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Ref: (a) SM 408-59 of 17 April 1959

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# PART I

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PART I

CHAPTER I

THE STATE OF READINESS OF U.S. FORCES

Twice during 1961 elements of PACOM forces were alerted for imminent combat action and combat units were pre-positioned in the Philippines, on Okinawa, or in the South China Sea. Equipment was loaded, and planes and ships stood by ready to move forces into Southeast Asia immediately upon receiving an order to execute existing plans. Although U.S. PACOM forces engaged in no armed hostilities during the year, they watched over an uneasy peace. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The Commander in Chief Pacific accepted as his main responsibility during 1961 the maintenance of the PACOM Armed Forces in a high state of morale and readiness. It was this force of approximately 375,000 men, organized and trained for fighting, upon which CINCPAC relied to carry out his mission of containing communism and protecting the vital areas in the Pacific Ocean. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Chapter 1 describes first the Communist Bloc forces that threatened to pour out over all the rest of the free peoples of Asia and destroy their freedoms. It then describes the U.S. Forces that contained the spread of communism, and CINCPAC's activities to support these PACOM Forces, and to maintain their state of readiness. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMUNIST FORCE STRENGTH CHANGES

As in previous years, the USSR was responsible during 1961 for the most important development in the Communist Bloc military posture. Although further reductions were made in Soviet personnel strength, there was significant improvement in the operational capability of missile weapon systems, as well as improvement in the quality of other weapons and equipment. 1

1. Information for this section was taken from a paper prepared by the CINCPAC J2 Division, titled, "Significant Military/Technological Developments in Far East Communist Bloc in 1960. (S)(In J046 files)
The Soviet Pacific Fleet added to its inventory two DDGs and two missile-configured submarines, thereby increasing its missile capability. Additional qualitative improvements were evidenced in the appearance in the Pacific of four new submarines --- two of which belonged to a long range attack class, one was a missile tracking, and one was estimated to be a nuclear-powered submarine. In a continuing program to test and develop its weapon system, the USSR conducted eight research and development or operational ICBM firings into the mid Pacific. It was estimated that during the year 24 MRBM launchers were deployed to the Soviet Far East. The confirmation of 13 surface-to-air missile sites in the Komsomol'sk, Sovetskaya Gavan, Vladivostok, Spassk Dalniy, and Irkutsk areas contributed significantly to the improvement of air defense for these areas. This brought the total SAM sites in the Soviet Far East to 14.

The Soviets advanced their technology in the nuclear weapon field during 1961 as a result of detonating 45 nuclear devices. This could mean an improvement in the yield-to-weight ratio for all weapons capable of being delivered by Soviet weapon systems. Some of the Soviet tests were believed to be connected with anti-missile and anti-satellite systems, which were under development in the USSR.

Chinese Communist ground forces showed a loss of eight divisions during 1961. There was a corresponding decrease in personnel strength. The reduction was not construed as a change of Red Chinese defense policies but rather as a reflection of existing needs. The Chinese Communist Navy added one "W" class submarine to its inventory and registered a slight increase in personnel. Of more significance -- for the first time the Chinese Communists included missiles among their weapons. A launch complex, consisting of probable surface-to-surface missile launch test sites and a surface-to-air missile site, was reported at Tien Tsung Ta Wan; and three surface-to-air missile sites were reported at Peiping.
### FAR EAST COMMUNIST BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH CHANGES DURING 1981

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<th>Ground Personnel</th>
<th>Ground Changes</th>
<th>Navy Personnel</th>
<th>Navy Changes</th>
<th>Air Personnel</th>
<th>Air Changes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>355,000</td>
<td>-20,000</td>
<td>1,048,500</td>
<td>-10,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHICOM</td>
<td>80,000</td>
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<td>71,000</td>
<td>+1,500</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>N. KOREA</td>
<td>329,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. VIETNAM</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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#### PACAIR MILITARY STRENGTH CHANGES DURING 1981

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<td>Numbered Fleets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attack Carriers (CVAs)</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Support Carriers (CVS)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers (CG)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers (DD, DE, DL, DCE)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines (SS)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polar Vessels (OE/DER)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>+9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare Vessels (MSV, AMMV, AAMV)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amphibious Warfare Ships</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>+9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air AB MS (VF)</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Air AB MS (VI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carrier Air Groups (CVW)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>+1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carrier ASW Groups (CVAS)</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fleet Air Forces (U.S. Navy/DV/TF)</td>
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<td>0</td>
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Fig. 2

### FIG. 3

Fig. 3
In North Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) navy had a small increase in the number of subchasers. The North Vietnamese Air Force still had no combat aircraft, but there was continuing evidence of DRV pilots being trained in North Vietnam and elsewhere in the Bloc. The Soviet airlift from North Vietnam into Laos undoubtedly provided the DRV air force with valuable experience in air support operations.

In North Korea, the air force registered a substantial decrease in its jet light bomber inventory, and a moderate decrease in jet fighters. There was a moderate reduction in the number of naval craft, but the personnel strength of the navy remained unchanged.

Air defense of the entire Far East Communist Bloc was improved by the addition of radar sites and additional modern radar and communication equipment.

A summary of principle strength figures in Communist Bloc order of battle, and the 1961 changes in these forces is shown in Figure 2.

U.S. FORCES DURING 1960

All services showed increases in military personnel during 1961. The year-end total exceeded the comparable 1960 figure by approximately 40,000. The largest part of this figure, however, was an increase in the Pacific Fleet strength, to reflect units stationed on the West Coast of the United States but available to CINCPAC, from 391,987 in 1960 to 431,979 on the last day of 1961. Marines assigned to Fleet Marine Force Pacific were included in Navy strength figures. By comparison, the strength of the U.S. Army Pacific rose from 80,482 in 1960 to 89,062, and the Pacific Air Force from 59,290 to 61,220 at the end of 1961.

No additional Army or Air Force units of significant size were assigned to the PACOM during the year; increases in strengths principally reflected attempts to maintain units already assigned.
PACIFIC COMMAND MILITARY PERSONNEL

MAJOR CONCENTRATIONS BY SERVICE

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1961

LEGEND

- ARMY
- NAVY
- MARINE CORPS
- AIR FORCE

SOURCE: JIII
at authorized strength. Military personnel stationed on Okinawa totalled approximately 2,500 more than in the previous year, and there was a similar increase in Korea. Smaller increases were made in MAAG strengths in Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. On the other hand, military strength declined significantly on Hawaii, the Marianas Islands, and on Midway Island.

The distribution and strengths of all PACOM military personnel are shown graphically by Figure 4.

COMMAND RELATIONS AND ORGANIZATION

There were no significant changes during 1961 to the command organization within PACOM. As the commander of the Unified Command, CINCPAC exercised operational command authority over all forces assigned. His general area of responsibility was the Pacific Ocean including the islands, the Eastern Indian Ocean area, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the countries of Southeast Asia, and the Bering Sea (less the Aleutian and other islands).¹

CINCPAC exercised operational command through three Service Component Commanders (Commander in Chief U.S. Army Pacific; Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet; and the Commander in Chief Pacific Air Forces), through three commanders of subordinate unified commands (Commander U.S. Forces, Korea; Commander U.S. Forces, Japan; and Commander U.S. Taiwan Defense Command), through three Representatives of the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPACREPS) and through Chiefs of Military Assistance Advisory Groups or similar organizations, of which there were ten. CINCPACREPS were located in the Philippines at Sangleay Point; at Ft. Buckner, Okinawa; and at Agana, Guam. There were Military Assistance Advisory Groups located at Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Tokyo, Japan; Vientiane, Laos; Taipei, Taiwan; and Saigon, South Vietnam. Joint U.S. Military Advisory Groups were located in

¹ CINCPAC INST 003020.2B, 16 Aug 61 (S)
PACIFIC COMMAND ORGANIZATION
1961
COMMANDER IN CHIEF

CINC

USARPAC
I.D. WHITE
J. D. COLLINS
J. W. SIDES
ADMIRAL, USN
ADMIRAL, USN
ADMIRAL, USN

CINC PACFLT

ADMIRAL, USN

CINC PACAF
E.D. O'DOHERTY, JR.
CINC MABDO

CONUS

KOREA
C. D. HAGNER
ADMIRAL, USA

TAIWAN DEFCON
C. S. MELBY
ADMIRAL, USA

CONUS

J. W. SMITH
ADMIRAL, USA

J. E. SMITH
ADMIRAL, USN

J. H. MABUS
ADMIRAL, USN

CINCPAC

RTULUS

P. W. CARAWAY
ADMIRAL, USA

J. H. MABUS
ADMIRAL, USA

CINCPAC

PHILIPPINES

J. R. CARSON
ADMIRAL, USA

D. J. WILSON
ADMIRAL, USA

CINCPAC

NARDO

J. S. COSTE, JR.
ADMIRAL, USA

J. S. COSTE, JR.
ADMIRAL, USA

CINCPAC

KOREA
V. H. R asm
ADMIRAL, USA

CINCPAC

VIETNAM
D. C. RALSTON
ADMIRAL, USA

CINCPAC

CAMBODIA
D. C. RALSTON
ADMIRAL, USA

CINCPAC

THAILAND
D. C. RALSTON
ADMIRAL, USA

CINCPAC

LAOS
D. C. RALSTON
ADMIRAL, USA

Figure 5
Thailand and in the Philippines. The military assistance organization in Burma was known as the Military Equipment Delivery Team and located in Rangoon. In Indonesia the organization was called the Military Technical Advisory Group, and located in Djakarta. The chiefs of all of the above MAAGs and similar groups were under the direct command of CINCPAC. A special situation existed in the case of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea (Provisional) in Seoul. CINCPAC exercised control over Military Assistance Program matters in Korea through COMUS Korea who, in turn, exercised control through CHPROVMAAG Korea, and through the chiefs of the Army Advisory Group (K MAG), the Navy Advisory Group (NAVADGRU), and the Air Force Advisory Group (AFADGRU).

ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE CINCPAC STAFF ORGANIZATION

During 1961 - a year when the reaction time for U.S. Armed Forces was further reduced - CINCPAC stressed improvements in staff organization, methods, and equipment. Much of his effort in this direction was devoted to creating a communication system that would serve the widely dispersed PACOM forces, and in adapting electronic computers to military requirements. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Establishment of PACOM War Games Branch

During the middle of January, the PACOM War Games Control Group was established on a temporary basis at the Kunia Facility. The mission assigned was to conduct a two-sided war game of the Single Integrated Operational Plan-62 in the PACOM area of interest. Originally, personnel for the group were provided by CINCPAC and Component Commanders on a temporary duty basis. However, when submitting the 1 July 1961 Joint Table of Distribution (JTD), for JCS approval, CINCPAC asked for 20 officers, eight enlisted men, and one civilian for assignment on a permanent basis. ¹ The JCS limited

¹ 1. CINCPAC ltr to JCS, 31 May 61, Ser: 0352 (C)
the total increase for which CINCPAC had asked, so that it was necessary to reduce the War Games Control Group to a total of 21 personnel. (See following section).

During October the War Games Group, which had operated under the immediate supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, was redesignated as the War Games Branch of the Operations Division.¹

CINCPAC Revised JTD

On 31 May 1961, CINCPAC submitted to the JCS his revised JTD, 1 July 1961, which included a request for 72 additional spaces - 33 officers, 38 EM and one civilian. Of this number, 29 spaces were required for the newly created War Games Control Group.² The JCS authorized an increase of only 40 spaces and asked that a revised JTD be submitted.³ This was done during September and approval was received from the JCS in October, at which time the authorized headquarters strength was 278 officers, 296 enlisted personnel, and 3 civilians.⁴ At the end of 1961 the CINCPAC staff was making the annual review of the JTD prior to submission of a revised JTD early in 1962. In this regard, CINCPAC directed his staff to make a critical review of all mobilization personnel requirements to reduce them to realistic and practical levels. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Changes Within the CINCPAC Staff

Comparatively few changes were made to the staff during 1961. The more important changes were:

The Nuclear Weapons Branch (J34) of the Operations Division was disestablished effective 22 May and the personnel and responsibilities of that branch were distributed among the Operations, Intelligence and Plans Divisions.⁵ (UNCLASSIFIED)

¹ CINCPAC INST 003500.5, CH. 2, of 5 Oct 61 (S)
² CINCPAC ltr to JCS 31 May 61, Ser: 0352 (C)
³ JCS Memo 880-61 of 11 Aug 61 (C)
⁴ JCS 122050Z Oct 61 (C)
⁵ CINCPAC Notice 5400 of 19 May 61 (U)
After the completion during May of the New Command Center, the Command Center Section of the Current Operations Branch was made a separate branch of the Operations Division and designated the Command Center Branch. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Lt. Gen. Verdi B. Barnes, U.S.A. assumed the duties of CINCPAC Chief of Staff on 12 May 61, relieving Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley. The assignment of an Army officer to this post was the result of a Secretary of Defense decision that the position of Chief of Staff should be filled by officers other than Navy. (UNCLASSIFIED)


Brig. Gen. Douglas E. Williams, USAF, assumed the duties on 10 July of Assistant Chief of Staff for the Communications-Electronics Division after the JCS had upgraded that position from a colonel to brigadier general. 1 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Minister E.W. Martin assumed the duties of Political Adviser in August 1961 relieving Minister S.J. Cottrell. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Colonel Edwin A. Machen, Jr., U.S.A. assumed the duties of Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel in June 1961 relieving Colonel Carl K. Warren, Jr., U.S.A. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Colonel Harry O. Patte son, USAF assumed the duties of Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence in June 1961 relieving Colonel Prentiss D. Wynne, Jr., USAF. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CINCPAC ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE HIS COMMAND FACILITIES

Development of Computer and EAM Facilities for CINCPAC Use

Continued progress was made in 1961 on an important undertaking started in 1959 by which CINCPAC hoped to improve his day-to-day operation and to speed the flow of information needed for making decisions under emergency conditions. This was the development of a

1. JCS 242223 Z Apr 61 cite JCS 553-505 (U)
multi-computer integrated electronic data processing system using computer programs in five subject matter areas -- intelligence, operations, logistics, communications and weather. The computer system, to be located at the Kunia facility, was being designed for support and to assist CINCPAC in exercising operational command of PACOM forces.

At Camp Smith, a system design was also started on a data facility principally for use in the management of the more than $800 million a year Military Assistance Program for which CINCPAC was responsible.

**EAM Support for MAP:**

CINCPAC became responsible for detailed MAP planning and programming as a result of the 1959 Draper Committee recommendations. The task was expanded during 1961 by provisions of the Military Assistance Manual, which contained requirements for detailed statements of equipment authorization; a list of country assets by individual line item; a computation for each separate line item required to show authorization, consumption, net assets, phased funding and deliveries; and other data. In order to meet these requirements, MAAG staffs and the CINCPAC staff became involved in the preparation and review of thousands of forms. To speed up the process, CINCPAC converted some of the data submitted by the MAAGs to an EAM file from which the CINCPAC MAP Program and Plan was prepared for submission to OSD.

The need for an improved data processing system increased as the result of a 1961 decision by Admiral Felt to shift the burden of preparing MAP programs and other administrative work to his own headquarters from the MAAG staffs, which would then be free to devote more time to "field" work.  

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1. Memo From J00 to J5, CINCPAC, Subj: Reduction of Paper Work for CHMAAGs, 6 Nov 61 (U)
At the end of 1961, CINCPAC was planning further mechanization to increase the accuracy of plan and program data, and to facilitate program changes. The immediate objective was to expand the Camp Smith facility to include the use of a small computer for processing the MAP Data File. The objective for the period after the FY63-68 MAP program submission, provided the necessary resources were authorized, was to allow CINCPAC to work with DOD from machine records that would be continuously up to date. Under this system, the MAAGs would initiate a change as the need arose, and approved transactions would be processed into PACOM data files as they occurred.  

Computer Facilities at Kunia:

There was steady progress during 1961 toward development of an integrated multi-computer system for installation at the Kunia facility. On 9 January, CINCPAC furnished CNO the requirements for the Kunia computer system, and during February established criteria for a computer installation to provide interim support. From these criteria, representatives from the David Taylor Model Basin, which had responsibility for analysis and programming, selected an IBM 704 computer to meet CINCPAC's interim requirements. The equipment was installed in June.

The selection of equipment for the Phase II computer installation developed a controversy between CINCPAC and CNO on one side, and Bureau of Ships on the other. The Phase II integrated computer system to be installed in Kunia in 1963-64 was expected to be the first of its kind for military use. It would provide for five Control Data Corporation (CDC) 160A and four 1604 general purpose digital computers integrated through a switching exchange into one system complex. CINCPAC and CNO supported the use of an electronic matrix

1. CINCPAC 010203Z Dec 61 (C)
switching concept to tie the computers to the input/output equipment. BUSHIPS opposed selection of the electronic switching matrix, and retained the Auerbach Corporation to study the problem and recommend the appropriate switching mechanism. Auerbach Corporation recommended the use of a matrix switch made up in two parts -- the basic switching to be done by a millisecond device with microsecond controls at the input/output devices. The matter was referred eventually to the Secretary of the Navy who decided in favor of the BUSHIPS/Auerbach proposal. Accordingly, the system hardware contract with the Control Data Corporation was modified to permit the redesign and development of the system switching equipment along the lines proposed by Auerbach Corporation.

Toward the end of 1961, as his staff became aware of the urgency for development of programs to use the automatic data processing equipment (ADP), CINCPAC initiated planning aimed at consolidating all staff assets involved in analysis and programming for the ADP system. This alignment would permit one organizational unit to provide computer programming support for the entire staff.
Camp H. M. Smith Command Facilities

Construction of a command center at Camp Smith commenced during 1960. The $385,000 project, for facilities from which CINCPAC would exercise command of PACOM forces under all conditions short of general war, was completed during April 1961. The CINCPAC Command Center relocation was completed on 20 April, and the first official staff meeting was held there four days later.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

The District Public Works Office, 14th Naval District completed a study early in 1961 on emergency power requirements for Camp Smith and recommended the installation of three 100 KW emergency generators to meet the requirements. This installation was partially complete at the end of the year. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Upon completion of the new Command Center at Camp Smith, the basement area previously used for this purpose was remodeled to accommodate the CINCPAC Communications Center, which moved to this area early in October. In turn, CNO made available to CINCPAC funds to remodel the old Communications Center area for use as a top secret vault. Construction was not scheduled until 1962.

(UNCLASSIFIED)
Selection of CINCPAC Alternate Headquarters

During October 1960 the JCS directed CINCPAC to activate by 1 July 1961 an alternate headquarters from which CINCPAC command functions could be exercised in case facilities on Oahu were destroyed. Prior to the completion of the underground headquarters facilities at Kunia, the Headquarters of the Commander Western Sea Frontier had been designated as CINCPAC Alternate Headquarters.

After considering several possibilities, CINCPAC tentatively selected Guam as the location for an alternate headquarters for continuity of command, and directed that a survey be made of communication facilities there. The choice of Guam became final after the survey indicated that with some minor modifications the communications facilities at Guam could support a CINCPAC command element on an austere basis.

During October 1961, a group headed by General E. E. Partridge, USAF, visited CINCPAC Headquarters in connection with a survey of the conditions of the national command and control system. As a result of this visit, the recommendation was made to provide CINCPAC with an alternate command headquarters afloat, the concept of which was under study.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Planning for military operations in the PACOM area was conducted under three separate conditions — basis when the employment of only U.S. troops was anticipated, as coordinated or combined planning when forces of other sovereign countries were involved, and as a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Planning that fell within the latter two categories is described in Chapter III; only unilateral CINCPAC plans are described in this section. (UNCLASSIFIED)

With the exception of Berlin contingency plans prepared during 1961 and OPLAN 62-61, all CINCPAC unilateral operation plans during

1. JCS 202104Z Oct 60 (S)
1961 were prepared to support the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). A revised JSCP, covering the period 30 July 1961 to 30 June 1962, was received at CINCPAC Headquarters on 3 January 1961, and became the basis for rewriting the CINCPAC General War Operation Plan 1-61, and the PACOM Cold War Operation Plan 70-61. Minor revisions were made to other unilateral plans. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Unilateral CINCPAC plans were designed to cover three general conditions -- general war, limited war, and cold war in which operations fell short of overt hostilities. The 12 principal CINCPAC Operation Plans for 1961 are described below and shown graphically on accompanying charts. (UNCLASSIFIED)

OPLAN 1-61

This was the general war plan for PACOM in the event of a general war between the U.S. and the USSR during the period April 1961 to June 1962. The plan, with Annexes A, B, and C, was promulgated on 26 January 1961 and superseded CINCPAC's General Emergency Operation Plan 1-58. The plan anticipated a general war initiated by the Soviets without warning, or one resulting from hostilities short of general war which were not intended by either side to lead to a general war. CINCPAC's mission in a general war was to defend the U.S. and other vital areas of the western hemisphere from attack through the Pacific, and concurrently to assist in defeating the Soviet-Sino Bloc.

The most significant change in the new plan was the inclusion of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) which became effective in April of 1961. Incorporating the objectives of the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy, the SIOP governed all attacks on all targets listed in the National Strategic Target List (NSTL), determined the targets to be attacked, the effort against each target consistent with the worth of the target, and integrated individual strikes for mutual support through the establishment of attack corridors, timing, and by other means.
## PACIFIC COMMAND
### MISSION AND TASKS
*AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1961*

**MISSION**
CONDUCT A STRATEGIC DEFENSE BY EXPLOITING OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES IN ORDER TO DEFEND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

*PROTECT RESOURCES, AREAS, BASES AND LOCATIONS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASKS</th>
<th>DIRECTIVE</th>
<th>CINC PAC PLAN TO ACCOMPLISH</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP)</td>
<td>I-61 General War Plan</td>
<td>Military forces of the US and USSR must be overtly engaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Support of internal uprisings and revolutions</td>
<td>JSCP 22-60 Support of Internal Uprisings and Revolutions</td>
<td>Provides military support to the British in the evacuation of Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Coordinate with the British on plans for the evacuation of Hong Kong</td>
<td>JSCP 23-61 Evacuation of Hong Kong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Defend Taiwan and the Philippines</td>
<td>JSCP 25-60 Defense of Taiwan</td>
<td>Now in Phase I: Patrol and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Be prepared to blockade the China coast</td>
<td>JSCP 26-60 Control of Maritime Traffic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Defend Korea</td>
<td>JSCP 27-60 Defense of Korea</td>
<td>The extent of operations in Korea are not to prejudice the primary task of securing Japan, Cimawa and the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Conduct Antisubmarine Operations and JSCP Control and maintain and Lines of Communications</td>
<td>JSCP 28-61 ASW &amp; Control &amp; Protection of Shipping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Conduct mining operations in Pacific Ocean &amp; the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean and waters contiguous there</td>
<td>JSCP 31-61 Pacific Mining Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Repel proposed Communist aggression or insurgency in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>JSCP 32-65 Defense of Mainland SE Asia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>In coordination with the State Department protect and evacuate U.S. nationals and U.S. sponsored non-combatants</td>
<td>JSCP 62-64 Protection and Evacuation of non-combatants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Support and promote U.S. interests and deter Communist aggression</td>
<td>JSCP 70-61 Cold War Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** JSI
PACIFIC COMMAND
MISSION AND TASKS

- Protect sea communications in Alaskan waters
- Insure operation DEW line Umnak-Midway
- Defend the U.S.
- Defend Pacific approaches to Panama Canal
- Provide for external defense of Philippines
- Counter Communist aggression or insurgency
- Assist in defense of Australia & New Zealand
- Assist in maintaining security of Japan
- Evacuation
- Cold War plan
- Miners Operations
- Prepare to blockade China coast
- Defend Taiwan
- Internal uprisings
- Defend in Korea
- Coordinate with British on plans for evacuation of Hong Kong
Ten annexes to OPLAN 1-61 were promulgated and forwarded to the JCS during March and April. Two of these -- Annex M, Cover and Deception, and Annex H, Reconnaissance -- were new and the others were revisions of annexes from the superseded plan for general war. Included in this group was Annex E, the Nuclear Planning Data and Target Lists for General War, which correlated the broad statements of nuclear objectives and priorities contained in Annex B (Concept of Operations) for general war with the CINCPAC target lists for general war.

The annex defined the fixed targets to be destroyed during the initial nuclear attack and those targets that would require a prescribed level of destruction or neutralization during operations following the initial nuclear attack. The revised Annex E contained the following major changes from the previous version: Only general war initial nuclear operations and subsequent operation tasks were treated; the concept of operations and philosophical guidance was contained in the basic plan rather than in the annex; detailed coordination instructions were contained in the CINCPAC SOP for Nuclear Operations 1-61 rather than in the Annex; the mobile target list was omitted; and the unconventional warfare list was omitted.

CINCPAC OPLAN 22-60

Operations Plan 22-60 was CINCPAC's unilateral outline plan providing for U.S. support of revolutionary outbreaks that might occur within either North Korea or Communist China. The plan depended upon COMUSTDC and COMUS Korea, in coordination with CIA personnel, to determine whether or not plans to support internal uprisings were in existence in the two countries, and whether or not such plans were realistic and in consonance with U.S. policy as set forth in the plan.
Only minor changes were made to the plan during 1961.

CINCPAC OPLAN 23-61

Promulgated on 7 August 1961, Operations Plan 23-61 superseded Plan 23-57. The plan provided for U.S. military operations in support of British forces during a forced withdrawal from Hong Kong. The concept of these operations anticipated support for a withdrawal; participation by U.S. forces in the active defense of Hong Kong would be as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Annex E (Nuclear Operations) to this operation plan was promulgated on 27 December 1961.

CINCPAC OPLAN 25-60

Plan 25-60 provided for U.S. participation, in coordination with the forces of the Republic of China, in the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus Islands. It also provided for U.S. participation in the defense of the Matsu and Kinmen Island Groups if and as directed by appropriate U.S. authority.

Two annexes were revised during 1961 -- Annex Q, Civil Affairs, and Annex N, Unconventional Warfare. Both superseded previously prepared annexes. The latter delineated responsibilities for Operational use and support of PACOM UW forces, and established requirements for the conduct and support of unconventional warfare in the defense of Taiwan, the Penghus, and, as required, the principal offshore islands.

CINCPAC OPLAN 26-60

OPLAN 26-60 was one of several CINCPAC plans by which the U.S. would control maritime traffic in the Pacific Command area and the East Indian Ocean in reprisal for, and to counter, communist interference or other actions inimical to U.S. interests and prestige.

1. CINCPAC OPLAN 22-60 dtd 27 Jun 60, Annex B, Ser: 000124. (TS)
The operations envisaged under this plan were varied and included harassment, blockade, surveillance, seizure, and destruction of Bloc ships in the PACOM area. Operations of this type were for conditions short of general war and, although developed for unilateral U.S. action, did not preclude participation by Allied forces.

Similar operations were included in the U.S. Berlin Contingency Plans and set forth in CINCPAC's OPLAN 91A-61, and in CINCPAC OPLANS 28-61 and 31-61.

Two changes were made to Plan 26-60 during 1961. The scope of the plan was broadened to include the USSR among the Asian communist nations (Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam) that made up the enemy forces. The mission was also extended. Previously the mission was to "Conduct military operations to control maritime traffic in those portions of the Pacific Ocean and its tributaries contiguous to the Asian mainland and deny one or more of the Asian Communist nations access to the sea." The wording was changed to "Conduct military operations to control maritime traffic in the PACOM area and deny one or more of the Asian Communist nations (including the USSR) access to the sea."

**CINCPAC OPLAN 27-60**

The only significant change made to OPLAN 27-60 during 1961 was to the Intelligence Annex, which was revised to reflect numerous changes, especially those that occurred following the fall of the Korean government headed by Syngman Rhee. The plan provided for U.S. participation in military operations in Korea, in conjunction with ROK forces and available UN forces, in the event the communist renewed aggression against South Korea. Besides the JCS Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the Unified Command Plan, OPLAN 27-60 was based on UN resolutions regarding UN military assistance to the ROK, the Mutual Defense Treaty and other agreements between the U.S. and the ROK, and the Declaration of the Sixteen Nations Relating to the Armistice, 27 July 1953. Annex E (Nuclear Operations) to this operation plan was promulgated on 31 August 1961.
CINCPAC OPLAN 31-61

This plan provided for offensive mining operations in the Pacific Ocean, the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean, and adjoining waters. The provisions of the plan were to be in support of CINCPAC operations under a general war situation as well as under conditions short of general war. Some of the provisions of this plan were also made a part of the Berlin contingency operation plans prepared by CINCPAC.

OPLAN 28-61

CINCPAC OPLAN 28-61, the plan for anti-submarine warfare and control and protection of shipping, was updated during 1961 and promulgated on 14 August. The area in which the plan was effective was the Pacific Ocean, the Bering Sea, the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean, and contiguous waters.

During peacetime, the objectives of the plan generally were to determine Sino-Soviet submarine capabilities and to keep their operations under surveillance, and to counter the threat to the U.S. of a submarine launched missile attack. These objectives would be expanded during limited war to include the protection of friendly shipping and operations to prevent the effective use of enemy submarines. In general war, the mission would include destruction of enemy missile launching submarines.

The most significant change made during 1961 to the plan was the addition of Maritime Rules of Engagement as Annex C. Another change, dated 14 September, to the Concept of Operations contained in Annex A established broad anti-submarine warfare (ASW) readiness conditions to replace PACOM defense readiness conditions. This was done because ASW operations were planned to cover conditions ranging from cold war operations to general war, and in recognition of the fact that ASW operations could expand suddenly while other type of military action were being held in restraint.

This plan, together with CINCPAC OPLANS 26-60 and 31-61, were the existing plans for the conduct of various military as well as non-military
techniques available to the U.S. against the Soviet Union in a way calculated to force the USSR to enter into negotiations within a frame of reference acceptable to the United States. The maritime military operations that CINCPAC could prescribe in furtherance of such a strategy were: harassment, blockade, surveillance, interception and examination, denial of bloc shipping to the U.S., establishment of ASW patrols, intensification of ASW surveillance by HUK forces, seizure and repossession of lend-lease ships, seizure of trawlers, seizure or destruction of all bloc ships in the PACOM area, intensification of reconnaissance, denial of critical sea routes to Bloc shipping, establishment of a large missile impact area in PACOM for the purpose of harassment, and the harassment of Bloc aircraft in the PACOM area.

**CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59**

One of the more important CINCPAC plans, OPLAN 32-59 was the unilateral plan providing for the defense of mainland Southeast Asia under conditions of conflict short of general war. The purpose of the plan was to deter communist aggression and to deal with communist controlled insurgency or external aggression through the use of indigenous forces and resources combined with mobile U.S. and other Allied forces. For this plan, mainland Southeast Asia consisted of Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Burma, Malaya, and Singapore.

The general concept of operations under OPLAN 32-59 provided for a continuous, integrated operation to counter the entire span of communist activities from subversion through overt external aggression.

The plan dealt with four phases. Phase I was a condition of alert that would exist until one of the other phases was directed. Phase II, the insurgency phase, was to extend from the time the U.S. made the decision to initiate U.S. military action against communist insurgency until stability and friendly control were reestablished, or until the conflict was expanded by overt external aggression by a communist
force. It was anticipated that the U.S. would intervene only upon a request for U.S. or SEATO assistance. Planning for Phase II consisted of detailed and separate plans for action in either Laos or in South Vietnam, and also recognized that PACOM forces could be required to conduct or participate in counter-insurgency operations in other areas of mainland Southeast Asia.

Phase III would commence with external aggression by North Vietnam, and Phase IV with external aggression by Communist China. In either case, the objective of U.S. action would be to stop aggression as quickly as possible, and to liberate North Vietnam and reunify Vietnam under a government friendly to the United States.

The principal supporting plans for CINCPAC 32-59 were those prepared by the three Component Commanders, and three supporting plans prepared by the Commander of Joint Task Force 116 -- one for Phase II Laos, one for Phase II South Vietnam, and a separate plan for Phases III and IV. All of these plans were completed and approved by CINCPAC. All annexes for CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59 were completed and PACOM forces were prepared throughout 1961 and capable of executing all supporting plans.

Only minor changes were made to OPLAN 32-59 during 1961. Some planning was done in connection with requests by CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF for authority to preposition ammunition and equipment in Southeast Asia in preparation for the execution of OPLAN 32-59. In an effort to reduce his logistical requirements, CINCPACAF asked during October for authority to preposition certain items in South Vietnam. Working through the CHMAAC Vietnam and the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, CINCPAC obtained approval from the Government of South Vietnam to stockpile ammunition and equipment, and CINCPACAF designated the 13th Air Force as his agent to work out the details.

1. CINCPACAF 140110Z Oct cite 61-166 (TS)
2. CINCPACAF 042140Z Nov 61 (TS)
In July, CINCUSARPAC proposed prestocking approximately 584 tons of ammunition in Thailand for initial airlifted U.S. Army Forces in support of OPLAN 32-59. 1 CINCPAC relayed the proposal to the Department of the Army and to CHJUSMAG Thailand indicating his approval. Approved by the Department of the Army on 20 September, the project was expected to be completed by the middle of 1962. The construction of five storage buildings and of approximately a mile of access road was required. The prepositioning of 584 tons of ammunition was expected to reduce airlift requirements by 43 C-124 or C-130 sorties. 2

OPLAN 60-59

First promulgated in January 1959, OPLAN 60-59 delineated the tasks and responsibilities of military commanders within PACOM with respect to planning and operations for the emergency care and the evacuation of U.S. noncombatants. Besides supporting the JSCP and the JCS Unified Command Plan, OPLAN 60-59 was based upon the Memorandum of Agreement "State-Defense Policies and Procedures for the Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens Abroad in time of Emergency."

Supporting plans were in being, and PACOM forces were prepared to support the implementation of this plan. The only change made during 1961 was minor in nature, and concerned the authority to initiate the plan. 3

OPLAN 62-61

The only CINCPAC operations plan that did not directly support the JCS Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan was OPLAN 62-61. This plan provided for protecting the public welfare of the people of the State of Hawaii, the Territory of Guam, the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and American Samoa in the event a prolonged labor strike disrupted the flow of supplies essential for health, safety, and welfare.

1. Ltr Hq USARPAC GPPSU-PL of 22 May 61 (TS)
2. JCS SM626-40 of 20 Nov 61. See Appendix A to Incl A, Para 3. (TS)
During 1961 the plan was rewritten and brought up to date. The only significant change promulgated was to include a more exact definition of the responsibilities of civil officials with regard to using their own resources before appealing for military assistance. The plan set forth those measures to be taken by PACOM commanders in the event CINCPAC authorized the furnishing, or was directed by higher authority to furnish, emergency relief to civilians of the insular areas. (CENSORED)

OPLAN 70-61 -- The PACOM Cold War Plan

The CINCPAC Cold War Plan provided guidance for and assigned tasks to CINCPAC subordinate commanders to further the U.S. cold war objectives in the Pacific Area. Specifically, the U.S. cold war objectives for which PACOM forces were responsible for supporting were to:

Deter general and limited war without sacrificing national U.S. security interests.

Develop and maintain U.S. military power, which would permit the U.S. to negotiate from a position of strength and in general to avoid the necessity to counter each move in the Sino-Soviet offensive.

Take the initiative in promoting sound economic growth and political development in the Free World.

Accelerate changes in the character and policies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc regimes that would be in the best interest of the U.S.

Prevent communism from gaining political control of Free World nations by subversion or other means short of war.

Strengthen the integrity and unity of the Free World through the maintenance of a collective defense system that would serve both the U.S. and Allied interests and further their resolution to cope with all levels of the communist threat.

Gain a significant increase in industrial nations' contributions to progress and security of the Free World, to include intensified support and encouragement of sound economic progress in the less developed nations.
A significant aspect of the plan was the provision for using U.S. military personnel, their dependents and other civilians who were in contact with foreign personnel, to contribute to the cold war effort. The plan anticipated using the capabilities of U.S. military forces, consistent with other assigned missions, to reinforce and support U.S. overt and covert political, economic, psychological, technological and cultural measures in order to support and promote U.S. interests in the PACOM area, and at the same time to deter communist aggression.

OPLAN 70-61 was based on and supported the JSCP of 1 July 1961-30 June 1962, as well as the JCS SM1201-59 entitled "Military Activities During the Cold War." The plan was published in March 1961. At the end of 1961, supporting plans were still under development.

CINCPAC Berlin Contingency Plans

CINCPAC became involved in contingency planning to avert or cope with a Berlin crisis, and prepared, during September and October, a "90 series" of plans as part of the JCS Berlin plans. Early in August the JCS furnished CINCPAC an outline concept of military operations in case the communist interfered with the U.S. access to Berlin. 1 This was followed by specific planning actions in support of the then recently-determined U.S. position on Berlin. The JCS also asked CINCPAC to review his existing contingency plans in the light of the guidance contained in the two JCS papers and to advise the JCS by 23 August of: 2

The adequacy of existing CINCPAC plans to support the JCS guidance.

CINCPAC requirements to develop additional plans to support the guidance.

Suggestions for improving the guidance or regarding worldwide military actions.

CINCPAC views as to the coordination required with other commands for each specific plan.

1: JCSM-524-61 of 7 Aug 61 (TS)
2: JCSM-545-61 of 21 Aug 61 (TS)
Statement of additional resources required.

CINCPAC’s answer, made on 24 August, listed CINCPAC OPLANS 32-59 (Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia) and 26-60 (Control of Maritime Traffic) as applicable and indicated that they were considered current and adequate, and that additional plans were not required at that time. As suggestions for improvements in the general war posture, CINCPAC listed several possible actions -- deployment of U.S. combat forces to South Vietnam, air harassment and reprisals, acceleration of air reconnaissance and probing flights by Nationalist China, encouragement of resistance and internal uprisings in Communist China, air action to halt the Soviet airlift into Laos, and the establishment, by declaration, of an "ICBM/IRBM impact area" of large dimensions for the purpose of harassing trespassers. Of these six possible courses of action, CINCPAC recommended only the last four.

After reviewing the answers and suggestions received from the U.S. unified and specified commanders, the JCS prepared a "Program of Plans" as a planning guide for the various commanders. This document listed a total of 67 various courses of action that could be taken to improve the U.S. position in the Berlin situation, the status of plans to execute the course of action, the commander who had primary responsibility, and the guidance and action required. Using this as a basis, the JCS directed the unified and specified commanders to develop a family of separate but related plans to implement the specific actions that could be taken after, or in some cases before, the closing of Allied access routes to West Berlin by the Soviets or the East German communists. 1

CINCPAC developed eight separate plans to satisfy the JCS requirement. Five of these were plans to harass or destroy communist aircraft, two plans anticipated seizure or destruction of communist ships, and one plan provided for increased aerial reconnaissance. The CINCPAC program of plans for the Berlin situation included the following:

1. JCSM-1022-61 of 28 Sep 61 (TS)
CINCPAC OPLANS 90A-61, 90B-61, and 90C-61 provided, in the order listed, for seizure and destruction of Soviet/Sino Bloc aircraft intruding the U.S. airspace, seizure and destruction of Bloc aircraft within 50 miles of U.S. territory, and denial of entry of Bloc aircraft to Allied nations in the PACOM area. OPLANS 90D-61 and 90E-61 were plans for harassment of Bloc aircraft, the first by air defense measures and the latter by administrative measures only. Although the action contemplated was designed to annoy only, the plan recognized the possible need for increasingly severe action.

The two plans for the conduct of military operations against Bloc surface vessels were 91A-61 and 91B-61. The first of these was a plan for the destruction of Bloc naval strength, and the second provided for the seizure or destruction of all Bloc shipping within specific geographic areas of PACOM which could be closed to communist countries.

The final plan of the 90 series, OPLAN 92A-61, anticipated the employment of PACOM reconnaissance capabilities to conduct overt tactical aerial reconnaissance against the Bloc countries.

All CINCPAC plans of the 90 series were in support of the U.S. strategy in the existing Berlin crisis, and were designed to improve the U.S. position in any negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Defense of Hawaii

Two changes were made during 1961 to CINCPAC plans for the Defense of Hawaii, and were incorporated in a revised CINCPAC Instruction 003020.6B that was issued on 2 November.

The first change was based on CINCPAC's decision that CINCPACAF would have over-all responsibility for the air defense of Hawaii prior to the activation of JTF 119, an assignment of responsibility not covered by the previous instruction. Upon activation of JTF 119, the Task Force Commander would assume responsibility for the air defense of Hawaii. The second change was the omission of any reference in the revised instruction to overt ground attack. This was in recognition of
the fact that, for the foreseeable future, the only significant threat to Hawaii was from attack by aircraft or missiles. The responsibility for the defense of Hawaii against sabotage or other overt disturbance had been assigned to CINCUSARPAC by the provisions of OPLAN 1-61 and by other instructions.

Under the revised plan, beside being responsible directly to CINCPAC for the air defense of Hawaii up to the activation of JTF 119, CINCPACAF was made responsible for selecting an Air Force general officer who would serve as Commander JTF 119. All three Component Commanders were responsible for earmarking appropriate forces, with a designated commander, to serve as component parts of the joint task force. The Air Force general officer designated as Commander JTF 119 would assume over-all responsibility to CINCPAC upon activation of the task force, and thereafter exercise operational control, through his subordinate component commanders, over-all forces furnished by the three services. Prior to activation, the Commander JTF 119 was responsible for developing plans, coordinating the necessary training, and taking other actions necessary to assure a smooth assumption of the air defense responsibility from CINCPACAF upon activation of the task force.

JTF 119 would be activated when directed by CINCPAC.

At the end of 1961, the Joint Task Force Commander had been designated by CINCPACAF, the component forces and their respective commanders had been designated, and all plans for the air defense of Hawaii were complete.
Plans for Development of Biological and Chemical Weapons and Defense Capabilities

In conformance with a JCS directive of 27 November 1961, CINCPAC reviewed all operational plans and modified them as necessary to provide for the specific use of chemical and biological weapons. 1

The JCS also directed that, as soon as possible, the munitions be strategically located to support existing plans, and that appropriate training exercises be expanded to include an evaluation of the ability of PACOM units to operate in an environment of biological and chemical agents.

Biological agents and toxic chemical agents were stored in CONUS; only non-toxic chemical agents were stored in the PACOM area. Existing CINCPAC plans called for biological agents to continue to be stored in CONUS.

