

2009

Flood Across the Border:



China's Disaster Relief Operations and Potential Response to a North Korean Refugee Crisis

**Flood Across the Border:
China's Disaster Relief Operations and Potential
Response to a North Korean Refugee Crisis**

Drew Thompson and Carla Freeman, Ph.D.

April 1, 2009

The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the U.S.-Korea Institute (USKI) of the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) for the opportunity to prepare this study.

Cover photo: View across the Tumen River from Fangchuan, China, looking into North Korea. Photo by Drew Thompson, December 2008.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	4
Introduction	7
<i>FIGURE 1: Partial list of military regulations relating to disaster relief and sudden incidents</i>	9
Chinese Interests, Local Conditions and the PRC-DPRK Border	9
<i>FIGURE 2: Map of China Highlighting Jilin Province</i>	10
<i>FIGURE 3: Map of Jilin Province Highlighting Yanbian Prefecture</i>	11
Possible Scenarios Involving Refugees Flowing into China	16
China’s Refugee Policies and Historic Treatment of Refugees	19
Government Coordinating Mechanisms	30
Disaster and Emergency Management: Planning and Organizational Structure	34
<i>FIGURE 4: Map of Central Government Pre-positioned Relief Materials</i>	37
<i>FIGURE 5: Disaster risk management organization system of China</i>	38
<i>FIGURE 6: Disaster Response Classification and Responsible Level of Leadership</i>	40
Disaster Relief and the Role of Local-level Governments	43
Provincial Bureaus and Organizations with Responsibility for Emergencies and Disaster Relief	48
Prefecture-Level Resources	59
Non-Governmental and International Disaster Relief Organizations	61
Current Challenges in Disaster and Emergency Management in China	64
Conclusion	66
<i>TABLE 1: Jilin Province Government Agencies Responsible for Disaster Relief</i>	69
<i>TABLE 2: Yanbian Prefecture Government Agencies Responsible for Disaster Relief</i> ..	75

Executive Summary

This report considers the planning, capacities and mechanisms for addressing natural disasters and domestic crises in the People's Republic of China and the implications for Chinese management of a potential crisis involving a rapid and unexpected increase in the volume of North Korean refugees fleeing to Chinese territory. Its focus is on structures and organizations in Jilin Province and its subordinate Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture.

Chinese officials are concerned that rapid and unexpected changes within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) could trigger a flood of refugees crossing the border into China creating a potential humanitarian crisis and threatening social stability in a Chinese region still struggling with significant development challenges. Yanbian, on the DPRK border, is a favored destination due to a substantial Korean-speaking ethnic Korean population, while cultural and family connections create a somewhat permissive environment for North Koreans. Any rapid influx of refugees would upset delicate balances, undermining social and economic stability and threatening the current state of law and order in the region.

Little is publicly known about how Chinese authorities are preparing for such a contingency and how they might respond to a humanitarian crisis on Chinese territory emanating from across China's border in North Korea. China-North Korea relations are politically sensitive, particularly the status of regime stability in Pyongyang and the status and treatment of North Koreans who enter China illegally. Chinese contingency planning for crises involving North Korea is considered a state secret, precluding public discussion of plans or contingency preparations. However, China has made extensive investments in planning, preventing and responding to natural disasters and emergency situations. The government has established mechanisms for inter-agency coordination, intelligence gathering, assessments, effective communications and response to disasters resulting in humanitarian crises. A raft of official plans, laws and regulations, promulgated at all levels of the government provide a legal framework, along with frequent exercises (many of which were stood up in the context of the 2008 Beijing Olympics). Those exercises, in addition to actual disaster responses, offer indications of how China might respond to a disaster caused by a sudden and unexpected flood of refugees arriving in China.

Due to the well developed culture of secrecy amongst the Chinese military, People's Liberation Army contingency planning for disasters and any planning for coordinated action with civilian authorities takes place in a black box, precluding informed discussion of the military's role in a North Korean humanitarian crisis. This study therefore focuses on civilian agencies and their capacities.

This study also does not consider scenarios either involving DPRK regime collapse or leadership transition scenarios, assuming only that instability and rapidly deteriorating conditions are a distinct possibility. Under this assumption, there are three possible scenarios in which large numbers of North Koreans might seek refuge across the border in China. The three circumstances are a steadily increasing flow, a sanctioned outpouring and

a mass exodus caused by regime collapse or similar breakdown. Each of these scenarios presents different challenges to the Chinese authorities at central, provincial and local levels in terms of addressing the potential humanitarian crisis caused by large numbers of North Koreans relocating to China. In particular, North Korean actions will likely determine how quickly or accurately Chinese authorities identify and assess the scope of the crisis. In addition the scenarios shape Chinese responses, such as the ability to hand over escapees to a functioning authority in North Korea, or whether or not Chinese forces can deploy forces across the border to deter refugees and provide humanitarian assistance on North Korean territory. However, in all scenarios, Chinese concerns remain the same: primarily ensuring law and order, social stability and continued economic growth. Chinese responses to the crisis will invariably seek to achieve those goals and how it manages refugees should be interpreted in that light. It is unlikely that ideological or altruistic motives will shape policy or actions on the part of Chinese officials in this case.

While a natural disaster is not an exact approximation of a refugee crisis involving North Koreans on Chinese soil, Chinese planning and experience for natural disasters does provide insights into the capacity of civilian authorities to respond to such a crisis. There are well documented structures, coordinating mechanisms and planning devices that are typically deployed by China's political leadership, with specific reference to their role in China's disaster and emergency planning and response. Likewise, each ministry, provincial bureau and lower level organ has clearly defined roles and responsibilities in responding to disasters or sudden incidents. With a government structure that is hierarchical, but with competing lateral relationships, the interlocking roles of the Party, military, central and local governments all play a critical role in disaster relief and mass incidents that are analogous to a humanitarian crisis involving North Koreans on Chinese soil. At each level of government, vital mechanisms, such as coordinating groups and established regulations clearly define roles and responsibilities and foster coordination creating a framework for a presumed Chinese civilian government response to a crisis.

However China's capacity to respond to disasters remains complicated by several factors, including:

- A complex bureaucratic structure with inherent challenges to inter-agency coordination and communication involving both horizontal, civil-military, and vertical dimensions and a reliance on *ad hoc* structures to encourage a coordinated response;
- Inadequate pre-positioned supplies and a heavy reliance on donations and volunteers;
- Uneven training for a humanitarian crisis on both civil and military sides;
- An absence of established protocols for international participation in response to a disaster, particularly from multilateral and Western aid groups, reflecting continued wariness of foreign assistance in national crises;
- Inadequate attention given to meeting the needs of victims over the long term.

Importantly, it is also clear that there are significant tangible resources available at the central, Jilin and Yanbian prefecture levels that will serve authorities responding to a

humanitarian crisis on their territory. Primarily, the Chinese government has demonstrated time and again the ability to mobilize large numbers of people to tackle challenges, as demonstrated by a “People’s War” approach that proved effective against the SARS outbreak, the Sichuan earthquake and even government preparation for the Beijing Olympics. Such experience extends even to government bureaus in Yanbian, including the police, customs and other departments which were mobilized for Olympics-related training exercises, provided new equipment and training experiences to ensure a rapid response to any unexpected event. This ability to appropriate resources, both those readily available and in regular use by local authorities, in addition to “importing” resources from other parts of the province or country represents a massive surge capacity to address crises that few other countries can match.

However, Chinese responses will still depend largely on how quickly officials identify an emerging crisis, assess the situation and report to higher authorities. The three refugee scenarios posed in this paper, the “trickle to a flood,” “Mariel outpouring” and “total collapse” each present different challenges to identification and developing a response. The “trickle to a flood” scenario is most likely to go unrecognized the longest, causing costly delays in government responses. Cover-ups are most likely to occur in this scenario, either to hide incompetence or present a sanitized image to the Chinese public and internationally. Local authorities may also fail to recognize the situation as a crisis, or report it as such to authorities above them in the hierarchy, perhaps because of concerns about how heightened security will affect the local economy through the disruption of local construction projects, for example, or through the imposition of restrictions on cross-border trade and tourism.

The political sensitivities that the Chinese place on their relationship with the DPRK and Chinese interests on the Korean Peninsula virtually assure that Chinese officials will seek to exclude the international community from any but the most superficial role in a crisis that unfolds in the border region. In addition to the issue of the status of North Korean refugees, other considerations may constrain China’s cooperation with international organizations on a refugee crisis. Chinese authorities will have a strong desire to manage information about the crisis, creating the impetus to exclude foreign organizations that they can not control. For these reasons, it is likely that in the event of a refugee crisis along the China-North Korean border, Chinese authorities will be reluctant to involve members of the international community in direct relief efforts. The unwillingness of Chinese authorities to privately discuss the issue with South Korea, as well as the US, and Japan as well, adds a significant level of potential complexity to China’s ability to mobilize an appropriate response to a DPRK refugee crisis.

This report considers the planning, capacities and mechanisms for addressing natural disasters and domestic crises in the People's Republic of China and the implications for Chinese management of a potential crisis involving a rapid and unexpected increase in the volume of North Korean refugees fleeing to Chinese territory. Particular attention is given to the roles and responsibilities of civilian government organizations, including at the provincial and subprovincial levels with specific reference to Jilin Province and Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and how they might respond to such a crisis unfolding within Chinese borders.

Introduction¹

Chinese leaders face multiple dilemmas confronting China-North Korean relations, including the threat that regional security will be undermined by North Korea's quest for a nuclear deterrent, and concerns that the faltering regime in Pyongyang could collapse, worsening an already deteriorating situation. In particular, Chinese officials are concerned that rapid and unexpected changes within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) could trigger a flood of refugees crossing the border into China creating a potential humanitarian crisis and threatening social stability in a Chinese region still struggling with significant development challenges.² Many North Korean refugees gravitate to the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin Province on the DPRK border, where there is a substantial ethnic Korean population that speaks Korean, while cultural and family connections create a somewhat permissive environment for North Koreans.

Any rapid influx of refugees would upset delicate balances, undermining social and economic stability and threatening the current state of law and order in the region. Little is publicly known about how Chinese authorities are preparing for such a contingency and how they might respond to a humanitarian crisis on Chinese territory emanating from across China's border in North Korea. China-North Korea relations are politically sensitive, particularly the status of regime stability in Pyongyang and the status and treatment of North Koreans who enter China illegally. Chinese contingency planning for crises involving North Korea is considered a state secret, precluding public discussion of plans or contingency preparations.

However, China has made extensive investments in planning, preventing and responding to natural disasters and emergency situations. The government has established coping

¹ Drew Thompson is the Director of China Studies and Starr Senior Fellow at The Nixon Center. Carla Freeman is Carla Freeman, Ph.d, is Associate Director of China Studies at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.

² Bates Gill and Andrew Thompson, "A Test for Beijing: China and the North Korean Nuclear Quandary," *Arms Control Today*, May 2003. See also: Gregory Moore, "'Lips and Teeth' or 'Boot on Bottom?'" – China-North Korea Relations and China's Interests In the North Korean Nuclear Dilemma," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, September 2, 2004.

mechanisms for inter-agency coordination, intelligence gathering, assessments, effective communications and response to disasters resulting in humanitarian crises. A raft of official plans, laws and regulations, promulgated at all levels of the government provide a legal framework, along with frequent exercises (many of which were stood up in the context of the 2008 Beijing Olympics). Those exercises, in addition to actual disaster responses offer indications of how China might respond to a disaster caused by a sudden and unexpected flood of refugees arriving in China. By studying these mechanisms and experiences, we can deduce what kinds of methods and resources the Chinese government could bring to bear in a response to a humanitarian crisis involving large scale displacement of North Koreans into Chinese territory.

This report considers the capacity of Chinese civilian government agencies to respond to a crisis involving North Korean refugees on Chinese territory. Clearly, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces would play a significant role in any crisis as affirmed by the 2008 white paper issued by the Chinese Ministry of Defense in January 2009, stating, "...it is an important task for the armed forces to take part in national development and disaster relief."³ Emergency rescue and disaster relief missions are budgeted for and considered part of the peacetime duties of Chinese security forces and facilities, including active forces, militia and civil air defense, which have been gradually integrating the disaster prevention and relief operations into their core capabilities.⁴ Regulations and guidance documents have authorized and clarified the military's roles and responsibilities, including the National Defense Law issued in 1997, and detailed regulations issued in 2005 which were applied during the PLA response to the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake.⁵ Beyond natural disasters, the PLA and PAP have developed regulations to deal with "sudden incidents" which can include various forms of civil disruptions, such as protests or other incidents that threaten social order. In November 2006, the PLA issued a "General Emergency Plan for the Military for Dealing with Sudden Incidents," which guides both the PLA and PAP responses to public security emergencies of various types. Details of this plan are not available, however. The well developed culture of secrecy amongst the Chinese military keeps both military contingency planning for disasters and any planning for coordinated action with civilian authorities in a black box. This study therefore will focus on civilian agencies and capacities. Despite our civilian focus, we will indicate where military, paramilitary and local militias could be expected to play a role in humanitarian intervention.

³ "China's National Defense in 2008," *State Council Information Office*, January 2009.

⁴ "China's National Defense in 2002," *State Council Information Office*, February 2002. See also China's 1998 defense white paper.

⁵ "中华人民共和国国防法," 新华, 2002年03月03日. Article 58 of the National Defense Law states that military service people should engage in disaster relief work; "第五十八条 - 现役军人应当发扬人民军队的优良传统, 热爱人民, 保护人民, 积极参加社会主义物质文明、精神文明建设, 完成抢险救灾等任务。"

*FIGURE 1: Partial list of military regulations relating to disaster relief and sudden incidents*⁶

Title of Regulations	Issuing Authority	Date of Promulgation
National Defense Law	Central Military Commission (CMC)	Mar. 1997
Regulations on the Defense Mobilization of Civil Transportation Sources	State Council (SC) and Central Military Commission (CMC)	Sep. 2003
Regulations on the Participation of the Military in Disaster Relief Operations	SC and CMC	Jun. 2005
General Emergency Plan for the Military for Dealing with Sudden Incidents	CMC	Nov. 2006

Chinese Interests, Local Conditions and the PRC-DPRK Border

China shares an approximately 1300km border with North Korea. Since the end of the Korean War, this border has been fundamentally a stable one. For the first three decades of Kim Il Song's rule, the DPRK's economy grew steadily and cross-border exchanges between the two countries had little to do with economic deprivation. Indeed, it was citizens from the PRC who during the height of China's Cultural Revolution ventured from China into North Korea seeking better conditions. As both political and economic circumstances within North Korea have deteriorated, however, especially since the late 1990s, North Koreans have regularly crossed into China illegally. In addition, North Korea's maneuvers to ensure its security in what it has perceived as a hostile international order amid the declining health of its Dear Leader, Kim Jong Il, have also raised the specter of a large scale disturbance on the Korean peninsula. China has sought to ensure stability along its borders in the interest of an enabling regional environment for its development objectives that include seeking to extend the prosperity enjoyed by China's coastal regions and largest urban centers to its less developed hinterland. China has become increasingly concerned that even if North Korea's nuclear ambitions can be managed, deteriorating conditions within the DPRK could lead to a humanitarian crisis within North Korea with spillover effects onto Chinese territory.

In managing any crisis along its border with the DPRK, China's interests are a combination of those identified by Beijing and by provincial and local authorities. In the event of a surge in North Korean refugees attempting to cross into China, central authorities in Beijing will be concerned first and foremost with managing the crisis so as to be able to exercise as much influence as possible over its outcome in the interest of its potentially broad security implications. The central government will not want either the United States or South Korea to determine how a crisis is managed on territory along its border. For their

⁶ Compiled from defense white papers and Chinese media reports. See: "China issues regulations on army's participation in disaster relief," *Xinhua*, June 21, 2005. See also: "Chinese military officer praises army for quake relief efforts," *Xinhua*, May 31, 2008.

part, provincial and subprovincial authorities in China’s border areas with North Korea will be profoundly concerned about the effects of a crisis involving North Korea, particularly in areas adjacent the border. The two Chinese provinces which border North Korea have both faced economic challenges under the reforms that have resulted in the partial dismantling and reorganization of state owned enterprises. Liaoning is a coastal province, however, and in the last decade has seen its heavy industrial, “rustbelt” economy began to benefit from increased foreign investment and trade, driven in part by economic flows through its booming port city of Dalian. Historically, Liaoning has not been a primary destination for North Korean refugees. Its shorter border with the DPRK is drawn by the Yalu River, which is both fairly wide and deep, making illegal crossings by North Koreans from North Pyongyang province difficult, at least until the river freezes in the middle of the winter. Furthermore, since 2006, sections of the border have been fenced with concrete and barbed-wire barriers. In addition, the areas bordering the DPRK in Liaoning are Mandarin speaking and lack a concentrated ethnic Korean population.

FIGURE 2: Map of China Highlighting Jilin Province

Map of China Highlighting Jilin Province




Jilin province is a different story. The province is still struggling to shed the legacy of its pre-reform economic structure and attain economic momentum. After the Chinese

Communist revolution, Jilin built its planned economy on the infrastructure left by the Japanese occupation and development of Manchukuo— which had had its capital in the provincial capital (then called Xingjing). With aid from Soviet Russia, after 1949 the region emerged as one of the centers of industrial development in China’s centrally planned economic system. This economic structure in combination with the province’s inland geography, has made it a less attractive venue for foreign direct investment than coastal competitors. This lack of outside investment has hampered the province’s ability to make the transition from planned to market-driven economy. At the same time, the process of privatizing large state-owned firms has meant massive lay-offs and an end to the social entitlements these firms provided in the planned economy, raising the threat of labor unrest. Despite natural advantages in the production of agricultural commodities, forestry and mineral resources, as well as some flourishing industries – Changchun’s First Automobile Group remains a leading center for automobile production in China, for example— the province has been slow to develop a vibrant private economy. As a result, unemployment across the province persists as a problem and development is uneven, with growth concentrated in the provincial capital and continuing high rates of both urban and rural poverty across the province.⁷

FIGURE 3: Map of Jilin Province Highlighting Yanbian Prefecture

Jilin Province



These economic difficulties are mirrored and in some respects intensified in Jilin’s border areas. There the concentration of a Korean minority (朝鲜族 *chaoxianzu*) along the border, along with the sheer physical geography of the region, not only complicate development efforts but present conditions that routinely pose additional tests to local strategies to manage social order. A predominantly ethnic Korean population at the time of China’s

⁷ UNESCAP factsheet of Jilin population. Accessed at: <http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/population/database/chinadata/jilin.htm>

Communist revolution led to the designation in 1952 of Jilin's Yanbian prefecture as an ethnic Korean autonomous area. Today, as a result of in-flows of Han Chinese and outflows of ethnic Koreans, only around 38 percent of the prefecture's population is *chaoxianzu*. Of the ethnic Koreans in Yanbian, most have their origin in North Korea, with the remainder coming from today's South Korea. Because of these historic and cultural ties, as well as geographic proximity to the Korean peninsula, some Korean nationalists in South Korea argue that Yanbian should be considered Korean territory. Yanbian prefecture covers about the same territory as the Gando (Jiandao) region, which Korean nationalists argue was Korean territory until Japan turned Korea into a protectorate and recognized Chinese suzerainty over the area in 1909.⁸ This latent territorial dispute is a factor in Chinese and Korean perspectives on virtually all aspects of border area management, from tourism and infrastructure development to contingency planning.

Yanbian spans 522km of Jilin province's 1206km border with North Korea. Its central city, Yanji, is located at the heart of the Yanji plain, approximately 10km from the China-DPRK border.⁹ China continues to rely heavily on the Tumen River between the prefecture and North Korea province as a natural barrier to migration from the Korean peninsula. Unlike the Yalu River between the DPRK and Liaoning, however, the Tumen is a narrow body of water and there are points at which it is less than 12m wide and at times only a meter deep. At a latitude of 42 degrees, moreover, winter in Yanbian lasts from November to April and subzero temperatures may keep the river frozen for months, tempting many from the DPRK to attempt the crossing even where the river widens. Other lengths of the border extend along the Yalu between Yanbian's Changbai county and the copper-mining city of Hyesan in Ryangang province. Here the border runs through the hard to secure terrain of the Changbai mountain range, declared a "heavy disaster area" for criminal activity by Chinese officials and another possible route for North Koreans attempting illegal entry into Chinese territory.¹⁰

After a period in which the border was relatively open following the launch of direct cross-border trade between China and the DPRK in 1982 and the introduction of the Regional Autonomy Law empowering Yanbian to undertake its own economic initiatives two years later, China began tightening security along its border.¹¹ Ironically, during the height of the Cultural Revolution, most cross-border migration was from Yanbian's ethnic Koreans to the then more prosperous DPRK. In addition, ethnic Koreans in Yanbian were recipients of support from relatives in North Korea during that period. However, it was widespread famine in North Korea linked to severe drought conditions and farming policies that began to drive increasing numbers of North Koreans to attempt to enter China in the mid and late 1990s. Chinese continued to provide food and energy assistance to North Korea, but problems in the distribution system and priority given to supplying military units left many North Koreans hungry, with estimates that millions may have died from starvation during

⁸ Outi Luova, *Ethnic Transnational Capital Transfers and Development-Utilization of Ties with South Korea in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region*, (Turku, Finland, Turun Yliopisto, 2007): 25;28.

⁹ Zhang Ping-yu et al., "Yanji City Orientation and Industry Development towards 21st Century," *Chinese Geographical Science*, Vol. 11.1: 70-75.

¹⁰ Guan Qingjiang and Qin Yubin: "Knitting "Sky Net" to Make People Feel Safe," *Jiefangjun Bao*, November 6, 2007.

¹¹ Luova, (2007): 89.

this period. Some have concluded that the ability of North Koreans to move across the Tumen River into China may have been an important factor in reducing food deprivation in North Hamyong province during periods of famine¹²

Initially, as others have documented, the Koreans who entered China illegally have often been provided assistance by Chinese Koreans, many of whom were reciprocating the help they had received from the North Korean side decades earlier. Local officials on the North Korean side of the border though aware that this was happening often looked the other way. Many of the DPRK citizens who crossed into Yanbian returned to North Korea, making repeat journeys to obtain food and goods increasingly unavailable to them at home. As the flows increased, more refugees sought to stay on the Chinese side of the border. In addition, as Chinese officials and scholars have argued, foreign advocacy groups sought to encourage more of them to seek refuge in China with the encouragement of foreign advocacy groups, while both China and North Korea began cracking down on cross border flows earlier in this decade. There are indications that the DPRK has increased its security forces along the border to slow this flow, including reports of closely spaced observation posts set back from the actual border. China for its part has sought to deter North Koreans from entering by returning North Koreans who enter China illegally to the DPRK, according to a bilateral agreement between Beijing and Pyongyang. In returning refugees to the DPRK, China does not treat North Koreans who cross the border as refugees as defined in the 1951 UN Convention and subsequent protocol, but handles them as defectors. Those returned to the DPRK face harsh punishment and even execution.¹³ Although after the initial crackdown, new regulations were introduced authorizing some short-term crossings between the two sides, permits for these are obtained at a price prohibitive to those Koreans who had become dependent on crossing the river for subsistence. In addition, the harsher policies and the accompanying stigma attached to North Koreans, coupled with the rising Han population in Yanbian, according to locals, have changed earlier attitudes of those in Yanbian toward refugees. They are increasingly seen as a problem in the region-- although locals recognize that this migration is generally attributable to economic conditions on the Korean side of the border.¹⁴

Local officials in China continue to struggle to develop Yanbian. Their most ambitious vision is the Tumen River Area Development project, which has the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Jilin provincial authorities, and Beijing. Investment largely associated --both directly and indirectly --with the Tumen project and other infrastructure programs and with remittances from Yanbian *chaoxianzu* working in South Korea and elsewhere in China have lifted incomes in Yanji and a number of other small cities in the prefecture, but as conditions continue to lag behind those of other regions in China, many in Yanbian continue to see greater opportunity elsewhere in China-- or abroad in South Korea. Jilin expected that supporting the Tumen program would facilitate Chinese access the Sea of Japan through international regional cooperation in developing a

¹² Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007): 70.

