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
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## The Program on U.S.-Japan Relations

Problems of U.S. Extended Nuclear  
Deterrence for Japan

USJP Occasional Paper 88-13

Shinichi Ogawa



The Center for International Affairs and  
the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AEM	Anti-ballistic Missile
ALCM	Air-launched Cruise Missile
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
C <sup>3</sup> I	Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
CEP	Circular Error Probable
GLEM	Ground-launched Ballistic Missile
GLCM	Ground-launched Cruise Missile
GNP	Gross National Product
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INF	Intermediate-range Nuclear Force
IRBM	Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
IRINF	Longer-range Intermediate Nuclear Force
LTBT	Limited Test Ban Treaty (Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in Atmosphere, in Outer space and Under Water)
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MIRV	Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle
MX	Missile Experimental
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Non-proliferation Treaty (Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)
NSNF	Non-strategic Nuclear Force
PAL	Permissive Action Link
PGM	Precision Guided Munitions
PRC	People's Republic of China
R & D	Research and Development

SACEUR     Supreme Allied Commander in Europe  
SALT       Strategic Arms Limitation Talks  
SDF        Self-Defense Force  
SDI        Strategic Defense Initiative  
SLBM       Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile  
SLCM       Sea-launched Cruise Missile  
SSBN       Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile Submarine  
SSN        Nuclear-powered Submarine  
START      Strategic Arms Reduction Talks  
TEL        Transporter-erector Launcher  
TNF        Theater Nuclear Force  
WP         Warsaw Pact  
USGPO      U.S. Government Printing Office

## INTRODUCTION

Comprehensive analysis of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear commitment to the defense of Japan has not been done in either the U.S. or Japan. Successive Japanese governments formed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have been totally passive toward the concept of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, and have accepted it without reservation as it is referred to in the U.S.-Japanese security relationship. One principal reason for the lack of ongoing policy analysis on the part of Japan in this field can be found in Japan's national sentiment, which tends to make nuclear security issues politically volatile. Japanese governments have not dared to challenge this Pandora's box. Instead, they have kept nuclear security issues at arms length by declaring the Three Non-nuclear Principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their introduction into Japan.

The other reason is that the geo-strategic environment in Northeast Asia has kept the nuclear conflict threshold relatively high compared with that in Europe. Since Western Europe faces overwhelming Soviet conventional forces across a land border, and the defense of Western Europe by conventional means alone has long been regarded as questionable. Therefore, Western Europe relies heavily on the threat of U.S. nuclear first-use and nuclear escalation: conventional, theater nuclear, and U.S. strategic nuclear coupling. On the other hand, a conventional military balance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia has not been

so adverse for the U.S. and Japan combined, and has therefore relieved the U.S. from planning for first use of its nuclear weapons and in the early stage of an armed conflict. In addition, the essentially maritime nature of the Northeast Asian strategic environment has precluded the development of an explicit doctrine for nuclear escalation. Thus, the Japanese government, unlike West European countries, did not openly question the U.S. nuclear guarantee after the Soviets achieved an assured destruction capability against the U.S. through its retaliatory strike, following the debate on the vulnerability of the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that constitute the ultimate means of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, or even after the Soviet modernization of its intermediate-range nuclear forces (INFs).

Nevertheless, the question of Japan's security from nuclear threat cannot be dismissed for an indefinite time for three reasons: First, there is wide anxiety in Japan that the current U.S.-Soviet strategic parity, based on mutually assured destruction (MAD), poses serious difficulties for the U.S. in carrying out its extended nuclear deterrence mission. Ever since the U.S.S.R. acquired the ability to inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage on the U.S. homeland, the credibility of the U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons and to escalate to the strategic level has been questioned. As a result of this anxiety, there have emerged several schools of thought in Japanese defense and academic communities, each of which has proposed its own solution to this problem.

One school of thought considers the "non-introduction" clause of Japan's Three Non-nuclear Principles as being incompatible with the U.S. policy of extending nuclear deterrence to Japan. This school advocates the modification of that clause into one that would permit plans for the transit of U.S. nuclear armed forces to Japanese territory during periods of operational requirements.

The second school, although a minority view, has strongly asserted that Japan should allow the stationing of U.S. land-based theater nuclear weapons on its territory as has been done in some European NATO countries. The principal rationale of this school's argument is that the current strategic nuclear parity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union risks "decoupling" between the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence to Japan and U.S. central strategic nuclear deterrent power; the deployment of U.S. land-based theater nuclear forces in Japan would contribute to hedging such an occurrence.

The third school, again a small minority, goes as far as to claim that Japan should possess strategic nuclear forces either by purchasing them from the U.S. or developing them indigenously. Their arguments are based primarily on nationalism and/or distrust of the U.S. nuclear commitment.

The fourth school, which regards not only U.S. extended nuclear deterrence but deterrence as a whole as an illusion, advocates more strict interpretation of the non-introduction clause and demands that Japan take a strong position to influence the U.S. toward making greater efforts for nuclear disarmament.

This school believes in complete nuclear disarmament as the sole means to remove nuclear threat.

A second reason for the necessity of studying the U.S. nuclear umbrella for Japan is derived from the psychological vulnerability of the Japanese to nuclear threats implanted by the experience of two atomic bombings. Since the Japanese public maintains a strong aversion to and fear of nuclear weapons, the most tempting and effective way for a nuclear adversary to neutralize Japan might be to threaten to use nuclear weapons or to explode a nuclear device for "demonstration" purposes.

Third, recent U.S.-Japanese trade and economic friction, if not contained and corrected, may damage U.S.-Japan cohesion and reduce the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence to Japan. This is because mutually beneficial economic interdependence between defender and protege, along with closer political and military ties, is essential to successful extended deterrence.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, compared with the U.S.-West European case, U.S.-Japanese relations, in relative terms, do not enjoy the mutual sympathy, loyalties, "we feeling" and trust based on cultural, historical, religious and ethnic identity. These are more important for the success of extended deterrence than particular indices of political, economic and military integration.<sup>2</sup> In light of the aforementioned, and as long as Japan continues to depend on the U.S. for its nuclear security, analysis of the U.S nuclear shield over Japan is a matter that cannot be neglected.

