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COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND  
(USCINCPAC)  
CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861

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
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Major General, USAF  
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# COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY



VOLUME I (U)

1984

*Prepared by the Command History Division  
Office of the Joint Secretary  
Headquarters USCINCPAC*

CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-5025  
1985

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## FOREWORD

(U) One only needs to study a map or a globe to see the importance of the United States Pacific Command's area of responsibility. Encompassing 100 million square miles of the world--50 percent of the entire earth's surface and 70 percent of the world's ocean area--the Command supports the economic, political, and military interests of the United States, as well as the interests of America's friends and allies in the region. Stability in the Asia/Pacific theater is fundamental to the security and freedom of not only the United States, but the entire free world.

(U) Over the last year I have traveled extensively throughout the theater. In the process I had the opportunity to visit with many civilian and military leaders from the region's nations and island-states. I am convinced that the cohesion of policy and coincidence of view among these people is stronger than ever. Indeed, the outlook for the future in this important area of the world is one of hope and optimism.

(U) This belief is clearly reflected in the area's tremendous economic advances. In 1984, United States trade with Asian and Pacific nations totaled approximately 174 billion dollars. This was up from 137 billion in 1983, an increase of 27 percent. Our Asian/Pacific commerce now represents 32 percent of all our foreign dealings, a higher percentage than any other area of the world, and is clearly indicative of greater things to come in the Asian marketplace. This economic progress is directly attributable to the drive and initiative of our Asian, Pacific, and Indian Ocean neighbors.

(U) Politically, I have seen vast improvements in our relationships with Japan, Korea, China, and numerous other nations in the region. Closer ties between the United States and the small Pacific island-nations have been possible because we share an interest in preserving the values and traditions of freedom around the globe. Although day-to-day differences of opinion crop up, the long-term political climate has been healthy and full of promise for the United States and its allies in the Asian/Pacific theater.

(U) Our greatest challenge to maintaining peace and prosperity remains the Soviet Union. Unable to foster valuable economic and political ties in the area, Moscow continues to build its military might. During the past year the Soviets have continued to increase their inventory of weapons--upgrading their forces with technologically improved aircraft, ships, and ground support equipment. The Soviets recognize that in the past they have neglected their "east flank," and they are now focusing more of their attention on their Far East forces.


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(U) The Kremlin is also not content to remain fixed on its own soil. Moscow continues to project its power throughout Southeast Asia and the South Pacific island region. The Soviets' sustained, unprecedented buildup at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam is continuing at a rapid pace. There are currently about twenty BEAR and BADGER aircraft and about a dozen MIG-23/FLOGGER interceptors at the air facility which has the capacity to support a great many more. Cam Ranh also serves as a warm water port for 20-30 Soviet ships and submarines operating in the South China Sea. Effectively, the USSR has extended its front approximately 2,200 miles south of Vladivostok and now has a staging base capable of interdicting sea lines of communication from the Philippine Sea to the Malacca Strait.

(U) The United States and our Pacific friends are not sitting idly by as the Soviets continue to modernize their forces and extend their power. We are continuing to upgrade our forces with newer aircraft (F-15s, F-16s, and F-18s), newer ships and submarines (OHIO-class submarines and SPRUANCE-class destroyers), and other more-capable military equipment. The United States is also "not alone" in defense of this hemisphere. We have continued to foster excellent relationships with the various nations and countries in the Pacific, and participation in joint military exercises promotes interoperability and mutual support which ensure we are prepared for future contingencies. Together, America and its allies are committed to preventing the Soviets from expanding their influence across the theater.

(U) In sum, although there are always problem areas that we need to address, I believe a good deal of progress was made in 1984; I am optimistic additional advances will continue in the future. And, as I've noted before, USPACOM forces are made up of some of the finest men and women I've had the privilege of commanding--their tireless support and dedication to their individual Services, as well as to this Command, ensure our goals of preserving peace and stability throughout the Pacific are in good hands.

  
W. U. CROWE, JR.  
Admiral, U. S. Navy  
Commander in Chief

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## PREFACE

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff require the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters USCINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the U.S. Pacific Command from the viewpoint of the Commander in Chief. The report also preserves the history of the USPACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS, to the extent that the impact on the USPACOM of major decisions and directives of the JCS may be evaluated by JCS historians without detailed research into USPACOM records.

(U) This history describes USCINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities and his relationships with U.S. military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions, but does not cover the detailed activities of his component and subordinate unified commands, which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters.

(U) The 1972-1973 historical narrative of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was the terminal history of that organization. Annex B of the 1976 USCINCPAC history was the terminal history of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand. Annex E of the 1978 USCINCPAC history was the terminal history of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command. The designations of Annex A (MACV), Annex B (MACTHAI), and Annex E (TDC) are reserved to facilitate future research and reference. The histories of U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea will retain the designations of Annexes C and D, respectively. The annexes are included only for those copies retained at USCINCPAC or forwarded to the JCS. Further distribution of those histories is the prerogative of the subordinate unified commander.

(U) The 1984 history is published in three volumes, consecutively paginated, with the glossary and index for these volumes at the end of Volume III.

(U) On 11 October 1983 the title of the command changed from "Pacific Command (PACOM)" to "U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)." The title of the commander changed from "CINCPAC" to "USCINCPAC." Since 1983, in the interest of consistency, the terms USCINCPAC and USPACOM have been used throughout the narrative. Footnotes reflect the appropriate title at the time.

(U) A further note about documentation: message traffic footnoted in this history other than General Service (GENSER) is followed by the abbreviations (BOM) or (EX) as appropriate. BOM is the acronym for "by other means" and EX is used to denote "special category-exclusive" messages.

(U) Chapters I and III were prepared by the undersigned, assisted by Shirley A. Streck, who also compiled the glossary. Tony Koura wrote Chapters

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II, IV, VII, and IX. Eileen O. Behana wrote Chapters V, VI, VIII, X, and XI, and supervised the physical layout of the product. The index was a joint effort.

(U) The Navy Publications and Printing Service Detachment Office, Pearl Harbor, printed and bound the volumes.

*Pauline Tallman*

PAULINE TALLMAN  
Command Historian

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\* Individual entries are unclassified. See Letter of Promulgation.

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## CHAPTER I

### THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND

#### SECTION I--THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

(U) The numerical strength of the U.S. Pacific Command was substantially the same as it had been a year earlier. There were some minor fluctuations in Service strengths and force dispositions, but the force picture was statistically unchanged. As discussed throughout this history, however, there was a great deal of change in many aspects of the command, with improvements in virtually every area of endeavor. In his foreword to this history, Admiral Crowe described the men and women of the U.S. Pacific Command as some of the finest he'd had the privilege of commanding.<sup>1</sup>

(U) A comparison of military strength by Service follows:<sup>1</sup>

	<u>1 January 1984</u>	<u>31 December 1984</u>
Army	47,507	51,587
Navy	180,442	177,570
Marine Corps	78,552	75,345
Air Force	44,537	45,548
Total	<u>351,038</u>	<u>350,050</u>

(U) Major areas of concentration of military personnel in 1984 are shown in the following table:

	<u>1 January 1984</u>	<u>31 December 1984</u>
Guam	9,045	9,036
Hawaii	56,649	57,512
Japan	48,496	45,646
Korea	38,882	40,462
Philippines	15,123	14,910


(U) The following charts and tables show U.S. Pacific Command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of those forces throughout the USPACOM. The information on these charts was current as of 31 December 1984, unless otherwise indicated. The chart showing the USCINCPAC staff organization is on the inside of the back cover of Volume III.

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1. U.S. Pacific Command Digest, Ser S122, 15 Feb 85 (S/NF), DECL OADR.


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# THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (U)



SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (S/NF), P. 3, DECL OADR.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN US PACOM



SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (SAFE), P. 4, DEEL OADR.

COMMAND ORGANIZATION (U)

- 1. (U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (USCINCPAC):
  - a. (C) USCINCPAC is the commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. The mission of USCINCPAC, in broad terms, is as follows: To establish the security of the USFACOM and defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean; to support and advance the security of the interests of the United States and discharge United States military responsibilities in the Pacific; Far East, South and Southeast Asia, and Indian Ocean; to prepare plans, conduct operations, and coordinate activities of the forces of the USFACOM in consonance with directives of higher authority. His general geographic area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is the Pacific Ocean west of 82 degrees west longitude, the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean west of 95 degrees west longitude and east of 100 degrees east longitude, the Indian Ocean east of 17 degrees east longitude (including the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf of Aden), Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China, the countries of Southeast Asia and the southern Asian landmass to the western border of India, and Madagascar and the other islands in all assigned water areas, including the Alaskan Islands (excluding air defense) but excluding the Alexander Archipelago, Kodiak, Nurikak, and Little Diomedes Islands.
  - b. (U) USCINCPAC exercises operational command of JCS-assigned or attached forces through the USFACOM Service component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces (when established).
  - c. (U) USCINCPAC exercises military command over military agencies, offices, organizations, and commands which administer security assistance programs within the USFACOM area and coordinates activities within the USFACOM area through established coordinating authorities who are designated United States Defense Representatives (USDRs) or USCINCPAC Representatives (USCRPACREPs).
  - d. (U) USCINCPAC is accredited as the U.S. military advisor or representative to the following organizations:
    - (1) (U) ANZUS Council: U.S. Military Representative.
    - (2) (U) Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board: U.S. Military Representative and Co-Chairman.
    - (3) (U) U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee: Member and Principal Advisor on Military Defense Matters to the Chairman of the U.S. Representative.
    - (4) (U) ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting: Delegates.
    - (5) (U) ROK-U.S. Military Committee, Plenary Session: Member.
- 2. (U) USFACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS:
  - a. (U) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT).
  - b. (U) Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF).
  - c. (U) Commander, U.S. Army Western Command (CIBWESTCOM) (area geographical areas of Japan and Korea).
  - d. (U) The USFACOM Service component commanders are responsible for accomplishing such operational activities and tasks as may be assigned by USCINCPAC. The USFACOM Service component commands consist of the respective component commanders and all those institutions, units, detachments, organizations, or institutions under their military command which have been assigned to USCINCPAC's operational command. Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or institutions may operate directly under the USFACOM Service component commander's authority and should contribute to the mission of USCINCPAC as appropriate.
  - e. (U) The USFACOM Service component commanders' responsibilities for the Security Assistance Programs are prescribed in the current version of DOD 5165.38 (Security Assistance Management Manual) and USCINCPAC Instruction 4900.8.
- 3. (U) COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS:
  - a. (U) U.S. Forces, Korea (USFKA), commanded by Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA); Seoul, Korea.
  - b. (U) U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan (COMUSJAPAN); Yokota Air Base, Japan.

- 4. (U) REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (USCINCPACREPs): General-ly USCINCPACREPs are established in certain areas where no subordinate unified command has been established and where significant forces of two or more Services are stationed.
  - a. (U) USCINCPACREP Aleutians is the Commanding Officer, Naval Station Adak (COMNAVSTAADAK), Adak, Alaska.
  - b. (U) USCINCPACREP Australia, American Embassy, Canberra, Australia.
  - c. (U) USCINCPACREP Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (USCINCPACREP GUAM/TTP) is the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas (COMNAVMARIANAS), Agaña, Guam.
  - d. (U) USCINCPACREP Indian Ocean (USCINCPACREP IO) is the Commander, Middle East Force (COMIDEAST-FOR).
  - e. (U) USCINCPACREP Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff/Strategic Air Command (USCINCPACREP JSTPS/SAC), Ohna Air Force Base, Nebraska.
  - f. (U) USCINCPACREP Kweipstein is the Commander, Kweipstein Missile Range, Marshall Islands.
  - g. (U) USCINCPACREP Philippines (USCINCPACREP PHIL) is the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines (COMUSNAVPHIL); Subic Bay, Philippines.
  - h. (U) USCINCPACREP Southwest Pacific (USCINCPACREPSWPAC); Suva, Fiji.
  - i. (U) USCINCPACREP Thailand (USCINCPACREP THAI) is the Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand (CHLUSMAGTHAI), Bangkok, Thailand.
- 5. (U) SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMANDERS: Security Assistance Programs, including Foreign Military Sales, are administered in the USFACOM under the following authorities:
  - a. (U) Chief, Joint United States Military Assistance Group, Korea ..... Seoul, Korea
  - b. (U) Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Philippines ..... Manila, Philippines
  - c. (U) Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand ..... Bangkok, Thailand
  - d. (U) Chief, Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan ..... Tokyo, Japan
  - e. (U) Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation, India ..... New Delhi, India
  - f. (U) Deputy Chief of Mission, Papua New Guinea, is responsible for the Security Assistance function for Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.
  - g. (U) U.S. Defense Attaches in Australia, Bangladesh, Burma, China, Indonesia, Madagascar (also for Comoros, Mauritius, and Seychelles Islands), Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Singapore (ARMA Singapore responsible for Brunei), and Sri Lanka (also for Maldives) are responsible for the Security Assistance function for their respective countries.
  - h. (U) USCINCPACREP Southwest Pacific performs Security Assistance functions as directed by USCINCPAC for Fiji and Tonga as an additional duty.
- 6. (U) USCINCPAC LIAISON OFFICERS to the:
  - a. (U) Commander, Alaskan Air Command (COMAAC), Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska.
  - b. (U) Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan, Yokota Air Base, Japan.
- 7. (U) SUBORDINATE USCINCPAC COMMANDS/CENTERS AND COMMANDERS:
  - a. (U) Commander, Special Operations Command Pacific (COMSOPAC), Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.
  - b. (U) Commander, Intelligence Center Pacific (COMICPAC), Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.
  - c. (U) Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCR-CRC), Barber's Point Naval Air Station, Hawaii.

Designated as U.S. Defense Representative. Also serving in that capacity are the U.S. Defense Attaches in India, Madagascar, and Sri Lanka and the U.S. Defense Liaison Office Representative in Hong Kong.







HQ USCINCPAC, COMPONENT, AND SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND STAFF PERSONNEL

STAFF	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MILITARY		U.S. CIVILIANS	FOREIGN NATIONAL CIVILIANS	TOTAL MIL/CIV
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
USCINCPAC <sup>1</sup>	105	46	99	126	23	9	115	58	342	239	108		689
CDRWESTCOM	94	57							94	57	234		385
CINCPACFLT			165	239					165	239	93		497
CINCPACAF <sup>2</sup>							344	314	344	314	249		907
CGFMFPAC					131	368			131	368	18		517
COMUSJAPAN	24	11	11	7	12	4	25	20	72	42	46	8	168
COMUSKOREA <sup>3</sup>	43	59	24	40	5	3	56	69	128	171	67	15	381
CINCUNC/CFC <sup>4</sup>	75	41	16	20	10	2	48	24	149	87	27	9	272
TOTAL	341	214	315	432	181	386	588	485	1,425	1,517	842	32	3,816

1. USCINCPAC - Airborne Command Post, Automatic Data Processing Systems Support Group, Headquarters Support Activity, Special Operations Command Pacific, and Intelligence Center Pacific not included.

2. CINCPACAF - Pacific Air Combat Operations Staff not included.

3. COMUSKOREA - Army Elements do not include Headquarters Eighth U.S. Army.

4. Even though the operations are not included in USCINCPAC, personnel increments for the United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command (UN/CFM) are included through USCINCPAC Headquarters J1 for JCS approval.

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (S/WF), P. 24, DECL OADR.

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**SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION PERSONNEL  
ASSIGNED STRENGTHS BY SERVICE & CIVILIAN CATEGORY**

STAFF	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MILITARY			U.S. CIVILIANS	DEPENDENTS		FOREIGN NATIONAL CIVILIANS
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	MIL		CIV		
FMSO AUSTRALIA				1				1		1	1		5		
DAO BANGLADESH	1	1							1	1			3		
DAO BURMA							1		1						1
ODC INDIA	1						1		2			1	3		4
OMADP INDONESIA	5	1	1	2	1		3	2	10	5		2	43	1	21
MDO JAPAN	2		2				2		6			6	8	4	5
JUSMAGKOREA	36	11	16	10	4	1	21	10	77	32		25	224	35	44
DAO MADAGASCAR			1						1				1		
SAO MALAYSIA	1	1	1						2	1		1	6		1
DAO NEPAL	1								1						
DAO NEW ZEALAND		1	1						1	1			3		
JUSMAGPHIL	12	3	4	3	1		4		22*	6		6	52	4	4
DAO SINGAPORE		1								1		1	1		
DAO SRI LANKA			1	2					1	2					1
JUSMAGTHAI	11	3	4	2	2		7	3	24	8		4	62		19
TOTAL	70	22	31	20	8	1	40	15	150	58		46	411	44	100

\* Includes one Coast Guard Officer.

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (SNF), P. 25, DECL OADR.

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MAJOR USPACOM BASES AND COMPLEXES

ARMY	NAVY/MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
<p>Schofield Barracks, Hawaii                      Fort Shafter, Hawaii                      Camp Zama, Japan                      Sagami Depot, Japan                      Camp Henry, Taegu, Korea                      Camp Howze, Tongduchon-ni, Korea                      Camp Howze, Kumchon, Korea                      Camp Humphreys, Pyong-taek, Korea                      Camp Red Cloud, Uijong-bu, Korea                      Camp Casey, Tongduchon-ni, Korea                      Camp Carroll, Waegwan, Korea                      Yongsan Garrison, Seoul, Korea</p>	<p>Naval Station Pearl Harbor/Naval Complex Pearl Harbor, Hawaii                      Naval Air Station Barbers Point, Hawaii                      Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe, Hawaii                      MCAS Iwakuni, Japan                      MCAS Futenma, Okinawa, Japan                      Marine Corps Base Camp Butler, Okinawa, Japan                      Yokosuka Naval Complex, Japan                      Naval Air Facility Atsugi, Japan                      Naval Complex Sasebo, Japan                      NAF Misawa, Japan                      Naval Fleet Activities Okinawa/NAF Kadena, Japan                      Naval Complex Chinhae, Korea                      Naval Complex Subic, Philippines                      NAS Cubi Point, Philippines                      Naval Complex Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory                      Naval Complex Apra Harbor, Guam                      NAS Agaña, Guam</p>	<p>Hickam AFB, Hawaii                      Andersen AFB, Guam                      Kadena AB, Okinawa, Japan                      Misawa AB, Japan                      Yokota AB, Japan                      Kunsan AB, Korea                      Osan AB, Korea                      Clark AB, Philippines</p>


SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (SAMP), P. 11, DECL OADR.

AVAILABLE FORCES (U)

ARMY	NAVY/MARINES OPCOM TO USCINCPAC	AIR FORCE
<p>1 Army Headquarters 1 Corps Headquarters 20 Infantry Division with 2 Mechanized Battalions 3 Infantry Battalions 2 Armor Battalions 4 Cavalry Squadron 4 Artillery Battalions 25th Infantry Division with 6 Infantry Battalions 1 Cavalry Squadron 3 Artillery Battalions 1 Air Defense Battalion Division and non-divisional Combat Support/ Combat Service Support Units Special Operations Forces 1 USA Special Forces Battalion (-)</p>	<p>2 Numbered Fleets 6 Attack Carriers** 1 Battleship 17 Cruisers** 75 Destroyers/Frigates** 4 Submarines (SSBNs) 43 Submarines (SSVs)** 3 Amphibious Ships** 6 Command Ships** 30 Fighter/Attack Squadrons*** 10 Electronic Surveillance Squadrons*** 8 Early Warning Squadrons*** 11 Carrier ASW Squadrons (HS + VS)*** 4 LAMPS Squadrons*** 12 Patrol Squadrons*** 1 EC-130J WLF Relay (TACAMO) Squadron 8 SOSUS Stations 1 Naval Special Warfare Group 2 Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) Headquarters 1 MAF 1st Marine Division with 9 Infantry Battalions 1 Tank Battalion 3 Artillery Battalions 1 Assault Amphibious Battalion (-) 1 Combat Engineer Battalion 1 Reconnaissance Battalion 3d Marine Aircraft Wing with 8 Fighter/Attack Squadrons</p>	<p>2 Numbered Air Force Headquarters 3 Air Division Headquarters 5 Tactical Fighter Wings* 1 Tactical Airlift Wing (MAC) 10 Tactical Fighter Squadrons 1 Aggressor Squadron 1 Tactical Air Support Squadron (-) 2 Tactical Air Support Squadrons (MAC) 1 Special Operations Squadron (MAC) 1 Airborne Command &amp; Control Squadron (TAC) 2 Tactical Airlift Squadrons (MAC) 1 Aeromedical Airlift Squadron (MAC) 1 Tactical Air Control Group 1 Tactical Control Squadron 1 Direct Air Support Squadron</p>
<p>Army Reserve Units 1 Infantry Battalion 1 Civil Affairs Group 1 Engineer Construction Battalion 1 Corps Headquarters (Augmentation) Army National Guard Units 1 Infantry Brigade U.S. Army Security Agency Units in the Pacific</p>	<p>1 Photo/Reconnaissance Squadron 1 Tank Squadron 1 Observation Squadron 9 Helicopter Squadrons 1 Light Aircraft Missile Battalion 1st Force Service Support Group 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade with 1 Infantry Battalion 1 Tank Battalion 1 Artillery Battalion III MAF 3d Marine Division with 6 Infantry Battalions 1 Tracked Vehicle Battalion (-) 2 Artillery Battalions 1 Combat Engineer Battalion (-) 1 Reconnaissance Battalion (-) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing with 4 Fighter/Attack Squadrons 1 Tank Squadron 4 Helicopter Squadrons 3d Force Service Support Group 1st Marine Brigade with 2 Infantry Battalions 1 Artillery Battalion 1 Engineer Group Support Group 1 Aircraft Group with 2 Fighter/Attack Squadrons 3 Helicopter Squadrons</p>	<p>* No aircraft assigned to one of the TFWs 2 Air Divisions (1 SAC, 1 MAC) 2 Strategic Wings (SAC) 1 Bomber Squadron (SAC) 1 Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (SAC) 3 Strategic Wing Squadrons (SAC) 1 Composite Group (HANG) 1 Tactical Fighter Squadron (HANG) 1 Test Group (AFSC) 3 Aerospace Rescue &amp; Recovery Squadrons (MAC) 1 Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (MAC) Air Weather Service Units (MAC) Air Force Communications Command Units (AFCC) Air Force Security Service Units (AFSS)</p>
<p>IN USFACOM BUT NOT OPCOM TO USCINCPAC</p> <p>3 Frigates (Naval Reserve Training) 9 Mine Warfare Ships (Naval Reserve Training) 3 Amphibious Warfare Ship (Naval Reserve Training) 4 Fleet OJ Specialty Readiness Squadrons Naval Oceanography Command Units</p>		


SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (S/NF), P. 10, DECL OADR.

# DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS (U)




SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (SWE), P. 14, DECL OADR.

# DEPLOYMENT OF WESTPAC NAVAL & MARINE AIR AND NAVAL SHIP UNITS (U)



SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (SNF), P. 17, DECL OADR.

# DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE UNITS (U)



SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (S/PF), P. 20, DECL OADR.

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**KEY USCINCPAC STAFF PERSONNEL**



**WILLIAM H. SCHNEIDER**  
LT GEN USA  
Deputy Commander in Chief  
and Chief of Staff



**WALTER C. SCHRUPP**  
MAJ GEN USAF  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
and Inspector General



**CARL TAYLOR, JR**  
CIV  
Political Adviser



**ROBERT A. MERIAN**  
FSO-1 CIV  
U.S. Information Agency Adviser



**ALFRED J. LYNN**  
GM-15 CIV  
Director for Public  
and Governmental Affairs



**MICHAEL T. STEELE**  
COL USAF  
Joint Secretary

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**COL CHARLES A. COBLE USAF**  
Director for Manpower and Personnel



**BGEN JIMMY C. PETTYJOHN USAF**  
Director for Intelligence



**MAJ GEN JOHN V. COX USMC**  
Director for Operations



**BGEN THOMAS R. OLSEN USAF**  
Deputy Director for Operations




**COMO J. WELDON KOENIG USN**  
Director for Logistics and Security Assistance



**COMO STEWART A. RING USN**  
Director for Plans and Policy



**BGEN BOBBY F. BRASHEARS USA**  
Deputy Director for Plans and Policy



**MAJ GEN VAUGHN O. LANG USA**  
Director for Command and Control and Communications Systems

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**ALBERT E. BOARDMAN**  
CAPT SC USN  
Comptroller



**EVERETTE D. STUMBAUGH**  
CAPT JAGC USN  
Staff Judge Advocate



**LOUIS H. ESKE**  
COMO MC USN  
Surgeon



**ARNOLD L. MABIE**  
COL USAF  
Commander, Intelligence  
Center Pacific



**F.X. O'CONNOR**  
GS-18 CIV  
Cryptologic Adviser



**WILLIAM C. SCHADE**  
GM-15 CIV  
Program Director, DOD Office of  
Assistant IG for Auditing, USPACOM  
Field Office

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AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS OF USCINCPAC STAFF DIRECTORATES

	1 October 1983				1 October 1984			
	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
USCINCPAC	7	8	0	15	6	16	0	22
Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff	3	2	1	6	3	2	1	6
Deputy Chief of Staff	2	0	1	3	2	0	1	3
Political and USIA Advisers	1	0	3	4	1	0	3	4
Inspector General	5	2	1	8	3	2	1	6
Public and Governmental Affairs Directorate	14	10	10	34	13	9	10	32
Joint Secretary	3	7	1	11	3	7	4	14
Manpower and Personnel Directorate	11	7	9	27	12	7	10	29
Intelligence Directorate	36	23	7	66	38	71	7	116
Operations Directorate	93	56	7	156	93	57	6	156
Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate	54	19	15	88	53	19	14	86
Plans and Policy Directorate	70	28	27	125	64	23	27	114
Command and Control and Communications Systems Directorate	38	19	14	71	40	17	14	71
Comptroller	3	1	7	11	3	1	7	11
Staff Judge Advocate	5	4	1	10	5	4	1	10
Surgeon	3	3	1	7	3	3	2	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>348</b>	<b>189</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>642</b>	<b>342</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>688</b>
Airborne Command Post	34	14	1	49	34	13	1	48
Headquarters Support Activity	11	103	14	128	8	45	11	64
Intelligence Center Pacific	131	184	76	391	131	187	80	398
Joint Casualty Resolution Center	3	9	2	14	4	12	2	18
Pacific Stars and Stripes	4	40	77	121	4	40	75	119
Special Operations Command Pacific					12	5	1	18
USPACOM ADP Systems Support Group	21	49	27	97	17	41	26	84
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>399</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>800</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>343</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>749</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>552</b>	<b>588</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>1,442</b>	<b>552</b>	<b>581</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>1,437</b>

SOURCE: J13. JCS 010143Z Dec 84 approved the USCINCPAC Headquarters JMP for FY 85. Other FY 85 JCS approval messages were 302335Z Nov 84, ABNCP; 010122Z Dec 84, HSA and USPACOM ADP Systems Group; 010124Z and 072014Z Dec 84, IPAC; 010143Z Dec 84, JCRC; 010115Z Nov 84, PS&S; and, 010118Z Dec 84, SOCPAC. See a discussion of the evolution of the Headquarters Support Activity elsewhere in this chapter.

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## SECTION II-THE USCINCPAC STAFF

### Key Personnel Changes in 1984

#### Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

(U) Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, served as Commander in Chief throughout 1984, and CAPT Joseph C. Strasser, USN, served throughout the year as his Executive Assistant.

#### Deputy Commander in Chief/Chief of Staff

(U) LT GEN William H. Schneider, USA, became Deputy Commander in Chief/Chief of Staff on 28 June, replacing LT GEN Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., USA, who departed on 26 June.

#### Political Adviser

(U) Mr. Carl Taylor, Jr., an FO-1, became Political Adviser (Career Minister (FE-OC) equivalent) to USCINCPAC on 14 December, replacing Mr. John J. Helble.

#### U.S. Information Agency Adviser

(U) Mr. Robert A. Merian, an FSO-1, replaced Mr. John A. Fredenburg as U.S. Information Agency Adviser on 19 January.

#### Director for Manpower and Personnel

(U) COL Charles A. Coble, USAF, became Director on 20 July, replacing COL Samuel H. Fields, USAF.

#### Director for Logistics and Security Assistance

(U) COMO J. Weldon Koenig, USN, became Director on 6 July, replacing COMO John R. Wilson, Jr., USN.

#### Director for Plans and Policy

(U) COMO Stewart A. Ring, USN, became Director on 23 July, replacing RADM Robert E. Kirksey, USN, who had departed on 7 June.

#### Comptroller

(U) CAPT Albert E. Boardman, SC, USN, became Comptroller on 16 August, replacing CAPT Malcolm C. Reeves, II, SC, USN, who departed on 13 August.

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### Staff Judge Advocate

(U) CAPT Everette D. Stumbaugh, JAGC, USN, became Staff Judge Advocate on 27 August, replacing CAPT Richard J. Grunawalt, JAGC, USN, who departed on 18 June.

### New USCINCPAC Emblem

(U) As noted in the 1983 history, on 11 October of that year the name of the command had changed from Pacific Command to U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and the title of the CINC had changed from Commander in Chief Pacific to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC).<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 21 November 1984 the Director for Manpower and Personnel announced that a new USCINCPAC emblem and crest had been designed. In addition to the title change, a new eagle design was applied and the USPACOM area of responsibility shown on the globe was redrawn to include the entire Pacific and Indian Oceans. Other minor design changes were incorporated. The new emblem is on the cover of this history.<sup>2</sup>

### Establishment of the Headquarters Support Activity

(U) As discussed in the 1983 Command History, the establishment of a Headquarters Support Activity under the direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff had been announced. Further study, including a review by the JCS Manpower Team that visited the headquarters in the autumn of 1983, modified somewhat the original plans.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 1 October 1984 the Headquarters Support Activity was actually established. The Commander, Headquarters Support Activity was dual-hatted. He also was Chief of the Headquarters Personnel Support and Administrative Division (J14) in the Manpower and Personnel Directorate. The Headquarters Personnel Division was already in place as J14, and became part of the Headquarters Support Activity. The Service elements and civilian personnel liaison kept their codes as J141 through J144. The Headquarters Support Division and the Administrative and Security Programs Division were transferred from the Joint Secretariat, with codes changing from J041 to J146 and from J042 to J147, respectively. The Philippine Military Academy instructor billet had been added to the USCINCPAC JMP in FY 83. In the FY 85 JMP he was designated as staff code J145. Other organizations that had originally been included in the HSA proposal remained where they had been in the USCINCPAC staff organization. These were the Flag Mess (J00's staff), the Defense

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, p. 23.
  2. J1/Memo/645 (U), 21 Nov 84, Subj: New USCINCPAC Emblem/Crest.
  3. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, p. 26.

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Special Security Communications Branch (J24), and the Command History Division (J044).<sup>1</sup>

### Operation Plans Division Established in Operations Directorate

(U) In 1980, with the enlargement of the Communications and Data Processing Directorate (J6) into what became the Command and Control and Communications Systems Directorate (C3S), most of the Technology, Requirements, and Evaluation Division (J34) of the Operations Directorate had also been incorporated into C3S, and other functions assigned elsewhere on the staff. The code J34 was not used again until 1984 when the new Operation Plans Division was formed.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Meanwhile, in 1983 a new concept was initiated by the JCS called the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPEs). This was designed as a single, integrated system to accomplish strategic planning, mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment. It was designed for use in peacetime deliberate planning, crisis action situations, and wartime execution. Initially JOPEs would integrate the Joint Operation Planning System and the Joint Deployment System. The JOPEs involved a total system approach to the planning and execution system of the future.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 4 September 1984 the Operation Plans Division (J34) was activated. Formed with on-staff manpower, J34 incorporated selected personnel and functions of both the Operations (J3) and Plans and Policy (J5) Directorates. The objective was to put more emphasis on plan execution and execution-related requirements and provide a baseline for JOPEs evolvement. The division was functionally aligned with the J3 in the Organization of the JCS to provide for better centralized management of execution planning and OPLAN execution.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The new division had four branches. The UNITREP/ADP Coordination Branch (J341) was drawn principally from the former J334, the Unit Status/Operational Reports Branch. The Conventional Plans Branch (J342) was formed with personnel from J52 and was assigned staff primary responsibility for the JCS-approved USCINCPAC OPLANs 5000, 5001, and 5027, review of the supporting plans, and maintenance and execution of the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data for those plans. The Contingency Plans Branch (originally

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1. USCINCPACNOTE 5400 (U), 7 Sep 84, Subj: USCINCPAC Headquarters Staff Realignment.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1980 (IS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 21-22.
  3. JCS 282104Z Feb 83 (U); J3/SSS/1073-85 (U), 5 Sep 85, Subj: Review of Draft USCINCPAC Command History for 1984.
  4. Ibid.; USCINCPACNOTE 5400 (U), 28 Aug 84, Subj: USCINCPAC Organization Change for the Operations Directorate (J3) and the Plans and Policy Directorate (J5).

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called the Operations Capabilities and Policy Branch) (J343) had responsibility for monitoring the development of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. It was formed primarily with personnel from the Plans, Capabilities and Ground Branch (J312), and also served as the J3 office responsible for the coordination and/or review of operational aspects of the other USCINCPAC OPLANS. In addition, it was responsible for monitoring unit readiness status of theater forces. The Plans ADP Support Branch (J344), which was the ADP Support Branch (J523) in J5, had primary staff responsibility for Volume III of the Joint Operation Planning System and also the Joint Deployment System. Certain administrative and joint manning augmentation billets were also realigned from J5 to J3. The assistant chief of the Command and Control Division, COL William F. Kelly, USA, became the first chief of the new division.

(U) The Plans and Policy Directorate retained responsibility for the USCINCPAC deliberate planning function, to include JOPS Volumes I and II. See the Operations chapter of this history for further details.<sup>1</sup>

### Admiral Crowe's Hats

(U) All of the CINCs of this command had been given numerous mementos during their assignments. Plaques, Korean "turtle boat" models, ceremonial swords, and similar military-related memorabilia had been received and displayed in the executive offices over the years. But Admiral Crowe collected hats, and the historian would be remiss if they were not reported.

(U) According to an article in a Honolulu newspaper, the collection began inauspiciously in Australia in 1976 when Admiral Crowe acquired a souvenir bush hat. "There's something about a bush hat," the Admiral is reported to have said. That was the beginning of what had become a formidable and ever-growing collection of all kinds of hats from all over the world. They numbered in the several hundreds.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The Admiral was famous for his hats by the time he became USCINCPAC, and his collection had flourished. As knowledge of it had grown, many of his hosts and visitors added to it. The collection display started in his office in a book case, spilled over his desk onto a table and a 20-foot window ledge. The hats filled a rack in his outer office, covered the far wall of his aide's office, and filled nine hall display cases to the brim, the newspaper account reported.

(U) The more than 500 hats represented over 30 countries on 7 continents, 2 kingdoms, 3 navies, and the New York Police Department. The hats included a Kiowa war bonnet, fezzes, a Chinese peasant hat, a cardinal's miter, a Superbowl helmet worn by an Oakland Raider, a circumcision hat worn only once by a

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1. Ibid.; J343 HistSum Sep 84 (U).

2. Honolulu Advertiser (U), 11 Sep 84, p. B-1.

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young Turk, and a bronze replica of a Corinthian helmet from 490 B.C. Also, an Igorot tribal hat from the Philippines, a Greek priest's hat, and hats of a Spanish bandit, a British Bobby, a Canadian Mountie, and a Royal Navy captain, circa 1800. More: hats from Senegal with beads, a shell headband from Micronesia, a purgee from Peshawar, a ghutra from Saudi Arabia, a papa-san's hat from the Republic of Korea. Still more: a Finnish admiral's hat, a Venetian gondolier's red ribboned straw boater, and a Gurkha's hat from Nepal. One special collectable: a hat from Yassar Arafat's headquarters, appropriated by U.S. Marines in Beirut on 19 October 1982.


(U) While there were enough baseball caps for three teams, there were only two college football helmets--from the schools of his undergraduate years, the University of Oklahoma and the Naval Academy. At the time of this writing, it was planned to give the collection to the University of Oklahoma when the Admiral, and his many hats, are retired. For the record, Admiral Crowe was size 7 1/8.<sup>1</sup>



Deputy Secretary of Defense William Howard Taft, IV, and some of the Admiral's hats in a 1985 photo.

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1. Ibid.



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SECTION III--COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

The United Nations Command in Korea

(C) In January North Korea proposed tripartite talks among North and South Korea and the United States for "peace and reunification" of the Korean Peninsula, as discussed in the Planning chapter of this history. There was interagency interest in the United Nations Command, the armistice agreement, and the Military Armistice Commission. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, therefore, had requested that the JCS explain some of the complex and unique arrangements in existence in Korea. In addition to the multilateral agencies there were the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and COMUSKOREA, USCINCPAC's subordinate unified command. A first draft defining these relationships had been proposed by the JCS on 3 February.<sup>1</sup>

(U) After considerable review and refinement the message was finally dispatched on 24 July. Its addressees included the National Security Council, the State and Defense Departments, the Embassies in Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York, as well as the USPACOM military commands. It was to provide information to agencies that were involved with Korean issues but that might not be entirely familiar with the unique international and bilateral aspects of the commands in Korea. The information was based on existing documents and was not intended to establish or change existing policy. The paragraphs that follow are taken from this message to bring readers of this history up to date on these arrangements.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The 1953 ROK-United States Mutual Defense Treaty was the basis for the bilateral security relationship. The United States also had obligations based on 1950 U.N. Security Council resolutions and the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. In 1978, the bilateral ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command had been established.

(U) The senior U.S. military officer assigned to Korea represented the Chairman, U.S. JCS as a member of the ROK-U.S. Military Committee, Permanent Session, and served as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC); Commander in Chief, ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CINCCFC); Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA); the Ground Component Commander of the UNC, CFC, and U.S. Forces Korea; and as Commander of the Eighth U.S. Army.

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1. JCS 031451Z Feb 84 (C), DECL OADR and 090117Z Feb 84 (U). The original title of the message had been "Command Relations in Korea," which was a much broader subject than this particular review; the title was changed to "The United Nations Command in Korea." The USCINCPAC staff participated in its preparation.
  2. JCS 241551Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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(U) The UNC had been established by the United States in July 1950 in response to U.N. Security Council resolutions that called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean armed forces to the 38th Parallel and recommended U.N. members furnish assistance to the ROK necessary to repel the armed attack by North Korea [which had begun on 25 June 1950] and restore peace and security to the area. The resolutions recommended that those forces be made available to a "unified command under the United States" and authorized the UNC to fly the U.N. flag.

(U) Unlike other U.N. peacekeeping forces, the UNC was neither funded nor directed by the United Nations, although CINCUNC made periodic reports to the U.N. [Security Council]. The UNC was to continue in existence until and unless the U.N. Security Council (in which the United States had a veto) disbanded it. If North Korea attacked, no additional U.N. approval was required for the UNC to conduct combat operations to repel the aggressor.

(U) The U.S. JCS were the channel of communication with CINCUNC. Directives from the U.S. Government, acting pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolutions, to CINCUNC were transmitted by the Secretary of Defense through the JCS, keeping USCINCPAC informed. In return, CINCUNC communicated directly with the U.S. JCS, concurrently keeping USCINCPAC informed.

(U) During the Korean War the United States and 15 other U.N. nations provided combat forces to the UNC. In addition, the ROK placed its forces under the Operational Control (OPCON) of CINCUNC.

(U) On 27 July 1953 CINCUNC signed the Armistice Agreement. This was an agreement between the military commanders of the forces engaged. No nation was a signatory. Marshal Kim Il-sung signed as Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA); Peng Teh-hua signed as Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV); and General Mark W. Clark, USA, signed as CINCUNC.

(U) The supervisory agency was the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), which consisted of 10 members, 5 from each side, who met at the call of either side to supervise implementation of the agreement and settle armistice violations through negotiations. The KPA/CPV MAC consisted of four North Koreans and one Chinese. The UNC component consisted of a U.S. rear admiral or major general, a ROK major general, a ROK brigadier general, a British brigadier, and a colonel from one of the other countries providing a liaison officer to the UNC (Australia, Canada, the Philippines, or Thailand).

(U) CINCUNC, as the sole signatory for the UNC side, had exclusive responsibility and authority for the maintenance of the armistice, which included the responsibility to insure compliance with the armistice by the UNC side. To that end, he had authority to establish and promulgate armistice-related directives, procedures, and rules of engagement for all military

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forces operating on the territory, in the airspace, or in the contiguous waters of the ROK in order to maintain and enforce the terms of the armistice agreement.

(U) The armistice also established a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission consisting of Swiss, Swedes, Poles, and Czechs to supervise armistice implementation outside the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

(U) Upon activation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command on 7 November 1978, OPCON of ROK combat forces was transferred from CINCUNC to CINCCFC, with CINCUNC retaining exclusive responsibility for maintenance of the armistice and all third country (non ROK or U.S.) UNC forces. CINCUNC also retained authority over the CINCCFC for armistice affairs to include the use of CFC forces, if necessary, to maintain the armistice. Although military planning and operations for the defense of the Republic of Korea had come to center on the CFC, the UNC still played an important role. The UNC, for example, provided the framework for third country forces' participation in the event of renewed hostilities: Australia, Canada, New Zealand (liaison officer located in Japan), the Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom had liaison officers to the UNC. The Philippines, Thailand, and the U.K. maintained UNC troop contingents totalling one platoon for ceremonial and security purposes. The UNC was a manifestation of third country support of the ROK.

~~(C)~~ The "Agreement Regarding the Status of United Nations Forces in Japan" and related notes provided for continuing third country UNC base and transit rights at seven U.S. bases in Japan that were also designated as UNC bases. UNC (Rear) Headquarters was retained in Japan to coordinate administrative and logistic support from those bases to UNC forces in Korea. Those UNC base and transit rights applied at the present time and in the event of renewed hostilities and were contingent upon operations being conducted under the U.N. flag.

(U) The armistice remained in effect, and the MAC was the only reliable channel of communication with North Korea. It provided a means to defuse potentially explosive incidents. Although the "supervisory" function of the Neutral Nations had become defunct, both sides believed that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission still played a useful role as a stabilizing influence at Panmunjom and as an unofficial channel of communication.

(U) Over the years, CINCUNC had made proposals to reduce tensions between the two sides and to enhance the effectiveness of the MAC. Initiatives had included proposals for redemilitarization of the DMZ, use of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to investigate armistice violations in the DMZ, and cross-notification of major military exercises. North Koreans had not accepted any of those proposals and were unlikely to do so unless the proposals also supported their objectives. Nonetheless, UNC proposals were

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worthwhile since they demonstrated good faith, kept the MAC machinery operating, and may have had some effect on North Korea, even though it had failed to respond publicly.

(U) The long-standing UNC position was that political discussions were outside the purview of the MAC. Any positive step to reduce tensions in Korea and promote North-South dialogue had been welcomed, however. MAC facilities had in the past been made available for use by North and South negotiators. However, because of the tensions inherent in the area, the Joint Security Area would not be a suitable location for international negotiations to resolve the Korean problem. No "tension reducing" proposal should be initiated that would undercut the effectiveness of ROK/U.S. capability to deter or repel external aggression in Korea or risk disrupting the MAC machinery.

(U) The ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command was a bilateral command established by the two governments in 1978 to more accurately reflect the growing ROK-U.S. military partnership. CINCCFC had peacetime operational control of most ROK combat forces, and of USAF air defense alert aircraft in the ROK (normally three F-15s), less the time they were committed to the protection of peacetime aerial reconnaissance assets. In wartime the CINCCFC received operational control of additional ROK and U.S. forces provided by the two countries.

(U) Strategic direction and operational guidance were provided to CINCCFC by both the U.S. and ROK National Command and Military Authorities (NCMA), a term unique to the ROK-U.S. relationship, through the ROK/U.S. Military Committee.

(U) The U.S. National Command and Military Authority communicated with the Military Committee through the senior U.S. military officer assigned to Korea, who represented the Chairman of the U.S. JCS. Neither the United States nor the ROK could unilaterally direct the actions of CINCCFC.

(U) U.S. Forces Korea was a subordinate unified command under USCINCPAC and was a U.S.-only organization.

(U) The JCS message also listed as references the seven documents, agreements, resolutions, etc., that had created these arrangements.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Ibid.

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## SECTION IV--U.S. FORCES AND BASES OVERSEAS

(U) Traditionally in these histories this section has outlined major actions that made for change in the status of U.S. forces or bases overseas. While there was evolutionary change, there were no major basing proposals, changes, or negotiations on-going in 1984 with the exception of the material that follows. The future status of our bases in the Philippines, however, remained a matter of continuing concern.

### Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

(U) The USCINCPAC Command History for 1968 first addressed the status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) and possible land use requirements there. (Micronesia had been placed in U.S. trusteeship by the United Nations following World War II.) Over the years the island groups had fragmented into four political elements: the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas; the Republic of the Marshall Islands; the Republic of Palau; and the Federated States of Micronesia, which consisted of Kosrae, Yap, Truk, and Pohnpei. The developments over the years in regard to the state of relationships between those island groups and the United States have been addressed in considerable detail in USCINCPAC Histories. The 1984 status of the various island groupings is discussed in the material that follows.<sup>1</sup>

### Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas

(U) The Covenant to establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), which had become effective on 9 January 1979, required the CNMI to lease certain areas for U.S. defense purposes. These areas included 17,800 acres of land on Tinian and the adjacent waters; 177 acres at Tanapag Harbor on Saipan Island; and all of Farallon de Medinilla Island, including the waters immediately adjacent. The lease was to run for 50 years with an option for an additional 50.<sup>2</sup>

(U) A lease agreement executed 6 January 1983 between the Marianas Public Land Corporation, the Commonwealth Ports Authority, and the CNMI, as lessors, and the United States as lessee, provided that the lessors would expeditiously take action to acquire proper title so that the use by the United States of the land in question would be guaranteed. Under a deferred payment agreement, \$26,434,200 was paid to the lessors upon execution of the agreement, and \$6,565,800 was placed in a joint account, to be released to the lessors as

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, p. 66.
  2. J73/Memo/C280 (C), 15 Jun 84, Subj: Northern Mariana Islands (U), DECL OADR; J5614 Point Paper (S), 4 Oct 84, Subj: Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) Issues (U), DECL 4 Oct 90.

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property within each of the three zones within the lease area was fully acquired. All costs of acquisition of those parcels were to be borne by the lessors with the exception of possible relocation costs.

(U) Some landowners sought to require increased payments for the land by the Marianas Public Land Corporation and instituted a lawsuit that resulted in a court enjoining the use of the \$26+ million to acquire the land. The CNMI had 18 months from the date of the original lease agreement to acquire title, and it became clear, because of the lawsuit, that this would not be done. On 5 July 1984, therefore, an amendment to the lease and deferred payment agreements was executed in which the United States agreed to release the \$6+ million in the joint account on condition that the CNMI would within 60 days either provide acceptable evidence of unencumbered title to all land within the Tinian lease area or institute eminent domain proceedings to acquire title to all unacquired parcels.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The CNMI had firm commitments from all landowners within the Tinian lease area, except 12, to acquire their land either through exchange or direct purchase. By 19 September, condemnation proceedings against the 12 parcels had been initiated by the CNMI Attorney General.

(U) All of the funds (\$33 million) appropriated for the acquisition of military lease areas in the CNMI had been obligated. Additional funding for relocation assistance was being sought by the Navy's Pacific Facilities Engineering Command.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ Military activity, principally exercise activity, was limited in scope and restricted to Tinian and Farallon de Medinilla, with the latter a 206-acre, low flat island of solid rock approximately 190 miles north of Guam. It provided the only location between Hawaii and the Philippines and Okinawa where live weapons could be utilized frequently without extensive and complex pre-event coordination. It was devoid of all but scrub vegetation, and had been certified for laser-directed live firing. Some of the exercise series conducted in the CNMI included KENNEL BEAR, QUICK LOOK, ELLIPSE CHARLIE, THERMAL GALE, SPECWAREX, and COPE ROAD, plus live firing by carrier aircraft and B-52s.<sup>3</sup>

#### Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands

(U) Also as discussed in the 1983 history, "Compacts of Free Association" had been completed in 1983 with both the Marshall Islands and the Federated

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1. Ibid.; COMNAVMARIANAS GUAM 050554Z Jul 84 (U).
  2. J5614 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 4 Oct 84, Subj: Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) Issues (U), DECL 4 Oct 90; PACNAVFACENCOM Pearl Harbor 150406Z Sep 84 (U).
  3. Ibid.

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States of Micronesia, which were Yap, Pohnpei, Truk, and Kosrae. The compacts had no precedent in U.S. history. After being ratified by plebiscites in each group of islands, both houses of the U.S. Congress would have to approve the arrangements before the United States could approach the United Nations about ending the trusteeship.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 31 March 1984, after executive review, the President of the United States signed and forwarded to the U.S. Congress the Compacts for the two entities. The Secretary of State advised that the Administration would address the issue of securing expeditious passage. The final Executive Branch review process, while lengthy, had been comprehensive and was intended to provide a very solid base of support for the product of those negotiations. Congress, however, did not complete its review in 1984.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 11 April 1984 Pravda repeated a theme that had surfaced at the United Nations the year before, a critical review of U.S. Micronesian policy. The article concluded that the United States had militarized the Pacific Islands rather than prepare them for independence. Commenting on the "Commonwealth" and "Free Association" compacts with various parts of the TTPI, the Soviet writer labeled the agreements as "unlawful instruments contradicting the spirit and letter of the UN charter." It was expected that the Soviet criticism of U.S. and Micronesian plans for dissolution of the TTPI trusteeship would gain in intensity as the process moved forward in the islands and in the U.S. Congress.<sup>3</sup>

(U) In Washington, meanwhile, Ambassador Fred M. Zeder, the President's Personal Representative in the Status Negotiations, and also Senator James McClure (R.-ID), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, proposed that in the post-trusteeship era a new federal agency be created to be responsible for relations with the Micronesian states. The proposal envisioned an agency headed by a political appointee with the title of "Ambassador" who would report directly to the head of the National Security Council. The office would be made up of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Interior, and Commerce. Ambassador Zeder believed this would eliminate the on-going battle between the State and Interior Departments for control; Senator McClure favored it as it was similar to his plan for federal administration of all U.S. territories.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1982 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, p. 42; USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 70-72.
  2. SECSTATE 093922/310202Z Mar 84 (U) and 099038/050048Z Apr 84 (U).
  3. AMEMB MOSCOW 04491/111547Z Apr 84 (C), E.O. 12356: N/A.
  4. J5614 Point Paper (U), 20 Apr 84, Subj: Proposed US Government Agency to Handle Future Relations with Micronesian States within the Compact of Free Association.

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(C) The JCS asked Admiral Crowe for his comments and the Admiral replied on 3 August. [From August 1971 to September 1973 Admiral Crowe had served as Director of the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations in the Department of the Interior and also as Deputy to the President's Personal Representative for those negotiations.] He noted that the status of free association was unique, and no existing federal agency was designed to handle all aspects of the relationship. Interagency cooperation was a "must." While the formation of a separate agency would appear on the surface to be advantageous, there were several concerns that came to mind. Placing the "freely associated states" under a separate agency might give them a status that would not be to their, or our, advantage. As with all newly emerging nations, they were very sensitive about their independence. They wanted to be considered as equals and treated similarly to other nations. To place them under the administration of an agency along with U.S. territories and the insular possessions, instead of the State Department, would send a clear message to them, to other nations, and to the United Nations that the United States still considered them to be territories under a new name.<sup>1</sup>

(C) That perception by other nations could limit their acceptance, hinder the establishment of diplomatic relations, and would open the United States to continued charges of colonialism by the USSR and Third World nations. Admiral Crowe said he believed that the State Department must have the lead and assume overall responsibility for the management of our future relations with the "freely associated states."<sup>2</sup>

(C) The Chairman of the JCS thanked the Admiral for his thoughts and said the JCS response to the State Department on post-Compact management had essentially adopted the Admiral's position that the State Department assume overall management.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Also in August, as the Congressional deliberations on their approval of the compacts and termination of the trusteeship continued, Admiral Crowe provided his thoughts to the Chairman of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Public Land and National Parks, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Representative John Seiberling (D.-OH). The Admiral had been invited to testify before the subcommittee, but a long-scheduled trip to Thailand made it necessary for him to send his written comments. The Admiral noted that Congressman Seiberling had specifically requested comments on the compatibility of the compact with U.S. national security interests in the Pacific. "As you know, I am a strong supporter of the compact since I believe

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1. JCS 311539Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 030454Z Aug 84 (C), DECL 31 Dec 90.
  2. Ibid.
  3. JCS 221610Z Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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it contributes directly to the defense needs of both the Micronesian states and the United States."<sup>1</sup>

(U) After outlining his own missions in the USPACOM, the Admiral said the security aspects of the compact supported and facilitated the accomplishment of those missions. The defense responsibility and corresponding authority given to the U.S. Government by the compact, coupled with the provision that the freely associated states would refrain from any action that the United States determined to be inconsistent with defense and security requirements, provided the latitude needed to support our security interests. Additionally, the provision for strategic denial insured that Micronesia would be foreclosed to the military forces of third nations, unless access was specifically agreed to by the United States. That greatly impeded the USSR or another nation in any attempt to expand its sphere of influence. At the same time, the compact guaranteed our military forces unrestricted movement within Micronesia.

(U) We placed great importance on access to facilities utilized by our forward deployed forces in the Western Pacific, he continued. Despite our hopes for stability, however, the possibility always existed that a host government would ask us to cease our use of bases in its territory. He cited the Philippines. While our facilities there had not yet been affected by the instability in that country, "we have no guarantee that this good fortune will endure indefinitely." A positive defense relationship with the "freely associated states" should enable the United States to maintain a strong, although reduced, presence in the Western Pacific should our current facilities arrangements begin to erode.

(U) Admiral Crowe said that he had for some time believed that the termination of our trusteeship was overdue. From his vantage point as USCINCPAC, he said he was even more convinced of the desirability, even necessity, of trusteeship termination. The ability to deal with the respective entities on a bilateral basis, rather than from a position in which the United Nations Trusteeship Council had an oversight role, was highly preferable from our national security perspective. There were of course, he said, a range of other political, economic, and moral factors that also argued for early termination. He concluded that he believed the compact's defense arrangements were highly compatible with and supportive of our national security interests in the Pacific. "I strongly recommend its endorsement by your subcommittee and subsequent expeditious approval of this important piece of legislation."<sup>2</sup>

(U) As noted above, the whole matter remained under Congressional study throughout the rest of the year with no final action taken.

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1. USCINCPAC 040520Z Aug 84 (U).

2. Ibid.

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Palau

(U) Palau matters turned out to be the most complex of the Micronesian entities in 1984, just as they had been the year before. The two major subjects of interest were repeated in 1984. First was the determination of U.S. military requirements for land and access, and second was the political process in Palau in which they were voting regarding their future status.<sup>1</sup>

~~(C)~~ In 1983 USCINCPAC had again outlined that U.S. long-term security interests in Micronesia stemmed from our world-wide strategic imperatives. The area was significant militarily because of its strategic location relative to Asia and the Pacific basin. The area had to be denied to potential adversaries and the United States must continue to develop flexible basing options within the region that would insure U.S. military requirements and also provide a hedge against the loss or erosion of existing U.S. bases in East Asia, especially the Philippines.

(U) Early in 1983 the people of Palau had voted to accept the Compact of Free Association by a simple majority, as required by their law. An internal referendum failed to get sufficient votes to change the Palau constitutional ban on radiological, chemical, and biological materials (the vote was 52.9 percent in favor, but the requirement was for 75 percent). The Palau Supreme Court ruled the two issues inseparable, and new negotiations began.<sup>2</sup>

~~(C)~~ Nothing was resolved in 1984, either. The following discussion outlines some of the year's events, especially as they related to USCINCPAC. In connection with the 40th anniversary commemorative ceremony of the battle of Peleliu in World War II, Admiral Crowe visited Palau on 8 and 9 February. He called on President Remeliek, the vice president, the senate president, and other Palau officials. The calls were essentially of a courtesy nature. USCINCPAC made no effort to suggest that the United States believed a solution to the Palauan status issue was urgently required. Rather, it was noted that the Administration in Washington intended to pursue Congressional action on the other parts of the Trust Territory during 1984. It was also suggested that the Palauans keep in mind the range and breadth of Soviet activity in the Pacific when considering their future status options.<sup>3</sup>

~~(C)~~ In general, while some leaders had evidenced no special affection for the United States, others clearly did reflect a reservoir of good will that was not expected to dissipate easily. USCINCPAC concluded that it was quite unlikely within the Palauan consensus system that the extremists could ram through a scheme that would completely sever U.S. ties. Perhaps even more to

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 72-75.
  2. Ibid.
  3. USCINCPAC 170545Z Feb 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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the point, in the Palau context, it seemed most unlikely that the extremists could successfully promote a scheme that would reject U.S. fiscal assistance. It appeared that our best course should be one of hanging tough in our negotiations, perhaps demonstrating some, but not too much, flexibility regarding the on-going offer.<sup>1</sup>

(C) On 2 April Palauan negotiator Lazarus Salii called on Admiral Crowe following a meeting a week earlier with Ambassador Fred M. Zeder, the President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations. He was seeking the Admiral's support for the most recent Palauan compact proposal. The proposal included a June referendum with a question on U.S. defense responsibilities and rights to introduce "means and substances" in the "event of attack or threat of attack." It was expected that this should resolve the constitution's nuclear issue if the requirement was laid down for a 75 percent approval on the question. While not completely confident the question would obtain that margin, Salii claimed most of the tribal chieftains and Palauan leaders would support the proposition. He believed it was imperative that a compact resolution be reached in 1984, before pro-independence forces obtained more ground. He urged rapid consideration of this proposition so the June referendum could be held, "before the Japanese and other anti-U.S. outsiders could get organized in opposition."<sup>2</sup>

(C) When Admiral Crowe advised the State and Defense Departments and the JCS about this meeting, he noted that Salii's proposal substantially reduced the U.S. financial obligation, compared to their December 1983 proposal, but costs still appeared about twice the initial U.S. compact offer. Salii claimed that, aside from reductions in the current account operations and capital accounts, the major funding difference in the latest proposal was a shift of capital account money to operations. "We want the cash, not projects," he said.

(C) In response to Admiral Crowe's query on who would decide whether a "threat of attack" existed, Salii stated that publicly it would be necessary for Palau to maintain that the decision would be joint. Privately, however, as a practical matter only the United States had the wherewithal to make such a judgement, and Palau would abide by the U.S. decision.

(C) Admiral Crowe noted that two issues, aside from the financial implications, gave him pause. He doubted that the terminology of the referendum proposition, even if it obtained the 75 percent approval, could withstand the "inevitable court challenge." Secondly, while the text of the land proposal appeared to be an improvement, it would be essential to have port and airport sites designated before the compact took effect.

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1. Ibid.

2. USCINCPAC 042346Z Apr 84 (C), DECL 4 Apr 90.

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(C) USCINCPAC next discussed an entirely different concept for resolution of the trusteeship. It was not a proposal that the Palauans themselves had discussed, but it was submitted for Washington's consideration as might be appropriate. The idea would be that Palau would opt for commonwealth status for a period of 15 years, during which time it would decide what status should follow. Under this approach the trusteeship could be terminated, the constitutional issue would be deferred, U.S. defense concerns would be alleviated, and Palau would get its money. The latter would be "in the same ballpark" as the Northern Marianas. Salii was attracted to this concept (primarily as a way out of Palau's immediate financial difficulties) but made it clear that any tabling of the idea would have to come from the U.S. side. It was evident throughout the discussion that the impetus for early settlement, as far as the Palauans was concerned, was money. Palau was in desperate financial straits. It was an election year in Palau as well as in the United States, and increasing taxes or cutting budgets, Admiral Crowe said, "was no more palatable for prospective candidates in Palau than anywhere else."<sup>1</sup>

(C) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs thanked USCINCPAC for his message, which had arrived just in time for a Micronesian Interagency Working Group meeting. It was agreed that the U.S. response to the latest Palauan status proposal would take the form of comments in a letter from Ambassador Zeder to Ambassador Salii, rather than another U.S. draft. They were interested to note Salii's attraction to the concept of a 15-year commonwealth status (which they understood to be Salii's initiative), and would actively follow up the idea with other Executive Branch agencies concerned.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Following a 28 April meeting with Ambassador Zeder, Admiral Crowe provided his thoughts in a personal message to the Washington principals. The Admiral and the Ambassador had discussed an earlier meeting in which Palau representatives had indicated to Ambassador Zeder their willingness to make certain concessions and the possibility of another plebiscite in Palau. The Admiral said he had "some background" in the matter and wanted to provide his thoughts. [Admiral Crowe, as noted above, had served as Director of the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations in the Department of the Interior and also as Deputy to the President's Personal Representative for those negotiations from August 1971 to September 1973.]<sup>3</sup>

(C) His remarks somewhat parallel those of a subsequent August message to the chairman of a Congressional subcommittee discussed above in the matter of consideration of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. He said that for some time he had believed that the termination of the trusteeship was overdue. From the vantage of his position as USCINCPAC he was

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1. Ibid.
  2. SECDEF 070024Z Apr 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 080117Z May 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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even more convinced of the desirability--even necessity--of trusteeship termination. The ability to deal with the respective entities on a bilateral basis, rather than from a position in which the United Nations Trusteeship Commission had an oversight role was highly preferable in terms of our military rights.

(C) He said "one is entitled to some scepticism" as to whether the Palauan negotiators could deliver, politically, on the offers they made. He said that, unlike the Indonesian slogan, for the Palauans "diversity" did not necessarily equate to "unity." Nevertheless, the Palauan position represented some apparent progress with which we must deal seriously, both as a matter of record and because it was clearly in our interest to achieve termination.

(C) He said that at this stage he could not prejudge whether the three issues--our military authority, strategic denial, and nuclear rights-- would be wrapped up satisfactorily. If they could be resolved satisfactorily, he believed we should be prepared to reexamine our position on the defense rights package we had heretofore been demanding in the negotiations. He said a decade earlier he had been deeply involved in formulating the U.S. position in this regard, and had personal familiarity with how and why it was done in the manner that still stood as our negotiating position. "Given that experience, and--again--looking at the subject from my present responsibilities, I am somewhat confident that we could demonstrate considerable flexibility in the formulation of the package. As we have long maintained, we should ensure rights of harbor and airfield access in the context of our defense responsibilities." Our position in regard to other military-use land requirements, however, could be much more negotiable, if that flexibility were pertinent to the overall settlement of the negotiation.

(C) The essential point, Admiral Crowe continued, was that he firmly believed the time had come to settle the Palau issue rapidly. Time would work against us politically in the region. Also, legally we were facing growing challenges in various suits pertaining to the Marshalls, the resolution of which might be affected by the Palau holdout. Anti-nuclear sentiment in Palau was bolstered by growing support in the South Pacific, and the United States needed a breakthrough, if at all possible.<sup>1</sup>

(C) On 9 May the JCS advised USCINCPAC that a delegation from Palau was to arrive in Washington in May. If the JCS were to reconsider their position (which supported earlier USCINCPAC recommendations) on land-use requirements, they needed USCINCPAC's recommendations. The Joint Staff identified three main issues in need of resolution. First was the specific/non-specific identification of airfield, harbor, and land use requirements. Next the need for exclusive use of 2,000 acres on Babelthuap for contingency basing and

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1. Ibid.

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support. The third was the need for non-exclusive use of 30,000 acres on Babelthuap for training and maneuvers.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The USCINCPAC reply of 14 May repeated the Admiral's strong conviction that as long as certain fundamental requirements were guaranteed in the final agreement, "we should be willing to compromise on less important points in the interest of short term trusteeship termination." The original Defense Department position in 1971 in regard to military land use was to outline our requirements in general terms with the understanding that specific needs would be negotiated when requirements arose. Several members of the Micronesian leadership had requested more specificity, and the requirements listed above had been identified "after an agonizing and reluctant U.S. effort."<sup>2</sup>

(S) Admiral Crowe said that if going back to our opening position would hasten the agreement process, it was in our interest to do so. Only joint usage of Airai Airfield and Koror Harbor facilities with exclusive use of 65 acres at the airfield and 40 acres at the port were considered hard requirements that should not be subject to further compromise. The other military needs listed earlier, while still valid, were not of such importance as to delay compact agreement. Should a crisis arise in the future that would require the use of additional land, we would, of course, have to negotiate the usage at that time. Land was owned communally on Palau, which could complicate the process and prolong the negotiations.

(S) USCINCPAC said we were definitely involved in a tradeoff; that is, divesting ourselves of the trusteeship in exchange for less specific land use agreement. It was his position that if other major issues could be satisfactorily resolved, the time had come to move forward with the agreement while accepting the risk of postponing negotiations on land use until the need actually occurred. "The sooner we can conclude negotiations with Palau and gain Congressional approval for all the compact agreements the better off we will be in this part of the world. Events in Palau do impact on attitudes and countries in other parts of the Pacific and protracting the negotiation will hurt us in many ways," Admiral Crowe concluded.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Negotiations between the United States and Palau had meanwhile resumed, and a modified version of the Compact that deleted the section concerned with nuclear, biological, and chemical issues was signed by both parties on 23 May 1984. The President of Palau issued an executive order for a second plebiscite, which was held on 4 September. The revised compact was

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1. JCS 092209Z May 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 142200Z May 84 (S), DECL 14 May 90.
  3. Ibid.

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approved by 66 percent of the voters. However, confusion existed as to the extent of the U.S. defense authority under the revised compact.<sup>1</sup>

(U) As the vote also did not obtain the 75 percent approval required to amend Palau's anti-nuclear constitution, confusion existed as to what the referendum accomplished. Ambassador Zeder had stated that the deletion of the section on those issues in no way limited the military responsibility and authority to introduce nuclear weapons if necessary. Palau government officials had publicly announced that deletion of the nuclear issues section meant the United States would comply with the Palau constitution. Palau opposition leaders had stated their intention to initiate legal proceedings, but had not done so by late in the year because no one was sure exactly what the referendum had done.<sup>2</sup>

~~(C)~~ When Ambassador Zeder visited the Marshall Islands in late September and early October he tried to dispel the misconception that Palau had gotten a "better deal" with the new compact. He stressed that Palau was not receiving a penny more of U.S. funds, that the U.S. Government would be willing to discuss an investment fund similar to Palau's if the Marshall Islands wanted a long-term relationship with the United States, that payments to Palau included compensation for substantial military access rights, and that even with "front-loading" of investment fund payments, Palau's receipts were not disproportionate to those for the Marshalls. The visit demonstrated U.S. concern over misconceptions that had arisen, while making clear our firm conviction that the essential parity of the compacts remained intact.<sup>3</sup>

Civic Action Team Program

(U) Since 1969 there had been a program in which Military Civic Action Teams (CAT) managed by USCINCPAC worked in various parts of the TTPI. They were small (about 13-man) engineering teams who worked on small-scale construction tasks such as road-building or improvements, small building construction, etc. The program provided a military presence that had been helpful and, for the most part, well received.<sup>4</sup>

(U) On 12 July 1984 the USCINCPAC Representative to Guam and the TTPI provided an annual assessment of the program. He said that the successful insertion of a an Army team in Kosrae in January 1984 had brought the number of teams deployed to five. Thus, in July, there were two Navy teams deployed

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1. J5614 Point Paper (U), 19 Sep 84, Subj: The Political Status Negotiations for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) and the Compact of Free Associations.
  2. J5614 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 4 Oct 84, Subj: Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) Issues (U), DECL 4 Oct 90.
  3. USCINCPAC 071946Z Sep 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR
  4. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I. pp. 75-76.

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to Yap and Palau, two Army teams deployed to Pohnpei and Kosrae, and an Air Force Team on Truk. He advised it was planned to continue to deployment of five CATs in accordance with interdepartmental support agreements negotiated with the TTPI until the ratification of the compacts of free association. The USCINCPACREP said the importance of the CAT program in Micronesia "cannot be overemphasized" in view of the long-term security interest of the United States in those islands and the strong Defense Department objective of denial of the islands to foreign military powers. He also strongly recommended that efforts be made to assure the presence of a CAT in Palau even after the termination of the U.S. trusteeship.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In another CAT matter, during a visit to USCINCPAC on 9 July the Project Manager of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, an Army major general, requested that USCINCPAC provide him with comments on the feasibility of assigning a CAT to Kwajalein Atoll for work on Ebeye and the outer islands. The general's request was based on Congressional interest led by Representative Morris K. Udall (D-AZ).<sup>2</sup>

(U) Admiral Crowe's response of 22 July, which had been coordinated with his component commanders, stated that while assignment of a CAT to Kwajalein was logistically feasible, if additional funding were made available, he did not consider it appropriate and did not recommend it. He cited the political, sociological, economic, and geographical situation at Kwajalein Atoll and in the Marshall Islands in general.<sup>3</sup>

(U) USCINCPAC noted that the Marshall's government had in the past opted not to have a CAT and had taken pride in its own people's accomplishments. By 1984 there were several projects being done by civilian contractors on Ebeye: a sewage treatment plant, a causeway, new electrical generators, and a desalination plant. Because of these, and the small size of Ebeye, a CAT would easily be open to the charge of being in competition with civilian industry.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The 76-acre Ebeye island had long been considered a slum by U.S. standards, but the population had mushroomed from the 450 people who had been relocated from Kwajalein in 1950 to approximately 9,000 by 1984 (with over 50 percent under age 15). The remote islanders were attracted by their relatives' money, Coke, beer, television, schools, and a hospital. The U.S. Army had been barging in fresh water, as there was none on the island.<sup>5</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC REP GUAM HQ 120653Z Jul 84 (U).
  2. J5614 HistSum Jul 84 (U).
  3. USCINCPAC 222200Z Jul 84 (U)
  4. Ibid.
  5. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, p. 33; J5614 Point Paper (S), 4 Oct 84, Subj: Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) Issues (U), DECL 4 Oct 90.

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
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(U) Ambassador Zeder, visited Ebeye on 31 August as part of a visit of the TTPI. He was accompanied by the USCINCPACREP Kwajalein, who was also the Kwajalein Missile Range Commander, three Marshall Islands officials, Ebeye Mayor Alvin Jacklick, and the president of the International Bridge Company, the principal contractor to the Kwajalein Atoll Development Authority. The mayor showed the Ambassador the new container yard, with its warehouse, refrigeration, and freezer facilities then under construction, and briefed the visitors on plans for construction of a causeway to Gugegwe and Ngingi, and for controlled development of those islands. The party also visited the sewage treatment plant, hospital, Bank of Guam, the communications satellite station, and several stores. Ambassador Zeder explained that he had come to observe first-hand the "impressive progress" which Ebeye had achieved under its elected leadership.<sup>1</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC 071946Z Sep 84 (C), DECL: OADR.

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CHAPTER II

THE THREAT

SECTION I--SITUATION IN THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Overall Threat Assessment for the President

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) When President Reagan stopped in Honolulu in April 1984 en route to China, Admiral Crowe briefed him on the general situation in the U.S. Pacific Command, including the threat facing his forces. He said the Soviets, well aware of the Asia-Pacific region's vital importance, had taken dramatic steps over the past 15 years to improve the capabilities of their armed forces in the Far East and to expand their military presence throughout the area. They continued modernization of fighter and strike forces, with practically a 1-for-1 replacement of aging air force fighters with new generation, longer-range attack aircraft. Equally impressive and alarming had been the Soviet naval buildup and increasingly far-flung deployments, their utilization of Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and their increased presence in Ethiopia and South Yemen.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The Soviets had built a substantial, multi-front warfighting capability with, most importantly, the ability to sustain their power projection. In doing so, they had achieved an overall extension of the battle zone.

Additionally, the USPACOM faced other potentially hostile forces, such as those of North Korea and Vietnam.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) North Korea continued to spend an enormous percentage of its gross national product on the military--probably the highest percentage in the world. Admiral Crowe said the brutal bombing in Rangoon in October 1983 once again reminded the world of Pyongyang's penchant for violence. There was little choice but to be constantly alert for North Korean aggression on the peninsula and in the adjacent air and sea space.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The Vietnamese possessed a strong and capable armed force which was of much concern to many U.S. allies and friends, notably Thailand and other ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nation) states. The Vietnamese military numbered over a million strong and it represented a major threat to peace in the region. About 166,000 Vietnamese troops occupied Kampuchea, and no reduction was in sight. USCINCPAC estimated that the Soviets paid the equivalent of some \$3 million a day for their important

1. USCINCPAC 130544Z Apr 84 (S/NF/WNINTEL), DECL OADR.

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foothold in Southeast Asia and to buttress their Vietnamese surrogates. That support, of course, was what enabled Hanoi to continue its suppression of the Khmer people.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Moscow and its surrogates were improving their military posture in a determined and consistent fashion. Clearly, said Admiral Crowe, the Kremlin was bent on using military strength to gain what it could not win in the Pacific's political and economic arenas. The potential battle zone was being enlarged every year. The Soviets were literally shaping their capability to threaten America's allies, the connecting lines of communication, more and more of U.S. sea and air forces, and now U.S. soil--the Aleutians, Alaska, Guam, the Northern Marianas, Wake, Johnston Island, and Hawaii.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) USCINCPAC appreciated the very important regional and global role being played by the People's Republic of China, whose 4-million-man army had a key role in deterring Vietnamese aggression while providing a counterbalance to Soviet power in the Pacific. Vietnamese concerns about a possible second border war with China had compelled Hanoi to base about half of its military force along the PRC border--forces that would otherwise be available for operations in Kampuchea or elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Meanwhile, some 90 percent of the Soviet Union's Far East ground forces were located along the common border with China. Uncertainty over China's role in any global conflict provided greater assurance that these Soviet forces would not be used elsewhere in Asia or against Europe. While China was not a U.S. ally in the traditional sense, Admiral Crowe said our nations had many parallel interests. One was mutual concern over the political objectives of the Soviet Union--objectives that were being supported by the growing power and influence of Moscow's military forces not only in the Pacific, but also worldwide. In reality, friendly relations between the United States and China benefited both nations. USCINCPAC believed U.S. relations with China had brought positive results for the United States and could serve as an important force for stability throughout the world.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Elsewhere in the USPACOM, the uncertainty of the political situation in the Philippines was a major concern. While the communist insurgents there did not yet threaten to topple President Ferdinand E. Marcos' regime, they were expanding their political activity and the military arm was growing. These developments, combined with the deteriorating economic and political situation in Manila, could allow the communists to increase their base of support. One of USCINCPAC's primary concerns was the potential loss of Philippine bases. In addition to the expense of replacing the \$12-billion facilities, it would take years to replace the trained civilian work force.

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(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Another tough problem with which USCINCPAC was grappling was land and air defense of the Aleutian Islands. The State of Alaska, the Aleutians, and Alaskan oil production facilities (which produced approximately 11 percent of U.S. requirements) were within range of Soviet air attack with TU-22M/BACKFIRES or air-refueled TU-16/BADGERS. In addition, key U.S. installations in the Aleutians, such as the COBRA DANE radar on Shemya and the vital submarine detection site at Adak, were within SU-24/FENCER A range. In the case of the Aleutians, should the Soviets be allowed to seize one of the island airfields as a forward operating base, the continental United States and Hawaii would be subject to direct air attack. In addition, the Soviets would be in a position, with their naval air assets, to completely dominate the North Pacific. The Aleutians, therefore, were a keystone in U.S. defense efforts.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Admiral Crowe advised the President that should the United States become engaged in the Persian Gulf, he had grave concerns about the difficulty of executing existing contingency plans without shore-based access, especially for tactical air operations. Although this region was not in USCINCPAC's area of responsibility, he was the primary supporting commander, and the size of the USPACOM area presented some unique military considerations.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Another area that USPACOM continued to watch was the tender situation on the Thai-Kampuchean border. Recent Vietnamese military operations against the Kampuchean resistance spilled dangerously into Thailand. The Thai, apparently confident of U.S. (and to a lesser extent, Chinese) support, reacted vigorously to the Vietnamese incursion. The Thai reaction and the not-so-coincidental People's Republic of China-Socialist Republic of Vietnam (PRC-SRV) border skirmishes sent a strong message to Hanoi that firm countermeasures would follow any Vietnamese action that threatened to expand the conflict.

(S) Since the 1979 PRC-SRV border war, tensions and hostilities continued with artillery duels and minor incursions by small units and accompanied by charges and countercharges of aggression from both Beijing and Hanoi. China had the capability to teach a second "lesson," but the Vietnamese buildup since 1979 limited this option and was unlikely in the near term. Chinese forces in the two southern military regions included 568,000 troops and 650-700 combat aircraft. Vietnamese forces within 250 miles of the northern border included about 704,000 troops and 330 combat aircraft.

(S/NOFORN) The Soviets continued to develop Cam Ranh Bay as a forward staging base for naval and air forces and were improving both port and airfield facilities. The value of prepositioning their naval platforms was demonstrated in September 1983 when Soviet ships and submarines used Cam Ranh Bay as a springboard for Indian Ocean operations and participated in a worldwide naval exercise. About 20 Soviet naval combatants and auxiliaries

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and up to six submarines were forward deployed there. The Soviets had also staged TU-142/BEAR F antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft from Cam Ranh on a rotational basis since 1980. In late 1983 BADGER aircraft, including strike variants, deployed there. The Soviets also operated two radio intercept facilities at the base, targeted against U.S. communications. Even naval infantry units were deploying to Cam Ranh, and could establish permanent billeting and support facilities.

(S/NOFORN) The Soviets also maintained a continuous presence in the Indian Ocean area. Surface combatants and cruise missile/attack submarines operated there on a routine basis. IL-38/MAY ASW aircraft deployed to and operated from Al Anad, South Yemen and Yohannes IV, Ethiopia. In 1982 Soviet naval order of battle in the Indian Ocean had averaged 28 units: 3 submarines, 6 surface combatants, and 19 auxiliaries. During 1983 the total average figure declined to 21 units: 1 submarine, 5 surface combatants, and 15 auxiliaries. No subs were deployed during about six months of the year. The Soviets continued to seek access to facilities in the area in order to improve their sustainability and maintenance capabilities, actively pursuing basing rights in Seychelles, Mozambique, and Madagascar.

(S) The Soviet capability against U.S. naval units was expanding through force modernization and the use of foreign basing rights. Strike capability was extended by the KIEV class vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft carrier (CVHG) and the BACKFIRE bomber. The KIEV had long-range offensive missiles (250 NM range SS-N-12/SANDBOX) and V/STOL aircraft to project power far from Soviet shores. Additionally, two regiments (40 aircraft) of naval strike BACKFIRE aircraft, with a combat radius of 2,900 kilometers, could easily reach Adak, Midway, Guam, or Clark Air Base in the Philippines. Aided by access to foreign naval facilities in Vietnam, Aden, and Ethiopia, which lay astride major sealanes, the Soviet Pacific Fleet was in an excellent position to conduct independent offensive operations far from home waters. The forward deployment of BADGER bombers at Cam Ranh Bay further illustrated the projection capability of Soviet military power. While the overall growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet would possibly slow over the next several years, the trend toward improving its capability to conduct offensive operations far from home would continue.

(S/NOFORN/NNINTEL) The Soviets also had a large-scale modernization program to upgrade Asian theater air strike capabilities. The overall size of the force would remain relatively constant, with upgrades in air-launched weapon systems and aircraft replacements. The 210 FENCER A bombers and 80 BACKFIRE bombers were the backbone of the Far East strike force. The FENCERS could strike targets throughout most of Japan, Korea, and China. The BACKFIRES could reach targets in these areas as well as the Philippines and part of the United States. The BACKFIRE force was expected to increase to 100 by

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1988. In addition, the new long-range Tupolev strategic bomber, BLACKJACK, would be deployed by 1990.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) More than one-third of the Soviet SS-20 IRBM force was deployed in the Far East. The first of several SS-20 bases had become operational in late 1977 in the Soviet Far East. The Brezhnev moratorium on SS-20 construction did not apply to the Far East, and it continued at an accelerated rate. This rapid deployment had been particularly threatening to neighboring China and Japan. The SS-20 carried three reentry vehicles, each of which had a nuclear warhead with an assessed yield of 0.2-0.85 megatons. It was being deployed for use against such targets as large cities, industrial complexes, airfields, and shipyards. The 5,000-km range of the missile included targets throughout all of China, Japan, Korea, the northern Philippines, and western Alaska.

*200 - 850 kt*

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) North Korea had also pursued an ambitious military expansion and improvement program since mid-1970, spending 20-24 percent of GNP as compared to 6 percent for South Korea. The north enjoyed a clear numerical advantage in almost all aspects of combat strength. It was considered capable of launching a combined-arms strike within five days after decision to attack. At the same time, ROK/U.S. forces required at least 48 hours' warning to achieve a strong defensive posture.

(S/NOFORN) The North Korean Army strength was 745,000, compared with 544,000 for the ROK. The north also enjoyed a 9-to-1 advantage in field artillery capable of firing 15 km or more and a 2.5-to-1 advantage in tanks and assault guns. With naval forces, North Korea had a 3-to-1 numerical advantage over the south. The north had 21 attack submarines; the south, in early 1984, had none. North Korea also had a 3-to-1 advantage in missile patrol boats. In air forces, the north had a numerical edge of 672 to 413 in fighter aircraft (somewhat offset by the south's qualitative superiority). North Korea had 294 transport aircraft and 115 helicopters, while the ROK had about 45 military transports.

(S/NOFORN) The South Korean military was organized principally as a strong ground force, supported by air and naval units. With U.S. logistical and combat support backing, it had been successful in deterring North Korean aggression for 30 years. The ROK strategy was a forward defense: to stop an attack as far forward as possible. This would defend Seoul while counter-offensives targeted enemy 2d and 3d echelon forces within North Korea. Ample warning time and preparation were key to the success of this strategy. With adequate warning, ROK Army units should be able to fight a strong delaying action until U.S. augmentation forces arrive. At sea, however, North Korea's sizable torpedo boat, missile attack boat, and submarine force effectively put all ROK Navy assets at risk. The ROK Air Force was well trained, particularly in air-to-air combat, and maintained a high state of operational readiness. The majority of its aircraft were modern, with adequate range and payload capabilities.

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(C) China perceived the Soviet force facing its northern frontier as the most direct threat to its security and maintained an estimated 1.8 to 1.9 million troops, or about 50 percent of its ground force, deployed near the common border. The PRC viewed the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Soviet use of Cam Ranh Bay, and Soviet support to Vietnam as efforts to encircle China and thereby increase the threat to its security.

(S) Chinese military strategy against threatened Soviet aggression had evolved from one of "luring deep" and attaining victory through Mao's "people's war" to a strategy of fighting forward in selective areas and generally not giving up territory. Key to this strategy was China's assessment that it could fight and win a protracted war with the Soviet Union, in both a conventional and nuclear environment. The Chinese military had recently decided to combat Soviet armor superiority by saturating the battlefield with antitank weapons, which were economical and cost-effective alternatives, in view of the cost of tanks and China's modernization programs. Consequently, China had shown great interest in the TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) antitank missile system, and entered into negotiations with two foreign companies to obtain them. Although China would continue to insist that Moscow reduce troop and missile deployments along the border, the military situation was expected to remain relatively stable in the near term.<sup>1</sup>

#### Threat to Japanese Interests

(S) In May 1984, addressing the 15th U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Subcommittee (SSC) in Tokyo, Admiral Crowe advised his hosts that North Korea's large armed forces remained offensively positioned and their continued growth and modernization raised great doubts about their recent protestations of peaceful intent. The north's armed forces continued to enjoy a sizable advantage in most aspects of combat strength when compared to South Korean forces. In addition to outnumbering the ROK by more than 200,000 troops, North Korea had an overwhelming firepower advantage, due in large part to an indigenous capability to produce most of its ground equipment.<sup>2</sup>

(S) During the winter of 1983-1984 the North Koreans continued to emphasize combined arms training designed to improve their capability to conduct large-scale offensive operations. This training, together with continuous paramilitary mobilization exercises, was clearly aimed at preparing both the military and civilian population for combat situations. Meanwhile, the North Korean Navy, in an attempt to strengthen and increase its anti-shipping force, continued its missile boat construction and modification program, which would add six missile-equipped platforms to an existing force of 31 missile attack boats. Also, highlighting their continuing submarine construction program was the mid-1983 launching of a new ROMEO class boat which increased the attack

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1. Ibid.
  2. ADMIN USCINCPAC 152215Z May 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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submarine inventory to 21. In air developments, North Korea's procurement of 44 MI-2/HOPLITE helicopters in early 1984 demonstrated an increased concern for tactical support of ground forces.

(S) The north's armed forces in general were well-trained, highly mobile and, for the most part, forward deployed. This military capability, combined with Premier Kim Il-sung's long-stated goal of reunification, made the Korean Peninsula a volatile, unpredictable area and an arena of continuing potential conflict. Nonetheless, Admiral Crowe said he believed that a politically stable and militarily strong South Korea, backed by a firm commitment of U.S. support, would deter North Korean aggression.

(S) Although the North Korean threat remained dangerous and unpredictable, USCINCPAC's primary concern continued to be focused on the Soviet threat to peace and stability throughout the Pacific theater. Admiral Crowe allowed that Moscow had little to really boast about in Asia at this juncture. The Vietnamese alliance was costing them a billion dollars a year. This money helped to underwrite Hanoi's repression of Kampuchea--a questionable venture at best. Additionally, Afghanistan could hardly be characterized as an untarnished victory, politically or militarily, and North Korea, although friendly to the USSR, was neither a grateful nor reliable ally. India remained non-aligned. The presence of millions of Afghan refugees encamped in Pakistan and the flow of Khmer villagers and Vietnamese refugees to safe havens further condemned communist policies. In short, Moscow's investments had paid small return in terms of political influence.

(S) Economically, the story was much the same. Moscow had been remarkably unsuccessful in penetrating the robust Asian markets. Only 7 percent of its exports went eastward and the region accounted for only 12 percent of Soviet imports. Vietnam, North Korea, and Afghanistan were all suffering from economic stagnation or decline and appeared destined to remain insignificant players in the marketplace of Asia. Despite their poor showing politically and economically (or more likely, because of it), the Soviets seemed to be turning to the one alternative they could develop and exploit unilaterally--their military power.

(S) Admiral Crowe said the Soviet Far East buildup had continued unabated since the last gathering of the SSC in November 1983, and he could not point to a single element of their military forces that had not been expanded and modernized in the past two years. This continuing buildup was all the more disturbing in light of their demonstrated willingness to project military power--through BACKFIRE bomber flights off the coast of Japan, the occupation of Afghanistan, the fortification of Japan's Northern Territories, and the willful destruction of Korean Air Lines' 747 over Sakhalin in September 1983.

(S) One new DELTA III nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) was also added to the Soviet Pacific Fleet, bringing the total strategic

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missile equipped submarine force to 31. Each of the fleet's six DELTA III submarines employed the 6,500-km range SS-N-18 missile, which had up to seven independently targeted warheads. Also, since early 1982, YANKEE class SSBNs had been conducting periodic theater nuclear patrols in the Sea of Japan. The YANKEEs were capable of striking targets in Japan and China, as well as U.S. facilities in the western Aleutians and the northern Philippines.

(S) The USSR continued to upgrade the airborne leg of their theater nuclear triad. Soviet BACKFIRE bomber strength increased to 80. This steady growth, from only 15 four years previously, reflected the continuing Soviet preoccupation with building a dedicated nuclear strike force in the Far East theater. Overall, this combination of nuclear-capable land and sea based missiles and aircraft provided the Kremlin with an unprecedented array of nuclear options in the area.

(S) The Soviets had also pursued a parallel buildup in conventional forces and equipment. The Far East High Command, which was established at Ulan Ude in 1979, continued to exercise authority over all non-strategic ground, air, and naval forces assigned to the Soviet Far East. There were improvements in ground force levels raising the number of Soviet divisions in the Far East to 52 plus a new type of army corps.

(S) While the number of tactical aircraft remained essentially unchanged, the replacement of older airframes continued. During the previous three years the Soviets introduced over 500 new tactical aircraft into their Far East inventory. The first deployment of the MIG-31/FOXHOUND in the Far East took place in 1983. This advanced interceptor represented a significant improvement in air defense and further emphasized the growing importance placed upon this region by the Soviet military.

(S) Modernization was also evident in Japan's Northern Territories still held by the Soviets. Significant force improvements had been taking place, including completion of the Tennei Airfield upgrade on Etorofu Island and deployment there of MIG-23/FLOGGERS. These aircraft, with a ground attack as well as an air intercept capability, could operate over northern Japan and represented a further resolve of the Soviets to maintain combat ready forces off Japan's shores. Meanwhile, about 10,000 army and border security personnel remained encamped at six different bases on the Northern Territories. Admiral Crowe reminded his Japanese hosts it was obvious that the Soviets appeared intent on maintaining their illegal occupation of these islands indefinitely.

(S) Turning next to naval forces, USCINCPAC said the Soviet Pacific Fleet, already the largest of their four fleets, continued its expansion and modernization efforts. In the preceding 12 months, three principal surface combatants, including the NOVOROSSIIYSK, a KARA class guided missile cruiser (CG), and a KRIVAK class guided missile frigate (FFG), had been added,

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bringing the number of major Soviet surface combatants in the Pacific to 86. In addition, three new VICTOR III submarines had been added to the force of nuclear-powered attack subs. Of the 130 submarines in the inventory, over half (71) were nuclear powered. The April 1984 amphibious assault exercise in the Gulf of Tonkin, which included the recently transferred IVAN ROGOV amphibious assault transport dock (LPD) and the MINSK CVHG, demonstrated the Soviet's growing capability and desire to project its sea power.

(S) This sea power projection was part of the Soviet's steady effort to expand its presence and influence throughout the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. In Southeast Asia, Cam Ranh Bay continued to serve as the focal point for Soviet out-of-area operations in the Pacific, and Vietnam's near-total dependence on Moscow for economic and military assistance assured the Soviets of long-term access. In 1983 a record high of five Soviet attack submarines, three of which were nuclear powered, were situated at or near Cam Ranh Bay in the South China Sea. These assets were immediately available to threaten the vital sea lanes that linked North Asia and Japan with their critical supplies of oil and other strategic commodities. The development by the Soviets of Vietnam's ASW, sea surveillance, and sea lane attack capabilities further enhanced Moscow's ability to threaten Free World passage throughout the Southeast Asian region.

(S) Meanwhile, in the Indian Ocean area, the Soviets continued to enjoy seemingly unrestricted access to ports and facilities in South Yemen and Ethiopia. Some 20 to 30 naval units could be found in the region on any given day. In South Yemen, the Soviets relied heavily on the anchorages around Socotra Island and maintained a continuing presence at Aden. They also upgraded their repair facility at Ethiopia's Dehalak Island and maintained a 100-man naval infantry contingent there.

(S) In Afghanistan a Soviet army of over 113,000 occupied that beleaguered nation. This force, which included 70 fighter aircraft and more than 100 attack helicopters, was less than 400 miles from the strategic Strait of Hormuz connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the vital sea lanes of the Arabian Sea. While their primary mission was to keep a Marxist government in place in Kabul, the Soviet occupation troops and the existing command and control mechanisms were also available to serve as the nucleus of a power projection force which could strike Iran or Pakistan, or advance southward through the Baluchistan region to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and the oil of the Persian Gulf.

(S) The Soviet footholds in Vietnam, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and Ethiopia put them in a good position to influence events along the critical Pacific and Indian Ocean sealanes so vital to the Free World's economic prosperity. Admiral Crowe said Japan, Korea, and the United States faced numerous challenges from North Korea and the Soviet Union; yet, the Free World was in relatively good shape in East Asia. The region was an economic success

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story--so much so that other parts of the world were impressed to the point that some felt threatened. The most important tasks which confronted the allies were to maintain stability in this vital region and insure its continued prosperity and resistance to Soviet imperialism. U.S.-Japanese relations provided the crucial cornerstone for accomplishing these objectives. Furthermore, Admiral Crowe said he believed meetings such as the SSC would strengthen the special partnership and greatly enhance the two nations' ability to effectively counter the threats to the freedom and stability both sought to preserve.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Ibid.

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SECTION II--SOVIET FORCES

Buildup of Forces in the Pacific

(S) Soviet military power continued to expand in the Pacific Basin during 1984. The military buildup was all the more disturbing in light of the demonstrated Soviet willingness to project military power through the deployment of offensive naval and air forces to Vietnam, which threatened vital sea lines of communication.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The Soviet Pacific Fleet had been engaged in a well-defined program of constant improvement in the number of surface ships and submarines and in the combat capability of these units. The newer platforms, such as the KIEV class aircraft carrier, employed the latest weaponry and sensor technology. They significantly extended the battle zone and killing range of the fleet well beyond Soviet borders. The number of combatants had nearly doubled since 1974, and included the addition of two KIEV class CVHGs and the IVAN ROGOV LPD. The overall submarine capability increased significantly as older boats were replaced by new construction or the transfer of units. There were over 132 submarines in the Soviet Pacific Fleet at the end of 1984, including a growing number of modern attack types.

(S/WMINTEL) Advancements over the last two years in Soviet naval aviation included the addition of the BACKFIRE bomber to the Far East with its improved antiship missile capability. Recent Soviet Air Force improvements in this area included the September 1983 deployment of MIG-31/FOXHOUND aircraft to Sakhalin. It was the most sophisticated interceptor in the Soviet inventory. Also deployed in August 1984 were six TU-95/BEAR G bombers, capable of being equipped with AS-4/KITCHEN air-to-surface missiles, to Ukraina. The number had increased to ten by the end of the year, posing a significant threat to allied land and maritime forces throughout the Northern and Western Pacific.

(S) SS-20 IRBM base construction continued in the eastern USSR. At the end of 1984 there were 162 launchers at 18 operational bases in the Soviet Far East. Two additional bases, one at Kansk and one at Barnaul, were known to be under construction. The dramatic buildup of Soviet forces at Cam Ranh Bay also presented an ever-increasing threat to the security of vital sea lanes in the South China Sea, Western Pacific, and Eastern Indian Ocean.<sup>2</sup>

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1. IPAC (IA-3) Point Paper (S), 27 Dec 84, Subj: Soviet Buildup in the Pacific (U), DECL OADR; J2/Memo/TS-09-85 (U), 1 Jul 85, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History 1984; review of draft.
  2. Ibid.

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Soviet Forces at Cam Ranh Bay

(S/NOFORN) The Soviet Union continued to employ Cam Ranh Bay as a forward staging base for deployed naval and air forces, and improvements were being made to the naval port facility and airfield. Based on the importance the Soviets placed on their presence in the region as evidenced by the significant buildup of forces, the composition of those forces, and the large shore support establishment, it was apparent that an operational "South China Sea Squadron" had already been formed. The command structure would be at least the equivalent of that in the Indian Ocean. The geographic location of Cam Ranh Bay was of major significance in that it provided the Soviets with flexibility in meeting commitments in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It also had several political and operational advantages: providing a presence near an important sea lane and near forward U.S. bases; enhancing monitoring of U.S. and PRC activities; creating military and political problems for the United States; facilitating Indian Ocean augmentation; and enabling the Soviets to influence regional developments.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Upgrades to the naval base included the addition of floating piers of the type used to berth nuclear-powered submarines at bases in the USSR. Additional improvements since 1979 included the establishment of two high frequency direction finding signals intelligence (SIGINT) sites which enhanced intelligence collection capability in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The identification in late 1984 of a third SIGINT site in the Da Nang area further expanded collection capability. Upgrades to the airfield facility included the installation of a second satellite communications terminal, increased fuel storage, a significant increase in ground support equipment, improved ammunition storage, and expanded maintenance facilities.

(S) In April 1984 Soviet naval units participated in the first probably combined USSR-SRV amphibious exercise, with the MINSK CVHG and IVAN ROGOV LPD participating. Soviet naval infantry conducted at least one amphibious landing in the Cam Ranh Bay area during the rehearsal phase. Additional landings might have occurred in an amphibious operational area south of Haiphong a few days later. This exercise underscored the growing importance of Cam Ranh Bay as a forward staging base for Soviet military power.<sup>2</sup>

(S) By late 1984 it was confirmed that the Soviets had increased the deployment of BEAR aircraft at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield to eight (four BEAR D reconnaissance and four BEAR F ASW variants). In addition, BADGER bomber aircraft were increased to 16, including 10 strike variants with the ability to conduct offensive operations in the South China Sea, Western Pacific, and Eastern Indian Ocean. Most significantly, in mid-December 1984, 14 MIG-23/

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1. IPAC (IA-3) Point Paper (S/NF/WNINTEL), 27 Nov 84, Subj: Soviet Use of Cam Ranh (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.

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FLOGGER variable-geometry fighter aircraft were delivered to Cam Ranh Bay, and were expected to be operational by February 1985.<sup>1</sup>

Recent Surface Combatant Construction

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Recent open-source reporting highlighted the significance of Soviet surface ship developments. Soviet naval planning apparently had progressed from a "defense of the homeland" concept to one suggesting that gaining and maintaining "command of the sea" in areas not contiguous to the Soviet Union was of increasing importance. Construction of the KIEV class V/STOL carrier had concluded in April 1982 with launching of the fourth and final unit, probably to be named BAKU. This ship was midway through fitting out. Its weapons suite remained an enigma; however, several marked differences from the lead unit were noted. The most significant were a phased array radar and the installation of SA-NX-9 SAMs (as on NOVOROSIYSK). Meanwhile, the lead ship KIEV concluded its first overhaul period, which had commenced in late December 1982. Two units of this class, MINSK and NOVOROSIYSK, were assigned to the Soviet Pacific Fleet.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) On the building ways adjacent to BAKU work continued on the Soviets' first conventional takeoff and landing aircraft carrier. Imagery analysis indicated the ship of approximately 70,000 tons would be nuclear powered. It could join the Soviet fleet by 1989. By 1995 the Soviets would probably have two operational full-size aircraft carriers. At the Leningrad shipyards construction of a KIROV class nuclear-powered cruiser continued. Unit 2, FRUNZE, was launched in May 1984 and late in the year was conducting sea trials. It might ultimately be assigned to the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Construction had begun on a third KIROV type hull in May 1983. Eventually, four to six of these units were expected to be built.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) In other developments, three destroyer construction programs were also underway. The SOVREMENNY class DDG began production at Leningrad in 1976, and three were operational in the Northern Fleet. Six other units were in various stages of construction, fitting-out, and sea trials. As many as five of these ships might be assigned to the Pacific Fleet, with the first arriving in 1986. SOVREMENNY was the first Soviet destroyer built since 1970 without a primary ASW function. The ship incorporated the SS-NX-22 cruise missile, providing a significant surface-to-surface warfare capability. This was complemented by a 130mm dual-purpose gun mount, providing the Soviet Navy with increased firepower to support amphibious operations as well as surface warfare. At the same time, the SA-N-7 system provided effective air defense against multiple targets in a hostile electronic countermeasures environment.

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1. IPAC (IA-3) Point Paper (S), 27 Dec 84, Subj: Soviet Buildup in the Pacific (U), DECL OADR.
  2. IPAC Intelligence Summary (S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT), Jan 85, pp. 26-28, DECL OADR.

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(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The second ongoing destroyer production program, that of the UDALOY DDG, had commenced in 1978 at both the Leningrad and Kaliningrad shipyards. Three had joined the fleet and a fourth was expected to achieve operational status by late 1984. Of note, three units had been fitted with a three-dimensional air search radar for improved surveillance and target acquisition. At least five additional units of this type were in various stages of construction or fitting-out. A total of 16-20 UDALOYs was projected and of these, six would likely be assigned to the Pacific Fleet. The third active destroyer project was of the venerable KASHIN class, the original version of which entered service in 1963. Units under construction at Nikolayev were contracted for delivery to India. Three units had already been transferred and three more were to be delivered by 1987.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Three, possibly four frigate programs were also ongoing. Construction of the KRIVAK II FFG continued at the Black Sea shipyard at Kerch. Eleven had been produced at several shipyards since 1970. Three units of a newer version, given the name of KRIVAK III, were identified at Kerch. The first of these was sent to the Pacific Fleet and, based on a likely ASW mission, could patrol the approaches to the Kuril Islands and Sea of Okhotsk. A total of 21 KRIVAK Is and IIs had been produced earlier. Other frigate construction programs were the KONI class, for export, and GRISHA class, of which 55 had been built by 1984.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The Soviet naval ship construction program underscored Moscow's commitment to qualitatively and quantitatively enhance its naval power projection capability. Overall numerical strength of the Soviet Navy showed a significant increase, from 189 major combatants in 1964 to more than 310 in 1984. There was an even more significant upgrade in quality. The percentage of missile-capable ships increased from 8.7 percent in 1964 to 34.6 percent in 1984. New technologies being incorporated in Soviet ship design and weapon systems would continue to complicate U.S. maritime strategy.<sup>1</sup>

#### New Generation SRBMs

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Since the mid-1960s the Soviets had provided their major combat units with surface-to-surface missile capability consistent with the expected mission of the unit. During the 1960s and early 1970s the primary role assigned to these short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) was battlefield nuclear strike. Over the last decade, however, the Soviets had expanded the anticipated role of SRBM systems and now considered them an integral component of both nuclear and non-nuclear fire support plans. To provide their ground units with the capabilities to meet this expanded mission the Soviets pursued an aggressive program which produced a new generation of SRBMs and a number of warhead options.<sup>2</sup>

1. Ibid.

2. IPAC Intelligence Summary (S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT), Jan 85, pp. 20-23, DECL OADR.

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(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The SS-12 MOD II was the Soviet Union's longest range SRBM (900 kilometers), and the only one deployed in the Far Eastern theater of military operations that could reach USPACOM bases from Soviet soil. Forty-eight SS-12 missiles were located at Novosysoyevka near Vladivostok. These missiles were transported within an environmentally controlled pod on a wheeled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). Each of the 12 TEL had three additional missiles assigned. Reload time was about 130 minutes. The two-stage solid propellant SS-12 MOD II was a modification of the SS-12 MOD I SCALEBOARD with an improved guidance and control system. It had a circular error of probability (CEP) of 300-400 meters at two-thirds maximum range instead of the 600-800 meters for the MOD I. The improved accuracy would allow some additional flexibility in targeting the nuclear warheads, which ranged in yield from 30 to 600 kilotons. An improved SS-12 with terminal guidance was expected to be operational as early as 1985. With this improved guidance the system might achieve a CEP of 50 meters.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) A new missile, the projected SS-23, also had the range to reach some USPACOM bases if deployed to the Kuril Islands. It was assessed to be the eventual replacement for the SCUD-B tactical nuclear missile at the front level. Some 108 liquid propellant SCUD-Bs were assigned to the Far Eastern theater and had the capability to deliver a 1,000 kg non-separating warhead 300 kilometers with an accuracy of 500-900 meters CEP. The SS-23 was a solid propellant missile with inertial guidance that was designed to improve this accuracy to 250-300 meters CEP and extend the range to 500 kilometers. The Soviets were attempting to improve this CEP to 50 meters by equipping the SS-23 with guidance update during flight.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) In addition to their nuclear capabilities the new-generation SRBMs could deliver high explosive, subprojectile, and chemical warheads. In a non-nuclear war, the most likely use of the SRBM weapon system against USPACOM forces would be chemical attacks on airbases. The Soviets were known to have toxic chemical warheads for their older generation SRBMs and these were believed to be available for the new missiles. However, the SS-12, being the ground commander's longest-range weapon, would most likely be employed with a nuclear warhead against key ground force targets in China or held in reserve for use against USPACOM targets. The primary mission of the new generation of Soviet SRBMs was battlefield nuclear strike. The mobility of these weapons, the short flight time, and the targeting flexibility provided the Soviet ground forces with a family of versatile and effective weapons. The development of more accurate guidance systems and more effective conventional warheads increased the possibility of their use in a non-nuclear conflict.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Ibid.; J2/Memo/TS-09-85 (U), 1 Jul 85, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History 1984; review of draft.
  2. Ibid.

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SECTION III--THREAT IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

Soviet Threat to the Aleutians

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(8) Any Soviet military action against targets in Alaska had to be considered within the context of Soviet strategic objectives and global events. While a large conventional attack on key facilities there was possible, it was unlikely. The more probable courses of action were air and unconventional attacks on facilities in the Aleutian chain. The importance of the entire Aleutian chain rested in the key U.S. defense facilities located at Adak and Shemya. These facilities included military airfields and early warning (EW), ground-controlled intercept (GCI), and distant early warning (DEW) systems. Of primary significance was the geographic location of these island facilities--close to the Soviet Union and at midpoint along the vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) between our Asian allies and the North American continent. In the event of impending hostilities with the Soviet Union, the facilities at Adak possessed the capability of providing initial early warning of major Soviet submarine and surface ship deployments. This warning was essential to the defense of the U.S. Pacific Command.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Although neutralization was considered more likely, seizure of the Aleutian facilities was well within existing Soviet capabilities. The location of the key bases--all within 900 NM of Petropavlovsk--and the relatively insignificant defense forces permanently assigned to the islands made them extremely vulnerable. Without prior warning the bases at Attu (with a Coast Guard LORAN station), Shemya, and Adak, and the unused airfield on Amchitka could be quickly seized by Soviet airborne forces using relatively few aircraft and assault personnel. Within hours the Soviets could reinforce their assault troops and deploy missile batteries and interceptor aircraft. Captured food, fuel, and supplies would minimize initial lift requirements. Once in place only a major U.S. effort, drawing upon forces badly needed elsewhere, could dislodge the Soviets and restore friendly control.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The most likely Soviet attackers would be Special Purpose Forces, or SPETSNAZ. They were trained to conduct activities which could extend from reconnaissance and sabotage to special electronic warfare operations. The mission of these SPETSNAZ would be to neutralize key targets such as the COBRA DANE radar on Shemya or the U.S. Navy's submarine tracking center on Adak. Teams of 5-12 men could easily be infiltrated by submarine, fishing vessel, or small aircraft. The Soviets had 13 active ground forces-subordinated SPETSNAZ brigades, of which four were located in the Far East area. The Soviet Pacific Fleet also had one naval forces-subordinated SPETSNAZ brigade.

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1. IPAC (IA-3) Point Paper (S/NE/WNINTEL), 12 Jul 84, Subj: Soviet Threat to the Aleutians (U), DECL OADR; J2/Memo/TS-09-85 (U), 1 Jul 85, Subj: US-CINCPAC Command History 1984; review of draft.

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(S) Of all the Aleutians, Adak was the most critical because of the naval facilities on the island, which included a SOSUS (sound surveillance system) submarine detection facility, a Naval Security Group SIGINT facility, and a P-3 ASW special weapons compound. Three other islands west of Adak (Amchitka, Shemya, and Attu) could also be occupied. Though of less strategic importance than Adak, all had airfields which could accommodate most Soviet aircraft. The most likely force to be used for securing a lodgment on Adak would be the Soviet Naval Infantry Division stationed at Vladivostok. It was organized into three naval infantry regiments with a total of some 6,600 fully equipped troops. They could be transported to the Aleutians by the Soviet Far East Amphibious Force which included 5 ALLIGATOR LSTs (300 troops each), 8 ROPUCHA LSTs (225 troops each), 4 POLNOCNY LSMs (180 troops each), 4 MP-4 LSMs (about 100 troops each), and 1 IVAN ROGOV LPD (521 troops). In addition, 2 POLNOCNY MSSs retained an amphibious lift capability. Although somewhat reduced as compared to the LSM version, they could probably together lift an additional 300 troops.

(S/NOFORN) Air support for an invasion of Adak would most likely be provided by Soviet Naval Aviation TU-16/BADGER bombers staging from Kamchatka. The most likely role for such aircraft would be protection of the assault force from U.S. naval units. These missile-carrying BADGERS had the capability to strike both land and sea targets. As of mid-1984 Soviet Far East Naval Aviation had 40 BACKFIRE and 67 BADGER strike aircraft in its inventory.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) In keeping with Soviet doctrine, naval infantry forces would be replaced after they had secured a beachhead. In the case of an Adak invasion, these forces would probably be used to quell all resistance and secure the entire facility before being replaced. Follow-on troops would most likely be drawn from uncommitted army units in the Far East Military District and transported to Adak by vessels assigned to the maritime fleet. The Soviets had over 400 Pacific-based merchant ships that could be used for the administrative lift of 6-7 motorized rifle divisions with equipment.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Although considered less likely, airborne or air assault forces could be used to seize Adak. This was judged less likely because only limited airlift assets were available in the Far East. The Soviet Union had one brigade and one battalion located in the Far East Military District capable of airborne/air assault operations that could be transported by two transport aviation regiments of 66 AN-12/CUB aircraft. Additionally, an airborne division of 6,500 men and associated transport aircraft based in the western USSR could be available for operations in the Aleutians, but this was highly improbable due to the demand for airborne forces that would undoubtedly exist in the European theater.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Soviet objectives in the Aleutians were probably to neutralize or destroy key facilities that posed a threat to their naval operations, or to occupy and use them as advanced bases for operations against

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the mainland United States, Canada, and critical Pacific SLOCs. Because of the considerable effort involved in an airborne or seaborne assault and occupation of any Aleutian island, however, the most probable course of action would be an airstrike to destroy or neutralize key facilities. An airstrike could be accomplished with relative ease without entailing the logistical train required to support an invasion and occupation. More importantly, the ground forces that would be needed to conduct an invasion would have a more urgent mission in securing La Perouse Strait between Sakhalin and the northernmost Japanese island of Hokkaido. Adak, which did not pose a direct threat to the Soviet Pacific Fleet, would probably be viewed as a target to be destroyed rather than as key terrain necessary for defense of the homeland.<sup>1</sup>

#### Flights Near Japan by Soviet Bombers

(U) In the 17th violation of Japan's airspace by Soviet aircraft since 1967, two TU-95/BEARs, part of a formation of seven bombers, flew through Japanese airspace for almost 3½ minutes on 23 November 1984. Thirty-four Japanese fighter aircraft scrambled to intercept them. Japan lodged a strong protest with the Soviet Union over these repeated intrusions into Japanese airspace by Soviet bombers. Just 11 days earlier, on 12 November, a record number of 40 Japanese fighters had scrambled to intercept another BEAR which defied warnings and flew over Japanese airspace off the western coast.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Although they did not intrude into Japanese airspace, 22 Soviet TU-22M/BACKFIRE supersonic bombers flew near Japan on 23 September, prompting 16 Japanese fighters to take to the air from Chitose, Misawa, Komatsu, and Hyakuri bases in northern Japan. Pilots reported they saw the BACKFIRES flying southward over the Sea of Japan off Hokkaido in groups of two aircraft each at 0745 hours local. Two hours later the bombers turned westward over the sea off Komatsu City, Ishikawa Prefecture, 250 miles west of Tokyo, and disappeared from the radar screen. On 20 June, eight Japanese fighters had scrambled to intercept three BACKFIRES when they flew almost the same course. BACKFIRE bombers had first been spotted by the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force flying over the Sea of Japan in September 1982.<sup>3</sup>

#### Claim to the Northern Territories

(U) The Japanese press noted on 13 July 1984 that the National Geographic Society of the United States, world-famous and authoritative map publishers, had changed their presentation of the Northern Territories from "USSR Administration" to "Held (illegally) by the USSR." Furthermore, the society added remarks to the new presentation that the area was an "integral part" of

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1. Ibid.

2. UPI, Tokyo, 26 Nov 84 (U).

3. COMUSJAPAN 250501Z Sep 84 (U), citing the Japanese press; FBIS Bangkok 231128Z Sep 84 (U), citing AFP, Tokyo, 23 Sep 84.

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Japanese territory. The Japanese Foreign Office hailed the society's action, expecting a further increase of international public opinion in favor of the Japanese demand for return of the four islands occupied by the Soviet Union since the end of World War II.<sup>1</sup>


(U) Following this lead, Prime Minister Nakasone of Japan instructed the Foreign Office and the Management and Cooperation Agency to work on foreign countries and international organizations so that they might also present the Northern Territories as belonging to Japan in their maps and encyclopedias, following the National Geographic Society. Radio Moscow in September reacted sharply to the Japanese action, saying that such a campaign could not in the least change the Soviet position that these islands were the southernmost part of the Kuril chain and had always been claimed by Russia.<sup>2</sup>




1. COMUSJAPAN 130501Z Jul 84 (U), citing Sankei News.
2. COMUSJAPAN 170501Z Sep 84 (U), citing Tokyo Shimbun.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 15555/311226Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR.
4. Ibid.

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
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1. AFSSO 5AF/COMUSJAPAN 0707127 Dec 84 (C)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  2. IPAC (IA2) Point Paper (S/NF), 9 Aug 84, Subj: Japan - Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) Capabilities and Readiness (U) DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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


1. IPAC (IA-2) Point Paper (S/NF), 17 May 84, Subj: JSDF Readiness and Sustainability Efforts (U), DECL OADR.
2. IPAC (IA-2) Point Paper (S/NF), 9 Aug 84, Subj: Japan - Air Self-Defense Force Structure and Limitations (U), DECL OADR.
3. Ibid; IPAC (IA-2) Point Paper (S/NF), 17 May 84, Subj: JSDF Readiness and Sustainability Efforts (U), DECL OADR.
4. IPAC (IA-2) Point Paper (S/NF), 9 Aug 84, Subj: Japan - Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), Structure and Limitations (U), DECL OADR.




1. Ibid; IPAC (IA-2) Point Paper (~~S/NF~~), 17 May 84, Subj: JSDF Readiness and Sustainability Efforts (U), DECL OADR.
2. IPAC Intelligence Summary (~~S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT~~), Jan 85, pp. 11-12, DECL OADR.

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
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1. Ibid.
  2. IPAC Intelligence Summary (~~S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT~~), Apr 84, pp. 13-15, DECL OADR.

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
1. Ibid.

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1. IPAC Intelligence Summary (S/NF/~~WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT~~), Jan 85, pp. 12-16  
DECL OADR.

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North Korean Intentions and Capabilities

(S/NOFORN) USCINCPAC believed that North Korea still hoped to achieve reunification on its own terms. Since 1980 it had conducted a series of large-scale military exercises, "war preparations" campaigns, and alerts designed to ready military forces and the civilian population for combat. However, North Korea had not been free to pursue its own course without reference to the Soviet Union and China. Pyongyang had followed an ambitious expansion and armed forces improvement program since the mid-1970s. As a result the north enjoyed a clear advantage in almost all aspects of combat strength over the Republic of Korea.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN) Should the ROK government stumble badly, or the United States be militarily diverted elsewhere, another invasion was seen as possible. However, USCINCPAC believed such a scenario was unlikely as long as U.S. forces remained in South Korea and the U.S. commitment remained credible. China and the USSR had contributed to both economic and military development in North Korea, but had shown no enthusiasm for another war that could draw them into a direct confrontation with the United States.

(S/NOFORN) The most likely scenario over the next several years was a drift toward a de facto "Two-Koreas" solution, with occasional violent

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1. Ibid.
  2. IPAC (IA-2) Point Paper (S/NF), 13 Feb 84, Subj: Assessment of North Korean Intentions/Capabilities (U), DECL OADR.

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incidents and tensions continuing at existing levels, or perhaps slightly higher. Nevertheless, North Korea was capable of sustaining an extended conflict against the ROK for a period of several months, virtually independent of outside assistance.

(S/NOFORN) The North Korean armed forces maintained a significant advantage over the south in personnel strength, combat maneuver units, jet combat aircraft, and fighting ships (especially missile attack boats). It was expected to maintain this advantage over the ROK until the early 1990s. North Korea had the capability to launch a major attack on South Korea with little or no warning, and such an attack would be land-based, with air and naval support. In addition, they could project sizeable special purpose forces by air, land, or sea into flank and rear areas of the south to conduct raids, denial operations, interdiction of lines of communication, and unconventional warfare operations.<sup>1</sup>

(S/REL ROK) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) said that North Korea was attempting to reverse the recent trend of becoming isolated politically and economically. Pyongyang's proposal for tripartite (NK-ROK-U.S.) peace talks, Premier Kim Il-sung's visit to Moscow and Eastern Europe, and continued emphasis on Third World diplomacy were recent examples of efforts to break out of this isolation. In the economic sphere, Seoul continued to prosper as the North Korean economy stagnated. Given the respective rates of growth, the gross national product of the south would be five times that of the north by decade's end. To help solve its domestic economic problems, and to compete more successfully in world markets, Pyongyang appeared to be changing its emphasis somewhat from heavy industry to a mix that included more light industry. Since first defaulting on \$1.6 billion in debts to the West in the mid-1970s, Pyongyang had been largely cut off from Western investment, goods, and technology. In his recent visit to the Soviet Bloc, Kim sought economic development and technological assistance from the Eastern bloc nations.<sup>2</sup>

(S/REL ROK) North Korea's efforts to turn its economy around and to gain foreign support indicated that a solution short of war was still being pursued. Kim Il-sung, 72 years old, had spent all of his adult life trying to reunite a divided Korea. Although he would like to complete this task in his lifetime, he had probably not set a specific time frame when reunification had to be accomplished. The grooming of his son, Kim Chong-il, as heir-apparent was designed, at least in part, to insure that the quest for reunification would not be buried with the father. The constant growth in military capabilities, combined with Kim Chong-il's pledge to continue his father's work, attested to North Korea's determination to keep the military option viable. Therefore, the DIA believed the north had adopted a long-term approach to reunifying the peninsula and was unlikely to act out of sheer desperation.

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1. Ibid.

2. SSO DIA 131357Z Aug 84 (S/REL ROK)(BOM), DECL OADR.

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(S/REL ROK) The transition to Kim Chong-il was progressing smoothly and indications of a power struggle were virtually non-existent. As older officials passed from the scene, they were being replaced with Kim Chong-il loyalists. Once Kim Il-sung dies, a move against the son was seen as possible, but the longer the elder Kim survives (his health seemed reasonably good), the better the chance was for an orderly transfer of power.

(S/REL ROK) As long as North Korea remained dedicated to reunification and refused to rule out the use of force, the DIA was concerned about its intentions. Although the DIA did not believe Pyongyang had decided to invade the south in 1984, North Korea would continue its efforts to destabilize the south. As time passed, given the high-tension environment on the peninsula, the potential for rapid deterioration in the situation could very well increase, especially with the number of international events hosted by Seoul growing, to include the 1988 Olympic Games.<sup>1</sup>

#### North Korean Forward Deployments

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The DIA reported [REDACTED] additional evidence of strategic North Korean Army unit redeployments. In the northwest, major elements of one of three tank battalions garrisoned at Kumchon, a 105th Tank Division installation, had departed since 1 June. A tank battalion from the nearby 1st Mechanized Infantry Division was also believed to have departed its garrison in early June. Elsewhere, high counts of rolling-stock inventory continued at Pyongyang Sopo Railyard. In the southeast, vehicle shed removal and dismantlement were detected at Wonsan Army Barracks WNW, the garrison of an M1974 self-propelled artillery battalion subordinate to the 7th Mechanized Division.<sup>2</sup> 1.5 c

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The DIA said that since the mid-1970s North Korea had sought to improve the combat power and efficiency of its 2d and 3d echelon forces. A major phase in this effort appeared to have begun with these redeployments. In earlier phases, these echelons were heavily mechanized; their ability to deploy rapidly forward was extensively tested; new command and control headquarters were created in the form of four mechanized corps; armored personnel carrier inventories were dispersed among a larger number of units; and mechanized divisions were broken down into smaller brigade-size organizations. In this new phase, further organizational changes were probably being made. A redistribution of tank and self-propelled artillery battalions was suggested.


(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Of greater significance was evidence of concurrent changes in the disposition of brigade-size and possibly larger units. Some of

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1. Ibid.
  2. DIA 140010Z Jun 84 (S/NE/WNINTEL), DECL OADR; J2/Memo/TS-09-85 (U), 1 Jul 85, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History 1984; review of draft.

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these changes were probably intended to relocate forces to areas that were better served by existing lines of communication and closer to the DMZ. Changes in the disposition of brigades and divisions subordinate to the southeast and southwest mechanized corps might not become widespread since they were already deployed close behind the forward corps. However, farther to the rear, brigades of the corps at Namdaechon were clearly being relocated and changes in the disposition of some brigades of the northwest mechanized corps might follow.<sup>1</sup>


- (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) On 9 July General William J. Livsey, COMUSKOREA, informed the Directors DIA and NSA (National Security Agency) that he was concerned about the reorganization underway within the North Korean ground forces.




1. Ibid.
2. SSO Korea 090820Z Jul 84 (S/NF/WNINTEL)(BOM), DECL OADR.
3. Ibid.
4. USCINCPAC 140233Z Jul 84 (S/NF/WNINTEL)(BOM), DECL OADR.

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1. SSO DIA 131357Z Aug 84 (~~S/REL ROK~~)(BOM), DECL OADR; J2/Memo/TS-09-85 (U), 1 Jul 85, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History 1984; review of draft.

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North Korean Talks Proposal

(C) On 10 January 1984 North Korea publicly proposed talks with the United States in which South Korean authorities would be permitted to participate. The Republic of Korea counterproposed bilateral discussions between North and South Korea, which might be expanded later to include other concerned countries. The United States supported the ROK preference for direct bilateral talks or, if multilateral, for a quadripartite (rather than tri-

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1. Ibid.

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partite) format. The State Department held that it was long a U.S. position that the future of the Korean Peninsula was primarily a matter for the people of Korea to determine and that, therefore, a dialogue between the north and south was required. China could make a positive contribution in such talks and, indeed, shared with the United States a responsibility to seek a reduction of tension in Korea. Thus, the United States shared the ROK view that if multilateral talks were to be held, quadripartite talks would be preferable to tripartite.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The ROK government had made clear its strong preference for a straightforward dialogue between the north and south, which it had proposed many times in the past, or for quadripartite talks in which both Korean parties would be represented equally. The ROK delivered such a response to the North Korean representatives at Panmunjom on 14 February. The north's answer to this was to reiterate publicly its original proposal for talks with the United States, in which "the Seoul authorities" would be "allowed" to participate.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN) No progress was made during the year on bilateral talks between the north and south, except for working-level Red Cross discussions concerning flood relief and preliminary economic talks. Near the end of the year, however, Chinese People's Volunteers officers told a United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission staff officer that North Korea would make a new tripartite talks proposal in January 1985. The new proposal would reportedly call for the talks to be held in China and initially involve only the ROK and North Korea, with China and the United States "observing." The Chinese were said to feel that a U.S. military presence in South Korea was "necessary to insure peace and keep the Russians out." Also, they felt that North Korea would give a positive response to South Korea's call for resumption of Red Cross, economic, and probably sports talks in January. However, when TEAM SPIRIT 85 started, the talks would most likely stop until the exercise was over.<sup>3</sup>

#### Situation in the Republic of Korea

(C) South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan's government continued to strive to improve political and social stability in the republic. The economy continued to improve and the administration, in its quest for recognition, elevated South Korea's international status by being selected as host for the 1988 Summer Olympics and the 1986 Asian Games. The major focus of South Korean foreign policy would remain the furtherance of strong ties with the United States and Japan. Contacts with the Soviet Union were increasing, following temporary strains after the Korean Airlines 747 shootdown, and

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1. SECSTATE 066956/070622Z Mar 84 (C), DECL 6 Mar 90.

2. Ibid.

3. SSO Korea 150330Z Dec 84 (S/NF)(BOM), DECL OADR.

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contacts with the PRC had increased dramatically since the hijacking of a Chinese airliner to Seoul in 1983.<sup>1</sup>

(C) President Chun had made several moves to liberalize some aspects of domestic, political, student, and press activity, reflecting confidence in his ability to withstand criticism of his policies and actions. Although student dissidents continued to be active, support for massive anti-government demonstrations was waning in light of Chun's democratization efforts. He planned to continue in his efforts to liberalize all aspects of life in South Korea, ranging from the lifting of various bans and restrictions on politicians and former politicians to increased freedom of the press and greater autonomy for universities. Most of Chun's supporters and many of the opposition believed that he would step down in 1988 as promised, and allow for peaceful elections and transfer of power. This would be a first in modern South Korean political history, and would be a prime indication of the progress and maturation that had occurred.

(C) The South Korean economy had experienced rapid growth over the preceding two years. After an initial slowdown at the beginning of the 1980s, the growth rate rose to nearly 10 percent annually. The 1984 GNP growth rate was 7.6 percent. The large national debt (\$42 billion) was being managed well and was not expected to cause any great difficulty. President Chun was exerting a great deal of effort in the acquisition of new technology for Korean industry. A good portion of his trip to Japan in the fall of 1984 was expected to be spent in further negotiations for Japanese high technology.

(S/NOFORN) As the GNP continued to grow, defense spending had also grown, and was pegged at 5.5 percent. The North Koreans still had the numerical advantage in troop strength and weaponry over the south and would continue to have it for at least the next five years. What South Korea lacked in quantity, however, it was almost frantically attempting to make up in quality. The navy was building its own modern destroyers and frigates. Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles had been developed for the ground forces, and the air force contracted for high-performance F-16s in the near future.<sup>2</sup>

#### Security Issues in China

(C/NOFORN) The Sino-Soviet rift was becoming less of a dominant factor in Chinese foreign policy as China increasingly stressed the theme of independence from alignment with either superpower. However, Beijing continued to view Moscow as the primary threat to Chinese security. Since 1982 the PRC and the Soviet Union had concluded five rounds of bilateral consultations, with

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1. IPAC (IA-2) Point Paper (S/NF), 17 Jul 84, Subj: Current Situation (Political and Military) in South Korea (U), DECL OADR; J2/Memo/TS-09-85 (U), 1 Jul 85, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History 1984; review of draft.
  2. Ibid.

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the latest occurring in October 1984 in Beijing. From an overall perspective, the recent improvements in Sino-Soviet relations had been more symbolic than substantive. Beijing continued to reiterate that the onus was on Moscow to eliminate perceived threats to China's security before relations could be fully normalized.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Although the Sino-Soviet border had become somewhat desensitized over the past few years, China continued to maintain about 1.8 million troops or 50 percent of its ground forces along the common border. The Chinese possessed the capability to defend forward (in selective areas) against both a Soviet conventional and nuclear attack, and force the Soviets into a protracted conflict in which Beijing firmly believed it could not be defeated.<sup>2</sup>

(S) To the south, for the past five years the Sino-Vietnamese border region was a point of tension and potential conflict, with the intensity of Chinese actions generally being proportional to Vietnamese activities near the Thai-Kampuchean border. PRC forces conducted a shallow incursion into the SRV in April 1984, for the first time since 1979. Although China augmented its forces along the border in August with two infantry divisions, Hanoi continued to hold a numerical advantage in ground troops in the border region. Since July, activity was limited to artillery exchanges and small-unit clashes. USCINCPAC believed it was unlikely that a 1979-type of Sino-Vietnamese conflict would occur in the near term.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Since diplomatic relations were established between the United States and the PRC in 1979, relations between the two countries had experienced both peaks and valleys. But after Secretary Weinberger's visit to China in 1983 and Defense Minister Zhang Aiping's reciprocal visit to the United States in 1984, Sino-American military relations reached a new threshold of cooperation. These two visits were followed by the conclusion of the first significant military equipment contract in July 1984, the sale of 24 Sikorsky helicopters to China. Additionally, the Chinese military was looking to the United States for further assistance in modernizing its forces, specifically in the areas of antitank and air defense systems, avionics for fighter aircraft, and artillery ammunition production techniques.<sup>4</sup>

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1. IPAC (IA-2) Point Paper (S/NE/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT/ORCON), 14 Dec 84, Subj: Current Issues in China (U), DECL OADR.
  2. IPAC (IA-2) Point Paper (S/NE/WNINTEL), 20 Apr 84, Subj: Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese Borders--Situation and Chinese Capabilities (U), DECL OADR.
  3. IPAC (IA-2) Point Paper (S/NE/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT/ORCON), 14 Dec 84, Subj: Current Issues in China (U), DECL OADR.
  4. IPAC (IA-2) Point Paper (S), 29 Aug 84, Subj: Sino-U.S. Military Relations (U), DECL OADR.

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(C) Although the relationship appeared to be flourishing, improvements in military cooperation--from Beijing's perspective--had definite, predetermined limits. Mutual self-interest would continue to be a key factor in this relationship, with cooperation falling well short of any Sino-American security agreement.<sup>1</sup>

(C) In the minds of the Chinese leadership, the problem of Taiwan was the single most pressing foreign policy issue confronting the country. The United States and the PRC had agreed in August 1982 that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the level of those supplied since 1979 and the United States intended to gradually reduce these sales, leading to a final resolution. Beijing had emphasized that the arms sales issue could be resolved by negotiations; i.e., agreeing to a specific time limit for the transfer of American arms to Taiwan. By doing so, the PRC believed that Taiwan would be more receptive to Beijing's proposals.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Although China had not renounced the use of force against Taiwan, it adopted a position calling for peaceful reunification with the motherland. In this regard, Beijing announced a "nine-point" proposal which essentially would allow Taiwan to exercise total autonomy in exchange for recognition of PRC sovereignty over the island. However, Taiwan consistently advocated that reunification with the mainland had to be accomplished through the three principles of nationalism, democracy, and the people's welfare. For the near term it was expected that Beijing would continue to take the propaganda offensive in the reunification issue. However, no movement was anticipated until the existing generation of leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait--and possibly the next generation--passes from the scene.<sup>3</sup>

#### Vanuatu Relations with Cuba

(S) Since Vanuatu established diplomatic relations with Cuba during the March 1983 Nonaligned Movement summit in New Delhi, and the first Cuban ambassador presented his credentials in July of that year, there had been increased regional concern as to the nature and extent of Cuban involvement in Vanuatu. This resulted in considerable speculation as to what impact their relationship would have on Vanuatu's foreign policy in general and, specifically, how willing Vanuatu would be in accommodating Cuban activities in the future.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid.
  2. IPAC (IA-2) Point Paper (C), 14 Dec 84, Subj: PRC: The Taiwan Issue (U), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.
  4. IPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (S/NF/WNINTEL), 17 Aug 84, Subj: Vanuatu Relations with Cuba (U), DECL OADR.

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(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Recent concerns had centered on the extent of the Cuban presence in Vanuatu. However, with the exception of expected annual visits of the Cuban Ambassador to Vanuatu (resident in Japan), the only Cuban presence there was a doctor and his family, the World Health Organization's representative to the island. His activities in Vanuatu appeared to be related solely to his legitimate work there.

(S/NOFORN) Late in 1983, after the U.S. action on Grenada, press reports fueled rumors that Cuba was going to construct a 10,000-ft runway in Vanuatu. There was nothing to substantiate this and local authorities flatly denied there was any basis to these rumors. The nature of Vanuatu-Cuban relations was often explained in the context of the Melanesian ethic of debt repayment; i.e., that Vanuatu felt it owed Cuba for having taken the lead to move for reinscription of the (former Anglo-French condominium of) New Hebrides on the list of countries deemed by the United Nations to be in a colonized state. However, there was a growing body of evidence that suggested the nature of Vanuatu-Cuban relations went beyond this ethic of debt repayment.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) In late April 1984, while Vanuatu Prime Minister Lini was visiting Japan, he met with the Cuban Ambassador. During the meeting the ambassador proposed a plan for covert training of the Vanuatu Mobile (police) Force and for providing agricultural and unspecified economic assistance. Recognizing regional apprehensions over a Cuban presence in the South Pacific, however, the ambassador suggested that the training could be accomplished instead by the SRV. Vietnam was seen as being a logical choice to conduct the training, in that Vanuatuan relations with that country could be explained in terms of the two nations' shared experience as former colonies of France. Although the status of the proposal was not known, receipt of such training would be rationalized within the context of Vanuatu's policy of nonalignment. Vanuatu had previously received military training assistance from Australia; therefore, training in Vietnam would serve to balance that.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Ibid.

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SECTION IV--THREAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Soviet Union and ASEAN

(C) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and, later, Brunei), founded in 1967, professed nonalignment but maintained the anti-communist stance that was at the heart of the 1954 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact) and manifested in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. The Manila Pact remained in effect, although SEATO activities ended around 1977. After World War II the rise of Asian nationalism provided a milieu for communist expansionist subversion and insurgency in the post-colonial void of Southeast Asia. Communist parties in the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia became active with Soviet and Chinese ideological and material support.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The 12-year Malaysian emergency, the rise of the Huks in central Luzon, the Chinese massacres in the mid-1960s which climaxed Sukarno's flirtation with communism, and the rise and fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia--all permanently solidified the fear and threat of communism in Southeast Asia. This had been sustained by the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of that country, and the established Soviet military presence in the three states of Indochina.

(C/NOFORN) Soviet handling of Southeast Asia had been conditioned by this history, particularly the opportunity for inroads in Vietnam, the strategic rapprochement between China and the United States, by the general turning back of communist insurgent initiatives in what became the ASEAN states through the 1950s and 1960s, and by the rapid economic progress in the region since then. Although a variety of party-to-party and leftist student labor and support activities had been continued, the Soviets attempted to cultivate overt state relationships in economic and cultural channels while maintaining covert espionage activities. Soviet strategic interests in developing good relations with ASEAN would preclude any substantial direct initiatives to support indigenous communist movements--particularly in view of the weakness of such movements. However, covert espionage activity and anti-western/capitalist subversion aimed at gaining Soviet inroads at the expense of other foreign powers could be expected to continue. In the last few years exposure of Soviet agents and espionage in ASEAN had been recurrent and widely publicized, and had undercut Soviet diplomatic and economic efforts to broaden relations in the area.

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1. IPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (S/NF), 28 Nov 84, Subj: Soviet Expansion into ASEAN Region (U), DECL OADR.

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(S/NOFORN) The Moscow-oriented Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP)--the party of the Huks--surrendered militarily to the government in 1974 but persisted as a quasi-legal leftist organization which received some financial support from overseas communists, principally the Soviet Union. It had been overshadowed by the Maoist-oriented group that splintered in 1968 to become the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)-Marxist/Leninist and fielded its armed New People's Army (NPA) in 1969. The CPP/NPA initially received party-to-party support from China, but this ceased in 1975 when the PRC was recognized by the Philippine government.

(S/NOFORN) Apparently, for the short term, Moscow had decided that Philippine President Marcos' staying power was intact. Releases on that country in TASS and Pravda had been slanted in favor of the Marcos government and against the "meddling presence of neo-colonial imperialists" (the United States) in Philippine affairs. In 1982 there was some concern over commercial efforts by the Soviets to gain access for merchant ship repairs in Subic Bay, not far from the U.S. naval facilities. The Philippine government eventually quashed the attempt on security grounds after firm signals were given by the U.S. Ambassador and USCINCPAC to their Philippine civilian and military counterparts.

(C/NOFORN) In June 1984 the American Embassy in Manila publicly exposed a disinformation attempt attributed to the Soviets involving fake U.S. Information Agency survey forms sent to prominent Filipinos. The bogus 21-page survey on USIA letterhead stationery purported to be a "study of tendencies which are now developing in ASEAN countries," and included a tendentious list of personal and leading questions geared to insulting the recipients and provoking anger against the United States. USIA disclaimers corrected the problem, but similar provocations were instigated simultaneously in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Near the end of 1984 the Soviets were angling to procure a new embassy location in Manila in line-of-sight with the U.S. Embassy. Although American and Philippine authorities apparently maintained contact on the subject, the concern was that the Soviets might be able to pay a high cash price to buy out a big property owner anxious to liquidate his assets and get out of the country.

(U) In Thailand, there did not appear to be active concern about Soviet disinformation ploys. Since the Thai caught a Soviet "trade official" (a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet Intelligence Service) red-handed in May 1983 taking delivery of classified documents, the Soviets had lowered their profile somewhat.

(S/NOFORN) Soviet misbehavior in Indonesia in recent years included anti-U.S. disinformation and active measures, propaganda targeted against Indonesian Army officers and government officials, agent-recruiting among Indonesians and the foreign diplomatic community, and espionage. The government of Indonesia dealt with these problems quietly and only occasionally had

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taken action against the Soviets in response. This lenient approach was prompted by Indonesian concern to project its nonaligned image. However, the government would not tolerate expansion of any activity to a level which would actually threaten the security or stability of the country.

(C/NOFORN) The governments of Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei and their citizenry distrusted Soviet intentions and it appeared the Soviets devoted little effort to mount active measures in those countries. Singapore reportedly had identified no communist-front groups or disinformation attempts, and the media were tightly controlled by the government. What little communist activity existed (including the reportedly continuing presence of a small number of cadre from the Communist Party of Malaya) was not considered a threat to stability. Malaysia was concerned in general about subversion of the large Muslim and Chinese components of its population. There was no data available on the Soviet relationship, if any, with Brunei.<sup>1</sup>

### The Situation in Vietnam

#### People's Army of Vietnam

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT) The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), with a strength of over 1.2 million, was by far the largest military force in the region and had the capability of sustaining offensive and defensive combat operations anywhere on mainland Southeast Asia. The PAVN was equipped with 2,200 tanks and more than 1,850 armored personnel carriers. The army maintained an estimated 712,000 troops (56 percent of its ground forces) in northern Vietnam, 150,000-170,000 in Kampuchea, and approximately 50,000 in Laos.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT) The PAVN Air Force had a complement of 12,500 personnel. Of its 762 aircraft (located at 15 major airfields), 586 were considered operational in mid-1984. Some 393 fixed wing aircraft and helicopters (67 percent of the total) were located in northern Vietnam. The PAVN Navy, with a complement of 12,000 personnel, operated an estimated 160 Soviet, Chinese, and U.S.-produced vessels, and controlled all naval activity in Vietnam and Kampuchea. Vietnam's reserve force was organized around the lightly armed 1.6 million parttime militia and self-defense forces and a potential reserve of some 3 million registered women and overage males. In the event of hostilities these forces would be a source of manpower for the regular forces.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Ibid.
  2. IPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT), 10 Oct 84, Subj: Status of PAVN in Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos (U), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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### Soviet Military Equipment Deliveries

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Soviet military aid to Vietnam had had a slight surge since mid-1983. Major deliveries included 51 MIG-21/FISHBEDs, 2 PETYA-II light frigates, 4 SHERSHEN torpedo boats, 2 SO-1 subchasers, 1 KHERSON 8,500-ton floating drydock (for dual civilian-military use), and 4 AS-7/KERRY air-to-surface missiles. While these deliveries probably represented a monetary value increase over the \$500 million annual military assistance noted during the past 2 years, they did not, as such, indicate a massive influx of weaponry as that which occurred in 1979-1980. Rather, it was believed the Soviets were providing selective inventory gap-fillers and enhancements to Vietnam. Nevertheless, the introduction of weapon systems such as the KERRY tactical ASM demonstrated continued Soviet willingness to modernize the PAVN.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Regarding some of these arms deliveries, the MIG-21s might be used to form new fighter regiments or might replace older-model FISHBED or MIG-17/FRESCO aircraft in existing regiments. The delivery of this large number of MIG-21s suggested that the MIG-23/FLOGGER probably would not be introduced into the Vietnamese inventory in the near future.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The naval vessel deliveries helped fill out the meager Vietnamese inventory. The arrival of two new PETYAs brought to four the total number of such frigates there. They were believed to be Vietnam's only operational major surface combatants. The four SHERSHEN torpedo boats were delivered to Vietnam with SA-N-5 SAM launchers installed. These represented the first SAM-equipped naval craft identified in the Vietnamese Navy.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Vietnam's second 8,500-ton floating drydock arrived at the Ho Chi Minh City port facility in January 1984, and was positioned upstream from the first one. The first drydock had serviced mostly commercial vessels and three Soviet naval auxiliaries since its arrival in December 1982. Both drydocks were expected to remain at Ho Chi Minh City, where they could service both Vietnamese and Soviet merchant and naval vessels. The drydocks were capable of handling Soviet attack submarines and surface combatants up to the size of a KRESTA class cruiser.

### Air Force Capabilities

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The existing Vietnamese Air Force (VAF) was the product of two major inventory transitions which occurred during the past decade. During the Vietnam War years, up to 1975, the VAF was equipped with older FISHBED, FARMER, and FAGOT/FRESCO aircraft. In its primary mission--defensive counterair--aircraft were secondary to SAMs and AAA. The first major transition came in 1975 with the fall of Saigon. At that time the VAF

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1. IPAC Intelligence Summary (S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT), Apr 84, pp. 4-6, DECL OADR.

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gained more than 1,000 U.S.-manufactured aircraft. These included F-5 and A-37 ground attack aircraft as well as UH-1 gunship and transport helicopters and other types of craft which had been in the South Vietnamese Air Force. While the Soviet-manufactured aircraft possessed by the VAF were suitable for ground attack their capabilities were limited, compared to the U.S. aircraft. As a result, the VAF obtained a good ground attack inventory for which it had no existing operational doctrine. However, the North Vietnamese used former South Vietnamese pilots to train the VAF in these aircraft, and by late 1975 were using UH-1 gunships against insurgents in the central highlands of southern Vietnam.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The U.S. aircraft-equipped VAF served the limited needs of the country after 1975. They were used in the invasion of Kampuchea in 1978 and were deployed to northern Vietnam in 1979 in response to the Chinese threat. In actuality, they played only a minor role in the invasion of Kampuchea and virtually no part in combat with the Chinese in the north. By 1979 the age of the aircraft and the lack of spare parts were having a debilitating effect on the fighter and transport fleets. It was in this period that the Chinese invasion prompted Hanoi to accept Soviet assistance, and this paved the way for the second major transition for the VAF--one characterized by a massive influx of newer Soviet-manufactured aircraft.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) This second transition began in early 1979, when the Soviet Union started supplying aircraft to the VAF on an unprecedented scale. The inventory was rapidly upgraded in air defense with late-model MIG-21s, in ground attack with SU-22s and MI-24s, in airlift with AN-26s, MI-6s, and MI-8s, and in antisubmarine warfare with BE-12s and KA-25s. These fixed and rotary wing aircraft gave the VAF the inventory needed to structure an air force which could provide multi-mission support to the other services of the armed forces.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) In 1984 the VAF continued to receive new aircraft deliveries from the Soviet Union, although at a reduced rate compared to 1979-1981. The transition to newer Soviet aircraft had reached the point, by early 1982, where the VAF was able to retire its F-5s and A-37s from active service. The existing operational inventory totaled about 800 aircraft of all types, including 300 combat models. Although the VAF now had an impressive inventory, it had some fundamental problems which would hamper optimum combat employment of these aircraft.

(S/NOFORN) Although the Vietnamese had gained limited experience in ground attack operations in Kampuchea with F-5s and A-37s, they used virtually none of the newer Soviet tactical aircraft in combat. VAF air-to-air combat skills had not been tested since the Vietnam War, and proficiency probably declined as a result of disuse and as experienced pilots assumed non-flying

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1. Ibid.

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positions. Although the VAF had many skilled interceptor pilots during the war years, the force had been relatively inactive, conducting only limited training. In view of these factors, the overall ability of the VAF MIG pilot was rated by U.S. intelligence as only fair.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The experience/proficiency problem was further complicated by limited realistic training and exercise activity. Because of this realism gap, it was questionable whether the VAF was capable of making even moderate use of the lethal ground attack potential of the FITTER and HIND fleets, or of the qualitative advantages of the late-model FISHBEDs. An increase in major exercises in Vietnam since 1981, however, could indicate that the Vietnamese were attempting to deal with this problem, and were also working towards the development of doctrine and tactics which would enable the VAF to make better use of its modern inventory.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Another key factor in the weapons system proficiency equation was maintenance. The availability and training of technicians were continuing problems for the VAF and had worsened with the influx of new aircraft. The once-excellent aircraft operational rate was believed to have declined to the point where perhaps 50 percent of the older VAF aircraft could be inoperative as a result of lack of proper maintenance. These maintenance and parts problems were believed to have been responsible for the retirement of the F-5s and A-37s.

(S/NOFORN) In general, these factors notwithstanding, the VAF did possess the capability to successfully conduct air defense and ground attack operations against the forces of other countries in the region, with the possible exception of the PRC. The VAF also was capable of defending its own airspace against the air forces of these countries. However, it was not known what kind of sortie rate the VAF could produce and maintain in the event of hostilities. Looking at various regional scenarios, it was estimated the VAF could adequately defend northern Vietnam against a Chinese assault for the short term, but eventually would lose an air war of attrition if the Chinese were to employ that type of strategy. The possible slight qualitative advantage held by the VAF was largely overshadowed by the PRC's considerable quantitative advantage.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) In Kampuchea the VAF could introduce fighters from southern Vietnamese airfields with minimum preparation, but would have difficulty sustaining operations in western Kampuchea. An airfield in Kampuchea would be needed as a forward operating location for launching or recovering fighters for strikes in the western part of that country. There was no evidence of any such preparations by the Vietnamese.

(S/NOFORN) Concerning offshore claims, many VAF tactical aircraft had sufficient range to reach the Spratly Islands area, but would have little loiter time left before having to return to base. However, such a scenario

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was unlikely because the VAF seldom operated fighters over water--nor were fighters normally operated at the maximum limit of their radii. The BE-12s, on the other hand, had flown to the vicinity of the Spratlys and could loiter for as long as six hours at that distance.

(S/NOFORN) In summary, the VAF had come through the transition years as a well-equipped but relatively untested force. Inventory improvements were obvious, but their integration into effective combat operations would be hampered by the factors mentioned above. Personnel and maintenance problems would continue to have a negative effect on the VAF, and there were no likely solutions in sight. As the VAF increased training and exercise activity and pursued the development of integrated air-ground operations, the actual benefits of a late-model inventory would begin to be realized. This would have the effect of enhancing, in real terms, the VAF's capability to conduct combat operations.<sup>1</sup>

### Internal Resistance

(S/NOFORN) A number of organizations were involved in resistance activities against the SRV government. However, government repression, disunity among resisters, lack of effective outside support, and limited logistics severely reduced their ability to wage an effective campaign against the authorities. The largest resistance organizations were comprised of either ethnic or religious groupings. There were also small Vietnamese exile groups offering limited resistance to the communist regime. In addition to the activities of these formalized anti-SRV factions, there had been limited expression of discontent including acts of sabotage by peasants, intellectuals, and urban dwellers. None, however, posed a serious threat to the government.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) In 1984 the only viable anti-regime activity was being conducted in the central highlands by the tribally based United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races (FULRO). It was originally established in 1964 to combat the anti-hill-tribe policies of the South Vietnamese government. It was now estimated that there were as many as 2,000 FULRO insurgents operating in the area.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) There were also three Vietnamese exile groups which worked towards the overthrow of the Hanoi regime: the Movement for the Liberation of South Vietnam, the United Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, and the National Salvation Front. These groups were involved in very limited activity and there was no evidence that they represented any real threat to the SRV.

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1. Ibid.

2. IPAC Intelligence Summary (S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT), Jan 85, pp. 5-6, DECL OADR.

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(C) For the long term Hanoi was probably most concerned by religious groups, whose appeal reached beyond ethnic lines. Vietnam's Buddhist sects, with at least 30 million followers among the country's 57 million people, were the largest organizations in Vietnam not under the control of the Communist Party. The largest and most formidable of these sects was centered on the An Quang Pagoda in Ho Chi Minh City. Established in 1949, An Quang was formerly in the forefront of political opposition to South Vietnamese governments. Later, despite the existing communist government's attempts to break the sect by arresting leaders, intimidating its followers, and organizing a rival church, Hanoi had been unable to wean Vietnamese Buddhists away from An Quang.

(C) Vietnam's Catholic population, estimated at between 3 and 4 million, had always been strongly anti-communist. In 1975 and 1976, Catholics mounted a short-lived armed resistance against the SRV government and continued to resist assimilation into the communist state. Vietnam's 100,000-200,000 Protestants, although less active politically, were heavily represented among the hill tribes of the central highlands.

(C) Adding to SRV security concerns were two uniquely Vietnamese religious sects, the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai. The former, located in the Mekong Delta region, was a militantly anti-communist reformist Buddhist sect numbering about 2.4 million people. They offered stiff resistance to the final 1975 communist offensive and in June 1983 the SRV government noted that the sect was probably responsible for the murders of many Communist Party members and their relatives living in the delta region. The Cao Dai sect, numbering between 1 and 2 million, initially attempted to find accommodation with the Hanoi regime. However, later reporting indicated that government repression had led to the formation of several Cao Dai anti-communist underground organizations.

(S/NOFORN) In summary, the SRV had conducted a concerted and largely successful effort to neutralize all internal opposition to the communist government. It had used military force or police repression against nearly every religious group and ethnic minority in the country. Church and tribal leaders had been imprisoned or exiled, organizations without state approval disbanded, religious practitioners harassed, and minorities pressed to assimilate. Armed resistance in the central highlands was reduced to the nuisance level. Activities by exile groups posed no serious challenge. Generally, for the present and foreseeable future, there was no serious internal threat to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In December 1984, in what was described as "the biggest espionage trial in Vietnam's history," the SRV government said it had recently uncovered a conspiracy going back to 1976 involving over 100 people led by two former South Vietnamese Air Force officers. The group allegedly had infiltrated

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1. Ibid.

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personnel into Vietnam since 1981, stockpiled weapons, conducted espionage and sabotage, and was preparing a series of attacks on sites in Ho Chi Minh City. Hanoi claimed that the Chinese and Thai were deeply involved in directing the conspiracy and that the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok was at least "informed" of these developments. The U.S. State Department said that anti-Hanoi plotting along the lines described by the SRV had been corroborated by intelligence reporting, but that it did not seem to pose a serious threat to the regime. The State Department was aware of no group that was capable of seriously challenging the SRV government with armed activity inside the country.<sup>1</sup>

### Territorial Claims in the South China Sea


(C/NOFORN) Conflicting territorial claims involving the Philippines, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Indonesia were a source of regional contention in the South China Sea. The situation was further complicated by the constantly expanding attention given by the superpowers to the importance of strategic shipping lanes that transited the area and to the economic considerations of fisheries and mineral resources. Because of these factors the Soviets, Chinese, and Vietnamese were all active in the South China Sea area.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN) Soviet activities in the South China Sea stemmed from their objectives and interests in the region which included the desire to:

- Establish and maintain a presence in this traditionally poorly Soviet-penetrated region, in the context of global political competition.
- Develop a military force capable of countering U.S. deployments in the region.
- Pose a southern-flank threat to the PRC, to complicate Chinese confrontational behavior on the Sino-Soviet border.
- Develop a competitive blocking presence to a potential long-term PRC penetration of the region.
- Develop a source of leverage in dealing with ASEAN, and establish a stepping stone towards Oceania for potential political and commercial benefit.
- Develop and maintain a dependency among its surrogate partners in Indochina by capitalizing on their economic dependency and communist governments.


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1. SECSTATE 369232/150538Z Dec 84 (S)(EX), DECL OADR.
  2. IPAC Intelligence Summary (S/NE/INTEL/NOCONTRACT), Jan 85, pp. 6-11, DECL OADR.


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
(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Soviet South China Sea activities focused on the naval and air facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam (see Section II, above). Its presence there provided a significant in-place threat to regional and allied naval forces and merchant shipping. Other Soviet activity in the region was centered in Ho Chi Minh City. Moscow's interests there were twofold: the existing situation allowed the Soviets to realize a return on capital investment in Vietnam, and it reduced shipyard load in the Soviet Pacific Fleet without transiting back to European Russia. To date, maintenance had been limited to auxiliaries, and there was no evidence to suggest that combatants would be serviced there in the near future.

(S/NOFORN) Chinese objectives and benefits in the South China Sea included desires to: perpetuate historical sea claims; assert territorial prerogatives; assert itself as the dominant regional power; exploit natural resources; counter superpower presence and inroads in the region, including the United States, but especially the USSR; maintain a presence in this historically Chinese-penetrated area in the context of regional political competition; develop a source of leverage in dealing with ASEAN; and complicate Vietnamese confrontational behavior along the PRC-SRV border and Vietnamese aggression in Kamupueha, especially along the Thai border.





(S/NOFORN) Vietnamese activities in the South China Sea supported Hanoi's objectives and benefits which paralleled, with variations, those of the PRC and included a desire to: perpetuate historical sea claims and the assertion of territorial prerogatives; develop Vietnam as the dominant regional power; exploit natural resources; maintain a presence in this historically competitive (Chinese-Vietnamese) area; complicate Chinese confrontational behavior along the PRC-SRV border and PRC support for Kampuchean resistance forces; and counter superpower presence and inroads in the region, including sidetracking U.S.-PRC "collusion," and positioning Vietnam for eventual reduction in dependency on the Soviets.



Thailand

The Vietnamese Threat

(S/NOFORN) No direct threat to the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Thailand from Vietnam was foreseen over the next 5-10 years. Nevertheless, the PAVN, because of its size and capabilities, did represent a potential threat to Thailand and to the peace and stability of the region that could not be ignored. Moreover, the Vietnamese were expected to again launch limited operations along the Thai-Kampuchean border which might involve Thai forces, and which might, therefore, require a U.S. response.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN/WMINTEL) A majority of the PAVN forces, as noted earlier, were tied down in the Hanoi area and the four northern military regions of the country; the requirement to maintain security against the perceived threat from China limited the number of troops that could be deployed elsewhere. Similarly, the Chinese threat, together with the need to maintain political influence and aid in combatting insurgency, explained the presence of Vietnamese troops in Laos. Little threat to Thailand was perceived from these PAVN forces. The principal threat to Thailand, therefore, stemmed from the presence of PAVN troops in Kampuchea, of which approximately 50,000-70,000 were within 50 miles of the Thai border. Elements of these forces were capable of conducting limited operations across the border at any time during the dry season (November-May). Limited incursions into Thai territory had occurred several times during the previous dry season, most notably in January and April 1983, during attacks on Cambodian refugee camps.

(S/NOFORN) The now well-established cycle of dry season attacks by the PAVN against Khmer resistance forces along the border, followed by a standdown during the rainy season, was expected to continue for the foreseeable future. There was, therefore, the recurrent possibility of engagements between Thai and PAVN forces, with risks of escalation and possible U.S. involvement.<sup>3</sup>

Status of Insurgency

(S/NOFORN) Over the years the Thai government had conducted a successful campaign against insurgent groups belonging to the Communist Party of Thailand

1. Ibid.
2. IPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (S/NF/WMINTEL), 13 Feb 84, Subj: SRV Threat to Thailand (U), DECL OADR.
3. Ibid.

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(CPT) and the southern Muslim separatist organizations. Government efforts had reduced CPT strength from a high of some 14,000 in 1979 to an estimated armed strength of only 2,000 by late 1984. Efforts against the Muslim separatists were harder to assess because of Thai reluctance to dignify them as insurgents, their close connection with criminal elements in southern Thailand and, at times, the identification of separatists as members of the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM), who also used southern Thailand as a refuge from Malaysian anti-CPM operations. Finally, Burmese insurgent groups such as the Shan United Army, along the Thai-Burma border, also posed a limited threat by establishing bases of operations or refuges inside Thai territory.<sup>1</sup>


(S/NOFORN) Employing a mix of civic action and military suppression campaigns, the Thai continued to conduct successful operations against the CPT. Several mass surrender ceremonies were held at which as many as 1,000 CPT members and sympathizers defected to the government side. The majority of the traditional CPT strongholds in northern Thailand was in government hands and the residents were being assisted in developing and improving their livelihood through road construction and the electrification of villages. Each insurgent who surrendered was granted farmland and the supplies necessary to establish a new life. Those insurgents who had been urban dwellers and who did not desire to become farmers were allowed to return to urban areas. USCINCPAC believed that while the CPT would probably never be totally eliminated, it was no longer a threat to Thailand's security. The CPT was not expected to create future problems, provided the government continued to carry out its promised civic action commitments.

(S/NOFORN) Thai assaults against Muslim separatists and their CPM allies in southern Thailand had produced measureable but still inconclusive results. Major CPM camps had been captured and their inhabitants forced to relocate into northern Malaysia. The separatist movement had been basically reduced to bandit status and, as with the CPT, would probably not pose a serious threat to Thai security if the government continued its existing policy.<sup>2</sup>

#### Special Operations Forces

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1. IPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (S/NF), 10 Oct 84, Subj: Status of Thai Insurgency (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. IPAC Intelligence Summary (S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT), Apr 84, pp. 6-8, DECL OADR.

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Malaysian Threat Perceptions

~~(C)~~ The Federation of Malaysia had been formed in 1963 in an atmosphere of continuing internal security problems and an external threat. The internal security problems remained from the 1948-1960 communist terrorist campaign which was defeated with British Commonwealth assistance. The external threat at that time was the opposition of Indonesia to the formation of Malaysia, leading to a period of confrontation in which political, economic, and military pressures were directed against Malaysia. A decade later, the end of the Vietnam war forced Malaysia to acknowledge the departure of British and U.S. forces from mainland Southeast Asia. The subsequent Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea reinforced Malaysia's awareness of an external threat and led to a reorientation of the roles of Malaysian armed forces.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Malaysia perceived the SRV as both its immediate and mid-range external threat, not only because of its domination of Indochina but also

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1. Ibid.
  2. IPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (~~S/NF~~), 8 Aug 84, Subj: Government of Malaysia - Threat Perception (U), DECL OADR.

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because of the unresolved issue of sovereignty over the South China Sea; specifically, the SRV challenge of Malaysia's claim and occupation of Swallow Reef. There was a comparable SRV threat against the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia, which held significant offshore gas and oil reserves. Neither the Gulf of Thailand nor the South China Sea were considered major barriers to an SRV attack against this area. In this regard, the Malaysians considered their country to be a front-line state against the SRV, as much as Thailand was.

(S/NOFORN) The Soviet Union was seen as a persistent unilateral threat to worldwide peace and stability. Externally, however, the more immediate concern of Malaysia was both the existing and potential military support the Soviet Union could provide toward Vietnamese expansionism. In addition, because of its ethnic Chinese communal problems, Malaysia viewed the PRC with suspicion owing to China's support of the communist terrorist campaign after World War II. While the PRC's normalization with the West was welcomed, Malaysia still remained suspicious of China's nuclear power, military modernization, and its long-term objectives in Kampuchea.

(S/NOFORN) The active internal threat was that which was posed by the communist terrorists. Although there had been considerable success against the local communists, it still required an inordinate expenditure of combat resources. In Peninsular Malaysia some 1,500 communist terrorists along the Thai side of the border continued to periodically carry out attacks against Malaysian and Thai security forces and development projects. In eastern Malaysia there was a very small communist insurgency in Sarawak and Sabah. The Beijing-oriented communist groups, however, were factionalized and poorly equipped and the predominantly ethnic Chinese members had not been effective in winning over the masses.

(S/NOFORN) The increased SRV threat and Malaysia's lack of confidence in Thailand's ability to thwart an SRV attack had convinced Malaysia that its military capabilities had to be improved. Malaysia was determined to become self-reliant for defense against external threats, but realized this was a long-term goal. Thus, Malaysia looked to ASEAN, the Five Power Defence Arrangement, and improving defense links with the United States as sources of security assistance in a crisis.<sup>1</sup>

#### Singapore

#### Threat Assessment

(C) Singapore's economic prosperity was closely linked to its political stability and geographic location. To insure this stability and preserve Singapore's national integrity, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had nurtured his nearly non-existent security force of 1965 to a relatively large, tri-service

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1. Ibid.

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military force in 1984. While still smaller than any of her neighbors, Singapore had tried to maintain a qualitative edge through training and the purchase of sophisticated equipment. This energy to modernize and expand military capabilities had been given new impetus by Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, the Thai-Vietnamese border clashes, and increased Soviet military and economic assistance to the SRV.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) Singapore did not face an immediate threat to national security from external sources. Of greatest concern was the threat of possible SRV expansionist policies. Singapore felt that in the event of all-out SRV aggression, neither Thailand nor Malaysia could survive. If such aggression were to occur, Singapore would be prepared to provide forces to Thailand and would probably deploy other forces to forward positions in southern Malaysia to attempt to defend the island. A permanent Singaporean military presence was already maintained in Thailand.

(S/NOFORN) The USSR (and, to a lesser extent, the PRC) was perceived to represent a long-term threat. While nonaligned, Singapore continued to be the staunchest pro-U.S. ASEAN state, and repeatedly condemned Soviet and Vietnamese activities in Southeast Asia. Singapore had been instrumental in bringing Indochinese refugee issues to the forefront in the United Nations. Singapore also maintained its stated intent to be the last ASEAN member to recognize the PRC. Singapore feared that its predominantly ethnic Chinese population had residual ties of loyalty and cultural identity with mainland China.

(S/NOFORN) Singapore was a vocal supporter of ASEAN and believed it was a vehicle by which the six member states could enhance their collective security. Relations between Singapore and its neighbors ranged from excellent with Thailand and Brunei, to "cordial" with the Philippines, and "correct" with Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore's Chinese population generally viewed its larger neighboring Malay state to the north with suspicion. Relations had often been uneasy, and racial tensions--just below the surface in both countries--periodically spilled over the border. For this reason, Singapore had strong motivations to establish a "Singaporean identity" which could override communal differences inspired by racial problems. Currently, Singapore did not consider Malaysia and Indonesia to be immediate threats to national security.

(S/NOFORN) The internal scene remained calm under the firm control of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his party. There was no active armed insurgency but there was a cadre of 250-300 hard-core Communist Party of Malaysia members in Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia with easy access to Singapore, and 500-600 sympathizers in Singapore alone. Historically, left wing extremists had been active in fomenting communal tensions between Singaporean Malays

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1. IPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (S/NF), 8 Oct 84, Subj: Threat Assessment for Singapore (U), DECL OADR.

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and Chinese. The last serious outbreaks were in 1964. In May 1976 the Internal Security Department conducted an operation which apprehended 50 members of two rival communist groups. Singapore's program of arrest and detention of known communists, coupled with a longstanding policy on the part of the CPM not to undertake any significant terrorist activity in Singapore, resulted in a very stable security situation. Additionally, the economic prosperity that Singapore enjoyed had blunted CPM recruitment and retention efforts.<sup>1</sup>

### The Defense Forces

(S/NOFORN) Singapore's post-independence defense policies derived from its strong sense of vulnerability. When Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia in 1965, with just two infantry battalions and a small maritime force, it was decided to develop a large reserve force of trained personnel. Subsequently, Singapore developed a well-armed, balanced military force capable of fulfilling its allotted tasks for a limited period without outside assistance. It continued to improve the quality of forces by training and by the acquisition of modern equipment. The focus in the last few years had been in joint service coordination and training, greater firepower and mobility for the army, and advanced detection and intercept for the navy and air force.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Little change was expected in the ground forces structure, which by 1990 would probably still consist of one regular infantry division plus supporting arms and two reserve infantry divisions plus supporting arms. Barring grave deterioration in regional security, there was little likelihood of further significant expansion of the ground forces. The navy was expected to remain the smallest of the three services and was clearly last on the government's priority list for reequipment. There would probably be little change in the 1980s in the navy's patrol functions, but there should be an increase in the number of patrol craft. An improved mine countermeasures capability was a long-range planning goal.

(C) The air force was viewed as key to the nation's defense and was receiving the lion's share of money and attention. Recent expansion programs showed radical improvements, including the upgrading of four airfields, installation of long-range fighter control and early warning radar, and first-line fighter defense provided by F-5Es with AIM-9 missiles. Future acquisitions would include 20 F-16 multirole fighters and 4 E-2C airborne early warning craft. To aid in modernization of the air force, Singapore expanded an A-4 aircraft rebuild program in 1982 with an output forecast of two aircraft per month. The air transport force was assessed as operationally efficient. Tactical strike training was enhanced by the establishment of detachments in Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia.

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1. Ibid.
  2. IPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (S/NF), 8 Oct 84, Subj: Modernization and Capabilities of the Singaporean Military Force (U), DECL OADR.

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~~(C)~~ Singapore's defense industries continued to develop and expand, and had become the most advanced in Southeast Asia. The country was self-sufficient in small arms manufacture, ammunition production up to 120mm, and small naval vessel construction. Singapore had negotiated training for army and air force personnel in Thailand, Taiwan, Brunei, and the Philippines. The expansion of overseas training, development of defense industries, and advanced technical training for maintenance personnel were expected to receive continued emphasis.<sup>1</sup>

#### Indonesian Threat Perceptions

~~(C)~~ Indonesia's leadership, while continuing to be concerned about internal threats to stability, had begun to pay due attention to external forces that could threaten the northern flank of the archipelago. Jakarta's dominant security concern since independence in 1949 had focused on subversion or political unrest springing from religious and racial tensions within the country. As a consequence, military equipment and training had been keyed to support counterinsurgency and riot control. Regional instability since the fall of Saigon in 1975, however, led Jakarta's military leadership to focus also on potential external threats, particularly along the northern sea lane approaches where Indonesia was ill-equipped to detect violations of its land or sea territory.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)~~ Although convinced that the long-term threat was from China, Jakarta saw a potential short-term threat from Soviet-backed Vietnam, with which it had a boundary dispute in the South China Sea since the 1960s. Indonesian military threat assessments had postulated a "limited war" against its territory by Vietnam, reinforced by the increased Soviet naval presence in Southeast Asia. Any military action in the strategic area lying close to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore would inevitably, in the Indonesian view, involve the superpowers and be disastrous to ASEAN aspirations for rapid economic development.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Internally, notable insurgencies existed in several scattered parts of the island chain. While they did not pose a serious threat to the central government, the total effect of the uncoordinated insurgencies did constitute a drain on the country's manpower and economic resources. In East Timor less than 500 active guerrillas of the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (FRETILIN) remained, following large-scale sweep operations by the Indonesian Army. The left-wing separatist forces still conducted small-scale raids, but were losing support as Timorese civilians moved out of the countryside and into urban areas. The government had

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1. Ibid.
  2. IPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (~~S/NF/NOCONTRACT~~), 8 Aug 84, Subj: Threat Perception of the Government of Indonesia (U), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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initiated reconstruction and development programs in the province, while Indonesian troops continued to conduct pacification operations.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) In Irian Jaya (West New Guinea) small groups from the Free Papua Movement, totaling less than 150 men, were conducting sporadic attacks against local police. Although small, the movement did cause disruptions in relations with neighboring Papua New Guinea. Special forces operations and a border agreement with the PNG helped to curtail the level of guerrilla operations.

(S/NOFORN) In Kalimantan (island of Borneo), activity by the People's Army of North Kalimantan, a small group of communist guerrillas, had been reduced to the level of sporadic banditry. Combined Indonesian-Malaysian border operations had basically destroyed the insurgent group, and only local territorial units from the Indonesian Army remained to maintain security in the area.

