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Colonel, USAF
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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME I

1980

Prepared by the Command History Division
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861
1981

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET
ADMIRAL ROBERT L.J. LONG
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
FOREWORD

The year 1980 offered demanding challenges to the Pacific Command. Tensions in many parts of the command remain high, the result of direct and indirect Soviet actions and regional political uncertainties. The Soviet Union has greatly increased its naval forces in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, continued to enlarge its air and ground forces, and used its growing military power to expand its presence and influence throughout the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. While a short decade ago the U.S. position of military dominance in the Pacific theater was unquestioned, U.S. force posture has declined in the face of growing Soviet military power.

These trends are of particular concern as U.S. and free world strategic and economic interests have focused on the PACOM region. For example, U.S. trade with its Asia-Pacific neighbors again outstripped its trade with Europe, as it has for the last several years. Free world economies, and the strength of alliance structures meant to deter aggression, are increasingly dependent on the continued flow of oil from the Arabian Gulf.

PACOM forces are continuing to be stretched thin as tensions in the oil producing areas keep U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean and northern Arabian Sea operating at almost a wartime tempo. Two carrier battle groups were on station in the Indian Ocean throughout 1980, and amphibious units with Marines embarked operated in the area for a significant part of the year. These protracted naval operations have increased the difficulty of meeting overall security responsibilities in the western Pacific.

To increase U.S. operational flexibility and collective security in protecting shared interests in the region, the U.S. has encouraged the support of friends and allies. In Northeast Asia, Japan’s efforts on defense and cost sharing with the United States have increased as Japanese public concern over aggressive Soviet behavior mounts. While gains are being made in our bilateral planning activities, it is hoped that the growing Japanese consensus for a stronger defense will result in Japan shouldering a greater share of their defense burden.

Tensions remain high on the Korean Peninsula. In 1980, the Republic of Korea underwent a major political transition. The year ended with renewed political stability and continued U.S. commitment to maintaining peace and security.

Chinese forces deployed along the Soviet border tie down a quarter of the USSR’s ground and air forces—an important factor in the global power equation as we pursue a policy that recognizes our parallel interest in halting Soviet expansionist activity.

In Southeast Asia, Vietnam presents special problems. In return for Soviet economic and military assistance that supports Vietnamese aggression
in Kampuchea, the Soviets have received virtually unrestricted access to the facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. The Soviets now enjoy a warm water forward base to support distant operations in the Indian Ocean. The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, are particularly effective politically in pulling together against such aggression. Thailand counts heavily on its security commitment from the United States, and the support of its ASEAN neighbors, as well as China, to inhibit Hanoi from any substantial incursion into Thai territory.

The Philippines remains a close ally. Continued access to bases in that country is essential to the continued support of deployed forces in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. Singapore is an outspoken supporter of our shared security interests. Malaysia has been a steady and helpful voice on regional security issues, and Indonesia continues to play an important role in the affairs of the region.

In Southwest Asia, there is no evidence that the USSR intends to withdraw from Afghanistan. The Soviet presence provides the USSR strategic advantage for any reach into the Arabian Sea. Pakistan's strategic location requires that we improve our security relationship. The United States needs a close and continuing dialogue with Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka to ensure that they fully understand our policies and objectives in the Arabian Gulf, Southwest Asia, and Indian Ocean littoral.

Australia and New Zealand remain staunch allies and view the ANZUS Treaty as the foundation of their security. Although limited in their ability to project military power, each contributes support to our forces, and probably of greater importance, to the perception of free world alliance structures promoting regional security. Micronesia continues to be strategically important. The United States encourages the nations there and elsewhere throughout the Pacific to deny the Soviets, or other hostile influences, opportunities to expand presence and influence.

The United States cannot go it alone. As we encourage the help and support of our allies, we need to demonstrate that we are determined and effective in our efforts to preserve peace and stability in the region. The job in 1980, and unchanged in the future, is to move the real and the perceived balance of power away from the Soviets and their surrogates. This strategy, coupled with significant U.S. force improvements, is essential in protecting U.S. and free world interests in the Pacific Command area.

R. L. J. LONG
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific

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PREFACE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the viewpoint of the CINCPAC. The report also preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS, to the extent that the impact on the PACOM of major decisions and directives of the JCS may be evaluated by the JCS historians without detailed research into PACOM records.

This history describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities and his relationships with U.S. military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions, but does not cover the detailed activities of his component and subordinate unified commands, which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters.

The 1972-1973 historical narrative of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was the terminal history of that organization. Annex B of the 1976 history was the terminal history of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand. Annex E of the 1978 history was the terminal history of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (supplemented by Appendix I to the 1979 CINCPAC history, which covered Taiwan wrap-up actions). The designations of Annex A (MACV), Annex B (MACTHAI) and Annex E (TDC) are reserved to facilitate future research and reference. The histories of U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea will retain the designations of Annexes C and D respectively. The Annexes are included only for those copies retained at CINCPAC or forwarded to the JCS. Further distribution of those histories is the prerogative of the subordinate unified commander.

The 1980 history is published in two volumes, consecutively paginated, with the glossary and index for these volumes at the end of Volume II.

Comprehensive notes on sources and documentation may be found in the 1972 history. Briefly, message traffic footnoted in this history other than General Service (GENSER) is followed by the abbreviations (BOM) or (EX) as appropriate. BOM is the acronym for "by other means" and EX is used to denote "special category-exclusive" messages.

Chapters I, III, and IV were written by the undersigned. Tony Koura wrote Chapters II, VI, VIII, and IX. Eileen O. Behana wrote Chapters V, VII, X,
and XI, and supervised the physical layout of the project. The index was a joint effort and the glossary was compiled by Mrs. Behana.

The manuscript was typed by Shirley A. Streck and Jane Kuriki. The Navy Publications and Printing Service Office, Pearl Harbor, printed and bound the volumes.

Pauline Tallman
PAULINE TALLMAN
Command Historian
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CHAPTER 1
THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND

SECTION I--THE PACIFIC COMMAND

(P) PACOM strength remained relatively constant in 1980 compared to the year before. Certain minor refinements in reporting procedures have modified overall strengths somewhat. Personnel strengths were at their lowest in the history of the command.

(U) A comparison of military strengths by Service follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>1 January 1980</th>
<th>31 December 1980</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>50,388</td>
<td>49,899</td>
<td>- 489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>151,446</td>
<td>155,011</td>
<td>+3,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>71,829</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>-8,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>41,855</td>
<td>39,648</td>
<td>-2,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>315,518</strong></td>
<td><strong>307,558</strong></td>
<td><strong>-7,960</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major areas of concentration of military personnel and their dependents in 1980 and the change from 1979 are shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Military (31 Dec 80)</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Dependents (31 Dec 80)</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>7,994</td>
<td>- 1,921</td>
<td>12,445</td>
<td>+ 356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>40,394</td>
<td>- 8,137</td>
<td>59,158</td>
<td>-26,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>42,125</td>
<td>- 6,200</td>
<td>34,240</td>
<td>+ 1,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>38,800</td>
<td>- 401</td>
<td>13,084</td>
<td>+ 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>12,121</td>
<td>-25,800*</td>
<td>19,318</td>
<td>- 623</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Navy reporting procedures used during 1979 may have reflected manning of ships in port at the time in addition to regularly assigned personnel.

(U) The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of those forces throughout the PACOM. The date of information on these charts is as of 31 December 1980, unless otherwise indicated. The chart showing the CINCPAC staff organization is on the inside of the back cover.

1. Strengths were derived from the Unit Status and Identity Report.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN PACOM

CINCPAC

CINCPACFLT  CINCPACAF  CDRWESTCOM

COMUS KOREA  COMUS JAPAN

CG EIGHTH US ARMY  CHUSMAGK

COMNAVFOR KOREA  COMNAVFOR JAPAN

COMAFK  COMAFAST (CG IXCORPS)

CDR IPAC  CDR JCRC

COMAFAST (COM SAF)

CINCPAC REP ALEUTIANS  CINCPAC LNO TO COMAAC

CINCPAC REP GUAM/TTP  CINCPAC REP AUSTRALIA

CINCPAC REP PHILIPPINES  CINCPAC REP SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

CINCPAC LNO TO REDCOM/ROJTF/JDA

CINCPAC REP JSTPS/SAC

CINCPAC REP INDIAN OCEAN

CHUSLG INDONESIA

CHODC INDIA

ODR PAKISTAN

CHUSDLG INDONESIA

OP COMMAND/OP CONTROL

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (SHE), p. 4, REVW 16 Feb 81.
COMMAND ORGANIZATION (U)

1. a. Commander in Chief, PACIFIC (CINCPAC) is the Commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of its objectives. The mission of CINCPAC, in broad terms, is to ensure: To maintain the security of the PACOM area and defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean; to support and advance the national policies and interests of the United States in the discharge of its responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Indian Ocean; to prepare plans, conduct operations and coordinate activities of the forces of the PACOM in commonwealth with directives of higher authority. The general area of responsibility for the conduct of naval operations in the Pacific Ocean, west of 120 degrees west longitude, the Pacific coast of North America, the Arctic Ocean west of 65 degrees west longitude and north of 10 degrees north latitude, and the Indian Ocean east of 17 degrees east longitude including the Gulf of Aden, and the Gulf of Aqaba. It also includes Japan, the Republic of Korea, the countries of Southeast and Southern Asia including Pakistan and India, and the islands except the Malayan Republic in all assigned water areas including the Mediterranean excluding all areas excluded by the presidential proclamation, Mediterranean, and Western Pacific.

b. CINCPAC exercises operational control of all forces assigned or attached to the PACOM Service Component Commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces assigned or attached to CINCPAC.

c. CINCPAC provides military command over military agencies, offices, organizations, and commands which administer security assistance programs in the PACOM area and coordinate activities within the PACOM area through established coordinating authorities who are designated United States Defense Representatives (USDRs) or CINCPAC Representatives (CINCPACRs).

d. CINCPAC accredits the U.S. military advisor or representative to the following organizations:

- FVO: U.S. Security Consultative Committee, Commander and Principal Advisor on Military Defense Matters to the Chairman of the U.S. Representation.
- FSI: Commander Pacific Air Force (CINCPAC).
- FSI: Commander of the U.S. Army, Western Command (commander of the U.S. Army, Western Command) exercises the geographical areas of Japan and Korea.

2. a. The PACOM Service Component Commanders are responsible for accomplishing such operational missions and tasks as may be assigned by CINCPAC. The PACOM Service Component Commanders consist of the respective component commanders and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations under the appropriate PACOM Service Component Commander in his Service role, and contribute to the mission of CINCPAC as appropriate.

b. The PACOM Service Component Commanders' responsibilities for the military assistance programs are prescribed in the CINCPAC Supplement to the DOD Military Assistance and Sales Manual.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (CONFID), p. 5, REV 16 Feb 01.
# SUBORDINATE UNITED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES

## KEY PERSONNEL

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<th>U.N. COMMAND/U.S. FORCES, KOREA/EIGHTH U.S. ARMY/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND</th>
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<th>Commander Naval Forces Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Kenneth E. Dooley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant to the Commander and JCS (USAMAG-R)</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Col. Orlando G. Gonzalez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary Joint Staff</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Col. Thomas A. Epperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR IJN LCN (Rear/Secretary UN Jt Bd and Deputy US Rep)</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Col. Albert Boyle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Protocol Section</td>
<td>LCOL</td>
<td>LCol. James L. Fike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/C</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Col. Thomas H. Redwine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/O</td>
<td>BGEN</td>
<td>BGen. Schuyler Russell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/S</td>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Robert W. Sennwald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep. Assistant Chief of Staff/S</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Col. William D. McWilliams, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/J</td>
<td>BGEN</td>
<td>BGen. William R. Sibbery, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/H</td>
<td>BGEN</td>
<td>BGen. Dennis L. Murphy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/E</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Col. Donald R. Griggs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Administrative Division and Secretary UNC/USMAC</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Col. Kenneth D. Truax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief, Adjutant General</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Col. Kenneth D. Mead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/Comptroller</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>BGen. Billy Peters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs Officer</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Col. Richard G. Hyde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge Advocate</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Col. James A. Munot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Col. Richard T. Gilmer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Chaplain</td>
<td>CH/COL</td>
<td>Ch/Col. Charles R. Gibbons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Joint Casualty Resolution Center

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>LCOL</th>
<th>Col. Stephen M. Perry</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

CINCPAC/REP CO, NAVSTA ADAK

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE ALEUTIANS

CINCPAC/REP USSAF Liaison Office/US Defense Representative/U.S. Diplomat CO

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE AUSTRALIA

CINCPAC/REP USSAF Liaison Office/US Defense Representative/U.S. Diplomat CO

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE GUAM/TPPI

CINCPAC/REP COMNAVMARHANAN

CINCPAC/REP COMNAV BAHAMAS

CINCPAC/REP COMNAV PACIFIC

CINCPAC/REP COMNAV PACIFIC

CINCPAC/REP COMNAV PACIFIC

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE INDIAN OCEAN

CINCPAC/REP COMDEASTFOR

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE PHILIPPINES

CINCPAC/REP COMNAV PHIL

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE SOUTH/WEST PACIFIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander/Commander SAF</th>
<th>RADM</th>
<th>RADM Stephen J. Huston</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander Naval Forces Korea</td>
<td>RADM</td>
<td>RADM Stephen J. Huston</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## United States Forces Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chief of Staff</th>
<th>LT GEN</th>
<th>Capt. William H. Ginn, Jr.</th>
<th>USAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary Joint Staff</td>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Marc A. Moore</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/Staff 11</td>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>Capt. Tommy H. Warren, Jr.</td>
<td>USMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/Staff 12</td>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>Capt. Edward W. Hill</td>
<td>USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/Staff 13</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Col. Jack A. Dodds</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/Staff 14</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Col. Bruce A. Trueblood</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/Staff 15</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Col. Raymond Ditch</td>
<td>USAAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/Staff 16</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Col. Harold D. O'Hara</td>
<td>USAAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Okinawa Area Field Office</td>
<td>LCOL</td>
<td>LCol. Robert F. Houston</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Command Source:
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS
FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

OFFICE OF DEFENSE COOPERATION INDIA (ODCI)

Chief
LCOL
John G. PATTERTON, Jr.
USAF

U.S. DEFENSE LIASON GROUP INDONESIA

Chief
COL
Albert C. WALDACK
USAF
Deputy Chief
COL
Robert J. ELLIS
USAF
Chief, Army Division
LCOL
John R. HANCEMAN
USA
Chief, Navy/Marine Division
COL
Malcolm C. REEVES, II
USN
Chief, Air Force Division
LCOL
VACANT

Chief, Plans, Programs and Training Division
LCOL
Richard D. TOMLIN
USMC
Chief, Personnel and Admin Division
LCOL
Robert E. CORRIGAN, Jr.
USAF

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE OFFICE, JAPAN

Chief, MIDAO
COL
Johnny H. EDMUNDSON
USAF

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE GROUP, KOREA

Chief
MAJ GEN
Orlando E. GONZALES
USA
Chief of Staff
CAPT
Leonard H. HARRISON
USN
AGS Plans and Programs
COL
William J. IRICK
USAF
AGS Procurement
COL
John J. YANG, Jr.
USA
AGS Logistics
COL
Theodore HAWKINS, III
USAF
AGS Admin
COL
Roger W. THOMAS
USAF
AGS Secretary
LCOL
Constantine J. BLAUSTEIN
USAF
Senior Army Assistance Officer
COL
Herbert A. ELLEN
USAF
Senior Naval Assistance Officer
CAPT
Alfred L. LAMBERT
USAF
Senior Air Assistance Officer
COL
Richard L. BRINGGAR
USMC

OFFICE OF THE DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE PAKISTAN (ODRP)

US Defense Representative Pakistan (ODRP)
COL
Sidney F. HUDSON
USAF

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, PHILIPPINES

Chief
BGEN
John W. FURS
USA
Chief, Management Division and Chief, Navy Service Section
CAPT
W. Robert FROSSER
USN
Chief, Logistics Division
COL
Chester A. FASSOTT
USAF
Chief, Support Services and Chief, AFS Service Section
COL
Robert W. THOMPSON
USA
Chief, Marine Service Section
COL
Darrel J. STOUT
USMC
Chief, Ground Forces Service Section
COL
Herbert G. THOMAS
USA

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, THAILAND

Chief
COL
Richard L. WEATHER
USAF
Supreme Command Liaison Officer
COL
Charles L. SHAW
USA
Chief, Army Division
COL
George H. GOETZKE
USA
Chief, Navy Division
CAPT
Andrew J. HEGGEMEN
USA
Chief, Air Force Division
COL
John M. KENNY
USAF
Chief, Training Liaison Branch
COL
James E. BROWN, Jr.
USAF
Chief, Support Services Branch
MAJ
William L. MAHAN, Jr.
USA
Chief, Admin/Programs Branch
CAPT
Earl B. HUE
USAF

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (SYN), p. 9, REVW 16 Feb 01.
### PACOM AREA PERSONNEL - SERVICE - CATEGORY - LOCATION (U)

**ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1980**

| LOCATION | TOTAL GRAND | MILITARY | USAF | USAF | USMC | U.S. CIVILIANS | USAF | USAF | USMC | LOCAL HIRE CIVILIANS | TOTAL | USA | USA | USAF | USAF | USMC | TOTAL | USA | USA | USAF | USAF | USMC | TOTAL | USA | USA | USAF | USAF | USMC | TOTAL | USA | USA | USAF | USAF | USMC | TOTAL | USA | USA | USAF | USAF | USMC | TOTAL |
|----------|-------------|----------|------|------|------|--------------|------|------|------|-------------------|-------|----|----|------|------|------|--------|----|----|------|------|------|--------|----|----|------|------|------|--------|----|----|------|------|------|--------|----|----|------|------|------|--------|----|----|------|------|------|--------|----|----|------|------|------|--------|----|----|------|------|------|--------|
| ALASKA   | 2,551       | 1,129    | 1,129|      |      | 17           | 15   | 2    | 192  | 192               | 1,031 | 1,069 | 62 |
| CANADA   | 6           |          |      |      |      |              |      |      |      | 6                | 6     | 6     |
| AUSTRALIA| 1,669       | 651      | 5    | 379  | 256  | 17           | 15   | 2    | 192  | 192               | 619   | 382   | 437 |
| BANGLADESH| 1         | 1        |      |      |      |              |      |      |      | 2                | 2     | 2     |
| BAHRAIN  | 6           | 6        | 4    | 3    | 1    |              |      |      |      | 2                | 2     | 2     |
| CHINA    | 3           | 3        |      |      |      |              |      |      |      | 3                | 3     | 3     |
| KOREA    | 20          | 10       | 2    | 5    | 3    |              |      |      |      | 10               | 10    | 10    |
| JAPAN/VIETNAM| 150,216 | 42,125   | 2,277| 2,605| 13,170| 8,490         | 930  | 1,479| 2,955| 1,176            | 20,461| 3,882| 10,159| 5,267| 1,077| 30,262| 3,919| 10,192| 16,525| 3,504|
| JOHNSTON ISLAND| 101 | 101     | 1    | 97   | 4    |              |      |      |      | 1                | 1     | 1     |
| VIETNAM  | 25,990      | 18,000   | 2,003| 394  | 870  | 13           | 15   | 5    | 2    | 2                | 2     | 2     |
| MALAYSIA | 2,354       | 16,000   | 30,033| 394  | 870  | 13           | 15   | 5    | 2    | 2                | 2     | 2     |
| THAILAND | 250         | 106      | 14   | 71   | 21   | 2            | 5    | 5    | 170  | 165               | 14    |
| AFRO/AFRICAN   | 32,349 | 31,349   | 31,629| 829  |      |              |      |      |      | 2                | 2     | 2     |
| AFRICA/EAST AFRICA| 59,045 | 59,045   | 58,747| 288  |      |              |      |      |      | 2                | 2     | 2     |
| PACIFIC/AFRICA| 15,000 | 13,258   | 3    | 379  | 297  | 17            | 15   | 2    | 192  | 192               | 619   | 382   | 437 |
| TOTAL      | 20,800     | 15,000   | 17,000| 394  | 870  | 13           | 15   | 2    | 192  | 192               | 619   | 382   | 437 |

**Note:** Since 31 December 1972 all military figures used in this publication have been derived from the USA Status and Identity Report.

**Source:** JIC/333
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<th>USMC</th>
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<th>TOTAL MIL AND CIV</th>
<th>LOCAL HIRE CIV</th>
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<td>186</td>
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<td>186</td>
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<td>138</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>154</td>
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<td>186</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>154</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>538</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (MN), p. 24, REDW 16 Feb 01.
### MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP PERSONNEL (U)
#### ASSIGNED STRENGTHS BY SERVICE & CIVILIAN CATEGORY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>TOTAL MILITARY</th>
<th>US CIV</th>
<th>TOT US PERS</th>
<th>LOCAL HIRE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
</tr>
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<td>ODR INDIA</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDLG INDONESIA</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAGKOREA</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (SUMC), p. 25, REVW 16 Feb 01.
**MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED STRENGTH IN PACOM**

**AS OF: 31 DECEMBER 1980**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS</th>
<th>TOTAL NAVY &amp; MC</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FORCES UNDER CINCPAC'S OPERATIONAL CONTROL</strong></td>
<td>46,688</td>
<td>151,080</td>
<td>62,176</td>
<td>213,156</td>
<td>29,176</td>
<td>289,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPERATIONAL FORCES IN PACOM NOT UNDER CINCPAC'S OPERATIONAL CONTROL</strong></td>
<td>3,231</td>
<td>3,931</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>4,755</td>
<td>10,472</td>
<td>18,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL MILITARY FORCES IN THE PACOM AREA</strong></td>
<td>49,999</td>
<td>155,011</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>218,011</td>
<td>39,648</td>
<td>307,558</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since 31 December 1977 all military figures used in this publication have been derived from the Unit Status and Identity Report.

SOURCE: J13/J33
# AVAILABLE FORCES (U)

## OPCOM TO CINCPAC*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY/MARINES</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Corps Headquarters</td>
<td>3. Attack Carriers ***</td>
<td>3. Air Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Infantry Division with</td>
<td>4. Cruisers ***</td>
<td>4. Tactical Airlift Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>5. Destroyers/Frigates ***</td>
<td>5. Tactical Fighter Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Infantry Division with</td>
<td>10. Carrier Air Wings with</td>
<td>10. Tactical Fighter Sqtrs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Does not include units with a primary mission of training.**

---

## IN PACOM BUT NOT OPCOM TO CINCPAC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNASA Units in the Pacific</th>
<th>6. Destroyers(Naval Reserve Training)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard Units</td>
<td>7. Mine Warfare Ships (Naval Reserve Training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>8. Amphibious Warfare Ships (Naval Reserve Training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve Units</td>
<td>9. Auxiliary Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>10. Fleet Composite Operations Readiness Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Civil Affairs Group</td>
<td>Naval Oceanography Command Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Engineer Construction Battalion</td>
<td>Naval Reserve Command Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Corps Headquarters (CU)</td>
<td>Naval Reserve Command Units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (SANC), p. 10, REVW 16 Feb 01.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS (U)

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (SYNCRP), p. 13, REV 16 Feb 01.
DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL AIR & SHIP UNITS (U)
WESTPAC

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81-(5/WP), p. 16, REW 16 Feb 01.
SECTION II--THE CINCPAC STAFF

Key Personnel Changes in 1980

Commander in Chief Pacific/Chief of Staff/Deputy Chief of Staff

(U) Admiral Robert L. J. Long, USN, served as Commander in Chief Pacific throughout the year, except for a two-day period in April (190200Z to 210400Z) when Admiral D. C. Davis, USN, CINCPACFLT, became Acting CINCPAC while Admiral Long was on leave. Lieutenant General Freddie L. Poston, USAF, was Chief of Staff throughout the year and Major General Robert B. Solomon, USA, served as Deputy Chief of Staff during all of 1980.

Inspector General

(U) On 25 July, at the time of reorganization of the command and control function, responsibility as Inspector General was reassigned from the Director for Personnel to the Deputy Chief of Staff, and Major General Robert B. Solomon, USA, assumed the responsibility as an additional duty.

Joint Secretary

(U) COL Frank J. Apel, Jr., USAF, became Joint Secretary on 27 May, replacing COL Francis W. Ethun, USAF, who was reassigned to the office of the Inspector General.

Director for Personnel

(U) COL Edward D. Reyes, USAF, replaced Brigadier General Andrew P. Chambers, USA, as Director for Personnel on 4 September.

Director for Intelligence

(U) BGEN (P) James C. Pfautz, USAF, became Director for Intelligence on 8 April, replacing BGEN John B. Marks, USAF.

Deputy Director for Plans

(U) BGEN James E. Thompson, USA, replaced BGEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, as Deputy Director for Plans on 11 July.
Director for Command, Control and Communications Systems

(U) MAJ GEN James M. Rockwell, USA, replaced BGEN Charles B. Jiggetts, USAF, as Director for Command, Control and Communications Systems on 20 December.

Staff Judge Advocate

(U) CAPT Richard J. Grunawalt, JAGC, USN, replaced CAPT Bruce A. Harlow, JAGC, USN, as Staff Judge Advocate on 2 August.

Surgeon

(U) RADM Lewis H. Seaton, MC, USN, became CINCPAC Surgeon on 24 September, replacing RADM D. Earl Brown, Jr., MC, USN.

Cryptologic Adviser

(U) Mr. David G. Boak reported as Cryptologic Adviser to CINCPAC on 1 August. He replaced CAPT W. K. Martin, USN, who continued to serve as Deputy Chief of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service Pacific Area Headquarters.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>CIV</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>66</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence Directorate</td>
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<td>70</td>
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<td>114</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>73</td>
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<td>Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>93</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>PACOM ADP Systems Support Group</td>
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<td>Intelligence Center Pacific</td>
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<td>Miscellaneous Units</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>482</td>
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<td>510</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>1,249</td>
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</table>

a. On 25 July 1980 the CINCPAC Communications and Data Processing Directorate was reorganized to include the Technology, Requirements and Evaluation Division of the Operations Directorate and form the new Command, Control and Communications Systems Directorate with the staff code C3S.
b. Two GS, Four Local Wage Rate.
c. Three GS, Five Local Wage Rate.
CONFIDENTIAL

Headquarters Joint Manpower Program

(U) A major headquarters staff realignment occurred on 25 July 1980 with formation of the Command, Control and Communications Systems Directorate. The realignment required an out-of-cycle change to the Joint Manpower Program for Fiscal Year 1981. Also, all changes in general and flag officer billets required both JCS and Service review.

(U) On 27 June CINCPAC submitted his formal request change to the JCS. He proposed that the new Command, Control and Communications Systems Director be an Army 0-7, with compensation coming from downgrading the billet of the Director for Personnel from an Army 0-7 to an 0-6, to be rotated between the Army and the Air Force. The billet for Deputy Director for Operations was to become an Air Force 0-7. (At this time it had been planned to transfer Inspector General duties to the Deputy Director for Operations billet, but it was subsequently decided to assign them to the Deputy Chief of Staff, an Army 0-8.)

(C) On 18 July CINCPAC additionally recommended that the new Command, Control and Communications Director position be shown as an Army 0-7 or 0-8. Establishment of the directorate was expected to result in a substantial increase in the level of responsibility and span of control associated with that director position. Also, it would place him at a level of authority compatible with the other major directors. As noted elsewhere in this chapter, the new director who arrived in December was an Army 0-8.

Command, Control and Communications Systems Directorate

(U) A realignment of the headquarters staff resulted in the formation of a Command, Control and Communications Systems Directorate on 25 July 1980. It carried the staff code C3S. It was designed to provide a single staff agency with total responsibility for C3 systems to include automatic data processing from requirements inception through operations and eventual removal. The new directorate had five divisions: Policy and Doctrine (C3SPD), Telecommunications Management (C3STM), Operations Planning, Exercises and Evaluations (C3SOE), ADP Systems (C3SAS), and Requirements and Development (C3SRD).

1. CINCPACNOTE 5400 of 11 Jul 80 (U), Subj: CINCPAC Headquarters Staff Realignment; CINCPAC 272130Z Jun 80 (U).
2. CINCPAC 182105Z Jul 80 (C), DECL 31 Dec 86.
3. CINCPACNOTE 5400 of 11 Jul 80 (U), Subj: CINCPAC Headquarters Staff Realignment.
The entire former Communications and Data Processing Directorate (J6) was incorporated in the new directorate, as was most of the former Technology, Requirements and Evaluation Division (J34) of the Operations Directorate. One individual was reassigned from J34 before the realignment to the Exercise Division of the Operations Directorate to continue performing an exercise evaluation function. (Further realignment in that division resulted in the deletion of one manpower space from J35.) The CINCPAC Reference Library, which had also been a part of J34, was realigned as part of the Joint Secretariat (J04), thus returning to the organizational segment from which it had been transferred in 1973.1

Functions of Political and USICA Advisers Separated

On 23 May the Chief of Staff advised of a reorganization to separate the offices and functions of the Political Adviser and the U.S. International Communications Agency Adviser. This action was designed to separate the Political Adviser's policy role within the staff from the USICA Adviser's advisory role. The USICA Adviser's functional responsibilities as Associate Political Adviser were deleted and the offices of the two advisers physically separated from one another.2

Position of CINCPAC Representative Southwest Pacific Established

On 29 November 1979 Admiral Long had directed that a naval officer billet be created in Suva, Fiji, to serve U.S. and CINCPAC interests in the newly emerging independent nations of the South Pacific. Efforts to obtain Defense Intelligence Agency support for a naval attache in Suva had failed because of manpower constraints.3

In March 1980 the decision was made to create the position of CINCPAC Representative Southwest Pacific, a U.S. Navy commander billet from the CINCPAC staff. It was desired to have an officer in place by the summer of 1980. Although the billet would remain a PACOM position, the officer would be incorporated into the Fiji Country Team and answer to the U.S. Ambassador to Fiji. "MODE" was a State Department function that controlled the numbers of official U.S. personnel attached to Country Teams in foreign countries.

1. Ibid.; J35/Memo/03-81 of 5 Jan 81 (U), Subj: Command History Submissions.
2. JO1/Memo/15-80 of 23 May 80 (U), Subj: Change to USICA Functions and Responsibilities.
3. J5124 HistSum May 80 (C), DECL 30 Apr 86.
CINCPAC asked the JCS to determine if MODE clearance was necessary for the position; the JCS replied that the CINCPACREP position was not under MODE constraints.¹

(U) On 10 May the first CINCPACREP Southwest Pacific was designated. He was Commander Dwayne O. Norris, USN, who had been assigned as executive assistant to the Director for Plans.²

(U) The CINCPACREP Southwest Pacific became operational in Suva on 1 October. Some limited administrative support was provided by the Embassy, which also provided office space.

Position Established for CINCPAC Liaison Officer to USREDCOM/JDA/RDJTF

(U) Terms of Reference were signed by Admiral Long on 1 November for the position of CINCPAC Liaison Officer to the Headquarters, U.S. Readiness Command/ Joint Deployment Agency and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. With that signing the terms became effective, as the document had been signed on 10 October by LT GEN P. X. Kelley, USMC, Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and by General Volney F. Warner, USA, CINC of the USREDCOM and Director of the Joint Deployment Agency on 16 October. The purpose of establishing this liaison office was to provide for closer coordination and cooperation among the commands involved. The officer would be the representative of CINCPAC and report directly to the Director for Plans on the CINCPAC staff. He was to function as a staff element of CINCPAC with duty station at MacDill AFB, Florida. He was authorized to deal collaterally with all CINCPAC staff agencies to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. The liaison officer would normally be an O-6 and possess a broad background in joint operation and planning matters as well as an extensive knowledge of CINCPAC planning and organizational relationships.³

(U) No officer had been assigned to the new position by the end of the year.

Disestablishment of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Regional Office Pacific (AROP)

(U) With the phaseout of the Thailand and Vietnam Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) offices, the ARPA director ascertained that a regional

1. Ibid.; CINCPAC 132037Z Mar 80 (U); JCS 6635/272117Z Mar 80 (U).
2. J5124 HistSum May 80 (U); CINCPAC 100116Z May 80 (U).
office, established at Camp Smith, would maintain the quality, relevance, and usefulness of the research and development ARPA had undertaken on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. Both CINCPAC and the JCS concurred with the idea and an office that came to be called the ARPA Regional Office Pacific (AROP) was opened on 9 April 1973 as an attached element on the CINCPAC staff.1

(U) In a letter received at CINCPAC's headquarters on 19 June 1980, the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency advised that he was reluctantly closing the AROP by 30 September. He said the action was necessary because of the agency's response to increasingly heavy workload and new demands on limited manpower.2

(U) Admiral Long replied that he understood the necessities of the situation and that he had shifted research and development responsibilities to the CINCPAC Plans Directorate to insure that proper attention was given "in this important area." The assignment in the Plans Directorate was to the U.S. Forces and Strategy Division. CINCPAC made arrangements to establish channels of communication between the headquarters and the Washington Defense research and development community by means of automatic distribution of various R&D documents, direct communication on specific projects, and briefings for CINCPAC and his staff on selected, high priority projects.3

(U) On 9 December the CINC of the Strategic Air Command advised CINCPAC that he had discussed with CINCPACAF the need for a SAC element in PACOM to support planning efforts in the Pacific. He proposed to establish a SAC liaison element to PACOM headquarters, located either at Hickam AFB (PACAF headquarters) or Camp Smith. The element would consist of three officers, headed by an O-6. He hoped for an activation date of approximately 1 March 1981.4

(U) CINCPAC advised on 16 December that he appreciated the initiative. He said such an element would substantially improve the interface on contingency and general war planning. He proposed that it be located at Hickam AFB, which would insure close coordination between the liaison element and the PACAF staff and would facilitate PACAF's integration of our USAF air effort

2. Ltr, Director ARPA to CINCPAC, undated (U), n.s.
3. Ltr, CINCPAC to Director DARPA, 30 Jun 80 (U), n.s.; J5/Memo/793-80 of 26 Jun 80 (U), Subj: Closing of DARPA Regional Office, Pacific.
4. CINCSAC 091834Z Dec 80 (U).
into PACOM planning and operational activities. He advised CINCSAC that he had asked CINCPACAF to work on the details.¹

(5) CINCPACAF subsequently described the initiative as invaluable in providing a "sorely needed" expertise to address SAC operations in the Pacific. He envisioned that the element would incorporate SAC elements into PACOM contingency war plans and exercises: provide SAC inputs during actual contingency planning (including use of the CINCSAC Strategic Projection Force); advise and assist CINCPAC and CINCPACAF on B-52 operations and initiatives in the Pacific; and monitor daily SAC activities in the PACOM area. He thought the composition of the SAC element should emphasize B-52 operational experience to support the vastly expanding strategic operations throughout the PACOM. "As you are aware," CINCPACAF said to CINCSAC, "B-52s currently conduct flights over Korea, Philippines, Australia and the Indian Ocean. Additional initiatives for Australia, Hawaii, Japan, Thailand, Philippines and Diego Garcia are underway." He said that addition of a logistic planner in the element to assist during basing considerations in Australia, Thailand, Diego Garcia, etc., would be very beneficial. Planning continued at year's end.²

Australia Manning Studies

On 16 May the U.S. Defense Attache Office in Canberra advised CINCPACFLT that the increased U.S. Navy and Marine Corps presence in the Indian Ocean had resulted in an upsurge of U.S. Navy ship visits to Western Australia ports, particularly to HMAS Stirling and Fremantle. It was expected that this tempo would continue. He noted that the Defense Attache Office was located over 3,400 kilometers from Perth, and the task of arranging ship visits in the area fell on the Naval Officer Commanding Western Australia (NOCWA). NOCWA's office consisted of a small headquarters staff (one operations officer) at HMAS Stirling. Although the Royal Australia Navy had not complained "and probably will not," the U.S. DAO believed that the existing operating tempo placed a heavy burden on the small staff. He recommended that consideration be given to establishing a USN liaison officer in Western Australia.³

CINCPACFLT advised the Chief of Naval Operations that CINCPAC had requested that the matter be resolved as a Navy issue, and he asked the CNO to take the matter for action.⁴

1. CINCPAC 162245Z Dec 80 (U).
2. HQ PACAF 192330Z Dec 80 (S), DECL 3 Nov 87.
3. USDAO Canberra 160619Z May 80 (C), DECL 16 May 86, retransmitted as CINCPACFLT 112024Z Jun 80.
4. CINCPACFLT 201957Z Jul 80 (C), DECL 1 May 86.
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(U) In the overall matter of Defense Department manning in Canberra, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency advised CINCPAC on 8 August that during a visit to Australia it had been brought to his attention that the Ambassador had long had serious misgivings about the large U.S. military presence in Canberra and in the Embassy. He said that there were 41 DOD personnel, including 36 housed in the Embassy, within a total U.S. Embassy population of 115 American employees.¹

(U) The DIA Director proposed to convert the Assistant Air Attache slot to an Assistant Naval Attache position and post that officer in the U.S. Consulate in Perth to assist with U.S. ship visits to Western Australian ports, and to reassign one enlisted billet from the DAO to assist him with the visits.

(U) He also said it had occurred to him that the CINCPAC Representative (who was also the USAF Liaison Officer) and his office might be moved and accomplish his missions equally well, and perhaps more effectively, from a location other than Canberra, possibly Sydney. This would reduce DOD presence in the Embassy from 36 to 21. He said that if CINCPAC agreed that the proposals had merit, the matter would have to be studied in depth prior to a cooperative submission to the Ambassador for his consideration.²

(C) CINCPAC immediately concurred with the proposal to convert the Assistant Air Attache billet to an Assistant Naval Attache billet, with both that officer and an enlisted assistant reassigned to Perth. On 29 August he provided his thoughts about moving the CINCPACREP out of Canberra. (He had consulted the Air Force as all billets in question belonged to that Service.) He advised that he believed it inadvisable to relocate the functions away from Canberra. The office had to be in close proximity to agencies of the Australian Department of Defence for timely liaison, coordination, and discussions covering a wide range of issues and initiatives that were vital to U.S. defense interests. He believed that it was equally important to be close to the American Embassy, as many issues were politically sensitive and consultation with the Embassy staff was required. Relocation would be costly, a suitable facility would have to be leased at higher cost, establishment of communications and storage of classified material would pose problems, and arrangements for the assigned aircraft (being provided by the Royal Australian Air Force at no charge) would have to be developed. He summarized that he did not believe moving out of Canberra was beneficial under existing circumstances.³

1. DIA 082343Z Aug 80 (U)
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 190012Z Aug 80 (U); CINCPAC 292132Z Aug 80 (U).

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SECTION III--COMMAND AND CONTROL

(U) With the reorganization that created the Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate, certain activities, such as Command Center modernization, formerly discussed in this section, will now be discussed in the Command, Control, and Communications Systems chapter of this history. Activities of the Airborne Command Post have been incorporated in the Operations chapter.

Unified Command Plan Biennial Review

(U) The Unified Command Plan, published by the JCS, was the basic charter of the unified and specified commands. It was based on decisions made by the President and the Secretary of Defense. It outlined the areas and responsibilities of the various commands. Revisions to this plan, therefore, were the means by which commands were formed or disestablished, by which geographic boundaries were set, and by which basic missions were assigned. The last change to the plan had been effective 1 May 1976. In the biennial review conducted in 1978, emphasis had been on Sub-Sahara Africa, which remained unassigned in the Unified Command Plan. (The JCS retained planning responsibility for unassigned areas; the CINC of the Readiness Command, when tasked by the JCS, was responsible for contingency planning, joint task force headquarters, and forces for the conduct of operations in unassigned areas.) The CINCs of the Atlantic, European, Readiness, and Pacific Commands had not been in agreement in their recommendations regarding assignment of Africa and there had been no change in the Unified Command Plan following that review cycle.1

(U) On 9 January 1980 the JCS requested comments on changes that might be required to the Unified Command Plan. CINCPAC provided recommendations in February. On 7 August, however, the JCS advised that because of other, ongoing issues, the resolution of which might impact upon any recommended changes to the Unified Command Plan, the biennial review was being held in abeyance. On 27 October the JCS again opened the Unified Command Plan.2

(U) CINCPAC was briefed on 29 November on the comments and recommendations prepared by his staff and component commands. Admiral Long then provided guidance on the content he desired in the CINCPAC response to the JCS. On 2 December he submitted a list of nonsubstantive, editorial type comments and recommended changes.3

2. CINCPAC AIRBORNE 260257Z Feb 80 (S), REVW 25 Feb 99; JCS 071240Z Aug 80 (U).
3. J5624 H1stSum Nov 80 (U); CINCPAC 022116Z Dec 80 (C), REVW 26 Nov 86.
CINCPAC provided his substantive comments on 6 December. He noted that planning and the conduct of operations in the Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, and adjacent area had demonstrated that existing command arrangements, coordination, and liaison between the PACOM and European Command had been "excellent," and that the job could be accomplished without modification to the Unified Command Plan. There were, however, some adjustments that might facilitate future operations in those and other areas.\(^1\)

He believed that the Red Sea and Persian Gulf should be placed within the PACOM geographic area of responsibility. He said that experience gained in the Indian Ocean operations had demonstrated the complexity associated with conducting maritime operations in an area where responsibilities for the Persian Gulf/Red Sea and the Indian Ocean were split between the European and Pacific Commands. He believed that those maritime areas should be combined under a single commander in order to provide optimum naval support to land and air operations in the area, enhance command and control of naval forces, and provide for protection and control of the sea lines of communication. "In view of current I.O. responsibility, CINCPAC enjoys the most ready and assured access to these waters and provides the majority of naval forces which can be brought to bear. To this end, the assignment to CINCPAC of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea should now be formalized."\(^2\)

Secondly, CINCPAC said, "the present arrangements for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and the Southwest Asia region do not appear to be working as well as they should." The potential problems associated with continuity of command upon deployment of the RDJTF into Southwest Asia coupled with lack of resources (intelligence, communications, logistics, etc.) caused his recommendation for a review of the RDJTF Terms of Reference. CINCPAC said consideration should be given to assigning the RDJTF Operational Command, when involved in planning for or execution of a Southwest Asia mission, to either CINCPAC or CINCEUR. If NATO and European concerns could be accommodated, CINCEUR would appear to be the appropriate commander and there would appear to be no need to change the EUCOM-PACOM land boundary. If a decision was reached to place the RDJTF under CINCPAC Operational Command, adjustments in the assignment of geographic responsibility in the Southwest Asia region would be required.

CINCPAC said that thought had been given to establishment of a separate unified command for Southwest Asia, but the idea had been rejected. Although it might have some political appeal, a new theater commander with no significant land or air forces in the area, and little probability of establishing a shore-based headquarters, could be viewed as a hollow measure and lead to

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1. CINCPAC 060423Z Dec 80 (S), REVW 5 Dec 86.
2. Ibid.
The European Command’s recommendations were somewhat different. That command recommended that future planning for deployment and employment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force be such that it would become a subordinate unified command of the EUCOM when deployed to Southwest Asia. He recommended that his command be assigned construction responsibility for Somalia and Kenya.

Ibid.
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He believed that assignment of Subsaharan Africa to a CINC for normal operations was not necessary, but that modifications to the Unified Command Plan should be limited to changes that would reflect EUCOM responsibilities in Africa south of the Sahara for Security Assistance, indications and warning, and facilities construction.  

(U) No change was made in the Unified Command Plan in 1980.

(C) The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was formally established on 1 March 1980 under the Operational Command of the CINC of the U.S. Readiness Command at MacDill AFB, Florida.

GAO Report on PACOM Headquarters

(U) On 11 September 1979 the JCS advised CINCPAC that the General Accounting Office planned to review the role of CINCPAC and his unified command. The review was expected to be completed in January 1980. The focus of the review was to be on missions, specific tasks and functions of CINCPAC's organization; the personnel structure of CINCPAC in Hawaii and throughout the Pacific; the cost of maintaining CINCPAC; and CINCPAC's involvement in training and other tasks, of which contingency planning, crisis management, and relationships with the JCS and the Services were examples.

(U) On 23 February 1980 CINCPAC advised his component and subordinate unified commanders that the GAO exit conference was scheduled for 10 March and invited their participation.

(U) The final report, "The Roles, Missions, and Relationships of Pacific Command Headquarters," was finally published on 18 August 1980. The report had been prepared for submission to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives. The transmitting letter stated that the GAO was unable to estimate staff savings that might be realized in the PACOM under various restructuring plans, as requested, because of the time available to complete the assignment and, more importantly, "because of the unclear role of the command in contingency or wartime conditions." We are recommending, the GAO said, that the Secretary of Defense fully define the desired role of the command under such conditions, and once

1. USCINCEUR 041530Z Dec 80 (S), DECL 1 Dec 86.
2. USCINCRE 010000Z Feb 80 (U).
3. JCS 3939/112138Z Sep 79 (C), DECL 11 Sep 85.
4. CINCPAC 230407Z Feb 80 (U).
that was accomplished, undertake a functional analysis of the PACOM to determine its appropriate organization structure and size.\(^{1}\)

(U) Their conclusions and recommendations following this 1980 study were as follows. Basically, they said, the unified command in the Pacific was an extension of the JCS. "As such, it performs a number of useful functions that, if not done in Hawaii, would be done elsewhere." They did believe, however, that the Defense Department had the opportunities to streamline and restructure the organization to more efficiently carry out its normal operations. Since the establishment of the unified command structure, the role of the unified commands had changed considerably. "In the Pacific, the unified commands' role has changed from that of primary responsibility for prosecuting a war to one of providing 'support and coordination,' a vague term DOD has not formally defined." They said CINCPAC had defined it as those actions that aided, complemented, or sustained a command in accordance with directives and agreements and provided for congruity of actions, goals, and objectives. Until that support and coordination role was clearly defined and the functions that PACOM could and should perform during a crisis or wartime situation were identified, the GAO considered it "difficult, if not impossible" to insure that the command was properly sized and functions were being done at the appropriate locations within the chain of command.

\(^{(S)}\) The GAO said that careful consideration should be given to the existing Army structure, particularly with regard to ongoing efforts to reestablish a U.S. Army Pacific headquarters. Such action, they said, would require establishing a separate Eighth U.S. Army headquarters and U.S. Forces Korea headquarters to replace the single integrated organization. Also there were potentially adverse political ramifications (a perception of reduced U.S. commitments in both Japan and Korea) if the plan was implemented. "Further, the WESTCOM Expanded Relations Program should be reviewed." (The Expanded Army Relations program had been designed to increase Army-to-Army contacts with friendly foreign governments in the wake of declining Army presence in the theater; it was in addition to the Army unit exchange programs that WESTCOM participated in.) The GAO said that the initiation and operation of the ERP raised questions as to whether certain aspects of the program should not more appropriately be performed in support of and under the supervision of the CINCPAC Security Assistance mission.

(U) The report recommended that the Secretary of Defense:

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- Fully define and incorporate the wartime responsibilities of the unified command in the Pacific into the Unified Command Plan during the ongoing review.

- Perform a functional analysis of the existing unified command structure on a vertical basis to insure that missions and functions were optimally staffed and located in the chain of command.

- Reexamine GAO previous recommendations on consolidating and streamlining Service headquarters in the Pacific.

- Fully examine the pros and cons of the need for a Pacific-wide component headquarters for the Army in Hawaii.

- Establish safeguards to prevent the possible circumvention of personnel ceilings that could occur by transferring personnel into nonmanagement activities, such as PACOPS. (PACOPS was a unit activated and assigned to PACAF headquarters in September 1979 to perform combat-related functions to maintain the combat readiness of PACAF and to deploy, employ, and execute combat air operations within the PACOM. PACOPS performed a considerable amount of work for PACAF headquarters, according to the GAO, which believed that although PACAF did not consider PACOPS to be part of the management headquarters, PACOPS performed certain functions a management headquarters staff normally performed.)

1. Ibid.
SECTION IV--U.S. FORCES AND BASHING OVERSEAS

Increased Access to Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea Littoral Bases

(S) CINCPAC's area of responsibility included the Indian Ocean east of 17 degrees east longitude, including the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf of Aden. The western land boundary was at the Afghanistan-Iran border. Use of military facilities in other countries in Southwest Asia and Northeast Africa by PACOM forces was increasing, however, and CINCPAC was involved actively in planning for access to such facilities. In December 1979 and January 1980 teams representing the State and Defense Departments visited Kenya, Somalia, and Oman for preliminary negotiations and initial surveys. (CINCPACFLT P-3s, however, had been operating once a week to Seeb International Airport, Oman, since 3 June 1979; P-3s had been using Kenya airfields since 1977. CINCPACFLT and Mid-East Force ships called at numerous ports in the area.)

2. JCS 161718Z Feb 80 (S), referenced in USCINCEUR 041802Z Mar 80 (S), DECL 2 Mar 86.
3. SECSTATE 057430/01/032353Z Mar 80 (C), GDS 3/3/86.

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Earlier, the JCS had requested that CINCPAC components begin processing port visit requests and initiate actions to establish and use logistic airheads in the three countries, and that PACAF and WESTCOM participate in a PACOM team visit to the area in view of projected Air Force and Army involvement. USCINCEUR, who had been asked to concur that PACOM take the lead to accomplish air lines of communication arrangements, provided his thoughts to the JCS and CINCPAC on 4 March. He noted that Oman was assigned to the European Command in the Unified Command Plan and that he had been assigned responsibility for Security Assistance in Africa south of the Sahara (21 nations in FY 81). He had accepted from the Defense Intelligence Agency the primary responsibility for indications and warning through Africa south of the Sahara. He said that while forces in the Indian Ocean region were principally under CINCPAC Operational Control and air lines of communication and air terminal capabilities would be in support of PACOM forces, that EUCOM have the lead, not PACOM, in light of support required for a permanent force in the region, expected deployments from and through the EUCOM, and shorter and more accessible lines of communication.3

1. J5323 HistSum Mar 80, DECL 1 Apr 86; CINCPAC 120322Z Mar 80 (S), DECL 11 Mar 86.
2. CINCPAC 260343Z Mar 80 (S), DECL 24 Mar 86.
3. USCINCEUR 041802Z Mar 80 (S), DECL 2 Mar 86.
On 27 March the JCS advised that negotiations had not yet culminated in final bilateral agreements, even though limited access had begun. They said it was important that progress already achieved not be compromised through premature approaches to those countries. Pending completion of such formal agreements, requests for access over and above routine, already established, day-to-day operations would have to be cleared through the Office of the Secretary of Defense and State Department.1

On 24 April the JCS advised that ad referendum agreements on the use of facilities in Oman and Kenya by U.S. Armed Forces had been initiated by representatives of the respective governments. The JCS cautioned that both the fact that such agreements existed and the contents of those agreements were classified. Further, all concerned should be aware that the Kenyans and Omanis were particularly concerned about potential leaks of the agreement details.2

The JCS provided some guidelines. Regarding Oman, at the airports of Masirah, Khasab (to be developed in the Musandam Peninsula by the United States with FY 81 funds for C-130 operations), and Thumrait (in Dhofar), the United States might conduct such peacetime activities as visitation, support, transit, exercises, and staging for combat activities. The United States might also use Port Raysut, near Salalah, for such activities. The Government of Oman attached special importance to Seeb and Salalah airports and Port Qaboos. In principle, the agreement made Salalah (like Seeb) available for exercises and also for contingency operations. In practice, however, the Omanis were not going to approve exercises at those locations, but they would permit their use in a contingency. (This was defined in the agreement as "staging of U.S. armed forces into or through Oman for the purpose of preparing for or conducting combat operations in situations involving threats to the security of Oman or to peace and security in the area.") When signed, the agreement was to exempt U.S. ships and aircraft from landing fees and all other charges that did not constitute compensation for services rendered and received. Negotiations continued to work out a fair-share contribution to operations and maintenance costs of common-use facilities. The Government of Oman did not want the United States to provide security forces for aircraft or facilities on Omani soil. Omani security forces would be used. The government did agree to the U.S. request to permit a permanent U.S. military presence of up to 100 personnel at Masirah. If more personnel were needed, or needed to be stationed somewhere else in Oman, the United States would need to ask for permission.

1. JCS 6535/270047Z Mar 80 (S), DECL 25 Mar 86.
2. JCS 3103/240627Z Apr 80 (S), DECL 22 Apr 86.
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(5) The JCS asked CINCPAC to begin planning for the shift of flights from Seeb; the goal was to show some progress "in the very near future in order to assure the Omanis that we are responsive to their concern."

(5) Regarding Kenya, the JCS continued, the ad referendum agreement covered use and improvement by the United States Forces of facilities at the air and sea port of Mombasa, and the airports at Nairobi and Nanyuki, and such other locations as may be agreed. The Kenyans had not placed significant operational restrictions on U.S. requested use of Kenyan facilities.

(5) The JCS concluded with some cautionary notes. The Omanis and Kenyans had undertaken military access agreements with the United States "to help us improve our strategic presence and capability." They did so at some potential diplomatic cost to themselves, and were particularly concerned over the future level and tone of publicity about U.S. military activities within their borders. Visiting units and personnel in Oman and Kenya "must continue to be sensitive to the national pride and concept of two-way partnership with which these nations are entering a new relationship with the USG. We can anticipate that many people will be wary and even suspicious of our presence until our attitudes and conduct have been judged both in the region and in our personal relationships in the respective countries." ¹

(5) When Admiral Long received the JCS message he requested that his staff prepare a plan of action and milestones on the subject. Objectives were to adjust operations in Oman to comply with JCS guidance and to develop concepts for fleet support, logistic support, and intelligence support using Oman and Kenya facilities, expand exercise programs in those countries as much as possible, and develop CINCPAC facility construction recommendations for submission to the JCS.²

(5) Important milestones were set as follows. By 15 June develop a refined concept of operations for fleet support, fleet logistics support, and expanded P-3/EP-3 operations. By 15 July conduct site surveys to develop revised construction requirements and identify facility requirements for an expanded exercise program. By 25 July to develop exercise proposals for forwarding to the JCS. Lastly, by 15 August to submit facility construction recommendations to the JCS for surge and peacetime use of facilities.³

1. Ibid.
2. J5325 HistSum May 80 (S), DECL 22 Apr 80.
3. Ibid.
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(C) The sensitivities of all the countries in the region were matters of continuing concern. An official of Abu Dhabi, discussing U.S. military posture and proposed Mid-East Force upkeep visit to Dubai, commented on "all the publicity emanating from Washington these days about the US buildup." He said that many of his colleagues were sincerely worried about it. "By this self-inflicting harm the US is making itself an ever-broader target for those who have other reasons for wanting to make us out as big threat to Gulf security. Everyday it seems there is a story, often front-paged, about so and so many American warships headed east through the Suez Canal, another 1,800 Marines loaded for bear and seeking handy beaches for maneuvers, large arrays of military equipment looking for a handy storage country. Why all these theatrics? Couldn't we cut down on official statements and somehow keep the press more in line -- and in tune with the peaceful reality on the Arab side of the Gulf?"

(S) The agreement with Somalia was signed in Washington on 22 August. Implied in the agreement was the position that a U.S. military presence at Somali facilities was a tangible expression of U.S. interest in Somalia's independence and integrity. The Somali Government was told that the United States would view any direct threat to Somalia with "serious concern" and would consult promptly with the Somali Government on an appropriate reaction. The United States obtained authorization to use the facilities at the air and sea ports at Berbera and Mogadishu, and such other locations as may be agreed, for visitation, support, transit, exercises, the staging of U.S. forces, the bunkering of ships, refueling of aircraft, accommodation of personnel, communication, navigation, supply, storage, and other military purposes. A Defense Department survey team was to be dispatched to Somalia, and CINCPAC requested that a PACOM representative be included in the team as PACOM forces would constitute one of the primary users of Somalian facilities.

(U) As a United Press report from Berbera noted following the agreement, it had been nearly three years since several thousand Soviet advisers and experts had been expelled from the nearby "Moscow Village." Britain, the colonial power in both Northern Somalia and Southern Yemen before independence, had recognized early that Aden and Berbera were strategically linked: "Nowadays it is the 15,000-foot airstrip, the longest in Africa, plus the port and fuel facilities which makes Berbera such a valuable bargaining chip to the two superpowers." The UPI writer said that on a recent day when the temperature crept above 1150 and Berbera's few tarmac roads became "as mushy as porridge."

1. AMEMB Abu Dhabi 1771/2309502 Jul 80 (C), GDS 7/23/86.
2. J5614 HistSum Sep 80 (C), REVW 13 Sep 86; JCS 112026Z Sep 80 (S), DECL 28 Aug 86; CINCPAC 151813Z Sep 80 (C), REVW 13 Sep 86.

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the proprietor of a small store did a brisk trade by selling icy Coca Colas from a deep freezer. "No other shop in Berbera has electricity," he said.  

A Kenyan official said his country was not pleased with the Somali-United States agreement, especially as Somalia had not renounced claims to Kenyan territory, but it hoped that the United States would be able to play a restraining influence. He said that Kenya was coming under increasing "heat" from its nonaligned friends over its agreement with the United States and wanted it clearly understood that it did not wish to be dragged into a Soviet-U.S. conflict.  

As noted above, CINCPAC had requested that a member of his staff participate in the Defense Department team visit to Somalia, which occurred 9 to 13 November. State Department briefings prior to the trip had stressed that increased use of force in the Ogaden would jeopardize U.S.-Somalia relationships; Kenya, as noted above, was suspicious about U.S. dealings with Somalia; the unfavorable stance of the House of Representatives Foreign Operations Subcommittee toward Somalia probably would preclude certain items, such as offensive-type weapons, from being purchased with FMS credits. The team would not be permitted to deliver the report to the Somali; they were to advise the Somali that the United States had not finished considerations on the report, but they could address the findings.  

The team first met in Nairobi with Embassy officials. Kenya had questioned U.S. judgment and trustworthiness as a result of the agreement with Somalia and there were hints they might reduce their cooperation with the United States. The Ambassador believed that consecutive stops of U.S. aircraft or vessels between Kenya and Somalia would be a mistake. The United States would be forced to treat the two countries separately, with no flights between the two. Also, overflight rights would probably never be given by the Kenyan Government to deliver equipment into Somalia. The Ambassador said that the people of Kenya saw Ethiopia as a friend and Somalia as an enemy.  

The team met with Somali officials in Mogadishu and with U.S. Embassy officials. Strengths and weaknesses of the Somali Armed Forces as assessed by the Military Survey Team were discussed. Considerable time was then devoted to explaining Foreign Military Sales procedures and viewing sample FMS cases. The Somali were accustomed to the Russian procedure of off-the-shelf delivery and did not readily understand lead time and associated FMS cost factors.

2. AMEMB Nairobi 16983/080910Z Sep 80 (C), GDS 9/8/86.
"Nor could they readily comprehend that we were not going to select the material that would be purchased with their credits, but that they would have the choice of asking for specific equipment and we would then advise them whether they could purchase it or not, even if it was available."  

Meanwhile, efforts to improve military capability to operate in Kenya, Somalia, and Oman continued with construction planning. On 20 October the Ambassador in Nairobi expressed concern over a lack of coordination of construction progress and policy development. Referencing a message from the Naval Engineering Command Atlantic requesting country clearance for Navy personnel to visit Kenya to begin implementation discussions with the Government of Kenya, the Ambassador said, "Whoa, the 'construction cart' is getting way out in front of the 'policy horse.'" He had several questions regarding planned facilities that he wanted answered before "we can welcome" the Navy team.  

On 25 October USCINCEUR noted that the area had not been assigned to a single unified commander and reiterated his view that the European Command should be assigned responsibility for construction planning and execution to avoid the recurrence of such problems.  

At about this same time CINCPACFLT provided CINCPAC with a concept of operations for support of naval forces in Kenya.  

On 7 November CINCPAC provided his thoughts on facilities responsibility to the JCS. He said that a primary ingredient in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia facility planning was to enhance capabilities and resolve shortcomings and problems associated with lack of basing posture. In a contingency, the Indian Ocean littoral facilities would support forces from the European and Pacific Commands and possibly the U.S. Readiness Command. "As host nations at present have turned away from a permanent U.S. presence, U.S. capabilities will consist of rapidly deployable ground and land-based TACAIR coupled with a significant naval presence." He noted that the Naval Facilities Engineering Command had been designated construction agent for Kenya and Somalia and the Navy was the host Service for Mombasa, Berbera, and Mogadishu. With these facts in mind, he said that CINCPAC should have the primary responsibility for planning, reviewing, and prioritizing requirements for Kenya and Somalia.

1. Ibid.  
3. USCINCEUR 251122Z Oct 80 (C), DECL 24 Oct 86.  
4. CINCPACFLT 252130Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 16 May 86.
Close coordination with USCINCEUR and proper use of established lines of communication with host nations and Embassies and Country Teams should avoid problems such as those outlined by the Ambassador in Nairobi on 20 October. CINCPAC concurred that USCINCEUR should have primary responsibility for Oman, and CINCPAC would continue to develop, refine, and submit requirements for those facilities on Oman that supported PACOM forces. No decision had been made in Washington by the end of the year about assignment of the African areas.  

(S) In one other action concerning Africa, earlier in the year, in March, the JCS had requested brief comments on the desirability, possible utilization, required construction, and costs related to possible U.S. use of Sudan facilities. CINCPAC transmitted his comments on 1 April. He said that possible uses included Army staging areas, tactical airlift and fighter staging bases, and capability to operate airborne intelligence platforms, such as the RC-135 and P-3/EP-3. Additional comments cited the desirability of redundant facility access in the area.  

**Forces and Basing in Korea**

(U) The drastic withdrawals of U.S. ground forces from Korea that had been promised by President Carter did not take place. By mid-1979 the Administration had decided that the idea would be reexamined in 1981, at which time a review of the situation would pay special attention to restoration of a satisfactory North-South military balance and evidence of tangible progress toward a reduction of tensions on the peninsula. There were no significant changes in U.S. Forces or basing in 1980; planned 1981 withdrawals are discussed later under this subject heading.  

(U) What did take place in the Republic of Korea in 1980 was a major transition in the leadership of that country. The turbulence began on 26 October 1979 when President Park Chung-hee was shot and killed by the chief of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. Park had been president since 15 October 1963. Prime Minister Choi Kyu-hah was named acting president and martial law was declared (excluding Cheju-do). On the night of 12 December 1979, General Chung Seung-hwa, Army Chief of Staff and Martial Law Commander, was arrested and charged with complicity in the murder of Park. The next day the National Security Command arrested seven more senior military officers for possible

1. CINCPAC 072251Z Nov 80 (S), DECL 6 Nov 86.  
2. J5323 HistSum Mar 80 (S), DECL 19 Mar 86; CINCPAC 010315Z Apr 80 (S), DECL 31 Mar 86.  
connection with the Park killing. Both of these arrest incidents were directed
by Army Major General Chun Doo Hwan, head of the Defense Security Command and
chief investigator into the assassination. A news dispatch from Seoul on
15 December cited "sources close to the Korean military" as saying that the
United States had protested the use of troops under joint command in the
seizure of "at least 16 generals and aides." The source reported that the
troops were under Chun's command and that he had ignored the established
command lines of the Combined Forces Command. Chun had moved elements of
the ROK Army 9th Division and other units to take military control of the
key facilities in Seoul. The troops were redeployed in violation of the
Combined Forces Command charter. ROK Minister of Defense Ro Jae-hyun had
been removed from the Cabinet.1

(U) On 13 December the United States issued warnings to both Koreas.
Seoul was told, according to the Associated Press, that any further moves in
"a power struggle between rival military factions" would have adverse impact
on ROK-U.S. relations. Pyongyang was again cautioned not to try to exploit
the situation in the South. Martial law remained in effect through the end
of the year.2

(c) In early January 1980 President Carter dispatched a letter to
President Choi, who had been inaugurated in December 1979. He said it would
be the policy of the U.S. Government to assist him and his government in every
appropriate way as they undertook the tasks of political reconciliation and
constitutional change. He said, referring to the events in the Mid-East and
Afghanistan, "Neither our capacity nor our determination to support our friends
and allies in East Asia has been diminished by our concerns elsewhere." He
said he was pleased North Korea had not acted belligerently during the weeks
of transition. Then he addressed the events of 12-13 December, which he said
"deeply distressed" him. He said that Ambassador Gleysteen and General Wickham
had made it clear to the President and senior members of the Korean Government
why the United States had been so concerned over strife within the Korean Army.
He warned of the results of such divisiveness.3

(c) The President continued, "I have been particularly disquieted by the
breach of the chain of command in the ROK Army. General Wickham has already
discussed our concern with former Minister Ro and now with Minister Choo
/Young-bock/, but I wish personally to emphasize to you the serious implications
of the breach of responsibility entrusted to the Combined Forces Commander

2. U.S. Forces Korea Chronology 1 Jan-31 Dec 79 (U), p.46.
3. SECSTATE 9490/090318Z Jan 80 (C)(EX), GDS 1/8/86.

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by both of our governments and the dangerous precedent set by the direct actions taken by some ROK officers outside the normal military framework. The Combined Forces Command is a critical element in our mutual cooperation for the defense of Korea. Any further disregard for these arrangements and the commitments they embody would have serious consequences for our close cooperation." President Carter said he hoped President Choi would convey his sense of profound concern to his colleagues.1

(S/NOFORN) In a series of what appeared to be carefully planned moves, Chun Doo Hwan was promoted to Lieutenant General and simultaneously held the dual power positions of Commander of the Defense Security Command and Acting Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. Then he was appointed Chairman of a 30-man Special Committee for National Security Measures, a committee composed of both civilian and military leaders that was formed by President Choi to advise him on both domestic and security measures. This committee had, in effect, emasculated the ROK National Assembly.2

(C) Because of these power moves by the military and public perception of stagnated movement toward a more democratic government, the ROK experienced severe civilian disorder during the period March to May, culminating in the seizure of the city of Kwang-ju by protestors.3

(G) Late in March, therefore, General Wickham directed the staffs of the UNC/CFC/U.S. Forces Korea/Eighth U.S. Army to increase their vigilance. They were to monitor situations or conditions that had the potential for leading to a major incident, increase counter-infiltration detection measures, and increase local security and anti-sabotage measures at military facilities and installations. CINCPAC immediately requested that forces in the Korean area not under the Operational Control of General Wickham take measures similar to those COMUS Korea had directed.4

(U) As the unrest continued and heightened, on 17 May the Martial Law Command extended martial law to all areas of the ROK. All political activities were banned to include indoor and outdoor assemblies for political purposes and demonstrations. Press and radio censorship was imposed. All universities were closed, desertion from jobs was prohibited, as was the "spreading of groundless rumors."5

1. Ibid.
2. J5111 Point Paper (S/NF), 18 Jun 80, Subj: Military-Political Assessment-Korea (U), DECL 30 Jun 86. 00-02
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 28023Z Mar 80 (S), DECL 28 Mar 86.
5. CINCUNC/CFC/USFK/EUSA 171845Z May 80 (U).
(U) The U.S. State Department issued a statement expressing deep concern about the civil strife in Kwang-ju and urged all parties involved to exercise maximum restraint and search for a peaceful settlement. The statement reiterated that the U.S. Government would "react strongly in accordance with its treaty obligations to any external attempt to exploit the situation in the Republic of Korea."1

(U) Before order was restored there had been over 100 deaths, with more rioters injured or detained.

(TS) The student riots and civil unrest in Korea caused the JCS to task CINCPAC to provide an updated Commander's Estimate and a prioritized listing of early actions to improve combat capabilities in Korea using the following cases: Case A was an attack by North Korea, Case B was massive infiltration by North Korea, and Case C was a complete breakdown of internal order in the ROK. The JCS also asked CINCPAC to provide his comments on a list of key indicators being used by the Defense Intelligence Agency to monitor events in Korea. On 30 and 31 May CINCPAC provided the requested listing of early actions under the three cases and on 2 June provided his comments and additions to the key indicators list used by the DIA in monitoring ongoing events.2

(TS) He forwarded an updated Commander's Estimate for those three cases on 11 June. He noted that the attention directed at the events in Korea in the preceding weeks had allowed him to reexamine our commitment to the defense of that country. He said the departure point for the development of the estimate had focused on two aspects of Korea planning. The first was OPLAN 5027 and stated U.S. policy for the defense of the ROK. The second centered on recent events in other parts of the PACOM and JCS guidance that "the activity in Korea cannot be viewed in isolation from the events of Southwest Asia."3

(TS) CINCPAC recommended the following actions, noting that the effort to prepare these papers was a good exercise that allowed his staff to revalidate many of the planning factors. He said that the use of the 5027 OPLANS constituted the best method to meet the North Korean threat and conduct a successful defense of the ROK. He said that caution should be exercised before actively committing "our primary battle forces in response to ROK civil unrest." He recommended that active steps be taken to turn around

1. SECSTATE 134359/22153BZ May 80 (U).
2. J5211 HistSum May 80 (TS), REVW 9 Jun 00, which cited CINCPAC 30024BZ and 310257Z May 80.
3. CINCPAC 112250Z Jun 80 (TS), REVW 29 May 00, REAS 2-301C(6).
the revised MAC utilization rates and the adverse effect those rates would have on the 5027 OPLANs. Finally, he noted that the FY 80 CINCPAC OPLAN 5027, which should arrive at the JCS in June, be afforded expeditious review and approval in order to realize the benefits of the most recent planning information for the defense of the ROK.  

(S) The JCS concurred that under assumptions contained in 5027 it was the best alternative for defense of the ROK, but they expressed concern that those assumptions would not accurately describe the real scenario at the time of North Korean aggression. "Other concerns are limited forces and logistics to meet potential worldwide conflicts of varying priority."  

(S) On 7 June CINCPAC, again following the pattern set by General Wickham, decreased requirements for vigilance. During the whole episode U.S. Forces remained at Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) IV, which was the normal DEFCON for Korea. On 9 July CINCPAC canceled a 96-hour aircraft carrier battle group contingency response posture that he had ordered in November 1979. CINCPACFLT was authorized to return to normal readiness posture the carrier battle groups that had been affected.  

(U) President Choi resigned on 16 August and General Chun Doo Hwan retired from the Army just before his unopposed election as president; he was inaugurated on 1 September. A constitutional referendum held on 22 October resulted in a record 95.6 percent turnout of those eligible to vote with 91.9 percent voting "yes" for the new constitution. "Purification" drives took place throughout almost all segments of ROK society with thousands of civilian and military personnel resigning their positions or retiring. In many cases they surrendered their accumulated wealth to the government.  

(U) One other political matter that the United States watched closely involved Kim Dae Jung. He had been a long-time opposition leader in Korea. On 29 February 1980 he had had his "civil rights" reinstated in an amnesty announcement by President Choi, that also concerned 686 others. Subsequently he was tried and convicted on sedition charges and on 17 September he was sentenced to death. He appealed to the Korean Supreme Court. The United States State Department had called the charges "far-fetched" and Secretary of State Muskie called the death sentence "extreme." While the sentence was

1. Ibid.  
2. JCS 3783/231625Z Jun 80 (S), DECL 18 Jun 86.  
3. CINCPAC 070307Z Jun 80 (S), DECL 6 Jun 86; CINCPAC 090515Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 8 Jul 86.  
under court review both President Carter and President-elect Reagan had sent word to Chun Doo Hwan regarding the death sentence. U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown made a brief stop in Korea in December to reiterate U.S. Government concerns. The Administration had made it clear to Seoul even before the original death sentence that killing Kim would have the most serious consequences for U.S.-ROK relations. President Chun was expected to make the final ruling. The appeal was in progress at the end of the year.¹

(⁵) Security Consultative Committee Meeting XIII (SCM) was to have been held in Los Angeles on 18 and 19 June, with the Military Committee Meeting one day earlier, but SCM XIII was postponed indefinitely in April 1980 after Chun was appointed Acting Chief of the KCIA. The United States viewed his appointment as an unacceptable mixing of civilian and military power positions in Korea. No SCM was held in 1980.²

(⁶) Planning regarding 1981 U.S. Forces withdrawals from Korea continued in 1980. Prior to such withdrawals, a 120-day advance notice to Congress was required. On 15 July the JCS tasked CINCPAC for input to that report, and CINCPAC asked COMUS Korea to forward the requested information to include projected unit activations and reductions and prioritized justification of manpower spaces that he desired to retain.³

(⁶) COMUS Korea's response of 26 August proposed a 1981 space reduction of 806 spaces. The majority of those spaces (767) were contained in the 1st Battalion, 2d Air Defense Artillery (Improved HAWK), whose inactivation and turnover of equipment to the ROK Army had been approved in March 1980. Additionally, COMUS Korea proposed the reduction of 39 other support and headquarters spaces. He also forwarded justification for the retention of 748 spaces and a subsequent upward adjustment of the Army manpower ceiling in the ROK.⁴

(⁶) CINCPAC, on 30 August, concurred with the proposed content and timing of the 1981 troop withdrawals. In addition, CINCPAC supported COMUS Korea's need for retention of manpower spaces within the Army structure in the ROK in order to permit required force modernizations, combat support, and intelligence capability improvements. CINCPAC further recommended that the

1. Ibid.
3. J5321 HistSum Aug 80 (S), DECL 11 Jul 86; JCS 6494/151714Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 11 Jul 86; CINCPAC 020016Z Aug 80 (S), DECL 1 Aug 86.
4. COMUSKOREA 260200Z Aug 80 (S), DECL Aug 86.
approval of the Secretary of Defense be sought, either as a separate initiative or as an adjunct to the 120-day report to Congress, for retention of spaces and subsequent adjustment of the manpower ceiling.¹

Combined Forces Command Assessment and Improvement Program (Project SORAK)

(S)—On 2 October CINCPAC informed the Chairman of the JCS, the Service Chiefs, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and his component commands of Project SORAK. He advised that this was a study he had initiated in coordination with COMUS Korea that would assess the capabilities and limitations of the Combined Forces Command combat forces and make recommendations concerning materiel, weapons, munitions, and organizational improvements. The project was funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and was being worked by three contractors, the Santa Fe Corporation, the System Planning Corporation, and BDM. The contractor effort would be coordinated by a steering group with CINCPAC, DARPA, and COMUS Korea membership and chaired by COMUS Korea. Additionally, a group, termed the North Asia Assessment Group, would also pull upon the expertise of appropriate Government laboratory and agency representatives, defense consultants, and representatives of defense contractors to insure the latest information for the study. The Project SORAK contract was promulgated on 1 August.²

(U) The name Project SORAK, incidentally, was not an acronym, but the name of Mount Sorak, a prominent mountain peak in the Republic of Korea.³

(U) CINCPAC outlined highlights of the study effort in his 2 October message. Project SORAK continued through the end of the year.⁴

I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group

(S)—As COMUS Korea had noted in a message to CINCPAC in August 1976, historians "will have some difficulty interpreting the record of USG decisions on the tenure" of the I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group. It had come into being in mid-1971, as a transitional command structure with an authorized life span of 18 months, at the end of which time it was to be replaced by a ROK field army. Political considerations were predominant in setting that terminal date. In

1. CINCPAC 300134Z Aug 80 (S), DECL 28 Aug 86.
2. J5111 HistSums Jun-Aug 80 (U); J5113 HistSum Oct 80 (S), DECL 30 Nov 86; CINCPAC 022055Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 30 Sep 86.
4. CINCPAC 022055Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 30 Sep 86.
1972 compelling military reasons prompted the JCS to recommend, and secure approval for, the continuance of that command for as long as a U.S. division was based in Korea. Within two years, however, military logic had given way to pressures for reduction of senior headquarters and general officer spaces. The rapid disestablishment of the group was decreed and the ROK Government informed. Phase-out preparations had been well underway when the imminent fall of South Vietnam and resultant ROK concerns combined to cause the United States to reverse its field and direct a standdown of all actions to disestablish the group. It became self-evident that the next review of the future of the group should be very deliberate, should weigh all political and military considerations, and should be in the context of overall U.S. policies toward the ROK.¹

On 13 December 1979 COMUS Korea requested authority to change the designation of the U.S. Army Element, I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group Headquarters to Combined Field Army (ROK/U.S.) to reflect more accurately the magnitude of the mission inherent in exercising command and control of the field army size organization. He noted that the request involved a change in designation only. There was to be no alteration of the ongoing mission, organization, authority or grade structure. He recommended retention of I Corps unit colors and associated memorabilia in Korea. He concluded that ROK authorities strongly supported this proposal. CINCPAC advised the JCS that he had no objection to the COMUS Korea request.²

On 5 February 1980 the JCS approved the Army unit redesignation. Then, on 13 March, the JCS advised of redesignation of the I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group. They congratulated the officers and men as the group was redesignated the Combined Field Army (ROK/U.S.). "This new unit title more accurately reflects the scope of command responsibility and the magnitude of the mission and continues the tradition of ROK/US cooperation and combined efforts to maintain peace."³

Ceremonies marking the redesignation were held in Korea on 14 March.⁴

Combined Forces Command

The Combined Forces Command had been established in Korea in 1978. Following the Twelfth Security Consultative Meeting in October 1979 the ROK

1. CINCUNC/COMUSK 161025Z Aug 76 (S), GDS-82.
2. COMUS Korea 130815Z Dec 79 (C), DECL 13 Dec 85; CINCPAC 220523Z Dec 79 (U).
3. JCS 5548/051943Z Feb 80 (C), DECL 4 Feb 86; JCS 4125/132333Z Mar 80 (U).

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Defense Minister and the U.S. Secretary of Defense agreed to seek ways to increase even further the responsibilities and effectiveness of the CFC. The Secretary of Defense directed a review of options for closer peacetime and wartime integration of U.S. and Korean combat capability within the CFC structure, with an instruction to specifically examine command arrangements including peacetime operational control of combat units.¹

*(E/NOFORN)* In assessing that range of options the study was to identify all significant constraints and pros and cons to include the impact on component command and regional security relationships for the options considered. On 28 November 1979 CINCPAC requested that his component and subordinate unified commands and his staff provide identification of problems experienced with the CFC organization that indicated a need for closer integration of U.S. and Korean combat capability, and to identify options for redressing each problem so identified. The submissions were consolidated at CINCPAC Headquarters and distributed for further review on 18 December.²

*(S)* An action officer level study group attended by representatives of the component commands, the Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea, and CINCPAC convened at CINCPAC Headquarters from 4 to 17 January 1980 to conduct the assessment. During the course of the study, several of the issues or problems and their options were dropped from consideration. The issue of peacetime Operational Control of U.S. combat forces was originally tasked by the JCS. In view of the 12 December 1979 domestic events in Korea (Chun Doo Hwan's arrests of senior Army officers that propelled him into power), CINCPAC and COMUS Korea, with the concurrence of the Chairman of the JCS, determined that consideration of that issue was inappropriate at the time. Several issues identified by the study group were deemed to be within the purview of CINCPAC, who had already initiated a number of command actions in the functional areas of planning and organization. The PACAF representatives identified two additional initiatives that appeared to offer potential merit for enhancing CFC effectiveness, but those were not examined by the study group because of their complex nature and time constraints. Both would be addressed in separate actions within appropriate command and staff channels. Of the issues and problems considered, the study group developed a total of 18 recommendations for JCS consideration, which were submitted on 8 February. Additional recommendations were developed by the study group for consideration and appropriate command and staff action within the PACOM.³

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2. JS61 Hist Sum Mar 80 (S/NF), REVW 10 Apr 00; CINCPAC 180035Z Dec 79 (TS/NF), REVW Dec 87.
3. Ibid.
(U) The CINCPAC recommendations of 8 February will be outlined, followed by JCS comments or concurrences on each as provided on 16 May, followed in turn by the comments or concurrences of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as provided to the JCS on 23 October (and to CINCPAC on 11 November).1

(C) First, CINCPAC addressed organization and manning.

...Recommend that existing command arrangements remain unaltered. Command chains and channels of communications are complex, but properly established in accordance with existing agreements and organization needs. If understood and adhered to, they will accommodate the requirements of all concerned.

The JCS concurred. The Secretary of Defense did not comment on this subject.

(C) Next, CINCPAC recommended that the CFC be provided with a full-time USAF O-9 Chief of Staff and an O-9 as Commander Air Component Command. The existing arrangement had one person assigned as both, an arrangement that required that he be at two different locations during times of crisis. CINCPAC provided rationale regarding the grade levels he recommended. He said that if an additional USAF O-9 was not available, the arrangement for peacetime operations could be modified so that the incumbent USAF O-9 could continue as a full-time Chief of Staff for CFC while fulfilling his responsibilities as the air component commander (similar to the arrangement by which the CINCCFC functioned as commander of the ground component command).

(C) The JCS advised that the Air Force did not have sufficient general officer authorizations to create a new O-9 position for the CFC. They said that preliminary reports following TEAM SPIRIT seemed to indicate that the O-9 could satisfy the responsibilities of both positions from the CFC command bunker TANGO. Any residual problems could best be resolved, they said, within the CFC by modifying duty descriptions to make better use of the O-9's Korean deputies. In addition, an existing Memorandum of Understanding between CINCCFC and CINCPACAF could be revised to permit the air component commander to delegate some of his responsibilities to the USAF O-8 who was the 314th Air Division commander. The Secretary of Defense said that the wartime requirement for an additional USAF O-9 to serve as CFC Chief of Staff was valid; therefore, he directed that the position be identified as a requirement for a wartime fill.

1. CINCPAC 080400Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 30 Jan 90; JCS 2522/81-1, 16 May 80 (S/NF), Subj: Report by the J-5 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Combined Forces Command (U), DECL 16 May 86; JCS 7041/110419Z Nov 80 (S/NF), DECL 5 Nov 86.

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The general officer to fill that position "should be designated now" to insure that in a contingency situation he was fully ready to discharge his responsibilities as CFC air component commander.

(S/NOFORH) The Commander, Fifth Air Force was designated to serve as the wartime CFC air component commander. He already commanded the Korea-based fighter units as well as the RF-4C and F-15 rotational detachments at Osan, and was knowledgeable of Korea OPLANs and immediately available in case of a contingency.1

(C/ROKUS) CINCPAC recommended that an integrated ROK-U.S. staff be established for the air component command and the naval component command. For the air component such a staff would provide more effective planning, coordination, and execution of combined air operations. A combined ROK-U.S. study was being conducted at the time to determine how this could best be achieved. For the naval component, CINCPAC proposed dual-hatting 11 staff billets of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea and the addition of 2 full-time U.S. naval officer billets in the CFC. The JCS concurred. They advised that they encouraged development of integrated component commands in accordance with the 1978 CFC Terms of Reference. Manning and funding, however, had to be consistent with in-country Service and command ceilings. The Secretary of Defense approved the recommendations for establishing air and naval component staffs. CINCPAC was asked by the JCS to proceed with unilateral planning for the combined staffs, but bilateral aspects of such planning were deferred for political reasons (the Kim Dae Jung case, discussed elsewhere in this chapter).

(U) CINCPAC recommended that the JCS request that the Services review their management level Operations Security (OPSEC) training to determine the availability and adequacy of training programs to meet the needs of joint/combined headquarters and senior-level staffs. Thus far none of the Services had established OPSEC training programs specifically tailored to those needs. "As a result CFC OPSEC program is limited," CINCPAC said. The JCS concurred in part. They advised that the Services, in conjunction with the Joint Staff, would review their OPSEC training to satisfy the requirements of all joint/combined headquarters and senior level staffs. The Secretary said that early resolution of problems associated with OPSEC training for a combined headquarters was desirable. A summary of actions being taken to resolve those problems should be forwarded to the Office of the Secretary by 30 January 1981. The JCS said the OPSEC training matter would be an agenda item for the next worldwide OPSEC conference.

1. The assignment of the Fifth Air Force commander was noted in PACAF SSO 240300Z Dec 80 (BOM)(S/NF), DECL 18 Dec 86.
(U) CINCPAC recommended that the JCS support and approve forthcoming CINCPAC recommendations relating to the FY 80 Joint Manpower Programs for USFK/EUSA and UNC/CFC headquarters, and that a Decision Package Set or Program Decision Memorandum be created to allow for implementation of those recommendations, as trade-offs were not available at CINCPAC. The changes were designed to increase CFC effectiveness by improving the Operations Security program in Korea and providing for improved exercise and naval unconventional warfare planning capability. The JCS advised that the FY 80 JMPs reflected realignment of the 52 Headquarters UNC spaces from the USFK/EUSA Headquarters JMP to the CFC Headquarters JMP and contained a requirement for 10 additional manpower authorizations in UNC/CFC and 15 additional authorizations in USFK/EUSA. The requirements had been supported by the CINCPAC/COMUS Korea manpower survey. Although the JMPs were being processed as a separate action, the JCS supported the realignments and recommended Defense Department approval of the additional manpower authorizations.

(5) The JCS replied that additional commitments by supporting commands precluded rescheduling EIGHT BELLSS in 1980. As an alternative, they were considering a JCS-conducted CINCPAC regional contingency exercise in the fall of 1981. The possibility of including nuclear play could be considered during exercise concept development, but releasability constraints might limit the degree of CFC participation. The Secretary of Defense said that planning to exercise nuclear capability should be included in unilateral U.S. exercises. "Nuclear play in combined US/ROK exercises should be deferred for the present."

(U) CINCPAC next recommended that the JCS increase their participation in exercises that were conducted in Korea. U.S. JCS participation in the large-scale exercises in Korea had been minimal and had limited JCS dialogue and influence with the CFC in the exercises. Typically, the JCS play had been
simulated at CINCPAC headquarters by a CINCPAC-manned response cell. Actual JCS participation, CINCPAC said, would enhance realism in the exercise and significantly contribute to the identification of, appreciation for, and solution of the real-world C3I problems. The JCS commented that while the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and the Defense Agencies monitored and supported CINC-conducted exercises, they did not possess the funds, personnel, or resources to actively direct or fully participate in CINC-conducted exercises. The Secretary said that selective participation by the JCS and Services in combined and joint exercises was encouraged whenever such play was practicable and mutually beneficial to the participating headquarters. The Joint Staff initiated a recommendation that, if approved by the JCS, would result in a JCS invitation for ROK/CFC participation in Exercise POTENT PUNCH in conjunction with ULCHI-FOCUS LENS-81.

(S/NOFORM) CINCPAC next addressed command, control, and communications. He recommended that the ROK Government be provided sufficient U.S. COMSEC equipment on an expanded loan program to satisfy the CFC requirements outlined in the COMSEC Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea (CPICK) and provide greater accessibility for operating and maintaining the equipment. (See, also, the Command, Control, and Communications Systems chapter of this history.) Without U.S. COMSEC equipment, the ROK would procure non-U.S. approved equipment from a third country that would not be compatible and that could not be used to process U.S. classified information. "This would impact adversely upon CFC effectiveness to direct a war effort in Korea." The JCS concurred in the requirement, and advised that they had requested the Director of the National Security Agency to obtain authority from the National Communications Security Committee to release identified COMSEC equipment to the ROK on a lease Foreign Military Sales basis. On 16 April the Director had requested Committee approval for release of U.S. COMSEC equipment to the CFC for special arrangements attendant to its release. The Secretary said that early fielding of COMSEC equipment to resolve existing shortfalls in OPSEC capabilities was requested.

(S) CINCPAC recommended that the JCS task the CFC to develop a comprehensive yearly C3 Master Plan with the Telecommunications Plan for Improvement of Communications in Korea (TPICK) and CPICK as supporting documents incorporating as many ROK requirements and capabilities as possible. The first draft, CINCPAC said, should be submitted by October 1981. The JCS concurred and advised they had recommended that the CFC undertake responsibility for development of the C3 Master Plan, which had been previously tasked to CINCPAC. Manpower and fiscal requirements were to be consistent with in-country Service and command ceilings.
(U) In a related matter, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS support CFC's effort to expand TPICK-80 to include an annex on CFC's command and control requirements as an interim solution to the development of a C3 Master Plan. The expansion should be accomplished during the next annual update of the TPICK. The JCS agreed that TPICK-80 should reflect CFC requirements, but that an expanded TPICK-80 should not be considered a substitute for the C3 Master Plan. Regarding these plans, the Secretary said recommendations for development of the CFC C3 Master Plan were approved. The plan should incorporate CPICK, TPICK, and applicable ROK plans that impacted on CFC capabilities. Implementation of the CPICK and TPICK plans should proceed, and development of the C3 Master Plan should not hold up implementation of priority sections of current plans.

(5) CINCPAC further recommended that the JCS review Service guidance concerning the release of war reserve-related information to insure a uniform policy existed that would provide a mechanism for exchanging information necessary for a realistic determination of materiel requirements to be used in the development and management of ROK and U.S. war materiel requirements. The JCS advised that they, with the Services, were addressing the development of
uniform guidelines for exchanging war-reserve related information within the CFC environment. This did not, however, envision a complete release of WRSA data to the ROK. They emphasized that WRSA were U.S. war reserve materiel and, even though funded for potential use in Korea, were subject to diversion to other areas. A complete release of WRSA information could make it politically infeasible to change stockage when requirements changed or if there was an emergency need elsewhere. Such a limitation had the potential for affecting future deployment decisions. The Secretary asked that guidance for the uniform release of WRSA information be developed and distributed to all concerned by 30 January 1981.

(S/NOFORN) Concerning intelligence, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS and the Defense Intelligence Agency recommend a change to National Disclosure Policy to permit the CFC staff full access to all intelligence products at the discretion of COMUS Korea, and that the JCS direct Service attention to the provisions of existing directives requiring proper caveat labeling of traffic addressed to CINCCFC and COMUS Korea. The JCS advised that Executive Order 12036 assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for dissemination of intelligence to foreign governments. That Director's directive 1/7 required originator approval for the release of cavedated information. Consequently, a change to National Disclosure Policy would not resolve the intelligence disclosure problem. The Defense Intelligence Agency had recently initiated a program to review for release to the ROK all collateral intelligence products on North Korea at the time of publication. The Services had also been requested to take similar action on their collateral intelligence products. The Defense Intelligence Agency was continuing its efforts with the Director of Central Intelligence to release to the ROK as much data as possible from sensitive compartmented information channels. The Secretary asked for a report on measures being taken to solve this problem with that same 30 January 1981 suspense date.

(S) The last major recommendation from CINCPAC was that the JCS support the long-range Theater Nuclear Force study that CINCPAC had requested in January. "The reductions in forward deployed TNF over the past decade have seriously degraded the capability to support national nuclear objectives," CINCPAC said. A comprehensive study of overall TNF posture, in the broadest context, was essential to identify and initiate quantitative and qualitative force improvements. Such a study could result in developing a more effective nuclear deterrent and consequently enhance the effectiveness of combined forces in Korea. The JCS advised that the Joint Staff was considering a long-range TNF study. The Secretary said that before initiating such a study, and to avoid duplication of effort, the JCS should coordinate any study plans in that area with the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning. (The JCS advised that PACOM Theater Nuclear Force studies were being centrally
managed by the Defense Nuclear Agency under a coordinated steering group headed by the Director, Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with representation from other agencies in the Office of the Secretary, the JCS, the Services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and CINCPAC.)  

Concerning all of the CFC improvements addressed in the memo from the Secretary of Defense, the following guidance was provided, "The ROK Government will not be informed of these changes to the Combined Forces Command until the Kim Dae Jung case is resolved. At that time, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) will consider release to the ROK." The JCS guidance, because of the Secretary's caveat, was a request to concentrate efforts on unilateral planning that would facilitate early implementation of the initiatives upon removal of the restriction.  

Back in 1979, in response to a request to identify and assess the range of possible options to increase the responsibilities and effectiveness of the CFC, COMUS Korea had discussed placing the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division and the 314th Air Division under the peacetime OPCON of CINCCFC. He noted that when the CFC had been established the ROK had relinquished OPCON of virtually all of its combat forces to the bi-national headquarters. The United States had placed under OPCON of the CFC only the 38th Air Defense Brigade (scheduled for withdrawal) and two USAF aircraft, when they were not committed to Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program defense. ROK military officials had noted the disparity. When the 38th Air Defense Brigade was inactivated (one battalion in 1980, one in 1981, and the last in 1982), there would be no U.S. forces under CFC OPCON on a full-time basis.  

Political considerations resulting from turbulence in the Korean Government caused planning in this regard to be held in abeyance through much of the year. In the Secretary of Defense's memo to the JCS on 11 November regarding the CFC, he requested that alternate forces that could be placed under CFC OPCON be identified for the following year when all of the Improved HAWK units except one were deactivated. He asked for the information by 30 January 1981.  

COMUS Korea and CINCPAC did not agree on the transfer of OPCON of U.S. forces to the CFC. COMUS Korea favored transferring OPCON of the 2nd

1. Ibid.
2. JCS 2523/81-3, 28 Oct 80 (S), Subj: Note to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command Improvements (U), DECL 23 Sep 86; JCS 7041/110419Z Nov 80 (S), DECL 5 Nov 86.
3. COMUS Korea 290735Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 21 Nov 85.
4. JCS 7041/110419Z Nov 80 (S), DECL 5 Nov 86.
Infantry Division during early 1981 and adoption of OPCON procedures or arrangements for other U.S. forces at increased DEFCON status. He said OPCON of U.S. in-country forces to the extent feasible would redress the perception problem and promote increased authority of the CFC. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff would then be more receptive to greater CFC participation in such important areas as rear area security, mobilization planning, and readiness oversight where further progress was required.\(^1\)

\(\text{(S/NOFROM)}\) CINCPAC said that the 2nd Infantry Division was identified as the only force within the PACOM that should be considered as a possible candidate for assignment to peacetime OPCON of the CFC. "However, CINCPAC recommends that no additional U.S. forces should be placed under the OPCON of the CFC." He said such assignment would virtually eliminate the capability for the United States to act unilaterally to lessen the intensity of crisis situations such as the Joint Security Area tree-cutting incident of 1976. Further, placing it under the CFC would require that provisions be made for U.S. unilateral nuclear capability in the areas of communications, security, surveillance, planning, and custody. He said the U.S. commitment and resolve to the combined defense of the ROK had already been substantially demonstrated in a number of ways (exercises such as TEAM SPIRIT, deployment of AWACS, and the U.S. forces deployed there). He noted that placing additional scarce U.S. forces under CFC OPCON might be perceived by friends and allies as increased U.S. interests in Korea with a concomitant diminishing of U.S. interests elsewhere in the PACOM.\(^2\)

\(\text{(S)}\) CINCPAC next provided an assessment of the adequacy of rear area security and measures taken to improve it. Regarding tactical air support coordination, he said the USAF recognized that there was a language problem between ROK controller and USAF augmenting forces. Several programs had been designed to increase the effectiveness of Air Force operations while minimizing employment problems such as the transition into the Korean Tactical Air Control System.

\(\text{(S/NOFROM)}\) CINCPAC provided comments on the on-going programs for the response to the Secretary of Defense. He advised of the status of the CFC air and naval component staffs, the planning still in unilateral channels. He said placing OPSEC training on the Worldwide OPSEC Conference agenda was a positive step, but only if the recommendations resulting from the conference were appropriately implemented by the Services. Regarding the C3 Master Plan, it would incorporate CPICK/TPICK and all applicable plans required to perform

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1. CINCPAC 300035Z Dec 80 (S), REVW 20 Dec 86.
2. Ibid.

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command and control within the ROK, but it would not be ready by 1 January 1981 as originally planned; it was rescheduled for 1 April.

In summary, CINCPAC said that the ROK-U.S. CFC improvement program was progressing in "a very satisfactory manner." In certain areas, such as the CFC air component command and tactical air support coordination, further progress could not be made until approval was received to proceed with bilateral actions. "It is, therefore, requested that such approval be given at the earliest possible time."\(^1\)

Thailand

In mid-February the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok forwarded a report of a meeting between Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanan, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke, and Admiral Long in which Kriangsak had mentioned Thailand as a possible base of operations. In a related matter, in order to enhance its ability to conduct Indian Ocean patrols, the Air Force had recommended that the JCS investigate the political feasibility of operating B-52s from U-Tapao. The JCS asked CINCPAC's views on a concept of operations, including possible P-3/B-52 joint use; the political implications; Thai perceptions; possible Vietnamese or Soviet response, including U.S. countermeasures; possible Thai quid-pro-quo; or other comments.\(^2\)

On 22 February the CINCPAC staff and component commands were provided with an initial draft for comment. Those inputs were discussed and incorporated in an action officers meeting held at CINCPAC headquarters on 25 February.\(^3\)

CINCPAC's response was provided to the JCS on 4 March. He said that in general he supported initiatives that would permit greater utilization or enhancement of the capabilities of forces assigned to, or stationed in, the PACOM. He supported B-52 staging operations from U-Tapao to support Indian Ocean operations, but recommended a gradual, phased approach, using P-3 and MAC flights prior to the initiation of KC-135 and B-52 operations. He recommended this incremental approach in order to permit an assessment of Thai public attitudes at each stage. Vietnamese or Soviet reaction to B-52 operations was anticipated to be limited. Thai requests for quid-pro-quo were expected to be uncertain but would likely involve additional military equipment and financial aid. The Thai could also demand a formal bilateral defense agreement in exchange for U.S. use of U-Tapao for B-52 operations.\(^4\)

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1. Ibid.
2. JCS 1143/211717Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 19 Feb 86.
3. J5314 HistSum Mar 80 (S), DECL 19 Feb 85.
4. CINCPAC 040346Z Mar 80 (S), DECL 3 Mar 86.
Prime Minister Kriangsak resigned suddenly on 29 February and on 3 March a decision was made in Washington to hold a moratorium on U.S. initiatives for Thailand to allow time for the new Thai Government to get established.¹

On 10 June CINCPAC advised the JCS that events in the preceding months had highlighted limitations on our ability to project power into the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. One of the most notable limitations was a lack of basing for land-based airpower. For example, planning efforts had revealed that the United States would be limited to two to three B-52 strike sorties per 10-hour period in the Persian Gulf area if the B-52 sorties were to originate from Guam. Use of U-Tapao for B-52 and KC-135 operations in such a case would significantly increase sortie rate capability while decreasing tanker support requirements. CINCPAC noted that actions in progress in several locations were attempting to overcome these limitations. He said we should continue efforts to obtain access in Australia, the Middle East, and other locations, but that each of those also had associated uncertainties and limitations. U-Tapao had been constructed as a B-52 base, and could regain that capability with some minor reconstitution. It was only about 3,200 miles from the Strait of Hormuz (Darwin, Australia, was 5,100 miles). He encouraged support for establishment of U.S. use of U-Tapao, using a phased, gradual introduction of P-3, KC-135, and eventually B-52 aircraft, and recommended the United States pursue the utilization of this base by U.S. forces. He concluded that he would not envision a permanent or direct presence of U.S. forces at U-Tapao, but a temporary or indirect presence.²

Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, to whom CINCPAC dispatched a copy of his message, noted that it was a question with broad strategic and international relations implications, as reacquiring base rights in Thailand would also have immediate impact on the regional political situation in Southeast Asia as well as the political situation in Thailand. He asked that CINCPAC outline more fully the requirements and objectives he had for U-Tapao.³

CINCPAC's reply noted that he recognized there were important policy considerations that would come into play with U.S. military use of U-Tapao or other facilities in Thailand beyond that already taking place through Don Muang. What he would like, he said, was to see developed assured access to an air facility like U-Tapao in the event we needed it on very short notice to support a contingency in the Indian Ocean area. He said he would

¹ J5314 HistSum Mar 80 (S), DECL 19 Feb 86.
² CINCPAC 100215Z Jun 80 (S), DECL 9 Jun 86.
³ SECSTATE 153131/110155Z Jun 80 (S)(EX), GDS 6/10/86.
like to think the physical preparation would not involve much more than filling
the fuel storage tanks and bringing in some ground support equipment and
perhaps a small number of temporary duty personnel. The surface appearances
had been good, but he would like to have a small (3-man) team take a quiet
look around. He proposed, as he had earlier, starting with P-3 and MAC
flights, then KC-135 tankers, and then working toward B-52s.\(^1\)

\(\textit{\text{\textbf{(E)}}}\) CINCSAC endorsed the CINCPAC proposal and advised that he stood ready
to assist, as required. No further action, however, was reported in 1980.\(^2\)

\textbf{Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands}

\(\text{(U)}\) For many years the status of negotiations regarding the political
future of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, a territory that had been
assigned to the United States in trusteeship by the United Nations in 1946,
had been of interest to CINCPAC. (This trusteeship agreement was the last
of the 11 U.N. trusteeships established after World War II.) Support facili-
ties in the area served as a hedge against the loss of other U.S. bases in
the PACOM. The United States and the Northern Marianas had signed a covenant
in 1975 to form the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas at such time as
the trusteeship agreement was terminated, scheduled for 1981. For other
islands, negotiations were still in progress. The island groups had become
fragmented and had become three separate entities: Palau; the Marshall Islands;
and the Federated States of Micronesia, which consisted of Kosrae, Yap, Truk,
and Ponape.\(^3\)

\(\textit{\text{\textbf{(E)}}}\) Negotiations continued early in 1980 at a round of talks held in
Kona on the Island of Hawaii from 7 to 14 January. At that meeting the
Compact of Free Association was initialed by the President's personal repre-
sentative in these negotiations (still Ambassador Peter Rosenblatt) and the
President of the Marshall Islands, Amata Kabua. The Federated States of
Micronesia voiced agreement, ad referendum, and stated that they would be
ready to initial the Compact soon. There had been political upheaval in
Palau, however, and the seating of an entirely new legislature and government
on 1 January, so that delegation had been neither prepared nor accredited to
negotiate. They worked hard with other delegations, however, and left with
a positive attitude that problems could be resolved and that the Compact would
ultimately be acceptable.\(^4\)

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. CINCPAC 182341Z Jun 80 (S), DECL 17 Jun 88.
\item 2. CINCSAC 022215Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 23 Jun 86.
\item 3. CINCPAC Command History 1979 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, p.49.
\item 4. J5124 HistSum Jan 80 (C), DECL 31 Jan 86.
\end{itemize}
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(U) CINCPAC participated in the final stages of negotiations in Guam and Kona from 26 September through 6 October, as he had been through the years. On 31 October, the Federated States and the Marshalls formally initialed the Compact of Free Association, followed on 17 November by Palau (which had to wait until after elections on 4 November). 1

(U) When finally approved, after further negotiations on detailed subsidiary agreements, the Compact would succeed the U.N. Trusteeship Agreement. It provided that the United States would retain plenary authority in defense and security matters, and that the three groupings would acquire full internal self-government and authority over all aspects of their foreign relations other than those that the United States determined to be related to security and defense. It set forth the financial and other types of assistance the United States would provide (U.S. $2.3 billion over a 15-year period) and covered many other areas, including environmental regulations, trade, and taxation. The Compact's aid and defense provisions continued for 15 years, and thereafter as mutually agreed. It also gave each of the Micronesian entities the option of unilateral termination should any of them later decide to seek full independence or any other political status. Such a unilateral termination, however, would be subject to continuation of U.S. defense rights in full terms.

(U) The Compact was expected to be formally signed when subsidiary agreements, covering such subjects as telecommunications, extradition, and military land-use and operating rights had been completed. There were still a number of points at issue during this period, mainly concerning Palau and conflict between the Palau Constitution and U.S. positions on nuclear, Law of the Sea, and land-use issues. In any case, it was not to be formalized during the Carter Administration and the political transition team for the new President was being briefed on the subject as the year ended.

(U) When the issues were resolved, the resulting draft Compact and the subsidiary agreements would have to be presented to the voters of Micronesia for approval by plebiscite, and then submitted to the U.S. Congress as a joint resolution for enactment into law. The United States would also have to decide in what form to present the completed arrangements to the United Nations and how, formally, to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. The Free Association status that the Micronesian entities had chosen had no exact precedent in U.S. constitutional practice on international law. The autonomy the Micronesian states would exercise exceeded that of U.S. Territories, while U.S. defense authority in the freely associated states was broad.

1. J5614 HistSum Nov 80 (U).

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ranging and of a different nature than treaty relationships with even the closest American allies.¹

(c) As noted in previous CINCPAC Command Histories, problems continued with Northern Marianas lease money. The covenant to form the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas included provisions for the United States to lease three land areas. The lease option was to be acted on by January 1983 and was to extend for 50 years, with an option for an additional 50 years at no additional cost. For several years the lease money had been included in the Navy budget, but then had been dropped in favor of other projects. This happened again in 1980 during a budget "scrub" by a Senate subcommittee. On 7 June CINCPAC provided his thoughts to the JCS. He noted that the people of the Northern Marianas believed the lease lands were more than an option; they believed the United States committed itself to payment of the agreed price and were planning on the money. Ongoing land negotiations with the rest of Micronesia could be adversely affected, as well as perceptions of U.S. staying power in the Pacific. CINCPAC said, "Uncertainty in the out years of forward basing and potential importance of Micronesia in future makes $28.2 million a bargain for the 100-year lease," and he urged the JCS to have the money reinstated in the budget. The JCS replied that they shared CINCPAC's concern and were seeking to restore the funds.²

(c) CINCPAC also wrote a personal letter to Joseph A. Doyle, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, in which he explained the importance of prompt payment. He noted that the leases became more expensive each year as consumer price indexing was built into the Covenant. In 1975 the cost had been $19.5 million. By the 1980 budget submission the cost would have been over $23 million, and for 1981 it had escalated to $28.2 million. He said that viewed in the light of increasing Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean basin and the unpredictable future of some of our Western Pacific bases, the Northern Marianas took on a greater strategic significance than before. The geographic location of the islands along the western boundary of the Trust Territory made them potentially vitally important to the United States. He asked for the Assistant Secretary's help in getting the lease monies reinstated.³

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1. Ibid.; J5614 HistSum Dec 80 (U), which included a copy of the draft Compact, as initialed.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1979 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 50-53; J5613 HistSum Jun 80 (C), DECL 30 Jun 86; CINCPAC 072004Z Jun 80 (C), DECL 30 Jun 86; JCS 2836/141329Z Jun 80 (C), DECL 10 Jun 86.
3. Ltr, Admiral Long to Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M,RL&L) (C), 1 Jul 80, n.s.
(U) The money had not been appropriated by the end of 1980.

In the matter of the retention of Tinian leasehold land, the idea of a "Superport" oil storage facility surfaced again. The concept had originated in the early 1970s during an oil crisis, particularly from Japan in their quest for a storage facility along the supertanker route. Palau had been the site originally considered, but that idea had been shelved because of opposition by environmentalists. Indonesia had been rejected because of governmental instability. Maug (north of Saipan) had been shelved because the Northern Marianas constitution declared it a natural wildlife refuge. Okinawa had been defeated by a public referendum. The latest proposal was forwarded by the Governor of the Northern Marianas to the U.S. Secretary of Defense on 19 September. He said the Commonwealth was entertaining its first large-scale economic development proposal. Northville Industries, Inc., of New York, had proposed to construct and operate an oil transshipment facility in the Northern Marianas, and other oil-related refinery products were a future production possibility. Their first choice was located on Tinian within the military leasehold area. Second site choice was on Saipan.¹

On 10 October CINCPAC provided his thoughts for the JCS to use in their recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. CINCPAC said that in view of the continuous cutbacks in U.S. military real estate holdings during recent years it appeared most important that the Defense Department retain the Tinian site as a potential facility for training, etc., and for Pacific contingencies. It was anticipated that newly independent Trust nations would increase the pressure for the return of lands leased or used by U.S. military for their own use for economic development. Future leases might be difficult to renew or obtain and prices would certainly increase. He said that he believed the JCS should recommend that the Secretary respond to the Governor advising of Defense Department intent to exercise the Tinian leasehold option from FY 82 funds, and also recommend that the Northville Company investigate other sites for location of their facility as concurrent Defense Department and Northville use was not compatible.²

(U) In another matter, and in response to a JCS request, CINCPAC was represented on a team that visited Palau to determine, ad referendum, land requirements for exclusive and non-exclusive military use. The visit was conducted from 15 to 21 September and the land requirements forwarded to the JCS on 20 September.³

1. J5123 HistSum Feb 76 (U); J5614 HistSum Oct 80 (U); Ltr, Office of Governor, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to SECDEF, 19 Sep 80 (U), n.s.
2. CINCPAC 100235Z Oct 80 (C), REVW 3 Oct 86.
3. J5614 HistSum Sep 80 (U); CINCPAC 201922Z Sep 80 (U).

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(U) Regarding one other matter of continuing interest, Pacific Island nation leaders from Guam, the Northern Marianas, American Samoa, Palau, the Marshalls, and the Federated States of Micronesia who attended the second annual conference of the Association of Chief Executives of the Pacific Basin voted unanimously on 15 August to reject Japan's proposal to dump nuclear wastes into the ocean some 600 miles north of the Marianas in the autumn of 1981. The resolution followed a meeting with four Japanese nuclear experts who assured them that dumping barrels of low-level radioactive wastes would be safe for man and the sea. The Japanese team leader had emphasized that the proposed dumping was not a foregone conclusion as some island leaders had felt, but he added that Japan was legally required only to give one year notice of the plan and to conform to the dumping regulations of the London Convention. "However, the Japanese would very much like to obtain mutual understanding from its Pacific neighbors to continue its friendly and amicable relations with nations in the region," the team leader said.  

Military Civil Action Teams

(U) For many years there had been a program in which Military Civil Action Teams managed by CINCPAC worked in various parts of the Trust Territory. These were small (9 to 13 men) engineering teams who worked on small-scale construction tasks such as road-building or improvements, small building construction, etc. The program was funded jointly by the TTPI Government and the Defense Department and provided a military presence that had been helpful and well received.  

(U) In the spring of 1980 there were three teams deployed: SeaBee teams on Yap and Palau and an Air Force PRIME BEEF team deployed to Truk Island in Yap. All were involved in road building and minor building projects. Ponape had requested a team in 1979 and CINCPAC had requested that the JCS obtain Army sponsorship for the new team. The Army agreed and WESTCOM deployed the new CAT in July. Earlier, on 5 March, CINCPAC had tasked CINCPACFLT and the SeaBees to begin movement of equipment to Ponape in anticipation of the Army CAT arrival. The Navy furnished all logistic support for the CAT Program regardless of the Service of the team.  

(U) In August CINCPAC concurred in the initiation of a new CAT for Kosrae as recommended by the High Commissioner of the TTPI. CINCPAC recommended, with the concurrence of CDRWESTCOM, that the Army field the additional team. With the addition of that team in FY 82 there would be five CATs in the PACOM.  

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1. HICOMTERPACIS Saipan 180704Z Aug 80 (U).
3. J5123 HistSums Mar-Apr 80 (U); CINCPAC 160026Z Apr 80 (U).
4. J5614 HistSum Aug 80 (U); CINCPAC 230247Z Aug 80 (C), DECL 22 Aug 86.
CHAPTER II
THE THREAT

SECTION I--SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND

(U) Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Robert L.J. Long, CINCPAC, issued his assessment of the situation in the Pacific Command in early 1980. The decade of the 1970s, he said, was a time of change, and entering the 1980s, events were rapidly evolving throughout the region. These events had vividly demonstrated the complexity and importance of the issues faced by the United States in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. "The challenge to prevent events from tilting the balance of power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans is not a future concern. That challenge is now," said CINCPAC.¹

Strategic Interests

(U) National interests of the United States in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas went beyond the primary security objectives of strategic deterrence, protection of U.S. territory and citizens, and regional peace and stability, declared CINCPAC. Oil, trade, and access to raw materials were essential to the United States' continued economic life. Some 95 percent of Persian Gulf oil transited the vulnerable Strait of Hormuz to the Arabian Sea. Trade between Asia and the United States continued to grow, and exceeded that of the European Economic Community—even with the exclusion of Middle East oil. American private sector direct investment in Asian-Pacific countries was nearly $20 billion. This, said CINCPAC, indicated the pendulum of world economic activity continued its swing toward the Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific.

(U) United States objectives for peace and stability in the region were served by mutual security treaties and defense agreements with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand (Manila Pact), and Pakistan. To support these agreements, CINCPAC stated the United States had to maintain credible military forces in the region. Strong visible forces provided a measure of deterrence to show U.S. resolve. Allied nations were looking for evidence that the United States was dedicated to maintaining military forces capable of fulfilling commitments and had the will to use those forces if necessary to counter the Soviets and their surrogates in the region.

¹ Statement by Admiral Long before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Pacific Area, 6 Feb 80 (U).
(U) Admiral Long believed that an "economic and security consensus" might be emerging in the new decade, and many nations were beginning to recognize the common threat, the interdependence of their interests, and the benefits of greater cooperation. The invasion of Afghanistan in the closing days of 1979, the complete disregard of international law by Iran in seizing the U.S. Embassy and U.S. hostages on 4 November 1979, and the militant policies of Vietnam in overrunning Cambodia, said CINCPAC, stood "in sharp contrast to the fundamental values of our nation and those of our allies."

Pacific Command Developments: An Overview

Northeast Asia

(U) In terms of security, Admiral Long believed that Japan had become increasingly concerned about Soviet intentions in Northeast Asia. The expanding Soviet presence in the Pacific had been an important consideration in Japan's effort to improve its defenses. While Japan remained restricted by its constitution from assuming collective security responsibilities, an increased awareness of strategic realities was apparent, said CINCPAC. United States-Japanese security relations were sound and Japanese concerns about the U.S. commitment to Northeast Asia were eased by President Carter's decision to hold in abeyance the withdrawal of ground combat forces from Korea. CINCPAC believed Japan would continue to cooperate in cost sharing programs with the United States, and would proceed with a steady improvement of its defense capabilities.

(U) In Korea, the assassination of President Park Chung-hee on 26 October 1979 and the subsequent political uncertainties had the potential for endangering stability. However, CINCPAC believed the greatest deterrent to an offensive move by Pyongyang was the presence of U.S. military forces in Korea. Evidence of continued U.S. commitment was provided by official warning statements and the steps the United States took to increase its forces and their readiness there.

(U) North Korea continued to maintain strong military forces, holding substantial advantages over South Korea in many force categories. This superiority included more than a 2 to 1 advantage over South Korea in tanks and some 60 percent more fighter and attack aircraft. There was also evidence that the North Koreans had continued to develop a commando-type force capable of large scale infiltration and attack on South Korea's lines of communication, facilities, and bases.

(U) North Korea routinely maintained a high readiness posture, and the possibility of attack was always there. However, said CINCPAC, the United States and South Korea had substantial forces of their own and any North
Korean attack would be very costly to the enemy. Still, Admiral Long and his military commanders in the area were watching this situation "very carefully."

Central Asia

(U) Of significant importance in Central Asia was the Sino-Soviet rift. The normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), formalized on 1 January 1979, greatly influenced the strategic situation in the Pacific, said CINCPAC. While in need of modernization, China's military organization was impressive—a standing army of 4.4 million troops, a large navy in terms of number of vessels, and an air force of over 5,000 combat aircraft—but the country had only a limited capability to project that power much beyond its borders. The Chinese continued to work on missile and nuclear weapons programs and were developing intercontinental ballistic missile and ballistic missile submarine capabilities.

(U) Admiral Long declared that a period of "increased dialogue" between the United States and China had arrived. This evolving relationship, he believed, would have significant implications in Asia and could enhance U.S. interests not only in the Far East but around the world as well.

(U) However, notwithstanding China's strong interests in economic development and its military preoccupation with its southern and northern flanks, CINCPAC believed it was essential that the United States continue to supply Taiwan with defensive weapons and spare parts "on a selective basis." Further, he said, it would be "prudent and useful to maintain our very fruitful private contacts with Taiwan, an enterprising and prosperous entity in the region."

Southeast Asia

(U) Owing to the Philippines' strategic location at the hub of Pacific air and sea lines of communication, the U.S. relationship with that country was of particular importance. A bilateral treaty provided for mutual defense and a military bases agreement newly amended on 7 January 1979 (subject to review in 1984) provided for continued U.S. basing. These air and naval bases, with their training, logistics, and repair facilities, said CINCPAC, were essential to the pursuit of mutual interests in Asia and the Indian Ocean.

(U) Admiral Long said he was seriously concerned about Vietnamese expansion and steadily increasing Soviet influence in the area. He believed the Soviets would try to increase their use of bases in Vietnam, and thus pose "serious and direct" threats to the United States and its allies.
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(U) The Vietnamese incursion into Kampuchea (Cambodia) created a "potentially explosive threat" to Thailand, said CINCPAC. This development had caused other Southeast Asian nations to feel increasingly exposed and vulnerable to pressure from Vietnam and the Soviets.

Southwest Asia and Indian Ocean

(U) Southwest Asia had dominated much of America's attention over the past year. The Soviets moved a step nearer the vital oil lifeline when they occupied Afghanistan, and their presence there, said CINCPAC, "casts a dark shadow on Pakistan, Iran, and the entire Persian Gulf."