This study first evaluates the aforementioned four schools' arguments and policy proposals, with due analysis of the implications of the December 1987 treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles (INF Treaty). In parallel with this, the nature and essential function of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to Japan will be discussed. Subsequently, this study explores the implications of the proposed multi-layered defense against ballistic missiles as part of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in defense of Japan. Whether or not the envisioned multi-layered defense, of which the research was initiated in the U.S. and has accelerated since 1983 under the name of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), will contribute to the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear shield has yet to be comprehensively analyzed in Japan. Finally, this writer's policy recommendations follow as the conclusion of this study.

#### **THE "NON-INTRODUCTION" CLAUSE AND U.S. EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE**

Some critics in Japan regard the non-introduction clause of Japan's Three Non-nuclear Principles, which is interpreted not only as prohibiting nuclear powers from stationing nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, but also as banning nuclear-capable combatants and aircraft from making transit visits to bases in Japan, as being in conflict with the U.S. policy of extending nuclear deterrence to Japan and overall global strategy. They have argued for the revision of that principle to one that would allow

nuclear-capable American warships and aircraft to utilize Japanese facilities during operations in support of global deterrent strategy. From this school's point of view, the non-introduction principle has been maintained only in consideration of Japan's national sentiment, without giving careful thought to U.S. nuclear strategy--of which Japan's defense is a component. These advocates claim that a U.S.-Soviet imbalance of theater nuclear forces in East Asia and the Soviet achievement of strategic parity with the U.S. is no longer congruent with such a self-centered Japanese policy. If Japan removed a ban on transit visits of nuclear capable U.S. warships and aircraft, the argument goes, it would ensure more flexible operations of U.S. nuclear armed forces in the Far East, thereby making more effective U.S. nuclear commitments to Japan.<sup>3</sup>

A professor at Japan's National Defense Academy, Masashi Nishihara, argues:

Japan should consider revising the interpretation of the last of its three principles regarding nuclear weapons: no possession, no manufacturing, and no introduction into Japan. . . . With Backfires and SS-20 missiles in eastern Siberia and SLEMs [Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles] in the Western Pacific, the Soviet Union can now blackmail Japan more easily than before. If Japan wants to stand firm against such Soviet nuclear blackmail, it should give the United States the option of bringing nuclear weapons into Japanese waters and naval ports for transit purposes. . . . This revised interpretation of the non-nuclear principles would enhance and make more effective the deterrence potential of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.<sup>4</sup>

Professor Nishihara, however, adds that stockpiling and deploying U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan are not wise because of strong popular sentiment against nuclear weapons.<sup>5</sup>

In evaluating the arguments above, an analysis of the nature and practice of the non-introduction principle would be helpful.

#### **Establishment of the Three Non-nuclear Principles**

The first official position toward the banning of nuclear weapons can be found in the deliberation of a bill for the Basic Law on Atomic Energy, jointly proposed by the LDP and the Japan Socialist Party, at the House of Councillors in December 1955. Article 2 of this bill stated that: "Development and utilization of nuclear power shall be limited to peaceful purposes and shall be conducted autonomously under democratic management, the result shall be released to the public and utilized for international cooperation."<sup>6</sup> Concerning the meaning of the words "peaceful purposes" in this Article, it was clarified that studies and use of nuclear power by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and studies of weapons which kill human beings with nuclear power were not included in this bill.<sup>7</sup> At this point, a consensus was reached between the ruling party and the opposition political parties that Japan would not produce nuclear weapons.

A more explicit governmental position on the abstention from any association with nuclear weapons was heard in February 1957. The then acting Premier, Nobusuke Kishi, in replying to a question concerning the possession of nuclear weapons in the House of Representatives, stated, "[W]e have no intention at all to possess atomic weapons. . ."<sup>8</sup>

Later, a debate on nuclear weapons emerged to discuss the relationship between nuclear weapons and Article 9 of the

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Constitution. On this issue the LDP government took the position that Article 9 did not prohibit Japan from developing and maintaining defensive and short-range nuclear weapons that do not pose a threat of destruction to other countries. The reasoning behind this interpretation is that: Article 9 does not deprive Japan of its inherent right of self-defense; since armed forces are at times a necessary and the only means of self-defense, Japan can maintain the minimum necessary military capability exclusively for self-defense; if nuclear weapons exist in Japan exclusively for this purpose, Japan, therefore, can develop and maintain these weapon systems. Thus Premier Kishi, while adding the view that the government had no plans to develop such an arsenal, declared in the House of Councillors on April 18, 1958 that "depending on the future development in nuclear weaponry, I do not think that the Constitution bans nuclear weapons if they are of a defensive character . . . "9

This legal reasoning, nevertheless, was not strong enough to overcome the Japanese people's anti-nuclear sentiment caused by the disasters in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In 1967, when the possibility emerged that administrative rights over the Okinawa Islands would be returned to Japan by the United States, the public and the political opposition parties began to wield strong pressure on the LDP government for a more clear-cut position on nuclear weapons. Okinawa was believed then to be a repository for U.S. nuclear weapons. During 1967, Diet opposition parties, supported by an anti-nuclear sentiment among the public, continued to insist that Okinawa should not be returned unless the Islands

were free of U.S. nuclear forces. Against this persistent claim, Premier Eisaku Sato counterargued that Okinawa would be returned hondo nami, which meant that the Islands would be the same as mainland Japan in the event of reversion. Since this answer simply implied that the prior consultation arrangement, the efficacy of which had been questioned during the Vietnam War, would become applicable to Okinawa, the opposition political parties were not mollified by Sato's answer. To weather this difficulty, on December 11, 1967, Sato announced in the Diet the Three Non-nuclear Principles.<sup>10</sup>

Sato's declaration of the non-nuclear principles, however, seemed at first a tactical move to attain a Diet consensus for the Japanese negotiating position on the Okinawa reversion issue.<sup>11</sup> For instance, in January 1968, when the opposition parties applied pressure on the Sato Cabinet to support adoption of the Three Non-nuclear Principles as a Diet resolution rather than leaving them merely a policy asserted by the Sato Government, Sato declared that Japan's policy on nuclear weapons rested on the following four pillars and argued against a Diet resolution that focused only on the Three Non-nuclear Principles.<sup>12</sup> The four pillars included: 1) maintenance of the Three Non-nuclear Principles, 2) efforts at nuclear disarmament, 3) reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for Japan's security against a nuclear threat and 4) development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.<sup>13</sup> In November 1971, one year and nine months after Japan's signature of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), when Premier Sato again was forced to adopt a Diet resolution aiming to

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reconfirm the Three Non-nuclear Principles in the context of the approval of the agreement on Okinawa reversion, he first tried to limit its duration to the life of his administration.<sup>14</sup> Later, however, Sato qualified his position and was quoted as saying that Japan would conform to the Three Non-nuclear Principles as long as an LDP Cabinet was in office.<sup>15</sup>

More recently, in June 1975, Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa of the Takeo Miki LDP Cabinet declared in the Diet that the Three Non-nuclear Principles were "guidelines of national policy."<sup>16</sup> Since then this view has been sporadically reconfirmed by successive LDP governments. The current administration, the Noboru Takeshita Cabinet, has also reconfirmed this posture.<sup>17</sup> Thus the LDP government intends to keep the Three Non-nuclear Principles as a matter of policy. As discussed, however, the birth of the Three Non-nuclear Principles was incidental to the Okinawa reversion debate rather than resulting from a systematic and advanced examination of the implications of the nonnuclear principles on Japanese security.