(S/NOFORN) In the Aceh area of North Sumatra approximately 75 armed members of the National Liberation Front for Aceh, an Islamic separatist group, conducted isolated terrorist actions against government installations and facilities. Special Forces teams and other military elements conducted patrols and had largely neutralized this organization.<sup>2</sup>

#### Burmese Insurgency

(S) Approximately 30 insurgent factions, representing an incoherent mix of separatists, communists, bandits, and narcotics traffickers, had actively opposed the Rangoon government since Burma gained independence in 1948. In particular, the so-called "Socialist Revolution" of 1962 had failed to satisfy the aspirations of powerful tribal groups such as the Karen, Kachin, and Shan, who sought autonomy to conduct their own affairs. Also, the PRC-supported Burmese Communist Party failed to gain any recognition for its cause. The net result was that as many as 25,000 to 30,000 armed insurgents now opposed the government for a variety of reasons.<sup>3</sup>

(S/NOFORN) The Ne Win government had failed to take steps to assimilate Burma's numerous ethnic minorities, and had offered no incentive for these upland peoples to place national identity above tribal affiliation. Moreover, the government's performance in the arenas of social programs, economic development, national unity, and in internal security had been dismal for the

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1. IPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (S/NF), 8 Aug 84, Subj: Insurgencies in Indonesia (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. IPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (S/NF), 18 Sep 84, Subj: Burmese Insurgent Problems (U), DECL OADR.

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past 25 years. The principal insurgent organizations and their estimated strengths and objectives were as follows:

- Burmese Communist Party; 12,000; overthrow of the government.
- Shan United Army; 3,500; narcotics.
- Kachin Independence Army; 3,000; autonomy, narcotics.
- Shan State Army; 2,000; narcotics.
- Karen National Liberation Army; 2,000; autonomy, smuggling.

~~(C)~~ The Burmese Communist Party probably posed the greatest long-term political/military threat to the Rangoon government. It was supported by the PRC, although not to such a degree that it represented an immediate threat to the central government. Since a key tenet of Burmese foreign policy was the maintenance of good relations with the PRC, it appeared that so long as that relationship remained cordial, the PRC would not aid the communist party beyond the extent required to sustain its revolutionary credentials. Activities were confined to the central and eastern portions of the Shan State plateau, east of the Salween River.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Karen National Liberation Army and its political arm, the Karen National Union, had long sought autonomy for their tribal-occupied region of Kawthule State in eastern Burma, adjacent to the border of Tak Province, Thailand. The Burmese Army made an attempt every dry season to crack the Karen strongholds, with little success, and the Karen continued their smuggling and blackmarketing operations along the Thai border. The Thai were generally tolerant of the Karen, and permitted sanctuary for villagers when combat operations caused them to flee across the river into their territory. It was unlikely that the Burmese Army could crush the Karen, but they could disrupt their economic base by isolating border enclaves.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ There was little prospect for resolving these insurgencies in the foreseeable future. Neither Ne Win nor his successors permitted the formation of rival political parties or granted autonomy to the communists or the minorities. The Burmese government would continue to rely on repressive military operations, thereby containing or perhaps diminishing the insurgencies somewhat, but not completely suppressing them.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ A coalition of the various major insurgent groups would pose a much more substantial threat to the central government, but such coalition was judged unlikely. The insurgents lacked unity, had disparate goals, and operated in remote areas of Burma's rugged uplands. As long as this was the case, they posed no direct or immediate threat to the government. On the other hand, they were a constant internal security problem, occupying much of

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the attention of the army. They also caused a serious drain on national resources, were principal suppliers of heroin to the world market, and prevented any coherent approach to national development.<sup>1</sup>

The "Golden Triangle" and Narcotics Trade

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) After Southwest Asia the so-called "Golden Triangle," or the Burma-Thailand-Laos border region, was the world's largest opium-producing area and the source of approximately 20 percent of the heroin consumed in the United States. Of the estimated 607 tons of opium produced in the Golden Triangle in 1983, about 550 tons came from Burma, 37 tons from Thailand, and 20 tons from Laos. This was consistent with Burma's historical position as the region's principal opium producer. Users within the region were believed to consume up to a third of the crop produced, and the remainder was then refined into a crude morphine base or highly refined heroin. Ten kilograms of raw opium were required to obtain 1 kg of morphine base, which could then be further refined into an almost equal amount of nearly pure heroin.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) A large and varied number of unsavory groups were involved in the narcotics trade but the majority of the traffic was controlled by only a few, operating inside Burma adjacent to the Thai border.

[REDACTED] The three principal groups involved in drug production and transfer were:

• The Shan United Army - Believed to control 70-80 percent of narcotics processing and trafficking in the Golden Triangle. Strength estimated at between 1,400 and 2,000.

• The 3d and 5th Chinese Irregular Forces - Numbering between 1,800 and 2,500, they were remnants of Kuomintang (Nationalist) divisions which retreated into Burma in 1949-1950. They operated as warlord bands, running narcotics caravans and refineries, and engaged in smuggling.

• The Burmese Communist Party - Following a reduction in aid from the PRC in the late 1970s, this group moved into the narcotics business to finance their movement.

1. Ibid.

2. IPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT/ORCON), 25 Jul 84, Subj: The Golden Triangle--an Overview (U) DECL OADR.

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(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Both the Burmese and Thai governments had independently undertaken anti-narcotics operations in the past several years, causing some interruptions in the trade. It appeared, however, that the traffickers were quite adaptable and had changed locations of the refineries, sought new distribution routes, and increased their purchases of acetic anhydride. In short, it seemed that the impact of government operations and such international pressures as could be applied had only transitory or minimal effects.<sup>1</sup>

### Trouble in the Philippines

#### Political and Economic Problems

(C/NOFORN) After opposition leader Benigno Aquino was assassinated upon his return to Manila from exile in August 1983, President Marcos faced the most serious situation he had encountered since the imposition of martial law in 1972. Since then, the economy had remained in poor condition but Marcos was able to restabilize the political situation. In the May 1984 parliamentary elections, oppositionists won about 60 of the 200 seats--a sizable minority. The electorate had sent a strong message to Malacanang Palace that the problems facing the Philippines were associated with the president's long tenure in office. Meanwhile, the economic situation had reached a critical stage, with the total national debt approximating U.S. \$26 billion. Foreign exchange reserves were very low. There were four currency devaluations during the past year to try to slow the drain by reducing imports and making exports more attractive. Devaluation, however, also meant increased pressure on the poor, who realized a decrease in buying power.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN) With budgetary restrictions resulting from the financial situation, resources available to the armed forces to handle all potential security threats could become so severely constricted that any increase in insurgent activity would begin to severely strain the ability of the government and its armed forces to respond.

(C/NOFORN) President Marcos was known to have some problems related to his kidneys. He was in seclusion for health reasons during August 1984 and again after 13 November, further raising speculation about his physical condition. One focus of attention was that if Marcos became incapacitated the military could make a move for a central political role.

(C/NOFORN) Public outrage over the Aquino assassination continued throughout 1984 even though demonstrations and violence, which peaked in September 1983, had tapered off by the end of that year. The investigative body looking into the killing received considerable praise for its pursuit of

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1. Ibid.

2. IPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (S/NF), 26 Nov 84, Subj: Philippine Political/Economic Situation (U), DECL OADR.

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the facts but was still left with wide discrepancies between the official government version that a communist hit man killed Aquino, and near-universal popular belief that Aquino was shot by his military escort. The board's final report, issued in late October 1984, was split, with the chairman issuing a minority opinion implicating the military, through the level of the brigadier general in charge of the Aviation Security Command. The four other board members escalated the level of blame to the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Fabian C. Ver. President Marcos acted swiftly to relieve Ver of his duties pending trial. Eventually, the general might very well be cleared of wrongdoing; if so, Marcos would have to weigh the political costs of returning Ver to his chief of staff position.<sup>1</sup>

### The Major Problem of Insurgency

(S/NOFORN) There were two serious, armed insurgencies in the Philippines: the Communist Party of the Philippines Marxist-Leninist and its military force, the New People's Army; and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), with its Bangsa Moro Army in the field. The NPA had expanded threefold during the last 3-4 years and was now regarded as the principal internal threat by the Philippine government. The communists were oriented to long-term struggle, with the ultimate goal of overthrowing the government.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN) The NPA operated throughout the country with the exception of Palawan and Sulu, and used its arms to back up its own shadow government at the local level in rural areas. USCINCPAC estimated NPA strength at over 12,000 armed regulars. Activity had expanded from Luzon to throughout Samar and the Eastern Visayas, Panay, and the eastern half of Mindanao. By early 1983 the Davao area of eastern Mindanao had replaced Samar as the most active NPA area. Recruitment and cadre proliferation continued despite the lack of an external sponsor to pump in money and weapons. The NPA conducted extortion, kidnappings, and liquidations against informers, local politicians, military personnel, and business entities linked to the Marcos government. It appealed to the rural populace by seizing on propaganda opportunities created by military abuse, economic disparity, restrictions on oppositionist political activity, and unfulfilled government promises. Late in the year the NPA was conducting ambush operations in Mindanao in unit strengths of 100 to 200 men.

(S/NOFORN) The MNLF differed from the NPA in several ways. It was technically a separatist movement, not an insurgency. Its goal was not overthrow of the Manila government but establishment of an autonomous or independent region in the Muslim areas of the southern Philippines, chiefly Sulu and Western Mindanao--the only area where the MNLF regularly operated. Unlike the NPA the MNLF drew external support from Islamic countries in the

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1. Ibid.
  2. IPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (S/NF), 26 Nov 84, Subj: The Current Internal/ Security Situation in the Philippines (U), DECL OADR.

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Middle East, mainly Libya, although this support had dropped off considerably in recent years due to factionalism in the movement.

(S/NOFORN) Estimated MNLF strength was less than 10,000 fighters, with many units now dispersed or disbanded. The MNLF chairman and other Muslim leaders remained in the Middle East and communicated through the backlands of Sabah, East Malaysia. The Philippine central government continued a policy of attraction, including amnesty, but with military response to local flareups. Of concern to Philippine authorities was the evidence of direct support to the MNLF by elements within Malaysia. The MNLF maintained camps in Sabah and reportedly had access to hospital facilities there as well.

(C/NOFORN) The post-World War II Huk rebellion was the armed reaction of the anti-government Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, the traditional Philippine communists, active since the 1930s in labor and agrarian agitation and ideologically oriented to Moscow. In 1974 the PKP pledged loyalty to the Marcos government and was allowed to exist as an organization (although not as a political party) which adopted the course of "legal struggle." Ten years later the PKP had an estimated 8,000 members and maintained its contacts with international communist organizations and reportedly received some token support from overseas. The PKP played an active role in the anti-U.S. bases coalition, a propaganda front drawing on many diverse oppositionists and which attempted unsuccessfully to agitate against a review of the military bases agreement.

(S/NOFORN) The ineffectiveness of the older, moderate political opposition encouraged the rise of more radical factions. The anti-Marcos focus had caused these factions, plus radical clergy, communist-influenced labor organizations, and student groups to communicate with each other in opposition to the government. Some funding from international socialist organizations was reported to reach Philippine dissidents. In the United States the Movement for a Free Philippines included a broad range of anti-Marcos people. There were frequent rumors that one or another of the groups was reviewing the option of taking up indiscriminate urban violence in Manila.

(S/NOFORN) President Marcos' dilemma was that he was fully engaged with political, economic, and security matters. The Philippines' weak economy inhibited proper addressal of security threats; conversely, the expenditure of scarce resources on security problems precluded their use on socioeconomic development.

(S/NOFORN) The most threatening internal security situation for the Philippines would be the simultaneous escalation of military activity by both the NPA and MNLF, coupled with resurgent urban terrorism in Manila by other radical groups. There was not yet evidence of significant coordination among these groups. The ideological differences between the Muslims and the communists made any significant coordination improbable. Nevertheless, the

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NPA threat was growing, and the MNLF could overcome factionalism and renew their activity. While these insurgencies did not directly threaten to topple the Manila government, they hurt the country significantly. The geographic spread of the NPA and the political agitation of the party through its front were particularly noteworthy. The Philippine armed forces continued in an effort to reorganize their counterinsurgency program but suffered from shortfalls in funds, logistics, maintenance, and communications. Communist and socialist elements had infiltrated labor and student groups and could be expected to stage protests and demonstrations focusing on nationalism and anti-Marcos themes, and thus carry anti-U.S. overtones.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The U.S. Embassy in Manila advised the Secretary of State in June 1964 that while the Communist Party of the Philippines lacked the capability to topple the central government, it was pursuing a long-term strategy which had worked well thus far. Through its New People's Army, it had been waging a rural-based rebellion against the government since 1969. It was able to break out of the central Luzon cradle of Philippine communism which confined the Huks in the 1950s and had spread its activities to an estimated 62 of the 73 Philippine provinces. By 1980 the groundwork was in place and NPA activities began to intensify. Philippine government officials privately estimated 8,000 armed NPA members; the CPP claimed 20,000 full and parttime guerrillas as of December 1983.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The Embassy said the CPP was moving across the Philippine Archipelago in a "ratchet-like manner" to expand its influence. The government could still take effective action and reverse the trend of events but the longer it delayed in beginning to deal effectively with the problem the harder this would be. Fake surrender ceremonies, stylized "dialogues," and one-shot civic action programs received dress headlines but did little to improve the government's position in the countryside where it counted. Until the government demonstrated its awareness of discontent and undertook to deal with its source, the communist threat would continue to grow.<sup>3</sup>

#### The Armed Forces

(S/NOFORN) The AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) was capable of maintaining law and order and containing and combatting the communist insurgency at existing levels. It was also able to contain the Muslim rebels, except when individual Moro commanders temporarily seized the initiative in specific locales. However, Muslim activity had been declining of late, allowing the AFP to redirect some maneuver forces against the NPA. The AFP could make only token contributions to U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty obligations, and

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1. Ibid.
  2. AMEMB Manila 15136/070507 Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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the government's ability to sustain garrisons and claims in the Spratly Islands against active contenders was uncertain at best.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) The AFP could not withstand a major external conventional attack without assistance. In addition to its material shortcomings, morale problems had arisen from imposed political constraints, government corruption, confused command structure, delay of pay, extension of tours in combat zones, and dissatisfaction with Marcos' policy of retaining certain general officers well beyond normal retirement. Another serious problem occurred when draftees were released from active duty. No provision was made for their subsequent employment, causing some to remain in forward areas to take up a roving life of banditry and petty extortion in the countryside.

(S/NOFORN) Operational military intelligence was weak in the AFP. Field commanders facing the MNLF in the south traditionally complained that the enemy had good order of battle intelligence on the AFP, while the military rarely had timely information on enemy dispositions. The AFP would require major resource input and upgrading to contend with any serious external support for the NPA, resurgent MNLF pressure, or renewed and determined urban terrorism.<sup>2</sup>

(S) With the suspension of General Ver, as noted above, LT GEN Fidel V. Ramos was named Acting Chief of Staff of the AFP. In mid-December 1984, two months after Ramos had been in command, the U.S. Ambassador in Manila apprised the Secretary of State of his views of the change. He said the illness of President Marcos late in the year had set Manila awash in rumors about what might happen if he were to die suddenly or become incapacitated for a lengthy period, and what the military might do in the circumstances. Also, the continued worsening of the NPA insurgency, particularly in Mindanao, had focused attention on the military's ineffectiveness, including its role in abetting the insurgency through acts of abuse and corruption. In all this speculation, the name of the acting chief of staff figured positively, and public opinion appeared to favor LT GEN Ramos as the person who could set the military right if given the chance to exert his brand of leadership.<sup>3</sup>

(S) LT GEN Ramos called on the AFP to regain the confidence of the people by returning to the basic military values of discipline and service. He admitted that much of what was wrong with the AFP had its roots in the martial law years, having become afflicted with "arrogance, abuse of authority, laziness, and corruption." He professed that the military did have some "bad eggs," but claimed they amounted to no more than 2 percent of the force and that it was unfair for the entire organization to suffer because of their

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1. IPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (S/NF), 26 Nov 84, Subj: Force Structure and Limitations of the Philippine Military (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. AMEMB Manila 34552/190823Z Dec 84 (S)(EX), DECL OADR.

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misdeeds. Ramos announced the creation of a special military committee, headed by his deputy, to investigate specific charges of abuse brought against military personnel. He also repeatedly stressed that the AFP would remain loyal to constitutional processes, disclaiming opposition charges that a military junta would take control from an incapacitated president.

(S) The Ambassador said that in any case what had to be kept in mind was that LT GEN Ramos had been the commander of the Philippine Constabulary for some 14 years--a period during which this organization had maintained a reputation for ineffectiveness and abusiveness. And no matter how well intentioned, it was doubtful that he could produce quick, positive results when the AFP's problems were rooted in poor leadership and ineffective institutions which cut across the entire military establishment (and, for that matter, the entire body politic). It was reform of the latter that would be fundamental to countering the insurgency. However, the longer LT GEN Ramos continued as Chief of Staff, "Acting" or not, the more likely he would be able to consolidate his control. The Ambassador was encouraged by the prospect that at least there was a military commander who offered the possibility of effecting reform, something that did not exist before.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Ibid.

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SECTION V--THREAT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA

Western Security and the Indian Ocean

(C) In a briefing made up for presentation to Australian and New Zealand representatives at political-military talks on the Indian Ocean in Washington the U.S. State Department said critical Western interests in the region were: access to Persian Gulf oil and other important strategic minerals, trade with a-quarter of the world's population, and countering Soviet efforts to extend their influence. The upheavals of the 1970s in the Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa dramatized the vulnerability of access to gulf oil and to the sea lanes of communication linking Europe, Africa, Asia, and Oceania. The result was a surge of activity to shore up the Western position in Southwest Asia.<sup>1</sup>

(C) Threats to Western interests stemmed primarily from tensions within or among regional states. The Iran-Iraq war; conflicts between Israel and the Arabs; between Arab states; between India and Pakistan or Sri Lanka; between blacks and whites and among blacks in Southern Africa; national and tribal frictions in the Horn of Africa--all complicated Western relations in the area and carried potential for instability that could seriously hamper Western access. They also provided the chief opportunity for expanded Soviet penetration.

(C) Since Moscow had little to offer toward economic development of the region and even less appeal as a political or social model, its hope for influence lay primarily in exploiting grievances for which there were no apparent peaceful means of redress. Moscow had put itself in an increasingly better position to do just that. Its natural advantage by virtue of proximity to the region had been bolstered on land (through the invasion of Afghanistan) and by sea (through the increase of naval activities from one end of the Indian Ocean to the other).

(C) The Soviets maintained an average of 20-25 naval ships in the Indian Ocean, including 5-10 combatants, and used logistic facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen backed up by major and growing naval facilities in Vietnam. Moscow also maintained a regular naval air presence in the region, based at Aden and Asmara; its submarines operated along key lines of communication; and it had furthered air force projection capability in Afghanistan.

(C) Soviet target countries in the region enjoyed key strategic locations. Moscow had treaties of friendship with Mozambique, Yemen, Ethiopia, and India, and significant arms transfer programs with key countries adjacent to the critical choke points which controlled access to the Indian Ocean. These areas of concentrated effort also coincided with major Soviet naval

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1. SECSTATE 138429/110350Z May 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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operating areas and the transit route through the Mozambique Channel. The strictly military threat posed by this Soviet activity was less important than its psychological impact. Moscow could quickly make an impressive show of force to heighten the nervousness of moderate governments who already felt threatened by local or regional developments. This intimidation factor was increased by the use of terrorism as a tool of state policy by states with close Soviet ties, and sent a potent message to rulers who cooperated with the West.

(C) The West had important assets in the Indian Ocean, especially compared with the Soviet Union: economic resources (investment, trade, and aid) which littoral states wanted for internal development; Australia's position as an Indian Ocean nation; continuing close British and French ties with former colonies, and the Commonwealth roles of the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand; the desire of moderate governments for Western military assistance and cooperative production arrangements; and significant military access arrangements of the United States in the area. None of these advantages, however, was uncomplicated.

(C) Diego Garcia was the only major facility to which the United States and the United Kingdom had guaranteed access. We also had access agreements with Oman, Kenya, and Somalia for peacetime and contingency use of key military facilities. Peacetime U.S. military presence in the region was chiefly naval.<sup>1</sup>

### India

#### Political-Military Situation

(C) Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's assassination on 31 October 1984 came as India was preparing to hold parliamentary elections. After nearly five years in office following her 1980 reelection, Gandhi left to her son and successor Rajiv a country beset with mushrooming corruption, declining law and order, factionalism within the ruling party, and growing unease about the government's ability to cope with such problems. Mrs. Gandhi had served two periods in office (the first from 1966 to 1977) and was a long-time fixture on the Indian political scene. Rajiv was an airline pilot by profession and entered politics only in 1980 following the plane crash death of his younger brother, then the heir apparent. Rajiv easily won the by-election called in 1981 to fill his brother's seat, and in February 1983 was appointed as one of five ruling-party general secretaries.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Ibid.

2. IPAC (IA-5) Point Paper (C), 23 Nov 84, Subj: Political/Military Situation in India (U), DECL OADR.

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(C) Domestic instability--as exemplified by Mrs. Gandhi's assassination--was at a high level, as was corruption. Despite Rajiv's initially smooth assumption of power and acceptable handling of the crisis which ensued as Hindu versus Sikh riots left thousands dead, there was bound to ensue a period of party infighting and political turbulence which would make it more difficult for the new prime minister to consolidate his power. Conversely, these factors would become worse if Rajiv Gandhi managed this consolidation poorly.

(C) Internationally, India's relations with most of its neighbors were strained because of increasing evidence that it had been meddling in their affairs, particularly through covert action. Recent evidence had demonstrated Indian support for terrorist/insurgent elements in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Late in 1984 relations were particularly bad with Pakistan, which India had accused of training Sikh terrorists.

(C) New Delhi demonstrated more pragmatism in its relations with the West. But ties with the Soviet Union remained the keystone of Indian foreign policy because India saw the USSR as the only power willing and able to provide it with a security guarantee and economic and military aid on favorable terms. Future Indo-U.S. relations were likely to be shaped by the resolution of contentious issues such as the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, arms sales to Pakistan, Pakistan's nuclear weapons development program, and economic aid.

(C) The Soviet Union provided India with generous military and economic assistance in order to maintain its foothold in the Indian ocean region and close ties with an influential Third World power, as well as to insure New Delhi's reliance on Moscow. A broad consensus existed in India that without this major Soviet connection, India would not have a respectable heavy industry, sufficient oil supply, an arms manufacturing capability, or adequate weapons with which to defend itself.

(C) Although India continued to view China as its principal long-term threat (and the United States as a major destabilizing presence in the Indian Ocean) Pakistan was the immediate enemy toward which the most enmity and attention were directed. Over the past several years New Delhi and Islamabad, which had fought three major wars with each other (1947-1949, 1965, and 1971), had taken steps to defuse their potentially explosive relationship. Both sides, however, continued to deploy a major portion of their combat power along the mutual border, and firing incidents normally numbered up to several hundred each year. Nevertheless, near the end of 1984, it was believed unlikely that either side was contemplating large-scale military action against the other. India possessed overwhelming military superiority over Pakistan.

(C) In the 1970s the USSR had sold India an estimated \$2.9 billion worth of weapons versus the West's \$1.6 billion. Moreover, from 1980 to 1982,

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India purchased weapons priced at \$6.1 billion from the Soviet Union and just \$2.7 billion from the West. As a result the Indian arsenal had come to be dominated by equipment of Soviet design--as high as 75 percent of the total.<sup>1</sup>

#### Relations with the Soviet Union

(C) A prime consideration in India's original decision to seek closer relations with the Soviet Union was the perceived unreliability of the United States as a possible economic and defense partner, as evidenced by the American "tilt" towards Pakistan in the two later wars. However, since the rise of Rajiv Gandhi, there had been a subtle shift in Indian policy towards a more balanced relationship with the superpowers. India's brand of nonalignment had often been mistaken for a pro-Soviet or anti-American posture, but in reality the country seemed to desire true neutrality. This posed certain problems for the Soviets, who generally believed that nonalignment should be synonymous with "anti-imperialism."<sup>2</sup>

(S) Faced with New Delhi's recent moves to diversify its sources of military weaponry, Moscow offered the Indians its most advanced military hardware instead of the stripped-down export versions normally provided to Third World countries. Recent Indo-Soviet agreements to set up joint production of a number of weapon systems (such as the MIG-27 fighter and T-72 tank) had created increased opportunities for the introduction of Soviet personnel into the country. In mid-1984 the Soviets had an estimated 150 military technicians in India augmenting at least 1,640 economic advisers. Reflecting New Delhi's determination to safeguard its independence and freedom of action, however, all of these personnel were closely monitored by the Indian security services.

(C) Culturally, India was a top-priority target for the Soviets, and they spent accordingly. Working from the strength of a long and trusted political relationship, Moscow used movies, rallies, cultural exchanges, and copious publications to pepper India's masses with the simple, repetitive message that the USSR was a nation that cared about people, cared about India, and continued to be a reliable ally.<sup>3</sup>

#### Relations with China

(C) After attaining independence in 1947 India at first enjoyed cordial relations with China, its giant neighbor to the north. However, tensions arising from the disputed boundary led to military confrontation in 1962. The subsequent warming trend did not begin until 1976 when diplomatic relations

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1. Ibid.
  2. IPAC (IA-5) Point Paper (S), 4 May 84, Subj: Indo-Soviet Relations (U), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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were resumed at the ambassadorial level. Trade resumed in 1977. Since then the relationship had fluctuated. Exploratory talks in December 1981 were the first attempt to sort out the border question since 1962. Further talks were held at the foreign ministry level in May 1982 and October 1983 but no concrete progress was made. Beijing had sought a package deal whereby the existing de facto line of control with minor adjustments could become the permanent boundary. New Delhi, on the other hand, sought separate negotiations on each sector of the common border.<sup>1</sup>

(C) India continued to deploy a third of its armed forces along the mountain border with China, spurred by the haunting memory of the short but devastating 1962 conflict which caught New Delhi totally unprepared. Of greater concern was the possibility of Chinese military support of Pakistan in the event of another Indo-Pakistan war, and Chinese technical aid to Islamabad's nuclear weapons project. Therefore, even if the evolving international climate and larger Sino-Indian interests in normalization prevailed, compromise and settlement of the border issue was viewed as being problematical in the near term.<sup>2</sup>

Bangladesh Relations with India and the USSR

(C) Relations between Bangladesh and India deteriorated in mid-1984, primarily as a result of India's efforts to stem illegal immigration and smuggling by erecting a barbed wire barrier along the common border. New Delhi argued that the barrier was necessary to prevent illegal activities; Dhaka maintained that it constituted a defense structure and violated a 1975 bilateral agreement prohibiting such construction within 150 yards of the border. Skirmishes between border security forces occurred in April, prompting both India and Bangladesh to deploy additional troops to the construction area. Force strengths were returned to normal in June and work on the border fence was suspended at the onset of the rainy season, temporarily easing tensions. However, allegations that Indian border guards crossed into Bangladesh in July, attacking a group of farmers and killing two, further strained relations.<sup>3</sup>

(C) The border incidents aroused nationalistic passions in Bangladesh and rekindled deeply ingrained suspicions of India's intentions. These events highlighted growing strains in Indo-Bangladesh relations which had developed over long-standing differences on water-sharing rights, land and maritime boundaries, and border crossings by insurgents. Both Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Bangladesh President and Chief Martial Law Administrator

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1. IPAC (IA-5) Point Paper (C), 4 May 84, Subj: India-PRC Relations (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. IPAC (IA-5) Point Paper (C), 8 Sep 84, Subj: Relations Between Bangladesh and India (U), DECL OADR.

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LT GEN Hossain Ershad were facing elections, and relations between the two countries were likely to be influenced by their perceptions of possible political ramifications. Gandhi realized that a major political or economic upheaval in Bangladesh could trigger massive Bengali migration into India's border regions, as occurred in 1971, creating social, economic, and political problems. Ershad, meanwhile, was acutely aware of regional power realities and would avoid escalating the border clashes if at all possible.

(C) Equitable distribution of the waters of the Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers had been a major point of controversy since 1947. The most recent water-sharing agreement, signed in 1977, expired on 31 May 1984. India actually controlled the scarce water through its diversion dam completed in 1975 at Farakka, just above the Ganges' entry into Bangladesh. New Delhi was pressuring Dhaka to accept India's proposal to build a Brahmaputra-Ganges River link canal across Bangladesh, designed to allow the abundant Brahmaputra waters to augment the Ganges. Dhaka had long opposed such a canal as being injurious to its interests, particularly in terms of population displacement and potentially serious ecological problems. Bangladesh last rejected India's canal proposal on 6 May 1984.

(C) In addition, Dhaka had accused India of harboring insurgents from the Chittagong Hill Tracts. While the insurgents did, in fact, routinely cross the border and were in some cases receiving Indian aid, New Delhi continued to deny any knowledge of such activities.<sup>1</sup>

(C) President Ershad met with new Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in early November and later informed the U.S. Ambassador in Dhaka that he was encouraged about prospects for improved Bangladesh-Indian relations. Both leaders had reportedly expressed a desire for improved relations and agreed that stability in Bangladesh was in their mutual interest. Ershad said he had told Rajiv that Indian support for opposition political groups in Bangladesh was resented by his people and made India unpopular in Bangladesh. Ershad said he had also mentioned the Ganges water issue to Rajiv as the only problem of real importance between the two countries. Rajiv was said to have expressed confidence the issue could be resolved. Previous experience had indicated that any progress would require intervention by the two heads of government.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Bangladesh's relations with the Soviet Union remained extremely cool since the expulsion of 15 Soviet diplomats in December 1983 for anti-government activities, although the Soviets did not take harsh diplomatic measures in retaliation as earlier threatened. Moscow had expressed displeasure at Dhaka's pro-Western orientation, and instability in Bangladesh could have provided an opportunity for further Soviet involvement

1. Ibid.

2. AMEMB Dhaka 7826/120948Z Nov 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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on the subcontinent. There was increasing evidence that the Soviets were attempting to destabilize Ershad's martial law administration through the funding of leftist political parties and student groups and support for labor agitation and anti-government demonstrations. The pro-Soviet opposition parties were weak and factionalized and would be incapable of themselves toppling the Ershad regime, even with Soviet backing. However, Moscow probably hoped to use the opposition to force a more even-handed stance by Dhaka.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) The Bangladesh security service continued to monitor Soviet activities closely and a new outbreak of political violence, coupled with strong suspicions of Soviet collusion, could prompt Dhaka to demand further reductions in the size of the Soviet Embassy staff. However, if Ershad were able to strengthen his position and be reelected to the presidency, he would probably attempt some degree of reconciliation with the Soviets in order to preserve Bangladesh's position as a nonaligned nation.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Two Soviet-linked publishing houses had been established in Dhaka to facilitate the channeling of funds to leftist groups for anti-government agitation. Among the Soviet officials expelled in December 1983 were two known KGB (Secret Police) agents. Ershad had originally ordered the expulsion of half of the Soviet Embassy staff of approximately 40 diplomats and 100 support personnel but later softened his demands. The Soviet Cultural Center was also closed in December, and Ershad refused to permit it to reopen.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) In 1981 Bangladesh security authorities had seized a shipment of communications equipment en route to the Soviet Embassy in Dhaka. The equipment was held for about a week, then returned to the Soviets for shipment back to the USSR. In December 1983 an Indian leftist newspaper accused the United States of backing the coup which had brought Ershad to power in March 1982. The allegations were believed to be part of the Soviet disinformation effort on the subcontinent.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) The Soviets informed Dhaka that they would be unable to provide the 50,000-75,000 bales of cotton agreed to in a bilateral barter arrangement for 1984. Moscow had likewise failed to fulfill commitments to other customers because of uncertainty about the 1984 crop. However, political considerations were also believed to have played a role in Dhaka's case.<sup>2</sup>

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1. IPAC (IA-5) Point Paper (S/NF/NOCONTRACT), 8 Sep 84, Subj: Relations Between Bangladesh and the Soviet Union (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.

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Sri Lanka

The Tamil Insurgency

(C) Insurgent activity by Marxist separatist bodies comprised of disaffected ethnic Tamils in Sri Lanka reached a point by late 1984 where it threatened government control of Tamil majority areas in the northern and eastern parts of the island nation. The extent to which separatist capabilities had grown during the past year and a half was amply demonstrated in a well-coordinated attack on 20 November when an insurgent force estimated at some 250 used overwhelming firepower and high explosives to destroy a police station, killing at least 27 policemen. This was the largest insurgent action to that time and the greatest number of government casualties suffered in a single incident.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The attack followed a series of "firsts" which occurred during the preceding several weeks and which included the first foreigner killed, the first guerrilla attack outside normal areas of operation, and the first army officer of colonel rank killed. Although still unable to drive government forces from insurgent-infiltrated areas, the separatists were rapidly developing that capability. There was evidence that the Tamil insurgents had established links with radical Sinhalese (majority ethnic group) leftist elements in the Sinhalese south. The inability of the military or police to respond in an effective fashion to these developments insured that the situation would deteriorate even further.

(C) Before July 1983 the insurgent movement had been small and ineffective, with an estimated 200-500 hardcore members. In that month, however, an ambush wiped out an army patrol of 12--the worst loss ever suffered by the Sri Lankan military. Anti-Tamil communal rioting broke out at the mass funeral held in Colombo and quickly spread throughout the country. At least 400 Tamils were killed and 100,000 left homeless. Another 60,000 fled to India. Police stood by, and in many cases members of the armed forces participated in the violence. This communal spasm traumatized the Tamil community, already disaffected due to discriminatory policies of the Sinhalese majority, and provided the insurgents with an influx of manpower. The result was that by early 1984 the Sri Lankan military, which previously had been able to avoid all but minimal involvement in the sporadic terrorist campaign in the north, found itself faced with the prospect of engaging in protracted stability operations. These did not go well, and the insurgency grew.

(C) The separatist movement itself was by that time effectively controlled by an array of Marxist-Leninist groups supported by indigenous sources, the Indian national and Tamil Nadu State governments, Indian private

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1. IPAC (IA-5) Point Paper (S), 26 Nov 84, Subj: Status of Tamil Insurgency in Sri Lanka (U), DECL OADR.

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individuals, and Tamil expatriates. The insurgency, which stemmed originally from legitimate Tamil grievances, had grown because of the inability of the Sinhalese-dominated government to move towards a political compromise which would satisfy both sides. This, combined with the excesses of the overwhelmingly Sinhalese military, had driven increasing numbers of Tamils into the insurgent camp. Ironically, most Tamils were neither communist nor supporters of a separate Tamil state.

(S) Insurgent gains would probably have been even more dramatic if not for the infighting which characterized the separatist movement almost since its inception. There were at least a dozen major groups active, although Sri Lankan authorities put the figure at nearly three dozen. Their total strength was probably more than 5,000. Until relatively recently, most of these personnel were not armed and remained in base areas in Tamil Nadu, India. Recent evidence, however, indicated that increasing numbers were established within Sri Lanka itself, principally in the Ceylon Tamil areas of the north and east but apparently also in Indian Tamil areas of the hill country. They were better armed than previously and for the first time were reported to be using automatic weapons.

(S) Despite its denials, India had supported at least some elements of most of the separatist groups. Available information, however, indicated that these officially sponsored personnel were outnumbered by those who received "unofficial" support from Tamil Nadu officials and private individuals. The role of the national government itself had been fairly extensive and was in the main a response to domestic political pressures. In the development of Indian involvement with the insurgents, there was apparently no intention of endangering the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka or to bring down the Colombo government.

(S) Indian policy makers had made a decision to intervene militarily in Sri Lanka only if communal violence occurred on such a scale as to threaten the very existence of the Tamil community. As a result, separatist groups had worked to create just such a situation.

(C) Colombo continued to refer to the separatists as terrorists although it was aware that what it was facing was a long-term insurgent attempt by communist guerrillas not only to establish a separate Marxist state but also to bring down the central government. Whereas, prior to July 1983, terrorist incidents comprised virtually the whole of the separatist campaign, communal violence in that month provided the insurgents with the excuse to conduct an ideologically motivated revolutionary war. They had made effective use of this opportunity and created an insurgent infrastructure and mass base as called for by Marxist-Leninist theory.

(C) Sri Lanka was thus faced with the prospect of a long-term battle against a communist insurgency posing as Tamil separatism. Even if the

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government countered with a sophisticated and pragmatic approach--something it had been unable to do--the authorities would have to contend for the remainder of this decade with a serious threat to domestic stability.<sup>1</sup>

External Support

(S) External support had been a key factor in the development of separatist capabilities in Sri Lanka. Before mid-1983 numerous members of the principal guerrilla groups in Sri Lanka had already received training abroad from either "liberation groups" (e.g., the African National Congress) or terrorist organizations (e.g., the Palestine Liberation Organization or the Irish Republican Army). The Indian government, by allowing insurgent base areas to be established in its country and by providing training and some weapons, contributed significantly to the increase in the overall level of violence. Colombo's small, lightly armed, and poorly trained security forces were ill-prepared to grapple with the intricacies of conducting stability operations. Although Sri Lankan military personnel continued to be trained in India--approximately 60 per year--it was deemed inappropriate to seek advice and training for this purpose from that country. Thus, Colombo looked elsewhere, primarily to Britain and Israel, for assistance in countering the terrorist threat.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Outside assistance for counterterrorism training was actually very limited. There were probably never more than a half-dozen Israelis in Sri Lanka conducting courses in intelligence methods, explosives, and commando operations at a training center near Colombo. Also, perhaps a half-dozen former British Special Air Service contract personnel reportedly helped to train a special police paramilitary force, which was to replace military personnel involved in stability operations. Late in 1984 London was reportedly making plans to train some 25 Sri Lankan personnel per year in Britain and was cautiously exploring ways in which to do more.

(C) For the immediate future most third-country assistance to Sri Lanka was expected to remain in the area of supply. Prior to 1971 the majority of the country's military equipment was of World War II British manufacture. The 1971 insurgency resulted in a large influx of equipment from a wide range of countries, including Britain, the USSR, the PRC, Yugoslavia, and India. This accumulation, combined with Sri Lanka's unwillingness to develop extensive contacts with foreign sources of armament, left the military with much obsolete equipment and a collective logistical nightmare. As the government became more open to foreign support, however, there were indications of a greater willingness to deal with the West. For example, 20 armored cars were

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1. Ibid.

2. IPAC Point Paper (S/NF), 27 Nov 84, Subj: Third Country Support for Counterterrorist Operations in Sri Lanka (U), DECL OADR.

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purchased from a British firm in early 1984 and 350 M-16 rifles were received from the U.S. firm of Colt Industries in September.<sup>1</sup>

Request for U.S. Assistance

(S) On 2 December the U.S. Ambassador in Colombo met with the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister at the latter's request. The minister said that if the separatists were successful in provoking a Sinhalese backlash, the government would be faced with a war on two fronts--first, to contain the terrorist attacks and second, to restore law and order in the rest of the country. The government did not have the resources to cope with this situation, and the minister made an urgent appeal for U.S. assistance. Specifically, he asked for military hardware, including speedboats and helicopters. He also hoped that units of the SEVENTH Fleet could be dispatched to the area. The Ambassador said that while he appreciated Sri Lanka's perilous situation, the United States had very strict regulations on what could be done. There were rigid requirements mandated by the Congress.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The Ambassador apprised the Secretary of State that this appeal reflected the sense of desperation that was then gripping the Sri Lankan government. It was looking for a miracle to reverse the situation in the north where for all intents and purposes the security forces no longer exercised effective control. It hoped that an infusion of military aid and a show of force would turn the tide against the militant separatists who were holding the upper hand.

(S) While the United States had a clear interest in doing all it possibly could to preserve Sri Lanka's democratic character, the Ambassador said we had nothing to gain from becoming directly involved on the side of the government in the communal problem. Not only would this put the United States in a position of choosing sides in a situation where questions of justice and equity were extremely nebulous, it would have profound ramifications on intra-regional relationships in South Asia and our own bilateral relationship with the area's major power, India. The Ambassador said the most useful role the United States could play in this situation would be to try to convince the government that there could be no resolution to the communal problem, whether on military or political terms, without the direct involvement of India. Major concessions would have to be made to the Tamils to have any hope for preserving some form of island-wide unity.<sup>3</sup>

(U) U.S. Ambassador at Large Vernon Walters visited Sri Lanka and India in early December and met with government leaders of both countries in an attempt to find a peaceful solution to the communal problem. He found that

1. Ibid.

2. AMEMB Colombo 08529/030848Z Dec 84 (S)(EX), DECL OADR.

3. Ibid.

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the Sri Lankan government was determined to achieve peaceful reconciliation with the minority Tamils, to meet their reasonable demands for some devolution of government authority to local bodies, and to counter the arguments of the militant Tamil separatists. Ambassador Walters repeated the U.S. message of support and encouragement in this effort and expressed our readiness to continue cooperating with the Sri Lankan government.<sup>1</sup>

#### Trends in Mauritius

(C/NOFORN) In June 1982 the leftist Mauritian Militant Movement/Mauritian Socialist Party (MMM/PSM) decisively defeated the Labor Party, ending its 14-year rule. Aneerood Jugnauth became prime minister, but the government collapsed in March 1983 with the resignation of 12 MMM ministers, and Jugnauth was expelled from the MMM. He continued as prime minister, however, and formed his own party, the Militant Socialist Movement (MSM). In new elections held in August 1983 the MSM, in an alliance with two other parties, won 41 of the 62 legislative seats. Since Jugnauth's reelection victory, his government generally followed a foreign policy based on pragmatism and on Mauritius' economic interests. While adhering to the general principles of nonalignment, the government had in the main pursued a pro-Western oriented foreign policy.<sup>2</sup>

(C/NOFORN) Relations with the United States improved, with regard to U.S. strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. Visits of U.S. naval ships were again welcomed and even strongly encouraged. On the question of Diego Garcia, the Mauritian government had soft-pedaled its sovereignty claim over the archipelago. More importantly, the Jugnauth government actively sought to provide Mauritian labor for maintenance and support of the Diego Garcia facility and to sell Mauritian produce to the U.S. Navy. The first Navy P-3 visit since June 1982 was conducted in July 1984 (see Operations chapter for ship and aircraft visits).<sup>3</sup>

(S) Having heard rumors in March 1984 that he or other senior officers at the U.S. Embassy had a "special relationship" with the opposition MMM leadership, the Ambassador met with Prime Minister Jugnauth in an effort to dispel these suspicions. The Ambassador said these rumors were totally false, and could be a malicious effort to create difficulties for the U.S.-Mauritian relationship. Jugnauth said it could well be an MMM plant. The Ambassador advised the State Department that Jugnauth's deeply rooted suspicion that the U.S. government was in sympathy with the MMM had long bedeviled our relations. He hoped that this meeting served the purpose of clearing the air and laying to rest some of the more recent and far-fetched suspicions of the prime

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1. FBIS Bangkok (U) 130521Z Dec 84; Department of State Bulletin (U), Vol. 85, No. 2095, Feb 85, pp. 25-28, quoting a 12 Dec 84 address by Ambassador Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
  2. IPAC Fact Sheet, Mauritius (S/NF/NOCONTRACT), 16 Nov 84, DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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minister. However, he said it must be assumed that the Mauritian government's disappointment that its courtship with the United States and the West had not produced more tangible results for the country would remain. This naturally raised the possibility of Mauritius' attempting to get more attention from the United States by seeking help from the Soviets.<sup>1</sup>

(C/NOFORN) By late 1984 the Soviet Union had only limited influence with Prime Minister Jugnauth's government. After the August 1983 elections a distinct chill had descended, given Jugnauth's perception that the Soviets had backed the opposition MMM and continued to support its Marxist leader, Paul Berenger. USCINCPAC believed that if Jugnauth's coalition government were to split and the MMM were to win an ensuing election (it won 46 percent of the votes in 1983), Soviet prospects in Mauritius would improve decidedly. The Soviet Embassy in Port Louis had 20-30 personnel. It was estimated that two or three of these individuals were intelligence officers. There was no Soviet military advisory presence.<sup>2</sup>

(C/NOFORN) Soviet port calls were resumed in June 1984 after a 2-year hiatus. Six Soviet combatant visits were permitted annually, as in the case of the United States and other powers. In May 1983 a 2-year cultural and scientific agreement was signed with the USSR. The accord offered 80 scholarships in the fields of medicine, veterinary science, other sciences, and engineering. In 1984 approximately 140 Mauritian students were studying in the Soviet Union.

(S/NOFORN) The Soviet Embassy was quite active in Port Louis in placing Novosti press articles in Mauritian newspapers, particularly those papers which were in financial need. The U.S. Embassy doubted these articles had a major political effect on the Mauritian people, who gave primary attention to larger-circulation papers which made heavy use of Western news services.<sup>3</sup>

## Seychelles

### Political-Military Situation

(S) The Seychelles government was beset by chronic political instability, economic decline, and a widening gulf between the small white radical ruling minority and the majority black population. Haunted by a history of coup attempts or threats and a major army mutiny, President France Albert Rene relied on military support from the Soviet Union and military personnel from North Korea for political survival. Exploiting Rene's paranoia, the Soviets were aggressively seeking to make inroads into Seychelles with the long-term

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1. AMEMB Port Louis 00921/161137Z Mar 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. IPAC (IA-5) Point Paper (S/NF/ININTEL/NOCONTRACT/ORCON), 19 Nov 84, Subj: Current and Projected Soviet Presence/Issues in Mauritius (U), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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goal of acquiring permanent air and naval access or basing rights in exchange for military aid.<sup>1</sup>

(C) During the past year Rene maintained a delicate East-West balance spurred by security and economic imperatives and a concomitant desire to portray his regime as truly nonaligned. Although Moscow persisted with its virulent disinformation campaign designed to promote distrust of the United States, the predominantly Christian population remained largely pro-Western. The danger to the U.S. Air Force satellite tracking station probably remained minimal so long as Rene appreciated its associated economic benefits. As one of the proponents of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace concept, the Seychelles government sought an end to the U.S. presence on Diego Garcia. Nevertheless, political, economic, and financial factors constrained Rene from evolving a foreign policy openly hostile to Western interests.

(C/NOFORN) Rene was badly shaken by another aborted coup attempt on 30 September 1984. He was also rudely awakened to his vulnerability to Soviet machinations and strong Seychellois resistance to a Marxist society as envisioned by Rene for the island state. Furthermore, the demonstrated readiness of the populace and mid-level military to climb on the coup bandwagon, if there were even a remote possibility of U.S. support, illustrated his precarious hold on the regime.

(C/NOFORN) Responding to charges both in Seychelles and abroad that he was bent on creating a communist state, Rene emphasized his intent to maintain a nonaligned foreign policy, free of domination by either the United States or the Soviet Union. On the home front, Rene rescinded the controversial land nationalization order which entailed the seizure of British-held private properties. The expropriation had threatened to strain Seychelles' relations with the United Kingdom and adversely impact on future tourism growth as well as substantive U.K. investments in the country.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Despite signs of moderation, however, Rene was believed unlikely to reduce ties with the Soviets and North Koreans on whom he relied for political survival, particularly in light of recent rumblings of another coup attempt and distrust of his military. This was underscored by the arrival late in the year of additional North Korean military advisers, raising their total to 140, and which complemented the 15 Soviet advisory personnel in the country.

(S/NOFORN) The Seychelles People's Defense Force consisted of approximately 1,000 personnel (including the Presidential Protection Unit). It was comprised of three infantry companies, one naval company, and a small air wing. Rene lacked confidence in the armed forces and police. Preferential

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1. IPAC (IA-5) Point Paper (S/NF/NOCONTRACT), 21 Nov 84, Subj: Political/Military Situation in the Seychelles (U), DECL OADR.

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treatment of the Presidential Protection Unit had created discontent and morale problems in the remainder of the military, and loyalty of the primarily pro-Western forces was questionable. It was believed most junior officers and enlisted personnel would be sympathetic to a coup attempt. Active participation in a coup could be expected if coup planning were not preempted by arrests, prospects for success and Western support were high, and the possibility of Soviet intervention were minimal.

(S/NOFORN) The Presidential Protection Unit, assisted by North Koreans, was capable of denying military or commercial aircraft access to Seychelles International Airport if not occupied by hostile ground forces, and could defend the island against a company-size ground or amphibious assault without air support. The fragmented Seychelles People's Defense Force and the police, however, probably would disintegrate when confronted by superior forces. As he had in the past, President Rene would continue to rely on Soviet naval port visits as a show of force to quell any coup attempt or popular uprising during his absences from the islands.

(S/NOFORN) Rene had succeeded in creating a new cadre of radical youth through his National Youth Service, the joining of which was compulsory. One out of three Seychellois would have no recollection of life before the revolution. Segments of the army, which came into existence in 1977, were fairly radical, particularly a small corps of senior officers who had been exposed to seven years of Soviet, Cuban, and Libyan military doctrine. All Soviet military equipment had been supplied free of charge or on a loan basis. Nonetheless, there were rising recurrent costs associated with maintenance and repair. While the official defense budget was reported as about 6.5 percent of the national budget, it was estimated at actually being closer to 10 percent.

(C) Following the aborted coup attempt of 30 September 1984, President Rene, in a 45-minute radio and television address on 5 October called for unity in the face of rumors and demonstrations. He assured the country that he was not a communist, that Seychelles would never allow foreign military bases--much less Soviet ones--and that there was freedom of religion in the country. Rene said that for 20 years people had said he was a communist, and that he was out to destroy religion in Seychelles. The truth, he said, was that Seychellois wanted a socialist system of government based on law and equality. No country, especially one as small as Seychelles, could ignore the super powers, "but what we are doing and what we will do is to keep both countries in a position where neither has any control over us," he said. Seychelles had struggled successfully to keep a balance between the two.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Ibid.

2. AMEMB Victoria 01390/090506Z Oct 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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Soviet Influence

(S/NOFORN) The Soviet Union appeared to be intent on gaining permanent air and naval basing rights in the Seychelles to complement the existing access they enjoyed in South Yemen and Ethiopia. Significant increases during 1983 in Soviet political and military activity suggested that Moscow was convinced it could make major gains in the Seychelles in the 1980s. USCINCPAC believed the Soviet leadership had reviewed future permanent basing requirements at several locations in the western Indian Ocean (Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique), and had determined that the Seychelles offered an excellent opportunity to achieve their goal. If the latest trends continued, given the inherently unstable condition of the Rene government, the Soviets could acquire basing rights there with little warning.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) Soviet diplomatic presence had increased from a few personnel in the early 1980s to an estimated 80--an inordinately large contingent for a country with a population of only 66,000. Soviet military advisory presence had fluctuated over the years. While they numbered approximately 15 in late 1984, their number was expected to increase with the commencement of a dry dock project in 1985.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN) The Soviet Ambassador in Victoria had developed close personal ties with Rene and unabashedly exploited the president's paranoia over real or perceived internal and external threats as well as his reliance on the Soviets for political survival. On at least nine occasions since 1979, Moscow had sent naval ships to Victoria to demonstrate its support for the Rene government. Combatants were present during the aborted mercenary coup attempt in November 1981, the army mutiny in August 1982, and civil disorder in October 1982. In June 1984 the Soviets again sent naval units to the islands to preempt potential disturbances in connection with the presidential election. Later, during the September 1984 aborted coup attempt, Moscow deployed a KRIVAK class FFG and a tanker and anchored them offshore to insure the survival of the pro-Soviet regime (as distinct from Rene personally) until the government restored calm in Victoria.

(S/NOFORN) The Soviet Union was the main supplier of weapons to the Seychelles. Military equipment deliveries from 1979 to 1983 had totaled an estimated U.S. \$2.2 million. They included armored cars, antitank weapons, air defense weapons, artillery, radar, and small arms. In 1983 new military hardware such as BM-21 rocket launchers, SA-7/GRAIL SAMs, and coastal surveillance radar systems were delivered.

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1. IPAC Intelligence Summary (S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT), Apr 84, pp. 23-24, DECL OADR.
  2. IPAC (IA-5) Point Paper (S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT/ORCON), 19 Nov 84, Subj: Current and Projected Soviet Presence/Issues in the Seychelles (U), DECL OADR.

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(S/NOFORN) The Soviet Union continued to make progress in its cunning efforts to establish naval access in the Seychelles. For example, Soviet technicians recently refurbished two of the 200,000-barrel British-built POL tanks on St. Anne Island in Port Victoria harbor and filled them to capacity. Presumably, they had future rights to the bunkering facility.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Soviet military air transport activity, which began in February 1983, continued throughout 1984. AN-12/CUB and IL-76/CANDID transports made scheduled overnight stops on the main island of Mahe one to three times a month en route to Mozambique and possibly Madagascar. In addition, Aeroflot operated one commercial TU-154 flight, usually on the third Tuesday of each month.<sup>1</sup>

(C/NOFORN) In a conversation with U.S. Embassy officials in Victoria in mid-July 1984 the Soviet Ambassador to Seychelles raised the possibility that Moscow might ask for "equal military basing rights" in response to the USAF tracking station on Mahe Island. The Soviet Ambassador also said he had told President Rene about the alleged military functions of the tracking station, claiming it received information from U.S. satellites targeted against the USSR. In response to a direct question, the Soviet Ambassador stated that in case of an external or internal threat, he would recommend that Moscow commit Soviet forces to aid the Rene government. He noted, however, that in the absence of a "real" threat, he could not say whether commitment of military force was official policy.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN) The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency commented that the Soviets apparently believed they were approaching a strong enough position to make demands on the Rene government, and possibly to Rene directly. Moscow was waiting for the most opportune time to make a request for "equal" basing rights. It might also try to influence any Seychelles decision on future U.S. Navy P-3 visits to the islands. Moreover, the Soviets might seek to use the basing-rights issue as justification for setting up a signals intelligence site in the Seychelles.<sup>3</sup>

(C) The U.S. Ambassador in Victoria apprised the State Department that on 7 August 1984 the Soviet Ambassador had told him the USSR would not ask for a military base or other military facilities in the Seychelles so long as President Rene remained in office. They did, however, reserve the right to request a "civilian facility," given the presence of the USAF tracking station. The Soviet Ambassador said they would not seek a base or military facility for two simple reasons: it would undercut their political campaign for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, and President Rene would not allow it. But, the Soviet Ambassador continued, if he or the Seychelles government

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1. Ibid.

2. DIA 212-11A/310210Z Jul 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.

3. Ibid.

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accepted the U.S. argument that the tracking station was not a military facility, then the USSR would be perfectly within its rights to request an equivalent facility. He did not spell out what kind of facility he had in mind, but the interpreter at one point mentioned a "radio station."<sup>1</sup>

Improving Relations with Madagascar

(C/NOFORN) Since the election of President Didier Ratsiraka in 1975 Madagascar had followed a policy of "revolutionary socialism" which moved the country away from previous French influence towards a leftist ideology more in line with the communist world. While the government purported nonalignment its similarity in ideology with the Communist Bloc, especially the Soviet Union and North Korea, had brought an eagerness on the part of the East to strengthen government ties with Madagascar. As one of the poorest of African countries, Madagascar willingly accepted closer relations with the East, primarily for the military aid they provided. After an 8-year relationship, however, there were indications in 1984 that President Ratsiraka was becoming uneasy with the amount of Soviet influence and the fact that Soviet-supported nationalistic policies had left his country bankrupt. Although Madagascar had always maintained ties with the West, primarily for economic needs only partially filled by the communists, within the last year it was believed that Ratsiraka had been taking a more pragmatic attitude towards increased Western support.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN) Soviet military assistance to Madagascar totaled nearly \$100 million in the last six years. In addition, communist presence in Madagascar included an estimated 300 Chinese (medical/engineer teams), 30-40 Cubans (10 believed to be involved in training the country's secret police), 1,100 North Koreans (military and civilian advisers), and 12-20 East Germans (microwave facilities construction).

(S/NOFORN) The United States had maintained a low profile with the Malagasy government since 1975 when the NASA tracking station was closed and the ambassador was withdrawn over a rent dispute. Relations further declined a year later when U.S. interests in Madagascar were nationalized and a 4-man U.S. training team was expelled from the country for allegedly fostering anti-government activity. Although diplomatic relations were restored in 1981, only recently had there been opportunities for the United States to gain better relations with the Malagasy government. One of those opportunities was the quick response of the U.S. Navy in providing disaster relief after a hurricane in 1984 heavily damaged port facilities (see both Operations and Logistics chapters).<sup>3</sup>

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1. AMEMB Victoria 01059/080819Z Aug 84 (S/NE/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT), DECL OADR.
  2. IPAC (IA-5) Point Paper (S/NF), 21 Nov 84, Subj: Political/Military Situation in Madagascar (U), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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(S/NOFORN) The USSR continued a concerted effort to cultivate close ties with President Ratsiraka, spurred by the strategic location of Madagascar and its potential for strengthening Soviet military capabilities in the Indian ocean. Soviet-Malagasy relations had cooled somewhat in recent years, primarily as a result of meager economic assistance and popular resentment. Nevertheless, Madagascar remained heavily reliant on the Soviet Union for arms and spare parts, military training and maintenance, and economic advisory support.

(S/NOFORN) Soviet deliveries of major arms had slowed since 1982, mainly because of Madagascar's inability to pay and President Ratsiraka's intransigence regarding Soviet demands for access or basing rights to Diego Suarez port and/or nearby Andrakaka airfield at the northern end of the island. At present, Soviet port access was limited to merchant ships at Tamatave. Soviet military transport flights were allowed at the international airport near Antananarivo. Soviet pilots and technicians flew and maintained the aircraft of the Malagasy Air Force, which provided them access to all of the country's air facilities.

(S/NOFORN) Soviet military presence continued to fluctuate, although in late 1984 an estimated 300 military advisers and technicians were believed to be in-country. In addition, eight Soviet geologists were employed in the national military office for strategic industries and some 50 Soviet professors taught at institutes of higher learning. About 500 Malagasy high school graduates were sent to Moscow each year for training. The Soviets also picked a number of middle and senior grade Malagasy officers for long-term (4-5 years) training in the Soviet Union in Moscow's continuing efforts to develop a cadre of pro-Soviet military personnel. By the end of 1984 some 2,000 Malagasy personnel had been indoctrinated and trained in various disciplines in the USSR. Many were military people who now had a vested interest in retaining a Soviet connection.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Through the strict control over distribution of arms, spare parts, ammunition, and technical training, the Soviets exercised near-total control over the readiness and mobility of Madagascar's armed forces. Soviet restrictions on the operational use of all aircraft had rendered the air force unable to maintain proficiency. This was compounded by the country's inability to maintain its inventory of Soviet-built aircraft without assistance.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Soviet advisers occupied key positions in the economic and political sectors of Malagasy society which could give them considerable control over the course of events in an internally or externally created crisis. Moscow was increasingly using Madagascar's indebtedness as leverage

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1. IPAC (IA-5) Point Paper (S/NF/WNINTEL), 19 Nov 84, Subj: Current and Projected Soviet Presence/Interest in Madagascar (U), DECL OADR.

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in pressing for concessions. In December 1983 the Soviets offered the Malagasy Navy five patrol boats. Ratsiraka declined, since acceptance of the boats, together with advisers, would have given the Soviets de facto access to Diego Suarez where the boats would be homeported. Also, at the behest of U.S. officials, Ratsiraka claimed he had ordered the dismantling of all three Soviet-built direction-finding SIGINT sites in the country. At the end of the year he was seeking U.S. assistance in replacing this equipment.<sup>1</sup>

#### Soviet Efforts in the Comoros

(C/NOFORN) Moscow recently gained a toehold on the strategic island state of Comoros when President Ahmed Abderehmane Abdallah finally succumbed to repeated Soviet enticements and accepted a scholarship for 13 Comoran medical students to study in the USSR. The unprecedented move undoubtedly was influenced by domestic pressures, perceived U.S. neglect, and Moscow's promise of economic aid and assistance in winning back Mayotte Island from the French. Further Soviet inroads into the Comoros would increase the threat to the overall political stability of the southwest Indian Ocean and the security of the sea lines of communication vital to the West.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN) Moscow unsuccessfully sought to gain access to the international airfield on Grand Comore Island and permission to use anchorages off the northern coast of Anjouan Island in late 1977 following the Soviet ouster from Somalia. More recently, in September 1984, the Soviet Ambassador to Comoros, who resided in Seychelles, reportedly made his fifth visit to the Comoros to persuade the impoverished government to accept Soviet largess.

(C/NOFORN) The Soviet Union sought to establish a resident mission in the capital of Moroni, obtain permission to station a TASS correspondent, and sign commercial agreements. As inducements to Moroni's acquiescence, the Soviets dropped strong hints that they would aid the Comoros in "freeing itself from French colonialism and regaining Mayotte." Aid offers also included all-expense paid scholarships for training in the USSR, construction of a fish processing plant, and "enough oil to fill all Comoran storage tanks twice." Covertly, the Soviet Union and Libya reportedly were colluding in an attempt to destabilize the pro-West Abdallah government and restore a radical Marxist-oriented regime.

(S/NOFORN) Moscow was funding external opposition groups located in France and Madagascar. Slick anti-Abdallah pamphlets which called for a popular uprising against the government and the establishment of a progressive Marxist people's republic also were being widely disseminated. With Moroni's acceptance of the Soviet scholarship offer, Moscow gained a toehold which

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1. Ibid; SECSTATE 362725/082146Z Dec 84 (S)(EX), DECL OADR.
  2. IPAC (IA-5) Point Paper (S/NF), 19 Nov 84, Subj: Current and Projected Soviet Presence/Issues in the Comoros (U), DECL OADR.

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
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would make it easier to step up demands to open an embassy, exploit the radical elements, and incrementally increase its influence in the Comoros.<sup>1</sup>

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
1. Ibid.

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
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
1. DIA 041400Z Jan 84 (S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT), DECL OADR.

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
1. Ibid.

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1. DIA 112127Z Apr 84 (U).
2. USCINCPAC 170107Z Feb 84 (U); USCINCPAC 231935Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR;  
HQ DA 171355Z Oct 84 (U); USCINCPAC 262105Z Oct 84 (U)(BOM).
3. JCS 132350Z Feb 84 (C), DECL OADR.
4. J3 (CTG) HistSum Jul 84 (U); J3 (CTG) Memo (U), 30 Jul 84, Subj: After  
Action Report - Dynamics of International Terrorism Course.

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
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1. USCINCPAC Instruction 3850.2C (U), 21 Feb 84, Subj: Protection of Department of Defense Personnel and Resources Against Terrorist Acts.
2. Ibid.


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1. J3 (CTG) HistSum Jul 84 (~~S~~); J3 (CTG) Memo (~~S~~), 9 Aug 84, Subj: After Action Report - Antiterrorism Survey, 13-23 Jul 84 (U), both DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.

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
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1. JCS 192235Z Jan 84 (U).
2. USCINCPAC 310355Z Jan 84 (U).
3. USCINCPAC 280400Z Jan 84 (C)(BOM), DECL OADR.
4. SECDEF 160051Z Feb 84 (C)(BOM), DECL OADR.

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
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1. COMUSJAPAN 130005Z Feb 84 (~~C~~), DECL OADR.
  2. OSD 122011Z Mar 84 (~~C/NF~~)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 202311Z Mar 84 (~~C~~)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  4. SECDEF 260036Z Apr 84 (~~C/NF~~), DECL OADR.

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
Countering the Terrorist Threat



1. JCS 251800Z Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. J311 HistSum Jan 84; USCINCPAC 270314Z Jan 84, both ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
3. COMUSKOREA 300625Z Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Dec 92.
4. CDRWESTCOM 310113Z Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.


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1. CINCPACFLT 180637Z Feb 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  2. J311 HistSum Feb 84 ~~(S)~~; USCINCPAC 070031Z Feb 84 ~~(C)~~, 180001Z Feb 84 ~~(C)~~, and 310325Z Mar 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
  3. J311 HistSum Jul 84 ~~(C)~~; USCINCPAC 130400Z Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, USCINCPAC 150046Z Jul 84 ~~(C)~~, all DECL OADR.


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
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1. J311 HistSum Aug 84 (~~C~~); USCINCPAC 112150Z Aug 84 (~~S~~), both DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.

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
COMMUNIST FAR EAST MISSILE FORCES



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
COMMUNIST FAR EAST AIR FORCES



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
COMMUNIST FAR EAST GROUND FORCES



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COMMUNIST FAR EAST MILITARY STRENGTH



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CHAPTER III

PLANNING

SECTION I--NATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING

FY 86 Posture Statement

(U) The Chairman of the JCS presented an annual posture statement to the Congress. On 30 July 1984 the JCS asked USCINCPAC for his views for inclusion in the FY 86 statement.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 4 September USCINCPAC provided an overview of his concerns. Admiral Crowe noted that he believed that the overview on the Pacific and East Asia needed stronger emphasis on U.S. security interests in the region. "The shifting military balance of power brought on by the continual growth of Soviet military forces in this area elevates the importance of the Pacific and East Asia to that of Europe. The size and growth of Asian-Pacific trade alone exceeds that of any other single region." In spite of those facts, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan allocated USPACOM forces to the defense of Europe in a global war, leaving the Pacific region vulnerable to Soviet takeover. "Even the physical security of the U.S. in the Aleutians and Continental Alaska is risked by insufficient forces once the reinforcement of Europe is initiated. The posture statement should be more global in its balance," the Admiral said.<sup>2</sup>

(S) He continued, advising that the nonstrategic nuclear forces threat to the USPACOM demanded discussion. There was ample information on NATO, but almost none on the Pacific-East Asia area. Deployment of the nuclear-armed TOMAHAWK missile to the USPACOM, for example, helped redress regional nonstrategic nuclear forces imbalances, and should be highlighted in the posture statement.

(S) The Admiral said that our military Services in the USPACOM "cannot do more with less manpower or equipment." As new weapons systems came on line, they "must be manned and sustained with adequate levels of ammunition and supplies" if USPACOM forces were to succeed in defending U.S. interests in

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1. JCS 301607Z Jul 84 (U).
  2. J5323 HistSum Aug 84 (U); USCINCPAC 041800Z Sep 84 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 050147Z Sep 84 (S), DECL OADR. A second message, the following day, was a line-in, line-out submission of specific proposed changes to the draft statement written in Washington that was prepared by the Admiral's staff.

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this region. "The posture statement should emphasize these military needs," the Admiral concluded.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ These themes will be repeated whenever USCINCPAC presents his views as part of the national planning process, as discussed in the material that follows. For many years--since 1967--USCINCPACs had been arguing in national forums that the "Swing Strategy" was no longer viable. This was a plan to redeploy significant numbers of USPACOM forces, ships, and aircraft to reinforce the U.S. European and Atlantic Commands in the event of NATO-Warsaw Pact war.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ On 3 November USCINCPAC's Director for Plans and Policy provided comment on a subsequent draft of the FY 86 posture statement. He noted that this draft gave an increasingly balanced treatment of the USPACOM. Although some of the USCINCPAC recommendations had not been used, it was evident there was a conscious effort to insure that statements concerning the European theater were balanced by similar comments on the Pacific theater. After providing some specific line-in, line-out changes, he concluded that this command was encouraged by the changes already incorporated and looked forward to working to provide the additional changes necessary to reflect the growing importance of the Pacific theater in our global strategy.<sup>3</sup>

#### Congressional Testimony

(U) On the afternoon of 23 February, Admiral Crowe testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the U.S. Senate as the Senate considered the Defense Department budget for Fiscal Year 1985. The hearings included the CINCs of the U.S. Central and Readiness Commands as well as Admiral Crowe, who was the first to speak. Although he had a written statement entered into the record, he was also invited to summarize his presentation. The Admiral did so, as discussed below, and then participated in a question and answer exchange that involved all three CINCs.<sup>4</sup>

(U) In his first congressional testimony as USCINCPAC, the Admiral said that in his first 7 months of his assignment he had traveled extensively through the command and been encouraged by many of the things he had found. While we had no multinational alliances such as NATO to focus our efforts, there was an "impressive and encouraging amount of cohesion and coincidence of view" among our Free World friends and allies in that part of the world that

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1. Ibid.

2. CINCPAC Command History 1982 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, p. 129.

3. J5323 HistSum Oct 84 (U); USCINCPAC 030430Z Nov 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

4. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, on S.2414, the DOD Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985. In the morning session testimony had been provided by USCINCLANT, USCINCSOUTH, and the USEUCOM Chief of Staff.

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translated into a definite military plus. "I believe it is fair to say that Moscow cannot be pleased as it looks eastward into my region." China remained terribly suspicious and opposed to the buildup of the USSR and certainly was resisting the expansion. Japan was firmly oriented toward the West and the Admiral believed its commitment was increasing every year. The ROK remained one of our staunchest allies. "The Soviet Union has not been able to increase or expand its influence in any substantial way in the ASEAN region or the South Pacific Islands."

(U) Looking at its own confederation, the Admiral said he suspected Moscow considered North Korea at best an unreliable and ungrateful ally. India remained unaligned. "Afghanistan I would not characterize as a success, either politically or economically." The one notable success for the USSR had been in Vietnam, at an estimated cost of \$1 billion a year.

(U) In a variety of ways, the Admiral said, the U.S. Government had manifested and expressed an unequivocal commitment to remain a Pacific power. He said his formal statement outlined in some detail our relationships with the various countries of the region, but in the interest of time, he would only address three in his remarks. He described the cautious emergence of Japan as a responsible member of both regional and global councils. Japan was resisting Soviet intimidation, was widening its ties with ASEAN nations, and expanding aid to the Third World. "I detect increasing disposition to address military matters, to cooperate with the United States, to exercise with us and confront one of her perplexing military problems." The fact remained, however, that Japan was not spending sufficient money on its own defense. They have set their own goals, but "in my mind they are not making sufficient investment to meet those goals." He said his headquarters attempted to identify the shortfalls constantly. "In every way available to us, we try to persuade Japan to do more."

(U) China had become a strong regional power. Despite our ideological and philosophical differences, the Admiral believed there was a strong common interest on which we could build a viable relationship. In any event, China loomed large in our strategic thinking and "must be taken into account in our military calculus."

(U) The Admiral said Congress was well aware that there was cause for concern in the Philippines. Our bases there remained important. Thus far the political turmoil had not spilled over on the bases and "we are making vigorous efforts to prevent that."

(U) Admiral Crowe next described the USPACOM region countries' role as the largest U.S. trading partner. He also outlined the Communist presence in the Far East and in Vietnam.

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(U) The United States had not been standing still. He said he would suggest that in the previous few years that there had been a remarkable turnaround in some of the curves in our own security fortunes and "I believe this Congress deserves credit." He outlined some of the new weapons systems that had been introduced, and noted that theater war reserves, ammunition, sustainability, and POL stocks were all climbing. "The [military] people we have are as good as any I have seen in 40 years of service."

(U) Nevertheless, he said, we have some distance to go. The expanding threat in the wake of Vietnam had presented us with a demanding and prolonged challenge. This required a consistent and thoughtful security policy geared for the long run instead of the peaks and valleys that had characterized so much of our peacetime efforts. Speaking of the FY 85 budget, the Admiral said he believed it was a positive step forward and would provide some of the things needed "today as well as to provide for the future."

(U) "I would put a high priority on strategic nuclear modernization, not because it is necessary to my responsibility or one of the things I deal with day to day, but I believe all our efforts in the military establishment throughout the world must rest on a viable and credible nuclear deterrent foundation." This was certainly true in the Pacific. "I cannot hypothesize any scenario where it would be in our interest to be dealing from nuclear inferiority."

(U) The Admiral continued, "If we are forced to engage in global hostilities, in my command, I would envision intense sea and air engagements in the Northwest Pacific and in the vicinity of the Aleutians, and wherever the Soviet forces are. Therefore, the Administration's determination to build a 600-ship Navy goes right to the heart of my major concern. We must preserve the momentum of the shipbuilding program."

(U) Equally important was the air battle. "I would, of course, prefer more," but the 350 new fighters, Air Force, Marine, Navy, that were in the budget were certainly "critical in my region."

(U) He addressed the long distances in USPACOM and the need for longer-range delivery platforms (the dual-capability fighter, such as the F-111 and the F-15E), and said he was constantly concerned about airlift capability.

(U) He said he didn't have many U.S. ground forces in USPACOM, but improvements for those forces in the FY 85 budget would pay dividends in Korea and make the 25th Division more deployable, versatile, and useful. He said that all of these improvements would go a long way to improve the military posture in the Pacific.

(U) The Admiral continued, "The most pressing need every day of an operational commander is sustainability. I constantly must be mesmerized and

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preoccupied with my ability to fight today, and sustainability goes to the heart of that necessity." In the last few years there had been significant improvement in practically every aspect of the subject, but "it will be some time yet before I will feel comfortable." He said his number one priority was ammunition. The budget also called for investment in spare parts and similar consumables, POL stocks. "These are the stuff of combat and they have my vigorous support."

(U) He discussed readiness and training. He said history suggested that we were hit almost every year by unprogrammed demands that came out of training--out of flying and steaming hours. In the previous year there had been the deployment in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as Central America and the Western Pacific with the shooting down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007. "In the flying business, reduced flying hours lead to accidents and often fatalities."

(U) USCINCPAC concluded that the budget did not provide for all of his needs or resolve all of his problems, but he could support the budget and believed the tradeoffs that had been made were wise ones. "If we were to have a major confrontation today in the Pacific, I suspect I would say that it is too close to call. I submit that is not good enough for this great Nation."

(U) Consequently he looked at the FY 85 budget as only one step in a long trek. He acknowledged that there were many demands on the budget but suggested that strong defense was "one of the cornerstones of our freedom, prosperity, and our progress." He said he and his command would strive in every way to maintain stability and peace in the USPACOM region. That was the fundamental mission. "To be successful we need hardware, good people, and your support," the Admiral concluded.

(U) Following the presentations by USCINCPAC and USCINCENT, a question-and-answer period started. The first discussion concerned readiness versus modernization. Admiral Crowe said that as an operational commander worried about the capacity to fight "today," his priorities in the Pacific had included sustainability, readiness, force levels, and modernization. "That, of course, springs from my point of view and where I sit. Where you stand depends on where you sit." When he placed his priorities in that fashion, he continued, he was not saying that modernization was not important. "It is absolutely vital." As he had said in his summary, some new systems had come into the command that were very important and had increased our capability.

(U) Modernization, he noted, primarily spoke to future capability and future shaping of the force. "There is a built-in difference in opinion between the people in the field and the planners in Washington. Somebody has to look at a policy in a macro sense and make those tradeoffs. When I list my priorities, I think all are important, but my immediate day-to-day concerns would be sustainability and readiness."

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(U) Subsequent questions and answers concerned command arrangements for the Middle East force and possible contingencies in Southwest Asia, Japanese defense spending, the situation in the ROK and the Philippines, modern weapons, the Merchant Marine, and, again, readiness in the USPACOM.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In a personal message to his component and subordinate unified commanders following the testimony the Admiral said he was disappointed that only 6 of 18 Senators on the committee attended. He provided his impressions on two subjects. He thought there was little likelihood there would be an increase in personnel end-strength of 30,000 and it was possible there would be no augmentation. A Congressional concern, which he shared, was that the existing readiness reporting system did not lend itself to making accurate assessments of the overall readiness of our forces. This was important to the Congress, because Army and Air Force reporting did not reflect marked improvements in readiness despite the heavy expenditures of the previous few years. Navy reporting had been more responsive in that regard. He said that any thoughts on ways to improve the system would be welcome.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 27 February COMUSJAPAN provided translations from the Japanese press on the Admiral's testimony. Most papers on 24 and 25 February noted that the Admiral had predicted that the Soviet Union would shortly deploy SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 tactical missiles in its Far East area also, following Europe. He was quoted as saying that in case a total nuclear war broke out, including use of strategic nuclear weapons, severe battles would first be developed in the Northwest Pacific. One paper noted the reference to the need for the Japan Self-Defense Force to increase its capabilities to cope with the increasing Soviet military strength in the Asia-Pacific theater. Another said the USCINCPAC had emphatically said the planned F-16 deployment at Misawa AB was one of the most important plans to keep the Air Force balance with the USSR.<sup>3</sup>

### The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System

(U) The Reagan Administration had revised the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System with the intention of involving the unified and specified commanders in all aspects of the system. The system involved a number of key documents, including Defense Guidance, the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum, and the Service Program Objectives Memoranda. The JCS, as action agency, periodically requested formal USCINCPAC review and comment on existing and draft documents in the system, and USCINCPAC was also invited to testify before the Defense Resources Board, the Department's highest program and budget-writing council. Each opportunity to provide input permitted USCINCPAC

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1. Ibid.
  2. USCINCPAC 010112Z Mar 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. COMUSJ 270501Z Feb 84 (U).

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to require Defense Department decision makers to take another look at USPACOM requirements.<sup>1</sup>

### Defense Guidance

(U) Defense Guidance was the document that outlined national security objectives in broad terms and provided guidance to the Defense Department, the Services, and the unified and specified commanders on roles, missions, and capabilities.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 10 February Admiral Crowe had advised the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS that he continued to be concerned that our planning and programming documents did not reflect a "realistic and uniformly acceptable global perspective." He said that he believed the planning scenario used in them contained a basic and serious deficiency.<sup>3</sup>

(S) He said that both Defense Guidance and the Joint Strategic Planning Document contained a global strategy. The scenario used in those documents, however, did not in his opinion adequately depict a realistic worldwide U.S.-USSR conflict. While the planning scenario had U.S. and Soviet forces fighting in Europe, the Atlantic, and Southwest Asia, it did not reflect combat anywhere in the entire Pacific. "I believe this is a major shortcoming which erodes the persuasiveness of the overall documents and results in a void in Pacific force development with an ultimate mismatch of U.S. and Soviet forces."<sup>4</sup>

(U) The first formal step in the Defense Guidance cycle for FY 87-91 was a review of the Defense Guidance document for the previous period, FY 86-90. USCINCPAC provided his comments on 31 August 1984. He identified three subjects as his major concerns.<sup>5</sup>

(S) Admiral Crowe first said that throughout the document there was a lack of emphasis on the Aleutians and Alaska. He noted that the regional defense policy for the Western Hemisphere correctly stated that the primary U.S. objective was to maintain the security of the North American continent, but the policy statement was devoted to the southern flank of the United States and there was no mention of the significant air threat to our northern frontier. He strongly recommended that the policy for the defense of the Western Hemisphere be expanded to include specifically Alaska and the Aleutians, and that appropriate changes to subsequent sections of the Defense

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, p. 123.
  2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 149-153.
  3. USCINCPAC 100031Z Feb 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. Ibid.
  5. J5326 HistSum Aug 84 (S), DECL 10 Sep 90.

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Guidance be made to stress adequate air defense for that portion of North America that was most vulnerable to direct Soviet attack.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Secondly, USCINCPAC said that the strategic priorities of the Defense Guidance should be adjusted to emphasize those actions that were necessary for the defense of the United States. "This is a concern because even though these priorities are not intended to affect deployment or employment decisions, they are subsequently reflected in planning guidance and establish an anticipated employment sequence."

(S) USCINCPAC's third recommendation was that the force planning scenario had to be updated to reflect the likelihood of conflict in the Pacific. He noted that this had already been accomplished in the scenario for the Joint Strategic Planning Document for FY 87-94, and he strongly recommended that that scenario be incorporated in Defense Guidance for FY 87-91. "To ignore or imply that there would be no hostilities in the Pacific when engaged in a major war elsewhere with the Soviets would be dangerously misleading," USCINCPAC said. He also provided a number of specific recommendations, reflecting both these three major concerns and some proposed changes to other important issues.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Admiral Crowe followed up his review of the guidance with a personal letter to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.). He noted that "we are all in agreement that our primary mission is to defend the United States." He said that he had consistently advocated in the Washington arena the need to concentrate on this mission when allocating resources for a global war. "We have made a great deal of progress in this effort, but I still find that decisions based on DG priorities continue to lean toward Europe and Southwest Asia." As a result, the forces required to defend the Pacific flank "are often assigned elsewhere in several of our planning documents."<sup>3</sup>

(S) He said he firmly believed that U.S. actions in the Northwest Pacific would be critical in a global war. Just as we defended the Atlantic flank in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap and Europe, "I feel our best defense in the Pacific should be a forward action oriented toward the Soviet Far East. During the Defense Guidance discussion in 1983, it had appeared that giving the same priority to access to Southwest Asia oil and the defense of our Pacific allies would allow some force structure modifications that we believed necessary to adequately defend the U.S. Pacific flank. This had not been the case, however, and Europe and Southwest Asia continued to be perceived as having a higher priority and first call on the forces in question." We seemed to accept past dependence on Persian Gulf oil as though it were still reality,

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1. USCINCPAC 310155Z Aug 84 (S), DECL OADR.

2. Ibid.

3. Ltr (S), Admiral Crowe to General Stilwell, 15 Sep 84, n.s., DECL OADR.

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without taking note of a greatly diminished U.S. demand for energy from that region.

(S) He advised General Stilwell that he had recommended that after the defense of the United States (to include the Aleutians, Alaska, Hawaii, etc.) he had listed defense of the NATO and the Northwest Pacific-Northeast Asia areas. Third was to insure access to Southwest Asia oil and defend U.S. Pacific territories and allies.

(S) He advised that in addition to those priorities, he had identified two major omissions in the existing Defense Guidance. The first was in the Illustrative Planning Scenario, where the Pacific was not even mentioned. As with the priorities, this issue had been a concern for a number of years and Admiral Crowe believed it was time to expand this scenario. (He noted, as he had in his earlier message to the JCS, that this had been done in the Joint Strategic Planning Document.)

(S) The second was the lack of emphasis on defense of the Aleutians and Mainland Alaska. "I vigorously recommend that the policy for defense of the Western Hemisphere be expanded to include specifically Alaska and the Aleutians. This will require appropriate changes to subsequent sections of the Defense Guidance to stress adequate air defense for that portion of North America that is most vulnerable to direct Soviet attack."

(S) USCINCPAC concluded:<sup>1</sup>

... To provide the winning strategy for defense of the United States, I am convinced that we must recognize that forward military action in the Pacific is equally important to our efforts in Europe, that war with the Soviets will be truly global, and that our vulnerable Northwest flank demands attention. I believe that a military strategy based on these concepts will ensure the security of North America and better place us in a position to defend our other vital areas of interest as forces become available.

(S) On 22 November Admiral Crowe provided his thoughts to Washington principals after reviewing the "Draft" Defense Guidance for FY 87-91. He said he believed the document was continuing to evolve in a positive direction. The guidance was gradually moving in accordance with USCINCPAC's recommendations. The new force planning scenario, for example, recognized the likelihood of conflict in the Pacific and depicted those actions that were critical to protecting our Northwest flank and our interests in Northeast Asia. Another positive step was reflected in the regional defense policy for the Western Hemisphere. Recognition of the need to defend the Aleutians and

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1. Ibid.

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Alaska was critical to our ability to maintain the security of the North American continent. This objective, however, "must be translated into programs that provide adequate ground, air and sea defense for our vulnerable Northwest flank." He also cited concerns with the strategy section and strategic prioritization.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The Admiral noted that by its very nature the Defense Guidance dealt with the future, providing guidance that would lay the groundwork for programs that extended well beyond the period FY 87-91. "The Soviets are on our Pacific flank now, and in the near future they would have a power projection capability that could pose a threat to the entire Pacific Basin. This area accounts for more trade and industrial development than any other part of the world, and the future, to quote the President, lies in the Pacific." The Draft Defense Guidance, however, did not contain the necessary guidance to support such a future, and "I believe we are running out of time to correct this deficiency."<sup>2</sup>

(S) The Admiral said that as a first step, we must modify our objectives, policy, and strategy to recognize the relative global importance of Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific. "Then, and this is most important, we must ensure that force and resource planning guidance are consistent with our estimate of tomorrow's threat and projected U.S. global interests. This does not mean we should scrap existing programs. However, as new estimates are developed, programs to meet future needs should also appear in the Defense Guidance." For example, he said, the policy statement regarding the need to defend the Aleutians and Alaska was "meaningless" if forces and resources are not programmed to fulfill this critical requirement. In addition we must take steps to correct the serious existing air defense deficiencies.

(S) He said in summary:<sup>3</sup>

. . . I firmly believe we need to take a hard look at the DG and determine where we want it to take us. If it is going to shape the U.S. military to meet future threats, we must take steps to adjust this important document to reflect the dynamic nature of our world and provide guidance that leads rather than follows current events. . . .

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1. USCINCPAC 221823Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.; According to an "Analysis" column in the Christian Science Monitor on 24 June, while the Reagan Administration did not want to be seen as backing down in Europe, White House officials frequently noted that he was the first "Pacific President."
  3. USCINCPAC 221823Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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FY 86-90 Program Review

(U) On 9 May 1984 the JCS advised that they were approaching the review cycle of the FY 86-90 Service Program Objectives Memoranda (POM) and asked each unified and specified commander to provide the four or five key issues they considered essential in order to execute their war plans.<sup>1</sup>

(S) USCINCPAC's reply of 21 May advised that as he was responsible for immediate execution of U.S. war plans, he was necessarily concerned with program issues that affected the USPACOM warfighting capability. The Admiral said, "While qualitative and quantitative improvements over the last several years have enhanced that capability, reductions in key areas of the FY 85-89 program will affect sustainability and readiness." If those reductions were not redressed in the FY 86-90 POMs, "the damage will be compounded." He said that U.S. Pacific Command priorities were in five broad areas: sustainability; force structure; force survivability; command, control, and communications; and readiness.<sup>2</sup>

(S) He described sustainability for USPACOM forces as the most serious conventional warfare deficiency in his command. "Even if Service POMs are fully supported, severe shortages will remain for several years." He cited shortfalls in air-to-air and threat munitions, and war reserve munitions.

(S) He said that shortfalls in combat support and combat service support units significantly eroded overall Army warfighting capability. He outlined some specifics. He also noted that the vast size of the USPACOM caused three additional concerns. The first was that the dual-role fighter programs had to be protected. Also, refueling capability needed to be increased from 20 tankers to about 75 if there was to be the capability to respond immediately in time of conflict. The third was the requirement for increased inter-theater and intra-theater airlift and sealift to meet required closures in all contingencies.

(S) In the area of force survivability, he noted a serious shortage of both active and passive air defense throughout the Pacific. He noted that the recently completed USPACOM Joint Air Defense Study had concluded that the greatest weakness was the lack of early warning. "Without adequate warning, U.S. and allied aircraft could be heavily attrited before entering the battle and our bases/facilities throughout the region could be severely disabled." He advised that deployment of over-the-horizon radar systems would significantly enhance broad-area surveillance and early warning.

(S) Implementation of the secure voice improvement program was required to enhance command, control, and communications. This included improved

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1. JCS 092046Z May 84 (U).
  2. USCINCPAC 211743Z May 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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secure voice and graphics conferencing. The jam-resistant Secure Communications Satellite Program was also needed to modernize our obsolete systems and tie command centers together.

(S) The Admiral said that readiness levels were a continuous concern. Of particular importance was the funding of sufficient flying hours for Air Force, Navy, and Marine tactical forces to insure their proficiency and safety. "Funding for sufficient steaming hours to maintain both our Indian Ocean operations and maintain a high level of operational proficiency throughout the fleet is also critical." He said that JCS-funded exercises such as TEAM SPIRIT had proved to be invaluable in achieving a high state of readiness.

(U) In conclusion, Admiral Crowe said, "Our forces must be prepared to respond to any contingency and it is our job to ensure they are prepared to win."<sup>1</sup>

(U) The process of the POMs continued. Subsequent to their publication by the Services, they were reviewed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine compliance with Defense Guidance. When a variance was found, it was developed as an "issue." The issues were categorized along functional lines and published in "Issue Books." The issue books were reviewed by the Defense Resources Board, which made decisions on the defense budget to be submitted to the President. As a member of the board, the Chairman of the JCS requested the views of the unified and specified commanders on the issues, alternatives, and offsets contained in the issue books that impacted on their commands. This was done so that the Chairman could properly represent the CINCs during the board's deliberations.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Issue Books One through Six are discussed in the following paragraphs. Issue Book One concerned policy and risk assessment. USCINCPAC advised that sustainability remained his major conventional warfare concern. He said that the continued use of "bow-wave" or deferred funding had a significant impact on that sustainability and served to postpone the day when there would be on-hand resources to fully execute operation plans. "Given the increasing Soviet threat, operational commanders must have confidence in the ability of their forces to sustain combat in the early days of a major war when usage rates will be very high." He fully supported the revitalization of Special Operations Forces, which provided a critical force multiplier and were extremely cost effective. Lastly, he said that the operating area of the TRIDENT submarine was presently limited because of inadequate control communications. "Funds for E-6A TACAMO replacement aircraft are sorely needed," he concluded.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Ibid.
  2. J5321 HistSum Jul 84 (U).
  3. USCINCPAC 200445Z Jul 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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(S) Issue Book Two concerned nuclear forces. USCINCPAC addressed four concerns. Discussing the sea-launched ballistic missile force structure, he said he was seriously concerned with our sea-based nuclear forces capability. An alternative that significantly reduced nuclear deterrence by cutting a TRIDENT submarine and impacting on other nuclear submarine programs effectively reduced survivable SLBMs by 960 warheads. "Our entire defense establishments must rest on a strong, credible nuclear force," he said. The second matter was nuclear forces command, control, and communication. The Service POMs did not provide the modern, survivable C3 capability required to control nuclear systems in the USPACOM. He recommended an alternative that provided for those programs. Regarding mapping, charting, and geodesy, he noted that much of Northeast Asia had never been mapped. Under the Service POMs, production of new maps and maintenance of existing maps would be delayed or cancelled. He supported restoration of the Defense Mapping Agency's production program. Lastly, in matters of strategic warning, surveillance, and air defense, the Admiral said that his command "desperately" needed an updated airborne warning and control system and an over-the-horizon radar network to provide early warning and command and control throughout the region.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Issue Book Three addressed conventional forces. The Admiral said he was concerned with the continued buildup of Reserves at the expense of the active force. Although he was fully committed to a strong and effective reserve force, the restricted availability of the reserve force, without mobilization, reduced a commander's flexibility in a crisis by forcing him to further stretch his already-limited assets. He said he supported the Army's plans regarding conversion of the 25th Infantry Division to a "Light" infantry division configuration, but he was concerned about moving combat support and combat service support units from the division to a corps that was not totally dedicated to the USPACOM. He also noted that the reorganization of the 25th Division should consider the uniqueness of this theater, the diversity of missions to which the division might be assigned, and the lack of base support in many areas. In the matter of broad-area tactical surveillance, he reiterated his requirement for over-the-horizon radar systems. USCINCPAC endorsed a Navy carrier air wing composition that contained an optimized balance of aircraft tailored to conduct offensive operations in "high-threat" as well as "Third World" contingencies. The air wings were responsive to the diverse requirements of the many areas in which they must perform. Long-range aircraft were required for power projection and war-at-sea scenarios in the Pacific theater.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Issue Book Four concerned modernization and investment. USCINCPAC said he concurred with the assessment that the Service POMs did not provide the necessary force multiplier conventional munitions to adequately improve survivability and sustainability. The POMs perpetuated the tradition of

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1. USCINCPAC 212031Z Jul 84 (S) REVW 19 Jul 04.
  2. USCINCPAC 212345Z Jul 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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slipping munitions funding and they reflected a slowdown in modern munitions research and development. He supported the alternative to obtain improved conventional munitions in the near term, in particular those with a standoff capability. He provided comments supporting military satellite communications; communications and computer security and survivability; and Department of Defense-wide command, control, and communications. "We simply have to improve the state of the art of our computer system which was designed in the 1960's," the Admiral said. He also outlined his requirements for several tactical command, control, and communications systems that were threatened in the Navy POM.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Issue Book Five concerned readiness and other logistics matters. The Admiral supported programs for Army material and training readiness and sustainability. Regarding the adequacy of Army equipment inventories, he said, "To continue to fill NATO requirements at the expense of USPACOM does not provide the overall capability to meet the global threat presented by the Soviet Union." In the matter of wartime medical capability, the Admiral said, "Continual deferring of the procurement of critical medical assets leaves the theater without minimum medical support capability. To overcome this serious shortfall, USCINCPAC supports . . . [the alternative] to accelerate the procurement of essential medical capabilities."<sup>2</sup>

(U) Issue Book Six concerned manpower. It raised four issues on personnel matters, but USCINCPAC's comments addressed the only issue with significant impact on the USPACOM. The POM raised the question should the Services be required to fund adequately the housing allowance program within POM guidance and should the Rent Plus housing allowance be replaced with a worldwide variable housing allowance program. USCINCPAC said that while changes to the variable housing allowance would have minimal impact on CONUS-based USPACOM forces, the conversion of Rent Plus was strongly opposed. The proposed system would place a significantly greater financial stress on Service members and their families stationed in high cost overseas areas--Singapore, Hong Kong, Hawaii, and Alaska. In Hawaii, even under Rent Plus, more than 30 percent of Service members had to absorb out-of-pocket expenses. Implementation of the variable housing allowance program would raise that to almost 70 percent and result in a "dramatic erosion" of the quality of life for overseas Service members and their families, and USCINCPAC strongly opposed it.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 27 August the JCS advised USCINCPAC that the Defense Resources Board had completed reviewing the FY 86-90 proposed program and the Program Decision Memoranda had been published conveying those decisions. PDM decisions concerning USCINCPAC concerns were provided. The following list

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1. USCINCPAC 212032Z Jul 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 222043Z Jul 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. ADMIN USCINCPAC 250341Z Jul 84 (U); USCINCPAC 251830Z Jul 84 (U).

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contains USCINCPAC concerns and then the Defense Resources Board's action on each, as follows:<sup>1</sup>

- Sustainability--25th Infantry Division munitions. The Army, Navy, and Air Force were to fund \$25 million in each year for adding war reserve ammunition stock in Korea in a two-for-one agreement with Korea.

- Sustainability--medical support. Increased funding (\$182 million in FY 86, \$1.6 billion in FY 86-90) to procure an additional 3 combat zone and 10 communications zone medical units in FY 86 and to fund additional medical units/hospitals in FY 87-90.

- Readiness--operating tempo. Funded deployed fleet operating tempo of 50.5 days per quarter, non-deployed fleet at 29 days per quarter.

- Air defense--over-the-horizon radar. Added funds to the OTHR for full-scale development to procure two radars in FY 88 and two more by FY 90. The prototype full-scale development radar would be placed in Amchitka. Funding included \$20 million in FY 86, which USCINCPAC had requested.

- Force structure--B-52s. Funding stayed with the Air Force's POM by funding 61 B-52s for conventional operations in the 1990's.

- Force structure--dual-role fighter (F-15, F-111, TR-1). Funding as in the POM. Two TR-1s were added for Europe, however.

- Force structure--LHD-1. Deferred procurement of the FY 86 LHD-1 until FY 88. Procurement of one LSD-41 was added to FY 84.

- Strategic modernization--sea-based nuclear forces. TRIDENT was restored for FY 86.

#### Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency

(U) On 9 May the JCS advised the unified and specified commanders and the Service Chiefs of the establishment of the Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency within the Organization of the JCS. It was established to assist the JCS in determining the impact of resource decisions on the nation's warfighting capability and integrating areas of CINC and JCS interest, especially cross-Service programs. It was to be the JCS focal point for the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. Its initial task was preparing the Chairman for participation in the Defense Resources Board meetings in July and August 1984.<sup>2</sup>

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1. JCS 271530Z Aug 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. JCS 092033Z May 84 (U); J5325 Point Paper (U), 20 Sep 84, Subj: Visit of MAJ GEN Olson.

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Enhancing CINC Participation in the POM Development Process

(S) When the Reagan Administration took the first steps to involve the unified and specified CINCs in all phases of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System in 1981, USCINCPAC expressed the thought that his headquarters was not geared for and time might preclude comment on or full review of each PPBS phase. There was also concern that the plan of action did not allow sufficient time for CINC actions, or necessary documentation for theater commanders to contribute effectively to advertised goals.<sup>1</sup>

(S) As he would note in a letter to the Air Force Chief of Staff on 20 September, Admiral Crowe had participated in two Defense Resources Board cycles and come away with the "uncomfortable feeling of being out of sync with the PPBS." When the board met to discuss the POMs, the Service programs were pretty much finalized without the benefit of considering the concerns of the area commanders. He believed the CINCs must get involved earlier in the POM cycle for theater requirements to be considered in a timely manner.<sup>2</sup>

(S) In preparation for the next POM cycle (FY 87-91), on 6 August USCINCPAC asked his component and subordinate unified commanders for their top warfighting concerns. The Commander of the U.S. Army Western Command thanked Admiral Crowe for his efforts before the Defense Resources Board in supporting critical Army programs in the Pacific, noting that the impact was already being felt. COMUSKOREA also noted that the Admiral's early involvement in the POM cycle would undoubtedly improve the visibility of Pacific issues and should allow us to achieve a higher priority than in the past.<sup>3</sup>

(S) By late September, the JCS (the Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency--SPRAA) advised that they were considering steps to enhance the CINC's role in the POM process and asked for USCINCPAC's comments. They proposed that the CINCs provide warfighting priorities to each Service component commander for consideration in developing their input to the Military Department POM, and then that the CINCs integrate those warfighting priorities into a single integrated prioritized list for the JCS. The CINCs were to look to their Service components to provide feedback on Military Department POM development relative to those warfighting priorities throughout the POM development process.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1981 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 111-112.
  2. Ltr (S), Admiral Crowe to General Charles A. Gabriel, USAF Chief of Staff, 20 Sept 84, n.s., DECL OADR. Similar letters were sent to the other Service chiefs, each outlining USCINCPAC's Service concerns.
  3. CDRWESTCOM 052345Z Sep 84 (S), DECL OADR; COMUSK 120400Z Sep 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. J5323 HistSum Oct 84 (U); JCS 260023Z Sep 84 (U).

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(U) USCINCPAC advised that he appreciated the opportunity to comment on this initial set of procedures. He said the JCS/OJCS were not sufficiently involved in the CINC-Service process the JCS had described on 26 September. It was the USCINCPAC view that the JCS/OJCS should be advocates for supporting the CINCs' needs with the Services. The proposed role was not adequate to provide that advocacy, however. For example, although the CINCs provided their input to the JCS, the only real feedback they got was from their own components. He believed the principal feedback should come from the JCS/OJCS. Such interaction would be necessary to insure that the CINCs' warfighting needs were considered and supported throughout the POM process. "In our view, providing that interaction is precisely what SPRAA's job ought to be."<sup>1</sup>

(U) USCINCPAC opposed the idea of forwarding a "single prioritized list" of warfighting priorities. Such lists, he said, were used more often to deny lower priority programs than to support higher priority programs. He recommended that the CINCs provide the list of their highest needs without internal prioritization, and also that the JCS not undertake to develop a single integrated prioritized list. USCINCPAC said he understood the difficulty in preparing what was essentially a new program for CINC participation in the POM process, and endorsed the efforts to improve the CINC and JCS role in that process.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 5 October the JCS provided further thoughts to clarify some aspects of the initial proposal. They advised that in most cases the unified command component commands would be responsible for interfacing CINC resource requirements with the parent Service. Regarding USCINCPAC's proposal that the JCS act as advocates for CINCs' needs, they advised that they did not consider it appropriate. The objective was to enhance CINC participation by improving communication among the players. Regarding the prioritized list, the JCS advised that while it was not necessary for the CINCs to prioritize, doing so enabled the JCS and the Services to better address CINC needs in the reality of fiscal constraints. Similarly, the OJCS assessment of all CINCs' warfighting needs required prioritization.<sup>3</sup>

(U) In outlining the procedures they planned to implement over the FY 87-91 POM development cycle, the JCS described the component commanders as the key link in the proposal. The Services would initiate action to strengthen this link by maintaining an effective dialogue with the CINCs through the component commanders. The CINCs were to submit to the JCS in November a list of warfighting needs they viewed with major concern. Finally, all CINCs would be afforded the opportunity to present unresolved concerns to the JCS in person prior to POM finalization.<sup>4</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC 031740Z Oct 84 (U).
  2. Ibid.
  3. JCS 052308Z Oct 84 (U).
  4. Ibid.

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(U) On 11 October USCINCPAC provided further thoughts to LT GEN Jack N. Merritt, USA, Director of the Joint Staff of the OJCS. He said he firmly believed the operational commander should have his day in court before the POMs were set in concrete. The program that had been outlined on 5 October would go a long way toward involving the CINCs in the Services' POMs in their formative stages. While he agreed with the thrust of the program, Admiral Crowe said he still had reservations about single integrated prioritized lists of warfighting needs. He said, "When I submit my priorities to components for their direct POM inputs, the components can act upon them directly with their Services. Consolidation of my component lists would necessarily result in some Service-unique requirements being placed in a relatively unfavorable position vis-a-vis other Service-unique requirements. I fear the resulting lower priority on the consolidated list would likely result in the Service using that priority to justify dropping that item from its POM." He said he also wished to emphasize that constant JCS feedback was absolutely necessary for the CINCs to be adequately prepared to participate in face-to-face meetings with the JCS to present unresolved concerns and to have meaningful discussions on such concerns prior to finalization.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 21 November the JCS tasked USCINCPAC to integrate the major warfighting priorities into a single prioritized list and provide it to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary, and Chairman of the JCS by the end of the year.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 10 December the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided instructions for preparation of the CINC's integrated priority lists. The list was intended to provide visibility for those few key problem areas that, in the judgment of the CINC, required the highest priority attention by the Department in developing and programming for solutions. For each problem area, the CINC should also identify his suggestions, within reasonable and realistic fiscal constraints, for the programs he believed were needed to solve those problems. Consideration was to be given both to funded programs that the CINC believed needed to be protected or enhanced and to unfunded requirements not included in Service programs. The CINCs should also identify potential savings from their area to deal with identified problem areas. The OSD point of contact was the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ Admiral Crowe provided his prioritized listing on 1 January 1985. He described himself as a strong advocate of greater CINC involvement. He firmly believed that the unified commanders' warfighting strategies and Service Chiefs' programs should be more closely linked and mutually supportive. In reviewing USPACOM problem areas, however, he advised that he should point out that his headquarters was not staffed to provide adequately some of the

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1. USCINCPAC 111055Z Oct 84 (U).
  2. J5325 HistSum (U); JCS 211624Z Nov 84 (U).
  3. SECDEF 101747Z Dec 84 (U).

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programming details that had been requested. Nor could he deal with the decisions the Services had to make in the POM process, such as program offsets and savings. "Moreover, I do not advocate the unified commander being staffed to assume Service programming tasks. Instead, CINC inputs should reflect our needs from a theater perspective and what should be programmed so we can fight today, if need be."<sup>1</sup>

(S) He said he believed it was important to consider not just the systems needed, but the base infrastructure and supporting command, control, and communications integration necessary to support those new systems. "The required command and control capability for employment of a weapons system must be included in the development of the weapons system and must be acquired and fielded concurrently with that system."<sup>2</sup>

(S) USCINCPAC advised that his top two priorities remained sustainability and air defense. "We must be able to maintain our warfighting efforts beyond the initial stages of hostilities with modern state-of-the-art munitions." Concurrently, he said, "I have a serious shortage of both active and passive air defense throughout the Pacific theater that places our base network at increasing risk to the growing Soviet air threat." He said the greatest weakness was the lack of adequate early warning. Defense of the Aleutians remained a primary concern because of command and control, force allocation, and infrastructure deficiencies.

(S) The remaining priorities were listed in sequence: combat support and combat service support; lack of long-range attack weapons delivery platforms; strategic airlift and sealift, and amphibious lift; reconnaissance resources; Special Operations Forces infiltration and exfiltration capability; command and control systems; and manning the force--the shortfall in Service end strengths.

(S) USCINCPAC noted that several major commands and agencies other than the Services had significant impact on his warfighting capabilities. He cited the Defense Logistics Agency for POL support, the Joint Deployment Agency, and the Transportation Operating Agencies. He recommended that the initiative to enhance CINC participation in the POM development process include the ability for CINCs to address appropriate issues to those major commands and agencies.

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1. USCINCPAC 010251Z Jan 85 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid. The CINCPAC Command History for 1967 had noted that requirements for communications were processed entirely independently from the base development plans or command, control, and management programs that required them, and the communications programs required a long lead time. This was, of course, during the Vietnam buildup and thus not a new problem. (CINCPAC Command History 1967 (TS) (Group 1), Vol. I, p. 790.)

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(S) USCINCPAC said there were few potential areas within the command that offered the opportunity to create savings with which to pay for even a portion of the required fixes without producing serious shortfalls in other areas. He believed offsets could only come from a Defense-wide review of programs. He offered some thoughts, however, about what would have the least impact on USPACOM. He said the proposed increases in sustainability were expensive but necessary, and unfortunately could come only at the expense of modernization. "USCINCPAC would be willing, however, to forego or stretch out modernization and weapons system procurement programs in order to generate funds for meeting our sustainability goals."

(S) He concluded by advising that the increasing importance of the Pacific Basin in U.S. strategy, our growing interaction with the nations of the region, and the growing industrial, financial, and trade interests we had in the Pacific all argued that the USPACOM theater should receive a larger percentage of U.S. defense dollars.<sup>1</sup>

#### Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis

(U) The CINCs of the unified and specified commands and the Military Services assisted the JCS each year in preparation of the Joint Strategic Planning Document. This document contained JCS advice to the National Command Authority on national military strategy and the forces needed to execute that strategy. It influenced the Defense Guidance document, discussed above, that was prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A key supporting document annually was the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA), which described the Minimum Risk Force (MRF), i.e., the level of forces necessary to accomplish the national military strategy with a minimum risk of failure. The USCINCPAC input to the JCS regarding the MRF was a major staff and component undertaking.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The document was in two parts. Part I contained strategy and force planning guidance and was the tasking document that requested input for preparation of Part II. Part II was divided into three books: **Book I** (Strategic Forces), **Book II** (General Purpose Forces - Conventional), and **Book III** (General Purpose Forces - Nonstrategic Nuclear). In 1983 the JCS had not published Part II (for FY 86-93) and thus USCINCPAC input for the MRF had not been required that year.<sup>3</sup>

(S) In 1984 the period of the JSPDSA was FY 87-94, based on JCS tasking of 21 December 1983. The Plans and Policy Directorate alerted the staff and component command representatives on 13 January and assembled them for a

1. Ibid.
2. J5312 HistSum Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 157-159.
3. Ibid.

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coordination meeting on 24 January. At that meeting the overview was briefed and force planning guidance was provided. This concerned scenario fixes, component operational tasks to be performed, and input format.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In their original tasking the JCS had requested USCINCPAC's views on the planning scenario. The scenario appeared in both the JSPDSA and Defense Guidance FY 86-90. Admiral Crowe provided his thoughts on 25 January. He said his major concern with the scenario was that it did not adequately depict a U.S.-USSR global conflict. U.S. and Soviet land, sea, and air forces were engaged in Europe and Southwest Asia, but there was no indication of similar engagement in the Pacific theater. "A truly global war scenario must recognize that U.S. and Soviet forces will engage wherever and whenever they meet. Further, Soviet forces that have the capability to attack the U.S. and our allies/friends should be engaged and eliminated before they can be employed." Similarly, Soviet strategic forces should be opposed when they tried to assemble in safe areas, and should be attrited to the maximum extent possible with conventional forces. Soviet forces deployed in the USPACOM theater possessed a significant capability to inflict damage on the United States, our allies and friends, and our forward-deployed forces and bases. "These Soviet forces cannot be left untouched in a global conflict, especially in the context of developing a Minimum Risk Force. Positive U.S. action against Soviet forces would also have a very profound influence on key nations, such as Japan and China." Accordingly, he offered a number of USPACOM-related events to be added to the scenario.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The Admiral followed up with a personal message to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS, requesting their personal involvement in correcting the scenario problem. (The Admiral's remarks regarding what he perceived as a "basic and serious deficiency" in the scenario were outlined earlier in this chapter in the discussion of Defense Guidance.) Admiral Crowe also raised the issue and requested corrective action during his office visits with the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and the Chairman during his trip to Washington in February.<sup>3</sup>

(S) In 1984, for the first time, CINCSAC and CINCMAC requested USCINCPAC input to assist in the preparation of their MRF. On 9 March USCINCPAC provided CINCSAC with a list of his requirements for conventional long-range aircraft, air refueling assets for employment, and strategic reconnaissance system. On 10 May the requested data was provided to CINCMAC for airlift, combat rescue, special operations, and weather reconnaissance aircraft.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J5321 HistSum Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 250841Z Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR. 00-071#
  3. USCINCPAC 100031Z Feb 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. USCINCPAC 090402Z Mar 84 (S), DECL 9 Mar 90, and 100119Z Mar 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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(S) USCINCPAC's input to Books II and III was provided to the JCS on 26 March. It listed a Minimum Risk Force of 12 2/3 division force equivalents, 4 Special Forces Groups, 67 tactical fighter squadrons, 13 carrier battle groups, 12 surface action groups, and 4 Marine amphibious forces.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In a 23 March memorandum to Admiral Crowe, the Director for Plans and Policy noted that in theory the MRF influenced preparation of the JCS Planning Force, but he said he doubted that the MRF really had much of an impact. The MRF was completely unconstrained, whereas the JCS Planning Force was constrained by capability and fiscal factors. Admiral Crowe noted in the margin of the memo, "I agree."<sup>2</sup>

Joint Program Assessment Memorandum

(U) USCINCPAC's input to the JCS for the FY 86-93 Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) was submitted on 1 June, in accordance with JCS Memorandum of Policy 84. The JPAM was an assessment of the warfighting capability and overall balance of the total Program Objective Memorandum forces to execute the national strategy. Its purpose was to assist the Secretary of Defense in reviewing the Service POMs and in drafting the Program Decision Memoranda.<sup>3</sup>

(S) USCINCPAC noted that all POMs reflected improvement in modernization and force structure at a slower rate than the previous year's program. While qualitative and quantitative improvements over the previous several years had enhanced our warfighting capability, reductions in key areas from the FY 85-89 program would affect sustainability and readiness. "The lack of adequate sustainment for USPACOM forces to fight an intense conventional campaign is the most serious non-nuclear warfare concern in the U.S. Pacific Command." While Service POMs addressed sustainability, and progress was indicated, severe shortages continued to remain for the near term, particularly munitions. Should a high intensity conflict arise during the early part of the POM period (FY 86-88), there was a high risk that sufficient modern munitions would not be available. Our forces would face high attrition during this "risk window."<sup>4</sup>

(S) USCINCPAC concluded:<sup>5</sup>

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1. J5321 HistSum Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR, which referenced USCINCPAC Ltr Ser S250 (S), 26 Mar 84.
  2. J5/Memo/S442-84 (U), 23 Mar 84, Subj: Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) for FY 87-94.
  3. J5323 HistSum Jun 84 (U).
  4. USCINCPAC 011025Z Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  5. Ibid.

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. . . The FY 86 program does not correct all war-fighting deficiencies and fiscal guidance will not permit readdressal of every shortcoming. Increased emphasis is particularly needed on sustainability in the Air Force and Army POMs. The average age of all weapons systems increases during the POM period. These are areas of concern to USPACOM, which currently possesses insufficient forces and sustainment for assigned tasks, for conduct of operations across a broad spectrum of potential hostilities. Overall, our greatest concern is that the JPAM exercise assumes full program funding. If this does not occur, we will ultimately be faced with even greater or more prolonged shortages than those indicated above.

### Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

(U) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP, pronounced jay-scrap) was the near-term document in the JCS joint strategic planning system. It addressed the application of in-being forces and capabilities to tasks and contingencies. It constituted the annual JCS tasking of USCINCPAC for certain plans and activities.

(U) Because the JSCP for FY 84 had been an extensive rewrite, the JCS had minimized the changes for FY 85 to provide a period of stabilization in the joint planning community. There had been, nevertheless, some general and conceptual changes and also some noteworthy changes specifically affecting USPACOM. The changes to Volume I of the FY 85 edition are outlined in the paragraphs that follow.<sup>1</sup>

(TS) USCINCPAC, as noted repeatedly elsewhere in this section, strongly believed that national level planning placed too little emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, with both planning scenarios and force allocations weighted toward the European and Atlantic theaters. One deletion in the JSCP for FY 85 addressed worldwide U.S.-USSR confrontations, deleting the statement, ". . . the US cannot confront the USSR simultaneously in all areas of the world." In a specific change affecting USCINCPAC, under the heading "Global Strategy--Conventional War Originating in Europe," the first U.S. objective in the Pacific was modified. For FY 85, the United States would, "with available forces and resources, protect US bases in the region and destroy or neutralize enemy forces, bases, and facilities as necessary to contain the Soviet Pacific Fleet and prevent Soviet force deployments to the West." In FY 84 the focus had been on "a primarily defensive campaign" to

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1. J5/Memo/TS342-84 (TS), 6 Mar 84, Subj: FY 85 JSCP Vol I - Significant Changes (U), DECL OADR. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 159-162 had outlined provisions of the FY 84 JSCP.

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contain or destroy the Soviet fleet and prevent the deployment of Soviet "ground forces. . .to the West."

(S) A number of USCINCPAC proposals for inclusion had not been incorporated, however, and one was the "swing" of forces issue, with JSCP FY 84 provisions for deployment of selected USPACOM forces to NATO or Southwest Asia still retained. (This subject is addressed in greater detail elsewhere in this section.)

(S) In the matter of general or conceptual changes for the FY 85 edition, some logistics matters were addressed:

- Strategic lift would also be provided by SAC's KC-10 fleet.
- The Services were directed to apportion critical items (identified by unified and specified commands, and including munitions and other items such as batteries and chemical and protective gear). The year before such apportionment had been only a "goal" toward which the Services were to work.
- Regarding apportionment of strategic mobility assets, "For planning, no CINC will be apportioned more than 75 percent [down from 80 percent in FY 84] of the lift available for use in those operation plans that support the global priorities" delineated in the Global Strategy section.

(S) Some of the specific changes that affected USCINCPAC included the following:

- Under "Regional Objectives," Thailand was added to the list of countries in whose defense the United States would assist.
- Japan would be encouraged to increase sustainability and to assist in LOC defense out to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan; Japanese defense improvements would be sought "in order to prevent coercion or neutralization of Japan by Soviet threat or innuendo"; Japan would be encouraged to align with the United States, or, failing that, would be encouraged not to succumb to Soviet pressure for support; and Japan would be encouraged to participate in an expanded joint and combined exercise program to promote interoperability and enhance military readiness.

(TS) China would be encouraged to provide overflight rights, including U.S. refueling and provisioning. It would also be encouraged and supported in its efforts to "preclude Soviet hegemony in Asia."


(C) The United States was to be prepared to provide security assistance to China in the event of Soviet aggression.

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(TS) JSCP 84 had directed preparation of a CONPLAN for the employment of nuclear weapons against the power projection capabilities of China. This requirement was dropped for FY 85. ✓

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(S) One other specific task that was added, however, was to include a planning option to neutralize or contain Vietnamese actions and prevent the USSR from using Vietnamese bases to conduct operations against the United States, its friends, and its allies.<sup>1</sup>



(S) The Admiral said that "swinging forces out of this theater could gravely damage U.S. interests in the region as well as expose U.S. territory to Soviet operations." Nevertheless, if the swing were retained, then at a minimum the approach should be more even-handed. While the JSCP directed deployment of selected Pacific forces to NATO or Southwest Asia, to be decided on a case-by-case basis depending on overall strategic requirements and the tactical situation, there was no mention of possible redeployment from Europe to the Pacific or Southwest Asia. He recommended inclusion of this provision, "Overall strategic requirements and tactical situation could easily demand redeployment to augment the Pacific, and such a provision should be incorporated if the swing strategy is retained."

(S) Regarding strategy in the USPACOM, based on forces apportioned, the Admiral recommended that rather than attempting to defend all of the vast USPACOM region, the United States should concentrate military efforts in those areas most vital to U.S. security. This would be U.S. territory and the approaches thereto, followed by Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines. Japan was acknowledged as the cornerstone of U.S. Pacific strategy, and Japanese industrial production ranked second only to that of the United States in the non-communist world. The Admiral said that the importance of

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1. Ibid.
  2. USCINCPAC 041840Z Sep 84 (TS), DECL OADR.

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retaining U.S. bases in Northeast Asia from which to counter Soviet aggression should be reemphasized.

(S) One of the recommendations USCINCPAC had made for the FY 85 JSCP had not been incorporated. That was to specifically add Guam and the Aleutians under the heading, "Global Strategy--Conventional War Originating in the Pacific." USCINCPAC made the same recommendation for FY 86, to specify, "The Defense of Hawaii, Alaska (to include the Aleutians), Guam, . . . ." USCINCPAC wanted the specific addition of the Aleutians to stress their importance to USPACOM defensive operations as well as to the defense of North America and the lines of communication. Guam was the key to support of forward bases, allies, and Western Pacific lines of communication.

(TS) In still another matter, USCINCPAC discussed JSCP tasking regarding Korea. The FY 85 JSCP tasked USCINCPAC to prepare a unilateral OPLAN that supported CINCUNC/CFC plans. The Admiral recommended that the sentence be replaced with JSCP tasking to "Prepare and maintain an OPLAN to support a combined conventional defense of the ROK to counter North Korean aggression. Develop the plan in coordination with U.S. staff officers on the CINCUNC/CFC staff and insure maximum compatibility between the U.S. unilateral plan and any bilateral plan involving the defense of the ROK." USCINCPAC believed that a clear U.S. mission or tasking statement was no longer included in the JSCP. U.S. limits, political considerations, and interests were not addressed. Also, U.S. tasking or guidance for the defense of Korea should be provided to U.S. officers on the Combined Forces Command staff. Further, maximum compatibility between U.S. unilateral OPLANs and bilateral plans could only be achieved when U.S. interests were stated and joint planning was undertaken.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 6 September USCINCPAC provided additional, more specifically detailed, recommendations for JSCP 86.<sup>2</sup>

#### Commitment of U.S. Pacific Fleet Forces to NATO--DPQ-84

(S) An issue of very major importance to USCINCPAC came under study again in 1984 and for a while there appeared to be hope that the USPACOM point of view might prevail. Since 1967 USCINCPACs had been arguing against the "swing" of USPACOM forces, ships, and aircraft to reinforce the U.S. European and Atlantic Commands in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. The "swing strategy" had come into being right after World War II, but USCINCPAC considered it no longer viable.

(S) Early in April 1984 the JCS asked USCINCLANT and USCINCPAC for recommendations regarding the NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) for 1984. They advised that on 31 May 1983 the JCS had recommended that DPQ-83

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1. Ibid. Operation Plans are discussed in Section II of this chapter.
  2. USCINCPAC 060310Z Sep 84 (TS), DECL OADR.

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change USPACOM swing forces (3 aircraft carriers and 53 other surface combatants) from the category called "earmarked for NATO" to the category called "other forces for NATO." On 12 August 1983 the Secretary of Defense had stated his decision to decrease the number of carriers committed to NATO and to hold reduction of other ships to a minimum. The JCS further advised that on 26 December 1983 USCINCEUR had recommended no decrease in the total naval commitment to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in DPQ-84.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In response to the JCS request, on 19 April 1984 USCINCPAC "strongly" recommended a number of changes to the DPQ. First, however, he noted that the adequacy of force levels within USPACOM for meeting commitments and for protecting U.S. interests was of vital concern to him. While there was no doubt some political benefit in continuing to list USPACOM forces in the DPQ, the costs throughout the Pacific of doing so could also be significant. He noted the increasing importance of the Asia-Pacific region and said the concept of automatically shifting forces from a theater of steadily increasing importance to the Atlantic should be modified.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Redeployment of earmarked forces to NATO might promote accommodation on the part of Asian nations perceiving a U.S. abrogation of previous commitments to bilateral security agreements. "Such redeployment would necessarily occur at a critical juncture in the conflict and would effectively remove transiting forces from battle when prompt actions by PACFLT forces could have a profound impact on the outcome of the war for the U.S. and its allies worldwide," the Admiral said. He continued, "It would seem prudent to transfer the Pacific Fleet units in the 'NATO earmarked' category to 'other forces for NATO' and eventually remove them from the DPQ response." He said this was consistent with an earlier decision that had shifted the 25th Infantry Division from the "earmarked" to the "other" category.

SSBN (S) With minimal augmentation, USCINCPAC said, assigned USPACOM forces had the potential to divert Moscow's attention solely from Europe, hold an appreciable number of its Far East forces in place, and affect the employment of its strategic reserve while at the same time inflicting considerable damage on its Pacific forces and bases. "Perhaps more importantly, we can blunt the reach of Soviet power and encourage the Asian nations, especially Japan and the PRC, to align with the Free World rather than remain neutral or make an accommodation with the USSR."

(S) Thus, USCINCPAC strongly recommended certain changes to the DPQ. He said, "Remove I MAF [Marine Amphibious Force] from the DPQ and designate it for use within USPACOM under all conditions of war initiation. I MAF is necessary to partially offset a considerable shortfall of theater-based U.S. Army forces in the Pacific." Because of the maritime nature of this theater,

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1. JCS 050031Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 190112Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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it was "critical" that Marines with their amphibious shipping be available to fight when and where needed. Both the DPQ and the current edition of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan allocated half of the Pacific Marine Forces to NATO if a global war started there. This left only one MAF available throughout the entire USPACOM.

(S) USCINCPAC's second recommendation concerned the automatic swing of USPACOM naval units to other theaters in a global conflict. With global war originating in NATO, the JSCP provided for the automatic swing of most of our Pacific-based amphibious ships and many surface combatants to the Atlantic. This left USPACOM Marine forces with few amphibious bottoms (most of which would be in overhaul) and negated the ability of Marine units to deploy, except by air. During a global war with the USSR, it was most likely that the USPACOM would receive little strategic airlift or sealift augmentation. Therefore, peacetime assets took on added importance. Swinging amphibious ships would not provide a significant (or timely) incremental increase in capability in the Atlantic, but in the USPACOM where there were so few ground forces, those ships could make a significant contribution. Moreover, assuming use of the Panama Canal, which was not certain, at least three weeks was required for the swing units to reach Atlantic ports. This was time lost to combat use, and also unnecessarily exposed the ships to attrition en route.

(S) Further, the loss of 25 combatant ships increased the vulnerability of our aircraft carrier battle groups, severely degraded our antisubmarine warfare/anti-air warfare/antiship underwater warfare capabilities, and provided practically no time for ship repair. DPQ-83 listing of two PACFLT carriers earmarked for the Supreme Allied Command Europe and the U.S. Atlantic Command further compromised USCINCPAC's Campaign Plan objective to bring carrier battle groups into fighting distance of Soviet naval bases. "USPACOM is the only theater where CVBGs can be offensively employed to directly strike the Soviet homeland." Broad expanses of the Pacific and Indian Oceans were ideally suited for the mobility of the carrier forces. It was also important to note that only in USPACOM was U.S. territory--Hawaii, the Aleutians, Guam, Alaska, and the West Coast of CONUS--directly at risk from Soviet conventional attack. "As an absolute minimum, we must maintain adequate forces in the Pacific to defend Guam, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Western United States, as well as the vital sea lines of communication, bases, and territories throughout the USPACOM area." The six carrier battle groups in PACFLT provided a baseline for absolute minimal ability to contain or control events at all levels of the crisis spectrum with little augmentation and to maintain a favorable balance of power in the Western Pacific.<sup>1</sup>

(S) USCINCLANT also provided his thoughts to the JCS. He said the increased capability provided by USPACOM NATO-earmarked forces was essential to the accomplishment of his assigned missions, and even with that capability,

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1. Ibid.

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assigned tasks would have to be accomplished sequentially. It was extremely difficult to concur in any proposal that would draw down committed LANTCOM/SACLANT assets. However, he said, "it is recognized that any major confrontation with the Soviets will, in all probability, quickly mature into a global conflict and that the US must maintain a posture that denies unchallenged Soviet access to areas of vital US interest." Such a situation, he said, could occur with the drawdown of USPACOM assets now earmarked for the support of NATO. The swing of those forces during the early and most critical days of a confrontation with the Soviets could effectively take them out of action during the period when the United States and NATO would need every bit of combat power they possess, he said. "In essence, worldwide requirements for naval forces . . . exceed available assets. Without additional assets, the only viable alternative is developing a program that allows for the allocation and redistribution of forces as required by the situation. Accordingly, the commitment of forces in the DPQ should be consistent with this requirement."<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) The U.S. National Military Representative to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe acknowledged that the growing global presence of the USSR required that the United States be prepared to check Soviet expansionism on a worldwide scale. He said, however, that the view from his theater was clear that the I MAF "must remain firmly committed to NATO." He said the I MAF was the major U.S. ground reinforcement for the southern region. "The major ground conflict will be in Europe," he continued, and therefore sufficient ground combat units must remain committed to enable us to mount a viable defense. He most strongly recommended no decrease in the total, or level, of U.S. naval forces commitment in DPQ-84.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 18 May the JCS provided all commands with a copy of the memorandum they had sent to the Secretary of Defense. They had concluded that the two Pacific Fleet carrier battle groups currently designated as "earmarked" should be redesignated as "other forces for NATO" in DPQ-84. This conclusion, although based primarily on the need to support global U.S. security requirements, was also strongly influenced by a number of other factors, they said.<sup>3</sup>

(S) First, they noted that the change followed the Secretary's direction to harmonize our various operation plans. Pacific Fleet carrier forces were not assigned to the Atlantic or European theaters for planning in the event of a global conflict. Consequently, U.S. operation plans would differ from NATO plans, which were based on forces committed in the DPQ. Noting the growing Soviet threat worldwide, by retaining PACFLT assets in the Pacific, USPACOM would be in a better position to protect and support forward-deployed U.S. forces and allies, and to tie down Soviet forces. They noted that during the previous year such events as the Korean Air Lines shutdown, the Grenada

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1. USCINCLANT 141604Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. USNMR SHAPE 040805Z May 84 (S/NF), DECL 32 Dec 92.
  3. JCS 181412Z May 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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rescue operation, and the situations in Central America and the Persian Gulf had underscored the global nature of U.S. security requirements and the need to allocate forces accordingly, and had increased the competition for those limited forces.

(S) The JCS said that an important departure from their recommended position for DPQ-83 involved the status of Pacific Fleet surface combatants. "Our proposed response to DPQ-83 recommended that all Pacific Fleet surface combatants be shifted to the "other forces for NATO" category. Their recommendation for DPQ-84 was to retain 4 cruisers and 21 destroyers/frigates as NATO "earmarked" forces. Those units would first escort Pacific Fleet amphibious units and then be available to augment the Atlantic Fleet in support of subsequent operations. Only the 2 Pacific carrier battle groups (2 carriers, 3 cruisers, and 19 destroyers/frigates) would be shifted to the "other forces for NATO" category. They concluded that because U.S. NATO allies were aware that changes might be forthcoming, the opportunity existed to take steps to bring U.S. national strategy and requirements and NATO plans into harmony. This would signal the U.S. intent to support its worldwide security commitments and might encourage other NATO members to increase their maritime-force contributions to the alliance.<sup>1</sup>

(S) USCINCPAC advised that he strongly supported the JCS decision, a move he described as "long overdue." He again noted that Japan and China had become increasingly important in our global strategy and "we must show by actions rather than words that we intend to remain in the Western Pacific in force during the crucial first days of a worldwide confrontation with the Soviets." When implemented, this change would give the United States a more balanced disposition of naval forces with the capability to counter Soviet naval force distribution in all theaters. While the modification might carry some political costs in Europe, USCINCPAC was convinced that those would not be high. The recommended change would be applauded by the Japanese "who do follow this issue with some interest."<sup>2</sup>

(S) The Admiral noted that it was important to bring Defense Guidance, joint strategic planning documents, and operation plans into harmony. The JCS recommendation moved in that direction, but USCINCPAC pointed out two inconsistencies that remained between the DPQ and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. First, the JSCP expressed a need for I MAF to support global U.S. security requirements; that is, it was apportioned for planning in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific. As such, it was not fully committed to NATO even though it was "earmarked." Our NATO plans, USCINCPAC said, which were based on forces committed in the DPQ, should not differ from U.S. OPLANS. Secondly, the DPQ-84 listed 27 amphibious ships as "other forces for NATO" while retaining 4 cruisers and 21 destroyers/frigates

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1. Ibid.

2. USCINCPAC 080509Z Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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as "earmarked" for NATO. Those ships were initially to be used as escort for the Pacific Fleet amphibious units, which might or might not "swing" to NATO as they were associated with I MAF. "In U.S. OPLANS, I MAF should be designated for use within USPACOM under all conditions of war initiation," the Admiral said. In order to bring our strategy and requirements into harmony, he strongly recommended that I MAF as well as the 25 surface combatants be redesignated as "other forces for NATO."<sup>1</sup>

(S) In late August the Secretary of Defense decided to retain the "swing" and the issue was closed for another year.<sup>2</sup>

#### Southwest Asia Review

(C) On 11 September the JCS advised that they had initiated an internal review of security strategy in Southwest Asia in preparation for a periodic interagency review of the same subject. They outlined that on-going strategy as it was then stated in Defense Department and national policy documents. They provided a summary of that strategy and asked for the comments of the CINCs of the U.S. Atlantic, European, Central, and Pacific commands.<sup>3</sup>

(C) USCINCPAC's reply of 28 September provided a review of U.S. objectives and policies in Southwest Asia and commented on aircraft carrier battle group deployments to the North Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.<sup>4</sup>

(S) USCINCPAC said that on-going U.S. objectives, policies, and strategies contained in Defense Guidance, the Joint Strategic Planning Document, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan had been reviewed. Each of those documents recognized that war with the USSR was likely to be global in nature. Because of the mismatch between our objectives and resources, however, a global conflict required the United States to rely on sequential operations. Therefore, it was "critical" that terms such as "vital interests" and "most vital objectives" be clearly defined, understood, and used with the utmost caution. This had not been done with the regional strategy for the Near East and Southwest Asia. The term "vital" was liberally sprinkled throughout the entire group of documents without rationale to support such assertions. Therefore, a primary objective of the review should be detailed analysis of the region's relative importance to the United States during a global conflict with the Soviets.<sup>5</sup>

(S) USCINCPAC said that since the United States depended on Persian Gulf oil for less than four percent of its needs, our interest in Southwest Asia

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1. Ibid.
  2. OSD 292308Z Aug 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  3. JCS 112249Z Sep 84 (TS), DECL OADR.
  4. J5326 HistSum Sep 84 (C), DECL 10 Oct 90.
  5. USCINCPAC 280344Z Sep 84 (TS), DECL OADR.

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was based primarily on the vulnerability of our allies and other friendly nations. This fact was recognized in the regional strategies published in DOD and JCS documents that identified the preservation of European and Japanese economies as the reason for U.S. interest in the area. The United States could not, however, and should not carry a disproportionate share of defending the Free World's interests in the area. Therefore, the exclusion of forces assigned to NATO from regional planning was inconsistent with both our strategy and our intent to share the defense of Southwest Asia with those countries most dependent on its oil. This inconsistency was compounded by the fact that Pacific forces required to defend the United States were not excluded. "Our first priority must be the defense of the U.S. and our friends/allies have to understand that this is our fundamental objective. If Persian Gulf oil is vital to Europe and Japan, these countries should be prepared to carry out their share of the defense burden."

(TS) Insuring that our allies and friends shared in the defense of Southwest Asia went beyond the allocation of military forces. The pursuit of the regional objectives listed in the guidance documents absorbed nearly 80 percent of the U.S. security assistance program worldwide. If this trend continued, our strategies in other regions would become increasingly difficult to execute. At the same time, the United States must be cautious in singling out specific allies to approach for increased aid, such as Germany and Japan. Each of our oil dependent allies should be encouraged to participate in the effort to maintain access to critical resources. The United States should also recognize the role that friendly oil producers played in the energy equation. The Gulf states had an equally vital interest in insuring continued access to their product and should be providing economic and military aid to less developed nations in the region. Saudi Arabia, for example, had assisted Pakistan in the purchase of major defense equipment from the United States.

(S) USCINCPAC concluded by providing specific comments on issues the JCS had raised regarding our carrier forces in the Northern Arabian Sea. He said the concept of conducting an interagency review of the security strategy in the Near East and Southwest Asia was "vigorously supported."<sup>1</sup>

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1. Ibid. Carrier and other surface combatant operations in the Indian Ocean and Northern Arabian Sea are discussed in considerable detail in the Operations chapter of this history.

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
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SECTION II--USCINCPAC PLANS

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USCINCPAC Operation Plans

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


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1. USCINCPAC Plans Status Report (U), Ser T30, 17 May 84 (TS), DECL OADR; J5/SSS/T22-85 (U), 17 Sep 85, Subj: Review of Draft USCINCPAC Command History for 1984. The following definitions pertained. An OPLAN was an operation plan for the conduct of military operations that could be translated into an operation order (OPORD) with minimum alteration. Complete plans included deployment/employment phases, as appropriate. A CONPLAN was an Operation Plan in Concept Format, an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require expansion into an OPLAN or OPORD prior to implementation. An OPORD was a directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.


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
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
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
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
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1. JCS 172118Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR. "Deliberate" was routine OPLAN/CONPLAN preparation, as opposed to crisis planning in an unexpected contingency. ✓
  2. Ibid.
  3. USCINCPAC 011907Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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
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1. Ibid.
2. J5212 HistSum Nov 84 (U).
3. J521(A) HistSum May 84 (U); JCS 271228Z Apr 84 (U), retransmitted as USCINCPAC 010155Z May 84; USCINCPAC Ltr Ser 1329 (U), 17 May 84, Subj: Approval of CINCPAC OPLAN 5001-82.
4. J521(A) HistSum May 84 (U); JDA 221555Z May 84 (U); USCINCPAC 020305Z Jun 84 (U).


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
1. J5213 HistSum Nov 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; COMUSJ 140800Z Sep 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. J5213 HistSum Nov ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
3. Ibid.; CINCPACFLT 062211Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
4. HQ PACAF 052145Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
5. J3/Memo/S1040-84 ~~(S)~~, 19 Oct 84, Subj: COMUSJAPAN Comment on Draft Annex C to OPLAN 5001-85 (U), DECL OADR.
6. USCINCPAC 160410Z Nov 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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
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1. J521(A) HistSum May 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; USCINCREC 291945Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.; USCINCPAC 120304Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
3. J5415 HistSum Jun 84 ~~(TS)~~, DECL OADR.




1. J5211 Point Paper (~~S~~), 3 Dec 84, Subj: JSCP Tasking to USCINCPAC OPLAN 5027 (U), OADR.
2. Ibid.


1. J5211 HistSum Apr 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 280331Z Apr 84 ~~(S)~~, OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. J5211 HistSum May 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 112312Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
4. JCS 261447Z Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
5. Ibid.



1. J5211 HistSum Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 010359Z Sep 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. J5211 HistSum May 84 (U) and Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 070202Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
3. J5214 Point Paper ~~(TS)~~, 4 Jun 84, Subj: CINCUNC/CFC CONPLAN 5021 (U), DECL OADR. ✓




1. Ibid., which referenced USCINCPAC 142132Z Mar 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR and JCS 211615Z Mar 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. CINCUNC/CFC 130515Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
3. J5214 Point Paper ~~(TS)~~, 11 Dec 84, Subj: CINCUNC/CFC CONPLAN 5021 (U), DECL OADR; SSO Korea 010100Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~(BOM), DECL OADR.




1. USCINCPAC 102245Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~(BOM), DECL OADR. ~~(S)~~ It was a USCINCPAC concern that the plan not be presented to both the ROK and U.S. JCS at the same time. USCINCPAC believed it necessary to have a firm and agreed position established before presentation to the ROK JCS. ✓
2. SSO Korea 110745Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~(BOM), DECL OADR.
3. Ibid.
4. JCS 241729Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~(BOM), DECL OADR.
5. J5214 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 11 Dec 84, Subj: CINCUNC/CFC CONPLAN 5021 (U), DECL OADR.

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
1. J5211 HistSum Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 130435Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. USCINCPAC Ltr ~~(S)~~, Ser C326, 26 Sep 84, Subj: Release of Information to the General Accounting Office (GAO) (U), DECL OADR. The GAO study was 392066.
3. Ibid.
4. JCS 142326Z Nov ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.




1. J5214 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR, 14 Sep 84, Subj: Japan-US Bilateral Planning Accomplishments/Follow-on Initiatives (U).
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1982 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. I, pp 144-145.
4. Ibid.
5. J5214 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 28 Dec 84, Subj: US-Japan Bilateral Planning (U), DECL OADR.




1. COMUSJ 160125Z Jun 83 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
2. JCS 110323Z Aug 83 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
3. COMUSJ 090230Z Nov 83 (~~S~~), DECL OADR, which referenced Ltr, Director, The Joint Staff, Japan Defense Agency to the Chief of Staff, HQ USFJ, 7 Nov 83, Subj: Japanese Comments on the JCS Review of JSDF-USFJ DEFPLAN-OPLAN 5050.




1. USCINCPAC 221810Z Dec 83 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. JCS 080049Z Feb 84 (U), which referenced SM 84-84, 6 Feb 84; USCINCPAC 201832Z Feb 84 (U); J5214 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 28 Dec 84, Subj: US-Japan Bilateral Planning, (U), DECL OADR.
3. COMUSJ 070611Z Mar 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
4. J5214 HistSum Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 260452Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR, which retransmitted COMUSJAPAN 250730Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR: J5214 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 28 Dec 84, Subj: US-Japan Bilateral Planning (U), DECL OADR.



1. Ibid.; USCINCPAC 220232Z Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
2. USCINCPAC 150344Z Dec 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR.
3. J5214 HistSum Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR; JCS 231803Z Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
4. J5214 HistSum Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
5. COMUSJ 210501Z Dec 84 and 240300Z Dec 84, both (U).



1. J5214 Point Paper (~~S~~), 14 Sep 84, Subj: Japan-US Bilateral Planning Accomplishments/Follow-on Initiatives (U), DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. JCS 162014Z Oct 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
4. J5211 HistSum Nov 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR; HQ NORAD 300855Z Oct 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR and 042115Z Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.



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1. J5211 HistSum Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR; HQ NORAD 042115Z Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR, which was retransmitted as USCINCPAC 060037Z Dec 84; USCINCPAC 180435Z Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
  2. JCS 110001Z Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.

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SECTION III - RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER USPACOM COUNTRIES

ANZUS

(U) For over 30 years the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Treaty had provided the basis for foreign and defense relations among those countries. In 1983 the election of a Labour Party Government in Australia had triggered a review of the alliance and relationships in general. The alliance had survived that review. In 1984 the election of a Labour Party government in New Zealand started a series of events that made survival of the alliance in its existing form uncertain at the end of the year.

(U) As 1984 had opened, the various organizational entities and mechanisms of ANZUS were functioning well. The 1983 history provides in considerable detail the nature of those functions. The principal meeting each year was the ANZUS Council with its associated meeting of the Military Representatives. Other forums were Staff Level Meetings and Seminars that did working-level planning, including planning for the first ANZUS war game. (That November game is discussed in Section IV of this chapter.) Seminar 84-1 was held in Auckland, New Zealand, from 27 February to 6 March, and Seminar 84-2 was held at USCINCPAC headquarters from 20 to 24 August.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ It was the matter of visits of nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered U.S. Navy warships to New Zealand ports that was at the heart of a controversy that arose among the ANZUS nations. Admiral Crowe was well aware of nuclear sensitivity, not only in Australia and New Zealand, but in Japan and throughout the South Pacific. Actually, there were four elements regarding nuclear matters, although sometimes they became blurred in South Pacific Islanders' eyes. There was nuclear propulsion of warships, nuclear-armed warships, nuclear testing, and nuclear waste dumping. In March the Admiral had provided his thoughts on nuclear sensitivities throughout the USPACOM region to concerned principals in the State and Defense Departments in Washington. The State Department readdressed USCINCPAC's "thoughtful perspectives" to the Ambassadors of the various countries involved and stimulated further dialogue on this important subject.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ The leader of the New Zealand Labour Party, David Lange, visited the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs on 19 January 1984. He appeared much more confident about Labour's chances of

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1. J5611 HistSums Feb and Aug 84 (U), both of which contain detailed reports of the seminars.
  2. USCINCPAC 220230Z Mar ~~(S)~~(EX), REVW 19 Mar 92 and 200420Z Apr 84 ~~(S)~~(EX), REVW 18 Apr 92; JCS 282315Z Mar 84 ~~(S)~~(EX), DECL OADR; SECSTATE 106917Z ~~(S)~~(EX), DECL OADR.

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winning the November elections than he had during a previous call at the Pentagon in the spring of 1982. He was described as adopting a tone that was intended to be vaguely reassuring, but attempted to distinguish between nuclear propulsion and nuclear armament of warships. He stated that there was no problem with visits by nuclear-powered ships--their safety record spoke for itself. It was the issue of armaments that was important to his party, but he cautioned that the United States not become mesmerized by the vocal campaign rhetoric that was likely to emerge, as anti-U.S. elements in the Labour Party were very small, but they were vocal. (The Labour Party's opinions and actions regarding U.S. ship visits have been discussed over the years in these histories.)<sub>1</sub>

(U) Admiral Crowe made his initial visit as USCINCPAC to New Zealand from 11 to 14 April. In an interview on Radio New Zealand the Admiral spoke of the access his ships had had to New Zealand ports. "This is very meaningful for us primarily because in support of ANZUS exercises, joint operations, operations to improve our inter-operability, we send units to this part of the world, and when we do it's important and almost imperative that we have access to the ports of New Zealand." He noted that it seemed extremely difficult for him to see how he could fulfill any military obligation that he might have under ANZUS where he would have to deploy forces to that part of the world if he did not have access to the ports of his allies.<sub>2</sub>

(U) Labour's spokesman on disarmament, Miss Helen Clark, told the New Zealand press that Admiral Crowe's remarks about the importance of the visits were far from convincing. "He implies that the visits are necessary because of United States Navy exercises in the region. Yet visits to date seem to have been designed primarily to give the crews rest and recreation, and to bolster the national government's foreign policy," she said.<sub>3</sub>

(S) In the Admiral's meetings with Prime Minister Robert D. Muldoon on this trip, the Prime Minister had been enthusiastic in his support for the alliance and had urged USCINCPAC to increase the number of ship visits whenever it became operationally feasible to do so.<sub>4</sub>

(S) In his report to Washington on the trip, Admiral Crowe advised that a Labour victory in New Zealand in November could almost certainly pose significant problems and decision issues for the United States and for ANZUS. From

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1. SECDEF 260012Z Jan 84 (C), DECL OADR. The record should show that there was more message traffic through Headquarters USCINCPAC on the ANZUS/ship visit issue than any other single subject since the U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia in 1975.
  2. AMEMB Wellington 01937/122346Z Apr 84 (U).
  3. AMEMB Wellington 01989/160432Z Apr 84 (U).
  4. AMEMB Wellington 02021/160629Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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his meetings with the opposition party, "it is crystal clear that at best the moderate elements in the . . . party, should Labour win, would face a nearly unmanageable task with the powerful and obstreperous left wing of the party on defense and foreign policy matters." USN ship visits, he said, and "probably some other aspects of the ANZUS defense cooperation, would be in serious--possibly terminal--jeopardy."<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 13 June the New Zealand Parliament voted 40 to 39 against the introduction of a Labour member's bill on "Nuclear-free Zone New Zealand." The Prime Minister, himself, spoke against the bill. He noted that the Labour Party had not opposed nuclear powered warship visits in the 1960's; in fact, had welcomed them. He also quoted Admiral Crowe's recent statement that he did not know how he could meet his responsibilities without access to the ports of allies. He noted that the Australian Labour Party had shown great fortitude since assuming office in 1983. Despite some pre-election statements, the Australians had made it clear they wanted the alliance and would support it.<sup>2</sup>

(U) This was the last major parliamentary development before Prime Minister Muldoon's 14 June decision to dissolve Parliament and hold an early election.

(U) In a campaign speech at Rotorua on 27 June the New Zealand Prime Minister discussed the reasons for the ANZUS commitment. He said that during World War II New Zealand was in serious difficulty, potentially at least. There was a time, he said, "when most of our fighting men were in Europe or the desert and the Japanese were heading this way and there was nothing to stop them." He continued that it was the American Navy at the Battle of the Coral Sea that did stop them. He noted that the children of men who fought in the war realized that without American support "we would have been under Japanese rule." Then, "Today it was the USSR which had more vessels in the Pacific than the United States." He urged keeping the ANZUS defense alliance strong.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz spoke to a conference on the American effect on Australian defense at the Australian Studies Centre of Pennsylvania State University on 24 June, which eventually reached the New Zealand press and brought claims from Labour that the United States was interfering in the election campaign debate. Mr. Wolfowitz saw ANZUS as part of the web of trade, political, social, and philosophical ties among the three countries. "Alliances were hard to put together and hard to keep but they should not be dismantled just because

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1. USCINCPAC 190206Z Apr 84 (S), REVW 17 Apr 92.
  2. AMEMB Wellington 9560/150150Z Jun 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Wellington 03187/282105Z Jun 84 (U).

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aggressors were not apparent--world climates changed rapidly," he said. The fall of the Shah of Iran, the Sino-Soviet split, the attempt to place Soviet missiles in Cuba, even a coup on the small island of Grenada, created new strategic interests and shifted political and military thinking abruptly, the Assistant Secretary warned. He said the United States attached critical importance to the access to Australian and New Zealand ports that provided ready access to the South Pacific and Indian Oceans.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Much editorial comment following publication of the speech was positive. One Wellington editorial noted that the Labour Party's problem with ANZUS was that the party was divided. "The activists--the core supporters who make tea, distribute pamphlets and always turn out for meetings--don't like America and are deeply and sometimes obsessively anti-nuclear. They are willing to place more trust in the good intentions of a totalitarian system like the Soviet Union than in a democratic government like America's. They hold a mish-mash of views that range from anti-nuclear to anti-male . . . ." <sup>2</sup>

(U) The Labour Party scored a resounding victory in the 14 July election, winning 56 seats to 37 for the National Party and two for the Social Credit Party. The newly formed New Zealand Party won about 12 percent of the popular vote nationwide, but no seats. The size of the winning margin surprised virtually all observers.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The long-scheduled 1984 ANZUS Council Meeting took place in Wellington on 16 and 17 July, just days after the election and before the new government was seated. This 33rd meeting was attended by U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Bill Hayden and Minister for Defense Gordon Scholes, and New Zealand National Party members, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Warren Cooper and Minister of Defence David Thomson. The 30-point communique issued following the meeting was substantially like those of the years before.<sup>4</sup>

(S) As usual, the ANZUS Military Representatives meeting was held in conjunction with the Council meeting. In his report to his Washington principals regarding the 18 July meeting, Admiral Crowe said that in light of the pre-election rhetoric he was not sure what to expect. In his opening remarks, however, Air Chief Marshal Jamieson of New Zealand outlined his personal commitment to maintain the continuity of the military relationship. At the conclusion of the meeting, there was essential coincidence of assessments and

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1. AMEMB Wellington 03298/050401Z Jul 84 (U).
  2. AMEMB Wellington 9719/032241Z Jul 84 (U), retransmitted as JCS 032352Z Jul 84.
  3. AMEMB Wellington 03522/141138Z Jul 84 (U).
  4. Thirty-Third ANZUS Council Meeting, Wellington, July 16-17, 1984, Communique.

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agreement on where they wanted military cooperation to go. The major question, of course, was whether the new government in New Zealand would permit fulfillment of those objectives.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Following the Council Meeting, Australian Foreign Minister Hayden was asked in a press conference about the ANZUS relationship and nuclear ship visits. He said Mr. Lange had advised him that the policy of his party stood, and that he, Hayden, had had talks with Mr. Schultz. Hayden said that later Mr. Schultz reported to him that he felt a little more relaxed. He had rather hoped that given time a resolution to the problem could be worked out. He said Mr. Schultz had said publicly that there were two important things: one was that there would be no American naval vessels visiting New Zealand for the remainder of the year according to the normal cycle of ship movements in the region, and secondly, that he hoped that there would be time to resolve the problem.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The U.S. Secretary of State also met with the press, with a New Zealand Radio reporter. The first question was whether denial of port access would affect trade. The Secretary said that New Zealand was a country that the United States had had great, long friendly relations with. "We have a trade relationship with New Zealand, and these things go forward. We think that we'll be friends with the people of New Zealand forever, whatever happened." Regarding the ANZUS military alliance, however, it meant the military forces of the allies interacted with each other. He said that by 1984 something like 40 percent of the ships in the U.S. Navy were nuclear powered.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ In a personal letter to Mr. Lange, the U.S. Secretary congratulated him on his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He invited to meet with him at the U.N. General Assembly meeting in September to continue the dialogue begun in Wellington. He offered to arrange in Honolulu, New York, or wherever might be most convenient, detailed briefings on the strategic balance, our related defense strategies, nuclear weapons systems, nuclear-propelled warships, our arms control objectives and strategies, and other related subjects. If Mr. Lange's schedule did not permit, the Secretary said they could explore the possibility of providing some of those briefings by sending a high-level team to Wellington.<sup>4</sup>

~~(C)~~ On 31 July Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz advised the U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand, H. Munroe Browne, that all agreed that enough had been said

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1. J561 HistSum Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL 7 Aug 80; USCINCPAC 272136Z Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL 18 Jul 90.
  2. AMEMB Canberra 07705/190741Z Jul 84 (U).
  3. SECSTATE 220911/262124Z Jul 84 (U)
  4. SECSTATE 222697/280420Z Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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publicly to make clear the U.S. position on ship visits and related ANZUS issues. We should now aim for quiet and private diplomacy rather than public dialogues.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The New Zealand National Party President and General Director visited USCINCPAC on 16 August. All discussions centered around the ship visit issue. The party president described the attitudes that had brought the situation to the existing state. In the leadership of the major political parties there were barely any left who had served in the military. Over half the voting age population was under 40, with little understanding or personal association with the events of World War II. The education system was dominated by left-leaning liberals who had inculcated their own philosophy in an entire generation of young people. A substantial anti-nuclear force had been mustered among the medical doctors of the country who were articulate and dramatic in presenting their views. The shift of New Zealand foreign trade away from Europe to the Pacific had contributed to breaking down the sense of internationalism among the citizenry. The visitors believed what was needed was a massive, structured reeducation campaign to imbue in New Zealanders the recognition that they could not exist in their quiet and happy corner of the world without regard to what was transpiring elsewhere. The National Party had failed for too long to recognize what was happening and must share the responsibility for the situation.<sup>2</sup>

(C) In a discussion with the visitors on how the United States should manage the ship/ANZUS issue in the next six months or so, Admiral Crowe emphasized the stakes involved for the United States in other areas of the world, including Australia, Japan, the Pacific island nations, and NATO. The United States could not be certain how long it had available in the context of the danger of the "New Zealand disease" becoming contagious elsewhere, or indeed in terms of U.S. public opinion or pressures. He emphasized that he was speaking candidly and requested that his observations be held in confidence. The visitors said there was only a gradual awakening starting among the New Zealand public of how serious a threat to ANZUS the Lange government position was. They recommended that the United States try to avoid taking any harsh action (such as retribution on dairy products issues) for the next six months or so. They cited the historical pattern of nine years of National Party rule followed by three of Labour. They hoped the United States would keep from dismantling ANZUS entirely, so that when the National Party returned to power it could be revived. They exhibited relative optimism about a chance for bringing attitudes around based on the essential conservatism of the New Zealand people. The entire spectrum of anti-nuclear sentiments had broadened and deepened, however, and would be difficult to overcome.<sup>3</sup>

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1. SECSTATE 224035/310115Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 180536Z Aug 84 (C), REVW 17 Aug 90.
  3. Ibid.

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~~(S)~~ While the stand-off on the issue continued as summer passed, there was indeed quiet diplomacy continuing. Throughout, Admiral Crowe held firm to belief in the worldwide, time-tested U.S. policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on U.S. military ships or aircraft.<sup>1</sup>

(U) A 1 September poll under the auspices of the U.S. Information Agency revealed that public opinion had shifted only slightly in U.S. disfavor over that of the previous year on the ANZUS-ship visit issues. The poll dramatically refuted the claim heard often in New Zealand that because 63 percent of the people had voted for parties with anti-nuclear policies, that percentage was opposed to U.S. Navy ship visits and some other aspects of ANZUS. "Clearly we still have a significant reservoir of public support on which to draw as we work our way through these issues in the months to come," the survey analysts concluded.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Mr. Lange did indeed visit the United Nations in New York in late September and met with Secretary Schultz. As reported on New Zealand radio, the meeting did not resolve the issue of nuclear warships visiting New Zealand or the future of ANZUS. In fact, a political editor said it seemed attitudes had hardened with the Americans seeming determined to lodge a schedule of warship visits with the government by December. Secretary Schultz told Mr. Lange the United States would be making a request for naval rest and recreation visits before the end of the year, and reportedly also raised the possibility of an end to the ANZUS agreement. Mr. Lange acknowledged there was pressure to resolve the issue, probably by the July 1985 ANZUS meeting.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ While in New York, Mr. Lange addressed a luncheon of the Foreign Policy Association on 24 September. He said, "We are not about to turn our backs on long standing friendships because of our nuclear policies. Let me stress this point for our nuclear allies. Our policies are not anti-ally. They are not anti-alliances. They are anti-nuclear. They arise from deeply-felt sentiments held by a majority of our people."<sup>4</sup>

(U) Still another voice was heard. Sir Wallace Rowling, former New Zealand Prime Minister and foreign affairs spokesman for the Labour Party (who had maintained a hard line against ship visits) was named Ambassador to the United States. He said a strong case existed for renegotiating the ANZUS treaty that would go beyond a straight military alliance. "I think ANZUS can no longer be regarded as relevant in its present form," he said.<sup>5</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC 110543Z Aug 84 and 022159Z Sep 84, both ~~(S)~~(BOM), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 180055Z Sep 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Wellington 04839/250457Z Sep 84 (U).
  4. SECSTATE 284551/252103Z Sep 84 ~~(S)~~, E.O. 12356: N/A.
  5. AMEMB Wellington 04898/270207Z Sep (U).

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(U) Admiral Crowe kept getting mentioned in the New Zealand press. First, he was quoted from "U.S. News and World Report" to the effect that he would find it very difficult to see how he could carry out his treaty responsibilities if our ships were not allowed to visit," and added that he did not favor a NATO-type Pacific alliance as bilateral alliances "give us a lot more latitude."<sup>1</sup>

(U) The newspapers also reported that Defense Minister Frank O'Flynn had received a full day of military briefings at USCINCPAC headquarters on 16 October. Much of the material discussed was classified, the Minister reported. He agreed, however, that part of the briefings involved a comparison of the relative strengths of the Soviet and American forces in the region. The next day's briefings were in addition to a helicopter tour of military facilities near Honolulu. Admiral Crowe, it was reported, was expected to head the team that would deliver to Wellington the schedule of requested ship visits. The composition of the list, and the government's reaction to it, was seen as being a "crunch point" in the ANZUS relationship.<sup>2</sup>

(S) When Admiral Crowe reported to Washington on the O'Flynn meeting, he described it as more of a gesture than a genuine effort to learn or to approach the issues with an open mind. All things considered, he said he was more pessimistic than he had been previously.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Shortly after the visit, however, a press release revealed that Defence Ministry briefing papers, prepared for Minister O'Flynn and then released by him for public debate, made clear that New Zealand was virtually defenseless without alliances and cancellation or even alteration of ANZUS would badly hurt New Zealand's defense capability. The papers stressed Russia's expanding Pacific strength. O'Flynn denied he ever advocated withdrawal from ANZUS.<sup>4</sup>

(C) The U.S. Ambassador in Wellington reported that Minister O'Flynn's United Nations Day speech in Wellington on 24 October was almost a recantation of his remarks in Parliament on 19 September, particularly the recognition that New Zealand needed allies and could not stand alone. "New Zealand has not suddenly become anti-Western or anti-American. We respect and value our Western partnerships and we wish to continue them. There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that we remain firmly committed to the Western Alliance and in particular to the ANZUS relationship." This apparent change was believed

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1. AMEMB Wellington 05323/180309Z Oct 84 (U).
  2. ~~AMEMB~~ Wellington 05328/180314Z Oct 84 (U); ADMIN USCINCPAC 062236Z Oct 84 (C), DECL OADR; AMEMB Rangoon/CINCPAC TDY 120908Z Oct 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 202931Z Oct 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  4. OSD 231638Z Oct 84 (U)(BOM).

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by the Embassy to be based more on the Prime Minister's instructions than on a change in attitude by the Minister.<sup>1</sup>

(C) Meanwhile, Prime Minister Lange's personal popularity reached new heights, according to a poll released on 16 October, with 75 percent of those polled indicating approval of his performance as Prime Minister in contrast to only 12 percent who disapproved.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Also in November, the Australian national weekly news magazine wrote that Admiral Crowe had signalled a cooling-off period between the United States and New Zealand to reconcile conflicting attitudes. Admiral Crowe was quoted as saying both sides understood how serious the issue was and "we're working to sort it out." The writer described Admiral Crowe as taking a "softer line" than recent Washington Administration figures had taken; they had served a virtual ultimatum on New Zealand to permit visits by nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ships or to leave the ANZUS alliance. When questioned about a possible Australian-U.S. bilateral defense treaty, the Admiral was quoted as saying, "We're working hard to sort the situation out. It's just too early to talk about alternatives."<sup>3</sup>

(U) The sorting went on as the year ended. No specific request for a ship visit had been made of New Zealand since the issue had surfaced, and the ANZUS treaty had not been abrogated by any party.

Access to Australian Dry-Docking Facilities

(U) Some other matters relating to U.S. relations with Australia were of interest in 1984. On 26 February the Australian government announced its policy on the dry-docking of foreign naval ships. A dispute had arisen in December 1983 when the British aircraft carrier INVINCIBLE had left Sydney without undertaking planned repairs to its propeller shaft amid a row on whether the ship was carrying nuclear weapons. The ship went to Singapore for the repairs. Defense Minister Gordon Scholes, who released the policy statement, said the Federal Government did not now require that visiting ships from allied countries reveal if they were carrying nuclear weapons. He said allied governments were aware of Australia's concern about the presence of nuclear weapons in Australian territory. On the availability of dry-docking facilities, Mr. Scholes said each request would have to be considered on its merits, taking into account the situation at the time. He said, however, that Australia would not endanger the safety of any allied or friendly warship or crew in need of access to Australian facilities.<sup>4</sup>

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1. AMEMB Wellington 05426/250424Z Oct 84 and 05725/130302Z Nov 84 both (C), DECL OADR.
  2. AMEMB Wellington 05356/190107Z Oct 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. USIS Canberra 11727/042316Z Nov 84 (U).
  4. FBIS Bangkok 260903Z Feb 84 (U).

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(U) The Australian press described the policy as a retreat, in which the Scholes back-down followed British and U.S. concern. An opposition party spokesman called on the government to apologize to Britain and said the statement showed the government had been "totally wrong" over the INVINCIBLE incident. One editorial said that since the government had decided that visiting warships would not be required to state whether they were carrying nuclear weapons, the dry dock argument presumably became irrelevant. "It should be, for the Labour Party cannot expect to have it both ways. If it wants the protective friendship of its allies, then the least it can do, when one of their vessels is in trouble, is to extend full repair facilities."<sup>1</sup>

(S) Admiral Crowe had been deeply concerned with this matter. On 4 January he advised Washington principals in the State and Defense Departments that he was in agreement with the Embassies in Canberra and Tokyo that acceptance of restrictions on the use of port facilities in Australia would lead to later serious problems elsewhere. If the United States was to prevent erosion of the neither confirm nor deny policy, the United States must adhere to it strictly and avoid any statement that detracted from it. Over the following weeks he provided a number of specific proposals concerning appropriate wording to convey the U.S. position.<sup>2</sup>

#### Australian Air Force Presence at Malaysian Airbase

(S) As discussed in earlier editions of this history, the United States had been interested in the continued basing of Australian aircraft at Butterworth, Malaysia. MIRAGE fighters had been based at Butterworth since 1965. Following the withdrawal of an Australian Army battalion from Singapore in the early 1970's, the presence of the MIRAGEs in the Malaysia-Singapore area had been Canberra's main contribution to the Five-Power Defense Arrangement; the aircraft provided the only all-weather air defense in the area. One squadron had been withdrawn in 1983, however, to be re-equipped with F-18 aircraft. The length of tenure for the other squadron was to be examined in 1985.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 17 March a Melbourne press service announced that the Australian Air Force was to maintain its presence at Butterworth. However, the deployment of permanent fighters was to be scaled down after 1988, when the MIRAGE aircraft were withdrawn from service. The Australian Defense Minister had announced that as the MIRAGEs would be gradually taken out of service, the Butterworth presence would be supplemented by additional fighters and F-111

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1. AMEMB Canberra 02022/270347Z Feb 84 (U); USIS Melbourne 0334/272315Z Feb 84 (U).
  2. USCINCPAC 040702Z Jan 84 (S), DECL 3 Jan 90, 200500Z Jan 84 (S), DECL 13 Jan 90, 271844Z Jan 84 (S), DECL 26 Jan 90, 090404Z Feb 84 (S), DECL 4 Feb 90.
  3. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, p. 187.

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fighter-bombers from Australia for major exercises. Ground support installations would be retained after 1988 as would ORION (P-3) reconnaissance aircraft and a company of soldiers. The Minister said his government had given a lot of thought to how it could best meet its objectives of contributing to regional security and enhancing Australia's own defense capability.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In a classified message the JCS had advised earlier that the number of MIRAGEs in the existing squadron would be gradually decreased from 18 to 8 by mid-1988. They had originally been scheduled to be withdrawn in 1986. In 1988, when the last were withdrawn, Australia would rotate 6 to 8 F-18 aircraft to Butterworth for a total of 12 to 16 weeks per year. The rotations might be in separate three-week periods, but details had not yet been finalized. Also, there would be at least 2 P-3s stationed there at any time.<sup>2</sup>

#### Australian Statement on Joint Facilities

(C) In anticipation of a July Australian Labour Party conference, both Prime Minister Robert J. Hawke and Foreign Affairs Minister William Hayden made public statements about the facilities in Australia used jointly by Australia and the United States. On 6 June the Prime Minister said he did so to try and create an information basis for the party and for the Australian community, so that people were able to come to conclusions on the basis of facts rather than emotion and speculation. He said he and his government were confident that the great majority of the Australian people would make the judgment that hosting of those joint facilities was in the interest of the Australian people.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The Prime Minister said the facilities were not military bases. There were no combat personnel or combat equipment there, no military stores or workshops, no plant or machinery or laboratories for research, development, production or maintenance of any weapons or combat systems of any kind.<sup>4</sup>

(U) He said timely knowledge of developments that had military significance was very important and could be critical for the security of the United States and its allies, including Australia. Effective deterrence and hence avoidance of conflict depended on this. Arms limitation arrangements between the United States and the USSR specifically provided for verification. The general purpose of the facilities jointly operated at Nurrungar and Pine Gap was to contribute to all of those objectives. Among the functions performed were the provision of early warning by receiving from space satellites information about missile launches, and the provision of information about the

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1. FBIS Bangkok 4M/BBC/170919Z Mar 84 (U)
  2. AMEMB Canberra 02478/080265Z Mar 84 (S)(EX), DECL OADR, which was retransmitted as JCS 081021Z Mar 84 and then CNO 180437Z Mar 84.
  3. AMEMB Canberra 05967/070743Z Jun 74 (U).
  4. AMEMB Canberra 05882/060611Z Jun 84 (U).

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occurrence of nuclear explosions, which assisted in nuclear test ban monitoring and supported nuclear nonproliferation measures. "Disclosures of other technical functions of the classified facilities would involve damage to both U.S. and Australian interests and cannot be justified."

(U) He said the purpose and function of North West Cape had already been made public. It was a communications relay station for ships and submarines of the U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Navy and served as a key element in a complex system of communications supporting the global balance.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The U.S. Ambassador described the 4 July statement by Foreign Minister Hayden as the best and most articulate defense of the continued operation of the joint facilities that had perhaps ever been given. His speech constituted a broadside attack on the arguments of left wing critics. In effect, he sought to reclaim the high moral ground by arguing that the facilities were an essential contribution to the process of deterrence and that their removal would be a major blow to the cause of peace. Similarly, he argued that an Australian decision to stop the export of uranium would violate an article of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and would undermine the only existing treaty limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup>

(C) The Foreign Minister said that while deterrence might not be a permanent answer to preserving peace, it was an essential interim step and the joint facilities played a key role. In view of the massive global impact of any nuclear war, Australia would be involved in a nuclear war whether the facilities were there or not, he said. He said North West Cape supported the U.S. Government's ballistic missile nuclear submarines' second strike capability. "It is essentially limited to defensive and deterrence functions." Pine Gap and Nurrungar played a role in verification of arms control agreements. He said it was highly unlikely that some major arms control agreements between the superpowers would have been reached if it had not been for those two facilities.<sup>3</sup>

(U) United Press International reported that in a defeat for its powerful left wing, the governing Labour Party on 11 July voted to allow U.S. military installations to remain in Australia and support the defense alliance between the two countries. Delegates to the national conference voted 55-43 against a motion to phase out the U.S. installations--the two satellite ground stations and the submarine signalling base. They also defeated motions by the militant antinuclear left to ban visits by nuclear-armed planes and warships and to repudiate the ANZUS defense alliance.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid.

2. AMEMB Canberra 07046/040849Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR.

3. Ibid.

4. DOD "Current News," 11 Jul 84 (U).

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## Brunei

(U) On 1 January 1984 Brunei became the newest country in the USPACOM area as it reestablished its independence from the United Kingdom. It subsequently became a member of the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The wealthy sultanate was the center of much world interest and is introduced in the material that follows.

(U) As described in the Pacific Defence Reporter, Brunei formally terminated 136 years of commercial guidance and 96 years of protection on 1 January. Amid the flush of world recognition, Brunei was quickly judged as a state of superlatives. It was the smallest country in Southeast Asia, about one-tenth the size of Tasmania, with only slightly more than 200,000 inhabitants. Oil and gas accounted for 98 per cent of its exports and 78 per cent of its gross domestic product. The GDP for 1983 was about \$4 billion, which provided an average annual per capita income of \$19,500, the highest in Asia. Current national reserves, earned entirely by Brunei Shell Petroleum Company, were estimated to be at least \$12.8 billion.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In an absolute monarchy, the ownership of this wealth resided conspicuously in the royal family. The third largest item in the 1984 national budget was euphemistically referred to as "Miscellaneous Services." For the first national day on 23 February, a new royal residence was completed. It was the largest in the world with 1,788 rooms, set in 300 acres of landscaped gardens with gold leaf encased domes, 4 thrones, a heliport, a 400-car underground garage, and a computerized electronic surveillance system, all at a cost of more than \$300 million. But the largesse was shared magnanimously. Education, medical care, and pensions were free. Many civil servants were given a free trip to England during their career.