CINCPAC COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES

Communication facilities upon which CINCPAC depended for the exercise of command extended half way around the Earth, and became increasingly critical as the tempo of warfare increased and the allowable reaction time decreased. To create and maintain a dependable and rapid communication system was one of CINCPAC's primary concerns during 1961. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Measures to Improve PACOM Communications System and Associated Electronic Equipment

As a sequel to planning action that commenced at a meeting in Japan during January 1960, the second meeting of Mid-Pacific Frequency Coordinators was held at Camp Smith on 17 January. The purpose was to coordinate radio frequency matters pertinent to the operations of

1. JCS 271906Z Nov 61 cite 2372 (TS)
Mid-Pacific communication systems. Specific items presented at the Camp Smith meeting were radio frequency requirements for Project HIGH POLISH (the program of monitoring Soviet missile firing in the Pacific) and Project MERCURY (Astronaut space capsule flight). In addition, extensive discussion was given to the existing problem of interference between the Army assigned frequency of 20750 kcs and the Air Force frequency of 20740, a problem that was eliminated by a readjustment of the two frequencies.

A new CINCPAC instruction was promulgated during January prescribing the channels of communications for MAP matters in the PACOM. CINCPAC also established a policy for the extension of meteorological services to Southeast Asia, delegating to PACAF the responsibility for implementation. (UNCLASSIFIED)

During May, CINCPAC completed a Strategic Communications Study covering the period from 1963 to 1967. Developed as a joint endeavor by CINCPAC and his Component Commanders, this study was a presentation of communication requirements and objectives considered necessary in order to execute effectively the PACOM mission during that period. The study considered the use of most known communication techniques and other matters such as total system standardization and maximum use of joint facilities within the world-wide Defense Communication System. It was planned to review this study during November 1962.

CINCPAC implemented during October the JCS world-wide Joint Uniform Telephone Priority System. This priority system standardized procedures in effect by the three Services, and provided to CINCPAC unqualified use of PACOM voice systems on an equitable basis. (UNCLASSIFIED)

A PACOM top secret and special category on-line routing guide was prepared to be included in the CINCPAC Communications Electronics Operating Instruction (CEOI). The guide was first of its kind and tabulated all facilities within PACOM.

1. CINCPAC Inst 05216.3 of 14 Jan 61 (C)
2. CINCPAC 17223Z Feb 61 (U)
3. JANAFPAC 93/61, 311935Z Oct 61 (U)
4. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 0718 of 21 Nov 61 (C)
A compilation of the latest U.S. military policies and procedures for international registration of radio frequencies used by U.S. Military Forces on foreign soil was published and distributed to the major elements of PACOM. Included in the compilation was the status, as of 15 August 1961, of basic arrangements and agreements between the U.S. and Allied Countries in the PACOM. The status information concerned action taken in accordance with the international agreement that frequency assignment registration would be made by the administration of the country where the station was located.¹ (UNCLASSIFIED)

In conjunction with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Honolulu, procedures were established for the coordination and use of non-government frequencies for military tactical and training purposes in PACOM. All military frequency requirements in non-government bands would be consolidated and forwarded to the FCC by CINCPAC, since the FCC wanted to deal with only one military agency.² (UNCLASSIFIED)

As the result of the JCS directive that CINCPAC establish an alternate headquarters by July 1961, CINCPAC surveyed Guam and that site was later selected as the location for the Pacific Alternate Command Element (PACE). For the support of this alternate headquarters at Guam, the JCS approved the following on-call communication tele-type circuits: JP-13, Kunia/PACE; JP-18, PAFCON ANDERSON/PACE; JP-26, 3AD SAC GUAM/PACE; JP-31, NAVY RELAY SAN MIGUEL/STARCAM CLARK; JP-32, PAFCON ANDERSON/13AF CLARK; and JP-34, NAVY RELAY GUAM/PACE. KO-6 voice cipher equipment was transferred from 3AD SAC Guam to PACE.

During January, a new PACOM Frequency Allocation and Use (FAU) supplemental list was completed and issued. This was a special preparation for CJTF-116, noting that all requirements for that Task Force were on an emergency basis. The supplemental FAU also contained frequencies to be used by all supporting components of CJTF-116.

¹ CINCPAC ltr 2400 Ser: 00725 of 1 Dec 61 (S)
² CINCPAC ltr Ser: 2453 of 20 Oct 61 (U)
Measures to Improve Communications in Specific PACOM Areas

Indonesia:

A contract was awarded in June to the Philco Corporation for the construction of a troposcatter system in Indonesia. The contract provided for the Sumatra-Java-Bali increments within funds already appropriated, and held options upon the contractor for the completion of increments in Ambon, Celebes, and Borneo upon the appropriation of funds in the future. One of the assumptions in the primary planning was that the Indonesian Army could furnish all connecting links and terminating equipment to make the system complete and usable. It later developed that the Indonesian Army was unable to do this, and desired to make some fundamental changes to the system specified by the contract. After two conferences at Camp Smith with representation of DA and Chief MILTAG, CINCPAC recommended to OSD in December that the contract be amended to provide the connecting links and terminating equipment, and to incorporate certain engineering changes in the system to give flexibility to meet future changes in Indonesian Army requirements. He further recommended that the increased costs from these changes be accommodated in the Military Aid Program by stretching the project over two additional fiscal years. At the end of 1961, the first link in the system - connecting Djakarta and Bandung - was in service.

Laos:

The project to build up supplies and equipment to strengthen the Lao Armed Forces, a project designated MILL POND that got underway during the spring of 1961, placed an extra burden on communication facilities in Southeast Asia. In March, CINCPAC issued special instructions concerning the routing of traffic into the MILL POND area. This involved obtaining routing indicators, establishing electrical addresses and determining initial cryptographic capability. As

2. CHMILTAG 290237Z Aug 61 (S)
3. CINCPAC 112200Z Jan 62 (S)
4. CINCPAC 202247Z Apr 61 (S)
requirements increased, CINCPAC asked the Army to establish a Strategic Army Communications (STARCOM) Relay at Bangkok and to arrange for deployment of a Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) signal support company to support Southeast Asia communications expansion. The Air Force was assigned responsibility for improving facilities at Takli and for U.S./Royal Thailand Air Force (RTAF) radio relay circuits terminating at Udorn, both of which were airfields in Thailand where the bulk of MILL POND supplies were unloaded.\(^1\),\(^2\)

**Vietnam:**

The increasing importance of STARCOM Saigon and the urgent communication problems that developed in Vietnam during the fall of 1961 prompted CINCPAC to recommend to the JCS that action on long range improvements in that area be accelerated.\(^3\) As an interim solution, CINCPAC recommended the use of an AN/TSC-16, provided the JCS would furnish operating personnel.\(^4\) CINCUSARPAC suggested that, with the activation of the AN/MRC-92 at Saigon, the AN/TSC-16 be deployed to Udorn, Thailand as an interim measure, a recommendation that CINCPAC approved. He assigned to CINCUSARPAC the responsibility for operating and maintaining the AN/TSC-16, and provided specific guidance for improving the terminal and relay communications at Saigon.\(^5\),\(^6\),\(^7\)

On 24 July, CINCPAC submitted to the JCS the communications and electronics requirements for South Vietnam. Supplemental requirements, representing a major effort to expand the communications systems supporting Vietnam, were forwarded to the JCS during October. These requirements were approved by the Secretary of Defense substantially as submitted during the 16 December Secretary of Defense conference at Camp Smith.

\(^1\) CINCPAC 202247Z Apr 61 (S)
\(^2\) CINCPAC JANAFPAC 21/61, 222047Z Mar 61 (S)
\(^3\) CINCPAC 032333Z Nov 61 (TS)
\(^4\) CINCPAC 081942Z Nov 61 (TS)
\(^5\) CINCUSARPAC 290327Z Nov 61 (TS)
\(^6\) CINCPAC 290109Z Nov 61 (TS)
\(^7\) CINCPAC 292318Z Nov 61 (TS)
The President's May 1961 program for Vietnam included as paragraph 10 the requirement to develop "on a priority basis as a matter of urgency," a radar surveillance capability to warn the Government of Vietnam of Communist overflights for clandestine supply or intelligence purposes. Since the MAP at that time contemplated heavy radar capability for the Vietnamese Armed Forces (VNAF) in the FY 64-65 time period, the new program required severe compression of lead times for planning, funding, procurement, and construction. MAP funds were provided immediately. With delivery of FPS-20/6 radars promised in September 1962, and crash priority construction starting at once, completion during April 1963 was expected for the first VNAF heavy radar site in the DA NANG area. To fill the interim gap, CINCPAC requested, and the JCS subsequently approved and directed the deployment of a USAF Tactical Air Control (TAC) mobile heavy radar unit from CONUS. Equipped with both search and height finder radars (AN/MPS-11 and AN/MPS-16), and manned to the Reporting Post level with 67 people, the unit was in place at Tan Son Nhut and operational on 5 October 1961. As approved by CINCPAC, the unit was under the operational control of the 13AF (2nd Advon), but responsive to the MAAG for training of country forces. The unit had a dual operational and training mission, and at the end of the year was training VNAF classes of about thirty each. Operationally, in addition to providing radar coverage of the southern area, the unit could provide substantial assistance to projects for training South Vietnamese pilots, and conducting reconnaissance and defoliation operations. As soon as enough VNAF AC&W people could be trained, the VNAF expected to install one of its light radar units (AN/TPS-1/10) at Pleiku.

Another serious deficiency in South Vietnam forces was the lack of a communications-electronics system to support tactical air operations. In spite of the fact that considerable equipment to support

1. State to Saigon 1423 of 20 May 61 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 080005Z Aug 61 (S)
3. JCS 111333Z Sep 61 (S)
4. CHMAAG Vietnam 050723Z Oct 61 (S)
5. CINCPAC 170011Z Sep 61 (S)
point-to-point and related air-ground systems had been delivered under MAP, when the tempo of Viet Cong actions increased suddenly in 1961 it became apparent that the VNAF needed a better air-ground system in order to support the South Vietnam ground forces. CINCPACAF proposed that a Tactical Air Control System (TACS) from PACAF resources be deployed to support the increased air operations and the Jungle Jim (discussed in Chapter IV) training of the VNAF in air-ground operations. The TACS package would include an additional mobile heavy radar to be located at Da Nang, and equipment and people to establish a Joint Operations Center and two Air Support Operations Centers, tying all locations together with appropriate communications. CINCPAC and the Secretary of Defense approved this concept, and on the last day of the year CINCPAC directed that the PACAF TACS be deployed.

Thailand:
As a result of the year-long crisis in Laos, Bangkok was developed as a major communications hub in support of the urgent communications requirements in Southeast Asia. A comparison of the communication facilities serving Southeast Asia is shown by Figures 10 and 11.

In planning for the MILL POND operation it became apparent that the marginal communication support was not equal to the job of supporting operations in Laos. Crash action was taken to extend the RTAF radio relay system (AN/TRC-24 equipment provided by MAP) to Udorn and Ubon, Thailand. This system then provided voice and teletype channels from Don Muang to Takli, Udorn, and Ubon. Designed to support Thailand air defense, the system was the only long lines capability within Thailand.

1. CHMAAG Vietnam ltr MAGCH-CS Subj: Study on RVNAF Air Control System, 30 Nov 61 (S)
2. CINCPACAF ltr, No Subject, 13 Nov 61. On CINCPAC R/S 0001549-61 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 010605Z Jan 62 (TS)
ALL CIRCUITS FULL DUPLEX
EXCEPT AS NOTED BETWEEN DON MUANG & VIENTIANE

FIG. II
With the start of Air America\(^1\) helicopter operations into Laos from Udorn, it was found that the system would not support on-line cryptographic operations due to the large number of relay sites required for radio line-of-sight across the Thai lowlands. Accordingly, CHJUSMAG Thailand recommended and CINCPAC approved re-siting the system to various mountain locations.\(^2, 3\) Helicopter support was required and CINCPACFLT was requested to provide two HUS's (H-34) with crews for a sixty day period.\(^4\) Re-siting operations were delayed by loss of one of the helicopters, but it was replaced and by mid-October the job was finished, thus doubling the quality and quantity of long lines communications in Thailand with no additional equipment required over what had been in use with the old system.\(^5\) At year's end MAP action was underway to speed up programmed delivery of modern helicopters to the RTAF to support the re-sited system.

In another action, CINCPAC continued to press for a formal agreement with the Thailand Government concerning the status of the Bangkok STARCOM station.\(^6\) Because the Thailand Minister of Defense wished to maintain the existing status, CINCPAC temporarily withdrew plans to formalize the station, and directed CINCUSARPAC to review planning for the expansion of the station based upon the probability that the informal status would continue for the foreseeable future.\(^7\)

**Philippines-Taiwan:**

The JCS, by Defense Communications-Electronics Memorandum (DCEM) 4644, asked CINCPAC to review again the requirements for channels in the Philippine-Taiwan troposcatter system that was scheduled for activation during the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1962. CINCPAC's first review submitted during 1960, indicated that the total

1. Air America is a civilian air transport system that is a subsidiary of Contract Air Transport System that is under military contract to deliver military supplies in PACOM.
2. CHJUSMAG Thailand 310820Z May 61 (S)
3. CINCPAC 072340Z Jun 61 (S)
4. CINCPAC 132305Z Jul 61 (S)
5. CHJUSMAG Thailand 250840Z Oct 61 (C)
6. CINCPAC 010308Z Nov 61 (S)
7. CINCPAC 150305Z Nov 61 (S)
requirements expressed by the three Services exceeded the 12-channel capability of the system then planned, and recommended doubling the number of channels provided that such expansion would not delay materially the completion of the system. The JCS had approved this recommendation and DA, with DOD approval, initiated programming action for the increase.

After a second review, CINCPAC stated that the requirements contained in JCS DCEM 4644 still exceeded the capability of the expanded system and, because of duplication of communication services, recommended a sharp reduction in channel assignments. Further, CINCPAC recommended that a portion of the system, not required for immediate assignment, be held in reserve under the control of the JCS Defense Communications Agency.

SEATO Communications

The SEATO Military Planning Office Communications-Electronic Division, authorized by SEATO Military Advisors in mid-1961, was activated when the Australian member reported for duty in January 1961, as chief of the section. The C-E Division subsequently assumed responsibility for coordination of SEATO communication matters and the performance of numerous tasks formerly accomplished by a caucus of C-E committee members, by individual member nations working independently, or by working groups. Because only three officers were assigned to the C-E Division, it was not expected to assume responsibility for all communication tasks and functions.

The following Communications-Electronics working groups were convened during the year: Electronic Warfare; Navigational Aids; a Working Group to prepare appendices to MPO OPLAN 5/61; and the Communications-Electronics Fifth Meeting.

Significant C-E accomplishments during the year included the preparation of a comprehensive C-E Annex to SEATO OPLAN 5/61; the finalization and publication of the SEATO Frequency Register; the

1. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 0667 of 2 Sep 61 (C)
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00433 of 1 Aug 61 (S)
release of Tactical CW Call Sign Book (ACP 110); acceptance of common tactical, authentication and numerical codes, and a secure call sign system that were proposed and developed by the U.S.

Electronic Warfare was given impetus by the release of Allied Communications Publication 178, Maritime Electronic Warfare Instructions, to SEATO, and preparation by CINCPAC of a draft Electronic Warfare Instruction that was distributed to SEATO Nations for approval. CINCPAC concurred in the co-location of United Kingdom and U.S. Army STARCOM long haul transmitting and receiving facilities with Aeronautical Radio at Siam Ltd. (AERO) Siam, Bangkok, Thailand. CINCPAC also authorized CINCUSARPAC to allocate channels in the U.S. Army STARCOM Bangkok radio relay system to inter-connect UK radio and receiver sites. The UK/Bangkok long-haul radio facility, as an integral part of the UK-Commonwealth radio network, provided for direct transmissions to Singapore for relay to Commonwealth stations.

Southeast Asia Telecommunications Project (SEATELCOM)

Although the Southeast Asia Telecommunications (SEATELCOM) project (described in CINCPAC's 1960 Command History) was under the auspices of the Agency for International Development (AID), that part of it that was intended to provide modern, long distance communications service throughout SE Asia was of obvious military interest. In this connection, certain funds originally earmarked for the MAP were diverted to this project as an appropriate expenditure for the security of Thailand, South Vietnam, and Laos.

From a military viewpoint, significant progress was not made during 1961. Only two countries, South Vietnam and Thailand, continued actively to figure in the project.

In South Vietnam SEATELCOM was to have provided a basic 600 channel microwave system which interconnected all important population centers in the country. AID engineers regarded this as a toll system of three parts: A grid network blanketing the populous
Mekong delta south of Saigon; a single axis network along the entire coast north of Saigon; and branches from the coastal network to the few population centers inland. Planning proceeded on this basis during the years 1959-1961, although increased Viet Cong terrorism in 1960 caused the problem of security for the multiple microwave radio relay stations to become increasingly serious.

Thus in June 1961 CINCPAC called this problem to the attention of all concerned and suggested that the use of forward scatter techniques should be considered, in order to avoid dependence upon vulnerable radio relay stations. Secretary RUSK had earlier pointed out the increasing importance of the project in the critical situation obtaining in South Vietnam (SVN).

An admission was made by the South Vietnam Secretary of State on 1 September 1961 that he "could not, at this time, consider the static guard requirement of the microwave outposts within the limits of present security forces." This prompted the Director USOM to recommend to AID that a different approach be taken. This approach would continue the Mekong delta network as planned, because the use of isolated radio relay stations could be avoided in that area. At the same time, several different schemes to create a system north of Saigon were proposed for engineering study. Construction on any of these schemes was deferred until the security situation was more clearly defined.

Although CINCPAC urged that AID get on with the job immediately by contracting for the delta network as previously planned and contracting for a troposcatter network north of Saigon, AID showed little inclination to take urgent action. Accordingly, at the end of 1961, CINCPAC and the JCS were seeking SECDEF approval of the proposition that the U.S. military undertake to furnish a troposcatter network in South Vietnam.

In Thailand, SEATELCOM was impeded by disagreement between AID and the Country Team. In the early months of the year the engineer's

1. CINCPAC 270440Z Jun 61(S); State 1502 to Saigon 7 Jun 4PM 61 (U)
2. USOM SAIGON AIRGRAM ICATO A833 of 26 Sep 61
3. CINCPAC 110115Z Oct 61 (C)
4. STATE 769 to SAIGON 011700Z Nov 61 (U)
5. CINCPAC 030106Z Dec 61 (TS); JCS 101443Z Dec 61 (TS)
(Television Associates of Indiana, Inc.) personnel situation showed steady improvement and his staff in Thailand assumed more effective proportions. A movement to change the concept for the Thailand microwave system gained momentum and was climaxed by requests from the Country Team and the RTG, that a new approach be adopted, and that the Country Team be authorized to negotiate contracts based upon the change in concept.\(^1\) The new approach was to provide an integrated microwave, microwave coaxial cable, and troposcatter system. AID resisted this change,\(^2\) and was not inclined to delegate further authority on the matter. CINCPAC sided with the Country Team.\(^3\) His reason was not one of technical conviction; that one concept was better or worse than the other, but rather a desire to avoid further delay on the project. However, in September AID suspended further action until experts from Western Electric Corporation could make an independent evaluation of both concepts.\(^4\) The year ended with dim prospects for a contract being awarded prior to mid-1962.

PACOM FORCE OBJECTIVES

U.S. Forces

As in previous years, the JCS asked CINCPAC to comment on the recommendations made by his Component Commanders regarding their Service major forces and equipment programmed in connection with the FY 1963 budget. In arriving at an evaluation of the adequacy of programmed forces, commanders were to assume that there would be no change in assigned missions, and that manpower authorizations and the over-all budget for FY 1963 through FY 1965 would remain at substantially the 1962 level.\(^5\) (C

CINCPAC recommended some increase, particularly in Naval strength and equipment, air defense units for both the Army and the Air Force, and he stressed the need for a squadron of fixed-wing aircraft

\(^1\) BANGKOK 166 to STATE 040700Z Aug 61 (U); Bangkok 392 to State 131235Z Sep 61
\(^2\) ICA TO 394 to Bangkok 7 Sep 61; ICA TO 422 to Bangkok 13 Sep 61
\(^3\) CINCPAC 192230Z Sep 61 (C)
\(^4\) STATE 362 to Bangkok Sep 61; Bangkok 443 to State Sep 61 (U)
\(^5\) JCS SM-289-61, 20 Mar 61 (C)
## U.S. ARMY UNITS

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. AIR FORCE UNITS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Air Defense F-102A Sqdns (^1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical Wg/Sqdn</td>
<td>3/13</td>
<td>4/16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Composite Reconnaissance C-130B2/RB-57</td>
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1. Above does not include F-102 air defense ANG squadron at Hickam AFB.
Allied Countries

The JCS in September asked CINCPAC to provide comments and recommendations, based on the Allied Military Forces Annex (Annex J) to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1966-68 (JSOP-66), for his area of responsibility in connection with the preparation of JSOP-67. In turn, CINCPAC asked his Component Commanders and CHMAAGs to forward their recommended Allied Military Force Objectives for PACOM countries, including also Malaya, New Zealand, and Australia. They were asked to recommend only those forces which were reasonably attainable and desirable in support of U.S. strategy in the mid-range period.

CINCPAC's recommendations, forwarded to the JCS on 2 November, corresponded to the previous year's submission except for a few significant changes. The main difference was the omission of any recommendations for Cambodian forces, a result of CINCPAC's reservations about the attitude of the Cambodian Government toward the U.S. at that time. Prince Sihanouk, who had broken diplomatic ties with Thailand during the fall of 1961, had made a bitter attack against the U.S. toward the end of October following publication of a New York Times editorial that was critical of his actions. Until the political climate improved, CINCPAC was reluctant to base long term plans on the unpredictable Sihanouk.

For other countries, CINCPAC recommended a substantial increase in Japan's combat strength; additional 8" artillery units for Korea; a decrease in the number of Lao volunteer battalions; increases in the Malayan navy; and a decrease in the number of Nationalist China's infantry divisions.

During 1961, CINCPAC continued planning for the development of reserve forces for Korea, the Philippines, Republic of China, Thailand and Vietnam.

1. JCS 281928Z cite 1678 Sep 61 (S)
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 042354Z Oct 61 (S)
3. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00662, Subj: Allied Military Forces in PACOM, 2 Nov 61 (S)
4. PHNOM PENH to STATE 315, 27 Oct 61, 4PM and 312 of 27 Oct 61 (U)
PLANNING AND OPERATIONS WITH U.S. COMMANDERSHAVING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ADJOINING AREAS

CINCPAC was responsible for coordinating the activities of his own forces with those of U.S. commanders of adjoining areas, a responsibility that involved routine coordination with the Alaskan and Caribbean Commands, SAC, MATS, and with CINCNORAD in his capacity as CINC Continental Air Defense Command. In this capacity, CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT during September to prepare supporting plans for two CINCLANT contingency plans for amphibious assaults against Cuba for the purpose of overthrowing the Castro Government.¹

In addition to the above commands, the creation of the new U.S. Strike Command posed several questions concerning the relationships between that command and CINCPAC. During November, the Commander in Chief of the Strike Command (CINCSTRIKE), General Paul D. Adams, addressed a letter to Admiral Felt outlining functions and coordination procedures of both CINCSITRIKE and his subordinate commands. The mission of STRICOM was to provide a general reserve of combat-ready forces to reinforce other unified commands, and to plan and execute contingency operations as directed by JCS. Pointing out that since he had a status equal with other unified and specified combatant commands, he would exercise full operational control over those combat-ready forces of TAC and USCONARC placed under his control for the purpose of carrying out his assigned missions. He stated, however, that operational command or control of STRICOM augmenting forces would pass to the commander being reinforced as mutually agreed.²

In a separate message, CINCSITRIKE indicated that he would establish a Joint Task Force Headquarters to command STRICOM forces that would be augmenting PACOM forces during a forthcoming exercise designated GREAT SHELF, provided that it was required by the theater commander.³ CINCPAC said he had no objections to CINCSITRIKE controlling augmenting forces during deployment, but saw no requirement for such a JTF Headquarters in PACOM during the conduct of an

¹ CINCPAC 290255Z Sep 61 (TS)
² CINCSITRIKE ltr to CINCPAC, Subj: Command Relationships, 22 Nov 61 (TS)
³ CINCSITRIKE 271820Z Nov 61 (C)
exercise, and that future strategic mobility exercises in PACOM would be planned and approved on a case by case basis. CINCPAC explained that augmenting forces would fall in line with his plan and command arrangements in the PACOM area, an arrangement that would hold true under actual operations as well.¹

During December, representatives from CINCPAC and from each of the three Component Commanders attended a planning conference at STRICOM Headquarters to integrate exercise programs involving transport and troop carrier forces from CONUS to overseas commands, to finalize CINSTRIKE's FY 63 Joint Exercise program, to secure tentative agreement on proposed FY 64 and FY 65 exercise programs, and to discuss similar matters of common interest.² (UNCLASSIFIED)

OPERATIONS OF U.S. FORCES

Throughout 1961 CINCPAC shifted his combat forces over the vast areas of the Pacific to meet the changing threats from Communist Bloc insurgency or attack. At no time during 1961 were troops ordered into attack, but their presence in forward staging areas or afloat in the South China Sea served as an effective deterrent force. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Operations in Support of January Emergency in Laos

PACOM forces earmarked to support CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59 (Phase II - Laos) were placed in DEFCON 2 on the last day of 1960. As a result of this, the following fleet units were directed immediately to operating areas in the South China Sea: Task Group (TG) 77.7 (USS LEXINGTON plus 5 DDs); TG 76.5 (Marine BLT embarked aboard USS PAUL REVERE and USS MONTICELLO plus 2 DDs); TG 70.4 (HUK USS BENNINGTON with HMR-161 embarked plus 6 DDs); and TG 77.6 (USS CORAL SEA) was ordered to sea from Okinawa.³,⁴,⁵

1. CINCPAC 080218Z Dec 61 (C)
2. CINCSTRIKE 062130Z Dec 61 (U)
3. COM7THFLT 311954Z Dec 60 (S)
4. CINCPAC 311436Z Dec 60 (TS)
5. CINCPACFLT 010501Z Jan 61 (TS)
In compliance with a JCS directive, 16 C-130 aircraft from Tactical Air Command were moved during the first three days of 1961 from George AFB to Clark AFB to augment the 315th Air Division.\(^1\),\(^2\)

Meanwhile, outloading operations for Joint Task Force 116 proceeded at Okinawa.

After the situation in Laos stabilized on 6 January, CINCPAC established DEFCON 3, and directed the three Task Groups to withdraw from the S. China Sea to new locations, but to maintain a four hour steaming notice.\(^3\) (SECRET)

On 10 January, CINCPAC directed that CJTF 116 release as many 315th Air Division aircraft as possible to permit the 315th to conduct regular airlift requirements and still maintain the prevailing DEFCON.\(^4\)

On 25 January, upon the recommendation of CJTF 116, CINCPAC approved offloading the amphibious shipping at Okinawa.

Operational control of WESTPAC forces earmarked for JTF 116 was returned to parent organizations effective 30 January.\(^5\) By 1 February, all USARPAC units had been returned to their parent organizations, and the offloading of amphibious units at Okinawa was completed by 3 February. DEFCON 4 was established again on 15 February.\(^6\),\(^7\),\(^8\)

Operations in Support of March Emergency in Laos

PACOM forces were again alerted for possible action in Laos, and the DEFCON was raised to 3 on 19 March, and to 2 on 21 March.\(^9\)

Movement of forces in response to the increased readiness included the following:

A Tactical Air Command C-130 Squadron was deployed from CONUS to Clark AFB with movement commencing on 21 March.

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1. JCS 311717Z and 311927Z Dec 60 (TS)
2. PACAF 040605Z Jan 61 (S)
3. CINCPAC 060137Z Jan 61 (S)
4. CINCPAC 100213Z Jan 61 (S)
5. CINCPAC 270107Z Jan 61 (U)
6. CINCUSARPAC 010311Z Feb 61 (C)
7. CJTF-116 msg 030438Z Feb 61 (S)
8. CINCPAC 142152Z and 150406Z Feb 61, both (TS)
9. CINCPAC 192201Z and 212235Z Mar 61, both (TS)
22 March, Marine Air Base Squadron 16 commenced movement from Okinawa to Udorn, Thailand. 1, 2, 3

Task Group 77.7 (LEXINGTON) and TG 77.5 (MIDWAY) were directed to the South China Sea, and TG 70.4 (BENNINGTON) was directed to a point approximately 100 miles south of Bangkok for the fly off of helicopters. Fourteen helicopters from the BENNINGTON were flown to Don Muang air strip in Thailand. 4, 5

In addition, TG 70.7 (KEARSARGE) was directed to embark HMR 161 for eventual transfer to the USS BENNINGTON at Subic; TG 76.4 (THETIS BAY (LPH 6)) embarked HMR 162 and a Battalion Landing Team at Okinawa and sailed for the South China Sea; TG 76.5 (PHIBRON 5) with a BLT afloat was stationed south of Cambodia; and the Commander of Amphibious Squadron 7 (TG 76.7) (with a Regimental Landing Team) from the 1st Marine Brigade that had embarked at Pearl Harbor for deployment in Exercise "GREEN LIGHT," was directed to Okinawa on 22 March. 6, 7 The Commander Task Force 76 also directed all available Phibron 5 and LandShipRon 9 vessels to converge on Okinawa and other loadout ports to load Marine units for positioning in the South China Sea. 8

Selected PACOM forces were maintained in DEFCON 2 readiness for contingency operations until 13 June 1961, although there were several changes in the forces earmarked for operations.

During April, the aircraft carriers KEARSARGE, BENNINGTON, LEXINGTON and MIDWAY rotated positions in the WESTPAC areas while maintaining their ability to support contingency and SIOP operations, and to conduct photo reconnaissance of Vietnam. When the rotation was completed in mid-April, the MIDWAY was in Yokosuka, the LEXINGTON assumed central CVA responsibilities, and the CORAL SEA became the southern CVA. 9

1. HQUSAF 210456Z Mar 61 (S)
2. PACAF 211110Z Mar 61 (S)
3. CINCPAC 182202Z Mar 61 (TS)
4. COM7THFLT 270818Z and 300702Z both Mar 61 (S)
5. COM7THFLT 240158Z and 191430Z both Mar 61 (TS)
6. CINCPACFLT 212045Z, 210840Z, 220608Z all Mar 61 (TS)
7. COM7THFLT 250036Z (S); 210508Z, 211148Z, 220504Z all Mar 61 (TS)
8. CINCPACFLT 220322Z Mar 61 (TS)
9. COM7THFLT 080949Z Apr 61 (S)
After embarking the Marine RLT-4 in Hawaii, PHIBRON 7 proceeded to WESTPAC, arriving on 7 April. On 10 April, the RLT was ordered to return from Okinawa to participate in Exercise GREEN LIGHT on the west coast of CONUS.\(^1\) (SECRET)

The BENNINGTON (TG 74.1) was relieved from WESTPAC duty and proceeded to CONUS.\(^2\) (SECRET)

On 26 April, CINCPAC directed that the Commander of SEATO Field Forces Designate move the U.S. Headquarters element of the SEATO Field Force, of Force Alpha and of the Air Component Staff from Okinawa to Clark Field as a first priority prepositioning movement.\(^3\) Early in April, CINCPAC had directed CINCUSARPAC to create a staff to be known as the Headquarters, U.S. Element SEATO Field Forces to replace CJTF 116 on Okinawa as the command element for U.S. Forces committed to SEATO OPLAN 5/61. The designated commander, Lt. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, arrived on Okinawa with 89 members of his staff. The assembly of the remainder of his staff and the staffs of subordinate Component Commanders was completed soon thereafter. Movement of the U.S. Elements of the SFF staff to Clark Field commenced on 28 April and was completed on 1 May.\(^4\) The 315th Air Division flew 163 sorties in support of this move.

As a result of the trend to place emphasis on the use of SEATO Forces, DEFCON 2 was established for all U.S. Forces earmarked for and in direct support of SFF OPLAN 5/61. DEFCON 3 was established for all U.S. Forces in support of JTF 116 and CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59, excepting those scheduled for participation in SEATO Plan 5/61.\(^5\)

After cease-fire negotiations got underway in Laos and the emergency tentatively had passed, CINCPAC relaxed the readiness condition to DEFCON 3 for all U.S. forces in support of JTF 116, CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59 (Phase II Laos or Vietnam), and SEATO OPLAN 5/61.\(^6\)

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1. COM7THFLT 100825Z Apr 61 (S)
2. COM7THFLT 061408Z Apr 61 (S)
3. CINCPAC 262130Z Apr 61 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 010041Z May 61 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 070227Z Apr 61 (TS)
6. CINCPAC 132037Z Jun 61 (TS)
On 10 June, U.S. Elements, SFF, were directed to return from Clark AB to their home stations, and the CG 3d MarDiv (CJTF 116) was directed to assume responsibility for reacting on short notice to contingency situations in Southeast Asia.  

Other Significant Operations

Marine Air Group 12 moved from Iwakuni, Japan to Naval Air Station Cubi Point during January.

PHIBRON 5 (TG 76.1) and LANDSHIPRON 9 (TG 76.2) arrived at Okinawa on 10 April, and then proceeded to the South China Sea area to participate in Exercise "Pony Express," a Joint Fleet exercise held during the period 14 April to 6 May.

PACAF was directed to deploy to Don Muang Airfield, Thailand, an Air Defense unit of 6 F-100 aircraft, one KB-50, and one C-130, plus necessary support personnel.

A Marine Air Base Squadron of 300 men was moved from Okinawa to Udorn, Thailand by theater airlift during the period 23 March to 26 March.

On 26 May, CINCPAC authorized the use of 315th Air Division aircraft to transport Ground Environment Electronic Installation Agency (GEEIA) personnel and equipment to Japan, and in July, to move other personnel and equipment to Bangkok for subsequent movement to Savannakhet. The purpose was to install radio tower and beacon equipment at Savannakhet.

The attack carrier BON HOMME RICHARD relieved the CORAL SEA in WESTPAC on 13 May, and the TICONDEROGA relieved the LEXINGTON on 30 May. Both of the new arrivals had improved aircraft equipment new to the WESTPAC inventory, including the A4D-2N aircraft which had limited all weather capability, the A3D aircraft.

1. CINCPAC 100138Z Jun 61 (TS)
2. COMTHFLT 041204Z and 080624Z both Jan 61 (S)
3. CINCPAC 110231Z Apr 61 (TS)
4. CHJUSMAG Thailand 261645Z Mar 61, cite MAO 10844 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 260317Z May 61 (U)
6. CINCPAC 120149Z Jul 61 (S)
modified for low altitude operation, and the standardized Sparrow III fire control system for the F3H-2. ¹ (CONFIDENTIAL)

At the end of November, CINCPAC asked the JCS to approve early deployment of a C-123 squadron to fulfill increased airlift requirements caused by mounting activity in Southeast Asia. ² This request was approved early in December. ³ CINCPAC proposed to base the squadron at Clark Air Base.

SPECIAL WEAPONS PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

Planning and other actions to insure the immediate and effective use of nuclear weapons by PACOM forces, when directed during a general war, constituted a large part of CINCPAC's effort during 1961. Besides the task of maintaining up-to-date intelligence upon which to base revisions to the target list, and planning for the use and delivery of weapons, approximately 30 members of the CINCPAC staff were engaged in analyzing existing plans and conducting war games on the PACOM portion of the Single Integrated Operational Plan. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CINCPAC maintained permanent representation with the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at the Strategic Air Command's Omaha headquarters, as well as other representatives who served there on a temporary basis. (UNCLASSIFIED)
Operations Analysis Activities:
The mission assigned to the Operations Analysis Section of the CINCPAC Staff was to conduct an operations research program for CINCPAC and to be responsible for the coordination of operations research programs in PACOM in which elements of more than one service were involved.²
JOINT TRAINING

PACOM forces participated in a joint mobility exercise that was proposed by the JCS, in two JCS sponsored world-wide Command Post Exercises, and in several joint training exercises of smaller scale. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Joint Mobility Exercise LONG PASS

Proposed by the JCS during the fall of 1960, the original planning for Exercise LONG PASS was described in the CINCPAC Command History for 1960. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The purpose of LONG PASS was to improve the state of readiness of U.S. Forces, test contingency plans, and to demonstrate to the people of the U.S. and foreign countries the U.S. capability to deploy reinforcements rapidly to threatened areas of the Pacific Command. As planned, the exercise was to last approximately five days, and would be conducted in the Clark AFB-Stotsenberg area. The force participating consisted of:

1. COMUSK 260740Z Jul 61 (TS)
2. JCS 011533Z and 011537Z both Feb 61 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 022325Z Sep 61 (TS)
4. JCS 161833Z Jan 61 (S)
1 CONUS Battle Group and logistic support units.
1 CONUS Composite Air Strike Force (CASF)
consisting of:
  2 F-100 Squadrons
  1/2 Recon Squadron
  Communication and Control Elements
  Supporting air lift
1 Okinawa based Battle Group
1 Brigade Headquarters from Hawaii

The concept of operations called for three phases. Phase I consisted of the movement of all forces from home station to the objective area; Phase II was the tactical operations at the objective area; and Phase III was the redeployment of forces to their home stations. (SECRET)

Early in January 1961, CINCPAC informed the JCS that he had postponed the training exercises of those PACOM forces scheduled for participation in LONG PASS that were also in support of JTF-116, which at that time was alerted for contingency operations in Laos. ¹ He stated that SEATO exercises and the Weapons Demonstration were being watched closely at that time, and recommended that LONG PASS be postponed since most PACOM forces involved were also involved in contingency plans. By the time the JCS answered this message, however, events in Laos had permitted relaxation of the alert status, and the JCS said they preferred that planning proceed on the assumption that the exercise would be conducted. They would, however, act promptly on any further recommendation to cancel LONG PASS because it was interfering with the essential mission. ²

Because of the anticipated impact the exercise would have upon the civilian populations of the Allied Countries in the PACOM, CINCPAC placed particular emphasis on the Public Information annex to the plan. He directed his CINCPACREP in the Philippines to keep Filipino officials informed and to select the official observers. ³ As approved

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¹ CINCPAC 051954Z Jan 61 (S)
² JCS 111442Z cite 988501 Jan 61 (TS)
³ CINCPAC 182345Z Jan 61 (TS)
by CINCPAC, the USARPAC Public Information Plan provided for no foreign observers except Filipino officials. Plans for newspaper coverage, carefully coordinated among CINCPAC, USARPAC, DOD, and the State Department, permitted U.S. and Filipino correspondents to attend, but was aimed at a minimum amount of publicity presented on a low key basis.

The exercise was conducted between 15 and 22 February in accordance with the joint plan. The plan set the stage of an insurgent uprising in an unnamed Southeast Asian country, which had requested U.S. assistance. The tactical situation called for tactical air missions on the objective area followed by a parachute assault on the airbase, then air landing of the Army Component Headquarters, air resupply, and the landing of the 1st Battle Group, 22d Infantry and logistic units from CONUS. Phase II operations concluded by expanding the airhead through the use of a helicopter attack by ground troops in conjunction with Air Force tactical fighter support. Approximately 100 men of the 1st Special Forces Group played the aggressor role by disrupting communications and night harassment.

**Exercise GREEN ROCK**

Exercise GREEN ROCK, a world-wide JCS sponsored exercise conducted to test emergency action and reporting procedures during a nuclear war, was conducted during the period 27-28 July 1961 as a warm-up for Exercise HIGH HEELS. The JCS notified CINCPAC during May of the planned exercise. CINCPAC directed that the play of the exercise, which was limited to the CINCPAC staff and PACOM Component staffs. The emphasis during the exercise was on intelligence reporting prior to hostilities, and on SIOP and atomic reporting after "A" hour. The objectives of the exercise were met within PACOM, and it proved to be a valuable

1. CINCPAC 212346Z Jan 61 (TS)
2. OSD 021750Z cite DEF 989670 Feb 61 (TS)
3. OPLAN JME PACOM 1961 (TS)
4. USARPAC 040350Z Mar 61 (U)
5. CINCPAC 122334Z Jul 61 (S)
instructional drill for the CINCPAC staff in preparation for subsequent exercises.

**Exercise HIGH HEELS**

The JCS world-wide atomic exercise for FY62, designated Exercise HIGH HEELS, was in the planning stage of the end of 1960. A conference was held in Washington, D.C., on 26 April 1961 at which time CINCPAC representatives were briefed on the new joint Operational Reporting System Manual which listed all information required by the JCS during general war conditions. The vulnerability period was established for 10-20 September. The JCS Outline Plan for Exercise HIGH HEELS was received on 15 July.

Controlled by the JCS, Exercise HIGH HEELS was conducted during the period 10-15 September as a JCS CPX of the Single Integrated Operational Plan and general war plans. The purpose was to test the SIOP and exercise strike forces under rapidly advancing conditions of readiness.

The intelligence summary was an excerpt from the existing intelligence situation, although later intelligence was either "prepositioned" simulated data, or simulated situations created by subordinate headquarters during the exercise. A brief but intensive intelligence build-up commenced on 10 September, DEFCON TWO was declared late on 11 September and the command post was manned within 45 minutes.

Movement of combat forces and weapons was simulated during the exercise; all other portions of the exercise, including weather, weapons available and times, were actual. All emergency and alternate means of communications available to the Command Center personnel were tested under operational conditions. The new Joint Operational Reporting System (JOPREP) was used throughout the exercise and proved to be a functional and effective reporting system.
During the exercise, the PACOM communications system was severely affected by two typhoons that inflicted actual damage to facilities and caused outages, by poor to fair actual propagation conditions, and an excessive number of messages. It was also limited by exercise high altitude nuclear detonations that eliminated all high frequency communication circuits between Hawaii and the West Pacific for three hours. Nevertheless, it was considered that the objectives were met within the PACOM, and that HIGH HEELS was the most comprehensive test thus far of the communications capabilities for general war plans.  

Other Joint Exercises During 1961

SALT SPRAY:

This exercise was specifically designed to test the PACOM devised method of nuclear strike coordination known as the "Broadcast System." Planned during 1960, the test was conducted during January 1961 by making simulated attacks against a target complex in Japan. The test indicated that the broadcast procedures contained in the CINCPAC Atomic SOP 1-59 would prevent both enroute and over-target interference. It was so successful that CINCPAC scheduled a subsequent exercise.

CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF submitted a jointly prepared exercise plan for SALT SPRAY II to be held during November, and at CINCPAC's invitation, the Strategic Air Command planned to participate. Unfavorable weather prevailed in the exercise area during the period 15-22 November when the exercise was scheduled, which caused the 5th Air Force to cancel the exercise before it was completed. Although partially successful, CINCPAC directed that the exercise be completed and, at the end of the year, plans were being made by CINCSAC, CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF for completion.

2. CINCPACFLT 120452Z Jul 61 (S)
3. 5AF 210706Z Nov 61 (S)
4. CINCPAC 292207Z Nov 61 (S)
SHARP EDGE:

This exercise was originally intended as a joint Army/Navy exercise involving an Eighth U.S. Army battle group in an amphibious assault landing on a South Korean beach. Requested by CINCUSARPAC and approved by DA and the CNO, the exercise was scheduled for the first of August. During the planning stage, Eighth Army asked the ROKs to provide air support for the assault landing phase of SHARP EDGE, thereby changing it from a joint to a combined exercise. Seeing a chance to promote public relations and achieve psychological objectives, Admiral Felt directed that maximum coverage be given to the exercise. Although the exercise was delayed several days because of typhoon weather in the area, it was completed on 11 August and was considered very successful. Broad publicity coverage played up continued U.S. interest in Korea, and let the Korean people know that U.S. forces were active and maintaining combat proficiency.

Exercise SEAWALL:

This was a joint Army/Navy/Air Force amphibious exercise held from 10 to 23 September. The troops embarked in the Tacoma, Washington area; the objective area was the southern beaches of San Juan Island. The following forces participated:

Army: Hq US Sixth Army, Hq 4th Infantry Division, 2d Log Command/6th Army Support units, and a battle group (-) as the aggressor force.

Navy: COMPHIGRU One, COMPHIBRON Five, one AGC, one PHIBRON (-), one LANDSHIPRON (-), one TACRON, plus ANGLICO, NAVBEACHGRU, and UDT Detachment.

Air Force: Units of the 9th AF, 12th AF, and 19th AF.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Besides dealing in the day-to-day and routine intelligence matters, the CINCPAC Intelligence Division was deeply involved in target planning.

1. CINCUSARPAC 030700Z May 61 (U)
2. CINCPAC 152330Z Jul 61 (S)
3. CTF 131 msg 110640Z Aug 61 (U)
for the Single Integrated Operational Plan, in obtaining and processing photo coverage of Southeast Asia countries, and in making special studies and assessments of events and trends that affected the ability of PACOM forces to carry out any of CINCPAC's general or contingency war plans. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Intelligence Activities in Connection with the SIOP

[Redacted]

CINCPAC urged his Component Commanders to take prompt action to initiate appropriate changes to the target list when necessary. At the same time, the CINCPAC Instruction regarding the Procedure for Submission of Recommended Target List Changes was revised to incorporate procedures for the expeditious handling and processing of all changes and

1. CINCPAC 232115Z Feb 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC ltr 00205 of 7 Apr 61 (S)
associated intelligence documents. The same instruction provided procedures for processing changes to CINCPAC contingency plans.  

Photo Coverage of Southeast Asia

The problem of obtaining satisfactory photo reconnaissance coverage became very important during several periods of crisis prior to the cease-fire period. At the time of the fighting that took place at the beginning of the year, CINCPAC directed CINCPACAF to revise the distribution of photographic prints and photo intelligence reports. He also asked that distribution be made by the fastest Armed Forces courier to assure that commanders with a decision making, or operational, need received the information expeditiously.  

In another move to extend the benefits of photo reconnaissance, CINCPAC directed CINCPACAF to send a photo technician, with equipment to provide duplicate negatives, and two photo interpreters to CHJUSMAG Bangkok to temporary duty.  

1. CINCPAC Inst 03860.1A of 5 Apr 61 (C)  
2. CINCPAC Inst 03020.7 of 10 Apr 61 (C)  
3. CINCPAC 020618Z Jan 61 (S)  
4. CINCPAC 110330Z Jan 61 (TS)  
5. JCS 031851Z May 61 (TS)
CINCPAC secured permission from the Government of South Vietnam to overfly that country in order to satisfy requirements of CINCPAC and the Component Commanders for photograph coverage. CINCPAC then directed CINCPACFLT to conduct the flights and distribute the photo materials. Flights commenced on 21 May and were completed on 3 June.

In response to a request from the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DA, CINCPAC compiled a statement of existing mapping and geodesical requirements that were unique to CINCPAC's assigned missions. These requirements, keyed to approved war plans or other

1. COM 7th FLT 04155Z May 61 (TS)
2. CHMAAG Vietnam 161351Z May 61 (S)
3. CINCPAC 190153Z May 61 (S)
4. CHJUSMAG Thailand 051040Z cite MAZ 11508 Jun 61 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 152211 Z Jun 61 (S)
pertinent documents that assigned the missions, were forwarded to DA during July.¹

**Other Intelligence Activities**

The improvement of the U.S. - Vietnam military intelligence capability in South Vietnam was established in November as a high priority item in the U.S. program to increase military support to the Government of Vietnam (GVN). For this purpose, CINCPAC, in coordination with CHMAAG Vietnam, recommended to the JCS an intelligence plan that included: Integration of U.S. intelligence specialists into the intelligence staffs of the RVNAF Joint General Staff and ARVN Field Command; the assignment of MAAG intelligence advisers to each corps, division and province headquarters; augmenting the MAAG J2 Division and its Evaluation Center; and the establishment of a U.S. intelligence/operations radio net.² This plan was approved by the Secretary of Defense and the JCS and, on 7 December, the JCS approved adding approximately 180 intelligence personnel to MAAG Vietnam to implement the plan.³ Other CINCPAC actions taken to support this plan included:

1. Placing an ARPAC intelligence officer on temporary duty to assist in operating the MAAG Vietnam Evaluation Center.

2. Furnishing CHMAAG Vietnam with a TO&E counter-intelligence unit of three officers and six EM to arrive in Saigon during January 1962.


4. Placing a Navy intelligence officer on 90 days TAD to CHMAAG Vietnam to help set up an N-2 Section in the Vietnamese Navy.

The CINCPAC Intelligence Division worked closely during 1961 with the Air Force Intelligence Center (AFIC), which was responsible for

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00397 of 13 Jul 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 202328Z Nov 61 (S)
3. JCS 072258Z Dec 61 (S)
the JCS-directed Target Data Inventory program. CINCPAC submitted to the AFIC a total of 230 recommended changes, additions or deletions to the preliminary print-out of the Southeast Asia/Western Pacific Target Data Inventory that were incorporated into the final version.  

1. CINCPAC 110354Z Apr 61 (C)
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00461 of 11 Aug 61 (S) or 00461
3. SSO JCS/OSD 212200Z Mar 61 (TS)
4. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00339 of 13 Jun 61 (S)
JOINT LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES

The CINCPAC Logistics Division coordinated the procurement and delivery of supplies and equipment for more than a third of a million U.S. fighting men, and developed plans and programs for a Military Assistance Program that was divided among ten countries that totalled $768 million in FY61 and approached $870 million for FY62. This task, carried out in accordance with the Military Assistance Manual and the Basic Planning Document, included the preparation of adequate justification and back-up for both plans and programs, and follow-up during the implementation of the approved and funded programs. The needs of both U.S. and Allied Forces were more complex than ever before. The amount of time allowed for procurement and delivery was often compressed by emergency needs. And the supply lines were the longest in the world. This section of the Command History describes CINCPAC's logistic planning and operations to fill the vast and varied requirements of these forces.

JCS Annual Transportation Studies

Each year the JCS has conducted annual transportation requirements and capabilities studies for general war and for limited war. The directives for the 1961 studies were issued in November - December 1960. The studies of 1961 were of particular interest to CINCPAC since CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59 Phase IV was used as the basis for the Limited War Study. PACOM requirements for these

1. J4DM 209-60 & 207-60, 28 Nov 60, and 213-60, 6 Dec 60, all (S)
studies were compiled and forwarded in January and February 1961. Data from these submissions were incorporated in the latest transportation studies of the JCS. These studies provided order of magnitude capability statements as a basis for PACOM transportation tables.

**Joint Logistic Planning**

**Transportation Support of OPLANS:**

One of the major CINCPAC undertakings during 1961, and one that directly reflected the state of readiness of U.S. Forces under CINCPAC's command, was the preparation of transportation tables to support the major operations plans. During September 1960, the JCS directed the commanders of unified and specified commands to prepare a transportation requirements plan for each limited and cold war plan submitted to the JCS in accordance with the existing JSCP. As submitted to the JCS, these requirements were to include all personnel and cargo transportation necessary for the initial deployments, resupply and evacuation, including movement from CONUS, intra-theater and inter-theater movements. The JCS assumed the responsibility for preparing general war transportation requirements, and capabilities studies in support of the JSCP.

To comply with the JCS directive, CINCPAC determined that it would be necessary to prepare transportation requirements for the four separate situations anticipated by OPLAN 32-59 and for OPLANS 25-60 (defense of Taiwan) and 27-60 (military operations in Korea).

Commencing with the first of these plans, CINCPAC asked his Component Commanders to prepare their requirements on Electronic Accounting Machines (EAM) cards in accordance with existing instructions. In addition the following additional guidance was given:

1. CINCPAC ltrs Ser: 0035, 0036, and 0038, 17 Jan 61, all (S)
2. JCS 1672/261 (TS) and 2016/120 (TS)
3. JCS 1844-320 of 26 Sep 60; para 6b, Encl "A" (TS)
4. CINCPAC Inst 004600.2, 31 Mar 60 (S)
1. CJTF 116 would be furnished printouts of the consolidated PACOM requirements, and would indicate on the printout those movements recommended for theater lift. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. For planning purposes, the entire C-124/130 airlift capability of the 315th Air Division, excluding aircraft earmarked for High Gear, would be allocated to CJTF 116 for the period during which the heaviest initial deployments were taking place.\(^1\) After this initial period of allocation, the 315th Air Division would return to control of the WESTPAC Transportation Office (WTO) and remaining requirements for theater lift would be made according to normal allocation procedures.\(^2,3\)

3. Pending completion of the transportation planning cycle and the publication of MATS and MSTS transportation supporting plans to CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59, Component Commanders would be prepared to request MATS or MSTS transportation for personnel and equipment which had not been specified for movement by theater transportation.

4. Based on the CINCPAC Transportation Requirements, developed in accordance with the procedure described above, CJTF 116 would prepare detailed movement schedules for all PACOM units earmarked for the JTF. Component Commanders would deploy units in accordance with the detailed movement schedules on implementation of the plan.

Working from this guidance, the Commander JTF 116 scheduled a planning conference in Okinawa with representatives from the Component Commands, WestPac Transportation Office, the 315th AD, and MATS participating.\(^4\)

The initial transportation requirements to support OPLAN 32-59 were received from the Component Commanders during March 1961. This information was contained on EAM cards from which the J4 Division prepared the first CINCPAC report listing transportation

\(^{1}\) CINCPAC 142258Z Jan 61 (S)
\(^{2}\) CINCPAC Inst. 4600. 3 of 11 Feb 61 (U), and 004631.1 of 4 Mar 61(S)
\(^{3}\) CINCPAC Inst. 004631.1 of 4 Mar 61 (S)
\(^{4}\) CINCUSARPAC 250115Z Jan 61 cite RJ93173 (S)
requirements in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59, (Phase II Laos). It was forwarded to the JCS on 21 March 1961. The summary of requirements indicated that, during the first five days CINCPAC had a requirement for moving 4,192 personnel and a capability of moving 3,279; for cargo the requirement was for 2,640 short tons with a capability amounting to 1,766 short tons. During the next five days, the requirements for personnel and cargo would amount respectively to 1,103 and 1,053 with a corresponding capability of moving 767 personnel and 778 short tons of cargo. After the 10th day following the order to execute, CINCPAC's capabilities would equal the requirements.

Transportation requirements in support of OPLAN 32-59 (Phase II Vietnam) were forwarded to the JCS on 5 April 1961. This study also revealed significant deficits in CINCPAC's ability to meet the requirements with the ships and aircraft available to him. During the first five days there was a requirement to move 5,573 personnel and 4,470 short tons of cargo with a corresponding capability amounting to 3,069 and 1,631. The transportation deficit for the second five day period amounted to only 60 personnel and 82 short tons of cargo, and the study indicated that thereafter CINCPAC would be able to meet all requirements.

Concurrently with the development of requirements to support OPLAN 32-59, CINCPAC made the initial transportation requirements estimate in support of the multinational force for Laos, CINCPAC Outline Plan X-61, that was under development at that time. This plan was dropped later in favor of the existing SEATO Field Forces OPLAN 5/61 for which estimated and interim transportation requirements were sent to the JCS during April.

During May and June CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS the transportation requirements in support of Phases III and IV of OPLAN 32-59,

1. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00052 of 21 Mar 61 (TS)
2. Ibid. See Encl 1, p. 2 (TS)
3. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00062 of 5 Apr 61, See p. 2 of Encl 1. (TS)
4. CINCPAC 302058Z Mar 61 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 210001Z Apr 61 (TS)
and the requirements in support of OPLANS 27-60 and 25-60 were forwarded to the JCS on 7 August and 25 September, respectively, thus completing all of the requirements except for SFF OPLAN 5/61 on which preparation had been held up awaiting a resolution of several proposed changes to the plan so that the transportation requirements would correspond to the approved force structure.

In the meantime, all data on transportation requirements were transcribed to the computer in order to facilitate preparation and revision of the requirements reports.

Before the end of 1961, the JCS had approved all transportation requirements submitted by CINCPAC. Those for Phase II of 32-59 for both Laos and South Vietnam were approved as submitted and the JCS agreed to provide for planning purposes the sealift and airlift to make up the reported deficits. Transportation requirements in support of CINCPAC OPLAN Phases III and IV were approved conditionally pending re-programming action by CINCPAC to bring the requirements inline with capabilities. Specifically, the requirements for Phases III and IV exceeded the military airlift cargo capability during the first 30 days, and the sealift passenger capability during the first 60 days. 1

At the end of the year, CINCPAC was in the process of preparing the JCS approved transportation requirements as transportation tables for distribution.

To establish a sounder basis for planning, CINCPAC sent during October a request to the Chief WestPac Transportation Office for figures on the amount of airlift that could be made available to support CINCPAC OPLANS during a limited war, and asked that the information be reported in terms of flying hours and aircraft per day. 2 The answer, routed through the 315th Air Division and Hq PACAF, stated that 18 C-130 aircraft would be available per day, with an additional seven available during the first six days under OPLAN 1-60. This would

1. JCS SM-1067-61 of 6 Oct 61 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 142315Z Oct 61 (S)
provide 5,000 flying hours per month. The C-124 aircraft could fly 2,976 hours the first month, and the availability of this type of craft would be 18 for the first five days, 12 for the next five days, nine aircraft from D plus 11 through D plus 20, and six for the next ten days. (Each augmentation squadron of C-130 aircraft would provide twelve aircraft per day and 1,728 flying hours per month.) All of the above figures were provided after deducting the requirements for High Gear and route support.¹ The information furnished was in close agreement with the figures CINCPAC had used in preparing the transportation tables.

Dispensers for Minature Missiles (LAZY DOG):

Early in 1961, CINCPAC urged CNO to modernize the LAZY DOG bomb and strafer to permit delivery by high performance aircraft.² Although more than 200 million missiles were stored in PACOM, no suitable dispensers were available.³ The Bureau of Weapons thereupon commenced development of a dispenser that could be used with A4D, FJ-4B or AD aircraft and, by late March, the development and testing had advanced so rapidly that bomb containers (M16A1) were being modified and loaded with missiles at the Naval Ammunition Depot, Concord, California for shipment to PACOM.⁴ By early May, LAZY DOG bombs were aboard the USS BON HOMME RICHARD and the USS TICONDEROGA.⁵ By November, both the MK 44 bomb (the new designator for the modified M16A1 container) and the AERO 7E strafer were positioned aboard 7th Fleet ships ready for use upon CINCPAC's direction.⁶ A similar capability for PACAF forces had not been developed.

¹ PACAF 210400Z Oct 61 cite PFMDC 61-9723C (TS)
² CINCPAC 080141Z Feb 61 (S)
³ CNO 111741Z Feb 61 (S)
⁴ COMNAVAIRPAC 251856Z Mar 61 (S)
⁵ CINCPAC FLT 120540Z Apr 61 (S)
⁶ BUWEP 222213Z Nov 61 (S)
Wartime Logistic Support of PACOM Allies:

During April of 1961, when it appeared probable that the U.S. would become involved in a limited war in Southeast Asia, CINCPAC did considerable planning for furnishing logistic support to Allied forces in PACOM. As a basis for later governmental level agreement, CINCPAC explored the Philippine Government's willingness and ability to provide, lift, and support the Philippine forces for operations in Southeast Asia. A Filipino capability was developed that was considerably higher than the Filipino Military Adviser to SEATO had initially put forward. A tentative position was developed and presented to the JCS whereby the U.S. through contractual arrangements with commercial suppliers in Thailand, might undertake to supply POL to all forces under SEATO MPO Plan 5. It was also determined that, if the plan was executed, MAP-supported forces already located in the area of operations would continue to receive U.S. logistic support, at least initially, through existing PACOM MAP administrative channels. MAP supported forces deployed from their own countries outside of the area of operations, such as the Philippines or Pakistan, would receive the logistic support that the U.S. agreed to provide in the area of operations through the

1. JCS SM 7-60 of 26 Jan 61 (TS)
2. CINCUSARPAC 262208Z Feb 62 (S)
3. Annex P, CINCPAC OPLAN 1-61 of 6 Mar 61 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 032330Z Apr 61 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 132316Z Apr 61 (TS)
6. CINCPAC 270251Z Apr 61 (TS)
military logistic systems supporting the deployed U.S. forces. Any reimbursement from MAP to the respective Service Departments would be accomplished at the departmental level.

**The CINCPAC Automatic Data Processing System:**

Vehicle Standardization Plan:
As a result of a USARPAC conducted conference held in Japan during July and attended by representatives from all MAAGs and JUSMACs, the Vehicle Standardization Plan was revised and the number of types of vehicles was reduced from 37 to 34. This list included 21 trucks and 13 trailers. (UNCLASSIFIED)

MAP Ceilings on Vehicles:
A review of the FY 62-67 MA Plans indicated that a disproportionate percentage of funds was being programmed for the procurement, maintenance and operation of motor vehicles. To reduce this cost, CINCPAC conducted studies to bring the total number of vehicles authorized to each country in line with the country's mission. The

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resulting policy and implementing instructions to the MAAGs limited the number of vehicles but allowed each country some flexibility in determining the type of vehicles. 1

MAAG Vietnam Build-Up:
The build-up of U.S. assistance to South Vietnam during the latter part of 1961 created some logistic problems, primarily arising from a lack of policy guidance regarding the assignment of support responsibilities and fund sources. U.S. TO&E units deployed to South Vietnam were to be supported by their parent services. Aside from these units, new concepts in the advisory effort involved U.S. personnel and equipment assigned to South Vietnam units in the field. U.S. personnel involved in communications and intelligence operations in the field and additional U.S. personnel assigned to the MAAG. Some of the additional equipment involved in the "beef-up" assistance program was to be included in the FY62 MAP for South Vietnam. On the other hand, there was some question concerning the title to other equipment sent in for use by U.S. forces, for which the fund source remained undetermined at the end of the year. In carrying out the build-up of MAAG Vietnam, CINCPAC received outstanding support from the Army, Navy and Air Force in furnishing materiel and construction requirements when needed.

Establishment of WESTPAC Transportation Office

The WESTPAC Transportation Office was established on 1 March to allocate airlift of the 315th Air Division. At the same time, the Joint Military Transportation Boards throughout the PACOM area were disestablished. The Boards were originally established to allocate MATS and MSTS transportation furnished to CINCPAC in wartime. Subsequently, when MATS and MSTS converted to an industrial fund operation, allocations were to be made, in peace and war, directly to the three Component Commanders. Therefore, there was no longer a

1. CINCPAC 190125Z Jul 61 (S)
requirement for the Joint Military Transportation Boards, except for
the one in Japan, which allocated theater airlift furnished by the 315th
Air Division. This Japan Board was made up of representatives from
the three services, and the chairmanship rotated each six months.
Thus, no one individual was responsible to CINCPAC for the efficient
use of this airlift. To correct this situation, the WESTPAC Trans-
portation Office was established to replace the Japan-Korea Area JMTB.
One individual then served as Chief of the Office for a full overseas
tour, and reported directly to CINCPAC. In addition, each of the
component commanders assigned an officer to represent him in the
WTO.\footnote{CINCPAC Instructions 4600.3 and 4600.4 of 11 Feb 61 (U)}
The WTO moved from Fuchu Air Station to Tachikawa Air Base,
Japan during May. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Principal Airlift Activities During 1961

The 315th Air Division was augmented twice during the first half
of 1961 by C-130 squadrons from CONUS. The 773rd Troop Carrier
Squadron (TCS) was stationed at Clark Air Base from 3 January to
28 February. The 774th TCS arrived at Clark on 23 March and returned
to CONUS on 16 June.

The Marine Air Base Squadron 16 was deployed to Udorn Air Base,
Thailand during March, and returned to its home base in Japan during
September and October. (Blank)

When intervention in Laos appeared imminent during April, U.S.
personnel of the staff of the Commander SEATO Field Forces were
flown from Hawaii to Okinawa by PACAF and MATS aircraft. During
the latter part of April and Early May, Headquarters CSFF (Designate)
and some of the U.S. units were moved from Okinawa to the Philippines
by theater airlift. In June these prepositioned units were redeployed
to their home stations.

On 2 May 1961, 39 C-124 and C-130 aircraft of the 315th AD were
placed on a standby basis at Clark Air Base for possible deployment of
U.S. forces to Southeast Asia. The number was reduced to 31 on
18 May and all were released on 20 May.
MATS aircraft stood down from 25 March to 18 May for possible deployment of the PACAF Mobile Strike Force to Southeast Asia. Initially, 28 craft were committed.

During October, CINCPAC authorized the 315th AD to assist the Air Weather Service in typhoon reconnaissance work, on an emergency basis. [Redacted]

CINCPAC established the following policy concerning transportation of MAP material in PACOM: MAP material could be shipped on a space available basis on regularly scheduled flights of the 315th Air Division. Special missions for moving MAP material would require CINCPAC approval, which would be given only in cases where Mats or MSTS could not satisfy the requirement.¹ (UNCLASSIFIED)

Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL)

The significant problems in connection with POL procurement and supply were concerned with furnishing supplies for needs in Southeast Asia, (including SEATO requirements), storage, and actions to standardize POL requirements for U.S. and Allied forces. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Standardization:

Implementation of either CINCPAC or SEATO OPLANS in Southeast Asia would require substantial quantities of grade 115/145 aviation gasoline to support the initial deployment of the forces and subsequent operations. The Royal Thailand Air Force stocked grade 100/130 avgas at inland air bases for use in its planes. Since the POL storage facilities provided for only two products, only jet fuel and one grade of avgas (100/130) were stocked at these bases. Since this presented an obstacle to the initial support of U.S. or SEATO forces, CINCPAC asked CHJUSMAG Thailand to determine the feasibility of the RTAF converting to the use of grade 115/145 avgas for its operations.² The RTAF agreed to this and the conversion was expected to be completed early in 1962.³ (Redacted)

¹. CINCPAC 052142Z Oct 61 (U)
². CINCPAC 180338Z Jul 61 (S)
³. CHJUSMAG Thailand 030315Z Aug 61 cite MAZ 11775 (S)
One problem of supplying aviation lubricating oil throughout PACOM arose because the Air Force and Navy specified different additives to Military Symbol 1100 oil. The Air Force used the MS1100 oil containing a 2% cyclohexanone additive; the Navy used a dispersant type oil, and the Army continued to use the basic MS1100 oil without an additive. As a result, those bases that serviced the aircraft of the three Services were required to carry three types of aviation lubricating oil. At the end of the year, CINCPAC was preparing a recommendation to the Defense Petroleum Supply Center for the selection of a single lubricant to reduce the stocking problem. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Corrosive Aviation Gasoline:
During 1960, over a million barrels of 115/145 avgas in PACOM had a corrosive rating of 2 or worse, a condition caused by sulfate reducing bacteria present in the water in the bottoms of tanks. Through an extensive program to redistribute the corrosive avgas for consumption, only 120,000 barrels were in stocks at the beginning of 1961. In January a tank in Koshiba, Japan was found to contain 192,000 barrels of corrosive avgas. However, by mid-year all stocks of avgas that were corrosive to copper because of bacterial action had been depleted from terminals in Japan, Korea and Okinawa.¹

Later in the year, however, JP-4 fuel samples removed from seven C-130 aircraft on Okinawa contained substantial quantities of foreign substances that analysis identified as microbiological contamination, probably a fungus growth. The prime source of the contamination was located at Tahkli, Thailand, and CHJUSMAG Thailand was asked to isolate JP-4 fuel at Tahkli until corrective measures could be taken.²

Since POL quality surveillance responsibilities in Southeast Asia were not defined clearly, PACAF asked the Air Materiel Force Pacific Area to perform this service for Air Force owned fuels. In compliance

1. CINCPAC 012113Z Jul 61 (U)
2. CINCPAC 150047Z Dec 61 (S)
with the PACAF request, AMFPA proposed a survey of facilities at Don Muang, Takhli, Korat, Udorn, Ubon, and several other air bases in Southeast Asia. In addition, at the end of the year CINCPAC was preparing to amplify and clarify the responsibilities for quality surveillance for products that were Service owned, furnished by a contractor, or in stocks of Southeast Asia host nations.1

Proposed Supply of POL to UK, NZ, and Australia:
Plans for supplying forces committed under SEATO Plan 5 provided for each nation to supply its own forces from commercial resources in Thailand. Unless there was careful coordination and additional U.S. furnished POL, CINCPAC doubted that the commercial companies could meet the demand, particularly for JP-4. Accordingly, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the UK, Australia, and New Zealand forces be permitted to draw against U.S. contracts for bulk and packaged POL delivered f.o.b. Bangkok on a reimbursable basis under a bilateral agreement.2 Representatives of the countries involved met in Bangkok in September to draft bilateral agreements covering the proposed POL supply procedures. The draft bilateral agreements were forwarded to the JCS during October for U.S. approval.3

POL Support for CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59:
One of the logistic problems connected with CINCPAC operations plans for U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia was procuring an initial supply of fuel. The Military Petroleum Supply Agency (MPSA) completed contracts with commercial oil companies in Thailand which would provide POL support for JTF 116 for the first 20 days of operation. Additional tanks, were under construction in Vietnam at Tan Son Nhat and Nha to provide this capability and were scheduled to be completed early in 1962.

These contracts provided for the stockage of package products, including large quantities of aviation and ground fuels, in Bangkok. To

1. CINCPAC 172316Z Jan 62 (S)
2. CINCPAC 270251Z Apr 61 (TS)
3. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00635 of 20 Oct 61 (S)
avoid the need to ship these products inland after the OPLAN was
implemented, CHJUSMAG Thailand recommended that packaged POL
products be stored at inland commercial terminals. Accordingly,
CINCPAC asked MPSA to amend the contracts to provide for storing
the packaged POL products at Udorn, Korat and Takhli. Movement
of the products to the inland locations was completed at the end of the
year.

War Planning Slate:
During March CINCPAC developed a mechanized procedure for
submitting the War Planning Slate (WPS). Since the WPS was an annual
report that had to be up-dated as changes occurred, the EAM procedure
was expected to facilitate preparation of future reports. The 1961 slate
also recommended that the resupply capability of MPSA, MSTS and the
Military Departments be studied and a common mobilization level be
established for all U.S. Forces within PACOM.

U.S. CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

CINCPAC continued during 1961 to stress the need for an active,
grass roots level, Civil Affairs program commonly known as Civic
Action. The areas that received the most attention during the year were
Korea, Laos, and South Vietnam.

The U.S. was not involved directly in civil affairs activities in
Japan or the Republic of China, where the need for U.S. assistance
did not exist, or in Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, Burma or
Indonesia where other factors seemed to militate against active CA
programs. China had the largest and most effective civil affairs pro-
gram in the PACOM, a program that the government developed after
belatedly realizing that it lost the mainland because it failed to win the
confidence and support of the people. To correct this, the Government

1. CHJUSMAG Thailand 230400Z Sep 61 cite MAL 12023 (S)
2. CINCPAC 212309Z Oct 61 (S)
3. CINCPAC ltr 4020/4812, Ser: 00103 of 21 Feb 61 (S)
of China established a political-military civil affairs school, and conducted a training program with a goal of 30,000 graduates. U.S. officers rated their program as excellent. In Thailand, where all government functions were in the hands of military personnel, the U.S., acting in accordance with the advice of Ambassador Johnson, refrained from encouraging the government to establish a civil affairs program. It appeared, however, that the Thailand Government was developing interest in such a program, particularly in the northeast provinces where the government needed strong support from the people.

South Vietnam Civil Affairs Activities

The greatest need for a civil affairs program in the PACOM area was in South Vietnam. Recognizing this need, the U.S. advisors helped the Vietnamese Army to design a civil affairs program aimed at both the Vietnamese people and soldiers alike. In the past the South Vietnamese Army had not been spectacularly successful in gaining the support of the people. This new program was designed to correct this condition.

In addition to the extensive training activities carried on by U.S. Civil Affairs Mobile Training Teams, the South Vietnamese Army activated two companies of 64 men each during 1961 to conduct civil affairs activities. These units helped combat commanders carry out civic action projects to improve health and sanitation conditions, and improve farming, fishing, or industrial activities, as well as overall security in the villages.

Although comparatively new, the Vietnamese civil affairs program made a genuine contribution to troop morale, and increased civilian support. There was, however, some concern among MAAG personnel that the civil affairs program was developing along the lines of a political commissar system, a trend that appeared more noticeable after the attempted coup in November 1960.¹

¹ Paper prepared by CINCPAC J55, Subj: The G-5 Functions in the Vietnamese Army, 4 May 61 (S)
Laos Civil Affairs Activities

The Lao Armed Forces had begun to develop an extensive civil affairs program prior to the Kong - Le Coup of August 1960. This program was suspended following the Coup. It was not until late 1961 that the civil affairs program was re-established by means of a Civil Affairs Mobile Training Team that conducted training courses for members of the FAL. In general the organization for civil affairs in Laos was patterned after the South Vietnamese program. Civil Affairs activities are discussed in more detail in Part II of this Command History.

South Korean Civil Affairs Activities

There were no civil affairs units or teams in South Korea, although there was an active program supervised by the Eighth U.S. Army, and a separate program within the ROK Army. The U.S. program was slanted toward civic action and community relations activities intended to improve the social and economic conditions of the civilians, and the relations between them and the U.S. Army. Probably the most significant and productive program in Korea was the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) that was started at the end of the war by General Maxwell Taylor, who was authorized to use $15 million worth of materials available in U.S. depots in Korea to help rebuild the country. The AFAK program was continued under Eighth U.S. Army administration, using funds procured through gradually diminishing allocations by the International Cooperation Administration. During FY61 the ICA allocation was $600,000, but no allocation was included in the FY62 ICA budget. Since it had been one of the most successful of U.S. aid projects, CINCUSARPAC and CINCPAC were anxious to continue it, although at the end of the year there was no acceptable solution to the funding problem. The Department of the Army suggested use of MAP funds available to CINCPAC. 1 Opinion on the legality of using MAP funds for the AFAK program varied, and CINCUSARPAC urged DA to

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1. DA 901932 msg 011848Z Sep 61 (C)

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seek further ICA support. Finally, in November, OSD notified CINCPAC that since AID (then ICA) still refused to provide funds, and since the AFAK program enjoyed support at high levels of the government, the Secretary of Defense would approve up to $600,000 increase in PACOM FY62 MAP funds if CINCPAC would agree to use these additional funds. Although in favor of the continuing the program, CINCPAC was reluctant to dilute the MAP effort with that type of program, and suggested that DA provide the additional funds. This problem remained unsolved at the end of 1961.

**Ryukyus (Okinawa)**

The U.S. continued to exercise its governmental authority over the Ryukyus through the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. High Commissioner. During February, Lt. Gen. Donald P. Booth, USA, who had served as High Commissioner for nearly three years, was succeeded by Lt. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA. During 1961 the Ryukyus economy was prosperous but dependent upon funds provided as a result of U.S. military activities. There continued to be strong and persistent sentiment among the Okinawans favoring returning the islands to Japanese administration. (UNCLASSIFIED)

During the fall of 1961, a group appointed by the President visited Okinawa to investigate the economic, political and social problems facing the U.S. civil administration, and to determine what corrective action and assistance was needed. The report of this group, completed during December, neither recommended popular election of the chief executive nor supported the return of administrative authority to Japan. Although neither the report nor its recommendations were released to the public, the report was criticized by the Okinawa press on the grounds that it failed to reflect the wishes of the Okinawa people.

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1. CINCUSARPAC 240150Z Sep 61 (C)
2. OSD 132224Z cite DEF 905612 Nov 61 (C)
3. CINCPAC 242101Z Nov 61 (C)
Guam

The control of the entry of persons into the Territory of Guam, which had been exercised by the U.S. Navy for longer than 50 years, was relaxed on 15 September 1961. Although U.S. citizens were authorized to enter Guam without a permit, there was no change in the requirements for aliens, ships, or aircraft. The port retained its former status as a closed port. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Trust Territory Civil Affairs Activities

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for which the U.S. was responsible as administering authority to the United Nations, included Micronesia islands scattered over an area larger than the continental United States. CINCPAC's responsibility in this area was limited to monitoring the administration of these islands. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Early in the year a United Nations Trusteeship Council Visiting Mission, made up of UN representatives from Bolivia, India, Belgium, and the UK, visited the Trust Territory for a six week period. A CINCPACFLT representative met with this group on Guam, and later both CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT representatives attended the meeting of the Trustee Council of the UN at which the Visiting Mission presented its report. This report and the general debate of the U.S. administration of its trusteeship, was more critical than usual of the U.S. administration. The Mission report indicated that education and economic development was inadequate in most districts. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The problem that caused most concern to UN representatives was that of claims, principally war damage claims against the Japanese government and claims for compensation for military use of lands in the Marshall Islands. Some of these claims had been outstanding but unsettled for longer than 15 years, and even friendly members of the Council expressed impatience. The other threat to U.S. control and use of these islands resulted from a General Assembly Resolution of December 1960 that called for independence for the island inhabitants, a resolution strongly endorsed by India and Russia.
As a result of criticism from UN representatives, and the discontent among the Micronesian residents because of the unsettled claims, the Department of Interior sent a two-man team to the Pacific in June to conduct a field survey and develop a plan to resolve the problem. This team consulted with CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT representatives enroute to Guam and the Trust Territory. (UNCLASSIFIED)

A separate problem existed in Saipan during part of the year. Late in 1960 two political parties were formed in Saipan, which was part of the U.S. Trust Territory. These two parties took opposite sides in a plebiscite to determine if Saipan should join Guam and become a part of a Territory of the U.S. The final vote, after considerable political friction and community disunity, favored rejoining Guam, but the visiting UN Mission refused to recognize the Saipan plebiscity, claiming that it would be a step in the wrong direction from trust territory to a non-self governing status. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Special Warfare Activities

Special warfare was an expanding activity in the PACOM area as both U.S. and Allied forces increased the emphasis on the use of psychological operations and unconventional warfare to defeat communist insurgency. In Laos Special Forces and PsyWar Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) were introduced to train SGL forces in tactics and techniques of counter-insurgency operations. U.S. Special Forces MTT's were increased from a few teams at the beginning of the year to an authorized total of 500 men at the end of the year. Eight and twelve man PsyWar MTT's were replaced near the end of the year with a fourteen man PsyWar advisory contingent on permanent duty with MAAG Laos. At the end of the year a MAP supported FAR Psychological Services Battalion was being organized. This unit had a TO&E strength of approximately 400. Another successful activity in Laos was the training and use of Meo tribesmen in guerrilla type actions, of which the most successful were harassing actions along the Route 7 communist supply route from North Vietnam. In South Vietnam, a U.S. Special Forces
MTT trained members of the Vietnamese army in anti-guerrilla tactics, and the Vietnamese army had two battalions of special forces trained in guerrilla fighting. An RVNAF PsyWar Directorate and PsyWar Battalion under MAP support, were actively engaged in psychological operations in support of South Vietnam's counter-insurgency campaign. In other countries -- Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand -- there were units and programs for the conduct of both psychological operations and unconventional warfare. (See)

More complete accounts of special warfare activities are included in the sections of this Command History about Laos and South Vietnam.

Unconventional Warfare Planning Guide

During 1961, CINCPAC published a Policy and Planning Guide for Unconventional Warfare. The first document of its kind, this guide contained the basic doctrine and terms of reference from which were derived the CINCPAC concepts for the military U.S. activities in cold, limited and general war. It also contained the specific planning and operational factors used in developing CINCPAC requirements for the support of military operations through UW means. The general concepts of the guide applied to both Allied countries and to U.S. forces, of which those in the PACOM area having a UW capability consisted of one U.S. Army Special Forces Group (Airborne) on Okinawa, and a limited number of units from the other Services trained to support unconventional warfare. 1

Development of Counter-Insurgency Forces

Due to the increased interest in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla activities, the JCS asked CINCPAC to submit quarterly status reports on the status of development of counter-guerrilla forces. CINCPAC submitted reports on 1 August and 30 October in which the more significant items were the following: (See)

1. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 000198 of 28 Aug 61 (TS)
Approximately 120 students from ten Allied countries attended or were programmed to attend the Counter-guerrilla Operations Course or the Psychological Operations Course at Ft. Bragg, N.C.

CINCUSARPAC proposed a program of instruction for a PACOM 10-week counter-guerrilla course to accommodate approximately 100 U.S. and Allied personnel. On Okinawa, the 3rd Marine Division had already established a counter-guerrilla and jungle warfare combat range. Marines also trained at the Zambales Training Area in the Philippines.

Counter-guerrilla or psyops training was also conducted by the Republic of China, Cambodia, Japan and in Laos by U.S. Special Forces Mobile Training Teams. In South Vietnam all training was oriented to stress counter-guerrilla tactics and techniques. On Okinawa the U.S. Army 1st Special Forces Group conducted courses on special forces techniques for U.S. and Allied personnel. 1, 2

**Escape and Evasion**

CINCPAC coordinated Escape and Evasion (E&E) activities among CINCAL, CINCPACFLT and CINCSAC prior to forwarding the list to the JCS for assignment to the Central Intelligence Agency. CINCAL provided CINCPAC with coordinates of those coastal removal areas considered most suitable for use with the safe E&E area within CINCAL's area of coordination responsibility. 3 CINCPACFLT then reviewed the coastal removal areas selected by CINCAL, and the areas were then added to the CINCPAC listing and included in appropriate CINCPAC OPLANs. 4

During June, seven PACOM officers attended the annual CIA E&E indoctrination course presented in the Washington D. C. area.

1. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00655 of 30 Oct 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00434 of 1 Aug 61 (S)
3. CINCAL 270012Z Jun 61 cite ALCOM OPN 5500 (S)
4. CINCPACFLT 172029Z Jul 61 (S)
PACOM Counter-Insurgency Course

Because the communists used guerrilla warfare in Southeast Asia, CINCPAC proposed setting up a PACOM Counter-Insurgency Course on Okinawa. When his Component Commanders and MAAG Chiefs indicated there was definite requirement for the training, CINCPAC directed CINCUSARPAC to prepare a plan and conduct the instruction. As approved later by CINCPAC, the course was to cover counter-guerrilla operations and the non-military aspects of counter-insurgency, both slanted toward small units. The first ten-week course was scheduled to commence in May 1962. Each course was expected to accommodate 100 students selected from officers and NCOs of U.S. and Allied armed and civil services.  

1. CINCPAC 130453Z Aug 61 (C)  
2. CINCUSARPAC ltr GPPOP-OP of 25 Sep 61 (C)
PART I

CHAPTER II

CINCPAC ACTIONS INFLUENCING THE STATE OF READINESS
OF ALLIED NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA

The preceding chapter discussed one of the principal objectives in
the accomplishment of the CINCPAC's mission, that of maintaining and
improving the state of readiness of assigned U.S. forces in PACOM.
This chapter discusses another CINCPAC objective, that of improving
the state of readiness of all forces of Allied countries in the PACOM
area. In 1961, one of the principal ways that CINCPAC influenced
the individual countries was through the Military Assistance Program
(MAP). Therefore, this chapter is devoted largely to a discussion of
CINCPAC's MAP activities. (UNCLASSIFIED)

AREA WIDE MAP ACTIVITIES

Country Mission Statements

The Country Mission Statements promulgated by CINCPAC in 1959
and 1960 remained in effect with no significant changes. They provided
a basis for MAP guidance to the U.S. authorities concerned, and also
provided a basis for such bilateral operational planning of military
discussions as might be appropriate between U.S. and national officials
when the political climate permitted. In order that the mission of
respective national officials could be related to that of the U.S. Forces,
the statements included three general topics: (1) Simplified concepts
for limited and general war in the specified area; (2) Missions that
national forces should be prepared to fulfill; and (3) Broad missions of
the U.S. in that area.

Command Relations

CINCPAC promulgated an instruction in August 1961 that set forth:
the command structure of the Pacific Command and the terms of reference

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of PACOM commanders in support of CINCPAC's missions. It was pointed out that the Component Commander's responsibilities for the Military Assistance Program were prescribed in CINCPAC's Instruction 4900.1B, described below. It also set forth the relationship between the Subordinate Unified Commanders, the Representatives of the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPACREPs) and the Chief of Military Assistance Advisory Groups. In those areas in which subordinate unified commands were established, the Chief MAAGs would keep the subordinate unified commanders informed of MAP objectives and plans under development.1

In setting forth the terms of reference for the Component Commanders, CINCPAC pointed out that they were to assist in coordinated planning with the three Subordinate Unified Commands.2

Terms of Reference

A program for updating the Terms of Reference for MAAG Chiefs in the PACOM was completed on 19 Dec 61. In addition, Terms of Reference for COMUS Korea, related to MAAG matters, was published on 7 August.3

As a result of an extensive manpower survey, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS during November that the Terms of Reference be

1. The term "MAAG" as used here refers to Military Assistance Advisory Groups, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Groups, or a comparable organization. All Chief MAAGs come under the direct military command of CINCPAC except the Chief ProvMAAG Korea. In Korea CINCPAC exercised control over the Military Assistance Program matters through COMUS Korea, and COMUS Korea exercised control through CHPROVMAAG Korea.