¹³ Hazel Smith, "The Plight of the North Koreans: North Koreans in China," *Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies*, Monterey, California, 2005: 2-4.

¹⁴ Freeman, interview Tumen, December 7, 2007.

port at the Tumen Delta. In that area, Yanbian is within 15 km from the Sea of Japan or the East Sea, on a point of Chinese territory that borders both North Korea and Russia at the village of Fangchuan. Geopolitical tensions in the region have proven a major barrier to making significant progress toward the Tumen project's ambitious goals.

Despite this, the prefecture has seen considerable development in infrastructure in recent years, linking it to Jilin's capital and to both North Korea and Russia. Today, Yanji is a local transport hub, connected by an expressway to Changchun and other major cities in the province. Other expressways run from Yanji to Tumen and to Hunchun, halving the travel time between major cities in the prefecture and the provincial capital.¹⁵ A highway now also connects Hunchun to Fangchuan and there are road links from Hunchun to the DPRK. These developments reflect general improvements in transportation infrastructure throughout the province in recent years—with road building projects begun during the Eighth Five Year Plan from 1991 to 1995 (a period when plans to develop the Tumen River Delta were also their most ambitious in scale) and more recent provincial-level and subprovincial projects connected to the central government's program to "Revitalize the Northeast" and "The Western Development Program," in which Yanbian was explicitly included.¹⁶ Rail services also connect Yanbian to Changchun and other cities across Jilin and Northeast China. In addition, there are rail connections between Yanbian and North Korea and Russia: rail lines link Hunchun to Rajin and Chongjin in the DPRK; the Sino-Russian Port Railways links Hunchun to Zarabino, and the railroad from Yanji to Mudanjiang in Heilongjiang province ties Yanji to the trans-Siberian railroad. Yanbian's key border ports are now interconnected by road or rail, such as the new Tuhun Railway between Hunchun and Tumen. Key border ports and cities include Tumen, linked by bridge across the Tumen River to the DPRK's Nanyang City; Hunchun, which as noted has rail connections to both the DPRK and Russia transportation networks and is open to direct trade with Russia at its Hunchun Port, is linked by highway to Shatuozi and Quanhe ports, which serve the DPRK; and Quanhe, designed to serve the Rajin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone in the DPRK. Yanji has a soon to be upgraded international airport with service to Seoul and regular domestic flights to Beijing, Shenyang, Dalian, Changchun and other major Chinese cities; however, there are no commercial flights from Yanji to destinations in North Korea.

Despite these improvements in transportation infrastructure, harsh winter weather and topography make transportation in and out of the region unreliable, particularly in the Changbai mountain area. As noted, the high expectations for the region's infrastructure and economic development associated with the Tumen River Area Development Programme to link the area to wider Northeast Asia transportation networks and markets have been disappointed by ongoing problems with international cooperation around planning and financing for the program, not unrelated to heightened international security concerns involving North Korea. The improvements in road and rail infrastructure to date, however, have paralleled slowly but steadily rising trade flows between Yanbian and the Korean

¹⁵ Greater Tumen Initiative website, <http://www.tumenprogramme.org/news.php?id=146;>
[http://www.tumenprogramme.org/news.php?id=520,](http://www.tumenprogramme.org/news.php?id=520;) (visited 10/23/08).

¹⁶ "延边交通快速发展 -- 公路," 兴边富民行动办公室, 吉林省人民政府办公厅; Zhao Huanxin, "State Policy Blesses Yanbian," *China Daily*, August, 5, 2002.

peninsula. The prefecture has invested considerable resources in improving management of its border ports, seven of which are open to trade with North Korea. Along with additional training of customs inspection personnel and the installation of more specialized equipment at higher volume port locations as part of pre-Beijing Olympics security planning, port authorities have sought to add staff with Korean and Russian language skills.¹⁷

These efforts at developing channels for cross-border trade technical improvements in border customs and inspection have included those directed toward border security operations at all levels, reflecting China's more stringent handling of undocumented border crossings. From the local police stations and Public Security Bureau contingents to the provincial level Border Public Security contingents, border security operations have been engaged in combating steadily rising cross-border crime, including drug and human-trafficking and related violence. Disturbingly, this has included raids (or "acts of banditry," as they are called by locals in border villages) from armed North Korean troops often operating alone or in small groups. A principal emphasis, particularly in the months ahead of the Beijing Olympics, has been on improving coordination among the various levels and agencies involved in border security. At the Changbai border post, for example, a joint patrol working system with relevant local authorities, including the military, police, and civilian bodies, were organized in army-police-civilian party subcommittees, which established "rapid response contingents" in 38 so-called "first line villages" along the border in this mountainous area to improve the capability of army, police and civilians "in coordinated combats(sic), rapid response and emergency handling."¹⁸ With funding notably from the central government's "harmonious borders, prosperous minorities" program, border battalions have also been engaged in what might be called "trust building" activities to improve relations between local villagers in ethnic Korean villages and border police in recent months. Local brigades have been engaged in the construction of demonstration public works projects in border villages and taking part in activities such as local ceremonies and other "recreational activities."¹⁹ At the same time, technological upgrades have been made to improve detection of illicit cross-border activities, such as the installation of remote sensing alarms and monitors in border villages and at crossroads.²⁰

Corruption among both Chinese border security authorities remains a serious weakness in day-to-day border control. On the Chinese side, wages are low—security personnel frequently complain about being unable to cover school fees for their children, for example, raising the temptation to accept bribes from those engaged in cross-border crimes, as well as from those entering China from North Korea illegally. Efforts have been made to improve living and working conditions among security personnel. There are also various programs that go hand in hand with a broader national effort to combat corruption by police and other security personnel—one recent program for the police was instituted under the

17 See for example, "Report on Yanji Customs," <http://yanbian.gov.cn>, June 18, 2008 and "Roundup on PRC Efforts To Ensure Security for Olympics Along PRC-DPRK Border," August 4, 2008 in World News Connection (File Number 985 Accession Number 266450215).

18 "延边支队和龙边防大队深入推进 "爱民固边" 模范村建设工作," 吉林省公安厅, August 20, 2008.

19 Op cit.

20 Guan (2007).

slogan “a letter from the masses is an order, the masses’ needs are the police’s desire” (群众留言就是命令、群众需要就是警情). Security units also apply mechanisms such as neighborhood committee surveys and complaint hotlines for citizens to report corrupt behavior by police and other security officials.²¹ Chinese press reports suggest, however, that despite improvements in local material conditions and efforts to boost morale in recent years, corruption and predatory practices are the norm.²² The additional resources for technology and training in combination with a zero tolerance policy for incidents along the border by central authorities ahead of the Olympics offered immediate incentives to local authorities to improve the discipline and capabilities of security authorities at the border, which may or may not be sustained.

As the foregoing suggests, for local-level officials in Yanbian, their prefecture’s border with North Korea is both an opportunity and a challenge. They would like to capitalize on their potential geographic and cultural advantages in serving as a bridge between the Chinese and particularly North Korean, but also South Korean, economies. For them, keeping the China-North Korean border open to legitimate economic and human flows is seen as key to their region’s economic development. At the same time, they must manage the day-to-day problems associated with a porous border and with a politically repressive country experiencing economic hardship. Their concerns are narrower than the geostrategic implications of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, proliferation, or the ramifications of a unified Korea on Chinese regional security, but they have a large stake in seeing better economic conditions across the border. Broadly speaking, only when conditions within North Korea improve will the economy on the Chinese side of the border make the kind of progress local officials envision as its potential. Chief concerns about developments on the Korean peninsula involve the threat that instability could lead to large scale refugee flows. Ensuring that starving North Koreans do not cross the border, undermine law and order, threaten social stability and potentially contribute to population pressure on the environment and local economy are primary considerations. These concerns might be considered parochial, but they are particularly valid from the perspective of provincial and lower level officials, as well as the most senior leaders in Beijing.

Possible Scenarios Involving Refugees Flowing into China

Despite efforts to deter North Koreans from crossing the border illegally, ample anecdotal evidence make it clear that conditions in the DPRK are dismal, leading North Koreans to take the additional risk associated with seeking to escape to China. Estimates of the numbers of refugees residing illegally in China today vary widely, with many assuming

²¹ See for example, “全国各地派出所将大变脸 统一建筑外观形象, 法制日报, December 22, 2006, and “一切为了群众满意,” 吉林省公安厅, January 5, 2006.

²² “让群众满意——图们市公安局边防大队向上派出所记事,” 吉林日报, December 22, 2005. For a discussion of the predatory practices associated with the decentralized nature of and control by party and local government over policing at the local level, See Murray Scot Tanner and Eric Green, “Principals and Secret Agents: Central versus Local Control over Policing and Obstacles to ‘Rule of Law’ in China,” *The China Quarterly*, (191, September 2007): 644-670.

between 200,000 and 300,000 and others reckoning more.²³ However, others estimate that the current number of refugees hiding in northeastern China is around 30,000 to 50,000.²⁴ Within Korea, hundreds of thousands are assumed to be out of work, low on food and otherwise classified as internally displaced persons by international analysts. In the event of reunification, The Bank of Korea estimates that up to 3 million people, out of a total population of 23 million, would likely seek to escape, with most heading to South Korea, but significant numbers likely heading towards China.²⁵ In the event of a collapse of the DPRK government in which the border with South Korea is not opened, significantly greater numbers would likely gravitate towards Chinese territory.

Due to the present dire conditions in North Korea, as noted large numbers already cross into China on a regular basis, some to seek permanent refuge, others for short-term foraging excursions, including armed North Koreans crossing the border and engaging in banditry. Longer term immigrants apparently face difficult circumstances, including commercial and sexual exploitation, poverty and other challenges arising from their uncertain circumstances.

Unless political and economic conditions dramatically improve in the DPRK, it is likely that North Koreans will continue to seek to escape to China in growing numbers, despite the risks and hardships. In the event that the situation in the DPRK deteriorates, the pressure to enter China in search of food and safety will only increase. As discussed, Chinese authorities are concerned about the potential impact that growing numbers of illegal North Koreans in China would have on social stability in China's northeast region.²⁶

In this study, we will not consider scenarios either involving DPRK regime collapse or transition scenarios, assuming only that instability and rapidly deteriorating conditions are a distinct possibility. Under this assumption, we will consider three possible scenarios in which large numbers of North Koreans will seek refuge across the border in China, presenting distinct challenges for Chinese officials. The three circumstances are a steadily increasing flow, a sanctioned outpouring and a mass exodus caused by regime collapse or similar breakdown.

"A Trickle to a Flood"

In the first scenario, "a trickle to a flood," the current pressure for North Koreans to flee to China for food, income or sanctuary increases dramatically due to deteriorating conditions within the country, such as famine or natural disaster. This scenario also assumes that some level of functionality remains in the DPRK government and security forces. While small numbers of refugees currently cross into China from the DPRK on a daily basis,

²³ "Conference Focuses on North Korean Human Rights Abuses," *Washington File*, US State Department, July 17, 2003.

²⁴ "North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and U.S. Policy Options," *Congressional Research Service*, September 26, 2007.

²⁵ Na Jeong-ju, "3 Million NK Refugees Expected in Crisis: BOK," *Korea Times*, January 26, 2007.

²⁶ Bates Gill and Drew Thompson, "A Test for Beijing: China and the North Korean Nuclear Quandary," *Arms Control Today*, May 2003; Carla Freeman, "In Pursuit of Peaceful Development: China, the Tumen Development Project and Sino-Korean Relations," *USKI Working Paper 2*, March 2008.

worsening conditions would increase this flow. North Korean security forces and internal government mechanisms (including the ration system) would still constrain the numbers attempting to slip through the cordon and make it to China. An incrementally growing number of refugees would give Chinese authorities time to respond in advance of the crisis developing, providing opportunities to re-enforce the border through technical means and shifting human resources to address the problem. However, an incremental intensification of an existing situation might delay Chinese crisis identification. Local level officials who are aware of a growing problem might not report it accurately or quickly to higher levels due to the political sensitivities of China-DPRK relations and the refugee situation. This behavior is common in the Chinese political system, as evidenced by the serial cover-ups of industrial and natural disasters and public health outbreaks that have occurred since the 2003 SARS outbreak.²⁷ In this circumstance, Chinese authorities still would have a range of opportunities to avert a major crisis and mitigate the impact from a flood of refugees. In addition to being able to deploy their own resources, they have opportunities and the incentive to provide material support to DPRK security forces, enabling them to more effectively police the North Korean side of the border and continue to receive DPRK citizens that have been captured by Chinese security forces.

“Mariel Outpouring”

In the second scenario, a “Mariel outpouring,” DPRK authorities become complicit in allowing their citizens to cross the border into China. Seen as a potential outlet for overcrowding and dwindling resources, local (or even Pyongyang-based) officials might encourage large numbers of DPRK citizens to cross into to China, perhaps even encouraging them to seek relief and later return. Officials might consider prioritizing an exodus, mobilizing “unproductive” members of society, including the elderly and disabled. They might also expel mental patients, prisoners, violent criminals and marginal workers from labor camps, foisting “problem citizens” on China, which would seriously threaten law and order conditions in Chinese communities. DPRK authorities could facilitate the exodus, providing transportation to the border and intelligence to help ensure they get across. This scenario would pose significant challenges to the Chinese government. While the crisis would be easily identifiable, the involvement of DPRK authorities might prevent refoulement (the legal term for the forced return of a migrant). Negotiations between the PRC and DPRK to resolve the situation might be protracted and could possibly stumble on DPRK demands on China. Up to this point, such a “Mariel outpouring,” is not known to have occurred. However, there is speculation that North Korean local officials enabled hungry North Korean citizens to cross temporarily into China in the mid-1990s;²⁸ in addition, the DPRK’s ability to extract concessions from negotiating counterparts is well known, as is its ability to craft a negotiating environment that favors its weak position. It is

²⁷ Despite central government orders that all coal mines shut down during the Olympic period in August 2008, many mines continued to operate. A major accident at one mine was covered up by local authorities and mine officials to prevent political embarrassment. Additionally, local government officials have attempted and failed to cover up a public health outbreak in Anhui province, while other officials attempted to cover up food safety incidents involving milk powder and eggs, only being exposed once international regulators and media exposed the cases.

²⁸ Smith (2005): 4.

not inconceivable that DPRK authorities might threaten, or attempt such a managed exodus to China in an attempt to extract benefits from their erstwhile ally.

“Catastrophic Collapse”

Lastly, a catastrophic collapse of the North Korean regime and the cohesion of its security forces are generally considered to be the catalyst for a large-scale flood of refugees fleeing to China. Without security forces to prevent large numbers of people from moving into the border region, large numbers of DPRK citizens will likely seek to cross into China. There is a possibility that DPRK soldiers will desert their units with their weapons and join the exodus, greatly increasing the likelihood that banditry will occur. Without a functioning North Korean government, Chinese authorities who detain North Koreans will be unable to send them back and ensure they will not attempt to cross again. Such a scenario will require significant expenditure of resources by Chinese authorities. Camps to contain, house and feed North Koreans will need to be set up as part of a short term solution to the crisis. It is possible that Chinese leaders will authorize PLA and PAP units to cross into North Korea to stop refugees before they can reach the border. Likewise, refugee camps could be set up on North Korean territory in the border area to feed and shelter the hungry and discourage them from moving into China. These camps could also serve as receiving centers for refugees captured by Chinese authorities in China. In the most optimistic scenario, “magnet sites” could be set up, which would provide food, shelter and work opportunities for North Koreans, encouraging illegal border crossers to voluntarily come out of hiding and join sustained programs that potentially represent a durable solution to the problem. Expanding existing cooperative farms, such as were used to manage ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam, could provide a possible model, coupling North Korean labor with Chinese managerial, material and technological inputs.²⁹ While a complete collapse of the DPRK government represents a major geostrategic challenge for China *vis a vis* ensuring the peninsula does not become an enlarged South Korea allied with the U.S., in terms of addressing the refugee crisis, it does present some opportunities for China.

Each of these scenarios present different challenges to the Chinese authorities at central, provincial and local levels in terms of addressing the potential humanitarian crisis caused by large numbers of North Koreans relocating to China. However, in all scenarios, Chinese concerns remain the same: primarily ensuring law and order, social stability and continued economic growth. Chinese responses to the crisis will invariably seek to achieve those goals and how it manages refugees should be interpreted in that light. It is unlikely that ideological or altruistic motives will shape policy or actions on the part of Chinese officials in this case.

China’s Refugee Policies and Historic Treatment of Refugees

China acceded in 1982 to both the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Even before accession, it participated in receiving a significant number of overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia. The largest

²⁹ "Chinese diplomats help DPRK farmers in harvest," *Chinaview*, October 30, 2008.

group of these came from Vietnam, as Chinese Vietnamese fled or were expelled from that country as the result of the political transition there after 1975. The status of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam had been a source of tension between China and Vietnam, first due to South Vietnam's policy of forcible naturalization of Chinese in Vietnam and then after 1975 between Beijing and Hanoi, whose socialist reform in the South resulted in growing repression and violence against the Chinese minority who dominated the commercial economy. Ethnic Chinese began to flee Vietnam in large numbers, particularly after the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979. Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam were then seen as a threat to national security and were compelled to leave by Hanoi, resulting in a surge in the number of ethnic Chinese Vietnamese refugees. Nearly 300,000 of them sought haven in China, making China the country that received the greatest number of Vietnamese refugees in Asia. China provided these refugees settlement as a first asylum destination, but also offered them the option of permanent resettlement. Many entered China across the border between Vietnam and Guangxi province, which received an estimated 220,000 refugees. Ultimately, Guangxi absorbed 110,000 refugees, with Guangdong taking in 100,000 and four other provinces taking in the remainder.

According to one study, when these refugees arrived in Guangxi there were no plans for their long term care. Initially, they were settled temporarily in private homes, offices, warehouses and schools and later in tents in parks and open fields along the border. The small towns on the Chinese side of the border were quickly overwhelmed by these refugees, known as *nanqiao* (南侨), who were subsequently moved using both military and civilian trucks to so-called "overseas Chinese farms." A number of these already existed in Guangxi and other provinces, set up after the expulsion of thousands of ethnic Chinese from Indonesia in the previous decade. In addition to being sent to farms, refugees with backgrounds in fishing were moved to new fishing villages; others were employed in mines and factories, or were given professional roles (such as assignments as teachers) in those units. Reports indicate that some *nanqiao* have prospered in China, where most arrived able to speak a Chinese dialect and some, particularly those who were from northern Vietnam, were familiar with the socialist system. Those who were settled along the coast have done the best; however, those who came from urban centers in Vietnam found their new lives in the countryside in often overcrowded conditions, picking tea or planting trees intolerably harsh, and thousands reportedly left the areas where they had been settled in China for Hong Kong, Macao, or the West. The resettlement and relocation process lasted nearly a decade, as China's reform policies took hold and resulted in the restructuring of many of the state units that had served to employ and house these overseas Chinese enterprises and farms.³⁰

How is a North Korean refugee different from an overseas Chinese refugee?

The Vietnamese Chinese refugees in China faced difficult conditions in China in many cases, but these reflected the economic circumstances in China in the wake of the Cultural

³⁰ . Discussion of Chinese refugees from Vietnam closely drawn from Theresa C. Carino, "Vietnam's Chinese Minority and the Politics of Sino-Vietnamese Relations," *Praxis*, January-April (1980); and Tom Lam, "The Exodus of Hao Refugees from Vietnam and their Settlement in Guangxi: China's Refugee Settlement Strategies," *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 13.4 (2000).

Revolution. They benefitted, however, from efforts by the new post-Mao Chinese central government to improve conditions within China for overseas Chinese, largely as part of the country's new opening up and modernization strategy which recognized the potential of the overseas Chinese in facilitating new international trade and investment flows. Institutions to manage overseas Chinese relations that had been disbanded during the height of the Cultural Revolution were reestablished. Organizational structures, such as the All China Returned Overseas Chinese Association, along with the overseas Chinese farms, and special universities and schools established for the education of overseas Chinese and their children were given the attention of China's senior leadership, including by Li Xiannian who personally directed a new Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. The *nanqiao* arrived at a time when these central efforts were underway. In addition, following China's accession to the UN Convention of Refugees and associated protocol, China began receiving funds from the UNHCR on improving conditions for resettled refugees from Vietnam through an UNHCR office established in Beijing in 1979.

Chinese management of the ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam provides only limited insight into the humanitarian standards that Chinese authorities may apply to a large population of North Koreans illegally entering China. Many of the organizational structures in place to manage overseas Chinese in the 1970s and 1980s have been dismantled along with the reform of the Chinese state sector. In any case, these would not apply to refugees from Korea who are ethnically Korean, not Chinese. In addition, while Chinese authorities cooperated with the UNHCR on resettlement of Vietnamese refugees, this was largely in the sense of receiving some funding for supplies; the structures that were set up to accommodate the refugees were under the management of the Chinese government alone. Since 1997, relations between China and the UNHCR have been strained explicitly over the issue of China's policy toward North Korean refugees. Indeed, no UN High Commissioner visited China between 1997 and 2006. In short, while China has experience managing large numbers refugees, this experience was at a different era in China's development and with refugees who were of Chinese ethnic origin, more easily integrated culturally and linguistically into the fabric of Chinese society, and at a time when Chinese society was still quite closed and the country was recovering from the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution. Today China is clearly a dramatically different place. Three decades have seen the Chinese state reduce its oversight of Chinese society for one, making it more conducive to a market-oriented economy, but also making management of social challenges more complex. In addition, Korean refugees who are not ethnic Chinese would require a different approach from Chinese authorities, certainly posing cultural challenges and perhaps raising difficult issues around Chinese nationalism. China has accepted around 200 other refugees who have settled in Beijing, mainly from Pakistan and the Middle East; however, it deported 15 from Pakistan in the months ahead of the Beijing Olympics.³¹ At the same time, contemporary China has the potential to commit material resources that were inconceivable when China contended with the inflow of ethnically Chinese Vietnamese thirty years ago.

³¹ Stephanie Nebehay, "China deports refugees ahead of Olympics: U.N," *Reuters*, April 8, 2008.

