

Policy Forum Online 09-032: April 21st, 2009

-“The North Korean Long-Range Missile Test-Launch of April, 2009: Results and Implications”

By Bruce E. Bechtol

CONTENTS

- I. Introduction
- II. Article by Bruce E. Bechtol
- III. Notes
- IV. Nautilus invites your responses

I. Introduction

Bruce E. Bechtol, Professor of International Relations at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, writes, “Iran is North Korea’s oldest and most profitable purchaser of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile technology... any missile test by North Korea should be assessed not only for its potential should a missile be launched from the North Korean landmass, but what it would mean if such a missile was launched from the Middle East – and who it would threaten.”

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

II. Article by Bruce E. Bechtol

-“The North Korean Long-Range Missile Test-Launch of April, 2009: Results and Implications”

By Bruce E. Bechtol

North Korea conducted a test-launch of the Taepo Dong II system on April 5, 2009. Preparations began as early as February 4, when a train carrying components of the missile was sighted near the missile launch facility at Musudan-ri. The train had previously departed from a weapons plant known for building long-range missiles.[1] A few days later in a statement obviously designed for foreign consumption, North Korea’s state-run propaganda arm (Rodong Sinmun) declared its nation’s right to develop “space technology.”[2] By February 10, the U.S. military had reportedly stepped up its monitoring of North Korean activities at Musudan-ri by moving assets (including naval craft) into position in the Pacific.[3] By February 11, reports indicated that the North Koreans had transferred missile-related cargo to their missile launch site, and vehicles needed for missile launches were traveling to the missile base.[4] In addition, press reports on the same day indicated that imagery showed sophisticated telemetry equipment


(needed for a missile launch) being assembled at the launch site.[5] Components for the missile were transported to the site on a 40 meter long special trailer that is reportedly capable of carrying the first and second stages of the three-stage Taepo Dong II missile.[6] Soon thereafter, the North Korean state-run press again declared Pyongyang's right to "launch a satellite," proclaiming, "Space development is the independent right of the DPRK and the requirement of the developing reality." [7]

On March 12, 2009, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) reported that it had been officially advised by the DPRK "of its intention to proceed with the launch of a communications satellite, under the terms of the DPRK's long-term plan for space development." The ICAO reported that the North Korean letter indicated the launch would take place between 4 and 8 April, and identified two specific "danger areas" where possible debris might fall from the vehicle. If one is to plot the areas on a map, the first was off of Japan's northeastern coast (approximately 373 kilometers from the launch site) and the second in the middle of the Pacific Ocean approximately 3,600 kilometers from the launch site in North Korea. The areas indicated are below.[8]

Area one	Area two
1) N404140 E1353445	1) N343542 E1644042
2) N402722 E1383040	2) N312222 E1721836
3) N401634 E1383022	3) N295553 E1721347
4) N403052 E1353426	4) N330916 E1643542

Many in the international community questioned the validity of North Korea's declaration of the planned test-launch as a "satellite launch." Officials in both Seoul and Washington reportedly believed the real purpose of the launch was to test the Taepo Dong II system. In fact, the two are so similar it is very difficult to tell them apart – until a satellite is actually launched. The vehicle (or missile if you will) used to carry a dummy warhead (what a test-launch would likely consist of) would likely be almost exactly the same as a vehicle used to launch a satellite. The major difference would only be the equipment mounted on top of the fuselage (the tip of the missile). If a satellite launch was the purpose of the vehicle, a "bulb-like" contraption would be on the tip - otherwise a more "pyramid-like" device would be on top of the fuselage. If the missile system the North Koreans claimed was being used to launch a satellite was to instead turn out to be a missile with a warhead, or (and this could happen almost as easily) if it were to stray off-course and head toward U.S. territory, the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system was prepared to both track it and shoot it down. Reportedly, air and space assets were capable of monitoring the system from take-off until landing. Sensors and satellites located in the United States, Japan, South Korea, and the waters of the Pacific Ocean were (and are) tied into a worldwide BMD system capable of matching up with weapons systems that could take the missile out at various stages in its flight. American weapons systems located on ships at sea, on land in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan were (and are) also tied into Japanese BMD weapons systems (SM-3 and PAC-3) also located on both land and sea (see figure 1).[9]

