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HISTORY OF HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES, JAPAN

1973

RCS: CINCPAC INST. 5000.5C

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PREFACE

- (U) CINCPAC Instructions 5000.5C (045), Ser 1239 of 9 March 1971, require the Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan, to submit an annual historical report which will provide a compact historical record of the operations of its head-quarters, as a CINCPAC subordinate unified command head-quarters in the PACOM.
- (U) This history reviews those significant actions and events which took place within Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan, during calendar year 1973. It addresses the coordination, the essential task of COMUSJAPAN; administrative activities of the headquarters; and the problems and difficulties encountered. The areas are reviewed by subject, not necessarily in order of importance or magnitude. The history does not duplicate the history programs of the services, however relations between Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan, and other headquarters are covered when considered to be of interest.

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COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES, JAPAN

COMMAND HISTORY

1973

Prepared by the Office of the Secretary Joint Staff

Headquarters, U. S. Forces, Japan APO San Francisco 96525 Fuchu Air Station

1974

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SECTION I

STATUS OF THE COMMAND

GENERAL

- (U) The mission and functions of Headquarters, United States Forces, Japan, remained unchanged during calendar year 1973. Reviewing briefly, COMUSJAPAN Lieutenant General Robert E. Pursley, USAF, performs three main functions:
- a. (U) He is CINCPAC's representative in Japan, the senior military spokesman and a member of the Country Team:
- b. (U) As COMUSJAPAN, he administers the Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Japan; and
- c. (U) He coordinates joint service matters between the service headquarters in Japan and various agencies of the Japanese Government.

PERSONNEL

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- (U) The authorized personnel resources within the J3 Division are not sufficient to respond to assigned responsibilities in a manner and to a degree considered acceptable. The issues addressed in this history have not diminished during this past year; they have increased and this trend is expected to continue during CY 74. The reason for increased activity is a combination of factors: Okinawa Reversion expanded USFJ sphere of operations, the J3 Staff has taken on new initiatives and assumed new responsibilities within the operational arena and, finally, increased opposition in Japan to U.S. Forces activities has resulted in a corresponding increase in Division requirements. Major J3 areas of responsibility which require increased attention during CY 74: improved coordination of MDAO activities with the service headquarters in Japan, increased participation by the Staff in major JSDF exercises, substantive Bilateral Planning and increased coordination with the Joint Staff Office. JCS approval of the latest USFJ JTD change request and increased manning for this Division will be required to effectively accomplish assigned responsibilities during CY 74.
 - c. (U) The Facilities Section (J42) was adequately manned to cope with the issues and problems facing us.

 However, it was unable to perform any long-range planning

or conceptualizing. The magnitude and significance of day-to-day problems addressed by this section requires the full exploitation of available resources.

MILITARY STRENGTHS AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973

	Military Off/Enl	Total
MAINLAND		
U.S. Army	335/1,682	2,017
U.S. Navy	649/3,296	3,945
U.S. Marine Corps	653/5,515	6,168
U.S. Air Force	667/6,471	7,138
Sub-Total	2,304/16,964	19,268
OKINAWA		
U.S. Army	914/6,380	7,294
U.S. Navy	263/1,924	2,187
U.S. Marine Corps	1,413/16,805	18,218
U.S. Air Force	982/8,992	9,974
Sub-Total	3,572/34,101	37,673
GRAND TOTAL	5,876/51,065	56.941

HEADQUARTERS STRENGTH

31 December 1973

			Authorized	Assigned
ARMY		Officer Enlisted	11 05	11 05
Sub	-Total		16	16
				- 1 S
NAVY	• 5.	Officer Enlisted	08 <u>04</u>	05 <u>04</u>
Sub-	Total		12	09
AIR FOR	CE	Officer Enlisted	<u>11</u>	12 07
Sub-	Total	er er en er	18	19
MARINES		Officer Enlisted	06 <u>01</u>	06 03
Sub-	Total		07	, 09
CIVILIA	NS (US)	Section and a section of	24	· 22
TOTAL	magnise of the second	• The second sec	77	<u>75</u>
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THE USFJ STAFF

KEY PERSONNEL CHANGES IN 1973

Secretary Joint Staff (J02)

Col Daryle K. Baxter, USA, replaced CAPT Llewellyn D. Bowen, USN, on 11 July 1973.