2. The term "combined" has been used in the past generally to describe U.S./Allied planning. Since it connotes co-equal voice in the determination, disposition and employment of forces, U.S./Allied military planning is identified as "coordinated" rather than "combined" as feasible. See: CINCPAC Inst 003020.2B of 10 August 1961. (S)

3. CINCPAC ltrs Ser: 0028 of 14 Jan 61 (Burma)(S); 0029 of 14 Jan 61 (Indonesia)(S); 0244 of 13 Apr 61 (Vietnam)(C); 0358 of 31 May 61 (Philippines)(C); 0371 of 6 Jun 61 (Laos)(C); 0374 of 8 Jun 61 (Cambodia)(C); 0375 of 8 Jun 61 (Thailand)(C); 0518 of Aug 61 (Korea)(C); 0772 of 19 Dec 61 (Japan)(C); 0771 of 19 Dec 61 (China) (C).
modified to provide within each MAAG that the heads of the Service
sections would have direct access to the Chief of the MAAG, and that
they would comprise a senior planning group. A small joint planning
and advisory staff also would be authorized. In reply, the JCS stated
that the terms of reference were being revised and standardized on a
world wide basis in terms sufficiently flexible to permit organizational
changes desired by CINCPAC.  

MAP Planning and Funding

FY 61 MA Program:
The MA Program for FY61 stood at $613 million at the beginning
of 1961, with a request by CINCPAC for additional funds pending. On
7 January 1961, the Defense Department advised CINCPAC that funds
were not available to provide for the requested increase in the FY61
program. However, in February the Department of Defense informed
CINCPAC that the PACOM FY61 ceiling was increased to $687 million
with a requirement of $731.3 million, and that the difference between
these figures would have to be funded within PACOM. CINCPAC was
able to furnish deviations in the amount of $43 million and reprogrammed
approximately $21 million from the Korea FY 50-60 MAP, with the
balance absorbed within PACOM. In March, OSD submitted a
revised PACOM FY61 program increasing the ceiling to $724 million
with an allocation of funds except for $21 million, which was to be
absorbed in PACOM. In July as a final measure to the FY61 program,
the Secretary of Defense increased the ceiling to $740,679,500 in response
to CINCPAC's request for additional funds to meet the emergency in
SEAsia.

1. CINCPAC 210349Z Nov 61 (C)
2. JCS 262311Z Dec 61 (C)
3. CINCPAC 060027Z Dec 61 (S)
4. OSD 070002Z Jan 61 cite DEF 988326 (S)
5. OSD 180020Z Feb 61 cite DEF 990563 (S)
6. SECDEF 092125Z cite DEF 991573 Mar 61 (S)
7. CINCPAC ADMNO 281940Z Mar 61 (S)
8. CINCPAC 170312Z Mar 61 (S)
9. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00190 of Mar 61 (S)
10. SECDEF 272335Z Mar 61 cite DEF 994779 (S)
11. CINCPAC 122032Z Apr 61 (S) and 102307Z Jun 61 (S)
FY62-67 MA Plan and FY62 Program

In December 1960, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the 1961 Strategic Force Objectives for PACOM were unchanged, and were to be used as a basis for the FY62-67 Military Assistance Plan. 1 CINCPAC in turn informed PACOM MAAG Chiefs to prepare their FY62-67 MA Plans on the FY62-67 Strategic Force Objective as modified by CINCPACs recommendation to the JCS. 2

During March, OSD/ISA requested that CINCPAC submit on 17 April 1961, the Country Chapters of the proposed PACOM FY62-67 MA Plans on an "as is" basis. As a result, CINCPAC staff representatives hand-carried the provisional plans to Washington, where they were used to explain the plan to the Director of Military Assistance. 3 Following the review of the Country Chapters of the FY62-67 MA Plans, OSD provided additional guidance for the preparation of the plan. 4

The President's message to Congress regarding FY62 military funds stated that, pending a reevaluation of the military program, a requirement for $1.6 billion existed to maintain forces in being, to meet prior commitments, to keep open production lines for the air defense system, and to provide a $100 million contingency fund for Laos, Vietnam, and the Congo. Accordingly, the FY62 PACOM MAP requirement of $739 million submitted in December 1960 by CINCPAC had to be reduced to $685 million. In May, OSD provided an estimated increase to $787 million to provide the necessary funds to counteract the stepped up action in SEAsia. ( )

Using these dollar guidelines assigned to the PACOM, the plan was prepared and submitted to the OSD on 25 August 1961. 5 In the forwarding letter CINCPAC recommended that the integrity of the plan structure be retained, but urged continued effort to reduce the supporting commentary, various categories of shortfalls and similar hand-prepared procedures, thereby reducing the work required by the MAAG Staffs. (UNCLASSIFIED)

1. JCS 231845Z Dec 61 cite JCS 987701 (TS)
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00296 of 11 Jun 60 (S)
3. OSD 302126Z Mar 61 cite 993029 (C) (downgraded to Unclassified)
4. OSD ltr 7 Jul 61, Subj: Guidance for Preparation of the FY62-67 MA Plan. (S)
5. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00496 of 26 Aug 61 (S)
advance funding was requested; and items used to develop the SECDDEF contingency reserve. However, the items not eligible for the deferral list, plus the force maintenance requirements made necessary initial funding of $687.6 million; thus CINCPAC was able to develop only $87.1 of the $130 million deferral list.  

FY62 Funding Procedures:
As the situation in SEAsia deteriorated during 1961, it became necessary for immediate funding and supply actions to be taken. Requirements were forwarded as FY62 program additions without corresponding deletions. Problems in programming were complicated by the absence of an approved funded FY62 program; special requests for advance funding were necessary and were approved by OSD. The net result of both emergency additions and advance funding actions was to overload the normal programming facilities with piecemeal actions.

In August, DOD directed a major change to MAP program funding and deviation methods. The FY62 MAP program had a funded program to the extent of the new obligational authority appropriated by Congress, as in previous years. In addition, the new procedure authorized, but did not approve or fund, an additional amount equal to the total Congressional authorization, which always exceeded the appropriation. The authorized but unfunded portion was used to fund sub-projects in priority order as money became available from recoupment, reapportionment, or any other means. This action eliminated the flexible system of change order accounts which had traditionally supported the changing MAP scene. These change-order accounts were made available to the Unified Commanders and thereby reduced program flexibility and the ability to adjust changes.

At the FY62 MA Program Procedures Conference, held 2-7 October, all MAAG representatives and component commanders were informed of the changes in program techniques. In general, the new

1. CINCPAC 230148Z Dec 61 (S)
2. OSD 112343Z Aug 61 cite DEF 900970 (C)
3. OSD 062324Z Oct 61 cite DEF 576035 (U)
procedures proposed were to increase the mechanization of forms used in the MAP program. A complete rewrite of the CINCPAC Supplement covering the new procedures was in process at the end of the year.

Air Defense Units for MAP Countries

At the close of 1960, the future availability of Nike equipment from U.S. production was in doubt since DA production plans called for a cut-off of future production under the existing contracts.

In February ASD/ISA informed CINCPAC that the PACOM FY61 program ceiling could be increased to provide funds for, among other things, the minimum Nike and Hawk ground equipment necessary to extend the reorder point to FY62 for PACOM, an amount equal to $12.6 million for Nike and $29.7 million for Hawk, and that Hawk must have been funded by 31 March 1961. ASD/ISA further requested CINCPAC concurrence in immediate funding of Nike and Hawk requirements, adding that if CINCPAC did not agree with this funding action, the PACOM FY61 program ceiling was to be reduced by these amounts. It was emphasized that failure to program Nike and Hawk requirements in FY61 would result in an uneconomical price increase that CINCPAC would have to bear in later programs. 1

On 21 February, ASD/ISA advised CINCPAC that the increased PACOM FY61 program would provide initial funding for ground equipment for 6 Nike battery sets and 12 Hawk battery sets from U.S. production. The inclusion of these items in the PACOM FY61 program would extend the reorder point to August 1961, which would prevent a price increase. ASD/ISA further advised that the completion of the 6 Nike and 12 Hawk batteries would require PACOM funding of $3.6 million in FY62 and $10.1 million in FY63. 2

On 25 February, CINCPAC advised ASD/ISA of this concurrence in the FY61 funding program of Nike and Hawk requirements under the condition cited, emphasizing, however, that the funds for emergency military operations were of a greater importance. 3

1. OSD 180020Z Feb 61, cite DEF 990563 (S)
2. OSD 210016Z Feb 61, cite DEF 990625 (S)
3. CINCPAC 252037Z Feb 61 (S)
The only PACOM countries concerned with the air defense units were Korea, Japan, and China.

In May CINCPAC advised COMUS Korea, CHMAAG Japan, and CHMAAG China that OSD had included in the PACOM FY62 MAP the Nike and Hawk ground equipment for which the production was considered critical. He also pointed out that delivery of surface to air missile (SAM) units could be made as then scheduled in the 5-year MAP plans, or could be accelerated, depending upon the country's ability to absorb and meet local funding responsibilities. CINCPAC asked these MAAGs to restudy their SAM requirements through FY68 and submit justification for any changes to the delivery schedules. \(^1\) CHMAAG Japan was also asked if he considered it practicable to attempt to get GOJ acceptance of all or part of the six SAM units not yet offered to the Japanese, together with an agreement for sharing the cost of the units.

CHMAAG China and COMUS Korea indicated their respective countries could meet the existing schedule of programming, but COMUS Korea suggested that before any SAM units for the ROK Army were shipped to Korea, the U.S. should satisfy itself that the political situation was satisfactory, that there was a satisfactory degree of U.S. operational control over the ROK forces, and that the ROKA had demonstrated with the first two SAM battalions its ability to use the remaining units, and that delivery schedule should allow one fiscal year between the Nike battalions and one fiscal year between the Hawk battalions. \(^2, 3\) The Japanese position was less definite because of the cost-sharing problem that would arise in discussions with the Japanese. The Japanese Defense Agency considered four Nike and three Hawk battalions the minimum requirement thru FY68, but because of the cost-sharing formula, the revised long-range (JFY 62-66) plan then being considered by the GOJ included only two Nike (including one already accepted under FY61 MAP) and two Hawk battalions. \(^4\)

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1. CINCPAC 311800Z May 61 (S)
2. COMUS Korea 070925Z Jun 61 cite UK 70393 CJ. (S)
3. CHMAAG China 080845Z Jun 61 cite MAGAR-O&P 6311. (S)
4. CHMAAG Japan 100940Z Jun 61 cite CME B94249 (S)
A change in the plan for Korea was indicated at the beginning of October, however, when the Department of State asked the U.S. Ambassador to Korea if he was then in a position to recommend discussions with the ROKG on a proposal to provide Nike-Hercules and Hawk missile systems to ROK forces. The Ambassador favored going ahead with discussions on the Hawk system, but wanted to delay similar action with regard to the Nike-Hercules because CINCUNC had recommended to CINCUSARPAC that the ROKA be equipped with the Hawk system only. CINCPAC at once asked COMUSK for his recommendation. COMUSK explained that the CG, Eighth U.S. Army had recommended that Nike-Hercules be eliminated for the ROK MAP. At the end of 1961 a policy decision on this matter was still under consideration by State and Defense Departments.

Nevertheless, at the end of 1961 the PACOM MAP SAM Plan remained as follows: Korea: one Nike battalion in FY63 and one in FY66; one Hawk battalion in FY63, one in FY64 and one in FY67. Japan: one Nike battalion in FY63 and one in FY65; one Hawk battalion in FY64 and one in FY66. China: one Nike battalion in FY61 and one in FY66; one Hawk battalion in FY63.

Light Tank Requirements for PACOM

As a result of a DA study and survey to determine the status of 37mm ammunition requirements to meet possible MAP emergency requirements, DA requested CINCPAC's plans on the replacement of all M8 tanks with M24 and/or M41s, and other theater tank plans. CINCPAC advised DA that the information and conclusions derived from the DA light tank conference at the end of January seriously questioned the validity of the DA assumption that M24 tanks would be supported through FY67, and requested that CINCPAC be advised of the existing plans to support this tank. DA informed CINCPAC that

1. State to Seoul 419, 2 Oct 61 (C)
2. Seoul to State 546, 5 Oct 61 (C)
3. CINCPAC Military Assistance Plan, 1 Sep 1961 (S)
4. DA 151749Z Mar 61 cite DA 991888 (S)
5. CINCPAC ADMINO 220025Z Mar 61 (S)
an additional study established the fact that it was no longer feasible
to procure those parts peculiar to M24 tanks, and recommended that
a plan be developed to support the M24 tanks with peculiar repair
parts through centralized controlled cannibalization as they phased
out of the system. CINCPAC advised DA that a PACOM light tank
allocation and distribution plan had been completed. Based upon
individual country FY63-67 MA Plan, light tank requirements had
increased slightly; however, in-country delivery rates for M41 tanks
did not exceed those previously provided to DA at the January tank
conference. Thailand and Vietnam were given higher priority and
would be totally equipped by FY67. China and Japan had been
accorded a lower priority, since both countries were able to develop
a satisfactory in-country M24 tank rebuild capability.\footnote{1} CINCPAC
provided DA the PACOM light tank distribution plan in June 1962.\footnote{2}

\textbf{Date Processing Center}

In 1961, CINCPAC developed and instituted a system for processing
MAP data through the use of automatic data processing equipment.
The system was designed to reduce the MAAGs' workload by central-
izing functions and eliminating fully annual MAP Program submissions.
It provided for control of excess MAP property through phasing of
allowances by fiscal year, created a processing capability for
individual transactions, provided for a control evolution of automation
in MAAGs and countries, developed techniques for computing MAP
requirements, and conducted research into better MAP data systems
including electronic inventory control at country level.\textit{(UNCLASSIFIED)}

The 1961 audit was the first CINCPAC machine audit of the data
submitted by the MAAGs. It was designed to discover and correct
errors that survived the technical review in the MAAGs' hand
prepared documents. \textit{(UNCLASSIFIED)}

\footnotesize{\begin{enumerate}
\item CINCPAC 220110Z Apr 61 (S)
\item CINCPAC Ser: 00335 of 13 Jun 61 (S)
\end{enumerate}}
The FY62-67 Plan data submitted by the MAAGs was machine punched to verify computations of requirements. These data were then placed on punch cards to facilitate up-dating and summarizing, and for print-out in various groupings. This permitted machine comparisons between authorizations and equipment requirements, thereby, reducing MAAGs administrative workload. (UNCLASSIFIED)

MAP Vehicle Support

Early in 1961 CINCPAC established a policy that prohibited the use of MAP funds to support the complete in-country rebuild of Japanese manufactured vehicles or components. 1 CINCUSARPAC promptly asked that CINCPAC reconsider the decision, claiming the separate countries would improve both their maintenance and self sufficiency if they could rebuild their own vehicles and parts. 2 The policy, CINCPAC explained, was not intended to discourage country self sufficiency by requiring recipient countries to use their own resources to procure parts or services from Japanese manufacturers if the rebuild of vehicle components was determined to be more economical than replacement. 3 In addition, CINCPAC would not support MAP funding for a higher level of maintenance than contemplated in existing Army regulations. CINCUSARPAC suggested that the country teams evaluate each country's ability to maintain its vehicles, and that the determination to suspend or reduce MAP fifth echelon repair parts support be made on the basis of these evaluations. 4 This was a suggestion CINCPAC did not favor. The complete tear-down and rebuild of WWII vehicles had been authorized in PACOM as an expedient because the PACOM MAP vehicle fleet was wearing out faster than it could be replaced. The replacement of the WWII vehicles with new ones materially reduced the requirements for continued rebuild. CINCPAC plans for future MAP support of the PACOM MAP fleet were based on the premise that complete tear-down and rebuild of wheeled vehicles was uneconomical and contrary to regulations. 5

1. CINCPAC 050039Z Jan 61 (C)
2. CINCUSARPAC 240301Z Jan 61 cite RJ 92589 (C)
3. CINCPAC 040418Z Feb 61 (C)
4. CINCUSARPAC 240305Z Feb 61 cite RJ 93322 (C)
5. CINCPAC 080245Z Mar 61 (C)
Follow-on Spares Support for MAP

Preliminary MAP policy guidance was received from the OSD in December 1961, stating that the follow-on spares program beginning with the FY63 MA Program would be computed to equal the value of requisitions required to be submitted during the program year. Apparently the above policy was a combination of factors brought about by a limitation of funds available for MAP support as well as an effort to force the countries to improve the efficiency of logistic planning and programming. In the past, it had been a practice to program requirements of sufficient funding levels to carry over for the first five or six months of the succeeding fiscal year. In the FY63 program implementation, the Director of Military Assistance retained continuing resolution authority to approve the fund follow-on spares and other continuing requirements on 1 July of each year, in amounts sufficient to provide continuity of operations until issuance of the normal MAP order.¹ (UNCLASSIFIED)

T-28 NOMADs for MAP Countries

During April ASD/ISA advised CINCPAC that T-28A aircraft excess to U.S. needs and then in storage could be modified for MA requirements to T-28 NOMAD configuration for increased performance and combat versatility at a cost of approximately $60,000 each. Asked to provide estimated use of this aircraft in PACOM, CINCPAC indicated tentative requirements for 104 T-28 NOMADs for 6 MAP supported countries.² Accordingly, ASD/ISA approved and funded 100 of the aircraft,³ and HQUSAF established a schedule to deliver the aircraft during 1962. However, a month later, in October, the increased emphasis on Vietnam prompted OSD to substitute 30 T-28B aircraft available from Navy sources for delivery in February 62, for the 30 T-28 NOMADs previously scheduled for June delivery to South Vietnam.⁴ HQUSAF then reduced the NOMAD contract from

1. OSD 210109Z Dec 61 cite DEF 584577 (U)
2. CINCPAC 022155Z May 61 (S)
3. OASD/ISA ltr, ser I-6077/61, 7 Jul 61 (S)
4. OSD 272233Z Oct 61 (S)
100 to 70. At the end of 1961, the schedule for delivery of NOMADs during 1962 was: 14 to Laos in June; 30 to Thailand in July; 16 to Cambodia in August; and the remaining 10 tentatively earmarked for delivery to Thailand in September. 1

Priority Construction Projects in SEAsia

CINCPAC became involved during 1961 in selecting and planning for certain preparatory type actions or projects that could be taken in Southeast Asia to improve the U.S. ability to conduct contingency operations, provided they were completed prior to the commencement of combat. This planning action was originally initiated by the Secretary of Defense on 8 May when he informed the Chairman of the JCS that a reappraisal, on an urgent basis, was required of the extent to which the U.S., in a conflict with Communist China, should rely upon the use of nuclear weapons. He then asked for answers to five questions that covered a variety of situations, including the extent of U.S. involvement, and the probability of U.S. success. The fifth question was, "Are there any military actions... the U.S. could take now that would significantly affect the answers to any of the above questions?" 2

CINCPAC's interest in this action was connected with the last question. On 15 June the JCS replied to the Secretary of Defense by JCSM 405/61 and listed, in reply to the fifth question, 15 actions that would improve CINCPAC's position in the event of war. These actions included improvements to airfields, roads, and railroads; prepositioning of war readiness materiel; increased MAP support; improved communications, and increased readiness of the reserve fleet.

To furnish additional information the JCS asked CINCPAC to estimate costs and give other specific data about the 15 logistic actions recommended to the Secretary of Defense. 3 CINCPAC's response, based on some rough estimates proposed the following additional

1. HQUSAF 2771216Z Dec 61 (C)
2. JCS 2118/157, 15 Jun 61 (TS)
3. JCS 1421342Z Jul 61 cite 999055. (S)
projects.¹
Construction of airfield and limited facilities at Ubon, Udon, Khorat and Bangkok, in Thailand and Pleiku and Saigon, in Vietnam.
Prepositioning of 20 locomotive and 700 flat cars in Thailand.
Increasing on-board medical material to 100% allowance.
Increasing available ammunition in all active USN ships to 100% service allowance.
Prepositioning available ammunition in 2 ammunition ships (AE), when activated.
Increasing production in ammunition types in short supply (aircraft ammunition, rockets and missiles; ASW torpedoes; SAM missiles; and shipboard ammo).
Establishing two semi-permanent naval communication units in Thailand to provide medium range ship-shore communications, an air to ground capability, connection with STARCOM facilities and local headquarters, and a standby capability for linkage with NAVCOMM station, Philippines.²
Two weeks later CINCPAC proposed several additional projects for prepositioning supplies, equipment and ammunition, and the expansion of communication facilities.³
Recognizing the need for a refined list of the projects, later in September CINCPAC suggested a priority listing in order to assist in analysis, funding and initiation of the essential projects.⁴ The suggested list of projects, arranged in order of priority, was sent to the PACOM Component Commanders, CHJUSMAG Thailand, and the CHMAAG of Vietnam and Laos, requesting their comments.⁴
After further study and after considering the comments received from his subordinate commanders, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS, a list separated into the following three priority categories:⁵

1. CINCPAC 241044Z Jul 61 (TS)
2. JCS 171858Z cite 1154, Aug 61 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 022340Z Sep 61 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 220825Z Sep 61 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 072140Z Oct 61 (C) passing CINCPAC 070242Z Oct 61 (TS)
Priority 1A included those projects not then included in the FY61 MAP, USOM, or other military department program, but which were the most pressing requirements recommended for immediate consideration.

Priority 1B included projects that were contained in the existing FY61 or FY62 MAP or other program, but were as essential as those in the 1A group.

Priority 2 contained projects not included in any MAP or other program.

The estimated cost of items listed under priority 1A was $244.5 million, and under priority 1B was $50.6 million.

During the Secretary of Defense Conference on 16 December at Camp H. M. Smith the Secretary of Defense approved the following construction projects that were included on the priority 1A list.

1. Improvement of existing airfield at Pleiku.
2. Construction of POL terminal at Qui Nhon.
3. Construction of ammunition storage facilities, a pipeline, and a hydrant dispensing system at Tan Son Nhut.

At the end of 1961 the remaining recommended priority items were under consideration.

MAP COUNTRY ACTIVITIES

Some MAP activities affected several or all of the allied countries in the PACOM area that shared in the Military Assistance Program. The significant ones have been discussed in the preceding section. Others were tailor made for a particular country and are presented on the following pages. Two countries -- Laos and South Vietnam -- received the most attention during 1961, as well as most of the changes in the PACOM MA program. Some of the individual MAP activities are discussed in this section but additional detail concerning the South Vietnam MAP is included in Chapter IV, and activities in Laos are described in the Summary of Laos contained in Part II of this Command History. (UNCLASSIFIED)

1. Record Secretary of Defense Conference, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Dec 61 p. 8-1-4, (TS)
Burma

Although the Government of the Union of Burma had been determinedly neutral, Communist China succeeded in 1961 in increasing its political and economic influence in Burma. The U.S. goal in Burma and the aims of the MAP for Burma, was to strengthen the Burma Armed Forces as the most effective anti-communist element in the country, to assist the Army in reducing insurgency and increasing internal stability, and to maintain an important channel for U.S. influence and training.

Except for a few items delivered under a FY52 program for Burma, no further aid was extended to Burma until after a military sales agreement was signed in 1958. Under this agreement, Burma agreed to make a token payment in its currency for U.S. military equipment services. In the past, Burma has shown particular interest in equipment to improve its transportation facilities, its communications, and in engineering services and equipment, all of which have served to strengthen both its armed forces and its economy.

The assistance program in Burma was administered by a small U.S. military group called the Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT).

The total value of the annual Military Assistance Programs for FY62 through FY66, amounted to approximately $43 million as prepared by CINCPAC in accordance with instructions from OASD/ISA.\(^1\) One of the problems in connection with the FY62 plan was the question of whether to include nine Caribou and 7 V-107 helicopters, items that were added by OASD/ISA although CINCPAC did not favor their inclusion.\(^2\) Later in the year, however, the Caribou aircraft and Vertol helicopters were deleted from the Burma program because of the increased funds required and because CINCPAC could not justify providing more advanced equipment to neutrals than to allied nations.\(^3,4\) Eighteen C-47 planes and 12 H-43B helicopters

1. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00200, 4 Apr 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 100145Z Dec 61 (S)
3. CINCPAC 310015Z Aug 61 (S)
4. CINCPAC 240630Z Sep 61 (S)
were substituted. Five of the H-34Bs were delivered in November; the remaining seven were to be delivered in mid-1962.\footnote{1}

**Cambodia**

The Military Assistance Program for Cambodia was carried out in accordance with the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and the Mutual Defense Assistance Treaty signed by Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, France, and the U.S.\footnote{2}

The bulk of MAP funds for Cambodia was used to support ground forces, for which the U.S. early in 1961 authorized an increase in the force structure from 26 to 27 infantry battalions.\footnote{3}

Of greater significance was a Cambodian request made during October for U.S. support of a new Frontier Battalion to be stationed in the northeast corner of Cambodia and given a special mission of civic action to counter communist activity.\footnote{4} CINCPAC pointed out to CHMAAG Cambodia that existing policy was intended to encourage local military forces to participate in civic action and public works activities, provided that such activity did not detract significantly from those military missions that the U.S. considered essential. However, he explained that it was contrary to policy to use MAP funds to support a unit specifically organized and equipped for civic action as a primary mission.\footnote{5} CHMAAG Cambodia then clarified the Cambodia request and explained that they wanted the new battalion to defend the area of rough terrain in northeast Cambodia to prevent incursions by the Viet Cong into Cambodia, a mission of benefit to the U.S. and its Allies. After CINCPAC informed the CHMAAG that any MAP support of the new battalion had to be contingent upon its having a military mission and being organized, equipped and trained to perform its mission, CHMAAG then justified the battalion on military grounds. Soon thereafter, as a result of actions on the part

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. HQ USAF 282119Z cite AFSMS-CD-G 8961, Jul 61 (C)
\item 2. AMEMB Phnom Penh 907 to State, 23 Jan 7PM 61 (C)
\item 3. CHMAAG Cambodia ltr, Subj: Org of New Bn, FARK, 28 Aug 61 (C)
\item 4. CINCPAC 250207Z Sep 61 (C)
\item 5. CHMAAG Cambodia 140750Z Oct 61 (S)
\end{itemize}
CAMBODIA
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1961

BASIC INFORMATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>61,000 SQ.MI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>5 MILLION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNUAL GROWTH</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA</td>
<td>10 ACRES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITERACY RATE</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFE EXPECTANCY</td>
<td>30 YEARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROSS NAT. PROD. 1960 (E)</td>
<td>$490 MILLION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER CAPITA</td>
<td>$400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFENSE BUDGET 1960 (E)</td>
<td>$42.7 MILLION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS % OF TOTAL EXPEND</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS % OF GDP</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OVERALL OBJECTIVE
DENY CAMBODIA TO THE COMMUNISTS, MAINTAIN ITS INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY, AND PROMOTE AN ATTITUDE BASICALLY FRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES.

MAP OBJECTIVE
STRENGTHEN THE CAPABILITY OF U.S. SUPPORTED FORCES TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST COMMUNIST DIRECTED OR INSPIRED SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY OR OTHER FORCES HOSTILE TO U.S. INTERESTS.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHIEF OF STATE</th>
<th>SBIANGEK, NORodom YARMAH, PRINCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINISTER NATL DEF</td>
<td>LON NOL, LGEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIEF GEN STAFF AND C/I ARMY</td>
<td>LON NOL, LGEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/I NAVY</td>
<td>COEDES, PIERRE, CAPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/I AIR</td>
<td>WOD HOUL, MGLEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. AMBASSADOR</td>
<td>RON, WILLIAM C. TRIMBLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, ICA</td>
<td>MR. CHARLES MANN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIEF, MAAG</td>
<td>GEN E.D. SCHERRER, USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AUTHORIZED MAP FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>26 INFANTRY BNs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/2 ARM DRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 MCH BN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>3 PATROL CRAFT, 1 LANDING SHIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>1 COMPOSITE SQN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 TRANSPORT SQN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

| ARMY | 29 BNs (26 INF, 1 DRG, 1 CAV, 1 ROYAL CD) |
|      | 1 ABN BDE |
| NAVY | 1 LANDING SHIP |
|      | 2 LANDING CRAFT (1 LCI, 1 LSD) |

COMBAT CAPABILITY

| ARMY | LIMITED CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY. |
| NAVY | SECURITY PATROLS ALONG COAST AND INLAND WATERWAYS. PROVIDE ADDITIONAL MOBILITY FOR ARMY ON RIVERS AND WATERWAYS. |
| AIR FORCE | LIMITED AIRBORNE OPERATIONS |

SOURCE: J53, J2
of the unpredictable Prince Sihanouk which made him appear unfriendly toward and critical of the United States, consideration of the new battalion was suspended by CINCPAC. In November, CINCPAC told CHMAAG Cambodia that he would take no action on the new battalion at that time, but that MAP support might be considered later if the Cambodian Government changed its attitude significantly. 1

Soon thereafter the French Military Mission in Cambodia recommended to CHMAAG Cambodia the organization of five additional infantry battalions for disposition in northern Cambodia. 2 By December, after Sihanouk's attitude appeared to have changed, CHMAAG Cambodia informed CINCPAC that he favored activating the Frontier Battalion first to prepare routes and facilities in northern Cambodia, and that plans should be made for later emergency support of five additional infantry battalions to be activated at a later date. 3 Cost of supporting the Frontier Battalion had been estimated at $918,000, an amount that CINCPAC considered excessive. 4 At the end of the year CINCPAC was considering MAP support for the battalion but achieved the cost of its support would not exceed $500,000.

Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia created a problem of unwarranted size when he asked that four Royal Cambodian Air Force pilots participate in a jet fly-by during a Cambodian Independence Day celebration on 9 November. The request, stemming from Sihanouk's anxiety to show his people that Cambodian pilots were undergoing jet training, was made in March so that there was ample time for planning, but at that time there were neither pilots nor jet planes in Cambodia, and none were scheduled to be delivered until mid-1962. The Cambodian pilots commenced language and pilot training on 8 January in CONUS. They would be qualified only in T-37 planes, which Cambodia was not scheduled to receive until July 1962. Nevertheless, CINCPAC considered the request important enough to see what could

1. CINCPAC 040221Z Nov 61 (S)
2. Phnom Penh to Vientiane 90, 081300Z Nov 61 (S)
3. CHMAAG Cambodia 271030Z cite 3030 Nov 61 and 140440Z cite 3215 Dec 61 (both S)
4. CINCPAC 232122Z Dec 61 (S)
be done to comply, and turned the problem over to CINCPACAF. From March until mid-October, CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, OASD/ISA and CHMAAG Cambodia attempted to find a solution. They finally arranged for the Cambodian students to undergo a condensed pilot training program so they could graduate in CONUS and enable them to pilot the aircraft in the Independence Day celebration. The remainder of their pilot training then would be accomplished in Cambodia by a USAF MTT. Four T-37 aircraft with spares and ground support equipment were delivered by special airlift together with erection specialists and an instructor pilot MTT to assist in conduct of the jet fly by. In the end, the entire celebration was cancelled because of flood conditions then critical throughout Cambodia.

Republic of China

One of the major problems connected with administering the MA program for the Republic of China -- that of reducing the overall force structure -- was a problem carried over from 1960 when the U.S. Government first attempted to improve the quality of GRC Forces, and reduce the cost of maintaining them. The GRC at first opposed attempts to pare its forces, but during January 1961 proposed a force level for its forces, recommending a ceiling of 568,300 men for FY62 and FY63, that would be decreased to 558,000 by FY66. This recommended force would include five reduced strength divisions that were justified only on a political and economic basis, with emphasis on the fact that the GRC would not accept any proposal that involved a drastic or sudden expulsion of mainland officers or men from its Armed Forces. Recognizing that a force level in excess of 561,000 was purely an economic and political problem, CINCPAC approved, subject to availability of

1. CINCPAC 150336Z Mar 61 (S)
2. CHMAAG Cambodia 140805Z cite 2607 Oct 61 (C)
3. CHMAAG China ltr, Subj: Military Force Levels for GRC for FY62 of 23 Dec 61 (S)
# Republic of China

## As of 31 December 1961

### Basic Information
- **Area**: 3,500,000 sq. mi.
- **Population**: 61,000,000 in 1961
- **Per Capita**: 1,980
- **Annual Growth**: 3.0%
- **Defense Budget**: 2.2% of GNP
- **Literacy Rate**: 35%
- **Life Expectancy**: 56 years

### Authorized Map Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 INF BN, 2 AMH BN, 9 MESH BN (CHF), 1 ARM BN, 1 MGE BN, 2 SPECIAL FORCES BNPS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 DD/SS/2 FR, 2 MD/CS/2 FR, 1 AIP/DM/2 FR, 1 LST/1 LPH/1 LWS/1 LHD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 MR FTR BMM, 1 MR RESCUE SQN, 1 TURBO RESCUE SQN, 1 TUR TANKER SQN, 1 MR FTR SQN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Total Country Forces
- **Army**: 110,000
- **Navy**: 20,000
- **Air Force**: 14,000
- **Reserves**: 50,000

### Combat Capability
- **Army**: Maintain internal security and conduct effective ground defense of Taiwan, Formosa, and offshore islands. Provide air, naval, and logistic support to U.S. forces in the area.
- **Navy**: Maintain interior security and conduct effective ground defense of Taiwan, Formosa, and offshore islands. Provide air, naval, and logistic support to U.S. forces in the area.
- **Air Force**: Provide air and naval support as required.

### Overall Objective

- **U.S. Diplomatic Mission**
  - **U.S. Ambassador**: Paul Everett E. Dunlop
  - **U.S. Representative**: Mr. Wesley Haralson
  - **Chief, MAAG**: Mr. Anton Fields
  - **Maj. Gen. Chester A. Daley, USA**

### Map Objective

- To assist the U.S. armed forces in maintaining the capability to use the country to conduct joint operations. To conduct operations within the country to prevent and combat Communist aggression. To maintain necessary bases, facilities, and ground environment for joint training U.S.-ROCA.

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**Source**: JCS, J2
funds, a ceiling of 568,300 for FY62; 563,300 for FY63; 561,000 for FY64 and FY65; and 558,000 for FY66. CINCPAC did not favor providing MAP support for the five reduced strength divisions, but recognized that the final decision would depend upon political factors under study in Washington.1

During September CINCPAC received a study from CHMAAG China that reinforced CINCPAC's position that the Chinese Army should retain two field armies; five corps; 15 forward look infantry divisions; two armored divisions; two armored cavalry regiments; an airborne regiment; three surface to air missile battalions; two special forces groups; and necessary supporting forces. One reserve division should be retained as planned, with a set of equipment for training casual replacements. CHMAAG China recommended that the remaining eight reserve divisions be deactivated, assigning the unit designations to existing replacement training centers.

No further action was taken on this matter until November when CINCPAC informed OSD that he planned to base the FY63-68 MA planning for the Chinese Army on a force structure essentially as recommended, which the OSD approved on 1 December.2,3,4

Soon thereafter, CHMAAG China presented the U.S. proposal to senior officers of the ROC Army. Initial reaction appeared favorable.5

During August, the Republic of China formally accepted the offer of one Hawk battalion.6 Training for the battalion, to be conducted at Ft. Bliss, Texas, was scheduled early in 1962. Earlier in the year CHMAAG China had prepared a plan for the integration of this Hawk battalion and two Nike Hercules battalions into the overall ROC air defense system.

1. CINCPAC 170352Z Jan 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 070020Z Nov 61 (C)
3. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00538, Subj: FY62-67 MAP Alternatives, China 14 Sep 61 (S)
4. OSD 011929Z cite DEF 906487 Dec 61 (C)
5. CHMAAG China 110721Z cite MGCC 12-238 Dec 61 (C)
6. CHMAAG China 270957Z cite TMGCC 9342 Sep 61 (S)
Indonesia

The Military Assistance Program for Indonesia was carried out under bilateral agreements between the U.S. and Indonesia, according to special provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. MAP deliveries, that totalled $20 million during FY61, were administered by a Military Technical Advisory Group (MILTAG), which lacked many of the advisory and training responsibilities of the regular MAAGs.

Since Indonesia's brand of neutralism was calculated to get as much as possible from both the Communist Bloc and the Free World, and since the government was considered untrustworthy, CINCPAC's policy toward Indonesia during 1961 was based on suspicion of that country's intentions, and reflected a reluctance to provide military assistance that could be used for anything except internal security. In line with this policy, CINCPAC opposed several proposals for increasing assistance or changing the MAP plan.

In January, OSD approved a plan submitted by the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia and the CHMILTAG to include in the Indonesia MAP funds for FY61 a preliminary architect and engineering survey of a naval base at Ratai Bay. CINCPAC opposed the proposal because he didn't think the U.S. was justified in spending MAP funds for that purpose. Because of political factors involved, he recommended that the decision be made at a joint State-Defense level. Nevertheless, the contract for the A&E study was let in June 1961.

CINCPAC opposed another proposal advanced by CHMILTAG at the end of September. This proposal was the result of a request by Indonesian authorities that the U.S. help standardize Indonesian Army weapons by providing enough M1 rifles, sub-machine guns, BARs, and pistols to outfit its entire force, rather than to provide these weapons on a unit-by-unit basis for those units the U.S. had agreed to support.

1. CINCPAC 160337Z Dec 60 (S)
2. CINCPAC 140259Z Jan 61 (S)
3. CHMILTAG 290130Z Sep 61 (S)
The request also indicated that Indonesia was increasing its armed strength, so that the net effect from the U.S. standpoint would have been an increase in the number of Indonesian troops for whom the U.S. would be then obligated to furnish weapons from 95,000 to 250,000 and, by 1968, to 350,000. CINCPAC asked CHMILTAG to discuss the proposal with the Ambassador and to determine his reaction. When CHMILTAG reported that the Ambassador agreed with the recommendation, CINCPAC stated his case to the JCS and OSD/ISA, claiming that there was no military justification for supporting the Indonesian proposal, and that he preferred to follow the approved MAP rather than to furnish weapons that would enable Indonesia to expand its Army several fold.

Toward the end of December, OSD/ISA advised CINCPAC that despite the lack of military justification, the State and Defense Departments had decided to accept the Indonesian proposal. Since the acceptance did not imply an increase in the MA Program, OSD/ISA asked CINCPAC to get a list from the Indonesian Government of those items to be deleted from the MAP plan in favor of the small arms, and to submit a recommended revised FY62 Army program, equal in value to the existing one, plus recoupments. At the end of the year, CINCPAC was waiting for CHMILTAG to furnish this list.

In March the U.S. Ambassador proposed an expansion of military assistance for Indonesia, to which CINCPAC objected on the grounds that the existing MAP for Indonesia was a balanced program for effective assistance. He also pointed out that the Basic Planning Document provided that military aid for Indonesia should be on a limited but continuing basis to help that country maintain internal security and combat communist activity within the country. The proposal was dropped.

CINCPAC also questioned a request for air drop equipment that Indonesia claimed was needed to make its C-47 and C-130 aircraft

1. CINCPAC 071318Z Oct 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 312046Z Oct 61 (S)
3. OSD 222337Z cite DEF 907519 Dec 61 (S)
more effective in meeting logistic needs. Although CHMILTAG and
the Ambassador considered the request valid, CINCPAC reported to
OSD/ISA that he couldn't justify the equipment as a military require-
ment, pointing out that although it could be used for self defense, it
was also suitable to support an attack on West New Guinea. This
request was also abandoned.

Japan
There was a significant reduction during 1961 in the amount of
Military Aid furnished to Japan, made possible by Japan's increasing
ability to pay for its own military force. The MA plan for Japan was
based on the U.S. sharing the cost on major items. For the ground
forces, these major items were M41 tanks to replace the obsolete
M24s, self-propelled 40mm guns, and continued training of selected
officers in CONUS service schools. For navy forces, the MA plan
provided continued support for anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare,
convoy shipbuilding and aircraft programs. Significant equipment for
the Japanese Air Force was semi-automatic ground environment, and
Nike and Hawk missile equipment for air defense. Of these items,
only the last two caused significant problems. Throughout much of
1961 the United States carried on negotiations with the Government of
Japan for one Nike-Ajax battalion and two Hawk battalions. These
units were in addition to one Nike-Ajax battalion that was furnished
to Japan under grant aid funds that came largely out of PACOM FY61
MAP funds, in accordance with an agreement between CHMAAG Japan

For the remaining three surface to air missile (SAM) units, OSD
authorized CINCPAC to establish the amount and guidance for Japan

1. OSD 082047 Z cite DEF 906850 Dec 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 282347 Z Dec 61 (S)
3. Enclosure to CHMAAG Japan Ltr. Subj: Transmittal of Memo-
randum of Understanding Concerning Nike Universal Weapons
System, 27 Apr 61 (C)
**JAPAN**

**AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1961**

### BASIC INFORMATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>145,000 SQ MI</th>
<th>LIFE EXPECTANCY</th>
<th>67 YEARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>94 MILLION</td>
<td>GROSS NAT. PRODUCT $38.4 BILLION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRICULTURE</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>GROSS NAT. PRODUCT PER CAPITA $330</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA 8.2 ACRE</td>
<td>DEFENSE BUDGET $4.5 BILLION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITERACY RATE</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>AS% TOTAL GNP EXPEND</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MAP OBJECTIVE

- Assist CO to develop military forces capable of (a) maintaining internal security against communist directed or inspired insurgency and counterattack by other forces hostile to U.S. interests, (b) assisting in defense of Japan against external communist aggression, (c) participating in collective security arrangements, and (d) securing political climate favorable to continued U.S. access to important bases and facilities. Accelerate necessary increases in the Japanese defense budget to the point where Grant U.S. assistance may be terminated.

### OVERALL OBJECTIVE

- Deprive control of Japan to any hostile power. Insure a strong, friendly, co-operative nation firmly aligned with U.S.

