

# AFTER KOPKAMTIB

## *Indonesia's intelligence and security apparatus*

By RICHARD TANTER

*The abolition of the much-feared **Kopkamtib** has been interpreted as a liberalising move. But the rest of Jakarta's extensive and powerful security machinery is still in place.*

In September 1988 President Suharto announced the abolition of *Kopkamtib*, the Operational Command for the Restoration of Order and Security, and its replacement by *Bakorstanas*, the Coordinating Agency for the Maintenance of National Stability. The demise of the twenty two year-old *Kopkamtib* had been expected since early in the year; when Benny Murdani stepped down as Armed Forces Commander in favour of General Try Sutrisno, both Murdani and then State Secretary Sudharmono spoke in the press about the need to reconsider the suitability of *Kopkamtib* for the tasks of the present period.

The reasons for the removal of *Kopkamtib*, the de facto martial law command that has dominated Indonesian political life for over two decades, are not yet clear. Some were external like the need to assuage foreign criticism of government repression that even surfaced in the back-rooms of the last IGGI meeting, and Suharto's fruitless pursuit of the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement. Others were internal - including the desire of Murdani and other military leaders for the army to retain control of Indonesian society from a less prominent and visible position.

Whatever the full explanation, the abolition of *Kopkamtib* is an important symbolic liberalisation move by the government. The question is whether the symbol will be matched by actual changes in the behaviour of the armed forces, especially the Army and the Police. Hopeful expectations were diminished when it was announced that the new body would be under the authority of Try Sutrisno, and that all existing *Kopkamtib* legislation and regulations would remain in place until specifically altered. Underlining the point, a month after these apparently momentous changes the government secretly executed two former Cakrabirawa Regiment sergeants, imprisoned in 1965 and living under sentence of death in Cipinang prison for more than twenty years.

Even if *Bakorstanas* does turn out to be very different from *Kopkamtib*, the rest of the extensive and powerful Indonesian military and civilian intelligence and security-apparatus remains in place. While many of the key organisations date from the early days of the New Order, the system as a whole underwent substantial changes in the 1980s under the professionalising influence of Benny Murdani. This article is a brief sketch of the major organisations.

### **Kopkamtib/Bakorstanas**

While the abolition of *Kopkamtib* and its replacement with *Bakorstanas* (*Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional*) is extremely important, the influence of *Kopkamtib* will suffuse the new organisation for a long time to come. *Kopkamtib* was in many ways not a real, autonomous organisation, but a particular mode of operation of the Armed Forces Command under New Order legislation. Under that authority, there were almost no effective limits on the rights or powers of the *Kopkamtib*

Commander, on the regional army commanders who exercised their delegated powers as Special Area Executives (*Laksusda*). In effect, *Kopkamtib* allowed the military, especially the Army, to rule under de facto martial law.

With a few exceptions, *Kopkamtib's* central organisation was made up of the Staff Assistants and Support Echelon to the Armed Forces Commander doubling up as Assistants to the *Kopkamtib* Commander. At the regional level, the Commander of the Military Region (*Kodam*) doubled as Special Area Executive, and in turn, his Intelligence Assistant doubled in a *Kopkamtib* function (*Asintel Laksusda*), heading up a *Kopkamtib* Intelligence Task Force (*Satgas Intel*). And so on down the line through *Korem* (Resort Military Command), *Kodim* (district Military Command) and *Koramil* (Military Sub-district Command) levels to the village. In this way the entire army intelligence, social and political, and operational machinery was under the control of the *Kopkamtib* Commander.

In recent years, *Kopkamtib*, both centrally and at the *Kodam* level has developed a close connection with specialist surveillance and intervention units in the Department of Labour Power to suppress and pre-empt labour disputes and trade union formation.

A great fabric of national and local regulations was issued over the two decades of *Kopkamtib's* life. What remains to be seen is just how much of this *Kopkamtib* organisational and regulatory framework *Bakorstanas* abandons, and how quickly. One possibility is that an Internal Security Law, similar to those in place in Malaysia or Singapore, could be enacted quickly, with responsibility for implementation shared between the old Army/*Kopkamtib* structure and the National Police (which are very much a junior part of the armed forces).

As a 'coordinating agency' advising the President, *Bakorstanas* should not have an active operational role itself, but that remains to be seen. What is certain is that the 'national stability' it is seeking to maintain will be very broadly defined, and will increasingly be concerned with economic and labour issues.