(U) Generous scholarship assistance was available since there was as yet no local university. Cheap government loans were for the asking, essentials were subsidized, and there was no income tax. A new \$95 million stadium could seat almost one-fourth of the entire population. Nearly 54,000 private cars had been registered for a thousand miles of motorable roads.

(U) Contrasts abounded but were not readily recognized. The minimum wage was still \$6 per day, despite a soaring cost of living. Out of a work force of 70,000, 32,000 were employed by the Government. The Agriculture Department had a staff of 2,000 but Brunei had only a few dozen farmers. Thirty-five percent of the population was Muslim, which could affect the Islamization drive. Three political prisoners were freed on Independence Day but another 50 were still held in Jurodong prison. The country had only three weekly newspapers (one in English), with the daily imported from Singapore. Radio

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1. Pacific Defense Reporter, Sep 84 (U), pp. 46-49.

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and color television were widely used although programs remained state controlled. Communications were limited: the national telephone book had 124 pages. Opposite the capital and across the Brunei river lived 27,000 people in a water village composed of shabby-looking wooden houses built on rickety stilts.

(C) The first U.S. military official to visit was the Commander of the U.S. Army's Western Command, LT GEN James M. Lee, who visited from 28 to 31 July. The U.S. Ambassador noted that as the Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) had put a helicopter at the general's disposal, an opportunity was provided to take as close a look at Brunei as had probably been had by any U.S. officials since we closed our consulate in Brunei in 1867. For that reason, the Ambassador's description of that trip is provided in considerable detail.

(C) On 29 July Ambassador Barrinton King, General Lee, and the Defense Attache were guests at a regatta on the Brunei River, the last event in the two-week-long celebration of the Sultan's birthday. (The Army Attache to Singapore, Colonel Harold L. Ladehoff, was also the Defense Attache to Brunei.) Following that the party flew via helicopter from RBAF Headquarters Berakas to the Headquarters of the Gurkha Battalion at Seria. The trip there and back provided an excellent view of the entire 80 miles of coastline of the main segment of Brunei State, where the vast majority of the population lived. Virtually all of the economic activity of the country aside from petroleum was in the immediate vicinity of the capital, Bandar Seri Begawan. Although most of the public works in connection with Brunei becoming an independent state had been completed, large tracts of land were being bulldozed for government and private housing projects, as part of a government plan to redistribute population and relieve congestion in the capital. The flight also passed over construction work on yet another new palace, adjoining the Royal Brunei Polo Club at Jurodong. This new palace was to house the Sultan's second wife, and although local estimates that \$200 million was being spent on this project were almost certainly exaggerated, it was obviously an elaborate and costly undertaking.

(C) Between the Port of Muara, at one end of the main segment of Brunei, and Kuala Belait, a divided highway was nearing completion which would replace the old winding two-lane road and should do much to bring the country closer together. Economic activity dwindled away about 20 miles from Bandar at Tutong, and from there on, with the exception of a few villages up-country, the inhabited area of Brunei consisted of a strip of one to three miles along the coast, with the remaining area inland almost unbroken jungle. It was

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1. Ibid.
  2. AMEMB Bandar Seri Begawan 0226/020120Z Aug 84 (C) DECL OADR. The Western Command has no history program of its own, so this account might otherwise not be recorded in a military history document.

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quite clear from flying at a low altitude over this area that the situation often described here (and deplored), that farming was dying out because of oil revenues, was an understatement. "During the visit we had under observation from the helicopter virtually every inch of the inhabited area of Brunei and we did not observe a single working farm, but we saw many rice paddies that had been abandoned." The only agricultural activity in the entire country appeared to be on two government agricultural stations and a certain amount of market gardening in the Bandar area. This latter activity was almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese, as was the entire commercial sector of the country.

(C) The Gurkha Battalion at Seria was, for good reason, located with the Brunei Shell Petroleum Facilities on one side and the Brunei Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Plant on the other. (The perimeter of the LNG Plant was patrolled by Gurkha troops rather than RBAF troops, and the Gurkhas also guarded all other sensitive government installations in the country.) The Gurkha Battalion was British-officered, and the atmosphere at the curry lunch given in honor of General Lee was probably unchanged from what it would have been a generation ago. However, at RBAF Headquarters, where the Commander hosted a dinner that evening for the General, the transition from British to Bruneian Command was very clear, with the senior officers, all of whom were present, about equally divided between British and Bruneian. (It was confirmed "off the record" to the DATT on this occasion that Brigadier Mohamed, until recently Deputy RBAF Commander, would take over as Commander from Brigadier John Friedberger when Mohamed returned from a year at the Royal Defense College in the fall of 1985.)

(C) On 30 July General Lee and the Defense Attache spent the entire day visiting RBAF units, including the Special Combat Division. By the end of the General's visit he had seen almost everything there was to see of the Brunei military with the exception of the Gurkha Reserve Unit (a Force of retired Gurkhas and retired British officers under the direct command of the Sultan and not subject to British control).

(C) On the last day of the visit the Ambassador, General Lee, and the Defense Attache were taken by helicopter to Brunei's rarely visited second enclave of Temburong, separated by the Limbang Salient of Malaysia from the main part of the country. They were taken on a Landrover tour of the district and at the end of the morning the unit commander took the party to the passenger ferry landing where traffic to Malaysia was obliged to cross, commenting that Brunei's claim to the Salient would seem "justified," since with one small bridge it would be possible to travel quickly by the present paved road from Bandar to Temburong rather than traveling by boat or helicopter. He added that nevertheless Brunei did not control the Limbang Salient, and had no intention of allowing a bridge to be built, or even a vehicle ferry to operate, since it wanted to keep very close control over Malaysian immigration. On the flight back it was quite clear that the

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Temburong district was very sparsely populated with little economic activity other than logging. In spite of government building activity to make up for past neglect, public facilities appeared already in excess of needs.

(C) The Ambassador commented that we started off with most Bruneians well disposed towards, although very poorly informed about, the United States. The visit also reinforced his view that prosperity was widespread among the population, that security was quite good, but that social problems were just over the horizon.<sup>1</sup>

(C) Admiral Crowe visited Brunei from 9 to 11 October, a visit the Ambassador described as an important step in strengthening relations between the two countries and particularly in establishing the kind of military-to-military relationship we had with other ASEAN countries. The Admiral received a briefing on Brunei's defense strategy and capabilities and visited Royal Brunei Armed Forces camps at Berakas and the naval base at Muara. Admiral Crowe was received in audience by the Sultan and later visited the main mosque in the capital. The Ambassador commented that not only was the timing perfect, but the "entire tenor" of USCINCPAC's visit was "just right" for this stage in our relations with Brunei.<sup>2</sup>

Comoros

(C) As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, U.S. interest increased regarding the Southwest Indian Ocean area, primarily because of the increasing Soviet threat of influence there. Madagascar events are described elsewhere in this chapter as is U.S. policy toward the whole region, which was the subject of a USCINCPAC-hosted working conference in December.<sup>3</sup>

(C) The U.S. Ambassador to Madagascar, Robert B. Keating, was also accredited to Comoros. When he reported a visit to the Comoros he had made in July, he said that President Abdallah had expressed his disappointment that the United States had not responded to his requests for help. He was unhappy with our giving so much to "Communist" Madagascar and so little to his "free and democratic" Comoros. As the most powerful and richest country in the world, we had not adequately recognized or rewarded his own steadfastness in support of Western interests in the Indian Ocean. The Ambassador commented to the State Department that we should come up with something concrete, an immediate high-visibility gift or project, before the limits of Sultan Abdallah's patience were reached.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid.

2. AMEMB Bandar Seri Begawan 0456/110910Z Oct 84, retransmitted as ADMIN USCINCPAC 1318377Z Oct 84 (C), DECL OADR.

3. J5612 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.

4. AMEMB Antananarivo 7930/281015Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR, which was retransmitted as JCS 281053Z Jul 84.

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(C) Admiral Crowe advised that the Ambassador's message had elevated his concern that our relationship with the Comoros was drifting in a direction that could threaten the favorable relationship we had had with that nation. He said that from his vantage point the Comoros were situated in a rather strategic spot, and he was concerned that recent Soviet overtures to the Comoros could bear fruit if we did not accord somewhat greater attention to that country. The Admiral said that the clear ascension of Soviet influence in the Seychelles was "worrisome to me." He would hope that we would do something positive at least to avoid seeing the Comoros succumb to Soviet blandishments as had occurred in the Seychelles. He recommended that Washington agencies devote some attention to this problem "now," before we lost our access and influence on an island nation that clearly would prefer a close association with the United States but might not feel it could wait forever for that to emerge.<sup>1</sup>

(C) Ambassador Keating visited Comoros again in early October. He was there to extend President Reagan's congratulations to President Abdallah on his reelection for another 6-year term. He also informed the Comorans that the United States would be opening an embassy there in 1985. Abdallah was delighted with the intention to open the embassy but "began to squirm" when the Ambassador congratulated him on his steadfastness in holding off Soviet initiatives. Further investigation revealed that he had accepted Soviet-offered scholarships (13 students had left for Moscow). President Abdallah discussed the development of Anjouan to be a major port. He had offered it to the French and would offer it to the Americans, he said, but if neither would help him he might have to offer it to someone else.<sup>2</sup>

U.S.-Japan Relationship

(C) The United States continued to consider Japan its most important ally in the Pacific. In a message of 7 September 1984 to the State Department, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan commented on the effect of Asian-Pacific attitudes on Japanese defense policy. That message outlined the status of U.S.-Japan relationships during this period, and portions are excerpted in the paragraphs that follow.<sup>3</sup>

(C) The Ambassador advised that the Japanese Government took seriously its neighbors' anxieties about Japanese military growth. To a degree that concern had contributed to Japan's reluctance during the postwar period to play a major military role. It had come into focus only recently, however, when other Asian countries began to express fear that U.S. pressure on Japan to invest substantially more in defense might lead to further U.S. military

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1. USCINCPAC 110050Z Sep 84 (C), REVW: 7 Sep 90
  2. AMEMB Antananarivo 02885/071417Z Oct 84 (C), DECL OADR, retransmitted as JCS 071453Z Oct 84.
  3. AMEMB Tokyo 18630/070903Z Sept 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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withdrawal from Asia, leaving an independent Japan in its place. He noted that Prime Minister Ohira's decision in 1980 (and its reconfirmation by succeeding Prime Ministers Suzuki and Nakasone) to cast Japan's lot squarely with the Western alliance was designed in part to allay Asian concerns as well as to recognize Japan's common interests with the West. Prime Minister Nakasone had responded even more explicitly, during his early visits to the Republic of Korea, ASEAN, and China, by publicly reassuring those countries about the directions and limits of Japan's defense program. Nakasone had also gone considerably further than his predecessors in placing emphasis on the U.S.-Japan alliance in Japan's security framework, repeatedly asserting that Japan's own military forces would remain dedicated solely to self-defense and would develop their new sea lane defense mission in close coordination with U.S. forces.

(C) Nevertheless, the Ambassador continued, it could not be said that Japan's low defense profile had been conditioned principally by its neighbors' attitudes. Rather, the single most important constraint on Japanese military growth was domestic political concern; the Japanese themselves harbored deep anxieties about the potential for misuse of Japanese military power. There was a widespread fear, including among many supporters of the Liberal Democratic Party, that translating Japan's economic power into commensurate military strength might either involve Japan in war, or equally serious from their viewpoint, lead to a revival of militarism that would destroy Japan's postwar democracy. The Government's response had been to adhere to a steady and long-term program of military modernization, to set an upper limit of one percent of the Gross National Product on annual defense expenditures, and to reconfirm political and constitutional limits on the Self-Defense Forces--while moving steadily to adopt a more open acknowledgement of the Soviet threat. Thus, in allaying the concerns of Asian neighbors, the Japanese could also point to a Self-Defense framework whose limits had been defined very carefully by domestic political considerations.

(C) At the same time, it had become increasingly apparent, particularly during Prime Minister Nakasone's tenure, that Japanese political leaders and government officials had come to see close defense cooperation with the United States as not only the most politically acceptable but the most efficacious contribution Japan could make to Asian security. "In the last few years we have witnessed a distinct shift in attitude toward the security treaty relationship, in which the vestiges of postoccupation resentment have nearly disappeared," the Ambassador said. In fact, he continued, the Japanese Government "now actively encourages a substantial long-term U.S. military presence in Japan through direct investment in U.S. bases, dramatic expansion of bilateral military planning and operations, and open recognition of the significance of the U.S. military presence in Japan for larger Asian security concerns." The Japanese Government clearly recognized that its neighbors welcomed a strong U.S. presence in Japan and valued the extent to which Japan acknowledged wider security goals. It should be noted, the Ambassador said,

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that in this respect the government had effectively led public opinion, not only to meet its neighbors' concerns, but also to consolidate Japan's role in the Western alliance.

(C) Finally, he said, the Government, for a different set of reasons, was also concerned about Soviet attitudes toward its military posture. On the one hand, they had clearly abandoned any pretense that Japan could remain neutral and unaffected by Soviet military growth in Northeast Asia, which in turn had become a spur to Japan's defense effort. On the other hand, however, Japanese leaders, media, and public were aware of the potential for rapid Japanese military growth or a significant modification in the political limits on Japan's defense posture to provoke Soviet reactions that would be detrimental to Japanese security interests. Moreover, there was a sizeable body of political opinion in Japan that questioned Japanese military growth, even under existing constraints, arguing that this in itself became the cause of a Soviet threat to Japan.<sup>1</sup>

(C) One Japanese initiative of 1984 illustrated an expanding participation in international affairs. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials had proposed to the British early in 1984 that a U.S.-U.K.-Japan informal discussion be arranged concerning "countries on the Indian Ocean rim." The U.S. Ambassador to Japan commented that while he saw some merit in an informal meeting of that kind, he was a little wary of the trilateral format in view of the sensitivities of some other "summit seven" countries about being excluded from such political/security discussions. He preferred for the U.K. and Japan to arrange the meeting and then invite the United States and perhaps others to sit in.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Admiral Crowe described the proposal as an encouraging sign of Japan's willingness to pursue its national interests from a global perspective. From that vantage, and because there had generally been little systematic coordination involving Japan on the Indian Ocean area, he tended to favor the proposal in principle.<sup>3</sup>

(C) The Admiral said that from the Embassy message there had been no indication of the level at which discussions would be held. Although Washington was in a better position to judge summit sensitivities, he said that perhaps a working-level meeting would reduce the risk of unhappiness from other summit members who might be excluded. He said that from a security point of view, he would think French participation would be useful, given the extensive French presence, influence, and knowledge of significant parts of the region.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid.
  2. AMEMB Tokyo 02103/020909Z Feb 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 090411Z FEB 84, DECL OADR.
  4. Ibid.

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(C) The U.S. Secretary of State viewed the proposal with interest. Japan, as a maritime nation and global trading partner, had a significant interest in the peace and stability of the Indian Ocean region. Further, he believed that Japanese interests in the region were complimentary to those of the United States and other Western allies and that they were bound to increase during the remainder of this century. In the Department's view, an informal dialogue with Tokyo on the Indian Ocean would serve mutual Western interests and contribute to the improved understanding of each other's positions in the region, in coordinating policy activities, in identifying potential concerns, and in fostering a sense of enhanced cooperation in the area.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The Secretary also commented that previous experience in regional security dialogues with the British and others suggested that a bilateral format provided the best opportunity for extended and in-depth discussion. Consequently, while we wanted to encourage this Japanese initiative, we preferred a bilateral format. If this was acceptable to the Japanese, the United States side would be prepared to meet with them in Washington immediately after their discussions with the British.<sup>2</sup>

(C) The Japanese, however, said that the United States and Japan already had many bilateral discussions on various regions of the world and that Japan and the U.K. also had a substantial number of discussions of that kind. The basic idea, he said, was to have a trilateral meeting on a subject of mutual interest. To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "the format was as important as the substance of the discussions."<sup>3</sup>

(U) Planning continued with talks scheduled for later in 1984. There was no further USCINCPAC action.<sup>4</sup>

(C) In another Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiative, the Deputy Director General for North American Affairs Bureau and the Deputy Director of Security Affairs visited the United States in September. On 4 September the Embassy in Tokyo advised the military and commercial installations they would be visiting about the nature of their questions. For example, when they visited the San Diego Naval Base they planned to ask what was involved in the U.S. concept of home-porting; the roles, missions, and particular concerns of the THIRD as compared to the SEVENTH Fleet; and how field carrier landing practice had been handled in the United States. For their visit to Bangor Naval Base and the Naval Shipyard at Bremerton, Washington, they would ask what role SSBN forces played in U.S. nuclear strategy; what was the definition

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1. SECSTATE 077032/152307Z Mar 84 (C), DECL OADR.

2. Ibid.

3. AMEMB Tokyo 05405/190734Z Mar 84 (S), DECL OADR.

4. SECSTATE 128852/022353Z May 84 (C), DECL OADR; J5/SSS/T22-84 (U), 17 Sep 85, Subj: Review of Draft USCINCPAC Command History for 1984.

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of SIOP; where were SSBN bases located and how many submarines in the total U.S. force; and what was the chain of command.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The Embassy said they had made it clear to the Deputy Director of Security Affairs that they would be asking sensitive questions, many of which could not be answered for security reasons. The Deputy Director said they would be interested also in defining the limits of what could be discussed, "bearing in mind the constant stream of information the Japanese press digs out of Congressional hearings and other authoritative sources in Washington." The Ambassador said that the objective in arranging the visits was to gain a better appreciation of broader U.S. strategic concerns and operations, which he found to be an encouraging trend within the Japanese Government.<sup>2</sup>

(C) As outlined in the Ambassador's message, the questions they would pose at USCINCPAC headquarters concerned the significance of Sasebo in U.S. naval strategy; the role of the F-16 deployment to Misawa; was the conventional land-attack version of the TOMAHAWK deployed in an experimental stage only aboard USS NEW JERSEY (BB-62); when would TOMAHAWK be deployed operationally; and when it was described as part of the Strategic Reserve, what did that mean, and was it not dedicated to the SIOP? USCINCPAC's Director of Plans and Policy met with the visitors on 13 September. Their questions were general in nature and the answers seemingly accepted, the Director said.<sup>3</sup>

(U) As reported in the 1983 Command History, in May 1983 President Reagan had signed an executive order establishing the United States-Japan Advisory Commission, a 15-man group (7 from the Japanese side) that was to concern itself with the whole scope of relations between the two countries, including political and security issues.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The Advisory Committee presented its report to the President and Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone on 17 September 1984. It said Japan should consider providing material support for multinational peace-keeping activities by sending non-military or even military personnel to participate in them. The report also advised Japan to increase its defense expenditures.<sup>5</sup>

(U) A Foreign Broadcast Information Service message of 29 September picked up a Beijing Xinhua transmission reporting on this event. It said the Japanese Prime Minister said he had no plans to send Japan Self-Defense Forces abroad. Speaking to a group of reporters in his official residence, he said that he had no intention of revising the Self-Defense Forces law and would not send forces abroad. As for the increase in defense expenditures, he said

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 18216/040927Z Sep 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Ibid.; USCINCPAC 260059Z SEP 85 (U)(BOM).
  4. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, p. 202.
  5. FBIS Okinawa 291226Z Sep 84 (U).

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Japan would strive to stick to the decision limiting the state defense budget to no more than one percent of the gross national product.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On-going specific planning, studies, or other U.S.-Japan activities are discussed in the appropriate parts of this history.

Subcommittee of the Security Consultative Committee

(C) In addition to the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, there were other lower ranking consultative mechanisms. One was the Security Consultative Subcommittee (SSC). This group was formed to provide "working level" talks at the Vice Minister-Ambassadorial level, and the first such meeting had been held in 1967. The group had no decision-making authority and, as a consequence, frank and open discussions on contentious issues had been conducted. Security Consultative Subcommittee Meeting XIV had been held in Honolulu from 29 August through 1 September 1982.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Timing of the next meeting had proved to be a problem for both sides throughout 1983, and SSC Meeting XV finally took place in Honolulu 25 to 27 June 1984. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Richard L. Armitage, Ambassador to Japan Mansfield, USCINCPAC, and COMUSJAPAN represented the United States. Japan Defense Agency Vice Director General Natsumi and Foreign Office Councilor Nakajima were the principals from Japan.<sup>3</sup>

(S) USCINCPAC, as was customary, presented a Pacific overview. Other subjects on the agenda included matters of U.S.-Japan cooperation, such as a report on the sea lane study and the status of U.S.-Japan roles and missions looking toward 1990. In that regard, the Japanese provided a presentation on 1986-1990 mid-term defense estimate goals and the United States side had a presentation on the division of labor. Regarding the strengthening of Pacific deterrence, new initiatives addressed included a U.S. presentation on TOMAHAWK deployment in the Pacific and a Japanese presentation on the potential for future host nation support and additional peacetime cost sharing.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The Embassy in Tokyo provided a report on Japanese media reaction. Editorial comments had noted a "softer U.S. stand" at this year's talks but pointed out that this did not mean that there was no U.S. dissatisfaction with Japanese defense efforts. One correspondent noted that the U.S. side had not pressed Japan to step up its defense capability; instead, he said the U.S. side called for combat sustainability and interoperability of military equipment between U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces. The talks indicated

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1. Ibid.

2. CINCIPAC Command History 1982 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 160-161.

3. COMUSJ 190501Z Jun 84 (U).

4. OSD 082056Z Mar 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR; COMUSJ 270501Z Jun 84 (U).

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that U.S.-Japan defense cooperation had entered a period of "substantial cooperation." Past meetings had seen unilateral U.S. demands for Japan to step up its defense efforts. One newspaper quoted Assistant Secretary Armitage as describing this meeting as a "quiet but fruitful dialogue." Vice Minister Natsumi was reported to have observed that the U.S. side had listened with understanding to explanations of Japan's "special circumstances."<sup>1</sup>

### USCINCPAC-Japan Joint Staff Office Exchange Visits

(U) Exchange visits between USCINCPAC staff officers and those of the Japan Joint Staff Office (JSO) continued in 1984. The Director for Plans and Policy led the delegation that visited JSO headquarters from 30 January to 3 February. Discussion topics included bilateral planning (the DEFPLAN-OPLAN 5051 approval process), combined exercises, the bilateral sea line of defense study, C3 interoperability, and the crisis action system. While in Japan the U.S. delegation visited the Japan Air Self-Defense Force Air Defense Command headquarters at Fuchu Air base and the Fuji Heavy Industries aircraft plant at Utsunomiya, north of Tokyo.<sup>2</sup>

(U) RADM Kiyoyaki Kobata of the JSO, who had been host for the visit, paid a return visit to USCINCPAC headquarters with some of his staff from 29 February to 2 March. This visit saw a continuation of joint discussions of bilateral planning, combined exercises, and the SLOC defense study. The JSO representatives also gave a presentation on the Japanese long- and mid-range planning process. Orientations for the visitors included a tour of Pearl Harbor and helicopter flight over selected military facilities on Oahu.<sup>3</sup>

### ROK-Japan Relationships

(U) While the United States enjoyed close relations with both Japan and Korea, for historic reasons the feelings between our two friends and allies were strained, and had been for a great many years. As a former foreign correspondent for the New York Times had put it, "Many centuries of close cultural connection between Korea and Japan, instead of mitigating the mutual antagonism of the two peoples, only exacerbate it." He continued that the Japanese were subliminally resentful that virtually their entire heritage from China, which ran the gamut from Buddhism and the Confucian ethic to the martial arts and geisha, had flowed to Japan through Korea, a far more ancient civilization. Subjugation of Korea had been their revenge. The Japanese had been ruthless colonizers on the Peninsula, and the Koreans had never forgotten. Japan had occupied Korea from 1910 to 1945. Only the Japanese language was allowed to be taught in Korean schools. Resisters were tortured. Thousands of Koreans were shipped to Japan as cheap labor. Those forced migrants

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 13218/290900Z Jun 84 (U).
  2. J5112 HistSum Feb 84 (U); USCINCPAC 230246Z Dec 83 (U)
  3. J5112 HistSum Feb 84 (U); USCINCPAC 180501Z Jan 84 (U).

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formed Japan's largest ethnic minority, and were a depressed community, victims of discrimination and contempt. It was 20 years after Japan's surrender following World War II before Tokyo and Seoul established formal diplomatic relations.<sup>1</sup>

(S) This same theme was reiterated in a message from the U.S. Ambassador to Japan in December 1981. He said the United States had to keep fully in mind the historical perspective of Korean-Japanese relations. Centuries of interchange, conflict, and misunderstanding, and a half century of harsh colonial rule had left their legacy. While comparisons were difficult, the relationship as seen from Tokyo was somewhat reminiscent of that between the Greeks and the Turks or the British and the Irish.<sup>2</sup>

(U) At least at the Head of State level, however, there was the beginning of dialogue. In January 1983 the Prime Minister of Japan and Mrs. Nakasone made an official visit to the ROK at the invitation of President Chun Doo Hwan; he was the first Japanese Prime Minister ever to visit Korea officially. The leaders were of the same opinion that the visit would make an important milestone for further increased friendly cooperation between the two countries following the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 15 August 1984 ROK President Chun Doo Hwan announced that he would make the first official visit to Japan, "under whose rule we suffered greatly in the past," because the visit was motivated by "our national determination to be self-reliant and to achieve peace and prosperity via our own means and independent capabilities." At the Liberation Day speech he said that in the past 100 years the nation had experienced numerous "trials and tragedies." He said, however, that "we have in the four short years since the inauguration of the fifth republic, established a firm and broad basis on which to advance a new history." He continued that "today we are no longer a passive subject of world history but are playing a leading role in its creation as well as contributing greatly to the peace and prosperity of the world."<sup>4</sup>

(U) In Seoul a few days later angry college students opposed to the upcoming visit partly destroyed a Japanese cultural center and a police station in Seoul in a violent anti-government demonstration. No injuries were reported. The students issued a resolution that said the trip was humiliating because Japan had not repented enough for what it had done to Korea during the colonial occupation.<sup>5</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1981 (TS/PRD), Vol. I, p. 160.
  2. Ibid.
  3. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/PRD), Vol. I, pp. 207-208.
  4. SSO Korea 150340Z Aug 84 (U)(BOM).
  5. Honolulu Advertiser (U), 30 Aug 84, p. D-6.

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(C) As time for the visit approached, the Embassy in Tokyo advised the State Department that a few key unresolved issues remained as negotiations on the joint statement continued. Issues included ROK demands that the Japanese government stop periodic routine fingerprinting of Korean residents of Japan, take steps to correct the bilateral trade imbalance, and facilitate technology transfer through a government science and technology agreement. President Chun was to see the Emperor twice on the first day of his visit, once in an official call at the Palace and later at the State banquet in his honor that evening. The phrasing of the toast was a matter of considerable interest. The proceedings would be televised.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The visit went as scheduled, without incident, from 6 to 8 September. In his arrival statement, Chun said he had come to change relations between two "near and distant" countries to "near and close" ones, and stressed the common goals of peace and freedom sought by both countries. Foreign Minister Abe attended the arrival ceremony, a special sign of the importance of the visit.<sup>2</sup>

(C) President Chun's arrival statement noted the "inseparable" and ancient ties between the two countries. He said he had come to put the "distant part of the ROK-Japan relations on a raft and send it away." He requested that the Japanese people and government accord greater consideration to the 700,000 Korean residents of Japan. He closed by thanking the Japanese Government, people, and "Emperor Hirohito" for the warm and courteous welcome. The Embassy noted that no Japanese referred to the reigning Emperor by his given name and there could be no doubt the Koreans knew the protocol on this point. It appeared to be deliberate and done to distinguish the way the ROK President, as head of an independent and equal state, referred to the Emperor from the way Koreans were made to do during the colonial period. President Chun also made what was considered a very slight bow to the Emperor when they met at the official welcoming ceremony at the Palace.

(C) The Emperor's dinner toast was perhaps the most focused-on aspect of the visit. As expected, it referred indirectly to Japan's harsh colonial rule over Korea. "We sincerely regret that there was an unfortunate past between us for a period in this century, and I believe that it must not be repeated again." Chun, after listening "solemnly," said in his return remarks that close friends, after a quarrel, become even more friendly than before. He augured "close, good-neighborly relations" and the opening of a new age of partnership.

(C) In the first round of talks between Chun and Prime Minister Nakasone, the ROK President cautioned against improving Japanese ties with North Korea

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 18213/040920Z Sep 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. AMEMB Tokyo 18581/070724Z Sep 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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in light of the "severe" situation on the Peninsula; Nakasone replied by expressing appreciation for the ROK's efforts to maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula and said that there was no reason for Japan to change its policy toward North Korea in the absence of significant changes in the situation. At the same time, Nakasone said that private Japanese-North Korean exchanges would continue. Nakasone also suggested that "surrounding countries" should help North Korea reduce its post-Rangoon isolation and remarked that China, intent on its own modernization, desired stability in Korea and that that circumstance in itself contributed to easing tensions. (The allusion was to the 1983 bombing incident in Burma in which North Korean terrorists failed to assassinate Chun, but killed others.)<sup>1</sup>

(C) The second round of Chun-Nakasone talks, also and unexpectedly, focused on the Korean Peninsula, the Ambassador in Tokyo reported. Both leaders reiterated their support for a North-South Korea dialogue, and stressed that no third party should interfere in that dialogue without the understanding of both Koreas. Nakasone again pledged that Japan would attempt to help reduce tensions in part through her good relations with China.<sup>2</sup>

(C) The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs rated the Chun visit a success, while not underestimating the difficulties in "translating bilateral hopes and expectations into reality." The Embassy believed the historic trip was indeed a success, but shared the Ministry's assessment that writing a new chapter in Japan-Korea relations would not prove an easy task.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Also on 7 September the top military officers of Japan and Korea met briefly in Tokyo in conjunction with the State visit. Generals Keitaro Watanabe and Lee Ki-baek met in what was described as a major sign of tightening ties between the two countries. The military leaders did not touch on the military situation on the Korean Peninsula or military exchanges between Tokyo and Seoul, Japanese officials reported. Japan's top uniformed officer had visited the ROK three times, while this was the second visit to Japan by his ROK counterpart.<sup>4</sup>

(S/NOFORN) For some years USCINCPAC (and others) had sought closer relations between the military of the two countries. Both Embassies and the subordinate unified commands had also agreed that the United States should remain a low-visibility, backstage catalyst for a program to bring about closer ties. Ambassador Mansfield believed that the Japanese and Koreans were the best judges of when and how to move forward toward military cooperation. Also, that such development as well as our bilateral relations with the two could be set back if the United States were to try to force the pace of this cooperation or put itself in a position of being publicly identifiable as the

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1. Ibid.
  2. AMEMB Tokyo 18632/070916Z Sep 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Tokyo 18945/120927Z Sep 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. FBIS Okinawa 071113Z Sep 84.

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instigator of it. Several attempts at such matters as midshipmen exchanges or exercise observation proposals had not come to fruition.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) Early in 1984 there were initiatives being discussed in U.S. Navy channels for mutual visits of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and ROK Navy training squadrons late in 1984 or 1985. Admiral Crowe advised CINCPACFLT that such a long-range program was ambitious and supported USCINCPAC objectives of enhancing collective security in the area. He cited previous attempts "without much success" to foster exchanges of that type. He said he would appreciate the Navy's keeping COMUSJAPAN and COMUSKOREA "in the loop" as the Navy pursued Service-to-Service efforts. He said that the payoff in terms of greater combined defense capability was certainly worth the energy and patience that might be expended in fostering mutual cooperation among our allies.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN) USCINCPAC repeatedly stressed the extreme sensitivities associated with the whole issue of bilateral cooperation and the potential for domestic political repercussions in both countries. In addition to the low profile, he also believed the United States should not establish any "milestones" for movement toward cooperation. These had been a feature of planning when it had begun in 1981 and had proved to be counterproductive.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 8 May the Ambassador in Tokyo said that in response to queries from USCINCPAC about the advisability of reviving U.S. attempts to foster ROK-Japan security cooperation, the Embassies in Japan and Korea and the subordinate unified commands in those countries had consulted extensively to review the record and survey the possibility of new approaches. He provided a summary of the conclusions drawn from those consultations.<sup>4</sup>

(S) He said that past efforts to encourage even low-level ROK-Japan military cooperation had met strongly negative responses from both sides. From a political perspective he further believed that an effort by the United States to overcome this reluctance could damage our bilateral defense relationships with both countries. He concluded that an aggressive attempt by the United States could be counterproductive and possibly risk damaging any coordination that already existed between those two countries by drawing attention to it. He recommended continued monitoring of existing and potential areas of bilateral cooperation, without setting specific objectives for U.S. participation, but being prepared to facilitate where our involvement was sought.<sup>5</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 207-210.
  2. COMNAVFORJAPAN 130730Z Feb 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR, which was retransmitted as CINCPACFLT 140050Z Feb 84; USCINCPAC 090502Z Mar 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 300525Z Mar 84 (S/NF)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  4. AMEMB Tokyo 09081/081005Z May 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  5. Ibid.

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U.S.-Korea Relations

(U) Relations with our Korean ally remained strong during 1984. The year was much quieter than the dramatic events of 1983 in which a South Korean passenger plane had been shot down by a Soviet jet fighter over the Sea of Japan with the loss of 269 passengers and crew. This tragedy was followed a little over a month later by the bombing in Rangoon, Burma, that killed 17 ROK officials, including 4 leading cabinet members, and narrowly missed assassinating President Chun Doo Hwan. The material that follows discusses the annual bilateral meetings between Defense officials of the ROK and the United States. Also in 1984 North Korea, again, proposed talks for "peace and reunification" and, again, while there was a tense peace, the two Koreas were a long way from reunification.

16th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting

(S) Admiral Crowe led the HQ USCINCPAC delegation to the annual Security Consultative Committee Meeting and the ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting in Seoul from 6 to 11 May. Preceding the major meeting, the 6th Military Committee Meeting was held on 7 May attended by the U.S. and ROK Chairmen of the JCS, USCINCPAC, and the CINCCFC. General Lee Ki-baek was Chairman of the ROK JCS and other Korean attendees were LT GEN Park Hi-mo, Director of the ROK JCS, and MAJ GEN Kim Eul-kwon, Director of the Strategic Planning Bureau of the ROK JCS. On the U.S. side, in addition to General Vessey and Admiral Crowe, BGEN Charles N. Pittman, C5 of the CFC participated, as did General Robert W. Sennewald, who was CINCCFC and thus represented both sides. Discussion topics included retaliation plans against North Korean provocations, the need to develop a joint ROK-U.S. pre H-Hour scenario, chemical defense, and deployment of LANCE (dual-capable [conventional-nuclear] missile) to the ROK. USCINCPAC provided the participants with an overview of U.S. force improvements in the Pacific. The Chairman of the U.S. JCS discussed U.S. global strategy with his ROK counterpart. CINCCFC, representing both Korea and the United States, addressed future actions necessary to improve the combat readiness of the Combined Forces Command.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) A private session of the MCM was also held on 7 May. The same principals listed above attended. General Sennewald provided a memorandum of record from that meeting on 17 May, with which Admiral Crowe concurred.<sup>2</sup>

(U) There was a one-day interval between the Military Committee Meeting and the main Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) which was held on 9 and 10 May. (The birth of Buddha was celebrated on 8 May and was an official

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1. J5111 HistSum May 84 (S) DECL OADR.
  2. SSO Korea 170630Z May 84 (S/NF)(BOM), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 260120Z May 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR.

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holiday in the ROK.) This SCM was the 16th meeting in the series. It was led by U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the ROK Minister of National Defense, Yoon Sung-min. Others representing the United States included U.S. Ambassador to Korea Richard L. Walker; JCS Chairman Vessey; Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; several other Washington principals; Admiral Crowe; and General Sennewald.

(S) During the Secretary-level meeting, which was attended by Admiral Crowe, significant developments included a request by the Koreans to retain U.S. Forces scheduled to participate in TEAM SPIRIT 88 beyond their scheduled redeployment date. This request was motivated by ROK concerns about maintaining stability and security during the 1988 Olympic games to be held in Seoul. The ROK Government also reported its intentions to allocate \$614 million to improve its war reserve stockage levels during the period 1988-1989 with 70 percent of the ROK expenditure to be allocated for munitions.

(S) Both the ROK and U.S. sides expressed their belief that the 6th MCM and the 16th SCM were the most productive of these meetings that had been held thus far.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The official communique issued following the SCM noted that the two sides pledged to continue together as allies in the cause of peace and stability in the region. They reaffirmed that the security of the ROK was pivotal to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia and, in turn, vital to the security of the United States, as had been confirmed by the Presidents of the two countries during President Reagan's visit to Korea in 1983. Both sides also reconfirmed that the continued existence of the United Nations Command, which had effectively functioned as a peacekeeping mechanism, held continuing importance until alternate arrangements could be agreed upon to insure lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.<sup>2</sup>

(U) See Chapter I of this history for a discussion of command arrangements in the Republic of Korea, which were so unique and complex they required explanation.

(U) After the SCM, planning began almost immediately for the 17th SCM, which was to be held in the United States in the spring of 1985.

#### North Korea's Proposal for Peace and Reunification Talks

(U) On 11 January North Korea formally proposed tripartite talks among the Republic of Korea, the United States, and itself "aimed at opening up a

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1. Ibid.; SSO Korea 131801Z Jan 84 (C)(BOM), DECL OADR: SECDEF 070100Z Apr 84 (U).
  2. COMUSK 100600Z May 84 (U).

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new horizon for the peaceful reunification of Korea." The talks, they said, should discuss conclusion of a peace treaty between the United States and North Korea as well as a declaration of non-aggression between the North and South.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement noting the North Korean authorities had raised the issue of such a tripartite meeting one day prior to their perpetration of the 1983 Burma bombing incident. In order to create favorable conditions for peace and unification and to solidify the foundation for national reconciliation, the North Korean authorities should admit to and apologize for and punish those responsible for the Burma incident, the statement continued. The Ministry described the unification of the Peninsula as essentially an internal problem of the Korean people and suggested a meeting between the highest authorities of the North and South, which they had already proposed, or if that was too difficult, at least a ministerial-level meeting.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 17 January the U.S. JCS advised that the U.S. Government, in consultation with the ROK, was developing a response to the North Korean proposal. It was likely that some mention would be made of the role of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC). This would include a reiteration of previous UNC tension reduction proposals and a statement that if North Korea wished to discuss "military tension reduction measures" the MAC provided a forum for such discussions. They asked CINCUNC and USCINCPAC for comments on the role of the MAC in any future North-South or multilateral negotiations.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Admiral Crowe agreed that the MAC was the appropriate forum for addressing strictly military tension reduction measures. He told the JCS, however, that the MAC should not be used as a forum for political talks. In fact, it might be unwise to refer to the MAC in any sense in a U.S. response to what was basically a political initiative. He said that although the use of MAC facilities would be feasible and convenient, future multilateral political negotiations should not be conducted within a locale where the environment was inherently tense and burdened with a history of confrontation. "The DMZ is all of that." (DMZ: the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas.) Furthermore, one would assume that if North Korea sought serious dialogue, it would recognize that a quiet, unpublicized approach would be more conducive to producing results. Finally, any DMZ incidents that might generate a MAC meeting would almost certainly have an immediate adverse impact on political negotiations being held nearby. The Admiral suggested that a

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1. AMEMB Beijing 00525/110650Z Jan 84 (U), which referenced a Xinhua (Chinese news agency) item.
  2. AMEMB Seoul 00309/110901Z Jan 84 (U).
  3. JCS 171444Z Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR. As noted above, see Chapter I for a discussion of MAC and other command arrangements.

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neutral nation, such as Sweden, might provide a more conducive setting for negotiations.<sup>1</sup>

(S) CINCUNC also noted that MAC was a military entity and should not be used as a forum for political talks. He recommended no specific mention of the MAC in the U.S. response. He also recommended that should any mention be made of past tension reduction proposals they should be referred to as "UNC proposals," not "MAC initiatives."<sup>2</sup>

(S) In an interagency group meeting in Washington on 23 January there was general agreement with the OJCS position that the United States should not become involved in trilateral talks, that China should participate if the United States did, and that political issues not be raised in the MAC. The role of the MAC was still at issue in that meeting, however. The JCS position reflected USCINCPAC's proposals: that MAC should not be involved in what was essentially a political issue; that political negotiations not be conducted at Panmunjom, in an environment that was inherently tense, burdened with a history of confrontation, and subject to disruption by DMZ incidents; and that MAC should not even be mentioned in an U.S. response or counterproposal.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Both the State and Defense Departments generated some initiatives designed to reduce tension on the Peninsula. The message traffic was mostly personal among the principals. Admiral Crowe provided his thoughts in such a message to Generals Vessey and Sennewald on 26 March. He noted that certain State Department proposals pertaining to possible mutual and balanced force reductions, mutual drawback of forces, and mutual elimination of tanks were unwise. In view of recent North Korean provocations against the ROK, any initiatives that could degrade the deterrent capabilities of the CFC forces would be "dangerous." He believed the overall approach should address several fundamental considerations or principles. First, we should pursue any reasonable prospect or possibility of a meaningful dialogue. Next, past North Korean performance provided no foundation for a judgment that they were serious this time about a national tension reduction process. Thirdly, the United States should do nothing to jeopardize our strong alliance with the ROK. Finally, any proposals we made should initially meet two criteria: first, they should be modest in dimension so that some realistic prospect of fulfillment existed; and secondly that the results should be clearly verifiable.<sup>4</sup>

(S) Admiral Crowe said that he supported General Sennewald's recommendation for a "closed door" secretaries' meeting without press attendance. He

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1. USCINCPAC 200513Z Jan 84 (S), DECL 31 Jan 90.
  2. CINCUNC 190532Z Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. JCS 260039Z Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. USCINCPAC 262104Z Mar 84 (S)(BOM), DECL 32 Mar 90.

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further suggested that if any serious dialogue developed with North Korea that we should frankly tell them that their actions over the years had quite simply not created any trust in them and that we could rely only on actions--not words--in making judgements about future dealings.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The JCS agreed with the recommendations of the Admiral and General Sennewald and had provided a response to the State Department based on their recommendations. They recommended that CINCUNC begin coordination with the ROK and, if they agreed, press on with the proposals.<sup>2</sup>

(U) No further USCINCPAC action on this subject took place in 1984.

(C) On 31 July the United Nations Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, Diego Cordovez, visited Seoul following a trip to Pyongyang. He met with the Senior UN Representative on the Military Armistice Commission, RADM Charles F. Horne, III, USN, and with the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Mission in Seoul. Admiral Horne explained that the UNC was a deterrence in that it was a collective group of nations preserving the armistice, that this was more of a deterrence than just two nations, the United States and the ROK. He explained that five other nations' representatives sat beside the UNCMAC senior member and that collective presence was seen and felt by all at the table and the multitude of press for each meeting. In addition, a total of 16 nations stood behind the armistice. When the armistice was signed, 16 nations stood behind a declaration to return if the armistice was abrogated.<sup>3</sup>

(C) During his several day visit to Seoul, Under Secretary Cordovez told his ROK hosts he had encountered an "extremely rigid" North Korean attitude in Pyongyang with the North Koreans holding to standard positions regarding tripartite talks. For their part the South Koreans reiterated their categorical opposition to tripartite talks and expounded their call for direct dialogue. United Nations admission for both Koreas and "cross-recognition" were also discussed in both capitals: the North was adamantly opposed to both on grounds either would tend to perpetuate the division of the Peninsula. The Under Secretary left the ROK with a pessimistic assessment regarding any further role for the U.N. in the troubled Peninsula's affairs. The South Koreans were "relieved."<sup>4</sup>

#### Madagascar

(S) As discussed in another section of this chapter, interest increased on the Southwest Indian Ocean area, primarily because of increasing Soviet

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1. Ibid.
  2. JCS 011145Z Jun 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Seoul 07984/300720Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR; CINCUNC 010725Z Aug 84 (U).
  4. AMEMB Seoul 08103/010754Z Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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influence, and USCINCPAC had hosted a working conference in December to examine Indian Ocean trends and issues, policy goals and objectives, military operational considerations and U.S. Government programmatic efforts.<sup>1</sup>

(S) A few highlights regarding 1984's events related to Madagascar follow. On 18 February, in response to a request from U.S. Ambassador Robert B. Keating, the State Department had prepared a statement entitled, "U.S. Policy Toward Madagascar," a paper they had cleared with the Defense Department's International Security Affairs office, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The opening paragraph of that paper is quoted:<sup>3</sup>

Political and military developments in Madagascar are relevant to U.S. strategic interests in the Southwest Indian Ocean. Specific policy objectives include denying the Soviets the use of Malagasy facilities for military purposes, preserving Western access to Madagascar's strategic minerals, ensuring that political developments in Madagascar do not jeopardize U.S. access to the Southwest Indian Ocean region, supporting U.S. commercial interests on the island, and encouraging trends toward economic liberalization and political moderation. Given our limited influence in the country and our resource constraints, we cannot expect to play a major role in Madagascar. We should, wherever possible, encourage the French, whose strategic interests are consistent with ours, to retain the lead in achieving our mutual objectives. Successful pursuit of these objectives depends on four principal factors: the extent to which Soviet presence and influence in Madagascar poses a threat to U.S. security interests; the policies and actions of the Malagasy government; continuing French resolve to play a major role in the area; and the level of resources which the U.S. is able to commit to Madagascar.

(C) As the paper noted, there had been a measurable improvement in Madagascar's relations with the West over the previous few years, reflected in the government's adoption of more moderate political and economic policies. To further those relationships, Admiral Crowe, in a personal message to Ambassador Keating (and our Ambassadors in Mauritius and the Seychelles as well), issued a standing invitation to offer appropriate host country personnel the opportunity to visit his headquarters when they might be travelling to

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1. J5612 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. SECSTATE 049742/180123Z Feb 84 (S), DECL OADR, which was retransmitted as JCS 180223Z Feb 84.
  3. Ibid.

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the United States. He recognized that the more common route would be through Europe, but he hoped that any who might be visiting the U.S. West Coast would be invited to visit USCINCPAC. He noted that his staff was geared for presenting tailored orientation programs to foreign government and military visitors.<sup>1</sup>

(C) At the end of his first year in Madagascar, Ambassador Keating described the situation, noting that our position was better than it had been a year earlier. "We have seized the initiative from the Soviets and we intend to hold it," he said. FY 85 was expected to see the formation of a Seabee unit requested earlier by President Ratsiraka, which should bring about establishment of a small Military Assistance Program to provide spare parts for the emergency repair of roads by the Malagasy corps of engineers. A river would soon be bridged, and it was expected that a small office would be opened for the Agency for International Development to launch a modest but high-visibility agricultural project. Those low-cost projects would permit the United States to capitalize on what had been done so far to reduce Soviet political and military influence on the island to keep the Malagasy "turning towards the West."<sup>2</sup>

(S) Toward the end of the year the Chief of Naval Operations addressed a number of possible Navy initiatives with Madagascar, which had been the subject of conversations when Ambassador Keating had visited Washington in October. The CNO outlined some possible proposals. Admiral Crowe advised the CNO that he fully supported and encouraged such initiatives. He cautioned, however, that we not raise expectations too high in Madagascar about what the United States might do in the future. In the near-term, he was working with CINCPACFLT for a repair ship visit as soon as a suitable ship became available. He also advised that he had learned that a modest \$2.05 million Military Assistance Program had been approved for Madagascar for FY 85 with \$5 million proposed for FY 86. The Admiral said that support from the CNO and the Ambassador had played a large role in realizing that breakthrough.<sup>3</sup>

#### U.S-Malaysia Military-to-Military Relations

(S) Relationships between the armed forces of the United States and Malaysia had grown considerably in recent years. (Those same years had seen a large increase in the Soviet strength and presence in the region.) In 1984 a new military-to-military committee was formed, called the "Bilateral Training and Consultative Group (BITAC)."

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1. Ibid.; USCINCPAC 270350Z Mar 84 (C), DECL 23 Mar 90.
  2. AMEMB Antananarivo 02270/140806Z Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR, retransmitted as USDAO Antananarivo 201301Z Aug 84.
  3. CNO 281400Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 150512Z Dec 84 (S), DECL 6 Dec 90.

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(S) On 21 January the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs advised Admiral Crowe that during a 20 January meeting between Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir the U.S. Secretary had recommended that further discussions of military cooperation be conducted at the military level. The Assistant Secretary requested that Admiral Crowe, following a visit he had scheduled to Malaysia in February, provide his thoughts on whether the formalization of such talks might be useful.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 20 February Admiral Crowe informed the Washington principals that he thought the idea of a military committee had merit and that, if the Malaysians agreed, USCINCPAC would be glad to go forward with it. He said that when he had discussed the subject with Malaysian officials, their reaction was favorable but noncommittal, as they had not yet been debriefed on the Weinberger-Mahathir discussions.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 22 February the U.S. Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur advised that officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were examining what might be done, but would want whatever it was to be done in low profile. One way to start would be a gathering of appropriate U.S. and Malaysian working-level military people--not a formal committee that would sooner or later be known publicly.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Admiral Crowe advised the Ambassador that he would be glad to operate informally in whatever manner was comfortable for the Malaysians. He believed that laying solid groundwork at the working-level meetings was important. He said that he strongly supported the further development of this initiative.<sup>4</sup>

(S) On 30 March the Defense Attache in Malaysia announced that the Malaysian Minister of Defense desired an initial, exploratory meeting in late April and recommended that USCINCPAC provide a representative. The State Department concurred, and on 6 April USCINCPAC nominated a member of his Plans and Policy Directorate staff to be his representative. That initial staff-level exploratory meeting was held on 27 April.<sup>5</sup>

(S) The first formal meeting of the Bilateral Training and Consultative Group was held on 5 July in Kuala Lumpur in the office of the Chief of the

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1. J5121 HistSum Feb 84 (S), DECL 31 Mar 90; OSD 210053Z and 242334Z Jan 84, both (S)(BOM).
  2. USCINCPAC 201830Z Feb 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 01449/220904Z Feb 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. USCINCPAC 060016Z Mar 84 (S), DECL 28 Feb 90.
  5. J5121 HistSum Apr 84 (S), DECL 30 May 90; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 02606/300821Z Mar 84 (S), DECL OADR; SECSTATE 4250/052314Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 060556Z Apr 84 (S), DECL 30 Apr 90; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 03473/300850Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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Joint Operations Staff and head of the Malaysian delegation, MAJ GEN Dato Mustaffa. The United States was represented by BGEN Bobby F. Brashears, USA, the USCINCPAC Deputy Director for Plans and Policy, and another J5 staff officer. The two delegations reached tentative agreement on Terms of Reference for "low-profile" security cooperation during this first meeting. It was agreed that there would be no publicity concerning any cooperation and that both sides would make best faith efforts to avoid disclosure of information anywhere.<sup>1</sup>

(C) USCINCPAC thought it might be in our interest to inform Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom as they would eventually learn of the meetings. The Ambassador did not agree, however, and suggested that during the October meeting it might be suggested that they brief their Five Party Defense Arrangement partners. The State and Defense Departments concurred. They believed it was important that we not take any action that could erode Malaysian confidence in the United States as a partner in military cooperation.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The first formal session of the BITAC took place on 30 October in Kuala Lumpur and was considered an unqualified success. BGEN Brashears again led the U.S. team; the Malaysian team was led by BGEN Othman Harun, Director of Defense Planning, Ministry of Defence, as MAJ GEN Mustaffa was out of the country. An important issue was raised early in the discussion when General Brashears recommended that the BITAC not become bogged down in the details of the already well-established Foreign Military Sales and International Military Education and Training programs, but instead operate as a "creative and pragmatic" policy tool for finding additional ways to strengthen security cooperation, especially in the areas of exercises and training.<sup>3</sup>

(S) It was agreed that three working groups would be formed: one was to work on specific plans for exercises in 1985 and 1986; a second to develop a Status of Forces memorandum of understanding; and the third was to develop contingency public affairs guidance in the event of an accident or other incidents involving U.S. forces.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J5121 HistSum Jul 84 (S), DECL 31 Aug 90; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 2696/061012Z Jul 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 162347Z Jul 84 (C), DECL 31 Jul 90; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 05659/180550Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR; SECSTATE 224888/312203Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. J512 HistSum Oct 84 (S), DECL 30 Nov 90; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 08754/310742Z Oct 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. Ibid.

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~~(S)~~ The record of the meeting was staffed at USCINCPAC headquarters and forwarded by the Defense Attache's office to the Malaysian counterparts, who approved the record, as amended slightly.<sup>1</sup>

~~(C)~~ Members of the working groups were named by both sides and the Exercise Planning Group was scheduled to meet in late February 1985.<sup>2</sup>

Naval Attache Assigned

~~(C)~~ On 6 January U.S. Ambassador Thomas P. Shoesmith advised that he had earlier deferred a decision on possible assignment of a naval attache to the Defense Attache Office in Kuala Lumpur until he had had sufficient time in Malaysia to evaluate the situation. He advised that he strongly believed that a naval attache was needed "now." He cited the tremendous growth in the interface between the U.S. and Malaysian navies in the previous two years. The Defense Attache Office had managed to institute a solid program of cooperation in the collection and exchange of intelligence, which was substantially navy oriented. Not only would such an attache be able to oversee exercise coordination, but he would be able to expand the cooperative collection endeavors already begun. "With the Soviets rapidly increasing their military presence in the region, I believe it essential that we be prepared to collect and report on their activities in a timely and professional manner."<sup>3</sup>

~~(C)~~ The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency was in complete agreement and began efforts to provide the officer. Admiral Crowe so advised the Chief of Naval Operations and sought his support, requesting early assignment of a navy captain for Kuala Lumpur. By 9 February the CNO had a candidate, who was in place by the summer of 1984. The Ambassador thanked USCINCPAC for his efforts to trigger such quick action.<sup>4</sup>

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Earlier, in late December 1983, the Commander SEVENTH Fleet had proposed that a USN Liaison officer be stationed at the Royal Malaysian Naval Base at Lumut. The Deputy USCINCPAC had concurred with CINCPACFLT approaching the Royal Malaysian Navy on this initiative, providing the Embassy approved and the action would not adversely affect on-going efforts to have a naval attache assigned, and the officer came from Navy resources. CINCPACFLT

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1. J512 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL 31 Jan 91; USCINCPAC 280143Z and 280144Z Nov 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; USDAO Kuala Lumpur 10046/190320Z Dec 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 290714Z Nov 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL 30 Nov 90; USDAO Kuala Lumpur 09943/140707Z Dec 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. USDAO Kuala Lumpur 00151/060712Z Jan 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  4. DIA 241347Z Jan 84 ~~(C)~~(EX), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 302221Z Jan 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR; CNO 092349Z Feb 84 (U); AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 01355/170950Z Feb 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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subsequently advised that the assignment of a naval attache to Malaysia would be sufficient to represent Navy interests for the time being.<sup>1</sup>

U.S.-Philippine Relations

(U) The formal forum in which USCINCPAC interfaced directly with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was the Philippine-United States Mutual Defense Board (MDB). Meetings of the MDB, which were co-chaired by USCINCPAC, occurred in June and December 1984. On 14 June the 26th anniversary meeting took place in Manila, co-chaired by Admiral Crowe and General Fabian Ver, Chief of Staff of the AFP. Major achievements during the previous year, as outlined at the meeting, included the finalizing of MDB OPLAN 1-83, providing for the joint Philippine-U.S. defense of the Philippines in the event of an outbreak of hostilities; revised procedures for inviting Third Country observers and participants to military exercises in Philippine territory; and monitored implementation of the 1 June 1983 Philippine-U.S. Memorandum of Agreement amending the 1947 Military Bases Agreement.<sup>2</sup>

(U) MDB Meeting 84-11 was held at Camp Smith, Hawaii, on 11 December. General Fidel V. Ramos, Acting Philippine Chief of Staff, could not attend, so the Philippines was represented by RADM Simeon M. Alejandro, Flag Officer-in-Command of the Philippine Navy. He was welcomed with a portico honors ceremony by Admiral Crowe on the 10th. Admiral Crowe told the board he looked forward to the continuation of the close military relationship that was necessary to insure cooperation on major defense issues. The MDB insured that the critical dialogue between the armed forces of the two countries occurred regularly.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ When Admiral Crowe was in Manila for the June meeting he called on President Marcos, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, and discussed specific bilateral security issues with General Ver. President Marcos raised the increased New People's Army threat and noted the emphasis he was placing on improvement of AFP ground forces to deal with the problem. He said his immediate need was to devote available resources to his ground forces. The President also volunteered that if U.S. Congressional action altered the FY-85 mix of the MBA compensation package, he believed the Philippines would have to review its commitments under the OPLAN.<sup>4</sup>

~~(S)~~ Admiral Crowe summarized his impressions of those meetings in a personal message to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS on 23 June. He said that while the MDB meetings had been pro forma, as usual,

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1. J5121 HistSum Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL 28 Feb 90; USCINCPAC 130147Z Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Jan 90; CINCPACFLT 020040Z Mar 84 ~~(S/NP)~~, DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 010733Z Jun 84 (U); USCINCPACREP PHIL 110304Z Jun 84 (U).
  3. J512 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL 31 Jan 91; USCINCPAC 010636Z Dec 84 (U).
  4. AMEMB Manila 16061/180758Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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other aspects of the trip made it perhaps the most important he had taken over the previous year, as well as the most depressing. He outlined his concerns, mostly regarding the New People's Army.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ On 3 July the Admiral provided another personal message to an expanded group of Washington principals in the Defense and State Departments and in the Philippines. He noted that he was concerned about the growth and increased effectiveness of the insurgent movement within the Philippines. He said that a major reduction in the budget of the AFP because of inflation, devaluation, and austerity cuts was having a serious impact on AFP operational and procurement actions. The AFP was generally in very poor condition in matters of training, logistics support, mobility, and communications capabilities. The problems were exacerbated by institutional and attitudinal factors within the AFP leadership that inhibited effective approaches in meeting the formidable challenges facing the military. The result was that at precisely the time the insurgency was expanding and gaining momentum, the Philippine defense establishment's ability to meet the threat was declining at a worrisome rate. While the circumstances were by no means without hope, new and innovative approaches would be required to arrest the deteriorating situation, the Admiral said.<sup>2</sup>

~~(C)~~ The Admiral said that over the previous few years the United States had tended to base our Security Assistance to the Philippines solely on negotiating the lowest compensation possible for use of the facilities at Clark Air Base and Subic Bay without due consideration for the specific needs of the AFP in meeting its several security responsibilities. "We must reorient our thinking on this issue if we are to succeed in our goal of upgrading the condition of the AFP and making them more relevant."

~~(C)~~ The Admiral advised that his staff and component commands would be addressing and developing recommendations for improving the situation on a priority basis.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ On 19 August Admiral Crowe provided the interested principals to whom his 3 July message had been addressed what he called a "first cut" at actions the United States might take to assist the AFP in restoring a capability to deal with the expanding threat. This initial look focused on a three-phased approach that combined logistics, maintenance, equipment, training, exercises, communications, and AFP cash flow considerations. Ideally, he said, the general policy parameters of the approach should be determined and our broad objectives generally defined prior to the actual development of specific programs and related projects. He recognized that this would be difficult to do in practice. He said his staff would continue to study and

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1. USCINCPAC 230249Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL 16 Jun 90.
  2. USCINCPAC 030613Z Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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refine these and other initiatives and looked forward to working with Washington agencies in this "endeavor of great importance."<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) Admiral Crowe said he was aware that the military element of the problem in the Philippines was but one dimension of a complex of inter-related economic, political, social, and security factors that had brought the situation to its present state. From the military perspective, however, it seemed evident that the deteriorating situation in the countryside and urban centers was the product of more than just inadequate or ineffective military forces. Only by addressing all aspects of the problem could lasting progress be made.

(S/NOFORN) He first noted some constraints. If the initiatives were to be effective they had to be seen as needed and appropriate by President Marcos. Questions of sovereignty, nationalism, and undue influence in internal affairs were politically volatile and sensitive issues at all levels of the Philippine government. Therefore, any perception that the U.S. Government was dictating policy or attempting to control internal affairs would very probably result in a severe negative reaction. Without support and/or acquiescence from the highest levels of the Philippine national leadership, any initiatives would produce only limited results at best.

(S/NOFORN) He outlined some other sensitivities. It was important, he said, that our approach key on cooperative and prudent efforts. We must carefully consider our position and course of action should the Philippines reject our proposals outright. In that case we must insure that we were able to at least maintain the effectiveness of our existing status and position. Furthermore, certain initiatives could create the impression that the U.S. Government was aligning itself more closely with the regime in power. Since a change in administration was always a possibility, we should be sensitive to the entire political spectrum. Having provided those thoughts, he recommended that Washington agencies "thoroughly and urgently" assess the Philippine situation and develop a broad and integrated approach to the problem.

(S/NOFORN) The three-phased approach he recommended had an initial phase that would involve a modest increase in on-going activities requiring limited steps that could be effected fairly readily within the State and Defense Departments. Types of projects under those parameters could include the allocation of funds and support for training. An intermediate phase could include an increase in security assistance funding programs to implement a broader range of selected assistance projects. He provided some examples.

(S/NOFORN) The final phase would encompass the full scope of an overall program of expanded assistance, to include a wide range of undertakings. It

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1. USCINCPAC 190013Z Aug 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.

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would involve long-term programs that would very likely require major increases in funding levels. In turn, these would no doubt involve some contentious policy decisions. He realized it might not be necessary or possible to progress to this extreme, and acceptability would in large part be dictated by events in the Philippines as well as the success (or failure) of the first two phases. He believed "we should have our thoughts in order in the event this phase is required." He listed a number of possible projects and initiatives.

(S/NOFORN) The Admiral repeated that none of the recommendations could be successfully accomplished without the complete and willing support of President Marcos. He noted that some of the "fixes" might be costly (in terms of dollars and additional in-country personnel) and/or unpopular. But, "we have a strategic vested interest in this former colony and a historical obligation to assist the GOP in this time of stress." He concluded that his staff was prepared to provide details on these and other possible initiatives as necessary.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The Chairman of the JCS advised that the Joint Staff would add USCINCPAC's three-phased approach to an OJCS "think-piece" that had been prepared as they worked to develop a JCS position.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 24 August a Washington Post Service commentary advised that the Reagan Administration's decision to begin a major new interagency study of the policy toward the Philippines had resulted from intensified concern about the gains of the New People's Army insurgency. The precipitating factors, according to "official sources," were the mid-June trip to the Philippines by Admiral Crowe and a lengthy report on the NPA problem sent to Washington by the Embassy in June. A Pentagon official familiar with both assessments was reported to have said that the "great cause for worry" was that the NPA, "without apparent external support," had increased its activities steadily despite the death or capture of some of its leaders and other setbacks at the hands of the Philippine army.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Interagency study in Washington continued.

#### South Pacific Islands

(U) In November, when Fiji Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara became the first South Pacific Island leader to make an official state visit to Washington, President Reagan described Oceania as a region becoming increasingly important to the United States. The President said, "We want to work

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1. Ibid.

2. JCS 222245Z Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR.

3. Honolulu Advertiser (U), 24 Aug 84, p. A-23.

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more closely with the people of Fiji and Oceania to help their region continue on a course of stable economic progress and democratic government free from international tensions and rivalries."<sup>1</sup>

(U) This U.S. diplomatic policy had long been followed by the USPACOM. Our relations with the many nations of Oceania had been the subject of much USCINCPAC effort. One principal area of interest was U.S. ship visits to foreign ports; this subject is discussed in the Operations chapter of this history. Certain other activities of interest in 1984 are discussed in the paragraphs that follow.

(U) The 15th meeting of the South Pacific Forum was held in August in Tuvalu. The forum was a regional organization comprised of the heads of government of the independent and self-governing countries of the South Pacific. The member countries were Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa. The Federated States of Micronesia had been granted observer status. Forum meetings at the head-of-government level had been held at least once a year since 1971 in the capitals of the various member countries.<sup>2</sup>

(U) At this 15th meeting Prime Minister Robert J. Hawke of Australia led the debate on a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange made a strong statement in support of such a zone, but emphasized that it should recognize freedom of navigation of the high seas and the sovereign right of each government to decide questions of port and airfield status. The forum agreed to establish a working group of officials to examine the issues with a view to preparing a draft treaty for consideration at the 1985 meeting.

(U) There was no condemnation of the United States in this meeting of the forum except for a Solomon Islands' government paper on a seized U.S. fishing boat and the question of tuna boats in island waters. A draft communique was adopted that called for a speedy resolution of the problems between the Solomons and the United States on "amicable and just terms" and also promoted a multilateral fisheries agreement.<sup>3</sup>

~~(C)~~ There were a number of visits by island officials during the year. As noted above the most significant was the visit of the Fiji Prime Minister to Washington for meetings with the President and Secretary of Defense. When the Charge d'Affaires delivered the White House invitation on 22 September the Prime Minister immediately accepted, calling it a great honor for his country

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1. AMEMB Wellington 05995/300041Z Nov 84 (U).
  2. J5614 Point Paper (U), 7 Sep 84, Subj: 15th South Pacific Forum (SPF).
  3. Ibid.

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and people. One of his associates later observed that he had never seen the Prime Minister so delighted or openly excited.<sup>1</sup>

(U) As a Fiji newspaper columnist commented on the invitation to call at the White House, "The list of national leaders waiting to make that particular call is a mighty long one. Every U.S. ambassador tries to get the prime minister or president of the country he is accredited to put on it, and then moved up it." The columnist said that in the State Department there was a realization that the Pacific Islands were becoming of some political importance, and that while they were not yet of any great strategic importance they might one day become so, depending on which direction the Soviet navy pursued the swift buildup of its Northwestern Pacific based fleet. The Americans, he said, had decided that it would be unwise to continue to almost entirely neglect the islands as they had done. "As an insurance they want to preserve the region as being one of the world's least troubled areas, and one that should be relatively easy to cultivate since it has lots of good reasons for being pro-American and few for being anti," the columnist continued. He said that the invitation was a gesture of extra goodwill toward a country that in the previous two years had made two important gestures of goodwill toward the United States: the opening of its ports to U.S. nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed naval vessels, should they choose to use them; and the first country to commit troops to the Sinai Desert peace force organized by the United States.<sup>2</sup>

(C) In a message to the State Department, the U.S. Ambassador to Fiji advised that he thought it vitally important that no one misunderstand what had happened in Fiji over the previous two years. Often in opposition to the flow of regional politics, Prime Minister Mara had essentially moved his country from a position of friendly non-alignment to a position of close, even coordinated support for the United States in the region and on global issues. "In the context of the South Pacific's political life, this is a significant, perhaps historic move that requires more than a 'business as usual' response on our part."<sup>3</sup>

(C) The Ambassador also noted that he had just been advised that in response to Fiji anti-nuclear activists, the government planned to issue a statement that is quoted in part:<sup>4</sup>

. . . As to why the Government has decided not to allow port calls into Fiji by Soviet ships of any kind, but to

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1. SECSTATE 281508/212052Z Sep 84 (C), DECL OADR, retransmitted as JCS 212218Z Sep 84; AMEMB Suva 3798/222327Z Sep 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. USINFO Suva 4676/140257Z Nov 84 (U).
  3. AMEMB Suva 4705/150441Z Nov 84 (C), DECL OADR, retransmitted as JCS 151233Z Nov 84.
  4. Ibid.

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allow calls into Fiji ports also by the nuclear powered military vessels of countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the explanation is simply that in the government's perception of Fiji's national security, given the bipolar division of the world today, would be more effectively ensured by closer association with those countries with whom we share common values and institutions than with others who are ideologically different from us. After all, these are the same countries which, together with Australia, New Zealand, and others, helped with the defence and security of Fiji and the South Pacific during World War II, and which today are active in providing development support to enhance the economic security of our people.

(U) After a stop in Honolulu (and a visit to USCINCPAC headquarters) the Prime Minister's visit with President Reagan was completed as scheduled. After lunch with the President, an Administration official reported that the United States would give Fiji military aid in 1985 to go towards standardizing the rifles of its three Army battalions and would look at a further program for the following year. No figure had been put on the military aid, but it was understood to be less than \$500,000. The Administration was also expected to urge Congress to give Fiji about an extra \$1 million in economic aid in 1985.<sup>1</sup>

~~(C)~~ Two other Oceania visitors to USCINCPAC headquarters in 1984 were Heads of State of their island nations. On 14 August His Highness Malletoa Tanumafili II of Western Samoa visited, and three days later the Admiral was visited by President Hammer DeRoburt of Nauru. Both received honors ceremonies and an update briefing.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Admiral Crowe also travelled to certain of the South Pacific islands during 1984. He visited Fiji from 9 to 11 April and Papua New Guinea on 14 and 15 October. Both visits received extensive press coverage in the respective countries.<sup>3</sup>

~~(C)~~ Relations between the United States and Vanuatu came under study in State Department channels in June. The Embassy in Suva advised that in recent encounters some Vanuatu officials had expressed interest in formalizing relations with the United States and broadening contacts with U.S. officials. (Some two years earlier, reporting responsibility for Vanuatu had been transferred from the Embassy in Suva to that in Port Moresby.) The Suva officials considered the recent encounters an apparent change since that last

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1. AMEMB Wellington 05995/300041Z Nov 84 (U).
  2. USCINCPAC 242057Z Aug 84 ~~(C)~~, REVW 23 Aug 90.
  3. AMEMB Suva 1460/122052Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR; USIS Port Moresby 180055Z Oct 84 (U).

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contact two years earlier, when they had appeared, at best, indifferent. In 1984, however, Prime Minister (Father) Walter Lini had told the embassy official that the United States "should have" an official presence in Vila. He went on to say that while this would oblige him to ask the same from the Soviets, he felt that a U.S. presence was especially important. The embassy official pointed out that other Pacific states, Fiji for example, did not feel compelled to offer residence status to the Soviet diplomats simply because the United States was present in Suva. Moreover, before talking about the need for a U.S. presence, we should first establish diplomatic relations. "To this Lini smiled and said that was a point worth considering."<sup>1</sup>

(C) The Deputy Chief of Mission in Port Moresby said they were encouraged by this report, but it was not the impression he had gained in March when the status quo had been praised. He agreed that it was time to "lean forward a bit" and suggested that after the 15th meeting of the South Pacific Forum (discussed above) the new U.S. Ambassador to Papua New Guinea and the Solomons make an orientation trip to Port Vila shortly after his arrival for duty. He said that Prime Minister Lini's remark about being obliged to let the Soviets in too, however, suggested that it would be advisable to concentrate on increasing the level and frequency of U.S. visits to Vanuatu rather than moving to establish a resident official presence.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Admiral Crowe advised the Secretary of State that he had read the messages from Suva and Port Moresby with interest. He believed it was much in our interest to pursue any opportunities that could lead to improved U.S. relations with Vanuatu. He reaffirmed that his headquarters had sought to support overall U.S. diplomatic efforts to strengthen our ties with the island nations. He said, "Vanuatu has been a most difficult nut to crack, of course," and the only opportunity he had had in recent time to cultivate a Vanuatuan official was during the December 1983 visit of President George Sokomanu.<sup>3</sup>

(C) The Admiral continued that as the State Department and the Embassy in Port Moresby sought to explore Vanuatu's potential interest in an improved relationship with the United States, USCINCPAC was prepared to assist in any appropriate manner. The headquarters would be delighted to host any Vanuatuan official who might have occasion to visit Hawaii.<sup>4</sup>

(U) One other matter of interest, particularly in the mid- and South Pacific, was an announcement of the decision by the U.S. Navy to dispose of naval submarine reactor plants at Federal land burial sites in the United States. Ocean disposal (dumping) had been one of the alternatives the Navy

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1. AMEMB Suva 2294/150053Z Jun 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. AMEMB Port Moresby 01306/252223Z Jun 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 022303Z Jul 84 (C), REVW 28 Jun 90.
  4. Ibid.

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had considered and their environmental impact statement had concluded that either option could be implemented without adverse environmental impact. The Navy was to publish an announcement to this effect in the Federal Register in early December.<sup>1</sup>

Antarctica

(S) In February 1983 the Commander, U.S. Naval Support Force Antarctica developed a study recommending, among other things, a review of U.S. Antarctica policy and the establishment of a permanent year-round support facility. (He forwarded it through Navy channels to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.) The facility would consist of a 10,000' hard-surface runway with a permanent support base for approximately 1,000 personnel. Because of differing opinions as to the utility of such a facility, little headway had been made on the recommendations by the spring of 1984. The study had been prompted in part by the knowledge that the Antarctic Treaty might be opened for amendment in 1991, and some observers perceived the possibility of a "land-rush" in this mineral-rich region should the treaty be abrogated. Other nations had been expanding their facilities while the United States, in fact, had been scaling down its basing structure.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 2 May USCINCPAC advised his component commanders that in a visit earlier in 1984 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics had broached the topic of a support facility as described above. Subsequent phone conversations with his office indicated he was moving to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. policy on Antarctica that would involve the State and Defense Departments and the National Science Foundation. A major item to be considered was the feasibility and desirability of establishing a year-round support facility. USCINCPAC asked his component commanders for their comments.<sup>3</sup>

(S/NOFORN) CINCPACFLT provided his comments on 25 May. He first outlined the existing situation. On 23 June 1961 the Antarctic Treaty, signed on 1 December 1959 by 12 original signatories, entered into force prohibiting any measures of a military nature such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, or the testing of any type of weapons. The treaty also contained provisions under which previously asserted territorial claims were suspended for the period of the treaty and no

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1. SECSTATE 360445/062356Z Dec 84 (U).
  2. USCINCPAC 022145Z May 84 (S), DECL 1 May 90. Antarctica was not a part of the USPACOM.
  3. Ibid. National Security Decision Memorandum 71 of 1970 had designated the National Science Foundation as the lead agency in Antarctic affairs, giving State and Defense secondary roles.

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new claim or enlargement of an existing claim to territorial sovereignty should be asserted. The treaty applied to the area south of 60° south latitude including all ice shelves, although nothing in the treaty prejudiced rights of any state under international law with regard to high seas within the area. Under Article 12 of the treaty, any time after 23 June 1991 a party may request a conference of all parties to review operation of the treaty and consider modifications or amendments. If any proposed modification or amendment approved at such a conference by a majority of the parties was not entered into force within a period of two years after its communication to the parties, any party may give notice of its intention to withdraw from the treaty effective two years beyond receipt of the notice.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) Since 1961 many of the original 12 signatories and 7 or more adherent parties had established research stations in coastal areas. In cases where parties had previously asserted territorial claims, their stations had generally been located within the area of their asserted claim. While the USSR, like the United States, had never asserted a territorial claim, it had established stations in virtually all coastal sections of the continent, including one inland site at Vostok. The United States had operated from between three and four permanent sites manned throughout the year and opened temporary base camps during the Austral summer season in locations to facilitate scientific research. To the extent that parties had maintained continuous and actual presence at those stations, they had maintained or developed the basis under international law for asserting or reasserting a territorial or resources claim at some subsequent point.

(S/NOFORN) CINCPACFLT described McMurdo Station as the principal permanent U.S. research station. He described the accessibility and servicing problems for that and the other stations.

(S/NOFORN) He continued that an ideal permanent research station in West Antarctica would permit year-round air operations with a port facility accessible for a significant period. He recommended Marble Point. Development cost of the facility described above (10,000' runway, etc.), based on a 1979 study and escalated to 1986-1991 dollars, was estimated at \$700 million.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN) On 14 June Admiral Crowe sent his thoughts on the matter to the Assistant Secretary. He said that because of its obviously favorable location and climatic conditions, Marble Point was suggested as a likely candidate. The Admiral said he had examined in some detail the possibility of developing a permanent facility and concluded that it would be difficult to accomplish given existing policy to abide by the 1959 treaty, which precluded the assertion of territorial claims. Moreover, he said, we would have great difficulty

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1. CINCPACFLT 252119Z May 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.

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justifying the construction expense at a facility such as Marble Point as our on-going logistic support effort appeared to be adequate.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) The Admiral said that while there was no existing military requirement, the question remained regarding what actions we should take if the existing treaty system became "unglued." Permanent facilities such as those suggested at Marble Point would be required to support any territorial or resource claim should the treaty not continue beyond 1991. He said we needed to begin looking at possible options since programming actions and subsequent construction would not leave much leadtime. He said he understood the Assistant Secretary would be undertaking a review of U.S. Antarctic policy. He said, "I applaud and support your efforts. Moreover, I hope such a review will provide a game plan for U.S. actions including how we might restructure our presence if the treaty begins to unravel."<sup>2</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC 140233Z Jun 84 (S/NF), DECL 5 Jun 90.
  2. Ibid.

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SECTION IV--MISCELLANEOUS PLANNING ACTIVITIES

USCINCPAC Commanders Conference

(U) Admiral Crowe hosted a Commanders Conference at his headquarters on 26 and 27 January. Main topics were warfighting strategies, anti-terrorism, and the Joint USPACOM Air Defense Study recently completed. The attendees are listed in the caption to the accompanying photo.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Primary emphasis was given during the conference to warfighting strategy. Admiral Crowe had asked his component and subordinate unified commanders to brief their strategy for the employment of their forces during a worldwide conflict with the USSR in two cases: hostilities starting in Europe as well as conflict initiation in the USPACOM. He asked that they conclude with any thoughts or recommendations about changes or modifications to the USCINCPAC Campaign Plan.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Briefly, by way of background, the USPACOM Campaign Plan had been designed in 1982 to be a workable strategy for global war with the USSR. It was an extension of previous separate but related efforts dealing with the subject. In 1982 it had been a "first cut" at defining USPACOM warfighting strategy. Late in 1983 a USCINCPAC Warfare Strategy Steering Group had been created as a management mechanism that would afford senior USPACOM, component, and subordinate unified command strategic planners the opportunity to become more familiar with the resources available to accomplish USCINCPAC warfighting strategy. It was not a means of circumventing the normal planning process, but a group to provide expertise in the planning system to serve as a medium for professional exchange among planners and policy makers to gain a USPACOM-wide awareness of Service requirements, capabilities, and limitations. Chaired by USCINCPAC's Director for Plans and Policy, the flag/general officer representatives had met for the first time on 20 December 1983.<sup>3</sup>


(U) The first day of the Commanders Conference, was devoted exclusively to warfighting strategies. The material that follows is taken from the summary report on the conference, and highlights the "disconnects" between those strategies and the Campaign Plan.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J5211 HistSum Jan 84 (U), which enclosed a copy of the agenda.
  2. USCINCPAC 290147Z Dec 83 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, p. 230. The USCINCPAC staff action officer who first prepared the Campaign Plan was LCOL Daniel J. Fitzgerald, USA, of the U.S. Forces and Strategy Division of the Plans and Policy Directorate.
  4. J5/Memo/S374-84 (U), 13 Mar 84, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History - January 1984, which transmitted J5/Memo/S313-84 (U), 1 Mar 84, Subj: USCINCPAC Commanders Conference.

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
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(U) In his opening remarks, Admiral Crowe said his greatest concern was the Soviet Union. The USSR had failed economically, politically, and militarily in the USPACOM, but continued to seek opportunities. He outlined the need to determine what the priorities were for dealing with the Washington community, and how those priorities affected the Campaign Plan. He cited the continuing need for additional U.S. resources.



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1. Ibid.

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(C) One guest attendee at the conference was Mr. Richard L. Haver of the Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence in Washington, who provided his insights into Soviet strategic thinking.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On the afternoon of the second day of the conference there was an anti-terrorist briefing and discussion. Admiral Crowe expressed support for recent JCS initiatives to improve anti-terrorist intelligence, security, and training with a USPACOM-wide focus. The commanders were convinced that action had to be taken at that time regardless of the actual threat condition that might exist in any given place. A revised USCINCPAC instruction on the subject was briefed and approved.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The Joint USPACOM Air Defense Study of 1983 was briefed to the conferees. All participants believed that the study was a good effort, that the logic used was correct, and that the results provided excellent supporting arguments in the efforts by USCINCPAC and his component commanders to acquire additional hardware and personnel. Mr. Haver concurred in the intelligence aspects of the study. The Soviet military priorities, tactics, weapons, projected aircraft availability and utilization, and Soviet capabilities agreed with on-going thinking within the intelligence community. CINCPACAF believed the recommended requirements were realistic and attainable. COMUS-JAPAN cautioned, however, that the requirements recommended by the study group should not be used in isolation as a shopping list of USPACOM requirements. There were many factors involved in hardware selection besides just air defense.<sup>3</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC 251500Z Dec 83 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. J5/Memo/S374-84 (U), 13 Mar 84, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History - January 1984.
  3. Ibid.

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USCINCPAC COMMANDERS CONFERENCE  
26 - 27 January 1985



Front row, from the left: General Robert W. Sennewald, USA, COMUSKOREA; Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, USCINCPAC; Admiral Sylvester R. Foley, USN, CINCPACFLT; General Jerome F. O'Malley, USAF, CINCPACAF. Second row: MAJ GEN Walter C. Schrupp, USAF, USCINCPAC Deputy Chief of Staff; LT GEN Charles L. Donnelly, Jr., USAF, COMUSJAPAN; LT GEN James M. Lee, USA, CDRWESTCOM; LT GEN Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., USA, Deputy USCINCPAC/Chief of Staff; Mr. John J. Helble, Political Adviser to USCINCPAC; RADM Robert E. Kirksey, USN, USCINCPAC Director for Plans and Policy. Third row: BGEN Charles M. Pitman, USMC, COMUSKOREA Assistant Chief of Staff J5; MAJ GEN Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, PACAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans; MAJ GEN John V. Cox, USMC, USCINCPAC Director for Operations; MAJ GEN Vaughn O. Lang, USAF, USCINCPAC Director for Command and Control and Communications Systems; MAJ GEN Thomas G. McInerney, USAF, PACAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence; BGEN Todd P. Graham, USA, WESTCOM Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff; COMO John R. Wilson, Jr., USN, USCINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance; and BGEN Bobby F. Brashears, USA, USCINCPAC Deputy Director for Plans and Policy.

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
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USCINCPAC's Six Initiatives

(S) On 3 April Admiral Crowe sent a personal letter to Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger outlining his principal initiatives for improving his warfighting capability in the USPACOM. He said that in his first nine months as USCINCPAC he had given considerable thought to how this command should contribute to the waging of a global war against the Soviet Union. He noted that his January Commanders Conference, discussed above, had dealt almost exclusively with warfighting strategy. In this letter he sought to identify those few major initiatives, which if undertaken, would significantly increase our military capability in this area.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The Admiral said he was not focusing on across-the-board augmentations, nor had he sought to identify expensive new programs. In fact, he said, several of the proposals could be accomplished at little cost. "I have limited myself to the consideration of those six primary initiatives which I truly believe can have significant long-term impact and which are needed before we can have confidence in our ability to fight a global war in this part of the world regardless of where it starts."


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1. USCINCPAC Ltr (S) to SECDEF, 3 Apr 84, n.s., DECL OADR. (U) These major themes are, of course, repeated in USCINCPAC inputs or comments regarding the various national level planning documents. They are repeated here to highlight them in the same way the Admiral had highlighted them to the Secretary and the Chairman.

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
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Southwest Indian Ocean Working Group

~~(S)~~ Primarily because of increasing Soviet influence in the Southwest Indian Ocean, and varying opinions on appropriate U.S. response, an interagency review of U.S. policy toward the Southwest Indian Ocean was initiated in September 1984. In support of this review, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Richard Armitage had suggested that USCINCPAC host a working conference to discuss and examine Indian Ocean trends and

1. Ibid.

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issues, policy goals and objectives, military operational considerations, and U.S. Government programmatic efforts. Admiral Crowe totally supported the proposal and offered to host the conference.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ The Southwest Indian Ocean (SWIO) Working Group met at USCINCPAC headquarters 3-5 December. Admiral Crowe advised Assistant Secretary Armitage and JCS Chairman Vessey that a lot of ground was covered by the group and some new ideas were discussed. All participants agreed that modest increases in military presence, military-to-military contacts, access, and assistance were needed, particularly in light of pro-West movement by some of the island states. They also agreed that our policy should no longer be inhibited by concerns that the Soviets would demand equal treatment or access.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The draft report of the study was the product of the combined effort of 34 representatives from the State and Defense Departments, the intelligence community, and the USCINCPAC staff. The conference report was circulated by the JCS for Washington comment. The report was intended to become the basis for a comprehensive Defense Department input to the planned Interagency Review. The material that follows was taken from that draft.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ The SWIO was an important region primarily because of its mineral resources and as a zone of transit for commerce and military contingencies. The relative importance of the SWIO did not compete with demands such as defense of the United States or NATO. Nevertheless, a more definitive SWIO policy was needed, particularly in light of pro-West movement by countries in the region.

~~(S)~~ U.S.. "geostrategic" goals in the region were to:

- Protect and preserve Free World access to resources in the region.
- Limit further Soviet political-military gains.
- Encourage and support the existence of independent states that were pro-West or, minimally, truly non-aligned.
- Promote regional political and economic stability.

~~(S)~~ U.S. policies developed to support those goals should not be inhibited by concerns that the Soviet Union would demand equal treatment or access.

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1. J5612 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; SECDEF 221444Z Sep 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 012141Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 180501Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL 7 Dec 90.
  3. J5612 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR. The USCINCPAC Director for Plans and Policy headed the USCINCPAC attendees, who included representatives from J03, J2, J3, J4, J5, J73, and IPAC.

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Any recommended initiatives for the SWIO should be workable within constrained resources (such as forces and funds) and sensitive to competing demands. The United States should aim toward workable programs for maximum effect.

~~(S)~~ Military objectives should include:

- Improving the security of friendly governments against the threat from insurgent groups and hostile states.
- Maintaining U.S. military presence in the region, primarily through ship and P-3 visits.
- Encouraging senior military-to-military contacts, both in the United States and in the region.
- Obtaining and maintaining access to ports and facilities to support peacetime military presence.
- Encouraging support and cooperation of allies and regional friends for contingencies.

~~(S)~~ In support of those objectives, two particular actions appeared appropriate. First was the successful renegotiation of the lease for the USAF Space Tracking Station in the Seychelles. Second was the prepositioning of defense fuel stocks and possibly military material in the SWIO in support of Southwest Asia contingency and peacetime operations.

~~(S)~~ Regarding the threat to the area, Soviet goals in the SWIO states were likely to remain the same. They included maintaining open sea lines of communication to facilitate support of their Eastern area; maintaining and expanding their economic interests; undermining pro-Western oriented regimes such as Mauritius; providing military and limited economic assistance to friendly states such as the Seychelles, Mozambique, and Madagascar; pressing and probing for military access while seeking to deny the United States the same; and countering U.S./Western inspired initiatives. (Mozambique, of course, was in Africa and thus assigned to the U.S. European Command, not USCINCPAC.)

~~(S)~~ The peacetime missions of Soviet military assets, principally the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron, were to show the flag and to provide diplomatic, political, and military support to friendly governments, such as the Seychelles.

~~(S)~~ Assumptions regarding Soviet wartime missions and current capabilities were outlined. Whether in peace or war, the Soviets were capable of posing a significant threat to regional stability by subversion of local governments.

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(S) Regarding U.S. military options, U.S. foreign policy should be aimed at increased U.S. access. This could be accomplished by increased ship visits, aircraft access, civic action teams, and cooperation with allies. A significant constraint to increased military access in the SWIO was the requirement for continuous U.S. naval presence in the North Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. (The report included distances and normal steaming time to the various islands from the North Arabian Sea.)

(S) Development of more positive relations with countries of the region could be enhanced by additional military assistance programs aimed toward nation building, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and by increases in the International Military Education and Training Program.

(S) The United States could not compete effectively with Soviet military assistance in terms of quantity of delivered material. However, with greater attention to program design and flexibility in implementation, U.S. assistance could be competitive qualitatively. It was probable that modest augmentation of U.S. military assistance management capability on the ground would be required by FY 86.

(S) The United States should also seek ways to improve upon existing cooperation with allies such as the British, French, and Japanese.<sup>1</sup>

#### Readiness Fund

(U) In 1981 the JCS had advised that consideration was being given to creating a general contingency fund to permit commanders of unified and specified commands to execute local initiatives. They would be urgent projects that could or should not have to wait for action in Service funding and would enhance force readiness and effectiveness. For the next few years the subject was studied and USCINCPAC provided lists of programs that could have been accomplished if such special funds were available. Any projects that had been specifically denied by the Congress were never considered candidates. Each year, however, the concept was eliminated from the budget by the Congress.<sup>2</sup>

(C) On 17 January 1984 the Chairman of the JCS sent a personal message to the CINCs of the unified and specified commands and the Services that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense had approved in Program Budget Decision 084, dated 19 December 1983, the sum of \$50 million for a CINC readiness fund starting in FY 85. The fund would be referred to as the JCS Special Fund to more appropriately describe its use and not cause confusion with the previous initiatives that had been rejected by Congress. The JCS Special Fund would be a special contingency fund that would be managed at the JCS level, with

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1. Ibid.


2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/PRD), Vol. I, pp. 259-260.

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expenditures approved on a case-by-case basis for fully-justified requests on a basis of high priority readiness or warfighting needs that required immediate funding.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The Chairman advised that earlier operational contingencies that would have been considered for special funding in the USPACOM area would have included the September 1983 Korean Airline search and salvage operation and the replacement of 25th Infantry Division equipment and supplies destroyed by Hurricane IWA in November 1983. The Chairman advised that final approval of the JCS Special Fund rested with Congress.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Admiral Crowe described the establishment of the fund as a great step forward. He agreed that the existence of the fund would allow us to conduct unscheduled operations such as the KAL search and salvage operations without drawing on funds for badly needed training and exercises.<sup>3</sup>




1. JCS 172230Z Jan 84 (C), DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. USCINCPAC 302219Z Jan 84, (C), DECL OADR.
4. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/PRD), Vol. I, pp. 236-237.
5. Ibid.

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Chemical Weapons  
Planning (p. 906)



1. COMUSK 210200Z Jan 84 (TS/FRD); USCINCPAC 302200Z Jan 84 (TS/FRD).
2. J5412 HistSum Jul 84 (S/FRD); J5412 Point Paper (S/FRD), 17 Dec 84, Subj: Status of Nuclear Weapons Storage in Korea (S).
3. USCINCPAC 170552Z Feb 84 (S/FRD).
4. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 172-173.
5. J5411 HistSum Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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(C) There were three basic types of TOMAHAWK missiles--the TOMAHAWK antiship missile (TASM), the TOMAHAWK land attack missile (TLAM) in either a conventional (TLAM/C) or nuclear (TLAM/N) role.<sup>5</sup>

(U) Initial Operational Capability for the TOMAHAWKs was as follows:

- TLAM/N - met in June 1984 for both submarines and surface ships.
- TLAM/C (with horizontal flight to impact) - met in March 1983.

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1. USCINCPAC 060007Z Dec 83 (S/NE/WNINTEL), DECL OADR.
  2. J5414 HistSum Feb 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.; JCS 151822Z Dec 83 (U).
  4. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 237-247.
  5. Ibid.
  6. J5422 Point Paper (S/FRD), 13 Sep 84, Subj: Overview of TOMAHAWK Program in USPACOM (U).

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- TLAM/C (with variable dive maneuver) - proposed for September 1985 for both submarines and surface ships.

- TLAM/C (with submunition dispenser) - September 1986 for surface ships and June 1987 for submarines.

- TASM - met in November 1983 for submarines and April 1984 for surface ships.

~~(S)~~ The Japanese were particularly sensitive about the nuclear-weapon capability of our ships, especially those which called at Japanese ports. Following some inaccurate reporting by one Japanese news service, in mid-February 1984 the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Under Secretary for Policy) provided a message to "set the record straight" with some information provided to "defuse" the issue.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The message said that TOMAHAWK launch platforms had been or would be installed on the following classes of ships:

- IOWA class battleships (BB-61 class)
- SPRUANCE class destroyers (DD-963 class)
- TICONDEROGA class cruisers (CG-47 class)
- LONG BEACH class cruisers (CGN-9 class)
- CALIFORNIA class cruisers (CGN-36 class)
- VIRGINIA class cruisers (CGN-38)
- ARLEIGH BURKE class destroyers (DGN-51 class)
- STURGEON class submarines (SSN-637 class)
- LOS ANGELES class submarines (SSN-688 class).

1. Ibid.

2. SECDEF 150117Z Feb 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR. 00-070H

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(U) As with other U.S. nuclear-capable systems and ships that were outfitted with those systems, there would be no certainty that specific ships were actually carrying nuclear TOMAHAWKS. "There are no telltale observable characteristics among any of the three types of TOMAHAWKS, and we will strictly observe our neither confirm nor deny policy." Port calls of nuclear-capable TOMAHAWK ships to Japanese ports, including those in the overseas family residence program, would be no different than port calls of other nuclear-capable ships, in the past or at present.

(S) The message noted that the Department was fully aware that introduction of the TOMAHAWK presented those opposed to the U.S.-Japan security relationship an opportunity to create and exploit misinformation and misunderstandings to our detriment. Washington agencies were endeavoring to assure that whatever was said regarding TOMAHAWK was consistent with the neither-confirm-nor-deny concept and would not complicate the Japanese government's position vis-a-vis its domestic critics.<sup>1</sup>

(U) A little over four months later, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs provided press guidance for TLAM/N deployments. On 27 June they advised that such weapons had become operational a few days earlier aboard some U.S. Navy combatants. In reply to a question whether this was a new step in the arms race, the proposed reply was, "No," continuing that the USSR had begun deploying nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles in the early 1960s. Of the seven such Soviet systems currently operational, six were judged to be dual-capable, that is, both nuclear and conventionally armed versions that might be deployed at sea. Of those, at least two types were capable of attacking land targets. If asked how many TLAM/Ns the United States deployed, the press guidance noted it was standard policy not to identify the specific number of nuclear weapons deployed. If asked what ships they were deployed on, the answer was that it was Navy policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on any specific ship or ships.<sup>2</sup>

(C) The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo advised that release of the 27 June announcement regarding deployment of TLAM/Ns without coordination with the Embassy had made management of public relations regarding a controversial U.S. military program "extremely difficult." It had the potential to undermine trust in us by the host government, which supported deployment but which relied on us to assist it in navigating as opponents of the deployment strove to link the deployment with the U.S. military base structure. The lack of advance public affairs coordination also had the potential to adversely affect base operations. The Embassy said the "surprise announcement" would have the effect of continuing to draw adverse attention to port calls by U.S. Navy

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1. Ibid.
  2. SECDEF 27225Z Jun 84 (U).

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
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ships, making such port calls the focus of demonstrations and sniping by opposition party Diet members and local officials. The Embassy requested that "any further major announcements--if indeed any are necessary at all--regarding SLCM deployments be coordinated well in advance with the Embassy" to maintain overall government support for the program and to better enable the Embassy to work with the Japanese to minimize adverse effects on the operations of U.S. forces in Japan.<sup>1</sup>

(8) Meanwhile, the activities of the USCINCPAC staff relating to planning for, managing, and testing cruise missiles continued throughout 1984 and are discussed in the paragraphs that follow.

(7S) The USCINCPAC Theater Mission Planning System (TMPS) of the Plans and Policy Directorate was the agency that planned both nuclear and conventional cruise missile missions launched from submarine or surface platforms.

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 13214/290855Z Jun 84 (C), DECL OADR, retransmitted as JCS 290912Z Jun 84.
  2. J5425/1 HistSum Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR; J5/SSS/T22-85 (U), 17 Sep 85, Subj: Review of Draft USCINCPAC Command History for 1984.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Ibid.; J5423 HistSum Oct 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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missiles that required that they be reserved initially for special applications.<sup>1</sup>

(C) On 22 October 1984, Admiral Crowe modified that policy and so advised CINCPACFLT. USCINCPAC retained the option to authorize initial use of TLAM/C.

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(TS) After missions were planned, support was provided in the form of Data Transport Devices. Nuclear operational Data Transport Devices to support the TLAM/N Initial Operational Capability had been transferred from the USCINCPAC TMPS, where they had been produced, to the Armed Forces Courier Service on 1 June for further transfer to USS NARRAGANSETT and USS LA JOYDA in San Diego.

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(U) Earlier, at USCINCPAC headquarters, a Data Transport Device Certification Process had been installed in the TMPS in mid-January. It was a computer system used to support the certification of nuclear operational Data Transport Devices to support nuclear operations.

(C) The software for the TMPS computer was upgraded to version 6.0. In [REDACTED] representatives from the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office, assisted by civilian contractors, installed the 6.0 version.


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At the same time, the software was upgraded to the 6.1 version. At the same time, software updates were installed for the VAX computer operating system and "Communication System Shore." As was customary following such updates, formal certification of the TMPS software was required to resume developmental, operational evaluation, and operational mission planning. Certification was granted by representatives of the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office on 19 September.

1. CINCPACFLT Subj: [REDACTED], 11 May 84, Subj: Command and Control Concept of Operations (U), REVW 14 Feb 88.
2. J5423 HistSum Oct 84 (C), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC Ltr Ser C349 (C), 22 Oct 84, Subj: Control of the Conventional TOMAHAWK Land Attack Missile (TLAM/C) (U), DECL OADR.
3. J5422 HistSum Jun 84 (C), DECL OADR; J5/SSS/T22-85 (U), 17 Sep 85, Subj: Review of Draft USCINCPAC Command History for 1984.
4. J5421 HistSum Jan 84 (U).
5. J5422 HistSum Jun 84 (C), DECL OADR; J5423 HistSum Sep 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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Maritime Anti-Air Warfare

~~(S)~~ On 6 January the JCS advised the unified commanders and CINCSAC of the formation of an anti-air warfare (AAW) investment planning group to

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1. J5421 HistSum Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  2. J5421 HistSum Feb 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. J5422 HistSum Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  4. J5423 HistSum Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  5. J5423 HistSum Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  6. J5423 HistSum Nov 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; NAVWPNCEN 232300Z Nov 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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develop a comprehensive maritime AA investment strategy for both sea-based and land-based forces. They said a significant and potentially high leverage contribution to maritime AAW could be achieved through conventional attack of Soviet bomber aircraft and bases posing a direct threat to allied naval forces. This would disrupt bomber attack or reattack of maritime forces and reduce the actual air threat to those as well as other forces. They asked each CINC to assess U.S. and allied Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft and missile capability to attack with conventional munitions the threat posed by Soviet bombers and bases. (They outlined parameters and assumptions for the study.)<sup>1</sup>

(S) USCINCPAC's reply was forwarded on 24 February and said our successful offensive action would achieve a reduction of the maritime AAW threat and outlined the capabilities in this theater.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The JCS guidelines had included that the risk of conflict escalation in attacking the Soviet homeland should be disregarded, but CINC comment on the magnitude of risk was solicited. The USCINCPAC reply said there was little hard intelligence on the Soviet response to U.S. strikes on Soviet territory. The Soviet military seemed to assume any U.S.-USSR confrontation that could lead to an attack on their homeland was the most serious eventuality, demanding reprisal. This particular estimate assumed USPACOM would be the first theater to launch strikes against Soviet homeland bases. If a strike was confined to a specific base, responding, for example, to a strike on one of our carrier battle groups, the threat of escalation was low. If a major campaign were launched, however, to destroy Soviet airbases in the Far East, the risk of escalation would increase sharply. Most of their retaliatory options were limited to U.S. and allied forward bases. Air attacks on the Soviet homeland posed a risk of provoking a nuclear response if a lack of success by the USSR on the global battlefield was evident to them.

(S) In the summary to the reply regarding maritime AAW, USCINCPAC said strikes against Soviet bomber aircraft and bases posing a direct threat to the Fleet were feasible if allied bases in Japan and Korea were available for offensive strike missions, and if land-based aircraft and the naval battle force were in position to launch the strikes. Time and distance from the battle area at war's outbreak might dictate that significant naval forces were not within range for early strikes against Soviet bomber bases. When positioned, however, such strikes could be conducted in coordination with U.S. and allied ground based forces after the Soviet submarine threat was lessened, and Japan was an active allied participant. The best investment strategy was to redress existing deficiencies in fleet AAW readiness, to improve sea and air platform sustainability, force structure, and modernization through the fiscal

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1. J5325 HistSum Feb 84 (U); JCS 061552Z Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR.

2. USCINCPAC 240615Z Feb 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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process of the Service Program Objectives Memoranda, and to persuade our allies to buy hardware that was interoperable with our warfighting requirements.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 3 April the JCS advised that further study would be by geographic region, with the Northern Atlantic/Norwegian and Mediterranean regions designated for initial study effort.<sup>2</sup>

### East Asia Liaison Group Activities

(U) In 1981 the East Asia Liaison Group (EALG) had been reactivated under the provisions of the State-Defense Department Statement on Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens Abroad, dated 8 July 1980. The EALG provided liaison between the Washington Liaison Group and the many embassies and consulates located in the various USPACOM countries, coordinating emergency and evacuation planning between posts and military commands. Also in 1981 the first exercise in crisis management of evacuation operations had been held in Manila; it was called TEMPO EAGLE I.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The Political Adviser to USCINCPAC was Chairman of the EALG. His report of 2 February 1984 had been forwarded, as had been the custom, to the Washington Liaison Group. With the accelerating number of terrorist incidents worldwide, organizational arrangements had changed within the State Department. By December 1984 the addressee was the Director, Office of Combatting Terrorism and Emergency Planning.

(U) Certain new posts came under the responsibility of the EALG in 1984: Bandar Seri Begawan (Brunei), Shanghai and Shenyang (China), and Pusan (Korea).<sup>4</sup>

(U) As required by the Emergency Action Manual, in 1984 the EALG reviewed and approved Emergency Action Plans prepared by posts in Guangzhou, Kathmandu, Port Moresby, Manila, Cebu, Port Louis, Dhaka, New Delhi, Chiang Mai, Suva, and the American Institute in Taiwan. Emergency plans had not yet been received from Beijing and Shanghai (also expected a year earlier), Bandar Seri Begawan, Shenyang, and Pusan.

(U) In anticipation of participation in Exercise ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 84, discussed below, and to remove misconceptions among USCINCPAC Crisis Action Team members on the role and function of the EALG during actual emergencies

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1. Ibid.

2. JCS 031420Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.

3. CINCPAC Command History 1981 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 201-202.

4. USCINCPAC POLAD Ltr (U), 12 Dec 84, to Director, Office of Combatting Terrorism and Emergency Planning, n.s. (which was the annual report).

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and exercises, an EALG policy memorandum of 4 September was prepared and issued. It prescribed the organization and procedures for the EALG in responding to emergency situations, its relationships to the USCINCPAC crisis action system, and clearly delineated the advisory and liaison role of the EALG with respect to military commands and posts. As such, the EALG provided advice and assistance to the USCINCPAC Crisis Action Team during potential emergencies in 1984 in the Seychelles, Sri Lanka, India, and the Philippines.

(U) The largest EALG exercise in 1984 was TEMPO EAGLE III, conducted in conjunction with an EALG conference held at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and the Sanno Hotel from 17 to 20 January. Over 50 representatives from Washington agencies, the Washington Liaison Group, the EALG, the USPACOM, and 18 EALG diplomatic posts attended. Ambassador Robert M. Sayre, Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism and Coordinator for Security Policy and Programs was the keynote speaker and set the stage for this conference on crisis management responsibilities and the interface and coordination necessary among State and Defense Department organizations.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Exercise TEMPO EAGLE III began in mid afternoon on 18 January and concluded on 20 January. The scenario-driven Command Post Exercise involved a developing crisis in a mythical country during which player decisions and actions affected the safety of U.S. citizens, their property, and selected third country nationals. To productively accommodate a greater number of diplomatic post participants, TEMPO EAGLE III was organized into two concurrent, yet independent, player/control teams. By allowing free play within assigned parameters, both player teams completed their assigned essential actions and attained equivalent on-going evacuation status through dissimilar methodology or courses of action.

(U) The more senior level of participants, particularly seven Deputy Chiefs of Mission, greatly enhanced the quality of player action. TEMPO EAGLE III represented an evolutionary improvement over previous exercises in the series. Some post-exercise observations included:<sup>2</sup>

- There was a general unfamiliarity among State and Defense Department personnel with each other's crisis organization, command/hierarchy relationships, and procedures. This lack of inter-departmental understanding could affect responsiveness and effectiveness in actual crisis situations.

- Rules and regulations concerning the administrative handling and classification of messages/cables between the Departments of State and Defense, such as SPECAT, LIMDIS, EXDIS, were not compatible and hindered efficient, accurate distribution of information to all required addressees.

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1. USCINCPAC POLAD Ltr (U), 2 Feb 84, to Washington Liaison Group, n.s.  
2. Ibid.

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- Since the counter-terrorist programs and activities were a principal concern of the conference, consideration should be given to including terrorist actions in future exercise scenarios.

(U) Another exercise was Operation BELL VOLCANO 84-1 conducted in Hawaiian waters in June by Amphibious Squadron THREE of the THIRD Fleet and the 37th Marine Amphibious Unit, First Marine Brigade. During the field exercise on the island of Molokai, 10 EALG members were cast as embassy or consulate personnel or U.S. citizens. Thirty Marines were assigned various other roles. The scenario required the insertion of a reconnaissance squad to locate missing evacuees, the placement of Marine security forces to protect the convoy route and two helicopter landing zones, and emergency medical evacuation, before the evacuees were extracted from three locations to the 37th MAU flagship. The exercise was evaluated as realistic, challenging, and valuable practical training for Navy-Marine units, and served to improve unit readiness before deployment to the Western Pacific.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The EALG participated for the first time in an exercise in the ULCHI-FOCUS LENS series (this in August 1984), a combined U.S.-ROK Command Post Exercise that is addressed in greater detail in the Operations chapter of this history. The exercise included a country-wide evacuation. The EALG provided a 24-hour response cell in the USCINCPAC Command Center while personnel at the U.S. Embassies in Seoul and Tokyo were on call during office hours. EALG and embassy participation proved worthwhile in the following areas:<sup>2</sup>

- Military players increased their knowledge of Emergency Action Plans; State Department crisis action organizations, functions, and procedures; and the need for coordination among affected units.

- Refined and improved working relationships and understanding between the EALG and USCINCPAC Crisis Action Teams as well as inter-country (Korea-Japan) teams.

- Identified the facility, administrative, logistics, and communication requirements required by the EALG during crises or exercises.

### Research and Development Objectives

(U) Every year USCINCPAC provided the Chairman of the JCS with a statement of his research and development objectives, a list of ways in which the

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1. USCINCPAC POLAD Ltr (U), 12 Dec 84, to Director, Office of Combatting Terrorism and Emergency Planning, n.s.
  2. Ibid.

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research and development community could most assist in improving USPACOM operational capabilities. The 1984 list was forwarded on 27 March.<sup>1</sup>

(U) USCINCPAC's Director for Plans and Policy said that the top three mission areas for the USPACOM in order of priority were naval warfare capabilities, tactical land warfare capabilities, and air warfare capabilities and supporting command, control, communications, and intelligence. In addition, the objectives that had been provided a year earlier remained valid.

(U) The Director advised the Chairman that the headquarters was pleased to note the impact of earlier input on research and development in the FY 86-93 Joint Strategic Planning Document. The Chairman's continued support in this dialogue was appreciated and it was hoped it would lead to timely improvements in operational capabilities.<sup>2</sup>

#### USPACOM Master Requirements List

(U) Development of the USPACOM Master Requirements List had begun in 1980 in the Plans Directorate in response to a need for an approved, standing list of requirements for this command. At that time it was expected to be a reference document, an internal management tool, and an aid in preparation of inputs to the JCS and other Defense Department agencies. The first edition had been published in 1981 and distributed only within USPACOM. The concept had since evolved, however, into a compendium of prioritized USPACOM requirements with wide distribution, including the JCS, the Defense Department, and the Services. To make it even more useful, by April 1984 it linked requirements to significant risks that had been identified in the USPACOM Campaign Plan (discussed elsewhere in this chapter).<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ A USCINCPAC Instruction of 30 April redesignated the document the USPACOM Master Priority List, which was intended to comprehensively list required improvements in USPACOM forces capabilities and the current status of those requirements. The MPL was scheduled to be published annually in June to provide updated Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System reference information and to help prepare USCINCPAC for Defense Resources Board and Congressional testimony concerning Defense Guidance and the Service Program Objectives Memoranda.

~~(S)~~ The risks, as identified in the Campaign Plan, at the time of the first Master Priority List preparation were as follows:<sup>4</sup>

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1. J5311 HistSum Mar 84 (U); CINCPAC Ltr Ser S253 ~~(S)~~, 27 Mar 84, Subj: Research and Development Objectives (U).
  2. Ibid.
  3. USCINCPAC S3025.2 ~~(S)~~, 30 Apr 84, Subj: USPACOM Master Priority List (MPL) (U), DECL OADR.
  4. Ibid.

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- Shortage of critical ammunition, POL, spares
- Inadequate air defense capability
- Insufficient combat support and combat service support forces
- Insufficient combat forces
- Insufficient unconventional warfare forces
- Effects of attrition on force structure
- Insufficient strategic air/sea lift
- Inadequate C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence)
- Insufficient credible nuclear forces
- Inadequate chemical warfare posture.

(U) The first and only edition of the new USPACOM Master Priority List was published on 19 July.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Shortly afterward it was decided to revert to the former title. The eighth edition of the USPACOM Master Requirements List was published in December.<sup>2</sup>

#### Over-the-Horizon-Radar

~~(S)~~ A new generation of Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) had come under study in the USPACOM in 1983. The USCINCPAC History for that year described the Doppler high frequency system in some detail. The equipment was not yet operational, but as inadequate early warning was the major shortcoming of existing USPACOM air defense capabilities, the development and deployment of such a system was of great interest.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ In the Office of the Secretary of Defense was a Broad-Area Surveillance Executive Committee that coordinated programs such as the Navy's Relocatable OTHR (ROTHR) and an initiative to place an OTHR in Japan.

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1. J53 HistSum Jul 84 (U).
  2. J5312 Point Paper (U), 7 Jan 85, Subj: USPACOM Master Requirements List.
  3. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/PRD), Vol. I, pp. 247-250.

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USCINCPAC recommendations had included deployment of ROTH systems to the Aleutians, Japan, and Guam.<sup>1</sup>

~~(C)~~ An ROTH site survey planning meeting, attended by a USCINCPAC staff member, had been held on 31 January and 1 February 1984 at SRI, International, at Menlo Park, California. At that meeting it was determined that Amchitka was a more favorable site than Adak for an OTHR in the Aleutians. Guam was also discussed as an attractive alternative because of existing support facilities, benign environment, and budgetary constraints.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ As noted in the 1983 History, location of such a facility in Japan was considered desirable but had significant political connotations. In a meeting with the Vice Minister of the Japan Defense Agency on 30 January, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Richard L. Artimage had explained that the United States would expand the OTHR system in 1985 with a new site in the Aleutians, and indicated U.S. interest in establishment of yet another system, possibly on Iwo Jima. The Vice Minister indicated interest in the technical aspects of OTHR but was not willing to discuss a site in Japan.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ The Assistant Secretary had been optimistic about 1985 deployment of OTHR. The Navy ROTH program was expected to procure two systems a year beginning in FY 88. The prototype was expected to deploy to Amchitka in September 1988. Expected system cost was \$100 million per sector, plus site preparation and base support. The Air Force OTH-B program was expected to procure two systems for Alaska in FY 90, in addition to systems for CONUS early warning.<sup>4</sup>

~~(C)~~ On 9 March 1984 the Embassy in Tokyo advised of a call on the Ambassador by a vice president of SRI International (headquartered in Arlington, Virginia), followed by a letter advising that the vice president planned to visit Japan in the coming months and wanted to discuss the OTHR issue with the Japanese. His letter enclosed a brochure that included a technical description of OTHR and its military applications, as well as a survey of optimum locations for sites in the Pacific, including Okinawa and Honshu, Japan.<sup>5</sup>

~~(S)~~ COMUSJAPAN advised USCINCPAC of his concern over political sensitivities and problems associated with using an uncoordinated and piecemeal approach on the OTHR initiative with Japan. He believed in a coordinated

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1. Ibid.; J5312 HistSum Feb 84 (U); J5312 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 14 Feb 84, Subj: Over the Horizon Radar (OTH) (U), DECL 14 Feb 90.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Ibid.; AMEMB Tokyo 02298/060807Z Feb 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  4. J5312 Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 7 Jan 84, Subj: Over the Horizon Radar (OTH) in USPACOM (U), DECL 7 Jan 91.
  5. J5312 HistSum Mar 84 (U); AMEMB Tokyo 04822/090932Z Mar 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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approach that used the offices of the Embassy and COMUSJAPAN in presenting the proposal to the Japanese government.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) In a personal message to the principals in Washington and Tokyo, Admiral Crowe reiterated that the U.S.-Japan OTHR initiative was an important step toward enhancing broad area surveillance and early warning in USPACOM. This goal was, in turn, the first step in achieving a viable air defense capability for our Pacific base structure. As technical information had already been passed to Japanese officials, Admiral Crowe believed it was imperative that a formal U.S. Government proposal be presented to the Japanese government for consideration prior to the upcoming meeting of the Security Consultative Subcommittee (SSC) then scheduled for late June. He advised that a coordinated approach must be agreed upon soon among the Office of the Secretary in Washington, the Embassy in Tokyo, COMUSJAPAN, and USCINCPAC headquarters in order to make such a proposal.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN) The Admiral said that the key issues requiring decisions were how an OTHR in Japan would be funded, who would man and operate it, when it would become operational, how data from the system would be disseminated, and where in Japan it would be located.

(S/NOFORN) The Admiral continued that his position on those issues was that sharing costs had a better chance of bringing the Japanese aboard in this undertaking. Combined funding should demonstrate U.S. commitment to the program. Furthermore, full Japanese funding could adversely affect agreement on U.S. Forces' operational control of OTHR tasking in crisis situations. The system should also be jointly manned and operated to insure constant and effective integrating into the remaining Pacific network. The system should become operational concurrently with the U.S. system in the Aleutians, so that the two could complement each other. Data from the system should be disseminated via the U.S. Forces Japan and Japan Joint Staff Office command centers to joint air defense centers and other appropriate agencies. Finally, the Japanese should make the final determination of the actual location of the system. The Admiral hoped for early resolution of all the issues.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The Ambassador in Tokyo endorsed Admiral Crowe's recommendation that a formal U.S. Government proposal be presented prior to the SSC in June. He believed that the Japan Defense Agency must be given a chance to consider the proposal in detail before it was aired at the political level. He also concurred that the United States had to develop a coordinated approach. The Ambassador believed that to gain Japanese interest in participating, the United States would have to address our proposal as much to Japan's self-defense

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1. COMUSJ 210551Z Mar 84 (S), DECL OADR, which was retransmitted as USCINCPAC 212145Z Mar 84.
  2. USCINCPAC 270126Z Mar 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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interests as to our interest in building a complete Pacific network. He agreed with the other USCINCPAC proposals regarding funding, manning, and site location.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) On 21 March USCINCPAC asked COMUSJAPAN to provide a draft Memorandum of Understanding to support our recommendations and approaches to Japan. This had been in response to a request from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. On 4 May, however, USCINCPAC advised that office that the Embassy in Tokyo believed strongly that the development of an official MOU, even in draft form, created the appearance that the project was farther along than it was. If a draft were to find its way into Japanese hands before the Country Team discussions had reached the stage of negotiating terms, it would prejudice the project. If the subject were to be discussed at the SSC in June, as USCINCPAC had recommended, additional groundwork should be accomplished prior to the meeting by a DOD briefing team visit, properly coordinated by COMUSJAPAN and the Embassy. The 4 May message, however, did include a draft Memorandum of Understanding.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The Office of the Secretary advised USCINCPAC that the draft MOU had provided valuable insights into the probable negotiating environment once officials discussions were underway. The OSD briefing team would focus on technical rather than policy questions. Their objective would be to provide the Japanese with a basis and opportunity to agree to formation of a bilateral working group, and it was hoped such a group would be established at the SSC.<sup>3</sup>

(S) At the same time as the SSC was meeting in late June, USCINCPAC advised the CNO and others at the Navy's Space and Electronics Systems Commands that he was vitally interested in both the Navy and Air Force OTHR programs. Not only did he fully support the programs of both Services, we needed more systems than were programmed and we needed them sooner. The Navy Program Objectives Memorandum only funded for five ROTH systems for the whole world, but USPACOM needed at least eight for the Pacific alone, with two in the Aleutians, two in Japan, three on Guam, and one in Hawaii, in that order of precedence. Given the three-year delay between deployment of the prototype and the first production system (FY 90), it was strongly recommended that the prototype be deployed to Amchitka, where it would be of the most operational utility and could be rigorously tested. (Then-programmed military construction funding would allow deployment only to environmentally benign places where base support already existed, such as Guam.)<sup>4</sup>

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 06365/300720Z Mar 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 042102Z May 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. SECDEF 230052Z May 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. J5312 HistSum Jul 84 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 270230Z Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR, which was retransmitted as USCINCPAC 290345Z Jun 84. The CNO had designated the Naval Space Command to eventually take over from the development manager (Naval Electronics Systems Command) and to manage ROTH in support of operational requirements.

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(S) Another obstacle arose. On 10 August Admiral Crowe advised the Washington principals and his component commanders that he was deeply disappointed to hear of a decision by the Defense Resources Board to once again delay the Navy ROTHr program. It appeared that for a lack of an additional \$20 million in FY 86 development funding that deployment of the ROTHr and initial procurement of production systems would be postponed until FY 89. He reiterated that inadequate early warning was his greatest single air defense weakness and that therefore the OTHR was his number one air defense priority. He asked for the personal intervention of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Based on the Admiral's recommendation, the Deputy Secretary added the money to the FY 86 budget to maintain the planned procurement schedule. The Admiral thanked him for keeping the program on track.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Also late in August, USCINCPAC addressed to the CNO the matter of the operational concept of ROTHr, which he believed should be expanded to address joint Service use. ROTHr was the only system programmed in the near term to provide broad area surveillance and early warning for U.S. Forces in the Pacific both on land and at sea. "It is imperative that ROTHr be a joint Service theater asset to remedy overall USPACOM air defense early warning shortcomings." He said that USAF activities must be able to task ROTHr in a manner similar to that described for battle groups.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 27 September USCINCPAC advised COMUSJAPAN that the CNO had formally decided that the prototype system would deploy to Amchitka in September 1988. He further advised him that the fact that there existed a U.S. initiative to place OTHR in Japan was still classified Secret. Earlier in September Admiral Crowe had advised COMUSJAPAN that he concurred with COMUSJAPAN's recommendation that Headquarters U.S. Forces Japan serve as the single point of contact for the Japan Defense Agency's unilateral study group that had been formed.<sup>3</sup>

(S) In the final significant OTHR action of the year for USCINCPAC, on 17 November the command provided comments on the Navy's concept of operations and a prioritized list of ROTHr sites in USPACOM. It was also noted that the most crucial element of the system would be connectivity. The ability to adequately interface with all users in a joint effort would be critical to insuring timely data transfer. Any incompatibility or inability to process ROTHr data would significantly impede the early warning for which the ROTHr was being procured. This 17 November message, it was noted, had been coordinated with USCINCPAC's Air Force and Navy component commanders. Because of the lasting impact of a formal ROTHr concept of operations document and the

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1. J5312 HistSum Aug 84 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 102232Z Aug 84 (S), DECL OADR; SECDEF 232239Z Aug 84 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 242259Z Aug 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 260126Z Aug 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 080234Z and 271941Z Sep 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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anticipated number of multi-Service users in the USPACOM, it was requested that the CNO afford USCINCPAC an opportunity to coordinate (chop) the final document before it was formalized.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) At the end of 1984 USCINCPAC was waiting for a favorable Japanese decision on OTHR, which was expected in January 1985.<sup>2</sup>

### Research and Analysis Division Studies

(U) The Research and Analysis Division of the Plans and Policy Directorate was continuously conducting various studies. Some were one-time studies of particular subjects, some were continuing studies that evolved during the study process and took new direction or form. Certain studies are addressed in the material that follows.

#### Cooperative War Reserve Munitions Stockpile Study

(U) The Research and Analysis Division (J55) participated in a study sponsored by the Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate. It concerned a USCINCPAC initiative to establish a cooperative war reserve stockpile of common munitions for use by selected USPACOM countries for improving their overall wartime sustainability.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The methodology used in the study divided the effort into eight major tasks. The task assigned to J55 was to develop alternative sites for locating stockpiles based upon consideration of political impacts, projected costs, military operational impact, and legal constraints.

(U) Political impact and legal constraint information was primarily derived from other divisions in the Plans and Policy Directorate and the Staff Judge Advocate. The Operations Directorate provided some input on projected costs and military operational impact.

(U) The final 32-page study was waiting approval by the study director at year's end. The analysis centered around the following topics:<sup>4</sup>

- Assumed locations of stockpiles and stockpile users
- Size of stockpile for each user

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1. J5312 HistSum Nov 84 (S), DECL 7 Dec 90; USCINCPAC 170509Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. J5312 Point Paper (S/NF), 7 Jan 85, Subj: Over the Horizon Radar (OTHR) in USPACOM (U), DECL 7 Jan 91.
  3. J55 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
  4. Ibid.

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- Number of C-141 loads and shiploads required for each user stockpile
- Distances between user and stockpile, flying time, and costs per sorties
- Sailing distances, time required, and costs of sealifting material.

ANZUS War Game I

(U) As discussed in the 1983 Command History, the war gaming of an exercise scenario was endorsed in ANZUS forums to provide a greater insight into the military problems of combined ANZUS operations and interoperability. A "seminar type game" appeared to be best suited to ANZUS purposes and the KANGAROO 81 exercise scenario had been selected as the basis for the initial game.<sup>1</sup>

(U) ANZUS War Game I took place in conjunction with the ANZUS Staff Level Meeting 21, which was held from 12 to 17 November at USCINCPAC headquarters. The objectives were to explore war gaming as a means to validate ANZUS concepts and documentation, and identify broad interoperability problems. Also, to identify specific problems in the combined planning process, command and control, and Rules of Engagement. The U.S. delegation leader acted as game director. The communications link between USCINCPAC headquarters and the Australian Central Studies Establishment had been considered a vital asset for coordination and data exchange during preparation for the game. It was anticipated that War Game II would be conducted in conjunction with SLM 24, which was then scheduled for the spring of 1985.<sup>2</sup>

Over-the-Horizon Radar Studies

(C) As discussed in considerable detail elsewhere in this chapter, the planned introduction of a new generation of Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) had been under study since 1983. Under the direction of the Research and Analysis Division, the visiting Australian exchange analyst had completed four studies on the subject. The Plans and Policy Directorate had wanted quantitative advice on the effectiveness of several potential combinations of OTHR providing overlapping coverage.<sup>3</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 188-190.
  2. J55 HistSum Dec 84 (U); J55 Point Paper (U), 31 Dec 84, Subj: ANZUS War Game I.
  3. J55 HistSum Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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(C) The first publication was titled "Over-the-Horizon Radar Study" and was published in March 1984; the second concerned, "Aspects of Over-the-Horizon Radar Deployment in Parts of USPACOM," June 1984; the third was entitled, "Priorities for Over-the-Horizon Radar Deployment in USPACOM," July 1984; and the fourth was a description of methodology for the studies, dated August 1984.<sup>1</sup>

(C) Included in the studies' findings were:<sup>2</sup>

- OTHR was capable of tracking Soviet BACKFIRE aircraft for long periods of time when they were beyond the range of conventional sensor systems.

- Detection by a single OTHR was easily avoided by an aircraft flying perpendicular to the radar line-of-sight, but could not evade overlapping OTHR patterns.

- A Guam OTHR boresighted at 270° provided no air defense early warning of BACKFIRE attack against the Philippines or sea lines of communication.

- An Iwo Jima OTHR at 0° and an Amchitka OTHR at 270° provided at least 100 nautical miles of air defense early warning against BACKFIRE attacks.

- Priorities for deployment to provide the most capability against the BACKFIRE threat were outlined.

(U) As noted in the general discussion of OTHR, however, political considerations were also significant.

Modern Aids to Planning

(U) In 1982 the USCINCPAC staff had begun a study of existing and planned war gaming studies within the Department of Defense with the objective of finding a global, automated war game that would be suitable for USCINCPAC headquarters. A staff reorganization created a new branch to accommodate the war gaming improvement program. This proved to be very timely activity, because General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, when he was appointed Chairman of the JCS later in 1982, had advised that one of his immediate objectives was to

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1. The studies were published as Plans and Policy Directorate, Research and Analysis Division, Working Papers, Numbers 2, 4, 5, and 6, respectively, of 1984, all (C), DECL OADR.
  2. J55 HistSum Dec 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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promote the use of modern analysis tools as an aid to the development and evaluation of plans. The process was called Modern Aids to Planning (MAP).<sup>1</sup>

(U) USCINCPAC efforts at developing a MAP program were active throughout 1984. In addition to the continued development of the USCINCPAC Simulation and Gaming Activity, the staff hosted the second JCS-sponsored MAP conference, initiated a study by the Institute for Defense Analyses to determine how MAP could best be utilized at this headquarters, and participated in a third JCS MAP conference at SAC headquarters.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The Joint Analysis Directorate of the JCS sponsored the second MAP conference, which was held at Camp Smith from 16 to 18 April. (The first had been held on 28 and 29 September 1983.) The purpose of the conference was to formulate an integrated hardware, software, and personnel acquisition program based on the individual CINC's plans for their MAP programs. The conference was attended by over 30 personnel from all of the unified and specified commands. Each CINC's representatives briefed their MAP requirements to include schedules for acquisition of hardware, software, and personnel plus their concept for operations and estimated funding requirements. The conference enabled the various staffs to exchange ideas and concepts in an informal environment.

(U) One of the outgrowths of the second MAP conference was a realization within the USCINCPAC staff that a need existed for a study to determine how the planning and evaluation process at this headquarters could be improved through the application of MAP analytical techniques. As a result of this realization, in July a proposal was made by Admiral Crowe to General Vessey to undertake a systematic study of USCINCPAC participation in the joint planning process and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System to determine how best to utilize MAP in USPACOM. The Admiral requested funding from the JCS and proposed that the study be undertaken by the Institute for Defense Analyses. The Chairman provided \$50,000 to enable the institute to initiate the study in August. By November the initial funding had been expended and additional funds were requested (\$250,000) and provided (\$150,000 only) by the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering from USDRE and JCS funds.<sup>3</sup>

(U) A third MAP conference was held from 31 October to 2 November. Members of the USCINCPAC staff, plus representatives from the Institute for

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 255-257.
  2. J55 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
  3. Ibid.; USCINCPAC 140230Z Jul 84 (U); JCS 152335Z Aug 84 (U); Ltr (U), 15 Oct 84, Admiral Crowe to Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, n.s.; Ltr (U), 17 Dec 84, Acting Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to Admiral Crowe, n.s.

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Defense Analyses who were working on the USCINCPAC MAP study, attended the JCS-sponsored conference held at SAC headquarters at Offutt AFB, Nebraska. Attendees included representatives from the unified and specified commands, the major Service schools, and selected contractor personnel. The major purposes of the conference were to provide a general update of the MAP program and to discuss the equipment field plan to support introduction of the Joint Theater Level Simulation. The program included an update on the USCINCPAC MAP program plus a briefing by the Institute for Defense Analyses on the status of their USCINCPAC study.<sup>1</sup>

(U) There were actually two systems under development: the Joint Exercise Support System (JESS) and the Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS). The Institute for Defense Analyses was working to produce the "JTLS naval module enhancement." This model was the one USCINCPAC planned to use when the gaming and simulation facility went into operation in the fall of 1985.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Planning for the USCINCPAC gaming and simulation facility continued throughout 1984. Funding again appeared to be a problem, a subject that concerned Admiral Crowe. The Navy was able to provide the necessary funds to keep the program on schedule, however.<sup>3</sup>

#### USCINCPAC Annual Seminar War Game I

(U) The first USCINCPAC Annual Seminar War Game was held from 24 to 27 April at Camp Smith. Originally planned for late 1983, it involved participants that included flag and general officers from the component and subordinate unified commands. The principal objectives of the war game were to assess the validity and explore ramifications of the USCINCPAC Campaign Plan, and to develop seminar war gaming expertise at USCINCPAC.<sup>4</sup>

~~(S)~~ As explained in the post-game report, in general the basic forward defense concept of the Campaign Plan worked well. Important issues of Rules of Engagement, mining, logistics, command and control, and timing, as well as questions about the use of the III Marine Amphibious Force and the 25th Infantry Division were identified.<sup>5</sup>

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1. J55 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
  2. USCINCPAC 190347Z Jul 84 (U).
  3. J55 Point Paper (U), 14 Jan 85, Subj: War Gaming Development Program; USCINCPAC 190439Z Sep 84; CNO 222212Z Oct 84 (U); USCINCPAC 010433Z Nov 84 (U).
  4. J5521 HistSum Aug 84 (U).
  5. USCINCPAC Ltr Ser S558 ~~(S)~~, 6 Aug 84, Subj: Letter of Transmittal, which transmitted Research and Analysis Division Report 3-84 of May 84, Subj: USCINCPAC Annual Seminar War Game I Post-Game Report (U).

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(U) The Director for Plans and Policy was game director and the technical adviser was Mr. Ervin Kapos. The discussions, arguments, and give-and-take among the players illustrated the rich yield of thought inspired by confrontation with professional problems of concern, and exceeded any such expectation from a computer simulation. It furnished players from different professional backgrounds with valuable insights into the problems and philosophies of Services other than their own. USCINCPAC staff personnel who participated enhanced their gaming expertise, particularly in the aspects of player and support personnel preparation, game materials, site preparation, flow of execution, and appreciation of the pivotal roles of game director and technical adviser.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ In response to the issue of the use of the III Marine Amphibious Force and 25th Infantry Division, the Ground and Amphibious Forces Employment Study (GAFES) was directed. The study was initiated to determine the missions for USPACOM's currently assigned ground forces during a global war with the Soviets and to assess the relative capability of assigned USMC and USA forces to accomplish missions contained in the USPACOM Campaign Plan.<sup>2</sup>

#### U.S.-Australian Analyst Exchange Program

(U) For some years USCINCPAC had maintained an intermittent exchange of analysts with the Australian Department of Defence, specifically the Research and Analysis Division of USCINCPAC's Plans and Policy Directorate and the Australian Central Studies Establishment. Dr. Alan L. Duus, who had arrived from Australia in March 1983, had his tour extended from March 1984 to 31 August to permit him to complete a series of studies for optimizing planned deployments of Over-the-Horizon Radar in USPACOM.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Mr. Joseph Hoagbin of the USCINCPAC staff served a six-month tour with the Central Studies Establishment beginning 15 January 1984. While there he developed a computer model for studying helicopter operations from destroyers.

(U) An effort was being made at year's end to continue the exchange on a more formal, long-range basis. A draft exchange agreement and a position description billet for the Australian analyst had been prepared.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid.

2. JO1/Memo/025 (S), 13 Aug 84, Subj: Ground Forces Employment Study (U), DECL 19 Jul 90.

3. J55 HistSum Dec 84 (U).

4. Ibid.

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U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity Support to USCINCPAC

(U) The Research and Analysis Division has in the past had analysts temporarily assigned from the U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (USAMSAA). Because of a shortage of funds in FY 83-84 no analyst was provided. In response to a USCINCPAC request of 12 June 1984, an analyst was attached in August for what was expected to be a one-year assignment.<sup>1</sup>

(U) USAMSAA was the lead agency for the Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness, which published Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals. These provided joint Service authenticated weaponeering effectiveness evaluations of conventional weapons against selected targets. Weapon characteristics, target vulnerability, delivery accuracy, methodology, reliability, obscuration, and air-combat maneuvering were treated in detail for use in planning and analyzing strike missions, war gaming exercises, and weapon requirements. The USAMSAA representative to USCINCPAC was assigned primarily to assist in related matters and to provide Army input to USCINCPAC studies and analyses.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The chief of the Research and Analysis Division and the USAMSAA analyst visited Korea to discuss coordinating group and effectiveness manual matters with representatives of the Combined Forces Command and the ROK. The Korea Institute for Defense Analysis was briefed on these subjects and the Korea institute's requirements for manuals were discussed. The USCINCPAC team also visited Japan to discuss the manuals with U.S. and Japanese representatives.<sup>3</sup>

Bilateral Sea Lines of Communication Defense Study with Japan

(S) A bilateral U.S.-Japan Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) Defense Study designed to implement planning for Japan's policy of undertaking self-defense of its sea lines out to 1,000 nautical miles had begun in 1983. The agreement to begin, which had been accomplished through diplomatic channels, stated that the study would be conducted using the existing threat and existing military forces. The objectives were to give a concrete form to combined actions for SLOC defense. It would only consider a conventional enemy attack, and the response to such an attack by conventional warfare. SLOC defense was to provide security of maritime traffic and involved many kinds of operations as required by the situation. Blockade of the three straits by mining within the minimum necessary for the defense of Japan would be included. The analysis in the study would primarily be focused on military matters such as shipping loss and damage rate. The quantity of shipping throughput necessary

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1. USCINCPAC 120314Z Jun 84 (U).
  2. J55 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
  3. Ibid.

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for sustaining the Japanese economy would not be used a criterion for adequacy of SLOC defense.<sup>1</sup>

(C) Problems with the concept of operations had been resolved in 1983; the Japanese had been concerned over a possible perception of lack of U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan because only one carrier battle group was included in the concept of operations. A second carrier battle group had been added as "case two," in accordance with standard naval doctrine for multi-carrier operations.<sup>2</sup>

(S) In 1984, cruise missile use received considerable attention. USCINCPAC had advised that Japanese preoccupation with cruise missiles was far out of proportion to their significance in the hierarchy of weapon systems available in this study. Nevertheless, they were frequently the subject of discussion.<sup>3</sup>

(C) Parenthetically, the use of the word "case" in this study had evolved during 1984. Case one, the base case threat, was divided into two parts, with and without air launched cruise missiles (ALCM). Case two, the delayed threat or delayed escalation phase, was also with or without ALCMs.

(S) The Japanese had been busy early in 1984 with the JFY 84 defense budget and subsequent activities, causing a delay on the SLOC study of approximately two months. Delays would continue to extend the study. In any case, COMUSJAPAN advised USCINCPAC early in March that a Japan Defense Agency senior level review of study documents (the RED attack plan and BLUE defensive concept of operations) resulted in their rejection of the use of RED ALCMs to strike selected Japan air defense and antisubmarine warfare assets. The inability to positively verify the existence of conventional RED ALCMs by 1988 had precipitated the agency's rejection of that weapon in order to preserve the credibility of study results.<sup>4</sup>

(S) The reasons the Japanese gave for their position included that the attack included in the proposed plan involved the use of about 800 ALCMs, which they considered inappropriate for the SLOC study. It was of such a major nature that it implied implementation of the full-scale defense of Japan. Also, such use of ALCMs would cause controversy on the Japanese side as to whether it complied with study guidelines calling for the use of "existing forces." Finally, the agency believed that under the Treaty of Mutual

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 202-207. Actual work on the study was led by the U.S. Forces Japan and Japan Self-Defense Forces Joint Planning Committee.
  2. Ibid.
  3. COMUSJ 080120Z May 84 (S), DECL 31 May 90.
  4. J5112 HistSum Mar 84 (C), DECL 30 Apr 90; COMUSJ 020444Z Mar 84 (S), DECL OADR, which was retransmitted as USCINCPAC 031012Z Mar 84.

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Cooperation and Security, in the case of such an ALCM attack, the United States was expected to act in Japan's defense. Japan had no specific defense against the ALCM, so the United States should retaliate with an "eye-for-an-eye" cruise missile attack.<sup>1</sup>

(C) To maintain a stringent yet realistic threat in the study, Admiral Crowe advised the Secretary of Defense that he proposed retaining the ALCMs in variations to the primary cases. He said that the Japan Defense Agency was demanding that the United States demonstrate its treaty commitment to defend Japan wherever Japan Self-Defense Force capability was exceeded, and insisted that the United States employ cruise missiles in response to RED ALCMs to deter further ALCM attack on Japan. He proposed to include cruise missiles (TOMAHAWK) only so long as the United States participants retained control over their targeting and avoided seemingly escalatory strikes on strategic Soviet targets. The JCS concurred with the Admiral's course of action.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Meanwhile, on 12 March COMUSJAPAN announced a bilateral Operations Sub-Group meeting scheduled for 26-29 March in Tokyo to finalize the BLUE defensive concept of operations and determine data requirements needed by the Analysis Sub-Group. This was the first time since October that a bilateral meeting had taken place with full participation of joint and component staff action officers. The meeting was the most productive bilateral meeting yet held in this regard in terms of resolving a number of sensitive bilateral issues. Lack of resolution of the ALCM issue prevented finalization of the BLUE concept of operations and supporting detailed defense plans.<sup>3</sup>

(S) In April an Intelligence Sub-Group met and revised the attack plan to eliminate the use of Soviet ALCMs and also provided a bilaterally acceptable modification of the existing RED attack plan that reduced the total number of Soviet ALCMs used but retained the military logic of their use in the attack plan. In the course of both unilateral and bilateral discussions on the use of cruise missiles, two policy issues had surfaced. The first involved the linkage between U.S. and Soviet cruise missile use. The second concerned a benefit to the U.S.-Japanese defense relationship that could be gained by demonstrating credible U.S. use of conventional cruise missiles.<sup>4</sup>

(S) COMUSJAPAN, therefore, proposed a U.S. position on those issues. U.S. cruise missile use should not be linked to Soviet ALCM use for two reasons. First, the U.S. weapons available in the study were far too few to be portrayed as an adequate retaliation. Secondly, such linkage could be mistaken as a de facto statement of U.S. policy concerning first use of all

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1. Ibid.
  2. USCINCPAC 152222Z Mar 84 (S), DECL 31 Mar 90; JCS 170103Z Mar 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. J5112 HistSum Mar 84 (C), DECL 30 Apr 90; COMUSJ 120430Z Mar 84 (U).
  4. COMUSJ 122356Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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cruise missiles, nuclear or conventional. On the second issue, COMUSJAPAN said the use of conventional U.S. cruise missiles in the study promoted a benefit that went beyond the SLOC study by demonstrating the credibility and utility of conventional cruise missiles. It supported Japanese acceptance of cruise missile-armed U.S. Navy vessels calling at Japanese ports. In other words, the SLOC study cruise missile use supported an argument that "TOMAHAWKS might carry conventional warheads and still be both ubiquitous and useful."<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ USCINCPAC replied that BLUE cruise missiles would be made available to support the objectives COMUSJAPAN had outlined. Primary emphasis, however, must stress a "de-linking" between RED ALCMs and BLUE cruise missile employment and preservation of flexibility within the U.S. command and control structure to employ cruise missiles in accordance with standard naval doctrine against militarily appropriate targets within the area of operations.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ In order to satisfy the concerns expressed by the senior Japan Defense Agency officials, USCINCPAC approved the following statement, which had been proposed by the SLOC study co-chairmen. The statement read, "In the event that enemy forces attack Japanese territory, USF will conduct whatever offensive operations are feasible against appropriate targets to deter or otherwise limit enemy capabilities for renewed attacks. USF will conduct offensive operations to neutralize enemy bases, air facilities, and SAM and GCI sites in the southern part of Sakhalin, Northern Territories and Kuril Islands. When appropriate, a strike may be made on Petropavlovsk when there is indication and warning of massive deployment of enemy forces. In addition, when militarily advisable, USF may employ cruise missiles against appropriate targets."<sup>3</sup>

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ It was hoped that all of the contentious side issues were now "behind us." It was the USCINCPAC staff view that the Japanese needed to understand that further excursions involving attempts to redefine U.S. national policy within the imposed artificiality and narrow confines of this study's scenario would be counterproductive. It was time to get on with the study to refocus on the broader objective of examining the best ways to successfully defend Japan's vital SLOCs.<sup>4</sup>

(U) An analysis plan had been completed on 24 January and analysis formally began on 4 June. A bilateral analysis working session was held from 26 September to 9 October. The purpose had been to solve remaining model problems, select read data set for production runs, and select final production run model sequences.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Ibid.
  2. USCINCPAC 080120Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 May 90.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Ibid.
  5. J55 Point Paper (U), 17 Dec 84, Subj: Japan/U.S. Bilateral SLOC Study - Analysis Phase.

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(S) On 24 December the Japanese co-chairman of the SLOC study subcommittee formally announced the need for a 3-month slip in the analysis/report schedule with the Case I (non-ALCM), rescheduled for the end of April 1985. There were two major causes for the delay. First, the complexity of the air battle model had made coordination between Analysis, Operations, and Intelligence sub-task groups more detailed and time consuming. Secondly, sub-routines of the model could not be run and validated simultaneously; they had to be run sequentially.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) COMUSJAPAN advised that the most significant milestone to date would be the analysis of Case I. The Japanese considered this the most politically sensitive because of the direction and speed of Soviet attack against Mainland Japan, taxing their defensive forces. The on-going delays were actually constructive in that they contributed significantly to Japanese understanding of tactical concepts in the joint defense environment, such as air escort/combat air patrol of U.S. mining operations; home port facility destruction or denial; naval gunfire neutralization; air superiority doctrine; and close air support.<sup>2</sup>

#### Iran-Iraq War

(S) The war between Iran and Iraq that had begun in September 1980 was of continuing interest to USCINCPAC and his staff, although neither of those countries was in his area of responsibility. Late in 1983, in response to a National Security Planning Group decision, the JCS had established a Military Planning Team, headed by the Director for Plans of the U.S. Central Command. Other members of the team were USCINCCENT staffers plus representatives of the JCS and the U.S. European and Pacific Commands.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The purpose of the team was to have military discussions with states of the Persian Gulf "to formulate combined military plans or coordinated actions to contain an escalation of the war that threatened neutral access to Persian Gulf oil."

(S) As a result of U.S. Military Planning Team efforts, it appeared that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries would be more conscious of the threat and aware of what was required to defend against it. Also, GCC mutual cooperation should improve considerably, with a pro-Western flavor. It was hoped that this solidarity followed by council initiatives with Iran and Iraq might in itself accomplish the U.S. goal for containing the war and encouraging an end to hostilities there.<sup>4</sup>

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1. COMUSJ 280201Z Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. COMUSJ 070719Z Dec 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
  3. J5221 HistSum Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCCENT 012310Z Dec 83 (TS), DECL OADR.
  4. Ibid.

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(U) Throughout 1984, however, the war went on.

Maritime Defense Zones Established

(U) On 18 April it was announced to the press that Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole and Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr., had signed a memorandum of agreement to strengthen national security by establishing Maritime Defense Zones on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Under this concept, Coast Guard area commanders in New York and San Francisco would be responsible to the Navy's Atlantic and Pacific Fleet CINCs, respectively, for planning and coordinating U.S. coastal defense. In time of war, or when directed by the President, the Coast Guard transferred from the Department of Transportation to the Department of the Navy. Under the Maritime Defense Zone agreement, Coast Guard area commanders would assume additional responsibilities to plan for and, when directed, conduct operations for the defense and safety of ports, harbors, and navigable waters. In addition, they would support other commands and agencies in the areas of antisubmarine warfare, mine countermeasures, protection of shipping, intelligence, civil defense, and related matters. The Coast Guard also participated in other major military exercises and coordinated closely with the other Armed Services to insure that its wartime capability could be effectively utilized, the press release said.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 5 May USCINCPAC's Director for Plans and Policy advised his counterpart at CINCPACFLT that evidence at this headquarters did not indicate that USCINCPAC had been consulted on the decision. He said USCINCPAC should have been asked to review and comment on the initiative as one of the zones was in his area of responsibility, directly affected his mission to defend the United States, and also affected the mission and disposition of naval forces under his Operational Command.<sup>2</sup>

Humanitarian Assistance

(U) On 18 February USCINCPAC responded to a tasking by the Secretary of Defense concerning humanitarian assistance efforts within the command. He said that the primary interest and emphasis within this command had to continue to be on force readiness and sustainability. "At the current level of austere funding, exercise and O&M money is not sufficient to fund major humanitarian operations."<sup>3</sup>

(U) "Having said that," the Admiral continued, "situations frequently arise where military forces can make a genuine contribution to the relief of human suffering without a significant expenditure of funds and without

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1. CINCPACFLT 190439Z Apr 84 (U), which retransmitted CNO 180002Z Apr 84. The memorandum of agreement had been signed on 7 March 1984.
  2. USCINCPAC 050359Z May 84 (U).
  3. SECDEF 081538Z Feb 84 (U); USCINCPAC 182350Z Feb 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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seriously compromising the ability to carry out assigned operational missions." He recommended that consideration be given to lessening humanitarian assistance legislative and regulatory restrictions, cautioned that increased funding for humanitarian assistance activities at the expense of operations and readiness was not desirable, and recommended continuation of existing structural organizations for assistance.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 29 February USCINCPAC provided a more detailed response that answered a number of specific questions that had been raised by the Secretary's message. He said that the examples he provided in this more detailed response illustrated how well existing humanitarian assistance and civic action programs were working without additional Washington-level coordination. The on-going support program did not need major modification. He recommended that humanitarian assistance not be significantly expanded to become a more explicit Defense Department mission.<sup>2</sup>

Leyte Gulf Landing Anniversary

(U) The fortieth anniversary of the World War II landing at Leyte Gulf in the Philippines was observed on 20 October. Leyte Gulf was the first landing by U.S. forces in the Philippines as they recaptured land the Japanese had captured 2½ years earlier. The Japanese had considered the Leyte battle the "decision" battle of the Philippines (and the war). Although they had reinforced heavily, by Christmas the Japanese forces were isolated with little hope of further reinforcement or escape. In a few more weeks the "decisive" battle was over. Every year this event was commemorated in the Philippines, but without actual military maneuvers. For 1984 they planned a combined Armed Forces of the Philippines-U.S. Navy military exercise in addition to the normal ceremony.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Admiral Crowe advised the host governor that he regretted not being able to attend. VADM James R. Hogg, Commander SEVENTH Fleet, was the senior U.S. representative. U.S. forces participating included two amphibious ships with embarked Marines, four Navy A-4 aircraft, and one SH-3 helicopter.<sup>4</sup>

CJCS Foreign Visitor Program

~~(C)~~ The Chairman of the JCS annually invited several of his counterparts from other nations to visit the United States as his guest. USCINCPAC was asked to nominate participants. On 14 June the JCS requested candidates for calendar year 1985. (As usual, no approach was to be made on this subject to

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1. Ibid.; J5122 HistSum Feb 84 (U).
  2. USCINCPAC 290440Z Feb 84 (U).
  3. J5123 HistSum Sep 84 (U).
  4. J5123 HistSum Oct 84 (U); USCINCPAC 092233Z and 191947Z Oct 84 (U). See the Operations chapter of this history for further details.

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any persons that were recommended.) Certain nominees for the 1985 visit schedule had been nominated before by USCINCPAC.<sup>1</sup>

(C) For each visitor nominated USCINCPAC provided rationale and a suggested itinerary that always included a stop in Hawaii at some point in the trip. The itineraries varied to accommodate the individual visitor. In order of USCINCPAC priority in the 1985 list were General Lee Ki-baek, Chairman of the ROK JCS; General Keitaro Watanabe, Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, Japan Defense Agency; General Sir Phillip Bennett, Chief of the Defence Force Staff of Australia; General Leonardus Benymin Murdani, Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces; General Kyaw Htin, Chief of Staff, Burmese Defense Services; and Air Marshal David Ewan Jamieson, Chief of New Zealand's Defence Staff. Generals Lee, Murdani, and Kyaw Htin and Air Marshal Jamieson had been nominated by USCINCPAC a year earlier.<sup>2</sup>

(C) General Fabian C. Ver, Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed Forces, had been invited to participate in the 1983 visitor program, but had to cancel at the last minute. An invitation was being held in abeyance pending the outcome of the Aquino investigation in the Philippines, during which General Ver was on leave.

(C) USCINCPAC said that, in regard to this program, China represented a special case. Various visits had been made by both sides and other considerations suggested that our military relationship had entered a new phase. One measure of that new relationship was that high ranking Chinese officers had stated that Yang Dezhi, the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army, would invite the U.S. Chairman to visit China in the near future. He was considered the Chairman's counterpart. In any case, if such an invitation were forthcoming, a reciprocal invitation from the U.S. Chairman to Yang would be appropriate. Such a visit would serve the broad objective of strengthening the foundation of understanding essential to insuring that the U.S.-China relationship progressed in a direction satisfactory to both sides.<sup>3</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/ERD), Vol. I, pp. 260-261; JCS 141403Z Jun 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 210129Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.; both U.S. JCS Chairman Vessey and Admiral Crowe did visit China early in 1985.

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1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the integrity of the financial system and for the ability to detect and prevent fraud. The text notes that without reliable records, it would be difficult to track the flow of funds and identify any irregularities.

2. The second part of the document outlines the specific procedures for recording transactions. It details the steps involved in entering data into the system, including the use of standardized codes and the requirement for double-checking entries. The document also discusses the importance of regular audits and reconciliations to ensure that the records are up-to-date and accurate.

3. The third part of the document addresses the issue of data security. It highlights the need to protect sensitive information from unauthorized access and to implement robust security measures. The text suggests that organizations should use strong passwords, encrypt data, and regularly update their security software to protect against evolving threats.

4. The fourth part of the document discusses the role of technology in improving record-keeping. It notes that modern accounting systems can automate many of the manual tasks involved in recording transactions, which can reduce the risk of human error and increase efficiency. However, it also cautions that technology should be used responsibly and that users should receive proper training to ensure they are using the systems correctly.

5. The fifth part of the document discusses the importance of transparency and accountability in financial reporting. It notes that organizations should provide clear and concise reports to stakeholders and should be open to external audits. The text emphasizes that transparency is key to building trust and ensuring that the financial system is operating as intended.

6. The sixth part of the document discusses the role of the regulatory body in overseeing the financial system. It notes that the regulatory body is responsible for setting and enforcing rules that govern the operation of the system and for ensuring that all participants are acting in accordance with these rules. The text suggests that the regulatory body should work closely with industry groups to develop standards and best practices that promote the integrity and stability of the system.

7. The seventh part of the document discusses the importance of ongoing education and training for all participants in the financial system. It notes that as the system evolves, participants must stay up-to-date on the latest developments and best practices. The text suggests that organizations should invest in training programs that provide ongoing education and support for their employees.

8. The eighth part of the document discusses the importance of collaboration and communication between all participants in the financial system. It notes that the system is a complex and interconnected network, and that the success of the system depends on the ability of all participants to work together and share information. The text suggests that organizations should establish clear lines of communication and encourage a culture of openness and collaboration.

9. The ninth part of the document discusses the importance of monitoring and reporting on the performance of the financial system. It notes that organizations should regularly track key performance indicators (KPIs) and report on their progress to stakeholders. The text suggests that organizations should use a variety of metrics to assess performance, including financial metrics, operational metrics, and customer satisfaction metrics.

10. The tenth part of the document discusses the importance of staying up-to-date on the latest developments in the financial system. It notes that the system is constantly evolving, and that participants must stay informed about the latest trends and technologies. The text suggests that organizations should subscribe to industry publications, attend conferences, and participate in professional development activities to stay up-to-date on the latest developments.

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# COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY





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\* Individual entries are unclassified. See Letter of Promulgation.

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CHAPTER IV

OPERATIONS

SECTION I--READINESS AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff


(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff's semiannual readiness report to the Secretary of Defense, based primarily on inputs by the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands, was the only regularly submitted assessment that dealt with joint force readiness at the national level. USCINCPAC provided his command's reports to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in April and October. These reports summarized significant factors which substantially improved or degraded operational readiness to meet JCS-approved plans.<sup>1</sup>

USCINCPAC's Overview in April

1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 263; J3342 HistSum Apr 84 (S/NE/WINTEL), DECL OADR; J341 HistSum Oct 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
2. USCINCPAC 150824Z, 150825Z, 150826Z, 150827Z, 150829Z, 150830Z, 150831Z, and 150832Z Apr 84 (S/NE/WINTEL), DECL OADR.


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
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
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
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
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
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1. Ibid.
2. USCINCPAC 152200Z, 152201Z, and 152202Z Oct 84 (~~S/NF~~), DECL OADR.


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


1. Ibid.

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ARMY UNIT READINESS CHANGES 1983-1984 (U)




Source: J3412 Point Paper (~~S~~), 28 Jan 85, Subj: USPACOM Unit Readiness (1984) (U), DECL OADR.

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NAVY UNIT READINESS CHANGES 1983-1984




Source: J3412 Point Paper (S), 28 Jan 85, Subj: USPACOM Unit Readiness (1984)  
(U), DECL OADR.

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MARINE UNIT READINESS CHANGES 1983-1984



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Source: J3412 Point Paper (~~S~~), 28 Jan 85, Subj: USPACOM Unit Readiness (1984)  
(U), DECL OADR.

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(U) USCINCPAC said that at present, there was no single system which enabled a theater operational commander to obtain and monitor meaningful, accurate, and timely assessments of his warfighting capabilities. USCINCPAC relied on two systems: the Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP), which provided current unit readiness statistics based only on designated unit resource areas, and the CINC's Semiannual SITREP, which did not provide a capabilities index. The UNITREP gave no consideration to the degree of modernization of existing equipment (in fact, upgrading of a unit frequently caused temporary degrading of status ratings), the length of time a unit could sustain itself, or whether needed support units were available and capable of rendering support. When considered by themselves, unit readiness statistics presented an incomplete and sometimes misleading measure of overall capability.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The CINC's Semiannual SITREP, although comprehensive, was narrative in nature, voluminous, and was not a good tool for day-to-day management decisions. Terminology frequently presented another problem. USCINCPAC said we too often referred to readiness when in fact we meant capability. This caused a communication problem within and outside the Department of Defense, and often resulted in a failure to consider all aspects of capability (force readiness, sustainability, force modernization, and force structure). We lacked a quantifiable index to measure capability and, in the absence of such an index, tended to use unit readiness statistics as a substitute.

(U) USCINCPAC offered several recommendations. They were not submitted as an integrated package, but rather as independent ideas which could perhaps stimulate discussion and analysis for arriving at a combined solution. Some might be useful as interim measures:

- Modify the existing unit reporting system so that it produced a listing of each combat unit, showing its assigned supporting units and their readiness status.

- Alter the existing unit reporting system procedures to prevent improvements in force structure or modernization from administratively downgrading a unit when in fact capabilities were increased.


- Establish a force capability index based on a combination of unit readiness, support unit availability/readiness, equipment features, and sustainability which would be keyed to OPLAN requirements.

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1. JCS 261434Z Mar 84 (U).


2. USCINCPAC 110255Z Apr 84 (U)

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1. Ibid.
2. USCINCPAC 280615Z Sep 84 (U).


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1. CINCPACFLT 100457Z Mar 84 (~~S~~) and USCINCPAC 270351Z Mar 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
2. USCINCCENT 291620Z Mar 84 (~~S/NF~~), DECL OADR.
3. USCINCPAC 292053Z Mar 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
4. CINCPACFLT 110010Z Apr 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.


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1. USCINCPAC 210407Z Apr 84 ~~(S)~~, USCINCCENT 261515Z Apr 84 ~~(S)~~, and JCS 291320Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
  2. JCS 141715Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL 1 Sep 90; USCINCPAC 232202Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 232202Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  4. USCINCEUR 201710Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~ and USCINCCENT 281345Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.

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
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1. JCS 141145Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~(BOM), DECL OADR.
2. CNO 161244Z Jul 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR, quoting CNO 061955ZZ Jul 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
3. USCINCPAC 152230Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.


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
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


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
1. ibid.
2. JCS 201307Z Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
3. USCINCPAC 050150Z Jan 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.

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1. USCINCPAC 050715Z Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. JCS 261800Z Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
3. CINCLANTFLT 272032Z Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
4. CINCPACFLT 280036Z Jan 84 ~~(S)~~ and 042036Z Feb 84 ~~(S)~~; USCINCPAC 070303Z Feb 84, all DECL OADR.

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
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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/PRD), Vol. II, p. 279.
  2. J311 Point Paper (U), 13 Apr 84, Subj: Pilot Program for Joint Doctrine; J311 HistSums Jan and Feb 84 (U).
  3. J311 HistSum Dec 84 (U); USCINCPAC 140357Z Dec 84 (U).

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
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Peacetime Rules of Engagement




1. J311 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 27 Apr 84, Subj: Peacetime Rules of Engagement (ROE) (U), DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. USCTNCCENT 272350Z Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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1. Ibid.
  2. USCINCPAC 202201Z Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. J311 HistSums Feb-Mar 84 ~~(S)~~; USCINCPAC 010145Z Feb 84 ~~(S)~~, JCS 162338Z Mar 84 ~~(S)~~, and USCINCPAC 172254Z Mar 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
  4. J311 HistSum Apr 84 ~~(S)~~; JCS 171930Z Apr 84 ~~(S)~~ and USCINCPAC 190026Z Apr 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.


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1. USCINCPAC 032200Z Mar 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. COMSEVENTHFLT 200558Z May 84 ~~(S)~~(EX), DECL OADR.
3. USCINCCENT 222030Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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1. USCINCPAC 292125Z May 84 ~~(TS)~~(BOM), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.

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
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1. USCINCCENT 082210Z Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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


1. Ibid.
2. J311 HistSum Jun 84 (~~S~~); USCINCPAC 112049Z Jun 84 (~~S~~), both DECL OADR.
3. JCS 152345Z Jun 84 (~~S~~) and USCINCPAC 231930Z Jun 84 (~~S~~), both DECL OADR.
4. USCINCPAC 042322Z Sep 84 (~~S~~) and 290015Z Sep 84 (~~S~~), both DECL OADR.



1. Ibid.
2. J311 HistSum Jun 84 ~~(S)~~; COMUSNAVCENT 082300Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~ and USCINCPAC 232100Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
3. USCINCPAC 261020Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.


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1. CINCPACFLT 261507Z May 84 ~~(S)~~ and 262059Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.

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1. PACNAVFACENCOM 262201Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. J311 HistSum Aug 84 ~~(S/NF)~~; CINCPACFLT 102106Z Jul 84 ~~(S/NF)~~, both DECL OADR.
3. HQ PACAF 202000Z Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
4. HQ MAC 031650Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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Battleship NEW JERSEY Returns to the United States

(U) After one of the longest peacetime deployments ever served by a U.S. Navy ship, the battleship NEW JERSEY (BB-62) returned to her homeport of Long Beach, CA, on 5 May 1984. She had left Long Beach on 9 June 1983, on a voyage that would take her to Thailand, back to Central American waters, and across the globe to the coast of Beirut, Lebanon. The ship was underway for 322 days, steaming more than 76,000 miles. Nearly half of that mileage was accrued while assigned to the SIXTH Fleet. Beginning her "short" first cruise since recommissioning, NEW JERSEY deployed to the Western Pacific until August 1983, when she was called upon to conduct surveillance exercises in support of U.S. allies in the Central American region. At the time, crewmembers still expected to be home by mid-September 1983, but the battleship was ordered to the Mediterranean Sea to support the U.S. element of the multinational peace-keeping force.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 23 October 1983 a truck bomb exploded in the Marine headquarters building near the Beirut International Airport, killing 241 U.S. Servicemen. Throughout that day, NEW JERSEY crewmembers were flown into Beirut to provide medical support and assist in the task of clearing debris and recovering the dead. The ship's Marine detachment was flown in to provide increased perimeter defense for the headquarters compound.

(U) During her time on station, NEW JERSEY was often used in her primary role of providing naval gunfire support. She fired more than 300 rounds of 16-inch projectiles at hostile targets east and south of Beirut. On 8 February 1984 she fired 288 of those rounds in her largest single gunfire barrage since Vietnam. This veteran of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam had once again proven her ability to provide sustained support for American forces anywhere in the world.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Preparing for NEW JERSEY's return to homeport, both the CNO and CINCPACFLT had favored an expeditious departure with a return transit via the Panama Canal. The preference for a return via Panama vice the Suez Canal was based on reduced transit time. From Naples, it would take about 12 days more to return home through the Suez. Thus, a westward route would result in less fuel consumption and a faster return to homeport. There was the added benefit of effecting a major combatant presence (without loitering) off Central

1. HQ PACAF 080230Z Aug 84 (S) and USCINCPAC 160339Z Aug 84 (S), both DECL OADR.
2. CNO 060019Z May 84 (U).
3. Ibid.

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America en route to Long Beach. Accordingly, USCINCPAC recommended NEW JERSEY return at a speed of advance of 20 kts after a brief stop at Rota, Spain, on 17 April, with arrival at Long Beach no later than 6 May.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Admiral Crowe sent a well done message to CINCPACFLT, saying no ship had attracted more concentrated public attention over the past year than NEW JERSEY. Her unprecedented peacetime deployment of 331 days saw her at work and in combat, from the waters of the Western Pacific through the Caribbean and the Atlantic into the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Throughout this period NEW JERSEY remained very much in the spotlight, as attested to by the focused attention she received whether showing the flag or responding to calls for fire. Complimenting the officers and men of the ship, Admiral Crowe said her operations amply demonstrated once again the capability, perseverance and staying power of our naval forces. NEW JERSEY was presented with the Navy Unit Commendation by CINCPACFLT.<sup>2</sup>

#### Submarines Decommissioned

(U) USS GRAYBACK (SS-574), one of the Navy's last diesel submarines, was decommissioned on 15 January 1984, ending 25 years of service. The largest diesel submarine in the world, GRAYBACK was the first to launch the REGULUS II missile successfully. Refitted and recommissioned in 1969, she became the only Special Warfare submarine in the U.S. fleet. Since that time, GRAYBACK had operated continuously with the SEVENTH Fleet. During those 14 years, she operated in a combat environment, conducted extensive Special Warfare training, and provided valuable ASW training to U.S. naval and allied forces.<sup>3</sup>

(U) USS PATRICK HENRY (SSN-599), formerly SSBN-599, was decommissioned on 25 May 1984, ending more than 23 years of active service. She had been the second SKIPJACK class nuclear-powered attack submarine to be converted to a GEORGE WASHINGTON class strategic missile submarine. This class was the first in the West to be armed with ballistic missiles. PATRICK HENRY carried both the POLARIS A-1 and A-3 missiles since her commissioning on 9 April 1960.<sup>4</sup>

(U) USS SEADRAGON (SSN-584) was decommissioned on 12 June 1984, ending more than 24 years of active service. She was one of four attack submarines of the SKATE class, which was the first U.S. effort to develop a production-model nuclear-powered submarine. Like her namesake predecessor, the "Red Pirate of the China Coast," SEADRAGON often paved the way for others to follow. After her commissioning on 5 December 1959, she sailed to the North Pole and then to her new home port at Pearl Harbor, becoming the first to make the east-west polar trip submerged.<sup>5</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC 090215Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 250230Z Apr 84 (U), CINCPACFLT 022240Z May 84 (U).
  3. CNO 211253Z Jan 84 (U).
  4. CNO 020310Z Jun 84 (U).
  5. CNO 160041Z Jun 84 (U).

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### Operation Plans Division Established

(U) On 3 July 1984 the Director for Operations approved a reorganization that would form the Operation Plans Division (J34), utilizing J3 and J5 resources, as of 4 September. Under the reorganization, J34 would assume responsibility for the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), a system that would basically integrate the information, planning, and execution systems currently used for joint operations. The objective of this personnel and functional staff reorganization was to put more emphasis on plan execution and execution-related requirements. In addition, this reorganization more functionally aligned with the OJCS J3, and provided for centralized management of JOPES-related requirements.<sup>1</sup>

(U) By way of background, in August 1983, the following staff issue surfaced: Which USCINCPAC directorate should be the OPR for monitoring development of the JOPES? J5 initially took the lead for JOPES because of its familiarity with the JOPS and the JDS. However, J5 felt that OPR for this system should reside elsewhere in the staff. A USCINCPAC planning and execution steering committee explored how, organizationally, USCINCPAC should transition from JOPS and JDS to JOPES. This caused the personnel working the issue to take a hard look at how USCINCPAC operated using the deliberate planning process as well as time-sensitive planning. It was discovered that the dichotomy between planning and execution was such that USCINCPAC operators lacked expertise in the OPLANs that they were expected to execute. In the real world or in an exercise, J3 had to rely heavily on J5 planners to provide the appropriate information for execution. To perpetuate the problem, J5 planners also had staff OPR and were the primary users of the JDS, an execution system. Operators were basically unfamiliar with the system.<sup>2</sup>

(U) As for the JOPES, the JCS Director of the Joint Staff had tasked the OJCS to monitor development of the system. Organizational changes took place within the OJCS J3 as well as the JDA to accommodate this tasking. JOPES, a massive information system utilizing the WWMCCS Intercomputer System (WIS) technology, was such that operators would have to be very familiar with the system, as well as use it on a routine basis. The emphasis with JOPES was on execution. Therefore, the USCINCPAC steering committee supported the working group's recommendation that J3, as the primary functional user, assume staff OPR for JOPES.

(U) To realign planning and execution functions on the staff, and as a cornerstone for further changes as JOPES developed, the staff recommended the following: J3 and J5 both have distinct responsibilities concerning USCINCPAC

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1. J34 HistSum Jul 84 (U); USCINCPAC Notice 5400 (U), 28 Aug 84, Subj: USCINCPAC Organization Change for Operations Directorate (J3) and Plans and Policy Directorate (J5).
  2. J343 HistSum Sep 84 (U).

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operation plans; J5 develop plans under the deliberate planning process (JOPS Vol I and II), and J3 provide ADP support to J5 using JOPS Volume III; when a plan is approved by the JCS, J5 transfer responsibility for maintenance and execution of the plan to J3; J3 assume staff OPR for the JDS and JOPES; and J3 create an organization using J3/J5 assets as a foundation to implement initial changes. To manage the numerous staff functions associated with OPR changes, J34 was activated on 4 September 1984, comprised of 10 officers, 7 enlisted, and 1 civilian. Colonel William F. Kelly, USA, was designated division chief.

- (U) The Operation Plans Division was primarily responsible to the Director for Operations for the maintenance of selected JCS-approved USCINCPAC OPLANS. Once a plan was approved by the JCS, J5 transferred the plan to J3 for plan maintenance and execution. In other words, the operators had staff responsibility for the plans they were required to execute. In addition, the division was the single point of contact in J3 for review of all USCINCPAC contingency plans less special plans and nuclear plans. In order to perform this plans-oriented mission, the division was organized into four branches:<sup>1</sup>

- UNITREP/ADP Coordination Branch, J341, was responsible for monitoring USPACOM component readiness and coordinating ADP support for the J3 staff, and was the staff point of contact for the UNITREP, a data base that provided unit information in support of readiness monitoring and planning and execution systems.