(U) Although Iran was not within the Pacific Command area, events there had a great impact on PACOM resources. Seventh Fleet battle groups provided a major military presence there. Prolonged unrest in this vital region would provide an opportunity for further Soviet inroads. This, said CINCPAC, posed "a direct threat to the very existence of industrialized nations [because of their reliance on Middle East oil]." The United States needed additional carrier battle groups, bases, and associated facilities, said Admiral Long, if it was to protect the vital flow of Persian Gulf oil and maintain a capability of responding rapidly to contingencies in the region without overextending its resources.

(U) While Africa was also not in the Pacific Command area, Admiral Long said Soviet efforts there were a long-term threat to the U.S. supply of scarce and strategically important natural resources. During the 1980s, he expected further Soviet efforts to consolidate and expand their presence on the continent. From his perspective, the admiral was particularly concerned about Soviet capabilities to bring force to bear on the Western Indian Ocean shipping lanes and the littoral nations.

Soviet Union

(U) While the weight of Soviet military strength had traditionally been oriented toward Europe, CINCPAC said Asia was receiving ever-increasing emphasis. In addition to the forces they had moved into Afghanistan, the Soviet Union was estimated to have about 700,000 military personnel in the Far East.

(U) Soviet military aviation in the Far East included nearly 2,400 aircraft, with about 800 air defense fighters, 1,200 tactical strike aircraft, and 350 bombers. These forces had received the most modern aircraft, such as the FOXBAT and FLOGGER fighters, the FORGER naval fighter, the FENCER fighter-bomber, and the BACKFIRE bomber. Deployment of these late-model aircraft had

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significantly increased Soviet offensive and defensive capabilities in the Far East.

(U) In addition, said CINCPAC, Soviet nuclear force capabilities in the Far East should not be underestimated, particularly in view of the deployment of two new mobile missile systems and the presence of ballistic missile submarines operating from Russian Pacific ports.

(U) The Soviet Pacific Fleet consisted of over 70 principal surface combatants and about 110 submarines. New ships in the fleet included the vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft carrier MINSK and two KARA class guided missile cruisers. Soviet naval forces operated primarily from Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk and conducted continuous ballistic missile submarine patrols. While operations by surface combatants were primarily in the Western Pacific, the Soviet fleet exercised its capability throughout the Pacific. In the Indian Ocean, the Soviet support structure allowed a routine naval presence of about 20 ships, significantly augmented during periods of crisis.

Potential for Conflict

(U) Admiral Long saw the potential for armed conflict at three levels. The first would be nuclear warfare. He believed the probability of this type of conflict to be low, if the United States continued its modernization of nuclear forces at appropriate levels to deter the Soviets.

(U) Second would be conventional war with the Soviet Union. In CINCPAC's view, such a conflict would be global and not restricted to Europe. Although such a conflict did not appear probable at the time to Admiral Long, he said the dangers would increase if the United States did not take immediate steps to reverse the existing trend in which the Soviets were improving their military capabilities faster than the United States.

(U) The third and most likely scenario, according to CINCPAC, was that the United States and its allies would be tested increasingly by crises, terrorism, and radical actions in the developing world. Here, he saw "primarily the hand of the Soviets and their surrogates and local insurgent groups." For example, 10,000 Cuban troops had been sent to Ethiopia; Soviets, Cubans, and East Europeans were in South Yemen and a major Soviet naval base in Aden; massive Soviet supply support was given to Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea; and the USSR itself had invaded Afghanistan.
SECTION II--THREAT IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

Soviet Air Buildup in the Far East

(S) The Soviet Union remained the single most serious threat to U.S. interests in the Pacific theater. According to the PACOM air component, the most significant factor limiting PACAF's capability to effectively respond to this threat was the disparity of air assets between the Soviets and the United States without the augmentation of theater forces. As the USSR introduced more improved air defense systems, the ability of U.S. dual-capable aircraft to penetrate enemy defenses and reach threat targets became increasingly limited. Based on this, PACAF had a stated requirement for the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) as a complement to nuclear tactical air and as an additive to existing programmed force levels. The GLCM, when deployed, would provide a credible long-range offset to the Soviet threat.1

Sino-Soviet Dispute and Its Effects

(S/NOFORN). While the Soviets regarded the United States as their major competitor in the world, they looked on China as their most intractable opponent. This adversary relationship with China had forced Moscow to grapple with the prospect of a "two-front" war in Europe and Asia and to reckon with the long-range prospect of a powerful opponent on its border. By refusing to offer significant concessions to the Chinese and by permanently altering the military geography of the Sino-Soviet border, the Soviet Union reduced chances for a radical improvement. Bilateral talks held in late 1979 failed to produce any improvement in relations, and subsequent talks were postponed following the Afghanistan invasion.3

1. CINCPAC 050142Z Nov 80 (S/FRD).
2. Ibid.
3. IPAC Point Paper (S/NF), 8 Apr 80. Subj: Soviet Policy Concerning China (U), REVW 8 Apr 00.
(S/NODIS) To deal with the potential security threat, the USSR, since 1965, had conducted a military buildup along the Sino-Soviet border. The balance favored the USSR because of its qualitative and technological advantages. A significant Soviet military development occurred in 1979 with the establishment of a wartime theater-level command in the Soviet Far East. Moscow was apprehensive about future military cooperation between the United States and China, seeing it as anti-Soviet in design. In addition, the possibility of a remilitarized Japan working closely with China and the United States represented to the Soviets a serious security threat.1

 Likewise, China perceived the Soviet Union as its major threat, and both sides had large forces deployed along their common border in defensive roles. The USSR had an estimated 456,000 troops positioned there in 46 divisions and China had some 1.8 million in over a hundred divisions near the frontier.2

 Manifestations of the Sino-Soviet dispute were most clearly seen in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Beijing claimed Moscow was "encircling China," with the ultimate desire for total control of southern Asia. The Chinese were countering with diplomatic initiatives on a regional and global scale. China probably hoped that greater contacts with the West, particularly the United States, would further erode Soviet influence in Asia. Beijing also hoped that a strong U.S. posture in Europe would force a corresponding Soviet response, thereby relieving pressure along China's northern border. In addition, Beijing probably desired a strong U.S. presence in Asia to counter Soviet prestige and power there. CINCPAC's Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC) believed the existing global situation and the temperament of the Chinese leadership suggested little likelihood of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the near term.3

 China's relations with Japan, on the other hand, continued to grow. Economic links were becoming stronger, and Beijing was looking favorably on Japan's influence in Northeast Asia as a counter to the Soviets. China did not pose a military threat to Japan, and it even encouraged a U.S. military presence there as a counterweight to the Soviets in the Far East.4

1. Ibid.
2. IPAC Point Paper (S), 22 Jul 80, Subj: Sino-Soviet Dispute (U), REVW 22 Jul 00.
3. Ibid.
4. IPAC Point Paper (S/NF), 22 May 80, Subj: PRC Relations with Other Nations in Asia (U), REVW 22 May 10; IPAC Point Paper (S/NF), 17 Jul 80, Subj: PRC Threat to U.S. Interests and Security Objectives (U), REVW 17 Jul 10.
The USSR sought to counter the Chinese with a peace treaty of its own with Japan. However, its intransigence on the "Northern Territories" issue (continued occupation since World War II of Japanese-claimed Shikotan, Kunashiri, Etorofu, and the Habomai group of islands to the northeast of Hokkaido) precluded an agreement. In 1978 the Soviet Union had initiated a sizeable deployment of personnel and equipment to these islands, and in late 1980 Soviet troop strength there was estimated by IPAC to be about 9,000.1

In January 1980, the government of Japan, for the first time, publicly called the Soviet presence in the Northern Territories "a potential threat to Japan." This reflected a hardening of the government's stance toward the Soviet Union in view of that country's invasion of Afghanistan.2

China's attitude toward Taiwan appeared to be one of patience and a desire to negotiate specific issues while assuming the achievement of (and lobbying for) the "one China" concept. Unless Taipei opted to declare independence, obtained a nuclear capability, or moved closer to the Soviets, the United States expected a long-term peaceful solution to the problem.3

Threat in Korea

North Korea, with its clear overall advantage in almost all aspects of combat strength over South Korea, was capable of mounting an attack at any time with a well-balanced force operationally controlled by at least eight conventional corps and one special corps. Line elements consisted of at least 34 divisions (32 infantry, 2 armored), 4 separate infantry brigades, 16 light infantry (Ranger/Commando elite forces) brigades, 5 reinforced infantry regiments, 4 reconnaissance brigades, 3 amphibious brigades, and 6 independent armored brigades.4

The greatest deterrent by far, believed IPAC, to an offensive move by Pyongyang was the U.S. presence on the Korean peninsula. In early 1980 IPAC did not see hostilities as being imminent. There was, however, continuing evidence that North Korea was improving its military readiness and ability to take advantage of any opportunity to go on the offensive.5

1. IPAC Point Paper (S), 8 Dec 80, Subj: Soviet Threat in East Asia (U), REVW 8 Dec 86.
2. IPAC HistSum Feb 80 (S/NF), REVW 28 Feb 80.
4. IPAC Point Paper (S/NF), 10 Jan 80, Subj: Intelligence Summary - North Korea, REVW 10 Jan 80.
5. Ibid.
If launched, such an offensive would probably be a coordinated ground, sea, and air attack, with the primary objective of quickly destroying the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army north of Seoul. The offensive was expected to consist of major ground attacks across the Demilitarized Zone in conjunction with air strikes and supported by airborne and seaborne Ranger/Commando operations against selected targets, including many deep in ROK rear areas.¹

North Korea's avowed objective of reunification posed problems for both China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese paid lip service to this objective but were unwilling to support with troops a military adventure by the north. Beijing's attitude concerning the U.S. military presence in the ROK was ambivalent. Whereas Chinese rhetoric historically had called for the total withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, such an occurrence could foster instability, a daring move by the north, and/or an increase of Soviet influence in the area—none of which China wanted.²

Publicly, the USSR had also consistently supported Pyongyang's reunification goal but did not desire a military solution. In addition, a number of factors had irritated Moscow's relationship with Pyongyang, including North Korea's accusations of Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea (which was supported by the USSR) and refusal to endorse the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (both aggressive acts also opposed by China). Moscow was opposed to any move to resolve the Korean problem in which it was not directly involved. The Soviet Union was intent on being able to influence the terms of any settlement so that neither the United States nor the PRC would profit at Soviet expense.³

Threat of Instability

Following the assassination of ROK President Park Chung-hee on 26 October 1979, the martial law commander, General Chung Seung-hwa, was arrested on 12 December after a gun battle and charged with complicity in the plot. Emerging from that power play was Major General Chun Doo Hwan (Chon Tu-hwan), who had used ROK troops from the Combined Forces Command in that action without notifying its commander, U.S. Army General John A. Wickham.⁴

1. IPAC Point Paper (S/NF), 10 Jan 80, Subj: General Concept for a Major Offensive (U), REVW 31 Oct 09.
3. IPAC Point Paper (S/NF), 8 Apr 80, Subj: Soviet Policy Concerning North Korea (U), REVW 8 Apr 00.
(U) On 14 April 1980, Chun, then a lieutenant general, was appointed to serve concurrently as Acting Director of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), thereby becoming the first active duty military man to hold that post. A ROK Government spokesman said, "the appointment was required in view of recent North Korean provocations and the security situation in and out of the nation." The previous director was Kim Jae-kyu, convicted assassin of President Park.1

(U) Antigovernment students and other rebellious elements took over the city of Kwangju, 175 miles south of Seoul on 21 May, seizing weapons and vehicles from the military. Demonstrators called for the ouster of Chun as KCIA Director and freeing of opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, arrested four days earlier on charges of plotting to overthrow the government. The ROK Army regained control of Kwangju on 27 May, but not until 1/10 persons had died in the action and an estimated $52 million in property damage was incurred.

(U) Lieutenant General Chun did relinquish his directorship of the KCIA on 14 July, and on 6 August, while still head of the Defense Security Command and Chairman, Special Committee for National Security Measures, was promoted to full general. He then retired on 22 August, in apparent preparation for the ROK presidency. Five days later, Chun Doo Hwan was chosen unanimously by the electoral college as the nation's new head of state, and was formally sworn in as ROK President on 1 September 1980.

(U) A military court on 17 September sentenced Kim Dae Jung to death on charges of sedition. North Korea abruptly cancelled working-level talks with the ROK on the 24th after accusing Seoul of "trying to whip up a war atmosphere," and President Kim Il-sung declared that continuing negotiations "would only serve to legitimize" the government of Chun Doo Hwan. North Korea also cut its end of the Seoul-Pyongyang telephone "hotline," which was only reopened in February 1980 after having been closed for nearly four years.

(U) In a newspaper interview on 10 November, General Wickham cautioned that the North Koreans could initiate a sudden offensive across the DMZ with little or no warning, supplemented by large-scale insertion of commando troops in ROK rear areas. They also had the capability, with stockpiled supplies, to conduct independent operations for several weeks without Soviet or Chinese support. However, General Wickham was confident that ROK/U.S. Forces in Korea, plus those planned for reinforcement, were capable of defeating any North Korean attack.2

1. USFK/EUSA Chronology (U), 1 Jan - 31 Dec 80.
2. Ibid.

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SECTION III--THREAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Soviets in Vietnam

(S) Soviet military assistance to Vietnam increased significantly following the border war between Vietnam and China in February 1979. This assistance not only replaced the combat losses from that conflict, it upgraded Vietnamese capabilities far beyond those existing prior to the Chinese incursion, and was invaluable in the prosecution of Vietnamese operations in Kampuchea. Deliveries to Vietnam since early 1979 included 143 MIG-21 FISHBED, 52 MIG-15/17 FAGOT/FRESCO, 13 SU-22 FITTER F, 16 MI-24 HIND, 11 KA-25 HORMONE, and 22 MI-8 HIP aircraft. The FISHBED deliveries more than doubled the number previously in the Vietnamese Air Force inventory and brought the total MIG-21 strength to approximately 215 by mid-1980.¹

(S) While this quantitative increase was significant, the overall quality of the Vietnamese Air Force was also improved since some of these fighters were the newer FISHBED N models not previously in their inventory. The FITTER F gave them an enhanced ground-attack capability. In the past, the Vietnamese had relied upon captured F-5 and A-37 aircraft for their ground-attack capability and had been forced to cannibalize parts in order to keep the aircraft flying. The 430-nautical mile range of the SU-22 gave Vietnam the capability to strike well beyond its borders, carrying a greater payload than the older U.S.-manufactured aircraft. The HIND helicopter gunships also upgraded their ground-attack capability. These would be used to replace the 20 captured UH-1 helicopters which were operational. The HORMONE helicopters gave the Vietnamese a previously lacking anti-submarine warfare capability and the HIP deliveries improved their tactical transport.²

(S) Naval deliveries between early 1979 and mid-1980 included 2 PETYA light frigates, 6 SHERSHEN patrol boats, 2 OSA II guided missile patrol boats, 3 POLNOCNY medium landing ships, 1 YURKA minesweeper, and 6 ZHUK patrol boats. By the end of the year, four more each of SHERSHEN and OSA II were delivered, bringing Vietnam's inventory of these to 10 and 6, respectively. All 16 of these fast patrol boats had been provided by the Soviets in 1979 and 1980. The SHERSHEN had an anti-ship/coastal defense mission and a maximum sustained speed of 45 knots with a range of 450 NM at that speed. Its armaments included two twin 30mm guns and four single 533mm torpedo tubes. It also carried depth charges and mines. The OSA II, with its STYX cruise missiles, also bolstered

1. CINCPAC 102209Z Sep 80 (S), REVW 8 Sep 86.
2. Ibid.

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anti-shipping capabilities which had previously been provided by just 3 KOMAR class boats.¹

³(S) Equipment deliveries designed to bolster Vietnamese ground capabilities included over 150 T-54/55 tanks, at least 500 long-range artillery pieces and rocket launchers, over 50 heavy amphibious ferry units, and more than 4,000 trucks, vans, and buses. This materiel significantly enhanced the firepower and mobility of an already capable, battle-tested Vietnamese Army. In all, these Soviet arms and equipment received in 1979 and 1980 gave the Vietnamese a strengthened combat capability in Indochina matched or exceeded only by the Chinese, and statements by Vietnamese officials indicated that they were confident they could stop a Chinese invasion similar to the incursion in February 1979.²

³(S) The border war and the cancellation of Chinese economic and military aid led to a much closer Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. The two had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 3 November 1978, and as of early 1980 up to 5,000 Soviet civilian and military advisers and technicians were believed to be in Vietnam. In addition, up to 1,200 Soviet advisers, including an estimated 200-300 military, were in neighboring Laos. The USSR was also permitted, for the first time, to use Vietnamese air and naval facilities for their own purposes.³

³(S/NOFORN/WMINTEL) Increased access to Vietnamese bases in 1980 was strategically important to the Soviet Union for three reasons: first, Soviet forces as a result were routinely positioned along one of the world's busiest trade routes. Daily, more than 120 ships in the South China Sea remained within reach of Soviet naval ships or aircraft operating from Vietnam bases. Secondly, routine access and use of Vietnamese ports greatly enhanced Soviet capability to rapidly reinforce surface and sub-surface naval forces in the Indian Ocean. Steaming distances to major sea lines of communication in the Arabian Sea were reduced almost by half. Thirdly, if deployed, Soviet attack aircraft staging from bases in Vietnam would significantly increase the threat to U.S. air and naval forces based in or operating near the Philippines.⁴

1. Ibid; CINCPAC 112010Z Nov 80 (S), REWV 6 Nov 86; CINCPAC 070335Z Oct 80 (S), REWV 6 Oct 86.
2. CINCPAC 102209Z Sep 80 (S), REWV 8 Sep 86.
3. IPAC Point Paper (S), 20 Mar 80, Subj: Soviet Initiatives in Southeast Asia (U), REWV 20 Mar 00.
4. CINCPAC 050142Z Nov 80 (S/FRD).
A Soviet floating drydock arrived at Cam Ranh Bay in early November 1980, enhancing the Soviet Navy's repair capability in this strategic area. The drydock displaced 4,500 tons and could hold a PETYA class frigate.\(^1\)

The Chinese viewed Soviet initiatives in Indochina as another step in Moscow's attempt to encircle China, and a primary national objective of the PRC was to counter this Soviet threat. The situation in Southeast Asia increased tension in the area and again brought Chinese and Vietnamese forces to the brink of confrontation.\(^2\)

**Threat to ASEAN**

Since the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese ties, Beijing had chosen to emphasize state-to-state relations with other Southeast Asian nations at the cost of curtailing aid to communist movements in those countries. Salient issues in that area included the Sino-Vietnamese-Laotian border dispute, sovereignty over island groups (Paracels and Spratlys) and oil exploration rights in the South China Sea, and Vietnam's close relationship with the Soviet Union. China made special efforts to strengthen ties to Thailand and promised assistance to that country should it be attacked by the Vietnamese. China was also attempting to woo those Southeast Asian states with which it did not have diplomatic ties, Singapore and Indonesia.\(^3\)

The U.S. Ambassador to Singapore advised the Secretary of State on 5 May 1980 that there was no question but that the increased Soviet military presence in Indochina was changing the strategic balance in Southeast Asia. There was also no question but that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN--Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines) was concerned about the prospect of a long-term Soviet military presence in the region because it strengthened the hand of Vietnam, it lent encouragement to left-wing forces who opposed the existing governments of the association members, it was seen as a threat by the PRC and could have the effect of increasing Chinese involvement in the region directly or indirectly, and it provided the Soviets a direct method for asserting greater leverage in the area.\(^4\)

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1. CINCPAC 112010Z Nov 80 (S), DECL 6 Nov 86.
3. IPAC Point Paper (S/NF), 22 May 80, Subj: PRC Relations with Other Nations in Asia (U), REVW 22 May 10.
4. AMEMB Singapore 04802/050735Z May 80 (C)(EX), DECL 5 May 86.
Thailand faced a major military threat following the Vietnamese takeover of Kampuchea in early 1979. In reaction to this threat it began to reorganize its military and turned to the United States for most of its requests for aid and assistance, mainly in increased foreign military sales credits and faster delivery of weapons and materials already approved by Congress.\(^1\)

Another problem resulting from the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea was the flood of Khmer refugees moving into Thailand. With the assistance of the United Nations and other international voluntary organizations, the Thai continued to sponsor a program of humanitarian relief for the estimated 160,000 refugees sheltered inside Thailand and possibly 500,000 to 800,000 more refugees that relied on food distribution for survival at points along the Thai-Kampuchean border.\(^2\)

The Chinese military attache in Bangkok had said on 28 June 1980 that China would assist Thailand militarily if the Vietnamese "made it necessary." He said the scope of the assistance would depend on the situation and could be economic, political, or military, adding that direct military support, if it were to occur, would be in the form of an attack along Vietnam's northern border. In September, again, the Chinese military attache in Bangkok reiterated that China would strike into Vietnam if the latter invaded Thailand. An invasion did not occur, but the threat to Thailand remained as Vietnam maintained an occupation force of 175,000 to 200,000 in Kampuchea, with an increase along the Thai frontier.\(^3\)

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1. IPAC Point Paper (C), 13 Jun 80, Subj: Current U.S.-Thai Issues (U), DECL 13 Jun 86.
2. Ibid.
3. IPAC HistSums Jun-Sep 80 (S/NF), REVW 30 Sep 00; SECSTATE 267692/062341Z Oct 80 (S)(EX), DECL 6 Oct 88.
SECTION IV--THREAT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA

Soviet Naval Presence

(S) Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean increased from the first deployment of combatants in 1968 until 1972. From 1972 to 1977 the force level there averaged slightly less than 8,000 ship days per year. In 1978 Soviet naval ship days increased slightly to 8,443 before falling to 7,594 in 1979. Ship days for 1980 were projected to be over 10,000.1

(S) Prior to the Iranian and Afghanistan crises of late 1979, the typical Soviet Indian Ocean force was comprised of 21 ships. Since then, as a result of increased U.S. presence in the area, the Soviets had maintained a force of approximately 30 ships in the Indian Ocean. Although most of the combatants deployed were considered second-line units, others included modern, sophisticated ships such as the KIEV class V/STOL carrier MINSK, LENINGRAD helicopter carrier, KARA and KRESTA missile cruisers, KRIVAK frigates, and ECHO II submarines.2

(S) The majority of naval units in the Soviet Indian Ocean Naval Squadron were homeported at Vladivostok with the Pacific Fleet; however, some units were provided by the Black Sea Fleet and, more recently, submarines had been provided by the Northern Fleet. Steaming time from Vladivostok to the Indian Ocean was approximately 10 days, and about the same transit time was involved for ships arriving from the Black Sea Fleet, provided no delays were encountered during transit of the Turkish straits and the Suez Canal. Although there had been no Northern Fleet surface augmentation to October 1980, under normal circumstances these units would transit from homeports to the Mediterranean via the Strait of Gibraltar and then to the Indian Ocean via the Suez, taking approximately 30 days. Submarines from the Northern Fleet would transit the Atlantic and enter the Indian Ocean via the Cape of Good Hope. Total transit time for the submarines, including local operations in the Atlantic, was usually about 30 days also. No Soviet submarine had transited via the Suez Canal. Units normally operated with the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron for about six months, with some deployments lasting up to eight months.3

1. IPAC Point Paper (S), 22 May 80, Subj: USSR Indian Ocean Operations (U), REVW 22 May 00; CINCPAC 010042Z Oct 80 (S), REVW 30 Sep 86.
2. IPAC Point Paper (S), 22 May 80, Subj: USSR Indian Ocean Operations (U), REVW 22 May 00.
3. CINCPAC 070335Z Oct 80 (S), REVW 6 Oct 86.
Soviet air activity in the Indian Ocean was limited to maritime reconnaissance missions flown by IL-38/MAY anti-submarine warfare aircraft, operating initially from fields in Somalia and after 1977 from Aden and Ethiopia. These aircraft were used on flights over the northern Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea to locate merchant ships and naval units in the area. Additionally, the Soviets supported these aircraft and their other naval forces with AN-12/CUB logistics flights.1

Strategic Importance of the Persian Gulf

Western dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf made this seaway one of the most strategically important areas worldwide. Although the Iran-Iraq war which erupted on a large scale in September 1980 had not spread to other Persian Gulf littoral nations, the potential loss of an estimated four million barrels of oil per day, previously produced by the belligerants, could have had a severe economic impact on nations which lacked alternative sources. Of much greater importance, closure of the Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the gulf would have caused catastrophic world economic and social convulsions and could have resulted in expanded military confrontations.2

The Persian Gulf area accounted for an estimated 62 percent of the world's known oil reserves. In 1980 an estimated 30 percent of the world's total oil production (40 percent of the non-communist world oil production) came from this area. The Iran-Iraq war crippled oil refining, storage, and transshipment points in both countries, and it was estimated that full restoration of facilities could take over a year, depending on the level of damage. The war continued at year end.3

Threat to Pakistan

The invasion of Afghanistan brought the Soviet military to the very frontier of Pakistan. Nearly 85,000 Soviet military personnel were in Afghanistan in late 1980, and another 32,000 were positioned along the Afghan border within the USSR. With a perceived threat from India on its eastern border, this situation gave stark awareness to the inability of Pakistan's military to counter a concerted threat from either the Soviet Union or India.4

1. IPAC Point Paper (S), 22 May 80, Subj: USSR Indian Ocean Operations (U), REVW 22 May 00.
2. IPAC Point Paper (S/NF), 31 Oct 80, Subj: The Strategic Importance of the Persian Gulf (U), REVW 31 Oct 86.
3. Ibid.
4. IPAC Point Paper (S/NF), 8 Oct 80, Subj: Assessment of Impact of Afghanistan Situation on Pakistan (U), REV 7 Oct 00; CINCPAC 042111Z Nov 80 (S), REVW 4 Nov 86.
In addition to the increased Soviet military presence, the insurrection in Afghanistan resulted in the movement of just over one million refugees into Pakistan. Of possibly greater concern to President Zia Ul-Haq was the potential of these refugees for exacerbating the problems caused by existing dissident elements in the country. Soviet subversive activity was still another source of concern. The Soviets were reportedly sponsoring a Pakistani government-in-exile in Kabul, Afghanistan, headed by the son of the late President Ali Bhutto. There was also evidence to suggest that the USSR had been supplying arms and other forms of aid to tribal dissident elements within Pakistan.¹

"Hot pursuit" activities by the Soviets against Afghan insurgents along the Pakistan border heightened tensions between the two countries. Pakistani forces responded to incursions by armed helicopters on a border post by returning fire—an effective demonstration of President Zia's resolve. Until the Soviets brought the Afghan insurrection under control or greatly increased forces there, however, IPAC believed the Soviets would limit their actions to hot pursuit and not make a concerted overt military thrust into Pakistan.²

Relations Between India and China

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan heightened Chinese concerns over encirclement by the Soviet Union and its client states, according to an assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency. As a result, Beijing was making a concerted effort to improve relations with India, a neighbor it had traditionally been suspicious about. In early 1980, for example, China sent Foreign Minister Huang Hua to attend the Indian Embassy's banquet marking India's 30th anniversary as a republic. The last time China sent such a high official was in 1961, prior to the deterioration that led to the 1962 war. Moreover, China's official news agency extensively covered the activities, quoting both Huang and the Indian Ambassador on the mutual commitment to improve ties. The media also reported Indira Ghandi's return to power without criticism.³

Despite such efforts, China found itself in a difficult situation. As a close friend of Pakistan, it had a responsibility to shore up that country's defenses because of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. At the same time, the PRC acknowledged that India's major strategic concern was a powerful China, a

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1. IPAC Point Paper (S/NF), 8 Oct 80, Subj: Assessment of Impact of Afghanistan Situation on Pakistan (U), REVW 7 Oct 80.
2. Ibid.
3. DIA 6401/072204Z Feb 80 (C), DECL 5 Feb 86.
powerful Pakistan, or worse, a powerful Sino-Pakistani military axis. Therefore, Beijing had to move cautiously in aiding Islamabad, or New Delhi could halt the improvement in relations, move closer to Moscow, or embark on a new regional arms race.  

China had to make every effort to allay India's fears over aid to Pakistan by pointing out that such equipment was intended only against Soviet aggression toward Pakistan and was not directed at New Delhi. China also had to convince India that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan not only was a threat to Pakistan but to all of South Asia, including India, and that the area could be stabilized only through regional cooperation. China was therefore forced to walk a dangerous political tightrope between its two mutually antagonistic neighbors.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
## COMMUNIST FAR EAST GROUND STRENGTH (U)

### USSR

- **Major Field Units of Soviet Army**
  - 7 Combined Arms Army Headquarters
  - 3 Corps Headquarters
  - 29 Motorized Rifle Divisions
  - 6 Tank Divisions
  - 3 Artillery (Rain) Divisions
  - 6 Motorized Rifle Brigades
  - 12 Artillery Brigades
  - 7 105-114 (65-83) D) Brigades
  - 306-118 (SCALE BOARD) Divisions

**PERSONNEL:** 450,000**

*Includes Central Asian, Siberian, Transbaikalian, and Far East Military Districts and Mongolia.

**Does not include: (a) ground units assigned to territorial air defense (PVD); (b) coastal defense forces of Soviet Navy; (c) ground crews and support elements of the air forces, 6th Internal Security Forces and Border Guard Troops (33,550 and 8,700).*

### CHINA

- 100 Infantry Divisions
- 35 Artillery Divisions
- 17 Field Artillery (TO 6,054)
- 3 Anti-Tank (TO 2,000)
- 19 Antiaircraft Artillery (TO 5,791)
- 11 Armored Divisions (TO 6,565)
- 3 Airborne/Artillery
- 3 Transportable Divisions (TO 9,900)
- 39 Border Defense Divisions (TO 6,725)
- 45 Garrison Divisions (TO 8,728)
- 16 Railway Engineer Divisions

**PERSONNEL:** 5,567,000

*20 additional AAA divisions are subordinate to the Air Defense Command of the CCAF.*

### NORTH KOREA

- 8 (possibly 9) Conventional Corps
- 1 Special Corps
- 28 Infantry Divisions
- 2 Mechanized Infantry Divisions
- 2 Motorized Infantry Divisions
- 2 Armored Divisions
- 4 Infantry Brigades
- 15 Infantry Brigades (Rearmed)
- 3 Armored Brigades
- 5 Armored Brigades (Reinforced)

**PERSONNEL:**

- Current estimated strength 642,000
- Military Security Forces 50,000

### VIETNAM

**REGULAR FORCES**

- 43 Infantry Divisions
- 20 Economic Reconstructions
- 19 Artillery Brigades
- 23 Independent Infantry
- 37 Antiaircraft Artillery
- 31 Engineer Regiments
- 8 Surface-to-Air Missile Regiments

**REGIONAL/LAND FORCES:**

- Full-time troops assigned to provincial districts armed with semi- and automatic weapons and medium caliber artillery weapons

**SECURITY FORCES:**

- 3 Armored Divisions
- 20 Armored Divisions
- 70 Armored Divisions
- 3 Armored Brigades
- 5 Armored Brigades

**PERSONNEL:**

- Regular Army 750,000
- Milieu — estimated to consist of 1.5 million people's militia/self-defense forces and three million reserve forces.

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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81, p. 53, REVW 16 Feb 01.

Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals.
## COMMUNIST NAVAL STRENGTH (U)
### FAR EAST & PACIFIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>CHINA</th>
<th>NORTH KOREA</th>
<th>VIETNAM</th>
<th>CAMBODIA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NUCLEAR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALLISTIC MISSILE</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRUISER MISSILE</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORPEDO ATTACK</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **SUBMARINES**                |      |       |             |         |          |       |
| DIESK                         |      |       |             |         |          |       |
| BALLISTIC MISSILE             | 9    | 1     | 0           | 0       | 0        | 10    |
| CRUISER MISSILE               | 4    | 0     | 0           | 0       | 0        | 4     |
| LONG RANGE ATTACK             | 1    | 0     | 0           | 0       | 0        | 1     |
| MEDIUM RANGE ATTACK           | 24(1)| 97    | 19          | 0       | 0        | 122   |
| SHORT RANGE ATTACK (SRO)      | 0    | 4(3)  | 1           | 0       | 0        | 5     |
| UNDETERMINED/MISCELLANEOUS TYPE| 5    | 0     | 0           | 0       | 0        | 5     |

| **PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS** |      |       |             |         |          |       |
| VESSEL CARRIERS               | 1    | 0     | 0           | 0       | 0        | 1     |
| CRUISERS (MISSILE)            | 9    | 0     | 0           | 0       | 0        | 9     |
| CRUISERS (GUN)                | 2(1) | 0     | 0           | 0       | 0        | 2(1)  |
| DESTROYERS (MISSILE)          | 6    | 0     | 0           | 0       | 0        | 6     |
| DESTROYERS (GUN)              | 16(5)| 2(2)  | 0           | 0       | 0        | 18(7) |
| FRIGATES (FF, FPC, MISSILE)   | 22(1)| 2     | 0           | 0       | 0        | 24(2) |
| FRIGATE (FF, GUN)             | 27   | 5     | 2           | 0       | 0        | 34    |

| **MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS AND SUPPORT SHIPS** |      |       |             |         |          |       |
| PATROL SHIPS                   | 192  | 1,001 | 348         | 40(4)   | 26(3)    | 1,615 |
| MINE WARFARE TYPES             | 102  | 63    | 9           | 0       | 0        | 165   |
| AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TYPES       | 14   | 9     | 115         | 0       | 0        | 130   |
| NAVAL AUXILIARY TYPE           | 256  | 256   | 3           | 1       | 0        | 257   |
| SERVICE CRAFT                  | 5(5) | 1,236 | 109         | 107     | 6(6)     | 1,492 |

| PERSONNEL STRENGTH            |      |       |             |         |          |       |
|                               | 100,000 | 255,000 | 31,000     | 8,000   | UNK      |       |

**NOTE:**
- (U) Figures in parentheses indicate additional units in reserve.
- (I) Many Vietnamese units believed to be impermeable.
- (I) Strike underpinned in Amphibious Warfay Type.
- (I) Strike underpinned in Naval Auxiliary Type.
- (I) Strike underpinned in Service Craft.

### SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST AIR FORCES (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USSRL.</th>
<th>CHINA</th>
<th>NORTH KOREA</th>
<th>VIETNAM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>NAVAL AIR</td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>NAVAL AIR</td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMBAT AIRCRAFT</td>
<td>4,426</td>
<td>1,426</td>
<td>1,426</td>
<td>1,426</td>
<td>5,858</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Fighter-(Day)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3,306</td>
<td>597</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Fighter-(All Weather)</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>106</td>
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<tr>
<td>Piston Attack</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Attack/Flighter Bouncer</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Bomber (Medium Range)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Bomber (Intermediate Range)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>63</td>
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<tr>
<td>Piston Light Bomber</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piston Medium Bomber</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Bomber (Long Range)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turboprop Bouncer (Long Range)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helicopter: Combat Assault</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,126</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>4,727</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>714</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUPPORT AIRCRAFT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Airborne Refueling</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Piston Transport, Light</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Piston Transport, Medium</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet and Turboprop Transport, Light</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Transport Medium</td>
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<td>Turboprop Transport, Medium</td>
<td>112</td>
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<td>Jet Transport, Heavy, (Long Range)</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Piston Repair</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helicopter: Admin/Liaison/Transport</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utility Miscellaneous</td>
<td>166</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Trainer</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>117</td>
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<td>Command, Comm. &amp; Control (Fixed Wing &amp; Hel)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,643</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2,298</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>257</td>
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<td>TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT</td>
<td>5,429</td>
<td>5,571</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>8,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>3,574</td>
<td>5,706</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL STRENGTHS</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>492,000</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>76,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. (U) Includes all combat and support aircraft in the Far East and Transbaikali Military Districts and the Far East Bumper Corps.
b. (U) Combat Aircraft: Fighter and bomber aircraft, which are used in fighter, ground attack, bomber-bomber, antiaircraft warfare roles, or reconnaissance/strumental warfare roles.
c. (U) Includes utility liaison aircraft, and jet fighter trainers. (I) includes all types of utility liaison aircraft, and jet fighter trainers.
d. (U) Combat Support Aircraft: All other aircraft assigned to operational units in support of the combat mission, including light and medium transports.
e. (U) Includes 219 LTVs used for liaison.
f. (U) Includes 220,616 personnel assigned to SAM and AAA units.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (S/AM), p. 58, REVW 16 Feb 01.

Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
# SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST MISSILE FORCES (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
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<th>LAUNCHERS</th>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>SURFACE</td>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TO SURFACE**</td>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SURFACE</td>
<td>SA-2</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TO AIR**</td>
<td>SA-3</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SA-3n</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SURFACE</td>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TO SURFACE**</td>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>62-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td></td>
<td>41-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>106-150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COASTAL</td>
<td>CSSC-2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>59</td>
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<td></td>
<td>DEFENSE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SURFACE</td>
<td>SA-2c</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TO AIR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH KOREA</td>
<td>SURFACE</td>
<td>SA-2</td>
<td>128 (45 OCS)</td>
<td>234 (EST.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TO AIR</td>
<td>SA-3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIETNAM</td>
<td>SURFACE</td>
<td>SA-2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TO AIR</td>
<td>SA-3n</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* East of 106°E if formerly listed as separate sites
** Occupied sites East of 106°E.

- 69 SA-2 complexes may consist of 1 to 5 launch sites of 6 launchers each.
- 69 Only 2 ICBM launchers confirmed although 5 additional roll-out launch sites confirmed.
- 69 Ninety-four occupied. CHORIN SA-2 sites may consist of 6 launchers.
- 69 Battalions move between prepared sites, none of which is known to be outside the Hanoi, Haiphong, Thu Duc Triangle.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (SYNF), p. 60, REVW 16 Feb 01.
CHAPTER III
PLANNING
SECTION I--NATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING

FY 82 Posture Statement

(C) The Chairman of the JCS prepared an annual military posture statement for presentation to the Congress. Since 1973 the Chairman had annually asked CINCPAC to provide input for that statement, and such a request was again received on 27 August 1980 for the FY 82 statement. The Chairman outlined several areas of specific interest. CINCPAC sought and considered inputs from his component commanders and his various staff agencies in the preparation of his response.1

(S) CINCPAC provided his reply on 27 September. He responded in detail to questioned subject areas. He also provided a brief encapsulation of his primary observations regarding U.S. military posture in the PACOM.2

1. J5324 HistSum Sep 80 (S), DECL 27 Aug 86; JCS 4772/271540Z Aug 80 (C), DECL 22 Aug 86; CINCPAC 300150Z Aug 80 (C), DECL 29 Aug 86.
2. CINCPAC 270304Z Sep (S/FRD), REVW 31 Dec 08.
Regarding presence and rapid deployments, CINCPAC said that the effectiveness of U.S. presence stemmed from both the capability of our forces and the perception of our willingness to use them. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the growing Soviet presence in Vietnam worried PACOM nations and "cause some to question our strength and reliability." CINCPAC said that a strong and steady U.S. military presence was the way to assuage their concerns. The vulnerability of Persian Gulf oil had shown the need to rapidly deploy forces. In the Indian Ocean, CINCPAC fully supported the ongoing efforts to improve access to littoral base facilities, but he was skeptical about "our ability to quickly translate an 'over-the-horizon' presence into an effective defense force given current restraints on our presence at those facilities."¹

**Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 81**

(U) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan was the near-term document in the JCS Joint Strategic Planning System. It addressed the application of in-being forces and capabilities to tasks and contingencies. It constituted the annual JCS tasking of CINCPAC for certain plans and activities.

⁻(S) The plan for FY 81 was not substantially changed from that of the previous year as far as CINCPAC's tasking was concerned. The major changes concerned newly formed organizations. CINCPAC was tasked to support and coordinate with the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) in OPLAN refinement, JDA deployment data base maintenance, and the coordination and monitoring of movement. When directed by the JCS, CINCPAC was to plan for the employment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) in non-NATO combat contingencies in assigned areas. Coordination with the Commander of the RDJTF for deployment/employment planning was to be as directed by the JCS.²

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1. Ibid.
Consolidated Guidance

The Defense Department's Consolidated Guidance had replaced three earlier documents in a revision of the national-level guidance and planning programs in 1978. Consolidated Guidance served as a guide to the Services and Defense Department Agencies in preparation of their Program Objective Memorandums. As had been the case in previous years, CINCPAC again found the thrust of national-level documents focused to too great an extent upon NATO and the Central Front.1

On 7 February the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on Draft Consolidated Guidance FY 82-86 and CINCPAC provided his response in two parts, both on 20 February. One of the messages concerned specific line-in/line-out recommendations to be considered by the JCS in conjunction with CINCPAC's comments on his major concerns.2

2. JCS 6382/072111Z Feb 80 (U); CINCPAC 202110Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 18 Feb 86.
3. J5321 HistSum Feb 80 (S), DECL 5 Mar 86; CINCPAC 200127Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 16 Feb 86.
The Draft perpetuated the ongoing strategy-resource mismatch by recognizing the problem but failing to offer a solution.

The paper was defensively oriented. CINCPAC noted the general tendency of the document to relegate PACOM forces to a defensive or reactive role and this remained a major concern. He said that a force was not a deterrent unless it was clearly capable of carrying the battle to the enemy and placing him on the defensive.

While the Draft stated that the "swing" of forces from theater to theater would not be automatic, it continually addressed a NATO-Warsaw Pact scenario where a swing would be expected.

In the parts of the Draft concerning regional guidance, CINCPAC said that specific guidance was limited. For example, the importance of the Aleutians was not addressed and coverage of simultaneous Korean and NATO contingencies lacked the depth of coverage accorded other scenarios, such as the NATO/Greater Middle East situation.

Regarding land forces, the restructuring and reorientation of Marine Corps forces to replace an Army mechanized division did not appear to pay sufficient attention to the lack of USMC capability to sustain heavy forces well inland over extended periods.

The pursuit of a coalition strategy was addressed. (In 1977, CINCPAC had recommended against further use or adoption of the term "coalition" to describe a combined effort by allies; he said the term "combined" as defined in JCS Publication 1 was considered more appropriate.) The pursuit of such a strategy was offered in the Draft as a means of reducing the strategy-resource mismatch. CINCPAC warned against considering such a strategy as an adequate hedge to an increased unilateral capability in meeting threats to U.S. and allied interests.

CINCPAC said that he regretted that the exceedingly short suspense allowed for his comments did not permit fuller exposition of a document of such importance.

1. Ibid.
Defense Policy Guidance FY 83-87

Defense Policy Guidance initiated and guided the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System/Consolidated Guidance cycle, and was a responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. CINCPAC provided comments on his major concerns on 11 October for the document concerning FY 83-87. He noted that it improved the content of the FY 82-86 document by giving special attention to improvements required in such areas as sustainability, special operations forces, and Korean C3 and secure communications.

CINCPAC said that the most pressing PACOM requirement was force structure growth. Ship and aircraft numbers were low and as he had repeatedly stated, the addition of Indian Ocean area requirements had available forces thinly stretched. He said there was a point at which quality improvement and enhanced reaction capability might fail to appropriately match superior numbers. For example, as the Soviet Union added aircraft to its Far Eastern forces at an annual rate exceeding the entire PACAF inventory, that point may have already been passed in the PACOM. Accordingly, while increased emphasis on rapid deployment was necessary, greater emphasis on maintaining forward deployed units was required to bolster any advantage in attempting to meet the force mismatch requirements. A valuable addition to the draft Defense Policy Guidance would be positive guidance leading to increased U.S. force levels.

After mentioning the long-term goal of fielding forces adequate to meet our strategy, the draft set the first priority as one of strategy retrenchment, that is, a strategy to match forces available. CINCPAC repeated that the highest priority should be one of expanding the force structure. Reduction of strategic aims should be a secondary, interim priority.

With the USSR modernizing its nuclear forces, existing policy and practices were pushing the United States toward perceived strategic inferiority.

Regarding maritime balance with the USSR, the guidance called for the maintenance of a margin of "U.S. superiority—a significant margin when allies are included—sufficient to carry out assigned missions." The missions were well stated and it was important that the guidance clearly stated that a maritime advantage was required. The forward strategy of the United States depended on maintaining this naval advantage and the successful execution of war plans depended on the capability to control the seas very early in any conflict.1

On 11 October CINCPAC also provided specific line-in, line-out comments to the Draft Defense Policy Guidance for FY 83-87.2

The Swing Strategy

The plan to redeploy significant numbers of PACOM forces, ships, and aircraft to reinforce the European and Atlantic Commands in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war was called the swing strategy. Since 1967 CINCPACs had believed this strategy that had come into being right after World War II was no longer viable and they had become increasingly insistent about the

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 112152Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 6 Oct 86.
subject in recent years. In 1979 the Secretary of Defense said the United States would retain the flexibility to move its military forces into--and out of--Asia and the Pacific. He had said that the swing strategy was only one of many Pentagon war plans. He ruled out neither moving air and naval forces into the Western Pacific nor preferentially to Europe; he also said that there was a possibility of moving forces from both Europe and the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and Mid-East in case of war or need to deter war.\(^1\)

\[(V)\] Both prior to and subsequent to that approval by "highest level," CINCPAC had thanked the JCS for the opportunity to comment. He offered no comments as PACOM requirements were covered; he said he supported the recommendations to "ease the rigidness embodied in the recognized 'swing' formula."\(^3\)

\[(U)\] The swing strategy had been the subject of an article in the New York Times by Richard Burt on 9 October 1979 that had set off some public discussion of the subject worldwide at that time. On 25 May 1980, Mr. Burt, again in the Times, reported that President Carter had agreed to a new strategic plan that no longer committed Washington to send Pacific-based forces to Europe in the event of a Soviet attack there. According to Government officials, Mr. Burt said, Robert W. Komier, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, had informed allied officials of the change at a NATO meeting in Brussels early in April and that Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had also discussed the change at a NATO session in May. The officials reportedly said that requirements of the increased U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, along with enhanced

2. J5324 HistSum Mar 80 (S), DECL 13 Mar 86; JCS 4053/131642Z Mar 80 (S), REVW 12 Mar 86; JCS 5182/082336Z Mar 80 (S), DECL 7 May 86.
3. CINCPAC 152030Z Mar 80 (C), DECL 13 Mar 86; CINCPAC 162119Z May 80.
Soviet forces in East Asia, had led the President to abandon the decades-old policy of NATO support known as the swing strategy.\(^1\)

(U) The article continued that in internal debate the State Department had been opposed to dropping the policy for fear it would alarm the Western alliance. In recent talks with Secretary of Defense Brown, however, NATO officials had evidently accepted the argument that the policy change would enhance Washington's capability to protect Western oil supplies in the Persian Gulf.\(^2\)

**Draft Policy Guidance for Contingency Planning**

(U) On 29 February the JCS advised that the Under Secretary of Defense for policy was developing a draft Policy Guidance for Contingency Planning document to provide Secretary of Defense annual guidance to the JCS, the Services, the Defense Agencies, and the Office of the Secretary for use in military contingency planning. It would focus on near-term resource availabilities

2. Ibid.
3. SECSTATE 140542/282309Z May 80 (C), GDS 5/28/86.
and assumptions to guide annual military operational planning. As envisioned, it would not be directive in nature to the CINCs, but would influence the content of the annual Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and Service capabilities plans. Expected objectives of the plan would be:  

- Establish guidelines for interaction between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS with regard to the planning assumptions used by military planners.

- Insure that plans were clearly understood and their attendant risks recognized by those responsible for their execution, including selected civilian officials responsible for implementation decisions.

- Insure that military objectives were consistent with available resources.

- Integrate DOD policy development, the Joint Operations Planning System, and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System to insure identification of key constraints that could be overcome by revisions to policies or programs.

(U) CINCPAC provided his thoughts on 2 May. He said that contingency planning was properly a military function guided by national policy and defense objectives. If fully implemented, the Policy Guidance for Contingency Planning would duplicate much of what was already being accomplished in the military planning process. In addition, the stated objectives of the guidance would work to establish a monitoring process that would add little to the harmony of overall defense planning. Implementation of the new paper was a step that CINCPAC believed should be taken slowly and the scope of the initiative should be limited to interaction between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS regarding planning assumptions used by military planners. CINCPAC did not see a case at that time for carrying the new project beyond that point. Nevertheless, he provided some editorial points on the first proposed document.  

FY 82-86 Program Decision Memorandums

(U) On 5 August the JCS requested the comments of the unified and specified commanders on Program Decision Memorandums for FY 82-86. This was the

1. JCS 2311/292357Z Feb 80 (U).
2. CINCPAC 020051Z May 80 (S), REVW 15 Apr 00, REAS 2-301c(6).
first time that comments had been requested by the JCS from the unified and specified commanders. In the past, comments had been limited to Service channels.1

(3) He urged near-term actions to preclude further slide by such means as deployment of cruise missiles, a review of the adequacy of fissile materials, and an improvement in strategic connectivity. He said that Program Decision Memorandums did not adequately redress strategic shortfalls.

(3) He said that airlift and sealift capability was adequate to provide for both contingency response and general war requirements. The Program Decision Memorandums recognized mobility force shortfalls by accounting for additional air and sealift and he urged funding at the enhanced level.

1. J5323 HistSum Aug 80 (S), DECL 12 Aug 80; JCS 1015/051835Z Aug 80 (U).
2. CINCPAC 151837Z Aug 80 (S), DECL 12 Aug 86.
Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis FY 83-90, Allied and Friendly Forces

1. Ibid.
2. J5312 HistSum Jun 80 (S), DECL 1 Jul 86.
3. Ibid.; JCS 3126/241456Z Apr 80 (S), REVW 11 Apr 00, REAS 6 and 7.
(U) Country Team inputs were received from 16 to 28 May. Action officer coordination on a draft PACOM corrigenda to Book IV for FY 82-89 followed and the corrigenda was dispatched on 16 June to the JCS.\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1} J5312 HistSum Jun 80 (S), DECL 1 JUL 86.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
SECTION II--CINCPAC PLANS

1. CINCPAC Plans Status Report, Ser T1, 2 Jan 81 (TS), REVW 2 Jan 01, REAS 2-301c(6). The following definitions pertained. An OPLAN was an operation plan for the conduct of military operations that could be translated into an operation order with minimum alteration. Complete plans included deployment/employment phases, as appropriate. A CONPLAN was an Operation Plan in Concept Format, an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require expansion into an OPLAN or OPORD prior to implementation. An OPORD was a directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.
1. J5211 HistSum Jan 80 (U); CINCPAC 220116Z Jan 80 (S), REVW 22 Mar 99.
2. Ibid.
3. J5211 HistSums Sep, Dec 80 (S), REVW 22 Mar 99; JCS 7517/281334Z May 80 (S), DECL 8 May 86; CINCPAC 032142Z Sep 80 (S), REVW 22 Mar 99, REAS 2-301c(6); CINCUNC 100152Z Sep 80 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 112205Z Sep 80 (S), REVW 22 Mar 99, REAS 2-301c(6); CINCPAC 080041Z Oct 80 (S), REVW 31 Dec 10, REAS 2-301c(6).
1. CINCPAC 112205Z Sep 80 (S), REVW 22 Mar 99, REAS 3-201c(6); CINCPAC 080041Z Oct 80 (S), REVW 31 Dec 10, REAS 2-301c(6).
2. J5211 HistSum Sep 80 (S), REVW 31 Dec 08.
3. CINCPACFLT 130211Z Sep 80 (S), REVW 31 Dec 08.
with the remainder of the Marine tactical air units deploying on D-Day directly to Yechon.\(^1\)

**Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force**

\(\text{(S)}\) In August 1979 the JCS informed the unified and specified commanders that a Contingency Review Group had been established to review planning efforts associated with the U.S. ability to respond rapidly to selected non-major contingencies. A conference was held in the Pentagon in September 1979 to identify capabilities associated with a Rapid Deployment Force. Effective 1 March 1980 a separate headquarters, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, was established at MacDill AFB, Florida, under the Operational Command of USCINCREDE, also at MacDill. The Commander of the RDJTF was responsible for planning, jointly training, exercising, and being prepared to deploy and employ designated forces of the RDJTF, as directed, to respond to contingencies threatening U.S. interests anywhere in the world. An area of responsibility was subsequently refined and the RDJTF's primary area of concern for contingency planning was Southwest Asia. For this purpose, however, Southwest Asia was defined as all states on the Arabian Peninsula south of the northern borders of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; the countries of Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan on the Middle East landmass; Ethiopia, Djibouti,

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1. J5211 HistSum Dec 80 (S), REVW 31 Dec 08; CINCPAC 312301Z Oct 80 (S), REVW 3 Apr 99, REAS 2-301c(6).
2. J541 HistSum Feb 80 (S), DECL 31 Jan 86; JCS 011458Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 31 Jan 86; CINCPAC 020009Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 31 Jan 86.
Somalia, and Kenya on the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and adjacent waters. (See map, page 35.)

By the spring of 1980 the tentative composition of the RDJTF had been identified for Army and Air Forces. U.S. naval forces had been identified only notionally as one surface action group, three carrier battle groups, one Marine Amphibious Force, and five P-3 patrol squadrons. In his 15 April semi-annual Commander's SITREP, USCINCREDO said that "failure to identify Navy and Marine Corps elements" was a restraint on the RDJTF capabilities. (It was noted that all of the Army and Air Force units designated were CONUS-based and had been CINCREDO's responsibility for a long time.) No naval command had been designated to be the Naval Component Command and the little planning that had been done was by CINCLANT units or by some ad hoc arrangement. The Navy's "in support of" policy had traditionally allocated operating forces to Fleet Commanders. On 6 September 1980 CINCPAC designated CINCPACFLT as a naval planning element to USCINCREDO and the RDJTF for contingencies involving use of PACOM naval forces in support of the RDJTF. Earlier, on 4 March 1981, Terms of Reference had been completed and signed by COMRDJTF and Commander, Mid-East Force designating responsibilities, functions, and mission of Commander, Mid-East Force as the Commander of the Forward Element of the RDJTF.

On 6 September CINCPAC forwarded his general comments on the OPORD, plus specific comments on individual sections of the document. On 15 September,
in a joint COMDJTF/USCINCRED message, those commands replied to CINCPAC's comments and those of other unified and specified commands and the REDCOM components. 1

1. CINCPAC 060030Z Sep 80 (TS/NF), REVW 1 Jul 00, REAS 2-301c(5); COMDJTF 151600Z Sep 80 (TS), REVW 1 Jul 00 (a 72-page message).
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SECTION III--RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER PACOM COUNTRIES

ANZUS Council Meeting

(U) The tripartite Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Pact had been signed in 1951, but never invoked in a wartime situation. Annual ANZUS Council meetings were normally held once a year, usually in June or July, and rotated among the three capitals. Each country delegation included a Military Representative, and CINCPAC served in that capacity for the United States.¹

(U) The 1980 meeting had been scheduled for the summer in Wellington, New Zealand, but as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan it was held 26 and 27 February in Washington. The principal delegates from Australia were Andrew Peacock, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Defence D. J. Killen; the principal from New Zealand was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Brian Talboys. The meeting was chaired by U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The Council members announced in the communique released following the meeting that they had agreed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a nonaligned country, was a blatant violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. They further agreed that the Soviet action challenged the independence of all states and called for appropriate political responses, according to national interests and capacities.²

(U) The communique said that the Council had discussed the composition and level of forces in the Indian Ocean that would be appropriate to demonstrate allied support for security of the area and determination to deter further Soviet adventurism. Later in 1980 Australia planned to deploy a carrier task group to the Indian Ocean led by HMAS MELBOURNE. Naval and air support would be given by New Zealand as resources permitted.

(U) The ANZUS partners strongly endorsed efforts of Southeast Asian nations to bring about the restoration of peace and security in their region. Regarding tensions along the Thai-Kampuchean border, the Council "viewed with particular concern the possibility that the hostilities could spill over into Thailand." They called on Vietnam to respect Thailand’s territorial integrity. They commented on the problem created for many of the countries of Southeast Asia by the persisting refugee exodus and the continuing importance of the humane policies of first asylum of countries in the region.

1. USICA WASHDC 09336/230143Z Feb 80 (C), EO 12065 NA.

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(U) Welcoming the independence of Kiribati since the last Council meeting, the Council reaffirmed the importance it attached to the peaceful progress of the South Pacific. They took note of the progress made toward self-determination in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and welcomed the increased participation of the Micronesian governments in regional organizations.

(U) Council members reviewed the conduct of the alliance since the previous meeting and expressed satisfaction with the continued high degree of cooperation and consultation. They took note of the regular program of exchanges, exercises, and visits carried out by the armed services of the three allies and the contribution these had made to the readiness of the members to support one another in periods of military danger or natural disaster.¹

**ANZUS Military Representatives Meeting**

(U) In conjunction with the ANZUS Council Meetings, Military Representatives usually held their own meeting. In 1980 such a meeting was held at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., on 28 February, the day following the Council meeting. The principal delegates were Air Marshal Sir Richard Bolt, Chief of the Defence Staff, New Zealand; Lieutenant General Sir Donald Dunstan, Chief of General Staff, Australian Army; and Admiral Long. These meetings addressed the military aspects of the ANZUS relationship.²

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1. Ibid.
2. J513 HistSum Feb 80 (U).
3. CINPCAC AIRBORNE 291800Z Feb 80 (S), REVW 1 Mar 00.
(U) The New Zealand representative, who had attended four of the military representative meetings, commented that this was the most productive he had attended.2

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
1. J5613 HistSum Nov 80 (C), REWV 5 Dec 86; Memo from National Delegations to Twelfth ANZUS Staff Level Meeting to ANZUS MILREPS, 2 May 80 (C), REWV 2 May 86.
(U) Admiral Long, as the U.S. Military Representative, ratified the two reports (SLM 12 and 13) and so advised the Military Representatives of Australia and New Zealand on 3 December.²

ANZUS Seminars

(U) ANZUS seminars were the working level conferences designed to promote the effectiveness of ANZUS military operations. The semiannual conferences both resolved problems passed to them by higher level ANZUS bodies and initiated their own new ideas. The first such seminar had been held in March 1976 at Camp Smith, with subsequent seminars rotating among participating countries.³

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1. Ibid.; J5611 HistSum Oct 80 (U).
2. CINCPAC 030011Z Dec 80 (C), DECL 1 Dec 86.
3. CINCPAC 180326Z Nov 80 (U); J5131 Point Paper (U), 23 Nov 77; Subj: ANZUS Seminars.
4. Memo, National Delegations to ANZUS Seminar V to Chiefs of National Delegations to the 12th ANZUS Staff Level Meeting, 7 Mar 80 (C); CINCPAC 080322Z Feb 80 (C), DECL 28 Feb 86.
(U) Seminar VII was scheduled for February 1981 in Wellington, New Zealand.

CINCPAC Briefing Team Visit to Australia and New Zealand

(U) CINCPAC provided a briefing team again in 1980 for Australian Service schools, as he had done for many years. In 1980 for the first time the team also visited New Zealand. The teams were customarily led by a flag or general officer and CINCPAC's Director for Plans led the team on the 13-22 November visit. The presentation was in three parts. Part I concerned "U.S. Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region," Part II was an "In-Depth Look at PACOM Forces," and Part III was entitled "Joint Operations." Discussion topics concerned

1. J5611 HistSum (C), Aug 80.
2. Ibid.
"Developments in Northeast and Southeast Asia" and "Developments in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and Command, Control, and Communications Arrangements."

(U) Briefings were provided at the Royal New Zealand Air Force Staff College at Auckland, and in Australia at the Australian Joint Services Staff College at Canberra and the Royal Australian Air Force Staff College at Fairbairn RAAF Base. CINCPAC's Airborne Command Post provided transportation to New Zealand and Australia; commercial transportation was used on the return. As usual, all briefings were well received.

U.S.-China Security Relationship

(U) As noted elsewhere in this history in a discussion of CINCPAC's official activities, the first distinguished Chinese visitors representing that government in its renewed association with the United States stopped in Hawaii en route to or from Washington visits. The first was Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin, who visited on 14 March.

(S) In over two hours of briefing and discussions at CINCPAC's headquarters, Minister Zhang expressed appreciation and said he came as the pioneer advance party for more important delegations to come. He said that since Secretary of Defense Brown's visit to China, relationships between the two countries were getting stronger. There were many common interests, the Minister said, and some differences; he would be reporting to his leaders on what he heard and they would place great importance on what was made available to them.

(U) When he arrived in Washington Minister Zhang told the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs that the arrangements and briefing presented by CINCPAC had been "perfect."

(U) On 5 June the PACOM was visited by Vice Premier Geng Biao, who was completing a visit to the Mainland United States. CINCPAC again provided a briefing and discussions followed. In his remarks at a dinner Admiral Long gave in his honor, the Vice Premier said that he and his colleagues felt extremely satisfied with the visit. They had discussed with U.S. military leaders the international situation, world strategy, and relationships

2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 150535Z Mar 80 (S)(EX), REVW 14 Mar 86.
4. SECSTATE 070456/170022Z Mar 80 (U).
between the two countries. He said that the military discussion had been beneficial. They had visited units of all three Services, viewed their equipment and facilities, and observed their "top-notch" training. "We have gotten to know many more friends and especially we have encountered many ordinary American people that still harbor very friendly feelings toward China." 1

(U) The Vice Premier also said that he believed that his visit this time had assisted the continuing developing relationship between China and the United States. "Not only is this fact in the interest of both our countries, but it also is in the interest of world peace. The people of our two countries have enjoyed historical friendship and at the present we have common goals and needs in our anti-hegemony effort." He said we all hope the Pacific Ocean will always remain peaceful, but that would require effort from all Pacific littoral countries. "At the same time, we must combine our efforts with the Western European countries as well as the Third World nations and together we will wage the anti-hegemony war." He urged continuing effort so that all aspects of relations between China and the United States, including military affairs, pointed toward even greater developments. He said that toward that effort "our attitude is utmost urgency." He concluded with a toast to the President and national leaders, his hosts, and, among other things, the continuing increasing friendship between the people of China and the United States. 2

(5) While in Hawaii the Vice Premier personally confirmed his invitation for CINCPAC and Mrs. Long to visit China. 3

(U) As part of a continuing, long-time interest in the People's Republic, and in part because of the accelerating pace of the establishment of U.S.-Chinese relations, in August CINCPAC requested that the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, prepare a study that could be used in formulating CINCPAC views on future U.S. relations with China. The resultant 20-page study was prepared by the school's Department of National Security Affairs and was dated 30 September. 4

(5) Meanwhile, on 5 September and again with refinements on 12 September, the JCS Director for Plans requested the comments of his counterpart on the CINCPAC staff regarding the U.S.-PRC security relationship. The JCS noted that the pace of military-to-military contacts and security related issues could be

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1. CINCPAC 072300Z Jun 80 (U).
2. Ibid; the "hegemony" villain in Chinese pronouncements was the USSR.
3. CINCPAC 070436Z Jun 80 (S)(EX), DECL 6 Jun 88.
4. J5122 HistSum Nov 80 (U), which contained a copy of the Monterey study.
expected to increase. In recent months action had been taken or decisions made on a U.S.-PRC civil air agreement, a port access policy, and on sales of U.S. military equipment to China. Ever since the 1978 announcement of recognition of China, relations had been expanding. Perhaps the most significant matter to the U.S. defense establishment was an as yet unquantifiable strategic convergence between the two countries. The JCS asked for some particular CINCPAC analyses and assessments.¹

(U) The CINCPAC reply was provided on 4 November. Some parts overlapped with thoughts in the Monterey study. In the summary it was noted that U.S. defense policy towards China had to be based on our national goals and interests, the strengthening of U.S. mutual defense ties throughout the world, and the establishment of a sufficiently flexible U.S.-PRC relationship based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other nations, non-aggression, and peaceful coexistence. Our defense relationship should focus on conveying our concern to the Soviets that the world must remain free from hegemony and that global balance must be maintained. We must remain sensitive to the concerns of those countries whose policies could improve Soviet access to the PACOM area; examples were India, Vietnam, and Indonesia. This sensitivity had to be a major factor in our relationship with other countries in the PACOM area to insure that area stability could be achieved and maintained. Any U.S. defense policy toward China had to be analyzed for its global significance and implications. "A China policy cannot be viewed as only a card to be played against the Soviet Union." Caution should be the watchword and the United States must take care to test the waters before embarking upon any China assistance program that might impact on maintaining global equilibrium of power, preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and strengthening of world order.²

¹ JCS 5934/051450Z Sep 80 (S)(EX), DECL 4 Sep 86; JCS 6974/122203Z Sep 80 (S)(EX), DECL 10 Sep 86.
² CINCPAC 041846Z Nov 80 (TS), DECL 31 Oct 86.
Defense Relations with Indonesia

(§) CINCPAC continued to believe that it was prudent, within existing political constraints, to seek continued expansion of closer defense contacts with the Armed Forces of Indonesia, and had several opportunities to comment on this subject to offices in the Defense Department in Washington in 1980. (See also the Operations, Security Assistance, and Intelligence chapters of this history for discussions of U.S.-Indonesian relations.)

(§) On 17 April the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs said his office was reviewing non-Foreign Military Sales or International Military Education and Training programs to improve defense relations with Indonesia. He said that over the previous two years a variety of initiatives had been proposed, including port calls by U.S. warships, combined training exercises, unit exchanges, observation of military exercises, assistance to Jakarta's defense industry, and research and development efforts. He said that for a variety of reasons, mainly political and economic, all of those initiatives had been rejected within the U.S. Government. He asked CINCPAC if those proposals were still operationally viable and desirable from the PACOM perspective. He asked the Defense Attache in Indonesia what the likely reaction to those proposals would be.2

(§) CINCPAC replied that from the PACOM perspective the initiatives remained viable and desirable. He noted that over the previous two years some expansion in military contacts with Indonesia had occurred. For example, over 20 officers had participated in a WESTCOM-sponsored on-the-job training program in Hawaii and senior Indonesian officers had observed a command post and field training exercise of the 25th Infantry Division. Additionally, Indonesian representatives had participated in the Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar and the Pacific Armies Management Seminars. While some success had been achieved in expanding military-to-military contacts, however, the

1. Ibid.
2. J5321 HistSum Apr 80 (S), DECL 15 Apr 86; SECDEF 2145/170203Z Apr 80 (S), DECL 15 Apr 86.
Government of Indonesia had remained reluctant to broaden defense contacts as evidenced by a recent unfavorable consideration of a WESTCOM request to send observers to a large-scale Indonesian Armed Forces exercise. He sought continued expansion of closer defense contacts, but believed that the FMS/IMET programs remained an essential ingredient in U.S. efforts for upgrading the defense relations with Indonesia.1

The Defense Attaché likewise believed that FMS and IMET programs were essential to upgrading relations and he, the U.S. Defense Liaison Group, and the Ambassador hoped to see more, but he also hoped to see an improved reaction time in the area of FMS. He said the ongoing ship visit policy of four ships a year was adequate, but there had been only one in 1979 and none by April of 1980. He believed the Indonesians would welcome four a year. He thought combined training exercises "philosophically an excellent idea," but one that had little chance of occurring for the Army or Air Force. In conjunction with port visits, passing exercises on a single ship basis did take place, but Indonesia avoided actions that would tend to place it in the "American camp." The same thing was true of unit exchanges. He said his bid to observe an Indonesian exercise had also been turned down (as WESTCOM's had been), but the Indonesian Government would probably approve such requests at some time in the future. He said he enthusiastically supported initiatives in the areas of assistance to defense industry and research and development efforts. He believed the Indonesian Government would probably react very favorably to U.S. efforts in this area.2

In September the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering advised of a July visit by the Indonesian Minister of Technology. The discussions had centered on the Indonesian Minister's expectations for the Indonesian defense industries and the type of cooperation with the United States that might be most beneficial. The Under Secretary suggested a continued exchange, including a possible survey visit to Indonesia in the autumn of 1980 to determine the needs of their defense industries, which would lead to the formation of a program for cooperation.3

CINCPAC encouraged participation in such a program as it would convey a strong and clear signal of U.S. Government support, interest, and friendship to not only Indonesia but to all Association of Southeast Asian Nations. He noted that Indonesia was strategically vital to U.S. security and economic interests and the fact that Indonesian sea lines of communication were important.

1. CINCPAC 182340Z Apr 80 (S), DECL 17 Apr 86.
2. USDAO Jakarta 06327/170826Z Apr 80 (S), DECL 15 Apr 86.
3. SECDEF 5606/031608Z Sep 80 (C), DECL 25 Aug 86.
to U.S. allies and friends in the Pacific as well. It was important, he said, that the relationship between the United States and Indonesia, including in a military-to-military context, be enhanced at a steady pace. "A program of defense industrial cooperation is a natural progression of our relationship."  

U.S.-Japan Planning and Cooperation

(Tr) On 1 April the Japan Diet's lower house established a special defense affairs committee, thus sanctioning national defense as a subject for debate for the first time in post-World War II Japan. The committee, although not empowered to discuss defense bills, was expected to debate security issues, such as responding to a military emergency, increasing defense spending, extending sea patrol areas, and mining Japan's straits. Establishment of this committee after years of political maneuvering was seen to indicate greater acceptance of defense as a legitimate national concern by opposition political parties and the public. This acceptance had been fueled by uneasiness over Soviet actions, especially intervention in Afghanistan, the naval buildup in the Pacific, and reinforcement of the Kuril Islands.  

(S) On 29 March 1980 CINCPAC submitted for JCS approval the notional force list for bilateral military planning with Japan. The force list had been developed in accordance with JCS guidance to develop the force within the bounds of military prudence. Ambassador Mansfield had been briefed on the force list prior to forwarding it to the JCS.  

(S) In early April the JCS asked CINCPAC to reanalyze the U.S. Army division force level submitted. On 9 April CINCPAC supported a reduction in Army forces from two divisions to one for planning.  

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1. CINCPAC 132009Z Sep 80 (C), DECL 30 Sep 86.
2. DIA 030703Z Apr 80 (C), DECL 2 Apr 86.
4. J5214 HistSum Apr 80 (S), REVW 26 Mar 00; CINCPAC 290220Z Mar 80 (S), REVW 26 Mar 00.
5. CINCPAC 092045Z Apr 80 (S), REVW 26 Mar 00.
On 17 May the JCS approved CINCPAC's 29 March submission, as revised. This permitted the Japanese Joint Staff Office and COMUS Japan to undertake final drafting and coordination of the Japan—United States Draft Defense Plan. On 27 September the plan was submitted to CINCPAC. Following staff and component command review, and resolution of resulting substantive comments, it was completed by mid-December, approved by CINCPAC on 2 January 1981, and forwarded to the JCS for review shortly after that.\(^1\)

With submission of the plan for JCS review, CINCPAC advised the JCS that as this had been an initial effort in the development of a U.S.—Japan plan, it had not been coordinated during preparation with organizations or elements outside the PACOM. As it had been forwarded to the JCS, elements of the plan were being coordinated with US CINCRED, CINCLANT, CINCSAC, CINCMAC, and COMSC. Comments resulting from that review would be forwarded to the JCS. The JCS were also advised that the plan had been designated a "Draft" Defense Plan for Japanese purposes and translation. It was understood by the U.S. planning community that planning and the resultant plan formed a continuous process. To the Japanese, however, a plan, once finalized and signed, was complete and must be executed. It was necessary, therefore, to include the word "draft" in the title to indicate that the plan was not meant for immediate execution, but was in instrument in a continuing process. For Japanese purposes, if the plan were implemented the word "draft" would be dropped from the title.\(^2\)

In another matter, on 6 December the Under Secretary of Defense, Robert W. Komor, expressed concern regarding the apparent lack of initiative in the Defense Department to secure Japanese support in covering U.S. POL requirements for contingencies. Referring to a Defense Attache report from Tokyo that said Japan did not have its own wartime POL support "sorted out yet" and there were "no known plans" for Japanese POL support of the U.S. military, Under Secretary Komor said, "What does nonplus me is that in the many, many years of US/Japan military relationship, neither DOD nor the US military has apparently ever done anything about either problem." He continued, "I also take a dim view of the DAO's negative judgment about an approach to the Japanese at this juncture. It is precisely this kind of negativistic inertia which inhibits us from ever changing outdated policies. Do we want Japan to be able to defend itself? Can it do so without POL? Should it therefore develop a wartime POL plan? If so, why shouldn't the

1. J5214 HistSum Dec 80 (S), REVW 14 Jan 87; JCS 171712Z May 80 (S), DECL 13 May 86.
2. CINCPAC Ltr Ser S14 of 12 Jan 81 (C), Subj: JSDF-USFJ Draft Defense Plan (U), REVW 27 Sep 00.
US ask that it cover US requirements in the area, especially if we are willing to pay for them?" The JCS asked CINCPAC for his comments, his suggested approaches for a reply to the Under Secretary, or substantive information. ¹

(5) CINCPAC advised the JCS that he supported the underlying thrust of the memo from Under Secretary Komar that the United States must seek greater, assured wartime support from our allies. The need for such support from Japan, in particular, was well recognized, and the scope of that desired support extended beyond the POL support issue.

(5) CINCPAC said that securing increased support from Japan, however, required a well-managed approach worked in concert with key proponents in the Japanese Government. The most appropriate mechanism to accomplish that objective was the bilateral planning process. He noted that bilateral military planning was well underway and represented a major breakthrough in U.S. planning efforts regarding Japan. Defense Plan 5098 provided for mutual support of common items of supply and maximum use of available resources procurable within Japan. In follow-on efforts, U.S. and Japanese participants would be addressing additional specific support, to include POL, that the Japanese could provide to the United States. CINCPAC said, "The bilateral planning process has provided steady progress and significant gains, and is considered the proper approach for securing increased defense cooperation."²

CINCPAC-Japan Staff Office Exchange Visit

(U) On 14 March CINCPAC asked COMUS Japan to pass to the Chairman of the Japanese Joint Staff Council an invitation for a member of his staff to visit PACOM headquarters. CINCPAC said that he believed visits in this series had proved to be beneficial in the past. He said that he hoped that the Joint Staff Office Chairman shared that perception.³

(U) CINCPAC hosted Rear Admiral Kahei Tatagiri, Director J3, Japan Joint Staff Office for the semiannual exchange from 8 to 13 June. Focus of the discussions was combined and joint operations and training. While in Hawaii the Admiral also visited the Pacific Missile Range, observed a torpedo exercise

1. J5113 HistSum Dec 80 (S), DECL 31 Dec 86; CINCPAC 160209Z Dec 80 (S), DECL 31 Dec 86.
2. CINCPAC 310231Z Dec 80 (S), DECL 31 Dec 86.

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aboard a P-3 aircraft, and participated in briefings and discussions with the component commands and the 25th Infantry Division.¹

(C) In a follow-on message to the JCS, CINCPAC noted that it was readily apparent that this and similar programs were vitally beneficial. He said that the professional and personal associations inherent in these visits provided immeasurable benefit to the advancement of mutual trust and understanding. He said he continued to have a personal interest in sustaining and expanding programs such as the JSO exchange visits.²

PACOM Initiatives for Malaysia

(S) In October the Malaysian Prime Minister met in Kuala Lumpur with the U.S. Ambassador and the Commander of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet. The Prime Minister expressed deep concern at expanding Soviet military capabilities and requested increased training support for the Malaysian Armed Forces. He said Malaysia would remain unaligned, but he also emphasized that his country and the others in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations had to ultimately depend on American strength and assistance for their security. CINCPAC asked his component commanders for their recommendations on initiatives in the areas of security assistance, intelligence, training, and exercises that could be offered to further the U.S. relationship with Malaysia.³

(S) CINCPAC considered the inputs from his component commanders when he prepared his 10 November message to the Ambassador. He proposed certain initiatives that could be offered to the Government of Malaysia as first steps in a "carefully phased increase in military-to-military contacts with the Royal Malaysian Armed Forces." CINCPAC said that he fully realized that the initiatives must not proceed too quickly and create an adverse reaction. He said he would appreciate the Ambassador's comments on his proposals.⁴

(S) He proposed that when his Director for Intelligence visited Malaysia to present the CINCPAC Persian Gulf Briefing he could examine the feasibility

1. J511 HistSum Jun 80 (U).
2. CINCPAC 242304Z Jun 80 (C), DECL 30 Jul 80.
3. J5121 HistSum Nov 80 (S), DECL 31 Dec 86; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 6563/040606Z Oct 80 (S)(EX), E.O. 12065: RDS-1 and 3 10/03/00; CINCPAC 112307Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 31 Oct 86.
4. CINCPAC 100830Z Nov 80 (S), DECL 30 Nov 86; CDRWESTCOM 170130Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 17 Oct 86; CINCPACAF 190130Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 31 Oct 86; CINCPACFLT 252240Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 31 Oct 86.
of establishing a formal intelligence exchange program between CINCPAC and the Royal Malaysian Armed Forces. CINCPAC mentioned a number of exercise initiatives, including Malaysian participation in the COPE THUNDER series in the Philippines, periodic AWACS deployments with combined training possibilities, increased port visits with increased opportunities for passing exercises, initiation of an Army exercise series, and Malaysian Army observations of 25th Infantry Division exercise TROPIC LIGHTNING. Personnel exchange programs offered opportunities to enhance exchange of doctrinal and training concepts as well as further interoperability with friendly forces. Although ship port visits had been minimal in the past, with increased transits to and from the Indian Ocean the opportunity to increase the level of such visits was available and could be considered. The Admiral said that he would like to visit Malaysia in the spring of 1981, that the Commander of WESTCOM planned to visit in January 1981, and that CINCPACAF intended to invite the Malaysian Air Force Chief of Staff to visit Headquarters PACAF in the near future. CINCPAC said he would want to work closely with the Ambassador on this important project and would appreciate the Ambassador's views on how these initiatives would be received in the existing political environment.1

Implementation of Philippine Military Bases Agreement Amendment

(U) CINCPAC had designated CINCPACREP Philippines as the single point of contact and overall coordinator for the implementation of the 1979 amendment to the Military Bases Agreement. Early reporting had been on a monthly basis, but by the end of 1980, in view of the excellent progress made on substantive provisions of implementation, the reporting requirement was changed to quarterly.2

(U) In a report summarizing events of 1980, CINCPAC advised the JCS that excellent progress had been made on provisions of implementation. "Positive cooperation and coordination between AFP and USF have eliminated sensitive issues and a warm, beneficial relationship has been maintained."3

(U) CINCPAC advised that General Romeo C. Espino, Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff, continued as Philippine Bases Commander. As of 31 December there were 615 AFP personnel at Subic Bay, 785 at Clark Air Base proper, 31 at John Hay Air Station, 28 at Camp O'Donnell, and 10 at Wallace Air Station. These personnel were involved in base gate and perimeter security.

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 122221Z Dec 80 (U).
3. CINCPAC 092131Z Jan 81 (U).
Construction of 29 additional perimeter security towers had been completed at Clark in February. Various security procedures had been implemented, including processing of intruders, barring them from bases, a joint standing operating procedure for gate guards, and establishment of joint perimeter patrols.1

**Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board Meetings**

(U) The Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board had been established in 1958. It met monthly to maintain the close communications required to achieve the security and defense objectives shared by the two countries. In May the MDB celebrated its 22nd anniversary with a meeting and luncheon hosted by the U.S. Ambassador. Admiral Long, U.S. Co-Chairman, presided at the meeting which was held in the U.S. Embassy. General Romeo C. Espino, AFP, attended as Philippine Co-Chairman. Major achievements for the MDB during the previous year had included the intensification of bilateral exercises with some participation for allied foreign observers; the relocation of the two-man USAF weapons controller teams at three radar sites to Wallace Air Station; the survey of boundaries of both the Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base; and the location and realignment of roads in training areas.2

(C) Admiral Long was host for an MDB meeting in Hawaii on 25 November. General Espino and other Philippine representatives were in Hawaii from 22 to 25 November to allow time for additional discussions, meetings, and briefings.3

**Philippine-U.S. Consultations on Security Matters**

(S) In January a special executive session of the Mutual Defense Board was convened following the monthly meeting to receive a memorandum from General Romeo Espino, AFP Chief of Staff and Philippine Co-Chairman of the MDB. The memorandum raised a number of questions regarding the relationship between the two countries in the event the United States went to war in the Middle East or Indochina.4

(S) CINCPAC asked the JCS for guidance on this matter. On 31 January the Secretary of State advised the U.S. Embassy in Manila that answers to those questions would be provided by CINCPAC, accompanied by the Ambassador, during the Admiral's scheduled visit to the Philippines. Guidance on the

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPACREP PHIL 150543Z May 80 (U).
3. J5121 HistSum Dec 80 (C), DECL 31 Oct 86.
4. CINCPACREP PHIL 280620Z Jan 80 (S)(EX), DECL 31 Dec 86.
proposed reply was forwarded to CINCPAC and State Department officials by the Secretary on 13 February.¹

(S) Admiral Long met with President Marcos on 18 February. He stressed the U.S. determination to do what was necessary to meet our security commitments. He expressed appreciation for good U.S.-Philippine relations, and suggested areas for improvement such as better intelligence exchange, more joint military exercises, and a reinvigorated Mutual Defense Board.²

1. CINCPAC 290328Z Jan 80 (S)(BOM), DECL 31 Jan 86; SECSTATE 027886/312248Z Jan 80 (S)(EX), E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/30/00; SECSTATE 039895/132347Z Feb 80 (S)(EX), E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/11/00.

2. AMEMB Manila 03199/191004Z Feb 80 (S)(EX), E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/19/00.
SECTION IV--MISCELLANEOUS PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Quarterly Report of Issues and Activities

(U) Since 1977 CINCPAC had been providing a quarterly report on major issues and activities to the Secretary of Defense with a copy to the Chairman of the JCS, in response to a request from the Secretary. CINCPACs had welcomed this vehicle of direct communication and the practice continued throughout 1980.

(S) CINCPAC's first 1980 quarterly report observed that the operating forces in the PACOM continued to do a superb job. Special highlights included the NIMITZ battle group compiling over three months of sustained sea operations, and the successful completion of TEAM SPIRIT. He noted that he had completed visits to a number of PACOM countries and been visited by the Chinese Vice Premier. If there was any underlying concern in those countries about U.S. intentions, he said, it was that U.S. strength and resolve might erode over time. Admiral Long said he had stressed that this would not be the case and used as evidence the efforts being made to expand and improve on military capabilities.1

1. CINCPAC 052150Z Apr 80 (S)(EX), DECL Apr 88.
2. CINCPAC 102132Z Jul 80 (TS)(EX), DECL 30 Jun 86.
3. Ibid.
1. CINCPAC 070439Z Oct 80 (S)(EX), REVW 1 Oct 86.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 032200Z Jan 80 (S)(EX), REVW 15 Dec 00.

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U.S. Initiatives in the PACOM

(S) CINCPAC had encouraged the development of initiatives to enhance the U.S. presence throughout the PACOM. On 16 July he noted that over the previous year many gains had been made in efforts in that regard. "I want to maintain this momentum with the goal of strengthening U.S. presence and increasing cooperation and contact with allies in the PACOM," CINCPAC said.²

(S) In that message to his component and subordinate unified commanders he said that it was necessary it be recognized that many actions, although often cast as Service initiatives, invariably had significant political implications and frequently impacted on the programs of other Services in the Pacific. He requested that, as a matter of routine practice, initiatives or commitments of such nature be coordinated with his headquarters prior to presentation to allied governmental or military authorities. In addition to insuring a unified approach, such coordination would provide CINCPAC the opportunity to coordinate with the U.S. Ambassador concerned and at the Washington level, if appropriate.³

CINCPAC Wrap-Up of Theater Military Activities

(C) On 5 December Admiral Long advised State Department officers throughout his command that in discussions with many of them he had sensed that it would be useful if more military information was conveyed to them and members of their Country Teams. He proposed a weekly wrap-up, a summary that would range in scope from reviewing operations and exercises to more general matters. Initially he thought the summary would include information on changes in attaches or Security Assistance chiefs, PACOM or specific regional intelligence vignettes, updates on significant force redispositions, base negotiations, major PACOM or regional plan changes, or incidents within the PACOM that had gained press interest.⁴

(U) The response was overwhelmingly enthusiastic. On 30 December the Admiral advised the same addressees that he would start providing the periodic report early in January and at least every six weeks thereafter.⁵

1. Ibid.
2. J5321 HistSum Jul 80 (S), DECL 10 Jul 86; CINCPAC 160317Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 10 Jul 86.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 050251Z Dec 80 (C), DECL 3 Dec 86.
5. CINCPAC 300025Z Dec 80 (U).
PACOM Master Requirements List

(U) In light of an apparent need for a command-wide master list of requirements, the Plans Directorate developed the preliminary format for such a document. The list was intended to be broad based and include initiatives and requirements that would correct deficiencies or enhance capabilities of PACOM forces. It was to be a management tool for CINCPAC and his staff that would also serve as a source document for preparation of major command reports, such as the SITREP and Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis.

(5) CINCPAC outlined the master list concept to his component and subordinate unified commanders on 29 July. Requirements would be placed in one of five classifications. First was readiness, a requirement that, if fulfilled, would increase the preparedness of PACOM forces to fulfill their wartime missions. Next was sustainability; if that requirement was fulfilled, it would prolong the time PACOM forces, or those forces scheduled to deploy to PACOM under existing plans, could effectively engage in combat or, alternatively, lessen the need for resupply from outside sources. Next was interoperability; if fulfilled, that requirement would improve the ability of PACOM forces to conduct joint operations and/or conduct combined operations with allies. Next was deployability; if fulfilled, that requirement would increase the capability of PACOM forces to be redeployed within the command, and/or increase the capability to receive reinforcements from forces arriving from outside the theater. Last was force structure; if fulfilled, that requirement would provide enhancement in one of the above categories, but would necessitate a significant change in PACOM force structure, such as addition of mine countermeasure forces, a tactical air squadron, or ground force units.

(5) Requirements would be placed in three priorities. The top third were to be priority one, the most urgent and important requirements, with priority two and three following in one-third increments.

(U) The PACOM Master Requirements List was expected to be published for the first time in the spring of 1981, and updated approximately semi-annually thereafter.

Nuclear Weapons Doctrine and Presidential Directive 59

(U) On 6 August the press announced that President Carter had signed Presidential Directive 59 that modified U.S. strategy in nuclear war to

1. J5323 HistSum Jul 80 (U); CINCPAC 292312Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 28 Jul 86.
2. Ibid.
emphasize destruction of Soviet military targets and command centers, rather than cities. The shift in emphasis away from massive retaliation towards what Defense Secretary Harold Brown called "countervailing strategy" had begun under Defense Secretary Schlesinger in 1974, the wire service said. The theory, reportedly, was that retaliating against the Soviet Union by striking its major cities and industrial centers was too drastic an option for the nuclear age in 1980. The Administration had been moving in this direction for three years, it was reported, and thus the change was evolutionary rather than revolutionary.1

(5) On 9 August the Secretary of State asked the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo to deliver a message from Secretary of Defense Brown to the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency. Secretary Brown wanted to inform the Japanese, as he was informing his NATO colleagues, of the President's directive. The Secretary described the strategy as one designed to enhance deterrence of any Soviet action that could lead to nuclear war by making clear that we had both the capabilities and plans for use of our forces, if deterrence failed, that meant that no plausible outcome of such a war could be a victory for the USSR, however they might define victory. He stressed that despite what some press reports had said, that this evolutionary development reflected what the United States had long included in its plans--effective and comprehensive coverage of military and control targets.2

(5) The Vice Minister of the Japan Defense Agency expressed gratitude for prior information on an anticipated formal statement by the President. The Japanese indicated the material would be useful in countering any misimpressions that might have arisen over publication of the announcement.3

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1. Washington Post, 6 Aug 80, p. 10; and 11 Aug 80, p.5 (both U).
2. SECSTATE 210617/091651Z Aug 80 (S); E.O. 12065: GDS 8/9/86.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 14022/110848Z Aug 80 (S); E.O. 12065: GDS 8/11/86.
4. CINCPAC 250352Z Jul 80 (TS), REVW 13 Jun 00.

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Nuclear Weapons' Allocations and Deployments

1. J542 HistSum Dec 80 (U); J5/Memo/S914-80 (S/FRD) of 22 Jul 80, Subj: FY 80-82 Allocation of Nuclear Weapons (U).
2. CINCPAC 062139Z Sep 80 (S/FRD).
Theater Nuclear Force Improvement Study

2. CINCPAC 192035Z Jan 80 (TS/FRD).
3. Ibid.
(U) The Chairman designated the J5 office on the Joint Staff as the office of primary record, with the Defense Nuclear Agency doing the analytical work. On 16 July CINCPAC submitted the Theater Nuclear Force Improvement Study (TNFIS) Terms of Reference to the Organization of the JCS for approval. The proposed TOR envisioned a two-phased program. Phase I was to be completed by 30 June 1981. It would provide a broad assessment and general conclusions to support specific recommendations to the JCS and Secretary of Defense for near-term requirements. It had the added value of meeting the requirements of the Joint Strategic Planning Document/JSPD Supporting Analysis planning cycle. Phase II, the completion date of which had not been determined, was to expand the effort to also include recommended long-term research and development objectives for new systems and warheads. This phase would include simulation and other sophisticated analytical techniques to optimize the PACOM TNF against the long-term threat (post-1990).3

(U) CINCPAC proposed that a TNFIS steering committee be formed to review the study effort at regular intervals to monitor its progress and thrust and provide additional guidance where appropriate. The committee would have

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 010249Z Apr 80 (S)(EX), DECL 31 Mar 86; JCS-1244/091700Z Apr 80 (S), DECL 5 Apr 86.
3. CINCPAC 160015Z Jun 80 (S), REVW 29 May 80.
representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, the Services, the DNA, and CINCPAC. It would appear useful, CINCPAC said, to request OSD sponsorship for the committee to secure the necessary high-level and timely support for study results and recommendations. In view of the associated work in the PACOM undertaken by the Office of Net Assessment, CINCPAC recommended that the Director of Net Assessment, Mr. Andrew Marshall, chair the committee.¹

(U) The JCS approved the Terms of Reference and forwarded them to the OSD's Director of Net Assessment on 19 August. The first meeting of the TNFIS steering group was held in Washington on 3 October. Rear Admiral Tissot, CINCPAC's Director for Plans, attended the meeting chaired by Mr. Marshall, as did representatives of the OSD (the Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy and the Assistant Secretary for Program Analysis and Evaluation), the JCS, the Services, the DIA, NSA, and Drs. Oswald and Conrad of the DNA.³

¹ Ibid.
² J542 HistSum Aug 80 (S), REVW 29 Jul 00; J5/Memo/T1093-81, 20 Aug 81 (U), Subj: CINCPAC 1980 Command History, review of.
³ J542 HistSum Dec 80 (S/FRD).
Command Nuclear Target List

1. Ibid.; MFR OSD Director of Net Assessment (S), 3 Oct 80, Subj: Net Assessment of Theater Nuclear Forces in PACOM (U).
2. Ibid.
1. J541 HistSum Apr 80 (U); J54/Memo/T83-80 of 5 May 80 (U), Subj: PACOM Nuclear Planning Group (PNPG).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1979 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 188-190; J543 HistSum Apr 80 (S/FRD); CINCPAC 120219Z Apr 80 (S/FRD).
1. Ibid.
2. J543 HistSum Mar 80 (U).
3. J543 HistSum May 80 (U); CINCPAC 102350Z May 80 (S/FRD); J543 HistSum Aug 80 (U).
(U) In Support of efforts to quantify requirements, a team from General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas visited CINCPAC's headquarters from 15 to 18 July and presented a series of briefings that provided an update on the conventional sea-launched missile. The following week another small team from General Dynamics provided a briefing.¹

(U) Throughout September and October the CMWG developed a new assessment of requirements that was geared specifically to personal directions from Admiral Long. The comprehensive cruise missile planning proposal from CINCPAC was ready early in December and forwarded to the Chairman of the JCS on 12 December.²

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1. J543 HistSum Aug 80 (U).
2. J543 HistSum Dec 80 (U).
3. CINCPAC 110210Z Dec 80 (S), REVW 19 Nov 00.
4. CINCPAC Ltr Ser S370 (S), of 12 Dec 80, Subj: Planning for Cruise Missiles in PACOM (U).
Planning for the CMMPS was in progress as the year began. It was, however, subsequently called the Cruise Missile Theater Mission Planning System (CMMPS). On 16 April CINCPAC forwarded to the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office in Washington a revised cost estimate, which, at $284,100 was an increase of $123,200 over the original estimate, which had been necessitated by the addition of a shielded enclosure in the computer room. This was required to protect materials used in the planning of conventional missions. In May the site was visited by members of the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office, McDonnell Douglas, and the Ray Proof Company to look at construction plans, examine alternatives for cutting costs, and speeding up construction. At the conclusion of the visit, the Navy's Public Works Center and the Naval Shore Electronics

1. Ibid.
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Engineering Activity Pacific (both in Hawaii), were authorized to start work immediately on the CINC PAC-recommended proposal for two shielded rooms. The Joint Cruise Missile Planning Office provided the funds.1

(U) As the work continued, a technician from the Ray Proof Company successfully tested the integrity of the shielded enclosures in August and work began on the interiors of the rooms. Work was essentially completed on both the basement computer room and first floor mission planning room by mid-September. (The Worldwide Military Command and Control System Single Integrated Operation Plan computer was relocated so that the cruise missile computer hardware could be in place on time.) Software installation was expected early in 1981.2

(U) In one other matter, in April the JCS had requested CINC PAC's comments regarding his preference for assignment of Long-term Operational Maintenance Support Management responsibility for the Theater Mission Planning System (TMPs) to either the Command and Control Technical Center or the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. CINC PAC recommended that the Joint Cruise Missile Planning Office retain the maintenance responsibility for the immediate future and when that agency was disestablished, the responsibility be transferred to the Command and Control Technical Center. The CTCC's excellent performance record in the development and maintenance of the Theater Nuclear Contingency Planning System made that agency the logical candidate for management responsibility for the TMPs, which would interface with the Nuclear Contingency Planning System.3

(U) The CINC of the Strategic Air Command had made a bid to seek support for operational maintenance support by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, but all three theater CINCs recommended CTCC support. The matter had not been resolved by the end of the year.4

1. J543 HistSums Apr, May 80 (U); CINC PAC 192213Z Apr 80 (U).
3. JB43 HistSum-Apr 80 (U); JCS 7157/011540Z Apr 80 (C), DECL 1 Apr 83; CINC PAC 162137Z Apr 80 (S), DECL Jan 83.
4. J543 HistSum Aug 80 (U); J543 Point Paper (U), 23 Jul 80, Subj: Long-Term Operational Maintenance Support (OMS) of the Cruise Missile Theater Mission Planning System (TMPs).

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Chemical Warfare Readiness Posture

On 9 April Admiral Long asked his Plans Directorate to provide an assessment of the chemical warfare readiness posture in the PACOM. A detailed assessment was completed, and on 11 June CINCPAC provided his thoughts on the subject to the JCS. He said that he had requested this assessment in view of the reported employment of lethal chemical munitions by Soviet forces in Afghanistan and by Soviet surrogates in Laos and Kampuchea. The results, while not surprising, clearly identified numerous weaknesses in the ability of U.S. forces to conduct retaliatory chemical warfare and to defend against hostile chemical attack for any extended period of time. Since deterrence was the base line of U.S. national chemical warfare policy—which permitted employment of chemical munitions only in retaliation when specifically authorized by the President—an essential factor in credibly deterring Soviet use of chemical munitions was an unquestionable U.S. capability to retaliate with chemical warfare at a level unacceptable to the enemy.1

Because Soviet forces possessed a far greater capability to wage chemical warfare than U.S. forces, and the Soviet stockpile of chemical munitions might exceed that of the United States by a factor of 10, it was doubtful that the existing U.S. chemical warfare capability made any significant contribution to chemical warfare deterrence. "A corrective program to alleviate equipment shortages, provide a modernized weapons stockpile (binary munitions), and formulate improved planning methods is urgently required."2

CINCPAC also addressed this subject in a message to his component commanders, also on 11 June. He advised of the content of his message to the JCS. He advised his component commanders that he knew the problem was receiving that share of attention and resources they could afford, but he wanted to convey his deep concern regarding these deficiencies and he requested aggressive action within their purview in providing remedies for chemical warfare related problem areas. He said that command emphasis needed to be directed toward developing an improved awareness of the existing and potential chemical warfare threat to the PACOM, establishing and maintaining realistic and effective training programs for units and individuals, identifying and when possible eliminating shortages in individual and collective protection equipment, identifying deficiencies in assigned trained personnel or available defensive chemical warfare equipment in major reports and through Service channels, identifying realistic wartime requirements by quantity and type, and providing justification to support across-the-board modernization of the chemical warfare stockpile.3

1. J542 HistSum May 80 (U); CINCPAC 110215Z Jun 80 (S), REVW 14 May 00.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 110220Z Jun 80 (S), REVW 14 May 00.
On 20 October the Department of the Army forwarded for CINCPAC's review a Chemical Program Action Plan. (The Army was the DOD executive agent for chemical warfare.) They described the plan as a most important milestone because for the first time they had gone beyond just talking about the chemical problem and produced a comprehensive, prioritized, and time-phased blueprint of what needed to be done. The CINCPAC reply was dispatched on 17 November.  

CINCPAC recommended that a joint Service concept of operations be developed at a higher priority than proposed. A realistic joint concept of operations in support of national policies was fundamental to the determination of chemical warfare requirements by the CINCs and their components. CINCPAC noted the strong European-NATO bias to the Army's action program for improving force structure and equipment, with a corresponding lack of emphasis on the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Improvements should be tailored to meet the needs of all forces worldwide. He recommended that programs specifically directed at PACOM needs be included in the action plan. CINCPAC believed that the priority for a public relations program should be higher; it was doubtful that the stockpiling of new munitions filled with contemporary agents or the production of new binary agents would be possible without the requisite public support. (Binary munitions were those packed in two more-or-less inert parts that became effective, and thus dangerous, only when activated, not in earlier storage and handling phases.)

CINCPAC noted that Congressional approval of a binary production facility at last made a chemical warfare program feasible, but it was essential that the production schedule for the new munitions be designed to insure that the most immediate needs of the various regional commanders receive the highest priority. The existing program did not seem to meet this criterion, at least not for the PACOM. The only new weapons programmed were artillery projectiles, but the bulk of the chemical warfare capability in the PACOM was provided by tactical aircraft; emphasis on development and production of longer-range systems with greater payload would be more appropriate for this theater. Further, the hazards involved in the handling, storage, and employment of the older generation of chemical weapons virtually precluded their employment from U.S. Navy ships, a circumstance that effectively eliminated over 40 percent of the PACOM air delivery capability. "Safe, air-deliverable binary munitions--for deployment at sea and ashore--consequently would be of far greater utility to CINCPAC than artillery ammunition." CINCPAC agreed that, as the action plan stated, training provided the quickest payback for the least investment. Also, from the CINCPAC perspective it was important that the United States not

1. J541 HistSum Dec 80 (U); DAMO-NCC Ltr to Admiral Long, 20 Oct 80 (U); CINCPAC Ltr Ser S342 (S), 17 Nov 80, n.s., REVW 31 Dec 00.
establish and exercise execution procedures exclusively in accordance with a NATO system, as proposed, but institute in addition the frequent use of a worldwide JCS system that would serve the needs of all theaters.¹

CINCPAC Planning Support for Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

(TS) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 81 tasked CINCPAC with respect to the Southwest Asia region: "Pending establishment of a nuclear planning cell in Headquarters, USREDCOM, provide nuclear planning support to Commander, RDJTF, through USCINCRED, and execution support directly to Commander, RDJTF, or as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."²

(TS) On 26 September the JCS provided preliminary planning guidance, including military objectives, threat assessment, key planning factors, mission concepts, and nuclear employment, for the COMRDJTF to begin operations planning to counter a Soviet invasion of Iran. The JCS requested that the COMRDJTF be prepared to brief the JCS on his initial concept and progress by the middle of November, with the objective of submitting the initial plan to the JCS for approval by 31 January 1981.³

(U) Through the PACOM Nuclear Planning Group, CINCPAC developed a nuclear concept of operations to support the tasking. He provided the concept to the USCINCRED on 25 November.⁴

(TS) The plan was unique in concept in that nuclear execution would be preplanned and executable by three nuclear CINCs. Because of this unique arrangement, a CINCPAC-sponsored joint planning conference with representatives from the JCS, SAC, USEUCOM, USREDCOM, and the RDJTF was scheduled for January 1981 at Camp Smith. The purpose was to finalize the COMRDJTF nuclear support plan.⁵

Research and Development Objectives

(S) In 1980 CINCPAC continued the annual practice of sending the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS a statement of his research and development objectives, which was based on a discussion of operational deficiencies in the command. The 1980 report was forwarded on 29 July.⁶

1. Ibid.
2. J541 HistSum Dec 80 (TS), REVW 19 Jan 01.
3. JCS 1920/2623362 Sep 80 (TS), REVW 24 Sep 00, REAS 5&6.
4. CINCPAC 250317Z Nov 80 (TS), REVW 24 Sep 00, REAS 5&6.
5. J541 HistSum Dec 80 (TS), REVW 19 Jan 01.
6. J531 HistSum Jul 80 (U); CINCPAC Ltr Ser S241 (S), 29 Jul 80, Subj: Research and Development Objectives (U), DECL 28 Jul 86.
CINCPAC said that without question there was a need for continued emphasis on those research and development projects that would improve combat capabilities related to the following broad mission areas. First was an improved surveillance and early warning capability to provide detection, classification, identification, and targeting information. Space platforms and related technology were applicable in that area. Of particular importance, CINCPAC said, was the ability to gather and correlate information on low-flying aircraft/anti-ship missiles and missile or attack submarines. Next he listed secure command and control communications between PACOM command centers and operational forces, a system capable of operating successfully under electronic countermeasures conditions and one that was interoperable with the C3 systems of PACOM allies.

He said that more effective weapons were needed for use against hardened surface targets and massed armor formations. Such weapons should have improved reliability and maintainability. Enhancing the survivability of weapon delivery systems was another objective, providing increased weapon release standoff distance and probability of kill. Associated was the building of immunity to enemy countermeasures. Further, he listed improved sealift and airlift capabilities designed to be compatible with allied systems to improve resupply efforts, and an improved naval mine countermeasure capability.

Admiral Long said he favored research and development measures that could be adapted to reduce the lengthy materiel development cycle. The exaggerated time frame required to field required weapons systems provided the potential for a qualitative and quantitative force imbalance vis-a-vis the USSR. Also, to insure that operational commands had a clear appreciation for ongoing research and development problems that would have future impact on advertised problem areas, he said it would be helpful to be appraised of new developments. He concluded by saying he hoped that a continuing flow of research and development information between the R&D community and CINCPAC headquarters would lead to improvements in operational capabilities.

U.S.-Japan System and Technology Forum

By agreement between the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Administrative Vice Minister of the Japan Defense Agency, the United States and Japan initiated a program of cooperation in weapon research, development, and acquisition, to include technology exchange and discussion of requirements in various mission areas. A semiannual Systems and Technology Forum was to be the mechanism by which the program would be conducted.

1. Ibid.
2. J5311 HistSum Sep 80 (U).

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The first such forum was held in Washington, D.C., on 3 and 4 September 1980, with two members and three others representing Japan and six U.S. members (including CINCPAC's Director for Plans), four associate members, and eight other attendees, including another CINCPAC staff officer, representing the United States. The first meeting served as a necessary introduction and exchange on the different national practices and organizations for military equipment development and acquisition. It remained evident, however, that there were large differences between the two countries, which was the purpose of the forum and which could only be reconciled over time as the exchange continued. The U.S. Under Secretary noted that the goals of the forum were better defense for both countries through better weapons, resupply capabilities, and interoperability, and greater efficiency, i.e., effective use of scarce resources. Achievement of those goals was best facilitated through an early exchange of weapons systems concepts and plans, and the exchange of technology base and systems information during the formative stages of development.¹

The second forum was held in Tokyo on 10 December. This time there were 13 on the U.S. side, again including a CINCPAC staff officer, and 16 on the Japanese side. (The conference time was compressed from two days to one because of the press of the Japanese Government budget cycle on the Japan Defense Agency participants.) The United States answered a number of questions that had been raised by the Japanese at the first forum meeting. These concerned FMS price and availability data, AH-1S (attack helicopter) acquisition, release of P-3C components, the F-15 releasability of technical coordination program, AIM-9L co-production, and C-130 acquisition.²

The U.S. side presented a briefing on U.S. Army Air Defense, covering such subjects as the threat, air defense capabilities, air defense system capabilities, doctrine, development program status, and planned future improvements. The Japanese asked questions about the PATRIOT surface-to-air missile. The United States replied it was in limited vice full production because not enough funding was available for full production of all new systems coming into the inventory; additional test data was needed on reliability, particularly in the interpretation of existing results. The United States asked for and received a summary of Japanese plans and developmental programs in the air defense field. When asked about the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system, a Japanese representative replied that one more year was required to

2. J5311 HistSum Dec 80 (U); MFR J5311 (S), 30 Dec 80, Subj: Trip Report-LCOL Clay R. Smith, Jr., to US-Japan Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF)(U), DECL 5 Jan 87.
complete the study of BADGE upgrade requirements and then three years to implement the new system. He noted that the combined efforts of the Japan Defense Agency and COMUS Japan were vital to the air defense of Japan. Regarding interoperability, the Japanese believed that release of classified data must be speeded up. At the conclusion of the meeting it was noted that discussion of Air Force and Navy air defense was also needed, as well as further talks about BADGE. The conferees considered it a useful dialogue, and believed much good information had been provided.¹

**Project JINDALEE**

(plaintext)

Project JINDALEE was a U.S.-Australian experimental over-the-horizon radar (OTH-R), located in Alice Springs, Australia. Initial U.S. support (funding and equipment) for the project, begun in the mid-1970's, had been provided by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. By 1980 U.S. participation was sponsored by the Chief of Naval Research, with primary technical assistance furnished by the Stanford Research Institute. On 16 October an Air Force-Navy-Stanford Research Institute team, en route to visit Project JINDALEE, briefed members of the CINCPACAF, THIRD Fleet, and CINCPAC staffs on over-the-horizon radar in California and an Air Force experimental project in Maine. On their return from Australia on 28 October, they briefed on Project JINDALEE's status. JINDALEE was in the process of being upgraded with a more powerful transmitter, larger receiving antenna array, and better signal processing equipment. Initial operational date for the improved system was expected to be September 1981.²

**DOD Antisatellite Requirements Analysis**

(plaintext)

The Organization of the JCS, the Services, and other Defense Department agencies had participated in an OSD-sponsored study conducted by the Air Force's Assistant Chief of Staff, Studies and Analyses. The purpose of the study was to examine issues pertaining to development and possible deployment of a U.S. antisatellite system. The study had been completed in September of 1979 and the results had been briefed to the unified and specified commanders in October and November of that year. On 16 January 1980 the executive summary of the draft final report was forwarded for CINCPAC's comments, which were provided on 16 February. CINCPAC noted that the Rules of Engagement section was greatly improved over what had been presented at the earlier briefing and was more clearly integrated into the overall effort at various levels of conflict. CINCPAC, noting that the report had not specifically examined the

1. Ibid.
effect of loss of U.S. satellite support, said that either this or a follow-on study should identify areas in which U.S. forces were overly dependent on vulnerable satellite systems, and develop guidelines for using redundant systems in the event a satellite was lost to enemy antisatellites. For the future he recommended actions regarding development of command, control, and communications systems to support counter satellite actions.1

Military Applications for Space-Based Systems

(C) The JCS asked CINCPAC to comment on a projected study on Space Warfare by the Defense Science Board. On 26 July he replied that he appreciated the chance to comment as he saw the upcoming study as an opportunity to develop a sound program to enhance military capability through the utilization of space platforms and associated technological advances. He thought the advantages of space systems would be great, particularly in the vast areas of the PACOM where wide ocean expanses severely limited existing land, air, and sea-based capabilities. He said there should be special interest in developing those projects that worked toward extending a capability, in both time and distance factors, to detect, identify, track, acquire, and expend ordnance on potential adversary targets.2

(S) He offered some thoughts regarding areas for which he saw a need to develop and field space-based systems. Among these were improved strategic and tactical capabilities to gain the military advantage against weapon platforms, such as the BACKFIRE bomber and sea-based anti-ship missile launchers; a survivable, electromagnetic pulse-hardened command and control system; adequate protection systems for our space-based platforms; and the near-term introduction of space related countermeasure equipment.

(S) CINCPAC concluded that the practicality of adapting space systems for military use was clear, as was the requirement to develop a related comprehensive Defense Department program and he said he would be very interested in reviewing the Defense Science Board report.3

1. J5323 HistSum Feb 80 (S), DECL 4 Mar 86; CINCPAC 161929Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 14 Feb 86.
2. J5311 HistSum Jul 80 (U); CINCPAC 260305Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 24 Jul 86.
3. Ibid.
Requirement for Large Fixed-Wing Spray Aircraft

The Air Force Commander for the Readiness Command requested PACOM requirements for and comments on the need for a large, fixed-wing, spray aircraft to combat insect vectored diseases. At the time the AFRES C-123 aircraft had this capability, but that aircraft was scheduled to be phased out by the end of FY 83. That command proposed to seek funds to install the capability in a C-130 aircraft. The message noted that the Rapid Deployment Force had worldwide tasking in such areas as the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean, South Pacific, and even Alaska, and the potential for insect vectored disease of catastrophic proportions was high. Diseases mentioned included malaria, dysentery, encephalitis, sand fly fever, bilharzia, and dengue fever.1

CINCPAC’s response of 18 April concurred in the need for a spray capability, but recommended consideration of alternatives to the C-130, such as helicopters, smaller aircraft like the OV-10, or a ground-based system. If the C-130 was to be used, he recommended development of a removable system to avoid conflicts with other C-130 missions. He noted that adding aerial spray as a C-130 mission could further complicate allocation of scarce tactical airlift resources. The C-130s performed, or were expected to perform, tactical airland and airdrop, unconventional warfare support, flare drop, and airborne communications functions. Also, no follow-on airframe had been identified as the C-130 replacement.2

Potential Danger to U.S. Volunteer Agency Personnel in Southeast Asia

On 21 March the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, advised that a group of Mennonites planned to undertake munitions clearing operations in an area of the Plaine des Jarres. They had constructed an armored tractor that they intended to use in driving over fields containing unexploded ordnance left over from past hostilities. (Besides U.S.-produced devices, Soviet and Chinese-origin ordnance was also there.) The purpose was to explode or otherwise locate dangerous devices and thereby open new fields for agricultural use. The Mennonites reported that farm families, including their children, were engaged in doing this work by hand and they wished to devise a safer way that would avoid the casualties that were being sustained. Embassy and DAO officials had frequently cautioned the Mennonites regarding the extreme danger inherent in such a project. The tractor arrived and embassy personnel reported

1. J5323 HistSum Apr 80 (C), DECL 7 Jan 86; USCINCAFRED 241845Z Mar 80 (S), DECL 7 Jan 86.
2. CINCPAC 182341Z Apr 80 (C), DECL 17 Apr 86.
that it was an International Harvester 674 with a chain rotor on hydraulic arms in the front and a farm rotor-tiller on the back. It was spottily armored with 3/16" steel. The Mennonites, the Embassy thought, might find it difficult to turn over all dangerous duty to their Lao associates, since it might be felt to be awkward or demonstrate a lack of faith in the project.1

CINCPAC added his cautions on the subject to the Embassy in Vientiane on 22 March. He described the idea as "commendable" but as one that would pose very serious risks to the personnel and equipment involved. Based on initial research it was uncertain whether a complete and definitive catalog of different munitions dropped in that area could ever be assembled. For example, the area was used as a general drop zone for aircraft weathered out of or diverted from their primary target areas in Vietnam and elsewhere in Laos. It was believed that the important point to make to the Mennonites was that it was highly probable that all types of munitions, including ROCKEYE antitank cluster bombs and other heavy munitions were dropped in the area, many of which could completely destroy an armored tractor, resulting in injury or loss of life.2

JCS Chairman's Foreign Visitors Program, FY 81

The Chairman of the JCS annually invited several of his counterparts from other nations to visit the United States as his guests. On 3 July the JCS asked CINCPAC for nominations in order of priority. Since General Jones had been Chairman there had been 17 foreign visitors in the program, 10 from the European Command, 2 from the Southern Command, and 5 from PACOM (1 each from Australia, Korea, and Singapore and 2 from Japan).3

CINCPAC's nominees, in order of priority, were General Romeo C. Espino, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; General Soem Na Nakhon, Royal Thai Army, Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces; and General M. Jusuf, Minister of Defense and Security, Commander-in-Chief Indonesian Armed Forces. (General Jusuf had been invited by the Chairman in FY 79 and 80 but he had been unable to accept either invitation because of commitments at home.)4

1. J5121 HistSum Mar 80 (C), DECL 31 Mar 86; AMEMB 0225/211003Z Mar 80 (C), E.O. 12065 N/A.
2. CINCPAC 222245Z Mar 80 (C), DECL 31 Mar 86.
3. J512 HistSum Aug 80 (C), DECL 30 Sep 86; JCS 5395/032225Z Jul 80 (C), DECL 2 Jul 86.
4. CINCPAC 062154Z Aug 80 (C), DECL 30 Jul 86.
CINCPAC Participation in Western Federal Regional Council Meetings

(U) On 14 February the President sent a message to Congress announcing the framework for a comprehensive Federal territorial policy towards Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands designed to strengthen the Government's commitment to encourage the self-determined political, economic, and social development of those territories. The Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs had advised the Chairman of the Western Federal Regional Council of Administration interest, and the fact that the Deputy Under Secretary of the Interior for Territorial and International Affairs and a representative from the White House would visit with the Western Council to discuss implementation of the President's policy. Thus, the Western Federal Regional Council met to show the commitment of the regional Federal family for improving relations with the Pacific Basin communities and to assure that the council had a specific stake in the unfolding of the Administration's policy on territorial assistance and was prepared to be responsive to the Department of the Interior, which had oversight responsibilities for all federal activities in the territories. Attendees at the Council's Pacific Development Meeting, held 24 and 25 July, included two White House representatives, one from the White House Staff on Domestic Policy and one from the Staff on Intergovernmental Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.1

(C) The Department of Defense was not officially represented at the meeting. BGEN Henry J. Hatch, USA, in charge of the U.S. Army Engineer Division, Pacific Ocean, at Fort Shafter, attended because of his engineering involvement with the council. Based on his knowledge of the agenda and his awareness of CINCPAC's interests, he recommended that a member of CINCPAC's Plans Directorate accompany him to the meeting, which was fortunate. The attendees were for the most part unaware of PACOM military interests and activities in the territories. Some were uninformed on the Compact negotiations and trusteeship termination concerns. Most were surprised to hear of the Military Civic Action Teams and the outstanding reputation those teams had gained among the islanders, at a relatively low cost. After learning of CINCPAC's involvement, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Interior and the council recognized the need for Defense Department-CINCPAC coordination in implementing the President's territorial policy.2

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1. J5614 HistSum Aug 80 (U); Ltr, Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs, the White House to Chairman, Western Federal Regional Council, San Francisco, 11 Jul 80 (U), with enclosure, Federal Territorial Policy, Message to the Congress Announcing Legislative Proposals and Administrative Actions, 14 Feb 80 (U).
(U) On 25 August Admiral Long wrote to the council chairman saying that he supported the endeavors to improve relations with the Pacific Basin countries and was glad to have been represented at the July meeting. He would welcome the opportunity to have a representative at future meetings where matters pertinent to his areas of responsibility and concern were addressed.²

CHAPTER IV--MILITARY OPERATIONS

Readiness of PACOM Forces

(U) Twice during 1980 CINCPAC provided readiness situation reports to the JCS, as required. Both reports were extensive, and highlighted areas of interest or concern.

(5) The first report was forwarded on 16 April. In his Commander's summary, CINCPAC said that PACOM forward deployed forces provided a rapid response capability and served as a projection of U.S. resolve and will. Events during the reporting period, however, had highlighted readiness shortfalls in personnel, force levels, munitions, and operations and maintenance funds, particularly in fuel costs to support the increased operating tempo in the Indian Ocean. A major conflict or some combination of lesser contingencies could rapidly deplete the Navy's levels of prepositioned war reserve materiel stocks and spread PACOM forces to the point where rapid support and augmentation would be required from the Continental United States.¹

(5) A few highlights from the April report follow. Throughout the readiness SITREPs, the CINCPAC Operation Plans considered for execution were 5001, 5027, and 5125. (See the Plans chapter for further information on those plans.) In the general war plan, the conduct of offensive operations against Soviet forces while simultaneously protecting Indian Ocean sea lines of communication and maintaining other forward deployed forces and bases, could not be accomplished without a significant buildup of existing forces. Regarding the Navy, readiness had improved in some operational areas, mainly due to the increased operating tempo in the Indian Ocean. SEVENTH Fleet battle groups had demonstrated the capability to plan and conduct effective strike operations.