### **Bais**

Undoubtedly the most important intelligence organisation proper in Indonesia today is the Strategic Intelligence Agency (*Badan Intelijen Strategis - Bais*), established in 1983 by Murdani. This all-military body under the control of the Armed Forces Commander replaced a smaller body also headed by Murdani for six years - *Pusintelstrat* (Strategic Intelligence Centre). *Bais* is a centralised operational intelligence-gathering body closely articulated with the operational resources of the Armed Forces Commander (and previously as the *Kopkamtib* Commander). It is the peak of the separate service (army, navy, air force and police) intelligence structures. Most importantly, it sits at the top of the Army's structure of intelligence assistants from the office of the Army Chief of

Staff through the *Kodams* and *Korems* and *Kodims* (where the Asintel line stops) to the local *Koramil* captain or warrant officer and the *Babinsa* (Village Guidance NCO) in the villages and *kampung*s.

*Bais* is a strategic agency in both military and political senses, and operates both domestically and abroad. It has at least ten section heads beneath the effective commander of *Bais*, the Deputy Head (*Bais*), currently Major-General Sutarjo (Murdani was the former head, and was not replaced earlier in 1988). Most importantly, unlike its rival *Bakin*, *Bais* has a direct link to operational forces through the Army/*Kopkamtib*.

**Bakin**

Formerly the pre-eminent intelligence agency, *Bakin*, the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency, was pushed into second position by the rise of *Bais* under Murdani's guidance. Founded in 1968, it has been headed since 1974 by one of President Suharto's most trusted advisors, Lt-Gen Yoga Sugama. In the late 1960s and 1970s *Bakin* went far beyond an intelligence gathering role.

During the time when Ali Murtopo was Deputy Head, *Bakin* was notorious for its black operations. Murtopo himself had control over the separate *Opsus* (*operasi khusus* - special operations) covert action and intelligence organisation, which ran along less bureaucratic lines and was essentially a private organization of Murtopo's. After Murtopo's political decline and his death in 1984 *Opsus* was dissolved and Murdani (for a time himself Deputy Head of *Bakin*) commenced the building up of the rival *Bais*.

*Bakin* is nominally a civilian organisation, and does employ civilians in its middle and lower ranks. But the four deputies (in charge of Administration, Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Analysis/Production) are all currently senior military men (serving or retired). Beneath them is a large number of directorates and bureaus. With the loss of its domestic operational authority (*Bakin* still has operational authority abroad) and the rise of *Bais*, *Bakin* has been forced back towards its nomi-

nal coordinating role. Much of its importance and influence comes from the fact that it is directly under the control of the President himself.

*Bakin* is experiencing the same passing of the generations as the Indonesian military as a whole. Yoga Sugama, trained at the Imperial Military Academy in Tokyo, must retire in the near future. In 1987 his deputy and contemporary Rujito was replaced by Major-General Sudibyo a Murdani protege. *Bakin* and *Bais* are in fact closely intertwined these days; Sudibyo is not only Deputy Head of *Bakin*, but also Director G (Intelligence Production) in *Bais*.

**National Police Intelligence**

Each of the four services within the Armed Forces has its own intelligence organisation, most importantly the Army. But the National Police Directorate of Intelligence and Security Affairs (*Intelpampol*) is also important, since the definition of criminality in Indonesia is so broad and subject to political direction that *Intelpampol* officers necessarily become involved in political surveillance and intervention.

The National Police, and *Intelpampol* along with it, are currently undergoing a considerable expansion, with increased responsibility for 'development problems'. With the abolition of *Kopkamtib* and its replacement by *Bakorstanas*, it is likely that police intelligence will become more actively involved with what are considered to be 'threats and obstructions to national stability and development'.

**Directorate General of Social and Political Affairs: Ministry of Home Affairs**

The military itself apart, the most important section of the Indonesian state is the huge Ministry of Home Affairs. Its importance can be seen by those at its head: former Army Chief of Staff Rudini is the present Minister, and the Secretary General is Major-General Nugroho, who simultaneously holds the position of Director A (Internal Affairs) in *Bais*.

**Who's who in intelligence**

**Sukarno**  
Major General, Army (born 1941, Semarang) graduated from the National Military Academy in Magelang in 1963. He began his intelligence career in 1970, after serving in RPKAD (paracommandos).