Figure 1



Source: Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2008 Annual Report, "Ballistic Missile Defense Systems," December, 2008, URL: <http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/FY08DOTEAnnualReport.pdf>

In early March, 2009, the Japanese navy announced that it planned to deploy an Aegis-equipped destroyer equipped with the SM-3 BMD system in the Sea of Japan in preparation for possible action involving the North Korean test-launch.[10] Given the launch elevation of the Taepo Dong system, it would be difficult for the SM-3 (which is designed for MRBM system defense – not an ICBM like the Taepo Dong) to intercept a launch. But the system could be used if debris from the system was falling on the Japanese landmass.[11] Approximately 90 percent of the "danger zone" that North Korea indicated when it announced the test launch was in the Sea of Japan near Akita Prefecture.[12] In another rather ominous move, North Korea announced on March 21 that it would close two routes in its air space during the April 4-8, 2009 time period. The two routes were normally used by flights transiting between North Korea and Russia or Japan.[13]

By the end of March, satellite imagery had reportedly photographed the nose cone of the Taepo Dong II, which was now sitting on its launch pad going through final preparations – though it still remained partially covered.[14] But an even more interesting issue came to light on March 29th when the Japanese press disclosed that a 15-man Iranian delegation (including several missile experts) was in North Korea – probably to observe the imminent test-launch.[15] By March 29th there were also reports that the U.S. was to deploy to "missile interceptor" ships from South Korea (other ships deployed from other areas as well), and the Japanese began moving their PAC-3 BMD systems into areas in northeastern Japan to prepare for the possibility of the missile falling into Japanese territory. The Japanese government ordered the BMD systems (and the associated seaborne SM-3 systems) deployed in the case of a malfunction in the North Korean launch where missile debris might fall on the Japanese landmass.[16]

By March 30, 2009, the Taepo Dong II missile system was reportedly not only on the launch pad, but free of any covering and casting a thick shadow.[17] By April 1st, press reports citing a senior U.S. military official confirmed that the North Koreans had begun fueling the missile.[18] U.S. Defense officials reportedly disclosed that imagery of the missile showed that it had a bulb-shaped nose cone consistent with a satellite payload – though ISIS senior analyst Paul Brannan also told reporters that, “They probably are launching a satellite. But the issue is that the steps they’re going through to do that run parallel to them being able to have other capabilities.”[19] South Korean Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee responded to the reports that a satellite payload was spotted on top of the missile nearing launch to the South Korean National Assembly in a hearing, when he stated, “Whether it is a satellite or a missile, the technology is the same.” He further stated, “We understand they are equally threats to the Korean Peninsula and our surrounding region, and will respond accordingly.”[20] By April 4th, the North Koreans appeared ready to launch their missile in a matter of hours, as camera equipment had been set up (to record the launch) around the launch pad.[21]

On April 5, 2009, at 1130 in the morning, the North Koreans launched the Taepo Dong II missile – their second launch of the system (the first being in July, 2006). According to press reports attributed to members of the South Korean National Assembly, North Korea notified the U.S., China, and Russia in advance of its plan to launch the missile (satellite) on April 5th. If true, this was an unprecedented move by the North Koreans.[22] The North Koreans called it the “Unha 2 Space Launch Vehicle.” Iranian officials and missile experts were reportedly present to observe the launch. After launching, the spent first stage fell into the Sea of Japan (East Sea) about 580 kilometers from the launch site. The missile successfully went into its second stage before passing over Japan. The system apparently suffered some kind of sequencing complication and the second stage failed to separate, causing both the second stage and the third stage to tumble into the Pacific Ocean.[23] According to analysis by Russian and American experts that was released in the Russian and South Korean press, the missile may have impacted as far as 2,390 miles from its launch site (in the Pacific Ocean). The analysis indicates that the second stage of the missile fired normally, but the third stage failed to separate from the second stage when it was supposed to. After burn out, the second stage briefly coasted upward into space. The third stage was then supposed to separate and fire, but instead failed to do so. Thus, according to the reports, Japanese and U.S. Defense officials believe the first and second stages worked as planned, but only the third stage failed. The spent first and second stages apparently fell into the “danger areas” the North Koreans had planned for and reported to international authorities earlier.[24]

