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**CHRONICLE**



Issue No. 95


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# ***Pacific Alert:***

## **Nuclear Arms and the New Militarism**

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# ***Pacific Alert:*** **Nuclear Arms and the New Militarism**

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Special production assistance from *turnaround* and *Archetype* (typography), *Inkworks* (printing), and *California Trade Bindery* (binding)  
Graphic design & production by Bob Steiner

## Front cover photo:

*New Zealand peace fleet opposes U.S. warship visit in late 1970s.*

*Campaign sign urging Palauans to vote against compact which would allow the United States to bring nuclear weapons and materials into Palau.*

## A Note from the Staff:

A special note of thanks is due to Glenn Alcalay, who prepared the book and film reviews and contributed research to the article on Micronesia. He is Washington representative of the U.S. Pacific Network and is currently completing a doctorate in medical anthropology with a dissertation on the effects of nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands.

This is the second-to-last issue of the *Southeast Asia Chronicle*. Issue number 96, "Asian Women: Breaking Stereotypes," will be out in just a few weeks, thanks to special grants we have received to publish it. As we indicated in our letter to subscribers announcing the demise of the *Chronicle*, those of you whose subscriptions extend beyond issue 96 may receive back issues to compensate for the unfulfilled part of your subscription. Please make your requests soon!

Back issues will continue to be available from the Philippine Resource Center, P.O. Box 40090, Berkeley, CA 94704 and from the Asia Resource Center, 538 7th Street, SE, Washington, DC 20003. A complete list of back issues will be included in issue number 96.

## The Resource Center Staff

Staff members for the Berkeley office are Joel Rocamora and Martha Winnacker. Staff members for the East Coast office are Jacqui Chagnon, Don Luce, and Roger Rumpf. Contributing editor is Walden Bello.

## The Southeast Asia Resource Center

Formerly called the Indochina Resource Center, the SRC is a major nongovernmental source of information on current developments in the countries of Southeast Asia, and on the U.S. involvement there. The Center follows and interprets events in Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, as well as in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. This research and analysis continues in the tradition of the Indochina Resource Center, which played a key role from 1971 to 1975 as one of the sources of accurate information for the anti-war movement's successful effort to cut U.S. aid to the Thieu regime.

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# About This Issue

## The Pacific is the scene of a double confrontation—between the United States and the Soviet Union and between militarism and self-determination


**T**he waters of the Pacific are troubled these days. On the one hand, the winds of change. Palau stands up to U.S. bullying and reaffirms its nuclear-free constitution. New Zealand bans visits by nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed warships. The Philippine dictatorship totters as an armed revolutionary movement sweeps the country.

On the other hand, a hurricane of reaction is gathering momentum. Rein-vigorated by right-wing control of the presidency, the U.S. Navy in the Pacific flexes its muscles for a shootout with the Soviet Pacific Fleet. The Pentagon hopes to remold the Philippine Army as a counterinsurgency force to stop the New People's Army. In the central Pacific, Kwajalein serves as the launching pad for the Ballistic Missile Defense Program, the heart of Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" strategy.

In an all-out nuclear war, about 2000 U.S. and 3000 Soviet nuclear weapons will explode in the Soviet Far East and in the Pacific (excluding the U.S. west coast). In total, these nuclear weapons will release about 1000 megatons of TNT-equivalent explosive power. To put this mind-numbing and stomach-wrenching figure into perspective, it is equal to about 55,000 Hiroshima-sized explosions. There are, of course, far fewer than 5000 nuclear targets in the Soviet Far East and the Pacific region. In fact, fewer than 600-700 U.S. warheads will destroy every human artifact in Siberia and the Far East, and even fewer Soviet warheads will vaporize all U.S. military bases in the Pacific.

The installation of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on board U.S. ships, deployment of Trident I missiles in the northern Pacific, and the imminent testing of Trident I into the southern Pacific are strategic thrusts which push the region closer to the brink of confrontation.

A new Pacific is being forged in the struggle to turn back the threat of nuclear war and foreign intervention. People are reaching across the ocean, from Manila to Hawaii, from Vanuatu



*Radar and missile-tracking equipment on Roi-Namur island in Kwajalein Atoll.*

to Tokyo to form a community dedicated to a vision of the Pacific different from the current reality of false and repressive "peace" imposed by a U.S. military bent on confrontation.

The alternatives are stark: a Pacific of scorched, radiating islands and poisoned waters or a Pacific that is truly an Ocean of Peace in the care of free peoples who respect and protect it as a source of life, sustenance, and community.

This issue of the *Southeast Asia Chronicle* is the product of a joint effort

by Nautilus Pacific Action Research, U.S. Pacific Network, and the Southeast Asia Resource Center.

Much of the information presented here is drawn from Nautilus' forthcoming *An American Lake: The Nuclear Peril in the Pacific*, which contains the full references and details for many of the topics discussed. If your interest is evoked by this issue, we urge you to obtain this book (see page 28 on how to order) and to consult the list of suggested readings on p. 27. □

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# The American Threat: The Reagan Navy Prepares for a Pacific War

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Walden Bello, Peter Hayes, and Lyuba Zarsky

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The array of U.S. weaponry, force deployments, and contingency plans in the Pacific is as terrifying as the region is vast

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At a time when the "Atlantic Alliance" is undergoing severe strains, the Pacific is often painted as a region marked by peace, prosperity, and confident U.S. leadership. Typical of these assessments is that made by Admiral William Crowe, Jr., Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC): "Actually, the Pacific is turning out to be the unsung success story of U.S. foreign policy. When you look at the situation there today, it's a very, very impressive one. We probably have more cohesion and convergence of view with our friends and allies in that part of the world than we've had at any time in the post-war period.<sup>1</sup>

Peace, however, exists only on the surface. For there are strong undercurrents that make the Ocean of Peace a potential powderkeg.

The Korean Air Lines incident in September 1983 revealed, even if only for a moment, the reality beneath the illusion of calm. And at times, the admirals slip and reveal the belligerence that guides U.S. policy in the region, as Adm. Crowe did when he told the *Honolulu Advertiser*:

"We're not General Motors; we don't have a profit and loss column every month. The only way we can tell whether we're doing a good job is to go to war and see if you win or lose, and wars don't come along that often. That's a hell of a handicap to work under."<sup>2</sup>

The Pacific is larger in area—68 million square miles—than the whole land surface of the planet. This ocean has historically provided the rationale for the expansion of the U.S. Navy, and American naval leaders from Commodore Perry to Admiral Crowe have regarded the area as their "turf"—an understanding which other maritime powers broke at their own risk. Perhaps the most reactionary of the services, the Navy has always resisted attempts to reduce U.S. military presence in the area. Before World War II, it opposed granting independence to the Philippines with the rationale that the defense of the United States began 8000 miles west of San

Francisco. And immediately after the war, the Navy, led by Admiral Chester Nimitz, the "architect of the Pacific victory," wanted to annex Micronesia outright, opposing the Truman administration's plan to control the area as a "strategic trusteeship" from the United Nations.

With its October 1944 destruction of the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Battle of Leyte Gulf in the Philippines, the U.S. Navy achieved the ideal of maritime supremacy to which its foremost strategic thinker, Alfred Mahan, had directed it. But the years since Leyte Gulf have been years of discontent for the fleet. First, it had to fight off the Air Force's drive to relegate it into a minor service in a post-war strategic situation dominated by nuclear bombs, long-range bombers, and missiles. Then, with all the other services, the Navy had to bear the weight of the defeat in Vietnam and the disdain of a public swayed by anti-militarist sentiment in the mid-seventies.

Peace was the most threatening element in the post-Vietnam era in the Pacific for it subverted the rationale for maintaining huge military forces there. Pacific Command felt a mortal threat when President Jimmy Carter tried to remove the U.S. Army division in South Korea in 1978. And it shuddered when even such a noted architect of "Containment" as George Kennan stated:

"The original justification for the maintenance of [the Philippine] bases has now been extensively undermined . . . The American response to the situation that now exists should be, surely, the immediate, complete, resolute, and wordless withdrawal of the facilities and equipment they contain, leaving to the Philippine government the real estate and only that."<sup>3</sup>

Among Navy men, a "stab in the back" theory similar to that propagated by the German General Staff after World War I emerged to explain the vicissitudes of the Navy and armed forces during the seventies. Liberal appeasers, in the view of former CINCPAC Admiral Ulysses Grant Sharp, committed "the most serious error in all of American military history" by leashing American air power during the Vietnam war.<sup>4</sup> It was these same liberals who, working hand in hand with "opportunists" like Henry Kissinger, saddled the United States with a "one-and-a-half-ocean Navy" to cope with a "three-ocean responsibility" by whittling down the number of warships from over a thousand in the mid-sixties to 479 in 1980. The admirals were especially incensed at the reduction of the number of aircraft carriers—the most valuable capital ships—from 25 to 12.

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This article is based on the authors' *An American Lake: The Nuclear Peril in the Pacific*, to be published by South End Press in 1985.



Ignoring the fact that the newer ships were swifter, more powerful, and more versatile than anything they had ever had, the admirals fought back bitterly. One tack was raising what one anti-Navy Air Force General described as "the great Soviet bugaboo."<sup>5</sup> Ironically, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the chief of the Soviet Navy, came to the rescue of a Pacific Command embattled by a growing isolationist mood at home and facing the butcher knives of cost-conscious congresspeople. Gorshkov, cried the admirals, had built a "blue-water Navy," forged a strategy of "forward defense" much like the U.S. Navy's, and acquired a string of "warm water ports" to project Soviet naval power globally.

**B**ut the argument for a major naval rearmament was also placed on more sophisticated theoretical grounds by a new generation of naval theorists. In this effort, the so-called "maritime school" of American defense thinking not only drew inspiration from their prophet Mahan but also appropriated the theories of Halford Mackinder, who is credited with pioneering the so-called "geopolitical approach" to strategic thinking. From Mackinder, the navalists have borrowed their strategic map of the globe as a duality made up of the "world-island"—the Eurasian land mass—and the "world ocean" surrounding the world-island. With this fundamental image, they restated Mackinder's axiom that dominance of the world-island tends to gravitate to the centrally located land powers—yesterday, Germany, today, the Soviet Union.<sup>6</sup>


But to counter Mackinder's pessimistic dictum that "he who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island," the navalists appealed to Mahan, the theorist par excellence of the U.S. naval build-up and imperial expansion at the turn of the century. Control of the "world-ocean" is the key to nullifying the land power of the "heartland." The United States, say the navalists, finds itself in the same situation that Britain was in from the 18th to the early 20th centuries: a naval "bastion-redoubt" in the world ocean ranged against continental land-powers. The navalists, in fact, reach further back into history for their models. As one Navy critic disdainfully put it: "For them, it's the Athens versus Sparta bullshit all over again."

At a time when there is parity between the superpowers at the nuclear-strategic level, and the modern Sparta, the Soviet Union, is dominant on land, naval supremacy enables the United States to redress the overall balance of power. According to navalist James Roherty:

"The central role of sea power in American force structure rests on the overriding need to control and to exploit the oceans in the critical relationship with the World-Island . . . The oceans permit the United States to project, relatively unimpeded, immense power to points of its choosing along the "rim" of the World-Island."<sup>7</sup>

These "geopolitical truths," argue the navalists, dictate the future primacy of a naval policy in U.S. strategy.

The coming to office of the Reagan administration in January 1981 marked the end of America's Weimar period. Among the very first steps taken by the new administration was the unleashing of the pent-up frustrations and bellicose propensities of the Navy. Key to this process was the appointment of John Lehman, an aggressive young defense consultant and former assistant to Henry Kissinger with a strong base in the Republican party, as Secretary of the Navy. Under Lehman, whose pugnaciousness and uncanny ability to



*Re-entry vehicles plunge down on Kwajalein.*

get his way is well-known at the Pentagon, the Navy has become the first among equals among the armed services, consuming as it now does the bulk of the defense budget for weapons procurement. Equally important, in the absence of any other competing approach, the maritime strategy, according to former Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Komer, has become U.S. strategy "by default."

Translated into policy by Lehman, the maritime strategy has three key pillars:

First is the achievement of what Lehman calls "outright maritime superiority over any power or powers which might attempt to prevent our use of the seas and the maintenance of our vital interests worldwide." In short, "If challenged, we will be capable of sending any opponent to the bottom."<sup>8</sup> The minimum condition for achieving undisputed superiority over the Soviet Union is a "600-ship Navy." Since the advent of the Reagan administration, a staggering \$62 billion of the defense budget has been allocated for naval shipbuilding, with the result that, as one critic underlines, "the Navy is the only service that is getting substantial force structure; most increases requested by other services have been deferred."<sup>9</sup>

The second pillar of what has come to be known as the "Lehman Doctrine" is the transformation of the force structure of the navy from one geared to "sealane defense" during the era of Jimmy Carter and Defense Secretary Harold Brown to one "visibly offensive in orientation, [with] offensive power . . . widely distributed throughout the fleet."<sup>10</sup> An aggressive, offensive posture and force structure would force the Soviet Union into a defensive, reactive position, allowing the United States to capitalize on Soviet geographic disadvantages and forcing the Soviets to concentrate their naval forces closer to home. Says one Navy spokesman: "We must be able to threaten the potential adversary in his most secure areas."<sup>11</sup>

This posture translates into the acquisition of at least 15 aircraft carrier battle-groups especially designed for force projection. Against critics who claim that advances in weapons technology have turned the aircraft carrier into a sitting duck at sea, navalists like James Roherty argue that:

"The supreme exploitation of oceanic opportunities is

achieved in the air-sea striking power of fast carrier forces. The versatility if not the mobility of the fast carrier force exceeds that of the fleet ballistic missile submarine, making it the premier ocean system. Participating in joint operations or acting alone, the fast carrier force lends itself to innumerable tactical scenarios . . . It is in the highly mobile and flexible capabilities of fast carrier forces that we confront the "continental threat" with a dimension that is unfamiliar to the enemy."<sup>12</sup>

With the launching or commissioning over the last two years of the 90,000 ton "Nimitz-class" giants *Theodore Roosevelt* and *Carl Vinson*, the Navy's 15-carrier battle force is almost complete. A major mission assigned to the carriers is the capacity not only to engage the Soviet fleet but also to attack ports, coastal installations and strategic targets further inland.<sup>13</sup> Oftentimes mentioned as candidates for aircraft-carrier launched air attacks are Soviet shore facilities in the Kola peninsula and the Soviet Far East. The naval high command has its eyes trained specially on Vladivostok, home base of the second most powerful Soviet fleet, the Pacific Fleet.

