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L. C. HEINZ
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics and Administration

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JCS</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USCINCEUR</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSAC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCONAD</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCAL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSTRIKE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUSARPAC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACAF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National War College</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army War College</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial College of the Armed Forces</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval War College</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air War College</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY

1964
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Illustrations</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE PACIFIC COMMAND</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMANDERS IN CHIEF PACIFIC</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I THE STATE OF READINESS OF UNITED STATES FORCES</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Forces During 1964</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities to Improve the CINCPAC Staff Organization</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC Activities to Improve Command Facilities and Command and Control Procedures</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM Force Objectives</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Planning</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II CINCPAC ACTIONS INFLUENCING THE STATE OF READINESS OF ALLIED NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Gaming</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations of U.S. Forces</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Training</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Communist Military Threat to Southeast Asia</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Force Strength Changes</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Logistic Activities</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC Communications Activities</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III ACTIONS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND INTERNAL UPRISINGS</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Wide Activities</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Activities</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV ACTIONS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND INTERNAL UPRISINGS</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC Activities to Preserve Freedom in Laos</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC's Activities to Counter Insurgency in the Republic of Vietnam</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC Actions to Strengthen Thailand's Resistance to Communism</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Chronology of Major Events in Connection with the Republic of Vietnam</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 January 1964 - 31 December 1964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Chronology of Major Events in Connection with Laos</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Concepts of CINCPAC Airborne Command Post Communication Plan</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Index to PEG Inspection Reports</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>CINCPAC Projects Completed by NAVCOSSACT</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Southeast Asia’s Monsoons and Military Operations</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Major Accomplishments of the Military Assistance Advisory Group,</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan (A debriefing report by CHMAAG Japan, Brigadier General J.W.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Worthington) April 1962 - April 1964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Military Advisors to SEATO 1964</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Visits to CINCPAC by U.S. Civil and Military Officials</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Visits to CINCPAC by Representatives of Foreign Countries</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>CINCPAC Key Staff Officers</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GLOSSARY</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INDEX</td>
<td>481</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fig. No.</th>
<th>Following Page No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Figure Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pacific Command Organization</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Pacific Command</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Command Arrangements in PACOM</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Command Relationships</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Available Forces</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pacific Command Personnel</td>
<td>(C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>MAAG and Service Advisory Groups Personnel</td>
<td>(C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific and Staff</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>U.S. Forces Pacific</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-11</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Indonesia's Illega Claim to International Waters</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-12</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Enemy Bomber Capability in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-13</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Enemy Fighter Capability in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-14</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Communist Military Strength</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-15</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>The Communist Military Ground Threat to Southeast Asia</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-16</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Estimated Communist Military Rates of Advance</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-17</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>The Communist Military Threat to Southeast Asia</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-18</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Far East Communist Bloc Military Strength Changes During 1964</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-20</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>MATS Pacific Routes</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-21</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Imbalance in Geographic Distribution of PACOM POL Storage Facilities</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-22</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>Emergency Evacuation Statistics</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. No.</td>
<td>Following Page No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Figure Classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-23</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>CINCPAC Communication Center Message Traffic Increase (1962-1964)</td>
<td>(C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-1</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>U.S. Organizational Structure for Military Assistance</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-2</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program</td>
<td>(C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-3</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>Ships Delivered to PACOM MAP Countries During CY 1964</td>
<td>(C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-4</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-5</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-6</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-7</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-8</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>Major POL Installations, South Korea</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-9</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>Location of Korea Oil Company (KOCO) Refinery, Ulsan</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-10</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-11</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-1</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>United States Collective Defense Arrangements</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-1</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-2</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Laos Route Designations</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-3</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>Areas Controlled by Viet Cong</td>
<td>(C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-4</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>Headquarters U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-5</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>Buildup of U.S. Military Personnel RVN</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. No.</td>
<td>Following Page No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Figure Classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-6</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>Casualties Among U.S. Personnel in RVN 1959 - 1964</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-7</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>Disposition of Major U.S. Operational Units</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-8</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-9</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>RVNAF Force Increase Comparisons</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-10</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>&quot;VC Target&quot; - the Railroads of South Vietnam</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-11</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>Summary of Construction to Support Increased Advisory Effort</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-12</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>Viet Cong Infiltration Systems</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-13</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>Gulf of Tonkin Incidents and Reprisal Air Strikes</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-14</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>Advance of Major U.S. Forces</td>
<td>(TS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-15</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>Free World Aid to Vietnam</td>
<td>(C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-16</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-17</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>Special Operations Centers (SOC), Thailand</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-18</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>Bangkok By-Pass Road</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-19</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>CE Base Thailand Trunk Capacity &amp; Loading as of 1 Nov 64</td>
<td>(C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-20</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>Upgraded CE Base Thailand - Trunk Capacity &amp; Requirements</td>
<td>(C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-1</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>Rainfall and Predominant Winds in Southeast Asia, 1 November - 30 April</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-2</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>Rainfall and Predominant Winds in Southeast Asia, 1 May - 31 October</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-3, 4 &amp; 5</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>Rainfall (Inches) at Selected Stations</td>
<td>(U)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE PACIFIC COMMAND

The Pacific Command was established on 1 January 1947. However, it was not until 1 July 1957 that the Department of Defense placed all United States Armed Forces in the Pacific under one Commander in Chief Pacific Command with headquarters at Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Territory of Hawaii. In parallel action, the United States Army Pacific, United States Pacific Fleet and United States Pacific Air Forces established headquarters in Hawaii.

Command arrangements in the Pacific Command were further refined on 1 January 1959 when, in accordance with the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the military departments to assign combat and associated logistic and support forces to the operational command of Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC). The chain of command was from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thence to Commander in Chief Pacific. This same chain of command remained in effect in 1964.
COMMANDERS IN CHIEF PACIFIC

Admiral Harry D. Felt, who assumed command of the Pacific Command on 31 July 1958, relinquished his title as Commander in Chief Pacific to Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp at 1015 Honolulu time on 30 June 1964, aboard USS RANGER.

The previous Commanders in Chief Pacific, as well as the period they performed this duty, were as follows:

Admiral John H. Towers 1 Jan 1947 - 28 Feb 1947
Admiral Louis E. Denfeld 28 Feb 1947 - 3 Dec 1947
Admiral Dewitt C. Ramsey 12 Jan 1948 - 30 Apr 1949
Admiral Arthur W. Radford 30 Apr 1949 - 10 Jul 1953
Admiral Felix B. Stump 10 Jul 1953 - 31 Jul 1958
CHAPTER I

THE STATE OF READINESS OF UNITED STATES FORCES

In 1964 Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) commanded United States military forces in the Pacific Command (PACOM), as he had in previous years, through the component commanders for Army, Navy, and Air Force, through the commanders of five subordinate unified commands, six Chiefs Military Assistance Advisory Groups, and various area representatives. His general area of responsibility covered almost half the earth's surface and included the Pacific Ocean and the islands therein (less Aleutians and islands in the Bering Sea), the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean area, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the countries of Southeast Asia. CINCPAC's mission was to defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean area and to support and advance United States policy and interest in the Pacific Command area. PACOM organization and available forces for 1964 are portrayed in Figures I-1 to I-5. (U)

This chapter describes CINCPAC's forces and his actions to plan for their deployment, training, logistic support, and employment to carry out United States policies. Related items are included in Chapter II, which describes CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program; in Chapter III which reports CINCPAC actions associated with his position as United States Military Advisor to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and with political military events pertaining to his command; and in Chapter IV which deals with CINCPAC's activities connected with Laos, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam. (U)

U.S. FORCES DURING 1964

PACOM - Wide Military Strength

Military personnel strength in PACOM rose from 439,190 on 1 January 1964 to 455,689 at the close of the year. All services shared
the increase except the Marine Corps. Comparative strengths of the
component services as well as PACOM, were as follows:

<table>
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<th>1 JAN 64</th>
<th>31 DEC 64</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>99,985</td>
<td>107,940</td>
<td>+7,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>197,433</td>
<td>206,712</td>
<td>+9,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>73,474</td>
<td>69,860</td>
<td>-3,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>68,298</td>
<td>71,177</td>
<td>+2,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>439,190</td>
<td>455,689</td>
<td>+16,499</td>
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The number of sponsors and dependents fluctuated widely throughout the theater, the greatest changes in the number of military personnel were a 9,203 increase in Hawaii and a decline of 6,826 in Okinawa. All services except Navy experienced a decline in the number of dependents overseas with their sponsors in PACOM countries. A 5,017 increase in Navy dependents was largely offset by a decrease of 1,101 Army, 524 Marine Corps, and 4,760 Air Force, so the overall change was only -1,368 in PACOM. All major areas of military concentration in PACOM, except Japan and Taiwan, showed increases of varying degrees. The major areas of concentration, the number of personnel, and changes during the year are shown below:

<table>
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<th>AREA</th>
<th>31 DEC 64</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
<th>DEPENDENTS</th>
<th>31 DEC 64</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
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<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>70,374</td>
<td>+9,203</td>
<td>70,809</td>
<td>+2,769</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>43,215</td>
<td>-1,330</td>
<td>49,356</td>
<td>-9,099</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>58,472</td>
<td>+4,740</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>+199</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marianas</td>
<td>7,819</td>
<td>+1,259</td>
<td>11,823</td>
<td>+1,565</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>39,925</td>
<td>-6,826</td>
<td>28,323</td>
<td>+1,589</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>15,617</td>
<td>+2,280</td>
<td>15,721</td>
<td>+1,819</td>
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<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>3,638</td>
<td>-265</td>
<td>4,469</td>
<td>-481</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>+387</td>
<td>1,616</td>
<td>+84</td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>23,292</td>
<td>+8,330</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>+182</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Strength Changes in Military Headquarters Within PACOM

During 1964 the number of Military personnel assigned to the Service Advisory Groups in Korea dropped from 1,442 to 1,147, a reduction of 295. During the same period the number of U.S. civilians
THE PACIFIC COMMAND

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1964

[Map showing various military command structures in the Pacific region, including labels such as CINCPAC, CINCSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CHINSAG, CHATAAG, CHIMEDT, CHUSMAG, and various countries and cities.]
COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN PACOM

CINCPAC

CINCPAC REP AUSTRALIA
CINCPAC REP MARPO
CINCPAC REP RYUKYUS
CINCPAC REP PHIL
COMUS JAPAN

CINCUSARPAC

COMUS TDC

CINCPACFLT

CG USAR TAIWAN
COM NAVFOR JAP
CG 5TH AIR FORCE

CINCPACAF

NAVY ACTIVATED: WHEN REQ.

CHMILTAG INDONESIA
CHMEDT BURMA
CHJUSMASA PHIL.
CHJUSMASA JAPAN
CHJUSMASA CHINA
DEPUTY CHJUSMASA THAI
CHJUSMASA THAI

--- OP COMMAND
----- PLANNING AND COORDINATION
1. COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC): CINCPAC is the Commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. His general area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is the Pacific Ocean, including the islands therein (less Australia), the Bering Sea, the eastern Indian Ocean area, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the countries of Southeast Asia.

   CINCPAC exercises operational command through the component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces (when established), and he is accredited as the U.S. Military Representative to the following organizations:
   b. ANZUS Council: U.S. Military Representative.
   d. Japanese-American Security Consultative Committee: Member and Principal Adviser on Military Defense Matters to the Chairman of the U.S. Representation.

2. COMPONENT COMMANDERS: There are three component commanders:
   b. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT).
   c. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF).

   The component commanders are responsible for accomplishing such operational missions and tasks as may be assigned by CINCPAC. The PACOM component commands consist of the respective component commanders and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations or installations under their military command which have been assigned to the operational command of CINCPAC. Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations or installations may operate directly under the component commander in his service role, and should contribute to the mission of CINCPAC as appropriate.

   Component commanders' responsibilities for the Military Assistance Program are prescribed in CINCPAC Instruction 4900.1 (current revision).

3. COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS: There are five subordinate unified commands in the PACOM:
   a. United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Korea (COMUS Korea), Seoul, Korea.
   b. United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (COMUS Japan), Fuchu Air Station, Japan.
   c. United States Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC), commanded by Commander United States Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC), Taipei, Taiwan.
   d. United States Military Assistance Command Thailand (USMACHTHAI) commanded by Commander United States Military Assistance Command Thailand (COMUSMACHTHAI), Bangkok, Thailand.
   e. United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (USMACV) commanded by Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV), Saigon, Republic of Vietnam.

   With the approval of the JCS, CINCPAC may establish additional subordinate unified commands or may disestablish or consolidate existing commands.

4. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPACREPS): CINCPACREPS are established in certain areas where no subordinate unified command has been established and where significant forces of two or more services are stationed. There are four:
   a. Commanding General, U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands IX Corps is the CINCPAC Representative, Ryukyus (CINCPACREP Ryukyus), Fort Buckner, Okinawa.
   b. Commander Naval Forces Marianas is the CINCPAC Representative Marianas-Bonin Islands (CINCPACREP MARBO), Agana, Guam.
   c. Commander Naval Forces Philippines is the CINCPAC Representative Philippines (CINCPACREP Philippines), Sangley Point, Philippines.
   d. USAF Liaison Officer to Australia is the CINCPAC Representative Australia (CINCPACREP Australia), American Embassy, Canberra, Australia.

   CINCPAC may designate additional CINCPACREPS or terminate designations as circumstances dictate.

5. CHIEFS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS (MAAGs): Military Assistance Programs are in effect and have been established in the PACOM area under Chiefs as follows:
   a. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Rep of China - Taipei, Taiwan
   b. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Japan - Tokyo, Japan
   c. Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand - Bangkok, Thailand
   d. Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines - Manila, Philippines
   e. Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia - Djakarta, Indonesia
   f. Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma - Rangoon, Burma

   Exceptions:
   s. COMUS Korea performs the MAP functions for Korea - Seoul, Korea
   h. COMUSMACV performs the MAP functions for Vietnam - Saigon, Rep of Vietnam
   i. Deputy Chief JUSMAC Thailand performs the MAP functions for Laos in planning, programming, requisitioning, receipt and storage in Thailand, and onward shipment to Laos and maintains liaison with USAID Laos and with Attachés.

6. SINGLE SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES (COORDINATING AUTHORITIES): The Secretary of Defense has directed CINCPAC to designate a single senior military representative in each country or area within the Pacific Command where U.S. Military personnel are on duty. The single senior military representatives are:
   a. Korea - Commander U.S. Forces, Korea
   b. Japan - Commander U.S. Forces, Japan
   c. Ryukyu Islands - Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Ryukyus
   d. Taiwan and Penghu - Commander U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
   e. Marianas-Bonin Islands - Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Marianas-Bonin Islands
   f. Philippines - Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Philippines
   g. South Vietnam - Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
   h. Thailand - Commander, U.S.-Military Assistance Command, Thailand
   i. Indonesia - Chief, Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia
   j. Burma - Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma
   k. Australia - Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Australia.
# AVAILABLE FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CINCUAR/PAC</th>
<th>CINCPACFLT</th>
<th>CINCPACAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Army Hq</strong></td>
<td><strong>6 Hawk Bns</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 Numbered Fleets</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Corps Hqs</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 Corps Arty</strong></td>
<td><strong>9 Attack Carriers (CVA)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Inf Divs</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 Sapper Bn</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 AW Star Support Carriers (CVS)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 ABn Brigade</strong></td>
<td><strong>288 How Bns</strong></td>
<td><strong>8 Cruiser Types</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Missile Cbnd (AT)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 Tpy Acq Bn</strong></td>
<td><strong>46 Submarine Types</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Special Forces Group(-)</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 Engr Bns (Const)</strong></td>
<td><strong>116 Destroyer Types</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Logistical Commands</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 Engr Bn (Combat)</strong></td>
<td><strong>73 Amphibious Warfare Types</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Nike-Hercules Bns(+)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 Little John Bn</strong></td>
<td><strong>19 Patrol Ship Types</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>14 Naval Reserve Training Ships</strong></td>
<td><strong>14 Naval Reserve Training Ships</strong></td>
<td><strong>41 Mine Warfare Ships</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8 Radar Picket Ships (AGR)</strong></td>
<td><strong>8 SQRUS Stations</strong></td>
<td><strong>101 Auxiliary Ships</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Fleet Marine Force (including)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 Photo Sqn (VLP)</strong></td>
<td><strong>101 Auxiliary Ships</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 MARDIV/WING Teams</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 Photo Sqm (VFP)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 Helo Utility Sqm (HU)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IN PACOM BUT NOT ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC**

**USASA Units in Pacifc**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Natl Guard Units</th>
<th>Army Reserve Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Engr Bn</td>
<td>1 Special Fos Gp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Nike-Hercules Bns(-)</td>
<td>1 Inf Bn (3 Bns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Inf Bde (3 Bns)</td>
<td>1 CA Gp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Engr Const Bn</td>
<td>1 Engr Const Bn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MAJOR AUGMENTATION FORCES WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE IN EMERGENCY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONUS Augmentation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Corps Hq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Inf Division w/support troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Airborne Division w/support troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ABn Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Log Coed (Type C)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These columns include all forces assigned. Some may be in various stages of overhaul, repair, or training and thus not available for immediate deployment.

**1-5**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>GRAND TOTAL</th>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>U. S. CIVILIANS</th>
<th>LOCAL HIRE CIVILIAN</th>
<th>DEPENDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>USMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALASKA (PACOM UNITS)</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BONIN ISLANDS</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURMA</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMBODIA</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWAII</td>
<td>159,850</td>
<td>70,374</td>
<td>17,882</td>
<td>32,242</td>
<td>10,159</td>
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<tr>
<td>HONG KONG</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDONESIA</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>140,368</td>
<td>43,285</td>
<td>5,787</td>
<td>8,650</td>
<td>18,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOREA</td>
<td>80,216</td>
<td>56,472</td>
<td>54,095</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAOS</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALAYA</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARIANAS</td>
<td>22,445</td>
<td>7,819</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARSHALLS</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDWAY</td>
<td>2,992</td>
<td>1,812</td>
<td>1,577</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW ZEALAND</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILIPPINES</td>
<td>42,076</td>
<td>15,647</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>3,427</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KYOKUS</td>
<td>23,296</td>
<td>9,505</td>
<td>11,659</td>
<td>2,810</td>
<td>11,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THAILAND</td>
<td>6,772</td>
<td>4,283</td>
<td>3,320</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIETNAM</td>
<td>25,403</td>
<td>23,292</td>
<td>14,687</td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAKE</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB TOTAL</td>
<td>618,973</td>
<td>319,297</td>
<td>107,947</td>
<td>30,145</td>
<td>30,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
<td>145,214</td>
<td>142,403</td>
<td>107,567</td>
<td>34,856</td>
<td>2,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>764,187</td>
<td>451,690</td>
<td>107,947</td>
<td>206,712</td>
<td>69,860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Civilians paid from DOD appropriated funds
# DOD/ARPA personnel
dropped from 94 to 62, and local hire civilians declined from 881 to 560. The net effect of military and civilian personnel changes was an overall decrease of 648.

Strength figures for MAAG's and MAAG-Type Commands other than Korea indicated an overall reduction of 2,976 personnel during the year. This reduction, however, was more apparent than real. The combination of COMUSMACV and MAAG Vietnam resulted in a reduction in MAAG personnel allowances of 3,178. However, since the authorization together with personnel manning these billets were transferred to COMUSMACV, there was a corresponding increase in subordinate unified command strengths and no actual savings in personnel. Another factor contributing to overall MAAG strengths was a change in bookkeeping procedures during the year which resulted in Foreign Service Local and Contract Hire Local Personnel being included in strength figures, as opposed to the previous practice of excluding these categories of personnel.

In addition to MAAG Vietnam, reductions were recorded in MAAG Cambodia (-27 (terminated on 10 January 1964)), MAAG China (-97), and MAAG Japan (-33).

Taking the above into consideration, the overall strength changes in MAAG's and MAAG-type activities, not including Korea, were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 JAN 64</th>
<th>31 DEC 64</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>4,905</td>
<td>1,633</td>
<td>-3,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Civilian</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Civilian</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>+296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5,266</td>
<td>2,290</td>
<td>-2,976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personnel strengths of the subordinate unified commands increased from 724 on 1 January to 5,308 at years end, a growth of 4,584. This was primarily attributable to the reorganization in Vietnam in May, at which time MAAG, Vietnam was disestablished and incorporated into COMUSMACV. The continued buildup in Vietnam accounted for the remainder of the increase as the other subordinate unified
commands personnel strength remained static or reflected minor reductions during the year. (5)

PACOM Force Requirements and Deployments

This section sets forth CINCPAC's views on several issues related to requirements and deployments of U.S. forces in PACOM. These accounts portray some of the problems associated with theater deployments, to include political and economic factors which influence the availability of military base sites in the theater.

Strategic Island Concept: In 1960, the CNO recommended that the JCS seek to identify strategically located islands which might have minimal political-economic importance and be sparsely populated. The U.S., he suggested, should negotiate access rights to some of these islands or at least encourage their retention under Western control for future use. The JCS favored the CNO's idea. For one thing, acquiring access rights for some future time would not commit the U.S. to a construction program. Instead, construction could be deferred until circumstances merited it. Also, strategic island bases offered some protection against further loss of U.S. overseas bases because of political changes.

The JCS initially focused attention on the Indian Ocean because of political instability and shrinking British influence there. In February 1964 the U.S. opened negotiations with the United Kingdom for access to certain Indian Ocean islands appropriate for current and future U.S. needs. Subsequently, in July, the JCS asked for CINCPAC's views and comments concerning the expansion of the concept to other parts of the world. 1

CINCPAC's reply listed 49 islands having one or more of the following potential uses. 2

1. JCS 7511 DTG 222153Z Jul 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 100832Z Aug 1964 (TS)
## MAAG AND SERVICE ADVISORY GROUPS PERSONNEL

**PACIFIC COMMAND AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED—BY SERVICE-CATEGORY-GROUP**

**AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1964**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>MC</th>
<th>AF</th>
<th>TOT MIL</th>
<th>US CIV</th>
<th>TOT US PER</th>
<th>LOCAL HIRE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASGD</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASGD</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASGD</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG CHINA</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>194</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAG JAPAN</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROV MAAG KOR</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSWAG PHIL</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSWAG THAI</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO NPO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDT BURMA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILTAG INDO</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPJUSWAG THAI</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB-TOTAL (MAAC'S)</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>413</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARMY ADV GP KOR</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVY ADV GP KOR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF ADV GP KOR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB-TOTAL (SV ADV GP)</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>1,703</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Airfields for strike, surveillance, staging, and support operations.
2. Communications, navigation, and space support sites.
3. Protected anchorage suitable for naval logistic support.
4. War reserve material storage.
5. Fixed underwater and space surveillance sites.

Many of the islands listed were under U.S. administration. In this connection, CINCPAC emphasized that continued U.S. administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was a vital ingredient in the strategic island concept.

**Proposed Withdrawal of a U.S. Infantry Division from Korea**

In 1963 consideration had been given by the JCS and DOD to withdrawing both of the U.S. divisions from Korea as a gold flow measure. In May of 1964 the President signed a National Security Agency (NSA) memorandum which asked the Secretary of State to coordinate a joint STATE-AID-Defense study which would enable him to "weight and resolve the choices facing us with respect to the possible redeployment — to Hawaii — of one of the U.S. divisions now stationed in Korea."¹

The memorandum directed that the study should explore what sequence of U.S. actions — involving economic assistance, military assistance, diplomatic communications, and public statements — would minimize the negative effects and maximize the benefit of such a redeployment. The study was to take into account Korea's military security and short-term political stability, and the long-term U.S. objectives of stimulating sustainable economic expansion and strengthening Korea's social and political institutions. Some of the other guidelines concerning the study were: assess the value to the U.S. military posture to be gained from the redeployment; to estimate

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 272
2. NSAM 298, May 1964 (S)
the balance of payments gain to be realized from withdrawing a division; and estimate the amount of gain which would be offset from an increase in military assistance to the ROK.

On 7 May the JCS passed the text of the NSA Memorandum to CINCPAC and asked him to provide recommendations by 11 May so the study could be finalized for National Security Council consideration on 26 May.¹ The JCS provided specific questions to be answered by CINCPAC; CINCPAC, in turn obtained the recommendations of Component Commanders and COMUS Korea.²-⁴

CINCPAC's comments to the JCS were keyed to the JCS questions; the essentials of his reply are given below.

**Possible Changes in ROK Force Structure and MAP:** The following considerations applied in CINCPAC's reevaluation of the Korea MAP to compensate for the loss of a U.S. division:

There had been no decrease in the threat to Korea, hence, militarily, there was no basis for decrease in

- the overall defensive force requirements; using accepted standards for an infantry division, a U.S. division was equivalent in effectiveness to two ROKA divisions; the U.S. proposal should be as palatable as possible to the ROK; any shift of U.S. forces should be made with as little loss of effectiveness as possible during the change-over period. Guided by the foregoing factors, CINCPAC recommended the following Korea Military Assistance Program.

1. Attain maximum effectiveness of the existing 18 ROKA active infantry divisions by filling authorized TO&E's. Total cost $18.5 million.

2. Convert to active status two ROKA reserve divisions with full authorized TO&E. Total cost $3.7 million.

3. Bring 10 tank battalions to full TO&E. Total cost $2.2 million.

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1. JCS 6199 DTG 072111Z May 1964 (S)
2. CINCPACFLT 092111Z May 1964 (TS)
3. PACAF OFLDC 2254-64 DTG 092343Z May 1964 (S)
4. COMUSK UK 60338 DTG 100842Z May 1964 (S)
4. Complete equipage of six 8" howitzer battalions. Total cost $2.2 million.

5. Complete equipage of ten 155mm howitzer battalions. Total cost $2.4 million.

6. Program the 6th Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-5) to complete JCS tactical fighter objectives during the MA Plan period. Total cost $15.0 million.

7. Provide modern interceptors. Total cost estimated to be $108.0 million for two F-4C squadrons.

8. Program four PCE (patrol craft) to complete JCS objectives during MA Plan period. Total cost $7.2 million.

9. Program 13 MSCs (mine sweepers) to complete JCS objectives during MA Plan period. Total cost $37.4 million.

10. Provide 61 LVTs (landing craft) for ROK marines as replacement for worn out vehicles. Total cost $7.3 million.

11. Suspend for a five year period the planned transfer of consumables from the MAP Program to the ROK budget. 1

The costs associated with the above equipment, plus $35 million to reach an acceptable level of war reserve ammunition in-country and $165 million over a five year period for increased operating costs due to increase in units and equipment, brought the increased cost of building and maintaining an acceptable defense posture in Korea during the FY65-69 plan period to $390.9 million.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Hawaii and other Locations: CINCPAC stated that if the redeployed U.S. division was stationed in Hawaii, the central location would lend flexibility to deployment anywhere in PACOM to participate in contingency plans. Although the cost would be high there would be no adverse flow of gold. However, the disadvantages included poor training areas because of the vast lava beds in the contemplated area on the island of Hawaii and the unsolved problem of an adequate water supply. Another possibility which CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC favored, was stationing the division in the Philippines on real estate located at Clark Air Base.
This would retain the division in a forward position with respect to Korea while greatly enhancing the capability to deploy Army forces to Southeast Asia or elsewhere in WESTPAC. Still other possibilities were one brigade (plus) in the Philippines, one brigade (plus) on the island of Hawaii and division (minus) in CONUS; entire division on Guam; entire division in CONUS or Alaska.

**Appropriate Military Measures to Avoid any Misreading of U.S. Intentions:** CINCPAC recommended that a mobility exercise (MOBEX) be conducted as the first step in a program to test U.S. capabilities for CINCPAC OPLAN 27 (Defense of Korea). He stated that the value to be derived from conducting a MOBEX in Korea would not materially offset the adverse psychological impact in the Republic of Korea of the removal of a U.S. division. Annual MOBEXes, however, would become increasingly significant as a means of portraying the U.S. intent toward the allies and showing the U.S. capabilities to potential enemies. Further display of the firm U.S. resolve toward the defense of Korea could include periodic rotation of one U.S. tactical fighter squadron to Kunsan and rotation of one U.S. F-4C Squadron to Osan.

**The Military Rationale for the Deployment:** Withdrawal of a U.S. division from Korea would incur substantial military risk, unless the withdrawal was fully compensated for by replacement with other equivalent and instantly available combat power. In addition to the tactical risk, CINCUNC's operational control of ROK forces would be jeopardized.

**Time Schedule for Withdrawal:** The National Security Agency memorandum which promulgated the withdrawal study had set possible decision dates as either 1 June or 1 December 1964 and allowed 18 months for the redeployment. CINCPAC provided a withdrawal schedule to meet the allotted time and stated that it could be accomplished in 18 months but would incur disadvantages associated with equipment procurement.
and storage of U.S. division equipment in-country for use if the division should have to be returned in a hurry to meet aggression.

In June the JCS passed on to CINCPAC information from OSD that the National Security council had deferred for several months consideration of redeployment of the division from Korea. In the meantime CINCPAC, acting on JCS directions, was conducting a more comprehensive Pacific site survey and cost study.

**PACOM Force Deployment Studies**

In response to a JCS request, CINCPAC conducted several studies related to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan and the Ryukyus during the years 1966 and 1970. Specifically, the following postulated conditions were examined.

1. Loss of all bases in the Ryukyus.
2. Loss of some bases in Japan.
3. Loss of all bases in Japan.
4. Loss of all bases in Japan and Ryukyus.
5. Loss of all bases in Japan and the Ryukyus with major redeployments to U.S. Territory.

Implications of the force redeployments which would be necessitated by each of these conditions were analyzed from a viewpoint of both cost and impact on strategy.

The studies emphasized the excessive cost involved and the severe impact of such deployment on the forward strategy and U.S. position in the Western Pacific. CINCPAC's response to the JCS included the comment that the U.S. should remain firm and resist any pressures which would force acceptance of the strategic and fiscal disadvantages revealed in these studies.

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1. JCS 6831 DTG 122224Z Jun 1964 (S)
2. JCS 6201 DTG 072113Z May 1964 (S)
3. JCS 6464 DTG 231258Z May 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 000318, 14 Aug 1964 (TS)
Service Jurisdiction Over Iwo Jima

In December of 1963 CINCPACAF, the implementer of Air Force primary ownership jurisdiction of Iwo Jima, recommended to CINCPACFLT that this jurisdiction be transferred to the Navy or Coast Guard. CINCPACAF based the recommendation on Navy wartime requirements and suggested that the Navy and Coast Guard were the predominant peacetime users.¹ CINCPACAF asked CINCPAC to support the transfer of jurisdiction.² 

CINCPACFLT felt that the limited Navy peacetime usage of Iwo Jima for occasional aircraft in support of Chichi Jima did not qualify the Navy as the predominant user.³ In addition, CINCPACFLT and CNO stated that they had no mobilization requirements for Iwo Jima. CINCPAC desired to retain Iwo Jima as a PACOM installation because of its strategic location and thought it particularly valuable as an emergency and back-up air base.⁴ 

CINCPAC recognized that the use of Iwo Jima filled no existing requirements of a pressing nature for any single service but stated that its retention as a potential military base was in the national interest. He found no reason for shifting primary ownership jurisdiction from the Air Force to another service.

CINCPAC Requirements for Johnson Island

CINCPACAF, in May, asked for a statement of CINCPAC's current requirements for Johnson Island. After consulting his other Component Commanders, CINCPAC announced his requirements for the island as base supporting facilities for chemical weapons as well as a staging base facility and alternate airfield for PACOM augmentation aircraft transiting the Pacific.⁵,⁶

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1. PACAF ltr PFLDP, subj: Base Development Plan Iwo Jima, 10 Dec 1964 (S)
2. PACAF 1st Ind (DFLDP), 10 Dec 1963 to CINCPAC ltr ser 001167, 12 Nov 1963 (S)
3. CINCPACFLT 250031Z Jan 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 270108Z May 1964 (S)
5. PACAF PFLDC 4194-64 DTG 050456Z May 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC 120227Z Jun 1964 (S)
ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE CINCPAC STAFF ORGANIZATION

CINCPACREP to Strategic Air Command (SAC)

The tense situation in Southeast Asia in the summer and fall of 1964 gave impetus to any measure enhancing planning and coordination for strategic forces which might be deployed in PACOM emergencies. Thus, in October, CINCPAC created the Office of Commander in Chief Pacific Representative (CINCPACREP) to Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC).

The mission of CINCPACREP SAC was to assist CINCPAC in coordinating matters of common interest with CINCSAC which arose from, or bore upon, planning and operations in the PACOM. On a day-to-day basis CINCPACREP SAC would facilitate staff coordination related to plans involving SAC and promote the expeditious exchange of operational and other information.

CINCPAC assigned the position of CINCPACREP SAC as an additional duty to his representative to the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (CINCPACREP JSTPS) located at Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska. This officer was Rear Admiral J. A. Jaap. Admiral Sharp, however, reserved to himself the authority for final concurrence in conceptual or policy matters related to SAC.\(^1\),\(^2\)

CINCSPIKE Liaison Officer to CINCPAC

Late in the year a liaison officer from the U.S. Strike Command was assigned to Admiral Sharp's staff. His primary mission consisted of the following three functions:

1. As directed by CINCSPIKE, assure the coordination of contingency support, augmentation and special war plans, and joint exercise plans.

2. As directed by CINCSPIKE, assist in the coordination of operations, exercises, communications, and training requirements of the U.S. Strike Command.

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1. CINCPAC Instr 3020.8, subj: Establishment of the Office of CINCPACREP to SAC, 27 Oct 1964 (U)
2. CINCPACJ01Memo121-64, subj: CINCPACREP SAC, 20 Nov 1964 (U)
3. Provide coordination in the development of joint doctrine, policies, and agreements.

CINCPAC integrated the Liaison Officer (an Army Lieutenant Colonel) as a working member of his staff to assist, as far as his liaison duties would permit, in planning. The staff was directed to coordinate directly with the Liaison Officer and to furnish him information on matters which were of interest to, or required coordination with, CINCSRIKE. 1

Shift of Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Functions

On 1 October CINCPAC transferred the CINCPAC staff function for PACOM management of Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy activities from the J2 Plans and Policy Branch (J21) to the J2 Target Intelligence Branch (J24). The change was prompted by a desire to enhance staff coordination and to conform with a similar functional grouping in the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Combining of Intelligence Branch and Operational Intelligence Branch

In 1964 CINCPAC combined two branches of his Intelligence Division into one branch called the Intelligence Branch. The internal reorganization brought together the existing Intelligence Branch, which provided the intelligence analytical capability of the Division, and the Operational Intelligence Branch, which performed the current intelligence and indications function.