(5) Regarding the Army in Korea, CINCPAC noted that U.S. forces could defend successfully against a limited chemical warfare attack, but had very limited offensive capability to conduct chemical warfare retaliatory operations. (Chemical warfare had come under greater consideration since the reported use of such weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.)

(5) For the Indian Ocean region, intelligence data bases remained inadequate to support planning and execution during contingency and crisis situations. There were also serious deficiencies in communications support at

1. CINCPAC 162300Z Apr 80 (TS/FRD).
Diego Garcia, afloat in the Indian Ocean, and on the Indian Ocean littoral to support continuing U.S. initiatives in the future, as well as a continued force presence in the area. In another intelligence matter, a critical gap existed in knowledge of Soviet ballistic-missile nuclear submarine deployment patterns and patrols. Detection performance had not improved, and continued to be affected by severely degraded SOSUS (sound and surveillance system) caused by system design limitations, cable outages, array anomalies, and environmental factors. 1

(C) CINCPAC's second report for 1980 was forwarded to the JCS on 5 November. CINCPAC advised that there had been some important improvements in the preceding six months, but a number of serious degradations continued to constrain the sustained ability of PACOM forces to successfully defend U.S. vital interests. (The same three plans were considered in the discussion: 5001, 5027, 5125.) PACOM forces remained marginally capable of executing those plans on an individual basis in the early phases of conflict; the ability to sustain operations in later stages was seriously reduced in many areas, addressed in detail in the report. 2

(C) The intensity of operations in the Indian Ocean had produced some valuable training benefits, particularly in anti-air warfare, but this had been at the cost of erosion in other aspects of readiness. Tactical capabilities had been enhanced by PACAF's aircraft modernization program, the deployment of three E-3As to Kadena, and the upgrade of several friendly nation air forces. The availability and responsiveness of WESTCOM reserve component forces was being increased through the implementation of the full-time manning program.

(C) Sustainability of forces continued to be a major problem area. Shortages in critical air and ground munitions, insufficient POL tankage, inadequate numbers of mobile logistic support force ships, and continued low O&M funding levels severely limited the PACOM's ability to execute the general war plan or the OPLAN for the defense of Korea. Shortfalls in strategic air and sealift further exacerbated this problem. Personnel shortages had grown increasingly severe during the reporting period, especially in naval forces. Beyond the raw numbers was the fact that shortages were heaviest in the highly skilled, experienced, middle-grade personnel (both officer and enlisted) who were the "backbone of combat effectiveness."

1. Ibid.
2. This 77-page report was transmitted as CINCPAC 050142Z, 050143Z, 050144Z, 050145Z and 050146Z Nov 80 (S/FRD).
While there had been some positive steps in improving chemical warfare training and in the availability of some protective clothing and equipment, readiness in this area remained unsatisfactory.

The continuing decline in CINCPACFLT's ability to conduct antisubmarine warfare had to be reversed. Subsurface capability was severely limited by inadequate force levels, personnel shortages, and weapons deficiencies. Surface ASW suffered from serious training shortfalls and shortages of equipment.

The lack of mine countermeasures capability in the PACOM had been dramatically highlighted by events in the Persian Gulf.

CINCpac noted that the PACOM could not accomplish the unconventional warfare tasks assigned in OPLAN 5001 without the assignment of active duty U.S. Army Special Forces units in the theater.

Intelligence posture ranged from satisfactory in Korea to marginal in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. There was a pressing need for additional manned airborne reconnaissance resources and increased Human Intelligence capability to improve collection and reporting capabilities.

Finally, medical resources in the PACOM and those allocated by the Services to support PACOM contingency plans were inadequate. The inability of the Navy to provide adequate backup medical support for Marine Corps forces deploying to a remote location continued to be a limiting factor in the commitment of those forces.¹

Indian Ocean Operations

Clearly the dominant matter in PACOM operations in 1980 was the continued major presence of U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean and adjacent sea areas. The previous year had seen the seizure of the U.S. Embassy and the American hostages in Iran on 4 November, the raid on the Grande Mosque at Mecca following which, on 21 November, Pakistanis stormed and burned the U.S. Embassy in that country, and by December the reports of Soviet troops in Afghanistan climaxing in the Christmas Day massive airlift of troops and equipment into that country.

As 1980 began there were two carrier battle groups on Indian Ocean patrol. On 10 October 1979 Battle Group ALFA (TG 70.1), led by USS MIDWAY

¹. Ibid.
(CV-41), with Commander, Carrier Group SEVEN embarked, had deployed to the
Indian Ocean accompanied by USS BAINBRIDGE (CGN-25) with Commander Destroyer
Squadron FIFTEEN embarked, USS PARSONS (DDG-33), USS KNOX (FF-1052), USS STEIN
(FF-1065), USNS MISSPILLION (TAO-105), USNS NAVASOTA (TAO-106), USS PINTADO
(SSN-672) for direct support, and USS SAN JOSE (AFS-7). The ships had been
originally scheduled to depart on 2 December, but they were retained on station.
In addition, Task Group 70.2 got underway from Subic Bay on Thanksgiving Eve,
21 November 1979, led by KITTY HAWK (CV-63), with Commander Task Force 77 and
Commander, Destroyer Squadron THIRTEEN embarked. TG 70.2 also consisted of
USS JOUETT (CG-29), USS BERKELEY (DDG-15), USS DAVID R. RAY (DD-971), USS
FANNING (FF-1976), and USS WABASH (AOR-5). The Mid-East Force remained on
station with five ships. There were 19 U.S. Navy ships either operating in
the Indian Ocean or en route thereto with more than 14,000 USN sailors
aboard as the year ended.1

(U) On 14 January CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT of a battle group from the
Atlantic Fleet that would be shifting to his Operational Control on 14 January.
The battle group, led by USS NIMITZ (CVN-68), with USS TEXAS (CGN-39) and
USS CALIFORNIA (CGN-36), had been serving in the SIXTH Fleet in the Mediterrane-
ian since deploying from their homeport in Norfolk, Virginia, in September.
The ships had departed Italian ports on 4 January and completed the 11,500
mile transit via the Cape of Good Hope at an average speed of advance of
approximately 25 knots without refueling en route. Thus, for a short while
there were three carrier groups on station in the area. (Time magazine said
American sailors had nicknamed the area Camel Station.)2

(C) On 15 January the NIMITZ task group was involved in an incident re-
sulting from poor seamanship actions by two South African Navy patrol boats
crossing the bow of CALIFORNIA, causing it to stop twice to avoid collision.
State Department actions consisted only of a demarche at the Embassy level.
Also in January USS JOUETT was under close surveillance by the Soviet AGI
PELENG in the Arabian Sea. The JOUETT's commanding officer considered the
maneuvers and actions of the PELENG to be in violation of the U.S.-USSR
Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement and Rules of the Road.3

462 As had been the case in 1979, the battle groups continued to be the
subject of frequent Soviet air and sea surveillance.

2. CINCPAC 140230Z Jan 80 (S), DECL 14 Jan 81; SECDEF 190028Z Jan 80 (C),
   DECL 23 Jan 80; Time, 18 Feb 80 (U).
3. J313 HistSum Jan 80 (C), DECL 6 Feb 86.
(U) On 31 January two battle groups transited the Strait of Malacca, one entering the Indian Ocean, the other departing. As the KITTY HAWK was relieved by NIMITZ as Task Group 70.2, the carrier led the group toward Subic Bay on route to West Coast homeports. The arriving battle group consisted of USS CORAL SEA (CV-43), USS HALSEY (CG-23), USS WILLIAM H. STANDLEY (CG-32), USS JOHN PAUL JONES (DDG-32), and USS SCHOFIELD (FFG-3).  

(N) NIMITZ remained on station throughout February. The MIDWAY battle group was relieved by CORAL SEA as TASK GROUP 70.1 on 5 February. MIDWAY and accompanying ships exited the Indian Ocean via the Strait of Malacca on 9 February. After a brief stop in Subic, BAINBRIDGE, FANNING, and DAVID R. RAY returned to their homeport in San Diego, where festivities headed by Secretary of the Navy Edward Hidalgo greeted their return. MIDWAY had departed Yokosuka on 30 September 1979. On its return to homeport on 21 February 1980 the carrier flew a banner from her stern proclaiming, in Japanese characters, that "People of the MIDWAY love Japan." The tumultuous welcoming delegation of the families of the Navy men was led by the SEVENTH Fleet commander, augmented by Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force flag officers, and "for a first in memory," the mayors of Yokohama and Yokosuka. Japanese news media carried favorable

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USN Photo

USS MIDWAY (CV-41), USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63), and USS NIMITZ (CVN-68) accompanied by escort and supply ships in the Arabian Sea, 23 January 1980.

1. CNO 021625Z Feb 80 (U).
reports on the group's return and civilian officials praised the men and ships for their efforts "in support of Japanese interests in the Indian Ocean region."

(5) During this period there was some discussion about reducing the submarine presence in the Arabian Sea from two to one, but CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT that there was growing concern regarding our antisubmarine warfare capabilities. The U.S. forces in the Arabian Sea had been structured primarily for contingency operations rather than the Soviet threat, which by mid-February had become more "ominous." CINCPAC considered it prudent to maintain the two-nuclear submarine posture at the time, and so advised CINCPACFLT.2

(5) With respect to the Soviet threat, on 26 February CINCPAC responded to a JCS request for comments regarding U.S. presence. CINCPAC said that the requirement for a U.S. military presence in the area was driven primarily by an increased Soviet threat. "Until their intentions with regard to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Persian Gulf oil fields, etc., become clear and the Soviet threat is reduced, a credible and visible U.S. presence will be necessary." He provided the JCS with proposals for two levels of military presence developed on the basis of the level of the threat and the possibility of employment.3

(5) NIMITZ and CORAL SEA remained on station and conducted routine operations during March. Two submarines remained on station also. USS HADDOCK (SSN-621) was relieved by USS GUARDFISH (SSN-612) on 13 March and USS LOS ANGELES (SSN-688) was relieved by USS BATON ROUGE (SSN-692) on 22 March.

(5) The first deployment of embarked U.S. Marines began in March. Amphibious Ready Group ALEA with the 31st Marine Amphibious Unit, supported from U.S. facilities in Japan and the Philippines, departed Subic and entered the Indian Ocean via the Strait of Malacca. Prior to any announcement, the State Department had advised the Embassies in Manila and Tokyo so that those governments could be advised of the plans.4

(U) The task force included USS OKINAWA (LPH-3), USS SAN SAN BERNARDINO (LST-1189), USS ALAMO (LSD-33), and USS MOBILE (LKA-115). Escorts were USS GRIDLEY (CG-21) and USS BARBET (FF-1088). All were homeported in San Diego.

1. J313 HistSum Feb 80, DECL 4 Mar 86; CNO 010109Z Mar 80 (U).
2. CINCPAC 222146Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 22 Feb 86.
3. CINCPAC 261642Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 25 Feb 86.
4. J313 HistSum Mar 80 (S), DECL 6 Apr 86; SECSTATE 038805/121615Z Feb 80 (S) (EX). E.O. 12065: RDS-3 2/12/90.
Marine Amphibious Unit was a combined arms team of approximately 1,800 personnel. Elements included infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, helicopters, and logistic personnel. In addition to standard individual and crew-served weapons, the unit was equipped with TOW and DRAGON anti-tank weapons, amphibious assault vehicles, 105mm howitzers, and M60 tanks. Its basic elements were a Battalion Landing Team, a Medium Helicopter Squadron, and a Marine Service Support Group.

The Marines operated in the vicinity of the carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean throughout their deployment. USS MOBILE conducted a port visit to Mombasa, Kenya from 18 to 22 April. The presence of two nuclear powered submarines continued; USS GUARDFISH (SSN-612) was relieved by USS TAUTOG (SSN-639) on 22 April and USS BATON ROUGE (SSN-689) was relieved by USS GROTON (SSN-694) on 29 April.

The most noteworthy action in the Indian Ocean during April, of course, was the aborted raid to rescue the American hostages in Iran. It is discussed elsewhere in this chapter.

Early in April the Secretary of Defense had approved the continued two-carrier posture in the area. Again a carrier battle group deployed from the Atlantic as another deployed from PACOM. USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64) led a battle group through the Strait of Malacca on 27 April; other ships were USS TRUXTON (CGN-35), USS WORDEN (CG-18), USS O'BRIEN (DD-975), USS BAGLEY (FF-1069), USS DAVIDSON (FF-1045), USS HAROLD E. HOLT (FF-1074), USS REASONER (FF-1063), and USS MARS (AFS-1). The battle group relieved the CORAL SEA group on 1 May.

The Navy's Information Office described the 102-day deployment of CORAL SEA. The carrier had departed its Alameda, California, homeport on 13 November 1979. After operating in the Philippine Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea, and making port calls in Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore, the ship had entered the Indian Ocean on 1 February. Pilots and aircrews of Carrier Airwing FOURTEEN had averaged 75 flights daily during the at-sea period, with more than 4,800 catapult launches and arrested landings credited to the flight deck crew. Engineering personnel on the carrier manned additional firerooms to generate steam to enable flight operations to continue in the hot Arabian Sea. Underway replenishments, 54 of them, brought food, fuel, and other supplies to the ship, and permitted uninterrupted continuation

1. SECDEF 7136/132047Z Feb 80 (U).
2. J313 HistSum Apr 80 (S), DECL 9 May 86.
3. JCS 7462/022029Z Apr 80 (S), DECL 15 Mar 86; CNO 0316002 May 80 (U).
of the mission. Special events, such as a motor whaleboat race, flight deck cookouts, athletic events, and talent shows, provided needed breaks from the operating schedule. The 102-day deployment more than doubled the previous record of the 33-year old carrier, whose longest previous deployment had been a 50-day period on YANKEE STATION off Vietnam in the spring of 1972.¹

(U) An all nuclear-powered battle group, led by USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69), rounded the Cape of Good Hope from the Atlantic on 29 April. Other ships in the group were USS SOUTH CAROLINA (CGN-37) and USS VIRGINIA (CGN-381). These ships relieved the NIMITZ group on 8 May.²

ARG ALFA/31 MAU again conducted routine operations in the vicinity of the carrier battle groups during the month of May. USS OKINAWA and USS SAN BERNARDINO visited Mombasa, Kenya, from 4–7 May on a port call. They were joined by USS GRIDLEY on 6 and 7 May. GRIDLEY also visited Mogadishu, Somalia in early May. ARG ALFA also made a routine port visit to Perth and Freemantle, Australia, during the period 23 to 27 May, and outchopped the Indian Ocean via the Lombok Strait on 1 June.³

As had been the case throughout the year, U.S. Naval forces had been subject to periodic Soviet ship and aircraft surveillance, but without incident.⁴

(U) The oldest Navy ship continuously in active commission returned to its San Diego homeport on 12 June. USS DIXIE (AD-14) had departed California on 5 November 1979 and was diverted en route from a Western Pacific destination to Diego Garcia to provide repair and upkeep services to U.S. units. During the four and a half months she was at Diego Garcia, DIXIE worked on 31 different ships and performed more than 2,500 separate jobs, including manufacturing parts for aircraft. The ship also acted as a transient barracks facility for more than 900 sailors and Marines staging through the island. Celebrating a 40th birthday on 25 April 1980, the ship performed a number of especially complex tasks, including replacing a 12-ton, 15-foot propeller on a frigate at anchorage (a first since World War II), repairing boiler uptakes on a cruiser, and replacing a main gas turbine engine on a SPRUANCE-Class destroyer.⁵

1. CNO 101600Z May 80 (U).
2. CNO 031600Z May 80 (U); J313 HistSum May 80 (S), DECL 2 Jun 86.
3. J313 HistSum May 80 (S), DECL 2 Jun 86; CINCPACFLT 160231Z May 80 (U).
4. Ibid.
5. CNO 071640Z Jun 80 (U).
The CONSTITUTION and EISENHOWER battle groups continued routine operations in June. On 17 June, however, USS DAVIDSON experienced a BRAVO Class fire in the fireroom during underway replenishment operations with USS SACRAMENTO (AOE-1). There were no personnel casualties, but the fire caused a complete loss of propulsion requiring a tow to Diego Garcia for repairs. On 21 June the rubber window in USS VIRGINIA's sonar dome developed a leak, which was subsequently determined to be an 11" x 4½" split. VIRGINIA's speed was limited to 5 to 7 knots pending repair arrangements. On 25 June CONSTELLATION sustained minor damage to its port side as a result of a collision with the Bangladesh merchant ship BANGLER JOY. The collision occurred during underway replenishment and vertical replenishment operations with PASSUMPSIC (TAO-1107) and SACRAMENTO. No personnel injuries occurred on either ship and normal air operations continued as scheduled on 26 June.¹

Two nuclear powered submarines continued on station: USS BATON ROUGE (SSN-689) relieved USS GROTON (SSN-694) and USS PUFFER (SSN-652) relieved USS TAUTOG (SSN-639) on 8 June. On 14 July GROTON again relieved BATON ROUGE and on 2 August USS PERMIT (SSN-594) relieved USS TAUTOG.²

USS DAVIDSON's fireroom repairs were completed on 14 July and the ship returned to its operating location. VIRGINIA arrived in Subic Bay on 22 July to begin repairs on the sonar dome.

The two carriers on station in July conducted routine operations. On 7 July, however, EISENHOWER lost an SH-3 helicopter on takeoff, but with no personnel casualties. On 16 July USS WICHITA (AOR-1) lost a CH-46 helicopter. The pilot was recovered with minor injuries while the remaining three crewmen were lost.³

Task Force 70 units conducted exercises with units of the Royal Navy on 8 and 9 July and again on 14 and 15 July. Royal Navy ships were in Task Group 318.0, which consisted of 2 destroyers, 3 frigates, and 4 support ships. Later, TF 70 ships escorted six Near Term Pre-positioning Ships from the vicinity of the Red Sea (16°N) to south of Socotra Island (10°40'N, 53°35'E).⁴

The second deployment of Marines occurred in July. On 17 July the New York Times reported that President Carter had ordered a new assault

1. J313 HistSum Jun 80 (S), DECL 8 Jul 86.
2. Ibid; J313 HistSum Jul 80 (S), DECL 5 Aug 86.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.; CINCPAC 092030Z May 80 (S), REVW 28 Feb 00.

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force of 1,800 Marines into the Indian Ocean to underscore the United States military presence there. An Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Amphibious Unit (2-80) deployed from Europe via the Suez Canal. The deploying ships were USS GUADALCANAL (LPH-7), USS NASHVILLE (LPD-13), USS PENSACOLA (LSD-38), USS LA MOURE COUNTY (LST-1194), and USS BARNSTABLE COUNTY (LST-1197). With the arrival of the amphibious ships, according to the Times, the U.S. forces would number 24 ships, including 17 fighting ships and 7 support vessels. The Soviet Union, the paper said, had 25 ships, 10 fighting craft and 15 support ships. One Soviet ship, reportedly, was the IVAN ROGOV, an assault ship similar to the GUADALCANAL that was believed to have aboard about 500 Russian naval infantry, the equivalent of Marines. It had been last reported in the Gulf of Aden, through which the GUADALCANAL had to pass to reach the Indian Ocean.¹

(5) USS EISENHOWER conducted a port visit to Singapore from 17 to 21 July, and then resumed operations in the Indian Ocean.

(5) MIDWAY was scheduled to replace CONSTELLATION on 5 August. On 29 July, however, the carrier collided with the Panamanian merchant ship CACTUS in the Strait of Malacca. Two petty officers from MIDWAY were killed. The carrier arrived at Subic Bay on 31 July for evaluation of the damage and repair. The ship finally relieved CONSTELLATION on 19 August.²

(5) Earlier, however, CONSTELLATION, BAGLEY, HOLT, and DAVIDSON visited Singapore from 5 to 11 August while TRUXTUN and PASSUMPSIC continued en route to Sattahip and Subic Bay respectively. Following reconstitution of the CONSTELLATION battle group by escorts from the MIDWAY battle group, CONSTELLA-

1. USCLANCEUR 131540Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 13 Jul 86; New York Times, 17 Jul 80, p.16 (U).
2. J313 HistSum Jul 80 (S), DECL 5 Aug 86; CINC PAC 022230Z Aug 80 (S), DECL 2 Aug 86; J313 HistSum Aug 80 (S), DECL 9 Sep 86.
3. J313 HistSum Aug 80 (S), DECL 9 Sep 86.
29 August. On 23 August USS VIRGINIA departed Subic Bay en route to the Indian Ocean with a 2 September call at Diego Garcia.  

(S) The second deployment of PACOM Marines began on 8 August. Amphibious Group ALFA, consisting of USS NEW ORLEANS (LPH-11), USS VANCOUVER (LPH-2), USS FREDERICK (LST-1184), and USS RACINE (LST-1191), with the 31st Marine Amphibious Unit embarked, arrived on station on 16 August. The Marines from the Mediterranean area had redeployed on 8 August.  

(S) In April 1980 the Navy had planned an incremental program with the eventual goal being an amphibious landing exercise by a Marine Amphibious Unit in Kenya. At each step, the feasibility of the next stop was to be determined. The first step was to be a visit to Mombasa by an amphibious ship and USS MOBILE had visited in April; the second was completed with the visit of USS OKINAWA and USS SAN BERNARDINO in May, in which static displays had been attended by high-level Defence Department people from Nairobi in a visit considered very successful. On 11 September, elements of the MAU conducted a demonstration exercise for a number of VIP Kenya officials. This was politically an extremely sensitive situation, however, and Kenya had strongly requested no publicity before, during, or after the exercise.  

(C) As MIDWAY and EISENHOWER battle groups and the ARG/MAU continued operations, port visits were conducted at Mombasa, Kenya; Colombo, Sri Lanka; Port Louis, Mauritius; and Perth, Geraldton, and Bunbury, Australia.  

(S) The submarines PHILADELPHIA and OMAHA remained on station throughout September. Three other ships departed the Indian Ocean during the month: MARS on 10 September, MISPELLION on 23 September, and RIGEL on 24 September.  

(S) When the war between Iraq and Iran erupted in the Middle East, CINCPAC planning actions intensified. On 4 October CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT that with the situation in the Persian Gulf region remaining highly volatile, it became increasingly clear that the primary Navy mission in the area was to insure the free flow of commerce into and out of the Gulf. In this regard, the possibility of the Strait of Hormuz being mined could not be ruled out and CINCPAC asked for an assessment of capabilities and response times for mine-sweeping assets to be operational in the Strait of Hormuz.  

1. Ibid.  
2. SECDEF 082144Z Aug 80 (U).  
3. CINCPACFLT 161724Z May 80 (S), REVW 1 May 81; J313 HistSum Sep 80 (S), DECL 10 Oct 86; AMEMB Nairobi 17535/121455Z Sep 80 (S), E.O. 12065, GDS 9/12/86.  
4. J313 HistSum Sep 80 (S), DECL 10 Oct 86.  
5. CINCPAC 042111Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 4 Oct 86.
The Strait of Hormuz ranged from a minimum distance of approximately 23.5 nautical miles between the islands of Larak (Iran) and Great Quin (Oman) to a maximum of 52 nautical miles. Because both Iran and Oman claimed 12 nautical mile territorial seas, approximately 15.4 miles of the strait's length between Larak and Great Quin, were overlapped by the territorial claims. The United States, however, did not recognize any territorial claim in excess of 3 nautical miles. Accordingly, the United States considered that all states enjoyed the right of high seas passage and all other high seas freedoms within the Strait of Hormuz beyond the 3-mile territorial sea limit. Those freedoms included the freedom to conduct naval exercises and maneuvers, including aircraft launching, with due regard being given to safety and compatibility with the exercise of high seas freedoms by other nations.1

The JCS provided some guidance regarding operations in the area. First, it was assumed that the projected mission of naval and air operations within the strait was to insure the unimpeded flow of shipping through the strait and the Persian Gulf. It was further assumed that, in so doing, the United States was impartial in the Iran-Iraq conflict and that it was protecting the collective interest of the international community in preserving freedom of navigation through this international strait.

They advised that surveillance and patrol activities by neutral warships or aircraft outside the territory of a belligerent violated no principle of international law; that minesweeping activities on the high seas represented no violation of law; and that protection of shipping routes that traversed international straits was a vital national interest of all commercial nations; and that international law precluded the closure of international straits. Also, blockade of an international strait between two areas of the high seas was not permissible under international law.2

CINCPACFLT sought input from CINCLANTFLT to provide CINCPAC with details of the forces that could be used for minesweeping. In the near term CINCLANTFLT could deploy six mission-ready RH-53D helicopters fitted with MK 105, MK 104, and MK 10 sweep gear. The first could be on station in six or seven days, and all, fully operational, 12 days after initial notification. Additional assets that could be used were also identified.3

In a personal message to the Chairman of the JCS, CINCPAC advised that a complete mine countermeasures concept was being prepared. CINCPAC said it

1. JCS 5219/280107Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 21 Oct 86.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCLANTFLT 052392Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 31 Dec 86.
was important to note that the impact of a belligerent nation proclaiming that a strait had been mined, even if in fact it had not, might have a similar effect on international shipping as if actual mining had taken place. Commercial ship insurance rates would probably rise, for example. CINCPAC made this point to emphasize that mine countermeasures operations might have to be conducted solely to prove or disprove that mining had taken place. 1

☐ On 18 October the JCS advised that the Secretary of Defense had approved the movement of mine countermeasure assets and personnel to Task Force 70. CINCPAC directed that CINCPACFLT coordinate directly with CINCLANT and CINCMAC for support required, assume Operational Control of the personnel on their departure from the Continental United States, assist in transporting the equipment and personnel to USS EISENHOWER, and prepare to conduct mine countermeasures operations when directed. 2

☐ In still another move to improve the force posture in the region, by JCS direction, the USS VOGE (FF-1047) with the Mid-East Force was relieved by USS LEAHY (CG-16) on 12 October. The guided missile cruiser, equipped with the Navy Tactical Data System, was able to link successfully with the AWACS aircraft that had been deployed to Saudi Arabia, enhancing early warning capability. 3

☐ Regarding the Mid-East Force, CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT on 29 October that in view of the continuing sensitive situation in the Persian Gulf region, five units be maintained until further notice. 4

☐ Meanwhile, the MIDWAY and EISENHOWER battle groups continued routine operations throughout October. USS PHILADELPHIA remained on station; USS OMAHA was relieved by USS HADDON (SSN-604) on 24 October. Port visits were conducted at Mombasa, Kenya; Colombo, Sri Lanka; and Perth, Geraldton, and Bunbury, Australia. 5

☐ The Marine Amphibious Ready Group, with the 31st MAU embarked, exited the Indian Ocean via the Lombok Strait on 12 October. An ARG/MAU from the Mediterranean area again deployed, entering the Indian Ocean on 31 October. Also departing during the month were VANCOUVER, RACINE, FREDERICK, PARSONS, WICHITA, and KALAMAZOO. 6

1. CINCPAC 160727Z Oct 80 (S), REVW 15 Oct 00.
2. CINCPAC 190100Z Oct 80 (S), DECL Oct 86, which cited JCS 181751Z Oct 80.
3. CINCPAC 160725Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 15 Oct 86; CINCPAC 180347Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 17 Oct 86.
4. CINCPAC 290145Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 27 Oct 86.
5. J313 HistSum Oct 80 (S), DECL 12 Nov 86.
6. Ibid.
A battle group led by USS RANGER (CV-61) entered the Indian Ocean via the Strait of Malacca on 30 October. Others entering included USS GOLDSBOROUGH (DDG-20), OUELLET (FF-1077), BADGER (FF-1071), NIAGARA FALLS (AFS-3), DETROIT (AOE-4), and HASSAYAMPA (AO-145). On 6 November RANGER relieved MIDWAY and the battle group departed for Subic Bay, transiting the Strait of Malacca on 13 November. MIDWAY had been away from its homeport in Japan since 14 July.

The Mediterranean ARG/MAU from SIXTH Fleet consisted of USS SAIPAN (LHA-2), USS EL PASO (LKA-117), and USS NEWPORT (LST-1179), again with 1,800 Marines embarked. The ARG/MAU conducted operations in support of the battle groups.

Ship visits were conducted to the ports of Djibouti; Diego Garcia; Bahrain; Mombasa, Kenya; Port Louis, Mauritius; and Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Late in October CINCPACFLT had intended to have USS LA SALLE of the Mid-East Force transit the Strait of Hormuz and rendezvous with USS EISENHOWER with the intention of beginning air mine countermeasures mid-depth mine sweeping training. He estimated two RH-53Ds would demonstrate such a capability and be considered ready for tasking by 9 November with minimum proficiency. A third was expected to be capable by 21 November. On 6 November, however, CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT that because of political sensitivities, ships with RH-53 helicopters embarked were not authorized in the Persian Gulf. Accordingly, he requested that plans for the RH-53s to enter with LA SALLE (and CORONADO during the turnover process) be adjusted.

During the deployment of the Mediterranean ARG/MAU the ships and Marines visited the Navy Support Facility at Diego Garcia. The commanding officer of that facility advised the ARG/MAU that their arrival had been viewed with trepidation, as history had never seen so many people in the Diego Garcia lagoon. But, he continued, the numbers represented only friends to be made and it had been a pleasure to serve. The Marines resumed operations in the Indian Ocean and on 4 December completed a transit of the Bab El Mandeb Strait and chopped back to CINCUSNAEVUR.

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1. J313 HistSum Nov 80 (S), DECL 8 Dec 86; CNO 010020Z Nov 80 (U).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPACFLT 011957Z Nov 80 (S), DECL 31 Oct 86; CINCPAC 062327Z Nov 80 (S), DECL 6 Nov 86.
5. NAVSUPPAC Diego Garcia 202248Z Nov 80 (U); J313 HistSum Dec 80 (S), DECL 8 Jan 87.
(S) RANGER remained on station through the end of December. The EISENHOWER battle group was relieved by a group headed by USS INDEPENDENCE (CV-62) out of Norfolk, and consisting of USS CHARLES F. ADAMS (DDG-2) and USS HARRY F. YARNEILL (CG-17). The ships relieved EISENHOWER, VIRGINIA, and SOUTH CAROLINA. As the INDEPENDENCE battle group did not have the nuclear capability of the EISENHOWER group, USS SAVANNAH (AOR-4) accompanied the ships across the Atlantic to provide underway replenishment.1

(C) In December ships called at Diego Garcia; Bahrain; Port Louis; Mombasa; Damman, Saudi Arabia; and Male.

(S) As had been the case throughout the year, two submarines remained on station. PHILADELPHIA and HADDO were relieved by USS MEMPHIS (SSN-691) and USS DRUM (SSN-677).2

(S) On 20 December the JCS advised that the Secretary of State had provided information on mine countermeasures operations in the Persian Gulf. CINCPAC, on 19 December, had advised of his intentions to authorize RH-53 training operations, including helicopters towing mine sweep gear, while USS CORONADO was conducting Persian Gulf duties. Training would be conducted in international waters clear of sea lanes. The JCS concurred with the mine countermeasures training plan that had been outlined by CINCPAC.3

(C/NOFO) In 1980 Australian ships entered the Indian Ocean in the largest deployment of those forces since World War II. The ships of Task Group 627.3, which set sail on 5 September, were HMAS MELBOURNE (a CVL), HMAS PERTH (a DDG), HMAS DERWENT (an FF), HMAS STALWART (an AR), HMAS SUPPLY (an AO), and HMAS OTAMA, a submarine. Port visits were scheduled for Singapore, Penang, Cochin, Madras, Colombo, Dubai, Muscat, Karachi, Bombay, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, with return to Fremantle, Sydney, and Stirling.4

Iran-Iraq War

(U) Neither Iran nor Iraq was part of the PACOM, but when disagreements between the two countries erupted in a fighting war, the impact was great on CINCPAC's forces in the Indian Ocean and ongoing plans for possible contingencies.

1. CNO 221719Z Nov 80 (U).
2. J313 HistSum Dec 80 (S), DECL 8 Jan 87.
3. JCS 202110Z Dec 80 (S), DECL 20 Dec 86.
4. DIA 262330Z Sep 80 (S), REVW, 26 Sep 10.
Briefly, a 1937 British treaty had formalized the river boundaries between the two countries. The Shatt Al Arab was specified as the western boundary of Iran with Iraqi territory extending to the low water mark on the Iranian shore. That effectively gave the whole river to the Iraqis. As the river's importance as a world petroleum export waterway grew, Iran realized its loss. To regain some control of the waterway became a major Iranian goal. The two countries continued to disagree and Iran became active in providing quantities of military supplies and equipment to the Kurdish rebels in Iraq; in 1975 regular Iranian Army forces were operating inside Iraq and fighting with Kurdish guerrilla units. The 1975 Algiers Accords were signed following agreement that the river frontier would run down the median of the deep water channel; the accords guaranteed border security and withdrawal of Iranian support for the Kurds.¹

The Kurdish rebellion collapsed within three months and relations between the two countries began to stabilize. Continued border violations kept the old issues alive, however, and on 17 September 1980 Iraq withdrew its support of the Algiers Accords. Within a few days full-scale war broke out. Guaranteed control over the Shatt Al Arab waterway was one of Iraq's main precepts for peace with Iran.²

A State Department message of 23 September provided summary guidance at the beginning of the conflict. The Secretary said that a continuation or escalation of the conflict would have seriously adverse implications for U.S. interests, as well as for many of the regional countries. The U.S. objective would be to end the war by mobilizing international pressures, particularly in the United Nations, to preserve the integrity of Iran, and to prevent the USSR from exploiting the situation or enhancing its position.³

Further guidance from the Secretary on 18 November noted that the U.S. response to the war had four major features: strict impartiality, non-intervention, promotion of a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement of disputes, and preventing the spread of hostilities by encouraging other countries of the region to maintain a non-belligerent stance. He said the United States was particularly concerned about the potential threat to international shipping in the Persian Gulf, either through direct military action by Iran or Iraq, or through voluntary blockages on the part of anxious ship owners. "We are also concerned about the security of other Gulf states." The United States

1. COMIPAC 30034OZ Sep 80 (S), REVW 29 Sep 00.
2. Ibid.
3. SECSTATE 254661/232134Z Sep 80 (S)(EX), E.O. 12065: RDS 1-3, 9/13/80 (sic), retransmitted as JCS 250141Z Sep 80 and SECSTATE 250505Z Sep 80.
was encouraging and supporting efforts in the United Nations Security Council to bring about a cease-fire. Meanwhile, the United States continued its policy of neutrality. "We are not supplying American or other military equipment to either side."1

(S) CINCPAC's planning for possible contingencies in the region was in response to JCS tasking and was often done in coordination with USCINCEUR. CINCPAC's original concept plan (submitted on 26 September) for multilateral naval cooperation had received very rapid Defense Department and inter-agency approval and had formed the basis of Navy-to-Navy talks since that time. On 6 October CINCPAC had forwarded a concept plan dealing with protection of deployed AWACS aircraft and augmenting Saudi Arabian air defense. On 18 October he had forwarded a proposal for securing sea lines of communication in the Persian Gulf and initiating mine countermeasure procedures in the Strait of Hormuz. The CNO advised that he had been in support of the plans from the onset. The planning process continued as the year ended.2

\[ \text{Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt} \]

(U) PACOM forces were among those participating in an aborted rescue attempt designed to recover the American hostages held in Iran. The following account is taken from the report President Carter sent to the U.S. Congress on 26 April 1980, explaining that it was his desire that Congress be informed on this matter and consistent with the reporting provisions of the War Powers Resolution of 1973.3

(U) The President said that on 24 April 1980 elements of the U.S. Armed Forces under his direction commenced the positioning stage of a rescue operation that was designed, if the subsequent stages had been executed, to effect the rescue of the American hostages who had been held captive in Iran since 4 November 1979, in clear violation of International Law and the norms of civilized conduct among nations. Instead, for reasons described below, all of those elements were withdrawn from Iran and no hostilities occurred.

(U) The sole objective of the operation that actually occurred was to position the rescue team for the subsequent effort to withdraw the hostages. The rescue team was under my overall command and control and required my approval before executing the subsequent phases of the operation designed to

1. SECSTATE 306955/01/181842Z Nov 80 (S), E.O. 12065: GDS 11/17/86.
2. CINCPAC O60356Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 5 Oct 86; CNO 261320Z Nov 80 (S), DECL 31 Dec 88, which cited CINCPAC 260245Z Sep 80 and 180545Z Oct 80.
3. USINFO WASHDC 280426Z Apr 80 (U).
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effect the rescue itself. No such approval was requested or given because, as described below, the mission was aborted.

(U) Beginning approximately 1030 Eastern Standard Time (1700 hours in Iran) on 24 April, six U.S. C-130 transport aircraft and eight RH-53 helicopters entered Iran airspace. Their crews were not equipped for combat. Some of the C-130s carried a force of approximately 90 members of the rescue team equipped for combat, plus various support personnel. From approximately 1400 to 1600 hours (EST) the six transports and six of the eight helicopters landed at a remote desert site in Iran (called Desert One) approximately 200 miles from Tehran where they disembarked the rescue team, commenced refueling operations, and began to prepare for the subsequent phases.

(U) During the flight to the remote desert site, two of the eight helicopters developed operating difficulties. One was forced to return to the carrier NIMITZ (CVN-68, on station in the Indian Ocean); the second was forced to land in the desert, but its crew was taken aboard another of the helicopters and proceeded on to the landing site. Of the six helicopters which landed at the remote site, one developed a serious hydraulic problem and was unable to continue with the mission. The operational plans called for a minimum of six helicopters in good operational condition able to proceed from the desert site. Eight helicopters had been included in the force to provide sufficient redundancy without imposing excessive strains on the refueling and exit requirements of the operation. When, then, the number of helicopters available to continue dropped to five, it was determined that the operation could not proceed as planned. Therefore, on the recommendation of the force commander and my military advisers, I decided to cancel the mission and ordered the United States Armed Forces involved to return from Iran.

(U) During the process of withdrawal, one of the helicopters accidentally collided with one of the C-130 aircraft, which was preparing for take off, resulting in an explosion and fire and the death of eight personnel (five USAF and three USMC) and injury of several others. At this point, the decision was made to load all surviving personnel aboard the remaining C-130 aircraft and to abandon the remaining helicopters at the landing site. Altogether, the United States Armed Forces remained on the ground for a total of approximately three hours. The five remaining aircraft took off about 1745 (EST) and departed from Iran airspace without further incident about 2000 (EST) on 24 April. No United States Armed Forces remained in Iran.

(U) The remote desert area was selected to conceal this phase of the mission from discovery. At no time during the temporary presence of United States Armed Forces in Iran did they encounter Iranian forces of any type. We believe, in fact, that no Iranian military forces were in the desert area,
and that the Iranian forces were unaware of the presence of United States Armed Forces until after their departure from Iran. As planned, no hostilities occurred during this phase of the mission - the only phase that was executed.

(U) At one point during the period in which United States Armed Forces elements were on the ground in the desert landing site a bus containing forty-four Iranian civilians happened to pass along a nearby road. The bus was stopped and then disabled. Its occupants were detained by United States Armed Forces until their departure, and then released unharmed. One truck closely followed by a second vehicle also passed by while United States Armed Forces elements were on the ground. These elements stopped the truck by a shot into its headlights. The driver ran to the second vehicle which then escaped across the desert. Neither of these incidents affected the subsequent decision to terminate the mission.

(U) Our rescue team knew, and I knew, that the operation was certain to be dangerous. We were all convinced that if and when the rescue phase of the operation had been commenced, it had an excellent chance of success. They were all volunteers; they were all highly trained. I met with their leaders before they went on this operation. They knew then what hopes of mine and of all Americans they carried with them. I share with the nation the highest respect and appreciation for the ability and bravery of all who participated in this mission.

(U) To the families of those who died and who were injured, I have expressed the admiration I feel for the courage of their loved ones and the sorrow that I felt personally for their sacrifice. (The bodies of the eight dead were not returned to the United States until August.) The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran. It was not directed against the people of Iran. It caused no Iranian casualties.

(U) This operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's powers under the Constitution as Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces, expressly recognized in Section 8(D)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. In carrying out this operation, the United States was acting wholly within its right, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to protect and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them. The statement was signed, "Sincerely, Jimmy Carter."1

<SYNOPSYN> As soon as the operation had been announced to the press, media interest was overwhelming around the world. On 26 April CINCPAC provided[1]

1. Ibid.
guidance to his component commanders and Navy forces in the Indian Ocean area. He cautioned that discussion of operational details beyond those made public by the U.S. Government was not authorized. This was to insure that no compromise of sensitive sources occurred. "Information pertaining to non-consummated events which would have occurred after the refueling of the mission's helicopters continues to be compartmented and will not be released under any circumstances." A message in a similar vein was sent by the CNO, who said that those in uniform should avoid any public speculation about, or comment on, any aspect of the operation. Curiosity about its details was intense, the CNO noted, and the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the JCS had provided, and would provide, all the information that it was proper and prudent to make public. "Comments at lower echelons are inappropriate and potentially unhelpful, as I am sure you recognize." A similar message was dispatched by the JCS.\footnote{1}

(U) The secrecy that surrounded the planning and early execution phase of the operation was perhaps exemplified at CINCPAC's headquarters. Admiral Long and a small handful of his staff operated as an ad hoc control cell to coordinate any PACOM actions. The helicopters, as noted above, had been launched from NIMITZ, which was under CINCPAC's OPCOM in the Indian Ocean. But all knowledge was limited to this very small operational group, and no report on their activities was prepared for historical purposes.

(U) What was described as excessive secrecy might have doomed the rescue attempt, a military review panel concluded in August. Earlier, in June, United Press International reported that a secret Senate Armed Services Committee report had concluded that the raid was flawed by a poor commander, poor organization, and failure to anticipate emergencies. The Pentagon denied the claims and the Chairman of the committee denied the existence of such a report. The author reportedly said the mission's overall commander was Army Major General James B. Vaught, described as an Army division commander who had substantial experience in combat but none in special operations. (The Pentagon spokesman had described him as an expert in the highly specialized techniques of special operations and a man who had performed skillfully in high-level management positions.) According to the report, Vaught created an organization that fragmented authority between Army Colonel Charles Beckwith for ground forces, Air Force Colonel James H. Kyle for fixed-wing aircraft, and Marine Colonel Charles Pitman. "Historically it has been unwise to fragment command. In this case, no one at Desert Site was responsible for making decisions. The man who was, was in the White House, thousands of miles from the scene of the action." The Pentagon spokesman commented that no one on the scene had any

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1. CINCPAC 260110Z Apr 80 (S), REVW 25 Apr 00; CNO 261904Z Apr 80 (U); JCS 4172/012341Z May 80 (S)(EX), REVW 2 May 85.
question who was in overall charge. Other charges in the report concerned weather prediction (dust clouds in the desert), emergencies, and maintenance of the SEA STALLION helicopters.\(^1\)

(U) As noted above, a review group of former high-ranking officers had been convened in May to investigate the circumstances surrounding the raid. Chaired by a former CNO, Admiral James Holloway, the group consisted of Army LT GEN Samuel Wilson, former head of the DIA; Air Force LT GEN LeRoy Manor (who had planned the raid on Son Tay prison in North Vietnam in 1970 and a former CINCPAC Chief of Staff); Army MAJ GEN James Smith; Air Force MAJ GEN John Piotrowski; and Marine Corps MAJ GEN Alfred Gray, Jr.\(^2\)

(U) As reported by the Washington Post Service, the JCS were so obsessed with keeping the plan secret that they never wrote it down or subjected it to the traditional "murder boards" (panels of critics) for review. Regarding that lack of review, a recommendation to establish a special review group had been rejected. As a consequence, the planners in effect reviewed and critiqued their own product for feasibility and soundness as they went along. To keep the plan secret, the JCS were acting as their own action officers and were denying themselves the staffing support they normally enjoyed when reviewing plans of a less sensitive nature. "No final plan for the rescue operations was ever published prior to the mission execution. A written plan to supplement oral briefings to the JCS would have provided them a document to study and review in the privacy of their own offices, which might have sharpened their understanding of details and led to more incisive questions," the panel said.

(U) Other reported conclusions:

- The group believed that intelligence community assets could have been pulled together more quickly and effectively.

- Thoroughly integrated training exercises of the joint task force for the final plan were not conducted. Operational readiness would have benefited from a full-dress rehearsal, and command and control weaknesses would probably have been ironed out.

- Command and control was excellent at the upper echelons, but more tenuous and fragile at intermediate levels.

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Regarding the number of helicopters, the plan kept changing as it was tailored to new information about the hostages. Additional helicopters and crews would have reduced the risk of abort due to mechanical failure, were operationally feasible, and could have been made available until quite late in the planning evolution.

The joint task force planning the mission had been given a table showing, by location and month, the frequency of suspended-dust occurrences. The helicopter pilots, however, were surprised when they encountered the dust, were unprepared to accurately assess its impact on their flight, and stated that they were not advised of the phenomenon. The C-130 pilots were also unaware of the possibility of encountering suspended dust.

Excessive secrecy on communications within the task force denied information essential to reach informed decisions. The additional information might have prompted helicopter number five (the one that returned to NIMITZ) to continue on to Desert One. One more flyable helicopter would have enabled the mission to proceed.

Failure to destroy secret information was noted. After all the emphasis on secrecy in planning, the helicopters abandoned in the desert when the mission was aborted contained Top Secret information about the operation that the Iranians captured and exploited for propaganda purposes. Failure to destroy the information reflected unfavorably on the performance of the personnel involved, the review group said.1

Right after the aborted operation, CINCPAC told his component commanders and their forces of the shared common disappointment in not successfully completing the mission. "From my perspective," CINCPAC said, "the performance of all involved was magnificent. You can be proud of the contributions made these past months in response to the Persian Gulf situation. Please convey my admiration to all who were involved in these essential opera-operations."2

Carrier Support Operations for Korea

The greatly increased operating tempo of Navy carrier forces was noted not only in the Indian Ocean region, but in support of Korean contingencies. Political matters remained unsettled in Korea following the October 1979 assassination of President Park, as discussed in Chapter I of this history, and

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 272035Z Apr 80 (C), REVW 26 Apr 86.
since 8 November 1979 a carrier battle group had maintained a 96-hour response posture for a Korean contingency. As 1980 began, the USS CORAL SEA (CV-43) battle group was in Subic Bay for minor upkeep. On 31 January the group was relieved of the Korean 96-hour contingency posture by the USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63) battle group, which, in turn, was relieved by a USS MIDWAY (CV-41) battle group.¹

(S) CINCPAC sought and received permission to relax the 96-hour Korean posture during brief periods to permit necessary upkeep for the ships. In granting one such request, however, the JCS advised CINCPAC that the 96-hour response posture should be resumed as soon as was practical. Gaps occurred, for example, between 2 and 8 February, 25 February to 17 March, and 26 April to 5 May.²

(S) On 23 May, because of the deteriorating internal situation in the ROK, COMUS Korea requested that a carrier battle group establish a modified operating location in close proximity to the Korean Peninsula at the earliest possible time. In response to this request, a battle group led by USS CORAL SEA and consisting of USS REEVES (CG-24), USS STANDLEY (CG-32), and USS ROANOKE (AO-7) was directed from homeward transit to the vicinity of Korea south of Cheju-Do. The battle group was later joined by USS PYRO (AE-24), USS KNOX (FF-1052), and USS KIRK (FF-1087), with USS BLUEBACK (SS-581) providing submarine support.³

(S) On 31 May a group led by MIDWAY relieved CORAL SEA. In the MIDWAY group were USS LONG BEACH (CGN-9) and USS MERRILL (DD-975), with CORAL SEA augmentees PYRO, KNOX, KIRK, and BLUEBACK for continued ROK support operations. On 13 June, as the internal situation stabilized, the MIDWAY group was returned to the 96-hour contingency response posture. On 28 June CINCPAC advised the JCS of his intent to cancel the 96-hour posture and return to normal SEVENTH Fleet readiness posture.⁴

(S) CINCPAC noted that it was no longer possible to provide continuous coverage of multiple, widely dispersed contingencies for extended periods without exacting an excessive toll on personnel, training, and material

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1. J313 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 4 Jan 86.
2. CINCPAC 022315Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 31 Jan 86; JCS 5383/051643Z Feb 80 (S), REVW 3 Feb 86; CINCPAC 272320Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 26 Feb 86; CINCPAC 092134Z Apr 80 (S), DECL 2 Apr 86.
3. J313 HistSum May 80 (S), DECL 2 Jun 86.
4. Ibid.; J313 HistSum Jun 80 (S), DECL 8 Jul 86; CINCPAC 280219Z Jun 80 (S), DECL 25 Jun 86.
readiness. The Indian Ocean and Korean contingency requirements of the previous seven months had required an operating tempo significantly higher than normal and not permitted the scheduling of sufficient upkeep periods to maintain material readiness at an acceptable level. This had resulted in an increasing backlog of deferred maintenance and a steady decline in the material condition of the deployed units. With the 96-hour response time, a ship in Subic Bay could not attempt any significant repair or maintenance action that could not be completed within 36 hours, effectively eliminating major maintenance for a majority of those systems that were most vital for an Indian Ocean deployment and that required repair after such a deployment. He also noted the relatively stable situation in Korea. The JCS concurred with the recommendation and dropped the 96-hour requirement.¹

Navigational Freedom and U.S. Security Interests

(LC) Law of the Sea negotiations had begun in 1973. At first the United States had generally not protested objectionable maritime claims made by other nations that the United States did not recognize as being valid under International Law and customary practice. In March 1979, however, it became U.S. policy to protest illegal maritime claims and exercise U.S. rights in the face of such claims. This was to promote the view that freedom of navigation and overflight through straits used for international navigation existed as a high seas right regardless of assertions of jurisdiction over 12-mile territorial seas. The Department of State was to take action to effect changes in excessive claims made by other states and/or make U.S. opposition to the claims known through official diplomatic protests. The Department of Defense was to plan for and carry out operations that would assert U.S. rights in the face of excessive claims by means of naval and air operations.²

(LC) The National Security Council had requested recommendations concerning proposed exercises, transits, and overflights from the Defense Department. The JCS consolidated the recommendations of the CINCs of the unified and specified commands and forwarded the proposal to the Council. Proposed operations had been approved for four PACOM countries: Indonesia, the Philippines, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands. Indonesia had a claimed territorial sea of 12 nautical miles. Its objectionable claim was an archipelago claim, in which the 12-mile territorial sea was measured from a straight base line connecting the outermost islands. The U.S. practice had been to provide "courtesy notification" to Indonesia of warship passage through the archipelago. The proposed

action was to have Pacific Fleet units continue to conduct exercises and transits through Indonesian-claimed archipelago waters. The United States, however, planned to direct the U.S. Defense Attache in Jakarta to phase out the courtesy notification of warship passage.1

(5) This policy change proved to be a serious irritant with the Government of Indonesia and had affected Indonesian-U.S. relations. In a personal message from Admiral Long to the Under Secretary of State in June 1980 the Admiral advised that he was concerned about several largely unrelated policy issues that were having a collective negative impact on U.S. relations with Indonesia. One was the navigation and overflight policy. He said his instinct was to remain firm in the application of the U.S. ship transit policy for Indonesia, but as a possible accommodating measure, he was examining the feasibility of broadening the existing intelligence exchange program with that country. He said that in coordination with the Defense Intelligence Agency he was examining possible arrangements that would expand ongoing intelligence support to provide the Indonesian military with a periodic intelligence summary to include location of U.S. naval units on routine operations in the vicinity of Indonesia. He said he was looking for a format that would adequately protect the security of naval movements and preserve the ship transit policy, but at the same time help alleviate Indonesian sensitivities.2

(5) The State Department advised the Ambassador of the proposal. The Ambassador told Admiral Long he greatly appreciated having a positive alternative proposal for the Indonesians. He hoped for the first briefing fairly quickly to keep up the momentum.3

(5) When the first intelligence summary was received the Indonesian Defense Department signaled its continuing displeasure over cessation of straits passage notification by delaying reception of the document, cancelling a visit by their Marine Commandant to the United States, and at least initial rejection of an offer of Subic Bay to overhaul two Indonesian destroyers.4

(5) On 16 September CINCPAC, in a message to the JCS, advised of a State Department direction that the CINCPAC intelligence summary being provided to the Indonesians be expanded to include specific and timely information with regard to planned movement of vessels, including U.S. naval vessels, moving to and from station in the Indian Ocean. The purpose of this expansion

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 192303Z Jun 80 (S), DECL 18 Jun 87.
4. AMEMB Jakarta 111027Z Aug 80 (S)(EX), E.O. 12065: RDS-4 8/11/00.

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was to resolve the ship transit notification problem satisfactorily and to remove it as a cause for misunderstanding and friction. CINCPAC interpreted the guidance to mean a desire to be as forthcoming as possible without jeopardizing global Law of the Sea interests. He provided some examples of hypothetical intelligence summary items regarding ship movements.\(^1\)

\(^{(5)}\) The JCS concurred, noting that the information conveyed should be specific and timely to remove Indonesian doubts concerning intended movement of U.S. vessels through areas of concern. They suggested CINCPAC and the Ambassador determine the exact format for the briefings. The State Department said they were pleased and gratified by CINCPAC's prompt and decisive action on the issue.\(^2\)

\(^{(U)}\) Details regarding presentation of the briefings are discussed in the Intelligence chapter of this history.

**Southeast Asia Refugee Operations**

\(^{(U)}\) In the years since the collapse of the governments in the Republic of Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos, over a million Indochinese had fled their homelands. On 21 July 1979 the President directed U.S. Navy assistance to refugees and PACOM units (SEVENTH Fleet ships and aircraft) began making a special effort, within normal operations, to locate refugees and provide humanitarian assistance. By the end of 1979 there had been 846 refugees taken aboard USN or USNS ships and operations continued.\(^3\)

\(^{(c)}\) Toward the end of 1979, following a series of messages between the JCS and CINCPAC in which the humanitarian aspects of the refugee search had been weighed against legitimate military requirements, the JCS had provided guidance that established a reduced level of flights when a lull in refugee activity occurred and a surge with an increase in such activity.\(^4\)

\(^{(U)}\) By the end of 1980 USN and USNS ships had rescued 2,978 refugees and debarked them: 1,519 in the Philippines, 694 in Thailand, 680 in Singapore, and 85 in Hong Kong. U.S. ships that had taken part included USS SAN JOSE (AFS-7), USS KILAUEA (AE-26), USS WORDEN (CG-18), USS LONG BEACH (CGN-9), USNS SEALIFT ANTARCTIC, USS FRANCIS HAMMOND (FF-1067), USS OLDENDORF (DD-972), USS JOSEPH P. STRAUSS (DDG-16), USS BAGLEY (FF-1069), USS TRUXTUN (CGN-35),

1. CINCPAC 162211Z Sep 80 (S), DECL 30 Sep 86.
2. JCS 1833/261906Z Sep 80 (S), DECL 26 Sep 80; USDEL SECRETARY UN NEW YORK 08051/0214142 Oct 80 (C), E.O. 12065: GDS 10-01-86.
4. CINCPAC 070649Z Mar 80 (C), DECL 5 Mar 86, which cited JCS 222010Z Dec 79.
USS MERRILL (DD-976), USNS PASSUMPSIC (TAO-107), USS HEWITT (DD-966), USS COCHRANE (DDG-21), USS BRUNSWICK (ATS-3), USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC-19), USS WICHITA (AOR-1), USS PARSONS (DDG-33), USS ROBISON (DDG-12), and USS BEAUFORT (ATS-2). In January the Norwegian ship STOLT SHEAF rescued 44.¹

(U) Throughout the year there were 54 sightings by P-3 aircraft. In April an F-14 from USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64) made one additional sighting.²

(CG) The dedicated search and assistance program was terminated on 30 September. Following that date P-3 crews continued to perform refugee surveillance as a collateral mission on operational and training flights to the South China Sea. On 1 November CINCPAC provided the JCS with a recapitulation report on the operations from 29 July 1979 through 30 September 1980. During that period P-3 aircraft had compiled 4,746 flight hours while conducting 476 dedicated refugee flights. They investigated 20,071 contacts and located 99 vessels. Merchant ships responding to P-3 requests for assistance embarked over 2,041 refugees; 727 of the 1,082 embarked by USN ships had been from vessels initially located by the P-3s. The aircraft also rendered aid and assistance to an undetermined number by dropping refugee survival packages when a USN ship was not in the vicinity, or merchant ship assistance could not be obtained. The refugee survival package was a low-cost expendable package devised by Commander Task Force 73 and Commander Task Group 72.3 as a means of dropping food and water to refugees.³

(CG) In his discussion of operational impact, CINCPAC noted that reduced squadron manning had aggravated the operational impact of the operations. Increased tasking resulting from events in the Mid-East and higher than normal levels of Soviet submarine activity in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean had placed even greater demands on available assets. The total P-3 refugee expense had been calculated at $4,146,610.

(CG) Lessons learned from the operations included:

- P-3 radar had limited effectiveness against small wooden vessels and most detections were made visually.

- Sonobuoys provided valuable one-way communication. The maximum benefit was derived from taping specific simple multi-lingual questions to the buoy with the request that they be answered in English, if possible.

1. J313 HistSums Jan-Dec 80 (U).
2. Ibid.
3. J311 HistSum Dec 80 (C), DECL 31 Oct 86; CINCPAC 010347Z Nov 80 (C), DECL 17 Oct 86.
• VHF-FM communications were essential for coordinating operations with merchant ships. Such radios were not installed in P-3s, but hand carried radios provided some limited capability.

• Long-life sonobuoys were invaluable when surface assistance could not be obtained on the initial flight and additional flights were required to relocate the refugee vessels.

• The refugee survival package, easily constructed of cardboard and styrofoam, provided a cheap, effective method of dropping stores to survivors or small boats at sea.

• During the last six months of operations the masters of merchant ships had been more likely to respond to requests for assistance, possibly because they had become aware of both the expeditious debarkations, minimizing delays in their sailing schedules, and the dire straits of the refugees.¹

---Nuclear-Powered and Other Ship Visits to Foreign Ports---

(S) A long-time CINCPAC goal had been for nuclear powered ship visits to PACOM countries to be considered "routine" by those countries, but this had not yet become a reality. Some visits were greeted with protest demonstrations and some countries did not permit such visits at all. They often were the subject of political sensitivity. Some port visits are listed in the discussion of Indian Ocean operations, elsewhere in this chapter. Certain other matters concerning such visits are discussed in the material that follows.

---New Zealand---

(S) Visits to New Zealand had traditionally been accompanied by local protests. Also, the leader of the opposition Labour Party had publicly announced that a future Labour government would ban all nuclear powered warship visits to New Zealand ports. He continued to advocate the establishment of a nuclear free zone. Nevertheless, a visit to Wellington by USS TRUXTUN (CGN-35) from 22 to 29 September was called an "unqualified success" by the Embassy. The Embassy told TRUXTON, "Your sensitivity to the special circumstances in which the visit took place was deeply appreciated."²

¹. Ibid.
². AMEMB Wellington 02975/090428Z Jun 80 (C), E.O. 12065: RDS-3 6/9/10; CINCPAC 040236Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 3 Jul 86; AMEMB Wellington 300017Z Sep 80 (U).
(U) Destroyer Squadron 21, consisting of USS OLDENDORF (DD-972), USS TURNER JOY (DD-951), and USS MARVIN SHIELDS (FF-1066) visited the Auckland Consular District from 15 to 31 October. The American Consul advised that the successful visit underscored the enthusiastic response by New Zealanders to the visit as well as their continued commitment and support for the ANZUS relationship. A change of command ceremony has was held on board OLDENDORF, which the consul described as bringing home the depth of U.S. Navy tradition and the attachment of the commander and his men.¹

Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands

(6) On 8 April the U.S. Embassy in Port Moresby advised that Papua New Guinea would host a biannual South Pacific Festival of the Arts from 29 June to 12 July. The Pacific Island states, Australia, New Zealand, U.S. territories in the Pacific, Hawaii, and Micronesia would all send performers and craftsmen. He asked that a U.S. Navy ship visit during that period. (In February the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade had announced that in support of Papua New Guinea's condemnation of the USSR invasion of Afghanistan, that country had banned Soviet vessels from using any of its ports.)²

(6) USS KINKAID (DD-965) visited Port Moresby from 30 June to 5 July and Honiara in the Solomon Islands from 7 to 9 July. (KINKAID was on South Pacific (SOPAC) Cruise 80 in company with USS O'CALLAHAN (FF-1051) and USS COOK (FF-1083). Other ports visited by SOPAC ships included Truk; Lae, PNG; Darwin, Townsville, Sydney, and Cairns, Australia; Bougainville; Noumea in New Caledonia; Tarawa in Kiribati; Funafuti, Tuvalu; the New Hebrides; Suva, Fiji; and Pago Pago in American Samoa.) While in Port Moresby the visit was considered a gesture of respect for the third festival of the arts. The Prime Minister, visiting the ship, was clearly impressed with KINKAID's gas turbine plants and their associated computerized control equipment. "There can be no doubt that the visit achieved its major objective of strengthening ties between the United States and Papua New Guinea," the Ambassador said.³

¹ AMCONSUL Auckland 030400Z Nov 80 (U).
² AMEMB Port Moresby 0458/080511Z Apr 80 (U); J313 Point Paper (S), 6 Oct 80, Subj: Ship Visits to Papua New Guinea (U), DECL 6 Oct 86.
³ AMEMB Port Moresby 0963/090512Z Jul 80 (C), E.O. 12065 N/A; J313 Point Paper (C), 21 Apr 80, Subj: South Pacific (SOPAC) Cruises (U), DECL 22 Apr 86.
(C) - As discussed in the 1979 History, there had been an incident involving U.S. Forces transiting the Solomon Islands en route to Exercise KANGAROO III on 15 October. The ships of Task Group 75.1 had operated in accordance with the concept of navigational freedom of the seas. Two helicopters, however, had flown over Florida Island. The newly-arriving Ambassador of the United States had included a formal apology when he presented his credentials. The 1980 visit by KINKAID, the same Ambassador noted, was entirely successful. He was reminded of the bitterness following the 1979 incident and said that KINKAID's visit restored relations to their formerly friendly state. Several cabinet members warmly praised the United States for sending the ship as a mark of respect and friendship. One said, "I have never felt so proud as when I heard your ship firing a salute to Solomon Islands independence /the second anniversary/ just as our national anthem was being played." 1

Sri Lanka

(C) - Colombo, Sri Lanka, had increased U.S. ship visits, reflecting the enhanced U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean area. There had been one warship visit in 1978 and one multi-ship visit in 1979. In the first half of 1980 USS DAVID R. RAY (DD-971) had called from 8 to 11 February. Beginning in July the pace had speeded up. USS AJAX (AR-6) visited from 30 June to 3 July; USS O'BRIEN (DD-975) visited from 5 to 9 July; USS KIRK (FF-1087) visited from 22 to 27 September; and from 15 to 18 September USS RACINE (LST-1191) and USS FREDERICK (LST-1184) had called. It was during the visit by RACINE and FREDERICK that an alleged liberty incident occurred involving the Soviet Embassy. Some Americans, one possibly without a shirt, were in the vicinity of the Embassy and may have been asked to leave. This was blown out of proportion by press elements opposed to the ship visits. One such editorial said the Sri Lankan Government's decision to provide recreational facilities for the American Navy was the "first step in turning Sri Lanka into an American imperialist military base and a 'harem' for American soldiers. What happened in Hong Kong or Thailand would gradually happen here," according to the editorial, which called American Service personnel "debauchees." "If the 'devil dancing' by crew members of an American warship...opposite a foreign embassy...is considered 'recreation' then we can imagine what would be in store for us in the future." 2

1. CINCPAC Command History 1979 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 239-241; AMEMB Port Moresby 0963/0905127 Jul 80 (C), E.O. 12065 N/A.
2. USDAO Colombo 170800Z Oct 80 (C), DECL 31 Dec 86; USS RACINE 190531Z Sep 80 (C), DECL 18 Sep 86; USDAO Colombo 0477/221000Z Sep 80 (U); CINCPACFLT 202311Z Sep 80 (U).
On 17 November Admiral Long called on Sri Lanka's President Jayewardene. During that meeting the President advised CINCPAC (and the U.S. Ambassador) of a new policy regarding naval visits to Trincomalee. Ships of the United States and other countries would henceforth be welcome.  

1. AMEMB Colombo 5612/240805Z Nov 80 (S), E.O. 12065 RDS 11/20/00.  
2. SECDEF 1990/120634Z May 79 (S), DECL 18 Apr 85.  
3. CINCPAC 202246Z Jul 79 (S), DECL 18 Jul 85.  
4. CINCPAC 291945Z Jul 79 (S), DECL 29 Jul 85.
1. USAFLO/CINCPACREP Australia 240151Z Sep 79 (S), REVW 24 Sep 85; CINCPAC 260415Z Sep 79 (S), REVW 24 Sep 85.
3. AMEMB Canberra 0723/240444Z Jan 80 (C), E.O. 12065; GDS 1/24/86; SECSTATE 020757/242229Z Jan 80 (C), E.O. 12065: GDS 1/24/85.
1. USAFLO/CINCPACREP Australia 01004Z Feb 80 (S); DECL 4 Feb 80.
2. 3AD Andersen AFB Guam 290655Z Feb 80 (U).
3. J5131 HistSum May 80 (S); DECL 31 Jun 86; CINCPAC 212040Z May 80 (S), DECL 31 May 86; CINCPAC 010125Z Aug 80, REVW 25 Jul 00.
4. J311 HistSum Aug 80 (S), DECL 26 Aug 86; CINCPAC 010125Z Aug 80 (S), REVW 25 Jul 00.
B-52 Operations in the Philippines

In response to a CINCPAC request of May 1979 regarding proposed B-52 training in the Philippines, the JCS advised that they concurred with and fully supported the proposal. Both the Departments of State and Defense, however, asserted that the timing did not appear propitious for raising the question with the Philippines. The JCS recommended a delay of six months. In August CINCPAC reiterated the urgency of the proposal and requested that every effort be made to obtain earliest Washington level approval to approach the Philippines on the initiative.3

In May 1980 CINCPACAF raised the question again, citing Soviet TU-95 (BEAR) aircraft incursions into Philippine airspace. CINCPAC again requested that Washington assess approaching the Philippines regarding the B-52s. The State Department provided authorization allowing Ambassador Murphy and CINCPAC to present the proposal to Philippine officials.4

On 22 May Admiral Long and the Ambassador met with President Marcos, AFP Chief of Staff Espino, and the Chief of the Presidential Security Command, MAJ GEN Ver, to propose B-52 training flights over the Philippines. The Admiral said the United States was seeking permission for high altitude flights.

1. CINCPAC 050011Z Aug 80 (S), DECL 4 Aug 86; USAFLO CINCPACREP Canberra 210640Z Oct 80 (C), DECL 18 Oct 83; SECSTATE 329328/1/121947Z Dec 80 (S), E.O. 12065; RDS-3 12/12/00;
2. J5614 HistSum Sep 80 (S), REVW 12 Sep 86; CINCPAC 200225Z Sep 80 (S), REVW 12 Sep 86.
3. J5121 HistSum Jul 80 (S), DECL 31 Aug 86; JCS 3987/280223Z Jul 79 (S), DECL 27 Jun 85, which cited CINCPAC 272150Z May 79; CINCPAC 100226Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 26 May 85.
4. J5121 HistSum Jul 80 (S), DECL 31 Aug 86; CINCPAC 072052Z May 80 (S), DECL 6 May 86; CINCPAC 150050Z May 80 (S), DECL 13 May 86; SECSTATE 129882/171254Z May 80 (S), E.O. 12065; GDS 5/15/86.
They would be of low visibility and not more than twice a week. The planes would not land in the Philippines. Both President Marcos and General Espino agreed that the overflights would provide valuable training in intercept techniques for both Air Forces.¹

(S) President Marcos authorized General Espino to work out detailed arrangements with the United States. The General asked Admiral Long to provide him with a concept of operations, which the Admiral did after coordinating the concept with CINCSAC and the JCS.²

(S) CINCPAC submitted the concept of operations, approved by CINCSAC, to the JCS on 11 June. One statement in the concept of employment said that participation in NEWBOY exercises or operations against the Crow Valley Range would be initially limited to high altitude tactics. "Additional training scenarios may be added after appropriate coordination."³

(S) The Embassy in Manila expressed concern that the proposed concept went beyond the State-Defense authorization for high altitude flights only.⁴

(S) The JCS, who had concurred on 20 June with the concept of operations as proposed, subsequently advised that the views expressed by the Ambassador were shared in Washington. They modified their concurrence to delete any references to other training scenarios; only high altitude tactics would be discussed.⁵

(S) On 8 July CINCPAC forwarded the approved concept of operations to his representative in the Philippines for forwarding to General Espino, via Ambassador Murphy.⁶

(S) On 22 October CINCPACREP Philippines forwarded to CINCPAC a letter from General Espino in which he advised that President Marcos had approved the conduct of B-52 training flights in accordance with the concept of operations, as amended slightly by the Armed Forces of the Philippines. General Espino had advised the CINCPACREP that the Armed Forces of the Philippines stood ready to cooperate fully in the activity.⁷

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1. AMEMB Manila 9992/2307462 May 80 (S), E.O. 12065: GDS 5/23/86.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 110325Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 9 Jun 86.
4. AMEMB Manila 12030/201129Z Jun 80 (S), E.O. 12065: GDS 6/19/86.
5. JCS 3703/202111Z Jun 80 (S), DECL 12 Jun 86; JCS 5372/032202Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 2 Jul 86.
6. CINCPAC 081920Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 30 Jun 86.
7. CINCPACREPPHIL 221343Z Oct 80 (S), which CINCPAC 290220Z Oct 80 retransmitted to the JCS.

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Operations began on 1 December with participation in a combined USAF-Philippine Air Force exercise for the defense of the Philippines in the series called NEWBOY. Although tied to NEWBOY in 1980, it was anticipated that the program would be extended to other training opportunities as mutually agreed between the two countries.

GIANT EXPRESS to Diego Garcia

F-15/E-3A Aircraft Visits

On 10 May the Secretary of State advised the Ambassadors in Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, and Singapore that CINCPAC would like to initiate visits by F-15/F-4 tactical aircraft to the ASEAN area. The visits would provide a visible reminder of continued U.S. military presence in the region and also respond to apparent interest in visits by tactical aircraft that had surfaced during an official visit by CINCPACAF to Singapore and Malaysia. The concept, the Secretary said, was that the visits would be conducted as "opportune journeys" coincident with regional exercises. Such visits would be composed of elements of not more than four aircraft of each type at any given time in a specific country. Crew composition and local activities would not exaggerate visibility and would be carefully coordinated with Country Teams. The Secretary asked the Ambassadors for their views.

The Ambassador in Indonesia replied that Indonesia's attachment to its non-aligned image would probably rule out a visit by tactical aircraft, but he did not anticipate a negative reaction in Indonesia if the aircraft visited other countries in Southeast Asia. The others all agreed to the concept of the visits, but wanted to be sure the aircraft visited countries other than

1. J311 HistSum Dec 80 (S), DECL 31 Dec 86.
2. J3141 HistSum Jul 80 (S), DECL 3 Aug 86.
3. SECSTATE 123843/100707Z May 80 (S), E.O. 12065: GDS 5/9/86.
their own, and Singapore did not want the visits to appear the result of their initiative.¹

(5) By September the planning for the trip had evolved to two F-15 aircraft and one E-3A AWACS, plus a C-141 for airlift support. CINCPAC so advised the Ambassador in Indonesia. He noted that in light of the Ambassador's earlier comments he had not included Indonesia in planning for the trip, but in light of recent adverse reactions to the apparent omission of Indonesia from other initiatives and activities, he wanted the Ambassador to be aware of the changes in case his views had changed.²

(5) There were some problems regarding release of public affairs guidance; Thailand, for example, wanted to be sure the aircraft visited Singapore and Malaysia before Thailand and was concerned with delays in approval from those countries.³

(U) Finally, following participation in the combined PACAF/Royal Australian Air Force exercise PACIFIC CONSORT, the aircraft visited New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. The aircraft were displayed and demonstrated at Ohakea RNZAF Base on 11 and 12 September with many high ranking visitors and extensive press coverage. The next stop was the Royal Singapore Air Force Base at Tengah where demonstrations were provided on 15 September. On each of the visits a ride in an F-15 was provided for one visitor. On 17 September demonstrations were conducted at the Royal Malaysian Air Force Base at Kuantan. Malaysia had elected to keep the visit in a low key to the general public and no media coverage was allowed on the base. The last stop was Don Muang in Thailand, where demonstrations were held on 19 September. The visit received low key public interest, but was well publicized throughout the military community. CINCPACAF described the visit as impressive evidence of U.S. capability and commitment to the Pacific theater.⁴

(U) The Ambassador in Singapore said that the highly positive reaction of Singapore's most senior defense officials was well worth the effort involved

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1. AMEMB Manila 9447/1509042 May 80 (S), E.O. 12065: GDS 5/15/86; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 3166/140203Z May 80 (S), E.O. 12065: GDS 5/14/86; AMEMB Singapore 5179/140450Z May 80 (C), E.O. 12065: GDS 5/14/86; AMEMB Jakarta 8006/160300Z May 80 (S), E.O. 12065: 5/15/86; AMEMB Bangkok 20674/150710Z May 80 (S), E.O. 12065: GDS 5/15/86.
2. CINCPACAF 060300Z Sep 80 (S), DECL 5 Sep 86.
3. AMEMB Bangkok 41053/100621Z Sep 80 (S), E.O. 12065: GDS 9/10/86 and 41723/121053Z Sep 80 (U); AMEMB Singapore 9610/110918Z Sep 80 (U); Hq PACAF 110105Z Sep 80 (C), DECL 5 Sep 86.
4. AFSSO PACAF 082300Z Oct 80 (U).
in making the arrangements. "All of those who saw the AWACS and F-15s, myself included, could not help but come away with enormous respect for American technology and skills of the personnel involved in the visit. What will you do for an encore?"}

Alleged Buzzing of Indian Air Force Aircraft

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1. AMEMB Singapore 9874/180527Z Sep 80 (U).
2. AMEMB New Delhi 4994/101128Z Mar 80 (S)(EX), E.O. 12065: GDS 3/10/86.
3. CINCPAC 210005Z Mar 80 (S)(EX), DECL 19 Mar 86.
Reconnaissance Operations

1. USDAO New Delhi 021105Z May 80 (S), REVW 2 May 00.
3. J314 HistSum Nov 80 (S), DECL 5 Dec 80.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
Airborne Command Post Activities

1. ABNCP HistSums Jan-Dec 80 (C), DECL 31 Dec 86, unless otherwise noted.
1. JCS 2219/072050Z Jun 80 (S)(EX), DECL 7 Jun 86.
1. JCS 6570/152145Z Jul 80 (C), DECL 15 Jul 86.
2. CINCPAC 121920Z Nov 80 (TS), REVW 7 Nov 00.
3. J316 HistSum Jul 80 (C) DECL 4 Aug 86.
Guam to Barber's Point Naval Air Station in Hawaii. The OPSEC people on the CINCPAC staff were also involved in the JCS-directed COMSEC vulnerability assessment of missile warning conferences.¹

1. (U) PACAF had an overall plan to relocate the Airborne Command Post's UHF/FDM equipment from mobile vans into permanent facilities. Action had been completed at Kadena in November 1978, and the facilities in Hawaii were relocated in October 1980 and at Clark Air Base in the Philippines in December. The overall plan had started in 1974 when a PACAF study revealed that continued support of the equipment in a mobile configuration was too expensive. At that time CINCPAC had approved relocation at Kadena, Hawaii, and Yokota, but requested that the Clark facility remain mobile. With the U.S. drawdown in Southeast Asia and continued high maintenance costs, however, PACAF had requested reconsideration of the matter in 1977. In September 1977 CINCPAC had rescinded the mobility requirement and PACAF initiated action to relocate the Clark equipment into the COMMANDO ESCORT facility. In November 1980 CINCPAC was advised that the materials and personnel were on hand to do the job at Clark, but the facility would have to be out of operation for 25 days during the work. Relocation started on 10 November and was completed on 5 December. The facility was flight tested by the Airborne Command Post on 16 December and officially accepted. Only Yokota remained to be relocated.³

1. Ibid.
2. J6225 HistSum Jun 80 (C), DECL 26 Jun 86.
3. C3STM13 HistSum Dec 80 (U).
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Unconventional Warfare

In 1974 the Army's Special Forces elements in the PACOM had been redeployed to the Continental United States. In 1977 the JCS had proposed to deploy one Army Special Forces Battalion to the Western Pacific, but there were political considerations at the time that precluded stationing them on foreign soil in the PACOM. CINCPAC considered such a deployment "highly desirable," however, and supported it. Unconventional Warfare appendices had not yet been written at that time for major CINCPAC Operation Plans, and without specifically defined wartime missions, the matter remained only under study.¹

Annex E to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 80 had eliminated the 7th Special Forces Group Airborne as a PACOM Unconventional Warfare asset, leaving no active duty Army Special Forces available to CINCPAC for planning. In 1979 both the Commander, U.S. Army Western Command and CINCPAC had detailed the requirements for active duty Special Forces in the PACOM, and those assessments remained valid, CINCPAC advised the JCS in April 1980. The JCS had advised that they were initiating joint action to consider the reallocation of Special Forces and asked for CINCPAC's comments.²

CINCPAC advised the JCS that lack of a dedicated Special Forces Group in the PACOM had begun to have a deleterious effect. For OPLANs 5000/5001, the concept of employment called for early Unconventional Warfare/Special Operations actions against selected targets, but there were no active duty assets. "The seriousness of this shortcoming cannot be overemphasized." In combined training, PACOM had a severely limited ability to satisfy requests from PACOM countries for combined special operations exercises. CINCPAC needed that capability to respond to countries requesting training, especially as they were part of PACOM strategy and further regional cooperation in the interests of the United States. Also, the PACOM was the only unified command without active duty assets. "Considering theater size, the continuing dynamic situation within and on the periphery and Unconventional Warfare/Special Operations mission requirements, the situation warrants timely consideration for reestablishing active duty Special Forces on the CINCPAC force list and forward deploying the unit in PACOM."³

Responding to the same JCS request, USCINCEUR recognized the validity of CINCPAC requests, but said that the forces allocated to him had always been insufficient and strongly urged retention of dedicated active duty units.⁴

2. CINCPAC 190340Z Apr 80 (S), REVW 5 Jul 99.
3. Ibid.
4. USCINCEUR 241604Z Jun 80 (S), REVW 17 Jun 00, REAS 2.

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In a message to the Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Long said that although many separate issues needed to be taken into account when deciding on the allocation of forces, he believed there was a real need to maintain a capable unconventional warfare response force dedicated to the Pacific Command.

On 17 July the JCS advised that the Army was considering restoration of Special Forces assets that had been proposed for elimination. The JCS study reallocation such assets would be held in abeyance pending the Army decision.

On 19 July CINCPAC provided the Army Chief of Staff with a statement of requirements for Special Forces in the PACOM in the near and long term. Active duty forces were required to maintain a responsive theater capability. The forces were needed to satisfy general war operational requirements and to maintain a ready response capability for regional contingencies. Other objectives called for utilization of Special Forces in Military Assistance training, increased combined exercise participation, and small unit exchange training to strengthen the U.S. presence and to foster increased cooperation with Asian allies. CINCPAC provided specifics about planned use of Special Forces in OPLAN 5000. The matter remained unresolved at the end of the year.

From 8 to 12 December CINCPAC hosted the first annual joint-combined Special Operations Conference at CINCPAC headquarters. Over 60 representatives from Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States attended to discuss matters of mutual interest to the Special Operations community in the PACOM. Among the attendees were eight flag or general officers.

The joint phase of the conference focused primarily on the orientation and deployment of the 7th Special Forces Group to the PACOM in support of OPLANs 5000/5001 and 5027. Included in this phase were briefings and workshop discussions on training and exercises, intelligence matters, operation plans, and psychological operations. The Commander of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance and some of his staff members made presentations on various Special Forces subjects.

The combined phase was conducted to promote combined and exchange training opportunities among the nations in attendance. Further, it was an

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1. CINCPAC 041925Z Jul 80 (S), REVW 3 Jul 86.
2. JCS 6698/171744Z Jul 80 (S), REVW 2 Jul 00, REAS 6.
3. CINCPAC 192359Z Jul 80 (S), REVW 18 Jul 86.
4. J361 HistSum Dec 80 (U).

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opportunity to improve existing participation in exercises, as well as establishing good rapport among all attendees. The presentation during this phase provided information on missions, organization, training, and capabilities of special operations organizations within or oriented to the PACOM. It was believed that the conference served to demonstrate the PACOM position on unconventional warfare and Special Operations matters.¹

Exercise NIGHT BLUE

Exercise PRIZE GAUNTLET 80

(PRIZE GAUNTLET 80 was a JCS-sponsored, worldwide, nuclear-oriented, crisis management Command Post Exercise conducted 24 to 28 March. Participants included the Organization of the JCS, the unified and specified commands, the Military Services, Defense Department agencies, and selected Federal civil agencies. PACOM participants included CINCPAC's component commands. At CINCPAC's headquarters participants were the Operations Action Group, the Logistics Readiness Center, the Joint Exercise Control Group, and the Nuclear Operations Center. Primary focus of the exercise was on trans- and post-nuclear attack procedures.⁴

The broad exercise scenario portrayed a situation in which worldwide Soviet and Warsaw Pact aggression had occurred. Active consideration of selective release was under way when a strategic nuclear strike was made on the United States along with a Soviet incursion into Alaska. The United States retaliated with execution of appropriate Single Integrated Operation Plan options. The strategic nuclear exchange occurred early in the exercise.

1. Ibid.
3. J332 HistSum Sep 80 (S), DECL 1 Oct 86.
4. J3523 HistSum Apr 80 (S), DECL 5 May 86.
to allow emphasis to be placed on residual capability assessment, residual threat assessment, reconstitution, and redirection.

The exercise was in two phases. Phase I, which emphasized primarily nuclear operations, SIOP following, and worldwide Airborne Command Post operations, lasted 36 hours. After an administrative break of six hours to brief participants on scenario advance, Phase II commenced as a period 21 days following the nuclear exchange, concentrating on reconstitution and redirection procedures and issues.¹

**PROUD SPIRIT 80**

NIFTY NUGGET had been a JCS-sponsored and conducted Command Post Exercise in 1978. Designed to exercise and evaluate logistic plans and procedures under mobilization conditions, it had been the first major examination of mobilization at the national level since World War II. The Secretary of Defense, following NIFTY NUGGET, had noted that severe shortcomings had been discovered in the nation's readiness to respond to an attack on NATO forces in Europe during a simulated full mobilization alert.²

PROUD SPIRIT 80, also a worldwide mobilization and deployment Command Post Exercise, was the successor to NIFTY NUGGET. The scenario depicted a world destabilized by inflation, commodity shortages, and political and religious upheavals pushed to the brink of military confrontation between the "superpowers" as the result of a series of aggressive Soviet foreign policy initiatives. Although the scenario developed with crises around the world, critical in varying degrees to U.S. interests, the principal areas of concern developed initially in the Mid-East and Asian nations. NATO was eventually drawn into direct confrontation with the Warsaw Pact in Western Europe and the President called for mobilization and reinforcement of Europe.³

The exercise ran from 6 to 18 November and differed from NIFTY NUGGET in that there was no war play designed in the exercise. CINCPAC participated as a supporting CINC with a response cell.⁴

CINCPAC provided his post-exercise first impressions for use in the JCS exercise summation. Specific comments included the observation that simultaneous execution of USCINCEUR and CINCPAC general war plans highlighted

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¹ Ibid.
³ J3511 HistSum Nov 80 (C), DECL 26 Nov 86.
⁴ Ibid.
the strategic airlift shortfall. It quickly became obvious that support for intra-theater movement of the PACAF forces would be principally provided by C-130 tactical airlift. Problems for scheduling movement or outsize cargo would be particularly difficult to work around. Adherence to delivery dates published in Time-Phased Force Deployment Data would be impossible without strategic airlift support. Regarding communications, CINCPAC noted that the majority of messages sent throughout the exercise were assigned too high a priority, diluting the message precedence system; the reliability of the WWMCCS intercomputer networks was inadequate because accessibility was only intermittent; and teleconferencing, which had been attempted several times, proved unreliable. In view of the problem areas and shortfalls that surfaced in both NIFTY NUGGET and PROUD SPIRIT, CINCPAC recommended that consideration be given to scheduling a major mobilization exercise at least biennially, possibly in conjunction with a wargaming exercise.¹

**Exercise FOREVER GONE**

(§) FOREVER GONE was a series of exercises that relocated the CINC (or an Alternate Command Authority for exercise purposes) to an Airborne Command Post by means of a helicopter as specified in the CINCPAC instruction on continuity of operations. Relocation from Camp Smith to BLUE EAGLE was accomplished by helicopters assigned to the 1st Marine Brigade, at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station. The relocation was to take place after Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) TWO or ONE was declared. The first of two exercises for 1980 was conducted on 19 February, to check procedures and equipment. The Director for Plans simulated CINCPAC relocation and flew on a BLUE EAGLE training flight from Hickam AFB. On 2 May the Deputy Chief of the Communications-Data Processing Directorate simulated CINC relocation; he also flew on a BLUE EAGLE training flight.²

**Exercise Telephone Notification**

(U) An Exercise Telephone Notification was initiated by the CINCPAC Command Duty Officer on Tuesday, 26 February, at 1930 hours. All CINCPAC staff directorates and elements reported notification completion times by 2130 hours, except for the Communications-Data Processing Directorate, in which the notification chain was complete at 2155 hours. The Duty Officer for that directorate had experienced a 40-minute delay in initial notification because of an inoperative pager.³

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1. CINCPAC 290141Z Nov 80 (§), DECL 28 Nov 86.
2. J332 HistSums Feb, May 80 (§), DECL 20 May 86.
3. J3321 HistSum Feb 80 (U).
A second Exercise Telephone Notification was initiated by the CINCPAC Command Duty Officer on Thursday, 4 September, at 2000 hours. All CINCPAC staff directorates and elements reported notification completion times by 2136 hours on that evening.\(^1\)

**Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 80**

TEAM SPIRIT was an annual joint-combined Field Training Exercise held in Korea and contiguous waters. It was the largest PACOM supported exercise and designed to stress training for deployment, reception, employment, and redeployment of Korean and U.S. Forces responding to possible contingencies in the Korean area. TEAM SPIRIT 80, the fifth in the series that had begun in 1976, was held from 1 March to 20 April 1980.\(^2\)

In the summer of 1979, press reports had surfaced regarding a statement by a member of the U.S. House of Representatives to the effect that funds for support of TEAM SPIRIT had been cancelled because the President’s decision to stop the withdrawal of forces made some exercises unnecessary. Actually, those were enhancement funds that were deleted from the JCS budget. To insure enhancement, the JCS reprogrammed funds allocated to Exercise POISE CHECK to provide $3.7 million for airlift and $0.85 million for sealift funds. Sealift costs up to $1.45 million were to be paid by the U.S. Army. Thus, by January 1980 some funding enhancement problems had been resolved, but reduced funding and real-world activities reduced the scope of the 1980 exercise from that of TEAM SPIRIT the year before.\(^3\)

Total participants in 1980 numbered approximately 145,000, compared to 168,000 in 1979. U.S. participants totaled 43,000, of which 11,500 were from bases outside Korea. Of the 11,500, 2,700 were Army, 3,000 Navy, 4,500 Air Force, and 1,300 Marines.

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2. J3512 HistSum Apr 80 (C), DECL 5 May 86.
3. CINCCFC/COMUSK 062315Z Aug 79 (S)(EX), DECL 6 Aug 83; CINCPACAF 272300Z Aug 79 (S)(EX), DECL 7 Aug 85; JCS SS0 302016Z Jan 80 (S), DECL 21 Jan 86; JCS 152356Z Jan 80 (C), DECL 14 Jan 86.
Included in TEAM SPIRIT was a sortie surge period from 23 to 29 March. Other events included air defense exercises, dissimilar air combat tactics, air defense artillery exercises, close air support, live ordnance deliveries, interdiction strikes, cross service training, search and rescue exercises, airlift, reconnaissance, B-52 activity and support, air refueling, and unconventional warfare. Approximately 528 aircraft participated. CONUS forces came from Moody, Eglin, and Elmendorf Air Force Bases and Air National Guard EC-130s from Harrisburg.

Navy units participating included USS LONG BEACH (CGN-9), USS CONSERVER (ARS-39), USS GRAYBACK (SS-574), a SEAL Team platoon, and P-3 aircraft of VP Squadron 19. Marine Corps personnel were as follows: 40 personnel with the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade headquarters elements, 260 personnel with the 9th Brigade Service Support Group, and 1,000 personnel of Marine Amphibious Group 30.

The Army's principal deployment was Task Force WARRIOR, consisting of elements of the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii, plus an 11th Signal Brigade element.

Major losses from the previous exercise in the series, mainly because of dollar constraints, were combat and combat support units from the 25th Division, the LANCE missile battery, and the 11th Signal Group. Also not available were 39 Air Force aircraft, including 6 F-111s, 24 A-7Ds from the Tactical Air Command, and 3 C-130s used as ABCCC.

Because of "real world" problems and Indian Ocean deployments, Navy losses to the exercise from the previous year included three ships and 75 aircraft of a carrier battle group, a Mobile Logistics Support Force, an Amphibious Task Force, and patrol and reconnaissance forces (approximately 7,000 personnel). The 5,700 Marines on other duty included a Marine Amphibious Brigade and a portion of a Marine Aircraft Group with its 43 aircraft.2

In a personal message to the Chairman of the JCS, CINCPAC called the success of the exercise noteworthy. He said that despite real-world requirements and funding constraints, many real benefits had been gained. He noted

1. J3512 HistSum Apr 80 (C), DECL 5 May 86.
2. Ibid.
the use of sealift for the first time in a PACOM exercise, and he called results most satisfactory. (This subject is addressed in considerable detail in the Logistics chapter of this history.) He believed the exercise series was of continuing value and believed it should be supported as a minimum at 1979 levels of participation, both in terms of exercising the forces of all Services but also because of the perceptions of allies and potential adversaries regarding U.S. continued willingness or ability to support a credible Western Pacific presence.\footnote{1}

(U) In a message to all participants, CINCPAC advised that although it would be June before the exercise evaluation was completed, the first impressions of senior U.S. and ROK commanders and staffs thought it to be the "best ever."\footnote{2}

\footnote{2} On 6 May the JCS advised that the Joint Staff was working on actions that would establish TEAM SPIRIT exercises for 1981 and 1982 at an equivalent level of participation with 1979 and provide funding guidance that would prevent recurrence of the uncertainties that complicated the 1980 exercise.\footnote{3}

\footnote{3} OPSEC (Operations Security) received considerable attention in this exercise. A Communications Security (COMSEC) executive agent was provided to the CFC by the PACAF Electronic Security Command representative, and CINCPAC staff members served as augmentees to the CFC Control and Evaluation organization. The after action OPSEC report was published on 26 June. TEAM SPIRIT was assessed overall to be from fair to good. This represented an improvement over the exercise the previous year, which had been only fair. For certain units in 1980, OPSEC posture was assessed as high. The after-action report listed a number of specific findings regarding poor procedures, several of which were repetitions of poor practices that had been noted in earlier exercises in the series. Recommendations designed to assist in correcting poor practices accompanied each finding. The report was distributed to each headquarters providing participants to facilitate planning for TEAM SPIRIT 81.\footnote{4}

\footnote{4} As usual, planning for the next exercise started almost immediately. CINCPAC's exercise directive was dispatched on 17 July to provide guidance for planning, conducting, and evaluating the next in the series.\footnote{5}

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1. SSO CINCPAC 290157Z Apr 80 (C)(BOM), DECL 21 Apr 86.
2. CINCPAC 290151Z Apr 80 (U).
3. JCS 061646Z May 80 (C), DECL 1 May 86.
4. J316 HistSums Jan, Jun 80 (C), DECL 1 Jul 86.
5. CINCPAC 170043Z Jul 80 (C), DECL 30 Jun 86.
ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 80 was conducted in Korea from 20 to 25 August by CINCCFC employing the Combined Forces Command's subordinate component commands and major subordinate headquarters, with support from CINCPAC's subordinate unified command, COMUS Korea, and coordination with ROK Government agencies. Other PACOM participants included CINCPAC headquarters acting as a JCS response cell and control cell, and a crisis action team consisting of an Operations Action Group, an Operations Planning Group, a Logistics Readiness Center, and CINCPACAF's Korea-based headquarters, the 314th Air Division, which was chopped to CINCCFC.2

2. J3523 HistSum Aug 80 (C), DECL 8 Sep 86.
3. Ibid.
Most of the after-action observations were similar to those regarding previous exercises in Korea. Exercise objectives were accomplished. The major problem during the exercise was the lack of adequate planning. The only subordinate unit to play the exercise was ROK Army Special Forces. Air Force and Navy units were not played, nor was a player response cell established, which made planning and execution of the mission difficult.

A member of the CINCPAC OPSEC branch augmented the CFC during this exercise as a COMSEC executive agent. His findings were included in daily briefings to the CINC of the CFC and promulgated Korea-wide by message. When timeliness was a factor, the recommendations were brought directly to the attention of the personnel involved. COMSEC posture during ULCHI-FOCUS LENS varied from fair to good, with many instances of COMSEC awareness and positive practices noted by monitors. ROK and U.S. units both reported to the executive agent and exchanged tapes of conversations in cases where translation was required. All briefings and messages were prepared in both Hangul and English.3

Problem areas noted in the after-action report included:4

- The continuing need for more and better COMSEC equipment, especially on voice circuits.

1. J361 HistSum Aug 80 (C), REVW 31 Dec 89. The Joint Special Operations Support Unit was a special operating agency established by the JCS and assigned to the U.S. Readiness Command.
2. Ibid.
3. J316 HistSum Aug 80 (C), DECL 8 Sep 86.
4. Ibid.
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- The need to secure logistics-related communications. Logisticians had conducted most of their business for years by means of non-secure communications. Against modern SIGINT collection, however, such communications were too vulnerable and lucrative to be allowed to continue.

- Definitive and permanent policy guidance was required from the national level regarding future combined ROK-U.S. COMSEC monitoring.

- OPSEC was a new concept for the Koreans, although many positive OPSEC practices were already in effect. A concerted effort by the CFC staff's OPSEC branch, already begun, would be required to implement a viable ROK OPSEC program.

Exercise FOAL EAGLE 81

(6) ROK participation consisted of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th, 11th, and 13th Special Forces Brigades of the ROK Army; 6 C-123 aircraft of the ROK Air Force; 6 ROK Navy craft; and 8 unconventional warfare platoons. U.S. forces consisted of a submarine, USS BRUNSWICK (ATS-3), a SEAL platoon from EASTPAC, and a SEAL platoon from CTU 76.0.4; 6 C-130E aircraft from the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing; and Army Special Forces elements (12th Special Forces Group Airborne (USAR) and the 19th Special Forces Group Airborne (Army National Guard)).

(l) Over 3,900 ROK personnel and over 700 U.S. personnel participated. Of 168 targets assigned, 161 were engaged successfully. FOAL EAGLE 81 had the best safety record of any FOAL EAGLE on record. Command and control of U.S. participants was provided by CINCPAC and the Joint Special Operations Support Element.²

2. Ibid.; J361 HistSum Nov 80 (C), REVW 31 Dec 89.

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COPE JADE Exercises

As noted above under the discussion of TEAM SPIRIT, Congressional action had deleted funds that were to be used for the enhancement of exercises in Korea. One of the affected exercises was in the COPE JADE series. On 15 January the JCS advised CINCPAC that exercise airlift funds allocated for Exercise POISE CHECK had been reprogrammed to provide funds for the Korean exercises. They asked CINCPAC to conduct COPE JADE 80-2, in accordance with their funding guidance.1

COPE JADE 80-2 was a joint-combined large-scale exercise conducted in the ROK from 13 to 14 May. The objectives were to provide realistic tactical air operations training including live air-to-ground ordnance delivery. There were 21,310 personnel participating and 1,590 sorties were flown. ROK Air Force F-4s, F-5s, F-86s, and 0-1/0-2s participated. The USAF flew F-15s, F-4D/E/Gs, RF-4Cs, MC-130s, HC-130s, HH-3s, OV-10s, and B-52s. USMC aircraft were F-4Js, TA-4s, and EA-6Bs. The U.S. Navy flew A-7Es.2

COPE JADE 81-1 was conducted 27 and 28 October 1980. It had the same general purpose as other exercises in the series. In this exercise objectives included integration and control of tactical air assets to include ROKAF, USAF, and USMC aircraft through the Korean tactical air control system; defensive air operations; and tactical air to ground support of operations. The 1,347 ROKAF and 273 USAF personnel and 16 U.S. Marines participated in the exercise in which 1,636 sorties were flown. ROK participants included the Army's Air Defense Command, and for the ROK Air Force, the Combat Air Command, 7 fighter wings with their F-4, F-5, F-86, and 0-1/0-2 aircraft, plus A-37s, UH-1s, AT-33s, RF-5s, T-33s, and C-123s. The U.S. Army participated with the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade and the Marines with 4 F-4s from MAG 15. USAF participation included 2 B-52s from the 3rd Air Division (SAC), and other units as follows:3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number &amp; Type Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18th Tactical Fighter Group</td>
<td>8 F-15; 3 RF-4C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91st Airborne Warning and Control Squadron</td>
<td>2 E-3A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Tactical Fighter Wing</td>
<td>4 F-4E/G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd Aerospace Search and Rescue Squadron</td>
<td>1 HC-130; 2 HH-53; 2 HH-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st Composite Wing (Tactical)</td>
<td>20 F-4E; 7 OV-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Tactical Fighter Wing</td>
<td>11 F-4E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>497th Tactical Fighter Squadron</td>
<td>4 F-4D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. JCS 5156/152356Z Jan 80 (C), DECL 14 Jan 86.
2. J3513 HistSum May 80 (C), DECL 3 Jun 86.
3. J3512 HistSum Oct 80 (C), DECL 4 Nov 86.
COPE THUNDER

The COPE THUNDER series of exercises in the Philippines had been ongoing since 1976. These joint air exercises, CINCPACAF believed, had steadily improved in the quality of training provided, with innovative and realistic day and night training accomplished. Efforts to expand the combined nature of some maritime exercises in prior years had encountered Philippine sensitivity, as, on occasion, approval of the Philippine Government had not been sought in advance. On 3 January 1980 CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF that he supported PACAF and U.S. Embassy, Manila, interest in broadening the scope of third country involvement in COPE THUNDER, particularly by members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines). CINCPAC advised that the forum to be used to approach the Philippines for permission should be the procedures of the Mutual Defense Board, and planning should be well in advance of desired participation. He said that he was sure that once appropriate MDB actions had been taken, the Ambassador would assist with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as appropriate.1

A message from the Ambassador in Manila in mid-March noted that with the ROK Air Force observing the March exercise and Australia invited for the following month, things seem to be moving along very well in achieving the objective of increasing third country exposure to the "unparalleled" training facilities in the Philippines. His message also concerned on-going arrangements to allow New Zealand observation, although the goal, ultimately, was participation by the various countries. The first observation by Thailand personnel (five Royal Thai Air Force, one Royal Thai Army) occurred from 8 to 12 December during COPE THUNDER 81-2. Observation by Singapore and Indonesian forces was scheduled for 1981.2

Exercise NEWBOY 81-1

As discussed in more detail elsewhere in this chapter, the first B-52 exercise over the Philippines occurred in 1980. On 1 and 5 December, during NEWBOY 81-1, a joint-combined training exercise for the defense of the Philippines, three B-52s conducted simulated high altitude bombing strikes against the Crow Valley Range areas. Philippine and U.S. fighters defended against the B-52 faker threat.3

2. J5121 HistSum Mar 80 (C), DECL 30 Apr 86; AMEMB Manila 05167/141037Z Mar 80, EO. 12065: GDS 3/14/86; J35 HistSum Dec 80 (S), DECL 24 Dec 86.
3. J35 HistSum Dec 80 (S), DECL 24 Dec 86.
(S) The B-52 strike force employed bombing tactics reminiscent of the Vietnam war. Land-based threats and fighter intercepts proved invaluable for all participants in this first encounter with the B-52s. Guam-based B-52s had no access to the RED FLAG exercises conducted in the United States, and this NEWBOY had all the possibilities for accurate, up-to-date attack and defensive scenarios. The B-52 force utilized most of its defensive capability and the results were a total simulated release of 166,500 pounds of explosives on the first attack wave and on the second wave a simulated release of 111,000 pounds. NEWBOY represented a real-world scenario in a controlled environment in which both aggressor and defenders could experience combat tactics.\footnote{1}

Exercise SPECWAREX 80

SPECWAREX 80 was a joint-combined special warfare training exercise conducted 18 February to 7 March 1980 on the Island of Luzon in the Philippines. It was the first time Australia and New Zealand Special Forces had participated in the exercise. The objectives were to develop joint and combined planning coordination, exercise command and control of special operations, and exchange operational techniques and procedures through cross training.\footnote{2}

Participation by the U.S. Army's 7th Special Forces Group was cancelled because of funding constraints. Other participants were as follows. Australia participants were a Navy diving team and two Special Air Service patrols. New Zealand sent two Special Air Service patrols. The Philippines provided one Special Warfare Group squad. USN participants were two SEAL platoons, one Underwater Demolition Team platoon, one frigate, one dock landing ship, one submarine, and helicopter support. The USAF provided two MC-130E aircraft and a Combat Control Team.\footnote{3}

Exercise WESTWIND 80

WESTWIND 80, the first of a planned annual series, was a joint/combined special operations (unconventional warfare) training exercise held in the vicinity of Perth, Australia, from 1 to 24 October. It was hosted by the 3rd Company, Special Air Service Regiment of the Royal Australian Army. Other participants were the First New Zealand Special Air Service Squadron, the British 22nd Special Air Service Squadron, personnel of the U.S. Army 7th Special Forces Group from the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, a U.S. Navy SEAL platoon from Naval Special Warfare Unit ONE, a

\footnote{1} Ibid.
\footnote{2} J3514 HistSum Mar 80 (C), DECL 9 Apr 86.
\footnote{3} Ibid.
USAF Combat Control Team from the 13th Air Force, the Joint Special Operations Support Element (a special operating agency established by the JCS and assigned to the U.S. Readiness Command), and CINCPAC Operations Directorate personnel. Air Support was provided by helicopters from the Australian Army and Air Force and two C-130 aircraft from the USAF 374th Tactical Airlift Wing.¹

(c) The exercise was divided into two phases. Phase I was cross training, which enabled personnel to train and become familiar with the special operations equipment of each participating nation. Special skills for which training was provided included reconnaissance, long-range patrol, free-fall parachuting, SCUBA, Klepper canoe and small boat operations, close quarter battle, and demolitions. Phase II was the operations phase in which exercise personnel participated in direct action missions including infiltration training by land, sea, and air. There were 10 mutually interdependent events designed to test skills in a realistic environment. Combined forces raiding teams infiltrated various areas by a variety of techniques to accomplish specific direct action tasks against an infantry company acting as an enemy force. The exercise was considered highly successful, with all aims and objectives met.

(c) It was planned that the host nation would rotate among ANZUS nations, with Exercise GONFALON planned for New Zealand in 1981 and Exercise TEMPEST GALE in Hawaii in 1982.²

Exercise BEACON COMPASS 80

(8) The first exercise in the BEACON COMPASS series had been conducted in 1979. Following the demise of the Central Treaty Organization, there had been no provision for the conduct of training exercises in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf. The 1980 exercise had been planned as a large-scale multinational, sea control exercise in the Indian Ocean area. Originally the concept had included, besides the U.S. task group, a Royal Navy task group and forces from Australia, New Zealand, Kenya, Pakistan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, but prior to the exercise the last-named three countries had been disassociated because of political considerations. Also several USN ships had been diverted from the exercise because it had begun shortly after the seizure of the U.S. Embassy and hostages in Iran.³

(6) BEACON COMPASS 80 was held from 28 October to 4 November, shortly after the start of the Iran-Iraq war. It was further modified in scope and

2. Ibid.

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concept due to real world political considerations and the withdrawal of Australia and New Zealand from participation. The exercise was run as a series of separate passing exercises between U.S. and Royal Navy ships under the umbrella name BEACON COMPASS.  

**Exercise RIMPAC 80**

(C) Exercise RIMPAC 80, a large-scale, multi-national, joint and combined naval warfare exercise was conducted from 26 February to 16 March in the Eastern Pacific and Hawaii operating areas. RIMPAC 80 was the seventh exercise in a biennial series.

(U) Back in April 1979 the Japanese press announced that the Japan Defense Agency had decided to greatly increase exercises between the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. Armed Forces in accordance with guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation adopted in November 1978. Until that time there had been only small-scale Japanese maritime exercises held two or three times a year with ships of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet. On 24 April 1979 the U.S. Defense Attaché in Japan was advised that Japan had accepted an invitation to participate in RIMPAC 80, the first such exercise of this scope.

(C) The primary objective of RIMPAC 80 was to exercise the combined naval forces of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and the United States in a multi-dimension threat environment using coordinated tactics and procedures. Participation was as follows:

- Australia, approximately 2,500 personnel. The Royal Australian Navy provided 1 CVS, 5 other surface ships, and 1 submarine; the Royal Australian Air Force provided 6 F-111 and 4 VP aircraft.

- Canada, with approximately 1,000 personnel, provided 4 surface ships and 2 VP aircraft from Canadian naval forces.

- Japan, with approximately 1,000 personnel, exercised 2 surface ships with 3 helicopters and 8 VP aircraft, all from the Maritime Self-Defense Force.

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1. J3522 HistSum Oct 80 (C), DECL 9 Nov 86; JCS 062106Z Mar 80 (S), DECL 14 Apr 86; CINCPAC 312132Z May 80 (S), DECL 30 May 86; SECSTATE 276596/170040Z Oct 80 (S)(EX), E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/16/00.
2. J3514 HistSum Mar 80 (C), DECL 9 Apr 86.
3. COMUS Japan 050445Z Apr 79 (U); USDAO Tokyo 07057/240823Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 84.
4. J3514 HistSum Mar 80 (C), DECL 9 Apr 86.
New Zealand provided approximately 500 personnel. The Royal New Zealand Navy provided 2 surface ships with one helicopter; the Royal New Zealand Air Force provided 2 VP aircraft.

The U.S. Navy had approximately 15,000 participants. Navy assets included one aircraft carrier, 2 guided missile cruisers, 21 other surface ships, 4 nuclear-powered submarines, and VP/VC/VQ aircraft. Marine Corps participants were MAG-24 and F-4 aircraft. USAF participants were from the 15th Air Base Wing and some T-33 aircraft. The Hawaii Air National Guard exercised F-4 aircraft.

CINCPACFLT advised CINCPAC that among the exercise's strong points was the fact that the forces of five nations worked smoothly together within the framework of a prolonged period of advanced warfare operations. The realistic scenario had allowed innovative planning and aggressive, free play operations by the major commanders. Some weak points concerned problems associated with the high degree of emission control practiced and degraded command, control, and communications.

Exercise COPE NORTH 80-2

On 20 February the Fifth Air Force in Japan completed Exercise COPE NORTH 80-2 with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force. It involved deployment of four PACAF F-15s from Kadena to Nyutabaru Air Base, Japan. During the four day exercise the F-15s flew a series of Dissimilar Air Combat Tactics sorties with Japanese F-104Js. It was significant because it marked the first time that USAF aircraft had operated from a Japan Air Self-Defense Force base for a combined exercise. It demonstrated the capability of the Air Force to integrate their support and operate from the base. Some minor anti-exercise demonstrations were held off base.

Exercise POSITIVE LEAP 80

CINCPAC participated in a JCS-sponsored employment/deployment exercise called POSITIVE LEAP 80 from 12 to 18 May and from 2 to 6 June. The supported commander was the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. The scenario depicted a USSR invasion of Afghanistan and a threat to U.S. interests in Iran, Kuwait, and Egypt. CINCPAC's component commands also participated. CINCPAC activated an Operations Action Group, an Operations Planning Group, the Logistics Readiness Center, and a controller cell for the exercise. This was

1. CINCPACFLT 072214Z Apr 80 (S), REVW 31 Dec 86.
2. J466 HistSum Feb 80 (U); AFSSD PACAF 252000Z Feb 80 (U)(BOM).
CINCPAC's first use of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Intercomputer Network; the experience gained in that regard was considered extremely beneficial.¹

**Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT**

(5) GALLANT KNIGHT was a proposed JCS-directed, USINCRED-sponsored exercise scheduled for autumn 1980. The Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was the supported commander. CINCPAC would be a supporting commander. On 20 September CINCPAC advised that it had become evident that providing the requested level of on-scene personnel participation would significantly affect the conduct of day-to-day operations and the readiness of naval components. Admiral Long said that while he fully concurred that the RDJTF concept needed to be exercised, other factors such as real-world operations, previously scheduled exercises, and concomitant staff participation had to be taken into account. He considered it counter-productive to commit critical staffs to an exercise to the detriment of on-going operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. He recommended two amendments to the exercise outline. First would be to send to the RDJTF a four-man CINCPACFLT liaison team that would function in an advisory capacity to the Commander, RDJTF, and interface with naval force headquarters. Second, he recommended that all PACOM components participate at their headquarters such as was normally done during a JCS Command Post exercise. This would provide full support to the exercise with the least impact on operations.²

(5) Later, on 4 October, CINCPAC reluctantly recommended that the JCS postpone the exercise. He believed participation would detract from important on-going operational and possible near-term contingency consideration in Southwest Asia. (The Iran-Iraq war had broken out shortly before and tensions in the area were heightened.)³

(5) The exercise was not postponed. CINCPACFLT provided a four-man liaison team to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the CINCPAC Operations Directorate monitored the exercise on a 24-hour basis providing output when required.⁴

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1. J3522 HistSum Jun 80 (C), DECL 7 Jul 86.
2. CINCPAC 200141Z Sep 80 (S), DECL 18 Sep 86.
3. CINCPAC 040107Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 3 Oct 86.

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PACOM Special Operations Exercise Conference

(U) CINCPAC's Operations Directorate personnel conducted a PACOM Special Operations Exercise conference at headquarters of the U.S. Army's Forces Command at Fort McPherson, Georgia, on 17 and 18 June. The purpose of the conference was to review and discuss administrative requirements and procedures for training in the PACOM area, review proposals and develop plans for combined training exercises, and review and coordinate proposed participation in joint training exercises. Special operations personnel from unified commands, Service components, and reserve components attended the informal conference. Personnel with varying degrees of special operations experience used the opportunity to develop and refine methods to increase participation in future PACOM special operations exercises by units based in the Continental United States.¹

1. J361 HistSum Jun 80 (U).
2. J321 HistSum Oct 80 (S); DECL 22 Oct 88.
4. CNO 121704Z Apr 80 (U).

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
Operations and Communications Security

As discussed in the 1979 CINCPAC Command History, Guam and Alaska were two PACOM areas that received special emphasis in the operations (OPSEC) and communications (COMSEC) security monitoring program. As discussed at that time, there had been concern since 1975 regarding the activity of Soviet auxiliary general intelligence (AGI) ships in the Guam area. These ships were dedicated to intelligence collection.2

A comprehensive report of the 1979 Signals Security survey of military activities on Guam, which had been prepared by the Naval Security Group Detachment at Pearl Harbor, was forwarded by CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC on 28 January 1980. (The Air Force monitor report had been received in November 1979.) Tapes and transcriptions of the communications and telemetry of the Air Force Satellite Tracking Facility on Guam during the survey period were provided to the National Security Agency for analysis.3

CINCPAC's comments, conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations regarding the Guam survey effort were published on 11 April. Among the significant findings:

- Based on circuit and telephone monitoring, Guam was a highly lucrative collection location for hostile intelligence platforms.

- SAC flight line radio communications were an extremely lucrative intelligence source.

- Monitored information regarding U.S. Navy ship schedules and communications systems testing could provide advance warning and steerage for hostile Signal Intelligence organizations.

- Sensitive information on U.S. Very Important Person movements was readily available.