#### **The Validity of the "Non-introduction" Clause**

Although the Three Non-nuclear Principles are not legally binding, various LDP governments have established several legislative guidelines that reflect their position on nuclear weapons. They include a domestic law, the Basic Law on Atomic Energy of 1955, and international treaties such as the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy of 1968, by which Japan limits its use of nuclear

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technology to peaceful purposes,<sup>18</sup> the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty: LTBT) which Japan signed in August 1963 and ratified in June of the next year, and the NPT, which Japan signed in February 1970 and ratified in May 1976. These domestic and international codes have provided endorsement of the first (no manufacturing) and the second (no possession) clauses of the Three Non-nuclear Principles and have been checks on any shift toward the nuclearization of Japan.

However, the non-introduction principle, which has been understood in Japan not only to prohibit nuclear weapons countries, including the U.S., from storing their nuclear weapons on Japanese territory, but to prohibit nuclear armed warships and aircraft from making transit visits, is not covered by any type of the aforementioned explicit legal restrictions.<sup>19</sup> Its validity has long been disputed. Most of the questions originated from the United States, two examples of which bear noting.<sup>20</sup> One was an article carried by the New York Times on October 27, 1974. It reported the existence of a secret 1960 U.S.-Japan agreement "permitting U.S. warships to carry nuclear weapons into Japan during port calls and American aircraft to bring them in during landings."<sup>21</sup> Japanese officials negotiating the agreement, according to the Times story, were reported to have told their American counterparts to "Go ahead and do it, but don't tell us or the Japanese people about it."<sup>22</sup>

The other was a statement by Edwin O. Reischauer, U.S. Ambassador to Japan from April 1961 to August 1966, in an

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interview with the Mainichi Shimbun on May 9, 1981. His wording confirmed the New York Times report. According to Reischauer, Japan has permitted U.S. warships to carry nuclear weapons in and out of Japanese ports and territorial waters under a confidential spoken agreement. Nuclear weapons, however, were not to be unloaded in Japan or stored on Japanese territory. This transit agreement was tacitly worked out, Reischauer said, in 1960, when the U.S. and Japan concluded the current U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and he claimed that transit did not violate the non-introduction principle.<sup>23</sup> Judging from these American disclosures, the U.S. appears to understand the non-introduction clause as just a prohibition against storing nuclear weapons in Japan but not transit visits to Japanese bases,<sup>24</sup> although the U.S. officially reiterated that it "understood and respected" Japan's Three Non-nuclear Principles.

The Japanese government categorically denied each of the American disclosures. The claim has been consistent: as the text of the prior consultation formula suggests, agreed between the U.S. and Japan when the current Mutual Security Treaty was signed, port calls by U.S. nuclear-armed warships are assumed to be subject to prior consultation with the Japanese government. Since no such consultation had been requested by the United States, successive governments argue, no nuclear weapons have been introduced.<sup>25</sup>

Nevertheless, it is debatable to what extent the Japanese government would be consulted prior to such nuclear-equipped port calls. This is because 1) U.S. armed forces, notably the U.S.

Navy, has followed a policy to "neither confirm nor deny" the presence of nuclear weapons on their units and 2) no prior consultation regarding nuclear weapons' movements has been invoked by the U.S. since establishment of the formula in 1960.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, the Japanese LDP government's assertion is not persuasive in view of the fact that 1) fully eighty-four percent of major U.S. naval combatants are equipped to carry nuclear weapons,<sup>27</sup> and 2) there has been no explanation of how the U.S. Navy off-loads and secures its nuclear weapons before entering Japanese territorial waters. Thus, although the truth is yet to be known, only eleven to twelve percent of the Japanese public believes that the non-introduction clause is observed in a manner as not only prohibiting nuclear weapons country from storing their nuclear weapons on Japanese soil but also banning nuclear armed combatants and aircraft from making transit visits.<sup>28</sup>

Why was such confusion brought about? The difference in the perception of non-introduction between the Japanese public and the U.S. was probably caused by the Japanese LDP government.<sup>29</sup> If the distinction was made consciously, and this seems persuasive, this semantic sleight-of-hand with the meaning of non-introduction was designed to answer the Japanese people's anti-nuclear weapons sentiment and to satisfy the requirements of flexible operation for U.S. nuclear forces.

## Implications of the "Non-introduction" Clause on U.S. Nuclear Strategy

Assuming that the non-introduction principle has prohibited the U.S. from storing nuclear weapons on Japanese soil but has permitted nuclear-capable U.S. warships and aircraft to make transit visits to Japan, what is the impact on American nuclear strategy in the Far East? The non-introduction clause, thus interpreted, could not have been a significant obstacle to a flexible operation of U.S. nuclear forces in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Frequent port calls by U.S. submarines and aircraft carriers, made after a cursory notification, would suggest this.<sup>30</sup>

On the other hand, if the non-introduction clause has prohibited nuclear armed U.S. units from touching Japanese territory, the principle may have seriously damaged the U.S. nuclear deployment posture in the Western Pacific because it may have forced the U.S. to operate nuclear weapons in the region at a higher cost and with potentially less safety. The U.S. could not have relied on American bases in Japanese territory as support for the desired operation of U.S. nuclear forces. To that extent, the principle might have been a significant obstacle to U.S. nuclear strategy in this part of the world.