### U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

- U.S. AMBASSADOR: TOHHU KAWABATA
- U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, ICA: PHILIP H. FRIEDER
- CHIEF, MAAG: HENRY T. BIXBY, USAF

### MAJOR MILITARY FORCES

#### Authorized Map Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Map Forces</th>
<th>Total Country Forces</th>
<th>Combat Capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY</strong></td>
<td>6 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 3 COMBINED BRIGADES</td>
<td>6 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 3 COMBINED BRIGADES, 1 AIRBORNE BRIGADE, 11 ARTILLERY BATTALIONS, 8 ARTILLERY BATTALIONS, 44 MORTAR BATTALIONS, 3619 WEAPONS, 32 ADAMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 AIRBORNE BRIGADE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAVY</strong></td>
<td>SELECTED ITEMS OF SUBMARINE AND ELECTRONICS</td>
<td>FF00, 2 S.S., 1 D.E., 2 PC, 1 PT, 1/F, 1/45 (5, 4, 1, 1, 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COMPLETION, CRUISE SUPPORT IS TERMINATED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE</strong></td>
<td>2 A/F FTR SQNS, 2 TINPT SQNS, 3 D/F SQNS, 2 A/F SQN TAC, 1 A/F A/F SQN TAC</td>
<td>2 A/F FTR SQN, 2 TRANSPORT SQN, 7 T/F SQN, 5 TRAINING SQN (C/E/F, 1 A/W), 4 T/F A/F SQN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** JSS, J2
FY62 credit financing. However, since Japan could not accept
credit financing without the Diet approval, the Japan Country Team
recommended acceptance of a Japanese proposal to have the U.S.
purchase the SAM units, for which Japan would pay a share of the
cost upon delivery. The Country Team and CINCPAC agreed Japan's
share should be 65% of U.S. dollar costs. The total cost of the
three SAM units was $71.5 million, of which Japan's share to be paid
on delivery amounted to $46.4 million. Japan accepted the proposal
on 26 October, except for the HIPAR equipment for the Nike units,
thereby reducing the total cost by approximately four million. The
Country Team recommended that the order for Nike units be placed to
meet the 1 November production deadline.

Soon after reaching a preliminary agreement on these three units,
the Japanese Government expressed interest in obtaining two additional
Nike Hercules battalions and back fitting the other Nike battalions with
Hercules missiles. CINCPAC advised CHMAAG Japan in November
that the total cost of a Hercules battalion ordered in the fall of 1962
would be close to $25 million.

(Additional information on this subject is included in area-wide
MAP activities.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

Riot Control Agents for Japan:
The Government of Japan expressed interest to CHMAAG Japan
in getting some CS, a riot control chemical agent. Since this agent
had been handled on a NOFORN basis because Britain had proprietary
rights, USARPAC asked DA about the policy governing the release of
information about it to friendly PACOM countries. The Department

1. OSD 202125 Z Sep 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 010238 Z Oct 61 (S)
3. Tokyo to State 1364 of 30 Oct 61 (S)
4. CHMAAG Japan 310716 Z cite CME B4285 Oct 61 (S)
5. CINCPAC 180305 Z Nov 61 (C)
6. OSD 230008 Z cite DEF 906146 Nov 61 (C)
7. CINCUSARPAC 170119 Z Feb 61 (C)
of the Army advised that technical information on CS could be given to friendly countries, but that British clearance was required before giving information about the formula or manufacturing process. DA also said that riot control agents and their disseminators were available for MAP programming, but that they required initial approval of the unified command, DOD, and the Department of State, and recommended that MAAGs obtain the approval of CINCPAC and the appropriate U.S. Ambassador before offering information on CS.¹

As a result of the request, CINCPAC prepared a CINCPAC Instruction to assign responsibilities concerning the use of chemical agents CN, DM, and CS and their respective disseminators by MAAG personnel for protection and by designated countries for control of local disturbances.²

Korea

As in previous years, Korea received the largest part of both the military and economic aid administered by the PACOM Military Assistance Program. The main event that affected the Republic of Korea armed forces during 1961 was the May military coup.

The 1961 objectives of U.S. military assistance to Korea were to furnish for the Army conventional artillery, small arms, anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air missiles and to replace the obsolete tanks. For the Korean navy the emphasis was on ASW, minesweeping, amphibious, and surface patrol activities; and the air force plan included century series fighter, improved radar and control facilities, and air-to-air missiles. There were no particular problems in carrying out military assistance, with the exception of provisions for the Nike and Hawk air defense equipment, which are described under the area-wide portion of this chapter.

1. DA 241718Z cite DA 990799Feb 61 (C)
2. CINCPAC Inst 03400.1 of 27 Apr 61 (C)
**KOREA**

**AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1961**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASIC INFORMATION</th>
<th>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AREA</td>
<td>37,000 SQ.MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION (1960)</td>
<td>25 MILLION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNUAL GROWTH</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA</td>
<td>0.2 ACRE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITERACY RATE</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFE EXPECTANCY</td>
<td>47 YEARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROSS INT. FLOW: 1960</td>
<td>$ 1.6 BILLION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER CAPITA</td>
<td>$ 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFENSE BUDGET (1961)</td>
<td>$ 229 MILLION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS % OF GDP</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONVERTED AT 1200 DPARA PER U.S. DOLLAR</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AUTHORIZED MANPOWER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 INF DIVS, 10 RES DIVS, 1 SPECIAL FORCES GCP</td>
<td>2 DE/FR/12PC/3FT/10WINEGART/2LSL/LSMR</td>
<td>5 TACTICAL FTR SQUADS, 1 TRANSPORT SQUAD, 1 TACTICAL RECON SQUAD, 1 TAC AIR CONTROL SQUAD, 1 AIR RESCUE SQUAD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 INF DIVS, 10 RES DIVS, 1 SPECIAL FORCES GCP</td>
<td>2 DE/FR/12PC/3FT/10WINEGART/2LSL/LSMR</td>
<td>5 TACTICAL FTR SQUADS, 1 TRANSPORT SQUAD, 1 TACTICAL RECON SQUAD, 1 TAC AIR CONTROL SQUAD, 1 AIR RESCUE SQUAD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COMBAT CAPABILITY**

- **ARMY**: Maintain internal security and effectively repel aggression from North Korea, assuming adequate logistic and air support from outside sources.
- **NAVY**: The ability of the ROK Navy to perform its assigned mission is considered satisfactory. The ROK Navy is considered capable of providing one-third of overall naval forces for amphibious assault operations or larger sized forces if lift, and other support is made available.
- **AIR FORCE**: Forces in being operationally ready to support ground operations, and conduct VFR air defense missions.

**SOURCE**: J53, J2
Laos

As in 1960, Laos was one of CINCPAC's major problem areas as the undeclared war continued. CINCPAC's representative in Laos at the beginning of the year was known as the Chief, Programs Evaluation Office, whose overall objective was to deny Laos to the Communist Bloc and insure that the Royal Lao Government's policy of neutrality remained oriented toward the West, by helping it maintain its independence and consolidate its control over the country. In April, at the direction of the JCS, the Programs Evaluation Office, which had been manned ostensibly by civilians, was converted to a regular MAAG. 1

Throughout 1961 the MA Program in Laos was subject to frequent revision and changes as the U.S. increased its aid and support of the Prince Boun Oum/General Phoumi government.

A typical example was a request by the Royal Lao Government for the U.S. to support four additional battalions. The action was approved by the State and Defense Departments in February and CINCPAC undertook to furnish the necessary supplies and equipment on an emergency basis. 2, 3

In addition to outfitting the four new battalions and the AD choc companies, CINCPAC and the PACOM commands were obliged to carry out what proved to be a major supply operation for FAL units. The urgent need for supplies was caused by several factors. During the period following the Kong Le Coup, there was a substantial loss of equipment and supplies due to neglect or lack of maintenance. Kong Le took substantial amounts of supplies when he fled to the north, and the FAL suffered other losses when units abandoned large amounts of supplies during engagements early in 1961. These supply problems were compounded by the fact that the Lao soldiers were inept at nearly all kinds of maintenance.

1. JCS 180026Z cite 994286 Apr 61 (TS)
2. State to Vientiane 868 of 15 Feb 2PM 61 (S)
3. CINCPAC 291600Z cite PEO LOG 458 Jan 61 (S)
# Laos

### As of 31 December 1961

#### Basic Information

- **Area**: 91,000 sq. mi.
- **GDP, Prod. 1959**: $411 million
- **Population**: 1.6 million
- **Per Capita**: $45
- **Annual Growth**: 1.5%
- **Defense Budget (E)**: $16.7 million
- **Agricultural Land per Capita**: 2.1 acres
- **Literacy Rate**: 25%
- **Life Expectancy**: 39 years

### Laos

- **King**: Sisavang Vatthana
- **Prime Minister**: Phnom Boun Oum
- **Min of Natl Security**: Phom Phoun Nisavang Mgen
- **Chief, Gen Staff**: Ms-Nouane Ratanhoune, Mgen
- **Cdr, Armed Forces**: Bounleut Sanhoun, Mgen
- **Cdr, Air Forces**: Thao Ma, Major

#### Authorized Map Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Total Country Forces</th>
<th>Combat Capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 INF Bns, 3 ARns, 4 RCR Cos, 10 FA Btys, 100 Volunteer Bns, 1 Special Forces Bn, Auto Defense Force (29,000)</td>
<td>21 INF Bns, 3 ARns, 4 RCR Cos, 10 FA Btys, 100 Volunteer Bns, Auto Defense Force (40,956), Radio Force (Approx 9,266)</td>
<td>Marginally capable of maintaining internal security along main roads and populated areas now held. Can effectively utilize stat forces to initiate and carry out guerrilla operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>River Patrol Force</td>
<td>Limited border operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1 Composite Soon, 1 Transport Soon, 1 Helo Soon</td>
<td>Limited airborne operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Overall Objective

To help Laos to the Communist bloc and ensure that Laos government's policy of neutrality remains oriented toward the West, by assisting the Royal Lao Government to maintain its independence and consolidate its control over the country.

### U.S. Diplomatic Mission

- **U.S. Ambassador**: Donald Winthrop C. Brown
- **U.S. Representative, ICA**: John Toober
- **Chief, MAAG Laos**: Gen Andrew J. Boyle

### Map Objective

Assist in the development of a military establishment capable of maintaining internal security against Communist directed or inspired subversion and insurgency or other forces hostile to U.S. interests, pending the development of an adequate police force for this purpose and to provide maximum feasible resistance to Communist inspired external aggression.
Typical of the supply activities during the first of the year were requests from CHPEO Laos during January for 10,000 M-1 grenade launcher adapters and rifle grenades, 9,800 additional carbines, 10,000 fatigue uniforms, 20,000 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, additional supplies of all types ammunition, communication equipment, medical supplies, and mine detectors.  

Many of the requests were filled from stocks available in Japan or other PACOM areas; in other cases CINCPAC passed the request to DA for supply action from CONUS. This supply operation, which continued through February on an emergency basis, was made more difficult because many of the supplies were requested by air delivery.

Another supply emergency arose during May when CHMAAG Laos requested airlift supply action of materiel to re-outfit six battalions that had lost their equipment during the Pathet Lao offensives that preceded the cease-fire agreement. Since it did not appear probable that there would be an immediate resumption of hostilities, CINCPAC directed that most shortages be made up from materiel on hand in Vientiane and Bangkok, or that was due in Bangkok. Making an exception of the request for 4.2 mortars, CINCPAC asked DA to airship them.

One of the major items furnished to the RLG was helicopters. During January four H-34 helicopters were delivered to replace four H-19A aircraft which did not have a satisfactory operational capability. With CINCPAC's approval, the Lao Air Force turned over the four aircraft plus peculiar spares and support to USOM, Bangkok for use by the Thailand Border Patrol Police forces, an act calculated to improve the U.S. bargaining position with the RTG. During March, the Navy transferred 14 additional H-34 aircraft to MAP. The craft

1. CHPEO Laos messages 060837Z, 061216Z, 100925Z, 060945Z, 181530Z, 191815Z, all Jan 61, all (S)
2. CHMAAG Laos 201233Z cite ML-LOG 2198 May 61 (S)
3. CINCPAC 262234Z and 272102Z May 61 (both (S)
4. CHPEO Laos 051625Z cite AFMMS-CD-PC 73897 Jan 61 (S)
5. CINCPAC 210420Z Jan 61 (S)
were then leased to Air America for operation in support of PAL under the terms of ICA services contract. On several occasions it was necessary for Hq USAF to make an emergency program deviation request for the replacement of helicopters that were destroyed.

After open hostilities evolved into what proved to be a "phony" cease-fire arrangement, the JCS approved the shipment of 3-HUS-1 helicopters from CONUS to MAAG Laos for use by the ICC, pending the formal acceptance of the RLG's offer to furnish transportation to this group. One of the helicopters crashed in Laos soon after the three arrived. Replacement was requested and approved.

Later in the year, CHMAAG Laos asked for seven helo courier aircraft (L-28) to provide increased mobility for MAAG personnel. CINCPAC concurred in the need and asked that OSD take action to procure the craft without a fund deviation in the Laos MAP. Information from OSD revealed L-28s were not available. CHMAAG Laos then requested L-20 aircraft be substituted for the L-28. CINCPAC concurred and OSD directed DA provide seven L-20 aircraft for use in Laos. The aircraft had not been delivered at the year's end. CHMAAG Laos also requested a U-3 or U-4 type aircraft for use by the Air Force section of MAAG. In considering this request, CINCPAC objected to introducing another type of aircraft into Laos and asked that the request be reconsidered.

Saltshaker:
One of the more important MAP activities for Laos during 1961 was the establishment of a 30 day reserve at combat rates of ammunition, weapons, clothing and equipment. Assigned the code

1. HQUSAF 281913Z cite AFMMS-CD-G 97316 Mar 61 (C)
2. ASC WPAFB 291300Z cite LMEN-149 Mar 61 (S)
3. HQUSAF 170031Z cite AFMMS-CD-G 97057 Jun 61 (S)
4. CHMAAG Laos 280803Z cite ML-OPT 4528 Sep 61 (S)
5. CINCPAC 030154Z Oct 61 (S)
6. CHMAAG Laos 061230Z cite ML-OPT 5389 Nov 61 (S)
7. CINCPAC 020206Z Nov 61 (S)
8. OSD 301956Z cite DEF 906415 Nov 61 (S)
name Saltshaker, the purpose of the reserve was to support a resumption of hostilities and to guarantee that the reserve remained intact, CINCPAC retained to himself authority for use or release of any item in the reserve.

Representatives from CINCPAC who visited Laos during the summer of 1961 learned that CHMAAG Laos had used most available reserve in Laos during the winter and spring hostilities, and lacked a reserve to cushion a renewal of Pathet Lao attacks. CINCPAC immediately initiated action to establish a reserve, hoping to have it in place before the end of the rainy season expected in November. In the initial request to DA and CINCUSARPAC, CINCPAC listed ammunition, ordnance, quartermaster, and signal items to be shipped to Thailand where the reserve was to be maintained. At the same time, he suggested to CHMAAG Laos that he transfer to the Saltshaker reserve any ammunition that was not needed for training or operations, including items remaining in the Burek Reserve, the name given to supplies that were accumulated in Thailand after the Kong Le coup when there was doubt about which factions of the Lao Army were entitled to, or should receive, U.S. furnished supplies.

Toward the end of August, CINCPAC sent another message to the Department of the Army listing additional items for Saltshaker that he asked to be charged against advance FY62 MAP funding. Some of the items requested were to be shipped to arrive in Thailand early in October, and others to arrive 30 and 60 days thereafter.¹

In establishing Saltshaker, CINCPAC directed that the remaining Burek reserve be phased out and combined with Saltshaker.²

In the meantime, negotiations were initiated with Thailand for permission to store the Saltshaker reserve in that country and to construct

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1. CINCPAC 250224Z Aug 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 252057Z Aug 61 (S)
the necessary storage facilities, which were not extensive since only facilities for Ammunition storage were required, and this requirement was partially satisfied by the existing Burek facilities. The necessary construction was completed prior to 20 December at a cost of $104,000.

The total cost of the Saltshaker reserve was approximately $3.1 million and, in volume, consisted of 4,500 measured tons of ammunition, approximately 20 measured tons of weapons, and 400 cubic feet divided equally between QM and Signal items. The ammunition storage was located near the highway between Bangkok and Korat. The weapons, clothing and equipment were stored in depots belonging to the Royal Thailand Army so that additional construction was unnecessary.

At the end of 1961 the 30-day reserve was in place and action on the project was complete.

Pepper Grinder:

A second project to provide storage facilities in Thailand for the benefit of the RLG forces was given the code name Pepper Grinder. This project was initiated by CHMAAG Laos in order to exercise better control on the ammunition shipped into Laos. Ammunition destined for Laos arrived at Bangkok by ship and was then shipped by rail to Laos where it was vulnerable to the faulty supply procedures common to the Lao Forces. The Thailand ammunition storage facilities were becoming saturated with Saltshaker shipments so that CHMAAG Laos had no means of controlling the times or amounts of shipments into Laos. In order to establish a surge point in the supply line, CINCPAC favored construction of a facility for Laos at Udorn, Thailand, and asked the U.S. Ambassador to coordinate the matter with Thailand officials.

1. CINCPAC 121907Z Aug 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 060930Z Oct 61 (S)
Construction costs for the necessary facilities were estimated at approximately $300,000, and an additional $25,000 was estimated for annual operation.\(^1\) Construction commenced on 11 October as soon as approval had been received from the Thailand Minister of Defense.\(^2\)

Completed before the end of 1961, this storage facility was located approximately 20 miles south of Vientiane and accommodated 3,500 tons of ammunition.

**The Philippines**

The Chief Joint United States Military Advisory Group to the Philippines administered the MA Program with the overall objective to develop the Philippine Republic into a strong, independent country capable of maintaining internal security, defending itself against external attack, and contributing to the common defense of SE Asia, under SEATO.

The most significant problem was force structure. The U.S. supported one regular Army division, the Philippine Constabulary (increased from 12,000 to 15,000 personnel), and provided two-fifths of the support for three reserve training divisions. During January of 1961, CINCPAC instructed CHJUSMAG Philippines to include support for a fourth reserve training division in the FY63-67 MA Plan for the Philippines.\(^3\) This reserve division, which made it possible for the Filipinos to station one reserve division in each of the four major geographical areas, was later approved by the JCS and was included in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.

Continued support for all four reserve divisions was questioned during October by the OSD which asked CINCPAC for an assessment of

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1. ADMNO CINCPAC 070227Z Oct 61 (S)  
2. CHJUSMAG Thailand 110220Z cite MAA 12097 Oct 61 (S)  
3. CINCPAC 182002Z Jan 61 (S)
**PHILIPPINES**

*AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1961*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>BASIC INFORMATION</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AREA</td>
<td>10,900 SQ. MI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>20 MILLION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROWTH RATE</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRICULTURAL LAND</td>
<td>8.4 ACRE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITERACY RATE</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFE EXPECTANCY</td>
<td>35 YEARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROSS INT. FUND</td>
<td>$4.8 BILLION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER CAPITA FUND</td>
<td>$175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFENSE BUDGET FUND</td>
<td>$1 BILLION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFENSE INT. EXPEND</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP % OF GDP</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PHILIPPINES**

- President: Macapagal, Diosdado
- Nat'l Defense: Peralta, Macario
- Chief Staff: AFP-Cruz, Felagio, LTGEN
- CG, Army: Alfred M. Santos, BGEN
- FCIG, Navy: Castro, Simon, COMO
- CG, Air Force: Mola, Pedro, BGEN
- Chief Constabulary (Acting): Garcia, Nicanaor, Col.

**OVERALL OBJECTIVE**

To develop the Philippine Republic into a strong, independent country capable of maintaining internal security, defending itself against external attack, and contributing to the collective defense of the Pacific area.

**U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION**

- U.S. Ambassador: Mr. W. E. Stevenson
- U.S. Representative, ICA: Mr. Phil M. Warner
- Chief, JUSMAG: Mr. Gen Verull, Sgt. D., USA

**MARP OBJECTIVE**

To assist in the development of a Philippine military establishment capable of 20 maintaining internal security against Communist infiltration or inspired颠覆 and defending itself against external attack and contribute to the collective defense of the Western Pacific area.

**AUTHORIZED MILITARY FORCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES</th>
<th>COMBAT CAPABILITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY</strong></td>
<td>1 INF DIV</td>
<td>Maintain internal security, after limited resistance to external attack and contribute to collective defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 NES DIV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 PHIL CONSTABULARY (12,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAVY</strong></td>
<td>22 PATROL CRAFT, 2 MINECRAFT</td>
<td>Off shore patrol and amphibious capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 LANDING SHIPS</td>
<td>Capabilities satisfactory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/5 MARINE HALY</td>
<td>Potential satisfactory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE</strong></td>
<td>3 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQNS, 1 TRANSPORT SQN, 1 AIR RESCUE SQN</td>
<td>Limited capability to fulfill mission of assist army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 A/F FTR SQN, 1 ITR CARRIER SQN</td>
<td>Maintain internal security and contribute to defense against external attack.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES**

- 1 INF DIV
- 4 NES DIV
- 1 PHIL CONSTABULARY (12,000)
- 22 PATROL CRAFT
- 2 MINECRAFT
- 7 LANDING SHIPS
- 1/5 MARINE HALY

**COMBAT CAPABILITY**

- Maintain internal security, after limited resistance to external attack and contribute to collective defense.
- Off shore patrol and amphibious capabilities.
- Limited capability to fulfill mission of assist army.
the effect of eliminating U.S. support for them. OSD was considering the advantages of concentrating on the one active division, it and the addition of more sophisticated weapons. This action stemmed from ICA reservations about the construction program for the reserve divisions, and State Department feelings that the past support of the reserve divisions had not produced results equal to the cost. CINCPAC referred the problem to CHJUSMAGPHIL, and incorporated his opinions in the reply sent to the OSD on 28 November.

CINCPAC did not agree with the State Department position on support furnished to the four reserves. He set forth his position that the reserve divisions formed local backup for the one Regular Army division, that they were a strong deterrent to the potential Huk threat, that they gave the Filipinos potential of five infantry division in existence for use in an emergency, and made it unnecessary to piece-meal the one regular division to cope with insurgency situations. CINCPAC believed that the efforts of CHJUSMAG to create strong and effective reserve units were making progress, and that it would be politically undesirable to withdraw support from the new Filipino Government. He reiterated his position that the reserve divisions constituted a military asset that should be retained through continuing MAP support.

At the end of the year the outcome of this issue was uncertain, but it appeared that the DOD position was not favorable to continued support of the four reserve divisions. (UNCLASSIFIED)

1. OSD 1719532Z Oct 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 280120Z Nov 61 (TS)
Thailand

The MA Program in Thailand was administered by the Chief Joint U.S. Advisory Group to support Prime Minister Sarit's efforts to defend the country's freedom against communist subversion. Considered to be one of the more determined U.S. Allies in Southeast Asia, Thailand paid approximately 75% of the cost of maintaining its armed forces; the $25 million balance came from U.S. assistance.

The 1961 objectives of the MAP for Thailand included additional training to raise the standards of proficiency and to develop counter-guerrilla techniques; increased and improved communication facilities (see the Communications Section, Chapter I); an increase in minesweeping equipment; modern anti-submarine warfare weapons; means of storing and handling both fuel and ammunition; two tactical fighter, and an allweather fighter, squadrons equipped with F86s until they could be equipped with century series aircraft; an AC&W system; additional fixed and rotary wing transports aircraft for the ground forces; construction of improved airfield facilities, and construction of a military road to by-pass Bangkok to the east. Only those projects that were other than routine are discussed here.

It became necessary during March for CINCPAC to ask for an emergency deviation to the FY61 Thai MA Program because of ten urgently needed airfield projects. Headquarters USAF was able to provide MAP FY61 funds for the architect and engineering services; actual construction was to be done with FY62 funds. In January the Department of Army proposed to place the Thailand small arms ammunition plant into operation. CINCPAC agreed to support the project with the minimum MAP funds necessary. After receiving a report from an Ordnance Officer who inspected the plant, CINCPAC tentatively approved $2 million to place it in operation.

1. CINCPAC ADMINO 220305Z Mar 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 130330Z Dec 61 (S)
3. OSD 182339Z cite DEF 907269 Dec 61 (S)
4. DA 172331Z cite DA 988884 Jan 61 (C)
5. CINCPAC 252001Z Jan 61 (C)
6. CINCPAC 151212Z Mar 61 (C)
# Thailand

**As of 31 December 1961**

## Basic Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>198,000 sq. mi.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>23 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Growth</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arable Land Per Capita</td>
<td>0.8 acre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectation</td>
<td>50 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Nat. Prod. 1000 (k)</td>
<td>$5.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita</td>
<td>$109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Budget 1962</td>
<td>$1.72 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of Total GNP</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of GDP</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**King-Phumiphon Adduadt**

Prime Minister, Supreme Commander Thai Armed Forces and CINC Army - Sarit Thanarat Fld Mar
CINC Navy - Chumpharn Adhatuda, ADM
CINC Air - Boonchao, Chanda Kureka, Air Marshall

## Authorized Map Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>3 Infantry Divisions, 1 CAV Div, 1 RCT 2 SEP CBH Div, 1 Ranger Div (SF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>4 Destroyer-Escort Type, 1 Patrol Craft, 3 Submarine Chasers, 6 Coast Guard Cutters, 4 Mine Sweepers, 2 Mine Layers, 5 Landing Ships, 5 Marine Divs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>2 Tactical FTR SQN, 1 Transp SQN, 1 Composite Heli Sqn, 1 Helicopter Fit, 1 Heliport Sqn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Total Country Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3 Infantry Divisions</th>
<th>1 Ranger Div (SF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 CAV Div</td>
<td>1 Arty Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 RCT</td>
<td>1 AAA Div</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Combat Capability

- **Army**: Maintaining internal security and offering limited resistance to external aggression. Can contribute up to 1 RCT to collective defense.
- **Navy**: Marginally satisfactory patrol capability in Gulf of Thailand and internal waters.
- **Air Force**: Limited air-borne operations and close support of the Army.

**Overall Objective**

retaining Thailand as an ally and strengthening the nation's will and ability to resist communism from within and without.

**Map Objective**

To assist the Thai Armed Forces to develop the capability of (a) maintaining internal security against communist elements or inspired subversion and insurgency or other forces hostile to U.S. interests and (b) offering indigenous feasible resistance to external communist-inspired aggression and (c) contributing to the collective defense of contiguous SEATO areas.

**U.S. Diplomatic Mission**

U.S. Ambassador: Kenneth T. Young
US Representative, ICA: Mr. Thomas E. Daughtery
Chief Judge: Raja Gen. Brian Johnson, USA
Named TAMP (Thailand Ammunition Manufacturing Plant), the project was scheduled to be operational early in 1962. One of CINCPAC's problems in SEAsia was concerned with the inadequate transportation facilities in that area. In Thailand all existing roads leading from the Gulf of Siam passed through Bangkok, which made the road network vulnerable and contributed to congestion in the capital city. Planning and negotiations for this by-pass road went on during much of the year among the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, CINCPAC, and OSD. At the end of the year the only remaining question was how to build a road planned between Chachoengsao and Prachinburi. In September OSD suggested deploying a U.S. military engineer unit to Thailand to do the work, to which CINCPAC agreed, although he preferred that the unit come from CONUS. At the end of the year OSD had approved tentatively the construction funds and CINCUSARPAC reported that an Army engineer battalion was available to do the work.

In May 1961, the JCS requested CINCPAC comments on a concept of Thailand border surveillance involving coordinated light aircraft, river boats, and ground patrols, with MAP support assistance as required. JCS also wanted comments on the desirability of mounting this patrol as a SEATO venture.

CINCPAC's initial view was that the concept was sound, since the necessary forces and equipment were available in Thailand, but he opposed mounting the patrol as a SEATO venture because of the possible inference that the U.S. was willing to write-off Laos and consider the river to be the main line of defense. It was later determined that suitable equipment was not available in Thailand and that Thailand wanted support funds for troop pay and allowances, CINCPAC decided that the Thais lacked enthusiasm, and the program was dropped.

In order to provide for the initial POL support of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59, CINCPAC proposed that aviation fuel be prepositioned at Thailand.

1. CINCPAC ADMINO 290854Z Sep 61 (S)
2. CINCUSARPAC 270327Z Dec 61 (S)
3. JCS 192105Z May 61 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 202350Z May 61 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 020200Z Aug 61 (TS)
SECRET

Air Bases. Headquarters USAF and the Royal Thailand Air Force concurred with this proposal, and the RTAF agreed to guard the prepositioned stock. The project was expected to be completed early in 1962.

In August Ambassador Young proposed establishing in Thailand a Combat Development and Test Center similar to the one in Vietnam. OSD agreed and sent a research and development team to Bangkok to make recommendations for the Thailand CDTC. The Thailand CDTC became operational at the beginning of November as an operating staff agency of the Director of Education and Research, Ministry of National Defense.

Because F-86F aircraft were in short supply, CHJUSMAG Thailand agreed to a USAF proposal to substitute F-86L craft for the third jet squadron to develop an all weather interceptor capability. CINCPAC approved the project as part of the FY62 MAP, but the delivery date had not been determined at the end of 1961.

South Vietnam

Military Assistance to South Vietnam jumped from a planned level of $70 million to twice that amount after the dispute in Laos was moved from the battlefield to conference tables, raising suddenly in the Free World the fear that communist infection would sweep through Laos and expose South Vietnam to new threats. The specific threat was from the North Vietnamese Viet Cong guerrillas.

The purpose of the MAP support was to sustain a force in South Vietnam that could resist and eventually overcome the Viet Cong. The specific means of doing this included the following: Increase the ground forces by 50,000 in order to create two additional infantry divisions, three additional infantry regiments, and more artillery, engineer, signal and transportation battalions; equip and train the entire 68,000

1. CINCPAC 142050Z Jan 61 (S)
2. HQ USAF 232046Z cite AFXPD-PL-AF, Jan 61 (S)
3. CHJUSMAG Thailand 011410Z cite MA2 10311 Feb 61 (S)
4. Bangkok to State 181, 7 Aug 61 (S)
5. CHJUSMAG Thailand 280425Z Jul 61 (C)
VIETNAM
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1961

BASIC INFORMATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>68,000 SQ. ML</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>14 MILLION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNUAL GROWTH</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRICULTURAL LAND PER CAPITA</td>
<td>1.1 ACRE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITERACY RATE</td>
<td>20-40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFE EXPECTANCY</td>
<td>36 YEARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROSS NATIONAL PROD. 1960 (C)</td>
<td>$2.1 BILLION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER CAPITA</td>
<td>$150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFENSE BUDGET 1960</td>
<td>$100 BILLION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS % OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS % OF GNP</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PRESIDENT-NGO DINH DIEM
SECRETARY OF STATE, FOR NATL. DEFENSE-NGO DINH DIEM
CHIEF OF STAFF-LT. GEN. VAN TATTLE, LTG. GEN.
DEP. C/S ARMY-GEN. NGUYEN KHANG, BGEN
DEP. C/S NAVY-HO TAN QUYNH, CDR
DEP. C/S AIR FORCE-GEN. NGUYEN XUAN VINH, LTCOL
COMMANDANT MACORPS-GEN. NGUYEN KHANG, MAJ

AUTHORIZED MAP FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES</th>
<th>COMBAT CAPABILITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 SEP ARMD REGTS</td>
<td>1 INF DIV-1.085M (SF)(M)</td>
<td>MISSION CAPABLE OF (1) MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST CONFLICT DIRECTED OR INSPIRED FROM FOREIGN MUSLIM MOVEMENT OR FROM OTHER FORCES HOSTILE TO U.S. INTEREST, AND (2) PROVIDING MAXIMUM FEASIBLE RESISTANCE TO COMMUNITY INSPIRED External Aggression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 SEP INF REGTS</td>
<td>1 INF ORG</td>
<td>CAPABILITY FOR PATROLLING RIVERS AND COASTAL WATERWAYS. MARINE COUPS CAPABLE OF BTL. LAND &amp; WATER SUPPORT &amp; SLIPPERY LANDING.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 SF GP</td>
<td>17 SEP ORG</td>
<td>CAPABLE OF PROVIDING LIMITED CLOSE SUPPORT FOR GROUND, LIMITED AERIAL SUPPORT, AND SUPPORT OF BTL. LAND OPNS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 INF ORG</td>
<td>5 INF REGTS</td>
<td>CAPABLE OF PROVIDING LIMITED CLOSE SUPPORT FOR ARMY, LIMITED AERIAL SUPPLY AND SUPPORT OF ADVANCED BASES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 COMM DEF CORPS</td>
<td>SELF DEF CORPS (55,000)</td>
<td>CAPABLE OF PROVIDING LIMITED CLOSE SUPPORT FOR ARMY, LIMITED AERIAL SUPPORT, AND SUPPORT OF ADVANCED BASES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 PATROL CORPS</td>
<td>5 PATROL CORPS (3 MSC, 2 MSC)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 LZ CRAFT</td>
<td>5 INF REGTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 BOAT GROUPS</td>
<td>1 INF DIV-1.085M (SF)(M)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 MARINE BATTALIONS</td>
<td>1 INF DIV-1.085M (SF)(M)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 JUNK FORCE DIVISIONS</td>
<td>1 INF DIV-1.085M (SF)(M)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 LIAISON SQUADS-1 TACTICAL FTR—2 TRANS P LASH</td>
<td>2 FTR, 1 (SF) SQUADS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 HELICOPTER SQUAD</td>
<td>1 HEL SQUAD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 ARMY INF SQUADS-2 MILITARY INFORMATION SQUADS</td>
<td>2 MILITARY INFORMATION SQUADS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: J55, J2
man Civil Guard and the 49,200 man Self Defense Corps; replace the M24 tanks with M41s; install a long-line communication network; improve the minesweeping, anti-submarine, amphibious, and coastal and river patrol capabilities; augment the tactical air capability with jet photo reconnaissance aircraft and a T-28B fighter squadron; and double the combat assault and air transport capability with a second squadron of H-34 helicopters. MAP funds were earmarked for construction of two jet and heavy-transport airfields, two heavy AC&W radar sites, strategic roads, shipyards and harbor improvements, and other logistical and training facilities.1 Most MAP activities in South Vietnam during 1961 are included in the detailed account of Vietnam that appears in Chapter IV. Only some of the smaller actions are listed under this section.

Personnel Surveillance Radars for Vietnam:

During July, CHMAAG Vietnam asked that he be furnished a personnel surveillance radar for functional and operational tests for use in border surveillance and similar situations, a request that OSD discouraged because of the complexity of the equipment.2 After learning that this item had been furnished to U.S. troops in Germany, CHMAAG repeated his request on 22 November and asked that three radars be airshipped as soon as possible.3 CINCPAC passed the request on to OSD/ISA and recommended that it be filled expeditiously and the costs charged as an addition to the FY62 MAP for Vietnam.4 Because of the complexity of the radars (AN/PPS-4) the Department of the Army suggested that a technician be sent with the equipment to spend 30 days training personnel in maintenance and operation, a suggestion with which CINCPAC agreed.5 The equipment was ready for shipment at the end of the year.

1. CINCPAC MA Plan Summary, FY62-67, 1 Sep 61, Vietnam Section p. 1 (S)
2. OSD 212215Z cite DEF 99979 Jul 61 (S)
3. CHMAAG 220003Z Nov 61 (S)
4. CINCPAC 292354Z Nov 61 (S)
5. CINCPAC 140016Z Dec 61 (S)
Printing Presses for PsyOps Program:

Early in November, CHMAAG Vietnam asked CINCPAC to make an emergency addition to the FY62 MAP and provide two offset printing presses to be used by the RVNAF PsyWar Center of Vietnam. The unit cost was estimated at approximately $13,500. Since it was a non-stocked item, DA recommended transferring a similar press that was stored on Okinawa in order to eliminate the delivery leadtime. USARPAC agreed to loan the extra press on Okinawa but the Department of the Army had determined by the middle of December that it could deliver suitable new presses within one to three months and recommended that the older model Okinawa press, which was not as suitable for operation in a tropical climate, be left on Okinawa.

This arrangement was satisfactory to CHMAAG Vietnam who asked that one press be shipped by air and the other by water, a solution that CINCPAC recommended to DA. Arrival of the first press was expected during February 1962.

Scout Dogs:

A project to train scout dogs for Vietnam infantry divisions and the airborne brigade got underway late in November when 46 dogs from CONUS arrived in Vietnam to undergo a six week training cycle. CHMAAG Vietnam approved a canine training center for Vietnam and authorized procurement of 290 scout dogs, which he wanted to be fully trained in CONUS before shipment. The latter requirement proved to be impracticable, however, because of the need to conduct the training with the intended handler, and the limited training facilities at Lackland AFB. Because the cost of procuring a dog in CONUS and shipping it to Vietnam was estimated at $350, some consideration was given to getting the dogs in Southeast Asia. However, at the end of the year,
the plan was to procure untrained dogs in the U.S. and conduct the training in Vietnam commencing in February 1962. In the meantime several Air Force men who were skilled in training dogs were in Vietnam on temporary duty training the dogs already there.

Aircraft for Vietnam:

Several changes were made toward the end of 1961 to advance the delivery of aircraft to South Vietnam. Besides substituting 30 T-28Bs for February 1962 delivery for the previously scheduled T-28 NOMADs, the scheduled delivery of all H-34C helicopters in the FY61 and FY62 MA Programs was advanced from August 62 to February. Nine L-20 aircraft were added to the FY62 MAP, at the request of CHMAAG Vietnam, for shipment in January 62. And as an interim action, CNO placed 15 T-28C aircraft on loan to Vietnam until the 30 T-28Bs were delivered.

Use of Technical Representatives:

As in Laos, CHMAAG Vietnam made extensive use of contractor furnished, civilian technical representatives as both instructors and as skilled workers. The approved FY62 Army Training Program for Vietnam contained 46 U.S. technicians and 128 Filipino technicians. During August, CHMAAG asked for a major deviation to the FY62 Program to increase the number of civilian contractor technicians by 50, claiming the increase was needed because of the increase in the RVN troop strength, the sophisticated communication equipment being installed, the decentralization of ordnance field maintenance installations, and an accelerated program of road and bridge construction. CINCPAC eliminated three Filipino photo technicians from the request because a Signal MTT was already programmed against the need, and recommended that the remainder be approved. As approved by DA, the estimated cost deviation was $426,560. (UNCLASSIFIED)

1. CHMAAG Vietnam 230449Z Dec 61 (C)
2. CHMAAG Vietnam 200751Z Dec 61 (C)
3. HQ USAF 072235Z Dec 61 (C)
4. HQ USAF 212206Z Nov 61 (S)
5. CNO 302057Z Oct 61 (S)
6. CHMAAG Vietnam ltr, MAGAR-LL of 31 Aug 61 (U)
7. CINCPAC 092303Z Oct 61 (U)
MAP TRAINING ACTIVITIES

CINCPAC was responsible for the overall training program in PACOM. MAAG Chiefs were directed to verify that the recipient countries made the best use of their own training resources, and of the personnel already trained under MAP, that specialist-type training undertaken under MAP support was in furtherance of the overall objectives and clearly beyond the capability of the recipient nations, and to otherwise be responsible for the conduct of the MAP supported training program.

MA Training Program Refinement for FY62

Early in 1961 representatives from OSD, CINCPAC, DA, CNO, USAF, USCONARC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, PACAF, and each MAAG attended refinement conferences for the MP Training Program, and furnished the following guidance to each MAAG representative:

The initial refinement would be in accordance with the Military Assistance Manual of November 1960 and CINCPAC's Supplement thereto, the FY62-66 MA Plan, and the Basic Planning Document.

Training in non-essential military subjects would be cut sharply.

It would be necessary for Allied countries to develop their own training capability by using their MAP-trained personnel as instructors.

U.S. controlled bases in Japan would not be used for third country training.

Based upon the refined program, MAP funding was established for the FY62 Training Program at $30.8 million for the Army, $10.8 million for the Navy, and $14 million for the Air Force.

The FY63 Training Program, submitted to OSD in the fall of 1961 for review, was later assigned the approximate values: $27.0 million for the Army, $13 million for the Navy, and $16.4 million for the Air Force.
1961 Training Activities

Most of the other-than-routine training activities that took place in PACOM countries during 1961 occurred in either Laos or South Vietnam. For Laos these activities included an accelerated training program that got underway early in the year when General Phoumi expanded the FAL; a program to use Thai military volunteers to stiffen FAL resistance; a large scale and very successful program known as White Star Mobile Training Teams; a program for training FAL infantry battalions in Thailand known as Project EKARAD; training of Lao pilots in Thailand; use of other Mobile Training Teams, use of technical representatives, and a plan to use either U.S. or Thai personnel as cadre personnel for the FAL in the event of a large scale cease-fire violation in Laos. Since these and other training activities are described in the Summary of CINCPAC's Participation in the Events in Laos, which is included in this Command History as Part II, they are not included in this section.

A detailed account covering all activities in South Vietnam is included under Chapter IV, and the MAP training activities that are described in that account are not repeated in this section. The important training activities in South Vietnam were the training of Ranger-type units, the Civil Guard and the Self Defense Corps; the use of Mobile Training Teams, and both U.S. and Filipino technical representatives; a Saigon Medical Training Center; a Combat Development and Test Center; and the training of the Vietnamese Junk Force for which MAP funds were authorized late in the year.

Use of Mobile Training Teams

One of the more successful methods of training Allied forces, especially in Laos and in South Vietnam, was the use of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to conduct specialist or technical type training. These MTTs, varying in strength from two to 12 men and furnished either from PACOM or CONUS resources, usually were used for specific
training assignments and for periods of a few months, although in Laos and South Vietnam many of the teams remained for six months and were then replaced.

In Laos, at the end of 1961, were approximately 500 personnel assigned to White Star Mobile Training Teams serving with FAL combat units as instructors and small training teams. Other MTTs in Laos conducted training in civil affairs, PsyOps programming and propaganda, intelligence methods, ordnance inspection, and unit training.

In Vietnam separate MTTs were used for instruction in CBR, PsyOps, loudspeaker and mobile press operations, QM stock record control, and one four-man orthopedic team was used to train Vietnamese Army professional and para-medical personnel in the latest techniques of orthopedic surgery.

In Cambodia, teams conducted training in POL depot organization, technical inspection of equipment, stock control and inventory procedures, procedures for inspecting and classifying parachutes, and on-the-job training for shoe repairman and communications personnel.

Other teams were sent to Japan, China, Thailand and the Philippines.