1. J323 HistSum Jul 80 (S/FRD);
3. J316 HistSum (C), DECL 7 Feb 84.
Appropriate recommendations for eliminating or minimizing Guam communications vulnerabilities to hostile exploitation were made to cognizant commands. In addition, CINCPACFLT was requested to conduct follow-on OPSEC surveys and communications "hearability" studies in the Guam area.\textsuperscript{1}
\begin{flushleft}
\textbf{(S)} The vulnerability of Signals Intelligence in Alaska had also been under study in 1979. Analytic reports were received by CINCPAC in February 1980 from the Strategic Air Command and the Electronic Security Command. A report entitled "Alaska: An OPSEC Vulnerability Assessment," was published on 20 June 1980. It provided detailed results of a PACOM OPSEC team visit to military activities in Alaska and the Aleutians, an airborne signals acquisition and analysis survey conducted by SAC and the Electronic Security Command, and Operations Directorate statistical analyses. The analysis concluded that military activities were highly vulnerable to SIGINT exploitation by Soviet airborne collectors, that Soviet intelligence collections flights in the Alaskan area were not related to Soviet photo-reconnaissance satellite launches or deorbits or Soviet missile flight tests into Kamchatka, and that increased Soviet intelligence interest in the Alaskan area since 1976 had paralleled the overall increased Soviet presence in the PACOM noted during that time.\textsuperscript{2}
\end{flushleft}
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\textbf{(S)} CINCPAC's recommendations for improving Alaskan OPSEC posture involved security of several sensitive, non-secure military communications links, increased use of Satellite Reconnaissance Advance Notice programs by Alaskan military units, vigorous programs of OPSEC-COMSEC threat briefings, development of Essential Elements of Friendly Information for area military exercises and operations, and the use of available SIGINT resources in a supplementary role as feasible.\textsuperscript{3}
\end{flushleft}
\begin{flushleft}
\textbf{(U)} An OPSEC survey of the Airborne Command Post was conducted in 1980, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter.
\end{flushleft}
\begin{flushleft}
\textbf{(U)} The annual Operations Security Report, covering the period 1 July 1979 to 30 June 1980, was submitted to the JCS on 1 September, in accordance with JCS Publication 18. The report covered an overview of the PACOM OPSEC program; OPSEC training and indoctrination program activities within the PACOM; OPSEC surveys and studies conducted, with summaries of significant findings; PACOM problem areas and recommendations; significant lessons learned; and a forecast of OPSEC activities for the next reporting period.\textsuperscript{4}
\end{flushleft}
\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{1} J316 HistSum Apr 80 (C), DECL 8 May 84.
\textsuperscript{2} J316 HistSum Jun 80 (S), DECL 1 Jul 85.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{4} J316 HistSum Sep 80 (U).
\end{flushright}
(U) In the last three months of 1980, OPSEC programs began receiving increased attention. Overall status of the programs was the subject of an ad hoc OPSEC Review Committee, convened by CINCPAC and chaired by the Deputy Chief of Staff. As a result of that meeting, several recommended actions to strengthen the PACOM program were formulated and presented to Admiral Long, who was studying them as the year ended. In the meantime, new OPSEC briefings covering both general and specific interest areas had been developed by the Operations Directorate; these were presented to senior staff members and to new staff members. Various hostile reconnaissance threat studies also continued.¹

Asia-Pacific Defense Forum

(U) The Asia-Pacific Defense Forum was a quarterly magazine published by CINCPAC and distributed to the foreign military audience in PACOM countries. It provided a military communication channel to enhance foreign understanding and perceptions in support of U.S. national objectives. First published in June 1976 with about 3,300 subscribers, by the end of 1977 there were over 10,000 copies being distributed. Almost 75 percent went to Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Content was primarily reprinted material from other U.S. publications, selected by the editorial board and approved by the Chief of Staff. Foreign material was encouraged.²

1. J316 HistSum Dec 80 (U).
4. JCS 3265/181707Z Jun 80 (S), REVW 16 Jun 99.
(U) The Executive and Managing Editors of the Forum, CINCPAC staff officers, visited Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Malaysia during the period 2 to 20 September to review and discuss with in-country personnel the means of improving and expanding the publication. As a result, circulation to the Republic of Korea was to be increased by 3,000 copies, to enable distribution down to the company level. The officers met with the editors of three Hong Kong-based military publications and established cooperative editorial relationships for future operations. The publications were Modernization, published in Chinese; Dragon, a bilingual Chinese-English publication; and COMMILIT, also Chinese-English. Both Modernization and COMMILIT had previously translated and published an article from the PACOM Forum. 4

2. CINCPAC 170146Z Jul 80 (S/NF), REVW 19 Jun 99.
4. J362 HistSum Sep 80 (U).
UNCLASSIFIED

P-3 Crash in Pago Pago

(U) American Samoa celebrated its 80th anniversary on 17 April. On 21 March CINCPACFLT had advised the Governor that he regretted that a U.S. Navy ship would not be available to visit during the celebration, but that a P-3 ORION Maritime Surveillance Aircraft was available and would participate in the anniversary activities. He thanked the Governor for the special tribute being paid to the U.S. Navy by the people of American Samoa.¹

(U) The P-3 left Hawaii with a contingent of 11 Navy personnel of Samoan descent selected to participate in the festivities and six members of the Army's Tropic Lightning (25th Infantry Division) sport parachuting team. While a crowd of 5,000 had gathered to watch the skydiving exhibition, the P-3 made two successful passes over the crowd, circling the harbor, dropping three parachutists successfully on each pass. On a third pass over the harbor the aircraft attempted to fly under tramway cables at an estimated altitude of between 250 and 350 feet. It clipped the tramway line and crashed into Samoa's major luxury hotel, the Rainmaker, killing all in the crew of six and a civilian employee of the NASA Samoa Tracking Station who was on the ground. One 90-room wing of the 200-room hotel burned for two hours; most of the hotel's occupants had been out watching the show.²

(U) The crash was attributed to pilot error in an official-use-only report that described it as the most tragic example of total disregard for flight discipline and sound judgment the endorser could recall in 35 years of military flying. The pilot, with forethought and knowledge of the tramway cable, placed his crew and aircraft in a position of extreme jeopardy which cost their lives.³

Tropical Cyclones

(U) Tropical cyclone activity in the PACOM was comparatively mild and there were no major disasters caused by weather conditions during 1980. Out of a total of 72 tropical cyclones, the majority (27) and most severe were located in the western Pacific, while those in the Indian Ocean area (19) and the eastern Pacific (16) were less destructive. Five of those in WESTPAC (WALLY, KIM, Super-typhoon WYNNE, BETTY, and DINAH) caused damage to life and/or property while two (ORCHID and WYNNE) necessitated evacuation of U.S. aircraft from Kadena AB, Japan, in September and October.⁴

1. CINCPACFLT 210154Z Mar 80 (U).
2. Honolulu Advertiser, 18 Apr 80, p. 1 (U); CINCPAC 190123Z Apr 80 (U).
3. COMNAVAIRPAC 181508Z Jun 80 (U).
4. J37 HistSums Jan-Dec 80 (U).
(U) In April WALLY crossed the Fiji Islands and dissipated within 48 hours. Maximum velocity attained was only 35 knots but extensive rainfall, caused by sustained convective activity, resulted in 17 lives being lost. Typhoon KIM, with winds of 120 knots in its seven-day life, was the second typhoon in a week to pass over central Luzon in the Philippines and caused extensive flooding, destruction, and deaths. The typhoon made landfall again 100 miles east of Hong Kong with 45-knot winds and again extensive flooding occurred.1

(U) Tropical Cyclone ORCHID formed approximately 300 miles north-northwest of Guam on 7 September and forced the evacuation of aircraft stationed there. ORCHID made landfall in southern Kyushu with 60-knot winds, causing some flooding there and in Korea where approximately 200 South Koreans were evacuated. Although it did not make landfall, WYNNE, during it track from 4 to 15 October, threatened both Guam and Kadena and forced evacuation of aircraft from Kadena. WYNNE reached super typhoon intensity with maximum winds of 150 knots on 9 October.2

(U) Two tropical cyclones in November resulted in significant damage--BETTY with gusts up to 82 knots recorded at Agana, Guam, damaged 188 homes and caused an estimated $1.4 million loss to local crops. On 4 November BETTY hit Luzon where four people died and 15,992 were left homeless. On 22 November DINAH crossed the northern portion of Saipan with winds of 80 and gusts of 101 knots. Sixty families were left homeless, and there was extensive damage to power and water systems, as well as total damage to cash and subsistence crops, which resulted in Saipan being declared a federal disaster area.3

PACOM Tropical Cyclone Conference

(U) The 22nd Annual Pacific Command Tropical Cyclone Conference was held at Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines from 28 to 31 January 1980 with CINCPACREP Philippines acting as host for CINCPACFLT. The 44 attendees, representing 35 military commands, plus the National Weather Service, Naval Oceanography Command, Air Weather Service, and the Naval Environmental Prediction Research Facility, dealt with 33 items in evaluating the performance of the PACOM Tropical Cyclone Warning and Reconnaissance System and revising procedures in preparation for the next cyclone season.4

1. J37 HistSum Apr 80 (U).
2. J37 HistSums Sep, Oct 80 (U).
4. J37 HistSum Feb 80 (U).
SECRET

CHAPTER V
LOGISTICS

SECTION I--PLANS/POLICY

PACOM Logistics Deficiencies

(b)(1), (2)(A)

1. J412 HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 7 Feb 86; CINCPAC 141745Z Jan 80 (S), DECL 21 Dec 86.

SECRET
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

1. J422 HistSum Nov 80 (S), DECL 8 Nov 86.
2. J412 HistSum Jul 80 (S), DECL 19 Aug 86; J42/J43/Memo of 26 Jul 80 (S), Subj: RDJTF Logistics Support Conference (U), DECL 26 Jul 86.
3. Ibid.
During the second day of the conference representatives were formed into committees for discussions on transportation, supply, ammunition, maintenance, and base development. Regarding the pre-positioning of supply and transportation assets, the CINCPAC representative, RADM Bird, commented that for the near term, PACOM and EUCOM stocks would be necessary to support the RDJTF but that additional pre-positioning was essential, either ashore or on ships. Regarding host nation support, it was agreed that assistance with transportation of supplies and initial troops from an airfield to the NTPS docking area, stevedoring, security, warehousing and storage areas, POL, and water would be beneficial to U.S. forces. RADM Bird stated that while the concept of establishing a logistics support base outside the area of operations might have merit, planning should only call for procedures which had been used routinely in peacetime. The majority of the attendees supported this position. It was also agreed that compatible logistics support computer systems were necessary, particularly if one Service were to be responsible for requisitioning materiel from all Services. The UTS-700 computer communications system was deemed a satisfactory solution. \(^2\)

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
Transportation requirements for the initial preplanned supply support should be studied to ensure adequate lift capability, and Class I (Subsistence) items should be included in this category.

A revised draft (#5) of the RDJTF logistics concept was forwarded in October. Although reviewing comments generally concurred in the concept, CINCPAC was still concerned with the open-ended nature of the assumptions the concept contained. A firm set of assumptions, based upon probabilities and best judgments, was still needed. Besides, CINCPAC did "not necessarily agree with the statement that commitment of the RDJTF would not detract from other U.S. commitments." CINCPAC's rationale was that employment of the RDJTF, under existing conditions, could have substantial impact on both force and logistic posture to execute other U.S. OPLANs and CONPLANs. At the end of the year no firm plans had been devised or promulgated.1

Near Term Pre-positioning Ships

In late 1979 the Secretary of Defense announced the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force designed to be able to reach trouble spots quickly in remote parts of the world. Defense officials said that $9 billion would be earmarked for the force in FY 81 and the following four years. The bulk of this funding would go towards development and purchase of equipment designed to enhance mobility: $6 billion would pay for development and procurement of between 50 to 60 new transport aircraft and some $1.5-2 billion would be earmarked for building 15 new SECURITY-class depot ships (PD-214s). The 15 PD-214 maritime pre-positioning force would be divided equally among the three U.S. Navy fleets.2

In March 1980 a Near Term Pre-positioning Ships (NTPS) program was activated as an interim plan for the maritime pre-positioning of ships as part of a sealift enhancement program. Pre-positioning of equipment was named by Secretary Brown as the second vital ingredient of an effective U.S. response to aggression and trouble spots in the Middle East-Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean areas. As a near-term option, a seven-ship force of commercial-type vessels was being assembled with sufficient unit equipment, supplies, fuel, and water to enable an 11,800-man Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) as well as several U.S. Air Force fighter squadrons, to operate until further logistics support could arrive from

1. J417 HistSum Dec 80 (U); CINCPAC 250330Z Nov 80 (U).
the United States. The NTP ships were to be pre-positioned within a few days' sailing distance of the Persian Gulf-Arabian Sea area. In an emergency they could move to a designated port and join up with personnel and planes flown directly from U.S. bases. The Secretary said this arrangement would provide a capability to respond to a crisis in days rather than weeks.¹

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Effective 16 May 1980 the Commanding General, 7th MAB Headquarters (Nucleus) at Twenty-Nine Palms, California, assumed responsibility for the organization, training, rapid deployment, and employment of assigned FMF forces to implement the NTPS concept. The seven NTP ships were ordered to sail to Diego Garcia as shown below, and 25 July was established as the operational ready date for the 7th MAB. Funding in the amount of $24 million was provided to the Marine Corps for support of the NTPS program. Estimated total cost for the NTPS package was $103.1 million for conversion and charter costs for one year for the seven ships plus two harbor tugs. Additionally, there was a one-time expense for unit equipment, end items, and provisioning of $1.544 million.²

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2. CG SEVENTH MAB 070008Z Jun 80 (C), DECL 7 Jun 86; CINCPACFLT 110322Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 31 DEC 88; JCS 5954/101511Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 7 Jul 86.
1. JCS 5954/101511Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 7 Jul 86.
2. CINCPAC 290214Z Aug 80 (S), DECL 26 Aug 86; CINCPAC 202033Z Sep 80 (S), DECL 18 Sep 86; J5325 HistSum Sep 80 (S), DECL 7 Jul 86.
3. Ibid.
1. J5325 HistSum Sep 80 (S), DECL 7 Jul 86; CINCPACFLT 110322Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 31 Dec 88; CINCPAC 202033Z Sep 80 (S), DECL 18 Sep 86; Op. Cit. J5/Memo/1053-81 of 12 Aug 81 (U).
2. CINCPAC 202033Z Sep 80 (S), DECL 18 Sep 86.
3. Ibid.

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1. JCS 1311/192009Z Nov 80 (S), DECL 19 Nov 86; CINCPAC 032221Z Dec 80 (S), DECL 26 Nov 86.
2. J5112 HistSum Oct 80 (S), DECL 30 Nov 86.
4. CINCPAC 200014 Dec 80 (C), DECL 19 Dec 86.
With careful coordination between CINCPAC's Directorate for Plans and Public Affairs Office, detailed public affairs guidance was provided to concerned commands and the arrival of the first NTP ship, USNS MERCURY, on 3 February 1981 turned out to be uneventful. As reported by the U.S. Consul in Naha, this was attributable, among other things, to effective Marine Corps public relations work and the advent of Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 81. There were no negative editorials or protests and only passing reference was made to future similar visits.\(^2\)

**Relocation of WWMCCS Terminals**

(U) In January 1979 the JCS approved relocation of the Logistics WWMCCS terminals from the CINCPAC Command Center area (in building 80) to the offices of the Director for Logistics and Security Assistance (in building 3A, room 313). Initial estimated completion date was January 1980. Subsequently it was learned that a crypto ancillary unit and a crypto safe would not arrive until March and May 1980 respectively. Estimated costs were $32,255. Relocation of the terminals was expected to save a significant number of manhours and greatly assist users in handling problems with WWMCCS unreliability. The project was completed on 20 Jun 1980.\(^3\)

**Relocation of Logistics Readiness Center**

(U) On 1 April 1980 construction started on a new CINCPAC Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) located adjacent to the new command center in building 80.

1. AMEMB Tokyo 22411/230804Z Dec 80 (S), GDS 12/23/86; COMUSJ 292320Z Dec 80 (S) DECL 23 Dec 86; J5112 HistSum Jan 81 (S), DECL 28 Feb 87; CINCPAC 032215Z Jan 81 (S), DECL 31 Dec 86; SECSTATE 8246/130517Z Jan 81 (S), GDS 1/12/86; CINCPAC 170350Z Jan 81 (S), DECL 31 Jan 87; AMEMB Tokyo 1367/270442Z Jan 81 (C), GDS 1/27/87; SECSTATE 21426/272203Z Jan 81 (C), GDS 1/27/87; Op. Cit. J5/Memo/S-1053 of 12 Aug 81 (U)
2. J51/Memo/C4-81 of 29 Jan 81 (C), Subj: Aide Memoire vs. Summary of Discussions (U), DECL 31 Jan 87; AMCONSUL Naha 060845Z Feb 81 (C), GDS 2/6/87.
Construction was completed in July. The center was first used during EXERCISE PROUD SPIRIT which was held 6-18 November. The exercise was also the first use of a newly installed PACOM Crisis Action Information Distribution System and the WWMCCS terminal in the LRC. The new arrangement provided smoother coordination between the LRC and the Operations Action Group.1

1. J414 HistSum Mar 80 (U); J411 HistSum Nov 80 (C), DECL 4 Dec 86.
SECTION II--RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Defense Retail Interservice Support

(U) The seventh annual PACOM DRIS Joint Interservice Resource Study Group (JIRSG) Chairmen's Conference was held 13-14 May at Pearl Harbor with 22 representatives from Japan, Guam, the Philippines and Oahu Interservice Support Coordinators. The keynote address was given by Major General Robert Gaskill, USA, Deputy Director, Defense Logistics Agency.1

(U) In assessing Defense Retail Interservice Support (DRIS) accomplishments to date, the Hawaii JIRSG chairman reported there were 13 permanent sub-study groups and a like number of ad hoc study groups. Of the 108 studies being conducted under the FY 78-82 DRIS plan, 25 were underway. The Guam chairman explained that out of a possible 101 studies, 72 were identified as not being feasible and 15 were in progress. In Japan, the chairman pointed out that the program was severely hampered because no personnel were assigned primary duties as DRIS although 135 people were involved in the FY 78-82 plan studies. The Korea representative noted significant accomplishments in the area of Army support to the Air Force for rebuild of 2½-ton trucks, laundry services consolidation, and establishment of a contract TDY hotel for all Services. The CINCPAC Interservice Support Coordinator addressed the need for identification and pre-negotiation of Interservice Support Agreements which would be required in support of CINCPAC OPLANs.2

(U) As follow up to the conference discussions, CINCPAC provided more specific guidance on ISA/OPLAN relationships in a revision to CINCPAC Instruction 4000.2L, Defense Retail Interservice Support (DRIS) Program. As requested by the Defense Logistics Agency DRIS program manager, CINCPAC completed a draft of Appendix 7 (JIRSG Procedures) to DOD Directive 4000.19M, which was presented at the worldwide DRIS Conference in November. At the end of the year a proposal was being staffed for transfer of one space from the CINCPAC POL Branch to COMUS Japan to serve as DRIS coordinator.3

1. J4212 HistSum May 80 (U); Minutes of Seventh Annual PACOM DRIS JIRSG Chairmen's Conference (U).
2. Ibid.
3. J4212 HistSum Dec 80 (U).
BULK POL DATA, PACOM

UNCLASSIFIED

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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81, p. 38.
Fuels

(U) In addressing the PACOM Petroleum Logistics Conference in November 1980, Brigadier General Lawrence R. Seamon, USMC, Commander, Defense Fuel Supply Center, presented an assessment of world and military oil market conditions. Security of crude oil supplies from the Middle East had become of increasing concern. The oil embargo market, dominated by OPEC, had been influenced by both geopolitical and economic considerations. The price and quantity supplied were not heavily influenced by the financial needs of the producing countries but were used as leverage to gain political goals and advantages: the oil weapon. The most remarkable aspect of the 1980 petroleum market was the rapid recovery from the Iranian crisis created in 1979. More importantly, the fundamental demand structure had reacted to the rising prices of the last several years and conservation efforts were beginning to pay off in the marketplace. By the middle of 1980 the laws of economics took over and supplies of crude and products were at record levels and demand was depressed. Spot prices, led by the high price of African light crudes, plunged below official levels. Crude spot prices continued to slide and price premiums on certain crude products were being dropped by OPEC members.1

Standard Bulk Petroleum Prices

(U) Based upon OSD/MRA&L guidance, standard prices were established by the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) for each grade of bulk petroleum that it handled. Prices were based on procurement costs, worldwide average transportation costs, service costs for contractor-operated terminals, and wholesale and retail losses. Normally these prices were adjusted at the beginning of each fiscal year, and although the DFSC had published new prices for FY 80 in August 1979, the increases were not sufficient to offset increased procurement costs. Therefore in January 1980 the Office of the Secretary of

1. CINCPAC Ltr Ser 153 of 27 Jan 81 (U), Subj: Minutes of the 1980 CINCPAC Petroleum Logistics Conference; J422 HistSum Oct 80 (U); J4222 Point Paper (U), 20 Oct 80, Subj: Sources of Crude Oil Imported by United States; J422 HistSum Jan 80 (C), DECL 3 Mar 86; DFSC 252058Z Jan 80 (C), DECL Jan 86.
2. Ibid.
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defense directed the DFSC to publish revised price increases for FY 80, with an effective date of 1 February. The revised prices reflected an average increase of more than double for major POL commodities listed below and a price increase of $1.25 per gallon for leaded motor gasoline. This meant an estimated $1 billion annual increase in PACOM O&M costs. In view of the impact that the increase in motor gasoline would have on military personnel living in certain areas, its price was reduced from $1.84 to $1.26 per gallon while the price of JP-4 was raised from $1.17 to $1.18 per gallon. A comparison of recent years' prices follows:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 77</th>
<th>FY 78</th>
<th>FY 79</th>
<th>FY 80</th>
<th>FY 80 (Rev)</th>
<th>FY 81</th>
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<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
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<td>0.420</td>
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<td>1.18</td>
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<td>0.358</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.456</td>
<td>0.630</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFM</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.449</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>0.457</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>0.590</td>
<td>0.710</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOGAS</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.590</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unleaded MOGAS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.650</td>
<td>1.29</td>
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</table>

(U) Upon learning of the increases, Admiral Long expressed concern to General Jones, Chairman of the JCS, that the views of the unified commanders were not obtained prior to implementing a decision of such magnitude, especially in the middle of the fiscal year, and noted the adverse effects on readiness and quality of life unless a supplemental budget were approved to cover the increased fuel costs. Regarding the impact on these two areas, the Admiral said:  

A cut in flying or steaming hours, or reduction in the present O&M budget, or reduction or curtailment of tankage repair projects cannot be accepted in order to maintain a credible readiness posture. A related concern is the impact on the quality of life of our personnel in Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines where the price increase of automotive gasoline and heating oil will be felt severely. The Army Air Force and Navy Exchange systems

1. J422 HistSums Aug 79, Jan and Sep 80 (U).
2. CINCPAC 300321Z Jan 80 (U)(BOM).
### 1980 POL Issues

(in thousands of barrels)

#### BY PRODUCT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JAN</th>
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<th>MAR</th>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>JP-4</td>
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<td>1,386</td>
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<td>1,238</td>
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#### BY AREA

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Source: J422
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PACOM POL ISSUES
(IN MILLIONS OF BARRELS)

* Naval Distillate phased out in 1974.

Source: J422
prices for automotive gasoline are now approximately 80 cents per gallon effective 1 Feb 80. Now, commanders are faced with the task of explaining the "benefit" of serving their country overseas, which I am sure, the troops will have difficulty in understanding.

(U) A separate message to the JCS in a similar vein followed which stated that pending receipt of advice on a supplemental appropriation, no operational restrictions were contemplated. To minimize the severity of the price increases on military personnel and dependents in PACOM and where stocks allowed, the Army, Air Force, and Navy exchange systems would hold back increases from 10 days to two or three months. ¹

(U) In April the JCS advised that the Services had requested supplemental appropriations to cover increased fuel costs of $3.5 and $4.4 billion for FY 80 and FY 81 respectively, but the amounts appropriated were reduced to $2.3 and $2.9 billion. ²

(U) By September, when the DFSC announced FY 81 prices, world market conditions had stabilized and, as depicted above, prices were reduced for FY 81 in three of the major products. ³

Petroleum Logistics Conference

(U) A PACOM Petroleum Logistics Conference was held at Camp Smith from 19 to 21 November 1980. Approximately 100 military and civilian PACOM POL managers, as well as representatives from CONUS, CINCEUR, and state and local industries met for discussions and briefings covering 35 agenda items. Selected subjects affecting PACOM included efforts being made by DFSC to expand contractual support within the PACOM. The Commander, DFSC, BGEN Seamon, asked participants to look for additional solicitations for Navy Special fuel and JP-5 within WESTPAC and to identify any additional storage that might be available for use by the U.S. Government. ⁴

(U) Another DFSC representative addressed implementation of DOD Directive 4140.25, "Procedures for Management of Bulk Petroleum," which had been revised to provide a worldwide DOD petroleum logistics system, including storage and

1. CINCPAC 020452Z Feb 80 (U)
2. J4222 HistSums Mar, Apr 80 (U).
3. J422 HistSum Sep 80 (U).
4. CINCPAC Ltr Ser 153 of 27 Jan 81 (U), Subj: Minutes of the 1980 CINCPAC Petroleum Logistics Conference; J422 HistSum Nov 80 (U); J4222 HistSum Oct 80 (U).
distribution facilities in support of current and projected peacetime and wartime requirements. Under the new directive, the Military Services, the Unified Commands, and the DLA were assigned interrelated yet distinct responsibilities for storage terminals and associated facilities. The directive also gave the DLA the authority to fund for maintenance of terminals, lease commercial tankage on a worldwide basis, and construction of new permanent storage.1

(U) Regarding PACOM storage capabilities, a CINCPAC representative reported a total figure of 28,397,000 barrels was available on 1 June 1979 with an out-of-commission rate of 18 percent. Although by 1 June 1980 storage had increased by 133,000 barrels with an attendant 20 percent out-of-commission rate, both of these rates were far from acceptable. The rate during that 12-month period was attributed to tank fires in Japan and torrential rains followed by mud slides in the Philippines, as well as closer scrutiny of the material condition of tanks throughout the PACOM. The biggest impact was in JP-5 and in terminals in Japan. It was hoped that during the next five years an additional 10,127,000 barrels of tankage could be built or repaired which would eliminate the deficit. So far, however, only 35 percent had been funded. Service Department and DLA support was needed for MILCON funding and assignment of high priorities to these projects to assure appropriation.2

2. Ibid.
(U) During 1980 negotiations on a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the U.S. Navy and the ROK Air Force were concluded. The MOA established procedures for storage, utilization, and replacement in kind of approximately 80,000 to 100,000 gallons of AVGAS and 2.5-3 million gallons of JP-4 annually by the ROK Air Force to USN/USMC units in Korea. The U.S. Navy was to deliver sufficient quantities of the AVGAS to insure a minimum of 90 days of U.S. requirements could be met without infringing on ROK Air Force supplies. For JP-4, the ROK Air Force would make issues to USN/USMC units from on-hand inventories and either receive cash reimbursement or repayment in kind through the Trans-Korean pipeline by deliveries at Pohang or Taegu. The U.S. Navy was also to provide a quarterly requirements list identifying future quantities and locations for fuel support and be responsible for all costs associated with delivery and storage of AVGAS.²

Storage Facilities in PACOM

2. J4222 HistSum Aug 80 (U).
1. J4233 HistSum Jun 80 (S), DECL 10 Jul 86; SSO Korea 180915Z Mar 80 (S)(BOM).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. J4233 HistSum Jun 80 (S), DECL 10 Jul 86; J462 Point Paper (S), 6 Nov 80, Subj: Transfer of War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) to ROK (U), DECL 6 Nov 86.
Munitions

1. J423 HistSum Dec 80 (S), DECL 14 Jan 87.
2. Ibid.
1. J423 HistSum Dec 80 (S), DECL 14 Jan 87.
2. Ibid.
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Chemical Identification Training Sets

(U) From the 1930s through 1970 the Department of the Army had fielded chemical identification sets with containers of representative chemical agents and simulants for classroom or field instructional identifications tests to provide familiarity with agents' appearance, color, and odor. In 1971 the Army declared the sets obsolete and directed their disposal under OPLAN SETCON. Under this plan 20,251 obsolete sets were to be moved in two phases from CONUS and overseas Army and Navy installations to Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado, for disposal by incineration.1

(U) Phase I of Operation SETCON, conducted in January 1978, was a pilot test of the safety, technical, and public affairs aspects of the overall plan. From PACOM, 984 sets were successfully moved to the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. During Phase II, 1,452 sets stored at Johnston Island were transported in four C-141 flights direct to the Rocky Mountain Arsenal between 20 and 22 May 1980 without accident or incident. CINCPAC and WESTCOM were responsible for movement of the sets from the storage area to the airfield. CINCPAC designated the Assistant Division Commander of the 25th Infantry Division as primary on-scene commander and the Naval Air Station, Barbers Point as the emergency airfield in PACOM. The Pacific Airlift Control Element at Hickam AFB was responsible for scheduling and monitoring the C-141 flights. The 2,164.7 liters of lethal and non-lethal agents in sealed metal containers contained phosgene, cyanogen chloride, tabun simulant, mustard, distilled mustard, nitrogen mustard, lewisite, and chloropicrin.2

1. J423 HistSum Apr 80 (U); J4236 HistSum Dec 80 (U); J42/Memo/83-80 of 9 Jun 80 (U), Subj: Operation SETCON II After Action Report.
2. Ibid.
SECTION III--MOBILITY OPERATIONS

TEAM SPIRIT 80

Sealift

(U) In recent years transportation of unit equipment for the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii to Korea for Exercise TEAM SPIRIT had been exclusively by airlift. As a result of a CINCPAC initiative in March 1979 the JCS had authorized a mix of sealift and airlift for TEAM SPIRIT 80 (held from 1 March to 20 April 1980) in order to conserve money and fuel and to provide a unique training opportunity.¹

(C) The Military Sealift Command RO/RO ship which had been dedicated to the exercise sustained extensive casualty to her port boiler on 30 January 1980. Therefore, complete replanning for the deployment and redeployment of the 25th Infantry Division unit equipment was necessary. Two C-4 breakbulk ships were substituted--the SS PIONEER COMMANDER was diverted from an ammunition run in WESTPAC and the SS AMERICAN RELIANCE was activated from reduced operating status in Alameda, California. The PIONEER COMMANDER arrived in Pearl Harbor on 11 February, departed on the 15th with 296 pieces of equipment, arrived at Pusan on the 26th, and completed discharge on 27 February. After suffering minor hull damage upon departure from Alameda, the AMERICAN RELIANCE arrived in Pearl on 13 February, commenced loading 334 vehicles and departed on the 17th. Offloading at Pusan was accomplished on 28 and 29 February.²

(U) The sealift redeployment phase began on 9 April with the arrival of the SS CHARLES LYKES in Pusan. The ship loaded 338 pieces of equipment in 11½ hours and arrived in Pearl Harbor on 18 April. The remaining 330 pieces were loaded on the SS PIONEER MOON between 10 and 12 April and arrived in Pearl on 21 April.³

(U) The successful and damage-free deployment and redeployment of Army unit equipment demonstrated that sealift was a viable and rapid method to deploy heavy unit equipment. Although an additional cost of $.62 million was incurred by the use of breakbulk ships, total sealift costs amounted to $2.75 million whereas the estimated airlift cost was in excess of $22 million. As a result, use of sealift would be considered for future PACOM exercises.⁴

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2. J433 HistSum Jan 80 (C), DECL 13 Feb 86; J433 HistSum Feb 80 (U).
4. J433 HistSum Feb 80 (U); J433 Point Paper (U), 23 Sep 80, Subj: Sealift for PACOM Exercises.
Airlift

(U) Airlift was used in all three phases of TEAM SPIRIT 80. In the deployment from 11 February through 15 March and redeployment from 31 March through 20 April airlift missions by type were as follows:¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
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<th>Redeployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>169</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-141</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC-10*</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-747*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Commercial contract wide-body aircraft from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet

(U) The employment phase involved 12 C-130 aircraft from MAC theater resources which operated out of Kimhae ROK Air Force Base throughout Korea. C-130 support included the full spectrum of airdropped and airdrop activity to U.S. and ROK users. Total cost of the airlift approximated $13.4 million.²

Assignment of C-130 Assets

(U) On 31 March 1975 Military Airlift Command (MAC)/Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Proposal 74-32 implemented the consolidation of Pacific theater airlift forces under MAC. Phase II of the consolidation plan brought Air Force tactical airlift forces under MAC with the Pacific Theater Airlift Manager (TAM) also serving as the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing Commander. Under this concept, CINCPAC retained operational command, while PACAF exercised operational control of airlift assets for CINCPAC through the TAM. On 1 October 1976, all airlift operations, including C-130 missions, were consolidated into the MAC Airlift Service Industrial Fund management system. In 1978 a MAC reorganization consolidated management of airlift operations in the Pacific under the 834th Airlift Division (MAC) at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, with subordinate units at Yokota, Osan, and Clark Air Bases. The commander had additional duties as MAC Liaison Officer to CINCPAC and as Special Assistant for Airlift to CINCPAC.³

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¹ J435 HistSum Jan 80 (C), DECL 12 Feb 86; J435 HistSum May 80 (U); Interview with LT COL R. A. Deboit, USAF, J434, 10 Jul 81 (U).
² J435 HistSum Jan 80 (C), DECL 12 Feb 86.
(U) In December 1980 the JCS forwarded a CINCMAC proposal that the four remaining C-130 squadrons (two each under USCINCEUR and CINCPAC) be reassigned to MAC with CINCMAC exercising operational control. The goal was to improve airlift efficiency and effectiveness, and rationale was alignment with other MAC airlift forces and standardization of management. CINCPAC would retain authority to task CINCMAC with prioritized requirements to be executed with the most appropriate airlift assets available.\(^1\)

\((c)\) In response to CINCPAC's request for comment, CINCPACAF stated he did not support the proposal. He believed that it would degrade the theater commander's capability to respond quickly to fulfill theater airlift needs and would complicate the command and control of tactical air assets in PACOM. CINCMAC, CINCPAC, and CINCPACAF already had the benefit of theater management with the services of the triple-hatted 834th Airlift Division commander. Moreover, adoption of the proposal would dilute the single manager approach to operations within the theater in peace- or wartime.\(^2\)

(U) CINCPAC's comments to the JCS on 17 December reflected those of CINCPACAF. Additionally, CINCPAC noted that close coordination between CINCPAC, PACAF, the Pacific Airlift Management Office, and the Pacific Airlift Center worked well, and PACOM users were satisfied with existing arrangements. The arrangements provided a flexible, responsive, timely theater tactical airlift capability for normal, contingency, and wartime use. CINCPAC considered reassignment of operational control of in-theater C-130 assets inadvisable.\(^3\)

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1. JCS 2654/021605Z Dec 80 (U).
2. HQ PACAF 112105Z Dec 80 (C), REVW 16 May 99.
3. CINCPAC 170200Z Dec 80 (U).

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1. JCS 2654/021605Z Dec 80 (U).
2. HQ PACAF 112105Z Dec 80 (C), REVW 16 May 99.
3. CINCPAC 170200Z Dec 80 (U).
1. Ibid.; J433 HistSum Jan 80 (C), DECL 14 Feb 86; J433 HistSum Nov 80 (U); CINCPAC 270134Z Nov 80 (U); CINCPAC 310045Z Dec 80 (U).
2. J434 HistSum Dec 80 (S), DECL 14 Jan 87.
Korean Contingency Resupply and Redistribution System

(U) In order to support CINCCFC/COMUS Korea with a viable, rapid aerial resupply system, the Korean Logistic Concept was formulated by CINCPACAF and concurred in by CINCPAC and COMUS Korea in 1976. The concept significantly reduced the number of aerial resupply sorties required to land at the various TACAIR combat bases, thereby insuring the priority of combat fighter operations from those bases. The concept proposed the development of Kimhae Air Base near Pusan, Korea, as the primary strategic airlift port and distribution center for a Korean contingency. Kimhae was envisioned as the primary receiving point, processing center, and transportation mode interface hub to distribute incoming resupply cargo, personnel, and mail for U.S. and ROK contingency military forces.2

(U) As a means of turning concept into reality, in December 1979 CINCPACAF drafted Program Management Plan (PMP) 79-10 entitled "Korean Contingency Resupply/Redistribution System (KCRS)." The KCRS brought together the actions required to implement the concept and the PMP delineated action required pertaining to land and air transportation, communications, medical, administrative, facilities, security, base vehicle support, manpower, postal, and ADP support.3

2. J437 HistSum Jun 80 (U).
3. Ibid.
UNCLASSIFIED

(U) It soon became evident that the necessary actions were beyond the scope of authority and responsibility of CINCPACAF, and on 16 May 1980, with the concurrence of CINCPACAF and COMUS Korea, the CINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance assumed overall responsibility for development of the KCRS. Working level conferences were held in Seoul in January and June 1980 with representatives from CINCPAC, COMUS Korea, CINCPACAF, and subordinate units, and at the latter meeting, CINCPAC assigned responsibilities to PACAF and COMUS Korea for the development of functional areas in support of the KCRS. Functions in support of inter-theater airlift of resupply cargo originating outside PACOM were addressed concurrently but separately by PACAF.1

(U) During planning conferences in September and October a decision was made to exercise portions of the KCRS during TEAM SPIRIT 81 and COMUS Korea was directed to prepare the necessary input for the exercise plan. Areas to be exercised included:2

- Termination and origin of inter-theater cargo channel missions at Kimhae vice Osan.

- Army air freight operation at Kimhae.

- Aerial delivery missions from Kimhae vice Taegu.

- Limited operation of the Distribution Control Center and USAF transportation movement operations at Kimhae.

- Communications between the Distribution Control Center, Combined Traffic Management Center, Korean Air Movement Office, Korean Air Logistics Control Center, and the C-130 element.

2. J437 Histsums Sep, Nov 80 (U).

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SECTION IV--FACILITIES ENGINEERING

Diego Garcia

(U) The Diego Garcia Atoll is located in the Chagos Archipelago in the Indian Ocean at 7°21'S, 72°28'E. The strategic importance of Diego Garcia had been recognized for a number of years, and prior to World War II it was a frequent stop for vessels in the Indian Ocean. After the war, the British relied on it for refueling and minor repairs. In 1965 the British Government created the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) as an administrative entity by combining islands of the Chagos with those of Aldabra, Farquhar, and Desroches. On 30 December 1966 the United States and the United Kingdom (U.K.) signed an agreement making the islands comprising the BIOT available to meet the needs of both governments.\(^1\)

\(^{(S)}\) Although Diego Garcia and some other islands in the Indian Ocean fell to the west of CINCPAC's 1968 area of direct responsibility, Admiral John S. McCain, who was CINCPAC at the time, was interested in developments there and was often consulted by JCS regarding U.S. requirements in the area. Twice in 1968 CINCPAC reaffirmed to the JCS his reasons for a U.S. base on Diego Garcia: for SSBN, logistic, and communications-electronics support; and as a base for staging forces through the Pacific into the Indian Ocean area in support of operations by other unified commanders. In view of the Soviet naval buildup in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean areas, he said, "...an airfield on Diego Garcia could have great strategic importance.\(^2\)

\(^{(S)}\) In April 1968 the concept for a "modest" facility for austere communications, POL storage, an 8,000-foot runway, and anchorage dredging was approved in principle by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, but funds were not appropriated until 1970. During this period CINCPAC continued to support construction of a 12,500-foot runway for the long term to accommodate various logistic, tactical, strategic, and tanker support aircraft.\(^3\)

(U) On 24 October 1972 the U.S. and U.K. Governments concluded an administrative agreement formally providing for the establishment of the Joint U.S.-UK Limited Communication Facility on the island of Diego Garcia. The name U.S. Naval Support Activity was agreed to in 1976.\(^4\)

1. J74 HistSum Jan/Feb 80 (U); CINCPAC 020115Z Feb 80 (U).
3. Ibid
4. CINCPAC 020115Z Feb 80 (U).

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(U) The U.S. Navy Seabee construction began in 1971 with one full battalion assigned for eight-month deployments. Other naval construction force units included detachments from battalions deployed at other sites. Major projects through 1979 included the causeway-pier in the lagoon, the POL facility, storage facilities, and berthing for Naval Support Activity personnel. The runway at Diego Garcia was lengthened from 8,000 to 12,000 feet, and other airfield improvements included additional parking aprons and limited maintenance facilities. The airfield had been used by Navy P3s on maritime patrol and by MAC C-141s for logistics support missions.¹

(8) Facilities and construction on Diego Garcia were addressed by the CINCPAC logistics staff in several areas during 1980 including a long-range expansion of facilities under military construction (MILCON) programming for FY 81-84, a shorter range effort to improve and expand living quarters, an airfield upgrade to accommodate B-52 operations, unconstrained requirements to support staging of the full Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), and billeting for MAC and SAC flight crews.

(1c) The FY 81-84 MILCON expansion of Diego Garcia was based upon the concept of supporting the rapid deployment of a heavy Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) in the FY 85 time frame from the Far East to the Middle East along with its supporting tactical aircraft. Initially this was planned to encompass the airlift of approximately 16,000 personnel, 2,300 tons of selected equipment, and 64 tactical aircraft. The balance of the equipment and supplies would be pre-positioned in five maritime pre-positioning ships (MPS) at Diego Garcia. A major constraint on the airlift in this concept was the assumption that intermediate airfields in host countries would be unavailable. The original program, which had been approved on 26 November 1979 in the amount of $141.1 million, included dredging, airfield facilities POL storage, wharfage, and water system upgrade.²

(5) Although CINCPAC had been kept apprised of the Diego Garcia MILCON expansion planning efforts during the latter half of 1979 and the Navy had begun design on projects for execution in FY 81-82, it was not until 29 December 1979 that the JCS tasked him to identify any additional facility requirements for the FY 83-84 segment of the expansion which would be necessary to support the rapid deployment concept. In late January 1980 the JCS amended their tasking and asked that consideration also be given to additional POL storage, aircraft parking, and a pier and mooring facilities to accommodate

¹ Ibid.
² CINCPAC Command History 1979 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p.302; J442 HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 5 Feb 86; JCS 2246/2915392 Dec 79, DECL 31 Dec 85.
the MPS. CINCPAC requested inputs from his component commands, CINCSAC, and CINCMAC and later asked CINCPACFLT, as the major U.S. claimant for Diego Garcia, to consolidate these inputs.¹

(5) On 26 February CINCPACFLT submitted the recommendations with information copies to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), concerned commands, and their respective engineering commands. CINCPACFLT's recommendations included expedited and/or increased dredging, aircraft parking apron, fuel hydrants, ordnance handling, wharfage, and water system totaling $209.9 (later amended to $226.5) million. These were separate and in addition to CINCPACFLT recommendations made on 11 February for supplemental FY 80 funding of habitability improvements (see below). Site development plans had already been completed for the revised master plan for the unconstrained requirements for RDJTF staging, but due to the different requirements in these two programs, CINCPACFLT recommended that revision of the master plan be limited to preparation of land use and siting plans for each concept until further operational concepts were defined.²

(5) In the first part of March CINCPAC readressed the PACFLT recommendations to the JCS, Service secretaries or chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, Defense Property Disposal Region Pacific, and Air Force Systems Command and forwarded his concurrence with CINCPACFLT's requirements. In addition, he stated that habitability requirements must be substantially completed before construction of additional operational facilities commenced. Further, MAC's requirements for pre-positioning of material handling equipment and aerospace ground equipment to support expanded airlift activity should be considered at an early point, but lack of an RDJTF scenario made it difficult to define and incorporate such MAC requirements.³

(5) In early May the JCS requested development of a site plan for Diego Garcia which could accommodate facilities proposed for the FY 81-84 MILCON, plus a B-52 airfield capability (see below). The site plan was to be distributed to all concerned commands for evaluation and comment back to the CNO by 1 August. Although most commands generally concurred in the site plan, Air Force elements expressed concern with the lack of a decision on the B-52 issue.

1. CINCPAC Command History 1979 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p.302; JCS 5191/260129Z Jan 80 (C), DECL 25 Jan 86; J44(A) HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 5 Feb 86; CINCPAC 170107Z Jan 80 (S), DECL 15 Jan 86; CINCPAC 220209Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 21 Feb 86.
2. J422 HistSum Feb 80 (S), DECL 10 Mar 86; CINCPACFLT 262351Z Feb and 050007Z Mar 80 (S), DECL 4 Feb 86.
3. CINCPAC 051910Z Mar 80 (S), DECL 1 Mar 86.
and adequacy of other air support provisions. Comments pertaining to the former were therefore withheld by the Air Force and CINCPAC pending decisions by JCS (and higher authority) regarding B-52 use. Later CINCPAC recommended that a new taxiway be made suitable for B-52s and that ultimately a parallel runway be built which would accommodate the B-52s.1

\(\text{(S)}\) In mid-July CINCPACFLT submitted a prioritized list of fleet readiness improvement MILCON requirements to CNO. This was prompted by authorization of limited FY 80 supplemental and anticipated delayed FY 81 funding. A revised summary followed in October of all Diego Garcia MILCON projects which would be required for the period FY 81-86. Most of these items had been supported previously in the FY 81-84 MILCON program and the projects listed for FY 81 were based on a Congressional authorization of $108 million. The figure for FY 82 amounted to $126 million, and, as discussed below, items for the Heavy MAB rapid deployment came to $155 million, with $220 million for a B-52 support capability.2

\(\text{(U)}\) On 17 November CINCPACFLT forwarded the revised siting plans for expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia. All applicable comments on the site plan distributed in June were incorporated and design for authorized projects was proceeding. The Diego Garcia Master Plan was to be updated in FY 81 and CINCPACFLT asked that any further comments on the revised site plan be submitted to PACNAVFAECOM by 30 December 1980 for incorporation.3

Habitability Improvements

\(\text{(S)}\) At the same time CINCPAC facility planners were compiling requirements for the MILCON FY 81-84 expansion program, the JCS requested that CINCPAC develop, within one or two months, alternatives for increasing existing forces on Diego Garcia by an additional 600 to 2,500 personnel. (Although the island capacity was only 1,500, there were approximately 1,900 personnel on Diego Garcia at the time, and the population was expected to grow to approximately 3,000 in the near future.) The increase had to be supported independent of existing facilities and the additional force was to be self-sustaining.

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1. J422 HistSum May 80 (S), DECL 10 Jun 80; JCS 4219/032051Z May 80 (S), DECL 28 Apr 86; J442 HistSum Jun 80 (U); J442 HistSum Jul 80 (S), DECL 8 Aug 80; J442 HistSum Aug 80 (S), DECL 22 Sep 86.
2. J442 HistSum Jul 80 (S), DECL 8 Aug 86; CINCPACFLT 180707Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 31 Dec 88, J442 HistSum Oct 80 (S), DECL 10 Nov 86; CINCPACFLT 042331Z Oct 80 (S), DECL 10 Jul 86; J442 Point Paper (S), 16 Jan 81, Subj: Diego Garcia Facility Plan (U), DECL 16 Jan 87.
3. J442 HistSum Nov 80 (U); CINCPACFLT Ltr Ser 44/8386 of 17 Nov 80 (U), Subj: Diego Garcia-Expansion of Facilities; Military Construction.
for a 180-day period. CINCPAC requested that his Service components provide proposals for their equipment, personnel, and transportation requirements, their assets and ability to provide these items; but also the time required for implementation and the impact on PACOM readiness.¹

(5) Because of his relationship as major U.S. claimant to the Navy Support Facility on Diego Garcia, CINCPACFLT addressed the requirements in terms of existing shortfalls and mid-range needs. CINCPAC found this approach preferable to the WESTCOM and PACAF proposals for furnishing temporary facilities, such as tents and portable support equipment in an austere environment. Besides, Army and Air Force assets would have to be drawn either from theater or CONUS war reserves which could impact more severely on PACOM readiness than the longer range PACFLT plan.²

(5) CINCPACFLT's proposal called for three-phased construction of a new camp by Navy construction forces already on Diego Garcia which would preclude further aggravation of already congested facilities. Phase I called for construction of seahuts for 520 men and a field mess; Phase II, additional huts to house 480 men; and Phase III, huts for 500 men, an interim galley to replace the field mess, and pre-engineered storage buildings. Costs were estimated at $8.6 million from MILCON funds, $3.1 million from O&M, and $3.5 million of Procurement Funds. CINCPACFLT also recommended that an additional $134 million in FY 80 supplemental MILCON funds be sought to provide permanent facilities to relieve existing and anticipated deficiencies. On 7 February CINCPAC recommended strong support to the JCS for both the immediate requirement for $15.2 million and the $134 million for permanent facilities. CINCPAC also advised that in order to take advantage of available shipping space leaving the West Coast for Diego Garcia, some construction materials and pre-engineered buildings were being loaded at Port Hueneme, California, with arrival in Diego Garcia in mid-March.³

(5) By the end of March the Secretary of Defense had approved $8.6 million from his MILCON contingency fund for the temporary camp (Project P-034), and construction started immediately. At the end of the year the construction of seahuts for 1,000 men, the field mess, and storage buildings had been completed. Only $7.5 million of CINCPACFLT's recommended additional $134 million FY 80 supplemental MILCON funds had been approved by Congress to buy long

1. J44(A) HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 5 Feb 86; CINCPAC 261813Z Jan 80 (S), DECL 25 Jan 86; J442 Point Paper (S), 23 May 80, Subj: Diego Garcia Habitability Improvements (U), DECL 23 May 86.
3. Ibid.
lead-time items such as generators. There were approximately 2,200 U.S. personnel on Diego Garcia.¹

Unconstrained Expansion of Facilities

(5) On 19 December 1979 the JCS had requested CINCPAC's views on possible future expansion and usage of Diego Garcia over and above the FY 81-84 MILCON proposal, both with or without additional (U.K.) acreage. Unconstrained by political or monetary considerations, a list of specific projects needed to support an increased U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean-Middle East region was forwarded to the JCS on 29 December. Based on this information the JCS had recommended to the Secretary of Defense that our support capabilities at Diego Garcia be expanded and that steps be taken to negotiate with the United Kingdom for use of the entire island. The Deputy Secretary of Defense concurred in the JCS recommendation and requested that a list of proposed future requirements, in priority order, with estimated costs be developed and submitted to him for approval by 29 February 1980. The JCS tasking message further required a facility description, category code, responsible component, unit and total costs, and a conceptual site plan—all by 19 February.²

(5) The list of projects required for the peacetime role was for support of 15 maritime pre-positioning ships, deployment of three MARs, 30 days of supply for the RDJTF, fleet support for three carrier battle groups, air defense of Diego Garcia, and a temporary staging camp for 4,500 Marine/Army troops. Projects for the contingency role called for a general expansion of capabilities and facilities. The RDJTF would include the following:³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Infantry Division</td>
<td>1 Surface Action Group</td>
<td>4 TACAIR Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Airborne Divisions</td>
<td>3 Carrier Battle Groups</td>
<td>2 TAC Recon Squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Armored Brigade</td>
<td>5 P-3 Squadrons</td>
<td>2 TAC Airlift Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operation of B-52s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MARINE CORPS

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1. J442 HistSum Mar 80 (S), DECL 9 Apr 86; J442 Point Paper (S), 16 Jan 81, Subj: Diego Garcia Habitability Improvements (U), DECL 16 Jan 87.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1979 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 303; J442 HistSum Feb 80 (S), DECL 10 Mar 86; JCS 6452/080037Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 4 Feb 86.
3. J442 Point Paper (S), 23 May 80, Subj: Expansion of Facilities (Unconstrained), Diego Garcia (U), DECL 23 May 86.
CINCPAC requested CINCPACFLT (PACNAVFAOCENCOM), as the master planning and construction agent for Diego Garcia, to consolidate information from the components, CINCMAC, CINCSAC, and USREDCOM for the CINCPAC response. Information from the latter three was desired on the functions under their direct control which would require support. On 18 February PACNAVFAOCENCOM forwarded a "Planning Report for the Expansion of Peacetime and Contingency Roles of the Navy Support Facility at Diego Garcia" which identified specific facility line items and personnel projections and included the required site plan. On 22 February a 30-page CINCPAC message in the prescribed format was forwarded to the JCS. Expansion and development constraints covered real estate, personnel support, environmental factors, construction, water supply, electrical power, telephones, communications, ordnance, and B-52 combat operations. Facilities costs to support a peacetime role were estimated in 1980 dollars at $2.6 billion. There would be a requirement for 5,526 additional personnel beyond the current loading. An additional $620 million and 8,161 more personnel would be required for the contingency role expansion. The JCS review reduced the combined package to $1.147 billion and 4,500 additional personnel. 1

Aircraft Support

In March 1980 CINCSAC requested that CINCPAC evaluate the addition of from six to nine inches of asphaltic concrete to the existing runway at Diego Garcia as an interim or alternate solution to providing a new Portland cement concrete runway parallel to the existing runway to accommodate B-52 operations. CINCPAC passed the request to CINCPACFLT whose reply stated that the proposal was feasible from an engineering standpoint, but operationally impractical. The rationale was based primarily on the adverse impact which the upgrade activity would have on ASW, surveillance, and logistics air operations. 2

On 7 May CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT to reevaluate the study. PACFLT's exploration of alternatives resulted in a recommendation that would require widening and overlaying the existing 150' x 12,000' runway, construction of a B-52 taxiway (175' x 12,000'), a parking apron, operations area, and support facilities, plus an ordnance storage area which could not be sited due to

1. CINCPAC 140210Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 13 Feb 86; COMPACDIVNAVFAOCENCOM Ltr Ser S/1 of 18 Feb 80 (S), Subj: Planning for Diego Garcia (U), DECL 4 Feb 86; CINCPAC 222005Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 20 Feb 86; J442 Point Paper (S), 23 May 80, Subj: Expansion of Facilities (Unconstrained), Diego Garcia (U), DECL 23 May 86.
2. J442 HistSum Apr 80 (S), DECL 7 May 86 and May 80 (S), DECL 10 Jun 86; CINCPACFLT 271930Z Apr 80 (S), DECL 22 Mar 86.
non-availability of land. CINCPACFLT recommended that if B-52 operations were contemplated, the taxiway should be constructed first at a cost of $36 million. Then it could be used as a runway while the existing runway was being upgraded for another $30 million. The parking apron would cost $49 million and other support facilities $105 million for a total of $220 million in FY 82 dollars. (This recommendation and site plan were incorporated in the FY 81-84 MILCON program discussed above.)

On 6 August CINCPAC asked the JCS for a decision on whether or not Diego Garcia was to be upgraded to a B-52 capability. The JCS reply: a decision was pending. CINCPAC also recommended that the pavements currently being designed for support of the heavy MAB program (FY 82 MILCON) be made suitable for B-52 use. This would reduce costs in case of a subsequent affirmative decision for the introduction of B-52s. At the end of the year the decision on the B-52 issue was still pending in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Air Crew Billets at Diego Garcia

In the spring of 1980 CINCPAC's facilities engineers were advised informally of congested and inadequate billeting for MAC flight crews transiting Diego Garcia. The implication was that under existing conditions (two trailers with 18 beds and two rooms in a BEQ with 12 beds) adequate crew rest was impossible and flying safety might be impaired.

On 22 April the 834th Airlift Division requested sealift of eight 55' to 12' x 10' trailers from Kwajalein to Diego Garcia to alleviate the situation and provide billeting for MAC air crews and ground personnel. CINCPACFLT expressed his concern to Headquarters MAC on 3 May that any additions, such as the trailers, might exacerbate the already overloaded limited utilities capacity, real estate and other island resources. The recent rapid expansion of operations in the Indian Ocean, he said, had placed extraordinary pressures on the Navy Support Facility to support new or expanded island functions. Steps were being taken through Congressionally approved MILCON funding to relieve some of the problem areas. He therefore requested that

1. J422 HistSum May 80 (S), DECL 10 Jun 86; CINCPAC 071106Z May 80 (S), DECL 2 May 86; CINCPACFLT Ltr Ser 44/S199 of 2 Jun 80 (S), Subj: Diego Garcia-Expansion of Facilities; Military Construction (U), DECL 15 Feb 80.
2. J442 Point Paper (S), 13 Jan 81, Subj: Diego Garcia Capability to Support B-52s (S), DECL 12 Jan 87.
shipment of the eight trailers be held in abeyance pending evaluation of the request and examination of the cited conditions on Diego Garcia. In a separate message to other interested commands who might be contemplating adding or upgrading facilities on Diego Garcia, CINC PACFLT requested identification of any such projects requiring under $100,000 in MILCON funds.1

(U) About the same time MAC's Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, asked for assistance in the matter from CINC PAC's Director for Operations. In responding to MAC and referring the request to CINC PACFLT, the Director suggested that a review and possible revision of the interservice support agreement between the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing and the Navy Support Facility, Diego Garcia, might help to improve maintenance of the crews quarters. CINC PACFLT was also requested to conduct a survey of the trailers for corrective action.2

(U) On 7 June CINC PACFLT advised CINC PAC that introduction of more trailers would create additional problems. Instead he recommended the air crews use the newly emplaced seahuts (see Habitability Improvements above) which would be modified with air conditioning, and on 19 June he directed accomplishment. On 23 June Admiral Long informed General Huysen, CINC MAC, that "I am confident that we have a handle on the situation, and we will continue to do everything possible to provide appropriate flight crew accommodations."3

**Increased Access to Indian Ocean Bases**

(S) In conjunction with State-Defense Department planning efforts for access to bases and facilities in Kenya, Somalia, and Oman, discussed in Chapter I of this history, CINC PAC was also tasked to provide information on facilities requirements. During the first part of 1980 no organizational responsibilities were assigned, and few refinements were made throughout the remainder of the year. A Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum of 29 April, however, designated the Army Corps of Engineers as the construction agent in Oman and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFACNGCOM) as the agent in Somalia and Kenya. Some additional direction was given in June by the Commander NAVFACNGCOM who assigned design and construction responsibility for

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1. 834ALD 221830Z Apr 80 (U); CINC PACFLT 030001Z May and 032350Z May 80 (U).
2. Ltr from MAJ GEN James I. Baginski, USAF, DCOS Operations, HQ MAC of 1 May 80 (U); Ltr from MAJ GEN J. K. DAVIS, USMC, CINC PAC Director for Operations, of 16 May 80 (U); CINC PAC Ltr Ser 1222 of 16 May 80 (U), Subj: Maintenance of MAC Crew Facilities at Diego Garcia.
3. CINC PACFLT 070234Z and 190234Z Jun 80 (U); CINC PAC 232215Z Jun 80 (U).
Kenya and Somalia to his Atlantic subordinate. Planning and programming assistance for facilities in support of CINCPAC missions was assigned to the Pacific subordinate (PACNAVFACENGCOM), but a cognizant unified command was not designated by the end of 1980.1

(5) In February the JCS asked USCINCEUR and CINCPAC for specific comments on proposed facility usage (both near and long term) and any additions or modifications to proposals made by a facilities inspection team after a January visit to these countries. Emphasis was to be on airfield usage and upgrade requirements. In addition to comments provided by CINCPAC planners on 26 February on proposed usage, CINCPAC logisticians forwarded recommendations for facility additions and modifications to support usage on 17 March. The recommendations, which pertained to all operations in the area, included deployable assets for short-term communications support and construction of a high-frequency and satellite communications facility in one of the three countries; specific requirements for an Army staging area, expansion of POL storage, and logistic support airfields. The message also spelled out additional requirements tailored to individual countries covering such items as billeting and dining facilities for aircrews, secure communications links to a U.S. command and control facility, refueling systems for C-130/C-141/C-5 aircraft, marshalling areas for troops and equipment, potable water, and navigational aids.2

(5) Representatives from CINCPAC and PACNAVFACENGCOM accompanied a NAVFACENGCOM team on a visit to Kenya from 21 June to 1 July. The team assessed design and construction execution capabilities and methods, discussed construction procedures with Kenyan Government officials, and gathered technical data on existing facilities and inspection sites for FY 81 construction program items. In August CINCPACFLT forwarded a refined concept of operations and facility development priorities for construction in Kenya to the CNO and invited CINCPAC comment. CINCPAC concurred in the basic concept and the FY 81 MILCON program proposed for Kenya and suggested several initiatives. Two pertained to Mombasa as a suitable alternative to Diego Garcia for fleet support. A few inexpensive permanent facilities for a training camp and site support might also be prudent, and a permanent regional communication system.
might fit into a long-term program for Kenya. CINCPAC also asked for reconsideration of construction of POL storage (JP-5) at Moi Airfield.1

(3) In November FMFPAC forwarded an estimate of construction costs totaling $1 million for building a Marine amphibious unit training camp in Kenya during FY 81. The following chart depicts funding requirements proposed by the Service Departments during 1980.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Using Service</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>FY 81</th>
<th>FY 82</th>
<th>FY 83</th>
<th>FY 84</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>KENYA</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Taxiway, apron, terminal, maintenance and communications facilities, warehouse, ammunition storage</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
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<td>Mombasa (Airfield, port)</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Moorings, storage, NAVAIDS, arresting gear</td>
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<td>SOMALIA</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Pavement overlay, storage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Berbera (Port, airfield)</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Utilities, storage</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Navy</td>
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<td>30.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>30.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMAN</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Utilities, storage</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>53.0</td>
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<td>Seeb</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Utilities, POL and ammunition storage</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>46.6</td>
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<td>Seeb/Qabooos</td>
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<td>Cantonment, POL and ammunition storage</td>
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<td>Masirah</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Utilities, supply, storage</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
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<td>Masirah</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Utilities, extend runway-taxiway, POL and ammunition storage, cantonment</td>
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<td>Thumrait</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Utilities, NAVAIDS, ammunition storage, cantonment</td>
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<td>Khasab</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Realign and extend overlay runway</td>
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Totals

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 81</th>
<th>FY 82</th>
<th>FY 83</th>
<th>FY 84</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>148.0</td>
<td>136.4</td>
<td>130.7</td>
<td>78.6</td>
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1. J443 HistSum May 80 (S), DECL 9 Jun 86; JCS 6836/212251Z May 80 (C), DECL 21 May 86; COMNAVACENCOM 232234Z May 80 (C), DECL 23 May 86; CINCPAC 042324Z Jun 80 (C), DECL 25 May 86; J444 HistSum Jun 80 (S), DECL 3 Jul 86; J443 HistSum Aug 80 (U); CINCPAC 052159Z Aug 80 (S), DECL 27 Aug 86.

2. J443 HistSum Dec 80 (S), DECL 9 Dec 86; CG FMFPAC 062331Z Nov 80 (S), DECL 4 Nov 88; J444 Point Paper (S), 22 Oct 80, Subj: U.S. Facility Access, Indian Ocean (IO) Littoral (U), DECL 22 Oct 86.
Beddown of A-10s in Korea

Based on the decision by the Secretary of Defense, an announcement was made at the October 1979 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting of plans to base a USAF A-10 squadron in Korea beginning in 1982. In December 1979 PACAF sent a survey team to Korea to select a main operating base. After approval of the team's recommendation of Suwon AB by Air Force Headquarters, negotiations with the ROK Air Force for use of Suwon as the beddown site were begun. Although Headquarters Air Force reduced the initial squadron size from 24 to 18 aircraft, PACAF attempted to restore the size to 24, but no change was made by the end of the year.1

In February 1980 a second Air Force survey team visited Kadena AB, Okinawa, the proposed site of A-10 depot maintenance, and the Suwon AB to develop detailed planning requirements with ROKAF officials. In a 17 June meeting with General Wickham, COMUS Korea, Korean Minister of National Defense Choo discussed Korean defense budgetary shortfalls due to the won devaluation and energy price increases. Although Choo visualized no impact on major defense projects, slippage might occur with the start of construction projects. Choo emphasized full support for the beddown program. At the close of the year no firm plans had been made.2

Japan

The increasing cost of maintaining U.S. forces in Japan had prompted the United States to seek relief through sharing of costs with the Government of Japan (GOJ). The long-term U.S. objective was to encourage the Japanese to share O&M costs, construction, more operational and mission-type facilities, and to include a wider spectrum of facilities. A U.S.-GOJ labor cost sharing agreement of 22 December 1977, wherein the GOJ agreed to fund approximately $30 million annually of the U.S. forces' local national workforce costs, was precedent setting in the cost sharing area. The accompanying chart depicts major GOJ cost sharing expenditures for recent years and projections for FY 81.3

1. J443 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 9 Jan 86.
2. J443 HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 5 Feb 86; J443 HistSum Feb 80 (S), DECL 7 Mar 86; SSO Korea 170900Z Jun 80 (S/NF)(BOM), REVW 17 Jun 86.
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GOJ COST SHARING
(in $ millions)

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* Pending final Diet approval of JFY 81 budget.
*** Disaster prevention, noise abatement, road improvement, relocation of dwellings, local livelihood assistance, and miscellaneous subsidy.

Note: Conversion rate: 220 yen=$1 U.S. Yen revaluations in JFY 79 and JFY 80 make dollar trend information suspect. Not included are figures for GOJ national lands which were used by the United States and which the GOJ counted as equivalent rental losses averaging approximately $182 million per year.

(U) Host nation funded construction programs (HNFCPs) were an exception, and in addition to, the Service oriented military construction (MILCON) programs, and overall program management was accomplished within the unified command chain of command. Generally, facilities construction for U.S. forces by the GOJ was accomplished under two programs. First was the Integrated Relocation Construction Program (IRCP), which had been in effect since the reversion of Okinawa in 1972, attendant to base reduction and consolidation actions. This was on a quid pro quo basis where the GOJ would only construct new facilities equal to the scope and function of those released by the United States. By the end of 1980 over one half of the projects identified in the $1.1 billion program had been completed. Approved programs were projected for
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completion by 1984 and would result in a 20 percent reduction in acreage and a 44 percent decrease in number of installations.¹

(U) The second major construction program was the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) and was a GOJ initiative begun in 1977, funded entirely by the Japanese, as a means of sharing costs for maintaining U.S. forces in Japan. Over the long term, U.S. requirements for this program were estimated at $1.5 billion of which $1 billion was expected to be used to meet critical housing needs. U.S. Service component requirements for the IRCP and FIP were reviewed and integrated annually by COMUS Japan as the designated DOD single point of contact. The proposal was forwarded for review by CINCPAC and the JCS and for approval by the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics (ASD/MRA&L). The U.S. approved version was then submitted for review and incorporation in the Japan Defense Agency's (JDA) Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAAA) budget for Diet approval. The Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) ran from April through March—a half year different from the U.S. fiscal cycle. Because the GOJ budget cycle was only 10-12 months long, staffing of proposals required expeditious U.S. review and approval in order to meet the suspense for the JDA budget request. During 1980 COMUS Japan's proposals for these two programs for JFY 80 and JFY 81 were carefully reviewed by ASD/MRA&L. It was anticipated that as the IRCP diminished, the GOJ would increase FIP funding commensurately.²

Facilities Improvement Program

(U) In April 1980 the Japanese Diet approved funding for the JFY 80 FIP in excess of $120 million (a 20 percent increase over JFY 79). The approved list of projects included all but two of the proposed operational construction projects. Four other housing projects were deferred.³


2. J441 Point Papers (U), 15 Jun and 9 Jul 80, Subj: Facilities Improvement Program (FIP Sharing)-Japan; SECDEF 6518/251437Z Jun 79 (U) and 4652/0600¹ 80 (U); CINCPAC Ltr Ser 186 of 24 Jan 80 (U), Subj: Proposed Cent Funding System in Support of GOJ-Funded Construction.

3. J44 Jun 80 (C), DECL 26 Jun 86; J441 Point Paper (U), 16 Apr 80, Subj of GOJ Facilities Improvement Programs (FIP).

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(U) In May COMUS Japan formulated the proposed JFY 81 FIP based upon inputs from Service commanders in Japan. The proposal contained a primary and a supplemental list of projects. The primary list continued emphasis on family and troop housing needs and environmental requirements. The supplemental list contained additional projects in these same categories but also included two mission-related projects. CINCPAC urged his component commanders in Hawaii to insure timely coordination and submission of their inputs based on guidance received through Service Department channels. On 6 May the U.S. Ambassador to Japan endorsed the proposal and recommended expeditious approval. The components generally concurred in the $197 million proposal except that CINCPACFLT supported COMNAVFOR Japan's request that bachelor enlisted quarters at Yokosuka be moved from the supplementary to the primary list. Also the Marine Corps emphasized the critical need for BEQ/BOQ and family housing upgrade on Okinawa. CINCPAC incorporated these views in his supporting message to the JCS on 23 May. On 29 May CINCPAC received telephonic approval of the proposal from ASD/MRA&L and relayed the information to COMUS Japan the same day.1

(U) By the end of August the JDA and the DFAA version of the JFY 81 FIP had been refined to $145 million, but the program still reflected a 20 percent increase over the previous year's funding. The differences from the COMUS Japan proposal were mainly in the scope of the projects. The DFAA called for site investigation or design development on two projects--housing at Ikego (Yokosuka) and hardened aircraft shelters at Kadena AB (Okinawa), whereas COMUS Japan requested actual construction. However, the upgrade of utilities systems at six bases had been added. COMUS Japan anticipated no further changes during staffing through the various GOJ ministries but formal approval by the Cabinet was not expected until late December and by the Diet in March 1981.2

(U) In tandem with the processing of the JFY 81 FIP proposal, COMUS Japan asked CINCPAC assistance and approval for the development of a multi-year FIP starting in JFY 82. COMUS Japan believed such a technique would be advantageous to U.S. interests because it would permit better management of construction in Japan, allow the Services more lead time to develop the necessary U.S. programming actions, enable Service headquarters in Washington to better judge which projects to support for MILCON funding, and would permit implementation of larger construction projects. Japanese interests would be served as well.

1. J441 HistSum Jun 80 (C), DECL 26 Jun 86; COMUSJ 020125Z May 80 (C), DECL 29 Apr 86; CINCPAC 032110Z May 80 (U); AMEMB Tokyo 7900/060930Z May 80 (C), GDS 5/6/86; COMMARCORBASESPAC 072049Z May 80 (C), DECL 6 May 86; CINCPACFLT 110424Z May (U); CINCPAC 231937Z May (C), DECL 20 May 86. J441 HistSum Aug 80 (U); COMUSJ 290545Z Aug 80 (U); Op. Cit., J5/Memo/ S-1053 of 12 Aug 81 (U).
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Siting of FIP projects on U.S.-controlled real estate required careful study in order to obtain the necessary local consensus. The GOJ liked to distribute construction projects geographically to meet political and economic constraints, and some projects required considerable political persuasion.1

(U) Except for the COMNAVFOR Japan, all Service component commanders in Japan concurred in the concept. The Navy feared that the GOJ might indiscriminately select, if given too much time, only those projects which were "economically stimulating or politically palatable." In June CINCPAC concurred with the COMUS Japan approach but with certain stipulations. COMUS Japan was to insure that Service priority needs were met, that the program would be flexible to accommodate unforeseen changes as well as compatible with the anticipated DOD directive on HNFCP and with U.S. MILCON programs. COMUS Japan was to control multi-year programming within U.S. channels and any release of program information to the GOJ for large multi-year projects would receive case-by-case handling with user Service consultation and concurrence. On 21 August ASD/MRA&L advised the results of a 20 May meeting between concerned Washington and PACOM representatives (see below). It was anticipated that an OSD memorandum would be forwarded to the Service Departments in mid-September to develop long-range unconstrained military construction requirements for Japan and Korea and subsequent development of long-range HNFCP for both countries. After a meeting in October with Service component representatives where a general consensus was obtained, COMUS Japan provided initial program guidelines for the implementation of a multi-year proposal for FY 82, 83, and 84. Final guidance would follow by 15 January 1981, and Service submissions would be due one month later.2

Integrated Relocation Construction Program

(U) In June 1979 ASD/MRA&L had approved the FY 80 Proposed Integrated Relocation Construction Program (PIRCP) in general, but with a caveat that additional project justification be furnished for each of the eight projects. This was to preclude requests to the GOJ for construction of facilities which were no longer required due to mission changes or decreases in personnel. The request was repeated in September 1979.3

1. J441 HistSum Jun 80 (C), DECL 26 Jun 86; COMUSJ 060700Z Mar 80 (U).
2. J441 HistSum Jun 80 (C), DECL 26 Jun 86; CINCPACFLT 110424Z May 80 (U); J441 HistSum Aug 80 (U); SECDEF 4158/212349Z Aug 80; J441 HistSum Dec 80 (U); COMUSJ 050300Z Oct 80 (U); CINCPAC 130354Z Jun 80 (U); COMUSJ 212352Z Nov 80 (U).
3. J441 HistSum Jun 79 (U); SECDEF 6518/251437Z Jun 79 (U); J441 HistSum Jun 80 (U); SECDEF 4474/131451Z Sep 79 (U).
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(U) CINCPAC solicited comments and justification from Service commanders in Japan, via COMUS Japan, and from components in Hawaii in the fall of 1979. The responses were unanimous. Providing additional justification could result in cumbersome, time-consuming procedures which would require additional manpower and be contrary to the dynamic nature of the GOJ program. It could render the annual U.S. proposal unresponsive to the short GOJ budget cycle and be counterproductive to U.S. efforts. Moreover, the ability of U.S. negotiators in Japan could be seriously restricted in their day-to-day efforts.1

(U) After review, however, CINCPAC forwarded additional justification for and revalidation of the JFY 80 PIRCP. The 29 March 1980 message cited each of the Service procedures for project requirements determination and validation which were similar to systems used for construction of U.S. funded programs. These systems were within established DOD criteria and were recognized as safeguards against unnecessary construction. It was CINCPAC's opinion that line item justification should remain a Service responsibility, performed when the project was developed, and revalidated by the Service when mission or personnel changes might affect facilities requirements. This was to preclude duplicative and unnecessary micro-management at higher headquarters levels. Nevertheless, CINCPAC said, all future PIRCP submissions would include a statement to the effect that the Service components had validated all projects.2

(U) COMUS Japan forwarded the recommended JFY 81 PIRCP on 24 March 1980 and CINCPAC recommended approval on 17 April, including a justification and validation statement.3

(U) On 26 April the JCS notified CINCPAC that ASD/MRA&L considered the information submitted with the JFY 81 PIRCP to be insufficient; moreover, the justification for the JFY 80 submission still had not been satisfactorily resolved. A similar message was received from ASD/MRA&L on 6 May and called for a meeting on 20 May in Washington of members of the JCS, the Service Departments, and PACOM to discuss the following topics:4

1. J441 HistSum Jun 80 (U); COMUSJ 110645Z Oct 79 (U) CINCPAC 031955Z Nov 79 (U); HQ PACAF 150225Z Nov 79 (U); COMMARCORBASESPAC 232040Z Nov 79 (U); COMNAVFORJAPAN 140200Z Nov 79 (U); CINCPACFLT 240214Z Nov 79 (U); COMUSJ 010740Z and 080720Z Feb 80 (U).
2. J441 HistSum Jun 80 (U); CINCPAC 292340Z Mar 80 (U).
3. COMUSJ 240621Z Mar 80 (U); CINCPAC 171943Z Apr 80 (U).
4. JCS 3495/2614492 Apr 80 (U); SECDEF 4652/060019Z May 80 (U).

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- How GOJ and ROK construction fit into overall CINCPAC five-year construction requirements.
- How CINCPAC priorities were determined.
- ROK construction.
- Justification of add-on projects.
- Facilities and installations which had been returned to host nation (GOJ and ROK).
- Integration of host nation construction with MILCON.
- Role of OSD in reviewing future host nation programs.

(U) PACOM representation at the meeting included the CINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance, and representatives from U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Forces Korea, and the U.S. Army Engineer Division, Pacific Ocean. In conference opening remarks, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Installations and Housing noted that host nation construction had high visibility in Congress and there was concern that Congressional pressure for increased host nation support would impact on other DOD programs such as MILCON and O&M to the point of establishing fixed percentages required from host nation support. Therefore, the ASD/MRA&L, as spokesman to Congress for all construction, needed to understand the total perspective of all construction overseas. The conference provided a much needed exchange of views and information and clarified communication channels for information feedback from field commands to build the ASD/MRA&L knowledge level on long-range facilities requirements. It was determined that long-range unconstrained and attainable facility requirements lists would be developed through Service Department channels while the unified command chain would provide inputs on the category of project requirements and allocation strategy rather than specific line item justification. A need for a clear DOD directive on policy for HNFCP was expressed. This led to discussion of the CINCPAC proposed centralized funding system and potential implementation by FY 82. The format for status reports on GOJ funded construction compiled by COMUS Japan would be changed to reflect more pertinent data. The conference resulted in approval of the JFY 81 PIRCP.1


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At the end of the year the JFY PIRCP was undergoing GOJ ministerial and Diet consideration and approval was expected by April 1981. COMUS Japan, in coordination with the Service components, was working on a multi-year facilities programming system which would include the JFY 82 relocation construction proposals.

Construction Agent Fees

In order to present standardized, coordinated U.S. construction requirements to the GOJ and to establish standardized construction criteria, in 1974 the OSD/(MRA&L) designated COMUS Japan as the single point of contact for all relocation related construction in Japan. The following year the ASD/MRA&L established the Army's District Engineer Japan (DEJ) as monitor for design and construction of all GOJ funded relocation projects, in lieu of a user Service. Construction agent fees were to be reimbursed from an individual user's O&M funds.

In December 1978 these policies were expanded to encompass all GOJ funded construction, i.e., relocation projects as well as cost sharing and any future related programs. During those years there had been some misunderstanding whether or not the construction agent's purview extended to design criteria as well as to design review and construction surveillance, or whether the former remained a user Service option. The Army had set a flat rate of approximately one percent for each of the three functions and the unprogrammed three percent of the total project construction cost imposed hardships on already constrained user O&M funds. Moreover, with a potential for increase in GOJ funded construction as Japan expanded cost sharing efforts, the hazard to user O&M funds would become greater.

In May 1979 COMUS Japan forwarded an approach, with accompanying rationale, for centralized funding of agent fees. After review, in September CINCPAC recommended the establishment of a centralized funding system, budgeted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and managed by the Army's Chief.

1. J441 HistSum Dec 80 (U).
2. SECDEF 5496/081726Z Dec 78 (U)
   Note: The Army also had similar responsibilities in Korea and Germany while the Navy covered areas in Southeast Asia, Guam, the Philippines, and Spain.
of Engineers with Department level O&M or MILCON funding. The system would be
applicable to Japan but could be expanded to include Korea, and would start in
FY 81 with continued funding by users for projects already in progress. CINC-
PAC acknowledged there would be inherent complications because of differences
between U.S. and host nation fiscal years and host government budget approval
uncertainties.¹

(U) In November 1979 the JCS concurred with the concept but stated that
FY 82 would be the earliest possible year for implementation. The JCS also
asked for a detailed plan for management of the proposed funding system. In
January 1980 CINCPAC requested that the component commanders and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, Pacific Division, review the proposal, which contained
10 attachments, for submission to the JCS In early February.²

(U) With a view toward recommending to the Secretary of Defense the
publication of a DOD directive on the subject, in August the JCS asked for
CINCPAC comments on a revision to the centralized funding proposal. In the
process of joint staffing, the JCS said, numerous other problem areas had
surfaced related to program management for host nation funded construction
programs in both Japan and Korea. The CINCPAC response concurred in the need
for a DOD directive and that Korea's Combined Defense Improvement Projects
program should be included. Also, the DOD directive should be applicable to
any PACOM host nation. CINCPAC asked that the designation of the DOD
construction agent and single point of contact be specified in the directive
to preclude possible misunderstanding. Program management responsibilities
should be delegated to the unified commander with authority/responsibility for
further delegation as appropriate to a sub-unified commander. On 15 January
1981 the JCS advised that publication of a DOD directive had been recommended
to the Secretary of Defense providing for a centralized funding system, from
MILCON funds effective in FY 82. Host nation construction policy considera-
tions, management procedures, and other CINCPAC proposals were recommended
for inclusion in the directive.³

Sanno Hotel

(U) The GOJ had agreed in 1978 to construct a replacement facility for
the Sanno Hotel with an estimated cost of $25-35 million. Release of the

¹ COMUSJ 180458Z May 79 (U); CINCPAC 140215Z Sep 79 (U).
² JCS 4698/150454Z Nov 79 (U); CINCPAC Ltr Ser 186 of 24 Jan 80 (U), Subj:
Proposed Centralized Funding System in Support of GOJ-Funded Construction.
³ DJSM 1573-80 of 11 Aug 80 (U) with CINCPAC First Endorsement Ser 2216 of
11 Sep 80 (U), Subj: Proposed Centralized Funding System in Support of
Government of Japan Funded Construction; JCS 152303Z Jan 81 (U).
old facility to the land owners was originally scheduled for December 1980. In May 1979 CINCPAC's Facilities Engineering Division Chief conducted an on-site review of the Sanno replacement facility to emphasize CINCPAC's concern for timely completion of the planned 150-room hotel. By mid-June 1979 the projected completion date of the new facility had slipped to September 1981. Also during 1979 the U.S. Navy agreed to assume Executive Agent responsibility for operation of the Sanno because of a change in Service utilization rates which reflected 45 percent use by USN/USMC personnel. The JCS requested that CINCPAC initiate this change in a timely manner and monitor arrangements for renegotiation of the new joint agreement. As 1979 ended, details of the agreement and transfer were being reviewed.1

(U) During 1980 management and construction actions for the Sanno progressed but at a slow pace. The Navy management survey team conducted an evaluation of the hotel from 14 to 25 January, and a Navy audit followed in February. In May the CNO recommended procedural actions for transfer of executive agent responsibilities and requested CINCPAC concurrence. After notifying Congress of the pending transfer, the Navy proposed changes as follows:2

- Management responsibility would be assigned at the Washington level to the Commander Naval Military Personnel Command with a Navy 0-6 designated as director of the Sanno, with additional duty to Commander U.S. Naval Forces Japan (COMNAVFOR Japan).

- Transfer of executive agent responsibilities would be effective 1 October 1980. This would allow time for the necessary personnel actions (RIF/rehire), inventories, and audits.

- The board of governors would be redesignated an advisory board.

- The Navy 0-6 Director would be the primary point of contact with the GOJ on all Sanno matters.

- The designation of the Sanno would be changed from a joint transient billeting facility to an Armed Forces Recreation Center.

- Suites would no longer be reserved exclusively for Service commanders, but would be made available to patrons when not required for official use.

2. J441 HistSum Jan 80 (U); CNO 021804Z May 80 (U).
(U) After resolution of some differences among concerned commands, CINC- PAC received a new joint agreement signed by COMUS Japan and the major Service commanders in Japan. On 26 August CINC PAC concurred in the CNO 2 May recommendations as modified. The agreement adopted the first two recommendations without change. Operating policy would be developed and prescribed by the executive agent in consonance with recommendations of the Sanno Advisory Board (with a chairman appointed by COMUS Japan), COMUS Japan, CINC PAC, and other interested commands. COMUS Japan and the Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Japan Engineering District, would delegate appropriate authority to the Director of the Sanno to interface with GOJ representatives. The Sanno was to be designated and operated as a "U.S. military multi-use hotel facility," and the suite reservation proposal was not addressed in the agreement. The agreement was signed by the four military Services in Washington and operations were transferred to the Navy on 1 October.1

(U) Concerning the construction for the new Sanno, in January COMNAVFOR Japan reported that architectural plans were about 30 percent complete. As the Navy proceeded with plans to assume management of the Sanno, COMNAVFOR Japan was concerned with construction delays and concomitant deterioration of the existing facility; he sought a more definitive statement of GOJ intent and a timetable for acquisition of the new facility. On 17 March COMUS Japan advised that the DFPA had provided a new milestone schedule with a 20 March date for start of demolition of buildings on the new site; construction would follow in late June with expected completion in April or May 1982.2

(C/NOFOR) Further delays were encountered in the destruction-construction schedule, however, because of continued neighborhood objection to the new U.S. facility. These objections were primarily the result of agitation by the Japanese Communist Party, and despite efforts by the landowner-builder (Amritsu Electric K.K.) and the GOJ, the neighborhood consensus problem was not resolved in 1980. However, the GOJ was successful in getting the lease for the existing facility extended until the replacement could be provided.3

1. J441 HistSum May 80 (U); COMUSJAPAN 102339Z May 80 (U); CDRWESTCOM 162330Z May 80 (U); HQ PACAF 210410Z May 80 (U); COMUSJAPAN 300705Z May 80 (U); J441 HistSum Aug 80 (U); CINC PAC 260201Z Aug 80 (U); J441 HistSum Dec 80 (U); Joint Agreement for the Operation of the Sanno Hotel, Tokyo Japan, effective 1 Oct 80 (U).
2. J441 HistSum Jun 80 (U); COMNAVFORJAPAN 250650Z Jan 80 (U); COMUSJAPAN 172330Z Mar 80 (U).
3. J441 HistSum Jul 80 (C), DECL 4 Aug 86; AFOSI Dist 46 020600Z Jul 80 (C/NF) REVW 21 Jul 10; J441 HistSum Dec 80 (U).
BEQ Support for NSA Personnel at Kunia

(U) The Kunia facility, which had housed CINCPAC's Alternate Command Facility; the Fleet Operations Control Center, Pacific; and various other agencies, was identified as excess to Naval Facilities Requirements in 1976 and was inactivated in March 1977.¹

(U) In response to a query from the Commander Naval Facilities Engineering Command, in September 1979 CINCPACFLT advised that the Naval Air Station at Barbers Point could not provide billeting for approximately 240 enlisted personnel of the initial operating capability crew by 1 July 1980. Operational demands required full utilization of the proposed barracks six months of the year, as well as year-round use by transients.³

(U) After receipt of a request from the NSA/CSS Pacific (NCPAC) office, PACAF advised CINCPAC and replied to NCPAC that spaces at Wheeler AFB could be made available in the desired time frame. In the letter to CINCPAC, PACAF elaborated that the two top floors of a building (102) at Wheeler were covered by Interservice Support Agreements (ISA) with the Army. The ISA for the second floor had already expired, and the ISA for the third floor would expire in December 1979. PACAF further notified NCPAC that estimated refurbishment costs of approximately $760,000 would have to be funded by NSA and requested an early decision regarding acceptance of the spaces.⁴

² PACNAVFACENGCOM Notice of Availability of Real Property, Kunia Facility, 241:KWA:ji of 25 Jul 77 (U); NCPAC 2102223Z Dec 78 (C), DECL 20 Dec 84.
³ J442 HistSum Oct 79 (S), DECL 13 Nov 85; CINCPACFLT 072344Z Sep 79 (U).
⁴ AsstDCS Plans, PACAF Ltr of 24 Sep 79 (S), to CINCPAC J4, DECL 19 Sep 87; AsstDCS Plans, PACAF Ltr of 24 Sep 79 (U), to NSA/CSS.
On 16 November the Air Force notified the Army to vacate spaces at Wheeler and allow transfer to NSA/CSS on 1 January 1980. The Air Force position was based on the fact the ISAs had or would expire by the end of 1979; therefore, they were for general logistics support of Army personnel at Wheeler and did not address facilities. On 23 November the Army replied it had no intention of terminating its use of the building.

Wheeler and the facility management and planning for ASD/I&H announced that within the Army was designated as host for the National Security Agency facility at Kikai. Certain Army aviation administrative functions at Wheeler would be moved immediately from the first floor of building 102 to another building.

At an exit briefing for representatives from interested commands, the Director of Installations Management and Planning for ASD/I&H announced that the Army was designated as host for the National Security Agency facility at Kikai. Certain Army aviation administrative functions at Wheeler would be moved immediately from the second floor of building 102 to another building.
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at Wheeler and NSA would prepare that floor for occupancy on 1 October 1980. Other Army functions would be moved when construction of permanent additional enlisted quadrangles was completed at Schofield Barracks. For the long term, the U.S. Army Engineer District, Pacific Ocean, would replace PACNAV FACENGCNOM as design and construction agent for NSA projects at Kunia and would design and construct all new support facilities for NSA. These announcements were confirmed by a DASD/I&H memorandum of 18 March 1980. On 22 February the Air Force requested that the Army vacate the second floor of building 102 by 2 March.1

(U) Rehabilitation of space to accommodate 144 people was completed on 15 December 1980 and the second increment was to be completed by 20 January 1981. The NSA's Quick Reaction Capability initial operating capability was also certified on 15 December. Planning continued for construction of quarters for 800 enlisted personnel at Schofield Barracks either in FY 82 or FY 83.2

1. J442 HistSum Feb 80 (S), DECL 7 Mar 86; J4/Memo/153-80 (U), Subj: Visit to PACOM by Representatives of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Housing); J442 HistSum Mar 80 (S), DECL 9 Apr 86; OASD/I&H Memorandum of 18 Mar 80 (U), Subj: Kunia QRC.
2. J444 HistSum Dec 80 (U).
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COMMAND HISTORY

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1980

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TOP SECRET
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CHAPTER VI
COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

SECTION I--COMMAND AND CONTROL

CINCPAC Responsibilities

The mission of the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), as well as his area of responsibility and the organization of the Pacific Command (PACOM), was detailed in Chapter I. To carry out his mission, CINCPAC's strategy called for mobile sea, air, and land forces located in forward areas; protection of lines of communication; a command and control system accommodating various scenarios and environments throughout the PACOM area of responsibility, providing effective monitoring of day-to-day operations, and allowing appropriate reaction to significant events in stressed conditions; and the ability to respond to single or multiple, related or unrelated crises covering the full spectrum of military activities.

1. PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan (U), C3SRD Ser S139 of 26 Mar 81 (S/NF), REVW 30 Jun 00.
The PACOM Command and Control System\textsuperscript{1}

1. Ibid.
Nuclear Operations

1. PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan, Enclosure (4) Nuclear Operations (U), C3SRD Ser T35 of 26 Mar 81 (TS), REVW 30 Jun 00.
PACOM Command and Control Facilities

WESTCOM Command Center was a semi-hardened, underground, all-source facility which supported the Commander WESTCOM in the control of Army forces in the PACOM, less those units in Japan and Korea. Major forces included the 25th Infantry Division and the 45th Support Group. Planning had begun for an alternate Army command facility on Oahu.

1. PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan, Enclosure (S) Baseline PACOM Command and Control Facilities (U), C3SRD Ser S139 of 26 Mar 81 (S/NF), REVW 30 Jun 00.
PACFLT Command Center was an all-source information facility which supported CINCPACFLT in the control of JCS-assigned Naval and Marine forces, including those under CINCPAC operational command. Major forces included the Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPPAC), Submarine Force U.S. Pacific Fleet (SUBPAC), and Third and Seventh Fleets. Command and control of the submarine force was exercised by the SUBPAC Command Center at Pearl Harbor.

PACAF Command Center was also an all-source information center which supported CINCPACAF in the command and control of Air Force units in the PACOM. Major forces included Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces.

USFK Forward Command Post was a combined facility serving both Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUS Korea) and the Eighth U.S. Army. COMUS Korea and the Combined Forces Command (CFC) interfaced at the forward command post, Seoul. Other COMUS Korea facilities included the main command post at TANGO, 17 KM south of Seoul, and the rear command post at Taegu.

USFJ Command Center supported the CINCPAC subordinate unified command in Japan.

Communications Facilities

(C) Communications in PACOM were greatly complicated by the size of the area and the dispersal and diversity of the forces. Essentially, each land mass contained its own system of microwave, cable, tropospheric scatter, and leased commercial links with associated switching and/or terminal points. They were interconnected via long-haul satellite, submarine cable, and/or radio links. This grid, managed by the Defense Communications Agency, was used in either the dedicated or common-user mode. Augmenting the grid were radio communications designed to reach ships at sea, the ABNCP, radio relay aircraft, and dedicated systems to support intelligence operations.

(C) Long-haul communications consisted of submarine cables, satellites, and HF radio. HF radio had provided most of the long-haul circuitry in the Pacific west of Hawaii until 1964, when a concentrated effort was made to realign circuits to the transpacific commercial submarine cable. Since then, reliance on cables increased significantly. Communications satellites were being used more and more in the Pacific long-haul communications. Commercial leases from International Telecommunications Satellite (INTELSAT) accounted for about one-third of transpacific trunking. In addition the Navy leased commercial Maritime Satellite (MARSAT) over the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Military-owned facilities included six Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) II satellites over these two areas. HF radio provided vital communications links with the fleet and airborne command posts in the Pacific.
Major switching systems were the Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON), Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN), and Automatic Secure Voice Communications Network (AUTOSEVOCOM). Five AUTOVON switching centers were located in the PACOM, with interswitch trunks provided by cable, satellite, microwave, and tropospheric scatter links. While CONUS and Hawaii AUTOVON switching centers were leased, those in the Western Pacific were operated and maintained by the military services. AUTODIN was the Defense Communications System message and data transmission service. The Wahiawa, Hawaii, switch was leased, while the other four in the Western Pacific were government-owned and maintained. AUTOSEVOCOM provided service for traffic to TOP SECRET/SI (Special Intelligence) for a limited number of subscribers. Wideband secure voice service was available from Pearl Harbor to Korea, the Philippines, Japan, and the CONUS switch at the NMCC.

The major land mass "backbone" communications systems in the PACOM were found on the islands of Oahu and Guam and in Japan proper, Okinawa Prefecture, Korea, and the Philippines. Communications on Oahu were generally leased from the Hawaiian Telephone Company but military microwave served as a backup. In Japan the backbone system was operated and maintained by the Nippon Electric Company for the U.S. military. In Korea the military backbone system consisted of microwave, VHF radio, and cable links between U.S. installations.

The backbone of naval communications to ships at sea was the system of Naval Communications Stations. Those serving the PACOM were located in San Francisco, San Diego, Honolulu, Guam, Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and Diego Garcia. Honolulu and Guam were designated Naval Communications Area Master Stations EASTPAC and WESTPAC, respectively.

Interface with the NMCS

The NMCS provided the means by which the National Command Authority could give strategic direction to the armed forces. It was the priority component of the WWMCCS and included the National Military Command Center (NMCC), the alternate NMCC, the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP), and other command centers as might be designated by the Secretary of Defense. The NMCS also included communications linking the NMCS command facilities, the unified and specified command centers, the Service headquarters command centers, other support agencies, and the NCA.

Emergency networks included the JCS Alerting Network (JCSAN), JCS Automatic Conference Arranger (JCS-ACA), JCS Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System (IEMATS), and ERCS, mentioned earlier. It used MINUTEMAN missiles to launch communications payloads which broadcast a prerecorded voice message beginning three minutes after liftoff. The Strategic
Air Command (SAC) could remotely record, verify, and insert the execution message into several UHF communications payloads on alert in underground silos. Expanded coverage could be obtained by launching multiple missiles on different trajectories. The JCSAN and JCS-ACA were non-secure voice means which could use existing circuits to internet the NMCS. Both terminated at the CINCPAC Command Center and the ALCOP. IEMATS was designed to transmit and receive JCS EAMS using AUTODIN.

(S) Special communications included the Aerospace Defense Command's Missile Warning Display System, the Navy's High Frequency Command Net, and SAC's GIANT TALK and Post Attack Command and Control System. Integrated systems included MEECN and WABNCP, described above.

Networks in the Pacific

sec 1.5(f)
**WWMCCS ADP Facilities in the Pacific**

(U) The Worldwide Military Command and Control System Automatic Data Processing (WWMCCS ADP) facilities in the Pacific Command consisted of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CINCPAC</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific WWMCCS Regional ADP Center (PACWRAC) Facility, Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>H6060 (PACOM 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Center, Camp Smith</td>
<td>H6060 (PACOM 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABNCP Ground Facility, Hickam AFB</td>
<td>Terminal to Camp Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PACOM Subunified Commands</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMUS Korea</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Walker, Taegu</td>
<td>H6060, H716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq USFK, Yongsan/TANGO</td>
<td>H716 (van-mounted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMUS Japan, Yokota AB</strong></td>
<td>H735 (hosting off COMUSK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTCOM, Fort Shafter</td>
<td>Uses 3 remote terminal devices from PACWRAC computer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PACFLT PACWRAC Facility, Pearl Harbor</strong></td>
<td>H6060 (Dual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACAF, Hickam AFB</td>
<td>H725G(IMP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H6060; Level 6 (leased)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H725G(IMP); IBM 360/50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The old CINCPAC Command Center had suffered from the long preoccupation with the war in Southeast Asia which caused the creation of makeshift arrangements in the facility to just "get the job done." This inhibited the adoption of modern command and control equipment and techniques needed to deal effectively with crises in the future and a flexible nuclear policy. The old facility was inadequate in size, function, and habitability, and lacked the space for equipment needed to support CINCPAC in dynamic decision making. As a result, resources necessary to discharge the full responsibility of the Command Center were scattered in various places around the headquarters. The existing manual display system failed to present information effectively and the noisy quarters, cramped as it was with communications equipment and pneumatic tubing, inhibited efficient operations.  

The requirement for modernization of the CINCPAC Command Center was first submitted in December 1975, and in May 1976 the Required Operational Capability (ROC 11) was converted into a Military Construction Project (MILCON P-002). Authorization for 100 percent design for the construction project was given at a level of $4.2 million. Because of the need to continue operating from interim facilities while the center was being modernized, a phased construction program was started. The Public Works Center, Pearl Harbor, began pre-transition site preparation as early as December 1977, and the contractor started outside work in May 1978. First and second floor transition work in Building 80, which was the CINCPAC Command Center at Camp H.M. Smith, was completed in August and construction on the third floor began in January 1979.  

The major construction work was completed by December, and the new Command Center was ready for occupancy on 14 February 1980. The facility was opened for viewing by members of the CINCPAC Staff and their families on the 29th, and on 3 March the Operations and Intelligence Watch Teams became operational there. That day marked the culmination of several years of planning by various elements of the CINCPAC Staff and the Command Center Modernization/PACOM Crisis Action Information Distribution System (PACAIDS) Project Managers' Office. Thorough coordination among the Project Managers; the Naval Shore Electronic Engineering Activity, Pacific (NAVSEEACT PAC); Resident Officer in Charge of Construction, Pearl Harbor; Public Works Center, Pearl Harbor; Hawaiian Telephone Company; and TEVAL Corporation, the general contractor, kept the  

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1. PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan, Enclosure (2) CINCPAC Required Operational Capabilities (U), J341 Ser S78 of 29 Feb 80 (S), REVW 29 Feb 90.  
2. Ibid.; J330(PMO) HistSum May 80 (U), w/encl CINCPAC Command Center Modernization Milestones (U)
project on schedule and under budget. The accompanying diagrams and photographs illustrate the new facility.1

1. Ibid.

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CINCPAC Command Center, with large group display screens above on mezzanine level, flanked by briefers' boxes.

View from CINC's booth on mezzanine level of large group display screens across Command Center bay.
(U) PACAIDS was a video and audio distribution system that used matrix routing to interconnect users and provided CINCPAC and his battle staff, located in the Command Center, with visual information on Cathode Ray Tubes (CRTs) and Large Group Displays (LGDs). An assortment of input and output (I/O) devices throughout the headquarters allowed the interchange of information. In addition to the Command Center, these devices were located in the Operations Planning Group (OPG) room, the Logistics Readiness Center (LRC), the Nuclear Operating Center, the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC), the Emergency Action Booth, the Command Center Briefing Room (CCBR), the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) offices, the office of the Director for Intelligence (J2), and the office of the Director for Operations (J3).

(U) The I/O devices were connected by a fully automated matrix switch, enabling them to receive information from every input device and route it to every output device. The PACAIDS video input devices were: 4 Honeywell Visual Information Processors (VIPs) on the Command Center floor (these were output devices for the CINCPAC standard H6060 WWMCCS ADP Processor); 2 Honeywell VIPs for the OPG; 3 Honeywell VIPs in the LRC; 6 UNIVAC 1652 alpha-numeric terminals of the PACOM Data Systems Center (PDSC); 1 Vector General graphic terminal of the PDSC; 1 Naval Environmental Display Station (NEDS) IA terminal—all on the Command Center floor; commercial television sets; 8 low resolution color TV cameras—3 in the Command Center and 1 each in the LRC, OPG, CCBR, IPAC, and JRC; and 9 Action Officer Briefing Consoles, functionally similar to those used in the NMCC.

(U) The output devices for PACAIDS were: 2 LGDs, located on the front wall of the Command Center, each 13 x 11.5 ft, with associated rear projection devices capable of displaying images and digital data received through the new system; and two types of monitors—one similar to a standard TV set and the other much smaller and intended for use by one person—located at various stations in the headquarters.

(U) Each PACAIDS input device was assigned its own permanent channel, always available to any output device. VIP inputs did not have an associated audio track; if there was a need to discuss what was being transmitted by the VIP, it would be done by a secure telephone call. Conversely, if the VIP operator wanted to insure that a particular PACAIDS user saw what was on his CRT, he would telephone that user and instruct him to dial the appropriate channel.

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1. PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan, Enclosure (2) CINCPAC Required Operational Capabilities (U), J341 Ser S78 of 29 Feb 80 (S), REVW 29 Feb 90.
If a user in a remote location wished to monitor what was happening on the Command Center floor, he could do so by switching his monitor to the LGD channels.

(U) The system had two different capabilities to record. The "buffers" were a temporary storage capacity in the matrix switch to store up to 200 displays intended for later presentation. Permanent historical recordings of information shown on the LGDs were possible through a system separate from the buffers. Record copies would be taken of appropriate LGD displays as determined by the Deputy Crisis Action Coordinator.

(U) PACAIDS was cleared to carry SI/TK classified information, both audio and visual. A physical disconnect was required to enable individual rooms to go to a lower classification.

(U) Most of the PACAIDS equipment arrived at Camp Smith from the CONUS on 23 June 1980, and the personnel to install it arrived at the end of the month. Installation of this equipment was completed by 1 September. The Large Group Displays and projectors arrived later and were installed by the 30th. The first 35 action officers were trained on PACAIDS during September and October, and three master control console operators were trained in November. PACAIDS was turned over to CINCPAC by the Naval Electronic Systems Command on 5 November 1980, with all components operational except for the link between the Command Center and IPAC Building 20, the NEDS, and the WWMCCS interface devices. IPAC was to become operational in February 1981, NEDS in the spring of 1982, and the WWMCCS interface upon receipt of the VIPs and completion of Tempest (compromising emanations) testing in Fiscal Year 1981.¹

(U) PACAIDS was a one-of-a-kind system which received worldwide attention and interest. Plans were underway to build similar command centers in Australia, Korea, Japan, and several U.S. military headquarters.

PACOM WWMCCS Regional ADP Center (PACWRAC)

(U) In 1975 the PACOM regional ADP facility planning group conducted a feasibility study for the consolidation of all Hawaii-based Navy and Air Force Worldwide Military Command and Control System Automatic Data Processing computers at one site. PACAF did not concur with this proposal, but CINCPAC and PACFLT computers were consolidated at the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific

1. J330(PMO) HistSUM Oct 80 (U); PACAIDS/Command Center Modernization Weekly Activities Reports (U), Jun-Sep 80; J330(PMO) HistSUM Dec 80 (U); CINCPAC 1420322 Nov 80 (U).
(FICPAC) building at Makalapa. This facility, formally opened in May 1978, was called the PACOM WWMCCS Regional ADP Center (PACWRAC).\(^1\)

(U) In October 1979 PACWRAC finally became a reality with the movement of the CINCPAC General Service (GENSER) operation and the Army ADP equipment to the facility. At the same time, the CINCPAC SIOP function was moved from Fort Shafter to Camp Smith. In addition to the movement of all CINCPAC operational programs to the PACWRAC computers, the loading of certain system software changes was accomplished to accommodate the combination of CINCPAC users with those of CINCPACFLT, the Third Fleet, SUBPAC, WESTCOM, and FMFPAC on the PACWRAC system. CINCPAC was connected to the PACWRAC via a remote network processor at Camp Smith and a high-speed multiplexed communications line.\(^2\)

**Problems with Reliability**

(U) Since the PACWRAC consolidation in October 1979 the quality of WWMCCS support provided to the CINCPAC Staff had not been up to the standards available before the move. The CINCPAC Director for Communications-Data Processing BG EN Charles B. Jiggetts, USAF, wrote of this concern to the PACFLT Deputy Chief of Staff for Management/Fleet Inspector General on 21 May 1980:\(^3\)

> I have a serious problem with the data processing support provided by PACWRAC for HQ CINCPAC and I need your help. Computer support has been unsatisfactory for so long that our staff has lost confidence in the capability of the present arrangement to support the CINCPAC mission.

(U) Operational experience in the conduct of Exercises PRIZE GAUNTLET in March and POSITIVE LEAP in May raised serious doubts concerning the adequacy of existing WWMCCS ADP service to provide reliable and timely C2 support to the CINCPAC Staff. Various other CINCPAC directors voiced similar concerns. When the CINCPAC WWMCCS computer was first relocated to the PACWRAC facility, it was realized there would initially be inherent technological, procedural, and managerial "growing pains." However, General Jiggetts said sufficient time had passed for resolution of difficulties brought about by the consolidation, and it was imperative that actions be taken to raise the existing level of support to mission-acceptable levels. "If service at least as good as what was available prior to consolidation is not possible, for whatever reasons," said General Jiggetts, "I need to know so that we can start developing alternatives to PACWRAC provided services."\(^4\)

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2. Ibid., p. 348.
3. CINCPAC Ltr Ser C124 of 21 May 80 (U), Subj: WWMCCS ADP Support.
4. Ibid.
(U) In reply, CINCPACFLT on 4 June said that corrective measures were being implemented to improve hardware and software reliability and system responsiveness. A weekly preventive maintenance program was initiated in April which allowed work to be done on one-third of the equipment while the rest of the system continued in production. Quarterly, a full day of preventive maintenance was scheduled to troubleshoot hardware problems. Many other steps were taken or were planned to improve reliability and response time, and PACFLT believed these would significantly raise the level of ADP support to CINCPAC users.¹

(U) In a memo to Admiral Robert L.J. Long, CINCPAC, General Jiggetts explained the existing computer support system and its shortcomings. He said there were three computer categories which were, or would be, in direct support of CINCPAC. They were the WWMCCS, intelligence, and cruise missile computers. Two WWMCCS computer facilities in Hawaii supported the CINCPAC command and control functions. The smaller of the two was designated as a nuclear planning computer and handled all SIOP functions for CINCPAC. It was located, as mentioned above, in the basement of Building 80 at Camp Smith. The second computer was the large triple-processor WWMCCS in the PACWRAC facility on the fifth floor of Building 352 (the FICPAC building) at Makalapa. It was used by the CINCPAC staff to support their command and control function. PACWRAC also supported PACFLT, WESTCOM, FMFPAC, and other naval commands, but not PACAF which had its own WWMCCS ADP facility at Hickam. The intelligence computer was operated and maintained by IPAC, at Camp Smith. The cruise missile computer was being installed with the SIOP computer at Camp Smith.²

(U) Although the PACWRAC facility was managed and maintained by the Data Processing Service Center Pacific (DPSCPAC), Pearl Harbor, General Jiggetts had the responsibility for providing high quality ADP support to the CINCPAC Staff. "If, within a reasonable time," he told Admiral Long, "PACWRAC does not provide us with services comparable to the quality we had when our computer was at Camp Smith, we should consider moving it elsewhere."³

Improvements Initiated

(U) Further actions were initiated to improve the unsatisfactory performance of PACWRAC. Beginning 4 August for CINCPAC and 15 August for CINCPACFLT, restrictions were placed on the use of the equipment by non-command and control

1. CINCPACFLT ltr FF1-1 5230 Ser 03D/4161 of 4 June 80 (U), Subj: WWMCCS ADP Support.
2. J6/Memo/C170 of 15 Jul 80 (U), Subj: Computer Support for CINCPAC.
3. Ibid.
users during the hours 0730-1300, Monday-Friday, which had a significant positive effect. The shifting of preventive maintenance to Sunday evenings was being negotiated with the vendor, Honeywell Information Systems, and was to begin in October. This change would eliminate scheduled downtime during prime operating hours. Reconfiguration of the PACWRAC data base was completed, compressing the operating system from 20 disk drives to 12. A 50-kW motor generator set was installed on 3 August, cutting outages due to power failure after that date to zero. A special team from Honeywell of seven experts in hardware, software, power, air conditioning, and management was contracted to look into all aspects of PACWRAC. The team was on site from 18 to 29 August.  

(U) The Honeywell team made 14 major recommendations. These, and the actions taken on them, were as follows:

- Rewire the grounding system. Accepted.
- Consider splitting the large triple Central Processing Unit (CPU) into a dual and a single CPU system with PACFLT and its heavy workload on the dual CPU and CINCPAC on the single CPU. Decision delayed until 1981.
- Replace existing consoles. To be done.
- Replace older peripheral equipment. Programmed.
- Implement boot deck/scheduler revisions (boot deck was a set of computer instructions used to start up (cold boot) or restart (warm boot) the computer). Fourteen of the 16 recommended boot deck items were adopted, and scheduler revisions were completed by 31 October.
- Reduce dependency on non-standard software. To be coordinated with the Command and Control Technical Center.
- Develop additional expertise in General Comprehensive Operating Supervisor and General Remote Terminal Supervisor analysis. Underway.
- Explore methods to reduce dependency on tape systems for Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) users. A program was developed which reduced the dependency; however, once an OPLAN was finalized, it had to be saved on tape because of the limited amount of permanent file space on disk.

1. C35/Memo/916 of 18 Sep 80 (U), Subj: Increasing Reliability of PACWRAC; status report on.
2. J01/Memo of 16 Oct 80 (U), Subj: PACWRAC Improvement Plan.
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- Develop a system to improve JOPS restart/recovery capability. A new WWMCCS standard JOPS system was to become operational on 1 December.

- Apply realistic resource limits for each job submission to prevent one or two users from dominating the computer to the exclusion of all others. Done.

- Reinstall on-line test and diagnostic software. Done.

- Reconfigure data networks for improved efficiency. Required further analysis.

- Intensify training and qualification program for operations personnel. Being done.

- Consider adding civilian technical personnel to the operations staff for continuity. The PACWRAC Triple was considered to be one of the most complex systems in the Defense Department, and while existing manning was only at about 80 percent of authorized strength and most positions were filled at lower rates than called for, there was a great reluctance on the part of DPSCPAC to bring civilian operators into the PACWRAC Operations Section for reasons of morale and incentive of the military personnel on board.

(U) Future actions planned in the following one to three years, both at PACWRAC and throughout the WWMCCS community, were as follows:1

- Installation of a new WWMCCS standard systems software release to bring it closer to operating systems used in the commercial world (scheduled for the entire WWMCCS community in October 1981).

- Addition of a second Remote Network Processor at Camp Smith (the CINCPAC RNP was the most heavily used anywhere, and a second terminal was scheduled for late in FY 81).

- Acquisition of a fourth CPU (planned for FY 83 at an estimated cost of $600,000).

- Improved manning of the PACWRAC facility (there was a potential for making it a joint facility to reduce the Navy's load and draw on the large-scale WWMCCS computer experience of the Army and Air Force).

1. Ibid.

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Readdressal of the PACAF WWMCCS ADP facility at Hickam. (Under the original PACWRAC concept, as stated above, PACAF was to move its small underutilized system into the facility. However, severe resistance was offered by PACAF, based mostly on the "eggs-in-one-basket" argument. The decision was made not to move that equipment to PACWRAC. The PACAF system, if moved to PACWRAC however, could provide a near-term, inexpensive augmentation of the existing system. PACAF resistance might diminish, believed CINCPAC, if the facility were managed by CINCPAC and manned jointly.)

The cost of hardware replacements and upgrades for the PACWRAC system between FY 80 and FY 83, not including maintenance, site preparation, engineering, and installation charges, was estimated at $1.74 million.¹

The CINCPAC Chief of Staff, LT GEN Freddie L. Poston, USAF, sent a personal letter to the Deputy CINCPACFLT on 20 October, enclosing a copy of the Honeywell report and requesting his assistance in taking the necessary actions to improve the performance at PACWRAC. Specifically, General Poston said he was concerned about the manning situation, and stated that increased emphasis on the assignment of qualified persons at 100 percent of authorization (particularly at supervisory positions) and conversion of selected positions to civilian could contribute significantly to the effective operation of the facility.²

The Deputy CINCPACFLT, in his reply of 24 October, said that manning had been realigned so that the prime shift was fully staffed with sufficiently qualified personnel to handle any eventuality. He said DPSCPAC was then manned at 87 percent (9 personnel short), and action had been taken to increase the manning of supervisors to a level of 8 E-7 or above, 12 E-6, and 20 E-5, which would provide not only an increase in the numbers of personnel assigned up to 97 percent of allowance, but would raise significantly the experience level available.³

Another problem plaguing the system was its poor software performance. CINCPACFLT informed the Command and Control Technical Center (CCTC) at Reston, VA, on 2 December that an inordinate percentage of computer downtime was attributable to system software problems, and a significant number of outstanding incident reports requesting assistance were awaiting resolution. CINCPAC also notified the Defense Communications Agency that efforts to raise the performance of the WWMCCS ADP to operationally acceptable levels continued to be

¹. Ibid.
². CINCPAC Ltr J01 Ser 2464 of 20 Oct 80 (U), Subj: WWMCCS ADP Support.
³. CINCPACFLT Ltr FF1-1 5230 Ser 03D/7907 of 24 Oct 80 (U), Subj: WWMCCS ADP Support.
stymied by excessive failures attributed to systems software. Both agencies were requested to assist in early resolution of these problems.1

**WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN)**

(U) WIN was a communications net set up to interconnect the various WWMCCS computers in support of both routine and crisis command and control information processing. It allowed the exchange of information between the WWMCCS and the logistics, intelligence, and tactical C2 systems, and also supported the NMCS, Service headquarters, unified commands, selected specified and component commands, transportation operating agencies, and other selected DOD agencies. Developed from 1978, WIN was expected to evolve over a period of years and included a number of WWMCCS host computers interconnected to accommodate both local and remote users. A WIN capability in the Pacific Command was achieved in September 1979 with the installation of an Interface Message Processor (IMP), a mini-computer installed in the PACWRAC to connect PACOM hosts (CINCPAC, PACFLT, PACAF) with the WIN system. On-island WIN capabilities were proven, but reliable connectivity with the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC) was not obtained owing to problems with the IMP at the ANMCC.2

(U) The CCTC began teleconference exercises with all WIN centers on 31 December 1979 to try to solve the momentary outage problem, which seemed to affect many users. DPSCPAC (PACWRAC) participated, using new software that provided clearer messages about WIN disconnects which would be useful as feedback to the CCTC. It was hoped that with the correct feedback, CCTC could create patches to overcome the connectivity problem.3

(U) Daily operational tests of WIN, as proposed by the JCS on 8 December 1979, were conducted between 0600 and 2200Z, Monday through Friday, beginning 7 January 1980. The exercises were centered around the integration of WIN with other command center communication capabilities. Tests were not to interfere with operational requirements, however. The NMCC initiated the teleconference tests with the various WIN site command centers. At the CINCPAC Command Center, 14 individuals on the Surface and Air Desks participated in the tests between 7 and 18 January, with the following results: 9 conferences called, 2 successfully joined. Reasons for non-success were system malfunction (4), notification failure (2), and operation error (1).4

1. CINCPACFLT 020217Z Dec 80 (U); CINCPAC 091855Z Dec 80 (U).
4. Ibid.; JCS 3930/030143Z Jan 80 (U).
(U) A PACOM WIN working group, meeting in early January, was formed to recommend a circuit routing between PACWRAC and the Military Airlift Command (MAC), and the location of a second IMP for Hawaii, and development of a plan for survivability and back-up processing. The circuit routing was recommended to go from PACWRAC to Hickam via leased line, Hickam to McClellan via government lease or WESTSTAR, and then to Headquarters MAC via leased line. The Air Force would make the routing decision and fund the off-island circuit. The working group also recommended the location of the second IMP to be Camp Smith, Makalapa (PACWRAC), or Hickam. In March, Hickam AFB (Hq PACAF) was selected to receive the second IMP.1

(U) The WWMCCS and WIN were tested during Exercise POSITIVE LEAP in early June and the system performed much better than it did in the past. Although total WIN availability was somewhat less than 50 percent over the 104 hours of the exercise, the PACOM IMP had a total availability of 94 percent. This availability was computed on the basis of 41 incidents and a cumulative outage of 6 hours and 13 minutes, for a mean time between incidents of 2 hours and 19 minutes. Overall availability of the PACWRAC, derived from user-to-computer connectivity, was 86 percent. This was based on 104 continuous hours of exercise play with 26 incidents noted and a cumulative downtime of 13 hours and 15 minutes, for a mean time between incidents of 3 hours.2

COMUS Korea WIN Circuit

(U) The Joint Command Information Systems Division of COMUS Korea Headquarters provided WWMCCS ADP support to the COMUS Korea staff and subordinate units, using selected configurations of Honeywell computers and other ADP equipment. Direct user access was provided by a group of remote terminal sites, each connected by a communication link to the WWMCCS main computer system at Camp Walker, Taegu. Remote terminal sites were located at Yongsan, TANGO (Command Center), Osan, Kunsan, Taegu, Camp Henry, and Chinhae. USFJ also received ADP support from the host computer at Taegu. These terminals in 1979 could not access WWMCCS main computers elsewhere, such as Hawaii or the CONUS, because of the lack of communications connectivity.3

1. J63A HistSum Jan 80 (U); CINCPAC 080102Z Mar 80 (U).
2. J63A HistSum Jun 80 (U); Exercise POSITIVE LEAP After-Action Report (U).
Communications System (DSCS) link could be pre-empted and then rerouted to Korea via Fort Buckner on Okinawa and Mainland Japan. The JCS concurred with this plan and instructed CINCPAC to take the necessary steps to make the facility available for use in the WIN.¹

(U) On 11 April COMUS Korea requested permanent entrance to the WIN network, stating that all WWMCCS terminal sites were being reinspected to confirm that they met the security requirements and all circuits had appropriate cryptographic devices installed which provided TOP SECRET protection. The inspections were completed, and COMUS Korea requested a WIN entry date of 1 June after system integration testing by the Naval Shore Electronic Engineering Activity Pacific and the Command and Control Technical Center in May. The CCTC software installation team arrived in Korea on 30 May for equipping and testing of the WIN software. With successful testing of the software and circuit, COMUS Korea declared on 12 June that the host computer was active for WIN traffic.²

FRAG II Remote Network Processor

(U) FRAG II, previously known as FRAG PREP, was the system of automated preparation and dissemination of fragmentary operation orders for USAF tactical aircraft in Korea. The WWMCCS computer at Taegu had been providing ADP support, transmitting orders through AUTODIN to Osan AB. It was found that the system was not responsive during peak operating periods because of competing requirements for ADP resources and the communications link to Osan was vulnerable to interrupted service and extended outages. In 1978 COMUS Korea had submitted a request for a mini-computer system at Osan to improve ADP support for FRAG PREP. By mid-1979 the project plan FRAG II was being finalized at Headquarters PACAF. CINCPAC agreed to acquire a leased Honeywell Information Systems (HIS) Level 6 computer for Osan and it was shipped in December.³

(U) The PACAF implementation team arrived in Korea on 12 January 1980 to install and check out the FRAG II software on the HIS Level 6 at Osan and the H6060 at Camp Walker, Taegu. The Level 6 had been augmented with equipment from Hickam AFB to provide a configuration approved by the JCS. A 7-day validation test was conducted at Osan to check the new software, and the only difficulty encountered was an intermittent hangup on the visual information.