**T**here is a third doctrinal dictum in Lehman's perspective, but this is the one that its adherents would much rather leave unstated: the probability of a limited, regional war. A Lehman follower, Marine Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor, a deputy chief of staff at the Pentagon, recently made the mistake of publicly predicting that a war with the Soviet Union in this generation is an "almost inevitable probability" because the Soviet Navy "is going into our turf." To put his listeners at ease, however, Trainor hastened to add that such a war would be a "non-atomic, conventional, regional conflict . . . which would not result in World War III."<sup>14</sup>

And why would this war be "limited"? Because, as another navalist, former Asst. Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Francis ("Bing") West, put it, "The Soviet Union is a mature global superpower,"<sup>15</sup> with an interest in preventing the escalation of a regional war to total war. West went on to elaborate on the navalists' doctrine of limited war:

"A strategy of global flexibility does not necessarily mean simultaneous, intense conflict worldwide. Quite the opposite. It means assessing the opponent's strength on the entire global chessboard, assessing the capabilities of theater criticalities, and assigning moves and counter-moves designed to terminate the conflict speedily and with minimum escalation, while protecting the interests of the United States and its allies."<sup>16</sup>

The navalists go on to say that if limited war is inevitable anyway, one must adopt strategies that put one's side at a decided advantage. One such strategy is a "first-strike" option, to which Lehman alluded when he told an enthusiastic audience at the Naval War College in June 1984: "Who gets to shoot first will have more to do with who wins than any [other] factor."<sup>17</sup> It is logic like this which underlines the truth in the old adage that madness indeed has its own peculiar rationality.

When the navalists talk about a limited regional war, they usually have two places in mind—the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.

Testifying before the Senate in March 1982, Francis West provided a chilling insight into current Pentagon war-planning when he asserted that in the Indian Ocean "a limited clash with the Soviet Union, followed by a cease-fire, is a possibility."<sup>18</sup>

The Indian Ocean joined the Pacific as another "American lake" in the 1970's, following the withdrawal of Britain's Royal Navy from "east of Suez" in the late sixties. Invoking the specter of a "massive Soviet naval build-up" in the area, Pacific Command began periodic deployment of carrier task forces in the early seventies, at the same time that the Pentagon leased from the British the tiny U-shaped island of Diego Garcia 1000 miles south of the tip of the Indian subcontinent to serve as a forward base. Naval deployments escalated following the Iranian revolution and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1980—two events which also provided the excuse to create a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) of 300,000 troops. Although the RDF was constituted into a separate unified regional command, Central Command (CENTCOM), in early 1983, Pacific Command retains operational control of the three naval carrier task forces assigned to the area, one of which is continuously on duty. These task forces are prepared to fight either a limited conventional war, a theater nuclear war, or a strategic war. They are armed with an awesome array of nuclear bombs, missiles, and depth charges which can easily be delivered by nuclear-capable fighter-bombers, helicopters, and P3C anti-submarine patrol planes.<sup>19</sup>

While the U.S. build-up in the Indian Ocean was initially justified with the image of Soviet ships cutting the oil lifelines to the West, there has been little talk of this lately. For example, Rear Admiral Robert Kurth of the Office of Naval Operations concedes: "Given the substantial presence of superior U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean since late 1979, it is not likely that the Soviets would provoke a naval confrontation."<sup>20</sup> The presence of Pacific Command and the RDF is now justified principally by their "support for moderate states against overt attack by radical states" and "support for moderate states against subversion aided or directed by outside powers."<sup>21</sup> Says West: "Radical fundamentalist movements" create situations "enticing to the Soviets, who . . . are more likely to opt for encouraging subversion and internal upheavals as a safer, more productive policy."<sup>22</sup> In short, the forces which the Pentagon considers the main enemy in Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean are new versions of the old foe it faced in Vietnam: popular nationalist movements.

Despite the current emphasis placed on the "radical fundamentalist threat," the threat of a U.S.-Soviet clash has not vanished. But, as Tom Farer, author of a highly respected study of the region sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, puts it, "The specter which may haunt is not an attack on oil tankers or even Soviet intervention in the style of the 1965 U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic but rather Soviet interposition in case the United States chooses this means [occupation of the Gulf] to shore up the existing international order."<sup>23</sup> With armed conflict in the Middle East threatening to spill beyond the Iran-Iraq war and draw in the conservative Arab Gulf states, Farer's scenario is not at all far-fetched.

**E**ven more than the Indian Ocean, the naval high command considers the Pacific a likely site of war. Before he relinquished his position as CINCPAC in 1983, Admiral Robert Long, Crowe's predecessor, reportedly told an astonished Japanese correspondent: "This region [the Pacific], I believe, is most probably where we shall witness confrontation with the Soviet Union."<sup>24</sup>

Even before the Reagan administration took office, the admirals had been able to force Carter's Defense Secretary Harold Brown to abandon the old "swing strategy," whereby

forces from the Asia-Pacific region would be transferred to Europe in the event of a contingency there. Under Reagan, the navalists have succeeded in bringing the Asia-Pacific region—the Navy's very special sphere of influence—back into the center of Pentagon war preparations and war planning, after a decade in which strategic decision-making was dominated by the so-called "Central Front, Europe-First School," which had favored the Army and the Air Force.

The military capabilities of Pacific Command have been substantially upgraded since Reagan took office in 1981. Forward-deployed naval surface ships with the Seventh Fleet increased by almost 100 percent between 1980 and 1983, from 21 to 40. Including ballistic missile and attack submarines, U.S. warship strength in the Western Pacific rose from 37 to 52 in just three years; while naval personnel strength more than doubled, from 15,000 to 34,000.

The Pacific Fleet is indeed at its aggressive best in years, for among the ships deployed to it are the USS *Carl Vinson*, one of America's newest carriers, and the recently recommissioned battleship *New Jersey*, whose 16-inch guns, according to Lehman, "can take under attack virtually all the MIG bases . . . in North Korea and punch right through the hangarets, bunkers, and caves where the real high priority targets are."<sup>25</sup>

Two years ago, while the eyes of the world were focused on the drama of the battle between the European peace movement and the NATO plan to deploy the ground-launched cruise missile, Admiral Long, then CINCPAC, made a statement that was little noticed: "To confront the Soviets throughout the full spectrum of conflict, we need to enhance and modernize measurably our theater nuclear force capability." To this end, he asserted that cruise missiles "in an appropriate mix of configurations, offer enormous potential for raising the striking power of our PACOM forces."<sup>26</sup> In June 1984, the Navy, after it had deployed the conventional warhead-armed cruise on surface vessels, proceeded to arm *Sturgeon* and *Los Angeles* class submarines with the more deadly version, which can reportedly carry a nuclear warhead with the explosive power of 200,000 tons of TNT to within 300 feet of a target 1500 miles away.

The non-naval prongs of Pacific Command have also been upgraded. The Pacific Tactical Air Forces are being qualitatively fortified with the assignment of several squadrons of ultramodern F-16 fighters to Suwon, South Korea, and Misawa, Japan. Neutron bombs may soon become the latest additions to the tactical atomic weaponry of the Second Army Division in South Korea, where, according to the best available information, there already are at least 250 tactical nuclear weapons, including mines, ground-launched missiles, and howitzer shells.<sup>27</sup> Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-52 bombers based in Guam are already armed with nuclear-tipped short-range attack missiles (SRAM's) and may receive the air-launched version of the Tomahawk (ALCM), which will allow them to fly to "standoff" position beyond the range of Soviet coastal air defenses from which they can launch their missiles in a saturation attack.

Admiral Nimitz once said that the great battles of the Pacific during the Second World War had earlier been "fought out" in war games at the U.S. Naval War College during the 1930's. Today another Pacific war scenario commands the attention of Pentagon and Pacific Command war planners: the "Vladivostok strike." As the Joint Chiefs of Staff "posture statement" describes it, in the event of war, a major U.S. "advantage . . . is the ability of American

forces—including those in Japan and Korea—to bottle up the Soviets' Pacific fleet at Vladivostok. . . ."<sup>28</sup> To get from Vladivostok to the open Pacific, the Soviets must pass through one of three straits, the widest of which is 100 miles across. Under U.S. naval doctrine, this American advantage would be translated into concentrated attacks by the U.S. fleet, "which would try to outmaneuver the opponent and to overwhelm him in one location rather than fighting all across the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean."<sup>29</sup>

What former Defense Secretary Harold Brown terms the Soviets' "strategic nightmare" would become reality in a battle in or over the Sea of Japan and the nearby Sea of Okhotsk. Even before a shot is fired, geography gives the advantage to

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"The only way we can tell whether we're doing a good job is to go to war and see if you win or lose."

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the Americans: the prime operational area of the Soviet Pacific Fleet is the nearly landlocked Sea of Japan, where maneuvering space is limited. The three narrow straits which lead out to the open Pacific can be easily mined, blockaded, or bombed. U.S. battle-groups, in contrast, would operate in the open seas, supported by land-based aircraft launched from Japan and South Korea.

In the event of war (which could be triggered by events in the highly volatile Korean peninsula, according to some scenarios) two carrier battle groups can be immediately deployed to the Northwest Pacific, off the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk, by the Seventh Fleet. In contrast, the Soviets still have to acquire a genuine carrier; currently, they have only two flat-topped cruisers with vertical takeoff aircraft and helicopters geared principally for anti-submarine warfare in the vicinity, forcing them to rely on cruise-missile firing ships, submarines, and land-based aircraft.

The Seventh Fleet and U.S. Air Force and Marine air units based in Japan and South Korea can bring a total of about 440 offensive aircraft—a great many of them nuclear-capable—to bear against the Soviets. Adding the U.S.-equipped air forces of Japan and South Korea tips the balance of forces against the Soviets and their one possible ally, North Korea. While they may continue to enjoy numerical superiority, they suffer from the qualitative inferiority of their aircraft. The Bear heavy bomber, boasts one American admiral, "would not get to 1000 miles" of a U.S. battle-group. It is also difficult to see how the newer long-range Backfire bombers can penetrate the super-effective U.S. screen of interceptors and fighter-bombers. And the Soviets have nothing to match the *enfant terrible* of the U.S. offensive force: the ultra-modern, nuclear-capable F-16 fighter. One squadron of F-16's is now based in Suwon, South Korea and two are scheduled for deployment in Misawa, in northern Japan by early 1985.

In short, it is unlikely that the Soviet Pacific Fleet can expect much help from the air . . . and air power continues to be the decisive force in naval conflict. The two other tactical arms of the Soviet fleet—missile-firing surface ships and submarines—would have to break through the mined or blockaded straits and the noisy Soviet submarines would have to contend with U.S. anti-submarine capabilities which a former Navy secretary has described as "awesome."<sup>30</sup>

Under these circumstances of inferiority at the theater-tactical level, the Soviets would have no choice but to escalate

to strategic, all-out nuclear war—an option which they have underlined again and again to counter the belief of many U.S. navalists that limited war is possible. Just as the dream of repeating the spectacular 1944 Leyte Gulf naval victory grips the imagination of the U.S. admirals, so too the Soviet high command is determined to prevent a repetition of the Battle of Tsushima in 1905, when the Czarist Baltic Fleet went down before the guns of the rising imperial Japanese Navy in one of the straits leading to the Sea of Japan.

In the meantime, the deadly game of confrontation continues in the area. Ships and planes of both sides sail and fly into the midst of one another's maneuvers and exercises, carrying with them the possibility of an incident which could escalate into confrontation.

The U.S. moves have been downright provocative. The KAL incident may or may not have been a U.S.-instigated attempt to "tickle" or activate Soviet radar defenses in the area, but there is no mistaking the intent of other American maneuvers.

The deployment of two squadrons of nuclear-capable F-16's to Misawa in Northern Japan brings Vladivostok, the Kurile Islands, and Sakhalin Island within the range of U.S. tactical air power.

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**"The oceans permit the United States to project . . . immense power to points of its choosing along the 'rim' of the World-Island."**

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A series of naval exercises have been explicitly intended as demonstrations of force. In April 1983, the U.S. and Canada held "Fleetex '83," the biggest Pacific naval maneuvers since World War II just off Soviet waters. "The Soviet reaction was predictable," asserted Adm. Long, then CINCPAC. "Any time we operate near their home waters, why, there is significant reaction."<sup>31</sup>

Soon after the KAL incident, the United States and Japan took advantage of Soviet defensiveness by staging an even bigger exercise, involving 160 Japanese and American warships near Soviet home waters in the Sea of Japan. "The timing of the exercises," noted one observer, "could not have been better chosen to aggravate Soviet anxieties and suspicions. . . ."<sup>32</sup> This was an understatement, since the centerpiece of the drill was "blockading" the vital Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits—international waterways through which Moscow's ships must pass to get to the open Pacific.

**W**hile unilateral militarization has been the principal method by which the United States has confronted the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region, tightening up relations with allies has not been neglected. However, relationships between allies have been steadily dominated by the dimension of anti-Soviet military cooperation. With the militarization of diplomacy, the defense attaches and military advisory groups (MAAG's) attached to Pacific Command—which has always run "a second foreign service" in the area<sup>33</sup>—have regained the influence and power they lost during Kissinger-Carter years, when strategic diplomacy briefly replaced containment militarism as the U.S. approach toward the Soviets. CINCPAC has once again assumed the status it had prior to the Vietnam War, which one general described as "the powerful proconsul of a powerful nation."<sup>34</sup>

Under U.S. pressure, Japan has agreed to "take responsibility" for "defense of the sealanes" to 1000 miles east and south of that country—which would bring the Philippines and Vietnam within its sphere of military influence. Japan will also export to the United States defense-related civilian technology—a move which critics claim to be a violation of the country's anti-militarist constitution. But probably the most blatant example of the militarization of U.S.-Japan ties are the increasing joint exercises between U.S. forces and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, including the biggest Pacific naval maneuvers since World War II.

Needless to say, these moves have not satisfied U.S. military planners, who want the Japanese to devote more resources to defense than the one to two percent of GNP which they currently allocate to it.

Despite its virulently anti-Communist ideology, the Reagan administration has followed what his former Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, described as "the strategic imperative of strengthening our relations with the People's Republic of China."<sup>35</sup> In contrast to the caution of preceding administrations, the Reagan White House is now openly promoting a U.S.-China alliance against the Soviet Union. While differences over the Taiwan question continue to stand in the way of more intensive cooperation, the current administration is providing an attractive incentive to the Chinese by offering to sell defensive weapons and technology like anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft missiles.