Moreover, Japan concerning itself only with the principle of non-introduction of nuclear weapons does not cover the entire situation. Although the debate over non-introduction has always centered on the presence of nuclear warheads or bombs per se, some of the U.S. bases in Japan have been provided with facilities essential to the conduct of nuclear warfare. The Japanese Islands are regarded as maintaining the most extensive U.S. forward

nuclear infrastructures in the Pacific region.<sup>31</sup> For instance, the KC-135 aerial refueling planes based at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa could refuel B-52 strategic bombers based in Guam en route to their Soviet targets. Communications regarding nuclear weapons emit from Owada, Tokorozawa, Yokota, and Yosami. Yokota maintains a Worldwide Military Command and Control System terminal and an "Emergency Action Console" to receive nuclear force orders. Yosami hosts a very low-frequency transmitter for communicating with U.S. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSENs) and other submarines.<sup>32</sup>

These bases that contain facilities or communications which, in part, support U.S. nuclear strategy, have never occupied so much concern and interest as nuclear weapons themselves among the Japanese public. The Japanese governments do not regard the stationing of these strategic nuclear command, control, communications and intelligence (C<sup>3</sup>I) installations as in conflict with the non-nuclear principles. In fact, when asked the meaning and roles of these installations in the Diet, Japanese administrations have answered that they are elements facilitating U.S.-Japan security relations, thereby strengthening U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for Japan.<sup>33</sup> However, American bases in Japan with significant strategic nuclear C<sup>3</sup>I systems would be as important as nuclear weapons themselves in terms of planning for and executing nuclear war and therefore, equally to nuclear weapons, would be obvious high-priority Soviet nuclear targets. Thus if the principal Japanese reason for the aversion to nuclear weapons is to avoid being involved in nuclear war, the Japanese

logically also should ban the U.S. from emplacing such extensive C<sup>3</sup>I installations on their soil. But to date the Japanese public in general has been silent on this point. This puzzling attitude has probably been caused by a lack of knowledge of the role of the strategic nuclear infrastructures in planning for nuclear war.

If the Japanese government can continue defining the non-introduction principle as it does and maintain its smoke-and-mirror routine on matters of nuclear weapons introduction, the non-introduction clause will not seriously hurt U.S. Naval and Air Force operations in the Western Pacific. As long as the Japanese public continues to disregard the implications of U.S. bases and facilities in Japan which can support nuclear strategy, the professed non-introduction clause will not have a negative impact on the U.S. nuclear commitment to Japan.

There remains the question whether this state of affairs can be maintained. Judging from the fact that the Japanese public does not raise objections to the nuclear transit question despite the fact that more than 70 percent of them believe nuclear-capable U.S. combatants and aircraft have routinely visited Japanese ports, some might think it better for the U.S. and Japanese governments to declare the true meaning of the non-introduction principle, thereby removing a potential thorn in the side of U.S.-Japan relations. However, modifying the interpretation of that principle, into one that bans stationing nuclear weapons but allows transit visits on Japanese territory, would not produce a notable change in the deployment posture of U.S. nuclear forces in the Far East. This is simply because the U.S. seems to have

already operated according to this meaning. For the Japanese government, on the other hand, the public revision of that principle would cause a serious political controversy. In every public opinion survey, although about three quarters of the Japanese people do not think that the non-introduction clause is observed, around 70 to 75 percent of the same respondents also respond that Japan should reject any transit visits by nuclear - armed forces and should maintain the non-introduction clause with its current meaning.<sup>34</sup> Thus, stated revision of that principle would rub the anti-nuclear public the wrong way and would produce political repercussions that might even oblige the Japanese LDP government to put teeth into the currently ambiguous non-introduction principle. It is unwise to upset the delicate balance maintained so far by the Japanese people between their anti-nuclear sentiment and their recognition of the value of U.S. bases in Japan for their security.

#### **STATIONING U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN JAPAN AND U.S. EXTENDED NUCLEAR DEFERRENCE**

Before the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty of December 1987, some in the Japanese defense community advocated the placement of U.S. land-based INFs such as Pershing IIs and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) on Japanese soil, in order to enhance the credibility of the U.S. nuclear shield for Japan.<sup>35</sup> This discussion originated from their anxiety that the U.S.-Soviet imbalance and asymmetry of theater nuclear forces in Northeast

Asia, brought about by Soviet deployment and reinforcement of the SS-20 and Backfire bomber, posed potentially serious difficulties for the U.S. in carrying out the policy of extended nuclear deterrence to its allies and friends in the region. For instance, Professor Yahiro Nakagawa of Tsukuba University once argued that:

. . . Soviet SS-20s, which have steadily increased in numbers every year, are unrivaled in East Asian theater Intermediate range Nuclear Forces [INF]. The Soviet Union retains "escalation dominance" capability of nuclear war in this region. From the point of view of theater nuclear forces, U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is on the point of losing its effectiveness. . . .

Because of inherent limitations in their performance characteristics, reinforcement of U.S. INFs by SLCMs [sea-launched cruise missiles] and ALCMs [air-launched cruise missiles] will not neutralize the Soviet superiority in INFs in East Asia. As NATO has deployed Pershing IIs and GLCMs, unless land-based theater nuclear forces are deployed in this region, U.S.-Soviet INFs will not be balanced in Asia and SS-20s will not be counter-balanced.<sup>36</sup>

The U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty, if ratified, will obligate the Soviet Union to dismantle its SS-20s including those deployed in Asian part of the Soviet Union. This prospect would make Nakagawa's contention largely irrelevant. Nonetheless, Professor Nakagawa has put a fundamental question to the Japanese public and the government: whether or not placement of the defender's nuclear weapons on the protege's soil would enhance the credibility of the nuclear umbrella. It is true the stationing of U.S. nuclear forces on Japanese territory would constitute a visible embodiment of the U.S. nuclear commitment. By intuition, stationing U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan seems to contribute to the viability of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, since an attack on Japan under these conditions might pose a higher

probability of the use of those nuclear weapons than attack on Japan in which no U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed. In addition, the perception of risk regarding the uncontrollability of nuclear exchanges, which poses the danger of escalation, might buttress a deterrent, if in fact Soviet risk perception follows this track.

This section explores the applicability of the proposition Nakagawa has forwarded to the U.S. nuclear umbrella to Japan. If applicable, to what extent, and if not, why. Even after the removal of SS-20s, the Soviet Union would maintain sizable theater nuclear forces usable against Japan. These include SLEMs carried by Yankee and Delta ballistic missile submarines, nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, and nuclear-capable aircraft including Backfire bombers. In view of this, it is still worthwhile exploring whether the placement of U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan would enhance the credibility of the nuclear umbrella. In analyzing this problem, an understanding of the roles and functions of U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNFs) and the logic of stationing U.S. NSNFs in Western Europe will be developed as an aid to analysis.<sup>37</sup>

#### General and Declared Roles of U.S. NSNFs

U.S. NSNFs have been deployed in some areas of Western Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf regions where the U.S. has vital security interests. The deployment of American NSNFs varies both in number and posture by area. The majority of U.S. NSNFs have been deployed in Western Europe, a relatively confined geographical area, and are primarily land-based.<sup>38</sup> U.S.