1. J63A HistSum Jan 80 (U); CINCPAC 212359Z Jan 80 (C), DECL 21 Jan 86; JCS 6340/281453Z Jan 80 (U).
2. J63A HistSums Apr-Jun 80 (U); COMUSK 110058Z Apr 80 (U); COMUSK 020213Z May 80 (U); NAVSEEACT PAC 222222Z May 80 (U); COMUSK 122326Z Jun 80 (U).
processors, apparently due to software problems in the long-haul communications link to Taegu.²

(U) The FRAG II system was successfully used during Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 1980 and was formally accepted by the 314th Air Division in April. On 10 May the CCTC announced that the Level 6 RNP (Release 120) had met all functional requirements for acceptability and would be distributed. The JCS advised the various commands on 15 May that they could proceed to acquire the Level 6 equipment. Total purchase cost of the FRAG II in Korea was expected to be $233,439.²

**WWMCCS Operational Test Bed**

(U) The WWMCCS System Engineering Organization (WSEO) had been charged with the establishment of a program to investigate, demonstrate, and evaluate the utility of ADP in the WWMCCS operational command and control environment. It was to undertake a functional research and development program to identify and demonstrate applications of ADP which offered improvements to the effectiveness of the WWMCCS.³

(U) The Pacific Command was selected as the operational test bed location in May 1979. On 12 February 1980, however, the Defense Communications Agency recommended that PACOM be deleted from consideration because of significant changes to the budget, travel funds to support the program, and organizational changes within the WWMCCS community. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence also re titled and restructured the program from WSEO test bed to "R&D in New WWMCCS ADP Applications." It would be conducted at the Readiness Command/Joint Deployment Agency.⁴

(U) CINCPAC requested reconsideration in March 1980, informing the JCS that as far back as April 1978 he had supported the program for R&D in the operational utility of ADP. The unresponsiveness of WWMCCS ADP had been documented and was acknowledged by the WWMCCS Council in the mid-1970s. As an example, the existing WWMCCS computer-supported information system was severely limited

1. J63A HistSums Jan-Feb 80 (U); JCS/Memo/ADP-133-79 of 28 Dec 79 (U), Subj: Acknowledgement Memorandum (SDN) N7901AA; DPSCPAC 2623262 Feb 80 (U).
2. J63A HistSum May 80 (U); CCTC 100612Z May 80 (U); JCS 6065/151701Z May 80 (U); COMUSK 160558Z May 80 (U); CINCPAC 302012Z May 80 (U); COMUSK 090651Z May 80 (U); CINCPAC 142323Z May 80 (U).
4. J63A HistSums Jan-Feb 80 (U); CINCPAC 240253Z Jan 80 (U); JCS 6730/282205Z Jan 80 (U); JCS 2230/290125Z Feb 80 (U).
by the lack of accurate, current, and easy-to-access data. Historically, the
development of data processing in support of command and control had evolved
around operations reporting and status keeping, and it was an accepted fact
that WWMCCS ADP had been unresponsive in dynamic situations such as those which
would occur in crises. The normal high level of operational activity in the
PACOM highlighted the command as the best area for the test bed. The situation
assessment and response functions were primarily concerned with force manage-
ment within a theater of responsibility, but also encompassed the national
military command system. CINC PAC said the DCA recommendation appeared to
delete PACOM purely out of funding considerations, and he still believed it
should conduct the program even though funds were curtailed and test bed ac-
vity might slip to FY 82.1

ABNCP Ground Facility WWMCCS Interface

1. CINCPAC 0823492 Mar 80 (U).
2. PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan. Enclosure (2), CINCPAC Required
   Operational Capabilities (U), CSRD Ser S139 of 26 Mar 81 (S/NS), REVW 30
   June 80.
Compact Automated Message Handling System

(U) As far back as December 1975, CINCPAC had officially identified an operational requirement for an automated message handling system for his command and control function. In February 1979, after a lengthy installation and testing period, the Directorate of Operations began full experimental use of an automated system installed on a temporary basis to determine its usefulness in a major military headquarters. Initially, a number of problems occurred such as poor reliability and user reluctance to get trained and routinely use the system. By June, however, many of the problems were solved and CINCPAC requested an extension of the experiment beyond its termination date of 30 September 1979. Nevertheless funds had not been programmed for continued operation, so the equipment was removed as scheduled.2

(U) In January 1980 the PACOM Data Systems Center (PDSC) became operational. This system included the central processing units located in Building 20, IPAC Headquarters, which supported 30 active terminals located throughout that building and in the CINCPAC Command Center, Building 80. It received incoming traffic from the Special Intelligence Communications (SPINTCOM) facility and the AUTODIN via SPINTCOM. Some 70 users regularly used PDSC terminals to review message traffic and exercise other related capabilities. By the end of 1980, three of six divisions within IPAC had gone to a "paperless" environment. (Refer to Chapter IX, Intelligence, for a description of the PDSC.)

(U) In April 1980, following an order by the Secretary of Defense to the Navy to proceed with its near-term automated message handling system program, all unified and specified commanders were tasked to identify their specific requirements for the Compact Automated Message Handling System (CAMHS). CINCPAC and the Southern Command were the only headquarters that identified a near-term requirement. Other headquarters felt that money could be better spent on development of a planned future (post-1985) system. PACOM headquarters also said that the major effort should be toward the long-term development, but did state a near-term need if certain specifications were met (random access, electronic release, on-line storage for 30 days, and on-line index). This was based on the command's experience with the temporary automated message handling system as well as the commonality of the CAMHS with the existing PDSC.

1. Ibid.; J63A HistSums Feb-Apr 80 (U); CINCPAC 152147Z Feb 80 (U); NAVSEEAECT PAC 042216Z Mar 80 (U); CINCPACFLT 130214Z Mar 80 (U); CINCPAC 132111Z Mar 80 (U).
2. C3SRD12 HistSum Oct 80 (U), w/encl Briefing (U), Subj: Compact Automated Message Handling System.
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(U) The Office of the Secretary of Defense had said that CAMHS would be the only automated message handling system to be acquired before the still undefined capability that would be part of the WWMCCS information system in the future. It was important to OSD that some system be utilized to bridge the gap between the existing one providing intelligence support and the ultimate system scheduled for development after 1985. It was not intended that CAMHS would permit elimination of all manual message handling procedures; however, once in routine use, it could eliminate a large percentage of message copies, streamline command center administrative procedures during exercises or crises, and provide an excellent test bed for future development.

(U) In response to a JCS request for CINCPAC concurrence with a Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC) proposal for a CAMHS installation at Camp Smith, CINCPAC on 3 October reaffirmed his interest in the system. The NOSC concept of operation and functional description appeared adequate to CINCPAC, and preliminary information indicated no major obstacles to development. CINCPAC's primary concern rested with the number of crypto devices required and personnel necessary to support these devices. The CINCPAC Headquarters anticipated that ADP support and maintenance requirements would be covered by contractor support, at least through FY 84, with funds already in the Chief of Naval Operations budget for the CAMHS program. Assuming these concerns could be rectified, CINCPAC welcomed the opportunity to participate in the project.¹

(U) However, the CAMHS project appeared in danger of falling victim to funding constraints when the Navy Director of Command and Control, VADM Gordon R. Nagler, wrote on 26 November to Admiral Long and said that FY 81 funds for R&D in C2 programs were more than $60 million short. He had taken a hard look in an effort to eliminate or cut back programs which were deficient in product and application, and asked CINCPAC's assistance in reviewing his requirement for a WWMCCS-related CAMHS which, VADM Nagler said, "I consider may not be cost effective." CAMHS would be replaced by a more capable Standard Automated Message Handling System (SAMHS) in FY 86. As of November, only CINCPAC had expressed a need for CAMHS; the other CINCs had elected to wait for SAMHS to satisfy their requirements. Termination of CAMHS could mean an immediate savings of $3 million and over $2 million more over the outyears.²

(U) CINCPAC informed the JCS on 10 December that concerns expressed earlier on 3 October had been partially allayed and procedures were being formulated to maximize the utility of the CAMHS once installed. PACOM

1. CINCPAC 030243Z Oct 80 (U).
2. C3SRD11 HistSum Dec 80 (U); CNO (Op 094) Ltr of 26 Nov 80 (U), Subj: Compact Automated Message Handling System.

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intelligence personnel were using the PDSC in their daily operations and were most enthusiastic about the support received. CAMHS, as an outgrowth of PDSC, would provide an interim automatic message handling capability for a much larger percentage of the staff. CINCPAC was willing to accept the system with its known shortcomings to insure that an operational test bed was available during the development of the SAMHS. Further, believed CINCPAC, an operational SAMHS by 1986 was "optimistic." Nevertheless, CINCPAC informed the JCS that his requirement for CAMHS was contingent upon mutual agreement by all concerned that CAMHS, installed and operating in a unified command headquarters by early FY 82, was necessary for the development of the standard system, and that funding in support of CAMHS could be continued in the outyears.¹

(U) The JCS replied on 22 December that SAMHS development was not considered to be contingent on CAMHS installation and operation, and it would be based on essentially new technology. The JCS had not validated a CINCPAC requirement for a user-oriented automated message handling system and did not support continuance of the CAMHS program. They did, however, strongly support a SAMHS development effort which reflected validated CINC requirements.²

(U) Admiral Long therefore deferred to VADM Nagler's judgment regarding the CAMHS project priority in the overall C3S budget. As the year ended, there was little prospect of having the system installed at CINCPAC Headquarters.³

1. CINCPAC 100204Z Dec 80 (U).
2. JCS 221832Z Dec 80 (U)
3. CINCPAC Ltr of 24 Dec 80 (U), Subj: Compact Automated Message Handling System.
1. Joint Operational Requirements for C3I in WESTPAC (U), J341 Ser S151 of 29 Apr 80 (S/NF), REVW 29 Apr 86.
In electromagnetic spectrum management, both JSDF and USFJ dealt directly and independently with the Japanese Civil Radio Regulatory Board for frequency assignment support. Experience elsewhere had shown that problems could be significantly reduced with the establishment of a combined spectrum management office; however, there were no plans to do so.
1. Joint Operational Requirements for C3I in WESTPAC (U), J341 Ser S151 of 29 Apr 80 (S/NF), REVW 29 Apr 86.
1. J6121 HistSum Feb 80 (S), REVW 19 Mar 99; DCA Ltr 410 of 20 Aug 79 (C), Subj: DCS Upgrade Study - Korea (U), REVW 19 Mar 99.
2. JCS 6173/061746Z Feb 80 (C), DECL 5 Feb 86; CINCPAC 160055Z Feb 80 (C), DECL 14 Feb 86.
1. COMUSK 190135Z Feb 80 (S), REVW 19 Feb 86.
2. HQ PACAF/DC Ltr of 28 Feb 80 (C), Subj: DCS-Korea Upgrade Project (U), REVW 31 Aug 99.
3. ADMIN CINCPAC 291740Z Feb 80 (S), REVW 28 Feb 86; CINCPAC 020400Z Mar 80 (S), REVW 28 Feb 86.
1. Ibid.; DCA 101/070341Z Mar 80 (S), REVW 5 Mar 86; CINCPAC 120156Z Mar 80 (C), REVW 1 Nov 84.
2. C3SRD23 HistSum Nov 80 (C), DECL 12 Dec 86.
3. COMUSK 140830Z Jul 80 (C)(EX), DECL 14 Jul 86.
CONSTANT WATCH

(U) CONSTANT WATCH, as explained earlier, was a joint USAF and ROKAF multi-phase program to modernize the Korean Tactical Air Control System, which was the command and control system used by the air force component commander of the CFC. The hub of the system was the Tactical Air Control Center. It controlled surveillance operations through a Control and Reporting Center and Army air support operations through a USAF Air Support Operations Center and ROKAF Direct Air Support Center at corps level. Counter-air and interdiction were controlled by means of direct communications to tactical air defense artillery units and air wings.3

(U) Phase I of CONSTANT WATCH was the design and construction of a hardened facility at Osan AB to accommodate a semi-automatic TACC, a co-sited Master CRC, and an intelligence center connected to the Korean Air Intelligence System (KAIS). The ROK was constructing the facility and the United States was installing the communications equipment and KAIS hardware. The initial operational capability date of January 1981 was on schedule.

(U) Phase II (Project 222) was automation of the CRC and upgrade of surveillance capability with new radars digitally netted from remote sites to the CRC via the ROKAF "PEACE FORTUNE" communications network. This was a unilateral program with Hughes Aircraft as the major contractor. Contract terms were approved by the ROK on 15 August 1980 and initial operational capability was scheduled for January 1984. Four AN/TSQ-73 radars to control SAMs would be purchased from the Litton Corporation and be digitally interfaced with the TACC. A U.S. supplied message processing facility would tie the TACC to USAF

1. Ibid.
2. CINC PAC 232312Z Jul 80 (S)(EX), DECL 22 Jul 86.
3. C3SRD23 Point Paper (S), Subj: Constant Watch (U), DECL 10 Oct 86.
1. Joint Operational Requirements for C3I in WESTPAC (U), J341 Ser S151 of 29 Apr 80 (S/NF), REVW 29 Apr 86.
2. Ibid.
1. AFSSO USAF/IN 031610Z Apr 80 (U)(BOM).
2. AFSSO PACAF/CC 072115Z Feb 80 (S)(BOM), REVW 5 Feb 00.
3. CINCPAC 212255Z Feb 80 (S)(BOM), REVW 21 Feb 00; CINCPAC 262236Z Mar 80 (S) (BOM), DECL 26 Mar 86; AFSSO PACAF/CC 280200Z Mar 80 (S)(BOM), REVW 27 Mar 10.
(U) Under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreement, on the other hand, all COMSEC equipment accepted by the NATO military committee had become available to each member nation. Nearly all U.S. COMSEC equipment, both ground and airborne, had been released to the NATO Alliance.

...so, Japan couldn't get to this level of alliance/trust.

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1. Ibid.
2. J613 Point Paper (S/NF), 9 Jan 80, Subj: US/ROK COMSEC Policy/Interoperability (C), REVW 31 Aug 85; CA(F4C) Point Paper (S/NF), 15 Jan 80, Subj: COMSEC Support for Korea (U), REVW 15 Jan 10; DIRNSA 111718Z Jan 80 (S) (EX), REVW 9 Jan 10.
1. Ibid.
3. J6131 HistSum Jan 80 (S/NF), REVW 4 Jan 10; Summary of the NSA Assessment of the CPICK (U), 4 Jan 80 (S/NF), REVW 4 Jan 10.
1. CA(F4C) Point Paper (S/NF), 15 Jan 80, Subj: COMSEC Support for Korea (U), REVW 15 Jan 10; DIRNSA 111718Z Jan 80 (S)(EX), REVW 9 Jan 10.
2. COMUS/INCCFC 210600Z Jan 80 (S/NF)(EX), REVW 31 Aug 99; ADMIN CINCPAC 220403Z Jan 80 (S/NF)(EX), REVW 31 Aug 99.
1. C3STM42 HistSum Jul 80 (S), REVW 6 Aug 00; CINCPAC 182006Z Jul 80 (S/NF), REVW 15 Jul 00; CINCPAC 180121Z Jul 80 (S/NF), REVW 9 Jul 86; JCS 291542Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 25 Jul 86.

2. Ibid.

3. C3STM42 HistSum Sep 80 (S), REVW 11 Sep 10; DIRNSA 130215Z Sep 80 (S/NF), REVW 11 Sep 10.
1. JCS 171938Z Sep 80 (S)(EX), REVW 15 Sep 10.
2. JCS 101957Z Oct 80 (S/NF), REVW 3 Oct 80.
3. Ibid.

2. C3STM42 HistSum Nov 80 (S/NF), REVW 3 Dec 86; C3STM41 Point Paper (S/NF), Subj: COMSEC Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea (CPI) (U), REVW 24 Nov 86; JCS 062253Z Nov 80 (C)(EX), REVW 5 Nov 00.
1. COMUSK 220222Z Nov 80 (S), REVW 22 Nov 00.
2. CA(F4C) Point Paper (C/NF), 16 Jan 80, Subj: COMSEC Support for Japan (U), DECL 16 Jul 00; DIRNSA 111718Z Jan 80 (S)(EX), REVW 9 Jan 10.
1. Ibid.
2. C3SRM42 HistSum Nov 80 (S/NF), REVW 3 Dec 86; C3S/Memo/S98-80 of 7 Nov 80 (S/NF), Subj: Interim U.S. COMSEC Plan for Japan FY 82-86 (C), REVW 5 Nov 86.
3. C3STM42 HistSum Nov 80 (S), REVW 3 Dec 86; CINCPAC 200233Z Feb 80 (S), REVW 18 Feb 86.
1. DIRNSA 232257Z Jul 80 (S), RE0V 17 Jul 10; HQ PACAF 130305Z Aug 80 (S), RE0V 7 Aug 10.
2. DIRNSA 290102Z Nov 80 (S), RE0V 25 Nov 10.
1. C3STM42 HistSum Nov 80 (C), REVW 3 Dec 86; CINCPACFLT 280301Z Oct 80 (C), DECL 1 Nov 86.
2. CINCPAC 042335Z Nov 80 (C), DECL 1 Nov 86.
3. JCS 1773/241659Z Nov 80 (C), DECL 18 Nov 86.
1. CINCPAC 012315Z Dec 80 (C/NF), REVW 28 Nov 86.
2. CINCPAC 292004Z Apr 80 (S/NF), DECL 23 Apr 86.
3. USDAO Manila 290324Z Apr 80 (S/NF), REVW 28 Apr 00.
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

1. CINCPAC 301607Z Apr 80 (S/NF), DECL 29 Apr 86; USDAO Manila 030539Z May 80 (S/NF), REVW 3 May 80.
2. CINCPAC 300204Z Apr 80 (S/NF), DECL 29 Apr 86.
3. C3STMZ HistSum Nov 80 (S/NF), REVW 3 Sep 10; CINCPAC 292004Z Apr 80 (S/NF), DECL 23 Apr 86.
4. CINCPAC 090210Z Jul 80 (C), DECL 8 Jul 86; DIRNSA 222117Z Aug 80 (C), DECL 22 Aug 00; DIRNSA 050002Z Sep 80 (S/NF), REVW 3 Sep 10; CINCPACREPPHIL 220010Z Nov 80 (C), DECL 31 Dec 81; CINCPAC 252250Z Nov 80 (C), REVW 23 Jul 10.

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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1. C3SPD HistSum Aug 80 (C), DECL 17 Sep 86; C3SPD Point Paper (S), 18 Aug 80, Subj: ANZUS C3 Interoperability (U), DECL 18 Aug 86; JCS 1771/2622042Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 12 Feb 86.

(U) CINCPAC's position was that long-range problem resolution of technical interoperability of C3 equipment should utilize existing organizations such as the CCEB. CINCPAC would work with ANZUS partners in the ANZUS seminar on the existing operational issues dealing with employment to ensure that identified or potential shortfalls were being addressed and brought to the attention of responsible agencies. CINCPAC would also query the component commands to determine C3 interoperability problems identified during combined exercises such as KANGAROO II and RIMPAC.

(U) The ANZUS seminar was held every 6-8 months for O5/O6 members of the Australian, New Zealand, and U.S. military to meet and discuss matters of mutual concern normally pertaining to combined operations and the conduct of combined exercises. ANZUS Seminar VI, held in Canberra, Australia, 25-29 August 1980, primarily addressed the issue of C3 interoperability.²

1. J3412 Point Paper (S), 13 May 80, Subj: ANZUS Interoperability (U), DECL 13 May 86.
2. C3SPD HistSum Aug 80 (C), DECL 17 Sep 86; C3S/Memo C50-80 of 3 Sep 80 (C), Subj: Trip Report by LCOL B.L. Wulf Attending the ANZUS Seminar in Canberra, Australia 25-28 August 1980 (U), DECL 17 Sep 86.
1. C3SRD31 HistSum Dec 80 (S), REVW 2 Jan 87; JCS 6544/102005Z Sep 80 (S), DECL 8 Sep 86.
2. C3SPD/Memo of 26 Nov 80 (S), Subj: Trip Report - C3 System Pre-Survey Visit to Malaysia; 17-21 Nov 80 (U), REVW 26 Nov 86.
1. USDAO Kuala Lumpur 1222/180722Z Dec 80 (C), REVW 18 Dec 86; CINCPAC 302132Z Dec 80 (C), DECL 24 Dec 86.

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SECTION III--TELECOMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT

Formation of CINCPAC C3S Directorate

(U) In January 1980, several months after Admiral Long's assumption of command, he expressed a desire to see staff supervision of Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) located in one agency at CINCPAC Headquarters, charged with the responsibility for coordinating the command-wide effort of these activities. At the time, there was some fragmentation and overlap of C3 functions between the Operations Directorate (J3) and the Directorate of Communications and Data Processing (J6). Both were charged with similar responsibilities in the long-range functional areas of systems evaluation, requirements, and development of command, control, and communications.1

(U) On 30 January the Deputy Chief of Staff tasked the Director for Personnel to survey staff directorates and recommend the principal staff proponent for C3I as well as the functions to be transferred from other agencies to that proponent. Guidelines established were that staff supervision of C3 would be located in one agency; the proponent would be responsible for coordination of command-wide efforts; operational requirements were paramount; wholesale reorganization actions were not favored; a tightknit, aggressive body would conduct C3 planning; an internal problem identification mechanism was desired; and the C3 proponent should be future-oriented. Admiral Long wanted a link between joint interoperability and the tactical command and control system. Additionally, interoperability should have a dual connotation--for joint Services as well as for combined applications.

(U) Several alternatives regarding placement of a principal staff proponent for C3 systems were considered. The option found to best satisfy the CINC's tasking was the structuring of an organization that would centralize both long-range C3 systems planning and development and day-to-day C3 functions management. Early on, it was determined that the new agency should be concerned only with command, control, and communications; intelligence functions would remain with the Intelligence Directorate (J2). Use of the term "C3" was considered preferable because the intention was to include only those intelligence functions associated with communications in the new organization. In addition, command and control operational functions such as the CINCPAC Command Center and the Airborne Command Post were not included.

(U) On 25 July 1980 the Command, Control, and Communications Systems (C3S) Directorate was established by combining the CINCPAC Communications and Data

1. C3SPD2 HistSum Dec 80 (U), w/encl C3S Reorganization Relook, Nov 80 (U).

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Processing Directorate (J6) and the Technology, Requirements, and Evaluation Division (J34) of the Operations Directorate. It was centralized in Building 35 of the Camp H.M. Smith compound, across the street from the main Headquarters CINCPAC building. The C3S Directorate contained five divisions: Policy and Doctrine (C3SPD); Telecommunications Management (C3STM); Operations Planning, Exercises, and Evaluations (C3SOE); Automatic Data Processing Systems (C3SAS); and Requirements and Development (C3SRD). PD would be responsible for long-range C3 objectives, while RD would be responsible for mid- to long-range planning and requirements development. TM and AS would be concerned with existing systems management.

Satellite Communications for the CINC's Aircraft

(U) On 6 November 1979 Admiral Long wrote to VADM Robert Y. Kaufman, Navy Department Director of Command and Control, saying that one of his first actions upon assuming command was to do a quick analysis of the command and control communications capabilities available to him as CINCPAC. He said he was "reasonably satisfied for now" with his fixed base systems but saw an urgent need to upgrade the communications capability of his command support aircraft. The CINC's C3 capability from his aircraft was HF radio, "subject to all the vagaries of atmospheric propagation." Since CINCPAC normally retained command even when on the road, Admiral Long said he felt it most desirable that the HF equipment on his two support aircraft be supplemented with UHF satellite capability to insure a more positive means of command and control and to facilitate retention of command regardless of where he traveled within the theater.¹

(U) Admiral Long told Admiral Kaufman that the CINCPAC staff recommended using Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM) equipment similar to that which was to be used on PACOM TACAMO aircraft (see Section I of this chapter). AFSATCOM equipment was recommended because it was new and available, and a dedicated channel could be provided on the supporting spacecraft. This equipment would be readily supportable through Navy channels. However, said Admiral Long, until the AFSATCOM airborne terminal could be acquired, he needed some kind of interim capability and asked the Navy's Director of Command and Control for assistance.

(U) VADM Kaufman suggested a three-step approach to meet CINCPAC's near-term and long-range requirements. He said a WSC-3 and ancillary equipment could be installed within 2 or 3 months and worked into the Navy's Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) ground terminal at Wahiawa in central

¹ CINCPAC Ltr of 6 Nov 79 (U), Subj: CINCPAC Support Aircraft Satellite Communications Upgrade.

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Oahu until Air Force Satellite Communications became available. This would get the CINCPAC aircraft on the Gapfiller satellite leased from the COMSAT General Corporation, an interim capability until FLTSATCOM became fully operational. However, the WSC-3 would eventually be replaced with two radios which would be fully compatible with the AFSATCOM channels. These radios, said Admiral Kaufman, should be available by the time the Pacific FLTSATCOM was up and working, about October 1980. One would be installed in the aircraft and the other in Hawaii. The third step would be in about 1983 when CINCPAC's AFSATCOM Consolidated Ground Terminal was installed; the second satellite communications teletype terminal could then be installed permanently in the second aircraft. Both VC-135 aircraft would then terminate into the AFSATCOM ground terminal in Hawaii. For best flexibility, the two radios which were to replace the WSC-3 could be provided in a transit case configuration which would let CINCPAC operate either from the aircraft in flight or on the ground with a portable SATCOM antenna.¹

(U) The installation of the interim communications upgrade as suggested by the Navy was completed, with the satellite terminal and antenna being installed by Hickam AFB maintenance personnel. Airborne testing was successfully conducted on 8 April 1980.²

(U) The UHF satellite terminal worked well during the trip to Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific in the summer, and was extremely reliable. The second step had called for the Navy buying two AFSATCOM Quick Reaction Terminals (QRTs) to provide secure teletype over the satellite circuit. Admiral Long then asked C3S to look into providing secure voice in addition to teletype over this system. The Navy sent a request for proposal to Rockwell International for two QRTs. The reply, in August, gave two options: the first at a cost of $396,000 was for secure teletype only; the second at a cost of $416,000 was also wired to provide secure voice. An additional $290,000 would be required to provide complete secure voice, including logistics support, for a voice downlink through the ground QRT only and have coverage of the Pacific and CONUS areas only. CINCPAC funded $20,000 to cover the cost of chassis wiring and connectors for secure voice on the QRTs.³

(U) On 19 September, Admiral Long wrote to VADM Gordon R. Nagler, VADM Kaufman's successor, saying that although the interim teletype worked well and

1. CNO Ltr of 21 Nov 79 (U), Subj: CINCPAC Support Aircraft Satellite Communications Upgrade.
2. J6123 HistSum Apr 80 (U).
3. C3STM23 HistSum Sep 80 (U); COMNAVELEXSYS 290624Z Aug 80 (U); CINCPAC 060111Z Sep 80 (U).

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was scheduled for upgrading in October 1981, additional steps would have to be taken before he could feel confident that he had positive command and control when embarked, particularly when traveling in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. The most essential need was for reliable secure voice satellite communications as a part of the AFSATCOM upgrade; the other was for a downlink capability to act as a relay to the CINCPAC Command Center so that he could have adequate secure voice when in the Indian Ocean area. Admiral Long asked if acquisition of the AFSATCOM equipment upgrade could not be accelerated.\(^1\)

(U) Admiral Nagler replied on 20 October, saying that, to get the permanent voice capability, CINCPAC would have to submit a Required Operational Capability (ROC) request to the JCS for approval because the scope of the need could not be unilaterally handled by the Navy. The voice requirement impacted on the Air Force for an Indian Ocean relay capability back to the CINCPAC Command Post, and the Army for the GSC-40 to be installed at CINCPAC under Phase III. To temporarily get secure voice, the Navy suggested Parkhill (a CV-3333 vocoder could also be used), but in so doing a fleet command and control net would be preempted.\(^2\)

(C) A ROC was prepared by CINCPAC and forwarded to the JCS for validation on 12 December. The ROC was developed to provide a reliable means of secure voice communications for the CINC on his command support aircraft so that he could maintain effective command and control of PACOM forces while embarked in the theater of operations (Pacific and Indian Oceans) or the CONUS. Initial operational capability was desired for October 1981 to coincide with the installation of the AFSATCOM QRTs. At that time there would be no need to preempt a fleet command and control net and a more versatile means of communication would be available (the QRT could be removed from the aircraft and installed in the embassy or residence of the CINCPAC while on the road).\(^3\)

**Crisis Communications Requirement**

(C) Many political, geographic, economic, and cultural factors made the Pacific theater particularly vulnerable to a crisis, and the command's ability to provide secure voice communications to a remote crisis scene was deficient. CINCPAC needed the capability to react rapidly to a crisis situation in its very early stages and to try to contain it at the lowest possible level.

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1. CINCPAC Ltr of 19 Sep 80 (U), Subj: CINCPAC Support Aircraft Satellite Communications Upgrade.
2. C3STM23 HistSum Nov 80 (U).
3. C3STM23 HistSum Dec 80 (C), REVW 6 Jan 87; CINCPAC ROC for CINCPAC Command Support Aircraft Long Haul Secure Voice Communications (C), REVW 6 Jan 87.
Headquarters CINCPAC submitted a Required Operational Capability (ROC 14) to the JCS for lightweight, easily transportable satellite terminals which could provide secure voice and record communications at the scene of a crisis. Two levels of capability were envisioned:

- An extremely light, man-transportable terminal which would provide a single secure voice circuit back to CINCPAC. Eight of these terminals were required to be forward deployed throughout the Pacific Command for reaction to a crisis scene within 8 hours.

- A relatively light, truck-transportable terminal which would provide two secure voice and one secure facsimile circuit for a larger crisis reaction force such as a Joint Task Force back to CINCPAC. Two of these terminals were envisioned, one deployed to a Western Pacific location and the other in Hawaii.

The existing and planned communications systems in the PACOM could not provide the security, flexibility, and responsiveness required for rapid deployment to all potential crisis areas with the needed level of capability. Communications support in remote PACOM areas had traditionally been provided primarily by HF radio. Some communication was possible via satellite circuits. A limited military satellite capability was available through deployment of JCS contingency terminals which were limited in number and were quite large.

CINCPAC ROC 14 was incorporated into the Joint Crisis Management Capability (JCMC) program. Concurrent development of a combined JCMC Level 2 and Level 3 was sufficiently similar to the Small Communications Augmentation Package requirement that a common modular solution was anticipated. A modular communications package that would satisfy both requirements was approved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD/C3I) in June 1980. Fiscal Year 1981 funds were directed to be reprogrammed to give a mid-1983 initial operational capability. The ASD/C3I also issued a memorandum implementing JCMC Level 1 (the Lightweight Communications Kit) with an interim capability to be provided by mid-1982 and full capability by mid-1984.

1. J6125 Point Paper (C), 14 Jan 80, Subj: Crisis Communications Requirements (U), DECL 31 Dec 85.
2. PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan, Enclosure (2) CINCPAC Required Operational Capabilities (U), C3SRD Ser S139 of 26 Mar 81 (S/NF), REVW 30 Jun 80.
3. Ibid.
MEECN Satellite Capability

The JCS Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN) Plan of December 1978 had required a PACOM capability to patch the MEECN satellite channel from the Lincoln Experimental Satellite 9 (LES-9) and the Pacific Gapfiller Satellite system at the Air Force Tactical Satellite Facility at Wahiawa, Hawaii. Accordingly, CINCPAC tasked PACAF to provide this capability with remote switching at the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post operational facility communications center at Hickam AFB. The capability was achieved on 4 January 1980. When directed to be used, this would allow one-way UHF satellite connectivity from the National Emergency Airborne Command Post, flying under the LES-9 footprint over the CONUS area, to the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post, flying under the Gapfiller footprint in the Pacific Ocean area—or reverse.1

SCOPE DAWN Satellite Ground Terminal

The SCOPE DAWN satellite ground terminal at Wahiawa was modified between 8 and 12 December 1980 so it could operate (TATS (Tactical Transmission System) modulation) over the AFSATCOM wideband frequency plans in addition to the Pacific Gapfiller and LES-9 satellite frequency plans. The purpose of this modification was for the Air Force to allow the Navy to terminate the Gapfiller lease as a cost savings move and rely on the FLTSATCOM/AFSATCOM systems. This modification would also allow the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post ground entry over AFSATCOM once the Gapfiller lease expired. A worldwide technical test was conducted on 15 December to insure proper operation of TATS modulation on the AFSATCOM wideband channel. The CINCPAC ABNCP operations facility transmitted ten versions of a designated test message via AFSAT 100W using TATS modulation. The Alternate National Military Command Center/Brandywine, National Emergency Airborne Command Post, CNCSAC ABNCP, and TACAMO Atlantic monitored the broadcast, which was a complete success.2

PACOM AUTOCONET

CINCPAC informed DIA on 1 January 1980 that all terminals of the PACOM AUTODIN Conferencing Network (AUTOCONET) were equipped with Tempest modifications; therefore, the system was declared operational as of 2 January. The PACOM AUTOCONET would be used in conjunction with the All-Source Information Center (ASIC) network from that date until approximately 20 February, when the CINCPAC AUTOCONET terminal was to be moved to the new command center.

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1. J6225 HistSum Feb 80 (S), REVW 22 Aug 99.
2. C3STM HistSum Dec 80 (U).
and activated in the communications support room. Contingent upon successful AUTOCONET operation (including personnel training), and activation of the Alaskan Air Command, COMUS Japan, and Thirteenth Air Force AUTOCONET terminals during January and February, the ASIC network would be deactivated on 4 March. The PACOM AUTOCONET would assume the primary all-source operations conferencing responsibility on that date.¹

**Hardening to EMP (Project APACHE)**

{(S)} Project APACHE, initiated in early 1975, was a joint CINCPAC/DNA (Defense Nuclear Agency) program to provide a quantitative assessment of the vulnerability of PACOM C4 (Command, Control, Communications, and Computers) networks to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) caused by high-altitude (75-300 km) nuclear detonations. Preliminary APACHE findings indicated that PACOM C4 capabilities were highly vulnerable to high-altitude EMP (HAEMP) and that only one high-altitude nuclear explosion in the Pacific area could cause disastrous disruption of national and PACOM command and control and totally impair such critical functions as emergency action and intelligence/warning message flow. Unlike the CONUS or Europe where landmass communication grids and rings were possible, the PACOM was totally dependent upon a few critical transmission and switching nodes.²

{(S)} An urgent operational requirement draft, setting forth the scope of the problem and proposed corrective actions, was submitted to the JCS at the end of February 1980. The APACHE EMP protection effort was planned in two phases. Phase I would utilize $280,000 of FY 81 CINC Initiative Funds to obtain the services of a U.S. contractor with EMP-trained engineers and technicians to assist in the development of a PACOM-oriented EMP protection plan and to make modifications to selected items of communications equipment if necessary. Phase II required $250,000 of FY 82 CINC Initiative Funds to provide training and experience for PACOM personnel in EMP protection, planning, engineering, installation, and maintenance procedures in order to phase out the support required of contractors. This phase would still require continued EMP-capable contractor support.³

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1. J6124 HistSum Jan 80 (U).
2. CINCPAC 210513Z May 80 (S), DECL 31 May 86.
3. Ibid; CINCPAC 230347Z Feb 80 (C), DECL 20 Feb 86.
1. C3STM23 HistSum Nov 80 (S/FRD).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.; C3S/Memorandum for Record/14 Nov 80 (S/FRD), Subj: Special Communications System for Korea (U).
Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment

2. JCS 2780/121653Z Aug 80 (S), DECL 8 Aug 86.
1. CINCPAC 270113Z Aug 80 (S), DECL 27 Aug 86.
2. Ibid.
Indian Ocean Communications

The only fixed U.S. communications facility in the Indian Ocean area was Diego Garcia. There, the U.S. Naval Communications Station Diego Garcia was activated in March 1973 to support both national and naval communications requirements in the Indian Ocean. This station had the following communications capabilities: primary access to the Defense Communications System via the U.S. Indian Ocean satellite; HF radio back up to satellite access; dual access to the AUTODIN system for general service and special intelligence record traffic; AUTOVON access; connectivity to the CINCPAC Voice Alerting Network; fleet multi-channel HF broadcast relay; fleet ship/shore radio channels; antisubmarine air/ground teletype circuit with patrol aircraft; PACOM HF/DF network station; air traffic control and flight following; HF radio link for weather data; one AUTOSEVOCOM trunk; and Military Affiliate Radio Station. Projected improvements included digital upgrade from Diego Garcia to Clark AB, replacing the existing obsolete satellite terminal, and installing a frequency sounder system for improved frequency selection.\(^1\)

With the existing level of forces (two carrier battle groups) in the Indian Ocean area, the Diego Garcia station and the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) were operating at maximum capacity. Additional communications requirements would necessitate completion of the digital upgrade and/or deployment of a contingency satellite terminal or a command and control platform. Preemption of existing circuits could also be required because of overloading of the satellite.\(^2\)

Diego Garcia/Clark Trunk Expansion

In December 1979 the Naval Communications Station Diego Garcia requested an expansion of the DSCS satellite link to Clark from 6 to 12 channels to satisfy the need to support increased Indian Ocean operations in the form of improved AUTODIN, AUTOVON, AUTOSEVOCOM, extension of dedicated teletype support, and special communications to support ASW/ocean surveillance missions. Numerous alternatives to achieve an expeditious increased capability were pursued by the Navy, Defense Communications Agency, and CINCPAC, and the decision was made to proceed with the 12 channel expansion. The U.S. Army Communications Systems Agency (USACSA), acting as the executive agent for DSCS earth terminals, directed the overall effort to accomplish interservice actions for engineering, logistics, installation, and testing support.\(^3\)

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1. J6212 Point Paper (C), Subj: Indian Ocean Communications (U), DECL 14 Jan 86.
2. Ibid.
(U) The 12-channel expansion was to be achieved by use of a digital communications subsystem, MSC-66 van at the TSC-54 earth terminal at Diego Garcia and the MSC-46 earth terminal at Clark, to convert the 6-channel analog signal to a 12-channel digital link. This approach would achieve the desired expansion with minimal impact on the critical Indian Ocean DSCS satellite. Initial operating capability was scheduled for 29 August 1980. The USACSA directed that the Clark MSC-46 be evaluated and any intermodulation problems be rectified prior to acceptance testing. Diego Garcia then identified a serious electrical power system problem which also impacted on the testing schedule, and the IOC was slipped to late September. A further delay was necessary to accommodate corrective actions to reduce the critical Indian Ocean DSCS satellite power loading problem. These actions were culminated in a successful test and a 29 October 1980 cutover to the Diego Garcia/Clark digital communications subsystem 12-channel expansion.1

Fleet Satellite Coverage

(e) The increased tempo of operations in the Indian Ocean saturated the existing communications satellite. In response to CINCPACFLT's requests in early January 1980 for additional support, the Navy made a review of available options and the following actions were initiated by the CNO to increase the capability and flexibility of satellite communications in the area:2

- The Commander Naval Electronic Systems Command was directed to reactivate both narrowband channels on the Atlantic Gapfiller Satellite.

- The Commander Naval Telecommunications Command was directed to review high data and low data rate accesses on the Atlantic and Indian Ocean UHF satellites and to coordinate relocation of Atlantic and Mediterranean users from the Indian Ocean Gapfiller to the Atlantic satellites until Fleet Satellite F-2 was in a position to support fully the Indian Ocean area. Further, the command would provide an access scheme for increased capacity and support of Indian Ocean battle groups.

- The Electronics Systems Command was also directed to expedite the testing and accelerate the transit of Fleet Satellite F-3 to arrive at 65° W about 10 February, at which time F-2 would be moved easterly at 6 degrees per day until Indian Ocean coverage was provided. In response to operational requirements of CINCUSNAVEUR, the easterly drift rate of F-2 was to be decreased.

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1. Ibid.
2. J6124 HistSum Feb 80 (C), REVW 31 Dec 86; CNO 232047Z Jan 80 (S), REVW 31 Dec 86.
to 1 degree per day beginning at 70° E in order to test for optimum F-2 positioning between 70° and 75° E for simultaneous access by both Rota (Spain) and Guam, if feasible.

- The Electronic Systems Command was to locate and plan for additional UHF ground terminals that could be installed at Guam and Diego Garcia, and investigate the feasibility of expediting satellite communications secure voice installations on deployed Indian Ocean ships as well as on ships to be deployed in the future.

(C) The net effect of these actions was to provide immediate additional accesses for PACFLT use on the Indian Ocean Gapfiller and to expedite final positioning of the Indian Ocean FLTSATCOM satellite (29 February vice 7 May). More specifically, the actions would: ¹

- Provide additional Atlantic satellite communications channels immediately to aid in the realignment of JCS contingency and Commander Middle East Force access to the Atlantic satellites. This freed up to two high data rate and four low data rate channels for Indian Ocean battle group support.

- Permit movement of FLTSAT F-2 prior to FLTSAT F-3 arriving on station at 23° W, placing F-3 in operation immediately following compressed warranty testing, satisfying SAC connectivity requirements, and thereby providing Indian Ocean satellite coverage (including Malaysia) by about 16 February

- Establish the program necessary to increase the total number of ground terminal accesses possible for use on the increased number of channels available with both the Gapfiller and fleet satellites.

- Maximize the effort to equip Indian Ocean battle group units with CV-3333 satellite communications secure voice.

(G) Movement of the Atlantic FLTSAT F-2 prior to contractor testing and operational availability of the newly launched FLTSAT F-3 west of 65° W was not feasible because of required connectivity between CINCSAC and Mildenhall, UK. ²

Radio Frequency Control

(G) In response to a Commander Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (COMRDJTF) request of 1 May 1980, CINCPAC said the assignment of radio frequencies to meet

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
communications requirements within the Indian Ocean area could best be supported by CINCPAC because the Indian Ocean data base was in a constant state of flux as new frequency requests, based on on-going operations, were introduced by Service headquarters. A copy of the Indian Ocean data base would be obsolete upon receipt at RDJTF Headquarters. Therefore, CINCPAC recommended that he retain overall management and control of frequencies in support of all requirements in the Indian Ocean area. CINCPAC would forward a copy of the frequency data base to RDJTF for information and planning purposes, with updates to follow by message.1

(C) CINCPAC further recommended that COMRDJTF, when specific units/equipment/locations were known, conduct an electromagnetic compatibility analysis based on (among other things) the CINCPAC Indian Ocean data base, and forward frequency recommendations to CINCPAC for final assignment action and update of the data base. The CINCPAC crisis data base was being maintained on a Wang 2200VP mini-computer, and all software and data files were available on request. CINCPAC was also attempting to acquire similar systems for subordinate unified commands, along with a deployable system for crisis requirements. Should these systems become available, it was anticipated that the deployable unit would be at COMRDJTF disposal.2

(S/NF) Nevertheless, the Readiness Command (USCINCRED) on 4 June submitted a frequency request to USCINCEUR in support of RDJTF planning for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. The European Command said it had no objections for assignments in any band except for HF frequencies in Saudi Arabia, and asked that CINCPAC take the appropriate action. Frequencies assigned could then be put in the Indian Ocean data base and distributed to USCINCRED, RDJTF, and USCINCEUR. Frequencies were unclassified but their use was classified SECRET/Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.3

(S/NF) As requested, no host nation coordination was attempted. Frequency assignments were provided by CINCPAC after extensive research of available U.S. military and international frequency records.4

1. CSSTM33 HistSum Sep 80 (S/NF), REVW 20 Sep 85; CINCPAC 062234Z May 80 (C), DECL 5 May 86.
2. Ibid.
3. USCINCRED 041855Z Jun 80 (S), REVW 30 May 88; USCINCRED 012052Z Aug 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Jul 86.
4. CINCPAC 152326Z Sep 80 (S/NF), REVW 20 Sep 85.
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DCS Reconfiguration in Japan

(U) A quid pro quo proposal associated with the Defense Communications System (DCS) reconfiguration plan for the Kanto Plain (Tokyo area) of Japan had first been submitted to the Government of Japan (GOJ) in April 1977. Basically, this proposal had offered the GOJ Camp Drake (also known as Camp Asaka) and Fuchu Air Station in exchange for the GOJ providing a communications building and 120 units of family housing at Camp Zama. The GOJ Defense Facilities Administration Agency officially responded to the proposal in October 1978, indicating it could not agree with the family housing portion of the plan. A PACAF cost analysis of various courses of action concluded that Yokota Air Base was better suited than Camp Zama for the consolidated DCS facility, and the JCS approved the change. COMUS Japan submitted a revised quid pro quo proposal reflecting this change to the GOJ in July 1979.¹

(U) The July 1979 proposal was based on the premise that Fuchu real estate, except for the joint use Air Defense Operations Team facility, should be totally vacated and that the United States should take full advantage of any possible quid the Japanese could offer. However, Headquarters PACAF informed COMUS Japan on 8 February 1980, conditions had changed. The GOJ, through the Facilities Improvement Relocation Panel, had informally expressed difficulty with the Tama Relay proposal and the AUTOVON switch. The Tama site was zoned residential and would cause approval problems. Further, said PACAF, it was in its best interests under bilateral study proposals to have the relay at Fuchu rather than Tama. The AUTOVON switch posed a fiscal problem owing to limited funds being available from projected land sales. Therefore, PACAF recommended the AUTOVON switch be withdrawn from the quid pro quo offer as a GOJ-provided item. The United States would provide a new switch to be installed in a new GOJ-constructed facility at Yokota. PACAF further recommended that the microwave relay facility be located on Fuchu rather than Tama.²

(U) Based on these PACAF recommendations, CINCPAC asked COMUS Japan to modify his July 1979 proposal to show these changes. COMUS Japan and Fifth Air Force drafted a revision to the Facilities Subcommittee Memorandum for the DCS reconfiguration in the Kanto Plain based on the need to retain certain facilities at Fuchu so as to interface with the Japan Self-Defense Force under bilateral planning. This would result in retention of the existing Kanto Plain microwave configuration. The major facilities (the AUTOVON switch, the AUTODIN switch, the primary technical control, the commercial interface, and tandem switches) would be moved from Fuchu and Drake to Yokota.³

¹ J6235 Point Paper (U), 27 May 80. Subj: DCS Reconfiguration in the Kanto Plain.
² J6235 HistSum Feb 80 (U); Hq PACAF 080200Z Feb 80 (U)
³ COMUSJ 130010Z Feb 80 (U).

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(U) The revised quid pro quo proposal was submitted to the GOJ Facilities Subcommittee on 18 March. It deleted the provision for a GOJ-provided AUTOVON switch and the Tama microwave facility. CINCPAC on 1 April then asked DCA to expedite preparation of the required System Engineering Plan and Management Engineering Plan for the Kanto Plain reconfiguration proposal.¹

(U) The USFJ memorandum of 1 April 1980 was the third revision of the original memorandum of April 1977, referring to the release of North Camp Asaka and Fuchu Air Station. It stated the United States proposed to release Camp Asaka (except for the portion necessary for the Far East Network transmitter site) and the Fuchu Communications Station (except for those portions necessary for the operation of the Air Defense Operation Team and the microwave facility and tower), upon provision by the GOJ (at no cost to the U.S. Government) of the following replacement facilities: a communications building at Yokota AB of approximately 52,700 sq ft net floor area and including all utilities and generators; telecommunications systems at Yokota, Fuchu, and Kamiseya; expanded technical control facilities at Kamiseya and Camp Zama; interconnecting cable systems for all newly installed facilities; and orderwire systems for the newly installed microwave facilities and interface with existing orderwire systems at each location. The proposal appeared to be acceptable to the GOJ, and approval was expected within 12 months.²

**COMMANDO LION Frequency Interference**

(S) A critical shortfall in Korea was the lack of an all-weather/night air strike capability to support U.S. and ROK forces in a contingency. The only all-weather/night bombing capability possessed by PACAF at the end of 1979 was radar bombing using either ground beacons or the TPB-1 ground radar bomb directing set. A LORAN-guided strike system had been tested in Southeast Asia, and it provided the versatility and accuracy needed to conduct all-weather strike missions. A proposal to upgrade the Northwest Pacific LORAN C chain was approved to meet this deficiency and assigned the code name of COMMANDO LION. This plan called for the upgrade of existing LORAN C stations on Hokkaido and Okinawa in Japan and construction of two additional transmitter stations in the vicinity of Pohang and Kwangju, Korea. The U.S. Coast Guard

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1. J6235 HistSum Mar 80 (U); COMUSJ 200016Z Mar 80 (U); CINCPAC 011951Z Apr 80 (U).
2. C3STM24 HistSum Jul 80 (U); Memorandum FSUS-474-2297-S(AF), USFJ to Facilities Subcommittee of 1 Apr 80 (U), Subj: Release of Camp Asaka, FAC 3048, and Fuchu Communications Station, FAC 3016; J6235 Point Paper (U), 27 May 80, Subj: DCS Reconfiguration in the Kanto Plain.
monitors located at Osan AB and near Pusan would be used to feed information automatically to the Coast Guard Far East Sector Headquarters at Yokota AB, Japan.¹

(C) The initial on-the-air date for the transmitter stations in Korea was 1 February 1980. There was no interference or reports of interference from any of the nearby facilities at that time. Six weeks later, however, on 18 March, a formal interference report was initiated by the 314th Air Division in response to a verbal request from the Minister of Communications that they were experiencing problems at Pohang on the commercial telephone system. A Pacific Communications Area electromagnetic compatibility team investigated and confirmed the interference, but was not successful in correcting the problem. On 3 September PACAF asked the Air Force Communications Command (AFCC) for assistance.

(U) AFCC solicited the advice of industry experts and arranged for consultation by contract with qualified engineers experienced in cable radio frequency interference and cable carrier telephone systems. The USAF 1842d Electronic Engineering Group team arrived on site on 19 September to investigate and held meetings with the Pacific Communications Area team and with Ministry of Communications representatives. The Ministry was concerned with maintaining uniformity and standardization in their systems and said it would not like to make changes which resulted in additional maintenance and test equipment requirements. The AFCC team provided USAF with recommendations to resolve the interference problem: vacate the 72-120 kilohertz (KHZ) frequency range and move to the 120-168 KHZ range. This would result in minimal equipment modifications. The Ministry agreed to conduct a test at USAF expense to determine if the U.S. proposal was satisfactory in eliminating the interference.

(S) When fully operational, COMMANDO LION was expected to provide reliable LORAN coverage over the entire Korean Peninsula, extending north to the Yalu River.

Communications Security

Interservice Interoperability

(U) A CINCPAC representative attended the Worldwide Communications Security (COMSEC) Conference sponsored by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14-15 February 1980. His participation was required for the identification of common cryptographic keying materials that would meet CINCPAC's

1. C3STM11 Point Paper (S), Subj: COMMANDO LION (U), DECL 31 Dec 85.
and component commanders' interoperability requirements for secure command and control communications when responding to inter-theater crisis or contingency situations.\(^1\)

\(-\) On 28 January CINCPAC hosted the first Joint COMSEC Working Group meeting with the components for the purpose of early identification of inter-service interoperability problems which could occur with the introduction of new COMSEC equipment in the PACOM. Items discussed ranged from worldwide keying materials for contingency operations to the Secure Voice Improvement Program. Participants gained a greater appreciation of other Service philosophies on new equipment integration, delivery schedules, keying material requirements, and other considerations attendant to the joint COMSEC program.\(^2\)

\(-\) At the second Joint COMSEC Working Group meeting at CINCPAC on 22 May, the principal theme revolved around those intra-/inter-service secure voice communications requirements deemed to be most critical to command and control communications in the PACOM. The uncertainty surrounding delivery/implementation dates for the new second generation secure voice systems within PACOM was considered to be a major adverse factor in PACOM readiness planning. Where USAF planning called for implementing an operational Vinson secure capability in Korea beginning in FY 82, Army plans called for implementation of Vinson in Korea in FY 85-86. The Army's efforts were being directed at filling existing Nestor shortfalls in the Pacific by FY 82. Vinson and Nestor equipment were not compatible. Faced with this dilemma, Air Force and Army efforts to achieve the interoperability considered vital for combined operations to successfully prosecute a war in Korea would be seriously jeopardized during the FY 82-86 non-compatibility period. The participants discussed the possibility of the Army shifting priorities to develop a Vinson capability in Korea in conjunction with the Air Force plans or, alternatively, developing a Vinson/Nestor interface device.\(^3\)

\(-\) Reporting to the JCS on the meeting, CINCPAC said it recognized that several compounding interoperability factors would require resolution even if a partial introduction of Vinson equipment diverted from the European theater were possible. Initially, obstacles related to logistical and maintenance support, operator training, etc., associated with the introduction of new communications hardware, would require detailed planning and coordination efforts. However, CINCPAC believed the situation as it was developing warranted immediate consideration and review at the JCS/DOD level. Before taking further

\(^{1}\) J613 HistSum Feb 80 (U)
\(^{2}\) J6131 HistSum Jan 80, DECL 31 Dec 86.
\(^{3}\) J613 HistSum Jun 80 (C), REVW 10 Jun 80; CINCPAC 140411Z Jun 80 (C), REVW 10 Jun 80.
action, CINCPAC requested a JCS forecast of Vinson equipment availability as well as priorities that might be altered to effectively bridge the serious interservice COMSEC gap. This would be preferable to an interface device.1

(C) The May meeting also dealt with the Pacific Fleet's ongoing installation schedule for secure HF voice (KY-75 Parkhill) capability in the Western and Eastern Pacific regions and the quick reaction program for KY-75 temporary installation aboard ships operating in the Indian Ocean that had not received their permanent KY-75 installation. It was recommended that aircraft carriers complete their KY-75 installation and have RYQ-75 spare kits on board prior to Western Pacific deployment.

(C) On 15 July CINCPAC hosted the first Joint COMSEC/OPSEC (Operations Security) Working Group meeting with the components. Discussed were future exercise schedules, joint tasking, area threat briefings, and problems associated with reporting requirements. All departed with a better understanding of CINCPAC's requirement for COMSEC/OPSEC monitoring during future exercises and a greater knowledge of problems experienced by their contemporaries in other Services.2

Exercise COMSEC Monitoring

(C) Telephone monitoring at CINCPAC Headquarters during JCS Exercise PRIZE GAUNTLET, 24-28 March 1980, was conducted with the support of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Theater Intelligence Center Pacific. Preliminary indications were that very favorable procedures were used in radiotelephone operations. There were virtually no security violations or disclosures of sensitive or classified information noted by the monitors.3

(C) An extensive COMSEC monitoring effort was conducted by the Naval Security Group Detachment, Pearl Harbor, during Exercise PROUD SPIRIT, 27 October - 14 November 1980, with the objective of detecting, identifying, and evaluating weaknesses in the CINCPAC staff communications security posture. Thirty telephone lines were monitored daily from 0730 to 1600 in CINCPAC's Communications Control Facility. During the 1,860 hours monitored, 1,095 conversations were evaluated, of which 504 (46 percent) were determined to be official in nature. Although exercise participants had been pre-briefed that monitoring would be conducted, a significant amount of classified or sensitive information was in fact discussed over unsecure telephone lines. The majority

1. Ibid.
2. C3STM4 HistSum Jul 80 (C), DECL 31 Dec 86.
3. J6131 HistSum Mar 80 (C), DECL 10 Apr 86.
of the disclosures revealed the nature, participants, and dates of PROUD SPIRIT and several other future exercises.¹

Emission Security

-(C)- The Chief of Naval Operations on 14 August 1980 cautioned his various commanders that there had been in recent years a significant increase in the number and types of automatic data processing and word processing equipment within the Navy [and in the other Services as well]. These machines interacted with each other to exchange data via protected distribution systems. Much of this equipment radiated compromising emanations and improperly shielded and/or installed distribution systems were susceptible to exploitation. A Tempest signal emission vulnerability existed if the compromising emanations were picked up by other connective media and transmitted outside the control zone where it could be exploited by a hostile force. For example, if the equipment was processing classified information near a telephone, the emanations could be picked up by the instrument and transmitted outside the area where the signal could be intercepted.²

-(C)- Commands processing classified information on automatic data processing, word processing, or protected distribution systems that had not been Tempest certified were told to submit requests for certification, and commands anticipating the purchase or lease of such equipment were ordered to adhere to existing instructions regarding national policy on control of compromising emanations. Shore commands using this equipment were instructed to visually inspect the entire system for emission security control every six months.

COMSEC Materials System

(U) Throughout 1980 superseded Communications Security Material System (CMS) materials were turned in or destroyed and the monthly destruction reports were sent to the Director CMS in Washington, D.C. Ready reserve material was received throughout the year from various agencies, and all transfers and destructions were reported to them and to the Director CMS. There were 346 transactions or transfers of CMS materials in 1980, 55 more than in 1979.³

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1. C3STM42 HistSum Nov 80 (C), REVW 3 Dec 86; CINCPAC O10053Z Oct 80 (C), DECL 30 Sep 86.
2. CNO 141922Z Aug 80 (C), REVW 7 Jul 86.
1. J6131 HistSums Apr, May 80 (U); C3STM42 HistSum Aug 80 (S), REVW 10 Sep 00.
2. C3STM42 HistSum Nov 80 (C), REVW 15 Dec 80; CINCPAC 310225Z Oct 80 (C), DECL 30 Nov 86.
3. Ibid.
CHAPTER VII
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
SECTION I--GENERAL

(U) In February 1979 the State Department requested a security assistance appropriation of $2,794.5 million: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits--$656.3; Military Assistance Program (MAP)--$110.2; International Military Education and Training (IMET)--$32.9; and Security Supporting Assistance (renamed Economic Support Fund)--$1,995.1. The military security assistance program was a continuation of President Carter's old arms transfer policy which specified that the United States would not:

- Be the first supplier to introduce into a region newly developed advanced weapons which would create a new or significantly higher combat capability.
- Sell such weapons until they were operationally deployed with U.S. forces.
- Permit development of advanced weapons solely for export.
- Permit coproduction by other countries of significant weapons, equipment, or major components.
- Allow U.S. weapons or equipment to be transferred to third countries without U.S. Government consent.
- Permit U.S. Embassy, military, or industrial representatives abroad to promote the sale of arms.

-(E)—Major U.S. allies, including 14 NATO nations, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan were exempt from the above restrictions. However, the goal of an eight percent annual reduction in arms sales corresponded with a drive for budget austerity along with emphasis on human rights. The FY 80 funding for PACOM countries is depicted on the accompanying chart. By the end of 1979 Congress had not appropriated funds for the FY 80 program. The drive for

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proposed</th>
<th>Allocated</th>
<th>Expended</th>
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<td>26,233</td>
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a. CDA levels.
b. Supply operations only for delivery of previously MIP funded material.
c. MIP under Sec 505(a) drawdown authority for Thailand in FY 80 in the amount of $1.1 million.

Source: Proposed FY 80 CPD, Allocation, SEESTATE 2080/3015/1Z Jul 90; Expended, FY 82 CPD.

(Reverse Blank p. 372) 374
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>MAF (Grant Materiel)</th>
<th>IMETP (Grant Training)</th>
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<td>FY 81(^a)</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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\(^a\) Continuing Resolution Authority levels.
\(^b\) Wind-up costs under Section 516(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act, including supply operations.
\(^c\) Supply operations only for delivery of previously MAP-funded materiel. The grant MAP for Taiwan ended in FY 75.
\(^d\) MAP under Section 506(a) drawdown authority was implemented for Thailand in FY 80 in the amount of $1.1 million.

SOURCE: FY 82 Congressional Presentation Document.
fiscal austerity ultimately resulted in an announcement by the State Department that there was "virtually no possibility that the FY 80 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Bill will become law, and security assistance programs thus will remain at continuing resolution levels for remainder of FY 80. Department recognizes problems caused by this severe underfunding of FMS and IMET programs, and regrets that our strenuous efforts to obtain more reasonable levels were defeated by last minute Congressional action to delete FMS and IMET increases from FY 80 omnibus supplemental appropriation."

(U) When the FY 81 security assistance package was presented to Congress, the Administration's position reflected a change towards defense related issues. There were recommendations for an increased defense budget, slightly higher security assistance funding levels, and changes in security assistance legislation. Also President Carter had made an exception to the arms transfer policy by permitting U.S. aerospace firms to design an FX fighter specifically for export. This was followed by an announcement that the eight percent reduction in arms sales would not be applied.

(U) Again no foreign assistance appropriations bill was signed and funding for FY 81 remained under continuing resolution authority (CRA). However, some significant amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and Arms Export Control Act (AECA) were passed under the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 on 16 December 1980 as Public Law 96-533. Shortly thereafter CINCPAC advised all PACOM security assistance organizations of the following changes affecting the security assistance program which included:

- MAP - delivery dates for material would be extended from three to five years after program termination and MAP funds could be merged with country funds to defray FMS costs.
- Presidential emergency transfer authority was increased from $10 to $50 million per year.
- IMET - Australia, Japan, and New Zealand could enter into reciprocal training agreements with the United States; the method of

1. Ibid.; SECSTATE 201885/301541Z Jul 80 (C), E.O. 12065: 7/28/86.
3. CINCPAC 122232Z Jan 81 (U).
computing training costs was changed so that henceforth prices would be based only on additional costs incurred by the U.S. Government for training foreign students; and permitted IMET program countries to purchase training at IMET vice FMS prices.

- Congressional notification on design and construction services would be required only on those cases which exceeded $200 million; further, notification would be required on third country transfer of U.S. military equipment exceeding $7 million for major defense equipment and $25 million for all other types, however, NATO, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand were exempted.

- The limit on commercial sales was raised from $35 to $100 million; sales over $100 million would have to be made under FMS procedures. NATO countries, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand were exempt.

- Restrictions were lifted on export of the STABALLOY (depleted uranium) round.

- The requirement to appropriate funds for credit guarantees was removed.

Security Assistance Reporting Requirements

(U) Under new security assistance procedures instituted in July 1978, the State and Defense Departments had decided to revise and consolidate reporting requirements. In an effort to eliminate redundancy, strengthen estimates, allow field participation in the zero-based budget process, and economize on reporting, two new reports would be submitted by Country Teams to the State Department with information copies to OSD, the JCS, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and unified commanders. The first report, an Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance, replaced three reports, and on 26 May 1979 CINCPAC forwarded the initial PACOM prioritized listing of MAP, FMS financing, and IMET funding and manning levels to the JCS as discussed in the 1979 CINCPAC Command History.¹

(U) The second new reporting requirement was for an annual Consolidated Data Report to be used in preparation of the Congressional Presentation

Document (CPD) and was due 15 December. This report would provide an update of the May submission of projection of defense articles and services each country might wish to acquire during the forthcoming budget year, including program description and justification. Because there were no substantive comments, CINCPAC did not submit a report in 1979. A State Department message of 28 October 1980 gave additional reporting guidance, revised the submission date to 14 November, and provided FY 82 security assistance budget request levels. No inputs were received from Bangladesh and Nepal, and Pakistan's was not received in time for inclusion in CINCPAC's initial submission. CINCPAC's message to the JCS generally supported higher program levels for FY 82 than were requested by the State Department, with the exception of the India IMET program. CINCPAC recommended reallocation of $200,000 from India's IMET funds to Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. The message also emphasized that CINCPAC should be given the opportunity to provide a timely military judgment on all proposed commercial and FMS sales of significant combat equipment to PACOM countries.

PACOM Security Assistance Conference

(U) The annual PACOM Security Assistance Conference was held 28 to 30 October 1980 at Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii. The 100 plus attendees included senior representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, the JCS, Military Departments, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, European Command, Southern Command, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Far East Branch of the GAO, American Institute in Taiwan, U.S. Army War College, Air Force Institute of Technology, CINCPAC staff, component commands, and PACOM security assistance organizations (SAOs). Conference opening and closing remarks were made by Admiral Long and the Director, DSAA, gave the keynote address.

(U) Topics at the two previous conferences had centered on management initiatives within the framework of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 (as amended), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), and administration policy stated in Presidential Decision 13. The basic tenets guiding MAP, IMET, FMS Credit and Cash Sales and the arms transfer process were essentially static.

1. SECSTATE 167901/010215Z Jul 78 (C), GDS-84; J453 HistSum Dec 80 (S), DECL 8 Jan 87; SECSTATE 287651/280743Z Oct 80, GDS 10/27/86; CINCPAC 031835Z Dec 80 (S), DECL 25 Nov 86.


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The consensus of the 1980 conference was that changes in the U.S. security assistance programs were needed and that policy guidelines for field personnel should encompass a more comprehensive view centered on collective security. Weapons systems transferred to recipient nations had increased in sophistication, thereby complicating maintenance and training requirements. Standardization and interoperability, therefore, should be important security assistance objectives.¹

(U) Cited among the weaknesses of the U.S. security assistance program were complex management and accounting procedures and insufficient funds and manpower to meet stated objectives. Many countries in PACOM viewed U.S. legislation as excessively restrictive. Policy was ambiguous, and the acquisition process slow and cumbersome. Nevertheless, the United States was generally considered a credible partner in meeting legitimate defense needs, particularly in terms of product quality, training, and long-term support.²

(U) Several major problems were identified by the conferees during formal presentations and discussions. Of prime concern was the adverse impact of long procurement lead times which host countries perceived as unresponsiveness to their requirements and which frequently resulted in escalating costs. As follow-up, CINCPAC solicited lead time data from the Military Departments on major weapons systems and equipment and forwarded to PACOM SAOs recommendations by the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command for minimizing the impact of long lead times. In addition, CINCPAC forwarded the results of a survey of PACOM SAOs to DSAA, EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, and the Military Departments which revealed the following major categories of FMS procedural irritants to host nations:³

- Excessive delays from time of approval to receipt in-country of letters of offer/acceptance (LOAs) and price and availability (P&A) data.
- Lack of firm price data and unexpected price increases.
- Lack of accurate delivery schedules and slippage in stated schedules.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.; CINCPAC Ltr Ser 618 of 31 Mar 81 (U), Subj: PACOM Security Assistance Activities Bulletin (SAAB), No. 38; CINCPAC 140411Z Nov 80, 142020Z Nov 80, 160340Z Jan 81, 202335Z Jan 81, all (U).

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(U) A second major concern was the continued reduction of manpower in security assistance organizations. CINCPAC agreed to conduct a thorough review of security assistance manpower requirements, including clarification of functional responsibilities, and initiate necessary changes. Especially, there was a need for legislative relief to permit SAOs to provide advice and assistance beyond response to specific requests from host country personnel as limited by the International Security Assistance Act of 1976. On 3 December CINCPAC requested a high-level review of security assistance legislation and policy guidance in a message to the Chairman, JCS.1

(U) Finally, many attendees commented that the decision in 1976 to terminate MAP should be reviewed because the FMS credit program could, due to large debt servicing requirements, result in the use of current year allocations just to meet prior year principal and interest payments.2

Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar

(U) The ninth Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS) which had been postponed from October 1979, was held in Seoul, Korea, from 28 April to 3 May 1980 with the CINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance as Chairman. The seminar continued to provide a forum for mutual exchange of logistics concepts, principles, and procedures having broad implications for Pacific nations. Meetings were designed to assist friendly armed forces in furthering self-sufficiency by strengthening their logistics management capability and to foster regional logistics cooperation among participating nations. Highlights of the seminar included a keynote address by Major General John R. D. Cleland, Commander, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, and presentations from participating nations. The theme of the seminar was "Defense Preparedness through Resource Management." Representation was from Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, Korea, Singapore, the United States, and for the first time, Japan. As part of the agenda, tours were conducted through a North Korean tunnel, the Joint Security Area, Shin-chon-ri (ROK) Air Base, the Chang-won Industrial Complex, the ROK Army Logistics Command and General Depot, the Ministry of National Defense Arsenal, and Hyundai Shipbuilding Yard.3

1. CINCPAC Ltr Ser 239 of 5 Feb 81 (U), Subj: 1980 PACOM Security Assistance Conference; CINCPAC 032253Z Dec 80 (C), DECL 3 Dec 86.
3. J452 HistSum May 80 (U); PASOLS Summary of Proceedings 28 Apr-3 May 80 (U).
(U) The Project Development Group, an organizational element of PASOLS, met in Singapore from 17 to 21 November 1980 with representatives from Australia, Bangladesh, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States attending. Among major actions developed by the PDG were feasibility studies on standardization agreements between participating nations, establishment of a joint research and development forum for PASOLS member nations, a routinely scheduled ammunition ship for member nations to reduce shipping cost and lead time, and exchange of information on equipment rebuild requirements, overhaul and rebuild capability, and operating costs and cost reduction programs.1

Security Assistance Directives

(U) A CINCPAC-WESTCOM working group meeting in March 1980 surfaced the need for CINCPAC policy guidance regarding security assistance matters in PACOM. As a result, CINCPAC Instruction 4900.8 "Pacific Command Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance," which consolidated legislative, executive, and command guidance, was published on 2 September 1980. A separate directive, "Channels of Communication for Security Assistance Matters," CINCPAC Instruction 4900.3, providing a single source for determining routing of security assistance communications had also been published earlier in the year.2

Phase IV Training

(U) DOD Directive 2000.10 prescribed four phases of selection and training for U.S. military personnel slated to positions involving planning and execution of security assistance activities—the first three phases were usually accomplished in CONUS prior to assignment. Phase IV included orientation in security assistance programming and management procedures within the unified command for personnel assigned security assistance responsibilities and others as determined by the unified commander. CINCPAC provided Phase IV training by means of two two-man mobile training teams twice during 1980. The two-team method with two members each—one for FMS and one for IMET—was initiated; it proved cost effective and more productive.3

(U) FY 80 Phase IV training was conducted from 1 January through 2 February in Burma, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. The FMS and IMET teams held sessions for 56 U.S. security assistance personnel and 172 host country officials who were primarily engaged in FMS activities and foreign student training requirements. FY 81 training was conducted in Burma, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Singapore, and Sri Lanka from 10 September through 7 October with audiences of 26 U.S. and 112 host country officials respectively. The training sessions were tailored to each country's needs and responded to specific requests of attendees.1

Foreign Student Training

(U) The subject of decreasing Japanese participation in CONUS training had been discussed at the XI U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Subcommittee meeting in the summer of 1979. The following September the Chief, Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO) Japan drew attention to the fact that FMS training costs for Japan often ran up to 90 percent higher than for NATO countries. He suggested to CINCPAC that the idea of comparable pricing for Japan, Australia, and New Zealand be promoted with appropriate agencies in Washington. CINCPAC responded by citing previous attempts to obtain legislative and tuition pricing relief and, at the same time, forwarded another appeal to the JCS.2

(C) In a November 1979 message to the State Department, the U.S. Embassy in Japan pointed out the substantial drop in the number of Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) officers attending U.S. military schools. High tuition charges (e.g., $37,000 for one year at a war college) had been the major cause of this decline. During his meetings with Secretary of Defense Brown in October, Japan's Defense Minister Yamashita proposed a substantial mutual expansion of training on the basis of "tuition exemptions." The Embassy believed there were substantial political and operational benefits to the United States as well as to Japan from expanding U.S. access to key SDF officers. The Embassy therefore recommended that State and Defense Departments seek legislation to permit Japan, Australia, and New Zealand to receive FMS training on the same basis as NATO allies.3

1. J452 HistSum Jan 80 (U); J457 HistSum Oct 80 (U).
2. CHMDO Tokyo 070449Z Sep 79 (U); CINCPAC 190349Z Sep 79 (U); CINCPAC 222130Z Sep 80 (U).
3. AMEMB Tokyo 20044/140641Z Nov 79 (C), GDS 11/14/85.
(C) The subject surfaced again in February 1980 at the Chiefs of Mission Conference and CINCPAC asked for assistance from the Secretary of Defense.

(U) By the fall of 1980 legislation had been drafted under the Glenn Amendment pertaining to Section 21 (G) of the Arms Export Control Act. The legislation was passed on 16 December as part of Public Law 96-533 and added Japan, Australia, and New Zealand to the list of countries eligible to reciprocal bilateral or multilateral agreements. These agreements would include reimbursement for direct training costs, but would exclude reimbursement for indirect and trainees' billeting costs and administrative surcharges. It was hoped that substantial reductions in training prices would result.¹

Basic STINGER Man-Portable Air Defense System

(C) In January 1980 the JCS requested CINCPAC comments on the sale of the Basic STINGER (previously known as REDEYE II) man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) surface-to-air missile to certain countries, including three in the PACOM region: Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea. After soliciting component views, CINCPAC concurred with the tentative position proposed by the JCS on non-release of Basic STINGER to Thailand and Malaysia. Although Korea already had 77 REDEYE I missiles for use in the defense of the Northwest Island chain, CINCPAC recommended deferral of the release of Basic STINGER until U.S. Forces requirements, including those of the 2d Infantry Division, had been satisfied; further, that future sale to Korea should be constrained in order that higher priority ROK force and material improvement programs would not be adversely affected.²

1. AMEMB Tokyo 20268/150203Z Nov 80 (U); J464 HistSum Jan 81 (U);
   SECDEF 2684/200123Z Jan 81 (U).
2. J453 HistSum Feb 80 (C), DECL 7 Mar 86.
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X = Equipment provided. Y = Request approved & accepted; equipment on order. Z = Requested; decision pending
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2. Pakistan was offered F-5E/F instead.
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1. Pakistan has UH-1s on loan from Iran for non-military use (U.S.-imposed restriction).
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**MISSILES**

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| TON (M-151)           |   |   |   |   |   |
|                       | X | Y | X | Y | X |
| DRAGON (M-47)         |   |   |   |   |   |
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**Miscellaneous Missiles**

| X |   |   |   |   |   |

**NAVAL SHIPS AND CRAFT**

| Barge, fuel oil          |   |   |   |   |   |
|                         | X | X | Y | X |   |
| Barge, water            |   |   |   |   |   |
|                         | X | X | Y | X |   |
| Cargo ships, light      |   |   |   |   |   |
|                         | X |   |   |   |   |
| Destroyers              |   |   |   |   |   |
|                         | X | X | X | Y | X |
| Destroyer Escorts       |   |   |   |   |   |
|                         | X | X | X | X | X |
| Dry Dock, floating      |   |   |   |   |   |
|                         | X | X | X |   |   |

1. India purchased TOWs for test; declined to sign FMS case for launchers/missiles; available if desired.
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### TANKS, ARTILLERY, AND COMBAT VEHICLES

| AAA (SP) |                         | X | X |       | X |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| AA gun, 20mm (VULCAN) |                         |   |   |       |   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Armored Car         |                         | X |   |       |   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Armored Cargo Carrier |                        |   |   |       |   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Armored Pers. Carrier |                        | X |   |       | X |       | X     | X     | X     | X     |       |       |       |       |
| Gun, 75mm           |                         | X | X |       | X |       | X     |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Gun, 90mm           |                         | X | X |       | X |       | X     |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Gun, 155mm          |                         |   |   |       | X |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Gun, 175mm (SP)     |                         | X | X |       | X |       | X     | X     | X     | X     |       |       |       |       |
| Howitzer, 105mm     |                         | X | X |       | X |       | X     | X     | X     | X     | X     |       |       |       |
| Howitzer, 105mm (SP) |                         |   | X |       | X |       | X     |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Howitzer, 155mm     |                         |   | X |       | Z |       | X     |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Howitzer, 155mm (SP) |                         | X | Z |       | X |       | X     |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Howitzer, 8-inch    |                         | X | X |       | X |       | X     |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Howitzer, 8-inch (SP)|                         |   | X |       | X |       | X     |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Mortar, 4.2-inch (SP)|                         |   | X |       | X |       | X     |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Other (SP)          |                         |   |   |       |   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Tanks               |                         | X | X |       | X |       | X     | X     | X     | X     | X     |       |       |       |
| Tank Recovery Vehicles |                     | X | X |       | X |       | X     | X     | X     | X     | X     |       |       |       |
| Misc. Combat Vehicles |                      | X | X |       | X |       | X     | X     | X     | X     | X     |       |       |       |

**Source:** DSAA "The Journal," 30 Sep 80 (C), DEC 31 Dec 86, and J4 staff officers.
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<td>Test conducted. LOA expired 25 Nov 80, No action by India.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Test conducted. LOA expired 10 Nov 80. No acceptance.</td>
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<td>No formal reply</td>
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<td>Not supported. Recommended limited number of AIM-9E missiles.</td>
<td>Approved AIM-9J missile. No action by India.</td>
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<td>Disapproved</td>
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<td>Approved Jan 79</td>
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<td>U.S. initiative as substitute for A-7/F-16. (Jan 79 and Nov 80). U.S. will approve F-5E/F.</td>
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<td>Supported</td>
<td>Approved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OV-10 Aircraft</td>
<td>Mar 77</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Approved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGM-84A HARPOON Missile</td>
<td>Mar 77</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
<td>Disapproved. Considered HARPOON as not on list of desired items for release.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGM-62A WALLEYE</td>
<td>Mar 77-Jan 78</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
<td>President Marcos asked that request be dropped--too expensive.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended Range Missile</td>
<td>Mar 77-Jan 78</td>
<td>Considered as</td>
<td>Same as for HARPOON.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-551 SHERIDAN ARAAV (Light Tank)</td>
<td>Feb 78</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
<td>No formal reply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-46 Torpedo</td>
<td>Aug 77</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
<td>No formal reply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Singapore probably will purchase French EXOCET.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGM-84A HAR-POON Missile</td>
<td>Nov 79</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
<td>Disapproved May 80.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P&amp;R provided. Pending Thai acceptance. Follow-on UH-1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60 Helicopter</td>
<td>Jan 81</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Approved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-5G Aircraft</td>
<td>Dec 80</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>No formal reply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-16 Aircraft (J-79 engine)</td>
<td>Dec 80</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>No formal reply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OV-1D Aircraft</td>
<td>Dec 80</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>No formal reply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-400 Aircraft</td>
<td>Oct 80</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>No formal reply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-16A Aircraft</td>
<td>Mar 78</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
<td>No formal reply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-10 Aircraft</td>
<td>Aug 77</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>No formal reply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-202 A1 Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>Nov 80</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>No formal reply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIM-43A REDEYE Missile</td>
<td>Oct 80</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>No formal reply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Disapproved because item no longer used or issued to U.S. forces due to technical problems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JCS recommended release of P&amp;A data but no delivery until required level of MANPAD missiles for U.S. forces is reached.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## PACOM SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
### FY 1981 BUDGET--ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS (IN THOUSANDS)
### AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>CINC PAC MAE FUNDED</th>
<th>FOREIGN ASST ADMIN SERVICES</th>
<th>MILITARY DEPT SUPPORT</th>
<th>TOTAL U.S. COSTS</th>
<th>HOST COUNTRY COSTS</th>
<th>GRAND TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$ 496.8</td>
<td>$ 0</td>
<td>$ 873.8</td>
<td>$ 1,370.6</td>
<td>$ 0</td>
<td>$ 1,370.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACOM HEADQUARTERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO AFGHANISTAN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>74.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO BANGLADESH</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO BURMA</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODC INDIA</td>
<td>146.2</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>237.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>237.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDLEG INDONESIA</td>
<td>627.2</td>
<td>432.9</td>
<td>930.9</td>
<td>1,990.1</td>
<td>509.6</td>
<td>2,499.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO JAPAN</td>
<td>977.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>244.9</td>
<td>1,255.5</td>
<td>155.80*</td>
<td>1,411.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSMAG KOREA</td>
<td>1,077.3</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>3,698.5</td>
<td>4,836.7</td>
<td>871.9</td>
<td>5,708.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO MALAYSIA</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO NEPAL</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO NEW ZEALAND</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODR PAKISTAN</td>
<td>203.9</td>
<td>196.1</td>
<td>190.0</td>
<td>590.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>590.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSMAG PHILIPPINES</td>
<td>542.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>986.8</td>
<td>1,541.6</td>
<td>745.7</td>
<td>2,286.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO SINGAPORE</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO SRI LANKA</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSMAG THAILAND</td>
<td>756.3</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>1,171.5</td>
<td>1,990.0</td>
<td>1,330.1</td>
<td>3,320.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 7,838.0</strong></td>
<td>$ 747.6</td>
<td><strong>$ 8,573.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 16,060.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 3,546.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 19,607.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (S/NF), p. 29, REW 16 Feb 01.

* *(non-third currency)* paid directly to the U.S. Government to offset U.S. costs and, therefore, is a non-add item.
SECTION II--COUNTRY PROGRAMS

AUSTRALIA

(C/NOFORN) In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Prime Minister of Australia Malcom Fraser announced a new five-year program of increased defense spending at the opening of Parliament on 19 February 1980. The Prime Minister committed the Government of Australia (GOA) to increase defense expenditures by an average of seven percent annually in real terms over the five-year period. The effort was intended to increase military outlays from the current 2.7 percent of gross domestic product to 3 percent by 1984-85. New defense initiatives included a GOA intent to make a commitment later in the year to purchase 75 U.S. tactical fighter aircraft (F-16s or F-18As). This was in lieu of a previous commitment to purchase only 25 with a possibility of another 50 later. Final selection had been expected early in 1980 and the Secretary of Defense notified Congress of the intent to sell 75 of one or the other on 23 July 1980. However, in late November selection was postponed for six months. At the end of the year FMS cases were in process for four F-111 fighters as replacement aircraft and also for 31 STANDARD missiles.1

(C/NOFORN) Additionally, Fraser said Australia would build a second underway replenishment ship (AOR) and buy a fourth guided-missile frigate (FFG) from the United States. Congressional notification on the sale of the frigate for $275.3M was provided by the Secretary of Defense on 21 March. Further indication of increased GOA defense commitment came in September with an announcement by Minister of Defence Killen of the planned replacement of Australia's only aircraft carrier, HMAS MELBOURNE. An FMS case for 27 MK-48 torpedoes valued at $24.7 million was also part of the Prime Minister's five-year program in upgrading Australia's aging weapons systems.2

1. DIA 1089/210217Z Feb 80 (C/NF), REVW 20 Feb 00; J463 HistSum Jun 80 (C), DECL 10 Jul 86; SECDEF 7567/241713Z Jul 80 (U); J5611 Point Paper (U), 26 Jan 81, Subj: New Tactical Figher (NTF) for Australia; J463 HistSum Sep 80 (U); SECDEF 2159/262056Z Nov 80 (C), DECL 20 Nov 86.
2. DIA 1089/210217Z Feb 80 (C/NF), REVW 20 Feb 00; J463 HistSum Mar 80 (C), DECL 5 Apr 86; SECDEF 6192/242043Z Mar 80 (C), DECL 21 Mar 86; J5611 Point Paper (C), 23 Jan 81, Subj: Replacement Carrier for RAN (U), REVW 23 Jan 87; J463 HistSum Apr 80 (C), DECL 8 May 86; SECDEF 3741/291920Z Apr 80 (C), DECL 28 Apr 86.
(U) During 1978 Australia Defence officials initiated discussions on wartime logistics support for weapons of U.S. origin in Australia's defence arsenal. Subsequent negotiations during 1978-80 led to a U.S.-GOA memorandum of understanding (MOU) which became effective 18 March 1980. The MOU provided that in peacetime the United States would provide certain defense articles and services. In wartime, however, support would be expanded to meet increased demands, including activation and expansion of Australia's defense production base. The MOU also provided Australia with a force activity designator equal to that of U.S. forces.\(^1\)

(U) Under amendments to the Arms Export Control Act enacted on 16 December, Australia gained exemption from a dollar ceiling on FMS purchases—a status equivalent to NATO members.\(^2\)

\(^{1}\) J4234 Point Paper (U), 30 Jul 80, Subj: Memorandum of Understanding on Australia/U.S. Logistic Support; OASD/MRA&L (IL) Ltr of 6 Jun 79 to RADM Bird (U).

FMS Sales

Bangladesh was the only country in South Asia not authorized to purchase defense articles and services under FMS. During a CINCPAC visit to Dacca in January 1978, President Ziaur Rahman requested assistance in obtaining these from the United States. In March 1978 CINCPAC had solicited Country Team views on a proposed message to the JCS seeking a presidential determination, under Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act, to authorize FMS cash sales to Bangladesh. The newly arrived U.S. Ambassador to Dacca did not concur with the CINCPAC initiative, stating that "...while we may at some time wish to make available non-lethal military material to Bangladesh, I believe we should stay generally out of military sales." The Ambassador did, however, push for increases in the IMETP. The issue remained dormant until the middle of 1980 when the Ambassador demonstrated a shift in his opinion by recommending in his annual assessment:

We should recognize the responsible role which Bangladesh has been playing in international fora on such issues as Afghanistan and Iran and invite President Zia to visit Washington after the elections, restore our military budget to previous levels, and make Bangladesh eligible for FMS sales.

The Ambassador reemphasized the need for a presidential determination on FMS in September after the IMET funding for FY 81 for Bangladesh was cut by CRA. Students had already been selected for two courses, and the Bangladesh Government considered the training important enough that it had asked to purchase the courses. Regretfully, the Ambassador advised the Bangladesh Government it was not possible since they were not eligible for FMS. On 10 October CINCPAC again supported a presidential determination for FMS to the JCS, but it was not until 20 January 1981 that the State Department advised the Ambassador that on 31 December 1980 President Carter had signed an executive decision making Bangladesh eligible to purchase military equipment and services through the U.S. FMS mechanism on a cash-sale basis. The State Department expressed the hope that Bangladesh would give priority to

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1. J478 Point Paper (S), 21 Jul 80, Subj: Presidential Determination to Authorize Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Bangladesh (U), DECL 21 Jul 86; J478 HistSum Jun 80 (S), DECL 10 Jul 86; AMEMB Dacca 3493/200845Z Jun 80 (S), GDS 6/20/90.
BANGLADESH (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA .................................................. 143,500 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS ...................... 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE ............................... 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION ................................................... 92,224,000
ANNUAL GROWTH ............................................ 2.7 Percent
LITERACY RATE .............................................. 25 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY ............................................ 45 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA ................................ 3 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (FY 79) ....................... $ 7.1 Billion
PER CAPITA .................................................. $ 88
DEFENSE BUDGET (FY 79) .................................. $ 145 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ....................... 8.8 Percent
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT .................................. Independent Republic under Martial Law

PRESIDENT, CHIEF MARTIAL LAW
ADMINISTRATOR, MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE ...................................................... MGEP Ziaur RAHMAN
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF ................................. MGEP Hossain ERSHAD
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF ................................. RADM Muhboob Ali KHAN
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF ................................. AIR COMMODORE B. P. SADRUDDIN

(U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

U.S. AMBASSADOR ........................................ HON. David T. SCHNEIDER
DATT ......................................................... LCOM Charles R. HORNABY, USA

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (S/NF), p. 63, REVW 16 Feb 01.
dual-purpose equipment (usable for nation-building projects and disaster relief as well as military applications) in utilizing the U.S. source of supply.¹

CINCPAC Visit

(5) Prior to CINCPAC's visit to Dacca, the Ambassador advised of three key issues which Admiral Long should be prepared to address with Government officials: requests for military equipment, increased IMET funding, and U.S. resistance to Soviet expansion in Southeast and Southwest Asia. Afterwards Ambassador Schneider reported that Admiral Long's 9-10 November visit had effectively reassured senior Bangladesh military leaders of U.S. determination to meet threats from the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf and in Southeast Asia. During the 24-hour visit each of the service chiefs had raised the issue of U.S. military sales to Bangladesh and recited respective service equipment needs: radar, F-5 type aircraft, coastal patrol craft, tanks, and anti-tank weapons were of high priority. The Defense Secretary and service chiefs spoke with particular emphasis on the importance of IMET. Although the Admiral could not forecast a favorable outcome for FMS, both Admiral Long and the Ambassador indicated strong support for training and their intent to seek increased IMET levels.²

1. AMEMB Dacca 5570/250525Z Sep 80 (C), GDS 9/25/86; CINCPAC 100234Z Oct 80 (C), DECL 9 Oct 86; SECSTATE 14577/200104Z Jan 81 (C), GDS 1/19/87.
2. AMEMB Dacca 6169/241002Z Oct 80 (C)(EX), RDS-1 10/24/90; AMEMB Dacca 6853/140925Z Nov 80 (C), GDS 11/14/86; CINCPAC (S)(EX) 250108Z Nov 80, DECL 21 Nov 88.
BURMA (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA ................................................. 678,000 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS .................. 15 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE ......................... 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION ............................................. 34,000,000
ANNUAL GROWTH ......................................... 5.6 Percent
LITERACY RATE ........................................ 70 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY ....................................... 66.3 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA ....................... 0.8 Acres
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ....................... $ 3.7 Billion
PER CAPITA ........................................... $ 120
DEFENSE BUDGET (FY 77) ......................... $ 166.4 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ................ 3 Percent
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT ......................... Social Republic Headed by a President

PRESIDENT ................................................. GEN U NE WIN
PRIME MINISTER ....................................... U MAUNG MAUNG KHA
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ........................ U LAY MAUNG
MINISTER OF DEFENSE, CHIEF OF STAFF ........ GEN KYAW HTIN
INSPECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSIVE
SERVICE INTELLIGENCE ......................... LT COL KAN NYUNT
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY ......................... MAJ GEN AYE KO
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, NAVY ......................... ADM CHIT HLAING
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR FORCE ................. MAJ GEN SAW PRU

(U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

U.S. AMBASSADOR ................................. HON. Patricia M. BYRNE
DATT .................................................... COL Charles A. SCHULI, USA

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (S/NF), p. 64, REW 16 Feb 01.
BURMA

(c) Burma had rigidly followed a neutral and independent foreign policy for many years which necessitated a cautious approach by the Burmese military towards acceptance of U.S. assistance. As a result, the Burmese politely, but firmly, declined to participate in regional conferences and seminars such as the Pacific Armies Management Seminar as well as those of a non-military nature.  

(e) The U.S. security assistance program in Burma included a small FMS cash program for the purchase of spare parts and ammunition and, after a hiatus of nine years, IMET was reinstated in FY 80 at $31,000. This funding enabled attendance by two Burmese officers at a series of four technical level courses in ammunition handling, maintenance, and inspection, and one officer at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Although the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon recommended an increase in IMET funding for FY 81 to $140,000 and CINCPAC supported a $100,000 figure, only $31,000 was programmed by the State Department.  

(f) In February 1980 the U.S. Ambassador forwarded an urgent request from the "highest levels of the Burmese Government" for the acquisition of two or three C-130s under the auspices of the International Narcotics Control Program. They were to be replacements for aging F-27 and FH-227 transports (one had crashed) by the Burmese Air Force for narcotics interdiction. He noted that military sales might be possible if favorable loans or interest rates were available, but he preferred the apolitical channel of the International Narcotics Control program. In addition, President Ne Win expressed a need for more helicopters from the United States. Both requests were rejected because of limited International Narcotics Control Program funds.  

1. J478 Point Paper (U), 20 Jun 80, Subj: Security Assistance Program for Burma; USDAO Rangoon 109/260802Z Feb 80 (C), REVW 26 Feb 86.  
3. AMEMB Rangoon 632/160255Z Feb 80 (S)(EX), RDS-3 2/14/90.
INDIA (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA .................................................. 2,138,500 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS .................. 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE ......................... 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION ..................................................... 699,000,000
ANNUAL GROWTH .............................................. 2.6 Percent
LITERACY RATE ............................................... 35 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY ............................................. About 56 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA ....................... 7.4 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ......................... $ 391.1 Billion
PER CAPITA .................................................. $ 541
DEFENSE BUDGET .............................................. $ 141 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ................... 16 Percent
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT ........................................

(P) NATIONAL LEADERSHIP (P)

PRESIDENT ........................................... Neelam R. REDDY
PRIME MINISTER AND
MINISTER OF DEFENSE ......................... Indira GANDHI
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF ...................... GEN Om Prakash MALHOTRA
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF ....................... ADM R.L. PERSHIA
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF .............................. ACM Idris Hasan LATIF

(U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

U.S. AMBASSADOR .......................... HON. Robert F. GOHEEN
ATT .............. COL, R.A. MOUNTEL, USA

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (S/RF), p. 65, REV 16 Feb 01.
(U) On 3 January 1980 India held nationwide parliamentary elections which returned Indira Gandhi to power as Prime Minister with a two-thirds majority for the Congress party.

(C) During 1979 without CINCPAC knowledge or over CINCPAC objection, the State Department had approved a number of arms sales to India. Some of these were considered by CINCPAC as legitimate defense needs and would not be contrary to the ostensible U.S. policy of evenhandedness or upset the balance of power between India and Pakistan. Others had been approved as an exception to policy in an attempt to counter the influx of Soviet weaponry into India. In a reversal of his nuclear arms non-proliferation stance, on 19 June 1980 President Carter approved the sale of 38 tons of enriched uranium to India. Although the U.S. Congress was concerned with India's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, on 24 September the Senate defeated the House vote opposing the sale.¹

(C) According to a July 1980 report by the U.S. Ambassador in New Delhi, Prime Minister Gandhi was determined to assure that India remained unchallenged as the pre-eminent power on the subcontinent. Further, India would continue to upgrade its military equipment by purchasing sophisticated arms from a number of foreign sources.²

(S/NOFORN) Ten MIG-23 FLOGGER fighters, for example, arrived in New Delhi two days prior to a December state visit by Soviet President Brezhnev to India. The MIGs, part of a $2.4 billion arms deal signed with the Soviet Union earlier in the year, were expected to become operational within a few weeks and be sent to the Pakistan border. During the visit Brezhnev and Gandhi spoke of increasingly closer relations between their two countries.³

(C) U.S. security assistance to India during recent years had been sporadic and had been complicated by the changing relationships between the U.S., India, Pakistan, and the USSR. As stated in the FY 80 Congressional Presentation

2. AMEMB New Delhi 15433/231230Z Jul 80 (C), E.O. 12065: NA.
3. Washington Star, 9 Dec 80, p. 7, "MIGs for India Arrive Along with Brezhnev" (U); DIA 081616Z Apr 80 (S/NF), REVW 6 Apr 01.
Document, U.S. policy called for evenhanded treatment—balanced with Pakistan—and the offer of a U.S. alternative to Indian reliance on the Soviet Union for military goods and services. India also sought to promote an internal industrial capability, enhanced by weapons coproduction arrangements and acquisition of advanced technology.¹

(At) India's IMET program had fluctuated along with U.S.-Indian relations and other security assistance programs. After dropping to zero in FY 73, IMET resumed in FY 74 with expenditures as depicted below. Although the FY 80 program was authorized at $438,000, Continuing Resolution Authority limited funding to $368,000, and India used only $283,000, including $31,229 paid in forfeiture for late cancellation of course quotas. The program for FY 81 called for $498,000.²

<table>
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<tr>
<th>IMET EXPENDITURES</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>(in thousands of dollars)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 74  196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 75  57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 76  131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 77  165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 78  300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 79  456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 80  283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

155mm Howitzers

M-198 Towed

(At) Initial notice of Government of India (GOI) interest in purchasing the 155mm towed howitzer (M-198) was forwarded as an informal request by the U.S. Defense Attache Office (USDAO) New Delhi on 17 April 1979. The U.S. Embassy supported the sale of the M-198, together with appropriate ammunition, as a replacement weapon for World War II vintage 5.5" howitzers. CINCPAC also favored the sale because it would afford the United States an excellent opportunity to demonstrate responsiveness to legitimate GOI defense requests and no new technology was involved. CINCPAC stated, however, that release of ammunition, such as rocket-assisted projectiles (RAP) and improved conventional munitions, would require further review. On 24 May 1979 the State and Defense Departments approved the sale but advised there would be approximately 25 months' lead time from the LOA implementation date and that requests for

2. Ibid.

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ammunition would be addressed separately. On 14 August the GOI requested a three-month in-country test of the M-198. Originally testing had been scheduled to commence in November but slipped to February 1980 and ultimately was conducted from 14 April to 3 July 1980.¹

Prior to completion of the test, on 12 June 1980 the U.S. Embassy forwarded a formal request for an LOA which included not only 230 M-198 howitzers, but also 230 M-813 trucks, 240,000 rounds of 155mm HE ammunition, and 24,000 each of illumination and smoke rounds. Furthermore, the GOI asked for a minimum of 20 howitzers during first quarter FY 81 if possible. The Embassy was advised that the lead time would be 25 months and would cost $445,000 each. Earlier delivery would require diversion from U.S. Army stocks. CINCPAC concurred in the desirability of expedited delivery of the 20 howitzers, provided U.S. force readiness requirements would not be degraded. The sale, CINCPAC said, would be the largest FMS purchase of U.S. equipment by India to date and would represent a major milestone toward the U.S. objective of reducing Indian dependence on Soviet arms.²

As reported below, an Indian delegation headed by Defense Secretary Menon traveled to the United States in October to sign a TOW LOA and one on the M-198 howitzer which became available during the visit. However, the delegation returned to India without signing either LOA and at year's end, the LOAs remained unsigned.³

**M-109A2 Self-Propelled**

On 31 December 1979 the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) India forwarded a GOI request for P&A data on 150 M-109A2 155mm howitzers—the self-propelled complement to the M-198. The State and Defense Departments authorized provision of the data in January 1980 and CINCPAC also supported the sale. CINCPAC recommended, however, that notification of the approval be delayed until a program of aid for Pakistan, then under development, was made public as discussed elsewhere in this chapter. Although the ODC India forwarded an LOA request from the GOI for a three-month in-country test of the M-109A2 from May through July 1980, LOA preparation was still awaiting a GOI definition of desired testing at the end of 1980.⁴

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1979 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 381-382; J474 HistSum Jun 80 (C), DECL 10 Jul 86.
2. J474 HistSum Jun 80 (C), DECL 10 Jul 86; CINCPAC 022315Z Aug 80 (S), DECL 19 Jul 86.
3. J474 HistSum Dec 80 (C), DECL 14 Jan 87.
4. J474 HistSum Jan 80 (C), DECL 7 Feb 86; J474 Point Paper (C), 29 Oct 80, Subj: Security Assistance Summary-India (U), DECL 29 Oct 86.
TOW Antitank Missile

After GOI inquiries in May 1978 regarding acquisition of the TOW antitank missile (M71A), the following September CINCPAC cited to the JCS a number of reasons why the TOW should not be furnished to India and recommended that a proposed contractor briefing be held in abeyance until the issue had been fully analyzed. Nevertheless, on 13 October 1978 the National Disclosure Policy Committee, over JCS, CINCPAC, and Navy objections, granted a State Department request for an exception to policy for India because political considerations outweighed military considerations. The GOI LOA request for 60 TOW ground launchers, 3,724 live and 630 inert missiles, associated items, and appropriate spares was forwarded by the Embassy on 2 November 1979. The following day a State/Defense message authorized the Department of the Army to prepare the LOA and provide the applicable evaluation and notification data required under Section 36(B) of the AECA as soon as possible.\(^1\)

During the first part of 1980 the LOA was in preparation and on 11 June the Congress was presented with 30-day notification on FMS case ULX for the TOW with a value of $32 million. On 23 June the Embassy advised of the GOI intent, which was confirmed on 22 July, to send a delegation of Indian defense officials to the United States on a self-invited visit as soon as practical. Ostensibly the purpose of the visit was to negotiate and finalize the TOW LOA and to discuss various aspects related to training programs, maintenance facilities, and allied matters. During several months of delays, reportedly caused by India's bureaucratic problems with political clearance, the TOW LOA signing was postponed from August to October and four additional LOAs were completed, cleared Congress, and awaited Indian signature. These concerned 230 M-198 howitzers, 230 M-813 trucks, 288,000 rounds of 155mm ammunition, and a TOW training package. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Defense notified the Embassy that the price of the TOW would increase by 22 percent to $39.1 million. Moreover, in order to obtain that price, signature and initial deposit would have to be made prior to 15 October, otherwise the price could escalate to $42 million.\(^2\)

2. J474 HistSum Jun 80 (S), DECL 10 Jul 86; AMEMB New Delhi 13401/231103Z Jun 80 (U); J474 HistSum Sep 80 (C), DECL 10 Oct 86; AMEMB New Delhi 15326/221044Z Jul 80 (C), GDS 22 Jul 86; J474 Point Paper (C), 29 Oct 80, Subj: Summary of Indian Defense Secretary Menon's Trip to Washington, 10-20 Oct 80 (U), DECL 29 Oct 86; SECDEF 6798/120116Z Sep 80 (U); SECDEF 5891/010243Z Nov 80 (S), DECL 29 Oct 80.
The 10-man delegation headed by Indian Defense Secretary K. P. A. Menon visited the United States from 6 to 18 October. In addition to the TOW program, the visit provided Secretary Menon an opportunity to bargain with U.S. officials on coproduction and early delivery of the TOW and M-198s, RAP ammunition, and other defense systems of interest to the GOI. In addition, according to the Chief ODCI, who accompanied the delegation, the trip served as a significant education process for the Indians in FMS sales procedures. Even though the United States agreed to release RAP munitions and speed up delivery of 20 howitzers by several months, as well as to study ways to expedite delivery of TOW missiles and support equipment, none of the LOAs were signed because terms and delivery schedules still did not suit the Indians.¹

Upon return to India, GOI officials requested extension of LOAs on the TOW and the M-198. Regarding the M-198, the Commander, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) advised that the deadline could be extended until 25 December. Contractor constraints prohibited extension of the TOW LOA beyond 10 November.²

On 17 December an Embassy report explained that delays were attributable to GOI deliberations concerning provisions for a contractor performance warranty, advance payments, and refund for undelivered U.S. spare parts in the event of war between India and Pakistan or China. Other events affecting the LOAs were a visit by Soviet President Brezhnev on 8 December and the forthcoming Indian elections. As the deadlines for the TOW and M-198 came and went, the Embassy advised that GOI interest in the TOW and M-198 continued but recommended that the LOA signature process be left up to the Indians without further U.S. prodding; new LOAs with updated P&A data could be negotiated later.³

Although a National Disclosure Policy exception was granted on 25 April 1980 to release information on the airborne version of the TOW, no steps were taken by the GOI to acquire the airborne TOW during 1980.⁴

2. J474 HistSum Dec 80 (C), DECL 14 Jan 87.
3. Ibid.; AMEMB New Delhi 26780/240902 Dec 80 (U).
4. J474 HistSum Jun 80 (S), DECL 10 Jul 86; SECSTATE 109126/250603Z Apr 80 (C) GDS 4/24/86.
INDONESIA (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA ........................................ 1,996,040 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS ................. 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE ......................... 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION ........................................ 149,000,000
ANNUAL GROWTH .................................... 2.1 Percent
LITERACY RATE ..................................... 60 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY .................................... 48 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA ......................... 43 Acres
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (1979) .................. $53 Billion
GDP PER CAPITA ..................................... $383
DEFENSE BUDGET (1980-US$) ....................... $1.5 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ................. 18.3 Percent
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT ............................ Republic, President, Cabinet, unicameral Legislature

PRESIDENT ........................................ GEN SOEHARTO
MINISTER FOR DEFENSE ......................... GEN Mohammad JUSUP
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS .................. Dr. Kusumaatmaja MOCHTAR
CINC ARMED FORCES ............................... GEN Mohammad JUSUP
DEPUTY CINC ARMED FORCES ... ADM SUDOMO
ARMY COMMANDER ................................. GEN PONIMAN
NAVY COMMANDER ................................ ADM Wiyono SUSIPTO
AIR FORCE COMMANDER ....................... AIR MARSHAL ASHADI Tjahjadi
COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS ................... BGGEN KARFI

(U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

U.S. AMBASSADOR ............................... HON. Edward E. MASTERS
U.S. DEPT ........................................ COL. Jack W. UTTINGERS, USA
CHURCH ........................................ COL. Albert C. WALBACK, USA

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (S/NF), p. 66, REV 16 Feb 01.
Security Assistance Program Changes

(S) During the past few years the U.S. Government perceived a deterioration in relations with Indonesia. Contributing factors included a change in notification procedures for U.S. warships transiting straits in the Indonesian Archipelago and decreases in the Indonesian security assistance program; MAP had been terminated in 1978, and there had been reductions between FY 78-80 in IMET funding from $2.709 to $1.6 million and in FMS credit from $40 to $30 million, and a 50 percent personnel cut in the U.S. Defense Liaison Group (USDLG). In a December 1979 message to the Secretary of State, the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia summarized his concerns regarding proposed cuts in various U.S. aid programs to Indonesia. He drew attention to Indonesia's significance as the world's largest Muslim nation and as a valuable source for basic raw materials. More often than not Indonesia had supported U.S. international positions, contributed to the Southeast Asia refugee program, and had notably improved human rights. CINCPAC supported the Ambassador's position to the JCS on the need to bolster Indonesia's security assistance and stated that any further reductions would send the wrong signal, i.e., lack of U.S. interest and concern, to the Government of Indonesia (GOI).

(S) In a March 1980 conversation with the U.S. Ambassador, the Indonesian Defense Minister (General Jusuf) expressed great, but largely unfounded, dissatisfaction with the responsiveness of the U.S. security assistance program and arrangements for commercial purchases. The Ambassador felt that the real basis for dissatisfaction was more likely the recent elimination of PL-480 Title I food aid and U.S. refusal to agree to large concessional Japanese rice sales to Indonesia. General Jusuf expressed similar sentiments to Admiral Long during his 26-28 May visit to Jakarta.

(S) In April 1980 the Secretary of Defense called for a reassessment by CINCPAC and the U.S. Defense Attache (DATT) in Jakarta of certain non-FMS/IMET

1. SECDEF 2145/170203Z Apr 80 (S), DECL 15 Apr 86; CINCPAC Command History 1979 (TS/FRD, Vol. I, p. 230-232; CINCPAC 200041Z Sep 80 (S), DECL 30 Sep 86; AMEMB Jakarta 1986/140846Z Dec 79 (S), XDS-3 12/14/89; CINCPAC 280001Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 18 Dec 85.
2. AMEMB Jakarta 5742 retransmitted by SECSTATE 170446Z Apr 80 (S)(EX), XDS-4 4/9/00; AMEMB Jakarta 8631/301028Z May 80 (S), RDS-4 5/30/00.
initiatives which had been suggested in the past to improve relations between the two countries:

- Port calls by U.S. warships.
- Assistance to Indonesia's defense industry and R&D efforts.
- Unit exchanges.
- Observation of military exercises.
- Combined training exercises.

(S) It was the DATT's opinion that the GOI would welcome the first two initiatives but that the latter three would not receive a favorable response. Instead, the DATT again recommended increases in the FMS and IMET programs and improved reaction time on FMS requests. Further, the DATT stated, these two programs were essential to the upgrading of the Indonesian military forces and good U.S.-GOI relations. CINCPAC seconded the DATT's comments regarding the importance of the FMS and IMET programs.2

(C) On 20 June the Ambassador advised of a forthcoming visit to Washington agencies by BGEN Sukotjo, Chief of International Programs for the Indonesian Department of Defense and Security (HANKAM). The major purpose of the visit was to investigate the feasibility of establishing a GOI defense purchase and management office as an adjunct of the Indonesian Embassy in Washington, which, it was hoped, would reduce FMS procurement problems. There were indications that BGEN Sukotjo might also discuss a phase-down of USDLG operations in the next three-to-five years. Because grant aid was not confined to IMET, BGEN Sukotjo said, there was no longer a need for a large USDLG which had cost the GOI $494,000 in FY 80.3

(S) The Chief of HANKAM's administrative staff, LT GEN Yogi Supardi, voiced similar thoughts to the Ambassador on 30 June but he additionally intimated that the USDLG staff should be substantially reduced by the end of 1981 and placed under the DATT. His conversation also reflected General Jusuf's themes of self-reliance, non-alignment, and disenchantment with declining U.S.

1. SECDEF 2145/170203Z Apr 80 (S), DECL 15 Apr 86.
2. USDAO Jakarta 6327/170826Z Apr 80 (S), DECL 15 Apr 86; CINCPAC 182340Z Apr 80 (S), DECL 17 Apr 86.
3. AMEMB 9961/200837Z Jun 80 (C), GDS 6/20/86.

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security assistance. A joint State-Defense message in July, reporting on BGEM Sukotjo's visit, noted his pessimistic view of future U.S. military supply relationships with Indonesia. The Ambassador's views were solicited as to the basis for this pessimism—was it really reduced funding levels or disappointment over the straits notification issue? The message again welcomed suggestions on means to restore U.S.-GOI relations.¹

Rumors of a GOI-imposed reduction in the USDLG continued throughout August and their validity was confirmed during a meeting on 1 September between the Ambassador and the HANKAM Assistant for Intelligence, LT GEN Murdani. Termination of USDLG activities would be phased and the GOI hoped to institute an arrangement for routine visits by MTTs or special groups. In other conversations between high-level U.S. and GOI officials, it was learned that no formal notification of USDLG was required and that the phase-out was indeed linked with the straits passage notification issue. General Sukotjo presented the formal GOI request to the Chief USDLG on 3 September:²

- USDLG strength should be reduced from 26 military spaces to 15 or less by 31 December 1981.
- Assistance-in-kind funding would terminate no later than April 1982.
- The residual security assistance element could remain separate from the DAO but should be renamed.
- The USDLG should present its proposal for the reduction to HANKAM in the near future.

As a result of Admiral Long's May visit, a weekly intelligence summary was provided for senior Indonesian military officials in an attempt to improve relations and assuage ruffled GOI feathers over the straits issue. Despite reasonably good military-to-military relations during 1980, overall conditions continued to deteriorate, and in September Under Secretary of Defense Robert Komor visted Indonesia to reaffirm high-level U.S. interest in Indonesia and to resolve defense related issues. Although the Indonesians were initially

1. AMEMB Jakarta 10407/300621Z Jun 80 (C), XDS-1 6/30/95; SECSTATE 179887/082306Z Jul 80 (S)(EX), GDS 7/7/00.
2. CHUSDLG Jakarta 290943Z Aug 80 (S)(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 86; AMEMB Jakarta 13742/020917Z Sep 80 (S), RDS-4 9/2/00; J473 HistSum Aug 80 (S), DECL 10 Sep 86; AMEMB Jakarta 13921/040903Z Sep 80 (S), GDS 9/4/86.
cool toward the Komer visit, by the time of his departure he was viewed as one of Indonesia's good friends. In meetings with President Suharto and Generals Jusuf, Yogi, and Murdani once again the themes were national cohesion, stability, and self-reliance. President Suharto stressed economic and social development by Indonesia and with the ASEAN framework. Militarily, top priority would be given to improvement and modernization of 100 infantry battalions. The drive for self-sufficiency had motivated changes in IMET policy (see below) and reduction of USDLG. Complaints were heard of disappointing U.S. economic aid, and although no mention was made of the straits issue, its significant impact on Indonesia's attitude toward the United States was obvious.1

(S) In a follow-up to Secretary Komer's discussions regarding the USDLG, Ambassador Masters briefed LT GEN Yogi on 28 October regarding the functions and responsibilities the Indonesian military would have to assume when the USDLG was reduced to 15 U.S. military. He further stated that if inclusion into the DAO were required, military manning would have to be further reduced to eight and Indonesia would have to assume additional functions. Yogi made it clear that "an assistance organization with another name would not solve the perceived problem and that the GOI would therefore accept the staff reductions to eight required for transfer of the function to DAO."2

(S) In commenting on the above proposals, CINCPAC advised the Ambassador that the Chief USDLG was developing plans for appropriate manning levels consistent with the desires of the Ambassador and the GOI. Also a memorandum of understanding was being prepared to define functional and command relationships for the security assistance section of the DAO. By 4 December the Chief had taken the necessary actions to effect the reduction to 15, however, he held some reservations concerning reorganization under the DAO.3

(S) In expressing his personal views to the Ambassador on organizational concepts for continuation of a successful Indonesian security assistance program, CINCPAC considered retention of the direct military chain of command from the chief of the security assistance element to CINCPAC essential. Further, security assistance personnel should have no collateral duties to compete with their primary responsibilities, and the head of the security

1. CINCPAC 200041Z Sep 80 (S), DECL 30 Sep 86; J473 HistSum Sep 80 (S), DECL 10 Oct 86; AMEMB Jakarta 15013/241127Z, 15144/261030Z, 15145/261048Z Sep 80 all (S), RDS-1 9/26/90, and 15270/300711Z Sep 80 (S), GDS 9/29/86.
3. CINCPAC 062350Z Nov 80 (S), DECL 31 Oct 86; CHUSDLG Jakarta 040739Z Dec 80 (U).
assistance element should be of appropriate rank and quality commensurate with the importance of the program. Conversely, neither the DATT nor DAO personnel should have security assistance responsibilities. The reorganized 15-man USDLG, renamed and placed with the DAO for cosmetic purposes, should continue to function as it had been, with independent direct access to the Ambassador in security assistance matters. In response, the Ambassador outlined his central goals as preservation of USDLG effectiveness with less manpower and a change visible to the GOI, preferably through a phased transition. The first step was to retain the basic USDLG configuration but with only 15 people, headed by an O-6 who would have independent, direct access to the Ambassador. Work would be fully coordinated with the DATT and there would be a merger of the two administrative offices. At some time in the future the two sections should be completely merged.¹

⁽S⁾ By 15 January 1981 a name for the new organization had been chosen--Security Assistance Management Office--and an out-of-cycle change to the FY 81 JMP had been submitted to the JCS for 15 U.S. military and 3 civilian spaces. CINCPAC also recommended to the JCS that future DATTs receive appropriate security assistance training prior to assignment to Indonesia. Organizational and functional concepts were still under study.²

IMET

⁽U⁾ Indonesia's IMET program for FY 76-79 had been the largest or second largest in the world. As such it was a cornerstone of U.S. security assistance and during that period 1,124 students received CONUS military or civilian training. However, funding was reduced from a high of $2.709 million for FY 78 to $1.6 million for FY 80. In September 1980 the Chief USDLG was notified that the Indonesian Ministry of Defense and Security (HANKAM) had made fundamental changes regarding use of IMET courses. Future attendance by Indonesian students at advanced courses abroad (military level 3) would be on a case-by-case basis and only for comparative study purposes. Additionally, command and general staff course attendees must first complete Indonesian equivalents and agree to teach in Indonesian service schools upon their return. Students already enrolled would be allowed to complete training and there would be minimal impact on the program until after FY 81.³

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1. CINCPAC 162121Z Dec 80 (S)(BOM), DECL 9 Dec 86; AMEMB Jakarta 19472/190937Z Dec 80 (S), GDS 12/19/86.
2. J473 Point Paper (S), 15 Jan 81, Subj: Reduction of U.S. Defense Liaison Group (USDLG) Indonesia (U), DECL 15 Jan 87; J473 HistSum Dec 80 (S), DECL 19 Jan 87; CINCPAC 140144Z Jan 81 (S), DECL 12 Jan 87.
3. DSAA "Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts" Dec 80 (U); J473 HistSum Sep 80 (U); J473 Point Paper (U), 2 Feb 79, Subj: IMET Indonesia.