Pentagon planners are not, however, waiting for a formal military alliance; they have gone ahead to integrate China into their strategic planning against the Soviet Union. "The PRC," says the FY 1984 "Posture Statement" of the JCS, "indirectly contributes to U.S. global and regional security as a counterweight to Soviet land power in Asia."<sup>36</sup> The most recent Pentagon "Defense Guidance" is quite specific about China's role in the event of war: ". . . [T]he U.S. will encourage PRC military initiatives that fix Soviet forces in the USSR's Far Eastern territories and will be prepared, if necessary, to provide logistics and other support for those initiatives."<sup>37</sup>

A third thrust of Ronald Reagan's alliance policy in Asia is to fortify South Korea and place North Korea on the defensive—a point which was underlined by Reagan's belligerent remarks during a visit to the peninsula in November 1983. South Korea has been upgraded by the Pentagon from a "significant interest area" to a "vital interest area" and given equal billing with Western Europe as a "first line of defense." A visit to Korea by the Army Chief of Staff Edward Meyer underlined this; Meyer told reporters that the decision whether or not to escalate from conventional to nuclear war was "far simpler here than in Europe where consultations have to be made with 15 different nations."<sup>38</sup> To make sure North Korea and the Soviet Union got the message, U.S. and South Korean units in the peninsula, augmented by U.S. forces from all over the Pacific, staged "Operation Team Spirit '84." Involving 207,000 troops, this year's exercise was the biggest ever and dwarfed the more publicized "Big Pine" games in Honduras.

The United States, South Korea, and Japan are also said to be exploring a closer multilateral relationship in order to facilitate joint operations and exercises which are not now possible under separate bilateral acts, like a joint blockade of the vital Straits of Tsushima separating South Korea and Japan.

In Southeast Asia, the centerpiece of the administration's policy is to "bleed Vietnam white" in concert with China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by



supporting the insurgency within Kampuchea of the Khmer Rouge-dominated Coalition Government for a Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).

By exacerbating fears of "Vietnamese expansionism," the United States hopes to speed up the militarization of ASEAN to take the place of the defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which fell apart during the Vietnam War. Military aid, including big shipments of tanks, has been increased to "frontline" state Thailand, which apparently has

also been promised F-16's by U.S. officials.<sup>39</sup> The United States is also nudging the different countries toward closer, preferably multilateral defense planning—a move that comes on top of already institutionalized intelligence exchanges, enrollment in one another's military schools, combined training exercises, regularized meetings of military staffs, and joint naval patrols.<sup>40</sup>

Perhaps the most brazen example of the militarization of allied relationships under Reagan is provided by the Philippines. U.S. policy is best summed up by two words: Clark and

## The "Soviet Threat"

Far from being the aggressive threat described by American military apologists, the Soviet military machine in the Pacific is weak and vulnerable. Its mission is to prevent a second front in a war with the United States. The Soviets keep 45 divisions of ground troops along the Soviet and Mongolian borders with China in the Transbaikal and Far East military districts. In a global superpower war involving China, these forces would try to wrest Manchuria from China to block a U.S. attack on Mongolia and European Russia over the north China plain.

The Soviets have erected a "hedgehog" coastal defense in the Far East. Along the Soviet frontier radar, fighter interceptors, and surface-to-air missiles guard against external attack. However, most of the fighters sent to intercept the KAL 007 747 plane as it blundered slowly through porous Soviet airspace failed to find it. The KAL airliner was able to fly unimpeded through highly defended Soviet airspace for more than two hours before it was shot down over the ocean south of Sakhalin Island. The hedgehog thus has many bare patches without quills.

In 1983, the Soviet Pacific Fleet sailed 84 general purpose surface vessels, 122 submarines, and 12 amphibious ships. U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman argues often that "A [sic] primary Soviet objective is naval interdiction of the lifelines connecting the United States, its allies, and the West's sources of vital fuel and minerals—95 percent of which move by sea."

Yet in their private writings, key maritime supremacists tell a different story. For Paul Nitze, former U.S. Secretary of the Navy and key strategist in the Reagan administration, there is no "cause for serious speculation that the Pacific sea lanes could be severed for any extended period by Soviet naval activities."

Starting from behind, the Soviet

Navy has taken a different tack rather than trying to overhaul the U.S. Navy from astern. Whereas U.S. forces in the Pacific occupy, threaten, or attack foreign lands and control the open oceans, Soviet forces are primarily devoted to defending the Soviet Far East. If the U.S. Pacific Fleet tries to batter down the Soviets' back door in the Far East, the Soviet Pacific Fleet will try to slam that door. This strategy entails denying U.S. aircraft carriers access to Far Eastern coastal waters, and protecting Soviet nuclear submarines in these coastal "bastions" from U.S. attack.

To these ends, the most important Soviet naval forces in the Pacific are the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) units. The two much-vaunted Soviet *Kiev*-class aircraft carriers deployed in 1979 and 1984 in the Pacific conjure up images of the monster 80,000-ton American carriers. In fact, Soviet "aircraft carriers" are actually 34,000-ton ASW cruisers, launching helicopters and short-range vertical take-off fighters to protect the cruiser and attack U.S. ASW aircraft over Soviet coastal waters. The American Navy is openly contemptuous of these "carriers."

The Soviet response to the threat of U.S. aircraft carrier attacks on the Far East is to surround the U.S. carrier task group with submarines and surface vessels, and to launch an all-out, simultaneous, saturation cruise missile strike. But as most Soviet warships can't reload at sea, notes naval expert Norman Friedman, "The Soviet Fleet disarms itself every time it carries out its principal tactics."

Achilles had only one vulnerable heel, but the Soviets have many in the Pacific. Most important is their heavy reliance on the 15,000-km southern sea route from the Mediterranean through the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia in the Far East. This west-east route is the Soviet equivalent of the Panama

Canal, except that the Soviets are more dependent and more vulnerable to the effects of interdiction than the United States. As one naval analyst told us, the United States can simply sit back and cut the Soviet Union in half, and wait for the Soviet Far East to collapse militarily in less than a month.

Aside from the logistical Achilles Heel, the Soviets have to overcome a litany of geographical obstacles before they can even put to sea. Worst of all, the Soviets lack direct access from their main ports to the Pacific Ocean from the Sea of Japan.

If the Soviet Fleet tries to leave through these "chokepoints" for the Pacific, it would have to get past what James Hersman, editor of *Sea Power* calls a "surlly lynch mob" of U.S. forces waiting to pounce. Indeed, the Soviets may have to mine the straits and blockade them to keep the U.S. Pacific Fleet out of their coastal bastions!

Adding allied naval and air forces to the superpower lineup only drives home the relative weakness of the Soviet Union. In a 1978 comparison of indices of naval capabilities, Barry Blechman and Robert Berman demonstrate that the United States and its East Asian allies outnumber the Soviet Pacific Fleet and its putative ally (North Korea) by five, displace nearly twice as many tons, and outgun the Soviet bloc in virtually every naval armament. All those ratios would worsen dramatically for the Soviets if the U.S. blockades the straits out of the Sea of Japan.

The Japanese alone can scramble more tactical air power, especially F-15s, than all the U.S. fighters in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. While the United States cannot hope to match the Soviet Union in landpower, the alliance with China has largely rectified that deficiency. Soviet ground forces are superior to the Chinese, but a Sino-Soviet war could embroil the Soviets in a protracted land war with no end.

Overall, as one Pentagon analyst put it, the United States in the Pacific is like a lamb sitting in a tree watching two lions tear each other apart. □

Subic. The diplomatic distance which characterized relations between dictator Ferdinand Marcos and Jimmy Carter gave way, under Reagan, to a warm embrace typified by Vice President George Bush's notorious toasting of Marcos as a "democrat" in 1981.<sup>41</sup> In exchange, Marcos has provided Pacific Command with virtually unrestricted access to Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base, two of America's largest and most strategic overseas installations, which serve to project U.S. power to mainland Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. The assassination of Marcos' rival, Benigno Aquino, in August 1983 did not substantially alter this policy of support for a man who is regarded as the most reliable guardian of U.S. strategic interests in the country. Since the declaration of martial law in September 1972, the annual level of military and military-related aid to Marcos has increased by close to 600 percent.

**U**ndergirding the United States' preparations for conflict in the Pacific is an impressive system of bases and installations which permits the maintenance of substantial U.S. forces overseas. There are an estimated 1500 U.S. bases, installations, and facilities overseas, with about 300 in the Asia-Pacific region.

These bases have traditionally been justified by Pentagon apologists under the doctrine of "forward defense." The imperial essence of forward defense, as it applied to the Asia-Pacific was stated bluntly by Gen. Douglas MacArthur right after World War II, when he declared that "the strategic boundaries of the United States were no longer along the western shores of North and South America; they lay along the Eastern coast of the Asiatic continent."<sup>42</sup>

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"[The Pacific], I believe, is most probably where we shall witness confrontation with the Soviet Union."

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With the onset of the Cold War and the policy of "Containment," forward defense became the code word for a two-pronged military strategy of surrounding the Soviet Union with a ring of hostile air and sea power and providing the United States with the capacity to intervene rapidly in crises in the Third World. On encircling the Soviets, a top secret 1960 Pentagon document noted:

"From an overall vantage point, one of the prime strategic advantages enjoyed by the United States over the USSR is the possibility of surrounding the Communist bloc with combat forces—or of strategically positioning or shifting these forces wherever needed."<sup>43</sup>

On intervention in Third World "trouble spots," the same document stated:

"In case of limited war, the U.S. bases, by their proximity to likely areas of conflict, will permit the early commitment of appropriate forces to help defeat the aggression and prevent broadening of the conflict. Also, because of the remoteness of the area, the base structure in the Far East will continue to represent a major capability to absorb the initial logistic drain which invariably accompanies contingency operations."<sup>44</sup>

Today, after the Kissinger-Carter interregnum, when detente and diplomacy briefly replaced containment militarism as the U.S. posture toward the Soviets, forward defense as

strategic encirclement of the Soviets and interventionist power projection in the Third World has been revived with a vengeance. Overseas bases, particularly naval ones like Subic Bay in the Philippines, argue the maritime supremacists, are the essential elements in the strategy "to make the Soviet Union an isolated island," as Lehman puts it.

In actual conflict situations, the U.S. Pacific basing system has been employed for the deployment of conventional power against popular nationalist movements. At no other time was this awesome capacity for power projection better demonstrated than during the Vietnam War, when the bases functioned as complementary parts of a regional garrison state which transcended the nations in which they were formally located.

Indeed, the presence of complementary military installations spanning territorial boundaries has drawn host countries into wars without the approval of their populations.

B-52 planes from Guam on their way to bomb Vietnam were met half-way by KC-135 tankers based at Clark Air Base in the Philippines and Kadena Air Base in Okinawa. The bombing of South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was carried out not only by Guam-based B-52's but also by those stationed at U Tapao Air Base in Thailand. High-frequency communications guidance for the bombing of Haiphong in 1972 was provided from the U.S. communications base at Northwest Cape in Australia.<sup>45</sup> Together with Marine bases in Japan and Okinawa, Subic Bay in the Philippines served as a huge training ground and rear area for U.S. Marines deployed to Vietnam. Clark served as the main logistical staging area for the mainland war effort (with traffic reaching as high as 50 transports per day bound for Vietnam), while Subic Bay served as the "essential fulcrum for projecting naval and naval air power into the Tonkin Gulf."<sup>46</sup> Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan functioned as a rear base and maintenance center for the Seventh Fleet's four aircraft carriers operating in the South China Sea and Gulf of Tonkin.

This was the overt side of the garrison state. Its covert face was a number of installations operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. Among these spy facilities supporting the Vietnam war effort were the CIA's regional communications headquarters in the Philippines, the offices of the CIA-owned Civil Air Transport (CAT) in Taiwan, and the agency's Okinawa Station and Saipan Training Station which fulfilled "a variety of training requirements, including intelligence, tradecraft, communications, counter-intelligence, and psychological warfare techniques."<sup>47</sup>

**P**rojection of conventional might, however, is not the only function of this Pacific garrison state. The bases also have key roles for both tactical nuclear war contingencies. Despite the restriction of weaponry to conventional arms during the limited wars in Vietnam and Korea, nuclear war, as the U.S. Army War College stated as far back as 1956, is the "typical," and non-atomic warfare is "a modification of the typical."<sup>48</sup> U.S. conventional forces have been reconstituted around nuclear weapons since 1945, so that most PACOM forces are conventional-nuclear or dual capable: B-52 bombers on Guam are dual-capable; F-16's with tactical air forces in South Korea and Japan are dual-capable; F-4's and F-14's operating on carriers homeported at Subic in the Philippines and Yokosuka in Japan are ready to fly tactical nuclear missions against Soviet ship and coastal targets; and the army division based in Korea is geared to use nuclear artillery shells and land mines in the event of a contingency in the peninsula.

Indeed, one of the major lessons derived by the military from the Vietnam War is never again to disqualify the use of nuclear weapons in wars of intervention. As Secretary of State Caspar Weinberger stated at his confirmation hearings: "It is still possible, I believe, to fight some wars using conventional forces that don't involve nuclear weapons . . . but I think that if you advise potential opponents in advance that you don't intend to cross certain lines, that you have almost assured another Vietnam . . . Any time you get into war, the possibility that you will use every weapon available must be left open."<sup>49</sup>

Not the least of the functions of the Pacific basing system is its contribution to the capacity of the United States to wage strategic nuclear war. In terms of delivery systems, forward bases in the Pacific now host two out of three systems: the Tomahawk and the B-52 long range bomber.

Naval forward bases like Yokosuka in Japan and Subic Bay in the Philippines have acquired new significance for U.S.—and Soviet—defense planners with the installation of Tomahawks on battleships and attack submarines which operate out of these bases. The nuclear-tipped Tomahawk, according to the Pentagon, is not just a tactical-nuclear, but a strategic weapon in the U.S. arsenal.

The importance of Guam as a nodal point for strategic

warfare has also increased with the possible upgrading of its 20 Strategic Air Command bombers with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles (ALCM's). Guam's Apra Harbor once served as a forward base for U.S. Polaris submarines. Polaris missile-submarine systems are now being replaced with longer-range Trident systems in the Pacific. The Trident I has a range of 4000 miles, which allows its deployment in the Eastern Pacific and its basing in Bangor, Washington State.

**S**trategic delivery systems, however, are only one component of the system of strategic warfare. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) facilities are also vital, as are the C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) installations without which the delivery systems are deaf, dumb, and blind.