Assistant Chief of Staff, J1

Lt Col Claude R. Rowell, USAF, became Acting ACofS J1 replacing Col George B. Lineker, USA, on 6 June 1973.

CAPT Harry L. Benson, USN, replaced Lt Col Claude R. Rowell, USAF, on 12 September 1973.

Assistant Chief of Staff, J2

LTC William K. Keller, USA, became Acting ACofS J2 replacing Col Andrew J. Roach, USA, on 7 July 1973.

Col Howard R. Ross, USA, replaced LTC William K. Keller, USA, on 10 August 1973.

Assistant Chief of Staff, J6

Col Joseph A. Novak, USAF, replaced Col Franklin J. Hickam, USAF, on 2 April 1973.

Director of Information (J71)

LTC Marvin L. Shiro, USA, became Acting Director of Information replacing Col Alan E. Goldsmith, USAF, on 16 April 1973.

Lt Col William M. Taylor, USAF, replaced LTC Marvin L. Shiro, USA, on 20 May 1973.

Chief of Protocol (J72)

Maj William J. Prout, USAF, replaced Lt Col Naoshi Hirazumi, USAF, on 15 June 1973.

Staff Advisor, Surgeon (J74)

CAPT Dermot A. Murray, USN, replaced CAPT Robert C. Lanning, USN, on 22 August 1973.

Staff Advisor, Comptroller (J76)

Col Lenore L. Henson, USAF, replaced Maj Thomas R. Bousquet, USAF, on 15 March 1973.

Staff Advisor, Provost Marshal (J77)

Col Stephen T. Frazier, USAF, replaced Col John Hunter, USAF, on 21 May 1973.

Staff Advisor, Safety (J78)

Col Warren J. Hunt, USAF, replaced Col Ernest G. Harley, Jr., USAF, on 21 May 1973.

SECTION II

PLANNING

OKINAWA RESIDUAL ACTIONS (U)

COMPANY OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR 1. (U) JSDF Okinawa Beddown: USFJ was the focal point for the coordination of JSDF beddown and transfer of MakaOkinawa Defense responsibilities to the GOJ. Milestones achieved included:

- a. Assumption of Ground Defense, Maritime Patrol, Air Defense Fighter Interceptor, and SAR responsibilities by JASDF on 1 January 1973.
- b. Assumption of SAM AD responsibilities by JSDF on 15 May 1973.
- c. Assumption of ACGW responsibilities and entire Okinawa Defense Mission by JSDF GOJ on 1 July 1973.
- d. Dissolution of the combined Ad Hoc Working Group for JSDF Okinawa Beddown on 29 June 1973.
- e. Coordination of temporary storage of JSDF SAM's in USF Okinawa facilities.

2. (U) Air Traffic Control (ATC):

- a. A major ATC issue facing this Division during CY 73 and will continue into early CY 74 is the development of agreements to insure the on-time reversion of Okinawa enroute air traffic control responsibilities from the U.S. to the GOJ in May 1974. Actions taken within the Civil Aeronautics Subcommittee (and made a matter of record in the Joint Committee) have established a clear record of positive U.S. cooperation and assistance to the GOJ. On-the-job training of JCAB air traffic controllers on a reimbursable basis in accordance with Foreign Military Sales procedures is underway in the USAF operated Okinawa Center. GOJ progress in training of controllers, construction of facilities, equipment installation and development of Letters of Agreement are being closely monitored and it appears that the GOJ will successfully meet the 15 May 1974 transfer date although a final decision is not expected until February 1974. Assignment of an Air Traffic Control Officer (AFSC 1616) to a permanent billet in the J3 Division in September 73 has been an important factor that has enabled USFJ headquarters to provide the technical expertise necessary to coordinate U.S. and GOJ activities in accordance with the Okinawa Air Traffic Control Agreement and the subsequent agreements relating to training of GOJ air traffic controllers.
 - b. In the meantime, little progress was made within the Civil Aeronautics Subcommittee to obtain additional designated training/testing airspace for U.S. Forces use.