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Indonesian Navy Supply Mobile Training Team

(U) During the fall of 1980 seven representatives from the U.S. Fleet Material Support Office (Mechanicsburg PA), Transportation Management School (Oakland, CA), Naval Supply Center (Oakland CA), and Naval Supply Depot (Subic Bay, RP) conducted 14 weeks of mobile training for ashore and afloat supply elements of the Indonesian Navy at Surabaya. This was a follow-on to a 1976 FMSO review of the entire Indonesian Navy logistics system and supplemented MTT efforts with other naval elements. The afloat curriculum consisted of eight weeks of afloat supply department operating procedures and was attended by 22 officers. The ashore curriculum, presented to 28 officers, consisted of a U.S. Navy supply organization overview; inventory management principles; supply corps officer and enlisted personnel qualifications, training, and career patterns; procurement methods and procedures, warehouse planning, safety and operations; and supply depot operations.¹

(U) In addition, a seven-week workshop was conducted with the ashore supply class to study the existing Indonesian Navy logistics system and to recommend improvements. After two visits, FADM Sukiswo, the senior Indonesian Navy Supply Officer, extended the workshop by three weeks in order that refinements could be made with Indonesian Naval Headquarters personnel in Jakarta. Admiral Sukiswo was deeply impressed with the workshop recommendations and saw them as a major advance in logistics for the Indonesian Navy. At a closing ceremony for the mobile team members, Admiral Sukiswo praised the team's unstinting dedication, expertise, and ability to adjust to unusual conditions and establishment of rapport. CINCPAC added congratulations and "well done" to the gratitude expressed by the Chief USDLG.²

English Language Training

(U) An English language training program from the Defense Language Institute, English Language Center (DLIELC), headquartered at Lackland AFB, Texas, was inaugurated in Indonesia in 1967 and consisted of one person assigned to the Indonesian Army Academy. Between 1974 and 1976, the detachment numbered five with stations in Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, and Malang. In 1976 the Language Training Detachment (LTD) was attached to the USDLG under the IMET program. Initially the detachment was to work in the small non-intensive English programs at the Indonesian service academies. However, LTD duties were increased to encompass coordination of English language instruction of all services through the Indonesian training offices. The program concept was a long-range plan to

2. CHUSDLG Indonesia O20754Z Dec 80 (U); CINCPAC 110431Z Dec 80 (U).
provide English language training for Indonesia IMET students with the goal of eventual program management by the Indonesians themselves. In addition, the LTD was to monitor English instruction for students prior to CONUS IMET training on the OV-10F aircraft being purchased by the Indonesian Air Force. The modest start evolved into a total of 20 permanent facilities and over 100 mobile facilities.1

(U) During the following years specialized language training paralleled Indonesian acquisition of U.S. military equipment such as the UH-1D helicopter, T-34 trainer, and F-5E/F fighter, as well as visits by technical U.S. MTTs. Also during 1977-78 a small number of Indonesians were sent to the DLI Foreign Language Center for observation training as a step toward the goals of establishing an Indonesian Defense Language Institute (Lembaga Bahasa HANKAM) and assuming responsibilities for English language teaching and support. By the end of 1978 LTD manning had been reduced to three, and in 1979, as the transition proceeded, the HANKAM elected not to retain the remaining instructor beyond FY 80 due to tight fiscal constraints resulting from rupiah devaluation and other factors. Also during 1979 the USDLG advised the Indonesians that IMET funded English training would no longer be provided for FMS projects. As a result of these decisions, the USDLG English Language Training Detachment program ended with the departure of the last consultant on 27 September 1980. English training was assumed by the HANKAM on 1 October 1980. During the life of the program over 160 persons received training in the Basic Language Instructor course given at the DLIELC. Since FY 78 approximately 28,000 Indonesian military members and dependents received language training with 823 out of 1,107 candidates passing English Comprehensive Language tests.2

F-5 Aircraft

-(C) The GOI had signed an LOA on 30 March 1978 for four F-5F and eight F-5E TIGER II aircraft at an approximate cost of $85 million. A second LOA for four additional F-5Es was signed in July 1978 for $22 million. The F-5s were financed primarily with FMS credit under PEACE KOMODO I and II respectively. Training was covered by four separate FMS cases consisting of pilot and maintenance training in CONUS and MTTs for instructor pilots, maintenance, and supply.3

1. J473 HistSum Sep 80 (U); CHUSDLG Indonesia End-of-Tour Report Ser 05-80 of 17 Jun 80 (U); J473 HistSum Sep 80 (U); DLIELC Language Training Detachment End-of-Tour Report (U).
2. Ibid.
A pre-delivery conference was held 15-27 January 1980 in Indonesia with representatives of U.S. and Indonesian military and contractors. The first eight aircraft arrived, as scheduled, on 21 April by C-5A with the formal transfer to the Indonesians on 5 May, and the second eight arrived on 21 July. With arrival in Indonesia, the F-5 became operational in all ASEAN member countries. The PEACE KOMODO after-action report noted that the initial site survey had failed to take the limited managerial and technical background and expertise of the Indonesians into account. Two spare engines were dropped while being off-loaded but no defects were found during tests performed at Clark AB in the Philippines and the engines were returned to Indonesia. The program was completed in 18 months instead of the normal 24 due to pressure of the Indonesian Government. According to the manufacturer (Northrop Corporation), the program was one of the most efficient and successful on record.\(^1\)

**Overhaul of Indonesian Ships**

Two of four ex-U.S. Navy CLAUDE JONES-class DEs were repaired at the U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility (SRF) at Subic Bay in the Philippines in 1977 through MAP grant aid. Repairs for the other two DEs were a continuing discussion topic at various levels of the Indonesian Navy's hierarchy in 1978. With the termination of MAP on 30 September 1978 and continued GOI funding problems, however, the near-term outlook for repairs and overhaul was dim. In August 1979 the Indonesian Navy developed a $52 million proposal for overhaul of 16 ex-U.S. Navy ships at Subic over a three-year period using FMS credit if the funding could be obtained. In January 1980, however, a report from the USDAO in Jakarta indicated that the plans for overhaul had changed. The overhaul would be deferred until 1981, include only 14 ships, and as many of those as feasible would be overhauled at the Indonesia Naval Shipyard (PAL) in Surabaya.\(^2\)

In commenting on Chief USDLG's advice to the CNO that Indonesia had allocated FMS credit funds for overhaul of two DEs at Subic, in April 1980 CINCPACFLT raised certain objections to the use of Subic as a site. CINCPACFLT stated, without USDLG knowledge, that the maintenance capacity of SRF Subic must be preserved first for SEVENTH Fleet ships and other U.S. ships operating in the Indian Ocean. Next was maintenance for host country (Philippine) navy, and then, if workload permitted, other allied navy maintenance. The SRF at Guam was the primary source for support of allied navies in the Pacific and three Thai ships had been referred there recently. Moreover, there was an

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1. Ibid.; J473 HistSums Apr, Dec 80 (U); USICA 210849Z and 220941Z Apr 80 (U); PEACE KOMODO After-Action Report, Dec 80 (U).
obligation to the Congress to provide SRF Guam with $22 million of work each year in order to retain a trained workforce nucleus.¹

(U) On 2 May the CHUSDLG forwarded a GOI LOA request for overhaul of the two DEs at Subic. He considered the location "critical" to the success of the overhauls based upon the following rationale:²

- The Philippines was a fellow ASEAN member and as such would provide a non-U.S.-aligned image; also the proximity of Subic would be a positive factor.

- Experience and rapport established by the 1977-78 DE repairs, plus leftover material at Subic belonging to the GOI, would expedite ship availability and in turn bolster Indonesia's effectivity in the refugee program.

- Crew members could receive much-needed training in many areas while ships were undergoing overhaul.

(Œ) CINCPACFLT agreed to overhaul1 at Subic as an exception to general policy on 23 July and CNO approved the LOA. The first DE (KRI SAMADI KUN) arrived at Subic on 30 December and work began on schedule. At the end of 1980 it was still planned that the eight LSTs and two auxiliaries would be overhauled at Surabaya with U.S. technical assistance.³

Ship Requests

(Œ) In order to improve their extremely limited sea defense capability, the GOI wished to acquire additional ships similar to the previously acquired CLAUDE JONES-class destroyers. The subject had surfaced during visits to Indonesia by Admiral Long and Under Secretary Komor. Although it had been ascertained that there were no destroyers available which would be suitable to Indonesia's needs, there were two ASHEVILLE-class patrol combatants (PG) which might be available after decommissioning by the U.S. Navy at the end of FY 81 in an "as is-where is" condition for approximately $500,000 each. In October the GOI indicated plans to conduct an inspection of the ships at Little Creek, Virginia, but on 10 December the Chief USDLG advised that after

1. J473 HistSum Apr 80 (C), DECL 2 May 86; CINCPAC 300134Z Apr 86 (C). DECL 23 Apr 86.
2. J473 HistSum May 80 (U); CHUSDLG Indonesia 020801Z May 80 (U).
full consideration the GOI "regrets it cannot accept the offer to purchase the ships." 1

Property Disposal

(U) In early 1978 the Chief USDLG requested CINCPAC assistance in negotiating an agreement with HANKAM covering disposal of excess MAP property. After 22 months of negotiations, an MOU between the U.S. and Indonesian Governments was signed on 17 October 1979. By 1980 the GOI had identified T-33, T-34A, C-47 aircraft, H-34 helicopters, trucks, patrol boats; and an LST as excess. Although physical inspection indicated most items had only scrap value, the disposal effort would clear the books of some $220 million worth of grant aid equipment provided by the U.S. Government over the previous 30 years. 2

1. AMEMB Jakarta 8921/020959Z Jun 80 (C), GDS 6/2/86; CNO 192216Z Jun 80 (C), DECL 10 Jun 86; CHUSDLG Jakarta 210154Z Oct 80 (U); SECDEF 6092/051308Z Nov 80 (U); CHUSDLG Jakarta 100918Z Dec 80 (U).

MK-46 Torpedoes

Negotiations between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the U.S. Navy for MK-46 torpedo technology began in 1969. Japan wanted the technology for development of surface platforms in both the tube-launched and ASROC modes, but the U.S. Navy disapproved release of the desired data. By 1973 the MK-46 was released for sale but not for foreign production. When Japan requested an FMS case for two MK-46s, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) advised that the minimum quantity available would be 100. Therefore, Japan opted to continue development of a domestic torpedo (MK-73) program. For the next several years Japan continued to seek release of MK-46 technology and in 1977 release was granted as the result of a Data Exchange Agreement (DEA). \(^1\)

In early 1978 Japan requested an FMS case for 50 MK-46 torpedoes per year as armament for the P-3C ASW aircraft. The purchase, however, was contingent upon authorization for licensed production (LP). The CNO approved the FMS purchase but disapproved the LP request, stating that the development program would be too expensive. CINCPAC asked CNO to reconsider LP later in 1978 but CNO refused. \(^2\)

During the second half of 1979 Japan was faced with the dilemma of whether to continue solely with the development and manufacture of the MK-73 by Mitsubishi, or to procure a limited number of MK-46s under FMS in combination with reduced procurement of the domestic MK-73. At the end of August Japan Defense Agency (JDA) officials were briefed on the newest version of the MK-46, the MOD-5 NEAR TIP. In November MSDF officials were notified informally that the CNO would consider LP for the MK-46, less the front end. Such a program would assure 75 percent production of the system in Japan. At the end of the year, Japan had not decided whether to pursue the strictly domestic manufacture of the MK-73 or a combination with MK-46s under FMS. \(^3\)

In January 1980 the Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO) Japan learned of a new initiative by the JDA to submit an LP proposal. Based on an 18 March visit by Mr. Ikeda, Director, Defense Division, Bureau of Defense Policy, JDA, with Navy officials in Washington, the Japanese were of the

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
JAPAN (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

- LAND AREA: 371,900 Sq Km
- LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS: 12 Nautical Miles
- LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE: 200 Nautical Miles
- POPULATION: 116,440,000
- ANNUAL GROWTH: 1.0 Percent
- LITERACY RATE: 99 Percent
- LIFE EXPECTANCY: 78 Years
- AGRICULTURAL LAND PER CAPITA: 0.1 Acre
- GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (1980): $1.2 Trillion
- PER CAPITA: $10,316
- DEFENSE BUDGET (1980): $11.4 Billion
- OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET: 5.7 Percent
- TYPE OF GOVERNMENT: Constitutional Parliamentary Monarchy
- EMPEROR: HIROHITO
- PRIME MINISTER: SUZUKI Zenko
- DIRECTOR GENERAL, JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY: GMURA Joji
- MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: ITU Masayoshi
- CHAIRMAN, JOINT STAFF COUNCIL: GEN TAKEDA Gen
- CHIEF OF GROUND (ARMY) STAFF: GEN SUGIURA Tsunehiko
- CHIEF OF MARITIME (NAVY) STAFF: ADIM YATA Toshinori
- CHIEF OF AIR (AIR FORCE) STAFF: GEN YAMADA Ryudei

(U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

- U.S. AMBASSADOR: HON. Michael J. Mansfield
- COMUS JAPAN: LT GEN RICHARD H. GINN, Jr., USAF
- CHIEF OF STAFF: COL. JOHN H. EDMUNDS, USAF
- DATT: CAPT. JOHN F. O'CONNELL, USAF

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (S/NF), p. 67, REV 16 Feb 01.
impression that, with the exception of the warhead and torpedo counter-countermeasures, LP might be approved. As a result of a 12-13 April meeting held by the JDA Director General, it was determined to proceed with introduction of the MK-46 program and that planning for the MK-73 would be cancelled or altered. 1

-(S)- The U.S. Navy terms presented to Government of Japan (GOJ) officials at briefings at the MDAO on 14 and 15 May, however, were not in accordance with those envisioned by the JDA—rather, they confined Japanese participation to a "sub-contractor" status and could be considered an insult. A letter of 22 May from VADM Yoshida, Director, Operations and Plans Department, Maritime Staff Office, JDA, to his U.S. counterpart, VADM Foley, expressed great dissatisfaction. Yoshida and Ikeda were under extremely heavy pressure to break the deadlock. Yoshida outlined a counter proposal and requested an early response so that the project could be included in the JFY 81 defense budget which had a July deadline. In transmitting the letter, the Chief MDAO Japan recommended keeping the issue in navy-to-navy channels if possible and expressed concern that "this issue could have a serious negative impact on the full range of our equipment programs and especially our relationship with MSDF." The Chief also urged a reply by 27 May in order to avoid escalation of the issue to higher levels, i.e., discussions between GOJ Vice Minister for Defense Watari and U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Perry scheduled for 28 May. 2

-(S)- The subject was, however, brought to Secretary Perry's attention and he promised to seek an improvement in the USN position. In subsequent exchanges of messages and conversations between CH MDAO, CNO, and VADM Yoshida, there was an attempt to attribute the problem to a misunderstanding of terminology, but the U.S. Navy position remained firm and Yoshida again asked for a better proposal prior to his reassignment on 27 June. If the response were not reasonable, he said, the MK-46 LP could become a topic at the forthcoming U.S.-GOJ Security Consultative Committee Subcommittee meeting scheduled to commence on 30 June. 3

-(S)- On 9 July after a thorough review by senior Navy officials, the CNO recommended release of the afterbody and 10 additional components of the MK-46 MOD 5 for LP in Japan. Additionally, final assembly and proofing in Japan were authorized subject to certain provisions. The GOJ response, in the form

1. CHMDO Tokyo 111109Z Apr 80 (C), DECL 11 Apr 86.
2. CHMDO Tokyo 221041Z May 80 (S), REVW 22 May 10.
3. CHMDO Tokyo 271029Z May (S), REVW 27 May 10; CNO 022345Z Jun 80 (S), GDS 30 May 87; CHMDO Tokyo 260015Z Jun 80 (S), REVW 26 Jun 86; CNO 262338Z Jun 80, REVW 31 Dec 80; J464 HistSum Jun 80 (U).
of a letter from RADM Nagata--Yoshida's replacement--expressed great apprecia-
tion for the review and the U.S. Navy's "deep understanding of the situation." The following month CNO advised the Chief MDAO that the Navy was also willing to consider the MK-46 MOD 5 for full licensed production at the time of satis-
factory fleet introduction of the USN advanced lightweight torpedo. At the close of 1980 work was continuing to resolve remaining problems related to partial LP, such as establishment of suitable proofing and testing sites and facilities, and the GOJ had not made a decision on the offer for full licensed production.1

1. J464 HistSum Jul 80 (S), DECL 6 Aug 86; CNO 091748Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 8 Jul 86; CHMDO 221159Z Jul 80 (S), REVW 22 Jul 86; CNO 242240Z Jul 80 (C), DECL 24 Jul 86; CNO 252300Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 25 Jul 86; J464 HistSum Aug 80 (C), DECL 29 Aug 86; J464 HistSum Dec 80 (C), DECL 12 Jan 85.
KOREA

(U) Events in Korea during 1980 centered on the struggle to achieve political and economic stability following the death of President Park Chung-hee in October 1979. Escalating oil prices, devaluation of the won, and slackening in foreign investments and credits compounded the economic turmoil. On the political scene, the civilian caretaker government of President Choi Kyu-hah strove to maintain stability until elections could be held. In March, however, student riots against the repressions of martial law began. Army General Chun Doo Hwan eventually emerged as a power capable of controlling the spreading riots, demonstrations, and political challenges, and acted as a punitive force for those associated with the assassination of President Park. He was inaugurated as President on 1 September.¹

(U) On 17 September Kim Dae-jung, longtime political foe of assassinated President Park, was sentenced to death on sedition charges. U.S. officials had been concerned ever since his arrest and opposed the death sentence. During a December visit to Korea, the U.S. Secretary of Defense pressed the Korean Government to spare Kim's life. A number of U.S. initiatives as well as ongoing actions regarding Korea were held in abeyance during this whole period because of the political turbulence and uncertainty.

FMS Credits and Force Improvement Plan

{(S)} During 1980 FMS credits for Korea were intimately interwoven with the ROK Force Improvement Plan (FIP) I. The ROK FIP was the equivalent of the U.S. five-year defense program/plan and had been conceived unilaterally by the Koreans in 1975. Chief objectives of the FIP were development of forces by 1980 capable of deterring and defending the Republic of Korea against North Korean aggression and development of ROK defense industries in support of the FIP programs. With the publication of the seventh revision to the FIP in late 1979 it became obvious that due to funding constraints and delivery schedules, completion of the FIP I would slip into 1981. Expenditures for 1980 were originally programmed at $1.2 billion.²

¹ The won exchange rate went from 484 to 500 per U.S. dollar after the assassination and by the end of 1980 had dropped to 600.
² J462 Point Paper (S), Jan 80, Subj: ROK Force Improvement Program (FIP) (U), DECL Jan 86; J461 HistSum Feb 80 (C), DECL 6 Mar 80; AMEMB Seoul 1511/040913Z Feb 80 (C), GDS 2/4/86.
At the end of 1977 planning for the basic troop withdrawal compensation package included $275 million in FMS credits annually for the period FY 78-82, which would help support the ROK FIP. However, by late 1978 the figures for FY 79 and 80 had dropped to $225 million, and when withdrawal planning dissipated as a result of the 1979 North Korean threat reassessment, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the FY 80 figure could be cut to as low as $155 or $165 million.1

In January 1980 the FY 81 budget proposal sent to Congress by the President contained a provision which suspended withdrawal of the 2nd Infantry Division from Korea. Shortly thereafter the State Department advised that the maximum amount of FMS credit which could be obligated under continuing resolution authority (CRA) would be $138 million for FY 80. (The ROKG had identified projects totaling $217.56 million.) Reaction to this reduction by the Korea Country Team was swift. The American Ambassador, citing the severe impact which such cuts would have on an already heavily burdened economy and especially on the FIP, requested that the State Department seek supplemental legislation to provide a level of $275 million in FMS credits. He also asked that IMET funding be restored to $1.8 million from $1.2 million and that the Country Team not be required to deliver the "bad news" until a decision was rendered on the supplemental legislation. CINCPAC supported the Ambassador's recommendation on both the FMS credit level and IMET levels.2

Meanwhile, the ROK Assistant Minister of National Defense for Logistics and Defense Industries advised Chief, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (CH/JUSMAG) Korea that the ROK requirement for FMS credits had increased to $425 million. This was caused by a recent reappraisal of the impact of the won devaluation and massive rises in oil prices on the ROK defense budget. In the face of a severe funding shortfall, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) believed that force readiness was of paramount importance at this particular time in order to maintain internal stability and that a $200 million deficit in 1980 FIP expenditures would result. After various considerations,


2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 30 Jan 80, "2nd U.S. Infantry Division Now Slated to Stay in Korea" (U); J46 HistSum Feb 80 (C), DECL 6 Mar 86; SECSTATE 29861/021814Z Feb 80 (C), E.O. 12065: N/A; J461 Point Paper (S), Jan 80, Subj: ROK Allocation of FY 80 FMS Credit (U), DECL Jan 86; AMEMB Seoul 1511/040913Z Feb 80 (C), GDS 2/14/86; AMEMB Seoul 1564/050807Z Feb 80 (C), GDS 2/5/86; CINCPAC 090507Z Feb 80 (C), DECL 4 Feb 86.
the MND had decided the only alternative was to seek $200 million in FMS credits in addition to the $225 million already requested.¹

(S/NF) The first notification of the $155 million figure to Korean officials was made in Washington by Deputy Secretary of Defense Claytor on 20 February in discussions with the ROK Deputy Prime Minister, Ambassador, and the Defense Attache to Washington. Consequently, on 26 February COMUS Korea, General Wickham, revealed the $155 million figure to Minister of National Defense Choo, who expressed shock and surprise. The Minister could not understand why the U.S. Government would not provide an adequate level of credits, particularly when the sales involved would help U.S. employment. General Wickham replied that supplementary legislation was being sought and if that failed, a request for an increased level for FY 81 would be generated. In a subsequent meeting on 1 April Minister Choo reviewed the continuing dire ROK budget situation. Although another review of defense programs revealed $22 million could be saved by cutting new projects, the ROKG would need $395 million in credits in FY 81 for successful completion of FIP I objectives.²

(S) The State Department reply on supplemental funding was not received in Korea until 14 April and was unfavorable. It cited severe Presidential budget constraints which precluded any supplemental requests. In fact, new requirements for Indian Ocean access programs had to be absorbed which meant FY 80 credits could be reduced even further and Korea might receive only $150 million for FY 81. On 30 July the State Department advised that $129 million was the maximum amount which could be obligated for FY 80 under CRA. According to CHJUSMAG Korea, the result was a $296 million deficit in the 1980 FIP ($200 million from the won devaluation and $96 million from the difference between the $225 million CPD figure and the CRA of $129 million). In order to make up the shortfall, the ROK MND adjusted the FIP schedule by slating 34 projects into a reserve category and deferring payment to ROK contractors until 1981 on eight other projects, and FIP I completion would be delayed accordingly.³

1. AMEMB Seoul 1806/110855Z Feb 80 (C), GDS 2/11/86; AMEMB Seoul 2508/290222Z (C) Feb 80 (C), GDS 2/28/86.
2. ASD/ISA 189-80/212347Z Feb 80 (C)(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 86; SSO Korea 270540Z Feb 80 (S/NF)(BOM), REVW 27 Feb 86; SSO Korea 020913Z Apr 80 (S/NF)(BOM), DECL 17 Apr 80.
3. SECSTATE 98557/142307Z Apr 80 (C), GDS 4/14/86; SECSTATE 201885/301541Z Jul 80 (C), E.O. 12065: 7/28/86; CHJUSMAGK 060835Z Aug 80 (S)(BOM), DECL 6 Aug 86.
In August the ROK MND received approximately $75 million in additional funding for 1980 for FIP I, but despite adjustments a requirement still remained for $216.7 million in FMS credits for 1980 for signed and unsigned LOAs. After the cut under CRA to $129 million, the FIP would still be short $87.7 million. Therefore, the American Embassy and CHJUSMAG Korea forwarded a ROK request for the early release of FY 81 credits in that amount during the first quarter which would enable the ROKG to sign LOAs in 1980 but defer initial payment into 1981. In September the Secretary of Defense advised that $34.4 million had been identified on existing contracts for which payment could be deferred until after 1 January 1981. That left $54.5 million of FY 81 credits which the State Department approved on 15 November for early release to be applied toward an LOA for the F-5E/F aircraft coproduction program (see below). Total FMS credits for FY 81 were set at $160 million.

F-5 Coproduction

In order to keep on par with North Korean combat capabilities and as part of its overall aircraft modernization program, the ROK Air Force planned, within the limits of national resources, to replace approximately 200 aging F-5A/B and F-86 fighter aircraft. The Koreans' first preference was to acquire the new U.S. F-16 multi-role fighter, either by sale or, if possible, through a coproduction or coassembly arrangement. Although agreeing in principle to sell the F-16 to Korea, the United States would not consider a cooperative F-16 production arrangement. Throughout much of 1978 and 1979 the Koreans deliberated on various fighter replacement options. In August 1979 the ROKG selected the F-5E/F and submitted a request to coassemble 36 F-5Es and 32 F-5Fs in the 1982-86 time frame. The primary role of the F-5E would be air defense; that of the F-5F combat training, and both would have secondary roles in close air support. After a Presidential exception to arms transfer policy limitations was granted, the PEACE FREEDOM III program was publicly announced at the 12th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul in mid-October 1979, Congressional approval of the LOA followed, and as 1979 ended, the conditions of an MOU were being negotiated with an estimated package cost of $441 million for FMS and direct commercial sales.

1. J462 HistSum Aug 80 (S), DECL 16 Sep 86; AMEMB Seoul 10406/130611Z Aug 80 (S), RDS-1 8/11/86; AMEMB Seoul 10836/210654Z Aug 80 (S), GDS 8/20/86; J462 HistSum Sep 80 (U); SECFOR 1039/201715Z Sep 80 (U); J462 HistSum Oct 80 (C), DECL 6 Nov 86; J462 HistSum Nov 80 (C), DECL 4 Dec 86; SECSTATE 305241/151006Z Nov 80 (C), RDS-1 11/14/10; J462 HistSum Dec 80 (C), DECL 12 Jan 87.

During 1980 the F-5 coproduction program also felt the effects of changes in the Korean Government and a stagnating economy. In February the Secretary of Defense forwarded a proposed MOU to the CHJUSMAG Korea with a total program cost of $550 million. A week later CHJUSMAG Korea forwarded a list of substantive differences between the earlier ROKG version and that of the Secretary of Defense, which he felt could prove troublesome, especially the cost ($441 versus $550 million) in view of recent ROK budgetary problems.1

ROKG officials signed the MOU in late June and requested modifications to the accompanying LOA which would spread out the production and funding schedules. The Koreans had decided to satisfy some logistics support requirements from their own inventory thereby hoping to reduce initial payments for costly standard and non-standard support equipment and spare parts. In August U.S. Air Force headquarters issued a revised LOA payment schedule and estimate of support costs reflecting a reduction from $101 million to $73.8 million.2

On 24 October the MOU was signed by U.S. Government officials and the Letter of Offer was accepted by the ROKG prior to the 15 November deadline. About the same time State and Treasury Department officials approved the release of $54.5 million in FY 81 FMS credits to be applied to the F-5 program. Total program cost had risen to $623.6 million.3

Coproduction and Third Country Sales

During the 1950s a ROK Army arsenal was established in Pusan, Korea, with MAP funds. In 1965 COMUS Korea proposed expansion of the arsenal, and architectural and engineering studies were made with the objective of increasing production capability to equal the total annual ROK requirement for small arms training ammunition. The program was included in the March 1966 agreements between the United States and the Koreans which provided for additional ROK Forces in Vietnam. The President's legislative proposal for FY 67 MAP called for greater emphasis on self-help. Self-sufficiency was to be furthered by conditioning military aid upon commitments from recipient countries to make maximum contributions to common defense, and $3 million was included in the regular FY 67 and FY 68 MAP programs for the arsenal expansion program.

1. J461 HistSum Feb 80 (C), DECL 5 Mar 86; SECDEF 5579/052032Z Feb 80 (C), DECL 4 Feb 86; CHJUSMAGK 120100Z Feb 80 (C), DECL 31 Dec 84.
2. J462 HistSum Jul 80 (C), DECL 8 Aug 86; CHJUSMAGK 011515Z Jul 80 (C), DECL 30 Jun 84; HQ USAF 022050Z Jul 80 (U); J462 HistSum Aug 80 (U); HQ USAF 072030Z Aug 80 (U).
3. J462 HistSum Oct 80 (U); J462 HistSum Dec 80 (C), DECL 4 Dec 86; SECSTATE 321765/050756Z Dec 80 (C), RDS-1 12/4/90.
However, the expansion was delayed somewhat by non-availability of production equipment in the United States due to urgent requirements in Vietnam. Meanwhile, in Korea numerous domestic and industrial capabilities were being established or planned for future improvements.¹

In early 1968 the ROKG had been actively considering building a small arms plant in Korea to reequip ROK Forces with a new shoulder weapon. The first formal discussion on the subject occurred at a meeting between representatives of the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK MND on 27-28 May 1968. In early October of that year, CINCPAC made a visit to Korea where he was provided a joint ROKG-COMUS Korea proposal for construction of an M-16 rifle plant in Korea and the ROK Army arsenal expansion plan. During a meeting with ROK President Park, Admiral McCain discussed the proposal and the President expressed deep interest in the proposed project.²

On 2 June 1969 the U.S. Government agreed in principle to the construction of the M-16 plant in Korea. In March 1971 the ROKG signed an agreement with Colt Firearms Inc. to construct and equip an M-16 rifle plant in Pusan. Construction and installation of equipment were completed in early 1974 and by the end of that year, a production goal of 90,000 rifles had been attained. The newly expanded arsenal also approximated its increased production goals in 1974, and in June of that year the ROK MND notified JUSMAG Korea that it planned to coproduce M-60 tanks and to upgrade all M-48 tanks with diesel engines and improved guns. Other items under consideration by the ROKG for coproduction were fighter aircraft, the VULCAN air defense system, and certain communications equipment.³

On the one hand, the United States wished to encourage the Koreans to be more self-sufficient in their defense posture—especially while U.S. troop withdrawal planning was in vogue. From 1978-80 the ROKG had submitted a number of requests to coproduce weapons systems and parts for domestic use. Commitments to approve and support ROK artillery production, tank upgrade, and 50OMD helicopter and F-5 coassembly had been made at U.S.-ROK Security Consultative and other high level meetings. Representative of the difficulties encountered was a request submitted by CHJUSMAG Korea in May 1980 for production of 155mm howitzers (self-propelled) and components. After receipt of State Department denial on the thick-walled gun tubes for the 155mm (and 8-inch)

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SECRET

(6) As ROK manufacturing capability continued to increase during the late 1970s and where anticipated production levels were successfully achieved, the Koreans looked to foreign markets as a means of further capitalizing their plant and equipment investments. The accompanying chart is representative of ROK requests for export of coproduced items to third countries. 1

(6) Early in 1980 the ROKG also asked for automatic prior approval of sales of like equipment to the same country and waivers on royalty fees since many of the requested items were no longer produced in the United States. The Korean position was that production for domestic use only could not maintain their defense industry; third country sales would strengthen the economy by expanding the production base; and profits from the resultant reduced unit costs would enable increased purchase of required war reserve materiel and FMS items. 2

(6) Especially confusing to the Koreans, the Country Team, and other countries were U.S. calls for assistance to provide defense materials to third countries on an emergency basis. Such was the case in February and March 1980 when a Defense Department representative approached the ROK Logistics Service Mission in Washington to ascertain the ROK capability to provide conventional arms to Pakistan. The Koreans were eager to assist but the Country Team was without guidance on how to advise or proceed. 3

(6) In March American Embassy Seoul forwarded a list of projected ROK production capability for 1980 and recommended U.S. support of appropriate ROK requests for defense sales to third countries. The Embassy also suggested it would be prudent for the U.S. Government to avoid the role of middleman by allowing direct negotiations between ROK and allied third country governments in order to save time and avoid potential financing, support or quality guarantee problems. 4

(6) In a number of cases CINCPAC had supported the Country Team position on production for indigenous use and for export of items to other PACOM countries. However, in December CINCPAC imposed a stipulation that future support would require complete justification when ROK TOE or WRSA shortfalls

1. ASD/ISA Memorandum of Record of 17 Apr 80 (S), Subj: Korea Review Group Meeting--26 Mar 80 (U), DECL 31 Dec 86; SECSTATE 174465/052335Z Jul 79 (C), GDS 6/28/85.
2. Ibid.
3. CHJUSMAGK 111048Z Mar 80 (C)(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 81; OSD/ISA 198-80/242320Z Mar 80 (S)(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 86.
# SELECTED SALES REQUESTS FOR COPRODUCED ITEMS--KOREA

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<td>Thailand 5</td>
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existed or were projected for proposed sale items. As 1980 ended the State Department implemented new guidelines to facilitate request processing for third-country sale of U.S. licensed defense materials.¹

Korea Review Group

{S} The Korea Review Group was established by the Secretary of Defense on 14 November 1978 to consider a wide range of policy issues evolving from problems with the $800 million arms transfer package. Representatives of the Military Departments, the JCS, three Assistant Defense Secretaries, and the Director of DSAA met in Washington in March and November 1980 for flag/action officer level discussions. At both meetings additional officers represented CINCPAC, COMUS Korea, and CHJUSMAG Korea; at the latter, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Defense Intelligence Agency were represented. In 1980, as emphasis on the transfer package dwindled, the group concentrated on a number of measures to improve ROK-U.S. defense cooperation. Chief among these measures were:²

- Establishment of acceptable procedures for transfer of WRSA under wartime conditions (see the Logistics Chapter of this history).

- Responsiveness to ROK requests for technology and components for SSM development.

- Responsiveness to ROK requests for coproduction and third country sales in support of tank and economic development programs. (See above.)

- Reassessment of the North Korean threat during 1981.

- Status of troop withdrawal planning.

- A-10 squadron deployment and beddown.

1. J462 HistSum Jul 79 (C), DECL 6 Aug 85; CINCPAC 232231Z Jul 79 (C), DECL 20 Jul 85; J461 HistSum Oct 79 (C), DECL 8 Nov 85; CINCPAC 020331Z Nov 79 (C), DECL 31 Oct 85; J462 HistSum Oct 80 (U); CINCPAC 211942Z Oct 80 (U); CINCPAC 202007Z Dec 80 (S), DECL 15 Dec 86.

2. CINCPAC Command History 1979 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 421-423; ASD/ISA Memorandum of 17 Apr 80 (S), Subj: Korea Review Group Meeting-26 Mar 80 (U), DECL 31 Dec 86; ASD/ISA Memorandum of 10 Dec 80 (S), Subj: Korea Review Group Meeting-6 Nov 80 (U), DECL 31 Dec 86.
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- Impact of economic slowdown and political turmoil on ROK Force Improvement Plans and FMS credits.

- Progress on Combined Defense Improvement Projects.

- Proposals for development of ROK-U.S.-GOJ security cooperation and Japanese economic assistance to Korea.

- Improvements to the organization and hardware technology level of the CFC under Project SORAK.

- Progress on communications improvements in South Korea under CPICK/TPICK (discussed in the Command, Control, and Communications Systems chapter).
A-4 Aircraft

The Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) had requested P&B data originally on 15 A-4C SKYHAWK attack/ground support aircraft in November 1977 and for 54 A-4Es (or A-4Cs) on 1 March 1978. Both requests were supported by CINCPAC for counterinsurgency operations. In May 1978 the State Department advised the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur that the A-4Es were not available and subsequently planning and/or budgetary P&B data was transmitted on 54 A-4Cs. During the early part of 1979 acquisition efforts centered on a contractor suggested for procurement of Israeli A-4Es (via U.S. reacquisition) as substitutes for the A-4Cs. When this failed to materialize the State Department offered availability of 63 A-4Ls at the Military Aircraft Surplus Disposal Command, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, under FMS credit. A formal Government of Malaysia (GOM) LOA request for 20 A-4Cs (subsequently increased to 25) and 63 A-4Ls was transmitted to the State Department in September 1979. \(^1\)

The Malaysian Defense Minister informed U.S. officials in January 1980 that the GOM had decided to purchase the A-4s. On 8 February formal 30-day notification for 88 A-4 aircraft under FMS case S4H at $23 million was submitted to the Congress. However, one week later the CNO advised the Embassy of a critical U.S. Navy need for wings from the A-4Ls and plans for removal from 14 of the A-4Ls at Davis-Monthan slated for Malaysia. The U.S. Ambassador strongly objected to such action which, he stated, "would sour major development of U.S.-Malaysian relations and raise a question of U.S. dependability as principal supplier of RMAF combat aircraft." As a result, the wings were reserved for RMAF use and an LOA was issued on 27 March for the 88 aircraft (including removed wings) in an "as is-where is" condition. The GOM signed the LOA on 21 May. \(^2\)

In December the GOM issued a tender of offer for a total rehabilitation and support package for the A-4s with bids due by the end of January 1981.

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2. J472 HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 8 Feb 86; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 582/230856Z Jan 80 (S), RDS-3, 1/22/90; J472 HistSum Feb 80 (C), DECL 8 Mar 86; SECDEF 6605/082202Z Feb 80 (U); CNO 150112Z Feb 80 (U); AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 1123/200737Z Feb (C), RDS-3 2/20/00; J472 Point Paper (C), 9 Jan 81, Subj: Malaysian Purchase of A-4 Aircraft (U), DECL 9 Jan 87.
MALAYSIA (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA ........................................... 322,566 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS ................. 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE ......................... 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION ....................................... 13,841,000
ANNUAL GROWTH ................................... 2.8 Percent
LITERACY RATE .................................... 85 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY ................................... 66 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA ........................... 88 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ......................... $ 124 Billion
PER CAPITA .......................................... $ 989
DEFENSE BUDGET ................................... $ 1,923 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET .................. 13.4 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT ................................ Constitutional Monarchy headed by Paramount Ruler (Kings), bicameral Parliament
PARAMOUNT RULER ................................. Ahmad Shah ibn Sultan Abu Bakar

PRIME MINISTER .............................. HUSSEIN ibn Onn
ACTING DEFENSE MINISTER .................... HSAN HUSAIN bin Onn
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS .............. Ahmad RITHAHDUSEEN
MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS .................. Mohamed GAHALAI bin Shafie
CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES STAFF .......... GEN SANY bin Abdul Ghaffer
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF ..................... GEN Khairil Mohamad GAHALAI
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF ......................... RADM Mohamed ZAIN
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF ............................. MGEN MOHAMED bin Talib

(U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

U.S. AMBASSADOR .............................. HON. Barbara M. WATSON
DATT ............................................... COL. Franklin W. COLLINS, USA

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (S/NF), p. 69, REV 16-Feb 01.
Contractor selection was scheduled for June 1981. The package was to include refurbishing of 68 aircraft (14 to be converted to two-seat trainers); ten years' total logistic and training support; construction of a large depot facility; and other miscellaneous items. Estimated package cost was $400 million with first in-country delivery expected in early 1984.1

F-5 Aircraft

The F-5E, in 1972 Malaysia purchased 14 F-5E fighters and two F-5Bs as trainers. One of the F-5Es crashed while on an RMAF training mission in June 1978. Subsequently, the GOM requested P&B data and LOAs on four F-5Fs and one F-5E. LOAs were signed in December 1978 and delivery was scheduled for late March 1981.2

During December 1979 the GOM submitted a request for P&B data for two RF-5Es which was changed to an LOA request in May 1980. The U.S. Ambassador recommended approval because the sale would update Malaysia's reconnaissance capability in borders. State, Defense, and Congress also approved, and the GOM signed the LOA in December 1980. Cost under FMS credit was $38.2 million.3

UH-1H Helicopters

In January 1980 the U.S. Embassy forwarded a Malaysian request for P&B data on seven UH-1H helicopters with an option to purchase an additional 33. The helos would replace present Allouette III helicopters, which had been plagued by mechanical problems, for use in forward air control, training, liaison, and light transport. The desired planning and review (P&R--changed from P&B) was provided on 7 March with unit costs of $1.725 million for 7 and $1.38 million for 33. Prices were valid for four months, but no extension or LOA was requested during that time and the offer expired.4
(U) On 13 July 1979 a request for P&B data and technical information on the basic CHAPARRAL air defense system was requested by the GOM for comparison with the British RAPIER system. CINCPAC and State and Defense Departments had no objections to the sale and the Commander, USASAC was requested to provide the information on 26 July.\(^1\)

\((C)\) In April 1980 a Malaysian request for similar information on the Improved CHAPARRAL was submitted. CINCPAC requested an assessment from the U.S. DAO on the impact which the introduction of this new technology would have on regional stability. In response, the Country Team gave strong support to the request citing the system as essential to the upgrade of Malaysia's air defense against potential Vietnamese aggression. Coupled with the in-service F-5 fighters and the A-4s scheduled for delivery in 1984, the I-CHAPARRAL would provide a reasonably effective air defense system capable of supporting deployed ground forces. Thereafter CINCPAC supported release of the export model (MIM-72F). Subject to an exception to national disclosure policy the State Department approved release of the P&B data on 10 May. After the exception was granted, the information was sent to the U.S. DAO on 14 July. However, no response was received from the GOM prior to the expiration of the P&B offer.\(^2\)

2. J472 HistSum Apr 80 (C), DECL 9 May 86; USDAO Kuala Lumpur 290445Z Apr 80 (C), DECL 24 Apr 86; J472 HistSum May 80 (C), DECL 6 Jun 86; SECDEF 6214/112100Z Jul 80 (C), DECL 11 Jul 86; J473 Point Paper (S), 9 Sep 80, Subj: Malaysia Security Assistance Program (U), DECL 9 Sep 86.
Military Equipment

On 27 December 1979 the Soviet Union launched a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan, replacing the regime of President Hafizullah Amin with Brabak Karmal. Two days later President Carter condemned the Soviet invasion and mentioned possible measures the United States might take in response. Among the options mentioned was increased military aid to the Government of Pakistan (GOP). The status of FMS to Pakistan as of 31 December 1979 is depicted below.1

Major Systems Provided Prior to 31 Dec 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200 TOW launchers, 3,000 missiles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>530 M-113A1 APCs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 GEARING destroyers with ASROC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 T-37 aircraft (leased)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>940 AIM-9 missiles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 AN/TPS-43 radars</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 M-48 and M-47 tanks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,098 Jeeps and trucks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Requests Being Staffed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,000 TOW missiles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 500-lb SNAKE-EYE bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm howitzers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 Jeeps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 C-12 cargo aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190 2½-ton trucks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical data packages for 105mm and 106mm fuzes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Systems previously offered to or requested by Pakistan

A-7 aircraft

GOP requested 110 in 1976; CINCPAC supported 49; SECSTATE disapproved 4 Jun 1977.

F-5 aircraft

In Oct 1978 U.S. told GOP F-5E was available. No LOA received before nuclear issue halted major sales.

GEARING destroyers

In Nov 1977 Pakistan Navy requested LOA for four additional ships. No action taken by SECSTATE (nuclear issue).

C-130 aircraft

LOA was requested in 1976. Pakistan rejected for lack of funds.

Air defense upgrade

Between 1976-1979 GOP requested P&B or P&A on I-HAWK, VULCAN, CHAPARRAL, and STINGER. After a major study, no LOAs were provided. Cost estimate for I-HAWK alone was $312 million.

1. J474 HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 8 Feb 80; J474 Point Paper (C), 19 Jan 80, Subj: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Pakistan (U), DECL 19 Jan 86.
(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA .................................................. 302,000 Sq. Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS .......................... 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE ............................... 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION .................................................. 62,270,000
ANNUAL GROWTH ........................................... 2.0 Percent
LITERACY RATE ............................................... 51 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY ............................................ About 46 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPTA .................................. 1.1 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ................................. $ 10.4 Billion
PER CAPTA ..................................................... $ 240
DEFENSE BUDGET ............................................. $ 1.15 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ......................... 29 Percent
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT ..................................... Islamic Federal Republic

PRESIDENT ..................................................... GEN ZIA UH-HAQ
CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR AND
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF .................................. GEN ZIA UH-HAQ
MEMBER MILITARY COUNCIL AND ACTING
CHAIRMAN JCS COMMITTEE ............................ GEN-MUHAMMAD IQRAM, Khan
MEMBER MILITARY COUNCIL AND
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF ........................ VAIDM KARANALABHANDHIN NIAZI
MEMBER MILITARY COUNCIL AND
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF ...................... AM-MUHAMMAD ANWAR-NAHMI

(U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

U.S. AMBASSADOR ................................. HON. ARTHUR W. HUMMEL, Jr.
U.S. DEF .............................................. MAJOR, HAROLD A. Maguire, Jr., USN
SECRET

In anticipation of formal tasking from the JCS, on 5 January 1980 CINCPAC requested the Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan (ODRP) to provide a prioritized list of military assistance required by Pakistan in the form of equipment, CONUS training, and contact teams—with and without FMS credit and IMET. In seeking CINCPAC's input, a JCS message of 7 January gave a tentative list of equipment that might be provided to Pakistan in the short term to deter or counter limited Soviet or Afghan cross-border incursions; and in the long term to present a credible deterrent. The analysis was to "identify Pakistan's legitimate military requirements as justified by the current and projected threat and Pakistan's present capabilities," but without consulting the Pakistanis.1

Comments from the U.S. Embassy stressed the need for a generous offer in keeping with the severity of the threat as perceived by the GOP, without previous constraints; reinstatement of IMET funding, and thorough consultation with the GOP prior to final conclusions. The last was important because recent strained U.S.-GOP relationships had left a void in U.S. knowledge of GOP capabilities and acquisitions from other countries. After receiving input from component commands, the CINCPAC response to the JCS on 10 January concluded that aid to Pakistan in the near term should be limited to weapons which could be absorbed easily. Equipment discussions should concentrate on Pakistan's short-term requirements, what the U.S. could provide in a timely manner, and what was releasable under changing policy arrangements. CINCPAC concurred that the list should be developed with GOP consultation and recommended that following initial joint discussions a survey team be dispatched to review the GOP ability to receive equipment. In the short term, this approach would build on and enhance the effectiveness of existing systems. CINCPAC also pointed to the need for a balanced arms transfer policy which recognized India's concerns.2

On 12 January Secretary of State Vance met with a Pakistani delegation in Washington led by GOP Foreign Adviser Agha Shahi and spelled out U.S. proposals for increased aid to Pakistan. Of significance in the security assistance area, he announced the President's intent to seek Congressional authorization for $100 million in FMS credit and $100 million in economic aid for both FY 80 and FY 81. It was subsequently learned that $600,000 in IMET funding

1. J474 HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 8 Feb 80; CINCPAC 052153Z Jan 80 (S), DECL 4 Jan 86; JCS 6170/071815Z Jan 80 (S), DECL 7 Jan 86.
2. J474 HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 8 Feb 80; AMEMB Islamabad 116/071230Z Jan 80 (S), RDS-3 1/8/00; AMEMB Islamabad 162/081200Z Jan 80 (S), REVW 8 Jan 00; CINCPAC 200353Z Jan 80 (S), DECL 9 Jan 86.
for both years was to be included. While no firm commitments were made on
equipment offers, the conferees agreed that a U.S. survey team would visit
Pakistan from 1-7 February. The team objectives were to acquire from the GOP
a refined understanding of current military capabilities, force levels, and
force deployment methodology; priorities for force modernizations; and identifi-
cation of specific equipment requirements. Discussions were also to cover
air defense, ground force improvements, and logistics infrastructure; procure-
ment policy for the immediate future; and longer term military supply
cooperation.1

(S) During the first part of the visit, the team was headed by National
Security Adviser Brzezinski and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher. After
their departure, on 4 February the leadership of the team passed to Assistant
Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs McGiffert. Principal
participants included the Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency,
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense/Research and Engineering (Acquisition
Policy), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (Near East and Southeast Asia
Affairs), senior Service security assistance representatives, and the CINCPAC
Director for Logistics and Security Assistance. While in Pakistan the team
was briefed at each of the service headquarters, viewed the Afghanistan border
by helicopter, held discussions with key GOP military commanders, and visited
the Navy dockyard; engineer members also viewed military and civilian produc-
tion and repair facilities. At the conclusion of the visit, U.S. and GOP
representatives agreed to three follow-on actions.2

- A visit by a U.S. air defense team to evaluate needs in the
western area.

- Review by a U.S. team of M-47 and M-48 tank problems and tank
overhaul needs.

- A production management team to advise on improving defense
production facilities and techniques.

(S) The Pakistan side presented a list of equipment needs and support items,
prioritized by service, reflecting quantities expressed in the near, mid, and
long term. A separate list of infrastructure requirements was also provided.

1. SECSTATE 9607/122233Z Jan 80 (S), RDS-1,3 1/12/2000; J474 Point Paper (C),
19 Jan 80, Subj: Reinstition of Security Assistance for Pakistan (U),
DECL 19 Jan 86; SECSTATE 25698/300137Z Jan 80 (S), RDS-1,3 1/29/86.
2. SECSTATE 25698/300137Z Jan 80 (S), RDS-1,3 1/29/86; AMEMB Islamabad 1299/
131056Z Feb 80 (S), REVW 13 Feb 80.

SECRET

440
Prior to departure, Secretary McGiffert and senior U.S. and GOP representatives met with President Zia, who pointed out, inter alia, that the threat to Pakistan was the greatest ever; Pakistan was making sincere efforts to improve relations with India; U.S. support was of great moral assistance, but additional assurances were necessary; and the 1959 agreement should be made into a treaty. After the team returned to the United States, on 7 February the Carter administration, at the request of the Pakistanis, deferred action on military and economic assistance.¹

(Ê) Meanwhile, in a 24 January message the JCS acknowledged the value of the CINCPAC submission in preparation of the 12 January consultations. The message went on to state that, because of limited time constraints, CINCPAC views had not been solicited in an initial assessment of U.S. requirements for access to Pakistani bases and facilities, however, they would now be appreciated. Prior to submission of a detailed concept plan, CINCPAC forwarded preliminary recommendations for such access. Although limited by lack of detailed, current data on ports and airfields and U.S. force employment levels, the following points were summarized in the 25 February response:²

- Pakistan's airfields, especially in the north, appeared to require substantial construction to improve POL capability.
- Ramp space at most Pakistani air bases was limited.
- Logistics supportability was limited at all bases due to poor lines of communication and inadequate storage facilities.
- Air defense early warning and point defense were inadequate.
- Base security was an unknown factor.
- Port facility at Karachi offered limited capability.

(Ê) During the following months the United States tried to maintain dialogue with the Pakistanis on security matters; however, by August the U.S. Ambassador relayed that the GOP Joint Staff Director for Operations had indicated that all proposed actions resulting from the February DOD team visit

1. AMEMB Islamabad 1299/131056Z Feb 80 (S), REVW 13 Feb 00; Washington Post, 7 Feb 80, "Military Aid for Pakistan No Longer Regarded as Urgent," by Don Oberdorfer (U).
2. JCS 3957/241820Z Jan 80 (S), DECL 24 Jan 86; CINCPAC 252057Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 20 Feb 86.
be held in abeyance and that the only U.S. military support desired was a U.S. fighter and help with improvements in defense production industries.\(^1\)

\(\text{(S)}\) During the remainder of 1980 Pakistan was faced with a number of problems and uncertainties. Over a million refugees had fled to Pakistan after the Soviet take-over in Afghanistan. There was a growing unrest among the various political parties with the continuation of a military government. Concern continued regarding the permanence and credibility of the U.S. commitment and Indian and Soviet reaction to support by the United States; also, Pakistan was reluctant to appear pro-American to other Muslim nations—especially Iran. However, with the grounding of approximately 40 aging F-86 SABREJETS in September, the desire for two squadrons of high-performance U.S. fighters (preferably the F-15) was so great that Pakistan was prepared to incur the unfavorable reactions such an acquisition would engender from its neighbors.\(^2\)

**Destroyers**

\(\text{(S)}\) Two U.S. Navy GEARING-class destroyers (DD) were transferred to the Pakistan Navy (PN) in April 1977 under FMS procedures for $225,000 each. After overhaul in CONUS, they were recommissioned in the PN as the TARIQ and TAIMUR in September 1978. In November 1977 the PN submitted an LOA request for four additional DDs with (ASROC weaponry) which CINCPAC supported. Because of the Washington political climate during the first half of 1978 (the nuclear reprocessing issue), the request was not favorably considered until after an October visit to Washington by the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan. During a November 1978 visit by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, the Pakistanis were advised that the United States was prepared to make four additional GEARINGs available to Pakistan—two of them possibly by 1980.\(^3\)

\(\text{(S)}\) Concurrent with the cut off of MAP (IMET) to Pakistan under the Symington Amendment, in April 1979, the State Department implemented a de facto pause in major arms sales to Pakistan, forestalling the sale of any additional ships. Nevertheless, the U.S. Ambassador urged the State Department to act speedily and affirmatively to conclude the sale of the four DDs to Pakistan.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{1.} SECSTATE 113479/300426Z Apr 80 (S)(EX), GDS 4/28/86; AMEMB Islamabad 7622/010530Z Aug 80 (C), RDS-1 7/31/00.
\item \textbf{2.} ODRP End-of-Tour Report of 26 Aug 80 (FOUO); J478 Point Paper (C), 19 May 80, Subj: Security Assistance Initiatives for Pakistan (U), DECL 19 May 86; Washington Post, 3 Sep 80, p.12 "Pakistan Puts Old U.S. Jets in Mothballs," (U).
\item \textbf{3.} CINCPAC Command History 1979 (TS/FRD), Vol II, pp. 431-433.
\end{itemize}
In supporting the Embassy position to the JCS, CINCPAC stressed the value of Pakistan to U.S. security interests. On 29 May the Policy Review Committee of the National Security Council disapproved release of the DDs to Pakistan, reportedly because of the nuclear impasse. CINCPAC was also informed that the U.S. Navy intention to retire 20 of the 27 GEARING-class DDs by 1 October 1979 had been altered because the Congress wished to retain some in the naval reserve force. In August the Chief of the PN was advised of the non-availability of the destroyers, and at the end of 1979 no action on the GOP request had transpired.1

Following the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in early 1980 Pakistan rejected an offer of $200 million in U.S. military aid, but asked that transfer of two destroyers by pursued separately. In response to a request from the Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan (ODRP) for P&A data, on 8 May 1980 the CNO advised that the FMS price would be under $300,000 each and two DDs (the USS HENDERSON at Long Beach, CA, and the USS ROGERS at Portland, ME) were scheduled for retirement in October 1980. The CNO also requested that the GOP confirm an intent to purchase by 28 May.2

The GOP requested that any transfer arrangements be handled as a classified, sensitive matter throughout the staffing and Congressional notification process in order to safeguard critical Pakistani-Iranian relationships. The ODRP explained that the PN had to overcome one major hurdle in obtaining approval for purchase of the DDs. Pakistan faced a problem with 120 M-48 tanks which had been sent to Iran for overhaul, originally as a gift of the former Shah. Forty had been completed and returned to Pakistan, 20 were completed and awaiting return shipment, but 60 were still being reworked. To President Zia and the Pakistan Army, the completion of the M-48 project was a top priority that could not be jeopardized.3

On 2 June the ODRP notified the State Department that the PN would accept the transfer of the two DDs no later than 1 October 1980. CNO advised that the USS DAMATO at Newport RI would be substituted for the ROGERS. Initially, the formal Congressional notification period was expected to end on 6 July. However, on 27 August the State Department advised that deliberations by the House Appropriations Committee on the naval reserve force issue were delaying approval. Meanwhile, the State Department was attempting to remove the two DDs for Pakistan from these consultations. CINCPAC sent a message to...

1. Ibid; J474 Point Paper (C), 22 Sep 80, Subj: Transfer of Destroyers to Pakistan (U), DECL 22 Sep 86.
2. Ibid; CNO 081918Z May 80 (C), DECL 29 Apr 86.
3. ODRP 190701Z May 80 (C), DECL 19 May 86; ODRP 291118Z May 80 (C), DECL 29 May 86.
the Secretary of Defense offering strong personal support of State and Defense efforts to expedite the sale.¹

(A) After personal intercession by the Secretaries of State and Defense "based on international security considerations /which/ have made it necessary implement immediately the sale of the DAMATO and HENDERSON to Pakistan" the DDs were severed from the reserve ship issue. The formal transfer took place on 30 September and the ships were renamed PNS TIPPU SULTAN and TUGHRIL. After repairs at Newport and ammunition loading at Charleston SC, the TIPPU SULTAN proceeded to Pakistan across the Atlantic while the TUGHRIL received repairs at Long Beach and ammunition at Seal Beach in California. The TUGHRIL stopped at Pearl Harbor for familiarization exercises during late November before heading for Karachi.²

1. ODRP 021113Z Jun 80 (S), DECL 2 Jun 80; CNO 162029Z Jun 80 (C), 31 Dec 86; ODRP 080545Z Jul 80 (C), DECL 8 Jul 86; SECSTATE 227505/270101Z Aug 80 (C), GDS 8/26/86; CINCPAC 290215Z Aug 80 (C)(EX), DECL 28 Aug 86.
2. SECSTATE 240718/101606Z Sep 80 (C), GDS 9/10/86; J474 Point Paper (C), 5 Oct 80, Subj: Transfer of Destroyers to Pakistan (U), DECL 5 Oct 86; Hawaii Navy News, 26 Nov 80 (U).
PAPUA NEW GUINEA

(1) In January 1978 the U.S. Embassy at Port Moresby initiated a request for technical publications on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), particularly for WWII ordnance used by U.S., Japanese, and British forces, for use by Papua New Guinea Defense Forces (PNGDF). The PNGDF had previously removed a total of 181 tons of ordnance, primarily of U.S. origin, and disposal equipment needed quantitative and qualitative upgrading. Because PNG was not authorized military security assistance under the AECA, the State Department advised that an exception to policy for PNG to purchase disposal publications was not feasible. Instead the Department suggested that PNGDF acquire the publications through commercial channels. CINCPAC recommended to the Secretary of Defense that an exception to policy be pursued to assist the PNGDF in the ordnance removal and requested support for release of EOD materials and training.1

(1) Twice in early 1979 the U.S. Embassy recommended that PNG be included among countries eligible for security assistance and requested EOD assistance. Both times CINCPAC supported the requests. On 15 June CINCPAC learned of a State recommendation to Congress for furnishing $25,000 on a one-time basis to PNG for EOD training. The following week State announced allocation of $12,000 in IMET funds. Although PNGDF was not able to select candidates, obtain approval, and make necessary arrangements for attendance in time for a September U.S. Navy EOD course at Indian Head, MD, two members of the PNGDF did attend the next session in July 1980.2

(1) As an outgrowth of this initiative and as a result of similar efforts by the U.S. Embassy and CINCPAC, Papua New Guinea was declared eligible for FMS under Section 3(A)(1) of the AECA by a Presidential Determination of 4 December 1980.3

2. Ibid.; AMEMB Port Moresby 4030/160400Z Feb 79 (C), GDS 2/15/85.
3. J463 HistSum Dec 80 (U).
PHILIPPINES (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA .................................................. 300,440 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS ................. 9,280 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE .................................. 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION .................................................. 66,600,000
ANNUAL GROWTH ........................................... 2.8 Percent
LITERACY RATE ............................................... 83 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY ............................................. 49 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA .................................. 55 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GDP) ................................ $ 99.5 Billion
PER CAPITA GNP ............................................... $ 1,483
DEFENSE BUDGET (FY 80) .......................... $ 747 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ....................... 14 Percent
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT ......................................... Republic

PRESIDENT .................................................... Ferdinand E. MARCOS
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS .................. Carlos P. ROMULO
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE .............. Jejomar C. BONDIL
CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP ................................. GEN Raul P. ESPINOSA, Army
CG, ARMY .................................................. MGEN Fortunato U. ABAD
CG, NAVY .................................................. RADM Dalmacio M. ALEJANDRO
CG, AIR FORCE ............................................. MGEN Samuel G. SARMENTO
CHIEF OF POLICE .............................................. MGEN Fidel RAMOS

(U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

U.S. AMBASSADOR ........................................ HON. Richard W. MURPHY
CHARGE D'Affaires, PHIL ................................ RAHM Lee S. LEVENSON, USA
CHIEF JUNIAG ............................................... BGEN John W. FOSS, USA

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (S/NF), p. 73, REVW 16 Feb 81.
PHILIPPINES

The major problem for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) continued to be the heavy demand for men, money, and materiel to deal with the Muslim insurgency in the southern Philippines and the New People's Army nation-wide.¹

(U) In his end-of-tour report of 6 August 1980, BGEN Korpal, the departing Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) Philippines noted that during the previous two years, while pursuing foreign policy goals of peace and neutrality, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) had increased relations with communist countries. Recently, however, the GOP had been supportive of key U.S. issues such as Iran, Afghanistan, and the Olympic boycott. President Marcos had publicly stated renewed confidence in the United States after the Afghan and Thai crises when the United States had demonstrated a firm and credible resolve to work with its allies for peace and security. Although martial law still restricted political and civil rights, the trend was towards gradual liberalization. Efforts by the GOP to meet basic human needs of the people were hampered by the pressures of world economics and a domestic economy dependent on expensive foreign oil.²

(U) Of the JUSMAG mission BGEN Korpal stated that limitations under PL 95-92, curtailing advisory and training functions of MAGs, impaired service-to-service contact. Also loss of the JUSMAG-dedicated C-12A resulted in increases in TDY travel and in a degradation of support to security assistance programs in remote areas where commercial air was non-existent. Specifically the COMMANDO PADS and Mindanao Microwave Project would suffer.

(U) Of significance in the FMS area, BGEN Korpal cited the development of a financial review process by both JUSMAG and the AFP which, by detection of errors, had saved the U.S. Government from a loss in excess of $1.5 million and $300,000 to the AFP.³

(U) The IMET Program continued to be one of the most effective and visible means for achieving U.S. national security objectives in the Philippines. Although the relative size of the program, in terms of students trained and courses offered, remained fairly constant due to the absorption of transoceanic

1. CHJUSMAGPHIL Ltr of 6 Aug 80 (S), Subj: End-of-Tour Report by Chief, JUSMAG Philippines (U), DECL 31 Dec 86.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
travel costs by the AFP when IMETP funding was decreased in FY 79 and FY 80, significant elements of the AFP viewed the reductions as a lessening of U.S. interest. As a result, there was a marked increase in third country training. Cessation of free correspondence courses under IMET also resulted in suspension of AFP participation in the alternate FMS program. On 31 March 1980 JUSMAG Philippines initiated a mid-year IMET review designed to insure maximum coordination between GHQ, the AFP services, and JUSMAG of current year training programs.\textsuperscript{1}

\textbf{(U)} In the property disposal program in the Republic of the Philippines, 1,425 end items of MAP equipment with an original acquisition value of $18.3 million were turned in through JUSMAG to the Defense Property Disposal Office between March 1979 and August 1980. Additionally, 17 aircraft, 9 aircraft engines, 871 vehicles, 19 pieces of engineer equipment, 1,850 weapons, 9 ships or craft, 100 pieces of Navy communication equipment and over 50,000 line items of repair parts were being processed for disposal.\textsuperscript{2}

\textbf{FMS Credits}

\textbf{(C)} The renegotiation of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in the Philippines, which had been signed on 7 January 1979, and President Carter's letter to President Marcos of 4 January 1979 commited the U.S. Government to a "best effort" to obtain Congressional funding of $500 million in security assistance funding during FY 80-84. This was commonly referred to as the bases compensation package; $250 million (or $50 million per year) of this was to be for FMS credit.\textsuperscript{3}

\textbf{(U)} While the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs was considering the Carter administration's FY 81 security assistance budget proposal, Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke appeared before the committee for the first time to defend the Administration's proposals for the Philippines. The Chairman of the JCS, in a letter of 3 March to Subcommittee Chairman Lester Wolff, also sought to forestall any possible reductions. General Jones stressed to Wolff the great importance he attached to security assistance for the Philippines as part of the MBA bargain for guaranteed, unhampered access to the U.S. facilities at Clark AB and Subic Bay. He pointed out that the GOP had upheld its part of the bargain during the recent crises in Afghanistan and Iran by allowing U.S. military units to exercise

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
and stage at Subic, and Clark was of comparable importance in current contingency operations. General Jones stated it was essential that the United States live up to its end of the bargain and he considered it of the utmost importance that all actions by the executive and legislative branches be directed at this period of global tension toward maintenance of access and cooperative attitudes on the part of governments /such as the GOP/.  

(C) On 10 March the Defense Department (ASD/ISA) advised of the Wolff Committee recommendation to cut FMS credit to the Philippines by $5 million in FY 81 with the intent to signal President Marcos of Congressional concern over what they perceived as inadequate progress on human rights in the Philippines. ASD/ISA and CINCPAC asked that U.S. military representatives in the Philippines take appropriate action to minimize the impact of the proposed cut and misinterpretation of U.S. support, and that they inform the GOP of ongoing administration and Defense efforts to reinstate the full amount of $50 million in FMS credit for FY 81. The U.S. Ambassador to Manila reported top GOP leaders' reactions: The President was hurt, the Defense Minister was angry, the Foreign Minister was disappointed, and the Chief AFP was disturbed. They believed the GOP had shown extreme responsiveness to recent U.S. requests, and there was some resentment at "interference in internal political affairs."  

(C) CINCPAC advised the Secretary of State on 22 March of his willingness to support administration efforts for the full $50 million in FMS credits. CINCPACAF also saw the proposed cut as disturbing and asked the Air Force Chief of Staff to support the State and Defense Departments' efforts. The Chairman, JCS, and CINCPAC sent letters to the Chief AFP expressing their deep concern and efforts to restore the FMS credits to $50 million. In early June a status report was received from the State Department describing delicate efforts with House and Senate committee meetings. State felt that just then "quiet corridor efforts were likely to prove more effective than highly-publicized pressure from the administration."  

(C) On 21 June Assistant Secretary Holbrooke called for CINCPAC's personal support of the restoration and Admiral Long responded with letters to Senator

1. SEOSTATE 77886/242251Z Mar 80 (U).
2. J5121 HistSum Mar 80 (C), DECL 31 Dec 86; SECDEF 3466/101639Z Mar 80 (C), DECL 8 Mar 86; CINCPAC 180242Z Mar 80 (S)(EX), DECL 31 Mar 86; AMEMB Manila 5349/180937Z Mar 80 (C)(EX), XDS-1; AMEMB Manila 5440/190952Z Mar 80 (C)(EX), XDS-1.
3. CINCPAC 220306Z Mar 80 (U); CINCPACAF 222330Z Mar 80 (C), DECL 8 Mar 86; CINCPAC 052134Z Apr (C), DECL 31 Mar 86 which cited JCS 291907Z Mar 80; SEOSTATE 149166/061516Z Jun 80 (C), GDS 6/4/86.
Church and Representative Zablocki. His letters stated that the deferral of the $5 million could have far-reaching adverse consequences on military readiness in the Pacific; that Filipinos viewed the deferral as a failure to adhere to the 1979 MBA commitment; that the GOP could become more demanding in future base negotiations and without unhampered operations from the Philippine bases, logistics difficulties would be enormous. In addition, U.S. credibility with other ASEAN nations would suffer.\(^1\)

(U) The Secretary of State advised that after extensive discussions during a House-Senate conference on 19 November, the conferees had agreed to delete the proposed $5 million cut in FMS credits for the Philippines for FY 81. However, concerns about human rights practices in the Philippines would be included in the language of the conference report.\(^2\)

\(\text{(S)}\) As 1980 ended CINCPAC told the Secretary of Defense that he believed that the United States should continue to make good on the $100 million annually in FMS credit and economic support funding as promised in the Military Bases Agreement commitment of 1979.\(^3\)

**DOD Coastal Defense Survey**

\(\text{(C)}\) In 1977, in response to GOP requests for information on radar-homing weapons, Chief JUSMAGPHIL had requested authority to release information on the HARPOON (RGM/AGM-84) and extended range WALLEYE (AGM-62) missiles to show the tactical complexity and excessive cost of these systems, e.g., $1.6 million for the HARPOON system, $600,000 for each missile, plus training and initial spare parts costs. CINCPAC supported the JUSMAG position to the JCS noting that no existing or projected threat to the Philippines warranted release. The Secretary of State replied that neither the weapons nor the information was releasable.\(^4\)

\(\text{(S)}\) About the same time the AFP requested permission to use FMS credit to purchase three multi-mission patrol ships (PSMM) equipped with the French-Italian OTOMAT antiship missile system. The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) advised that OTOMAT was not available form U.S. sources and that the United States was still not prepared to release the HARPOON, which was the only U.S. substitute for the OTOMAT, to the GOP.\(^5\)

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1. SECSTATE 163053/210107Z Jun 80 (C), E.O. 12065: NA; CINCPAC 240026Z Jun 80 (U).
2. SECSTATE 308222/192237Z Nov 80 (U).
3. CINCPAC 032200Z Jan 81 (S)(EX), REVW 15 Dec 00.
5. J476 HistSum Nov 79 (S), DECL 11 Dec 85.

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The air- and surfaced-launched versions of the HARPOON and PSMM were included in a 20-page AFP military equipment requirements list submitted by GOP Minister of National Defense Enrile to the U.S. Ambassador on 22 December 1977 for accelerated delivery. From 31 January to 14 February 1978 a DOD Equipment Survey Team visited the Philippines to review the list with GOP officials in conjunction with the ongoing Philippine base negotiations. The team determined that the HARPOON was an inappropriate system for the AFP but that the PSMM was available for purchase.1

On 1 October 1979 the Chief JUSMAG Philippines advised CINCPAC of renewed AFP interest in purchasing the PSMM with FY 80 FMS credits; armament would be the HARPOON missile system, the OTO Melera 76mm gun, EMERLEC 30mm twin guns, and the Sperry-Rand fire control system (MK-92). Interest was reaffirmed on 4 October when GOP Foreign Minister Romulo handed a copy of the request to Secretary of State Vance in New York City. The U.S. Ambassador reported on subsequent discussions between President Marcos, Minister Enrile, Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Armacost. Enrile portrayed an increasing threat from Vietnam and the USSR, especially to the Palawan and Spratly islands, which the Harpoon could help counter. Armacost cited the high cost of the HARPOON; that it might not be cost-effective or appropriate to the threat; arms transfer policy limitations; and suggested that the United States send a team to find answers to the Philippine coastal defense problems. Holbrooke acknowledged that, while the situation in Asia was evolving and the U.S. position was not rigid on the HARPOON, a study would be worthwhile before making so large a commitment. Should the GOP wish to pursue the HARPOON subsequent to the review, he would reopen the subject at the Washington level. President Marcos asked that naval and air considerations be integrated in the study and directed that acquisition of the PSMM be suspended.2

The JCS tasked CINCPAC on 15 November to form a DOD Coastal Defense Survey Team to review Philippine coastal defense requirements in the southwest sector with particular focus on Palawan (running from Mindoro to the Balabac Strait); to seek Philippine analysis and rationale with respect to specific equipment; and to provide the AFP, as appropriate, U.S. recommendations on how best to defend the southwest sector coastal area. Additionally, the Filipinos asked for discussions on acquisition of the PSMM, a U.S. missile system or


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alternative missile systems from third countries with FMS credit, and pros-
pects for obtaining the full $250 million FMS portion of the base compensa-
tion package.1

-(S)- Prior to departure, originally scheduled for late November 1979,
the team reviewed the 1978 DOD Equipment Survey Report. Headed by the Com-
mander Naval Surface Group Mid-Pacific with representatives from the JCS,
CINCPAC, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), COMNAVFORPHIL, JUSMAGPHIL, 3rd TFW
(13AF), and PATWING 1, the team arrived in the Philippines on 10 January 1980.
AFP representatives presented their coastal defense requirements in three
(operational) categories: protection from terrorist intrusion; protection of
western offshore oil fields (the Nido Fields off Palawan, the Kalayaan Island
group, and Reed Bank) from future sabotage; and security of activities within
their territorial waters and economic zone. After briefings and discussions
the team departed the Philippines on 17 January and returned to CINCPAC. It
was the team consensus that the United States should support AFP requests for
the following items.2

- Patrol ship multi-mission equipped with 76/62mm DP gun MK 7,
  MK-92 fire control system, ERERLEC twin 30mm gun, and HARPOON missile system.
- Additional EMERLEC twin 30mm guns, 76/62mm DP guns, and MK-92
  fire control systems for coastal patrol interdiction craft and overhaul of
  four DEs and four WHECs, plus appropriate communications suites.
- Up to 25 additional fast patrol craft (PCF).
- Through lease or loan, two coastal minesweepers (MSC), one
  minehunter (MH), and one mobile in-shore surveillance system.
- The extended range WALLEYE missile as armament for F-8H
  aircraft.
- Coastal surveillance aircraft (Fokker F-27 maritime model).

-(S)- In forwarding the Survey Team Report on 22 January to the Secretary of
Defense via CINCPAC and the JCS, the Team Chief noted that "...the GOP had
carefully considered alternatives, attempted to make the best utilization of

1. J475 HistSum Nov 79 (S), DECL 11 Dec 85; JCS 5270/1520372 Nov 79 (S),
   DECL 15 Nov 85; J475 HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 8 Feb 86.
2. Ibid.; COMNAVSURFGRU MIDPAC 1tr of 20 Jan 86 (S), Subj: DOD Coastal Defense
   Survey Team Report (U), DECL 20 Jan 86.
present assets through modernization, and where needed, had requested additional procurement." The report concluded that while the immediate threat, if considered in isolation, did not warrant the HARPOON or WALLEYE capability, ancillary considerations and advantages should be weighed. The U.S. power projection in the 1980s would depend to a large extent upon forward basing at Clark and Subic, vis-a-vis renegotiations for these bases. A negative response to the GOP requests would be viewed as a lack of support for valid military requirements and adversely impact on Philippine and ASEAN perceptions of U.S. resolve to aid friends and allies, especially since the Philippines was the only nation in Southeast Asia not having a precision guided weapon. The HARPOON and WALLEYE systems would be ideal stepping-stones to operation and maintenance of more advanced technology. Specifically, the team recommended that the United States support the present Philippine plan for coastal defense improvement; that the HARPOON and the WALLEYE be released to the GOP; and that the possibility of Philippine purchase, through FMS credits, of the PSMM with the requested armaments, including the HARPOON (or a third-country missile system), be investigated.1

(S) CINCPACAF, Chief JUSMAGPHIL, and CINCPACREPPHIL concurred in the report. CINCPACFLT did not support release of the extended range WALLEYE and recommended substituting MK-80 series bombs and 2.75/5-inch rockets. On 5 February the CINCPAC Release Review Group recommended against release of HARPOON or WALLEYE to the Philippines. However, if it were determined by higher authority that political considerations were paramount, CINCPAC would interpose no objection to release of HARPOON.2

(S) During an 18 February meeting with Admiral Long in Manila, President Marcos asked whether or not FMS credits could be used for purchase of F-27 FOKKER aircraft, the PSMM retrofitted with an Israeli GABRIEL II surface-to-surface anti-ship missile, and/or PCF ships equipped with German engines. At the time President Marcos observed that HARPOON was beyond the GOP financially, but he wished to keep his options open.3

(S) CINCPAC comments on the Survey Team recommendations were provided to the JCS on 4 March. CINCPAC concurred with U.S. support of the AFP coastal defense improvement plan, acquisition of the PSMM even without the HARPOON,

1. CONNAVSURFR/ MIDPAC Ltr of 20 Jan 86 (S), Subj: DOD Coastal Defense Survey Team Report (U), DECL 20 Jan 86.
2. J475 HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 8 Feb 86; J475 HistSum Feb 80 (S), DECL 6 Mar 86; J47/Memo/S-14 of 8 Feb 80 (S), Subj: Results of CINCPAC Release Review Group (U), DECL 7 Feb 86.
3. J475 HistSum Feb 80 (S), DECL 6 Mar 86.
development of a surface mine countermeasures capability, and provision of mobile inshore surveillance system information. CINCPAC also recommended that no further action be taken on the HARPOON pending renewed initiative from the GOP. Also the WALLEYE was considered inappropriate as armament for the F-8 due to backfit cost and excessive pilot workload. The JCS review of 11 April paralleled CINCPAC's comments.1

(S) In anticipation of questions which President Marcos might ask during his 22-23 April visit to CINCPAC, the State Department advised that FMS credit could not be used by the GOP for purchase of military equipment produced wholly or partially in third countries. The message cited policy considerations as well as legal constraints embodied in Section 42(A) of the Arms Export Control Act as basis for denial. Furthermore, in view of the difficulties with obtaining Congressional approval of the FY 80 Foreign Assistance Appropriations bill and the FY 81 levels requested for the Philippines, State did not believe it would be wise to grant an exception. The State Department response, agreeing to all aspects of the Philippine coastal defense improvement plan, except for the HARPOON and WALLEYE, was conveyed to GOP Minister Enrile on 2 July. In lieu thereof, State recommended ordnance such as ROCKEYE, 2.75 or 5-inch rockets or MK 80 series laser-guided bombs as substitutes. As background information to the Ambassador, the State Department noted that the United States had no mine-sweeping or mine-hunting ships available for lease, loan, or sale to the GOP, but information on a mobile in-shore surveillance system might be available.2

Support for F-8H Aircraft

(S) An LOA was signed on 17 October 1977 by Philippine officials for 35 F-8H fighter aircraft on an "as is-where is" basis. Ten air frame "spares" were to stay at Dallas for potential long-term parts support. The other 25 were to be refurbished by LTV (Ling-Temco-Vought). Projected delivery was April through December 1978; however, delivery was not completed until late March 1979. Numerous problems plagued the program throughout 1978. These included delays in training; acquisition of spare parts, support equipment, and ammunition; faulty refurbishing procedures; and financial and computer problems. The Philippine Air Force (PAF) development of requirements for ejection cartridges, pylons, racks, launchers, personal flying and survival

1. J475 HistSum Mar 80 (S), DECL 7 Apr 86; J475 HistSum Apr 80 (S), DECL 6 May 86.
2. J475 HistSum Jun 80 (S), DECL 10 Jul 86; SECSTATE 162285/2007062 Jun 80 (S), XDS-1 6/19/00; J475 HistSum Jul 80 (S), DECL 7 Aug 86.
gear, and armament was on a piecemeal basis with commensurate delays in processing of the necessary LOAs.\(^1\)

\(\text{(C)}\) The only armament for the F-8 approved at the time of procurement was 20mm ammunition. Air-to-air and air-to-ground gunnery training was to have been conducted by LTV as part of the initial contractor training package. Inasmuch as this had not been accomplished in CONUS as programmed, gunnery practice had to be conducted after arrival of the aircraft in the Philippines. Efforts to acquire the necessary ammunition started in February 1978 by an FMS case for 40,000 rounds from stock and 300,000 rounds from production. Although transfer of 100,000 rounds from Subic Naval Magazine was accelerated under a MAP line on 11 November 1979, the rounds were received by the PAF unlinked which caused further problems and delay.\(^2\)

\(\text{(U)}\) Acquisition of 20mm ammunition in desired quantities and condition continued to be a problem for the PAF throughout 1980. On 14 December 1979 JUSMAG Phil initiated an LOA request through Navy FMS channels to have the 100,000 rounds linked at Subic Bay. After a February visit to Clark AB by CINCPACAF where the Philippine Vice Commander asked for assistance in obtaining the ammunition, CINCPAC ascertained that 137,000 rounds of linked ammunition were available at Subic but CINCPACFLT had reserved it for Navy requirements. On 26 March 1980, 130,120 rounds, followed by another 2,800, of unlinked 20mm ammunition were shipped from CONUS for the Philippines. Cost for belting was to be $46,775 per 100,000 rounds and charged to MAP.\(^3\)

\(\text{(U)}\) On 29 June a shipment of 46,953 rounds of belted ammunition arrived at Subic and shortly thereafter the PAF was able to commence gunnery training with the F-8H. By August the PAF had developed a capability to link the rounds, and in September CHJUSMAG Philippines forwarded an AFP request to the Secretary of Defense, Security Assistance Accounting Command and CNO to cancel the FMS case for disintegrating belts, end links, and dummies necessary for linking the approximately 132,000 rounds. The AFP intended to obtain these materials commercially through LTV. The LOA request of 14 December 1979 for linking the initial 100,000 rounds was also cancelled.\(^4\)

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2. Ibid.
3. J471 HistSums Mar, Apr 80 (U); HQ PACAF 280030Z Feb 80, CINCPAC 050025Z Mar 80 (U); SPCC 241051Z Apr 80 (U).
## SINGAPORE (U)

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**President**

DH. Benjamin, Henry SHEARES

**Prime Minister**

Lee Kuan Yew

**Minister of Foreign Affairs**

S. Samanthabhai RAJARATHNAM

**Second Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs**

S. Samanthabhai RAJARATHNAM

**Minister of Defense**

NGEEN Winston CSOO Wee Loong

**Director, General Staff**

Col. Simairan Singh GILL

**Commander, Singapore Navy**

COL. RHIOO Eng Ann

**Acting Commander Air Force**

LTCOL. TEO Eng Cheng

### (U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

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<tr>
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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (S/NF), p. 74, REV 16 Feb 01.

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
CONFIDENTIAL

SINGAPORE

F-5 Aircraft

The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) procured one squadron of 15 F-5E TIGER II fighters, three attrition aircraft, plus three F-5F trainers in 1978-79 under FMS case PEACE ORCHID. In the middle of 1979 the RSAF wished to reorganize the squadron into two flights of ten aircraft each—one for operations and the other dedicated to pilot training with four in reserve for maintenance and attrition. Six additional F-5s would be needed to flesh out these units.1

(U) The proposed acquisition of the additional Northrop F-5s was announced on 18 August 1979 by U.S. Representative Charles H. Wilson (D-CA), head of a six-member Congressional delegation visiting PACOM countries, after discussions with the GOS Minister of Defense, Foreign Minister and other officials.2

At the request of the GOS, in December 1979 the USDATT inquired whether these aircraft could be purchased under the original PEACE ORCHID LOA or if a new one were necessary. Headquarters U.S. Air Force responded that a new LOA would be required. In April 1980 Congress received formal 30-day notification of the purchase at a cost of $33.8 million. The six F-5Es were scheduled for delivery in May 1981.3

Missiles

MAVERICK and LGBs

In response to a USDAO Singapore request of 18 April 1980, the U.S. Air Force provided information concerning adaptability of the MAVERICK family of weapons and laser-guided bombs (LGBs) to RSAF F-5E/F and A-4B aircraft. This was followed by a formal GOS request forwarded by the U.S. Ambassador on

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3. USDAO Singapore 170655Z Dec 79 (C), DECL 12 Dec 85; HQ USAF 201755Z Dec 79 (C), DECL 20 Dec 85; J472 HistSum Apr 80 (U).
7 May for 200 MAVERICK (AGM-65A) TV missiles, 600 laser-guidance kits for MK-82 500-lb. bombs, laser designators, spares, and supporting ground equipment.¹

(C) In a 7 May message disapproving the HARPOON sale to Singapore (see below), the State Department wished to soften the blow and offered "favorable consideration" on the MAVERICKs and LGB kits as evidence of U.S. responsiveness to GOS needs. The Secretary of Defense requested that the Air Force provide the LOA and sponsor an exception to national disclosure policy if required. Congressional notification of the $26 million sale of the 200 MAVERICKs was given on 18 February 1981.²

HARPOON and VULCAN

(S) On 1 November 1979 the U.S. DAO relayed a GOS request for detailed technical specifications, P&B data, anticipated delivery time, training, maintenance, and other support requirements on the HARPOON (RGM-84) surface-to-surface anti-ship missile and the 20mm naval VULCAN gun system. These systems would be used for arming frigates which were under construction. CINCPAC requested supporting justification for the potential sale in accordance with CINCPAC Instruction 5050.14B, "Release of Advanced Technology and Weapons within PACOM," in order to make the necessary military assessment to the JCS.³

(S) The rationale from the DAO emphasized Singapore's vulnerability, especially to a threat from Soviet-supported Vietnam. Also cited were Singapore's significant strategic location to important world trade and communications routes, a drive by military planners toward a forward defense strategy with primary reliance on air and naval forces, capability of supporting the systems, desires for selective qualitative improvements vice quantitative expansion, and ongoing support for a U.S. presence in the area with access to the Indian Ocean. The DAO message also asked that similar information on the VULCAN PHALANX close-in weapons system (CIWS) be provided.⁴

1. J472 HistSum Apr 80 (U); USDAO Singapore 4240/180149Z Apr 80 (U); J472 HistSum May 80 (C), DECL 6 Jun 86; AMEMB Singapore 4937/070943Z May 80 (C), DECL 7 May 86.
2. SECSTATE 121013/072335Z May 80 (C), GDS 5/7/86; SECDEF 6617/192355Z May 80; SECDEF 182115Z Feb 81.
3. J472 HistSum Nov 79 (S), DECL 10 Dec 85; USDAO Singapore 010740Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 1 Nov 85; CINCPAC 060257Z Nov 79 (C), DECL 3 Nov 85.
4. USDAO Singapore 280451Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 30 Nov 85.
After consideration by the CINCPAC Release Review Group on 5 December 1979, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that P&B data on the HARPOON not be released to Singapore at that time. While many factors favored release, CINCPAC stated that existing arms transfer policy restrictions prohibited its introduction into the region, the projected threat did not justify introduction in the near future, and release to Singapore would make rejection of requests from other ASEAN countries more difficult. However, in January CINCPAC supported the release of information on the VULCAN gun system and the PHALANX CIWS minus the depleted uranium projectile—again because of the advanced level of technology.1

Despite an appeal by the U.S. Ambassador in March for favorable consideration of the HARPOON sale, State Department denial was forwarded on 7 May. GOS officials voiced disappointment to the Ambassador and implied that the request might be reinstated next year. The State Department did, however, approve release of P&R data in July of the PHALANX CIWS, less the depleted uranium (STABALLOY) ammunition. The information was forwarded by the CNO in September but no request for LOAs on either the 200mm VULCAN gun system or the PHALANX CIWS was received by the end of 1980.2

1. J47/Memo/74-79 of 11 Dec 79 (S), Subj: Results of CINCPAC Release Review Group (U), DECL 10 Dec 85; J472 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 10 Jan 86; J472 HistSum Jan 80 (C), DECL 8 Feb 84.
2. AMEMB Singapore 3033/180341Z Mar 80 (S)(EX), GDS 3/18/86; J472 HistSum May 80 (C), DECL 6 Jun 86; SECKSTATE 121013/072335Z May 80 (C), GDS 5/7/86; J472 HistSum Jun 80 (C), DECL 9 Jul 86.
TAIWAN

(C) As a result of severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan on 1 January 1979 no new security assistance commitments were made to Taiwan during 1979 although requests were accepted and delivery of items previously committed to Taiwan continued as scheduled.1

(S/NOFORN) On 22 June 1979 the President signed Executive Order 1243 which gave the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) (Taiwan) authority to perform as unofficial representatives of their respective governments and FMS case processing resumed. Between 22 June and 1 September 1979, new FMS cases, case amendments, and case modifications totaling approximately $598 million were signed by AIT, but these did not include Taiwan's requests for weapons and equipment to be purchased in 1980. In August 1979 CCNAA-Washington submitted a request for 15 major weapons. In accordance with established procedures, CINCPAC submitted recommendations including a personal endorsement by Admiral Weisner to the Chairman, JCS for the release of the requested systems to Taiwan. Specifically, an improved fighter, HARPOON missiles, Improved CHAPARRAL, and STANDARD missiles were identified as urgent requirements.2

(U) On 3 January 1980 the State Department announced that the moratorium on (new) weapons requests had been lifted and that, subject to Congressional notification and authorization, some items would be approved for sale to Taiwan. The only items specifically rejected at that time were high-performance aircraft (F-16, and F-18). The State Department estimated the value of the approved items at approximately $280 million. The status of major arms requests from Taiwan at the end of 1980 is shown on the accompanying chart.3

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2. Ibid., p.89.
3. SECSTATE 752/030930Z Jan 80 (S)(EX), GDS 1/1/86; Wall Street Journal, 4 Jan 80, P.4 (U); Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 3 Jan 80, "U.S. to Sell Weapons to Taiwan," by Juan J. Walte (UPI) (U); J463 Point Paper (S), 5 Feb 81, Subj: Taiwan Major Arms Requests (U), DECL 5 Feb 87.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved HAWK launchers and missiles</td>
<td>1 battalion (5 batteries)</td>
<td>Approved; LOA accepted 30 Apr 80.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved HAWK missiles</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Approved; LOA issued 1 Oct 80.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-110A2 8&quot; howitzers (SP)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Approved; LOA accepted 4 Sep 80.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-109A2 155mm howitzers (SP)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Approved; LOA accepted 4 Sep 80.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOW launchers missiles</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Approved; LOA accepted 10 Jul 80.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-48 series tanks</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>Approved; only 24 immediately available; LOA in preparation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-113A2 armored personnel carriers</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>Under consideration; JCS and DOD recommended approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARPOON (RGM-84A) launchers missiles</td>
<td>40 320</td>
<td>Under consideration; JCS and DOD recommended against approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANDARD launchers missiles</td>
<td>40 400</td>
<td>Under consideration; JCS and DOD recommended approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76/62mm rapid-fire guns and mounts</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Approved; LOA accepted 28 May 80.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-930 MOD I fire control systems</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Approved; export license issued for commercial sale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved SEA CHAPARRAL missiles</td>
<td>284 120</td>
<td>Approved; LOA accepted 10 Apr 80.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimissile automatic electronic warfare systems</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Under consideration; requested 22 Sep 80.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH-3D antisubmarine warfare helicopters</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>CCNAA has not yet responded to DOD's request to specify particular system desired. CCNAA is investigating commercial sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Under consideration; JCS and DOD recommended approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-46 torpedoes</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Two approved; no additional ships currently available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-61D SAR helicopters</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Approved; LOA accepted 28 Aug 80.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High performance fighter aircraft</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>F-4, F-16, F-18 ruled out by Presidential decision; release of F-X P&amp;R data is under consideration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOROP cameras</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Approved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIAA XII IFF systems</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>Approved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIM-9L SIDEWINDER missiles</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Disapproved; not compatible with inventory aircraft; AIM-9R offered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP-44 aircraft</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Disapproved; out of production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-14A 24 landing control centers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Under consideration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THAILAND

(U) The major external threat to Thai national security since 1975, and which escalated late in 1978, had been along the Thai-Cambodian border. U.S. security assistance to Thailand had declined and was reflected in reduced manning of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) Thailand and security assistance funding as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 75</th>
<th>FY 76</th>
<th>FY 77</th>
<th>FY 78</th>
<th>FY 79</th>
<th>FY 80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JUSMAGTHAI Manning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. military</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. civilians</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local nationals</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Security Assistance Funding
(in millions of dollars)

| MAP | 26.5 | 16.7 | 15.8 | 7.7 | 1.7 | 11.5 |
| IMET | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.09 | .796 | .817 |
| FMS (credit) | 7.7 | 36.7 | 30.0 | 29.5 | 30.0 | 36.0 |
| FMS (cash) | 15.2 | 106.9 | 104.6 | 111.7 | 416.1 | 225.5 |

(U) After the December 1978 Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) invasion of Cambodia and subsequent stationing of SRV forces on the Thai border, there was generally a turnaround in U.S. responsiveness to Thai needs. From 1978 to 1979, U.S. military sales in Thailand jumped fourfold from $100 million to $400 million. The Royal Thai Government (RTG) 1980 budget saw more than a quarter of the expenditures programmed for defense, and the proposed 1981 budget envisaged an increase in defense spending to a total of $1.25 billion.

(6) In 1979 border tensions increased. Camps, bulging with refugees just inside the Thai border, had been the targets of incursions by Cambodian forces.

THAILAND (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA .............................................. 512,820 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS ................. 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE .................. 200 Nautical Miles

POPULATION .................................................. 40,000,000

ANNUAL GROWTH ........................................ 2.3 Percent
LITERACY RATE ........................................ 70 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY ........................................ 60 Years

ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA .................................. 0.7 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (1976) .................. $11.7 Billion
PER CAPITA (1976) .................................... $450
DEFENSE BUDGET (FY 76) ......................... $ 550 Million

OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET .................. 18.6 Percent

TYPE GOVERNMENT ........................................... Constitutional Monarchy

KING ......................................................... PHUMIPHON Adulyadej
PRIME MINISTER ......................................... GEN Prem Tinsulanonda
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ................................ BUNCHU Ratnasathavan

MAJ GEN PRAMAN Adirekran
GEN SODH Mrakhan
COL THAVAT Khumon

SUPREME CDR. ARMED FORCES ................. GEN SODH Na Nakorn

CINC ARMY ....................................................... GEN Prem Tinsulanonda
CINC NAVY ...................................................... ADM RAMUT Sukhadanin
CINC AIR FORCE .................................................. ACM PHANIAK Romanot

(U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

U.S. AMBASSADOR ....................... HON. Morton I. ABRAMOWITZ
CHIEF JAMMUANGTHAI .................. COL. Richard L. WEAVER, USA

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 81 (S/NF), p. 77, REW 16 Feb 01.
led by Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin. In September and October five U.S. C-141 flights carried 105mm howitzers, PRC-77 radios and M-60 machine guns to Thailand as tangible evidence of U.S. interest in Thai security.1

(S) During 1980 the U.S. Administration took further steps to ease the financial burden caused by Thailand's expanding defense expenditures and was appreciative of Thailand's treatment of Cambodian refugees. In a meeting on 18 January in Bangkok, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Armacost informed Prime Minister Kriangsak of U.S. Government budgetary proposals for increasing FMS credit to Thailand from $40 to $50 million in FY 81.2

(S) In his January 1980 quarterly report to the Secretary of Defense, Admiral Long cited maintenance of a credible U.S. commitment to Thailand's security and development of the Thai defense capability against limited external military threats and domestic insurgency as the two key U.S. military objectives in Thailand. In 1979 the United States had accelerated delivery of selected items of military equipment, airlifted a number of high visibility items from prior year grant aid and critical FMS purchases, significantly increased FMS credit for Thailand, and expanded staff assistance visits. Other support efforts under consideration included increased U.S. ship and aircraft visits and deployments to Thailand, additional financial aid, identification of additional FMS material for acceleration and an emergency logistics support package. During a February visit to Thailand, the Admiral, accompanied by Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs Holbrooke, voiced strong American support for the defense of Thailand.3

(U) On 29 February Prime Minister Kriangsak resigned amid growing domestic opposition and serious economic problems, the latter attributable in part to Thailand's total dependence on increasingly expensive imported oil. He was succeeded on 3 March by General Prem Tinsulanon, former Minister of Defense and CINC Royal Thai Army.4

(U) On 23 June 1980 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia seized several miles of Thai territory including three Thai villages and a food distribution center. Thai ground and air counterattacks succeeded in driving the Vietnamese back across the border, but a number of Thai soldiers and civilians were killed.

2. AMEB Bangkok 3260 of 21 Jan 80 (S)(EX), RDS-1, 1/18/86, retransmitted by SECESTATE 21357/251535Z Jan 80.
3. CINCPAC 100431Z Jan 80 (TS/FRD)(EX), DECL 31 Jan 86; Current History, Dec 80, pp. 188-195 (U).
scores injured, and more than 100,000 refugees were forced to flee the camps during the ensuing skirmishes. The next two weeks were filled with a show of U.S. support. Howitzers, rifles, and ammunition were immediately airlifted to Bangkok at U.S. expense and approval on a number of other arms requests was expedited. Nevertheless, large concentrations of Vietnamese forces remained along the border during the following months.¹

FMS Credit Terms

-secret-

(5) Under provisions in effect at the beginning of 1980, Thailand was expected to repay loans for FMS credit purchases within five to seven years. In the 18 January discussions with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Armacost and Ambassador Abramowitz, Prime Minister Kriangsak asked that the U.S. Government consider extending the time limit for these payments. As a result, the Secretary of Defense, with State Department concurrence, requested Treasury Department approval of a 10-year repayment period for FY 80 FMS credit purchases. Messages from Ambassador Abramowitz to the State Department in March affirmed the need for extending the repayment schedule to the maximum allowable, as well as extending the grace period for beginning such repayments. Such action, the Ambassador said, would assist the Thai in the current and near-term balance of payments crunch created by the ambitious Thai defense equipment expansion program for 1979 through 1981. It would also have a major political impact toward convincing the Thai of the sincerity of U.S. interest. CINCPAC endorsed the Ambassador's request and also cited the political value, especially to a new Prime Minister. It would also demonstrate appreciation for Thai support of U.S. regional objectives.²

(6) Coinciding with the accelerated equipment shipments after the Vietnamese incursion into Thailand, in late June the State Department offered Thailand two repayment options for FY 80 FMS credits: three years grace and nine years to repay, or five years grace and five years to repay. On 7 July Chief JUSMAG Thailand reported that Thailand would accept the latter. The message also conveyed a Thai request to apply the same provisions to the undisbursed portions of prior year FMS loans.³

1. Ibid.; Deadline Data on World Affairs, Thailand, pp. 92-93, issued Dec 1, 1980 (U).
2. J477 HistSum Mar 80 (C), DECL 9 Apr 86; SECSTATE 21357/251535Z Jan 80 which retransmitted AMEMB Bangkok 3260 of 21 Jan 80 (S)(EX), RDS-1, 1/18/86; AMEMB Bangkok 13806/260542Z Mar 80 (C), GDS 3/26/90; CINCPAC 00301032Z Apr 80 (C), DECL 28 Mar 80.
3. J477 HistSum Jun 80 (C), DECL 9 Jul 86; CHJUSMAGTHAI 071108Z Jul 80 (C), GDS 7/6/86.
During a 14 November visit, Prime Minister Prem asked CSAF General Allen and Ambassador Abramowitz for further extension of the grace period to seven years and five years repayment—the maximum allowable under current legislation. General Allen and the Ambassador responded that the Congressional mood appeared favorable and they would work for further improvement of the grace period.

Accelerated Equipment Delivery

On 18 June Chief JUSMAG Thailand submitted a monthly SITREP on accelerated availability of military equipment containing 77 line items requisitioned by the RTAF. The Vietnamese incursion into Thailand six days later (see above) prompted the JUSMAG to forward a priority list of items which the Thai might desire should the United States decide to provide immediate delivery of some equipment. It was JUSMAG's suggestion that the undelivered FY 80 items on the June SITREP should be shipped first. Additional items that would have great impact, JUSMAG stated, included 35 M-48A5 tanks on a pending LOA, remaining items on a DRAGON missile case, F-5 and OV-10 spare engines, Air Force 20mm ammunition, and all other pending ammunition cases. Further, depending on the nature and duration of possible contingencies, Thai military equipment needs in order of priority were items already requested; ammunition, fuels, communications gear, medical supplies, and spare parts (support); and replacement and additional weapons and aircraft.

A separate prioritized assessment from the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs was forwarded by the JUSMAG on 25 June. In the view of JUSMAG it contained many new items which the Thai were not trained to operate, maintain, or support. In a forwarding endorsement to the JCS on 26 June, CINCPAC concurred that even limited introduction of new weapons (attack helicopters, TOW missiles, M-198 towed howitzers, and air defense radar for the VULCAN missile), into the Thai inventory would entail significant delay for training and establishment of support lines prior to becoming combat effective. Instead, CINCPAC advocated expedited air shipment of 106mm recoilless rifles and 105mm howitzers, and sea shipment of M-48A5 tanks and M-113 APCs. Since these items had recently been released for shipment to Thailand, they would serve as tangible evidence of U.S. responsiveness. CINCPAC also endorsed immediate relief for RTAF shortfalls in various types and sizes of ammunition for tanks, howitzers, mortars, rifles and machine guns, and POL items. Moreover, CINCPAC

1. JCS 191601Z Nov 80 which retransmitted AMEMB Bangkok 55106/150604Z Nov 80 (S)(EX), GDS 11/15/86.
2. J477 HistSum Jun 80 (C), DECL 9 Jul 86; CHJUSMAGTHAI 180918Z Jun 80 (C), DECL 18 Jun 85; CHJUSMAGTHAI 240817Z Jun 80 (C), DECL 24 Jun 85.
pointed out the tremendous stress that expenditures during the last 18 months had placed on Thailand’s ability to provide for cash purchases; more favorable FMS credit arrangements and loan repayment schedules should also be sought for the Thai.\textsuperscript{1}

(U) The following day, while in Kuala Lumpur for an ASEAN meeting, Secretary of State Muskie announced to the Thai Foreign Minister that the United States would speed up delivery of weaponry already committed to Thailand, including 35 M-48A5 tanks, small arms ammunition, and recoilless rifles. The United States would also ease repayment terms for some military sales already made to Thailand to soften the burden on the Thai economy.\textsuperscript{2}

(U) On 1 July President Carter approved immediate airlift, under Section 506(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act, of small arms and artillery from U.S. Army arsenals direct to Bangkok on U.S. military aircraft. The airlift was expected to cost roughly $1 million to transport M-16 rifles, 106mm recoiless rifles, and 105mm howitzers. Also the United States would expedite surface shipments to Thailand of small arms and artillery ammunition worth $5.5 million and 35 M-48A5 tanks worth $23.5 million. On 2 July the Secretary of Defense directed air shipment of the following items from Aberdeen, Maryland, Anniston, Alabama, and Rock Island, Illinois, which were delivered as follows:\textsuperscript{3}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Arrival</th>
<th>Carrier</th>
<th>Items Delivered.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 July</td>
<td>2 C-141</td>
<td>12 - 105mm howitzers; 350 - M-16 rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 July</td>
<td>1 C-141</td>
<td>6 - 105mm howitzers; 650 - M-16 rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 July</td>
<td>2 C-141s</td>
<td>38 - 106mm recoiless rifles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) Similar to the airlift in September and October 1979, delivery of the equipment received significant coverage by Thai and international media in Bangkok. This time, however, it was duly noted that the United States had picked up the tab for the airlift.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{enumerate}
\item CHJUSMAGTHAI 251103Z Jun 80 (C), DECL 25 Jun 86; CINCPAC 270331Z Jun 80 (C), DECL 26 Jun 86.
\item JO3/74/Memo/347-80 of 31 Jul 80 (U), Subj: Significant Statements, which cited ICA wire of 27 Jun 80.
\item SECSTATE 174186/020032Z Jul 80 (U); SECDEF 5079/021434Z Jul 80 (U); J477 HistSum Jun 80 (C), DECL 7 Jul 86; SECDEF 5417/032322Z Jul 80 (U).
\item CHJUSMAGTHAI 070535Z Jul 80 (U).
\end{enumerate}
Reporting the Thai reaction, on 7 July the American Embassy stated: 1

Airlift has clearly proved to be a graphic and impressive demonstration of U.S. interest and a reminder of U.S. potential. The fact that the items were types of immediate utility in border situation added to impressions of substance rather than mere symbolism. There seems no question that Thai leadership and public have been buoyed up with new confidence in U.S. and in their own capabilities to handle situation with only logistical, not troop support from U.S.

Tanks

To counter the significantly increased SRV threat to Thailand in the spring of 1979, Thailand needed to build-up its armor capability. Throughout 1979 tanks were a high priority item on Thai equipment requests. M-41 parts, engines, and transmissions were procured to rebuild the aging fleet purchased under MAP. The CINC Royal Thai Armed Forces (General Soem) wished to acquire the new M-60A3 tanks. The Defense Department, however, believed that the M-60 was too sophisticated, heavy and expensive ($890,000 per tank); besides the M-60s would not be available until March 1981. Defense considered the M-48A5 more appropriate for Thai needs: it would be cheaper ($385,000), easier to maintain, 15 could be made available immediately, and additional ones might be available from Israel. On 30 August 1979 Thailand requested an LOA for 30 additional M048A5s (later raised to 35). In September the State Department indicated an intent to supply Thailand with a total of 150 M-48s over the next few years. The initial 15 were delivered on 27 October and subsequently the RTG confirmed the M-60s would not be required. Thailand also procured 30 M-41s under a major item excess program (MIMEX) offer from Japan during the latter half of 1979 and 30 additional were requested in 1980. 2

On 18 January 1980 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Armacost informed Prime Minister Kriangsak that the Defense Department had approved the sale of the additional 35 M-48A5 tanks in two increments with delivery of the first 19 in late spring. On 31 January the Secretary of Defense approved

1. AMEMB Bangkok 28109/071030Z Jul 80 (C), GDS 07/06/86.
diversion of the 35 tanks from Army assets at a cost of $109,354 per tank, plus cost of upgrading from M-48 to M-48A5.\(^1\)

\((S)\) When no information was forthcoming on the tank LOA throughout March 1980, the American Ambassador and the new Thai Prime Minister expressed serious concern over the delay in delivery. As their concern increased CINCPAC tried twice to elicit a response from Washington with no results. It was later learned that the Department of Army objected to the reduced tank price. On 6 May the State Department advised that the earliest anticipated delivery date would slip to August or September. Further, these would be the last tanks at such a low price and any additional would require a Presidential determination for emergency conditions.\(^2\)

\((U)\) After the 23 June Vietnamese incursion, the White House announced on 1 July that delivery of the 34 M-48A5s would be expedited by sealift following completion of 30-day Congressional notification on 23 July. On 1 August Chief JUSMAG Thailand advised that a check for $21,398,165 and copies of the signed LOA had been forwarded to the Security Assistance Accounting Command. The 35 tanks were received in Thailand on 29 September.\(^3\)

**Weapons Systems**

\((C)\) During February 1980 the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok and Chief JUSMAG Thailand forwarded a request for P&B information from the Thai Army and Air Force on three separate weapons systems for an anti-armor role: 155mm rocket- assisted projectiles (RAP), laser-guided bombs (LGB), and the MAVERICK missile (AGM-65A).\(^4\)

\((C)\) Although the requests for P&B (changed to P&R (Planning and Review)) on the RAP and LGB were recent, Thailand had requested P&B data on the MAVERICK weapon system as armament for F-5E/F aircraft in May 1977. At the time CINCPAC viewed the request as premature because the MAVERICK was considered a high

1. SECSTATE 251535Z Jan 80 which retransmitted AMEMB Bangkok 3260/21 Jan 80 (S)(EX), RDS-1, 1/18/86; J478 HistSum Jan 80 (C), DECL 4 Feb 86; SECDEF 1813/310056Z Jan 80 (C), DECL 28 Jan 86.
2. J477 Talking Paper (S), Jun 80, Subj: Tanks for Thailand (U), DECL 30 Jun 86; J477 Point Paper (S), Apr 80, Subj: M48A5 tanks for Thailand (U), DECL 30 Apr 86; SECSTATE 119933/062222Z May 80 (S), GDS 5/6/86.
3. SECSTATE 174186/020032Z Jul 80 (U); J477 HistSum Jul 80 (U); CHJUSMAGTHAI 010805Z Aug 80 (U); J477 HistSum Dec 80 (U).
4. J477 HistSum Feb 80 (C), DECL 7 Mar 86; AMEMB Bangkok 5578/040550Z Feb 80 (U); CHJUSMAGTHAI 060404Z Feb 80 (U); AMEMB Bangkok 201052Z Feb 80 (C), E.O. 12065:N/A.
technology system, there was no significant armored threat in Thailand, and its use by the Thai Air Force would dilute the air defense role of the single F-5E/F squadron. Therefore, in July 1977 CINCPAC recommended that the MAVERICK information not be released. State and Defense Departments also disapproved release. 1

With Vietnamese and Cambodian incursions into Thailand in June of 1979 and 1980, however, the air and armor threat perception changed. Moreover, Thailand was scheduled to receive a second squadron of F-5E/F aircraft during Third Quarter FY 81. On 28 February 1980 the CINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance convened the CINCPAC Release Review Group to assess release of these three weapon systems in terms of the threat, the President's arms transfer policy, economic considerations, and the operational and logistics capabilities of Thailand's armed forces. On 17 March CINCPAC recommended release of all three systems to Thailand. Later that month, the State Department approved release of classified information on the MAVERICK to Thailand and an exception to National Disclosure Policy followed in May. Air Force Headquarters provided the P&R data to Chief JUSMAG Thailand on 13 November which estimated costs at $17,628,000 for 300 missiles, and $16 million for cockpit modification of 20 F-5E/F aircraft. Spares, support equipment, training, etc. would bring the total package cost to $39,543,504. After State and Defense Department approval on 4 August, the Commander U.S. Army Security Assistance Command was to provide an LOA for 7,604 rounds of the 155mm RAP. Provision of price and availability (P&A) data for 100 LGB kits, associated equipment, and training was to be provided to Thailand by 5 December by the U.S. Air Force. 2

Rocket Launchers and REDEYE Missiles

Prior to submission of formal requests by the RTG for 66mm rocket launchers (M-202A1) and REDEYE portable anti-aircraft missiles (FIM-43), Chief JUSMAG Thailand had queried CINCPAC's Director for Logistics and Security Assistance in October 1979 regarding potential U.S. approval. The Thai wished to use the rocket launchers as defensive infantry weapons in jungle combat; the REDEYE to develop a capability similar to the Vietnamese with the SA-7.

After a meeting of the CINCPAC Release Review Group, the informal response was affirmative for the rocket launchers. However, the CINCPAC Security Assistance Director's 7 November response, while recognizing the need for improvement in

2. J477 HistSum Feb 80 (C), DECL 7 Mar 86; HQ USAF 131445Z Jun 80 (C), DECL 12 Jun 81; HQ USAF 131825Z Nov 80 (C), DECL 3 Nov 86; SECDEF 8766/042134Z Aug 80 (U); HQ USAF 041315Z Nov 80 (U).
the Thai air defense capability, recommended nonrelease of the REDEYE. The Director was dubious of Thai ability to provide security for the system, and the lack of a command and control system would make it difficult for the Thai to distinguish between friendly and enemy aircraft. As an alternative, he offered to support diversion of VULCAN or CHAPARRAL anti-aircraft missile assets, also recommending that JUSMAGTHAI encourage the Thai to develop an overall integrated air defense plan.1

(△) As discussed above, the 23 June 1980 Vietnamese attacks from Cambodia on Thai territory escalated Thai military equipment requirements. In October 1980 the American Embassy Bangkok advised the State Department of the formal submission by the Royal Thai Army of a request for P&A on the REDEYE. The Embassy further advised State of Thai consideration of the British equivalent BLOWPIPE if the REDEYE were denied, and urged expedited review by State. CINCPAC provided a reassessment to the JCS on 18 October supporting realizability for a limited number of REDEYE missiles subject to certain conditions of availability, supportability, and safety. In a memorandum of 17 November (JCSM-281-80) the JCS recommended release of P&A data with the provision that delivery of missiles be delayed until after U.S. Army requirements were met around FY 87. In mid-November the U.S. Embassy advised the State Department that the Royal Thai Air Force had placed an order for the BLOWPIPE and asked the status of the REDEYE request. At the end of 1980, no decision had been made on the request.2

(△) On 21 November CHJUSMAGTHAI forwarded a request for an FMS case for 250 of the 66mm rocket launchers, 6,000 rockets, spare parts, and training. CINCPAC supported the request, noting, however that the system was currently out of production, procurement lead times would exceed one year if production were resumed, and any diversion from U.S. assets would require accelerated delivery justification from Thailand. There was no further action during 1980.3

30mm Gunpod

(△) With the activation of the first F-5E Tiger II squadron scheduled for June 1978, in January of that year the RTG requested P&B data on the GAU-8/A 30mm machine gun as part of the F-5E armament. CINCPAC supported the

2. J476 HistSum Nov 80 (S), DECL 12 Dec 86; AMEMB Bangkok 55225/170825Z Nov 80 (S), XDS-1, 11/17/00.
3. J476 HistSum Nov 80 (C), DECL 10 Dec 86; CHJUSMAGTHAI 211203Z Nov 80 (C), DECL 19/11/85; CINCPAC 040323Z Dec 80 (C), DECL 24 Nov 86.
request, but in May 1978 the State Department denied the request because the ammunition contained a STABALLOY (depleted uranium) penetrator in the armor-piercing round and would require an exception to Presidential Determination-13. (PD-13 was the source of the Carter Administration's arms transfer policy and severely limited transfer of advanced technology to other than close allies. One obscure provision embodied nuclear-derived material.) In June CINCPAC voiced concern over Thai vulnerability to armored incursions which the GAV-8/A was designed to counter. CINCPAC asked that the JCS seek reconsideration of releasability to Thailand based on the facts that numerous other countries possessed the equipment and Thailand already had equally sophisticated weaponry. CINCPAC also suggested description of the system be changed to "four-barrel 30mm gunpod."¹

(C) By June 1979 Thai border conditions had deteriorated and the State Department approved a General Electric license for export of the machine gun to Thailand. March 1980 saw further softening of President Carter's arms transfer policy. However, it was not until August 1980 that CHJUSMAGTHAI forwarded a P&R request for 20 gunpods and 100,000 rounds of ammunition, including the armor-piercing incendiary with the STABALLOY round without which the gunpod would be ineffective against hard targets such as tanks. CINCPAC also pointed out that FY 79 Congressional legislation had removed previous constraints on FMS sales of the STABALLOY round. The P&R data was forwarded on 21 January 1981.²

Equipment Delivery Status

(C) The following list reflects major equipment items under FMS and MAP which were delivered in Thailand since First Quarter FY 78 through the month indicated:³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truck (various sizes)</td>
<td>2,658</td>
<td>Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRAGON tracker</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Feb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. CINCPAC Command History 1978 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p.476; J476 HistSum May 78 (C), DECL 10 Jun 86; CINCPAC 080201Z Jun 78 (C), GDS-84.
2. J476 HistSum Aug 80 (C), DECL 10 Sep 86; Washington Star, 5 Mar 80, p.14, "Carter Begins Using Military Hardware in His Foreign Policy," by Vernon A. Guidry, Jr., (U); CINCPAC 2B1917Z Aug 80 (C), DECL 22 Aug 86; HQ USAF 211803Z Jan 81 (U).
3. CHJUSMAGTHAI Information Memorandum of 16 Jan 81 (C), Subj: Security Assistance Overview (U), DECL 16 Jan 87.

CONFIDENTIAL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRAGON missile</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOW launcher</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M88 tracked recovery vehicle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOW missile</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M113 armored personnel carrier</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-37B trainer aircraft</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/TPS-43 radar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-48A5 tanks</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130 aircraft</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm howitzer</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106mm recoilless rifle</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>Dec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER VIII--PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--MILITARY PERSONNEL

Situation in PACOM

Military Personnel Deficiencies

(U) At the start of the year, Headquarters CINCPAC noted that the Pacific Command was experiencing certain military personnel deficiencies as a result of general recruitment and retention problems. In the United States as a whole, the Services were not meeting recruitment and retention goals and were seriously short in particular skills and skill levels. The Department of Defense had attained only 92.8 percent of its overall FY 79 recruiting goal. These goals had not been met since FY 76. At the same time, the DOD second-term retention rate of 68.2 percent showed a marked decline from the FY 78 rate of 82.6 percent.1

(U) In the Pacific Command the Army was experiencing a shortage of senior grade enlisted personnel, particularly in the infantry battalions. Also of concern were E-5 tank drivers, E-5 helicopter technicians, E-5 patient care specialists, E-6 cavalry scouts, E-6 signals intelligence interpreters, and E-9 armor senior sergeants. Combat arms strength had declined in the specialties of infantryman, indirect fire infantryman, heavy antiarmor weapons crewman, and fire control crewman. Support specialties were also suffering, particularly in radio operator and military police skills. While projections of the total number of officers appeared favorable, levels in aviation warrant officers, aviation commissioned officers, and aviation materiel management commissioned officers were decreasing. There was also an overall shortage of captains, which was particularly acute in combat arms specialties, but was being felt in the signals intelligence field as well.2

(E) Pacific Fleet readiness was degraded in virtually all mission areas and inshore support activities as well because of personnel shortages. At the end of March 1980 twelve fleet units were reporting C-4 in overall readiness primarily because of personnel deficiencies. Fifteen other units reporting C-4 listed a shortage of personnel as a contributing factor. In addition, 34 units reported C-3 for lack of personnel. There was an existing shortfall at the time of 5,700 experienced petty officers (E-5 through E-9) at sea with the Pacific Fleet, which was only 87 percent of wartime requirements. These

2. Ibid.
deficiencies were especially significant in aircraft carrier engineering and flight deck departments and in air intelligence centers, as well as cruiser and destroyer guided missile fire control technicians and air controllers ashore and afloat.

(5) Shortages of pilots and supervisory personnel at the E-5 through E-9 level at air stations reduced the effectiveness of search and rescue, organic airlift, and related functions. Patrol squadron personnel shortages limited the ability to conduct extended and detached flight operations, and impacted on readiness and safety. Aircrew deficiencies in tactical electronic reconnaissance squadrons also limited full detachment support for contingency operations. Additionally, ship upkeep was degraded by personnel reductions in shipyards and by shortages of middle grade petty officers in key craft ratings. Finally, the number of medical personnel assigned to PACFLT units was inadequate to support contingency missions.

(6) In the Marine Corps, a shortage of cryptologic linguists precluded the support of contingency operations. The Air Force was the only component in PACOM that was substantially manned to meet wartime needs. However, decreases in rated officer staff manning had an unfavorable impact on overall readiness in PACAF.

Retention

(U) The most serious personnel problem being encountered in both enlisted and officer ranks was the fact that too many men and women were choosing to leave the Service after 6 to 15 years. They were taking with them the skills and experience that could only be replaced by a large investment of time and money. This loss was being acutely felt in PACOM's aviation, submarine, and other technical fields which required long periods of specialized training. Much of PACOM's personnel problem could have been solved if the loss of these skilled and experienced people was somehow stemmed. While first-term reenlistment rates were encouraging (the DOD rate had risen each year since FY 76), second-term and career reenlistment rates continued to fall. The Marines, for example, experienced a dramatic drop from 69.1 percent in FY 78 to 51.9 percent in FY 79.

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(U) Retention in the Pacific Fleet was not improving in FY 80, as pointed out by Headquarters CINCPAC in late September. There was a shortfall of approximately 24,400 enlisted personnel in PACFLT at that time. Among them, the most critical was the shortage of E-5 through E-9s which had grown to some 6,750 and was projected to increase to 10,500 by December. Among officer personnel in the Pacific Fleet, surface warfare retention was projected to remain significantly below required levels. While FY 80-81 retention was expected to be 41-42 percent, a higher rate as well as an increase in new accessions was needed to attain a satisfactory sea/shore rotation. As it was, a surface warfare officer could expect only one 2-year shore duty during his first 10 years of service. Naval pilot retention was projected to bottom out in FY 80 and increase in FY 81; however, the levels expected at that time would not prevent a severe manpower squeeze. Nuclear submarine officer retention remained significantly below required levels and was projected to decline even more, to 35 percent in both FY 80 and FY 81. As a result, the existing sea/shore rotation (14 years at sea during the first 20 years of service) was projected to deteriorate in the next three years.¹

(U) To improve Navy personnel retention, Headquarters CINCPAC believed certain decisions had to be made to support the Navy as a viable career option. In addition to an increase in base pay and allowances, meaningful sea pay of $400 to $800 per month (scaled by pay grade) would be an incentive to remain at sea and also serve as a retention incentive. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus program needed revamping. Of the seven most critically unmanned ratings in PACFLT, only three were eligible for the bonus and none received the maximum. Health care and educational benefits also needed to be improved.²

Status of PACOM Aviators and Submariners

(U) In the event of mobilization, Headquarters CINCPAC believed the Services would have to recall former flyers and submarine officers to active duty. The existing shortage of officers in these skills was beginning to degrade the Pacific Command's combat capability. At the beginning of the year, PACAF was manning its tactical fighter squadrons at 100 percent, but a 20 percent shortfall existed in staff and supervisory positions. The Air Force as a whole anticipated a 9 percent shortfall in aviators by the end of FY 80. PACFLT line squadrons were manned at 97 percent, but shore aviator billets were only 75-80 percent filled. The Navy was suffering a 31 percent shortfall in its total pilot inventory. FMFPAC had 86 percent of its aviators on hand and was experiencing shortfalls of 20 percent in its staff and supervisory positions.