The United States is well-equipped to wipe out Soviet ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's) with its contingent of P3C ASW planes which operate from bases in Guam, Japan, the Philippines, Okinawa, and Diego Garcia and its fleet of about 38 nuclear-powered "hunter-killer" submarines operating out of Guam, the Philippines, Japan, and Okinawa. Equipped with nuclear depth-charges, nuclear-tipped SUBROC missiles, and torpedoes, the P3C "Orions" and killer submarines are guided toward their prey by sonar arrays (SOSUS) laid out on

## Practice Makes Perfect

**M**odern wars are the culmination of years of exhaustive preparation. CINCPAC's forces spend most of their time practicing for war. While these exercises keep the means of war well-oiled, they also serve to remind U.S. allies that the American military is all that stands between the Devil and the deep blue sea. They are also meant to serve as demonstrations of force for the Soviets, Vietnamese, North Koreans and other potential enemies.

U.S. and allied forces stage an impressive number of joint exercises every year. Billed as the "free world's largest exercise," the annual "Team Spirit" exercise on the Korean peninsula is a sea-land-air affair involving South Korean troops and U.S. units from all over the Pacific. Held from February to April, the 1984 exercise featured 30 to 40 ships and over 200,000 troops, including 30,000 marines who stormed ashore and across frozen rice-fields. The United States makes no attempt to hide the fact that the exercises are meant to rehearse a war against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea).

Another war exercise involving 160 U.S. and Japanese warships, including two aircraft carrier battle groups, took place in the Sea of Japan after KAL 007

was shot down in September 1983. The drill, billed as the biggest naval maneuvers in the Pacific since the World War II, involved blockading the Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits, international waterways through which Soviet ships must pass to get to the open Pacific. International press accounts termed the exercise "provocative."

A related exercise held in 1983 was Fleetex, a U.S. exercise including Canadian naval units which was held a few hundred miles off the Soviet Far East—or less than 20 minutes flight time for carrier strike aircraft. Involving three aircraft carriers and 41 escorts plus land-based Navy and Air Force planes from Guam, Adak, Japan, and the North American West Coast, Fleetex reasserted U.S. presence in the north-west Pacific. Exercises like Fleetex usually elicit responses from the Soviets such as mock Backfire attacks on the U.S. formations. By this stratagem, the U.S. Navy is able to monitor the latest Soviet capabilities.

Perhaps the biggest allied naval mobilization is RIMPAC. Begun in 1971, RIMPAC is held every two years at the Hawaiian island of Kahoolawe, as well as at San Diego and Pearl Harbor. In May 1984, RIMPAC assembled 80 ships and submarines and 250 aircraft, manned by 50,000 sailors and

marines from Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States. Indigenous Hawaiians have mounted stiff resistance to the bombing of Kahoolawe, which is a sacred ancestral site. The Japanese RIMPAC contingent reportedly decided not to fire on the island as a result of public pressure.

There are other, smaller joint exercises: "Kangaroo" (with Australia), "Cobra Gold" (Thailand), "Balikatan" (shoulder-to-shoulder)/Tangent Flash" (Philippines), "Beach Crest" (Japan), and "Triad" (New Zealand). Some of these exercises are counter-insurgency oriented. For instance, in the 1960's, "Jungle Drum" in Thailand trained soldiers from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) for action against Thai insurgents. In October 1982, "Exercise Thermal Gale" in Hawaii aimed to beef up Australian and U.S. special warfare capabilities.

In addition to joint maneuvers, the U.S. military conducts its own unilateral exercises in the Pacific. One of the most important is the annual "Global Shield" drills. Run by the Strategic Air Command, this exercise involves a global alert, escalation of the Cold War, and finally a mock nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. The B-52's in Guam disperse to pre-selected bases surrounded by ground teams, and fly sorties over practice targets.

While little is known about exercises of nuclear ballistic missiles, the submarine test-firing of Trident missiles is probably conducted as a nuclear war exercise. □

the ocean floor at strategic points throughout the Pacific. U.S. submarine tracking and destroying techniques are very advanced. U.S. Navy sources claim (probably with a degree of overstatement) that in 2000 patrols, their SSBN's have not been detected even once by Soviet submarines, while *all* Soviet SSBN movements have been tracked by them. And William Claytor, secretary of the Navy during the Carter administration, asserted, "[T]he qualitative edge that we hold over the Soviets in both equipment and personnel is awesome and our ability to orchestrate the many components of the U.S. anti-submarine warfare team into an effective killer force has enormously improved in recent years."<sup>50</sup>

Without the sophisticated satellite-based C3I facilities in the Pacific, U.S. nuclear-war fighting capability would be drastically reduced.

Among the most vital C3I facilities in the Pacific are the following:<sup>51</sup>

—The VLF (Very Low Frequency) communications station for U.S. missile submarines in Northwest Cape, Australia, Hawaii and Japan and at least eight LF (Low Frequency) facilities providing "back-up" communications scattered across the Pacific.

—TACAMO aircraft towing four-kilometer-long antennae which serve as airborne VLF transmitters and provide "nuclear survivable" communications to the U.S. SSBN's in the event of destruction of ground-based VLF facilities. TACAMO's fly out of Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii and have Okinawa as a back-up base; they also have access to air bases in Guam, the Philippines, and Japan.

—SIGINT (Signals Intelligence or communications and electronic spying) sensors operated by the Pentagon, National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency in Alaska, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, New Zealand, Hawaii, Okinawa, Australia, Diego Garcia, Guam and the Philippines.

## Ships and planes of both sides sail and fly into each other's maneuvers

—ASAT (Anti-Satellite) radar stations which track Soviet launches of satellites, especially of vehicles which might be directed against U.S. C3I satellites. Three of these stations, which make up the so-called "Pacific Barrier," are located in Guam, Kwajalein, and San Miguel in the Philippines. Other tracking stations called GEODSS, which track satellites in deep-space orbits for early warning and communications, are found in Taegu, South Korea and Hawaii.

C3I facilities in the Pacific are profoundly destabilizing under the counterforce doctrine which has guided U.S. nuclear warfare strategy since the issuance of Presidential Directive 59 by Jimmy Carter. In contrast to the old deterrence strategy which relied on the U.S. capacity to mount a devastating counter-attack against Soviet cities to dissuade the Soviets from carrying out a first strike, counterforce emphasizes destroying military targets, including Soviet missile siloes. For this reason, it is assumed that counterforce is a first-strike doctrine, since targetting Soviet siloes in a second strike would not make much sense. Pacific C3I facilities, asserts Australian researcher Desmond Ball, are used "for the identification and precise location of targets necessary for the planning of counterforce attacks, as well as for the continuous real-time monitoring of Soviet missile siloes and bomber bases, command and control centers, etc., necessary for the slow-motion counterforce exchanges."<sup>52</sup>



*Kadena Air Force base, Okinawa*

In addition, the Pacific has always served as the major test site for American nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Between 1946 and 1958, some 66 nuclear devices were detonated in the Marshall Islands in the Central Pacific—afflicting the health of both the Marshallese and U.S. servicemen who monitored the tests.

Since the early 1960's, Kwajalein atoll in the Marshalls has served as the impact area for experimental missiles fired from Vandenberg Air Base and Point Mugu Naval Base in California. Nearly all the major long-range ballistic missiles, including the Zeus, Hercules, Titan, Sprint, Nike, MX and Trident rockets, were tested at the Pacific Missile Range, as were multiple reentry vehicles (MIRV's) for nuclear warheads. Currently, Kwajalein also serves as the center of the Army's Anti-Ballistic Missile Test program, which made news in early June when a rocket fired from Kwajalein intercepted and "neutralized" a dummy warhead on a missile fired from Vandenberg 100 miles up in space.<sup>53</sup>

Beginning in December 1983, MX missile tests began into instrumented shallow ocean areas outside of Kwajalein. Eight MX re-entry vehicles were fired into a "Broad Ocean Area" about 2500 miles from Kwajalein. The Navy has also staked out a broad ocean area in the vicinity of Oeno Island, part of the Pitcairn Islands, for testing the Trident,<sup>54</sup> which is also test-fired into the ocean near Wake Island. The rationale for these tests was that Kwajalein, which lies 4800 miles away from Vandenberg, was too close to be able to test fully the capabilities of the new long-range missiles. In short, with advances in instruments recording missile impact, the whole Pacific is well on its way to becoming a U.S. missile laboratory—something which might occur in the late 1980's, when NAVSTAR navigation satellites will enable the United



# Tomahawk: Missile in Search of a Mission

**T**he Tomahawk cruise missile is not merely another weapon system in the U.S. Pacific nuclear arsenal. The Tomahawk is a nuclear weapon that dances on the razor edge of nuclear war in ways that are new and fraught with hazard.

Referred to fondly in the Navy as "Slick'ems" (SLCM's, for sea-launched cruise missile), the Tomahawk first appeared in the Pacific when the conventionally-armed anti-ship version was installed on four U.S. Navy vessels in 1983. Controversy came, however, with the arming of *Sturgeon* and *Los Angeles*-class nuclear attack submarines with the sea-launched nuclear land attack model.


With the deployment of SLCM's, the number of ships in the U.S. Pacific Fleet capable of launching a nuclear land attack on the Soviet Union will increase from five to about 50 in 1990. The number of nuclear-tipped Tomahawks with the fleet could reach 400 by that date. If the 20 B-52 strategic bombers are armed with the nuclear-tipped air-launched version (ALCM), 400 more land-attack cruise missiles could be added to the Pacific arsenal by 1990.

What exactly is the Tomahawk?

It is essentially a pilotless, self-guiding jet bomber that is very "smart." Land-attack Tomahawks use very sophisticated inertial guidance systems to bring them to a target. After launching, the missile goes on a relatively high cruise, using a gyroscope for guidance. When it reaches a pre-designated stretch of coast, the downward-looking altimeter radar measures the terrain contours and checks them with the landfall terrain contour map stored in its memory. After necessary corrections are made, the missile, flying now at low altitude, begins the attack phase, zig-zagging to conceal its approach from air defense radars and following rivers or railways to the target. Once very close to the target, the computer compares video pictures of the target with its digitalized memory to provide last-minute guidance to score a bullseye.

Tomahawks are slow compared to rocket-powered ballistic missiles, taking two to three hours to reach their maximum range. However, their firepower and accuracy are about the same as that predicted for Trident II missile—that is, they can "kill" very hard targets with a high probability.

Far from being a planned escalation of the arms race, development of the



*Tomahawk missile being launched from one of the eight Armored Box Launchers aboard the battleship USS New Jersey (BB-62).*

cruise missile was opposed by all three services because they saw it as competing for scarce funds and upstaging weapons systems which they preferred. The Air Force saw it undermining its rationale for the B-1 Bomber; the Navy feared that it would compete with naval air power and subvert the justification for the big aircraft carrier; and the Army saw the cruise missile as competitive with artillery systems. What saved the cruise was Henry Kissinger's need for bargaining chips in arms control negotiations with the Soviets in 1972. Later in the seventies, Jimmy Carter encouraged its development and deployment for two reasons: he wanted to use it to placate the Air Force after his veto of the B-1, and he promised to deploy it in Europe in exchange for the NATO allies' support for the SALT II Treaty.

But forced by the civilian leadership to develop the missile, the services adapted Tomahawk to their own strategic thrusts. For the Army, control of forward deployed cruise missiles (as well as the Pershing medium-range rocket missile) allows it to carve out a stronger role in strategic warfare, which had previously been dominated by the two other services. For the Air Force, the Tomahawk would keep Soviet strategic air defenses constantly off-balance, unable to predict which of the threats

posed by the versatile B-52 bombers will materialize: ALCM's, nuclear-tipped short range attack missiles (SRAM's), or free-falling gravity bombs.

For the naval high command, the Tomahawk is important mainly because of its impact on naval warfare. In modern naval engagements, where the opposing fleets are hundreds of miles apart, the long-range anti-ship cruise would supplement carrier aircraft in sinking the Soviet Navy. Second, in the event of a U.S. carrier-led assault on the Soviet Far East or the Kola Peninsula, the nuclear-tipped Tomahawk would enable the Navy to defeat any Soviet attempt to launch a coordinated, simultaneous saturation missile attack on the aircraft carrier, the centerpiece of the Navy's offensive strategy. With the Tomahawk, the Soviets must now target many cruise-carrying ships instead of merely zeroing in on the huge carrier.

Contrary to the claim of Navy apologists, the deployment of the Tomahawk in the Pacific has nothing to do with deterrence. Ret. Admiral Ralph Weymouth, former director of Navy Program Planning at the Pentagon, was right on the target when he said recently: "I don't see how the long-range Tomahawk with a nuclear warhead is going to be part of deterrence. It's going to be part of war-fighting." □

States to plop sonar buoys anywhere in the Pacific to determine the precise splashdown of incoming re-entry vehicles.

In the last forty years, while the eyes of the West were focused on Europe, the Pacific became the site of two "limited" but bloody wars—Korea from 1950 to 1953 and Vietnam from 1965 to 1975. Today there reigns over the area the illusion of peace and prosperity. As we have seen, however, there is, instead, within the U.S. military an undercurrent of aggressive militarism legitimized by a dangerous doctrine which could lead to a Pacific confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Unlike Korea and Vietnam, however, such a confrontation is not likely to remain regional in scope nor conventional in terms of the weapons employed. Indeed, a Pacific conflict this time around could very well serve as the trigger for a bigger cataclysm. □

#### Notes:


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# The Great Pacific Island-Grab

Walden Bello

The United States government has treated Micronesian people and land as expendables—but is unwilling to relinquish control



Julian Rukon

*"Operation Homecoming" camp on Kwajalein Island next to radar screen. The four-month encampment by 1,000 Marshallese was a protest against regulations barring them from the island without special passes.*

One of the most cherished half-truths taught in American schools is that the United States was one of the sources behind the dismantling of colonial empires after the Second World War. What is true is that the United States did press the British and the French to give up their formal empires. What is often not stated, however, is that the United States has a record of decolonization worse than that of the British and the French. Aside from the Philippines, practically all areas colonized by the United States have ended up being absorbed into it either through direct annexation (Hawaii, Texas, etc.) or sugar-coated annexation (the commonwealths of Puerto Rico and Northern Marianas).

The latest attempt at formal territorial absorption is now before the U.S. Congress. The target is Micronesia, the last United Nations trusteeship. The vehicle for this process is the so-called "Compact of Free Association"—a contradictory and legally dubious status under which a nation would be "sovereign" in its domestic and foreign policy-making while entrusting its defense to the United States.

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands encompasses more than 2,100 islands and atolls strewn over 7.8 million square kilometers of ocean. The total land area, however, comes to only 1,854 square kilometers, and the population to 130,000. The Trust is currently divided into three political entities: the Republic of the Marshalls, Republic of Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia. A fourth entity, the Northern Marianas, left the Trust in 1976 when it opted for "commonwealth" status under the U.S. Government.