Following the test launch, despite the third stage failure of the system, U.S. analysts and government officials reportedly said that the test raised new concerns about advancements in North Korean long-range missile technology. Many also said that the launch was a test of the Taepo Dong II and merely cover for what in reality was a long-range missile test.[25] In South Korea the reaction was similar. A government official speaking on condition of anonymity said, “It is our assessment that North Korea’s missile capabilities have advanced because its abilities to launch the rocket can be converted into

long-rang missile technology.”[26] Professor Yun Duk-min of the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade in Seoul told the South Korean press in part, “It is one of the steps that the North will take to keep improving its missile capability. The North will test again at some point.”[27] North Korea obviously understood the military applications of the test launch and took elaborate steps to protect their assets. Pyongyang deployed both fighters and bombers near the launch area and deployed one of its warships at sea near the site. The aircraft flew past the mid-way point between Japan and North Korea and a destroyer also reportedly sailed closer to Japan than to its home port – which is very unusual. One of the aircraft conducting the patrols (a MiG-23) crashed into the sea the day before the launch.[28]

After several days of wrangling for wording, the UN Security Council finally issued a statement unanimously condemning North Korea’s test launch. The statement (and the actions taken in the resolution) was considerably watered down from what both the United States and Japan had been pushing for. China and Russia opposed making the resolution too harsh in what their diplomats felt would have been an over reaction. The result was a compromise that did not carry the weight Washington and Tokyo had hoped for.[29] North Korea’s response to the UN resolution was quick and harsh. Pyongyang ordered UN inspectors at its site at Yongbyon to leave. North Korea also ordered them to remove seals on equipment and remove cameras. In addition, North Korea renounced the Six-Party talks, saying in an official statement that it “will never participate in the talks any longer nor...be bound to any agreement.” Finally, the North Koreans stated that they would restart operations at their Plutonium nuclear reactor. An official statement in the state-run press said that Pyongyang would “bolster its nuclear deterrent for self-defense in every way.”[30]

The implications of the launch are important yet there is disagreement among analysts about the reasons for its timing – why April, 2009? Some have assessed that the launch was for internal North Korean consumption in order to strengthen Kim Chong-il’s status after the stroke he suffered in 2008. Others have opined that the launch was likely conducted to continue raising the stakes with the Lee Myung-bak administration in South Korea. Of course, many have assessed that the launch was conducted to “test” the new Obama administration in Washington.[31] In my view, all of these reasons are very important – but they are also ancillary. The main reason that the North Koreans tested the Taepo Dong II system was because they assessed it was ready - and they plan to proliferate the technology to Iran. The North Koreans likely believed they had worked out most of the issues associated with the missile launch of 2006. They were of course partially right, as the launch was more successful than the launch of 2006 but still short of being a successful ICBM launch of a three-stage missile. Selling this missile to Iran likely means revenues in the hundreds of millions of dollars (perhaps more) as well as energy aid. According to press reports, Iranian specialists and high-ranking officials were present at the launch – as they also were in 2006, 1998, and 1993.[32]

North Korea has proliferated nearly every kind of missile in its inventory to Iran going all the way back to the 1980s. To recap, this includes the SCUD B, C, and probably D systems, the No Dong, and the Taepo Dong X (also known as the Musudan, based on