- Conventional Plans Branch, J342, was responsible for maintenance of JCS-approved OPLANS and the review of component command supporting plans. Plans physically transferred to J3 were OPLANS 5000, 5001, and 5027. OPLAN 5051 would be transferred at a later date.

- Contingency Plans Branch, J343, was the J3 point of contact for the review of all USCINCPAC contingency plans less special and nuclear plans and the JCS-approved USCINCPAC OPLANS managed by J342. This branch was also the staff point of contact for monitoring the development of the JOPES.

- Plans ADP Support Branch, J344, provided ADP support to J5 during the deliberate planning process using the JOPS Volume III. In addition, J344 provided ADP support to J3 operational planners during plan maintenance, and to elements of the USCINCPAC Crisis Action Team during execution. Therefore, this branch had staff responsibility for the JDS, a system that supported execution of our warfighting plans.

1. Ibid.


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1. J311 HistSum Jun 84 ~~(S)~~; Hq PACAF 120200Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. USCINCPAC 162020Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
4. JCS 281345Z Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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PLANNING (P. 915)

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1. J311 HistSum Oct 84 (~~S~~); USCINCPAC 201254Z Oct 84 (~~S~~) and CINCPACAF 262045Z Oct 84 (~~S~~), all DECL OADR.
  2. J321 HistSum Jul 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
  3. J324 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
  4. J322 HistSum Dec 84 (~~S/PRD~~).
  5. J325 HistSum Jul 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.


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(B)(1)(a)

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
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1. J322 HistSum Jul 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
2. J34 HistSum Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
3. J3 HistSum Nov 84 (U); J321 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
4. J324 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
5. J322 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
6. J323 HistSum Aug 84 (U).

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
1. J323 HistSum Aug 84 (~~S/NF~~), DECL OADR.
2. J323 HistSums Oct-Nov 84 (~~C~~) and (~~S/NF~~), DECL OADR.
3. J322 HistSum Dec 84 (~~S/FRD~~).
4. J311 HistSum Nov 84 (~~S~~), HQ NORAD 300855Z Nov 84 (~~S~~), both DECL OADR.

1. HQ NORAD 202045Z Nov 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.

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(B)(1)(a.)




1. J311 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(S)~~; HQ NORAD 042115Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.
2. USCINCPAC 180435Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
3. JCS 151832Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, USCINCPAC 172210Z Dec 84 ~~(U)~~, CINCPACFLT 181636Z Dec 84 ~~(C)~~, and COMTHIRDFLT 190212Z Dec 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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LORAN  
(p. iii)

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1. J311 HistSum Feb 84 ~~(S)~~; USCINCPAC 090812Z Feb 84 ~~(S)~~ and 112040Z Feb 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
2. J311 HistSum Mar 84 (U); USMCEB 020114Z Mar 84 (U) and USCINCPAC 090405Z Mar 84 (U).
3. J311 HistSum May 84 ~~(S)~~; USCINCPAC 050530Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.
4. J311 HistSum Aug 84 (C); USCINCPAC 082249Z Aug 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.


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1. COMUSJAPAN 150325Z Aug 84 ~~(C)~~, CINCPACFLT 180057Z Aug 84 ~~(C)~~, HQ PACAF 180220Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR; and CDRWESTCOM 170020Z Aug 84 (U).
2. J311 HistSum Sep 84 ~~(S)~~; USCINCPAC 121430Z Sep 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.
3. J311 HistSum Nov 84 ~~(S)~~; USMCEB 221332Z Oct 84 ~~(C)~~, USCINCPAC 072102Z Nov 84 ~~(S)~~, USMCEB 162300Z Nov 84 ~~(C)~~, all DECL OADR; and USCINCPAC 210201Z Nov 84 (U).

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
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
1. J311 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(C)~~; SECSTATE 086583/240222Z Mar 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
2. SECSTATE 179260/190420Z Jun 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL 18 Jun 94.
3. SECSTATE 368249/140725Z Dec 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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
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1. CINCPACFLT 060821Z Oct 84 (~~S/NF~~) and USCINCPAC 070217Z Oct 84 (~~S~~), both DECL OADR.
  2. USDAO Beijing 20913/071250Z Nov 84 (~~S/NF~~), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 112012Z Dec 84 (~~S/NF~~) and 200420Z Dec 84 (~~S/NF~~), both DECL OADR.
  4. USDAO Beijing 24267/280821Z Dec 84 (~~S~~)(EX), DECL OADR.

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1. J311 HistSum Jul 84 ~~(C)~~; JCS 062024Z Jun 84 ~~(C)~~ and USCINCPAC 162350Z Jul 84 ~~(C)~~, all DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.

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1. J311 HistSum Aug 84 ~~(S)~~; USCINCSO 012100Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~ and JCS 041354Z Aug 84 ~~(C)~~, all DECL OADR.
  2. CINCPACFLT 180207Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~ and USCINCPAC 182320Z Aug 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 060430Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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USCINCPAC Briefing Team

(U) The USCINCPAC Deputy Chief of Staff, MAJ GEN Walter C. Schrupp, USAF, informed the U.S. Deputy Chiefs of Mission in Tokyo, Manila, and Seoul; the U.S. Consul General in Naha; and the USCINCPACREPs in Guam and the Philippines that, because of the many requests to make the USPACOM command briefing available to audiences throughout the theater, he had formed a team which was prepared to do just that. It had great potential to provide an improved basis of understanding about USCINCPAC's missions, forces, and capabilities, as well as the threat throughout the command. The briefing was intended for presentation in English to U.S. and allied command and general staffs, embassy officials and staffs, allied governments and diplomatic audiences, and others as determined appropriate. The presentation was 45 minutes in duration, with a question-and-answer period following, which MAJ GEN Schrupp would host. The scheduled itinerary was Yokota, Kadena, Osan, Clark, and Andersen, 13-20 December 1984. All travel would be by the USCINCPAC Airborne Command Post aircraft.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The team departed Hawaii for the Far East on 12 December. In Korea, General Livsey said the team briefed near-capacity crowds (approximately 100 persons each) at all three of their presentations at Yongsan Army Garrison, Seoul. It had a standing-room-only crowd at Osan for their briefing at Osan AB. The question-and-answer periods after the briefings were very productive, and particularly noteworthy were those after the ROK briefing on 17 December. COMUSKOREA hoped to see the Pacific Area Update offered on the road on a recurring basis.<sup>4</sup>

1. Ibid.
2. USCINCPAC 012225Z Sep 84 (C), DECL OADR.
3. USCINCPAC 230035Z Oct 84 (U).
4. COMUSKOREA 280800Z Dec 84 (U).

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Pacific Fleet Homeporting

(U) Homeports were locations at which ships, ship-based squadrons and staffs, or other deployable fleet activities were assigned for administrative purposes. Homeports were assigned by the CNO, based on recommendations of the fleet or cognizant commanders of the operating forces of the Navy. Homeports were assigned or reassigned on the basis that such assignments would remain effective for a period in excess of six months. The choice of homeports was based on many factors, including security, navigation, and location. Considerations were the same for foreign ports as for U.S. ports, except that the acceptability to the host government was required for foreign homeports.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The following Navy activities and ships were homeported in Japan:<sup>2</sup>

- Yokosuka: Commander SEVENTH Fleet, Commander Destroyer Squadron FIFTEEN (COMDESRON 15), USS MIDWAY (CV-41), USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC-19), USS WHITE PLAINS (AFS-4), USS KNOX (FF-1052), USS LOCKWOOD (FF-1064), USS FRANCIS HAMMOND (FF-1067), USS KIRK (FF-1087), USS REEVES (CG-24), USS TOWERS (DDG-9), USS COCHRANE (DDG-21), USS OLDENDORF (DD-972), Commander Carrier Air Wing FIVE (CVW 5), Attack Squadron 56 (VA 56), VA 93, VA 115, Fighter Squadron 151 (VF 151), VF 161, Airborne Early Warning Wing 115 (VAW 115), and Commander Submarine Group SEVEN (COMSUBGRU 7).

- Atsugi: Commander Fleet Air Western Pacific (COMFAIRWESTPAC), Helicopter Combat Support Squadron ONE Detachments TWO and SIX (HC 1 Det 2 and HC 1 Det 6), and Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 136 (VAQ 136).

- Kamiseya: Commander Patrol Wing ONE (COMPATWING 1).

- Misawa: PATWING 1 Det Misawa.

- Sasebo: USS DARTER (SS-576) and USS ST LOUIS (LKA-116).

- Okinawa: Commander Amphibious Group ONE (COMPHIBGRU 1) and PATWING 1 Det Kadena.


(U) On 29 December 1984 the CNO announced that USS SAN BERNARDINO (LST-1189) would shift homeports from San Diego, CA, to Sasebo during FY 86 under the Overseas Family Residency Program, in order to increase the capability of SEVENTH Fleet. Two other ships, USS BARBEL (SS-580) and USS DUBUQUE (LPD-8), had previously been announced for homeporting at Sasebo by the end of FY 86.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J313 Point Paper (S), 14 Dec 84, Subj: U.S. Navy Homeporting and Ship Visits in Japan (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. CNO 290009Z Dec 84 (U).


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(U) The following U.S. Pacific Command Navy activities and ships were homeported in Guam: Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE (VQ 1), PATWING 1 Det Agana, USS PROTEUS (AS-19), USS SAN JOSE (AFS-7), USS NIAGARA FALLS (AFS-3), USS WHITE PLAINS (AFS-4), and SS AMERICAN SPITFIRE (Near Term Pre-positioning Force alternate base).<sub>1</sub>

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1. J313 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 25 Jul 84, Subj: U.S. Navy Overseas Homeporting in Guam (U), DECL OADR.
  2. J36A Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 22 Oct 84, Subj: Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC) (U), DECL OADR.

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USCINCPAC Combined Special Operations Conference

(U) USCINCPAC hosted its fourth annual Special Operations Conference at Camp H.M. Smith, 21-24 February 1984, to discuss matters of mutual interest to the U.S.-Free World SO community. Over 170 representatives from the CONUS, USPACOM, and six Free World countries (Australia, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) attended.<sup>2</sup>




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1. Ibid.
  2. SOC 5 HistSum Feb 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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1. Ibid.
2. SSO FT BRAGG 251704Z Jan 84 (~~S~~)(BOM), DECL OADR.
3. Ibid.


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
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1. CDRWESTCOM 271200Z Feb 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 170711Z Mar 84 ~~(S)~~ and CDRWESTCOM 230130Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.
  3. HQ DA 161648Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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
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1. J365 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 23 Aug 84, Subj: USAF Special Operations Forces (SOF) in USPACOM (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. CSAF 032218Z Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL 28 Dec 89.
  4. USCINCPAC 310140Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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1. J363 Point Paper (~~S~~), 20 Nov 84, Subj: Forward Deployment of USPACOM Oriented U.S. Army Special Forces (U), DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. CDRUSARJ/IX Corps 030220Z Jul 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.


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1. CDRWESTCOM 270200Z Aug 84 (U).
2. Ibid.

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
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1. J367 HistSum Sep 84 ~~(S)~~; JCS 051306Z Sep 84 ~~(S)~~ and USCINCPAC 270349Z Sep 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. J367 HistSum Dec 84 (U).



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SECTION II--OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Indian Ocean Fleet Operations



1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 306-308.
2. CNO 072107Z Jan 84 (U).
3. J313 HistSum Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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
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(U) Ship visits were conducted during January at the Indian Ocean ports of Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory; Mombasa, Kenya; Kismaayo (Kismayo), Somalia; Karachi, Pakistan; and Cockburn Sound, Western Australia.<sup>1</sup>

(U) RANGER and her 10-ship battle group entered Subic Bay on 25 January, concluding 121 days at sea. She had left her homeport of San Diego in July 1983 and, following operations off the western coast of Central America, entered SEVENTH Fleet waters in September. After a short stop at Subic Bay, RANGER and the battle group departed for the Indian Ocean, where they spent 95 days on station in the Northern Arabian Sea. Although some of the ships had brief port visits, the battle group remained at sea for four months, and was cited by CINCPACFLT and COMSEVENTHFLT for its fortitude, professionalism, and dedication to duty. Admiral Crowe also asked CINCPACFLT to extend his admiration and respect to the officers and men of the entire RANGER CVBG for the superb manner in which they accomplished the lengthy and arduous deployment. The manner in which RANGER remained on station and repaired the damage suffered during the major fire testified admirably, he said, to the staying power of U.S. naval forces.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 29 February the last of the 14 ships of the RANGER CVBG returned to their Pacific Fleet homeports, completing nearly eight months of operations with the SECOND, THIRD, and SEVENTH Fleets. RANGER and five escorting ships returned to San Diego; two escort ships had returned earlier to Pearl Harbor; and six supporting ships returned to various homeports in California, Washington, and WESTPAC. ~~The CVBG was the first to have such a record maintained, continuous operations for eight months, and the longest at sea for four months and steaming more than 60,000 miles in the process.~~<sup>3</sup>

- 00-0764
1. Ibid.
  2. CNO 040035Z Feb 84 (U); USCINCPAC 180441Z Feb 84 (U).
  3. CNO 040045Z Mar 84 (U)



1. J313 HistSum Feb 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. Ibid; USS LAWRENCE 261556Z Feb 84 ~~(S)~~, SECSTATE 060320/010402Z Mar 84 ~~(C)~~, AMEMB Muscat 1412/071145Z Mar 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
3. J313 HistSum Feb 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

(U) Five ships of the MIDWAY CVBG returned to homeport at Yokosuka on 23 May, ending five months of operations with the SEVENTH Fleet. More than 90 days were spent operating in the NAS near the Strait of Hormuz.


~~(S)~~ The Secretary of Defense directed deployment of the Atlantic Fleet AMERICA Battle Group directly to the Northern Arabian Sea upon completion of

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
1. J313 HistSum Mar 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. J313 HistSum Apr 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
4. Ibid.
5. J313 HistSum May 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
6. CNO 020310Z Jun 84 (U).

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21-28 May upkeep at Malaga, Spain, to relieve the KITTY HAWK Battle Group.



(U) Ship visits during June were conducted at Diego Garcia; Bahrain; and Fremantle, Bunbury, Geraldton, and Exmouth, Western Australia.<sup>3</sup>



1. JCS 222045Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL 21 May 90; CINCUSNAVEUR 241404Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. J313 HistSum Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
3. Ibid.
4. J313 HistSum Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
5. USS AMERICA 151323Z and 151843Z Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL 15 Jul 90.

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(U) Ship visits during July were conducted at Diego Garcia, Bahrain, Singapore, Djibouti, and Abu Dhabi.<sup>1</sup>

(U) USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65), homeported at Alameda, CA, entered the SEVENTH Fleet area of operations on 11 July, while proceeding on a scheduled deployment to the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. In addition to ENTERPRISE, ships of Battle Group FOXTROT included USS ARKANSAS (CGN-41), USS JOUETT (CG-29), USS KINKAID (DD-965), USS LEFTWITCH (DD-984), USS MAHLON S. TISDALE (FFG-27), USS ROBERT E. PEARY (FF-1073), and USS BREWTON (FF-1086), supported by USS SACRAMENTO (AOE-1) and USS FLINT (AE-32).<sup>2</sup>

(U) The AMERICA Battle Group was relieved by the ENTERPRISE Battle Group on 24 August. On completion of turnover the ENTERPRISE CVBG commenced operations in the NAS and the AMERICA CVBG sailed for a Suez Canal transit en route to the USCINCLANT AOR. Ship visits during August were conducted at Mombasa; Bahrain; Diego Garcia; Muscat; Victoria, Seychelles; Port Louis, Mauritius; Karachi; Point des Galets, La Reunion; Djibouti; and Male, Maldives.<sup>3</sup>

[REDACTED]

(U) Ship visits were conducted in September at Bahrain, Diego Garcia, Mombasa, Fremantle, Muscat, Karachi, Cockburn Sound, and Darwin.<sup>4</sup>


[REDACTED]

1. Ibid.
2. CNO 140341Z Jul 84 (U).
3. J313 HistSum Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
4. Ibid.
5. J313 HistSum Sep 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
6. Ibid.
7. J313 HistSum Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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(U) No U.S. Navy ships entered or departed the Indian Ocean during October. Ship visits were conducted to Fremantle, Darwin, Victoria, and Male.<sup>1</sup>



(U) Ship visits were conducted during November to Male, Mombasa, Karachi, Cockburn Sound, and Albany, Western Australia.<sup>5</sup>


1. Ibid.
2. JCS 261815Z Oct 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
3. CINCPACFLT 012050Z Nov 84 (~~S~~)(BOM), DECL OADR.
4. J313 HistSum Nov 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
5. Ibid.

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(U) Ship visits were conducted during December to the three liberty ports mentioned above, Singapore, Penang, and Phuket.




1. J313 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(S)~~; USCINCPAC 242225Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.
2. J313 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
3. USOMC Mogadishu 40257/161025Z Feb 84 ~~(C)~~ and USCINCCENT 162101Z Feb 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
4. USOMC Mogadishu 40385/121053Z Mar 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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available and that the Country Team could provide in-country logistic support. The EOD team was expected to be available for movement by 2 April.<sup>1</sup>


(U) Upon completion of the demolition and departure of the EOD team from Berbera on 1 May, the Chief USOMC Mogadishu commended the NAS Barbers Point, HI, team for the exceptionally professional job done. He said the Somali officials were very impressed with the manner in which the United States responded to this critical situation. While the initial attitude of the Somali was one of disdain, he said it could now be characterized as one of admiration. Even the affected families of the deceased and wounded showed their appreciation. At the same time, he cautioned that the lesson learned in Somalia should be duly considered and not repeated. Admiral Crowe congratulated CINCPACFLT and the EOD team for their superb effort. He said the goodwill established served to underscore and enhance U.S.-Somali relations.<sup>2</sup>



1. USCINCCENT 202300Z Mar 84 (C) and USCINCPAC 212335Z Mar 84 (C), both DECL OADR.
2. USOMC Mogadishu 40708/030605Z May 84 (U) and USCINCPAC 050527Z May 84 (U).
3. SECSTATE 037138/080024Z Feb 84 (S)(EX), repeating AMEMB Jakarta 02154; SECSTATE 046951/160150Z Feb 84 (S)(EX), repeating AMEMB London 03582; SECSTATE 047694/161846Z Feb 84 (S)(EX), all DECL OADR.
4. CINCPACFLT 302310Z May 84 (S)(EX) and USCINCPAC 010232Z Jun 84 (S)(EX), both DECL OADR.


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1. J311 HistSum Sep 84 ~~(S)~~; CNO 072201Z Sep 84 ~~(C)~~ and JCS 191243Z Sep 84 ~~(C)~~, all DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 292305Z Sep 84 ~~(S)~~ and USCINCCENT 061750Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB New Delhi 23293/171232Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~(EX) and USCINCPAC 202030Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.
  4. SECSTATE 328696/032252Z Nov 84 ~~(S)~~(EX), DECL OADR.

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1. J311 HistSum Nov 84 ~~(S)~~; JCS 101424Z Nov 84 ~~(S/NF)~~ and USCINCPAC 171927Z Nov 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
2. J311 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(S)~~; CINCPACFLT 051736Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, ODRP Islamabad 25643/230916Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, and SECSTATE 379545/280048Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~(EX), all DECL OADR.
3. ODRP Islamabad 26145/311127Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.


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(U) The KITTY HAWK Battle Group, including COMCRUDESGRU THREE, paid a highly successful visit to Western Australia from 22 to 27 June 1984. The 10-ship group, including the nuclear-powered cruiser LONG BEACH, centered activity in the Perth area. Ships also visited Bunbury and Geraldton, and HAROLD E. HOLT also visited Exmouth to provide a tie-in with the Harold E. Holt Joint Facility. A VIP flyout to KITTY HAWK the day before arrival involved 15 federal parliamentarians--the most ever in Australia. The carrier also hosted a VIP luncheon for 30 prominent residents. COMCRUDESGRU THREE held a discussion on security issues with the federal Minister for Aviation and other officials at the American Consul General's residence. 4

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1. J313 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 5 Jan 84, Subj: U.S. Military Operations in the Indian Ocean (I.O.) (U), DECL OADR.
  2. J313 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 28 Dec 84, Subj: Ship Visits to Australia (U), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.
  4. AMCONSUL Perth 0273/060700Z Jul 84 (U).

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(U) Anti-visit demonstrations proved small and ineffective. There were eight charges of crew misbehavior--more than any visit in the past two years. The Consul General said this might be the only serious possible cause of visits to Perth being less welcome, and needed to be addressed. The U.S. Navy had an extraordinarily high reputation in Perth, but it could be dissipated quickly with future such incidents. Nevertheless, a random telephone survey taken by a local newspaper the last two days of the visit showed that 85 percent of those queried stated that Australia needed the United States for its defense.<sup>1</sup>



1. Ibid.
2. AMEMB Canberra 10426/280733Z Sep 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR; USIS Canberra 10445/020148Z Oct 84 (U).
3. J313 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 29 Nov 84, Subj: Ship Visits to Sri Lanka (U), DECL OADR.
4. Ibid.

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1. AMEMB Colombo 1129/180415Z Feb 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. J313 Point Paper (S), 29 Nov 84, Subj: Ship Visits to Sri Lanka (U), DECL OADR; USS GEORGE PHILIP 221200Z Nov 84 (U).
  3. AMEMB New Delhi 260710Z Nov 83 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
  4. Ibid.


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1. AMEMB New Delhi 25581/141236Z Dec 83 ~~(S)~~; USCINCPAC 270405Z Jan 84 ~~(C)~~; CNO 281816Z Jan 84 ~~(C)~~; and USDAO New Delhi 02243/311152Z Jan 84 ~~(C)~~ and 03099/100852Z Feb 84 ~~(C)~~, all DECL OADR.
2. COMSEVENTHFLT 150813Z Feb 84 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL OADR.
3. USS WHIPPLE 171356Z Feb 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR; AMEMB New Delhi 03951/220756Z Feb 84 (U); USCINCPAC 010430Z Mar 84 (U).

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
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1. AMEMB New Delhi 04259/241219Z Feb 84 ~~(C)~~ and USCINCPAC 150349Z Mar 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.
  2. USDAO New Delhi 0584/050807Z Jun 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. CINCPACFLT 042111Z Dec 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  4. J313 Point Paper ~~(C/NF)~~, 16 Nov 84, Subj: Ship Visits to Pakistan (U), DECL OADR.

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(U) USS LASALLE (AGF-3) visited Port Victoria on 11 August, the first U.S. Navy ship to call there in eight months.<sup>3</sup>



(U) KINKAID's visit was rescheduled, and carried out 6-10 October. The Ambassador said it was "a roaring success." More importantly, it could not

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1. J313 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 15 Nov 84, Subj: Ship Visits to Seychelles (U), DECL OADR. (See also USCINCPAC Command History 1983, Vol. II, pp. 311-312.)
  2. USCINCPAC 062215Z Mar 84 ~~(S)~~(BOM), DECL OADR.
  3. J313 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 15 Nov 84, Subj: Ship Visits to Seychelles (U), DECL OADR.
  4. AMBEMB Victoria 130820Z Aug 84 ~~(C)~~ and USCINCPAC 150309Z Aug 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR; AMEMB Victoria 01215/040929Z Sep 84 (U) and 01233/060522Z Sep 84 (U); USCINCPAC 080220Z Sep 84 ~~(C)~~(BOM), DECL OADR.

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have come at a better time and it served an invaluable political interest by demonstrating that the United States supported a policy of nonalignment. The crew volunteered to paint the local orphanage. The people turned out in force to welcome the Americans at a road race through Victoria. Basketball games drew good crowds in a special spirit of goodwill. There were no liberty incidents. Everyone important from President Rene on down welcomed this particular visit (coming on the heels of an abortive coup attempt a week earlier) because it underscored the importance the United States attached to a foreign policy balanced between the superpowers. Admiral Crowe and CINCPACFLT both congratulated the commanding officer and crew for their exemplary performance in enhancing U.S. prestige in Seychelles at a critical time.<sup>1</sup>

Madagascar


(C) In the wake of Typhoon KAMISY, which hit northern Madagascar 9-12 April 1984 (see Section IV, below), USCINCPAC advised the U.S. Ambassador in Antananarivo that USPACOM forces stood ready to provide whatever disaster relief assistance was deemed necessary and appropriate. At the same time, USCINCPAC was aware of the Malagasy policy on visits of naval vessels from non-littoral states. The Secretary of State on 18 April asked USCINCPAC to consider sending a naval tender to Diego Suarez or Majunga to help get port facilities back into operation. USCINCPAC had CINCPACFLT direct USS HECTOR (AR-7) to proceed from her position near Diego Garcia to Madagascar to provide assistance as requested. President Ratsiraka warmly agreed to a port call by HECTOR to Diego Suarez and was thankful for the U.S. offer of help.<sup>2</sup>

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1. AMEMB Victoria 01410/101021Z Oct 84 (U); USCINCPAC 151105Z Oct 84 (U); CINCPACFLT 160511Z Oct 84 (U).
  2. USCINCPAC 130523Z and 182006Z Apr 84 (C); SECSTATE 118237/211758Z Apr 84 (C), a11 DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Antananarivo 01182/040638Z May 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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
(U) Admiral Crowe thanked CINCPACFLT for his willingness to make HECTOR available from its assigned mission of fleet support for humanitarian assistance to Madagascar. For this relatively modest investment, the United States had reaped a tremendous amount of goodwill. USCINCPAC also congratulated the officers and men of the ship for their outstanding efforts. He said this visit was instrumental in furthering U.S. interests in Madagascar as well as in the Indian Ocean itself in general.<sup>1</sup>



1. USCINCPAC 050515Z and 050529Z, both May 84 (U).
2. USCINCPAC 120549Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
3. J311 Point Paper (S/NF), 10 Apr 84, Subj: P-3 Access in SWA (U), DECL OADR.

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
1. ~~J311 Background Paper (S/AFM), 29 Nov 84, Subj: USPACOM P-3 Operations, Access, and Goals (U), DECL OADR.~~
2. ~~J311 Point Paper (S), 20 Jun 84, Subj: P-3 Operations from Masirah (U), DECL OADR.~~
3. USCINCCENT 192227Z Jan 84 (C), DECL OADR.
4. ~~J311 HistSum Mar 84 (S); USCINCPAC 152200Z Mar 84 (S)(BOM) and 241940Z Mar 84 (S), all DECL OADR.~~

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1. USDAO Muscat 0353/041000Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~; J311 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 20 Jun 84, Subj: P-3 Operations from Masirah (U), DECL OADR.
2. J311 HistSum Aug 84 ~~(S)~~; USCINCPAC 170310Z Aug 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
3. J311 HistSum Sep 84 ~~(S)~~; AMEMB Muscat 290926Z Sep 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.

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1. SECDEF 222002Z Oct 84 (S), DECL 16 Oct 90.
2. Ibid.
3. J311 Background Paper (S/NF), 29 Nov 84, Subj: USPACOM P-3 Basing, Access, and Goals (U), DECL OADR.
4. J311 Point Paper (S), 20 Jun 84, Subj: P-3 Access to Pakistan (S); J311 HistSum Feb 84 (S/NF); AMEMB Islamabad 02037/010230Z Feb 84 (S); and USCINCPAC 020252Z Feb 84 (S/NF), all DECL OADR.

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1. CTF 72 170513Z Mar 84 ~~(C)~~ DECL OADR.
2. J311 HistSum Apr 84 ~~(S/NF)~~; USCINCPAC 262225Z Apr 84 ~~(S/NF)~~, both DECL OADR.
3. J311 HistSum Aug 84 ~~(S)~~; CTF 72 071329Z Aug 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
4. USCINCPAC 180153Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~ and AMEMB Islamabad 20329/050518Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.

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1. J311 HistSum Nov 84 ~~(C)~~; CINCPACFLT 200416Z Nov 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
2. J311 HistSum Oct 84 ~~(C)~~; USCINCPAC 011632Z Nov 84 ~~(S)~~ and CINCPACFLT 310536Z Oct 84 ~~(C)~~, all DECL OADR.
3. J311 Background Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 29 Nov 84, Subj: USPACOM P-3 Basing, Access, and Goals (U), DECL OADR.
4. AMEMB Djibouti 1333/200617Z May 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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1. Ibid.
2. J311 HistSum Apr 84 ~~(S)~~; USCINCPAC 110416Z Apr 84 ~~(S)~~ and JCS 131639Z Apr 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
3. AMEMB Mogadishu 3691/250820Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~; J311 Background Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 29 Nov 84, Subj: USPACOM P-3 Basing, Access, and Goals (U), both DECL OADR.

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1. AMEMB Mogadishu 10014/181220Z Oct 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
2. J311 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(C)~~; AMEMB Mogadishu 10601/061023Z Nov 84 ~~(S)~~ and USCINCPAC 220257Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
3. J311 Background Paper ~~(S)~~, 15 Nov 84, Subj: U.S. Military Aircraft Visits and Access to Comoros, Maldives, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion, Mozambique, and Seychelles (U); J311 HistSum Jun 84 ~~(S)~~; JCS 012338Z Jun 84 ~~(C)~~, CINCPACFLT 132136Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, and USCINCPAC 232227Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.


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1. J311 HistSum Jul 84 ~~(C)~~; AMEMB Victoria 00932/170809Z Jul 84 ~~(C)~~ and USCINCPAC 270147Z Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
2. USCINCPAC 222130Z Sep 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
3. J311 HistSum May 84 ~~(C)~~; USCINCPAC 101936Z May 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
4. JCS 281802Z Jun 84 ~~(C)~~; J311 Background Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 29 Nov 84, Subj: USPACOM P-3 Basing, Access, and Goals (U), both DECL OADR.


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1. J311 HistSum Apr 84 ~~(S)~~; USCINCPAC 142230Z May 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
  2. J311 HistSum Jun 84 ~~(S)~~; AMEMB Port Louis 02001/110739Z Jun 84 ~~(C)~~ and USCINCPAC 192354Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
  3. CTF 72 180320Z Aug 84 ~~(C)~~ and AMEMB Port Louis 03452/220725Z Oct 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
  4. J311 Background Paper (S/NF), 29 Nov 84, Subj: USPACOM P-3 Basing, Access, and Goals (U), DECL OADR.

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
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1. COMSEVENTHFLT 242301Z Mar 84 ~~(S)~~ and AMEMB Canberra 11258/230624Z Oct 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, pp. 315-318; J3/SSS/5750/1072-85 (U), 5 Sep 85, Subj: Review of Draft USCINCPAC Command History for 1984.
  3. J312 HistSum Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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1. MSCO Guam 162300Z Jan 84 and 170800Z Jan 84, both ~~(S)~~ DECL OADR.
2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 317.
3. USCINCPAC 070403Z Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
4. JCS 111846Z Feb 84 ~~(S)~~ and USCINCPAC 130035Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.




Western Pacific Fleet Operations

(U) Three Filipino fishermen were rescued by USS COCHRANE (DDG-21) in early January 1984 after three days adrift in their outrigger canoe, 50 miles

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1. USCINCPAC 130035Z May 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
  2. JCS 241723Z Oct 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 242252Z Dec 84 (~~S~~)(BOM), DECL OADR.

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west of Subic Bay. The fishermen were lifted by helicopter from COCHRANE to USS MIDWAY (CV-41), and later transferred to NAS Cubi Point.<sup>1</sup>




1. CNO 140034Z Jan 84 (U).
2. J313 HistSum Feb 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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
(U) An unusually high level of search, rescue, and medical assistance activity occurred late in the month. On 23 February a woman from a Soviet trawler was treated for internal bleeding at McMurdo Station, Antarctica. On the 26th, Naval Station Adak treated an injured crewman from a Japanese cargo vessel. A USMC H-46 from Iwakuni assisted in a SAR effort for a crashed Japanese PS-1 ASW amphibian on 26 February. On the 27th, two SH-3Gs from Cubi Point and one HH-3E from Clark recovered all 16 Americans and one Philippine national aboard a pleasure cruise diving boat aground in the Mindoro Strait. Also on the 27th, USNS H.H. HESS (T-AGS-38) assisted a flooding Panamanian cargo ship.<sup>1</sup>



1. Ibid.
2. J313 HistSum Mar 84 (S), DECL OADR.
3. CTG 77.2 220510Z Mar 84 (S) and USS KITTY HAWK 301307Z Mar 84 (S/NF), both DECL OADR.
4. COMUSKOREA 240730Z Mar 84 (U).

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1. J313 HistSum Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.
2. USS HAROLD E. HOLT 020615Z Apr 84 (C), DECL OADR.
3. J313 HistSum May 84 (S), DECL OADR.
4. J313 HistSum Jun 84 (C), DECL OADR.
5. J313 HistSum Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR.


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1. COMSEVENTHFLT 011141Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. ATKRON 115 Det Kunsan 160409Z Jul 84 (U).
4. J313 HistSum Aug 84 (U)
5. J313 HistSum Sep 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
6. J313 HistSum Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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1. J313 HistSum Nov 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  2. J313 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. USS BARBOUR COUNTY 260310Z, 260840Z, and 270440Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL 25-26 Apr 90.

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
(U) A VFA-131 McDonnell-Douglas/Northrop F/A-18 HORNET fighter, participating in night field carrier landing practice at Naval Air Facility San Clemente, crashed on the north shore of Santa Catalina Island at 190632Z June 1984. The pilot stayed with the aircraft and was killed. 4



(U) While conducting routine practice replenishment approaches during the afternoon of 3 December, the amphibious assault ship NEW ORLEANS and amphib-

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1. USCINCPAC 050910Z May 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR; COMTHIRDFLT 052255Z May 84 (U).
  2. USS LEAHY 052350Z, 060530Z, and 061930Z May 84 (U).
  3. CTG 170.3 011902Z Jun 84 (U).
  4. STRKFITRON 125 190655Z Jun 84 (U).
  5. J313 HistSum Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  6. J313 HistSums Oct-Nov 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

ious transport dock DENVER collided some 840 NM southwest of San Diego. Some damage was sustained by both ships but each was able to continue transit to San Diego without assistance. Both ships were homeported in San Diego as units of PHIBRON THREE, which was returning from a 6-month deployment to Western Pacific and Indian Ocean areas.




SSN/44BN  
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(P. 919)

1. COMTHIRDFLT 040437Z Dec 84 (U).
2. J313 HistSum Dec 84 (C), DECL OADR.
3. J321 Point Paper (S), 9 Apr 84, Subj: TRIDENT Employment in the Pacific (U), DECL OADR.
4. Ibid.; J3/SSS/5750/1072-85 (U), 5 Sep 85, Subj: Review of Draft USCINCPAC Command History for 1984.

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(P. 919)




1. J321 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 9 Apr 84, Subj: TRIDENT Employment in the Pacific (U), DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. J312 HistSums Mar-Apr 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
4. J321 HistSum Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
5. J321 HistSum Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
6. J321 HistSum Sep 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.


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(U) Conventionally powered warships and auxiliaries and nuclear-powered submarines conducted routine visits to various Japanese ports for ship upkeep and crew rest on a frequent basis and after "notification" to the government of Japan. Among nuclear-powered surface ships visiting Japan in recent years, USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-70) visited Sasebo in March 1983. USS CARL VINSON (CVN-70) and USS TEXAS (CGN-39) also visited Sasebo in October 1983. USS LONG BEACH (CGN-9) visited Yokosuka 2-5 March 1984, and TEXAS again visited Sasebo 6-8 December.

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1. J321 HistSum Oct 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  2. J313 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 14 Dec 84, Subj: U.S. Navy Homeporting and Ship Visits in Japan (U), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.
  4. AMEMB Tokyo 12038/150629Z Jun 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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(U) The Navy confirmed that TUNNY was nuclear-capable, but neither confirmed nor denied whether the ship was actually carrying nuclear weapons. TUNNY was one a class of ships which was previously announced by the Navy that would be TOMAHAWK-capable. To say that a ship was TOMAHAWK-capable did not necessarily mean it was carrying the nuclear variant of the missile.<sup>1</sup>



Hong Kong


(U) U.S. Navy ships routinely visited Hong Kong. During Fiscal Year 1984 a total of 54 ships visited that port city, including 7 nuclear-powered warships.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 31 December 1984 the USDLO Hong Kong advised all concerned that the year-end visit of USS TARAWA (LHA-9), USS DULUTH (LPD-6), and USS TUSCALOOSA (LST-1187) "complemented the holiday spirit with Old Glory flying proudly in Hong Kong Harbor." There were numerous calls from guests who participated in the daily tours of the ships that expressed appreciation for the extraordinary hospitality received. All were impressed with the professional and courteous manners of the crews of the amphibious group. The USDLO said the visit left a very favorable impression on the city of both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps.<sup>4</sup>



1. SECDEF 152331Z Jun 84 (U).
2. AMEMB Tokyo 25635/140936Z Dec 84 (C), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 180241Z Dec 84 (U).
3. J313 Point Paper (S/NF), 7 Dec 84, Subj: Ship Visits to Hong Kong (U), DECL OADR.
4. USDLO Hong Kong 310921Z Dec 84 (U).

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1. J313 Point Paper (~~S~~), 30 Oct 84, Subj: Ship Visits to Singapore (U), DECL OADR.
2. USDAO Singapore 08964/220631Z Aug 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 292335Z Aug 84 (U).
3. J313 Point Paper (~~C~~), 11 Sep 84, Subj: Ship Visits to Brunei (U), DECL OADR.

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(U) USS HENRY B. WILSON (DDG-7) visited Brunei, 9-12 July 1984, and the U.S. Ambassador in Bandar Seri Begawan called it an "unqualified success." Despite the very small size of the Brunei Navy and its inability to receive WILSON at the naval facilities because of the ship's draft, her requirements were efficiently met and the crew was shown every courtesy. More than 1,200 Bruneians visited the ship despite the fact that the commercial wharf in Maura, where WILSON tied up, was more than 17 miles from the capital. Local interest was stimulated by press reports that WILSON was the first U.S. naval vessel to visit Brunei since USS CONSTITUTION--"Old Ironsides"--in 1845. 1

Palau


(U) USS PELELIU (LHA-5) visited her island namesake in the Republic of Palau in the Caroline Islands, 7-9 February 1984, to participate in a ceremony honoring U.S. Marines who fought there during World War II. Members of the ship's company and the embarked 31st MAU helped dedicate a memorial to the 1st Marine Division, which suffered heavy casualties on the island 40 years earlier. Admiral Crowe and COMNAVMARIANAS and several veterans of the battle

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1. AMEMB Bandar Seri Begawan 0178/170440Z Jul 84 (U).
  2. J313 Point Paper (S), 18 Sep 84, Subj: Ship Visits to Thailand (U), DECL OADR.
  3. CTF 70 301628Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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spoke at a brief ceremony atop a cliff in the mountain range which was named "Bloody Nose Ridge" by the Marines in 1944. During the invasion, more than 1,200 Marines were killed in action and 5,275 were wounded while taking the island from the Japanese fortified in cliff-line caves. Several hundred Peleliuans joined the men of the amphibious assault ship in a beach party during the 3-day visit.<sup>1</sup>



1. USCINCPACREP Guam/TTPI 100707Z Feb 84 (U).
2. J311 Point Paper (S), 15 Oct 84, Subj: Aircraft Access to U-Tapao and Other Aircraft Visits to Thailand (U), DECL OADR.
3. Ibid.

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
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1. J311 H1stSums Jan-Feb 84 (S); AMEMB Bangkok 67257/270201Z Dec 83 (S)(EX), USCINCPAC 032331Z Jan 84 (S)(EX), USCINCPAC 032332Z Jan 84 (S), AMEMB Bangkok 08665/160151Z Feb 84 (S)(EX), and USCINCPAC 180042Z Feb 84 (S), all DECL OADR.
2. COMSEVENTHFLT 180021Z Feb 84 (S) and CHJUSMAGTHAI 08860/190512Z Feb 84 (S), both DECL OADR.
3. AMEMB Bangkok 10347/281434Z Feb 84 (S), DECL OADR.
4. J3523 Point Paper (S), 12 Jul 84, Subj: Combined TACAIR Training (U), DECL OADR.

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1. J311 HistSums Jun-Aug 84 ~~(S)~~; AMEMB Bangkok 24980/160131Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, USCINCPAC 260205Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, AMEMB Bangkok 36210/190851Z Jul 84 ~~(S)~~(EX), USCINCPAC 040407Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~(EX), and USCINCPAC 260132Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
2. J311 HistSum Jun 84 ~~(S)~~; CHJUSMAGTHAI 25946/151325Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~ and USCINCPAC 210010Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
3. J311 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 14 Aug 84, Subj: Aircraft Visits to Malaysia (U), DECL OADR.

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1. J311 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 29 May 84, Subj: Australia P-3 Use of Butterworth (U), DECL OADR.
2. J311 HistSum Jan 84 ~~(S)~~; USCINCPAC 130119Z Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.
3. JCS 012045Z Feb 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.


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1. USCINCPAC 201830Z Feb 84 (S), DECL OADR.
2. J311 HistSum Apr 84 (S); USDAO Kuala Lumpur 02823/090605Z Apr 84 (S), USCINCPAC 110415Z Apr 84 (S), AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 02925/110833Z Apr 84 (S), USDAO Kuala Lumpur 03411/270855Z Apr 84 (S/NF), and USCINCPAC 280451Z Apr 84 (S), all DECL OADR.
3. J311 Point Paper (S), 14 Aug 84, Subj: Aircraft Visits to Malaysia (U), DECL OADR.


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1. J311 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 8 Oct 84, Subj: U.S. Access To and Use of Singapore Air Facilities (U), DECL OADR.
  2. J311 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 30 Jul 84, Subj: Aircraft Visits to Indonesia (U), DECL OADR.
  3. J311 HistSum Apr 84 ~~(C)~~; USDAO Jakarta 05386/300420Z Mar 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.

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
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1. CINCPACFLT 261657Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~ and USCINCPAC 280329Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
2. J313 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 19 Mar 84, Subj: South Pacific (SOPAC) Deployments (U); CINCPACFLT 232121Z May 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.

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1. USCINCPAC 210012Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, SECSTATE 256613/290537Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~(EX), and USCINCPAC 292320Z Aug 84 Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCLANT 011544Z Sep 84 ~~(S)~~, USCINCPAC 112346Z Sep 84 ~~(S)~~, AMEMB Canberra 09935/180803Z Sep 84 ~~(S)~~(EX), and USCINCPAC 260545Z Sep 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
  3. AMCONSUL Melbourne 1757/162325Z Oct 84 (U).

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


(U) On 30 January 1984 Prime Minister Muldoon reacted quickly to opposition leader David Lange's statement that a Labor Government (if it came to power) would ban visits by warships from the nuclear powers unless he, as Prime Minister, were given an assurance that the ships were not nuclear-armed.<sup>3</sup>

(U) WHIPPLE berthed at Port Lyttelton (Christchurch) as scheduled on her SOPAC cruise, 17-19 March. In spite of several wild demonstrations, the visit was described as a "splendid success." The ship and crew were warmly welcomed, especially by the Maori people. SCHOFIELD visited Port Chalmers (Dunedin), 17-19 March. Land-based and water-borne demonstrators greeted the frigate's arrival, but she departed without further incident.<sup>4</sup>




1. Ibid.
2. J313 Point Paper (S), 17 May 84, Subj: Recent and Projected Ship Visits to New Zealand (U) and J313 Point Paper (S), 21 Nov 84, Subj: NPW Port Visits to New Zealand (U), both DECL OADR.
3. AMEMB Wellington 00325/200230Z Jan 84 (U)
4. NAVSUPFORANTARCTICA Det Christchurch 190451Z Mar 84 (U) and USDAO Wellington 01456/220254Z Mar 84 (C), DECL OADR.



(U) On 13 June the ruling National Party defeated an opposition move to ban U.S. nuclear-powered warships from New Zealand ports despite the defection of two government members of Parliament. Prime Minister Muldoon was forced to rely on the support of two former Labour opposition members to beat the move by a single vote. Earlier, Muldoon had warned, "We could not remain the government if this bill became law."<sup>3</sup>

(U) In a surprise move, the National Party called for an election in July before before it was required in November and was defeated. David Lange was installed as Prime Minister. In his first interview on 29 July Lange told a countrywide TV audience that he did not expect to see any U.S. Navy ships in New Zealand during his 3-year term.<sup>4</sup>




1. DIRNAVINSERV 232138Z Mar 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.
2. AMEMB Wellington 02250/012210Z May 84 (C), DECL OADR.
3. FBIS Bangkok 130728Z Jun 84 (U).
4. AMEMB Wellington 03821/300426Z Jul 84 (U).

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
1. USCINCPAC 210415Z Nov 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
2. SECSTATE 355503/012347Z Dec 84 and 366301/130339Z Dec 84, both (~~S~~)(EX), DECL OADR.
3. J313 Point Paper (~~C~~), 12 Sep 84, Subj: Ship Visits to Papua New Guinea (PNG)(U), DECL OADR.

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
(U) Replying in Parliament on 14 August to questions on ship visits, PNG Prime Minister Somare said his government would not allow visits by ships known to have nuclear weapons. But he added that no country would say what weapons its ships carried, and an exception would be made for the ships of countries which had "some agreement or support for the region" (presumably, this meant ANZUS and the United States). Somare said it was up to each Pacific nation to decide its own policy, and he contrasted PNG's conditional permission with New Zealand's outright ban. These statements were seen to basically reaffirm PNG's policy of allowing visits by naval vessels of friendly states without raising questions about armaments.<sup>2</sup>



1. AMEMB Port Moresby 00531/130148Z Mar 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
2. AMEMB Port Moresby 01694/160943Z Aug 84 (U).
3. AMEMB Port Moresby 246963/211849Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~(EX), DECL OADR.


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1. J313 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 21 Aug 84, Subj: Ship Visits to the Solomon Islands (U), DECL OADR.
  2. AMEMB Port Moresby 00425/290555Z Feb 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.
  4. AMEMB Port Moresby 00759/090125Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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


(U) USS WADDELL (DDG-24) conducted very well-received port visits to Lautoka (27-29 October) and Suva (29-31 October). The nuclear weapons issue was not raised. The U.S. Ambassador in Suva said WADDELL's civic action projects resulted in many favorable comments from the highest levels in the Fiji government and in several appreciative newspaper articles. Admiral Crowe sent a message of congratulations to the commanding officer and crew for their superb performance. He also advised CINCPACFLT that he was most pleased to receive the Ambassador's comments regarding the fine receptions given to WADDELL in Fiji, CUSHING in New Caledonia, and CIMARRON in Tonga. The goodwill

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1. J313 Point Paper (S), 9 Nov 84, Subj: Ship Visits to Fiji (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.


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1. J313 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 9 Nov 84, Subj: Ship Visits to Fiji (U), DECL OADR; AMEMB Suva 4554/060259Z Nov 84 (U), USCINCPAC 080102Z Nov 84 (U), and USCINCPAC 140539Z Nov 84 (U).
  2. J311 HistSum Aug 84 ~~(C)~~; AMEMB Suva 2886/292034Z Jul 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 010414Z and 080329Z Aug 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
  4. J311 HistSum Sep 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR; AMEMB Suva 3567/102216Z Sep 84 (U) and CTG 72.2 130308Z Sep 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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Navigation and Overflight Rights at Sea


(U) The mobility and flexibility of USPACOM naval and air forces were dependent upon the preservation of our right to transit international straits and archipelagic waters and operate freely on the high seas. In March 1983 President Reagan stated that the United States would exercise and assert its

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1. AMEMB Suva 1435/110438Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  2. J313 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 10 Oct 84, Subj: U.S. Navy Ship Visits to Tonga (U), DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Suva 2731/170409Z Jul 84 (U).
  4. AMEMB Suva 4554/060259Z Nov 84 (U) and USCINCPAC 080234Z Nov 84 (U):

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
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navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that was consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Further, the United States would not acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other related high sea uses.



1. J733 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPACFLT 050334Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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


1. Ibid.
2. J313 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 23 Jul 84, Subj: Operational Importance of U.S./ Allied Access to Indonesian Straits (U), DECL OADR.




(1)(a)

1. Ibid.
2. J311 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 18 Oct 84, Subj: BUSY BOOMERANG and GLAD CUSTOMER Update (U), DECL OADR.
3. Ibid.




1. J311 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 30 Jul 84, Subj: B-52 Training in the Philippines (U), DECL OADR.
2. J311 HistSum Feb 84 ~~(S)~~; USCINCPAC 182305Z Feb 84 ~~(S)~~ and 13AF 130730Z Feb 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
3. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 346.

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
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1. J311 HistSum Apr 84 ~~(C)~~; USCINCPAC 100506Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. J311 HistSum May 84 ~~(C)~~; COMUSJAPAN 230505Z May 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 10528/250924Z May 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. AMCONSUL Naha 0530/250741Z and 0540/292235Z Oct 84 (U).
4. CINCSAC 120114Z Nov 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
5. AMCONSUL Naha 0606/150755Z Nov 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.


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1. J314 Point Paper (~~S/NF~~), 21 Nov 84, Subj: Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) (U), DECL OADR.


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


1. Ibid.
2. J314 HistSums Jan-Mar 84 (8), DECL OADR.

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1. Ibid.
2. J314 HistSum Jan 84 ~~(S)~~ DECL OADR.
3. J314 HistSum Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
4. J314 HistSum Nov 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.




1. Ibid.
2. J314 HistSum Jan 84 ~~(S)~~; 5AF 230835Z Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.
3. J314 HistSum Mar 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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
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1. J314 HistSum May 84 ~~(S)~~; Det 2 9SRW 220035Z May 84 ~~(S)~~ and ADMIN USCINCPAC 240145Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.
  2. J2321 HistSum Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. J314 HistSum Sep 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  4. J314 HistSum Oct 84 ~~(S)~~; USCINCPAC 240405Z Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, both DECL OADR.

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1. Ibid; J2324 HistSum Oct 84 (~~s~~), DECL OADR.
2. J314 HistSums Nov-Dec 84 (~~s~~), DECL OADR.
3. J314 HistSum Dec 84 (~~s~~), DECL OADR.

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1. J314 HistSum Mar 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
  2. J314 HistSum Jun 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
  3. J314 HistSum Jul 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
  4. J314 Point Paper (~~S/NF~~), 27 Mar 84, Subj: GIANT SCALE II Mission Overland Thailand and Kampuchea (~~S~~); USCINCPAC 182300Z Feb 84 (~~S/NF/WNINTEL~~), both DECL OADR.


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1. Ibid.; CINCPAC 030243Z Apr 82 (S/NF), REYW 2 Apr 88.
2. Ibid.; AMEMB Bangkok 12760/9 Mar 84 (S), DECL OADR.
3. J314 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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
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1. J314 HistSum Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. JCS 242302Z Jul 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
4. Ibid.
5. USCINCPAC 220831Z Sep 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
6. J314 HistSum Oct 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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1. J314 HistSum Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. USCINCPAC 242320Z Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.

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
ADLMP  
(P. 920)

P. 428

ABCMP  
(P. 820)

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(B)(1)(A)



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
ABCMP (p. 420)  
(B)(1)(a)

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1. Ibid.


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
1. J311 Point Paper (U), 21 Sep 84, Subj: Okinawa ACMI.
2. J311 HistSum Jan 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR; HQ PACAF 060208Z Jan 84 (U).
3. USCINCPAC 062330Z and 131841Z Jan 84 ~~(C)~~, COMUSJAPAN 100055Z and 200525Z Jan 84 ~~(C)~~, HQ PACAF 112325Z Jan 84 ~~(C)~~, all DECL OADR; HQ PACAF 021910Z Feb 84 (U).

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1. COMUSJAPAN 210600Z Sep 84 (U).
  2. J311 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 17 Dec 84, Subj: Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) in Kanto Plain for USS MIDWAY (CV-41) Carrier Air Wing (CVW-5) (U), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.; USCINCPAC 220401Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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
SECTION III--EXERCISES




1. J3521 HistSum Apr 84 (C); J3521 Point Paper (C), 17 Apr 84, Subj: TEAM SPIRIT 84 (TS 84) (U), both DECL OADR. For evaluations of major exercises in the USPACOM area, see also "Inspector General Activities" in Other Supporting Activities chapter.

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


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1. Ibid.


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1. COMSEVENTHFLT 282120Z Mar 84 '8), DECL OADR.


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1. Ibid.
  2. USCINCPAC 031932Z Apr 84 (~~S/REL ROK~~)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.


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1. CINCUNC/CFC 070230Z Apr 84 (~~S/REL ROK~~), DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCUNC/CFC 102345Z May 84 (~~S/REL ROK~~), DECL OADR.

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
1. Ibid.

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of confidence in data and reports available from the JDS. JDS training and familiarization needed more emphasis in the future.<sup>1</sup>

(U) USCINCPAC followed up on 22 June with his initial report to the JCS. He said that MAC moved over 18,400 personnel and 4,200 short tons of cargo to Korea during the strategic deployment phase. During deployment, 309 missions were flown; during redeployment, 289. A mix of MAC military (C-130, C-141B, C-5), SAC KC-10, and Civil Reserve Air Fleet B-747 aircraft were used. The use of 16 B-747 troop, 2 B-747 cargo, and 3 KC-10 cargo missions demonstrated the integration of CRAF and SAC airlift aircraft with MAC into the exercise flow. The Military Sealift Command moved approximately 470,000 sq ft of cargo to and from Korea, using 6 MSC-controlled Ro/Ro and breakbulk vessels. This included the NTPF vessel MERCURY and, for the first time, the MV AMERICAN EAGLE.<sup>2</sup>




(U) Tactical employment airlift was the best to date, with 16 MAC and Air National Guard C-130s and 3 MAC C-141s flying 179 missions (51 airdrop, 122 airland, and 6 fuel bladder). The ROK Army, for the first time, made extensive use of aerial resupply.

(U) In general, said USCINCPAC, TEAM SPIRIT 84 was a resounding success. GFC and USCINCPAC derived a wealth of positive information on the quality and character of the exercise, as well as its shortfalls. This information was being incorporated into the planning for TS 85 to further enhance training value for participants.<sup>3</sup>

- 
1. IG/Ltr/S387 (S/REL ROK), 29 May 84, Subj: Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 84 Evaluation Report (U), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 220536Z Jun 84 (S/NOFORN), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.


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
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
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FOIA  
(b)(7),  
Sect  
1.5(d)

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(S/REL ROK)

The Air Component Command, Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Ground Component Command, and Headquarters, CFC thoroughly exercised the process by which 3d echelon forces were identified, targeted, and attacked. This flow of enemy forces into the main battle area had to be controlled, a task requiring full integration of the targeting process. For the next week, this was very well done during the exercise.



FOIA  
(b)(7)  
Sec 1.5

(S/REL ROK) Out-of-country participation by U.S. forces, by design, did not include the joint deployment community. As such, the CPX was an employment exercise for the most part. Since significant U.S. force augmentation was required, future UFL exercises should be employment and deployment oriented. Therefore, CINCUNC would seek full participation by the joint deployment community in UFL 85.

FOIA  
(b)(7)  
Sec 1.5

(S/REL ROK) In summary, CINCUNC said UFL 84 provided an excellent opportunity to exercise, evaluate, and refine their plans, techniques, and procedures

1. SSO Korea 290230Z Aug 84 (S)(BOM) DECL OADR.
2. CINCUNC CFC 092330Z Sep 84 (S/REL ROK), DECL OADR.

for the defense of the ROK. In addition to President Chun, the Minister of National Defense, the ROK CJCS, and ROK Service chiefs received briefings at Command Post TANGO during the exercise.

[REDACTED]

Where possible in our exercise program, USCINCPAC considered it extremely important that we continue to press for the full evaluation of our combined chemical operations and logistics procedures. In this regard, he believed that the early termination of chemical play during UFL 84 might have precluded a complete evaluation. It appeared to him that any unwillingness to see chemical retaliation through to the ultimate conclusion of ceasing chemical hostilities might give our ROK allies a false impression of our resolve. He was also concerned that this action might set a precedent for future exercises, thereby exacerbating an already difficult situation.

Sect 1.5(g)

[REDACTED]

Sect 1.5(g)

FOAL EAGLE 84

(S/REL ROK) Exercise FOAL EAGLE 84 was conducted in Korea from 29 October through 30 November 1984, with the FTX portion being 9-21 November.

[REDACTED]

Sect 1.5(a)

Several innovations were incorporated into this year's exercise. For one, operations were executed by areas, vice targets, which improved control and evaluation.

[REDACTED]

Sect 1.5(g)

(S/REL ROK) CINCUNC said FOAL EAGLE 84 portrayed a more realistic exercise than in previous years. Participants were able to substantially attain all goals.

[REDACTED]

Sect 1.5(g)

1. Ibid.
2. USCINCPAC 271900Z Sep 84 (S/REL ROK) (BOM), DECL OADR.
3. CINC UNC CFC 290235Z Dec 84 (S/REL ROK), DECL OADR.

Japan

(U) Over the past several years, exercises with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces included only combined, uni-Service exercises with the USN-JMSDF and USAF-JASDF. These exercises included ASWEX, MINEX, and RIMPAC (USN) and COPE NORTH (USAF). The U.S. Army conducted GOPHER BROKE in Japan, Korea, and Hawaii, but the JGSDF neither participated nor observed. The perception was that the Navy and Air Force were far ahead of the Army in quantity and quality of combined exercises with the JSDF.<sup>2</sup>

(C) U.S. government policy had placed emphasis on increased defense spending on the part of Japan. USCINCPAC had established a goal of improved military relations and increased joint/combined exercises with the JSDF. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (27 November 1978) and the Memorandum for the Conduct of Joint Studies and Associated Activities by the JSDF-USFJ (15 February 1979) set the stage for increased Japan-U.S. exercises. Headquarters USFJ conducted a CPX study with the JSDF in 1980. It resulted in a mid-term concept for JSDF-USF combined training and exercises and provided for joint/combined exercises to begin in 1982. This exercise program reflected a significant shift in the ability and willingness of the JSDF to enter a new era of planning and training to insure the defense of Japan.

(C) FOREST BLADE 81 was essentially a canned, walk-through CPX, totally preplanned, designed to expose the Joint Staff Office to U.S. CPX procedures. FOREST BLADE 82 was a full-scale CPX. FOREST BLADE 83 was an enhanced CPX and included participation by Headquarters USCINCPAC and component player cells. FOREST BLADE 84 was conducted in October 1983 in Japan. FOREST BLADE 85 was scheduled for March 1985. This series was expected to become a full-scale joint/combined FTX in the FY 87 time frame.

(C) Meanwhile, during the above period, the U.S. Army increased JGSDF participation in the IX Corps CPX GOPHER BROKE exercise series from observers in 1978-1979 to full participation in 1980-1981. YAMA SAKURA I was a full-scale JGSDF CPX in conjunction with GOPHER BROKE at Camp Fuji in February 1982. YAMA SAKURA II was conducted in Hawaii in June 1982, YAMA SAKURA III in Japan in December 1982, YAMA SAKURA IV at Ft Ord, CA, in May 1983, and YAMA SAKURA V in Hokkaido in November 1983. This one included over 800 U.S. and 2,500 JSDF participants. YAMA SAKURA VI was held in May 1984 at Ft Lewis, WA, and YAMA SAKURA VII would be in Hokkaido in January 1985 (see below).

- 
1. Ibid.
  2. J3512 Point Paper (C), 17 Dec 84, Subj: Combined Exercises with Japan (U), DECL OADR.

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(U) In addition, the U.S. Army proposed and, with full Japanese government approval, implemented a plan to commence combined training. A modest junior officer exchange program was ongoing. In September 1980 a U.S. Army infantry squad from the 25th ID visited and trained with the JGSDF. In August-September 1981 two 5-man tank crews trained with the Northern Army, and in October-November 1981 a 105mm howitzer section trained with the Middle Army.

(C) Other combined exercises were also conducted. COMEX 82 was a USA-JGSDF communications exercise at Camp Higashi, Chitose, Japan. A complete communications slice of a U.S. Army battalion (approximately 200 personnel) participated, along with elements of the JGSDF 73d Tank Regiment of the Northern Army. COMPANY FTX-83 was a USA-JGSDF combined reinforced company/battalion training exercise at Camp Fuji. A company from the U.S. Army 9th ID from Ft Lewis, WA, participated with elements of the JGSDF 31st RCT. These two exercises were followed by the combined BATTALION FTX 84 (October 1983) in Hokkaido. Elements of the 9th ID participated with units from the Northern Army. GOLDEN TSUBA, 4 September-9 October 1984, was a combined USA/JGSDF brigade FTX in northern Honshu.

(U) The Navy and Air Force increased JMSDF and JASDF participation in their uni-Service combined exercises. In addition, the JMSDF invited the Navy to participate in its annual exercise (ANNUALEX), the largest naval exercise conducted by the Japanese (see below).<sup>1</sup>

MINEX 84-1J

(C) MINEX 84-1J, 14-28 February 1984, was a combined USN-JMSDF mining and explosive ordnance disposal exercise in the Sea of Suonada, off Kyushu, southern Japan. It was coordinated simultaneously with ASWEX 84-1J (see following) in the vicinity of Yokosuka. Objectives were to build experience in minelaying and minesweeping operations and EOD, as well as to enhance the spirit of cooperation and readiness of forces. Participating were U.S. Navy P-3 aircraft and JMSDF coastal minesweepers (25), minesweeper hunter vessel HAYASE, coastal minelayer SOYA, P-2J aircraft, and KV-107 helicopters.<sup>2</sup>

(C) The two USN P-3Bs were to drop a number of training mines in the exercise area in order to provide sweeping and disposal training. In addition, JMSDF participants were to drop approximately 50 moored and ground training mines in the exercise area. The two forces previously conducted this exercise 30 times between 1955 and 1971. In the past they were not called "combined" exercises. Between 1975 and 1980 the JMSDF conducted similar

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1. Ibid.

2. J35 HistSum Feb 84 (C); J35/Memo/C50-84 (C), 6 Feb 84, Subj: Briefing Input for Exercise MINEX 84-1J (U) and COMNAVFORJAPAN 170625Z Jan 84 (C), all DECL OADR.

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exercises and called them "JMSDF routine MINEXs" with assistance from the U.S. Navy. They were now being called "combined" to reflect the true nature of the exercise and the increasing importance of cooperation between U.S. and Japanese defense forces.<sup>1</sup>

ASWEX 84-1J

(S) ASWEX 84-1J, 17-26 February 1984, was a COMSEVENTHFLT-sponsored Significant Part II combined USN-JMSDF naval operations and antisubmarine warfare exercise conducted off Yokosuka, Japan. The purpose was to improve interoperability in ASW, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisurface warfare (ASUW), electronic warfare (EW), and communications. Participating for the U.S. Navy were COMDESRON 13, USS ALBERT DAVID (FF-1050), USS OUELLET (FF-1077), USS DARTER (SS-576), and USNS PASSUMPSIC (T-AO-107). JMSDF participants included Commander Escort Flotilla FOUR, 6 destroyers, 1 submarine, and 1 oiler.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The Japanese press reported the JMSDF had announced on 14 August that they would stage a combined ASW special training exercise with the United States in Pacific waters east of Boso Hanto and Izu Shichito (south of Tokyo). P-3Cs from both sides would participate with the fleets. This was another of the routine combined exercises staged since 1957, but the first to be carried out since the JDA Vice Director General circulated a memo in December 1983 authorizing the supply of fuel from Japanese oilers to U.S. warships.<sup>3</sup>

COPE NORTH 84-3

(S) COPE NORTH 84-3, 29 March-7 April 1984, was a JCS-directed, combined USAF/JASDF air operations exercise conducted in Japan. This was the second of two JCS-directed COPE NORTH exercises to be held in FY 84. The purpose was to exercise selected U.S. and Japanese units in a combined exercise format for the enhancement of mutual defense objectives.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The basic scenario for 2-3 April was dissimilar air combat tactics training. On 4-5 April there would be composite force operations involving JASDF F-1 strike aircraft in an area defense role. DACT engagements would include 2 versus 2, 2 versus 4, and 4 versus 4 aircraft. Control would be provided by the E-3A operating from Kadena AB and the 623d Tactical Control Squadron deployed to the Tobetsu GCI site near Sapporo, Hokkaido. This would

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1. Ibid.
  2. J35 HistSum Feb 84 (S); J35/Memo/C49-84 (S), 6 Feb 84, Subj: Briefing Input for Exercise ASWEX 84-1J (U), both DECL OADR; CINCPACFLT 042044Z Feb 84 (S), DECL 2 Feb 89.
  3. COMUSJAPAN 150501Z Feb 84 (U).
  4. J35 HistSum Apr 84 (S); J35/Memo/C94-84 (S), 12 Mar 84, Subj: Briefing Input for Exercise COPE NORTH (CN) 84-3 (U), both DECL OADR; HQ 5AF 090741Z Mar 84 (U).

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be the fifth time a CONUS-based USAF unit would participate in the COPE NORTH exercise series.

(U) The deployment phase was 29-30 March, employment 2-5 April, and redeployment 6-7 April. USAF participants would be at Chitose AB, Hokkaido. AWACS aircraft would stage from Kadena AB, Okinawa, with daily in-flight refueling. USAF aircraft involved were six F-15 from the 49th TFW (TAC) and one E-3A from the 961st AWACS. JASDF aircraft included 18 F-4EJ and 5 F-1. Scheduled sorties were 48 F-15, 4 E-3A, 48 F-4EJ, and 42 F-1.<sub>1</sub>

#### YAMA SAKURA VI

~~(C)~~ YAMA SAKURA VI, 26-31 May 1984, was a Significant Part II U.S. Army IX Corps/JGSDF Ground Staff Office-cosponsored joint/combined CPX with a defense of Japan scenario. The exercise was conducted at Ft Lewis, WA, for the first time. The major Japanese players were from Headquarters Northern Army in Hokkaido. This was a precursor to a larger YAMA SAKURA VII to be conducted in Hokkaido in January 1985. Approximately 500 persons (400 U.S., 90 Japan) participated. This was the first year that the Special Operations Command, Pacific, took part in this exercise series. It was also the second exercise involving echelons above corps (EAC). USCINCPAC was providing augmentees to flesh out the EAC player cells in order to develop concepts for use in YAMA SAKURA VII.<sub>2</sub>

(U) Combined exercise objectives were to improve operations and planning capabilities in the functional areas of host nation support, intelligence exchange procedures, fire support coordination, deep attack techniques, integrated air defense and air space management, logistical support, personnel management and administrative support, rear area operations, and civil-military operations; to exercise command and control of combined forces in simulated combat operations on Hokkaido; to improve IX Corps and JGSDF participants' awareness of each others' doctrine and tactics, organization, and standard operating procedures; to develop an EAC concept to improve joint/combined operations in Japan; and to exercise and evaluate in a simulated wartime environment, force sustainment through reception, staging, and deployment of personnel, critical supplies and equipment, and familiarization of JGSDF logistics participants with U.S. Army combat service support procedures and requirements.

~~(S)~~ The IX Corps continued to inject more realism into YAMA SAKURA CPXs and towards that end, would emphasize reception, staging, and deployment of personnel, supplies, and equipment. The EAC concept could be developed and

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1. Ibid.
2. J35 HistSum May 84 ~~(C)~~; J35/Memo/S161-84 ~~(C)~~, 8 May 84, Subj: Briefing Input for Exercise YAMA SAKURA VI CPX (U) and CDRUSARJ/IX Corps 270400Z Mar 84 ~~(S)~~, all DECL OADR.

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refined during this exercise in preparation for YAMA SAKURA VII, and progression to the JCS-coordinated FOREST BLADE exercise program.

*1.5.10*  
(S) In the YAMA SAKURA VI scenario, the enemy invaded Hokkaido, landing on the Wakkanai Peninsula initially with a three-division force and moving southward. The landing was opposed by the Northern Army's 2d ID, which was later reinforced by three lead divisional RCTs of reinforcing divisions from outside Hokkaido and two independent brigades. As the exercise began, the Japanese forces were successfully delaying against the enemy in the vicinity of Otoineppu Pass north of Asahikawa. IX Corps occupied defensive positions to the immediate south and southwest of Asahikawa with one division. The remaining IX Corps forces, U.S. Navy, USMC, and three reinforcing Japanese divisions (-) were deploying and staging into Hokkaido, and JASDF/USAF forces were achieving air superiority over the battlefield. [REDACTED]

(S) Major U.S. participants were Headquarters USARJ/IX Corps, 47th ID (MN Army National Guard), 5AF, SEVENTHFLT, III MAF, USFJ, NAVFORJAPAN, 311th Corps Support Command, 35th Engineer Brigade, 11th ADA, USCINCPAC, PACAF, PACFLT, SOCPAC, DIA, JDA, and MSC. Japanese participants were from the Ground Staff Office, Northern Army headquarters and two infantry divisions, Air Staff Office, and Maritime Staff Office. The employment of nuclear weapons would not be simulated during this exercise.<sup>1</sup>

#### BEACH GUARD 84-2

(S) BEACH GUARD 84-2, 15-16 July 1984, was a Significant Part I Marine Amphibious Unit noncombatant emergency evacuation training exercise on Iwo Jima. The exercise was categorized as a Part I exercise due to Japanese sensitivity to the historical significance of the island and consequent media interest. This was the third in the Exercise BEACH GUARD series. The last had been held in October 1983.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The aim was to exercise an amphibious ready group and a MAU in planning, coordinating, and conducting emergency evacuation of non-combatants. Participating were COMPHIBRON THREE, USS NEW ORLEANS (LPH-11), CO 31st MAU, BLT 3/3, other units, and helicopters. JMSDF liaison and escort officers were also involved. Exercise planning included the simulated use of riot control agents by U.S. forces, together with simulated defensive measures against

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1. Ibid.
  2. J3512 HistSum Jul 84 (S); J35/Memo/C238-84 (S), 5 Jul 84, Subj: Briefing Input for Exercise BEACH GUARD (BG) 84-2 (U) and USCINCPAC 040501Z Jul 84 (S), all DECL OADR.

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similar agents used by opposition forces as incapacitating and harassment tactics.<sup>1</sup>

(C) CINCPACFLT, in his final exercise report, said that NEW ORLEANS arrived off Iwo Jima at 150500K (local time). L-hour for heliborne landing was 1400 hours, and some 440 troops were ashore at 1600. NEMVAC of 30 personnel took place at 1500. Small unit tactics training for troops ashore started at 1600. Tactical reembarkation began the next morning at 0600, and the exercise was completed at 1100 hours. Close coordination of helicopter movements enabled the first assault wave to arrive at the landing zone within 15 seconds of L-hour. An orderly processing of evacuees was conducted and airborne helicopters were available to transport evacuees upon completion of processing. Unscheduled helicopter lifts were conducted as a result of unanticipated high demand for drinking water ashore. The normally warm July temperatures and calm winds in combination with the volcanic heat of the island mandated close observation of the physical condition of all personnel ashore. The control of 88 sorties of close air support, combat air patrol, ASW, and forward air control aircraft was coordinated with naval gunfire in a simulated scenario.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Due to engineering casualties and escort ship requirements, all other ships except NEW ORLEANS were deleted as exercise participants. A surface assault was not accomplished due to the reduction in participating forces. The heliborne assault objective, however, was successfully done. An actual medevac of a Marine with acute appendicitis from Iwo Jima to Okinawa was performed smoothly and in a most timely fashion.<sup>3</sup>

#### ANNUALEX 59G

(C) ANNUALEX 59G, 12-20 September 1984, was a JMSDF-sponsored, combined JMSDF/USN multi-threat exercise in coastal waters of the Sea of Japan, northern and southern waters of Honshu, and the surrounding waters of the Izu and Ogasawara Shoto (Islands). The U.S. Navy had participated in ANNUALEX for the last four years, and in 1984 took part during 16-20 September. The Navy reciprocated by inviting the JMSDF to participate in Exercise RIMPAC biennially.<sup>4</sup>

(S) The purpose of the exercise was to develop results of the JMSDF/USN CPX of June 1984 by conducting actual at-sea operations. The concept of operations was that ANNUALEX 59G was scenario-driven, established a crisis condition in SLOCs around Japan, and required a coordinated effort by JMSDF and USN forces to regain control of the SLOCs. USS MIDWAY dedicated A-6, A-7,

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1. Ibid.; CINCPACFLT 310234Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. CINCPACFLT 310234Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.
  4. ADMIN USCINCPAC 100605Z Oct 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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and EA-6B aircraft as Orange air during the first three days of the exercise and EA-6B thereafter. The submarine threat was both diesel and nuclear. The MIDWAY Battle Group continued north throughout the 5-day exercise, with an overall speed of advance of 12.5 kts, arriving at a point east of Misawa AB at exercise finish.<sup>1</sup>

(S) U.S. Navy Green forces were CTF 70, USS MIDWAY (CV-41), USS COCHRANE (DDG-211), USS REEVES (CG-24), USS KNOX (FF-1052), USS LOCKWOOD (FF-1064), USS FRANCIS HAMMOND (FF-1067), USS OLDENDORF (DD-972), and USNS PONCHATOULA (T-AO-148). JMSDF Blue forces included 12 destroyers and 1 oiler, plus P-3Cs and P-2Js. U.S. Navy Orange forces were USS INDIANAPOLIS (SSN-697), USS DRUM (SS-677), and USS DARTER (SS-576). JMSDF Orange forces included 6 submarines, 3 destroyer escorts, 6 support ships, and F-4, F-15, and P-2J aircraft.

(S) CINCPACFLT reported that successful interoperability was demonstrated and contributed directly to smooth execution of events in the exercise plan and the engagement of real-world threats. For example, three JMSDF DDs operated under the tactical control of CTG 70.1 in the CVBG inner screen, and ASW helicopters operated safely during carrier flight operations. A JMSDF/USN tactical towed array sonar (TACTAS) unit operated in a search area under the tactical control of a USN ASW commander. Three JMSDF ships refueled from USNS PONCHATOULA. JMSDF/USN surface and air assets worked together in the prosecution of several submarine contacts. JDS SHIRANE (DDG-143) initially detected, designated, and tracked a Soviet TU-95/BEAR throughout an intercept engagement. A continuous Link-11 picture was maintained by three JMSDF surface ships, JMSDF P-3C aircraft, and USN forces. Inter-navy professional and cultural exchange resulted from the embarkation of 7 officers and 8 enlisted among five JMSDF/USN ships. In addition, USS MIDWAY hosted a JMSDF flag officer and mini-staff as observers on the flagship. This was also the first full integration of a CVBG in an ANNUALEX.

(S) Orange air raids and multiple Soviet aircraft overflights contributed to a sustained AAW threat during much of the exercise. [REDACTED]

*Sect 1.5(g)* [REDACTED] The JDS SHIRANE effort noted above was especially impressive.

(S) The information gained by the ASW commander throughout the exercise revealed a busy sequence of contacts and heavy allocation of assets. A review of Orange SS/SSN inputs indicated active participation on both sides. The freeplay nature of this exercise culminated in outstanding ASW training for all concerned. The constant pressure of a subsurface threat provided coordinated battle group ASW training in a multiple-threat environment over a prolonged period.

1. CINCPACFLT 270036Z Oct 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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(C) CINCPACFLT said that from an overall view, the exercise went exceptionally well. The JMSDF, having now worked with a carrier battle group, would be anxious for more interoperability with aircraft carriers. More effort would have to be put into the area of C3, communications flexibility, and the composite warfare commander concept.<sup>1</sup>

(S) COMSEVENTHFLT advised CINCPACFLT that the high quality of this year's pre-exercise planning effort was key to overall success of ANNUALEX 59G. Of particular note, in execution, was the improved employment of JMSDF diesel submarines. The lack of aggressive submarine employment noted during last year's ANNUALEX was gone. Also, the significant increase in aggressor aircraft and MIDWAY's Battle Group participation combined to provide a far more realistic scenario and threat for participants.

[REDACTED] The overall observer exchange and embarkation of a JMSDF flag officer and his small staff in MIDWAY (as observers) yielded particularly positive results.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Admiral Crowe congratulated CINCPACFLT and COMSEVENTHFLT on the successful U.S. Navy participation in ANNUALEX 59G. It was apparent that our efforts were paying dividends in terms of encouraging the JSDF to improve their defense posture. In addition, it was obvious that good planning was key to that success. The emphasis on new initiatives such as the Navy's support of FOREST BLADE, participation in YAMA SAKURA, and the JANUS series provided the catalyst leading to improved operations on employment exercises such as ANNUALEX and RIMPAC (see below).<sup>3</sup>

#### ASEAN Area

#### BALIKATAN 84

(C) BALIKATAN 84, 21-31 May 1984, was a JCS-coordinated, USCINCPAC-sponsored, joint/combined U.S.-RP land/sea/air exercise in the Republic of the Philippines. It was the third in a series of fully integrated exercises to employ the provisions of the U.S.-RP Mutual Defense Board OPLAN 1-83. This was the first year it expanded to a national-level CPX, to include air and naval forces.<sup>4</sup>

(C) U.S.-RP MDB OPLAN-mandated coordinating/control groups were again located in Manila (as they would be during an actual contingency), as follows:

1. Ibid.
2. COMSEVENTHFLT 290034Z Sep 84 (S), DECL OADR.
3. USCINCPAC 120054Z Oct 84 (S), DECL OADR.
4. J35 HistSum May 84 (C); J35/Memo/C175-84 (C), 16 May 84, Subj: Briefing Input for Exercise BALIKATAN 84 (U) and J3522 Point Paper (C), 20 Sep 84, Subj: Exercise BALIKATAN (U), all DECL OADR.

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Joint Combined Coordinating Group at Mutual Defense Board facilities, Ft Bonifacio; Ground Defense Control Center at Philippine Army Security Command Headquarters, Ft Bonifacio; Combined Air Operations Center at Philippine Air Force 1st Air Division Headquarters, Villamor Air Base; and Naval Defense Control Center at Philippine Army Museum building, Ft Bonifacio. Exercise command and control was executed through a parallel command structure with each national force having singular control over its respective forces. The exercise was conducted in four phases:

- Phase I (21-25 May) - CPX involving elements of all U.S. and Philippine Services in the conduct of simulated joint/combined operations.

- Phase II (22-30 May) - Air and maritime operations including naval surface (22-26 May), air defense (26-27 May), TACAIR maritime (28-30 May), and close air support (27-31 May); at Clark AB, NAS Cubi Point, Subic Bay operating areas, and Ft Magsaysay.

- Phase III (23-31 May) - Amphibious operations including transit exercises, assault, opposed operations ashore, Army FTX, and cross-training activities. Amphibious operations were at Bolotan, Zambales (40 NM northwest of Subic Bay); FTX at Ft Magsaysay.

- Phase IV (21-31 May) - Civil-military operations including medical and dental treatment, deployment of Clark AB USAF Tactical Hospital, and selected small-scale community engineering projects; at Bolotan.

(C) U.S. participants numbered approximately 5,100 (1,700 Navy, 2,100 Marine Corps, 800 Army, 500 Air Force); Philippine participants approximately 1,000 (300 Navy, 100 Marine, 200 Army/Constabulary, 400 Air Force). Principal U.S. forces were USS ST LOUIS (LKA-116), USS THOMASTON (LSD-28), USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35), USS HENRY B. WILSON (DDG-7), USNS NAVASOTA (T-AO-106), USNS CATAWBA (T-ATF-168), VC 5 (A-4/SH-3), CVW 2 DET (F-4/A-6/A-7/F-14); Headquarters 33d MAU, BLT 1/1, MSSG 35, 3d Recon Bn (aggressors), VMFA 212 (F-4), VMA(AW) 242 (A-6); HMM 268 (CH-46); 25th ID bn task force, 1st SFG(A) (2 "A" and 1 "B" teams); 3d TFW (F-4), 18th TFW (F-15), 961st AWACS (E-3A), and MAC (C-5/C-141/C-130).

(C) Philippine military participation was significantly reduced from previous years, owing to budgetary constraints and domestic problems. The Philippine Air Force was the only major participant. Philippine Army, Navy, and Marine units participated on only a limited basis. The Philippines granted an important concession to the United States in concurring with the USCINCPAC request to exercise U.S. Army and Navy forces without comparable levels of host military participation.

(C) The value of the exercise to USPACOM force readiness was significant. It provided the only opportunity (except COBRA GOLD) to exercise U.S. ground

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combat and amphibious forces in a truly tropical environment. It had great potential for USAF and naval air interoperability training in maritime operations and SLOC defense. It also demonstrated to regional adversaries the resolve and ability of the United States to assist in the defense of the Philippines. Finally, it was building a valuable fund of knowledge and experience in the mechanics of contingency operations under the provisions of MDB OPLAN 1-83.<sup>1</sup>

(C) A Combined Special Operations Task Force was established for the first time in the series at Ft Bonifacio; a Combined Special Forces Operating Base was located at Ft Magsaysay; and an Air Force Special Operations Base was at Clark AB in the 1st Special Operations Squadron headquarters. Actual training conducted by RP Special Forces included land navigation, booby traps, and individual combat techniques. U.S. Special Forces taught communications, medical procedures, small unit tactics, interrogation and fingerprinting techniques, demolitions, foreign weapons, and night firing. The training culminated in an FTX which included night infiltration by parachute from an MC-130, patrolling, raids, and ambushes and extraction by UH-1H helicopter. U.S. Special Forces medics conducted a very successful MEDCAP in the Ft Magsaysay area, treating over 600 people.<sup>2</sup>

#### COPE THUNDER

(S) COPE THUNDER 84-4, 21 February-2 March 1984, was a joint/combined air operations exercise in the Philippines. The exercise was marked by an extensive ground battlefield scenario and air support activities. Over 98 percent of the scheduled 1,240 sorties were actually flown by USAF, USMC, PAF, and Royal Singapore Air Force aircraft. Ground forward air control training was accomplished throughout the exercise, and Marine and Army REDEYE teams added realism to the high-threat environment. All participants acknowledged the success and value of this concentrated training. The PAF participated with four F-5A and the RSAF with eight A-4 aircraft; the remainder were mostly USAF.<sup>3</sup>

(S) COPE THUNDER 84-5, 9-20 April 1984, was a routine tactical air defense/strike training exercise. Twenty-two Republic of Korea Air Force maintenance and munitions personnel assigned to the USAF 6479th Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron at Taegu AB, Korea, participated for the first time. The squadron was a combined USAF/ROKAF organization, which had won a number of awards during theater maintenance and weapons loading competitions. Total scheduled sorties were 1,094 and total aircraft were 97 USAF/USN/USMC.

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1. Ibid.
  2. J363 HistSum May 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. J35 HistSum Feb 85 (S); J35/Memo/S68-84 (S), 15 Feb 84, Subj: Briefing Input for Exercise COPE THUNDER 84-4 (U), both DECL OADR.

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Some 6-7 COPE THUNDER exercises were held annually in the Crow Valley Range area.<sup>1</sup>

LEYTE LANDEX (PAGBABALIK)

(U) In March 1984 the Philippine government, through the MDB Plans Committee, proposed a combined RP-U.S. amphibious exercise in Leyte on 20 October 1984, the 40th anniversary of the Leyte landing of World War II. The location would be the site of the 1944 landing ("Red Beach"), just south of the town of Tacloban in northeastern Leyte. The exercise name would be PAGBABALIK ("The Return"). The Philippine Navy, Marines, Air Force, Army, and Constabulary would participate with modest force levels. Committed U.S. forces would include two amphibious ships with embarked elements of a USMC BLT and four NAS Cubi Point A-4 aircraft. The Philippine military would conduct coincident medical and dental activities. The combined amphibious assault exercise would be part of the commemoration ceremonies, which would include wreath-laying, a parade, and remarks by dignitaries.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Two U.S. Navy ships, USS ALAMO (LSD-33) and USS ST LOUIS (LKA-116); elements of the 3d Mar Div landing force, SEVENTHFLT; and support personnel from the U.S. Naval Facility, Subic Bay, were involved in the operation. Approximately 2,060 personnel from the two countries participated.<sup>3</sup>

(U) USCINCPACREP Philippines attended the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the Leyte landing, which was held on Sunday, 21 October. It had been scheduled for the 20th but was delayed 24 hours due to weather-related travel delays of President and Mrs. Marcos, the guests of honor. USCINCPACREPPHIL reported that the combined exercise portion by RP/U.S. ships and Marines, supporting USN/USAF/PAF air events, and the reenactment of General Douglas MacArthur's return to the Philippines were all very well executed. A realistic General MacArthur was portrayed by COL Barry Howard, Vice Commander Thirteenth Air Force (Clark AB). The U.S. level of participation in all events was appropriate and provided a good, balanced mix of Philippine and U.S. efforts. Other associated events (Presidential honors, flag-raising and wreath-laying ceremonies, military-veterans-civilians parade, and stirring speeches by the U.S. and Japanese Ambassadors to the Philippines and President Marcos) all combined to provide an interesting and very "upbeat" program that highlighted the strong and continuing bonds of Philippine-U.S. friendship, mutual trust, and cooperation. VADM James R. Hogg, COMSEVENTHFLT, was the official U.S. military representative.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J35 HistSum Apr 84 (S); J35/Memo/S113-84 (S), 30 Mar 84, Subj: Briefing Input for Exercise COPE THUNDER 84-5 (U), both DECL OADR.
  2. J3522 Point Paper (U), 20 Sep 84, Subj: RP/US Combined Exercises in Leyte.
  3. CNO 201504Z Oct 84 (U)
  4. USCINCPACREPPHIL 222313Z Oct 84 (U).

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SEASOE With Thailand

(U) A Southeast Asia Special Operations Exercise (SEASOE) was conducted 17-25 January 1984 at Lopburi, Thailand. Activities accomplished by U.S./Thai SOF were day/night high altitude, high opening (HAHO) military free fall parachuting; low level C-130 flights; short field takeoff/landing operations; landing zone/drop zone operations during day and night; and airland assault to rescue prisoners of war. Royal Thai Army Special Warfare Command personnel were pleased with the overall achievements and indicated a desire to conduct a SEASOE as part of the pre-exercise activities for COBRA GOLD 84.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The USCINCPAC SOCPAC representative who took part in SEASOE reported that although the exercise was an outstanding success, a significant degradation occurred when they were forced to switch C-130s to support another exercise, UNDERSEAL. This resulted in a 48-hour delay and left several operational and support personnel stranded in a remote area until operations could continue. Maintenance problems to the C-130 also caused an inflight abort of the night assault mission--the most important exercise objective.<sup>2</sup>

RESCUEX 84

(C) RESCUEX 84, 8 April-1 May 1984, was a combined USN/RTN Significant Part II unconventional warfare exercise conducted at Sattahip and U-Tapao, Thailand. It was a one-time name for an exercise in the UNDERSEAL series. The name change was proposed by the RTN because of Thai funding constraints. It was last conducted as UNDERSEAL 84-1, 4-20 January 1984. Participating for the United States were USN SEAL Team 1, ALFA Platoon; Special Boat Squadron 1; and USAF C-130/MC-130E aircraft. Thai participants were 2 SEAL platoons, 2 Bell 212 helicopters, 1 C-215 seaplane, 1 LST, and 2 fast patrol craft.<sup>3</sup>

COBRA GOLD 84

(U) COBRA GOLD 84, 2 July-10 August 1984, was a JCS-directed, USCINCPAC-sponsored, joint/combined sea control, air, ground, special operations, and amphibious exercise conducted at various locations in Thailand. It was the third exercise in the COBRA GOLD series, consolidating a number of small-scale combined operations into a larger joint/combined exercise.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The USCINCPAC IG Observation Team reported that during this year's exercise, the RTA Special Forces became a full-fledged COBRA GOLD participant; thus, combined SF operations were fully integrated with the principal FTX

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1. CHJUSMAGTHAI 270935Z Jan 84 (U).

2. Ibid.

3. J35 HistSum Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.

4. IG Ltr (C/BEL THAI), Ser C318, 17 Sep 84, Subj: Exercise COBRA GOLD 84 Observation Report (U), DECL OADR.

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scenario and fully supported the conventional combined amphibious task force commander. Elements of USCINCPAC's forward deployed U.S. Army SF battalion in Okinawa participated in COBRA GOLD for the first time, with a total of 70 personnel (active and reserve) taking part. Highly successful pre-exercise cross training, 19-24 July, was followed by an also highly successful FTX, 25-28 July, in Kanchanaburi. In support of the main FTX, four combined "A" teams were infiltrated into the exercise area near Pattani to conduct special operations in support of the conventional forces.

~~(C/REL THAI)~~ USAF Special Operations in support of the Combined Special Operations Task Force were outstanding. Approximately 80 hours were flown in support of exercise and pre-exercise missions by the MC-130 from the 1st SOS and the C-130 MAC Special Operations Low Level aircraft from the 374th TAW. A USAF Combat Control Team also performed outstandingly in the drop zones. The U.S. Navy special warfare training program was described as realistic, stressful, and imaginative. Four combined SEAL platoons were formed and each performed extremely well during the entire exercise period.

(U) The combined RTMC/USMC amphibious landing was conducted over The Pha Beach in textbook fashion. Coordinated with a simultaneous company-size heliborne assault, forces moved rapidly across the beach road unimpeded by traffic or local civilians. USN/RTAF air operations were also highly successful. Interoperability between squadrons was greatly enhanced by the collocation of hangar and pilot briefing spaces, which provided daily face-to-face exchange of tactics, techniques, and procedures. DACT for the RTAF was provided by the U.S. Navy Composite Squadron 5.<sub>1</sub>

~~(C)~~ The U.S. Ambassador to Bangkok, observing the 6 August COBRA GOLD 84 activities in Songkhla with Admiral Crowe and Thai Supreme Commander Arthit, advised the Secretary of State that this series had quite rightly become the centerpiece of our combined training efforts with the Royal Thai Armed Forces. As such, it had assumed a key position in the overall U.S.-Thai bilateral security relationship. COBRA GOLD served the important foreign policy objective of developing a militarily self-reliant Thailand. After three COBRA GOLD exercises, both the U.S. and Thai sides had developed a sound feel for conducting this series within the limits imposed by Thai military capabilities and political realities. The Ambassador believed its nature, scope, and forces involved were appropriate to the military and political conditions in Thailand.<sub>2</sub>

SEASOE With Singapore and Malaysia

~~(C)~~ A SEASOE was conducted by USCINCPAC/J3, with WESTCOM/USFK/PACAF forces participating, in Singapore 8-9 July and in Malaysia 9-15 July 1984.

1. Ibid.

2. AMEMB Bangkok 42263/221203Z Aug 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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SEASOE was designed as a series of small-scale, low-visibility exercises to enhance the interoperability of U.S. and allied or friendly Southeast Asian Special Operations forces. It served to introduce and familiarize the regional SOF with operational techniques and procedures of USPACOM SOF. The exercises, which originated in 1980, had normally been conducted semiannually, and thus far host nations had included Thailand (see above), the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia.<sup>1</sup>

ANZUS

PITCH BLACK 84-1

(C) PITCH BLACK 84-1, 30 April-11 May 1984, was a JCS-coordinated, joint/combined Australian-sponsored, major ANZUS air defense exercise conducted in the vicinity of RAAF Base Darwin, Australia. It was the first time this exercise had been approved as a JCS-coordinated exercise and the first time that USAF tactical air participated. PITCH BLACK 83 (May 1983) was the first time the United States had participated, and it was limited to a B-52 and a tanker. The aim of the PITCH BLACK series was to test the Australian air defense system, to test and evaluate air defense doctrine, and to enhance interoperability among ANZUS air defense forces.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Deployment of USAF TACAIR commenced on 21 April from Clark AB to RAAF Base Darwin. Pre-exercise DACT was flown with RAAF MIRAGE craft, 23-26 April. Exercise work-up phase was conducted 29 April-3 May, with actual exercise play 5-10 May. The 961st AWACS deployed an E-3A on 30 April to support the exercise. The 3d Air Division deployed two B-52s and supporting tankers also on the 30th. U.S. participants were 8 F-4E, 2 B-52, 2 KC-135, 1 E-3A, C-141/KC-10, USS COPELAND (FFG-25), and two WESTCOM observers. Australian participants were 10 MIRAGE III, 7 F-111C, 2 P-3, 1 B-707, 1 C-130, HMAS BRISBANE (FFG), HMAS STUART (DE), 1 HS-748, and 16th Air Defense Regt. (-) (RAPIER SAM). New Zealand was to participate with 4-6 A-4K aircraft.

(C) The exercise provided significant beneficial training to U.S. and Australian participants. The integration of ground-based Australian air defense radars with ship-borne and airborne radars provided unique interoperability training. The addition of an AWACS plane doubled the attacking force neutralization rate over past exercises in the series. A RAAF-developed brevity code for use in countering communications jamming was successfully used by USAF, RAAF, and RNZAF participants. The addition of KC-135s greatly increased flexibility and station time for air defense fighters. The pre-exercise work-up week provided excellent training for USAF F-4 crews and RAAF

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1. J365 HistSum Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. J35 HistSum May 84 (C); J35/Memo/C116-84 (C), 3 Apr 84, Subj: Briefing Input for Exercise PITCH BLACK 84-1 (U) and J3523 Point Paper (C), 12 Jun 84, Subj: Exercise PITCH BLACK 84 Summary (U), all DECL OADR.

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MIRAGE crews from the operational conversion unit at Darwin. The inclusion of aircrew combat survival training during the exercise also proved highly valuable. The only significant problem occurred when the RAAF MIRAGE III fleet was grounded due to a non-exercise-related aircraft accident. USAF F-4s substituted for the MIRAGEs, but a number of training opportunities were lost.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The Chief of the Air Staff, RAAF, in a message to Admiral Crowe, thanked all of the USAF and USN personnel who participated in Exercise PITCH BLACK 84-1. It proved once again that the ANZUS partners could combine as a highly successful force. He said he was particularly impressed with the professionalism, discipline, and willingness displayed after the exercise was restructured following the unfortunate withdrawal of the MIRAGE aircraft. Admiral Crowe also passed his congratulations to CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT.<sup>2</sup>

TRIAD 84

(C) TRIAD 84, 1-16 October 1984, was a JCS-coordinated, New Zealand Defence Force-sponsored, Part II major ANZUS joint/combined air FTX and land command and signals exercise. It was conducted triennially, and was the only major joint/combined ANZUS exercise sponsored by New Zealand. The major goal of TRIAD 84 was to enhance the interoperability and effectiveness of ANZUS ground and air forces. All exercise objectives were successfully met.<sup>3</sup>

(C) Major participants were PACAF (8 F-15, 10 F-16, 1 E-3A, KC-10); WESTCOM (bde hq, 3 bn cells, air cavalry, air defense cells); RNZAF (6 A-4, 4 P-3); NZ Army (div hq, bde hq); RAAF (3 F-111, 8 MIRAGE, B-707, C-130); and Australian Army (bde hq, bn cells). TRIAD 84 was designed to practice C3I arrangements within the context of joint and combined ground and air operations; improve air defense, interdiction, and strike capabilities within a maritime environment; improve the ability to conduct land and air operations within New Zealand's strategic area in the South Pacific; and improve the understanding of the relationship between the civil population and resources within an operational area, the press, and other public communications media and operational needs; and practice the application of the laws of war.<sup>4</sup>


(U) CINCPACAF congratulated the New Zealand Chief of Air Staff on what was obviously a very successful exercise. The Commander Thirteenth Air Force, who was an observer, had given CINCPACAF an enthusiastic account of the exercise and highly praised the RNZAF. U.S. forces had also been treated royally by the RNZAF and the people of New Zealand and were appreciative of their hospitality.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Ibid.
  2. DEFAIRB Canberra 280444Z May 84 (U); USCINCPAC 080031Z Jun 84 (U).
  3. J35 HistSum Oct 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  4. Ibid.
  5. CINCPACAF 152025Z Oct 84 (U).

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(S) On 6 August, two months before the exercise, the New Zealand Chief of Defence Staff had assured USCINCPAC that the incoming Prime Minister and Minister of Defence had confirmed that TRIAD 84 should go ahead as planned and would welcome U.S. participants.



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SANDGROPER 84

(C) SANDGROPER 84, 13-30 October 1984, was a JCS-coordinated, USCINCPAC-sponsored, joint/combined maritime and air superiority exercise conducted at RAAF Learmonth and in waters off Western Australia. It was held biennially, alternating with the KANGAROO series. The purpose was to test and evaluate ANZUS air and naval forces in a multi-threat environment. Objectives were: to practice tactical procedures in accordance with established ANZUS doctrines in an air/sea operating environment and to exercise tactical command and control systems; to exercise combined air force elements in maritime operations and tactical air reconnaissance; and to improve interoperability against agreed ANZUS doctrines and procedures in C2 and in the application of air forces assigned to the air superiority battle.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Participating were 10 RAAF MIRAGE III, 4 RAAF F-111, 2 RAAF and RNZAF P-3, 1 USN P-3, 10 USAF F-16, 6 RAN ships, 2 RAN submarines, 1 RNZN ship, and 1 USN ship. A RAAF ground control radar unit also took part. The 8th TFW (Kunsan AB, Korea) had deployed the F-16s from New Zealand to Australia on 13 October after completion of TRIAD 84 (above). In the employment phase of SANDGROPER 84, 15-22 October, exercise sorties included maritime operations, airfield attack, and offensive/defensive counterair missions. The 8th TFW flew 179 of 180 scheduled sorties (including deployment/redeployment) and the U.S. Navy P-3s flew 8. RAAF MIRAGE IIIs flew 160, RAAF F-111s 24, and RAAF P-3s flew 10 sorties. The 8th TFW aircraft stood down 23-25 October to

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1. NZDEF Wellington 060230Z Aug 84 (U); USCINCPAC 082159Z Sep 84 (S); SEC-STATE 272769/140356Z Sep 84 (S); AMEMB Wellington 05010/020325Z Oct 84 (C), all DECL OADR.
  2. J35 HistSum Oct 84 (C); J35/Memo/C352-84 (C), 10 Oct 84, Subj: Briefing Input for Exercise SANDGROPER 84 (U), both DECL OADR.

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prepare for redeployment. Originally scheduled for a 26 October redeployment launch, typhoon activity en route delayed movement until the 30th. Airlift and refueling were provided by 2 KC-10s in a dual role.<sup>1</sup>

*7.5(a)* (C) Headquarters PACAF said SANDGROPER 84 was extremely successful and met all objectives. Fleet defense/ship attack tactics were successfully integrated with the RAN, providing RAN GCI controllers and USAF pilots valuable cross training. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MIRAGE/F-16 DACT in a multi-bogie environment presented RAAF and USAF pilots excellent opportunities to refine tactics and fly against unique dissimilar aircraft with highly skilled pilots. Throughout the exercise the focus was on realism at all levels--from providing realistic maritime tasking with maximum flexibility to allowing airfield attacks on operating airfields.<sup>2</sup>

#### GONFALON 84

(C) GONFALON 84, 17 November-17 December 1984, was a JCS-coordinated, USCINCPAC-sponsored joint/combined Special Operations exercise conducted in New Zealand. The exercise was in two phases, cross-training from 17 November to 2 December and an FTX from 3 to 17 December. Participants included: New Zealand 1st Special Air Service (100), U.K. 22d SAS (30), Australia SAS Reserve (24), U.S. Army Special Forces (28), USN SEAL (23), and USAF (88). Special equipment included a USN special warfare light craft (36-ft SEA FOX), airlifted from Subic Bay by a C-141. It was airlifted on a transport trailer and ramp-launched. The USAF provided 1 MC-130E and 1 C-130E and the RAAF provided 1 C-130H aircraft.<sup>3</sup>

(C) All planned cross-training and FTX missions were successfully executed. U.S. participants were well received. An extensive joint/combined debriefing was held on 16 December at Popalsura Camp, New Zealand. Comments arising from that would be used to enhance planning for the U.S.-hosted Special Operations series, THERMAL GALE 85, scheduled for Hawaii in September 1985.<sup>4</sup>

#### Indian Ocean

#### EFFECTIVE TEAM

(S/NOFORN) EFFECTIVE TEAM was the code name given to proposed air-to-air refueling exercises between USAF ELF ONE tankers based in Saudi Arabia and a

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1. HQ PACAF 291700Z Nov 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. J362 HistSum Dec 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  4. Ibid.

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USPACOM carrier battle group in the Northern Arabian Sea. Originally, the plan called for deploying an additional E-3A AWACS and a KC-10 tanker to Riyadh, launching from there, overflying Oman, proceeding to a point in the NAS, and rendezvousing with and offloading fuel to naval aircraft from the Indian Ocean CVBG. This scenario was designed to exercise procedures similar to those that would be required in a real-world contingency. The directing headquarters would be USCENCOM. Participating commands would be ELF ONE of USCENAF, SAC, and PACFLT. The first exercise was to begin on 23 January 1984. The JCS approved on 20 January, contingent upon Saudi concurrence. The Saudi government agreed, but only with in-country assets plus any personnel augmentation required. Therefore, the planned deployments were cancelled, and ELF ONE assets were used in the refueling exercise. They were adequate to accomplish four missions every other day. The missions were scheduled for 23, 25, 27, and 29 January, with orbit time of 30 minutes and 24,000 pounds of fuel offload. Three drogue-equipped KC-135 tankers would be required. USCINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to execute his portion of Exercise EFFECTIVE TEAM 1-84 as planned.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) In order to maintain a high degree of interoperability between the Indian Ocean Battle Group airwing and USAF tankers, CINCPACFLT desired to conduct an aerial refueling exercise with each deploying Indian Ocean CVBG. Accordingly, EFFECTIVE TEAM 2-84 was scheduled for 27-30 April in conjunction with KITTY HAWK's availability in the NAS. USCINCPAC supported the initiative. However, various reasons, including scheduling conflicts, delayed the aerial refueling exercise, and EFFECTIVE TEAM 2-84 was not held until the first week of July, with the USS AMERICA airwing. Planning was underway at the end of the year for EFFECTIVE TEAM 1-85, proposed for March-April 1985.<sup>2</sup>

#### VECTOR SOUTH 84

(C) VECTOR SOUTH 84, 14-20 August 1984, was a JCS-coordinated, USCINCPAC-sponsored joint/combined ground defense exercise conducted on Diego Garcia, BIOT. The purpose was to test the combined ground defense of the island, including air deployment and employment of reinforcements, in accordance with USCINCPAC CONPLAN 5122-83. Participating were the British Representative, BIOT, and Naval Party 1002; COMSEVENTHFLT, COMNAVSURFGRU WESTPAC, III MAF, 1st Bn 1st SFG, 1st SOS, MAC, MSCPREPOGRU ONE, PATWING ONE DET Diego Garcia, and COMNAVSUPFAC, NAF, NAVCOMSTA, and NISRA Diego Garcia.<sup>3</sup>

1. USCINCCENT 182320Z Jan 84 (S/NF)(EX); JCS 202026Z Jan 84 (S/NF)(EX); CHUS-MTM Riyadh 211015Z Jan 84 (S/NF)(EX); ELF ONE 211230Z Jan 84 (S/NF)(EX); J311 HistSum Jan 84 (S); USCINCPAC 211830Z Jan 84 (S/NF), all DECL OADR.
2. J311 HistSums Mar-Jun 84 (S); CINCPACFLT 181824Z Mar 84 (S); USCINCPAC 200416Z Apr 84 (S); COMUSNAVCENT 290350Z Jun 84 (S), JCS 291637Z Dec 84 (S/NF), all DECL OADR.
3. USCINCPAC 222051Z Jun 84 (C); CINCPACFLT 230117Z Oct 84 (C), both DECL OADR.

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(C) Immediately upon initiation of the exercise, on-island subordinate commands implemented area security and defense plans. Concurrently, the Naval Support Facility (NSF) security department and Royal Marines initiated intense patrolling of land and lagoon areas. As the situation deteriorated, the Royal Marines placed operating positions on the eastern portion of the island, and the USMC company was mobilized and brought under the operational control of the area coordinator. Virtually every organic subordinate element of the NSF was tested. When the scenario situation on Diego Garcia deteriorated, the area coordinator requested reinforcement by the USMC Air Contingency Battalion (ACB) on Okinawa. The battalion headquarters and 1st echelon of the ACB arrived fully combat ready and prepared for immediate employment. The ACB was functioning within an hour after arrival. The Aggressor force of twelve SFG personnel conducted a single night event on 19 August.

(C) Among the lessons learned, CINCPACFLT said the NSF needed to communicate with the ACB commander before and immediately on arrival at Diego Garcia. Since there would be a 24-hour period from time of notification of the ACB until its arrival, there was enough time for the two commanders to communicate via message. The NSF commander and his staff should be at the airport to brief the ACB commander and his staff immediately upon arrival to provide a tactical update.

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VALIANT USHER 84-10KE

(C) VALIANT USHER 84-10-KE, 9-18 September 1984, was a Significant Part I U.S.-Kenya amphibious assault exercise held in Kenya. It was designed to train participants in planning, coordinating, and executing a heliborne and waterborne opposed amphibious assault with subsequent operations ashore. The scenario called for Kenyan forces to be in a defensive posture to oppose the landing. The U.S. forces would land, move inland, link up with Kenyan forces, and conduct two days of combined training. The forces would then shift to tactical disposition and commence a 3-day free-play exercise. This was the second amphibious exercise in Kenya. The first was held in March 1982.<sup>2</sup>

1. Ibid.
2. J35 HistSum Sep 84 (C); J35/Memo/C308-84 (C), 31 Aug 84, Subj: Briefing Input for Exercise VALIANT USHER 84-10KE (U), both DECL OADR.

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(C) Principal CINCPACFLT participants were USS NEW ORLEANS (LPH-11), USS DENVER (LPD-9), USS MOBILE (LKA-115), and USS SCHNECTADY (LSD-1185). USMC participants were the 31st MAU, BLT 3/3, and HMM-165. Kenyan armed forces units were an infantry battalion, an artillery battalion, an armored reconnaissance squadron, an engineer troop, patrol boats, 4 helicopters, and 1 BUFFALO transport aircraft.<sup>1</sup>

(C) In his first impressions report of the exercise, COMSEVENTHFLT said he strongly recommended an advance party in future events for pre-exercise planning, as was done in this case. Communications with Kenyan patrol boats were generally good, although UHF communications were limited to less than 10 NM. They could easily understand English transmissions if spoken at a moderate pace. Flight decks of all ships were exercised on a daily basis in support of the landing force ashore. The shallow beach gradient resulted in landing craft frequently experiencing difficulty in retracting, and salvage boats were continuously employed in keeping the beach clear and retracting landing craft. It resulted in excellent training opportunities. The significant time spent ashore by the landing force (7 days), allowed almost complete offload of MOBILE, providing excellent training for hatch and assault boat crews. HMM-165 helicopters displayed a continued high state of availability and readiness.

  
The early grounding of several USN assault craft on D-day hampered ship-to-shore movement of on-call surface serials. The numerous shifting sandbars and washouts in the surf zone and tidal considerations hampered boating the majority of the day. The high range of tide and shallow gradient combined to produce a fast-moving waterline. Loading and offloading operations were found to be significantly smoother on the incoming tide. Rains during the preceding week had softened the only beach exit and initially precluded tanks from leaving the beach. Other wheeled and tracked vehicles were able to negotiate the exit on schedule, and the tanks moved after the route was compacted and dried sufficiently. The lack of fixed-wing aircraft participation severely limited the response to tactical call for fires and the timeliness and effectiveness with which CAS missions could be prosecuted. In general, however, all planned exercise objectives were successfully achieved.<sup>2</sup>

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#### Planning for Forward Based Exercises

(S) In May 1984 the JCS advised USCINCCENT and USCINCPAC that the CNO had proposed a new Southwest Asia exercise to improve the achievement of increased readiness in the Persian Gulf. Given the lack of direct access to primary gulf states, the CNO suggested that the use of another facility close to that

1. COMSEVENTHFLT 031622Z Oct 84 (C), DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.

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area might be an attractive alternate. A "MIRROR IMAGE" exercise could be developed and staged from a forward area such as Berbera, Somalia, to provide USCINCCENT an opportunity to exercise C2 interoperability between land-based TACAIR/AWACS/tankers and the CVBG in a support role. [REDACTED]

*1.5 Sec X (S)*  
[REDACTED] The publicity from such an exercise, with regional participation, would act as a positive signal of U.S. resolve and commitment to our Persian Gulf friends and Somalia. The JCS requested the two CINCs' recommendations.<sup>1</sup>

*(S)* USCINCPAC replied that the proposed MIRROR IMAGE Persian Gulf exercise would provide an excellent opportunity for joint operations, as well as demonstrate USAF capabilities to deploy rapidly into SWA to share national tasking with the CVBG. USCINCCENT believed that while it was a good idea, the objective could be more effectively accomplished within the confines of existing exercises such as the BRIGHT STAR series and the periodic TACAIR exercises in Oman. He recommended, instead, that we continue to diplomatically press the Saudis for a "true" PORT GAP rehearsal in the Persian Gulf area.<sup>2</sup>

*(S)* In October the JCS advised USCINCCENT that recent events in the Middle East underscored the need to exercise portions of regional contingency plans along with their selected forces. [REDACTED]

*Sec X 1.5 (S)*  
[REDACTED] It would be highly valuable to deploy a USAF TACAIR/AWACS/tanker package and exercise it with the Indian Ocean CVBG. Additional benefits could accrue through the participation or observation by British, French, and regional Arab forces. USCINCCENT was instructed to proceed with the planning, in coordination with USCINCPAC.<sup>3</sup>

*(S)* However, USCINCCENT, with the agreement of all concerned, advised the JCS that the option of conducting the exercise in Oman and adjacent waters was more feasible than Somalia. It would cost only two-thirds as much in terms of TDY, logistics, and strategic airlift (sorties and dollars). It would also require the deployment of approximately 325 fewer people. A further operational consideration was the fact that a BEACON FLASH exercise with the Omani was scheduled in the mid-January 1985 time frame. This would indicate that the SOAF was already planning for operations with the U.S. Navy at that time

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1. J311 HistSum May 84 (S); JCS 152148Z May 84 (S), both DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 060251Z Jun 84 (S); USCINCCENT 222320Z May 84 (S); SSO CINCCENT 172045Z Aug 84 (S)(BOM), all DECL OADR.
  3. JCS 111928Z Oct 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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and should make scheduling of the exercise easier. The Somalia option did not meet exercise goals and would only turn the operation into a more costly test of deployability and sustainability than an exercise of coordination, interoperability, and mutual support. USCINCCENT said he and USCINCPAC had long been on record in favor of a PORT GAP/PORT GRAND rehearsal at the earliest possible time.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The JCS agreed, and on 30 November directed that USCINCCENT, supported by USCINCPAC, conduct the forward based exercise as enhancement to Persian Gulf readiness as proposed; i.e., with Oman. The availability of lift assets dictated that the exercise be conducted between 20 January and 20 February 1985. The necessary diplomatic overtures had been initiated through State Department channels.<sup>2</sup>

Pacific Area and USCINCPAC Headquarters

NIGHT BLUE

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BELFRY EXPRESS 84-1

(S) Admiral Foley advised Admiral Crowe on 31 March 1984 that the PACFLT DEFCON Three loadout and dispersal of attack submarines and a submarine tender from Pearl Harbor and San Diego in Exercise BELFRY EXPRESS 84-1 was successfully conducted during the period 26-28 March. A total of 14 SS/SSN (10 Pearl Harbor/4 San Diego) and USS MCKEE (ASR-41) at San Diego were loaded and surge-deployed within 48 hours of commencement of exercise (COMEX). Two of the 14 submarines were at sea and were returned to port for loadout. A 15th SSN was unable to satisfactorily restore interrupted upkeep work items within 48 hours and would have required an additional 2-3 days to complete repairs.<sup>4</sup>

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1. USCINCCENT 202220Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. JCS 302310Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 399; J35 HistSum Feb 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. CINCPACFLT 310105Z Mar 84 (S), DECL OADR. 00-0274

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(S) The spectrum of readiness of the 12 units inport varied from loaded and ready for WESTPAC deployment to deep into a 4-week refit. USS INDIANAPOLIS (SSN-697) was generated from fast cruise and USS SKATE (SSN-578) from a long shutdown following deployment. USS TAUTOG (SSN-639) had disconnected the battery preparatory to a replacement during upkeep but was able to reconnect, load mines, and sail. An additional 6 SSNs at sea at COMEX conducting CNO project operations or at sea in the San Francisco/Puget Sound areas were not exercise players, but could have been loaded and generated within the 48 hours. A total of 143 MK-48 torpedoes, 2 MK-37 torpedoes, 9 HARPOON missiles, and 35 MK-57 mines were loaded. A key factor in the timing was the ability to conduct weapons handling at night and at Subases Pearl Harbor and San Diego. The rules were waived to allow them to do the exercise under realistic increased DEFCON conditions. CINCPACFLT said he was extremely pleased with the results. This was a solid test of PACFLT's ability to surge-deploy attack submarines loaded and ready for war.<sup>1</sup>

#### RIMPAC 84

(C) RIMPAC 84, 14 May-28 June 1984, was a THIRD Fleet-sponsored, Significant Part I, large-scale joint/combined maritime exercise in the Hawaiian and Southern California naval operating areas. It was conducted biennially. Participating units included not only forces from the U.S. Navy but also ships and aircraft from Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand-- from nations around the "Rim of the Pacific." The purpose was to conduct a realistic, multi-threat, theater-level exercise to improve the coordination and interoperability of combined and joint forces in maritime operations; and to afford participating units the opportunity to conduct weapons firings on the instrumented Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF).<sup>2</sup>

(C) Principal U.S. participants were COMTHIRDFLT; COMCARGRU 3; COMPHIBGRUEASTPAC, COMTRAPAC, COMCRUDESGRU 5, COMDESRONS 7, 9, 17, 25, 31, and 33; COMSUBPAC; COMSUBTRAGRU WEST COAST; COMINERON 5; COMNAVSPECWARGRU 1; COMSPECBOATRON 1; FLTCORGRU 1; COMFEWSG; COMPACAREA COGARD; COMNAVBASEs San Diego and Pearl Harbor; COMFLETRAGRU Pearl Harbor; MSOs San Diego and Honolulu; USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65); USS CARL VINSON (CVN-70); 3 CGNs; 3 CGs; 3 DDGs; 8 DDs; 2 FFGs; 6 FFs; 8 SSNs; 2 Ss; 6 USCGCs; 9 landing ships; 8 auxiliary ships; 8 minesweepers; COMPATSWINGSPAC; COMASWINGPAC; COMPATWINGS 2 and 10; 4 VPs; TACGRU 1; TACRON 11; CARAIRWINGS 11, 14, and 15; B-52s and KC-10s; VC-1; MAG 24; FEWSG; 15th ABW; Hawaii Air National Guard; 3d MAW; and 5th MAB. Allied forces were from Australia (1 destroyer, 1 frigate, 2 submarines, 1 oiler, 3 P-3Cs); Canada (3 destroyers, 1 oiler, 5 aircraft); Japan (5 destroyers, 4 P-3Cs, 4 P-2Js); and New Zealand (1 frigate, 2 P-3Bs). In all, there were 84 ships and about 250 aircraft and 50,000 personnel from the five countries.<sup>3</sup>

1. Ibid.

2. J35 HistSum Jun 84 (C); COMTHIRDFLT 180021Z May 84 (C), both DECL OADR.

3. Ibid; COMUSJAPAN 150501Z May 84 (U).

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(C) RIMPAC 84 was conducted in five phases. Phase I, to 29 May, included operational planning, transits, and inport training and briefings. Phase II, 30 May-4 June, consisted of scenario-driven warm-up operations, including cold war and transition to hot war. Phase III, 5-17 June, was the scenario-driven conventional war phase, including sea control and power projection (air strikes/amphibious assault) and submarine operations. Phase IV, 18-21 June, consisted of inport post-exercise debriefings and report construction. Phase V, 22-28 June, included non-scenario weapons firings and other exercises in the Hawaiian operating area and other instrumented ranges at the PMRF. Forces from Japan were incorporated in a defensive posture during scenario operations. Due to treaty requirements, they were placed under exclusive U.S. tactical control and employed only with U.S. units. Employment of JMSDF aircraft was based on the same guidelines.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In what was aptly described as "the biggest liberty party in almost 40 years," more than 65 ships from five countries packed Pearl Harbor in mid-June after the main phase of RIMPAC 84. It was the largest number of ships to visit there since World War II.<sup>2</sup>

FREEZE FRAME 84

(C) FREEZE FRAME 84, 9-13 July 1984, was a USCINCPAC-sponsored CPX conducted at Headquarters USCINCPAC, Camp H.M. Smith. It was held for the purpose of exercising the USPACOM Joint Air Operations Planning Team (JAOPT) concept and the Joint Targeting Committee (JTC). Participating were USCINCPAC J31, J36/SOCPAC, and J22/IPAC; CINCPACFLT; CINCPACAF; and SAC OL-HI.<sup>3</sup>

(C) PACFLT, in its after-action report, said that throughout the exercise there appeared to be a need to continually define the scope of the JAOPT to preclude going beyond the intended precepts; specifically, the tendency to become too involved in functions of subordinate commands, which would limit their operational flexibility. There was a need to better define the JAOPT charter. Although FREEZE FRAME 84 accomplished its objective in exercising the JAOPT, it did not reveal problems associated with coordination processes at the operating level.

(C) PACAF said there were two main benefits derived from the exercise: the opportunity to meet and resolve joint air operations problems with counterparts, and the chance to finalize the concept and fully resolve the functions of the JAOPT. The exercise provided an excellent forum to coordi-

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1. J3522 Point Paper (C), 25 Oct 84, Subj: Japanese Participation in Exercise RIMPAC (U), DECL OADR.
  2. CNO 160041Z Jun 84 (U).
  3. J313 HistSums Jul-Aug 84 (C); USCINCPAC 030411Z Jul 84 (C), CINCPACFLT 200601Z Jul 84 (C), HQ PACAF 272355Z Jul 84 (C), and USCINCPAC 100109Z Aug 84 (C) all DECL OADR.

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nate and plan missions on a daily basis. Also, the scenarios furnished a good vehicle for the JTC to determine what types of intelligence the JAOPT required for decision-making. However, it was found to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate and execute a joint operation within 24-36 hours. A more realistic time for execution would be 48-72 hours. This lead time was necessary when SOCPAC teams, B-52s, and certain national assets were required. The point was, we might not be able to strike as rapidly as commanders desired. The competition for assets would be fierce when trying to prosecute our campaign plan after OPLAN 5000/5001 had been implemented. It was realistic to assume that we would not have all the assets desired to execute joint operations but rather, somewhat less. Both PACFLT and PACAF recommended exercising the concept further in the upcoming JCS POWDER RIVER CPX. USCINCPAC agreed, and proposed conferences to plan for FREEZE FRAME 85-1, to be held in conjunction with POWDER RIVER 85.<sup>1</sup>

FREEZE FRAME 85-1

*Sect 1.5(a)* (S) FREEZE FRAME 85-1, held in conjunction with JCS CPX POWDER RIVER 85, (15-26 October 1984) was a USCINCPAC-sponsored CPX to test the Joint Air Operations Planning Team. [REDACTED]

Accordingly, USCINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to provide a naval concept of operations with designated units and CINCPACAF to provide a concept for air operations, and convene the next day at USCINCPAC headquarters to carry out the JAOPT exercise.<sup>2</sup>

(S) PACFLT said the JAOPT exercise served to highlight the existing readiness for joint air operations within the USPACOM. It successfully demonstrated SEVENTH Fleet/Fifth Air Force coordination and communications capabilities by the use of voice and satellite communications. A review of the naval supporting plan for this exercise was indicative of the high level of detailed, already in-place, joint organizational and operational liaison between PACAF and PACFLT command activities.<sup>3</sup>

*Sect 1.5(a)* (S) PACAF reported that JAOPT activity during POWDER RIVER 85 provided a valuable means to exercise and test coordinated air strike planning and execution procedures during a conflict in the USPACOM. Early on, however, when it became evident that the POWDER RIVER 85 scenario was not going to permit the desired level of combat operations in the Pacific to exercise the JAOPT and coordinated airstrikes, [REDACTED]

1. Ibid.
2. J311 HistSum Oct 84 (S); USCINCPAC 171152Z Oct 84 (S), both DECL OADR.
3. J311 HistSum Nov 84 (S); PACOPS 280300Z Nov 84 (S) and CINCPACFLT 292344Z Nov 84 (S), all DECL OADR.

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PACAF recommended that future scenarios should be built around a theater war, and not an incident in isolation. PACAF also recommended that JAOPT activities should become an integral part of major exercises involving a conflict in the USPACOM.<sup>1</sup>

FLEETEX 85

(U) FLEETEX 85, 15 October-1 December 1984, ultimately involved five U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups, an amphibious ready group, a surface combatant task group, the SEVENTHFLT flagship, USMC aircraft, several Navy commands, and U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Air Force units. The exercise began off the coast of California with ships and aircraft of the THIRD Fleet. It moved into the SEVENTH Fleet's area of responsibility in mid-November with four CVBGs, an SCTG, and USN/USMC/USAF aircraft participating. These joint operations were designed to exercise commanders, staffs, and forces in integrated battle force command and control and antiair, antisurface, and antisubmarine warfare. Some 65 ships, almost 500 aircraft, and 35,000 men participated. Units of the Canadian Navy also participated in parts of the exercise.<sup>2</sup>

(S) In the WESTPAC area the exercise force list included three CVBGs (VINSON, MIDWAY, and ENTERPRISE) and over 65 ships and submarines. USAF F-15s, KC-135s, and E-3As played key roles in support of the complex and fast-paced action. The force of the fleet rendezvoused in the South China Sea and steamed north past Okinawa to Northern Japan and Hokkaido. The threat, consisting of air, surface, and subsurface systems and the actions taken to counter it, resulted in a most realistic combat environment. In addition, the Japanese Self-Defense Force, with 13 ships and 17 aircraft, participated in a separate and distinct exercise, ASWEX 85-1JA. This distinction was made at the insistence of the the government of Japan, which wanted to forestall domestic reactions that would undoubtedly have occurred had JSDF participation in a major U.S. offensive exercise such as FLEETEX become public knowledge.<sup>3</sup>

(S) At the conclusion of Phase I, CINCPACFLT reported to the CNO that the three CVBGs joined up to form the SEVENTH Fleet FLEETEX 85 Battle Force on 22 November. The force spent 22-25 November, in part, in intensive live air-to-air warfare exercises. Forty PACAF F-15s from Kadena AB were made available for outer air battle play on the 26th, and 20 F-15s were added to the inner air battle package on the 27th. During the outer air battle, the battle force encountered repeated air attacks for almost four hours. The AAW grid successfully engaged 60 aggressor aircraft with CAP and 32 with long-

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1. Ibid.

2. CNO 262107Z Oct 84 (U); CINCPACFLT 030750Z Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.

3. J35 HistSum Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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range SAM intercepts. All attacking aircraft were engaged prior to reaching 150 NM of the fleet; most intercepts occurred beyond 250 NM.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Strong interoperability with the Air Force was demonstrated as the AWACS and KC-135 tanker support was fully integrated into the grid for threat direction and fuel support. A solid AWACS link and excellent communications provided timely warning. All in all, CINCPACFLT reported that they maintained a tight, well-fueled, AAW grid throughout the outer air battle. Carrier EA-6Bs were productively employed in counter-targetting and electronic warfare support measures/jamming during the multiple raids against the force.

(S) FLEETEX 85 attracted some Soviet attention beyond the suspected trailing submarine. At the height of the outer air battle, the battle force vectored four armed aircraft (2 F-14s and 2 A-7s) against some Soviet BEARS from Cam Ranh Bay AB, well off the exercise threat axis. The intercept was executed 250 NM from the nearest carrier. CINCPACFLT said he was well pleased with the conduct of Phase I.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 2 December, at the conclusion of the exercise in the Sea of Japan, CINCPACFLT reported that the Soviets launched 52 aircraft at night toward the battle force, including 46 strike and reconnaissance (BACKFIRES, BADGERS, and BEARS) and 6 surveillance (MAYs) types. The BACKFIRES all turned early and orbited behind the Soviet buffer zone as the U.S. fighter CAP paralleled their tracks. The battle force, operating a fully integrated AAW grid centered on USS TEXAS (CGN-39), responded to the mass Soviet raids brilliantly. The two air wings scrambled 24 fighter, attack, EW, and tanker aircraft (in addition to the 28 aircraft routinely launched that night) to stiffen the force's formidable AAW defense and to take advantage of this unique training opportunity.<sup>3</sup>

(S) CINCPACFLT said "the frosting on the cake" was occasioned by the sortie of the Soviet carrier NOVOROSSIYSK and escorts from Vladivostok the same night. On 2 December she was moving south in the Sea of Japan, operating her FLOGGER aircraft within a 25-mile radius of the ship, completely confined by five surrounding fighter CAP stations from VINSON and MIDWAY. The net effect was a total offset of the Soviet carrier's combat potential--apparent to both sides. CINCPACFLT said the performance of all FLEETEX 85 participants, both Navy and Air Force, was outstanding. He believed the past three weeks, culminating in last night's climactic encounter, had convincingly demonstrated that the Pacific Fleet was fully ready "to sail into harm's way." The enthusiasm and morale within the battle force ships after last night's activities was "sky high."<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPACFLT 270935Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. CINCPACFLT 030500Z Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. Ibid.

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(S) CINCPACFLT apprised USCINCPAC that JMSDF participation (which, for domestic political reasons, was styled as being part of a parallel national Japanese ASWEX exercise) was aggressive and outstanding. A decade ago, the JMSDF would not even put to sea the same day MIDWAY sailed for fear that the public would associate the two events; during the last week of November, two Japanese flag officers commanded portions of the battle force's escorting destroyer screen for MIDWAY and VINSON--historic progress toward the achievement of real USN/JMSDF interoperability.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The exercise spanned the entire Pacific Fleet area of responsibility from East Africa to the California coast, reflecting the priorities of the USPACOM war plan. The Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron was constructively eliminated by the USS INDEPENDENCE Battle Group, then operating in the Northern Arabian Sea. The increasingly important Soviet naval base at Cam Ranh Bay was simulated under successful attack by aircraft from MIDWAY and ENTERPRISE. Both attacks took place on 19 November, prior to the join-up with CARL VINSON and the move north in force. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] USS LA JOLLA (SSN-701) simulated the attack on 27 November after being called up by probe alert and given full over-the-horizon targeting data.<sup>2</sup>

(S) USCINCPAC advised the CJCS that FLEETEX 85, one of the largest and most comprehensive maritime warfare exercises ever conducted, concluded on 1 December. Reports indicated that it was extremely successful and amply demonstrated the high level of combat readiness being maintained by our front-line forces. Admiral Crowe believed we would find the benefits, in terms of force proficiency and lessons learned, to be significant and broadly applicable to our operations worldwide. Also, he would be pleased to provide a briefing on the Soviet reaction to the exercise, as requested, during General Vessey's upcoming visit to USCINCPAC headquarters.<sup>3</sup>

(S/NOFORN) The DIA reported on 11 December that the Soviet reaction to FLEETEX 85 was normal. Surveillance of exercise participants by AGIs was initiated in mid-October, covering the movement of the VINSON and CONSTELLATION Battle Groups from the U.S. West Coast. Meanwhile, another AGI transited the Hawaiian area and assumed surveillance of the carriers while they were in this region. In WESTPAC an AGI surveilled the MIDWAY and ENTERPRISE Battle Groups near Subic Bay, as they prepared for exercise participation. Soviet air reaction began on 10 November, when two BEAR Ds conducted a mission against the VINSON BG southeast of Midway. Subsequent BEAR D flights were performed on the 12th and 13th. On 19 November a CHARLIE I SSGN probably


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1. CINCPACFLT 030750Z Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR. *00-077H*
  2. Ibid.
  3. USCINCPAC 060015Z Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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assumed trail of the VINSON BG and remained with the group until the 25th. Another BEAR D mission was performed on the 19th, concurrent with the formation of the three-carrier battle force in the Philippine Sea. Daily BEAR flights began on 26 November.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) As the battle force moved east and northeast of Japan, the tempo of BEAR flights increased. On 30 November and 1 December the MIDWAY and VINSON CVBGs entered the Sea of Japan through Tsugaru Strait, while ENTERPRISE moved southeast en route to the CONUS. Soviet combatant surface ship surveillance began on 1 December when a CG and a DDG assumed trail of the two CVBGs. At least two, and possibly three, Soviet submarines were in the vicinity of the carriers. Continuous air reaction by MAYs began on 1 December, with periodic missions by BEAR Ds and Fs against ENTERPRISE in the Northwest Pacific.



(S/NOFORN) The DIA said the Soviet response to FLEETEX 85 was more tempered than the one observed in 1982. (A direct comparison with the 1983 response was not possible because severe weather probably precluded a heavier one.) In 1982 at least 129 aircraft reacted to the exercise; at least 82 responded to this year's. Except for the NOVOROSSIYSK Task Group's participation, surface and submarine reaction was consistent with past Soviet responses to U.S. carrier operations near the USSR. The early reaction by AGIs and their continued presence along the transit routes of the assembling battle force implied Soviet foreknowledge of major exercise events. In the 1982 exercise, the apparent surprise appearance of two U.S. CVBGs off Kamchatka probably prompted a tightening of Soviet surveillance practices. This year's Soviet reaction to FLEETEX 85 continued to demonstrate Moscow's determination to monitor U.S.-allied naval operations, since they posed a greater threat to Soviet mainland facilities. Employment of the CVHG as part of this year's reaction force and the use of BACKFIRES in 1982--both for the first time--indicated the importance of these systems in Soviet naval strategy.<sup>2</sup>

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1. DIA 110330Z Dec 84 (S/NE/WNINTEL), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.

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
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(8) The 961st AWACS reported to PACOPS that it flew nine mission sorties for a total of 87.2 hours in support of FLEETEX (15.6 hours) and post-FLEETEX (71.6 hours) operations. All required tasking was accomplished, but the mission on 2 December was shortened 2.9 hours due to tanker abort. TADIL-A/Link-11 operations between USN and USAF units were accomplished on all missions. The E-3A acted as a distant early warning picket and provided surveillance reporting and/or early warning on both Soviet and North Korean aircraft known or suspected to be reacting to the battle force. They controlled 15 intercepts of Soviet BEAR, BADGER, MAY, MAIL, and COOT aircraft. On 30 November E-3A controllers helped defend USS STRAUSS against two Blue air strike packages launched from the battle force with six Orange air USMC F-4s from Misawa AB and their C-130 tankers. This resulted in 10 intercepts on the attacking forces and effective defense of STRAUSS. E-3A controllers also conducted tanker refueling for both E-3 and USN/USMC/USAF fighters.<sup>1</sup>

(8) The AWAC squadron said it was heavily taxed during this exercise, particularly on 1-2 December when 3 missions were launched or recovered in less than 8 hours. With only 3 aircraft and 4 aircrews, the squadron could not maintain that type of surge. No more than one E-3A 12-hour orbit (with refueling) should be scheduled in any 24-hour period.<sup>2</sup>

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1. 961 AWACS 140745Z Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.

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## SECTION IV--OTHER OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

### Incidents and Accidents

#### Search for GLOMAR JAVA SEA Survivors

(U) The MV GLOMAR JAVA SEA, an oil drilling ship owned by Global Marine, Inc., and leased to Atlantic Richfield Co., capsized and sank during a typhoon southwest of Hainan Island in the Gulf of Tonkin on 26 October 1983. The 400-ft, 11,000-ton ship had been exploring for offshore oil deposits under contract with the People's Republic of China. Divers eventually recovered the bodies of 35 crewmen but 46 others remained missing a year later. All were presumed to have drowned. The victims included 37 Americans. There were unconfirmed reports that some survivors had drifted to Vietnam in lifeboats, but the U.S. government said there was no evidence to support such claims.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The National Transportation Safety Board determined, in findings released a year after the accident, that the probable cause of the capsizing and sinking of GLOMAR JAVA SEA was the flooding of its starboard wing tanks 6 and 7 through a fracture in the hull resulting from a structural failure of undetermined origin. Contributing to the structural failure was the decision that the vessel remain anchored with all nine anchors. This subjected the ship to the full force of the typhoon. It was not overloaded and had sufficient intact stability to withstand the effects of the moderate-strength typhoon, provided no other overturning forces were acting on the ship, the board said. If it had been operated without adjacent wing tanks empty, or had been designed to withstand the flooding of two adjacent wing tanks, the ship might not have capsized. A Board investigator said the ship probably listed 15 degrees, then capsized after taking in water. Nevertheless, the vessel was in compliance with all Federal regulations. The report said it was probable that some crewmembers successfully abandoned the ship in its starboard lifeboat and survived for 36 to 48 hours after the accident.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The father of one of the American victims asked the U.S. government to file criminal charges against the two companies, based on the report's conclusion that they contributed to the loss of life by neglecting to evacuate non-essential personnel before the storm and for anchoring the ship in the face of typhoon-force winds. The families of about 40 crewmen were suing the two companies for more than \$100 million, claiming negligence on their part led to the disaster.<sup>3</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/PRD), Vol. II, pp. 426-427; UPI Houston, 18 Dec 84 (U).
  2. UPI Washington, 15 Oct 84 (U).
  3. UPI Houston, 18 Dec 84 (U).

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(U) Earlier, on 10 February 1984, the JCS had informed USCINCPAC that the National Security Council requested that the DOD compile a descriptive summary of the search effort for survivors of the GLOMAR JAVA SEA. Of particular interest was an assessment of the effectiveness of the search and any evidence that would support or denigrate the possibility that survivors might have drifted to the Chinese or Vietnamese coasts. USCINCPAC requested that Headquarters PACAF coordinate with CINCPACFLT and provide a response to USCINCPAC.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 28 February USCINCPAC apprised the JCS that the search for GLOMAR JAVA SEA survivors had commenced at 262347Z October 1983 when a U.S. Navy P-3 was launched from NAS Cubi Point and proceeded to the last known position of the ship, 17°17'N/108°53'E (about 75 miles off the coast of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam). Low ceilings, poor visibility, and high sea states resulting from Typhoon LEX hampered the initial search efforts. USN P-3 and USAF HC-130 aircraft continued daylight air searches through 3 November 1983. A total of 21 missions had been flown, involving 215 flight hours. The area search was bounded on the north by 19°00'N, to the northeast by a line drawn 24 NM from the coast of Hainan Island, to the east by 110°00'E, to the south by 15°00'N and to the west by a line drawn 20 NM from the SRV coast. This enclosed an area of approximately 70,000 square miles.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Sightings in the search area included life rafts, life boats, life jackets, oil slicks, dye markers, and floating strobe lights. No survivors or bodies were located. The areas near the Vietnamese and Chinese coasts were not searched by U.S. military aircraft, but were reportedly thoroughly searched by the SRV and PRC, respectively. Neither country reported finding any debris, bodies, or survivors.

(U) Based on weather, sea states, altitude of the air search (200-300 ft), and track spacing, the U.S. search effort had a probability of detection of over 90 percent. In view of this, and the fact that the search continued past normal life expectancy for people exposed to environmental conditions prevalent in the northwest area of the South China Sea (life expectancy 80-100 hours; search over 180 hours), the chances were minimal that any survivors would have drifted to the Chinese or Vietnamese coasts.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation, since it had to make a statement of the probable fate of missing crewmembers, requested an explanation of how the life expectancy was determined. On 8 May 1984 USCINCPAC replied that the National Search and Rescue Manual provided information on environmental factors which affect survival time of individuals in water. The

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1. J311 HistSum Feb 84 (U); JCS 102302Z Feb 84 (U) and USCINCPAC 110249Z Feb 84 (U).
  2. USCINCPAC 281139Z Feb 84 (U).
  3. Ibid.

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average water temperature in that region of the South China Sea was 80°. While some persons had survived over 80 hours in water temperatures above 70°, the major problems would be staying afloat and fighting off sharks. In spite of the adverse weather at the time of sinking, the most optimistic approach was taken in planning the rescue operation. In view of the relatively warm water, it was believed that survivors could remain alive at least 80 hours and possibly up to 100 hours. There was no firm basis for establishing the upper limit of 100 hours, so the search was continued well beyond that time. It was terminated after a week primarily because it was believed by that time any survivors would have either been located by the search aircraft or would have drifted ashore.<sup>1</sup>

ROK Army Helicopter Crash Kills ROKA General

(C) At approximately 120255Z July 1984 a ROK Army helicopter crashed in the Republic of Korea while flying between Taegu and Taejon. Killed in the crash was the 2d ROK Army Commander, General Kim Ho Han. Also killed in the crash were the pilot and copilot of the helicopter. The SROKA G2, BGEN Sung Yun-Yong, and the general's aide died shortly thereafter of injuries sustained in the crash.<sup>2</sup>

(U) COMUSKOREA advised Generals Vessey, Wickham, and Sennewald, and Admiral Crowe on 18 July that the ill-fated aircraft had been en route from Taegu to Kyongju but due to bad weather turned back and was flying along the Seoul-Pusan Highway and encountered a lowered ceiling. A guard post in the area observed the helicopter banking away from the lowered ceiling and very shortly, another guard post heard the aircraft impact on a hillside. There was no indication of equipment failure or malfunction.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Admiral Crowe sent a letter of condolence to the ROK JCS Chairman and the families of General Kim and BGEN Sung, whose superb military reputations were well known throughout the Pacific Basin.<sup>4</sup>

Seizure of U.S. Tuna Boat by Solomon Islands

(C) On 4 August Admiral Crowe informed the Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense that he had been following with concern the incident involving the Solomon Islands government (SIG) seizure on 28 June 1984 of the U.S. fishing boat JEANETTE DIANA, alleged to have been operating illegally in the Solomons' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In light of actions taken which indicated an

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1. J311 HistSums Apr-May 84 (U); COGARD MSO Mobile 241614Z Apr 84 (U) and USCINCPAC 082351Z May 84 (U).
  2. COMUSKOREA 120804Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR; SSO Korea 121045Z Jul 84 (U) (BOM).
  3. SSO Korea 180400Z Jul 84 (U)(BOM).
  4. USCINCPAC 140211Z Jul 84 (U)(BOM).

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impasse in the negotiations between the SIG and the owners for return of the boat, Admiral Crowe was particularly concerned that the U.S. government manage the problem in such a manner as to avoid potential long-term and serious damage which could affect our overall relations with the SIG and other South Pacific island nations.<sup>1</sup>

(C) USCINCPAC's interest in this issue stemmed from the rather fragile relationship the United States enjoyed with a number of Pacific island nations in terms of our determination to pursue an effective strategic denial policy in the region. The Soviets continued to make overtures to some of the island nations, including the SIG, in attempting to attain a foothold in the area. So far, as a result of influences that the ANZUS partners had brought to bear, the Soviets had enjoyed limited success in these attempts. However, along with Vanuatu, the Solomons was perhaps the most uncertain nation in the region in this context and could be susceptible to Soviet blandishments. The USPACOM had invested substantial effort over the past several years to insure that the island nations were well disposed toward USN ship visits. SIG Prime Minister Mamaloni had recently been a guest of USCINCPAC.

(C) Admiral Crowe believed it essential that the fishing boat issue be handled in the calmest and most diplomatic fashion possible. This would avoid inflaming the SIG and precipitating a chain of reactions which could jeopardize not only our relationship with the Solomons but also with others in the region. He sought the Departments' assistance in devising an approach which would contribute to our long-term ties in the South Pacific and, thereby, protect our important security interests there.<sup>2</sup>

(C) The Assistant Secretary apprised the Acting Secretary of State that although there had been innumerable seizures of American tuna boats going back to the 1950s, what made this seizure unprecedented was the failure to get the boat back. In all other situations except one (where the owner had to buy back the vessel), the boats were released on the payment of fines, license fees, or similar charges. In the case of JEANETTE DIANA, the crew was forcibly removed from the vessel, damage to some of its systems apparently followed as a result of mishandling by an inexperienced SIG crew, and the boat had been offered for sale by public tender (at a price of \$2.7 million). The U.S. government was making it clear that it was not in the interest of the SIG to try to sell to a third party because of the title cloud and potential damage to our bilateral relations.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Economic damage to the SIG through application of the "Magnuson Act," which provided for American economic sanctions against any nation impounding a U.S. fishing vessel, would be severe. It would end the annual export of about

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1. USCINCPAC 040517Z Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. SECSTATE 100016Z Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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\$12 million worth of Solomon Islands tuna (one-sixth of its total export trade) to canneries in Pago Pago and San Diego. The embargo was to become effective 23 August.<sup>1</sup>

Soviet Detention of U.S. Barge and Crew

~~(C)~~ The Soviet Foreign Ministry called in a U.S. Embassy Moscow officer to state that on 12 September 1984 an American self-propelled barge, FREIDA-K of Juneau, AK, with a crew of five, had penetrated 15 cables' lengths (1.75 miles) into Soviet territorial waters at 65°51'N/168°58'W in the direction of the island of Osmanov, and was intercepted by Soviet security forces and escorted into Bucht Provideniya (Bay of Providence). The crew was being accommodated at a local hotel. The captain allegedly admitted having inadvertently violated the border of the USSR and had signed relevant documents.<sup>2</sup>

~~(C)~~ On 18 September the Secretary of State requested Coast Guard assistance in providing a suitable cutter to act on behalf of the Department of State in accepting the barge FREIDA-K and her five crewmembers detained in the USSR. The transfer was to take place in international waters in the vicinity of the Bay of Providence (Chukotski Peninsula) at approximately 191700Z September. The captain of the cutter was empowered to sign Soviet documents for the release on behalf of the United States government.<sup>3</sup>

Soviet Submarine on Fire in the Sea of Japan

(U) A Soviet GOLF II diesel ballistic missile submarine (SSB), which had been seen on fire and drifting on the surface in the Sea of Japan off the Japanese coast, was able to make her way back to Vladivostok under her own power after 52 hours of firefighting and damage control efforts. Analysis of pictures taken by JMSDF P-3Cs indicated the fire was started by an electrical overload caused when the boat caught and badly damaged a Japanese fishing boat's nets on the night of 18 September 1984. The shrimper was pulled backwards and the steel cable holding the net 60m below the surface was cut.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The P-3C had found the sub on the surface on 20 September, 90 km northwest of Okino Island. Abnormally thick white smoke was issuing from the sail. A NATYA I minesweeper was accompanying. Thirty minutes later the boat dived, either to extinguish the fire or avoid the cameras. An hour and a half later the boat resurfaced. No smoke was seen. The next day smoke was again observed and an oiler and tug sprayed water on the hull. That night the sub was towed, and then continued under her own power at 9 kts towards Vladivos-

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1. USIS Canberra 09076/270225Z Aug 84 (U); SECSTATE 248057/220344Z Aug 84 (U). (Note: The embargo was not lifted until March 1985.)
  2. AMEMB Moscow 11751/140945Z Sep 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. SECSTATE 276320/181945Z Sep 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  4. Jane's Defense Weekly, 6 Oct 84, p. 566

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
tok. The GOLF II operated as the Soviets' theater nuclear force, and was capable of carrying three nuclear missiles.<sup>1</sup>

Hotel Fire in Baguio, Philippines

(U) The Baguio Pines Hotel was hit by a disastrous fire near midnight on 24 October 1984. The 217-room hotel, in which there were reportedly 330 registered guests, was totally destroyed. Early reports listed American casualties as at least two dead, seven missing and presumed dead, and 51 injured. The remaining uninjured Americans were returning to Manila. The injured had been evacuated by the USAF to the Clark AB Regional Medical Center (RMC).<sup>2</sup>

(U) In its final report of the incident Headquarters Thirteenth Air Force said 135 of the victims had been received at the Clark AB RMC. Eight persons had been transported by helicopter, 43 by C-130 transport, and the remainder by bus from Baguio. Six were put in intensive care, with three requiring surgery. Twenty-eight others were admitted, treated for minor injuries, and released. Drug prescriptions lost in the fire were replaced by the RMC pharmacy, as were eight pairs of eyeglasses. The entire Clark community responded to the disaster. Base facilities remained open to provide meals, clothing, and replacement funds. An overwhelming, voluntary turnout of people on the base assured that the evacuees were met and taken care of on an individual basis.<sup>3</sup>


(U) Admiral Crowe commended the Thirteenth Air Force commander and Clark AB personnel who provided assistance to the victims of the Baguio hotel fire. He said the aircrews and medical personnel exhibited the highest degree of professionalism in responding to this tragedy. As it had so many times in the past, the Clark AB community once again demonstrated a faithful and humanitarian response to others in need.<sup>4</sup>



1. Ibid.
2. AMEMB Manila 29233/240735Z Oct 84 (U).
3. 13AF 251510Z Oct 84 (U).
4. USCINCPAC 270450Z Oct 84 (U)(BOM).

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1. CINC UNC CFC 231106Z Nov 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
  2. UPI Seoul, 23-26 Nov 84 (U).
  3. AMEMB Seoul 12424/230856Z Nov 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
  4. CINC UNC CFC 231040Z Nov 84 (~~S/REL ROK~~) and JCS 270030Z Nov 84 (~~S~~), both DECL OADR.

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(U) The Soviet defector departed Seoul on the night of 29 November under arrangements made by the Rome-headquartered UNHCR. In Italy he was expected to prepare for permanent settlement in the United States, according to a ROK MOFA official. Matuzok would be treated as a temporary refugee in Rome until

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1. CINCUNC 241204Z Nov 84 (U).
  2. SECSTATE 348362/241919Z Nov 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Seoul 12563/280709Z Nov 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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his final trip to the United States. At the request of the UNHCR, Matuzok was accompanied on the trip by a ROK Red Cross official. The UN Development Program in Seoul acted as an intermediary contact in arranging the Russian's trip, the official said.<sup>1</sup>



(U) In response to USCINCPAC's request for additional details, the U.S. Ambassador in Paris stated de Rosnay's family had said the sail was reddish-orange, the board was black, and he was equipped with a compass, whistle, and distress signal mirror. He also had a camera with flash, which might be used for signalling, and a device for releasing orange-red dye. The family later added that de Rosnay was wearing a type of wet suit, and could survive longer in the relatively warm water of the strait. Also, the mast might have broken and he could have drifted to the south. It was confirmed that de Rosnay's wife was an American, whose parents lived in Hawaii.<sup>4</sup>

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1. UPI Seoul, 30 Nov 84 (U).
  2. J311 HistSum Nov 84 (U); USDAO Paris 44953/271120Z Nov 84 (U); AMEMB Paris 45098/272110Z Nov 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 280127Z Nov 84 (U).
  4. AMEMB Paris 45101/280354Z and 45136/281452Z Nov 84, both (U).

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(U) The USDAO Beijing informed RCC Kadena that as of 280900Z, PRC authorities were still studying the U.S. Embassy request to permit USAF SAR aircraft to fly up to 8 NM off the coast in the search effort. Basically, they preferred to carry out the search with their own aircraft and were evidently studying this possibility. Meanwhile, the USAF aircraft was terminating its flight over international waters and returning to Kadena AB. It would try again the next day.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In accordance with recommendations from PACAF and the WESTPAC RCC, USCINCPAC on 30 November approved the discontinuance of further U.S. SAR flights. The USDAO Beijing advised that the PRC was also terminating its SAR efforts. They had sent out four aircraft and four ships all day on 1 December, concentrating on the area suggested by the United States and looking on islands and shoals, with no sightings.<sup>2</sup>

### Southeast Asia MIA Resolution Efforts

#### The JCRC Program

(U) At the close of U.S. involvement in Indochina there were 3,408 U.S. personnel (military and civilian) unaccounted for. A total of 725 prisoners of war had been returned to U.S. control; remains of 192 were recovered and identified; 2,491 personnel remained unaccounted for. The JCS established the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) in 1973 as the DOD agency to resolve the status of these individuals. The JCRC was a Joint Services organization functioning under the operational control of USCINCPAC and was located at Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI. A liaison office (JCRC LNO) was located at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok.<sup>3</sup>


(U) The U.S. government had stated that resolution of the POW/MIA issue was of the highest national priority. The principal obstacle to resolution, however, was intransigence on the part of communist governments in Southeast Asia, who continued to link progress on the issue to diplomatic concessions. The JCRC possessed information which, coupled with site inspections, could lead to the resolution of a significant number of cases, although some could never be resolved due to such factors as loss at sea or total disintegration. The POW/MIA issue was being pursued by two primary methods: information gathered from refugees departing Southeast Asia, and government-to-government technical meetings during which negotiations were conducted. An agreement had been reached with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in 1982 to allow four meetings per year, but the actual frequency was only about once a year. Meetings were on an ad hoc basis with the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR). There was no contact with the government in Kampuchea. The JCRC felt

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1. USDAO Beijing 22271/280935Z Nov 84 (U).
  2. USCINCPAC 302211Z Nov 84 and USDAO Beijing 22634/040330Z Dec 84, both (U).
  3. JCRC Point Paper (U), 19 Jul 84, Subj: Status of POW/MIA Situation.

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
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that the outlook for continued progress was excellent, but for full resolution was poor.<sup>1</sup>



1. Ibid.
2. JCRC Point Paper (C), 19 Jul 84, Subj: JCRC Refugee Interview Program (U), DECL OADR.
3. JCRC Point Paper (U), 19 Jul 84, Subj: JCRC Activities in Thailand.

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
1. SECSTATE 021025/240527Z Jan 84 (~~C~~), DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. SECSTATE 050311/180920Z Feb 84 (U).
4. Ibid.

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1. JCRC Liaison Bangkok 221305Z Feb 84 (S)(EX), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.


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1. SECDEF 020135Z Mar 84 ~~(C)~~ and 170105Z Mar 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
  2. SECDEF 170105Z Mar 84 ~~(C)~~ and 030118Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~; JCRC Liaison Bangkok 191357Z Mar 84 ~~(C)~~ and 301240Z Mar 84 ~~(C)~~, all DECL OADR.
  3. SECDEF 131705Z Apr 84 ~~(S)~~(EX) and ADMIN USCINCPAC 142053Z Apr 84 ~~(S)~~; both DECL OADR.

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
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1. JCRC Liaison Bangkok 170859Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
2. JCRC Liaison Bangkok 261007Z May 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
3. SECSTATE 189225/272124Z Jun 84 ~~(C)~~(EX) and AMEMB Bangkok 32973/300325Z Jun 84 ~~(C)~~(EX), both DECL OADR.

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
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1. USDAO Manila 17531/300400Z Jun 84 (C), SECDEF 022239Z Jul 84 (C), and AMEMB Bangkok 33309/030749Z Jul 84 (C)(EX), all DECL OADR; CDR JCRC 100800Z Jul 84 (U).
2. SECDEF 272238Z Jul 84 (U) and 011428Z Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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
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1. JCRC Liaison Bangkok 181228Z Aug 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
2. JCRC Liaison Bangkok 271253Z Oct 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
3. SECSTATE 012926/161501Z Jan 84 ~~(C)~~(EX), DECL OADR.

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
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1. Ibid.
2. SECSTATE 014377/171848Z Jan 84 ~~(C)~~(EX), DECL OADR.
3. USCINCPAC 080335Z Nov 84 ~~(C)~~ and AMEMB Vientiane 1766/191035Z Dec 84 ~~(C)~~  
(EX), both DECL OADR.

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1. USCINCPAC 080335Z Nov 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. AMEMB Beijing 00383/9 Jan 84 ~~(S)~~(EX), DECL OADR, retransmitted by SECSTATE 006312/100143Z Jan 84.

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Designation and Burial of the Vietnam Unknown

(U) On 17 May the Vietnam Unknown was designated at Pearl Harbor and began his long journey to burial in Arlington National Cemetery on Memorial Day, 1984. A month earlier the Secretary of Defense had announced his decision to proceed with the interment of an unknown Serviceman from the Vietnam era. USCINCPAC and his staff, in cooperation with the Army's Military District of Washington ceremonial and special events personnel, planned for and executed the solemn, flawless, 20-minute designation and departure ceremony at Pearl Harbor. The designation of the candidate as the Vietnam Unknown was ceremoniously performed by a Congressional Medal of Honor winner of the Vietnam War, SgtMaj Allan J. Kellogg, Jr., USMC, of the Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor.

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1. USCINCPAC 110305Z Jan 84 (~~S~~)(EX); SECSTATE 051777/220107Z Feb 84 (~~S~~)(EX); AMEMB Beijing 07040/27 Apr 84 (~~C~~)(EX), retransmitted by SECSTATE 030550Z May 84, and DECL OADR.
  2. USDAO Beijing 301014Z May 84 (~~C~~)(EX), DECL OADR.
  3. OASD (PA) New Release 190-84, 13 Apr 84 (U); Program brochure provided to spectators at the ceremony at Bravo Pier, Pearl Harbor, on the day of the ceremony. The records of preparation for the ceremony are retained in J044 archives.

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(U) In remarks in the program provided to guests, Admiral Crowe noted that the ceremony was particularly meaningful for the families of those who sacrificed their lives, and those who were still missing. "We must never forget the almost 2,500 Americans who are still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia." He especially welcomed the families of MIAs who were present. Admiral Foley, CINCPACFLT, delivered remarks at the ceremony, representing Admiral Crowe who was not present. General O'Malley, CINCPACAF, presented the Purple Heart medal to the Unknown. Prayers were offered by three chaplains, and an aerial review was flown by aircraft of the Hawaii Air National Guard.

- (U) The Vietnam Unknown departed Pearl Harbor on USS BREWTON (FF-1086), escorted by the Coast Guard cutter STOREY, and proceeded to Alameda Naval Air Station, CA, arriving on 24 May. The Unknown was transported to the Base Chapel at Travis AFB and on the 25th was flown to Andrews AFB, MD, and on to the U.S. Capitol Rotunda. On Memorial Day, 28 May, the funeral procession with the caisson left for Arlington National Cemetery. A flyover was held as the caisson was centered on Memorial Bridge. President Reagan presided over the impressive State funeral service, followed by interment in the Tomb of the Unknowns, joining the Unknowns from World War I, World War II, and the Korean War.<sup>1</sup>

(U) As noted above, a technical adviser and the pallbearer section for the designation ceremony in Hawaii were provided by the Army's Military District of Washington. The pallbearers from Washington were used because of the unique lifting sequences and the synchronized movement required.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The following information is taken from some proposed questions and answers prepared by the Military District of Washington for use with media representatives regarding the selection and designation process. Public Law 93-43, which had directed the Secretary of Defense to inter the Unknown, required that he be an American Serviceman who lost his life during the Vietnam era, who served in Southeast Asia, and who was unidentifiable. Unlike previous conflicts when there were many unidentified remains, there was only one unidentified remains from the Vietnam conflict that was qualified to be the Vietnam Unknown.<sup>3</sup>

(U) In World War I, where 1,648 Americans were unidentified, the Unknown was selected from one of four remains. In World War II there were 8,526 unidentified. The Pacific candidate was selected from among 8 unidentified and the European candidate from among 13. The World War II Unknown was then selected from those two candidates. The Korean War had 848 unidentified, and the Unknown was selected from four of those. During the Vietnam War, casualties were quickly evacuated from the battlefield, identified in mortuaries,

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1. Ibid.

2. ADMIN USCINCPAC 090301Z May 84 (U); USCINCPAC 211830Z May 84 (U).

3. HQ USAMDW WASH DC 141000Z May 84 (U).


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and then flown home. In addition, better medical records and advanced technology had allowed very high success in identifying remains from that war. The U.S. Army CILHI had the greatest capability for identifying remains of any organization within the Defense Department and still received remains from Vietnam and earlier wars.

(U) Thus, the Vietnam Unknown was not selected, but was designated. As the Unknown represented all Services and all races, creeds, colors, and national origins, anonymity was paramount so all records concerned with the unidentifiable remains were destroyed, as they had been following earlier selections because the Archivist of the United States approved their disposal as being in the public interest.

(U) The tomb in Arlington had originally been designed for only one soldier and now held four. There were no plans at the time to make room for any Unknown in future wars.<sup>1</sup>




1. Ibid.
2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol II, p. 435.
3. J313 HistSums Jan-Dec 84 (U).

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1. CNO 060019Z May 84 (U).
2. AMEMB Bangkok 04023/241219Z Jan 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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Tropical Cyclones

(U) During 1984 a total of 87 tropical cyclones occurred in the USPACOM. The areas of occurrence were as follows: 24 in the Eastern North Pacific, 2 in the Central North Pacific, 30 in the Western Pacific, 12 in the South Pacific, 15 in the Indian Ocean, 3 in the Bay of Bengal, and 1 in the Arabian Sea. Of these 87 tropical cyclones, there were 2 super typhoons (130 kts or greater), 41 typhoons/hurricanes (64-129 kts), 36 tropical storms (34-63 kts), and 8 tropical depressions (33 kts or less).<sup>3</sup>

(U) Although the majority of the tropical cyclones which occurred in the USPACOM in 1984 formed and dissipated over open water, 41 of these systems struck countries in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, with some causing considerable death and destruction. China was struck 8 times, Australia 6, Mexico 5, the Philippines 4, Taiwan 4, India 3, Vietnam 3, Madagascar 2, Somalia 2, Japan 1, Korea 1, Mozambique 1, and the Northern Marianas 1. The Philippines suffered the most in 1984, with three typhoons sweeping across the islands from the east, first over the north in August, then the south in September, and finally across the center in November. Thousands lost their lives and material damage was very extensive. The following tropical cyclones caused loss of life and/or property damage, or were otherwise significant to the USPACOM during the year.<sup>4</sup>

Disaster in Madagascar and U.S. Navy Assistance


(U) TC 30S (KAMISY) was by far the most significant and destructive system of this year's Southern Indian Ocean tropical cyclone season which had commenced on 1 July 1983. KAMISY formed approximately 900 miles east of Madagascar on 6 April and moved rapidly westward as it increased in intensity.

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1. Ibid.
  2. SECSTATE 023690/260157Z Jan 84 (C)(EX), DECL OADR.
  3. J37 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
  4. Ibid.

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
The cyclone, now with sustained winds in excess of 100 kts, crossed the northern tip of Madagascar near Diego Suarez (Antsiranana) and then, after striking the southern Comoro Islands, made an abrupt turn to the southeast. KAMISY again struck the northwestern coast of Madagascar near Majunga (Mahajanga) with winds in excess of 80 kts. After crossing the island from west to east, KAMISY finally dissipated over open ocean on 13 April. The strong winds and heavy rains brought by the storm resulted in tremendous destruction to the northern one-third of Madagascar. There were at least 50 deaths and more than 65,000 people were without shelter. Heavy rains caused extensive flooding throughout the area. There was also major damage to the island's sugar cane, rice, vanilla, and shrimping industries. Initial estimates were that the overall damage was over \$100 million.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Antananarivo reported that just when Madagascar thought the rainy season had finally ended, KAMISY roared in and devastated the north of the island, bringing with it high wind and heavy rain, inflicting much damage to Diego Suarez and Nosy Be. KAMISY tore off the tin roofs of houses and smashed huts throughout the region. In Nosy Be at least one of the largest tourist hotels was damaged. The Catholic Relief Service was providing food, clothing, and medicines for the cyclone victims and the French were also involved in assistance measures. The Malagasy government was flying emergency rice supplies to Diego Suarez and Nosy Be for free distribution until an expected ship delivery of 2,000 tons arrived in the area. The Embassy had not yet received a direct request for U.S. assistance, but this message was sent before KAMISY reversed directions and hit Madagascar again. There were also sketchy reports of serious damage in the Comoros, and that over half the inhabitants of Mayotte were homeless.<sup>2</sup>

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1. J37 HistSum Apr 84 (U).
  2. AMEMB Antananarivo 00964/121305Z Apr 84 (U).
  3. DIA 130330Z Apr 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.


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1. AMEMB Antananarivo 00993/151232Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 200236Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. USS HECTOR 191607Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  4. SECSTATE 118237/211758Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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1. USS HECTOR 241445Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~ and 251800Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.
  2. USS HECTOR 261815Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, 281800Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, and 291705Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, all DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Antananarivo 01128/271112Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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Typhoon IKE: Worst on Record in the Philippines

(U) Typhoon IKE (NITANG) was easily the most destructive tropical cyclone to occur in the USPACOM in recent years. It formed on 27 August just south of Guam and initially tracked in a northwesterly direction as it rapidly intensified to typhoon strength. Late on the 28th IKE abruptly changed course to the south and finally settled on a westerly track as it continued to grow in strength. The system slammed into northern Mindanao Island, Philippines, on 1 September with sustained winds of 125 kts, gusting to 150 kts. IKE left a trail of death and destruction as it moved across the central Philippines, finally passing into the South China Sea near Mindoro on 3 September. After crossing the sea on a northwesterly track IKE made landfall again on Hainan Island, China, and gradually dissipated on 6 September. In the Philippines several thousand people were believed killed and several hundred thousand others made homeless. Most loss of life was from flooding and storm surges in coastal areas, especially in fishing villages.


(U) Meanwhile, USCINCPACREP Philippines said the U.S. military community there was raising funds in a "neighbors helping neighbors" campaign for disaster relief. Participation was purely voluntary; there would be no goals,

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1. USCINCPAC 280121Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  2. J37 HistSum Sep 84 (U).
  3. AMEMB Manila 24440/061312Z Sep 84 ~~(C)~~ and USCINCPAC 110039Z Sep 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.

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quotas, or guidelines; no records would be maintained of command participation. The call to charity would issue from the pulpit, not from headquarters. Admiral Crowe enthusiastically supported this private program to assist victims of Typhoon IKE. He said efforts such as these would not only demonstrate genuine concern for our fellow human beings, but also have a long-term, positive impact on relations between our Servicemen and women and the Filipino people. Admiral Crowe also informed his component commanders, Admiral Foley, General O'Malley, and LT GEN Lee of this grass-roots effort, and asked if they might wish to consider similar voluntary measures involving Service members and their families in Hawaii. The Philippine government had initially indicated a desire to take care of its own, but unofficial efforts were another option.<sub>1</sub>



(U) Three weeks after the typhoon struck, the death toll stood at 1,238, with 538 more missing, 1,297 injured, and more than 200,000 people homeless, according to Philippine Red Cross officials. The Office of Civil Defense had listed more than 1,000 people still missing. Surigao del Norte alone recorded 776 deaths and Bohol, about 50 miles to the east, registered 179 deaths. The worst previous storm in the Philippines since World War II, in 1951, had killed 763 people.<sub>3</sub>

(U) USCINCPACREP Philippines said the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps there had raised more than \$50,000 in contributions during the "neighbors helping neighbors" typhoon relief campaign. Significantly, more than two-thirds of that amount was credited to charitable contributions of SEVENTH Fleet sailors. USS MIDWAY (CV-41) alone raised \$10,700. Proceeds were being converted into

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1. USCINCPAC REP Philippines 120506Z Sep 84 (U); USCINCPAC 140256Z Sep 84 (U), and 150255Z Sep 84 (U).
  2. AMEMB Manila 25091/131121Z Sep 84 (C), DECL OADR; SECSTATE 274622/150504Z Sep 84 (U).
  3. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 6 Sep and 1 Oct 84, from AP, Manila (U).

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food, tools, building materials, and medicines, with distribution via a network of religious leaders in the central and southern provinces who were working with the U.S. Facility, Subic Bay Naval Base Chaplain to insure direct benefit to those in need. On 13-14 October U.S. Navy personnel transported medical supplies, food, and wood to build 600 fishing boats, nearly 1,000 fishing nets, and other relief materials to Surigao for distribution directly to the typhoon victims.<sup>1</sup>

### Other Significant Tropical Cyclones

(U) Of the five tropical cyclones in the USPACOM area during January 1984, only TC 13S (DOMOINA) was significant due to the destruction it caused in making landfall in Southeast Africa. She formed approximately 225 miles off the northeast coast of Madagascar on 19 January and initially tracked westward, losing a great deal of intensity crossing that large island. After reaching the warmer waters of the Mozambique Channel, however, DOMOINA reintensified rapidly as it tracked southwestward toward the mainland coast of Africa. It made landfall on 28 January with sustained winds of 60 kts. Extensive flooding caused by the torrential rains resulted in widespread flooding throughout southern Mozambique, Swaziland, and eastern South Africa where at least 19 people were reported to have died by drowning.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The next tropical cyclone of significance to the USPACOM, CHLOE, formed on 27 February just off the northwest coast of Australia, some 475 miles southwest of Darwin. As it traveled southwesterly off the Australian coast, CHLOE gradually intensified to 75 kts sustained winds just before landfall near Port Hedland. Although CHLOE initially posed a threat to the Naval Communications Station at H.E. Holt near North West Cape on 1 March, it dissipated rapidly over land and caused no damage before passing out to sea again.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The most destructive tropical cyclone of March was KATHY, which formed in the Coral Sea on the 19th just east of York Peninsula, Australia. This system initially moved westward across the peninsula but once it reached the Gulf of Carpentaria, turned to the southwest and intensified rapidly. KATHY again made landfall on the southwestern gulf coast near Borroloola with sustained winds of some 75 kts and virtually flattened this small town of 450 inhabitants. Winds gusting to 174 mph were reportedly experienced as KATHY slammed into the town. Remarkably, only one life was reported lost. The cyclone dissipated just inland of the coast on 23 March.<sup>4</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC 110004Z Oct 84 (U) and CNO 201504Z Oct 84 (U).
  2. J37 HistSum Jan 84 (U).
  3. J37 HistSum Mar 84 (U).
  4. Ibid.

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(U) In August there were 13 tropical cyclones in the USPACOM area--7 in the Western Pacific, 1 in the Central Pacific, and 5 in the Eastern Pacific. The strongest one of the month, DINAH, formed on 24 July approximately 550 miles west-northwest of Wake Island and intensified rapidly as it moved to the southwest. However, on 26 July, DINAH, now at typhoon strength, looped to the north and finally settled on a northwesterly track. It dissipated over open water about 500 miles south of the Aleutian Islands. This system was significant in that it reached sustained wind speeds of 125 kts on the 28th, and traveled over 2,600 miles in its 8-day life span.<sup>1</sup>


- (U) HOLLY formed 350 miles southeast of Okinawa on 16 August and initially tracked westward before turning north and intensifying to typhoon strength. As it approached Okinawa a decision was made to fly aircraft away from Kadena AB to safe havens. The center of HOLLY passed 90 miles to the west of Okinawa on 19 August, dumping 15-16 inches of rain on the island as it went by. The system continued north and then turned to the northeast just south of Korea, passing through Tsushima Strait, sparing both the Korean Peninsula and the main islands of Japan. It finally dissipated over open water just to the west of Hokkaido on 22 August. Reports from Okinawa indicated that only light damage was suffered on the island as a result of the strong winds and heavy rain.