Negotiations are at a standstill despite documented efforts on the U.S. side to obtain resolution of this problem, which is now particularly sensitive in light of the arrival of the USS Midway and the return of the 1st Marine Air Wing to Iwakuni. The U.S. side will continue to press for negotiations with the GOJ on this issue during 1974. It should be noted that the GOJ has not placed restrictive limitations on our training/testing activities, therefore our negotiations will be aimed towards improvements in air safety rather than outright establishment of designated U.S. airspace.

c. Civil Aeronautics Subcommittee negotiations to revise the 1952 Agreement relating to Air Traffic Control have not progressed as rapidly as earlier expected. The major obstacle to revision of this obsolete document is GOJ reluctance to continue the U.S. advantages and priorities in the new agreement which were contained in the old agreement. In addition, the Annexes relating to Aircraft Accident Investigation and Search and Rescue Procedures require revision and the GOJ side has indicated that difficulty will be experienced in updating these Annexes due to the large number of agencies involved. The revision to the basic ATC Agreement is expected to be completed by mid-1974; however, Annex 1 and Annex 2 will require continued negotiations throughout CY 74.

OPERATIONAL MATTERS (U)

1. (U) MAAG Residual Functions: This headquarters continued to monitor, coordinate, and support the accomplishment of MAAG residual functions by the USFJ staff, the services in Japan, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Office. Staffing for the annual JSOP input was also successfully completed. Funds totalling approximately \$12,000 were available and supported 197 days of TDY (USFJ-50, USA-87, USN-53, USAF-7). Staff personnel reductions, not only in this Division, but throughout the services, impinged on capabilities to fully cover all prospective and lucrative areas in this field.

2. (U) U.S. Forces Training Areas:

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a. The major training area objectives attained during CY 73 was the successful conversion of the North

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Fuji Maneuver Area (NFMA) into a II4 (b) SOFA facility. Objective for NFMA during CY 74 will be initiation of Over-the-Trail-Firing, once this is accomplished, our objectives for normalization of NFMA operations (pursued vigorously over the last five years) will have been acachieved.

- b. Other issues involving U.S. Forces training areas surfaced during CY 73 and, to a large degree, our objectives were attained. In support of Midway aircraft, negotiations were required to permit resumption of airground operations in the Ripsaw Range. In June, the GOJ announced plans to construct a civilian airfield on le Shima in support of EXPO 75. As operations from this airfield will impinge upon U.S. Forces use of the le Shima air-ground range, a special U.S.-GOJ working group was established by the Facilities Subcommittee in order to reach an agreement that would satisfy both U.S. and GOJ requirements. Six meetings were held during the remainder of CY 73; positions on both sides were hardened and a satisfactory agreement has not been reached. finally, U.S. Forces use of Okino Daito was suspended in August as the result of an internal GOJ controversy over ownership of this facility.
- 3. (U) Operational Coordination: Of major significance was the direct telephone links established between this headquarters and the service headquarters in Japan, and procedures have been established which provide for timely coordination of significant information. Additionally, operational plans and procedures were translated into USFJ plans and policy directives. Objectives attained include the following:
- a. COMUSJAPAN CONPLAN 5060 (NEMVAC) was published and approved by CINCPAC on 12 November 1973.
- b. USFJ Policy Letter 55-5 established a new incountry NUDET reporting system.
- c. USFJ Policy Letter 355-1 provided new procedures for coordinating typhoon warning information.
- d. USFJ Policy Letter 55-4 was revised; new directive promulgated USFJ and service headquarters responsibilities pertaining to MAAG residual functions.