**Training in CONUS**

For career personnel of Allied countries, the use of CONUS training continued to be an important means of developing both instructor personnel and the highly skilled technicians. In FY61 a total of 7,647 trainees (officer and enlisted) from PACOM Allied Countries attended U.S. Service Technical schools and/or participated in orientation tours on-the-job training. During FY62 the allocation of spaces totalled 5,606. During both fiscal years, the largest number of spaces went to China, Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
ROK Training for SAM

Several MAP projects for Korea were allowed to slide temporarily as a result of the unsteady political situation that followed the May Military Coup. In July CINCPAC sent a message to ASD/ISA urging that a decision be reached to proceed with the training of the two SAM battalions in the ROK FY61 MAP. The ASD/ISA response pointed out that the U.S. Ambassador and CINCUNC recommended that the U.S. prepare to commence ROK missile training by 1 Nov 61, with the implied understanding that preparations would halt any time before October if the political situation dictated. For planning purposes, the ASD/ISA said that Hawk cadre training for non-U.S. personnel was scheduled to begin mid-November 1961 with a completion date of March 1963 for the first unit. Thereafter, one battalion would complete training every six weeks.

1. CINCPAC 252209Z Jul 61 (S)
2. OSD 032140Z cite DEF 999954 Aug 61 (S)
PART I
CHAPTER III
CINCPAC ACTIONS TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES

One of CINCPAC's important responsibilities was to promote unity among the free countries of PACOM, creating effective military strength greater than the sum of the contributions by the individual nations. A chief means CINCPAC used to accomplish this was to continue to emphasize his support of SEATO, which he considered an important and essential military alliance. (UNCLASSIFIED)

SEATO Conferences

During 1961 there were two SEATO Military Advisors (MILAD) Conferences, and several major committee conferences. Admiral Felt, in his capacity as U.S. MILAD, attended both MILAD conferences. Members of his staff and representatives from other PACOM Commands attended the committee conferences in the capacity of U.S. representatives. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Military Advisors Conference Number 14 (MA14C):

The 14th Meeting of the SEATO MILADs was held 27-29 March. An important result of the meeting was the statement of unanimity among the member nations regarding the willingness of SEATO to intervene in Laos if intervention was necessary to prevent a communist take-over. Other significant actions taken at MA14C were:

1. CINCPAC 02033Z Apr 61 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 261121Z Mar 61 (TS)
United States collective defense arrangements in the Pacific command
report, after which it was determined that the MPO should re-examine the question and prepare a report for future consideration. This action was in accord with the U.S. position.

MPO Plan 4/61 was approved with the following modifications: As requested by Pakistan, the MILADs directed CHMPO to make provisions for appropriate defense of East Pakistan; the command structure was to be similar to that for MPO Plan 5; and logistic and unconventional warfare forces would be retained under national command.

It was agreed that the next step was to develop force requirements for MPO Plan 4.

The Secretary General was asked to assess the probability that Burma and the Protocol States would consent to aid from SEATO if Red China or North Vietnam attacked their countries.

Military Advisors Conference Number 15 (MA15C):

The MA15C was held in Bangkok from 3 to 6 October. Well before the meeting, USMILAD directed his SEATO representatives to get out-of-session agreement, if possible, on U.S. views regarding MPO Plans 4 and 6, the main agenda items. He recommended that the subcommittees be formed and put to work on 1 October in order to have their papers ready for MILAD consideration on 3 October. As a result of the working-level, out-of-session meetings on the main agenda items, the national views became known and a number of divergencies were cleared before the MILADs met.

The major accomplishments of MA15C were connected with the approval of MPO Plans 4 and 6 as described above. Other important actions included:

- The Pakistan MILAD discussed the increasing communist influence in Afghanistan and increasing activities against Pakistan, and asked SEATO to develop a plan to meet communist-inspired overt aggression from Afghanistan. The MILADs agreed that the Pakistan MILAD should submit to CHMPO a statement of the threat to West

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1. CINCPAC 090340Z Sep 61 (S)
Pakistan, and directed the CHMPO to assess the Pakistan statement and make recommendations to the MILADS. By drawing attention to the serious situation in South Vietnam, the U.S. MILAD succeeded in obtaining agreement for the MPO to develop, on an urgent basis, a SEATO plan (Plan 7) to counter insurgency on that country.

The MILADS agreed on a program of future work that gave highest priority to Plans 5 and 7, but provided that Plans 4 and 6 would be revised and further developed in accordance with decisions reached at the 15th Conference.

All U.S. positions approved by the JCS before the meeting were accepted at MA15C. ¹

SEATO Fifth Communications-Electronic Meeting (CE5M):

The Fifth Communications-Electronics Meeting was held in Bangkok from 6 to 16 June. The PACOM delegation, headed by the CINCPAC Deputy J6, included a representative from each of the Component Commanders and two observers from the office of the Director, National Security Agency. Of the 18 items on the agenda, the more important and the action taken thereon were the following:

The delegates approved for publication a new Frequency Usage and Assignment register that had been prepared by the U.S. ¹

The delegates accepted with minor changes a U.S. -submitted SEATO COMSEC Operations, Distribution and Accounting Manual. The overall U.S. progress in the production of SEATO crypto system was considered satisfactory.

A significant number of new SEATO C-E publications were reviewed, and the delegates determined a requirement for additional publications.

The delegates recommended that activities of the SEATO C-E Division, MPO be expanded so it would be able to prepare most of the C-E papers previously prepared by the member nations. As expanded,

¹ CINCPAC 070320Z Oct 61 (TS)
the C-E Division would ask for specialist assistance as necessary, but retain overall responsibility for preparation and coordination of the item.

Logistic Committee Meeting LOG4M:
During January a delegation of U.S. logistic planners under the direction of a CINCPAC staff representative participated in the Fourth SEATO Logistic Committee Meeting (LOG4M) in Bangkok. For the first time and at CINCPAC's direction, representatives of the Component Commanders attended the meeting so that they could develop SEATO planning factors that would be consonant with U.S. unilateral plans to meet similar threats. The purpose of LOG4M was to review logistic support problems in SEATO. Items of importance that were discussed and recommended to the MILADs included: Logistic support for a major SEATO force; logistic support plans and studies developed by the MPO; the type and amount of support required by the armed forces of Burma and the Protocol States; and the progress of SEATO logistic planning.

One of the major problems that arose during the meeting was the control of logistic units. Since the report of LOG4M was not precise and could have been interpreted to permit control of U.S. logistic forces by other than U.S. commanders, the JCS asked that the report be changed to ensure that a SEATO commander, as such, would not control U.S. logistic forces even though he were a U.S. officer, but that U.S. logistic units would be assigned to the respective U.S. Service Component Commander within the contributed SEATO force. These changes were adopted by the MILADs at MA14C.

SEATO Intelligence Conference:
The Seventh Meeting of the Intelligence Committee (INT7M) was held in Bangkok from 7 to 17 November. One of the principal agenda items was preparation of the intelligence threat for South Vietnam.

1. JCS 102343Z Apr 61 (TS)
required for the preparation of SEATO Plan 7. Other important items that were considered, approved, or recommended to the MILADs were:

- An estimate of the Communist threat to the treaty areas.
- A determination of the capabilities and effectiveness of the Chinese and North Vietnamese Communists.
- A revision of Southeast Asia target information.
- Determining the order of battle of communist forces in SEATO area.
- Determining the order of battle of Burma and Protocol States.

**SEATO Operation Plans**

There were four SEATO Force Commander's plans completed or in the process of development or revision during 1961. These plans were prepared by the Military Planning Office and identified as MPO plans, although a substantial contribution was made by members of CINCPAC's staff. All of these plans anticipated a defense of Southeast Asia, or a part of it, against communist insurgency or attack. SEATO MPO Plan 5 provided for the defense of Laos against communist insurgency; MPO Plan 7 provided for assistance to the Government of Vietnam to counter communist insurgency; MPO Plan 6 was the SEATO Plan for defending the Protocol States (Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam) against an overt attack by North Vietnam; and MPO Plan 4 provided for defense against an overt attack by both North Vietnam and Communist China, and for the defense of Southeast Asia, to include the Philippines and Pakistan.

In addition, a supporting SEATO Field Forces Operation Plan for the defense of Laos was prepared by Lt. Gen. Harkins, Deputy CINCUSARPAC and CSFF (Designate) for Plan 5, and approved early in 1961.

**MPO Plan 5/61:**

One of the problems carried over from 1960 was an offer by Pakistan to provide an infantry battalion for the Central Force Reserve.
for MPO Plan 5, provided that the U.S. moved and supported 
the battalion, and provided there would be an immediate follow-on of the 
remainder of Pakistan forces, for which the U.S. would also have to 
provide transportation and support. In January, CINCPAC recom-
manded to the JCS the following course of action:

1. When the U.S. /Pakistan agreement on this matter was 
established, that representatives of CINCPAC and Pakistan meet to 
work out the details. He proposed that the U.S. initially agree to air-
lift the battalion to Thailand, and to provide material support as 
required, but not agree to move the remainder of the Pakistan forces 
until required by the SEATO Field Forces Commander. If Pakistan 
representatives would not agree to that, the U.S. could then offer to 
airlift and support the Pakistan battalion initially, with the remainder 
of the brigade group to follow by surface means within 60 or 90 days 
unless the U.S. and Pakistan agreed that reinforcements were not 
needed. As a last resort, the U.S. could agree to Pakistan's 
proposal.

2. In the meantime, the U.S. should advise the Pakistan 
Military Advisor (MILAD) that the U.S. was considering the offer and 
would advise him soon.

The question of airlifting and supporting the Pakistan battalion was 
not resolved during 1961. In July the UK representative advised 
CINCPAC that his government could not get authority from the 
Maldivian Government for the U.S. to use Gan Airport in the Maldives 
Islands as a stop during the airlift, making it impracticable to 
conduct the lift. CINCPAC urged the JCS to take action to 
strengthen British efforts to persuade the Maldivian Government to 
permit use of the airfield.

For several weeks during the spring of 1961, SEATO members 
prepared to implement MPO Plan 5 to prevent what appeared to be a 
communist attempt to seize control of Laos. The occasion of greatest

1. CINCPAC 200445Z Jan 61 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 102345Z Jul 61 (TS)
apparent danger occurred near the time when SEATO MILADS met in Bangkok for their 14th conference. Before departing for this conference Admiral Felt, who attended in his capacity as U.S. MILAD, directed his staff to prepare a multi-national plan for intervention in Laos. The premise was that SEATO would be unable to reach unanimous agreement on intervention. Therefore, the U.S. would intervene with the help of those SEATO member nations willing to assist. Although the MILADS preferred to negotiate, and hoped for an acceptable cease-fire in Laos, they were willing to take military action under Plan 5 if necessary to prevent a communist Laos. From his discussions with other MILADs, Admiral Felt concluded that the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, The Philippines, and Thailand probably would provide forces as agreed. Participation by France was not expected. Participation by both Pakistan and the Philippines was contingent upon U.S. airlift and support of the units. As a result of this apparent SEATO unity, Admiral Felt shelved further consideration of the multi-national plan.1

Another problem with which Admiral Felt worked at the 14th conference concerned suitable objectives in case of SEATO intervention. As defined in Plan 5, the objective was to establish conditions in Laos so that it could resolve its problems and maintain its security and independence. Admiral Felt gained some support for his position that a realistic objective should include the recapture of the Plaines des Jarres (PDJ) and the restoration of conditions that existed prior to Kong Le's coup. Following the conference, he told the JCS that he believed the other SEATO members would agree to an objective to include the capture of the PDJ and Xieng Khouang, but that because of suspicion among other members that the U.S. was trying to get them involved in a prolonged jungle war, the U.S. should avoid trying to further expand the objective.2

Following the conference, CINCPAC appointed Deputy CINCUSARPAC (Lt. Gen. Paul D. Harkins) as the Commander SEATO

1. CINCPAC 020330Z Apr 61 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 030555Z Apr 61 (TS)
Field Forces (Designate and directed him to assemble and activate his staff at Okinawa. He was to assume the title Commander SEATO Field Forces (CSFF) as soon as SFF Plan 5/61 went into effect. Meanwhile, his staff assembling at Okinawa was designated as the PACOM Element of the SEATO Field Forces Commander's Staff. As an additional readiness measure, CINCPAC directed his Component Commanders to have the Commander of Force Alfa, the Commander Air Component, the Commander Base Area Command, and staff personnel earmarked for SFF Plan 5/61 report to CSFF (Designate). CINCPAC also made the following recommendations to the JCS and his Component Commanders:

1. The U.S. should maintain maximum flexibility to meet a fluid situation that would depend upon whether intervention was carried out under administrative or assault conditions.

2. The CSFF (Designate) should see that his staff was as familiar with the area of operations as was CJTF-116 and his staff.

3. The CSFF (Designate) should plan on a UK-Australian-New Zealand brigade moving to Seno, but be prepared to send a U.S. contingent there if the brigade failed to appear.

**SEATO MPO Plan 4**

This plan envisaged overt intervention in Southeast Asia by both North Vietnam and Red China. First approved by the MILADS in 1960, revision of this plan was one of the major agenda items for consideration by the SEATO MILADS at their 15th meeting. Development of supporting plans had waited on political decisions concerning the designation of the "Appointed Nation" that the U.S. was prepared to accept.

Several of the problems connected with MPO Plan 4 were concerned with force structure and force requirements, command organization, and initial deployment. Long before the conference, CINCPAC asked his staff to prepare the necessary portions of the

1. CINCPAC 062320Z Apr 61 (TS)
plan to make the revisions so that he could present a completed paper presented according to the U.S. position for approval or change. This preliminary work was submitted to all delegations before the conference.

At the conference, the U.S. was asked to accept the "Appointed Nation" position and designate the SEATO Force Commander as previously approved by the JCS. Admiral Felt accepted for the U.S. In respect to selection of the Field Forces commanders, the MILADs agreed that Pakistan should appoint the Field Forces Commander for the Western region, and that the Philippines would designate the FFC for the Easter region. For the Central region, the Thai MILAD argued for splitting it into two parts along the Mekong River, a proposal the other MILADs opposed. Since the U.S. was to appoint the Field Forces commander for the Central region, Admiral Felt proposed that Thailand appoint the Central region Deputy Force Commander who would have direct access to the Force Commander. This resolved the issue. 1

The French MILAD attempted to insert in the plan a restriction on the use of nuclear weapons, but later agreed to proceed with planning on the concept of operations predicated on using nuclear as well as conventional weapons. The MILADs agreed that the MPO would prepare an estimate of forces required if only conventional weapons were used.

As a result of Admiral Felt's lead, the following force commitments were made during MA15C to support Plan 4:

Australia: Two battalion groups, of which one would have logistic support personnel; two light bomber squadrons; two fighter squadrons; a light transport squadron plus additional transport support initially; two destroyers, a carrier and two escorts.

New Zealand: One infantry battalion by D plus 2, increasing to an infantry brigade (less a battalion) by D plus 60; a medium range transport squadron and a light bomber squadron, three frigates or one cruiser and two ASW frigates.

1. CINCPAC 071320Z Oct 61 (TS)
United Kingdom: The UK element of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade plus a commando unit to be held in strategic reserve; 12 day-fighter aircraft plus a short range transport force for in-theater air transport; certain aircraft to support SEATO operations but to remain under UK control; an attack carrier, a commando ship, a cruiser, 10 destroyers, three submarines, eight minesweepers, all of which would remain under national command.

United States: Two infantry divisions, one airborne division, an armored cavalry regiment, one missile command with one Hawk and one Nike-Hercules battalion; three communications detachments; and psywar and civil affairs units as required. Under national command the U.S. would furnish heavy and medium bombers, transports and additional tactical air and supporting units as required. Navy forces committed included a Marine division, a Marine air wing, a communications battalion, and composite radio company detachment under the SEATO Force Commander. Other Pacific Fleet and supporting units as required would be in support under national command.

Other member nations did not make a firm commitment during the conference.  

SEATO MPO Plan 6:
In outline form at the end of 1960, MPO Plan 6 was the SEATO Force Commander's plan for defense of the Protocol States against overt aggression by North Vietnam. This plan was also a major agenda item at the 15th Conference where the more important questions were related to the designation of the "Appointed Nation" that would appoint the Field Forces Commander.

At the conference, having settled all divergencies on Plan 4, the MILADs turned to Plan 6 and easily agreed that since Plan 4 probably would be implemented after Plans 5 or 6, it was logical for Plan 6 command arrangements to be identical to those of Plan 4. The U.S. was proposed as the "Appointed Nation" and Admiral Felt accepted.

1. Ibid.
Incomplete force commitments, similar to those made under Plan 4 were made.  

**SEATO MPO Plan 7:**

During the 15th MILAD Conference, Admiral Felt drew attention to the serious situation existing in South Vietnam and reminded the other MILADs of SEATO's responsibility to this Protocol State. The MILADs quickly agreed that SEATO should have a plan and the Chief MPO was directed to develop a SEATO plan for countering communist insurgency in South Vietnam, giving the project the highest priority.  

By the end of 1961, this plan was already in outline form.

**Appointment of SFF Commander:**

In accordance with agreements reached at the 15th Conference, USMILAD recommended to the JCS that Deputy CINCUSARPAC, Lieutenant General Paul D. Harkins, USA, be designated as the Field Force Commander for SEATO Plans 4 and 6. As soon as he had received approval from the JCS, Admiral Felt directed General Harkins to prepare appropriate SEATO Field Forces Plans to support the two MPO plans, and to assemble a joint planning staff at Headquarters USARLPAC to assist in developing the plans.

**SEATO Field Forces Plan 5:**

This plan, which supported MPO Plan 5, was partially developed during 1960 and changed several times during 1961. After a revision in January, it was reviewed and approved as SFF 5/61 draft plan and distributed to the MILADs prior to the 14th Conference. Although it was not on the conference agenda, as a result of the agreements reached there, and in view of the existing situation in Laos, immediately after the conference CINCPAC concluded that SFF 5/61 needed some additional revisions and proposed to the SEATO MILADs, the Commander SEATO Forces, and the CHMPO the following changes:

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 122155Z Oct 61 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 082131Z Nov 61 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 050206Z Apr 61 (TS)
That the Pakistan infantry battalion that had been made available to the Central Force Reserve be deployed initially to Laos to become part of Force Alfa.

That the U.S. Army airborne battle group, then a part of Force Alfa, be replaced by a second U.S. Marine Battalion landing team. The airborne BG would be retained at Okinawa as a ready reserve.

That Thailand should plan to deploy, in addition to the infantry battalion to Vientiane, a second battalion initially to Paksane as part of Force Alfa. The Thai RCT (-), then in general reserve would be moved into Central Force Reserve status.

Because of the possibility of early implementation of SFF Plan 5/61, the provisions contained in the plan were examined carefully at the 14th conference, especially such matters as logistic support and command arrangements. Immediately after the conference, CINCPAC asked CSFF (Designate) and his Component Commanders to review the plan and submit recommendations, and to consider a reduction of U.S. personnel in the headquarters of all commanders and in logistic units designated for FAL support. To clear up areas of responsibility within the U.S. chain of command, CSFF (Designate) was advised that in his capacity as Commander U.S. Element SFF he was directly under CINCPAC and responsible for coordinating U.S. multi-service matters for U.S. forces. Logistics and other uniservice matters would be handled by the three U.S. PACOM Component Commanders directly with the Service Components of U.S. Element SFF. 1

To straighten out another problem, CINCPAC sent a message to the Pakistan MILAD and explained that since U.S. logistic support would move from Bangkok through Korat to Vientiane, it would be extremely difficult, from a U.S. viewpoint, to support the initial Pakistan battalion that would be operating with the 28th Brigade in Southern Laos. If the U.S. proposal advanced at the 14th Conference for deployment of the Pakistan battalion with Force Alfa remained

1. CINCPAC 152341Z Apr 61 (TS)
unacceptable to Pakistan, CINCPAC suggested that Pakistan approach the UK to determine if the UK, Australia and New Zealand forces could furnish logistic support. ¹

CHPEO Laos was advised to continue his advisory mission to the FAL upon implementation of SFF Plan 5, remaining under CINCPAC, rather than CSFF, control. He was told to be prepared to establish liaison with the U.S. Element of SFF to coordinate U.S. logistic support of the FAL.

Planning for the employment and support of SFF Plan 5/61 continued on a priority basis through the remainder of April and most of May, with events in Laos becoming most critical at the end of April. The U.S. Element of Headquarters SFF, Force Alfa, and Air Component Staffs moved from Okinawa to Clark AFB, and all forces earmarked for commitment under the plan remained in PACOM DEFCON 2 until the middle of May. A more detailed account of the movements of forces and preparations for implementing SFF Plan 5 is included in Part II of this Command History. ²

After the crisis had passed and units were returned to home stations, CINCPAC asked CSFF (Designate) to hold a command level critique of all actions connected with the activation, planning, movement, and inactivation of U.S. Elements of SFF. Anxious to profit from the experience, CINCPAC asked that the major problems be brought to the attention of all concerned, and that the plans be refined and developed further. ³

At the request of the Commander SFF (Designate), a SEATO planning conference was convened in Bangkok on 15 September with the major staff officers of SEATO Field Forces attending. The conference reviewed the revised SFF OPLAN 5/61 and conducted several working sessions to coordinate and resolve remaining details for implementing the plan. ⁴

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1. CINCPAC 210130Z Apr 61 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 160402Z Jun 61 (S)
SEATO Training Exercises

Three SEATO exercises were conducted during 1961 to improve the readiness of the SEATO forces. The first was an air defense exercise, the second an air-ground transportation command post exercise, and the third was an amphibious exercise.

Exercise AIR BULL:
This air defense exercise was conducted during the first week of March in accordance with the SEATO Combined OPlan prepared for it. Political clearance for the exercise was given at the 14 February meeting of the SEATO Council Representatives, who agreed that Thailand would act as host, and that invited observers would be limited to six from the U.S. and two each from South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, and Nationalist China. The primary exercise headquarters was located at Don Muang, Thailand.

Phase I was concerned primarily with air defense operations involving tactical fighter aircraft furnished by participating nations, and ground radar environment operating under a combined air defense concept. Air defense missions were conducted from Don Muang, Tak Li, and Korat airfields using SEATO tactical fighters against faker aircraft sorties. Member nations participating in the exercise were Australia, France, Pakistan, New Zealand, Thailand, UK, and the U.S.

The exercise was considered successful, although problem areas remained in air defense operations.

Exercise RAJATA:
Thailand acted as host nation and also provided the Exercise Director and the SEATO Force Commander for Exercise RAJATA. With most planning done in 1960, the CPX was held during the period 8-19 March. It was based upon a situation in which a Southeast Asia country asked for SEATO assistance in combating communist insurgency.
More than 1,500 personnel participated, most of them furnished by the UK, the U.S., and Thailand with token forces from France, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.

The benefits obtained from the exercise were that it afforded key officers an opportunity to reconnoiter an area of possible operations; it provided combined staff experience for officers from participating nations; uncovered some of the weak links in SEATO plans; raised several logistical problems; confirmed the need for a SEATO exercise SOP; and proved the need for additional ground command post exercises before holding a large scale ground maneuver.

Exercise PONY EXPRESS:

PONY EXPRESS, an amphibious exercise conducted in the Kota Belud area of North Borneo from 17 April to 7 May, was co-sponsored by the U.S. and the UK. The scenario envisioned communist forces invading South East Asia, and SEATO responding to a request for assistance by making amphibious landings in South Vietnam to block communist resupply and reinforcements along the coastal road, and to establish a beachhead for further operations. The U.S. provided the Exercise Director, Commander of the Amphibious Task Force, and Commander of Amphibious Troops; the UK provided the Deputy to the three posts.

Prior to the exercise, because of the PACOM readiness requirements resulting from the Laos crisis, CINCPACFLT had indicated that it would be necessary to withdraw his forces from the exercise if the defense condition was not relaxed by 5 April. Reluctant to postpone the exercise, CINCPAC directed modification of the plan and tailoring the ready forces to permit participation. 1 Three days before the exercise was to begin, the JCS proposed that Pony Express be cancelled because of the situation in Laos. CINCPAC reported to the JCS that he was opposed to cancelling the exercise at such a late date, especially since the exercise was planned to permit full implementation

1. CINCPAC 290549Z Mar 61 (S)
of SEATO Plan 5 on short reaction notice. The JCS concurred and the exercise, involving more than 60 ships and more than 26,000 men, was conducted as scheduled.

Planned SEATO Exercises

By the end of the year, planning was in progress for the scheduled FY62 SEATO exercises. The first of the annual SEATO exercises programmed to be conducted was the amphibious exercise, nicknamed TULUNGAN.

Exercise TULUNGAN:

This exercise was approved by the SEATO MILADs during 1960. The U.S. and the Philippines were to co-sponsor the exercise, with the UK, Australia, and New Zealand also participating. In the early stages of planning, the Filipinos asked that the exercise plan be modified to include the Philippines in the beach assault phase, which CINCPAC rejected because the Filipinos lacked over-the-beach training. In the spring of 1961, the UK and NZ withdrew from the exercise, and Australia reduced its participation. In the end, CINCPAC recommended to JCS that the exercise be postponed until 1962 and modified to include over-the-beach training for the Filipinos before the exercise. The JCS approved this change, and the exercise was scheduled for early 1962.

Exercise SEA DEVIL:

SEATO Maritime Exercise SEA DEVIL was scheduled for April 1962. Australia was the sponsoring nation, and the Flag Officer in Command of Australian Fleet was designated the coordinating authority.

1. CINCPAC 280245Z Apr 61 (TS)
2. JCS 132120Z Jul 61 (S)
Exercise AIR COBRA:

The SEATO Tactical Air Exercise, nicknamed AIR COBRA, was scheduled for April 1962. Thailand and the U.S. were to co-sponsor the exercise with Thailand providing the Exercise Director. CINCPACAF was assigned the responsibility for coordinating planning with participating nations.

SEATO Cost Sharing Formulas

Major policy changes in the method of sharing SEATO costs were under development during 1961. In late April the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand asked for guidance on the related questions of national versus SEATO common costs, and the establishment of a common fund. 1 CINCPAC proposed to the JCS criteria for separating national costs from SEATO common costs, and also suggested that a SEATO revolving fund be set up to pay certain expenses of national forces incurred within an area of operations. Beneficiary nations would then be obligated to reimburse the revolving fund. 2 The Departments of State and Defense accepted CINCPAC’s proposed criteria for separating national costs from SEATO common costs, and recommended that the SEATO MPO prepare, for consideration by the MILADs and member nations, a list of items that would qualify as SEATO common costs.

When the Chief MPO submitted his recommendations, CINCPAC passed them on to his Component Commanders for review and comment. 3 The SEATO MPO also proposed to the MILADs that criteria be established to identify certain costs of SEATO military operations that would not be clearly assessable to the forces of a particular member nation, and that a tentative list of such costs be submitted to the SEATO council. 4 Subject to a few changes, this list was accepted by the JCS, and CINCPAC notified the MPO of U.S. approval. 5

1. Bangkok to State 1919, Apr 61 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 032333Z May 61 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 272304Z Sep 61 (C)
4. MPO MS/623/65/61 (C)
5. CINCPAC 042216Z Nov 61 (C)
In a related action, the Thailand MILAD raised the question of SEATO costs in connection with past training exercises, and asked for information about these costs from the member nations. Reasoning that, although the expenditures by member nations were roughly proportional to the size of participating forces and the distance traveled, the cost data compiled on past SEATO exercises would be meaningless because of the differing accounting procedures, CINCPAC recommended that member nations maintain records on future exercises, from which the required data could be obtained.

COMBINED EXERCISES (NON SEATO):

In addition to SEATO exercises, a number of combined exercises were conducted with armed forces of other nations as part of the PACOM Component Commanders training cycle. These exercises varied in scope from important tactical training between minor allied military units to large scale land-sea-air exercises preceded by extensive coordinated planning preparation.

The exercises that are discussed here are those that involved CINCPAC as an active participant in the planning, or that required approval from CINCPAC or higher authority.

US/ROK Special Forces Exercises:

There were two US/ROK combined special forces training exercises scheduled during the first half of 1961. Due to a possible conflict with SEATO exercises, CINCPAC approved the first exercise but withheld approval of the second. COMUSK requested, in the interests of cold weather training, that both exercises be held as one, and outlined airlift requirements. After PACAF stated that the airlift could be furnished, CINCPAC approved the exercise and it was held from 7 to 22 February 1961. This exercise provided for the testing of applicable unconventional warfare plans, reconnaissance of accessible areas, and emphasized language and area familiarization training.

1. CINCPAC 230035Z Sep 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 230023Z Nov 60 (S)
Exercise Counter Punch:
Planned during 1960, Exercise Counter Punch was conducted from 11 to 24 March to test the readiness of the UN/U.S. forces in Korea and the ROK military forces to defend South Korea. Since the details of the exercise that COMUS Korea submitted to CINCPAC early in 1961 indicated that the play of the exercise would include both nuclear and CBR warfare, CINCPAC submitted the exercise details to JCS for approval. The JCS permitted nuclear and CBR warfare to be played during the last few days of the exercise. 1 (C

U.S. Forces participating were the U.S. Seventh Fleet, the Fifth Air Force, and the First Special Forces Group. 2

Exercise Turn Back:
This exercise, similar to Counter Punch, took place in Korea from 8 to 21 November with all U.S., UN, and ROK forces down to division level participating. COMUS Japan agencies participated in supply and transportation regarding theater combat reserves and movement to Korea. Like the other exercise, it included nuclear and CBR warfare in the play of the exercise.

Exercise KOREA 61-II:
This exercise was a combined US/ROK Special Forces exercise scheduled by CINCUSARPAC in accordance with CINCPAC Instruction 003500. 3 It took place in Korea from 18 September to 6 October and accomplished the following objectives: The establishment of a combined Special Forces operational base, and the exercise of control of six operational detachments during both guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations; and infiltration by air, sea, and land facilities.

Combined Training With South Vietnam:
Considerable planning during 1961 was devoted to bilateral exercises between the U.S. and South Vietnam that would provide training for coastal and amphibious type operations. In August,

1. CINCPAC 312345Z Jan 61 (C)
2. CHMAAG Vietnam 220931Z Aug 61 (S)
CHMAAG South Vietnam proposed that two South Vietnamese minesweepers conduct simple minesweeping and tactical exercises with U.S. minesweepers returning from Phnom Penh. Conducted at the beginning of September, this exercise was considered very successful. As a result, CINCPAC immediately asked CINCPACFLT to go ahead with a combined training plan for the Vietnamese Navy, working out the plans with CHMAAG South Vietnam and keeping CINCPAC informed.

Combined Training with Thailand:

Two combined training exercises involving Thailand troops were held during 1961. One of these was a small combined exercise proposed by CINCPAC in May in which the participants were U.S. and Thai Marine units, and members of the Royal Thai Navy. As pre-exercise training for the Thai Marines, a U.S. Mobile Training Team gave instruction in jungle warfare and over-the-beach operations. Called Jungle Drum, the exercise was conducted from 10 to 21 November.

The other exercise, called Experience IV, took place from 27 November to 2 December. It was a mining exercise in which mining units of the U.S., the UK and Thailand participated.

Combined Exercises Planning

Planning was partially complete for two other combined exercises that were scheduled in 1962. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Exercise GREAT SHELF:

A large amount of planning was devoted to this exercise during 1961 to provide for the realistic training upon which CINCPAC insisted. Originally scheduled as a Philippine/U.S. combined exercise to be held during December 1961, it was postponed until early in 1962. During 1960, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Philippines proposed a bilateral ground exercise. Before much planning had been

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 120103Z Sep 61 (C)
3. CINCPAC 270250Z May 61 (C)
done, the JCS directed that the U.S. conduct a strategic mobility exercise using CONUS forces, and suggested it be held during October or November. As a result, CINCPAC made a tentative proposal to the Filipinos that the December bilateral exercise be expanded to include CONUS based forces. After the Filipinos agreed to this, there was a delay while the exercise plan was revised.

One of the sensitive areas in planning with the Filipinos had been command relationships. The Filipino desire to command all forces on Filipino soil conflicted with the U.S. position that U.S. troops should not be placed under a foreign commander. This question arose early in planning for GREAT SHELF and was settled during a meeting between General Cabal and Admiral Felt, when it was agreed that the positions of exercise director, field force commander, ground component commander and air component commander would be filled by U.S. personnel, and that Filipino officers would serve as deputy to each of the commanders. General Cabal later wanted the exercise plan to provide that the U.S. ground component would be attached operationally to the Philippine ground component after the link-up of the two forces, but CINCPAC disagreed, pointing out that there was no reason why one force should be attached to the other.

During August the JCS asked about the possibility of advancing the planned date for the exercise and conducting it in Thailand. CINCPAC said that, although planning would be difficult because of the short time involved, it could be done. However, the JCS later approved the concept and scope of the exercise as originally proposed.

Additional Planning for Combined Exercises:
Several combined exercises for which the planning was partially complete were either cancelled or not approved for execution.

1. CINCPAC 240354Z Jun 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 111633Z Aug 61 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 230232Z Aug 61 (S)
4. CINCPAC 280806Z Aug 61 (TS)
Exercise Aumee, a combined U.S./Republic of China Special Forces training exercise, was proposed and outlined by COMUSTDC and later integrated into the PACOM Special Forces training program. It was scheduled on Taiwan during the period 15 April to 31 May. As that time approached, however, it became apparent that there would be a shortage of planes because of the Laos crisis, and CINCPAC reduced the U.S. force and suggested that the GRC do the same.\(^1\) A few days later, on 22 March, CINCUSARPAC withdrew all USARPAC forces in order to comply with the CINCPAC directed DEFCON 2, and the exercise was then cancelled.\(^2\)

CINCPAC did not approve another U.S./GRC exercise proposed by COMUSTDC to provide training in amphibious assault and simultaneous vertical envelopment. Participants were to be units of the Seventh Fleet and of the Chinese Navy and Chinese Marine Corps. The U.S. was to furnish the equipment.\(^3\) Since the proposed vertical envelopment was beyond the Chinese capability, CINCPAC did not think the exercise would provide realistic training.\(^4\)

CINCPAC also turned down a Filipino request that the U.S. provide aircraft for use in air movement training. The original request, by General Cabal, was for planes to airlift a battalion combat team to another base in the Philippines as part of Exercise Great Shelf. Because of the time limitation on U.S. aircraft, CINCPAC countered by proposing an air transportability training program for the Filipinos that would include short distance airlifts for company size units.\(^5\) The Filipinos agreed to this, but asked the U.S. to provide helicopter-borne training also.\(^6\) At the end of the year, the air transportability training was still under consideration, but CINCPAC did not agree to furnish training in helicopter troop movement because the Filipinos had no tactical helicopters and none were forecast through the 1965 MA Program.\(^7\)

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1. CINCPAC 182056Z Mar 61 (TS)
2. COMUSTDC 280343Z Mar 61 (TS)
3. COMUSTDC 210651Z Jul 61 (S)
4. CINCPAC 280356Z Jul 61 (S)
5. CINCPAC 230232Z Aug 61 (S)
6. CINCPACREP Philippines 300147Z Aug 61 (S)
7. CINCPAC 130650Z Sep 61 (S)
An anti-submarine training exercise for U.S. and South Vietnamese units was cancelled during October because of floods in the Mekong River area. It was planned as a simple sonar tracking exercise.

**Mutual Defense Board**

Planning by the Philippine/U.S. Mutual Defense Board (MDB) for development of a mutual defense plan continued through the year. Although there was substantial progress on the planning, it was obvious that the Filipinos were holding out for a single commander - a Filipino to command and control all forces committed under the plan, to which CINCPAC would not agree. In November, when CINCPAC was told that the problem had reached a deadlock in the subcommittee, he decided to defer action until after the change in the Philippine administration resulting from the November election, in hopes that another Filipino co-chairman would be more sympathetic to the U.S. position.

**SEATO MPO Budget Estimate for FY62**

The MPO budget estimate for FY62 totaled $163,000, including an increase of $49,000 over the previous year. The increase reflected an increase in MPO activities and an agreement between the Secretary General and the Chief MPO whereby the MPO would assume a larger share of the headquarters common services budget. Admiral Felt recommended to the JCS that the budget be approved, and OSD approved it. (UNCLASSIFIED)

**POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES**

CINCPAC maintained an active interest in all negotiations that affected U.S. rights or obligations in Allied Countries of the Pacific Command area. In three countries CINCPAC was concerned with negotiations over Status of Forces Agreements; on Okinawa and the

1. AMEMB Saigon 191200Z Oct 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 122258Z Dec 61 (TS)
3. OSD 140046Z Jan 61 (U)
Bonin Islands there were Japanese attempts to regain certain authority or rights; and there were other political-military negotiations that had a direct influence upon the prestige or capability of the U.S. Government or U.S. Armed Forces. The more important negotiations are discussed in the following paragraphs, according to geographical area.

Japan

Fuji-McNair Training Area:

In mid-1960 the Japanese Government asked for the return of the Fuji-McNair Training Area, significant portions of which the Japanese people wanted for agricultural purposes. At that time, CINCPAC agreed to return the area to the control of the Government of Japan (GOJ) if the training area would be held in its existing size and made available for U.S. training use. Although Prime Minister Ikeda had assured the U.S. on this point, early in 1961 the GOJ claimed that it meant equivalent size rather than existing size, and that it would be impossible to satisfy the local farmers unless the GOJ could exchange other parcels of land for certain desirable farming areas. CINCPAC advised the Commander U.S. Forces Japan (COMUSJ) that the Working Group of the Joint Committee could receive for study any GOJ proposal for exchange of land, but that it should make no commitment.

At an 8 February meeting, the Japanese stressed the following three points: The GOJ had a political problem because of promises to an association of residents near the Fuji-McNair area; there was an economic problem in the area for which the most feasible solution was to convert some Fuji-McNair land to agricultural uses; and the existing situation was ripe for exploitation by trouble makers. The opposing U.S. position was based upon the following facts: The area was the minimum size needed, and the minimum size, as determined by the U.S., was not subject to change or approval by the GOJ; the

1. CINCPAC 041045Z Feb 61 (C)
U.S. would study any proposal to adjust the area if equivalent usefulness were preserved; and that the GOJ had not yet fulfilled assurances given by the Japanese Ministers in September 1960. The major block to progress was a 1959 agreement between the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) and residents near Fuji-McNair, with which the GOJ was reluctant to tamper.  

The Director General of the Japanese Procurement Agency made a new Japanese proposal through the Joint Committee on 14 April. This provided the following: In exchange for the return of the facility, the GOJ would guarantee its use by U.S. Forces on a schedule to be determined, and would revise the 1959 Agreement with the local residents to correspond with the provisions approved by the Joint Committee. The U.S. was expected to release for agricultural use up to 880 acres in the southeast portion of east Fuji, and to give increased consideration to the use of the Fuji-McNair area by Japanese forces, and to study with the GOJ the feasibility of using other JDA maneuver areas. After the U.S. reacted without commitment to this proposal, on 19 May the Japanese presented an official proposal that was essentially the same except that it contained an offer to make available to U.S. Forces a JDA maneuver area on Kyushu.

After consulting the CG FMFPAC, COMUSJ concluded that the most realistic U.S. attitude was to accept GOJ offers of JDA maneuver areas and negotiate according to the principle of "equivalent training usefulness"; and to agree to a reduction of about 400 acres at the Fuji-McNair area, but insist upon a guarantee that the area would not be reduced further unilaterally.

With JCS approval, CINCPAC instructed the U.S. Representative on the Joint Committee to proceed with negotiations provided the scheduling of use, satisfactory to all users, could be worked out with the GOJ. Accordingly, in August, the U.S. representative presented

1. COMUSJ 030771Z Mar 61 (C)
2. COMUSJ 280652Z Apr 61 (S)
3. COMUSJ 220722Z May 61 (C)
4. COMUSJ 290115Z May 61 (C)
5. JCS 231314Z Jun 61 (S)
a counterproposal to the Japanese 19 May offer. The significant
differences in the U.S. draft were the provision to release only about
400 acres in the southern portion of Fuji-McNair area, an exchange of
areas in the northern portion, and a flexible arrangement for scheduling
U.S. use of the area. 1

The GOJ experienced certain difficulties in negotiating with farmers
in the Fuji-McNair area for a settlement regarding the use of that area
by U.S. Forces, but these differences were settled on 18 September on
terms that were compatible with the U.S. position. (Ho)

On 21 November, the Japanese presented their counterproposal to
the U.S. position paper presented on 9 August, and although the two
sides were approaching agreement at the end of the year, two major
points were unresolved. The first of these was GOJ insistence that
only one alternate JDA maneuver area would be approved for use with-
out further application to the Joint Committee on a case-by-case basis.
The U.S. intended to press for a right to use any JDA area as previously
offered by the GOJ. The second point on which there was disagreement
stemmed from U.S. insistence that the GOJ guarantee to remove
intruders and demonstrators during periods of U.S. use. The GOJ
position on this matter was that Japan was already obliged to perform
this service by guaranteeing the U.S. full use of the area under
Japanese law generally, as well as under terms of the Status of Forces
Agreement normally applicable only to U.S. facilities and areas in
Japan. (Ho)

At the end of 1961, CINCPAC advised that a compromise was not
indicated on either point. 2, 3

Indirect Hire System:

The transfer of Japanese non-appropriated fund employees to the
indirect hire system was completed with the successful negotiation of
an agreement that was implemented on 1 December. 4 (Ho)

1. COMUSJ 110105Z Aug 61 {C}
2. COMUSJ 180745Z Dec 61 {C}
3. CINCPAC 310030Z Dec 61 {C}
4. CINCPAC 300347Z Sep 61 {C}
Closing of Mito Bombing Range

On 20 November 1961, approximately 15-20 machine gun bullets from a U.S. Air Force B-57 were accidently fired into houses near the Mito Bombing Range. Although the accident was traced to a malfunction of the safety system, it led to the temporary closing of the range by the Commander, 5th Air Force. The GOJ suggested relocating the range, but at the end of the year had not offered a suitable replacement site. 1

Korea

In 1960, when the Republic of Korea raised the question of a Status of Forces Agreement, the U.S. declined to discuss it. The question, including the matter of criminal jurisdiction over members of U.S. Forces, came up again in March 1961. CINCPAC favored negotiations to establish formal agreement on matters of exit and entry, customs and taxation, but recommended against any action that would give the impression that the U.S. was willing to discuss criminal jurisdiction. 2 However, after a high level decision that the U.S. should no longer refuse to negotiate full Status of Forces Agreement with the ROK, the U.S. Ambassador to Korea informed the Korean Prime Minister that the U.S. would open such negotiations. However, the Ambassador was told to warn the Koreans that the U.S. would not pay for any facilities used by U.S. Forces in Korea, and that the subject of criminal jurisdiction was a delicate matter on which no agreement could be reached unless there was assurance that U.S. personnel would have rights comparable to those afforded in the U.S. In actual practice, the U.S. would expect to exercise jurisdiction over most cases involving members of U.S. Forces. 3

Several meetings -- the first on 17 April -- were held before all negotiations were broken off after the May military coup. These meetings were devoted to studying the overall issues and never reached the specific problems.