(U) KELI formed approximately 675 miles southwest of Hilo, Hawaii, on 17 August. As the system moved in a west-northwesterly direction, it rapidly attained hurricane strength and tracked toward Johnston Island. KELI passed 60 miles west of the island with winds of 95 kts on 21 August and then rapidly dissipated the next day. Earlier, when it was first determined that KELI might strike Johnston, fear that the hurricane-force winds and high seas would totally overwhelm the facilities there resulted in a decision to completely evacuate all personnel to Hickam AFB. At 200400Z KELI was reported as being 200 NM south-southeast of Johnston Island and moving north-northwest with maximum sustained winds of 100 kts and gusts to 120 kts. However, Johnston suffered little damage from the hurricane.<sup>2</sup>

(U) JUNE formed suddenly 125 miles east of Luzon Island, Philippines, on 28 August and tracked due west, striking the island with 50-kt winds that same day. After crossing Luzon JUNE turned to the northwest and finally dissipated over the Chinese mainland on 30 August. Although JUNE never attained typhoon strength, this innocent-sounding tropical storm brought considerable death and destruction to northern Luzon. Reports were received that at least 67 people were killed and 30,000 left homeless there as a result of flooding and mud slides triggered by heavy rains from the storm.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J37 HistSum Aug 84 (U).
  2. Ibid., DCA PAC 200715Z Aug 84 (U).
  3. J37 HistSum Aug 84 (U).

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(U) The ROK government declared a state of civil defense emergency as the torrential rains began to fall across the country's northern third. They caused floods which left (as of 4 September) at least 101 dead, 49 missing, and more than 30,000 homes destroyed. Some 114,000 persons, mostly in the Seoul-Inchon area, were forced from their homes as the rain-swollen Han River overflowed and backed up drainage systems in low-lying areas. The Han crested on 2 September, flooding large areas with 3-4 ft of water. There was property damage of about \$48 million. Seoul's water supply was affected, as were electrical and telephone services. Areas north and east of the capital were also flooded. Damage to the nation's ready-to-harvest rice crop was heavy. Some 66,000 hectares of cropland (about 5.5 percent of Korea's total) were flooded. Over half a million people were mobilized for relief and rehabilitation work.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Osan CCP 020554Z Sep 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
  2. COMUSKOREA 040445Z Sep 84 (~~C/REL~~ ROK), DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Seoul 09412/030242Z Sep 84 (U) and 09463/040818Z Sep 84 (U).

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(U) In a surprise move North Korea offered (and even more surprisingly, the ROK accepted) large amounts of relief supplies to flood-devastated South Korea through their Red Cross channels. A total of 1,393 truckloads of rice, textiles, and medical supplies were unloaded at Panmunjom on 29-30 September. They included 7,200 tons of rice, 500,000 meters of textiles, and 759 boxes of medical supplies. A ceremony was then held during which ROK Red Cross officials presented 1,600 "thank you" parcels (worth about \$500 each) to their North Korean counterparts. The gift parcels were loaded onto the last trucks heading north. There was heavy press coverage by both North and South Korean journalists. Everything went smoothly and the operation was completed without incident. In addition, 12 DPRK vessels loaded with cement departed for South Korean waters; 8 headed for Inchon on the west coast and 4 headed for Pukpyong on the east coast. Unloading began at Inchon on the 30th, but would not be completed at either port for several days. Some 90,000 tons of cement were on 11 ships. The 12th, the ill-fated 13,000-ton freighter TAEDONGGANG-KO, laden with cement, sank in North Korean waters en route to Inchon.<sup>1</sup>

(U) VANESSA formed on 22 October approximately 600 miles east-southeast of Guam, then tracked west-northwesterly and rapidly intensified to typhoon strength. With the approach to Guam, aircraft not able to be hangared were evacuated from Andersen AFB and NAS Agana, and ships capable of getting underway were sortied from Apra Harbor. However, VANESSA passed about 70 miles south of Guam and only minor damage was reported to installations on the island. As the system continued to maintain its west-northwesterly track and intensified to super typhoon strength, it posed a potential danger to Okinawa. Thus, aircraft at Kadena AB were likewise flown away as a precaution. But when 350 miles south of Okinawa and headed north, VANESSA made an abrupt turn to the northeast and finally dissipated over open water on 31 October. VANESSA was the most intense typhoon to occur in the USPACOM in 1984, as it attained sustained winds of 155 kts and gusts to 190 kts.<sup>2</sup>

(U) WARREN started as a tropical depression in the South China Sea approximately 350 miles southwest of Manila on 23 October. The system slowly meandered northward and gradually intensified to minimal typhoon strength. On 27 October WARREN turned eastward and suddenly posed a threat to Subic and Clark. As a result, aircraft--some of which had just arrived from Okinawa due to the threat of VANESSA to that island--were evacuated from NAS Cubi Point and Clark AB and ships were sortied from Subic Bay. However, WARREN stalled about 125 miles west of Subic Bay, then reversed course and finally dissipated over the South China Sea on 31 October.<sup>3</sup>

(U) AGNES formed on 1 November approximately 450 miles south of Guam. As the system tracked west-northwesterly it rapidly intensified so that by the

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1. AMEMB Seoul 10461/010534Z Oct 84 (U).
  2. J37 HistSum Oct 84 (U).
  3. Ibid.

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time it slammed into the central Philippines near Samar Island on 4 November, AGNES had sustained winds of 125 kts. After wreaking havoc through the islands it crossed the South China Sea and struck central Vietnam near Qui Nhon with winds of 85 kts on 7 November before dissipating over the highlands the next day. The Philippines, still reeling from the blows of Typhoon IKE two months before, again suffered tremendous damage. At least 257 people were reported dead and more than 230,000 were left homeless. In Vietnam, although there were no reported deaths, high winds and heavy rains caused considerable damage to structures and utilities and severely impacted on agriculture.<sup>1</sup>

(U) BILL formed some 500 miles east of Guam on 8 November and initially tracked westward. As it approached Guam at typhoon strength, aircraft were again flown off to safe havens as a precaution. However, even though BILL passed only 15 miles south of the island with winds around 80 kts, little damage was reported to DOD facilities there. The typhoon continued into the Philippine Sea and, on 14 November, turned to the northwest as it continued to intensify. As BILL passed to the northeast of the Philippines on a northerly track, it abruptly reversed course and dissipated over open water approximately 150 miles east of Luzon on 17 November. However, on 20 November, BILL regenerated and rapidly built back to 50 kts. It dissipated for good, still over water to the east of the Philippines, on 22 November. During its lifespan, Super Typhoon BILL on 15 November reached a maximum intensity of 130 kts of sustained winds.<sup>2</sup>

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1. J37 HistSum Nov 84 (U).

2. Ibid.

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## CHAPTER V

### LOGISTICS

#### SECTION I--PLANS AND POLICY

##### Joint Deployment System Users Conferences

(U) In response to a recommendation from a Joint Deployment System (JDS) general officer steering committee meeting in December 1983, the first of planned quarterly JDS Users Conferences was held at Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) headquarters, MacDill AFB, Florida, from 31 January to 2 February 1984. Two main concepts of the conference were improving functional usability of the JDS and improving the content, format, and summary capability of JDS reports and retrievals. Discussions covered 156 topics with some being tabled until the next conference. Several enhancements to increase JDS flexibility both internally and externally were proposed. While much had been accomplished to allow for management information products, a need still existed to allow the user to perform an ad hoc query function. The graphic information presentation system (GIPSY) was also reviewed, but most of it was still in test phases. A few topics were beyond the conference scope, and there would be separate conferences on such subjects as nonunit related cargo and personnel.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Another Users Conference was held on 6-7 July at the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. Of the 14 subjects discussed, two remained unresolved: the JDS level of detail and the TOA capability to update data on cargo actually available. Requirements for post full operational capability (FOC) for the JDS was also a major subject.<sup>2</sup>

(U) As a result of the July Users Conference, 187 incidents which required resolution were identified, plus an additional 137 technical items. Together, these translated into a need for 91 more capabilities in the JDS of which 95 percent would be available in the full operational capability. Among the topics briefed to attendees at the conference or at the follow-on Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) conference (see below) were the mode optimization and delivery estimation system (MODES); the development, production, and testing schedules for the JDS; screen design and standardization; JDS use in exercises, and the joint planning graphics module (JPGM). Initially, the MODES would be available as a subsystem of the JDS at FOC. It was being designed to provide support to unified command planners, TOAs, and the JDA with the capability to determine and assign optimal modes of movement

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1. J413 HistSum Feb 84 (U).
  2. J413 HistSum Jul 84 (U). Note: TOA refers to the three transportation operating agencies--MAC (Military Airlift Command), MSC (Military Sealift Command), and MTMC (Military Traffic Management Command).

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in a rapid manner. The JPGM was designed for the non-ADP action officer to rapidly plot data from the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD), movement tables or the JDS data base.

(U) A JOPEs conference followed from 8 to 13 July with some 400 attendees from approximately 25 members of the joint deployment community, including 22 from the USPACOM. The JOPEs conference consisted of briefings and workshops on the Operation Planning Steering Group master plan, WIS (WMMCCS Information System), Joint Resource Information Manager, JOPS ADP, and the Force Module.<sup>1</sup>

(U) A third JDS Users Conference was held at MacDill AFB on 10 and 11 December. Unlike previous conferences, this session consisted primarily of briefings, updates, and information presentations as opposed to discussion and resolution of specific issues. Those topics of significance were the FOC, MODES capability at initial operational capability, a users group charter, status of the JDS functional description, status of documentation and full implementation of the JPGM, use of teleconferences during field training exercises, designation of unified CINCs as TOAs for theater assigned airlift, level of detail in the JDS, and updates on JDS training and testing.<sup>2</sup>

(U) While the term Full Operational Capability remained undefined, it was to be interpreted to mean that capability which would be available in September 1985; all other programmed capabilities fell into the category of Post FOC. The FOC briefing identified the modules of the JDS that were scheduled to be available to users by the September FOC date. Regarding designation of unified CINCs as TOAs for theater assigned airlift, USCINCPAC would be allocated intra-theater airlift assets and would require the same capabilities as the TOAs in regard to scheduling, manifesting, and changing airlift in support of deployment moves. Discussion with the JDA revealed that the organic movement scheduling module of the JDS would be enhanced by September 1985 to provide the same capabilities as those available to TOAs. In addition, a system was available that might meet USCINCPAC and PACAF needs for automatic scheduling and merging of intra-theater airlift schedules into the JDS in the same way that inter-theater schedules were created and merged with MAC's closure profile of inter-theater airlift.

### Refinement Conferences

#### Nonunit Related Cargo Conference

(U) The conference to finalize nonunit related cargo (NRC) (also called nonunit supply) procedures for USCINCPAC OPLAN 5000-84 and determine a means to exercise them was held at the JDA headquarters from 15 to 17 February 1984. Objectives were to determine if data being reported satisfied decision-making

1. Ibid.
2. J412 HistSum Dec 84 (U).

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and movement monitoring requirements; who should report the data; and what format should be used. Procedures proposed at the conference were primarily aimed at macro management information and were considered interim until they could be adequately tested and exercised.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In the long term, the JDA was looking toward system interface with a Transportation Coordinator-Automated Command and Control Information System (TC-ACCIS) to provide movement information to the joint deployment community. Until such a system could be developed, however, logistic planners worked toward formulating interim procedures for integrating the movement of NRC from point of origin to destination; even such interim procedures would require testing in exercises and then adaptation to exercise scenarios.

(U) Conference discussion revealed that the JDA scheduling subsystem would distribute allocated lift between forces (by unit line numbers) and NRC (by cargo increment numbers) based on OPLAN prioritization specified by the supported CINC. Initial prioritization would be based on OPLAN TPFDD distribution of lift assets between forces and NRC.

(U) Discussion of tracking critical items resulted in an agreement that monitoring and providing movement status was a Service responsibility best accomplished through MILSTRIP/MILSTAMP and the Defense Transportation System. USCINCPAC and USCINCEUR maintained that the JDA should continue to serve as the focal point for coordination and impact analysis as well as for monitoring and coordinating movements of critical items. The Service representatives, however, held that existing systems were adequate and would not support development of additional systems within the JDS.

#### OPLAN 5000-84

(S) OPLAN 5000-84 constituted a complete revision of the standing USCINCPAC General War Plan. The salient features of the new plan were the incorporation of the USCINCPAC Campaign Plan as the basis for the concept of operations, utilization of significant augmentation forces required to prosecute a war in the Pacific, utilization of force modules in TPFDD development of plan preconflict measures, and identification of actual capabilities to conduct a general war instead of developing unsupportable requirements.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The Phase I TPFDD refinement conference was held at the JDA from 4 to 13 June 1984. Primary conference objectives were to identify and validate specific force, nonunit, and movement requirements and to produce a refined TPFDD that contained accurate data and met time-phasing as desired by USCINCPAC. The conference was attended by representatives from the OJCS, Service headquarters, USCINCPAC and its concerned component and subordinate commands,

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1. J411 HistSum Feb 84 (U).
  2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 449.

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TOAs, SAC, TAC, USCINCRED, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Fuel Supply Center, Air Force Logistics Command, Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM), USCINCSOUTH, FORSCOM, and the Coast Guard.<sup>1</sup>

(U) According to a JDA summary, all nonunit related personnel refinement actions were completed efficiently and effectively. Representation by USCINCPAC, components, and Service headquarters planners contributed immeasurably to a successful conference. Noncombatant as well as medical evacuation requirements were developed and refined. Additionally, each Service finalized replacement requirements for casualty and other losses and generated filler personnel records as needed.

(U) Post Phase I milestones were developed and the Phase II conference was slated for 25 February 1985. Certain issues, however, still required resolution. Sealift and airlift attrition factors--USCINCPAC was to assess the threat to lift assets and provide attrition factors. Class IV planning-- Thus far supported commanders had not been able to generate nonunit civil engineering records successfully from the Civil Engineering Support Plan Generator. Service containerization policy--each Service should develop a standardized containerization policy for each class of supply; then the JCS should include appropriate policy in Annex B of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

(S) Under the global war scenario, USCINCPAC believed that subsequent to initial offload, the near-term prepositioning force (NTPF) ships should be applied to OPLAN 5000-84 common user transportation requirements by the MSC. Because USMC unit mount-out ammunition requirements in early (1-15) days for outload of breakbulk tonnage would exhaust the outload capability at the only West Coast ammunition port at Concord, California, it was once again recommended that USCINCPAC continue initiatives toward developing an enhanced West Coast container ammunition outload capability.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Army nonunit resupply requirements were not developed prior to nor sourced at the conference and all but munitions were to be developed and "sourced" by DARCOM. Because sourcing of other Services munitions requirements had to be accomplished at that same time, Army and SMCA (single manager for conventional ammunition) munitions requirements were to be developed and sourced by DARCOM in time for the munitions Phase I TPFDD refinement conference on 24 September (see below).<sup>3</sup>

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1. JDA 311956Z Jul 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.; USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 448-449.
  3. The word "source," used as a verb, means to identify the available forces or units, (sources of) supply, or replacement personnel to support a plan.

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(U) Following completion of the separate Phase I refinement for munitions, the OPLAN 5000-84 TPFDD was edited by USCINCPAC and Service components and released to the joint deployment community on 13 November 1984. Editing consisted primarily of insuring logical relationships among all data elements in TPFDD records and emphasizing accuracy and completeness of data elements necessary for the TOAs to complete their analysis of transportation requirements. The results of TOA analysis would serve as the basis for strategic movement refinement actions to be completed during the February 1985 Phase II refinement conference.<sup>2</sup>

OPLAN 5001-85


(U) The USCINCPAC OPLAN 5001-85 Initial Logistics Conference was conducted from 12 to 14 December 1984, in conjunction with the Final Forces TPFDD, at Camp Smith with representatives from component and subordinate unified commands, the JDA, MAC, MSC, and MTMC. Major accomplishments derived from the conference were the review and modification by consensus of the logistical guidance and the logistics concept portion of the OPLAN. Logistics guidance, with specific taskings, was promulgated to concerned commands on 1 January 1985.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J416 HistSum Sep 84 (S), DECL OADR. See also USCINCPAC Command History 1981 (TS/PRD), Vol. II, p. 319. Note: In this context, retail assets were considered unit dedicated while wholesale referred to depot level stocks.
  2. J416 HistSum Nov 84 (U).
  3. J418 HistSum Dec 84 (U); USCINCPAC 010157Z Jan 85 (S), DECL OADR.

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Exercises

(U) The Logistics Plans and Policy Division strove to improve the quality of logistics play in major exercises through active participation in the exercise development process. Highlights of the 1984 efforts are described below. For exercise details, see the Operations Chapter of this history.



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1.5(a)

ULCHI FOCUS LENS 84

(U) The annual joint/combined ROK-U.S. CPX for the defense of Korea was conducted 16 to 27 August 1984. USCINCPAC participation in Exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS 84 included the logistics readiness team and augmentation by J4

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1. J419 HistSum Apr 84 (8), DECL OADR.
  2. The word "source," used as a verb, means to identify the available forces or units, (sources of) supply, or replacement personnel to support a plan.

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staff members to the joint exercise control group and the USCINCPAC IG evaluation team. Twelve critique items were submitted by the Director for Logistics and Security Assistance to the Director for Operations.<sup>1</sup>



(U) This was the command's first opportunity to exercise the Joint Deployment System since system change package 8 was brought on line. In addition to building a plan with force modules (FM) using the FM subsystem, USCINCPAC logistic planners were afforded an opportunity to review modules of the scheduling and movement, as well as reports' generation subsystems. (Other than during an exercise in which transportation operating agencies (TOAs) participated, the USCINCPAC staff had no opportunity to exercise JDS procedures and functions.)<sup>3</sup>

(U) Numerous questions from the JCS and the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) highlighted the need for an automated capability to create movement schedules for intra-theater airlift assets (C-130s) and a capability to perform transportation feasibility analysis of mixed mode movements with varying transportation assets. This would be an essential capability in any no-plan situation when courses of action would have to be evaluated rapidly by applying limited lift resources.


(U) The scenario also caused OPLAN 5001 not to be executed which precluded significant resource expenditures and allocation decisions associated with critical readiness and sustainability items. As a result, with the exception

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1. J419 HistSum Aug 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
  2. J419 HistSum Oct 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
  3. Note: The three TOAs were the Military Airlift Command (MAC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

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of reclaims to JCS reallocation directions, the opportunity for substantive logistic play and participation was missed.




(b)(1)  
1.5 (a)  
(c)

1. J418 HistSum Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR; J418 Point Paper (S), 6 Feb 84, Subj: TJS LPP (U), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. II. pp. 454-458.
2. J418 Point Paper (S), 6 Feb 84, Subj: TJS LPP (U), DECL OADR; J413 HistSum May 84 (U); General Arthit Kamlang-Ek, SC, Ltr, 29 Apr 84 (U); J418 Point Paper (S), 3 Apr 84, Subj: TJS LPP (U), DECL OADR; SECSTATE 57601/280537Z Feb 84 (S), DECL OADR.
3. J413 HistSums Mar and May 84 (U).

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


(b)  
1.5(d)  
6

1. USCINCPAC 110830Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL 8 Jun 92; SECSTATE 175411/150357Z Jun 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 102139Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; SECSTATE 259030/310028Z Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
2. AMEMB Bangkok 45314/110822Z Sep 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 030149Z and 240129Z Oct 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
3. CHJUSMAGTHAI 030700Z Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; J413 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 11 Feb 85, Subj: TJSLPP (U), DECL OADR.

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(b)(1)  
1.5(d)  
(a)



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1. J413 HistSum Jun 84 (U); CHJUSMAGTHAI 201141Z and 261015Z Jun 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. CHJUSMAGTHAI 201141Z and 261015Z Jun 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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SECTION II--RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Sustainability

(U) Sustainability in 1984 continued to be USCINCPAC's most pressing everyday concern and is discussed in detail in the Planning chapter of this history. Admiral Crowe sounded his concern on the subject to his superiors at every opportunity as well as to the public through speeches and in the media. In a year-end message to the Secretary of Defense he noted that sustainability was his principal conventional warfare concern and that it would ". . . continue until we are in a position not only to fight at any time, but for a protracted period." His highest priority was ammunition. While noticeable progress had been made, increased requirements had outstripped these improvements in numerous areas.<sup>1</sup>

(U) A review conducted in September 1984 indicated that these improvements in USPACOM's sustainability over the previous four years were attributable to a 155 percent increase since FY 80 in Defense Department sustainability funding. In general terms, all Services reported substantial gains in munitions, particularly PACFLT and PACAF selected critical munitions, USMC ammunition, and Army ground ammunition for Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. divisions. Both petroleum stocks and available tankage were improved. All Services reported gains in repair parts and major end items. Continuing emphasis was required, however, in order to keep pace with equipment modernization, and even if Service Program Objectives Memorandums for FY 86-90 were fully implemented, severe shortages in munitions and petroleum would remain for several years.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Illustrative of Admiral Crowe's concern was a conference on sustainability convened at USCINCPAC headquarters. This first annual conference was attended by some 30 members of component and subordinate unified commands, Central Ammunition Office-Pacific, JCS, and USCINCPAC staffs from 24 to 26 April 1984. Presentations on the USPACOM area of responsibility, OPLAN concepts, and sustainability posture and discussions of JCS issues and initiatives formed the core of the conference.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Agreement and understanding were affirmed that lack of sustainment was the most serious conventional warfare concern in the USPACOM and that munitions and petroleum were the most critical areas which would impact on the

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1. USCINCPAC 250300Z Feb 84 (U); J424 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR; J4/Memo/1050 (U), 12 Sep 84, Subj: Sustainability Improvements Point Paper (U); Washington Post, 31 Jul 84, p. 12, "Admiral Sees Sustainability," by Fred Hiatt.
  2. Ibid.
  3. J424 HistSum Jul 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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**USPACOM SUSTAINABILITY POSTURE (U)**

As of 30 September 1984

CLASS OF SUPPLY	EUSA			25TH INF DIV 1			PACFLT <sup>2</sup>			PACAF		
	DAYS OF SUPPLY	PERCENT ON HAND	* S-RATING	DAYS OF SUPPLY	PERCENT ON HAND	* S-RATING	DAYS OF SUPPLY	PERCENT ON HAND	* S-RATING	DAYS OF SUPPLY	PERCENT ON HAND	* S-RATING
I SUBSISTENCE	45	60	3	2	7	4	41	100 +	1	41	68	3
II CLOTHING	25	33	4	7	23	4	-	18	4	-	83	2
III PACKAGED POL <sup>3</sup>	22	29	4	17	56	3	10	67	3	10	30	4
IV BARRIER	41	54	4	27	89	2	NOT AUTHORIZED					
V AMMUNITION	(US ONLY) 57	(US ONLY) 76	(US ONLY) 2	2	7	4	125	-	4	125	209	1
VII END ITEMS	17	22	4	3	8	4	-	14	4	-	-	2
VIII MEDICAL	14	18	4	15	49	4	-	-	-	-	-	4
IX REPAIR PARTS	29	38	4	14	48	4	26	19.3	4	INCLUDES WAR READINESS SPARES KIT/BASE LEVEL SELF-SUFFICIENT ONLY.		

1. Reflects requirements change.  
 2. FIFAC is included in PACFLT reporting.  
 3. Bulk POL is managed jointly by product.

SOURCE: J42

\* S-Ratings: S-1 Fully Combat Sustainable (50-100%)  
 S-2 Substantially Combat Sustainable (75-85%)  
 S-3 Marginally Sustainable (50-74%)  
 S-4 Not Combat Sustainable (0-49%)

combat capability of USCINCPAC OPLANs. Initiatives in support of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (see WRSA below), were important to the defense of Korea and U.S. interests in Northeast Asia. JCS Memorandum of Policy 172 on military capability reporting was being revised to reflect new reporting for sustainability (e.g., critical items, apportioned CONUS stocks). A strong case was made to include peacetime operating stocks in capability assessments but was not adopted. Critical items would be apportioned during the deliberate planning cycle and then allocated during execution of an OPLAN. The effect that the new Joint Operation Planning and Execution System would have on planning and execution of military forces deployment was also discussed.

Sustainability Reporting

(S) Sustainability ratings (s-ratings) were assigned by class of supply to indicate a percent of fill of items in that class of supply with a modicum of subjective judgment assisting in that assignment. It had proven useful in assessing that portion of sustainability concerned with pre-positioned war reserve stocks and assessing the aggregate condition of a class of supply, but it did not address specific or critical items within a class. An S-rating represented a quantity of stocks on hand against the objective or requirement for that supply class in the most demanding OPLAN. S-ratings were reported in semiannual SITREPs by class of supply with the ten most critical items in each class presented. Operating stocks, either wholesale (support unit) or retail (with unit) assets, were not considered in developing the overall S-rating for a class of supply. Capability reports to the JCS in April 1984 and the update in October rated sustainment from theater pre-positioned War Reserve Stocks as indicated below. The accompanying chart summarizes the overall posture. The significant changes in the 25th Infantry Division columns are the result of requirements changes.<sup>1</sup>

<u>Class of Supply</u>	<u>S-Rating</u>
1	2
2	4
3	4
4	4
5	4
6	4
7	4
8	4
9	3

1. J4233 Point Paper (S), 16 Mar 84, Subj: Sustainability Reporting (U), DECL OADR; J424 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR; CDRWESTCOM 142230Z Sep 84 (S), DECL OADR, Sec. 12 of 19 sections. In this context, retail assets were those positioned for unit usage while wholesale assets were those with a support unit or in some way as backup to retail assets.

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CINCs' Critical Item List

(S) In the fall of 1982 the JCS solicited unified and specified commanders to identify key items most critical to their respective warfighting operations. These items would be considered for production surge planning prior to a crisis or contingency. The JCS compiled and published a composite prioritized listing, based upon the CINCs' submissions, but modified by weight factors applied in consonance with OSD/JCS worldwide priorities.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The following November USCINCPAC submitted a list of some 50 critical munitions, spares, and end items. The JCS composite listing generally conformed to USCINCPAC's items and priorities, with preferred air-to-air munitions such as AIM-7 (SPARROW) and AIM-54 (PHOENIX) missiles at or near the top. The list was regarded by those within OSD/JCS/DLA (Defense Logistics Agency) and the Services as reflecting the "fighting CINCs'" needs and became known as the CINCs' Critical Item List or "CIL." Subsequently, as part of an OSD initiative to enhance the industrial base, the CIL became institutionalized with the publication of DOD Instruction 4003.5M. This instruction approved recommendations contained in JCSM-170-83 directing the Services, DLA, and the JCS to develop a policy for building a surge capability for consumables and for selected critical major weapons systems. It was the JCS intent that the new CIL be used by the OSD and the Services to fund procurement of long lead-time components associated with production of CIL items. In essence, a rolling inventory would be created for those items on the CIL which would permit surge in production if required, yet be consumed as the production line approached completion of the required amounts.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In July 1984 the Logistics Resource Management Division Chief represented USCINCPAC at the CINCs' CIL conference held at Fort McNair, D.C., to reaffirm definitions associated with the CIL and production surge planning. The JCS felt it imperative that logisticians as well as planners meet to establish parameters for the next CIL which was to be submitted as part of the October 1984 CINCs' semi-annual situation report to the JCS. Additionally, the JCS had tasked the National Defense University's Mobilization Concepts Development Center to develop an automated data base and a methodology to prioritize the composite list.

(U) After some controversial discussion, the conferees concluded that OPLANS, as selected and identified by the submitting CINC, would be used as the basis for critical item selection in the October 1984 submission rather

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1. J42 HistSum Jul 84 (U); J42/Memo/S70-84 (S), 2 Aug 84, Subj: Trip Report CIL Conference 17-18 Jul 84 (U), DECL OADR.
  2. J4/SSS/S1247 (U), 12 Sep 84, Subj: Review of draft USCINCPAC Command History for 1984.

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than a Defense Guidance scenario. While the CIL should and could reflect major end items, focus should be on critical item (equipment, munitions, and spares) shortfalls which would preclude CINC accomplishment of assigned Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) tasks and OPLAN requirements--otherwise the list could become a "wish list." The rationale for this was that CINCs were charged with accomplishing the JSCP tasking and the associated OPLANS with Service-assigned forces and logistics. Therefore, the limited resources that might be made available for production surge should be directed to those items most critical to OPLAN accomplishment "today," so that the surge production could make a timely contribution to sustainability.<sup>1</sup>

(U) JCS Memorandum SM-497-84 of 3 August 1984 required each unified and specified CINC in each year's October SITREP to report at least 20 items and/or weapons systems which he considered most critical to his current warfighting capability. The 150 candidates from USCINCPAC Service component and subordinate unified commands were refined to 100 items and weapons systems as defined and prescribed in the JCSM. The CIL was based on execution of USCINCPAC OPLAN 5000-84 and CINCUNC/CFC OPLAN 5027 with today's weapon systems and forces as provided in the current JSCP. The list was weighted toward sustainability in the early days of the campaign and reflected a high weight on gaining air superiority and securing sea lines of communication. It was only to be used in preparing the industrial preparedness planning list and for production surge, and it was not to be substituted or correlated with the CINC's priority warfighting needs submitted to the OJCS, the Defense Resources Board (DRB), and the Services. Once again at the top of the list was the AIM-7M SPARROW followed by the SIDEWINDER, HARPOON, and other missiles.<sup>2</sup>

### Munitions

#### War Reserve Ammunition

(S) USPACOM war reserve ammunition was pre-positioned in Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, Japan, and Korea. A shortfall in war reserve ammunition was a critical element in U.S.-ROK capabilities to meet a major sustained attack from North Korea, and therefore was one of several factors which made OPLAN 5027 logistically unsupportable. Theater requirements for 1984 under OPLAN 5027U were based on the following stockage objectives: Army (75 days of supply)--35 ROK divisions, 1 U.S. division (in-country) and 4 1/3 U.S. divisions (reentry)); Air Force and Marine Corps (60 days of supply); U.S. Marine air

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1. Ibid.

2. J4242 HistSums, Sep and Oct 84 (U); USCINCPAC 152202Z Oct 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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and Navy (60 days of supply)--6 carrier task groups and 7 Marine air squadrons. USPACOM's overall war reserve ammunition posture (in short tons) is depicted below.<sup>1</sup>

31 December 1984

	<u>Requirements</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>Days of Supply</u>
Army/ROKA/ROKMC	1,839,809	843,720	38
Air Force/ ROKAF	79,233 30,228	104,723 21,920	90+ 60
Navy/Marine (Air) ROKN	116,598 4,857	117,480 4,064	90+ 75
Marine (Ground)	<u>30,533</u>	<u>46,733</u>	90+
Total	2,101,258	1,137,305	

(U) Based on available in-theater assets, the munitions shown on the facing chart were critical shortfall items in the USPACOM at the close of 1984 as compared with 1983. War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) were U.S.-titled stocks identified for use by allies.

#### AIM-7 Missile Allocation

(S) For a number of years the AIM-7 (SPARROW) air-to-air missile had been one of the most critical items in the USPACOM for both the Air Force and Navy. In the late seventies, this shortfall was the result of a worldwide shortage caused by earlier decisions not to reopen the production line, as well as by substantial production delays. In 1978 USCINCPAC learned of a revised USAF Tactical Air Missile Program which not only reduced PACAF's allocation but also transferred some 300 missiles to Europe. In an effort to insure a continuous supply of AIM-7s for Korean and USPACOM contingencies, PACAF obtained Air Staff approval for tactical ferry of AIMs by CONUS augmentation forces (at the option of the area commander); further, AIMs, earmarked under the program

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1. J4231 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR; J4/SSS/S1247 (U), 12 Sep 84, Subj: Review of draft USCINCPAC Command History for 1984. Note: HQ DA authorized stockage only for in-theater forces, i.e., 2 divisions. Therefore, the additional 2 1/3 divisions scheduled for deployment to Korea did not have PWRMS in the USPACOM.

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CRITICAL SHORTFALL MUNITIONS IN USPACOM

<u>U.S. Air Force (60-day stockage objective)</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
Level of effort:	<u>Days of Supply</u>	
AGM-65 (MAVERICK)	12	8
Threat oriented:	<u>Percent On-Hand</u>	
AIM-7F (SPARROW)	19	14
<u>U.S. Navy (60-day stockage objective)</u>	<u>Days of Supply</u>	
Level of Effort:		
MK-82/84 Laser Kit (EW09/10) (USMC)	23	8
Sonobuoy (SQ-77)	0	0
WALLEYE I	17	30
Threat oriented:	<u>Percent On-Hand</u>	
AIM-7 (SPARROW)	35	21
AIM-7E (SPARROW) (USMC)	24	21
AIM-54 (PHOENIX)	41	31
ASROC	48	82
AGM/RGM-84A (HARPOON)	43	20
AGM/UGM-84A (HARPOON)	24	44
RGM-84A-1/2/3A (HARPOON)	43	55
RIM-7H/IPDMS (NATO SEA SPARROW)	35	26
RIM-66 (STANDARD MR)/RIM-24 (TARTAR)	32	46
RIM-67 (STANDARD ER)/RIM-2 (TERRIER)	2	53
MK-46 Torpedo	23	39
MK-60 Mines	16	67
MK-62/63/64/65/67 Mines	0	0
<u>USA/ROKA/ROK(MC) (less USMC) (75-day stockage objective)</u>	<u>Days of Supply</u>	<u>WRSA</u>
4.2" Mortar (HE)	10 ROKA	12 ROKA
105mm Howitzer (ICM)	28 ROKA	28 ROKA
155mm Howitzer (ICM)	0 ROKA	28 ROKA
155mm Howitzer (ADAM)	8 USA	39 USA
155mm Howitzer (RAAMS)	4 USA	14 USA
8" Howitzer (ICM)	10 USA	14 USA
Light antitank weapon	0 ROKA	0 ROKA
TOW Missile	20 USA	90+USA

ADAM - Area Denial Artillery Munition  
IPDMS - Improved Point Defense Missile System  
ICM - Improved Conventional Munitions  
RAAMS - Remote Antiarmor Mine System

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for USAF in Europe and the Aerospace Defense Command, would also be designated as available for PACAF contingency planning.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The SPARROW shortage continued into the 1980s. The Aerospace Defense Command/North American Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM/NORAD) also had only a limited number of air-to-air missiles for employment during a contingency involving the defense of CONUS. Upon execution of their OPLAN 3000/3003, PACFLT would chop air forces to augment NORAD. In the past, CINCNORAD had sought an additional allocation of 176 AIM-7 and 96 AIM-54 Navy missiles from USCINCPAC to support these augmentation forces. PACFLT, with USCINCPAC support, had firmly resisted CINCAD's efforts because the missiles would have to be withdrawn from forward deployed carriers. In May 1984 USCINCPAC repeated a July 1983 proposal to the JCS which recommended that OPLAN 3003 needs for air-to-air missiles should not be limited to the AIM-7; rather, AIM-9 and -54 assets and requirements should also be considered as part of the total OPLAN 3003 picture.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Because the issue could not be resolved, in May the matter went before the Joint Materiel Priorities Allocation Board (JMPAB) which was chaired by the JCS Director J4 (Logistics) and had representatives from J3, J5, C3S, and each Service component. On this issue, lines were drawn based on Service representation. The Air Force supported CINCNORAD while the rest of the JMPAB supported no-change, which ultimately favored USPACOM.<sup>3</sup>

(C) Coordination by the JCS with the Air Staff on the JMPAB decision proved difficult because the Air Staff was seeking a commitment from the JMPAB for future missile allocations to NORAD. Meanwhile, the Army expressed concern that these actions could set a precedent for logisticians to make decisions when operators could not agree.<sup>4</sup>

(S) Finally, on 5 November the JCS advised that the JMPAB had determined that inadequate Navy AIM-7 and AIM-54 assets existed to pre-position these missiles at OPLAN 3003-committed West Coast bases. Until inventories improved, one load of AIM-7 (56 missiles) and one load of AIM-54 (48 missiles) would be designated in the Navy maintenance pipeline to be delivered to the designated West Coast bases in support of OPLAN 3003 with concurrence by the JCS upon execution of the OPLAN. The JMPAB decision was satisfactory to

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1978 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 292-293; 1979, Vol. I, p. 290; 1981, Vol. II, p. 328; 1982, Vol. II, p. 420; 1983, Vol. II, p. 467.
  2. J4235 HistSums May, Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 030303Z May 84 (S), DECL OADR, which cited CINCPAC 301915Z Jul 83.
  3. J4/Memo/S1357 (S), 15 Nov 84, Subj: Air-to-Air missiles for Navy and Marine Corps Augmentation (U), DECL OADR.
  4. J4235 HistSums May, Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR; Op. Cit., J4/Memo/S1357.

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USPACOM because missiles in the Navy pipeline would come from all sources--not just PACFLT--and the numbers of missiles required were reduced.<sup>1</sup>

### 25th Infantry Division War Reserve Munitions

(S) USCINCPAC considered the lack of pre-positioned munitions for the 25th Infantry Division (based at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii) to be a critical factor in employing the division for USPACOM contingencies outside of Korea. Following Admiral Crowe's expressions of concern to the Defense Resources Board in July 1983 and elsewhere, the Army announced a revision to its policy for pre-positioning war reserve stocks in the Pacific. The change authorized a full 30 days of sustainment for the 25ID to be stored outside of Korea.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 10 September 1984 the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics advised that the FY 85 Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) would include a specific entry for the 30 days of ammunition and secondary items for the USPACOM ground force reserve outside Korea at a position competitive with NATO, Korea, and USCENTCOM. The Army staff initiated action to fill 95 percent the 25ID's 30 days' ammunition during FY 85 from on-hand assets and current procurement. Movement was expected to begin within 90 days. The other 5 percent was items that were not currently in procurement. Before actual movement could begin, WESTCOM would have to provide a plan for distribution and storage, identify a funding source for logistic support of the stocks, and validate and refine the 30-day ammunition requirements in view of the existing and planned 25ID force structuring to light infantry division.<sup>3</sup>

### Explosives Safety Surveys

(U) The Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) was chartered to insure compliance with DOD policy and host nation laws. Periodic surveys were conducted under the provision of Title 10 U.S.C. 172 and DOD Directive 6055.9 (Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards) to monitor compliance. From 20 September through 11 October 1984 DDESB representatives conducted explosives safety surveys of all Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force ammunition and explosives facilities and activities in the USPACOM as follows: Japan-24, Philippines-4, Guam-4, Hawaii-11, and Diego Garcia-2; Korea would be surveyed at a later date.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The DDESB did not report any major safety violations which would severely hamper or stop any USPACOM operations although violation of quantity-distance requirements still existed throughout the USPACOM. The major reason

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1. JCS 051922Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR; J423 HistSum Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 464-465.
  3. SSO DA 101735Z Sep 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR; J423 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR; HQ DA WASHDC 131432Z Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. J4232 HistSum Oct 84 (U).

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for the violations was the scarcity of real estate which would provide the proper distance requirements at the respective sites, and there were approved waivers and exemptions allowing these violations.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The DDESB did state, however, that any new or renewed waivers and exemptions of ammunition safety standards in Japan would require coordination with the Government of Japan.<sup>2</sup>

"Hold Harmless" Agreements

(U) For overseas storage each Service had its own implementing instructions under DOD Directive 6055.9. The Air Force used AFR 127-100 which stated that criteria less restrictive than U.S. standards would only be used when an international agreement (commonly referred to as a "hold harmless" agreement) existed which absolved the United States of any liability in the event of a mishap.<sup>3</sup>

Korea

(U) At the end of 1984 in Korea there were 78 waivers and 18 Secretarial exemptions for USAF-owned and -operated munitions activities. There were 2 Secretary of the Air Force exemptions for Munitions Storage Activity Gained through Negotiations of USAF-ROKAF Memorandum of Understanding (MAGNUM) sites. The latter were ROK Air Force sites storing USAF munitions and were already covered by "hold harmless" agreements.<sup>4</sup>

✓ (S) If U.S. standards concerning exposures to off-base personnel were adhered to strictly, the net explosive weight of USAF munitions then stored in the ROK would have to be reduced by approximately 90 percent. That option was untenable in view of minimally acceptable levels of sustainability to execute OPLAN 5027. Remaining options included removing inhabited buildings within the safety arc or concluding "hold harmless" agreements, or both. COMUSKOREA previously had been unsuccessful in securing a "hold harmless" agreement from the ROK Government to cover all USAF munitions activities in Korea. In a November 1984 meeting of the Korea Review Group, USCINCPAC supported placing the "hold harmless" agreement on the 1985 ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting agenda. This was done in anticipation that such prompting would cause the issue to be resolved before the actual meeting.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Ibid.
  2. J4/Memo/C1509 (C), 14 Dec 84, Subj: Ammunition safety standards in foreign nations (U), DECL OADR.
  3. J423 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. J423 HistSum Dec 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR; J4/SSS/S1247 (U), 12 Sep 84, Subj: Review of draft USCINCPAC Command History for 1984.
  5. Ibid.

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Japan

(S) USCINCPAC was on record to the JCS supporting COMUSJAPAN's position that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement between Japan and the United States did not require any coordination of waivers and exemptions of U.S. ammunition explosive safety standards with the host nation for off-base exposures. This was based on a USCINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate opinion that the Standard of the recently revised DOD Directive 6055.9 (31 July 1984) went beyond the authority granted by the previous Standard issued in November 1983. USCINCPAC therefore recommended a selective policy under which the United States would take the "hold harmless" approach in Korea, but a "do not discuss" position with Japan. Plans were to expand policy on a country-by-country basis as the need arose.<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) According to COMUSJAPAN, discussions with high ranking members of the GOJ Defense Facilities Administration Agency indicated that Japan did not wish to be formally advised of waivers and exemptions, and if told, they would be compelled to disapprove them. Therefore, COMUSJAPAN asked USCINCPAC to obtain either DOD concurrence on the USFJ position or a DOD exemption for the requirement.<sup>2</sup>

(C/NOFORN) In January 1985 USCINCPAC asked the JCS to delete the requirement to comply with host nation ammunition safety standards and consult with host nations on new or renewed waivers and exemptions, or at a minimum, to waive these requirements for USPACOM until an assessment could be made of the scope of the total problem and correction action taken. USCINCPAC then asked the Service components for detailed information in order to assess the magnitude of the problem which full compliance with U.S. standards would bring. Near and long-term remedies, or those instances where overriding operational requirements dictated that the United States identify and accept the risk without consulting host nations were also to be addressed. The components were also asked to support this position through their respective Service channels.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Following a presentation by the USCINCPAC Logistics Resources representative to the DDESB on 21 February 1985, the Board voted to delete the requirement for host nation coordination from the DOD Standard. The Board also agreed to amend the DOD policy for use of host nation ammunition safety standards if they were more restrictive than U.S. standards.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid.; J423 Point Paper (S/NF), 28 Nov 84, Subj: Ammunition Safety Standards in Foreign Nations (DDESB Issue) (U), DECL OADR.
  2. COMUSJAPAN 220200Z Oct 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
  3. J423 HistSum Jan 85 (C/NF), DECL OADR.
  4. J423 HistSum Feb 85 (U).

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Chemical Munitions

(U) All stockpiled chemical munitions were under the control of the OJCS. Apportionment of these assets for planning purposes and allocation to the Unified Commanders during wartime were to be accomplished by the JCS and JMPAB. In July 1984 HQ USCINCPAC published its first instruction (S8070.2) on logistical procedures for the deployment of chemical munitions. The instruction provided guidance for peacetime planning and exercise/wartime implementation of chemical munitions logistical procedures. It depicted the basic flow of actions for chemical munitions for each Service component along Service-established conventional ammunition channels. Components and subordinate unified commands were to develop directives for logistics deployment of chemical munitions using this instruction as a guide.<sup>1</sup>

War Reserve Stocks for Allies

(U) The existing War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) program was based on a 1969 Presidential decision to stockpile defense articles to support selected Asian allies who had neither the industrial base nor economic capability to completely provide their own logistic support in wartime. Because of other DOD priorities, there had been no requests by the Services to the Congress since 1976 for authority or funds to purchase stocks for WRSA. As a result, materiel placed in WRSA had been principally munitions which were excess to U.S. force requirements but which were not necessarily up-to-date or of the type needed. In 1982 a memorandum of agreement (MOA) was signed by the U.S. and Korean Governments which provided the methodology for expediting transfer and sale of WRSA assets to the ROK in a military emergency.<sup>2</sup>

(C) In February 1984 USCINCPAC published an implementing instruction giving policy and procedural guidance to COMUSKOREA and his Service components (314th Air Division, Eighth U.S. Army, and Naval Forces Korea). It included a discretionary provision for COMUSKOREA to call forward offshore WRSA stocks, but USCINCPAC retained the right to withhold such stocks should conditions elsewhere in the USPACOM require. Based on U.S. Service prepositioning objectives, as contained in the Section V of the FY 85-89 DOD Defense Guidance, COMUSKOREA's Service components were to determine critical ROK sustainability shortfall items and to report their assessment of ROK sustainability annually. USCINCPAC also urged that the WRSA MOA be exercised during joint command post exercises such as ULCHI FOCUS LENS, with sufficient play to test policy level decisions as well as transfer procedures.<sup>3</sup>

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1. USCINCPACINST S8070.2 Ser S475 (S-RELROK), 9 Jul 84, Subj: Logistical procedures for the deployment of chemical weapons (U), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPACINST C4080.1A (C), 27 Feb 84, Subj: The War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) Program (U), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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(C) Despite support by the Army Chief of Staff, USCINCPAC, COMUSKOREA and others, the Congress failed to approve the FY 84 WRSA program which was contained in a proposed amendment to Section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Plans were to try to revise the FY 85 proposal, initiated in January 1984, for \$135 million worth of ammunition (33 short tons) by adding the \$125 million FY 84 stocks.<sup>1</sup>

WRSA Follow-on Memorandum of Agreement

(S) The WRSA memorandum of agreement (MOA), which became effective 25 June 1982, was limited to U.S. transfers to the ROK of only those WRSA-designated stocks up to a value of \$2 billion. Provisions of the MOA specified a requirement for development of additional mechanisms to grant U.S. commanders in Korea the authority to transfer U.S. defense articles other than those designated as WRSA during contingencies. The next year a "Follow-on" MOA was developed by JUSMAG Korea, U.S. Forces Korea, and the ROK Ministry of National Defense in coordination with the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and USCINCPAC to establish a mechanism for timely transfers of U.S. defense articles other than WRSA. In effect, the MOA provided a means for the ROK Armed Forces to enter the U.S. Services' supply systems to replace the first 30-days of anticipated combat losses and attrition. An important corollary of the MOA required the Korean Government to demonstrate progress toward contributing to their own War Reserve Materiel (WRM) stocks. After several obstacles were overcome, the WRSA Follow-on MOA was signed by Secretary of Defense Weinberger in December 1983 and countersigned by ROK Minister of Defense Yoon on 11 February 1984. Ratification by the ROK National Assembly did not transpire until 25 June 1984.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Under an agreement by the Logistics Cooperation Committee at the 16th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul, Korea, in May 1984, the Follow-on MOA required implementing instructions. The ROK Government was to develop and prioritize WRM requirements and establish a systematic program to significantly increase war reserve stockage levels through procurement from U.S. and ROK sources. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) would develop procedures for annual review of ROK plans for increasing their war reserves. The U.S. Services were to assist the ROK in developing the requirements and identifying items and categories of items not available from U.S. stocks. The JCS, in conjunction with the Services, would develop detailed procedures regarding ROK requisitioning, U.S. sourcing, transportation, transfer, and accountability.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J423 HistSum Mar 84 (C), DECL OADR; SSO Korea 160830Z Aug, USCINCPAC 242300Z Aug, SSO DA 031717Z Oct, all 84 (C)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. III, pp. 562-564; J462 HistSum Jun 84 (U); J423 HistSum Nov 84 (S/NF) DECL OADR.
  3. J4232 HistSum May 84 (S), DECL OADR; J4242 Point Paper (S), 14 Sep 84, Subj: Follow-on MOA implementing instructions (U), DECL OADR.

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(U) Following a September meeting with Service component, and USFK representatives, USCINCPAC provided some of the transfer mechanics for the draft U.S. implementing instruction. The JCS draft was then finalized, approved by the U.S. Services, and forwarded to COMUSKOREA on 2 January 1985 for review and negotiation of necessary portions with the Korean Government.<sub>1</sub>

Modern Munitions for WRSA

(S/NOFORN) In April 1984, following an in-depth examination of what might be done to begin to correct continuing serious shortfalls in the WRSA program, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs/East Asia and Pacific Affairs) asked Admiral Crowe and General Sennewald (COMUSKOREA/CINCCFC) to comment on a draft ASD (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics (MI&L)) memo for the Secretary of Defense recommending one of four options and a proposed SECDEF Memorandum as follow-on to implement the recommended option. That option would require funding by the Army and Air Force of \$10 million and the Navy \$5 million each year over FY 86-90 for the purchase of designated modern munitions which were in critically short supply in the WRSA stockpile. U.S. procurement would be contingent upon the ROK purchasing \$50 million worth of similar munitions per year (a two-for-one basis) over the same period for their own war reserve stocks. The other three options were not recommended because one was even more aggressive but would doubtless encounter strong Service and congressional opposition; another would, in essence, continue the status quo and result in only marginal improvement; and the last would probably incur untenable political consequences and be seen by ROKs, allies, and other friends as outright renegeing on previous promises.<sub>2</sub>

(S) Both Admiral Crowe and General Sennewald supported the recommended option, but with certain differences. General Sennewald felt that a careful approach to the Koreans would be necessary because they might resist being told to spend specific amounts. Unquestionably, however, adding modern munitions would enhance CFC's capabilities and the ROK Government's "... perception of our combined defense efforts."<sub>3</sub>

(S) Admiral Crowe stated that while the recommended option had merit, certain other points should be considered before proceeding. He felt "... very strongly that other than for some selected Army munitions, the Services should store new procurement WRSA items outside the ROK (i.e., in the offshore WRSA stocks held in Japan). This would foster a greater degree of assurance that the stocks would be available for other contingencies, and at the same time be earmarked and readily available for a Korean emergency." Moreover, the proposal should clearly indicate that new WRSA procurements would be in

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1. J4242 HistSum Sep 84 (U); USCINCPAC 222131Z Sep 84 (S), DECL OADR; J4241 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
  2. OSD (ISA/EAPR 074/84) 211749Z Apr 84 (S/NF)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  3. SSO Korea 240505Z Apr 84 (S/NF)(BOM), DECL OADR.

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addition to the excess stocks then programmed for WRSA. Specific dollar new procurement objectives for the Services, as well as ROK-U.S. procurement ratios, might be premature. It would be prudent to wait until the provisions of the Follow-on MOA were implemented before approaching the ROK with specifics.<sup>1</sup>

(S) A 23 August Defense Resources Board Program Decision Memorandum directed implementation of the 2-for-1 proposal, and on 31 August the JCS asked USCINCPAC to provide a prioritized list of modern munitions which should be emphasized during the first year of the program. Noting the USCINCPAC preference for storing modern WRSA munitions with offshore stocks in Japan, the JCS asked whether USCINCPAC would be willing to modify his position should that become a problem in negotiations with the Korean Government. USCINCPAC solicited inputs from his Service components, COMUSJAPAN, and COMUSKOREA. Their responses on storage location were mixed.<sup>2</sup>

(S) In a preliminary response to a USAF headquarters query, CINCPACAF had stated a preference for storing all USAF/ROKAF procured modern munitions for WRSA on the the Korean Peninsula because it would optimize beddown of WRSA munitions, decrease time-consuming movement of critical munitions in wartime, enhance relationships with the Koreans, improve readiness and sustainability on the Peninsula, and improve the inventory posture of both U.S. and ROK Air Forces.<sup>3</sup>

(S) In a later message to USCINCPAC, CINCPACAF supported the total theater strategy. Munitions storage was under construction at Misawa, Japan, to support the new F-16 wing, and there were discussions with the Japanese to establish a MAGNUM operation at other beddown locations in Japan. Besides, the additional WRSA would be such a small portion (18 short tons or .02 percent of total stored PACAF munitions) that it would not violate USCINCPAC's strategy. In any event, PACAF could quickly move them anywhere required in-theater.<sup>4</sup>

(S) COMUSJAPAN firmly supported the USCINCPAC position on storage in Japan and stated that high value items could be accommodated. Larger volume would require new facilities and safety waivers, and he asked for USCINCPAC support in securing the necessary Military Construction Authority from the

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1. USCINCPAC 282335Z Apr 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  2. J462 HistSum Aug 84, JCS 271530Z and 312317Z Aug 84, USCINCPAC 050440Z Sep 84, all (S), DECL OADR.
  3. J423 Point Paper (S/NF), 19 Oct 84, Subj: Storage of Modern Munitions for WRSA (2 for 1 Initiative) (U), DECL OADR; CINCPACAF 052330Z Oct 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. CINCPACAF 270430Z Oct 84 (S), DECL OADR. MAGNUM was an acronym used to mean Munitions storage Activity Gained through Negotiation of USAF-ROK Memorandum of Understanding.

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Congress. Meanwhile, the Service components in Japan were assessing capabilities to determine what additional facilities might be needed.<sup>1</sup>

(S) CDRWESTCOM also supported the offshore concept and later suggested that it might be prudent for a USCINCPAC Service component working group to explore munitions storage options with a view toward improving theater strategy and sustainability because, in a crisis, strategic lift for munitions would be at a premium.<sup>2</sup>

(S) CINCPACFLT recommended that on-hand and future U.S. Navy WRSA assets be stored in Korea, while agreeing that a "prudent" portion of the modern WRSA munitions could be stored offshore--specifically those not needed in the earliest days in Korea. COMUSKOREA (now General Livsey who had succeeded General Sennewald) continued to be concerned with ROK reactions. Offshore storage was "untenable" for two reasons: availability of modern munitions would be crucial to success of the battle. "Experience has shown that, at worst, stocks stored in Japan may not ever arrive in Korea and, at best, their arrival may not be expeditious. Second, the 2-for-1 incentive will be unacceptable to the ROK if there is no certainty of their receiving the U.S. portion. . . . This command believes the only realistic approach which will achieve ROK support is to designate these as WRSA-Korea items intended for the future use of Korea only."<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 13 October USCINCPAC forwarded to the JCS a prioritized list incorporating the Service component recommendations which included STINGER, Improved TOW, HARPOON, and SIDEWINDER missiles, projectiles, other improved conventional munitions, plus substitute items. USCINCPAC reaffirmed that at least a portion of U.S.-purchased munitions be stored outside Korea. While acknowledging COMUSKOREA's (General Livsey) concerns, USCINCPAC stated that having the flexibility to execute various USPACOM OPLANS and CONPLANS was more important, particularly in view of existing unsatisfactory on-hand WRM ground munitions for deployments to other areas of operations in the USPACOM. Further,<sup>4</sup>

USCINCPAC does not concur that WRSA stocks stored in NEA outside the peninsula would not reach Korea in a timely manner if needed. In a 5027 scenario, our full commitment to support the ROK is assured. However, now is an excellent opportunity to start introducing the Korean military to some of the realities which face the USG throughout the region and shape our wider strategic thinking. In the final analysis the ROKs

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1. COMUSJAPAN 140440Z Sep, 090145Z Oct, and 010130Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. J423 HistSum Nov 84 (S) and CDRWESTCOM 092140Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. J423 HistSum Nov 84 (S/NP), DECL OADR; CINCPACFLT 112326Z Sep 84 (S), DECL 30 Sep 92; COMUSKOREA 182324Z Sep 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. USCINCPAC 130116Z Oct 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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stand to gain and in turn should be willing to take into account some of our broader interests. Our flexibility and capability to meet the Soviet challenge throughout NEA during a 5000 scenario is of vital importance to the Koreans. I am firmly persuaded that the US-ROK relationship is strong enough to support such a dialogue. If they cannot grasp this reasoning we should then reassess the offer. Unfortunately our resources are limited and we simply cannot afford the luxury of dedicating large quantities of U.S. ammunition to a Korean only contingency. It is the USCINCPAC position that all U.S. ammo stored throughout PACOM should be available if needed for a crisis in any part of the region including one on the Korean peninsula. We should commence working now to make that position a reality--not only in our own minds but in Seoul's as well.

(U) In outlining his thoughts on negotiating strategy USCINCPAC said that OSD/MI&L should develop the negotiating proposal consistent with ROK agreement in the WRSA Follow-on MOA to provide a plan to significantly increase its WRM. The final proposal should be presented to the Korean Ministry of National Defense by COMUSKOREA, with negotiations commencing sometime after November 1984.

~~(S)~~ In the way of ground rules, Admiral Crowe shared General Livsey's views on such things as validation of munitions priorities and consideration of each country's production capabilities. Neither the basic SALS-K agreement nor the recently renegotiated SALS-K Reimbursement Agreement would be open for discussion. Additionally, it should be emphasized that existing and future SALS-K agreements should not be influenced by WRSA issues. It should be stressed that funds expended for construction of storage facilities, purchase of training stocks, or costs involved with storage of WRSA stocks on the peninsula should not be considered as any portion of the ROK contribution to war reserves.<sub>1</sub>

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1. Ibid. SALS-K (Single Ammunition Logistics System-Korea) was a ROK-U.S. memorandum of agreement signed in November 1974 by COMUSKOREA and the ROK MND. It covered the responsibilities and procedures for storage initially of U.S.-titled munitions in ROK Army facilities on a reimbursable basis similar to the Air Force MAGNUM project. Under SALS-K, the ROK Army provided Class V field service support for all EUSA forces for ammunition supply points, including receiving, transporting, storing, security, maintenance, issuing, and when necessary, demilitarizing. Similar services were performed for U.S.-owned WRSA munitions, but at no cost to the U.S. Government. As a result, it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to segregate in-place WRSA munitions in Korea. (Source: USFK/ EUSA Annual Histories 1979, (S/NF/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL), pp. 137-138, REVW 31 Dec 86; 1981, pp. 165-168; 1982 pp. 160.)

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(U) In closing, USCINCPAC said that to further commit or earmark U.S. Government-purchased, produced, or titled (2-for-1) munitions with a designator of WRSA-Korea (for future use of Korea only) could adversely impact on the entire WRSA program by introducing a "string" that could be applied to the other on-hand WRSA stocks. Although the stocks were U.S.-titled and planned for release to the ROK, until formally transferred, "they would be subject to removal in accordance with U.S. law and we should both make clear and hold fast on the position. It is imperative that no government be given a unilateral veto on the usage of U.S.-titled stocks."

(S) Later, USCINCPAC cautioned that, before negotiations commenced, a consolidated U.S. position should be established on what constituted a "significant ROK increase" and whether or not the "two-for-one" figure (ROK - \$250 million to U.S. \$125 million over five years) should be in addition to an offer of \$614 million made by the ROK Minister of National Defense at the 16th SCM. Also, there should be a united position on having all or a major portion of U.S.-contributed munitions stored outside of Korea. This was important to USPACOM sustainability because, he said, it was the first time that the United States was offering to procure advanced munitions for WRSA that were also in short supply in "our own war reserve stockpile."<sup>1</sup>

(S/NOFORN) A 14 November JCS Memorandum for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (MI&L/Logistics and Materiel Management) recommended that the United States start negotiations by demanding the right to store all the U.S.-purchased munitions outside Korea, and then be prepared to give in a little at a time on the Navy and Air Force munitions. The JCS Memorandum also recommended holding the line at storing ground munitions offshore unless at some point in negotiations it might become necessary to concede that some part be stored in Korea. OSD representatives favored this thinking, but in a message to COMUSKOREA Admiral Crowe questioned the underlying philosophy. He said:<sup>2</sup>

The essential issue here is our flexibility and capability to meet the Soviet challenge throughout the region. Frankly, I would think that defending Korea would be incentive enough. If they need additional rewards in order to persuade them to take steps in their own interest it is difficult to take seriously their sincerity to make a firm commitment on the 2-for-1 initiative. In turn, I do not believe we must continually demonstrate our own commitment with additional assurances. We have nothing to apologize for--our record speaks for itself. The fact is that we have important commitments outside of the peninsula and it is imperative that we put ourselves in a

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1. COMUSKOREA 150135Z Oct 84 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 100253Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. J423 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 221835Z Nov 84 (S/NF)(BOM), DECL OADR.

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better position to deal with a spectrum of contingencies. . . They insist that they are beginning to appreciate the larger strategic picture in NEA. I believe we should put that to the test instead of always giving way merely to demonstrate once again that we support the ROK.

(S) On 20 November Admiral Crowe advised his component and subordinate unified commanders of the establishment of a working group, as had been recommended earlier by CDRWESTCOM, to review overall plans, programs, and policies in the munitions area. The recommended working group came to fruition as the first annual USPACOM Munitions Conference. Among the major issues to be addressed were the best storage locations and facilities in the USPACOM, from a joint perspective, to gain optimum advantage with limited strategic lift; storage locations for additional 25ID munitions as well as for modern munitions in WRSA; capabilities to support chemical munitions requirements; and opportunities for interservice ammunition support.<sup>1</sup>

### Fuels

#### Inventory

(U) At the beginning of 1984 the USPACOM inventory position for all fuel products was 24.3 million barrels. Construction of new tanks, repair of existing tanks, and leasing of commercial facilities to store U.S. stocks during 1984 allowed the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) and the Services to increase USPACOM's inventory to 24.7 million barrels by the end of the year.<sup>2</sup>

#### Standard Bulk Petroleum Prices

(U) Standard bulk petroleum prices for FY 85 declined by an average of 7.9 percent from FY 84 except for AVGAS which showed a 17.4 percent decrease. FY 85 prices per gallon are depicted in the following comparison.<sup>3</sup>


	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>(Rev*)</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
JP-4	.420	.437	.550	1.18	1.16	1.39	1.17	1.00	.93
JP-5	.441	.456	.630	1.32	1.27	1.42	1.26	1.08	1.00
DFM	.441	.449	.610	1.29	1.22	1.37	1.21	1.03	.95
AVGAS	.557	.590	.710	1.40	1.41	1.60	1.51	1.55	1.32
MOGAS	.543	.507	.590	1.26	1.26	1.29	1.29	1.13	1.05
Unleaded									
MOGAS	-	.507	.650	1.29	1.29	1.32	1.29	1.20	1.11

\* FY 80 prices revised effective 1 February 1980.

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1. USCINCPAC 200443Z Nov 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  2. J4225 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
  3. J4225 HistSum Dec 84 (U).

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**BULK POL DATA-USPACOM  
(MILLIONS OF BARRELS)**



SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (SYMFC), P. 35, DECL OADR.

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1984 POL Issues  
(in thousands of barrels)


	BY PRODUCT												TOTAL
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	
AVGAS	4	1	1	3	9	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	27
JP-4	942	965	1,509	855	678	1,273	784	1,059	686	764	1,036	786	11,337
JP-5	351	353	466	341	405	549	550	374	254	465	591	242	4,941
MOGAS	62	47	123	56	48	59	50	59	54	53	63	59	733
Diesel	942	1,000	701	742	429	869	1,009	468	473	647	1,424	503	9,207
NSFO	281	214	67	230	176	197	57	50	50	83	69	113	1,587
Total	2,582	2,580	2,867	2,227	1,745	2,948	2,451	2,011	1,518	2,013	3,185	1,705	27,832
						BY AREA							
Adak*	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	39	36	25	34	25	184
Diego Garcia	61	50	241	86	62	338	69	147	48	59	48	47	1,256
Guam	260	392	309	196	160	116	239	167	119	115	228	132	2,433
Hawaii	518	517	608	422	536	839	585	428	327	622	1,004	395	6,801
Japan	930	734	763	654	405	621	725	603	584	558	834	551	7,962
Korea	324	332	464	177	153	192	145	222	139	175	231	219	2,773
Philippines	412	555	400	692	429	842	663	398	265	459	806	336	6,257
Singapore	77	-	82	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	166
Total	2,582	2,580	2,867	2,227	1,745	2,948	2,451	2,011	1,518	2,013	3,185	1,705	27,832

\* New location gained July 1984  
Source: J4225

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### USPACOM POL ISSUES

(IN MILLIONS OF BARRELS)



Source: J4225

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### Petroleum Logistics Conference

(U) The annual USPACOM Petroleum Logistics Conference was held at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, from 7 through 9 November 1984. The conference was attended by approximately 75 military and civilian POL (petroleum, oil, lubricants) managers and representatives from USPACOM and CONUS commands. The keynote address was presented by RADM W. J. Ryan, SC, USN, Commander of the Defense Fuel Supply Center. Four closely interrelated themes were addressed from a number of perspectives: worldwide disparities, both military and non-military, between POL supply and demand; the global nature and scope of product movement requirements; terminal facilities expansion, renovation, and renewal; and generation and use of POL information for OPLANs and resource management.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In his address, RADM Ryan emphasized some of the principal "lessons learned" in recent exercises and contingencies. Operational contingencies were always short-fused, and quick action, even if not optimal, was better than no action. Because in-country distribution was often difficult, better in-country POL capabilities and support information were needed. Joint Petroleum Offices (JPOs) should be prepared to go to the theater of operations during an exercise to deal with on-site logistic needs. In addition, the presentation focused on the POL supply base as related to shifts in refinery capacity. The relative success of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) in obtaining funding for maintenance projects at DLA facilities was also discussed.

(U) Another DFSC presentation was on an initiative to improve the material condition of POL facilities. Under the existing Defense Stock Fund charter, the respective operating agencies were responsible for funding maintenance at government-owned and -operated facilities and at foreign government-owned facilities that stored DLA product. In a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics), the DLA proposed a change to the charter that would permit the DLA to fund the maintenance costs at all facilities storing DLA product worldwide, except those funded by the NATO infrastructure. If this proposal were ultimately approved, the changes would be implemented in FY 87.

(U) There was a need for a more sophisticated capability to calculate Peacetime Stockage Objectives and to evaluate petroleum distribution system requirements. To satisfy these needs, the DLA funded a study to develop a Peacetime Stockage Objective model and a companion study of the distribution system.<sup>2</sup>

(U) A briefing on sustainability of USCINCPAC OPLANs discussed the basis for sustainability ratings S-1 through S-4 used in the feasibility assessment

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1. J4222 HistSum Dec 84 (U); USCINCPAC Ltr Ser 3464 (U), 4 Dec 84, Subj: USPACOM Petroleum Logistics Conference - 1984.
  2. Ibid.

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of each OPLAN. Highlighted in the briefing were a summary of correctly positioned versus malpositioned fuel assets and a summary of tanker lift capabilities. Among initiatives to improve S-ratings covered at the conference were increasing fuel stocks in-theater; improvement of tankage capacity through Military Construction funding; utilization of host nation reserves; and increasing the number of supporting tankers.

(U) The status of the Naval Petroleum Reserves was presented by the Energy Branch of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The presentation explained that the Reserves were established early in this century to provide an emergency petroleum supply for U.S. Navy vessels. While occasional use of the Reserves had been allowed, they generally remained shut-in for emergency use. For instance, in 1976 the Congress allowed production from the Reserves at their maximum efficient rate for a period of six years with an unlimited number of 3-year production extensions. Operation of the Reserves was transferred to the Department of Energy in 1977. At that rate of consumption, the reserves would be exhausted for military use by the year 2000. In light of their projected exhaustion, the Navy and JCS had vigorously argued for reversion to their original purpose. However, the Cabinet prevailed with its opposing argument that production from the Reserves would generate a \$43 billion revenue-stream between 1985 and 1988, while concurrently helping to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil sources. The Navy intended to press the case for shut-in of the Reserves.

(U) The Energy Management Office of the Air Staff presented an overview of Air Force energy programs, future fuel requirements, status of storage projects, and synthetic jet fuel development. The first of two briefings given by personnel from the Military Sealift Command outlined the MSC mission and discussed the composition and general capabilities of the MSC-controlled tanker fleet. The second was a detailed, graphic portrayal of POL tanker lift capabilities and requirements in relation to the transportation analysis of OPLAN 5000.

### USNS T-1 Tanker Replacement Program

(U) In January 1984 the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) advised that three T-1 tankers, the ALATNA, NODAWAY, and CHATAHOOTCHEE, would be transferred to the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) and replaced by three equivalent commercially contracted carriers. This decision resulted from a joint maritime congress (Maritime Trade Association) suit in 1983 alleging that the competitive process was predetermined to insure continued Government operation of the T-1s. The DOD Inspector General evaluated MSC bidding procedures and recommended that the T-1 delivery function be solicited.<sup>1</sup>

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1. J4223 HistSum Dec 84 (U).

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(U) In February an MSC representative visited the USCINCPAC Joint Petroleum Office to discuss the requests for proposal (RFPs) that would be sent to industry for replacing the civilian-manned USNS T-1 function. MSC also asked USCINCPAC a number of questions on T-1 layup requirements so that guidance could be given to the Maritime Administration (MARAD) which managed the RRF program. As possible layup sites, USCINCPAC recommended Sasebo and Yokohama (Japan), Pearl Harbor (Hawaii), and Kwajalein. Other recommendations included a recall response time of 10 days and a requirement that the contracted equivalent vessels remain in service during contingencies. Further, USCINCPAC should retain the ability to spot-charter tankers, and the T-1s should be subject to periodic inspection and testing.

(S) USCINCPAC expressed concern to the JCS in late June regarding the reduction in readily available tanker assets in the MSC-controlled fleet (from 25 to 18) and the concomitant impact on USCINCPAC OPLANs. To further exacerbate the situation, the Korean Government was withdrawing two regional tankers from the FY 84 Korean Flag Shipping List. USCINCPAC recommended that any further plans for reduction be held in abeyance pending completion of a DOD expanded sealift study and MSC's evaluation of USCINCPAC OPLAN 5000-84.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In July the barge HANNA 4002 and tug KING CHALLENGER were inspected by the MSC and found to be suitable for acceptance on contract. The USNS NODAWAY was transferred to MARAD for layup in Pearl Harbor. By year's end, the SENECA barge and M/T BRAVADO tanker had been placed on contract to replace the ALATNA and CHATTAHOOCHEE. The SENECA made her first delivery on 31 December and the M/T BRAVADO was scheduled for her first delivery in January. Yokohama's North Dock was selected as the layup site for the ALATNA and CHATTAHOOCHEE. However, the actual transfer date to MARAD had not been determined.

#### Petroleum Positioning

(S) In February 1984 the JCS published new guidance on bulk petroleum war reserves. JCS SM 49-84 modified the number of days of pre-positioning stock recommended for storage at USPACOM locations. The pre-positioned days of supply (DOS) in most cases were reduced by changing USPACOM's primary wartime supply location from the Gulf Coast to the West Coast. That document also promulgated USCINCPAC's petroleum positioning strategy developed in 1983 for Korea, Okinawa, and Japan. The actual impact on USPACOM's war reserve stock would be reflected in the DFSC inventory management plan to be published in January 1985.<sup>2</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC 290253Z Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. J4223 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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Allocation and Storage of War Reserves

(S) Representatives from all unified commands met at the Defense Fuel Supply Center in February 1984 to allocate the FY 84 petroleum War Reserve increases. The DFSC briefed attendees on the status of War Reserve stocks for each unified command as well as the algorithm used to determine the highest priority of need for more reserves. It was decided that USCINCCENT, having the highest priority, would be allocated the entire one million barrels of new War Reserves that were funded by the Congress for FY 84.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Subsequent to the conference, the DFSC and USCINCCENT, for a variety of reasons, determined that the one million barrels could not be stored within USCINCCENT's area of responsibility. The next best location was found to be Singapore (in the USPACOM) so the DFSC asked the State Department for permission to negotiate with commercial contractors in Singapore for the necessary storage. Based on negotiations in 1982 by the State and Defense Departments, the latter asked the U.S. Ambassador in Singapore to address the issue with Singapore officials. Approval by the Singapore Government was not granted until 13 April, and the DFSC was not able to consummate contracts for the additional storage in Singapore in time to accommodate the FY 84 allocation by 30 September. Accordingly, in June the DFSC asked USCINCEUR and USCINCPAC if the one million barrels of War Reserves could be stored temporarily in Gaeta, Italy, St. Theodore, Greece, and the limited, previously contracted storage in Singapore.<sup>2</sup>

(S) USCINCPAC accepted DFSC's proposal with the caveat that the existing USCINCPAC reserve levels in Singapore would be moved to Matsuyama, Japan, until the one million barrels of new tankage would be ready in Singapore. USCINCPAC levels (176,000 barrels) would then be returned to Singapore. By year's end approximately 800,000 barrels of Jet A-1 had been placed into storage in Singapore. The remaining 200,000 barrels were scheduled for receipt in late January 1985.<sup>3</sup>

(S) In order to provide the unified commander more input in the DFSC leasing program, the DFSC formalized an annual report whereby each unified commander recommended quantities and locations for leased storage for each Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) period. USCINCPAC's first report recommended 5,915,000 barrels of leased storage at six USPACOM locations for the FY 87-91 POM period. USCINCPAC also made suggestions for host nation initiatives in Korea and Japan to help improve sustainability.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J4223 HistSum Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.; AMEMB Singapore 3821/130415Z Apr 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. J4223 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. USCINCPAC 291423Z Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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(S) The size of the FY 85 petroleum WRM storage build-up had not been published as of 31 December, but it was anticipated that the quantity would be considerably less than FY 84.<sup>1</sup>

### Aleutians POL Support Responsibilities

(U) In April 1982 tentative agreement had been reached between the USCINCPAC JPO and the Defense Fuel Region (DFR)-Alaska that the latter should assume wartime petroleum resupply responsibilities for JTF-Aleutians, while the USCINCPAC JPO would retain responsibility for wartime planning in close coordination with the DFR-Alaska. However, another option was discussed by a working group at the October 1982 PACOM Petroleum Logistics Conference. It called for the establishment of a Sub-area Petroleum Office (SAPO) at Adak or assignment of petroleum support responsibilities to the SAPO Hawaii.<sup>2</sup>

(S) A final decision was deferred pending approval of a proposed revision to the Unified Command Plan boundaries to include Alaska with USCINCPAC's area of responsibility. Following disapproval of the proposal in September 1983, USCINCPAC POL logisticians resumed negotiations with the DFSC to resolve the question.

(U) During the February 1984 conference on allocation of War Reserves (see above) the USCINCPAC representative obtained action officer concurrence that the DFR-Alaska be established as a USCINCPAC SAPO. The request was formally forwarded to the JCS in March and approved in May. In the course of the approval process, the desirability of a memorandum of agreement to formalize command arrangements among the DFSC, Alaskan Air Command, and USCINCPAC was determined, but the agreement was not consummated by the end of 1984.<sup>3</sup>

### Fuel Charges in Malaysia

(U) On 4 January 1984, the U.S. Defense Attache in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, advised of a recent change in pricing of fuels used by U.S. military aircraft and ships. For aircraft fuel this amounted to an increase from the previous Royal Malaysian military rate of approximately \$1.09 per gallon to the commercial rate of \$1.38 per gallon, plus a 25 percent surcharge bringing the total cost per gallon to \$1.70. The increased charges occurred as a result of an audit by Malaysian Ministry of Finance auditors who resurrected a dormant 1961 GOM policy directive. The directive had established three fuel

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1. J4223 HistSum (S), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC Command History 1982 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 439-440; J4223 Hist-Sum Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. J4223 HistSums Aug, Dec 84 (U).

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price categories--for Malaysian military forces, for commonwealth forces, and "others."<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 13 January USCINCPAC expressed his concerns for the impact the policy could have on future combined U.S. exercises with Malaysia, as well as possibly establishing an undesirable precedent. USCINCPAC asked the USDAO to relay certain concerns to appropriate Malaysian military and civilian authorities, outlining USAF and USN reciprocal charges and arrangements.<sup>2</sup>

~~(C)~~ In February USCINCPAC authorized the USDAO to initiate negotiations for a memorandum of understanding with Malaysia and outlined its thrust. In March USCINCPAC forwarded a proposed text to the JCS with which the Chief of Naval Operations concurred. The Air Staff took exception to certain details, and in May the JCS advised that there was no authority for a single USCINCPAC-level agreement. As an alternative, the JCS recommended separate agreements in Service channels. The JCS also recommended that, pending resolution, all aircraft use the DFSC commercial contract arrangements at Singapore civil airport and that all ships bunker from appropriate commercial sources. USCINCPAC replied that no such combination would work. During combined exercises, refueling from Malaysian military supplies was essential to operational success.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 27 August a "Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defense, Malaysia and the United States Navy concerning the Price and Surcharge of Fuel Supplied to Naval Vessels and Military Aircraft of One Country by the Other" was signed. The terms prescribed the costs of diesel and aviation fuels by the Malaysian Ministry of Defense at the base price paid by the Malaysian Armed Forces at each supply location while the Malaysians were to pay the standard U.S. military fuel price; the surcharge for both was not to exceed five percent, and the agreement was retroactive to 1 October 1983. Admiral Crowe commended the USDAO for his efforts stating: "Your hard work in negotiating this MOA with the Malaysian Ministry of Defense should greatly improve relations between our governments and provide significant benefits to the military services of both countries."<sup>4</sup>

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1. J422 HistSum Jan 84 (U); J422 Point Paper (U), 24 Jan 84, Subj: Price and Surcharge for Aviation and Naval Diesel Fuel in Malaysia.
  2. USCINCPAC 130117Z Jan 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 160331Z Feb 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR; CNO 130018Z Apr 84 (U); USAF 301353Z Apr and 082015Z May 84 (U); JCS 041839Z May 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 100100Z May 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  4. J422 HistSums May, Sep 84 (U); USDAO Kuala Lumpur 220743Z Jun ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR and 300342Z Aug 84 (U); USCINCPAC 172041Z Sep 84 (U)(BOM).

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Thailand

(S) A follow-on maintenance contract and updated memorandum of agreement were consummated with the Royal Thai Navy as part of the fuel system upgrade at the RTN Air Base at U-Tapao, Thailand, to support a continuation of the limited U.S. air operations that were begun in 1981.<sup>1</sup>

Korea

(S) The quantity of petroleum held by the Republic of Korea for U.S. forces in 1984 did not change from the 223,000 barrels obtained in 1983. The DFSC reflected the entire quantity in the FY 84 inventory management plan so it was now counted as War Reserves for sustainability reporting. COMUSKOREA, working through the ROK-U.S. joint petroleum committee, was to continue to seek additional quantities from the Koreans in 1985.<sup>2</sup>

Groundwater Contamination in Hawaii

(U) In September 1983, following discovery of the chemical substance ethylene dibromide (EDB) in July 1983 in wells supplying water to the town of Waipahu on the Island of Oahu in the State of Hawaii, Admiral Crowe informed Hawaii's Governor George Ariyoshi of the results of a thorough review of all military-controlled fuel storage and pipeline facility records on the island. In essence, the possibility of military leaded fuel having contaminated the Waipahu ground water was very remote.<sup>3</sup>

(U) In January 1984 the Hawaii Department of Health was provided detailed historical information pursuant to a request from the Governor in relation to the State's continuing investigation. The following month the Governor expanded the focus of the investigation with a request for an examination of the military's practices regarding the disposal of flushing solvents and petroleum tank wastes. This request was based on an allegation from an anonymous source that the military had dumped large quantities of sludge or cleaning solvents adjacent to a golf course (Mililani) perhaps as long as ten years previous.<sup>4</sup>

(U) In March the Governor was asked to provide test results not previously made available as well as additional details concerning the anonymous allegations of wrongful dumping of sludge and solvents. His 19 March reply forwarded the requested test results and assured that non-military sources of the contamination had not been ruled out. Again in May the Department of Health requested additional amplifying data on the historical information concerning

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1. J4222 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. J4223 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/PRD), Vol. II, pp. 479-480.
  4. J4222 HistSum Dec 84 (U). Note: Mililani was adjacent to or near Schofield Barracks and Wheeler AFB.

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fuel spills and storage leaks. In July the Governor provided additional details regarding the anonymous allegations and indicated that agricultural chemicals were believed to be responsible for the water contamination.

(U) The Governor was apprised in August that the information he provided in July corresponded most nearly with one or two incidents. The first was a routine tank-cleaning operation in November 1975 at the Waikakalaua tank farm which involved on-site weathering of JP-4 sludge. The second was a 1978 repair effort related to a pipeline leak near Mililani. In September the Department of Health was provided the additional data requested in May. Like earlier information, this latest data did not suggest that fuel spills or storage leaks by the military were responsible for groundwater contamination.<sup>1</sup>

### Commissary Support in Thailand

(U) In June 1983 the Chief JUSMAG Thailand formally requested establishment of a military commissary-type facility in Bangkok to serve both U.S. military and State Department employees in Thailand. Following a visit there in October of that year, a survey team concluded that such a facility was both feasible and desirable. In May 1984 representatives from the Army-Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) visited Thailand for the purpose of negotiating an agreement to transfer State Department assets and facilities to AAFES in order that a military commissary-exchange could be established to serve approved patrons. The American Community Support Association in Thailand voted unanimously in October to sign the memorandum of understanding with AAFES, and the Ambassador approved the initiative. AAFES estimated service could start as early as May 1985 if final details could be worked out expeditiously.<sup>2</sup>

### Defense Regional Interservice Support Conference

(U) The USPACOM eleventh annual Defense Regional Interservice Support (DRIS) Conference was held at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, from 18 to 20 September 1984. Nearly 50 representatives from Service Departments, OSD, USCINCPAC, component and subordinate commands, and other concerned commands in USPACOM attended. The keynote address was given by Mr. Duncan Holaday, the Director for Installation Management at OASD/MI&L. This was the first conference held since the publishing of the new DOD DRIS Regulation (4000.19R) which returned control of the DRIS study process from USCINCPAC to the Services.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Notable among actions generated by the conferees were that the DOD DRIS Steering Committee agreed to investigate methods to provide more on-site DOD DRIS training courses in the USPACOM and the OASD/MI&L would strive for greater Service executive coordinating agent cooperation in providing uniform

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1. Ibid.
  2. J424 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
  3. J421 HistSum Sep 84 (U).

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guidance to the field. USCINCPAC would publish a new DRIS instruction, develop an informational briefing for presentation to commanders throughout the US-PACOM, and explore the possibility of a DRIS newsletter.

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## SECTION III--MOBILITY OPERATIONS

### TEAM SPIRIT 84

(U) The TEAM SPIRIT series was the largest airlift/sealift deployment, employment, and redeployment exercise of forces in the Free World. Cargo was sealifted from Oakland, California; Tacoma, Washington; New Orleans, Louisiana; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Subic Bay, the Philippines; and Naha, Japan. Forces were airlifted from 35 CONUS and USPACOM airfields to 9 offload airfields in Korea. The three major phases of the field training exercise (FTX) were: strategic deployment 1 February-19 March; employment 16-30 March; and strategic redeployment 28 March-30 April 1984.<sup>1</sup>

#### Sealift

(U) The TEAM SPIRIT 84 (TS-84) sealift deployment commenced as scheduled on 1 February 1984 at Pearl Harbor with the loadout of the MV AMERICAN EAGLE. The ship was loaded with 102,873 square feet of 25th Infantry Division equipment consisting of helicopters, rolling stock, and CONEX containers. Unexpected ease in loading and a highly capable Army stevedore group resulted in the ships being loaded and sailed in two days ahead of schedule. Deployment continued throughout the month of February with the last arrival in Korea on 12 March.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Sealift redeployment began on 4 April with MV AMERICAN EAGLE departing Pusan, Korea, followed by USNS COMET on 6 April, and the USNS METEOR which got underway on 7 April. AMERICAN EAGLE and METEOR went to Pearl Harbor; COMET went to the West Coast of the United States. Concurrently, the Near Term Pre-positioning Force RO/RO ship USNS MERCURY started shuttling III MAF cargo and equipment from Pohang, Korea, to Naha (Okinawa), Japan. Sealift terminated on 9 May when the last piece of equipment was offloaded from AMERICAN EAGLE in Pearl Harbor. Total cargo moved to and from Korea was 933,303 square feet or 145,855.2 measurement tons (M/T), as depicted below. Sealift costs amounted to \$11.15 million.<sup>3</sup>

<u>Service</u>	<u>Square Feet</u>	<u>M/T</u>
Army	674,988	97,115.6
Marine Corps	219,060	40,817.6
Air Force	30,765	4,936
Navy	8,490	2,986

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1. J434 Point Paper (C), 24 Feb 84, Subj: TEAM SPIRIT - 84 (U), DECL OADR; J434 HistSum May 84 (U).
  2. J433 HistSum Feb 84 (U).
  3. J433 HistSum Dec 84 (U).

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### Airlift

(U) During TS-84, 309 deployment and 289 redeployment airlift missions operated from 35 onload airfields in CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, Okinawa, and mainland Japan to nine offload airfields in Korea. Over 36,000 troops and more than 8,500 tons of cargo were airlifted to and from Korea. Military airlift closure rates were 98 percent arriving within 24 hours of schedule and 87 percent arriving within two hours. The original JCS budget of \$25.376 million was insufficient to include all desired forces. Therefore, the 25th ID provided \$525,000 in funds for troop movement, and the III MAF provided an additional \$380,000 for two fighter squadrons. Excluding \$1.1 million funding by TAC, airlift costs in millions of dollars amounted to \$23.677 million.<sup>1</sup>

Deployment (military)	\$ 7.544
Redeployment (military)	7.617
Commercial	8.914
Employment airlift	1.104
Total (excluding TAC)	<u>\$25.179</u>

(U) The Joint Deployment System (JDS) was again used for TEAM SPIRIT deployment, but effectiveness was limited by a number of factors. The Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) base was not constructed in a timely manner and when finally completed, contained many inaccuracies. Some software problems, unfamiliarity with the system on the part of many officers in the Pacific joint deployment community, and an inexplicable system failure in early March were also contributing factors.

(U) During deployment, two B-747 cargo, 16 B-747 troop, and three KC-10 cargo/tanker missions were flown. These missions demonstrated the effectiveness of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program and provided valuable experience in KC-10 operations. In the tactical employment phase, 182 C-130 and 11 C-141 missions were flown in support of the participating ground, naval, and air forces. Of them, 51 were airdrop, 6 delivered fuel in bladders, and 122 were airland; 4,293 troops were airlanded and 109 were airdropped; and for the first time, the low altitude parachute extraction system of whole blood was successful. Another first was the insertion into the FTX area of elements of the III MAF Air Contingency Battalion by 11 C-130 sorties from outside Korea.

(U) Exercise of the Korean Contingency Resupply/Redistribution System at Kimhae AB and throughout Korea demonstrated the system's viability, but major facilities' deficiencies remained, especially in support of explosives handling and airdrop rigging operations. The lack of a consummated ROK-USFK memorandum of agreement continued to impede facilities development.

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1. J434 HistSum May 84 (U); USCINCPAC IG TEAM SPIRIT 84 Evaluation Report, p. 2-5, (S/RELROK), DECL OADR.

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(U) For the first time, the Osan passenger terminal was successfully used for TEAM SPIRIT redeployment missions. Sixteen B-747 troop flights were scheduled around the normal channel flights, and all but one were processed smoothly. The Passenger Booking Agency successfully matched over 1,000 non-unit travelers to returning TEAM SPIRIT missions for savings in excess of \$500,000 in duplicate commercial lift.

### TEAM SPIRIT 85

#### Sealift

(U) The TS-85 Initial Planning Conference was held at HQ USCINCPAC during the week of 4 June 1984. Utilizing preliminary planning data, exercise participants and Military Sealift Command (MSC) representatives were able to develop a scheduling concept to support TS-85 sealift requirements within the allotted sealift budget of \$14.57 million.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The sealift planning evolution was basically concluded with the Final Planning Conference held in Seoul, Korea, from 4 to 6 December 1984. It was anticipated that deployment and redeployment would involve a total of four vessels moving equipment from the ports of Oakland, Tacoma, Pearl Harbor, Subic Bay, and Naha at an estimated cost of \$8.98 million.

#### Airlift

(U) The TEAM SPIRIT 85 airlift conference was held on 31 May and 1 June, immediately prior to the Initial Planning Conference (see above). Planning guidelines and assignment of related tasks were issued on 20 June. Key areas of emphasis were to be quality tactical airlift events and repetition of TS-84 successes in deployment, employment, and redeployment airlift. The Joint Deployment System (JDS) was to be used to build the deployment airlift schedule, and the deployment TPFDD exercise lift requirements data base would replace formal airlift requests.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The initial airlift allocations message published in early July provided planning guidance for USCINCPAC component commands to use in constructing their TPFDD inputs. After completion in late July, they were merged at HQ USCINCPAC and made available to the Joint Deployment Agency. A TPFDD refinement review was subsequently conducted by USCINCPAC, MAC/22AF, and component action officers in consultation with user representatives. This was the first time that the JDS was used in the USPACOM as the sole source of exercise lift requirements and demonstrated its applicability to exercise planning.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J433 HistSum Jun 84 (U).
  2. J434 HistSum Jun 84 (U).
  3. J434 HistSum Aug 84 (U).

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✓ (U) At the sealift/airlift planning conference held 6 through 8 November, the TPFDD for OPLAN 5069E (an OPLAN created by the JDA for TS-85) was reviewed and later released to the JDA for processing and to MAC for airlift scheduling. As a result of the conference, III MAF air deployment was adjusted to commence on 1 March 1985, thereby minimizing their force pre-positioning. Also, a scheme to air deploy the 7th Infantry Division brigade task force in five days was developed. At the opening session of the final planning conference held at the Combined Forces Command HQ in Seoul, Korea, from 4 to 7 December, the status of deployment airlift planning was briefed to 650 attendees. In addition, a USCINCPAC representative coordinated airlift support arrangements with concerned commands at Osan AB, Korea, and Yokota AB, Japan.

### Military Sealift Command Liaison Officer

(U) The naval officer in charge of the MSC Office Honolulu was responsible for MSC shore end functions for MSC ships and MSC-related commercial operations calling at Honolulu. While he and his office staff were properly trained and manned to carry out these MSC port functions, the MSC Commander, VADM William Rowden, USN, believed they were not properly equipped to perform liaison functions for either USCINCPAC or CINCPACFLT. In an effort to be more responsive to unified commanders' needs, MSC liaison officers had recently been assigned to USCINCEUR and USCINCENT/USCINCREC/Director JDA. In a March 1984 message VADM Rowden proposed the establishment of a similar function at HQ USCINCPAC. The billet would be a Navy O-6 provided by MSC with dual-hatted responsibilities and located at CINCPACFLT. His job would be to serve as a direct liaison and communications link between USCINCPAC and the MSC in all matters concerning strategic sealift, both in peacetime and wartime. Admirals Crowe and Foley concurred in the proposal and MSC authorized the billet, however at the end of the year the OINC MSC Honolulu was still functioning as the MSC LNO.<sup>2</sup>

### Sealift Programs

(U) There were three Navy sealift programs which had been developed since 1979 to reduce reaction time for a Rapid Deployment Force (later designated USCENCOM) deployment: the Near Term Pre-positioning Force (NTPF), its follow-on Maritime Pre-positioning Ships, and the Fast Logistics Ships--more commonly known as the SL-7 program.

#### SL-7 (TAKR) Basing Plan

(U) Under the SL-7 program the Navy procured eight SL-7s, the largest and fastest container ships in the U.S. flag merchant fleet, which were to be used by the MSC to enhance DOD strategic mobility postures. These ships were being

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1. J434 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
  2. COMSC 071807Z Mar 84 (U); USCINCPAC 310603Z Mar 84 (U).

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converted to roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels and were to be designated as TAKRs ("T" - civilian crewed, "A" - auxiliary, "K" - cargo, "R" - RO/RO). When converted, the TAKRs would have the capability to carry all the equipment required by an Army division, and then they would be placed in the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) in a 4-day, ready-for-sea status.<sup>1</sup>

(U) At a TAKR users conference hosted by the Department of the Army (DA) and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in Washington, D.C., in late March 1984, a joint Army-Navy proposal was tabled which called for berthing all eight of the TAKRs in East and Gulf Coast ports. On 23 April USCINCPAC asked for reconsideration of the DA-CNO berthing proposal and recommended that one or more TAKRs be berthed on the West Coast, and USCINCPAC and CDRWESTCOM supported the USCINCPAC recommendation. While applauding the SL-7 initiative which provided a significant increase in the rapid response capability of strategic sealift resources, USCINCPAC said that without one or more on the West Coast, there would be no enhancement of the strategic sealift capability to immediately respond to USPACOM requirements. Their accessibility for West Coast unit training and exercise support would also be affected whereas with some West Coast basing, approximately \$1.5 million could be saved in exercise funds each time one of the ships was used in support of large-scale exercises in the Pacific.<sup>2</sup>

(b)(1) 1.5 (a)



NTPF Expansion Requirements and Funding

(C) As the NTPF expanded in size and as maintenance requirements became more involved, the issue of funding responsibilities came to the fore. Under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) developed by the USPACOM components, the Navy paid annual per diem costs of over \$200 million. In addition, the Navy paid for all terminal operations, including stevedoring, required to offload/offload cargo from the NTPF ships when ship maintenance was required. The Army

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1. J433 HistSum Apr 84 (U).
  2. Ibid.; USCINCPAC 232319Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.; JCS 061620Z Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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and the Air Force reimbursed the Navy only for maintenance performed on respective Service ammunition and offloading/loading of cargo and ammunition which was incident to required ship drydock or normal business operations. Moreover, provisions of the MOU applied to support provided only at the Naval Magazine at Subic Bay in the Philippines.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Navy funding for all NTPF terminal operation costs was through the CINCPACFLT budget. The funding requirement for offload/onload (terminal operations) of cargo was never recognized in the Navy budget process, except in May of the execution year as a result of the CNO mid-year review. In 1984 PAGFLT advised that, with the shift of NTPF funding from one budget activity to another, they would no longer have the flexibility to fund requirements "out-of-hide" until recognized at the mid-year review.

(U) Expansion in the number of NTPF ammunition ships and maintenance requirements placed an untenable burden on NAVMAG Subic's ability to provide fleet support as well as required NTPF ammunition maintenance. To relieve some of the workload on Subic, in August 1983 USCINCPAC initiated efforts to identify one or more NTPF alternate ammunition maintenance facilities to relieve Subic. After eight months of surveys and studies, two sites were identified and designated by USCINCPAC as NTPF maintenance facilities which could be used to support approved NTPF maintenance schedules, as required. The two sites were the Army's Tengan Pier-Air Force 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron on Okinawa (breakbulk), and the U.S. Army ammunition complex at Akizuki-Hiro (Sasebo) Japan (for NTPF LASH or breakbulk).<sup>2</sup>

(U) CINCPACFLT questioned the responsibility for funding terminal operation costs at sites other than Subic, as well as the future responsibility for such costs regardless of the location of the ammunition maintenance facility. When CINCPACFLT was unsuccessful in reaching any form of compromise with the USCINCPAC components, USCINCPAC attempted to mediate the issue by providing short- and long-term options, but that effort was also unsuccessful. As a result, on 14 July 1984 USCINCPAC asked that the JCS intervene and publish Service funding responsibilities for accomplishing NTPF maintenance.

(U) On 21 August the JCS directed that for the near term the Navy would be responsible for terminal operation costs if the requirement to discharge/backload cargo were driven by a ship's maintenance requirement, such as the American Board of Shipping certification. If discharge/backload were in order to inspect, maintain, or replace cargo, then the owning Service that generated

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1. J4/Memo/C930 (C), 13 Aug 84, Subj: NTPF Funding Issues (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.; USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), VOL. II, p. 492; J433 HistSum May 84 (U).

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the cargo offload requirement would fund such costs. Long-term funding concepts, such as a single-source funding manager, would be addressed separately, but no further guidance was provided by the end of the year.<sup>1</sup>

MV SHANTA SHIBANI

(U) A 4 January 1984 message from the U.S. Defense Attache Office, New Delhi, notified USCINCPAC that the Indian MV SHANTA SHIBANI was in difficulty and that diversion to Guam or Wake Island might be necessary. The ship arrived at Wake Island on 16 January, and the ship's owner, Hede Navigation Company, determined that repair would require the expertise of two engineers from India. Because there was no commercial air service to Wake, Hede sought transportation by military aircraft for the repairmen. Based upon a request for assistance relayed through the U.S. Embassy, New Delhi, the State Department declared that transportation of the repairmen, plus an insurance representative, was in the national interest and asked for Defense Department assistance. Following an abortive attempt to reach Wake on a regularly scheduled weekly flight, the three arrived on Wake on 26 January.<sup>2</sup>

(U) After inadvertent grounding of the ship and subsequent breakage of all mooring lines on 24 January, the master of the SHANTA SHIBANI requested that his 7-month pregnant wife be provided transportation to Hawaii. This travel was also endorsed by State, coordinated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and accomplished via a scheduled MAC mission. By 2 February it became apparent that repairs would take longer than anticipated and an ocean-going tug would be required; also, concern mounted that provisions on the ship might run out. Hede Navigation then contracted an ocean-going tug from Japan which brought along some provisions. In addition, the base services contractor at Wake provided water and fuel, and approximately 4,000 pounds of provisions were airlifted from Honolulu on a scheduled MAC mission following State and Defense consultations. Following temporary repairs to the hull, the MV SHANTA SHIBANI departed Wake on 14 February.<sup>3</sup>

Korean Airlines Agreement

(U) A memorandum of agreement between the United States and Korea for use of Korean civilian aircraft during contingencies was signed by Admiral Long and the ROK Air Force Chief in December 1981, and implementing instructions were developed during 1983. Formal signing of the latter transpired when General Thomas M. Ryan, Jr., USAF, CINCPAC, visited Korea in September 1984.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J433 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
  2. J435 HistSum Mar 84 (U).
  3. Ibid.
  4. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 492-493; COMUSKOREA Ltr DJ-T (U), 9 Sep 83, Subj: Implementation Instructions for Use of Korean Airlines (KAL) aircraft.

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## SECTION IV--FACILITIES ENGINEERING

### U.S. Military Construction Programs in USPACOM

FY 85

(U) Total Military Construction (MILCON) authorization worldwide under Title VI of Public Law 98-407 for FY 85 was \$8.707 billion, and USPACOM's share was increased by approximately \$190 million over FY 84 as reflected in the accompanying chart. For a time during the congressional process, the prospects for several key USPACOM projects looked bleak, and Admiral Crowe appealed to Assistant Secretary of Defense/Manpower, Installations, and Logistics (ASD/MI&L) Dr. Lawrence Korb concerning certain deletions slated by the House of Representatives. Failure to authorize projects at Misawa, he said, would delay completion of the F-16 initiative. Japanese funding in the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) could not be accomplished because projects of a war-fighting nature were in direct contravention of Japan's constitution. Funding in the FY 85 MILCON program of fuel tankage at Pohang, Korea, was essential to guaranteeing improvement of USPACOM's sustainability posture, and existing fuel storage in Korea was a critical limiting factor in all USCINCPAC OPLANs involving Korea. Funding of DOD Dependent Schools on Okinawa in the FIP was also not workable because it was too late to process through the Japanese budget cycle before the housing, funded in the Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) 1984 FIP, would come on line and students would be on board. Action by the Senate Appropriations Committee in August restored some of the House cuts.<sup>1</sup>

(U) A comparison of the FY 84 authorization with the FY 85 requested and authorization, by Service, is depicted in the accompanying chart; but classified projects are not included. In addition, funds were authorized for construction at two Defense Fuel Supply Points (Adak-\$6,730,000 and Pohang-\$15,800,000), the Defense Property Disposal Office at Pearl Harbor-\$1,950,000 and four DOD Dependent Schools (Zukeran-\$2,250,000, Seoul-\$1,130,000, Subic-\$2,950,000, and Clark-\$4,970,000). Among significant projects approved were Navy home-porting requirements in Hawaii, Guam, and Subic Bay; POL and ammunition storage facilities in Korea, Japan, and the Aleutians; improvement of Army and Air Force personnel support facilities in Korea; continuation of fleet support and rapid deployment force facilities in Diego Garcia. Others were 405 family housing units at the Naval Station Adak, Alaska (\$53.1 million); modernization of existing facilities, renovation, and new structures at Tripler Army Medical Center, Hawaii (\$115 million); ammunition storage at

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1. USCINCPAC 200524Z Jul 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR; OSD 151906Z Aug 84 (U)(BOM). Public Law 98-473 FY 85 Continuing Resolution Appropriations and Military Construction Appropriations Act 1985. The JFY ran from April through March--a half year different from the U.S. fiscal cycle.

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MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION IN USPACOM  
(in thousands of dollars)

	Army		Navy		Marine Corps		Air Force		Total		
	FY 84	Req-85	FY 85	Req-85	FY 84	Req-85	FY 85	Req-85	FY 84	Req-85	
Alaska (Aleutians)									2,970	70,467	62,467
American Samoa		3,094	-0-							3,094	-0-
Australia									3,020		
Diego Garcia									58,200	16,100	16,100
Cuam									980	6,400	6,400
Hawaii	41,800	159,700	162,830		10,600	18,450	18,450		3,150	3,800	3,800
Japan	1,400	1,900	1,900		750	9,150	9,150		51,796	43,680	40,750
Johnston Island										67,000	21,000
Korea	59,840	123,740	118,240						82,633	79,143	59,543
Kwajalein	5,620									5,620	
Philippines									8,850	42,425	42,125
Wake Island										1,235	1,235
Totals	108,660	355,434	303,970	130,120	188,802	149,197	11,350	27,600	27,600	204,629	186,383
											163,553
											454,759
											754,219
											644,620

Figures in brackets were funded by SAC and are non-add items.

Source: FY 84--PL 98-115; Req-85---J443 Point Paper (U), 17 Feb 84, Subj: FY 85 MILDOR and OASD/PA news release 1 Feb 84; FY 85--PL 98-407.

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Johnston Island (Army - \$21 million); Misawa AB, Japan (Navy - \$9.3 million) and COMMANDO PORT (Air Force - \$20 million for F-16 beddown).<sup>1</sup>

FY 86

(U) During July through October 1983, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics insisted, over USCINCPAC objections, that USCINCPAC prioritize USPACOM MILCON projects to insure that the unified CINCs' priorities were being followed. Motivation for this was to highlight the most urgent theater requirements associated with strategic planning. On 15 December USCINCPAC directed his component and subordinate unified commanders to provide a prioritized listing of FY 86 MILCON projects by 13 February 1984. At the request of the subordinate unified commanders (COMUSJAPAN and COMUSKOREA), USCINCPAC issued the following additional guidance for assigning such priorities.<sup>2</sup>

- Priority 1: Improve readiness of U.S. forces in-being.
- Priority 2: Enhance sustainability of deployed forces, including allies.
- Priority 3: Modernize the forces.
- Priority 4: Provide adequate training facilities.
- Priority 5: Initiate other steps to support the above--energy conservation, fire protection, air and water pollution counter measures, etc.

(U) In response to USCINCPAC guidance for the FY 86 POM development, the Service components submitted the following program, in millions of dollars. Priority 5 included \$118 million for military family housing construction (including new construction as well as major renovation) which supported all of the higher priorities.<sup>3</sup>

<u>USCINCPAC's Priority</u>	<u>Program Amount</u>	<u>Percentage of total</u>
1 Readiness	211	32
2 Sustainability	121	19
3 Modernization	80	12
4 Training	15	2
5 Other	<u>226</u>	35
Total	653	

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1. Public Law 98-407, Aug 24, 1984 (U); J443 Point Papers (U), 17 Feb, 29 May, and 15 Jul 84, Subj: FY 85 MILCON Program.
  2. J443 HistSum Jan 84 (U); USCINCPAC 150226Z Dec 83 (U).
  3. J4/SSS/S1247 (U), 12 Sep 85, Subj: Review of Draft USCINCPAC Command History for 1984.

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### Ammunition Port Facility on Guam

(U) For several years explosives safety inspections had noted the lack of adequate explosives port and berthing facilities for ammunition ships and tenders on Guam. Most ammunition handling activity took place at the "Hotel" wharf on Cabras Island in Apra Harbor where the majority of the Government of Guam commercial pier facilities and a privately-owned pier with above-ground POL storage tanks were located. Moreover, the site was within the 7,210-foot explosive safety quantity distance (ESQD) arc from the Hotel wharf. In 1979 two-separate ammunition berths were proposed to allow simultaneous handling of an ammunition cargo ship and a combatant ship.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Although authorized in the Navy's FY 79 MILCON program, the projects were not funded by the Congress and consequently were not accomplished. On 11 September 1979 the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Marianas, submitted an alternative proposal for construction at the combatant wharf site on Orote Point at a cost of \$25 million. The project would both meet the Services' anticipated needs and free commercial pier facilities from the ESQD hazard zone. The alternative was approved and \$24 million was authorized in the FY 84 MILCON program for construction of the new wharf in Apra Harbor which would have the capacity of handling up to 3 million pounds net explosive weight "without waiver." On 6 December 1984 bids were opened with preference given to U.S. contractors.<sup>2</sup>

### HQ USCINCPAC Operational Control Center

(U) On 7 May 1984 Admiral Crowe forwarded a request to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for FY 86 MILCON funding of a 4-story headquarters operational control building. Surveys had indicated that existing space would not be adequate for handling the ever-increasing number of equipment expansions and new installations. The proposed MILCON Project P-097 projected a 61,200-square foot building at an estimated total cost of \$20 million. The entire building and its connecting bridge to Building 4 would be a sensitive compartmented information facility and constructed with approximately 20 decibels of electromagnetic pulse protection.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 16 May the CNO forwarded the request to the Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command recommending that it be included in the Navy's FY 87 MILCON program. On 17 November Admiral Crowe asked CNO Admiral Watkins'

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1981 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 615 and 1982, Vol. II, p. 715; J443 Point Paper (U), 26 Jul 84, Subj: Ammunition Port Facility, Orote Point, Guam.
  2. Ibid.; J443 Point Paper (U), 14 Dec 84, Subj: Ammunition Port Facility, Orote Point, Guam.
  3. J443 HistSum May 84 (U); J4/Memo/C194 (U), 17 Feb 84, Subj: MILCON Project P-097, USCINCPAC Operational Control (OPCON) Center.

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personal support for the project. Admiral Watkins replied that it would receive "every consideration" as the FY 87 Program Objectives Memorandum was being developed but he expressed doubt that design milestones could be met in time for the project to be included in the FY 87 program.<sup>1</sup>

### Madagascar

(U) USCINCPAC was informed on 19 June of a request from President Ratsiraka of Madagascar for U.S. assistance by providing a 300-meter Bailey bridge as a replacement for one at Namakia which was swept away by Cyclone AUDREY in December 1983. Loss of the bridge denied access to the harvest and processing of sugar cane and rice--two of the country's chief crops which were valued at over \$6 million. A subsequent message from U.S. Ambassador Robert B. Keating requested USCINCPAC funding for a civil engineer to survey Malagasy engineer equipment and to assess requirements for the bridge replacement. USCINCPAC, through the Atlantic Naval Facilities Engineering Command, arranged for the Resident Officer-in-Charge of Construction in Kenya to perform the survey.<sup>2</sup>

(U) A temporary bridge was erected by the Malagasy Army Corps of Engineers in early August and, as a result, 50 percent of the 1984 harvest was saved. Later that month USCINCPAC asked the Pacific Naval Facilities Engineering Command to prepare preliminary design and cost estimates for a non-standard steel stringer bridge based on site survey information. On 29 August USCINCPAC provided cost estimates of \$1 million for a Bailey bridge and \$1.6 million for materials and transportation of an on-site fabricated steel stringer bridge. Plans were to dismantle the temporary bridge in November prior to start of the rainy season.<sup>3</sup>

### Philippines

(U) In conjunction with a USCINCPAC manpower survey, a member of the Facilities Engineer staff conducted a survey of the JUSMAG Philippines in Manila from 1 to 12 October 1984. The facilities survey focused on the 29 family housing quarters and recommended closing of the Howell compound (11 units) during FY 85 in order to save \$60,000 annually in Philippine Government assistance-in-kind costs. On 22 December JUSMAGPHIL provided USCINCPAC and the Defense Security Assistance Agency with an outline for vacating the Howell compound between 1 February and 31 December 1985. Beginning 1 January 1985 a leased housing program through the U.S. Embassy would serve as a substitute.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J443 HistSums Jun, Dec 84 (U).
  2. J443 HistSum Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.
  4. J444 HistSums Oct, Dec 84 (U).

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Japan Host Nation Funded Construction Programs

(U) USCINCPAC provided overall theater direction and control of USPACOM host nation-funded construction programs (HNFCP) in accordance with a DOD Directive (4270.34). There were two HNFCPs for U.S. forces in Japan which were totally funded by the Japanese Government (GOJ).

(U) One was the Integrated Relocation Construction Program. Since the reversion of Okinawa in 1972, Japan had funded relocation construction to assist in the reduction and consolidation of U.S.-used facilities. This program was based on the quid pro quo concept, and most of the identified \$1.2 billion program was complete. The JFY (Japan Fiscal Year) 1984 program totaled \$49.5 million.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The other, the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP), was a Japanese initiative to assist U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) as part of a cost sharing concept developed in 1977. Under this concept the GOJ funded the entire FIP with no requirement for proportionate matching of U.S. funds and no quid pro quo requirement. Increases of between 20 to 25 percent per year through JFY 84 were in consonance with U.S. congressional desires for increased Japanese defense spending.<sup>2</sup>

~~(C)~~ Growth of overall Japanese defense funding was of serious concern to USCINCPAC. While growth in the annual FIP budget was desirable, careful consideration had to be given to the balance between the FIP budget and the budget for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), and it was necessary to avoid a position of encouraging an increase in the FIP at the expense of the JSDF.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The FIP was the only program for construction of quality-of-life type facilities (including family housing) in Japan, but it also provided some funding for construction of limited operational projects as well. Not all U.S. military construction requirements could be worked effectively under the FIP, and those which could not, generally fell into five classes: repair and maintenance projects, renovation and/or expansion of facilities, operational projects, politically contentious projects, and sensitivity projects (those which would require disclosure of classified information or high technology data to secure through the FIP).<sup>4</sup>

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1. J4/Memo/S929 ~~(S)~~, 13 Aug 84, Subj: FIP-Japan (U), DECL OADR; J441 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 17 Dec 84, Host Nation Construction-Japan (U), DECL OADR.
  2. J441 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 17 Dec 84, Host Nation Construction-Japan (U), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.
  4. USCINCPAC 220409Z Jan 85 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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(C) The FIP was one of the most visible elements of the cost sharing concept in the defense of Japan and the Western Pacific. It had become increasingly attractive to all the Service components as a means of obtaining much needed modern facilities. Resulting competition for project funding pitted "priority of need" against component demands for "fair share" or other equitable distribution. Prior year distribution is shown below by percentage.<sup>1</sup>

<u>Service</u>	JFY					
	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
Army	0	11.1	10.1	5.7	6.	3.6
Navy	37.6	19.2	25.2	21.5	28.	14.4
Marine	11.5	32.5	27.6	31.2	29.	13.
Air Force	50.9	37.3	37.1	41.6	36.	69.

(U) USCINCPAC had designated COMUSJAPAN as the program manager and single point of contact with the Government of Japan (GOJ) for the purpose of negotiating and proposing FIP projects within USCINCPAC-JCS-DOD guidance. Among the significant projects in the JFY 84 FIP, which was approved by the Japanese Diet in April 1984, were Misawa F-16 beddown facilities (\$82.9 million); 524 new Marine Corps MFH units on Okinawa; environmental assessments and earth and flood control work in support of Navy housing at Ikego (see below).<sup>2</sup>

JFY 85 Facilities Improvement Program

(C) During the week of 30 January 1984 a COMUSJAPAN-sponsored engineering steering group met to develop a JFY 85 FIP strawman which reflected \$219.1 million in carryover projects and \$248.9 million for new projects. Following refinement, on 16 March COMUSJAPAN submitted the project requests to USCINCPAC. These are summarized below, by Service, in millions of dollars, and compared with subsequent GOJ Cabinet/Japan Defense Agency (JDA) action.<sup>3</sup>

<u>Program</u>	<u>Carry-over COMUSJAPAN/JDA</u>	<u>New Projects COMUSJAPAN/JDA</u>	<u>Total COMUSJAPAN/JDA</u>
F-16 support	45.9/ 47.5	4.52/ 8.5	50.42/ 56.
Navy	74.2/ 36.0	88.4 / 20.6	162.6 / 56.6
Air Force	39.4/ 48.7	114.93/ 59.7	154.33/108.4
Marine Corps	34.6/ 28.2	33.18/ 16.0	67.78/ 44.2
Army	25. / 14.1	18.34/ 8.0	43.34/ 22.1
Total	<u>219.1/174.5</u>	<u>259.37/112.8</u>	<u>478.47/287.3</u>

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1. J441 Point Paper (C), 23 Aug 84, Subj: Facilities Improvement Support for USARJ (U), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC Instruction 11010.2D (U), 5 Dec 84, Subj: Construction; Op. Cit., J441 17 Dec 84 Point Paper.
  3. J441 HistSums Feb, Mar 84 (C), DECL OADR; J441 HistSum Dec 84 (U).

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(C) The JFY 85 FIP was the first integrated FIP listing of all Service component projects to be rank-ordered in accordance with USCINCPAC readiness, sustainability, and other goals. After four meetings, staff members from USCINCPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, COMMARCORBASESPAC, and WESTCOM, representing USARJ, were unable to reach a consensus on integration and priority of their respective projects. Ultimately, USCINCPAC resolved the priority issue at the flag officer level. Carryover projects remained the same at \$219.1 million, but USCINCPAC's modifications to certain new projects, as depicted below in millions of dollars, plus \$95.23 million for other projects, reduced the JFY 84 FIP-request to \$475.68 million.<sup>1</sup>

	<u>COMUSJAPAN</u>	<u>USCINCPAC</u>
F-16 beddown	4.52	8.93
Sasebo homeporting	50.	54.9
Okinawa MFH	80.	87.57
Relocations for MFH	4.2	4.2
Army	18.34	5.75

(C) Under USCINCPAC guidelines for integration and prioritization of "New Projects," COMUSJAPAN was to make every effort to insure that projects received GOJ funding in accordance with established priorities. However, if a new project dropped off the prioritized list (for whatever reason), the guidelines provided procedures for substitution of the next new project on the list. That procedure would be continued until the entire new project prioritized list was exhausted, or until there were no funds remaining. In the event that the new projects prioritized list was exhausted and funds were still available, COMUSJAPAN was then to ask USCINCPAC for substitute projects. USCINCPAC would give primary consideration to the Service that had incurred the greatest decrement on the integrated priority list.<sup>2</sup>

(C) USCINCPAC's planning goal was to maintain a minimum of 25 percent of available funding for new projects in the JFY 86 FIP and beyond. Recognizing the difficulty of accurately predicting carryover totals and GOJ FIP funding levels, COMUSJAPAN was to use this figure, to the best of his ability, during formulation of the JFY 85 FIP with the GOJ. Deviation from this goal would require USCINCPAC approval. Also, COMUSJAPAN was to submit all F-16 (COMMANDO PORT) support projects to the GOJ as "over and above" the FIP.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 27 July 1984 COMUSJAPAN informed USCINCPAC that the GOJ (Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA)) first-cut draft JFY 85 FIP was set at

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1. J441 Point Paper (S), 13 Sep 84, Subj: JFY85 FIP-Japan (U), DECL OADR; J4/Memo/C432 (C), 21 Apr 84, Subj: JFY85 FIP (U), DECL OADR; J441 HistSum Apr; COMUSJAPAN 160505Z Mar; and USCINCPAC 220026Z Apr, all 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 220026Z Apr 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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\$287.3 which represented a near zero growth (.55 percent). At COMUSJAPAN's suggestion, Admiral Crowe asked State and Defense Department executives to assist in influencing the Japanese to provide a 20-25 percent increase. On 23 August U.S. Embassy representatives held a meeting with DFAA Vice Minister Natsume for that purpose. Mr. Natsume explained that the previous funding level growth had resulted from special contractual arrangements to accommodate actual disbursements in JFY 85 for the F-16 beddown at Misawa AB.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Included in the U.S. FY 85 MILCON appropriations act (PL 98-473 of 12 Oct 1984) was the stipulation that none of the funds for the F-16 beddown could be obligated or expended unless . . . the GOJ JFY 85 budget included COMMANDO PORT projects additive to the JFY 84 FIP. In November the proposed \$287.3 FIP budget, as recommended by the Japan Defense Agency, was approved by the GOJ Cabinet for submission to the Diet in April 1985. All indications were that allocations would be as depicted above.

#### JFY 86 FIP Planning

(U) For some years COMUSJAPAN had requested that long-range planning be developed for HNFPC in Japan as a tool to alleviate MFH problems as well as to ameliorate Service component contention in prioritizing construction projects. Again in 1984, COMUSJAPAN prepared a long-range FIP strawman which incorporated many previous lessons learned. By way of general guidance, on 24 September USCINCPAC advised COMUSJAPAN and Service components that expectations of FIP funding level increases at the 20-25 percent rate were no longer valid. While efforts would be made to secure some growth, a zero growth situation would likely emerge. The JFY 86 FIP was to be consolidated by COMUSJAPAN and forwarded to USCINCPAC for final approval as a prioritized list. The message also provided priority definition, program guidance, and a proposed concept for project substitution.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 6 December USCINCPAC revised the outline for development of the JFY 86 FIP in an attempt to consolidate previous unwritten policy and procedures into one comprehensive document as well as to provide procedures for new concepts in FIP management procedures. This detailed guidance was intended to overcome past problems and insure full understanding by all parties concerned regarding proper funding sources, project categories, prioritization procedures, the substitution process, and allocation of budget targets. Priorities were to be divided into three major categories--each further sub-divided into five sub-categories, as listed below. A USCINCPAC instruction would be published after further refinement.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J441 HistSums Aug 84 (S), DECL OADR, and Dec 84 (U); AMEMB Tokyo 17527/240840Z and 18074/310912Z Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/PRD), Vol. II, pp. 501-504; COMUSJAPAN 290724Z May 84 (C), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 242231Z Sep 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. J441 HistSum Dec 84 (U); USCINCPAC 060501Z Dec 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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Category I: That portion of projects initiated in prior year FIP programs which were to be funded in the current program year.

Category II: All new projects to be initiated in the current program year.

Category III: That portion of project costs in category II which could not be funded in the current program year, but which were to be funded in the out years, plus that portion of project cost from previous years still not funded in the current program year.

(U) The five sub-categories within each of the above were to track and manage related groups of projects as identified below.<sup>1</sup>

Sub-category A: Those projects directed by the JCS, DOD, or USCINCPAC.

Sub-category B: MFH projects and certain minimum essential community support projects such as fire, police, ambulance, shopette, daycare center, etc.

Sub-category C: All unaccompanied personnel housing projects.

Sub-category D: Service initiatives which would be allocated to the Army (14 percent), Air Force (27 percent), Marine Corps (28 percent), and Navy (31 percent).

Sub-category E: All projects initiated unilaterally by the GOJ.

(U) The December guidance was explicit regarding which facilities projects should be requested under MILCON versus FIP. Generally, the FIP was the preferred source of funding for military family housing, related community support (less non-appropriated-fund type facilities for profit-making activities), all DOD Dependent Schools projects and those operational projects for which there was a strong probability the GOJ would fund. MILCON was to be used for ammunition storage and handling facilities projects, new POL storage and distribution facilities projects, maintenance and repair projects, and those operational projects which were not in the best U.S. interests to ask the GOJ to fund (high technology or U.S. security sensitive projects). Non-appropriated funding should be requested for all facilities used for profit making activities.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.; SECDEF 192136Z Dec 83 and 311455Z Jan 84 (U); J4/SSS/S1247 (U), 12 Sep 85, Subj: Review of Draft USCINCPAC Command History for 1984.

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Family Housing

Ikego

(U) Construction of family housing to satisfy the Navy's shortfall in the Kanto Plain was the Navy's highest priority requirement under the FIP. Between 900-1,300 units were needed for personnel stationed at Atsugi and Yokosuka. Acquisition of new real estate was not possible, and Ikego was the only U.S. facility with sufficient real estate located within reasonable commuting distance. Since 1980 prefectural environmental constraints had limited inclusion of site, design, and construction funding for this politically sensitive project in the FIP.<sup>1</sup>

~~(C)~~ For a while in early 1984 it appeared that the Ikego MFH initiative was achieving significant progress by gaining the support of the adjacent Zushi-city Assembly. However, following the Mayor's announcement of support for Ikego housing, the U.S. Embassy reported that a campaign by a relatively small core of local housewives had been all but taken over by professional communist and socialist organizers who were sent to Zushi to spur a recall campaign against the Mayor.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Despite official support of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the New Liberal Club, and the Democratic Socialist Party, on 11 November Mayor Mishima was defeated in an extraordinary election by Kiichiro Tomino who was the Secretary General of the non-partisan but leftist "Association of Citizens for Protecting Green and Children." Nevertheless, the Chairman of the Facilities Subcommittee affirmed GOJ support for the project but requested that all communication on the issue be coordinated through that office. On 5 December the GOJ turned down a plea by Tomino for cancellation of the Ikego housing project and said it would proceed with a plan to build 920 apartments in a portion of the 725-acre woodland site as scheduled.<sup>3</sup>

Sakibe Area (Sasebo)

(U) The U.S. Naval Fleet Activities at Sasebo on the Island of Kyushu, Japan, included an 82-acre site called the Sakibe area. On 28 January 1974 the U.S.-GOJ Joint Committee had agreed to the total release of the area subject to certain conditions. One of those was that Sasebo Heavy Industries (SSK) would construct a one million-ton drydock facility; otherwise, the Navy

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (T8/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 513-514.
  2. COMUSJ 120335Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR; AMEMB Tokyo 19511/190845Z Sep 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Tokyo 21955/230931Z Oct 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR; AMEMB Tokyo 130834Z Nov 84 (U); COMUSJ 260800Z Nov 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR; UPI wire story (U), dated Tokyo, 5 Dec 84; COMUSJ 160505Z Mar 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR; J441 Point Paper (S), 30 Jul 84, Subj: JFY85 FIP-Japan (U), DECL OADR.

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could reclaim the area. Since the reopening of the Suez Canal in June 1975 and the end of the worldwide oil crisis, the GOJ contended that world conditions made such a large drydock uneconomical, and subsequently, two conflicting requirements involving the Sakibe area evolved. The Governor of Nagasaki Prefecture wanted to construct a power plant on another parcel of land owned by SSK, but SSK said it would sell the land only if a smaller drydock could be built at Sakibe. On 30 June 1983 the United States announced a plan to station two additional ships at Sasebo under the overseas family residency program. In order to meet family housing needs (approximately 550 units) and operations and logistic support requirements, on 30 July COMNAVFORJAPAN requested the return of the Sakibe area.<sup>1</sup>

(U) That October DFAA representatives briefed USFJ Facilities Engineers on a proposal by the Nagasaki Prefectural Governor to provide land for family housing at the Harioshima Industrial Park--some 30-50 minutes driving time from the Sasebo base. Meanwhile, the USCINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate rendered an opinion that reacquisition of Sakibe, because SSK had not constructed the drydock, was not an enforceable right. In December, at a Sasebo Special Working Group meeting, the GOJ formally offered land at the Harioshima Industrial Park for MFH.

(U) COMNAVFORJAPAN had been reluctant to provide detailed requirements for the operational and logistic facilities, and in January 1984 CINCPACFLT briefed Admiral Crowe on the issue. Later that month, following USCINCPAC authorization, COMUSJAPAN was asked to formally present the Navy's operational, logistic, and support concept plans and requirements for the Sakibe area to the GOJ if in return they would meet certain Navy pre-conditions for housing at Harioshima.<sup>2</sup>

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ On 31 July COMUSJAPAN reported that negotiations with the DFAA on the JFY 85 FIP were stymied by a firm GOJ stance on the Sasebo issues. Specifically, the GOJ was unwilling to support any new projects in the JFY 85 FIP related to Sasebo family housing without a conceptual agreement on pending land issues. Basically, the GOJ would agree to provide the eastern half of Sakibe for U.S. forces use; to proceed with construction of 52 MFH units at Sasebo main base; and to fund survey and basic design at Harioshima, if the Navy would agree by 6 August that the remaining units be constructed on [only] 214,000 square meters at Harioshima versus the 250,000 square meters that the Navy had insisted was the minimum required. Otherwise, the Sasebo housing line would be dropped from the JFY 85 FIP. COMNAVFORJAPAN concurred and the

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1. J444 HistSum Dec 83 (U); Enclosure (4) to J4/Memo/S429 (U), 5 Apr 84, Subj: Background Information on Sasebo/Sakibe Land and Facility Requirements Issue.
  2. Op. Cit., Enclosure (4); J441 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 15 May 84, Subj: Sasebo Land/Facility Requirements (U), DECL OADR.

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Sasebo projects were in the JDA approved package; the eastern half (approximately 125,000 square meters) of the Sakibe area was retained by the Navy.<sup>1</sup>

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1. J441 HistSum Aug 84 (U); COMUSJ 312245Z Jul 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR; COMNAV-FORJAPAN 062100Z Aug 84 (U); Jane's Defence Weekly (U), 9 Feb 85, p. 210; J441 Point Paper (C), 24 May 85, Subj: Host Nation Construction-Japan (U), DECL OADR.

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# COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY



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
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*Prepared by the Command History Division  
Office of the Joint Secretary  
Headquarters USCINCPAC*

CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-5025  
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CHAPTER VI

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

SECTION I--POLICY

(U) From 10 to 24 October COMO J. Weldon Koenig, USN, traveled to five of the ASEAN countries on his initial trip to Southeast Asia as the USCINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance. Accompanying him was his Security Assistance Policy Division Chief. In reporting on the trip to Admiral Crowe he cited three overall impressions. First, that with the exception of Malaysia, all of the SAOs were in excellent shape. Leadership was positive, morale high, and the personnel assigned were eager to do their best toward serving U.S. interests.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Basically, the respective programs were moving in the right direction although some refinements were desirable. He believed IMET levels had probably reached the saturation point in most ASEAN countries. Nearly all students with the requisite backgrounds and English language skills were being sent to CONUS for training. While every country wanted more FMS credit, debt servicing presented a problem. As a result, grant aid, extended repayment terms, or concessional interest rates were the desired alternatives to FMS-guaranteed credits. While newly passed legislation would permit "on-budget" guaranteed credit and hence, concessional terms, the outlook for the Congress to increase credit levels significantly was bleak.

(U) The existing security assistance program was serving long-term national interests well, but there were few programs available to the unified commander to serve shorter term theater interests. The IMET Program built long-term benefits by exposing future leaders to the U.S. way of life and institutions. What was lacking, he said, was funding resources for the CINC to establish instant rapport and influence key host country officials and military counterparts now. Were such resources available, they could be used to fund CINC-sponsored conferences concerning operational and logistics matters, or to respond immediately to short-term requirements such as SeaBee advisory assistance to Madagascar and civic action advice and assistance to Papua New Guinea.

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1. J45 HistSum Oct 84 (U).

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FY 1984 USPACOM COUNTRY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM  
(in thousands of dollars)

Country	FMS Credit			MAP (Grant Materiel)			IMETP (Grant Training)		
	USCINCPAC	CPD	Allo- cation	USCINCPAC	CPD	Allo- cation	USCINCPAC	CPD	Allo- cation
Bangladesh							225	225	269
Brunei							30	-	-
Burma							250	250	116
Fiji							80	80	84
India							200	200	126
Indonesia	50,000	50,000	45,000				2,340	2,700	2,379
Korea	240,000	230,000	230,000				1,850	1,850	1,786
Madagascar							#	50	50
Malaysia	12,500	12,500	10,000				900	900	881
Maldives							30	-	23
Nepal							95	95	112
Papua New Guinea							30	30	41
Philippines	50,000	50,000	50,000	*	-	0	2,000	1,300	1,488
Singapore							50	50	56
Solomon Islands									27
Sri Lanka							150	150	143
Thailand	100,000	94,000	94,000	*	5,000	5,000	2,000	2,400	2,229
Tonga							30	30	30
Totals	452,500	436,500	439,000		5,000	5,000	10,260	10,310	9,840

Sources: USCINCPAC - CINCPAC 122040Z Nov 82; CPD - FY 84 CPD/State 042335Z Feb 83; Allocations: J462 HistSum Oct 84/  
SECSTATE 050654Z Oct 84 and FY 86 CPD.

\* USCINCPAC proposed Direct Credit. The Congress denied use of Direct Credit but allocated MAP funds to Thailand of \$5,000 which had the effect of reducing the interest rate of their FMS credits.  
# Not in USCINCPAC AOR at time of submission.

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Funding

FY 84

(U) Funding history of USCINCPAC FY 84 security assistance programs is depicted on the accompanying chart.<sup>1</sup>

FY 85

(U) Funds for FY 85 security assistance programs were appropriated under Continuing Resolution (Public Law 98-473) signed by the President on 12 October 1984 which provided worldwide FMS Credit sales of \$4.9 billion, \$805 million for MAP, \$56 million for IMET, \$3.8 billion for the Economic Support Fund (ESF), and authorized \$325 million for the Special Defense Acquisition Fund. Estimated figures for USCINCPAC programs are shown below, in thousands of dollars.<sup>2</sup>

	<u>F M S</u>		<u>MAP</u>	<u>IMET</u>	<u>ESF</u>
	<u>Treasury Rate</u>	<u>Concess. Rate</u>			
Bangladesh				275	
Burma				275	
Fiji			300	100	
India				300	
Indonesia		32,500		2,300	
Korea	220,000			1,900	
Madagascar			2,050	50	
Malaysia	4,000			950	
Maldives				25	
Nepal				100	
Papua New Guinea				50	
Philippines		15,000	25,000	1,900	140,000
Singapore				50	
Solomon Islands				30	
Sri Lanka				150	
Thailand	75,000	20,000	5,000	50	5,000
Tonga				50	
Totals	299,000	67,500	32,350	8,555	145,000

FY 86 Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance

(U) The Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance (AIASA) was one of two submissions used by the Administration to formulate the security

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1. CINCPAC 122040Z Nov 82 (S), DECL OADR; FY 84 CPD/State 042335Z Feb 83 (U); J462 HistSum Oct 84/SECSTATE 050654Z Oct 84 and FY 86 CPD (U).
  2. JCS 161911Z Oct 84, PL 98-473, FY 86 CPD, pp. 20, 28, 31, 32, all (U).

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assistance budget request to the Congress and was used in the interagency program development process and in the preparation of the Congressional Presentation Document (CPD). In addition, this report provided estimates and data required by the Secretaries of State and Defense to carry out their responsibilities for security assistance. The AIASAs, together with the unified command comments, also served as the basis for the development of the Joint Security Assistance Memorandum and its Supporting Analysis.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The budget process for the FY 86 security assistance program was initiated in the spring of 1984 with the State Department guidance which required submission of the AIASA from applicable posts by 15 March. The reporting requirements applied to the Military Assistance Program (MAP), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit, FMS cash sales, Commercial Exports, and the Economic Support Fund (ESF). Unified commanders were to review the submissions and submit appropriate comments directly to the JCS by 15 April. Among other things and due to additional congressional imposed requirements, the AIASA submissions were to forecast and prioritize requirements for major U.S. weapons systems and significant secondary and ammunitions items for five years, i.e., FY 86-90.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In presenting the evaluation of the FY 86-90 AIASA country submissions USCINCPAC said that security assistance remained an essential instrument of U.S. national security and foreign policy with the USPACOM. The threat to regional interests and those of friends and allies continued to grow as did associated defense costs and the complexity of the systems required to counter this threat. There were three primary objectives. Support for countries (Korea and Thailand) that had to confront the Soviet Union and its client or surrogate states directly. Second, to assist those countries which required help to maintain internal security and stability to preserve independence and to contribute to regional stability. Third, to ensure continued U.S. access to critical bases, geostrategic locations, and strategic raw materials.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ General comments and recommendations on the country submissions were listed in priority, based primarily on each country's willingness and ability to contribute to USCINCPAC objectives in relationships, immediacy of threat, potential for contribution to relationships, strategic importance, and levels or content of previous programs. In addition to justification for individual country programs described below, commentary on selected points included USCINCPAC's belief that the Korea submission was flawed with regard to manning. Levels were in contradiction with the FY 85 CPD and DSAA-directed reductions. Also, USCINCPAC recommended that future AIASA submissions include a status report of ROK War Reserve Materiel shortfalls and ROK plans and programs to

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. III, pp. 526-527.
  2. SECSTATE 3551/061505Z Jan 84 (U).
  3. USCINCPAC 161755Z Apr 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR

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increase their contribution to WRM. (See the Logistics Chapter of this history for details.) USCINCPAC pointed out the need for providing financial support for purchase of a modern, state-of-the-art fighter by New Zealand, despite State Department objections. The submission for Malaysia did not stress the importance of Malaysia's strategic location, and USCINCPAC urged steps to increase naval exercises and access to Lumut Naval Shipyard and Butterworth Air Base, respectively.

FMS, MAP, and ESF Levels

(S) In supporting requests for FMS credit, MAP, and ESF, USCINCPAC said that any level below \$230 million for Korea would be inappropriate in view of the growing seriousness and force imbalance posed by the North Korean threat. The proposed levels for the Philippines were based on the Military Bases Agreement review of FY 83. Any reduction of the overall amounts or adjustments in the distribution of these levels could have significant political repercussions. The severe economic situation in the Philippines dictated that maximum consideration be given to concessional rates and/or extended repayment terms.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Special consideration should be given to Thailand as a front line state. Thai Government efforts to modernize its forces in the face of a legitimate threat and its status as a long-term friend and ally dictated that maximum consideration be given to continued strong U.S. support. Indonesia was expected to acquire an advanced fighter during the report period (FY 86-90), and projected FMS credit levels would only cover a fraction of anticipated acquisitions. Therefore, support of the continuity level with appropriate concessional rates would be supportive of country and regional objectives. USCINCPAC concurred with Country Team comments concerning Malaysia's lack of use of FMS credits and the recommendation that the program be curtailed if no expenditures occurred during FY 85. USCINCPAC recommended levels for FY 86 were ~~as~~ prioritized <sup>as</sup> indicated below (in millions of dollars).

	<u>F M S</u>		<u>MAP</u>	<u>ESF</u>
	<u>Market</u>	<u>Concessional</u>		
Korea	230			
Philippines	30	30	25	95
Thailand	70	30	10	5
Indonesia	25	20		
Malaysia	5			
Burma	5			
Madagascar			1.5	
Mauritius				4
Totals	365	80	36.5	104

1. USCINCPAC 161756Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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IMET

(C) USCINCPAC-recommended IMET levels were generally less than recommended in the Country Team submissions and were developed to balance military and political considerations with an attainable, meaningful IMET projection for the USPACOM. The primary emphasis was on student training requirements necessary to fulfill USCINCPAC regional objectives. Over 89 percent of the student training requirements were situated in Korea and ASEAN countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). To achieve these requirements, dollars were allocated to fulfill priorities, and approximately 87 percent of the proposed dollars was dedicated to these seven nations.<sup>1</sup>

(U) USCINCPAC-recommended student load and associated minimum and continuity dollar levels for FY 86 were prioritized as follows:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Students at Continuity Level</u>	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Continuity</u>
Korea	292	1.069	2.
Philippines	296	1.867	2.211
Thailand	278	1.820	2.232
Indonesia	225	2.4	2.611
Malaysia	100	1.	1.202
Singapore	17	.019	.05
Fiji	13	.081	.081
Brunei	10	.03	.03
Sri Lanka	18	.166	.166
Bangladesh	40	.264	.308
Burma	20	.175	.205
India	18	.185	.236
Nepal	10	.101	.101
Papua New Guinea	8	.065	.065
Madagascar	7	.05	.106
Tonga	4	.03	.03
Seychelles	4	.045	.06
Maldives	4	.03	.03
Solomon Islands	3	.02	.03
Cormoro Islands	2	.03	.03

Manning

(S) Security assistance manpower in the USPACOM would remain relatively steady with a minor increase in FY 86 of three billets to accommodate a proposed 2-person SAO in Madagascar and one additional space in Thailand. A

1. USCINCPAC 161756Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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recapitulation of proposed USPACOM SAO/DAO(SA) manning (military, U.S. and Foreign National civilians) for the period FY 85-90 follows.

	FY 85				FY 86				FY 87				FY 88	FY 89	FY 90
	Mili- tary	U.S. Civilian	F.N. Total		Mili- tary	U.S. Civilian	F.N. Total		Mili- tary	U.S. Civilian	F.N. Total		T o t a l s		
Australia	3	0	0	3	3	0	0	3	3	0	0	3	3	3	3
Bangladesh	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Burma	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
India	2	1	4	7	2	1	4	7	2	1	4	7	7	7	7
Indonesia	15	3	21	39	15	*4	21	*40	15	*4	21	*40	39	39	39
Japan	6	6	5	17	6	6	5	17	6	6	5	17	17	17	17
Korea	111	27	42	180	111	27	42	180	111	27	42	180	180	180	180
Madagascar	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	1	0	1	2	2	2	2
Malaysia	3	1	1	5	3	1	1	5	3	1	1	5	5	5	5
Philippines	27	6	4	37	27	6	4	37	27	6	4	37	37	37	37
Singapore	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	2	2	2	2
Thailand	33	5	19	57	33	6	19	58	33	6	19	58	58	58	58
Totals	201	50	98	349	202	51	99	352	202	51	99	352	352	352	352

\* 1 in Indonesia is non-add for a position at Surabaya which had been turned down by Indonesian officials after the AIASA submission.

### Functions and Manning

(U) With security assistance programs increasing world-wide and the attendant program management responsibilities, according to the DSAA, managing SAO manpower and financial resources was taking on new importance. As a first initiative, in concert with the Joint Staff, the DSAA had established a new system to enable the SAOs, unified commands, and the Joint Staff to state SAO manning requirements in a more timely and appropriate manner. The requirement to submit and validate SAO joint manpower programs annually was rescinded, and changes were submitted concurrently with the Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance (AIASA) to be consistent with manning authorizations being sought during the security assistance budget cycle.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In March 1984 the DSAA advised that better overall program management was needed. While recognizing the growing number of non-security assistance

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1. SECDEF 302337Z Mar 84 (U).

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**USPACOM SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS  
FY 1985 BUDGET--ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS (IN THOUSANDS)  
AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1984**

ORGANIZATION	USCINCPAC MAE FUNDED	FOREIGN ASST ADMIN SERVICES	MILITARY DEPT SUPPORT	TOTAL U.S. COSTS	HOST COUNTRY COSTS		GRAND TOTAL
					ASSISTANCE IN KIND	CONTRIBUTED CURRENCY	
HQ USCINCPAC	\$ 728.1	\$	\$ 1,528.1	\$ 2,256.2	\$	\$	\$ 2,256.2
DAO AUSTRALIA	36.9	6.9	128.3	172.1			172.1
DAO BANGLADESH	21.4			21.4			21.4
DAO BURMA	10.2	3.8		14.0			14.0
DAO FIJI	2.0			2.0			2.0
ODC INDIA	167.4	35.7	104.4	307.5			307.5
OMADP INDONESIA	569.4	268.1	740.3	1,575.8	85.0		1,660.8
MDO JAPAN	906.0	32.6	347.6	1,286.2	110.0	(644.6)*	1,398.2
JUSMAGKOREA	4,290.6	196.4	5,080.6	9,507.6	843.2	(3,301.3)*	10,350.8
DAO MADAGASCAR	11.0			11.0			11.0
DAO MALAYSIA	200.4	8.2	131.3	339.9			339.9
DAO NEPAL	9.9			9.9			9.9
DAO NEW ZEALAND	4.0			4.0			4.0
JUSMAGPHIL	1,149.1	28.3	1,842.1	2,819.5	514.4		3,333.9
DAO SINGAPORE	34.7		31.4	66.1			66.1
DAO SRI LANKA	14.4			14.4			14.4
JUSMAGTHAI	2,063.8	110.6	1,822.9	4,017.3	1,926.7		5,944.0
(RESERVE)	38.2			38.2			38.2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$ 10,219.5</b>	<b>\$ 688.6</b>	<b>\$ 11,557.0</b>	<b>\$ 22,465.1</b>	<b>\$ 3,479.3</b>	<b>\$ (3,945.9)*</b>	<b>\$ 25,944.4</b>

\* Contributed currency is paid directly to the U.S. Government to offset U.S. costs and, therefore, is a non-add item.

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (SPWF), P. 29, DECL QADR.

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functions required to be performed in-country in support of U.S. forces or for other unilateral DOD purposes, such functions were not covered in Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act and needed to be identified and charged to the benefiting DOD components. The objective was to establish clear criteria to insure that all SAOs were properly manned and funded to accomplish program management and mission implementation in a legal, economic, and efficient manner. Unified commands were asked for their views and recommendations for developing criteria. In turn, USCINCPAC solicited inputs on five basic points from the USPACOM SAOs. USCINCPAC's response to the DSAA addressed functions from a funding perspective rather identifying functions that should be eliminated. A more precise differentiation would have required lengthy, detailed surveys.

(U) Among the functions identified that might be considered for alternate supporting agencies and/or funding, USCINCPAC noted many were beyond the unified commander's authority and in some cases, such as negotiating country-to-country agreements, might require legislated authority. Candidates for review included non-security assistance related exercises, ship visits, and bilateral planning; field logistics centers; weapons and other systems development coproduction agreements; ADP support and development; and third country sales.

(U) USCINCPAC was also concerned that without prior coordination, the discontinuance or relocation of certain programs, which had evolved over time and were perceived by host nations as de facto, could create unwarranted adverse political ramifications. Prudence would dictate proceeding cautiously and flexibly in any transition. There was no "standard" SAO--all were different and required tailored treatment. Because security assistance programs had evolved from almost total management by the SAO through a period of cooperative interrelationship toward total host-country self-sufficiency, the character and degree of support had and would continue to change dramatically. Meanwhile, there had been a corresponding increase in collateral functions for the SAOs where treaty nations were involved because, as they became more sophisticated and self-sufficient, U.S. military interests in interoperability of the "total force" had increased, thus stimulating U.S. efforts to acquire leverage by providing services in support of these objectives. USCINCPAC also asked that a determination be made as to how the transition could be programmed through the Program Objectives Memorandum cycle.

(U) On 28 November, following a Manning Criteria Working Group meeting in Washington, the DSAA forwarded a list of functions being performed by SAOs worldwide to be used as a guide when conducting manning surveys or reviews of SAOs. The list contained some 170 functions in eight categories. When manpower surveys were conducted, functions would be categorized as security assistance, other security assistance, and non-security assistance. Surveys were also to recommend appropriate funding sources.<sup>1</sup>

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1. J452 HistSum Dec 84 (U).

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Southwest Indian Ocean

(C) Revisions to the Unified Command Plan in October 1983 added Madagascar to the USCINCPAC area of responsibility. Consequently, USCINCPAC began developing a long-range game plan to incorporate security assistance support for Madagascar along with that to the Comoro Islands, the Seychelles, and Mauritius. The intent was to develop a plan in which security assistance programs could be used to increase U.S. influence in this area carefully and gradually. The unique political considerations of each country and availability of DOD personnel assigned in the region were considered, as well as long-range U.S. security interests.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The U.S. Defense Attache in Antananarivo, Madagascar, managed the security assistance programs in the first two countries. During May 1984 USCINCPAC recommended to the DSAA that he also assume responsibility for the Seychelles, and for Mauritius if and when a DOD-administered security assistance program was established. USCINCPAC also anticipated that the USDAO would require some augmentation to effectively support programs in that area. The Defense Intelligence Agency concurred with the proposal, and in June the USDAO affirmed the need for additional manning.<sup>2</sup>

(C) The Seychelles was authorized \$50,000 in IMET funding for FY 84 but none was used, and because of an unfavorable political climate probably the result in FY 85 would be the same. The Comoro Islands had no FY 85 IMET authorization, but there was a possibility of establishing a program in FY 86 with between \$30,000-50,000 in funding. For Madagascar, see Section II of this chapter.<sup>3</sup>

USPACOM Security Assistance Conference

(U) The annual USPACOM Security Assistance Conference, hosted by Admiral Crowe, was held from 3 to 7 December 1984 at Camp Smith and Honolulu's Ala Moana Americana Hotel. The conference chairman was Commodore J. Weldon Koenig, USN, USCINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance. The conference theme was "Future Directions of USPACOM Security Assistance." The 137 attendees included 19 flag rank equivalents and represented 38 different organizations and activities of the State, Defense, and Military Departments, the JCS, three other unified commands, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), USCINCPAC component commands, and 17 USPACOM security assistance organizations (SAOs). The conference was adjudged by the DSAA

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1. USCINCPAC 040439Z May 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. DIA 181130Z May 84 (C), DECL OADR; USDAO Antananarivo 154/071223Z Jun 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. J472 Point Paper (C), 27 Nov 84, Subj: Security Assistance - Southwest Indian Ocean (U), DECL OADR.

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Director as the most productive and best administered of any of the unified command conferences he had attended during his 3-year tour. Subjects of particular significance are discussed below.<sup>1</sup>

- The JCS J-5 Deputy Director agreed to investigate the possibility of having the uniformed Services budget for some security assistance related activities under Title 10 (U.S. Armed Forces). Such projects as travel by foreign nationals to CINCs' conferences, bilateral training during exercises, U.S. forces-provided civic action, the College of the Pacific, and developing standard NATO-type agreements with USPACOM countries were examples of items which might be candidates for funding outside the security assistance purview.

- The JCS agreed to develop a method for reviewing release of ancillary COMSEC gear and support equipment required to maintain a sophisticated system prior to offering the end item for sale. An example was the sale of P-3 aircraft which did not require a significant release review in itself, but did for TADIL A and TADIL C support systems, without which the end item could not effectively interoperate with U.S. forces.

- The JCS and USCINCPAC agreed to develop interoperability objectives for each significant USPACOM country. The JCS would provide those objectives developed in a JCS study and USCINCPAC would add others as needed. Such objectives would provide guidelines for the SAOs to assist USPACOM countries in developing force structures and systems capable of operating with U.S. forces.

(U) Other items requiring further action included centralization of individual Service records for SAO personnel. Most records would be relocated to Hawaii with exceptions for those personnel assigned in Japan, Korea, and Air Force and Navy personnel in the Philippines. There was a need for completion and distribution of the FMS user guide. With the exception of the ADP application for IMET, there was little standardization of ADP software, hardware, Tempest certification, or channels of communication for security assistance management. Other applications needed to be explored and necessary standards published. Detailed job descriptions should be provided to SAO replacement personnel upon notification of billet assignment. To enhance SAO continuity, the list of key billets and desired tour lengths should be validated in the next joint manpower program cycle. Military Department cataloging procedures needed further standardization.<sup>2</sup>

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1. J454 HistSum Dec 84 (U); J4/Memo/1529 (U), 18 Dec 84, Subj: 1984 U.S. Pacific Command Security Assistance Conference (PACSAC).
  2. USCINCPAC 092100Z Jan 85 (U).

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### Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar

(U) On 3 February the DSAA announced a new policy which suspended IMET funding support after FY 84 for foreign military attendance at both the US-CINCPAC-sponsored Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS) and WESTCOM's Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS). The suspension was based on the DSAA concept that neither seminar fulfilled the stated objectives of the IMET program. According to the DSAA, the actual training value of the conferences was questionable and did not fulfill stated objectives of the IMET program. Formal training in CONUS was preferred to observer or on-the-job training.

(U) In a March message to DSAA Director LT GEN Philip C. Gast, USAF, Admiral Crowe strongly disagreed with the decision because IMET funding allowed participation, regardless of a country's financial status. He said, "Both seminars expose senior foreign officials to U.S. systems and procedures which are vitally important to the U.S. Government as well as to shared regional interests. Information provided is definitely educational and provides management level exposure that is normally available to only a selected few at our CONUS senior service schools. PASOLS is the only joint (multi-service) Defense Department level forum in the USPACOM. The use of IMET funds for PAMS and PASOLS is fully consistent with the primary purpose of IMET." In a later message the Admiral expressed concern with the seeming conservative direction being taken in IMET funding policy. Following consultations with State and other Defense Department officials, in May LT GEN Gast advised that IMET funds for PAMS and PASOLS might possibly be used beyond FY 85; however, careful attention must be paid to site selection and agenda construction to insure compliance with congressional intent and objectives.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The thirteenth PASOLS session was held at the Hilton Hawaiian Village Hotel in Honolulu from 3 to 8 June 1984 with 65 delegates representing Australia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the United States and including 23 of flag rank. The conference was hosted by Admiral Crowe with a theme of "Supply Management." Assistant Secretary of Defense/Manpower, Installations, and Logistics Dr. Lawrence J. Korb presented the keynote address. Representatives from the State Department, JCS, Army and Air Force headquarters, DSAA, and USCINCPAC component commands were among the attendees. Seminar discussion topics were:<sup>2</sup>

- Sourcing of supply during contingencies.

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1. J456 HistSums Apr, Jun 84 (U); USCINCPAC 030242Z Mar 84 (U); OSD 141941Z May 84 (U)(BOM); J457 Point Paper (U), 29 May 84, Subj: IMET funding for delegate attendance to PASOLS.
  2. J455 HistSums Jun, Jul 84 (U); 1984 PASOLS Final Report (U).

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- Documenting the sustainment requirement.
- Need for logisticians to develop a strategy for obtaining national authorization and funding for sustainment of forces during peacetime and in a contingency.
- Advantages and disadvantages of centralized supply and inventory management.
- Proper measurement tools for contingency logistics planning.

(U) During a meeting on 4 June the Logistics Review Board agreed to retain the name PASOLS, but the Board changed its title to Logistics Steering Group and the Project Development Group name was changed to Committee. Due to existing resource constraints, a permanent secretariat was voted as a long-range goal, and a newsletter would not be published for the time being. It was also agreed that the Logistics Steering Group would not have tasking authority; rather PASOLS participation would be strictly informal and voluntary. Two other considerations adopted were 5-year rotational seminar themes, and the PDC meetings would be held immediately following the PASOLS in order to reduce expenses and maintain continuity.

(U) By way of more substantive matters, LSG members approved proposed terms of reference which specified new conditions and benefits of full membership versus observer status. Each country could provide a list of cooperative agreements in the region, but any reference as to which country/countries were involved would be excluded. Then a list of cooperative agreements would be published as an index to other countries desiring bilateral or multilateral logistics arrangements. Countries could provide a list of equipment in their inventory in order to determine commonality and bases for cooperative logistics ventures. Sensitive or classified items and equipment could be excluded, and data would only include nomenclature and stock number, but not quantities or cost data.<sup>1</sup>

### Training Workshop

(U) During the period 9 to 17 February 1984 the USCINCPAC Directorate for Logistics and Security Assistance conducted its tenth annual Security Assistance Training Workshop. The Workshop was conducted at Honolulu's Ala Moana Americana Hotel and brought together security assistance training managers from the USPACOM SAOs and component commands, the DSAA, Military Departments, and the U.S. Coast Guard. The 9-day function was organized according to four subject modules.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Ibid.

2. J456 HistSum Feb 84 (U).

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(U) During the first two days, the Military Department and DSAA representatives provided security assistance technical programming information. The next segment dealt with policy issues and answers, and the third was devoted to SAO country perspective presentations. The final module was the Military Department review of host country training requests for FY 85 and the solution of FY 84 training program problems. In weekend meetings a plan was established for coordinating the FY 85 security assistance training program publication and the FY 86 request submission cycle. By its conclusion, the Workshop had reviewed approximately \$21 million in IMET program requests from some 20 USPACOM countries, as well as clarifying numerous technical training management procedures and new security assistance training policies. According to comments by DSAA and Military Department delegates, the Workshop was very successful and had set the worldwide standard for training workshops.

#### Weapons Release to ASEAN

(S) In 1984 USCINCPAC release policy toward ASEAN members remained one of evenhandedness--release to one nation should signal willingness to release to all. While the United States was tied to two of the countries (Thailand and the Philippines) by mutual security agreements, the determining factor in dealing with all was the benefit that accrued to U.S. national security and political interests in promoting commonality of weapon systems and common support facilities and capabilities. Concerning high technology transfers, USCINCPAC policy considered, among other things, the country's ability to absorb, employ, maintain, and protect the technology involved; the economic impact; and its likely effects on internal development, other force modernization and readiness programs, and on other USPACOM security assistance programs.<sup>1</sup>

(C) Support for release, under the guidelines provided in President Reagan's 8 July 1981 directive on U.S. arms transfer policy, was reflected by USCINCPAC's generally favorable recommendations between 1981-84 on requests from ASEAN members for such state-of-the-art weaponry as the STINGER surface-to-air missile, HARPOON anti-ship missile, and an advanced fighter aircraft (F-16/100).<sup>2</sup>

#### STINGER

(S) In 1980 USCINCPAC had concurred with the JCS not to release the Basic STINGER man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) to Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea. Similarly, in the fall of 1983 USCINCPAC and the DSAA concurred in a

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1. J455 Point Paper (S), 9 Jul 84, Release of high technology/sensitive weapons to ASEAN countries (U), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 131440Z Jan 84 (C), DECL OADR; CINCPAC Command History 1981 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 371, 387-388; 1982, Vol III, pp. 501-503; 1983, Vol. III, pp. 547, 578, 591, 597, 601, 611.

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denial to a Philippine request for Price and Availability (P&A) data; however, in December the Philippines Armed Forces (AFP) Chief asked Admiral Crowe to reconsider the decision.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In 1982 the National [Military Information] Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) established criteria for release of information concerning STINGER which prescribed host country agreement to two significant criteria: to take extraordinary measures to safeguard the missiles and to allow U.S. verification of unexpended missiles. As an adjunct, release of TSEC KIR-1A COMSEC equipment necessary for identification of U.S. aircraft required approval of the National Communication Security Committee. On 17 February 1984 a USCINCPAC Weapons Release Review Group, composed of representatives from key staff directorates and component commands, recommended approving release in principle of STINGER to Singapore, the Philippines, and other ASEAN members, provided there was an established threat and a demonstrated ability to protect the weapons against theft or disclosure. The group additionally recommended that STINGER training and training simulators be provided.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Some USCINCPAC staff and component command elements, however, disagreed. For the Philippines, opposition was based upon the lack of an established threat; excessive costs, technology, and vulnerability; and political instability. Nor was there an established threat to Singapore, but there was a potential for reverse engineering of STINGER and transfer of technology to other weapons systems. In a 26 March message to Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs Richard L. Armitage, Admiral Crowe recommended a staged release of STINGER to the Philippines--immediate release of training and training simulators; STINGER acquisition if the weapons remained under U.S. control; and ultimately, full release to AFP control once a capability was demonstrated to provide adequate security and exercise command/control and there was an identified threat.<sup>3</sup>

(C) In March, Thailand requested a Letter of Offer/Acceptance (LOA) for STINGER missiles, followed by Singapore's request for Planning and Review (P&R) data in June, and in August the DSAA forecast a decision by the end of September. On 11 September USCINCPAC, in providing comments to the JCS, urged that training and training simulators be approved for Singapore and Thailand. Such a course of action would provide certain advantages--among them opportunities to: develop the necessary weapon system training expertise, permit training continuity for foreign soldiers attending FMS- and IMET-funded U.S.

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1980 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 383, and 1983, Vol. III, p. 601.
  2. J4/Memo/S342 (S), 22 Mar 84, Subj: Releasability of the STINGER weapon system to the Philippines (U), DECL OADR; J452 HistSum Feb 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. Op. Cit., J4/Memo/S342; HQ PACAF 170400Z Feb 84 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 262110Z Mar 84 (C)(BOM).

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courses, insure security of STINGER technology by retaining in U.S. custody, and be released only when a threat warranted. USCINCPAC concurred with the JCS that the STINGER missile not be released to Singapore or Thailand at that time.<sup>1</sup>

(S) While the JCS agreed that providing STINGER training for Singapore and Thailand would have long-term beneficial effects, such action was in conflict with the Security Assistance Management Manual (DOD Directive 5105.38M) because it could create a false impression that the United States was willing and ready to make STINGER available and would ultimately approve its sale. Such action was also contrary to specific national disclosure policy procedures for release of MANPADS which prohibited release of all information (classified or unclassified) until all exceptions to the NDP were obtained and a decision was made approving transfer of the MANPAD system itself. The JCS advised it would be "an uphill battle complicated by interagency politics."<sup>2</sup>

#### Advanced Fighter Aircraft

(S) Since September 1981 the Administration had endorsed sales of either Northrop's F-5G or General Dynamics' F-16/79 as an export fighter (FX) in lieu of the more advanced GD F-16/100 (also known as the F-16A). Later that year following a survey of ASEAN country team opinion, USCINCPAC had recommended that a policy in principle be established for a positive response to ASEAN requests for the F-16A, but during the intervening years the Washington community continued to oppose release despite informal and formal requests from Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines.<sup>3</sup>

(C) In January 1984 USCINCPAC again recommended release of the F-16A to ASEAN members, provided the release would not jeopardize internal development, modernization, and readiness programs. In late March Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology William Schneider Jr. reported to a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that "Since the policy was announced in 1980, we have sold no FX aircraft and we have no firm commitments beyond Singapore for a future purchase. . . [who] will scrap the only existing FX order if it is given U.S. Government permission to buy the F-16A." Nevertheless, in April Representatives from House Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Asian and Pacific Affairs requested the State Department to conduct an assessment of ASEAN interest in the FX fighters, provide assurances that interested countries receive a comprehensive presentation along with a Government evaluation of the aircraft, and a description of Administration management of the FX policy. (Prior to this

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1. SECDEF 092314Z Aug 84 (C); USCINCPAC 100006Z Jul 84 (C); USCINCPAC 110054Z Sep 84 (S), all DECL OADR.
  2. JCS 202044Z Sep 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1981 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 387, 1982 Vol. III, p. 501-503; 1983 Vol. II, pp. 547, 597, 611, 625-626.

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request, USCINCPAC had again queried embassies in the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand concerning a comparative life cycle cost and performance data briefing on the F-5E/F, F-20, F-16/79 and F-16/100 to host countries. The unanimous response indicated that such a briefing would be useful, but it should be held in abeyance until the U.S. Government decided on releasability of the F-16A. Later, Singaporean officials asked for an extension of the time limit of the LOA for the eight F-16/79s they had requested until after such a briefing.)<sub>1</sub>

(U) An 8-man team led by USAF Vice Chief of Staff LT GEN Larry D. Welch briefed Admiral Crowe before proceeding to ASEAN capitals and making presentations to interested officials between 29 May and 15 June.<sub>2</sub>

(C) In December 1983 Thailand made clear its desire to buy between 16 and 20 F-16A/Bs. During a 16 December review of Thai defense needs with Defense Secretary Weinberger in Washington, Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi presented a formal request for the F-16A. Secretary Weinberger cautioned that a decision would require a major review and take considerable time.<sub>3</sub>

(S) A Letter of Offer/Acceptance was formally requested in early January 1984. Later that month Admiral Crowe conveyed his personal thoughts on the Thai request to JCS Chairman General Vessey. He was reluctant to oppose the F-16A sale to Thailand even though the FX would probably be more appropriate. He fully agreed with Ambassador Dean's assessment of the importance of Thailand as a friend and ally and the need to demonstrate U.S. commitment to that relationship. He went on to point out various ramifications of approval versus disapproval--high costs, complex technology, effects on ASEAN members, impact on other Thai and USPACOM programs. Most important would be the long-term impact on U.S.-Thai relationship. If the F-16A were ultimately to be released to the Thai, then it should be done "now" in order to ". . . reap the political benefits associated with a timely and positive response to the perceived requirement of a front line ally. . . If we say no now, we should be prepared to live with the consequences indefinitely."<sub>4</sub>

(S/NOFORN) When Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon visited Washington in April, he was asked to first receive the comparative fighter briefing. After that, the Office of the Secretary Defense would respect the Thai decision and

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1. USCINCPAC 302222Z Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR; J452 HistSum Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR; Washington Post, 29 Mar 84, p. 22 "FX Jet Program Proves Failure in Third World" (U); SECSTATE 99067/050125Z Apr 84 (LOU); USCINCPAC 070502Z Apr 84 (C)(BOM), DECL OADR; AMEMB Singapore 4415/300731Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. HQ USAF 231100Z May 84 (U).
  3. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. III, pp. 625-626.
  4. J444 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 250452Z Jan 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR.

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support it to the Congress. In a letter of 9 August responding to President Reagan's of 16 July, the Prime Minister conveyed the Thai decision to purchase the F-16A. On 5 November the Thai Finance Minister announced devaluation of the Baht from 23 to 27 Baht to the American dollar which, in effect, would increase cost of the F-16A by 17 percent. Although Thai Air Force officials reaffirmed their decision to purchase the F-16A, the State Department was asked to hold the LOA request in abeyance until further notice.<sup>1</sup>

Performance Evaluation

(U) The USCINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance (J4) was tasked with the mission of evaluating the efficiency of each USPACOM security assistance organization (SAO) and the effectiveness of each security assistance program and related activities. The J4 was assisted in executing this responsibility by the Chief, Performance Evaluation Division (J48), who accomplished the mission through the USCINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group (PEG), comprised of members of the USCINCPAC staff and led by the J48. The composition of the PEG and the duration of the in-country evaluation were dependent upon the size of the SAO/security assistance program. The reports of the evaluations served as management tools for USCINCPAC, the USPACOM component commands, and the chiefs of the respective SAOs. The evaluation also reduced the need for additional inspections of the SAOs and programs, assisted in resolving specific problems, and enhanced communication and coordination between the individual SAOs and the USCINCPAC staff. The PEG conducted evaluations during 1984 as indicated below. In addition, the J48 staff participated in assistance visits to Malaysia (11-13 April) and Korea (23-31 July).<sup>2</sup>

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Country</u>
30 Jan-9 Feb	Thailand
28-30 March	Singapore
2-10 April	Indonesia
12-31 May	Philippines
26-30 September	Japan
29-30 October	Sri Lanka
4-6 November	Nepal
11-13 November	Bangladesh
15-16 November	Burma

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 40333/131050Z Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR; FBIS Bangkok 060155Z Nov 84 (U); USDAO 050821Z Nov 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR; SECSTATE 362112/081205Z Dec 84 (C)(EX), DECL OADR; FBIS Bangkok 171039Z Dec 84 (U).
  2. J48 HistSum Dec 84 (U).

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(U) During the FY 84 cycle of inspections, the PEG focused special interest on FMS case management, resource management, and organizational anti-terrorism programs. Also, the PEG and the J48 played a major role in the establishment of a viable system of internal management control in the five largest SAOs--Japan, Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

(U) The addition of a full-time evaluation and management NCO billet in J48, as the result of the 1984 JCS manpower survey, greatly expanded the division's ability to participate fully in the day-to-day staff actions of the directorate and enabled J48 to offer the J4 another staff perspective. Relieved of the administrative workload, division personnel were also able to participate in the USPACOM exercise program among other collateral duties.

### Excess Vehicles and Engineering Equipment

(U) A survey was conducted in May 1984 by HQ USCINCPAC (J4) and the Defense Property Disposal Region-Pacific (DPDR-PAC) regarding availability and demand for excess vehicles and engineering equipment. The survey indicated that a considerable market existed in the USPACOM for a large number of obsolete Army and Marine Corps 2½-ton and 5-ton vehicles and engineering equipment, which were to be replaced and would become excess to U.S. force requirements. If made available for redistribution or sale, the equipment could satisfy ground mobility requirements of several USAPCOM countries if serviceability, sustainability, and favorable pricing could be provided. With regard to potential FMS sales, an overriding concern of interested countries was the assurance of supportability during the remaining life of the equipment.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In July 1984 the first 21 out of a total 200 Marine Corps vehicles were processed for turn-in to the DPDO in Honolulu. These turn-ins were in various condition codes, but even the better vehicles were without spare parts, secondary repairables, or special tools with which to prolong their service life. USCINCPAC proposed that Marine Corps and Army units turn in the excess serviceable vehicles to the DPDO in lots of 50 to 100 vehicles and that the maximum possible support package be included in order to maintain the vehicles at least for the immediate future. They would then be offered for sale as a total "as is-where is" package. If, however, a support package could not be provided, a shortage list was to go to the FMS customer.

(U) In response to the USCINCPAC proposal, the Defense Property Disposal Service asserted that all property sold under the DPDS FMS program was on an "as is-where is" basis and that the cost of any repair or rehabilitation was not included in the price. However, the DPDS indicated that it did provide a weekly screening service for requests for specific repair and spare parts from foreign buyers. The DSAA would be as supportive as possible in providing

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1. J458 HistSum Jul 84 (U).

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necessary low-cost material to the USPACOM countries. USCINCPAC was advised that items not yet turned over to the DPDS could also be sold by Military Departments under FMS as long supply prior to turn-in to DPDS.

### Excess Small Arms - Thailand

(U) For the past several years various USPACOM countries had requested authority to dispose of excess small arms which had been provided under the MAP. Due to peculiarities in U.S. law however, there was no simple or routine method of disposal. In fact, demilitarization of small arms was suspended worldwide by Section 701 of the 1980 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 96-154), which provided that no DOD appropriated funds should be used for demilitarization of small firearms. In 1983 the law was amended to authorize receipt for disposal processing (including demilitarization) of all fully automatic small arms up to and including .50 caliber. Parts and components for such weapons and also those for non-automatic small arms were also acceptable, but not the complete non-automatic small arms weapons. Further, a Defense Property Disposal Office could accept accountability, but physical custody had to be controlled and safeguarded by appropriate custodians.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Because of increased interest and as a result of a Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) review of JUSMAG Thailand in February 1984, the disposal of excess MAP-provided small arms attained prominence. Guidance obtained by USCINCPAC from the Defense Property Disposal Region-Pacific recommended abandonment in place with the necessary demilitarization and disposal to be accomplished by the host country and witnessed by JUSMAG or Security Assistance Organization personnel, as opposed to DPDO personnel. Abandonment in place would give full scrap value of materials disposed of to the host country. This procedure was subsequently authorized for the Office of the Military Attache for Defense Programs, Indonesia, and for JUSMAG Philippines.<sup>2</sup>

### Retention of Excess MAP Property

(U) As an alternative to disposal action, in July 1983 the ROK Army asked Chief JUSMAG Korea for authority to retain 465 Basic HAWK missiles which had been certified as excess to ROK requirements. The missiles had exceeded their normal service life and were considered of no value as redistributable property. The ostensible purpose for retention was use in training and in "dummy/-decoy" missile sites. Based upon a Defense Logistics Agency opinion that no residual scrap value remained in the missiles, on 26 April 1984 USCINCPAC authorized retention of the missiles by the ROK with the understanding that they would be turned in to the U.S. property disposal function in Korea when they had exceeded their ultimate utility.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J451 HistSum Apr 84 (U).
  2. DPDR-PAC Ltr DPDR-PD (U), 5 Mar 84, Subj: Disposal of MAP weapons.
  3. J451 HistSum Apr 84 (U).