- e. USFJ Policy Letter 355-2 was revised in order to update information concerning disaster control and military support.
- f. USFJ Policy Letter 50-1 pertaining to U.S. Forces training areas was revised.
- g. A new USFJ Policy Letter (USFJPL 55-6) was prepared in order to promulgate Headquarters USFJ requirements for significant information. This new directive was coordinated with the service headquarters in Japan and is now awaiting publication.
- h. A comprehensive revision was made to the USFJ Staff Procedures Manual in order to establish realistic staff procedures and actions in support of increased defense readiness conditions. In effect, the staff has translated "Lessons Learned" during the November 73 DEFCON 3 declaration into more comprehensive staff instructions and procedures.
- 4. (U) <u>USFJ Command Briefings</u>: The preparation/presentation of the <u>USFJ Command Briefing</u> is identified as a key issue in recognition of the amount of staff time required to revise and update this briefing. During CY 73, the USFJ Command Briefing was presented 48 times: 30 to U.S. military groups, 11 to U.S. civilians and DOD representatives, 5 to Japanese defense officials, and twice to UNC Rear-sponsored groups of third country nationals. There were several significant accomplishments in the USFJ briefing efforts during CY 73:

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- a. A new unclassified version of the USFJ briefing was prepared that includes simultaneous translation into Japanese through the use of headsets, earphones and a wireless radio transmitter. This briefing was presented several times to JN audiences with outstanding results.
- b. An entirely new JSDF briefing was prepared that factually presents an overview of the JSDF to include GOJ national policies/attitudes, assessment of each service and prospects for the future. On 13 December 73 this briefing was presented to the CINCPAC Japan Action Group (JAG) and on 14 December 73 to the CINCPAC Staff.

- c. The standard USFJ classified briefing was continually updated during this past year, the latest revision in December 73 incorporated film clips of JSDF activities and equipment.
- d. In addition to command briefings presented at this headquarters, a USFJ Staff Team visited all major service installations in mainland Japan and Okinawa. During these visits, the USFJ briefing was presented and the Staff representatives participated in useful discussions and exchanged views with service personnel. Visits included Misawa AB, Yokota AB, Yokosuka, Camp Zama, Atsugi NAS, Kamiseya, Iwakuni MCAS, Sasebo, Naha, Kadena AB, Ft Buckner, and Camp Butler.

SECTION III

FACILITIES MATTERS

1. (U) Key issues addressed in 1973:

- a. Negotiations between USFJ and the GOJ for the user of the new petroleum pipeline being constructed by the JNR in transporting POL products from the Yokohama terminal to Yokota AB.
- b. Orientation and organizational realignment to the petroleum management and distribution takeover by the Defense Fuel Supply Center.
- c. Inter-agency coordination of the Navy's P-019 fuel facility rehabilitation and the Army's Yokohama fuel tank repair programs. These are now scheduled for completion in CY 75.
- d. The ever-increasing requirements for antipollution and environmental protection by both the Japanese government and our own agencies.
- e. The fuel crisis, along with the resulting energy conservation functions. A continuing Energy Coordination Group has been organized to handle such matters as GOJ energy restrictions (electric power) and fuel allocation.
- f. Negotiation of replacement-in-kind agreements for fuel with the Japanese Joint Staff Office for the Air Force and the Navy.
- g. Reallocation of the fuel tankage in Japan to provide for the increased Navy ship activity in Yokosuka and Sasebo, as well as the distribution pattern changes brought on as a result of the Arab embargo.
- h. Implementation of the 23 January 73 agreement-in-principle regarding the Japan Facilities Adjustment Program (JFAP). This has been the key issue facing the J42 section and has commanded the vast majority of the section's time and effort.

