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COMMAND HISTORY

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Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces

(S/NOFORN) In September, USCINCPAC requested his component commanders and COMUSK evaluate the contribution of nonstrategic nuclear forces (NSNF) as they related to deterrence and warfighting strategy in the USPACOM, and in charting their future course. He noted that NSNFs had played an important role in U.S. policy over the last 35 years, with their principal rationale being the U.S.-Soviet Cold War confrontation. Several geo-political factors bore on the problem, including the breakup of the Soviet empire; the refocus of national military strategy on regionalism and forward presence; the resurgence of ethnic and cultural conflicts; and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The changed political and military situation in Europe and the new international climate prompted the reevaluation of theater nuclear forces, and Admiral Larson asked for thoughts on two general topics:¹⁷

- The NSNF role in future U.S./USPACOM warfighting and deterrence strategies.
- CINC nuclear requirements for land- and sea-based NSNF, assuming that NSNF had a future role in U.S. strategy.

(U) This issue, and the status of nuclear weapons located in Korea, became moot on 27 September 1991.

Nuclear Force Initiatives

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(U) On 27 September, the President announced a series of significant U.S. nuclear initiatives with the objectives of taking advantage of recent international developments to advance a series of bold actions intended to:¹⁸

- Move the U.S.-Soviet strategic equation in the direction of increased stability and reduced risk of war.
- Encourage and facilitate efforts by reformist elements in the Soviet center and the republics to decrease excessive strategic nuclear force levels and programs and to reduce the large inventory of tactical nuclear weapons.
- Improve the safety, security, and environmental soundness of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces.
- Provide an increased role for ballistic missile defenses against limited attack.

(S) Specific proposals announced by President Bush included acceleration of the seven-year period of dismantling land-based strategic

¹⁷USCINCPAC 091820Z Sep 91 (S/NE)

¹⁸CJCS 111425Z Oct 91 (S/PRD)

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nuclear missiles under the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START Treaty) signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991. All U.S. strategic bombers were removed from the day-to-day alert status they had maintained since 1957, and the proposed rail-based system for the MX missile was abandoned. All ground-launched theater nuclear weapons world-wide were to be withdrawn and destroyed, and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons were to be eliminated. At the same time, the President emphasized that nuclear deterrence would remain a cornerstone of U.S. defense policy and that the nuclear forces not eliminated by these measures would be fully effective and modernized to ensure a credible deterrent posture.

~~(S)~~ Implementation of the unilateral initiatives required significant coordination among the CINCs, the Services, and other government agencies to ensure the safe and orderly movement of over 2,000 nuclear weapons to storage and destruction sites. General policy guidance issued by CJCS stressed that safety and security were paramount, and that extraordinary efforts that could degrade safety or security were not authorized. Affected units had to retain their nuclear certification and proficiency until further notice, and older weapons which lacked modern safety features had priority for earliest return, retirement, and destruction. Shipborne weapons were to be removed before the next deployment for U.S.-based ships, while the weapons were to be removed at the first opportunity from ships homeported overseas. First priority for transportation of weapons was the return of AFAPs from Korea, but actual movement was dependent on Presidential approval.

~~(S/FRD)~~ All CINCs were directed to retain the capability to regenerate and/or redeploy naval nuclear weapons in a timely manner, and to ensure that storage and other necessary support infrastructure was maintained. Nuclear annexes to OPLANs and non-SIOP options were to be maintained, and the annexes should include planning factors, timelines, and rationale to regenerate and/or redeploy sea-based tactical nuclear weapon systems. [REDACTED] 6.1


6.1.a [REDACTED] USCINCPAC was specifically tasked to develop a plan for the removal of AFAPs, TOMAHAWK Land Attack Missiles, Nuclear (TLAM/N); nuclear strike bombs, and nuclear depth bombs (NDBs) at the earliest opportunity.¹⁹

~~(S/FRD)~~ The President approved the Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization (NWDA) for FY 91 and FY 92 on 5 November 1991 as National Security Directive 64 (NSD-64). This action cleared the way for the actual return of all land-based Naval air-delivered and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons to U.S. territory, the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Korea,

¹⁹Ibid.

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and other withdrawals in Europe. CJCS advised USCINCPAC that the withdrawal of weapons from Korea had highest priority for transportation assets, with weapon movements to commence before the next meeting of the ROK-U.S. Military Committee and Security Committee (MCM/SCM) scheduled for 20-22 November 1991.20



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