NSNFs in other regions are geographically dispersed, being mostly sea-based.<sup>39</sup>

U.S. NSNFs, land-based NSNFs in particular, are expected to fulfill a specific mission, as can be inferred by their deployments adjacent to the Soviet Union with its powerful conventional forces. The mission is to supplement and reinforce U.S. extended nuclear deterrence.<sup>40</sup> Recent issues of the United States Military Posture, prepared annually by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have noted, without referring to any particular theater, that the U.S. NSNFs "support conventional forces by providing a major deterrent to conventional, theater nuclear, and chemical attack, and are essential to a strategy of flexible response."<sup>41</sup>

A more concrete explanation appears in the FY 1983 issue:

TNF [theater nuclear forces] are designed for use in conjunction with conventional forces to deter conventional, theater nuclear, and chemical attack. Coupling conventional forces to strategic forces, TNF contribute to deterrence by creating uncertainty for the aggressor concerning US and allied responses.<sup>42</sup>

Thus, American NSNFs stationed within U.S. allies have been regarded as a deterrent by maintaining a tangible combat link between conventional defenses and U.S. central strategic forces.

#### **The Roles of U.S. NSNFs in Western Europe**

U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for Western Europe has one dominant code: the U.S. reserves the right to use its nuclear weapons first and escalate to the strategic level if necessary, in the event of a major Soviet conventional attack or to defend Western Europe effectively once war began. Because of this, in

Europe the linkage function designated to NATO-based U.S. NSNFs is made prominent and regarded as cardinal to credible U.S. extended deterrence.

As Soviet strategic nuclear forces grew to rough parity with those of the U.S. around the first half of the 1970s, nuclear issues, specifically the state of the theater nuclear balance, surfaced in European politics. The heated debate had begun with the handling of the enhanced radiation weapon issue in 1977 and with West Germany Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's speech in the 1977 Alastair International Institute for Strategic Studies. He noted that Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), by neutralizing the strategic capabilities of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, magnified the significance of East-West disparities in tactical nuclear and conventional weapons.<sup>43</sup> The discrepancy between Soviet and American theater nuclear forces in Europe became more prominent and visible due to the start of Soviet deployment of its SS-20 in 1977. SS-20 was a new version of the old, inaccurate, and fixed SS-4 and SS-5, and was substantially more capable. It is a highly accurate, mobile, and re-loadable ballistic missile, and carries three multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) each with a 150 kiloton warhead.<sup>44</sup> Because of its mobility and accuracy, the SS-20 was considered to be fairly invulnerable and to have considerable prompt hard-target kill capability.

Some Europeans and Americans increasingly voiced the fear that the widening gap threatened to decouple Western Europe's defense from the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The SS-20 could, it was argued, launch a disarming first strike against NATO's F-111

fighter-bombers, the principal U.S. NSNFs based in Europe that can reach Soviet territory.<sup>45</sup> Remaining F-111s, if any, would have difficulty in penetrating ever improving Soviet air defenses. Thus, the argument goes, if any low level nuclear conflict erupted in Europe which was likely to escalate to a level involving the SS-20s, it would eventually compel the U.S. to choose from two options: to employ its strategic nuclear systems (probably the Poseidon SLBMs assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe)<sup>46</sup> or to do nothing fearing disastrous destruction of the U.S. homeland by Soviet retaliation. Under conditions of strategic parity and U.S. vulnerability against nuclear attack, some Europeans feared the U.S. would opt for the latter, leaving the Soviet homeland a "sanctuary" from attack. In effect, it was feared that a perceived "gap in NATO's continuum of deterrence" threatened to undermine U.S. willingness to use its nuclear weapons.<sup>47</sup>

To make matters worse, these concerns had been exacerbated by a SALT-II process that appeared to foreclose, albeit temporarily, the deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and GLCMs in Europe.<sup>48</sup> These weapons systems were considered by some European defense planners to be among the means that could help rectify the growing imbalance in long-range theater nuclear forces in Europe.<sup>49</sup>

In order to alleviate West European anxiety, NATO, after two years of study and consultation within the alliance, decided in December 1979 to follow the "dual track" approach: moving simultaneously with a program of deployment of 108 Pershing IIs

and 464 GLCMs in five West European countries and with arms control talks on the long-range theater nuclear forces with the Soviet Union.<sup>50</sup> Having failed to achieve the INF negotiations, NATO since December 1983 has begun deploying these two land-based INFs on West European soil and plans to complete these deployments by the end of 1988.<sup>51</sup>

Aside from the problems of military rationale for the choice of Pershing II and GLCM,<sup>52</sup> a serious debate on the deployment in terms of its effects on coupling to U.S. central strategic forces occurred within NATO. One school of thought held that, in a climate of U.S.-Soviet mutual vulnerability, deploying such a large number of new land-based INFs would actually be a decoupling move in the context of a Eurostrategic balance and the limited nuclear war this balance would theoretically make possible.<sup>53</sup> The specter of limited nuclear war brought about wide-ranging protests against the INF deployments in West Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.<sup>54</sup>

The other school maintained that the revitalization of European-based U.S. NSNFs' punitive capability against Soviet territory would, if employed, make a U.S.-Soviet intercontinental nuclear exchange more likely, thereby buttressing U.S. extended nuclear deterrence to Western Europe. Richard Burt, then Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs of the U.S. State Department, commented at Brussels in September 1981:

The United States took this step [deciding to deploy new missiles] in the full knowledge that the Soviet Union would most likely respond to an attack on its homeland by U.S. systems in Europe with an attack on the United States. Thus the emplacement of long-range U.S. cruise

and ballistic missiles in Europe makes escalation of any nuclear war in Europe to involve an intercontinental exchange more likely, not less . . .<sup>55</sup>

Of the two schools, the former argues that the 572 new land-based missiles would weaken coupling, and the latter maintains they could strengthen it. Both theories, however, seem to highlight only one feature among many possibilities. The former discussion dismissed an existing risk of NATO's "inadvertent" nuclear response and the latter ignored the negative implications of alleged vulnerability of Pershing IIs and GLCMs to a Soviet preemptive strike.