The merger was made primarily because the functions of the two branches were dependent upon each other and better coordination would be promoted through the union.... For an analyst to be effective it was necessary that he be aware of the very latest current intelligence. For a current intelligence indications officer to be effective, he required the detailed backup the analyst could furnish him. Since the two had to work hand in glove in order to furnish CINCPAC and PACOM

1. CINCPAC J01 Memo subj: CINCSRIKE Liaison Officer to Headquarters CINCPAC, 28 Oct 1964 (U)
with the best possible intelligence, it was logical to put them under the same branch chief. (U)

The administrative and operational functions of special intelligence and the Special Projects Office (clearances, security, physical handling of Special Intelligence messages) was taken from the Operational Intelligence Branch and placed in a separate section reporting to the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence. (U)

The reorganization was similar to one recommended by the JCS Manpower Survey Team. While the reorganization did not change the existing manpower figures for the Division, CINCPAC was prepared to identify six spaces, as a result of the merger, which could be deleted if the JCS Manpower Team's recommendations were approved. (U)

Automation of Key Indigenous Persons Program Data

In 1958 the JCS published a directive to the Service Departments and Unified Commands which provided guidance for the nomination and planning for evacuation of selected key indigenous persons. The intent of this directive was to initiate planning for the evacuation of selected key persons from foreign areas in the event of an emergency. By so doing their services might be utilized by the U.S. and/or denied to the enemy. Selected key indigenous persons were those military, political, scientific, technical, cultural and other leaders or experts whose utilization and/or denial would contribute significantly to U.S. security. Commanders concerned were to nominate individuals on a continuing basis to the JCS by filling in a blank form with various personal information concerning the nominated individual. After a JCS review and approval, the forms were returned to the nominating commander who then planned for the evacuation and utilization of the key persons.

In 1964 CINCPAC reviewed all JCS papers relating to the Key Indigenous Persons Program and determined that the existing reporting procedures and methods of maintaining required information were

1. JCS SM 46-58, 10 Sep 1958 (S)
cumbersome, time-consuming, and ineffective. Accordingly, in recognition of the need for a better method, a key punch card system was developed. As of mid-February all personal data held by CINCPAC on approved and nominated persons was converted to key punch cards. Also, Annex L, Evacuation of Key Indigenous Persons (C), to CINCPAC OPLAN 60-64 was published and provided that machine listings would be used in reporting changes in personal data to CINCPAC. CINCPAC recommended to the Defense Intelligence Agency that key punch cards and machine listings be adopted for world wide usage in the Key Indigenous Persons Program.  

Disestablishment of Cold War Activities Group

In April the Cold War Activities Group, established within CINCPAC Headquarters in 1958, was disestablished. The function of the group had been to solicit and originate ideas for CINCPAC action which would contribute toward achievement of U.S. cold war objectives. In the interim from 1958 to 1964, however, the concept of military activities in the cold war had been broadened to the extent that it became one of three bands of the spectrum of war as envisioned in JCS planning documents. These three bands were cold war, limited war, and general war.

Cold war military activities, under the existing concept, included counterinsurgency as well as other military activities short of limited war. Because of the expansion of cold war activities in the military picture, an evolvement occurred whereby they became properly handled as routine staff actions. Also discontinued in 1964 was the JCS requirement of CINCPAC to submit a Cold War Activities Report. CINCPAC in turn, discontinued the requirement for a similar report from PACOM subordinate commanders.

1. CINCPAC ltr 3800 ser 00259, 26 Feb 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC Instr 03410.1, 25 Feb 1958 (C)
3. CINCPAC Note 3410 (J3), 15 Apr 1964 (U)
4. JCS 5739 DTG 081343Z Apr 1964 (S)
5. ADMINO CINCPAC 140459Z Apr 1964 (C)
CINCPAC Staff Authorized Strength

As the result of JCS actions on the CINCPAC 1 July 1963 JTD, the CINCPAC Staff increased from 643 to 652 during the year. Following a JCS manpower survey of the staff in July and August, and a subsequent CINCPAC reclama, the CINCPAC Staff authorized strength was increased an additional thirteen spaces. However, this had not been reflected in the assigned strength at the end of the year. 1

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Change of Service Designations

The JCS, in October, approved a CINCPAC recommendation that the Chief JUSMAG Philippines JTD billet be converted from Air Force to Army. 2 The change would be effective 1May 1965 and the grade of Major General was being retained.

The position of Chief MAAG China was also being changed. In December CINCPAC recommended that upon Air Force Major General K. O. Sanborn's rotation in the summer of 1965, an Army Major General accede to his position as Chief MAAG China. 3 The basis of CINCPAC's recommendation was the need for normal rotation of the billet to a different service. Since COMUS Taiwan Defense Command was a Navy Flag Officer, Army was in line for the Chief MAAG China billet.

Another change, occurring in later 1963 but not noted in the 1963 CINCPAC History, was the JCS approval of converting the billet of Chief MAAG Japan from Army Brigadier General to Navy Rear Admiral. 4, 5

Terms of Reference for COMUS Japan

As a matter related to development of revised Terms of Reference, COMUS Japan asked that his responsibilities for dealing with the

1. JCS SM 1786-64, 23 Nov 1964 (S)
2. JCS 1088 DTG 221909Z Oct 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 182234Z Dec 1964 (C)
4. JCS 3710 DTG 271350Z Nov 1963 (C)
5. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 128
Government of Japan be re-examined and clarified in view of the current authority of CHMAAG Japan to also deal with the Japanese Government as the Secretary of Defense's representative. However, CINCPAC decided to take no action to revise either COMUS Japan or CHMAAG Japan Terms of Reference.

Memorandum of Agreement Between CINCPAC and CINCAL

In September 1961 CINCPAC and CINCAL concluded an agreement relative to responsibilities in Alaskan waters and the Bering Sea. Operations under this agreement had revealed a need for further resolution of aerial reconnaissance responsibilities but over a period of time an informal working arrangement was devised with satisfactory results. In April 1964 CINCAL suggested revising the existing agreement. CINCPAC concurred and the two Commanders in Chief jointly approved a new agreement on 29 June 1964.

Under the agreement CINCPAC was to coordinate all reconnaissance flights over the Pacific Ocean area south of a line extending from 54° 45'N., 162°E., to 41°N., 176°E., and thence to 55°N., 130°W. CINCAL, in turn, was to coordinate all reconnaissance flights in the area north of this line. In the event that aircraft of either Commander in Chief were to reconnoiter in the other's primary area of aerial reconnaissance he would coordinate with his counterpart. (CINCPAC's coordinating agent was to be PACAF; CINCAL's was to be the Alaskan Air Command). The revised agreement also provided that CINCPAC would retain operational control of PACOM aircraft reconnoitering north of the newly established line—even when the flight was included in CINCAL's monthly reconnaissance schedule.

1. COMUS Japan ltr to AC/S Plans, CINCPAC, 24 Aug 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 0713, 1 Oct 1964 (C)
3. CINCAL ltr, J-3/5, 14 Apr 1964 with attachment (C)
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 252355Z Apr 1964 (C)
5. Memorandum of Agreement Between Commander in Chief Pacific and Commander in Chief Alaska Concerning Responsibilities in Alaskan Waters and Bering Sea, Naval Stations Kodiak and Adak, 29 Jun 1964 (C)
Consideration of Establishing a MAAG Korea

Late in 1963 CINCPAC considered the establishment of a conventional MAAG Korea to replace the Korean Service Advisory Groups as then constituted. Component Commanders and COMUS Korea were solicited in 1964 for their views on the change. They objected, and in view of possible reduction in effectiveness of CINC United Nations Command operational control over ROK forces, CINCPAC advised commands concerned that no further action was contemplated. However, CINCPAC stipulated that should significant changes occur in U.S. and ROK Armed Forces operational relationships, or should later developments in the MAP for Korea dictate, the proposal would be reexamined.

Split of COMUSMACV/COMUSMACTHAI into Separate Commands

In early 1964 Air Chief Marshall Dawee, Thailand Chief of Staff, Supreme Command Headquarters, hinted that the Thais were dissatisfied with U.S. command arrangements whereby Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) was resident in Saigon in his other capacity as COMUSMACV. In June, Colonel Thanat, Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs, initiated a discussion on this matter with the U.S. Secretary of State. Thanat expressed concern of the Thai government over so-called "multiplicity of U.S. command channels in Thailand." Subsequent investigation by Ambassador Martin and discussions between the Ambassador, Prime Minister Thanom and Air Chief Marshall Dawee, revealed that the real Thai concern was based on the double-hatting of COMUSMACV as COMUSMACTHAI, thus indirectly identifying U.S. actions in South Vietnam with those in Thailand.

1. COMUS Korea ltr, 31 Jun 1964 (S)
2. CINCUSARPAC ltr, 27 Jul 1964 (S)
3. CINCPACAF 170442Z Jul 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 220104Z Sep 1964 (S)
5. CINCPACFLT ltr ser 63/00530, 17 Jul 1964 (S)
Ambassador Martin explored several alternative solutions to the command problem.\textsuperscript{1} From a number of possible options, the one considered most advantageous at that time would have resulted in the designation of CHJUSMAGTHAI (Major General Easterbrook) as COMUSMACTHAI upon the detachment of General Harkins as COMUSMACV/THAI. Ambassador Martin proposed that the change be implemented through an exchange of notes between the Embassy and the Thai Defense Minister. Admiral Felt, General Harkins and General Westmoreland all concurred in this solution. General Westmoreland further recommended the establishment of COMUSSEASIA to exercise command over both COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI. Ambassador Taylor concurred in the desirability of splitting MACV and MACTHAI into two separate commands, and urged action as a matter of priority.

CINCPAC proposed still an additional variant, wherein MACTHAI would be disestablished and CHJUSMAGTHAI would revert to his earlier status as the single U.S. military representative in Thailand.

Ambassador Martin asked for an early decision in August, noting that until some action was taken it would be politically embarrassing for General Westmoreland to visit Thailand.\textsuperscript{2} During a concurrent trip to Thailand, CINCPAC (by now Admiral Sharp) discussed this command problem with Thanom and Dawee, both of whom reaffirmed their earlier desire that the commands be split. CINCPAC advised the JCS of his discussions, and recommended that the U.S. proceed with the changes in an effort to reinforce Thai cooperation in Southeast Asia planning matters.\textsuperscript{3} CINCPAC also noted that the proposed change would free COMUSMACV for primary attention to the problems in South Vietnam.

On 20 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCPAC that the Secretary of Defense had decided to defer action on any change to

\textsuperscript{1} BANGKOK 2161 to STATE
\textsuperscript{2} BANGKOK 120 to STATE
\textsuperscript{3} CINCPAC 050744Z Aug 1964 (S)
the existing command structure. In so doing the Secretary of Defense noted that inasmuch as the JCS were of the opinion that the existing command arrangements were preferable from a military standpoint, and in view of the fact that it was not fully evident that the proposed change would solve the political problem which gave rise to the proposal, retention of the existing command structure seemed prudent.

Coordinating Committee for U.S. Missions Southeast Asia (SEACoord)

In early September Ambassador Taylor expressed concern over the problems which he foresaw in the coordination of political and military actions in Southeast Asia. He was particularly concerned that national policy decisions were being implemented by separate actions of the American Embassies in Saigon, Bangkok and Vientiane, as well as by COMUSMACV, the Seventh Fleet, and the military forces of host countries. He suggested creation of coordination machinery to ensure smooth functioning of the whole.

Without a formal charter, the Ambassadors to Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos convened in Saigon for an organizing session, on 8 October 1964. On 10 October Ambassador Taylor forwarded to the State Department draft Terms of Reference (TOR) for a new committee. The committee was to be known as the "coordinating Committee for U.S. Missions Southeast Asia, SEACoord," and would coordinate "political recommendations and military operational matters affecting more than one mission." A military component of SEACoord would be established, known as SEAMIL.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the draft TOR for SEACoord at their meeting on 12 October and requested the comments of CINCPAC thereon. CINCPAC\(^2\),\(^3\) recommended that the committee limit its functions to policy recommendations and political actions, without direct involvement in military operational matters. CINCPAC

1. JCS 002142 DTG 202319Z Nov 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 192305Z Oct 1964 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 230010Z Oct 1964 (TS)
questioned the need for a separate military committee (SEAMIL), in view of the existing command structure already in place and functioning well. At their meeting on 4 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff acted on the subject of SEACoord, advising the Secretary of Defense, inter alia, that they viewed "Southeast Asia as a militarily strategic entity." The established and planned military structure reflected this view and provided effective military command arrangements responsive to the existing and anticipated situations in the area. However, they recognized the necessity for political coordination and for the established military structure to provide advice and information. The JCS also provided SECDEF with recommended changes to the charter of both SEACoord and SEAMIL, all of which were in consonance with the changes recommended by CINCPAC.

SEACoord had its first formal meeting on 5-6 November. General Hunter Harris, CINCPACAF, attended the meeting as the personal representative of CINCPAC and General W. C. Westmoreland attended as the Subordinate Unified Commander in Vietnam. Following this meeting Ambassador Taylor advised that in view of the political-military composition of SEACoord, and in light of past experience, it had been determined that no need existed for a separate military committee. It was his intention to use ad hoc military staff backup for SEACoord deliberations. The proposed Terms of Reference for SEAMIL were withdrawn.

On 9 December, SECDEF informed the JCS that he considered the establishment of SEACoord in no way changed the existing command relationships in the established chain of command for the coordination of military operations. Accordingly, he saw no need for any change in the Terms of Reference submitted by the Ambassador.²

1. JCSM 935-64, 4 Nov 1964 (TS)
2. SECDEF Memo, 9 Dec 1964 (JCS 2339/142-5) (TS)
CINCPAC ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE COMMAND FACILITIES AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES

During 1964 CINCPAC's Phase II Automatic Data Processing System became a reality. Other actions were taken on Command Facility and Command and Control projects. This section represents, for the most part, a continuation report on projects initially taken up in the CINCPAC Command History of 1963.

CINCPAC ADP System

CINCPAC's Phase II Automatic Data Processing (ADP) system was installed in April and accepted for operational use on 1 June. The system consisted of four large Control Data Corporation 1604A computers and five 160A computers manufactured by the same company. Throughout the remainder of 1964 it provided limited support to CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and COMSERV PAC as well as the Defense Communications Agency – Pacific and an Air Force weather unit.

The system was expected to be used more extensively as additional computer programs were completed, tested, and turned over to CINCPAC. System capabilities, as of the end of 1964, were limited by an insufficient number of tape drive units and by system support program deficiencies. Improved system support program packages were expected to be available by mid-1965. Eight disc file units would be installed and operable during 1965 also.

The interim Phase I system (IBM 704/1401), tentatively scheduled for removal in November 1964, was retained pending the successful conversion of all CINCPAC ADP programs currently operational on the interim system. Removal of the IBM 704 and 1401 equipment was re-planned for June 1965, contingent on status of conversion efforts at that time.

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 26
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 27
CINCPAC Airborne Command Post

Early in 1964 CINCPAC informed the JCS that the Airborne Emergency Communications Post (AECP) was his third priority need for command facilities. CINCPAC indicated that the basic C-135B aircraft would satisfy his AECP requirements.

The JCS asked the Secretary of Defense to approve in principle both CINCPAC and USCINCEUR airborne command post requirements. The JCS noted that six aircraft could be funded in each of the year's FY66 and FY67, and eight could be funded in FY68. Upon direction of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS and Air Force jointly took action to prepare a FY66 Program Change Proposal for the Airborne Emergency Communications Post aircraft and equipment.

The Secretary of Defense, in March, changed the outlook on Airborne Command Posts (ACPs) by asking the JCS to consider the requirement for ACPs on a world-wide, single package basis. The Secretary of Defense wanted to attain the greatest effectiveness in allocation of the total available aircraft for the various existing requirements, plus attaining the best prices in procurement of new aircraft. Under the new outlook CINCPAC endorsed the allocation of KC-135A aircraft with maintenance crews, flight crews, and emergency action staff personnel; "as package to PACOM at earliest practicable date." CINCPAC felt that existence of the ACP would permit development of continuity of operations procedures and perhaps permit the eventual disestablishment of the CINCPAC alternate command center at Guam.

The JCS, in July, forwarded to CINCPAC a Defense Communications Systems study on ground communications environment to support the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post. The JCS stated that the actual

1. CINCPAC 042227Z Jan 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 17
3. JCS 1800/790-2 of 22 Jan 1964 (with SM-47-64 attached (S))
4. JCS 1800/816-1 of 12 Mar 1964 (with JCSM 210-64 attached (S))
5. CINCPACAF PFCVC 285 DTG 101902Z Apr 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC 180211Z Apr 1964 (S)
communications plan would be developed in coordination with the Services and CINCPAC.\textsuperscript{1,2} CINCPAC did not agree with some items contained in the Defense Communications Systems plan and provided the JCS with more definitive views pertaining to both CINCPAC Airborne Command Post concepts and the ground communications support environment.\textsuperscript{3}

During 1964 the concept of an Airborne Emergency Communications Post had gradually evolved into that of an Airborne Command Post. CINCPAC clarified this aspect in October, stating that the ACP would be operated as a continuously airborne facility, appropriately manned and capable of initiating execution of CINCPAC war plans and maintaining required force and weapons status.\textsuperscript{4} The concept was officially changed from an emergency communications post to that of a full-fledged airborne command post.\textsuperscript{5} These were factors that influenced the change:

1. Realization that an afloat capability could not be achieved in the same time frame as an airborne facility.

2. Increased knowledge of the type, number, and configuration of the aircraft to be made available, together with a better appreciation of ACP capabilities.

3. An ACP, with suitable ground communications, offered a quick response capability in the event loss of facilities or deteriorating conditions required CINCPAC command and control to move westward.

Midway would provide communications entry into the trans-Pacific cables; however, continuous support of the ACP

1. JCS 2308/278-1 of 22 Jul 64 (S)
2. JCS 8016 DTG 210033Z Aug 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 281854Z Sep 1964 (C)
4. CINCPAC 020347Z Oct 1964 (S)
5. CINCPAC 121105Z Oct 1964 (S)
could not be maintained at Midway and further westward movement of the ACP would probably be effected. For survivability, additional communications facilities would be located in the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan. Five ACP aircraft would be based at Hickam AFB under normal conditions, with dispersal probable at higher than normal DEFCONS. Ground personnel and normal flight crews, augmented by two radio operators, one switchboard operator, and one teletype operator for each crew, would be provided by the Air Force. CINCPAC would provide five teams consisting of a Command Representative, an Emergency Action Operations Officer, a Logistics Officer, an Operations NCO, and an enlisted Intelligence Specialist. This added up to thirty-five additional personnel required for the CINCPAC Staff. 1

In October the Secretary of Defense approved the allocation of airborne command post aircraft to CINCPAC and USCINCEUR. Five KC-135As, modified to provide Post Attack Command and Control System capabilities, including KW-7 crypto equipment, were scheduled for delivery to CINCPAC by 1 September 1965. 2 Instructions were issued by the Chief of Staff, Air Force, relative to necessary improvements to the aircraft, communications equipment to be installed, and placement of UHF/FM multiplex vans, as well as improvement of certain ground HF/Single-Side-Band installations. PACAF was requested to provide a unit designation and submit manning requirements for the unit which would maintain and operate CINCPAC aircraft. 3

CINCPAC's ground support communications environment in support of the ACP was resolved in October by a working group composed of representatives of JCS, Defense Communications Agency, USAF, and CINCPAC. 4 The JCS directed Defense Communications Agency to review the communications plan drafted by this working group and submit it to the JCS. 5

Concepts of the completed

1. CINCPAC 121105Z Oct 1964 (S)
2. CSAF AFOCC 8531 DTG 282333Z Oct 1964 (S)
3. Ibid.
4. JCS 9286 DTG 011555Z Oct 1964 (C)
5. JCS 9201 DTG 141953Z Oct 1964 (U)
communication plan are contained in Appendix C.

When the year closed, neither the ACP concept of operations nor a requested increase of 35 personnel for the CINCPAC Staff had been approved by the JCS.

**Protective Construction Project**

Construction to increase the protection from blast damage of CINCPAC's Operations Center [redacted] was begun in 1964.

Although the project was removed by the House Armed Services Committee from the FY65 Military Construction Program, a successful reclama was made to the Senate Armed Services Committee. The [redacted] was resolved in late 1963 and construction began in May 1964. Work was expected to be complete by 1 June 1965.

**Secure Television and Data Link System**

CINCPAC's secure television requirements, for a link between Camp Smith and the Operations Center [redacted], were first submitted to CNO in October 1961. CINCPAC set the date upon which the equipment was needed for use as being 1 January 1963.\(^1\),\(^2\)

The CNO reviewed the requirement and coordinated with the Bureau of Ships (BUSHIPS) to install a developmental system which would be tested and evaluated prior to procurement of production equipment.\(^3\) BUSHIPS planned to install a prototype system in November 1962, testing and evaluating the entire system from January through June 1963. However, because the key generator (TSEC/KG-24 (V-1)), [redacted] did not become available as scheduled, an operational evaluation was delayed.\(^4\)

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1. CINCPAC LTR 746211Z Oct 1961 (C)
2. CINCPAC LTR 082316Z Nov 1961 (C)
3. CNO Ltr ser 0216036, 18 Dec 1961 (C)
4. BUSHIPS Ltr ser 507E-001674 of 28 Nov 1962 (S)
The secure system was finally installed in late 1963 and operational testing and evaluation commenced in early 1964.  

In May the Bureau of Ships proposed a number of solutions but all were beyond the scope of the existing project. A plan was finally devised by BUSHIPS whereby the newly installed data link system (AN/UYQ-1 (XN-1)), would be isolated from the existing closed circuit television system (AN/GXQ-3) thereby making the data link secure. CNO stated his intention of following this plan and requested BUSHIPS to reprogram $50,000 for this purpose from existing Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation funds.  

Subsequently, in August, action was deferred while CINCPAC reviewed the operational requirements for system improvements.  

CINCPAC's review reaffirmed the requirement for secure television but it was decided that the ultimate extent of utilization could not be realistically appraised until the system was operational. CINCPAC stated that it was becoming more evident every day that, if the potential of the newly installed nine-computer complex was to be realized, specific requirements for the television and data link were stated by CINCPAC as follows:

1. Full duplex secure video communications with picture quality at least equal to normal television standards.  
2. A remote digital input/output query capability  
3. A digital card transceiver capability between  
4. High speed printout at Camp Smith of digital data read from magnetic tape  
5. Two-way secure facsimile system.

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1. BUSHIPS ltr ser 607B-001874 of 28 Nov 1962 (S)  
2. CNO ltr ser 003018P72 of 12 Jun 1964 (S)  
3. CNO ltr ser 03069P72 of 31 Aug 1964 (C)  
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 0815 of 2 Nov 1964 (C)
In meeting these requirements, CINCPAC suggested that CNO consider a two-phase approach. The first phase would be an off-line capability providing (1) input/output typewriting, high speed printing and card transceiving capabilities at Camp Smith, (2) input/output typewriting, magnetic tape input to the high speed printer at Camp Smith and card transceiving capability and (3) manual switching equipment necessary to connect the various television and digital data equipment to the data link. The second phase would be an on-line system providing direct communications with the computer system from one or more locations at Camp Smith.

In response to CINCPAC's statement of requirements CNO directed the Bureau of Ships to provide a full duplex secure video communications system at an estimated cost of $200,000, and to initiate a feasibility study on the remaining items. ¹

**PACOM Alternate Command Center Afloat**

No change in the Alternate Command Center Afloat project occurred during 1964. ²

CINCPAC stated, in January, that was the only command and control facility project of higher priority than the Afloat Center. ³ However, in October, the airborne emergency communications post concept officially changed to a requirement for an airborne command post. CINCPAC then inferred that the Airborne Command Post had become a higher priority, stating that "an afloat capability could not be achieved in the same time frame as an airborne facility." ⁴, ⁵

**Project for Relocation of CINCPAC Headquarters**

To reduce the vulnerability of the staff and have it readily available for emergencies, CINCPAC initiated a project in early 1962 to build a

1. CNO 201347Z Nov 1964 (C)
2. See CINCPAC Command History, 1963, for background on Alternate Command Center Afloat.
3. CINCPAC 042227Z Jan 1964 (S)
4. Ibid.
5. CINCPAC 121105Z Oct 1964 (S)
In 1964, Congressional committees did not authorize construction of the new headquarters. The project was approved, however, by the Secretary of Defense as part of the FY66 DOD Military Construction program.

CINCPAC, in 1963, estimated that considerable savings would accrue from consolidating the headquarters. In 1964 CINCPAC revised the estimates to reflect even more substantial savings. CINCPAC provided CNO, who was to sponsor the project, substantiating material to prove the building cost of about $2,000,000 could be recouped in less than two years. CINCPAC estimated, for example, that a move would permit a staff reduction of 14 officers and 41 enlisted personnel. This would be accomplished by eliminating the communication center at Camp Smith and the duplicate emergency action teams at the two locations. The reduction of electronic equipment maintenance and rental costs at Camp Smith would save about $88,000 per year, while building maintenance and staff operating costs would be reduced by another $122,000 per year. One-time savings, from the elimination of secure voice, data and facsimile links from Camp Smith, would be about $255,000. In addition, approximately $500,000 worth of government owned communications terminal equipment could be made available for other requirements.

Senior Staff Officers Command and Control System Advisory Board

CINCPAC established, in December, a Senior Staff Officers Command and Control System Advisory Board. The primary purpose was to provide guidance and direction to the Director, Command and Control System Group in the development and management of the PACOM Command and Control System, and to keep Assistant Chiefs of Staff and Heads of Independent Offices apprised of the status of the CINCPAC system.

1. For background on above ground headquarters see CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 23
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 24
3. CINCPAC Staff Instr 5420.18
In addition to the above, specific functions were assigned to the board as follows:

1. To broaden staff knowledge of CINCPAC Command and Control System capabilities, thereby assuring effective utilization of a multi-million dollar investment.
2. To determine system objectives.
3. To establish Command and Control policy.
4. To develop solutions in problem areas.

PACOM FORCE OBJECTIVES

Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

Annually the JCS developed and distributed a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). The document translated, for a future period, the United States national objectives and policies into military objectives. It also prescribed strategic concepts for the employment of forces, and defined the basic undertakings to achieve those objectives. The JSOP information and planning guidance applied to conditions of cold, limited, and general war, and one portion of it prescribed the PACOM force structure.

Beginning in 1963 the JCS had solicited the recommendations and supporting rationale of the Commanders in Chief of unified and specified commands for the forces they considered appropriate to their mission. None the less, the subsequent publication of the force tabulation for the JSOP seldom reflected the force as recommended by CINCPAC and the other Commanders in Chief; rather, it presented the force which the JCS considered feasible when all factors, from the national level, had been considered. For example few of the changes in his force objective that CINCPAC had recommended in connection with JSOP-69 were reflected in Part VI, Force Tabulations, of the plan when it was later promulgated. ¹

¹ Compare Part VI JSOP 69 with CINCPAC Command History, 1963, pp 28-33, 43-44.
JSOP 70

Parts I-V of JSOP 70 reached CINCPAC on 13 August 1964 and covered the period July 1969 to 30 June 1974. These documents were, in the main, similar to JSOP 69. The strategic concept contained in the plan combined, as in previous years, a strategy of flexible and controlled military action to counter any threat posed by an enemy power. Prominent among the factors recognized as influencing the strategic environment were: a downward appraisal of the Soviet conventional threat, a growth in Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear forces, the troubled political relationship between NATO powers, an improved U.S. capability to deploy forces, a developing situation of approximate mutual deterrence between the U.S. and the USSR, and an increased evolution of new centers of communist influence.

The JSOP 70 concept of employing forces in the Western Pacific was similar to JSOP 69 and previous years. It was to hold in Southeast Asia as far forward as possible and along the general line Philippines-Taiwan-Okinawa, South Korea, and Japan. In conjunction with that, the U.S. was to control the Straits of Malacca, South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, Japan Sea, Bering Sea, and Bering Strait. The plan recognized that maintenance and control of bases, resources, and lines of communications in the Pacific were necessary to meet this concept and to prepare for ultimate offensive operations.

CINCPAC's basic undertakings were grouped under the headings of cold, limited, and general war. His cold war undertakings demanded a high state of readiness to apply a broad spectrum of action to protect U.S. interests throughout the Pacific area, the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean, and their contiguous waters. If events led to a condition of limited war, CINCPAC was to undertake additional defensive and offensive action to protect interests directly related to the U.S., or to protect interests with which the U.S. was associated by international agreements such as SEATO or the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.
He was to use all means to hold, in conjunction with allies, the line Southeast Asia (as far forward as possible), Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, South Korea. 1 CINCPAC was also to exploit offensive possibilities and help defend Taiwan, the Penghus, Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand. Further, CINCPAC was to assist indigenous forces in containing Chinese Communist and Soviet forces and neutralizing their support bases. As a collateral undertaking CINCPAC was to support CINCORAD/CINCONAD and provide military forces to meet national commitments in the Canada-U.S. Regional Area.

With the receipt of JSOP 70, CINCPAC's task was to recommend to the JCS a PACOM force level for the period of the plan. 2, 3 As in 1963, he consulted his Component Commanders for recommendations which would serve as a point of departure in developing a CINCPAC response. CINCPAC recommended that the Component Commanders use the Free World Forces structure reflected in Annex J to JSOP 69, and the general terms of the enemy threat as it was outlined in parts I-V of JSOP 70, for guidance in computing their force structure. Overall, the development of the U.S. force level for JSOP 70 was considered easier than the same task for JSOP 69 since there was no requirement to evolve a force to support a specific limited war situation as there had been in the previous year. 4, 5

After giving due consideration to the comments of the PACOM Component Commanders, and in accordance with the format prescribed by the JCS, CINCPAC submitted his recommendation for PACOM force levels under the following primary headings:

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1. Defense of Korea not to prejudice the retention of Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines.
2. JCS SM 1282-64 of 7 Aug 1964 (TS)
3. JCS 8177 DTG 211950Z Aug 1964 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 180135Z Aug 1964 (TS)
5. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 28
6. CINCPAC ltr 3121 ser 000374 subj: Recommended PACOM U.S. Forces for JSOP 70 (U) of 28 Sep 1964 (TS)
1. Peacetime deployments in PACOM for the end of each fiscal year from 1965 through 1974.

2. General War Force Expansion in PACOM, with an assumed M-Day of 1 July 1969.

Under each of the above headings CINCPAC submitted a "required" and "reasonably attainable" force objective. The required force levels, which might be considered the optimum force required to accomplish the assigned basic undertakings, were based on military considerations only. This portion of CINCPAC's recommendation also included a rationale to justify the required force levels.

Recognizing that the required force levels might be of a magnitude that precluded any reasonable expectation of attainment, CINCPAC's reasonably attainable force objectives took cognizance of known and anticipated limiting factors imposed by military, political, economic, and other considerations. The reasonably attainable force objectives were normally smaller than the required force levels and, again in line with JCS instructions, CINCPAC provided a statement of the risk associated with the reasonably attainable force levels.

The following summary presents some of the more significant aspects of CINCPAC's recommended force levels for JSOP 70.

Army:

**Peacetime**: As in the previous year, CINCPAC considered four Army divisions as the required peacetime force that should be deployed in PACOM, to include, as it had in 1963, a division force stationed in the Philippines. However, in his recommendation for a reasonably attainable peacetime force objective, he deleted the division force in the Philippines because of the balance of payments impact and political considerations. As to the risk associated with that reduction, he cited:
1. The absence of a deterrent effect that a major element of American military ground force could provide to communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

2. The absence of the stabilizing effect which the force could provide in the Indonesia-Malaysian quarrel.

3. A slower reaction time for a major U.S. ground reinforcement to Southeast Asia, thus limiting the options available to American policy makers in the event of overt communist aggression.

**General War** - Admiral Sharp considered that four divisions, augmented by one more six months after M-Day, was the required Army force expansion for general war. But for the reasonably attainable force expansion objective he recommended only three divisions, the same number deployed in PACOM during 1964. However, CINCPAC believed that with the reduced force the U.S. would risk being forced out of Korea if the Communists preempted and their initial attacks were particularly destructive. At the least, he predicted a serious reduction in the U.S. capability to launch a timely counteroffensive.

**Navy and Marine Corps** - CINCPAC recommended only nine Fleet Ballistic Missile submarines for a reasonably attainable peacetime force as opposed to the 13-16 which he believed to be the optimum number for cold war deployments. His basis for this was that the SSBN physical facilities planned for the PACOM would support no greater force.

Admiral Sharp recommended ten Attack Carrier Strike Groups for a reasonably attainable peacetime force objective in comparison to the twelve he considered as an optimum number; but he noted that each CVA deleted would cost a sustained average of 100-125 sorties per day. Other reductions reflected in the reasonably attainable peacetime force, in CINCPAC's judgement, risked the loss of the ability to cope with the submarine threat and compromised the
deterrent effect of the Navy and Marine forces in PACOM.

Air Force: In his supporting rationale for the required USAF force levels in PACOM, Admiral Sharp observed that he considered the force reasonably attainable from a cost standpoint and as logistically supportable. He also stated that his recommendation represented the minimum force required to accomplish the essential tasks inherent in the strategy, concepts, and basic undertakings of JSOP 70 after taking into consideration the many operational factors involved and making due allowances for acceptable risks.

In relation to the reasonably attainable PACAF peacetime deployments, CINCPAC pointed out that his recommendation was, with the exception of mid-range ballistic missile squadrons, the same as that he considered the required force for peacetime deployment.

Admiral Sharp recommended four mobile mid-range ballistic missile squadrons and two hardened mid-range ballistic missile squadrons as required for peacetime deployment in PACOM. For the reasonably attainable peacetime force, he reduced the number of squadrons to two and one respectively, observing that the reduction would risk an overall improvement in offensive capability, a loss of flexibility in deployment, and a reduction in the cross-targeting which the greater allocation of units could provide.

CINCPAC also recommended one Airborne Command Post as a reasonably attainable peacetime deployment as opposed to the optimum number of three. However, he noted that this would reduce the redundancy of command and control capability over WESTPAC forces and inhibit command and control in limited or general war situations in Southeast Asia.

Citing the guidance in JSOP 70 that contemplated forcing indirect aggression to a level "openly military in character" when such action might be in the interests of the United States, CINCPAC observed that it seemed that such action might be called for to cause North Vietnam and Communist China to terminate their direct support to the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao. He cautioned, however, that the 1964 PACAF
force was inadequate to accomplish the air tasks associated with that strategy in the event of overt CHICOM military intervention. He urged that the U.S. not subscribe to a "military posture which would degrade our combat capability to the extent of inviting or increasing our susceptibility to communist encroachments and penetrations." That plea was aimed at restoring the PACAF capabilities sacrificed in the interests of stemming the flow of gold in 1963.  

**PACOM Forces Required to Meet CHICOM Threat**

In late December 1963 the JCS asked CINCPAC to estimate what proportion of PACOM forces was required solely to meet the threat posed by Red China and her satellites such as North Korea, North Vietnam. The objective of the JCS was to determine, for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, whether PACOM strength could be reduced if U.S.-USSR tension was relaxed by certain measures being contemplated.  