One of his first assignments was as personal Assistant to the Commander of *Kopkamtib* and from 1980-85 he was the Commander of the Armed Forces Intelligence Education Centre. After being involved in training Attorney-General's Department people in intelligence work he was appointed in 1988 to head the Intelligence Section of the Attorney General's Department.

**Sudibyo** Major General. Attended the Army Staff and Command School in 1973 and served in the mid 1980s as Assistant for Intelligence in the Defence Department. In 1987 he was appointed Deputy Head of *Bakin*, but appears to have served concurrently as Assistant I/Intelligence under the Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff and as Director for Intelligence Production in *Bais*.

**Muhammed Iman Sutarjo**, Major General, Army. Graduated in 1950 from the Army Officer's Education Centre and in 1954 was part of the first class, which also included Benny Murdani, to go through Commando Troop Instructors Training. He attended the Army Staff and Command College from 1969-70 but little is known of his activities until he was appointed as Deputy Head of *Bais* in about 1984. In 1988 he was the Director of the 'Vietnamese Management' section in *Bais*, an autonomous body responsible directly to Murdani.

**Yoga Sugama**, General, Army (born Tegal, Central Java 1925). Trained at the Agricultural Institute in Tokyo in 1942 and from 1942 until 1945 attended the Ground Forces Military Academy (*Rikugun Shikan Gakko*) in Tokyo. He returned to Indonesia in 1948, after having served as an allied military translator. Worked in intelligence during the revolution and in 1952-53 did an intelligence training course at Maresfield in UK. He was closely associated with Suharto in the late 1950s. After 1965 he occupied several key intelligence posts,



including Assistant for Intelligence in Kostrad (1965-66); Personal Assistant to the president in charge of intelligence and security (1967-?); Head of Intelligence at the Defence Department (1970-?); Assistant for Intelligence, *Kopkamtib* (1970); Chief of Staff of *Kopkamtib* (1978-80); and, most significantly, Head of *Bakin* from 1974 to the present.

## After Kopkamtib

The Directorate-General of Social and Political Affairs is responsible, according to the State Almanac, for 'political guidance (*pembinaan*) in the country, development of national unity in the context of activities for national political guidance, and Pancasila ideological development.' In practical terms the Directorate-General supervises the activities of 500,000 plus Category B and C former political prisoners, ensures that elections are conducted appropriately, and coordinates closely at all levels of government with the Army Social and Political Affairs staff who sit at the elbow of all civil administrators. At the village and *kampung* level, this Directorate-General links in to the base level intelligence system of the *rukun tetangga* and *rukun kampung* neighbourhood watch. The present head, Brigadier-General Hari Sugiman, was Formerly Personal Assistant to the then *Kopkamtib* Commander, Admiral Sudomo.

### Junior Attorney-General (Intelligence)

The intelligence apparatus extends to the legal system through the office of the Junior Attorney-General (Intelligence). Some idea of the increasing importance the government attaches to this organisation can be seen from those who head it. The present incumbent is Brigadier-General Sukarno, a long-time intelligence officer who came to the post after five years as head of the Armed Forces Intelligence Development Centre at Bogor from 1980-85. Like his predecessor Major-General Nugroho (now simultaneously Secretary-General of the Department of Home Affairs and Director A (Internal

Affairs) in Bais), Sukarno is a former Personal Assistant to the Commander of *Kopkamtib*.

### State Cryptography Institute

The State Cryptography Institute (*Lembaga Sandi Negara*) is formally responsible for all state encoding and cryptography policy, but particularly in the security field. Headed by Rear-Admiral Subardo, it is directly under the President. What is not clear is the extent to which this organisation is involved in foreign electronic surveillance (and whether in cooperation with other agencies, including *Bais* and *Bakin*).

### Opstib

When the President announced the abolition of *Kopkamtib*, he also announced the dissolution of a smaller organisation which grew out of *Kopkamtib* - Operation Order (*Opstib*). *Opstib* was apparently established in 1977 to be the regime's organisation to break corruption and smuggling (though some have suggested a broader agenda). The organisation was rather shadowy, but was closely linked to Murdani. Since large levels of smuggling and corruption and other illegal economic activities continue, it can only be assumed that *Opstib* was utilised selectively. One example was its use to break through obstructions to the construction of the Jakarta ring road caused by corruption, embezzlement and land fraud. The regime apparently felt that there were occasions when it needed to be serious about activities it would normally indulge. The promise that now *Opstib*'s functions will be carried out within each government department and agency is an interesting one. ●

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## Indonesia's Intelligence Empire