Soviet SS-N-6 technology). Iran is North Korea's oldest and most profitable purchaser of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile technology.[33] This highlights the real threat from the April 2009 missile launch. While a successful three-stage launch would mean North Korea had an ICBM that could hit Alaska or Hawaii, it would also almost undoubtedly mean that Iran would end up with the technology in the near future. Thus, any missile test by North Korea should be assessed not only for its potential should a missile be launched from the North Korean landmass, but what it would mean if such a missile was launched from the Middle East – and who it would threaten. No matter what was going on with the Six-Party talks, relations with their neighbor to the South, or internally within the government of the DPRK, if the North Koreans assessed this missile system was ready they were going to launch it. The potential gains from proliferation were simply far too important for any significant delay. For future reference, those who have an interest in the region should consider this – because future test launches are not only likely, but imminent in coming years, as the North Koreans further develop long-range missile technology.

III. Notes

[1] See: “Advanced N. Korean Missile Last Seen on East Coast: Officials,” *Yonhap*, February 4, 2009, URL:

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2009/02/04/28/0401000000AEN20090204005600315F.HTML>
Jung Ha-won, “Satellites Detect Possible Missile Moves in North,” *JoongAng Ilbo*, February 4, 2009, URL: <http://joongAngdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2900589>

[2] See: “Rodong Sinmun: DPRK Entitled to Use Space for Peaceful Purposes,” *Peoples Daily*, February 8, 2009, URL: <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90851/6587821.html>

[3] David Morgan, “U.S. Steps up Monitoring of North Korea: Official,” *Reuters*, February 10, 2009, URL: <http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE51A0CC20090211>

[4] “N. Korea Shipping Missile-Related Cargo to Launch Pad: Source,” *Yonhap*, Feb 11, 2009, URL: http://www.koreancenter.or.kr/news/news_foreign_view.aspx?menu_code=02001000&news_id=AEN20090211008100315

[5] Barbara Starr, “U.S. Official: North Korea Might be Making Missile Preparations,” *CNN.com*, February 10, 2009, URL: <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/02/10/north.korea.missile/index.html>

[6] “N. Korea ‘Transports Missile to Launch Site,’” *Chosun Ilbo*, February 13, 2009, URL: <http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200902/200902130001.html>

[7] Kim Hyun, “N. Korea Signals Satellite Launch, Feasts on Leader’s Birthday,” *Yonhap*, February 16, 2009, URL: <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2009/02/16/77/0401000000AEN20090216002900315F.HTML>

[8] See: “ICAO Officially Advised of DPRK Plans for Rocket Launch,” *International Civil Aviation Organization*, March 12, 2009, URL: http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/2009/pio200902_e.pdf

[9] For more details regarding South Korean and U.S. assessments regarding the purpose of North Korea's second Taepo Dong II test-launch, the differences between a vehicle carrying a dummy warhead vice a satellite, and the capabilities of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense system, See: Tony Capaccio, “Pentagon Tester Lacks ‘High Confidence’ in U.S. Missile Defense,” *Bloomberg News*, February 24, 2009, URL: <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=afc4fyAJ1Tg&refer=home>

“North Korean Leader Says Communist Regime Strong – Agency,” *Ria Novosti*, March 15, 2009, URL: <http://en.rian.ru/world/20090315/120566933.html>
Martha Raddatz and Lauren Sher, “U.S. Ready to Respond to North Korea Missile,” *ABC News*, February 26, 2009, URL: <http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=6965611>
Jung Sung-ki, “Will NK Rocket Launch be ‘Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?’” *Korea Times*, March 26, 2009, URL: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/03/113_42065.html
Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2008 Annual Report, “Ballistic Missile Defense Systems,” December, 2008, URL: <http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/FY08DOTEAnnualReport.pdf>