CINCPAC answered this query in January, 1964, and indicated that irrespective to some form of detente with the USSR, the situation would not lessen the force requirement of PACOM. He emphasized that several contingency situations involving only the CHICOMS and their satellites would require strength in excess of CINCPAC's JSOP 69 recommendations. CINCPAC also pointed out that in some approved plans, not involving the USSR, PACOM would need sizeable augmentation from EASTPAC and CONUS sources.  

**Free World Forces**

The JCS annually required CINCPAC and other commanders of unified and specified commands to prepare the regional section of Annex J (Free World Forces) to JSOP 70.  

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, Ch V  
2. CINCPAC ltr 3121 ser 000374 subj: Recommended PACOM U.S. Forces for JSOP 70 (U) of 28 Sep 1964 (TS)  
3. JCS 4169 DTG 272309Z Dec 1963 (TS)  
4. CINCPAC 010425Z Jan 1964 (TS)  
5. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, pp. 35-36  
6. JCS SM-1646-64 of 14 Oct 1964 (C)  
7. JCS 1184 DTG 261608Z Oct 1964 (S)
submission CINCPAC secured the recommendations of his subordinate unified commanders and MAAG chiefs (where available). The Component Commanders then commented on those recommendations and proposed force levels for the nations where there were no subordinate unified commanders or MAAG Chiefs.

CINCPAC in turn, forwarded to the JCS a recommended structure of the military forces of the thirteen Free World nations in PACOM. He also proposed general strategic priorities (illustration at Figure I-9) which should govern the development of the forces, stated a mission for the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean Area, assigned regional tasks, presented a mission statement for each country, and listed the force structure for 1 July 1964 and force guidelines through FY74 for each country.

The force structure proposed by CINCPAC consisted of the forces he believed desirable in terms of American strategy and interests through FY74. Admiral Sharp noted that the nations in PACOM fell into four distinct categories in regard to their capability to achieve the desirable force level.
CINCPAC RECOMMENDED GENERAL STRATEGIC PRIORITY FOR ALLIED AND NON-ALIGNED NATIONS OF THE PACOM AREA

KEY
- First & Equal Priority
- Second Priority
- Nonaligned, No Priority Given
Because of the plight of China, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines CINCPAC submitted for each of those nations both a minimum required force level with supporting rationale and a reasonably attainable force level with a statement of the associated risk.\(^1\) He emphasized that a failure to attain the minimum required force levels in those allied nations could have grave implications for American national policy and would certainly affect the adequacy of the U.S. force levels he had earlier recommended for JSOP 70.

**Air Force Tactical Relationship Study (SEAsia)**

In mid-August the JCS asked CINCPAC to review an Air Force study\(^2\) which visualized fifteen USAF Tactical Squadrons, in conjunction with allied ground forces, defending Southeast Asia.\(^3\)

The first of the study's two non nuclear hypothetical situations featured USAF interdiction of the communist force as soon as it was detected leaving China, enroute to Thailand. The study stressed that severe terrain, poor supply routes, and plentiful choke points would promote the "closure, entrapment, and destruction" of the enemy by air interdiction. CINCPAC in contrast, considered that this under-estimated Communist China's ability to avoid offering lucrative interdiction targets by traveling in well dispersed and lightly equipped formations. Consequently, Admiral Sharp rejected the AF thesis that U.S. air interdiction and minimal allied ground forces could stop a CHICOM/PAVN ground force. In another variance from the AF view, CINCPAC credited the CHICOMs with the ability to infiltrate forces and preposition supplies so as to launch an offensive from advanced positions deep in NVN or Laos, thus further reducing vulnerability to air interdiction.

A second concept portrayed in the AF study visualized air power as the primary defense against a CHICOM force massing to cross the

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1. For an explanation of the meaning of "required" and "reasonably attainable" force levels see "CINCPAC's Recommended U.S. Force Structure" earlier in this chapter.
2. Relationship of Tactical Air to Ground Forces (Southeast Asia), 1964 and 1969.
3. JCS 7931 DTG 142137Z Aug 1964 (S) specified that CINCPAC comments should exclude 1969.
Mekong River (near Vientiane) while opposed by a defending Thai Army division. CINCPAC, besides expressing strong doubt that the Royal Thailand Army (RTA) would fight without U.S. ground assistance, considered that the Mekong would not be an appreciable obstacle to Communist Chinese light infantry force, and that a Thai division, defending a 60 mile front, was insufficient to compel the enemy force to mass. More likely, he commented, the CHICOMs would make hasty river crossings at lightly defended sites in a deliberate effort to avoid presenting the profitable target anticipated by the study.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

This section of the history discusses the major events and changes associated with CINCPAC's operational planning responsibilities. It includes operations and logistic actions related to specific plans and, in selected cases, actions related to Component Commander's plans which are in support of a CINCPAC operation plan (OPLAN). (S)

CINCPAC initiated, issued and changed his operation plans in response to directives from higher headquarters, because of new requirements, and according to variations in U.S. and enemy capabilities. These plans were kept current by a program of continuing review and a

1. CINCPAC 240123Z Aug 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPACAF 64-TS-510, DTG 222236Z Aug 1964 (S) for CINCPACAF's comment on the study.
U.S. FORCES PACIFIC

Legend

NAVY
U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
273,000 MEN
440 SHIPS
2,600 AIRCRAFT

ARMY
U.S. ARMY PACIFIC
105,000 MEN

AIR FORCE
U.S. AIR FORCE PACIFIC
72,000 MEN
780 AIRCRAFT
formally scheduled annual review. The PACOM General War Plan, and certain other plans, were reviewed early in the calendar year to incorporate the fundamental planning guidance contained [redacted] which was normally received in December and effective the following July. Plans were not rewritten, however, unless the scope or number of changes justified this measure. 1

CINCPAC designated those of his subordinate commanders who were to prepare, and submit for his review, plans in support of CINCPAC OPLANS. He encouraged them to develop their supporting plans concurrent with his own. To provide depth to the review process, the commanders reporting directly to CINCPAC were required to review the supporting plans of those who would be their subordinate commanders when and if a specific plan was implemented. Additionally, CINCPAC required his Component Commanders to review, for service matters, the plans of the Component Commanders subordinate to CINCPAC's unified commanders and commanders of joint task forces.

OPLAN 1-65, General War Plan

This plan was a revision of OPLAN 1-64 and reflected the guidance contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)-65. 2 Before publishing this revised plan, Admiral Felt solicited the comments of his Component Commanders. 3

OPLAN 1-65 retained a substantially unchanged General War Objective, although this objective had been reworded in JSCP-65 to accommodate a distinction between the separate Asian Communist and Soviet threats. More important was a modification in the modus operandi for achieving the objective, a modification that appeared to introduce a marked selectivity in the application of force. [redacted] significant changes were in regard to "Operations Subsequent to Initial [redacted] and a new CINCPAC task to provide post-attack
and damage assessment information to the National Military Command Center. CINCPAC promulgated the new General War Plan on 29 June and published a revision of Annex U, Emergency Action Procedures of CINCPAC, in early October.

On the last day of November the JCS approved OPLAN 1-65 subject to minor modifications and a review of the Force Tabs and Intelligence annexes. It was expected that these would be accomplished and disseminated in January 1965.

OPLAN 25-65, Defense of Taiwan/Penghus

Following the annual review of OPLAN 25-64, Change 4 was promulgated in April and the revised plan was designated OPLAN 25-65. While there was no substantive change to the plan, Annex G (Communications-Electronics) and Annex D (Intelligence) were extensively rewritten.

CINCUSARPAC's Oplan 25-65 was approved, with some minor changes, on 16 November. Admiral Sharp noted that the troop list for U.S. logistic augmentation personnel reflected a reduction of approximately 1800 logistic spaces in comparison to the previous supporting plan (CINCUSARPAC Oplan 25-63).

Another savings in logistics support personnel was anticipated on the basis of a COMUSTDC statement that two U.S. Army Transportation Boat companies (approximately 400 spaces) could be eliminated from the troop list during the semi-annual review of the plan in March 1965.

OPLAN 27-65, Defense of Korea

This plan was updated in July as CINCPAC OPLAN 27-65. The most significant feature of the revised plan was the substitution of the

1. CINCPAC ltr 3121 ser 000233, 29 Jun 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC ltr 3121 ser 000385, 2 Oct 64 (TS)
3. CINCPAC ltr 3121 ser 000421, 23 Oct 1964 (TS)
4. JCS SM-1803-64, 30 Nov 1964 (TS)
5. CINCPAC ltr, ser 000165, 27 Apr 1964 (TS)
6. CINCPAC ltr ser 000453, 16 Nov 1964 (TS)
7. COMUSTDC 100824Z Jul 1964 (TS)
8. CINCPAC ltr ser 000278, 27 Jul 1964 (TS)
Hawaii based 25th Infantry Division for a CONUS Airborne Division as the initial U.S. reinforcing division to reach Korea. The Airborne Division was rescheduled as the last of the U.S. divisions to reach Korea; and the transportation appendix of the plan was revised to reflect this realignment and a revised MATS airlift capability. This revision was waiting JCS approval at the end of the year.

Originally suggested by CINCUSARPAC, this modification to OPLAN 27 would take advantage of the greater defensive capability of the infantry division during the defensive (Phase I) stage of operations. It would also reduce the initial MATS airlift requirements since the theater reserve stocks for the 25th Infantry Division were located in Japan.

On the other hand, the offensive (Phase II) stage of operations would find the airborne division available for the role it was best suited to play. Under the revised plan, the infantry division was expected to close in Korea by air and surface transportation between D plus 10 and D plus 25. Supplies and equipment from the Forward Floating Depot (FFD) and the Department of the Army Forward Depot (DAFD) would support the division's initial requirements.

Before adopting this concept, CINCPAC considered and rejected the idea of airlifting personnel and light equipment of a CONUS based infantry or airborne division to Korea and marrying the division up with the assets of DAFD and FFD. This, and the ultimate decision to rearrange the deployment schedules, was strongly influenced by a general shortage of strategic airframes.

In December 1963 and January 1964 CINCPAC coordinated actions which eliminated an airlift requirement equal to 80 C-124 loads of force accompanying and resupply material for forces associated with CINCUSARPAC's OPLAN 27-63 (a supporting plan for CINCPAC OPLAN 27-64). He also undertook to shift Class I and V tonnages

1. CINCUSARPAC GPPSU-PO RJ85528 220336Z Nov 1963 (S)
2. CINCPAC 312314Z Dec 1963 (S)
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 270236Z Dec 1963 (S)
5. CINCUSARPAC RJ 86080 DTG 072648Z Jan 1964 (S)
required by CINCUSARPAC OPLAN 27-63 from MATS to surface lift. CINCPAC further suggested to CINCUSARPAC that pooling PACOM resources of Class I and V supplies would drastically reduce or eliminate the demand upon strategic airlift to move these types of stocks. Specifically, CINCPAC's proposal was to make stocks of Class I and V supplies, already prepositioned in WESTPAC and intended for the Eighth U.S. Army and other USARPAC forces, available for resupply of the augmentation division. In turn, the quantities thus used could be replaced from the scheduled resupply for the CONUS division. CINCUSARPAC stated\(^1\) that Class II could be supplied to all augmentation forces, however, supply of Class I and V to CONUS augmentation forces was not feasible under stockage authorizations. Therefore, it was decided to substitute the 25th Infantry Division for CONUS Airborne, \textit{inter alia}, to save airlift requirements.

CINCPAC's objective in pooling the Class I and V supplies was to reduce airlift, from CONUS, of most of the Class I and V supplies (equivalent to 544 C-124 loads) required to support the airborne division until arrival of the first surface resupply from the U.S. mainland.\(^2\)

In September CINCPAC conducted a logistic appraisal of his OPLAN 27-64.\(^3\) The appraisal sought to identify logistic limiting factors associated with the plan and was based on a JCS premise that there would be no significant intervention in Korea by the Chinese Communists. CINCPAC received tacit JCS approval to report service identified shortages of mission-oriented items without relating them to specific targets.\(^4\)

Admiral Sharp based his appraisal on data obtained from his Component Commanders and COMUSK.\(^5-8\) In it he stated that it was

\(^1\) CINCUSARPAC ARP 2260 DTG 030330Z Mar 1964 (S)
\(^2\) CINCPAC 170310Z Jan 1964 (S)
\(^3\) JCS memo SM 885-64 of 15 Jun 1964 and SM -1339-64, 15 Aug 1964 (TS)
\(^4\) CINCPAC 050333Z Sep 1964 (TS)
\(^5\) CINCUSARPAC ltr GPLO, 15 Sep 1964 (S)
\(^6\) CINCPACFLT ltr 4000 ser 41/000228, 15 Sep 1964 (TS)
\(^7\) CINCPACAF ltr PFMLP, 15 Sep 1964 (TS)
\(^8\) COMUSK ltr USFK DJ-P, 14 Sep 1964 (TS)
extremely remote that there would be a North Korean attack without massive Chinese Communist participation. But, guiding the appraisal on the JCS premise, he considered the South Korean rail and highway system adequate to handle the supply and personnel movements from D-Day to D plus 105. After that time, Admiral Sharp visualized a drastic reduction in long distance surface transportation because Inchon or Wonsan would be used as a port instead of Pusan. From this requirement he concluded that construction efforts should be concentrated on maintaining existing facilities and not be diverted to major LOC construction.

CINCPAC considered that his OPLAN 27-64 should be modified to add 21 U.S. Army logistic units to the troop list and that the transportation tables should be revised to include the transportation necessary to lift the CINCPACUSARPAC operational projects associated with the plan. 1, 2

OPLAN 32-64, Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia

CINCPAC's basic plan for the defense of the Southeast Asia mainland, short of general war, was OPLAN 32. 3 Throughout 1963 he sought to refine the plan, with particular emphasis on reconciling the plan with the realities of transportation resources. In doing this, some desirable unit moves had to be discarded from the plan. For example, CINCPAC deferred deployment of a portion of his theater reserve because of limitations in transportation capabilities. 4

In another case, Admiral Felt directed COMUSMACTHAI to modify his Phase II, Laos deployment schedules because MATS total capability was already committed and could not support the moves as then planned. 5

But in other instances it was possible to expand transportation capabilities by modifying supporting facilities. This was the case when

1. CINCPAC ltr 4000 ser: 00376, 29 Sep 1964 (TS)
2. It should be noted that at the time of this appraisal OPLAN 27-64 had been superseded by CINCPAC OPLAN 27-65.
4. CINCPAC 310519Z Jul 1964 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 202009Z Apr 1964 (S)
it was confirmed that MATS OPLAN 32 operations would saturate the facilities of Clark Air Base in the Philippines.¹ CINCPAC subsequently coordinated an increase in the refueling capabilities at Kung Kuan, Taiwan, and plans were modified to provide a shift of some traffic to that base. This move also increased air transportation capabilities, indirectly, by reducing route distances.²-⁶

Some limiting factors were only indirectly associated with transportation and could not be eliminated. For example, COMUSMAC-THAI proposed to preposition, at Korat, the equipment intended to support his headquarters if OPLAN 32, Phase II, Laos/Thailand was implemented. Such an arrangement would have made the equipment immediately available and reduced future transportation requirements. However, CINCPAC overruled COMUSMACTHAI's proposal because neither the personnel nor storage space at Korat was sufficient to support the prepositioned equipment; further, the necessary material could be in Korat within 30 days after an order to execute.⁷,⁸

Another complication in planning the transportation aspects of OPLAN 32, Phase II, Laos, came to light when a CINCPAC sponsored airlift planning conference, including representatives of CINCSTRIKE and MATS, revealed that the JCS had overestimated the capabilities of the air transport in support of PACOM. Consequently, schedules based on the JCS stated capability⁹ were as much as 18 days out of phase with what the actual resources could accomplish during the A plus 15 to A plus 40 period. CINCPAC concluded that the CONUS unit deployments would have to be adjusted and that his future planning would recognize the shortage of C124, C130, and C133 aircraft which would exist during the earliest phases of executing OPLAN 32.¹⁰

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00395, 19 Mar 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 040231Z Apr 1964 (S)
3. PACAF PFMLP-W 347 DTG 250224Z Apr 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 280230Z May 1964 (S)
5. COMUSTDC 280230Z May 1964 (S)
6. COMUSTDC TFOAS 64M1209E DTG 170610Z Jun 1964 (S)
7. CINCUSARPAC ARP 12673 DTG 142040Z Aug 1964 (S)
8. CINCPAC 242018Z Aug 1964 (S)
9. JCS SM-475-63 of 10 Apr 1963 (S)
10. CINCPAC 222020Z May 1964 (S)
About the same time, the JCS asked CINCPAC to evaluate the capacity of PACOM air and ocean terminals in terms of OPLAN 32 requirements.¹ At CINCPAC's order, PACAF studied the air aspects of the problem and concluded that the capacity was adequate as long as the planned augmentation of personnel and equipment was provided.² CINCPAC concurred in the PACAF finding, and his response to the JCS emphasized that the terminal capacity would be adequate only if OPLAN 32 was implemented as a complete reaction plan.³

CINCPAC's evaluation of the ocean terminal capacity was sent to the JCS in late June. In it he termed the capacity sufficient, but he recommended early planning to prestock Army lighterage to align the capabilities in Thailand and RVN with the time phasing requirements of the plan. CINCPAC also suggested that the lighters could be stored indefinitely with minimum care and surveillance.⁴

The JCS subsequently directed an evaluation of the Army and Navy capability for air terminal clearance based on the air base loading contemplated during OPLAN 32 execution. After consulting both services CINCPAC informed the Joint Chiefs that the Army and Navy had the capability to clear the traffic for which each was responsible.⁵⁻⁷

Variation in the CONUS augmentation forces also required CINCPAC to alter his planning. For instance, in August CINCSTRIKE announced that the two C123 squadrons called for in OPLAN 32 would not be available immediately as planned but could be available from reserve forces within two months after D Day.⁸ CINCPAC agreed to the interim substitution of one C130 squadron, but he urged reinstatement of the two squadron C123 augmentation at the earliest opportunity.⁹

¹ JCS 1673 DTG 052139Z Jun 1964 (S)
² PACAF, Capability Study for Support of Major Air Deployment SE Asia, 29 Jul 1964 (TS)
³ CINCPAC 220022Z Jul 1964 and 110242Z Aug 1964. Both (S)
⁴ CINCPAC 272136Z Jun 1964 (S)
⁵ CINCUSARPAC 11767 DTG 312155Z Jul 1964 (S)
⁶ CINCPACFLT 080044Z Aug 1964 (S)
⁷ CINCPAC 110242Z Aug 1964 (S)
⁸ CINCSTRIKE STRP 5-P 7461 DTG 172200Z Aug 1964 (S)
⁹ CINCPAC 262042Z Aug 1964 (S)
based Cl30 squadron would arrive in Koke Kathiem, Thailand by D plus four, and that it would be replaced by two reserve Cl23 squadrons at D plus 60.¹ (S)

Two changes to CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64 were published during the year. Change 2² deleted Cambodia and France from the friendly forces of the plan. It also applied similar assumptions concerning the estimated reaction of Burma and Cambodia in the event of communist attack. The logistic support assumption was revised to provide more flexibility and scope, and the responsibility for Air Defense was rewritten to stand alone without reference to the General War Plan. The JCS approved the change, with minor modifications, in August.³ Change 3, promulgated on 23 December⁴ further updated the plan. (S)

In June the JCS directed CINCPAC to conduct a logistic appraisal of OPLAN 32-64. The objectives were to determine the adequacy of logistic support for general purpose type forces and to provide a basis for remedial actions to improve the capability and control posture of the armed forces during the immediate and mid-range period.⁵,⁶

Admiral Sharp elected to study Phase IV of the plan because it would require the greatest logistic effort.⁷ A scenario was prepared and passed to the Component Commanders, DEP COMUSMACVTHAI, and to COMUSMACV, to guide their participation in the project.⁸

Following a delay caused by the operational commitments in WESTPAC Admiral Sharp submitted his appraisal on 5 October.⁹ It indicated the shortage of mission-oriented items, without relating them to specific targets, and identified logistic limiting factors. The study indicated a need for remedial action related to augmentation units from CONUS sources and in the facilities and procedures associated with storage, transportation, and resupply. Some of the

1. CINCSTRIKE STR J6-P 9760 DTG 170048Z Sep 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 000107, 26 Mar 1964 (TS)
3. JCS SM 1299-64, 12 Aug 1964 (TS)
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 000523, 23 Dec 1964 (TS)
5. JCS SM 885-64 of 15 Jun 1964 (TS)
6. JCS Memo 1339-64 of 15 Aug 1964 (TS)
7. CINCPAC 110406Z Jul 1964 (S)
8. CINCPAC 090047Z Aug 1964 (S)
9. CINCPAC ltr 4000, ser: 000394 of 5 Oct 1964 (TS)
inadequacies could be corrected by projects then underway but others would require action by higher authority. Pending more specific progress in resolving these problems, Admiral Sharp considered it unnecessary to modify the plan.

**OPLAN 37**

This was one of CINCPAC's most active plans during 1964. It was conceived as a stabilizing measure for the situation in the Republic of Vietnam and, after multiple adjustments, it evolved into a comprehensive and flexible plan directed toward stabilizing the situation in both RVN and Laos. Also, three of CINCPAC's other OPLANS were incorporated into the revised plan.

**OPLAN 37-64 — Actions to Stabilize the Situation in RVN:** This plan was established as a result of the President's approval of a 16 March Secretary of Defense memorandum, written after the Secretary's March visit to the Republic of Vietnam.

On 19 March, in response to directions from the JCS, CINCPAC began developing the plan. It provided for a series of actions in three categories, to be executed in sequence and in the following order:

1. This OPLAN had two titles during the year. It was first oriented toward RVN, then revised to include Laos. See text.
2. Prime Minister of Laos.
3. JCS 5390 DTG 182233Z Mar 1964 (TS)
Border Control Operations - To be conducted on 72 hours notice by GVN forces with U.S. aerial reconnaissance, airlift, and advisor support. The plan allowed for expansion of authority to permit low level reconnaissance as a supplement to the already approved high level flights; limited incursions by GVN patrol forces into Laos, which could be expanded to include U.S. advisors and aerial resupply; hot pursuit of VC forces moving across the Cambodian border; destruction of Viet Cong bases on the Vietnam - Cambodian border; and air and ground strikes by GVN forces against selected targets in Laos.

Retaliatory Actions - To be directed against North Vietnam on a 72 hour notice by GVN forces as "tit-for-tat" retaliatory actions with U.S. aerial reconnaissance and other support. The actions would embrace overt high and/or low level reconnaissance by U.S. or FARM GATE aircraft and retaliatory bombing strikes and commando raids by GVN forces against selected North Vietnam military targets such as communications centers, training camps, and infiltration routes. Also included would be aerial mining by GVN aircraft, with possible U.S. assistance, of major North Vietnam ports. Certain U.S. deployment repositioning was essential to establish adequate strategic posture for the execution of these actions.

Graduated Overt Military Pressures by GVN and U.S. Forces - To be executed on a 30 day notice and envisaged as going beyond the "tit-for-tat" stage. This would include air attacks against North Vietnam military, and possibly industrial, targets, utilizing the combined resources of the GVN Air Force and FARM GATE, reinforced by two B-57 squadrons. Prior to implementation it would be necessary to provide some additional air defense for South Vietnam and to ready U.S. forces in the Pacific for escalation, or for expanded offensive operations against North Vietnam.
CINCPAC submitted the basic plan and six of the annexes to JCS on 30 March.  

The JCS approved the plan but directed some changes, the most important of which altered the original guidance concerning forces and lead times. Provisions were to be added to allow FARM GATE and U.S. aircraft to participate in Border Control Actions. Similarly, FARM GATE Strike Forces were to be considered part of the GVN effort in Category 2 (Retaliatory Actions) and an option was to be provided to permit participation of U.S. forces. Also, anticipating that some Category 3 (Graduated Overt Military Pressures by GVN and U.S. Forces) actions might be executed before all ground forces were deployed to mainland Southeast Asia, the JCS directed CINCPAC to provide for that alternative.  

He complied by publishing the change on 6 July.  

Meanwhile, CINCPAC had forwarded additional information to the JCS on the reaction time for units involved in the plan. He suggested that the major limiting factor to improving the reaction time was the absence of authorization to plan jointly with the GVN.  

In July the JCS directed CINCPAC to prepare a plan to strike specified targets in the DRV. Admiral Sharp's strike plan, published as Annex R to CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64, varied in some details from the JCS guidance. However, the differences were mainly attributable to CINCPAC's more current intelligence and his estimate, lower than that of the JCS, concerning the VNAF and FARM GATE capabilities. Admiral Sharp provided a rationale in each instance where his plan varied from JCS instructions.  

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000115 of 30 May 1964 (TS); CINCPAC 1501312Z Apr 64 (TS). Additional annexes were transmitted as they were completed. (CINCPAC ltrs sers: 000135, 10 Apr 1964 (TS) 000137, 14 Apr 1964 (TS), 2062, 13 Aug 1964 (U), and 001365, 28 Aug 1964 (S)  
2. JCS SM-560-64, 21 Apr 1964 (TS)  
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 000252, 6 Jul 1964 (TS)  
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 240220Z Apr 1964 (TS)  
5. JCS 2343/423, 11 Jul 1964 (TS)  
6. JCS 2343/423-2, 2 Sep 1964 (TS)  
7. CINCPAC 290412Z Sep 1964 (TS)
When a CINCPAC team briefed Annex R to the JCS on 5 October, the JCS directed that the annex be revised to plan a higher damage level for attacks against the target list and to provide a commensurate increase in the air capability of the force structure. The appropriate revisions were promulgated on 17 December and it was anticipated that distribution would be completed during the first week of 1965.

During the same period that the revised target list was being formulated the JCS solicited Admiral Sharp's comment on certain questions, posed by the Secretary of Defense, concerning further action if the DRV will and capability to fight survived the attack on the targets. CINCPAC suggested several actions, to include further strikes on targets from the original list and attacks on other lucrative targets. Admiral Sharp also observed that PACOM forces should be deployed and alerted during the early phases of the air operation to place the theater in a favorable position to counter Chinese Communist intervention. CINCPAC thought that the logistic preparations accompanying the recommended deployments, and target planning completed for other contingencies, would facilitate expansion of the air campaign.

OPLAN 37-65, Military Actions to Stabilize the Situation in RVN and/or Laos: Even while OPLAN 37-64 was being refined, the JCS solicited CINCPAC's views on consolidating certain contingency plans for Laos and RVN. Admiral Felt's first recommendation was that his message outline plan for holding key Mekong River areas in Laos should be consolidated with OPLAN 32-64. He also suggested that the overt aspects of COMUSMACV OPLANS 34A, 98, and 98A could be

1. CINCPAC ltr ser: 00373, 28 Sep 1964 (TS)
2. JCS 8949 DTG 222246Z Sep 1964 (TS)
3. JCS 9769 DTG 132237Z Oct 1964 (TS)
4. JCS 8307 DTG 032050Z Sep 1964 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 120503Z Sep 1964 (TS)
6. CINCPAC 300930Z May 1964 (TS)
consolidated with certain aspects of CINCPAC OPLAN 33 as it applied to RVN forces. He further proposed that the covert aspects of those plans be included in a covert annex to CINCPAC OPLAN 37. In May the JCS approved Admiral Felt's recommendations.

After further consideration, CINCPAC altered his position and recommended that it would reduce proliferation of plans if OPLANS 33 and 99 as well were incorporated into OPLAN 37. He reasoned that all the plans he had proposed for consolidation with OPLAN 37 were basically similar because each provided some form of military operational option directed against North Vietnam or for border control operations as part of a program of graduated military pressures to cause cessation of North Vietnam's support of insurgency in Laos or RVN. Admiral Sharp also proposed to include the 94 individual strike plans as an annex to OPLAN 37.

When Admiral Sharp submitted these recommendations to the JCS he observed that the resultant OPLAN 37 would embrace all actions and force options designed to cause the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to cease and desist in its support of communist insurgency in Laos and RVN. He emphasized that the plan could be implemented in stages and that it would be flexible enough to accommodate any future variants which might be developed. The JCS approved CINCPAC's revised consolidation proposal.

On 19 November CINCPAC signed OPLAN 37-65. The revised plan was entitled "Military Actions to Stabilize the Situation in RVN and/or Laos." It consolidated the following operations plans:

CINCPAC OPLAN 33-62 — United States Military Operations Against North Vietnam (S)
CINCPAC OPLAN 34-64 — Military Operations (RVN) in North Vietnam (TS)

1. CINCPAC 230306Z May 1964 (TS)
2. JCS 6514 DTG 271812Z May 1964 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 022330Z Aug 1964 (TS). CINCPAC also withdrew his proposal to consolidate the outline plan for holding key Mekong River areas with his OPLAN 32-64. He announced he intended to take no further action in that regard since the outline plan was actually only a partial implementation of certain phases of OPLAN 32.
4. JCS 7801 DTG 071950Z Aug 1964 (S)
CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 — Military Actions to Stabilize the Situation in the Republic of Vietnam (S)

CINCPAC OPLAN 99-64 — Military Operations Against North Vietnam to Stabilize the Situation in Laos (S)

This consolidation of plans included guidance and instructions which caused COMUSMACV OPLANS 34A, 98, and 98A to be superseded.

OPLAN 38-64 — Military Operations to Terminate Aggression in Southeast Asia

In response to JCS instructions, Admiral Felt prepared the above plan and promulgated it less some of the annexes, in early June. It was a unilateral capabilities plan providing for the employment of United States forces, and whatever friendly or allied forces might be available, to counter and terminate large scale aggression launched by Communist China and North Vietnam.

The plan envisioned holding the general line of the Mekong River and conducting punitive and crippling air and naval attacks against the North Vietnamese homeland. In accordance with JCS desires, CINCPAC's OPLAN 38-64 emphasized maximum application of U.S. air and naval forces while emphasizing minimum essential U.S. ground forces required to accomplish the mission.  

The JCS approved CINCPAC's plan in July but directed minor changes. CINCPAC disseminated the necessary modifications in advance notices of change. Additional annexes were distributed in August and in October change 1 was published incorporating the latest changes to the plan.

1. JCS 5601 DTG 011821Z Apr 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 000199-64, 1 July 1964 (TS)
3. JCS SM 1215-64, 29 Jul 1964 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 100201Z Jul 1964 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 132001Z Jul 1964 (TS)
6. CINCPAC ltr 3010 ser 000298, 4 Aug 1964 (TS)
7. CINCPAC ltr ser 000428, 27 Oct 1964 (TS)
OPLAN 39-65 — Contingency Plan for Asian Communist Aggression (U)

In June the JCS directed CINCPAC to prepare a contingency plan, requiring a minimum commitment of U.S. ground troops, addressing the possibility that Communist China might undertake large-scale aggression in Southeast Asia, South Korea, or elsewhere. ¹

Admiral Sharp prepared a unilateral plan which envisioned U.S., allied, and friendly forces conducting limited war contingency operations against Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam to forestall or cause cessation of large-scale aggression by Communist China or its allies.

The resulting plan, OPLAN 39-65 was highly flexible. It could be executed as a separate campaign or as part of an overall Pacific Strategy. The concept embraced four situations wherein large-scale aggression might become imminent or be directed against the following areas:

1. Taiwan - by Communist China.
2. South Korea - by Communist China and North Korea.
4. Southeast Asia and South Korea - by Communist China, North Vietnam and North Korea. ²

Further flexibility was inherent to the plan because it could be implemented in a deterrent of operations phase according to the requirements of the situation. CINCPAC promulgated the plan in September, ³ and it was briefed to the JCS four days later. Change 1 to the plan was published 13 September and on 21 September the JCS approved the basic plan and Change 1 with minor modifications. ⁴ CINCPAC also furnished the JCS information related to closing times and targets so the plan could be war gamed. ⁵

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¹ JCS 7128 DTG 271903Z Jun 1964 (TS)
² Southeast Asia, for the purposes of the plan, included Laos, North and South Vietnam, Burma and Cambodia.
³ CINCPAC ltr 3010 ser 000348, 5 Sep 1964 (TS)
⁴ JCS SM 1534-64, 21 Sep 1964 (TS)
⁵ CINCPAC 290249Z Sep 1964 (TS)
Change 2 was distributed on the last day of November. It included several JCS directed modifications, a general updating, and promulgated several annexes and portions thereof.¹

At the end of the year an additional change and Annex E were under preparation.
WAR GAMING

This portion of the history portrays CINCPAC's significant war gaming activities. The techniques and methodology of war gaming were useful tools in testing the feasibility of CINCPAC Operations Plans. Of necessity, each war game was based on a scenario containing multiple assumptions. For this reason, the results of a particular game applied only to the specific environment established by the scenario.

Six computer war game, simulations designed to meet CINCPAC specifications, were under contractor development and monitored by the Naval Command Systems Support Activity (NAVCOSACT). Of the three scheduled for completion, one model satisfied requirements and was accepted. The other two projects scheduled for turnover were slipped due to program and/or systems deficiencies.

Appendix E lists all of CINCPAC's model development projects undertaken by NAVCOSACT since 1 January 1961 and indicates the status of each at the end of 1964.

SIOP-64 versus RISOP-64

This game was completed during 1964, and particular attention was devoted to an analysis of the combat strength and command and control effectiveness which PACOM would retain after a Soviet initiated nuclear attack. As might be expected, there was a close relationship between the status of warning and the damage sustained by PACOM forces during the exercise. Another important aspect of the game was an assessment of the impact of radiological fallout on the post attack capabilities of the U.S. /Allied and Sino/Soviet forces.

1. CINCPACREP JSTPS 112235Z Dec 1964 (TS)
The majority of the game was played on computer. However, the complexity and dynamic characteristics of some phases, for example the aircraft carrier vs. air and submarine attack, required manual play. During the course of play a check point and interrupt was devised for the Battle Simulator Model to minimize the loss of machine time in the event of machine failure or interruption by a higher priority job.

Component Commanders received the results of the game for information and comment. In early April a member of CINCPAC's staff briefed game results to the Joint Staff and key staff personnel of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

In May, CINCPAC received the results of the JCS war game of SIOP-64 vs. RISOP 64 for comment. Although there was a significant correlation between the JCS and CINCPAC game, CINCPAC directed his comments toward the major differences in the results of the two games.

Blue Data Base

During 1964, as part of his continuing program to improve the validity of PACOM war gaming techniques, CINCPAC compiled comprehensive data related to U.S. installations in the Pacific area. The data, termed Blue Data Base, was subsequently forwarded to the JCS for incorporation into a world-wide data base. The resulting JCS/PACOM mutual data base could be inserted into computers and was expected to promote a more precise correlation of the results of future war games.

CINCPAC later converted the Blue Data Base to a format comparable to the DIA Bombing Encyclopedia. This would permit all SIOP/RISOP targeting to be accomplished by means of computers, with a resultant improvement in speed, accuracy, and standardization.