Since it wrested Micronesia from the Japanese during the

Second World War, the United States has done pretty much what it pleased with the territory. It did not formally annex the area, as the U.S. Navy recommended, but the "strategic trusteeship" mandate it obtained from the United Nations provided a respectable cover for the creation of an exclusive Pentagon preserve. The official callousness toward the wishes of the people whom the United States was supposed to be preparing for independence in accordance with the United Nations mandate was reflected in Henry Kissinger's impatient remark in 1969: "There are only 90,000 people out there. Who gives a damn?"

The Pentagon certainly did not give a damn when it converted the Marshall Islands into a test site for at least 66 nuclear explosions between 1946 and 1958—including the notorious "Bravo" hydrogen bomb test of 1954, the largest nuclear explosion ever detonated by the United States. Defense Department propaganda films showing the inhabitants of the test islands willingly being evacuated to other atolls "where there is better coconut" were a ghastly lie concocted to mask the human tragedy of forcible relocation of hundreds of islanders from their ancestral atolls. Since then, the inhabitants of Bikini and Enewetok have been "nuclear nomads," unable to gain acceptance in other island communities yet unable to return to their atolls because the United States refuses to spend the money to clean them up thoroughly.

But long-term relocation from their irradiated islands was a minor tragedy compared to the fact that many islanders were themselves irradiated by the tests. For a long time, U.S. officials maintained that the contamination of people in the


# Military Forces, Weapons, and Installations in the Pacific

Source: An American Lake, the Nuclear Peril in the Pacific

© Nautica/Southeast Asia Resource Center, 1984 Map by Geo Sinner

## Key to Military Forces, Major Bases, and Weapons Systems (U.S. unless specifically marked as USSR)

- 1 aircraft carrier
- 10 submarines
- 10 major surface warships
- naval base—logistics, training center, supply base, repair yards, headquarters
- Marines
- anti-submarine aircraft
- long-range transport
- airfield
- Army
- nuclear submarine operating zone (attack or ballistic missile)
- submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) base
- nuclear missile range launch
- missile impact point (US)
- missile impact point (USSR)
- nuclear warhead storage
- surface-to-air missiles (USSR)
- anti-submarine hydrophones
- strategic and medium range bombers
- nuclear depth bombs
- nuclear-capable artillery
- atomic demolition munition
- ICBM/IRBM silos, launchers (USSR)
- U.S. National Military Command Center
- Soviet Command Center
- ballistic missile early warning sites or stations monitoring Soviet ballistic missile tests
- Distant Early Warning (DEW) line or tactical radar
- space and satellite tracking stations
- ground stations (outside USA) for communications satellites
- communications and navigational aid stations for nuclear armed submarines
- communications base, signals intelligence



**Notes:**  
 Disputed areas are not included in the Pacific Command.  
 The Atlantic Command extends to the Pacific offshore South America only, and the Southern Command directs operations in Central and South America. U.S. forces on the West Coast may be sent anywhere. The Central Command directs operations in Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the Horn of Africa, but the Indian Ocean is under Pacific Command jurisdiction.  
 Bases and forces are shown by country, not by precise in-country location.  
 U.S. access to allied bases and facilities is not shown.  
 Only 15 percent of the Soviet Pacific Fleet is generally underway at any given time; the remainder is in homeports.  
 The U.S. Seventh Fleet maintains an underway rate of 55 percent, and the Third Fleet is 30 percent underway.

\*Major ballistic missile-attack submarine base (log and ice bound in winter) (USSR)  
 Submarine on Soviet navy visit to Pacific



atolls of Rongerik, Rongelap, and Uterik was "accidental." However, a recent report by the U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency admits that the 1954 Bravo bomb was detonated despite the fact that the nuclear test officials knew, *six hours before the event*, that the winds were headed in an easterly direction from the Bikini impact area toward Rongelap and other inhabited atolls. The U.S. Department of Energy was, in fact, forced to admit that a total of 14 atolls were subjected to radioactive fallout from the 66 nuclear tests between 1946 and 1958. However, only the inhabitants of two atolls—Rongelap and Uterik—have been provided with any follow-up medical treatment.<sup>2</sup>

It is not surprising then that, as Marshallese health worker Darlene Keju claims, "the list of health problems resulting from [radiation] exposure is virtually endless, and includes many cases of thyroid cancer, leukemia, cataracts, miscarriages, and stillbirths." Of particular concern to Keju and others is the increasing incidence of jellyfish babies, which "breathe and move up and down, but are not shaped like a human being but rather like a bag of jelly."<sup>4</sup> These babies live only for a few hours.

According to radiation experts, the worst is yet to come. The peak period for the eruption of radiation-related cancers is expected 40 years after exposure, which, in the case of the Marshallese, would come in the 1990s.

Perhaps mindful of this fact, U.S. officials have devised a document which would essentially absolve the United States of responsibility for the long-term genetic and health damage done to the Marshallese by the atomic testing. While the contaminated islanders are suing the United States to the tune of \$5 billion, Section 177 of the Compact would limit the U.S. government to \$150 million in reparations and, under the notorious "espousal" provision, would prevent litigation against the U.S. government stemming from the latent health effects of the nuclear tests.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon continues to use the Marshalls as a weapons testing site. While atmospheric nuclear blasts are no longer detonated, Kwajalein atoll has, since the early sixties, served as an "impact area" for incoming missiles launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. All major U.S. ballistic missiles—from the Minuteman to the MX—have landed in the atoll. To facilitate testing, residents of Kwajalein Island and other islands were evicted and relocated to the island of Ebeye, which has turned, over the last 20 years, into an overcrowded island-slum in the heart of the Pacific.

**T**he nuclear reparations issue and the continued missile testing in the Marshalls are only two of several controversies which are associated with the Compact. Another is the tremendous political pressure exerted by the United States on the people of Palau to revise their Constitution to drop a key provision which has earned the island republic the distinction of being the world's first nuclear-free nation.

In 1979, 92 percent of the people of Palau approved a Constitution in which the following provision was central: "Harmful substances such as nuclear, chemical, gas or biological weapons intended for use in warfare, nuclear power plants, and waste materials therefrom, shall not be used, tested, stored, or disposed of within . . . Palau without the express approval of not less than three-fourths (3/4) of the votes cast in a referendum . . . on this specific question." This key clause stemmed from the determination of 14,000 Palauans to avoid

the nuclear devastation that has been visited on their Marshallese neighbors and their determination to keep out of any entanglements that could make their land either a springboard for or an object of attack. They bitterly remembered the havoc created in their lives when U.S. and Japanese troops fought the bloody battle for Peleliu, one of Palau's major islands, during the Second World War.

The United States, however, has opposed the nuclear-free provision with equal determination. Under U.S. pressure, Palauan officials rewrote the constitution to exclude the anti-nuclear provision. But this second constitution was

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## The loss of their homes was a minor tragedy compared to the effects of radiation on the islanders themselves

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rejected by 70 percent of the voters in October 1979. In July 1980, 78 percent reaffirmed the original Constitution, upholding their status as a nuclear-free nation.

In February of 1983, the Constitution was challenged again. A plebiscite was held to approve the Compact of Free Association with the United States, which had certain sections that would allow the United States the right to store and transit nuclear and other harmful materials and weapons in Palau. Because of the constitutional provisions on this issue, a 75 percent vote was needed to override the Constitution and approve the nuclear-related sections of the Compact. Though affirming free association with the United States, the results of the plebiscite did not yield the necessary 75 percent vote to nullify the Constitution. The legal controversy which ensued was resolved when, to the chagrin of U.S. officials, the Palau Supreme Court ruled that the voters had upheld the Constitution and rejected the Compact.

Undaunted, the U.S. and Palau executive branches attempted last September 4 to override the Constitution a fourth time. This time, U.S. officials submitted a revised Compact to the electorate which did not specifically mention the U.S. intent to bring nuclear materials into Palau but implicitly subsumed it under the general provision giving the United States the "full authority and responsibility for defense matters in or relating to Palau" and the right "to conduct within the lands, water, and airspace of Palau the activities and operations necessary for the exercise of its authority and responsibility." The voters were not fooled, and despite heavy lobbying by U.S. and Palauan government officials, the Compact again failed to get the 75 percent of the vote necessary to override the Constitution's anti-nuclear clause.

Why is the United States so intent on destroying the anti-nuclear provision? The official answer was provided by a staff member of the U.S. Office for Micronesian Status Negotiations (OMSN):

"Should the United States, for whatever reasons, elect in the future to relinquish its forward bases at Okinawa and in the Philippines, Palau would be one of the logical replacements. That is why the U.S. must secure military rights in these islands against the day when Tinian, Guam, and Palau may become our fallback arc of defense in the Western Pacific."<sup>5</sup>

With some 70 percent of the ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet said to be armed with nuclear weapons, Pentagon planners find Palau's constitutional ban on nuclear material

anathema. Ambassador Fred Zeder, President Reagan's top man in the negotiations, argues heatedly that "The United States must have the flexibility to effectively defend Palau. . . . So, as a matter of policy, we can neither confirm nor deny the existence of nuclear weapons on our ships."<sup>6</sup> Zeder told a Senate Committee that the Palauans would "come around" to accepting the U.S. viewpoint.<sup>7</sup>

Among those in the forefront of the opposition to the Pentagon is Palauan activist Roman Bedor. Zeder's position is hypocritical, he asserts: "It's not our defense that they're interested in. This Compact is primarily designed to secure U.S. military interests in our land for the next 50 years."<sup>8</sup> Bedor's remarks underline a feature of the Compact which belies the U.S. claim that it confers sovereignty on Palau: While Palauans by a majority vote can move to terminate the agreement, they cannot unilaterally do away with the U.S. right to exercise "full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters" for the next half century.

Some observers are not convinced that Palau's possible contribution to the ability of the United States to project power is vital and discount the military question in explaining its determined effort to emasculate the Palauan Constitution. It is the Constitution's "demonstration effect" that the United States really fears, they say.

Indeed, the Palauan "disease" has proven contagious. Last September, the voters on Ponape in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) passed a measure making their island a nuclear-free zone. A few days after the Ponape vote, the Leadership Conference of the FSM supported the Ponape decision and encouraged its adoption throughout the territory. Palau also inspired the recent proposal of 14 South Pacific nations to form a nuclear-free zone and New Zealand's decision to ban visits by nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ships.

**I**n defense of the Compact, U.S. officials point to the fact that a majority of the Marshallese, Palauans, and citizens of the Federated States voted for the arrangement. Critics point out, however, that the independence option was deliberately foreclosed by the United States during the 37 years in which it served as the UN's "administering power."

Strong support for the critics' claim that the United States acted to thwart its mandate to lead the territory toward independence is found in the infamous "Solomon Report." The product of a U.S. survey mission commissioned by then President John F. Kennedy and headed by Harvard economist Anthony Solomon, now chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the report has remained classified since it was completed in 1963. This is not surprising since it contains stunning revelations.

It states, for instance, that National Security Memorandum No. 145, issued in 1962, "set forth as U.S. policy the movement of Micronesia into a permanent relationship with the U.S. within our political framework. In keeping with that goal, the memorandum called for accelerated development of the area to bring its political, economic and social standards into line with an eventual association."<sup>9</sup> The Solomon report described itself as providing "an integrated master plan [for] making Micronesia a United States territory."<sup>10</sup>

Among the recommendations made by the report which became policy under succeeding administrations were the following:

- Acculturation of Micronesians to the "American way of life" through educational curricula stressing American cultural and patriotic values and symbols, and the assignment of large



*Sign urging Palauans to defend their nuclear-free constitution.*

numbers of Peace Corps volunteers to spearhead this process of Americanization.

- Massive infusion of U.S. funds into Micronesia. In recent times, some \$130 million of U.S. government appropriations has flowed into Micronesia per annum, a sum which comes to about 95 percent of the total cost of Trust Territory operations. Manipulation of these funds to encourage political outcomes favorable to the United States was recommended:

"For the outcome of the plebiscite [on Micronesia's future status] to be favorable, the Mission believes that there must be an effective capital investment program before the plebiscite to give Micronesians a sense of progress to replace the deadly feeling of economic dormancy."<sup>11</sup>

While it encouraged dependency at the level of economic relations, the United States practiced divide-and-rule tactics at the political level. When the Congress of Micronesia, set up in 1964, began to become a forum for independence sentiments in the late sixties, the United States encouraged regional divisions and abetted the fragmentation of the territory into four separate political entities—a process which was legitimized by a referendum in 1978. Then, dealing with each "state" separately, the United States entered into a

## The Solomon report was "an integrated master plan [for] making Micronesia a U.S. territory"

separate agreement to set up a "Commonwealth" with representatives of the Northern Marianas, and began separate discussions on "free association" with delegates from the Marshall Islands, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia.

**D**espite the flow of U.S. money into the islands, however, hardly any economic development has taken place. Indeed, in his influential *Micronesia: Trust Betrayed*, Donald McHenry, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, asserted that "there seems to be general agreement that the United States has failed dismally to develop Micronesia economically."<sup>12</sup> Most funds went to the creation of an administrative bureaucracy and "welfare state" designed to entice Micronesians into permanent affiliation with the United States, while relatively little went to spending for infrastructure and industrial projects which could have triggered self-sustaining development in the area.

The social and economic consequences of the Solomon master plan are starkly evident throughout the territory. Only five miles of paved road in Palau and an antiquated sewage system in Ebeye in the Marshalls which a few years ago spewed human waste into kitchen sinks. Cholera, a disease that the World Health Organization (WHO) declared eradicated a few years back, broke out in Truk in the FSM in 1982. Tuberculosis and leprosy also exist in epidemic proportions in the FSM. "It is simply shocking," says health worker Darlene Keju, "that people in U.S.-administered areas are dying of diseases which are supposed to have been eradicated."<sup>13</sup>

Many older Micronesians point out that in terms of economic development, the U.S. record is dismal compared to that of the Japanese, who occupied the area from 1914 to 1945. The Japanese fortified the islands, but they also made the large investments in infrastructure and export production

### "The physical infrastructure . . . is not yet back to the level of pre-World War II"

which made the area economically vibrant. Today, stated Micronesian specialist Mary Lord in recent testimony in Congress, "the physical infrastructure of roads, hospitals, docking facilities, power systems, water, and sanitation is not yet back to the level of pre-World War II."<sup>14</sup>

In short, over the last 37 years of Trusteeship, the United States has by design fostered a stultifying and overwhelming dependency on U.S. aid which has made many Micronesians who would otherwise opt for independence fearful of the economic consequences of that alternative.