How is a humanitarian disaster involving DPRK citizens on Chinese territory different from a disaster involving Chinese citizens?

The risk of humanitarian crisis from refugees entering China is not unique to the China-DPRK border. As mentioned, in addition to the Vietnamese Chinese refugees, China currently hosts smaller numbers of recognized refugees from South Asia and Africa, including almost 100 refugees from Pakistan alone.³² Several countries on China's borders face environmental, economic and political difficulties that could potentially lead to an increase in refugees seeking to enter China.

Nonetheless, while there are numerous national, provincial and local-level plans and regulations for dealing with emergency situations and disasters, there are none publicly available that specifically address a refugee crisis from a neighboring country, including the DPRK. Indeed, the extent of civilian and military contingency planning specifically for a North Korean refugee crisis is unknown. A Chinese response to a humanitarian crisis resulting from a rapid and dramatic increase in the numbers of North Koreans crossing into China is likely to draw upon the extensive planning and experience in responding to natural disasters and emergency situations. Similar to a natural disaster, a humanitarian crisis caused by waves of refugees would affect Chinese citizens, be localized, challenge law and order and threaten to undermine social stability. However, as will be discussed below, a DPRK refugee crisis would differ in several respects from a domestic disaster, necessitating the implementation of some alternative responses.

We can safely assume, however, that several factors will affect Chinese planning and response. Principally, we can assume that civilian and "social forces" (the private sector) will not mobilize in the event of a crisis so long as it remains on the DPRK side of the border. Chinese responses will be pragmatic and reflect the impact of a crisis on Chinese citizens and interests primarily on the Chinese side of the border. It is also understood that security forces will seek to prevent any crisis from spilling into China if at all possible. This may entail stopping border crossers at the border. And, as mentioned above, China may act in order to stop displaced persons from approaching the border, which could include moving security forces inside the DPRK itself, a decision that would not be taken lightly due to China's well developed notions of sovereignty.

Because of the lack of available information on Chinese perspectives on mounting relief or stabilization missions within the DPRK, this report will not consider the implications of this strategy. It should be noted, however, that Chinese authorities have been increasingly active in responding to international disasters, including sending civilian and military personnel to assist in disaster relief efforts, such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. Both military and civilian authorities are increasingly considering the utility and advantages of increasing their capacity to engage in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions abroad. This option is unlikely to be employed unless the threat is dire and

³² 2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, China.

it is carried out with permission from, DPRK authorities. A humanitarian crisis involving North Koreans is thus very distinct from a natural disaster, in that the Chinese government response differentiates geography as well as the identity of the affected individuals. The humanitarian crisis scenario is also distinct from a natural disaster in that the Chinese government has some control over where to mount its response.

The Status of DPRK Refugees in China

China does not consider North Koreans crossing the border illegally to be political or economic refugees, in contrast to most international judgment, including that of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).³³ Any North Korean escapee in China without appropriate documentation is considered an “illegal transgressor” and subject to punishment according to Chinese law, including notification sent to DPRK authorities and involuntary repatriation or refoulement. China has signed several agreements with North Korea on managing the border area, some of which are secret. According to these arrangements, China agrees to return North Koreans if they are caught without permits on Chinese territory. As a result, China is not a safe haven for North Koreans escaping hunger or political repression. One unpublished agreement on border management reportedly signed between the Chinese Public Security Ministry and the DPRK Ministry of State Security in 1998 contains a clause that states, “a person will not be deemed as an illegal transgressor if the person has crossed the border due to circumstances beyond his or her control, such as natural disasters and/or mental illness.”³⁴ This strongly suggests that Chinese authorities have conducted some contingency planning for a refugee crisis scenario, including discussions with DPRK counterparts about addressing a flood of refugees crossing “involuntarily” into China due to an unexpected or uncontrollable circumstance. Regardless of the scenario, a DPRK citizen on Chinese territory is unlikely to enjoy the same protections a Chinese citizen would receive and, with this, government relief services are likely to be different in terms of both standards and quality.

A North Korean humanitarian crisis unfolding on Chinese territory would also significantly differ from a natural disaster in terms of information management. For instance, Chinese TV and print media carried saturation coverage of the government’s response to the Sichuan earthquake in March 2008, describing unfolding events in extensive detail with on-the-spot reporting. The PLA in particular mobilized a massive propaganda effort to expound the magnitude of its effort as well as the heroism demonstrated by individuals and entire units. It is unlikely that similar levels of attention will be given to a North Korea crisis. Furthermore, international attention will potentially challenge information management plans, as foreign governments, international media, relief agencies and NGOs seek to gather information or publicize conditions. Chinese propaganda authorities and

³³ For the purpose of this paper, we will use the term “refugee” to designate illegal North Korean border crossers, despite Chinese official reluctance to designate them as such.

³⁴ Photos of the agreement were published by Yonhap in January 2007. Chinese translations of the Korean article and photos have been published on specialist blogs. *World News Connection* carried an English translation of the Yonhap article, referencing the exemption clause. The translation of the clause here is from Article 4 of the photographed agreement, translated by the authors. See also: “ROK’s Yonhap Obtains 1998 DPRK-PRC Agreement on Security Issues in Border Areas Article by Shenyang correspondent Cho Kye-ch’ang,” *Yonhap*, January 26, 2007.

government departments responsible for information management will likely impose strict information controls and security forces will be enrolled to enforce travel restrictions on foreigners and even domestic media. South Korean and faith-based organizations are currently active in China working with North Korean escapees. It is likely that they will be quickly identified and ordered to leave the region under the pretext of ensuring their personal safety. Likewise, a crisis will undoubtedly spark intense interest on the part of the South Korean media, though they too will likely be able to obtain only limited access to the affected areas and have to settle for officially sanctioned Chinese government reports and second-hand information. This intense international interest, coupled with political sensitivities perceived by Chinese authorities will complicate all aspects of the crisis response.

The political climate may challenge other aspects of the government response to such a crisis. The civilian government information reporting process, including conducting assessments, reporting results and conditions to higher authorities might be more complicated than for a natural disaster. The need for information security might slow the flow of information up the chain of command, resulting in slow or distorted responses, including poor allocation of resources and more problems in coordinating a response among the many different government actors that can be expected to play a role. Likewise, international cooperation might present challenges, as the government, on one hand, wants to project an image of control, while on the other hand, resources might be stretched thin, increasing the need for international assistance. Government sensitivities towards allowing international relief agencies and foreign aid workers access to disaster sites, as evident during the Sichuan earthquake, either to accompany donated material or participate in assessment work, will be even greater in a North Korean refugee crisis.

However, Chinese interests in responding to a humanitarian disaster involving DPRK citizens on Chinese soil are consistent, however, with its interests in any humanitarian crisis, whether caused by a natural or a man-made disaster. Priorities and objectives include the maintenance of law and order, protection of Chinese citizens and assets, including assuring public health and preventing the spread of disease. Managing the process of displaced persons will certainly differ between Chinese and DPRK refugees, primarily due to an assumed reluctance on the part of DPRK refugees to interact with Chinese government responders over fears of punishment and involuntary repatriation. As with any humanitarian crisis, however, immediate priorities will be to ensure that displaced persons are identified, food and shelter are provided, and hygiene conditions are maintained to prevent the spread of disease. Rehabilitation, reconstruction and other durable solutions will need to be determined based on the actual situation.

Crisis Response and China's Government Structure

It is a truism that China is a complex country with a population of 1.3 billion and a political system driven to promote and ensure social and its own regime stability, yet at the same time for all its tremendous capabilities, nevertheless, faces enormous governance challenges implementing and coordinating its policy objectives. The following sections of this report describe the structure, coordinating mechanisms and planning devices that are

typically deployed by China's political leadership to implement its aims, with specific reference to their role in China's disaster and emergency planning and response.

The Party

The cornerstone of China's stable political system is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). All levels of Chinese government function under leadership of the Communist Party, which has the ultimate authority over the country. The Party wields its power through decision-making and policy-setting functions which are enacted through the politburo, central committee and party committees within all branches of government including departments, commissions and organizations (as well as schools, military units, and government-owned enterprises.) A hierarchical organization with over 73 million members, the Party controls all aspects of economic, political, cultural and social issues in the country.³⁵ With few exceptions, the leaders of a particular government entity, such as a local governor, minister or organization director simultaneously hold a leadership position in the organization's Party committee. Likewise, Party members are also the senior leaders of the military, court system and legislative branch.³⁶ The Party is more secretive than respective government branches, although significant strides have been made in increasing transparency.

The military, specifically the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and its branches are directly controlled by the Party at the highest level through the Central Military Commission (CMC). CMC members are appointed by the Central Committee, with Hu Jintao, the general secretary of the Party's Central Committee serving as chairman of the CMC. Through this system, defense policy emanates from the CMC and senior-most civilian leadership.³⁷

Party leadership in the making of policy is ensured by Party members who are organized into groups, which can be designated variously as "Party groups," "small groups," "leading groups" or "leading small groups." Standing "leading small groups" comprising senior leaders make foreign and domestic policy at the strategic level, and address policy issues that cross ministerial and sectoral lines. A leading group has reportedly been formed to supervise reconstruction following the Sichuan earthquake in Sichuan province, known as the, "Leading Group for Inspecting Funds and Materials for Combating the Earthquake and Providing Disaster Relief for Quake Victims."³⁸

For the purposes of this study, which is focusing on emergency response and disaster relief, the role of the Party is generally considered synonymous with the functions of the government as it pertains to government capacity.

³⁵ "Number of CPC members rises to 73 million," *People's Daily*, October 09, 2007.

³⁶ Harry Harding, *Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949-1976*, Stanford University Press, 1981. Page 284.; See also: Craig Dietrich, *People's China: A Brief History*, Oxford University Press, 1998. Page 61.; See also: Susan L. Shirk, *How China Opened Its Door: The Political Success of the PRC's Foreign Trade and Investment Reforms*, (Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1994): 13.

³⁷ David M. Lampton, *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000: 1978 - 2000*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2001): 62.

³⁸ Alice L. Miller, "The CCP Central Committee's Leading Small Groups," *China Leadership Monitor* No. 26, Fall 2008.

The Central Government

China's central government is responsible for the implementation of the Party's strategies, policies and the laws and the regulations that have been approved by the National People's Congress. The central government oversees the ministries and committees that are part of the State Council, China's cabinet. In addition, it directs local-level governments, wielding power through Party organs over officials at all levels of the political hierarchy through determination of promotions and appointments of leadership positions. The central government issues national administrative rules and regulations as well as orders and decrees, in accordance with the Chinese Constitution. These directives can be intended for central government departments, or lower level bureaus and organizations.³⁹

The central government is responsible for conducting foreign relations, including treaties and agreements with other countries and multi-lateral organizations. The central government is the sole level of government permitted to approve international cooperative programs and projects, including personnel exchanges and bilateral or multilateral international conferences involving foreign governments.⁴⁰

Lastly, the central government collects taxes from provinces and enterprises directly owned by the central government (such as tobacco companies), and allocates a portion of that income back to provinces to fund special projects (such as disaster reconstruction, development projects, and other operating budget supplements, etc.) and support provinces and impoverished regions which require additional financial support. However, provinces collect the majority of revenues, including corporate taxes, customs duties and other taxes, giving the provinces significant fiscal control. Wealthy provinces can be reluctant to pay all requested remittances to the central government, because much of the treasure will be re-allocated to poorer provinces instead of returning to the wealthy province to support local budgets. Extensive bargaining can occur between the central government and provinces over collection and allocation of resources.

The State Council

The State Council is the nation's cabinet, responsible for administering state affairs through its ministries and offices. Granted this responsibility by the Constitution and the "Organic Law of the State Council," it is similar to the executive branch of government in other countries. The State Council is led by the Premier, Wen Jiabao, and vice premiers, state counselors, ministers, the auditor-general, and of course, the Secretary-General of the Party.

Vice premiers are key leaders in the State Council, each with their own portfolio, with the executive vice premier responsible for day to day affairs. One of China's prominent vice premiers and a former member of the leading party members' group of the Ministry of Civil Affairs has close links to both Yanbian and the DPRK. Zhang Dejiang, a Liaoning

³⁹ Jianfu Chen, *Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature, and Development*, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999): 98-102.

⁴⁰ 谢庆奎, 《当代中国政府》, 辽宁人民出版社, 1991. Page 191.

native, is a graduate of both Kim Il Sung and Yanbian universities. He served as president of the latter and later was a deputy party secretary for Yanbian prefecture. Vice premier Hui Liangyu is responsible for rural issues and disaster prevention and response. As head of the Earthquake Relief Headquarters and the State Flood Prevention and Drought Resistance Headquarters within the State Council, Hui has played a significant role in disaster emergency prevention and relief since he became vice premier in 2003. In the summer of 2007, he sent directions to the Zhejiang Provincial government in response to Typhoon Sepat, indicating that he was providing oversight of that disaster.⁴¹ In January 2008, he urged provincial and local governments to prepare for earthquake relief efforts, particularly in the event of an earthquake occurring during the Olympics.⁴² His role includes guiding provinces in preparing for other natural disasters, such as floods and forest fires.⁴³ The former party secretary of Anhui and Jiangsu provincial party committees, he has extensive experience as a provincial administrator. A Jilin native, his early career was spent in Jilin province as a county official, and he rose through the ranks to eventually lead the provincial agriculture and animal husbandry bureau. He subsequently became the vice governor of Jilin province before taking on leadership roles in other provinces. His experience from the bottom to the top of the provincial government ladder, coupled with his extensive experience at the central government level makes him a critical player in shaping policy for rural issues in addition to disaster relief planning and response. Furthermore, he is a member of China's Hui minority, potentially giving him insights into issues affecting minority communities as well as credibility amongst minority cadres and citizens.⁴⁴

Key Ministries under the State Council Responsible for Disaster Prevention and Relief

The Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) is in charge of “social administrative affairs” of Chinese citizens. This includes providing pensions and subsidies for unemployed and disabled persons, poverty alleviation projects and welfare payments to the poor, providing for unsupported elderly and orphans, supervision of village elections, management of neighborhood committees, urban grass roots elections, and marriage licenses. It is also responsible for determining geographic borders between provinces and between counties (and resolving border disputes that arise between them) and finding employment for demobilized soldiers. It is also the leading ministry in charge of disaster prevention, planning and relief.⁴⁵ It is responsible for drawing up policies, organizing and coordinating specific work plans and emergency response systems, assessing and reporting the magnitude of each disaster, and distributing resources to affected areas. In addition, it also initiates conferences for experts and government officials to exchange ideas in disaster planning and response.

With support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Ministry of Civil Affairs organized the first national disaster reduction plan in 1998, coordinating the

⁴¹ “回良玉要求浙江严防次生灾害 妥善安排受灾群众,” 中国新闻网, 2007年08月19日.

⁴² “回良玉: 进一步提高地震灾害综合防御能力,” 搜狐新闻, 2008年1月21日.

⁴³ “回良玉: 进一步提高地震灾害综合防御能力,” 搜狐新闻, 2008年1月21日.

⁴⁴ See Hui Liangyu's official bio at: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/data/people/huiliangyu.shtml>

⁴⁵ See: “The Organizational Structure of the State Council,” State Council Information Office.

efforts of over 30 ministries and 100 scientists. (The plan was subsequently ratified by the premier.) MOCA also houses key offices responsible for responding to disasters, including: the Office of the National Committee for Disaster Reduction; the National Office of Unified Coordination for Disaster Management; and the Department of Disaster and Social Relief within the ministry and plays a leadership role in the National Commission for Disaster Reduction (NCDR), an interagency committee headed by a vice premier and made up of 34 ministries, the military and government-organized non-governmental agencies (GONGOs).⁴⁶

The Ministry of Health (MOH) is responsible for setting the policies, guidelines and laws related to health and the control of disease. It supervises the system of hospitals and clinics, the state food and drug administration, and the Chinese Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDCs) and the local anti-epidemic stations in the CDC system. It is also responsible for overseeing the provincial and local departments responsible for addressing the health needs that arise from a disaster or emergency situation, including providing medical treatment to victims and responders, preventing infectious disease outbreaks.

The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) is “in charge of public security in the country and [is] the highest leading and commanding organ of the Armed Police.”⁴⁷ The ministry is responsible for ensuring all aspects of law and order, mitigating any threats to social stability through establishing policies and regulations and supervising the work of lower level bureaus. The MPS and its subordinate Public Security Bureaus (PSB) and the Armed Police at provincial and lower levels guard the borders and provide the man power to respond to mass incidents (*quntishijian* 群体事件), including mass demonstrations and riots.

In addition to its responsibilities overseeing the government’s revenues and expenditures, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) plays a significant role in addressing disasters and humanitarian crises. It channels grants to affected areas and shapes financial policies that ensures adequate funding for prevention and relief work carried out by various government departments at central and local levels. Since the beginning of 2008, MOF granted RMB 27.543 billion for the relief of China’s January 2008 snow disasters, RMB53.607 billion for Sichuan earthquake relief and an additional RMB70 billion for the first phases of post-earthquake reconstruction.⁴⁸

Provincial and Sub-provincial Governments

China’s 31 provincial governments (which include autonomous regions and the municipalities of Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Chongqing) are all led by a provincial party committee and a governor’s office. The provincial party secretary and governor are

⁴⁶ National Disaster Reduction Center of China

⁴⁷ David M. Finkelstein & Kristen Gunness, *Civil-military Relations in Today's China: Swimming in a New Sea*, M.E. Sharpe, 2006. Page 271.

⁴⁸ “税收快乐并痛着,” 腾讯网, 2008年8月4日.

the representatives of the central government in the province. The secretaries of large provinces are often also members of the central committee or politburo. Provincial governors and the party committee secretary have decision-making rights and are entitled by the central government to interpret central government guidance and adapt directives to suit the conditions of the specific province. This gives the governor's office extensive authority and implementing power, analogous to the State Council, at the provincial level. Like a provincial cabinet, the governor's office oversees the provincial bureaus and is responsible for implementing the policies and directives of the central government. The provincial-level governor's office also forwards directives to prefectural (or municipal) governments who, in turn, forward directives and supervise the work of county level governments, and so on through townships to the administrative village level. Likewise, information is passed up the same chain of command and "passed on" to the next higher level, where it is collated and forwarded up the chain. Likewise, the provincial bureaus each oversee county-level bureaus in the same chain, known as a *xitong* (系统), or "stovepipe" in bureaucratic terms.

Each province and county has a bureaucratic system that mirrors the level above it, with each level's bureau answering directly to its governor at the same level, rather than the respective ministry in Beijing.⁴⁹ This creates a complex matrix of loyalties, as each level has both lateral and vertical obligations. One scholar explains this complex arrangement:

To say that the relationship between the State Council and provincial governments is one of direct subordination does not mean that all provincial officials have to take orders from the State Council as a whole. According to the system of the bureaucratic rank, central ministries and provincial governments are on the same bureaucratic level. Therefore, though provincial bureaus are lower in bureaucratic rank than their ministerial counterparts in Beijing, provincial bureaus do not necessarily take orders from their ministries... [P]rovincial bureaus have to answer to two superior units, the central ministry and the provincial government, which are at the same administrative level.⁵⁰

Between provincial and county governments are either provincially-administered cities or prefectures. Prefectural governments and provincially administered city governments technically have the same administrative rank; however, the city has a full administrative structure while prefectural administrative offices are in fact representative offices of the provincial government. Generally, prefectures still exist only where there are no major urban centers.⁵¹ Other prefecture or prefecture-like structures used to administer counties include the leagues of Inner Mongolia or autonomous prefectures, such as Yanbian, where generally more than 50% of the population is a minority ethnic groups recognized by the PRC (again, Yanbian was around 73% ethnic Korean when it was designated in 1952). It is the county that has primary responsibility for the provision of public services and collection of taxes. In many ways, the county government is the most functional service

⁴⁹ Yasheng Huang, *Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations During the Reform Era*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999): 58.

⁵⁰ Baogang He, Brian Galligan, Takashi Inoguchi, *Federalism in Asia*, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007): 224.

⁵¹ Yang Zhong, *Local Government and Politics in China*, (New York: ME Sharpe, 2003): 67-68.

provider to Chinese citizens, as this level of government implements decrees passed down from above. Rather than setting policy and providing technical guidance and supervision, the county actually implements programs and provides retail-level services to citizens. In keeping with the vertical characteristics of the political system, the county government oversees township governments in its jurisdiction. Townships, in turn, oversee “administrative villages,” the lowest level of government. “Administrative villages” are an administrative aggregation of “natural villages,” which are a collection of residences or a former “production brigade” (an administrative unit dating from the pre-1978 commune period). County governments are generally more functional than townships, which often are underfunded and inefficient and unable to effectively provide services and reliably collect taxes or administer complicated programs, pushing the responsibility to the county level in most instances.

Government Coordinating Mechanisms

China’s bureaucracy has only expanded outward from the basic government machinery put in place to manage China’s planned economy in response to the growing complexity of China’s post-reform economy and society. Following the universal bureaucratic principle of “be wise and play it safe” (“名哲保身” *mingzhe baoshen*), China’s multifarious ministries, bureaus and offices remain jealous guardians of their particular resources and responsibilities. At the same time, the increasing demands on China’s bureaucracy to address social challenges, develop and manage infrastructure, deliver energy resources, and sustain economic growth, as well as deal with natural disasters and other emergencies, can require coordinated action by multiple bureaucratic actors on several levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy. There are a number of mechanisms used by the Chinese state to bring Party and bureaucratic actors together across functional lines around certain policy challenges. These structures principally fall into two categories: leading small groups or *lingdao xiaozu* (领导小组), also called “leading groups” (as noted above in the discussion of Party-State relations,) and “integrated coordinating structures” or *zonghe xietiao jigou* (综合协调机), which includes “working groups” or *gongzuo zu* (工作组).

Leading Groups

Leading small groups are formally sanctioned by Chapter IX of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China (CCP). As Party institutions they are non-standing bodies that when first defined were to report directly to both the CCP Politburo and Secretariat. After reforms in the late 1980s, leading small groups were redefined more flexibly as one of the consulting bodies of the Party Central Committee. Typical structures of leading small groups include leading members of the Party, government (ministerial heads, etc.), and military. They usually do not have staff, but rely on government offices for staff support as needed. Leading small groups at the top of the Party-State hierarchy are generally established to deal with strategic issues, offering a forum for the expression of policy ideas and preferences and consulting on ways to ensure cooperation in policy implementation.⁵²

⁵² Lu Ning, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,” in David M. Lampton, (ed.), *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform* (Stanford University Press, 2001): 45–49.

According to one analyst, the first leading group was established by Mao Zedong as early as 1953 because of his mistrust of Premier Zhou Enlai under whose leadership the State Council had initiated changes to tax policy without reporting the revision to the CCP. To emphasize the subordination of the state to the Party's authority, policy issues were dealt within work systems or "kou," classified according to their purposes, such as planning in the area of finance, foreign policy, labor, education, and other policy areas. The work systems are the predecessors of the leading small group as it was later formally enshrined in the Party Constitution.⁵³

Since their formal introduction into the Chinese policy making process, leading groups have become ubiquitous within the Chinese policy structure, found at virtually all levels of the Party-State hierarchy. To offer an example of a leading group at the apex of China's political system, where the large number of actors involved in shaping China's energy policy makes the policy process a Byzantine one, a National Energy Leading Group was established in 2005. To begin to streamline and make energy policy decision making more strategic, this group, chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao, involved more than a dozen state ministers and was supported administratively by a State Energy Leading Group Office within the National Development and Reform Commission of China's State Council.