- i. Development of the Joint Okinawa Base Incremental Consolidation Plan and its subsequent presentation to the GOJ.
- j. Implementation of the Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan, and problems related to the slippage of Phase I construction.
- k. Development of mutually acceptable procedures regarding USG-GOJ cooperation on environmental matters including on-site observations and sampling at U.S. facilities and areas.
- 1. Resolution of EXPO-75 related construction projects affecting U.S. facilities and areas on Okinawa, without degrading operational capabilities.
- m. Negotiation of electricity rates for U.S. Forces on Okinawa after reversion.
- n. Negotiation of acceptable water contracts for U.S. Forces on Okinawa after reversion.
- o. Movement of overweight/ oversize vehicles on Okinawa and on mainland Japan.
 - p. Movement of tanks and LVTP's on Okinawa.
- 2. (U) Major accomplishments during CY 73:
- a. Replacement-in-kind fuel agreements with the JSO for the JASDF/JMSDF and the USN/USAF.
- b. Agreements in concept with the JNR to install the fuel pipeline connections into our terminal at Yokohama and at Yokota AB in order to keep all of our operations within the confines of our bases. Any cost which would rightfully be ours is to be incremented over time as a part of the transportation charges on regular fuel shipments to Yokota AB. Our gains in this area, notwithstanding use of this pipeline, are not anticipated prior to late CY 75.
- c. Established allocation levels on gasoline for all rightful claimants.

- d. Established an Energy Coordination Group for the purpose of reviewing service conservation actions in a manner which allow for a complete exchange of information and provide a forum for the discussion of GOJ power and defense fuel allocation restrictions.
 - e. Completed the JP-5 (FSII) conversion program.
- f. Completed and presented the Joint Okinawa Base Incremental Consolidation Plan to the GOJ.
- g. Reached agreement in the Joint Committee on the procedures to be followed regarding US-GOJ cooperation on environmental matters. GOJ-requested environmental survey questionnaires for nineteen facilities were completed and forwarded to the GOJ and the USG has cooperated in making on-site environmental observations/sampling at seven U.S. facilities. No results have yet been received.
- h. Obtained a Joint Committee codification of the agreement regarding JFAP. This Joint Committee memorandum stipulates the oral agreements of 23 January 73.
- i. Established a JFAP Construction Panel which negotiated scopes and, to a degree, timing for the JFY 73 and JFY 74 JFAP construction.
- j. Resolved the conflict over rehabilitation of barracks at Misawa versus reconstruction. Resolution was in favor of reconstruction, which GOJ desired, with conditions that certain USG requirements be accomplished in JFY 74.
- k. Reached agreement on release of Camp Fuchinobe and U.S. Army Medical Center to the GOJ for certain relocations at Camp Zama.
- 1. Completed conversion of North Fuji Maneuver Area to Article II4(b) use and agreed on conditions of use.
- m. Handled all GOJ EXPO-75 requests expeditiously and offered a wide variety of alternatives to GOJ in cases where their requests could not be approved, e.g.,

Ie Shima, widening of Route 58 from Kadena north to Nakadomari.

- n. Completed negotiations and settlement of acceptable water contracts on Okinawa for U.S. Forces.
- o. Successfully completed the movement of tanks between Sagami Depot and North Pier and Numazu Beach to Camp Fuji training area.
- p. Established a subcommittee on movement of vehicles and development of a system on consultation for movement of overweight/oversize vehicles between the USG and GOJ.

SECTION IV

COMMUNICATIONS

- 1. (U) The primary and overall goal of the J6 Division has been to ensure that highly reliable and timely communications, both voice and record, with all necessary security protection, were continuously available to all U.S. Forces elements in Japan, and to and from higher, lateral and subordinate headquarters outside of Japan. The key task in meeting this goal has been to plan, organize and coordinate all the various components of the total communications system and its interfaces so as to attain an efficient and cost-effective dynamic equilibrium between demand and capacity.
- 2. (U) The following were the key issues faced:
- a. Consolidation of the Japan Telecommunications-Electronics Agreement (TEA) and the Okinawa TEA into a single document.
- b. Integration of the American Embassy Telephone system into the U.S. Military System.
 - c. Review and updating of documentation.