1. JCS SM-687-64, 8 May 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 270401Z Jun 1964 (TS)
3. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 54
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 000268, Subj: PACOM Blue Data Base, 16 Jul 1964 (TS)
5. 4 volumes (S)
JWGA Conference

Two of CINCPAC's representatives attended a Joint War Games Agency (JWGA) conference in Washington during July. That conference reviewed the comments of the services and Commanders in Chief relative to factors learned during the JCS SIOP-64 which might provide guidance for future SIOP games. Factors which received particular attention were those concerned with pre-launch survivability, tactical warning, communications, and residual strength of PACOM forces. CINCPAC reiterated his earlier comments related to deficiencies in his own command and control facilities. 2

Analysis of Air Interdiction on CHICOM/NVN Movement in Southeast Asia

In June CINCPAC made a detailed analysis of the results to be expected from U.S./Allied air interdiction of an 18 division CHICOM/NVN force advancing toward the Mekong River. The purpose of the

2. CINCPAC 270401Z Jun 1964 (TS). The sensitivity of this message precludes more detailed comment on this subject.
study was to develop an answer to a question posed by General Taylor during the Secretary of Defense Conference at CINCPAC in early June. U.S./Allied forces were assumed to be previously deployed in accordance with CINCPAC OPLANS 38-64 and 32-64. Then, based on CINCPAC's estimate of the most likely invasion routes, war gaming techniques and methodologies were applied to each invasion force. Significant comments resulting from the study were:

1. U.S./Allied air power could slow but not stop the invading force. This was particularly true of night ground movements in areas with primitive communication routes.

2. A strong U.S./RVN force in the Danang area could close the coastal route to a rapid enemy advance. Further, such a force would require the CHICOM/DRV to devote a substantial effort to defending the coastal approaches to NVN; this would reduce the communist elements available for the advance to the Mekong. It was speculated that the Communists would not attack south along the coast in the face of a strong U.S./RVN posture in the Danang area.

3. U.S./Allied air could gain command of the air over the battle area by approximately D+3.

4. An invasion through Burma could succeed. However, token resistance by the Burmese would force the Communists to use a considerable portion of their original force to protect their extended line of communication. That factor was believed to offer an opportunity for a U.S. led guerrilla force.

5. The U.S./Allied capability to slow the enemy advance through Laos was limited to delaying action. The Communists could close on the Mekong between Vientiane and Savannakhet within eight or nine days after starting their attack. It was noted that this was a case where the technological disparity between the opposing forces had the least impact.

6. Thai forces, with the support of U.S. air forces and combat support units, could stop the communist force along the general line Chieng Mai-Lampang. That, however, would seriously deplete the Thai force available for deployment along the Mekong.

1. PACOM WID 14-64, 3 Apr 1964 (S)
7. In the event that CINCPAC OPLAN 37, Category III actions were implemented, HAWK units should not be committed to the defense of Saigon and Bangkok because the Chinese Communist aircraft lacked the range to make effective attacks against those urban centers. Rather, HAWK units should be employed in the defense of vital airfields closer to the enemy.

8. The Chinese Communists could be expected to strike against Korea or in the Formosa Strait area to relieve U.S. pressure against South China. ¹

CINCPAC had this study briefed to the JCS on 26 June in connection with their discussion of the force requirements of OPLAN 38-64.

Analysis of CINCPAC OPLAN 37

The air-to-air and air-ground aspects of CINCPAC OPLAN 37 were analyzed during May using war game techniques and methodology. The project sought to determine the probable military consequences of implementing Category III actions of the plan. The report of the exercise emphasized that there was a strong possibility that the Chinese Communists could achieve early command of the air if the plan was executed by an unaugmented PACOM force structure. For that reason, it was considered essential that the U.S. air support, radar coverage, and anti-aircraft capability should be increased beyond the level envisioned by the plan. The study further pointed out the necessity for the prompt destruction of the DRV early warning radar net.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the analysis was the suggestion that implementing OPLAN could prove disastrous to the U.S./Allied force unless advance preparations were made for the contingency that the Chinese Communists would intervene in force. ²

The results of this analysis became important considerations in CINCPAC's study of what damage interdiction could inflict on a communist force invading Southeast Asia.

1. CINCPAC J3 Memo 00075, Subj: Report on Analysis of U.S./Allied Air Interdiction on Movement of CHICOM/NVN Forces into Southeast Asia (C), 13 Jun 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC J35 Memo 00014, 20 May 1964 (TS)
Appraisal of OPLAN 39-65

This plan was appraised using war gaming techniques and methodologies, and the results were forwarded to the JCS on 12 September. 1

The results of the study confirmed the logic of the plan objectives. These were to deter aggression by a massive deployment of U.S. air and naval power, and to force recall of Communist Chinese, North Korean, and North Vietnamese forces after invasion had started by heavy U.S. offensive strikes against key targets. However, there were indications that PACOM should be prepared for the possibility of failure in achieving these objectives. The study indicated that the ground deployments of OPLAN 39-65 were insufficient to halt communist forces if Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam invaded nations allied with the U.S. It also appeared that the Chinese/North Vietnamese could probably seize both Saigon and Bangkok by about D+66, and that U.S./Allied forces in Korea at D+60 would probably retain a defensive position similar to the Pusan perimeter.

OPERATIONS OF U.S. FORCES

PACOM forces of significant size were deployed during 1964 to meet communist threats in Laos and Vietnam. An account of these events may be found in Chapter IV. Some other significant operations, and CINCPAC recommendations concerning proposed operations, are reported in this section.
Concord Squadron

The JCS requested that CINCPAC submit a proposed schedule for deployment of a Carrier Task Force in the Indian Ocean for approximately two months out of each six month period commencing in December 1963. This was the result of a suggestion by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, subsequently approved by the President, that the U.S. make appearances of a goodwill nature in order to improve the U.S. image in this area of difficult politico-military conditions. 5

CINCPAC submitted two sailing schedules of one month each and subsequently many messages were exchanged in regard to determining the ports to be visited, the order of visits, operational control of the task force, and composition of the task force. 6-7 After delays for coordination with foreign governments concerned and U.S. agencies, Task Group 77.7 of the U.S. Seventh Fleet was selected to begin the
cruise on 31 March. 1 The Task Force was redesignated Task Force 90, given the nickname "Concord Squadron"; and an additional ship, the USS CIMARRON was added for part of the cruise. The Concord Squadron was made up of the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31), USS SHELTON (DD790), USS BLUE (DD 744) USS FRANK KNOX (DDR 742), USS CIMARRON (AO 22), and USS HASSAYAMPA (AO 145). 2

A side issue of the Concord Squadron cruise concerned whether the Task Force would remain under operational command of CINCPAC throughout the cruise or chop (change of operational command) to either CINCLANT or CINC Middle East Southern Asia and Africa South of the Sahara (CINCMEARFA). CINCPAC stated that the force would remain under CINCPAC operational command, in accordance with JCS Publication 2, both at sea and in ports in CINCMEARFA area. 3 CINCSTRIKE recommended to the JCS that CINCPAC be directed to coordinate with him concerning the detailed itinerary of task force visits in the MEAFSA area. 4 As a result, at JCS request, CINCPAC obtained CINCMEARFA comments and took them into consideration in preparing the cruise schedule. 5

To clear the air on command relationships, JCS stated, "it is preferable for CINCPAC to retain operational command of the force for the purposes of these visits." However, USCINCMEARFA for future visits would develop recommendations and forward proposals to CINCPAC. CINCPAC, in coordination with CINCLANT and CINCMEARFA, would develop detailed schedules and forward them to JCS for approval. 6

The squadron sailed from Subic on 31 March. 7 Visits were made to Kenya and Malagasy, then on to the Gulf of Oman where the squadron arrived on 2 May and performed a weapons demonstration for the Shah

1. COMSEVENTHFLT 130203Z Mar 1964 (S)
2. CTF 90 DTG 310404Z Mar 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 062006Z Dec 1963 (S)
4. CINCSTRIKE 141923Z Jan 1964 (S)
5. CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEARFA 072312Z Feb 1964 (S)
6. JCS 5331 DTG 161542Z Mar 1964 (S)
7. CINCPACFLT 310542Z Mar 1964 (S)
of Iran. Each of these visits was highly successful and the squadron was praised by U.S. Country Officials for their performance of duty.\(^1\),\(^2\)

The squadron, after the demonstration for the Shah, commenced the long voyage back to Subic and transited the Malacca Strait on 11 May without incident. The Department of State decided that the Concord Squadron should return to its normal operating area without further port visits. Task Force 90 was dissolved and assumed TG 77.7 upon arrival at Subic on 16 May.\(^3\),\(^4\) Thus ended the first of a planned series of cruises into the Indian Ocean.

With a view toward further implementing the Presidentially approved periodic naval task force cruises into the Indian Ocean, CINCPAC, in October, proposed to the JCS a Concord Squadron Cruise II for the period 13 April - 22 May 1965.\(^5\) The purpose of the cruise would be to fulfill the objectives of providing intermittent U.S. presence in the area and familiarization for fleet units. CINCPAC proposed routing through the Malacca, Sunda, and Makassar Straits to reemphasize national policy that the U.S. would not tolerate any interference with its freedom of access to international seas, straits, and airspace.

The Concord Squadron Cruise II would consist of one attack carrier (USS MIDWAY), four destroyers, and a fleet oiler. The task group was to visit Bay of Bengal ports (two in India, one in eastern Pakistan), Cocos Islands, thence to western Australia ports for the Battle of Coral Sea Commemoration, and return to Subic Bay, Philippines.

CINCPAC, in making his recommendation for Concord Squadron Cruise II, stated that the following comments were pertinent:

1. The Cruise should not be of longer duration than proposed because of possible unfavorable impact on 7th Fleet readiness.

2. In keeping with U.S. national policy concerning freedom of the seas, public knowledge of the cruise should be avoided prior to transiting Malacca Strait on the outbound leg.

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1. CNO 011645Z May 1964 (C)
2. ALUSNA TEHRAN 041430Z May 1964 (S)
3. JCS 6210 DTG 081325Z May 1964 (C)
4. CINCPACFLT 090040Z May 1964 (C)
5. CINCPAC 310040Z Oct 1964 (S)
3. Earlier scheduling than proposed was less desirable because of inclement seasonal weather in the area for flying and ship operations.

4. The schedule provided for visits to both India and Pakistan as a political necessity.

The JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the CINCPAC proposed sailing schedule for Concord Squadron II be approved for planning purposes and that transits of international seas, straits, and airspace [redacted]. The JCS made their recommendation with the reservation that the military situation existing in Southeast Asia at the time of the proposed cruise might preclude such a deployment.

Proposed Operations to Counter Indonesian Claim to Territorial Sea Areas

Indonesia announced her intention in December 1957, to depart from the three mile breadth of her territorial sea and claim a twelve mile breadth measured from straight base lines connecting the outermost points of the islands of Indonesia, and also claim the waters inside these base lines as "national waters." The U.S. strongly protested this action as being contrary to established international law, however, subsequent to that time the U.S. on more than one occasion offered to accept a six mile breadth of territorial waters with an additional belt for exclusive fishing control. In 1960 President Sukarno signed a government regulation officially constituting the 12 mile claim and Indonesia, on several occasions, took positive action to assert her alleged rights in waters she had claimed as internal. The Indonesian claim, frequently referred to as "Mare Nostrum" (meaning "our Seas"), had serious strategic implications if allowed to stand. A graphic illustration of Indonesia's claim is found at Figure I-11. (S)

Admiral Sharp, in a July meeting with his staff, directed that a study be undertaken regarding the maritime and air space of the Indonesian area. The Admiral stipulated that the purpose of the study
would be to determine the PACOM position relating to the serious effects upon the Free World should the Indonesians restrict maritime and air traffic over and through the Celebes and Java Seas.

The study was completed on 1 September. It constituted a thorough history of the law of the seas concerning territorial waters, including Indonesia's claims, and an analysis of the U.S. position regarding the Indonesian Claim. A few of the facts reflected in the study are condensed below.

The principle of territorial waters was first recognized by Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist and statesman, in 1625 when he declared that sovereignty over a part of the sea is gained by a territory insofar as those who sail over the part of the sea along a coast may be compelled from the shore as if they were on land. It followed that the states dominion should be measured by the range of cannon firing from the shore. This is the basis of the marine league of three mile limit.

Of 73 coastal states in attendance at a 1958 United Nations Conference in which the U.S. offered a compromise proposal to permit a state to fix the breadth of its territorial sea at a distance up to six miles, hardly more than 20 adhered to the three mile limit. However, the U.S. proposal failed to receive the required two-thirds majority; it barely failed a second time at a 1960 United Nations meeting.

Indonesia, under the current claim, did not recognize the right of innocent or peaceful passage to the waters inside the baseline from which the 12 mile limit was measured except under certain conditions set forth by Indonesia. One of these conditions was that foreign warships and government vessels, that were not merchant ships, were required to notify Indonesia of intended passage in advance unless passage was to be along sea lanes determined by the Minister/Chief of Staff of Indonesian Navy.

While the stated policy of the U.S. had consistently been to recognize nothing more than a three mile limit, its actual policy had been one of providing prior notification to Indonesia of intended transits through the area in question. The U.S. in 1964, informed Indonesia in advance when the Concord Squadron was scheduled to transit the Malaccan Straits. (See, Concord Squadron, this section) In May 1964, upon completion of the annual Coral Sea celebration in Australia, COMSEVENTHFLT proposed that the destroyer GRIDLEY transit the Indonesian internal
sea in making its passage from Perth, Australia to Subic Bay, Philippines. The American Embassy at Djakarta took the position that the U.S. should inform the Indonesians of GRIDLEY's route for otherwise there was grave danger that such passage would create further difficulties in the already strained U.S./Indonesian relations. As in the instance of the Concord Squadron, the U.S. gave prior notification to the Indonesians. The U.S. thus had not actually executed its stated policy in the matter. Instead, through fear of exacerbating U.S./Indonesian relations, the U.S. was in fact complying with the Indonesian internal sea and territorial waters edict.

Another instance in which the U.S. did not follow its policy of recognizing only the three mile limit concerned operations along the Soviet coastline. CINCPAC in June 1964, advised the JCS that the BURTON ISLAND would conduct Artic surveys during the period July to September and stated that operations would require the ship to operate as close as six miles from the Soviet Coastline. The JCS approved BURTON ISLAND operations but placed a 12 mile approach restriction to the Soviet Coast. CINCPAC requested that the 12 mile limit be modified where safe navigation required closing inside of this distance. The JCS disapproved the CINCPAC request for BURTON ISLAND to navigate inside the 12 mile limit, even when required for safe passage.

Indonesia, on the other hand, had enforced her claim on several occasions including arrest of a British ship for failure to fly British colors while in Indonesian waters in 1958, and ordering a British Navy salvage ship out of the area in 1963 when she attempted to render assistance to an Indian steamer stuck on a reef in Indonesian waters.

On 2 September the U.S. Ambassador in Djakarta advised that Indonesian officials were taking a belligerent attitude as the result of a recent passage of British warships through the Sunda Strait. In this instance notification had not been given to the Indonesian's satisfaction, and they had threatened retaliatory action should the British attempt to pass through the Sunda Strait again. The Ambassador stated that the British probably intended to retransit Sunda Strait on the return.

1. CINCPACFLT 250308Z Apr 1964 (S)
2. DJAKARTA 2326 to STATE, 11 May 1964 (S)
3. STATE 1228 to DJAKARTA, 13 May 8PM 1964 (C)
4. CINCPAC 242030Z Jun 1964 (S)
5. JCS 7297 DTG 082035Z Jun 1964 (S)
6. DJAKARTA 428 to STATE, 2 Sep 1964 (S)
voyage to Singapore about 12 September. CINCPAC immediately recommended to the JCS that they contact the State Department to urge unstinting U.S. support of the United Kingdom position and that close coordination be initiated between the U.S., United Kingdom, Australia, and other friendly governments to exercise rights of freedom of access to international seas and straits.¹ The JCS concurred with CINCPAC's recommendation but the United Kingdom subsequently gave advance notification to the Indonesians and returned the warships to Singapore via the Lombok Straits in order to preclude provocative action. In October CINCPAC recommended the following to the JCS:

1. That the actual practice of the U.S. be modified to the end that the U.S. exercise its historic right to the free use of those waters of the Indonesian archipelago, and the claimed waters of all other countries, which it considered to be high seas, by the frequent and unannounced operation of warships and aircraft therein.

2. That the U.S. come out loud and clear in opposition to the illegal Indonesian claim, by the execution within the time frame of the next two months, and at frequent intervals thereafter, of operations within the waters in question to include transits of the Sunda and/or Lombok Straits with appropriate naval forces on an unannounced basis.²

The JCS asked CINCPAC to make recommendations for specific cruises and CINCPAC recommended two cruises as follows:³

Cruise 1: One guided missile destroyer with a destroyer division commander embarked, plus an additional destroyer to depart Subic and proceed via Palawan Passage, Karimata and Sunda Straits to Christmas Island; thence to Darwin and return through Lombok and Makassar Straits, Sibutu Passage and Mindoro Strait.

Cruise 2: One guided missile destroyer with a destroyer division commander embarked, plus an additional destroyer to depart Subic proceeding via Mindoro Strait,

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1. CINCPAC 132355Z Sep 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 102244Z Oct 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 172307Z Nov 1964 (S)
Sibutu Passage, Makassar Strait through the Java Sea, Sunda Strait to Cocos Island; thence around the Northern end of Sumatra to Georgetown, Penang, Malaysia; thence via Malacca and Singapore Straits, Palawan Passage to Manila.

CINCPAC recommended that the first cruise begin about 12 December and last 21 days; cruise two would be delayed until February 1965 while reaction to the first cruise was evaluated. The visits to Christmas and Cocos Islands would update information needed for a proposed third Concord cruise in April and May of 1965. Another fringe benefit of the cruises would be to update the area knowledge of electromagnetic propagation, meteorology, oceanography and geodesy.

In November CINCPAC made additional recommendations for two cruises to counter the illegal claims of Indonesia to international waters. The patrol recommended for December was disapproved but a February transit, subject to review of the JCS and State Department, was still planned by CINCPAC as of the end of 1964.

Indian Ocean Study

The JCS, in November, became interested in a paper labeled "Indian Ocean Study" which had been completed by the Institute of Naval Studies in June. This study suggested that for the Indian Ocean Area "successful conduct of U.S. policy requires a force that will be effective just above the transition level from diplomatic support to military force, thereby providing the U.S. policy maker with a military option for supporting U.S. interests." It further alleged that "in this specific sense, there is a gap in the U.S. national capabilities in the Indian Ocean." The force needed to accomplish the above objective — as seen by the study — was a U.S. CVA task force and Battalion Landing Team or comparable force, deployed to the Indian Ocean on a full time basis.

1. CINCPAC 310040Z Oct 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 172307Z Nov 1964 (S)
3. JCS 003067 DTG 190007Z Nov 1964 (S)
The JCS asked CINCPAC as well as other military commanders to comment on the Indian Ocean Study. The littoral of the area in question fell partly in CINCPAC's assigned area of responsibility and the rest was the responsibility of CINCMEAFA. CINCPAC's comment to the JCS was to the effect that the military security gap in the Indian Ocean area was probably an overrated problem which, if it actually existed, would not be overcome by deploying on a permanent basis a Battalion Landing Team and a CVA task force. CINCPAC stated that the existing enemy threat was focused in Southeast Asia where it was apparent that U.S. armed forces might be needed. Therefore, it was logical that military forces allocated to the PACOM be stationed in the area where they were needed. If and when forces were needed in the Indian Ocean, they could be deployed quickly.

In making recommendations to CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC commented regarding the permanent presence of a U.S. force in the Indian Ocean: "Recent occurrences in Southeast Asia plainly show that presence or a show of force no longer is a sure deterrent."

As the most promising solution for continuing protection of U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean area, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS the exploitation of the following capabilities:

1. Demonstration by words and deeds that U.S. national policy was being constantly implemented.
2. Continuing military assistance programs.
3. Concord Squadron cruises on an intermittent basis.
4. Continuing effort to obtain base rights in the Indian Ocean.

**JOINT TRAINING**

During 1964 CINCPAC participated in two world-wide JCS conducted Command Post Exercises and planned for a third exercise.

1. JCS 001762 DTG 110125Z Nov 1964 (S)
2. CINCUSARPAC ARP 19051 DTG 232128Z Nov 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 260026Z Nov 1964 (S)
of this type. In addition CINCPAC monitored the testing of a Forward Floating Depot and participated in other, less significant, exercises.

Exercise DICE DROP

Exercise DICE DROP was a "no notice" JCS conducted worldwide CPX held during the vulnerability period 10-28 February 1964. It was held to meet the JCS requirement for a General War Plans exercise during each training year and served as a rehearsal for Exercise HIGH HEELS III.

The primary purpose of DICE DROP was to test implementing and reporting procedures required for the execution of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and SACEUR's Nuclear Strike Plan.

Overall CINCPAC objectives were to exercise the following facilities and procedures:

1. Participating Command and Control Centers, Communications Centers, and Logistical Centers, in emergency duties under conditions leading up to and in general war operations.
2. CINCPAC Emergency Action Procedures.
3. PACOM Defense Readiness Procedures.
4. The control and execution of general war plans.
5. JCS Operational Reporting System.
7. Communication facilities and procedures in support of command and control.
8. Simulated movement of nuclear weapons.
11. Nuclear Detonation and Radioactive Fallout Reporting Procedures.

DICE DROP began on 17 February with the declaration of ROUND HOUSE (DEFCON 3). The exercise rapidly escalated into general war...
climaxed by an all-out Soviet nuclear attack on the Western Allies and a retaliatory execution of the SIOP. Movement of combat and combat support forces were simulated to fully exercise the general war plans.

After 72 hours, the exercise ended on 19 February. From the CINCPAC point of view, all stated exercise objectives were achieved. The exercise was timely and useful as a vehicle through which all CINCPAC procedures and plans leading up to and during the initial stages of general war operations were reviewed and exercised. Established emergency action procedures were considered to be rapid, accurate, and effective. As a result of the exercise, however, CINCPAC made many changes to his own standing exercise procedures and recommended other changes to the JCS.  

**Exercise HIGH HEELS III**

Exercise HIGH HEELS III was a JCS conducted world-wide command post exercise. It highlighted the obligations and mutual security aspects of selected alliances to which the U.S. was a signatory power. It also exercised the plans and procedures for operations in areas of primary concern to NATO, CENTO, and SEATO commands. The exercise was scheduled for the period 7-28 September.

The Gulf of Tonkin incidents in early August created throughout the PACOM, a stitution whereby force deployments and general readiness posture made it incompatible for Component Commanders and other commanders subordinate to CINCPAC to take full part in the exercise. Also it was necessary to lighten as much as possible the communications load in the Western Pacific. Due to the close relationship between HIGH HEELS III and succeeding exercise FINE ART, it was not practical to pull out of the exercise altogether. A middle course was necessary. Since the JCS had authorized Commanders in Chief to prescribe the level of participation within their commands, Admiral Sharp decided to significantly modify PACOM 1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00528 subj: Final Report of CINCPAC Participation in Exercise DICE DROP, 16 Apr 1964 (S)
2. See Chapter IV, Vietnam.
participation. He informed the JCS that all PACOM echelons and operational activities would be represented by a small Exercise Staff which would operate from CINCPAC Headquarters (Kunia). This staff was composed of members from the CINCPAC Staff and from the Component Commands.¹

The scenario for HIGH HEELS III was built around a framework of controlled incidents known as "peg points". Maximum practicable use was made of techniques and procedures associated with Automatic Data Processing. This offered the advantages of furnishing a logical, orderly, and sequential approach to planning of the required exercise input, as well as a rapid and automatic means of monitoring exercise execution.

HIGH HEELS III began on schedule and proceeded in an orderly fashion until 18 September, at which time a third Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred (See Chapter IV, Vietnam). This incident placed so much strain on PACOM and JCS communication facilities that the JCS suspended HIGH HEELS III as of 19 September.²

1. CINCPAC 190103Z Aug 1964 (C)
2. JCS 8829 DTG 182307Z Sep 1964 (C)
On 21 September CINCPAC and Component representatives met to consider courses of action open to their commanders to assure the most effective representation in the exercise when (and if) it resumed. It was concluded that the point had passed when any consideration should be given to bringing headquarters subordinate to the CINCPAC-Component level into the exercise. Field headquarters, in the meantime, had been given the patterns of Soviet nuclear detonations (scheduled for introduction in the exercise beginning 26 September) and were already far advanced toward determining "residual operational capabilities" of their forces. 1 This determination had developed as probably the most important HIGH HEELS III objective and was being accomplished by the various PACOM field headquarters through a process of analysis and evaluation of many factors such as disposition of forces at time of detonation, amount of protection, fall-out factors, etc.

CINCPAC, on 28 September, recommended to the JCS that HIGH HEELS III be resumed and completed as soon as practicable. But the JCS subsequently cancelled the exercise. 2 On 2 October CINCPAC informed subordinate headquarters that the exercise was cancelled and asked for their completed analyses by 1 November. 3 CINCPAC expected to combine field level analyses with his own war games data for production of a final report to the JCS in early 1965. The final CINCPAC analysis would be used to establish the beginning situation for Exercise FINE ART which was to be held in the Spring of 1965.

Planning for Exercise FINE ART

In October CINCPAC representatives took part in a JCS planning conference for Exercise FINE ART. This JCS conducted Command Post Exercise was planned for 10-21 May 1965. (C)

FINE ART was contemplated as a continuation of HIGH HEELS III and would amount to a problem of force reconstitution and continuation of military operations following a general nuclear exchange.

1. "Residual operational capabilities" refers to the capabilities of a force to accomplish its mission following a nuclear exchange.
2. CINCPAC 2823Z Sep 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 020331Z Oct 1964 (C)
with Soviet Russia. This phase of operations had not previously been played in a JCS sponsored exercise. The exercise was designed to emphasize problems in logistics, communications, and personnel matters. It was to be conducted in two Phases; CINCPAC's participation would be limited to the field phase occurring 10-17 May. The second phase would involve only Washington agencies during the period 18-21 May. CINCPAC's primary exercise function would be to prepare and submit material needed by the Washington agencies for the second phase.

During November CINCPAC made detailed arrangements to complete analysis of Exercise HIGH HEELS III statistical data upon which to base the beginning situation for Exercise FINE ART. CINCPAC produced computerized Bomb Damage Analysis of exercise nuclear detonation effects against both Red and Blue data bases. He also conducted abbreviated war games indicating, for exercise purposes, the effectiveness of SIOP execution by PACOM forces. These gaming activities, plus narrative reports submitted by PACOM area commanders, were intended to furnish the basis for various exercise Joint Operational Reports required by the JCS in preparation for Exercise FINE ART.

Required Atomic Post-Strike Result reports were submitted through Joint Nuclear Plot to the JCS in November. Component Commanders provided input to Personnel Status, Logistic Readiness and Operational Readiness reports. CINCPAC consolidated and submitted these reports, along with a Petroleum Damage Efficiency Report, to the JCS in December. These actions were required by JCS Exercise OPLAN 1-65.

It was expected that CINCPAC's Exercise FINE ART Operation Plan would be issued by mid-January 1965.

1. CINCPAC 022231Z Dec 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 200021Z Dec 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 162135Z Dec 1964 (S)
Exercise QUICK RELEASE

In 1963 a Forward Floating Depot, consisting of three converted Victory-type merchant ships was established at Subic Bay as a means to hasten U.S. response to contingencies in Southeast Asia. It was designed to carry organizational equipment, basic and prescribed loads for a Brigade Task Force, and other supplies.1 In 1964 Exercise QUICK RELEASE was conducted 25 January - 19 February to test the Forward Floating Depot concept.2

One brigade of the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii and the 117th Terminal Service Company of Fort Eustis, Virginia were airlifted to the exercise area in Okinawa by MATS.3,4 There they formed a Brigade Task Force. The Forward Floating Depot ships proceeded from Subic Bay to Okinawa and after offloading steamed to Japan for temporary dry docking and overhaul. Upon receiving and processing their equipment and supplies, troops of the Brigade Task Force conducted a three day training exercise in the Okinawa Northern Training Area.

U.S. observers of QUICK RELEASE included, in addition to representatives of CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC and the 25th Infantry Division, officers from OASD, DA and other major commands. Foreign representatives were present from the Japan Self Defense Force and Great Britain.

The CINCPAC observer reported that the offloading portion of QUICK RELEASE was a positive test of the feasibility of unloading the Forward Floating Depot at a port similar to those at Bangkok or Saigon but that it did not test the capability for over the beach unloading. He further observed that despite a number of minor discrepancies, offloaded equipment appeared to come through in excellent condition. The same was not true of the equipment after the exercise; rehabilitation attributed to the exercise was estimated to cost in excess of $100,000 plus fair wear and tear.

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 77
2. For a detailed report of the Forward Floating Dept Test see USARPAC Annual Historical Summary, 1 Jul 1963 to 30 Jun 1964 pp. 65-93
3. CINCSIRKE STR J3-0 0018 DTG 022107Z Jan 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 182238Z Dec 1963 (S)
The exercise revealed the need for a number of changes in configuration of the Forward Floating Depot, one of which was to reduce the number of rations carried. (C)

THE COMMUNIST MILITARY THREAT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

The following discussion provides a broad general outline of the communist military threat to Southeast Asia as CINCPAC saw it and as it influenced his plans, decisions, and actions in the latter half of 1964.¹

Concept of Threat

Southeast Asia was pressed securely between the thumb of North Vietnam and the palm of Communist China. Typically, the area was extremely rough, densely vegetated, and only passable by primitive and infrequent routes. These features, CINCPAC thought, would preclude a communist invasion on the grand scale that had been experienced in Europe. Instead, he felt, an invasion would probably involve multiple penetrations by task forces² advancing over the few routes threading through Southeast Asia; much like the Japanese invasion of Malaya during World War II. Although division and sometimes army size units would transit some of the routes, they would approach in column and seldom be mutually supporting. Only the lead battalion would have the occasion to deploy with companies abreast and then only when faced by roadblocks or other hasty defense tactics.

The expansive rice-cultivated deltas in the vicinity (65 mile radius) of Bangkok, Rangoon, and Saigon would permit broader fronts

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2. Task forces consist of a preponderance of "trigger puller" combat troops with provisions allowed for route security forces, rear area engineers, additional signal support, administrative troops, motor transport units, and antiaircraft defense of key points along each route.
and full utilization of artillery. There, vegetation would give little hinderance and there were more feeder routes. Even so, off-road trafficability and deployment would be inhibited by seasonally flooded soil.

CINCPAC considered that the size of the Red military threat in Southeast Asia was largely based on the logistical capabilities of the unsophisticated routes. For the most part the roads were nothing more than bulldozer blade-width tracks that had been improved over the years by adding fist-sized rock, gravel, or other material to improve trafficability. Passing sufficient combat power to provide a threat to Southeast Asia would saturate each of the routes to its capacity.

The initial communist invasion would doubtlessly be phased so that the widely separated columns would converge at key points on a previously determined schedule. (Phasing, in this sense, means to laterally control; a difficult maneuver involving several advancing columns.) CINCPAC believed that the communist plan would envisage deep penetrations through continuous and rapid daily motion. Certainly the invading force would not race through the initial stage of the operation and then stop to build up their rearward lines of communication when so much depended on speed. Instead, CINCPAC thought, the invader's advance would feature boldness and speed and have enough combat power to overrun the in-place defenders. Their aim would be to disrupt a timely U.S./SEATO reinforcement of the area by destruction or early capture of entry points. The communists would realistically assume that their massive attack would trigger reinforcements, but the external U.S. logistics lines were thousands of miles in length.

It was also unlikely that additional communist units would follow up the invasion, thought CINCPAC, because invasion routes would be saturated at the outset. He conceded, however, that Chinese military manpower provided the potential for a consistent follow-up of replacements to fill the gaps created by casualties.
The Communist Assessment and Their Decisions: CINCPAC assumed that the Reds would be cognizant of the Free Asian military forces they would face when they transited Burma, the Laos buffer area, and when they crossed the Mekong. Even so, he thought the Communists would start their operation with the assessment that the Southeast Asian defense forces in place would offer little resistance and that success would depend on nullifying U.S. reinforcements.

The Communists would probably estimate that the Pathet Lao and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) would defeat the FAR in Laos; at the same time providing security for the relatively unmolested transit of major Red troop units through Laos.

Departing the North Vietnamese staging area near Dong Hoi, the Communists would cross the demilitarized zone (DMZ) into South Vietnam with the assessment that the Viet Cong (VC) would occupy most of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) time. Probably only one ARVN division would be free of harrassment to meet the surprise invasion. However, not wishing to sell the South Vietnamese short, the Red planners would conclude that a second ARVN division would probably be available as well as 15 assorted special battalions (airborne, ranger, marine, armor) to be employed piecemeal. The Communists would count on infiltrating sizeable units from Laos, a week prior to D-day, and taking control of the high ground north of Danang (Col des Nuages).

It would be assumed that it would be next to impossible for Burma to mass its 85 army battalions into a large force at a given point. These Burmese units were scattered throughout Burma in a counter-insurgency role, and they had only two semi-operational brigade headquarters. Further, the Burmese had never maneuvered on a scale larger than battalion, and the country’s transportation system would not support large scale deployments. The red planners would probably conclude that there would be token Burmese resistance from Lashio to Mandalay, but it would degenerate to small-scale guerrilla actions. A sizeable communist force would be dropped off at strategic points within Burma to deal with any resistance elements.
The Reds would also conclude that, if the U.S. reacted immediately, approximately two American divisions could be committed piecemeal. They would consider that their IL-28 Beagle bomber attacks together with TU-2 Bat bombers would slow U.S. reinforcement by damaging Thai air bases and the port facilities at Bangkok, Danang and Saigon. (Figure 1-13 illustrates the communist bomber capability). However, the Chinese would not wish to be overly optimistic so they would not place great reliance on this. The U.S. would probably have a sizeable amount of air power in place, but it would be supported by a fair to poor early warning system.

Since the coups d'etat commenced in the 30's, a substantial part of the armed forces of Thailand had been stationed in the Bangkok environs so the Thai politicians could maintain surveillance over each other. The Communists would conclude that this would continue, particularly because the Thai were not positive as to how the U.S. would react to a full scale invasion.

The Chinese would expect that the most they would have to initially contend with in north and northeast Thailand would be components of two of the three Thai infantry divisions. (The Thai also had a cavalry division and a separate regimental combat team deep in Peninsular Thailand.) They would reckon that three regimental teams (approximately 2,200 men each) would meet them in the north around Chiangrai, Chieng Mai, and Lampang and that three more regimental teams would be dispersed to Udorn, Nakhon Phanom, and Mukdahan.

The Thai willingness to fight, and to conduct delaying actions against the tremendous odds facing them, would be directly correlated to the promised commitment of U.S./SEATO ground forces.