The U.S. and Western Europe, partly by design and partly by happenstance, have postured for inadvertent nuclear response--NATO would escalate to a nuclear war that risks central strategic exchanges even though NATO did not intend to do so. Professor Bruce M. Russett of Yale University discusses this point:

Since the deliberate use of nuclear weapons, ordered by the National Command Authority or SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander in Europe], has become dubious . . . current deployments and dual purpose systems have produced a "tight coupling" from conventional war to tactical nuclear war to central strategic nuclear war. INF weapons emplaced in Western Europe invoke the real possibility of quick "use them or lose them" decisions. Tactical nuclear weapons might have to be deployed rapidly out of their storage "igloos," short-circuiting the normal peacetime permissive action link (PAL) codes and procedures. Decisions to use such weapons might devolve to low-level military officers, highly decentralized and subjected to immediate threats of being overrun by hostile forces. . . .

Very plausibly this risk--that we would go to nuclear war even though we did not intend to do so--poses the currently most credible threat as a deterrent to Soviet attack in Western Europe. For those who perceive that the greatest risk of war stems from a deliberate Soviet decision to launch an aggressive attack . . . it may seem an acceptable deterrent. But

for those who perceive that the greatest risk of war stems from an inadvertent escalation of an unintended political conflict . . . the risk of losing military control over such an initially uncontrollable incident is not acceptable.<sup>56</sup>

The danger of inadvertent nuclear war in Europe existed well before the deployments of the new land-based U.S. INFs: 6,000 NATO-designated American NSNFs have been under decentralized and delegated control; these nuclear weapons have suffered from ambiguity of command authority over the course of their employment and NATO has remained unable to clear a course of war through the complexity of crisis and wartime management.<sup>57</sup>

As to Richard Burt's argument, deployments of U.S. INFs did not just end with making nuclear war in Europe more likely to involve U.S.-Soviet strategic exchanges. They may at the same time have heightened the danger of Soviet preemption in a grave crisis because of their vulnerability and their launch range, which covered the Soviet homeland.<sup>58</sup> This negative aspect was prominent in the case of Pershing IIs that had a provocatively powerful prompt hard-target kill capability.<sup>59</sup> The Soviet preemption was even more likely because of the Soviet nuclear doctrine that emphasizes all-out preemption, "striking first in the last resort."<sup>60</sup> In view of this, the destabilizing effect of Pershing IIs may have been as prominent as the coupling effect on NATO deterrence.

Judging from the aforementioned defect of the Pershing IIs and the GLCMs, the principal motivation for the deployment of the land-based INFs in Europe was a political one, both to reinforce Soviet perceptions of the U.S. security commitment to Western

Europe and to reassure West European governments by placing another visible embodiment of the commitment alongside the durable presence of American troops. But the extent to which the Soviets were deterred by these additional deployments would be marginal, if any, since America's stake in Western Europe's security was already so significant.

On December 8, 1987, the U.S. and the Soviet Union concluded the INF Treaty that provides for complete elimination of their land-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in three years.<sup>61</sup> Soviet SS-20s and U.S. Pershing IIs and GLCMs are the principal weapon systems subject to the elimination. Under this Treaty, the Soviet Union must give up some 1,300 warheads, more than three times the number the U.S. is required to eliminate.

The INF Treaty, however, has not been received without skepticism. Critics have argued that with the Pershing II and the GLCMs gone, a gap in the continuum of deterrence would be opened once again. After the INF Treaty is put into effect, it is feared, there will remain only U.S. strategic nuclear forces (aside from battlefield nuclear forces) to redress the conventional imbalance between the Warsaw Pact (WP) and NATO. However, the threat to employ U.S. central strategic forces to redress the conventional imbalance is less believable to the Soviets than the threat to employ the Pershing IIs and GLCMs which, by virtue of their location and vulnerability, must either be used in response to a Soviet attack or be lost.<sup>62</sup>

Critics have raised other negative prospects. The INF Treaty might create zones of unequal or differential security not only

between the U.S. and Western Europe but also among West European countries. This is because nuclear weapons left on West European soil after the INF Treaty are short-range tactical nuclear weapons mainly deployed in Central Europe, and the use of these weapons are geographically confined, in particular, to West Germany. This poses a risk of war being confined to Central Europe. Professor Helga Haftendorn of Berlin Free University argues:

The elimination of LRINF [longer-range INF] and the proposed acquisition of a war-fighting capability with small nukes and PGM's [Precision Guided Munitions] by NATO is seen with great concern. It could make Germany a primary battlefield in a limited nuclear war.... the shorter the range, the more dead Germans.... the argument has thus been quite persuasive that Germany is the only country where nuclear weapons are deployed which can be only used on German (including East German) territory!...

[P]riority should have been given to an agreement on battlefield nuclear weapons . . .<sup>63</sup>

A war that is confined to Central Europe or Western Europe is a legitimate fear. However, the point is that deterrence is not an "either/or" entity. It is an issue of "more or less." Removal of the Pershing IIs and GLCMs alone will not make the Soviets believe that they can fight a limited nuclear war. Given the various and significant U.S. stake in Western Europe, the Soviets will continue to have uncertainties over the American response. As long as the Soviets cannot dispel these uncertainties, they will be deterred. Moreover, the elimination of SS-20s and Pershing IIs, both of which have powerful prompt counterforce capability, would contribute to the stabilization of nuclear balance in Europe. Thus, the question once again is how to reassure Western Europe—particularly West Germany—of American

commitment under an emerging new strategic environment in Europe. Some measures of reassurance are necessary, since the credibility of the U.S. commitment required for allies is more demanding than that required for the Soviet Union.

#### The U.S. NSNFs in the Far East

U.S. NSNFs in the Far East are mostly sea-based, except for those deployed in the Republic of Korea. American NSNFs on South Korean soil are reportedly mostly airborne bombs, artillery such as dual-capable 155 mm and 8" howitzers, and atomic demolition munitions, totalling about 150 nuclear warheads.<sup>64</sup> Unlike the situation in NATO, where in peacetime a "dual-key" control mechanism is implemented (the Pershing IIs and GLCMs are exceptions), the U.S. controls all nuclear-capable launchers and nuclear warheads in the Republic of Korea.<sup>65</sup>

Since returning Okinawa to Japan in May 1972, the U.S. has placed no nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, aside from alleged transit calls. Nor is there evidence that the U.S. permanently stations nuclear warheads in the Philippines.<sup>66</sup> Guam is the principal storage site for U.S. nuclear weapons in East Asia and the Western Pacific.