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- d. Modification of communications arising from base/installation consolidations.
- e. Integration of Defense Special Security Communications System into the Automatic Digital Network System.
 - f. Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) easements.
- g. Review of communications ramifications of Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan (KPCP) and Japan Facilities Adjustment Program and evaluating alternatives to assure sufficiency in both quality and quantity.
- h. Automated telecommunications center consolidation study.
 - i. Telephone standards compliance (40/60 Class A/C ratio).

- j. Providing day-to-day radio frequency support to meet U.S. Forces requirements in Japan.
- k. Assisting in the planning of the Headquarters move to Yokota.
- 1. Communications support to Japan Self Defense Forces on Okinawa.
- 3. (U) Major accomplishments during CY 73: To insure that day-to-day communications coordination is effective, J6 chairs the Joint Communications Coordination Committee (JCCC) every three to four months. This meeting is attended by the senior communicators of each service and Defense Communications Agency Japan. All actions of mutual interest taking place are researched and informal discussions held concerning areas of command interest. Minutes are written and follow-on action taken, as necessary. This coordination and additional J6 staff activities resulted in the following major accomplishments during CY 73:
- a. AUTOVON Network Inward Dialing throughout Japan telephone system.
- b. Japan mainland/Okinawa Prefecture TEA Consolidation.

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- c. Re-issue of updated communications resources book, which lists each U.S. military facility in Japan, U.S. communications resources on each facility, known plans for each facility, if any, and affect on communications planning. This book has proved to be an invaluable tool which serves as a planning document to all services in the event future facility reductions are necessary. The book has been distributed throughout the services in Japan and Hawaii.
- d. Integrated Joint Communications System/Military Integrated Telecommunications System Okinawa.
- e. Termination of operation of the second Far East Network AM radio station on Okinawa.

- 4. (U) Major objectives not achieved during CY 73: Network Outward Dial into AUTOVON or commercial system. Navy and Air Force have achieved the necessary 40/60 class A/C telephone ratio and Army anticipates compliance by end of March 1974. This will enable direct outward dialing to AUTOVON at routine precedence for 10% of Class A phones. Installation of local Automated Message Accounting equipment will permit direct outward dialing into the commercial telephone system. This is scheduled for second quarter FY 75.
- 5. (U) The present structure of forces and resources for communications support to U.S. Forces in Japan is adequate. A significant concern will be the ability to maintain communications forces and asset levels sufficient to support contingency plans.
- 6. (U) The facilities and capabilities in Communications-Electronics (C-E) areas are modern and effective. A significant effort must be maintained to insure that phasedown do not reduce C-E capability to a point where communications are no longer efficient and effective.

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SECTION VI

POLITICAL/MILITARY MATTERS

- 2. (U) Implementation of Okinawa Reversion Agreement on labor: Considerable effort was expended at this headquarters, within the services, and at the local level on the conversions and administration of Okinawa employees to the indirect hire employment system. Inexperience on the part of both sides in Okinawa in the implementation of the system as administered in mainland Japan necessitated close coordination between the USFJ and GOJ (DFAA) in working the "bugs" of this implementation. This close coordination has paid off in terms of increased understanding and fuller cooperation at the local level in the appropriate enforcement of USFJ policy concerning maintenance of employee discipline within U.S. installations in the face of persistent union efforts and campaigns to undermine USFJ authority and control.
- 3. (U) 1973 general pay increase: Negotiations were successfully completed on 19 November 1973 on MLC, MC and IHA pay increase package and modifications with estimated savings to U.S. Forces of over \$1,000,000.
- 4. (U) Labor cost sharing study: Representatives of the J5 Division and the services in Japan developed a study

which provided options that could be used in future discussions with Japan for sharing labor costs associated with maintenance of U.S. Forces in Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty. Study was forwarded through CINCPAC to OSD in mid-1973.