Weather and Military Operations in Southeast Asia: Appendix F discusses the affects of the Southeast Asian weather on military planning and operations in that area. It also contains illustrations depicting the Southeast Asian wind and rainfall patterns and precipitation data for selected locations.
Perhaps the U.S. would, in the future be reluctant to bomb Red China as during the Korean War. But the Red Chinese would concentrate the major part of their air power on the air defense of mainland China as the Americans might elect the highly controversial option of bombing China's homeland. The Chinese Communists hoped that the U.S. would forego a strategic nuclear retaliation for fear of world opinion. Although they might be faced with tactical nuclear weapons in the Southeast Asian arena, the Red Chinese considered that the advancing columns, shrouded by vegetation and darkness, would present few lucrative targets. More importantly, the Chinese believed that the Southeast Asians did not wish to be liberated by nuclear weapons. If the U.S. used nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia, the Chinese personnel losses would probably not be great; but "blow down" would create logistical problems and might force heavier reliance on light units using the hundreds of trails leading into Southeast Asia.

The Asian Communists would conclude that their three main tasks were:

(1) Invade South Vietnam, defeat its harassed army, and make all of Vietnam a communist entity.

(2) Transit Laos quickly with practically no opposition. Swim the Mekong at multiple points to create safe bridgeheads for rafted equipment and rapidly continue the penetration toward Bangkok. This force to be assisted by Red Chinese divisions marching through North Thailand.

(3) Invade Burma and immediately declare a no-nonsense policy in the areas overrun. When the penetration advanced as far as Pegu (50 miles north of Rangoon), take the option of sending one division into Thailand via Mae Sot and Tac and/or two infantry regiments by way of Three Pagoda's Pass and Kanburi directly to Bangkok.

The Communists in estimating their force requirements would conclude it necessary to support themselves entirely with all classes of supply. However, as a bonus, they would hope to find large quantities of foodstuffs in Southeast Asia which the natives would be delighted to spare once they were told of cash remunerations. They might also fall heir to some petroleum products, military ordnance and other
stores, but they would not count on this.

The Military Threat: The threat to Southeast Asia was based on the combined military might of Communist China and North Vietnam, both dedicated communist nations with little foreseeable opportunity to defeat the Western World through economic strangulation. Both had elected to follow revolutionary means to gain the objectives of communism.

The Red Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) consisted of a navy (CCN), air force (CCAF), and an army (CCA). The CCA, 161 divisions and 2,321,000 men, was the largest army in the world. The CCAF had over 2,000 jets ranging from MIG-15 to MIG-21; it was the largest air force in the Far East. The CCN was primarily a coastal defense force of PT boats, but it also had 28 submarines (21 "Whiskey" Class) whose effectiveness was untested.

Ground Threat - With an estimated strength of 224,800, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) had the largest and most effective ground force on the mainland of Southeast Asia. This force had vanquished the French. Its morale was reportedly high and the leadership competent. The PAVN had five infantry divisions, seven infantry brigades, one antiaircraft division, one artillery division, and ten independent infantry regiments. The North Vietnamese Navy, a coastal defense force, formerly consisted of approximately 46 PT boats and motor gunboats. Since the August events in the Gulf of Tonkin the exact count was not available.

A history of these forces revealed an unwillingness to undertake military operations unless they had a heavy numerical superiority over the opposition. However, the logistic restrictions of overland routes limited the Communists ability to achieve that. But they would probably reckon that the Southeast Asian nations were unable to concentrate their military resources. Thus against South Vietnam's 105,000 army combat troops plus 30,000 U.S. reinforcements¹ the Communists could only commit about nine (plus) divisions or 125,800

¹. Two U.S. divisions.
combat troops. Against Thailand's 40,000 army combatants, reinforced initially by about 24,000 other SEATO troops, the Reds could commit something on the order of nine divisions or 136,000 combat troops. Against the Burmese Army combat core of about 77,000, the Red Chinese could commit six divisions or 95,000 combat troops.  

In terms of ground combat power (infantry, armor, artillery) the Communists could have a slight superiority of 356,000 combat troops against an Allied total of around 255,000. This equates to one and a half Communists to one Allied ground combatant. It should be kept in mind however, that the Communists would have surprise to their credit, and their 24 divisions would actually be on the ground and possess the initiative. On the other hand, some of the Allied forces would be thousands of miles from the battle, and many local units would be tied down by tactical operations or politics. Many would not have the wherewithal to reach the multiple-pronged enemy onslaught. Crossing into South Vietnam, Burma, and Thailand the Communists would face no more than 100,000 ground force Allies playing the role of trigger-pulling combatants. A realistic equation of initial ground combat power was roughly three and 1/12 to 1 in favor of the Communists. 

In terms of geographical approach and territorial objectives, the Communist ground threat during dry weather is illustrated in Figure I-15.

Air Threat - The Red Chinese could make available 150 IL-28 Beagle bombers out of the 290 in their inventory. It had been estimated, even in consideration of an 80 percent in-commission rate, that 225 bombers were sufficient to handle the Southeast Asian targets. These aircraft, operating from airfields in southern China, could reach almost any target located northward of Bangkok and Saigon to include

1. Infantry, artillery, and armor.
2. Does not include administrative and rear area troops.
those two cities. In addition, the Chinese Communists could deploy 360 MIG-15/17 jet fighters toward Southeast Asia, and 40 IL-10 Beasts that were reclassified as prop ground attack aircraft. This totaled 625 aircraft.

The overall communist campaign would probably commence with Beagle and Bat bomber strikes against selected targets throughout Southeast Asia. U.S. fighter/bomber aircraft deploying to Southeast Asia from other locations would probably find most of the major airfields and their facilities heavily damaged after the first 24 hours of Chinese bombing sorties.

Of the 360 jet fighter aircraft it was likely that 180 would be used to control airspace and to perform air defense missions in the extreme south of Red China and in North Vietnam. The remaining 180 jet fighters would probably be used in a "guns only" close support attack role in conjunction with the 40 IL-10s.

It should be noted that the Red Chinese had the capability of airlifting 5,000 troops in the first sortie. Their experience in conducting a lift of this magnitude, however, was limited.

Naval Threat - The Communist Chinese were capable of:

1. Conducting anti-shipping tactics by employing 28 submarines. The "W" Class submarine carried a workload of 12 twenty one inch torpedoes or 16 torpedo-tube mines. These submarines could arrive in the South China Sea in approximately six days. It was estimated that 12 to 15 submarines could be committed initially but only four to six would be available on a sustained basis.

2. Providing conventional amphibious lift for about 15,000 lightly equipped troops. This capability could be

1. Bomb load data have been derived from the intelligence annex of USAF Specific Operational Requirements (SOR) publication. The Beagle's 6,600 pound bomb load capability has sometimes been erroneously calculated as only 2,200 pounds. Bats are estimated to have a 2,200 pound bomb load capability.

2. Airfields, rail marshalling yards, port facilities, key rail bridges.
increased considerably with use of powered junks, which could lift as many as 45,000 additional troops over a short distance.

3. Conducting large-scale defensive and small-scale offensive minelaying.

4. Conducting operations with a major part of its PT boats against naval forces and shipping in the South China Sea. The P-6 and P-4 PT boats were capable of speeds over 45 knots and were armed with 21 inch and 18 inch torpedoes respectively. The CCN considered PT boat units as part of its "elite" forces. These boats, utilizing the cover of weather and capitalizing on their small size, would endeavor to retaliate against blockading forces or U.S. combat or supply shipping. They had no on-board reload torpedo reserve and their short range radar provided insufficient air warning. Also, the 25mm guns were relatively ineffective against modern aircraft.

**Summary of Threat:** Any communist military campaign to conquer Southeast Asia would be largely a land campaign with principal reliance on army forces supported by the CCAF. In the event of such a campaign the Communists would count on the Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam to step up their guerrilla warfare efforts.

It is possible that the Red Chinese might not attack Burma in the initial phase of the war because of a political decision by Peiping. Even so, Chinese troops enroute to Thailand might cross the eastern Shan States to reach Thailand.

**COMMUNIST FORCE STRENGTH CHANGES**

(Figure I-18 refers.)

**Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR)**

As in the past, the USSR was the most important communist force in the Far East and the one reflecting the most important changes in military posture during 1964. Continuing the trend of the previous year, there was a reduction in the number of personnel in the Soviet armed forces. This was offset, in part, by the deployment of improved weapons and equipment.
THE COMMUNIST MILITARY THREAT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

**GROUND THREAT SUMMARY**

**Dry Weather**
24 (plus) Divisions. Six to Burma, nine to Thailand, and nine plus to South Vietnam during the dry weather period (January through May).

**Wet Weather**
11 (plus) Divisions. Four to Burma, four to Thailand, and three (plus) to South Vietnam during the wet weather period (June through December).

**AIR THREAT SUMMARY**

150 IL-28 (Beagle) jet light bombers (6,600 pound bomb load).
75 TU-2 (Bat) prop light bombers (2,200 pound bomb load).
360 MIG-15/17 (Fagot/Fresco) fighters
40 IL-10 (Beast) prop ground attack

625 Total aircraft

In-commission rate: (ten day stand-down assumed)

First three days — 80 percent of original
4-7 days — 60-70 percent of original
Sustained — 50-60 percent of original

**NAVAL THREAT SUMMARY**

12 to 15 submarines on station in the South China Sea and Gulf of Siam during the first five days with four to six on a sustained basis. Harassment from PT boat coastal defense forces.
### FAR EAST COMMunist BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH CHANGES DURING 1964

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USSR</th>
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**FOOTNOTES:**

*Line Divisions/Brigades include infantry (regular motorized, mechanized), armored (tank), airborne (parachute), divisions.

**Air strengths include air force and naval air force strengths.

***Changes in designation from former divisions and separate regiments.
The number of intercontinental ballistic missile sites continued to increase, so at the end of 1964 the Soviets had a greater strategic missile capability in the Far East in comparison to 1963. Research and development of ICBMS was also noted, with continued firings into the central Pacific impact area. Additional Surface to Air (SA-2) missile sites were observed. The Soviets continued to add to their air strength with additional eastward deployment of moderate numbers of new generation jet fighters.

The addition of two nuclear powered submarines was the most significant change in the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet during 1964.

People's Republic of China (CHICOM)

The Chinese Communist ground forces continued to reflect a small decrease in personnel strength. Similarly, the Air Force registered a slight decrease in number of aircraft; perhaps due to an inability to replace aircraft lost through normal attrition. More significant was an increase of 70-80 MIG-19 Farmer aircraft in the Air Force. Of the 1963 estimated eight to fifteen surface-to-air missile sites in Communist China, thirteen had been confirmed as SA-2 sites by the end of 1964. The most significant improvement in air defense capability was in the south and southwest portion of the country.

There were, during 1964, several indications that Red China accorded high priority to modern, prestige-type weapons. The Chinese detonated their first nuclear device in October; testing of surface-to-surface missiles continued, and two guided missile patrol boats of probable CHICOM construction were noted. In addition, a "G" class missile-firing submarine (probably built by Red China) was sighted and there were indications that "W" class submarines were being constructed in the country.

Communist China was probably working on the SS-N-4 missile (range 350 nautical miles) associated with the "G" class submarine.
Possibly this signified that China's missile development program was broader in scope and more advanced than previously estimated.

**Korean People's Republic (North Korea)**

There was a slight decline in the personnel strength of the Army. Although the Navy added two patrol craft there was no significant change noted in the country's naval capability. The North Korean Air Force remained fairly static, with an increase of 25 jet fighters being the only change in the order of battle.

**Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)**

The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) was credited with a personnel strength of 439,950 under order of battle procedures employed in 1963. However, because of a 1964 revision in the method of computing order of battle alignment, approximately 200,000 personnel previously credited to the PAVN were deleted from the regular force and identified as militia. This procedural change thus reduced the PAVN to 250,400 personnel and increased the militia to an available force strength of 2,000,000 without changing the overall capability of the armed forces.

**JOINT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

The area of CINCPAC's primary intelligence responsibility is portrayed in Figure I-19. Within this vast area, CINCPAC was engaged in a variety of intelligence activities, ranging from the simple to the complex, local to area-wide, and national to international. The intelligence aspects of his operations plans and major decisions are covered elsewhere in this volume of the Command History; this portion is devoted primarily to actions associated with the following:

1. Production
2. Mapping, charting, and geodesy.
3. Improvement of intelligence capability.
Discontinuance of Series 50 Air Target Mosaic Production: For several years CINCPAC had been concerned about the high cost, marginal accuracy, and long lead time involved in theater production of Series 50 Air Target Mosaics.

However, after a Component Commander's reappraisal of requirements for Series 50 mosaics, and in consonance with the need for quick-response target graphics which accompanied the August-September build-up in PACOM, CINCPAC stopped the Series 50 production. In lieu of Series 50, he increased production of tactical format materials and substituted the Unified Photo Interpretation Report (Part II) for the discontinued Series 50.

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 001173, 20 Jul 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 001162, 20 Jul 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 250528 Z Jul 1964 (S)
4. DIA DIAMC 62938 DTG 111434 Z Aug 1964 (S)
5. RAAF DEPAIR 170600 Z Aug 1964 (S)
6. MOD AIR 191757 Z Aug 1964 (S)
Those moves aligned PACOM Target Material production with that of CINCEUR, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE and provided a cheaper, quicker, and equally accurate means of depicting targets. Further, the new production policy permitted existing facilities to produce more target graphics and cover a correspondingly greater number of targets.

Search for Substitute for Series 200 Air Target Chart: In mid-1964 the DIA sought an Air Target Chart that could be produced, from existing topographic bases, faster and at less cost than the Series 200 Air Target Chart (ATC). In response to an informal DIA request, the 67th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron produced and distributed an Experimental Air Target Chart at a scale of 1:250,000. The chart used Army MAP Service ND 49-9 Series 250 Sheet as a base and included intelligence annotations, data of significance to radar, accented ridge lines, and textual intelligence annotations on both sides of the chart. DIA and the Unified and Specified Commands were to evaluate the new chart and, if it was found acceptable, the DIA was to entertain proposals to terminate the production of Series 200 ATC coverage for non-Sino Soviet Bloc areas. (C)

CINCPAC's views on the experimental chart were later briefed to DIA and others at the Radar Prediction/Simulation Conference held at the Pentagon. CINCPAC did not concur in substituting this chart for the standard Air Target Material Program Series 200 Air Target Chart because the contour interval was too great to allow precise determination of detail; and the elevation data was in meters, hence in conflict with the aircraft altimeters which were all calibrated in feet. (C)

At the end of the year no specific decision had been reached as to the acceptability of the new chart. 2-5 (C)
House of Representatives Appropriation Sub-Committee Visit:
On 3 November the House of Representatives Appropriation Sub-
Committee investigators visited CINCPAC. They explored the details
of target materials production and the use of automatic data processing
(ADP) in intelligence production. The sub-committee showed greatest
interest in the support that the DIA provided to CINCPAC and in
possible overlap or duplication in CINCPAC/DIA activity.² (U)
In June, Admiral Felt urged DIA to speed the establishment of a
good metric tie between Iwo Jima and Guam so these two sites could serve
as a means of correlating the existing PACOM geodetic surveys to each
other and to the World Geodetic System. The DIA later indicated that
only Iwo Jima and Guam were to be tied to the Tokyo Datum and the
WGS 60 by 1 October and the islands of Sarigan, Pagan, Asuncion and
Farallon De Pajaros would be tied to Guam in the same time frame.

At the end of the year, however, only Iwo Jima was recorded as
a known station in WGS 60. The tie-in on the above islands (Sarigan,
etc.) was not complete, although the raw data was on hand and it was
expected to be processed early in 1965. Other significant projects
completed during the year were as follows:

1. Tie between Caroline Islands - New Guinea -
    Australia.
2. Tie between Marshall Islands - Caroline Islands.

It was hoped that the tie between the Marshall Islands - northern
portion of the Fiji Islands-Gilbert Islands would be completed in early
1965. Based on past experience, however, it was recognized that
scheduled completion dates were subject to major slippage due to
adverse weather, political unrest, logistic shortcoming, and other
factors.

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 0084, 20 Jan 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 001250, 3 Dec 1963 (S)
3. CINCPAC 272000Z Jun 1964 (S)
4. DIAMC - 393286 DTG 062134Z (S)
5. The phases of the Southwest Pacific Tri-Service Precise Geodetic
   Surveys were: Phases 1, 3 - Caroline Islands, New Guinea,
   Australia tie, Phase 2 - Marshall Islands to Caroline Islands tie;
   Phase 4 - Marshall Islands to northern portion of Fiji Islands,
   to Gilbert Islands tie. See DIAMC - 369401 DTG 022152 Z Sep 1964 (S)
JOINT LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES

This section includes theater wide general logistic activities. Other logistic actions are treated separately as follows:

1. CINCPAC Operational Planning: Chapter I.
2. Military Assistance Program (except Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand): Chapter II.
3. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization: Chapter III.
4. Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand: Chapter IV.

CINCSTRIKE/USCINCPACMEAFSA OPLAN 531/11

Under this plan CINCPAC was to provide an amphibious task force of 1/3 Division/Wing Team (Marine Expeditionary Brigade) for operations in the MEAFSA area.

In August CINCSTRIKE provided CINCPAC a scenario based on this plan and asked to be informed of any logistic deficiencies, limitations or constraints that would inhibit the PACOM ability to support it. 1 The scenario indicated:

24 June — JCS directed CINCPAC to move the amphibious task force to a point 100 miles west of the Nicobar Islands.

11 July — D-Day for amphibious landing at Basra, Iraq.

26 July — Linkup between Basra and Baghdad forces.

After analysis of the plan and the associated scenario CINCPAC informed CINCSTRIKE that the following logistic constraints applied. 2

1. Inadequacy of PACOM organic amphibious lift would place reliance on MSTS augmentation which could not meet the closure dates at the objective.

1. CINCSTRIKE STRJ4-P 8124 DTG 061830Z Aug 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 050409Z Sep 1964 (TS)
2. A 15 day mount-out of all classes of supply was insufficient to support the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) for the duration of the operation.

3. The plan would divert major CINCPACFLT logistic forces and degrade WESTPAC operational logistic capability.

In view of the above constraints, CINCPAC concluded that CINCSKRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA OPLAN 531/11 was logistically infeasible.

**CINCLANT OPLAN 315-64**

In April CINCLANT requested that CINCPAC provide detailed transportation tables for the PACOM force that was to support the above plan. He further expressed concern that CINCPAC's recent increase in the force (12,140 vice 8,970) would degrade the capability of the force to meet the 72 hour reaction time specified in the plan.

CINCPAC pointed out that the increased force was essential to provide command and control and service support for the units he was sending. He further indicated that part of the increased force was to move by sealift but the balance would close by air within a 72 hour period.

There were a variety of subsequent actions refining transportation requirements related to the transportation of the PACOM force.

**Logistic Feasibility Evaluation of OPLANS**

CINCPAC tested the logistic feasibility of some operations plans by means of command exercises, maneuvers, war games and/or separate studies. Other plans were sometimes accepted as logistically feasible.

1. CINCLANT 141934Z Apr 1964 (C)
2. CINCLANT 232218Z Apr 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 251404Z Apr 1964 (TS)
4. COMSTS ltr ser 0322M6, 31 Aug 1964 (C)
5. CINCPAC 300536Z Sep 1964 (C)
6. CINCPAC ltr ser 000195, 26 May 1964 (TS)
7. ADMINO CINCPAC 162313Z Jul 1964 (C)
8. CINCPAC 241855Z Jul 1964 (C)
9. ADMINO CINCPAC 162312Z Jul 1964 (C)
10. CINCPAC ltr ser 0601, 28 Jul 1964 (C)
feasible because their logistic scope was substantially less than that of plans which were separately evaluated.

In June CINCPAC reported to the JCS that exercise DICE DROP did not reveal any logistic infeasibility in his General War Plan. He also reported that his other major contingency plans were logistically feasible. SEATO plans were termed logistically feasible on the basis of a study of a comparable CINCPAC OPLAN. At the same time, he observed that there were logistic constraints in PACOM sealift, airlift, and Army logistic units. These factors, he emphasized, degraded the logistic capability to support simultaneous execution of two or more of his major contingency plans.  

Logistic Readiness REDLOG Reporting

In 1963 CINCPAC began to follow a new JCS directed procedure termed REDLOG Report, to describe the logistic readiness and staying power of PACOM forces in the event any CINCPAC OPLAN was implemented.² (S)

Admiral Felt's logistic readiness report of February 1964³ noted that all logistic units assigned to PACOM were ready to perform their assigned missions. However, he also observed that the limitations specified in his November 1963 report were essentially unchanged; specifically, the logistic facilities in Korea and Southeast Asia and the embarkation facilities in Okinawa were still inadequate.

CINCPAC specified the following constraints on logistic support of his OPLANs 25, 27, and 32-64:

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000231, 26 Jun 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, pp. 66-68
3. CINCPAC 160124Z Feb 1964 (S)
2. Deep sea diving submarines were restricted to a 500 foot operating depth and it appeared that this condition would not be lifted before March 1965.

3. Shortage of torpedos; too slow replacement of obsolete torpedos.

4. Fleet overhauls and routine maintenance deferred because of insufficient Operations and Maintenance funds with the result that combat capability was degraded.

5. Supply of trained technicians not keeping pace with new fleet equipment population. The result was a degraded maintenance standard.

6. Only 30 days support level of starter cartridges for the F-100 and F-105 aircraft.

CINCPAC further reported that his capability to support OPLAN 1-64 was degraded by the fact that 25 of the 128 assigned F/TF-102 aircraft were grounded for corrosion to engine intake ducts.

The May REDLOG report varied but little from the February report. But the August report, submitted while PACOM forces were being built up as a result of the DRV attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, indicated the debilitating effects of some of the previously reported constraints. For example, the aggravated materiel shortages occasioned by peacetime funding had degraded combat readiness to such an extent that aircraft, ordnance, and parts sometimes had to be transferred from ships not sailing to those committed. At the same time, CINCPAC reported that the completion of paving at the ROK Air Base at Kwangju had improved the U.S. capability to perform sustained military operations.

In September the JCS solicited CINCPAC for recommendations that would eliminate duplication from the Logistic Readiness Report. After consulting his Component Commanders, CINCPAC proposed that the REDLOG was duplicative to the Operational Readiness Report.

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1. CINCPAC 160419Z May 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 140400Z Aug 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 040413Z Sep 1964 (U)
4. CINCUSARPAC ARP 14601 DTG 120230Z Sep 1964 (S)
5. CINCPACFLT 141959Z Sep 1964 (C)
6. CINCPACAF PFMLP-W DTG 150358Z Sep 1964 (U)
which was also submitted to the JCS. He recommended the retention of only Part III (Commander's Logistic Estimate) of the REDLOG Report.  

Even before CINCPAC's recommendation reached the JCS they had suspended the REDLOG report pending its complete reappraisal. The JCS also requested specific answers concerning the requirement for, and the content of, the report. Accordingly, CINCPAC reiterated his position and provided the specific answers asked by the JCS.  

Pending the JCS reappraisal, CINCPAC directed his Component Commanders to submit only Part III (Commander's Logistic Estimate) of their feeder reports.  

**Theater Airlift**

In association with the 1963, Flow of Gold problem, it had been established that CINCPAC would lose two C-130 squadrons and one C-124 squadron from his theater airlift resources during 1964. The expectation at higher levels was that an extension of MATS routes would compensate for the surrendered theater airlift capability, but Admiral Felt had not shared that opinion, principally on the basis that he would be left with insufficient resources for contingencies. Events in 1964 proved that CINCPAC's analysis had been substantially correct. Though he lost the C-124 squadron he gained two additional C-130 squadrons (on TDY from CONUS) during the year. Even so, he was unable to satisfy the mounting airlift requirements associated with the enhanced PACOM posture at the end of the year.

Near the middle of March the JCS informed CINCPAC that PACOM might be tasked, in April, to airlift and resupply a UN peacekeeping force of New Zealanders and Australians to Cyprus. There were already indications that a serious airlift shortage was developing, and the UN project would make a heavy inroad on the PACOM airlift force.
Admiral Felt's reply to the JCS pointed out that this airlift job would degrade his capability to support scheduled exercises and handle contingencies. As alternatives, he recommended that Australia provide the airlift or that MATS jets move the UN force.¹ ²

There was a continual increase in PACOM airlift requirements throughout March and indications were that there would be further increases in April and May.³ Accordingly, some low priority missions were delayed and certain schedules in Southeast Asia, Japan, and Korea were curtailed or eliminated;⁴ also, some training missions were dropped.⁵

CINCPAC cautioned his subordinate commanders that his airlift resources were to be reduced in July. He also directed the Chief Western Transportation Office (CHWTO) to make sure that the reduction was understood by the theater users so they would use MATS whenever possible.⁶ Some relief occurred when it was arranged for MATS to assume the mission of supporting the reconstruction of a Loran tower on Iwo Jima after the July reduction in airlift.⁷

Twice CINCPAC appealed to the JCS to cancel the October withdrawal of the C-130 squadron at Naha, Okinawa.⁸ ⁹ Pending action on this he investigated, to no avail, the possibility of enhancing PACOM airlift by increasing the utilization rates of his existing resources.¹⁰ ¹³

In July the C-124 squadron at Tachikawa AB (16 aircraft) was transferred, thus reducing the monthly productive capability of PACOM C-124s from 2000 to 1150 hours.¹⁴ There was, however, some consolation because MATS assumed the Korea-Japan and Japan to Iwo Jima and Marcus routes at that time.
Also in July, the FAR and Neutralist forces in Laos launched Operation Triangle against the Pathet Lao, and the heavy ammunition requirements for the offensive required resupply by airlift.\(^1\) Almost immediately the JCS advised CINCPAC that the C-130 squadron in Okinawa, previously scheduled for withdrawal to CONUS on 1 October, was to remain in PACOM until 1 July 1965.\(^2\)

The buildup in U.S. forces following the August conflicts between the U.S. and the DRV caused unprecedented demands on PACOM airlift resources. At one time there was a backlog of one thousand tons of PACOM cargo at Travis AFB, so MATS could not supplement the theater airlift. Another large backlog occurred at Clark AB in the Philippines. This situation required a heavy overfly of authorized flying hours\(^3\) and was further complicated when President Sukarno of Indonesia barred the only U.S. flag commercial airline routing through his country. As a consequence CINCPAC had to divert some of his aircraft to support CHMILTAG requirements until the commercial airline was reinstated.\(^4\)

By September, augmented at his request by two C-130 squadrons (32 aircraft total),\(^5\) CINCPAC was able to reduce the theater backlogs to a reasonable level. But requirements continued to exceed capabilities by a substantial margin,\(^6,7\) despite stringent CINCPAC efforts to achieve further economy and efficiency by all users of theater airlift resources.\(^8,9\)

During November, at the request of the JCS, Admiral Sharp reassessed his airlift requirements and considered alternatives related to the retention of the C-130 squadron beyond its scheduled redeployment date of 1 July 1965. His comprehensive 21 November report to the JCS provided a clear picture of the undesirable consequences of the eight months

\(^{1}\) MATS MAOC/SA/MCP 694-G DTG 240215Z Jul 1964 (C)
\(^{2}\) JCS 7629 DTG 301629Z Jul 1964 (S)
\(^{3}\) CHWTO ltr ser 0088-64, 10 Sep 1964 (S)
\(^{4}\) CINCPAC 220120Z Aug 1964 (C)
\(^{5}\) JCS 7734 DTG 051233Z Aug 1964 (S)
\(^{6}\) CHWTO WIO 696 DTG 160609Z Oct 1964 (U)
\(^{7}\) PACAF ltr PFMTR, 16 Oct 1964 (U)
\(^{8}\) CINCPAC ltr ser 2929, 30 Oct 1964 (U)
\(^{9}\) CINCPAC 070345Z Nov 1964 (U)
that PACOM had suffered from a serious airlift deficit. These included the deferral of high priority missions, nonparticipation in joint exercises, cancellation of other essential training exercises, and continual overfly of authorized hours. CINCPAC stressed that he had fully exploited the compensating potential of combining training into productive missions, extending MATS routes, and increasing the use of augmentation aircraft.

In relation to depending upon augmentation aircraft for emergency situations, Admiral Sharp pointed out that the two USSTRICOM C-130 squadrons had not been available for operations in PACOM until five days after they had been dispatched to WESTPAC on a priority basis. He also observed that during the preparations for communist reaction to the August air strikes on the DRV, his airlift had accomplished the vital positioning of forces in WESTPAC before the CONUS augmentation had arrived.

In closing his report to the JCS, Admiral Sharp emphasized that the redeployment of the C-130 squadron in July 1965 would have a serious impact on his capability to carry out operations and to provide airlift support for contingency OPLANS and emergencies. He cautioned that if the situation in Southeast Asia continued to be as unsettled as it had been in 1964 he could see no alternative but to keep the PACOM airlift forces in being and in place indefinitely. As his last comment, CINCPAC recommended that the scheduled redeployment be cancelled and that all concerned be promptly advised.¹

The critical shortage of theater airlift continued through the end of 1964 without any indications of lessened requirements. CINCPAC was faced with the probable loss of the two TDY C-130 squadrons and the Okinawa based C-130 squadron.

MATS Transportation of Dependent Students

Although a high school was available at Taipei, a number of service members assigned there were sending their dependent high school children to school at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. CHMAAG China queried CINCPAC as to whether the students might be authorized to use MATS on a space available unaccompanied basis between Clark AB and

¹ CINCPAC 210258Z Nov 1964 (S)
Taipei at Christmas and during other extended holiday periods.

CINCPAC, observing that the question would be applicable throughout the PACOM, passed the query to CSAF. In response a coordinated tri-service message announced the policy that transportation was not authorized between a more distant school overseas and a home station overseas during vacations if an accredited school was located closer and could accommodate the dependent student. The sponsor's alternatives were:

1. To select the closest accredited school, in which case vacation travel was authorized.

2. If another school was selected, excluding those within CONUS, no space available travel was authorized.

3. If a school within CONUS was selected one round trip per school year was authorized.

(U)

Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants

One of CINCPAC's major logistic objectives was to create a POL storage and distribution system that would support PACOM forces under contingency conditions. Some of the major considerations affecting this problem were the great distances in the theater; a limited number of storage sites; inadequate storage capability at some existing sites; limited funds available for expansion of storage facilities; multiple and divergent centers of potential trouble in the Pacific area; and POL requirements in a given area which could change with dramatic speed in response to major force shifts. In spite of CINCPAC's continuing program to adjust the PACOM POL stocks and develop additional storage facilities, events of 1964 emphasized the continuing geographic imbalance of theater POL storage facilities.

Following the August conflicts in the Gulf of Tonkin between the U.S. and DRV naval units, there was an immediate increase in Pacific Fleet demands against U.S. POL stock at Subic Bay in the Philippines. There was a corresponding drop in the draw against the normal source of supply at the large Yokohama and Sasebo terminal complexes in

1. CINCPAC 162320Z Sep 1964 (U)
2. CSAF AFSTP 75219 DTG 232152Z Sep 1964 (U)
IMBALANCE IN GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PACOM POL STORAGE FACILITIES
1964

LEGEND

- Deficit in storage in relation to local area requirements. (thousands of barrels)

- Used to meet deficit area storage requirements. (thousands of barrels)

Source: J4
Japan. And at one time only a four day stock of Navy Special Fuel Oil (NFSO) remained at Subic. Consumption was much in excess of that which had been forecast for normal operations.

CINCPAC corrected this by diverting to the Philippines many tankers enroute to other PACOM terminals, but he recognized that it would be dangerous to depend on this expedient for future crises. Therefore, an urgent FY65 construction project was initiated to expand the POL storage facilities at Subic by 350,000 barrels. This promised some relief for the Subic POL deficit in storage facilities, but at the end of the year there was no solution in sight for immediate contingency requirement needs.\(^1\) Even with this construction Subic would be 1,123,000 barrels short of the acceptable level of NFSO operating and prepositioned War Reserve Stocks.

The deficit in POL storage facilities for naval surface operations was paralleled by a similar imbalance in the storage capacity for Navy and USAF jet fuel. CINCPACAF, in May, noted that a recent change in USAF contingency plans had created a shortage of 892,000 barrels in the jet fuel storage facilities in the Ryukyus. As an expedient, he requested that this amount of fuel be stored in Japan.\(^2\) CINCPAC arranged a realignment of the Japan POL storage plan to accommodate the PACAF's additional requirement as well as stocks for other similarly deficient areas. On implementation of the plan, early in 1965, the Japanese storage facilities would contain 3,659,800 barrels of POL products which were intended to meet specific requirements outside of Japan.\(^3\)

Some of this POL stock would be destined for Wake Island, a major aircraft refueling point for every U.S. contingency plan associated with Southeast Asia. There, based on contingency requirements, aviation fuel storage was about 157,600 barrels short. Pending construction of additional storage facilities at Wake, scheduled for FY66, CINCPAC placed the Wake deficit stock in Japan, with further plans to move it to Hawaii upon completion of the tankage conversion program on Oahu (see below).\(^4\)

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1. CINCPACFLT 082227Z Feb 1965 (TS)
2. CINCPACAF PFMSG-P 8520 DTG 230122Z May 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC Instr 4020.7

Page 133 of 495 Pages SECRET
In July 1960 a project was initiated at Red Hill, Oahu, Hawaii to modify four excess Navy Special Fuel Oil storage tanks (each of 300,000 barrel capacity) to store USAF jet fuel. The pumping facility and pipeline for the project was tested and found acceptable during the week of 17 August 1964, and on the last day of the year the storage facility became fully operational, with two tanks being utilized for the storage of AVGas and two for jet fuel.\footnote{CO.NSC.PEARL SPDIIR ser 7238, 31 Aug 1964 (U)}\footnote{MTS GUAM 010456Z Dec 1964 (U)}\footnote{CINCPACFLT 082227Z Feb 1965 (TS)}

The completion of Red Hill storage facility modification, at a cost of approximately five million dollars, was expected to help alleviate a critical deficit of aircraft fuel storage capacity on Oahu. Further, as outlined above, the facility could accommodate the Wake Island aviation fuel deficit until additional storage capacity was developed at Wake.

A project to improve the POL discharge facilities at Subic Naval Base in the Philippines and at Guam made it possible for "Monster" tankers (450,000 barrels) to use these ports.\footnote{Previously, POL deliveries to these sites had been accomplished with tankers of capacities of 160,000 barrel or less. (U)}

This turn of events was of dubious value to CINCPAC. True, the cost of delivery was reduced but the flexibility of delivery schedules was also restricted because only three sites — Subic, Sasebo, Guam — could accommodate the 44 foot draft of the larger ships. Additionally, the extraordinary capacity of the Monster tanker dictated that the POL stocks in the already scarce PACOM storage facilities had to be allowed to fall to an extremely low level so the cargo could be accepted. Thus, to maintain a proper reserve stock, the Subic storage facilities had to be expanded.