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## WESTCOM Expanded Relations Program

(U) Reduction of the U.S. Army presence and disestablishment of the HQ U.S. Army Pacific, coupled with reduced U.S. security assistance programs in the Asia-Pacific region in the early 1970s, had resulted in a void in contacts between the U.S. Army and other armies of the region. In 1979 the U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM) took action to reestablish contacts with friendly and allied armies and developed an Expanded Relations Program with Department of the Army and USCINCPAC guidance. The ERP included reciprocal visits, information exchanges, individual observer or on-the-job training, personnel and unit exchanges, combined exercises, and annual conferences called the Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS).<sup>1</sup>

### Pacific Armies Management Seminars

(U) The Pacific Armies Management Seminars were a WESTCOM initiative to facilitate and enhance interactions among the armies of the Asia-Pacific region. Participation grew from nine nations at PAMS I, held from 18 to 21 November 1978, to 20 nations at PAMS VII, held 21 to 25 March 1983 in Seoul, Korea. PAMS I through IV were hosted by WESTCOM and held in Honolulu, Hawaii. PAMS V was co-hosted by WESTCOM and the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Manila in 1981. PAMS VI was co-hosted by the Papua New Guinea Defence Force in Honolulu 1982, and PAMS VII with the ROK Army in Seoul in 1983.<sup>2</sup>

(U) PAMS provided mid-level ground force managers in the grades of major to colonel an apolitical forum where they could meet and discuss professional military subjects on a non-attribution basis. The theme for each seminar was varied to include training management (PAMS I and V), resource management (PAMS II and VI), operation planning and management (PAMS II), internal defense and development (PAMS IV), and national development and security (PAMS VII). Each seminar was conducted on three different levels with general officer guest speakers addressing plenary sessions with an overview of the central theme. The theme was then further divided into topics, sub-topics, and discussion points. In addition to country presentations, participants divided into panel groups where they sought solutions to common problems that would be practicable in their varied local conditions.

(U) One of the keys to PAMS success was the support of high-level officials. Philippine President Marcos addressed PAMS V, ROK President Chun Doo Hwan spoke at PAMS VII, and foreign flag and general officers from Australia, Indonesia, Korea, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand made presentations. U.S. officers included Admirals Weisner,

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1. J474 Point Paper (U), 5 Dec 83, Subj: U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM) Expanded Relations Program (ERP).
  2. J4/Memo/180 (U), 8 Feb 84, Subj: PAMS VIII. Note: PAMS III and IV were both held in 1980.

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Long, and Crowe (USCINCPACs) and Army Generals Starry, Meyer, Guthrie, Wickham, Vessey, and Sennewald.

(U) As stated above, in February 1984 the DSAA advised that IMET funding for PAMS was to be suspended, but through the auspices of Admiral Crowe and WESTCOM Commander LT GEN Lee, the suspension was vacated for the time being. PAMS VIII was held at the Hale Koa Hotel in Honolulu, Hawaii, from 27 February to 9 March. Co-hosts were LT GEN James M. Lee, USA, and His Royal Highness Crown Prince Tupouto'a, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Kingdom of Tonga. Admiral Crowe gave the keynote speech on the theme "Management of Technology." Representatives attended from Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Fiji, Hong Kong (UK), Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tahiti (France), Thailand, Tonga, and the United States.<sup>1</sup>

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1. J456 HistSums Apr, Jun 84 (U); USCINCPAC 030242Z Mar 84 (U); OSD 141941Z May 84 (U)(BOM); WESTCOM/DSCOPS (APOP-IM) Information Paper (U), 8 Feb 84, Subj: Eighth PAMS.

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SECTION II--COUNTRY PROGRAMS

AUSTRALIA

(U) During FY 84 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Australia totaled \$428.9 million, including \$76 million in commercial exports. All sales were for cash as Australia received no FMS credit, International Military Education and Training funds, or Grant Aid.<sup>1</sup>

Aircraft

(U) The Australian FMS program reached a major milestone when the first two F/A-18 HORNET aircraft were delivered to the Government Aircraft Plant in Melbourne on 4 June 1984. This represented the first delivery of a \$3.1 billion purchase of 75 aircraft originating in December 1981.<sup>2</sup>

(U) During 1983 the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) investigated candidates to meet their respective helicopter requirements. At the urging of the Australia Defence Department, commonality was of great interest, and primary candidates were the Sikorsky UH-60A BLACKHAWK for the RAAF and the SH-60B Navy SEAHAWK version. In early 1984 some consideration was being given to the British-built Westland LYNX. On 5 October 1984 the Australian Government announced the purchase of eight SEAHAWKS to equip its new anti-submarine guided missile frigates at a cost of \$316 million. Although a commercial sale, the RAN would buy spare parts and training through FMS. The first SEAHAWK was scheduled for delivery in the 1987-88 timeframe. There was an option to purchase four additional helicopters at a later date.<sup>3</sup>

Missiles

(S) In May 1984 the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) advised of an informal request from the Royal Australian Navy for Planning and Review (P&R) data for possible acquisition of submarine-launched TOMAHAWK anti-ship missiles (TASM) using conventional warheads in both the land and sea attack modes. Anticipated acquisition was in the 1989-90 period. Because the system had not been released to any foreign country, the CNO said that review by the Foreign Disclosure Review Board would be necessary.<sup>4</sup>

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1. FY 86 Congressional Presentation Document (CPD) (U), p. 79.
  2. J464 HistSum Jun 84 (U).
  3. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. III, p. 541; J462 HistSum Oct 84 (U).
  4. CNO 222343Z May 84 (S), DECL OADR.


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# AUSTRALIA (U)



(S/NOFORN) MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY (U)



**(U) BASIC INFORMATION**

LAND AREA ..... 7,692,300 Sq Km  
 NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS ..... None Claimed  
 ECONOMIC ZONE ..... 200 Nautical Miles  
 FISHING ZONE ..... None Claimed  
 SECURITY ZONE ..... 3 Nautical Miles  
 TERRITORIAL SEA ..... 15,462,000  
 POPULATION ..... 1.3 Percent  
 ANNUAL GROWTH ..... 98.5 Percent  
 LITERACY RATE ..... 71 Years  
 LIFE EXPECTANCY ..... \$ 153 Billion  
 GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ..... \$ 10,067  
 PER CAPITA ..... \$ 4.6 Billion  
 DEFENSE BUDGET ..... 9.3 Percent  
 OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ..... Federal State within the Commonwealth  
 TYPE GOVERNMENT ..... recognizing Queen Elizabeth II as Sovereign or Head of State  
 GOVERNOR GENERAL ..... Sir Ninian STEPHEN  
 PRIME MINISTER ..... Robert J. HAWKE  
 MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ..... William HAYDEN  
 MINISTER FOR DEFENCE ..... Kim BEAZLEY  
 CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE ..... GEN Sir Phillip H. BENNETT  
 CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, ARMY ..... LT GEN Peter C. GRATTON  
 CHIEF OF THE NAVY STAFF ..... VADM David W. LEACH  
 CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF ..... AM Selwyn D. EVANS

**(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL**

AMBASSADOR ..... MON. Robert D. NESEN  
 USCINCPACREP AUSTRALIA AND  
 BAITT ..... COL James S. WAGGENER, USAF  
 CHIEF, FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ..... LCOL Michael P. WEITZEL, USAF

**(S/NOFORN) USMACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY (U)**

Recommended Role:  
 See line of communication protection in southern Indonesian Archipelago.  
 Contributions to participating forces:  
 Indian Ocean presence (periodic).  
 Continued sea presence.  
 Focal point for interoperability of ASEAN forces.

**(U) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES**

Provide support to the Australian Ministry of Defence efforts to strengthen their military capability to defend against possible external threats and contribute to regional defense.  
 Assist in maintaining necessary rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements for U.S. and allied forces and deny them to forces opposed to U.S. interests.  
 Maintain and strengthen contacts between host country and U.S. military personnel fostering favorable attitudes toward the U.S. and encouraging pursuit of military objectives compatible with U.S. interests and strategy.  
 Enable defense of contiguous airspace/sea areas and air/sea routes.

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (87MF), P. 57, DECL OADR.

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(S) CINCPACFLT recommended release of the TOMAHAWK but with certain caveats. Development or co-usage of sophisticated ashore targeting facilities and C2 linkage would be required. While release was consistent with Australia's antiship underwater warfare role in countering the Soviet threat, the land attack role for Australia was not a major consideration in USPACOM theater strategy. Also, release of the land attack missile was not recommended because targeting and fire control systems were too sensitive for release, and Australia did not possess reconnaissance and targeting resources to properly employ the land-attack variant.<sup>1</sup>

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1. CINCPACFLT 140029Z Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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# BRUNEI (U)

(S/NOFORN) MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY (U)



### (U) BASIC INFORMATION

ANJUNGA ..... 5,785 Sq Km  
 NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS ..... 200 Nautical Miles  
 ECONOMIC ZONE ..... 200 Nautical Miles  
 FISHING ZONE ..... None Claimed  
 SECURITY ZONE ..... 12 Nautical Miles  
 TERRITORIAL SEA ..... 218,000  
 POPULATION ..... 3.9 Percent  
 ANNUAL GROWTH ..... 45 Percent  
 LITERACY RATE ..... 87 Years  
 LIFE EXPECTANCY ..... \$ 19.8 Billion  
 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ..... \$ 27,000  
 PER CAPITA ..... \$ 161 Million  
 DEFENSE BUDGET ..... 12.8 Percent  
 % OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ..... Constitutional Monarchy  
 TYPE GOVERNMENT ..... controlled and governed by a Paramount Ruler

JUL TAN, PRIME MINISTER, FINANCE MINISTER  
 AND HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER  
 HH Sir Muda HASSANAL Bolkiah Muizzaddin Waddaulah  
 MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ..... Muja MOHAMMAD Bolkiah  
 DEFENSE MINISTER ..... Sir OMAR Ali o SAIFUDDIN  
 COMMANDER, ROYAL BRUNEI ARMED  
 FORCES (RBAF) ..... BGEN John FRIEDBERGER  
 COMMANDER OF THE ROYAL BRUNEI ARMED FORCES  
 (Designate-Late 1985)  
 COMMANDER, RBAF ARMY ..... BGEN Pehin Dato MOHAMMAD bin Haji Daud  
 COMMANDER, RBAF AIR ..... BGEN John FRIEDBERGER  
 WING ..... LCOL Pengiran Dato (Abidin) Bin PENGIRAN Ahmad  
 COMMANDER, RBAF FLOTILLA ..... LCOL Pehin Dato KEFLI

Map of Brunei reproduced with Malaysia

### (U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR ..... HON. Barrington KING, Jr.  
 ARMA ..... COL Harold L. LADEHOFF, USA

Headed in Singapore

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (S/NF), P. 59, DECL OADR.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BRUNEI

(U) On 1 January 1984 the Sultanate of Brunei attained full control over its foreign affairs and external security. By reestablishing its independence, Brunei formally terminated 136 years of commercial guidance and 96 years of protection. It was the smallest country in Southeast Asia with only slightly more than 200,000 inhabitants. Oil and gas accounted for 98 percent of its exports and 78 percent of its gross domestic product which in 1983 was about \$4 billion for an average per capita income of \$19,500.<sup>1</sup>

(C) In September 1984 the State Department asked the U.S. Embassy in Bandar Seri Begawan to collaborate with the U.S. Defense Attache in Singapore on an analysis of Brunei's military establishment with emphasis on procurement needs over the next five years. Since 1981 there had been 91 requests for munitions licenses from contractors who wished to market major weapons systems and other defense articles in Brunei. Most were since 1983, and contractors were more interested in marketing major defense equipment since independence.<sup>2</sup>

(C) U.S. Ambassador Barrington King Jr. responded with his views of the fundamental tenets of Brunei's defense policy: the Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) would be maintained only at a level which could be supported from Brunei's population base; no weapons systems would be acquired which the RBAF were not technically capable of handling; in other words--quality, not quantity. Brunei's acquisitions would be determined by the nature of the state's perceived limited threat. What was expected over the next five years was continued acquisition of the kind of weaponry the RBAF had found most appropriate to its needs, e.g., surface-to-air (RAPIER) missiles, seaborne surface-to-surface (EXOCET) missiles, light (SCORPION) tanks, and transport and attack (Bell) helicopters. Admiral Crowe concurred with Ambassador King's assessment and with State Department concerns that too many inappropriate requests for munitions licenses for Brunei could lead to weapon acquisitions beyond their needs and capabilities.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Pacific Defence Reporter (U), Sep 84, p. 46.
  2. SECSTATE 288044/271859Z Sep and 298057/052322Z Oct 84 (C) DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Bandar Seri Begawan Brunei 503/170930Z Oct 84 (C), DECL OADR; US-CINCPAC 270519Z Oct 84 (C)(BOM), DECL OADR.

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# CHINA (U)



(S/NOPOR) USFACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY (U)

Recommended Role:  
Overflight rights in long term.  
Tact understandings in long term.  
Concentrate on improving dialogue.

**(U) BASIC INFORMATION**

LAND AREA .....	9,600,000 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	None Claimed
ECONOMIC ZONE .....	None Claimed
FISHING ZONE .....	None Claimed
SECURITY ZONE .....	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA .....	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION .....	1,059,802,000
ANNUAL GROWTH .....	Over 75 Percent
LITERACY RATE .....	1.2 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY .....	About 68 Years
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT .....	\$ 500 billion
PER CAPITA .....	\$ 500
DEFENSE BUDGET .....	\$ 9.9 Billion Estimated
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET .....	15.8 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT .....	Communist State
PRESIDENT .....	LI Xiaonian
CHAIRMAN NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS .....	PENG Zhen
PREMIER .....	ZHAO Ziyang
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS .....	WU Jiaobang
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE .....	ZHANG Aijiang
CHAIRMAN OF CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION .....	**DENG Xiaoping
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF .....	YANG Dehai
COMMANDER PLA NAVY .....	LIU Huaqing
COMMANDER, PLA AIR FORCE .....	ZHANG Tingfu

**(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL**

AMBASSADOR .....	HON. Arthur W. HUMMEL, JR.
DEPUTY .....	RADM David G. RAMSEY, USN

\*The United States does not recognize the claimed requirement to obtain prior permission for overflight through the claimed territorial sea.  
\*\*DENG Xiaoping is the most powerful individual in both the government and Communist Party

**(S) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES (U)**

Provide support for China's efforts to strengthen its military capabilities to defend against external threats and counter Soviet expansionist policies, thereby contributing to regional defense and stability.

Promote the evolution and modernization of China's armed forces while encouraging qualitative improvement in the PRC's defense efforts.

Give appropriate consideration to Chinese requests for FMS or commercial sales of military equipment, training, and services; and in general, maintain an attitude of helpfulness and cooperation with the Chinese armed forces which will enhance China's preference for U.S.-made equipment and technology.

Foster social and professional contacts between Chinese military officers and those of the U.S. Armed Forces, thus promoting Chinese openness towards the West and a cooperative relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Provide the Chinese Army's stated interest in the development of an enduring relationship with the United States.

**(U) MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY**

See Communist Forces/Deployments.

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CHINA

Export of Military Equipment

(U) On 15 December 1978 the joint communique between the United States and China was signed normalizing relations effective 1 January 1979. A flurry of activity aimed towards developing cultural and trade exchanges followed. During his January 1980 visit to China, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown announced that the United States would be prepared to consider licensing for export certain items of civilian equipment and technology with military support applications. This was followed by House and Senate approval granting most-favored-nation status to China on 24 January.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 18 March 1980 the State Department officially opened the door for U.S. companies to sell limited kinds of military equipment. Items approved were in Categories VII-IX, XI, XIII, and XVIII as listed in the March Munitions Control List Newsletter (number 81). It included such things as trucks, mobile repair shops, transport aircraft and helicopters, training equipment, flight simulators, aerial cameras, and technical data related to articles in the newsletter. Each sale over \$7 million, however, would have to be specifically approved by the State Department. Export license applications were also approved for certain dual-use technology items and would be submitted to the NATO Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Actions.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In one of the first visits to the United States by Chinese officials Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin stopped in Hawaii on 14 March 1980 en route to Washington and was briefed by Admiral Long. Also, Vice Premier Geng Biao, China's top military official, stopped in Honolulu following a meeting with President Carter in Washington for discussions with the Admiral on 5 June.

(U) On 4 June 1981 the Reagan Administration announced a decision in principle to permit China to purchase, on a case-by-case basis, more advanced American technology with potential military overtones. Secretary of State Haig was to carry the offer to Beijing. On 14 December 1981 China was removed from the list of countries denied U.S. Munitions List export licenses.<sup>3</sup>

~~(C)~~ By July 1982 the State Department reported that over 100 licenses had been issued to U.S. firms seeking to make sales of Munitions Control List

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1. J463 Point Paper (C/NF/PROPIN), 15 Aug 83, Subj: Export of Military Equipment to the PRC (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Washington Post 19 Mar 80 (U), p. 2; Wall Street Journal, 18 Mar 80 (U), p. 22; Munitions Control Newsletter No. 81 3/80 (U); OASD/PA News release, 29 May 1980 (U).
  3. J463 Point Paper (C/NF/PROPIN), 15 Aug 83, Subj: Export of Military Equipment to the PRC (U), DECL OADR; Washington Post, 6 Jun 81 p. 1, (U).

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items to China. Licenses for military support equipment and clearly defensive weapons incorporating less sensitive technology made up the preponderance of approvals. The U.S. Embassy in Beijing was directed not to provide active assistance to U.S. companies, or their representatives, seeking to promote sales of Munitions List items to China unless the Embassy knew that necessary munitions control licenses had been obtained.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Following a June 1983 Presidential decision, China was allowed to buy American computers and other dual purpose high-technology equipment. China was placed in Export Controls Category V which barred shipment of specific military items but allowed manufacturers to presume that other exports would be approved.<sup>2</sup>

(C) In 1980 and 1981 the Chinese had passed two "shopping lists" of military goods during visits of senior U.S. officials to China. Discussions on military technical cooperation between the two countries during a visit by Defense Secretary Weinberger to China in late September 1983 clarified, in general terms, the major areas for future cooperation (C3, military computers, test equipment and instrumentation, training and training technology, and medical support), but no agreement was reached on specific technology levels, other than air defense and anti-armor. Finally, after painstaking review and coordination, the Chinese, through Defense Attache Zhang Wutang, were given a formal answer to their requests on 23 December 1983. In 1984 the pace quickened. After almost four years of delay, the military-to-military and FMS relations gathered momentum. Once the response was in hand, the Chinese sent a delegation led by Zhang Pin (the son of Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping) to the United States in February-March 1984 for discussions on the sale or transfer of military weapons and technology. This was the first time that military FMS questions had been worked at the action officer level rather than as a result of a visit by senior executives.<sup>3</sup>

(C) Topics discussed by the group in Washington were 16K static random access memory (SRAM) technology, manufacturing technology for magnetic discs, heads, and drives; microwave electron tubes; computer assisted design, visits to facilities at Los Alamos and Livermore, avionics improvements to their F-8 fighter, naval close-in air defense weapon system, sonar systems, test range instrumentation, large caliber artillery shell production, electronic components and devices, and Improved TOW missiles. Results of the Washington discussions were so favorable that a DOD working group, comprised of representatives from DOD/ISA, DSAA, JCS, and the three Services made a return visit.<sup>4</sup>

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1. SECSTATE 184365/022106Z Jul 82 (C), GDS 7/01/82.
  2. J463 Point Paper (C/NE/PROPIN), 15 Aug 83, Subj: Export of Military Equipment to the PRC (U), DECL OADR.
  3. OSD 281402Z Dec 83 (C)(BOM), DECL OADR; J4/Memo/TS418 (TS), 16 Apr 84, Subj: Security Assistance Relationship with the PRC (U), DECL OADR.
  4. Ibid.

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(S) From 29 March to 10 April 1984 the DOD team visited China. As a result of the discussions during these visits, the DOD team was given formal, written Chinese requests for Letters of Offer/Acceptance (LOAs) for U.S. site survey teams to begin detailed technical discussions leading to coproduction of TOW anti-tank missiles, upgrade of Chinese manufacturing capabilities for producing large caliber artillery ammunition, and modernization of avionics on their F-8 (FINBACK) interceptor aircraft. Where the option existed for commercial channels, the Chinese expressed a strong preference for carrying out these programs through FMS. The team also had direct access to the F-8 and TU-16 aircraft and production lines, artillery shell production, and other military facilities which were normally banned to foreign military. In Beijing the team met with Zhang Aiping who remarked that their efforts were "good for the mutual defense of both countries, and that if they had been working at Mach 2, they should now start working at Mach 3 or 4." The DOD team estimated a potential for an FMS program of \$2 billion in the next two years.<sub>1</sub>

(S) In reporting on the team's success to Admiral Crowe, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific) James Kelly commented that in connection with the development of a technology cooperation/security assistance relationship, "We expect that the action will be in the Washington arena until the Chinese actually sign up for some FMS cases. At that point we would anticipate CINCPAC staff and components' security assistance elements to start playing an important role in implementing these sales." Other aspects of the relationship and exchange of visits were going well. Admiral Crowe's reply expressed appreciation and interest: "We are tracking events as closely as we can, and are ready to take our place in the action at the appropriate time."<sub>2</sub>

(S) According to a report by Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs Richard Armitage, the highlight of the visit was demonstration of confidence on the part of the Chinese. The Chinese also expressed considerable interest in a visit by unit commanders to observe a training exercise of the 25th Infantry Division. (Although CDRWESTCOM forwarded a proposed itinerary for a PLA visit in September to the 25ID in Hawaii, the Chinese decided the time was not right.)<sub>3</sub>

(U) The U.S. Government was prohibited by Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, from providing security assistance to China, and the prohibition could only be waived by special Presidential determination. An FY 83 legislative initiative to eliminate the prohibition was

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1. OSD (ISA/EAPR 82-84) 272007Z Apr 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR; J4/Memo/TS418 (TS), 16 Apr 84, Subj: Security Assistance Relationship with the PRC (U), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 080055Z May 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  3. GSD (ISA/EAPR 113/84) 162132Z Jun 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR; CDRWESTCOM 270205Z Jul 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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dropped by the Joint Congressional Conference Report. On 4 April 1984 the State Department advised that it was taking steps to implement the President's June 1981 decision in principle to make China eligible to purchase defense articles and services furnished by the U.S. Government.<sup>1</sup>

(U) From 22 to 24 April President Reagan stopped in Honolulu for briefings by Admiral Crowe before proceeding to China. While the President's visit broadened U.S.-Chinese economic cooperation, White House officials acknowledged it did not meet expectations. Among tangible accomplishments were the initiating of an agreement for cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the signing of a tax treaty that would assist Americans doing business in China, and signing of an accord on official cultural relations. On 12 June, during a 3-day visit to Washington by Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping, the President formally granted China Foreign Military Sales eligibility.<sup>2</sup>

(S) At the conclusion of Zhang Aiping's visit, he and Secretary Weinberger signed an Agreed Minute. Both the United States and China agreed that the existence and substance of the minute was to be kept classified. The text follows.<sup>3</sup>

During the September 1983 visit by Defense Secretary Weinberger to the PRC at the invitation of PRC Minister of National Defense Zhang Aiping, the two sides held serious and sincere discussions and agreed on the principle of Sino-American military technology cooperation at agreed levels of technology including mutually agreed military equipment and weapons systems that are already fielded, in production, and in some cases, in research and development stages. Subsequently, the two sides established staff-level work teams for Sino-American military technology cooperation, to continue the discussions and develop mutually agreed upon military mission areas and levels of technology for cooperation. As a result of meetings between the work teams, the two sides have agreed on some cooperation projects, particularly production of anti-tank missile systems and modernization of large caliber artillery shell production. Also affirmed for follow-on cooperation is the modernization of aircraft avionics to improve Chinese defense against invading armed aircraft. In addition, cooperation in other types of military technology was discussed in a preliminary fashion. During the June 1984 visit by PRC Minister Zhang Aiping to the U.S. at the

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1. J463 Point Paper (C/NF/PROPIN), 15 Aug 83, Subj: Export of Military Equipment to the PRC (U), DECL OADR; SECSTATE 97626/040357Z Apr 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. Washington Post, 1 May 84, p. 1 (U); AMEMB Beijing 13927/060748Z Aug 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. OSD (ISA/EAPR 114/84) 162131Z Jun 84 (S) (BOM), DECL OADR.

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invitation of U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the two sides agreed in principle to facilitate the necessary steps to begin concrete realization of cooperation in the three projects cited above. It was also agreed that continued discussion of various other mission areas and defense systems was useful and desirable. Agreed the 13th of June, 1984.

(U) On 24 July the Chinese signed a contract for the first sale of defense equipment--24 Sikorsky S-70C2 transport helicopters--on a commercial sale basis. FMS sales for training materials, publications, and site surveys amounted to approximately \$813 thousand during FY 84.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Other high-level visits in 1984 included a visit by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman in late August. The Secretary and the Chinese Navy Commander Liu Huaqing agreed on certain areas of antisubmarine warfare and anti-air warfare. Subsequently, a 10-member Chinese Navy delegation led by Admiral Chen Youming (and including Zhang Pin) visited the United States from 10 November to 19 December for Navy-to-Navy discussions to expand cooperation in military technology for conventional naval defensive mission areas. The Hawaii portion of the visit included a call on Admiral Crowe, discussions with the USCINCPAC staff on the conduct of FMS and USCINCPAC's role, and consultations with members of the PACFLT staff. A reciprocal U.S. logistics team, led by Assistant Secretary of Defense/Manpower, Installations, and Logistics Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, visited China in late October for discussions aimed at supporting the PRC logistics modernization effort.<sup>2</sup>

#### Security Assistance Role

(S) Near the end of 1980, in making recommendations for the biennial review of the Unified Command Plan, Admiral Long said: "Based on the changing climate in U.S. foreign policy, the People's Republic of China should now be placed within the PACOM geographic area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations. Additionally, CINCPAC will require latitude for planning and administration of security assistance programs should such activity begin with the PRC." But it was not until a 28 October 1983 revision to the Unified Command Plan that China was assigned to the USPACOM area of responsibility and USCINCPAC was charged with evacuation of noncombatants for China.<sup>3</sup>

(S) In a 6 August 1984 message to the State Department, Ambassador Hummel noted that ". . . responsible organizations within the PRC military have moved with uncharacteristic speed in their efforts to acquire specific equipment,

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1. FY 86 CPD (U), p. 83; USDAO Beijing 250355Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR (nh).
  2. CNO 0712218Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR; OSD (ISA/EAPR191/84) 191526Z Nov 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR; OSD 301555Z Aug 84 (C/NF)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  3. CINCPAC 060423Z Dec 80 (S), REVW 5 Dec 86; USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/PRD), Vol. I, p. 29.
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services and training implied by the new status." Among other stepping stones, three Chinese officers were attending the Security Assistance Management course for foreign purchasers at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). "In short," he said, "it has become abundantly clear that a broad U.S.-China security assistance relationship is beginning to emerge."<sup>1</sup>

(S) With regard to fostering the new, expanding relationship he said, "I believe an immediate in-country point-of-contact under my direct supervision is essential for SA related matters. I recommend that U.S. Defense Attache Office Beijing assume this responsibility, and that the Defense Attache be designated the Chief, Security Assistance Office in the People's Republic of China." The principal Service attaches would assume in-country responsibility for specific Service-related programs, and no additional manning or support was necessary or desired at the time. When no answer was received, on 2 November he repeated the recommendation, urging the formal designation so there would be no misunderstanding on the part of the Chinese as to channels of communication.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The response came from the Secretary of Defense (Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)) and spelled out the chain of command. The Secretary of State was responsible for overall direction of the security assistance program. The Ambassador implemented the program in country, and under the Ambassador, USDAO Beijing was assigned in-country security assistance management responsibilities in accordance with a DSAA-DIA memorandum of understanding dated 14 and 25 November 1980.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Special care should be exercised by all concerned, however, not to use the term "security assistance" with the Chinese. Even if a separate office were established sometime in the future, another euphemism would be developed. DOD Directive 5140.3 was the basic guideline spelling out relationships and channels of communication which prescribed the limited security assistance management and administrative functions allowed by U.S. law under Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and under the Arms Export Control Act. The USDAO was to keep the ASD/ISA, DSAA, JCS, USCINCPAC, the State and Military Departments informed of security assistance activities in-country. Provisions would be made for the Defense Attache and other replacement personnel who would have security assistance responsibilities to receive appropriate training at the DISAM and orientation with the DSAA. Defense Secretary Weinberger's 13 January 1983 memorandum "Defense Relations with China" designated the ASD/ISA as the focal point for planning and oversight of the Defense Department's China policies.<sup>4</sup>

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1. AMEMB Beijing 13927/060748Z Aug 85 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. AMEMB Beijing 20637/020906Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. SECDEF 162123Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. Ibid.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## China Forum

(U) In an attempt to develop closer liaison between the military personnel who had a professional interest in events in China, an unofficial group identified as "The China Forum" was created by and for military personnel in Hawaii with an interest in the U.S.-China relationship. The mission of the organization was to develop a better understanding of China by becoming a focal point for China-related activities. It also aimed at providing opportunities for discussion of U.S.-China national security relationships. The Forum provided a cross fertilization mechanism among Hawaii's military organizations.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The China Forum was launched following a luncheon on 27 March 1984 at which Admiral Crowe spoke on the subject of China as a counterbalance to Soviet pretensions in Asia. Activities consisted of membership luncheons with guest speakers knowledgeable on China affairs. A steering committee, chaired by the J4 East Asia Plans and Programs Division Chief and composed of personnel from a number of locations held meetings with China experts for behind-the-scenes conversations. Liaison was maintained with other Hawaii-based groups such as the Asia Forum and the East-West Center. Approximately 100 members from HQ USCINCPAC, component commands, and other "China Watchers" met again on 13 June to hear BGEN Bernard Loeffke, USA, the departing USDAO Beijing. Other meetings featured Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Affairs) James Kelly on 18 July and local television journalist Bob Jones on 20 September. Special guests at the 18 December meeting were a group of seven academics and administrators from China who were traveling under the USIA International Visitor Program.<sup>2</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC Ltr (U), Ser 130, 20 Jan 84, Subj: "The China Forum"; J46 Point Paper (U), 7 Dec 84, Subj: The "China Forum"; J4/SSS/S1284 (U), 20 Sep 85, Subj: Review of Draft Command History for 1984.
  2. J463 HistSums Mar, Dec 84 and luncheon flyers (U); J4/SSS/S1284 (U), 20 Sep 85, Subj: Review of Draft Command History for 1984.

UNCLASSIFIED

# FIJI (U)

(S/NOFORN) MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY (U)



(S/NOFORN) USPACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY (U)

Recommended Role:  
Participation in United Nations peace-keeping forces.

(C) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES (U)

Foster social and professional relations through training/conferences to promote the evolution and modernization of the Fijian armed force.

Assist Fiji in establishing its contribution to the United Nations peace-keeping force and the Shant multinational observer force.

### (U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA ..... 18,376 Sq Km  
 NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS ..... 200 Nautical Miles  
 ECONOMIC ZONE ..... 200 Nautical Miles  
 FISHING ZONE ..... None Claimed  
 SECURITY ZONE ..... 12 Nautical Miles  
 TERRITORIAL SEA ..... 12 Nautical Miles  
 POPULATION ..... 666,000  
 ANNUAL GROWTH ..... 2.1 Percent  
 LITERACY RATE ..... 80 Percent  
 LIFE EXPECTANCY ..... 71 Years  
 GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ..... \$ 1.0 Billion  
 PER CAPITA ..... \$ 1,769  
 DEFENSE BUDGET ..... \$ 17 Million  
 OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ..... 5 Percent  
 TYPE GOVERNMENT ..... Independent State within the Commonwealth, recognizing Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State

GOVERNOR GENERAL ..... Ratu Sir George CAKOBAU  
 PRIME MINISTER ..... Ratu Sir Kamalasa T. MARA  
 MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ..... Jonei MAVOA  
 COMMANDER, ROYAL FIJI MILITARY FORCES ..... Col Ratu Epeli NAULATIKAU

The United States does not recognize Fiji's claim of archeologic status. Fiji's maritime claims are measured from straight baselines connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands.

### (U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR ..... HON. C. Edward DILLERY  
 USCINCPACREP SOUTHWEST ..... CDR Timothy W. TEDFORD, USN  
 PACIFIC DA-TT ..... CAPT Frederick W. LAWLER, USN

Headquarters in Wellington, New Zealand

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (SWNF), P. 62, DECL OADR.

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FIJI

(C) In May 1984 U.S. Embassy Suva proposed liquidating \$35,000 in a Fiji Army holding account for the purchase of additional M-16 rifles, if they could be made part of the original package of Sinai Multilateral Force and Observer (MFO) funding. If not, perhaps the funds could be used for badly needed M-16 repair kits. The rifles were needed in-country for training personnel in preparation for rotation to the Sinai MFO.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In late November 1984 Fiji's Prime Minister Sir Ratu Kamisese K.T. Mara became the first South Pacific island leader to make an official visit to Washington, D.C., and meet with President Reagan at the White House. The President stated that "I am particularly grateful for the sense of responsibility that he has demonstrated in the area of regional security. Having weighed his genuine concern over nuclear issues against the defense needs of his country and the Oceania region, in 1983 Prime Minister Ratu Mara reopened Fiji's ports to all our American naval vessels. I know that such decisions are not easy and reflect a high degree of political courage. I applaud your statesmanship." Afterwards, a senior Administration official reported that the United States would give Fiji military aid in FY 85 to go towards standardizing the rifles of its three army battalions to M-16s. Under Continuing Resolution appropriations for FY 85, \$300,000 in MAP funds was approved for Fiji.<sup>2</sup>

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1. AMEMB Suva 1964/220338Z May 84 (C), DECL OADR; J4/SSS/S1284 (U), 20 Sep 85  
Subj: Review of Draft Command History for 1984.
  2. AMEMB Wellington 5995/300041Z Nov 84 (U); PL 98-473 (U), 12 Oct 84.

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# INDONESIA (U)

(S/NOFORN) MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY (U)



(S/NOFORN) USMACV MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY (U)

Recommended objectives:  
Wartime straits control.  
Peace-time straits surveillance.  
Mine warfare.

(S) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES (U)

Maintain a stable and independent Indonesia favorably disposed toward the United States.  
Support the GOI in developing a credible military establishment for self-defense.

Enhance U.S. forward defense posture and U.S. rapid ability to deter or respond to aggression by allowing U.S. reconnaissance aircraft to overfly the LOCs in the GOI to maintain friendly relations with neighboring, as well as the United States, and to pursue regular economic and trade relations.  
Promote ASEAN equipment compatibility, both internally and regionally, where and when appropriate.

Improve the capability for inter-island transportation of troops and material in support of internal defense operations, as well as search and rescue operations.  
Provide tangible support and encouragement to the Indonesian armed forces in the execution of the military program in support of national development.  
Enhance the U.S. image and maintain personal contacts with the Indonesian armed forces.

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	1,908,240 Sq. Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS*	200 Nautical Miles
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	Certain Areas
SECURITY ZONE	12 Nautical Miles
TERRITORIAL SEA	180,935,000
POPULATION	2.2 Percent
ANNUAL GROWTH	64 Percent
LITERACY RATE	48 Years
LIFE EXPECTANCY	\$ 70 Billion
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	\$ 440
PER CAPITA	\$ 2.84 Billion
DEFENSE BUDGET	11.8 Percent
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	Republic, President, Cabinet, Unicameral Legislature
TYPE GOVERNMENT	

PRESIDENT ..... GEN SOEHARTO  
 MINISTER FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY ..... GEN PONHIAN  
 MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ..... DR. MOCHTAR  
 CHIEF ARMED FORCES ..... GEN MOERDANI  
 ARMY COMMANDER ..... GEN RUDDI  
 NAVY COMMANDER ..... ADM HONJLY  
 AIR FORCE COMMANDER ..... ADM SUKARDI  
 COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS ..... MAJ GEN SOEDIGDO

\* The United States does not recognize Indonesia's claim of archipelagic status or the requirement for advance notification for warship transit through the archipelago. Indonesia's maritime claims are measured from straight baselines connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR ..... HON. JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE  
 J1 ..... COL FRANK WILLIAMS, USA  
 M40 ..... COL THOMAS L. SAMS, USA

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (SNF), P. 64, DECL 048R.

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INDONESIA

(S) There were no major defense equipment purchases made by Indonesia during 1984 although officials were pondering advantages of the F-16/100 aircraft versus additional F-5Es or HAWK missiles for augmenting air defense. Lack of an external threat and existing economic constraints were key factors in weighing priorities. Also under exploration was a joint project with Singapore to acquire a small number (6) of F-16s, along with a support package, to provide regional interoperability.<sup>1</sup>

IMET Program

(U) The FY 84 Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) report of 17 May 1984 cited a problem with utilization of International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds. There had been problems in identifying qualified students for programmed IMET courses. This was due primarily to language qualification and lack of responsiveness by Indonesian officials to meet nomination deadlines. Assignment of a full-time U.S. Defense Language Institute specialist in March 1984 was expected to help the Indonesian English Language Program. Also, in January 1984 cost-sharing by the Indonesian Government for transoceanic travel expenses was stopped in order to reduce loss of foreign exchange. In FY 83 Indonesia had lost 44 student training opportunities and suffered \$24,297 in penalty costs. The FY 84 IMET program consisted of 167 students scheduled for CONUS training and eight in-country mobile training teams (MTTs) with an overall funding level of \$2.5 million, including approximately \$100,000 to support English language training. By the time of the evaluation, 2-11 April, another eight training opportunities for FY 84 had been lost and \$12,304 in penalty costs incurred.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The FY 85 program was a larger version and projected 224 students to attend 445 courses in CONUS. During the mid-year program review, the Office of Military Attache for Defense Programs (OMADP) reported that based on OMADP overtures, Indonesian Government officials had initiated several program changes to remedy underutilization. In addition, as a result of a conference with USCINCPAC's Director for Logistics and Security Assistance, HANKAM's LT GEN Yogi Soepardi had agreed to a complete rework of the FY 85 IMETP. It was also hoped that a major reorganization of the Indonesian Armed Forces implemented on 1 April 1984 would avert some of the difficulties.<sup>3</sup>

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1. AMEMB Jakarta 2653/150758Z Feb 84 (S)(EX) and 3622 retransmitted by SECSTATE 64584/060119Z Mar 84 (C)(EX), DECL OADR; DAO/MADP Jakarta 090717Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC PEG Report on Indonesia FY 84 (FOUO), pp. II-4, 6; J472 Point Paper (U), 21 Mar 84, Subj: IMET Program.
  3. Ibid; DAO/MADP Jakarta 021137Z May 84 (U). HANKAM was the equivalent to the U.S. Department of Defense.

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## FMS Case Management

(U) The above-mentioned PEG report listed FMS case management by the OMADP as follows:<sup>1</sup>

Army: 16 cases totaling \$63.2 million--the largest portion for 171 105mm howitzers, associated munitions, and equipment. There were two cases pending, and three had been closed in the past year.

Air Force: 84 cases valued at \$185.5 million. Of these, 11 were credit (\$121.5 million) and 73 were cash cases (\$65 million). Since 1 January 1983, four cases had been closed, 14 cases opened, and 10 were pending.

Navy: 7 cases with a value of \$18 million and four inactive at \$3 million. Four more cases totaling \$3.1 million were awaiting implementation. This represented roughly a 5-fold increase in active FMS case workload over the past two years. In addition, the Marine Corps had one FMS case (since 1979) for night vision devices (\$68,000) which would soon be closed.

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1. USCINCPAC PEG Report on Indonesia FY 84 (FOUO), pp. 8, 10, 12, 14.

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## JAPAN

(U) An austere Japanese budget in 1984 was slowing defense modernization and was limiting current and future Japanese sustainability. Although the Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDO) Japan was monitoring 651 FMS cases with a value of about \$2.5 billion, MDO personnel were involved in case management by exception only because the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) managed these cases. The PEG team, therefore, found that the MDO was completing a transition which had resulted in a diminished role in traditional security assistance functions and a greatly increased role in managing the transfer of defense-related technologies.<sup>1</sup>

(U) As Japan's industrial and technological capabilities grew, the JDA switched from a policy of direct procurement of U.S. systems to a policy which emphasized in-country production. As a result, MDO's security assistance activities evolved into the more complex management functions, as illustrated by activities involving R&D cooperation and the transfer of technology between the U.S. and Japan. The MDO served as the primary point of contact for memorandum of understanding (MOU) negotiations on technology transfer and assisted in managing 45 annexes under the U.S.-Japan Data Exchange Agreement (DEA). The MDO also coordinated the DOD-JDA Systems and Technology Forum which was established to facilitate U.S.-Japan cooperation in developing defense-related technology.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The number of FMS students declined dramatically from 148 students in FY 84 to approximately 65 by September 1984. This was due primarily to a decline in the technical training required to support new acquisitions. It was expected that when the PATRIOT missile was introduced in 1985, additional technical training requirements would be generated. Although the Glenn Amendment of 1980 authorized Japan to purchase U.S. training at the substantially lower FMS (NATO) price, the JDA still had not agreed to approve the necessary reciprocal pricing agreement.<sup>3</sup>


(U) The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA) of 1954 provided for the exchange of technical information for defense between the U.S. and Japanese Governments. Later that year the DEA was signed, but exchange had been somewhat restricted because Japanese policy prohibited the export of defense-related materials and technology. The policy was reversed in January 1983 when Prime Minister Nakasone announced Japanese technology could be exported to the United States.<sup>4</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC PEG Report on Japan FY 84 (FOUO), pp. 1, 3.
  2. Ibid., p. 4.
  3. Ibid., p. 5.
  4. Ibid., p. 6.

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# JAPAN (U)

(S/NOFORN) MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY (U)



(S/NOFORN) USFACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY (U)

Recommended Role:  
See lines of communication surveillance/protection to 1,000 miles.  
Facilitate assistance host nation support for augmenting forces.

(C) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES (U)

- Encourage modernization and qualitative improvement in Japan's self-defense efforts, particularly in antisubmarine warfare, air defense, and logistics.
- Encourage standardization, compatibility, and interoperability of U.S. and Japanese defense equipment.
- Encourage an increased dialogue in defense planning for expanded U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA ..... 381,945 Sq Km  
 NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS ..... None Claimed  
 ECONOMIC ZONE ..... 200 Nautical Miles  
 FISHING ZONE ..... None Claimed  
 SECURITY ZONE ..... 12 Nautical Miles  
 TERRITORIAL SEA ..... 120,018,000  
 POPULATION ..... 0.6 Percent  
 ANNUAL GROWTH ..... 77 Years  
 LIFE EXPECTANCY ..... \$ 1,060 Billion  
 GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA ..... \$ 8,947  
 DEFENSE BUDGET ..... \$ 12.5 Billion  
 % OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ..... 5.5 Percent  
 TYPE GOVERNMENT ..... Constitutional  
 Parliamentary Monarchy

EMPEROR ..... HIROHITO  
 PRIME MINISTER ..... NAKASONE Yasuhiro  
 DIRECTOR GENERAL JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY ..... KATO Koichi  
 MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ..... ABE Shinzaro  
 CHAIRMAN, JOINT STAFF COUNCIL ..... GEN WATANABE Keisaro  
 CHIEF OF GROUND (ARMY) STAFF ..... GEN MAKAMURA Morio  
 CHIEF OF MARITIME (NAVY) STAFF ..... ADM YOSHIDA Manabu  
 CHIEF OF AIR (AIR FORCE) STAFF ..... GEN MORI Shigeharu

Administrative Regions: 1. Hokkaido, 2. Tohoku, 3. Kanto, 4. Chubu, 5. Kansai, 6. Shikoku, 7. Kyushu, 8. Ryukyu Islands.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR ..... HON. Michael J. MANSFIELD  
 COMUSJAPAN ..... LT GEN Edward L. THIER, USAF  
 CIMUSJAPAN ..... COL Robert C. JOHNSON, USA  
 CATT ..... CAPT Walter C. NIX, USN

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (SNF), P. 65, DECL OADR.

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(U) Under authority of the MDAA, the MDO performed security inspections of approximately 30 Japanese defense industries which possessed U.S. classified information and equipment. The PEG team recommended that, since this function had been transferred to the Defense Investigative Service and the National Disclosure Policy Committee, the MDO should seek to transfer responsibility. The PEG team also recommended that the NDPC investigate a loop-hole in Japanese law that allowed the transfer of highly sophisticated dual-use technology.<sup>1</sup>

### C-130 Aircraft

(U) In early 1980 the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) announced plans to acquire 14 C-130H aircraft through FMS to supplement the domestically developed C-1 medium transport for long-range support of heavy equipment and personnel. Licensed coproduction was not considered in view of the small number of aircraft involved.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The first two C-130s were ferried by JASDF crews, accompanied by USAF advisers, to Komaki Air Base, Japan, on 14 March 1984. The third and fourth aircraft were delivered in December 1984. Budget constraints and the relatively low priority of the C-130 program hampered procurement of the remaining aircraft, but the Congress received the request for two more C-130s in July. Estimated cost, with spare parts and support equipment, was \$54 million.<sup>3</sup>

### Missiles

#### PATRIOT

(U) The JDA had a requirement to replace or extensively modify its NIKE-J missile system because the U.S. Army officially stated it would no longer support the NIKE, and procurement of parts, together with increasing maintenance costs, would become prohibitive. In 1978 the JASDF Air Staff Office requested information on the availability and releasability of the PATRIOT surface-to-air missile system to be used in planning for the JFY 80-84 Mid-Term Defense Plan. In 1981 the JDA dispatched a 10-member survey mission to the United States and Europe, and in August 1983 announced that the PATRIOT was the best candidate for replacement of the NIKE. It was not until mid-1984 that the request for two initial PATRIOT sets was included in the JFY budget. Plans called for expanding the number of air defense missile units from 19 to 24--all with PATRIOTs. Total project cost would exceed \$2.7 billion.<sup>4</sup>

1. Ibid., p. 7.

2. Ibid., p. 20.

3. Ibid.; J463 HistSum Mar 84 (U); UPI Wire Note Washington (U), 27 Jul 84; J4/SSS/S1284 (U), 20 Sep 85, Subj: Review of Draft Command History 1984.

4. USCINCPAC PEG Report on Japan FY 84 (FOUO), p. 26; Washington Times, 14 Aug 84, p. 6 (U); Janes Defence Weekly, 22 Sep 84, p. 490 (U).

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STINGER

(U) All three Japanese Self-Defense Forces had exhibited interest in the U.S. STINGER man-portable air defense system (MANPADS), and the JMSDF also considered the STINGER-POST. While initial interest had surfaced in 1977, it was not until JFY-81 that funds were provided for the purchase of 20 weapons for the Ground and Air components. As of September 1984, procurement of 182 missiles (107 for the JGSDF and 75 for the JASDF) had been authorized. Japan also asked for release of STINGER for coproduction, and the United States agreed to coproduction in principle, minus the guidance sections.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Ibid., p. 28.

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KOREA

Force Improvement Plan

(S) The Republic of Korea (ROK) Force Improvement Plan (FIP) II 1982-86 objectives were to increase capital zone defense capability, complete requirements for the initial stage of war, increase the reserve forces capability, and to increase their counter-unconventional warfare capability. FIP II assumed an early warning would be provided by the United States, a continued U.S. presence in Korea, and augmentation by U.S. forces in the event of hostilities.

(S) The original FIP II estimate of \$10.3 billion was based on a 28 percent share of the ROK defense budget which, in turn, assumed 6 percent of the GNP being budgeted for defense. Slower than expected economic growth compelled ROK officials to revise the FIP II target down to \$9 billion in March 1983. Subsequent increases in the Won-Dollar exchange rate and lower than projected levels of FMS credits compelled ROK officials to further reduce the FIP II target to \$8.3 billion. That target assumed that \$1 billion would come from FMS credits and that \$1.3 billion would be spent on debt service over the 5-year period. Under FIP II, ROK defense purchases from the United States were expected to reach \$2.653 billion, but with the reductions, many major projects would be either cancelled or stretched-out. Actual and projected FIP II expenditures are shown below in billions of dollars.<sup>1</sup>

(C) On 3 December 1984 President Chun Doo Hwan approved the FIP for 1985 and 1986-1990 (target year plus 5-year Defense Plan). According to Korean officials, priorities focused on anti-infiltration measures, principally to counter the AN-2 Colt threat. Specifically, the FIP envisioned procurement of OV-10D aircraft, STINGER missiles, AH-1S COBRA helicopters, and low-altitude radar by 1987. The \$10 million reduction in FMS credits for FY 85 would be absorbed by delaying the fielding of the KH-179 155mm howitzer, which would permit funds programmed for domestic weapons procurement to be shifted to pay for items purchased from the United States.<sup>2</sup>

	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>
Total FIP expenditures	1.27	1.31	1.38	1.43	1.55
Percent of Defense Budget	28.6	29.3	32.	32.1	32.2

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1. J462 Point Paper (S), 27 Jul 84, Subj: ROK FIP II (U), DECL OADR.
  2. CJUSMAGK 190115Z Dec 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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# KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (U)

(S/N/OFORM) MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY (U)



## (S/N/OFORM) USPACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY (U)

**Recommended Roles:**  
 Regional battle damage repair.  
 Shared ROK-U.S. command, control, and communications.  
 Use of civil assets.  
 Build up own forces to deter attack.

## (S) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES (U)

Secure U.S. economic, military, and political interests in Northeast Asia through the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the preservation of a non-Communist government in the Republic of Korea. Insure the ability of the Republic of Korea to defend itself with U.S. assistance against external aggression. Reduce ROK's dependence on U.S. combat forces by supporting modernization and improvement of ROK Armed Forces. Encourage standardization and interoperability of U.S. and Korean defense equipment to include complementary follow-on support for this acquisition. Support the U.S. forward defense strategy in the region by promoting joint programs which contribute to obtaining the necessary rights, authorizations, and facilities arrangements.

### (U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA ..... 96,919 Sq Km  
 NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS ..... None Claimed  
 ECONOMIC ZONE ..... Agreed Boundaries  
 FISHING ZONE ..... None Claimed  
 SECURITY ZONE ..... 12 Nautical Miles  
 TERRITORIAL SEA ..... 41,989,000  
 POPULATION ..... 1.5 Percent  
 ANNUAL GROWTH ..... 93 Percent  
 LITERACY RATE ..... 70.4 Years  
 LIFE EXPECTANCY ..... \$ 70.8 Billion  
 GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ..... \$ 4.3 Billion  
 PER CAPITA ..... 5.4 Percent  
 DEFENSE BUDGET ..... 32.2 Percent  
 OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ..... Republic with Power  
 OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ..... Centralized in a Strong Executive  
 TYPE GOVERNMENT

PRESIDENT ..... CHUN Doo Hwan  
 PRIME MINISTER (ACTING) ..... SIN Pyong-hon  
 MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ..... LEE Won-syung  
 MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ..... YUN Song-mih  
 CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ..... GEN YI Ki-paek  
 CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY ..... GEN CHONG Ho-yong  
 CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR FORCE ..... GEN KIM In-hi  
 CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ..... ADM CHAE Sang-hwe

\* The United States does not recognize the requirement for prior notification for entry/exit through the claimed territorial sea.

### (U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR ..... HON Richard L. WALKER  
 CONSUL GENERAL ..... GEN William J. LINSEY, USA  
 CHIEF OF MISSION ..... MAJ GEN Hugh J. GURIN, USA  
 DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION ..... COL Henry E. MCCracken, Jr., USA

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (S/NIF), P. 66, DECL OADR.

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Foreign Military Sales

(U) FMS credits for Korea amounted to \$185 million for FY 83 and \$230 million for FY 84. Despite efforts by State and Defense officials at various levels, credits were reduced to \$220 million for FY 85; however, 30-year repayment terms on the entire amount were approved. Korean officials continued to push for annual funding of \$500 million for FY 86 and beyond, but as the budget process progressed, maintaining a \$230 million figure seemed more realistic.<sup>1</sup>

16th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting

(U) The 16th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was held in Seoul, Korea, on 9 and 10 May 1984. Significant developments during the SCM Sessions are reported in the Planning Chapter of this history. SCM committee meetings addressed key issues listed below with follow-up actions required as indicated.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The Security Cooperation Committee: The United States would seek higher credit levels and improved repayment terms for Korea. Regarding the Defense Industrial Cooperation Agreement, the United States agreed to conduct a review to determine if DOD policies and regulations which implemented the "Buy America Act" were being applied accurately and fairly to Korea.



1. J462 HistSum Nov 84 (U); USCINCPAC 161756Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR; OSD (ISA/EAPR 130/84) 242243Z Jul 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR; FY 86 Congressional Presentation Document (U), p. 95; J462 Point Paper (U), 30 Nov 84, Subj: ROK security assistance summary.
2. J461 HistSum May 84 (U); J5111 Point Paper (S), 15 May 84, Subj: 16th ROK-US SCM (U), DECL 31 May 90.
3. Ibid. -

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(S) Technical Cooperation Committee: The United States and Korea would start detailed discussions in the near future towards an ammunition standardization agreement. The U.S. presentation at the fall TCC meeting would include the status of mini-RPV, chemical alarms, and detoxification (decontamination), and identification of possible areas for cooperation in infra-red seeker technology for tactical missile application.

### Weapons Systems

#### M48A5 Tanks

(C) In March 1982 the Department of the Army advised that Eighth Army and war reserve M48A5 tanks were scheduled to be replaced by M60A3s in FY 85. That same month at the 14th SCM Secretary of Defense Weinberger announced a U.S. intent to make the M48A5s available to the ROK, if desired, through FMS. Although records indicated that 155 tanks were in-country, there was no commitment of a fixed quantity, and no information on unit cost, modifications, etc. was available. When the Army did not provide any further details, in June 1983 the JUSMAG again requested information, and in October MAJ GEN Park Chun-sik, MND First Vice Minister discussed the subject with DASD/ISA (EAPA) James Kelly.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The United States offered the 155 M48A5s for delivery beginning in September 1984 with an initial price of \$619,000, which was scaled down first, to \$517,000, later to \$427,000, and ultimately \$419,065. In February 1984 the ROK agreed to purchase 24 and the transfer was completed on 4 October 1984.<sup>2</sup>

#### UH-1H Helicopters

(C) In September 1983 Chief JUSMAG Korea, MAJ GEN Hugh J. Quinn, USA, advised that inquiry had been made several times since May 1982 concerning disposition of Eighth Army UH-1H helicopter assets following scheduled replacement by UH-60A BLACK HAWKS, but each time he had been led to believe they were needed for CONUS requirements. After the sale of 10 to the Philippines, he inquired again asking that a token number be offered to the ROK Army. The DSAA position was that, in the absence of compelling circumstances, it was unlikely that a ROK request would be favorably considered.<sup>3</sup>

(S/RELROK) In December MAJ GEN Quinn recounted an informal request made by the ROK MND First Vice Minister for more helicopters. Korea's primary need

1. J461 HistSum Apr 82 (C), DECL 30 Apr 88; CJUSMAGK 030400Z Jun 83, DECL 3 Jun 89; CJUSMAGK 060330Z Oct 83 (S), DECL OADR.
2. SSO Korea 050425Z Dec 83 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR; J462 HistSums Dec 83 (C), DECL OADR, Feb, Apr, Sep, Oct 84 (U).
3. SSO Korea 190220Z Sep 83 (C)(BOM), DECL OADR; OSD 222113Z Sep 83 (C), DECL OADR.

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was mobility to counter constraints imposed by Korea's terrain and its inability to project decisive combat power when and where needed. Existing assets were fully committed to defense of a 30-mile strip south of the DMZ. Recent formation of one ranger commando regiment (RCR) plus plans for two more called for counter-infiltration operations covering the rest of the country. The additional UH-1H capability would be especially important in view of the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics. It was MAJ GEN Quinn's view that providing 66 helicopters in the near term would provide a significant start toward filling the additional 170 validated UH-1 requirements needed for OPLAN 5027 as well as counter-infiltration and counter-terrorist missions of the RCRs. JUSMAG's assessment, however, did not provide requested detailed financial impact statements.<sup>1</sup>

(C) Thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James Kelly offered a solution. The U.S. Army did in fact have a host of requirements for these aircraft, but based on detailed justification and prioritization of ROK requirements, perhaps increments of 5 to 10 helicopters could be made available. Admiral Crowe's 27 January 1984 assessment favored Mr. Kelly's--that U.S. needs should come first and gradual sales would minimize financial strains to the ROK.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 23 April the Korean MND was formally advised that 20 helicopters were available at \$450,000 each. After arrangements had been worked out for specific available aircraft, joint ROK-US acceptance inspections commenced on 30 May. ROK Army inspections and test flights were completed on 16 July, and the MND approved the purchase on 12 September with LOA signature one week later. Aircraft transfer was completed on 29 October.<sup>3</sup>

### Third Country Sales

(C) U.S. support of the ROK technology base stemmed from the Korean War period, and during the last ten years, the pervasiveness of U.S. technology throughout the Korean economy was driven by a Korean desire for self-reliance based on the uncertainty of U.S. commitments. As a result, the Koreans, with U.S. encouragement, used U.S. technology, which had been acquired through a variety of means including reverse engineering, to try to build a completely self-reliant defense industrial capability. This situation led to the ROK making significant capital investments in a defense industrial capability which could not be maintained without export sales, and most military items

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1. CJUSMAGK 020632Z Dec 83 (S/RELROK), DECL 2 Dec 89.
  2. J461 HistSum Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR; J4/Memo/S0097 (S), 20 Jan 84, Subj: EUSA UH-1H helicopter assets for the ROKG (U), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 270440Z Jan 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  3. J462 HistSum Dec 84 (U).

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produced by those industries resembled U.S.-designed items even after extensive Korean research and development.<sup>1</sup>

(U) U.S. law and foreign policy dictated that the United States maintain control of all U.S. equipment and technology transferred to allied countries in order to insure that they did not fall into enemy hands nor be used in a manner prejudicial to U.S. interests, and to protect the U.S. industrial base. As a result, defense items of U.S. origin but produced by Korea required U.S. Government approval prior to export. According to policy and procedures developed over the years, the U.S. Government reviewed each ROK third-country sales (TCS) request on a case-by-case basis, which the ROK Government viewed as too restrictive.

(S) Since 1981 various attempts at resolving these vexing problems by high-level officials and ad hoc groups had failed to satisfy either government. As described in the 1983 history, problems concerning sales by Korean industrial firms of lethal and non-lethal and U.S.-origin and non-U.S.-origin defense and dual-purpose items to Iran and other excluded countries (and in some cases to Iraq as well), continued to plague and perplex not only U.S. and ROK Government officials, but a host of other nations as well. The latest attempt at resolution was initiated in June 1983 with a series of in-country discussions, called KIWI meetings, between the U.S. Country Team and ROK MND counterparts. Again, the first four meetings failed to achieve a consensus for resolving the longstanding issues of technology transfer, origin determination, TCS, and ROK defense industry utilization. By late 1983 the Korean attempts to circumvent U.S. policy and law had become more frequent, despite U.S. protests and the potential adverse impact on ROK-U.S. relationships.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Early in 1984 there were reports of over \$300 million in ROK third country arms sales in 1983. Of that figure, only \$120 million had been reported to the United States. On 24 February 1984, the Office of the Secretary of Defense offered proposals for rejuvenating KIWI negotiations. In return for ROK agreement to institute tight controls on the sale of selected U.S. technology based items, the United States would offer an expanded matrix (of weapons and approved countries) and approval for transfer of selected technical data packages. A SECDEF memorandum, outlining U.S. proposals to resolve the TCS stalemate, was developed in coordination with OSD, USCINCPAC, JUSMAG Korea, and U.S. Forces Korea. A flag-level Korea Review Group meeting was held in Washington on 20 March to finalize the U.S. position for presentation to the ROK Government after the 16th SCM on 9-10 May.<sup>3</sup>

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1. CHJUSMAGK Ltr MKCH (S), 24 Jun 83, Subj: End of Tour Report (U), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. III, pp. 564-568; SECSTATE 152767/240356Z May 84 (S)(EX), DECL OADR; J462 Point Paper (S), 19 Sep 84, Subj: Third country sales of U.S. origin, ROK-produced items (U), DECL OADR.
  3. J462 HistSum Feb 84 (S), DECL OADR; Washington Post, 10 May 84, p. 21 (U).

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(S) In March the U.S. Embassy and COMUSKOREA made coordinated demarches to the ROK Foreign Minister and Defense Minister, respectively, citing specific examples of Korean sales to Iran which not only violated U.S.-ROK agreements, but also were contrary to previous ROK assurances that such sales were not taking place. Specifically cited was a potential Korean sale to Iran of up to 50 high-speed, shallow-draft patrol boats which could become a threat to U.S. interests as well as to U.S. Navy ships in the Arabian Gulf. Nevertheless, reports of ROK Government knowledge and involvement persisted and again in May, similar representations were made in military and diplomatic channels. By November the flow had abated somewhat, and the ROK Government was mending relations with Iraq and other Arab states, but the issue was still contentious.<sup>1</sup>

(U) A fifth round of KIWI negotiations took place on 16 May in Seoul where the U.S. representatives presented the proposals to the ROK. The proposals and Korean responses are described below.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The ROK Government would continue to use the matrix, but its utility was uncertain in light of the case-by-case requirement. The Koreans saw the liberalization on specified matrix items as a sign of progress. Production ceilings on seven previously ineligible defense items was acknowledged with appreciation; but with correction of certain factors. The ROKG needed reassurance that the remaining four ineligible items on the matrix were still open to industry-to-industry negotiation. The Koreans were pleased that the U.S. requirement for the Korean Foreign Minister to sign transfer assurances could be waived. Discussions on prospects for additional maintenance contracts for U.S. military equipment would continue, and discussion on the issue of mixed technology would be initiated.

(C) Another thorn in mid-1984 which exacerbated U.S.-ROK relationships was the recent assessment of royalty fees on TCS items of U.S. origin. While always part of U.S. law, they had generally been waived. Even when in September export royalties were waived until October 1989 for those items not in U.S. production, the Koreans were surprised and hurt, particularly since having acceded to U.S. pressure by ceasing sales of defense items to Iran. Mixed technology and future technology transfers were also emerging as problems requiring special and careful negotiation.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J462 Point Paper (S), 19 Sep 84, Subj: Third country sales of U.S. origin, ROK-produced items (U); AMEMB Seoul 2681, retransmitted by SECSTATE 160817Z Mar 84 (S)(EX); SSO Korea 160401Z Mar 84 (S)(BOM); COMUSK 240200Z May 84 (S); USINT Baghdad 2120/111534Z Sep 84 (S)(EX), all DECL OADR.
  2. J461 HistSum May 84 (U); AMEMB Seoul 5330/210703Z May 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. CJUSMAGK 100400Z Aug 84 (C); J462 HistSum Oct 84 (C); SECDEF 080052Z Sep 84 (C); SSO Korea 260140Z Oct 84 (C)(BOM), all DECL OADR.

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## JUSMAG Security Assistance Functions

(U) In August 1984 the Chief JUSMAG Korea, MAJ GEN Quinn, advised USCINCPAC of his concerns regarding certain non-traditional security assistance functions. He noted that the authority to perform these functions was based on various sources such as the intent of the Congress, Executive Orders, ROK-U.S. memoranda of understanding, SCM agreements, and various State and Defense Department taskings. Following an in-depth analysis, MAJ GEN Quinn concluded that there was a definite need to continue such functions for the foreseeable future--some with more emphasis and others with less. Not only did they support the Koreans in their efforts to increase their defense capability, but they also assisted U.S. agencies charged with implementing various programs and protecting U.S. interests. He therefore felt it imperative that the DOD seek approval for JUSMAG Korea to continue these activities and asked USCINCPAC's help in initiating action. Specifically, one source of authority was contained in Section 6, Congressional History for the Security Assistance Act of 1979, PL 96-92, and would expire at the end of FY 85. It stated:<sup>1</sup>

. . . However, it is the intention of the Committee that the performance by the MAAG in Korea of such advisory and training assistance, especially in the areas of defense resources management and development of the ROK defense industrial base, should be continued during the 1980-1985 period. The Committee intends that nothing in section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 be construed as circumscribing in any way continuing during that period the range of advisory, training, and technical assistance being rendered by the MAAG in Korea.

(U) A review was underway concerning the authority and justification for performing the other functions, the impact of not performing them, and alternatives to JUSMAG's performing them, and results would be forwarded to USCINCPAC at a later date. The U.S. Embassy and COMUSKOREA "heartily" endorsed MAJ GEN Quinn's conclusions and recommendations, and said that if the JUSMAG did not perform these functions, they would not be performed at all. USCINCPAC also strongly supported the request for continuance of the necessary legislative authorization to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs. In addition, USCINCPAC affirmed that JUSMAG Korea would continue to require special manning authorization to fulfill these responsibilities. In November 1984 the Chief, JUSMAG Korea, received verbal agreement from the Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency to allow continuation of those functions covered by the Congressional Testimony through 1986; however, no approach to the Congress was planned. A USCINCPAC survey of security assistance functions and manning was scheduled for June 1985.<sup>2</sup>

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1. CJUSMAGK 100730Z Aug 84 (U).
  2. AMEMB Seoul 9248/290810Z Aug 84 (C), and CHJUSMAG-Korea End of Tour Report 10 July 1983-10 June 1985 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 140952Z Sep 84 (U).

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## MADAGASCAR

(U) Madagascar became a French colony in 1896 and gained status as an overseas territory in 1946. In October 1958 it was proclaimed the autonomous Malagasy Republic within the French community, achieving full independence in June 1960. In December 1975 a new constitution was approved for the Democratic Republic of Madagascar.

(U) After a hiatus of five years, in November 1980 the United States resumed normal diplomatic relations with Madagascar. Until a change to the Unified Command Plan in October 1983, Madagascar was under the purview of the JCS and not assigned to a unified command's area of responsibility. A modest security assistance program (IMET) was initiated in FY 83, and program functions were performed by a 2-man U.S. Defense Attache Office in Antananarivo.<sup>1</sup>

(U) For the first time since the early 1970s, four Malagasy military officers visited U.S. military facilities during 1982 on a 2-week orientation training tour. In FY 83, \$17,000 of the \$20,000 requested in IMET funds was expended to provide training for four students. For FY 84, \$50,000 in IMET funding was expended on English language training and attendance at the U.S. Army's Engineer Advance Course for three Malagasy Army officers. A like amount was requested for FY 86.<sup>2</sup>


(U) In February 1984 Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs Richard L. Armitage forwarded a copy of a recent DOD study on the strategic importance of Madagascar and the Cape Sea route to Admiral Crowe. He wrote that ". . . the study's conclusion is that a modest increase in aid to the Ratsiraka government is worth the investment in an effort to deny further Soviet military access to facilities in Madagascar." The FY 85 Continuing Resolution (Public Law 98-473) appropriated \$2.05 million in MAP funds for Madagascar, and USCINCPAC endorsed \$1.5 million for FY 86 for engineering equipment replacement parts which would allow formation of a small naval engineering unit along the lines of a Navy SeaBee battalion. \$3 million in Economic Support Funds was also requested in the FY 86 CPD. If economics improved, the Malagasy also hoped to acquire Lockheed C-130s.<sup>3</sup>

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1. FY 85 Congressional Presentation Document (CPD)(U); JCS SM 729-83 (C), 28 Oct 83; AMEMB Antananarivo 652/140954Z Mar 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. FY 85 and 86 CPDs (U); AMEMB Antananarivo 652/140954Z Mar 84 (C), DECL OADR; J472 HistSum Mar 84 (U).
  3. ASD/ISA Ltr I-20763/84 (U), 14 Feb 84; USCINCPAC 161756Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR; AMEMB Antananarivo 652/140954Z Mar 84 (C) and 8435/061211Z Nov (S), DECL OADR.

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# MADAGASCAR (U)

(S//NOFORN) MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY (U)



(S//NOFORN) USRPA COM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY (U)

Recommended Role:  
Denial of USSR access.

(C) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVE (U)

Reduce Soviet and other communist bloc influence while promoting independence and economic development.

### (U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA ..... 595,700 Sq Km  
 NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS\* ..... 150 Nautical Miles  
 ECONOMIC ZONE ..... 150 Nautical Miles  
 FISHING ZONE ..... 50 Nautical Miles  
 SECURITY ZONE ..... 50 Nautical Miles  
 TERRITORIAL SEA ..... 50 Nautical Miles  
 POPULATION ..... 9,445,000  
 ANNUAL GROWTH ..... 2.8 Percent  
 LITERACY RATE ..... 53 Percent  
 LIFE EXPECTANCY ..... About 46 years  
 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ..... \$ 3.2 Billion  
 PER CAPITA ..... \$ 360  
 DEFENSE BUDGET ..... \$ 82.1 Million  
 % OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ..... 15 Percent  
 TYPE GOVERNMENT ..... Democratic Republic

PRESIDENT ..... ADMIRAL Didier RATSIRAKA  
 PRIME MINISTER ..... LCOL Desire RAKOTOARJAOA  
 MINISTER OF DEFENSE ..... RADAM Guy SISON  
 FOREIGN MINISTER ..... Adrianaribone Jean BEMAMANJARA

\* The United States does not recognize territorial sea claims in excess of 12 nautical miles or claimed security zones beyond the limits of the territorial sea.

### (U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR ..... HON. Robert B. KEATING  
 DA 11 ..... CAPT Giles M. THOMPSON, USN

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (S//NF), P. 67, DECL OADR.

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MAURITIUS

(U) Mauritius was a small island-state located 500 miles east of Madagascar. Beginning in 1715 it was occupied by the French, and in 1814 it was ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of Paris. In March 1968 it gained independence.

(U) In 1974 Mauritius was made eligible for security assistance by Presidential determination, but none was proposed or provided until FY 82 when \$2 million in Economic Security Funds was approved to ease foreign exchange constraints. Economic problems had resulted from a destabilized and depressed sugar market exacerbated by two years of weather damage to the crop.

(C) In early 1984, as requested by U.S. Ambassador Andrews, Admiral Crowe endorsed an increase to \$4 million in ESF for Mauritius. His backing was based on a more friendly attitude towards the United States, increased frequency of U.S. ship visits, laborers at Diego Garcia (see the Personnel Chapter of this history for details), and support of U.S. positions in the United Nations. In comments on the Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance, USCINCPAC also favored initiation of a modest IMET program for Mauritius.<sup>1</sup>

(C) Ambassador Andrews was greatly disappointed when informed that the FY 85 ESF allocation was only \$2 million and asked that, if at all possible, the figure be raised. He said, "The GOM has done cartwheels in courting the USG and in accommodating U.S. interests in key votes in the UNGA, on political/strategic issues affecting Diego Garcia by downplaying its claim of sovereignty . . . and other political issues such as expelling Libyan diplomats and preventing Cuba from establishing an embassy, and it has one of the best records as an active democracy which fully respects human rights." At the time (21 November) he did not feel it would be a "tactically appropriate moment to inform the GOM." On 12 October (the date that the FY 85 Continuing Resolution appropriation was signed) Prime Minister Aneerood Jugnauth had what he considered an important and constructive discussion with Acting Secretary of State Dam in Washington that signaled a closer relationship with the United States. In the six weeks since then, the U.S. Government had given notice of its intention to impose a quota on the importation of cotton shirts and of its inability to make a full retroactive adjustment for another year on sugar which was due Mauritius for undershipment during the two previous years.<sup>2</sup>



(C) Mauritius had a Special Mobile Force with aging British and French equipment which was responsible for defense. In August 1984 a member of the

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1. AMEMB Port Louis 987/231054Z Mar 84 (C), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 161755Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. AMEMB Port Louis 3882/211202Z Nov 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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# MAURITIUS (U)

(S/NOFORN) MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY (U)



(S/NOFORN) US/PACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY (U)

Recommended Route:  
U.S. ship visits  
Access to facilities.  
Denial of USSR access.

## (U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA ..... 1,865 Sq Km  
 NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS\* ..... 200 Nautical Miles  
 ECONOMIC ZONE ..... 200 Nautical Miles  
 FISHING ZONE ..... 200 Nautical Miles  
 SECURITY ZONE ..... None Claimed  
 TERRITORIAL SEA ..... 12 Nautical Miles  
 POPULATION ..... 1,018,000  
 ANNUAL GROWTH ..... 1.8 Percent  
 LITERACY RATE ..... 61 Percent  
 LIFE EXPECTANCY ..... About 64 Years  
 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ..... \$ 960 Million  
 PER CAPITA ..... \$ 890  
 DEFENSE BUDGET ..... \$ 4.5 Million  
 OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ..... 2.9 Percent  
 TYPE GOVERNMENT ..... Parliamentary Democracy  
 (British-Commonwealth)

GOVERNOR GENERAL ..... Sir Seewoosagur RAMGOOLAM  
 PRIME MINISTER ..... Anerood JUGNAUTH  
 AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE ..... ANIL GAYAN  
 MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ..... ANIL GAYAN

\*The United States does not recognize the claimed requirement for advance notification for the ship transit through the claimed territorial sea.

## (U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR ..... MON. George Roberts ANDREWS  
 DATT ..... CAPT Giles M. THOMPSON, USN  
 HEADQUARTERS IN Antananarivo, Madagascar

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (S/NF), P. 70, DECL OADR.

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USCINCPAC Security Assistance staff visited Mauritius, as well as other countries in the area (Madagascar, Seychelles, and Comoro Islands), and reported that several British, French, and Indian military personnel were assigned to assist in training and maintenance. His report indicated that the only rational use of IMET would be to provide coast guard training and perhaps professional development or leadership training on a limited basis. He recommended a slow, cautious approach to insure that initiation of an IMET program would be appropriate and productive.<sup>1</sup>

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1. AMEMB Port Louis 2796/031211Z Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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# PHILIPPINES (U)

(S/NOFORN) MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY (U)



(S/NOFORN) USPACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY (U)

Recommended Rules:  
Base security.  
Coastal defense and surveillance.  
Internal defense.

(S) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES (U)

Assist in acquiring and maintaining necessary rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements for U.S. and allied forces and deny them to forces opposed to U.S. interests.  
Support development of improved internal security and anti-smuggling capabilities and promote the security of U.S. facilities.  
Promote equipment commonality, both internally and regionally, to enhance material compatibility when appropriate.  
Promote self-reliance.  
Encourage continued contribution by the Armed Forces of the Philippines to economic and social development through civic action.

### (U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	300,440 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS*	200 Nautical Miles
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	None Claimed
SECURITY ZONE	0.5 to 300 Nautical Miles
TERRITORIAL SEA	None
POPULATION	55,520,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.3 Percent
LITERACY RATE	89 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	59 Years
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	\$ 39 Billion
PER CAPITA	\$ 760
DEFENSE BUDGET	\$ 800 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	14 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Republic

PRESIDENT	Ferdinand E. MARCOS
PRIME MINISTER	Cesar VIRATA
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Arturo TOLENTINO
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	Juan P. ENRILE
CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP	GEN Fabian C. VER*
CG, ARMY	MAJ GEN Josephus G. RAMAS
CG, NAVY	ADMIRAL Simon M. ALEJANDRO
CG, AIR FORCE	MAJ GEN Vicente M. PICCOLO, Jr.
CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP	LT GEN Fidel V. RAMOS

\* The United States does not recognize the Philippine claim of sovereignty over the maritime claims of the Philippines are based in part upon geographic coordinates in the 1930 Treaty of Paris and the 1930 US-UM Treaty delimiting the boundary with Burma.

\*\* On temporary leave

### (U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	HON Stephen BOSWORTH
USCINCPACREP PHIL	ADM Edwin R. KOHN, USN
CHIEF JUSMAGPHIL	CGEN Teddy G. ALLEN, USA
JA11	COL Thomas J. PALLET, USAF

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (SNF), P. 74, DECL OADR.

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PHILIPPINES

(S) Retention of U.S. bases at Clark and Subic was the single most important U.S. objective in the Philippines. These bases constituted the southern anchor of the forward basing strategy in the Pacific. Throughout 1984 reports of deteriorating economic, political, social, and military conditions in the Philippines continued to dominate USCINCPAC's security assistance philosophy and actions. In preparation for a meeting with Philippine Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, in January Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) Richard Armitage asked Ambassador Michael Armacost and Chief, Joint Military Advisory Group Philippines (CHJUSMAGPHIL), BGEN Charles E. Getz, USA, for their assessments of conditions in the Philippines. Based on a Defense Intelligence Agency assessment, he believed that the most serious military threat facing the Philippines stemmed from internal rather than external sources, while proposed major defense equipment (MDE) acquisitions appeared to be aimed primarily at projecting Philippine military forces and capabilities against an external threat.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The Ambassador acknowledged that the GOP "wish list" for FMS financing was not entirely realistic, but he said that care should be taken in pressing the GOP to reorient its use of MAP and FMS significantly toward procurement of essentially counter-insurgency items. GOP rationale for using U.S. aid for modernizing the Navy and Air Force was MDB OPLAN 1-83 and the U.S. pressure that they sensed to assume greater responsibilities for offshore surveillance and defense. While the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA) insurgency continued to grow, the GOP's major deficiency in stemming the insurgency was not equipment--what was needed was better government, a renewed sense of purpose by GOP officials down to the local level, and more efficient delivery of government services in remote areas. Unless the GOP also addressed fundamental concerns about military discipline and corruption, more equipment would not help much. The GOP did not admit to having a serious insurgency problem, and for domestic political reasons, might not be willing to undertake a major reorientation of its public policy which carried with it public acknowledgement of yet another failure in the countryside. Funding of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) compensation package in FY 85-89 would face tough opposition in the Congress and because of congressional concern regarding military abuses and the low regard for the present Philippine Government, it might be preferable, the Ambassador said, to defend a security assistance package oriented toward external rather than internal defense.<sup>2</sup>

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1. OSD (ISA/EAPR 11/84) 141634Z Jan 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  2. COS Manila 16/161101Z Jan 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR.

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(S) The CHJUSMAGPHIL assessment acknowledged there was no purely military solution for any insurgency and that a total Philippine Government effort was required to create the environment necessary to correct the deficiencies contributing to the underlying causes of insurgency. In certain areas of the Philippines the situation had deteriorated to the point where the military had to provide protection for the civil programs. Any upgrading of the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) would improve their overall capability to meet both their conventional defensive role and internal security mission. Training, across the board, was of paramount importance to such an upgrade.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In a more detailed assessment, Ambassador Armacost set forth his perceptions of the current situation and trends in the Philippines, and he attempted to identify key policy problems to be faced in the coming months. President Marcos had survived the immediate fallout from the Aquino assassination in August 1983 and hoped to restore greater legitimacy to his government through legislative elections in May. Although the credibility of his regime was low and uncertainties persisted about his health, he had preserved his authority.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The CCP/NPA was continuing to expand its base of support in the countryside, but it had not exploited the turbulence stimulated by the Aquino assassination. It had neither initiated operations in the urban centers nor intensified its activities in rural areas. The Ambassador was unsure whether this reflected divisions within the leadership, caution induced by awareness of their vulnerabilities, or confidence that the situation was ripening so satisfactorily that they need not mount costly or risky ventures to accelerate the process at that time. The dominant concern of most Filipinos was the May legislative elections, and the faltering economy would most likely be a prime issue in the elections.

(S) A June assessment by the Ambassador on the communist insurgency estimated that the CPP/NPA had spread activity to an estimated 62 out of 73 provinces. Confidential GOP statistics indicated that 17 percent of all villages and city wards were under some degree of communist influence. The Embassy felt these were understated and that NPA organizational activity had reached major proportions in several regions. The GOP was now locked in a steadily escalating struggle with a communist enemy in which the stakes were control of the Philippines. There was little indication that the Marcos Government was capable of turning the situation around, and until the GOP demonstrated its awareness of discontent and dealt with its sources, i.e., weak and corrupt local administration, ineffective economic policies, cronyism, loss of government credibility, and military abuses, the situation would continue to deteriorate and the ultimate outcome was unknown.<sup>3</sup>

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1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 170600Z Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. AMEMB Manila 5248/250822Z Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Manila 15136/070507Z Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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(C/NOFORN) A JUSMAG version of the situation presented to Admiral Crowe during his 13-16 June visit to the Philippines reviewed Philippine Service conditions and capabilities (and lack thereof). AFP ground forces were 90 percent deployed in counter-insurgency operational areas. The report also described the overall AFP financial status and procurement plans to rectify the problems.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The Embassy report of Admiral Crowe's meetings with President Marcos, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, and AFP Chief of Staff General Fabian Ver indicated some GOP recognition of the increasing NPA threat and the need to shift emphasis and resources from modernization programs, such as the sophisticated F-16 fighter, to upgrade of ground force capabilities. Admiral Crowe emphasized to them the importance of improving base perimeter security at both Clark and Subic, given the increase of global terrorism.<sup>2</sup>

(S) In one of two messages to Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Admiral Crowe shared some "quite disturbing assessments." His message was couched in forceful terms: The GOP had so far proven woefully inadequate to the NPA challenge. GOP civil and AFP resources available to undertake major programs to contain and undermine the NPA were sadly lacking. He was compelled to conclude that a serious insurgency situation was developing which could ultimately threaten extensive U.S. interests in the Philippines. He seconded the recent Embassy and JUSMAG evaluations that poor leadership and corruption at the senior officer level were facts of life, sapping the professionalism out of the AFP. Worsening economic problems were having a devastating impact on the Armed Forces. Significant improvements would require a host of actions--many of which might be beyond U.S. control, and it was clear that major surgery would be required. It would not be easy, nor could he promise ideas that would do more than address the margins of the problems.<sup>3</sup>

(S) In the second message the Admiral treated Philippine Service problems more specifically, for example, the Philippine Navy (PN). Based on U.S. Navy standards, none of the PN's 250 ships/vessels/craft were in an operationally ready status. This condition was the result of a totally ineffective supply and maintenance system compounded by a training program which was non-existent above the lowest levels. Damage control and watertight integrity were totally ignored. There was no preventive or planned maintenance system, and no technical libraries of any substance existed. The PN supply system had deteriorated to the point of almost total ineffectiveness. Approximately 55 percent of the installed plant equipment at the Cavite Naval Shipyard was out of commission. True corrective actions for improving the situation in the Philip-

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1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 191300Z and 191301Z Jun 84 (S/NF) and JUSMAGPHIL Background Paper (C/NF), 13 Jun 84, Subj: Situation Report-Security Assistance Program - Philippines (U), DECL OADR.
  2. AMEMB Manila 16061/180758Z Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 230249Z Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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pires would require significant Washington level assistance. It was crystal clear that "business as usual" would not suffice. What was dictated, he said, was a "fundamental determination that we cannot allow the Philippines to go under." On 19 August the Admiral forwarded his initial suggestions and said more detailed proposals would be submitted as appropriate.<sup>1</sup>

#### Near-term Initiatives

(S) In September, Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, who had succeeded Ambassador Armacost, provided an analysis of the security situation in the Philippines and a strategy for continuing military assistance. Building on Admiral Crowe's 19 August treatise and its broad recommendations for responding to the worsening security situation, Ambassador Bosworth said that an overriding consideration should be to avoid getting caught between the slow erosion of Marcos' authoritarian control and the still fragile revitalization of democratic institutions. At this stage he believed security assistance should concentrate on practical programs involving such basics as logistics, maintenance, training, exercises, equipment for mobility, and communications to help build and modernize the AFP from the bottom up. He had asked JUSMAGPHIL to develop low visibility programs for Country Team review which could be funded from existing or planned levels of resources and be within the scope of permissible security assistance activity.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 19 October the Ambassador recommended 12 training and 5 logistic support initiatives for concentrating resources on serious, basic deficiencies within the AFP. Discussions with GOP and AFP leaders would focus on improving basic capabilities with particular emphasis on insurgency. The key to significant progress, however, would still remain a change in the attitude and quality of AFP leadership.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Admiral Crowe commended these initiatives in broad terms to the JCS, stating that everything possible should be done to improve logistics for the AFP ground forces most immediately concerned with countering the insurgency. He then requested comments from his Service components and USCINCPACREPPHIL. CDRWESTCOM offered to expand the exchange program between the U.S. 25th Infantry Division and the AFP and observation of Special Operations Forces' training by AFP personnel, plus several logistics improvement possibilities. CINCPACFLT said the immediate requirement was to get at least some ships operational. (Earlier reports had noted that none of the 250 Philippine Navy (PN) ships were considered operationally ready by U.S. Navy standards.) Support to the PN should concentrate on areas where it could best support the Philippine Army, i.e., in logistics support and restoration of PN troop lift capability (LST/LCU/LCM repair). (In June he had reported that five of the LSTs which

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1. USCINCPAC 030613Z Jul and 190013Z Aug 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. AMEMB Manila 24512/071055Z Sep 84 (S)(EX), DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Manila 28799/190318Z Oct 84 (S)(EX), DECL OADR.

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were on the "active" list were resting on the harbor bottom at Cavite, about one-half submerged.) He then presented a practicable evaluation of the Embassy's training and logistic proposals. CINCPACAF was supportive in general terms.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Referring to the Embassy's 19 October suggestions, the State Department commended the proposals in general as offering feasible, low-profile solutions to some of the AFP's basic problems. While certain technical training and observation of combined exercises met with unqualified support, some suggestions requiring appropriate reimbursement should be requested on an individual basis. Others conflicted with existing policy and statutory limitations and would have to be supported by convincing rationale in order to seek modification of such restrictions. Initiatives that did not appear immediately feasible concerned observation of several U.S. exercises, JUSMAG assistance concerning helicopter employment doctrine (exclusive of operational activity), and expansion of the customer relations team program including logistics management assistance.<sup>2</sup>

(S) To General Vessey, Admiral Crowe expressed dissatisfaction with State's response and said it lacked anything new in terms of policy or program direction. It was more a "business as usual" approach rather than a tangible indication of U.S. efforts to go the "step beyond," which he felt was needed now. The longer meaningful initiatives were delayed, he said, the more difficult the ultimate solution would be.<sup>3</sup>

Security Assistance Defense Analysis Paper

(C) On 28 December USCINCPAC asked the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Program Analysis and Evaluation to take the lead in conducting a study of Philippine security assistance needs during the next decade. The analysis should consider, but not be limited to the strategic importance of the Philippines to the United States; threat to the Philippines; possible conflict scenarios; current and projected organization and capabilities of the AFP; Philippine economic constraints affecting defense spending; and illustrative security assistance programs for the Philippines. The study was expected to begin in March and be completed by October 1985.<sup>4</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC 272115Z and 272111Z Oct 84 (S)(BOM), CDRWESTCOM 311930Z Oct 84 (S), CHJUSMAGPHIL 170313Z Jul 84 (C), CINCPACFLT 192030Z Jun 84 (S/NF) (EX), CINCPACAF 201845Z Nov 84 (S), all DECL OADR.
  2. J475 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR; SECSTATE 365424/121157Z Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 242301Z Dec 84 (S), DECL 31 Dec 90.
  4. J475 HistSum Dec 84 (C) and USCINCPAC 280111Z Dec 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### Security Assistance Funding

(U) In 1984 the Philippines was experiencing its most critical economic crisis since World War II. A serious liquidity problem in 1983, on top of a major structural imbalance in the economy, forced the Government to devalue the peso, declare a moratorium on the repayment of commercial debt principal, open negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a standby arrangement, and seek debt rescheduling. With inflation running over 50 percent, the Philippines registered negative real GNP growth of around six percent. In late July 1984 an IMF team returned from Manila after failing to reach agreement on provision of a \$650 million standby loan to pave the way for resumption of commercial loans.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Security assistance funding for the Philippines for FY 84 amounted to \$50 million in FMS guaranty credit, \$1,488,000 for the IMET Program, and \$50 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF). (MAP grant aid had been discontinued in 1981.) In a letter to President Marcos dated 31 May 1983, following review of the 1979 Military Bases Agreement, President Reagan pledged a "best effort" to obtain total appropriations of \$125 million in MAP, \$300 million in FMS credits and \$475 million in Economic Support Funds during the five fiscal years beginning 1 October 1984.<sup>2</sup>

### FY 85

(U) The Administration's request to the Congress for FY 85 security assistance funding included \$25 million for MAP (grant aid), \$60 million in FMS credits (\$30 million at concessional rates of 5 years grace and 7 years repayment and \$30 million at market rates with 10 years grace and 20 years repayment), \$1.9 million for the IMET Program, and \$95 million in ESF.

(U) Despite defense by representatives from the State and Defense Departments, the Administration's request met with resistance in both the House and Senate. In March the House Foreign Affairs Committee markup eliminated the entire \$60 million in credits with concomitant increase in ESF to \$155 million. Their rationale in so doing was based on the GOP economic situation and the fact that military aid had been front-loaded under the previous 5-year MBA. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to reduce credits by \$30 million and increase ESF commensurately. They wished to encourage fair and thorough investigation of the Aquino assassination and to support genuine free and fair elections to the National Assembly in May 1984.<sup>3</sup>

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1. FY 86 Congressional Presentation Document (CPD) (U), p. 103; Far Eastern Economic Review (U), 30 Aug 84, p. 28.
  2. FY 86 CPD (U), p. 105; SECSTATE 49485/172240Z Feb 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. J475 Point Paper (C), 6 Aug 84, Subj: Philippine Security Assistance Program Issues (U), DECL OADR; J4/Memo/C397 (C), 30 Mar 84, Subj: FY 85 Security Assistance for the GOP (U), DECL OADR.

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(S) In an April meeting Ambassador Armacost advised President Marcos, Defense Minister Enrile, General Ver, and others of the status of the House and Senate bills. Marcos opined that, based on a recent CIA briefing, a serious external threat was unlikely; and consequently, delays in the military modernization program would be tolerable. He also acknowledged the potential advantages of accepting some revisions in the FY 85 MBA compensation package.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The sums appropriated for FY 85 security assistance under the Continuing Resolution dated 12 October 1984 limited FMS credits to the Philippines to \$15 million with concessional rates. Estimated allocations for other programs were MAP - \$25 million, ESF - \$140 million, and IMET - \$1.9 million.<sup>2</sup>

(S) When on 16 October he briefed President Marcos on the Continuing Resolution, Ambassador Bosworth reported that Marcos' reaction was positive and that he had expressed appreciation for the Administration's efforts in obtaining at least some FMS credits. He said that the increased ESF was responsive to the country's primary economic needs and that he had already told the military [AFP] that the reduction in funds for FY 85 definitely ruled out any large purchases such as aircraft. With reference to focusing on the increased internal threat from the NPA, Marcos said the AFP needed to concentrate on transport and communication. The Ambassador suggested it might be useful to jointly examine AFP procurement plans for the next three to five years; Marcos said he would instruct the AFP to follow up.<sup>3</sup>

(U) As it became apparent that U.S. security assistance would shift from military to economic support, the question then became one of how to shuffle funds and priorities in order to get the maximum benefit from the few defense dollars that would be made available. In March Defense Minister Enrile submitted a priority list of equipment and support requirements to be funded with FY 85 MAP and FMS credits.<sup>4</sup>

(U) Complicating the already dire and complex GOP financial situation further were arrearages in FMS, commercial sales, and unused FY 84 FMS credit. As of 12 March 1984 the GOP was \$28.6 million in arrears for FMS credits, and since March 1983, \$8.1 million in FMS cash cases. Although FMS credits could be used to remove arrearages on FMS cash cases by changing them to credit cases, the FY 84 FMS credit loan which could be used to pay the arrearages had not been signed because the GOP wanted to negotiate better terms for the FY 84 loan. In May the Philippine Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense Minister formally requested that the terms on the \$50 million in FY 84 FMS credits be changed from 3 to 5 years grace with 7 years for repayment of principal plus

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1. AMEMB Manila 9095/050849Z Apr 84 (S)(EX), DECL OADR.
  2. Public Law 98-473 (U), 12 Oct 84; FY 86 CPD (U), p. 105.
  3. AMEMB Manila 28698/180820Z Oct 84 (S)(EX), DECL OADR.
  4. J474 Point Paper (S/NF), 23 Nov 84, Subj: Philippines Security Assistance Program Issues and Country Team Initiatives (U), DECL OADR.

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interest. The Embassy and USCINCPAC strongly urged support for this request--not once but three times--but it was not until September that the appeal was granted. Although the GOP managed to erase arrearages on FMS credits, the \$8.1 million due for cash arrearages remained, and as a result, no new cash cases could be opened.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Meanwhile, any and all avenues of obtaining funds and equipment were investigated by the AFP. In June and July information was requested on the possibility of using FMS credits to finance government-to-government or commercial leases for major defense equipment (MDE). While realizing the letter of the law prohibited such mechanisms, USCINCPAC endorsed the request and said that the option should remain open for the GOP to lease MDE from DOD stocks through FMS cash transactions. USCINCPAC asked the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) to remain extremely flexible in policy and procedural matters as alternatives to rescue the AFP were being sought. The DSAA promised to be open-minded to any specific requests but politely advised that prospects were dim for such MDE leases. The Congress and its investigative arm, the General Accounting Office, had been very critical of such usage in El Salvador and Central America, and legislation passed in 1981 was quite specific regarding the perceived use of leases to circumvent financial shortfalls.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Other avenues to save the AFP modest sums of hard currency were surfaced by General Ver during Admiral Crowe's June visit to the Philippines. The Admiral had subsequently obtained DSAA approval during a visit with the Director, LT GEN Philip C. Gast, USAF, on 26 July. The United States would continue funding of assistance-in-kind support for JUSMAGPHIL in 1985 as had been done in 1984, plus the cost of utilities. (For details see the 1983 History). However, the DSAA stipulated that a manpower and facilities survey be conducted as soon as possible to insure that appropriate reductions were made before 1 January 1985. (See also the Personnel Chapter of this history.) Legislation would be sought to allow President Reagan to waive proceeds from sales of MAP equipment delivered prior to 1975 to the GOP. (A precedent had been established by a GOP-JUSMAG note of 7 August 1971.) As an exception to policy, U.S. correspondence courses could be furnished at no cost via MAP-financed FMS purchase. Payment for some U.S.-provided support services at Clark and Subic could be extracted from FMS cases and paid in pesos versus

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1. J475 HistSum Mar 84 (C), SECDEF 032118Z Apr 84 (U); CHJUSMAGPHIL 171525Z May 84 (U); AMEMB Manila 13864/250313Z May 84 (C), USCINCPAC 050502Z Jun 84 (C), AMEMB Manila 16510/210925Z Jun 84 (C), USCINCPAC 252351Z Jul 84 (C), SECDEF 242229Z Aug 84 (C), AMEMB Manila 22940/230552Z Aug 84 (C), USCINCPAC 271712Z Aug 84 (C)(BOM), all DECL OADR; AMEMB Manila 26012/210721Z Sep 84 (U).
  2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 260308Z Jun 84 (U); USCINCPAC 040334Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR; SECDEF 131942Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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dollars. LT GEN Gast estimated overall savings to the AFP would be approximately \$650,000.<sup>1</sup>

FY 86

(S) In November the Ambassador provided new approaches to funding the security assistance program. In his submission for the Consolidated Data Report for FY 86 funding, he proposed that all items in the submission be funded by MAP, and that MAP funding for FY 86 total \$100 million. The proposal was based on both policy and economic considerations, as well as the shift of most of the proposed FMS loan credits to ESF in FY 85.<sup>2</sup>

(S) As justification for the change from FMS to MAP he said that continued reliance on FMS credits was simply not responsive to the economic realities of the Philippines. He also cited a recent, dramatic shift by President Marcos who had publicly admitted the serious threat imposed by the CCP/NPA insurgency. Marcos had said privately that the situation called for an "increase in internal requirements." The Embassy felt that a shift from FMS to MAP would significantly demonstrate U.S. support, as well as to force the AFP to deal via government-to-government LOAs. This would also shortcircuit middlemen and the consequent lucrative commercial contracts which had driven much of the military's past procurement into overly costly and at times poorly chosen contracts. As a result, JUSMAGPHIL would have a much greater role in the AFP procurement planning cycle, and it would permit the United States to concentrate on the total package concept (spares and training) associated with LOAs. Because of Philippine sovereignty sensitivities, however, the shift would have to be presented carefully to President Marcos and other Filipinos as part of an overall performance-based program.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The \$100 million MAP level was based on the \$60 million FMS program and \$25 million MAP already proposed to the Office of Management and Budget, plus an additional \$15 million to be considered as partial recoupment of the \$45 million in proposed FMS credits for FY 85 which had been shifted to ESF. This would also help in building up to the overall levels of military assistance as originally proposed in the FY 85-89 MBA compensation package of \$425 million which included \$125 million MAP and \$300 million FMS. The shift to an all MAP program was proposed on a 1-year basis, with subsequent recommendations to be based on a careful analysis of AFP performance, as well as an analysis of the political and economic situations prevailing at the time.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J475 HistSum Jul 84 (C), USCINCPAC 140407Z Jul 84 (C), SECDEF 272332Z Jul 84 (C), all DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 230159Z Aug 84 (C), DECL 31 Jul 90; CH-JUSMAGPHIL 130554Z Aug 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.
  2. AMEMB Manila 30585/070439Z and 30586/070513Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Manila 31699/161120Z Nov 84 (S)(EX), DECL OADR.
  4. AMEMB Manila 30585/070439Z and 30586/070513Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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(S) Admiral Crowe lauded the Ambassador's excellent analysis of the impact and implications of a \$100 million MAP package for FY 86; especially the use of leverage to exact whatever AFP reforms could be managed. General Vessey incorporated some of Ambassador Bosworth's and Admiral Crowe's 19 August recommendations in a strategy paper to Secretary Weinberger.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 15 December the IMF approved the long-awaited \$605 million (615 million special drawing rights) 18-month standby credit loan to the Philippines. IMF approval would allow Philippine officials to begin final negotiations on other aspects of an \$11 billion recovery program and rescheduling of some \$1.1 billion of the country's record \$25.6 billion foreign debt.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 17 December the AFP indicated they were processing a request to pay the cash arrearages with FMS credits in hopes that sanctions on new commercial sales might be lifted. On 21 December CHJUSMAGPHIL BGEN Teddy Allen advised Acting AFP Chief of Staff LT GEN Fidel V. Ramos (General Ver had stepped down because of charges of involvement in the Aquino murder case) that the use of FMS credits would no longer be endorsed for direct commercial sales. All procurement for goods or services to be financed with FMS credits would have to be through government-to-government channels. This would protect both the United States and the AFP by insuring that the goods and services were of the best available quality and were negotiated at the most favorable cost. BGEN Allen recommended that this policy continue even after resolution of cash arrearages.<sup>3</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC 170507Z Nov 84 (S), DECL 30 Nov 90; USCINCPAC 232211Z Nov 84 (S)(BOM), DECL 19 Nov 92; JCS 162330Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. UPI Wire Note Manila 15 Dec 84 (U).
  3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 170510Z Dec 84 (C), DECL 17 Dec 1986; CHJUSMAGPHIL 210045Z Dec 84 (C), DECL 31 Dec 86.

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SINGAPORE

Aircraft

F-16

(C) In December 1983 Singapore submitted a request for purchase of eight F-16 aircraft equipped with the General Electric J-79 engine. This was closely followed by a further request for Planning and Review (P&R) data on 240 HARPOON missiles and associated support equipment.<sub>1</sub>

(U) On 22 March 1984 the Congress was officially notified of a Letter of Offer/Acceptance (LOA) to the Government of Singapore (GOS) for eight F-16/79 aircraft with government-furnished aeronautical and avionics equipment (for installation during production), aircraft spares, support equipment, and training at an estimated cost of \$280 million. This was the first and only potential sale of an export fighter (FX) since adoption of the concept under the Carter Administration in 1980. In April 1984 the export fighter program was examined by the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee. Testimony by Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs Richard Armitage and Under Secretary of State for Science, Technology, and Security Assistance William Schneider indicated that a reassessment of the policy might be in order. It was possible that the whole program might be cancelled due to lack of interest because Singapore would really prefer the F-16/100 (also called F-16A) if it were approved for export. (Note: As an exception to policy, the F-16A had previously been approved for export to Egypt, Pakistan, and Venezuela.)<sub>2</sub>

(C) Singapore received the comparative fighter briefing on the F-16/79, F-16/100, and F-20 by the USAF-led team on 11 June 1984, and LOAs on the F-16/79 were extended until 31 August. (See also Section I of this chapter.) With approval for Thai acquisition of the F-16A, SECDEF denial of F-16/79 LOA extension beyond 31 December became moot. Singapore dropped plans for the F-16/79 and turned its efforts toward procurement of the F-16A.<sub>3</sub>

F-5E

(C) Toward the end of 1984 U.S. officials learned that the GOS had initiated a contract with Northrop to purchase six F-5E TIGER 2 aircraft as part

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1. J471 HistSum Dec 83 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. J471 HistSum Mar 84 (U); Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 Apr 84, p. 604 (U).
  3. USDAO Singapore 110804Z May 84 (U); CHJUSMAGTHAI 130532Z Jun 84 (C), DECL OADR; SECDEF 010057Z Dec 84 (C), DECL OADR; Interview with CDR G. D. James, USN, J471/J462 (C), 23 Sep 85, DECL OADR.

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# SINGAPORE (U)

(S/NOFORN) MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY (U)



## (S/NOFORN) USPACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY (U)

Recommended Rules:  
 Control of straits (westside).  
 Sea surveillance capability (westside).  
 Provide U.S. access to ports and airfields.

(C) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES (U)

Preserve friendly relationship under which the United States enjoys continued access to Singapore's naval and air facilities.  
 Continue Singapore's support for the freedom of navigation in and overflight of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.  
 Enhance progress towards an enhanced capability of Singapore to maintain its own security.  
 Maintain moderate, noncommunist government not subject to undue Chinese or Soviet influence.  
 Improve Singapore's relations with ASEAN neighbors, thereby contributing to regional theme of cooperation and peace.

### (U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA ..... 618 Sq Km  
 NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS .....  
 ECONOMIC ZONE ..... Agreed Boundaries  
 FISHING ZONE ..... Agreed Boundaries  
 SECURITY ZONE ..... None Claimed  
 TERRITORIAL SEA ..... 3 Nautical Miles  
 POPULATION ..... 2,531,000  
 ANNUAL GROWTH ..... 1.2 Percent  
 LITERACY RATE ..... 84.2 Percent  
 LIFE EXPECTANCY ..... 71 Years  
 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ..... \$ 14.2 Billion  
 PER CAPITA ..... \$ 5,745  
 DEFENSE BUDGET ..... \$ 833.4 Million  
 OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ..... 11.9 Percent  
 TYPE GOVERNMENT ..... Republic within Commonwealth

PRESIDENT ..... C. V. Devan Nair  
 PRIME MINISTER ..... LEE Kuan Yew  
 MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ..... Suptan DRANABALAN  
 MINISTER OF DEFENSE ..... GOH Chok Tong  
 CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF ..... MAJ GEN Winston CHOO Wee Leong  
 COMMANDER, ARMY 3RD DIVISION ..... COL BOEY Tak Hap  
 COMMANDER, SINGAPORE NAVY ..... COL KHOO Eng Ang  
 DEPUTY COMMANDER .....  
 SINGAPORE AIR FORCE ..... COL Michael TEO Eng Ching

### (U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR ..... HON. J. Stapleton ROY  
 JATT ..... CAPT Paul H. BASSIN, USN

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (S/NF), P. 76, DECL OADR.

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of an overall modernization program and for enhancement of training capabilities. The U.S. Embassy considered it unlikely that this procurement action would affect the F-16 program.<sub>1</sub>

E-2C

(C) On 12 July 1982 Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew advised the Embassy of the GOS decision to purchase the Grumman E-2C HAWKEYE prop-jet sea surveillance aircraft. An initial site survey was conducted by the U.S. Navy and Grumman in January 1983. As planning proceeded for 1987 delivery, a question arose concerning inclusion of certain sophisticated command and control capabilities in the aircraft. Admiral Long supported a tactical command-control data link which could provide a potential for interoperability between U.S.-GOS forces, and ultimately with and among other ASEAN forces. He said that if existing data links were deemed inappropriate, then an appropriate system should be developed. JCS Chairman General Vessey agreed and said that the use of the tactical digital information link (TADIL)-A, as well as other options would be explored. In August 1983 an LOA was provided to the GOS for the four E-2Cs without the TADIL-A (LINK 11) installed. Instead, a Link SIGMA, which would be interoperable with U.S. forces, was to be developed. It was hoped that the TADIL-A would be released prior to mid-December in order to preclude the GOS from incurring \$250,000 per quarter in R&D start-up costs for the development of link SIGMA.<sub>2</sub>

(C) With approval of TADIL-A and C in mid-1984, the Chief of Naval Operations recommended that the GOS request Grumman and the Navy to continue to develop the formal functional operational standard (FOS) for Link SIGMA, because when the TADIL A was released, the GOS could request incorporation of the TADIL functions into the tactical tape. This would then allow the GOS to complete development of the formal FOS for Link SIGMA and yet have TADIL functions incorporated into their tactical tape. Both of these actions could be accomplished while remaining within the scope and price of the FMS case.<sub>3</sub>

Missiles

(U) During 1984 Singapore complained of dissatisfaction with reliability of MAVERICK (AGM-65) missiles. In a spate of four firings, failures had occurred twice and remedial action was sought. Dissatisfaction was also expressed with the procurement process of the I-HAWK product improvement program. In this case, it was escalation of costs from \$9 to \$17 million within

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1. SECSTATE 351953/290044Z Nov 84 and AMEMB Singapore 12937/040928Z Dec 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. III, pp. 608-611.
  3. J47(A) HistSum May 84 (C), DECL OADR; J471 Point Paper (S), 1 Aug 84, Subj: Security Assistance desired by Singapore (U), DECL OADR.

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a year's time. The STINGER missile system had also been requested and is discussed in Section I of this chapter.<sup>1</sup>

HARPOON

(C) After having been turned down in 1980, the GOS requested P&R data in late 1983 on 240 HARPOON (RGM-84A) surface-to-surface missiles as armament for six missile boats and a new class of mini-corvettes. By mid-1984 the HARPOON had been approved for release to Singapore in principle. Approval was based on Singapore's signature of a General Security of Military Information Agreement and purchase of the E-2C HAWKEYE for an over-the-horizon targeting capability. One issue clouded and delayed the execution of the LOA. Singapore wanted to perform depot level maintenance in Singapore, and U.S. Navy FMS requirements stipulated units were to be shipped to CONUS for maintenance.<sup>2</sup>

(C) The GOS believed location of depot maintenance was a strategic requirement and was willing to pay a reasonable premium (or forego other desirable advantages) in order to acquire a missile with depot level maintenance capability. With an approaching LOA deadline of 30 November, Singapore's Permanent Secretary of Defense Philip Yeo became anxious when no response to his two letters of inquiry was received from the Navy. (Singapore was also considering candidates from French and Swedish firms.) The Navy response of 20 November referred to agreement between GOS and Navy representatives on 31 October on benefits and rationale for government-to-government procurement using FMS procedures because commercial procurement would not provide for configuration management, product improvement to stay current with threat, and cost savings realized from combined U.S. Navy and foreign procurement. On the issue of depot maintenance capability, once Singapore reached a level of operational capability requiring maintenance, discussions could be held on provisions for an expanded intermediate level repair capability.<sup>3</sup>

(S) As negotiations were concluding, Mr. Yeo had one other reservation: product assurance on the operational performance of the HARPOON. Referring to the unsatisfactory experience with USAF MAVERICK, he proposed an annex whereby the Navy would replace any faulty missiles which precluded achievement of a 95 percent hit probability. The Navy, however, was prohibited by law from incurring costs for defense articles sold to foreign governments. Besides, it

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1. USDAO 11425/220636Z Oct 84 (U); AMEMB Singapore 9036/230642Z Aug 84 (U).
  2. AMEMB Singapore 12844/230558Z Nov 83 (C), DECL OADR, which cited SECSTATE 121013/072335A May 80; J471 Point Paper (S), 19 Oct 84, DECL OADR; CINC-PACFLT 032036Z Jan 84 (C), DECL OADR; CNO 092330Z Mar 84 (C), DECL OADR; USDAO 7022/060157Z Jul 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR; AMEMB Singapore 10834/050837Z Oct 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. USDAO Singapore 12665/260327Z Nov 84 (C), DECL OADR; CNO 201235Z Nov 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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could not detect human error in firing which would directly affect hit probability. A more comprehensive U.S. Navy warranty would be provided in the next six months and would include provisions against performance, workmanship, and material defects.<sup>1</sup>

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1. ~~USDAO~~ Singapore 13359/130237Z Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR; CNO 142130Z Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR; DIA 180320Z Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.

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# SOLOMON ISLANDS

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY



**BASIC INFORMATION**

LAND AREA ..... 28,785 Sq Km  
 NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS ..... None Claimed  
 ECONOMIC ZONE ..... 200 Nautical Miles  
 FISHING ZONE ..... None Claimed  
 SECURITY ZONE ..... 3 Nautical Miles  
 TERRITORIAL SEA ..... 263,000  
 POPULATION ..... 3.7 Percent  
 ANNUAL GROWTH ..... 90 Percent  
 LITERACY RATE ..... 57 Years  
 LIFE EXPECTANCY ..... \$ 110 Million  
 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ..... \$ 480  
 PER CAPITA ..... Independent Parliamentary State  
 TYPE GOVERNMENT ..... within the Commonwealth

GOVERNOR GENERAL ..... Sir Baddeley DEVESI  
 PRIME MINISTER ..... Sir Peter KENILOREA  
 FOREIGN MINISTER ..... Paul TOWUA

The United States has not recognized Solomon Islands' claims to archipelagic status. The Solomon Islands has established two archipelagic baseline systems around the outer groups of islands. The maritime claims of the Solomon Islands are measured from geographic coordinates.

**U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL**

AMBASSADOR ..... HON. Paul F. GARDNER  
 DCM ..... MR. Morton R. DWORREN, Jr.  
 Resides in Papea Near Gunies. DCM manages security assistance.

**U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES**

Create skills necessary for effective control and maintenance of security.  
 Improve the management of the Solomon Island security force and capability for maritime surveillance.  
 Strengthen military-to-military relations and create a better understanding of the United States, its institutions, and values.

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (SYNF), P. 77, DECL OADR.

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SOLOMON ISLANDS

(U) In 1983 the State Department had approved establishment of a small IMET program for the Solomon Islands and allocated \$30,000 in FY 84 funding. A CONUS orientation training tour of Army, Navy, and Coast Guard bases was conducted in April 1984 and provided two high-ranking Solomon Island officials with an appreciation for U.S. military training programs. Similar programs were proposed for FY 85 and FY 86.<sup>1</sup>

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1. J464 Point Paper (C), 22 Aug 84, Subj: Solomon Islands Security Assistance Summary (U), DECL OADR; J463 HistSum Feb 84 (U).

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# THAILAND (U)

(S/NOFORN) MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY (U)



(S/NOFORN) USPACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY (U)

Recommendations:  
Defend against Vietnam.  
ASEAN from the south.  
U.S. use of Thai facilities.  
Current operational use.  
Emergency access.

### (C) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES (U)

Provide support for the development of Thai military capabilities to defend against limited external military threats and protect maritime lines of communication.  
Assist the Royal Thai Government to develop the capability to suppress insurgency and to maintain internal security.  
Enhance defense material compatibility.  
Provide support for cost effective programs that develop Thai military self-sufficiency.  
Maintain U.S. influence in Thailand providing potential access to Thai facilities in support of U.S. objectives.

### (U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA ..... 514,820 Sq Km  
 NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS ..... 200 Nautical Miles  
 ECONOMIC ZONE ..... 200 Nautical Miles  
 FISHING ZONE ..... None Claimed  
 SECURITY ZONE ..... 12 Nautical Miles  
 TERRITORIAL SEA ..... 12 Nautical Miles  
 POPULATION ..... 51,724,000  
 ANNUAL GROWTH ..... 1.9 Percent  
 LITERACY RATE ..... 84 Percent  
 LIFE EXPECTANCY ..... 61 Years  
 GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ..... \$ 39.3 Billion  
 PER CAPITA ..... \$ 784  
 DEFENSE BUDGET ..... \$ 1.6 Billion  
 OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ..... 19.8 Percent  
 TYPE GOVERNMENT ..... Constitutional Monarchy  
 KING ..... PHUMIPHON Adunyadet  
 PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE ..... PREM Tinsulatanon  
 MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ..... ACM (Ret) SITTHI Sawatside  
 SUPREME COMMANDER .....  
 ARMED FORCES ..... GEN ARTHIT Kumbang-ak  
 CINC ARMY ..... GEN ARTHIT Kumbang-ak  
 CINC NAVY ..... ADM PRAPPAK Chantaveeral  
 CINC AIR FORCE ..... ACM PRAPPAK Dhupatananya

### (U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR ..... HON. John Gunther DEAN  
 CHIEF JUSMAGTHAI ..... COL John D. BLAIR, IV, USA  
 JAT ..... COL Charles R. PRESTON, USMC

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (S/NF), P. 80, DECL OADR.

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THAILAND

(U) Visits to the United States by Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon and Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces General Arthit Kamlang-ek, selection of an advanced fighter, and acquisition of additional M48A5 tanks were the highlights of the U.S.-Thai security assistance relationship during 1984 as the Thai continued their struggle against Vietnamese incursions into Southeast Thailand.

(U) Prime Minister Prem, accompanied by Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila, spent four days (12-16 April) in Washington, D.C., where he visited President Reagan, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, JCS Chairman General John Vessey, and other officials. One of the highlights of the visit was the signing of a science and technology cooperation agreement, and the central issue of discussions was sale of an advanced fighter.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Reports to USCINCPAC on Prem's "successful" visit outlined discussions with Secretary Weinberger and General Vessey on subjects of concern to the Thai. The Prime Minister was told that the Administration would support the decision to seek extended FMS repayment terms (10 years grace/20 years repayment) for Thailand from the Congress for FY 86. The Secretary asked Prem to receive the comparative fighter aircraft briefing and then to decide which fighter to request (see also Section I of this Chapter). The Defense Department had identified 40 M48A5 tanks which could be made available to Thailand in the coming months (see below). Thailand's request for 24 Improved TOW anti-armor weapons would be supported. Every effort would be made to insure that FMS material ordered by Thailand was delivered expeditiously.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Regarding Thai attendance at U.S. Service academies and Senior Service schools, Thailand would receive a high priority for academy positions. The U.S. would continue to assist with the Thai Joint Service Logistics Planning Project (TJSLPP) (see the Logistics Chapter for details), but it was emphasized that the purpose of the project was to improve the Thai joint logistics system. General Vessey asked that the Thai insure continual U.S. access to Indochinese refugees in Thailand in order to acquire information on U.S. POW/MIA cases. The Prime Minister expressed his deep appreciation and gratitude for U.S. efforts.<sup>3</sup>

(C) Following the meeting, Foreign Minister Siddhi left a memorandum for the Secretary which listed specific Thai requests for military equipment and

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1. Washington Times, 13 Apr 84, p. 5 (U).
  2. J473 HistSum Apr 84 (U); OSD (ISA/EAPR 67/84) 140052Z Apr 84 (S)(BOM); SECDEF 200030Z Apr 84 (S); JCS 171700Z Apr 84 (S), all DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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other assistance. Among them were an increase in FMS credit (up to \$200 million annually) with the longer 10/20 years terms and a three percent interest rate. In the way of equipment the Thai asked for 155mm COPPERHEAD artillery shells and STINGER missiles (see Section I of this Chapter), plus certain other items and high-level training for improving Thai intelligence capabilities.<sup>1</sup>

(C) General Arthit spent two days (24-26 October) in Hawaii en route to CONUS. Discussions with Admiral Crowe covered Exercise COBRA GOLD, TJSLPP, the Vietnamese and resistance situation in Cambodia, Arthit's invitation to visit Moscow, and M48A5 tanks. Admiral Crowe reported "the strong message that General Arthit seemed to be conveying throughout their conversations was that the U.S. must be upfront and concrete in its commitment to allies. Arthit was relentless in his pursuit of this theme."<sup>2</sup>

Weapons Requests

M48A5 Tanks

(C) In August 1979 Thailand had requested a Letter of Offer/Acceptance (LOA) for 50 M48A5 tanks, and that September the State Department indicated an intent to supply a total of 150 M-48 tanks over the next few years as a means of bolstering Thailand's armor capability. Despite a short supply in Army stocks, 50 M48A5s were delivered by September 1980. On 21 January 1981 the U.S. Embassy forwarded and USCINCPAC supported, a Thai Army Price and Availability (P&A) request for 50 additional M48A5s. The March response from the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) advised that Army shortages precluded further supplies through FMS until 1984 and the price would probably be \$541,800 each.<sup>3</sup>

(C) In November 1981 the Embassy reopened the issue by requesting Planning and Review (P&R) on 50 tanks forecast for availability in 1984. Following discussions that same month with Prime Minister Prem and RTARF Supreme Commander General Saiyud, Admiral Long asked that five M48A5s be provided by 5 May 1982. The Embassy concurred and the DSAA approved the cash sale at a cost of \$625,000 each, noting that additional M48A5s probably would not be available until 1985. The tanks were delivered on 23 May.<sup>4</sup>

(C) In October 1983 the Royal Thai Army (RTA) asked about the possibility of receiving additional tanks before 1985. USCINCPAC recommended that a second increment of five (out of a total request for 50) M48A5s be delivered to Thailand during the April-May 1984 timeframe, but the DSAA replied in November

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1. SECDEF 200030Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. J473 HistSum Oct 84 (U); USCINCPAC 272110Z Oct 84 (C), REVW 25 Oct 1990.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1982 (TS/FRD), Vol. III, pp. 537-538.
  4. Ibid.

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that the tanks would not be available before 1985 or 1986. In February 1984 the Chief JUSMAG Thailand asked if between 50-100 M48A5s which were being turned in by the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea could be made available to the Thai. On 5 March U.S. Embassy Bangkok forwarded a request for 40 M48A5s and on 17 March the DSAA advised that the U.S. Army did not have excess M48s and all those not purchased by the Republic of Korea would be retrograded to CONUS. In a 28 March message to Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs Armitage, JCS Chairman General Vessey, and Army Chief of Staff General Wickham, Admiral Crowe urged filling the Thai request with those not needed by the ROK because of the long-standing U.S. commitment. Prime Minister Prem's visit would be an opportune time for such a positive gesture of U.S. credibility in recognizing the importance of Thailand as a front-line state. On 13 April President Reagan offered the tanks to Thailand.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Because RTA inquiries concerning the availability of M48A5 tanks during the previous two years had been fruitless, the RTA did not really expect to be offered all of the requested tanks and they had only budgeted for 10. As a result, when the LOA was issued with an expiration date of 31 August, the Thai encountered difficulties in financing all 40 at a total case value of \$32 million. Through the combined efforts of JUSMAG, RTARF, Embassy, and Washington agencies, the deadline for LOA signature was extended to 31 October and sufficient funds were located from various sources to make an adjusted down payment. The crisis was averted and the LOA was signed on 30 October. The RTA requested that 35 of the tanks be delivered within two months after case implementation and the remaining five in the May-June 1985 timeframe.<sup>2</sup>

Advanced Fighter Aircraft (F-16A)

(S) A major priority of the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) had been the acquisition of a credible attack aircraft. As early as March 1978 the RTAF expressed a desire to obtain data on F-16/100 (also known as the F-16A) aircraft. In June of that year Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak strongly supported the purchase of a small number of F-16s by the RTAF. The U.S. Government let this request die without providing the RTAF the required information. In December 1981 USCINCPAC proposed establishment of a policy in principle to respond positively to ASEAN countries' requests for F-16A and F-X (F-16/79 and

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. III, p. 625; J473 HistSum Mar 84 (U); J4/Memo/S395 (S), 23 Mar 84, Subj: M48A5 tanks for Thailand, etc. (U), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 280225Z Mar 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR; Baltimore Sun, 19 Apr 84, p. 2 (U).
  2. J473 HistSum May 84 (U); CHJUSMAGTHAI 191143Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR; SECDEF 062056Z Jun 84 (U); J473 HistSum Jul 84 (C), AMEMB Bangkok 37252/251209Z Jul and 41091/151158Z Aug 84 (S), SECDEF 172322Z Aug 84 (C) DA 251446Z Sep 84 (C), all DECL OADR; J473 HistSum Nov 84 (U); J4/SSS/S1284 (U), 20 Sep 85, Subj: Review of Draft Command History for 1984.

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F-5G (later F-20)) aircraft. In April 1982 the JCS stated that, because the majority of the ASEAN members had a questionable ability to operate, maintain, or afford advanced technology aircraft, approval of the F-16A or comparable advanced fighter aircraft should be discouraged.<sup>1</sup>

(S) After an exhaustive evaluation of all available U.S. follow-on fighters (A-4, F-5, A-7, A-10, F-16/79 and 100, F-10), on 4 January 1984 the U.S. Embassy advised of the RTAF formal request for an LOA. The request was for 16 aircraft (12 F-16A and 4 F-16B) with options to purchase up to four additional aircraft. Desired delivery was to begin 24 months after LOA signature at the rate of two per month. The RTAF budgeted \$506 million over a period of seven years. That sum would be supplemented by anticipated FMS credits over the same period. In view of the strong Thai Government commitment to procure the F-16A, USCINCPAC expressed reluctance to oppose its sale to Thailand and continued to favor an evenhanded release policy toward ASEAN member nations. (For details on U.S. release policy, see Section I.) On 26 January the State Department reported that the Thai request was under interagency consideration, but because the issues were complex, a final decision was not expected soon.<sup>2</sup>

(U) As reported by the Embassy in January, the Bangkok press "kept the pot boiling over Thailand's proposed purchase of the F-16A," and this held true for the remainder of the year.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 13 June the comparative fighter briefing was presented by a USAF team led by Air Force Vice Chief of Staff LT GEN Larry D. Welch to approximately 120-140 RTAF, Supreme Command, Ministry of Defense, and U.S. Country Team officials including RTAF CINC Air Chief Marshal Prapan Dhupatemiya, Deputy Supreme Commander General Bulrit Dardarananda, Deputy Defense Minister ACM Phaniang Kantarat, Ambassador Dean, the Air Attache, and members of JUSMAGTHAI. Prime Minister Prem was given a synopsis of the information during a meeting with LT GEN Welch. A week later the Embassy advised that the RTAF was delaying its decision on the purchase and had told the local press there was "no point in a hasty decision and the purchase was still under study."<sup>4</sup>

(U) During a 5 July press conference Deputy Defense Minister Phaniang announced that the RTAF had confirmed its decision to buy a squadron of the F-16As, but the matter would likely be considered again and that the Prime

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1. J473 HistSum Jan 84 (U); J473 Point Paper (S), 1 Feb 84, Subj: F-16/100 sale to Thailand (U), DECL OADR. See also CINCPAC Command History 1981 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 387-388, 1983, Vol. III, pp. 625-627, 1978, Vol. II, pp. 457-479.
  2. Ibid.; USCINCPAC 250452Z Jan 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR; SECSTATE 23936/260557Z Jan 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Bangkok 3714/231300Z Jan 84 (C), DECL OADR; FBIS 051408Z Jul 84 (U).
  4. COS Bangkok 4/141121Z Jun 84 (C)(BOM), DECL OADR; AMEMB Bangkok 30424/141143Z and 31232/201143Z Jun 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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Minister would have the final say. JUSMAGTHAI received a letter on 10 July from ACM Prapan stating the RTAF conviction that the F-16A was the most suitable aircraft, and asked that this reaffirmation of the original request be conveyed to the USAF; efforts to process and deliver the aircraft expeditiously would be appreciated. Following a 24 July meeting with Prime Minister Prem, Ambassador Dean reported the impression that, from the Thai point of view, there was no great rush to take action before the U.S. November Presidential elections. What mattered to the Thai was for the Congress to ultimately give approval. Further, Prem was not enthusiastic about the purchase of any advanced fighter aircraft at that time because of the considerable expense, but Prem felt in no position to oppose the Thai military on the issue. The Ambassador also noted the considerable opposition within Thai civilian circles on the grounds that the money should be spent on higher priorities. Nevertheless, in a 9 August letter to President Reagan, Prem confirmed the F-16A choice while at the same time acknowledging it might "take some time to complete the requisite governmental procedures."<sup>1</sup>

(C) Financing of the purchase, according to a conversation between the Ambassador and ACM Prapan, was based on Thai budget appropriations, by fiscal year, as follows: 1984-\$43 million; 1985-\$70 million; 1986-\$80 million; 1987-\$133 million; and 1988-\$135 million. This was under the premise that one-fourth of the FMS credit made available to Thailand would be devoted to the aircraft purchase and that FMS credits would increase over the next few years by about 10 percent each year. Another source would be unused FMS funds from FY 82 and 83 of approximately \$19 million.<sup>2</sup>

(C/NOFORN) On 5 November the Baht was devalued from 23 to 27 Baht to the American dollar, which in effect would increase costs of the F-16A by 17 percent. Although RTAF officials reaffirmed their decision to purchase the F-16A, the State Department was asked to hold the LOA request in abeyance until further notice.<sup>3</sup>

Combat-Heavy Equipment Transporters

(U) Twelve combat-heavy equipment transporters (C-HET) had arrived in Thailand completely incapable of performing the tasks for which they were designed and purchased. The RTA designed an acceptable modification and a report of discrepancy was approved for \$244,200. Because the RTA did not budget money for the modification, in December 1985 the U.S. Army Security

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 33926/061239Z and 34554/110828Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR; UPI Wire Note Bangkok 5 Jul 84 (U); AMEMB Bangkok 40333/131050Z Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. AMEMB Bangkok 2202/011003Z Mar 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. FBIS Bangkok 060155Z Nov 84 (U); USDAO 050821Z Nov 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR; SECSTATE 362112/081205Z Dec 84 (C)(EX), DECL OADR; FBIS Bangkok 171039Z Dec 84 (U).

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Assistance Center was asked to provide funding so that the modifications could proceed. Funds were not released until 29 January 1985.<sup>1</sup>

### Accelerated Deliveries

(S) In November 1984 JUSMAGTHAI reviewed all requests for equipment, weapons, and ammunition on order under the FMS system in order to identify those which the RTARF might request for accelerated delivery. Planning was then initiated for the reasonable acceleration of FMS deliveries for the 1984-85 dry season contingency. At the end of the year the Department of the Army was coordinating routine and accelerated shipments to the freight forwarder for January 1985.<sup>2</sup>

### JUSMAG Thailand

(U) Effective 1 October 1984 the Joint Plans/Programs Division of JUSMAG Thailand was formed. During the course of this reorganization, two subordinate branches were also formed: the Joint Training Branch (previously the independent Training and Programs Branch) and the Joint Plans/Programs Branch (previously a task force operation built around the Supreme Command Liaison Officer's position as part of the Thai Joint Service Logistics Planning Project). The chief reason for the reorganization was to develop an entity in JUSMAGTHAI to deal with the Supreme Command and RTARF on issues involving joint Thai or combined U.S.-Thai initiatives. The reorganization was also intended to institutionalize, within the formal JUSMAGTHAI structure, an activity which for the three years previous ~~and~~ been conducted on an ad hoc basis. By formally establishing an organization designed to work with the RTARF on logistics planning within the guidelines established by USCINCPAC and approved by the DSAA, JUSMAGTHAI would be able to make significant contributions to improving the combat readiness of the RTARF.<sup>3</sup>

(U) In his end of tour report as CHJUSMAGTHAI, COL William P. Holmes, III, USA, noted that the steady increase of FMS credits and IMET funds since 1980 showed a determined resolve on the part of the United States to support its friends. Recommendations included assignment of a U.S. comptroller to JUSMAGTHAI to manage the increasing workload caused by JUSMAG's entrance into the Embassy leased housing pool and assistance-in-kind funding. The tour length for accompanied JUSMAG personnel should be three years instead of two, and a firm policy on extensions should be established.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J473 HistSum Dec 84 (U); USCINCPAC PEG Report on Thailand FY 85 (FOUO), p. 10.
  2. J473 HistSum Dec 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC PEG Report on Thailand FY 85 (FOUO), p. 3.
  4. J4/Memo/S993 (S), 27 Aug 84, Subj: CHJUSMAGTHAI End of Tour Report (U), J473 HistSum Aug 84 (U); (S/NF), DECL OADR; JUSMAGTHAI Ltr MAGTC (S), 28 Aug 84, Subj: End of tour report (U), DECL OADR.

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(S) In the areas of operations, training, and planning, the support of exercises could not be divorced from security assistance. The pursuit of interoperability and commonality and the wealth of rapport gained from continued exercise support far outweighed costs. Also, JUSMAG had a pressing need for a liaison officer from PACFLT to assist in the coordination and direction of the rapidly expanding exercise program.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Ibid.

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CHAPTER VII

COMMAND AND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS


SECTION I--COMMAND AND CONTROL

The USPACOM Command and Control System

Command Facilities

(U) USCINCPAC command facilities supported the National Command Authority/Joint Chiefs of Staff (NCA/JCS) and appropriate commanders in accomplishing command and control functional tasks. The facilities might be used to manage situations ranging from regional crises to general war and were designed to operate on a 24-hour/day basis. They were the centers in which the political-military situation was reviewed, higher authority was consulted, decisions were made, orders were issued or relayed, and at which intelligence and operations reports were received, acted upon, and forwarded. USCINCPAC command facilities effected the command and control of forces both directly and through the command centers of USPACOM Service components and subordinate unified commands. Therefore, these other command centers were required to be interoperable with the USCINCPAC command centers.<sup>1</sup>

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


1. USCINCPAC Ltr (U), C3SPP Ser S221, 14 Mar 85, Subj: USPACOM Command and Control System Master Plan (C2SMP), with Encl (1) (S/NF) USPACOM Command and Control System Master Plan (U), Mar 85, DECL OADR.

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
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1. Ibid.

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1. Ibid.

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Interoperability

(U) Improving interoperability between the U.S. Services and between U.S. forces and allies had been a major goal in the USPACOM for some time, and was a key ingredient in coalition warfare strategy. Several separate actions were being addressed to improve interoperability. Most interoperability problems seemed to stem from the lack of a stated requirement and the fact that no single organization or agency had the primary responsibility to set or enforce standards. The USPACOM's greatest leverage on interoperability problems might thus be through the identification and statement of requirements.<sup>1</sup>

(U) USCINCPAC influence over research and development, acquisition, and procurement processes had traditionally been left as Service prerogatives. In addition, each of the Service commands had its own unique interoperability requirements since respective operational environments differed. However, USCINCPAC had to review interoperability from a total USPACOM command and

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1. Ibid.

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control system approach. It was therefore essential that USCINCPAC review all C2 requirements submitted by components to their respective parent Services in order to recognize, identify, and propose solutions to potential USPACOM interoperability issues before they became major problems or adversely affected mission execution.<sup>1</sup>

### Worldwide Military Command and Control System

#### WWMCCS ADP Support in the USPACOM

(U) WWMCCS ADP support was provided by three host computer sites in the USPACOM: the Pacific WWMCCS Regional ADP Center (PACWRAC), operated by the 1. Data Processing Service Center Pacific, Pearl Harbor (DPSCPACPH), provided support to Headquarters USCINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CDRWESTCOM, CGFMFPAC, and COMUSJAPAN. The PACAF facility at Hickam AFB supported CINCPACAF and the 2. 3d Tactical Fighter Wing at Clark AB, Philippines. The USFK facility at Camp Walker, Taegu, supported COMUSKOREA. Nuclear Planning and Execution moni- 3. toring was provided by the SIOP computer located at Headquarters USCINCPAC. 4. USPACOM commands were connected to the CONUS by the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network through Interface Message Processors (IMPs) located at CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and COMUSKOREA.<sup>2</sup> ✓

(U) Critical WWMCCS standard systems supported in the USPACOM included Unit Reporting (UNITREP), Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS), and the Joint Deployment System (JDS). The existing WWMCCS ADP would be augmented or replaced under the WWMCCS Information System program. WIS would replace obsolete equipment and enhance command and control capabilities with additional tools such as the Automated Message Handling System (AMHS). The Defense Data Network would incorporate WIN in FY 86. The Defense Communications Agency completed initial DDN site surveys in Korea and on Oahu in April 1983. The DCA activated a new DDN site at the Taegu Automatic Switching Center (ASC) and upgraded the existing DDN site at the USCINCPAC Technical Control Facility in August 1983.

(U) The connection from Korea to the CONUS was dependent on the survivability of Oahu because connection from WESTPAC to the CONUS was single-threaded over the one WESTPAC DSCS satellite. Key user concerns in the USPACOM fell into three general areas: hardware/software reliability, system responsiveness, and quick response to user needs. The WIS and DDN were expected to enhance user support in all three areas.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Ibid.
  2. C3SAS114 Point Paper (U), 10 Jan 84, Subj: Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Automatic Data Processing Support in the USPACOM. *00-0814*
  3. Ibid.

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### WIS Status

(U) In June 1984 the USCINCPAC Director for Command and Control and Communications Systems apprised the USCINCPAC staff of the latest status of the WWMCCS Information System program. This much-needed modernization was projected to cost in excess of \$4 billion and would be implemented worldwide from FY 86 through FY 91. The WIS program was managed by a Joint Program Management Office (JPMO) headquartered in McLean, VA. To insure the program met the operational needs of the various commands, user involvement in documenting requirements had been extensive. Prior to being fielded, the hardware and software would undergo extensive testing at two facilities: the Development and Evaluation Facility at Hanscom AFB, MA; and the Operational Support Facility at Reston, VA. Upon completion of testing, the system would be installed at four Service "lead sites." These sites were Headquarters U.S. Army Forces Command and Headquarters U.S. European Command for the Army, Headquarters USCINCPAC for the Navy, and a site yet to be determined for the Air Force.<sup>1</sup>

(U) As the Navy lead site, USCINCPAC would be using the WIS to prove its operational utility in the USPACOM environment. This would require the participation of all staff elements to insure proper feedback to the WIS JPMO on performance of the system in the real world. More importantly, clear statements of the staff's evolving requirements and their satisfaction with the delivered system could be made to the OJCS based on actual use of, and experience with, the system.

(U) The first part of WIS to be fielded at USCINCPAC would be the Common User Subsystem (CUS). It would provide a "user-friendly" microprocessor-based workstation, an automated message handling capability, several small computers, and a Local Area Network (LAN). The CUS Request for Proposal was released to industry for bid on 17 February 1984. Contract award was planned for about September. The CUS system should be fully installed at Headquarters USCINCPAC during FY 86-87. Following the CUS contract award, other contracts would be initiated to replace the existing Honeywell WWMCCS processors during FY 87-88.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In July, however, the Director for C3S reported that the Chief of Naval Operations had eliminated WIS funding in the FY 86 POM for all Navy-supported CINCs. The deletion of funds would indefinitely suspend software contracts for the Automated Message Handling System, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), and software conversion of command-unique C2 software. It would also suspend procurement of the AMHS and follow-on hardware which would be required to support the JOPES. The deletion


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1. C3SAS112/Memo/694 (U), 15 Jun 84, Subj: WWMCCS Information System (WIS) Program.
  2. Ibid.

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of funds would force the USPACOM to rely on the existing WWMCCS ADP into the 1990s. The WWMCCS ADP lacked growth potential, had increasingly excessive maintenance costs, and would not be supported by the vendor after 1991. Replacement equipment was already difficult to obtain. Further, WWMCCS ADP did not support the JOPEX requirement for transportability.<sup>1</sup>




1. C3SAS121 Point Paper (U), 11 Jul 84, Subj: Impact of Deletion of WWMCCS Information System (WIS) Funds in the CNO FY. 86-90 Program Objective Memorandum.
2. 0882 Point Paper (S), 22 Oct 84, Subj: Strategic Connectivity in the Pacific (U), DECL OADR.
3. Ibid.

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


1. CINCPACFLT 040215Z Aug 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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
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
1. Ibid.
2. USCINCPAC 192034Z Aug 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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1. Ibid.
2. JCS 22225Z Aug 84 (S), DECL OADR.
3. USCINCPAC 122249Z Sep 84 (C), DECL OADR.
4. USCINCPAC 212301Z Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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Modifications to USCINCPAC Command Support Aircraft


(U) As the result of a meeting in November 1983 of USCINCPAC, PACAF, and 89th Military Airlift Wing representatives, the following communications modifications to the two C-135 USCINCPAC command support aircraft were agreed upon: new HF communications systems to provide secure voice and teletype; new UHF satellite communications systems for secure voice and facsimile; installation of reproduction equipment; a switching capability to select high or low look-angle input port to the UHF satellite antenna, with control provided to the radio operator's console; and upgrade of the existing radio operator's console and equipment racks to accommodate communication modifications.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The purpose of the modification proposal was to upgrade and enhance the communications capabilities of the CINC's support aircraft. It also better utilized space at the radio operator's console and new equipment rack, leaving space for future growth. On completion of these modifications to the two assigned C-135 aircraft, configuration commonality would be obtained for both operator and VIP personnel. As discussed at the meeting, the new communications equipment to be installed aboard both aircraft should be maintained by the Air Force. Navy communications equipment should be removed and turned in. USCINCPAC was procuring a set of the following equipment to satisfy one of the requirements: URC-112 UHF satellite terminal, AM-7175/URC power amplifier, and AN/GXC-7B facsimile device. A second set of equipment should be programmed by the 89th MAW for the second aircraft. Also, the Dorne Margolin UHF satellite antenna needed to be installed aboard aircraft #2671 before aircraft #2668 went in for depot maintenance. This was accomplished in January 1984, allowing a UHF satellite communications capability for both command support aircraft.<sup>3</sup>


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Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment

1. Ibid.
2. C3SCS14 HistSum Jan 84 (U); C3SCS14 Ltr Ser 3108 (U), 29 Nov 83, Subj: Communications Modifications to Command Aircraft (C-135 2668 and 2671).
3. Ibid.



1. J332 Point Paper (~~S~~), 21 Nov 84, Subj: Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (TW/AA) System (U), DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. J3322 Point Paper (~~S~~), 16 Apr 84, Subj: COBRA DANE-AN/FPS-108 Radar (U), DECL OADR.



(U) Because a number of major commands had submitted statements of requirements for TW/AA, the JCS called a meeting of interested parties in May 1984. As a result of this, several commands jointly drafted Multi-Command ROCs (MROCs) for TW/AA and for the NDS, as the two programs overlapped. Both were in near final form at the end of the year. Further work on the TW/AA draft MROC was awaiting formal approval of the revised TW/AA architecture. The draft NDS MROC was expected to be circulated by the JCS/C3S for final approval about 1 December 1984. These two MROCs would encompass the USCINCPAC requirements previously stated in USCINCPAC ROCs 35-84 and 36-84 for the NDS and TW, respectively. 3

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
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1. Ibid.
2. C3SCS24 Point Paper (S), 16 Nov 84, Subj: Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (TW/AA) (U), DECL OADR.
3. Ibid.; C3SCS24 HistSum Dec 84 (U).

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1. C3SCS21 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
2. Ibid.
3. C3SCS23 HistSum Apr 84 (S/FRD); JCS 021307Z Apr 84 (S/FRD).

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
1. Ibid.
2. C3SCS11 HistSums Jan-Mar 84 (U); C3STM17 HistSum Feb 84 (U).

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
FLAMING ARROW NET  
(p. 907)



1. C3STM17 HistSum Oct 84 (S) and J33 HistSum Sep 84 (S), both DECL OADR.
2. J33 HistSum Oct 84 (U); J332 Point Paper (U), 29 Oct 84, Subj: Preliminary Results of the Follow-on Evaluation (FOE) of the Special Communications System (SCS).
3. C3SCS14 Point Paper (C), 11 Jul 84, Subj: Defense Satellite Communications Systems (DSCS) in USPACOM (U), DECL OADR.

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
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1. Ibid.
2. C3SCS14 HistSum Apr 84 (U); USCINCPAC 271853Z Apr 84 (U).
3. Ibid.

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1. C3SCS14 HistSum Dec 84 (U)
  2. C3SCS14 HistSum May 84 (S); C3SCS14 Ltr Ser S267 (S), 3 Apr 84, Subj: MILSTAR Communications Control and Operations Concept (U), both DECL OADR.

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JCMC 1

(U) A crisis situation could develop requiring communications connectivity that could not be provided by the DCS. This situation would make it necessary to rapidly deploy a minimum essential communications capability. The Joint Crisis Management Capability Level 1 (JCMC 1) program provided a deployable secure voice capability using the URC-101 radio and the VINSON Communications Security (COMSEC) device (KY-57/98). JCMC 1 assets were controlled by Headquarters USCINCPAC (C3S) and were available to support USCINCPAC staff agencies and USPACOM subordinate unified and component commands, with the following deployment priorities: crisis or contingency military operations, disaster relief, VIP support where local support was insufficient, and other uses.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The JCMC 1 consisted of two elements: fixed stations and deployable terminals. The fixed stations were located at Headquarters USCINCPAC and NAVCAMSWESTPAC (Guam). The latter provided communications connectivity to USCINCPAC for elements conducting operations in the Southwest Asia-Indian Ocean area. There were eight JCMC 1 deployable terminals prepositioned throughout the USPACOM: four in Hawaii, two in the Philippines, and two in Korea. Each deployable terminal consisted of three suitcases containing two URC-101 radios, one VINSON COMSEC device, and batteries. A fourth suitcase was available for extended logistic support. The URC-101 could provide UHF satellite and UHF/VHF line-of-sight communications and was configured to operate for extended periods on batteries.

(U) A 6-hour response time to meet contingency situations was required. The equipment would be operationally tested, if satellite access could be made available, by scheduled communications checks and after periods of maintenance. The JCMC 1 system was capable of handling Top Secret information using the VINSON COMSEC device. The system required a minimum amount of training to

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1. Ibid.
  2. USCINCPAC Instruction 2011.1B (U), 23 Apr 84, Subj: Joint Crisis Management Capability Level 1 (JCMC 1).

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operate and maintain. Assembly, antenna pointing, and other operations would require trained operators with practical experience.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 28 September 1984, Det 3, 4th Communications and Instrumentation Support Squadron, Clark AB, reported one URC-101 tactical satellite transceiver, antenna, and two AC/DC power supplies stolen. This was part of the JCMC 1 located in the Philippines. Several other items of equipment were also stolen along with the JCMC 1 assets from the satellite communications work center. All equipment, however, with the exception of the satellite antenna, was recovered a week later. The JCMC 1 was since restored to operation and the antenna was replaced with a spare.<sup>2</sup>

### C3 Improvements

~~(S)~~ In December 1983 USCINCPAC had documented a requirement for an improved communications capability to support Unconventional Warfare/Special Operations Forces. Existing communications for UW/SOF relied primarily on common-user elements of the DCS; i.e., AUTODIN, AUTOVON, and AUTOSEVOCOM. System interconnects for the most part were dependent upon either satellite or cable media to furnish long-haul trunking capacity between fixed nodes which were often separated by broad ocean expanses of 3,000 miles or more. While such an architecture was satisfactory during peacetime, the survival of the DCS during wartime would be problematical. The USPACOM DCS was essentially a limited grid network with critical chokepoints. Generally, out-of-country DCS connectivity in the USPACOM was limited to commercial and military satellites and commercial submarine cables, while in-country DCS connectivity lacked interconnects with foreign commercial and military systems. There was no reconstitution capability for most of the critical systems. Implementation of this required operational capability would assure a satisfactory means for command and control of special operations.<sup>3</sup>

(U) In May 1982 the NSA had approved the Motorola Radio Corporation-designed Data Encryption Standard (DES) as a privacy feature on the Model 300 hand-held radio. In April 1983 Motorola was issued a purchase order of \$175,000 to design and install a DES system for the leeward side of the island of Oahu. The system was to use three radio repeaters, located atop Mt Kaala, Camp Smith, and Diamond Head, to be installed and maintained by Motorola. The mobile and hand-held radios were to be designed so that they could also be used on the old USCINCPAC Mobile Radio Alert Net system as a back-up and/or for the windward side, which the DES system did not cover. The purchase order called for the delivery of five mobile radios (for USCINCPAC, Deputy USCINCPAC/Chief of Staff, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and one for future assignment) and 15 hand-held radios for use by USCINCPAC, his key staff personnel (J001, J01,

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1. Ibid.
  2. C3STM13 HistSum Oct 84 (U)
  3. C3SCS14 HistSum Jan 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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J011, J2, J3), his component commanders, and visiting dignitaries. The entire project was funded via FY 83 CINC Initiative Funds. On 2 April 1984 the system was made operational, with a good-to-excellent signal from Turtle Bay, around the North Shore, to Hawaii Kai, with the system terminal location on the USCINCPAC Emergency Action Officer's console.<sup>1</sup>

(U) USCINCPAC ROC 42-84 was submitted to the JCS for review and validation in June 1984. The ROC stated requirements for a centralized Emergency Action Message handling system in the Headquarters USCINCPAC Command Center to eliminate multiple processing over separate telecommunications systems.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The Fourth Annual JCS/C3S Conference, held 26-27 June, was attended by the USCINCPAC Director for C3S and two members of his staff. The focus of the conference was the C3 requirements process and how to improve it. USCINCPAC was the only CINC to present an end-to-end proposal for improving the ROC system. While there was verbal agreement from the Service representatives on the new proposal, several members of the OJCS seemed to think the Services would not support it.<sup>3</sup>

✓ (S) USCINCPAC ROC 43-84, WWMCCS Airborne Resources Manpack UHF Satellite Communications Terminal, was forwarded to the JCS on 19 October 1984. This terminal would provide the capability for USCINCPAC WABNRES (ABNCP/TACAMO) assets to deploy or disperse to austere or civilian airfields during increasing DEFCONs or reconstitution, and maintain connectivity with the USCINCPAC Command Center or the NCA. This capability would allow connectivity without requiring aircraft ground power or cooling air, or necessitating the operation of an aircraft engine.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The first meeting of the USPACOM Secure Voice Working Group was held at Camp Smith, 27-29 November. The purpose was to develop a mechanism to insure that coordinated transition planning occurred within the command's secure voice programs. These programs included the AUTOSEVOCOM Life Cycle Extension Program, Secure Conferencing Program, Secure Voice Improvement Program, and Red Switch Project. The meeting focused on USCINCPAC program definition, architecture, transition plan, and implementation plan with milestones. There was a positive exchange of information and identification of key actions arising from briefings, which required resolution. It was decided that working groups would continue to meet quarterly, followed by annual USPACOM conferences.<sup>5</sup>

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1. C3STM12 HistSum Apr 84 (U).
  2. C3SCS23 HistSum Jun 84 (U).
  3. C3SPP3 HistSum Jun 84 (U).
  4. C3SCS2 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  5. C3SCS12 HistSum Nov 84 (U).

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(S) A USCINCPAC/C3SCS representative attended JCS C3S-sponsored working groups during 13-15 December 1983 and 5-7 September 1984 to develop and refine a Multi-Command ROC for a CINC/Service/Agency Mobile Command Center. The CMCC would provide CINCs, the Services, and DOD agencies a surface-based, mobile command facility to insure that users could survive and endure through all phases of a nuclear war and continue to command and support U.S. forces. The CMCC system was planned as the solution to the USCINCPAC Alternate Command Facility requirement, originally submitted in 1981. The CMCC project was designated as MROC 1-84 and distributed to the Services for comment. Service comments were being incorporated at the end of 1984, and the MROC was to continue to move through the validation process in 1985.<sup>1</sup>

### Japan Reconfiguration and Digitization

(U) The Japan Reconfiguration and Digitization Program had three phases: Phase I (FY 84-86) would relocate AUTOVON and AUTODIN functions from Fuchu and Camp Drake to Yokota AB, digitize radios in the Kanto Plain, and install telephone switches at Yokota, Camp Zama, Negishi, and Iwakuni. Phase II (FY 85-87) would digitize radio links in Okinawa and install a telephone switch at Ft Buckner. Phase III (FY 87-89) digitized the Japan Tropo System.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Phase I involved a quid pro quo agreement whereby the Japanese government provided a communications building at Yokota in exchange for return of vacated AUTOVON and AUTODIN facilities at Fuchu and Camp Drake. The building was completed and turned over to U.S. use on 7 September 1984. Other parts of Phase I were proceeding as scheduled and were funded by the USAF, with the exception of telephone switches at Iwakuni, Zama, and Negishi. The DCA offered to fund the Defense Switched Network portion of these switches. A contract for Collins digital radios was awarded in September.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The Army had funds identified for Phase II, beginning in FY 85. USAF funds for Phase III would begin in FY 87; however, the DCA recommended that the digital upgrade of the Japan Tropo System be accomplished via a submarine fiber optic cable at a cost of \$54 million in FY 87. USCINCPAC disagreed with a one-year funding for a project of this magnitude. USAF funds were spread across three years, and this appeared to be a more realistic approach. COMUS-JAPAN recommended that the telephone switch planned for Negishi be located at Yokosuka instead. The USCINCPAC Director for C3S asked the DCA to assess this recommendation and staff it with the Air Force and Navy.<sup>4</sup>

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1. C3SCS22 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. C3SCS13 Point Paper (U), 10 Sep 84, Subj: Japan Reconfiguration and Digitization (JRD).
  3. Ibid.; C3SCS13 HistSum Sep 84 (U).
  4. C3SCS13 Point Paper (U), 10 Sep 84, Subj: Japan Reconfiguration and Digitization (JRD).

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SECTION II--C3 INTEROPERABILITY IN THE USPACOM

Interoperability with Korea

(S/NOFORN) Due to the highly vulnerable single-path communication nets in Korea, the C3 systems there could only marginally support a war effort. Several initiatives were in progress to provide a more survivable and modern communications system.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The most significant C3S improvement plan was the Telecommunications Plan for Improvement of Communications in Korea (TPICK). TPICK objectives would improve overall C3S survivability, endurance, and responsiveness supporting requirements of the CINCCFC/UNC and supporting U.S. forces. A key effort under TPICK was a project to install an underground fiber optic cable system from Camp Red Cloud to Pusan. This program would provide a more survivable Defense Communications System for U.S. forces in the ROK. It would be the first use of fiber optic cable for long-haul transmission in the USPACOM. Another major TPICK effort was the Korea Telephone Switching Upgrade Program which would replace obsolete U.S. military telephone exchanges in the ROK with off-the-shelf electronic switches.

(S) Implementation of a Satellite Terminal Employment Plan for Korea (STEP-K) provided a much-needed architecture for planning, enabling more effective use of all satellite terminals. The scheduled employment of a U.S. Army Tactical Satellite Company in FY 85 (17 earth terminals) would provide significant improvements to both in- and out-of-country C3 supporting the CFC, UNC, USFK, and EUSA. The scheduled addition of a U.S. Army Area Signal Battalion (phased in FY 85-88) would greatly assist in providing signal resources to support CFC and U.S. forces. The possible deletion of several companies of the battalion had been addressed between the Department of Army and EUSA in Korea. USCINCPAC supported COMUSKOREA's position at the Defense Resources Board meeting for retaining the entire unit. The decision was not finalized as of the end of 1984.

(S) Installation of the Flaming Arrow Net-Pacific, a special satellite communications system, as mentioned earlier, would enhance Non-Strategic Nuclear Force operations. The system was composed of a Command Post terminal at Headquarters USCINCPAC and terminals in Korea to support USCINCPAC OPLAN 5027. The installation of a high frequency radio network, known as Regency Net-Korea, would also provide a secure communications path for NSNF operations. A ROC documenting this requirement was validated by the JCS in April 1984.<sup>2</sup>

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1. C3SCS13 Point Paper (S/NF), 14 Sep 84, Subj: Improvement of C3 in Korea (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.

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### TPICK

(U) The fiber optic cable transmission backbone was an integral part of the TPICK program. It would increase survivability of the fixed Defense Communications System, satisfy requirements for new digital subscribers, and enhance system reliability. The program was to be conducted in three phases: Phase I would establish a new cable transmission system from Camp Red Cloud in the north to Pyongtaek in the center of the country, with spurs to Command Post TANGO, the Hardened Tactical Air Control Center (HTACC), and Camp Humphreys. It started in FY 83. Phase II would extend the backbone from DCS Crown to Taegu, with spurs to Camp Ames, Camp Carroll, and Camp Walker. It would have an FY 85 start. Phase III would extend the system from Taegu to the Hialeah Compound in Pusan in the south, with spurs to the Chinhae Naval Base and Kimhae Air Base. Additionally, a fiber optic cable would be installed between Suwon and Osan, with an FY 86 start. The U.S. Army POM fully funded the program. The Phase I duct was completed, with joint U.S.-ROK funding, by mid-1984. The Phase I electronics contract award was made soon after that.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 20 September 1984 the U.S. Army signed a contract with Northern Telecom, Inc., to replace the aging electromechanical telephone switches in Korea with state-of-the-art digital switches. The contract provided for the installation of 33 switches at 24 locations in the country. These new telephone switches, in concert with the the new digital fiber optic cable backbone, would provide improved communications support to our operational forces in Korea. Cost of the switch contract was \$17.5 million.<sup>2</sup>

### CONSTANT WATCH/Project 222

(U) CONSTANT WATCH was a multi-phased program involving both the USAF and ROKAF. Overall program implementation responsibility had been assigned to the 6008th Tactical Air Control Flight Program Management Office at Hickam AFB in Hawaii. Phase I provided the basic communications and construction of the HTACC at Osan AB. The HTACC building met the January 1981 IOC date. Phase II was the USAF portion of ROKAF Project 222, which was a ROK initiative to provide an automated Master Control and Reporting Center. Phase III called for automation of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) construction and dissemination process in Korea. It would also provide automated intelligence support to the combat units. Phase IV was the installation of a command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) system in the Headquarters PACAF Command Center.<sup>3</sup>

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1. C3SCS13 Point Paper (U), 27 Jul 84, Subj: Korea Fiber Optic Cable Transmission System.
  2. C3SCS13 HistSum Sep 84 (U).
  3. C3SIN3 Point Paper (C), 21 Jan 84, Subj: CONSTANT WATCH (U), DECL OADR.

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(C) Integrated with Phases I-III were the following: Korean Air Intelligence System (KAIS) improvement, a totally U.S. funded program to provide automated aids for intelligence data handling, processing, and analysis; Baseline Initial Operational Capability, coincident with Phase I, provided access to external data bases and other capability at the U.S.-only level; Increment I of interactive access to ROK-U.S. intelligence data bases, with IOC in November 1981; Increment II interactive access to a U.S.-only data base; Increment III direct computer interface with the operations computer; and Increment IV intelligence data interface between the HTACC and the Korean Combat Operations Intelligence Center (KCOIC). The KCOIC program provided for the construction and equipping of a hardened facility at Osan AB to house selected intelligence collection and processing systems and automated aids for the fusion and analysis of intelligence information.<sup>1</sup>

CPICK

(C/REL ROK) The COMSEC Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea (CPICK) allowed C3 interoperability between U.S. and ROK forces by providing rent-free U.S. communications security equipment to those ROK forces under the operational command of the CINCCFC. The JCS had approved implementation of the CPICK program in 1981, and designated the U.S. Army as lead Service. Originally, CPICK had called for the release of 1,302 U.S. COMSEC devices. However, that number was reduced to 1,177 because of USAF initiatives which duplicated CPICK encryption requirements. Subsequently, all 1,177 COMSEC devices were delivered.<sup>2</sup>

(C/REL ROK) CPICK equipment was maintained by 17 U.S. and 13 ROK military personnel operating five Combined COMSEC Support Facilities located throughout Korea (Seoul, Osan, Wonju, Chinhae, and Camp Red Cloud). The U.S. Army established a COMSEC equipment maintenance training program to acquaint ROK personnel with maintenance responsibilities and duties.

(C/REL ROK) In addition to the CPICK equipment, the National Communications Security Committee (NCSC) approved a USFK request for the release of 231 COMSEC devices to encrypt various communications circuits associated with an upgrade of the Korean Tactical Air Control System (KTACS). Upgrades would be made under CONSTANT WATCH Phase II/Project 222 (above). Additionally, this equipment would be included in the CPICK Memorandum of Agreement, released at no cost to the ROK, and maintained by the CPICK maintenance structure. Delivery of KTACS COMSEC equipment began in August 1983 and was to be completed in late 1984.

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1. Ibid.
  2. C3STM2 Point Paper (C/REL ROK), 19 Jul 84, Subj: COMSEC Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea (CPICK) (U), DECL OADR.

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(C/REL ROK) In accordance with the preliminary CPICK release agreement, CPICK requirements would be met on a quid pro quo basis with the United States providing COMSEC equipment and parts on a cost-free basis and the Koreans contributing personnel, construction, and other security and logistics support. The memorandum of agreement, stipulating U.S. and ROK responsibilities relative to the concepts implementation, was being negotiated in mid-1984 by COMUSKOREA with the ROK government.<sup>1</sup>

Interoperability with Japan

USFJ Coordination Center

(C) As a result of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and DEFPLANS 5051 and 5098, USCINCPAC determined that there was an urgent need for a U.S. Forces Japan Coordination Center at Yokota Air Base. A Japanese counterpart coordination facility was under construction at the Japan Defense Agency Headquarters in Tokyo. Because obtaining approval under the formal ROC-Technical Analysis/Cost Estimate process would be lengthy, USCINCPAC funded an austere interim coordination center using CINC Initiative Funds of \$625,000. Initial operational capability was scheduled for October 1984.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Meanwhile, COMUSJAPAN developed ROC 20-81 to build a full-capacity coordination center to replace the interim facility. The ROC was approved on 11 June 1984, and full operational capability was estimated for early 1989. The U.S. Navy was assigned lead Service implementation responsibility. It would budget funds and perform engineering, acquisition, installation, user acceptance, and testing.<sup>3</sup>

BADGE

(C) BADGE-X was a \$500 million upgrade of the JASDF air defense system which included extensive upgrading of the command and control centers and full automation of the data link and communication systems. Japanese budget approval was received in late 1982 and contracts were awarded to the Nippon Electric Company, in conjunction with the Hughes Corporation.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid.
  2. C3SIN Point Paper (S), 13 Sep 84, Subj: Summary of C3S Combined Interoperability with Japan (U), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Ibid.

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
(S) In a related move to upgrade Japanese air defense, the JASDF purchased eight Tactical Digital Information Link-A (TADIL-A) equipped E-2C airborne early warning aircraft. The first four were delivered in March 1983. A JASDF contractor designed a "communication buffer" to interface the TADIL-A of the Japanese E-2Cs with their BADGE system. This buffer would also allow all U.S. TADIL-A equipped systems such as the USAF E-3 AWACS and the USN Naval Tactical Data System to be interoperable with the BADGE.<sup>2</sup>

COMMANDO TORII


(S) U.S.-Japan agreements had required each country to exercise control over its own air forces. However, to permit orderly execution of combined air operations, colocated operators and command and control facilities were needed. COMMANDO TORII was a PACAF initiative stating communications requirements for one Combined Operations Center at Fuchu and four JASDF Sector Operations Centers. To allow for required connectivity at the lowest cost, the plan included interconnecting long-haul transmission systems, interconnecting the U.S. AUTODIN with the Japanese equivalent, and modifying and expanding the Fifth Air Force Command Center. The concept of operation had not yet been approved by the JASDF, but in the meantime PACAF was pursuing the upgrade of the Fifth Air Force Command Center.<sup>3</sup>

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1. C3SIN Point Paper (C), 13 Sep 84, Subj: U.S. Communications Security (COMSEC) Equipment for BADGE Air Defense System (U), DECL OADR.
  2. C3SIN Point Paper (S), 13 Sep 84, Subj: Summary of C3S Combined Interoperability with Japan (U), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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
(C/NOFORN) Political and fiscal constraints within the Japanese system also were realities which could not be ignored. The austere JDA budget limited the acquisition of U.S. systems; therefore, adherence to a unified, prioritized U.S. secure interoperability plan was critical to achieving realistic objectives.



1. COMUSJAPAN 210130Z Nov 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.

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1. Ibid.
  2. DIRNSA 131859Z Dec 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.
  4. COMUSJAPAN 310001Z Dec 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.
  5. C3S/SSS/C-063-85 (C/NF), 12 Sep 85, Subj: Review of Draft USCINCPAC Command History for 1984 (U), DECL OADR.

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Interoperability with ANZUS

(U) The ANZUS Staff Level Meeting 19 (SLM 19), held in late 1983, had recommended the establishment of a subgroup of the SLM consisting of the C3 principals of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The group would meet annually to address trilateral issues of tactical interoperability and strategic connectivity. The first meeting was held at Headquarters USCINCPAC, 5-9 March 1984, and was hosted by MAJ GEN Vaughn O. Lang, USA, the Director for C3S. The other principals were COMMO Harry Adams, RAN, Director General, Joint Communications-Electronics; and COL Tony Cooper, NZA, Director, Defense Communications. The meeting was given the tentative title of "ANZUS Communications Forum."<sup>1</sup>

(U) The forum was termed an unqualified success. Each of the three directors provided an overview of the communications-electronics situation in his own area of responsibility. From these presentations and the resulting discussions, the members determined that a number of existing and emerging interoperability issues confronted the ANZUS partners. Among them were: the gridding of long-haul communication links among the three nations; new equipment programs impacting on interoperability; COMSEC devices, materials, milestones, and changes; and communication shortfalls in exercises and operations. Addressing the forum, Admiral Crowe said the success of the meeting was important to mutual long-range defense efforts, and could make a significant difference in respective governments' attitudes in all three countries.

(U) The forum also proposed terms of reference for continued annual meetings, and these were approved by the ANZUS Military Representatives in July 1984. The forum's primary or alternate members might require advisers to attend the meetings to deal with technical aspects of some issues, and the members might from time to time request the assistance of specialist panels or working groups. The location for the meetings would rotate among the three nations and precede the first SLM of each year. The forum received guidance from, and was responsible to, the ANZUS MILREPs. Reports of the meetings would be forwarded for the attention of the MILREPs through the SLM.<sup>2</sup>

Interoperability with Thailand


(C) The Royal Thai Air Force Air Defense System (RTADS) was an ongoing program of the RTAF to automate its air defenses. The USAF Electronic Systems Division (ESD) was providing, through an FMS case, the technical support required by the RTAF to manage this program. The ESD completed the program acquisition plan in August 1983 and initial site surveys were completed in

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1. C3SIN3 HistSums Mar and Dec 84 (U); C3SIN3 Point Paper (U), 19 Mar 84, Subj: JOO Visit to Australia and New Zealand.
  2. Ibid.

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June 1984. The RTAF had requested the inclusion of interoperability as a priced option in the letter of offer/acceptance, and had asked the United States to consider sharing the costs if this option were exercised. USCINCPAC prepared a concept of operations for C3 interoperability with the RTADS and it was validated by the JCS.<sup>1</sup>



Interoperability with Singapore

(C) In August 1980 the Singapore Air Force (SAF) had unofficially requested planning and review data from the United States for the E-2C HAWKEYE airborne early warning aircraft. In March 1983 USCINCPAC supported initiatives to insure the SAF E-2Cs would be interoperable with U.S. forces, and in May the Navy said it would support release of the TADIL-A/Link 11 to the government of Singapore (GOS). However, in October, the GOS signed LOAs for four E-2C aircraft with unique "SIGMA" data links which were not interoperable with U.S. links. Grumman Aircraft commenced development of the SIGMA link and, by January 1984, Singapore had invested over \$250,000 in this research program.<sup>4</sup>




1. C3SIN2 Point Paper (C), 10 Oct 84, Subj: Interoperability of Thailand Automated Air Defense System (TADS) (U), DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. C3SIN2 HistSum Dec 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.
4. C3SIN2 Point Paper (C), 16 Jan 84, Subj: Singapore E-2C C2 Interoperability (U), DECL OADR.

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The CJCS advised USCINCPAC on 21 April that the NSA would support the requirement to interoperate with Singapore's E-2C aircraft.<sup>1</sup>



1. USCINCPAC 190031Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~(BOM) and JCS 211510Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~(BOM), both DECL OADR.
2. JCS 200007Z Jun 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
3. CNO 292144Z Jun 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
4. C3SIN2 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 5 Oct 84, Subj: Status of TADIL Release to Government of Singapore (GOS) ~~(U)~~, DECL OADR.
5. C3SIN2 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(C)~~; USDAO Singapore 13152/070419Z Dec 84 ~~(C)~~, both DECL OADR.

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Proposals for Other Countries

(C) The government of Malaysia had embarked on a military expansion and modernization program in 1979. Supporting this program, USCINCPAC provided an assistance team to evaluate Malaysia's C3 requirements and provide recommendations to achieve these needs. A part of this expansion program was the acquisition of the Malaysian Air Defense Ground Environment (MADGE) system for the Royal Malaysian Air Force and the desire to acquire E-2C airborne early warning and P-3 antisubmarine warfare aircraft. These aircraft acquisitions would provide an opportunity to introduce the Tactical Digital Information Link into the RMAF inventory. It would allow Malaysia to be interoperable not only with U.S. forces, but also with other TADIL users and prospective users in the region such as Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and Singapore. USCINCPAC would encourage Malaysia to achieve this command and control interoperability.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The government of Indonesia was upgrading its military equipment at a measured pace. USCINCPAC saw this equipment acquisition as a vehicle to also introduce command and control interoperability between U.S. forces and those of Indonesia. However, Indonesia's position on nonalignment might hinder this initiative. There were three equipment acquisition efforts ongoing that could afford the opportunity to introduce C2 interoperability: HAWK surface-to-air missile, automated air defense system, and an Indonesian Navy command and control frigate (fleet flagship). The potential existed to introduce the TADIL-A/B/C link into these acquisitions and provide interoperability with U.S. and other friendly forces in the region.<sup>2</sup>

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1. C3SIN2 Point Paper (C), 16 Jan 84, Subj: USPACOM Interoperability: Malaysia (U), DECL OADR.
  2. C3SIN2 Point Paper (C), 16 Jan 84, Subj: USPACOM Interoperability: Indonesia (U), DECL OADR.

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1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that this is crucial for ensuring the integrity of the financial statements and for providing a clear audit trail. The text notes that any discrepancies or errors in the records can lead to significant complications during an audit and may result in the disallowance of certain expenses.

2. The second part of the document outlines the specific requirements for the records. It states that all receipts, invoices, and other supporting documents must be retained for a minimum of three years. Furthermore, the records must be organized in a logical and systematic manner, such as by date or by category, to facilitate the audit process. The document also mentions that the records should be readily accessible to the auditor at all times.

3. The third part of the document provides guidance on how to handle common situations that may arise during the record-keeping process. For example, it addresses the issue of lost receipts, suggesting that the taxpayer should make a diligent search for the original document and, if it cannot be found, provide a written explanation of the circumstances. It also discusses the treatment of cash payments and the importance of documenting these transactions through bank statements or other reliable sources.

4. The final part of the document concludes by reiterating the overall importance of thorough record-keeping. It encourages taxpayers to take the time to maintain accurate and complete records from the beginning, as this will significantly reduce the risk of errors and the potential for an audit. The document ends with a statement of the preparer's responsibility to ensure that the taxpayer's records are in compliance with the relevant tax laws and regulations.