**I**ndependence is not, however, an unrealistic option for some rising Micronesian political activists. Roman Bedor, for instance, is confident that an independent Palau would not result in a cut-off of aid but bring about its diversification. "Unless we are independent, we would not be able to get aid to develop our economy from other countries. With diversified trade and aid ties, our economy would in fact be much healthier than it is today, when we have to depend on handouts from the U.S."<sup>15</sup>

But Bedor and other independence activists in Micronesia face an uphill battle. For instance, in Palau, while rural communities which have been traditionally self-sufficient may favor independence, the bloated urban-based government bureaucracy based in the capital city of Koror has a vested interest in some form of permanent association with the United States. As anthropologist Catherine Lutz describes this stratum: "The U.S. policy of non-development has created a huge class of government employees whose ability to eat depends on the continuance of dependence on the United States."<sup>16</sup>

It is probably the younger generation of Micronesians who eventually will tip the scale in favor of independence. Throughout the territory, there is an abnormally high rate of suicide among teenagers who are caught in a dilemma between "Americanization and tradition." In other countries subjected to colonialism, individual *anomie* has often been a symptom of a latent collective turbulence which later exploded in nationalist political movements.

Meanwhile, the Reagan administration is rushing the Compact through the U.S. Congress. The Senate Energy Committee, which has jurisdiction over Micronesia, has already approved the document, but it is snagged in the House

of Representatives, where the Democrat-controlled Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks chaired by Rep. John Seiberling (Dem.-Ohio) is subjecting it to a close review in an effort to address the more obvious inequities like the terms of radiation compensation for victims of atomic testing.

Disturbing questions are sometimes raised in the U.S. Congress, the responses to which highlight the farce that Micronesian "sovereignty" would be under the Compact. For instance, on September 18, several members of the Foreign Affairs Committee wondered how the administration could reconcile its claim that Micronesian entities would acquire sovereignty over their foreign affairs while the United States would retain full and absolute authority over defense matters. The State Department representative replied, non-plussed: "If the Micronesians make any pronouncement, there is no special problem with us." However, "we retain plenary responsibility for defense and security *as we define it*."<sup>17</sup>

The spokesman from the Pentagon was even more blunt: "If they enter into any type of relationship which, in our judgment infringes on our defense position, then we are obliged to take action."<sup>18</sup> Colonialism is indeed alive and well in the heart of the Pacific. □

#### Notes:

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5. Richard Teare, interview in film *Strategic Trust: The Making of Nuclear-Free Palau*.
6. Stated in meeting with visiting representatives of Focus on Micronesia Coalition, Minority Rights Group, and U.S. Pacific Issues Network, Washington, D.C., May 1, 1984.
7. Stated in testimony before Senate Energy Committee, Washington, D.C., May 24, 1984.
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12. Donald McHenry, *Micronesia: A Trust Betrayed* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1975), p. 7.
13. Talk at Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., March 13, 1984.
14. Testimony before Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks, U.S. House of Representatives, Sept. 25, 1984.
15. Talk at United Nations Church Center, New York, May 17, 1984.
16. Testimony before Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks, U.S. House of Representatives, Sept. 25, 1984.
17. Edward Derwinski, State Department Counselor, reply to question by Rep. Steven Solarz at House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Compact of Free Association, Sept. 18, 1984.
18. Defense Dept. representative, reply to question by Rep. Steven Solarz at House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, Sept. 18, 1984.

# Kwajalein: Arms Race and Apartheid

**O**n June 10, 1984, a Minuteman 1 missile with a mock warhead took off from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and headed toward the Central Pacific. As it hurtled through space, another missile was fired from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshalls. The next few moments were described by one press report:

"More than 100 miles in space, the interceptor opened a 15-foot steel net resembling a spider web. As the interceptor approached its target at a combined collision speed of 20,000 feet per second, the net snagged the warhead and destroyed it. An Army official likened the feat to "hitting a bullet with a bullet."

Kwajalein has been in the forefront of missile development since the early sixties, having served as the "impact area" for virtually all long-range rockets, including the Minuteman, Poseidon, Polaris, Trident, and, most recently, the MX. Indeed, as Owen Wilkes, former staff member of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, puts it, "If one were to ask which spot on earth contributed most to the nuclear arms race, the answer might well be Kwajalein Atoll."

Seized from the Japanese in 1944, during the Second World War, Kwajalein's ideal Central Pacific location led to its being designated part of the Pacific Missile Range in 1960. In what must surely go down in history as one of the most deceitful "agreements" perpetrated by a colonial power, the United States forced the people of Kwajalein to lease their atoll for 99 years for \$750,000, or at less than \$9 an acre. Over the next few years, as the central two-thirds of the lagoon—the so-called Mid-Atoll Corridor—became the impact area for incoming missiles, the residents of the main island of Kwajalein and other smaller islands were uprooted, provided with \$25 a month as "compensation," and relocated to the tiny island of Ebeye.

As the Kwajalein Missile Range (KMR) grew in importance, so did the frustrations of the uprooted residents increase. A situation of *apartheid* came to characterize the relations between the U.S. Army which operated KMR and the dislocated people. At Kwajalein, 3000 Americans lived in relative luxury on the island's 900 acres, provided with airconditioned houses, bowling alleys, a golf course, basketball and

handball courts, baseball fields, swimming pools and free services.

In contrast, overcrowding marked life in Ebeye, with the population growing from 500 in 1951 to 4500 by the mid-sixties. By 1984, the population had more than doubled, as people from all over the Marshalls flocked to the island to fill the KMR's demand for logistic and service personnel. Today, with 8500 people crammed into 66 acres, Ebeye has a population density higher than that of Washington, D.C.

Slum conditions prevail. The island's sewage system broke down in 1979; when people flushed their toilets, human waste would gush into their sinks. Though repaired, the current system's collection capability remains marginal until a new one is installed. The one hospital on the island has one emergency room, one delivery room, one laboratory and 12 beds. The island has only three doctors and no dentist. Educational facilities are no better, consisting of one dilapidated public elementary school for 1250 children. There is no high school, resulting in a condition whereby less than half of Ebeye's students who complete elementary schooling go on to some form of secondary education.

Perhaps nothing is more irksome to the people of Kwajalein than the social indignities visited on them daily. To visit their island, they must have passes, which are issued in limited numbers. They must be off the island by nightfall or risk arrest. To transact business at the branch of the Bank of Hawaii, they must first wait in a hot bus since no more than ten people are allowed to enter the bank at a time; then, they are escorted and watched by Army security personnel.

**W**hat marginal improvements in their lot have come about have resulted from direct, militant action on the part of the Kwajalein people. In 1969 they defied the Army by occupying some restricted "mid-corridor islands"; a year later, the Defense Department agreed to provide the displaced landowners \$420,000 per annum over five years, or approximately \$285 annually for each of about 1470 people.

A more massive protest took place in July 1979, when 500 landowners staged a sail-in to several restricted islands. This action forced the U.S. to agree to provide \$9 million annually as rent for

KMR; \$5 million would go directly to the landowners while \$4 million would be channelled to the Marshall Islands central government for capital improvements and other projects.

The biggest protest took place from June to November 1982. "Operation Homecoming" saw about 1000 people occupy parts of Kwajalein and other mid-corridor islands in response to the signing of the Compact of Free Association between the United States and the Marshall Islands government. The protestors were angered by the provisions in the Compact which would grant the U.S. military the right to use Kwajalein for fifty years and reduce the annual rent for the KMR from \$9 million to \$1.9 million.

Despite harsh military reprisals like arrests, closing of the bank in Kwajalein, and shutting off of toilets at the resettlement sites, the people persisted and succeeded in getting parts of the Compact renegotiated. Among the major changes forced by the protesters were: 1) reduction of the maximum term of the KMR lease from 50 to 30 years; 2) an agreement to give the Kwajalein landowners a greater portion of the \$9 million annual rent; and 3) establishment of a \$10 million fund to improve living conditions over the next three years.

The concessions have not, however, corrected the fundamental injustice of the situation in the eyes of the landowners. This deep dissatisfaction surfaced dramatically in September 1983, when 70 percent of the people of Kwajalein voted against the Compact of Free Association between the Marshalls and the United States. According to Ataji Balos, chairman of the Board of Directors of the Kwajalein Atoll Corporation, the vote was a protest against "the imposition of thirty more years of the same treatment on the Kwajalein people." In an impassioned plea for justice delivered on August 9, 1984 before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks, Balos summed up this treatment:

"In short, we must live in a community in which the military intrusion on our lives not only dominates, but controls totally. Our future economic and social development will be within the parameters of what derives from military activity at Kwajalein." □



# The Pentagon and the Philippine Crisis

Walden Bello

## The Departments of Treasury, State, and Defense all have their own Philippine policies—but Reagan has the last word

**T**he Philippines, which hosts two of the United States' most strategic overseas bases, is climbing quickly to the top of the Reagan administration's list of Third World headaches. The president has, in fact, warned that developments there could create "a communist power in the Pacific." Yet it is becoming increasingly clear that U.S. policy toward the beleaguered Ferdinand Marcos is fraught with contradictions and beset by dissension.


Prior to the October 21, 1984, presidential debate in which President Ronald Reagan made his notorious statement about not throwing Ferdinand Marcos "to the wolves," there had been much talk about a "new" U.S. policy toward the Philippines. The Reagan administration, many commentators claimed, was slowly but surely distancing itself from President Ferdinand Marcos. The State Department, in fact, had nearly convinced some sectors of the Philippine opposition that the United States was genuinely interested in democratizing the political process.

But even before Reagan's candid remarks pulled the rug from under the so-called pragmatists now managing Philippine policy at the State Department, the U.S. Government's policy toward Marcos was already torn by contradictions. Instead of one policy, there have, in fact, been several competing, if not contradictory, ones followed by different key agencies acting on their perception of what best serves U.S. interests in the Philippines at this point in time.

The U.S. Treasury Department's main interest, for instance, is "reforming" the Philippine economy to enable it to service its close to \$30 billion foreign debt, a huge chunk of which is owed to U.S. private banks. Thus, within the administration, Treasury has been the most enthusiastic champion of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) standby program which will provide the regime with a \$630 million credit in return for the imposition of austerity measures like the devaluation of the peso, tax increases on vital commodities and services, and severe cutbacks in government social expenditures.

Probably most revealing of the attitude that guides Treasury's policy toward the Philippines and other debt-ridden Third World countries is a statement made last year before the House of Representatives' Banking Committee by Secretary Donald Regan: "I don't think we should let a nation off the hook because we are sympathetic to the fact that they are having difficulty . . . As debtors, I think they should be made to pay as much as they can without breaking them . . . You just can't let your heart rule your head in these situations."

The State Department, on the other hand, is the agency



Subic Navy base

most painfully aware of the contradiction that underlies U.S. policy toward the Philippines. The Philippine situation is a time bomb created by the intersection of three severe crises: political legitimacy, economic depression, and the international financial crisis. While Treasury puts a premium on keeping the lid on the international debt crisis by squeezing the debtor, State believes that the key crisis to focus on is that of political legitimacy. Indeed, many at State are concerned that squeezing the Philippine economy to stabilize the international financial system is the surest way to more explosive political turmoil.

Thus, while Treasury has been tightening the purse-strings of foreign aid to Marcos, State has been loosening them. It accelerated the disbursement of "economic support funds" of \$50 million earmarked for the regime under the Fiscal Year 1984 U.S. foreign aid appropriations. It also managed to get two large U.S. government export credit agencies, the

Dorothy Friesen

Export-Import Bank and the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to extend \$925 million worth of credit lines to the regime. It was this \$1 billion in U.S. bilateral aid—together with over \$1 billion in loans from the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, Japan, and Common Market countries—which kept the essentially insolvent economy from going under during mid-1984.

The conflict in perspective between Treasury and State came to a head in early September, when Treasury cast a no vote for the United States on a proposed \$150 million World Bank agricultural loan to the Philippines on the grounds that its conditions were "soft." State mounted a strong counter-lobby, with Secretary of State George Shultz attempting to convince Regan of the "destabilizing effects" of a no vote. Treasury held firm.

**T**he State Department pragmatists who now guide the agency's policy toward Marcos see the problem as principally political. The country is polarizing between a thoroughly discredited dictatorship and a rising revolutionary movement whose most threatening wing is the New People's Army (NPA), which operates in 56 of the country's 73 provinces. The solution lies mainly in achieving a reconciliation between Marcos and the elite opposition by forcing the dictator to share some of his jealously guarded power. The vital target group is the large urban middle class, which must be given the hope that a series of electoral exercises will produce a peaceful parliamentary alternative to revolutionary polarization.

The challenge is how to accomplish this without destabilizing the regime and giving more opportunities to the revolutionary opposition. In pursuing its route to political stabilization, State has forged a "diplomacy of distance" from Marcos, nudged him toward holding elections last May and making it plain that it wants the military conspirators who planned the Aquino assassination punished. In pressuring the dictator, State has adopted a low-profile posture and attempted to convey its message in language that is diplomatic but "firm."

Devised and put into motion by pragmatists such as Michael Armacost, who served as envoy to Manila prior to his elevation to the number three post in the State bureaucracy earlier this year, the diplomacy of distance was projected in the media as the U.S. policy.

One of the most important allies of the State Department is Rep. Steven Solarz, the key player in Congress. It was Solarz who gathered the Congressional support required to put some teeth in the State Department moves to pressure Marcos to liberalize. More than anybody else, it was Solarz who achieved the bipartisan consensus which pushed through, by a vote of 413 to 3, the October, 1983, House resolution calling for a "thorough, independent, and impartial investigation of the Aquino assassination" and "genuine, free and fair elections" to the National Assembly. It was also Solarz who got a Democratic-Republican majority to fight off an attempt by Rep. Tony Hall (Dem.-Ohio) to eliminate all military aid to Marcos in May, 1984. It is widely known on Capitol Hill that State Department opposition to Solarz' moves is token and that Solarz fronts initiatives which the State Department pragmatists, for diplomatic reasons, cannot take the overt lead on.

This is not to say that the Brooklyn Democrat is a tool of a Republican State Department. The Solarz-State Department alliance reflects a "pragmatic-reformist" approach to defusing polarization and undercutting the left. There are two critical

assumptions: that the problem is primarily political, though it has military aspects; and that economic aid will be necessary to bridge the transition to a less restrictive regime. Thus, among all the executive agencies, it has been State which has been most sympathetic to Solarz' vision of a "Marshall Plan" for the Philippines, which would grant billions of dollars in emergency bilateral aid to the regime if Marcos agrees to yield his power to legislate by decree and dismantles the economic empires of his cronies.