An example of a ministerial-level leading group can be drawn from China's response to the Sichuan earthquake. Immediately following the earthquake, the Ministry of Health formed a "Leading Group on Disaster Relief."⁵⁴ The PLA also has leading groups, including one specifically on emergency response, the "PLA Leading Group for Responding to Emergencies" that was active in coordinating the PLA's response to the Sichuan earthquake.⁵⁵ The Ministry of Public Security also heads inter-ministerial leading groups on cross-border issues, such as human trafficking.⁵⁶

Leading groups exist to help coordinate central-local activities, regional projects, and provincial policy goals. Provincial-level leading groups modeled after China's central-level leading group on WTO/GATT accession were established to help provinces prepare for China's accession into the World Trade Organization, for example. Central government participation in the Tumen River development project, a project involving trade and infrastructure links between Northeast China and Northeast Asia of which the Yanbian region is a keystone, was also coordinated by a Tumen River Area Leading Group under the State Council and State Science and Technology Committee. In 2002, Jilin province set up a leading small group on "enriching the border region" focused on the Korean minority in Yanbian prefecture.⁵⁷ At the municipal level, leading groups may be

⁵³ Zhou Qi, *Organization, Structure and Image in the Making of Chinese Foreign Policy since the Early 1990s*, (Johns Hopkins University Dissertation, March 2008): 135-139.

⁵⁴ "Press release of the Embassy of China in the United States (No. 10/2008)," <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxx/t452865.htm>.

⁵⁵ "Latest News from Disaster Relief Troops Heading to 58 Townships and Towns," *PLA Daily*, May 15, 2008.

⁵⁶ See website; "Human Trafficking and Modern Day Slavery," <http://gvnet.com/humantrafficking/China.htm>.

⁵⁷ 吉林省委副书记、副省长 全哲洵, "在全国兴边富民行动现场经验交流会上的发言," 2002. 关于: 抓好省级政府推动 深入开展兴边富民行动.

established for any number of purposes – from improving public health to meeting family planning targets to boosting production of articles of clothing – headed by the secretary or deputy secretary of the municipal party committee (who is usually also the mayor).⁵⁸ Leading groups were established by many cities around China to assist in the reconstruction of cities and towns in Sichuan devastated by the earthquake, headed as would be expected the Party Secretary of the Municipal Party Committee and the mayor, supported in some cases by an administrative office for the leading group. Leading groups also function at the county level. For example, Jilin’s Antu County with its Changbai Mountain scenery, interested in exploiting growing tourist interest from South Korea, established a county-level leading small group to explore tourism development of the area.⁵⁹ Townships also have leading groups, such as leading groups on family planning and public safety headed by the township party secretary, often with members including the heads of the local police station, office of civil affairs, and town-level branches of mass organizations, such as the Women’s Federation.⁶⁰

Coordinating Structures

“Coordinating structures” are the various committees that are found throughout the Chinese political system. These committees are standing structures that are supported administratively by government “coordinating” offices. Typical committees include the planning committee, education committee, trade committee, science and technology committee, etc. At the provincial level, for example, these committees are headed by a vice-governor with responsibility for the particular sector. The committees are generally used to communicate with and convene leaders at the same or lower levels of the bureaucracy with responsibility for the same sector. For example, a municipal or county official responsible for overseeing implementation of education policy at his or her level of government would serve on the education committee. In addition to these standing committee structures, the formation of *ad hoc* committees, often called “small groups” or *xiaozu* (小组) is also a feature of efforts by officials to coordinate a response to a particular problem or policy task by providing a more routine channel for communication, sharing information or ideas, and laying the groundwork for a coordinated response in a situation where administrative authority is fragmented.⁶¹

Working Groups

Generally, working groups or *gongzuo zu* (工作组) are structures established by higher levels of government agencies to inspect or oversee how lower level organs are implementing policy or managing challenges. For example, in the wake of the Sichuan

⁵⁸ See for example, “Guangzhou Delegation visits Quake-hit Sichuan County,” NewsGD.com, August 19, 2008.

⁵⁹ “‘长白山文化风情线’建设领导小组检查沿线情况,” 安图县档案局, 2004.

⁶⁰ See for example, “关于成立南沈灶镇创建文明镇领导小组的通知,” 南沈灶镇人民政府, 东台政府网, April 24, 2008.

⁶¹ See, for example, Mao Shoulong et al, *Management of Provincial Government*, (毛寿龙, 省政府管理), China Broadcasting Publishing House, 1997.8: 130-133.

earthquake, the People's Bank of China (PBoC) established a working group to "inspect and direct" relief efforts in Sichuan, officially headed by PBoC governor, Zhou Xiaochuan. Working groups in the health and safety area from the Ministry of Health or its provincial-level representatives communicate with local level authorities to ensure regulations or disease-prevention measures are undertaken.⁶² The term "working group" [usually working small group or *gongzuo xiaozu*(工作小组)] is also used by Chinese agencies following the international norm to structure interactions with international counterparts, both at the central and subnational levels of government, such as the US-China Working Group on Climate Change or the Jilin- Primorskiy Kray Working Group. In addition, working groups may be set up within single organizations to deal with a particular issue, such as a so-called "spotlight issue"⁶³ involving public health or safety, a "guideline" issue expressed in a *tongzhi* or notice by higher authorities, or a larger scale crisis. In China's 2008 earthquake, the State Council's Emergency Command Center set up working groups to manage an array of issues, from emergency response, to sanitation, to propaganda, water resources and public order, among others. Teams from the provincial headquarters for earthquake relief sent to the disaster area were also organized as "working groups." During the 2004 tsunami disaster, working groups of officials from China's embassies and consulates were also set up to coordinate disaster relief.

Planning

China continues to assign high value to planning as a way to identify and rank the challenges that the government must address in the near term and look ahead to manage trends in the longer term. At the central level, China continues to issue a Five-Year Plan, now called a "Five-Year Guideline" as it has since 1953. In addition to this national Five-Year plan, China has annual national plans, national plans for long term urban development and more *ad hoc* plans for regional development.⁶⁴

At the central level, oversight and coordination of production and implementation of the Five-Year Plan is the purview of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The planning process has been described as "top down and bottom up," dependent on good information flows up from the local level, with the more global view and capacity to establish national priorities enabled by the existence of a stable institutional structures that "allow the accumulation of data, experience and knowledge and the gradual improvement of established procedures and methods."⁶⁵ Implementing the objectives of the plan may require the establishment of leading groups or other coordinating bodies. Plans are also produced by subnational authorities. At the provincial level, for example, the provincial Development and Reform Commission produces a Five-Year plan, as does

⁶² 卫生部工作组：阜阳手足口病防治工作取得成效，www.gov.cn/gzdt/2008-05/09/content_965411.htm.

⁶³ Yang Zhong, *Local Government and Politics in China: Challenges from Below*, (Armonk, ME Sharpe, 2003): 137-138.

⁶⁴ Gregory Chow, "The Role of Planning in China's Market Economy," *International Conference on China's Planning System Reform*, March 24-25, 2004.

⁶⁵ Zhi Liu, "Planning and Policy Coordination in China's Infrastructure Development, *ADB-JBIC-World Bank East Asia Pacific Infrastructure Flagship Study*. Accessed at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPINFRASTRUCT/Resources/855084-1137106254308/China.pdf>.

the municipal Development and Reform Committee that in final form mirrors the country's national plan. As part of the drafting process, provinces and municipalities may use their draft plans to lobby for the inclusion of greater resources or other central-determined allocations in the national Five-Year Plan.⁶⁶

Along with these development plans, there are plans to help realize the objectives of longer-range plans. It might be said that planning is an inherent feature of China's contemporary political norms. Plans are prepared for a range of sectors and contingencies, including disaster management as will be discussed in some detail below.

Disaster and Emergency Management: Planning and Organizational Structure

As Chinese officials often point out, China is a country that is prone to frequent and severe natural disasters that in recent years have affected an average 200 million people in China annually.⁶⁷ In imperial China, an emperor who ruled a country free of natural disasters had the Mandate of Heaven to legitimate his power. Even after the collapse of the imperial system, the failure of China's leaders to prevent floods and protect the masses from the destruction associated with earthquakes, typhoons, droughts, winds, and other plagues and pestilence has tested their capacity to govern. Some argue that among the greatest blows to Chiang Kai-shek's popular support was his decision to breach dams along the Yellow River to halt the encroaching Japanese army. The devastating Tangshan earthquake was widely seen in China as a portent of Chairman Mao Zedong's demise.⁶⁸ In the language of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of China's contemporary government, planning for disaster reduction is "an important guarantee for realizing the overall objective of sustainable development of the economy and society."⁶⁹

Planning and Law in Disaster Management

The priority given by China's leaders to disaster relief and awareness of the potentially politically destabilizing impact of weak responses to disasters have not always translated into effective disaster management approaches in China. China's "Disaster Reduction Plan" was formulated only in 1998 with China's ninth Five-Year National Economic and Social Development Plan and its "2010 Long-term Objective." According to descriptions of the drafting process, more than 30 ministries were involved in its development. Local authorities and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) were also among those consulted in the drafting and revision process, with the latter serving as a key source of funding for the process. The Plan was promulgated as a series of severe floods along the

⁶⁶ "Draft of the Eleventh Changchun Five-Year Plan has been Finished," Changchun Municipal Government, May 25, 2005.

⁶⁷ "Disaster Emergency Management in China," (*Total Disaster Risk Management, Asian Disaster Reduction Center*, 2005): 72.

⁶⁸ Andrew Mertha, *China's Water Warriors*, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2008): 1.

⁶⁹ Yang Siquan, "China's Emergency Preparedness," paper presented at "Preparing for Large-Scale Emergencies," Asian Development Bank Headquarters, Manila Philippines, July 5-6, 2007.

Yangtze, Nen, and Songhua Rivers pushed water levels to historic highs, forcing massive evacuations that left hundreds of thousands of people without shelter. In Heilongjiang alone as many as 500,000 people were still living without shelter long after the waters subsided as winter approached.⁷⁰ Reports of profiteering and misappropriation of disaster relief funds were also widespread.⁷¹ Since the 1998 Disaster Reduction Plan was issued, the Ministry of Civil Affairs has been engaged in establishing various mechanisms and protocols to improve both central and local authorities' capacity for disaster and emergency response and mitigate problems associated with bureaucratic corruption and predatory practices.

The 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic proved perhaps the greatest post-Mao test of China's political leaders' mandate to govern since Tiananmen Square. It made clear to Chinese authorities the need for greater standardization and improved governance when dealing with unexpected emergency situations. The ouster of China's Minister of Health and the Mayor of Beijing after the cover-up of the SARS epidemic was revealed marked one way for China's top leadership to make clear that those authorities tasked with protecting public welfare will be held accountable for mismanagement. The complete breakdown of the reporting system, including active subversion on the part of many government officials showed that regulations that would hold the bureaucracy accountable in future circumstances were also needed. A decision was announced in August 2005 that the death toll from natural disasters, once a closely guarded state secret, would be openly reported. Old habits die hard—the Jilin provincial government resisted open reporting on the Songhua River chemical spill in November 2005 and some reports suggest that the central government also withheld information as the situation worsened.⁷² But if accurate figures on the death toll from the 1976 Tangshan earthquake remain elusive, the 2008 earthquake reflected significant improvements in the transparency of China's approach to disaster management. China's premier Wen Jiabao stood alongside the media amid the death and destruction from the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, mourning with the victims' families as information about casualties was reported, celebrating the rescued and the rescuers, and apologizing for the government failures that had contributed to the losses in life.

As China approached the Beijing Olympics period, other emergency contingency plans and laws were announced. The 2006, the National Emergency Contingency Plan for Public Events (《国家突发公共事件总体应急预案》), and the 2007 Sudden Incident Law (《突发事件应对法》) were both promulgated to address shortfalls in emergency response planning and accountability for responses. While both were passed in the context of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, they are, together with other regulations, intended to create a framework for government departments to accurately and quickly report and respond to emerging incidents that threaten the public welfare. These laws, along with the numerous disaster laws share a number of similarities. The State Council "pushes" each of them to the 31 provinces, requiring them to be studied, and ultimately adapted for use at the provincial level. Provincial authorities subsequently "push" those plans to prefectures and

⁷⁰ "Yangtze Flood Pushes through Central China," *CNN*, August 25, 1998,.

⁷¹ "China Flood Victims Now Face Threat of Disease, Profiteers," *CNN*, August 24, 1998.

⁷² Robert Marquand, "Chinese Decry Toxic Coverup," *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 25, 2008.

cities and so forth to the county and township level. The key plans also standardize the incident classification and reporting system, including the four-tier classification based on severity, and associated time limits in which to report to the next higher level. These regulations also give on-site incident commanders greater latitude to mobilize local resources and also make reports directly to local military units and “leapfrog” government levels to report to higher authorities when warranted.

In addition, the Chinese government has demonstrated enthusiasm for adapting and updating existing plans and regulations based on experience and new technologies. For instance, the 1997 Earthquake Prevention and Disaster Reduction Law (《中华人民共和国防震减灾法》) was updated in 2005 and finally released in 2008 in draft form, incorporating new clauses specifically based on experiences from the Sichuan earthquake. The updated regulations clarify government authority to appropriate private resources and allow for the curtailment of individual freedoms in the case of emergencies. Additionally, the regulations strengthen language authorizing on-the-ground incident commanders to “coordinate” the efforts of People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police in disaster mitigation (discussed further below), as well as mobilizing local resources.

Advance planning for disasters under the management of MOCA also includes storage of disaster relief materials. Maps of China’s reserve points show 10 central-level warehouses for relief materials at Shenyang, Harbin, Tianjin, Zhengzhou, Hefei, Wuhan, Changsha, Nanning, Chengdu, and Xian with a reported 135,000 tents in storage. Provincial and local MOCA offices also maintain material reserve warehouses for disaster relief in all provinces, including Jilin, as well some cities and counties, with an estimated 236,000 tents at hand.⁷³ The government also has an emergency fund allocation system with the capacity to provide additional funding to disaster-stricken areas within 2-3 days. Public donations are also a critical component of disaster relief efforts, with around 30,000 urban donation stations in place to receive routine donations of supplies as well as public donations in response to an emergency.⁷⁴ In addition to material supplies, as part of overall planning, the Chinese government requires relevant departments and some of the country’s key state owned enterprises to not only draw up emergency response plans but to engage in training activities as part of disaster preparation and in accordance with legal guidelines, such as those in the Law on Protecting against and Mitigating Earthquake Disaster.⁷⁵

⁷³ UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, China Country report. Accessed at www.unisdr.org; See also: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/14/38120232.pdf>: 12.

⁷⁴ Shi et al., <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/14/38120232.pdf>: 12

⁷⁵ Tang Aiping, Wen Aihua, and Tao Xiaxin, “Earthquake Disaster Management in China,” Paper presented at Map Asia Conference 2003, 5.

FIGURE 4: Map of Central Government Pre-positioned Relief Materials




Structure of Disaster Management and Emergency Response System

The structure of China’s disaster management and response system reflects the challenges of coping with disasters that are often enormous in scale and require the involvement of a wide array of bureaucratic actors, not only at the central level of government, but throughout China’s bureaucratic hierarchy. China has a disaster management system in place in which central authorities provide coordinating authority and lower level authorities are responsible for management of the disaster itself, with various departments tasked with different aspects of disaster relief operations. What Chinese authorities see as both “disaster risk” and “public security” management on the civilian side follows the structure of “one office and four committees.” This refers to China’s efforts to develop an integrated national emergency response and management system, implementation of which is the responsibility of “one office,” a national Emergency Management Office under the State Council, created in 2006, and four committees to manage four different types of disaster/public security events. These four committees include the National Commission for Disaster Reduction (NCDR) headed by a vice premier and composed of representatives from more than 30 different agencies under the State Council, including the Ministry of Civil Affairs in a leading role and the Seismological Bureau. The NCDR’s role is to get disaster reduction actions underway and coordinate them as well as by helping local authorities with local disaster reduction work and by working with international bodies in exchanges and cooperation around disaster reduction operations. A National Committee for Work Safety manages industrial accidents, a National Committee for Patriotic Health

manages public health, and a National Committee for Integrated Management for Public Security deals with specific challenges to public security. The four committees are made up of a vice premier or member of the State Council of China as committee director, a minister or vice minister from relevant ministries as vice directors, and the vice ministers from the corresponding ministries as committee members. At the local levels, there are corresponding management organizations.⁷⁶

FIGURE 5: Disaster risk management organization system of China⁷⁷



Other coordinating authorities for disaster management and relief at the central government level include the Office of Comprehensive Coordination for the Nationwide Fight against Disaster and Relief Efforts, and supporting organizations, such as the Board of Experts, an advisory body to the NCDR and the National Disaster Reduction Center of China (NDRCC), considered the operations agency under the NCDR, and the Department of Disaster and Social Relief, also under MOCA.⁷⁸ The latter performs a range of functions, including conducting training and overseeing international cooperation, providing technology and information to support decision making on disaster reduction, and carrying out emergency relief. In addition, recently an Academy of Disaster Reduction and Emergency Management (ADREM) has been established at Beijing Normal University, with joint authorization from the MOCA and Ministry of Education of China (MOE), to serve as a national research base and education center for disaster reduction and emergency management in China.⁷⁹ Other agencies that play a role in disaster and public security management include the Chinese Center for Disease Control under the Ministry of Health

⁷⁶ Shi Peijin, Liu Jing, Yao Qinghai, Tang Di, Yang Xi, "Integrated Disaster Risk Management of China," OECD Conference Financial Management, (Hyderabad, India, February 26-27, 2007): 7.

⁷⁷ Shi Peijin et al. (2007): 7.

⁷⁸ Li Jing, "Disaster Management in China: Strategies and Activities," UNESCAP Regional Symposium on Regional Disaster Management Support System - Satellite Information Access Mechanism 19-21 March 2008, Bangkok, Thailand. (Accessed at: http://www.unescap.org/icstd/SPACE/Workshops/2008/Regional_DMSS/China.pdf).

⁷⁹ Wang Zhenyao, "The Process in the Development of the Chinese Disaster Reduction Plan and the Progress Made, 2005-2009," *China National Center for Disaster Reduction*, 2005.

(MOH) and the Chinese Supervision Center for Work Safety under the State Administration of Work Safety.⁸⁰ Along with these bureaucratic structures, there are a number of leading groups under the State Council focused on risk management for natural disasters, including the State Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters and the State Earthquake Relief Headquarters, with corresponding bodies at the provincial and local levels. In addition, there are government organized associations such as the Chinese Society and Technology Association and the China Association for Disaster Prevention and the Red Cross Society of China, which also play important complementary roles in disaster relief activities in both research and relief operations.⁸¹


Disasters are classified on a scale of one through four depending upon their scope and extent. In the event of a class one disaster, a vice premier under the State Council is placed in charge, working closely with the director of the office of the National Disaster Reduction Commission. A second tier disaster is managed by the minister of civil affairs, while third and fourth class disasters are managed by vice ministers and departmental directors. Criteria, including numbers of households affected, a particular event's impact on livelihoods (such as a massive snowstorm on range animals), estimated deaths and injuries contribute to the decision making process how to declare and classify a disaster, triggering the decision to open and staff disaster response headquarters at different levels of government. First grade disasters, such as the Sichuan earthquake of 2008, receive the highest level of government response, with the vice premier who directs the State Council's National Disaster Reduction Commission taking the lead in managing the situation. In fact, the Sichuan earthquake had the full attention of China's premier Wen Jiabao who oversaw the State Council's emergency response center, officially the "Headquarters for Resisting Earthquake and Providing Disaster Relief" 《国务院抗震救灾综治促群局挥部》 with State Councilor Ma Kai (former head of the National Development and Reform Commission) and Minister of Public Security, Meng Zhengzhi, serving as "deputy commanders" of disaster relief operations.⁸² Coordinating the government's response to so-called "fourth grade" disasters falls to the Department of Disaster and Social Relief under the Ministry of Civil Affairs.

⁸⁰ Ibid, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/14/38120232.pdf>

⁸¹ <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/14/38120232.pdf>: 9

⁸² <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/14/38120232.pdf>: 11 and Mulvenon, (2008): 2.

FIGURE 6: Disaster Response Classification and Responsible Level of Leadership⁸³



The People's Liberation Army and the People's Armed Police

Along with civilian government agencies and volunteers, mobilization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), People's Armed Police (PAP), and local militia (people's armed forces) is a critical arm of the government's disaster relief efforts. This is not a recent development; the role of China's military in natural disaster rescue missions is longstanding. Its response was essential to the relief efforts following numerous typhoons, floods, forest fires, major industrial accidents and other disasters over the past decades, as well as the Sichuan earthquake rescue and relief effort. A PLA command group for coordinating disaster relief was established immediately after the Sichuan earthquake struck, for example.⁸⁴

The People's Armed Police (PAP), China's internal security force, protects and in some cases maintains China's power and communications infrastructure as well as gold mines, forests, and water supplies, and maintains the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway and the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, for example. Border security and firefighting forces are under the PAP as well, although they are directed by departments under the civilian public security apparatus, separate from the military chain-of-command. The PAP is specifically tasked with

⁸³ Wang Zhenyao, "The Process in the Development of the Chinese Disaster Reduction Plan and Progress Made 2005-2009," Ministry of Civil Affairs China national Center for Disaster Reduction Presentation.

⁸⁴ James Mulvenon, "The Chinese Military's Earthquake Response Leadership Team," *China Leadership Monitor*, 2008.35: 2.

handling peacetime emergencies, including emergency rescue and disaster relief operations. It operates a crisis response support system designed to organize the general headquarters, contingents (divisions) and detachments (regiments), to respond to emergencies.⁸⁵ Military and security forces are also tasked with assisting local governments with rescue operations in the event of a disaster. During the Sichuan earthquake, military units from military districts as well as from the local militia were dispatched to every town and township.⁸⁶ In addition, during a disaster, PLA forces from more than one military region may be mobilized to the disaster area. During the Sichuan earthquake, for example, specialized medical and rescue troops from the Beijing and Shenyang Military Regions supported medical teams based in the affected Chengdu and Jinan Military Regions.⁸⁷ In addition, the PLA can be expected to provide material support to civilians. During the 2008 snowstorm, for example, the PLA supplied quilts and warm clothing to disaster victims through its General Staff and General Logistics Departments, drawing on supplies from military warehouses in the region. PLA medical personnel are also assigned not only to anti-epidemic and sanitation work, but military medical teams establish medical shelters and provide emergency medical treatment.