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## SECTION III--TELECOMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT

### USCINCPAC/C3S Involvement in PPBS

(U) Two USCINCPAC/C3S representatives attended a Command, Control, and Communications Systems Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) Review Conference for unified and specified command C3S personnel, 29 May-1 June 1984. At the conference, Military Department representatives provided briefings concerning C3S programs which were included in the FY 86-90 Service POMs. Those C3S programs which were determined to be unfunded or inadequately funded were selectively addressed in draft issue papers with recommended funding alternatives and then submitted to the OSD.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The JCS Director for C3S, in his opening remarks, advised the various CINC representatives to identify the "most severe, most critical" C3 deficiencies using the broadest perspective of the CINCs in all functional areas. They should tie the C3 capability to war fighting capability and consider the CINC's plans in relationship to C3 requirements, and look for deficiencies in those plans. They should also support DOD-wide programs such as upgrades to COMSEC, Secure Voice Improvement Program, AUTOVON, and AUTODIN.

(U) Each of the Services presented POM briefs, and issue papers were presented to the JCS/C3S. Issues of interest to the USPACOM, and those that were forwarded to the OJCS Strategic Program Review Acquisition Agency, were: the E-6A, Navigation Satellite Timing and Ranging (NAVSTAR) survivability, strategic connectivity, tactical C3, Joint Multichannel Trunking and Switching System (JMTSS), Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS), Defense-wide C3, WWMCCS Information System, Non-Strategic Nuclear Force C3, and Jam Resistant Secure Communications (JRSC). Issue papers would be reviewed by the JCS and presented to the OSD as candidates for the Issue Books which would then be reviewed by the Defense Resources Board. USCINCPAC would be asked to comment on the Issue Books in July before the DRB.

(U) Of special interest was the observation by the USCINCPAC attendees that, regardless of how the various CINC representatives prioritized their individual programs, they received no special attention or emphasis by the joint staff unless the OJCS at the C3S action-officer level agreed and also supported the program.<sup>2</sup>

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1. C3SPP2 HistSum May 84 (U); C3SPP2/3 Memo (U), 11 Jun 84, Subj: Trip Report--C3S POM 86 Review Conference; USCINCPAC 030215Z May 84 (U).
  2. Ibid.

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Joint Multichannel Trunking and Switching System

(S) The JMTSS requirement (ROC 15-80) was for equipment that would be based at protected forward and strategic rear country sites to reconstitute war-damaged in-country assets of the Defense Communications System. JMTSS was required to provide area connectivity to and between joint combat, combat support, and other supporting units within the USPACOM area. The system would have to provide rapidly deployable, modularly employable, air transportable equipment designed to operate and interoperate with equipment being provided by the Joint Tactical Communications (TRI-TAC) and DSCS systems.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In January 1984 representatives from USCINCPAC/C3S, the Defense Communications Agency, DCA PAC, and the Booze, Allen and Hamilton Company met to review a draft report on the proposed Mid-Range JMTSS Architecture. It was being developed by the DCA to satisfy USPACOM ROC 15-80. JMTSS had been incorporated into the overall USCINCPAC concept for Theater Mission Essential Communications Systems. As a result of the meeting, significant modifications were made to the draft report, particularly to the section dealing with implementation packaging.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The DCA delivered the final report to USCINCPAC during the week of 1 May and provided an executive summary and briefings to the USCINCPAC staff and component commands. Between 9 and 18 May, briefings on the selected architecture were given to the staffs of COMUSKOREA, COMUSJAPAN, and DCA PAC by USCINCPAC/C3S. On 15 May the architecture report was endorsed by Admiral Crowe and forwarded to the JCS for implementation decision.<sup>3</sup>

(U) In December C3SOE reported that the JMTSS architecture was being used to track OPLAN shortfalls and provide a basis for components to institute POM actions as well as providing USCINCPAC the means to coherently track required remedial actions. On 18 December Headquarters USCINCPAC tasked USPACOM component and subordinate unified commands to put recommended architecture improvement actions into their respective FY 87 Service POMs.<sup>4</sup>

Proposed Transmitter Sites for VOA

Korea

(S) National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 45 had directed the Voice of America (VOA) to undertake a major modernization and expansion program.

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1. USCINCPAC Ltr (U) C3SPP Ser S221, 14 Mar 85, Subj: USPACOM Command and Control System Master Plan (C2SMP), with Encl (1) (S/NF) USPACOM Command and Control System Master Plan (U), Mar 85, p. B-2, DECL OADR.
  2. C3SOE12 HistSum Jan 84 (U).
  3. C3SOE22 HistSum May 84 (U).
  4. C3SOE HistSum Dec 84 (U).

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Korea was identified as a preferred location for short wave radio broadcasts beamed to the Soviet Far East, Mongolia, and China. In October 1982 the National Security Council requested the State Department to approach various countries, including the ROK, about potential broadcasting facilities. In September 1983 a technical team consisting of VOA, JCS, and USCINCPAC representatives met with USFK and ROK government (ROKG) personnel in Seoul. Additional technical information was provided by the VOA, and ROKG officials participated in four more meetings. Two visits to potential sites were also made.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Main concerns of the ROKG were the amount of land required (1,500 acres for a combined VOA/RFE facility), the potential for interference with existing communications, and the potential for retaliation in kind by the USSR or North Korea. Concerns of the USFK were possible interference, loss of frequencies, and the potential for increase in the jamming threat by the USSR and North Korea. In response to these concerns the VOA seemed willing to minimize the impact to agricultural land by building in coastal mudflat areas, and it claimed that interference could be resolved by proper coordination. The potential for jamming was unknown; however, previous experience had shown that jamming was done to the receivers in target countries and not to the transmitter itself.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) advised COMUSKOREA on 28 January 1984 that the VOA had a mandate from the President and the approval of Congress for a major upgrade and expansion of VOA/RFE facilities as a matter of the highest priority. The aim was to exploit, to a far greater degree than in the past, informational media as a key instrument of national power. Existing VOA/RFE transmitters were not capable of effectively broadcasting to Soviet audiences east of the Urals. To plug that gap, U.S. options for a permanent site in Northeast Asia had narrowed to the ROK. Available information in Washington led to the conclusion that the project was on dead center, with no progress in prospect. COMUSKOREA's personal support was requested.<sup>3</sup>

(S) COMUSKOREA said he fully appreciated the urgency with which the Administration was pursuing the establishment of a VOA station in the ROK, and the USFK staff was supportive of this effort. From the ROKG's point of view, however, the issue was complex with implications for international, domestic, intelligence, national security, communications, real estate, and reclamation policies. Seven ministers and at least three intelligence/security agencies were involved and virtually each of these saw the project as having more disadvantages than advantages. The U.S. Embassy was of the opinion that the

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1. C3STM14 Point Paper (S), 27 Jul 84, Subj: Voice of America (VOA)/Radio Free Europe (RFE) Transmitter Facility in Korea (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. OSD 280222Z Jan 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR.

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basic problem was the unpopularity of the project with nearly every ministry and agency concerned. Nevertheless, COMUSKOREA and the Embassy would do whatever they could to urge the ROKG to face the issue.<sup>1</sup>

(C) After much delay, the first negotiating meeting was held at a remote, highly secure location in northern Seoul on 12 September 1984. The ROKG stressed its political sensitivity about the project; the need to gain National Assembly and popular approval; the requirement for continued confidentiality; and the importance of not using inhabited, arable, or already reclaimed land for the site. It objected to what it claimed were changes in the U.S. plan, pointing out that the highest level of the ROKG [President Chun Doo Hwan] had approved the project based on specific points laid out by the ROKG's working levels. The ROKG reiterated the importance of obtaining copies of all U.S. site agreements with other countries, noting that the course of negotiations would be influenced by our response to their request.<sup>2</sup>

(C) The U.S. negotiating team, headed by the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), outlined the U.S. government's worldwide modernization plan; stated its awareness of the ROKG's sensitivities about the project; explained the inadequacies of the two sites the ROKG had initially offered for inspection; and briefed the ROKG on its preliminary observations of two other possible sites.

(C) A claimed change in the U.S. plan which bothered the ROK team was the plan for a transmitter beamed in a southwesterly direction to southern China and Southeast Asia. They said it was their earlier understanding that we would be broadcasting in a northerly and westerly direction and did not include languages other than Russian, Chinese, and Mongolian in our plans (the latest plans included provisions for Lao and Vietnamese as secondary languages from the site).<sup>3</sup>

(C) On 27 November the U.S. Ambassador again raised the subject of site negotiations with the ROK Foreign Minister, stating that further delays in resuming talks would be difficult to understand. The Ambassador reminded the Foreign Minister of President Reagan's personal interest in the project and said that if delays continued, it could be concluded that some elements in the ROKG bureaucracy were not complying with the decision of the two government leaders to negotiate an agreement. This could in turn impinge on attitudes affecting other issues of great importance to the ROKG. The MOFA Director General for American Affairs privately acknowledged that the Ministry of Culture and Information and Ministry of Communications were particular roadblocks and he would try to have the Blue House (the ROK Presidency) remove them.<sup>4</sup>

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1. SSO Korea 060920Z Feb 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR.
  2. AMEMB Seoul 09881/150710Z Sep 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.
  4. AMEMB Seoul 12534/270901Z Nov 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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(C) Finally, on 11 December, the MOFA agreed to resume transmitter site negotiations in Seoul on 18 December and requested the names of the U.S. delegation. The U.S. Embassy was trying to arrange a preliminary meeting at which to attempt to pin down, ad referendum, subjects to be discussed along the lines recommended by the USIA.<sup>1</sup>

Thailand

(C) Meanwhile, as preliminary talks and formal negotiations were painfully proceeding in Korea, the United States signed agreements for radio relay sites with Sri Lanka in December 1983 and with Morocco in March 1984. Also, in March 1984, the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok successfully completed negotiations (which took 16 months) with the government of Thailand for the construction and operation of a VOA transmitter station in the Ban Dung District of Udon Province. The USCINCPAC staff was not involved in these negotiations.<sup>2</sup>

(C) The agreement provided for the construction of one 250-kilowatt and up to six 500-kilowatt shortwave radio transmitters with buildings and support facilities. Construction time was expected to take 3 to 4 years. The station would be shared with the Royal Thai government, giving them the opportunity to strengthen their international broadcasting capability. The RTG would be able to broadcast foreign and Thai language programs on transmitters capable of reaching listeners in the Middle East, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere. The United States would be responsible for the cost of construction and certain other related items. The radio station, once completed, would become the property of the RTG and be made available for U.S. use as a relay station. No VOA program relayed by the station would be in the Thai language.

(C) On 29 May 1984 the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok said the RTG had once again asked that the announcement of the transmitter agreement be delayed until construction of a perimeter fence was completed in mid-July.<sup>3</sup>

Secure Communications Improvements

Secure Voice Programs

(U) Improving the secure voice (and secure voice/graphics conferencing) capabilities in the USPACOM continued to be a high-priority USCINCPAC/C3S directorate goal. General improvements were being effected under the AUTO-SEVOCOM Life Cycle Extension Program (ALCEP) and the Secure Voice Improvement Program (SVIP). ALCEP was the near-term (to 1987) modernization to improve

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1. AMEMB Seoul 13105/120526Z Dec 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. C3STM14 Point Paper (C), 13 Jul 84, Subj: Voice of America (VOA) Short-wave Transmitter Station in Thailand (U); AMEMB Bangkok 27230/291206Z May 84 (C), both DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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the existing AUTOSEVOCOM and insure continued effectiveness until development of the SVIP, the long-range (1987-1990s) AUTOSEVOCOM replacement program.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Specific USCINCPAC C2 secure voice and graphics conferencing improvements would be accomplished under the Secure Conferencing Project-USPACOM Early Operational Capability which, during FY 85, would provide dedicated connectivity among the major USPACOM command centers. It represented not only increased C2 capability but also improved survivability, as its long-haul transmission medium was the Jam Resistant Secure Communications satellite system which would provide HEMP protection for many of its communication paths. It would provide a dedicated conferencing capability (2 secure voice, 1 teletype, and 1 facsimile) in the command centers at Headquarters USCINCPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, WESTCOM, USFK (Yongsan and TANGO), 314th Air Division (Osan), and USFJ.<sup>2</sup>

Meteor Burst Communications

(U) The Defense Communications Agency/Command and Control Engineering Center (DCA/CCEC), Naval Electronic Systems Command (NAVELEX), and Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC) had been conducting field experiments in 1983-1984, demonstrating command and control applications of meteor burst communications. Meteor burst communications was attractive for C2 applications because of rapid recovery in a nuclear-disturbed environment and inherent low probability of intercept. It was the vulnerability to hostile interception that was the primary interest in the proposed test. This effort represented the first field experiment undertaken by the DOD to better understand the potential vulnerabilities to intercept of meteor burst communications and to determine, if intercept conditions did exist, what technical and operational control measures should be considered.<sup>3</sup>

(U) To conduct the test a master station would be located at the Barking Sands Pacific Missile Range Facility, Kauai; and remote stations at the Pohakuloa Training Area, Hawaii; Midway Island; Johnston Island; and Oahu. Additionally, a Meteor Burst Communications Monitoring System would be installed on the NOSC research vessel Kaimalino, berthed at Kaneohe, Oahu. An additional remote station might be located on the crest of Haleakala, Maui, at an altitude of 10,000 ft within the DARPA Maui Optical Station if ambient noise conditions were acceptable. A remote station at this altitude could act as an airborne interceptor or airborne jammer against the master stations. It was planned to install this equipment in September-October 1984 and conduct

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1. C3SCS11 Point Paper (C), 11 Jul 84, Subj: Secure Voice Improvements in the USPACOM (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. DCA/CCEC Memo (U), 5 Apr 84, Subj: Summary of Meteor Burst Communications Vulnerability Testing Discussions Between DCA/CCEC, NOSC, USCINCPAC/C3S, and Component Command Representatives (27-28 March 1984).


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tests for about eight weeks. Station separation ranged from 288 mi between Kauai and Hawaii, to 1,181 mi between Kauai and Midway.


(U) The experiment would be managed by a steering committee composed of representatives from the DCA, NOSC, and USCINCPAC. The DCA would provide overall program guidance, funding support, and chairing of the steering committee, and participate in providing guidelines and criteria for vulnerability assessment. The NOSC would provide overall program management and technical direction, and conduct and analyze the testing. USCINCPAC/C3S would provide the focal point for interested USPACOM organizations to observe and/or participate in the experiment.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Ibid.
2. USCINCPAC Instruction 9407.1A (U), 5 Dec 84, Subj: Electromagnetic Pulse Hardening Policy for Command, Control, and Communications Networks.
3. Ibid.

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C3S Exercise Evaluation

(U) For the second consecutive year the JCS was invited to, and did, provide an augmentee to the USCINCPAC/C3S evaluation team for TEAM SPIRIT 84, held in Korea in March 1984. The team consisted of five other members, three from USCINCPAC and one each from PACAF and WESTCOM. The team was led by the USCINCPAC/C3S Exercise Branch Chief. Support of the USCINCPAC/C3S exercise evaluation effort by the JCS provided valuable aid and extended the experience base of USPACOM exercises at the JCS. USCINCPAC anticipated continued support from the JCS on this augmentation program.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Exercise BALIKATAN 84 in the Philippines, 21-31 May 1984, was also evaluated by USCINCPAC/C3S. This exercise provided an extensive training experience for C-E planners. The C3S established in support of the exercise headquarters provided adequate communications to accomplish the stated objectives. Strengths were observed in: the overall attention to detail and the professionalism of exercise C-E planners, colocation of exercise headquarters, employment and performance of the U.S. Navy Ashore Mobile Contingency Communications van, host-nation exercise C-E support, and C3 supporting air operations during the amphibious portion of the exercise. Deficiencies noted were: the lack of coordination and control center standard operating procedures, lack of a coordinated communications control/systems control plan, absence of camouflage for communications sites, minimal physical security around exercise sites, the need for increased secure communications, and the necessity of communications diversity planning.<sup>2</sup>

(C) During Exercise COBRA GOLD in Thailand, 2 July-10 August, the evaluator found that the C3 systems and equipment that were utilized adequately

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1. C3SOE2 HistSum Mar 84 (U).
  2. C3SOE22 HistSum May 84 (U).

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supported exercise requirements during all phases. The colocation of all shore-based strike aircraft, GCI controllers, and the Navy AMCC van at Hat Yai provided a cohesive and well-coordinated unit. C3 system strong points included the air defense communications system employed by the combined task force and the employment of ECM by the screening force of the task force. Improvement was still needed in the areas of secure communications and data link capability to certain ships of the Royal Thai Navy, COMSEC equipment employment, fire support C3 link-up operations, and standardization of tactical publications.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Exercise ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 84 in Korea, 17-28 August, was observed by a communications team composed of USCINCPAC, JCS, DCA, and USREDCOM personnel. This procedural exercise provided an extensive real-world training experience for the communicators. Ground Mobile Force tactical satellite equipment which was supposed to arrive in Korea in time for UFL 84 was delayed due to production problems. This caused a serious communications support shortfall. A typhoon which struck the southeastern portion of the country required the dismantling of some HF sites. Several other shortfalls were found, including the lack of secure voice capability from Commander Naval Forces Korea to COMSEVENTHFLT, Special Warfare communications, and communications support to the ROK government B-1 Bunker. Exercise play highlighted a number of serious C3 management problems. The most serious was the inability of the TANGO Combined Communications Operations Center to identify an estimated 30-35 percent in essential communications circuits which could not be supported, given the damage estimates generated by the scenario. Additionally, the areas of C3CM offensive and protection measures and capabilities needed to be incorporated in all operations. On the positive side, UFL 84 was the first major Korean exercise to institute real communications denials of record traffic. This was a significant step forward in C3 realism.<sup>2</sup>

(C) JCS CPX POWDER RIVER 85 (October 1984) was the first exercise to test the new C3S Crisis Action Instruction which detailed significant organizational and procedural changes for the C3S support team. Use of the procedures resulted in major improvements in C3S players' operational direction and management of USPACOM communications for OPLAN 5001. Significant progress was made in highlighting the Soviet threat to vulnerable USPACOM C3 nodes, tasking intelligence support for critical Indications and Warning data on the potential threat, recommending and implementing procedures to counter the threat, conveying information on the likely C3 sustainability shortfalls resulting from the threat, and designing a procedure to manage the reconstitution of theater-wide mission-essential communications in the USPACOM (once the threat struck). The exercise was also successfully used to test message economy and discipline. All were major firsts for USPACOM exercise play and measurably increased realism and improved Crisis Action Team training in C3 operations.

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1. C3SOE22 HistSum Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. C3SOE22 HistSum Aug 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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Major points highlighted were: a 40-60 percent lack of sustainability for critical communications in the USPACOM, limited use of C3CM and C3 protective measures, requirement for dedicated SOCPAC C-E support, underuse of WWMCCS/WIN capabilities, need for WWMCCS interface with DCA PAC, and need for a formal Crisis Action Team training program to improve effectiveness.<sup>1</sup>

(U) A USCINCPAC/C3S observer attended a FOAL EAGLE Special Operations exercise in Korea for the first time, 10-19 November 1984. The observer watched SO headquarters play at Seongnam, CFC cells at Command Post TANGO, the SO Control Center at the HTACC (Osan), the Combined Air Force SO base at Taegu, and the 19th Support Command rear-area security liaison cell at Camp Henry (Taegu). Observation of the exercise provided valuable reference data on Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force C-E support requirements and the unique communications needs of Special Forces. These data would permit more effective support of C3 needs for SOCPAC and aid in the C3S Directorate's preparation of C-E annexes for SOCPAC OPLANS.<sup>2</sup>

#### Frequency Management

##### USPACOM Spectrum Management Conference and Workshop

(U) The annual USPACOM Spectrum Management Conference was held at the Hale Koa Hotel in Honolulu, 23-27 January 1984, hosted by the USCINCPAC Joint Frequency Management Office (JFMO). Attending were frequency managers from the CONUS and from throughout the USPACOM area, plus representatives from Australia, New Zealand, and Korea. The conference addressed the continuing needs of the spectrum manager and surfaced specific problems that had an impact on operational requirements. Major agenda items were: USPACOM data base management; contingency and exercise frequency support; USPACOM frequency management structure; USPACOM research, development, test, and evaluation activities and actions; unique C-E systems; Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center (ECAC) operations and current/future capabilities of the Frequency Resource Records System (FRRS); satellite frequency coordination; improved spectrum utilization techniques; improved HF spectrum utilization; crisis spectrum management; and C3CM.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Preceding the conference, and as part of a continuing effort to insure that the USPACOM portion of the FRRS was current, accurate, and manageable, a 2-day Spectrum Management Workshop was conducted by the Headquarters USCINCPAC JFMO at the Federal Building in Honolulu, 19-20 January 1984. Attending were representatives from the subordinate unified commands, USCINCPACREPs, and USPACOM components. The workshop addressed unique problems being

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1. C3SOE21 HistSum Oct 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. C3SOE2 HistSum Nov 84 (U).
  3. C3STM35 HistSum Jan 84 (U); CINCPAC 280249Z Sep 83 (U).

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encountered in frequency management and the corrective actions taken to solve them.<sup>1</sup>

### Frequency Coordination in the Philippines

(U) A team from Headquarters USCINCPAC, Headquarters PACAF, and the U.S. Navy Frequency Management Office visited the government of the Philippines Frequency Management Office during the period 30 April to 10 May 1984 to reconcile discrepancies between U.S. military and Philippine frequency records. Disparities in frequency records were corrected. The visit also pointed out the need to convince Philippine civil and military authorities that the U.S. military had both the desire and technical ability to manage proper frequency discipline and use of this vital resource if they could receive priority support with minimum red tape for satisfying frequency requirements. A follow-up visit was accomplished by a similar U.S. team from 23 November to 1 December.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Meanwhile, the USCINCPAC Director for C3S on 10 July requested that CINCPACFLT transfer a Navy billet to the USCINCPAC JMP for proper staffing of the joint frequency management function with a qualified manager to be located in Manila. The function had been performed by the USAF in Manila from 1964 to 1974 and at Subic Bay from 1974 to 1978 before being transferred to the Navy. The Navy had consecutively assigned three ensigns, with no prior experience, to the job. Radio frequency management was a specialized field and successful coordination with Philippine civil and military authorities required the use of qualified personnel. Furthermore, operation from Subic Bay did not allow the daily contact that was necessary. CINCPACFLT agreed to transfer a civilian billet to the USCINCPAC JMP and USCINCPAC on 2 November requested the JCS to authorize this transfer. It was still awaiting action at year-end.<sup>3</sup>

### Coordination Visit

(U) A USCINCPAC JFMO representative visited host government civil and military radio frequency regulatory authorities and subordinate Joint Frequency Management Offices in Guam, Thailand (USDAO/JUSMAG), the Philippines, Korea, and Japan, during the period 27 August to 14 September 1984. The visit was made to continue dialogue with host government counterparts regarding streamlining the frequency coordination process and to perform staff assistance with subordinate managers.<sup>4</sup>

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1. C3STM35 HistSum Jan 84 (U); USCINCPAC 210554Z Oct 83 (U).
  2. C3STM32 HistSums May and Dec 84 (U).
  3. C3STM3 HistSums Jul and Dec 84 (U); C3STM3 Ltr Ser 1911 (U), 10 Jul 84, Subj: Joint Frequency Management Philippines; USCINCPAC 020444Z Nov 84 (U).
  4. C3STM32 HistSum Sep 84 (U).

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Communications Security

OPSEC and Threat to USPACOM Communications

(S/NOFORN) On 27 January 1984 the Commander U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Theater Intelligence Center Pacific (USAITIC-PAC) informed all concerned that the Soviet merchant tanker KAPTAIN KOBETS was located about 200 NM northeast of Oahu, and could conduct communications surveillance operations near Hawaii before continuing on to home waters. It was a known fact that Soviet merchant ships had an intelligence collection mission, and operations and operations security (OPSEC) personnel were alerted to the potential SIGINT threat posed by the ship.<sup>1</sup>

(S/REL CAN) On 6 February the Soviet intelligence collector SSV-468 (ex-GAVRIL SARYCHEV) was sighted, dead in the water, only 7 NM south-southeast of Pearl Harbor, and could remain in the vicinity of Oahu through at least the next day. OPSEC personnel were again alerted to the surveillance threat by USAITIC-PAC and cautioned to protect on-going or planned operations while this vessel was in the vicinity of Oahu.<sup>2</sup>

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The SSV-493, a Soviet BALZAM class 4,000-ton armed AGI intelligence collector, was reported transiting southwesterly from the CONUS on 30 May 1984 and believed to be en route to Hawaiian waters for intelligence collection operations against RIMPAC 84 joint and combined exercise participants as well as military installations on Oahu. CINCPACFLT instructed THIRD Fleet to take appropriate precautionary measures and promulgate an electromagnetic emission control alert to RIMPAC participants and Hawaiian area military installations when appropriate. The Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center Pacific (FOSIC-PAC) said the BALZAM SSV-493 was located 625 NM north-northeast of Hawaii as of 041000Z June 1984. At a speed of 12 kts, the USAITIC-PAC Threat Analysis Branch estimated the ship to arrive in Hawaiian waters on 6 June. The vessel had continued a consistent westerly track from the coast off San Diego. In the past, this AGI had conducted SIGINT operations in the Hawaiian area in September 1983. It was capable of receiving VLF-VHF signals and was equipped with a medium-frequency dipping SONAR.<sup>3</sup>

(U) News media in Seattle reported on 29 August 1984 that the 289-ft Soviet intelligence collection vessel SEMEN CHELYUSHKIN had moved to a point 30 miles southwest of Cape Flattery, near the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca. After spending nearly two weeks by the strait, the ship had cruised south to waters off Oregon, then moved back to its position near the strait,

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1. CDRUSAITIC-PAC 272030Z Jan 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
  2. CDRUSAITIC-PAC 062349Z Feb 84 (S/REL CAN), DECL OADR.
  3. CINCPACFLT 300309Z May 84 (C) and CDRUSAITIC-PAC 060133Z Jun 84 (S/NF/WNINTEL), both DECL OADR.

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used by TRIDENT submarines from the Bangor Naval Base on Hood Canal. The ship had first been spotted in international waters off Canada on 13 August. The closest the vessel had come to the coast was when it was spotted within four miles of the mouth of the Columbia River. The last time a Soviet intelligence ship had been in the area was in November 1983 when the ex-GAVRIL SARYCHEV took up a position off the entrance to the strait. Before that it was the BALZAM in June 1983, and before that the ex-GAVRIL SARYCHEV in July 1982.<sup>1</sup> ✓

(U) On 8 December 1984 SEMEN CHELYUSHKIN sailed from a position 20 miles north of Oahu to a similar distance south of Kauai, according to a THIRD Fleet spokesman and reported in the Honolulu media. The spokesman said the main mission of the intelligence ship was to collect information about U.S. naval operations and ships. The Navy had monitored the ship continuously during its voyage from the coast of Southern California. This visit was the third of its kind to Hawaiian waters since July. The Soviet vessel ZABAYKAYLE had also sailed from the West Coast and was seen east of Hawaii Island during Exercise FLEETEX 85 in October. In July, it was also spotted near Hawaii after sailing from the West Coast.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Meanwhile, the Naval Operations Intelligence Center reported on 30 July that the Soviet cargo ships PULA (14,868 DWT) and NOVOLVOVSK (13,650 DWT), which had earlier been denied access to the Port of Los Angeles for national security reasons, had received approval for a later port call. The initial itinerary for both ships had been denied by the Department of Defense because the requested port calls coincided with a time period during which the U.S. Navy would be conducting sensitive testing in the Southern California area. Similar testing would also be conducted during 8-10 August and would result in further denials of any Warsaw Pact ship port calls requested in the vicinity. Both PULA and NOVOLVOVSK were granted access to the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, respectively, after 30 July.<sup>3</sup>

(S) In another, possibly compromising, case, the Cypriot merchant vessel KYRIAKOU, a DOD contract tanker, arrived at the U.S. Facility Subic Bay POL pier at 0600 hours local on 24 August 1984. The ship was scheduled to depart at 1100 hours local on the 25th. It flew a Cypriot flag had had a Greek master, but all 23 crewmembers were Polish citizens. COMUSNAVPHIL said the presence of the 23 Soviet Bloc citizens in the midst of the facility provided a unique overt intelligence collection opportunity for the communists. This was the result of a DOD contract let by the Defense Fuel Supply Center, Cameron, with Inter-Asia Marine Transport, Inc., of Manila, for the discharge of JP-4 and diesel fuel marine. The company was on a Philippine government watch list for association with communist activities.<sup>4</sup>


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1. AP Seattle, 14 Aug 84 (U) and UPI Seattle, 29 Aug 84 (U).
  2. Honolulu Sunday Star Bulletin & Advertiser, 9 Dec 84 (U).
  3. NAVOPINTCEN 301837Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  4. COMUSNAVPHIL 240705Z Aug 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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(C) Neither the U.S. Facility Subic nor the Military Sealift Command Southeast Asia had received notice of the communist-bloc nationality of the crew through MSC channels. The Philippine government had informally advised the U.S. Facility of the crew's nationality only two days before arrival. During the visit, KYRIAKOU had a clear view of the Naval Supply Depot, Ship Repair Facility, large auxiliary floating drydock with an ammunition ship in drydock, USS OKINAWA (LPH-3), USS ALAMO (LSD-33), USS STERETT (CG-31), and ongoing airborne mine countermeasures operations being conducted by HM-16. The crew had been restricted to the ship, and all activities had been advised that the ship posed an intelligence collection threat. COMUSNAVPHIL recommended that in the future, contracts with owners of ships with flags of convenience exclude ships which had crewmembers of Soviet Bloc citizenship.<sup>1</sup>


(C) However, the CNO said no policy existed which precluded citizens of Soviet Bloc nations from being crewmembers of such ships. Nevertheless, for ports designated by CINCPACFLT as presenting unique intelligence collection opportunities, the Defense Fuel Supply Center and the Military Sealift Command would include a requirement in contracts to notify the designated commands 48 hours in advance of arrival of ships under their charter with Soviet Bloc crewmembers embarked.<sup>2</sup>



(C)(U)(A)

1. Ibid.
2. CNO 301317Z Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR.
3. C3STM23 HistSums Jan-Dec 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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


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
1. Ibid.

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




SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (S/NF), P. 38, DECL OADR.



SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (S/NF), P. 39, DECL OADR.



SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (S/PWF), P. 40, DECL OADR.







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## CHAPTER VIII

### PERSONNEL

(U) Effective 1 October the Headquarters Support Activity (HSA) was assigned to the Manpower and Personnel Directorate for operational direction and support. Under this organizational change, the Headquarters Support Division (J041) and the Administrative and Security Division (J042) were incorporated with the Headquarters Personnel Division (J14) and redesignated as branches J146 and J147, respectively. The name of the new entity was Headquarters Personnel Support and Administrative Division, and its chief became dual-hatted with the additional title of Commander, Headquarters Support Activity.<sup>1</sup>

#### SECTION I--MILITARY PERSONNEL

(U) In his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, as well as in numerous other fora, Admiral Crowe commented that the nearly 360,000 men and women assigned to USCINCPAC's operational command were as good as any troops he'd seen in his 40 years of service. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines were professional in every sense of the word--well educated, bright, dedicated, hard-working, and possessing a genuine sense of purpose. He said, "If we enjoy a marked advantage over our opponents in any area, it is in the quality of our personnel. Consequently, it is essential that we continue to put great emphasis on personnel policies and programs."<sup>2</sup>

#### Status of Service Components

(U) The Army's Western Command (WESTCOM) officer distribution plan support decreased from 99.7 percent to 95.2 percent between October 1983 and 1 April 1984; by 30 September it rose back to 96.3 percent. Enlisted strength remained below the minimum acceptable level of fill of 95 percent between June 1983 and April 1984, but was up to 98 percent by 30 September. Shortages in infantry, field artillery, air defense, signal, and several combat support occupational specialties impacted on readiness. NCO (E5-E9) fill continued at 100 percent; E1-E4 fill continued to increase to 88.8 percent by 1 April and to over 97 percent at the end of September. Army Reserve component elements (USAR and ARNG) also continued to show improvements with the Reserve at 97.9 percent and the Hawaii ARNG at 94.8 percent of authorized strength by 30 September while Guam's ARNG had increased by 5 percent to 78 percent.<sup>3</sup>

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1. USCINCPACNOTE 5400 (133), 7 Sep 84, Subj: USCINCPAC Headquarters Staff Re-alignment; J10A HistSum Jul 84 (U).
  2. USCINCPAC 170355Z Feb 84 (U), p. 9.
  3. USCINCPAC 150826Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR, p. 45; USCINCPAC 152200Z Oct 84 (S), DECL OADR, p. 9.

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(C) In Korea and Japan the Army still had serious shortfalls in the linguistics, electronic warfare, and intelligence fields; low combat support/ combat service support levels would severely limit sustainability in combat operations.<sup>1</sup>

(C) Navy officer retention continued to improve significantly, but despite gains, mid-grade officer shortages still existed in the surface, aviation, and particularly the submarine communities. Afloat submarine commands were being manned to allowance, thereby requiring extended tour lengths to make up for these shortages. At sea and ashore, respectively, there were 34 and 14 enlisted ratings and closed-loop Navy enlisted classification codes assigned which were manned at less than 80 and 70 percent of structured strength. Among shortages of submarine repair ratings, most significant was the critical shortage of personnel to test certain materials and structures for deficiencies and defects. Manning in the electronics warfare technician rating also remained inadequate.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Increased USMC personnel manning had resolved many previously reported deficiencies. Most notable were the increases in cryptologic and communications intelligence personnel.

(U) In the Air Force, recent higher officer retention rates were gradually offsetting the losses of experienced fighter pilots during 1978-1980, but it would take several years to regain aircrew stability and experience in the tactical air forces.

Manpower Plans and Policy

(U) The USCINCPAC manpower management office developed plans and policy and prepared joint manpower programs for HQ USCINCPAC and its seven direct reporting units (ADP Systems Support Group, Intelligence Center Pacific, Airborne Command Post, Headquarters Support Activity, Joint Casualty Resolution Center, Special Operations Center Pacific, and Pacific Stars & Stripes) and reviewed those of three subordinate joint activities (U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), and USFK's Communications Security Support Activity (CSSA)); also the United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command (UNC/CFC), prior to submission to the JCS and the Services. In addition, USCINCPAC and the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), in conjunction with the Services, managed JMPs for security assistance organizations (SAOs) in the USPACOM, but USCINCPAC managed SAO civilian personnel manning exclusively. Personnel assignments to SAOs in the USPACOM in 1984 are depicted in Chapter I.

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1. J134 Point Paper (C), 7 Feb 85, Subj: USPACOM Personnel (U), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 150826Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR, p. 47.

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### JCS Manpower Survey

(U) Following the 1983 JCS Manpower Survey, USCINCPAC had non-concurred in many of the organizational recommendations and in deletion of several of the billets identified by the JCS team. The Chief of Staff's reclama in October had also questioned certain aspects of the team's methodology. At the end of 1983 the JCS were reviewing the USCINCPAC response, and final results of the survey were expected in mid-1984. However, the JCS chose to implement only selected recommendations from the survey and included them in the FY 85 JMP guidance issued in December 1984.<sup>1</sup>

### FY 85 USPACOM Joint Manpower Programs

(U) Action on the FY 85 JMP resulted in not only a disapproval of additional billets, but a net reduction from the FY 84 levels. The proposed FY 85 JMPs for USPACOM joint activities were forwarded to the JCS in the fall of 1983 with a net requested increase of 95 billets over the 2,263 authorized for FY 84. After 14 months of deliberation, the JMPs were approved by the JCS in December 1984. The impact was disapproval of the requested end strength increase (+95 spaces) and a decrease of 7 from FY 84 for a net reduction of 102 billets as depicted below. (The 7 spaces were used to satisfy some of the additional worldwide JMP requirements.) Reductions were accomplished by disapproving some requested increases, eliminating billets from a three percent low priority listing developed in FY 82, and deleting billets identified as excess in a 1983 JCS manpower survey of HQ USCINCPAC, HSA, IPAC, and the ADP Systems Support Group.<sup>2</sup>

### Manpower and Personnel Management

(U) For many years joint commands had operated under a manpower system that was dependent upon the willingness of the individual Services to take billets from their respective resources to provide additional joint manpower spaces. In recent years the Services' flexibility to accommodate such requests became severely limited due to operational and budgetary developments. This had resulted from delivery of new weapons systems procured in earlier years but without authorization by the Congress for concomitant increases in manpower to operate and maintain those systems.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Consequently, realignment of existing billets to man the new systems was emphasized by the Services at the expense of satisfying additional joint manpower requirements. In order to obtain additional joint billets in such an

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/PRD), Vol. III, p. 679-680.
  2. J133 HistSum Dec 84 (U); J133 Talking Paper (U), 21 Nov 84, as amended, Subj: Joint Manpower Program; SSO Korea 080040Z Dec 84 (U)(BOM).
  3. J1/Memo/329 (U), 2 Apr 85, Subj: Manpower and Personnel Management.

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environment, it became necessary for USCINCPAC, as well as other unified commanders, to compete for resources along with the Services in the budget development process. To that end, in 1984 USCINCPAC began working with the JCS towards incorporation of USPACOM joint manpower requirements in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). Success was achieved in December 1984 with the additional manpower requirements requested in the FY 86 JMP submission being considered in the FY 87 Program Objectives Memorandum process. By programming manpower adjustments in the outyears, there was some assurance of approval and the provision of sufficient lead time for efficient assignment of personnel. Adherence to the long-range PPBS philosophy would not in itself eliminate manpower and personnel turbulence. As a corollary action, USCINCPAC enhanced management of personnel resources through curtailment of internal management decisions, which had resulted in the placement of personnel in billets other than those assigned or intended by the respective military personnel centers.<sup>1</sup>

### Management Headquarters Ceiling

(U) The FY 84 DOD Authorization Act, signed on 24 September 1983, directed a five percent reduction of manpower billets within all DOD management headquarters by 30 September 1984. An attempt by JCS Chairman General Vessey to have unified commands and joint activities excluded from this reduction was unsuccessful. In late March 1984 the JCS advised that the initial effort would not be a reduction but a "scrub-down" of functions and associated billets to identify those that should be redesignated from a management headquarters program element code (PEC) to a non-management PEC. The six unified commanders were to report the results of their "scrub-down" efforts by 23 April. USCINCPAC, as a Navy-administered headquarters, was asked by the Chief of Naval Operations for similar information by 8 May. The net effect of recoding for FY 85 was a redesignation of 166 billets as reflected on the accompanying chart--84 at the ADP Systems Support Group, 16 at the USFK Communications Security Support Activity; and 66 were recoded and realigned into one section at USFK headquarters which was redesignated the USPACOM Joint Command Information Systems Activity.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Ibid.; Interview with LCOL R.A. Bouthillier, USAF, J133, 17 Jun 85 (U); USCINCPAC Instruction 1300.2 (U), 11 Jan 84, Subj: Assignment and Reassignment Procedures for HQ USCINCPAC Staff Personnel.
  2. JCS 262257Z Mar 84 (U); CNO 171429Z Apr 84 (U); J133 Talking Paper (U), 21 Nov 84, as amended, Subj: Joint Manpower Program.

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USPACOM Joint Manpower Programs for FY 84 and FY85

	FY 84 Authori- zation	FY 85 Requests	JCS Adjust- ments to FY 85 Requests	Changes from FY 84 Authori- zation	JCS FY 85 ap- proved levels
HQ USCINCPAC/HSA	764	+20/784	-32	-12	752
Airborne Command Post	49	49	- 1	- 1	48
ADP Systems Support Group	97	-2/ 95	-11	-13	r 84
Intelligence Center Pacific	391	+7/398		+ 7	398
Joint Casualty Resolu- tion Center	14	+5/ 19	- 1	+ 4	18
Special Operations Com- mand Pacific	6	+15/ 21	- 3	+12	18
U.S. Forces Japan	141	+27/168	-18	+ 9	150
Pacific Stars & Stripes	121	121	- 2	- 2	119
U.S. Forces Korea	382	+14/396	-15	-1	*381
USFK Communications Se- curity Support Activity	17	17	- 1	-1	r 16
UNC/CFC	<u>281</u>	<u>+9/290</u>	<u>-18</u>	<u>- 9</u>	<u>272</u>
TOTAL	2,263	+95/2,358	-102	- 7	2,256

r = Recoded billets; total 166

\* = 66 of these billets were recoded and realigned into one section which was redesignated the USPACOM Joint Command Information Systems Activity.

Manpower Surveys

(U) During 1984 members of Headquarters USCINCPAC conducted manpower surveys of the Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDO), Japan; JUSMAG Philippines; and the U.S. Air Force Liaison Office/USCINCPACREP Australia.<sup>1</sup>

Japan

(U) Manning at the MDO Japan had remained at the same level since 1969: 6 military, 6 U.S. civilians, and 5 local wage rate (LWR) Japanese civilians. Evaluations by the USCINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group for FY 80 through FY 83 and a February 1981 manpower review had reported manpower shortages. Requests were also made to increase manning from 17 to 20 spaces in the FY 83 JMP submission and in the FY 84 and FY 85 Annual Integrated Assessments for Security Assistance, but the Deputy Chief of Mission had nonconcurred.<sup>2</sup>

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1. J131 Memo 29 May 85 (U).
  2. Final Report on HQ USCINCPAC/J1 Manpower Survey of Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDO) Japan 23-27 January 1984 (U).

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(U) A USCINCPAC team composed of five persons from the Manpower and Personnel Directorate conducted a manpower survey from 23 to 27 January 1984 and found that, while certain billets were over-tasked and some had capacity for assuming additional workload, overall the 17 authorized spaces were adequate to accomplish assigned mission responsibilities. The JMP did not reflect a true portrayal of the organizational structure, and the team recommended that a formal supervisory relationship be established for all civilian employees. The team also noted potential deficiencies in some other administrative procedures.

Philippines

(U) As of February 1983 the Philippine Government (GOP) was furnishing 157 AIK (assistance in kind) personnel in support of the overall JUSMAGPHIL mission. As the Philippine economic situation worsened during the latter part of 1983, GOP Armed Forces Chief General Ver asked for, and the United States (DSAA) agreed to, relief from some 1984 AIK obligations. In granting a USCINCPAC request for the United States to continue AIK funding in 1985, plus utilities, the Defense Security Assistance Agency stipulated that a manpower and facilities survey be conducted as soon as possible to insure that appropriate reductions were made before 1 January 1985.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The USCINCPAC survey team, headed by the J1 Deputy Director and consisting of an assistant team chief, six surveyors, and one clerk/administrator from Clark AB, conducted a survey of the JUSMAG Philippines Security Assistance Support Personnel (SASP) manning, short- and long-term housing, and other facilities requirements. At the direction of the DSAA, the survey was to determine where costs could be reduced. The on-site portion of the survey and the initial report took 74 man-days.<sup>2</sup>

(U) At the conclusion of the survey the team validated 66 of the 93 SASP positions (not including the security guards) based on a determination that AIK personnel were largely underemployed. Seven of the 66 validated positions should be made part of the JUSMAG JMP, and work accomplished by 47 others should be contracted out. Also, closure of the Howell compound (leased housing for JUSMAGPHIL personnel) was recommended; residents should be moved to higher quality leased housing in Manila. In addition, certain organizational changes were recommended, which if implemented, could result in more effective workload distribution and administrative management. The findings were officially forwarded to the JUSMAG on 8 November.<sup>3</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. III, p. 605; SECDEF 272332Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 222315Z Aug 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.
  2. J135 HistSum Oct 84 (U); J131 Point Paper (C), 26 Nov 84, Subj: Status of Manpower in JUSMAG Philippines (U), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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(U) In comments on the report the Chief JUSMAGPHIL advised that Howell Compound would be phased out by the end of 1985. Seven AIK billets would be transferred to the JUSMAG Joint Manpower Program (JMP) at a cost of \$7,500 over and above FY 85 budget figures. Some overtime would be eliminated. Retirement would be offered to five employees nearing retirement eligibility; however, severance pay of about \$4,000 might be necessary. In coordination with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, consideration would be given to the transfer of 47 persons to a services contract and to retention of 12 employees in an AIK status effective 1 January 1986. The Chief said that other recommendations were not feasible at the time but would be reevaluated periodically based on the Philippine political, economic, and sociological situation.<sup>1</sup>

### Australia

(U) At the beginning of 1984 the USCINCPACREP Australia/U.S. Air Force Liaison Office in the U.S. Embassy Canberra consisted of 4 officers, 6 enlisted, and 2 civilians, funded by the Air Force; 1 officer, 1 enlisted, and 1 civilian were assigned to the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Office in addition to personnel assigned to the Defense Attache. In June 1984 revised terms of reference were issued for the USCINCPACREP which were intended to eliminate ambiguity and overlap of functions with the Defense Attache office.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Following several months' experience under the new TOR, three USCINCPAC J1 personnel conducted a manpower survey from 5 to 16 November of the revamped organization. Key recommendations included transferring some of the USCINCPACREP responsibilities to the Defense Attache; establishing an Air Force Element designated as the DOD Support Activity-Australia under the DATT; and the elimination of 3 military and 2 civilian billets (leaving 7). Ambassador Nesen supported the findings of the draft report, and the USCINCPAC-approved study was forwarded to Air Force headquarters in December 1984 for final action.<sup>3</sup>

### Alaska

(U) Following recommendations by the 1983 JCS Manpower Survey Team, USCINCPAC and the Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK) Commander validated the need for USCINCPAC's Liaison Officer to the Alaskan Air Command (AAC) and concurred in the downgrade of the Navy billet from captain (O6) to commander (O5). The terms of reference for the LNO were expanded to include membership in a newly-

- 
1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 240200Z Oct 84 (U).
  2. J136 Point Paper (U), 15 May 84, Subj: Foreign Military Sales Office (FMSO) and U.S. Air Force Liaison Office (USAFLO) Manning in Australia; USCINCPACINST S3020.2J (S), 21 Jul 84, Subj: Command Relationships in the U.S. Pacific Command (U), DECL OADR.
  3. J133 HistSum Dec 84 (U); J133 Point Paper (U), 3 Dec 84, Subj: Manpower Study of USCINCPACREP/DAO Australia.

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established JTF-AK cell to provide for continuity of planning and coordination for joint operations and exercises within the Alaska theater.<sup>1</sup>

### Service Affiliation of Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces Japan

(U) On 10 November 1983 the Commandant of the Marine Corps had recommended a change in Service affiliation for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces Japan, from a "rotational" Service (Army, Navy, Marine Corps) assignment to designation as a Marine Corps nonrotational billet. Justification for the request was that USMC personnel constituted approximately 50 percent of the command and should be represented by a permanently assigned general officer in the decision-making chain of command. Both COMUSJAPAN and USCINCPAC agreed and forwarded the request for a change to the JCS. On 14 January 1984 the JCS approved the change from rotational to nonrotational Marine Corps major general, to be effective immediately.<sup>2</sup>

### Personnel Planning

#### Exercise Augmentation

(U) Prior to Exercise ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 82, personnel augmentation was essentially decentralized at both USCINCPAC and COMUSKOREA headquarters levels. Accordingly, no one office in either command had cognizance over the entire process of requesting, validating, and providing personnel augmentation. COMUSKOREA and USCINCPAC instituted strict procedures for the management of personnel augmentation in April 1982 which were first used in ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 82. In essence, a single point of contact (POC) for COMUSKOREA was identified for requesting/validating personnel augmentation requests, and a single POC for USCINCPAC was identified for receiving/filling each request. Each headquarters then refined its internal procedures for monitoring the sourcing and filling action. This system was used for Exercises TEAM SPIRIT and ULCHI FOCUS LENS 83 and 84. Procedures were refined and validated after each exercise. A refinement resulting from TEAM SPIRIT 84 was that COMUSKOREA would publish its consolidated request message in the September-October time-frame vice November.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Nevertheless, problems persisted. WESTCOM was tasked for the largest number of augmentees even though it had the fewest directly available resources as well as the lowest fill rate. Sometimes specifications for billets were inaccurate or incomplete, or COMUSKOREA requested augmentees for uni-

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1. J136 Point Paper (U), 17 Apr 84, Subj: Review of USCINCPAC Liaison Office Alaskan Air Command (LNO/AAC).
  2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, p. 40; JCS 140044Z Jan 84 (U).
  3. USCINCPAC TEAM SPIRIT Action Officer memo (U), 16 Apr 84, Subj: Personnel Augmentation Procedures for TEAM SPIRIT.

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
Service units, asked for more augmentees than necessary, or didn't fill requirements from in-theater resources.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Although there was an augmentation shortfall and appropriately cleared communicators were in short supply, significant strides were made in Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 84. USCINCPAC, fully supported by component commands, achieved the highest number and percentage of exercise personnel augmentation fill rate to date by filling 153 of 186 requirements. Again, for Exercise ULCHI-FOCUS LENS, USCINCPAC provided assistance to COMUSKOREA by sourcing and filling 167 out of 225 personnel augmentation requirements. This represented the largest number of out-of-country augmentees provided for any major exercise to date.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In an effort to attain even higher fill rates, on 3 January 1985 USCINCPAC asked COMUSKOREA to develop a standard list of all augmentation billets required for the joint/combined staffs/elements necessary for three exercises (ULCHI FOCUS-LENS, FOAL EAGLE, and TEAM SPIRIT), which reflected only essential augmentees. The list could then be used by components to plan ahead for future requirements. COMUSKOREA concurred with the recommended procedures for submission of augmentation lists to USCINCPAC 180 days prior to the start of the exercise for the first two; and 130 days before for TEAM SPIRIT. By using the previously submitted augmentation list as a base, appropriate additions and deletions would be included, with an indication as to which were to be filled by in-country assets. Justification would be provided for any additional augmentation, as well as any special instructions.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J132 Point Paper (U), 24 Dec 84, Subj: Individual Augmentation for Exercises in the USFK Theater.
  2. J132 HistSum Mar 84 (U); J134 HistSum Aug 84 (U); USCINCPAC 070615Z Mar 84 (U).
  3. USCINCPAC 030003Z Jan 85 (U); COMUSKOREA 170745Z Jan 85 (U).
  4. J134 HistSum Dec 84 (S/NF), CDRUSAEIGHT 270330Z Sep 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.

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Reserve Forces in USPACOM

(U) Reserve forces from all Services assigned to augment active duty forces in the Pacific theater played significant roles under both peacetime and mobilization conditions. In peacetime, the majority of Army Reserve units were combat support and combat service support, and the Army National Guard comprised over one-third of the Army's combat divisions and more than two-thirds of the Army's separate brigades worldwide. Peacetime contributions of the Reserve component in the USPACOM included participation in WESTCOM's Expanded Relations Program, civil affairs expertise to American Samoa and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and emergency/disaster relief.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The Naval Selected Reserve formed a part of the total Pacific naval force in critical mission areas. Under USCINCPAC OPLAN 5000/5001 reserve units mobilized to PACFLT commands would include one carrier air wing, two frigates, nine MSO minesweepers, four P-3 patrol squadrons, and five other ships. For USCINCPAC OPLAN 5027, mobilized forces would include six P-3 patrol squadrons and up to nine MSO minesweepers. In addition, mobilized reservists would compose approximately 50 percent of major staffs under these OPLANS. Peacetime contributions included augmentation of major staffs in exercises, ASW support to SEVENTH Fleet reserve by P-3 squadrons, and intelligence products for operational fleet use.

(U) The Hawaii Air National Guard (HANG) provided the only peacetime air defense for the Hawaiian Islands, and upon mobilization would be federalized. Under a Military Airlift Command (MAC) associates program, reserve pilots flew MAC channel routes in USPACOM while other reserves augmented aerial port squadrons and aerial refueling tanker units.

(U) Throughout the U.S. Marine Corps, Individual Ready Reserves (IRR), as well as Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units, performed 2-week active duty annually and some of these units trained with FMFPAC forces. When mobilized, SMCR units would increase FMFPAC strength by about 12,000, while several thousand IRRs would fill out the active units.

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1. CSA 041840Z Dec 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
  2. J134 Point Paper (U), 7 Feb 85, Subj: Contribution of the Reserve Forces in the Pacific Theater.

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## USCINCPAC and HSA Augmentation

(U) Under the FY 84 and 85 USCINCPAC and Headquarters Support Activity Joint Mobilization Augmentations (JMAs), officer and enlisted Individual Mobilization Augmentation billets were approved as depicted below.<sup>1</sup>

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Total</u>
O8					
O7			1/ 1		1/ 1
O6	9/ 9	7/ 7	4/ 3		20/ 19
O5	39/40	30/31	27/27	9/ 9	105/107
O4	30/31	15/15	20/20	2/ 2	67/ 68
O3		9/ 8	4/ 3		11/ 11
O2			1/ 1		1/ 1
WO	2/ 2			1/ 0	3/ 2
Total	80/82	61/61	57/55	12/11	210/209
HSA	1/2		2/2		3/ 4
E9	1/ 1	1/ 1			2/ 2
E8	2/ 1	4/ 2			6/ 3
E7	4/ 4	4/ 4	3/ 2	1/ 1	12/ 11
E6	11/10	15/15	5/ 4		31/ 29
E5	21/18	32/27	28/27	5/ 5	86/ 77
E4	6/ 5	13/13	8/ 6	1/ 1	28/ 25
E3	2/	1/			3/
Total	47/39	70/62	44/39	7/ 7	168/147
HSA	7/7	17/12	4/4		28/23
Civilian		17/ 15			17/ 15
HSA		5/ 4			5/ 4
Grand Tot	127/121	148/138	101/94	19/18	395/371
HSA	8/9	22/16	6/6		36/31

### Mobilization

#### Army

(U) Effective 12 October 1983 the 711th Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) Detachment was established at HQ USCINCPAC by authority of paragraph 3-12f, AR (Army Regulation) 600-20. This unit afforded Army reservists the opportunity to earn retirement points by attending regularly scheduled

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1. HQ CINCPAC FY 84 JMP, 1 Oct 83; HQ USCINCPAC FY 85 JMP, 1 Oct 84; CINCPAC HSA FY 84 JMP, 1 Oct 83; USCINCPAC HSA FY 85 JMP, 1 Oct 84, all (U).

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drills twice a month at this headquarters. Duties included performance of special projects for directorates and staff agencies and keeping abreast of new policies and regulations relating to Army Reserve matters.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Under the FY 84 USCINCPAC and Headquarters Support Activity JMP augmentation, up to 84 officer and 68 enlisted billets were authorized by M+6. Because the Army did not assign enlisted persons in grades E-5 and below to IMA positions, actual enlisted positions would total 23 under such criterion. Numbers assigned were officers 45 and 10 enlisted as of June 1984. Coordination was maintained with the Army Reserve Personnel Center Liaison Office-Pacific at WESTCOM to fill vacancies.<sup>2</sup>

### Air Force

(U) The Air Force Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) was different from other reserve programs because there was no fixed organizational structure per se. The place of residence, unit of assignment (organization to which an IMA was assigned and would normally report for duty upon mobilization), and unit of attachment (organization to which an IMA was attached for training) could be thousands of miles apart. Hq USAF annually reviewed the projected manning for all active duty Air Force Speciality Codes (AFSC) which would have shortfalls that could be supported by the reserve forces. These AFSCs were identified to the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) as funded positions, and then ARPC recruited and filled these positions. Reservists applied for IMA positions through the ARPC which, in turn, would forward the application to the unit of assignment [USCINCPAC]. Upon acceptance, the necessary paperwork was completed and returned to the ARPC.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The types of tours were annual tour (AT), which was the required 2-week active duty in each fiscal year, and inactive duty training (IDT), which was authorized training performed by a reservist not on active duty or active-duty-for-training (ADT). Tours were authorized to support short-term needs of the active force or tours that were above and beyond annual tours for special/training projects which were normally projected three years in advance. IMAs assigned to major commands, special operating agencies, or direct reporting units had to perform their annual training with their unit of assignment. The 39 funded positions within USCINCPAC were all unit assignment positions with the majority of the personnel having a unit of attachment other than USCINCPAC. All 39 were Category "B" positions and were authorized 24 IDT periods for pay (12 days) and one 12-day (2-week) ADT each fiscal year.

(U) For many years Headquarters PACAF (Director of Personnel Plans and

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1. J146 HistSum May 84 (Revised) (U).
2. Ibid.
3. J143 Point Paper (U), 9 Jul 85, Subj: Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program.

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Systems) was the controlling activity for all Air Force Reserve programs within the USPACOM for "3V" (joint) command elements. In September 1983 PACAF initiated action to transfer the IMA program to USCINCPAC's Air Force Personnel Element because PACAF assumed that USCINCPAC would act as the "major command" (higher headquarters) for all 3V units within the USPACOM when, in fact, its purview would be limited to the headquarters USCINCPAC Air Force Reserve affairs manager; COMUSJAPAN and COMUSKOREA would manage their own respective programs.<sup>1</sup>

(U) A conference was held in October 1983 at Camp Smith with representatives from PACAF and the Air Force Military Personnel Center at which it was agreed that IMA program management for the USPACOM would be transferred to USCINCPAC once a civilian billet was authorized to manage the program. It was USCINCPAC's understanding that this civilian would manage not only the Air Force Reserve program, but also the other three Services' programs. A conference at the ARPC in Denver, Colorado, where the matter could be resolved was scheduled for February 1984 but did not transpire until March; meanwhile, PACAF pressed to transfer all its responsibilities for the IMA program to USCINCPAC. Effective 1 April these functions were transferred to respective Air Force elements at USFJ, USFK, and USCINCPAC. At year's end, however, without authorization for the civilian billet, the problem of collective program management remained unresolved.

### Alcohol and Drug Abuse

(U) Results of a 1982 "Worldwide Survey of Alcohol and Nonmedical Drug Use Among Military Personnel" reflected self-report responses of 21,936 randomly-selected military personnel. Among several major initiatives undertaken to reduce drug and alcohol abuse was a comprehensive DOD-wide policy for dealing with the problem of intoxicated driving. DOD Directive 1010.7 was signed on 10 August 1983 by Secretary Weinberger and was implemented by USCINCPAC on 4 April 1984 which allowed each Service component to operate its own programs according to Service directives. USCINCPAC staff would provide overall coordination for alcohol and drug abuse issues which affected operational readiness within USPACOM, and Service component control managers would meet at least quarterly to review and coordinate program activities.<sup>2</sup>

(U) From 4 to 22 January 1984 Representative Charles B. Rangel (D-New York), Chairman of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, led a 33-member delegation to Hawaii, Hong Kong, Rangoon (Burma), Bangkok and Chiang Mai (Thailand), Islamabad and Peshawar (Pakistan), and Ankara (Turkey).

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1. J143 Point Paper (U), 9 Jul 85, Subj: Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program. Note: 3V was an Air Force category for assignment to a joint activity.
  2. OASD(PA) News Release No. 425-83, 25 Aug 83 (U); USCINCPACINST 5350.3B (U), 4 Apr 84, Subj: Alcohol and drug abuse by DOD personnel.

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The trip purpose was to continue the committee's comprehensive oversight and review of the problems of narcotics, drug, and polydrug abuse and control. In Hawaii the delegation received briefings from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Customs Service (USCS), Honolulu Police Department, and the four military Services. The military briefings, chaired by Admiral Crowe and held on 5 January, covered the current level of drug abuse among the military; effectiveness and results of the drug abuse enforcement and prevention programs implemented by the Services during the last two years; and areas of concern faced by the military in controlling drug abuse within the ranks.<sup>1</sup>

(U) At the quarterly USCINCPAC Drug/Alcohol Abuse Committee meeting on 26 March, discussions by Service component command representatives concerned Service efforts in combating alcohol abuse, the Hawaii Joint Police Association annual substance abuse seminar, a recap of USPACOM urinalysis quotas, and the aforementioned Rangel delegation visit; there was also a briefing on the Pearl Harbor Naval Station substance abuse prevention program.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Among highlights at other quarterly USCINCPAC Drug/Alcohol Abuse Committee meetings was a briefing on the Tri-Service Alcohol Rehabilitation Facility at Tripler Army Medical Center, its background, philosophy, bed capacity, and staffing requirements. The program had enjoyed an approximate 90 percent success rate since its "out-of-hide" operation began in July 1980. Beginning in 1984 the 6-week program was opened to members of all Services and some Veterans Administration patients. Another meeting, held at the U.S. Army Drug Testing Laboratory at Schofield Barracks, followed a tour of the facility. The tour acquainted attendees with the capacities, equipment, the scientific processes involved, and other capabilities of the lab.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Another review of narcotics control efforts in Asia was commissioned by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The 3-person task force on Narcotics Control traveled throughout the USPACOM from 11 August to 7 September and spent two days in Hawaii. Stops included Tokyo, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Rangoon, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Manila, and Guam. Again, the focus was on meetings and briefings with host government drug enforcement officials, United Nations representatives, and, where appropriate, with U.S. military officials. In Hawaii, the task force expressed concern over the problems the Air Force and Army had experienced in obtaining resources to expand the Schofield Drug Laboratory capabilities to give more urinalysis quotas to commands. (Because of equipment and personnel limitations, the lab was only processing about 9,000 samples monthly.) Navy labs for the USPACOM were located at Oakland and San Diego, California, and processed approximately 30,000 samples

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1. J111 HistSum Jan 84 (U).
  2. J111 HistSum Mar 84 (U).
  3. USCINCPAC Ltrs Ser 2522 of 28 Sep 83, Ser 308 of 3 Feb 84, Ser 884 of 5 Apr 85 all (U), Subj: Minutes of USCINCPAC Drug/Alcohol Abuse Committee (DAAC) with component service representatives.

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monthly.<sup>1</sup>

### National Narcotics Border Interdiction System

(U) The Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385) precluded the U.S. Armed Forces from assisting local law enforcement officers in carrying out their duties although certain exceptions could be granted on a case-by-case basis. In December 1981, as part of the Defense Authorization Act of 1982, the Congress enacted a statute (10 USC 371-378--Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials) which authorized the Secretary of Defense to cooperate with local civilian law enforcement officials by providing information, equipment, facilities, and training. However, if the requested assistance pertained to drug enforcement, illegal aliens, or customs control, personnel could be used to operate equipment for monitoring and communicating the movement of air and sea traffic. The statute did not permit direct participation by military members in interdicting vessels or aircraft, search and seizure, or arrest unless otherwise authorized by statute. Also, the statute prohibited the provision of equipment or facilities if such assistance would adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense/Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics (ASD/MRA&L) provided policy guidance in DOD Directive 5525.5 of March 1982. As a result, the Army, Navy, and Air Force significantly expanded assistance to civilian law enforcement officials, primarily in and around Florida. In 1983 the DEA expressed concern over the increased cultivation of marijuana in Hawaii--some of it on military reservations, other federal, state, and private lands. Under the leadership of Vice President Bush, a National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) was created on 17 June 1983 to provide a higher level of coordination among federal, state, and local drug enforcement agencies. On 18 October 1983 DEA officials met with USCINCPAC representatives (J73, J31, J11, and J23) for discussions concerning possible USCINCPAC assistance to the DEA coordinated marijuana eradication program in Hawaii. Specifically, the DEA asked USCINCPAC to consider providing helicopter surveillance support and training assistance. Although the Hawaii Air National Guard had been mobilized for that purpose by the Governor, the extent of their contribution was limited due to other commitments; also, the Coast Guard had insufficient resources to be an effective force.<sup>3</sup>

(U) From 4 to 6 June 1984 the Vice President's chief of staff, ADM Daniel J. Murphy, USN (Ret), who was also the coordinator of the NNBIS, visited Honolulu as the guest of the Fourteenth Coast Guard District (14CGD). The

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1. SECSTATE 201035/092300Z Jul 84 (LOU); J111 HistSum Sep 84 (U).
  2. J73/Memo/461-83 (U), 21 Oct 83, Subj: Military participation in civilian anti-drug law enforcement activities.
  3. Ibid., with enclosure; See also J116/Memo/155, 18 Oct 83 (U), Subj: Meeting with USCINCPAC J73 and Drug Enforcement Administration agents.

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purpose of his visit was to discuss the NNBIS with the Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee of Hawaii which was composed of the heads of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and senior military commanders. On 6 June Admiral Murphy visited Camp Smith for a briefing and discussions with Admiral Crowe and his component commanders. Admiral Murphy explained NNBIS procedures, and USCINCPAC pledged support within existing DOD guidelines.<sup>1</sup>

(C) USCINCPAC had assented to a maximum E-2C tasking of four sorties per month in the USPACOM for the NNBIS, and requests from the Pacific Region NNBIS Center for air support had been met by PACFLT with E-2B/C, P-3, S-3, and OV-10 aircraft. In FY 84 PACFLT made available an average of 4-8 sorties per month/per type aircraft. Also, non-dedicated air support was provided in conjunction with other missions in the form of vessel lookout reporting by P-3/S-3s on a "not-to-interfere-with-business" basis. Between June 1983 and November 1984 Navy and Marine aircraft had flown 1,284 hours, mostly on the west and southwest borders of CONUS, at a cost of \$1,079,000. Seized and/or recovered material was 3 aircraft, 6 vessels, 5 vehicles, and 17 tons of marijuana.<sup>2</sup>

(C) In response to JCS queries in August and September 1984, USCINCPAC stated that any additional tasking of E-2C aircraft to support NNBIS would adversely impact on PACFLT readiness and training and would increase competition for scarce E-3 assets. Regarding a U.S. Southern Command proposal, USCINCPAC recommended that responsibility for anti-narcotics operations remain with the government agencies to which assigned. Further, USCINCPAC did not concur in a proposed uncompensated expansion of military involvement in anti-narcotics operations because of effects on missions, collateral functions, forces, and funding.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 15 October 1984 Vice President Bush announced the establishment of a Honolulu office as part of the Pacific Regional NNBIS Office in Long Beach, California, in the fight against drug trafficking in the Pacific. The 14CGD Commander RADM Robbins was named to head the effort with the USCS assistant special agent-in-charge John R. Helmerson as deputy coordinator. The Honolulu office would also provide better coordination in the analysis and use of intelligence, as well as in the use of military resources in the anti-narcotics effort. That same day NNBIS Staff Director CAPT L. N. Schowengent, USCG (Ret), met with four USCINCPAC staff members concerning the new office. NNBIS plans called for eventual staffing of the Honolulu office by 10 people, including one from each military Service at the E-7 to E-9 level.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J114 HistSum Jun 84 (U).
  2. PACFLT (CDR D. O. Collins, USN) Point Papers (C), 3 Dec 84 and 2 Jan 85, Subj: NNBIS air support availability and effectiveness (U), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 060430Z, 182320Z Aug and 012225Z Sep 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  4. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 15 Oct 84, p. A-7 "U.S. Broadens War on Drugs in Pacific Area," (U); J73/Memorandum for the Record (U), 15 Oct 84, Subj: Meeting between NNBIS Staff Director and members of USCINCPAC Staff.

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(U) On 6 December Admiral Murphy met with Admiral Crowe, the Coast Guard's Pacific Area Commander VADM John Costello, and 14CGD Commander RADM Robbins. Admiral Murphy spoke of concern at the highest national levels that Hawaii, and especially the Big Island, was becoming a major illicit drug center. Discussions focused on the major problems in eradication efforts there, especially the lack of helicopter support for law enforcement agencies. With the extensive eradication efforts by Mexico and Colombia, demands for Hawaii drug products were expected to increase.<sup>1</sup>

### Customs

#### Aircraft Preclearance Program

(U) For a number of years military customs inspections of crews and passengers returning to the customs territory of the United States (CTUS) was accomplished under DOD Directive 5030.49R "U.S. Customs Sanctioned Military Customs Preclearance Inspection Program." Program objectives were to eliminate the flow of illicit narcotics and other contraband; assist U.S. customs, agriculture, and immigration services; and minimize inconvenience and delay to DOD personnel, equipment, and cargo.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The Air Force rescinded earlier support for the program on 30 November 1982 because it was considered duplication, harassment, and time-consuming. The Air Force recommended that the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) perform border clearance for MAC flights at the first CTUS port. On 8 September 1983 HQ USAF proposed a phaseout of the preinspection portion of the program for Military Airlift Command (MAC) charter (Category B) flights from overseas military air terminals. A month later a demonstration project was implemented in the U.S. European Command involving flights originating in Italy and entering the CTUS at Philadelphia.<sup>3</sup>

(U) A similar demonstration survey began in the USPACOM on 1 January 1984 for flights originating Clark AB, the Philippines, transiting Kadena AB, Okinawa, and then entering the CTUS at Anchorage, Alaska. USCINCPAC tasked USCINCPACREP Philippines and COMUSJAPAN to assist MAC in evaluating the Pacific demonstration. Data was then forwarded to USCINCPAC who, in turn, forwarded his evaluation to the Department of the Army--the DOD executive agent for the customs inspection program.<sup>4</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC Ltr Ser 132 (U), 16 Jan 85, Subj: Minutes of USCINCPAC Drug/Alcohol Abuse Committee (DAAC) with component service representatives (4th Qtr, CY 84).
  2. J111 Point Paper (C), 23 Nov 84, Subj: Passenger Preclearance Program (DOD 5030.49R) (U), DECL OADR.
  3. J111 Point Paper (U), 24 Aug 1984, Subj: Passenger Preclearance Program.
  4. Ibid.

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1983 USPACOM MILITARY CUSTOMS INSPECTIONS/EXAMINATIONS

<u>Category</u>	<u>M C I</u>		<u>Inspected</u>	<u>Examined</u>	<u>Theater</u>	<u>CTUS</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Seizures</u>		
	<u>Part/</u>	<u>Full-time</u>						<u>Contra-</u>	<u>Discov-</u>	
	<u>Time</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Theater</u>	<u>CTUS</u>	<u>Theater</u>	<u>CTUS</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>traband</u>	<u>erries</u>	
General	26/ 15	41								
PAX/Crew baggage (Accom. " )	32/121	153	172,167	309,923	76,431	76,740	635,261	73	5,031	5,104
Household goods (109/101		210	11,975	975	22,168	1,056	174	9	4,171	4,180
Unaccompanied bag.			5,544	426	52,559	1,769	60,298	7	2,222	2,229
POV			-	-	6,474	590	7,064	1	86	87
Ships	(195/ 19	214				*47	95	40	15	55
Aircraft					*25,351	*6,838	32,189	5	83	88
DOD Cargo	342/ 43	385	89,496	47,921	115,930	56,785	310,132	0	2	2
Combination	339/ 94	433								
	1,043/393	1,436	279,182	359,245	273,562	136,940		135	11,610	11,745
			*25,399		*6,885					
										1,045,213

\* No breakdown available between CTUS and Theater.

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(U) Both the USCS and USDA had previously expressed their preference for exploring and testing alternatives to improve preclearance procedures rather than terminating the program. In August USCINCPAC supported continuation of the preclearance program, only if the inspections would be honored by USCS officials upon entry into the CTUS. The next month the Air Force extended the trial period indefinitely. For awhile it appeared that if U.S. military customs inspectors discontinued preclearance, Philippine customs agents might try to insist on inspecting outbound baggage--a U.S. prerogative established in a U.S.-Philippine agreement of 8 December 1982 on customs, immigration, and quarantine. However, in November arrangements which satisfied Philippine authorities were made by Thirteenth Air Force and the USCINCPACREP Philippines for occasional observation and/or participation by Philippine customs agents in the random anti-drug/anti-hijack inspections. In December USCINCPAC agreed to phase-out preclearance of MAC Category B flights. Four weekly flights were affected--the aforementioned two originating at Clark, and two originating at Osan AB, Korea, transiting Yokota, Japan, and entering the CTUS at Anchorage, Alaska. Preclearance for military aircraft, exercises, household goods, personal property, and naval vessel movements, however, remained intact.<sup>1</sup>

### Military Customs Conference

(U) The annual USPACOM Military Customs Conference was held from 30 October through 1 November at the New Sanno Hotel in Tokyo, Japan. Attendees included representatives from COMUSJAPAN, COMUSKOREA, USCINCPACREPs in the Philippines and Guam, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, MAC, USDA, and USCS. Major areas of concern and discussion included copyright and trademark violations, the MAC preclearance demonstration project (see above), and a USCS proposal for realignment of USCS advisers in the USPACOM.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Quarterly customs reports were required by USCINCPAC Instruction 5840.3. The information on the accompanying charts was compiled from submissions by COMUSJAPAN, COMUSKOREA, USCINCPACREP Guam/TTPI (including the Naval Support Facility Antarctica Detachment Christchurch, New Zealand), and USCINCPACREP Philippines (including Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia). The charts depict the actions of USPACOM military customs inspectors (MCI) during 1983 and 1984. The manning figures are averages of quarterly submissions. The numbers of seizures and inspections/examinations are calendar year totals. The lower numbers of aircraft inspected and examined reflected the MAC Category B demonstration project departing from the Philippines and Japan. Contraband discoveries were principally agricultural and weapon finds.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J111 HistSum Aug 84 (U); HQ USAF 081200Z Sep 83 (U); HQ USAF 251835Z Sep 84 (U); USCINCPACREPPHIL 140806Z Nov 84 (U), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 270227Z Nov 84 (U); Op. Cit., J111 Point Paper of 23 Nov 84.
  2. J111 HistSum Nov 84 (U).
  3. USCINCPAC Ltrs (U) Ser 1672, 19 Jun 84 and Ser 635, 8 Mar 85, Subj: USPACOM Military Customs Report FY 2/84 and 1/85, respectively.

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1984 USPACOM MILITARY CUSTOMS INSPECTIONS/EXAMINATIONS

Category	M C I		Full-time Total	Inspected		Theater	CTUS	Examined		Theater	Total	Seizures		Total
	Part/							CTUS	Theater			CTUS	Theater	
General	35/	5	40											
PAX/Crew baggage (Accom. " )	54/	99	153	187,929	284,981	48,499	82,062	603,471	46	2,707	2,753			
Household goods (163/132		295		14,237	1,179	20,182	823	36,421	14	4,975	4,989			
Unaccompanied bag.				21,792	543	40,591	1,643	64,569	4	3,745	3,749			
POV				-	-	7,986	364	8,350	3	80	83			
Ships	(121/	20	141			*34	*322	356	14	0	14			
Aircraft						*18,390	*3,607	21,997	1	2	3			
DOD Cargo	169/	77	246	100,630	49,805	73,739	45,169	269,343	0	151	151			
Combination	183/	97	280											
	725/	430	1,155	324,588	336,508	190,997	130,061	82	11,660	11,742				
				*18,424		*3,929		1,004,507						

\* No breakdown available between CTUS and Theater.

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## Personnel Administrative Services

### Education Services Workshop

(U) The second biennial USPACOM Education Services Workshop was held at Kyong Ju in Korea from 23 to 27 April 1984. Sponsored by USCINCPAC, approximately 125 education officers from the four Services at the installation, major command, and Military Department levels and academic professionals were guests of the Eighth U.S. Army. The workshop provided a forum to discuss existing programs and contract compliance and to increase personal professional development among the Services and educational institutions. Specific Service-oriented and joint training were also conducted.<sup>1</sup>

### Dependent Schools

(U) The Department of Defense Dependent Schools-Pacific (DODDS-PAC) Region Advisory Council was comprised of representatives from USCINCPAC's component commands (including FMFPAC). At a Council meeting on 16 February 1984 members received an information briefing by the DODDS-PAC mathematics coordinator on the educational and administrative use of computers in the schools. Additional agenda items included discussions on funded bus monitors, designated location dependents, school security, and student enrollment. Subjects discussed at a meeting on 21 June included visits by a DOD Inspector General team and the North Central Association elementary and secondary accreditation staff members, school bus safety, and effects of projected military force structure changes on DODDS-PAC.<sup>2</sup>

(U) At the 30 October meeting the Region Director, Dr. Killin, reviewed regional highlights, as well as the latest Scholastic Aptitude Test results which showed that DODDS-PAC students' average scores were higher than both DODDS-wide and national average scores. Also discussed were representation by U.S. Forces Korea on the Council, the DODDS-PAC construction program and supply system changes, and student enrollment.<sup>3</sup>

### Impact Aid

(U) Federal Impact Aid appropriations were intended to reimburse local school districts for the cost of educating federally-connected dependents. In recent years such funding for dependents in Hawaii had been in jeopardy, primarily because the State of Hawaii's Department of Education was organized into just one district for all islands. In the late 1970s Hawaii's share was

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1. J114 HistSum Apr 84 (U).
  2. J114 HistSum Jun 84 (U); J1/Memo/S006 (U), 1 Aug 85, Subj: Review of Draft USCINCPAC Command History 1984.
  3. J114 HistSum Oct 84 (U).

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approximately \$16 million, but the figures had dropped to \$13 million (FY 81), \$10.8 million (FY 82), and \$11.3 (FY 83).<sup>1</sup>

(U) In December 1983 the President signed Public Law 98-211--an initiative by Hawaii's Senator Daniel K. Inouye and Representative Cecil F. Heftel. The law allowed the State's seven administrative regions (of the one district) to be counted as separate school districts for the purpose of computing Impact Aid. The Federal program recognized two categories of students. In Category A were students who had sponsors living and working on Federal property; Category B students had sponsors who worked on Federal property but lived in the civilian community and paid property taxes. The formula in the new law provided that districts would receive funding as follows:<sup>2</sup>

Those with 20 percent or more Category A students--100 percent of entitlement for those students (Super A district); with less than 20 percent Category A students--a pro rata share of the amount remaining after Super A districts were paid (non-Super A). Districts with 20 percent or more Category B students--50 percent of entitlement for those students (Super B district) while those with less than 20 percent would receive a pro rata share of the amount remaining after Super B districts were paid (non-Super B district).

(U) Hawaii had no Super B districts, and the only one qualifying as a Super A district was the Central Oahu region. Based on U.S. Department of Education and Library of Congress estimates in November 1983, Hawaii was projected to receive \$15.6 million in Impact Aid for FY 84. However, due to a 37 percent increase in actual costs for Super A districts nationwide, Hawaii received only \$9.3 million. The figure projected for FY 85 was \$9.7 million.<sup>3</sup>

### Postal Affairs

(U) A special USPACOM Postal Operations meeting was held on 12 January 1984 at Hickam AFB with representatives from USCINCPAC, PACAF, PACFLT, and WESTCOM. Training requirements were discussed with the the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) Mail Processing Support Division Director who served as USPS military liaison. Three video tape training aids prepared by USPS were reviewed for use by unit mail, finance, and supervisory postal personnel.<sup>4</sup>

(U) From 15 to 18 September the Executive Director of the Military Postal Service Agency met with USPACOM's component command postal representatives

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1. J114 Point Paper (U), 9 Jul 84, Subj: Impact Aid; CINCPAC Command History 1982 (TS/PRD), Vol. III, pp. 608-610.
  2. Ibid.
  3. J114 Point Paper (U), 4 Apr 85, Subj: Impact Aid.
  4. J114 HistSum Jan 84 (U).

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on mail support for contingency operations, mail facilities at Japan's Narita International Airport, and routing of Navy mail throughout the Pacific.<sup>1</sup>

### United Service Organizations

(U) In September 1983 the United Service Organizations (USO) of Hawaii asked Admiral Crowe to appoint a member of his staff to provide liaison with the USO of Hawaii. During the preceding 12-month period, the USO Center at the Honolulu International Airport had assisted more than 21,000 military members and dependent travelers. The 19 September letter from the USO of Hawaii President also asked that members of USPACOM be apprised of the program's needs and benefits. The Personnel Administrative Services Branch Chief was appointed as USCINCPAC's liaison officer. During 1984 the board was considering establishment of an additional facility at Fort DeRussy.<sup>2</sup>

### American Red Cross

(U) On 6 March 1984 representatives of the component commands and Coast Guard, who comprised the Military Liaison Committee of the Hawaii State Chapter, American Red Cross (ARC), met at the Camp Smith Officers Club. At the meeting, chaired by the USCINCPAC Personnel Services Division Chief, a briefing on the existing and proposed national Red Cross organization was given by Mr. Ed Webb, a member of the state ARC staff. An ARC headquarters proposal recommended that a Service to the Armed Forces function become a responsibility of local ARC chapters rather than be supervised from the national headquarters. It was the Committee's consensus that such a change would not adversely affect service to the military.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Since 1967 the ARC had provided a liaison representative with the USCINCPAC J1 staff--first with an office at Fort Shafter (until 1969), then at Camp Smith (1969-71), back to Fort Shafter (1971-81), and then at the local state office until 1984. The liaison representative was responsible for consolidating information from the two ARC directors in the Pacific. Under the above ARC reorganization, the position was abolished in 1984, and the single Pacific Area Director was located at Camp Zama, Japan.<sup>4</sup>

### Overseas Combined Federal Campaign

(U) The 1985 Overseas Combined Federal Campaign Pacific was conducted from 22 October to 30 November 1984. A record donation of \$3,232,400 was

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1. J114 HistSum Sep 84 (U).
  2. USCINCPAC Ltr Ser 2580 (U), 6 Oct 83 in reply to Mr. Marvin R. Koga's Ltr of 19 Sep 83; J114 HistSum Mar 84 (U).
  3. J114 HistSum Mar 84 (U).
  4. Interview with LCOL D. J. Dempsey, USA, J114, 19 Jun 85 (U).

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received from 101,520 contributors as compared with \$2,900,611 for 1984.<sup>1</sup>

### Personnel Benefits and Entitlements

(U) In his year-end report to the Secretary of Defense, Admiral Crowe noted that benefit erosion was coming to the forefront during a period of budget reduction. He expressed his gratitude for the Secretary's past support but said that with the diminishing numbers of eligible youth, ". . . the appearance of an 'open season' on military benefits must be scrupulously avoided." While the level of members' concern fluctuated with the various proposals; taken in toto they could pose a serious future retention and readiness problem. "We must act now to turn around adverse perceptions that affect the quality of life of our members."<sup>2</sup>

### Shipment of Foreign-made POVs

(U) For a number of years emission control and other automotive standards in Japan, coupled with import-export restrictions, had created seemingly inordinate financial hardships for DOD personnel using U.S. manufactured privately owned vehicles (POVs) or foreign-made (FPOVs) while stationed in Japan. Despite USCINCPAC, component, and subordinate command efforts, economic pressures during 1983 and 1984 led to greater congressional interest and regulation governing purchase and use of FPOVs while in an overseas area. At the end of 1983, Service headquarters were attempting to establish uniform procedures for obtaining exemptions from the requirement for a Service Secretary, on a case-by-case basis, to approve shipment of FPOVs from Guam as an alternate port. Relief was sought through two venues during 1984.<sup>3</sup>

### State Department Effort

(U) In April 1984 House Armed Services Committee Chairman Melvin Price (D-Illinois) asked the State Department what DOD and Japanese Government (GOJ) restrictions created the POVs and FPOVs problems. Congressional interest stemmed from the fact that importation of foreign-made [Japanese] vehicles was a key balance of trade issue, and this appeared to be a way for Japanese manufacturers to evade the quota system. As a result, in June the State Department asked the U.S. Embassy Tokyo to raise the issue with the GOJ in diplomatic channels.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J113 HistSum Dec 84 (U); USCINCPAC 051937Z Jan 84 (U); J1/Memo/S006 (U), 1 Aug 85, Subj: Review of Draft USCINCPAC Command History 1985; USCINCPAC 112334Z Feb 85 (U).
  2. USCINCPAC 100212Z Jan 85 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/PRD), Vol. II, pp. 493-496.
  4. SECSTATE 99135/050506Z and AMEMB Tokyo 8543/270944Z Apr 84 (U); SECSTATE 181259/202132Z Jun 84 (LOU).

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(C) The Embassy made the demarche to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 24 July requesting that Japan remove its stringent emission control and other restrictions on automobiles imported solely for the use of U.S. military personnel. Accompanying the demarche was a "sense of the Congress" resolution which linked requested exemption from Japanese environmental requirements along with exemption from safety standards that was granted to Japanese Self-Defense Force personnel stationed in the United States. On 12 December the Embassy advised that the GOJ response was negative--its position had not changed since April 1979 when the question was last raised in the U.S.-GOJ Joint Committee. The Status of Forces Agreement did not authorize the import of POVs belonging to U.S. Servicemen; therefore exemption from applicable laws would require a separate government-to-government agreement. Also, seeking favorable treatment for U.S. Servicemen would incur a high political cost for the GOJ for a comparatively small gain. The Embassy believed that ". . . further pursuit of the issue will not be fruitful."<sup>1</sup>

Defense Department Effort

(U) On 24 December 1983 Admiral Crowe appealed to the Service Secretaries for expeditious and favorable consideration on any request from USPACOM personnel for use of alternate ports for shipment of FPOVs to CONUS upon completion of their tour. In response, the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force designated Guam as an alternate port for shipment of POVs owned by their Service members serving in Japan and Okinawa. In February 1984, Navy Secretary John Lehman followed suit with his approval for Navy and Marine Corps personnel stationed in Japan (including Okinawa) and Singapore. With the passage of the FY 85 DOD Authorization Act (PL 98-525), however, effective 1 November 1984 FPOV shipments from Guam as an alternate port were restricted to 100 per month. Moreover, after 30 September 1985, Guam would no longer be an authorized alternate port for Service members stationed outside Guam, unless specifically approved by law.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In October implementation of the 100-vehicle-per-month ceiling was delegated from the Secretary of Defense to the Chief of Naval Operations, to USCINCPAC, and then to COMUSJAPAN, with USCINCPAC retaining approval authority. On 26 November COMUSJAPAN submitted an acceptable allocation proposal which assigned quotas among the Army, Navy, and Air Force, based on the projected number of personnel scheduled to rotate from Japan between 1 December 1984 and 30 September 1985. Monthly allocations were to average: Army - 9; Navy (including Marine Corps) - 50; and Air Force - 41. Service components

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1. SECSTATE 214625/202320Z Jul 84 (LOU); AMEMB Tokyo 15202/260858Z Jul 84 (C), DECL OADR; AMEMB Tokyo 25389/120800Z Dec 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/PRD), Vol. II, pp. 493-496; J73/Memo/526-84 (U), 15 Nov 84, Subj: End of tour purchase of motor vehicles and shipment from alternate ports located in a different country, e.g., Guam.

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were responsible for allocating quotas to subordinate commands and had approval authority for individual alternate port shipment requests.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Meanwhile, at the request of a U.S. Representative, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) (the investigative arm of Congress) initiated its own study under the title of "Review of Foreign-made Privately Owned Vehicles by U.S. Servicemembers through the 'Alternate Port' of Guam (Code 393066)." The review was concentrated in CONUS until November, and a GAO representative subsequently visited the Naval Supply Depot Guam, Yokosuka, Camp Zama, Yokota, and the U.S. Embassy in Japan. Work in Hawaii with USCINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and PACAF was to be completed in January 1985. The objectives of GAO fieldwork in the USPACOM were to:<sup>2</sup>

- Verify the number of FPOVs which entered the United States through the "alternate port" arrangement in Guam during FY 82-84; determine the future trend of these imports.

- Determine the per-car cost to the U.S. Government of shipping Japanese-made cars routed through Guam, as opposed to the cost paid by Japanese automobile manufacturers who shipped directly from Japan to the United States.

- Determine the criteria necessary to qualify for the benefits under this DOD policy.

- Determine if alternatives existed to redress higher car-related costs borne by all Servicemembers in Japan and Singapore.

### Housing on Oahu

(U) Management of all military family housing on Oahu was consolidated on 1 October 1983 under the administration of the U.S. Army. With a total of approximately 70,000 residents, the Oahu Consolidated Family Housing Office was billed as the "largest consolidated family housing activity in the world." As of 30 August 1984 there were some 18,850 units, as indicated below, plus 50 general, flag officer, and installation commander quarters. Utilities cost nearly \$4 million monthly, and there were more than 1,200 miles of paved streets to sweep and maintain. Replacement property value exceeded \$2.5 billion. A captain/colonel inter-Service family housing working group and a flag/general officer joint family housing policy advisory board provided input

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1. J73/Memo/546-84 (U), 27 Nov 84, Subj: End of tour purchase of motor vehicles and shipment from alternate ports located in a different country, e.g., Guam.
  2. GAO Honolulu 011850Z Nov 84 (U).

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concerning housing management and policy. The Housing Office also assisted Service people to find private rental housing.<sup>1</sup>

<u>Installation</u>	<u>Number Units</u>	<u>Number Locations</u>
Pearl Harbor	4,481	21
Barbers Point	2,396	5
Fort Shafter	3,516	4
Hickam AFB	2,957	3
Schofield Barracks	3,619	4
Kaneohe MCAS	<u>1,881</u>	<u>(overall)</u>
	18,850	37

### Hawaii Joint Allowance Board

(U) At the suggestion of the DOD Per Diem, Travel and Transportation Allowance Committee (PDTTAC), USCINCPAC convened representatives from Service component commands to develop joint policy and procedures concerning several overseas allowances and benefits. There was a perception that some allowances discriminated against Service members stationed in Hawaii (particularly on Oahu). Among these were the Rent Plus Housing Allowance (RPHA), the exclusion of Hawaii as an origination point for funded dependent student travel; and the need for a joint Service temporary lodging allowance (TLA) instruction in Hawaii.

(U) The first meeting of this Hawaii Joint Allowance Board was held on 6 December 1983 at Camp Smith and was hosted by the USCINCPAC Personnel Services Division Chief. Also attending were representatives from the Oahu Consolidated Housing Office and the Naval Investigative Service because of the problems with Rent Plus. Discussions extended to the need for standardization of forms, guidance, and treatment for Rent Plus. At the second quarterly meeting held on 15 March, a briefing was given by a representative from the DOD Inspector General's Office on the status of their audit on Rent Plus (see below), and the Board continued to meet through year's end.<sup>2</sup>

### Rent Plus Housing Allowance

(U) Between September 1981 and July 1982 a new system of payment of off-base housing costs for military members stationed outside of CONUS called "Rent Plus" was implemented in the USPACOM. The program was designed to make housing allowances more equitable by providing an amount of money more nearly approximating the costs of renting in areas outside CONUS. Each member was

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1. COMNAVBASE PEARL HARBOR 140021Z Jun 84 (U); The Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 30 Aug 84, p. D-3.
  2. J113 HistSum Nov 83 and Mar 84 (U).

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paid a housing allowance equal to his/her actual rent (within a dollar ceiling for each pay grade), plus average utilities and occupancy and/or termination expenses, less BAQ. The dollar ceiling for rent was established at the 80th percentile reported by all personnel within each pay grade during the annual housing survey conducted during December 1981-January 1982. A grandfather clause provided an option to remain with the previous system for up to four years in the same dwelling, or to switch to Rent Plus at any time. A separate formula, primarily for Hawaii and Guam, applied to individuals who were buying their own homes.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Worldwide some 90,000 DOD members were affected by the implementation of the Rent Plus allowance with approximately one-sixth living in Hawaii, plus another 370 members of the Coast Guard. Housing conditions in Hawaii (especially on Oahu) differed in numerous respects from those in CONUS. Habitable land area was limited and there was a constantly increasing population (roughly 20 percent in 10 years) with rents increasing by 125 percent in the same timeframe. While approximately 8,700 new housing units were needed annually, only 1,000 were being built. Hawaii had the lowest average vacancy rate (1 percent) in the nation (5 percent). Also, Hawaii had the highest percentage of rentals (58) compared with the national average (41). The occupancy rate of Government housing was usually between 98-99 percent, and there was no congressional funding for on-base housing until 1988. In mid-1984 approximately two-thirds of those drawing RPHA in Hawaii were in grades E6 and below. Of those, one-third paid rents in excess of the Rent Plus ceilings. Of the 1,500 renters in the O1-O3 grades, 39 percent paid more than their ceiling.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In January 1984 the DOD Inspector General began an audit of Rent Plus in the USPACOM (Project 4FV-026). Its purpose was to determine if the program were being administered effectively; if the allowances were reasonable; if the Services were effectively monitoring payments to prevent abuse; and if the Services were assigning Government quarters consistent with the established rules for authorizing Rent Plus. Completion was anticipated by June 1984.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 17 April Hawaii U.S. Representative Cecil F. Heftel (D) and Honolulu City Council Chair Patsy Mink co-chaired a hearing in Honolulu to gather community input on Rent Plus. Per Diem Committee (PDTTAC) participation was invited; however, the Defense Department declined because the hearing was of a local (Honolulu) nature and not sponsored by a congressional committee or sub-

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/PRD), Vol. III, pp. 607-608. Note: The figure of 6,242 for Hawaii on page 608 erroneously was based only on the number of questionnaires returned during the survey.
  2. J113 Point Paper (U), 7 May 84, Subj: Conversion of Hawaii from Rent Plus Housing Allowance (RPHA) to Variable Housing Allowance (VHA); CCGD FOURTEEN 272037Z Apr 84 (U); DOD Study Group Report, Executive Summary, Jan 85 (U).
  3. J113 HistSum Jan 84 (U).

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committee. Therefore, no official military representatives participated by direction of USCINCPAC. Those testifying were a mix of military dependents, civilians, realtors, and State and City government officials. Reports from participants indicated that the hearing did not produce conclusive evidence that Rent Plus was a cause of local rental increases. A record of the proceedings was to be submitted to the Defense Department as well as to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Also, in early 1984 there were moves in the Congress to substitute the variable housing allowance (VHA) or modify the RPHA in both Hawaii and Alaska by means of the FY 85 DOD Authorization Act. To counter this possibility, USCINCPAC's Service components appealed to their respective headquarters for support in retaining Rent Plus. The major concern, in addition to the above rationale, was that the VHA was not flexible enough to accommodate the rapid changes in the unique Hawaiian rental market and would result in significant out-of-pocket expenses for junior personnel. The components asked that no change be made, at least until the results of the DOD IG audit were known. A comparison of the Rent Plus and Variable Housing Allowances in Hawaii, by grade, at the end of 1984 is reflected on the accompanying chart.<sup>2</sup>

### HOUSING ALLOWANCE COMPARISON

Grade	With Dependents			Without Dependents		
	RPHA	VHA	Difference	RPHA	VHA	Difference
O6	\$ 1,173	\$ 1,186	\$ + 13	\$ 932	\$ 976	\$ + 44
O5	1,102	1,091	- 10	875	919	+ 44
O4	1,057	1,020	- 37	839	862	+ 23
O3	1,032	949	- 83	819	778	- 41
O2	907	899	- 8	719	693	- 26
O1	832	841	+ 9	659	619	- 40
E9	957	861	- 96	759	631	-128
E8	957	830	-127	759	607	-152
E7	882	796	- 86	699	532	-167
E6	812	734	- 78	643	481	-162
E5	782	696	- 86	619	467	-152
E4	682	611	- 71	539	419	-120
E3	642	555	- 87	507	401	-106
E2	582	534	- 48	459	328	-131
E1	512	523	+ 11	403	293	-110

1. J113 HistSum Apr 84 (U); Opening statement of the Honorable Cec Heftel, Rent Plus Hearing, April 17, 1984 (U).
2. CDRWESTCOM 230123Z Feb 84 (U); HQ PACAF 250310Z Apr 84 (U); CINCPACFLT 050450Z May 84 (U); CGFMFPAC 092029Z May 84 (U); J113 Talking Paper (U), 16 Apr 85, Subj: Continuation of the Rent Plus Housing Allowance in Hawaii.

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(U) Admiral Crowe also expressed his concern and solicited the support of Assistant Secretary of Defense/Manpower, Installations, and Logistics (ASD/MI&L) Dr. Lawrence J. Korb. The Admiral noted the potential long-range effect resulting from aligning Hawaii and Alaska with the other 48 states under the VHA. He said it could lead eventually to a redefinition of an overseas area and to the loss of multiple compensations required by the distance to CONUS with the possible reduction in morale, readiness, and retention. He also remarked on the favorable comparison between RPHA and the 22.5 percent federal civilian cost of living allowance in Hawaii which should be maintained.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Dr. Korb agreed but cited the "bad press" the RPHA program was receiving in Hawaii. This was a reference to a resolution by the Hawaii State House of Representatives calling on the Defense Department to re-examine the Rent Plus program. Some of Hawaii's residents perceived that the program was responsible for raising their rental costs. The resolution also stated that the program gave ". . . 'overly generous housing allowances' of \$590 a month to Army sergeants and \$925 a month to Army majors and utility payments of up to \$115 a month." It further asked the Defense Department to construct new housing units near military bases. While expressing his personal commitment to preserving the quality of housing achieved under the RPHA, Dr. Korb noted the concerns about the local program administration--dramatic cost increases had left the RPHA system in Hawaii ". . . extremely vulnerable to public and congressional criticism."<sup>2</sup>

(U) In late June, at Dr. Korb's suggestion, Admiral Crowe solicited support of Hawaii's Senator Inouye and representatives as the FY 85 legislation approached an important stage. In early July USCINCPAC was apprised that an annual adjustment (increase) voted by the PDTTAC was scheduled to go into effect on 1 August. On 27 July the PDTTAC announced that, in order to be prepared to administer the VHA program in Alaska and Hawaii should congressional action mandate implementation effective 1 January 1985, a survey would be made to develop appropriate VHA rates for Service members arriving in Alaska or Hawaii on/after that date. Data collection forms were to be returned to the PDTTAC by 1 October. The following day USCINCPAC was advised that Dr. Korb planned, among other things, to suspend the 1 August RPHA adjustment. Dr. Korb felt it prudent to await the results of the IG investigation.<sup>3</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC 280335Z Bravo 12 (released with Golf 301931Z) Apr 84 (BOM)(U).
  2. OSD/MI&L 181837Z May 84 (BOM)(U); The Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 20 Mar 84, p. A-14, "State House Asks Study of 'Rent-Plus'" (U).
  3. OSD/MI&L 212218Z Jun 84 (BOM)(U); USCINCPAC 220430Z, 230400Z, and 230401Z Jun 84 (U); PDTTAC 162101Z Jul 84 (U) (not held); USCINCPAC 162331Z Jul 84 (BOM)(U); PDTTAC 272050Z Jul 84 (U); ADMIN CINCPAC 280320Z Jul 84 (U); OSD/MI&L 091338Z Aug 84 (BOM)(U).

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(U) On 7 August Hawaii's campaign to have the USS MISSOURI battleship group homeported at Pearl Harbor was officially launched. In a message to his components on 11 August Admiral Crowe expressed the desirability for the military community on Oahu to speak with one voice because of the direct relationship between the Rent Plus housing issue and local efforts to encourage homeporting of additional ships at Pearl Harbor.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In an August Navy Times article Dr. Korb confirmed that the DOD IG had found abuses in the Rent Plus program by Hawaii-based Service members which he said were partially attributable to a lack of internal controls. Based on that same preliminary DOD IG audit information, the Defense Resources Board, in a program decision memorandum, directed that a DOD study group be formed to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the RPHA system. The study group convened on 24 September and during the ensuing months examined systems used by the State Department, the Office of Personnel Management, and the CONUS VHA system. Field trips were made to select installations both in the USEUCOM and USPACOM.<sup>2</sup>

(U) PACFLT, PACAF, and FMFPAC were asked by the study group for responses to six questions. Their responses, as well as comments by USCINCPAC and WESTCOM, were again unanimously in favor of retention of Rent Plus. While the RPHA required additional administrative burdens and the opportunities for potential abuse were greater, it had helped a large majority of Service members to obtain satisfactory quarters for themselves and their families in tight housing markets. As a result, morale, retention, and readiness rates were higher. Among USCINCPAC's recommendations was a name change to dispel public misperception of the term "Rent Plus." As the DOD coordinating agency for housing in Hawaii, WESTCOM was implementing a number of administrative changes including a joint Services form documenting the entitlement, computerized programs, and more intensive command verification. In commenting on the DOD IG audit draft report on 26 November, USCINCPAC reinforced earlier statements favoring Rent Plus.<sup>3</sup>

(U) By joint House-Senate conference committee action of 25 September on the FY 85 DOD Authorization Act, Rent Plus in Hawaii and Alaska was doomed and VHA became mandatory after 31 December 1984. However, an amendment to the Continuing Resolution Authority allowed RPHA in Hawaii and Alaska to continue

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1. USCINCPAC 110049Z Aug 84 (U).
  2. The Navy Times, 20 Aug 84, "Rent-Plus Endangered By Abuses, Korb Says," by Rick Maze, p.1 (U); SECDEF 041701Z Oct 84 (U).
  3. HQ PACAF 270130Z and CDRWESTCOM 312100Z Oct 85 (U); CGFMFPAC 032021Z, CINCPACFLT 032104Z, and USCINCPAC 152043Z, all Nov 84 (U); USCINCPAC Ltr Ser 3359 (U), 26 Nov 84, Subj: Draft Report on the Audit of the Rent-Plus Housing Allowance Program in Hawaii and Alaska (Project 4FV-026).

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until 30 September 1985. At the end of the year neither the DOD IG audit report nor that of the DOD study group had been finalized.<sup>1</sup>

### Awards

(U) The ROK Government recognized U.S. Air Force and Navy personnel and units for their participation in search and recovery operations in connection with the shutdown of the Korean Airlines B-747 commercial flight (007) on 31 August 1983. On 18 April 1984 Minister of National Defense Yoon Sung-min conferred the order of National Security Merit, Cheonsu Medal, to RADM Walter T. Piotti, USN (COMCRUDESGRU-5) and RADM Gerald W. McKay, USN (COMNAVFOR-KOREA); RADM William A. Cockell, USN, formerly COMCRUDESGRU-5, was presented the same order later in Washington, D.C. The Order of National Security Merit, Sam Il Medal, was conferred on CAPT Charles S. Maclin, USN, COL Harry K. Rogers, USAF, and LCOL Walter R. Peacock, USAF. The following units were presented the ROK Presidential Citation: Fifth Air Force, Cruiser-Destroyer Group FIVE, and USS STERETT (CG-31). In addition, 4 Air Force and 8 Navy officers, 19 other Air Force units, and 41 other Navy units were recognized by receiving letters of appreciation from Minister Yoon.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Honolulu Advertiser, 26 Sep 84, A-1, by Jim Borg; J113 Point Paper (U), 22 Jan 85, Subj: General Accounting Office (GAO) Review of Rent Plus Housing Allowance (RPHA).
  2. CINCUNC/CFC 230700Z Apr 1984 (U).

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SECTION II--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

(U) USCINCPAC was the focal point for foreign national labor matters and pay administration within the U.S. Pacific Command. This responsibility was derived from the Foreign Service Act of 1980, JCS Publication 3, and DOD Instruction 1400.10. The instruction authorized USPACOM component commanders to establish foreign national wages, as well as employment benefits and conditions, on a coordinated basis through the USPACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee (JLPC). Committee members were the top civilian personnel officials of PACFLT, PACAF, and WESTCOM with the USCINCPAC Civilian Personnel Policy Division Chief serving as Adviser and the Personnel Officer of the Army-Air Force Exchange Service, Pacific, as an associate non-voting member.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Under the provisions of USCINCPAC Instruction 12200.3B, each Service component was assigned certain country areas for which it had prime coordinating responsibility: PACFLT--the Philippines, Guam/TTPI, and Australia; PACAF--Japan; and WESTCOM--Korea. U.S. forces had exclusive bargaining agreements with employee unions in Australia (biennial with the Trades and Labor Council), Korea (triennial), and the Philippines (triennial); in Japan the chain was via the Japanese Government who dealt with the U.S. Forces (ZENCHURO) union. In each major USPACOM country there was a Joint Labor Affairs Committee (JLAC) which paralleled the JLPC. The accompanying chart depicts numbers of foreign national and U.S. citizen, appropriated and non-appropriated fund (NAF), employees in the USPACOM as of 31 December 1984. During FY 84 approximately 61,000 foreign nationals, at a cost of \$638 million, plus 40,000 U.S. citizens were employed by U.S. forces. Wage expenditures for foreign nationals for FY 81-FY 84 are depicted below. The figures (in millions of dollars) reflect fluctuations in foreign exchange rates over the periods indicated.<sup>2</sup>

<u>Country</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Japan	382.8	359.2	350.7	377.5
Korea	160.7	172.7	189.0	201.4
Philippines	61.2	67.6	67.8	51.4
Other Countries	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0
Total	<u>612.7</u>	<u>607.5</u>	<u>615.5</u>	<u>638.3</u>

\* U.S. Forces costs only; Japan's contributions not included.

1. J121 Point Paper (U), 8 Apr 85, Subj: Foreign National (FN) Civilian Employee Policy and Pay Setting in USPACOM.
2. Ibid.; J12 Papers (U), 1 Mar 85, "U.S. Pacific Command U.S. Forces Local National Employment Costs" and "USPACOM Civilian Personnel Strength, by Service and Country, Appropriated and Nonappropriated Fund Activities as of 31 December 1984."

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U.S. FORCES CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES, BY LOCATION, SERVICE/AGENCY

As of 31 December 1984

	<u>ARMY</u>		<u>NAVY</u>		<u>AIR FORCE</u>		<u>AAFES-PAC</u>		<u>DOD AGENCIES</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	
	<u>Foreign Nat'l</u>	<u>U.S. Cit.</u>										
Australia	-	-	222	26	1	101	2	1	2	10	227	138
Guam	-	58	-	4,368	-	1,006	-	193	-	24	-	5,649
Hawaii	-	5,645	-	15,460	-	2,389	-	633	-	223	-	24,350
Japan	3,619	1,227	10,494	2,698	*5,238	1,213	*1,250	414	295	306	*20,896	5,858
Korea	*14,075	2,031	227	43	3,204	280	*2,050	102	67	387	*19,623	2,843
Philippines	9	9	15,137	592	3,865	286	727	50	68	407	19,806	1,344
Thailand	153	-	17	6	-	-	-	-	4	27	174	33
Other sites	-	-	*73	30	-	-	-	-	25	10	*98	40
<b>Totals</b>	<b>*17,856</b>	<b>8,970</b>	<b>*26,170</b>	<b>23,223</b>	<b>*12,308</b>	<b>5,275</b>	<b>*4,029</b>	<b>1,393</b>	<b>461</b>	<b>1,394</b>	<b>*60,824</b>	<b>40,255</b>
TCNs	1		49		5		8				63	

\* Third Country Nationals (TCNs) not included; listed separately below.

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## Automated Compensation System

(U) During 1983-84 the Joint Labor Policy Committee spearheaded the first U.S. Government computerization of foreign national wage surveys. Leading the team effort was the WESTCOM Foreign Labor Officer who developed the software program in conjunction with representatives from USCINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and the Chief ADP Systems and Research Division of the DOD Wage Fixing Authority. USCINCPAC representatives drafted an instruction manual for what was named the U.S. PACOM Automated Compensation System (PACS).<sup>1</sup>

(U) The system was designed to operate from a master menu which linked existing programs and those to be developed into a unified software package. Representing six individual functions, the software consisted of four BASIC (beginners all-purpose symbolic instruction code) source programs:

- SHORTENT - permitted entry of raw data and update of files in terms of base pay, bonuses, allowances, and payments-in-kind from a job recapitulation worksheet.

- SHORTROL - aggregated that data in SHORTENT in a number of different ways according to selection of parameters by the operator. Data could be aggregated by company/job or job and by different categories of pay. The result was an extract file that was accessed by other programs in the system.

- LINEAR2 - drew linear least squares regression (statistical) lines using all data, data less those points beyond plus or minus two standard deviations, and data less those points beyond 20 percent bands.

- SCHEDULE - computed the new base pay, adjusted it for industrial average employee tenure within a grade level versus U.S. Forces employee average tenure (step rate), and printed out basic wage schedules and tables.

(U) The software was designed to facilitate and analyze foreign national wage surveys conducted within the USPACOM area of responsibility. The automated survey system enhanced the reliability and validity of locality wage survey procedures, particularly in the aggregation of wage data used, to construct wage trend lines. Application of this computer technology permitted the aggregation of data with greater speed and accuracy than was possible manually. The hardware consisted of the Hyperion portable microcomputer linked to an Epson FX 80 printer. The first application of this automated system was in the 1984 U.S. Forces Korea wage survey; another was in the Philippines (see below).

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1. J122 HistSum Jul 84 (U).

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## Korea

(U) On 14 February the ROK Ministry of Labor advised the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Civilian Personnel Director that the President and Vice President of the USFK Korean Employees Union (KEU) had been dismissed. The action stemmed from a determination that they had failed to fulfill their union officer responsibilities in a manner required by the ROK Government's Labor Union Law. Mr. Kang In-sik was designated as interim president, and in March he was elected to a full term of office. A smooth transition occurred although the abrupt displacement of the two principal officers resulted in a more cautious union leadership.<sup>1</sup>

### Wage and Benefits Adjustment

(U) A full-scale wage survey of 75 non-U.S. Forces employers in Korea was conducted during April and May 1984 by members of the U.S. Forces Korea staff and a USPACOM Survey Team. The survey statistics supported an average 8.1 percent wage increase for Korean employees of USFK, an upward adjustment in the benefits allowance from 7 to 7.7 percent of basic wages, and an upward adjustment in dependent tuition assistance payment for middle and high school students. The survey results were approved by the USPACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee on 24 May.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 28 May the KEU was informed of the approved survey results. The union officials indicated that the results were unacceptable and threatened to hold a "work refusal" and picket demonstrations on 1 June unless the wage adjustment package was enhanced by: raising the wage increase for non-manual workers to 4 percent for grades 8-10 and at grade 13; authorizing dependent tuition assistance for college students; authorizing payoff of unused annual leave; and changing classification from grade 1 to grade 2 of food service workers.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Following further union-management consultations, on 29 May the union accepted a USFK counterproposal to study the last three KEU demands, and after more consultations, on 30 May the union dropped its demand for a 4 percent increase for the higher graded non-manual workers who represented less than 3 percent of the workforce. In turn, USFK management agreed to continue compute health benefit premiums on base pay only, rather than base pay plus a consolidated allowance payment.

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1. J122 HistSum Jul 84 (U).
  2. J122 HistSum May 84 (U).
  3. J122 HistSum May 84 (U).

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### Japan

#### Wage Increase

(U) U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) concluded negotiations with Japan's Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) on 28 December 1984 that resulted in a 3.37 percent wage increase for USF Japanese employees. The increase was identical to the annual increase granted to Japanese Public Service employees for the period 1 April 1984 to 31 March 1985.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In conjunction with the negotiations, the DFAA also agreed to accept USFJ proposals to establish a when-actually-employed employment system under the U.S.-Japan (USFJ-DFAA) Indirect Hire Agreement (IHA) and to establish an advanced inhire system under the Master Labor Contract and the IHA. Details were to be worked out through USFJ-DFAA discussions.

### Philippines

(U) As of December 1984 U.S. forces in the Philippines employed 1,344 U.S. citizens and 19,806 foreign national (FN) workers, by Service, as listed on the chart earlier in this section. Local hire of U.S. citizens (primarily military dependents) was restricted by the 1968 U.S.-Philippine Base Labor Agreement (BLA) which granted preferential employment to Filipinos. With the exception of the DOD Dependent Schools, U.S. citizen employees were not represented by a union. Foreign National labor costs in appropriated and non-appropriated funding (NAF) for FY 83 were \$67.8 million or around \$3,300 per NAF employee while the FY 84 figures were \$51.4 million and \$2,400, respectively. This decrease in average employee salary was primarily due to soaring inflation and the continued weakening of the peso (P) and conversion rates. Still, U.S. forces employees were better considered to be off than Filipinos in the private sector with its expanding unemployment or those in the low pay public sector.<sup>2</sup>

#### Bases Labor Agreement Review

(U) The 1947 U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement (MBA) was silent on U.S. forces use of labor in the Philippines. In order to set guidelines on labor, a U.S.-Philippine Bases Labor Agreement (BLA) was mutually agreed to and implemented in 1968. The BLA covered a rough average of 20,000 Filipinos employed by both appropriated and NAF activities. During the intervening 16 years it had served the U.S. Government well, although on numerous occasions the employee union (Federation of Filipino Civilian Employees' Associations

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1. J121 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
  2. J121 Point Paper (U), 2 Aug 84, Subj: U.S. Forces (USF) Civilian Labor - Philippines; J12 Paper (U), 1 Mar 85, "U.S. Pacific Command U.S. Forces Local National Employment Costs."

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(FFCEA)) established under the provisions of the BLA, had sought to have the Government of the Philippines (GOP) renegotiate the Agreement. Intergovernmental negotiations were conducted in 1976 and again in 1977, but eventually were aborted without agreement.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Under terms of the 1 June 1983 Memorandum of Understanding concluding the MBA review, it was agreed that intergovernmental discussions to revise the 1968 BLA would begin within six months or on another agreed upon date. A ceremony held on 15 December 1983 at the Arlegui Presidential Guest House in Manila opened the BLA Review with introductory remarks by U.S. Ambassador Michael H. Armacost and Philippine Ambassador Benjamin T. Romualdez. The full panels then met in joint session to present opening statements and to agree on procedures for conduct of the review. It was agreed to proceed with informal negotiations using point teams from each government with joint full panel meetings to be called as needed. Proceedings were then recessed for the year-end holidays.

(U) While 38 informal negotiating meetings were held between 18 January and 15 November 1984, only one joint meeting of the full panels was held, and that was on 23 January for the purpose of re-reviewing procedures and opening statement positions. U.S. point team negotiators at all meetings were Embassy Labor Attache Joseph E. Lee, Panel Chairman, and DOD representative George M. Wyman, the USCINCPAC Civilian Personnel Policy Division Chief. Point team negotiators for the GOP were Deputy Minister of Labor Carmelo C. Noriel, Panel Chairman; and at various meetings, Assistant Foreign Minister for American Affairs Ambassador Josue L. Villa; Assistant Minister of Labor Francisco L. Estrella; National Labor Relations Commissioner Ricardo C. Castro; and FFCEA President Roberto Flores. Full panels consisted of seven additional members for each government.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Little progress in the negotiations was made from mid-January to 15 March when it was agreed to schedule the next meeting for 22 May which would be after the campaign and elections for Philippine National Assembly representatives. The meantime would afford negotiators of both sides time for consultation with their respective governments. A summary of the unresolved issues, their status, and/or country positions as of 15 March follows.<sup>3</sup>

● The GOP focus was on Philippine sovereignty, and a deadlock nearly resulted from GOP demands for direct application of Philippine labor and social law in U.S. forces employment of Filipinos. The U.S. position was that the BLA must govern; Philippine law was to apply only as agreed and specified in the BLA.

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1. J12 HistSum Dec 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR. See also the USCINCPAC Command Histories for 1968, 1976, and 1977.
  2. AMEMB Manila 32656/160918Z Dec 83 (LOU).
  3. J12 HistSum Dec 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.

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● The GOP wanted control of U.S. forces hiring of U.S. civilians in order to strengthen the 1968 BLA provision for preferential employment of Filipinos while a principal U.S. goal was to expand, not restrict, the use of DOD dependent hire employment. (As of late February 1984 there were 653 Navy, 464 Air Force, and 563 DOD Dependent Schools U.S. citizen jobs, or approximately five percent of the civilian workforce, filled as exception to the Filipino preferential employment of Article I, paragraph 1, of the MBA.)<sub>1</sub>

● Originally, the GOP wanted to apply Philippine law to U.S. forces ability to separate employees. Particularly when work accomplishment was changed to contracting out, the GOP wanted the U.S. forces to reemploy affected separated employees or to require the contractor to employ them without diminution of benefits. The United States reserved the right to separate employees and could not require contractors to match existing pay and benefits, but it was willing to require the successful contractor to give the right of first refusal to affected direct hire Filipinos.

● The GOP wanted the FFCEA to be included in all wage-setting processes, including development of rates of pay. The U.S. side held to its unilateral prerogative to set pay without subjecting it to collective bargaining.

● The GOP insisted that the U.S.-GOP Joint Labor Committee (JLC) should have decision authority on labor policy matters; the U.S. stand was to retain the 1968 BLA conciliation and mediation role of the Committee on policy issues and interpretation of labor agreements.

● On individual appeal cases of separation for cause and employee suspensions, the United States proposed establishing an appellate authority comprised of an equal number of U.S. forces and GOP representatives with authority to render binding decisions by a majority vote. The GOP objected to this because in the absence of a majority vote, the U.S. management decision to suspend or separate would prevail. The GOP required that the process guarantee a binding decision which the U.S. proposal did not do.

● The U.S. side wanted a provision stating that the BLA and collective bargaining agreements negotiated with the union would be the exclusive remedies for complaints of workers covered by the BLA. The GOP wanted Philippine law to apply unless expressly exempted by the BLA.

● Agreement was reached on six minor issues: overtime, manpower allocation in emergencies, governmental immunities under international law, continuance of benefits in force, BLA revisions could be requested by either government at any time, and the BLA would remain in effect for the duration of the MBA unless terminated earlier by agreement of the two governments.

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1. AMEMB Manila 4778/230702Z Feb 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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(C) Talks did not reconvene in May as anticipated, and there were reports of infighting among GOP agencies regarding responsibility for and conduct of the BLA review. The U.S. and GOP point teams reactivated the review in Manila on 25 September. Soon thereafter it became clear that the Philippine Ministry of Labor and Employment had assumed leadership within the GOP and that two earlier firm Philippine stands were moderated: insistence on application of Philippine law, provided that adequate recognition of Philippine law was included in the preamble; and insistence that the Joint Labor Committee be a policy decision body.

(C) As time passed other issues were moderated. The GOP representatives often attempted to get the United States to modify its stand, even on previously agreed positions. GOP Panel Chairman Noriel finally suggested in early November that perhaps some issues were just too difficult and should be left for others to change at a later date. As a result, the hard fought issues of preferential employment and responsibility for wage setting remained basically status quo when ad referendum agreement was reached on 13 November. The U.S. position prevailed on contracting out and the individual appeal cases.

(C) The final issue left unsettled was the amount to be paid each employee as a midyear bonus. The GOP, reflecting union concerns, complained that the 1968 BLA figure of 200 pesos was woefully inadequate during the intervening 16 years and was even more so because no inflation factor had been built in. The GOP advocated a P2,000-2,500 bonus based on 1968-1984 cost of living index data. The U.S. team was willing to request U.S. Government approval of an increase to 1,000 pesos based on wage increases granted during that time period which amounted to a 466 percent compounded increase above the 1968 average employee pay. The United States also cited the difference in dollar-to-peso exchange rates between 1968 (\$1 = P3.9158) to 1984 (\$1 = P20) as supporting the 1,000 peso bonus.

(C) The informal negotiations were adjourned on 13 November with the understanding that each panel would seek higher authority approval of the agreements reached to date informally. In a message to the Secretary of State, Ambassador Bosworth (Ambassador Armacost's successor) commended the U.S. panel's efforts in resolving the issues satisfactorily "... without compromising our fundamental ability to manage our labor forces at the base facilities and to insure our unhampered use of those facilities as required." Reflecting on the effect of the deteriorating Philippine economic situation he stated, "Conclusion of the agreement will have a positive psychological effect in a period of considerable economic stress and labor uncertainty among Filipino workers. In fact, had times been more prosperous, we would have probably faced much harder GOP negotiating tactics." The U.S. State Department, in coordination with the Defense Department, approved the agreed positions on

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24 December and authorized a cap of 1,000 pesos for the mid-year bonus. GOP approval and a position on the bonus were not rendered by year's end.<sup>1</sup>

Wage Adjustment

(U) In 1983 the FFCEA had objected to how the annual wage survey was conducted--specifically, the methodology used to establish new wage schedules. They had demanded expanded union participation in the pay-setting process. Based on a decision by the Joint Labor Committee (JLC), the issue had been left for resolution by the BLA review.<sup>2</sup>

(C) By early March 1984, with the BLA review recess imminent (see BLA Review above), the union saw little prospect of relief through that venue on the two major points which it wanted handled differently in the 1984 survey: bonus computation and merit increases. At a 14 March 1984 JLC meeting the FFCEA announced it would neither participate in, nor accept the results of, the 1984 wage survey unless the Federation's demands regarding the 1983 wage survey were resolved. The U.S. JLC panel bluntly told FFCEA President Flores no purpose would be served by obstructing the survey, and that without the wage survey there would be no wage increase.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Subsequently, U.S. forces representatives worked with FFCEA leaders to overcome problems insofar as possible within areas of previously agreed participation. Concurrently, an FFCEA vice president took a course in pay-setting at a Filipino university which helped take some of the mystery out of the process. As a result, the FFCEA participated responsibly, knowledgeably, and without confrontation, but continued to press for greater FFCEA participation, particularly in setting pay rates (i.e., negotiation).

(U) A full-scale wage and limited fringe benefits survey of 36 private sector employers was conducted in the greater Manila area during July and August, and revised wage schedules were based on data obtained using the new USPACOM Automated Compensation System described above, as modified for Philippine survey peculiarities. Survey findings supported weighted average (by U.S. forces population) increases of 37 percent for non-manual and 31.33 percent for manual employees. Survey findings did not, however, support any change in existing policy or benefits regarding overtime pay during travel, severance pay upon voluntary resignation, U.S. forces non-participation in the home development mutual fund, or supplemental health benefits.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J12 HistSum Dec 84 (C); AMEMB Manila 31709/170535Z Nov 84 (C); SECSTATE 376524/242145Z Dec 84 (C), all DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. III, p. 689.
  3. AMEMB Manila 7179/190130Z Mar 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  4. J122 HistSum Sep 84 (U).

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(U) On 22 August the wage survey chairman met with representatives of the FFCEA for consultation on the results of the survey. While generally pleased with the increase, FFCEA representatives raised certain technical questions regarding computation methodology which the survey chairman answered to their satisfaction. Other FFCEA recommendations conflicted with DOD pay-setting policies and practices and could not be adopted.

(U) The 1984 wage adjustment for approximately 20,000 local national employees of U.S. forces in the Philippines was approved by the USPACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee (Service components) on 6 September 1984. The adjustment was implemented through issuance on 13 September of revised wage schedules by CINCPACFLT, the lead agency for developing foreign national compensation plans in the Philippines, with an effective date of 1 October.

### Foreign National Compensation

#### Wage Order No. 3

(U) Under Philippine Presidential Wage Order No. 3 issued on 1 November 1983, all Filipino employees were to receive an additional P135 monthly living allowance. Findings of a special survey conducted in December 1983 by the USCINCPACREP Philippines showed that implementation of Wage Order No. 3 was clearly prevailing practice among the 35 private employers surveyed for wage purposes in July-September 1983. However, because it was less than prevailing (48.57 percent) in terms of number of companies paying the full P135, it was necessary under DOD Instruction 1400.10 to seek the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense in the public interest. Through the JLPC, on 6 February 1984 USCINCPAC supported the in-country recommendations submitted by the USCINCPACREP Philippines to the Secretary of Defense who concurred on 13 February. His authorization for the P135 living allowance was implemented by CINCPACFLT four days later. The allowance was payable to each U.S. forces Filipino employee separately from base pay and in addition to any emergency and/or living allowances previously granted. P135 was equal to \$9.60.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Under the schedule developed by the USCINCPACREPPHIL Joint Labor Affairs Committee, P90 was paid to employees on the rolls as of 1 November 1983 and another P45 was added starting 1 December 1983. This brought living allowance totals to P504 for employees earning less than P1,500 base pay per month; P480 for those earning between P1,500-1,800 per month; and P405 for those earning above P1,800.

#### Wage Order No. 4

(U) On 1 May 1984 President Marcos signed Wage Order No. 4 which required integration into base pay of four across-the-board living allowances in the

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1. J122 HistSum Mar 84 (U); USCINCPAC 062352Z Feb 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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Philippines: Presidential Decree (PD) 1614 of 1 April 1979--P60; PD 1634 of 1 September 1979--P60 and 1 January 1980--P30; PD 1678 of 21 February 1980--P60; and PD 1713 of 18 August 1980--P60.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In consonance with DOD and USCINCPAC policy guidelines, which required that wage or benefit changes be supported by prevailing practice, a survey was conducted by U.S. Forces in June 1984 to determine the degree of implementation of Wage Order No. 4 within the non-U.S. forces sector. Based on affirmative survey findings and according to authority delegated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, integration was approved by the USPACOM JLPC retroactive to 1 May 1984. The integration lowered the amount of emergency (monthly living) allowance paid and increased the basic pay rate by a like amount. The net effect of the integration to U.S. forces in the Philippines was that a higher rate of base pay resulted in slightly higher rates used to compute overtime, holiday pay, and severance pay.<sup>2</sup>

Wage Order No. 5

(U) Presidential Wage Order No. 5 announced on 13 June raised the daily minimum wage throughout the Philippines and increased the living allowance by P5 per day. During the course of the aforementioned July-August full-scale wage survey, implementation of WO 5 paid monthly to all employees separately from base pay was clearly found to be prevailing practice. Based on these results, on 27 August the JLAC recommended the payment of P150 per month effective 16 June to all employees, regardless of salary, and separate from base pay. Approval was granted by CINCPACFLT on 1 September.<sup>3</sup>

Diego Garcia

(U) For a number of years the Public Works Center and other U.S. commands at Subic Bay provided a small number of Filipinos at Diego Garcia on a TDY basis to assist in contract administration and operational housekeeping functions.

~~(C)~~ In 1981 under a joint venture, CMC & RBRM construction contractors had employed up to 270 Mauritian and 1,000 Philippine nationals. In September 1983 a new base operations support (BOS) contract was negotiated with FEBROE Company which initially called for 840 Filipino workers but later was changed to incorporate from 75 to 150 Mauritians. A purpose of the BOS contract was to consolidate all base operations support, previously done in-house and by several separate contractors (see below), into one contract.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J122 HistSum Jul 84 (U).
  2. Ibid.
  3. USCINCPACREPPHIL 270407Z Aug 84 (U); CINCPACFLT 010534Z Sep 84 (U).
  4. Interview with Mr. George Wyman, J12, 15 Jul 85 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.

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(C) Initially, USCINCPACREP Philippines feared that the release of a large number of Filipinos from Diego Garcia and their return to Subic might adversely impact on the labor market. However, conditions were reversed and Diego Garcia ended up with a net increase of approximately 130 Filipino nationals as depicted below. In addition, FEBROE hired 75 Mauritians bringing the total third-country national population to 1,162. Only five Filipino direct-hire employees were slated for reduction-in-force at Subic.<sup>1</sup>

<u>Prior to FEBROE takeover circa 1 Sep 1983</u>		<u>With FEBROE by 1 Sep 1984</u>	
ISI (contractor)	151	FEBROE (BOS contract)	1,062
Buenaventura "	334	Resident Officer in charge	
Maytag "	22	of Construction Diego Garcia	8
Public Works Center		(direct hire)	
Subic Det. (direct hire)	350		
Naval Support Facility		Naval Support Facility	
Diego Garcia (direct hire)	<u>98</u>	Diego Garcia (direct hire)	<u>17</u>
Totals	955		1,087

#### Offshore Mauritian Labor

(C) In view of the location of Mauritius and the ascension of a pro-Western head of state, relationships with the Government (GOM) were of significance to the United States and USCINCPAC. In recent years employment of Mauritian laborers on Diego Garcia had been a sensitive issue for the Mauritian, U.K., and U.S. governments. In early November 1983 USCINCPAC initiated an overall policy review on the issue, and subsequently Admiral Crowe had supported the use of a modicum of Mauritian laborers by the base operating support (BOS) contractor, FEBROE Company, at Diego Garcia.<sup>2</sup>

(S) After spending Christmas 1983 with the troops on Diego Garcia, in early January 1984 Admiral Crowe renewed his efforts to support U.S. Ambassador Andrews' request for utilizing Mauritian laborers for contractor work at Diego Garcia as a means of maintaining the support of and for the existing GOM headed by Prime Minister A. Jugnauth. In separate messages to Assistant Secretary of State Wolfowitz and Ambassador Andrews, the Admiral noted the existence of a certain "residue of uneasiness" on Diego Garcia as a result of problems experienced with the previous group of Mauritian laborers. It was important, he said, that the initial cadre be carefully selected and small in number (10-25) in order to minimize contract costs, the potential for security, labor, and language problems, and other complications. He urged Wolfowitz

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1. Ibid.; AMEMB Manila 9992/131153Z Apr 84 (C), DECL 4/13/89; USCINCPACREP-PHIL 200707Z Apr 84 (U); CINCPACFLT 090104Z May 84 (U).
  2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. III, p. 695.

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to seek a speedy resolution of the political and military, as well as managerial aspects.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Secretary Wolfowitz deferred to Ambassador Andrews for a response. The Ambassador still believed the initial number of Mauritians should be 150-200 in order to keep the Mauritian leftist opposition from accusing the GOM of "prostituting itself to the U.S. with only token results." However, he would consider the hiring of 75 workers immediately and another 75 at the time of contract renegotiation slated for September 1984.<sup>2</sup>

(S) In his request to CINCPACFLT that FEBROE be instructed to hire 75 Mauritians, Admiral Crowe said he was persuaded by the Ambassador's arguments to demonstrate U.S. political commitment to the Jugnauth government which had staked its prestige and credibility on the issue. The Admiral also asked that if the cadre performed in a totally satisfactory manner and if political, economic, and management conditions were favorable at the time of contract renegotiation, at least another 75 be hired if, in fact, the Navy decided to renew the BOS contract with FEBROE.<sup>3</sup>

(C) A FEBROE representative visited Mauritius from 20 to 24 February on a fact-finding mission concerning hiring of Mauritians. When three weeks elapsed without any follow-on action, USCINCPAC advised the anxious Ambassador that contract negotiations were being finalized and hiring was expected to begin in April.<sup>4</sup>

(U) Meanwhile, the contract proposal being developed by the Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (PACNAVFACENGCOM) (the Navy's and CINCPACFLT's master planning and construction agent for Diego Garcia) became more complex than anticipated. Whereas the Navy's (PACFLT and PACNAVFACENGCOM) intent was to include the Mauritians with the employees performing work within the scope of the existing BOS contract, FEBROE indicated it was not desirable because of their commitments to the Philippine Government, the Philippine labor contractor, and to Filipinos already on the payroll or in the pipeline. (NOTE: The BOS contract conditions prescribed performance of functions only and did not specify numbers of personnel to perform the functions.) Instead, FEBROE preferred (and proposed) using the Mauritians to perform additional level of effort work at an estimated additional cost of \$535,000.<sup>5</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC 100513Z and 110042Z Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. SECSTATE 12462/141048Z Jan 84 (C), DECL OADR; AMEMB Port Louis 277/161126Z Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. USCINCPAC 200511Z Jan 84 (S), DECL 16 Jan 90; USCINCPAC 270020Z Jan 84 (C), DECL 26 Jan 90.
  4. AMEMB Port Louis 768/280831Z Feb 84 (C), DECL 2/27/90, and 933/190835Z Mar 84 (C), DECL 3/19/90; USCINCPAC 200226Z Mar 84 (C), DECL 19 Mar 90.
  5. PACNAVFACENGCOM 030409Z Mar 84 (U).

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(U) It had not been CINCPACFLT's intent to increase the scope of the contract. PACFLT's FY 84 Diego Garcia Special Projects Execution Plan included \$400,000 not yet under contract, and the FY 85 Execution Plan workload was programmed at \$1 million of which half might have potential for accomplishment under existing BOS contract provisions.<sup>1</sup>

~~(C)~~ It was not until 30 April that the FEBROE representative reached agreement with Intermanagement Ltd., of Mauritius for the recruitment of the initial 75 Mauritian laborers. Plans called for the first three supervisory employees to depart for Diego Garcia on or about 23 May, and the remaining 72 would follow on or about 27 June. Based on an earlier agreement to insure that no troublemakers were recruited, the GOM, working within very limited time constraints, recommended against hiring of 22 individuals--most because of past criminal records. In mid-July, however, two Mauritian supervisors described as "malcontents" were terminated by FEBROE while in a probationary status; the remainder, according to reports, seemed happy and were performing well.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In October Ambassador Andrews reported that 77 Mauritians were at Diego Garcia, and FEBROE planned to hire additional workers on a one-for-one replacement basis over the next six months up to the planned 150 total. FEBROE stated they were "extremely pleased with Mauritian employees."<sup>3</sup>

Equal Employment Opportunity

(U) The HQ USCINCPAC Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Committee sponsored a cultural awareness day on 8 November 1984 emphasizing the Japanese culture. (In 1983 the first such event had been held honoring the Hawaiian culture.) Approximately 150 people attended a program which featured demonstrations of chado (a formal tea ceremony), shakuhachi (Japanese flute), karate (self-defense), flower arranging, pearl stringing, and origami. The event concluded with sampling of a number of Japanese foods.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPACFLT 232129Z Mar 84 (U).
  2. AMEMB Port Louis 1585/041018Z May 84 (LOU), 2131/261108Z Jun 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR, and 2255/111137Z Jul 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  3. AMEMB Port Louis 3366/111228Z Oct 84 (LOU).
  4. J135 HistSum Dec 84 (U); EEO Forum May 1985 (U).

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## CHAPTER IX--INTELLIGENCE

### SECTION I--SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT

#### USPACOM Intelligence Architecture

(U) The first meeting of the USPACOM Intelligence Architecture Working Group was held from 16 to 27 January 1984, chaired by the USCINCPAC J224A. Participating were representatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), MITRE Corporation, USCINCPAC, COMUSKOREA, CINCPACFLT, Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC), CINCPACAF, CDRWESTCOM, and FMFPAC. The group's effort produced a working draft of a theater intelligence architecture for 1995. The architectural effort was expected to be ongoing, with future work concentrating on a baseline description of funding and program requirements. In June the USCINCPAC J21 was restructured and augmented with personnel from other J2 offices and renamed the Intelligence Systems Planning and Programming Division. It was charged with coordinating the overall intelligence architecture for the USPACOM.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In September a memorandum of understanding was signed by the chiefs of intelligence of USCINCPAC, COMUSKOREA, COMUSJAPAN, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and CDRWESTCOM, forming the charter for the USPACOM Intelligence Architecture. The goal of this planning and programming effort was to improve intelligence support to combat operations by coordinating the intelligence planning actions of Headquarters USCINCPAC, the components, agencies, and subordinate unified commands into a USCINCPAC-approved architecture.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The objectives to be satisfied by the planning and programming activity mandated by this charter were to:

- Assess the existing baseline intelligence analysis, production, and support structure, to include existing capabilities, future programs, and the overall alignment of responsibilities.

- Survey and address all levels of intelligence support, including joint interfaces at the Army division, Navy battle group, Air Force wing, and joint task force levels. Provisions for intelligence support to combined operations are to be developed in accordance with overall DOD guidance. Consider operations throughout the command at all levels of activity from peace through war.

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1. J224A HistSum Jan 84 (U); J212B HistSum Jun 84 (U).
  2. J212B HistSum Sep 84 (U); Memorandum of Understanding (U), Subj: USPACOM Intelligence Architecture Charter, undated.

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- Develop a unified command perspective of the planning and programming efforts of subordinate echelons and cooperating agencies, and prepare functional and fiscal recommendations and associated milestones for higher, lateral, and subordinate echelon implementation in the planning, programming, and budgeting system cycle.

- Formulate proposals for USPACOM components, agencies, and subordinate unified commands to systematically improve survivability of intelligence nodes to permit continued support to various echelons and insure development of backup capabilities for key theater intelligence functions.

- Outline specific programs for development of an overall theater intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination structure which not only satisfies peacetime requirements but also would be capable of direct support to wartime operations.

- Analyze recommended improvements in terms of operational criticality.

- Coordinate the development of an integrated and survivable intelligence communications network to insure the internetting of key intelligence nodes with each other and with operational commanders. Insure this communications network takes into account the services provided by the General Service (GENSER) communications networks as well as those dedicated to Special Intelligence (SI).

(U) The USPACOM Intelligence Architecture Executive Steering Committee would be chaired by the USCINCPAC Director for Intelligence (J2). Membership would include the senior intelligence officers from the USPACOM components and subordinate unified commands. Representatives of other appropriate activities and agencies might also be invited to participate. The committee would meet as needed to review the state of theater intelligence planning and to provide appropriate guidance for future planning activities. It would also make recommendations for submission to appropriate programming activities.

(U) The USCINCPAC Intelligence Systems Planning and Programming Division (J21) would have day-to-day administrative responsibility for the program. It would be the focal point for carrying out the guidance from the steering committee, developing and drafting the architecture, organizing the activities of contractor staff augmentees, approving the content of contractor staff products, and coordinating the efforts of various working groups. USCINCPAC would periodically provide update briefings to subordinate unified commands and components.

(U) Disciplinary, functional, cross-functional, and ad hoc working groups would be formed to develop sub-portions of the architecture. Architecture working groups would be made up of members from organizations represented on

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the Executive Steering Committee. Representatives from other organizations might also be invited to participate with approval of the USPACOM Intelligence Board. Appropriate contractual assistance would also be made available to support architecture planning and development. The working groups were charged with developing specific parts of the overall architecture and to implement guidance provided by the steering committee in accordance with the objectives of the charter. USCINCPAC J2 would provide the administrative and clerical support for the architecture effort.<sup>1</sup>

### Intelligence Data Handling System

#### IPAC Planning

(U) In November 1983 the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC) had published a draft System Architecture Plan consisting of three volumes which was intended to serve as a working and evolutionary guideline for IPAC for the 1985-1993 time frame. Volume I was a statement of the functional requirements for automation; Volume II defined the automated data processing (ADP) architecture necessary for the requirements stated in Volume I; and Volume III provided for an evolutionary transition plan to move from the existing IPAC ADP systems configuration to the proposed future architecture. These documents were intentionally published as working editions so that changes could be made as new missions were prescribed and as fast-changing technology expanded automated capabilities.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In September 1984 the IPAC Objective Plan was renamed the IPAC Command Objective Plan and became Volume I of the new IPAC Architecture Plan. Volumes I through III of the former IPAC ADP Architecture Plan became Volumes II through IV of the IPAC Architecture Plan. The Office of Command Resources (CR) retained responsibility for Volume I and the Directorate of Data Systems (DS) assumed responsibility for Volumes II through IV, with CR taking responsibility for Volume II on 1 December 1984. In order to finalize the IPAC Architecture Plan in time for its use in the General Defense Intelligence Program Plan (GDIPP) preparation, 1 November 1984 was set as the date for final publication and submission to the USCINCPAC Director for Intelligence for approval.<sup>3</sup>

(U) IPAC (CR) prepared a memorandum in September 1984 to the USCINCPAC J21 requesting the latter prepare a J2 message clarifying the proper use of "USPACOM Data Systems Center (PDSC)" and "IPAC Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) 21(V)." A proposed message was included with the memorandum, defining PDSC as a USCINCPAC project completed in September 1982 and which had provided IPAC and FICPAC with automated intelligence systems. IPAC IDHS

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1. Ibid.
  2. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. III, pp. 705-706.
  3. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Sep 84 (U).

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21(V) was defined as the PDSC-developed system currently in operation at IPAC. The message was needed to avoid confusion resulting from the continued use of "PDSC" within the USPACOM and at the national level.

(U) Also in September COMIPAC signed and forwarded to J21 a memorandum recommending that IPAC assume executive agency for the USPACOM Intelligence Data Handling System Center (IDHSC)-II Switch, the Community On-line Intelligence Network System (COINS)-II Tactical Automatic Switch (TAS), the USCINCPAC Network Security Officer function, and full control over IPAC-funded MITRE Corporation resources. Upon J21 concurrence with these recommendations, DS would prepare memoranda of agreement to formalize the transition of authority and responsibility in each of these areas. While DS would assume the bulk of the functions associated with each, CR and DS verbally agreed that all training responsibilities would become a CR function.<sup>1</sup>

### ADP Systems

(U) Pending completion of Tempest testing, the USCINCPAC J2 authorized the addition of seven IBM 3178 computer terminals and issued an interim Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) accreditation. Installation of the seven terminals in IPAC DS was completed on 13 January 1984.<sup>2</sup>

(U) A DIA team completed installation of the User Telecommunications Network (TELNET) at IPAC. The 15 SU-1652 terminal users hosted on the IPAC USS3 computer could now access the Defense Intelligence Agency On-line System (DIAOLS) and COINS through TELNET. Until activation of the Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System (AIRES) II at the DIA, scheduled for 15 May 1984, only USCINCPAC J23 would have AIRES interactive TELNET access. The SU-1652 user TELNET capability was also installed on the FICPAC PDSC Remote System (PRS) as part of this joint DIA-IPAC effort. In July an initial PRS software system was generated and transferred to WESTCOM for testing on their hardware configuration.<sup>3</sup>

(U) In June the USCINCPAC Command and Control and Communications Systems (C3S) Directorate officially asked the Naval Telecommunications Command to initiate a service request for a new Local Digital Message Exchange/Automated Message Handling System (LDMX/AMHS) line. IPAC obligated \$125,000 towards this project to improve the efficiency and reliability of GENSER message traffic transmission from the Naval Telecommunications Center (NTCC) Camp H.M. Smith LDMX to the IPAC AMHS. The new LDMX circuit was activated on 10 December. The line provided a more direct path for the delivery of GENSER messages to the IPAC AMHS than previously, and should improve circuit reliability.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid.
  2. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Jan 84 (U).
  3. IPAC (DCO) HistSums May and Jul 84 (U).
  4. IPAC (DCO) HistSums Jun and Dec 84 (U).


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(U) On 2 November the testing of COINS II software was successfully completed by contractors. With that, the IPAC COINS II Terminal Access System was the only such remote site to complete this testing satisfactorily.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The IBM 4341 memory upgrade from 8 to 12 megabytes was accomplished on 11 December during normal scheduled maintenance time, without any loss of system availability to the users. Initial indications were that reduced system overhead was contributing to increased throughput and faster user response time.<sup>2</sup>

QUICKTEL-84 Demonstration



1. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Nov 84 (U).
2. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Dec 84 (U).
3. J3 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR.
4. Ibid.

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### Korean Intelligence Support System

(U) The Korean Intelligence Support System (KISS) was under development to automate and enhance existing manual intelligence in Korea. It would automate the manual message handling system and provide much-needed on-line data base and application tools for both combined forces and U.S. forces intelligence analysts. The Required Operational Capability (ROC) and Mission Element Needs Statement (MENS) had been validated by the JCS in December 1981. Milestone 1 (the concept) had been approved by the Under Secretary of the Army in June 1983, and Milestone 2 (definition/design) was approved on 12 June 1984.<sup>1</sup>

(U) KISS would provide: direct intelligence support to echelons above corps level for both U.S. and combined forces in Korea; intelligence automation needs in peace, crisis, or war; survivability, with two main computer centers (at Command Post TANGO and Command Post Taegu); a broad array of analyst applications; an automated message handling system; dynamically updated local data bases; analyst-to-analyst secure communications; and English-to-Hangul or Hangul-to-English word conversion for formatted messages.

(U) An integration and application developmental contract was to be let to begin implementation of KISS in FY 85. A basic operational capability for the AMHS would be completed by the end of FY 85, and the final operational capability with two computer centers and terminals homed to both centers was scheduled for completion in FY 89.<sup>2</sup>

### IPAC Joint Manpower Program

(U) IPAC's FY 85 Joint Manpower Program (JMP), as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was forwarded to the JCS J1 via USCINCPAC J133 on 13 December 1984. As submitted, IPAC's FY 85 JMP showed a total of 398 billets. Also, on 13 December, IPAC's FY 86 JMP request was finalized and submitted to the JCS J1. This request was based on the FY 85 JMP (as submitted), and incorporated all manpower requirements previously provided in IPAC's FY 86 POM/GDIPP and accepted for planning and programming for FY 86 by the JCS on 1 December 1984. In addition, this request incorporated all FY 87 manpower requirements as identified in IPAC's FY 87 POM/GDIPP submission.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J212 Point Paper (U), 23 Nov 84, Subj: Korean Intelligence Support System (KISS).
  2. Ibid.
  3. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Dec 84 (U).

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SECTION II--COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

Signals Intelligence

Wartime Reserve Modes

(S) On 13 and 14 March 1984 the Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsored the second Wartime Reserve Modes (WARM) workshop to discuss the WARM issue. The workshop was hosted by the NSA/W Group at Ft Meade, MD. A USCINCPAC J2 representative from the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Collection Management Branch and two IPAC representatives from the Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Analysis Division attended the workshop. In the keynote address, the OSD Director for Electronic Warfare/Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures (EW/C3CM) said there was a need for a validated DIA threat assessment that was the same for all of the Services. Presently, each Service used its own threat assessment which supported its requirements for new equipment. However, the assessment itself varied greatly among the Services.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The Chief of the NSA W2 Group said WARM was not just ELINT or SIGINT, or even just the intelligence discipline alone; operations needed to get involved. Some WARM data was available two years before, but was just now being consolidated into a single data base. There were 25 Soviet signals with known wartime reserve modes in the Kilting data base, but it was estimated that these 25 listings comprised only 10 percent of the total WARM picture.

(S) Most original data on WARM had come from Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT) and foreign military exploitation, but very little from ELINT. EW equipment ("black boxes") might not work properly, and the intelligence community viewed the problem as critical. Further, collectors might not be reporting the one-time WARM intercept because it might not be recognized. If it did get reported, it might not be fully processed until enough data was available to validate the intercept.

(S) A basic problem was that WARM was not identified among Essential Elements of Information (EEI) in Operation Plans (OPLANS) or SIGINT support plans. Tactical Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) under the operational control of the tactical commander did not get reported into the national data base. WARM parameters detected by the tactical ESM collector did not get evaluated, unlike Operational ELINT or Technical ELINT data. Finally, there was no established data base for WARM.

(S) There were no intelligence production requirements to address the WARM problem. The first platform to detect WARM signals might well be


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1. J2321 HistSum Mar 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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
tactical assets such as fighter aircraft or surface combatants in a crisis situation. A pilot who sees a SAM shot at him but has no cockpit radar warning receiver (RWR) indication needed to make this information available to other tactical assets in the area, to intelligence collectors, and to EW equipment reprogrammers. A method of recording data received by RWR gear could help the intelligence community, but the problems of processing the data could be enormous. The EW operator was the key to WARM, and operators needed to get involved.




(S) Many questions were raised during the open forum of the workshop. For example, almost all of the attendees were ELINT representatives and there were few HUMINT and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) people. Also, WARM was more than an intelligence problem. There was a need to get operators to state their requirements. The Washington community was still looking for a "WARM Czar" to take over from the NSA. Once researchers could develop black boxes

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that recognized WARM parameters and automatically make changes, the problem might be solved. How would collectors be integrated, and how would allies be supported? What impact did WARM have on offensive missiles? How would analysts and engineers get into the WARM problem for the quick turnaround cycle required during a crisis or wartime? The major point made was that the Air Force pilot or Navy combat information center officer or Army SIGINT collector in the front lines needed to know immediately if the enemy had implemented wartime reserve modes. It was better to go into combat knowing your system might or might not work than assuming it was 100 percent correct and would take care of any threat.



1. Ibid.
2. USCINCLANT 262035Z Apr 84 (TS/NF), DECL OADR.



1. Ibid.
2. CINCSAC 041620Z May 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.

Electronic Intelligence Management

(C) (U) An OUTLAW SHARK (AN/USQ 81-V) system was installed in IPAC's Operational ELINT Analysis Branch, ELINT Analysis Division, on 16 January 1984. The system employed a processing computer and two operator terminals with video displays. Analysts would use the equipment to graphically display tactical ELINT information in near-real-time against a background map with electronic order of battle (EOB) and other intelligence information superimposed. The equipment was in limited operation, pending connection to an input source and operational training.<sup>3</sup>


(S) (U) (NOFORN) In January CINCPACFLT requested that daily production of the Indian Ocean/Middle East ELINT Summary Report be extended through the end of the month. USCINCPAC validated the request and daily production continued until 3 February. Actions in the Persian Gulf-Strait of Hormuz area had necessitated the daily attention since 23 December 1983.<sup>4</sup>

(S) (U) The Third Annual ELINT Conference was held at the National Security Agency, 4-8 June 1984. The conference, attended by over 600 people, provided excellent briefings on current ELINT and ESM initiatives, as well as projected plans and programs. Significant briefings and working-group discussions focused on: the NSA's W Group reorganization, SIGINT collection overview, BLUE/GRAY (Third World emitters) update and data base requirements, SIGINT support to military operations, Project BEACHMAN overview, Electronic Warfare

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1. Ibid.
  2. JCS 041310Z Jun 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
  3. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Jan 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  4. IPAC (DCO) HistSums Jan and Mar 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.


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Reprogrammable Library/Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming/Flagging, Wrangler, WARM, tactical reporting, specific emitter identification (SEI), millimeter wave/wideband recording/pulse doppler exploitation, intelligence correlation and analysis, and the United Kingdom EW operations support establishment. In addition to scheduled briefings and working groups, important issues affecting different commands were discussed and actions taken to resolve problems.<sup>1</sup>



1. J2321 HistSum Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR.
2. USCINCPAC 120420Z Jun 84 (S), DECL OADR.
3. Ibid.

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
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(S//NOFORN) General Vessey replied to USCINCPAC that he had discussed the U-2R/TR-1 problem with CINCSPACE, and that the latter was aggressively pursuing a solution. In the meantime, other platforms were being surged in an attempt to fill the void. The reason for the delay was because the accident board had recommended a halt in flight tests of the aircraft with the interim tailpipe clamp adapter until the engine manufacturer completed extensive ground testing of unmodified tailpipes. If they could duplicate clamp failure under simulated accident conditions, the modified clamp would be cleared for flight

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1. J2324 HistSum Oct 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 310323Z Oct 84 (S//NF), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

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testing. On the other hand, if the unmodified clamp did not fail during ground testing, more time-consuming tests would have to be made.



1. JCS 162345Z Nov 84 (~~S/NF~~), DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCUSAC 191250Z Nov 84 (~~S/NF~~) and 221440Z Nov 84 (~~S~~), both DECL OADR.
4. CINCUSAC 202359Z Nov 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
5. USCINCPAC 262225Z Nov 84 (~~S~~) and CINCUNC 270800Z Nov 84 (~~S/NF~~), both DECL OADR.

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Imagery Intelligence

~~(S)~~ In February 1984 the Iran-Iraq war increased in intensity and USCINCPAC, in coordination with the DIA, tasked imagery coverage of the battlefield area to provide USCINCPAC activities with the current situation. Additionally, IMINT collection was tasked in reponse to reported terrorist training, preparation for operations, and increased threat to CINCPACFLT forces operating in the Northern Arabian Sea as well as USCENTCOM forces in the Persian Gulf.<sup>1</sup>

-(U) Also in February USCINCPAC's Imagery Intelligence Branch completed a three-month effort to develop and refine a concept of imagery exploitation operations for the island of Oahu during the next 5-8 years. The concept and a cost/benefit analysis of distributing USPACOM imagery exploitation between the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group and the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific was provided to the DIA/General Defense Intelligence Program staff. The analysis and concept of operations supported a GDIP requirement by FICPAC/CINCPACFLT to obtain a computer-aided tactical information system in the 1985-1986 time frame.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ A team from the DIA visited USCINCPAC during 30 April-1 May to provide information on the new national-level imagery requirements format and structure. Known as the COMIREX Requirements Structure (CRS), the new formats expanded on the intelligence/collection problem-set format in present use and included a concept of exploitation problem-sets. The new CRS would improve the identification of requirements and satisfaction of accounting, provide for more flexible tasking of advanced collection systems, and improve exploitation tasking against intelligence topics as well as individual installations. The conversion to CRS brought with it significant interface problems between the COMIREX Automated Management System and DOD systems, particularly the DIA Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System and, potentially, the Air Force Computer Aided Tactical Information System and the Selective Imagery Distribution system. Over the longer term, the DOD would likely use the CRS format for imagery requirement management instead of the existing Imagery Requirements Objectives File system.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ During the period 31 July-3 August an OSD/DIA team visited Headquarters USCINCPAC to brief the command on the status of the DOD Imagery Acquisition and Management Plan (IAMP). The plan had been directed by a program decision memorandum in August 1983. Its purpose was to develop a consolidated DOD approach to digital imagery dissemination to operational commands. The centerpiece of the plan was the requirement for upgrade of the Defense Dissemination System. Due to time constraints the IAMP had been


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1. J231 HistSum Feb 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.
  2. J2311 HistSum Feb 84 (U).
  3. J2311 HistSum Apr 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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developed in Washington with participation by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the military departments, the JCS, and the DIA. Unified and specified command requirements had been requested and would be included in the final version of the IAMP.<sup>1</sup>

(a) x  
(b) (c)

Human Resources Intelligence



Recommendations for Improvement in HUMINT Collection

(b) (c)

(S/NOFORN) On 16 January 1984 the Secretary of Defense had directed that a joint DOD-CIA examination be conducted to develop proposals for improvements in HUMINT support to the U.S. military forces [redacted]. This was to be followed, as Phase II, by a similar effort encompassing other areas of potential conflict. [redacted]

In support of this effort the DIA, CIA, State Department, and the Services completed an estimate of areas of potential conflict over the next five years. A working group then reviewed the list from the standpoint of possible U.S. military involvement. [redacted]

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1. J231 HistSum Aug 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. USCINCPAC 051939Z Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.

[REDACTED] Instead, the list centered on countries or regions where potentially critical threats existed--where the United States might become militarily involved, but which might have been the subjects of less intense intelligence scrutiny. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (b)(1)(p)  
[REDACTED] (S/NOFORN) The DIA apprised the theater commanders that a methodology had been developed for HUMINT tasking which was based on four stages of involvement. Stage I was pre-involvement where HUMINT collectors concentrated on intelligence collection which contributed to analysis of the threat and thereby aided policymakers in determining policy options. This stage also was generally characterized by data base building and monitoring indicators of instabilities. [REDACTED] (b)(1)(c)

[REDACTED] Essentially, HUMINT activities and capabilities developed during this stage formed the basis for transition to future stages.

(S/NOFORN) In Stage II, preparation for involvement, HUMINT collectors sought intelligence which would support actions to be taken by U.S. military forces. Data bases would be updated as necessary during this stage. A key requirement for this stage was clear identification of the operational commanders' HUMINT collection needs. Those HUMINT capabilities necessary to support military involvement would be activated, [REDACTED] (b)(1)(c)

[REDACTED] A determination had to be made as to what HUMINT resources already in place would be independently maintained or resubordinated to the operational commander during activation of Stage III and what organic HUMINT capabilities the military force would contain--such as interrogation, security, document exploitation, and materiel acquisition. The dynamics during this stage centered on activating previously developed augmentation capabilities and assuring DOD HUMINT participation in appropriate contingency planning.

(S/NOFORN) In Stage III--involvement--organic, augmented, and other HUMINT collectors provided intelligence support to U.S. forces which might be

1. DIA 222333Z Mar 84 (S/NOFORN)(EX), DECL OADR.

in a non-combat (peacekeeping or stabilizing) or combat role. What was most important during this stage was assuring that HUMINT capabilities previously identified as critical to supporting the operational commander were in fact doing just that. A key element during the involvement phase was activation of the facility which sends needed information to the operational commander and properly tasked HUMINT resources. A concern would be integrating HUMINT efforts of various agencies which had pre-crisis presence with the organic HUMINT resources of the military force (connectivity).


(S/NOFORN) In Stage IV, post-involvement, HUMINT collectors supported U.S. forces in the after-action phase. This stage was concerned with the maintenance of specified HUMINT capabilities to meet the changing needs of the operational commander.

(b)(1)(c)



(S/NOFORN) The entire process, which involved the State Department as well as the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency, was to be closely coordinated among policy, operational, intelligence collection, and intelligence analysis elements. The DIA envisaged use of the National Intelligence Office Watch Committee process to evaluate the level of threat.

(b)(1)(c)



(S/NOFORN) Support and active involvement by unified commanders was vital to success of this effort. The DIA wanted to avoid a sterile planning exercise and implement instead the simplest possible arrangements for deciding on intelligence needed for particular countries and stages of involvement. The agency believed this required a linkage to theater operational planning processes, with commanders providing input as to intelligence needed and in tasking theater HUMINT assets for data obtainable in-theater. Theaters would

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advise the DIA concerning these intelligence needs and indicate where collection assistance was needed outside the theater's own assets.<sup>1</sup>


Asia/Pacific Defense Attache Conference

(U) The Defense Intelligence Agency scheduled its FY 85 Asia/Pacific Defense Attache (DATT) Conference at the Hilton Hawaiian Village in Honolulu during 10-14 December 1984. Attending were 22 U.S. Defense and Service attaches stationed in Australia, Bangladesh, Burma, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan (USCENTCOM area), Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Also attending were many representatives from the DIA and other CONUS agencies and intelligence personnel from USCINCPAC and other local headquarters. The conference focused on DOD HUMINT collection and its contribution to the intelligence community.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Opening remarks were given by BGEN Donald W. Goodman, USAF, Chief of Staff and Assistant Vice Director, DIA; and BGEN Jimmy C. Pettyjohn, USAF, Director for Intelligence, USCINCPAC. In conjunction with the DATT Conference a Pacific Area Update briefing was hosted by LGEN William H. Schneider, USA, Deputy USCINCPAC/Chief of Staff, followed by a question and answer session with Admiral Crowe. The remainder of the conference agenda consisted of various national- and theater-level presentations on topics of mutual interest. Some segments of the conference were devoted to attache support discussions between the DIA and DATTs.<sup>3</sup>

Indications and Warning Intelligence


(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Since April 1984 North Korea had been redeploying elements of its ground forces to the forward area. A review of available data indicated that this redeployment was probably related to an overall force improvement program involving mechanized and paramilitary reserve forces, which had been underway since 1980. Some units probably were involved in localized moves related to internal reorganization of mechanized forces. However, some rear area units had moved to the forward corps.



1. Ibid.
2. J2331 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
3. Ibid.
4. IPAC (IA-2) Point Paper (S/NF/WNINTEL), 26 Oct 84, Subj: Reduction of Warning Time in Korea; Intelligence Collection Shortfalls (U), DECL OADR.

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
Nuclear Testing in French Polynesia

(S/NOFORN) By late 1984 France had conducted 73 successful underground nuclear tests on Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia. These tests were done under the auspices of the French Atomic Energy Commission, which was established in October 1945, and directed toward peaceful uses until 1954. Research and development was initiated for the production of nuclear weapons in

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1. Ibid.
  2. DIA 051257Z Dec 84 (S/NF/WNINTEL), DECL OADR.

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1956 and the French detonated their first nuclear device in February 1960, in Algeria. Subsequently, 17 nuclear tests were conducted in Algeria (4 atmospheric and 13 underground). The Pacific Test Center became operational in 1966 and consisted of a rear support base at Papeete, Tahiti, a forward support base at Hao, test sites on Mururoa and Fangataufa (also used as an observation post), and emergency landing strips at the Isles Gambier Atolls, approximately 800 miles southeast of Tahiti.<sup>1</sup>

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1. LPAC (IA-4) Point Paper (S/NF), 19 Nov 84, Subj: French Nuclear Testing in French Polynesia (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.

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[REDACTED]

(U) New Zealand media carried a report on 5 October that French nuclear testing would continue for at least 15 more years. The report was filed by journalists visiting the testing site at Mururoa. According to the Deputy Director of Testing, within three years all tests would be carried out beneath the lagoon for security reasons. The opposition leader in New Zealand's Parliament claimed that the continuation of testing was at variance with a personal assurance he had received at a meeting with the French President that testing should end by about mid-1985, and called for clarification by French authorities.<sup>2</sup>

(C) On 5 November New Zealand's Prime Minister, David Lange, strongly condemned the latest French nuclear test at Mururoa and hinted that his country would get more active in opposition to the tests. Lange said the explosion of a 40 KT device on 1 November--the second blast within a week--signaled the start of a new series of tests. The U.S. Ambassador in Wellington believed that Lange felt betrayed by the announcement that France would continue to test at the Mururoa site through the end of the century. That revelation came just days after Lange had met with the French Minister of External Affairs in New York, at which time Lange had not been informed of French testing plans.<sup>3</sup>

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1. DIA 132211Z Jun 84 (~~S/NF~~), DECL OADR.
  2. AMEMB Wellington 05087/050340Z Oct 84 (U).
  3. AMEMB Wellington 05636/062110Z Nov 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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


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SECTION III--INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

Targeting

USPACOM Management



Tiger Team Target Analyses

(U)  
(C) At the 15 March meeting of the Target Actions Group, IPAC presented its North Korea target analysis briefing prepared by Tiger Team I. The IPAC study was to be compared and combined, as appropriate, with complementary targeting efforts at PACAF. Collection requirements were to be reviewed and established for intelligence shortfalls identified in the study. PACFLT and WESTCOM representatives asked that the IPAC briefing be presented at their commands also.<sup>2</sup>

(U)  
(C) The Tiger Team I North Korea target analysis briefing was presented to the USCINCPAC J2 and Admiral Crowe on 4 and 6 September 1984. They approved sending the team to the Western Pacific to inform commanders of the results of the IPAC analysis. During the week of 8-15 September, therefore, Tiger Team I presented its "Critical Targets Air Campaign Plan" briefing to major WESTPAC operational commanders and their staffs. This tour disseminated results of Tiger Team I's analytical effort, provided cognizant staffs the campaign plan target list, and promoted greater opportunities for analytical exchanges. Specific audiences included COMUSKOREA, COMUSJAPAN, CDRUSARJ, COMSEVENTHFLT, and CG Third Marine Division and their staffs. Three members of the Headquarters PACAF Intelligence Directorate staff accompanied the team

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1. USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. III, p. 725; Minutes, USPA-COM Target Actions Group Meetings, Jan-Oct 84, hereinafter cited as TAG Minutes.
  2. TAG Minutes Mar 84 (C/MF), DECL OADR

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for purposes of establishing target material requirements and to display general support of IPAC's ongoing efforts.<sup>1</sup>

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(C) At the 15 June TAG meeting, members received a status report on another study, Tiger Team II's "Soviet Far East Military District of Military Operations (TVD) USCINCPAC OPLAN 5000 Target Analysis." AT1 component TAG members were emphatic in stating that this project should be an integrated USPACOM effort to insure that it encompassed all targeting aspects and weapon systems. Members were assured that components would have a chance to preview the analysis results prior to the briefing of the final product. In August the IPAC representative reported that interim briefings had been given to the USCINCPAC J2 and J3.<sup>3</sup>

(C) The Tiger Team II briefing was presented to Joint Air Operations Planning Team and TAG members on four occasions between 20 and 26 September, with each group receiving a 3-hour briefing. A total of 44 senior USPACOM officers, plus a senior analyst from the NSA and the DIA, attended. They recommended that an abbreviated version, in addition to a briefing of the final target selection, prioritization, and packaging resulting from this analysis, be provided to the USCINCPAC and other flag and general officers and their staffs throughout the USPACOM upon completion of the project. Further efforts would be devoted to integrating the analysis data into a format for the presentation of those targets considered the most critical to the war-fighting capability of the Soviet Far East Military District TVD.<sup>4</sup>

(C) TAG members were informed at the 26 October meeting that the IPAC analytical effort to select and prioritize Tiger Team II targets was nearing completion. IPAC estimated that the final briefing would be available for presentation to USPACOM organizations in January 1985.<sup>5</sup>

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1. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Sep 84 (U); TAG Minutes Sep 84 (S/NF/WNINTEL), DECL OADR.
  2. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Oct 84 (S/REL ROK), DECL OADR.
  3. TAG Minutes Jun 84 (C/NF) and Aug 84 (S/NF), both DECL OADR.
  4. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Sep 84 (U); TAG Minutes Sep 84 (S/NF/WNINTEL), DECL OADR.
  5. TAG Minutes Oct 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.

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(S) Earlier, at the 26 April 1984 TAG meeting, the chairman had reviewed targeting participation in Exercise NIGHT TRAIN 84, which provided an excellent learning experience. One of the lessons learned affirmed the fact that the OPLAN 5000/5001 target list needed to be prioritized. This had been a major objective of the Tiger Team II analysis.<sup>1</sup>

Project SIDEVIEW

(U) SIDEVIEW was an automated process for transforming overhead imagery into any user-desired perspective of the selected geographic area. The DIA on 7 March announced development of a small-scale SIDEVIEW production capability as a testbed to confirm the practicality and affordability of the system. The TAG chairman reviewed USPACOM's proposed response which supported DIA efforts to develop a prototype SIDEVIEW production capability. The USCINCPAC response also stated our anticipated need for in-theater SIDEVIEW production capability if the DIA testbed proved successful.<sup>2</sup>

DMA Chart Production

(U) Defense Mapping Agency representatives visited the USPACOM on 29 May to discuss DMA production requirement procedures and USPACOM concerns about the low rate of chart production in the USCINCPAC area of responsibility (AOR). The TAG chairman reported that as a result of these discussions IPAC would add a fourth criterion to the Command Operational Priorities Requirements List (COPRL) program so that the maximum point value would be available for USPACOM requirements. The DMA explained that when a chart was judged adequate according to the DMA's Product Maintenance System (PMS) criteria, it would not be revised or updated regardless of its priority in the COPRL. The DMA would provide USCINCPAC with a production priority list that identified the adequacy of charts according to PMS criteria. From this listing USCINCPAC could identify essential charts which had been deemed adequate by the DMA, and detail specifically why certain charts were inadequate for USPACOM operational requirements. Production of 200-series Air Target Charts and Joint Operational Graphics-Radar in the USCINCPAC AOR would improve significantly as the DMA, in conjunction with IPAC, had identified 49 sheets for out-of-cycle scheduling in FY 85-86.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The TAG was informed at the 26 October meeting that the DMA had produced 18 out-of-cycle Air Target Charts in the USPACOM area. Based on existing DMA production projections, charts for the USPACOM AOR should be up to date within two years.<sup>4</sup>

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1. TAG Minutes Apr 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.
  2. TAG Minutes Mar 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.
  3. TAG Minutes Jun 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR; J2/Memo/TS-09-85 (U), 1 Jul 85, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History 1984; review of draft.
  4. TAG Minutes Oct 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.