^[10] “Japan to Deploy Interceptor in Sea of Japan to Counter N. Korea,” *Kyodo News*, March 3, 2009, URL: <http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/japan-to-deploy-interceptor-in-sea-of-japan-to-counter-n-korea>

^[11] Hiroyuki Koshiji, “Analysis: North Korean Threat to Japan,” *UPI*, March 16, 2009, URL: http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2009/03/16/Analysis-North-Korean-threat-to-Japan/UPI-60071237239346/

^[12] “‘Danger Zone’ for Debris Lies in EEZ,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 18, 2009, URL: <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20090318TDY02304.htm>

^[13] Bomi Lim, “North Korea to Close Air Routes for Rocket Launch,” *Bloomberg News*, March 22, 2009, URL: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=azE46E_VYe9A#

^[14] “Spy Satellites Spot Nose Cone of NKorea Rocket,” *AFP*, March 29, 2009, URL: <http://www.france24.com/en/20090329-spy-satellites-spot-nose-nkorea-rocket-report>

^[15] “Iran Missile Experts in North Korea ‘to Help with Rocket Launch,’” *The Times*, March 29, 2009, URL: <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5994905.ece>

^[16] See: Jon Herskovitz, “U.S. Deploys Anti-Missile Ships Before N. Korea Launch,” *Reuters*, March 29, 2009, URL: <http://abcnews.go.com/International/WireStory?id=7204521&page=1>
“Missile Units on Way to Northeast Japan Ahead of N Korean Rocket Launch,” *Japan Today*, March 29, 2009, URL: <http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/missile-units-on-way-to-northeastern-japan-ahead-of-n-korean-rocket-launch>
“Japan to Order N. Korean Rocket Destruction to Prepare for Failure,” *Kyodo News*, March 27, 2009, URL: <http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/3151494>

^[17] Sam Kim, “N. Korean Rocket Shown Fully Mounted in Commercial Satellite Image,” *Yonhap*, March 30, 2009, URL: <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2009/03/30/3/0401000000AEN20090330003100315F.HTML>

^[18] Mike Mount, “North Korea is Fueling Rocket, U.S. Military Says,” *CNN.com*, April 1, 2009, URL: <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/04/01/north.korea.rocket/index.html>

^[19] David Morgan, “North Korea Missile Shows Sign of Satellite Payload – U.S.,” *Reuters*, April 1, 2009, URL: http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2009/4/1/worldupdates/2009-04-01T030602Z_01_NOOTR_RTRMDNC_0_-388132-2&sec=Worldupdates

^[20] Sam Kim, “N. Korean Satellite Same Threat as Missile: Defense Chief,” *Yonhap*, April 1, 2009, URL: <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2009/04/01/0301000000AEN20090401009900315.HTML>

[21] Sam Kim, "N. Korea Set to Launch Rocket in Hours," *Yonhap*, April 4, 2009, URL: <http://english.siamdailynews.com/asia-news/eastern-asia-news/korea-news/north-korea-news/north-korea-set-to-launch-rocket-in-hours.html>

[22] "N. Korea Notified U.S., China, Russia of Launch Time," *Chosun Ilbo*, April 7, 2009, URL: <http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200904/200904070024.html>

[23] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "Launch Failure Frustrates North Korea's Missile Aspirations," *Janes Defence Weekly*, April 7, 2009, URL: http://search.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jdw/history/jdw2009/jdw39507.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=joseph%20bermudez&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JDW&

[24] See: "North Korea's Missile Flew 500 Miles Farther Than it was Expected," *Pravda*, April 13, 2009, URL: http://english.pravda.ru/world/asia/13-04-2009/107390-North_Korea_missile-0
N. Korea Rocket 'Flew Farther Than Previously Thought,' *Chosun Ilbo*, April 13 2009, URL: <http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200904/200904130006.html>