U.S. NSNFs deployed in South Korea have been helpful in deterring the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from attacking the South. North Korea's President Kim Il-Sung has declared his unreserved ambition to reunify Korea. However, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in the South has crystallized the risk that war against South Korea might lead to a U.S. nuclear response,

incurring damage that even an ambitious man like Kim might find unacceptable. The danger of U.S. nuclear use was signaled by former U.S. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger's comment on possible nuclear first use on the Korean Peninsula.<sup>67</sup>

Soviet restraint with regard to the Korean Peninsula has been attributed largely to foreign policy considerations. Yet the possibility of nuclear confrontation with the U.S. might underlie Soviet reluctance to support or be dragged into a war on the Peninsula. In this manner, U.S. NSNFs located in South Korea, coupled with the presence of close to 43,000 U.S. troops, have contributed to a successful defense of the Republic of Korea that has long faced superior conventional forces in North Korea.<sup>68</sup>

Furthermore, to the extent that U.S. nuclear weapons on South Korean soil help to deter North Korea, they contribute to the security of Japan. Japan's security would be gravely threatened should a large-scale armed conflict break out on the Peninsula or the South Korean regime be overthrown. Thus, reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea are likely to be seen as a weakening of U.S. extended deterrence, not only by the South Koreans but also by the Japanese people.

A Soviet nuclear threat in the Far East has existed since the 1960s—in ICBMs, in the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, and in the TU-16 Badger bombers and tactical strike aircraft.<sup>69</sup> Since the late 1970s, however, the nuclear dimension increased in East Asia and the Western Pacific primarily because of a Soviet buildup of its nuclear forces and the U.S. response to these Soviet movements. With its initial deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic

missiles in 1978 and deployment of the medium-range Backfire bomber in 1979, the Soviet Union significantly altered the character of its military presence in the region, creating a qualitatively new threat to U.S. military bases in this region, the U.S. Seventh Fleet, China, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.

The Soviet nuclear buildup, however, has presented as much a political as a military challenge to East Asia.<sup>70</sup> The Soviet Union has used its increased nuclear power for political initiatives designed to stimulate Asian anxieties about the possibility of a nuclear conflict and to exploit fears over the decoupling of the U.S. strategic deterrent from the defense of Japan and South Korea. These Soviet initiatives have called for an Asian collective security organization and a range of proposals for nuclear free zones. Soviet initiatives and proposals can be understood largely as a means of undermining the political cohesion between the U.S. and its East Asian allies.

Although the symbol of the Soviet nuclear reinforcements in East Asia was SS-20s and Backfire bombers, the U.S. and its allies did not respond to them on a quid pro quo basis. In terms of the balance of theater nuclear forces, the Soviet deployment of SS-20s and Backfire bombers might have encouraged some in the U.S. to seek a counter-balancing deployment, either Pershing IIs, GLCMs, or land-based nuclear-capable aircraft.<sup>71</sup> And for U.S. allies in the region, placement of these U.S. intermediate nuclear forces on their territory might constitute a visible embodiment of the U.S. nuclear commitment.

Why, then, did the U.S. and its allies in East Asia not deploy land-based INFs? Deployment of land-based U.S. INFs, either on South Korean or Japanese territory, is not only politically challenging but also strategically unnecessary. Politically, land-based systems may cause political problems with U.S. allies in this region, as were experienced in Western Europe. Deployment of such weapons, despite the Soviet buildup, may be viewed as provocative and unsettling to regional security. It may be exactly the type of response the Soviet Union sought to turn allies against the U.S. by playing on anti-nuclear feelings in Asia, particularly in Japan.

Strategically, the Republic of Korea, presumably the most hospitable location for a deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs, does not need such weapon systems. As long as the immediate and direct threat South Korea faces is a conventional threat from the North just across the border, such INFs with a 1,800 to 2,500 km range would be useless. U.S. tactical nuclear forces already deployed are sufficient to deter non-nuclear North Korea.

For Japan as well, deployment of land-based U.S. INFs is neither indispensable nor suitable in strategic terms. First, land-based U.S. INFs, by virtue of their vulnerability, might encourage American nuclear first use for fear that such vulnerable forces would be destroyed in an armed conflict. The initiation of the use of nuclear weapons in an armed conflict involving Japan would be detrimental to not only Japanese but American interests. The human and material targets in Japan--cities and economic infrastructures, as well as military installations--are of

significant value to the United States, to say nothing of their significance for the Japanese. On the other hand, the Soviet Far Eastern province is largely underdeveloped and underpopulated. This geo-strategic asymmetry should deter nuclear first use by the United States.

Second, as far as the U.S. nuclear umbrella for Japan is concerned, the function of conventional and nuclear coupling is not as relevant to its viability as it is in the U.S.-Western Europe relationship. This is because the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat to Japan is quite different from that confronting Western Europe. Western Europe, as mentioned earlier, faces formidable Soviet conventional forces to the east across a land border, and the defense of Western Europe by conventional means alone has long been regarded as questionable should the Soviet Union launch a full-scale conventional attack. Thus NATO, in order to deter such a Soviet assault, relies heavily on the threat of U.S. nuclear first use and escalation to the strategic nuclear level. Japan, on the other hand, does not face a Soviet conventional threat of the same type and magnitude of that confronted by Western Europe. The Soviet conventional threat posed to Japan is alleviated considerably by Japan's island position and the existence of the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) which has pinned down considerable Soviet forces. Thus the status of conventional forces, including naval forces in Northeast Asia confronting the Soviet Union, has not been so adverse for the U.S. and Japan combined. Therefore, the U.S. does not need to rely heavily on nuclear weapons to defend

Japan.<sup>72</sup> For these reasons, the U.S. nuclear shield Japan has and will continue to enjoy is, in essence, a U.S. retaliatory nuclear deterrent against Soviet nuclear first use against Japan. Deterrence rests with the fear that the U.S. would use its nuclear weapons to respond to a Soviet nuclear threat or attack on Japan which would risk escalation to strategic nuclear war.