2. Ibid.

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PACOM Army forces did have an adequate number of aviators on hand at the time, but Army-wide shortages in junior aviators would begin to affect the PACOM. Overall, the Army had a 32 percent shortfall in its junior grade aviators.¹

(U) The Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (SUBPAC) was manned at 100 percent of officer requirements at the start of the year. But to maintain this level, increasingly longer sea tours had to be mandated. This, in turn, was affecting retention to the extent that the number of resignations submitted in the first part of FY 80 was the highest in several years. It was projected that only 35 percent of submarine officers completing their initial obligated service would choose to remain on active duty during FY 80, as opposed to 42 percent during FY 79.²

Naval Reserve Training at Headquarters CINC Pac

(U) The Mobilization Augmentation Training Program at Headquarters CINC Pac, or Naval Reserve Active Duty for Training (ACDUTRA), was established in 1976 and was supported by three Naval Reserve Detachments located in Seattle, WA, Rock Island, IL, and Stillwater, OK, that recruited, administered, and trained reservists who were assigned against the mobilization augmentation portion of CINC Pac's Joint Manpower Program document. These reservists (95 officers and men assigned in mid-1980 against 113 reserve billets) annually performed two weeks of training in their billets at Camp Smith. Comments from the various directorates concerning the performance and motivation of these reservists during their stay had consistently been favorable. The training these two week provided would prove invaluable in the event of mobilization, said CINC Pac.³

(U) The Chief of Naval Reserves on 28 December 1979 had prohibited the travel of reservists to locations outside of the Continental United States (CONUS) for the performance of ACDUTRA unless government messing and berthing were available and Navy organic airlift was utilized. On 14 January CINC Pac requested reconsideration for his headquarters because travel to Hawaii via Navy organic aircraft would prove impractical and therefore severely curtail the training program. Further, while government billeting was being used, government messing facilities were limited. CINC Pac believed that reserve training given at his headquarters was unique and could not be duplicated elsewhere. However, a waiver could not be obtained, and the few reservists

2. Ibid.
3. CINC Pac 141851Z Jan 80 (U); J132 Point Paper (U), 9 Jun 80, Subj: Reduction of Naval Reserve Active Duty for Training (ACDUTRA) at Headquarters CINC Pac.
who reported for training after January 1980 had to personally bear the cost of travel to Hawaii. As of June there was no indication for improvement in the funding posture for FY 81.

Military Pay and Benefits

(U) In June 1979 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had requested that the Secretary of Defense support a 7 percent military pay increase for October 1979 vice the proposed 5.5 percent, and recommended the same to the President. In addition the JCS had requested that a Joint Service/Office of the Secretary of Defense study on military compensation be convened to redress the effects of past pay caps. Pay raises in the civilian sector were equaling or exceeding the 1979 guidelines set by the President, making even the 7 percent pay raise for military personnel inequitable and imposing an unfair financial sacrifice on them. An FY 80 pay raise in excess of 10 percent was believed to be required to regain comparability with private-sector pay. The Secretary of Defense endorsed essentially all recommendations made by the study group, but the Office of Management and Budget indicated it would oppose them. The report had proposed that the Department of Defense ask Congress for an additional $800 million in FY 81 to increase basic pay for grades E-1, E-3 through E-6, 0-3 through 0-5; improve permanent change of station travel entitlements; and provide a variable housing allowance for off-base quarters in high-cost CONUS areas.1

(U) Concerned about the prospects for an adequate pay increase and the effects it would have on recruitment and retention of quality personnel for PACOM, Admiral Long sent a message to General Jones, CJCS, on 31 January 1980, encouraging his continued efforts in obtaining fair compensation for the military. CINCPAC was convinced that inadequate pay and the erosion of benefits were major contributing factors in the worsening personnel situation. He said:2

Military pay raises, repeatedly capped well below annual inflationary levels, merely slow—but not stop—the declining dollar value of take home pay. Since 1972, 15-20 percent of the real purchasing power of our members' pay has been lost. We not only lag behind our civilian counterparts but even find ourselves threatened with deferred raises which would place us further behind. Coincident with the foregoing is the curtailment of benefits, which further aggravates our financial woes. . . .

2. CINCPAC 312304Z Jan 80 (U).

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I am, of course, intimately aware of the continuous efforts that have been made to protect our members against the assaults on their pay and benefits. I believe, however, that now is a propitious time to redouble those efforts to reverse the trend and restore some of the losses. I believe that there is a growing national attitude and Congressional awareness that we must have a strong, stable military force to protect our national interests. That force can be sustained only if the "pros" associated with military service clearly outweigh the "cons." At present, the balance is threatened. I realize that I am preaching somewhat to the "choir" but the issue is of such import that I want you to know personally my views.

General Jones said he shared Admiral Long's concern regarding the military's recruiting and retention problems and the Joint Chiefs were working on the issue in a number of forums. The CJCS said it would be premature to expect immediate, dramatic relief, but he sensed increasing recognition of the seriousness of the problem and was hopeful that over the long term they would be able to reverse the adverse trend.1

These efforts were rewarded, and by July the FY 81 Defense Authorization Bill and the Nunn-Warner Amendment were in Joint Committee and expected to provide an 11.7 percent pay raise effective 1 October plus a 25 percent increase in aviation career incentive pay and enlisted aircrew pay, 10 percent increase in subsistence allowances, increased sea pay, increased enlistment and reenlistment bonus authority, and other increased allowances and benefits.2

Environmental and Morale Leave Program

The Environmental and Morale Leave (EML) program was an expansion of space available travel, begun in 1954, to allow personnel relief from adverse environmental conditions. It was originally established to permit eligible military personnel and their dependents stationed at isolated posts to travel on a space-available basis via Military Airlift Command (MAC) flights to various destinations for rest and recuperation purposes. In 1976 a new class of space available passengers (unaccompanied dependents) was added. In March 1979 the JCS had asked the unified commands to review the EML program because it was not meeting the travel needs of participants. There was too much competition for available seats between Service members and unaccompanied dependents.

1. JCS 6534/081954Z Feb 80 (U).
dependent in heavily populated EML areas, there was a lack of priority travel, and leave destinations could be chosen worldwide. As a result of this review, the DOD in November 1979 proposed new EML rules which gave a higher priority for sponsor/sponsor-accompanied-by-dependents travel and authorized only one destination on an individual's EML travel orders. Normally not more than two destinations would be assigned for each origination site. These would be the first destinations of a MAC route that provided relief from the adverse conditions of the origination site.1

(U) Early in 1980 CINCPAC noted that proposed legislation was being staffed by the Services and the DOD to establish a funded EML program which would apply to remote overseas areas. This would provide rest and recuperative relief to members at locations which were not serviced by MAC airlift. The proposed legislation would authorize members and dependents one paid round trip air fare to a designated relief area during a 24-month tour. Congressional approval was required for the program, however, and by December the bill was still under consideration in House and Senate Armed Services Committees.2

(U) Meanwhile, beginning 15 May 1980, a new EML program was implemented worldwide in which an accompanied or unaccompanied eligible DOD sponsor was given a higher priority for space-available travel. Sponsors and their families were authorized two EML trips a year. In July staff members of Headquarters CINCPAC and MAC met at Hickam AFB and discussed how to reduce confusion at terminals and standardize EML travel procedures. One item being developed was a standardized leave authorization form which would be carried by all travelers regardless of Service affiliation. Unified commanders were to determine the origination and destination points of the EML program. In line with guidance from the DOD, normally no more than two destinations were authorized from each origination point. There was a planned yearly review of destination sites within the PACOM area, and these could be altered by CINCPAC based on an examination of requests and the availability of MAC flights. Individual units could make recommendations through their chain of command to alter destination sites.3

1. J113 Point Paper (U), 23 May 80, Subj: Environmental and Morale Leave (EML) Program.
3. J74 HistSum Jul 80 (U).
As of 15 May 1980 the places from and to which EML travel could be performed in the PACOM area were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origination Site</th>
<th>Destination Site</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alaska (Adak, Shemya)</td>
<td>Anchorage; CONUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Samoa</td>
<td>Honolulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia (Alice Springs, Exmouth, Woomera)</td>
<td>Sydney; Honolulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diego Garcia</td>
<td>Singapore; Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>Philippines; Honolulu, CONUS; Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia (Jakarta, Bandung, Malang, Surabaya)</td>
<td>Singapore; Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (Kanto Plain, Sasebo, Akizuki, Misawa, Iwakuni, Okinawa)</td>
<td>Intra-country; Alaska; CONUS; Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnston Island</td>
<td>Honolulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Japan; Alaska; CONUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midway</td>
<td>Honolulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (Clark, Cubi Point, Manila)</td>
<td>Japan; Honolulu; CONUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Singapore; Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Territory of the Pacific</td>
<td>Philippines; Honolulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islands (Enewetak, Krorob, Kwajalein, Majuro, Ponape, Saipan, Truk, Yap)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wake Island</td>
<td>Honolulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Philippines; Honolulu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*JIL3 Point Paper (U), 23 May 80, Subj: Environmental and Morale Leave (EML) Program.*
(U) On 23 June the Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command asked CINCPAC to add the CONUS as a designated EML destination site for Woomera, Australia, because the environmental and climatic conditions there were very harsh. On 10 July CINCPAC replied to CINCSAC saying he would make an exception to policy on travel to the first destination of MAC channel flights and approve the CONUS, on a trial basis, for Australia-based personnel. This routing, however, would be reviewed for possible overloading of the Honolulu–CONUS leg.¹

(U) In addition, COMUS Korea and COMUS Japan in July and August requested that the Philippines be included as an EML destination for Korea-based personnel and that Korea be allowed for Japan- and Philippines-based personnel. Based on an analysis of passenger airlift use rates which showed that EML travel was feasible from Yokota to Osan and from Osan to Yokota and Clark during non-peak periods, CINCPAC on 10 September approved these destinations on a six-month trial basis to 15 March 1981. In addition, on 18 September, CINCPAC notified all concerned that Japan-based personnel could travel to Korea as well as to the Philippines and the previously listed destinations. Points of origin were expanded to include Mio, Kobe, Hokkaido, Iwo Jima, and Marcus Island. As a point of precaution, CINCPACREP Philippines did point out that waiting time at Clark for space-available travel was long and hotel space near that base was often unavailable. COMUS Korea also warned that military guest quarters in Korea were almost nonexistent and that civilian facilities were limited and expensive.²

(U) Noting that CINCPAC had added these new destinations for Korea, Japan, and Philippines-based personnel, Headquarters USAF informed CINCPAC on 24 October that the entire space-available program, including EML, was being reviewed by the JCS and Service representatives, and a conference was scheduled for later in the year to discuss proposals to revise the system. In the interim, any further plans to increase the number of destinations for PACOM personnel in hardship posts should be held in abeyance, said USAF. CINCPAC agreed with this recommendation on 1 November, but noted that the determination to increase the destinations had been based on the consideration of large EML-eligible populations, the existence of MAC space-available seats, and the opportunity for adequate relief.³

¹ CINCSAC 232300Z Jun 80 (U); CINCPAC 102133Z Jul 80 (U).
² CINCPAC 100120Z Sep 80 (U); CINCPAC 180117Z Sep 80 (U).
³ HQ USAF 241530Z Oct 80 (U); CINCPAC 010141Z Nov 80 (U).
Human Relations/Equal Opportunity Program

(U) Human Relations/Equal Opportunity (HR/EO) activity for the CINCPAC military staff included: periodic commanders calls, all-hands meetings, etc., with HR/EO discussion topics; staff-wide dissemination of available HR/EO training courses; commanders' open-door policy to receive and act on complaints of racial, ethnic, or sexual discrimination; inclusion of specific comments on efficiency reports regarding the person's support of EO principles and programs; insuring that equal housing rights of members were supported by referral to respective housing offices; and to the extent possible, elimination of any identification of an individual by race or ethnic background in the proposed assignment of that individual to the headquarters. Intercultural and HR orientation classes were provided by the respective Service support commands, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and CDRWESTCOM. A review of available records in early 1980 disclosed that no formal complaints had ever been filed by Headquarters CINCPAC personnel with any of the Service branches or with the CINCPAC Inspector General.1

CINCPAC Staff Ethnic Composition (Military)2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officer Male/Female</th>
<th>Enlisted Male/Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>350/9</td>
<td>221/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>9/0</td>
<td>24/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>4/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>15/0</td>
<td>16/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian/Alaskan</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>375/9</strong></td>
<td><strong>266/83</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were two Black general officers (the Directors for Personnel and Communications-Data Processing) and one Black, one Hispanic, and three Asian American/Pacific Islander O-6s.

2. J14 Point Paper (U), 14 Mar 80, Subj: Staff CINCPAC Ethnic Composition (Military).
Awards in ROK/U.S. Combined Headquarters

(U) In a letter to CINCPAC on 20 June COMUS Korea requested the expansion of eligibility criteria for DOD-level awards to encompass U.S. personnel serving in the major subordinate headquarters of the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). The Combined Field Army (ROK/U.S.) was a deployed and combat ready field army of three corps and 13 divisions. It was immediately subordinate to Headquarters, ROK/U.S. CFC, and was supported by a variety of air and ground elements, both Korean and American. The Headquarters, Combined Field Army (ROK/U.S.) had a bi-national staff (roughly 60 percent ROK and 40 percent U.S.) and exercised operational control of all committed forces. This headquarters was truly combined, said COMUS Korea; there was no counterpart, parallel, or advisory framework, and supervisory channels external to the CFA were both bi-national and tri-Service. While this was a combined headquarters, its U.S. members were precluded by existing directives from eligibility for DOD-level awards which were limited to joint staffs.¹

(U) COMUS Korea said that assignments to Headquarters, Combined Field Army (ROK/U.S.) required an understanding of and participation in unified action—a prime characteristic of a joint tour assignment. These same conditions applied to U.S. members of Headquarters, Air Component Command and Headquarters, Naval Component Command, and expansion of the eligibility criteria appeared justified and appropriate for these personnel as well. CINCPAC support was requested in recommending DOD expansion of the award eligibility.²

(U) In endorsing COMUS Korea's letter to the CJCS, CINCPAC said expansion of the eligibility criteria for DOD-level awards to include unique combined organizations such as the CFC was justified, with the exception of the Defense Distinguished Service Medal. He concurred with COMUS Korea's recommendations.³

(U) The CJCS replied on 31 August saying the draft DOD Directive 1348.27 consolidated the criteria and policy for the award of DOD service medals and included "jointly staffed combined commands" as eligible activities, and it would appear that personnel assigned to major subordinate headquarters of ROK/U.S. CFC would qualify for the award of appropriate defense medals upon approval of that directive. The Office of the Secretary of Defense concurred with this assessment. Thus, U.S. personnel assigned to the Combined Forces Command became eligible for joint awards.⁴

2. Ibid.
4. JCS 1378/311637Z Jul 80 (U).
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USAF Representation in USFK and CFC Staffs

(U) The issue of U.S. Air Force representation on the staff of U.S. Forces Korea and the Combined Forces Command was a specific point of discussion at the CINCPAC-sponsored CFC Study Group meeting in January. CINCPACAF contended that the Air Force lacked sufficient representation in key management positions to allow an influential input into the air/land battle situation. In March CINCPAC tasked USFK to evaluate 16 billets on the CFC staff and 17 billets on the USFK staff for possible conversion from Army to Air Force. After much discussion, PACAF had proposed and COMUS Korea had agreed by October to six billet changes as follows:

- USAF O-6 as Special Assistant for Tactical Air in CFC C3, as Chief Strategy and Policy Planning Division in USFK, as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff Comptroller in USFK, and as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff C6 in CFC.
- USAF O-5 as Deputy Public Affairs Officer in USFK and as Deputy Provost Marshal in USFK.

(U) COMUS Korea nonconcurred in two PACAF proposals:

- Chief Plans Division in CFC C5. PACAF had said that senior air expertise could be especially effective in the force level and composition determination process. However, COMUS Korea stated that Plans Division personnel also served on the Ground Component Command staff and it was essential that a U.S. Army officer serve as Chief to insure that critical consideration was given to ground operations in CFC war planning.
- Chief Air/Ground Operations Branch in CFC C3. The PACAF rationale was that there was no USAF representation in this key function where there were major opportunities to enhance the air/ground partnership. The incumbent would provide expertise in the Forward Air Control/Air Liaison Officer/Close Air Support areas. COMUS Korea, however, stated this position also functioned for the Ground Component Command, USFK, and Eighth U.S. Army.

RDJTF Augmentation

(U) The Commander in Chief Readiness Command (CINCREDC) on 24 October requested that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant, Marine Corps (CMC) provide staff augmentation and portions of the support element for

1. JIl33 Point Paper (U), 21 Oct 80, Subj: USAF Representation in USFK and CFC Staff.
2. Ibid.

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the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) Headquarters. In accordance with
the terms of reference for the RDJTF, the CNO and CMC asked that augmentation
requirements be coordinated with the supporting CINC. Therefore, CINCRED
requested that CINCPAC fill certain staff augmentation and support element
requirements with qualified and fully operational personnel ready for immediate
deployment. Suitable backup resources were also required in the event the
primary fills were not available for deployment. Identified were the following
53 positions:

Staff Augmentation (Navy)

Escort Officer, Admin Section  O-2  1
Legal Clerk, Legal Section    E-7  1
Public Affairs Specialist, PAO E-6  1

Staff Augmentation (Marine Corps)

Electronic Warfare Officer, J3 Operations  O-3/O-4  1
Logistics Clerk, J4 Logistics            E-5  1
Escort Officer, Admin Section           O-2  1
Vehicle Operator, Admin Section        E-3  1
Public Affairs Officer, PAO             O-3  1
Press Information Specialist, PAO       E-4  1
Cathode Ray Tube Operator, Data Automation E-5  2

Support Element Augmentation (Navy)

Supply Clerk/Driver, Hq Commandant     E-5  1
Cook, Hq Commandant                    E-4  2

Support Element Augmentation (Marine Corps)

Vehicle Driver, 2½ T, Hq Commandant    E-3  2

Combat Engineer Platoon, with equipment as required  37

Unless sooner deployed, CINCRED anticipated that augmentees and equipment
would participate in a joint readiness exercise sometime late in the third
quarter or early in the fourth quarter of FY 81. Names and locations of
individual augmentees and support element units were to be provided by CINCPAC
by 14 December.

1. USCINCRED 212035Z Nov 80 (U).

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SECTION II--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Setting Foreign National Pay

(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics (ASD/MRA&L) in a 1972 memorandum had delegated to the PACOM Service components (through the military Departments) the authority to establish compensation and employment conditions for non-U.S. citizen employees of the U.S. Forces (USF) in the Pacific Command. This authority was to be exercised on a coordinated basis through a committee established by CINCPAC. The General Accounting Office (GAO), in 1977 and 1978, conducted surveys and issued reports on USF foreign national compensation plans and retirement benefits covering Korea, the Philippines, and Japan. The surveys were part of a larger GAO review which also included Germany and Italy. A number of recommendations were made to bring USF foreign national compensation more closely in line with prevailing practice in each country surveyed.1

(U) Based in part on these GAO surveys, the ASD/MRA&L also conducted a comprehensive worldwide review of DOD foreign national pay setting practices during 1978 and 1979. CINCPAC, PACOM component commands, and commands in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines were active participants in this review. Following this review, the ASD/MRA&L issued a supplemental memorandum on 2 July 1979 which provided additional DOD policy guidance specifically oriented to determining compensation for local national employees of USF within CINCEUR and CINCPAC. This memorandum, for the first time, established a DOD methodology for setting foreign national employee grade and step rate structures, industrial and occupational coverage to be used in salary and wage setting, and methodology for translating wage survey data into USF wage schedules. The memorandum was issued as an interim measure in order that the two commands would have the common guidance required to implement the changes resulting from the ASD/MRA&L's review of the various foreign national compensation systems.2

(U) The DOD guidance stated the legal basis for setting foreign national employee pay was Section 444 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended by Section 6 of the Act of 8 September 1960, which authorized the Secretary of State to establish uniform compensation plans applicable to all U.S. agencies.

1. J121 HistSum Jan 80 (U).
2. Ibid.; ASD/MRA&L Memo of 2 Jul 79 (U), Subj: Coordination of Personnel Administration Affecting Local Nationals and Other Non-U.S. Citizens in USEUCOM and USPACOM.

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in a particular area based on prevailing local pay practices. The guidance further stated the ideal grade structures to be used were those of the U.S. General Schedule (GS) and the Federal Wage System (FWS) unless the prevailing practice was so different as to handicap the recruiting and managing of the workforce. The step rate structure within grades would also be based on prevailing practices and apply country-wide. The law required that salaries be based on prevailing wage rates and compensation practices for corresponding types of positions in the locality.¹

(U) The GAO had recommended that the DOD adopt a Total Compensation Comparability (TCC) approach in setting pay and benefits for foreign national employees. TCC was defined as having total compensation comparable to prevailing practice in the non-USF sector of the area of employment. The OSD approach was to develop a TCC plan for general application department-wide, but this was abandoned in favor of a separate TCC plan for each country. On 17 October 1980 CINCPAC submitted TCC plans for Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, and these were approved by the Deputy ASD/MRA&L for Civilian Personnel Policy on 6 November. The CINCPAC TCC plan for Australia, submitted on 12 December, was approved on 30 December. The plans for Korea and Japan were incorporated into the new DOD Manual for Foreign National Compensation, published in December. Those for Australia and the Philippines would be added to the manual at a later date.²

Foreign National Labor Costs—Japan

Labor Cost Sharing

(U) Inflation and the rapid revaluation of the Japanese yen during the 1970s markedly increased U.S. operating expenses in Japan. In spite of an overall reduction of more than 24,000 Japanese employees in the last seven years of the decade, total USF labor costs were 28 percent greater in 1980 than had been in 1973. Additionally, the total accrued retirement obligation rose to about $550 million by early 1980. At that time, the average yearly cost per Japanese employee was estimated at $17,600. Fiscal years 78-80 figures were as follows:³

1. Ibid.
2. J121 HistSum Dec 80 (U); ASD/MRA&L Memo of 6 Nov 80 (U), Subj: Total Compensation Comparability Plans, Pacific Command; ASD/MRA&L Memo of 30 Dec 80 (U), Subj: U.S. Forces Total Compensation Plan-Australia.

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Japanese Employees of U.S. Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 78</th>
<th>FY 79</th>
<th>FY 80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>20,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. Forces Cost ($ in millions)</td>
<td>$389</td>
<td>$410</td>
<td>$363 (projected)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) A high-level effort by the U.S. Government, sustained over several years, finally resulted in the Government of Japan (GOJ) acceding in 1977 to two labor cost-sharing agreements with the United States. The first, effective 1 April 1978 (the beginning of the Japanese Fiscal Year--JFY 78), was set at 6 percent (amounting to 3 percent for U.S. FY 78, which had begun on 1 October 1977), and totaled $30 million. The second agreement, effective 1 April 1979, added 7 percent to the first agreement (and averaged 9.5 percent for U.S. FY 79), and amounted to $35 million. For JFY 79, the GOJ shared 13 percent of the total Japanese employee labor costs, or $65 million. The 1979 agreement had followed the GOJ's initiative to share added costs in return for labor stability--particularly in Okinawa Prefecture where the unemployment rate was high. In addition, a May 1978 GAO report, "DOD Pay Practices for Japanese Nationals Should be Changed," helped spur Japan's 1979 cost sharing action. As a result, the GOJ agreed to pick up costs which the United States (GAO) had identified as "overpayments" beyond those granted to GOJ National Public Service (NPS) employees. These (with estimated JFY 79 dollar costs) were:

- U.S. Forces 10 percent pay differential ($19 million).
- English language allowances ($1.3 million).
- Premium pay computation based on above two items ($2.2 million).
- Severance/retirement formula excess obligation ($8 million).

By 1980 U.S. Forces Japanese labor costs paid by the GOJ exceeded in total amount those which had been identified by the GAO as excessive.

(Y) (CONFIDENTIAL) During Secretary of Defense Harold S. Brown's visit to Japan in March 1980 the Japanese Foreign Minister informed him that the sharing of

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1. Ibid.; J121 Point Paper (U), 31 Jan 80, Subj: Labor Cost Sharing -- Japan; J121 Point Paper (C), 9 Jun 80, Subj: Labor Cost Sharing -- Japan (U), DECL 9 Jun 86.

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labor costs had been stretched to the maximum, under the existing Status of Forces Agreement. Despite this official GOJ stand, however, additional labor cost-sharing measures were being explored. COMUS Japan believed it would be difficult but he was maintaining a dialogue at the working level with the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA). The U.S. Ambassador agreed there was a need to keep the subject alive but any new initiatives would have to appear to be originated by the GOJ.1

Pay Increase for 1979

A GOJ 1979 wage survey had found an existing difference between National Public Service (NPS) and private industry pay of 3.7 percent, and the GOJ National Personnel Authority proposed an average NPS salary increase of 3.7 percent retroactive to 1 April 1979. On 28 January 1980 U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) and the GOJ DFMA reached agreement on the USF local national wage increase package for JFY 79. As was established practice, USFJ agreed to the same pay increase as provided by the GOJ for NPS employees. Pay factors included basic wage schedules, family allowances, commutation allowances, and housing allowances. USFJ achieved some cost avoidance by implementing that portion of the NPS wage package which provided longer step waiting periods (18 or 24 months vice 12 months for step increases for employees over age 56) and no step increase beyond certain ages to be determined after publication of a forthcoming NPS regulation. Although it was not possible to compute the exact yen value of this cost avoidance, it was considered significant in that it established a precedent for USFJ insistence on benefiting from the cost-avoidance portions of the NPS wage package. The lowering of these benefits was scheduled for 1 April 1980 application.2

Negotiations with the DFMA on the JFY 79 wage increase had begun on 20 December 1979 following the Japanese Diet's passage of the NPS pay bill. The 3.7 percent pay increase was not an issue. DFMA representatives, however (at the union's urging), initially refused to agree to the USFJ insistence of adopting the lengthened step increase waiting periods for older employees. The DFMA also tried to gain extra benefits that had not been approved for the GOJ. The USFJ negotiators, however, were eventually successful in achieving the cost-avoidance step changes without acceding until the other issue was settled. Through these negotiations, USFJ reinforced its right to negotiate the annual wage package and to curtail costly practices which were discontinued for employees of the GOJ.3

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1. J121 Point Paper (C), 9 Jun 80, Subj: Labor Cost Sharing -- Japan (U), DECL 9 Jun 86.
2. J121 HistSum Jan 80 (C), DECL 30 Jan 86; COMUSJ 300015Z Jan 80 (C), DECL 30 Jan 86.
3. Ibid.
(U) During the course of the negotiations, the Zenzhuro union, representing all USF local national employees, scheduled three protest demonstrations to demand early action on the 1979 pay increase. A 25 January sit-down at the gates of USF installations was conducted without hampering military operations. A planned 2-hour strike for 31 January and an 8-hour strike for 15 February were cancelled after the 28 January announcement that agreement was reached.\(^1\)

**Pay Increase for 1980**

(U) On 8 August 1980 the Japanese National Personnel Authority recommended a wage increase of 4.61 percent for NPS employees for JFY 80, retroactive to 1 April 1980. This was the first time in six years that the increase was higher than the preceding year, but still far below the double-digit rates that prevailed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Data for the past nine years' trend are shown below:\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JFY</th>
<th>Monthly Avg Increase (¥)</th>
<th>Percent Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>8,907</td>
<td>10.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>14,493</td>
<td>15.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>31,144</td>
<td>29.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>15,177</td>
<td>10.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>11,014</td>
<td>6.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>12,005</td>
<td>6.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>7,269</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>7,373</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>9,621</td>
<td>4.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{\text{(C/HOPOH) USFJ and DAA negotiators entered into the 1980 wage talks on 29 December 1980 and concluded them on the 30th. At that time agreement was reached to grant the approximately 20,000 Japanese employees of U.S. Forces a pay increase of 4.61 percent, as expected, retroactive to 1 April 1980. This was identical to the increase approved by the Diet in late November for G0J employees. Also agreed to were modest increases in family, commutation, and adjustment allowances. The longevity step increase (LSI) issue, which USFJ demanded be resolved before entering into the 1980 wage negotiations,}}\)

1. COMUSJ 210740Z Jan 80 (U) and 300555Z Jan 80 (U).
2. J121 HistSum Dec 80 (C), DECL 31 Dec 86; USFJ Ltr of 20 Aug 80 (U), Subj: 1980 Wage Increase - Japan National Public Service Employees.
was settled on 26 December. USFJ objectives were to make the NPS LSI stoppage system compatible with the Master Labor Contract/Indirect Hire Agreement and to conclude unresolved issues of previous-year wage revision negotiations prior to entering new wage revision negotiations. Both of these were accomplished.°

The DFAA formally acknowledged, in a memorandum confirming the agreement, USFJ's intention to propose revisions to the USFJ retirement allowance system in accordance with the pending NPS retirement allowance bill. The DFAA also confirmed its willingness to negotiate such a proposal at an appropriate future date.°

**Direct Hire Employees**

(U) Most Japanese nationals working for the U.S. Forces in Japan were indirect hire employees under the direct supervision of USF, but hired by the GOJ and legally employees of the GOJ. During the 1979 discussions concerning the transfer of executive-agent responsibilities from Army to Navy for the Sanno Joint Services Transient Billeting Facility in Tokyo, it was recognized that most of the employees at the Sanno were Japanese national direct hires (hired without the assistance of the GOJ). Further inquiry revealed that direct hire local national employees were also being used to a limited extent elsewhere in Japan by USF (a total of 251 employees, including 110 at the Sanno, 48 at Camp Zama, 13 at Yokosuka Naval Base, 44 at Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, and 36 at Atsugi Naval Air Station).°

(U) In December 1979, CINCPAC provided COMUS Japan a clarification of policy and an amendment to CINCPAC Instruction 12200.3A concerning responsibilities and procedures to be followed in the event any element of USF Japan had or proposed to utilize a direct-hire method of employing local nationals. As a result of that guidance, COMUS Japan submitted a proposed procedure to CINCPACAF on 9 June 1980 for personnel administration of local national non-appropriated fund direct hire hourly rate employees. After a review of the proposed procedure by the PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee (JLPC), PACAF approved the procedure with some exceptions and reservations.°

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1. J121 HistSum Dec 80 (C), DECL 31 Dec 86; COMUSJ 310700Z Dec 80 (C), REVW 31 Dec 86.
2. Ibid.
3. J121 HistSum Dec 80 (C); USFJ Ltr of 9 Jun 80 (U), Subj: Japan Direct Hire Program.
4. J121 HistSum Dec 80 (U); CINCPAC Ltr Ser 2993 of 11 Dec 79 (U), Subj: Personnel Administration for U.S. Forces Non-U.S. Citizen Civilian Employees in PACOM.
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(U) Responding to a recommendation to review the local use of various allowances, COMUS Japan and the Service components conducted a survey of hotel and food service employees to determine prevailing practice in the application of language, holiday, family, commutation, housing meal, and seasonal allowances for temporary employees. Also, the Services agreed to place appropriate controls on setting rates of pay above the minimum step, similar to existing controls under the Indirect Hire Agreement. Efforts would be continued in Japan to attempt to negotiate appropriate changes to the Indirect Hire Agreement to assimilate the direct hire employees. Results of the survey clearly indicated that the prevailing practice was to pay no allowances to temporary employees, with the exception of commutation and meals. COMUS Japan was given approval to implement the Japan Direct Hire Program less commutation and meal allowances.1

Management of Foreign National Employees in Korea

Labor-Management Agreement of 29 February 1980

(U) Negotiations for a new U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)-Foreign Organizations Employees Union (FOEU) labor-management agreement took place in Korea during the period 15 January to 15 February 1980, culminating with its signing on 29 February. The agreement was normally renegotiated on an annual basis and expired one year after the date of signing.2

(U) The new agreement reflected no radical changes from the previous version. However, improvements and additions were made which strengthened management's rights, provided new definitions, and improved certain administrative practices. The agreement identified the employer as USFK, comprised of all Army, Navy, and Air Force components at all command levels, including the Korea Overseas Area Exchange (KOAX), other non-appropriated fund activities, and USFK invited contractors. The FOU represented nearly all of the Korean National direct hires of USFK and invited contractors. Certain classes of positions were excluded from union representation and coverage, including management officials, supervisors, and civilian personnel specialists. In addition, the agreement did not cover Korean employees of the Korean Service Corps, who were affiliated with the FOU under a separate labor-management agreement.3

1. Ibid.
2. J122 HistSum Mar 80 (U); USFK-FOEU Labor-Management Agreement (U), 29 Feb 80; USFK Joint Labor Affairs Committee Meeting Minutes (U), 25 Feb 80.
3. Ibid.

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Revised Wage Rates Effective 1 July 1980

(U) Revised wage schedules for U.S. Forces local national employees in Korea were approved jointly and issued by CDRWESTCOM, the PACOM Service Component Command responsible for setting pay in the area. The new wage rates, effective 1 July 1980, resulted in an average pay increase of 15.1 percent for manual and 23.3 percent for non-manual employees. There were some 21,000 local national employees in Korea, about 60 percent classified in manual occupational fields. The revised schedules were based on a survey of locality (Korea) wages and fringe benefits of 84 private and public sector firms during March - May 1980.¹

(U) In September 1977 the GAO decided that the USF Korea method of setting pay resulted in overpayment of wages to its employees and recommended that an average-to-average concept be used in setting pay. This concept called for equating pay lines, derived from wage surveys, to the actual average step or salary of USF employees. For the Koreans, the average step in 1980 was determined to be 8.16 for manual and 7.29 for non-manual employees. The traditional pay setting method was to equate survey results to the fifth step in the 10-step (changed to 12 steps in 1979) wage schedules with 4 percent increments between steps. As a result, DOD, in its own review of pay setting in Korea, found USF wages on the average to be about 10 percent above industrial rates. USF in Korea was instructed by DOD to move toward the average step over a 3-year period commencing in 1979. DOD further instructed USF Korea that new or additional benefits should not be granted until new changes in the system were made. In 1979, USF reduced survey results for the manual schedule by 2 percent and for the non-manual schedule grades 1 through 8 by 1 percent and grades 9 through 13 by 4 percent.²

(U) During 1980 OSD directed for application in 1981/82, use of the Total Compensation Comparability (TCC) concept in setting foreign national pay worldwide. This concept called for compensation of USF foreign national employees to be based on comparability with non-USF employees to include both pay and benefits. COMUS Korea and in-country commands opted for application of TCC in 1980. That would encompass complete elimination of the GAO-identified wage overpayment (average to average) and also would compensate employees for benefits not provided by USF that were found to be prevailing practice among non-USF employees. USF lag in benefits was equated to 7 percent of base pay.³

¹ J122 HistSum Jun 80 (U); WESTCOM Ltr of 27 Jun 80 (U), Subj: Authorization of US Forces Wage Schedules - Korea; COMUSK 120102Z Jun 80 (U).
² USFK Ltr of 10 Jun 80 (U), Subj: US Forces Wage and Benefit Survey Findings and Recommendations.
³ Ibid.
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(U) Application of TCC to the 1980 survey data produced average increases of 10.8 percent for manual and 23.3 percent for non-manual employees for a combined weighted average increase of 15.7 percent. This adjustment was based on reducing the full amount required under the average-to-average concept and providing a cash benefit allowance of 7 percent of base pay in recognition of prevailing benefits not practiced by USF. Additionally, the survey supported payment of dependent tuition assistance, paid days off for certain family events and occupational premiums for certain occupations.1

(U) In forwarding the survey results the in-country command described the labor situation in ROK as fragile and potentially explosive. Negative reaction to the USF pay proposals (particularly the disparity between manual and non-manual workers) of the Foreign Organizations Employee Union (FOEU) representing all U.S. Forces Korea employees was of immediate concern. Accordingly, the PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee (JLPC) was requested by COMUS Korea to review the data in an effort to reduce the disparity between the manual and non-manual employees, yet preserve and implement TCC.

(U) The USF Korea Civilian Personnel Director visited JLPC in Hawaii on 17 Jun 80 and presented the in-country position. Concerns included the potential for serious labor disturbances on USFK installations, a 35.8 percent rise in the ROK cost of living during CY 79, the tightening of martial law, FOUJ reactions, and other relevant considerations. The JLPC conducted a detailed review of all wage survey data to explore options available within legal and DOD policy constraints. A determination was made that new firms surveyed in 1980 (31 percent of the sample) had a significant and abnormal effect on manual workers' pay rates. Based on this undue negative influence, manual payline was recalculated using a discount factor for information gathered from the new firms. The resulting payline permitted a 15.1 percent manual employees average pay increase and a narrowing of difference between manual and non-manual increases. The non-manual average pay increase remained at 23.3 percent, with an overall average of 18.3 percent when combining both pay lines.2

(U) In addition to the wage increases, employees received significant changes in their benefits package which included a new medical insurance plan (approved for implementation before the 1980 wage survey), tuition assistance, and paid time off for selected family events. The resultant pay and benefit adjustment represented the first application within DOD of TCC, a full year before the 1981 implementation date mandated by OSD. It enabled USF Korea to complete DOD required average-to-average implementation and to recognize prevailing benefits, thereby enhancing the USF Korea image as a responsible employer.3

1. Ibid.
2. JI22 HistSum Jul 80 (U).

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Local National Employees in the Philippines

New Wage Rates Effective 1 October 1980

(U) A revised schedule of wages for some 20,000 USF local national employees in the Philippines was jointly approved and issued by CINCPACFLT, the PACOM Service Component Command responsible for setting pay in that area. Revisions were based on data obtained during a full-scale wage and a partial fringe benefits survey of 32 private sector employers in the greater Manila area during July and August 1980. The new wage rates, effective 1 October 1980, resulted in an increase in base pay averaging 18.6 percent for manual and 16.3 percent for non-manual employees. The rates applied to both appropriated and nonappropriated fund employees. A separate wage and fringe benefits survey was also conducted for managerial and supervisory employees who were exempt from the Collective Bargaining Agreement with the U.S. Forces. This survey included 22 private sector employers, the results of which were integrated with those produced by the aforementioned survey of 32 companies.¹

The GAO, in a 1977 review of USF Philippines employment compensation, was critical of the method of setting pay rates and recommended that the industrial average pay rate, as developed by the wage survey, be matched to a step in the USF pay schedule that represented the average in grade length of service of USF employees. For the Philippines, that average step in 1980 was determined to be 4.73 for manual employees and 4.67 for non-manual employees. The traditional pay setting practice had been to place the industrial pay average at the middle step (Step 4) in each wage schedule, with step rates on each side being calculated at 3 percent intervals. As a result, GAO estimated that Philippine employees were being overcompensated by 3 percent through matching industrial pay to the 4th step rather than the employee average step. OSD informed the GAO that U.S. Forces in the Philippines would move toward the average step over a 3-year period starting in 1979. Pay rate matching was adjusted by one-third of the difference for 1979 and the full average-to-average for the remaining two-thirds was accomplished during the 1980 survey, thus eliminating all overcompensation.²

Emergency Allowance for Inflation

(U) CINCPACFLT on 21 May approved an emergency allowance payment of 60 pesos per month to all Filipino employees, retroactive to 1 February 1980,

1. J122 HistSum Nov 80 (C), DECL 30 Nov 86; CINCPACFLT Ltr FF1-1 Ser 74/7402 of 3 Oct 80 (U), Subj: Wage Schedules for Non-U.S. Citizen Employees in the Republic of the Philippines.

2. Ibid.
based on the in-country Joint Labor Affairs Committee's recommendation that the allowance, established by Philippine Presidential Decree (PD) 1678, be paid to all employees regardless of salary level. A review indicated that it was common practice among participating wage survey firms to pay the 60 pesos monthly, separately from base pay effective 21 February.1

Q (U) (CONFIDENTIAL) The PACOM JLPC's determination to approve the recommendation was based on the following:

- Companies with a majority of the survey's employee population paid the emergency allowance under PD 1678 to all employees regardless of salary. This determination was based on existing information regarding the San Miguel and B.F. Goodrich firms.

- It precluded adverse morale should the allowance be paid only to those employees earning up to 1,500 pesos monthly. Less than 9 percent of the USF workforce earned more than 1,500 pesos monthly. This category included employees occupying critical managerial, professional, and technical positions.

- It precluded pay distortion problems.

In view of these considerations, the JLPC authorized payment of the emergency allowance regardless of salary level.

(U) The need for an emergency allowance was attributed to a rising consumer price index and an erosion of real wages. This payment raised the total of emergency allowance payments over the last several years to 320 pesos a month for each employee.2

(U) The rapidly rising inflation rate in the Philippines caused the issuance of another Presidential Decree (PD 1713) six months later, requiring private firms to pay an additional 60 pesos per month to each employee earning less than 1,500 pesos a month. A USF special survey in November found that the private sector paying the allowance regardless of salary level was marginally short of 50 percent. However, CINCPACREP Philippines and the Services in-country recommended, and the PACOM JLPC concurred, that U.S. Forces pay the 60 pesos to all employees, effective 18 August, the prevailing practice date of implementation. This action raised the total emergency allowance payment to 380 pesos per month.3

1. J121 HistSum May 80 (U); CINCPACFLT 210507Z May 80 (C), DECL 1 May 83.
2. Ibid.
3. J121 HistSum Dec 80 (U).
Base Labor Agreement

The United States-Republic of the Philippines (U.S.-RP) Base Labor Agreement (BLA) of 1968 came into question early in the year when CINCPAC noted that "some quarters in Washington" had voiced the idea the United States should take the initiative in opening talks for renegotiating the agreement. CINCPAC strongly opposed taking such action.\(^1\)

The GAO review of compensation in 1977 had recommended a number of changes to the system of setting pay scales for Filipino employees to bring them more into line with prevailing local practices. While the averaging method was adopted, as explained above, four other GAO recommendations could not be unilaterally implemented by the United States. This would require a renegotiation of existing agreements and Philippine officials, said CINCPAC, stood poised with demands for greater benefits. The United States would have more to lose than gain through such negotiations. For example, it would not be wise to reopen the BLA talks to eliminate the 200 peso ($27) mid-year bonus (which was not prevailing practice), and in the process lose control of the hiring and other necessary personnel management prerogatives. The bonus was originally negotiated as an inducement to get the Government of the Philippines (GOP) to sign the agreement in 1968. The Philippines continued to provide some of the most cost-effective labor in the world. For instance, in the repair of ships, the average journeyman ship repairer at Subic Bay cost the United States $1.05 and hour, or less than $2,200 a year. CINCPAC said the United States would not want to lose its unilateral (but fair) wage-setting and workforce-managing authorities by reopening the U.S.-RP BLA for what he termed "rather minor particulars." To do so would cost the United States dearly in the years ahead.\(^2\)

CINCPAC advised the Secretary of Defense on 29 March 1980 that, despite a generally favorable political climate for U.S.-RP discussions on security-related issues, there were special considerations when it came to labor. In any renegotiation there would be a certain amount of "giving," and the United States had little to give in the labor area without risking effectiveness in operations. During and since the 1976-1979 Military Bases Agreement negotiations, the GOP and the Philippine workers union had periodically pressed for shared decision-making with U.S. Forces in setting wages, in contracting out work, and in deciding employee grievances; for expanding preferential employment provisions to Filipinos vice U.S. citizens; for outside binding arbitration on employee disciplinary action appeals; and for other advantages.

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1. CINCPAC 292130Z Mar 80 (C), DECL 29 Mar 86.
2. J121 Point Paper (C), Subj: Foreign National Compensation - Philippines (U), DECL 22 Jan 86.
The existing BLA contained provisions that protected USF management rights in these matters and these rights were considered necessary to effectively manage the workforce.¹

(U) (C/NOFORN) The USF had made significant inroads since 1976, said CINCPAC, in diminishing the cause of some major GOP and union demands. For example, a joint committee in 1977 agreed on most cases in dispute as to which civilian positions should be Filipino or American. To offset the GOP argument that employee appeals should be submitted for binding arbitration (by a Filipino arbitrator), CINCPACREP Philippines (with the Philippine Labor Department) co-sponsored professional training seminars for USF internal arbitration systems; and provided more stringent guidelines to commanders considering recommendation in the arbitration process.

(U) (C/NOFORN) CINCPAC said protection of existing labor provisions was critical to the day-to-day management and operation of the bases in the Philippines, and any U.S. initiative or consent to renegotiate the BLA would open the door for the GOP to chip away at essential U.S. management prerogatives. He and his component commanders considered that the preservation of existing BLA provisions was directly related to unhampered operation of the bases—a hard-fought issue during earlier military bases negotiations.

(U) The United States took no initiatives to reopen BLA talks during the year.

Rossi v. Brown Decision on Preferential Hiring

(U) The 1968 U.S.-RP Base Labor Agreement had provided, in part, for preferential hiring of Philippine nationals at U.S. facilities except where special circumstances required the employment of U.S. citizens. The only positions reserved for U.S. citizens were those in which needed skills were not available locally or in which Philippine nationals could not serve for reasons of security or special management needs. In practice, only about 4 percent of the 20,500 civilian jobs in U.S. facilities were held by U.S. citizens. In Rossi v. Brown, a number of U.S. citizens, including dependents and permanent residents, challenged the preferential hiring provisions of the BLA in the U.S. Federal District Court. The plaintiffs alleged the hiring provisions violated Public Law 92-129 (the Hughes-Schweiker Amendment) which provided that:²

¹ CINCPAC 292130Z Mar 80 (C), DECL 29 Mar 86.
² J73/Memo/278-80 of 3 Oct 80 (U), Subj: Adverse Decision in Rossi v. Brown; AMEMB Manila 18899/280303Z Sep 80 (C), DECL 26 Sep 86.
CONFIDENTIAL

Unless prohibited by treaty, no person shall be discriminated against by the Department of Defense...in the employment of civilian personnel at any facility or installation operated by the Department of Defense in any foreign country because such person is a citizen of the United States or is a dependent or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States.

(U) On 29 March 1979 the U.S. District Court ruled against the plaintiffs, holding that the BLA, although an executive agreement, was in effect a "treaty" and, therefore, was excepted from the application of the Hughes-Schweiker Amendment.

(U) On 15 September 1980 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled 3-0 that preferential hiring under Article I of 1968 Base Labor Agreement was contrary to U.S. law, thus reversing the verdict of the District Court. The court declared:1

We are persuaded that the word "treaty" in Section 106 of the amendment was used in the sense set forth in Article II of the Constitution—an international agreement concluded by the President with the advise and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. This construction is consistent with the terminology normally used under United States law. It also comports with Congressional intent to alleviate the economic plight of United States military personnel and their dependents; if we were otherwise to construe the term to encompass all international agreements, the exception to the ban on discrimination virtually would engulf the general rule.

Thus we find that the Base Labor Agreement of 27 May 1968 is not a "treaty" for purposes of Section 106, and the provision for preferential hiring set forth in Article I of the Agreement accordingly is invalidated. We therefore reserve and remand to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

The U.S. Ambassador in Manila advised the Secretary of State that if this decision were allowed to stand, many adverse consequences to U.S. activities in the Philippines would follow. The most direct impact, of course, would

1. SECSTATE 250957/201058Z Sep 80 (C), DECL 19 Sep 86.

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be in the labor relations area at the military bases. The preferential hiring provision was a key element of the BLA from the Philippine point of view, since it served to ensure that the maximum possible number of positions at the U.S. facilities were filled by Filipinos. The economic benefits derived from the facilities were an important argument for the GOP and other Filipinos favorable to the U.S. presence in supporting the continued existence of those facilities.  

Beyond the labor area, the decision—if it drew, as it seemed to, a broader distinction between an executive agreement and a treaty—raised questions about the validity of various provisions of many other executive agreements, which formed the very underpinning of the U.S. security relationship with the Philippines. The Military Bases Agreement itself and other sensitive areas such as criminal jurisdiction were of especial concern. The Ambassador also surmised that the distinction drawn by the court between executive agreements and treaties would have an impact in other countries where the United States had military facilities based on executive agreements.

CINCPAC voiced his concern to the JCS on 4 October, saying the hiring preference granted to Philippine nationals was a matter of great importance to the GOP. He agreed with the Ambassador that the decision had the potential of impacting on defense relationships with other nations in the PACOM area of responsibility. CINCPAC agreed the ruling should be appealed and, if necessary, corrective legislation should be sought.

The JCS said they shared CINCPAC's concern and advised on 9 October that the DOD General Counsel in cooperation with the State Department was preparing an appeal to the Justice Department for further review. In addition, legislation was being drafted to change the wording of the Hughes-Schweiker Amendment, Section 106. In particular, the word "treaty" would be changed to "international agreements" or other suitable words.

On 20 October the following statement was released to Manila news media to counteract adverse publicity and speculation by the local press:

U.S. military authorities in the Philippines are working closely with the U.S. Embassy in Manila through the U.S. Departments of State, Justice, and Defense to determine the implications of the court's decision in this case. The whole

1. AMEMB Manila 18899/280303Z Sep 80 (C), DECL 26 Sep 86.
2. CINCPAC 042332Z Oct 80 (C), DECL 2 Oct 86.
3. JCS 3484/091838Z Oct 80 (C), DECL 8 Oct 86.
4. CINCPACREPPHIL 230204Z Oct 80 (U).
case is under review. The status of the review is not available at this time. However, current Filipino employees of the U.S. at the bases can be assured that there should be no threat to their employment as a result of the decision.

On 29 October the U.S. Attorney filed, on behalf of the government, a "Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc" with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. This action constituted a request to the full court (12 judges) that they rehear the case because it raised questions of exceptional importance. The Secretary of State told the American Ambassador in Manila that it would be quite unusual for the Court of Appeals to grant a rehearing. If denied, he would consider urging the Supreme Court to review the case.¹

¹ A rehearing was not granted before the end of the year. The full court was to hear the case early in 1981 and would uphold its earlier ruling. As a result the government would seek legislation to change the language of the law.²

Offshore Labor Agreement

(6/NOFORN) The U.S. Embassy in Manila on 7 May 1980 requested State Department authorization to study the termination of the U.S.-RP Offshore Labor Agreement (OLA) of 1968. The Embassy also proposed the exchange of diplomatic notes confirming mutual agreement that the OLA was no longer necessary. CINCPAC was opposed to this proposal and recommended to the Secretary of Defense on 28 July that the OLA remain in force and not be terminated. CINCPAC had not become aware of the proposal until earlier that month.³

³ The Embassy proposal centered mainly on the portion of the agreement dealing with contractors. It was believed by CINCPAC to be based on the Embassy's experience with the PACAF procurement activity and the GOP Labor Ministry in resolving Air Force contract award disputes involving Filipino workers who provided base operating support at Wake Island. Adverse publicity in that situation was of continuing concern, but CINCPAC said retention of the contractor provision was required to keep the U.S. Government technically out of the contractor-employee-GOP relationship.

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1. SECSTATE 291233Z Oct 80 (C), DECL 29 Oct 86.
3. CINCPAC 282357Z Jul 80 (C), DECL 26 Jul 86.
The number of direct-hire third-country nationals (TCNs) employed by USF in the PACOM had been reduced from over 1,000 in 1970 to less than 25 by early 1980, of which less than 20 were Filipinos. Direct-hire TCN Filipino wages, when employed in non-U.S. areas (such as Okinawa), continued to be based under a PACOM-wide system of home-country local national rates, with overseas differentials. Despite the small number employed, said CINCPAC, that system and its OLA base needed to be retained in the event the United States ever had the need to expand TCN direct-hire employment anywhere in the PACOM. If the OLA were terminated, inordinate renegotiation would be required whenever TCN employment was contemplated by U.S. Forces. Further, it could require immediate renegotiation for those few TCNs still employed. Opening the Offshore Labor Agreement for the purpose of terminating the contractor article would give the GOP a decided advantage to renegotiate the direct-hire portion as well. Since the direct-hire portion, in CINCPAC's view, was satisfactory for existing and future USF needs, he strongly recommended that no action be taken to terminate the OLA in whole or in part.

No initiatives were taken in this regard during the year.

Pay Differential for Long Term TDY at Diego Garcia

The Public Works Center and other commands at Subic Bay had been tasked to provide support to the U.S. Navy Support Facility, Diego Garcia, and the amount of work was expected to increase significantly in the years ahead. A large part of this work was performed by Filipino employees skilled in various trades and crafts and in specialized occupations such as supply, engineering, communications, and administration. They had served at considerable personal sacrifice at this remote site, and compensation was considered inadequate to entice the best employees for repeat assignments.1

The CINCPACREP Philippines Joint Labor Affairs Committee (JLAC) reviewed the situation and considered the following three options:

1. Continue the existing practice of temporary duty (TDY) with payment of $11 per diem in addition to regular pay.
2. Appoint employees as TCNs who would receive regular pay, subsistence allowance, and an overseas differential.

1. J121 HistSum Dec 80 (U); CINCPACREPPHIL Ltr 07:JT:bs 12550 Ser 51/80 of 29 Aug 80 (C), Subj: Pay Differential for Filipino Employees Assigned to Diego Garcia (U), DECL 29 Aug 86.
• Continue to place employees on TDY but pay a 25 percent differential in addition to regular pay and per diem.

(C/NOFORN) The JLAC determined that the first option would result in an inadequate number of skilled employees for assignment. There was no incentive for employees to accept TDY when, for example, they had to pay $3 per meal in the dining room. The second option was also rejected by the JLAC. CINCPAC policy discouraged the use of TCNs. The third option was unanimously accepted as the most viable. It permitted retention and control of the employees by their commands and provided maximum flexibility in managing the time and assignments of personnel. It would pay a differential identical to the overseas differential granted to Filipino TCN employees and offered the best possibility of attracting top quality employees to accept assignments away from home for up to six months. Accordingly, the JLAC and CINCPACREP Philippines recommended to CINCPACFLT that it authorize a 25 percent differential over base pay, in addition to other allowances.

(C/NOFORN) The PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee agreed with the CINCPAC-REP Philippines proposal. State Department Standardized Regulations authorized a 20 percent foreign post differential payable to U.S. citizen employees permanently assigned to Diego Garcia or after 42 days of continuous TDY. CINCPAC requested and received Secretary of Defense (ASD/MR&A&L) confirmation of a JLPC proposal to also pay a 20 percent differential for foreign national employees assigned for long-term TDY to Diego Garcia retroactive to the first day after 42 consecutive days on site.

U.S. Civilian Employees

Headquarters CINCPAC Civilian EEO Program

(U) The Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Act of 1972 had placed federal agencies and their employees under the EEO provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The concept of the EEO program was to eliminate discrimination in federal employment for reasons of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap. It included Affirmative Action Plans, Federal Women's Programs, and Upward Mobility Programs. The CINCPAC Chief of Staff served as the Headquarters EEO Officer and the Director for Personnel exercised staff supervision over the program. The Headquarters CINCPAC EEO program was administered by the Deputy Equal Employment Opportunity Officer (DEEOO), a staff member of the Personnel Directorate. An EEO committee had been established in

1. SECDEF 1959/270052Z Sep 80 (C), DECL 25 Sep 86.
1974 to assist in determining attitudes of, and toward, minorities and women assigned to CINCPAC Headquarters and to assist the DEEOO.¹

(U) Headquarters CINCPAC had, in early 1980, a total of 140 civilian employees, of whom 83 (59 percent) were women. Eighty-nine percent (74) of the women were concentrated in the GS-4 to GS-7 grades, with the average grade level being about GS-6. Seventy-four percent of the 57 male employees, on the other hand, were in the GS-11 to GS-14 grade range, and their average grade was about GS-12. The staff was cognizant of this situation, but options to improve the balance were limited. Upward mobility billets would be identified as vacancies occurred and a commitment was made to aggressively recruit qualified women for higher level jobs. By May 1980 five upward mobility billets had been filled by women at CINCPAC.²

(U) The Office of Personnel Management prohibited the collection and use of minority census data in Hawaii; therefore, at CINCPAC Headquarters, the EEO program was primarily a "women's" program.

Annual Performance Ratings

(U) The CINCPAC Performance Rating Board/Incentive Awards Committee met in May and June to review recommendations for Outstanding Performance Ratings (OPRs) and cash awards for headquarters employees for the rating period from 1 April 1979 to 31 March 1980. Of the 131 civilian employees eligible to be rated, 69 were recommended for OPR and all were approved. Twenty-eight were recommended for Quality Step Increase (QSI) and 6 were approved. Twenty-two were recommended for Sustained Superior Performance Awards (SSPAs) and 8 were approved; 10 others received SSPAs after having been recommended for QSI.³

New COLA Rate

(U) The Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) rate for federal civilian employees on Oahu was raised from 12.5 percent to 15 percent of base pay effective 21 September 1980.⁴

Post Differential for Diego Garcia

(U) The Office of the Secretary of Defense on 18 October said it would request concurrence of the Department of State for the retroactive payment of

2. Ibid; J144 HistSum Apr 80 (U).
4. J144 HistSum Sep 80 (U).
post differential for long-term TDY of U.S. employees ordered to Diego Garcia if it received confirmation that employees were used for such duty. CINCPAC-FLT replied on 10 November that existing and future Navy requirements indicated an immediate need for substantial numbers of U.S. employees for waterfront improvement projects of approximately 150 days and a projected need for many highly specialized engineering personnel to support construction requirements exceeding 42 days but which would not involve a permanent change of station. In addition, long recruitment delays had been experienced, and the use of TDY for periods in excess of 42 days could be expected to reoccur while recruitments were in process. The establishment of the Officer in Charge of Construction, Diego Garcia, would also require TDY personnel to set up management systems for administering emerging contract operations. Approval of the retroactive differential payment, said CINCPACFLT, could be expected to provide the incentive for obtaining needed volunteer skills in view of the anticipated PCS (permanent change of station) recruitment difficulties and also reduce the requirement for long-term employees.¹

(U) CINCPAC passed CINCPACFLT views to the Secretary of Defense (ASD/MRA&L) and asked that he obtain State Department approval to provide retroactive payment of post differential to long-term TDY U.S. employees on Diego Garcia. CINCPAC said that a similar program for foreign national (Filipino) employees had been confirmed by the ASD/MRA&L earlier, on 27 September. Approval for U.S. employees was still pending at the end of the year.²

1. J121 HistSum Dec 80 (U); CINCPACFLT 102301Z Nov 80 (U).
2. CINCPAC 140336Z Nov 80 (U).
SECTION III--MISCELLANEOUS PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

Headquarters CINCPAC Manpower Actions

(U) During February the CINCPAC Chief of Staff ordered temporary augmentation from within the headquarters of the Operations (J3) and Plans (J5) staffs in response to increased demands brought about by the series of crises in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. As a result a total of eight officers were provided to J3, three officers to J5, and two enlisted personnel to J5. With the exception of one permanent officer transfer (with billet) each to J3 and J5, the remaining personnel were assigned for a period not to exceed six months. The Chief of Staff also announced a comprehensive manpower survey of the headquarters to identify organizational and manpower modifications necessary to improve and streamline the staff to effectively meet existing and projected mission requirements. The last such survey had been completed in July 1978.¹

(U) The internal manpower survey was conducted by the Personnel Directorate from May to August 1980 and was completed and approved for implementation in December by the Deputy Chief of Staff. Thirteen billets were approved for deletion (5 officer, 5 enlisted, 3 civilian) and eight billets were approved for addition (4 officer, 4 enlisted).²

(U) The Headquarters CINCPAC FY 81 Joint Manpower Program (JMP) was completely revised as of 15 November 1980 and submitted to the JCS to be approved for the remainder of FY 81. This action was necessary because of the large number of approved and pending out-of-cycle changes and extensive internal realignments. These included establishment of the Command, Control, and Communications System Directorate (C3S); realignment of general officer positions, by which the Director of Personnel (J1) billet was downgraded to an Army/Air Force 0-6 rotational position; the establishment of the Director C3S as an Army 0-8, and the Deputy Director for Operations as an Air Force 0-7; extensive internal reorganization of the Plans Directorate (J5); establishment of a billet for the Executive Officer to the Political Adviser (PA); and several other internal realignments. JCS approval would result in no change to total FY 81 authorized manpower, as approved on 8 September 1980, with the

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1. J134 HistSum Feb 80 (U); J01/Memo/2-80 of 22 Feb 80 (U), Subj: Temporary Personnel Augmentation for J3 and J5 and Manpower Survey Actions.
2. J134 HistSum Nov 80 (U).
exception of a correction to Navy officer and enlisted totals (shown in parentheses). The FY 81 totals requested are shown below:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>100 (101)</td>
<td>112</td>
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<tr>
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<td>56</td>
<td>138 (137)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>114</td>
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<td>743</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PACOM Military Customs Program**

(U) DOD Directive 5030.49R prescribed the objectives of the military customs program: eliminate the flow of narcotics, drugs, and other contraband; assist U.S. Customs, Agriculture, and Immigration Services; and minimize inconvenience and delays to DOD personnel, cargo, and mail. The DOD directive was oriented toward entry into U.S. Customs territory. CINCPAC Instruction 5840.3 expanded the program to include inter/intra-theater operations. Headquarters, Department of Army was the DOD executive agent and the unified commands were tasked with program management. In the Pacific Command the CINCPAC Personnel Directorate was the office of primary responsibility.

(U) PACOM resources committed to the Military Customs Program were staff representatives at CINCPAC, subunified, and component headquarters, and approximately 1,280 Military Customs Inspectors (MCIs)—the vast majority of whom were part-time. In addition a total of four U.S. Customs Service advisers were with Headquarters COMUS Korea, COMUS Japan, CINCPACREP Philippines, and CINCPACREP Guam. In FY 78 PACOM MCIs made 1,078 drug and 11,676 contraband seizures; in FY 79 they made 1,280 drug and 37,963 contraband seizures. Significant improvements were made in 1979 to speed the processing of passengers and improve the quality of MCI examinations. Monitoring by CINCPAC of inbound flights to Hawaii, Alaska, and California showed expeditious processing by the Customs Service of DOD passengers and cargo pre-inspected by PACOM MCIs.

(U) In response to a Headquarters Department of Army request, CINCPAC on 7 February 1980 provided operating costs in PACOM directly associated

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1. J134 HistSum Nov 80 (U).
2. J111 Point Paper (U), 1 Feb 80, Subj: PACOM Military Customs Program.
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with military customs functions. Estimated annual recurring costs were $5.0 million, most of which was military personnel cost computed at an average grade of E-5. The CINCPAC position was that the military customs program was a major investment which was considered necessary to help eliminate the flow of narcotics, drugs, and other contraband within the Western Pacific and into the customs territory of the United States. Of concern, however, was the part-time manpower required to maintain the level of inspection and examination standards by subunified commanders and CINCPAC representatives. 1

(U) CINCPAC said that while military customs functions were being performed as efficiently as possible, he was actively searching for methods to streamline procedures and to reduce costs, inconveniences to members, and delays in cargo movement with programs such as pre-clearance and selective enforcement. He could see no elimination of any functions performed by the MCIs unless they were picked up by another agency of the U.S. Government.

(U) Pre-clearance procedures had been limited to selected Category B flights originating from only four bases in Europe, and in July 1979 the Army was exploring the feasibility of expanding this to military flights and from other locations as well. CINCPAC proposed that the pre-clearance program be expanded in PACOM to include Category B flights from Yokota, Osan, Kadena, Clark, and Andersen. However, various problems arose in gaining accreditation by the U.S. Customs Service (USCS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the program could not be initiated during 1980. 2

(U) A point questioned by subordinate commands was the degree of required inspection: 100 percent inspection or 100 percent examination of household goods, passengers, and accompanied baggage. CINCPAC said that the basis of the military customs program was established on a 100 percent inspection requirement within DDO. There was no specific requirement for 100 percent examination during pre-departure procedures, nor was an MCI required to be present during the entire household goods packing. The most positive approach, said CINCPAC, was to have thorough, 100 percent inspections with good or detailed examinations when required. The USCS disagreed, saying that until a good selective enforcement procedure could be developed, it supported the continuance of 100 percent examination of household goods and baggage and MCI presence at pack-outs, as was being done on Guam and in the Philippines. Where 100 percent examination was not standard practice, the USCS strongly urged that it be started. 3

1. J111 HistSum Jan 80 (U); DA 21161BZ Nov 79 (U); CINCPAC 072016Z Feb 80 (U).
2. J111 HistSum Feb 80 (U); DA 031915Z Jul 79 (U); CINCPAC 280129Z Jul 79 (U); CINCPAC 262305Z Dec 79 (U); CINCPAC 082254Z Mar 80 (U).
3. J111 HistSum Mar 80 (U); CINCPAC Ltr 111 Ser 736 of 24 Mar 80 (U), Subj: PACOM Military Customs Inspection Program; USCS 04056/291455Z May 80 (U).
(U) The 1980 PACOM Military Customs Conference was held from 18 to 20 November at Hickam AFB, and was attended by representatives from the USCS, USDA, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Headquarters DA, USAF, MAC, and subunified and component commands. Discussions centered on the subjects of pre-clearance for Category B flights, expansion of pre-clearance for military flights, selective enforcement program for household goods, involvement in the mail program, the smuggling threat and countermeasures, and future programs. The CINCPAC position on pre-clearance was that examination of all passengers and accompanied baggage would continue, pending a change to CINCPAC instructions which would require at least an inspection with examination when required or when a threat was seen.1

Drug Trafficking

(U) For many years, including 1980, the PACOM geographical area was the source of most of the world's illegal hashish and opiates. The "Golden Triangle" of the Burma-Laos-Thailand border area furnished most of the heroin and opiates, while most cannabis concentrate (hashish) originated in Pakistan. Illegal narcotics continued to flow from Southeast Asia to the United States through civilian channels on both the east and west coasts. Narcotics were available in varying amounts in all countries where PACOM troops were concentrated. Since 1977 the smuggling and attempted smuggling of narcotics from PACOM countries into the United States by DOD personnel had been slowed to a low level by strong DOD and PACOM initiatives.2

(U) Because of drug suppression efforts by the Pacific Command, the DEA and USCS viewed military aircraft and ships as very low smuggling risks. The joint military customs program provided a strong deterrent to smuggling through the DOD transportation system. Evidence from all sources indicated to CINCPAC that no commercial sized shipments of illegal drugs were being moved through DOD transportation means in PACOM.

(C) The U.S. Embassy in London had sought guidance in August 1980 from the State Department on how to respond to British concerns over the entry of illegal drugs into Diego Garcia via U.S. postal channels. CINCPAC advised the JCS that the strategic importance of Diego Garcia mandated close and continuous cooperation between military and local officials in dealing with all types of criminal offenses and, although available evidence did not suggest that significant quantities of drugs had entered the island through the mails, efforts to plug this potential source should be vigorously pursued as a matter of mutual concern.3

1. J311 HistSum Nov 80 (U).
2. J311 Point Paper (U), 1 Feb 80, Subj: Military Drug Trafficking in PACOM.
3. CINCPAC 130207Z Sep 80 (C), REVW 28 Aug 00.
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(U) Aside from the situation at Diego Garcia, CINCPAC said that changes in DOD directives prohibiting military authorities from inspecting mail exacerbated problems in maintaining favorable host-nation relations at overseas locations within the PACOM. Rules which prohibited military authorities from doing their part to stem the flow of illicit drugs and other contraband into foreign countries through military post offices were confusing to allies who clearly expected maximum cooperation in such areas. Accordingly, with respect to Diego Garcia, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS a thorough review of policies governing postal inspections and said that a minimum effort should be made within DOD to obtain an exception which would permit reasonable inspections by military authorities at overseas facilities.

Disparities in Privileges and Benefits

(U) There were various disparities in privileges and benefits between DOD personnel assigned to PACOM and State Department personnel in the same areas. CINCPAC, responsible for overseeing the security assistance program in the PACOM, advised the Secretary of Defense on 19 December that there was growing concern over the differences in perquisites among personnel serving in the same Country Team assignments. PACOM Defense Attache offices and security assistance organizations indicated to CINCPAC two major inequities: no post differential allowances for military personnel and a lack of funded travel for emergency and environmental/morale leave for DOD personnel.  

(U) CINCPAC said these inequities were inherently unfair to the DOD segment of Country Teams. The continued loss of U.S. dollar purchasing power, coupled with local inflation, was financially debilitating. This hardship was only partially offset by existing housing and cost of living allowances. The overall impact, he said, especially for the military community, was disillusionment, low morale, and financial difficulties. Funded travel cost associated with emergency and environmental/morale leave was a relatively low dollar value perquisite, but would be extremely important where there were no MAC channel services.

(U) To correct these inequities, CINCPAC requested the Secretary's support in developing legislation to provide military members an allowance similar to the post differential received by State Department representatives assigned to U.S. Country Teams in hardship areas. This allowance would remove a major irritant and provide equitable treatment for all U.S. Government employees there. He said he appreciated the continuing efforts to obtain leave for DOD personnel at isolated locations. (See earlier section in this

I. CINCPAC 190202Z Dec 80 (U).

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chapter.) CINCPAC said military members of Country Teams should not continue to be burdened with financial problems that had long been recognized and eliminated for State Department co-workers assigned to those posts.

Reduction of Dependents Overseas

(U) Congress had established by law a ceiling of 325,000 command-sponsored military dependents overseas, a ceiling which had to be attained not later than 30 September 1980. The Secretary of Defense had reaffirmed the position that there should be no ceiling; that dependents should be allowed to accompany sponsors overseas to any area where security and support facilities were adequate for their needs. The total number of command-sponsored dependents overseas at the start of the year was 318,225; therefore, no reductions were required. The number of PACOM command-sponsored dependents overseas, excluding Alaska and Hawaii, was 82,208. Including these states, the figure was 170,516. The CINCPAC position was to oppose a reduction of dependents, for reasons of morale, personnel management, and operational readiness.¹

Visit of DASD(EO) to PACOM

(U) The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity (DASD(EO)), M. Kathleen Carpenter, visited PACOM bases in Korea, Okinawa, the Philippines, and Hawaii from 10 to 26 March 1980. The purpose of the trip was to gain an on-site assessment of the management of equal opportunity (EO) and equal employment opportunity (EEO) programs for military and civilian personnel; status of EO, race relations, and human relations training; utilization of women in the military; and implementation of OSD guidance regarding EO and EEO in the Pacific Command. She was also interested in candid discussions of ideas and in receiving suggestions about how the DOD could be more effective implementing its human goals.²

(U) Much of Ms. Carpenter's attention was focused on the utilization of women in the military. She met with small groups of military women and junior enlisted personnel (frequently in closed-door sessions) to solicit comments and candid discussions of sexual harassment, equal opportunity, and race relations. The DASD(EO) indicated that the following points were of concern:

- Unit commanders should insure that they had the capability to assess the equal opportunity climate within their units.

¹ J132 Point Paper (U), 28 Jan 80, Subj: Reduction of Dependents Overseas.
² J135 HistSum Mar 80 (U); J114 HistSum Mar 80 (U).
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- Commanders must continue to raise their level of consciousness regarding sexual harassment and implement methods to restrain its occurrence.

- Policies regarding mandatory EO unit training should be reexamined for adequacy and be updated, if necessary, to make the program more relevant to organizational needs.

CINCPAC's preliminary overall assessment was that Ms. Carpenter found morale and dedication very high in the PACOM. In her exit briefings throughout the command and at Headquarters CINCPAC, she indicated that her impression of equal opportunity programs within PACOM was favorable.

Federal Day 1980 Awards Program

(U) The Federal Day Awards Program, sponsored by the Honolulu-Pacific Federal Executive Board, recognized selected individuals for their outstanding work performance, accomplishments, and contributions to the Federal Service and the community. Headquarters CINCPAC nominees for 1980 were Margaret N. Maruo (J77 Research and Analysis Office) for Federal Employee of the Year; CAPT William E. Holtkamp, USAF (J6 Communications-Data Processing), for Military Officer of the Year; and SFC Edward H. Jordan, USA (J6), for Enlisted Serviceman of the Year. They competed with nominees from other Federal agencies and the winners were announced at the awards luncheon on 2 May. CAPT Holtkamp was selected as the Federal Day Military Officer of the Year for 1980.1

Combined Federal Campaign

(U) Contributions by PACOM participants to the 1980 Overseas Combined Federal Campaign - Pacific totaled $1,798,206.03 (corrected figure). This campaign included nine PACOM commands and agencies: COMUS Japan, COMUS Korea, CINCPACREP Philippines, CINCPACREP Guam, NAVSUPPAC Diego Garcia, CHJUSMAG Thailand, CHUSDLG Indonesia, CINCPACREP Australia, and ODR Pakistan. The Overseas Combined Federal Campaign did not include Headquarters CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CDRWESTCOM, or other organizations in Hawaii.2

(U) Headquarters CINCPAC contributions to the 1981 Honolulu area Combined Federal Campaign, pledged during 1980, totaled $33,255.71 ($2,018.46 more than the previous year), with a participation rate of 93 percent and contributions averaging $42.47 per person.3

1. J144 HistSum Mar, Apr 80 (U).
2. J113 HistSum Feb 80 (U); CINCPAC 160051Z Jan 80 (U).
3. J142 HistSum Dec 80 (U).

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CHAPTER IX

INTELLIGENCE

SECTION I--SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT

PACOM Data Systems Center

(U) In 1975 the Department of Defense had approved a CINCPAC proposal to establish a PACOM Data Systems Center (PDSC), and in 1976 the requirement to establish the PDSC had been validated by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CINCPAC Director for Intelligence was designated the PDSC program director and the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPC) was charged with operating and managing the host complex along with specific sub-systems supporting the PACOM indications and warning and IPAC analysis functions.¹

(U) The PDSC concept called for the interface of off-island systems via incoming messages received over all-source and collateral lines and via the Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) Communications Network central node for external data-base access and/or bulk data transfer. Under DIA-delegated production the PDSC was designated host computer with data bases on-line to external users via the IDHSC-II node. The major computers of the system constituted a homogeneous, functionally partitioned network of 13 Digital Equipment Corporation PDP 11/70-based AN/GYQ-21(V)s. The central node was connected via fiber optic channels to the CINCPAC Command Center complex where another pair of machines supported the communications center and automated message distribution functions. It was also connected to the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC) node at Makalapa where one PDP 11/70 provided support to FICPAC's intelligence functions. Plans were to connect the central node to the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) node at Hickam Air Force Base and the Commander, U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM) at Fort Shafter.

(U) By July 1979 all 25 of the interactive graphic SU 1652 terminals had been installed, tested, and accepted by the government. By October the 29 alpha-numeric terminals had also been installed and accepted. The optional 46 terminals required for the PDSC were scheduled for FY 81 and FY 82 procurements, depending on the availability of funds.

Preliminary Operational Capability

(U) Preliminary operational capability for the PDSC was attained on 28 January 1980. This capability provided automated message routing to the PACOM Watch and to IPAC analysts via the Automated Communications Center Subsystem in the CINCPAC Special Intelligence Communications (SPINTCOM) facility and the Message Support Subsystem in the Building 20 PDSC computer room. Message traffic was received at the OJ-389(V)/G dual screen analyst work stations. At the time, approximately 20 terminals were in use, from which messages, queues, and storage files could be accessed. Basically, the PDSC project had reached its first goal: the transfer, adaptation, and implementation of the National Military Intelligence Center Support System software and capabilities into the intelligence processes on the island of Oahu.1

Fiber Optics Failure

(U) A massive power outage at Camp Smith on 21 March 1980 caused a failure of the PDSC fiber optic system for 10 days. A Hughes Aircraft Company engineer had to be called in and the system was returned to service on 31 March. In the interim, message traffic for the PACOM Watch and IPAC analysts was handled manually. Fiber optics spare parts were later obtained and kept on site, and this was expected to provide some stability until a Hawaiian Telephone Company fiber optic system became operational.2

(U) Unstable electrical power supply continued to hamper PDSC development and services, however. Power failures, interruptions, surges, and lows occurred all too frequently. A second power outage was experienced a week after the PDSC recovered from the massive failure of March. Immediate and longer-term effects on the computers, their peripherals, and communications connectivity were debilitating to the system. Installation of the Hawaiian Telephone system, with a 37-channel capacity, was begun in May and completed in August. In September, requirements were established for an additional five channels, with completion scheduled not later than February 1981. The Hughes fiber optics system was dismantled in October. At the end of the year, a need was recognized to increase the system with another 17 channels.3

Initial Operational Capability

(U) Initial operational capability of the PACOM Data Systems Center was scheduled for late January 1981. At that time, hardware configuration was

3. J213A HistSum Apr 80 (U); J212B HistSum Dec 80 (U).
to be as follows:¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 - PDP 11/70</td>
<td>Automated Communications Subsystem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - PDP 11/70</td>
<td>Message Support Subsystem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - PDP 11/70</td>
<td>User Support System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - PDP 11/70</td>
<td>Intelligence Data Handling System II Switch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - PDP 11/70</td>
<td>Data Base Host</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - PDP 11/70</td>
<td>Development Support Subsystem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 - OJ-389(V)/G</td>
<td>Analyst Terminals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) On 24 December 1980, a letter was forwarded to the Commander, Naval Data Automation Command requesting approval for a 1-year extension of the existing development contract with an option for an additional year. In addition to justifying the need for the extension and option, an important milestone was established for full operational capability by September 1981. At that time the following new requirements would be satisfied:²

- Outbound message handling.
- PACOM Data Systems Center/Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System interface.
- Additional PACOM Remote System Node implementation/enhancement.
- Applications related to electronic intelligence processing, collection requirements management, installation analysis, and imagery interpretation report review. Enhancements to the PDSC system based upon user operational experience would be performed in the follow-on contract.

**Data Base Management System**

(U) System support software elements planned for the PDSC included operating systems, language translators, device handlers, and the Data Base Management System (DBMS). The system selected to support the integrated data base was the DBMS-11, which was designed to provide data base facilities for the PDP-11 COBOL programs and any other digital host language which supported a call statement or equivalent. During the first part of 1979 other candidate

¹. J212B HistSum Dec 80 (U).
². Ibid.
DBMS sources were tested for performance and utility. Although none of these systems were completely satisfactory for PDSC requirements, the commercially available and already procured Digital Equipment Corporation DBMS-II was selected for retention with some contractor adaptation.¹

(U) On 20 June 1980 the PDSC contractor demonstrated the following four DBMS primitive features: Data Base Open, Search Index Equal, Get Data, and Data Dictionary Interface. The demonstrated DBMS features were satisfactory but required adjustments to improve performance. On 11 July, contractor personnel demonstrated two additional basic DBMS features: And/Or Logic and Search Index General. This completed a set of six DBMS primitives which allowed logical queries to operate with a test data base.²

(U) On 25 August the PDSC contractor delivered software modules, integrated with the PDSC DBMS, which loaded data and indices to the data. This was an essential step in proving that a high-performance DBMS could be developed for the PACOM Data Systems Center on PDP 11/70 computers.³

(U) The J21/PDSC Program Management Office chaired a critical management decision group for PDSC DBMS development in September 1980. Contractor progress and DBMS capabilities were evaluated by the group, which included representatives from DIA/RSE (Mr. Irv Luckom), the Rome Air Development Center, and the MITRE Corporation. It was determined that the PDSC contractor had delivered and demonstrated enough basic DBMS capabilities so that continuation was more cost effective than pursuing other alternatives. After a review of existing and planned development as well as the alternatives, the staff, with Mr. Luckom's concurrence, directed the continuation of the PDSC DBMS development effort.⁴

(U) In December the PDSC contractor loaded data to the PDSC data base. An unforeseen problem arose whereby DBMS-II, functioning in an IAS 3 operating system environment, would not load records which were greater than 3,000 bytes. The contractors temporarily solved this problem by creating overflow records from any original record greater than 1,200 bytes. The overflow records were then loaded. At the end of the year coordination with Digital Equipment Corporation was proceeding to solve this problem. Initial operational capability of the Data Base Management System, as with the PACOM Data Systems Center itself, was projected for the end of January 1981.⁵

2. J212A HistSum Jun, Jul 80 (U); J212B HistSum Dec 80 (U).
3. J212A HistSum Aug 80 (U); J212B HistSum Dec 80 (U).
4. J212B HistSum Dec 80 (U).
5. Ibid.
Intelligence Data Handling System

(U) The PACOM Intelligence Data Handling System Communications (IDHSC) network was designed to provide the intelligence community in the Pacific with the capability for interactive, on-line query and response, and bulk data exchange using internetted IDHS computers in Hawaii and in the Continental United States (CONUS). This internetted system, designated IDHSC II, included PACOM access to the National Security Agency's Community On-Line Intelligence System (COINS) and the Defense Intelligence Agency On-Line System (DIAOLS).  

(U) Move of the PACOM IDHSC II switch from FICPAC to IPAC, in planning for several years, was accomplished in phases through March 1980, with emphasis being placed on a minimum of interruptions to users of the system. The actual turnover commenced on 3 April, and IPAC assumed operational responsibility on 7 April 1980.  

(U) The effort to interface the PACOM Data Systems Center with the Intelligence Data Handling System network proceeded on schedule in the last half of 1980. The final test and accreditation of this software was expected to occur during the last two weeks of January 1981. The interface would then allow PDSC users to have query/response access to the COINS. Interactive access to the DIAOLS was scheduled for April 1981.  

(U) The COINS II Terminal Access System increased its availability to users during 1980. Although the system, which was connected to the National Security Agency via the ARPANET, was technically still an experimental one, it had been possible to provide more utilization time for analysts on Oahu.  

Satellite Communications

(C) Planning had been underway since 1977 to provide remote access to the IDHSC II network for additional PACOM users in the Western Pacific: the 501st Military Intelligence Group and 314th Air Division in Korea; Commander U.S. Forces Japan (COMUS Japan), Fifth Air Force, and 500th Military Intelligence Group in Japan; and Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines. Commander U.S. Forces Korea (COMUS Korea) and the Fleet Intelligence Support Center Western Pacific were the only two existing remote PACOM users. The data links then in use (underwater cable, microwave, etc.) were extremely complicated and very unreliable.  

2. J211 HistSum Jan 80 (C), DECL 11 Feb 86; J211 HistSum Apr 80 (U).  
3. J211 HistSum Dec 80 (U).  
4. Ibid.  
5. J211 HistSum Jan 80 (C), DECL 11 Feb 86.
The frequency of problems along the entire length of these old communications links had resulted in a definite degradation in the service provided by the IDHSC net to the remote user commands. For this reason planning concentrated on upgrading the circuits to remote users by placing them on the existing Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS). To lease additional non-satellite circuits for new users was prohibitively expensive, and would have expanded existing problems with low reliability and very low line speed.¹

Satellite connections had been approved and promised by the Defense Communications Agency in 1977. Hookup dates were originally delayed until October 1978, then March 1979, and finally October 1979. In early 1980 the Defense Communications Agency had indefinitely postponed all new hookups to the DSCS. Other planning efforts had continued, however. New high-speed equipment and new feeder lines had been ordered. Funding and coordinated arrangements for multi-site installation teams had been finalized. Circuit activation awaited long-overdue conversion of the DSCS from an analog to a digital system.²

The satellite circuits were finally made available for activation in early December 1980. Existing users were then activated, but new users would have to wait until April 1981 because of delays in procuring the necessary equipment. The communications link between the PACOM IDHS switch and the DIA switch was successfully upgraded to a higher speed (9600 baud) and placed on a government satellite in October.³

Improved Circuit to Makalapa and Hickam

During May and June 1980, Naval Shore Electronic Engineering Activity Pacific personnel in cooperation with CINCPAC J242 personnel installed, tested, and evaluated communications equipment in conjunction with upgrading data communications paths to Makalapa and Hickam Air Force Base. Completion at Makalapa occurred in May and at Hickam in August 1980. The net effect of the conversion was the improved real-time update of intelligence data bases in support of CINCPAC and component commanders.⁴

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. J211 HistSum Dec 80 (U).

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Manning Shortfalls

(U) There was a critical manning shortfall of Cryptologic Technician Operators (CTOs) in the CINCPAC Special Intelligence Communications (SPINTCOM) facility which serviced the CINCPAC, IPAC, and FMFPAC (Fleet Marine Force Pacific) staffs as well as the PACOM Data Systems Center. On 3 January CINCPAC asked the JCS for an out-of-cycle change to the Joint Manpower Program to increase the SPINTCOM facility's Joint Table of Distribution allowance by seven billets. Essentially, the primary cause for this requirement was an Office of the Secretary of Defense moratorium on Automated Data Processing (ADP) software. The moratorium prevented the acquisition of an ADP system which would have offset the anticipated increase in workload resulting from CINCPAC's automation of the POSC.1

(U) The projected automation of the SPINTCOM facility, identified as far back as 1975, had called for an eventual reduction of nine billets in FY 82. However, complete automation as projected was not fully achieved. The installed equipment provided automatic switching functions but traffic still had to be manually handled. Since 1975 the active Special Intelligence (SI) circuits had increased from 14 to 30 and were expected to reach 45 by June 1980. Message handling had correspondingly increased; for example, Operations Communication traffic (which was handled in a separate facility from the SPINTCOM), required a dedicated operator and manual handling to process the increase from zero to approximately 500 incoming/50-60 outgoing messages daily. Also, within the SPINTCOM facility, record SI traffic sent increased from about 40 to some 75 daily, and record SI received was up from less than 500 to over 1,300 daily. This substantial increase in function, requiring more manual processing, had been accomplished without net CTO manpower increases.2

(U) In September 1978 an Air Force Communications Service management engineering team conducted a detailed survey of the facility and documented a requirement of nine added billets, two of which were subsequently added to SPINTCOM from within Headquarters CINCPAC staff resources. This action restored the activity to the 35-operator level previously authorized through FY 77, but which had been reduced in FY 78 and FY 79 to 33 as a result of internal compensation for added maintenance billets. A late 1979 reevaluation of SPINTCOM requirements validated a continuing need for acquiring the remaining seven additional CTO billets as identified by the survey team.3

1. J242 HistSum Jan 80 (U); J242/Memo 231-79 of 19 Nov 79 (U), Subj: SPINTCOM Manpower.
2. CINCPAC 030137Z Jan 80 (U).
3. Ibid.

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(U) The SPINTCOM facility had been identified as the source for nine billets for transfer to IPAC for the PDSC, but because of the shortfall within the facility itself, CINCPAC informed JCS that SPINTCOM would nor be in a position to supply those billets. CINCPAC therefore recommended these spaces be programmed from other sources. As compensation for the spaces from within the PACOM Program II resources, the following were offered: three Navy enlisted spaces then in the Provisional Plans Office, and four Navy officer spaces which had been identified by a survey of U.S. Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command (USFK/CFC) as possible reductions, assuming other compensation.\textsuperscript{1}

(U) CINCPAC had requested the addition of three Navy E-5 and four Navy E-4 authorizations to support the SPINTCOM requirement for seven CTOs. However, the JCS indicated that officer spaces might not be acceptable compensation for the addition of enlisted billets and that only one Navy authorization from USFK was available. Since there were no Navy enlisted assets available to compensate for the desired added spaces, CINCPAC, on 16 February, again requested that officer compensation be reconsidered. Also, CINCPAC interposed no objection to filling the E-4 and E-5 authorizations with qualified cryptologic technician "A" school graduates, as had been done on a limited basis, to avert a billet-gapping situation.\textsuperscript{2}

(U) Further, CINCPAC wished to maintain a SPINTCOM that was entirely manned by Navy personnel because it had always been a unique Navy organization staffed entirely with naval communications management, supervisory, operations, and maintenance personnel. The introduction of a small number of Army or Air Force communications personnel "could potentially be professionally detrimental to the individuals concerned," said CINCPAC. This was because they would be in a small minority, Navy supervisors would not be experienced in their particular training requirements, there would be incompatibility with specialties possessed, and management could be constrained by a lack of flexibility which was then afforded with Navy personnel. Finally, and possibly most important, CINCPAC said continued use of Navy manpower in SPINTCOM was supported by ongoing studies concerning the future consolidation of communications centers which could result in transfer of the CINCPAC SPINTCOM facility to Navy communications support facilities in Hawaii.\textsuperscript{3}

(U) The out-of-cycle change request to add seven Navy CTO manpower authorizations to the Headquarters CINCPAC FY 80 Joint Manpower Program was approved by the JCS on 8 March 1980, subject to PACOM's identification of additional

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2} J242 HistSum Apr 80 (U); CINCPAC 160126Z Feb 80 (U).
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid.
enlisted trade-offs of like Service and grade from within existing PACOM resources for four of the seven SPINTCOM spaces requested. The remaining three enlisted spaces requested were approved for immediate implementation. The Navy would fill the E-4 and E-5 cryptological technician authorizations with qualified E-3 CT "A" school graduates.¹

PACOM Special Intelligence Communications Management Action Group

(U) The PACOM Special Intelligence Communications Management Action Group (PACSICOM MAG) was established by CINCPAC Special Instruction 3810.1, 12 January 1979, as a subordinate element of the PACOM Intelligence Board to coordinate PACOM Special Intelligence requirements and to develop an architectural concept of the Pacific Command's SI Operational Communications circuitry. The primary goal was to provide for an economic and diversified plan for inter-connectivity of PACOM SI communications circuitry. The resultant product would provide a PACOM plan of action for restructuring PACOM circuitry and preclude implementation actions developed by outside agencies. As the function of the MAG was specific and limited, a review not later than one year from the date of the CINCPAC governing instruction was directed.²

(U) The PACSICOM MAG was composed of Special Intelligence communications personnel from CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and CDRUSACSG (Commander U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group). The CINCPAC Special Security Office (J24) was to designate the chairman and vice chairman/secretary of the group. Other representation (e.g., National Security Agency/Central Security Service Pacific for NSA matters, and J21 for IDHS) would be provided on an as-required basis. The group was to meet at the call of the chairman, but at least once per calendar quarter.³

(U) A year after implementation, J24 made a review of the PACSICOM MAG to determine whether there was a need to continue the group. Attempts to schedule meetings of the group had met with some difficulty. Of the five meetings held in March, June, July, and November 1979 and January 1980, only the last was attended by representatives from all component commands. The consensus of all participants was that the PACSICOM MAG had limited potential for policy formation in Operational Communications since guidance in this area came from the national level. Therefore, it was determined that any approach to assert

1. J242 HistSum Apr 80 (U); JCS 3419/081655Z Mar 80 (U)
2. J242 HistSum Apr 80 (U); CINCPAC Instruction 3810.1 of 12 Jan 79 (U), Subj: PACOM Special Intelligence Communications Management Action Group.
3. CINCPAC Instruction 3810.1 of 12 Jan 79 (U), Subj: PACOM Special Intelligence Management Action Group.
consolidation of this circuitry should be dealt with on an ad hoc basis. To meet this requirement, J24 said the nucleus of the group should remain as then constituted, with ADP specialists and user personnel added as necessary to respond to specific PACOM Intelligence Board tasking. As a consequence, J24 recommended to the CINCPAC Director for Intelligence that the PACSICOM MAG as a permanent group be downgraded to an ad hoc committee, to be convened at the direction of the PACOM Intelligence Board.\(^1\)

(U) The board, during its regular meeting on 15 February, was against the concept of an ad hoc committee, and agreed to disband the MAG, subject to reinstallation should the need arise. It was formally disbanded on 13 March 1980.\(^2\)

**General Defense Intelligence Program**

(U) A General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) team visited IPAC 21 March - 2 April and was provided with information relative to the team's preparation for the program/budget review of the GDIP for FY 82-86. All deputies through the division level provided briefings and discussions on IPAC's mission and all-source intelligence production functions. The GDIP team was also provided with the results of the Navy GDIP "priority ranking," and was fully apprised of the adverse impact on the PACOM Data Systems Center development that would result if IPAC were not funded through the current level in FY 82. The following major points were stressed:\(^3\)

- Non-funding of cumulative Austere-2 level resources would preclude full development of the PACOM Data Systems Center Data Base Management System ($1.2 million).
- Non-funding of current level requirements meant deferral of computer-based intelligence analyst support systems required for development in FY 82 ($1.5 million).
- Concerted DIA and tri-Service support of IPAC's enhanced level requirement for 21 additional intelligence analysts (8 Navy/6 Air Force/7 Army) was required for upgrade of IPAC's intelligence support and crisis response responsibilities.

1. J24/Memo/24-80 of 6 Feb 80 (U), Subj: PACOM Special Intelligence Communications Management Action Group (PACSICOM MAG).
2. J22/Memo/S088-80 of 29 Feb 80 (S), Subj: Minutes of PACOM Intelligence Board (PIB) Meeting (U), REVW 26 Feb 86; CINCPAC Notice 3810 of 13 Mar 80 (U), Subj: CINCPACINST 3810.1; cancellation of.
3. IPAC HistSum Mar 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Mar 00.
(U) On 22 May IPAC prepared a reclama to the proposed decrements to funding levels for the IPAC GDIP proposal, FY 82 budget. In the opinion of IPAC and J21 PDSC staffs, funding of IPAC at the Austere-1 level in FY 82 would place the IPAC/PDSC designed software development program in serious jeopardy. The reclama strongly recommended that sufficient funds be restored to the IPAC FY 82 budget in order to fund the procurement of essential hardware and software applications programs in the following order of priority:

- SU 1652 dual monitor terminals OJ-389(V)/G hardware (43): $906,000.
- Operational Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) exploitation software: $275,000.
- Weapons planning support software: $100,000.
- Penetration Analysis support system software: $200,000.
- Associative file processor: $100,000 (software); $100,000 (hardware).
(Based on late contractor information, this lowered considerably the amounts of $200,000 for software and $340,000 for hardware requested in the IPAC GDIP proposal FY 82-86.)

(AC) On 23 September IPAC provided responses to the Chief of Naval Operations on questions posed by the review board on the FY 82-86 GDIP budget at their 22 September meeting. IPAC said that its PDSC programming and operations contract (General Services Administration) and IBM 360/40 operations at IPAC were both scheduled to terminate on 30 September. In response to another question, additional descriptive detail was provided on software interfaces to intelligence collections systems.

Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning

(U) A detailed review of the Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP) Fiscal Year (FY) 1980-1988 was completed in November 1979. Comments and recommended changes were submitted to DIA on 5 December 1979 for use during the annual DIA review cycle. The study had been accomplished as a joint J22-IPAC project during October and November, and involved an exhaustive comparison of IPSP priorities in 182 categories for 50 countries (a matrix of 9,100 priorities) against the level of PACOM interest of concern. Over 80 recommended changes to specific priorities in 24 different countries were forwarded to DIA, along with justifications for the changes. In addition, several changes were

1. IPAC HistSum May 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 May 00.
2. IPAC HistSum Sep 80 (S/NF), REVW 30 Sep 00.
proposed to streamline the format of the IPSP, thereby increasing the usability of the document in support of the Joint Strategic Planning System.\textsuperscript{1}

(C) CINCPAC J22 and IPAC analysts conducted another review in early January 1980 of IPSP priorities based on late events in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral. One hundred and fifteen changes were recommended, primarily as a result of the changed status of Afghanistan and the situation in Iran. A short suspense on the project was dictated by the need to get the updated priorities to Washington by 16 January, the date of the meeting of various intelligence agencies to discuss and update the document that drove budget allocations.\textsuperscript{2}

Physical Accreditation

Cruise Missile Mission Planning System Installation

(U) On 16 April J24 informed J54, Nuclear Plans and Policy Division, that a number of security measures would have to be considered in order that the computer room would comply with SCIF accreditation requirements. Ultrasonic transmitters and receivers had to be placed below the ceiling of the room. The perimeter door, if locally fabricated, would be either of metal-clad type (minimum of 16-gauge face) or solid wood (minimum thickness of 1 3/4 inches). In addition, the door would be equipped with a pneumatic closer and approved locks, hinges, and alarms. Sound baffles in air conditioning ducts were not required if the facility were used only as a computer center and there was no

1. J221 HistSum Jan 80 (U).
2. IPAC HistSum Jan 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Jan 00.
3. J243 HistSum Jan 80 (C), REVW 31 Jan 00.
discussion of SCI matter within it. However, all ducts and other openings would need steel bars and approved alarm systems. All personnel assigned to work in the proposed area would have to be SCI-cleared, and this facility would be the only accredited storage area in the basement of Building 80. Billet requirements would have to come from within CINCPAC because of a freeze on SCI positions imposed by the Defense Department.¹

Command Center

(U) Early in the year Phase II construction of the CINCPAC Command Center modernization plan was nearing completion and it was scheduled to become a Special Activities Office (SAO) accredited area on 1 March 1980. Therefore, CINCPAC sent a letter on 25 January to DIA requesting interim SCI accreditation approval. At the time of submission certain alarm and telephone systems had not been identified and minor construction revisions were being considered.²

(S) During 23-28 April Special Agents of the Naval Investigative Service Pacific conducted a Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Inspection of the new CINCPAC Command Center. This was an interim inspection and a follow-up for the entire facility was conducted during 1-2 October. At that time minor discrepancies were noted and actions were taken to correct the problems.³

Intelligence Management Division

(U) J24 began a review early in the year of primary physical requirements necessary for SAO accreditation of the south end of the second floor of Building 3B. Upon completion of Phase III construction in mid-July 1980 of the CINCPAC Modernization Program, J22 (Management Division) was to relocate there from the first floor of the same building.⁴

(E) The accreditation checklist for the new Management Division area was completed and forwarded to DIA on 12 August. J24 requested that the area be granted an interim approval as an SI/TK secure working area (no storage). In order to increase the efficiency of J22 operations, the installation of Volumetric Alarms and security upgrading of the exterior door had also been requested. Upon completion of these items, J24 was to request accreditation be amended to SI/TK closed storage.⁵

2. J243 HistSum Jan 80 (U).
3. J243 HistSums Apr, Sep 80 (S), REVW 30 Sep 00.
5. J243 HistSum Aug 80 (C), DECL 11 Sep 86.
Effective 8 September 1980, DIA designated Building 3B, Rooms 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 216A, and 217 as a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility, accredited as an SI/TK work area authorized no storage. DIA noted that this was an interim accreditation.¹

**IPAC Reorganization**

(U) Effective 24 October 1980, the Intelligence Center Pacific was reorganized. The Deputy for Data Systems was not affected by the reorganization; however, the name was changed to Directorate of Data Systems. The name change standardized all titles from deputy to directorate. The most significant organizational changes were:²

- **Office of Command Resources and Operations** - A new activity that replaced the old Deputy for Resource Management. It would consolidate all of the command support and service functions under COMIPAC.

- **Directorate of Production** - This was a new activity formed from the resources of the old Deputy for Intelligence. It monitored intelligence production, dissemination for customer satisfaction, and conformance with PACOM directives.

- **Directorate of Intelligence** - A revised directorate that provided current intelligence analysis and estimates on the capabilities of foreign forces and countries within PACOM. It also supported the indications and warning effort.

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1. J243 HistSum Sep 80 (C), REVW 5 Sep 86; DIA 081515Z Sep 80 (C)(BOM), REVW 5 Sep 86.
2. IPAC HistSum Dec 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Dec 00.
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SECTION II--COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

PACOM Intelligence Posture

(S) CINCPAC/J2 believed that intelligence on major threats such as the USSR, North Korea, and the PRC was generally good but in the Pacific Command the United States was more likely to become involved in Third World contingencies than in a war with one of the major adversaries. Defense intelligence was therefore found to be weakest in situations which were most likely to occur. J2 said too much emphasis was being placed on satisfying national-level priorities for the collection and processing of intelligence, which resulted in unanticipated events occurring in vitally important (but lower priority) areas such as Thailand, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Department of Defense (DOD) were all involved because of the growing interrelationship of military, economic, and political factors in the Third World. Military intelligence was especially important, said J2, because in many PACOM countries the military played a leading political role. Existing CIA, State, National Security Agency (NSA), and military attaché efforts were inadequate to protect long-range U.S. interests.²

(S/MODERN) Intelligence support to PACOM forces during contingency operations in Third World areas was also a critical problem. This support was variously budgeted as operational (intelligence-related), national intelligence, and tactical intelligence programs. It included Navy P-3/EP-3 aircraft and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) direct support elements; Air Force RC-135 and U-2 aircraft; Army Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), and radar aircraft; and Air Force and Navy photo reconnaissance aircraft. J2 concluded that all military intelligence agencies had to dedicate additional resources to achieve overall improvements in Third World intelligence activities.³

(ecret) On 19 January 1979 CINCPAC had expressed his concern to the JCS on the limited intelligence resources available to him to cope with events then emerging in Southeast Asia. The JCS acknowledged the problem on 14 February 1980 and indicated that the DIA Director, as the J2/JCS, would examine the PACOM problem in detail. The J2/JCS indicated his intention on 21 March to form a study group, with representatives from J3 (Operations) and J5 (Plans) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NSA, the Services, and CINCPAC, to review the overall intelligence posture of the Pacific Command. To support this study, he requested an initial input from CINCPAC.³

1. J221B Point Paper (S/NF), 1 Feb 80, Subj: PACOM Intelligence Posture (U), REVW 1 Feb 00.
2. Ibid.
3. J232 HistSum Dec 80 (C), REVW 30 Jan 87.
Together with the components and subunified commands, the CINCPAC staff developed an overall assessment of resources and requirements, and provided this to the Defense Intelligence Agency on 13 October. The report outlined the fact that fundamental to CINCPAC resource constraints was the emphasis at the national level on general war, while the post-World War II history of PACOM was one of "brush-fire" contingencies and limited wars. Assets available to support CINCPAC intelligence requirements were a conglomeration of predominantly national systems, coupled with limited theater and tactical resources. As a consequence, some of these resources were less than optimally suited to CINCPAC needs and were not always responsive to theater interests when they were not coincidental with national priorities.\(^1\)

In late September representatives of J2 CINCPAC went to DIA and assisted in the preparation of implementing memoranda which would facilitate follow-on action to the study. Included was a memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, apprising him of the study and requesting that he consider further memoranda from himself to the Secretary of State, the Director for Central Intelligence, the National Security Adviser to the President, and Directors of the Defense Intelligence and National Security Agencies. At the end of the year implementing memoranda were at the JCS for review and forwarding to the CJCS for signature.\(^2\)

Indications and Warning Network

\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) J242 HistSum Jan 80 (U); AFSSO PACAF 150240Z Dec 79 (C), DECL 14 Dec 85.
CINCPAC agreed that another year's delay (on top of the year already past) in INDICOM circuit availability would severely limit the Korean portion of the PACOM I&W system. J22 asked J24 to investigate CINCPAC's capability to obtain terminal equipment and to have it installed earlier than the January 1981 date then proposed. A search showed that all necessary terminal equipment, less cryptological devices, was available, with an estimated cost for installation of $12,000. However, on 25 January 1980, PACAF recommended that 314AD withdraw its statement of requirement for early installation of the terminal in its existing Special Security Office, and then relocation to the TACC 6 months later, because it would not be cost-effective. In view of this, CINCPAC interposed no objection in delaying installation and activation of the 314AD INDICOM circuit until January 1981 to coincide with completion of the hardened TACC.2

Of the numerous options for improving U.S. intelligence and warning capabilities in Korea, three were selected by the JCS for the Secretary of Defense's consideration. A draft memorandum to the Secretary was being reviewed in late February 1980 by the Army, Air Force, DIA, and J5/JCS staffs, and CINCPAC was asked for his views. The three options were:3

1. AFSSO PACAF 150240Z Dec 79 (C), DECL 14 Dec 85.
2. J22/Memo/C537-79 of 20 Dec 79 (C), Subj: 314th Air Division INDICOM Installation (U), DECL 14 Dec 85; J24/Memo/14-80 of 22 Jan 80 (U), Subj: 314AD INDICOM Installation; AFSSO PACAF 252155Z Jan 80 (U); CINCPAC 010258Z Feb 80 (U); J242 HistSum Jan 80 (U).
3. OSD 292226Z Feb 80 (S)(EX), DECL 31 Dec 86.
The draft memorandum recommended that the Secretary approve the Army proposal to increase its OV-1D fleet in Korea and that he sign the letter to the Director for Central Intelligence recommending CIA concurrence in an increase in SR-71 and RC-135 coverage over North Korea.

1. CINCPAC 140152Z Mar 80 (S)(EX), DECL 11 Mar 86.
Tanker Movements

Owing to the outbreak of hostilities between Iraq and Iran in September and the threat to shipping in the Persian Gulf, a high level of effort was being expended by IPAC in November to provide tanker and oil movement data for the CINCPAC morning briefing. A task team of five people was organized to work on the project using ocean surveillance intelligence reports and SIGINT data. A tanker movement data base had been established, which was the key to the entire tracking effort.\(^1\)

Analysis of tanker traffic and oil flow from the Persian Gulf continued in December. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remained unimpeded and the Naval Ocean Surveillance Intelligence Center reported tanker traffic as normal. The quantity of oil being shipped from the Persian Gulf for the month of December 1980 was 13.5 million barrels per day as compared to the November average of 11 million barrels per day. Four IPAC Targets Division personnel remained dedicated to analyzing all tanker movements in the Northern Indian Ocean in order to compile the data necessary to support the daily CINCPAC briefing.\(^2\)

\(^1\) IPAC HistSum Nov 80 (S/NF), REWV 30 Nov 00.
\(^2\) IPAC HistSum Dec 80 (S/NF), REWV 31 Dec 00.
SECTION III--INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

Targeting

PACOM Management

Target Intelligence Production Plan

1. CINCPAC Command History 1979 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 499; Minutes, PACOM Target Action Group Meetings, Jan-Dec 80, hereinafter cited as TAG Minutes.
2. TAG Minutes, Jan-May 1980 (S/NF), REVW 24 Jan 00.
Command Nuclear Target List

1. TAG Minutes, Mar-Apr 80 (S/NF), RevW 28 May 86; IPAC HistSums Apr, Jul 80 (S/NF), RevW 31 Jul 00.
2. TAG Minutes, Oct 80 (TS), RevW 18 Nov 10; IPAC HistSum Nov 80 (S/NF), RevW 30 Nov 00.
3. IPAC HistSum Jan 80 (S/NF), RevW 31 Jan 00.
1. TAG Minutes, May 80 (S/NF), REV 29 May 10.
2. TAG Minutes, Jul 80 (S/NF), REV 26 Aug 10.
3. Ibid.
4. IPAC HistSum Nov 80 (S/NF), REV 30 Nov 10.
5. TAG Minutes, Jun 80 (S/NF), REV 26 Jun 10.
1. IPAC HistSum Jul 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Jul 00.
2. TAG Minutes, Sep-Oct 80 (S/NF), REVW 18 Nov 10.
3. IPAC HistSum Jan 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Jan 00.
4. TAG Minutes, May-Jun 80 (S/NF), REVW 26 Jun 10.
Cruise Missile Targeting

1. TAG Minutes, Jul 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Jul 00.
2. TAG Minutes, Nov 80 (S/NF), REVW 3 Dec 10.
3. IPAC HistSums Jan-Feb 80 (S/NF), REVW 28 Feb 00.
4. TAG Minutes, Jul 80 (S/NF), REVW 26 Aug 10.
Automated Tactical Target Graphics

(U) Meanwhile, as a result of a EUCOM message pointing to duplication of TTM production, FICPAC was requested by CINCPAC to review the EUCOM catalog to determine if PACOM had produced ATTGs which had previously been produced by EUCOM. Examination of the common country data base revealed that 13 of the

1. IPAC HistSum Aug-Sep 80 (S/NF), REVW 30 Sep 00.
3. TAG Minutes, Jan-Mar 80 (S/NF), REVW 24 Jan 00.
total ATTGs produced by PACOM duplicated EUCOM production. Of these, however, only 5 were available to PACOM users. The remaining 8 had been received after PACOM had produced an ATTG on the same installation. Another problem was that PACFLT ships did not receive the EUCOM catalog and were therefore not aware of their products. This was a continuing problem, and was to be addressed outside the TAG by the 548th RTG, FICPAC and CINCPAC.¹

During the July meeting, TAG members were requested to carefully review ATTG production procedures involving decompartmented materials. New decompartmentation rules had made additional source materials accessible for ATTG production. However, these materials were not universally releasable and could seriously impact on ATTG release programs and markings.²

(U) On another matter, IPAC raised the question in November of getting ATTG producers to submit Field AIF (F/AIF) changes to assure that the AIF and ATTG textual portions were the same. Producers noted that quality control generally assured the ATTG, at production, agreed with the latest AIF on hand. However, where the AIF and ATTG differed, a F/AIF was generally submitted. The problem seemed to arise in the slowness of the AIF update cycle in Washington. The consensus was that little could be done to assure 100 percent agreement between the AIF and ATTG. However, IPAC would develop a general F/AIF handbook to standardize procedures and provide more definitive guidelines.⁴

U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command Study

1. TAG Minutes, May 80 (S/NF), REVW 29 May 10.
2. TAG Minutes, Jul 80 (S/NF), REVW 26 Aug 10.
3. TAG Minutes, Nov 80 (S/NF), REVW 3 Dec 10.
4. Ibid.
(S//NOFORN) On 8 March 1980 CINCPAC provided the Pacific Command's response to a definition of a BEN ground force barracks area in North Korea, which was accepted by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Korea Consultative Group then approved an amended version of the CINCPAC/DIA agreed definition. Initially, this amended definition had not been received with favor by CINCPAC, but subsequent discussions with the senior National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) Korea analyst, who had authored the amendment, resulted in concurrence by CINCPAC on 21 June. Two related issues, AIF/GOB interconnectivity and a common exploitation graphic for North Korea GOB/barracks areas, were under development by DIA and DIA/NPIC, respectively. NPIC was using a special format National Basic Reference Graphic to depict North Korean ground force installations. However, this was not an approved graphic and coordination with DIA and users would have to be effected before wide distribution could occur. NPIC's position was that ATTGs then being produced on ground force installations were not accurate enough to permit use as the authoritative graphic.²

Contingency Planning Facilities List

2. TAG Minutes, Mar-Jun 80 (S/NF), REVW 26 Jun 10.
3. TAG Minutes, Jan, Mar 80 (S/NF), REVW 24 Jan 00.
components were to coordinate requirements with IPAC. This was done, and in May the PACAF representative expressed pleasure with the expeditious printing and distribution of the North Korea CPFL UTM sort. He recommended the adoption of a grid square sorting procedure, vice the latitude sequence then in use, saying the change would enhance retrievability of the data. Additionally, PACAF would request that CINCPAC authorize the production of a ROK-releasable UTM sort, since the initial version was a document not releasable to foreign nationals. It was desired to use the new sort at the ULCHI-FOCUS LENS exercise scheduled for late July.¹

³

The DIA also approved the release of selected North Korean ground, air, naval, SAM, and AAA order of battle data to the Republic of Korea. With this consent and the previous approval on expanded AIF release as well as the electronic order of battle data, the Pacific Command put together one of the largest release packages ever made to a foreign country. CINCPAC was to consolidate the various release authorities and prepare appropriate tasking to initiate the program.³

³

The TAG membership was told in October that there was a need to begin examining the issue of producing a single CPFL vice separate NOFORN and releasable versions. Discussions with Washington and Hawaii area release and disclosure personnel indicated that it might be possible to obtain authority to release decompartmented imagery to ROK operational units. As a result, CINCPAC was developing a new proposal for release at the ATTG.⁴

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1. TAG Minutes, Feb, May 80 (S/NF), REVW 29 May 10; IPAC HistSum May 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 May 00.
2. TAG Minutes, May 80 (S/NF), REVW 29 May 10.
3. TAG Minutes, Jun 80 (S/NF), REVW 26 Jun 10.
4. TAG Minutes, Oct 80 (S/NF), REVW 18 Nov 10.
5. Ibid.

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Further discussions in November with the DIA indicated there were no major obstacles to obtaining the release of selective AIF data to Japan. The main break was in the category code. DIA saw no problem in releasing full 5-digit numbers. However, they preferred that CINC PAC limit the number of categories to those necessary to support existing USFJ/ JSDF planning. TAG members were asked to provide their recommendations to CINC PAC by 3 December as to what categories should be released to Japan.  

Forward Area Neutralization Graphic

Forty-three questionnaires were sent to prospective users of the FANG. All were returned with favorable comments. Some, however, reported it would be a nice-to-have item, but should not be a mandatory one. With some changes incorporated, the 548th RTG was prepared in October to move ahead with production. It would be designated a PACOM product. Eventually, the TAG was thinking of releasing the FANG to ROK units, possibly by Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 1981. Several problems had to be resolved before initiating production, however, such as identification of collection requirements to keep it current, determining why it was described as nice-to-have but not required, and what Army support would be required by the 548th to produce and maintain the FANG.

1. TAG Minutes, Nov 80 (S/NF), REVW 3 Dec 10.
2. TAG Minutes, Jul 80 (S/NF), REVW 26 Aug 10.
3. TAG Minutes, Sep-Oct 80 (S/NF), REVW 18 Nov 10.
Field Automated Installation Intelligence File

(U) The IPAC Installations Branch processed 71,600 Field Automated Installation Intelligence Files during 1980. This was more than a 19 percent increase over the nearly 61,000 F/AIFs processed during 1979, in spite of the reduced manning (80 percent) of the branch since May 1980. In 1978, only 11,400 and in 1977, only 5,000 F/AIFs had been processed by IPAC. A key factor in this huge increase was the capability to use a computer to automatically generate mass F/AIFs to fill blank data fields in the Master AIF. The increase would have been impossible without automating the PACOM Field AIF program. IPAC recommended that the Defense Intelligence Agency accomplish many of the AIF changes, which IPAC had been processing, using automated means.¹

Coordination with DIA

(U) The Targets Division began receiving tape transmissions from DIA advising IPAC of priorities 1 and 2 AIF changes which were being accepted by DIA. In the past, the lack of such knowledge caused IPAC considerable effort in tracing the status of IPAC-submitted F/AIFs. This new procedure resulted in a savings of manpower and improved the management function of the F/AIF Automated Records Management program.³

Transfer of AIF Executive Agent Function

(-) On 28 November IPAC representatives attended a meeting with Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific and CINCPAC J222 members to discuss the transfer

1. IPAC HistSums Jan, Dec 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Dec 00.
2. IPAC HistSum Aug 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Aug 00.
3. IPAC HistSum Nov 80 (S/NF), REVW 30 Nov 00.
4. IPAC HistSum Dec 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Dec 00.
of the PACOM AIF executive agent function from FICPAC to IPAC. J222 asked IPAC to reaccomplish a time-phased production transfer schedule which had been submitted earlier in July. At the meeting it was tentatively determined that IPAC should undergo parallel operations with FICPAC during Phase I establishment of the PACOM Data Systems Center to realistically test and evaluate the capabilities of the PDSC prior to effecting the agent function transfer. Under this concept, FICPAC would continue to be the primary production agency for AIF executive agent functions, while IPAC would try to accomplish the same production requirements with the PDSC.¹

(U) During the Phase I period, 28 January - 31 September 1981, IPAC would test the PDSC system and evaluate the AIF products prior to assumption of production responsibilities on 1 October 1981. At that time IPAC proposed the initiation of parallel operations of ad hoc requirements.²

**Order of Battle Intelligence**

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(U) Also in February, IPAC received a request to support the Constant Watch Program Management Office by providing a database extract for use by Korean Air Intelligence System contractors to assist in finalizing the KAIS database design. The extract consisted of a full record printout of any 50 North Korean records from the Target Analysis Pacific Area missile, ground, and antiaircraft artillery, as well as air, order of battle files.³

(U) In September CINCPAC concurred with a DIA proposal to eliminate a parallel operations phase prior to delegation of AOB responsibility for the final nine PACOM area countries. Delegation of these countries would complete the schedule for transfer of AOB data base maintenance from DIA to IPAC.⁴

1. IPAC HistSum Nov 80 (S/NF), REVW 30 Nov 00.
2. IPAC HistSum Dec 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Dec 00.
3. IPAC HistSum Jan 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Jan 00.
4. IPAC HistSum Feb 80 (S/NF), REVW 28 Feb 00.
5. IPAC HistSum Sep 80 (S/NF), REVW 30 Sep 00.
The Defense Intelligence Agency requested draft updates of IPAC's Table of Organization and Equipment by 30 September for use in computing North Korean Army strengths in support of decisions affecting the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from the ROK.  