6. (U) Major accomplishments during CY 1973:

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- a. Improved US/GOJ labor relations on Okinawa.
- b. Successful completion of 1973 General Wage Increase negotiations.
- c. Successful implementation of major reductions in force. Large RIF's were successfully implemented with a minimum of labor unrest. (Through CY 1973 over 8,000 local national employees were released.)
 - d. Development of the labor cost-sharing study.
- e. Participated in preparations for the newly established series of Security Consulative Group discussions which have enhanced the security dialogue between US/Japan.
- f. Publication of USFJ Compendium of US/Japan Treaties, Agreements and other documents.
- 7. (U) Major objectives not achieved:

- a. Labor negotiations: J5 Labor representatives were unsuccessful in getting GOJ to delete language and adjustment allowances from the basis of computation of bonus payments and retirement allowance. This change could have resulted in minimizing the cost for these latter payments by several million dollars. This will remain an objective for CY 1974.
- b. A continuing objective not fully attained is to strengthen, within the services, by staff visits, understanding of the provisions and limitations of the SOFA in an attempt to lessen the problems created between U.S. Forces and GOJ.
- Coverage for Okinawa employees: Currently their employees are covered by the GOJ-administered program pursuant to the USG-GOJ reversion agreement. After a joint USFJ-DFAA study it will be determined whether their employees should continue under the current coverage or be placed under the Health Insurance Society that covers the MLC/IHA employees in mainland Japan. The latter society is in the red on the fiscal year budget but the GOJ has been picking up this loss. At the end of 1973 it was agreed between DFAA/USFJ to delay a determination on changing the coverage of employees in Okinawa until the financial status of the USFJ Health Insurance Society was improved.

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SECTION VII

PUBLIC INFORMATION

- 1. (U) The key issue faced by the Office of Information during 1973 was the need to assure that public affairs efforts and programs undertaken were responsive to the needs of the command during this period of sensitive negotiations, changing national relationships, and new areas of emphasis. Towards this end, this office initiated a program in mid-year designed to:
- a. Establish relevant public affairs objectives and a plan of action to achieve those stated objectives.
- b. Increase the professional relationship with both local and Tokyo-based U.S. newsmen.
- c. Encourage greater staff utilization of public affairs capability.
- d. Encourage greater cooperation among service information staff.
- e. Combat perennial GOJ periodic premature public release of information.
- 2. (U) General achievements realized during 1973:
- a. Established a foundation for increased professional working relationships with both Tokyo-based U.S. newsmen and their Japanese counterparts.
- b. Improved the command's capability to be more responsive to media demands.
- c. Maintained close working relationships with service public affairs officers on major issues.
 - d. Realized limited success with GOJ agencies on the necessity for prior coordination of public announcements.
 - e. Provided significant public affairs support to joint special projects including Japan International Air Show.

- f. Supported two major community relations tours involving Defense Orientation Conference Association and Japan Defense Agency.
- 3. (U) Najor objectives not achieved during the year were:
- a. The desired degree of coordination with GOJ public affairs staffs, most notably DFAA.
- b. The strengthening of the ability to stay ahead of continuing developments of negotiated issues towards the institution of planned public affairs actions rather than defensive reaction-inspired efforts.
 - c. Increased news coverage of USFJ activities on both national and local media.

SECTION VIII

PERSONNEL/ADMINISTRATION

- 1. (U) Functionally, Personnel/Administration tasks fall into two general areas: (a) administrative support of the Headquarters and (b) coordination/catalyst of people-oriented programs.
- 2. (U) In the first area, the best measure of success is whether the entire staff has the resources to accomplish their tasks and are able to concentrate on those primary tasks with minimum concern for disruptive administrative details. These resources range from sufficient number of capable people to efficient administrative procedures. There have been no individual key issues in this area, but, collectively, it is considered a major accomplishment that this headquarters has been able to secure sufficient funds and personnel in these times of general austerity.
- 3. (U) The key issues in our people programs in 1973 have been drug abuse, customs, scout financing, COLA and off-base crime (Okinawa).