[25] Julian E. Barnes and Greg Miller, "North Korea Shows Progress in Mastering Missile Technology," *Los Angeles Times*, April 6, 2009, URL: <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-north-korea-missile6-2009apr06,0,4471509.story>

[26] Sam Kim, "S. Korea Considers N. Korean Rocket Launch Step Forward in Missile Capability," *Yonhap*, April 6, 2009, URL: <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2009/04/06/97/0301000000AEN20090406006900315F.HTML>

[27] Yoo Jee-ho, "North's Rocket Shows Improved Technology," *Joongang Ilbo*, April 7, 2009, URL: <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2903232>

[28] See: Sam Kim, "N. Korea Deployed Top Air, Naval Forces to Guard Rocket Launch," *Yonhap*, April 8, 2009, URL: <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2009/04/05/66/0301000000AEN20090405008200315F.HTML>
"N. Korean Jet Crashed in East Sea Before Rocket Launch, Gov't Source," *Yonhap*, April 9, 2009, URL: <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2009/04/09/0401000000AEN20090409009100320.HTML>

[29] See: "UN Security Council Condemns North Korean Rocket Launch," *AFP*, April 14, 2009, URL: http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/422132/1.html
"No Security Council Agreement on NKorea Launch," *AFP*, April 5, 2009, URL: http://rawstory.com/news/afp/No_Security_Council_agreement_on_NK_04052009.html
Kim Sue-young, "China, Russia Wants to Keep 6-Way Talks Alive," *Korea Times*, April 7, 2009, URL: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/04/113_42759.html
"Full Text of U.N. Security Council's Statement on N. Korean Rocket Launch," *Yonhap*, April 13, 2009, URL: <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2009/04/14/0200000000AEN20090414000500315.HTML>

[30] See: Jon Herskovitz, "North Korea Orders U.N. Inspectors Out," *Reuters*, April 14, 2009, URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20090414/wl_nm/us_korea_north
"DPRK to Withdraw From Six-Party Talks," *Xinhua*, April 14, 2009, URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/14/content_11183813.htm

[31] See: Breffni O'Rourke, "Rocket Launch, Reelection Boost Kim Jong Il's Standing," *Radio Free Europe*, April 9, 2009, URL: http://www.rferl.org/content/Rocket_Launch_Boosts_Supreme_Leaders_Standing/1605612.html
Jack Kim, "Scenarios: How Far Will North Korea Raise Tensions?" *Reuters*, March 26, 2009, URL: <http://uk.news.yahoo.com/22/20090326/tpl-uk-korea-north-scenarios-sb-81f3b62.html>
Matthew Lee, "North Korean Missile Launch Tests Obama," *Associated Press*, April 5, 2009, URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090405/ap_on_go_pr_wh/us_nkorea

^[32] See: Stephanie Griffith, "Iran Present at North Korean Missile Launch Says US," *AFP*, July 20, 2006, URL:

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Iran_Present_At_North_Korea_Missile_Launch_Says_US_999.html

Gordon C. Chang, "A Missile Shot for Iran," *Manilla Times*, April 8, 2009, URL:

<http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2009/april/08/yehey/opinion/20090408opi7.html>

Jeff Stein, "U.S. Claim that Iran Attended Launch Would be Explosive – If True," *Congressional Quarterly*, July 28, 2006, URL: http://public.cq.com/public/20060728_homeland.html

^[33] For details of North Korean proliferation of missiles to Iran, See: "North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program: Chronology of North Korea's Missile Trade and Developments," *James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies*, 1980-1999, URL:

http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_north_korea/chr8089.htm

Kevin Kane, "Iran and North Korea's Military Relations: Trading with Terrorists?" *Daily NK*, February 5, 2007, URL: <http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?catId=nk00300&num=1638>

IV. Nautilus invites your responses

The Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network invites your responses to this essay. Please send responses to: bscott@nautilus.org. Responses will be considered for redistribution to the network only if they include the author's name, affiliation, and explicit consent.