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
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ATTG Production

(U) Headquarters PACAF proposed on 22 May that USPACOM Automated Tactical Target Graphics (ATTG) producers provide an ATTG production forecast listing to the IPAC Target Analysis Division. Upon receipt of the forecast IPAC would provide "target significance" statements for incorporation into the ATTGs. This procedure would provide several benefits: assist in scheduling the production of associated products such as Weaponing Information Sheets (WISs); provide enhanced, OPLAN-relevant target significance statements; and furnish an improved, higher-quality ATTG product to USPACOM operational users.<sup>1</sup>

(U) TAG members at the 15 June meeting approved the proposal, with the provision that the target significance statement provided by IPAC would be used at the producer's discretion. Effective August 1984, the production forecast would be submitted with the monthly ATTG production report. It would cover production planned for 60 days in advance of the following month. Similarly, IPAC would provide target significance statements to ATTG producers by the 15th of the month prior to production. These procedures would be detailed in the next revision to the USCINCPAC Targeting Program instruction.<sup>2</sup>

(U) At the 26 October TAG meeting the FICPAC representative summarized results of their recently completed ATTG customer survey. They indicated that the ATTGs were used in a variety of ways in addition to target planning. Overall, the ATTG proved to be a frequently used, well-presented, and valuable product. In only one area did customers indicate need for improvement--the quality of hard copy prints made from microfiche. It was noted that FICPAC progress toward tighter quality control in microfiche production would prove beneficial. FICPAC was to share ATTG user comments with the other USPACOM producer, the 548th RTG.<sup>3</sup>




(S) The TAG chairman announced that, in accordance with DIA instructions, FICPAC had assumed Tactical Target Material production responsibility for

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1. TAG Minutes Jun 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. TAG Minutes Oct 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.

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naval-related categories in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. The chairman anticipated that at least 50 percent of FICPAC's ATTG production would be dedicated to satisfying USCENTCOM requirements.<sup>1</sup>



Battle Area Weaponeering Guide

(U) On 23 January 1984 Headquarters PACAF requested from IPAC a weaponeering aid which would assist intelligence support personnel in rapidly choosing the most appropriate aircraft-weapon combination to assign against battlefield targets. TAG members at the January meeting concurred in the requirement for such an aid. A working group was formed to investigate if there was a product available to meet this need. If not, the TAG would coordinate the development of a product that would meet the requirement for an easy-to-use, quick-reference guide for use by often inexperienced personnel in time-critical situations.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Representatives from IPAC, PACAF, PACFLT, and FICPAC met to discuss plans for producing a USPACOM Battle Area Weaponeering Guide (BAGUIDE). It was determined that none of the Services produced such a document. The

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1. Ibid.
  2. TAG Minutes Mar-Oct 84 (C/NF) and (S/NF/WNINTEL), DECL OADR; J2/Memo/TS-09-85 (U), 1 Jul 85, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History 1984; review of draft.
  3. TAG Minutes Jan 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.

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conventional Weapons Guide produced in Europe gave the same type of generic weaponing data that the proposed BAGUIDE would give, but it included much information useless to USPACOM forces, and its massive size made it inconvenient and unsuitable for expeditious use. The Navy and Marines were definitely interested in having a theater BAGUIDE. It was decided at the meeting that IPAC would produce the BAGUIDE, with USCINCPAC, FMFPAC, and PACAF providing the necessary inputs (delivery conditions, weapons load, and targets) directly to IPAC. IPAC planned for the document to be sectionalized according to Service.

(2) At the 27 September TAG meeting the IPAC member said that the first iteration of the Battle Area Weaponing Guide was in the production and distribution stage. The BAGUIDE was a Secret document that included weaponing data for generic target types. During a recent USPACOM intelligence publications review it was suggested that perhaps a generic document like the BAGUIDE could serve in place of the existing WIS, thereby conserving scarce resources and enhancing timeliness of information. Accordingly, once the BAGUIDE was distributed, USPACOM users would be surveyed to determine the impact of discontinuing the WIS. Needs of the operational users, however, would be the determining factor in any resulting decision.

Special Target Analyses


CRUISE MISSILES (p. 909)

1. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Mar 84 (U); TAG Minutes Mar 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.
2. TAG Minutes Sep 84 (S/NF/WINTEL), DECL OADR.
3. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Jan 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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Cruise Missiles  
(p. 909)




1. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Jul 84 (~~S~~/FRD).
2. TAG Minutes Oct 84 (~~S~~/NF), DECL OADR.
3. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Jan 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.
4. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Aug 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.

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CROSS MISSILES  
(P. 909)

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


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Chemical warfare  
Intelligence (p. 906)




1. TAG Minutes Oct 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR; J2/Memo/TS-09-85 (U), 1 Jul 85, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History 1984; review of draft.
2. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Nov 84 (S), DECL OADR.
3. TAG Minutes Mar 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.
4. R/S 211217 May 84 (TS), Downgrade to (S) [unclear]

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Chew.  
(p. 906)

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


1. Ibid.
2. USCINCPAC 291854Z May 84 (S)(BOM), DECL OADR.

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Chem.  
(p. 906)



1. Ibid.

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Chem.  
(p. 902)

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1. TAG Minutes Aug-Oct 84 (S/NF) and (S/NF/INTEL), DECL OADR.
2. USCINCPAC 191800Z Oct 84 (TS), DECL OADR.
3. Ibid.
4. JCS 082212Z Jun 84 (TS/EX), DECL OADR.

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1. DIA 082335Z Jun 84 (~~TS/NF~~)(~~EX~~) DECL OADR.
2. USCINCPAC 110221Z Jul 84 (~~TS~~), DECL OADR.

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Unconventional Warfare

(C) IPAC completed its portion of the draft "USCINCPAC Special Operations Campaign Strategy" in June. This had been requested by the USCINCPAC J36 and included unconventional warfare (UW) targeting requirements. The Special Operations Forces campaign strategy complemented and supported the conventional air and naval campaign plans. The finalized script was briefed to the Director Joint Special Operations Agency during his visit to USCINCPAC Headquarters.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In August IPAC reviewed the draft copy of the first intelligence study for Special Operations produced by ITIC-PAC, as requested by J36 and the WESTCOM Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence. The review concluded that the ITIC-PAC product contained the necessary data to support pre-conflict mission concept planning.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Also in August IPAC completed a review of four detailed installations studies produced by the DIA in support of USCINCPAC UW targeting requirements. The IPAC response consolidated FICPAC, WESTCOM, and SOCPAC comments. The studies were evaluated as very professional and of high quality, not only for unconventional warfare but also for cruise missiles and airstrikes. Additionally, a list of future targets for DIA production was forwarded.<sup>3</sup>

Intelligence Files

AIF Production



1. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Apr 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.
2. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Aug 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
3. Ibid.
4. TAG Minutes Jan 84 (C/NF), DECL OADR.

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(U) Programming to produce microfiche of all AIF records released to Australia was successfully accomplished in May. Production of the microfiche was in response to a request by the JIO AIF Manager for IPAC to supply all future AIF baseline data in microfiche as well as compressed tape format. In tape format, records would be in full file. In microfiche format, only essential identification data would be provided. The Australians desired microfiche for archival purposes.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 12 July the Target Analysis Division submitted the Far East Military District Installations List (FEMDIL), dated June 1984, to the Technical Services Division for final production and dissemination. The FEMDIL was previously produced as the Far East Contingency Planning Facilities List (FECPFL). This change was made to avert any potential confusion between the national-level CPFL program and IPAC products previously bearing the "CPFL" acronym. Also, for the first time, it provided the "activity" for EOB installations.<sup>3</sup>


(U) In July IPAC compiled the initial elevation project for the Air Force Reserve unit Detached Training Site (DTS)-45 at Arlington Hall Station, VA. This was the first step in expanding the AIF enhancement program using Air Force Reserve augmentation. It supplemented existing efforts involving three Naval Reserve units, and marked a first in having Air Force Intelligence Service Reserve DTSS work on the AIF. IPAC later compiled and forwarded an AIF enhancement project to DTS-39 in Knoxville, TN. This brought the total number of reserve units supporting the Target Analysis Division to five (3 Navy, 2 Air Force). Projects for additional DTS units were being researched.<sup>4</sup>

~~(S)~~ In August, Target Analysis Division personnel met with the Commander DTS-3 of Salt Lake City, UT, to discuss the feasibility of DTS-3 undertaking an AIF enhancement project. DTS-3 voiced concern about the project size and currency of data to be returned to IPAC since they only drilled bimonthly. IPAC would develop an AIF elevation project tailored to meet their needs. DTS-3 would also contact the Salt Lake City Naval Reserve unit to see whether it could work on a joint IPAC project in the future. DTS-3 would be the third Air Force Reserve unit to receive an AIF elevation project.<sup>5</sup>

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1. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR.
  2. IPAC (DCO) HistSum May 84 (U).
  3. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Aug 84 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, DECL OADR.
  4. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Jul 84 (U).
  5. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Aug 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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(S//NOFORN//WNINTEL) IPAC forwarded a F/AIF (data change request to the AIF) to the DIA requesting Target Data Inventory activation of 19 installations and mineable areas in North Korea which were included in USCINCPAC OPLAN 5027. These activations were based on analysis and research performed by Tiger Team I (see above). IPAC subsequently sent a second F/AIF to the DIA requesting deletion of eight installations and LOC road segments, also in North Korea. Imagery analysis revealed the targets were no longer in existence.<sup>1</sup>



(C) In September the Target Analysis Division prepared and staffed within IPAC an extensive point paper on the DIA Military Intelligence Integrated Data System (MIIDS). Essentially, MIIDS was an attempt by the DIA to meet the unified and specified commands' requirements for an ability to associate order of battle and AIF data into a single threat display, thereby improving analytical capabilities. Because of its dependence on an ability to link files using certain common data elements, there was a data processing system impact in that more data maintained at a higher level was anticipated.<sup>4</sup>

(U) TAG members were informed at the 27 September meeting that the first USPACOM AIF Executive Agent Products Catalog, dated July 1984, had been distributed to some 140 recipients. The catalog provided information on the content, frequency, format, countries, categories, AIF items, sorts, and

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1. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Aug 84 (S//NF//WNINTEL), DECL OADR.
  2. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. Ibid.
  4. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Sep 84 (C), DECL OADR.

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customers for each AIF executive product. Guidelines for requesting modifications of existing products and for requesting new products were included in the catalog. Users were reminded that all requests for new products had to be validated by USCINCPAC.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center (DMAAC) was attempting to phase out its "Free World" hardcopy volumes of Airfields and Seaplane Stations of the World (ASSOTW) due to budget constraints. The overall feeling at IPAC was that the ASSOTW volume should continue to be published. Among the reasons cited were the lack of alternate source data on Third World/non-communist airfields, the nonavailability of ADP airfield data sources to field and deployed naval units, and the tenuous nature of electrically dependent data bases in a wartime environment. The IPAC position was sent by the Geophysics Division (J37) as the USCINCPAC response to the DMAAC.<sup>2</sup>


FARM Status Report

(U) The Field Automated Installation Intelligence File Records Maintenance status report for 1984 indicated the following F/AIF actions were forwarded by various USPACOM and associated organizations to the DIA and other designated producers during the year:<sup>3</sup>

<u>Organization</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>3d Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
Reserve Unit 0171				
Denver	1,139	210	-	1,763
Reserve Unit 0218				
Kansas City	518	485	179	76
Reserve Unit 2489				
Whidbey Island	-	-	35	-
6th TIG	2	-	-	-
548th RTG	130	71	164	112
FICPAC	765	-	134	200
IPAC/PT-3	14,860	311	1,906	642
IPAC/PT-5	-	-	84	-
Total	<u>17,414</u>	<u>1,077</u>	<u>2,502</u>	<u>2,793</u>

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1. TAG Minutes Sep 84 (S/NF/WNINTEL), DECL OADR.
  2. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Nov 84 (U)
  3. TAG Minutes Apr, Aug 84 (C/NF) and Oct 84 (S/NF), all DECL OADR; J2/Memo/TS-09-85 (U), 1 Jul 85, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History 1984; review of draft.

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Target Intelligence Production Plan

(C) At the 2 August TAG meeting the USPACOM representative to the Target Intelligence Production Plan (TIPP) Validation Conference reviewed the proceedings for the members. Now in its fifth year, TIPP research was resulting in products with direct applicability to USPACOM targeting. Of great significance to USPACOM targeters was the progress being made in the development of the integrated data base. This would merge the existing order of battle and installations files (OB and AIF) into a single restructured data base system. A DIA staff team would be visiting the theater to present detailed briefings on the system and its implications for targeting and production personnel.<sup>2</sup>

C3CM Intelligence Support

(U) The USPACOM Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures Intelligence Sub-Working Group (formerly Intelligence Support Committee), comprised of members from USCINCPAC J2/J3/C3S, IPAC, PACFLT, FICPAC, PACAF, 548th RTG, WESTCOM, FMFPAC, and other concerned agencies, was chaired by the USCINCPAC J2 Targets Branch. It convened three times at USCINCPAC Headquarters in 1984, in January, May, and August.

(C) At the 17 January meeting the chairman reviewed results of the 30 November 1983 action officers' conference at the DIA during which they outlined planning for enhanced national-level management of intelligence support to EW/C3CM. This would be a long-term, four-phased effort including: development and evaluation of exploratory plans; R&D and systems acquisition; initial deployment and testing of C3CM intelligence support systems; and employment of C3CM operations. The USPACOM was participating in four initial tasks under the DIA action plan: Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWIC) publication of an updated list of C3CM data requirements; DIA survey of intelligence products and publications supporting EW/C3CM planning; DIA survey

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1. Ibid.
  2. TAG Minutes Aug 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.

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of command priorities for EW/C3CM support; and command reviews of a draft JEW C paper on operational concepts for EW/C3CM.<sup>1</sup>

~~(U)~~  
(S) Committee members also discussed a DIA letter of 7 December 1983 which requested command reviews of a draft DIA statement of geographical and topical priorities for intelligence support to EW and C3CM. The consolidated USPACOM response recommended higher priorities for tactical airstrike systems and supporting air/ground command and control systems. The USPACOM also recommended a higher priority for North Korea, due to the proximity of U.S. and ROK forces and the high potential for conflict.

~~(U)~~  
(S) The Rome Air Development Center (RADC) on 10 January 1984 offered to assist the USPACOM in developing an interoperable data base system designed to support C3CM battle management at component and major subordinate unified command levels. The RADC urged that advance planning be initiated immediately to permit an early summer start on the project. USCINCPAC prepared a response which accepted the RADC offer of assistance and provided sufficient information to permit the RADC to begin advance planning, pending resolution of funding problems.<sup>2</sup>

(U) At the 23 April meeting Headquarters USAF and RADC representatives reviewed progress achieved on the Tactical Air Forces (TAF) C3CM data base project. In response to additional USAF tasking, the General Telephone and Electronics Corporation had recently completed a strawman TAF C3CM concept of operations based primarily on initial user surveys and the functional description document. A theater C3CM systems requirements review was held in June at the GTE facility, and the final document was expected in July. This completed Phase I of the TAF C3CM data base contract.<sup>3</sup>

(U) RADC representatives provided preliminary comments regarding a USCINCPAC request for review of a draft Statement of Work (SOW) in support of USPACOM C3CM intelligence requirements. They estimated that a separate

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1. J222C/Memo/30 Jan 84 ~~(C)~~, Subj: USPACOM C3CM Intelligence Support Committee Meeting of 17 January 1984 (U), DECL OADR.
  2. Ibid.
  3. J222C/Memo/11 May 84 ~~(C)~~, Subj: USPACOM C3CM Intelligence Support Committee Meeting of 3 May 1984 (U), DECL OADR; J2/Memo/TS-09-85 (U), 1 Jul 85, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History 1984; review of draft.

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follow-on contract to satisfy all tasks specified in the SOW would cost approximately \$1.5 million for 180 man-months of contractor effort and take some 18 months to complete. However, the contract could be divided into two or more phases to reduce initial costs. RADC also suggested that separate Army and Navy concepts of operation would probably be required, perhaps as addenda along with the PACAF concept within an overall USPACOM concept document. They also restated their earlier offer to assist the USPACOM by serving as contract technical manager if funding could be found for a theater C3CM support system.

(S) The committee generally favored USCINCPAC J2 action to update the SOW and initiate a concerted effort to secure funding for at least the first phase of a USPACOM C3CM intelligence support system. However, the PACFLT representative expressed reservations concerning this course of action, citing ongoing but incomplete PACFLT efforts to define command C3CM responsibilities and concepts. PACFLT was not convinced that a theater-wide C3CM data base development effort should be initiated at this time. The chairman stressed the USCINCPAC J2 responsibility to promote intelligence data base interoperability within the theater and the desire to take advantage of the RADC offer of assistance.<sup>1</sup>

(U)  
(S) At the 2 August meeting the chairman and the PACAF representative reviewed results of the system requirements review held at the GTE facility in Rockville, MD, on 6-7 June. Participating Air Force commands had approved the TAF C3CM functional description document, subject to contractor incorporation of a large number of recommended changes. GTE was also authorized to proceed toward completion of the system specifications and implementation plan early in FY 85. However, FY 85 funding for system implementation at Headquarters PACAF and other locations was uncertain. Additionally, PACAF and other TAF user commands were reassessing the large number of C3CM data elements proposed for the TAF data base to identify those which were not absolutely essential for effective C3CM combat operations.<sup>2</sup>


(U)  
(S) The chairman reviewed his visit to the DIA, OJCS, and the Services in early June to secure support for theater C3CM intelligence requirements. FY 85 was expected to be an exceptionally lean year for any new funding initiatives. However, the OJCS and DIA were very supportive of USPACOM efforts to develop an interoperable theater C3CM data base system. The DIA agreed to request a total of \$900,000 for USPACOM C3CM support in FY 86 and FY 87 as a GDIP manager's initiative. USCINCPAC J2 expressed strong support for this DIA initiative.

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1. Ibid.

2. J222C/Memo/Aug 84 (S), Subj: USPACOM C3CM Intelligence Subgroup Meeting of 2 Aug 84 (U), DECL OADR.

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1.5 etc

DIA Intelligence Production Studies

(U) On 5 June the Director DIA informed the CINC's that his agency was reviewing its publications to see how well intelligence users, at all levels, were supported. The intent was to find ways to improve what they were charged to do. The Director asked for personal views of the CINC's on DIA finished intelligence publications, independent of those of their staffs. Of particular interest was the extent to which the CINC's viewed DIA publications such as Defense Estimates, DIA Appraisals, and the like. The Director was looking at everything from selection of topics, through format and style, to dissemination techniques and media. By separate correspondence, the DIA would be asking the various staffs for similar information.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Admiral Crowe replied that his J2 and IPAC personnel reviewed the vast majority of DIA information received at this headquarters. They integrated it with other material available, analyzed it from a Pacific perspective, and presented it to him in morning staff briefings. Special


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1. Ibid.
  2. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Mar 84 (C), DECL OADR.
  3. DIA 051510Z Jun 84 (U)(BOM).

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Intelligence briefings, memoranda, or situation reports, and significant estimates and appraisals were routed directly to the CINC.<sup>1</sup>

(S//NOFORN) Admiral Crowe raised two issues for consideration by the DIA. First, he encouraged continued efforts to produce analyses which addressed the operational and planning concerns of field consumers and allies in plainly usable formats. This would include more aggressive and timely release, sanitization, and disclosure policies to speed the flow of important and fast-breaking situational intelligence. Second, he recommended an evaluation of Soviet developments from a regional perspective as well as a global one. Shifts in Soviet interest, emphasis, or capabilities in one theater often indicated important changes in other areas. For example, the recent Soviet modification of SS-20 IRBM developments facing NATO was coupled with continued and probably accelerated deployments in the Pacific theater. These deployments caused considerable concern among our Asian and Pacific allies. Consideration of the total effect of Soviet action might provide a more cohesive view of their overall intent and capability.<sup>2</sup>

Study of the Philippine Armed Forces




1. USCINCPAC 140132Z Jun 84 (S//NF)(BOM), DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. AMEMB Manila 34231/140820Z Dec 84 (S//NF)(EX), DECL OADR.
4. USCINCPAC 270130Z Dec 84 (S//NF)(EX) and AMEMB Manila 35284/280659Z Dec 84 (S//NF)(EX), both DECL OADR.

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
SECTION IV--INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE



1. CDRWESTCOM 180211Z Apr 84 ~~(C)~~, DECL OADR; J2/Memo/TS-09-85 (U), 1 Jul 85, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History 1984; review of draft.
2. Ibid.
3. AMEMB Bangkok 24980/160131Z May 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR.

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
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1. USCINCPAC 122205Z Jun 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
2. CDRWESTCOM 192000Z Jun 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
3. USDAO Bangkok 161048Z May 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
4. Ibid.


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1. CINCPACFLT 150330Z Aug 84 (C), DECL OADR.
2. Ibid.
3. USCINCPAC 111910Z Sep 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
4. USCINCPAC 150505Z Dec 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
5. CDRWESTCOM 202230Z Dec 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
6. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Feb 84 (S), DECL OADR.

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1. IPAC (DCO) HistSum Nov 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
2. J2/Memo/TS-09-85 (U), 1 Jul 85, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History 1984; review of draft.
3. IPAC HistSum Oct 84 (C), DECL OADR.
4. Ibid.; J2/Memo/TS-09-85 (U), 1 Jul 85, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History 1984; review of draft.
5. IPAC HistSum Dec 84 (S/NF), DECL OADR; J2/Memo/TS-09-85 (U), 1 Jul 85, Subj: USCINCPAC Command History 1984; review of draft.

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## CHAPTER X

### OTHER SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

#### SECTION I--OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF<sub>1</sub>

(U) The trips and associated speeches made by USCINCPAC are highlighted below and are listed chronologically. A selected list of distinguished visitors, meetings with news media personnel, and local speeches follows.

#### Trips and Associated Speeches

(U) Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Palau, Guam Trip, 30 January-10 February: As part of his orientation of the USPACOM area as USCINCPAC, Admiral Crowe departed Hickam on 30 January, stopped to refuel at Clark Air Base, and arrived the next day in Jakarta, Indonesia, on the first leg of his trip. On 1 February following an honors ceremony at the headquarters of the Indonesian Department of Defense and Security (HANKAM), Admiral Crowe called on Minister of Defense General Poniman, CINC of the Armed Forces General L. B. Murdani, and Joint General Staff Chief LT GEN Himawan Soetanto. Among the military sites he visited was the Kalibata National Cemetery for a wreath-laying ceremony. The next day the Admiral was flown by the Indonesian Air Force to Jogjakarta where he called on LT GEN Yogi Memet, Joint Regional Commander of Java, Bali, and Lesser Sunda Islands. Later that day he continued on to Surabaya for a tour of the naval base given by Indonesian Fleet Commander RADM Rudolph Kasenda and met with naval district commander RADM Soewardi. On 3 February he visited the P.T. PAL (Indonesia Naval) Shipyard and then spent the weekend on Bali.

(U) On 5 February the Admiral flew to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The next day he received a Country Team briefing, met and briefed Foreign Minister Tan Sri Muhammad Ghazali bin Shafie, and made calls on Chief of Defence Forces General Tan Sri Ghazali Seth, Deputy Minister of Defence Abang Abu Bakar, and Secretary General for Defence Tan Sri Yusof. Late that afternoon he held a background press briefing for approximately 10 media representatives.

(U) In the morning of 7 February Admiral Crowe traveled to Singapore for meetings with the Country Team, Ambassador Harry E.T. Thayer, and Minister of Defense Goh Chok Tong. At the Ambassador's luncheon Admiral Crowe conferred informally with Minister of Foreign Affairs Suppiah Dhanabalan. In the afternoon the Admiral called on Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and was guest of honor

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1. Material for this section was taken from J00 trip files and daily calendars, Protocol itineraries, J03/LA congressional visitors log, and J74 HistSums for 1984, all (U).

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at a dinner that evening given by Chief of the General Staff MAJ GEN Winston Choo Wee Leong.

(U) The morning of 8 February Admiral Crowe departed Singapore and flew to Airai State Airport on Babelthup in the Palau archipelago in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). From there he went by helicopter to the island of Peleliu where he was met by Governor of Peleliu Yukio M. Shmull, and they proceeded by jeep to an area adjacent to Bloody Nose Ridge to conduct a ceremony commemorating one of World War II's hardest fought battles. The ceremony included Admiral Crowe's remarks and unveiling of a First Marine Division Association plaque in memory of the Battle of Peleliu. Admiral Crowe, plus other dignitaries, proceeded by helicopter to USS PELELIU (LHA-85), which was lying offshore, for a reception and then returned to Airai airport.

(U) On 9 February Admiral Crowe had breakfast with the Palau Republic's House Speaker Carlos Salii and made calls on President Haruo I. Remeliik, Vice President Alfonso R. Oiterong, Senate President Kaleb Udiu, High Chief and Mayor of Koror State Ibedul Yutaka Gibbons, and High Chief of the Northern Confederation Reklai Siangeldeb Basilius. Before flying to NAS Agana, Guam, he also visited the camp of the Navy Civic Action Team-Palau. At Andersen AFB on 10 February the Admiral received a 3rd Air Division briefing and then a helicopter tour of the island en route back to Agana for discussions with COMO Dale N. Hagen, USN, USCINCPACREP Guam/TTPI. He also called on Guam's Governor Ricardo J. Bordallo, Speaker of the Guam Legislature Carl T.C. Gutierrez, Agana Heights Commissioner Frank Portusach, and Bishop of Agana Felixberto C. Flores. Return to Hickam was the same date (dateline crossing).

(U) Washington, D.C., Trip, 19-24 February: Departing Hickam AFB on 19 February and accompanied by three principal staff members, Admiral Crowe arrived at Andrews AFB, Maryland, the following day. On 21 February the Admiral conferred with Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Howard Taft, IV, Navy Secretary John Lehman, and Senator John Melcher (D-Montana). The next day he had discussions with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, and Assistant Secretary of State East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul D. Wolfowitz. Following a meeting on 23 February with LT GEN Robert C. Kingston, USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, Admiral Crowe testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, providing his assessment of the Asia-Pacific region. He also met with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Fred C. Ikle, his Assistant Secretary Richard N. Perle, and again with General Vessey and Secretary Wolfowitz on the 24th. Prior to return to Hawaii on 25 February, he conferred with Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) Richard L. Armitage.

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(U) San Diego, California, Trip, 5-7 March: Admiral Crowe flew to North Island NAS, California, on 5 March. The next day he was interviewed by members of The San Diego Union editorial board. In the evening some 600 people heard his keynote speech culminating a 3-day joint conference of the National Security Industrial Association and the American Defense Preparedness Association. Return to Hawaii was on 7 March.

(U) Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, American Samoa, and Tahiti Trip, 3-16 April: Admiral Crowe departed on an orientation tour of the Southwest Pacific on 3 April, arriving at Fairbairn RAAF Base (Canberra), Australia, the next day. On 5 April he was briefed by members of Ambassador Robert D. Nesen's Country Team. Lunch was with eight members of the Australian media, and in the afternoon Admiral Crowe conferred with Prime Minister Robert J.L. Hawke, Defence Minister Gordon G.D. Scholes, Foreign Minister William Hayden, and Shadow Foreign Minister Michael MacKellar. Following an honors ceremony at the Australian Defence Department the next day, the Admiral held discussions with Defence Secretary Sir William Cole, Defence Force Staff Chief ACM Sir Neville P. McNamara and his successor, LT GEN Sir Phillip H. Bennett, Air Staff Chief AM S. David Evans, and Naval Staff Chief VADM David W. Leach. On 7 April the Admiral was given a tour of Sydney's harbor by RADM Geoff Woolrych, RAN, Fleet Commander.

(U) On 9 April the Admiral flew from Sydney to Nadi, Fiji, and then on to Suva's Nausori Airport by charter aircraft. The following day he met with Ambassador Fred J. Eckert and members of his Country Team. There followed a series of calls on Governor General Sir Ratu Penaia Ganilau, Minister of Home Affairs Militoni V. Leweniqila, and Acting Foreign Minister/Minister of Finance Moses Qionibaravi. Also, Royal Fiji Military Forces Commander COL Ratu Epli Nailatikau hosted ceremonies and briefings at the RFMF headquarters at Queen Elizabeth Barracks. The Admiral then visited USS BRONSTEIN (FF-1037), which was in Suva for a port call, and met informally that evening with Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese K.T. Mara, Foreign Minister Jonati Mavoia, and Deputy Prime Minister Ratu David Toganivalu. On 11 April Admiral Crowe held a press conference with Fijian radio, TV, and newspaper media representatives at the American Center prior to departing for Nadi and New Zealand.

(U) Upon arrival at RNZAF Base Ohakea, he inspected an honor guard before continuing on an RNZAF flight to Wellington and a meeting with Ambassador H. Monroe Browne. On 12 April, in addition to attending a Defence Council meeting, there were visits with Prime Minister Sir Robert D. Muldoon, Minister of Defence David S. Thomson, Defence Staff Chief AM D. Ewan Jamieson, and Opposition Leader David Lange and a press conference. On 13 April the Admiral proceeded from Wellington to Lake Taupo before departing Auckland on the 14th.

(U) After crossing the dateline, the Admiral arrived in Pago Pago, American Samoa, the afternoon of 13 April. The next day he participated in a traditional Kava ceremony and spoke at the dedication of a new Pago Pago dock,

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which was the opening event of American Samoa's Flag Day celebration. That afternoon he traveled to Faaa, Tahiti, where he was the guest of the Commander of the French Naval/Maritime Force in the Pacific, VADM Jean H.J. Montpellier. On 16 April an honors ceremony at Fare Ute French Naval Base preceded briefings on the political-military situation and on French military forces in Polynesia at the Taaone headquarters. Later that day Admiral Crowe returned to Hawaii.

(U) San Francisco Trip, 24-28 April: Shortly after President Reagan's departure from Hickam AFB on 24 April, Admiral Crowe flew to Alameda NAS, California. The next day he held discussions, in seminar format, with Hoover Fellows and members of the Stanford University faculty at the Palo Alto campus on USPACOM issues and developments impacting on U.S. strategic interests. On 26 April the Admiral met with San Francisco Mayor Dianne Feinstein, addressed a luncheon meeting of the Asia Foundation, and participated in a seminar with approximately 35 faculty members from San Francisco State University's School of Business, Behavioral and Social Science, university administrators, and members of the Board of Directors for the U.S.-Japan Institute. The following day he spoke to some 250 members of San Francisco's Commonwealth Club. This speech was broadcast live via satellite by 270 National Public Radio Network stations and by tape on the 120 commercial stations of the Club's own network. Also that day he met with Dr. Robert Scalapino, Director of East Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and later addressed off-the-record remarks to a seminar with 20 members from the International Relations Institute and Institute of East Asian Studies. Return to Hawaii was on 28 April.

(U) Korea Trip, 5-10 May: Admiral Crowe, accompanied by four key staff members, flew to Korea on 5-6 May to attend the 16th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). After preliminary meetings with JCS Chairman General Vessey and his ROK counterpart General Lee Ki-baek, COMUSKOREA General Robert W. Sennewald, and ROK Minister of Defense Yoon Sung-min, on 7 May Admiral Crowe attended the opening session of the Military Committee Meeting. The meeting highlight was a signing ceremony for Change 1 to ROK-U.S. Military Committee Strategic Directive #1. The SCM plenary sessions convened on 9 and 10 May. In addition, the Admiral visited the Commander of the Combined Field Army (ROK/US), LT GEN Louis C. Menetrey, USA, at Nightmare Range to observe a tactical exercise and static displays on the 9th, and he attended meetings with Defense Secretary Weinberger and ROK President Chun Doo Hwan on the 10th before returning to Hickam.

(U) Oklahoma, Kentucky, Washington, D.C., Trip, 10-23 May: After a 2-hour refueling stop on 10 May at Hickam, Admiral Crowe proceeded to Tinker AFB near Oklahoma City. The following day he addressed the Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce Friday Forum luncheon and attended two receptions--one by Governor George Nigh at the Governor's mansion. The other was a combined Navy League/Naval Academy Alumni Association/Naval Reserve reception where the Admiral made remarks and unveiled a portrait of a Medal of Honor recipient. On 12 May

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he was the speaker at the tri-Service ROTC commissioning ceremony at the University of Oklahoma at Norman. That afternoon during the commencement ceremony Admiral Crowe was awarded the University's highest honor--the Distinguished Service Citation--"as a patriot, loyal Oklahoman, and distinguished military leader."

(U) The Admiral flew to Louisville, Kentucky, on 14 May, and the next day was given a briefing and tour of the Naval Ordnance Station. After that he was flown by helicopter to LaGrange, the town of his birth, where 15 May was proclaimed "Admiral Bill Crowe Day." Following lunch at the Oldham County Public Library he was presented the key to the city, and in the evening he was honored by a reception and banquet. The next day he proceeded from Louisville to Andrews AFB.

(U) On 17 May Admiral Crowe participated in groundbreaking ceremonies in Washington for the U.S. Navy Memorial, and he was the guest luncheon speaker at the National Press Club on 18 May. During the afternoon he held discussions with three key House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee members on the Compact of Free Association; he held a similar session for Senator James A. McClure (R-Idaho) on 22 May. While in Washington, the Admiral also conferred with the following officials: Admiral Robert L.J. Long, USN (Ret), former USCINCPAC, and Senator Spark M. Matsunaga (D-Hawaii) (21 May); Defense Secretary Weinberger, CNO Admiral Watkins, Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii), Representative Daniel K. Akaka (D-Hawaii) (22 May); and General Vessey, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael H. Armacost (23 May). Admiral Crowe attended Defense Science Board briefings in the afternoon of 23 May and addressed the group at a dinner meeting at Ft. Meyer prior to departing for Hawaii.

(U) Korea, Japan Trip, 30 May-4 June: Admiral Crowe flew to Seoul, Korea, on 30-31 May where on 1 June he participated in the COMUSKOREA change of command ceremony at which General William J. Livsey, USA, relieved General Robert W. Sennewald, USA. The Admiral, accompanied by two key staff members, continued to MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, that afternoon. Marine Aircraft Groups 12 and 15 hosted briefings, displays, and meetings on 2 June as well as side visits to the Ohara Range and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Academy on Eta Jima. The next morning Admiral Crowe visited the A-Bomb Museum at Hiroshima and then proceeded, via Iwakuni, Yokota AB, Hardy Barracks, and the New Sanno Hotel, to Camp Zama where he addressed an Army Dining-in hosted by LT GEN Alexander M. Weyand, USA, CG U.S. Army Japan/IX Corps. On 4 June the Admiral called on Ambassador Michael J. Mansfield, addressed remarks to a breakfast meeting of the Japan Forum for a New Society--a prestigious group of senior members of the business, government, and academic communities. At noon he made off-the-record remarks to members of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan. The next morning he met with Japan Defense Agency Director General Yuko Kurihara and Joint Staff Council Chairman General Sumio Murai before departing for Hickam AFB.

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(U) Philippines Trip, 12-15 June: Accompanied by three key staff members, Admiral Crowe flew to Manila on 12-13 June to co-host the 26th anniversary meeting of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board. In addition to the MDB meeting, on 14 June Admiral Crowe conferred with members of the Country Team and Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) Chief General Fabian C. Ver. That evening he hosted a reception for 200 U.S. and Philippine guests at the Manila Hotel. On 15 June he met with President Ferdinand E. Marcos at Malacanang Palace, was accorded honors at Camp Aguinaldo (AFP headquarters), met with Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, and visited BGEN Charles E. Getz, USA, at the JUSMAG Philippines compound. Return to Hickam AFB was that same day.

(U) New Zealand Trip, 14-18 July: On 14-15 July Admiral Crowe and three staff members flew to RNZAF Base Ohakea and proceeded to Wellington, New Zealand. On 16 July the Admiral met with Prime Minister Robert D. Muldoon prior to morning and afternoon sessions of the 33rd ANZUS Council meeting. The next day two more sessions were held, plus a joint press conference and meetings with Foreign Minister Warren E. Cooper and Opposition Leader David Lange. On 18 July Admiral Crowe attended the ANZUS Military Representatives meeting before returning via Auckland to Hickam AFB.

(U) Washington, D.C., and New York City Trip, 21-31 July: Along with three key staff members, Admiral Crowe traveled to Washington, D.C., on 21-22 July to present USPACOM briefings at the annual unified and specified commanders conference held on 23 and 24 July and at Defense Resources Board meetings on 24-26 July. He also conferred with Defense Secretary Weinberger and Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency LT GEN Philip C. Gast, USAF, on 26 July. Admiral Crowe was interviewed by 5 members of the U.S. News & World Report editorial board and 13 from The Washington Post on 27 and 30 July, respectively. On 31 July the Admiral flew to New York City for an interview by The Wall Street Journal editorial board. He returned to Hickam via Andrews AFB the same day.

(U) Thailand Trip, 4-10 August: Accompanied by three key staff members, Admiral Crowe departed Hawaii 4 August and arrived in Bangkok on 5 August after stopping in the Philippines for fuel. He held informal discussions that evening with Ambassador John G. Dean. The next day he flew from Don Muang airport via C-12 to Hat Yai, then by helicopter to The Pha Beach to observe air, naval, and ground demonstrations in connection with the assault phase of the U.S.-Thai joint/combined exercise, COBRA GOLD. He continued on to USS NEW ORLEANS (LPH-11) and to the Combined Army play/assembly area. He later toured the RTAF and U.S. Navy exercise facilities at Hat Yai before returning to Don Muang. On 7 August, following discussions with CINC Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) Supreme Command General Arthit Kamlang-ek, Admiral Crowe was awarded the Most Noble Order of the Crown (First Class-Knight Grand Cross) of Thailand by Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanon. The following day the Admiral visited the Royal Thai Army (RTA) 1st Infantry Division and witnessed a realistic anti-terrorism demonstration. Later that day the Admiral flew to Chiang

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Mai, where he met informally with 3rd Army Commander LT GEN Tiab Kromsuriyasak and on 9 August with RTARF Intelligence Chief LT GEN Pricha Singha. The Admiral's party returned to Hawaii on 10 August after refueling at Andersen AB, Guam.

(U) Saipan, Tinian, Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, Macau, Brunei, Burma, and Papua New Guinea Trip, 26 September-15 October: On 26-27 September Admiral Crowe traveled to Saipan, Northern Marianas. The next day he met with Governor, Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Island (CNMI), Pedro Tenorio, the CNMI Senate President and House Speaker, and U.S. High Commissioner Janet McCoy. On the 29th the Admiral flew by helicopter to Tinian for a tour of WWII sites. Later that day he continued on his trip to Kimpo AB (Seoul), Korea.

(U) On 30 September, following discussions with Ambassador Richard L. Walker and COMUSKOREA General Livsey, ROK JCS Chairman General Lee Ki-baek presented Admiral Crowe with the Order of National Merit, Ton Il Medal. He later attended a conference with Minister of Defense Yoon Sung-min. The following day, along with numerous other visiting foreign dignitaries, the Admiral observed the ROK Armed Forces Day ceremony. He also conferred with Prime Minister Chin Lee-chang.

(U) On 2 October the Admiral flew to Yokota AB, Japan, where he met with LT GEN Edward L. Tixier, USAF, COMUSJAPAN, later received a command brief, and met with U.S. Forces Japan component commanders. The next day he held discussions with Ambassador Michael J. Mansfield, Country Team members, and JDA Vice Minister Haruo Natsume. The Admiral toured Pacific Stars and Stripes on 4 October and proceeded from Yokota AB to Niigata where he addressed the Japan-U.S. Economic Council. A large number of Japanese and American business and industrial leaders attended, including a contingent from Hawaii headed by Governor George Ariyoshi and First Hawaiian Bank Chief Executive Officer John Bellinger.

(U) On 5 October Admiral Crowe flew to Kadena AB, Okinawa, for informal meetings with U.S. Service commanders, calls on Governor of Okinawa Junji Nishime, visits to MCAS Futenma, Camp Butler, the 1st MAW Tactical Air Control Center to observe STINGER air defense training, and a briefing at 313th AD headquarters. After breakfast the next morning with approximately 100 enlisted personnel from all Services at the Kadena NCO club, he was interviewed at the Far East Network studio before proceeding to Hong Kong. From Hong Kong he traveled via hydrofoil to Macau on 7 October and met with Governor of Macau RADM Vasco de Almeida e Costa, Portuguese Navy. The next day he met informally with Consul General Burton Levine.

(U) On 9 October the Admiral flew to Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, where on the day following he met with Ambassador Barrington King Jr. and received honors at Camp Berakas from Brigadier John Friedberger, Commander of the Royal

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Brunei Armed Forces. Also, at Port Mura he received a briefing and tour of Brunei's naval facilities before a meeting at the palace with Brunei's Sultan, Sir Hassanah Bolkiah. Others attending included Defence Minister Sir Ali Saifuddin who was the Sultan's father, and the Foreign Affairs Minister who was one of the Sultan's brothers. The Admiral held a brief TV interview before departing from Brunei on 11 October.

(U) Shortly after his arrival in Rangoon, Burma, Admiral Crowe met with Ambassador Daniel A. O'Donohue and his Country Team. On 12 October he called on Minister of Defense General Thur Kyaw Htin and Minister of Foreign Affairs U Chit Hlaing. The next day he departed Mingaladon airport, refueled at Bangkok, and arrived at Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, on 14 October. Shortly after arrival he met with Prime Minister Michael T. Somare and later with Ambassador Paul F. Gardner and members of the Country Team. At Murray Barracks on 15 October Admiral Crowe met with PNG Defense Force Commander BGEN Kenneth Noga, Acting Secretary of Defense Stephen Mokis, Minister for Defense Boyamo Sali, and 20 PNGDF senior staff. He also was briefed on PNGDF mission and organization and held a press conference before departing for Hickam AFB.

(U) Dallas, Oklahoma City, Washington, D.C., Maxwell AFB, Amarillo, and Little Rock Trip, 19 November-5 December: Admiral Crowe flew via Dallas to Oklahoma City where he was inducted into Oklahoma's Aviation and Space Hall of Fame on 23 November. (He was the highest ranking military officer from the state.) On 24 November he continued on to Washington, D.C., for meetings and conferences as follows: 26 November, Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft, Navy Secretary Lehman, Defense Secretary Weinberger; 27 November, the Defense Resources Board convened and Admiral Crowe made the USPACOM presentation; 28 November, another DRB session and then a "mini-conference" of unified and specified commanders, a meeting with Vice CNO Admiral Ronald J. Hays, and one with Secretary Weinberger and Prime Minister of Fiji Ratu Sir Kamisese K.T. Mara; 29 November, Commandant of the Marine Corps General P. X. Kelley, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael H. Armacost, Assistant Secretary of State Wolfowitz, JCS Chairman General Vessey, and CNO Admiral Watkins. On 30 November he flew to Maxwell AFB, Alabama, to address the Air War College Class of 1985, returning to Washington the same day.

(U) On 3 December the Admiral flew to Amarillo, Texas, (via Oklahoma City) where he addressed a civic leaders dinner audience of approximately 500. Prior to his address, he met with local media representatives. The next day he flew to Little Rock, Arkansas, for a luncheon speech to approximately 150 civic leaders at the Little Rock Country Club. That afternoon he conducted separate interviews with Jean-Loup R. Combemale of Defense and Diplomacy Magazine, Rick Reed of NBC's affiliate KARK-TV, staff writer for Little Rock's Arkansas Gazette James Scudder, and the Little Rock ABC-TV affiliate, KATV. His public affairs officer accompanied him on this leg of the trip. Return to Hawaii was on 5 December.

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### Distinguished Visitors to USCINCPAC, Meetings with News Media Personnel, and Local Speeches

(U) In recent years, the number of visitors to USCINCPAC headquarters increased. For example, in 1983 the Protocol Office recorded 243 high-level visits with a total of 993 people; in 1984 the numbers were 375 and 2,007, respectively. Honors ceremonies, when appropriate, were usually held at Camp Smith's Bordelon Field. Exceptions were made in cases of inclement weather, security requirements, etc., when an abbreviated form was conducted under the headquarters' porte cochere.

(U) In order to assure that dignitaries visiting USCINCPAC headquarters were accorded appropriate recognition and to convey the importance and prestige which he attached to such visits, Admiral Crowe encouraged staff attendance at all honors ceremonies. He also increased the practice of portico honors ceremonies during 1984. Honors at Bordelon Field were conducted for Defense Ministers (or their equivalent) and above. The ceremony included gun salute, inspection of honor guard, and pass-in-review by the honor guard. Portico honors, consisting of a small honor guard detail and musical honors, were rendered to fellow CINCs, Chiefs of Services, and foreign military and civilian leaders of comparable position on their first visit to the headquarters.<sup>1</sup>

3 January - Admiral Crowe met with The Honolulu Advertiser editorial board, and front page articles published in the 4 and 5 January issues of the newspaper resulted.

5 January - Admiral Crowe met with and hosted briefings at the Hilton Hawaiian Village hotel for a 36-person congressional delegation headed by Representative Charles B. Rangel (D-New York), Chairman of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. While in Hawaii, the delegation also received briefings by local officials of the Drug Enforcement Agency, U.S. Customs, Honolulu Police Department, and the military Services. The delegation proceeded to Okinawa, Hong Kong, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, India, and Turkey.

6 January - Interview with Mr. Howard Silber, Military Affairs Editor, Omaha World-Herald on the Soviet buildup in the Far East.

7 January - Admiral Crowe met China's Premier Zhao Ziyang upon arrival at Hickam AFB and hosted a barge tour of Pearl Harbor for him. This was the

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1. USCINCPAC Instruction 5400.2A (U), 5 Oct 79, Subj: Staff Administrative Manual (Volume I) para I-404; USCINCPACNOTE 5060 (U), 28 Mar 84, Subj: Staff attendance at honors ceremonies -- visiting VIPs and dignitaries.

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Premier's first visit to Hawaii as well as his first stop en route to his meeting with President Reagan.



Admiral Crowe welcomes China's Premier  
Zhao Ziyang upon arrival at Hickam AFB.

10 January - LT GEN John N. Brandenburg, USA, Commander I Corps and Ft. Lewis, Washington, briefed the Admiral on the I Corps mission in USPACOM.

11 January - Breakfast with Papua New Guinea's Foreign Minister Rabbie L. Namaliu who was in Honolulu for a Law of the Sea symposium.

11 January - Meeting with members of the Theater Nuclear Force Improvement Study Independent Review Group: Mr. Peter H. Haas, Professor Patrick J. Parker, VADM Jerome King, USN (Ret), and General John W. Vogt, Jr., USAF (Ret), plus Dr. John E. Mansfield, Assistant Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Defense Nuclear Agency.

12 January - Interview by Mr. Yasuo Takeyama, Managing Director, Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Tokyo).

12 January - Meeting and lunch with Ambassador to New Zealand H. Monroe Browne, who was returning to his post.

13 January - Admiral Crowe attended sessions of the Williamsburg XIII Conference held at the Makaha Resort. The conference, sponsored by the Pacific Forum, was a meeting of leaders and educators of Pacific littoral nations.

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16 January - Meeting with General Robert T. Marsh, USAF, Commander, Air Force Systems Command.

23 January - Mr. Burt Fowler, Chairman, Defense Science Board.

23 January - General Robert W. Sennewald, USA, COMUSKOREA/CINCUNC/CINCCFC/CDR EUSA.

23 January - Dr. Robert S. Cooper, Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency/Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Technology.

24 January - Mr. Benjamin F. Schemmer, Editor of the Armed Forces Journal, interviewed Admiral Crowe in connection with articles in the April issue featuring the USPACOM.

24 January - LT GEN Winston D. Powers, USAF, Director of the Defense Communications Agency.

25 January - CDR Donald J. Farber, USN, USCINCPACREP Southwest Pacific.

25 January - RADM Stephen J. Hostettler, USN, Director of the Joint Cruise Missile Project, met with Admiral Crowe and hosted a briefing on the TOMAHAWK program.

26 January - Admiral Crowe convened a USCINCPAC Commander's Conference which is discussed in the Planning Chapter of this history.

10 February - Meeting with General Pramote Thavornchan, Chief of Staff, Royal Thai Armed Forces Supreme Command; General Banchop Bunnag, Chief of Staff, Royal Thai Army; and RADM Wirul Kongchan, RTN, Director, Thai Joint Logistics Planning Group.

13 February - Breakfast with Ambassador to the Philippines Michael H. Armacost.

13 and 29 February - Meetings with Admiral Robert L.J. Long, USN (Ret), former USCINCPAC.

14 February - Admiral Crowe met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Affairs) James A. Kelly who was returning from Japan, Thailand, Fiji, Australia, and New Zealand.

16 February - Admiral Crowe met former President Jimmy Carter upon his arrival at Honolulu International Airport.

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27 February - Visit by General Shigehiro Mori, Chief of Staff, Japan Air Self-Defense Force.

27 February - Briefing on high altitude electromagnetic pulse by LT GEN Richard K. Saxer, USAF, Commander, Defense Nuclear Agency.

1 March - Meeting with His Royal Highness Crown Prince Tupouto'a, Tonga's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defense. The Crown Prince was co-host of WESTCOM's Pacific Armies' Management Seminar VIII held at the Hale Koa Hotel.



His Royal Highness Crown Prince Tupouto'a  
meets with Admiral Crowe.

2 March - Mr. Leonard Gollobin, Chairman ASW Committee, National Industrial Association and President of Presearch.

2 March - Admiral Bernard A. Clarey, USN (Ret), former CINCPACFLT.

8 March - Mr. Ryohei Okamoto, President of the Yokosuka (Japan) Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

8 March - Admiral Kinnaird R. McKee, Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.

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9 March - Admiral Crowe hosted a visit by Prime Minister of New Zealand Sir Robert D. Muldoon, who was returning from Washington, D.C., and CONUS.



Admiral Crowe confers with Prime Minister Muldoon.

- 9 March - Mr. Harry Gray, Chairman of United Technologies.
- 12 March - Ambassador to Madagascar Robert B. Keating.
- 13 March - Meeting with Roman Catholic Bishop of Hawaii Joseph A. Ferrario.
- 15 March - Admiral Crowe hosted a briefing and lunch for 30 members of the Honolulu Consular Corps.
- 16 March - Address to 75 members and guests of the Honolulu Council, Navy League of the United States, in the Ilikai Hotel Pacific Ballroom. The Admiral spoke on the activities, mission, and current status of operations within the command.
- 16 March - Assistant Secretary of Interior for Territorial and International Affairs Richard T. Montoya.
- 19 March - Interview by Mr. Theh Chongkhadikij, Editor of The Bangkok Post, on the Soviet threat and the role of USPACOM forces in countering that threat.
- 20 March - Breakfast with Ambassador to Fiji Fred J. Eckert.
- 23 March - COMO Stewart A. Ring, USN, Director, East Asia and Pacific Region, OASD/International Security Affairs, who was returning from ANZUS Officials Talks in Wellington and visits to Perth, Bangkok, and Guam.

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23 March - VADM P. D. Stroop, USN (Ret), consultant to Rockwell Corporation.

26 March - U.S. Ambassador-at-Large Richard Fairbanks.

26 March - Dr. John H. Felix, Chairman of the Pacific Basin Boy Scout Council, and Mr. Jack Moore, Executive Director of the Aloha Council.

27 March - Address to the inaugural meeting of the China Forum, an informal group of "China watchers," at the Hickam Officers Club.

27 March - Mrs. Thomas (Anna) Gear, National President of the American Legion Auxiliary.

27 March - Interview with Mr. Charles Aldinger, Reuters News Service correspondent based in Washington, D.C. Major issues raised included a comparison of the Soviet and U.S. military positions in Asia; the strategic importance of the Pacific basin to the United States; and developments in the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia, Socotra, etc.

28 March - Admiral Crowe hosted a headquarters visit and barge lunch for President of the Republic of Singapore C.V. Devan Nair who was on a private trip.

2 April - Ambassador to Korea Richard L. Walker.

2 April - COL John Banks, USA, USCINCPACREP Kwajalein.

2 April - Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN (Ret), former Chief of Naval Operations.

3 April - In the morning Admiral Crowe flew to Kona on the Big Island of Hawaii to address the semi-annual meeting of Chief Executive Officers Forum at the Mauna Lani Bay Hotel. His presentation to more than 400 participants and wives on the USPACOM included an overview of the current status of mission objectives throughout the command.

17 April - Mr. Tomohisa Sakanaka, Senior Staff correspondent for Tokyo's Asahi Shimbun interviewed Admiral Crowe. The interview focused on the Soviet military buildup in the Far East and Japan's efforts toward defense cooperation.

18 April - Admiral Crowe addressed some 60 members of the Harvard Business School Club of Honolulu at the Kahala Hilton Hotel.

9 April - Question-and-answer session with 18 members of the Japan-America Society of Hawaii in the Command Center Briefing Room.

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20 April - Meeting with Air Chief Marshal Prapan Dhupatemiya, Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Air Force.

20 April - Briefing and discussions with Senator Barry M. Goldwater (R-Arizona) who was returning from Taiwan, Korea, and Japan.

24 April - President Reagan, accompanied by his wife Nancy and a 15-member official party, visited Honolulu from 22 to 24 April en route to his state visit to China. Among the official party were Secretary of State Shultz and Ambassador to China Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. The President and Mrs. Reagan arrived at Hickam AFB on Easter Sunday at 1300 and were greeted by Governor and Mrs. Ariyoshi, Admiral and Mrs. Crowe, and SFC and Mrs. Gregory Emfinger, an enlisted couple representing USPACOM. The Reagans later attended an Easter communion service at Saint Andrews Cathedral and then called on the Ariyoshis at Washington Place.



Admiral and Mrs. Crowe greet  
President and Mrs. Reagan on arrival at Hickam AFB.

On 23 April Admiral Crowe briefed the President on the USPACOM at the Kahala Hilton. That evening the Crowes held a dinner at Quarters A in honor of Secretary of State and Mrs. Shultz. At 1100 the next day, following ceremonies at Hickam, the President's entourage departed for Guam. Three aircraft in addition to Air Force 1 carried White House and State Department staff and press members.

28 April - Ambassador Fred M. Zeder, II, the President's Personal Representative to the Micronesian Status Negotiations.

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1 May - Miss Lynne Waters, KITV (Channel 4), ABC's Honolulu affiliate, video-taped an interview with Admiral Crowe which was shown in five consecutive segments the following week.

1 May - Admiral Crowe met India's President Zail Singh upon arrival at Hickam AFB, and the next day he hosted a barge tour of Pearl Harbor for him. President Singh was returning from visits to Mexico and Argentina.

Admiral Crowe greets  
President Zail Singh  
at PACFLT Boat House.



3 May - Ambassador to Brunei Barrington King Jr.

3 May - Mr. Clifford G. Olson, Jr., Veterans of Foreign Wars Commander in Chief.

4 May - Ambassador M. Virginia Schafer who was departing her post in Papua New Guinea.

25 May - Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN (Ret), former USCINCPAC.

25 May - General William J. Livsey, USA, en route to his new multi-hatted assignment as COMUSKOREA/CINCUNC/CINCCFC/CDR EUSA.

29 May - Visit by RADM Cedric Steward, Chief of New Zealand's Naval Staff.

29 May - President of the Federated States of Micronesia Tosiwa Nakayama.

5 June - Breakfast with Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics) at the Hilton Hawaiian Village.

5 June - Governor of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Pedro P. Tenorio.

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6 June - Admiral Crowe hosted breakfast, briefing, and discussions for Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, USN (Ret), Chief of Staff to the Vice President.

6 June - Brigadier Abu Saleh Mohammad Nashim, Adjutant General of the Bangladesh Army.

7 June - Colonel William P. Holmes, III, USA, Chief, JUSMAG Thailand.

11 June - Ambassador to Indonesia John H. Holdridge.

18 June - Ambassador to the Philippines Stephen W. Bosworth.

18 June - RADM Warren E. Aut, USN, Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency's Field Command.

19 June - Visit by Australia's Minister of Defence Gordon G.D. Scholes who was en route to CONUS and Canada.



Defence Minister Scholes and Admiral Crowe at honors ceremony at Bordelon Field.

19 June - Visit by Admiral Manabu Yoshida, Chief of Staff, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

22 June - LT GEN Herman O. Thomson, USAF, Director for Plans and Policy, OJCS.

23 June - Luncheon in honor of Ambassador to Japan Michael J. Mansfield and Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs Richard L. Armitage.

25 June - Admiral Crowe presented an overview briefing on the U.S. Pacific Command at the first session of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Subcommittee XV held in the Ilikai Hotel's Hilo Suite; he attended sessions the following two days.

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28 June - Breakfast with VADM Lee Baggett Jr., USN, Director of Naval Warfare.

28 June - Meeting with New Zealand's Defence Secretary Denis B.G. McLean.

29 June - Interview by Mr. Michael Richardson, Singapore-based correspondent for Melbourne's (Australia) The Age and the Pacific Defence Reporter.

2 July - LT GEN Robert C. Kingston, USA, USCINCCENT.

2 July - BGEN Teddy G. Allen, USA, en route to assuming his new duties as Chief JUSMAG Philippines.

10 July - General Arun Shridhar Vaidya, Indian Army Chief of Staff.



Admiral Crowe and General Arun Shridhar Vaidya

12 July - MAJ GEN (P) Edward L. Tixier, USAF, en route to his new assignment as COMUSJAPAN.

12 July - Farewell call by BGEN Charles E. Getz, USA, Chief JUSMAG Philippines.

18 July - Lunch with Admiral James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, who was returning from a trip to the Aleutians.

19 July - Farewell to Secretary of State and Mrs. George Shultz at Hickam AFB. The Secretary was returning from a tour of five Asian nations.

20 July - In the morning Admiral Crowe flew to Kaanapali, Maui, where he provided a USPACOM briefing to a congressional delegation led by Jack Edwards

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(R-Alabama) at the Hyatt Regency Hotel. Edwards was a member of the House Appropriations Committee and the senior Republican on its Defense Subcommittee. The delegation was returning from Hong Kong, Seoul, Manila, and Kuala Lumpur.

20 July - RADM Edwin R. Kohn, Jr., USN, en route to assuming his new duties as USCINCPACREP Philippines.

2 August - Visit by General Wallace H. Nutting, USA, USCINCREC/Director, Joint Deployment Agency.

3 August - Professors Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, Pan Heuristics Corporation.

13 August - Mr. Rick Carroll, writer for The Honolulu Advertiser, interviewed Admiral Crowe on his hat collection.

14 August - Visit by His Highness Malietoa Tanumafili II, Head of State, Western Samoa, who was returning from Washington, D.C.



Admiral Crowe and His Highness Malietoa Tanumafili II

16 August - Meeting with Ambassador to Australia Robert D. Nesen at Honolulu International Airport.

16 August - Miss Sue Wood and Mr. Barry Leay, President and General Director, respectively, of New Zealand's National Party.

16 August - LT GEN Richard K. Saxer, USAF, Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency.

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17 August - Visit by President of Nauru Hammer deRoburt.

Admiral Crowe with President Hammer deRoburt



27 August - LT GEN Alexander M. Weyand, USA, CG U.S. Army Japan/IX Corps.

28 August - Meeting with Senator Jeremiah Denton (R-Alabama).

28 August - Ambassador Paul F. Gardner en route to his new post in Papua New Guinea.

29 August - LT GEN Dato Mohamed Hashim, Deputy Chief of the Royal Malaysian Army.

29 August - Admiral Crowe greeted Air Marshal D. Ewan Jamieson, RNZAF, Chief of New Zealand's Defence Staff, upon arrival at Hickam AFB and hosted his visit to Hawaii during the two following days.



Admiral Crowe and  
Air Marshal  
D. Ewan Jamieson

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30 August - RADM James E. Service, USN, President of the Naval War College.

31 August - Director General, North American Bureau, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Takakazu Kuriyama.

4 September - General Thomas M. Ryan, Jr., USAF, Commander in Chief, MAC.

4 September - Meeting with President of the Federated States of Micronesia Tosiwo Nakayama.

5 September - Ambassador Fred M. Zeder, II, the President's Personal Micronesian Status Negotiations Representative.

6 September - Admiral and Mrs. Crowe hosted a briefing, tour of the US-CINCPAC Command Center, and dinner in the Flag Mess for eight of Honolulu's civic leaders and their spouses. Similar events were held on 19 October and 14 November as a means of fostering military-civilian community relationships.

17 September - Ambassador Howard B. Schaffer en route to his new post in Bangladesh.

18 September - Senator S. I. Hayakawa (R-California), Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for Diplomacy, who was en route to Tonga, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea to discuss foreign policy concerns with governmental and academic leaders.

18 September - Interview by Ms. Tracy Tong of Hawaii Public Radio for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

19 September - Mr. Harry E.T. Thayer en route to his new assignment as Director of the Taipei Office, American Institute in Taiwan.

Admiral Crowe welcomes  
Western Samoa's Prime  
Minister Tofilau Eti  
Alesana on 19 September.



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- 20 September - Admiral Robert L.J. Long, USN (Ret), former USCINCPAC.
- 21 September - Breakfast with Admiral James D. Watkins, CNO, who was the keynote speaker at the Defense Orientation Conference Association (DOCA) national convention. Also that day, following a command briefing, Admiral Crowe hosted a question-and-answer session for DOCA members.
- 21 September - Admiral Crowe hosted a visit by Japan's Minister of State for Defense/Director General, Japan Defense Agency, Yuko Kurihara.
- 24 September - General Charles A. Gabriel, Air Force Chief of Staff.
- 24 September - COMO Dale N. Hagen, USN, USCINCPACREP Guam/TTPI.
- 25 September - Ambassador to Thailand John Gunther Dean.
- 15 October - Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy en route to his new post in Singapore.
- 16 October - Admiral Crowe hosted a visit by New Zealand's Minister of Defence Frank O'Flynn.
- 16 October - COMO James D. Cossey, USN, Director, East Asia and Pacific Region OASD/International Security Affairs.
- 17 October - Air Marshal D. Ewan Jamieson, RNZAF, Chief of New Zealand's Defence Staff.
- 19 October - Ambassador C. Edward Dillery en route to his new post in Fiji.
- 23 October - Ambassador Fred M. Zeder, II, the President's Personal Micronesian Status Negotiations Representative.
- 23 October - Admiral Crowe participated in a USIA WORLDNET interview which was conducted at KITV (ABC Channel 4) studios in Honolulu. The Admiral was interviewed by foreign correspondents located in Bangkok, Melbourne, Sydney, Singapore, Seoul, and Tokyo. (See the Public Affairs section of this chapter for details.)
- 24 October - Admiral Crowe hosted a visit by GEN Arthit Kamlang-ek, CINC, Supreme Command, Royal Thai Armed Forces.
- 24 October - Visit by Air Marshal S. David Evans, Chief of Australia's Air Staff.
- 25 October - Interview with Mr. Paul Gigot, Editor of the Hong Kong Branch, The Wall Street Journal.

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29 October - Mr. Ichiro Watanabe, member of Japan's Diet and Chairman of the Komeito Party's Foreign Policy Committee.

29 October - Mr. Henry Hebler, President of Boeing Aerospace Corporation.

30 October - VADM James H. Doyle, Jr., USN (Ret), Vice Chairman of the National Security Industrial Association and Anti-air Warfare Committee.

2 November - General Maxwell R. Thurman, Army Vice Chief of Staff, who was en route to New Zealand, Australia, and Johnston Island.

5 November - Mr. Atsuyuki Sassa, Director General of Japan's Defense Facilities Administration Agency.

5 November - Ambassador Joe O. Rogers, U.S. Director of the Asian Development Bank.

9 November - Admiral Crowe flew to Kaanapali, Maui, to provide an informal theater briefing to a 34-person congressional delegation led by Representative C. Melvin Price (D-Illinois), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

11 November - Admiral Crowe addressed approximately 300 veterans and their guests at a Veterans' Day dinner at Ft. Ruger's Cannon Club.

13 November - Mrs. Glennetta Vogelsang, National President of the VFW Ladies Auxiliary.

13 November - Representative Vic Fazio (D-California) met with Admiral Crowe for discussions on the sale of Mainland milk in commissaries in Hawaii.

14 November - Governor of Hawaii and Mrs. George R. Ariyoshi.

15 November - Ambassador-at-Large Morton I. Abramowitz who was returning from a trip to Japan, Korea, China, Hong Kong, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand.

16 November - RADM Robert D. Yanow, RCN, Commander of Canada's Maritime Forces in the Pacific.

18 November - New Zealand's Defence Staff Chief Air Marshal D. Ewan Jamieson.

5 December - General Bennie L. Davis, USAF, CINCSAC/Director, Joint Strategic Planning Staff, met with Admiral Crowe and presented the annual SIOP update brief.

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5 December - Two representatives from Oklahoma City's KTVY-TV station filmed Admiral Crowe's daily activities for a 5-minute documentary aired on Christmas Eve.

6 December - Breakfast with ADM Daniel J. Murphy, USN (Ret), Chief of Staff for the Vice President, VADM John Costello, Commander of the Coast Guard Pacific Area, and RADM Clyde Robbins, 14th Coast Guard District Commander.

6 December - Visit by General Lee Ki-Baek, ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman.

7 December - Admiral Crowe was the featured speaker on board the USS ARIZONA Memorial at the 43rd anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack with approximately 250 civilian and military dignitaries attending.

7 December - Mr. Clair George, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency.

7 December - LT GEN Philip C. Gast, USAF, Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency.

8 December - RADM Edwin R. Kohn, Jr., USN, USCINCPACREP Philippines.

8 December - Mr. Clarence M. Bacon, American Legion National Commander.

8 December - RADM Simeon Alejandro, Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, who was in Hawaii for U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board Meeting 84-11 held on 11 December.

10 December - RADM David G. Ramsey, USN, U.S. Defense and Naval Attache to China.

11 December - Dr. Guy Pauker, RAND consultant.



Admiral Crowe escorts  
JCS Chairman General  
John W. Vessey, Jr.

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11 December - Admiral Crowe met JCS Chairman General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, at Hickam AFB. The next day Admiral Crowe briefed the General at Camp Smith prior to his departure for Washington, D.C.

13 December - Admiral Crowe addressed members of the USCINCPAC Staff in the Pollock Theater on 13 and 14 December.

13 December - LT GEN George B. Crist, Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics, Headquarters Marine Corps.

16 December - Representative G. V. "Sonny" Montgomery (D-Mississippi) led a congressional delegation on a trip to the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Burma. Upon returning to Honolulu, Representative Montgomery briefed Admiral Crowe on the delegation's findings in connection with MIAs, Agent Orange, and Amerasian children.

17 December - Meeting with Admiral Chen Youming, Director of China's PLA-Navy Equipment and Technology Department and delegation leader.

18 December - Governor of American Samoa Peter T. Coleman.

19 December - Senator William Cohen (R-Maine).

20 December - Under Secretary of the Army James R. Ambrose.

31 December - Canadian Minister of National Defence Robert C. Coates.

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SECTION II--COMPTRROLLER ACTIVITIES

USPACOM Operating Budget

(U) Funds for USCINCPAC headquarters and subordinate activities were made available via the Navy funding chain. Fiscal Year 1984 obligations by activity for each type of funding follow:<sup>1</sup>

<u>Operations and Maintenance, Navy</u>			
<u>Organization</u>	Program 2 (General Purpose Forces)	Program 3 (Intelligence & Communications)	Program 9 External Public Affairs
HQ USCINCPAC	\$ 10,935,400	\$ 4,229,100	\$ 48,700
COMIPAC	-	8,238,700	-
COMUSJAPAN	2,126,400	239,800	-
COMUSKOREA	-	<u>1,935,900</u>	-
Total	\$13,061,800	\$14,643,500	\$ 48,700

Military Assistance Executive/Foreign Military Sales Trust Funds

<u>Organization</u>	<u>FY 1984 Obligations</u>
T10 (Administrative Expenses)	
HQ USCINCPAC	\$ 715,300
T20 (Security Assistance Activity Expenses)	
JUSMAG Korea	\$ 4,123,400
JUSMAG Philippines	1,021,600
JUSMAG Thailand	1,575,300
MDO Japan	824,100
ODC India	138,500
OMADP Indonesia	491,300
Australia	33,800
Bangladesh	16,100
Burma	8,200
Fiji	700
Malaysia	135,900
Nepal	13,000
New Zealand	2,000
Singapore	36,000
Sri Lanka	18,300
Dependent Education	<u>40,000</u>
Total	\$ 8,478,200

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<u>Organization</u>	<u>FY 1984 Obligations</u>
<u>Official Representation Funds</u>	
HQ USCINCPAC	\$ 26,300
CDRJCRC	-0-
COMUSJAPAN	12,100
USCINCPACREP Australia	300
USCINCPACREP Guam/TTPI	800
USCINCPACREP Philippines	<u>1,900</u>
Total	\$ 41,400

<u>MAP Representation Funds</u>	
JUSMAG Korea	\$ 3,900
JUSMAG Philippines	2,700
JUSMAG Thailand	3,800
MDO Japan	2,700
ODC India	700
OMADP Indonesia	2,300
USDAO Bangladesh	100
USDAO Malaysia	400
USDAO Nepal	-0-
USDAO Singapore	-0-
USDAO Sri Lanka	100
CH FMS Australia	<u>100</u>
Total	\$ 16,800

<u>Emergency and Extraordinary Expense Funds</u>	
HQ USCINCPAC	\$ 4,300
COMIPAC	700
COMUSJAPAN	1,400
USCINCPACREP Philippines	<u>4,200</u>
Total	\$ 10,600

Operations and Maintenance, Navy Funding

(U) In Fiscal Year 1984 the USCINCPAC Intelligence Data Handling System Office's budget was increased by \$1.1 million for the development of a DOD Intelligence Information System interface for the IBM 4341 computer.<sub>1</sub>

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Security Assistance Funding

(U) Security assistance funding was provided to the USCINCPACREP Southwest Pacific for the first time in FY 84. These funds were provided to help the USCINCPACREP SWPAC, who resided in Suva, Fiji, carry out his responsibilities pertaining to the initiation and progression of Tonga's modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) program which began with FY 84, as well as to assist in Fiji's IMET program.<sup>1</sup>

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1. J72 HistSum Dec 84 (U).

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**USPACOM JOINT COMMANDS-O&M(N) FUNDED**  
 FY 1985 PROGRAMMED ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS (IN THOUSANDS)  
 AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1984

ORGANIZATION	U.S. COSTS		
	USCINCPAC O&M(N) FUNDED BUDGET	MILITARY DEPT SUPPORT	TOTAL
USCINCPAC	\$ 14,160.0	\$ 11,393.0	\$ 25,553.0
IPAC	10,021.0	3,467.0	13,488.0
COMUSJAPAN	2,607.0	1,285.5	3,892.5
COMUSKOREA	2,245.0	527.0	2,772.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$ 29,033.0</b>	<b>\$ 16,672.5</b>	<b>\$ 45,705.5</b>

**USPACOM FUNDING PROGRAMS**  
 AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1984  
 (IN THOUSANDS)

APPROPRIATION	FY 1985 BUDGET	FY 1986 BUDGET REQUEST
<b>OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE, NAVY</b>		
PROGRAM 2 -- GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES	\$ 12,363.0	\$ 12,363.0
PROGRAM 3 -- INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS	16,618.0	21,204.0
PROGRAM 9 -- ADMINISTRATION AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES	52.0	52.0
<b>TOTAL O&amp;M(N)</b>	<b>\$ 29,033.0</b>	<b>\$ 33,619.0</b>
<b>MILITARY ASSISTANCE EXECUTIVE</b>		
T-10 ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE	\$ 728.1	\$ 1,092.0
T-20 MILITARY MISSION EXPENSE	9,488.3	10,009.8
<b>TOTAL MAE</b>	<b>\$ 10,216.4</b>	<b>\$ 11,101.6</b>

SOURCE: U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND DIGEST, 15 FEB 85 (S/NF), P. 28, DECL OADR.

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## SECTION III--LEGAL AFFAIRS

### USPACOM Legal Conference

(U) Under a continuing conference concept, the USPACOM Legal Conference remained in year-long session and culminated in an annual meeting. The conference was composed of a core group, six standing committees, and an executive council. The 1984 annual meeting was held at Camp John Hay (Baguio) in the Philippines from 13 to 17 February. Ambassador Michael H. Armacost, U.S. Court of Military Appeals (COMA) Judge Albert V. Fletcher, Army Deputy General Counsel Richard Whiston, USCINCPACREP Philippines RADM Dickinson M. Smith, Thirteenth Air Force Commander MAJ GEN Kenneth P. Burns, and Marine Corps Judge Advocate Division Director BGEN Walter J. Donovan were guest speakers. The 50 military and two civilian lawyers attending the conference represented, in addition to USCINCPAC, Service components and their respective subordinates; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of the Army, the COMA, COMUS-JAPAN, COMUSKOREA, U.S. Army Japan, Combined Field Army, 2d Infantry Division, I Corps; the Atlantic, Central, Southern, and Military Airlift Commands; Alaskan Air Command, U.S. Air Force Liaison Office (Australia), Army-Air Force Exchange Service-Pacific, and the 14th Coast Guard District.<sup>1</sup>

~~(C)~~ (U) The annual meeting resulted in a series of recommendations, such as that the concept of "cordon sanitaire" be removed from the peacetime rules of engagement (PROE) for U.S. seaborne forces; that PROE be examined to allow downgrading or declassification; and that the USCINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate propose draft PROE on piracy. Addressed also were issues and recommendations concerning military dependent misconduct (see below), tax exemptions in Australia, security assistance training for attorneys, and amending 10 U.S.C. 1037. This last recommendation would allow payment of counsel fees, court costs, and other expenses incident to representation for civilian employees accompanying the armed forces.

(U) Other recommendations developed by the conference included sovereign immunity from U.S. Government inspection of foreign military aircraft and vessels; the United Nations Status of Forces Agreement in Japan, prisoner transfer agreements for Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and New Zealand (see below); maritime claims; the U.S.-Soviet Agreement for the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas; maritime challenges, and use of CAPTOR mines. Further recommendations concerned the subpoena of civilians to appear before military courts-martial outside of U.S. territories; Uniform Code of Military Justice jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the military

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1. J733 HistSum Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR; J73/Memo/S99-84 (S), 2 Mar 84, Subj: USPACOM Legal Conference-1984 (Executive Report) (U), DECL OADR.

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in overseas areas, as well as various judicial and non-judicial military issues.<sup>1</sup>

Exercise Participation

TEAM SPIRIT 84

(U) Evaluation by the USCINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) of joint Navy, Army, Air Force, and Marine forces was accomplished during the field training exercise phase of TEAM SPIRIT 84 by five evaluators representing USCINCPAC and component commands. Although consistency of plans and rules of engagement with LOAC principles was essential to compliance with the LOAC, the most critical stage in developing awareness of the basic principles of the LOAC and ensuring active involvement of the entire command structure in their implementation occurred during joint exercise play. Separate evaluations were made for each Service component. Summaries of noteworthy conclusions of the evaluators follow.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Naval force commanders and their staffs correctly applied LOAC targeting principles during naval air warfare play to minimize and, where feasible, to preclude collateral death and injury to noncombatants and collateral damage to civilian property. During the course of the amphibious landing, amphibious force commanders and their staffs correctly applied LOAC targeting principles which took into account the protected status of cultural objects and civilian noncombatants.

~~(C)~~ (U) For the first time in any naval subset exercise in support of TEAM SPIRIT, Naval Special Warfare (SEAL) operations included an LOAC event. The introduction of INCSEA (U.S.-USSR Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement of 1972) operational law problems into the transit and pre-exercise portions provided invaluable training experience.

(U) For the first time in TEAM SPIRIT play, Army judge advocates had full access to commanders, their operational staffs, and tactical operations centers. While commanders and staffs at all levels showed an increased awareness of the need for close adherence to ROE, lack of regulatory implementation of the LOAC program at the tactical command level led to confusion as to responsibility for implementing USCINCPAC, JCS, and DOD Law of War programs. The exercise revealed that Eighth Army did not have a formal agreement with Air Force units in Korea to govern transfer of enemy prisoners of war in Air Force custody to the Army.

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1. Ibid.

2. J733 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, J73/Memo/S266-84 ~~(C)~~, 1 Jun 84, Subj: USCINCPAC J73 Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) Evaluation for Exercise Team Spirit 84 (U), DECL OADR.

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NIGHT TRAIN 84

(S) Operational legal issues in the JCS-sponsored command post exercise NIGHT TRAIN 84 focused on military support for civil defense, martial law, noncombatant evacuation operations, and ROE. [REDACTED]

ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 84

[REDACTED]


1.6 (U) (S) (U) Another adopted recommendation was inclusion of Wartime Information Security Program play. Consideration was also recommended for addressing such real world issues as United Nations involvement, Red Cross assistance in non-combatant evacuation within the theater, and POW transfers.

Nuclear Waste Disposal in the South Pacific

(U) The South Pacific Forum was a regional organization comprised of the heads of government of independent and self-governing countries of the South Pacific. Member countries were Australia, New Zealand, Cook Islands, Nauru, Fiji, Western Samoa, Tonga, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. The Federated States of Micronesia had been granted observer status. Meetings at the head-of-government level had been held at least annually since 1971 in the capitals of the various member countries. The 15th Forum was held in August 1984 on Tuvalu.<sub>3</sub>

1. J733 HistSum Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR; J73/Memo/S188-84 (S), 19 Apr 84, Subj: Exercise NIGHT TRAIN 84 First Impressions Report (U), DECL OADR, annotated by J3.
2. J733 HistSum Dec 84 (S), DECL OADR; J73/Memo/391-84 (S), 28 Aug 84, Subj: ULCHI-FOCUS LENS (UFL) First Impressions Report (U), DECL OADR, annotated by J3.
3. J5614 Point Paper (U), 7 Sep 84, Subj: 15th South Pacific Forum (SPF).

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1. J733 HistSum Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR; J732 Point Paper (~~S~~), 12 Sep 84, subj: Nuclear Waste Disposal in the South Pacific (U), DECL OADR.
2. J733 HistSum Dec 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 190346Z Jul 84 (~~S~~), DECL OADR.

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Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction

- (U) As of 30 November 1984 U.S. personnel in post-trial confinement in foreign penal institutions in USPACOM totaled 35. A break-out by country and Service follows:<sub>1</sub>

<u>Country</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total</u>
Australia		2			2
Japan	1	2	22	4	29
Korea	1			1	2
Taiwan	1				1
Thailand	1				1
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>35</b>

Prisoner Transfer Agreements

(U) Prisoner transfer agreements, which had been concluded with Mexico, Canada, Peru, Panama, Bolivia, and Turkey, permitted U.S. nationals who were convicted in the courts of the signatory nation to serve their sentence in U.S. federal prisons with their release determined in accordance with U.S. federal parole laws. The multilateral convention on the transfer of sentenced persons negotiated under the auspices of the Council of Europe, which was open to accession by all nations, was signed by the United States but as of late April 1984 had not yet entered into force.<sub>2</sub>

(U) One such agreement had been negotiated with Thailand and was awaiting Senate ratification. With almost 50 U.S. military personnel held at that time in foreign confinement facilities within the USPACOM, USCINCPAC recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General be requested to consider negotiating bilateral prisoner transfer agreements

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1. J733 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
  2. USCINCPAC 250233Z Apr 84 (U).

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with the Governments of Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, or alternatively, to encourage those governments to accede to the Council of Europe Convention on prisoner transfers. Such transfers from foreign confinement to CONUS, USCINCPAC said, would eliminate significant administrative and logistic burdens. Moreover, when separated upon return to CONUS, such personnel would no longer count against the end-strength of the concerned Service.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 5 May the Secretary of Defense advised that the Justice Department would favorably consider the request--in fact, accession to the Convention had been discussed with Japanese officials in February. Ratification by the United Kingdom was anticipated within the next year, and it was hoped Australia and New Zealand would follow suit. Korea, with only a few affected servicemen, would receive low priority.<sup>2</sup>

Law of the Sea

(U) From 21 February to 10 March 1984 a USCINCPAC Judge Advocate accompanied State and Defense Department representatives for technical level discussions on Law of the Sea (LOS) and related issues with government officials in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Australia, and Indonesia. Status and country positions follow.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~(U) Papua New Guinea (PNG) was considering changes to domestic legislation to implement the 1982 LOS Convention, but PNG did not intend to impose any prior notification or authorization requirements for warship transit; nor were there any proposals which would restrict transit by nuclear-powered warships or ships which might have nuclear weapons. PNG archipelagic claims would not conflict with U.S. security needs, but U.S. fishing interests might oppose formal recognition of those claims.

~~(S)~~(U) The Solomon Islands indicated intent to insure that domestic law complied with the 1982 LOS Convention. Plans called for redrawing their claimed archipelagic baselines to reduce the existing five archipelagoes to two.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid.; J731 Point Paper (U), 21 Jul 84, Subj: SOFA with Japan; SECDEF 050035Z May 84 (U).
  2. SECDEF 050035Z May 84 (U).
  3. J733 HistSum Dec 84 ~~(S)~~, DECL OADR; J73/Memo/C158-84 ~~(S)~~, 2 Apr 84, Subj: State/DOD Law of the Sea (LOS) Delegation visit to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Australia, and Indonesia; report of, DECL OADR; J73/Memo/C157-84 ~~(S)~~, 2 Apr 84, Subj: Trip Report concerning LOS consultations (U), DECL OADR.
  4. J73/Memo/C157-84 (C), 2 Apr 84, Subj: Trip Report concerning LOS consultations (U), DECL OADR.

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(U) The Government of Fiji appeared to be seeking formal U.S. recognition of its archipelagic claims, and there would be no requirement for prior notification or authorization for warship transit. Some changes in domestic law would be made to conform with the 1982 LOS Convention.<sup>1</sup>

(C) Australian officials agreed to approach Fijian officials informally to underscore the importance of modifying their archipelagic claims in order to prevent misconceptions and to comply with international law. Resolving Indonesia's requirement for prior notification of warship transit was discussed, as was the possibility of an Australian program to protest objectionable claims.

(C) Indonesian representatives were receptive to U.S. views on the Convention and its relationship to Indonesian archipelagic claims. They also understood the U.S. desire for a global resolution between navigational freedoms and coastal states' rights in order to promote long-term maritime stability. U.S. recognition of Indonesian archipelagic claims would flow from compliance with navigation articles of the LOS Convention, and other concessions were not being sought as a prerequisite to recognition.



1.6 (d)(5) and (6)

#### International Agreements

(U) Substantive restrictions on the authority of DOD components to negotiate and enter into agreements with foreign governments began with the Case Act of 22 August 1972. The Act required reports to the Congress by all Departments on certain types of agreements. In implementing the Case Act, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) developed an elaborate scheme of controls in DOD Directive 5530.3 and DOD Instruction 2050.1. More recently, in a 19 September 1983 memo, Secretary Weinberger had directed "that all proposed commitments to foreign governments, whether in the form of international agreements or unilateral letters or memoranda, should have the concurrence of the General Counsel before they are issued."<sup>3</sup>

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1. Op. Cit., J733 Dec HistSum.
  2. Ibid.; For details on the USCINCPAC Information Summary see CINCPAC Command History 1980, Vol. I, pp. 184-186, and Vol. II, pp. 409-410 and 563-565. The word "Intelligence" was changed to "Information" in 1981.
  3. Report of 1985 USPACOM Legal Conference (S), DECL OADR, with Tab B, HQ PACAF (JAA) Ltr (U), 12 Apr 85, Subj: 1985 Report of the Standing Committee International Politico-Military Relations.

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(U) On 19 January 1984 HQ USCINCPAC republished its implementing instruction which delegated authority to negotiate and conclude specified international agreements. The instruction provided for judge advocate review of proposed agreements, established reporting requirements within USPACOM, and gave guidance for processing agreements through unified versus Service channels. On 4 February Admiral Crowe recommended that OSD review, update, and reissue its two directives to facilitate further refinement of both unified and Service guidance to subordinate commands.<sup>1</sup>

(U) A 17 May 1984 Deputy Secretary of Defense memo eased the September 1983 position somewhat by confining OSD review requirements to international agreements with "policy significance." While applauding the revision of the two DOD guidelines, Admiral Crowe deplored the requirement during the interim for submitting all agreements through the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) for review by the General Counsel. He asked the JCS to seek repeal of the review set forth in the 17 May memorandum. He said such a restrictive policy could create a huge bottleneck, thereby delaying mission needs and having a chilling effect upon all future negotiations with allies and friendly countries. In the USPACOM there were approximately 1,000 classified and 5,000 unclassified international agreements, and each year another 500 were generated, including one-time events such as combined exercise agreements.<sup>2</sup>

(U) As requested by the JCS, USCINCPAC cited a case of a telecommunications agreement (under JCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 112) between the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Fifth Air Force which had been prepared on 22 June 1983 but was not finally approved until 24 March 1984. (It had been received by USCINCPAC on 29 August and forwarded on 9 September 1983, but approval was not given until 15 March 1984.) USCINCPAC recommended a 30-day maximum review time at the Washington level, after receipt of all pertinent documents for agreements requiring review at higher level.<sup>3</sup>

(U) At the end of 1984, JCS MOP 112 on telecommunications agreements was being rewritten, and MOP 179 on the negotiation of all international agreements was scheduled for update. The JCS would try to provide for maximum flexibility and latitude for unified and specified commanders, at least in the pre-negotiation phase.<sup>4</sup>

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1. USCINCPAC 040754Z Feb 84 (U).
  2. Op. Cit. Report of 1985 USPACOM Legal Conference; USCINCPAC 130422Z Jul 84 (U).
  3. USCINCPAC 010326Z Sep 84 (U).
  4. Report of 1985 USPACOM Legal Conference (S), DECL OADR, USCINCPAC (J73) Ltr (U), 29 Jan 85, Subj: Requirements for the Negotiation of International Agreements.

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### Dependent Misconduct

(U) For a number of years there had been instances of misconduct by dependents of either U.S. servicemembers or civilian personnel at overseas bases which had not only caused problems for base commanders and host-country civil authorities but which also had impact on U.S. Government assets and operations. Efforts by USCINCPAC to obtain relief through Service, DOD, and Department of Justice channels met with little if any support for developing legislation which would extend an overseas commander's jurisdiction to that necessary to effect involuntary return of the offending party.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The 1983 USPACOM Legal Conference Report of the Standing Committee on U.S.-Host Country Relations recommended that a means be considered whereby overseas commanders could involuntarily return misbehaving dependent family members to CONUS. Following study of a draft instruction at the 1984 conference and review by subordinate unified and component commands, a USCINCPAC instruction was issued on 13 August 1984. Basically, the instruction provided commanders with the authority for such actions as debarment from specific areas of posts or bases, suspension or revocation of logistic support privileges, advance return of family members to CONUS and/or removal from a host country, and curtailment of a member's tour. The instruction was applicable to U.S. military and civilian personnel covered by status of forces or military bases agreements in the USPACOM.<sup>2</sup>

### Environmental Working Group

(U) During recent years the United States and other governments were confronted with an increasing number of environmental issues and their adverse impact on operational readiness. At HQ USCINCPAC such issues crossed all staff lines. For example, in 1981 Admiral Long had appealed to the JCS Chairman for consideration of measures to counter what he termed "a plethora of federal and state environmental regulations affecting virtually every aspect of the national defense." He also pointed out the inordinate amount of time and money expended by commands and commanders to defend such actions and to comply with environmental standards.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The collective provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321, and other legislation required that every major federal

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1. USCINCPAC J73 Ltr (U), 6 Feb 84 to COL George M. Nakano, USAF (Tab G, USPACOM Legal Conference Report (U)).
  2. USCINCPACINST 1350.1 (U), 13 Aug 1984, Subj: Misconduct by Family Members of U.S. Military and Civilian Personnel Enjoying SOFA (or Applicable Military Bases Agreement) Status in USPACOM; J73/Memo/349-84 (U), 1 Aug 84, same subject.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1981 (TS/FRD), Vol. III, pp. 600-602.

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action include a carefully considered environmental impact assessment. Such assessments had to examine the probable impact on: plant and animal life; air, water, and noise pollution; erosion; sanitary sewage; storm runoff; introduction of toxic materials; and secondary or indirect consequences, such as conservation of limited fuel resources and reduced or increased requirements for security.<sup>1</sup>

(U) At its 1983 annual meeting, the USPACOM Legal Conference recommended that a survey be conducted of the entire range of environmental constraints in the USPACOM area of responsibility together with a study of their impact on operational readiness. The subsequent review of the applicable laws and existing DOD and USCINCPAC instructions suggested that the existing ad hoc approach to resolution of environmental issues within the USPACOM could be improved.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In 1984 a permanent USCINCPAC staff environmental working group was established to provide the staff, USCINCPAC representatives, subordinate unified commands, and component commands with information and guidance concerning the potential impact of environmental constraints on USPACOM operational readiness. The group would also monitor local, state, federal, and foreign environmental requirements and command responsiveness in providing effective liaison and assistance to the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice and the Office of the U.S. Attorney. The group consisted of representatives from the Operations, Logistics and Security Assistance, and the Plans and Policy Directorates, the Public Affairs Office, and the Staff Judge Advocate serving as chairman.<sup>3</sup>

### Travel to Macau

(U) Since 1981 active duty U.S. military personnel were allowed to visit the Portuguese colony of Macau for leave or liberty, provided they had valid passports, approved leave or travel papers, and sufficient funds for a round-trip boat ticket from Hong Kong. In 1984 the arrangements were refined to permit substitution of a military identification card for a passport; dependents, however, were still required to have a valid passport. In addition,

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1. J73/Memo/130-84 (U), 15 Mar 84, Subj: Draft Instruction concerning USCINCPAC Staff Environmental Working Group on Environmental Constraints on Operational Readiness. The other legislation consisted of the Clean Air, Clean Water, Endangered Species, National Historic Preservation, Resource Conservation and Recovery, Safe Drinking Water, Noise Control, Coastal Zone Management, and Atomic Energy Acts.
  2. Ibid.
  3. USCINCPACINST 6280.3, 3 Apr 84, Subj: USCINCPAC Staff Environmental Working Group.


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military personnel and dependents were required to purchase a visa either in Hong Kong or at an entry point to Macau for a fee of HK \$25.<sub>1</sub>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1981 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, p. 600; J732 Point Paper (U), 17 Sep 84, Subj: Lifting of Travel Restriction to Macau.

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## SECTION IV--PUBLIC AFFAIRS

### President Reagan's Visit to Hawaii

(U) Preparations for President Ronald W. Reagan's visit to Hawaii, en route to China, were arranged by a USCINCPAC team headed by the Protocol Officer with members from the Public Affairs Office (PAO), Headquarters Support Division, and the J4 Mobility Operations Division. The USCINCPAC team hosted a Presidential pre-advance group on 17 and 18 February 1984 and together they scouted Hickam AFB, three Honolulu churches, the Kahala Hilton Hotel, and the Governor's home (Washington Place).<sup>1</sup>

(U) Members of the Presidential advance team arrived in Honolulu on 14 April, and with extensive augmentation, the USCINCPAC team began functioning the following day. Members of the USCINCPAC Public Affairs Office manned an advance press office at the Kahala from 17 to 24 April, while other staffers, together with representatives of the PACFLT and FMFPAC PAOs, assisted the White House press office at the Ilikai Hotel press center from 22 to 24 April. PACAF, assisted by 15th Air Base Wing PAO personnel, provided a press center on 22 and 24 April at Hickam AFB.

(U) Press advisories were issued on accreditation and the Presidential schedule by the USCINCPAC Media Liaison Office which accredited over 160 Hawaii area media representatives to cover the visit. Arrival and departure ceremonies at Hickam and the service at St. Andrew's Cathedral were carried live on local TV stations. In addition, both Honolulu newspapers and all three major TV channels staked out the Kahala Hilton to get a view of the President.

### Media Activities

(U) From 31 January to 3 February 1984 USCINCPAC and component command Public Affairs Offices (PAOs) hosted the annual ROK Ministry of National Defense press tour. Three representatives from the Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation and three from the Korea Broadcasting System were in Hawaii to gather publicity on Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 84 operations. The Koreans also visited U.S. facilities in Guam, the Philippines, Japan, and California.<sup>2</sup>

(U) From 16 to 18 July 1984 the USCINCPAC Public Affairs Office assisted media representatives covering Secretary of State George P. Shultz' stopover in Hawaii following his 5-nation Asian tour. Arrangements were coordinated with the 15th Air Base Wing at Hickam AFB for local media coverage of his

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1. J742 Memorandum for the Record (U), 26 Apr 84, Subj: Visit of President Reagan to Hawaii, April 1984.
  2. J7422 Jan-Jun HistSum Supplement (U).

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arrival and departure. The PAO also assisted the media during the Secretary's speech to the Honolulu Committee on Foreign Relations.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The USCINCPAC Public Affairs Operations Officer traveled to Hanoi, Vietnam, for the repatriation of the remains of eight U.S. servicemen missing in action which were turned over by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to a U.S. team on 17 July.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 31 August the Public Affairs Office hosted a visit by Mr. Lee York-Wo, Editor of the Xinhua (New China) News Agency's Hong Kong Bureau. This first visit by Mr. Lee to the United States was under the auspices of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) International Visitor Program.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Director General of the Japan Defense Agency Yuko Kurihara visited USCINCPAC headquarters and the USS ARIZONA Memorial on 21 September. He was accompanied by 10 representatives of the Japanese media who were hosted by the USCINCPAC PAO during their coverage of Kurihara's activities.<sup>4</sup>

(U) On 21 December the Public Affairs Office assisted with media coverage for British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher during her brief refueling stop at Hickam AFB. She was en route to Washington, D.C., following a trip to China. The USCINCPAC and 15th ABWg Public Affairs Offices assisted local media as well as 14 members of the British press corps traveling with the Prime Minister.<sup>5</sup>

### Visit of Premier Zhao Ziyang

(U) As part of USCINCPAC participation in the visit of China's Premier Zhao Ziyang to Honolulu, the USIA Adviser, working from 3 through 8 January 1984 with a White House press team, set up a fully equipped press center at the Ala Moana Americana hotel. Manned by USIA staff members from Washington, D.C., the center was used by American, Chinese, and other foreign media representatives covering the Premier's visit to Honolulu. USCINCPAC provided a photocopier, typewriters, and other office equipment, and USIA funded a TELEX machine and operator, long distance telephone lines, and cable television for use by the visiting press. On behalf of the White House Press Office, the Adviser served as press "site person" by coordinating all media arrangements for the Premier's visit to the East-West Center.<sup>6</sup>

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1. J741 HistSum Jul 84 (U).
  2. J7422 HistSum Jul 84 (U).
  3. J7421 HistSum Aug 84 (U).
  4. J7421 HistSum Sep 84 (U).
  5. J7421 HistSum Dec 84 (U).
  6. USIA Adviser memorandum (U), 18 Jan 1984, Subj: Visit of Premier Zhao Ziyang.

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## USIA WORLDNET Interview

(U) On 23 October Admiral Crowe participated in a USIA WORLDNET interview which was conducted at Honolulu's ABC affiliate KITV (Channel 4) studios. Admiral Crowe was interviewed by foreign correspondents located in Bangkok, Melbourne, Sydney, Singapore, Seoul, and Tokyo. The show was a 1-hour live satellite TV hookup to those capitals. The question-and-answer session was moderated by Mr. Harry Ellis, retired Senior Correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, who was in the USIA studios in Washington, D.C. Admiral Crowe's responses and video image were relayed from Honolulu via satellite to Washington where they were mixed with the audio from the correspondents, as well as with the audio and visual image of Ellis. The mixed signal was then relayed by five satellites around the world to the international capitals.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The program received excellent reviews and significant mention in the wire and print media. U.S. Embassy Tokyo reported that Admiral Crowe's performance was a valuable contribution to the Embassy's [USIA's] ongoing programming in the defense and security areas. Correspondents and academicians who attended were grateful for the opportunity to hear the latest official statement of U.S. Pacific policy. Video tapes and transcripts were dispatched to six USIA centers throughout Japan for information of branch PAOs and for use in center libraries and programs.<sup>2</sup>

(U) From Singapore, the Embassy reported that 40 invited observers attended the program and almost half were from the Ministry of Defense; also attending were military attaches and other diplomats from the various foreign missions. Segments were broadcast at prime time on two TV channels in all four official languages, and all of Singapore's daily newspapers had reported the Admiral's remarks.<sup>3</sup>

## Community Relations

### Hawaii

(U) On 18 and 19 August the U.S. Air Force "Thunderbirds" performed over Bellows Air Station and Waikiki on Oahu in observance of Hawaii's 25th statehood anniversary. The USCINCPAC PAO arranged for participation by 50 military personnel (10 from each Service) at the official statehood ceremony held on 21 August at the Neal Blaisdell Arena in Honolulu, Hawaii.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The Director for Public and Governmental Affairs and the Public Affairs Officer arranged a series of programs designed to enhance rapport and

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1. J7421 HistSum Oct 84 (U).
  2. AMEMB Tokyo 22373/290908Z Oct 84 (U).
  3. AMEMB Singapore 11681/290836Z Oct 84 (U).
  4. J743 HistSum Aug 84 (U).

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the military image with the Honolulu civilian community. Admiral and Mrs. Crowe hosted a USCINCPAC Pacific Area Update (PAU) briefing, tour of the command center, and a dinner in the Flag and General Officers' Mess for eight civic leaders and their spouses on 6 September. A second such event was held on 19 October and included Service component commanders, their wives, and guests. The third in the series, held on 14 November, included Senator Spark M. Matsunaga (D-Hawaii) and 17 other distinguished members of the Honolulu community.<sup>1</sup>

(U) From 18 through 21 September the Defense Orientation Conference Association (DOCA) held their annual national convention in Honolulu for the first time. As convention host, CINCPACFLT arranged for the 78 members to tour select military facilities on Oahu. Following a USCINCPAC briefing on 21 September, Admiral Crowe hosted a question-and-answer session. In the evening Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins addressed 300 members and guests at the convention banquet at the Ilikai Hotel.<sup>2</sup>

(U) From 11 to 14 October 28 members of the Japan Defense Society, a civilian organization composed of influential Japanese industrial leaders which supported the Japan Self-Defense Forces, toured military bases on Oahu. Their visit included meetings and/or visits with CINCPACAF and the Hawaii Air National Guard; CINCPACFLT and the USS OUELLET (FF-1077); CG FMFPAC, 1st Marine Brigade, Kaneohe MCAS, and they received a USCINCPAC PAU brief with Admiral Crowe on 12 October.<sup>3</sup>

### Australia

(U) The U.S. Ambassador to Australia asked USCINCPAC to assist with participation by the III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) band in the annual Australian-American observance commemorating the World War II Battle of the Coral Sea from 2 to 10 May 1984. After the celebration, Ambassador Robert Nesen reported that the III MAF band was "a resounding success," giving 11 performances in 4 days in 3 different cities. The highlight was a pre-game concert at Melbourne's first home game of the football season. When the Melbourne team took to the field to the strains of "It's a Grand Old Flag," which was the team's fight song, the crowd "went wild." The team president asked that the band tape the music to be played before each home game. The Ambassador noted the particular importance of the 1984 Australian-American Week observance in light of the nuclear-free movements and status of the ANZUS alliance.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J743 HistSum Sep, Oct, Nov 84 (U).
  2. J743 HistSum Sep 84 (U); CINCPACFLT 232154Z Jul 84 (U).
  3. J743 HistSum Oct 84 (U).
  4. USCINCPAC 190207Z Apr 84 (U); OSD (ISA/EAPR 79-84) 241556Z Apr 84 (C) (BOM); USCINCPAC 250326Z Apr 84 (C), DECL OADR; AMEMB Canberra 5164/170434Z May 84 (LOU).

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SECTION V--INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

Exercises

(U) Under guidelines established in 1981, the USCINCPAC Inspector General (IG) evaluated joint operational readiness; the adequacy of command, control, and communications (C3); and operations security effectiveness through the medium of selected USPACOM joint and combined military exercises. During 1984, the USCINCPAC IG evaluated or observed six exercises. Exercise evaluations emphasized doctrine, systems, procedures, and techniques. Observations requiring corrective action were referred to appropriate agencies with cognizant USCINCPAC staff agencies designated for monitoring. Those items warranting consideration for the JCS Remedial Action Program (RAP) were also identified. Reports highlighted noteworthy strengths as well as problem areas. The four most significant reports are highlighted in chronological order. (For exercise details, see the Operations Chapter of this history.)

TEAM SPIRIT 84

(U) TEAM SPIRIT 84 was a JCS-directed, USCINCPAC-sponsored, military exercise conducted by the Combined Forces Command (CFC) held in Korea from 1 February through 30 April 1984. The USCINCPAC Inspector General staff formed the nucleus of the 52-person evaluation team composed of representatives from U.S. Readiness Command, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, and the JCS. The evaluation was oriented toward joint U.S. operational matters to include planning, coordination, and execution, and focused upon doctrine, systems, techniques, and procedures.<sup>1</sup>

(U) TEAM SPIRIT 84 deployment was the best to date. Budget constraints were met, user satisfaction with Military Airlift Command (MAC) and Military Sealift Command (MSC) closures was at an all time high, and reception of large units at aerial ports of debarkation was well done. However, more emphasis was needed in coordinating arrival and reception of small units and individuals. Problems with the Joint Deployment System (JDS) data base and its use were experienced during planning and execution.

(S/RELROK) Planning and operational functions were improved over TEAM SPIRIT 83, especially utilization of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and execution of the corps level air-land battle concept. Realistic in-depth threat portrayal contributed significantly to intelligence preparation of the battlefield and maneuver planning. Improvements in air surveillance interoperability resulted from better training, increased communications reliability, and the first interface of the Korea Master Control and Reporting Center

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1. USCINCPAC Ltr Ser 387 (S/NF/RELROK), 29 May 84, Subj: Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 84 Evaluation Report (U), Executive Summary, DECL OADR.

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(MCRC). Two repeat deficiencies from TEAM SPIRIT 83 were noted: lack of a joint suppression of enemy air defense campaign plan and lack of adequate voice links to coordinate air activity between the Services' air command and control facilities. Even though improved data link interoperability was observed, additional effort was still required to assure that an adequate, survivable air surveillance-air defense network would exist for a Korean contingency.



(S/RELROK) Command, Control, and Communications (C3) operations showed significant improvement. This was due to intensive efforts by both in-country and augmenting C-E units. Many satellite communications systems were deployed for the exercise and provided key support in the rugged terrain of Korea. The C3 counter-measures programs, including camouflage, were taking hold but still needed attention and inclusion of JCS and USCINCPAC guidance. WWMCCS use and availability of secure voice systems significantly increased. Lack of availability of SI-cleared C-E personnel remained a critical problem. Other areas needing improvement included message handling, air tasking order receipt time, and use of ROK Ministry of Communications leased lines. Two critical communications functions were vulnerable to disruption due to lack of redundancy--centralization of all air control at the MCRC and dependence of U.S. Marine Forces Korea air operations on a single thread communications link between Yechon and Pohang.

(C/RELROK) Ground operations were highlighted by a widespread knowledge and interest in the air-land battle concept throughout corps and division staffs. As with TEAM SPIRIT 83, actual second echelon division level command and control nodes provided a moving electronic signature in the corps area of interest, giving the opposing corps commander realistic targets for acquisition, targeting, and attack. Especially noteworthy were operations of corps movement control centers. Battle damage assessment (BDA) procedures did not show improvement over previous exercises. This was due primarily to the restricting of BDA play to the hardened tactical air control center level with no information flow to ground corps elements.

(S/RELROK) Strong points in air operations were component integration in the air tasking order, accomplishment of a large force employment exercise and multiple-coordinated force packages, execution of a forward combat location exercise, and demonstration of a series of successful search and rescue

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missions. However, some ATO distribution delays were encountered, and communications difficulties degraded the effectiveness of certain missions.

(C/RELROK) The naval and amphibious operations were extremely successful. Extensive planning occurred, and evolutions were professionally conducted by staffs of the Amphibious Task Force Landing Force. As with previous exercises of this magnitude, extensive pre-positioning of landing force assets in-country was required. This created many artificial situations, but was needed because of insufficient amphibious shipping and a short exercise period ashore which did not permit transfer of all necessary equipment across the beach. A major planning consideration for future TEAM SPIRIT exercises should be the assignment of adequate Blue support forces, given the opposing threat and impact of non-exercise requirements upon forces assigned.

(S/RELROK) Realistic chemical defense training varied greatly throughout TEAM SPIRIT 84. The Air Component Command (ACC) actively integrated chemical defense training into the exercise, and chemical target analysis was effectively accomplished at both division and corps level. Ground forces chemical defense training, however, was minimal. Standardization of nuclear-biological-chemical reporting, survivability of command centers, and increased chemical staffing at HQ CFC still required attention.

(C/RELROK) Although enhancements within the special operations arena were planned and in some cases allocations were made to improve CUWTF communications, a fully dedicated special operations communications support package was lacking. With the increased emphasis and activity in special operations, a corresponding increase in the CFC and Special Operations Command-Korea staffs should be considered. A fully coordinated combined special operations forces liaison team SOP was needed. The issues of OPCON of MAC special operations low level aircraft and naval special operations mission support watercraft still remained unresolved.

(S/RELROK) Coordination of air logistics by the ACC resources management center and the support provided to deployed ground forces by the 19th Support Command were improved over previous exercises. Support to the Fleet was much improved by the addition of reserve personnel who managed the movement of cargo from air heads to ships. The need for mutual support legislation and improved management of war readiness spares kits was again noted.

(S/RELROK) Airlift employment was flexible and responsive. Air drops doubled over TEAM SPIRIT 83, with the ROK Army a major user for the first time. The combined airlift office and the Korean airlift control center request systems were sound and effective. There was a major improvement over last year in air drop rigging coordination. The 374th Tactical Airlift Wing was regularly 100 percent committed while maintaining a launch reliability of over 95 percent.

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(U) The medical program showed significant improvement over past years. The exercise was enhanced by increased play of naval medical units both at sea and ashore. Significant Korean blood program events took place. The Joint Medical Regulating Office and the Aeromedical Evacuation Control Center met the evacuation system objectives. Medical communications were of poor quality and difficult to use. The number of simulated casualties, to include chemical casualties, should be increased to more closely represent the projected casualty profile.

(U) TEAM SPIRIT proved to be an effective training opportunity for the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Command interest in implementing the DOD Law of War program resulted in increased LOAC play, and commanders fully supported LOAC events. Enemy prisoner of war (EPW) play during the exercise was limited. LOAC in special operations was not actively played.

(U) Operations security activities were conducted to the maximum extent possible. Exercise players appreciated that OPSEC was important; however, the absence of structured OPSEC training detracted from player understanding of what OPSEC was intended to accomplish. Public affairs operations continued to show improvement over an already exceptionally well-run operation. In the redeployment phase, base camp and railhead operations, aerial port and departure airfield control group operations, and land seaport terminal operations were well managed and coordinated.<sup>1</sup>

#### BALIKATAN 84

(U) Exercise BALIKATAN 84 was a small-scale, JCS-coordinated, USCINCPAC-sponsored joint and combined exercise conducted in the Philippines during the period 21-31 May 1984. Activities included a command post exercise (CPX), amphibious assault, tactical air operations, an infantry battalion FTX, a special operations exercise, and civil military operations.<sup>2</sup>

(C/REL RP) There were significant improvements in BALIKATAN 84, especially the expansion of U.S. Air Force participation, the increase in joint tactical air operations, the inclusion of air defense operations, expanded play of the naval defense coordinating center and the participation of the USAF tactical field hospital in civil-military operations. Additionally, the outstanding support provided by in-country U.S. commands was especially noteworthy.

(C/REL RP) After a slow start, coordination in the Joint Combined Coordinating Group (JCCG) improved greatly over the course of the exercise. Again, many participants did not clearly understand exercise command relationships and sources of authority contained in RP-U.S. MDB OPLAN 1-83.

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1. Ibid.
  2. USCINCPAC Ltr Ser C258 (C/NF/REL RP), 19 Jul 84, Subj: Exercise BALIKATAN 84 Evaluation Report (U), Executive Summary, DECL OADR.

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(C/REL RP) Ground operations were integrated into a 10-day national level CPX and included a 17-day uni-service U.S. infantry battalion task force jungle training program. The expansion to a well organized and executed national level CPX was a major improvement in both size and quality. A highlight of the CPX was the integration of two notional U.S. HAWK battalions into the Philippine Air Defense System. Consideration should be given to enhancing future exercises by re-introducing the division player cell that participated in BALIKATAN 82 and 83, and providing for player cells from major supporting units. In addition, the battalion task force should be fully integrated into the exercise and include FTX joint training. The jungle training program, including cross-training with the Philippine Army, was outstanding.

(C/REL RP) Air operations and live-fly phases were generally well planned and executed and resulted in a mutually beneficial joint/combined training evolution. The 2-day air defense exercise and close air support missions flown during the exceptionally well-executed amphibious assault at Botolan accounted for the majority of the TAC air missions generated. The deployment of notional HAWK battalions during the latter part of CPX play, as well as during the air defense exercise, surfaced several real world situations that clearly pointed to a requirement for expanded air defense artillery participation in BALIKATAN 85. There were no recognized nets for processing, validation, or adjudication of airlift requests. Neither the EXPLAN nor the RP-U.S. MDB OPLAN 1-83 provided an organizational structure for airlift support or procedures for requesting airlift. There was no task organization of airlift forces for CPX play. Noncombatant evacuation operations were not exercised. FTX tactical airlift employment was limited to insertion and resupply of U.S. Army Special Forces, and did not include use of airlift by other participating forces.

(C/REL RP) Naval and amphibious operations proved very valuable with combined Philippine/U.S. Navy operations exceeding exercise expectations. Pre-H-hour naval gunfire support and close air support operations were effectively coordinated from the embarked tactical air control center, but no live fire was demonstrated in the amphibious objective area due to the close proximity of the civilian population.

(C/REL RP) For the first time, special operations play was included and elements of USCINCPAC's forward deployed USA Special Forces battalion participated in BALIKATAN. Their cross-training with the PA Special Warfare School Philippine Home Defense Group was highly successful. The USAF medical civil affairs program was effectively completed despite a delayed start. MDB discussion and agreement would be required regarding the MDB OPLAN combined special operations command and control structure. Training benefits would be greatly increased if future special operations cross-training and the FTX were linked to the overall exercise scenario.

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(C/RELRP) Communications support showed some significant improvements in the areas of communications-electronics (C-E) planning, host nation support of the C-E system, location and communications support for exercise headquarters, and C3 support for tactical air operations. C-E system deficiencies were noted in the areas of coordinating center SOPs, communication system management, command post physical and operational security, C-E system activation time, distribution of C-E user information to exercise players, and lack of "command configured" shipping to support amphibious operations.



(C/RELRP) Logistic support operations were improved from past years. The problems that occurred were quickly resolved and could be eliminated with a single point of contact from each of the Services. Areas to be considered for added emphasis included additional logistics MSEL items for the coordinating center staffs, integration of logistics with operations at the JCCG, and closer coordination of logistics between the JCCG and other coordinating staffs.

(C/RELRP) Civil-military operations were well organized and executed. The 657th Tactical Hospital medical-dental project was commendable and provided the U.S. members with unique opportunities to practice their skills in a realistic environment. Provision should be made to continue funding these projects from O&M funds in order to provide this training.

(C/RELRP) During the deployment phase of BALIKATAN 84 all exercise participants were deployed satisfactorily, and arrival airfield control group/departure airfield control group operations were improved from previous exercises. However, improvement was needed at Clark AB in coordinating aerial port and base mobility reception support to insure prompt clearance of arriving forces. The need for a redeployment airlift planning conference and point of contact for airlift coordination for deployed units was validated during the exercise.<sup>1</sup>

COBRA GOLD 84

(U) Exercise COBRA GOLD 84 was a JCS-directed, USCINCPAC-sponsored joint/combined sea control, air, ground, special operations, and amphibious exercise conducted from 2 July to 10 August 1984 at various locations in Thailand. It was the third exercise in the COBRA GOLD series, consolidating a number of

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1. Ibid.

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small-scale service-to-service exercises into a larger joint/combined exercise. The exercise was designed to train commanders and staffs, enhance development of tactics and techniques, and provide a basis for cooperation between U.S. forces and the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF). All basic exercise objectives were met by the participating military forces. The exercise demonstrated U.S. interest in the region to allies in Southeast Asia and significantly enhanced mutual understanding and interoperability.<sup>1</sup>

(C/RELTHAI) For the first time in the series, elements of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) and U.S. Army participated in conventional joint/combined ground operations. The high degree of success was evidenced by numerous examples of highly productive interoperative training initiatives providing a sound basis for further training enhancements during future COBRA GOLD exercises. A cross-training program and the planning and execution of two air mobile operations using USMC helicopters to lift RTA and USA troops was accomplished in an outstanding manner. Areas requiring additional attention included indirect fire support coordination, CAS procedures, as well as personnel and logistic play.

(C/RELTHAI) Special operations in COBRA GOLD 84 were highly successful. Elements of USCINCPAC's forward deployed USA Special Forces Battalion in Okinawa participated for the first time. Their pre-exercise cross-training with the RTA Special Forces at Lop Buri and Kanchanaburi was highly beneficial and professionally executed. A progressive step in joint/combined command and control of special operations was implemented this year by forming a Combined Special Operations Task Force (CSOTF) at U-Tapao. Consideration should be given to bringing the Combined Naval Special Warfare Task Group under the CSOTF to preserve unity of command and control of special operations forces. Relocating the CSOTF to a more centralized location should facilitate RTARF special operations participation in the CSOTF. Training benefits were maximized by fully integrating combined special operations in the main FTX in support of the conventional commander. Participation of U.S. civil affairs and psychological operations personnel and units in future exercises should be considered because of the potential training benefits in Thailand.

(C/RELTHAI) The amphibious landing was conducted according to plan and varied from precise execution only as required to accommodate the VIP/DV visitors. The combined training received by all participants prior to and during the exercise was superb. Aggressor forces ashore provided realistic opposition and significantly enhanced realism and training.

(C/RELTHAI) An extended 6-day Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT) period was conducted prior to the first scheduled war-at-sea strike. The training, coordination, and liaison between and among air units ashore and the tactical air control squadron aboard USS NEW ORLEANS combined to provide

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1. USCINCPAC Ltr Ser C318 (C/NF/RELTHAI), 17 Sep 84, Subj: Exercise COBRA GOLD 84 Observation Report (U), Executive Summary, DECL OADR.

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outstanding command and control of air operations throughout the exercise. The collocation of all shore-based strike aircraft, ground control intercept (GCI) controllers, and the U.S. Navy ashore mobile communication center van at Hat Yai provided a cohesive and well-coordinated unit and enabled face-to-face briefings between USN and RTAF pilots, GCI controllers, and communications support personnel. The superb control provided by RTAF GCI controllers and the close proximity to the DACT ranges and amphibious objective area (AOA) allowed for maximum DACT training and permitted extended overhead times for CAS aircraft operating within the AOA.

(C/RELTHAI) C3 system strong points included the air defense communications system employed by the combined task force and the employment of electronic counter measures by the screening force of the CTF. Areas where C3 planning and execution could be improved included providing a secure communications and data link capability to designated RTN ships, overall employment of communications security equipment, exercise fire support communications and planning, C3 supporting link-up operations, standardization of tactical publications, and timely publication of exercise frequencies.

ULCHI FOCUS LENS 84


(U) ULCHI FOCUS LENS 84 (UFL 84) was a JCS-coordinated, UNC-sponsored annual CPX conducted from 17 to 30 August 1984 in Korea in conjunction with a ROK national mobilization exercise. The USCINCPAC Inspector General's staff observed this exercise for the third time. j



1. USCINCPAC Ltr Ser S729 (S), 26 Oct 84, Subj: Exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS 84 Observation Report (UFL)(U), Executive Summary, DECL OADR.

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(U) Chemical operations play was characterized by comprehensive and aggressive exercise of C3 and logistic procedures. Areas of concern included nuclear-biological-chemical report collation, targeting priority and target analysis capability, and implementation of chemical logistic procedures.



(U) Problems highlighted in the legal area during UFL 84 concerned the lack of court-martial jurisdiction over civilian personnel accompanying the forces after martial law was declared, but in the absence of a declared war; release of dependent prisoners from ROK post trial confinements; and the reporting of Law of Armed Conflict violations.

(U) Operations security planning and execution were much improved but support services required improvement. Tactical deception planning was aggressive but initiated late in the exercise planning cycle. Both programs needed formal documentation regarding manning, organization functions, and procedures.

(U) Deployment related aspects of the exercise lacked depth and realism. UFL 84 had been planned as a test of deployment capability and procedures with a focus on the Joint Deployment System to monitor and manage the strategic

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movement of augmenting U.S. forces. Prior to the CPX, however, a decision was made to forego strategic deployment play and U.S. OPLAN required arrival dates in lieu of a JDS airlift schedule for force arrival determinations. This negated JDS use entirely and resulted in loss of needed experience at all levels.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Ibid.

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SECTION VI--MEDICAL ACTIVITIES

Medical Readiness

(U) On 20 January 1984 the Secretary of Defense directed his Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs, Dr. William E. Mayer, to conduct an independent review of medical readiness planning in the U.S. European Command and to develop recommendations for corrective action. The review was initiated in direct response to the way casualties were handled after the Marine Barracks bombing incident in Beirut, Lebanon, on 23 October 1983. The Long [Admiral Robert L.J. Long, former USCINCPAC] Commission report had concluded that overall planning for medical support in the European chain of command was deficient. The report recommended review of medical plans and staffing at each echelon of operations and administrative chain of command to insure appropriate medical support.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 16 March the Secretary of Defense directed a similar review of medical readiness in the Pacific. The review was conducted from 13 April to 3 May and included visits with USCINCPAC, component, and subordinate unified command medical staff members in Hawaii, the Philippines, Korea, and Japan, including Okinawa. The 4-member team was headed by BGEN France F. Jordan, MSC, USA, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Medical Readiness. The review focused on the medical aspects of command, control, and communications; tactical and strategic evacuation; planning; requirements and capabilities to support OPLANS and CONPLANS; capability and plans responsive to terrorist attacks; readiness reporting; biological and chemical warfare threat and defenses; host nation support; and intelligence.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ The DOD Report "Medical Readiness Status in the U.S. Pacific Command" dated 1 June 1984 concluded that the USPACOM lacked adequate medical readiness resources. The problem was a consequence of the low priority habitually assigned to medical readiness by participants in the planning, programming, and budgeting system. In turn, this precluded realistic planning for wartime medical support despite the efforts of USPACOM medical planners to make the most effective use of inadequate resources to minimize the preventable loss of life and trained manpower in the event of war.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ Chief among the report's findings and recommendations was the need for joint command and control over medical planning and resources. Aeromedi-

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1. J762 Point Paper (U), 30 May 84, Subj: Medical Readiness Review.
  2. Ibid.; J76/Memo/186-84 (U), 24 Jul 84, Subj: DOD Medical Readiness Review Group Status Report on the USPACOM; JCS 091736Z, SECDEF 102047Z, retransmitted by USCINCPAC 110129Z, all Apr 84 (U).
  3. J76/Memo/186-84 (U), 24 Jul 84, Subj: DOD Medical Readiness Review Group Status Report on the USPACOM.

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cal evacuation policy and concepts should be reevaluated, and the capability of the aeromedical evacuation system to support existing OPLANS should be determined. The medical readiness reporting system was critically flawed. Theater medical assets could not be activated in due time, and the existing medical logistics system would not support wartime operations and should be augmented. Moreover, reliance on host nation support was inadvisable. The report recommended accelerated procurement and prepositioning of wartime surgical capabilities. Adequate medical planning staffs should be provided, and existing medical units should be brought to full readiness immediately. The best planned element of medical support in the Pacific was the effective joint medical planning initiated for combatting terrorists.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Commenting to the JCS on the report on 20 September, the USCINCPAC Surgeon stated that aeromedical evacuation, the tri-Service regional planning programs, and host-nation medical support would be studied at the USPACOM Medical Planning Conference in November (see below). He also emphasized the need for additional manpower spaces in the FY 85 USCINCPAC, U.S. Forces Korea, and U.S. Forces Japan Joint Manpower Programs. Among initiatives the Surgeon took to improve medical readiness in the USPACOM was the review of component and subordinate unified command requirements for medical planners.<sup>2</sup>


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1. Ibid.
2. USCINCPAC 200237Z Sep 84 (U); J762 Point Paper (U), 30 May 84, Subj: Medical Readiness Review.
3. USCINCPAC 150831Z Apr 84 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (TS/FRD), Vol. III, p. 789.

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Medical Planning Conference

(U) The 1984 USPACOM Medical Planning Conference was held at Hickam AFB in Hawaii from 27 to 29 November 1984 with 50 senior medical service representatives and chief medical plans officers from the USPACOM attending. The conference goal was establishment of a theater master plan for contingency medical support, while at the same time providing an exchange of information on component Service medical programs, future plans, and joint medical planning problems and opportunities.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Among issues studied by conferees in working group sessions were USPACOM hospital bed requirements and bed speciality mix; Navy/Marine Corps medical support concepts, sustainability reporting, Class VIII supply support, and host nation support; tri-Service medical regionalization planning, exercises, and wartime communications; and disease/non-battle injury and outpatient rates for medical planning modules.

Family Advocacy Program in Hawaii

(U) According to State of Hawaii records, 27 percent of all Hawaii's reported child abuse cases in 1979 involved military families, although only 16 percent of the state's population was military. U.S. Senate Report 96-393, which accompanied the FY 80 DOD appropriation bill, specifically addressed child abuse, and the Senate Appropriations Committee had requested that the General Accounting Office make an in-depth review of the situation in Hawaii. According to an informal report by the Assistant U.S. Comptroller General for Human Resources dated 14 November 1980, none of the Services provided full-time personnel or program money specifically in support of family advocacy

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1. USCINCPAC 152202Z Oct 84 (S), DECL OADR.
  2. J762 HistSum Dec 84 (U).

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programs as of August 1980. The same letter identified USCINCPAC as having the capability to direct family advocacy programs of the Services in Hawaii, which until then had been hampered by a lack of coordination and centralized direction, especially in relationships with various State of Hawaii agencies and officials. On the DOD level, action was taken to implement the GAO recommendations through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) with the publishing of DOD Directive 6400.1 (Family Advocacy Programs) in May 1981. It required the military Services to maintain programs to identify, remedy, and prevent child abuse and neglect and spouse abuse in military families.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Largely through the efforts of Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii), who expressed concern about the unique stresses with which military families had to cope, the FY 82 DOD appropriation bill included \$5 million for family advocacy programs. Because the appropriation was not considered sufficient for comprehensive world-wide implementation, a 3-year joint Service demonstration project in Hawaii was developed and administered through USCINCPAC. The project was approved by the Defense Department, and each Service transferred \$221,000 in family advocacy funds, or \$663,000 for the first year's operation in FY 83. In FY 84 the total was \$850,000, and requirements for FY 85 totaled \$1,036,000.<sup>2</sup>

(U) As USCINCPAC, Admiral Long on 3 February 1981 directed establishment of a Military Family Advocacy Coordinating Council. In addition to Service component members, the council was comprised of representatives from the Coast Guard, the Military Family Resource Center (the Navy's local family advocacy affiliate), the State of Hawaii's Department of Social Services and Housing (Children's Protective Services), and two civilian representatives appointed by the Governor. The council was strictly advisory, had no directive authority, and acted as a central coordinating agency for development of memoranda of understanding and other agreements with appropriate state and local agencies. The Executive Assistant (J76A) to the USCINCPAC Surgeon was appointed Coordinator, Military Family Advocacy Programs, Hawaii, and was responsible for designating the chair of the Council (rotated annually among the Services).<sup>3</sup>

(U) The Council's first meeting was held on 24 March 1981, and during that first year of operation the Council assisted in the development of family advocacy response teams at major military installations on Oahu. Procedural

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1. J76 HistSum Dec 84 (U); J76/SAFE Point Paper (U), 3 Jan 85, Subj: Proposed J76 Family Advocacy Division (J764); HQ USCINCPAC Surgeon (J76) Orientation to Project SAFE, 10 Dec 84, p. 2; AsstComptGen (HRDiv) Ltr (U), 14 Nov 80.
  2. Op. Cit., Orientation to Project SAFE pp. 2-3.
  3. J76/SAFE Point Paper (U), 9 Apr 85, Subj: Military Family Advocacy Coordinating Council (MFACC).

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guidelines among the Services were established along with standardized mechanisms of identification, reporting, and case follow-up. The council's functions included establishing standardized procedures and a communications network; development and promotion of community education, prevention, and professional training programs were also key elements.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Project Services Assisting Family Environments (SAFE), Hawaii, began operation in September 1982. Services were contracted through civilian community agencies and coordinated with appropriate state officials and at various military command levels. The USCINCPAC Surgeon maintained administrative oversight through a Project Advisory Group. Members were from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and the Military Family Resource Center, with a chairman (J76A) and a Project Manager (J7642). However, administration of the project was decentralized, and it relied upon input from and operational control at individual Project SAFE sites. Separate contracts were let initially for an emergency shelter facility and clinical service and outreach teams at every major military installation; a pre-natal prevention project was added in March 1984. The USCINCPAC Comptroller was the fiscal agent, and the Chief, Headquarters Support Agency (HSA) was the contract and supply agent.<sup>2</sup>

(U) A major goal of SAFE was to pioneer the development of baseline measures and standards for developing, implementing, administering, and funding military family advocacy programs in order to generate general policy and program recommendations for possible transfer to other military settings.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Op. Cit., Orientation to Project SAFE p. 3; J76/SAFE Point Paper (U), 9 Apr 85, Subj: Military Family Advocacy Coordinating Council (MFACC).
  2. J764/SAFE Point Paper (U), 10 Apr 85, Subj: SAFE Project.
  3. Op. Cit., Orientation to Project SAFE, p. 8.

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## CHAPTER XI

### SELECTED CHRONOLOGY 1984

(U) This unclassified chronology was compiled from Department of State Bulletins, the periodical Current History, and Public Affairs chronologies for 1984. Although many of the events were outside of USCINCPAC's assigned area of responsibility, all either directly or indirectly affected the U.S. military force posture and/or political relationships in the U.S. Pacific Command.

- 2 Jan - The Syrian Government released LT Robert O. Goodman, Jr., USN, crewman of an A-6E INTRUDER taken prisoner after ejecting over Syrian anti-aircraft positions in Lebanon. Democratic presidential contender Rev. Jesse Jackson claimed credit for Goodman's release because of his negotiations with Syrian officials.
- 6 Jan - William Howard Taft IV, 38, was named Deputy Secretary of Defense to replace Paul Thayer who resigned in the face of Security and Exchange Commission charges that he illegally passed stock tips to traders. Taft had been the DOD General Counsel.
- 6 Jan - President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 119, known as the Strategic Defense Initiative. The directive was a follow-on to his "Star Wars" speech of March 1983 and formally initiated a multi-billion dollar research program to determine if new space-based or other advanced defensive weapons could be developed to stop an enemy missile attack.
- 12 Jan - China's Premier Zhao Ziyang ended a visit to the United States and to Washington, D.C., where he met with President Reagan and other U.S. officials. Zhao and Reagan signed agreements on exchanging scientific and technological information and industrial cooperation.
- 18 Jan - President Reagan approved the Army's plan to create a new "light" division in 1985. The new 17th Division would contain approximately 10,000 troops and have greater mobility than existing divisions.
- 19 Jan - U.S. warships off Lebanon were put on alert against possible suicide attacks by Islamic terrorists. On 25 January the Defense Department confirmed that shoulder-fired Army anti-aircraft STINGER missiles and crews were sent to ships in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf areas.
- 20 Jan - Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad concluded a visit to Washington, where he met with President Reagan and other U.S. officials.

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- 25 Jan - In his State of the Union address President Reagan endorsed an \$8 billion plan to lift a permanently-manned space station into orbit in less than 10 years.
- 26 Jan - In an attempt to stem the flow of advanced technology, the Pentagon banned the sale of Apple Computer's new Macintosh home computer to communist countries because it contained technology the Soviets did not have.
- 9 Feb - After a long illness, Soviet Chief of State and General Secretary of the Communist Party's Central Committee Yuriy V. Andropov, 69, died.
- 13 Feb - The Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee named Konstantin U. Chernenko, 72, to succeed Andropov as its General Secretary.
- 14 Feb - The South Korean (ROK) Government rejected North Korea's (DPRK) proposal for a 3-way (ROK-U.S.-DPRK) meeting to discuss the future of the divided Korean Peninsula. The ROK Prime Minister's letter said negotiations would have to be face-to-face between the two countries, without foreign [U.S.] intervention.
- 23 Feb - Brunei celebrated its independence from Great Britain which was effective 1 January.
- 25 Feb - After meetings with President Reagan and other government officials, New Zealand Prime Minister Sir Robert C. Muldoon ended his 4-day visit to Washington.
- 1 Mar - The United States and Vietnam agreed to step up efforts to locate American fighting men missing in action in Vietnam, but the State Department made it clear that the agreement would not lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations.
- 16 Mar - The U.S. Army announced that for the first time in a decade its elite Special Forces would return to the Far East. Approximately 150 Green Berets from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, would begin moving to Okinawa later in the month.
- 21 Mar - In the Sea of Japan there was "an embarrassing bump in the night." A Soviet nuclear submarine rose up from beneath the 80,000-ton aircraft carrier USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63) causing some damage to both vessels. Later, Navy Secretary Lehman pointed out that during the course of three days' exercising (subhunting phase), the sub had been "killed" more than 15 times and was ignored thereafter.

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- 24 Mar - Eighteen Americans and 11 South Koreans aboard a U.S. Marine Corps helicopter were killed when their CH-53D struck the side of a mountain in darkness and poor weather. The chopper was participating in Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 84 and operating about 24 miles north of Pohang, Korea.
- 30 Mar - President Reagan formally ended U.S. participation in the multinational force that failed to bring peace to Lebanon. The peacekeeping effort had begun with the dispatch of more than 2,000 marines to Beirut in September 1982. Secretary of State Shultz termed the move a "rearranging of our military assets. . . ." Italy, Great Britain, and France were also ending their participation. A detachment of about 100 marines remained in Beirut to protect the U.S. Embassy and other U.S. military personnel.
- 2 Apr - The Soviet helicopter carrier MINSK (37,000 tons) fired eight red flares at USS HAROLD E. HOLT (FF-1074) (3,900 tons) in the South China Sea, three of which hit the ship and one narrowly missed the ship's captain as he stood on a wing of the bridge. The flares caused no injuries or damage. CNO Admiral Watkins later termed the incident "polite harassment."
- 7 Apr - Like a mouse that roared, Maui County in the State of Hawaii declared itself a nuclear-free zone and banned all nuclear-powered Navy ships from entering its coastal waters. The Pacific Fleet Commander, Admiral Foley, claimed that federal law superseded local law under Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution.
- 14 Apr - Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon of Thailand concluded a Washington visit. On 13 April President Reagan announced the sale of 40 M-48A5 tanks as a signal of continuing U.S. support to Thailand in its border struggle with Vietnamese troops in Cambodia.
- 24 Apr - President Reagan departed from Hickam AFB for Guam on the second leg of his trip to China. He arrived in Hawaii two days earlier on Easter Sunday. Among his activities while on Oahu were meetings with a group of the state's Republicans and a general overview briefing of the Pacific theater by Admiral Crowe.
- 25 Apr - President Reagan was welcomed to China in a historic ceremony in Beijing's Tiananmen Square.
- 26 Apr - Sultan Mahmood Iskandar of Johore was sworn in as Malaysia's eighth king.
- 27 Apr - A spokesman for the Japan Defense Agency confirmed that the Soviet Union, as part of its accelerating military buildup in Asia, had

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nearly doubled the number (20) of MiG-23 fighters stationed on Etorofu. Etorofu was one of four disputed northern islands less than 100 miles from Hokkaido.

- 30 Apr - In Beijing, President Reagan and Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang formally signed tax and cultural exchange agreements and witnessed the signing of an industrial nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and China. The tax and nuclear agreements had to be ratified by the U.S. Senate.
- 1 May - President Reagan said Sino-U.S. relations reached "a new plateau" as a result of his 6-day journey to China.
- 7 May - In U.S. district court in Brooklyn, seven manufacturers of the herbicide Agent Orange agreed to create a \$180-million fund to cover illness and genetic damage suffered by veterans of the Vietnam War. Damage suits by veterans groups against the involved companies were dropped.
- 8 May - The Soviet National Olympic Committee announced that Soviet athletes would not participate in the Summer Olympic Games to be held in Los Angeles. The committee cited serious concern over security arrangements as rationale. By the end of the month 11 other communist countries followed suit.
- 10 May - Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the security of South Korea during the 16th meeting of the ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul.
- 11 May - In Jakarta, Indonesian President Suharto told Vice President George Bush that U.S. ties with China should not be improved at the cost of good relationships with members of ASEAN. In a 2-hour meeting, Bush reportedly tried to allay fears that President Reagan's recent trip to China did not signal a weakening in relations with the ASEAN bloc. On his 10-day tour, Bush also visited Japan, India, Pakistan, and Oman.
- 15 May - In a major speech convening China's parliament, Premier Zhao Ziyang announced major reforms in business, agriculture, and industry aimed at "smashing" the last vestiges of radical leftism. He said China's recent experiments in limited free enterprise and the "responsibility system" proved such policies could be applied on a much wider scale.
- 17 May - In a ceremony at Pearl Harbor Marine Barracks SGT MAJ Allan J. Kellogg, Jr., a Medal of Honor holder from the Vietnam War, designated the Unknown U.S. Serviceman of Vietnam. The remains left Pearl Harbor en route to Washington, D.C., aboard USS BREWTON (FF-1086).

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The ceremony was part of a 10-year effort in which the Army's Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii, was responsible for identification procedures.

- 20 May - President Chiang Ching-kuo of Taiwan was sworn in for his second 6-year term. His new vice president was Lee Tung-hui, a native Taiwanese and U.S.-educated professor of agricultural economics.
- 24 May - Reflecting the country's attitude at the time toward on-going involvement in Central America, the House of Representatives approved \$61.75 million in emergency military aid for El Salvador, but voted to ban further financing through the CIA for guerrillas trying to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government.
- 25 May - Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, for the first time, indicated that Beijing would station troops in Hong Kong after Britain's lease on the colony expired in 1997. The announcement sent shockwaves through Hong Kong's financial district with the stock index plunging 30 points within an hour of the first reports.
- 28 May - Presiding over a state funeral, President Reagan awarded the Medal of Honor to an unknown soldier who was killed 11 years ago in Vietnam. The body was interred in the Tomb of the Unknowns at Arlington National Cemetery.
- 29-May - President Reagan authorized 200 STINGER missiles with reloads and a KC-10 tanker for Saudi Arabia because of "grave concern" over escalation in the Persian Gulf conflict.
- 30 May - CINCPACFLT Admiral Sylvester R. Foley, USN, told reporters in Tokyo that the United States had started arming some of its ships in the Pacific with cruise missiles. He also said that most of the TOMAHAWK missiles would have conventional warheads and that some of the ships capable of carrying TOMAHAWKS would visit Japan. Japanese leftists vowed to step up protests against this move.
- 1 Jun - General William J. Lidy, USA, took command of some 48,000 U.S. forces in Korea, replacing General Robert W. Sennewald as COMUSKOREA.
- 2 Jun - The Indian Army was ordered to take control of the State of Punjab, and travel to the province by foreigners was restricted. In three days, 35 people were killed by Sikh extremists fighting for the state's autonomy.
- 5 Jun - U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf were reported to be escorting oil tankers chartered by the Navy's Military Sealift Command to provide fuel for the military. The oil was destined for ships supporting USS

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KITTY HAWK (CV-63) and those based at Diego Garcia, Subic Bay (Philippines), and Sasebo (Japan).

- 6 Jun - Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos announced the year's third devaluation of the peso. The devaluation--22.2 percent--increased some food prices by 40 percent.
- Initially, over 300 Sikh extremists and government troops were reported killed and 450 Sikhs taken prisoner when the Indian Army attacked and captured the Sikhs' holiest shrine, the Golden Temple at Amritsar. Figures of the dead later rose to 800 Sikhs and 200 soldiers killed.
- 12 Jun - President Reagan signed a declaration that China was eligible to purchase U.S. weapons. This was the first step in the legal process which would permit China to buy U.S. weapons and arms production technology.
- 13 Jun - India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared that the Sikh rebellion had been stopped. In the three previous days some 600 Sikh soldiers deserted to protest the Army's raid on the Amritsar shrine.
- France exploded a small nuclear device at its Mururoa Atoll testing site just hours before the New Zealand Government of Prime Minister Sir Robert Muldoon narrowly defeated an attempt to introduce legislation that would ban port calls by nuclear-armed or -powered ships. The next day Muldoon called general elections for 14 July after his National Party lost its 1-seat majority in Parliament.
  - The United States and China agreed in principle to the sale of U.S. anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons and some military technology to China. The agreement between Defense Secretary Weinberger and visiting Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping culminated three days of talks and four years of U.S. efforts aimed at forging closer ties between Washington and Beijing. Zhang's visit had included tours of defense and industrial sites in Texas, California, and Washington. Meanwhile, the Congress was requesting additional Chinese assurances on a nuclear sales agreement signed by President Reagan on 30 April.
- 17 Jun - Nearly 80 ships--the largest fleet since World War II--from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, and the United States were moored in Pearl Harbor, allowing some 20,000 sailors to take weekend shore leave. The ships were participants in the biennial RIMPAC exercise held near the Hawaiian Islands.
- 19 Jun - The Defense Department told the Congress it planned to sell 12 C-130 transport planes to Taiwan as replacements for older aircraft.

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- 23 Jun - President Junius R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka ended a state visit to the United States.
- 26 Jun - President Marcos admitted in a nationally televised speech, that he was "shocked" by the increase in the strength of communist rebels in the Philippines, particularly on the strife-torn island of Mindanao. About the same time, some 300 students marched on the U.S. Embassy in Manila, denouncing the United States, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank for interfering in Filipino affairs.
- 27 Jun - Meetings of the 15th U.S.-Japanese Security Consultative Committee concluded. Sessions between American and Japanese diplomats and defense officials, including Admiral Crowe, were held at the Ilikai Hotel in Honolulu.
- 9 Jul - The Defense Ministers of China and Japan met for the first time since 1949. Zhang Aiping met with Yuko Kurihara in what was termed a symbolic encounter. Officials said the meeting marked a "significant" step towards the establishment of closer military ties between the two countries.
- 10 Jul - The Indian Government reported that Sikh separatists in West Europe and the United States conspired with Sikhs in India to promote the secession of the Sikh-dominated state of Punjab.
- 19 Jul - The Democratic national convention nominated Congresswoman Geraldine A. Ferraro (D-New York) for Vice President by acclamation. This followed by one week her selection by former Vice President Walter F. Mondale, who was seeking the presidential slot, as the first potential woman for that office.
- 14 Jul - In New Zealand's first snap general elections since 1951, the Labour Party, led by David Lange, won 56 seats in Parliament; the National Party 37 and Social Credit 2 seats. Among Labour's key foreign policy planks were legislation to make New Zealand and its territorial waters nuclear free and opposition to visits by nuclear-powered and/or -armed vessels and aircraft.
- 16 Jul - At the opening of the ANZUS Council meeting in Wellington, the United States warned that it would break defense ties with New Zealand if the new Labour Government followed through on threats to ban port visits by American nuclear warships. Secretary of State Shultz, however, maintained a note of optimism by stating that the United States hoped to continue in partnership with the new government.

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- Seeking to avoid a crisis within the Pacific alliance (ANZUS), U.S. officials said that probably no Navy warships would be sent to New Zealand until mid-1985 at the earliest. This would give David Lange a "comfortable amount of time" to decide whether to maintain the Labour Party's pledge to ban all nuclear ships, or to modify the pledge and avoid a possible break in the 33-year-old ANZUS alliance.
- Shultz warned New Zealand that any weakening of ANZUS resolve through indecision or "opting out" would hand the Soviet Union "a windfall by default" in the southwest Pacific. Australia's visiting Foreign Minister Bill Hayden generally agreed stating that the watchword would be, "No ships means no ANZUS treaty."
- 17 Jul - New Zealand Prime Minister-elect David Lange met with Secretary Shultz and said he stands by his Labour Party's pledge not to allow nuclear-armed ships to dock in New Zealand.
  - Secretary of State Shultz wound up a 13-day trip in the USPACOM which took him to Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. On 12-13 July he attended the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in Jakarta.
- 25 Jul - Soviet cosmonaut Svetlana Savitskaya became the first woman to walk in space.
- 26 Jul - David Lange took office as New Zealand's Prime Minister.
- 3 Aug - A record 236.6 million shares were traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
- 5 Aug - Shipping sources in Cairo reported that a tanker in the Red Sea was damaged by a mine explosion. In the month previous, 15 ships from 12 nations, including the Soviet Union, were damaged in the Gulf of Suez or the Red Sea, presumably by mines laid by Libya and/or Iran. On 14 August a British and French minesweeping convoy entered the Suez Canal, joining the U.S. helicopter effort which had commenced on 8 August.
- 7 Aug - Hawaii's campaign to have a battleship (USS MISSOURI) group homeported at Pearl Harbor was officially launched with the formation of the Hawaii Economic Development Project--Homeport Task Force, chaired jointly by Governor George Ariyoshi, Mayor Eileen Anderson, and Chamber of Commerce chairman Frank Manaut. Its predecessor, the Homeport Hawaii Task Force chaired by Roy J. Yee, was formed in April. Pearl Harbor was competing with San Francisco, Long Beach, and Alameda in California.

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- 12 Aug - The 16-day Summer Olympics concluded successfully at Los Angeles without any terrorist incidents.
- 20 Aug - The United Nations Children's Fund reported that 7 million people were threatened with starvation in Ethiopia. In some parts of the country there had been neither harvested food nor rain in over 10 years.
- 21 Aug - An estimated 450,000 Filipinos turned out in a national day of protest over opposition leader Benigno Aquino's assassination one year ago.
- 23 Aug - Navy Secretary John Lehman ended a 9-day visit to China. During the visit, the first ever by a U.S. Navy Secretary, rumors surfaced concerning possible port calls in China by U.S. warships.
- Defense Secretary Weinberger issued new regulations for press coverage in combat areas. Under the concept, coverage would be limited to a pool representing various media organizations on a rotating basis.
- 27 Aug - A U.S.-Chinese agreement was signed for the Department of the Interior to help China design the world's largest hydro-electric dam--the Three Gorges project on the Yangtze River.
- 2 Sep - Typhoon IKE slammed across the Philippines killing some 1,500 people and leaving more than 1,000 missing and 500,000 homeless in the most destructive typhoon to strike the Philippines since World War II.
- 5 Sep - The Space Shuttle "Discovery" successfully returned to earth at Edwards AFB, California, from its first flight after six days in space.
- 8 Sep - South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan ended his 2-day visit to Japan. Chun was the first South Korean leader ever to pay an official visit to Korea's former colonial ruler. During a historic meeting with Chun, Emperor Hirohito declared Japan's past rule of Korea "regrettable" and "unfortunate," which observers said was tantamount to an indirect apology and symbolized a "new era" between the two countries. Chun also held discussions with Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone on tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Protests and demonstrations marred the visit--before in Korea and during in Japan. Koreans felt the visit was premature because Japan had not repented enough, while Japanese felt there was no need to apologize. A \$3.28 million security net for the visit was the heaviest ever mustered in Japan and included some 23,000 policemen, 268 roadblocks, and spot checks.

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- 19 Sep - Five American seaman and their ship, the Frieda K, were released from Soviet custody after being held for a week in eastern Siberia after they apparently wandered into Soviet waters while en route to Nome, Alaska.
- 20 Sep - According to an ABC-TV report, the CIA conducted foreign and domestic operations, including secret weapons shipments abroad, through a firm which the government said was forced into bankruptcy by a crooked investment adviser. Ronald Rewald, jailed on charges of swindling 400 investors out of \$22 million, claimed he was a CIA agent and that the Honolulu-based investment firm Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham, and Wong, which eventually went bankrupt, was a CIA front. Both the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and tax authorities filed charges against Rewald, who faced 100 federal charges of fraud, tax evasion, and perjury. It was reported that the firm was involved in arranging secret shipments of military hardware to Syria, India, and Taiwan. The CIA would not say whether Rewald was an agent, but admitted it had "slight involvement" with the firm.
- A Saudi-registered merchant ship was damaged after hitting a mine just south of the Suez Canal. It was the 19th ship to be damaged by a mine in the Red Sea since 9 July.
  - The temporary headquarters of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was bombed by a truck carrying explosives, killing at least 23 people, including two Americans and wounding the U.S. Ambassador. A group calling itself "Islamic Jihad" claimed responsibility for the bombing.
- 24 Sep - The State Department issued a worldwide alert to U.S. embassies after a threat of further action against the United States by the Islamic Jihad appeared in Lebanon's As Safir newspaper.
- 25 Sep - More than 20 Soviet BACKFIRE bombers from Siberia flew over the Sea of Japan. No violation of Japan's airspace was reported although 16 Japanese fighters scrambled to intercept the group--the largest number yet in the region.
- A U.S. district court judge in New York City tentatively approved a \$180 million settlement for Vietnam veterans and their families who claimed to have been harmed by the herbicide Agent Orange. The settlement was financed by seven chemical companies who manufactured it.
  - General Jerome F. O'Malley was relieved as Commander in Chief Pacific Air Forces by LT GEN Robert W. Bazley at Hickam AFB. LT GEN Bazley received his fourth star on 1 November.

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- 28 Sep - Although more than 60 U.S. nuclear warship visits had transpired in Australia since 1976, anti-nuclear dockside workers in Darwin walked off their jobs when the nuclear submarine USS ASPRO (SSN-648) berthed and declared they would not go back to work until it left.
- 29 Sep - The Indian Army returned the Golden Temple in Amritsar to the Sikhs after an anti-government rally by 50,000 to 100,000 Sikhs earlier that month.
- 370 North Korean trucks entered South Korea with supplies for the flood-ravaged south; this was the first time since the end of the Korean War that the two countries had agreed to such an action.
- 30 Sep - According to Norwegian officials, a South Pacific Island Airways Boeing 707 on a flight from Alaska to the Netherlands strayed to within 15 minutes' flying time of Soviet territory near the Kola Peninsula and two Norwegian fighters got it back on course. Among those on board the chartered flight were 120 Fijian soldiers en route to U.N. peace-keeping duties in the Middle East.
- 1 Oct - China marked 35 years of communist rule with its first military parade in 25 years. A parade of 10,000 troops and an impressive display of military equipment, including hundreds of tanks, strategic missiles, and other heavy weapons, was followed by a massive civilian parade by 500,000 people.
- Talks began between U.S. and Vietnamese officials on the transfer of 10,000 political prisoners from "re-education camps" in Vietnam to the United States. It was anticipated that many of the 10,000 would be children of American GIs or former employees of the U.S. Government.
- 3 Oct - A United Nations report prepared by the Burmese Government said there was irrefutable evidence that North Korea ordered its agents to assassinate a South Korean presidential delegation visiting Burma last year. On 9 October 1983 a bomb killed 24 people, including four South Korean cabinet ministers, in front of Rangoon's Martyrs' Mausoleum.
- 5 Oct - In Singapore, New Zealand's Prime Minister David Lange said his country would remain in ANZUS, but was "unable, unwilling, and refusing" to accept nuclear weapons in its territory. Lange sought to assure Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew that New Zealand would not pull out of a five-nation defense arrangement with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and Great Britain, even though a Labour Party resolution called for withdrawal from military alliances with nuclear powers.

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- 12 Oct - An Iranian aircraft attacked an Indian oil tanker, the 47th ship to be damaged this year in the Persian Gulf as a result of the Iran-Iraq war.
- 16 Oct - Admiral Crowe told a news conference in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, that New Zealand's ban on visits by U.S. nuclear-powered warships was a threat to the alliance between the two nations and Australia. "The ANZUS Alliance is a force for stability in the Pacific, and its survival is important to all nations in the region," he said.
- 31 Oct - Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by two Sikh members of her personal bodyguard by submachine gun fire outside her home in New Delhi. Later that day her 40-year-old son, Rajiv Gandhi, was sworn in as the new Prime Minister.
- 5 Nov - Philippine prosecutors ordered Armed Forces Chief General Fabian C. Ver and 25 others to answer charges of double murder in the slaying of Benigno Aquino and the man the military claimed had killed him. General Ver had begun a voluntary leave of absence from his military duties on 24 October.
- 6 Nov - President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George Bush were re-elected.
- Vietnamese troops launched their first dry season raid into Thailand's Surin province.
- 7 Nov - Defense Secretary Weinberger signed a directive restricting all public disclosure of technical material with military or space applications which would be of value to the Soviet Union.
- 15 Nov - China formally took delivery of the first three of 24 U.S.-built Sikorsky helicopters in a ceremony attended by former U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig. The \$150 million transaction represented the first Chinese purchase of U.S. equipment with obvious military applications.
- 21 Nov - China's news agency Xinhua said frontier guards repulsed a Vietnamese attack along the Sino-Vietnam border signalling a new round of fighting between the two communist rivals.
- 23 Nov - In a serious incident between North and South Korea, a Soviet citizen visiting Panmunjom defected to the South Korean side. The defector was a language student at a Pyongyang university and worked part-time as a translator at the Soviet Embassy. Two North Korean and one South Korean soldiers were killed in a firefight during the Russian's

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escape, and one U.S. soldier was wounded. The defector was sent to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in Rome for possible resettlement in the United States.

- 26 Nov - China announced that it would allow U.S. warships to call at Chinese ports for the first time since 1949. Agreement in principle had been reached during Navy Secretary John Lehman's 9-day visit to China in August.
- 28 Nov - President Reagan, in a show of support for the islands of Oceania, met with Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese K.T. Mara of Fiji for two hours of talks that marked the first visit of an Oceania leader to the White House. President Reagan praised Fiji for committing peace-keeping troops to the Middle East and its 1983 decision to reopen its ports to U.S. nuclear-powered naval vessels.
- 30 Nov - Some 8,000 protestors mounted the biggest rally in 14 years at the heavily guarded U.S. Embassy in Manila, warning that Filipinos would soon follow Iran's example and storm the American mission. Another 1,000 massed outside Clark Air Base to denounce the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship and called for the dismantling of U.S. bases in the Philippines.
- 1 Dec - Australia's Labour Prime Minister Robert J.L. Hawke was returned to power but with a reduced majority.
  - The Pentagon announced that operational responsibilities for military space systems would be centralized in a new joint U.S. Space Command reporting to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- 3 Dec - The American-owned Union Carbide insecticide plant in Bhopal, India, leaked 45 tons of methyl isocyanate into the atmosphere which, according to initial reports, resulted in 410 people killed and 12,000 injured. Later estimates raised the number killed by the gas to 2,500.
- 7 Dec - At a ceremony on board USS ARIZONA commemorating the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Crowe spoke on how the attack changed the course of U.S. and world history.
- 10 Dec - The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS CARL VINSON (CVN-70) docked at Yokosuka, Japan, amid heavy security and following two days of noisy protests against the port call. ✓
- 14 Dec - Exactly four months after the Labour Party's election to power in New Zealand, Prime Minister Lange announced that the United States

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and New Zealand had resumed formal negotiations on visits by U.S. nuclear-powered and -armed ships.

- 17 Dec - Prime Minister Lange reaffirmed his Labour Government's decision to ban U.S. nuclear warships from New Zealand ports.
- 19 Dec - In Beijing's Great Hall of the People, China's Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher formally signed an agreement for the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997. Under the agreement, Hong Kong would keep its capitalist system for 50 years beyond 1997.
- 21 Dec - For the first time in Singapore's last four general elections, two seats were won by the opposition; Lee Kuan Yew was reelected Prime Minister, nevertheless, with 79 seats in Parliament.
- 28 Dec - Under an agreement signed by Chinese and Soviet negotiators in Beijing, the Soviet Union would aid in modernizing Chinese factories and facilities built during the 1950s with Soviet aid. Accords were also signed on scientific and technological cooperation.
- 31 Dec - Rajiv Gandhi was sworn in as India's sixth Prime Minister after an overwhelming victory in nationwide elections two days earlier.
  - The Civil Aeronautics Board ceased operations.

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## GLOSSARY

### A

AAC	Alaskan Air Command
AAW	Antiair Warfare
ABNCP	Airborne Command Post
ACC	Air Component Command
ACMI	Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation (range)
AD	Air Division; Destroyer Tender
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AE	Ammunition Ship
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFS	Combat Store Ship
AFSATCOM	Air Force Satellite Communications System
AGF	Command Ship
AGI	Intelligence Collection Ship (Soviet)
AGM	Air-to-Ground Missile
AIASA	Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance
AIF	Automated Installation Intelligence File
AIM	Air Intercept Missile
ALCM	Air-launched Cruise Missile
AMEMB	American Embassy
AMHS	Automated Message Handling System
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States (Treaty)
AO	Oiler
AOA	Amphibious Objective Area
AOE	Fast Combat Support Ship
AOR	Area of Responsibility; Replenishment Oiler
AR	Repair Ship
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARS	Salvage Ship
AS	Submarine Tender
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD (ISA)	ASD (International Security Affairs)
ASD (MRA&L)	ASD (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics)
ASD (MIL)	ASD (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics)
ASDF	Air Self-Defense Force (Japan)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASM	Air-to-Surface Missile
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare
ATAG	Antiterrorist Action Group
ATG	Amphibious Task Group
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications (network)
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System

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## B

BADGE	Base Air Defense Ground Environment (System, Japan)
BB	Battleship
BOA	Broad Ocean Area
BOM	By Other Means
BSF	Brief Stop for Fuel

## C

C	Confidential; Combat Readiness (rating)
C2	Command and Control
C3CM	Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures
C3I	Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
C3S	Command and Control and Communications Systems (Directorate)
CAS	Close Air Support
CDRWESTCOM	Commander U.S. Army Western Command
CEP	Circular Error of Probability
CFC	Combined Forces Command (Korea)
CG	Commanding General; Guided Missile; Cruiser
CGN	Guided Missile Cruiser (nuclear propulsion)
CHJUSMAG-K	Chief Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea
CHJUSMAGPHIL	Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines
CHJUSMAGTHAI	Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand
CHMDO	Chief Mutual Defense Assistance Office (Japan)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CILHI	Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCADC	CINC Aerospace Defense Command
CINCCFC	CINC Combined Forces Command
CINCLANTFLT	CINC U.S. Atlantic Fleet
CINCMAC	CINC Military Airlift Command
CINCPAC	CINC Pacific (changed to USCINCPAC)
CINCPACAF	CINC Pacific Air Forces
CINCPACFLT	CINC U.S. Pacific Fleet
CINCSAC	CINC Strategic Air Command
CINCUNC	CINC United Nations Command
CINCUSNAVEUR	CINC U.S. Naval Forces Europe
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
CMCC	USCINCPAC Mobile Command Center
CMS	Communications Security Material System
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COD	Carrier Onboard Delivery (aircraft)
COM	Command(er)
COMCARGRU	Commander Carrier Group
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
COMNAVFOR	Commander Naval Forces
COMNAVMARIANAS	Commander Naval Forces Marianas
COMRDJTF	Commander Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
COMSEC	Communications Security
COMUSJAPAN	Commander U.S. Forces, Japan
COMUSKOREA	Commander U.S. Forces, Korea

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CONPLAN	Concept Plan (operation plan in concept format)
CONUS	Continental United States
CPA	Closest Point of Approach
CPD	Congressional Presentation Document (Foreign Aid)
CPICK	COMSEC Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines Marxist-Leninist
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRUDES	Cruiser-Destroyer (force)
CS/CSS	Combat Support/Combat Service Support
CSS	Central Security Service
GT	Counterterrorist
CTF	Commander Task Force
CTG	Commander Task Group
CUWTF	Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force
CV	Multi-purpose Aircraft Carrier
CVBG	Carrier Battle Group
CVN	Multi-purpose Aircraft Carrier (nuclear propulsion)
CVW	Carrier Air Wing
CW	Chemical Warfare

### D

DA	Department of the Army
DACT	Dissimilar Air Combat Tactics (training)
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DATT	Defense Attache
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
DCS	Defense Communications System
DD	Destroyer
DDG	Guided Missile Destroyer
DDN	Defense Data Network
DECL	Declassify
DEFCON	Defense Readiness Condition
DEFPLAN	Defense Plan
DFAA	Defense Facilities Administration Agency (Japan)
DFSC	Defense Fuel Supply Center
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRNSA	Director, National Security Agency
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DODIIS	Department of Defense Intelligence Information System
DOS	Days of Supply
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DPSCPAC	Data Processing Service Center Pacific
DRB	Defense Resources Board
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System

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## E

EAM	Emergency Action Message
ECCM	Electronic Counter-countermeasures
ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
EMP	Electromagnetic Pulse
EO	Electro-optical
EOB	Electronic Order of Battle
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ESC	Electronic Security Command
ESD	Electronic Systems Division (USAF)
ESM	Electronic Warfare Support Measures
EUSA	Eighth U.S. Army
EW	Early Warning; Electronic Warfare
EWO	Emergency War Order
EX	Exclusive (for)

## F

F/AIF	Field Automated Installation Intelligence File
FAN-P	Flaming Arrow Net-Pacific
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FCLP	Field Carrier Landing Practice
FF	Frigate
FFG	Guided Missile Frigate
FICPAC	Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific
FIP	Facilities Improvement Plan; Force Improvement Plan
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FORSCOM	Forces Command (U.S. Army)
FOSIC	Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center
FOUO	For Official Use Only
FRD	Formerly Restricted Data
FSM	Federated States of Micronesia
FTX	Field Training Exercise
FY	Fiscal Year

## G

GAO	General Accounting Office
GCC	Ground Component Command
GMF	Ground Mobile Force (C3S)
GNP	Gross National Product
GSDF	Ground Self-Defense Force (Japan)

## H

HEMP	High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse
HF	High Frequency
HMAS	Her Majesty's Australian Ship
HNFPC	Host Nation Funded Construction Program

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HSA Headquarters Support Activity

## I

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile  
ID Infantry Division  
IDHSC Intelligence Data Handling System Communications  
IFF Identification, Friend or Foe  
IMET International Military Education and Training  
IMINT Imagery Intelligence  
IMP Interface Message Processor  
INCSEA Incidents at Sea (Agreement)  
INSCOM Intelligence and Security Command (U.S. Army)  
IOC Initial Operational Capability  
IPAC Intelligence Center Pacific  
IR Infrared  
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile  
I&W Indications and Warning

## J

JASDF Japan Air Self-Defense Force  
JCMC Joint Crisis Management Capability  
JCRC Joint Casualty Resolution Center  
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff  
JDA Japan Defense Agency; Joint Deployment Agency  
JDS Joint Deployment System  
JFY Japan Fiscal Year (1 April-31 March)  
JGSDF Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces  
JMP Joint Manpower Program  
JMSA Japanese Maritime Safety Agency  
JMSDF Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force  
JMTSS Joint Multichannel Trunking and Switching System  
JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System  
JOPS Joint Operation Planning system  
JPAM Joint Program Assessment Memorandum  
JRSC Jam Resistant Secure Communications  
JSA Joint Security Area (Korea)  
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan  
JSDF Japan Self-Defense Forces  
JSO Joint Staff Office (Japan)  
JTF Joint Task Force  
JUSMAGPHIL Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines  
JUSMAGTHAI Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand

## K

KAIS Korean Air Intelligence System  
KISS Korean Intelligence Support System  
KMR Kwajalein Missile Range  
KPA Korean People's Army (North Korea)  
KTACS Korean Tactical Air Control System

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## L

LAMPS	Light Airborne Multi-purpose System (helicopter)
LCC	Amphibious Command Ship
LF	Low Frequency
LHA	Amphibious Assault Ship (general purpose)
LKA	Amphibious Cargo Ship
LNO	Liaison Officer
LOA	Letter of Offer/Acceptance
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
LOC	Line(s) of Communication
LPD	Amphibious Transport Dock
LPDR	Lao People's Democratic Republic
LPH	Amphibious Assault Ship (helicopter)
LSD	Dock Landing Ship
LSM	Landing Ship, Medium
LST	Tank Landing Ship

## M

MAB	Marine Amphibious Brigade
MAC	Military Airlift Command; Military Armistice Commission
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MAU	Marine Amphibious Unit
MAW	Marine Aircraft Wing
MBA	Military Bases Agreement (Philippines)
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
MCM	Mine Countermeasures
MDB	Mutual Defense Board
MDO	Mutual Defense Assistance Office (Japan)
MDL	Military Demarcation Line
MEECN	Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network
MFH	Military Family Housing
MIA	Missing in Action
MIDEASTFOR	Middle East Force
MILCON	Military Construction
MILSTAMP	Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures
MILSTAR	Military Strategic Tactical and Relay (satellite)
MILSTRIP	Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedures
MLSF	Mobile Logistic Support Force
MMM	Mauritian Militant Movement
MND	Ministry of National Defense
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines)
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MODLOC	Modified Location
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPS	Maritime Prepositioning Ships
MRA&L	Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics
MSC	Coastal Minesweeper; Military Sealift Command
MSDF	Maritime Self-Defense Force
MSO	Movement Schedule Orders

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MSS Special Minesweeper  
MTMC Military Traffic Management Command

### N

NAF Non-appropriated Fund  
NAS Naval Air Station; Northern Arabian Sea  
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (Warfare)  
NCA National Command Authority  
NCND Neither Confirm Nor Deny (policy)  
NCPAC National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Pacific  
NDP National Disclosure Policy  
NEO Noncombatant Evacuation Operation  
NF Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals  
NK North Korea  
NM Nautical Mile  
NMCC National Military Command Center  
NOCONTRACT Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants  
NOFORN Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals  
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command  
NPA New People's Army (Philippines)  
NPW Nuclear-powered Warship  
NSA National Security Adviser; National Security Agency  
NSNF Non-strategic Nuclear Forces  
NTPF Near Term Prepositioning Force

### O

OADR Originating Agency's Determination Required  
OASD Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  
OJCS Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
O&M Operations and Maintenance  
OPCOM Operational Command  
OPCON Operational Control  
OPLAN Operation Plan  
OPORD Operation(s) Order  
OPSEC Operations Security  
OPTEMPO Operating Tempo  
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense  
OTHR Over-the-Horizon Radar

### P

P&A Price and Availability  
PACAF Pacific Air Forces  
PACFLT U.S. Pacific Fleet  
PACOM Pacific Command (changed to USPACOM)  
PACOPS Pacific Air Combat Operations Staff  
PAF Philippine Air Force  
PAL Permissive Action Link  
PARPRO Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program

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PASOLS	Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar
PAVN	People's Army of Vietnam
PDM	Program Decision Memorandum
PEG	Performance Evaluation Group
PHIBRON	Amphibious Squadron
PIB	USPACOM Intelligence Board
PLA	People's Liberation Army (China)
PNGDF	Papua New Guinea Defense Force
PNPG	USPACOM Nuclear Planning Group
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POM	Program Objectives Memorandum
POW	Prisoner of War
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
P&R	Planning and Review
PRC	People's Republic of China
PROPIN	Proprietary Information
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PWRMS	Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel Stocks
PWRS	Pre-positioned War Reserve Stocks

### R

RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RCC	Rescue Coordination Center
REL	Releasable (to)
REVW	Review (for declassification)
ROC	Required Operational Capability
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	ROK Army
ROKAF	ROK Air Force
ROKG	ROK Government
ROKN	ROK Navy
ROKNM	ROK Navy Marines
RO/RO	Roll On/Roll Off
ROTHR	Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar
RTA	Royal Thai Army
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force
RTARF	Royal Thai Armed Forces
RTG	Reconnaissance Technical Group; Royal Thai Government
RTN	Royal Thai Navy

### S

S	Secret
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAG	Surface Action Group
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SAO	Security Assistance Organization
SAR	Search and Rescue
SASMO	Strategic Air Support of Maritime Operations
SCM	Security Consultative Meeting (Korea)

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SEAL	Sea, Air, Land (Team)
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SF	Special Forces
SHF	Super High Frequency
SI	Special Intelligence
SIG	Solomon Islands Government
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operation Plan
SITREP	Situation Report
SLBM	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM	Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
SLM	Staff Level Meeting
SLOC	Sea Line(s) of Communication
SOAF	Sultanate of Oman Air Force
SOPAC	Special Operations Command, Pacific
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SON	Sultanate of Oman Navy
SOPAC	South Pacific
SOS	Special Operations Squadron
SRBM	Short Range Ballistic Missile
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam
SS	Submarine (conventionally powered)
SSBN	Ballistic Missile Submarine (nuclear-powered)
SSC	Security Consultative Committee Subcommittee (Japan)
SSGN	Guided Missile Submarine (nuclear-powered)
SSM	Surface-to-Surface Missile
SSN	Submarine (nuclear-powered)
SUBPAC	Submarine Force U.S. Pacific Fleet
SWA	Southwest Asia

## I

TA	Terrain Avoidance
TAC	Tactical; Tactical Air Command; Tactical Air Control
TACAIR	Tactical Air
TACAMO	Airborne Very Low Frequency Radio Broadcasting
TADIL	Tactical Digital Information Link
TAG	Target Action Group
TCS	Third Country Sales
TDY	Temporary Duty
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TLAM/C(N)	TOMAHAWK Land Attack Missile/Conventional (Nuclear)
TMPS	Theater Mission Planning System
TOA	Transportation Operating Agency
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOR	Terms of Reference
TOW	Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (missile)
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
TPICK	Telecommunications Plan for Improvement of Communications in Korea
TS	TEAM SPIRIT (Exercise, Korea); Top Secret

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TTPI Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands  
TW/AA Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment

## U

U Unclassified  
UFL ULCHI-FOCUS LENS (Exercise, Korea)  
U.K. United Kingdom  
U.N. United Nations  
UNCMAC United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission  
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
USA\_ United States of America; United States Army  
USAF U.S. Air Force  
USAITIC-PAC U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)  
Theater Intelligence Center Pacific  
USARJ U.S. Army Japan  
USCENTCOM U.S. Central Command  
USCINCCENT Commander in Chief U.S. Central Command  
USCINCEUR Commander in Chief U.S. European Command  
USCINCLANT Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Command  
USCINCPAC Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Command  
USCINCPACREP Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Command Representative  
USCINCRED Commander in Chief U.S. Readiness Command  
USCINCSOUTH Commander in Chief U.S. Southern Command  
USDAO U.S. Defense Attache Office  
USEUCOM U.S. European Command  
USFJ U.S. Forces Japan  
USFK U.S. Forces Korea  
USIA- U.S. Information Agency  
USLANTCOM U.S. Atlantic Command  
USMC U.S. Marine Corps  
USN U.S. Navy  
USPACOM U.S. Pacific Command  
USREDCOM U.S. Readiness Command  
USS U.S. Ship  
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
UW Unconventional Warfare

## V

VOA Voice of America

## W

WABNRES WWMCCS Airborne Resources  
WARM Wartime Reserve Modes  
WESTPAC Western Pacific  
WIN WWMCCS Intercomputer Network  
WIS Weaponneering Information Sheet; WWMCCS Information System  
WNINTEL Warning Notice-Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  
WRM War Reserve Materiel  
WRSA War Reserve Stocks for Allies  
WWMCCS Worldwide Military Command and Control System

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