1. COMUSJ 210321Z Nov 61 (C)
2. CINCPAC 042340Z Mar 61 (C)
3. State to Seoul 1133, 5 Apr 10PM 61 (S)
The U.S. Ambassador to Korea asked the State Department for a copy of the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan to be used as a basis of the U.S. negotiating position. CINCPAC asked the JCS for an opportunity to comment on this draft agreement, and suggested that a study of Korean law might indicate that the more restrictive terms of the U.S. draft Status of Forces Agreement for Taiwan would be a better basis than the agreement with Japan.

After reviewing a study of Korean Law made by Eighth U.S. Army Korea, CINCPAC advised the JCS that Korean justice and confinement systems were totally unacceptable by U.S. standards. Pointing out that treaty provisions could not prevent bribery of judges, insulate Korean courts from susceptibility to mob pressures, or insure compliance with Korean constitution and statutes, CINCPAC claimed that no arrangements which might be worked out would insure U.S. personnel of adequate trials by U.S. standards. Therefore, this fundamental condition for negotiating agreement on criminal jurisdiction set forth in the State Department decision could not be met. 2

On 5 May, the JCS asked for CINCPAC comments on a DOD proposed draft agreement covering the use of facilities and areas, one provision of which would make the Status of Forces Agreement inapplicable in a "defense area" contiguous to the DMZ. 3 After obtaining the views of COMUS Korea, CINCPAC told the JCS that because of the peculiar situation of U.S. forces in Korea, he favored the idea and thought such a "defense area" should include most of South Korea. Should a compromise on that point prove necessary, CINCPAC recommended that the "defense area" extend back to the rear corps boundary. 4 Negotiations were broken off before this concept could be presented for consideration.

1. CINCPAC 180200Z Apr 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 230157Z May 61 (S)
3. JCS 052000Z May 61 (C)
4. CINCPAC 182353Z May 61 (C)
During July the Korean Foreign Office proposed that negotiations with the U.S. be resumed. Although the U.S. recognized the fact that it was committed to the principle of negotiation, the State Department considered that even preliminary talks would be premature until the governmental organization and legal system of the ROK had returned to normal.  

The Philippines

Negotiating panels in the Philippines made slight progress during 1961 toward agreement on revisions of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, which had been delayed or deadlocked since 1956 over the issue of criminal jurisdiction. Although prepared to yield some jurisdiction over cases arising from off-base incidents, the U.S. had maintained steadfastly that the majority of on-base cases involved matters of military discipline, and that it was reasonable and in the "larger interests" of both governments for the U.S. to try such cases. By April 1961, Philippine Foreign Secretary Serrano indicated that he was prepared to accept this view and the principle of a Netherlands type waiver regarding on-base off-duty offenses. He objected, however, to phrasing that would imply a waiver of Philippine jurisdiction, which would make it difficult for him to obtain congressional or popular approval, but was agreeable to provisions having the same force and effect.  

Although the two sides were approaching agreement on the issue, no further action was taken during 1961, partly because Serrano was involved in the Philippine political campaign and unable to devote time to negotiations.

Republic of China

Negotiations with the Republic of China for a Status of Forces Agreement to cover U.S. personnel who were not members of MAAG:

1. Seoul to State 061100Z Jul 61 (C)
2. State to Seoul 28 Jul 61 2PM (C)
3. CINCPACREPPHIL 240552Z Apr 61 (C)
4. AMEMB Manila 190923Z Oct 61 (C)
had been taking place since 1954. As in Korea and the Philippines, the question of criminal jurisdiction was considered the most difficult to resolve. During 1960 the GRC presented a new SOFA draft, and the U.S. later responded with a counterdraft. In 1961, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the initiative concerning reopening of negotiations be left to the GRC, and that no further steps be taken by the Ambassador to raise the question in view of the GRC tacit acquiescence in covering non-MAAG personnel under the favorable provisions of the 1951 MAAG agreement.

VISITING IN THE PACOM AREA

Strengthening of relationships between the U.S. and other countries in the PACOM was materially assisted by visits to CINCPAC and the Component Commands by numerous foreign dignitaries and by personal contacts of CINCPAC representatives who visited foreign countries in the area. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Visits by U.S. Civil and Military Officials

As in 1960 CINCPAC actions to improve the state of readiness of U.S. Forces in the PACOM were facilitated by briefings and discussions held with the large number of representatives of U.S. governmental agencies who visited the Pacific Command during 1961. (UNCLASSIFIED)

In calendar year 1961 there were 649 high ranking officials from the Executive Branch of the government, Department of Defense, the Military Departments, the Congress and other branches of the government who visited the Pacific Command. The majority of the visitors transited Hawaii on inspection trips through the Pacific Command area and received briefings from or met with CINCPAC or Component Commanders. In addition a large number of the visitors transited Hawaii enroute to the West Pacific and again on their return to CONUS.

The principle offices or committees represented by these visitors during the year were as shown in Appendix A. (UNCLASSIFIED)

1. ADMINO CINCPAC 101959Z Mar 61 (S)
Visits by Representatives of Foreign Countries

During the year 540 high ranking foreign dignitaries visited Hawaii. Some of these visits were stop-overs enroute to and from the mainland, while others were specifically made for briefings or discussions. All directly concerned CINCPAC or the Component Commanders. Many of the visitors came in groups ranging from 2 to 66 persons. There were approximately 67 of these groups. A list of foreign visitors grouped according to countries appears in Appendix B. (UNCLASSIFIED)

WEAPONS DEMONSTRATION

The third CINCPAC Weapons Demonstration was conducted from 3 to 11 February 1961. Patterned after previous demonstrations, it was planned as an occasion for top military leaders of the free nations in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific to become better acquainted with each other, and to get first hand knowledge of the capabilities and weapons of U.S. forces.

Invitations were extended to 18 nations. A total of 48 foreign officers representing 14 countries -- Australia, Cambodia, Republic of China, France, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaya, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, and South Vietnam -- accepted and attended. Laos, Burma, India and Ceylon failed to send a representative. Of those who attended, 21 were either Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chiefs of Service, or Deputy Chiefs of Service. Of the remaining 27, 15 were of flag rank.

The Demonstration was divided into three phases, the first of which was a get-acquainted period at the John Hay Air Base, Baguio. For the first two days, Lt.Gen. Manuel F. Cabal, Chief, Armed Forces of the Philippines; Rear Admiral J. M. Carson, USN, CINCPACREPPHIL; Maj. Gen. T. S. Moorman, USAF, Commander 13th Air Force; and Maj. Gen. D. McC. Daniel, USA, Chief JUSMAG Philippines served as co-hosts. The arrival of guests by air was arranged so that each group
Dive/glide bombing.
Strafing/rocket firing at towed spar.
Napalm drops.
Destroyer and air ASW techniques.
Underway replenishment both day and night:
Refueling of CVA, CA, CLG, and DD.
Replenishment of ammunition to CVA.
Terrier missile shoot by USS PROVIDENCE (CLG 6).
Regulus shoot by USS HALIBUT (SSGN 587).
Snorkeling, diving and surface tactics by nuclear submarine.
Night illumination.

Phase II concluded with departing honors aboard the carriers on
the morning of 9 February in Buckner Bay, Okinawa. Afterwards the
guests went ashore by Marine helicopters.

For Phase III, General L. D. White, USA, CINCUSARPAC;
General E. O'Donnell, Jr., USAF, CINCPACAF; and Lt. Gen. D. P.
Booth, USA, CINCPACREP Ryukyus, served as co-hosts. The
following events and demonstrations were presented during Phase III,
on 9 and 10 February:

USARPAC Firepower Demonstration:
Air drop by elements of 503rd Airborne Battle Group.
Air drop of heavy equipment.

Special Forces:
Organization and techniques employed in guerrilla
warfare.
Capabilities of HUlA helicopter.
Fire support by helicopters armed with machine guns,
3.5 rocket launchers, SS-10 missile and Little John
delivered by helo and fired.
Reinforcement of Special Forces Troops by infantry
platoon transported by helicopters.

Demonstration by Chinese Air Force Tiger Jets, precision
flying team of Republic of China Air Force.
Static display of aircraft, weapons, and equipment available to Army, Marine, and Air Force units assigned to PACOM. Displays manned by trained personnel to explain equipment and answer questions.

Orientation rides for guests in F100's and F102's.

Marine Firepower Demonstrations:

Firing of supporting arms:
- 8 inch SP Howitzers.
- ONTOS.
- M48 Tank.
- M67 Flame Tank.
- 155mm Howitzer.
- 4.5 Rocket Battery.

Vertical envelopment utilizing reinforced rifle company as helicopter borne assault troops to seize heavily defended objective.

Missile firings:

Army:
- Nike-Hercules.
- Lacrosse.
- Hawk.

Marine:
- Honest John.

Marine combat airfield consisting of 3000 feet of aluminum planked strip, mobile arresting gear, portable control tower and radar equipment, and mobile fuel tank farm.

Weather with poor visibility hampered the Marine demonstration and forced the cancellation of a display of close air support of ground troops and an aerial resupply mission. For the same reason, CINCPACAF had to cancel the Air Force firepower demonstration and Matador firing. The guests departed for their home countries on 11 February.

A budget of $37,000 was made available to CINCPAC to cover all costs incurred by CINCPAC in connection with the demonstration. These funds were made available from appropriations, with 42%
provided from Navy MAP administrative funds, 35% Navy MAP training funds, 15% Navy Operations and Maintenance funds, and 8% furnished by the State Department.

Because of the uneasy situation existing in Laos and South Vietnam, the demonstration was well timed to show military leaders U.S. strength and ability to combat communist aggression in the Pacific.

The extent to which one objective was achieved -- that of affording top military leaders of the free nations in the Pacific area an opportunity to become better acquainted -- can be measured by the following quotations from letters received subsequent to the Demonstration:

"The exercise provides a unique opportunity for contact with many of our neighbours, which, in the military field at least, would not otherwise be available at all."

CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, NEW ZEALAND ARMY

"To me, one of the real pleasures of the trip was the opportunity I had to talk to and get to know Asian friends. In every way, quite apart from what we saw demonstrated to us, I consider the gathering was of very great value."

DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF, ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

"Partially because there has never been any doubt in my heart as to your combat effectiveness and determination to lead the free world in resisting Communist aggression in its multitudinous forms, I have been inclined to consider the getting together of your guests as the most important and successful aspect of the occasion. The seeds of friendship sown in Camp John Hay, the ward-room and the Ft. Buckner Open Mess have great prospects of growing and developing to the immense benefit of solidarity among all of the free nations."

CHIEF, GENERAL STAFF, REPUBLIC OF CHINA

"It was also my great pleasure to have many opportunities to establish the close friendship with so many military leaders who came from various countries as well as your commanders, who are keenly engaging in our common task, the mutual defense of the free world."

CHIEF OF THE MARITIME STAFF, JAPAN MARITIME SELF DEFENSE FORCE
"Besides, the big-get-together of the military leaders of the free nations have, in my estimation, produced unparalleled effects in bringing about closer ties among the nations. To me this seems far significan and more important aspects of the weapons demonstration."

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

"Apart from seeing the impressive Demonstrations by parts of your four Armed Forces, I think I derived most value from meeting many other senior officers of the Southeast Asian Region."

GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING
15 DIVISION
PAKISTAN

With respect to the second objective, which was to give the guests first hand knowledge of U.S. weapons and capabilities, the following quotations illustrate how well it was accomplished:

"What I witnessed in the Demonstration was so informative and so impressive that I am fully convinced that the marvelous and astonishing achievements of the U.S. Armed Forces in the invention of weapons stand as a guarantee in the maintenance of world peace."

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
CHINESE NATIONALIST NAVY

"I returned from this trip with a deep sentiment of confidence prompted by the very high degree of preparation of the American units, and by the trustful and friendly atmosphere prevailing among the representatives of the 15 countries who had gathered on your invitation."

DIRECTOR OF INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
FRANCE

"We were very much impressed and amazed at the precise and carefully coordinated development of the events as well as the spectacular scene and formidable display of the Air, Land, and Sea Power of the U.S. forces in the Pacific. I must confess that my confidence in our great Ally have increased immeasurably at the conclusion of my trip to the demonstration."

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
"The fire power demonstrations were excellent. It is gratifying to know that the United States of America is equipped with the necessary weapons and prepared to meet any form of aggressions in the defense of the Free Nations of the world."

COMMANDER, SECOND FEDERAL INFANTRY BRIGADE MALAYA

"I will consider this trip one of the highlights of my life and I have certainly been most impressed with the men and the material under your command in the Western Pacific. The Australians were particularly impressed by the high degree of training, the toughness and the high morale of the Seventh Fleet, the Marines and the Special Forces Group."

DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

"The readiness of the U.S. forces in your command and their wondrous efficiency surely have lent enthusiasm to your steadfast Allies and courage to the wavering. The excellent morale of the demonstrating troops was also frequently commented upon by all of your guests."

CHIEF, GENERAL STAFF REPUBLIC OF CHINA
PART I

CHAPTER IV

CINCPAC ACTIONS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST
AGGRESSION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Vietnam gained independence from France in 1949. Since then, communist guerrilla forces of Ho Chi Minh have tried to spread the socialist revolution across the new country. The terms of the Geneva Accords on the cessation of hostilities that resulted in dividing the country scarcely interfered with communist plans or activities for taking over all of Vietnam. In 1961, the leaders of communist North Vietnam still regarded their country as the base for the struggle for national reunification, or "the liberation of the south". This struggle by communist guerrillas consisted of any action to create disorder or confusion in South Vietnam, or to disrupt or destroy the communities and the government. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Twice during 1961 the United States increased its effort to help South Vietnam resist the attacks and terrorism that were carried out under the direction and support of North Vietnam. During May the JCS announced the Presidential Program for South Vietnam and in the fall there was the program that resulted from the Department of Defense decision to increase substantially MAP and other U.S. support for that country. This chapter describes CINCPAC's part in carrying out these programs, and other actions, for South Vietnam. The progress and results of the U.S. effort during 1961, and additional actions considered necessary, were discussed at a Secretary of Defense Conference held at CINCPAC Headquarters on 16 December.

OPERATION PLANS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

The main problem related to the implementation of any plan for resisting or eliminating the communist insurgency in South Vietnam was to persuade the Government of Vietnam to carry out changes or
reforms needed to make the plans effective. CINCPAC had a part in the preparation of four major operation plans for military operations against the Viet Cong. One of these contemplated employment of U.S. or SEATO forces in the event that the communists intervened in South Vietnam on a large scale. The remaining three plans were based on the use of South Vietnamese forces, and as such were vulnerable to the weaknesses of the organization and command structure of the RVNAF. Although U.S. officials fully recognized the need for immediate reforms to make operation plans effective, at the end of 1961 the GVN still retained much of its customary reluctance to establish an authoritative and responsible command organization.

The Counter-Insurgency Plan for Vietnam

Completed in final form in the spring of 1961, the Counter-Insurgency Plan (CIP) for Vietnam was an outgrowth of a CINCPAC effort in 1960 to create a plan covering all actions that would be necessary to defeat communist insurgency there. The plan covered political, economic, and military actions. Commencing in April 1960, CINCPAC's staff conducted a counter-insurgency study, and in July CINCPAC decided to prepare an outline plan for JCS consideration. When completed, this plan was sent to the JCS with a recommendation that the JCS coordinate the plan with other Washington departments and agencies. After it was approved by the Departments of State and Defense, it was turned over to the U.S. Ambassador in Vietnam for further development.

As expanded by the Vietnam Country Team and approved by CINCPAC and the JCS, the CIP recognized that one of the problems arose from the spreading discontent in South Vietnam among the intellectual class and, to some extent, among the laboring class. This discontent was expressed in criticism of President Diem and his family. Aggravating the government's problems was the successful campaign of the Viet Cong to discredit Diem and weaken the
Viet Cong Forces

PROVINCES
1. Gia Lai
2. Dinh Tuong
3. Dong Nai
4. Long An
5. An Giang
6. Vinh Long
7. Gia Dinh
8. Kien Phuc
9. An Xuyen
10. Can Tho
11. Soc Trang
12. Bien Hoa
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ESTIMATED VIET CONG (VC) STRENGTH TOTAL 17,075
government's authority. Accordingly, the CIP considered the principal task facing the GVN to be the restoration of individual security, a job involving military, economic and political reforms. (Silent)

One of the principal provisions of the CIP was a proposed increase of the RVNAF strength from 150,000 to 170,000. (Silent)

Responsibilities for carrying out the plan were divided among the GVN, the Country Team, and other U.S. agencies. The Country Team's responsibility was concerned largely with persuading President Diem to adopt and carry out his part of the plan, all of which was not expected to be particularly palatable. (Silent)

In April the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam presented the CIP to Diem who issued directives the same month to carry out only a part of the plans and reforms that the U.S. considered necessary. These directives provided for:

1. Broadening the authority for RVNAF field commanders.
2. Creating corps and division tactical zones.
3. Creating logistic commands, and dissolving the regional commands.
4. Broadening the authority of military commanders with respect to operations within province boundaries.

Other than these actions, at the end of 1961, President Diem had failed to carry out those actions that the U.S. government considered necessary and that only he could put into effect. (Silent)

Nevertheless, the CIP remained the basis for most U.S. plans for South Vietnam. (Silent)

Vietnam Win Plan

Considering the possibility that the program of increased aid to South Vietnam might prod the communists into open hostilities on a large scale, the JCS in October asked CINCPAC to list the augmentation he would need to win a war providing North Vietnamese and Chinese Communists intervened. This plan, developed on an urgent
basis, became known as the Win Plan.\(^1\)

CINCPAC answered immediately and said that his OPLAN 32-59 was the plan to win, and that Phase II (Vietnam), and Phases III and IV anticipated war that progressed from guerrilla type warfare to full-scale war with the communists. He indicated that the U.S. could expect token forces from Southeast Asia countries - enough to lend a SEATO label to the operation. In addition to the forces for Phases III and IV, CINCPAC listed those SEATO forces that could be expected to participate, but also said that any additional forces required would depend upon a Presidential decision on the use of nuclear weapons.\(^2\)

**Campaign Plan for Systematic Armed Action Against the Viet Cong**

Anxious to convert South Vietnam to offensive warfare, CINCPAC directed CHMAAG Vietnam to prepare a plan for systematic action against the Viet Cong by which the RVNAF could concentrate decisive strength, and gain and maintain GVN control of key population centers and facilities. CINCPAC also directed his staff to prepare an outline plan and send it to CHMAAG.\(^3\) As prepared, the plan set forth a means of carrying out a systematic military campaign against the Viet Cong, but left the Counter-Insurgency Plan as the primary instrument for coordinating U.S. and GVN governmental level efforts. The objectives of the plan were:

1. To gain control of critical areas, key facilities, and the largest part of the civil populace by military operations designed to place the maximum RVNAF combat strength against Viet Cong targets at proper times and places.

2. To maintain a posture near the 17th parallel that would deter overt aggression.

President Diem showed little enthusiasm when the plan was presented to him, apparently because of his reluctance to delegate authority and control of forces to his commanders.\(^4\)

\(^1\) JCS 121559Z Oct 61 cite JCS 1853 (TS) This request was made originally by telecon.
\(^2\) CINCPAC 10121Z Oct 61 (TS)
\(^3\) CINCPAC 060247Z Dec 61 (TS)
\(^4\) CHMAAG Vietnam 210957Z Dec 61 (TS)
Province Plan for South Vietnam

At the 16 December Secretary of Defense Conference at Camp Smith, the Secretary stressed the need for an early GVN victory, for both military and psychological reasons. Because the GVN was stalling on implementing the broader Counter-Insurgency Plan, he asked for a plan to clear the communist guerrillas from one province. Accordingly, CINCPAC asked CHMAAG Vietnam to try to persuade President Diem to mount a smaller operation that had a chance of early success, and that would contribute to the Campaign Plan for Systematic Armed Action Against the Viet Cong. CINCPAC offered a plan for aggressive, phased action to secure GVN control of Binh Duong Province in the III Corps area.¹ At the end of the year the decision rested with the GVN.

THE PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

Soon after the political negotiations in Laos got underway, emphasizing the Free World's critical need for increased opposition to communism in Southeast Asia, CINCPAC received two messages that listed actions, approved by President Kennedy, that were intended to stiffen South Vietnamese resistance. The first of these from the JCS dated 2 May, listed five military actions.²

The complete Presidential Program was received on a 20 May Department of State message, and contained 30 separate but mutually supporting actions, and instructions to carry them out on a priority basis and with a sense of urgency.³ Besides the following 11 military actions, of which five were identical to those received by CINCPAC on 2 May, the program contained actions that were of a political, economic, or psychological nature. (S)

1. Install a radar surveillance system by which the GVN could detect communist aircraft on intelligence or air supply missions.

2. Provide MAP support for the 20,000 man increase in the

³

¹ CINCPAC 232135Z Dec 61 (TS)
² JCS 021804Z May 61 cite JCS 995205 (S)
³ State to Saigon 1423, 20 May 61 8PM (S)
South Vietnamese Armed Forces.

3. Increase the MAAG to the extent necessary to carry out the rest of the program, of which a part would be training the 20,000 man addition to the RVNAF.

4. As the Program developed, consider the need for a further increase in the ARVN beyond the 170,000 level.

5. Extend MAP support to include the entire Civil Guard (CG). Of the 68,000 members, 32,000 were already supported by MAP; the remaining 36,000 were inadequately trained and equipped.

6. Provide support and advice to the Self Defense Corps (SDC), which had a strength of approximately 40,000.

7. Provide MAP support for the Vietnamese junk force, to include training of junk crews either in Vietnam or the U.S.

8. Give Special Forces type training to help the GVN speed up the training of its Special Forces.

9. Help the ARVN carry out health, welfare and public works activities in the villages.

10. Study jointly with the GVN the problem of controlling the Vietnamese borders to prevent enemy infiltration.

11. Consider setting up in Southeast Asia a facility to develop and test new techniques to help the U.S. and the GVN in their joint campaign against the communists.

The significant political actions that were a part of the program were intended to increase the confidence of President Diem and his government in the U.S.; attempt to strengthen Diem's support within his own country; and negotiate for a possible bilateral treaty, attempting to improve Vietnam's relation with other countries, especially Cambodia, and improve its standing in world opinion.

The economic aspects of the Program were to send economic and fiscal experts to Vietnam to help work out a financial plan; authorize ICA to develop in the rural areas civic action programs with short, simple, impact-type projects on the local level; attempt to develop a
long-range economic program to instill confidence in U.S. actions; and evaluate the fiscal and economic problems of an additional increase in the RVNAF

Radar Surveillance Capability
At the beginning of 1961, the only radar facility in South Vietnam was an AN/TPS - 1/20 that was suitable only for training. Because of an urgent need, CINCPAC requested that U.S. mobile radars be used to warn of communist aircraft over Vietnam until the permanent AC&W installations were complete. In response to CINCPAC's request, the JCS asked the Air Force to deploy a USAF Combat Reporting Post to South Vietnam and to leave it there until the radar programmed under MAP was in operation. The Air Force mobile equipment, consisting of a search radar (AN/MPS-11), a height finder radar (AN/MPS-16), and supporting communication and power equipment was deployed as requested and operating at Tan Son Nhut Air Base on a 24-hour a day basis before the end of October. Training of 34 Vietnamese operators commenced on 16 October. ¹ Construction of the first permanent AC&W site, at Da Nang, was expected to be complete in FY63.² See also Chapter I, page 33.

20,000 Force increase for RVNAF
One of CINCPAC's first actions in 1961 to help Vietnam was to press for a 20,000 man increase in the Royal Vietnamese Armed Forces.³ Originally recommended by CHMAAG Vietnam and CINCPAC in October 1960, action on the matter dragged because of opposition from the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam. After CHMAAG overcame the objections, CINCPAC again recommended to the JCS that the RVNAF be increased from 150,000 to 170,000 in order to carry out the counter-insurgency operations. Fifteen thousand of this number were to be organized into additional infantry, ranger, and Marine combat

1. CHMAAG Vietnam 310605Z Oct 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 202020Z Dec 61 (TS)
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 0041, 18 Jan 61 (S)
units, with certain additions allocated to the Army and Air Force. The remaining 5,000 men would be used for logistic support forces to correct an existing lack of balance between combat and logistic support units; to provide support for the additional 15,000 combat forces, and to render partial logistic support for the Civil Guard. The JCS approved the increase on 1 February and said that OSD/ISA would advise CINCPAC of the source of funds to support the increase. The slowness in deciding which agency would provide the funds caused a delay of several months.  

Although the Presidential Program authorized the increase, the initial action by the GVN and RVNAF to activate units was further delayed by U.S. budgetary support problems that were not resolved until mid-summer. The induction rate increased sharply in August. Equipment for the 20,000 force increase began arriving in sufficient quantities by late summer.

Build-up of MAAG Vietnam

MAAG Vietnam had an authorized strength of 685 when the Presidential Program was announced in May. The same JCS message that authorized the increase suggested that approximately 100 additional military personnel would be needed immediately, and that others would be necessary to train the 20,000 man addition to the ARVN, 40,000 members of the Self Defense Corps, and approximately 40,000 Civil Guardmen.

At the end of the year MAAG Vietnam authorized strength had passed the 4,000 mark and was headed toward a projected strength at the end of June 1962 of 5,434 non-MAP supported, and 2,394 MAP supported spaces. The large increases in authorized MAAG strength came during the last three months of 1961.

1. CINCPAC 092048Z May 61 (S)
2. CHMAAG Vietnam ltr Ser: 008059, Subj: First Twelve Month Report of Chief MAAG, Vietnam. pp 13,14. of 1 Sep 61 (S)
3. JCS SM-19-62, of 4 Jan 62 (TS)
The case for Further Increase in the RVNAF

A separate requirement of the Presidential Program was to consider, together with the GVN, the need for increasing the RVNAF beyond the 170,000 level. In May, CHMAAG Vietnam concluded that 15 divisions and a total strength of 280,000 were required to meet the external and internal threat in South Vietnam. He recommended immediate approval of, and full support for, a two division force of 15,000 each. 1 CINCPAC agreed with the basic concept of CHMAAG's study, but doubted that 15 divisions would be needed. He recommended that the JCS Strategic Force Objectives for Vietnam be boosted to a nine division force, and that CHMAAG Vietnam develop detailed plans for a 30,000 force increase that would get underway in 1962 provided the GVN demonstrated the need and its ability to use the troops. However, CINCPAC urged that the GVN and the U.S. first try to organize, train, and equip the 20,000 RVNAF increase, the 68,000 Civil Guard (CG), approximately 50,000 members of the Self Defense Corps (SDC), and carry out the rotation and retraining of the existing forces. 2

On 2 August the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense an increase in the strength of the RVNAF up to 200,000, and that periodic assessment be continued during the build-up process to determine the need for these additional forces. 3 The President authorized this increase on 11 August. To guarantee the effectiveness of the increase, before the 170,000 level was reached, the U.S. wanted to be sure that a mutually agreed-upon, geographically phased strategic plan for combating the Viet Cong existed; that there was an understanding on the training and use of the additional 30,000 soldiers; and that the rate of increase could be regulated to permit efficient use of the new men. 4 The question of going ahead with the build-up arose in October

1. CHMAAG Vietnam ltr Ser: 78/61, Subj: Requisite RVNAF Force Structure, of 19 May 61 (TS)
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 000128-61 of 9 Jun 61 (TS)
3. JCS 041516Z Aug 61 cite JCS 1035 (S)
4. JCS 151541Z Aug 61 cite JCS 1128 (S)
when the Secretary of Defense proposed that a careful review be made early in 1962. \(^1\) CINCPAC told the JCS on 1 November that he did not think the GVN had satisfied the three JCS conditions. Nevertheless, he recommended that the U.S. not slow down the rate of build-up (estimated to reach 175,000 by the end of 1961), on the assumption that President Diem would comply under pressure, which was expected to increase after General Maxwell Taylor's visit to South Vietnam. \(^2\)

CHMAAG Vietnam continued to recommend an ultimate ARVN force level of 278,000. \(^3\) Although he estimated that this force level was a goal for 1967, he recommended a 25,000 increment above the then-authorized 200,000, of which 5,000 spaces were defined as contingency spaces to meet minor but urgent requirements within the RVNAF. \(^4\)

At the 16 December Secretary of Defense Conference, the Secretary indicated he would favor an increase beyond the 200,000 figure if an increase was necessary, but CINCPAC suggested an increase of the Civil Guard strength would be more desirable. \(^5\) Following the conference, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS approve the 5,000 contingency spaces that CHMAAG Vietnam wanted, but that any consideration of a further increase in the RVNAF beyond 205,000 be deferred pending an evaluation of the GVN actions against the Viet Cong. \(^6\)

At the end of 1961 the approximate strength of the RVNAF was as follows: \(^7\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>162,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Guard</td>
<td>63,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Defense Corps</td>
<td>53,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ground Forces</td>
<td>279,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. JCS 172135Z Oct 61 cite JCS 1899 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 012316Z Nov 61 (TS)
3. CHMAAG Vietnam 080049Z Dec 61 cite MAGPA 4236 (S)
4. Agenda of SECDEF Conference, Hq CINCPAC 16 Dec 61, item 6 (TS)
5. Record of SECDEF Conference, Hq CINCPAC 16 Dec 61, p 6-2, (TS)
6. CINCPAC 222332Z Dec 61 (S)
7. CINCPAC WID 49-61, 15 Dec 61 (S)
Navy 3,900
Marines 3,100
Air Force 5,300
Total Armed Forces 291,300

Increase in Civil Guard Program:
The request for increased support of the Civil Guard originated with the South Vietnam Country Team, which recommended on 8 March that the existing MA Program be modified to support a CG strength of 68,000 -- its approximate strength at the time -- rather than 32,000.1 After CINCPAC had investigated the matter during a visit to Saigon in March, and had discussed it with CHMAAG, he recommended to the JCS on 2 April that authority be granted initially to provide MAP materiel and supplies to carefully selected and qualified CG units beyond the 32,000 ceiling then authorized MAP support. This action would be undertaken within the limits of the existing FY61 MA Program. CINCPAC further recommended that full support for 68,000 CG be initiated in FY62, and that $20 million be added to PACOM's FY62 MAP ceiling to support this action.2

The training program was delayed and hampered by a shortage of trained leaders, and a lack of facilities and sites. However, at the end of the year 16 companies had completed the 24-week course of unit training, a total of 11,764 men had completed the 16-week individual training course, 33 companies were undergoing unit training, and approximately 20,000 personnel had received limited basic training, and there was sufficient equipment on hand to outfit new units.3

The question of training the Civil Guard and the Self Defense Corps arose at the 16 December Secretary of Defense conference. CHMAAG Vietnam estimated that the entire CG would have undergone training by 1963, a date that the Secretary considered too late. He directed that

1. Saigon to State 1444, of 8 Mar 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 022145Z Apr 61 (S)
3. CHMAAG Vietnam 270655Z Dec 61 (S)
Vietnam submitted a plan to create a force of 420 sailing junks and 63 motor junks as part of a coastal surveillance program that also included a river patrol, aircraft patrol, and shore units. In February 1961, the State Department approved the use of MAP funds to support the junk force.

The Presidential Program also specified MAP support for the junk force, to include training of junk crews in Vietnam, or at U.S. bases. The first junks procured under this authorization, and the crews, came from the South Vietnamese fishing fleet. U.S. advisors commenced training additional crews. Of the 420 junks needed -- a division of 20 junks for each of 21 separate districts -- only 80 were available at the end of the year. These were operating along South Vietnam's northern coast. Contracts had been let for construction of 40 additional junks, and CHMAAG had an approved design for a motor junk.

The Secretary of Defense was also anxious to speed up procurement of junks, and suggested the possibility of buying them in Hong Kong, Japan, or Taiwan. He also urged CHMAAG to push the idea of incorporating the junk force into the Vietnamese Navy.

Late in December coastal surveillance operations were broadened to include two minesweepers from the U.S. Seventh Fleet and land based aircraft.

Development of South Vietnam's Special Forces

A recognized RVNAF weakness was the lack of special forces type soldiers trained to cope with insurgency and to carry guerrilla warfare into North Vietnam. Authorized special forces strength was increased from the May figure of 305 to 805, with the added personnel provided from the 20,000 man increase. Actual build-up of strength and the

1. CHMAAG Vietnam 170545Z Dec 60 (S)
2. State to Saigon 1054 of Feb 61 (S)
3. CHMAAG 220053Z Oct 61 (TS)
4. Record of SECDEF Conference, Hq CINCPAC of 16 Dec 61. Section 8-D. (TS)
5. CINCPAC 151915Z and 292326Z both Dec 61 (S)
The conduct of training was slow however, because of the GVN's reluctance to release either its Special Force personnel for retraining or to detach members of committed units for special forces type training. At the end of August a total of 157 recruits was undergoing SF training and the task of organizing the additional SF units was underway. 1 At the end of November, two SF MTTs of 12 men each left Okinawa to help CAS Saigon train members of the RVNAF Special Forces Group as instructors in unconventional warfare. This action was the result of a CIA request to the JCS with which CINCPAC agreed. 2 The SF MTT was to present a four month course of instruction to Vietnamese personnel. Upon completion of this instruction, the SF MTT was scheduled to remain in Vietnam to help the instructors in the early phases of team training.

Civic Action Build-up

The emphasis on ARVN participation in health, welfare, and public works activities in the villages was in recognition of the critical need in Vietnam for popular support of the government and its anti-communist operations, and the fact that the best method of gaining grass roots type support was by helping the villagers. CHMAAG Vietnam asked that a Civic Action Mobile Training Team be sent to Vietnam and, after it arrived in July, the members were used for the following specific tasks: 3 to develop a civil affairs organization that would help build security in those areas that were liberated from Viet Cong control; to determine what the RVNAF could do to improve the economic, social, and political development of the people; and to recommend a program of civic action. Before the CA MTT returned to CONUS in December, it helped organize two reduced strength CA companies, made up a list of projects that the RVNAF could do, and briefed the top commanders on the need for civic action and the importance of the recommended program. 4

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1. CHMAAG Vietnam 310929Z Aug 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 150534Z Nov 61 (TS)
3. CHMAAG Vietnam 200915Z Jul 61 (S)
4. CHMAAG Vietnam 310605Z Oct 61 (S)
Border Surveillance and Control

The problem of controlling border infiltration was an old and persistent one long before it was listed on the Presidential Program. It was further aggravated in 1961 because the movement of enemy guerrillas and their supplies through Southern Laos and across the ill-defined and mountainous border separating that country from South Vietnam increased significantly. To a lesser extent, there was enemy traffic across the border separating Cambodia from South Vietnam.

Border control became a priority project in May and a combined RVNAF-MAAG group and a DOD team studied several suggested methods. An earlier CHMAAG recommendation favored using a large number of helicopters to patrol the border, a plan with a recognized disadvantage that stemmed from a lack of facilities for maintaining helicopters. In June the JCS also proposed that an effective intelligence and border control system be established by aerial surveillance along the entire border. The RVNAF established outposts and several airstrips along the Laos border and from this experience developed another concept for border surveillance based upon fewer but larger patrol bases from which combat patrols would operate. At the end of August the RVNAF approved the reorganization of the outposts in the I Corps area in accordance with the patrol base concept.

In November CHMAAG Vietnam submitted to CINCPAC a plan for using Rangers to patrol the border. The Ranger companies, located along the most probable Viet Cong routes and backed up by ARVN and the Civil Guard, would operate ranger-type patrols on both sides of the border to locate, harass and ambush the Viet Cong. This plan, which was included in the Counter Insurgency Plan, provided for 11 patrol bases manned by Ranger companies and 14 manned by Civil Guard companies. In addition to the patrol company, a Civil Guard base garrison company would occupy and defend each patrol base, and seven infantry battalions would be available for use wherever

1. JCS 021331Z Jun 61 cite JCS 996887 (TS)
2. CHMAAG Vietnam 061051Z Jul 61 (S)
3. CHMAAG Vietnam 050345Z Aug 61 (S)
needed. 1 Jungle Jim aircraft were to be used in the border patrol, and the plan anticipated a landing strip suitable for C-47 aircraft at each patrol base. 2 Three thousand Montagnards, noted for their ability to operate in their native mountainous jungle area, were recruited and in training at the end of the year for patrol work in the northern part of the country. 3

Although the border plan had been developed and refined, at the end of the year the GVN had not released to the border task the 5,000 Rangers needed to put the plan in operation.

Combat Development and Test Center, Vietnam

The idea of a test center to study equipment, techniques and doctrine was one of the provisions of the Presidential Program that was readily acceptable to the GVN. After a few discussions, Vietnamese, OSD, and MAAG officials reached agreement to locate the center at RVNAF Headquarters under the supervision of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff. U.S. advisors with R&D qualifications would assist the Vietnamese personnel. 4 By August the Combat Development and Test Center had commenced work on four projects: a chemical to kill the tapioca plant upon which the guerrillas depended for food; a terminal guidance beacon; use of patrol dogs; and a chemical defoliation agent to destroy jungle foliage in Viet Cong assembly, ambush, and hiding area. 5 Among the more than 50 projects handled by the center, some of the more important ones were: development of small boats for use in the Mekong delta area; fluorescent marker-filled grenades to help identify Viet Cong members; a persistent scent agent to help trained dogs track down guerrillas; the Armalite AR-15 rifle; and a "flying doctor" program.

1. CHMAAG itr Subj: South Vietnam Operational & Border Control plan, 8 Nov 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 202040Z Oct 61 (S)
3. CHMAAG 220933Z Nov 61 (S)
4. CHMAAG Vietnam 291037Z Jun 61 (S)
5. CHMAAG Vietnam 050345Z Aug 61 (S)
OTHER RELATED ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN SOUTH VIETNAM

In addition to those specific tasks listed on the Presidential Program, CINCPAC took an aggressive role in any action that he believed would support the U.S. position in Southeast Asia, or that would improve the relative position of Free World countries. The more important of these related actions to help South Vietnam are discussed below. Some of these, and most of those that were a part of the Presidential Program, were grouped at the end of the year under one program called "Project Beef-up". (SSNRT)

United States Troops to Vietnam

On 9 May the JCS asked CINCPAC's opinion on a plan under study by the Secretary of Defense to commit U.S. forces to Vietnam. The purpose of such a move would be to provide a psychological deterrence of further communist aggression from North Vietnam, China or the Soviet Union, and to rally the morale of the South Vietnamese and encourage SEATO and neutral nations to support South Vietnam's defense.

Under consideration were three possible actions: To send two U.S. battle groups with necessary support units to establish two divisional field training areas; to assign to CINCPACFLT responsibility for coastal patrol activities, using small U.S. Naval Forces in conjunction with Vietnamese forces to prevent Viet Cong infiltration; or to assign to CINCPACAF the responsibility for border surveillance and close-support of Vietnamese ground forces in counter-insurgency actions using a small U.S. Air Force group in conjunction with Vietnamese forces to help seal the Vietnamese borders and defeat the communist guerrillas within these borders.

On 11 May, the JCS outlined a plan for the movement of U.S. troops into South Vietnam in order to: provide a visible deterrent to potential North Vietnam or Chinese action; release Vietnamese forces from

1. JCS 090021Z May 61 (TS)
advanced and static defense positions to let them engage in counter-
insurgency actions; assist in training South Vietnamese; and to pro-
vide a nucleus for the support of any additional major U.S. or SEATO
military operation in SEAsia. JCS recommended that troops for this
operation come from the U.S. in order to preserve the flexibility of
PACOM forces. 1 CINCPAC recommended that if troops were sent to
South Vietnam, the ground forces should consist of a U.S. Army
infantry division reinforced with Army aviation units, engineers,
artillery and a tailored logistical command. 2 Naval forces for the
plan would be the Seventh Fleet as normally deployed which would
relieve the GVN of any requirement to maintain readiness for resisting
a large scale invasion by sea. Coastal patrol would remain a GVN
function with some U.S. assistance. For air forces, CINCPAC
considered 8 B57s for border surveillance, close support and counter-
Viet Cong operations; 4 F102s for possible air defense and counter air
operations, and possibly two or three reconnaissance aircraft. For
command relations, CINCPAC suggested designating CHMAAG Vietnam
as Commander U.S. Forces Vietnam to exercise, under CINCPAC,
operational control of all U.S. forces in South Vietnam. No further
action was taken on this during the year.

Expanded Role of Military Advisors

CINCPAC originally had authorized CHMAAG Vietnam, subject to
gVN concurrence, to provide MAAG advisors to artillery, armored and
separate Marine battalion level. 3 The restriction against placing
advisors with all battalions made it difficult to obtain first hand know-
ledge of RVNAF planning and operations, since battalions organic to
the infantry regiment frequently operated at a considerable distance
from the parent headquarters and since Ranger and Civil Guard
companies normally operated independent of regimental control.
Accordingly, CHMAAG requested that his instructions be amended to

1. JCS 111802Z May 61 cite 995775 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 120544Z May 61 (TS)
3. CINCPAC ltr, Ser: 00341 of 2 May 1959 (S)
permit using advisors at lower echelons. 1 CINCPAC authorized
CHMAAG, with the GVN concurrence, to detail MAAG advisors down
to battalion headquarters level and to the command posts of separate
smaller units when required. 2 This did not include authorization to
place MAAG advisors forward of battalion or separate smaller unit
command posts in disputed areas. CHMAAG was to take every
reasonable precaution to avoid assignments that would expose MAAG
personnel to the risk of capture, or that in any way would cause
embarrassment to the U.S. Government.