Technical Escorts for Toxic Chemical Munitions

Since 1962 CINCPAC had vainly attempted to develop procedures that would standardize the movement and handling of toxic chemical munitions within PACOM. The conflict, which could not be resolved,
personnel technically qualified to handle emergencies occasioned by leakage or accidents) during shipment. Each service staunchly maintained that it did not have enough of these technicians and through April all efforts to achieve a compromise failed. ¹

The Department of Army was preparing a Joint Service regulation to be available 15 February 1965, concerning the general subject of technical escorts. Even so, Admiral Felt directed the Component Commanders to review a draft instruction prepared earlier by CINCUSARPAC. He tasked CINCUSARPAC to recommend modifications to an earlier proposal so CINCPAC could publish an interim instruction on technical escort. ² In this action he had JCS concurrence. ³

Again, neither CINCPACFLT nor CINCPACAF would agree to the CINCUSARPAC proposal. ⁴-⁶ By this time the target date for completion of the Department of the Army directive on technical escort was only four months away (Feb 65). Under the circumstances, CINCPAC concluded that he would defer publishing his instruction until the DA prepared document was available. He decided to handle interim technical escort requests on a case-by-case basis.

Cancellation of Project Green Mountain

As a precautionary move in 1960 a stock of 584 short tons of ammunition was established in Thailand to support a U.S. airborne battle group for 10 days. The supply of ammunition was designated operational project Army USARYIS ORD-29-62-OP (PAC) (U), nicknamed GREEN MOUNTAIN, and held under MAP guise.

By 1964 the establishment of additional ammunition stockpiles for Southeast Asia (e.g., Department of the Army Forward Depot and Forward Floating Depot) and other changes eliminated the requirement for GREEN MOUNTAIN. Accordingly, on the recommendation of CINCUSARPAC, the project was cancelled and the assets were dispersed to other activities. ⁷, ⁸

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1. CINCPAC 302025Z Apr 1963 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 050510Z Sep 1964 (S)
3. JCS 8575 DTG 112305Z Sep 1964 (S)
4. CINCUSARPAC Itr GPOP ser 2502, 29 Sep 1964 (S)
5. CINCPACFLT 190321Z Sep 1964 (S)
6. CINCPACAF PFMDC 12546 DTG 160230Z Sep 1964 (S)
7. CINCUSARPAC 190155Z Jul 1964 (TS)
8. DA 241729Z Jul 1964 (U)
Emergency Evacuation of Dependents

To prepare a response to a Senate Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee request for information concerning the total military effort expended in transporting and maintaining dependents of Department of Defense personnel overseas, the JCS asked CINCPAC to summarize the time, effort, and logistical support that would be required to evacuate DOD dependents in an emergency. CINCPAC was also requested to include similar evacuation data for other U.S. citizens to include tourists, present in PACOM area countries.1 (U)

CINCPAC abstracted information from the Far East Liaison Group Report of 30 June and added a computation of equivalent C-130 loads involved in the event that military aircraft should be required. This information is reflected in Figure 1-21.2 (U)

CINCPAC noted that there would be almost no impact on military operations if, with adequate warning, evacuation was orderly and progressive by commercial transportation as provided in State Department plans. However, he reported that wholesale and immediate evacuation under general war conditions, would be neither practical nor desirable. Further, he predicted that evacuation could have significant adverse impact on military operations in Japan, Okinawa, and Guam.

Under limited war conditions, CINCPAC believed that interference would probably be most significant in Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. The existing concentration of dependents in RVN, he thought, would permit easier evacuation. He foresaw no particular problems concerning evacuation of the smaller areas involved in a limited war situation since the aircraft bringing troops and material into the affected areas could be used to take out dependents and other noncombatants. CINCPAC stated that the military situation prevailing at the time evacuation was ordered would govern the time factors involved.2 (U)

Traffic Management

In January the JCS sent CINCPAC a DOD study that was critical of traffic management in USEUCOM; they further indicated that the

1. JCS 001687 DTG 091630Z Nov 1964 (U)
2. CINCPAC 180407Z Nov 1964 (U)
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Footnotes:
1. Includes US citizens who are residents in various countries. Although they are entitled to evacuation, it is considered unlikely that most of them would elect to be evacuated since they are married to local nationals. This situation is particularly true in Japan and the Philippines. Does not include DOD or other US employees on the theory that they will be required to remain on duty.

2. Air and sea evacuation figures are estimated weekly capacities. X indicates adequate capacity that has not been calculated.

3. C-130 equivalent load represents 85 persons with an average of 60 lbs baggage per person. The number of loads is calculated to take care of all noncombatants.
conclusions and recommendations of the report should be studied as they applied within PACOM.  

CINCPAC reviewed his original input to the DOD study in conjunction with representatives of the Component Commanders and concluded that the existing PACOM organization, procedures, and regulations best fitted the characteristics of the Pacific theater. However, he obtained a copy of each directive and regulation related to transportation and traffic management from the Component Commanders and other subordinate commanders. These were reviewed and analyzed to detect undesirable traffic management practices.

British Request for Claymore Mines

The British Embassy in Saigon approached COMUSMACV in early June regarding the purchase of Claymore Mines for operational evaluation in Borneo.

CINCPAC asked the Department of the Army to take appropriate action, observing at the same time that the request was unusual and of doubtful legality. In reply, the DA stated that the mine could be made available from CONUS stocks, and suggested that the British Embassy in Saigon refer the request to the British Embassy in Washington for procurement action. CINCPAC concurred and asked COMUSMACV to take the appropriate action.

In July another DA proposal suggested that the mines be made available from stocks in RVN, and that they be replaced within two months from CONUS sources. CINCPAC indicated no objection, provided COMUSMACV agreed. COMUSMACV concurred in the agreement and the mines were subsequently delivered to British custody in RVN.

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1. JCS ltr MJCS 11-64, 17 Jan 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00607, 15 Jun 1963 (S)
3. CINCPAC 142359Z Mar 1964 (U)
4. CINCPAC 142358Z Mar 1964 (U)
5. COMUSMACV MAC J41 4491 DTG 021029Z Jun 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC 070021Z Jun 1964 (S)
7. CINCPAC 130121Z Jun 1964 (S)
8. DA 978335 DTG 171839Z Jul 1964 (S)
9. CINCPAC 182301Z Jul 1964 (C)
10. COMUSMACV MACLOG-OR 22107 DTG 230114Z Jul 1964 (C)
11. CGUSAMC 7-9583 DTG 291930Z Jul 1964 (C)
CINCPAC COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES

This section describes CINCPAC's activities to improve the speed, reliability, and security of the communications upon which he depended to exercise control of his forces. It also describes, to some extent, CINCPAC's efforts to modernize and extend the communications facilities in allied PACOM countries.

The need for rapid communication was most effectively demonstrated during 1964 in connection with South Vietnam and Thailand due to the increase of insurgency, infiltration, subversion, terrorism, and sabotage. The active role of the U.S. in these two countries required a reliable, almost instantaneously responsive intra and inter-theater communication system. CINCPAC activities to improve communication in South Vietnam and Thailand are described in the RVN and Thailand sections of Chapter IV.

Command and Control Communications

In 1963 CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS joint voice and teletype cable requirements of the PACOM Component Commanders. CINCPAC, at that time, advocated the use of circuit seizure/pre-emption equipment when exercising emergency actions, and also recommended the termination of required circuits in common-user Defense Communications Agency (DCA) switchboards.¹

In 1964 a DOD decision that common-user channels would be used for command and control purposes, as CINCPAC had recommended, spurred the development of plans to lease circuit seizure equipment. Efforts towards this end culminated in a CINCPAC approved plan whereby seizure could be electronically accomplished on four Trans-Pacific cable circuits connecting the Component Commanders to their respective forces in the Western Pacific. CINCPAC, in addition, would have an over-ride capability on each circuit.² Contractual action for the circuit seizure capability was being taken in late 1964;

1. CINCPAC Command History 1963, p. 85
2. CINCPAC 060116Z Sep 1964 (C)
installation would take about seven months.

In addition to the cable circuit seizure capability, plans to effect seizure of high frequency radio circuits were also underway at the end of 1964. Development and contracting action for this capability was delegated by the JCS to Naval Communications Systems Headquarters.

Communications to support the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post are described in the section in this chapter titled CINCPAC Activities to Improve His Command Facilities.

Trans-Pacific Cables

An extensive Trans-Pacific cable program which began in 1962 was mostly completed in 1964. 1, 2

Legs of the cable complex which were completed in 1964 are as follows:

1. Second California to Hawaii cable terminating at Makaha was completed in September.
2. Submarine by-pass cable from Haunama Bay, Hawaii to Makaha was completed in April.
3. Cable from Hawaii to Guam was operational in May and the north spur from Guam to Japan opened in June. The south spur from Guam to the Philippines was delayed for a short time by governmental negotiations on legal problems of revenue and other pertinent aspects. However, this leg became operational in mid-November.
4. The Hawaiian land tail of the Trans-Pacific cable (an underground distribution cable extending from Makaha to the facilities of the Hawaiian Telephone Company and then to Haunama Bay) was completed in April.

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1962, p. 56
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 86
Military cable laying activities beyond the Philippines were completed and would provide high quality voice communication from Hawaii to Saigon beginning 1 January 1965.

Joint Overseas Switchboards

In 1963 DOD approved actions necessary for the establishment of a joint voice network in PACOM and Joint Overseas Switchboards became operational in January 1964 at Kunia in Hawaii, Guam, Philippines, Okinawa, Japan, and Korea. Overseas telephone service in Taiwan had and would continue to be provided through the use of a two position switchboard (SB 1315) which was placed in service in August 1963. The switchboard, located at Taipei, was scheduled to be installed in the new Defense Communication System facility being constructed by the Army at Grass Mountain approximately eight miles from Taipei.

Coincident with the installation of the new overseas switchboards, Telephone Terminals (AN/FTA-15) were installed on all the High Frequency voice circuits connected to the boards, thereby improving their operational usage.

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 87
Pacific Command Frequency Management

Project Gemini: Extensive frequency coordination was generated by the Project Gemini manned space flight program in 1964, as had occurred for Project Mercury in 1963. To ensure adequate communications-electronics support for Gemini missions designated GT-3 and GT-4, radio frequencies were required for spacecraft control, telemetry, tracking, and recovery operations. The spacecraft and telemetry frequencies were coordinated, cleared, and assigned without difficulty, having been used previously in support of Project Mercury. Frequencies also were cleared and assigned by CINCPAC for the use of tracking ships to be located east of Hawaii and in the Indian Ocean. Since the Gemini program would be followed by the Apollo Lunar probe, CINCPAC initiated frequency planning to support subsequent Gemini and Apollo requirements on a continuing basis.

SYNCOM: In anticipation of the 1964 launch of the SYNCOM III communications satellite, coordination was initiated by CINCPAC in December 1963 for the necessary telemetering, beacon, and communications. Primary ground terminals in the Pacific were to be located in Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines. Concurrent with planning for SYNCOM III, the SYNCOM II satellite was moved from its stationary orbit over the Atlantic to the Pacific. In the event SYNCOM III failed, its ground control facilities could still be used for SYNCOM II. While SYNCOM II was in transit, tests were scheduled using the USNS KINGSPORT as a terminal. During the tests, radio frequency interference problems were encountered in the Hawaiian area from existing microwave communications systems. To resolve these conflicts, it was necessary to shift microwave frequencies since the satellite

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 88
2. FAPUSMC 032218Z Dec 1963 (C)
3. FAPUSMCB 191857Z Oct 1964 (C)
4. CINCPAC 070045Z Nov 1964 (C)
5. FAPUSMCB 1204392 Dec 1963 (U)
6. CGUSASATCOMAGCY AMCPM-SG-6-063 DTG 181950Z Feb 1964 (U)
frequencies could not be changed. The early resolution of SYNCOM II interference proved to be of great value in paving the way for interference-free SYNCOM III operations. Theater and host government coordination actions were completed and frequency assignments were made by CINCPAC for use of SYNCOM II and III systems in Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, and Saigon. The latter location was added on an urgent basis. Both SYNCOM II and III provided highly reliable communications in support of CINCPAC objectives in addition to their primary role of providing test data to support NASA and DOD research and development programs.

**Frequency management within SEATO:** This was a significant item on the agenda of the SEATO Communications-Electronics Committee's Seventh Meeting (CE7M) held in Bangkok 25 February through 3 March 1964. Key problem areas which required resolution were: The lack of a SEATO Frequency Coordinator; the need for an effective SEATO frequency coordination system and the need for an up-to-date frequency register. The first problem was resolved as the result of a billet swap within the SEATO Military Planning Office (MPO). An internal change was concurred in by CINCPAC and approved by the JCS whereby the JTD of the Communications Electronics Division in the MPO was modified to include a U.S. officer (vice a French officer) who would perform the functions of SEATO Frequency Coordinator. In July the MPO convened a working party at Bangkok to develop a viable SEATO frequency coordination system and an up-to-date frequency register from terms of reference drawn up during CE7M. The working party resolved the two remaining problems to the satisfaction of all members. However, during the Military Advisors Twenty-First Conference (MA21C), held at Bangkok in October, it was recognized that

1. FAPUSMCEB 042219Z Mar 1964 (U)
2. FAPUSMCEB 091953Z Jul 1964 (U)
3. FAPUSMCEB 012239Z Sep 1964 (C)
4. Report of SEATO CE7M, Feb 1964 (S)
5. CINCPAC 130615Z Apr 1964 (C)
6. JCS 6116 DTG 011618Z May 1964 (C)
7. USMILADREP SMPO BANGKOK 140300Z Jul 1964 (C)
the SEATO Frequency Register, SEAP-12B, would require input from member nations on a continuing basis and that this effort would be undertaken by the SEATO Frequency Coordinator as a routine matter.
Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN)

AUTODIN was first announced to PACOM in January 1963 and reported in the CINCPAC 1963 Command History. This network was being installed for the rapid handling of data, teletype, graphics and digital voice. Plans for the installation of Automatic Data Message Switching Centers (ADMSC) proceeded on schedule. Conferences for the purpose of determining traffic volume have been periodically held with the results showing increases on each occasion. The Trans-Pacific cable greatly enhanced the Manual Data Relay Center (MDRC) capability to pass traffic to and from WESTPAC. However, it was necessary to obtain an additional channel from Hawaii to Japan.

United States Air Force efforts to provide teletype message transmission and secure on-line capability had progressed by the end of 1964 to the point where all PACAF locations were scheduled to begin operation in January 1965. This action was expected to greatly enhance capability to handle increased traffic volume.

Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON)

Announced in PACOM at the same time as AUTODIN, AUTOVON's purpose was to provide high quality voice service to selected high priority subscribers. The Defense Communications Agency (DCA) decided that the AUTOVON switching facility to be installed in Hawaii would be leased and installation would be made at the Hawaiian

1. For a detailed report see pp. 280-285 USARPAC Historical Summary 1 July 1963 - 30 June 1964, 30 June 1964 (TS)
2. DCA 314.27/5426 DTG 301858Z Oct 1964 (U)
3. CINCPAC 1963 Command History p. 90
Telephone Company facility at Wahiawa. The subscriber list was completed, concurred in by CINCPAC in October, and submitted to DCA for approval. The AUTOVON program throughout PACOM was proceeding according to schedule at the end of 1964.

Communications Consolidation Plans

This report of consolidation of Defense Communications System (DCS) facilities, with the primary objective of consolidating the tri-service common user communication environment into one system, is carried over from the CINCPAC Command History, 1963.

Consolidation of these systems was completed during 1964 in the Philippines (AF), Japan (AF), Guam (Navy), and Taiwan (Army). In Okinawa, progress was slow but near the end of the year the cut-over of channel derivation equipment from Kadena (AF) to Futenma (Army) was completed. This permitted Army control of Air Force DCS HF trunks in Okinawa.

The Army was constructing an entirely new DCS facility in the vicinity of Taegu, Korea and consolidation of systems in Korea was not expected until late calendar year 1965. Upon completion, the Army was to assume responsibility for all DCS communications in Korea.

A plan for consolidation of DCS communications in Hawaii was pending DOD approval at the end of 1964.

Systems Plan for Upgrading Joint On-Island Communications

A plan developed by CINCPAC for upgrading on-island (Oahu, Hawaii) communications was submitted to the JCS in October 1963 and approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in June 1964. There

1. DCA 300/1944 DTG 302114Z Apr 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC 240321Z Oct 1964 (C)
3. For a detailed report see pp. 272-280 USARPAC Historical Summary 1 July 1963 - 30 June 1964, 30 June 1964 (TS)
4. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 91
were two major requirements contained in the CINCPAC plan as follows:

1. Communication Service Requirement — Consisted of six projects which were urgently needed for support of service expansions on Oahu. These were lease projects which, based on a ten year service contract, would have an annual lease cost of $305,000.

2. Maintenance and Rehabilitation Requirements — Comprised of 13 projects which were vitally necessary to upgrade and renovate the existing military owned cable system for support of the Communication Service Projects as well as other essential on-island services. The one-time cost of these projects was to be $1,407,000.

The U.S. Army was assigned responsibility for funding of the improvements subject to approval of DOD and availability of funds within the Army current fiscal program. The Army approved four projects for implementation in 1964 and proposed to program two of the remaining 15 projects in FY65 and 13 in FY66. ¹ OSD considered the projects adequate to meet current requirements, but felt that the long range objective should be the elimination of government-owned trunking facilities as rapidly as commercial capability became available.

Realizing that the Army's programming actions probably would not produce results until at least mid-1967, CINCPAC, in October, requested CINCUSARPAC to prepare a plan for an early phased transfer of trunking service from government-owned to commercially-owned facilities. ² This was done in an effort to meet the support requirements of the Defense Communication System AUTOVOVON and AUTODIN switching programs.

Western Pacific Intra-area Wide Band Communications System

The CINCPAC Communications Objective Study of June 1961 supported the expansion of existing wide band tropospheric scatter systems and the extension of new wide band systems into other areas.

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1. DA CC-E, OCC-E 58541, DTG 241724Z Aug 1964 (U)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 2686, 6 Oct 1964 (U)
to provide a continuous system of high quality communication throughout the Western Pacific. Accordingly, an expansion program was begun. The status of Wide Band systems expansion, reported as being in progress in the CINCPAC Command History, 1963, at the end of 1964 was as follows:

**Trans-Taiwan:** This system was completed and placed into service on 29 April 1964.

**Taiwan-Philippines:** The U.S. Army negotiated a contract in June 1964 with Page Communications Engineers to relocate the Philippine terminal from its existing location to Cabuyo near Baguio, to modify the terminal to provide 24 channels within acceptable standards, and to construct a microwave relay between Cabuyo and the Air Base area. Progress, at the end of 1964 was at a standstill while site entry problems were being negotiated with the Philippine Government.

**Philippines - South Vietnam:** This project was completed near the end of 1964. It provided 60 channels between Clark AFB and Nha Trang, and 36 channels between Nha Trang and Saigon. The 24 remaining channels at Nha Trang were to be utilized for communications to locations in Northern RVN or to Bangkok and other locations in Thailand.

**Saigon-Bangkok:** The technical difficulties experienced on this system could not be overcome, therefore, the U.S. Army proposed to DOD that the Thailand terminal be moved from Bang Ping, southeast of Bangkok to Green Mountain, northeast of Bangkok. Propagation tests were made on the Saigon-Green Mountain path and sufficient data was gathered to substantiate the feasibility of the system. At the end of the year a plan was being coordinated by DCA in Washington, to provide for this system and other wideband communications improvements in South Vietnam and Thailand.
CINCPAC Communication Center

The monthly volume of messages processed by the CINCPAC Communication Center in 1964 continued to spiral upward, increasing by 25 percent over the previous year. During the first 10 months of 1964 an average of 42,469 messages were processed each month, compared with 33,869 in 1963 and 24,164 in 1961.

Efforts were continued to gain an increase in manpower authorizations for the Communications Center over and above the increase of seven spaces approved by the JCS in 1963.\(^1\) The JCS Manpower Survey Team, which conducted a survey of CINCPAC in June, recommended that the Communication Center JTD be increased by an aggregate of two spaces.\(^2\)

Early in 1964, as a continuation of work begun in 1963, all teletype circuits were upgraded from 60 to 100 words-per-minute. Four additional circuits were installed to meet the increasing traffic loads and to maintain an acceptable speed of service. At the end of 1964 the CINCPAC Communication Center operated KW-26 secure circuits on a 24 hour basis to locations as follows:

1. CNO
2. Each Component Commander
3. NMCC-San Miguel (Readout only.\(^2\) Two Full-Duplex circuits in tandem)
4. NMCC-Fuchu (Readout only. Two Full-Duplex Circuits in tandem)
5. COMSUBPAC
6. Naval Communications Station Honolulu
7. DCS Relay Station, Hickam (Plan-55, two circuits, through Secret)
8. DCS Relay Station, Aliamanu (Oahu) (through Secret)

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1. JCS Report of Personnel Utilization and Manpower Requirements Survey 1 Jun 1964 (U)
2. Readout: Ability to monitor a circuit and receive copies of messages being transmitted.
10. NMCC (Operated as teleconference circuit)
11. COMUSMACV (Operated as teleconference circuit)

The Naval Command Systems Support Activity (NAVCOSSACT), in response to a CINCPAC project request, made a detailed study to determine the feasibility of providing the CINCPAC Communication Center with an automated message storage and retrieval system.\(^1\),\(^2\) The project was generated with a view toward providing better service to the CINCPAC Staff by making central message files more accessible through expeditious retrieval of messages by date-time-group, subject, originator, cite number, classification, precedence, or combinations thereof. NAVCOSSACT concluded that a system employing coded microfilm storage and automated retrieval would be both feasible and practical. A system providing complete in-house capability, including film processing, was purchased in late October for delivery in early Spring, 1965. Filming of back message files, using limited coding began in December. The system was expected to be fully operational by mid-1965, at which time associated leased data processing equipment was programmed for delivery.

Error Detection and Correction

The high incidence of message garbling over CINCPAC's long haul HF radio system caused CINCPAC, in 1963, to initiate action which culminated in the DCA investigating the efficiency of several devices which might eliminate the problem.\(^3\) High incidence of message garbling continued in 1964 causing many service actions and message retransmissions which abnormally delayed critical traffic. DCA continued to give attention to the problem although by the end of 1964 no solution was in sight.

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1. CINCPAC Project 10C400A entitled "Message Retrieval" 4 Nov 1963 (U)
2. NAVCOSSACT Report No. 074, Jan 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 93
Communications Casualty Planning

In reviewing capabilities for the restoration of PACOM communications facilities in the event of significant damage, CINCPAC determined that comprehensive plans did not exist to relate facilities requiring restoration to mobile/transportable communications equipment which could be used to accomplish the restoration. The DCS facilities in Saigon were of particular concern because of their vulnerability to attack by insurgent forces. Accordingly DCA-Pacific was tasked in November to prepare plans to identify equipment with trunks to be restored at the various DCS stations. 1

IFF Mark X SIF Procedures in PACOM

A new procedure was scheduled to be implemented on 1 January 1965 for the use of IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) Mark X Selective Identification Feature (SIF) for all aircraft and ships operating in the PACOM. It was expected to improve conditions in aircraft and ship recognition, identification, tracking, and target correlation. The new procedure was being implemented through the revision and republication of CINCPAC's directive on the subject of identification. 2

Although the basic procedure of the identification operations was to remain unchanged, the system was expected to be greatly improved by new features as follows:

1. Elimination of currently used air traffic control identification codes and substitution of joint use civil/military aviation traffic identification codes.

2. Establishment of a NORAD/CINCPAC IFF procedures change-over-line and expansion of the CINCPAC area of control pertaining to recognition and identification of aircraft and ships.

3. Full advantage taken of the Selective Identification Feature of IFF equipment by increasing the number of track correlation codes available.

1. CINCPAC 03010Z Nov 1963 (C)
2. CINCPAC ser 00360, Oct 1964 (S)
Electronic Warfare (EW)

In November 1963, CINCPAC established a Pacific Command Electronic Warfare (PACOM EW) Advisory Group to improve the Command Electronic Warfare posture. During 1964 this group convened on an on-call basis, in accordance with its terms of reference, reviewed the status of electronic warfare capabilities, training and requirements, evaluated problem areas, and correlated measures for improved effectiveness.

The membership of the PACOM EW Advisory Group consisted of EW representatives from the staffs of CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF. Technical Assistance was provided by National Security Agency Pacific, Army Security Agency Pacific, National Security Group Pacific, Pacific Security Region, and Defense Communications Agency Pacific.
Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) in Vietnam and Thailand

In 1964 CINCPAC approved and directed implementation of a
CSAF backed proposal for equipping the RVN and Royal Thai
Government, through the MAP, with TACAN equipment appropriate for
each country. In accordance with the provisions of this proposal, Thailand
was to be equipped with AN/GRN-9 TACANs and South Vietnam was to
receive AN/TRN-6 apparatus. 1

Implementation required no additional action for Thailand and
necessary reprogramming action for Vietnam was accomplished during
the March 1964 MAP review. 2 Additional programming action was
taken to satisfy a TACAN requirement at Bien Hoa, making a total of
seven TACAN sites programmed for Vietnam. Implementation was
continuing at the end of 1964 and activation of other sites in Vietnam
was contingent upon VNAF capability to operate and maintain them. 3

Communications Activities in the Philippines

During 1964 there were several changes, actual and programmed,
affecting the Communications-Electronics (C-E) posture in the
Philippines. Early upgrading improvements were found to be necessary
in the DCS Station Clark Air Base relay and HF facilities and in some
of the associated interconnecting cable and microwave keving lines.

1. CINCPAC 290231Z Feb 1964 (C)
2. Thailand MAP Format D3b, Mar 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 281943Z Mar 1964 (C)
This was a USAF responsibility. The title SPEED QUEEN was assigned to the overall project, and immediate action taken to engineer and program several improvement sub-projects. Only a few sub-projects were completed by the end of 1964, however, because adequate funds were not available. Approximately 50% of the remaining sub-projects were scheduled for completion during 1965 with still others yet to be programmed and/or funded.

In addition to the above, planning for the upgrading and expansion of communications interconnecting the various U.S. military locations in the Philippines was in progress with expected completion by FY67. Wide Band communications to the Philippines from the East and West via the Trans-Pacific and Wet Wash cables became operational during December 1964.

The U.S. Army contracted for the relocation of the Philippines terminal of the Philippine-Taiwan tropo-scatter system, however, completion was not expected until mid-1965 or later due to problems being experienced in obtaining sites from the Philippine Government.

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000119, 22 May 1961 (TS)
2. MJCS 118-62, 23 Apr 1962 (S)
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 00626, 11 Sep 1962 (S)
4. CINCPACFLT ltr ser 78/00819, 4 Oct 1962 (S)
5. JCS 1567 DTG 091728Z Jul 1963 (S)
6. JCS 2463 DTG 122047Z Sep 1963 (S)
7. CINCPAC 020510Z Oct 1963 (S)
8. CINCPAC ltr ser 0016, 26 Jan 1964 (S)
9. COMUSTDC 030308Z Nov 1964 (S)
Communication Activities in Korea

Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) Microwave System: A Military Assistance Program (MAP) funded ROKA microwave system, which was designed to provide a high capacity, high quality communication system was started in 1962, and suspended in 1963 pending review by OSD. An OSD Study Team Report of June 1964, concluded that there was a requirement for the ROKA microwave system and recommended to OSD that the suspended funds ($3.4 million) be released and that the system be constructed. OSD agreed to release the funds for the microwave project providing that cost estimate differences between Korea Military Advisory Group (K MAG) and U.S. Army Strategic Communication Command (USASCC) would be reconciled by CINCPAC and that appropriate relationship between the ROKA system and the Agency for International Development (AID) funded Ministry of Communication (MOC) System was assured.

CINCPAC, coordinating with the Department of the Navy, K MAG and AID, was able to meet the requirements established by OSD. In August CINCPAC recommended to OSD that the procurement and installation of the ROKA and MOC systems be accomplished by joint contract and OSD, in October, concurred. The Army, tasked with the preparation of the technical data required for the award of the joint contract to industry, was nearing completion of this requirement at the end of 1964.

Signal Support Facilities, Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM): In March, CINCUSARPAC recommended that CINCPAC approve a proposed communication project for U.S. Army Forces, Korea, which would provide an alternate means of communications to serve the military community, especially surface-to-air missile sites, from the

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 98
2. Study Team Report on Korean Telecommunication System, 13 Jun 1964 (S)
3. OSD DEF 977840 DTG 142352Z Jul 1964 (C)
4. CINCPAC 160033Z Aug 1964 (C)
5. OSD DEF 8617 DTG 141544Z Sep 1964 (U)
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to Pusan. In addition, it would help alleviate short comings of the existing single axis of communication. The proposed system would consist of seven primary communication sites. Because the proposed system generally paralleled the existing U.S. Army system and would cover areas to be served by the planned Republic of Korea Army system and the Korean Ministry of Communications system, CINCPAC held the proposal in abeyance until a reevaluation confirming needs and eliminating possible duplication could be made.  

In September the reevaluation of the project was completed and it was determined that the northern portion (five sites) of the proposed system was needed to support the U.S. Army SAM units. CINCPAC then recommended to the JCS that the northern portion be approved and titled Signal Support Facilities, SAM. JCS concurred with CINCPAC's recommendations and requested the Army to install the five Northern sites. At the end of 1964 technical data was being prepared for contract negotiations with industry.

1. CINCTUSARPAC ltr to JCS, Subj: Validation of Korean Alternate Axis Microwave System, 23 Mar 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC 190324Z May 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 012041Z Oct 1964 (C)
4. JCS 9755 DTG 132140Z Oct 1964 (C)
CHAPTER II
CINCPAC ACTIONS INFLUENCING THE STATE OF READINESS
OF ALLIED NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA

The basic problem in the part of the free world where CINCPAC had considerable responsibilities was security—security within countries from communist subversion and insurgency, and security of countries from externally applied communist aggression. CINCPAC sought to provide the needed security of free men from communism through the armed forces of the Pacific Command and those of the Asian nations which had been created by U.S. Military Assistance. 1

CINCPAC remained the key figure for administration of Military Assistance in the Pacific Ocean Area. He was, however, only a part of the huge U.S. effort. The highest authority for Military Assistance was granted by Congress to the President, whose principal advisors with respect to Military Assistance were the National Security Council, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Bureau of the Budget.

The Secretary of State provided foreign policy guidelines within which it was the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to plan and administer the program. This function was delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and discharged by the Director of Military Assistance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff established basic military objectives and ensured consonance with U.S. strategic concepts; the military departments served as supply agencies for military assistance equipment and training; and the Unified Commands directed and supervised program development and execution through the Military Assistance Advisory Groups, subordinate Unified Commands, or Missions in the recipient countries.

CINCPAC's responsibility was that of supervising program development and execution in the largest Unified Command in the world. (The U.S. organizational structure for planning and administering Military Assistance is shown graphically at Figure II-1.)

In 1964 CINCPAC, like other U.S. Commands involved in the administration of the Military Assistance Program, felt the squeeze of reduced funds with which to protect a worldwide MAP investment of about 31 billion dollars since 1950. A worldwide Congressional appropriation of about 5 billion annually in 1950 had dwindled, because of congressional refusal to appropriate more, to an annual figure in the vicinity of one billion dollars in 1964. During the early MAP years an abundance of equipment which was either excess or obsolete to U.S. requirements could be transferred to needy allied countries for little more than rehabilitation and transportation costs. By 1964 most of the equipment for transfer to allied countries had to be manufactured at costs which made stretching the MAP dollar difficult. (U)

Because of the need to build allied country forces capable of withstanding both internal and external communist threats—forces which would as nearly as possible measure up to the requirements of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan—CINCPAC evaluated and reevaluated the MAP as carefully as possible to ensure that the most possible defense was obtained from the funds available. In addition, CINCPAC furnished the JCS extensive justification for increasing the amount of MAP funds available to the PACOM. (U)

AREA WIDE ACTIVITIES

The Military Assistance Program

CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual: Prior to June 1964 CINCPAC had forwarded to each PACOM MAAG the annual publication, Part I (Objectives) DOD Military Assistance Manual (MAM) containing objectives guidance for all PACOM countries. In addition CINCPAC forwarded his own supplemental guidance to this publication.

Recognizing that compromise of any one package could cause considerable damage from a security standpoint, CINCPAC decided to provide to each MAAG only the objectives guidance applicable to his host country. Accordingly, CINCPAC combined specific country data

Page 137 of 495 Pages
The Secretary of Defense operates within the foreign and fiscal policy guidelines laid down by the Secretaries of State and Treasury, respectively.
from the DOD publication with his own supplement and made up
differently constituted packages for each MAAG; these were titled
"CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual."

As a result of this change each PACOM MAAG received like sections
of the 1964 CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual titled: "General",
"Area Wide Planning Guidance", and "Programming and Logistics."
Sections titled "Specific Planning Guidance", and "MAAG Terms of
Reference", were prepared separately for each country and distributed
to the applicable country only. 1,2

PACOM Military Assistance Planning Reference Books: The
Secretary of Defense, in 1964, directed CINCPAC and PACOM country
MAAGs to develop a MAP back-up book for each country in PACOM,
together with an overall CINCPAC Regional Summary. 3 CINCPAC gave
instructions to country MAAGs for input to the books and they were
completed and distributed in August. 4-12 The purpose of the books was
to explain and justify country forces and approved Military Assistance
Programs. They contained detailed descriptions of MAP elements,
narrative descriptions and justification for the country MAP programs,
and various useful tables. (U)

In December CINCPAC furnished information to the MAAGs for
updating the books and expected to publish changes in February 1965. 13 (U)

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00784 subj: CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual,
   Part I (Objectives, 6 Jun 1964 (S)
2. Interview of Lt. Col. Frauenheim, CINCPAC J5 Division by Capt.
   Rose of CINCPAC Historical Branch.
3. OSD DEF 955028 DTG 102205Z Feb 1964 (U)
4. Section B, Part II, CINCPAC Supplement to DODMAM, 4 May 1964 (U)
5. CINCPAC ltr ser 001282, 14 Aug 1964 (U)
6. CINCPAC ltr ser 001289, 17 Aug 1964 (U)
7. CINCPAC ltr ser 001306, 19 Aug 1964 (U)
8. CINCPAC ltr ser 001315, 21 Aug 1964 (U)
9. CINCPAC ltr ser 001345, 25 Aug 1964 (U)
10. CINCPAC ltr ser 001346, 25 Aug 1964 (U)
11. CINCPAC ltr ser 001370, 31 Aug 1964 (U)
12. CINCPAC ltr ser 001458, 19 Sep 1964 (U)
13. CINCPAC 080419Z Dec 1964 (C)
Effects of Reduced MAP on PACOM Countries: In view of the FY64 and FY65 reduced Military Assistance Programs, and the prospect of further reduction in subsequent years, the JCS in February 1964 asked CINCPAC to appraise the impact this would have on the capability of Free World Forces in the Pacific to accomplish their missions.  