The Solarz-State Department project to "reform" the dictatorship, however, has not evoked much enthusiasm at the Pentagon. This became evident early on during the discussions of the so-called "Inter-Agency Task Force" which was set up to discuss and coordinate policy in the aftermath of the Aquino assassination on September 21, 1983. "The Defense Department apparently has its own agenda," asserted one participant who shared the State Department's view that the problem was mainly political. The source added that most of the Pentagon officials were inclined not to rock the boat, although "there are some military men who agree with the more political approach of the State Department."

**A**t the heart of the Pentagon's coolness toward the State Department's political reform initiatives is their possible impact on Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base.

In the view of Pentagon planners, these two bases—especially Subic—have acquired added strategic functions over the last decade which now make them "simply irreplaceable," as navalist Alvin Cottrell puts it.<sup>2</sup>

Up to the late sixties, the principal utility of Subic and Clark lay in their being the key points for the projection of U.S. aeronaval power into Southeast Asia. Clark served as the logistical staging area for the U.S. war effort in Indochina while Subic was "the essential fulcrum for projecting naval and naval air power into the Tonkin Gulf and against North Vietnam."<sup>3</sup>

Subic's role as the springboard for the deployment of U.S. carrier forces in the Indian Ocean was greatly enhanced in 1980 when the United States took advantage of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan to escalate its naval presence in the

## The State Department is most aware of the contradiction underlying U.S. policy toward the Philippines

area. Today, one can say with certainty that the much-vaunted Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which is geared for intervention in Northwest Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East, would be crippled without Subic.

When the United States began to drum up the Soviet "naval threat" in the late seventies, the Philippine bases acquired another critical role: that of providing critical back-up support for a "contingency" in Northeast Asia—including a naval strike at the Soviet naval facilities at Vladivostok in the Soviet Far East, in line with the U.S. Navy's "maritime strategy" of pressing the Soviet Pacific Fleet close to its home waters and knocking it out quickly in the event of war.<sup>4</sup> In the event of a Northeast Asian contingency, the bases are meant to provide not only critical naval-air assistance but also logistical support for Chinese ground actions against the Soviet Union. Central to providing this logistical assistance are bases in Japan and the Philippines, where a tactical air wing of 16 C-130's and three C-9's is based at Clark.

One might say that it has been only in the last decade that the full strategic potential of the Philippines for the employment of the offensive might of the United States has been realized. And because he has granted the U.S. military *carte blanche* to develop the strategic potential of the bases, Ferdinand Marcos has drawn, over the last 18 years of his rule, his greatest and most consistent support within the U.S. government from the Pentagon.

**A**lways accurate in smelling out the real center of power, Ferdinand Marcos has cultivated cordial ties with successive CINCPAC's while having uneven relationships with U.S. ambassadors and senior State Department officials, especially those who have tried to emphasize human rights issues. He has been amply rewarded: since the mid-seventies, the Pentagon and Pacific Command have been the strongest opponents of Congressional efforts to reduce aid to Marcos on human rights grounds. A case in point was the recent debate on the proposal of Rep. Steven Solarz, head of the House of Representatives' Asia-Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, to reduce the fiscal year 1985 military aid appropriations for Marcos from \$85 million to \$25 million. While the State Department put up only token opposition to this effort, which passed the House in May, Pentagon pressure was decisive in getting \$15 million restored during the Senate-House conference committee meetings in early October.

But Marcos is valued not only as a trusted friend. In the U.S. military command's view, the dictator, despite his rank unpopularity and total lack of legitimacy as a ruler, continues to dominate the Philippine military and thus provides the only effective counter to a rising revolutionary movement that demands the withdrawal of the U.S. bases. Marcos is the linchpin of the military, which would fall into quarrelling factions if his monopoly on political power were ended. Pacific Command also realizes that the elite opposition has been severely weakened by Marcos' dismantling of its grassroots power bases during the 12 long years of martial law. Forcing Marcos to share power with the elite opposition, as State wants to do, might bring short-term gains in political legitimacy at the expense of military morale and cohesion. Moreover, once begun, the process of political reform brings nationalists and leftists to positions of significant influence, thus opening up more opportunities for the revolutionary movement.

**S**keptical of the effectiveness of broader political reforms, the Pentagon has chosen to place emphasis on a military solution to the Philippine crisis. The key is building up the Philippine military as a counterinsurgency force. In remarkably candid testimony before the Solarz Committee on October 4, Richard Armitage, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, laid out some of the steps the Pentagon felt were necessary to make the Philippine military more effective:

- First, the military high command must be "reformed." According to Armitage, "It is obvious to all of us that the people at the top have to be the ones that those down below, including the NCO's [non-commissioned officers], can emulate. They can't be affected by habits of corruption."

- Second, training of troops must be disciplined and include skills in what Armitage called "counter-propaganda." He commented, "We need to demonstrate graphically that what we are doing comes from the heart."

- Third, troop morale must be improved by, among other things, "troop rotation, so troops don't stay in one place for

long periods of time, which is bad for morale."

- Fourth, military equipment must be geared not for external defense needs but for counterinsurgency against the New People's Army.

"We have relayed our concern to responsible officers," Armitage asserted suggestively. "In January, I went there and talked with some of them, but I think there's no reason to identify them."

A similar U.S. effort has been under way in El Salvador for the past two years. There, the Pentagon has been instrumental in the retirement and forced exile of a number of corrupt, inefficient, or incorrigibly rightist generals and colonels. Automatic promotion according to one's class in the military academy is giving way to a system based on "merit"—success in hunting down and winning battles against the guerrillas. Military units are being restructured into mobile "Hunter Battalions" trained by U.S. advisers in El Salvador or the United States, and tactics are being oriented away from conventional to counter-guerrilla warfare. In the process, direct control of the Salvadoran military has passed to the Pentagon.

While they are determined not to destabilize Marcos in the transition, Pentagon officials apparently consider Armed Forces chief Gen. Fabian Ver and his coterie of "political generals" as obstacles to their plans for the Philippines, which they hope to implement with the cooperation of "professional generals." The implication of Ver and his clique in the Aquino assassination by the "majority report" of the official investigating commission is thus seen by many in the Defense Department as the first major break in their effort to supervise directly the transformation of the Philippine Army into a counterinsurgency force.


Gen. Fidel Ramos, Ver's replacement, is a West Point graduate who is regarded by his counterparts in the U.S. military as a professional capable of rallying and placing into positions of influence other professional soldiers. Many Americans see him as the equivalent of the recently slain Col. Domingo Monterrosa, who had spearheaded the transformation of the Salvadoran military into a counterinsurgency force.

**T**he big question throughout the last year has been: What are Ronald Reagan's own policy preferences toward the Philippines? Ever since the Aquino assassination, the White House has allowed the State Department to take the lead in the diplomatic-political area. Yet it has not interfered with the Treasury and Pentagon in the pursuit of their traditional bureaucratic concerns. With respect to the Philippines, as in many other foreign policy areas, Reagan has acted like the chairman of a corporate board whose members are carrying out distinct policies which sometimes work at cross purposes.

Ferdinand Marcos, however, knew that Reagan's deepest instinct is to distrust liberalization as being the antechamber to revolution. Thus, throughout the last year, he tried to arouse the ideological conservatism of the White House against the pressures for liberalization coming from the State Department. In contrast to his playing down the "Communist threat" prior to the assassination, he sounded the alarm frenziedly when State Department officials began to talk about power-sharing and an electoral apertura. For instance, after the May 14 elections, he told the *Washington Post*:

"I don't know why Americans do not seem to realize the danger of a communist rebellion in the Philippines . . .

We have to face up to the fact that if we do not weaken



*USS Coral Sea from Bo. Kalaklao*

the NPA subversives now, later on they'll be marching in the streets here and proclaiming a takeover of government."<sup>6</sup>

This tactic has paid off handsomely. Right after the presidential debate last October 21, government-controlled media in Manila blared Reagan's comments:

"... I know that there are things there in the Philippines which do not look good to us from the standpoint right now of democratic rights, but what is the alternative?"

"It is a large communist movement to take over the Philippines. They have been our friend since their inception as a nation, and I think that we've had enough of a record of letting under the guise of revolution, someone that we thought was a little more right than we would be, letting that person go and then winding up with totalitarianism pure and simple as the alternative."

"And I think that we're better off, for example with the Philippines, of trying to retain our friendship and help them right the wrongs we see than to throw them to the wolves and then facing the communist power in the Pacific."<sup>7</sup>

It was an ideological response right out of Jeane Kirkpatrick's right-wing ideological manifesto "Dictatorships and Double Standards," and its impact on the State Department's diplomacy of distance was devastating.

Abetted by the president's instinctive preference for authoritarian allies, no matter how discredited and corrupt, the Pentagon's prescription for a military counter-insurgency solution is winning out in the policy struggle. This will have significant implications for the Philippines. The State Department's program of limited reform would not have headed off eventual social polarization, but it would have delayed it by fostering the illusion of a parliamentary solution in key sectors of the middle class. By rudely destroying the latter's last hopes that the United States will abandon the dictator, the Reagan-Marcos prescription will surely accelerate the popularization of the revolutionary alternative.

**I**f polarization does ensue and the counter-insurgency solution fails, what then? What can we expect to be the U.S. military's response to the very real threat that a popular nationalist government would pose to the base complex?

The "fallback" option—transferring the facilities to Micro-

nesia, specifically to the so-called "defense arc" formed by Tinian, Guam, and Palau—does not appear likely. Pentagon officials have apparently shelved this alternative for reasons of cost: the move would cost at least \$3 billion. It would also mean the loss of a work force of 39,000 Filipinos who are, according to former Ambassador William Sullivan, more skilled than even their counterparts in U.S. shipyards. The only real alternative to Subic, he asserts, is to service the Seventh Fleet from the West Coast of the United States.<sup>8</sup>

But there is another reason, a political one, and that is the growing anti-nuclear movement in the Pacific. The people of Palau, a candidate for some fallback facilities, have adopted a constitution that outlaws the presence of nuclear weapons and materials within the island. And in the Central Pacific, the people of Ponape have voted to declare their island a nuclear-free zone—a move endorsed by the leadership conference of the Federated States of Micronesia. These moves are part of a growing mood throughout the Pacific to de-nuclearize the area; other manifestations of this movement are the New Zealand Labor government's decision to ban visits by nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed warships and the decision of 14 South Pacific countries to band together to form a nuclear-free area.

Is ground-troop intervention a likely course of action? This is improbable. If the Reagan administration is already having such a difficult time persuading the American public to

## The Pentagon's plan for the Philippine army is similar to the one it has just implemented in El Salvador

sanction the sending of more U.S. advisers to El Salvador, which has a population of six million, what more with the Philippines, which has a population of 53 million, most of whom are spread out on 11 major islands? To have a chance of being even slightly effective, a ground-troop operation would have to be at least as large as the U.S. build-up in Vietnam. The last time the United States "pacified" the Philippines, at the turn of the century, it needed 50,000 troops to deal with a population of six million; and the operation took three years (10 years if we include the "Moro Campaign" in the South).

This is not to say that the United States will not apply direct military pressure on the insurgents. But this is most likely to be in the form of U.S. aeronaval strikes in support of the local army. As Franz Schurmann has pointed out, U.S. airpower in support of mercenary ground troops is the preferred form of warfare of the naval officers who dominate Pacific Command.<sup>9</sup>

There is an alternative to withdrawal and ground-troop intervention now being considered by Pentagon officials. This is the "Guantanamo Solution" or, more appropriately, an "enclave strategy" such as that proposed by Gen. James Gavin for U.S. forces in Vietnam in the mid-sixties. This strategy would probably yield Clark, which, in CINCPAC's view, is dispensable and indefensible, but not Subic, which is indispensable and defensible. Subic would be surgically isolated from the rest of Luzon and fortified with ground units. That such an option is now being considered is hinted at in a "contingency report" by Sevinc Carlson of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a right-wing think-tank with close ties to the Navy. *In extremis*, writes Carlson,

"Subic Bay's geography and location (at the tip of a penin-



sula and partially protected by a peninsula-wide range of hills) make it at least theoretically defensible by the United States. With Subic, therefore, a Guantanamo Bay situation might be hypothetically possible, though hardly politically feasible. Clark Air Field, however, is another story. It is situated in a flat plain with no natural defenses in the heart of "Huk country." In the face of Philippine government hostility, defending Clark—for the United States—would require reconquering and subsequently regoverning, almost all Luzon at least."<sup>10</sup>

The enclave strategy would pose a major threat to a nationalist government without entailing the political costs of ground-troop intervention. From Subic, rapid deployment commando units could occasionally sally forth to different points of a relatively small archipelago to keep such a government off balance. Subic would also probably serve as a supply center for "contras" scattered on various islands who will be encouraged to keep up a smoldering war to harass the nationalists.

Is the future really this bleak? Surely, the Filipino people, after having waged such a long struggle against various forms of U.S. intervention, deserve a few years of peace in order to be able to forge the institutions of genuine self-rule and national development. It would be folly for them, however, not to steel themselves to face this likely scenario of beleaguered American power hanging on to a strategic enclave—an iron

enclave from which it could project offensive force globally as well as periodically lash out at local attempts at a peaceful reconstruction of the country. □

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
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## "Yellow Rain":

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Tom Seeley examining a nest of *Apis florea*.

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# For a Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific

## The movement has grown from protests against individual nuclear tests to an international alliance seeking fundamental changes

Lyuba Zarsky

From Hawaii to the Philippines, from Micronesia to Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand, peoples of the Pacific are stepping up their opposition to military and nuclear intervention.

Popular opposition to nuclear weapons has its roots in the atomic tests in the Marshall Islands during the early 1950's. Marshall Islanders repeatedly petitioned the United Nations to forbid further tests in Micronesia. The Japanese peace movement found important new support when fallout from the 1954 "Bravo" hydrogen bomb test in Bikini contaminated and later killed Japanese fishermen aboard the *Lucky Dragon*. Throughout the Pacific, Bikini Day—March 1—is still remembered as Nuclear-Free Pacific Day.

While unquestionably dominant, the United States is not the only foreign nuclear power in the Pacific. The British used Australia and Christmas Island for atmospheric nuclear tests during the 1950's. Defeated and expelled from Indochina in 1954, France nevertheless held on to its colonial possessions in the South Pacific—among them, "French" Polynesia, New Caledonia, and New Hebrides (held as a condominium with Great Britain). When Algeria gained independence in 1961, the French moved their atomic testing grounds from the deserts of North Africa to the Polynesian island of Muroroa, restarting their nuclear development program with a bang in 1966. The French atmospheric tests ignited protest in nations throughout the region, especially in the south Pacific. A 1973 trade union boycott against France in Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji was so effective that not even a letter could get through. In 1975, a conference held in Suva, Fiji, molded the region's popular, national opposition movements into a formally coordinated effort—the Nuclear-Free Pacific Movement, later known as the Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific Movement (NFIP).