Civil-Military Coordination and Planning

The civilian and military chains of command intersect formally at the highest reaches of the government and party leadership; therefore, coordination between the two as in the Sichuan response is most likely a top-down prospect, rather than an *ad hoc* agreement to work together by low-level civilian officials and junior officers. The extent to which an effective response is mounted will depend on how quickly the crisis is identified, followed by the capacity of China's senior leaders to quickly adapt existing plans to the evolving situation. Slow identification of a crisis could hinder effective civil-military coordination and encumber mobilization. This is a particular risk in the North Korean refugee scenario, particularly if there is no readily identifiable catalyst (such as DPRK regime collapse or natural disaster) driving growing numbers of refugees to cross the border. In this slower moving scenario, it is possible that senior leaders will not recognize that the initial "trickle" of refugees is increasing to "a flood," therefore delaying orders from the highest levels instructing civilian and military units to coordinate efforts. While the response to the Sichuan earthquake was impressively swift, however, China's track record in quickly identifying and appropriately assessing other types of crises (think SARS or the Songhua spill for recent examples) has been poor and there is no indication that existing bottom-up reporting mechanisms will perform any better in the event of growing numbers of North Koreans crossing the border. The likelihood of local-level officials covering up incidents or choosing not to report problems to their superiors is significant.

Once a crisis is identified, however, coordination between civil and military authorities can be expected to be achieved through *ad hoc* working groups, as in the Sichuan earthquake

⁸⁵ Official Chinese government webpage on People's Armed Police (PAP) in English, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194480.htm>.

⁸⁶ Mulvenon (2008): 4

⁸⁷ Zhou Fang, "China Moves To Prevent Epidemic Disease in Quake Areas," *Xinhua*, May 21, 2008.

disaster. As noted, civilian working groups focused on specific aspects of the relief effort were established under the Premier-led “Headquarters for Resisting Earthquake and Providing Disaster Relief,” which operated as an emergency command center. PAP and PLA organizations were assigned to a number of these working groups. Both the PAP (Sichuan contingent) and members of the PLA’s Chengdu Military Region were assigned to the emergency management and relief group; the PAP and PLA’s General Logistics Department worked together with civilian agencies on the sanitation and epidemic prevention group; the PLA’s General Staff Department’s Operations Department served on the water resources group; and the PAP was assigned to the public order group with such ministries as education, justice, and the People’s Bank of China.⁸⁸

Military planning for disasters is secretive, in contrast to civilian plans which are more widely distributed. It is assumed that the frameworks for military plans have been shared with civilian authorities, though there is little available evidence to prove or disprove this assumption. That said, some Chinese military disaster plans have been selectively shared with military counterparts from other countries, demonstrating that they are detailed and comprehensive, going so far as to allocate specific tasks to individual units in specific scenarios. For example, portions of some plans include units being identified and tasked with undertaking reconnaissance, damage assessment, repair and security for key installations, such as power and chemical plants. Transportation units, including helicopter units, are assigned to ferry personnel to and from the identified sites, indicating that planning for expected events, particularly earthquakes and storms, has been quite extensive.⁸⁹

Recent disasters have demonstrated that military and civilian units work side by side in certain circumstances, demonstrating that coordination is indeed taking place. For example, during the Sichuan earthquake, there are various reports of PAP and PLA medical units working with civilian aid teams assembled by hospitals, embedding military doctors within the clinics established by civilian medical units. Likewise, during the snow storms of 2008, civilian engineers worked with PLA and PAP units to repair downed power lines and clear rail lines. Whether these joint civil-military operations were pre-planned or timely marriages of convenience is unclear. In the event of a humanitarian crisis involving large numbers of North Korean refugees, a high-degree of civil-military coordination would likely be a necessary component for success in addressing the crisis. PAP and Public Security units would likely work together to share community-level intelligence and ensure that adequate forces are deployed to ensure law and order. Likewise, civil and military medical and engineering teams would likely be obliged to coordinate or pool resources in order to carry out their respective missions.

Because so little is known about planning for North Korean refugee contingencies, it is likely that any plans in existence are closely held secrets and not widely shared between civilian and military authorities.

⁸⁸ Apparent text of “Circular on Formation of Working Groups of State Council’s General Headquarters for Earthquake Control, Disaster Relief” *Xinhua Domestic Service*, May 19, 2008 (*World News Connection*).

⁸⁹ Interviews; Washington, DC, November 2008.

Disaster Relief and the Role of Local-level Governments

When a disaster strikes in China, the provincial government is often the administrative organ with the most tangible resources at hand, in close proximity to an unfolding crisis. Provincial governments generally have large staff rosters and can draw upon lower-level government human and materiel resources, such as those from city (*shi* 市) or prefecture (*zhou* 州), or counties (*xian* 县). Like the premier, who is in charge of the State Council in Beijing, the Governor of a province directly controls the various departments at the provincial level and is responsible for coordinating with and supporting administrators at lower-levels in the political hierarchy to mobilize local resources to conduct relief work. This is known as “unified leadership of the provincial government” (在省政府统一领导下).

In the event of a declared, large natural disaster, the provincial government would set up a disaster relief headquarters. A commander-in-chief would be appointed, likely a governor or vice governor, depending upon the situation and class of disaster. Deputy commanders would be drawn from government departments with relevant expertise specific to the task at hand. For example, the provincial office of flood control, or the earthquake disaster office could provide leaders to act as deputies in the case of those types of natural disasters. While plans for a humanitarian disaster have not been published, it is likely that deputy directors in a refugee crisis would be appointed from the Civil Affairs and Public Security bureaus. Generally, the disaster relief headquarters would be set up under the Civil Affairs Bureau, with responsibility for day-to-day operations under the guidance of the bureau director who acts as the director of the headquarters office.

The provincial headquarters’ responsibility is primarily to unify leadership and command of the relief effort within the province, mobilize and integrate resources and make rapid decisions related to relief work. The provincial headquarters is responsible to request central government or extra-provincial support and to mobilize and command military units, including the army, armed police and local reserve units. The headquarters convenes technical experts and uses impact assessment results to make decisions and allocate resources. Lastly, the headquarters is the consolidation point for data collection and the only body authorized to report information to higher authorities or the public via the media. The provincial leaders, working through the headquarters staff can be expected to utilize existing plans to divide responsibilities and work among provincial and subordinate organizations, grouping them into teams based on area of responsibility.

Provincial-level Working Groups and their Roles and Responsibilities

According to Jilin provincial planning guidelines, 35 government bureaus and private sector entities under the control of the provincial government are designated as “members” of the disaster relief headquarters that may be established in the event of an emergency. Those bureaus are assigned responsibilities in core areas and are expected to coordinate with other bureaus having similar and complimentary duties in “working groups” (工作组). Standard procedure is to form eight working groups, though it is likely that sub-groups can be formed to address specialized needs or situations. The eight standard groups are; the

disaster assessment group (灾情搜集评估组); relief, resettlement, transfer group (救援和转移安置组); engineering and rescue group (工程抢险组); victims' needs group (灾民生活物资保障组); law and order group (治安保卫组); medical and public health group (医疗卫生组); reconstruction group (恢复重建组); information dissemination group (宣传报道组).

Disaster assessment group (灾情搜集评估组)

Disaster assessment team members: Agriculture Committee, Civil Affairs Bureau, Water Resources Bureau, the Office of Land Resources, Forestry Bureau, Meteorological Bureau, Seismological Bureau, and the Animal Husbandry Bureau.

The members of this group are responsible for collecting and reporting to headquarters information about the disaster, assessing the losses and damages and determining what the impact of the disaster is on the local economy and individual households. Each of the provincial bureaus on this team have responsibility for tasks in rural areas in normal times, giving them experience and networks that reach beyond the major urban centers where government presence is stronger.

In the area close to the DPRK border, it is likely that refugees will seek to hide in rural districts as well as rugged mountains and forested areas. This team will likely play a role in determining where refugees are aggregating and assessing the conditions. These bureaus' connections with farmers in rural communities will provide valuable intelligence about the scope and impact of the humanitarian crisis during an initial assessment phase.

Relief, resettlement, transfer group (救援和转移安置组)

Relief, resettlement and transfer group members: The provincial military authority, People's Armed Police Corps, Water Resources Bureau, Civil Affairs Bureau, and the Provincial Justice Bureau.

This group is responsible to protect government and personal property within and remove people from an affected area. Because disaster planning scenarios in China most often focus on earthquakes and floods, mass dislocation of the population is carefully planned for, as is urban search and rescue for survivors in collapsed structures.

In the humanitarian crisis scenario, PLA and PAP soldiers will play a key role in controlling refugees and form the logistical backbone for moving refugees to areas for permanent settlement. The Justice Bureau will address legal issues, including, when warranted, incarceration in prisons managed by the Bureau.

Engineering and rescue group (工程抢险组)

Engineering and rescue group members: The provincial military authority, People's Armed Police Corps, the provincial people's air-defense office, the Water Resources bureau, the

Communication Bureau, the Construction Bureau, Communications Authority, the provincial Power Company Corporation, the provincial Civil Aviation Authority, China Southern Airlines Group Jilin Branch, and the Changchun, Jilin and Tonghua branches of the Shenyang Railway Bureau.

This group is in charge of water conservancy, electric power, telecommunications, water supply, roads, gas supply, drainage and other infrastructure repairs, particularly in the case of a destructive natural disaster. Rail and aviation authorities would ensure the capacity to transport personnel and materiel to and from the disaster area. Note that in China, the Communication Bureau is responsible for administering and overseeing transportation links, while the Communications Authority is under the Ministry of Information Industry and is responsible for supervision of the telecommunications industry and infrastructure. In March 2008, the government announced that the Ministry of Communications, Civil Aviation Administration and the State Postal Bureau would be merged into a new Ministry of Transportation. At the provincial level, the names have not yet been changed, and it is unclear if the provincial Civil Aviation authority will act autonomously as a member of the working group, or be represented by the Communication (Transport) Bureau, much the way the Centers for Disease Control are represented by the Health Bureau on other working groups.

Victims' needs group (灾民生活物资保障组)

Victims' needs group members: The Economic and Trade Commission, Office inner-provincial trade, Finance Bureau, Civil Affairs Bureau, Grain Bureau, the Civil Aviation Authority, China Southern Airlines Group Jilin Branch, the provincial Red Cross chapter, and the provincial Charity Federation.

As its name applies, the members of this group are responsible for addressing the immediate needs of disaster-stricken people, particularly food, clothing and shelter materials. Just as in a natural disaster, a humanitarian crisis involving refugees will create the need for the delivery of basic necessities to displaced persons.

Law and order group (治安保卫组)

Law and order group members: Provincial Public Security Bureau, the provincial Armed Police Corps.

The PSB and People's Armed Police (PAP) are the primary organs in charge of protecting lives and property, preventing criminal acts, such as looting or other illegal activities. The PAP is a paramilitary police force with different branches having different chains of command. While some bureaus of the PAP are in the PLA chain of command structure, a portion of the PAP is commanded by Public Security Ministry and Bureau authorities, so for the purposes of this study, we will consider them a civilian, rather than military organization. Law and order is one of the primary concerns in any disaster scenario, particularly one involving large numbers of refugees from the DPRK, many of whom are

potentially destitute or starving. Community policing and specialized units trained to manage large-scale public gatherings will undoubtedly play a major role in any scenario.

Provincial disaster planning documents do not describe a role for the Ministry of State Security (MSS) provincial branches. However, it can be assumed that MSS officers will work closely with provincial authorities to ensure that state secrets are protected and intelligence on any evolving situation is carefully gathered. For example, MSS agents might be responsible for tracking and contacting any senior-level DPRK officials, or South Koreans who might enter the country.

Medical and public health group (医疗卫生组)

Medical and public health group members: The Health Bureau, the provincial Food and Drug Administration and the provincial Red Cross chapter.

This group is responsible for providing medical treatment to victims of disasters as well as emergency rescue personnel and other responders. It is responsible for preventing epidemics from spreading, mostly through public hygiene works, such as ensuring sanitary conditions in camps for displaced persons and responders, as well as appropriate disposition of human remains. Disease reporting is a key function of public health authorities, who have invested significant resources into infectious disease reporting infrastructure following the 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). Likewise, this group will ensure that an adequate supply of medicines is available and dispensed appropriately. Non-governmental organizations will be coordinated by the Chinese Red Cross and NGOs controlled by the Health Bureau. This would include coordination and distribution of donated medicines and medical equipment. The bureaucratic reorganization of 2008 in which the State Food and Drug Administration was rejoined to the Ministry of Health will have a limited impact on the work of this group. The provincial Health Bureau will undoubtedly mobilize its other subsidiary units as well, including hospitals and clinics, government owned medical enterprises, the Centers for Disease Control and anti-epidemic stations.

Reconstruction group (恢复重建组)

Reconstruction group members: Provincial Development and Planning Commission, the provincial people's air-defense office, Civil Affairs Bureau, Water Resources Bureau, Communication Bureau (Transportation), Construction Bureau, Justice Bureau, Education Bureau, Communications Authority, the Provincial Power Company Limited, Civil Aviation Authority, Shenyang Railway Bureau's Changchun, Jilin, and Tonghua branches.

The members of this group are responsible for re-building physical infrastructure in the disaster areas. This includes short-term fixes and long-term rebuilding of housing, transportation networks, water systems, telecommunications and other infrastructure. Public buildings, including schools, hospitals, prisons and other government structures would be repaired or rebuilt by the members of this group, along with other structures and systems necessary to promote the return to pre-disaster economic and social order.

Information dissemination group (宣传报道组)

Made up of the Provincial Party Committee Propaganda Department, the Provincial Government Information Office and the Provincial Foreign Affairs Office, the information dissemination group is responsible for media management, holding press conferences, issuing media reports and censoring news outlets to “ensure a correct understanding” of the situation. The members of this group would also manage visiting journalists’ accreditations and communicate guidelines for reporting on particular topics, especially subjects the government considers particularly sensitive.

All of the above working groups are designed to ensure coordination amongst the members, and also to facilitate dissemination of political and technical response directives from higher authorities, including the governor’s office and central government authorities. Likewise, the members of the groups are expected to pass along guidance and instructions to their subsidiary organs that have been mobilized to address a particular crisis. In some cases, sub groups can be formed under the guidance of the above groups, directing more specialized resources to the effort.

For instance, under the information dissemination group, a sub-group can be formed to deal with media and press activities. In addition to the three leading members, the radio and television bureau, Civil Affairs bureau, provincial TV and radio stations would coordinate to manage media matters. That sub-group would generate “internal guidance” (指导对内) to editors at papers and broadcasters, authorize press releases, track local and domestic public opinion, and work with “organizations that guide public opinion” (组织舆论引导).⁹⁰ Likewise, under the medical and public health group, separate sub-groups likely would be formed to address different issues, such as medical treatment which involves hospitals, and public hygiene involving the CDCs and infectious disease hospitals.

Each of these groups would most likely respond to a DPRK humanitarian disaster drawing upon experience and frameworks established in their regular disaster planning processes. While much of the planning and experience at provincial and prefecture levels has focused on floods, earthquakes, typhoons and snowstorms, response groups would undoubtedly adapt to a DPRK humanitarian crisis unfolding on Chinese soil based on regular assessments of the unfolding crisis, guided primarily by directives from higher authorities and data collected locally. Of course, significant adaptations are likely, due to the complexities added by the political sensitivities as articulated by Beijing, and the fact that in all likelihood, many affected individuals will not be Chinese citizens and on Chinese territory with uncertain legal status

⁹⁰ 《吉林省突发公共事件新闻发布应急预案》，吉林市人民政府办公厅。

Provincial Bureaus and Organizations with Responsibility for Emergencies and Disaster Relief

In an emergency situation, the provincial government will mobilize key bureaus to respond to a disaster or crisis situation according to various contingency plans that have been developed by provincial authorities to divide responsibility and clarify roles. This section will identify some of the key duties assigned to provincial-level organs.

Provincial Military District

While this report does not focus on the role of the military, it is important to underscore that the People's Liberation Army and the People's Armed Police play a vital and central role in any emergency contingency. Known in Party jargon as the "backbone of the assault force" (骨干突击力量), the PLA and the PAP can rapidly commit large numbers of personnel, many with specialized training, as well as deploy equipment and materiel to address major incidents and events.⁹¹ Provincial-level military authorities are expected to organize a command in affected areas, mobilize and command reserve troops, local militia forces, whose responsibilities include defense of China's frontiers in peacetime and coordinate with local authorities and appropriate necessary materiel from civilian and military sources. Likewise, military commanders are expected to mobilize specialized units, such as local military academies, in certain circumstances when additional manpower is needed to support military and civilian responses.

Provincial People's Armed Police Corps

While the People's Armed Police Corps is often referred to as "military police," key branches of the PAP are actually under the direct command and authority of civilian authorities, primarily the Ministry of Public Security and its local bureaus. Provincial civilian authorities therefore have authority to command several key branches of the PAP, including border patrol, internal security and fire fighting units, among others. In the event of a human security disaster involving DPRK refugees in Jilin, PAP units would be responsible for law and order functions, such as suppressing any riots and protecting property and relief supplies from looters. They would also be responsible for managing large numbers of displaced persons, operating camps, and transferring victims and displaced persons out of affected areas.

Propaganda Bureau

The provincial Propaganda Bureau is a Communist Party department that answers directly to the provincial party committee and is responsible for coordinating reports from various responding agencies, creating internal reports for senior officials and monitoring media outlets. A key function of the bureau is to provide guidance to print, TV and radio editors

⁹¹ "受权发布:国家突发公共事件总体应急预案," Xinhua, 2006年01月08.

about approved and banned topics. Because it is a party department, it has considerable influence in policy-setting and oversight of government departments and companies.

A traditionally strong government agency staffed by loyal party members, it faced significant challenges controlling domestic media reporting about the Sichuan earthquake in 2008 during the first weeks following the disaster. Chinese media outlets defied orders from the bureau to only report using officially sanctioned information released by government departments and Xinhua news agency. Government leaders consider information control to be a critical function during a crisis situation, and within any work group responsible for information dissemination, the propaganda bureau is first among equals.

It is also worth noting that the provincial propaganda bureau's international liaison department likely maintains contacts with counterparts in the North Korean Worker's Party, establishing a possible communications link in time of a crisis.⁹²

Provincial Information Office and Foreign Office

Within the governor's office of every province is an information office and a foreign affairs office, which are often co-located. Jilin province is no exception. As its name implies, the information office is responsible for releasing official information to the media including international outlets and houses the provincial spokesperson. The foreign affairs office is a provincial version of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsible for coordinating the province's external relations. In the case of a natural disaster or humanitarian crisis, the foreign affairs office and the information office would host and escort foreign journalists, likely in well choreographed tours. These offices would collect feedback on foreign reporting of provincial affairs and in many instances provide a clipping service to provincial officials.

Provincial Development Planning Commission

The Provincial Development Planning Commission is in charge of making arrangements and coordinating all aspects of disaster relief planning including allocation of relief funds, major infrastructure investments or other capital projects for prevention or reconstruction efforts. The planning commission sets the terms for budgets for provincial-level projects as well as provincial departments. Considered *primus inter pares* among other provincial bureaus, the planning commission has tremendous clout through its role as budget maker. In situations where multiple ministries share jurisdiction and a compromise on a potential difference can not be achieved, the planning commission's convening power is leveraged to bring the various government stakeholders to the table in an attempt to reach a compromise solution.

⁹² David Shambaugh, "China's "Quiet Diplomacy": The International Department of the Chinese Communist Party," *China: An International Journal*, (Volume 5.1, March 2007): 26-54.

Provincial Economic and Trade Commission

The Provincial Economic and Trade Commission is responsible for the coordination of departments in charge of railways, post and telecommunications, electricity, businesses, raw materials and medicines. In a disaster relief scenario, they would play a coordinating role ensuring that government corporations under different departments, private companies and government bureaus contribute to government-directed efforts.

Provincial Education Bureau

In the event of a disaster, resuming normal teaching activities in a timely fashion is a top government priority. China's education system is extremely goal oriented, with each level focused on preparing students to pass tests to enter the next level, all the way to university. If students in one area are affected by a disruption of some sort, the future of large numbers of students can potentially be compromised. Traditional Chinese values also place great emphasis on investing heavily in children's education as a means for advancement, not only of the individual child, but often the family or community as well, making rapid resumption of normal teaching cycles a political necessity for officials. Furthermore, the resumption of classes is a tangible indication to the local population that the government is addressing a crisis situation and firmly in control.

In the midst of a humanitarian crisis, the education department would play a role in coordinating resources and making school and university campuses available to government responders for use as staging areas for relief goods or displaced persons or temporary housing for relief workers.

Provincial Public Security Bureau

The Provincial Public Security Bureau has primary responsibility for maintaining domestic security, particularly law and order during a crisis. Just as in normal times, the bureau and its subsidiary departments at all levels of government down to community policing stations are responsible for preventing illegal activities and "crack downs" on crime.

Public Security Bureaus include unarmed community police forces and traffic police, as well as investigative divisions and counter-narcotics divisions. The PSB also includes armed detachments, known as "special police" and units similar to SWAT teams in the United States which are highly trained in counter-terrorism and "direct action" missions such as hostage rescue. Like their counterparts in the U.S., Chinese police also operate toll-free emergency numbers to report crime and summon officers. Unlike most U.S. police forces, Chinese PSB is also responsible for household registration, issuing identification cards with unique identifier numbers to all citizens, issuing entry and exit visas for Chinese citizens and long-term residence permits for foreigners. Police bureaus also are responsible for monitoring the internet for subversive or otherwise inappropriate content.

The provincial police bureau also oversees the provincial police academy and administrative detention centers such as drug detoxification centers. Facilities such as these could potentially be utilized in a humanitarian crisis much the same way that school campuses can be used, but most likely for particularly sensitive issues, or housing displaced persons involved in violent or criminal activities.

Under PSB authority are a number of specialized commands referred to as People's Armed Police (PAP). These include fire brigade detachments, border guards, and domestic security units. These units are related to PAP detachments that are directly under the control of military authorities. There is clearly joint interoperability between the detachments under these different commands, but generally speaking, the PSB-controlled PAP units are distinct and separate from units under the PLA.

Local Public Security and Relations with Civil Authorities

Public security units in border areas are under a special command (边防总队) and would play a critical role in stopping North Koreans from entering Chinese territory. Various units responsible for border activity not only man check points at official border crossings and operate networked databases of border crossers, they also operate in areas well back from the actual border in counties and "border villages." Among this population, they conduct community policing activities, including propaganda and outreach in communities near the border to gather intelligence, educate citizens, discourage illegal crossing and smuggling.⁹³ In some circumstances, PSB authorities also engage in promoting economic growth among communities in the border area, through microfinance and public works projects. Undoubtedly, these efforts which generate income for citizens buy the PSB clout and access to information from the community. This is likely particularly valuable when PSB units are tasked with actively seeking to identify, and when required, detain illegal border crossers from North Korea who reside in the province.

As previously mentioned, key branches of the People's Armed Police are under the authority of provincial public security officials. PAP soldiers often operate closely with their PSB counterparts in a variety of situations. For crisis situations, PAP officers play a major role in crowd control, responding to riots and mass incidents (群体事件). PAP officers also guard prison facilities operated by the justice ministry, and PAP officers are called in to quell uprisings in PSB administered detention centers. As noted, specialized branches of the PSB also guard important installations, including bridges, hydropower plants, gold mines and military bases.