CINCPAC's answer gave an analysis of forces' existing capabilities, their weaknesses, and the probable effects of reduced military assistance. His appraisal pictured the PACOM countries as being reasonably well equipped; however, reduction of FY64-65 funds had severely curtailed force improvement items for ground and air defense forces, and to a greater extent, naval forces. CINCPAC felt that the reduced MAP would be a serious setback to the U.S. strategy of augmenting U.S. forces with MAP supported forces. In this connection CINCPAC had emphasized to the MAAG Chiefs the necessity of lowering the existing level of operating costs in order to be able to spend more dollars on force improvement.

CINCPAC described general requirements for force improvements as follows:

Ground Forces - The forces in being were basically well equipped, possessed a good capability to combat insurgency and could cope with external aggression on a limited scale. Modernization and force improvement dollars were sufficient only for the most critical modernization needs.

Naval Forces - Because U.S. naval forces were not large enough to provide, in addition to other tasks, the capability of keeping open coastal and territorial sea communication lines of PACOM countries, it was necessary to depend upon the small Asian navies to do this. The primary contact of most Asian countries with the Free World was by sea; therefore, it was necessary they have effective navies. The existing Asian navies were not strong enough to keep sea

1. JCS 4769 DTG 071548Z Feb 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 180208Z Feb 1964 (S)
lines of communication open. (Their main needs were for coastal patrol and mine warfare ships.) Without the LOCs immobilization of carefully built-up allied ground and air forces would result. Since modernization of existing patrol ships would cost only about 20 percent as much as activating additional ships, this should be given a high priority in the MAP.

**Air Forces** - Tactical forces were being modernized to the degree believed necessary and attainable under funding ceilings. However, air defense in all-weather conditions was poor and the all-weather aircraft then on the market were not within the MAP pocket book capability. Air defense radar and associated AC&W systems needed modernization but this also was beyond reach, dollar wise.

CINCPAC stated that, while he did not have the answer to the problem of modernization versus MAP dollars, he felt that the U.S. must continue to be highly selective in allocating available MAP resources and that efforts must be increased to have the PACOM countries assume a greater share of operating costs within their military budgets. He then commented on country capabilities, deficiencies, and requirements, on a country-by-country basis.

**Korea** - There were two major deficiencies existing in the Korean Armed Forces. First, the Korean Navy had only a limited capability to control the waters adjacent to the Korean peninsula. In addition to existing naval forces, there was a need for additional Coastal Patrol and Mine Warfare ships; as well as modernization of existing Coastal Patrol ships. Second, there was a need for a semi-automated Aircraft Control and Warning system because of the proximity of modern North Korean Air Force jets to United Nations Command units and depots. Additionally, lack of modernization of certain army equipment was seriously affecting combat capabilities of Korean Ground Forces, especially in tank units. Also, more artillery and communications equipment was needed. However, all of those needed improvements had been deleted from MAP Plans and Programs because of drastic MAP ceiling reductions.
Japan - The reduced FY64-65 MA dollar ceilings would not preclude MAP from accomplishing urgent U.S. grant-aid commitments, but funds should continue to be made available for influence type training to assure that Japan continued to be oriented toward U.S. military doctrine and weapon systems.

China - Status of armed forces in the Republic of China was much like Korea. Ships in the Chinese Navy were, for the most part, old and of many different types. CINCPAC felt that about 25 ships should have modernization overhauls and that eight mine sweepers were urgently required if the Chinese Navy was to do a barely adequate mine warfare job. While Chinese Army combat potential compared favorably with that of other PACOM countries, except possibly that of the Republic of Korea, the ROC tanks and APC's were old and of questionable dependability. Without effective mobility the capability of the Chinese Army to repel an invasion of Taiwan and the Penghus would be seriously impaired.

Republic of Vietnam - The RVN continued to receive priority for MAP resources. The FY64 program appeared adequate but CINCPAC felt that an increase in MAP support above that then programmed would be necessary. While it was difficult to project detailed item deficiencies, ammunition expenditures of over $60 million in FY65 were not unrealistic. Increases in Viet Cong actions in the northern part of RVN, plus the emphasis VC had placed on exploiting the strategic hamlets, indicated that additional measures would be necessary to contain and defeat the Viet Cong. The requirement to maintain strength in northern RVN and simultaneously defeat the Viet Cong in the Delta, while sealing the infiltration of arms and personnel via North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, would require a continued high level of expenditures at least through FY65.

Philippines - While the dollar value of MAP for the Philippines Armed Forces approximated previous levels, MAP dollars
in FY64 and FY65 had for the most part been concentrated on modernizing Air Force units. This was needed but the size of the effort had precluded attainment of other equally important objectives. CINCPAC saw little need to increase the MAP support of the Philippines Army until there was tangible evidence of internal improvement. The major deficiency in the Armed Forces was the lack of modernization and availability of sufficient ships to fulfill coastal patrol and mine warfare surveillance in Philippines waters.

Thailand - The most important requirement in Thailand was to place trained ground units in the north and northeast portion of the country to combat insurgency, particularly from across the Laos border. Failure to have already achieved this objective was not due to lack of MAP funds, but the lack of Country Budget support and aggressive action by the RTG. The Thai Navy's greatest weakness was its lack of adequate Patrol and Mine Warfare ships to carry out surveillance in the Gulf of Siam. Limitation of MAP funds had precluded any improvement of naval capability. Of lesser importance, but essential, was a requirement to modernize the Air Force with F-5 aircraft. This deficiency was expected to become more serious in the FY65-66 time period.

Laos - The FAR and Neutralists had failed to attain the capability to control the areas they occupied at the time of the Geneva Accords. This failure was not due to lack of MAP support. The FY64-65 MAP programs would continue to provide support in the form of training and operating costs for the 46,500 man FAR and Neutralist basic approved force levels. MAP funds did not provide for any speed-up in tempo of operations nor did they provide any increase in combat capability through materiel modernization or expansion. The funds included in the FY64 and FY65 MA Programs would not support FAR-Neutralist forces in excess of the approved 46,500. (Support was later extended to additional FAR and Neutralists. See the U.S. Military Assistance Program for Laos, Chapter IV)
FY64 Military Assistance Program: The dollar ceiling of $801. 4 million that was initially used as the basis for the FY64 PACOM Military Assistance Program had been trimmed to $569. 0 million by the end of 1963. Reductions were due primarily to the trend in Congressional debate that indicated drastic forthcoming cuts in the total Aid Program.

In December 1963 CINCPAC had sent a message to the OASD/ISA in which it was pointed out that abnormally late Congressional action on the FY64 MAP appropriation placed increased importance on adequate and timely Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) coverage of PACOM MAP country's essential operating requirements. CINCPAC outlined in detail the inadequacies of existing CRA coverage, among which were late issuance of CRA MAP orders, short periods of MAP order coverage (30 or 60 days), and slowness in funding orders contained in CRA emergency funding requests. CINCPAC recommended that procedures for providing CRA funds be expedited and that recoupment funds be used for CRA operating costs.

In January 1964, after Congressional authorization and appropriation in late December of a one billion dollar Foreign Aid Program, the first FY64 MAP Orders were issued. These helped to correct a situation that by the end of CY 1963 had threatened to interrupt MAP operations in the PACOM.

Effects of Anticipated FY65 MAP Appropriations (Adjusted FY65 Dollar Ceilings): In September OASD/ISA was reviewing and adjusting the FY65 MA Program in an effort to align the program with funds anticipated to be available after Congressional appropriations. OSD estimated that appropriations would be $138. 2 million short of meeting program costs world-wide. The Secretary of Defense directed that the shortfall would be met by reprogramming and/or shift of MAP costs to the Services.

OASD/ISA arrived at a tentative proposal of cuts to be considered by the Secretary of Defense and the JCS asked CINCPAC for his assess-

1. CINCPAC Pamphlet FY64-69 CINCPAC Military Assistance Plan/ Program, 1 Dec 1963 (S)
MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

PROGRAM AND DELIVERIES BY COUNTRY FY 1950 THROUGH FY 1963

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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>986</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>976</td>
<td>1229</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1775</td>
<td>2149</td>
<td>2459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. of China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bar graph showing military assistance in millions of dollars from FY 1950 through FY 1963 for various countries.
ment of the impact of the proposal in terms of mission accomplishment and attainment of U.S. objectives. ¹

The proposed reductions had their greatest impact within PACOM on the Republic of China ($30.1 million reduction); Korea ($11.1 million reduction); Philippines ($9.9 million reduction); and the Army Logistics Center Japan ($1.1 million reduction), part of which affected the Far East Area. CINCPAC assessed the effects of the proposed MAP adjustments as follows:

China — The proposed cut in the China MAP would delay for another year the urgently required modernization in the Army and Navy. Because reductions already effected in the programming of operating costs had reduced support funds below the amount actually used during prior year operations, CINCPAC estimated that further reductions would virtually eliminate investment programming unless force levels were reduced. He believed that elimination of investment programming was preferable since it offered the best chance of future progress toward JCS Force Objectives. The impact of the cut would be felt in the following areas:

1. Existing degraded conditions of the Navy Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability would further deteriorate. Modifications to GRC destroyers (DDs) and escort ships (DEs), planned as the backbone of an ASW improvement effort, would be eliminated. The nine DD/DEs in the GRC inventory were inadequate to meet any significant invasion threat in the Taiwan Straits. Two DD/DEs currently programmed for FY65 would be eliminated, thus continuing the weak defense posture at sea. It had already been established that immediate rehabilitation of the GRC aging LST Fleet was essential to preserve the U.S. investment. Further, if this program did not receive support in FY65, the Chinese might soon be forced to reduce logistic support to the Off-Shore Islands.

2. Army mobility and firepower would remain at an inadequate level. In addition, deletions effected by this cut would cause mobility to remain tied to WWII tanks and personnel carriers that were no longer supportable, thus...

¹ S 8976 DTG 232237Z Sep 1964 (S)

See ROC Construction and Rehabilitation of LSTs, this Chapter.
accelerating a deteriorating mobility capability. The proposed cut would also eliminate slightly less than one-third of the thirteen 8" Howitzers currently programmed, with an obvious reduction in firepower.

Korea - The established force objectives could not be met under existing FY65 funding limitations. The proposed reductions would further seriously degrade combat effectiveness of Korean Armed Forces. Considering the imminent obsolescence of equipment there was much to be done if the ROK Armed Forces were to achieve and maintain an adequate military posture. A $20 million FY65 reduction would:

1. Leave War Reserve Ammunition at inadequate levels.
2. Fail to provide for needed runway repair and improved air depot facilities.
3. Significantly impair shore establishments as well as high seas capability for the ROK Navy.
5. Vehicle mobility improvement, urgently needed by the Infantry Divisions, would not be achieved.

Philippines - It was anticipated that adverse political repercussions would be forthcoming on this cut in view of a prior overall reduction in the FY64 MA Program.

Thailand - The proposed reduction would have no major impact on the operational capability of the Thai military forces. However, it was believed that in view of the situation in Southeast Asia, any MAP reduction in Thailand would have political repercussions out of proportion to the magnitude of the cut.

U.S. Army Logistics Center Japan - Reduction in operation and maintenance funds of the depot at Tokorozawa would reduce the Japanese work force by 25 percent with a corresponding degradation of
depot capability to respond to PACOM MA country requisitioning actions. In addition, funds for stock replenishment would be inadequate.

In summary, CINCPAC stated that the proposed reductions in the FY65 PACOM Military Assistance would result in a serious degradation of force effectiveness, particularly of ground and naval forces, with the greatest impact on two forward countries – Korea and China.

In early October the Secretary of Defense approved the readjustment of PACOM FY65 ceilings. Although the cuts to Korea and Republic of China were less than those originally proposed by OASD/ISA, the overall PACOM reductions were about the same. The new FY65 PACOM MAP dollar ceilings (less Packing, Crating, Handling, and Transportation) in comparison with previous ceilings are given as follows: ($ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Previous Ceilings</th>
<th>Revised Ceilings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>$ 7.3</td>
<td>$ 6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>132.0</td>
<td>114.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep of China</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>205.8</td>
<td>208.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USALCJ</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Wide</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the OSD MAP conference in Washington (5-15 Oct) CINCPAC representatives were required to reduce the country programs to the revised dollar ceilings.

**FY66 Proposed MAP Ceilings:** During the October OSD MAP Conference the FY66 PACOM country ceilings were reviewed and revised ceilings were developed by the Office of the Director of Military Assistance and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for

1. OASD Memo 1-28, 283/64, Oct 1964 (S)
approval. The proposed revision, in comparison with previous ceilings (less Packing, Crating, Handling, and Transportation) follows:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Previous Ceiling</th>
<th>Proposed Revised Ceiling</th>
<th>($ in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>$ .8</td>
<td>$ 3.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>115.0</td>
<td>109.8</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Laos</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>39.3</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rep of China</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>53.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>29.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>143.0</td>
<td>181.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USALCJ</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Wide</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effects of FY66 MAP Levels on JSOP-70: In October the JCS asked CINCPAC for data, supplementary to that developed for Annex J of JSOP-70, as input for a JCS study which would reassess world-wide MAP objectives within various funding levels. These funding levels were:

1. $1.0 billion - existing program
2. $1.2 billion - minimum desired program
3. $1.4 billion - optimum program

The MAAGs most affected were those in China, Korea, Philippines, and Thailand. In response to CINCPAC's request, they each submitted data concerning the impact of the three alternative fund levels on forces and programs. For the most part these reflected drastic impacts on forces if the $1.0 billion level was adhered to. CINCPAC passed these responses on to the JCS.  

1. OSD Memo 1-28, 914/64, 23 Oct 1964 (S)
2. JCS 1184 DTG 261608 Z Oct 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 001725, 16 Nov 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 001734, 17 Nov 1964 (S)
5. CINCPAC 18222Z Nov 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC 182229Z Nov 1964 (S)
7. OSD DEF 003118 DTG 221556 Z Dec 1964 (S)
FY67-71 OSD MAP Dollar Guidelines: The Secretary of Defense, in December, approved readjusted PACOM FY67-71 Military Assistance Dollar Guidelines. The new dollar guidelines (including costs for Packing, Crating, Handling and Transportation except for Japan, Indonesia, and Malaysia) were as follows: ($ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORWARD DEFENSE</th>
<th>FY67</th>
<th>FY68</th>
<th>FY69</th>
<th>FY70</th>
<th>FY71</th>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of China</td>
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<td>$108.2</td>
<td>$126.4</td>
<td>$113.0</td>
<td>$99.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>144.9</td>
<td>128.0</td>
<td>155.0</td>
<td>144.0</td>
<td>128.0</td>
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<td>40.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
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<td>30.0</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>27.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<td>185.0</td>
<td>160.0</td>
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<table>
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<th></th>
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<td>Burma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>.1</td>
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<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>46.0</th>
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<th>46.0</th>
<th>46.0</th>
<th>40.0</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less MAP Assets Applied</td>
<td>-31.6</td>
<td>-31.5</td>
<td>-31.1</td>
<td>-30.9</td>
<td>-30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC TOTAL</td>
<td>$593.3</td>
<td>$532.4</td>
<td>$541.3</td>
<td>$480.0</td>
<td>$415.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DOD Cost Reduction Program (MAP)

In April CINCPAC was visited by the Director of International Programs, OASD, who explained that his trip was not an inspection or survey of any kind but was primarily for the purpose of soliciting ideas for cost reduction in MAP. The Director, Mr. Donald S. Cuffee, indicated that perhaps DOD emphasis was shifting from balance of payments to cost reduction. (U)

Subsequently, in May, the DOD Cost Reduction Program was instituted as part of a broad governmental cost reduction program initiated by the President. The purpose of the DOD program was to improve procurement and logistics management and to reduce operating costs.

1. OSD DEF 003118 DTG 221556Z Dec 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC J4 Memo 141-64, 22 Apr 1964 (U)
costs of the Defense establishment. Cost reduction in the Military Assistance Program was a part of the DOD program and OSD/ISA was made responsible for the development and implementation of necessary guidance and procedures to extend cost reduction to this particular area.

DOD published "Interim Instructions for Application of Cost Reduction to the Military Assistance Program" and these were forwarded to CINCPAC reporting activities (Component Commanders, MAAGs and other major commands subordinate to CINCPAC). In addition CINCPAC, in September, published instructions to his reporting activities which outlined a quarterly reporting system for MAP cost reductions and cost avoidance and gave guidance for developing savings. The CINCPAC Instruction was designed to insure that only those cost reductions which represented true savings would be reported. It identified many specific areas where savings might be realized but also provided for reports of savings in other areas.

OASD/ISA assigned an initial FY65 cost reduction goal to CINCPAC of $15.0 million. CINCPAC, in turn, further subdivided the goal as follows:

| HQ CINCPAC | $ .400  |
| CHMAAG China | 2.600  |
| CHMAAG Japan | .850  |
| COMUSMACV | 2.978  |
| CHJUSMAG Thailand | .864  |
| DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand | .350  |
| CHJUSMAGPHIL | .448  |
| CHMILTAG Indonesia | .070  |
| CHMEDT AMEMB Rangoon | .154  |
| CINCUSARPAC | .300  |
| CGUSALCJ | 1.848  |
| CINCPACFLT | .300  |
| CINCPACAF | .300  |
| COMUSKOREA | 3.538  |

Total $15,000 million

CINCPAC recognized that, because of the lack of precedent in MAP, the assigned goals might prove either too high or too low. He stated that the goals were intended to provide a target and incentive and asked

1. DOD Directive 5010.6, subj: Department of Defense Cost Reduction Program, 22 May 1964 (U)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 2061 with Enclosure (1), 13 Aug 1964 (U)
3. CINCPAC Instr 7720.1 subj: DOD Cost Reduction Program (MAP)(U)
his reporting activities to promptly notify him if any of the assigned goals were believed to be unrealistic.

**Logistic Support of MAP Forces in Wartime**

In 1962 CINCPAC proposed a plan for wartime resupply support of PACOM MAP countries other than Korea.¹ The Department of the Army (DA) in 1963 approved the plan which envisioned providing end item density data from the MAP EAM S-2 summary, showing allocated assets at the beginning of the fiscal year and projected delivery requirements through the ensuing years.

National Inventory Control Points (NICPs) were to compute automatic resupply requirements for MAP forces using end item density information as a basis. CINCPAC provided the first end item density summaries in the fall of 1963, however, DA cancelled the requirement to have NICPs compute resupply requirements. DA placed the task on USARPAC to compute support requirements of combat essential items for each PACOM MAP supported country for the first 90 days of combat. In January 1964 CINCUSARPAC asked CINCPAC for further data on equipment authorizations of country active and reserve forces but CINCPAC advised him that refined authorization data could not be furnished until July.²,³

At this point DA stated that the required computation would be made for total initial issue, including make-up of existing unit shortages, roundout equipment for reserve forces activated within 90 days of the start of combat, and resupply requirements.⁴ Ammunition War Reserve Level requirements were being provided separately.

DA asked USARPAC to also provide separately, by 3 February, ROKA requirements for initial equipment roundout and consumables for the first 90 days of combat.⁵ USARPAC at first suggested that CONUS

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1962, p. 99
2. CINCUSARPAC RJ 86083 DTG 072200Z Jan 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 180259Z Jan 1964 (S)
4. DA 951559 DTG 142118Z Jan 1964 (S)
5. DA 950823 DTG 081719Z Feb 1964 (S)
Inventory Control Points make the ROKA computation, using prepositioned QUICK TRIP requisitions, but because DA rejected the USARPAC suggestion, the requirement was eventually given to EUSA who passed it on to KMAG.\(^1\),\(^2\) Since KMAG was not staffed for the purpose, nor did it have all the required data immediately available to perform the computations, it was determined that 90 days would be required to produce the desired results.\(^3\)

CINCUSARPAC advised CINCPAC that he did not possess the basic data to make the computations requested by DA, stated that computations for ROKA were being accomplished by KMAG pursuant to assignment of responsibility to EUSA, and requested that CINCPAC instruct other MAAGs to prepare like computations.\(^4\) CINCPAC then sent a message to DA giving a resume of the situation and making recommendations as follows:

1. MAAGs' capability to perform support requirement computations was practically non-existent. Earlier reductions of MAAG personnel coupled with a heavy workload caused by successive major MA program changes, had already taxed MAAG capabilities to their limits.

2. Concerning resupply requirements—most accurate and fastest method of making resupply computations was for the appropriate U.S. Army logistic agency to compute the requirements based on major end item equipment density data already provided by CINCPAC and scheduled to be updated annually. Further, combat resupply computations should be made using U.S. rates.

3. With respect to initial issues—it would have to be assumed that country forces would fight for the first 90 days of combat using equipment on hand plus resupply. This was true for a number of reasons, including the lack of skilled indigenous persons to support rapid mobilization and lack of indigenous personnel who could be trained to effectively utilize and maintain significant additional quantities of equipment within a specified time.

4. Existing equipment authorization documents contained ideal authorizations which had not been met due to

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1. CINCUSARPAC RJ 86161 DTG 120044Z Jan 1964 (S)
2. DA 95168 DTG 151525Z Jan 1964 (S)
3. CG EUSA KA 20079 DTG 141010Z Jan 1964 (S)
4. CINCUSARPAC RJ 86293 DTG 202152Z Jan 1964 (S)
the low levels of technical and economic capabilities that existed within the countries and because of limited MAP funds. The existing MA programming/planning cycle included efforts to trim authorizations to realistic figures.

CINCPAC's plan for resupply of MAP supported army forces in wartime also applied to country navies and air forces. In answer to CSAF and CNO requests that CINCPAC compute initial shortages and combat consumption for country air forces and navies for the first 90 days of battle, CINCPAC gave essentially the same recommendations that he had made earlier to DA. 1-4

The Air Force pursued the question of contingency support of MAP forces during wartime still further. The Air Force Logistics Center (AFLC) stated that contingency combat items should be selected in coordination with MAAGs, whereas the CINCPAC intent was that service expertise would be applied to this selection. The AFLC also contemplated the development of country limited war support packages which would be reflected in CINCPAC's annual MAP programming documents for the purpose of identifying annual contingency funding requirements. CINCPAC had no objection to the development of support packages since it would allow MAAGs in a limited war situation, to call forward programmed items in lieu of requisitioning.

In April CSAF asked CINCPAC to compute the shortages which would have to be replaced to support the ROKAF for the first 90 days of combat (a requirement which DOD had placed on CSAF). CINCPAC again held to the position that the appropriate Service Logistic Center (AFLC) should make the computation. 5

Later, in June, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that appropriate portions of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP-69) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP-65) be changed to assign the responsibility for the computation of wartime resupply requirements to the services vice the commanders of Unified and Specified Commands. 6

1. CSAF AF SMA 85176 DTG 162248Z Jan 1964 (S)
2. CNO 202109Z Jan 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 282100Z Jan 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 282101Z Jan 1964 (S)
5. CSAF AFSM 68327 DTG 092322Z Apr 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC ltr 4000 ser 00832, 11 Jun 1964 (S)
At the end of 1964 CINCPAC's recommendation was still under review by the JCS.

Proposal to Centralize MAP Ammunition War Reserves (AWR)

In late 1963 CINCPAC commented on a Secretary of Defense memorandum which directed that a determination be made of reductions in cost of MAP AWR, if stocks kept in the Republic of China, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines were centrally stored and retained under control of CINCPAC. The CINCPAC analysis revealed that the savings, not including costs of real estate acquisition, would be about $2.5 million through FY67. The most desirable locations for centralized storage were Okinawa, followed by Japan. Acquisition of real estate in these areas would wipe out dollar savings, gold flow would be involved, and political considerations were adverse. Therefore, CINCPAC recommended that a centralized AWR storage facility not be established in PACOM.

The JCS then asked CINCPAC for an additional study on the centralized AWR concept to include:

2. Country AWR program by round.
3. Annual savings by round for each country, under centralized storage concept.
5. Possible centralized storage locations with initial and operating costs.
6. Operational implications to include reaction times.
7. Advantages and disadvantages to the concept.
8. Funding priorities.

CINCPAC, with the help of his Component Commanders, furnished the information required.

1. CINCPAC 190247Z Nov 1963 (S)
2. MJCS-179-63, subj: MAP Ammunition War Reserve Levels, 13 Dec 63 (S)
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 0010, 4 Jan 1964, subj: Centralized MAP AWR for PACOM (S)
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 0023, 7 Jan 1964, subj: Same as above.
programmed ammunition available for centralized storage during the period through FY69 offered prospects of possible savings of $1.6 to $4.8 million depending on location of the central storage facility.

However, subsequent to the above computation DOD directed a further reduction in the FY65 MA Program. For the four countries authorized an AWR, the reduction amounted to nearly a quarter of the total value of their FY65 MAP. Since the reduction had to come from investment costs (including AWR), the ammunition previously computed as available for storage from the FY65 program would be reduced by a minimum of 50 percent. Dollar ceilings of FY66 through FY69 were not expected to exceed the FY65 ceiling, so similar reductions could be expected in those years. The potential savings would also dry up.

On the basis of this and former findings, CINCPAC reaffirmed his original recommendation against the centralized storage proposal. CINCPAC stated that, if the centralized concept had been adopted prior to the establishment of AWRs in individual countries, it would have been cheaper than the existing system and offered greater flexibility and control of ammunition assets to the theater commander. This advantage, however, did not exist in the PACOM where in-country AWRs were already in being and where, under existing funding limitations, there was the probability that little AWR would be programmed in the future.

**PACOM F-5 Aircraft Program**

In 1964 four PACOM countries, Korea, Republic of China, the Philippines and Thailand, had F-5 aircraft programs. In each case the F-5 was scheduled to replace the aging F-86F type aircraft. The overall objective was to modernize a total of 18 tactical fighter squadrons in PACOM of which six were in Korea, eight in the Republic of China, two in the Philippines, and two in Thailand.

To provide the aircraft at a minimum price, a production schedule of 12 aircraft per month was necessary at Northrop Aircraft Corporation. OSD, concerned about the ability of the Unified Commands world-wide to program enough aircraft for support of such a schedule.

1. CINCPAC 132114Z Jan 1964 (S)
convened an aircraft allocations conference in March out of which came two alternate proposals. OSD asked the Unified Commands to study these proposals. The first proposal would modernize 15 PACOM squadrons, just three squadrons short of the objective of 18. Much of the modernization would take place in FY68-69 because of tight ceilings and other requirements in the FY65-67 time period. The second alternate proposal would result in only eight squadrons being modernized and countries would not be able to program any F-5 aircraft after FY67. CINCPAC concluded that this alternative was unacceptable since squeezing all of the aircraft into a time period ending with 1967 would seriously impair the objectives of ground and naval elements as well as affect overall operating costs.

CINCPAC reviewed the Chinese Communist threat and concluded that force objectives for the fighter squadrons were valid and should not be changed. CINCPAC made a recommendation to OSD which was in consonance with the first alternative and which included 300 aircraft in PACOM programs for FY63-69 at an estimated cost of $272.0 million. Under this alternative F-5s were programmed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Years</th>
<th>FY65</th>
<th>FY66</th>
<th>FY67</th>
<th>FY68</th>
<th>FY69</th>
<th>Total Aclt</th>
<th>Total Costs</th>
<th>Total Sqdns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>145</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>41</td>
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<tr>
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<td>307</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Korea, the five aircraft in FY66 and two of the 17 programmed for FY69 were added in July as the result of a decision to delete two surface-to-air missile battalions from the Korea MAP and divert part of the funds to F-5s.

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1. CHMAAG China MGGC3312 DTG 240411Z Mar 1964 (S)
2. COMUSKOREA UK 60190 PROVMAAG-K DTG 190305Z Mar 1964 (S)
3. CHJUSMAGPHIL AFP 1197 DTG 181438Z Mar 1964 (S)
4. CHJUSMAG Thailand JTFM 50238 DTG 190331Z Mar 1964 (S)
5. CINCPAC 182124Z Apr 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC 012323Z Jun 1964 (S)
7. OSD DEF 982785 DTG 182355Z Aug 1964 (S)
OSD approved CINCPAC's recommendation and it was incorporated into the PACOM FY65-69 Military Assistance Plan/Program.\(^1\)\(^2\) An estimated 5% increase in unit cost was expected to result from a revised eight aircraft per month production rate which would meet worldwide requirements.

Headquarters USAF queried CINCPAC on planned roles and missions of F-5 units programmed for PACOM and wanted to know of any plans to use the AGM-12B (GAM-83) Bullpup missiles with F-5.\(^3\)

The PACOM MAP contained no provision for use of Bullpup missiles with the F-5 weapon system. To insure that a valuable capability was not overlooked, CINCPAC asked CINCPACAF to provide comments and recommendations regarding Bullpup use with the F-5.\(^4\)

The study subsequently written by CINCPACAF was provided to MAAGs for consideration and planning guidance.\(^5\) The Republic of China quickly indicated that the Bullpup could not be programmed in the China MAP because of funding limitations.

In August, because of OSD concern as to whether or not aircraft would be available to meet Joint Strategic Objectives Plan requirements for PACOM countries, the JCS asked CINCPAC to study the possible use of aircraft being phased out of the U.S. Air Force and Navy inventories as replacements for the F-86Fs in use by MAP countries.\(^6\)

One of the reasons for OSD concern was the fact that production of T-38s for the USAF, which were part of the Northrop production package in which F-5s were being built, was being reduced. This could have the effect of raising the cost of F-5s.

In conjunction with CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT, CINCPAC evaluated aircraft being phased out of U.S. inventories, some of which were the A4E, F-6A, F-100D, F-84F, and the F-1C. The aircraft were considered as to comparable merits of price, logistic and training.

1. OSD DEF 970844 DTG 272359Z May 1964 (S)
2. OSD DEF 972020 DTG 042359Z Jun 1964 (U)
3. CSAF AFSSMA 94269 DTG 091954Z Jul 1964 (U)
4. CINCPAC 190159Z Jul 1964 (U)
5. CINCPAC ltr ser 0689 of 21 Sep 1964 (C)
6. JCS 8149 DTG 282055Z Aug 1964 (C)
impacts, availability, and operational improvement of country air
forces. CINCPAC finally concluded that the aircraft evaluated would
not provide enough benefits over the F-86 to warrant the problems and
cost involved. CINCPAC, therefore, recommended staying with the
F-5 program. In addition CINCPAC recommended that a modest fire
control and radar ranging capability be developed for the F-5 and that
all PACOM interceptors be equipped with improved, inexpensive, infra-
red air-to-air missiles. ¹

In September the JCS informed CINCPAC that OSD was examining
ways for reducing fund requirements for FY65 because of anticipated
shortages. The JCS estimated that PACOM would be reduced $50.0
million but indications were that the F-5 program would not be affected.²

Air Force Retention of Support Responsibility for MAP H-34 and AIH
Aircraft

OSD proposed that the U.S. Military Service which was the
primary user of an aircraft should be the Service to provide mainte-
nance and logistic support of that aircraft when it was turned over to
another country through the Military Assistance Program. In the
PACOM the CH-34C (Army primary user), UH-34D and AIH (Navy
primary user) were being supported as MAP aircraft by the Air Force.
Accordingly, CSAF proposed a tentative date of 1 July by which time
support responsibilities for these aircraft would be turned over to the
primary U.S. user.³

In order to facilitate support transfer arrangements, CINCPAC
convened a conference on 22 June at which all interested agencies were
represented.⁴ The Navy had a reasonable support proposal so the
conferrees generally agreed that the Department of the Navy should
assume all PACOM MAP support for the subject aircraft, including the
Army used CH-34C. Because the CSAF proposed transfer date was

1. CINCPAC 050336Z Sep 1964 (S)
2. JCS 8976 DTG 232237Z Sep 1964 (S)
3. CSAF AFMSMDSB 60017 DTG 112208Z Mar 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC ltr 4900 ser 0542 Subj: Transfer of Support Responsibility
   for A-IH and H-34 Aircraft, 6 Jul 1964 (S)
obviously too soon for appropriate arrangements to be made, the
conferrees recommended a transfer date of 1 January 1965. The recom-
mendations which evolved out of the conference were forwarded by
CINCPAC for approval of the Secretary of Defense.¹

Subsequently CSAF and CNO reviewed the problem and recom-
mended against transfer of support responsibilities. The high cost of
additional Navy support facilities, needed for the Navy to take on the
job, was one factor in the joint CSAF-CNO recommendation. In view
of costs involved and the fact that the Department of the Air Force was
already providing highly satisfactory support, OSD decided that the
USAF would continue to support CH-34C, UH-34D, and AH aircraft in
PACOM MAP country Air Force units.² CINCPAC advised PACOM
MAAGs to amend their plans and programs in consonance with the OSD
decision.³

Republic of China Ammunition to RVN

Due to a shortage of MAP funds for support of the RVN, CINCPAC
initiated a review of ammunition assets in PACOM MAP countries in
hope of providing part of the RVN requirements from excesses.

In March CINCPAC requested CHMAAG China to approach the
GRC in regards to releasing certain Army ammunition items to the U.S.
for transfer to the RVN MAP.⁴ In early May the GRC released
ammunition valued at $7.54 million for this purpose and U.S. Army
supply agencies took action to have the ammunition shipped from the
Republic of China to South Vietnam.⁵

Support of PACOM MAP Amphibious Capability

Marine Corps Amphibious capability of Korea, China, and
Thailand was directly dependent on Landing Vehicle, Track (LVT)

¹. Ibid.
². OSD DEF 001659 DTG 062327Z Nov 1964 (S)
³. CINCPAC 072235Z Nov 1964 (S)
⁴. CINCPAC 042116Z Mar 1964 (S)
⁵. CHMAAG China 120209Z May 1964 (S)
operational readiness. Since the LVTs belonging to these countries were of World War II vintage, their life expectancy, by 1964, had been exceeded.

On-hand LVT assets for PACOM MAP Marine Corps was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>CHINA</th>
<th>THAILAND</th>
<th>KOREA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LVT4</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVT3C</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVTA4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVTA5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Replacement vehicles from the U.S., either from current U.S. assets (LVTP5A1) or new production vehicles (LVTPX12), would not be available to the MAP until FY72. In the meantime it appeared that a degradation of 20 to 60 percent in amphibious capability would occur due to wear-out. CINCPAC felt that Japan manufacturing could provide the required vehicles cheaper and quicker. He estimated that beginning in FY67 a reasonable procurement program would be seven vehicles per year for Thailand, 13 per year for Korea, and 30 per year for the Republic of China. Estimated cost was approximately $100,000 for each vehicle.

CINCPAC recommended to OSD that Japan procurement of the LVTP5 type vehicle be evaluated since maintenance of the amphibious capability was a current requirement and because MAP country amphibious forces directly supported U.S. operational plans in Korea and China. The Office of Defense Military Assistance, near the end of 1964, agreed to undertake study of the problem in order to develop a suitable source of LVT replacement.