The experience of the Marshall Islanders, other Micronesians generally, and the Polynesians, has profoundly affected the character of the anti-nuclear

movement. For it is clearly their colonial status which makes the islanders victims of nuclear and military development. Only through independence will they be able to halt the military bulldozer which has overrun them.

The lesson is not lost on movements in countries which are formally independent but economically, culturally, and militarily under the influence of the United States. In the Philippines in the mid-seventies anti-nuclear sentiment was fused with aspirations for genuine independence in a widespread movement which sought the withdrawal of U.S. military bases and opposed the construction of a Westinghouse nuclear power plant.

In the late 1970's, the tiny island of Palau emerged in the forefront of the nuclear-free Pacific movement when its people successfully fought off U.S.-Japanese plans to build a nuclear-powered superport. In 1979, Palau became the world's first nuclear-free nation when its people approved a constitution banning the presence or transit of nuclear material and weapons within their boundaries. Since then, they have successfully resisted attempts by the United States to get them to drop the nuclear-free provision of their constitution.

Also in 1979, the victory of the Vanuatu-Pati Party in the ex-colony of New Hebrides led to the establishment in newly independent Vanuatu of a government committed to Pacific self-determination and denuclearization. Vanuatu has over the last few years become a beacon to Pacific peoples struggling for independence and against militarization. It provides strong diplomatic and moral support to the Kanak independence movement in New Caledonia. It also participates in regional governmental organizations such as the South Pacific forum, where it presses for the establishment of a genuine nuclear-free zone.

Along with New Zealand and Papua New Guinea, for example, Vanuatu recently strengthened an Australian government proposal calling for a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific.

Criticized by some popular anti-nuclear groups for being too weak, the Australian proposal would prohibit nuclear testing and waste dumping but would allow the transit of nuclear warships and warplanes. Through the persistence of the three countries, Australia conceded that each signatory to the treaty would be free to make its own decision on nuclear warship transit—a limited but significant step toward a real nuclear-free zone. In 1983, Vanuatu hosted the Fourth Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific Conference.

Palau and Vanuatu have now been joined by New Zealand in the leadership of the movement to curtail nuclear arms. The New Zealand Labor Party's decision to ban visits by nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed warships is viewed with alarm by the Pentagon, which fears a snowball effect which could severely restrict U.S. military movements in the region.

Among non-governmental organizations, one of the nerve centers of the movement is the Pacific Concerns Resource Center (PCRC) in Honolulu. Established in 1980 by the Third Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific Conference—a meeting which included for the first time activists from the U.S. anti-nuclear movement—the PCRC acts as a resource center, clearinghouse, and campaign coordinator for grassroots groups throughout the Pacific.

The PCRC works closely with the U.S. Pacific Network (formerly the U.S. Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific Network), which was established to link the U.S. disarmament movement to the Pacific. The Network, with offices in Seattle and Washington, D.C., lobbies in Congress on Pacific issues, provides research and information to the Pacific movement, and works with other solidarity and human rights groups. In 1984 and 1985, it aims principally to try to stop the Compact of Free Association with Micronesia, which it denounces as a "colonial document" intended mainly to secure U.S. military rights to the area. The Network also distributes information on the various dimensions of U.S. militari-

zation in the Pacific and actively supports the Kanak independence movement in New Caledonia.

Trade unions in the Asia-Pacific region have also promoted nuclear-free Pacific goals. In 1981, the Pacific Trade Union Forum was formed to bolster conditions for independent trade unionism, as well as promote demilitarization and denuclearization. That the Forum is perceived as a threat to U.S. political interests is indicated by the formation of a parallel organization, the Labor Committee for Pacific Affairs, allegedly by American AFL-CIO officials and policy advisors from the Washington, D.C.-based right-wing think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies. According to the *New Zealand Times* (October 30, 1983), the Americans behind the Labor Committee are linked to the CIA.

An important feature of the movement is the strong participation of indigenous peoples in Hawaii and the United States. The American Indian Movement (AIM) has been a consistent supporter of popular struggles in the Pacific. The native Hawaiian movement has led the fight against the U.S. Navy's bombing of Kahoolawe island.

Many church and church-linked bodies throughout the Pacific actively support the anti-nuclear movement. Among the most energetic are the Pacific Council of Churches based in Suva, Fiji, which has backed the movement since its inception. In the United States, the Focus on Micronesia Coalition and the Task Force on Militarization in East Asia-Pacific, two groups based at the National Council of Churches in New York, have consistently brought Pacific concerns to the large church denominations. They have also been active in support of Pacific issues at the United Nations and the U.S. Congress.

Among other U.S.-based groups with Pacific interests or programs are Alliance for Philippine Concerns, Asia Resource Center (formerly Southeast Asia Resource Center), Center for Development Policy (Boston), Church Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines, Clergy and Laity Concerned, Committee for a New Korea Policy, Friends of the Earth, Friends of the Filipino People, Greenpeace, Institute for Policy Studies, Minority Rights Group, Nautilus Pacific Action Research, North American Coalition for

Human Rights in Korea, Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, Pacific Studies Center, Philippine Resource Center, Philippine Support Committee, and the Riverside Disarmament Project. Many publications offer insightful perspectives on the region, but deserving of special mention for consistent publicity on NFIP are *AMPO* (Tokyo), *Chain Reaction* (Melbourne), and *Pacific Research* (Mountainview, California).

Tours by Pacific activists have been an effective way of bringing the issue of Pacific demilitarization and independence to the U.S. peace and human rights communities. Palauan activist Bernie Keldermans, Julian Riklon and Darlene Keju of the Marshalls, and Honolulu-based journalist Giff Johnson are among those who made national tours in 1983 and 1984 to educate Americans about the Pacific.

In the spring of 1985, activists from throughout the region will again tour the United States. Organized by the Asia Resource Center, the Asia-Pacific Disarmament tour will provide to many Americans the first opportunity to hear firsthand about life under the gun in the Pacific. □

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## Action Guide

For more information on Asia-Pacific and Indian-Ocean-related issues please contact the following:

American Indian Movement (AIM)  
330 Ellis St., Room 438  
San Francisco, CA 94102

Alliance for Philippine Concerns  
P.O. Box 7277  
Ann Arbor, MI 48107

AMPO  
P.O. Box 5250  
Tokyo

Int. Japan Campaign for the  
Demilitarization of the Indian Ocean  
(CDIO)  
29 Elsie Rd.  
London SE22  
England

Center for Development Policy  
11 Garden Street  
Cambridge, MA 82138

Chain Reaction  
37 Swanston St. Room 14, 4th Floor  
Melbourne  
Victoria 3000, Australia

Committee for a New Korea Policy  
221 Central Avenue  
Albany, NY 12206

Focus on Micronesia Coalition  
475 Riverside Drive  
New York, NY 10027

Friends of the Filipino People  
P.O. Box 2125  
Durham, NC 27702

Institute for Policy Studies  
1901 Q. Street NW  
Washington, D.C. 20009

Minority Rights Group  
35 Claremont Ave. Box 45  
New York, NY 10027

Nautilus Pacific Action Research  
Box 309  
Leverett, MA 01054

North American Coalition for  
Human Rights in Korea  
110 Maryland Ave., NE. Box 68  
Washington, D.C. 20002

Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign  
International Coordinator  
303 Mass. Ave., NE  
Washington, D.C. 20002

Pacific Concerns Resource Center  
(PCRC)  
P.O. Box 27692  
Honolulu, Hawaii 96827

Pacific Research Pacific Studies  
Center  
222 B View St.  
Mountainview, CA. 94041

Philippine Resource Center  
P.O. Box 40090  
Berkeley, CA 94704

Philippine Support Committee  
1346 Connecticut Ave., NW  
Room 533  
Washington, D.C. 20036

Project Ploughshares  
Conrad Grebel College  
Waterloo, Ontario NZL 3G6  
Canada


Riverside Church Disarmament  
Project  
490 Riverside Drive  
New York, NY 10027

Task Force on Militarization in East  
Asia-Pacific  
National Council of Churches  
475 Riverside Drive  
New York, NY 10027

U.S. Pacific Network  
Washington Office:  
1346 Connecticut Ave., NW.  
Room 533  
Washington, D.C. 20036  
National Office:  
Smith Tower Room 1203  
506 Second Ave.  
Seattle, WA 98104

# Booknotes

*Collision Course at Kwajalein: Marshall Islanders in the Shadow of the Bomb*, by Giff Johnson, Pacific Concerns Resource Center, P.O. Box 27692, Honolulu, Hawaii 96827, 1984, 72 pp. (\$7.95 to addresses in the U.S., Canada and Micronesia. All other countries, \$9.50 airmail, \$8.00 surface.)



In this striking large-format volume, journalist Giff Johnson has meticulously documented the inordinate price paid by the people of the Marshall Islands for their involuntary role in the nuclear arms race. In what promises to be an important contribution to the current arms debate, Johnson has assembled detail upon agonizing detail about how human concerns are over-shadowed by the hypnosis of the arms race.

Beginning with the history of the 66 atomic and hydrogen bomb tests at Bikini and Enewetak, Johnson carefully unravels the grand design which lurks beneath the murky depths of the United Nations "strategic trust" agreement signed in 1947. Under this agreement, the U.S. pledged to "protect against the loss of lands" and to "protect the health of the inhabitants" of the Trust Territory. Yet in 1946 it had already dislodged the Bikini islanders for the nuclear tests of Operation Crossroads.

Noting that U.S. strategic planners lacked pertinent data about the adverse health effects of exposure to radioactive fallout, the author makes a convincing case that thousands of unwitting Marshallese were hit with fallout for experimental human studies.

The 1958 cessation of atmospheric

nuclear tests in the Marshalls did not release them from their role in the development of nuclear weapons. Instead of warheads, they became the testing grounds for delivery systems as Kwajalein Atoll became an Army anti-ballistic missile (ABM) facility.

Having identified Kwajalein as a key strategic area for the development of the ABM program, the Pentagon again dispensed with the indigenous population to make way for the influx of scientific, military, and technical support personnel for the billion-dollar-plus Kwajalein Missile Range (KMR).

Johnson's narrative covers both the violation of the Marshallese people's basic human rights and the military significance of the weapons deployed and tested there. In so doing, it presents a powerful example of our contemporary dilemma: The more we insist upon building the exotica of the arms race, the less secure we actually become.

"Strategic Trust: The Making of Nuclear-Free Palau." Directed by James Heddle. A production of Positive Futures Center. 60 minutes. 1983.

Palau, the tiny new republic in the southwestern corner of Micronesia, is credited with being the world's first nuclear-free nation. From 1979 through September 1984 the 14,000 inhabitants of this precedent-setting country voted on four separate occasions to affirm and re-affirm their constitution's ban against radioactive substances crossing their borders. U.S. defense planners, however, view the island nation as a stop-over point for the Seventh Fleet (as well as a jungle warfare training base) and are determined to remove the Palauan ban against receiving U.S. nuclear powered armed warships.

In "Strategic Trust," director Jim Heddle captures a modern-day David and Goliath epic by use of ethereal camera shots of Palau's rock islands, interviews with anguished islanders, and the tedium of a plebiscite on the Compact of Free Association.

Narrated by actress Joanne Woodward and featuring Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith, the soundtrack is interspersed with traditional and melodic Palauan songs to create a blend of "East meets West" in the nuclear age.

At a recent Congressional screening of the film on Capitol Hill, President Reagan's personal representative for Micronesian affairs, Ambassador Fred

Zeder, blasted the film as "a very clever piece of propaganda" and a "cheap theatrical presentation." Zeder's appearance in the film portrayed him as toeing the Pentagon's line on the necessity of re-vamping the nuclear-free constitution.

*Other recent publications on Pacific issues.*

Nautilus, *An American Lake: The Nuclear Peril in the Pacific* (Boston: South End Press, 1985).

Nautilus, *Warheads and Warships: U.S.-Pacific Connections* (Leverett, MA: Nautilus, 1984).

Also available from Nautilus at cost (mailing plus xeroxing) is a two-part bibliography of 2000 references on the militarization of the Pacific region.

Giff Johnson, *Collision Course at Kwajalein: Marshall Islanders Shadow of the Bomb* (Honolulu: Pacific Concerns Resource Center, 1984). Excellent. A must read.

Roger Clark and Sue Roff, *Micronesia: The Problem of Palau* (New York: Minority Rights Group, 1984). A thoroughly documented and devastating critique of the Compact of Free Association and U.S. bullying of Palau.

Catherine Lutz, ed., *Micronesia as Strategic Colony* (Cambridge: Cultural Survival, 1984). This collection of essays is probably the best available on the tragic social and economic consequences of U.S. colonialism in Micronesia.

P. Todd and "Raven", *Arming and Disarming the Indian Ocean* (London: CDIO, 1984).

P. Chapman, *Canada and the Movement for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific*, Project Ploughshares Working Paper 84-2, Ontario, 1984.

Walden Bello and Edward Herman, "U.S.-Sponsored Elections in El Salvador and the Philippines," *World Policy Review*, Summer 1984. Discusses U.S. attempts to stabilize the volatile Philippine situation. Available from Philippine Support Committee.

U.S. Pacific Network brings out two publications, a monthly *Newsletter* and a *Congressional Update*. To get on the mailing list, write to the Network.

Pacific Concerns Resource Center brings



out the *Pacific Bulletin*, which covers diverse developments. Write to PCRC to get on the mailing list.

Victorian Association of Peace Studies, P.O. Box 316, Fitzroy, Australia, brings out the journal *Peace Studies* and an excellent series called *Peace Dossier*.

*Further Reading on the Soviet Union in the Pacific*

Some liberal and establishment books

which make an attempt to be evenhanded in their assessment of the military and diplomatic capabilities of the Soviet Union are the following:

A. Cockburn, *The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine* (New York: Vintage, 1984).

J. Collins, *U.S./Soviet Military Balance: Statistical Trends, 1970-1982*, Congressional Research Service Report No. 83-1536, (Washington, D.C.: 1984).

R. Feinberg, *The Intemperate Zone: The Third World Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy* (NY: Norton, 1983). See especially chapter 3.

S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985).

J. Steele, *Soviet Power: The Kremlin's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).

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