Like their PSB counterparts, a PAP division is responsible for guarding the border, including manning crossing points and patrolling border regions. In any crisis scenario involving large numbers of border crossers entering Jilin province, PSB and PAP officers would be the most important civilian units in terms of manpower, capability and proximity.

⁹³ "通报吉林公安边防部门服务地方经济建设相关情况和十六项措施的有关情况," 吉林省公安厅, 2008-08-06. See also: "白山边防支队架起警民连心桥推动爱民固边战略稳步发展," 吉林省公安厅, 2008-10-21.

Civil Affairs Bureau

The Civil Affairs Bureau is the primary department assigned responsibility to coordinate the province's disaster relief efforts. This includes preparing plans, arranging training for its staff and the staff of other agencies. The bureau and its departments of disaster response are responsible for opening, equipping and staffing emergency crisis headquarters under the aegis of the provincial governor. It also is responsible for preparing for all of the "material needs of potential victims" ("储备灾民生活所需的紧急救援物资"), including stockpiling tents, food, water and medicine as well as enacting evacuation and temporary resettlement plans. The bureau supervises and inspects all relief work, collects and disburses relief funds, and coordinates the efforts of all domestic and international agencies that donate materiel or personnel. Furthermore, they assemble data for reports to the governor's office and release authorized reports to the media.

Key organizations managed by the Ministry of Civil Affairs at the central government level would coordinate closely with provincial level civil affairs bureaus, providing guidance and support. Those organs include the China National Center for Disaster Reduction, the office of the National Committee for Disaster Reduction, the National Office of Unified Coordination for Disaster Management and the Department of Disasters and Social Relief within the Ministry of Civil Affairs.

The provincial bureau of civil affairs would play the central role in a disaster or humanitarian crisis within Jilin province. As the key link between the central government and officials in the affected area, the provincial civil affairs bureau in Changchun would act as a hub coordinating all incoming and outgoing information and material resources.

In addition to the 10 or so warehouses around the country stockpiling relief goods for the central government, Jilin Province operates its own "Relief Supplies Reserve Center" (救灾物资储备中心) in the provincial capital, Changchun. A new 3458 square meter facility was constructed in 2002 at a cost of RMB 18,000,000 (US\$2.57 million) to house the province's disaster relief and poverty alleviation materials. By 2003, the warehouse was incorporated into a US\$5.5 million, 12,000 square meter complex containing the general office of the Civil Affairs Bureau, the provincial Disaster Reduction Center, a community service center and a training center for provincial civil affairs cadres. A year later, the bureau invested an additional US\$1.4 million to construct a 3,630 square meter injury rehabilitation and prosthetics center.⁹⁴

The relief supplies reserve system has done double duty not only for disaster relief materials stockpiling, but also as a collections center for donated materials later given to impoverished residents. Senior leaders at each level of government traditionally give gifts to the poor as part of "poverty alleviation" efforts. In cold climates, such as Jilin province, quilts, winter coats and other clothing are common items for senior officials to distribute to

⁹⁴ 《充分发挥财务职能作用 全面服务民政事业发展》，董洪志，
http://www1.mca.gov.cn/artical/content/WGJ_XXJL/200743162253.html

poor urban and rural residents. These donations generally occur prior to major holidays, especially the Spring Festival (Chinese New Year), when red envelopes with small cash payments are also distributed. Often such donations are symbolic and ceremonial, rather than a sustained and scaled up program that addresses the root causes of poverty, with campaigns given titles such as “Sending Warmth and Love” (“送温暖、献爱心”).

Despite the exploitation of poverty alleviation donation programs for propaganda purposes, the scale of many poverty relief donations is reportedly quite large, (12 truck loads hauling hundreds of thousands of quilts and coats in one annual report), demonstrating that significant volumes of goods are being donated to the government and then distributed to the needy. According to the provincial civil affairs annual report, from December 1, 2005 to January 31, 2006, throughout the province they received donations of over 2,636,000 pieces of clothing, comprising 520,000 quilts, 390,000 cotton coats, 665,000 quilted pants, 350,000 wool pants, 266,000 flannel pants, 156,000 down jackets, and 289,000 other items of clothing. This indicates that storage and logistics capacity at government facilities is significant, at least for surge events, as is the province’s ability to collect significant volumes of cold-weather relief supplies.⁹⁵ This capacity came into play when the province marshaled resources in support of the Sichuan earthquake. Within two weeks of the disaster, the provincial civil affairs bureau reported receiving over RMB 405 million in cash and RMB 166 million worth of supplies and shipping 200,000 articles of clothing.⁹⁶

Consistent with government regulations governing disaster relief materials, major urban centers also operate storage facilities which supplement centers operated by national and provincial authorities.⁹⁷ These facilities are used to collect donations made by organizations within the city or county, as well as store relief materials for future allocation by local level officials. Yanbian prefecture operates a center which was recently used to collect donations for the Sichuan earthquake, while major cities in the province, such as the provincial capital, Changchun, have their own facilities which are staffed and funded by city authorities in accordance with their own budgets and plans.⁹⁸

The Civil Affairs Bureau’s responsibility in a humanitarian crisis caused by displaced North Koreans in Jilin would likely be similar to its role in a natural disaster affecting Chinese citizens, whether within Jilin’s jurisdiction or elsewhere in the country. It will undoubtedly take the lead in mobilizing and coordinating all national, provincial and local resources allocated to the mission.

⁹⁵ See: “开展“冬衣暖人心、关爱进万家”救灾捐助活动，确保灾民困难户温暖过冬,”省民政厅, 中共吉林省直属机关工作委员会. See also: “省直机关社会捐助活动发送仪式举行,” 吉林日报, December 7, 2007. See also: “省食品药品监督管理局开展“送温暖、献爱心”社会捐助活动,” 省食品药品监督管理局, November 24, 2006.

⁹⁶ “吉林省支援地震灾区捐赠接收情况,” 吉林省民政厅, 2008年5月30日.

⁹⁷ 《救灾捐赠管理暂行办法》, 吉林省民政厅, 撰写时间: 2005-07-06, 发布时间: 2008-06-30.

⁹⁸ “长春市5年内重点建设101个民生项目,” 吉林省人民政府, 2008-01-07.

Justice Bureau

The Justice Bureau is responsible for prisons and detention facilities. It also transfers prisoners and officers between facilities. The People's Armed Police provides security at prisons operated by the bureau, highlighting the close relationship and supporting role that PAP units play for civilian counterparts.

Like other public facilities, prisons and other detention facilities would play an important role in a humanitarian crisis. The bureau would be responsible to cope with large numbers of detainees in the event of mass unrest or widespread banditry caused by a massive influx of desperate North Koreans. Temporary processing and holding facilities would be organized by the bureau, working closely with People's Armed Police and public security departments. Likewise, the justice bureau would work to process criminal cases involving North Koreans. In particular, it would be involved in liaison work with DPRK authorities to adjudicate cases of displaced persons who might be escapees from DPRK prisons and camps, and possibly facilitate repatriation of DPRK citizens in the Chinese detention system.

The Finance Bureau

The finance bureau is responsible for raising disaster relief funds from existing budgets and other current account sources, managing disaster relief funds that are allocated to the province by the central government and auditing and supervising the expenditure of all funds. While funds are most often allocated by the planning commission and in the case of an emergency the provincial authorities in charge, the finance bureau plays a critical role getting resources to the affected areas and units quickly.

Bureau of Land and Resources

The land and resources bureau is primarily responsible for geological disaster monitoring and reporting. It is unlikely to play a significant role in a humanitarian crisis involving North Koreans. That said, in some cases, its some of its resources might be appropriated, such as supplies or other resources earmarked for a mass casualty event.

Construction Bureau

The construction bureau is responsible for ensuring that infrastructure is adequate to address a disaster. Much of the available planning focuses on earthquake scenarios, where equipment, materials and engineers would be needed in large quantities at short notice to repair water, gas and sewage pipes, fix roads and other urban infrastructure.

In the event of a humanitarian or public health crisis, the construction bureau would muster its forces to build temporary facilities to house workers and displaced persons alike, provide medical treatment, sanitation and food services.

Communications Bureau

The Communications Bureau is primarily responsible for transportation infrastructure, including maintaining roads, waterways and other facilities. The bureau would be responsible for ensuring road and water access to the affected area, and appropriating vehicles for the delivery of emergency supplies and transport responders and victims.

Agriculture Commission

The provincial agriculture commission is in charge of collecting data and reporting to higher authorities about conditions in the countryside. Its focus in a crisis would be principally on how an emerging crisis potentially threatens farmers and their livelihood, referred to as the “means of production” in rural areas, including as crops and animals. The agriculture commission is specifically tasked with leading the interagency process to develop disaster plans for responding to snow storms, and takes the lead in implementing relief and development programs in rural areas, particularly projects that restore agricultural production. Specialized subsidiary units provide veterinary services, fodder management and other extension services to farmers and their livestock, in order to mitigate the affects of a disaster and stimulate the rural economy.

In the event of a crisis involving North Korean refugees, the Agriculture Commission, through its network of experts in rural issues and local-level service providers would play an important role in the assessment phase of a crisis, identifying the impact of large numbers of displaced persons in rural areas and providing intelligence back to higher levels. Additionally, the commission would be in a position to release rations from its food stores and purchase relief materials and food from Chinese farmers to help feed large numbers of displaced persons and assembled relief workers.

Water Resources Bureau

The Water Resources Bureau is responsible for water management, flood monitoring and reporting, as well as implementing the plan for flood prevention. Primarily focused on assessment and reporting, it is not a primary responder for a humanitarian crisis situation.

Forestry Bureau

The provincial Forestry Bureau is responsible for managing provincial forestry resources. This includes exploiting forest resources including selling lumber rights and investing in ventures which utilize forest lands and lumber. In northeastern provinces, including Jilin, forests comprise a significant portion of the provincial geography, making the forestry bureau well funded and well staffed. For disaster planning and response, it focuses largely on preventing and fighting forest fires, working closely with specially trained PAP fire brigades. In addition, it is tasked with evacuating and resettling citizens affected by disasters in territory under their jurisdiction. In the case of a North Korean crisis scenario, forest bureau resources and stockpiled material could be allocated to a relief effort involving displaced persons.

Reportedly, many North Korean refugees are already in hiding in and near forested areas in Jilin province.⁹⁹ The forestry bureau could play an active role accounting for refugees currently avoiding detection in land under forest bureau jurisdiction. A possible opportunity exists for the bureau to provide social services (including shelter, food and medical care) for refugees already in hiding in China, which would encourage voluntary participation in programs, such as work-for-food and shelter programs. North Koreans could provide their labor to help with forest and trail maintenance and other government-sponsored projects. Or course, this would require great sensitivity and political acuity to avoid the perception of exploitation as well as overcome participants' fears of persecution or forced repatriation to the DPRK where they face severe punishment. It is impossible for the forest bureau to act alone to establish such a project properly and would require extensive coordination with higher authorities and possibly technical support from outside agencies.

The Health Bureau

The Health Bureau is primarily responsible for providing for the health needs of citizens affected by a crisis, including victims and responders. Medical emergency teams are recruited from hospitals and clinics to provide medical treatment, using existing medical facilities as well as setting up temporary facilities for triage and first aid. A vital responsibility is preventing epidemics by establishing good hygiene conditions, including providing for clean water supplies, waste water, food safety and active disinfecting of contaminated areas. The Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC) and anti-epidemic stations at prefecture, county and township levels provide the personnel and expertise for this responsibility. Additionally, the CDC monitors for infectious disease outbreaks that can be triggered by a humanitarian crisis situation (particularly cholera and typhoid), and reports on infectious disease cases to higher authorities. Following the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, the central and provincial governments made massive investments in the CDC system down to the county level. This includes infrastructure in physical plants, equipment and human resources to improve identification and diagnosis of diseases, and also massive investments in telecommunications equipment and networked systems to improve disease reporting to higher levels.

Following the reorganization of the State Council in 2008, the central government State Food and Drug Administration was incorporated into the Ministry of Health. It is expected that provincial food and drug administrations (FDA) will be incorporated into provincial health bureaus as subordinate organizations, similar to the CDC. While implementation of that reorganization is taking place at different rates across the country, the FDA's role in a disaster situation is primarily to ensure the adequate supply and quality of emergency medicines and equipment. Under the guidance of the health bureau, the FDA will also coordinate the delivery and allocation of foreign and domestic donations of medical products.

⁹⁹ Testimony of Joel Charny to Congressional-Executive Commission on China, April 19, 2004.

The health condition of North Koreans is assumed to be particularly poor, as are the supposed health conditions of North Koreans in hiding on the Chinese side of the border. A rapid influx of North Koreans would therefore pose a particular health risk to both the civilian and military population in China. Tuberculosis infection in the DPRK is also believed to be quite high (as high as 5% by some estimates), posing particular risk to Chinese when they come in contact in large numbers.¹⁰⁰ This high rate of infection will also complicate efforts to aggregate North Koreans in camps, potentially creating new disease vectors among prisoners, dramatically increasing exposure to relief workers.

People's Civil Air-Defense Office

According to the 2006 Defense White Paper published by the Ministry of National Defense, the Civil Air Defense system in China covers approximately 85 percent of major cities. According to the White Paper, "All large and medium-sized cities have protection and rescue contingents for emergency rescue, rush repair, medical aid, fire fighting, maintenance of order, chemical defense, epidemic prevention, communications and transportation." Provincial and local civil air defense departments are a key part of the civilian reserves system, directly under the joint leadership of the civilian government and military commission. The office has a director and deputies, with an appointed liaison officer from the provincial military district headquarters who serves as one of three or more deputy directors. The Jilin provincial Civil Air Defense Office is lightly staffed with approximately 40 full time employees, while the Yanbian prefecture office has less than 15.¹⁰¹

In the event of a humanitarian crisis the civil air defense offices will mobilize the reserves to fill out their ranks. If a mass mobilization effort is called for, this office will likely also direct the efforts of "volunteers," citizens recruited from government departments, state owned enterprises and government affiliated organizations. The civil air defense departments can draw upon local resources, including the many bomb shelters built beneath urban structures and factories, particularly facilities constructed at the height of tensions between China and the Soviet Union in the 1960's and '70's when Chairman Mao exhorted the people to, "Dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony; be prepared against war, be prepared against natural disasters, and do everything for the people."¹⁰²

Food and Grain Bureau

The provincial Food and Grain Bureau maintains reserves of strategic foodstuffs. In the event of a humanitarian disaster, the bureau would be responsible for maintaining a supply of rice, other grains, oil and salt and ensure their continued supply throughout the crisis.

¹⁰⁰ Stephen Glain, "Giving Until It Hurts," *The Washington Post*, March 9, 2008.

¹⁰¹ See: China Defense White Paper 2006, VI. National Defense Mobilization and Reserve Force, Civil Air Defense. PLA Daily, January 15, 2007. See also: 吉林省人民防空办公室职能配置、内设机构和人员编制规定(吉政办发[2000]54号) and 延边朝鲜族自治州人民政府办公室文件, 延州政办发[2005]13号.

¹⁰² See: 毛泽东提出"深挖洞, 广积粮, 不称霸"(1972年) and 中共党史上的80句口号(46) * "备战、备荒、为人民"

Animal Husbandry Bureau

In the event of a disaster, the Animal Husbandry Bureau would assess the damage to livestock and report to higher authorities the economic and social impact from the losses. This is particularly relevant in a snow disaster, which affects pastoral animals, but also relevant in a public or animal health crisis. In the event of a humanitarian crisis involving North Korean refugees, the bureau would play a limited role, but possibly contribute its knowledge of rural conditions to assist planning and relief efforts.

Provincial Trade Office

The provincial trade office is responsible for regulating inner-provincial trade. In the event of a disaster, it would contribute to the effort to procure local relief goods, particularly food and other immediate needs. It would also coordinate efforts to mobilize local transportation teams to assist with transferring emergency supplies to affected areas.

Meteorological Bureau

The meteorological bureau is responsible for weather forecasting and relaying relevant information to higher authorities. It also participates in assessment efforts, particularly in the event of a weather-related disaster such as a snow storm or typhoon. In the event of a humanitarian crisis involving North Korean refugees, which could take place in the depth of winter when wild food is scarce and the Tumen and Yalu rivers freeze over facilitating escape from the DPRK, forecasts would be critical for determining appropriate responses and directing specific cold-weather relief materials.

Seismological Bureau

The seismological bureau is in charge of earthquake disaster monitoring, damage surveys and engineering standards for construction. It will have little function in a humanitarian crisis scenario.

Communications Authority

The Provincial Communications Authority is responsible for all aspects of telecommunications. In the event of a disaster or humanitarian crisis, it will be responsible for ensuring that communications infrastructure is functional, particularly for command authorities.

Civil Aviation Authority and China Southern Group Jilin Branch

The Provincial Civil Aviation Authority and the China Southern Group Jilin Branch is responsible for managing civilian airport facilities in the province. In the event of an earthquake, it would be responsible for making emergency repairs to airport facilities, as well as facilitate the delivery of relief supplies by air. The airport authorities would

provide resources to a relief effort, including cargo storage and staging areas for relief goods, cargo handling equipment and transport vehicles. In a humanitarian disaster scenario, airport facilities could also serve as staging areas and temporary shelter for relief workers and even displaced persons in extreme circumstances.

Power Company

The provincial power company's role is to ensure adequate and reliable power supply to areas affected by a disaster. For a natural disaster or in case of sabotage, the company would be responsible for making emergency repairs. Electricity distribution is particularly vital not only for critical facilities, such as headquarters and hospitals, but also for transport networks, because many of China's rail lines are electrified and utilize electric engines. Failure of the power grid would paralyze the delivery of non-local relief materials.

Railway Bureau

The various branches and departments of the railway system within the province would play a vital role in allocating rolling stock and rail access to a relief effort. Rails would be utilized to move large numbers of displaced persons, relief workers, including soldiers and armed police units, as well as the large-volume of relief supplies that would come from outside the province, such as the pre-positioned relief supplies managed by the central government at depots in Harbin and Dalian.

The Jilin Red Cross and Jilin Charity Association

The provincial branches of the Red Cross and Charity Association would be the leading government-organized Non Governmental Organizations (GONGOs) responsible for coordinating with all domestic and international relief and charity organizations. They would also receive domestic and international donations of relief goods and establish care centers in affected areas.

While the local Red Cross and Charity Association might be conduits for international aid being donated for a specific disaster, they are not inclined to jointly implement programs in affected areas, or otherwise welcome international relief agencies to do anything other than donate cash and materiel. In the event of a North Korean crisis, the political sensitivity surrounding China-DPRK relations assures that all provincial-level non-governmental organizations will closely follow government guidelines which will restrict foreigners' access to affected areas.

Prefecture-Level Resources

Similar to Jilin province, Yanbian prefecture maintains disaster and crisis management plans, and has a preplanned division of labor for each government department closely mirroring the responsibilities of their provincial-level counterparts. As in all local governments, some departments have greater capacity than others. Human capacity, staffing levels, budget adequacy and access to existing resources will affect individual

department performance to some extent, but otherwise, roles and responsibilities are very similar to provincial ones established elsewhere in this report. Like the province that can direct personnel and appropriate resources from prefectures and municipalities under it, Yanbian prefectural authorities can mobilize subsidiary counties and cities in the event of a crisis.

The prefecture and its counties control considerable fixed assets, including fleets of government-owned and directed vehicles, government buildings and compounds, including schools and other facilities. Additionally, the prefecture supervises a significant public health infrastructure, including numerous hospitals and community clinics, in addition to public health units such as anti-epidemic stations and laboratories staffed by full-time, fully funded public servants. Like Jilin province, Yanbian prefecture civil affairs units maintain centers for the collection and distribution of disaster and poverty relief supplies at the prefecture capital, as well as in several counties.

However, the prefecture-level government differs from the province in that it is the first level of government with effective “community level intelligence” gathered from the counties beneath it. Yanbian prefecture, like other governments at the same level, possesses intimate local-knowledge that often is not directly available to provincial and central government authorities. Prefecture-level officials have significant freedom to oversee activities in the communities in its jurisdiction, whereas provincial authorities often have to make formal requests to visit the prefecture and counties, submitting themselves to carefully orchestrated tours and inspections managed by lower-level authorities. Coupled with the reporting methods that aggregate village/township/county level data into bundles that are passed on to the province, a sanitized perspective can develop at provincial levels, leaving local-level authorities with an often exclusive perspective and unparalleled local intelligence. This gap in local-level intelligence can enable local level officials to pursue parochial interests, potentially without the knowledge or endorsement of higher-level authorities. Conversely, in the event of a humanitarian crisis, this local-level familiarity is vital to mounting an effective response.

In Yanbian’s case, its status as an autonomous Korean prefecture is a reflection of the “ethnic resources” it possesses, particularly its 807,700 Chinese-Koreans, making up approximately 38% of the total population in the prefecture.¹⁰³ These Chinese of Korean descent are a significant advantage in the prefecture’s dealings with both North and South Korea. A common language in particular is a key competitive advantage for Yanbian companies and entrepreneurs as they pursue their business with North and South Koreans, as well as overseas Koreans and overseas Chinese. There are currently approximately 150,000 Korean-Chinese from Yanbian living abroad, with an estimated 50,000 Yanbian Koreans in South Korea, including professionals, workers, trainees, students, and wives of South Korean men. As noted above, most of Yanbian Koreans trace their roots to North Korea, while the remainder has ties to the South.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Yanbian Government Official Website: www.yanbian.gov.cn

¹⁰⁴ Luova (2007): 28.

These connections and a large cadre of Korean speakers in Yanbian offer critical capability to a local-level response to a humanitarian crisis involving large numbers of North Korean refugees. The existence of a large number of Korean-Chinese in Yanbian acts as a magnet for refugees because of the ability to communicate easily and openly with less risk of identification, and also because of a network of sympathizers and extended relations who can provide shelter and aid. While the situation for many North Korean refugees in Jilin province is dire, the “ethnic resources” in Yanbian provide for greater opportunities for refugees than in other parts of China. Additionally, South Korean non-governmental organizations, including church groups, are able to operate more freely in Yanbian because of the lack of a language barrier. In the event of a large-scale humanitarian crisis prompted by a sudden increase in North Korean refugees crossing the border, Korean-speaking Chinese will be indispensable to the government effort to mitigate the consequences. International connections between Yanbian’s Korean-Chinese and overseas Chinese, particularly in South Korea, could be a potential conduit for channeling aid to refugees and assisting in resettlement efforts as well.

Non-Governmental and International Disaster Relief Organizations

In addition to government bodies, other domestic actors such as China’s party and mass organizations like the Chinese Communist Youth League, may use their organizational structures to deliver aid and money to disaster-stricken areas. In addition, China’s Red Cross Society and various domestic and local NGOs could also be mobilized, as they were during the Sichuan earthquake. Donations from businesses and other organizations were an important source of charitable funds for Sichuan earthquake victims, and insurance companies were new players in post-earthquake relief efforts as well.¹⁰⁵ As in other recent large-scale emergencies, trained personnel from hospitals and universities can also be mobilized. Notably, a team of health professionals from Jilin Province’s Yanbian Hospital, who had participated in a disaster preparedness and emergency health training program through a Center for Refugee and Disaster Response (CRDR) project, took part in the Sichuan earthquake relief efforts and were preceded to Sichuan by a PAP border defense unit’s medical team.