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- a. Drug Abuse: This is the most perplexing problem facing us. After reviewing almost two years of statistical data gathered under the auspices of the Tri-Service Drug Abuse Coordination Group, the overall accuracy of the data is questionable. It is recognized that each service has its own drug abuse program with the same overall objectives; however, with the close proximity of bases in Japan, particularly on Okinawa it would seem essential to have some coordination mechanism. It is not certain that the presently constituted body is the answer. A meeting with the services will be held in the near future to attempt to make the coordinated program more effective and to increase emphasis on alcohol abuse.
- b. Customs: The DOD customs program is well established in Japan with most activities certified by the U.S. Bureau of Customs. This program is closely related to prevention of drug trafficking and has probably been instrumental in reducing the flow of drugs through

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military channels. Its major objective is the prevention of movement of drugs and other contraband to the U.S. This seems to have been successful, but the program is expensive. In effect, DOD is financing primarily, a Bureau-of-Customs program.

- c. Scout Financing: Both the Boy and Girl Scout programs are financed almost entirely by service welfare funds. This year for the first time the participating commands have raised questions about the cost of scouting in the Far East. In fact, not all commands have come forth with their share of the Scouting budgets. This is understandable in view of the increasing costs of these programs and the decreasing availability of welfare funds.
- d. Off-base Crime (Okinawa): This is another program that is dependent on service efforts with this headquarters serving as a catalyst. Judging from statistics furnished from Okinawa Area Field Office, the efforts to reduce off-base crimes was a success in the first five months of 1973. Statistics for the latter half of 1973 have been received and analysis is nearing completion.
- 4.(U) Major objectives not fully realized in 1973 include:
- a. Drug abuse, a continuing problem that will require all-out effort on the part of everyone.
 - b. COLA was not established in Japan in 1973.

GLOSSARY

Air Defense	AD
Air Traffic Control	ATC
Aircraft Control and Warning	AC&W
Amplitude Modulation	AM
Automatic Voice Network	AUTOVON
Communications-Electronics	C-E
Contingency Plan	CONPLAN

Cost of Living Allowance	COLA
Defense Facilities Administration Agency	DFAA
Department of Defense	DOD
Electromagnetic Interference	EMI
Government of Japan	GOJ
Health Insurance Society	HIS
Human Intelligence	HUMINT
Indirect Hire Agreement	´ IHA
Japan Action Group	JAG
Japan Air Self Defense Force	JASDF
Japan Civil Aviation Bureau	JCAB
Japan Defense Agency	JDA
Janan Facilities Adjustment Program	JFAP

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Japan Maritime Self Defense Force /	JMSDF
Japan National Railway	JNR
Japanese National	JN
Joint Communications Coordination Center	JCCC
Joint Self Defense Forces	JSDF
Joint Staff Office	JS0
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan	JSOP
Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan	KPCP.
Landing Vehicle, Track, Personnel	LVTP
Liberal Democratic Party .	LDP
Mariner Contract	МС
Master Labor Contract	MLC
Military Assistance Advisory Group	MAAG
Military Defense Attache Office	MDAO
Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan	NEMVAC
North Fuji Maneuver Area	NFMA
Nuclear Detonation	NUDET
Office of Secretary of Defense	OSD
Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants	POL
Search and Rescue	SAR
Status of Forces Agreement	SOFA
Surface-to-Air Missile	SAM
Telecommunications-Electronics	TEA
Temporary Duty	TDY
United Nations Command	UNC

United States Air Force
USAF
United States Army
USA
United States Forces, Japan
USFJ
United States Forces Japan Policy Letter
USFJPL
United States Navy
USN

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