Third, again for geo-strategic reasons, deployment of land-based U.S. INFs on Japanese soil would not contribute significantly to the function of theater nuclear and strategic nuclear linkage. In the case of Europe, its geographic symmetry provides a high probability of linkage to escalate from a theater to a strategic nuclear war. American Pershing IIs and GLCMs stationed in Western Europe, with a 1,800 km and 2,500 km range respectively, can hit the European part of the Soviet Union—the heartland of that country. In this sense, from the Soviet point of view, these INFs are strategic weapons and have strategic significance. Because of this, some European and American analysts, including Richard Burt, argued that Pershing IIs and GLCMs in Western Europe would make escalation of any nuclear war in Europe more likely to involve a U.S.-Soviet strategic exchange. However, American INFs deployed in Japan do not threaten similar escalation. They can target, at most, the region and military bases roughly east of the city of Chita. The area of coverage, if compared with Soviet Europe, is in essence a scantily populated, politically and economically peripheral region of the Soviet Union. This being the case, from the Soviet point of view, U.S. INFs stationed in Japan might only threaten theater nuclear war.

Therefore, they might not strongly compel the Soviets to escalate to a strategic exchange against the United States.

Moreover, placement of U.S. INFs, which do not produce a coupling effect, would be in some circumstances disastrous to Japan's security. Combined with the already significant U.S. strategic C<sup>3</sup>I assets in Japan, such INFs on Japanese soil would transform Japan into a nuclear capable U.S. forward base and raise further the danger of making Japan a nuclear battlefield.

Although, at present, few defense experts believe that a nuclear exchange is controllable,<sup>73</sup> ever-progressing military technology enhances the reliability of weapon systems and reduces the yield of nuclear warheads. This trend may someday make nuclear weapons seem usable at least at the non-strategic level and mislead the authorities into believing one can control nuclear exchange below the strategic level. In parallel with this, the pernicious desire to use nuclear weapons for the attainment of political objectives would likely increase among decision makers. These adverse prospects outweigh any symbolic value U.S. land-based nuclear weapons would have in maintaining the efficacy and credibility of the U.S. nuclear shield over Japan.

In short, the geo-strategic environment surrounding Japan has relieved the U.S. and Japan from deploying U.S. nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. As long as the U.S. and Japan continue to maintain an adequate conventional military balance (mainly air and naval forces) vis-a-vis the Soviet Union around Japan, the primary function of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is to maintain a retaliatory nuclear deterrent. Such a nuclear deterrent does not require

Japan to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons. Sea-based U.S. nuclear forces deployed in the vicinity of Japan--SSEBs, carrier-based dual-capable A-6 and F/A-18 aircraft, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) loaded on Guam-based B-52 strategic bombers, and nuclear-tipped SLCMs--all sufficiently deter Soviet nuclear first use against Japan. Moreover, the INF Treaty of December 1987, if put into effect, will dismantle all SS-20s (171 missiles in Asia alone), while requiring the elimination of no U.S. sea-based missile, delivery vehicle or warhead in East Asia and making no changes in the U.S. force posture in this region. This makes even more unnecessary the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Japanese territory.

Despite the favorable condition that might be brought about by the INF Treaty, one thorny question remains--SLCMs. The U.S. has been deploying nuclear-tipped Tomahawk SLCMs in the Far East since 1984.<sup>74</sup> These cruise missiles have a range of 2,500 km. The ultimate number of nuclear-capable SLCMs in the Western Pacific is not known.<sup>75</sup> However, it is likely to be a considerable number in view of categories of warships certified to deploy them and the size of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.<sup>76</sup>

The essentially maritime nature of the Northeast Asian strategic environment justifies sea-based nuclear forces over land-based INFs. Also, SLCMs, air-breathing and slow target, are primarily second strike weapons and therefore suitable for a retaliatory deterrent--the principal function of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent to Japan. In terms of nuclear stability as well, nuclear-capable SLCMs are positive. Judging from the fact

that SLCMs are fairly survivable, if loaded on submarines, and are not well suited for use in a preemptive disarming first strike, nuclear-armed SLCMs serve well as stabilizing second strike weapons.<sup>77</sup> Indeed, the principal U.S. rationale for deployment of the nuclear-capable SLCMs is to secure a strategic and theater nuclear reserve force, to strengthen nuclear deterrence.<sup>78</sup>

Nevertheless, at the same time, versatile Tomahawk SLCMs have several negative implications that cannot be overlooked for nuclear stability in the Western Pacific. First, since the SLCM is dual-capable, it blurs the distinction between conventional and nuclear war when such missiles are used against an adversary and may result in both lowering the nuclear threshold and increasing the premium of nuclear preemption. Further, the possibility that nuclear-capable SLCMs could be used not only for tactical and theater but for strategic missions would make it difficult to judge the intention of a launch, thereby precipitating nuclear escalation.<sup>79</sup>

Second, putting nuclear-tipped SLCMs on nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) that suffer from inadequate communications from the National Command Authority may simply add to the danger of unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons.<sup>80</sup> The fact that nuclear-capable SLCMs are not coordinated by the Pentagon's Single Integrated Operational Plan might heighten the danger.<sup>81</sup>

Third, American nuclear deployments in East Asia and the Western Pacific are wholly unilateral. In contrast to Western Europe, where the U.S. consults with its allies in the multilateral framework of NATO on the employment of nuclear

weapons, the U.S. in the Far East need not seek consultation with its allies on nuclear employment. Increases in the numbers and platforms of SLICMs, with the aforementioned problems, coupled with the rather provocative nature of U.S. naval strategy, may lower the nuclear threshold. Given that Japan maintains two important U.S. naval bases (Yokosuka and Sasebo) for the U.S. Seventh Fleet and nuclear C<sup>3</sup>I systems for U.S. submarine forces, any U.S.-Soviet theater nuclear exchange in the Asia-Pacific region would inescapably affect Japan. If both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are uncertain whether or not such a nuclear war could be confined to the theater, the two countries would be very cautious in employing nuclear weapons. To that extent, the risk of Japan being a nuclear target is alleviated. However, U.S. authorities seem to expect nuclear SLICMs to play a role that will help confine the nuclear war to the theater level, should deterrence fail. Commodore Roger F. Bacon, Director of the Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, once testified in the U.S. Senate that the deployment of SLICMs gave "an increase in the range of escalation control options available to the nation [U.S.] without resort to the central strategic systems."<sup>82</sup> This wording suggests a limited nuclear war, rather than coupling to a strategic deterrent.

Fourth, relying heavily on the SLICMs may simply add another negative implication to the prospect of arms control in the Far East. Because of their multi-mission capability and concealable nature, SLICMs, as opposed to the GLICMs or ALICMs, have a serious potential to paralyze future arms control efforts.<sup>83</sup> Some