The training offered Yanbian medical personnel by CRDR and the contribution of the UNDP mentioned earlier as a lead source of financing for China’s disaster planning effort point to the potential importance of international organizations, both NGOs and multilateral, and to a possible role for foreign governments in relief efforts. China sought international assistance in relief operations for the Sichuan earthquake within two days after the catastrophe. It invited rescue workers from “neighboring countries” to take part within three days after the earthquake, engaging Japanese, Singaporean, Taiwanese and South Korean search and rescue teams (SAR) to assist. While Chinese reports in the months that followed touted the aid that Western NGOs had provided, teams from Western countries were largely restricted from taking part in rescue operations, with official requests limited

¹⁰⁵ . Shi et al, Ibid: 12.

to in-kind contributions of supplies.¹⁰⁶ A United Nations' situation report released two days after the earthquake made the following announcement, "the Government of China has communicated that while it appreciates and welcomes international assistance, prevailing conditions (i.e. blocked roads, heavy rains, and difficult access) and the lack of local coordination capacities, the deployment of foreign experts and professionals is not recommended at this stage." Its request involved in-kind assistance of emergency relief supplies and supplies. UN agencies that contributed emergency supplies —tents, blankets, school kits, as well as health equipment – to earthquake relief included the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Organization for Migration, World Health Organization, UN World Food Program, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Limits of International Involvement

It is extremely probable therefore that the Chinese government will restrict access to affected areas and, except for a small handful of diplomats or vetted experts, will not grant permission for the staff of international relief agencies to travel to the area. The UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team organized for the Sichuan earthquake disaster was put on "stand down" status.¹⁰⁷ While accepting heavy equipment from western countries, including the US from which it also requested high resolution images from the Pentagon's National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, China pointedly never requested search and rescue assistance from Western states. In addition, while the German Red Cross operated a small field hospital in the region affected by the earthquake, according to reports, only two international disaster relief workers from the International Red Cross Red Crescent Societies were on the scene evaluating needs for longer term assistance.¹⁰⁸

The lack of access to affected areas was frustrating for government, non-government and multinational agencies tasked with responding to disasters. Six weeks after the earthquake, UNHCR issued a final report of its donation of 15,000 tents and \$60,000 in cash to the Chinese government. That report diplomatically hints at some of the difficulties the agency encountered in its interaction with the Chinese government. Stating that, "an internal document was issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, mostly under the pressure of the UNHCR Regional Representation to the three local Civil Affairs Bureaus for quick delivery and distribution of the consignments" and that "enormous work was undertaken by the [UNHCR] Regional Representation to ensure the timely shipment and safe arrival of the tents," suggesting that the various Civil Affairs departments from the Ministry to the province were not acting quickly or transparently. The report goes on to detail their frustration with Chinese authorities who actively sought to limit their access to affected areas and ensure that their donated goods reached the intended recipients. The report stated,

¹⁰⁶ "国际 NGO 在华重获新生," *Xinhua Wang*, June 16, 2008.

¹⁰⁷ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *OCHA Situation Report No. 2 Sichuan Province, China– Earthquake*, May 14, 2008, (<http://www.un.org.cn/public/resource/ea380196e396b6f187aec8780181c60f.pdf>): 1.

¹⁰⁸ "China: Red Cross Red Crescent sends tents, field hospitals and international disaster relief experts to help earthquake survivors", International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies, May 27, 2008, <http://www.ifrc.org/docs/news/pr08/3708.asp>.

“There was a strict control over media in the disaster areas by the authorities. The request of a UNHCR field video/photo mission was agreed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but resisted by the Ministry of Civil Affairs. UNHCR was nevertheless able to dispatch the crew by the end of May with the help of MFA, but local officials were advised by the senior level not to accept any interviews.” The report concludes that “UNHCR’s quick response to the Sichuan earthquake was highly appreciated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the local governments, as well as the victims,” but omits to note the appreciation of the Ministry of Civil Affairs.¹⁰⁹ This cold reception to international relief agencies during the Sichuan earthquake will no doubt be even frostier in the event of a crisis on the North Korean border.

As noted in previous sections, China’s cooperation with western groups and UNHCR is complicated by the position of these organizations on China’s historic treatment of North Korean refugees. China has cooperated with UNHCR on settling the 300,000 refugees from Indo-China it has accepted—accommodating, as discussed above, the second largest number of Indo-Chinese refugees of any country in the world. China is signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention which obligates party states to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to asylum seekers and agrees not send them back to their countries where they may be persecuted. However, it has insisted the North Koreans illegally entering China should not be considered refugees, routinely deporting those it captures back across the border according to its bilateral agreement with the DPRK.¹¹⁰

In addition to the issue of the status of North Korean refugees, other considerations may constrain China’s cooperation with international organizations on a refugee crisis. As past patterns of behavior show, Chinese authorities will have a strong desire to manage information about the crisis. The presence of international agencies and NGOs, some with a human rights mission, and others without such an agenda may seek to operate independently and resist close coordination with Chinese government authorities, making information management difficult.

For these reasons, it is likely that in the event of a refugee crisis along the China-North Korean border, Chinese authorities will be reluctant to involve members of the international community in direct relief efforts. We can safely presume that any organizations currently operating in the border areas, including the international media, South Korean faith-based organizations and any other relief organizations will be quickly identified and banned from the border area once a crisis has been identified. Likewise, China will seek to exclude all international media outlets and the majority of Chinese journalists.

¹⁰⁹ “Final Report on UNHCR Emergency Response to Sichuan earthquake,” UNHCR, June 24, 2008.

¹¹⁰ Interestingly, current China-DPRK policy recalls Ming and early Qing agreements with the Choson court on “illegal crossings” from Choson into China or vice-versa—usually by would be hunters or gatherers of ginseng. Choson officials who failed to prevent these crossings could be banished; captured violators of the Chinese border were usually beheaded when returned to Choson; Choson officials would also kill Chinese subjects caught on their side of the Yalu and Tumen. (see André Schmid, “Tributary Relations and the Qing-Choson Frontier on Mount Paektu,” in Diana Lary (ed.), *The Chinese State at the Borders*, (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2007): 132-133.

Current Challenges in Disaster and Emergency Management in China

Despite the raft of updated laws, plans, guidelines and efforts to improve coordination in the wake of a disaster, particularly following the 2003 SARS outbreak, there have still been significant breakdowns in the government's response to crises. Crisis identification remains a major problem, particularly among local officials, many of whom are poorly educated and remain parochial in their thinking. Situational awareness among local officials is often poor, and with a tightly controlled domestic media, access to information can be limited, and accountability is often lacking. This creates a preference for attempted cover ups on the part of officials at all levels. This affects decision making when it comes to what and when to report to higher levels. As noted, spectacular failures include the 2005 Songhua River disaster following an industrial accident at the Jilin Petrochemical Corporation, which caused 100 tons of benzene and other chemicals to spill into the Songhua, contaminating drinking water in major cities not only in China but also in neighboring Russia. Chinese officials covered up the accident, refusing to release information for 10 days following the spill. Similar public health incidents have occurred with lengthy delays in reporting. In many cases, Chinese officials at various levels have refused to respond to an incident until it is reported in the international media, such as the recent melamine contamination incidents in 2007 and 2008.

Disaster relief operations themselves are mainly carried out at the local level by local disaster relief committees that must coordinate the activities of various relevant departments, from Civil Affairs to Health, among many others. This brings us to a recurring challenge, which is only partially resolved by new regulations and stepped-up planning: a lack of clarity in responsibilities. This leads to uncertainty and hesitant bottom-to-top reporting about the situation as it is evolving. As discussed elsewhere in this report, the Chinese government structure is hierarchical, but with competing lateral relationships, further challenging communications. For local level officials, uncertainty leads to delay, as they seek clarification or guidance from higher levels before addressing or reporting a situation, particularly a new crisis that is not clearly identified in previous directives. For example, it can be unclear which level of government has the right to announce warnings in the event of a disaster. While the county-level government has the formal authority to do so, it is still obligated to consult with the prefecture because an alert will affect the entire prefecture.¹¹¹

Efforts to better define the responsibilities of the various government agencies involved in disaster mitigation, clarify the chain of command, and improve coordination among the many actors have been ongoing. The 2004 National Emergency Relief Plan on Natural Disasters marked an important step forward, with all provinces, autonomous regions and provincial-level cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) also drafting their own emergency plans. This was followed in 2006 by the issuing by China's central government of a plan for emergency response to both public incidents and natural disasters, including specific plans for disaster relief; forest fires; and geological disasters, such as earthquakes, and floods. In addition, China established an early warning and prediction system

¹¹¹ 汪永清,“权威解读《突发事件应对法》的几个问题,”《中国行政管理》,2007年12月11日.

involving such central level agencies as the Seismological Bureau, the Meteorological Bureau, the State Forestry Bureau, and the Ministry of Water Resources among others. Early warning and evaluation of disaster situations are provided using remote sensing technology under the management of the NDRCC and reported through Civil Affairs departments down through the levels of government. Recent technological additions to China's early warning capabilities include the launch of new satellites under the "2 + 1" project, with an expansion of the program planned in the future.¹¹²

The involvement of so many different government agencies and other actors in disaster relief continues to complicate coordination, however, and in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake of May 2008, China has begun exploring the utility of a single disaster relief agency along the lines of the United States' Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).¹¹³ In July 2008, an Emergency Management Office was created and guidelines were issued granting departments the authority to coordinate and summon other departments to deal with issues of public health and safety.¹¹⁴

The PLA's Shortcomings in Recent Disaster Relief Efforts

While the official story on the role of the PLA and PAP in disaster relief operations is one of unimpeachable preparedness and acts of heroism, actual events suggest a number of weaknesses in military capabilities for disaster management. The PLA mobilized 100,000 troops to earthquake-affected areas within four days. Most of these were ordinary combat troops with little rescue training. Furthermore, they had inadequate equipment, with many units having no work gloves and equipped with only shovels. Troops often removed earth and rubble from victims with their hands.¹¹⁵ There were delays in deploying forces with more specialized training. For example, China's air force immediately deployed 6,500 paratroopers to Sichuan but reportedly only 15 were dropped into the disaster zone, the rest impeded by weather conditions and terrain for 44 hours. With many roads blocked by landslides and without heavy transport planes and helicopters, the military was unable to transport excavators and cranes into the area quickly. Approximately 100 helicopters were used to bring supplies and medical teams to more remote areas; however, evacuation operations were slow and many victims died in the absence of adequate medical care.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, one helicopter crashed, killing 18. It took searchers 12 days to locate the crash, and 1,000 troops to carry out the bodies on foot, indicating that other helicopter crews were unable to support a rescue and recovery mission and exposed extremely limited search and rescue capabilities.¹¹⁷

Along with these issues, analyses of the Sichuan earthquake rescue operations reveal ongoing weaknesses in basic capabilities to deliver disaster relief.¹¹⁸ Stockpiled supplies proved inadequate, requiring officials to scurry to locate materials, including tents. In

¹¹² Closely drawn from Yang Siquan, *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Wang Xu and Diao Ying, "How to fight disasters in future," *China Daily*, June 26, 2008.

¹¹⁴ China reshuffles cabinet office, *Xinhua*, 2008-07-20.

¹¹⁵ See, for example, <http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=134090>.

¹¹⁶ Jake Hooker, "Earthquake Revealed in China's Military," *New York Times*, July 2, 2008.

¹¹⁷ "Rain slows recovery of helicopter crash bodies in China's quake zone, *Xinhua*, 2008-06-12.

¹¹⁸ See for example, Roberta Cohen, "Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary," June 2008.

addition, poor communications hampered rescue operations pointing to the need for improved communications technology. Initially, China used satellite imagery to assess the disaster region; however, troops had only delayed access to surveillance images.¹¹⁹ Again, China also did not appear to have established protocols for coordinating with international rescue teams in rescue operations, causing significant delays in enabling even those foreign rescue workers who were permitted to participate in the emergency response on the ground.

Conclusion

While a natural disaster is not an exact approximation of a refugee crisis involving North Koreans on Chinese soil, Chinese planning and experience for natural disasters does provide some insights into the capacity of civilian authorities to respond to such a crisis. Certainly, many of the same challenges in responding to a natural disaster apply, though other challenges unique to such a crisis would inevitably surface and compound existing challenges.

Clearly China's capacity to respond to disasters remains complicated by several factors, including:

- A complex bureaucratic structure with inherent challenges to inter-agency coordination and communication involving both horizontal, civil-military, and vertical dimensions and a reliance on *ad hoc* structures to encourage a coordinated response;
- Inadequate pre-positioned supplies and a heavy reliance on donations and volunteers;
- Uneven training for a humanitarian crisis on both civil and military sides;
- An absence of established protocols for international participation in response to a disaster, particularly from multilateral and Western aid groups, reflecting continued wariness of foreign assistance in national crises;
- Inadequate attention given to meeting the needs of victims over the long term.

However, it is also clear that there are significant tangible resources available at the central, Jilin and Yanbian prefecture levels that will serve authorities responding to a humanitarian crisis on their territory. Primarily, the government has demonstrated time and again the ability to mobilize large numbers of people to tackle challenges. This "People's War" approach was effective against SARS, the spring festival snow storms in 2008, and the Sichuan earthquake. Mass mobilization was certainly employed in the government's preparations for the Olympics, even among government bureaus in Yanbian, such as the police, customs and other departments which were mobilized for training exercises, provided new equipment and instructed to step up enforcement efforts and ensure a rapid response to any unexpected event. This ability to appropriate resources, both those readily available and in regular use by local authorities, in addition to "importing" resources from other parts of the province or country represents a massive surge capacity to address crises that few other countries can match.

¹¹⁹ Hooker (2008).

However, Chinese responses will still depend largely on how quickly officials identify an emerging crisis, assess the situation and report to higher authorities. The three refugee scenarios posed in this paper, the “trickle to a flood,” “Mariel outpouring” and “total collapse” will each present different challenges to identification and developing a response. The “trickle to a flood” scenario is most likely to go unrecognized the longest, delaying government responses and potentially wasting valuable time and resources. Cover-ups are most likely to occur in this scenario, either to hide incompetence or present a sanitized image to the Chinese public and internationally. Local authorities may also fail to recognize the situation as a crisis, or report it as such to authorities above them in the hierarchy, perhaps because of concerns about how heightened security will affect the local economy through the disruption of local construction projects, restrictions on cross-border trade and tourism.

A “Mariel outpouring” in which a crisis is precipitated by intentional actions on the part of the North Korean government also presents challenges, although it provides the Chinese government the opportunity to paint itself in a particularly favorable light, if it is willing and able to coordinate its response with international actors, such as the UNHCR, and manage international media interest.

A total collapse of the North Korean regime or similar dramatic catalyst will favor a rapid identification of the crisis and mobilization of resources by Chinese authorities. It is likely that this collapse scenario is the most planned-for event and therefore the scenario with the best developed response plans. However, since Seoul’s response to the crisis will be a significant factor in how such a crisis unfolds, China’s response will have to be inherently flexible. For example, if Seoul seeks to keep its own borders closed to human flows from across the DMZ, this would possibly make for a greater population of refugees pushing toward Chinese territory. The political sensitivities that the Chinese place on their relationship with the DPRK and Chinese interests on the Korean Peninsula virtually assure that Chinese officials will seek to exclude the international community from any but the most superficial role in a crisis that unfolds in the border region. This lack of trust and unwillingness to meaningfully engage the international community in such a crisis will undoubtedly cause frustration and even outrage in key constituencies in the US, South Korea and elsewhere. Chinese responses to international queries will reflect this mistrust, and will likely fuel a cycle of frustration as the government rejects entreaties to allow international actors access to information or the affected areas. More significantly, the unwillingness of Chinese authorities to privately discuss the issue with South Korea, as well as the US, and Japan as well, adds a significant level of potential complexity to China’s ability to mobilize an appropriate response to a DPRK refugee crisis.

There is little doubt that Chinese planners at the highest level are actively considering their options to respond to various crises presented by the current conditions in the DPRK. It is also probable that officials at some levels of the bureaucracy recognize their own shortcomings and the challenges that they face, though there is little likelihood that significant energy will be expended to frankly assess past performance. It is a certainty that the Chinese government will be able to control its own territory and keep international actors out of the border area while it addresses a crisis. A preference for controlling

information and access to affected areas will likely result in decisions being made by senior leaders that would generate significant alarm were they to be fully revealed in advance. For example, conditions for detained North Korean refugees might not meet expectations of the international community, including in terms of food and shelter provided at the outset of a crisis.

Lastly, Chinese authorities are likely to conclude that based on the challenges that they will undoubtedly face in addressing a North Korean refugee crisis unfolding in Yanbian and elsewhere in the border region, the best solution available to them is to prevent a refugee crisis from unfolding on Chinese territory at all. It is therefore possible that PRC authorities are considering mounting operations within DPRK territory to prevent the largest waves of refugees from reaching the border and overwhelming civilian agencies operating within China. Undoubtedly, political calculations will be made at the highest levels about how such a move would be received internationally and efforts will be made to attempt to shape domestic and international public opinion by characterizing Chinese efforts in the most benign terms. However international observers choose to interpret Chinese intentions and actions in addressing a North Korean refugee crisis, China's assertion that it seeks stability in the Northeast region and peaceful conditions within North Korea and in its surrounding international environment should be considered genuine.

TABLE 1: Jilin Province Government Agencies Responsible for Disaster Relief

English	Chinese
Government and Communist Party Bureaus, Committees and Offices	
<p>Jilin Province People's Government 329 Xinfu Road, Changchun City, Jilin Province, 130051 Wang Min; Secretary of the CPC Jilin Provincial Committee Han Changfu; Governor, provincial party committee deputy secretary Zhu Yanfeng, Executive Vice Governor http://www.jl.gov.cn/zt/english/</p>	<p>吉林省人民政府 吉林省长春市新发路 329 号 王珉; 省委书记 韩长赋; 省委副书记、省长 竺延风; 常务副省长 http://www.jl.gov.cn</p>
<p>Development and Reform Commission Xinfu Road, Changchun City, Jilin Province Tel: 0431-88976245 Li Fuchun, Director of Development and Reform Commission</p>	<p>发展和改革委员会 长春市新发路 电话: 0431-88976245 李福春; 省发改委主任</p>
<p>Economic Affairs Commission Zhang Zijie, Director of the Office of Administrative Examination and Approval Tel: 0431-82752883 Email: jw_xxzx@mail.jl.gov.cn http://jw.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sjw/index.htm</p>	<p>经济委员会 张子杰, 行政审批办主任 电话: 0431-82752883 Email: jw_xxzx@mail.jl.gov.cn http://jw.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sjw/index.htm</p>
<p>Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission 329 Xinfu Road, Changchun City, Jilin Province 130051 Tel: 0431-8916460 Email: mw_bangongshi@mail.jl.gov.cn http://mw.jl.gov.cn/</p>	<p>族事务委员会 (民族宗教) 长春市新发路 329 号, 130051 电话: 0431-8916460 Email: mw_bangongshi@mail.jl.gov.cn http://mw.jl.gov.cn/</p>
<p>Civil Affairs Bureau 1616 Puyang Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province 130062 Tel: 0431-87670015 Email: zhangdan@jl.gov.cn http://mzt.jl.gov.cn/</p>	<p>民政厅 长春市普阳街 1616 号, 130062 电话:0431-87670015 Email: zhangdan@jl.gov.cn http://mzt.jl.gov.cn/</p>
<p>Business Bureau 3855 Renmin Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province 130021 Zhang Aiping, Director Tel: 0431-82752968 http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sswt/index.htm</p>	<p>商务厅 吉林省长春市人民大街 3855 号, 130021 张爱平, 主任 电话: 0431-82752968 http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sswt/index.htm</p>
<p>Personnel Bureau</p>	<p>人事厅</p>

<p>Street building in the city of Changchun, 2650 Email: rst@jl.gov.cn Zhang Ali, Deputy Director Tel: 0431-82752856 http://rst.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/srst/index.htm</p>	<p>长春市建设街 2650 号 Email: rst@jl.gov.cn 张阿丽, 副主任 电话:0431-82752856 http://rst.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/srst/index.htm</p>
<p>Communications Bureau 287 Guiyang Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province Tel: 82852702, 82852700 Email: zwdt@jl.gov.cn Song Jiang, Director Tel: 0431-85631455 http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sjtt/index.htm</p>	<p>交通厅 长春市贵阳街 287 号 电话:82852702 82852700 Email: zwdt@jl.gov.cn 宋秋江, 主任 电话 : 0431-85631455 http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sjtt/index.htm</p>
<p>Education Bureau 6755 Main Street, the people of Changchun City, Jilin Province, 130022 Tel: 0431-85391104 Fax: 0431-85391104 Dai Guang, Deputy Director Tel: 0431-82752925 http://edu.jl.cninfo.net/public/AA/index.jsp or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sjyt/index.htm</p>	<p>教育厅 吉林省长春市人民大街 6755 号, 130022 电话: 0431-85391104 传真: 0431-85391104 戴光, 副主任 电话 :0431-82752925 http://edu.jl.cninfo.net/public/AA/index.jsp or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sjyt/index.htm</p>
<p>Public Security Bureau 806 Xinfu Road, Changchun City, Jilin Province 130051 Tel: 0431-82098114 Email: gat@mail.jl.gov.cn Li Shenxue; Director www.gat.jl.gov.cn</p>	<p>公安厅 吉林省长春市新发路 806 号,130051 电话: 0431-82098114 (总机) Email: gat@mail.jl.gov.cn 李申学; 省公安厅厅长 www.gat.jl.gov.cn</p>
<p>Health Bureau 971 Jianzheng Road, Changchun City, Jilin Province Tel: 0431-82725264 Li Dianfu, Director Email: jlws2135@163.com http://www.jlws.gov.cn/</p>	<p>卫生厅 长春市建政路 971 号 电话: 0431-82725264 李殿富; 厅长 Email: jlws2135@163.com http://www.jlws.gov.cn/</p>
<p>Finance Bureau 3 Jianshe Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province Tel: 0431-82729667 Xu Shaohong, Deputy Director Tel: 0431-8550723/ 82752953</p>	<p>财政厅 长春市建设街 3 号 电话: 0431-82729667 徐少宏, 副主任</p>