Vietnam Aircraft

Replacement of obsolete F8F aircraft in South Vietnam was a
matter of long-standing concern to CINCPAC. Jet aircraft were
desired, but the Geneva Accords precluded their introduction. The
AD-4 was programmed, but upon CNO's recommendations, the AD-6
was substituted because the newer aircraft would be easier to support.
Accordingly, 25 AD-6 aircraft were delivered to the GVN by the end
of MAY 1961. Although the Geneva Accord prohibited the introduction
of jet aircraft into Vietnam, two T-33 and four RT-33 aircraft were
advanced from FY62 to the FY61 add-on list by CINCPAC. 3 In an
attempt to speed up modernization of the Vietnamese Air Force,
CINCPAC asked that the OSD secure early State Department approval
for the introduction of the jets into Vietnam. 4, 5 The U.S. Ambassador
to South Vietnam, however, opposed introducing jets into Vietnam
because of the Geneva Accords, and at the end of the year there had
been no resolution of the problem. 6

1. CHMAAG Vietnam 250615 Jan 61 cite MAGCH-SO143 (S)
2. CINCPAC 312008Z Jan 61 (S)
3. CINCPAC 1tr Ser: 00283 of 18 May 61 (S)
4. CINCPAC 120057Z Sep 61 (S)
5. CINCPAC 190217Z Sep 61 (S)
6. State to Saigon 451 Oct 18, 9 PM (S)
Ranger Training for South Vietnam

Three Mobile Training Teams from CONUS conducted ranger training in South Vietnam during 1960. This training was continued during the first part of 1961 by a PACOM MTT that consisted of two Special Forces officers, two SF NCOs, and five ranger-qualified officers. This team completed its six-month period of temporary duty on 1 June and was replaced by a team of six officers and six NCOs. CINCUSARPAC furnished a replacement MTT during November. These MTTs, which were supported by MAP funds available to CHMAAG Vietnam, conducted training for 65 Ranger companies at three training sites, with South Vietnamese cadres assuming much of the training responsibility by mid-year. As a result of the 20,000 man force increase, 21 new Ranger companies were added to the program.

JUNGLE JIM

The Department of the Air Force activated the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS) in April 1961, equipped with SC-47, RB-26, and T-28B aircraft, and assigned to it the code word "Jungle Jim". This unit was trained to operate in a counter-guerrilla role with a U.S. or friendly foreign ground force, either overtly or covertly. The squadron was also to be able to train air forces of friendly foreign governments to use assigned aircraft in counter-guerrilla operations. Aircraft and crews were to be able to deploy on very short notice and, with the exception of POL, were to be self sustaining for a period of 30 days.

The JCS recommended that priority considerations be given to placing an element of the 4400th CCTS with MAAG Vietnam. The mission of this element would be to train the Vietnamese Air Force, and to participate in research and development testing of counter-guerrilla techniques. The JCS advised CINCPAC on 11 Oct 61 that part of the 4400th CCTS would be sent to South Vietnam, and authorized

1. JCS 052145Z Oct 61 cite JCS 1774 (TS)
direct coordination between CINCPAC and the Chief of Staff, Air Force. CINCPAC recommended that 4 SC-47s, 4 RB-26s and 8 T-28s be deployed to South Vietnam without delay. Deployment of Detachment 2, 4400th CCTS aircraft, personnel, and equipment began on 5 November 1961. All T-28 and SC-47 aircraft were in Bien Hoa by 24 November and the RB-26 aircraft arrived during December. All aircraft were marked with RVNAF markings. CINCPAC informed CHMAAG Vietnam that the primary mission of the detachment was to conduct tactical training for the RVNAF. When the JCS requested CINCPAC views regarding use of "Jungle Jim" aircraft for combat air operations in support of the RVNAF, he explained that he fully concurred in the use of "Jungle Jim" aircraft for combat air operation where such operations were the extension of the "Jungle Jim" mission. The JCS then approved the use of "Jungle Jim" aircraft on combat missions with combined U.S. /RVNAF crews aboard. In the meanwhile, the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam directed that no "Jungle Jim" combat mission be flown until authorized by the Ambassador. At the 16 December meeting held in Hawaii, the Secretary of Defense informed CINCPAC that the President had approved the "Jungle Jim" program as originally planned, and on 26 December the JCS explained that mixed crews were to be used in combat missions when the RVNAF lacked the capability due to the lack of training, and that such flights were to train GVN personnel to fly combat missions on their own. At the end of the year U.S. /RVNAF manned aircraft were flying combat training missions in South Vietnam.

Recommended Actions in SVN Short of War

On 16 October Admiral Felt submitted to the JCS a list of military actions, short of introducing U.S. combat forces into South Vietnam,

1. JCS 112230Z Oct 61 cite JCS 1847 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 280335Z Oct 61 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 162056Z Nov 61 (TS)
4. JCS 271738Z Nov 61 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 280428Z Nov 61 (TS)
6. JCS 062055Z Dec 61 cite 2488 (TS)
7. AMEMB Saigon 151521Z Dec 61 (TS)
8. JCS 260116Z Dec 61 cite JCS 2704 (TS)
which he thought could and should be taken at once, provided satisfac-
tory diplomatic arrangements could be made with the GVN. Actions
listed were in two categories -- those in direct support of the GVN,
and those to support U.S. combat forces when and if introduced. Recom-
mended actions to support the GVN were to; Deploy as soon as possible
two U.S. Army transportation helicopter companies from CONUS to
provide airlift and to augment South Vietnam's transportation; be
prepared to deploy quickly the "Jungle Jim" squadrons; accelerate
delivery of T-28 aircraft needed for close air support; recommend
that CIA expand its contacts in South Vietnam immediately; and
continue photo reconnaissance. CINCPAC also urged that SVN
communications be improved. 1

To support U.S. combat forces if committed, CINCPAC recom-
mended construction of POL facilities, improvements at Pleiku
Airfield, and construction of a road from Attopeu in Laos to Kontum
in SVN. He also urged that the U.S. make preparations for intro-
duction of SEATO forces into SVN by prepositioning in South Vietnam
as soon as possible stores of ammunition, communication equipment,
and other selected war consumable items.

Army Helicopter Companies for South Vietnam

In mid-November, in response to CINCPAC's recommendation,
the JCS directed that two U.S. Army helicopter companies be deployed
to the Western Pacific in anticipation of using them in support of the
RVNAF. 2 While these two units were enroute, the JCS informed
CINCPAC that they had decided to deploy an additional company, and
that the two units then enroute were to go directly to Saigon. 3 Two
companies arrived in South Vietnam in December and the third was
enroute at the end of the year. The mission of the helicopter units
was to fly support missions for the RVNAF for which South Vietnamese
pilots were not yet qualified, and to help in training the RVNAF.

1. CINCPAC 180444Z Oct 61 (TS)
2. JCS 172455Z Nov 61 (TS)
3. JCS 041548Z Dec 61 (TS)
Operation Ranch Hand

Ranch Hand was the name assigned to a project to defoliate jungle areas and destroy certain food crops by spraying them with special chemicals. The original suggestion was made by a group of OSD R&D personnel during the summer and fall of 1961. CHMAAG Vietnam then broached the subject to OSD and suggested that defoliation of border areas and known Viet Cong strongholds, and destruction of the tapioca plant upon which the Viet Cong depended for food would be of major benefit to the RVNAF. 1 On 12 October, CHMAAG Vietnam asked OSD for six spray-equipped aircraft. 2 The U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam backed the idea, provided the aircraft carried civilian markings and the crews wore civilian clothes, and indicated that President Diem strongly favored the project. 3

When the JCS asked CINCPAC for his reaction, he said he couldn't predict the results of defoliation, but was dubious of a project to defoliate the entire border since it could not be patrolled adequately. 4 Both CHMAAG and the U.S. Ambassador again urged a prompt favorable decision but the JCS explained that the final decision depended upon the solution of problems of probable communist charges of bacteriological and chemical warfare, and getting President Diem to assume responsibility. 5, 6, 7

After the Secretary of Defense, on 10 November, directed Hq USAF to furnish six C-123 spray equipped aircraft on a priority basis, CINCPAC assigned operational control for the conduct of defoliation operations to CINCPACAF, and assigned planning and coordinating responsibility to CHMAAG Vietnam, who was also directed to submit a plan for time-phased operations. 8

1. CHMAAG Vietnam 030811Z Oct 61 cite MAGRD 1636 (S)
2. CHMAAG Vietnam 131001Z Oct 61 cite MAGRD 1769 (S)
3. Saigon to State 448 Oct 61, 071300Z & 546 Oct 61 260300Z, both (S)
4. CINCPAC 210438Z Oct 61 (S)
5. CHMAAG Vietnam 061131Z Nov 61 cite MAGCH-CH 3180 (TS)
6. Saigon to State 589, 031150Z Nov 61 (S)
7. JCS 082302Z Nov 61 cite JCS 2134 (TS)
8. CINCPAC 102334Z Nov 61 (TS)
The program, limited to defoliation of "key routes", was approved by the President on 4 December, but operations were not to proceed until a revised and detailed plan was approved. As directed by CINCPAC on 6 December, CHMAAG Vietnam submitted a detailed plan that listed selected areas totalling 241 square kilometers. Because CINCPAC considered these provisions too general, in mid-December he sent his own proposed plan to CHMAAG Vietnam. The plan was not completed at the end of the year, however, and the chemicals for defoliation had not yet arrived in Vietnam, although the six aircraft with spray equipment were waiting at Clark Air Force Base.

Secretary of Defense Conference 16 December 1961

On 16 December the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, the Chairman of the JCS, CINCPAC and CHMAAG Vietnam attended a conference at CINCPAC's Camp Smith Headquarters. The purpose of the conference was to afford the Secretary of Defense an opportunity to examine all approaches to the problems in South Vietnam. Similar conferences were planned at monthly intervals thereafter to reach a meeting of minds among Washington, Honolulu, and Saigon officials.

One of the main items discussed at this conference concerned methods of defeating the Viet Cong, which had an estimated December strength of 17,000. The Secretary of Defense indicated that, although existing U.S. policy did not anticipate the use of U.S. troops against the Viet Cong, South Vietnam had the highest priority, and the U.S. was prepared to provide everything except combat troops that CINCPAC needed to control the rising insurgency. The Secretary of Defense also indicated that money should not be a controlling consideration in planning operations.

1. JCS 041835Z Dec 61 cite JCS 2447 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 060218Z Dec 61 (TS)
3. CHMAAG Vietnam 140839Z Dec 61 cite MAGCH-DC 4442 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 202340Z Dec 61 (TS)
During the conference, Admiral Felt stressed the need for destroying the communist regional forces as a means of disrupting the entire communist campaign. Designed as a connecting link between the fully armed regular communist forces, which were trained for conventional type actions, and the paramilitary forces that were used to conduct terrorist activities in the local communities, the regional forces were considered the backbone of the Viet Cong organization. Intelligence sources indicated a communist objective of establishing one regional company in each South Vietnamese district, and one battalion in each province. Backing up the Viet Cong regular forces were an estimated 200,000 men who belonged to paramilitary or regional forces. CHMAAG Vietnam estimated that one fourth of the total South Vietnamese population supported the communists, and that an equal portion of the population was on the fence.1

Other major decisions reached as a result of the first conference were:2

1. U.S. combat troops would not enter SVN under the existing situation, but U.S. advisors would function down to battalion level, in teams, with one advisor assigned to each province chief.

2. CHMAAG Vietnam would prepare a campaign plan in detail based on CINCPAC's outline plan, and attempt to have it adopted by the GVN and the Vietnamese field commanders. CHMAAG Vietnam would also urge the RVNAF to organize a joint task force and begin operations by selecting one province, clearing it of Viet Cong and holding it. (Throughout the conference the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS stressed the need for a specific plan, followed by positive action.) CHMAAG was also directed to establish a Joint Operation Center (JOC) and to submit a plan for defoliation by 25 December.

3. "Jungle Jim" aircraft were to be used for training and operational missions in SVN with U.S. personnel in the front seat, and

1. Record of Secretary of Defense Conference, HQ CINCPAC, 16 Dec 61, Item 1. (TS)
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 000300, 18 Dec 61 (TS)
SVN personnel in the rear. CHMAAG would establish a Tactical Control Center for air control.

(4) A coastal reconnaissance plan was approved and scheduled to start 22 December. There was also a decision to investigate the possibility of expediting the procurement of junk.

(5) Training of the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps was to be expedited.

(6) Plans for improving the intelligence system in SVN would be completed.

(7) Communications in SVN would be improved.

(8) SVN construction projects were approved by the Secretary of Defense.

(9) CHMAAG Vietnam was to develop a border control plan for military anti-guerrilla actions at key points on the Laos/SVN border. The plan was to involve active patrolling and ambushing measures at vulnerable spots to be put into effect as soon as possible.

**Unified Command for South Vietnam**

The JCS raised the question of establishing a U.S. unified command in South Vietnam and, in November, asked for CINCPAC's views. CINCPAC proposed an organization and terms of reference for such a command and said that with additional U.S. units entering the country, a single spokesman was needed. Under CINCPAC's concept, CHMAAG would retain responsibility for administration and training in connection with the Military Assistance Program.  

During his 16 December conference at Camp Smith, the Secretary of Defense explained that, although DOD favored the proposed command arrangement, the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam opposed the plan, and that a decision would have to be made at the State-Defense level.

1. CINCPAC 290301Z Nov 61 (TS)
MAAG Army Aviation

On 2 December, CHMAAG submitted a requirement for additional personnel and aircraft to support the MAAG advisory group. Although the aircraft were available, DA proposed that units would satisfy the support requirement better than individuals and aircraft. This was approved by CINCPAC, and at year's end the following units had been alerted in CONUS for deployment to Vietnam: An Army fixed wing company; the headquarters and headquarters detachment of a transport aircraft battalion; an Army transport aircraft maintenance company, and a signal detachment. This was not a MAP supported program.

Small Boats for Use in Mekong Delta

One of the projects undertaken by the Combat Development & Test Center was to determine the type of boat best suited for the Mekong Delta area, where roads and waterways were used alternately. The requirements were for a light weight boat that its normal six man crew could carry, and a boat that could be maneuvered through waterways choked with grass and weeds. The CDTC eventually selected inflatable rubber boats with outboard motors. In addition, the CDTC recommended a 6-man fiberglass sampan, and at the end of 1961 construction of these was underway in the U.S. and at the Saigon Naval Shipyard.

Air Control Facilities in SVN

While in South Vietnam during October, CINCPAC asked CHMAAG Vietnam to make a study of the need for facilities to control the operations of the increased number of aircraft. After considering the

1. CHMAAG Vietnam 020707Z Dec 61 (S)
2. CINCPAC 050339Z Dec 61 (S)
3. DA 091709Z Dec 61 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 130505Z Dec 61 (S)
5. JCS 222002Z Dec 61 (S)
6. JCS SM 50-62, 11 Jan 62 (TS)
7. CINCPAC 292335Z Nov 61 (C)
8. CHMAAG Vietnam 041047Z Dec 61 (C)

Page 194 of 224 Pages
MAAG study and a separate plan prepared by his staff, CINCPAC approved a system based on the USAF Tactical Air Control System, which he proposed U.S. personnel operate until South Vietnamese could be trained.\(^1\) The GVN approved of the TACS, and its deployment was expected early in 1962.\(^2\)

**Father Hoa's Guerrilla Fighters**

A group of South Vietnam patriots headed by a local priest, who was known as Father Hoa, a former officer in the Chinese Army, had been uniquely successful in fighting the Viet Cong in the southwest delta area. Since the group received scant support from the central government, CINCPAC asked CHMAAG Vietnam to consult with \[\text{[redacted]}\] and the U.S. Ambassador to see what help Father Hoa's group needed.\(^3\) After CHMAAG said he needed only the authority to furnish support, CINCPAC obtained permission from OASD/ISA to transfer excess MAP items to CAS, which was authorized to provide help for Father Hoa.\(^4,5,6\)

**Military Intelligence**

The improvement of the U.S.-GVN military intelligence capability in South Vietnam was one of the high-priority items in the U.S. program to support South Vietnam. In coordination with CHMAAG Vietnam, CINCPAC drew up and recommended to the JCS an intelligence plan that provided for the following: Integration of U.S. intelligence specialists into the intelligence staffs of the RVNAF Joint General Staff and ARVN Field Command; the assignment of MAAG intelligence advisors to each RVNAF corps, division and province headquarters; augmenting the MAAG J2 Division and its

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1. CINCPAC 202327Z Dec 61 (TS)
2. CHMAAG 311411Z Dec 61 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 060420Z Dec 61 (TS)
4. CHMAAG Vietnam 160151Z Dec 61 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 232149Z Dec 61 (TS)
6. OSD 192305Z Jan 62 (TS)
7. CINCPAC 202328Z Nov 61 (S)
Evaluation Center; and setting up a U.S. intelligence/operations radio net. The Secretary of Defense and the JCS approved both the plan and an increase to the MAAG of approximately 180 intelligence personnel.  

With this additional personnel, CHMAAG Vietnam hoped to increase U.S. advice to, and support of, the RVNAF intelligence organization, and integrate the U.S. and South Vietnam intelligence efforts at all levels from the JCS through the province headquarters, thereby improving the over-all RVNAF intelligence capability.

The general concepts for the functioning of U.S.-RVNAF activities were accepted and approved by the GVN Minister of Defense on 19 December 1961.

In addition to taking the actions necessary to implement the above plan, CINCPAC arranged for a Navy intelligence officer on a TDY basis to help CHMAAG Vietnam develop plans for the Vietnamese Navy N-2 section, obtained for CHMAAG a TO&E counterintelligence unit of three officers and six EM, and directed CHMAAG to initiate actions to develop an intelligence structure within the Vietnamese Air Force as soon as possible.

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1. JCS 072258Z Dec 61 (S)
APPENDIX A

VISITS TO PACOM
Visits by U.S. Civil and Military Officials

U.S. DISTINGUISHED VISITORS

Vice President of the U.S. (Lyndon B. Johnson)
plus party of 31 and 30 to 35 press members. 9-10 May 1961.

Vice President of the U.S. (Lyndon B. Johnson)

Secretary of State (The Hon Dean Rusk)
Asst Sec of Def, ISA (The Hon Paul H. Nitze)
Asst Sec of State for Public Affairs (The Hon Roger W. Tubby)
Dep Asst Sec of State for FE Affairs (The Hon John M. Steeves)

Secretary of State (The Hon Dean Rusk and Mrs Rusk)
Secretary of Commerce (The Hon Luther H. Hodges and Mrs Hodges)
Secretary of the Interior (The Hon Stewart L. Udall and Mrs Udall)
Secretary of Labor (The Hon Arthur J. Goldberg and Mrs Goldberg)
Under Secretary of the Treasury (The Hon Henry H. Fowler and Mrs Fowler)
Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisers (The Hon Walter W. Heller and Mrs Heller)

Secretary of Defense (The Hon Robert S. McNamara)
Chairman of the JCS (Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA)
Asst Sec of Def, Public Affairs (The Hon Arthur Sylvester)
plus party of 2. 16 December 1961.


Secretary of the Army (The Hon Elvis J. Stahr, Jr)

Under Secretary of State (The Hon Chester Bowles)
plus party of 2. 18 November 1961.

Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (The Hon George W. Ball)
Dep Asst Secty for FE Economic Affairs (Mr. Avery F. Peterson)  
plus party of 6.

Chairman of the JCS (Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA)  

Chief of Staff of the Army (Gen George H. Decker, USA)  
plus party of 7. 29 Sep - 5 Oct 61.

Commandant of the Marine Corps (Gen David M. Shoup, USMC)  

Chief of Naval Operations (Adm George W. Anderson, USN)  

Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard (Adm A.C. Richmond, USCG)  
Asst Sec of the Treasury (The Hon A. Gilmore Flues)  
plus party of 4. 15-19 October 1961.

Director CIA - desig (Mr. John McConel)  

Dep Under SecState for Political Affairs - desig (The Hon U. Alexis  
Johnson)  
plus 1. 11-12 April 1961.

Military Representative of the President (Gen M.D. Taylor, USA)  
Dep Spec Asst to the President (Dr. Walt W. Rostow)  

Asst Secty for Pub Land Mgt, Dept of Interior (Mr. John A. Carver, Jr)  

Asst Sec of State for Educational & Cultural Affairs (The Hon Philip  

American Ambassadors to -  
Cambodia (William C. Trimble). 8 Jul 61.  
China (Everett F. Drumright). 23 Jul 61  
and 7 Aug 61.  
India (J. Kenneth Galbraith). 13-14 Nov 61.  
Indonesia (Howard P. Jones). 18-20 Apr 61  
and 12-18 May 61.  

Under Secretary of the Army (The Hon Stephen Ailes) General Counsel, D/A (The Hon Powell Pierpoint) plus party of 8. 6-8 Jul 61.

Under Secretary of the Air Force (The Hon Joseph V. Charyk) plus party of 7. 17-18 Dec 61.

Presidential Task Force on the Ryukyus (Mr. Carl Kaysen, Chairman) plus party of 8. 12 Oct 61.

President's Special Financial Group to Vietnam (Dr. Eugene Staley) plus 1. 16-17 Jul 61.

Net Evaluation Sub Committee, NSC (Gen Leon W. Johnson, USAF) plus party of 11. 11-15 Dec 61.

President American National Red Cross (Gen Alfred M. Gruenther, USA (Ret). 18 Aug 61 and 3-7 Sep 61.


Dep Asst Sec of Def, ISA (Mr. W. P. Bundy) plus party of 11. 15-16 Dec 61.

Member Advisory Panel to President and to Dir Bureau of Budget on Major Problems Govt Orgn and Operations (Mr. Sydney Stein, Jr). 24-25 Apr 61.

Mutual Security Evaluation Team (Mr. Frank A. Waring, Chairman) plus party of 3. 609 Mar 61 and 16-18 Apr 61.

CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS

Banking and Currency Committee. 27-29 Oct 61.
Sen Edward Long (D-Mo) Rep Leonor Sullivan (D-Mo)
Banking and Currency Committee. 27-29 Oct 61.
   Rep Martha Griffths (D-Mich)
   Rep Thomas Ashley (D-Ohio)
   Mr. Robert Poston, Counsel

Senate Judiciary Committee. 29-30 Apr 61 and 13-14 May 61.
   Sen Thomas J. Dodd (D-Conn)
   Mr. David Martin, Staff Member


Active Duty Tour for U.S. Congressmen and Staff Members. 6-8 Oct 61.
   Sen Hiram L. Fong (R-Hawaii), Colonel, USAFR
   plus 15 others

Mbr Foreign Affairs Committee. 6-8 Dec 61.
   Rep Robert R. Barry (R-NY)

Mbr Hse Appropriations Sub-Cte, State, Justice, Judiciary and Related
   Agencies. 29 Jun - 2 Jul 61 and 7-9 Jul 61.
   Rep Frank T. Bow (R-Ohio)
   Mr. Elmer R. Hipsley, State Dep Escort Officer

Mbr Hse Cte on Foreign Affairs. 17-18 Nov 61.
   Rep William S. Broomfield (R-Mich)

Mbr Hse Cte on Armed Services. 20-22 Nov 61.
   Rep Jeffrey Cohelan (D-Calif)
   LCol Winchester Kelso, USA, DA Rep and Escort Officer

Hse Foreign Affairs Committee. 25-27 Oct 61.
   Rep John L. Pilcher (D-Ga)
   Rep Harris B. McDowell, Jr., (D-Del)
   Rep Thomas F. Johnson (D-Md)
   Rep E. Ross Adair (R-Ind)
   Mr. Albert C. F. Westphal, Staff Consultant
   Mr. Harvey Cox, USIA
   Mr. Henry Sandri, State Dept
   LCol James Ames, USAF, Escort Officer

Veteran's Affairs Committee. 30 Nov-12 Dec 61.
   Rep James G. Fulton (R-Pa)
   Rep Thaddeus J. Dulski (D-NY)
   Rep Horace R. Kornegay (D-NC)
   Rep Roland V. Libonati (D-Ill)
   Rep William H. Ayres (R-Ohio)
   Mrs Helen Biondi, Staff Member
   Miss Kay Small, Staff Member
UNCLASSIFIED

Hse Foreign Affairs Committee. 9-19 Dec 61.
   Rep Wayne L. Hays (D-Ohio)
   Rep D. S. Saund (D-Calif)
   Rep Frances P. Bolton (R-Ohio)
   Rep Horace Seely-Brown (R-Ohio)
   Mr. Boyd Crawford, Staff Administrator
   Miss Patricia Peake, Staff Member
   Miss Irene Lewis, Admin Asst to Rep Bolton

Hse Sub-Cte on Appropriations for State, Justice, the Judiciary and
Related Agencies. 25 Nov - 3 Dec 61 and 28 Dec 61.
   Rep John J. Rooney (D-NY), Chairman
   Mr. William J. Crockett, Asst SecState for Admin
   Mr. Raymond F. Farrell, Associate Commissioner, Immigration
   and Naturalization Service
   Mr. Jay B. Howe, Staff Asst to Sub-Cte. 25 Nov - 3 Dec and
   16 Dec 61.

Hse Committee on Public Works. 19-21 Feb 61 and 2 - 3 Mar 61.
   Rep Clifford Davis (D-Tenn.
   Rep Robert E. Jones (D-Ala)
   Rep Frank E. Smith (D-Miss)
   Rep Frank M. Clark (D-Pa)
   Mr. Richard Sullivan, Staff Member
   Mr. John Leahy, State Dept Representative

Hse Ways and Means Committee. 18 Feb 61.
   Rep Steven B. Derounian (R-NY)

Hse Armed Services Committee. 9-23 Oct 61.
   Rep Clyde Doyle (D-Calif)
   LCdr N. R. Bach, USN, OLA Escort Officer

   Rep Samuel N. Friedel (D-Md)

Hse Appropriations Sub-Cte, Dept of Agriculture. 6-7 Jan 61
   Rep Walt Horan (R-Wash)

Hse Armed Services Committee. 13-16 Oct 61.
   Rep Richard E. Lankford (D-Md)
   LCol James E. Campbell, USA

Hse Cte on Appropriations. 27-29 Nov 61.
   Rep William E. Minshall, Jr., (R-Ohio)
   LCol William D. Lynch, USA

Joint Cte on Immigration and Nationality Policy. 30 Mar - 2 Apr 61.
   and 8 Apr 61.
   Rep Arch A. Moore, Jr., (R-WVa)
   Mr. William Crabtree, Staff Mbr Judiciary Cte

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Hse Banking and Currency Committee. 20-23 Nov 61 and 17-21 Dec 61.
Rep Abraham J. Multer (D-NY)

Hse Cte on Armed Services. 8-11 Dec 61.
Rep Walter Norblad (R-Ore)
LCol Jack Reiter, USAF, Escort Officer

Foreign Operations Sub-Cte of Hse Appropriations Cte. 15-17 Nov 61.
Rep Otto E. Passman (D-La)
Rep Joseph M. Montoya (D-NM)
Rep Hugh Q. Alexander (D-NC)
Mr. Francis G. Merrill, Staff Member

Treasury Post Office Sub-Cte, Hse Appropriations Cte. 30 May - 3 Jun 61.
Rep J. Vaughn Gary (D-Va)
Rep Tom Steed (D-Okla)
Rep Hugh Q. Allender (D-NC)
Rep Silvio O. Conte (R-Mass)
Rep William H. Milliken, Jr., (R-Pa)

Hse Committee on Science and Astronautics. 19-22 Nov 61 and 2-4 Dec 61.
Rep Olin E. Teague (D-Tex)
Maj Ted Connell, USAF, Escort Officer

Hse Government Operations Committee. 15 Nov - 6 Dec 61.
Rep George M. Wallhauser (R-NJ)

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 19-22 Nov 61 and 7 Dec 61.
Rep James E. VanZandt (R-Penn)
Capt E. J. Bauer, USN, Consultant, Jt Cte on Atomic Energy

Hse Judiciary Committee. 31 Mar - 2 Apr 61
Rep Basil L. Whitener (D-NC)

Mr. Jerome S. Adlerman, Gen Counsel
Mr. Philip W. Morgan, Minority Counsel
LCol Eric Linhof, USAF, Escort Officer

Mr. Daniel F. McGillicuddy, Jr., Spec Counsel
Mr. Ben J. Gilleas, Staff Investigator
Maj James M. Brower, USAF, Escort Officer
Staff Mbr, Senate Cte on Armed Services. 2-5 Oct 61.
Mr. Gordon A. Nease
Col James M. McGarry, USAF, Escort Officer

Staff Mbrs, Spec Sub-Cte on Government Info, Hse Cte on Government Operations. 25 Nov - 1 Dec 61.
Mr. Samuel J. Archibald, Staff Member
Mr. Jack Howard, Staff Member
Mr. Phineas Indritz, Chief Counsel

Staff Mbr. Hse Cte on Armed Services. 10-11 Oct 61.
Mr. John R. Blandford, Counsel
Col D. M. Lightfoot, USAF, Chief Congressional Cte Div, SAFLL
APPENDIX B

VISITS TO PACOM

Visits by Representatives of Foreign Countries

The following indicative listing shows the countries and some of their distinguished representatives who came to Hawaii in 1961:

ARGENTINA

His Excellency Dr. Arturo Frondizi, President of the Argentine Nation and Mrs. Frondizi
His Excellency Dr. Miguel Angel Carcano, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship and Mrs. Carcano
Dr. Alejandro Orfila, Ambassador to Japan
Dr. Benjamin Guzman, Senator
Dr. Miguel Angel Juarez Penalba, Representative
BGen Baldomero Llerena, Chief of the Casal Militar and party of 58 others, 21-22 Dec 61.

AUSTRALIA

His Excellency Robert G. Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia and Mrs. Menzies plus party of 4, 21 Feb 61
Hon Athol G. Townley, Defense Minister plus party of 2, 13-16 Jun 61.
Hon Howard Beale, Australian Ambassador to U.S. 12 Jan 61.

Air Mar Sir Frederick Scherger, RAAF, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Cte and Lady Scherger, 13-16 Jun 61.

Mr. John Knott, Secretary, Ministry of Supply


RAdm Alan W. R. McNicoll, Aus Navy, Flag Officer Commanding Australian Fleet (Desig), 24-28 Sep 61.

LtGen Sir R. Garrett, Aus Army (Ret), Provost, The Aus Admin Staff College, 5 Jan 61 and 19-21 May 61.
BELGIUM
Mr. Jean L. M. Adriaenssen, Representative from Belgium on the UN Mission to the Trust Territory. 1-5 Feb 61.

BOLIVIA
Hon Carlos Salamanca, Chairman UN Mission to the Trust Territory, Representative of Bolivia on Trusteeship Council (Bolivian Ambassador to UN). 1-5 Feb 61.

CAMBODIA
H. R. H. Norodom Sihanouk, Chief of State and President Council of Ministers and Princess Monique plus party of 11. 3-4 Oct 61.

CANADA
RAdm E. W. Finch-Noyes, RCN, CANCOMAR-PAC and Mrs. Finch-Noyes plus 1. 24 Mar - 8 Apr 61

CHINA
Gen 1st Class Chen Cheng, GRC, Vice President and Premier, and Mrs Chen Cheng
His Excellency Shen Chang-huan, Minister of Fgn Affairs and Mrs. Shen

Gen 1st Class Yu Ta-wei, CNA, Minister of National Defense and Mrs Yu Ta-Wei. 7 Dec 61.

Gen Peng Meng-chi, CNA, Chief Gen Staff, MND
Adm Ma Chi-chuang, CNN, Vice Ch of Gen Staff, MND plus party of 3. 26 Oct 61.

Vice Adm Tsao Chung-chou, CNN, Vice CINC, Republic of China Navy. 22 Aug 61.

FINLAND
His Excellency Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, The President of Finland and Mrs. Kekkonen
His Excellency Ahti Karjalainen, Minister of Foreign Affairs
His Excellency Richard R. Seppala, Ambassador of Finland plus party of 4. 28-31 Oct 61
JAPAN

His Excellency Hayato Ikeda, Prime Minister of Japan and Mrs. Ikeda

His Excellency Zentaro Kosaka, Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Honorable Kiichi Miyazawa, Member of the House of Councillors

plus party of 7. 18 Jun 61 and 27-29 Jun 61.

Mr. Nobusuke Kishi, Former Prime Minister of Japan and Mrs. Kishi

Mr. Taeko Fukuda, Mbr Lower House and Mrs. Fukuda

Mr. Hideo Bo, Member Lower House

plus party of 3. 1-3 Oct 61

His Excellency Zentaro Kosaka, Foreign Minister of Japan,

plus party of 2. 13-14 Sep 61 and 24-25 Sep 61.

Adm Kichisabura Nomura, IJN (Ret), Member of House of Councillors, Japanese Diet

plus 1. 11-13 Jun 61 and 4-10 Jul 61.

Gen Ichiji Sugita, GSDF, Chief of Staff, GSDF

plus party of 3. 4 Mar 61 and 20-22 Mar 61.

KOREA

Gen Chung Hee Park, ROK A, Chairman,
Supreme Council for National Reconstruction

MGen Yang Soo Yoo, Chairman Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee

His Excellency Duk Shin Choi, Minister Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Byung Kyu Chun, Minister of Finance

His Excellency Byeng Kwon Bak, Minister of National Defense

His Excellency Chung Pum Song, Dep Chairman, Economic Planning Board

plus party of 8. 21-24 Nov 61.

KOREAN GOOD WILL MISSION TO AMERICA

MGen Yu Yang-su, Delegation Leader
(Rank of Ambassador for this mission)

plus party of 3. 2-3 Jul 61

His Excellency Kwak Sang-hun, Speaker, House of Representatives

plus party of 2. 7-8 May 61.
LAOS
MGen Phoumi Nosavan, Minister of National Security
BGen Ouane Rathikoun
plus 1. 1-2 Jul 61.

NEW ZEALAND
Mr. H. L. Bockett, Secretary of Labor and
Mrs Bockett.
20-22 Jul 61.

His Excellency Keith J. Holyoake, Prime Minister
plus party of 2. 1 Mar 61.

His Excellency George Robert Laking,
Ambassador to the U.S. and Mrs. Laking.
25-27 Apr 61.

Mr. A. D. McIntosh, Secretary External Affairs. 15 Sep 61.

Mr. Frank Corner, Chief NZ Delegate to
General Assembly and Mrs Corner.
7 Oct 61.

MGen Sir Stephen Weir, NZ Army (Ret),
Military Advisor to New Zealand Government.
2-6 Aug 61.

PAKISTAN
Air Commo M. A. Rahman, Pakistan AF,
Chief of Staff, Pakistan Air Force
plus party of 4. 7-8 Jan 61.

PERU
His Excellency Manuel Prado, President of Peru, and Mrs. Prado
plus party of 9. 7-9 May 61 and 25-26 May 61.

PHILIPPINES
Commo Jose M. Francisco, Phil Navy, Flag Officer in Command Phil Navy and
Mrs. Francisco

SWITZERLAND
MGen Lubin Guillaume, Swiss Army, Mbr UN Armistice Commission.
25-27 Jun 61.
SWITZERLAND
(Cont'd)

MGen R. Hartman, Swiss Army, Mbr Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee, Korea. 25 Jan - 4 Feb 61.

THAILAND

Air Chief Marshal Boonchoo Chandrubeks, RTAF, CINC Royal Thai Air Force
Air Mar Kamol Theyatunga, RTAF, Vice Chief, RTAF
Air Vice Mar Tragool Thavaravey, RTAF, Surgeon General
plus party of 2. 19-22 Nov 61.

Adm Chamnarn Adhaya, RTN, CINC and Chief of Staff Royal Thai Navy
plus party of 3. 29 Apr 61 and 13-16 May 61.

RAdm M. C. Galwana Ciskul, RTN, Comdt., Royal Thai Marine Corps
plus 1. 22 - 26 Apr 61.

LGen Pachern Nimitbutr, RTA, Ch of the Royal Thai Army Signal Corps, also Director General, Telephone Organization of Thailand
plus party of 3. 6-9 Jul 61.

UNITED KINGDOM

Her Royal Highness Princess Alexandra of Kent and party. 2 Nov 61.

Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador to the U.S. and Lady Caccia. 26 Feb - 7 Mar 61.

Adm Louis (Francis Albert Victor Nicholas) Mountbatten, Chief Imperial Defense Staff, Great Britain
plus party of 15. 2-5 Mar 61

Adm David Luce, Royal Navy, CINC, Far East Station
plus party of 5. 10-15 Jan 61.

Air Mar Anthony D. Selway, RAF, CINC FEAF
plus party of 13. 5-8 Jun 61.

Air Mar Dennis H. F. Barnett, RAF, CINC RAF Transport Command
plus 1. 3 Nov 61 and 7-8 Nov 61.
UNITED KINGDOM (Cont'd)

Mr. G. K. Gaston, Representative from U.K. on Trusteeship Council, UN Mission to the Trust Territory.
1-5 Feb 61.

Air Mar Sir John R. Whitley, RAF, Inspector General, RAF, and Lady Whitley.
12-13 Jul 61.

MGen T.H.F. Foulkes, Royal Army, Engineer-in-Chief, British Army.
4-5 Dec 61 and 7-10 Dec 61.

VIETNAM

His Excellency Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Secretary of State for Presidency and Asst Secretary of State for National Defense.
plus 1. 11 Jun 61.
## PART I

### GLOSSARY OF TERMS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Army Combat Engineers</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC&amp;W</td>
<td>Aircraft Control and Warning</td>
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<td>AD</td>
<td>Air Division</td>
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<td>ADP</td>
<td>Automatic Data Processing</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADPS</td>
<td>Automatic Data Processing System</td>
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<tr>
<td>AERO Siam</td>
<td>Aeronautical Radio of Siam Ltd.</td>
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<td>AEWRon</td>
<td>Aircraft Early Warning Airborne Squadron</td>
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<td>AFADGRU</td>
<td>Armed Forces Assistance to Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFAK</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
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<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Intelligence Center</td>
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<td>AFIC</td>
<td>Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company</td>
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<td>ANGLICO</td>
<td>Army Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD/ISA</td>
<td>Anti-Submarine Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Browning Automatic Rifle</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAR</td>
<td>Battalion Landing Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLT</td>
<td>Bureau of Ships</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUSHIPS</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAMTT</td>
<td>Civic Action Mobile Training Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAO-SOP</td>
<td>Coordination of Atomic Operations-Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Controlled American Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBR</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, and Radiological warfare</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>Carrier (CVA) Controlled Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCTS</td>
<td>Combat Crew Training Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDTC</td>
<td>Combat Development and Test Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-E</td>
<td>Communications - Electronics</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEOI</td>
<td>Communications Electronics Operating Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Civil Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG</td>
<td>Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAGPHIL</td>
<td>Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHMAAG</td>
<td>Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHMILTAG</td>
<td>Chief Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHPEO</td>
<td>Chief Programs Evaluation Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHMPO</td>
<td>Chief Military Planning Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHPROVMAAG</td>
<td>Chief Provisional Military Assistance Group, Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Combat Intelligence Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Atlantic</td>
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<td>CINCNORAD</td>
<td>Commander in Chief North American Air Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPACAF</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACREP</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSSTRIKE</td>
<td>Commander in Chief of the Strike Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCUNC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief United Nations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUSARPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief United States Army Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIP</td>
<td>Counter Insurgency Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Commander Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>(Chemical Agent)</td>
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<td>EAM</td>
<td>Electronic Accounting Machine</td>
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<td>Escape and Evasion</td>
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UNCLASSIFIED

HAWK
HIPAR
HJ
HQUSAF
IBM
ICA
ICBM
ICC
JCS
JCSM
JDA
JMTB
JOPREP
JSCP
JSOP
JSTPS
JTD
JTF
KMAG
KW
LandShipRon
LPH
MA
MAAG
MAP
MATS
MILAD
MPO
MPSA
MRBM
MSTS
MTT
NAVADGRU
NAVBEACHGRU
NCO
NIKE
NSTDB
NSTL
NZ
OASD/ISA
OPLANS
OSD

Homing-all-the-way-killer (Surface-to-air Missile)
High Powered Acquisition Radar
Honest John
Headquarters United States Air Force
International Business Machine
International Cooperation Administration
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
International Commission for Supervision & Control
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
Japanese Defense Agency
Joint Military Transportation Board
Joint Operational Reporting System
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
Joint Table of Distribution
Joint Task Force
Korea Military Army Advisory Group
Kilo Watt
Landing Ship Squadron
Landing Platform Helicopter Ship
Military Assistance
Military Assistance Advisory Group
Military Assistance Program
Military Air Transport Service
Military Advisor
Military Planning Office
Military Petroleum Supply Agency
Medium Range Ballistic Missile
Military Sea Transport Service
Mobile Training Team
Naval Advisory Group
Naval Beach Group
Noncommissioned Officer
Surface-to-Air Missile
National Strategic Target Data Base
National Strategic Target List
New Zealand
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/
International Security Affairs
Operational Plans
Office of the Secretary of Defense
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<td>Pacific Air Force</td>
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<td>Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phibron</td>
<td>Amphibian Squadron</td>
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<td>POL</td>
<td>Petroleum Oils and Lubricants</td>
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<td>PPC</td>
<td>Photo Processing Center</td>
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<td>PsyOps</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<td>PsyWar</td>
<td>Psychological Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>QM</td>
<td>Quarter Master</td>
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<td>RB</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Bomber</td>
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<td>RCT</td>
<td>Regimental Combat Team</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<td>RLG</td>
<td>Royal Laotian Government</td>
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<td>RLT</td>
<td>Regimental Landing Team</td>
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<td>Royal Thailand Air Force</td>
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<td>Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<td>Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile</td>
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<td>SDC</td>
<td>Self Defense Corps</td>
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<td>SEAsia</td>
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<td>SEATELCOM</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Telecommunications</td>
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<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SFMTT</td>
<td>Special Forces Mobile Training Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIOP</td>
<td>Single Integrated Operation Plan</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>STARCOM</td>
<td>Strategic Army Communications System</td>
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<td>TAD</td>
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<td>Thailand Ammunition Manufacturing Plant</td>
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<td>Task Group</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>Underwater Demolition Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCONARC</td>
<td>United States Continental Army Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMILAD</td>
<td>United States Military Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>USOM</td>
<td>United States Operations Mission</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Socialist Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>Unconventional Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAHPRon</td>
<td>Heavy Attack Photo Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>VNAF</td>
<td>Vietnamese Armed Forces</td>
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<td>VPRon</td>
<td>Patrol Squadron</td>
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<td>WESTPAC</td>
<td>Western Pacific</td>
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<td>Weekly Intelligence Digest</td>
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<td>WESTPAC Transportation Office</td>
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