Electronic Order of Battle

1. IPAC HistSum Mar 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Jul 00.
2. IPAC HistSum Nov 80 (S/NF), REVW 30 Nov 00.
3. IPAC HistSum Aug 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Aug 00.
4. IPAC HistSum Mar 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Mar 00.
Intelligence Support to the RDJTF

Conference at MacDill AFB

(U) An Intelligence conference hosted by the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was held 16-18 September 1980 at MacDill AFB, Florida, and was attended by a CINCPAC J2 representative. The purpose of the conference was to develop a proposed intelligence architecture to support the RDJTF during its deployment and employment. The CINCPAC J2 representative said while there were high hopes for what the conference might accomplish, it fell far short of the mark. One major reason was that much of the information was new to many of the conferees and generated more questions and concerns than firm operational proposals. Other reasons for the conference not attaining its goals were a too-narrow focus on Iran, insufficient component assets to accomplish the intelligence mission, and too much duplication of capabilities.4

1. IPAC HistSum Apr 80 (S/NF), REVW 30 Apr 00.
2. IPAC HistSum May 80 (S/NF), REVW 30 May 00.
3. IPAC HistSum Oct 80 (S/NF), REVW 3 Oct 00.
4. J22A HistSum Sep 80 (S/NF), REVW 30 Sep 00; J2/Memo/S059 of 3 Oct 80 (S/NF), Subj: Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) (U), REVW 30 Sep 00.
The European Command and the Atlantic Command were considered supporting commands. As such, memoranda of understanding had to be developed to specify how they would support the RDJTF. As the controlling element of Navy/Marine forces, the Pacific Command was looked upon as responsible to the RDJTF for these components. Therefore, PACOM became responsible for garrison preparedness and the Navy/Marine planning effort for these forces committed to the RDJTF.

An immediately apparent weakness in RDJTF operational capability was communications. During deployment and initial employment phases, the Commander RDJTF was dependent upon links to either an EC-135 or an E-3A aircraft serving as his command post until he was inserted and became operational in the theater. For deployed units, these aircraft would serve as airborne relays. Initially, intelligence would have only one secure communications channel (for sanitized data only) which would be shared with the National Command Authority. The RDJTF envisioned all intelligence data being fed to a center at MacDill for retransmission to deploying units.

The conferees, except for the Readiness Command (REDCOM) and RDJTF, did not support the establishment of a fusion center at MacDill to support the RDJTF during initial deployment and employment. It was noted that such a center would be duplicative of functions already being performed by national and unified and specified commands. Additionally, SAC, TAC, and PACOM had tactical intelligence networks capable of providing the same data to deploying units during a crisis situation. SAC was also one of the seven communications nodes of the RDJTF. In either peacetime or crisis situations, the addition of a MacDill fusion center would be a further drain on already thinly spread assets. Notwithstanding, RDJTF had gone forward to DIA and JCS on 25 September with a requirement for the MacDill Intelligence Support Center.

A major shortfall identified by the conferees was that components of the RDJTF had neither the equipment nor personnel to perform many of the intelligence collection functions tasked of them or the manpower to exploit the data once collected. It was noted by CINCPAC and SAC conferees that contrary to RDJTF perceptions, and barring global war, national and theater assets would be focused on the area of conflict. For this reason, it would be more logical to leave most of the analytical functions to the intelligence delegated producers. These producers already had the data bases, interface with all-source intelligence, and communication links to provide the RDJTF with timely and accurate assessments. To burden the deploying units with extensive intelligence requirements would constitute a redundant expenditure of limited resources. Additionally, these augmentation forces would have to come from unified and specified command resources which were overextended to meet theater intelligence needs.

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While the conference was to address an intelligence architecture to support RDJTF operations anywhere in Southwest Asia, discussion was limited to the Iran scenario. Many of the points discussed were applicable to an Afghanistan/Pakistan scenario, but most were not transferable to Africa. Moreover, each of these areas had its own unique problems requiring a case-by-case resolution.

The CINCPAC representative said RDJTF had been focusing its attention on deployment intelligence requirements to the neglect of what needed to be done in the pre-deployment phase. Many intelligence products necessary to the successful execution of initial RDJTF operations were long lead-time items, such as port and harbor studies, amphibious studies, lines of communication analyses, target systems analyses, and strike graphics/target folders. If RDJTF did not begin at an early date to identify their requirements for these products, said J2, "they may not be there when the warning notice goes up."

The CINCPAC representative believed the conference, overall, "did more to highlight problem areas than to build an intelligence architecture to support the RDJTF." Until the shortfalls noted above were corrected or the RDJTF accepted a degree of dependence on unified and specified command support, the intelligence architecture would have a less than optimum capability to support the deploying RDJTF.

Solutions Suggested by CINCPAC

On 7 October 1980 CINCPAC provided some comments to Commander RDJTF which represented PACOM perceived solutions to some of the problems highlighted during the September conference at MacDill AFB. Subsequent decisions driven by problems affecting other areas of the planning effort such as command relations, logistics, and operational planning might modify the responsibilities, techniques, and modes of connectivity, but CINCPAC believed all concerned had to retain flexibility in planning for intelligence support so as to be able to accommodate future changes or modifications to the roles and missions of the RDJTF.

CINCPAC believed that greater effort had to be exerted to obtain sufficient secure communications channels between supporting intelligence commands and the deploying RDJTF, as well as between the various RDJTF elements themselves. Also, planning for intelligence support for the RDJTF appeared to be overly dependent on satellite communications. With the vulnerabilities

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1. CINCPAC 0706032 Oct 80 (S/NF), REVW 30 Sep 00.
built into the satellite system, the assumption that they would be available
was not necessarily valid.

(S/NOFOR) CINCPAC did not envision a requirement for an RDJTF fusion
center located at MacDill to support initial phases of deployment. As noted
during the conference, SAC had a 24-hour operational center that was already
part of the Rapid Deployment Force's communications nodes. Additionally,
command arrangements between TAC and Ninth Air Force (committed to the RDJTF)
were such that Ninth would receive an almost continuous flow of intelligence
data during its deployment. In the Pacific Command, IPAC, 548th Reconnaissance
Technical Group, FICPAC, Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center, and Fleet
Intelligence Support Center offered a wide variety of intelligence collection
and exploitation capabilities with almost the same near real-time fusion of
intelligence as SAC and the national agencies. PACOM's IDHS network was such
that these agencies could provide and were providing a continuous flow of timely
intelligence data to units in the Indian Ocean. The deployment of PACOM and
LANTCOM carrier battle groups during the initial phases of the Iranian crisis
(December 1979 - May 1980) and later sustained deployment to the Indian Ocean
attested to this capability. CINCPAC therefore recommended that RDJTF, Com-
mander Air Forces, and Commander Marine Forces examine existing PACOM, SAC, and
TAC IDHS capabilities to determine the best hookups to assure continuous intel-
ligence support during deployment.

(S) CINCPAC did not agree with the RDJTF that the attention of unified and
specified commands and National Agencies would be elsewhere during a crisis
situation, thereby limiting analytical support which they could provide. To the
contrary, barring global war, national and theater assets would be focused on
the area of conflict. For this reason it would be more logical to leave order
of battle analysis to the existing Delegated Production Program. PACOM, SAC,
LANTCOM, and EUCOM elements already had the expertise, data bases, interface
with all-source intelligence, and communication links to provide the RDJTF with
timely and accurate OB data. To burden the deploying units with extensive OB
maintenance requirements would constitute a redundant expenditure of limited
resources. This would also be true in many areas of general intelligence
analysis.

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On tactical target materials production, CINCPAC did not agree that commands supporting the RDJTF begin an almost blanket production of Automated Tactical Target Graphics in Southwest Asia in order to be prepared for any contingency. PACOM was initiating a review of targets within its existing area of responsibility in Southwest Asia and Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, Pakistan, and Afghanistan). Those which were already part of CINCPAC plans either had or would have ATTGs produced. Those which would meet the selection criteria for probable inclusion in an RDJTF OPLAN would also be identified and an ATTG produced. PACOM was developing a targeting document for distribution that would list the targets this headquarters considered essential for strike during initial deployment. Since ATTG production was a long lead-time item, CINCPAC recommended that RDJTF identify as early as possible its objectives in the different areas of Southwest Asia.

As for general intelligence production, PACOM was prepared to support the RDJTF to the fullest extent possible. To assist in this effort, CINCPAC said RDJTF should identify as soon as possible those intelligence products which could be developed well before the warning notice.

Earlier, CINCPAC responded to a request from RDJTF for comments on DIA action items to enhance RDJTF capabilities. On ADP intelligence support, CINCPAC said a reasonable near-term IDHS capability could be provided quickly with the acquisition of a number of Teletype Model 40 (or equivalent) terminals and printers and multiplexing them via a high speed leased line between Tampa and the DIA IDHS switch. If one AN/GYQ-21(V) computer could be found quickly, it could be installed at the Readiness Command as an IDHSC II node. Multiple terminals could then be connected to the computer. It would provide interactive and query/response access to all intelligence data files worldwide, including those in PACOM, which had been made available to network users. A significant analyst-to-analyst chatter capability similar to, but somewhat faster than, the I&W INDICOM system would be available in the near future with this sort of connectivity.1

CINCPAC said using the carrier battle group as a source of intelligence support was a questionable concept because they were heavily overcommitted in terms of available communications equipment. A better approach would probably be to use the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) since it had intelligence responsibilities for Commander Landing Force already and normally would have some circuitry up for this support to the force. However, once forces were in place and the CATF departed, the RDJTF would require in-country (non-Navy) support in accordance with existing Service doctrine.2

1. CINCPAC 270620Z Sep 80 (S/NF), REVW 30 Sep 00.
2. Ibid.
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RDJTF Support Requirements

(S) In a message to supporting commands--CINCLANTFLT (Norfolk, VA), CINCPACFLT (Pearl Harbor, HI), XVIII Airborne Corps (Ft Bragg, NC), Ninth Air Force (Shaw AFB, SC), FMFPAC (Camp Smith, HI), FMFLANT (Norfolk), and 1st Marine Amphibious Force (Camp Pendleton, CA)--the Commander RDJTF said there were limitations to the capabilities of national intelligence systems to provide all of the detailed and near real-time intelligence products which his force, as tactical users, would require. This emphasized the need for a comprehensive mix of organic intelligence systems to assure that responsive tactical intelligence support was available, he said, to complement support provided by national collection systems.¹

(S) The Commander RDJTF, Marine LT GEN P.X. Kelley, said he was sure that addressees, as key planners and commanders for operations which U.S. military forces could be directed to conduct in Southwest Asia, shared his concern and would support his requirement that they have the best possible intelligence to support future contingency operations. "Accordingly," said Kelley, "I suggest that you emphasize at every opportunity, within your command and through your Service channels, the need for tactical intelligence resources to provide that needed balance between national and tactical systems." The following was a representative listing of tactical intelligence systems and capabilities which Kelley felt were missing from his force list or had not been identified for RDF designated forces:²

- The Air National Guard RF-4C designated RDF units did not possess tactical electronic reconnaissance sensors, side-looking airborne radar, or complete infrared capabilities.

- A severe shortage of language qualified personnel in RDF designated units and throughout the intelligence community existed, and there was a mismatch between languages assigned such units.

- There was a limited capability to exploit manual Morse code, which was used by some elements of Soviet forces, as well as most Southwest Asian countries.

- There were shortages of equipment to identify and precisely locate battlefield radars and communications emitters.

¹ COMRDJTF 241930Z Oct 80 (S)(BOM), REVW 24 Oct 86 (retransmitted by CINCPACFLT 282215Z Oct 80).
² Ibid.

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SECTION IV--INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE

Intelligence Guidance and Support to Hq USFJ

Analysis Center

Background

1. J223B Point Paper (S/NF), 16 Jun 80, Subj: CINCPAC Intelligence Guidance and Support to HQ USFJ(J2) (U), REVW 31 Dec 86.
Decision to Establish Center

2. Ibid.
3. AFSSO 5AF/COMUSJ 020730Z May 80 (S)(BOM), REVW 2 May 86.
Support for Combined Forces Command

Foreign Disclosure Requirements

Visit of Assistant Chief of Staff, C2 CFC

(U) On 1 March 1980 USFK J2 informed CINCPAC and DIA that MAJ GEN Kim Jin Sup, ROKAF, the Assistant Chief of Staff, C2, CFC, had expressed a desire to visit U.S. intelligence organizations in Hawaii, Washington, and Japan. USFK J2 said he fully supported MAJ GEN Kim's proposed orientation visit. As the CFC C2, he required a complete knowledge of the intelligence support available to his command. It was also important for MAJ GEN Kim to have the opportunity to meet principal members of the U.S. intelligence community in Washington and the Pacific theater. Such visits, said USFK J2, would be of immeasurable assistance in accomplishing the CFC intelligence mission.3

(U) MAJ GEN Kim did visit PACOM Headquarters and Oahu based intelligence organizations 17-20 June 1980. During the visit he met with the CINCPAC J2, COMIPAC, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence for PACAF, and the Commander, 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group. MAJ GEN Kim also paid courtesy calls on Admiral Long, LT GEN Poston, MAJ GEN Herman O. Thomson.

1. CINCPAC 032133Z May 80 (S), REVW 3 May 86.
2. CINCPAC 120549Z Jan 80 (S/NF)(BOM), REVW 12 Jan 99.
3. USFK/EUSA 010410Z Mar 80 (U).

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(Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence, Hq PACAF), and MAJ GEN Herbert E. Wolff (Commander, U.S. Army Western Command). In conjunction with meeting the commanders and analysts of on-island intelligence organizations providing intelligence support to the CFC, MAJ GEN Kim toured IPAC, Hq PACAF, 548th RTG, and the CINCPAC Command Center. He was also given a briefing of the missions and functions of WESTCOM. At each command visited, LTC Dennis C. Biddinger, USA, the USFK escort officer, presented a briefing on the mission and functions of the CFC C2 organization, and outlined steps being taken to fully integrate U.S. and ROK intelligence analysts into a fully combined intelligence staff.¹

Intelligence Release to the Philippines

1. J222 HistSum Jun 80 (U).
2. CINCPAC 010603Z Mar 80 (S/NF), REVW 26 Feb 36.
1. J223 Point Paper (S/NF), 10 Apr 80, Subj: Improved Intelligence Sharing with the Philippines (C), REVW 10 Apr 86; CINCPAC 070354Z Mar 80 (S/NF) REVW 6 Mar 86.
2. CINCPAC 300123Z Mar 80 (S/NF), REVW 28 May 86.
3. J223C HistSum Sep 80 (S/NF), REVW 15 Oct 86; CINCPAC 062142Z Sep 80 (S/NF), REVW 29 Aug 86.
Indonesian Intelligence Summary

1. CINCPAC 230334Z Sep 80 (S/NF/Releasable to Philippines), REVW 17 Sep 80.
2. J233C HistSum Nov 80 (S/NF/Releasable to Philippines), REVW 4 Dec 86.
3. SECSTATE 196135/150124Z Jul 80 (S)(EX), DECL 24 Jul 86.
1. Ibid.
2. J221B Point Paper (S), Subj: Delivery of Indonesian Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) (U), REVW 20 Aug 86.
3. SECSTATE 239251/091355Z Sep 80 (S)(EX), REVW 8 Sep 00.

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1. AMEMB Jakarta 14797, 20 Sep 80 (S)(EX), REWV 20 Sep 00 (retransmitted by SECSTATE 253287/222024Z Sep 80).
ASEAN Briefings

Intelligence Exchange Initiative

1. AMEMB Singapore 12637/080350Z Dec 80 (C), REVW 8 Dec 00; USDAO Jakarta 18775/080714Z Dec 80 (S), REVW 1 Dec 86; USDAO Manila 24644/110412Z Dec 80 (S), REVW 11 Dec 86; AMEMB Jakarta 19012/110417Z Dec 80 (C), REVW 11 Dec 00.
2. CINCPAC/Memo to J2 of 24 Nov 80 (S/NF), Subj: Intelligence Exchange (U), REVW 24 Nov 86.
3. J2/Memo/S074-80 of 18 Dec 80 (S/NF), Subj: Intelligence Exchange (U), REVW 11 Dec 86.
1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 232121Z Dec 80 (S/NF), REVW 9 Dec 86; DIA 310012Z Dec 80 (S), REVW 20 Dec 80.
In a brief ceremony on 16 July, JDA Director General Kichizo Hosoda presented Japan's third highest award, the Second Class of the Order of the Rising Sun, to LT GEN Tighe. He was the first DIA Director to be so recognized by the Japanese Government, which had previously awarded the order to only two other American generals. Admiral Long congratulated LT GEN Tighe for receiving such a distinguished award, saying it was real evidence that his achievements were well recognized in both the United States and international intelligence communities.

1. J223C HistSum Jul 80 (S), REVW 1 Aug 86; USDAO Tokyo 12393/160315Z Jul 80 (S), REVW 16 Jul 00.
2. USDAO Tokyo 12461/170102Z Jul 80 (C), REVW 17 Jul 00; CINCPAC 190112Z Jul 80 (U)(BOM).
3. J223C HistSum Nov 80 (S), REVW 10 Dec 86.
4. J223C HistSum Apr 80 (S), REVW 5 May 86; IPAC HistSum Apr 80 (U).
1. J233C HistSum May 80 (S), REVW 19 Nov 00.
2. IPAC HistSum Feb 80 (S/NF), REVW 28 Feb 00; IPAC HistSum Nov 80 (S/NF), REVW 30 Nov 00.
3. IPAC HistSum May 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 May 00; IPAC HistSum Dec 80 (S/NF), REVW 31 Dec 00.
CHAPTER X
OTHER SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF1

Trips and Associated Speeches

(U) The trips and associated speeches made by CINCPAC are highlighted below and are listed chronologically. Also included are selected lists of distinguished visitors and meetings with news media personnel.

(U) Japan and Korea Trip, 19-27 January: Admiral Long made his initial trip as CINCPAC to Japan and Korea and was accompanied by two principal staff officers. The party arrived at Yokota AB, Japan the afternoon of Sunday, 20 January. The following day the Admiral met with LT GEN William H. Ginn, Jr., USAF, COMUS Japan, and received USFJ and 5th Air Force briefings before proceeding to Tokyo. In Tokyo he visited U.S. Ambassador Mike Mansfield, Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Saburo Okita, the Director General American Affairs Bureau, Tohijiro Nakajima, and the U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Office. On 22 January he flew by helicopter to Camp Zama for a meeting with LT GEN John Q. Henion, USA, Commander U.S. Army Japan/IX Corps. That same morning he also visited Yokosuka for a briefing by RADM Lando W. Zech, Jr., USN, Commander U.S. Naval Forces Japan; an honors ceremony by VADM Eichi Tsunehiro, Commandant of the Yokosuka Naval District; and meetings with Yokosuka's Mayor and Chamber of Commerce and Industry President. Another honors ceremony was held for Admiral Long in Tokyo that afternoon at the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) headquarters. This was followed by calls on Minister Enji Kubota, Director General JDA, and General Goro Takeda, Chairman of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), Joint Staff Council, and a visit to Pacific Stars and Stripes. Admiral Long was interviewed by the Far East Network (AFRTS) at Yokota early on Wednesday, 23 January, prior to his departure for Korea.

(U) Upon arrival in Seoul the Admiral was met by General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA, COMUS Korea. There followed a wreath-laying ceremony at the National Cemetery, visits and briefings at the Combined Forces Command and the JUSMAG Korea headquarters, and a call on U.S. Ambassador William H. Gleysteen, Jr.

1. Material for this section was taken from J00 trip files and daily calendars; Protocol itineraries; J03/LA Congressional visitors log; and J74 HistSums for 1980, all (U).
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The next day General Lew Byong-hion, Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, held an honor guard ceremony for Admiral Long. While in Seoul the Admiral met with President Choi Kyu-hah at the Blue House and with Prime Minister Shin Kyon-hwak and Minister of National Defense General Choo Young-bock. In the afternoon the Admiral flew by helicopter to Osan for tours and briefings at the 314th Air Division. In the evening he was the guest of honor at a dinner by General Lew and other guests, including the ROK Service Chiefs. On 25-27 January Admiral Long flew by helicopter and C-12 to other parts of South Korea. Visits included: Command Post Tango; Camp Red Cloud for an I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group briefing; lunch with MAJ GEN Park Seo-jik, CG of the 3rd ROK Division; a briefing and tour of the 5th ROK Corps; the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division at Camp Casey on the 25th; and on the 26th to Pohang and Chinhae where he met with the ROK Fleet Commander, VADM Yi Chong-ho. On Sunday Admiral Long was interviewed by the Armed Forces Korea Network and visited the United Nations Command Support Group-Joint Security Area in the Demilitarized Zone prior to departing for Hickam that evening.

(U) Washington, D.C. Trip, 3-7 February: Admiral Long departed Hawaii on Sunday, 3 February for Washington, D.C. to present the annual PACOM Area Report (testimony) to members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on 5 and 6 February, respectively. General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA, COMUS Korea, and LT GEN William H. Ginn, Jr., USAF, COMUS Japan, accompanied the Admiral to Washington. While in Washington the Admiral also met with General David C. Jones, USAF, Chairman JCS; Deputy Secretary of Defense W. Graham Claytor, Jr.; Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Dr. William J. Perry; DOD Representative for Law of the Sea Matters, VADM Shannon D. Cramer, USN (Ret); and Vice CNO Admiral James D. Watkins. Upon his return to Hawaii on 7 February, Admiral Long made brief remarks to six representatives of the local media at Hickam AFB concerning his testimony and discussed his upcoming trip to Southeast Asia.

(U) Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines Trip, 8-19 February: Admiral Long departed Hawaii the morning after his return from Washington to attend the East Asia Chiefs of Mission Conference in Singapore. Assistant Secretary of State (East Asia and Pacific Affairs) Richard C. Holbrooke and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) for East Asia, Pacific and Inter-American Affairs Nicholas Platt plus two principal CINCPAC staff members accompanied the Admiral on this trip. The party arrived in Singapore late 9 February (dateline change) and conference sessions commenced on Sunday, 10 February. The conference included discussions on global politics, global security and strategy (which the Admiral chaired), Southeast Asia refugees, Micronesian status negotiations, China, Indochina, and U.S.-China relationships. On 11 February the party also paid calls on Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Minister of Defense Howe Yoon Chong, Director of the General Staff MAJ
GEN Winston Choo Wee Leong, and Foreign Minister Sennathamby Rajaratnam. Immediately following the conclusion of the conference on 12 February the party flew to Bangkok. The following day the party members met with the Thai Prime Minister, Kriangsak Chamanan; Minister of Defense and CINC Royal Thai Army General Prem Tinsulanon; Supreme Commander Royal Thai Armed Forces, General Soem Na Nakhon; U.S. Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz; and Country Team members. On the 14th and 15th the Admiral toured Thai Army field units and refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodia border by helicopter and sedan. He also visited Thai installations at Utapao and Sattahip the next day before departing for Clark AB in the Philippines on 16 February. Upon arrival at Clark, the Admiral met with MAJ GEN James R. Hildreth, USAF, Commander, 13th Air Force for a briefing on the Military Bases Agreement before proceeding to Subic Bay. On Monday, 18 February, the Admiral flew to Baguio to attend the Philippine Military Academy commencement ceremonies and a meeting with President Ferdinand E. Marcos; he then returned to Subic. Admiral Long received honors at Camp Aguinaldo from General Romeo C. Espino, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and met with U.S. Ambassador Richard W. Murphy and his Country Team members at the Embassy prior to his departure for Hickam AFB.


(U) Alameda NAS, Beale AFB, Portland, Seattle Trip, 18-22 March: Admiral Long departed Hawaii on Saturday, 8 March for NAS Alameda, California. On Monday he continued to Beale AFB, California, where he received briefings from the 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing Commander and observed launchings of SR-71 and U-2 aircraft. From there on 11 March he flew to Portland, Oregon, where he addressed the Portland Rotary Club. The following day he proceeded to Boeing Field near Seattle, Washington, to address the Boeing Management Association and for a tour of Boeing facilities. He also spoke to the Seattle Rotary Club that same day before returning to Hawaii.

(U) Barking Sands (Kauai), Hawaii Trip, 18-20 April: Admiral Long traveled to the island of Kauai via U-21 aircraft from Wheeler AFB on Oahu for a
tour and briefings on the Pacific Missile Range Facility on 18 April. He returned to Oahu on 20 April.

(U) Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand Trip, 18 May-4 June: Accompanied by three principal staff members, Admiral Long traveled to Clark AB in the Philippines on 18-19 May (dateline crossing) by C-135 and proceeded to Baguio by C-12, where he met with General Romeo C. Espino, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the following day. On 22 May, as the Senior U.S. military representative, he served as chairman of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Board (80-5) anniversary meeting. On Monday, 26 May, the Admiral's party flew to Jakarta, Indonesia. While in Jakarta he met with senior Indonesian defense officials, U.S. Ambassador Edward E. Masters, and members of the Country Team. On the 28th the Admiral flew to Surabaya for meetings with Indonesian naval officials and toured Fleet activities there. He also visited the military district commands on Bali and the Lombok Strait region before departing from Jakarta for Canberra, Australia, on 29 May. On Friday, 30 May he met with the Governor General of Australia, Sir Zelman Cowen, Secretary of the Defence Department William B. Pritchett, Chief of the Defence Force Staff Admiral Sir Anthony M. Synnot, RAN, U.S. Ambassador Philip H. Alston, Jr., and members of the Country Team. The Admiral traveled to Sydney on Sunday, 1 June, where he held a news conference the following day before departing for Auckland, New Zealand. On 3 June he was honored at ceremonies by the Royal New Zealand Navy and Air Force followed by tours and briefings of New Zealand defense activities. On the 4th he paid calls on the Acting Prime Minister, Brian E. Talboys; Defence Secretary Dennis B.G. McLean; Chief of the Defence Staff VADM Neil D. Anderson, RAN, and U.S. Country Team members. The Admiral departed Auckland for his return to Hawaii on 4 June.

(U) Monterey Trip, 26-30 July: Admiral Long, accompanied by BG EN James C. Pfautz, USAF, his Director for Intelligence, departed Hawaii late Saturday, 26 July, and proceeded, via NAS Alameda, arriving at the Monterey Navy Post Graduate School on 28 July. The Admiral attended meetings of the Strategy Sub-Panel of the CNO Executive Panel on 28-29 July for the purpose of examining opportunities for expanded collective security in the Pacific area. The Director for Intelligence presented a briefing on regional military capabilities. Return to Hawaii was on 30 July.

(U) Kona, Hawaii Trip, 1-2 August: Admiral Long flew to Kona on the island of Hawaii to address a joint meeting of the Kona Council of the Navy League and the Kona Coast Chamber of Commerce. His speech was on the U.S. military force balance, threats to regional stability in the PACOM, and Service retention problems—the draft versus the all-volunteer concept.
(U) **Elmendorf, Victoria, B.C., McChord, Offutt, Washington, D.C., Norfolk Trip, 3-13 August:** On Sunday, 3 August, Admiral Long flew to Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, where he met the following day with LT GEN Winfield W. Scott, Jr., USAF, Commander, Alaskan Air Command (AAC) and the CINCPAC Liaison Officer to AAC for discussions on the defense of the Aleutians. That same day he also addressed the Anchorage Chamber of Commerce. On Tuesday, 5 August, the Admiral proceeded to Victoria, B.C., and Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt for briefings and discussions with RADM Michael A. Martin, Commander of Canada's Maritime Forces in the Pacific, on Canada-U.S. Maritime Operation Plan (WEST). The next stop was the Submarine Base at Bangor, Washington for a tour of facilities, including TRIDENT training. That afternoon the Admiral flew on to Offutt AFB in Nebraska, where he met with General Richard H. Ellis, CINCSAC/Dir JSTPS, to receive mission briefings. He flew to Washington, D.C., on 7 August where he met with Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Robert W. Komor, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Dr. William J. Perry, and Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency LT GEN Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF, on the following day. On Monday, 11 August, the Admiral traveled to Norfolk, Virginia, to attend the annual CINC's Conference at Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command Atlantic. Topics covered during the sessions included trends in strategic nuclear balance, theater nuclear forces, and conventional forces; a strategic appraisal of SouthWest Asia; the shifting military balance; and budget and personnel issues. After the conference concluded on 13 August, the Admiral returned to Hawaii.

(U) **Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka Trip, 7-20 November:** The purpose of this trip by Admiral Long was to make initial calls on appropriate military and civilian officials in these countries and to demonstrate continued U.S. interest in these areas. The Admiral, accompanied by two key staff members, departed Hawaii on Monday, made a stop in the Philippines and proceeded to Dacca, Bangladesh, arriving there Sunday, 9 November. Shortly after arrival he called on Bangladesh Foreign Secretary S.A.M.S. Kibria, Defense Secretary A.H.F.K. Saddique, and exchanged briefings with U.S. Country Team members. The following day he met with Army Chief of Staff LT GEN Hossain Ershad, Navy Chief of Staff RADM Mahboob Ali Khan, and Chief of the Air Staff AVM B.P. Sadruddin before proceeding to Islamabad, Pakistan.

(U) While in Islamabad the Admiral called on Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq, Chairman of the Joint Staff Committee General Mohammad Iqbal Khan, Chief of the Naval Staff VADM Karamat Rahman Niazi, and met with the U.S. Country Team. During a side trip to Peshawar he visited the Air Chief of Staff, Air Marshal Mohammad Anwar Shamin, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and had lunch in the Khyber Rifles Mess. On Thursday, 13 November, the Admiral flew to New Delhi, India, for a three-day visit where he met with the Indian Service Chiefs (Navy—Admiral Ronald L. Pereira; Army—General Om Prakash Malhotra; Air—Air
Chief Marshal Idris Hassan Latif), Defense Secretary P.K.A. Menon, and Secretary of External Affairs Eric Gonsalves. Admiral Long held a press conference with Indian newsmen prior to departure on Monday, 17 November, for Sri Lanka. During his visit to Sri Lanka he briefed senior service officers, toured military facilities in the Colombo area, and was given a barge tour of the Colombo harbor. He also called on President Junius R. Jayewardene and was the guest of honor at a dinner by Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa. The Admiral departed Sri Lanka on 19 November and made a one-day stop in the Philippines before returning to his headquarters in Hawaii on the 20th.

Distinguished Visitors to CINCPAC,
Meetings with News Media Personnel, and Local Speeches during 1980

4 January - General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA, COMUS Korea.

14 January - Congressional delegations headed by Richard H. Ichord (D-Missouri) and A. B. Won Pat (D-Guam) met with Admiral Long for briefings and discussions.


14 January - Mr. Nicholas Platt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs for East Asia, Pacific, and Inter-American Affairs.

14 January - Admiral Long met with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown at Barber's Point during his brief stopover in Hawaii.

15 January - Representative Richard H. Ichord (D-Missouri).

15 January - MAJ GEN J.E.D. Perera, Commander of the Sri Lankan Army.

17 January - Mr. Robert Rich, State Department Country Director for Korea.

18 January - Admiral Long addressed the Pacific Armies Management Seminar III on the changing scene in the strategic situation in Asia and the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas.

28 January - Admiral Sir Anthony M. Synnot, RAN, Chief of the Australian Defence Force Staff.

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1 February - General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA, COMUS Korea, and LT GEN William H. Ginn, Jr., USAF, COMUS Japan.

20 February - VADM Sylvester R. Foley, Jr., USN, Commander, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet.

21 February - Dr. Lynn E. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning.

22 February - Mr. Thomas Patterson, Western Regional Director of the Maritime Administration.

2 March - Air Marshal Sir Richard B. Bolt, Chief of the Defence Staff and Defence Minister Dennis B. G. McLean of New Zealand.

3 March - Mr. John H. Moxley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.

3 March - RADM German Guesalaga, Chilean Naval Attache to Washington.

4 March - Governor of American Samoa Peter Coleman.

6 March - Admiral Long was interviewed by the Editorial Board of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. During the interview the Admiral discussed the world situation and referred to three possible levels of the conflict with the USSR--nuclear holocaust, worldwide U.S.-USSR conventional confrontation, and regional conflicts such as had occurred and which could lead to worldwide confrontation.

7 March - Admiral Sir Anthony M. Synnot, RAN, Chief of the Australian Defence Force Staff.

13 March - General Xu Yimin, Chinese Defense and Military Attache to the United States, Mr. Feng Liesun, Chinese Assistant Defense Attache, and Mr. Charles W. Freeman, Jr., Department of State Director for China Affairs.


17 March - General Mun Hyung-tae, ROKA (Ret), Chairman of the ROK National Assembly Defense Committee, and six committee members met with Admiral Long and received a command briefing before proceeding to Washington for meetings with other U.S. officials.
17 March - General Robert H. Barrow, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

18 March - Air Marshal Sir Richard B. Bolt, Chief, New Zealand Defence Staff.

20 March - Dr. Don LeVine, JASON Study Group.


20 March - Admiral Long addressed the Windward Rotary Club at the Mid-Pacific Country Club in Kailua.

22 March - Ms. Kathleen Carpenter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity.

24 March - Professor Donald Zagoria, State Department Representative to the Southeast Asia Regional Security Conference.

24 and 28 March - Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield.

27 March - Mr. Yoshiki Hidaka, correspondent for the Japanese Broadcasting Company (NHK-TV), taped an interview with Admiral Long which focused on U.S.-Japan defense relations and capabilities. In emphasizing the U.S. commitment to defend Japan, Admiral Long stressed the need for increased contributions from all U.S. allies to meet the expanding Soviet threat. Bilateral planning had indicated the need for Japanese expansion of air defense, protection of sea lines of communication, and anti-submarine warfare capability.

27 March - Admiral Long spoke to the Association of the United States Army at the Hale Koa Hotel.

3 April - Admiral Long spoke to members of the Harvard Business School Club of Honolulu at the Plaza Club.

4 April - Dr. Juerg Dedial, Political Editor of the Swiss newspaper Neue Zurcher Zeitung,

7 April - LT GEN P. X. Kelley, USMC, Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

10 April - VADM Robert R. Monroe, USN, Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency.

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14 April - Dr. Everett Kleinjans, Chancellor of the East-West Center.

16 April - Dr. Nils F. Wikner, consultant with Santa Fe Corporation.

18 April - Mrs. Agnes Kennedy, American Legion Auxiliary President.

21 April - Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard C. Holbrooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Northeast Asian Affairs Michael H. Armacost, and Ambassador to the Philippines Richard W. Murphy met with Admiral Long in conjunction with Philippine President Marcos' visit to Hawaii.

22 April - Admiral Long held an honors ceremony for President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which was followed by a briefing for the President and key members of his entourage and a Pearl Harbor barge luncheon.

24 April - Canada's former Ambassador to Tehran Kenneth Taylor, who assisted six U.S. diplomats in escaping from Iran in late January, met with Admiral Long.
28 April - Interview by Mr. Adelbert Weinstein, Military Editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (West Germany).

30 April - En route back to Tonga from a European trip, Crown Prince Tupouto'a met with Admiral Long and reestablished long-standing relations between CINCPAC and the Tongan Royal Family.

2 May - General Bryce Poe, USAF, Commander Air Force Logistics Command.

5 May - General Volney F. Warner, USA, Commander, U.S. Readiness Command, presented briefings and held discussions with Admiral Long on the evolving Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and Joint Deployment Agency.

6 May - Admiral Long addressed the Honolulu Rotary Club at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel on the relationship of political, economic, and military balance in support of U.S. national interests and security.

17 May - General Richard F. Stilwell, USA (Ret), and RADM William R. McClendon, USN (Ret).

5 June - Vice Premier Geng Biao, China's top military official, stopped in Honolulu following his first visit to Washington, D.C., before returning to Beijing. While in Washington, Premier Geng met with President Carter, Secretary of Defense Brown, and other top U.S. officials. Admiral Long presented a briefing for the Premier and gave a reception in his honor.

Admiral Long receives Vice Premier Geng Biao of China.
6 June - Mr. Nicholas Platt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs/East Asia and Pacific).

9 June - General Richard H. Ellis, USAF, Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command.

9 June - Dr. Gene Paolucci and Dr. N. F. Wikner of the Santa Fe Corporation, and Dr. Donald R. Cotter.

10 June - LT GEN William H. Ginn, Jr., USAF, COMUS Japan.

10 June - General Yoon Ja-joong, Chief of Staff, Republic of Korea Air Force.

15 June - LT GEN Roscoe Robinson Jr., USA, Commander U.S. Army Japan/IX Corps (Designate).

17 June - Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) Joseph A. Doyle.

17 June - Admiral Long spoke at the annual convention banquet of the National Military Intelligence Association at the Hale Koa Hotel.

18 June - Prok Amaranand, the Thai Ambassador (Designate) to the United States.

20 June - Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN (Ret), former CINCPAC.

20 June - Ambassador Peter R. Rosenblatt, the President's Personal Representative to the Micronesian Status Negotiations.

21 June - Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, USN, Deputy Assistant Secretary Naval Reactors, Department of Energy.

23 June - MAJ GEN Jerry R. Curry, USA, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

3 July - LT GEN Paul F. Gorman, USA, Director Plans and Policy (J5) OJCS.

7 July - General Edward C. Meyer, Army Chief of Staff.

8 July - Mr. Ernst Freisewinkel, producer of "A World Mirror" for ARD-TV, West Germany, interviewed Admiral Long and asked what were his greatest
concerns in the Pacific Command. The Admiral replied the Soviet global threat, which he perceived militarily at three levels. Regarding the Soviet ship threat, Admiral Long stated the trend toward Soviet numerical superiority had to be turned around. He also pointed out some disadvantages confronting Soviet naval forces--geographic constraints, qualitatively inferior weapons systems, and a lack of ability to project their naval power.

8 July - Mr. Leo J. Moser, Charge d'Affaires, Laos.

8 July - Representative Dan R. Glickman (D-Kansas).

11 July - Air Vice Marshal Selwyn D. Evans, RAN, Chief, Joint Operations and Plans, Australian Department of Defence.

11 July - RADM Summer Shapiro, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence.

14 July - Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations.

16 July - General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA, COMUS Korea.

25 July - Neville Trotter, Esq., Member of British Parliament.

25 July - Ambassador to China Leonard F. Woodcock and Ambassador to Bangladesh David T. Schneider.

30 July - Dr. Edward E. Conrad, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Defense Nuclear Agency, presented a briefing to Admiral Long on Soviet Navy doctrine, a Northwest Asia assessment, and mid-range nuclear weapons.

31 July - Admiral Long presented the CINCPAC View Briefing for the American Bar Association Board of Governors at the Makalapa "0" Club.

31 July - Ambassador to Fiji William Bodde (Designate).

31 July - General Counsel of the Defense Department Togo West.

14 August - LT GEN William H. Ginn, Jr., USAF, COMUS Japan.

19 August - New Zealand's Ambassador to the United States T. Frank Gill.

21 August - Mr. Kazuo Aichi, Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Shunpei, Diet member of Japan.
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21 August - Mr. Gordon Law, Assistant and Science Adviser to the Secretary of the Interior.

25 August - Air Vice Marshal David E. Jamieson, Chief of the Royal New Zealand Air Staff.

25 August - During an interview by Mr. Gavin P. Ellis, senior defense journalist of the New Zealand Herald, Admiral Long described his perception of the three-level Soviet military threat cited above. He predicted that there will be increased use by the Soviets of proxies and surrogates in regional confrontations, as was the case in Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola, and Nicaragua. Such "insurgent groups" would be used to extend Soviet influence and control to achieve the Soviet goal of world domination. It was important, therefore, that the Free World realize how regional stability and strength related to global stability. Admiral Long also discussed the need for overall increased allied defense cooperation, including ANZUS, in view of the latest Soviet adventurism.

30 August - Admiral Long met with the Prime Minister of Australia, John Malcom Fraser, as he transited Hickam AFB.

1 September - Mr. Ichiro Masuoka, Secretary of the Japanese Diet.

1 September - VADM David C. Richardson, USN (Ret), DOD Consultant, and member, Naval Research Advisory Committee.

4 September - Ambassador to Thailand Morton I. Abramowitz.

5 September - The Indonesian Ambassador to the United States, D. Ashari.

6 September - John Browne, Esq., Member of British Parliament.

9 September - BGEN Eugene S. Korpil, USA, and BGEN John W. Foss, USA, outgoing and incoming Chief JUSMAG Philippines.

15 September - RADM Bruce Keener III, Commander Military Sealift Command.

15 September - Ambassador to Malaysia Barbara Watson en route to her new post.

18 September - VADM Guido J. Willis, Chief of the Australian Naval Staff.

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19 September - Prime Minister of New Zealand Robert D. Muldoon.

19 September - Vice Marshal R. Sunaryo, Director of the Indonesian National Institute of Air and Space.

19 September - Ambassador to Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands Harvey J. Feldman.

22 September - RADM Albert J. Baciocco, Jr., USN, Chief of Naval Research.

25 September - Ms. Ginger Lew, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

26 September - Admiral Long addressed the Hawaii Chapter of the Association of Government Accountants at the Ala Moana Hotel on the growing Soviet military capability and his perceptions of measures the United States could use to meet any Soviet threat.

29 September - Secretary of the Navy Edward Hidalgo.

1 October - Mr. Douglas L. Kidd, member of the New Zealand Parliament.

2 October - Mr. Bill Kreh, editor of the Navy Times.

2 October - Mr. Wallace Green, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Territorial and International Affairs.

3 October - RADM Gote Bloom, Swedish Navy, Chief of the Swedish Delegation to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea.

7 October - Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Ranasinghe Premadasa.

9 October - Mrs. Evelyn Colbert, Department of State Representative to the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace Conference.

10 October - Ambassador to Pakistan Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.

10 October - Mr. Pierre Brochand, French Consul General in San Francisco.

11 October - Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Papua New Guinea, Noel Levi.

16 October - Ambassador to Papua New Guinea Harvey J. Feldman.

17 October - Mr. Frank C. Bennett, Jr., State Department Director of Australian and New Zealand Affairs.

17 October - Mr. Kumashi Kakehashi, Mayor of Sasebo, Japan.

17 October - MAJ GEN Park Se-jik, Commanding General, Capital Security Command, ROK.

20 October - Mr. J. William Middendorf, former Secretary of the Navy.

23 October - General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA, COMUS Korea.

23 October - Mr. Michio Saito of the Tokyo Broadcasting System interviewed Admiral Long. The interview was to be used as part of a 50-minute TV documentary entitled "U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation." Admiral Long reviewed U.S.-GOJ security arrangements vis-a-vis the growing Soviet military threat in the Far East. He pointed out that it was up to Japan to decide what improvements should be made to its defenses to complement the U.S. defense commitment.

27 October - RADM William A. Hughes, Commander, Canadian Maritime Command, Pacific.

28 October - RADM Jacques A. Choupin, Commander of the Armed Forces of French Polynesia, the Pacific Test Center, and the Maritime Zone of the Pacific.

30 October - VADM Yuthaya Cherdboommaung, RTN, Commandant of the Royal Thai Marine Corps.

30 October - LT GEN Ernest Graves, Jr., USA, Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency.

31 October - COL Albert C. Waldack, USA, Chief USDLG Indonesia.

31 October - Interview by Mr. Hermie Rivera of Philippine TV. In response to Mr. Rivera's questions concerning U.S. responsiveness to Soviet expansion in Afghanistan and the Pacific, Admiral Long related the current Soviet global challenge to the long-range objective of world domination. He noted the nuclear deterrent capability of the United States and cited the
value of interlocking defense agreements with friends and allies to meet either a global or regional threat. For all contingencies in the Pacific/Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf areas, the Admiral pointed out the strategic importance of the U.S. bases in the Philippines. Regarding unrest in the Middle East, he outlined recent U.S. actions in the form of defense budget increases, the positioning of a large naval task force in the Indian Ocean, expanded use of Diego Garcia, and negotiations with some Persian Gulf states.

3 November - General Lew Allen, Jr., Air Force Chief of Staff.

3 November - General Toshimichi Suzuki, Chief of Staff, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.

3-4 November - Admiral Long was the host for a meeting of 15 members of the Chief of Naval Operations' Executive Panel.

4 November - General John W. Vessey, Jr., Army Vice Chief of Staff.

6 November - Admiral Long chaired a briefing and gave a luncheon for 21 members of the Japan Defense Society.

24 November - General Romeo C. Espino, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines received honors at Bordelon Field.

24 November - VADM Robert H. Scarsborough, Vice Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard.

25 November - Admiral Long was co-host of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board Meeting held at Camp Smith.

26 November - Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN (Ret), former CINCPAC.

28 November - Admiral Tsugio Yata, Chief of Staff, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

1 December - VFW Ladies' Auxiliary National President Jeanette Frank met with Admiral Long.

1 December - Ambassador to Singapore Harry E. T. Thayer en route to his new post.

10 December - Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Engineering and Systems) David E. Mann.
14 December - Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) David E. McGiffert and his deputy, Nicholas Platt.

15 December - MAJ GEN John Bruen, USA, Commander Military Traffic Management Command.

15 December - RADM Ross H. Trower, USN, Navy Chief of Chaplains.

16 December - Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States Sultan Mohammed Khan.

18 December - Admiral Long addressed members of the CINCPAC staff in the Pollock Theater on 18 and 19 December.

18 December - Admiral Long was interviewed by the Honolulu Advertiser editorial board. Background discussions included the draft, Service retention problems, Japan's defense forces, the TRIDENT submarine program, and the Soviet military expansion in the Western Pacific.

22 December - Mr. Michael J. Kogutek, National Commander of the American Legion.

23 December - Representative Phillip Burton (D-California).

(U) In addition to the Admiral's personal appearances before local audiences in 1980, the CINCPAC View briefing team, which was constituted in 1977, made 69 presentations to headquarters visitors and civic and professional groups totaling over 1,000 people in the Honolulu area.¹

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SECTION II--PACIFIC COMMAND OPERATING BUDGET

(U) Funds for CINCPAC headquarters and subordinate activities were made available via the Navy funding chain. Fiscal Year 1980 obligations by activity for each type of funding follow:

Operations and Maintenance, Navy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Program 2 (General Purpose Forces)</th>
<th>Program 3 (Intelligence &amp; Communications)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC headquarters</td>
<td>$ 7,394,000</td>
<td>$ 2,051,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMIPAC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,196,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS Japan</td>
<td>1,579,642</td>
<td>167,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS Korea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,566,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$ 8,973,642</td>
<td>$ 9,982,769</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Military Assistance, Executive Funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>FY 1980 Obligations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T10 (Administrative Expenses)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC headquarters</td>
<td>$ 439,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T20 (Security Assistance Activity Expenses)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG Korea</td>
<td>3,462,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG Philippines</td>
<td>469,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG Thailand</td>
<td>558,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHMDAO Japan</td>
<td>710,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHUSDLC Indonesia</td>
<td>368,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHODC India</td>
<td>116,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHODR Pakistan</td>
<td>156,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>2,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>15,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>4,399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. J72 HistSum Jan 81.
## T20 (Security Assistance Activity Expenses)(cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FY 1980 Obligations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>20,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>4,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Education</td>
<td>43,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$ 6,385,512</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Official Representation Funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund</th>
<th>FY 1980 Obligations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC headquarters</td>
<td>$ 24,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRJCRC</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS Japan</td>
<td>8,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACREP Australia</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACREP Guam / TTPI</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACREP Philippines</td>
<td>2,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$ 36,945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## MAP Representation Funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund</th>
<th>FY 1980 Obligations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG Korea</td>
<td>$ 3,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG Philippines</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG Thailand</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHMDAO Japan</td>
<td>2,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHUSDLG Indonesia</td>
<td>2,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHODC India</td>
<td>806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHODR Pakistan</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$ 16,537</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Emergency & Extraordinary Expense Funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>FY 1980 Obligations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC headquarters</td>
<td>$ 1,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMIPAC</td>
<td>1,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS Japan</td>
<td>1,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACREP Philippines</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$ 4,501</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SECTION III--LEGAL

Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction

PACOM Confinement Statistics

(U) As of 30 November 1980 U.S. personnel in post-trial confinement in foreign penal institutions in PACOM totaled 79. A breakout by country and Service follows:¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy/Marine Corps</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total          | 8         | 3    | 68                | 79    |

1. J73 HistSum Dec 80 (C), DECL 2 Oct 86.
2. Ibid.
(U) TSGT Jessie Hope, USAF, was charged with smuggling on 10 February 1974. The trial court had ruled, however, that the evidence (wristwatches) had been improperly seized. TSGT Hope remained on administrative hold pending an appeal by the Government of the Philippines of the trial court ruling on the admissibility of evidence. On 21 November 1980 the U.S. Embassy Manila was advised that the Philippine Supreme Court had ruled the evidence was admissible and had remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. At the end of 1980 Hope was awaiting a reassessment by the Philippine prosecutor for possible dismissal of the case on the grounds of failure to provide a speedy trial.\(^1\)

Taiwan

(U) SGT Ronald A. Lutz, USAF, was convicted of intentional homicide and sentenced to 10 years confinement effective 27 June 1975. His wife, Ching Ping Lutz, was convicted of importation of heroin and marijuana and sentenced to 10 years confinement effective 18 July 1975. Mrs. Lutz was paroled (and released from confinement) on 1 April 1980; SGT Lutz was released on parole on 5 June 1980. SGT and Mrs. Lutz were the last U.S. military personnel in foreign confinement in Taiwan. (See CINCPAC Command History 1975 for case details.)\(^2\)

Korea

(U) As a result of the declaration of martial law by the Republic of Korea on 27 October 1979, the application of the criminal jurisdiction article (XXII) of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) remained suspended throughout 1980. The effect of the suspension was that the U.S. Government had the right to exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military and civilian personnel in Korea. However, because U.S. military courts-martial lacked jurisdiction over civilians in peacetime, a jurisdictional void resulted vis-a-vis offenses committed by U.S. forces civilians in Korea.\(^3\)

(U) Also during 1980 the Korean Supreme Court had interpreted the Agreed Minutes regarding Article XXIV of the SOFA to mean that cases pending appellate review when martial law was declared were void. As a result, the

\(^1\) CINCPAC Command History 1979 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p.553; J73 HistSum Dec 80 (C), DECL 2 Oct 86.
\(^2\) J73 HistSum Apr-May 80 (C), DECL 31 May 86.
\(^3\) CINCPAC Command History 1979 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p.553; J73 HistSum Dec 80 (C), DECL 2 Oct 86.
convictions of 10 U.S. military members awaiting appellate review were set aside by the Koreans. Included in that number were SP4 R. E. Miller, USA, convicted of murder, and PVT W. L. Thomas, USA, convicted of attempted murder. A serious jurisdictional issue was then presented as to whether COMUS Korea was barred from trying any of the 10 by court martial. Because of the seriousness of the crimes allegedly committed by Miller and Thomas, COMUS Korea decided to refer their cases to trial by general court-martial and risk a ruling by a U.S. military judge or appellate authorities that prior trial by Korean authorities barred trial by U.S. court-martial. The remaining eight cases (robbery and drug offenses) were not retried.¹

1980 PACOM Legal Conference

(U) The 1980 Pacific Command Legal Conference, sponsored by the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate General, was held from 30 July to 1 August 1980. Sixty military conferees, including the Judge Advocates General (JAG) for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, the Army Assistant JAG, and military lawyers in the PACOM, attended sessions at the Hale Koa Hotel and CINCPAC Headquarters. In addition, DOD General Counsel Togo D. West, Jr., addressed the conference on several DOD initiatives to improve the administration of military justice and on efforts by the DOD to minimize the adverse impacts of the Freedom of Information Act, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and environmental laws and regulations.²

(U) The 1980 PACOM Legal Conference afforded the opportunity for a meaningful dialogue on highly important legal issues generated by the rapidly-changing events in the Pacific Command. The conference concentrated on a number of issues associated with the enhanced PACOM presence and increased responsibilities in the Middle East and Indian Ocean. A seminar on military justice focused on the difficulties experienced by the Navy in providing trial and other legal services to Navy battle groups in the Indian Ocean. Another seminar was conducted on U.S. navigation and overflight policy and CINCPAC's role in exercising freedom of the high seas in the face of coastal and archipelagic states' claims which did not accord with international law. A presentation on the Law of War graphically illustrated in realistic battlefield scenarios how Law of War issues arose in the armed conflict environment. Of particular interest were the instances where the military lawyer, by properly advising the field or fleet commander, could contribute to greater effectiveness in combat.³

¹ J73/Memo/327-80 of 13 Nov 80 (U), Subj: Trip Report: Japan, Korea, and the Philippines.
² J73 HistSum Dec 80 (C), DECL 2 Oct 86; J73/Memo/210-80 of 13 Aug 80 (U), Subj: Report of 1980 PACOM Legal Conference.
³ Ibid.

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Rules of Engagement Seminar

(U) The CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) sponsored a Rules of Engagement Seminar for CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CDRWESTCOM, and CG FMFPAC SJAs on 13 November 1980. The seminar stressed the importance of SJAs being fully conversant with the PACOM peacetime rules of engagement in order to provide legal guidance to their respective commands, particularly in light of definitive legal input (guidance) at the JCS and Service levels.¹

¹ J73 HistSum Dec 80 (C), DECL 2 Oct 86; J73/Memo/336-80 of 21 Nov 80 (U), Subj: Rules of Engagement Seminar.

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SECTION IV--RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OFFICE

(U) The Research and Analysis Office's studies and reports are highlighted below. Certain of these studies were of a continuing nature with findings and conclusions updated as appropriate.¹

**Australian Analyst Exchange**

(U) In April 1979 at the initiative of Prime Minister Fraser, the Australian Department of Defence (ADOD) proposed an operations research analyst exchange with CINCPAC. Approval by both governments was obtained by the end of the year. The ADOD analyst performed one-year temporary duty beginning on 9 June 1980 and worked on Phase II of a study on defense of the PACOM sea lines of communication and the India military expansion and modernization study. The CINCPAC analyst reported to Canberra, Australia, on 1 July 1980 and worked with the Central Studies Establishment within the ADOD.

**Economic Studies**

(U) Studies performed during 1980 reaffirmed earlier findings that Japan and the entire Asia and Pacific region were of primary economic importance to the United States. U.S. imports from Asia exceeded those from Europe by over $11 billion, and Japan was second only to Canada as our leading trading partner. U.S. imports were approximately $28 billion more than exports in world trade. Accordingly, the validity of a statement to the effect that economically and militarily Asia and the Western Pacific were secondary to Europe was refuted and deleted from the draft Consolidated Guidance.

(U) A 1980 update of a previous study on U.S. dependence on imports of non-fuel raw materials listed 47 minerals that were required to satisfy more than 10 percent of the apparent consumption. (Apparent consumption was defined as production plus gross imports, less exports.) Potential and existing western hemisphere sources of these non-fuel minerals would reduce the import requirement to twelve major non-fuel minerals. Four of these twelve could be shipped by air, but the other eight would have to transit sea lanes from two of the most mineral-rich areas of the world: Australia and South Africa. To maintain these non-fuel mineral imports at peacetime levels, 198 round trips

¹ Material for this section, unless otherwise indicated, was taken from J77 HistSum Dec 80 which transmitted Research and Analysis Office Report No. 3-81 of Jan 81 (S/NF/WNINTEL/NO CONTRACT), REVW 8 Sep 10.
between the United States and Australia and 133 between the United States and South Africa would have to be made annually. These estimates were based on the use of 10,000-ton capacity ships.

Japan

(U) An analysis of the total forces required to defend Japan against a direct attack by the USSR assigned sub-study responsibilities for naval and ground engagements and campaigns to PACFLT, WESTCOM and CINCPAC, and air defense and air battles to CINCPAC. The study time frame was 1985-1990 with the enemy (Red) objective of totally occupying Hokkaido, Japan, with ground forces from the Soviet Far East Military District. The Red air attack was designed to achieve air superiority with air forces available from the Far East Bomber Corps and Tactical Aviation Forces. These were countered with friendly (Blue) ground forces from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and air forces from the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force.

(U) The study found the Red ground force had difficulty in achieving clear victory in most cases, and the Red air force obtained only partial air superiority in the early waves of air attack, only to lose it in later waves. Blue tank attrition and ammunition consumption were high when Blue adopted an aggressive role and large scale reinforcement was necessary.

PACOM Basing Study

(U) On 30 October 1980, a CINCPACREP Guam letter pointed out a number of deficiencies in the Guam Land Use Plan which had been completed in 1977. The deficiencies stemmed from study guidelines which had prescribed that land requirements be based on foreseeable requirements into mid-1985 including only projected Guam-based forces under "normal peacetime conditions." By 1980 it was apparent that "foreseeable requirements" and "peacetime conditions" would have to be redefined. Four major changes in PACOM peacetime conditions not foreseen in 1977 were large-scale continuous (U.S./USSR) Indian Ocean naval presence, Soviet presence in Vietnam, increased emphasis on U.S.-GOJ bilateral planning, and recognition of China and non-availability of Taiwan bases.

(SECRET) There was a need to study PACOM basing requirements for all four Services through 1990, specifically to define PACOM basing requirements in an era of reliance on rapid deployments and changing commitments. The study was to determine the optimum basing structure for support of national objectives and strategy in the PACOM. Consideration was to be given to fall-back bases as substitutes for the possible loss of present bases in the Philippines and
Japan. The preliminary analysis identified three major sub-studies to determine optimum basing for PACOM forces in CONUS, U.S. forces in Korea and Japan, and an analysis of fall-back bases to substitute for possible loss of present bases. Within the latter, two broad categories of tasks were peacetime operations with tension and contingent operations. There was also a need to distinguish between "continuous" deployments, e.g., existing carrier battle group (CVBG) operations in the Indian Ocean, and "non-continuous" deployments such as exercises and other training deployments according to duration and ways of support.

(5) In the context of Indian Ocean deployments there was little Army involvement, and because current deployments consisted mostly of naval forces, a naval basing sub-study was given highest priority. Maintaining CVBGs in theater was achieved by bringing support in the form of fuel, stores, ammunition, personnel, spare parts, etc. to the CVBGs which therefore could be considered effectively as two bases-mobile air bases together with their logistic pipelines. With such optimal forward basing location and composition of forces, it was found that no large benefits would be derived from possession of a forward land base such as Diego Garcia. Although a number of significant small benefits would accrue, they would not provide a strong justification for setting up a naval base within the Indian Ocean littoral.

Protecting Sea Lines of Communication in the Pacific and Indian Oceans

(5) In 1979 a study for protecting sea lines of communication in the Pacific and Indian Oceans was conducted in the context of a worldwide non-nuclear conflict with the USSR using regional sea and air superiority as a measure of effectiveness. During 1980 Phase II, which was a continuation and expansion of the previous year's effort, measured survivability of major allied economies in the PACOM as a function of the attrition of materials throughput. The study found that with the Soviet Pacific Fleet submarine threat deployed to five major attrition zones (Arabian Sea, Indonesian Archipelago, East China Sea, southeast of Japan, and northeast of Japan), merchant ship attrition would be severe but would not create a catastrophic economic impact.1

(5) Attrition of merchant ships would equal 1,000 in 180 days and there would be a shortfall of over 20 percent in Japanese imports. The impact on Japanese economic indicators at the end of the 180 days was estimated at reductions of 15 percent in the gross domestic product; 22 percent in industrial production; and 54 percent in exports. Evasive routing of merchant shipping to avoid the South China Sea and the straits of the Indonesian Archipelago would reduce ship attrition by approximately 25 percent, but the import shortfall

would increase about 20 percent because of added transit times. Massing of submarines near the Japanese terminus of the SLOCs would reduce ship attrition by 19 percent with only a 5 percent reduction in Japanese import shortfall.

Selective attrition of tankers (298 in 180 days), however, would cause more severe economic problems. There would be a shortfall in Japanese petroleum imports of over 45 percent and the impact on economic indicators would be 20 percent reduction on the gross domestic product and industrial production, and a 70 percent reduction on exports. The study anticipated that the Soviet Pacific Fleet submarine force would be reduced to a minor threat by the end of 180 days through attrition. Therefore, the economic interactions between Pacific Basin countries caused by loss of imports to Japan would be negligible.

South Asia-India

(U) In response to a request from the Director for Logistics and Security Assistance for a study of security and arms transfer policy options in South Asia, members of the Research and Analysis office held discussions from 29 September to 8 October 1980 with 10 academics and members of the State Department who specialized in India and the South Asia region. The study group concluded that India wanted to dominate the South Asia region and to exclude all external powers from an influential role in South Asia. India regarded the USSR as a reliable friend and ally and the United States as an unreliable friend even though the latter had been a major source of economic assistance since the early years of India's statehood. Moreover, India had a schizophrenic attitude toward the U.S. military buildup in the Indian Ocean. The buildup ran against India's basic policy of regional dominance and might encourage further Soviet counteractions, but in private, India recognized some form of military response was needed to discourage further Soviet actions.

(U) China was regarded as a threat, but India would like normalization of relations. Indian policy toward Afghanistan was aimed at reducing the tendency for Soviet expansion, and India had an interest in Pakistan's becoming a stable buffer against Soviet presence in West Asia. Both India and Pakistan were moving toward the development and production of nuclear weapons.

(U) The study group suggested that the United States could think in terms of "symbolic" weapon transfers to India—those which would attract a lot of attention, such as ships, and yet which would not ultimately threaten the existence of Pakistan. The U.S. policy on weapon transfers should encourage Indian self-sufficiency and should aim to maintain a military imbalance between India and Pakistan.
(S//NOFORN) Related to the above study was a further analysis of Indian political and military objectives in the light of developments in Iran and Afghanistan. Plausible theories were developed to explain India's recent large program of force modernization and expansion with emphasis on mobility and deep strike capability. There was considerable evidence of obsolescence and aging in India's military equipment that would account for modernization, but not for force expansion.

(U) Examination of economic trends in India and Pakistan showed a relatively slow upward trend in the long term. Over the previous 13 years India's growth rate averaged 5.2 percent per year while Pakistan averaged 7.3 percent. In defense expenditures India had been outspending Pakistan by about three to one. Beginning in 1972 (after the short Indo-Pakistani war in December 1971) the foreign trade imports of both countries increased four-fold during the remainder of the decade. Exports, although increasing, were seen to lag behind imports towards the end of the decade. This was especially noticeable in the case of Pakistan which showed a large deficit of about $2 billion in imports over exports during 1979. India also had a deficit trade balance of $1.7 billion, but it was from a larger total trade of $15 billion as compared with $6 billion total trade for Pakistan.

Southeast Asia

(U) In June 1980 the Research and Analysis Office completed a six-month study of the strategic implications of Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia. This analysis, encompassing military, economic, and political implications, addressed questions regarding recent Soviet actions and their potential expansion in Vietnam. It quantified boundaries on what Japan and the United States might face in wartime, defined selected U.S. war-fighting options, and reported on current ASEAN perceptions of the Soviets, Chinese, and Americans.

(S) Study results concluded that the Soviets had established a nucleus for intelligence surveillance, logistics support, and peacetime and wartime operations from Vietnamese bases which placed U.S. bases in the Philippines and the Holt Naval Communications Station in Australia within the unfueled combat radius of Soviet BACKFIRE bombers. Further, that by using SRV facilities, the Soviets had shortened the length of supply and deployment round trips to the Indian Ocean by 14 to 30 days. Soviet warships and aircraft could interdict the South China Sea shipping lanes and U.S. supply lines to the Indian Ocean from bases in Vietnam. U.S. naval units could suffer up to a two-week penalty en route to the Indian Ocean if detoured around Australia to avoid Soviet operations from Vietnam.
The results of several hypothetical quantitative assessments used to size potential conflicts in this region included:

- Soviet forces composed of up to 15 percent of their Pacific Fleet cruise missile capable assets, operating from Vietnam, could tie up, divert, or require the deployment of at least one U.S. CVBG to Southeast Asia to achieve a favorable balance in wartime. Two CVBGs would balance 16-25 percent of the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

- The strike aircraft of two CVBGs, or equivalent land-based aircraft, could put seven major SRV airfields containing one BADGER regiment and three FLOGGER squadrons out of action in less than a week and/or mine the major ports of Vietnam in five days.

- Two Soviet BADGER regiments operating from SRV bases could inflict serious damage on either Clark AB or the Subic Bay complex within 30 days of strike operations. Four regiments would be required to damage both bases within 30 days.

In addition, it was found that Soviet support of Vietnam reinforced the threat perceived by ASEAN countries and China. The near term prospects for a Soviet-Vietnamese break in relations were slim, but it was an ultimate probability. Meanwhile, the politically and economically isolated Vietnamese needed an alternative, such as an accommodation with ASEAN, to reduce their heavy reliance on the USSR. Without U.S. counteractions, the Soviet presence in Southeast Asia would hasten the decline of U.S. influence perceived by some of the national leaders of that region. The ASEAN countries were looking for new U.S. initiatives to counter the Soviet presence.

The study recommended that operational plans be modified specifically to account for a Soviet threat emanating from Vietnam and that the possibility of closing the straits into the South China Sea to prevent Soviet passage be considered. Philippine air defenses should be reviewed in light of the decrease in warning time through Soviet use of SRV airfields with a view toward increasing radar coverage by additional ground sites or AWACS E-3A aircraft. Continued U.S. support of ASEAN should be demonstrated through increased IMET and FMS credit programs and by cooperative military research and development among ASEAN countries. Also ASEAN should be encouraged to propose alternatives to SRV dependence on the USSR, and an enhanced intelligence exchange program between the United States and ASEAN should be promoted. Finally, the feasibility of home-berthing U.S. ships in Australia or in an ASEAN country should be investigated.
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SECTION V--PUBLIC AFFAIRS

RIMPAC Media Visit

(U) At the request of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, the CINCPAC Public Affairs Office arranged a visit for approximately 21 Japanese media representatives to cover the Hawaii portion of Japan's first participation in Exercise RIMPAC 80. RIMPAC was a biannual exercise designed to test and improve combat readiness of participating countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) in most major aspects of conventional maritime warfare. The Exercise was jointly sponsored by CINCPACFLT and COMTHIRD Fleet.¹

(U) The group was escorted by three members of the JMSDF Public Information staff, and on 14 and 15 March 1980 received briefings and tours by the Army at Fort Shafter and Schofield Barracks; by the Navy at THIRD Fleet headquarters on Ford Island; and a briefing by CINCPAC at Camp Smith. At Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), they witnessed a DRAGON missile dry fire demonstration, and six members of the pool spent part of one day aboard the USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64).²

Foreign Journalists Tour

(U) During the period 17 to 20 May a Defense Department-International Communications Agency sponsored tour was arranged for 14 foreign journalists. The tour objective was to emphasize the U.S. determination and ability, in concert with allies, to insure the security of the Pacific area in the face of Soviet military expansion. Members of the tour were from Australia, China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Activities in Hawaii included meetings and briefings by component commanders, tours and demonstrations at Kaneohe MCAS, Schofield Barracks, and Pearl Harbor, and a CINCPAC briefing hosted by the Deputy Chief of Staff.³

Japanese Defense Society

(U) From 5 to 9 November 20 influential business executives of the Japanese Defense Society were CINCPAC's guests in Hawaii as part of a Defense Department biannual tour of U.S. defense installations. While in Hawaii the group received briefings and tours at PACAF and PACFLT headquarters. At Kaneohe MCAS the group visited the combat simulator center and viewed a landing

1. J7422 HistSum Mar/Apr 80 (U).
2. Ibid.

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operation; at Schofield Barracks, the training areas and the air assault school. A Pearl Harbor tour and visit to the USS HAROLD E. HOLT (FF-1074), a CINCPAC briefing, and a luncheon by Admiral Long were also provided to the members. On 9 November they departed for CONUS where they were scheduled to visit five other military installations and the Pentagon.¹

Pacific Stars and Stripes

(U) For a number of years delays in MAC flights or mission abortions from Tokyo, Japan, to Guam had caused late or non-delivery of Stars and Stripes to Guam. On 25 March 1980 the Commander, Pacific Stars and Stripes (PS&S) asked CINCPAC to authorize an exception to policy for shipment of PS&S via foreign flag air carrier. The Commander also asked that the cost of the shipments be prorated in accordance with a 1960 Army-Air Force agreement.²

(U) After receiving concurrence from the 834th Airlift Division (MAC), CINCPAC exercised provisions of 1973 guidance from the JCS and on 21 June authorized a one-year test program. After nine months experience, PS&S was to evaluate the impact of more timely delivery on PS&S sales on Guam. If schedules were compatible with shipping schedules, a change should be made to a U.S. flag air carrier.³

¹ J7423 Hist Sum Nov 80 (U).
² J741 HistSum Jun 80 (U); CINCPAC 210431Z Jun 80 (U).
³ Ibid.

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CHAPTER XI
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
SECTION I
SELECTED CHRONOLOGY 1980

(U) This unclassified chronology was compiled from Department of State Bulletins, the periodical Current History, and various wire service reports for 1980. Although many of the events were outside of CINCPAC's acknowledged area of responsibility, all either directly or indirectly affected the U.S. military force posture and/or political relationships in the Pacific Command.

1 Jan - The Soviet Embassy in Tehran was stormed by thousands of Afghans and their Iranian supporters who tore down the Soviet flag before being driven away by Iranian police.

2 Jan - A crack division of 10,000 Soviet troops, supported by heavy armor and warplanes, launched an all-out attack on Moslem rebel forces south of Kabul, Afghanistan.

- The Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, India was seized briefly by about 85 Afghan students protesting Soviet invasion of their country.

- President Carter recalled U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Thomas J. Watson for consultations regarding the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan.

3 Jan - India's seventh national parliamentary elections were held.

- Consideration of the SALT II Treaty was formally suspended by the United States.

- The State Department announced plans to sell $291.7 million of defensive arms to Taiwan.

- Fifty-two nations called for an urgent meeting of the U.N. Security Council to consider the situation in Afghanistan.

4 Jan - In response to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, President Carter cut off sale of high technology equipment and grain
to the USSR and limited Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters.

5 Jan - Secretary of Defense Harold Brown arrived in Beijing for an eight-day visit, the first to China by a senior Pentagon official since the Communists came to power in 1949.

- A small explosive device was hurled at the U.S. Embassy in Manila. There were no injuries and only minor damage was reported.

7 Jan - The Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council resolution condemning the invasion of Afghanistan.

8 Jan - U.S. administration officials disclosed that the United States had sent two Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to Egypt to practice combat operations

- The Washington Post reported that the United States had informed Great Britain of further plans to develop Diego Garcia as a military base including the capability to handle aircraft carriers and other large vessels.

13 Jan - The United States offered Pakistan a tentative two-year economic and military aid package worth about $400 million to help meet the threat of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

14 Jan - Indira Gandhi was sworn in as Prime Minister of India.

- The U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning "armed intervention" in Afghanistan and called for the immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

- The President of the Marshall Islands and the U.S. Negotiator for Micronesian Status Negotiations initiated an agreement that gave limited independence to the Marshalls while the United States retained military and security rights.

17 Jan - President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan reportedly called a U.S. offer of $400 million in aid, "peanuts."
18 Jan - U.S. Air Force officials on Okinawa announced that an AWACS aircraft would be stationed at Kadena AB starting in July with three more to be added by 1983.

19 Jan - The Afghan Government expelled journalists with U.S. passports after keeping them under house arrest for two days.

20 Jan - The Defense Department approved full-scale production of the Army's XM-1 main battle tank.

21 Jan - President Carter pledged to see increased U.S. military strength as his top foreign policy priority during 1980.

23 Jan - The Chicago Tribune reported that U.S. Air Force B-52s were flying surveillance missions in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea oil tanker lanes.

- In his State of the Union Address, President Carter said the United States was ready to go to war if necessary to protect vital energy supplies in the Persian Gulf area. The President also said he would seek legislation and funds to revitalize the Selective Service System.

24 Jan - State Department spokesman Hodding Carter III cited strong circumstantial evidence that the Soviet Union was using lethal chemicals against Afghan nationalists resisting the Soviet subjugation of their country. He stopped short of an accusation to that effect because the Administration lacked absolute proof although reports of the use of a chemical vapor dropped from aircraft in bombs have circulated since September 1979 (before the Soviet invasion).

- Anti-Soviet sentiment prodded Congress into approving a U.S.-China trade treaty signed on 7 July 1979, thereby elevating China's trade status above that of the USSR. The treaty granted China most favored nation status and placed it on an equal footing with other American trading partners.

- The Defense Department announced that the United States would sell China military equipment but not weapons. In Beijing U.S. and Chinese officials signed a memorandum of understanding to build a receiving station in China for reception of data from a U.S. satellite.
28 Jan - President Carter submitted a record $141.7 billion defense spending plan to Congress to expand American military power and contain Soviet aggression.

29 Jan - The Senate adopted a resolution [88 to 4] calling for the United States to boycott the Moscow Summer Olympics unless the games were postponed, canceled, or moved, regardless of whether or not Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan.

U.S. and Canadian officials announced that six American diplomats, who had evaded capture at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and who had been hidden in Canada's Tehran Embassy, escaped from Iran last weekend with the help of the Canadian Ambassador and using Canadian passports.

30 Jan - The State Department announced heavy fighting between Vietnamese troops and Cambodian forces loyal to ousted premier Pol Pot close to refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border.

31 Jan - The Baltimore Sun reported that Australia's Prime Minister Malcom Fraser had offered the United States staging facilities at Australian naval bases to help meet the strategic situation arising from Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

1 Feb - Presidential envoy Clark M. Clifford said in New Delhi that the United States had reversed its position and was willing to sell sophisticated military supplies to India.

2 Feb - Prime Minister Ohira named Kichizo Hosoda as Japan's new Defense Agency Director General with the rank of cabinet minister. Hosoda replaced Enji Kubota who resigned to assume blame for an embarrassing spy scandal.

3 Feb - Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq said that U.S. national security adviser Brzezinski promised him that U.S. forces would come to Pakistan's defense in the event of a Soviet attack. After two days of talks in Islamabad, Brzezinski affirmed the U.S. commitment under a 1959 mutual security agreement and said the proposed $400 million in U.S. aid was only a start in the U.S. response to the threat posed by Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
5 Feb - Admiral Robert L.J. Long, CINC PAC, testified before members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on 5 and 6 February, respectively.

7 Feb - In a North Vietnamese cabinet shakeup, Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap was replaced by General Van Tien Dung and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh was replaced by Nguyen Co Thach.

11 Feb - Thailand's Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanan axed 19 ministers of foreign affairs, industry, education, justice, and science while the powerful interior minister Lek Naomali was elevated to Deputy Prime Minister.

12 Feb - President Carter dispatched a four-ship Marine amphibious unit carrying 1,800 Marines to join U.S. naval forces in the Arabian Sea off the coast of Iran. According to Administration officials the purpose was to shore up the defense of Pakistan and nearby oil states.

18 Feb - Philippine Deputy Foreign Minister Ingles said his government had agreed to let the United States use its military bases in the Philippines as staging areas for U.S. Marines headed for the Arabian gulf.

19 Feb - Prime Minister Fraser announced that Australia would spend $19.4 billion on defense over the next five years to help the United States protect the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

20 Feb - State Department spokesman Hodding Carter announced that the United States would not participate in the Moscow Olympics this summer because Soviet troops were not withdrawn from Afghanistan by the 20 February deadline.

20 Feb - Agreement was reached in Washington by President Carter and Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi for U.S. use of port and military facilities in Kenya. The agreement would allow for re-positioning of military equipment for rapid deployment forces and permit increased use of port facilities at Mombasa.

26 Feb - Japan's Navy embarked on its first training exercise with U.S., Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand forces in the Central Pacific. On 24 February 6,000 demonstrators had staged a protest at the naval port of Yokosuka against Japan's participation in the exercise.
27 Feb - At the conclusion of a two-day annual meeting of the ANZUS Council in Washington, D.C., Australian Foreign Minister Peacock announced an Australian carrier task group would be deployed to the Indian Ocean. New Zealand Foreign Minister Talboys said his country would contribute naval and air support to an increased Indian Ocean presence to the extent its resources would allow.

- In Bogota, Colombia, leftist guerrillas seized the Dominican Republic's embassy during a reception and took U.S. Ambassador Diego Asencio and a large portion of Bogota's diplomatic corps hostage.

29 Feb - South Korea reinstated the civil rights of 687 former opponents of President Park Chung-hee, including opposition leader Kim Dae-jung. The amnesty was announced by President Choi Kyu-hah in a drastic move to patch up national unity.

- Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanan resigned, leaving one of America's closest allies in Asia without a head of government. Under Kriangsak's leadership, Thailand had tried to maintain a middle road among the divergent currents of U.S., Soviet, and Chinese waves of influence in Southeast Asia. Kriangsak had taken power in a quiet coup d'etat in 1977.

1 Mar - In Washington, D.C., it was reported that the Soviet Union had airlifted additional soldiers to Afghanistan bringing the total of Soviet troops there to 75,000; 25,000 more were stationed along the Soviet-Afghanistan border.

- Chief of the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff General Sany bin Abdul Ghaffer announced that Malaysia planned to beef up its armed forces to more than 100,000 troops by the end of the year; 30,000 to 40,000 new recruits were to be enlisted during the year in addition to the existing strength of 70,000.

3 Mar - The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea opened a 10-week session aimed at reaching final agreement among all countries on a comprehensive new legal order for the oceans.

- King Phumiphon Adunyadet appointed Defense Minister General Prem Tinsulanon as Prime Minister of Thailand following a weekend of political jockeying.

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6 Mar - Colonel Pak Hung-ju was executed by firing squad for his involvement in the murder of President Park Chung-hee in October 1979.

- Administration sources reported that the United States had shelved plans for obtaining Congressional approval for $400 million in economic and military aid to Pakistan. The day before, Pakistan's adviser on foreign affairs had announced that Pakistan would not accept the U.S. $400 million proposal.

10 Mar - U.S. Defense Department sources said the early warning systems that would tell the President of a Soviet missile or bomber attack were less than 100 percent reliable and had weak links that needed improving. Top Air Force commanders, in their annual budget testimony, had repeatedly warned Congress of these gaps, but so far funds for modernizing the complicated warning systems and their aging computers had not received urgent attention.

21 Mar - During a two-day visit to Washington, D.C., Japanese Foreign Minister Saburo Okita told the United States that Japan would increase its defense spending and lay out $1 billion this year to improve facilities used by U.S. troops in Japan.

22 Mar - According to Tokyo's Asahi Shimbun, Vietnamese troops in Cambodia had used poison gas against Khmer Rouge rebels near the Thai-Cambodian border. A surgeon on a visiting International Red Cross team said an autopsy on six dead Khmer Rouge showed they had been killed by poison gas.

23 Mar - Accepting a previous offer from President Anwar Sadat, the Shah of Iran flew to Egypt from Panama one day before extradition papers were to be filed by Iran.

24 Mar - Indonesia's Armed Forces started the biggest combined military exercise ever held in the country's history. The war games involved a total of 30,000 troops in the South China Sea and were to combat an "enemy" coming from the north.

29 Mar - The United States and Turkey signed an agreement that would enable the United States to continue to use an air base, four intelligence-gathering installations, and seven communications stations in return for military and economic assistance to Turkey.
1 Apr - In Congressional testimony, Under Secretary of Defense Robert W. Komor announced the United States would station from 15 to 100 Americans as caretakers for expanding military facilities in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia as part of a U.S. military buildup in the Indian Ocean region. He said about $250 million would be spent to improve 10 ports and airfields.

3 Apr - The Baltimore Sun reported West Germany planned to send two destroyers and two support ships for an extended tour of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean as a show of concern for security in the region.

7 Apr - President Carter broke diplomatic relations with Iran, ordered all Iranian diplomats to leave the United States, and imposed a formal embargo on American exports to Iran. All visas issued to Iranians for future travel in the United States were to be invalidated.

8 Apr - South Korea announced the first launching of a domestically manufactured destroyer. The Koreans expected the destroyer's capability would be superior to that of any similar types in the inventory of advanced countries.

- At the conclusion of a three-year, $100 million reclamation project, Eniwetak islanders returned home after 33 years to the site of 43 nuclear tests that were conducted from 1948-58.

9 Apr - Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance called upon 25 American allies to joint the United States in an economic boycott of Iran.

10 Apr - U.S. Navy sources said POLARIS submarines operating from Guam would be withdrawn over a 15-month period beginning in July and be replaced by the fast TRIDENT submarines in 1981.

- According to radio reports from Tehran, Iranian naval units had steamed into Persian Gulf waters to "demonstrate their readiness to counter any aggression and violation of our territorial waters."

17 Apr - In announcing additional economic reprisals against Iran, President Carter declared that if these and allied pressures failed [to gain release of the hostages], the only next step available would be some form of military action.
17 Apr - Deputy Secretary of Defense Claytor stated that the U.S. Navy would move some of its ships from the Mediterranean and Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean permanently to sustain U.S. presence in the volatile Persian Gulf area.

- A U.S. Navy P-3 plane dropping skydivers over Pago Pago harbor clipped a tramway line and smashed into American Samoa's major luxury hotel. The plane missed a crowd of 5,000 spectators but the entire crew was killed.

22 Apr - Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos met with Admiral Robert L.J. Long, CINCPAC, at Camp Smith, Hawaii, for briefings on security in the Pacific area and U.S. bases in the Philippines.

24 Apr - In the wake of President Carter's threat to use military force against any nation trying to control the Persian Gulf and its oil, leaders of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee called for formal consultation under the 1973 War Powers Resolution.

25 Apr - In an early morning televised address, President Carter confirmed that because of equipment failure in three of eight helicopters, a U.S. attempt to rescue the 53 hostages in Iran was aborted the night before. As they withdrew, eight U.S. servicemen were killed when a transport plane carrying fuel and a helicopter collided on the ground and burst into flames at a rendezvous in the desert 250 miles south of Tehran. The President took full responsibility for the mission and for aborting it.

27 Apr - Eighteen hostages, including U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Diego C. Asencio, who had been held at the Dominican Republic Embassy in Bogota for 61 days were released.

- The Pentagon announced that U.S. naval strength in the Indian Ocean had reached a record high of 34 ships, with the arrival of the aircraft carrier CONSTELLATION and six escort ships, while the Soviets had 27 ships in the same general area.

28 Apr - Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resigned in protest of President Carter's attempt to rescue the American hostages in Tehran. Vance presented his hand-written note dated 21 April
to Carter four days after the forced cancellation of the mission. Vance had opposed the mission from the outset and had warned the President that he would quit after the raid whether it was successful or not.

1 May - In a ceremony at the White House, President Carter and Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira signed a five-year agreement for collaboration in basic scientific research.

4 May - In Belgrade, Tanyug, the official press agency, announced the death of President Josep Broz Tito after a long illness; Tito led Yugoslavia ever since World War II.

- The Soviet Union installed a permanent military base on an island chain north of Japan and strenghtened its troops there to division-force, reports said. Japanese Government sources confirmed that an army division headquarters was set up last February on Etorofu Island, the largest of the four Kuril Islands claimed by Japan but which had been held by the Soviets since the end of World War II.

6 May - The bodies of the eight U.S. servicemen killed in the unsuccessful 25 April rescue mission to Iran were returned to the United States. Tehran radio reported that the U.S. hostages were now being held in 12 cities, including Tehran.

13 May - Student demonstrations, which began in early May in Seoul and several provincial cities, gained momentum after a weekend lull. Chanting students, demanding an end to martial law, battled riot police.

16 May - A stunning no-confidence vote Friday against the ruling Liberal Democratic Party threw Japan's usually steady political scene into disarray and prompted the Prime Minister to call new elections for the second time in eight months.

- In Washington, D.C., the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission voted unanimously not to grant a license for the export of enriched uranium to India; the Indian Government had refused to accept international safeguards on its nuclear power plants.

18 May - China extended its military reach Sunday, test firing an unarmed CSSX-4 intercontinental ballistic missile 6,250 miles...
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into the South Pacific, and the official Xinhua news agency said the test achieved complete success. A missile with this range could carry a nuclear warhead anywhere in the Soviet Union or to the west coast of the United States.

25 May - Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao arrived for a nine-day American visit during which China was expected to win approval to buy some U.S. military support equipment and high technology items.

27 May - South Korean army commandos and crack troops backed by tanks smashed a nine-day insurrection in the provincial capital of Kwangju in a pre-dawn assault, killing 13 students and militants.

28 May - India signed that nation's largest foreign arms purchase in a $1.6 billion agreement with the Soviet Union, the Defense Ministry said. They declined to disclose the types of weapons being bought from the Kremlin.

- Thailand Foreign Minister Siddhi Savelsila made an official visit to Washington, D.C., 28 May-4 June.

29 May - Commander of the United States Armed Forces in the Pacific, Admiral Robert L.J. Long, concluded a four-day official visit to Indonesia.

- After meeting in Washington, D.C., with Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Geng Biao, Defense Secretary Harold Brown said that the United States would permit the sale of air defense radar, helicopters, and transport planes to China and would allow U.S. companies to construct electronic and helicopter factories in China.

- India received 30 metric tons of heavy water from the Soviet Union officials said. The shipment was part of 250 tons of heavy water the Soviets promised India in an agreement signed last February, the officials said.

1 Jun - The United States was withdrawing 1,800 Marines it sent to the Arabian Sea in mid-March as part of a military buildup there following the Iran and Afghanistan crises, the Pentagon announced. The spokesman said the Marines, who were embarked on four amphibious ships, left the Indian Ocean

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through the Lombok Straits. They were accompanied by a cruiser and a frigate. The United States was maintaining about 25 ships—warships and support vessels—in the Arabian Sea on an indefinite schedule.

3 Jun - Because a computer error in the North American Air Defense Command indicated the launching of a Soviet ICBM, the U.S. strategic nuclear forces were ordered to a higher alert; the error was perceived and corrected in three minutes when direct data from sensors indicated a computer error. The only plane that did take off was an unarmed command and control aircraft from Hawaii, officials said. Pentagon spokesman Thomas B. Röpke said the EC-135 was not equipped to fire missiles by remote control. In November 1979 a similar error had led to a false alert.

5 Jun - Geng Biao, China's top military official, arrived at Hickam Air Force Base yesterday for a two-day visit before returning to Peking. His stay in Hawaii will complete a 10-day visit to the United States. He met with top U.S. officials, including President Carter and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, in Washington last week. In Hawaii, Geng met with Admiral Robert L.J. Long, Commander in Chief Pacific at Camp Smith.

- The United States reached agreement with Oman, a strategic Persian Gulf outpost, for access to air and sea facilities there as a bulwark against Soviet penetration of the oil-rich region. The Carter administration had been impelled to seek new facilities by the revolution against Iran's pro-Western government early last year. The Soviet drive into Afghanistan last December dramatized the search. Only British-owned Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean, is currently available to U.S. forces. Oman guards the Strait of Hormuz, through which 61 percent of Western oil supplies pass.

6 Jun - The U.S. early warning system again falsely indicated an alert.

12 Jun - Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira died of a heart attack; chief Cabinet secretary Masayoshi Ito became acting Prime Minister until elections were to be held. Ohira had been hospitalized on 31 May for exhaustion and a heart problem.
17 Jun - Assistant Secretary of Defense Gerald P. Dinneen said that the failure of a small 46-cent chip in an integrated circuit of a computer in the North American Air Defense Command headquarters in Colorado caused the false alerts on 3 and 6 June.

21 Jun - A North Korean spy boat was sunk and eight North Koreans were killed in a clash with South Korea military forces, and Seoul said the battle brought the two sides close to war. South Korea's Defense Ministry said the flareup was provoked by an armed North Korean spy boat that tried to land agents on a western coastal point in an apparent bid to stir up further anti-government violence in the South.


26 Jun - The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64) suffered a 15-foot gash on its port side in a collision in the Arabian Sea with a Bangladesh merchant ship, a Navy spokesman said. The CONSTELLATION was refueling from the USS PASSAPSIC (T-AO-1107) when it collided with the Bangladeshi merchant ship BANGLAR JOY; but no casualties were reported from either of the vessels.

27 Jun - Preliminary agreement was reached with Kenya on expanded U.S. military use of port and airfield facilities in that East African country, the State Department announced. No details were given, but the agreement was part of a major American effort to obtain sea and air facilities in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean area for use in emergencies.

30 Jun - Meetings of U.S.-Japan Subcommittee of Security Consultative Committee XIII were held in Honolulu, Hawaii through 2 July.

- An agreement for cooperation with Indonesia concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy was signed in Washington.

2 Jul - Acting under the Military Selective Service Act, President Jimmy Carter signed a proclamation ordering some four million men born in 1960 and 1961 to register for possible military conscription.
3 Jul - The United States was sending seven ships loaded with military equipment for a reinforced Marine brigade to the Indian Ocean in case of emergency, the Defense Department said. The ships carried tanks, artillery, and ammunition for a reinforced Marine brigade of 12,000 men. Some of the ships would probably be stationed at the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia.

4 Jul - President Carter made an official visit to Tokyo to attend a memorial ceremony honoring the late Japanese Prime Minister Ohira. While in Japan, he conferred with Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng, also attending the ceremony.

15 Jul - Zenko Suzuki was named Prime Minister of Japan.

16 Jul - The United States and Japan held discussions on a Pacific Basin spent nuclear fuel storage study, 16-18 July.

- Soviet access to the former U.S. military base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, was giving birth to a new and dramatic expansion of Soviet military activity in Southeast Asia. Western diplomatic sources confirmed that the Soviets had moved into the sensitive former military base, which they apparently intended to use as the hub of their military operations in Southeast Asia. The sources noted that from Cam Ranh Bay, Soviet heavy bombers were within two hours of the Malacca Strait, a critical chokepoint for Asian oil routes, and even closer to the large U.S. air and naval bases on the main Philippine island of Luzon.

24 Jul - The Administration announced it was willing to sell $3.1 billion worth of F-16 or F-18 fighter aircraft to Australia for upgrading Australian and allied defenses in the Pacific area. The Defense Department said the sale of 75 F-16 or F-18 fighters to Australia would not change the regional balance of power but would assist Australia in maintaining stability in the area.

29 Jul - The 64,000-ton U.S. aircraft carrier MIDWAY (CV-41) and the Panamanian registered merchant ship CACTUS collided Tuesday in Far Eastern waters. Two U.S. sailors were killed and three injured, the Navy said. Preliminary information indicated there were no casualties aboard the log-carryer CACTUS, and the extent of damage to the merchant ship was not
immediately known. The collision occurred in a passage between Palawan Island in the Philippines and North Borneo, about 450 nautical miles southwest of the U.S. Facility, Subic Bay. MIDWAY left Subic on 15 August after completion of repairs for minor gashes on its left side.

18 Aug - A Soviet transport plane violated Japan's air space near the Goto Islands off Nagasaki Prefecture in western Japan on its way to Hanoi from Khabarovsk, it was reported. The Japanese Defense Agency said the transport plane, identified as an Ilyushin IL-62 of Aeroflot, violated Japan's air space for some 15 minutes, apparently to avoid storm clouds, which prompted six Air Self-Defense Force fighters to scramble and order the Soviet plane to get out of Japanese air space. The next day Japan, aggrieved by repeated Soviet violations of its air space, announced it would arm the nation's jet interceptors with air-to-air missiles for the first time since the early 1970's.

19 Aug - USS MIDWAY (CV-41) sailed into the Indian Ocean and relieved the USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64), the Defense Department disclosed. MIDWAY took over as leader of an eight-ship battle group that operated in the Indian Ocean along with a five-ship battle group headed by the nuclear-powered carrier USS EISENHOWER (CVN-69).

20 Aug - U.S. Republican vice presidential candidate George Bush arrived in Beijing for a visit with Chinese leaders.

21 Aug - A Soviet freighter began evacuating survivors aboard a Russian nuclear submarine that was engulfed by fire in the Pacific, authorities said. The blaze killed at least nine crewmen on the ECHO-1 type submarine and three others suffered burns, officials of Japan's Maritime Safety Agency said. The Russian crew refused assistance from Japanese vessels that reached the scene of the accident, about 97 miles east of Okinawa. The next day, fearing radiation leakages, Japan refused the crippled submarine passage through its territorial waters. Government officials said notification of the refusal was made through the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo as a Soviet tug and three companion ships maneuvered to shepherd the submarine to its Siberian base.
22 Aug - The United States signed an agreement that allowed American forces to use Somalia's military bases. Similar arrangements had been negotiated and signed with Kenya, Somalia's southwestern neighbor, and with Oman, on the southern edge of the entrance to the Persian Gulf.

23 Aug - The Japanese Government lodged a strong protest with the Soviet Union over the violation of its territorial waters by a Russian nuclear submarine disabled on 21 August and the tugboat towing it to its home base. The Japanese Government turned down a Soviet request to pass the firegutted submarine into the territorial waters because of fears of radiation leakage. However, the tug and submarine crossed the territorial waters just north of Okinawa and moved to the East China Sea.

27 Aug - Egypt confirmed it had offered the United States air and naval facilities for the first time at a Red Sea port, which might be used eventually by the new U.S. Rapid Deployment Force. Discussions were held some time ago on the use of the port of Bernice on Ras Banas Peninsula, which juts out into the Red Sea, 80 miles north of the Egyptian-Sudanese border. The port included a naval base and a military airstrip. According to the Washington Post, American troops could fly to the base during periods of Middle East tension, but would not be stationed there permanently.

28 Aug - The Soviet aircraft carrier MINSK was spotted cruising south in the strait between Japan and South Korea, the Japanese Defense Agency said. It was the first time the 32,000-ton carrier had been sighted by Japanese patrol craft since it arrived at the Siberian base of Vladivostok in June 1979. MINSK, accompanied by a 3,300-ton KRIVAK-type missile cruiser, was headed for the East China Sea through the Tsushima, or Korea, strait.

30 Aug - Three Soviet warships, including the aircraft carrier MINSK, had cruised south of Japan within the past 24 hours, Japanese Defense officials said. The officials also said an 8,200-ton Soviet guided missile cruiser of the KARA class was spotted sailing down the Sea of Japan. The Soviet naval movement prompted speculation that the flotilla was on a mission either to the Indian Ocean or the Arabian Sea.
30 Aug - In New Delhi, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi denounced the United States for rescinding tariff protection on Indian manufactured goods imported by the United States.

5 Sep - General Edward Meyer, the Army's Chief of Staff, announced Friday a gradual withdrawal of some 7,000 U.S. troops from Europe and Korea as part of a "master plan" to improve the readiness of the Army. Meyer said U.S. forces in Europe and South Korea were manned at about 103 percent authorized strength. The drawdown would leave U.S. forces in both places at 100 percent strength, he said. Meyer said about 6,000 troops would be withdrawn from the 200,000 in Western Europe and about 900 from the 30,000 in South Korea.

6 Sep - The Soviet aircraft carrier MINSK, which had been cruising through the South China Sea for a week, put into the former U.S. naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, for refueling, Kyodo News Service reported.

8 Sep - In Beijing, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Transportation and Telecommunications Boyd Hight and Chinese officials initialed an agreement to begin regular commercial flights between the United States and China.

12 Sep - In Manila nine bombs exploded in buildings around the city; the 6 April Liberation Movement claimed responsibility for the bombings.

17 Sep - Iraq renounced the 1975 border settlement with Iran; the two countries were at war. Since 2 September both had reported border clashes and air strikes.

- The United States and China signed four bilateral agreements—civil air transport, textile, maritime transport, and consular.

18 Sep - Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito made an official visit to the United States from 18 to 25 September.

22 Sep - Blustery winds and heavy seas thwarted attempts by antinuclear demonstrators in small craft to protest the arrival in Wellington, New Zealand, of the U.S. nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser USS TRUXTON (CGN-35). Police said about six small craft braved the weather to meet the ship but they were easily kept away by naval and harbor board
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patrol boats. Dockworkers walked off the job and closed Wellington port to protest the visit, as they had done during the vessel's last visit in 1976. TRUXTON called at the New Zealand capital following exercises with the New Zealand Navy in the Tasman Sea.

23 Sep - Iran had more military equipment and people than Iraq, but could lose an all-out war because its soldiers lacked discipline and its hardware might not be in top shape, American military analysts said. Pentagon spokesman Thomas Ross said no American military forces had been put on alert as a result of the conflict, even though it could threaten to halt oil supplies to the West from the Persian Gulf. The United States had two ships in the gulf--the LASALLE, flagship of the U.S. Middle East Force, and the frigate BOGEY. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier EISENHOWER (CVN-69) and its accompanying ships were about 1,000 miles away. In addition, 1,800 U.S. Marines were aboard four amphibious ships in the Arabian Sea.

- A Foreign Ministry official said that China would not resume peace talks with Vietnam because of Vietnam's aggression toward Kampuchea.

26 Sep - China for the first time admitted that it had nuclear-powered submarines. A vice minister in the Chinese machine-building ministry said that China had experience in constructing nuclear submarines but did not disclose how many of the vessels the Chinese Navy had.

29 Sep - The nuclear-powered cruiser USS TRUXTON sailed from Wellington, where its presence had sparked protest marches and union shutdowns of port and ferry services. The protests were the latest demonstrations in New Zealand against nuclear-powered warships' visits.

30 Sep - The United States was rushing four special early-warning radar planes to Saudi Arabia to help strengthen the oil-rich country's air defense against a possible spread of the war between Iraq and Iran, the Pentagon announced. In announcing the shipment of the highly sophisticated planes, U.S. officials said the deployment was temporary and stressed that the move did not mean the United States was taking sides in the Iran-Iraq war. The decision to deploy the aircraft was
made in response to a request from the government of Saudi Arabia.

2 Oct - In Pakistan, Afghan guerrilla leaders reported a new Soviet offensive in the Kunar Valley, along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

- The United States ordered the carrier MIDWAY to join the flattop EISENHOWER near the Persian Gulf as Middle East hostilities stopped two Soviet cargo vessels from unloading arms in Iraq. The MIDWAY, guided missile cruiser LEAHY, guided missile destroyer PARSONS, and oiler NAVASOTA had entered the Arabian Sea and were expected to join the EISENHOWER on 3 October, U.S. officials said. The two carriers would launch some 170 aircraft, a significant tactical air force.

4 Oct - An Indonesian patrol boat fired on and seized a Japanese fishing boat with its crew of 10. None of the crew was injured in the incident which took place 124 miles northwest of Indonesia's Celebes Island.

5 Oct - Representatives of the United States and of the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands concluded five days of negotiation in Hawaii over the future political status of those islands, which are part of the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

7 Oct - China strongly protested and said that the Soviet Union must take full responsibility for a border shootout between troops in which two persons were killed. The firefight occurred along the river Argun in the remote northeast Inner Mongolia region. It was the first serious border incident between the two countries since July 1979.

15 Oct - China officially protested the 2 October signing of an agreement between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taiwan Coordination Council for North American Affairs; Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin said the accord betrayed principles established between the United States and China.

16 Oct - China set off a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, its first such test since 1978. U.S. officials immediately activated a nationwide network of stations to monitor fallout
from the huge radioactive cloud when it was expected to reach the United States in four to five days.

18 Oct - Australia held parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser's Liberal Party was returned to office.

23 Oct - Soviet Premier Kosygin resigned and was replaced by his First Deputy, Nikolai A. Tikhonov.

29 Oct - The Defense Department disclosed that between 10 and 14 additional nuclear warheads would be carried by submarine-launched POSEIDON missiles. 

30 Oct - The United States had dispatched a third aircraft carrier, the RANGER (CV-61), into the Indian Ocean to relieve the MIDWAY, the Pentagon said. RANGER was accompanied by the guided missile destroyer GOLDSBOROUGH (DDG-20), the frigates BADGER (FF-1071) and OUELLET (FF-1077), and the oiler PASSUMPSIC (T-AO-1107). Additionally, the United States had sent three amphibious ships with 1,800 Marines aboard to the area. These ship movements brought to 37 the number of ships the United States had deployed in the Indian Ocean area compared to 25 for the Soviet Union.

1 Nov - The United States, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia initialed agreements that gave the island groups self-government.

2 Nov - The Soviet aircraft carrier MINSK and three support ships steamed into the Gulf of Thailand to within 94 miles of Thai territory before turning back, Thai Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Samut Sahanavin said. The MINSK arrived in the South China Sea about 1 September from its base at Vladivostok and had operated from the U.S.-built base at Cam Ranh Bay of Vietnam.

4 Nov - In the presidential election, Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan and vice presidential candidate George Bush won 44 states, with 489 electoral votes; President Jimmy Carter won only 6 states and the District of Columbia, with 49 electoral votes. Ronald Reagan would become the 40th President of the United States. Independent candidate John Anderson received 7 percent of the total vote. Some 52.4 percent of the 160,491,000 eligible voters voted. Republicans
gained control of the Senate, 53 to 47; Democrats retained control of the House, 243 to 192, although they lost some seats. Republicans won 7 governorships, a gain of 4.

5 Nov - Three armed North Korean commandos were shot to death by South Korean troops in the North's first infiltration attempt since the two countries suspended their dialogue in September, the South Korean Defense Ministry said.

17 Nov - The United States and the Republic of Palau initiated the accord under which Palau would manage its own internal and foreign affairs under a "free association" with the United States.

19 Nov - By a vote of 111 to 22, with 12 abstentions, the U.N. General Assembly repeated its call for the Soviet Union to withdraw troops from Afghanistan.

21 Nov - The Soviet aircraft carrier MINSK was spotted by a patrol plane of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force cruising north 30 miles southeast of Japan's southern-most Kyushu island, the Defense Agency said. Agency officials said they believed the ship was headed for the Soviet Far East naval base at Vladivostok.

24 Nov - The International Monetary Fund approved a $1.7 billion loan to Pakistan, the largest loan ever granted by the IMF to a developing nation.

3 Dec - In Beijing, high-level talks on economic issues were held between Japanese Cabinet ministers and their Chinese counterparts.

6 Dec - Secretary of Defense Harold Brown was scheduled to visit South Korea on 13 December after two days of talks with Japanese officials in Tokyo, the Pentagon announced. Secretary Brown was to meet with Korean defense officials and President Chun Doo Hwan to discuss developments in bilateral security relationships during the previous year.

- Heavy fighting continued in Khuzistan, Iran's oil-producing province. Iranian planes attacked Kurdish cities in northern Iraq in an attempt to cut supply routes to Kurdish insurgents in northwestern Iran.
UNCLASSIFIED

8 Dec - Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev arrived in New Delhi for a state visit. On 11 December, at the conclusion of talks between Brezhnev and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, a joint communique was issued declaring each nation's opposition "to outside interference in the internal affairs of the countries" of Southwest Asia.

12 Dec - In Tokyo for two days of talks, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown urged Japan to increase military spending in the 1980's.

16 Dec - President Jimmy Carter signed the $2.88 billion foreign aid bill, although he declared that two provisions giving Congress veto power over some economic and military aid were unconstitutional.

18 Dec - Former Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei N. Kosygin died.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Antiaircraft Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>Air Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABNCP</td>
<td>Airborne Command Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADIZ</td>
<td>Air Defense Identification Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMIN</td>
<td>Administrative Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADOT</td>
<td>Air Defense Operations Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Automated Data Processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AECA</td>
<td>Arms Export Control Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSATCOM</td>
<td>Air Force Satellite Communications System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGM</td>
<td>Air-to-ground Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIF</td>
<td>Automated Installation Intelligence File</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIM</td>
<td>Air-launched Intercept Missile; Air Intentions Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIT</td>
<td>American Institute in Taiwan; Advanced Individual Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALCOP</td>
<td>Alternate Command Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMEMB</td>
<td>American Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANMCC</td>
<td>Alternate National Military Command Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, United States (Treaty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOB</td>
<td>Air Order of Battle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARPA</td>
<td>Advanced Research Projects Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD(ISA)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD(MRA&amp;L)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIC</td>
<td>All-Source Information Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASICOM</td>
<td>All-Source Information Center Communications Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASOC</td>
<td>Air Support Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Antisubmarine Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATDS</td>
<td>Airborne Tactical Data System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOCONET</td>
<td>AUTODIN Conferencing Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTODIN</td>
<td>Automatic Digital Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOSEVOCOM</td>
<td>Automatic Secure Voice Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOVON</td>
<td>Automatic Voice Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>Aviation Gasoline</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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### B

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>BADGE</th>
<th>Base Air Defense Ground Environment (Japan)</th>
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<tr>
<td>BEN</td>
<td>Basic Encyclopedia Number</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEQ</td>
<td>Bachelor Enlisted Quarters</td>
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<td>BLA</td>
<td>Base Labor Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOM</td>
<td>By Other Means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOQ</td>
<td>Bachelor Officers' Quarters</td>
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### C

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>C</th>
<th>Confidential</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Command, Control, and Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAMHS</td>
<td>Compact Automated Message Handling System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>Civil Action Team; Crisis Action Team; Conventional Arms Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATF</td>
<td>Commander, Amphibious Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>Cluster Bomb Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTC</td>
<td>Command and Control Technical Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command (Korea); Combined Federal Campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG-K</td>
<td>Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea</td>
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<td>CHJUSMAGPHIL</td>
<td>Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAGTHAI</td>
<td>Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIIC</td>
<td>Combined Imagery Interpretation Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCADC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Aerospace Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCCFC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Combined Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCLANTFLT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCMAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Military Airlift Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACAF</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific Air Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACINST</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACREP</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACREP PHIL</td>
<td>CINCPAC Representative, Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUNC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief United Nations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUSNAVEUR</td>
<td>Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIWS</td>
<td>Close-In Weapons Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJC</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMMPS</td>
<td>Cruise Missile Mission Planning System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CMS Communications Security Material System
CMWG Cruise Missile Working Group
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
CNTL Command Nuclear Target List
COC Combat Operations Center
COINS Community On-line Intelligence Network Systems
COMINT Communications Intelligence
COMNAVFOR JAPAN Commander, Naval Forces Japan
COMNAVFOR KOREA Commander, Naval Forces Korea
COMNAVFOR MARIANAS Commander, Naval Forces Marianas
COMSEC Communications Security
COMUS Commander, United States Forces
COMUS Japan Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan
COMUS Korea Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea
COMUSNAVPHIL Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines
CONUS Continental United States
CPD Congressional Presentation Document
CRA Continuing Resolution Authority
CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CPICK COMSEC Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea
CRC Combat Reporting Center; Control and Reporting Center
CRT Cathode Ray Tube
CTAN CINCPAC Teletype Alert Network
CVAN CINCPAC Voice Alert Network

D

DAO Defense Attache Office
DASC Direct Air Support Center
DAAT Defense Attache
DBMS Data Base Management System
DCA Defense Communications Agency; Defensive Counter Air
DCS Defense Communications System; Deputy Chief of Staff
DECL Declassified
DEFCON Defense Readiness Condition
DFAAA Defense Facilities Administration Agency (Japan)
DFSC Defense Fuel Supply Center
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAOLS Defense Intelligence Agency On-line System
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DOD Department of Defense
DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
DPSCPAC Pacific Fleet Data Processing Systems Center
DRIS Defense Retail Interservice Support

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>DSAA</td>
<td>Defense Security Assistance Agency</td>
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<td>DSCS</td>
<td>Defense Satellite Communications System</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAM</td>
<td>Emergency Action Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASTPAC</td>
<td>Eastern Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEO</td>
<td>Equal Employment Opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELINT</td>
<td>Electronic Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E&amp;M</td>
<td>Environmental &amp; Morale Leave</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>Electromagnetic Pulse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOB</td>
<td>Electronic Order of Battle</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal; Estimated Operational Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERCS</td>
<td>Emergency Rocket Communications System</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSA</td>
<td>Eighth U.S. Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>EX</td>
<td>Exclusive (for)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Foreign Assistance Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAIF</td>
<td>Field Automated Installation Intelligence File</td>
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<tr>
<td>FICPAC</td>
<td>Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIP</td>
<td>Force Improvement Plan</td>
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<td>FLTSATCOM</td>
<td>Fleet Satellite Communication</td>
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<td>FMFPAC</td>
<td>Fleet Marine Force Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales; Field Maintenance Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRD</td>
<td>Formerly Restricted Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDIP</td>
<td>General Defense Intelligence Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLCM</td>
<td>Ground-Launched Cruise Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>Government of, Followed by Initial of Country Concerned, i.e. GOP-Government of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOB</td>
<td>Ground Order of Battle</td>
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<tr>
<td>HANKAM</td>
<td>Indonesian Department of Defense and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>High Explosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HF</td>
<td>High Frequency</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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HistSum  Historical Summary
HNFCP  Host Nation Funded Construction Programs
HUMINT  Human Resources Intelligence

I

IDHS  Intelligence Data Handling System
IDHSC  Intelligence Data Handling System Communications Network
IEMATS  Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System
IMETP  International Military Education & Training Program
IMP  Interface Message Processor; Inventory Management Plan
INDICOM  Indications and Warning Communications Network
INTELSAT  International Telecommunications Satellite
IPAC  Intelligence Center Pacific
ISA  International Security Affairs; Interservice Support Agreement
I&W  Indications & Warning

J

JASDF  Japan Air Self-Defense Force
JCMC  Joint Crisis Management Capability
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSAN  Joint Chiefs of Staff Alert Network
JDA  Japan Defense Agency; Joint Deployment Agency
JFY  Japan Fiscal Year
JGSDF  Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force
JIRSG  Joint Interservice Resource Study Group
JLAC  Joint Labor Affairs Committee
JMP  Joint Manpower Program
JMSDF  Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
JOPS  Joint Operation Planning System
JRC  Joint Reconnaissance Center
JSCP  Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSDF  Japan Self-Defense Force
JSO  Joint Staff Office (Japan)
JSPDSA  Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis
JUSMAG  Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group
JUSMAGK  Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea
JUSMACPHIL  Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines
JUSMAGTHAI  Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand

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K

KAL
Korean Air Lines

KTACS
Korean Tactical Air Control System

L

LF
Low Frequency

LGB
Laser Guided Bomb

LGD
Large Group Displays

LNO
Limited Nuclear Option; Liaison Officer

LOA
Letter of Offer/Acceptance

LORAN
Long Range Navigation

LP
Licenced Production; Liberal Party (Philippines)

LRC
Logistics Readiness Center

LTD
Language Training Detachments

M

MAB
Marine Amphibious Brigade

MAC
Military Airlift Command

MAF
Marine Amphibious Force; Military Assistance Funds

MAO
Major Attack Options

MAP
Military Assistance Program; Maritime Air Patrol

MARISAT
Maritime Satellite

MBA
Military Bases Agreement

MDAO
Mutual Defense Assistance Office (Japan)

MDB
Mutual Defense Board

MEECN
Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network

MILCON
Military Construction

MND
Ministry of National Defense

MOA
Memorandum of Agreement

MOGAS
Automotive Gasoline

MOU
Memorandum of Understanding

MPS
Maritime Pre-positioning Ships

MSC
Military Sealift Command

MST
Mobile Support Team; Mutual Security Treaty

MTT
Mobile Training Team

N

NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVFAFCOM
Naval Facilities Engineering Command

NAVSEEAECT PAC
Naval Shore Electronic Engineering Activity, Pacific

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NCA
National Command Authority
NCPAC
National Security Agency/Central Security Service Pacific
NEACP
National Emergency Airborne Command Post
NMCC
National Military Command Center
NMCS
National Military Command System
NORAD
North American Aerospace Defense Command
NOSC
Naval Ocean Systems Center
NSA/CSS
National Security Agency/Central Security Service
NCSC
National Communications Security Committee
NOFORN
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NTDS
Navy Tactical Data System
NTPS
Near Term Pre-positioning Ships

O

ODCI
Office of Defense Cooperation, India
ODRP
Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan
OLA
Offshore Labor Agreement
O&M
Operations and Maintenance
OPCOM
Operational Command
OPCON
Operational Control
OPEC
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPG
Operations Planning Group
OPLAN
Operation Plan
OPORD
Operation(s) Order
OPSEC
Operations Security

P

P&A
Price and Availability
P&B
Planning and/or Budgetary
P&R
Planning and Review
PACAF
Pacific Air Forces
PAC AIDS
PACOM Crisis Action Information Distribution System
PACCAT
PACOM Command and Control AUTODIN Terminal
PACFLT
United States Pacific Fleet
PACNAVFACENGCOM
Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
PACOM
Pacific Command
PACWRAC
PACOM WWMCCS Regional ADP Center
PAF
Philippine Air Force; Pakistan Air Force
PARPRO
Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program
PASOLS
Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar
PDSC
PACOM Data Systems Center
PIRCP
Proposed Integrated Relocation Program

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| PN | Philippine Navy; Pakistan Navy |
| PNG | Papua New Guinea |
| POL | Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants |
| POM | Program Objectives Memorandum |
| PPDB | Point Positioning Data Base |
| PRC | People's Republic of China |
| PSMM | Patrol Ship Multi-Mission |
| PWRMR | Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel Requirements |

| QRT | Quick Reaction Terminal |

| RAP | Rocket-Assisted Projectiles |
| R&D | Research and Development |
| RDJTF | Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force |
| REDCOM | U.S. Readiness Command |
| REVW | Review |
| RNO | Regional Nuclear Option |
| ROC | Required Operational Capability |
| ROK | Republic of Korea |
| ROKAF | Republic of Korea Air Force |
| RO/RO | Roll On/Roll Off |

| S | Secret |
| SAC | Strategic Air Command |
| SAM | Surface-to-Air Missile; Space Available Mail; Special Air Mission |
| SAMHS | Standard Automated Message Handling System |
| SAO | Selected Attack Options; Special Activities Office; Security Assistance Organization(s) |
| SCI | Special Compartmented Intelligence |
| SCM | Security Consultative Meeting (Korea) |
| SEAL | Sea, Air, Land (Team) |
| SECDEF | Secretary of Defense |
| SI | Special Intelligence |
| SIGINT | Signal Intelligence |
| SIOP | Single Integrated Operation Plan |
| SITREP | Situation Report |
| SLOC | Sea Lines of Communication |
SOFAS
SPINTCOMM
SRF
SRV
SSB
SUBPAC

TAC
TACAIR
TACAMO
TACC
TAG
TAM
TATS
TCC
TCN
TDI
TDY
TMPS
TNFIS
TOW
TPICK
TS
TTM

U
UHF
U.K.
U.N.
UNC
UPI
USA
USAF
USCINCEUR
USCINCRED
USCINCSO
USCINCSOUTH

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Status of Forces Agreement
Special Intelligence Communications
Ship Repair Facility; Special Reporting Facility;
Strategic Rocket Forces
Socialist Republic of Vietnam
Single Side Band
Submarine Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Tactical Air Command; Tactical Air Control
Tactical Air
Nickname for Airborne Very Low Frequency Radio Broadcasting
Tactical Air Control Center
Target Action Group
Theater Airlift Manager
Tactical Transmission System
Total Compensation Comparability
Third Country National
Target Data Inventory
Temporary Duty
Theater Mission Planning System
Theater Nuclear Force Improvement Study
Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided
Telecommunications Plan for Improvement of Communications Korea
Top Secret
Tactical Target Materials

Unclassified
Ultra High Frequency
United Kingdom
United Nations
United Nations Command
United Press International
United States of America; United States Army
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Commander in Chief Europe
U.S. CINC Readiness Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>USDAO</td>
<td>U.S. Defense Attache Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDLG</td>
<td>U.S. Defense Liaison Group (Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
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<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFJ</td>
<td>U.S. Forces, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFK</td>
<td>U.S. Forces, Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>U.S. Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USICA</td>
<td>U.S. International Communication Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USREDCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Readiness Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>U.S. Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTM</td>
<td>Universal Transverse Mercator</td>
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### V

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VIP</td>
<td>Very Important Person; Visual Information Processors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VLF</td>
<td>Very Low Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/STOL</td>
<td>Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### W

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>WESTCOM</td>
<td>Western Command (U.S. Army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WESTPAC</td>
<td>Western Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIN</td>
<td>WWMCCS Intercomputer Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRSA</td>
<td>War Reserve Stocks for Allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSEO</td>
<td>WWMCCS System Engineering Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWABNCP</td>
<td>Worldwide Airborne Command Posts</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWMCCS</td>
<td>Worldwide Military Command and Control System</td>
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(1) Volumes I and II are integrated in this index. Annexes to the CINCPAC History are not included as each contains its own index. The volumes are paged consecutively. Volume I contains Chapters I-V, pages 1-286. Volume II contains Chapters VI-XI, pages 287-626 and the glossary.

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