<p>http://czt.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sczt/index.htm</p>	<p>电话 : 0431-8550723/ 82752953 http://czt.jl.gov.cn/ http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sczt/index.htm</p>
<p>Justice Bureau 329 Xinfu Road, Changchun City, Jilin Province 130051 Tel: 0431 – 82750317 Email: jlssft@tom.com Zou Donghui, Deputy Director of the Office Tel: 0431-82752923 http://sft.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/ssft/index.htm</p>	<p>司法厅 长春市新发路 329 号, 130051 电话 : 0431 - 82750317 Email: jlssft@tom.com 邹东辉, 办公室副主任 电话:0431-82752923 http://sft.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/ssft/index.htm</p>
<p>Land and Resources Bureau 518 Main Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province, 130042 Tel : 0431-88550127 Email: jlgtyt@163.com http://dlr.jl.gov.cn/infopub25/default.htm</p>	<p>省国土资源厅 吉林省长春市长春大街 518 号 130042 电话: 0431-88550127 Email: jlgtyt@163.com http://dlr.jl.gov.cn/infopub25/default.htm</p>
<p>Construction Bureau 287 Main Street, Guiyang, Changchun City, Jilin Province Tel: 0431-88275260 Email: jst-xxb@jl.gov.cn Chen Keming, Director Tel: 0431-82752879 http://jst.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sjst/index.htm</p>	<p>建设厅 长春市贵阳街 287 号 电话: 0431-88275260 Email: jst-xxb@jl.gov.cn 陈克明, 主任 电话: 0431-82752879 http://jst.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sjst/index.htm</p>
<p>Agricultural Commission 1486 Main Street, the people of Changchun City, Jilin Province 130051 Tel: 0431-88906502 Fax :0431-88906504 Cheng-Hua Wang, Deputy Director (tel: 82752815) http://www.jlagri.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/snw/index.htm</p>	<p>农业委员会 长春市人民大街 1486 号 130051 电话: 0431—88906502 传真: 0431—88906504 郑建东, 主任 (电话 : 82752817) http://www.jlagri.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/snw/index.htm</p>
<p>Forestry Bureau 3698 Main Street, Changchun Yatai City, Jilin Province, 130022 Tel: 0431-88626865 Email: lyt@jl.gov.cn Bing Xuxin, Director (tel: 82752866) http://lyt.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/slyt/index.htm</p>	<p>林业厅 长春市亚泰大街 3698 号, 130022 电话:0431-88626865 Email: lyt@jl.gov.cn 邴书新, 主任 (电话 :82752866) http://lyt.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/slyt/index.htm</p>
<p>Cultural Bureau</p>	<p>文化厅</p>

<p>2779 Main Street Building, Changchun City, Jilin Province 130021 Tel :0431-85614100 Email: zjp2000cn@jl.gov.cn http://wht.jl.gov.cn/</p>	<p>吉林省长春市建设街 2779 号 130021 联系电话: 0431-85614100 Email: zjp2000cn@jl.gov.cn http://wht.jl.gov.cn/</p>
<p>Auditing Bureau 6399 Main Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province Tel: (0431) 85265114 Email: zhpengyu@gmail.com http://sjt.jl.gov.cn/</p>	<p>审计厅 长春市亚太大街 6399 号 电话: (0431) 85265114 Email: zhpengyu@gmail.com http://sjt.jl.gov.cn/</p>
<p>Labor and Social Security Department 3336 Main Street, Changchun Yatai City, Jilin Province 130022 Tel: 0431-12333 Email: jlldbzxxzx@126.com http://ldbzt.jl.gov.cn/</p>	<p>劳动和社会保障厅 长春市亚泰大街 3336 号 130022 电话: 0431-12333 Email: jlldbzxxzx@126.com http://ldbzt.jl.gov.cn/</p>
<p>Family Planning Commission 54 Main Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province 130051 Tel: 0431-8906330 Email: jsw@mail.jl.gov.cn http://jsw.jl.gov.cn/</p>	<p>人口和计划生育委员会 长春市人民大街副 54 号 130051 电话: 0431-8906330 Email: jsw@mail.jl.gov.cn http://jsw.jl.gov.cn/</p>
<p>Jilin Province Water Resources Department 3726 Weixing Road, Changchun Road, Jilin Province 130033 Tel: 0431-84994114, 0431-85316712 Email: govmaster@jl.gov.cn http://slt.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/ssl/index.htm</p>	<p>水利厅 长春市卫星路 3726 号, 130033 电话:0431-84994114, 0431-85316712 Email: govmaster@jl.gov.cn http://slt.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/ssl/index.htm</p>
<p>Foreign Affairs Office 300 New Road, Changchun City, Jilin Province 130041 Tel: 0431-2711154 Email: Swqb@mail.jl.gov.cn http://wb.jl.gov.cn/</p>	<p>外事办公室 长春市新发路 300 号 130041 电话: 0431-2711154 Email: Swqb@mail.jl.gov.cn http://wb.jl.gov.cn/</p>
<p>Office of the People's Air Defense Pi Zhenke, Deputy Director Tel: 0431-82752809 http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/srfb/index.htm</p>	<p>人防办 皮振克, 审批办公室副主任 电话 : 0431-82752809 http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/srfb/index.htm</p>
<p>Provincial Food (or Grain) Bureau 725 West Main Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province 130061 Tel :0431-88566276 Email: jlgic@jl.gov.cn</p>	<p>粮食局 长春市西民主大街 725 号 130061 电话: 0431-88566276 Email: jlgic@jl.gov.cn http://grain.jl.gov.cn/ or</p>

http://grain.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/slsj/index.htm	http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/slsj/index.htm
Animal Husbandry Bureau 1486 Main Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province 130051 Tel: 0431-2716030 Fax: 0431-2711639 Email: zhhy_115@126.com Yu-Juan Liu, Deputy Director (tel: 82752819) http://myj.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/smyj/index.htm	牧业局 长春市西民主大街 1486 号 130051 电话:0431-2716030 传 真: 0431-2711639 Email: zhhy_115@126.com 刘玉娟, 副主任(电话: 82752819) http://myj.jl.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/smyj/index.htm
Domestic Trade Office (Trade and Industry Bureau) 599 South Lake Road, Changchun City, Jilin Province 130022 Tel :0431-85279092 Email: jlsgsaic@mail.jl.cn Xia Yanchun, Director (tel: 82752916) http://www.jlgs.gov.cn/index.jsp or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sgsj/index.htm	省内贸办 (工商局) 长春市南湖大路 599 号 130022 电话:0431-85279092 Email: jlsgsaic@mail.jl.cn 夏延春, 主任(82752916) http://www.jlgs.gov.cn/index.jsp or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sgsj/index.htm
Meteorological Bureau 287 Guiyang Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province Tel: 0431-82752805 Email: webmaster@jlqx.gov.cn Min-Jie Wang, Section Tel: 0431-2752805 http://www.jlqx.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sqxj/index.htm	气象局 长春市贵阳街 287 号 电话: 0431-82752805 Email: webmaster@jlqx.gov.cn 王敏杰, 科员 电话:0431- 2752805 http://www.jlqx.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sqxj/index.htm
Seismological Bureau 5829 Weixing Road, Changchun City, Jilin Province Li Chunwei, Director of Customer Service Tel: 0431-82752771 http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sdzj/index.htm	地震局 长春市卫星路 5829 号 李春伟, 窗口负责人 电话: 0431-82752771 http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sdzj/index.htm
Communications Bureau 733 Main Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province 130000 Tel: 88922702 88923308 E-mail: jlca@mail.jl.cn Ma Chi , Director of Customer Service (tel: 82752945) http://www.jlca.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sjtt/index.htm	通信管理局 长春市西民主大街 733 号 130000 电话: 88922702 88923308 E-mail: jlca@mail.jl.cn 马驰, 窗口主任(电话: 82752945) http://www.jlca.gov.cn/ or http://zwdt.jl.gov.cn/ckdw_spck/sjtt/index.htm
Jilin Provincial People's Government on Economic and Technological Collaboration	吉林省人民政府经济技术协作办公室

57 Main Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province Tel: 8905401,2723753, Fax: 8905402 Email: jxb@mail.jl.gov.cn http://jxb.jl.gov.cn/xsjxb/	长春市人民大街 57 号 电话：8905401、2723753、 传真：8905402 Email: jxb@mail.jl.gov.cn http://jxb.jl.gov.cn/xsjxb/
Jilin Province Earthquake Damage Defense Department 6755 Main Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province 130022 Tel: 0431-85391104 Fax: 0431-85391104	吉林省地震局震害防御处 长春市人民大街 6755 号 130022 电话：0431-85391104 传真：0431-85391104
<i>Provincial Level Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations and Corporations</i>	
Red Cross 1486 Renmin Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province Tel: 0431-88919277 www.jlredcross.org.cn/	红十字会 长春市人民大街 1486 号 电话: 0431-88919277 www.jlredcross.org.cn/
Provincial Charity Federation 666 Renmin Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province 130051 Tel: 0431-87922568 Email: jlscszh@163.com www.jlscsw.cn/	省慈善总会 长春市人民大街 666 号 130051 电话：0431-87922568 Email: jlscszh@163.com www.jlscsw.cn/
Women's Federation 61 Renmin Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province 130051 Tel: 0431-82726802/ 85877716 Fax: 0431-88906764 Email: jlfnetw@163.com www.women.jl.gov.cn	妇女联合会 吉林省长春市人民大街 61 号, 130051 电话：0431-82726802/ 85877716 传真：0431-88906764 Email: jlfnetw@163.com www.women.jl.gov.cn
Jilin Electric Power Supply Company 4629 Renmin Street, Changchun City, Jilin Province Tel: 0431-85792222 Email: liwq@jlep.com.cn http://www.jlep.com.cn/	省电力有限公司 吉林省长春市人民大街 4629 号 电话：0431-85792222 Email: liwq@jlep.com.cn http://www.jlep.com.cn/
China Southern Airlines, Jilin Branch No website available	南航集团北航吉林分公司 无相关网页
Civil Aviation Authority No website available	省民航局 无相关网页
Jilin Province, Changchun, Shenyang Railway Administration Branch Railway	沈阳铁路局长春铁路分局 无相关网页

No website available	
Shenyang Railway Bureau in Jilin Railway Sub Branch No website available	沈阳铁路局吉林铁路分局 无相关网页
Shenyang Railway Bureau Tonghua Railway Sub Branch No website available	沈阳铁路局通化铁路分局 无相关网页

TABLE 2: Yanbian Prefecture Government Agencies Responsible for Disaster Relief

English	Chinese
Government and Communist Party Bureaus, Committees and Offices	
<p>Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture People's Government 759 Henan Street, Yanji, Jilin Province Tel: +86-433-2810069 Fax: +86-433-2810069 Email: yb@yanbian.gov.cn www.yanbian.gov.cn Lee Yong-hee, Yanbian People's Governor Jun Feng, deputy governor Lijing Hao, deputy governor Xi Menshun, deputy governor Min Guangdao, deputy governor Yu Jinjing, deputy governor Li Man, deputy governor You Wangjing, deputy governor Wang Fusheng, deputy governor Zhen Yulan, deputy governor Cho Yong, Secretary-General</p>	<p>延边朝鲜族自治州人民政府 吉林省延吉市河南街 759 号 Tel: +86-433-2810069 Fax: +86-433-2810069 Email: yb @ yanbian.gov.cn www.yanbian.gov.cn 冯君延边州人民政府副州长 李景浩延边州人民政府副州长 西门顺基延边州人民政府副州长 闵光道延边州人民政府副州长 于竞进延边州人民政府副州长 李满延边州人民政府副州长 王景友延边州人民政府副州长 王福生延边州人民政府副州长 甄玉兰延边州人民政府副州长 赵龙延边州人民政府秘书长</p>
<p>Education Bureau Tel: 04332512940 Fax: 04332511670 Email: quanwentuan@hotmail.com http://www.ybedu.net/web1/</p>	<p>教育局 电话 04332512940 传真：04332511670 Email: quanwentuan@hotmail.com http://www.ybedu.net/web1/</p>
<p>Public Security Bureau No website available</p>	<p>公安局 无相关网页</p>
<p>Supervision Bureau 108 Guangming Street, Yanji City, Jilin Province</p>	<p>监察局 延吉市光明街 108 号</p>

<p>Tel : 0433-2902371 Email : xfs@ybjj.gov.cn http://www.ybjj.gov.cn/</p>	<p>电话 : 0433-2902371 Email : xfs@ybjj.gov.cn http://www.ybjj.gov.cn/</p>
<p>Civil Affairs Bureau 137-9 Ai dan Road, Yanji City, Jilin Province 133000 Tel: 0433-2311810 http://2311810.dh.jl.cn/</p>	<p>民政局 吉林省延吉市爱丹路 137-9 号 133000 电话: 0433-2311810 http://2311810.dh.jl.cn/</p>
<p>Justice Bureau http://www.yanbian.gov.cn/zhengwugongkai/zhengwugongn/zhengwun.php?tbname=govvjigouset&no=29&page=1&action=read&category=&keyword=</p>	<p>司法局 http://www.yanbian.gov.cn/zhengwugongkai/zhengwugongn/zhengwun.php?tbname=govvjigouset&no=29&page=1&action=read&category=&keyword=</p>
<p>Business Bureau http://www.yanbiancom.gov.cn/</p>	<p>商务局 http://www.yanbiancom.gov.cn/</p>
<p>Financial Services Bureau Extension Street, Yanji City, Jilin Province Tel :0433-2876083 Email: cz@gov.cn http://www.ybcz.gov.cn/</p>	<p>财政局 延吉市延南街 电话: 0433-2876083 Email: cz@gov.cn http://www.ybcz.gov.cn/</p>
<p>Personnel Bureau http://www2.yb.jl.cn/rcsc/rsj/ http://ybrsj.blog.163.com/</p>	<p>人事局 http://www2.yb.jl.cn/rcsc/rsj/ http://ybrsj.blog.163.com/</p>
<p>Construction Bureau 1088 Henan Street, Yanji City, Jilin Province Tel: 0433-2870611 Fax: 0433-2870600 Email: ybjs@163.com http://www.ybjs.gov.cn/</p>	<p>建设局 中国吉林省延吉市河南街 1088 号 电话:0433-2870611 传真:0433-2870600 Email: ybjs@163.com http://www.ybjs.gov.cn/</p>
<p>Water Resources Bureau 4339 Yanhe West Road, Yanji City, Yanbian Prefecture, Jilin Province 133002 Tel: 0433-2827850 Email: sljwzgl@163.com http://www.ybsl.gov.cn/</p>	<p>水利局 吉林省延边朝鲜族自治州延吉市延河西路 4339 号 邮政编码: 133002 电话: 0433-2827850 Email: sljwzgl@163.com http://www.ybsl.gov.cn/</p>
<p>Cultural Bureau 18 Henan Street, Yanji City, Jilin Province 133001 Telephone: Head of the office : 86-0433-2818099 Performance Department : 86-0433-</p>	<p>文化局 中国吉林省延吉市河南街 18 号, 133001 电话: 团长室 : 86-0433-2818099</p>

2818098 Email: Head of the Mailbox:tuanz@ybgwt.com Department of Performance:ycb@ybgw.com Head of the mailbox: tuanz@ybgwt.com Department of performance-mail: ycb@ybgw.com Fax : 86-0433-2812795 http://www.ybgwt.cn/	演出部：86-0433-2818098 传真：86-0433-2812795 Email: 团长信箱:tuanz@ybgwt.com 演出部信箱:ycb@ybgw.com http://www.ybgwt.cn/
Communications Bureau 3568 Park Road, Yanji City, Jilin Province Tel: 0433-2705010, 2255090 Email: ybjt4@jljt.gov.cn http://www.ybjt.gov.cn/	交通局 延吉市公园路 3568 号 电话：0433-2705010,2255090 Email: ybjt4@jljt.gov.cn http://www.ybjt.gov.cn/
Health Bureau No website available	卫生局 无相关网页
Auditing (Accounting) Bureau No website available	审计局 无相关网页
Statistics Bureau 67Henan Street, Yanji City, Jilin Province 133000 Tel :0433-2813456 http://2813456.dh.jl.cn/	统计局 吉林省延吉市河南街 67 号 133000 电话：0433-2813456 http://2813456.dh.jl.cn/
Tourism Bureau http://www.cybta.com/	旅游局 http://www.cybta.com/
Food Bureau 86 Henan Street, Yanji City, Jilin Province Tel: 0433-2813360 http://www.yblsj.com/	粮食局 吉林省延吉市河南街 86 号 电话：0433-2813360 http://www.yblsj.com/
Office of the People's Air Defense 769 Henan Street, Yanji City, Jilin Province 133001 Tel: 0433-2812719 http://www.yanbian.gov.cn/yanbian/yanbianrenfang/index.htm	人防办 延吉市河南街 769 号 133001 电话：0433-2812719 http://www.yanbian.gov.cn/yanbian/yanbianrenfang/index.htm
Seismological Bureau http://www.yanbian.gov.cn/ybdz/	地震局 http://www.yanbian.gov.cn/ybdz/
Foreign Affairs Office No website available	外事办 无相关网页
Legislative Affairs Office	法制办

http://fazhi.yanbian.gov.cn/	http://fazhi.yanbian.gov.cn/
Supply and Marketing Cooperation 501 Henan Street, 4th Street International Business Center, Yanji City, Jilin Province (133001) Tel :0433-5088304 Fax :0433-5088306 Email : ybmaster@sina.com E-mail: ybmaster@sina.com http://yanbian.jlcoop.gov.cn/	供销社 延吉市河南街 4 号国际商务中心, 501 (133001) 电话: 0433—5088304 传真: 0433-5088306 Email: ybmaster@sina.com http://yanbian.jlcoop.gov.cn/
Meteorology Bureau webmaster@ybqx.gov.cn http://www.ybqx.gov.cn/	气象局 webmaster@ybqx.gov.cn http://www.ybqx.gov.cn/
Security Bureau 298 Senhua Street, Yanji City, Jilin Province 13300 Tel: 0433-2516609	安全局 延吉市参花街 298 号, 133000 电话: 0433-2516609
Telecommunications/Media Bureau Editorial :0433-5085050 Authors-mail: ybxxg@126.com Marketing :0433-5085080 Email: ybxxg01@163.com Technology :0433-5085050 Email: vistastudio.cn@hotmail.com QQ : 781153936 QQ: 781153936 http://www.yb983.com/ec/	广电局 编辑部 : 0433—5085050 投稿邮箱 : ybxxg@126.com 市场部 : 0433—5085080 邮箱 : ybxxg01@163.com 技术部 : 0433—5085050 邮箱 : vistastudio.cn@hotmail.com QQ : 781153936 http://www.yb983.com/ec/
Forestry Bureau Tel: 0433-2909889 Email: yblygqt@163.com http://jlybfg.com/	林管局 电话: 0433-2909889 Email: yblygqt@163.com http://jlybfg.com/
Technology Bureau 300 Tianchi Road, Yanji City, Jilin Province 133001 Tel : (0433)2211143 Fax : (0433)2254117 Email: luotinglei@sina.com http://www.ybkjj.com/	科技局 吉林省延吉市天池路 300 号 133001 电话 : (0433)2211143 传真 : (0433) 2254117 Email : luotinglei@sina.com http://www.ybkjj.com/
Agricultural Bureau http://www.ybnj.gov.cn/	农机局 http://www.ybnj.gov.cn/
Environmental Protection Bureau http://www.ybhb.gov.cn/user/	环保局

	http://www.ybhb.gov.cn/user/
Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau 2112 Chaoyang Street, Yanji City, Jilin Province, 133000 Tel :0433-2661207 Email: 2661205@163.com http://www.ybqi.gov.cn/	质监局 吉林省延吉市朝阳街 2112 号 133000 电话 : 0433-2661207 Email : 2661205@163.COM http://www.ybqi.gov.cn/
Trade and Industry Bureau 2188 Tianchi Road, Yanji City, Jilin Province 13300 Tel: 0433-2236010 Email: ybzgsj@163.com http://www.ybgs.gov.cn/user/index.php?page=1&menu_id=46	工商局 延吉市天池路 2188 号, 133000 电话: 0433-2236010 Email: ybzgsj@163.com http://www.ybgs.gov.cn/user/index.php?page=1&menu_id=46
Development and Reform Commission 759 Henan Street, the city of Yanji, Jilin Province, (inside provincial government headquarters), 133001 Tel :0433-2814657 Fax :0433-2817880 http://www.ybxx.gov.cn/	发改委 (发展和改革委员会) 吉林省延吉市河南街 759 号 (州政府院内), 133001 电话 : 0433-2814657 传真 : 0433-2817880 http://www.ybxx.gov.cn/
Animal Husbandry Bureau No website available	牧业局 无相关网页
Agricultural Commission 3418 Tianchi Road, Yanji City Post, Jilin Province 133000 Tel : 0433-2260236 2260237 2260238 Email: ybnyxx@163.com http://yanbian.jlagri.gov.cn/	农委 地址 : 延吉市天池路 3418 号 133000 电话 : 0433-2260236 2260237 2260238 Email: ybnyxx@163.com http://yanbian.jlagri.gov.cn/
Language Commission (Translation Department) http://www.ybfyj.gov.cn/user/	语委 http://www.ybfyj.gov.cn/user/
Population and Family Planning Bureau No website available	人口和计划生育委员会 无相关网页
Information Industry Bureau Email: jy4048@163.com http://www.it-yb.com/user/ or http://www.it-yb.com/files/it_yb/it/index.htm	信息产业局 Email: jy4048@163.com http://www.it-yb.com/user/ or http://www.it-yb.com/files/it_yb/it/index.htm
Food and Drug Bureau 3322 Tianchi Road, Yanji City, Jilin	食品药品监督管理局 延吉市天池路 3322 号 133001

Province 133001 Tel: 0433-2265007 Email: gtz@ybfda.gov.cn http://www.ybfda.gov.cn/	电话: 0433-2265007 Email: gtz@ybfda.gov.cn http://www.ybfda.gov.cn/
Work Safety Bureau Tel:0433-2876610 Email: ajj-yb@mail.jl.gov.cn http://www.ybsafe.gov.cn/user/	安全生产监督管理局 电话: 0433-2876610 Email: ajj-yb@mail.jl.gov.cn http://www.ybsafe.gov.cn/user/
Economic Commission Yanji City, Jilin Province 133000 Email: ybzxfwzx@163.com http://www.ybjw.net/	经济委员会 吉林省延边州延吉市 133000 Email: ybzxfwzx@163.com http://www.ybjw.net/
Press and Publication Bureau No website available	新闻出版局 无相关网页
State Government Agencies Authority No website available	州政府机关事务管理局 无相关网页
Investment Bureau No website available	投资管理局 无相关网页
Social Insurance Company 9 Qianjin Road, Yanji City, Jilin Province 133001	社会保险公司 吉林省延吉市前进路 9 号, 133001
Public Housing Fund Management Center 2169 Tianchi Road, Yanji City, Jilin Province Tel: 0433-2253299/ 2222100-406 http://www.ybxxsc.com.cn/xxsc/jijin/	住房公基金管理中心 延吉市天池路 2169 号 电话: 0433—2253299、2222100—406 http://www.ybxxsc.com.cn/xxsc/jijin/
<i>Provincial Level Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations and Corporations</i>	
Red Cross 759 Henan Street, Yanji City, Jilin Province 133001 Tel :0433-2814616 Fax :0433-2814614 http://www.ybzredcross.org.cn/	红十字会 延吉市河南街 759 号 133001 电话: 0433-2814616 传真: 0433-2814614 http://www.ybzredcross.org.cn/