1. CMC 232019Z Oct 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC 280521Z Oct 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 212126Z Nov 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 180216Z Dec 1964 (S)
5. OSD 241500Z Dec 1964 (S)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type Ship</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Date Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>MSF 387</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>December 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YTL 584</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>July 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YTL 585</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>July 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOREA</td>
<td>Sewart Cruisers 40'</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>December 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILIPPINES</td>
<td>LCP-R</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>March 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THAILAND</td>
<td>LCM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>February 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH VIETNAM</td>
<td>PGM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>April 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LCVP</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>July 1964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STAT Program Expansion

During 1963 four Seabee Technical Assistance Teams (STATs) had begun civic action work in the RVN and three STATs had been on the job in Thailand. The success of these teams prompted OSD, in early May 1964, to request that CINCPAC review existing and future counterinsurgency programs to determine which projects could use STATs and what the possible requirements would be.

CINCPAC accomplished the requested review and estimated the new STAT requirements as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit and Disposition</th>
<th>Personnel Officer</th>
<th>Personnel Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regular STATS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 teams deployed RVN</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 teams in training for RVN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 teams deployed in Thailand</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Waterfront Teams</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 teams deployed in RVN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 teams in training for RVN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Construction Battalion Pacific</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Headquarters Detachment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training Staff</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Construction Battalion Center</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Hueneme</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above requirements were in addition to the existing STAT program. The regular STATs would be deployed in the RVN continuously, but deployment in Thailand would only be during the dry season of November through June each year.

The waterfront teams would be equipped with pile drivers, construction craft, scuba equipment, and tractors. They would construct inland waterway physical control points such as finger piers, docking.

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 236 and 247
2. OSD DEF 967476 DTG 062343Z May 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 090500Z Jun 1964 (C)
facilities, and cable type control points. The STATs in RVN would be used for construction and repair of new life hamlets, roads, bridges, schools, dispensaries, wells and airstrips; hamlet electrification; and water supply and sanitation improvements and support facilities for the RVN junk force. In Thailand, STATs would be used for land clearing; community development; training of Thai in basic construction skills; irrigation projects; and the construction and repair of all weather pierced steel planking air strips, earth dams, roads, bridges and culverts.

CINCPAC emphasized that the personnel needed to carry out the projected use of additional STATs were not available from within PACOM resources. Therefore any expansion of the existing STAT program would require an augmentation of qualified personnel. Additional service funds for training and outfitting would be needed also. CINCPAC stated that MAP should fund projects of military or paramilitary nature such as air strips, junk force support facilities and waterfront control points. The Agency for International Development should fund projects which were socio-economic and non-military as was the case of current STAT operations.

PACOM Screening of Excess MAP Navy Repair Parts

Prior to 1964 MAP country excess Navy repair parts had been disposed of without reporting or screening for possible use elsewhere in the PACOM area.\(^1\) Prior to the implementation of Navy control procedures, such as the Ships Integrated Parts List, large excesses often developed in-country.\(^2\) Additionally, modernization programs within certain countries eliminated some of the equipment for which large quantities of parts had been stocked. Some PACOM countries, however, had a continuing requirement to support the same types of equipment that were being eliminated in other countries.\(^3\)

\(^1\) BUSANDA Note 5910, 23 Sep 1963 (U)
\(^2\) BUSANDA Instr. 4910.11 (U)
\(^3\) CHJUSMAG Thailand 150956 Z Nov 1963 (C)
CINCPAC, in order to adjust to the above situation, requested that MAAG Vietnam report a quantity of repair parts, which were excess to the needs of the Vietnamese Navy, for PACOM screening prior to final disposition. 1 CINCPAC also asked CINCPACFLT to establish and monitor PACOM wide screening procedures and appropriate instructions were issued by CINCPACFLT to PACOM MAAGs. 2 As a result, over $125,000 worth of excess Vietnam Navy repair parts were redistributed within the PACOM area. 3 In addition, $325,000 worth of excess Hamilton diesel engine repair parts were identified by Korea and redistributed to Thailand. 4

Based on the initial success of the screening procedure, Navy Sections of PACOM MAAGs were requested, during the FY65 programming cycle held at PACOM Headquarters in April-May, to submit listings of excess repair parts which were available for redistribution. MAAG China subsequently reported a quantity of repair parts valued at approximately $1.4 million and CINCPACFLT asked to have the list of parts screened for possible use in other PACOM countries. 5

At the end of 1964 approximately 11 percent of all parts, reported as excess PACOM MAP Navy repair parts, had been redistributed. The success of the screening technique caused it to be established as standard PACOM Procedure. 6

MAP Ship Backup Spares

CINCPAC, in November 1963, made recommendations to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) relative to improving the system for handling ship backup spares in MAP countries. 7 CINCPAC stated that it appeared that ship backup spares were being programmed by BUSHIPS on the basis of each individual ship delivered, without regard to the

1. CINCPAC 042200Z Dec 1963 (C)
2. CINCPACFLT Note 4900 ser 74/184, 18 Jan 1964 (U)
3. NAVSEC MAAG Vietnam ser 0225, 21 Jul 1964 (C)
4. COMUSKOREA ltr ser 1490, 6 Dec 1963 (U)
5. CINCPACFLT Note 4900, 6 Jul 1964 (U)
6. CINCPACFLT Instr 4900.5, 21 Aug 1964 (U)
7. CINCPAC 220109Z Nov 1963 (C)
number of similar type ships held in-country. Furthermore there was no indication that the backup spare requirements were being coordinated with the country concerned. This resulted in pyramiding of requirements, duplication of requests, loss of effective control of in-country spares, and uneconomical use of funds. CINCPAC recommended a system of providing backup spares based on ship population and coordination of requirements between MAAGs and BUSHIPS. CINCPAC also called CNO’s attention to the fact that a considerable amount of money, $4.9 million, had accumulated in past years MAP for backup spares and that the spares provided for by these funds were not to be delivered until the period July 1965-June 1966.

The Chief of Naval Operations acknowledged the problems CINCPAC had brought to the fore and said he would try to find a solution. After checking with various Navy bureaus, CNO approved a procedure for MAP country backup spares whereby this type spare would be eliminated as such and integrated into other classes of spare parts. Using this system, ample opportunity would exist for BUSHIPS and MAAGs to coordinate country requirements.

CNO later determined that a large portion of remaining previous years’ funds for backup spares (determined to be $4.4 million instead of $4.9 million) was not required for this purpose and would be recouped on 30 June 1964. Accordingly, CINCPAC asked for requirements against these funds from MAAGs in Vietnam, China, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. Positive responses were received indicating the recouped funds could be constructively used for improvement of naval operating force capabilities. Vietnam and China required more ship spares; Thailand and Korea desired to modernize shipboard electronic equipment; and the Philippines wanted to modernize shipboard ordnance.

1. CNO 222047Z Nov 1963 (C)
2. BUSHIPS ltr ser 409C-233, Dec 1963 (U)
3. OSO 041750Z Dec 1963 (C)
4. SPCC Mech 052110Z Dec 1963 (C)
5. BUSANDA 061603Z Dec 1963 (C)
6. NSG Oakland 121550Z Dec 1963 (C)
7. CNO 112153Z Feb 1964 (C)
and electronic equipment. 1-5 (C)

In June 1964 CNO promulgated approved Record Control Numbers (which would allow countries to begin requisitioning) and established country ceilings for expenditure of the recouped backup spare parts funds. Part of the existing $4.4 million had already been tentatively obligated. The remaining $2,885,000 was broken out to MAP countries as follows: 6 (C)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ceiling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>580,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>360,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>825,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C)

Feasibility of Scheduling Target Submarine for India

CNO asked CINCPAC for his comments concerning the scheduling of target submarine services for India in FY65, using 20 percent available service time. 7 In replying CINCPAC invited CNO's attention to the CINCPACFLT directive which allocated MAP target submarine services and also pointed out that target services were provided from CINCPAC MAP funds. 8

CINCPAC non-concurred in extending target submarine services to India for reasons as follows:

1. **Transit Time**—MAP target submarine operations in the Western Pacific ranged from Korea to the Gulf of Siam. Services were rendered to Korea, China, Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand. Transit time between these areas was 80 to 100 days annually. Service to India would require 22 days additional transit time with corresponding reduct ion in time devoted to target services in the PACOM.

1. CHMAAG Vietnam MAGNV 253 DTG 060649Z Mar 1964 (C)
2. CHMAAG China MGNA 327 DTG 050901Z Mar 1964 (C)
3. CHJUSMAG Thailand 180914Z Mar 1964 (C)
4. COMUSKOREA ltr PROVMAAG-K-LP, 5 Mar 1964 (S)
5. CHJUSMAGPHIL 1211 DTG 060906Z Apr 1964 (C)
6. CNO 241957Z Jun 1964 (C)
7. CNO 042029Z May 1964 (S)
8. CINCPACFLT Instr 04950, 1A, 2 Oct 1963 (C)
2. Service Time—Under the current allocation, using navies received about 1.3 days per year for each Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) ship, as opposed to the standard requirement of 1.7 days per year. If India was to receive 20 percent of the total service time, service time per PACOM MAP ASW ship would be reduced to an unacceptable 0.8 days per year.

3. Projected annual costs of the Auxiliary Target Submarine (AGSS)—Averaged about one million dollars with pro rata shares assessed against the MAP of each participating country. Participation by India would increase the pro rata share of PACOM MAP countries for the AGSS services due to the added transit time involved. Funding could be further complicated since India fell in the CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA area of MAP responsibility.

As of the end of the year CINCPAC had received no additional correspondence concerning target submarine services for India.

Responsibilities of MAAGs in Military Assistance Sales (MAS) Program

Although MAS procedures were delegated to the U.S. Service Departments, CHMAAG Japan, in 1963, had taken an increased role in this program. 1 This was in line with designated MAAG functions which included promotion of sales. 2 (U)

In April 1964, CHMAAG China informed CINCPAC that the GRC had recently established a MAS Project Office within the office of the Deputy Chief of General Staff for Logistics. Further, that the Ministry of National Defense (MND) had indicated a desire to coordinate all MAS matters with the MAAG and to process MAS requests and related administrative and supply documents through MAAG Channels in the future. 3 Prior to this time all MAS negotiations and funding arrangements for the GRC had been handled exclusively at the Washington level between country representatives and the U.S. Service Department concerned. CHMAAG China asked that he be fully informed on the status and development of all MAS matters concerning the GRC in order to effectively advise and assist the new GRC MAS Project Office. CINCPAC

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 127
2. DOD Directive 5132.3 para IV F 1f, 8 Jul 1963 (U)
3. CHMAAG China MGGD-L 41150 DTG 070825Z Apr 1964 (U)
then requested DA, CNO, and CSAF to honor CHMAAG China's request.¹

In answering CINCPAC's request, the CSAF advised that his head-
quarters was becoming increasingly concerned over recent communications
which proposed changes to the Military Departments' procedures for
conducting military sales. CSAF cited the DOD directive authorizing
the Military Departments to execute sales directly with host nation
counterpart services² and stated that the USAF had not delegated its
responsibilities to the MAAGs.³ CSAF raised a number of questions as
to how MAS would be conducted through MAAG channels. CINCPAC
provided CSAF with answers to his questions concerning the MAAGs
involvement in MAS; these answers provided for a team effort by both
the MAAGs and Service Departments.⁴ CINCPAC pointed out the
Secretary of Defense's desire that Unified Commands and MAAGs
promote sale of U.S. hardware to appropriate foreign governments and
stated that MAAGs were capable of providing in-country service to U.S.
Military Departments in MAS matters.

In a subsequent exchange of comments the CSAF agreed with
CINCPAC's stated intent of MAAGs participation in MAS but no agreement
was reached regarding the procedures that should be followed in
achieving a team effort.⁵,⁶ CINCPAC informed DOD that the best interests
of all concerned would be served by having MAAG procedures, with
regard to MAS, sufficiently uniform to eliminate the necessity for the
host countries to adjust to different ways of doing business with each
Service Section of the MAAGs.⁷ Since differences of opinion still
existed between CSAF and CINCPAC on this matter, CINCPAC asked
that DOD review the existing MAS directives and give consideration to
the publication of a DOD directive outlining specific responsibilities of
the MAAGs in the promotion of Military Assistance Sales.

¹ ADMINO CINCPAC 112238Z Apr 1964 (U)
² DOD Directive 5132.3 Subj: MAS Procedures (U)
³ CSAF AFSMSAC 87077 DTG 122144Z Jun 1964 (U)
⁴ CINCPAC 172204Z Jun 1964 (U)
⁵ CSAF AFSMSAC 92010 DTG 302053Z Jun 1964 (U)
⁶ CINCPAC 100153Z Jul 1964 (U)
⁷ CINCPAC ltr ser 1711, Subj: Military Assistance Sales, 10 Jul 1964 (U)
HAWK Missile Modification

The Commanding General U.S. Army Missile Command, in June, advised CINCPAC that, during tests of the HAWK missile's ability to perform low altitude intercepts on USAF Hound Dog missiles, the HAWK had failed to lock on target due to a deficiency in the missile receiver. This pointed to a serious problem when using the HAWK to defend against fast, low flying, small radar cross-sectional aircraft operating over heavily cluttered terrain. To correct the deficiency, modifications costing $92,872 per HAWK battalion were necessary.  

The first of two HAWK battalions in the Korea MAP was pending shipment to Korea but could be modified in the U.S. if shipment were delayed for 90 days. CINCPAC did not have data for immediate programming of the modifications and it was decided to wait and modify the first Korea HAWK battalion in Korea. The Republic of China also had recently received a HAWK missile battalion so CINCPAC programmed the necessary modifications for both of these battalions in the FY65 MA Program.  

Japan was scheduled to receive one HAWK battalion in February 1965 and another in the Winter of 1966. The CG U.S. Army Missile Command advised CINCPAC that equipment for the two Japanese battalions would be modified during production and no increase in the cost of the missiles was anticipated. Existing plans envisioned deployment of modification teams to Korea in April 1965 and to Taiwan in October 1965.

Performance Evaluation Group Inspections

Throughout 1964 CINCPAC's Performance Evaluation Group (PEG), assisted by approximately 20 members of the CINCPAC and Component Commanders' staffs, visited PACOM MAP countries to inspect the Military Assistance Program activities. An index to the

1. CGUSAMCOM ltr AMCPM-HA, subj: Definition and Method of Implementation of HAWK Modification Program, Operation Crossbow, 11 Jun 1964 (U)
2. CGUSAMCON AMSMI-SSMG-7893-64 DTG 122145Z Aug 1964 (S)
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 200516Z Jun 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 190306Z Aug 1964 (S)
5. CGUSAMCON AMCPM-HAIT-259 DTG 032037Z Sep 1964 (S)
reports which the PEG made upon completion of inspections is found at Appendix D. Some general comments made by the PEG in these inspection reports are reflected below.

Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand: Thai Army personnel engaged in training Lao military forces were observed to be competent, hard-working, and well disciplined. Supplies for Laos were being channeled through two main Thailand Facilities—REDCAP in Bangkok and PEPPERGRINDER in Udorn. Improved communications by means of STARCOM facilities and single-side-band radios made both of these operations effective. No major problems existed with respect to delivery of required items to Laos. On a second inspection of Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand, stowage and security of ammunition was considered inadequate.

Thailand: The principal area which needed improvement was in the logistic field—adequate maintenance of records and planning of supply levels. In his comments on the PEG report, Chief JUSMAG Thailand questioned the validity of an inspection based upon the standards of the U.S. Armed Forces. CINCPAC replied, however, that U.S. standards were necessary in defining most goals.1,2

Philippines: Deficiencies in the logistics system continued to point up a lack of command supervision on the part of Philippine military commanders. A contributing factor was the rapid turnover of the chiefs of the services. The PEG group recommended a comprehensive, coordinated and meaningful annual schedule of field visits by members of the MAAG Philippines staff.

Republic of China: The inspection team noted a close rapport and excellent working relationships between MAAG personnel and

1. CHJUSMAG Thailand ltr LOG 0597-64, 5 Mar 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC ltr 5040 ser 00502, 10 Apr 1964 (S)
members of the ROC Armed Forces. Continued efforts were needed to reduce the excesses of Army wheeled vehicles. Navy attention needed to be given to problems associated with the logistic system and maintenance and repair operations, both aboard ship and in the Navy yard.

Republic of Korea: The PEG was favorably impressed with the smartness, discipline, and high state of training of the Korean Armed Forces. Deficiencies were found primarily in the logistics area. The PEG emphasized the importance of following-up aggressively on overdue requisitions. Controls were needed in order to account for all material. Duplication and waste of material needed to be eliminated.

Burma: Only a limited inspection of Burma was possible because of the nature of the Burma MAP and because of restrictions placed by the Minister of Defense on visits to Burmese installations. Difficulty existed in the identification, location, and issue of spare parts for commercial vehicles which had been delivered to Burma in 1963. The CINCPAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics endeavored to resolve this problem with the U.S. Army Materiel Center.

Pacom Map Data Center

CINCPAC's MAP Data Center was one of the primary tools used to develop Military Assistance Plans and Programs for the Pacific Command. (C)

During 1964 the MAP Data Center implemented new automatic data processing techniques which reduced the error rate of MAP submissions to a negligible level. The CINCPAC staff was provided editorial assistance during MAP reviews, and managerial assistance in the form of dollar summary reports which helped ensure compliance with program ceiling directives. Data files were managed so that continual changes, characteristic of MAP programming, could be effected and special reports generated at a moment's notice. The major significance attached to these accomplishments was that MAAGs
were given the proper frame of reference within which to state their program requirements. (C)

The production of the FY65-69 MAP submission was accomplished more smoothly than before. By using established machine formats, key punch operator time was greatly reduced as was staff time. In 1963, using hand-written formats, the MAP submission took over six months of concerted effort by MAAGs and CINCPAC. In 1964 the entire job was completed in four months and the submission was made 45 days earlier.

In an effort to get relief from the pressure created by an increased workload upon the MAP Data Center, a data systems design evaluation was conducted. It was decided that the main factors inhibiting economy of machine and personnel effort were the restricted capacity and processing speed of the Electronic Data Processing System on hand (IBM 1401). Manpower overtime for equipment operators could be cut 75 percent if more machine capacity and better machine performance were available. For this reason invitations to bid were issued in January to 12 computer manufacturers. 1 Four of the manufacturers offered proposals and the Sperry Rand Corporation UNIVAC 1050 III system was accepted. 2, 3 Installation and file loading were completed in December and, as the year closed, the PACOM MAP Data Center capability was greater than ever before. (C)

COUNTRY ACTIVITIES

MAP activities concerning Vietnam, Laos and Thailand are included in Chapter IV.

Burma

By the end of 1963 the Burma FY64 MAP had been reduced to include only training and follow-on spares for equipment previously delivered. 4 However, the FY65 OSD ceiling guideline of $8.0 million

1. NSC Pearl Ltr Code 50 ser 4295, 27 Dec 1963 (U)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 1073, 13 May 1964 (U)
3. OSD DEF 974188 DTG 182343Z Jun 1964 (U)
4. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 120
allowed $4.5 million worth of investment items to be placed in the Burma MAP. After review by CINCPAC, the investment items contained in the FY65 Program were: six C-47 aircraft; two T-33A aircraft; one minesweeper, inshore; aircraft support; engineer construction equipment; topographic equipment; and infantry weapons. These items varied mainly from the CHMEDT Burma submission, which had the Ambassador's concurrence, in that CINCPAC eliminated six F-1C aircraft and added six C-47 aircraft to the program. CINCPAC did not approve the F-1Cs because of the stated objection of the Burmese to its lack of a bombing and rocket capability. ¹

CINCPAC, in July, completed review of the FY66 Burma MA Program as well as the FY65 Program. The FY66 Program was within the OSD ceiling guide of $.8 million, and $.7 million of this was slated for operating costs. A FY66 MAP revision for Burma was being considered which might reflect a straight Military Assistance Sales program for Burma, with perhaps some MAP funds for follow-on spares only.

In late June, CHMEDT Burma forwarded a Burmese government query regarding the future availability of certain items for consideration by Burma for future sales agreements. The items included: Mach 1.4 to 1.6 interceptor-tactical aircraft; jet helicopters operable at altitudes of 12,000 feet with capacity of from eight to twenty five combat equipped troops; transport aircraft in the 40 to 100 thousand pound weight class with short take off and landing capability; specific AC&W radar or short range search and height finding portable radar; and fixed air navigational aids. ²

In view of the political nature of the Burma program, CINCPAC forwarded the request to OASD/ISA recommending that the information be provided. ³ CINCPAC commented that there was no existing military requirement for the high performance jet aircraft and that requirements for the large transports and jet helicopters were questionable.

¹ See Burma Aircraft Program, this section
² CHMEDT Burma MCX-183 DTG 290117 Z Jun 1964 (C)
³ CINCPAC 140145 Z Jul 1964 (S)
## Burma

**As of 31 December 1964**

### Basic Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>262,000 sq. mi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>24,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Growth</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arable Land Per Capita</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>As % of Total Government Expenditure</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of GNP</td>
<td>.96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chair of Council of Ministers
- Union of Burma Revolutionary
- Government/Defense Minister - Gen Ne Win
- Vice Chief of Staff Army - Brigadier San Yu
- Vice Chief of Staff Air - Brigadier Thaung Dan
- Vice Chief of Staff Navy - Commodore Thaung Tin

### Major Force Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>82 INF BN, 4 SIGNAL REC BN, 2 INF BN, 1 ENG BN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75 INF BN, 9 LIGHT-INF BN, 3 ARMY BN, 1 MORTAR BN, 1 ARMY BN, 1 ARMY BN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1 PATROL SHIP, 11 FQ, 2 MINESweepers, 4 LSS</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17F, 1 NEWF, 5F, 10PR, 4LCE, 2PMB, 1MG, 3BC, 10RA, 4RO, 8M, 1CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1 TAC FTR SOW, 2 TRANS SOW, 2 HELO SOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 TRANS SOW, 5 COMMUNICATIONS SOW, 1 OPERATIONAL CONVERSION UNIT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Overall Objective
- Assist all efforts to promote free world influences and resist communism.

### U.S. Diplomatic Mission
- U.S. Ambassador: Mrs. Henry A. Biddle
- U.S. Aid Representative: Mr. Donald D. Barnes
- Chief, Agency: Col. Henry A. Lowe, USA

### Map Objective
- General Objectives are:
  1. To demonstrate general U.S. support for the independence, unity, and internal security of Burma.
  2. To provide a channel for U.S. influence in the Burmese armed forces, seeking thereby to promote attitudes favorable toward the U.S. and to plant seeds of closer U.S.-Burmese cooperation among defense services personnel.
  3. To provide Burma as an alternative to acceptance of, and dependence upon, military aid from Communist countries, thus enabling Burma to demonstrate to the Communists a picture of strategic non-alignment.
  4. To demonstrate U.S. good faith in carrying out its undertakings while avoiding adverse political reactions which would be produced if the United States were to appear to sacrifice or undermine Burmese understand to be a military assistance commitment.

### Combat Capability
- Not yet capable of fully securing internal peace and order, unable to offer sustained effective resistance to direct attack by Choms. No significant capability beyond Burma borders.
- Capable of giving light support to the Army, discouraging prach, and conducting inshore patrol duties.
- It is capable of performing its primary mission of maintaining internal security by supporting the Army and Navy, negligible air defense capability against air attack by major power.
CINCPAC concurred with the requirement for the radar and navigational aids and recommended that any information on the items requested by the Burmese government be provided on the basis of true dollar sales rather than token payments.

It was later determined that the Burmese request regarding Military Assistance Sales (MAS) availability and prices was directed toward planned purchases in the FY68-69 time frame. CHMEDT Burma recommended that the U.S. provide Burma with training and follow-on spares, for equipment furnished Burma in FY65 and prior years, on a "token sales" basis at an estimated MAP cost of $4 million. This proposal was directed at maintaining CHMEDT presence in Burma and providing contact with the Burmese Armed Forces. The American Ambassador to Burma pointed out to the State Department that the CHMEDT proposal was a political prerequisite for maintaining Burmese neutrality and enhancing the U.S. position in Burma. The Ambassador stated that the "token payment" proposal for providing training and follow-on spares would assure the Burmese of U.S. reliability and prevent the Burmese from turning to other sources of supply such as the Soviets, Egyptians, Yugoslavs, or French.

CINCPAC took the position that Military Aid to Burma was based more on political than military considerations and, while generally concurring with the proposal, felt any decision should rest on a joint DOD/State position. OSD, however, would not provide the sales information requested by the Burmese and stated that it was reluctant to offer follow-on spares under any arrangement other than a true dollar sales basis, due to foreseeable cuts in the MAP and the existing Burmese restrictions on CHMEDT Burma (CHMEDT was not allowed to make end-use inspections) which made it difficult to justify this action to the General Accounting Office and Congress.

1. OSD DEF 890461 DTG 312157Z Jul 1964 (S)
2. CHMEDT Burma MCX 218 DTG 040600Z Aug 1964 (S)
3. CHMEDT Burma MCX 226 DTG 070945Z Aug 1964 (C)
4. RANGOON 95 to STATE, 9 Aug 1964 (C)
5. CINCPAC 140347Z Aug 1964 (S)
6. OSD DEF 982459 DTG 151932Z Aug 1964 (S)
OSD recommended that negotiations proceed for the FY65 program on the basis of previous State/Defense advice that the FY65 increment terminate a so called "$43 million commitment" and that the Burmese be advised that the FY66 and future programs would be on a straight MAS basis. The "43 million commitment" was a multi-year program authorized by the U.S. President in 1962 and offered to provide the Burmese Government equipment, materials, and services, subject to availability of funds. The dollar value of the program was to be up to $43 million spread over a four or five year period commencing in FY62. Through FY65 the value of programs under this commitment came to approximately $32 million (FY62-$11.2 million, FY63-$10.8 million, FY64 - $2.7 million, FY65 - $7.3 million). Although the Burmese had paid only token parts of the above amounts, and under U.S. law the aid to Burma was considered grants, the Burmese considered the aid as purchases. They remained neutral in their political affiliations, and would not allow the U.S. to conduct end use inspections.

Ambassador Byroade, the U.S. Ambassador to Burma, requested permission for CHMEDT Burma to go to Washington to plead the case for continuing the "token sales" arrangement and the State Department approved the visit.1

However, in September DOD and State jointly approved the policy that Burma would have to pay full dollar value for all major items and follow-on-spares for major items procured after FY65. Further, for FY66-68 planning, Chief MEDT Burma might provide under MAP token sales, follow-on-spares, material training assistance, and Military Training Team support for major items procured during FY65 and prior. The total amount of such token sales support was not to exceed that remaining under the 43 million dollar arrangement ($11 million).2 The Burmese reacted with no apparent surprise to this policy move, preferring to finalize the FY64-65 programs and to discuss the later programs some other time.3

1. STATE 69 to RANGOON, 19 Aug 1964 (C)
2. STATE 102 to RANGOON, 22 Sep 1964 (S)
3. RANGOON 198 to STATE, 30 Sep 1964 (S)
In October Chief MEDT Burma informed CINCPAC that negotiations with the Burmese on the FY64-65 programs were nearing completion. The Burmese had tentatively agreed to a shopping list for the FY65 MAP which would reduce the requirement for C-47 aircraft from six to four, increase T-33A20s from two to four, and add two H43F Helicopters.

**Burma Aircraft Program:** In 1963 the U.S. substituted 12 F-1C aircraft for a like number of F-86Fs which were in the FY63 Burma MA Program. Two of the twelve aircraft were slipped to the FY64 MAP. Four of the F-1Cs were delivered in February 1964 and the remaining eight were to be delivered in May.

In March 1964 the CHMEDT Rangoon informed CINCPAC that, contrary to the formal sales agreements, the first increment of four aircraft had arrived in country without rocketry and bombing capability. Although the Bureau of Naval Weapons advised that the F-1Cs could be configured similar to the MF-1C, which had the required capability, the Burmese Air Force was not willing to accept those in-country or the eight aircraft yet to be delivered. The Burmese stated that they strongly desired the F-86F aircraft as originally contained in the 1963 Sales Agreement.

CINCPAC informed OASD/ISA that training and logistic support for the F-1C had progressed to the point where substitution of another type aircraft, even if available, would be economically unattractive and that persuasion through military and diplomatic channels for Burmese acceptance of the modified F-1Cs was the best course of action.

CNO offered several alternative solutions which involved combinations of modifying F-1Cs and furnishing MF-1Cs. OSD, as in the previous year, confirmed that F-86Fs were not available and offered a solution which was passed through CINCPAC and CHMEDT Burma.

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1. CHMEDT Burma MCX 314 DTG 160150Z Oct 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 120
3. CHMEDT Rangoon MCX-67 DTG 121230Z Mar 1964 (C)
4. BUWEP 182132Z Mar 1964 (C)
5. CHMEDT Rangoon MCX-73 DTG 190330Z Mar 1964 (C)
6. CINCPAC 282303Z Mar 1964 (C)
7. CNO 062207Z Apr 1964 (C)
thence to the Burmese Government. 1,2 OSD offered to substitute MF-1Cs for the F-1Cs. 3 The substituted aircraft would have capabilities equal to or better than F-86Fs and 10 of them could be made ready for shipment by 31 July with the remaining two on the way shortly thereafter. As evidence of U.S. regret over the delay, the four F-1Cs already in Burma would be left at no cost to the Burmese. This would permit the Burmese Air Force to continue flight training while the 12 MF-1Cs were prepared. CINCPAC noted that the four F-1Cs in-country plus the 12 MF-1Cs offered would provide the full force objective of 15 Unit Equipment (authorized) aircraft plus one attrition.

In June CINCPAC tried to get approval of an increase to the FY63 Burma MAP in the amount of $117,200 for cartridges and rockets for use with armed T-33s and F-1C aircraft. 4,5 While engaged in this activity, CINCPAC was notified by CHMEDT Burma that the Burmese Air Force (BAF) would not accept the MF-1Cs offered by the U.S. and further requested that the four F-1Cs in-country be evacuated. 6,7 The Burmese emphasized that the decision was final but they appreciated the fact that the U.S. had made every effort to provide them with acceptable aircraft. Their stated reason for the rejection was that the proffered aircraft were not land based; this alluded to their carrier designed landing characteristics.

The Burmese government requested that the BAF be provided the following in lieu of the 12 MF-1Cs:

1. Four armed T-33 aircraft with internal gunnery and external rocket and bombing capability. Follow-on spares and associated ground equipment in sufficient quantity to support these T-33s at a base apart from the base where existing T-33s were already located.

2. Three H-43B helicopters with follow-on spares and associated ground equipment so that they might be located apart from existing H-43Bs.

1. OSD DEF 963068 DTG 081710Z Apr 1964 (C)
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 142146Z Apr 1964 (S)
3. CHMEDT Rangoon MCX-93 DTG 210430Z Apr 1964 (C)
4. CINCPAC 130315Z Jun 1964 (S)
5. ADMINO CINCPAC 090122Z Apr 1964 (C)
6. CHMEDT AMEMB Rangoon MCX-170 DTG 220400Z Jun 1964 (S)
7. OSD DEF 963068 DTG 081710Z Apr 1964 (C)
The F-1C program was cancelled and OSD deferred approval of additional ammunition items pending final determination of the type of aircraft that would be delivered to the Burmese. 1-4

Although H-43B aircraft were not available, H-43F aircraft were available and CHMEDT Burma indicated that the Burmese were willing to accept them as a substitute. 5, 6 CSAF stated that T-33A20 aircraft were available also and CINCPAC asked OSD to approve CHMEDT Burma taking action to finalize negotiations with the Burmese. 7 CINCPAC also asked OSD to cite the amount of F-1C funds that remained to cover the cost of T-33 and H-43Bs.

In the meantime OSD could find no MAP country takers for the four F-1Cs in Burma nor for six F-1Cs which were at Alameda waiting to be shipped. 8, 9 CNO took action to have the F-1Cs in Burma shipped to Alameda to be held while further sales possibilities were investigated. 10 To add to the complexity of the problem, 1,700 pounds of F-1C equipment and parts had to be rounded up from Bangkok. 11, 12

OASD/ISA concurred in CINCPAC's recommendation to substitute T-33A and H-43F aircraft for the F-1Cs, subject to agreement on the quantities and types of aircraft equipment to be included in the substitution. 13

By September the four T-33As had arrived in Burma and the Burmese were extremely concerned over ammunition to be used with these aircraft (50 caliber, 2.75 inch rockets, and 5 inch rockets). Chief Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma urged that ammunition be reinstated in the FY63 MAP for early delivery. 14

1. CHMEDT AMEMB Rangoon MCX 170 DTG 220400Z Jun 1964 (C)
2. CHMEDT AMEMB Rangoon MCX 171 DTG 220746Z Jun 1964 (C)
3. OSD DEF 975021 DTG 242352Z Jun 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 130315Z Jun 1964 (S)
5. OSD DEF 980092 DTG 300059Z Jul 1964 (S)
6. CHMEDT Burma MCX 253 DTG 250830Z Aug 1964 (C)
7. CSAF AFSMSA 93988 DTG 082110Z Jul 1964 (C)
8. CNO 011939Z Jul 1964 (C)
9. OSD DEF 977827 DTG 142325Z Jul 1964 (C)
10. CNO 161443Z Jul 1964 (C)
11. CHMEDT AMEMB Rangoon MCX 214 DTG 280616Z Jul 1964 (C)
12. ADMINO CINCPAC 020433Z Aug 1964 (C)
13. OSD DEF 8362 DTG 042357Z Sep 1964 (C)
14. CHMEDT AMEMB Rangoon MCX-282 DTG 231000Z Sep 1964 (S)
Funds remaining in the F-1C program which could be transferred to pay for T-33As and H-43Fs amounted to $31,500. The total requirement to fund the substituted aircraft was $1,468,629, resulting in a shortage of $1,137,129. CINCPAC requested that OSD make funds available to fill the void.

OSD, in November, agreed to issue a MAP Order Amendment to the FY63 MAP based on a new cost estimate of $1,394,200 for the four T-33As, three H-43Fs, and associated equipment. In mid-December the orphaned F-1Cs were shipped out of Burma. Final arrangements were made for the aircraft substitution and CINCPAC forwarded change data to OSD for addition of the new aircraft to the FY63 Burma MAP and deletion of those formerly in the program.

Cambodia

As the result of a 20 November 1963 note from the Cambodian government, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Cambodia, established on 16 May 1955, was formally discontinued on 10 January 1964.

On 10 January Brigadier General Robert C. Taber, CHMAAG Cambodia, sent a letter to the Cambodian Minister for National Defense which stated: "I have the honor to inform you that the United States Military Assistance Group, Cambodia, is discontinued as of this date. All personnel, military and civilian, who were assigned or attached to the U.S. MAAG have departed Cambodia, except for myself and my family. We will depart 11 January."

The smoothness of the evacuation attested to the fact that the withdrawal had been well planned and executed. There were five voyages by LSTs carrying 6406 measurement tons of cargo and 30 trips by C-123 aircraft carrying 115 short tons of cargo. A total of 185 DOD sponsored persons were evacuated.

1. BUSANDA 0220002Z Oct 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC 072239Z Oct 1964 (S)
3. OSD DEF 001883 DTG 140116Z Nov 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC ltr 4900 ser 001891 subj: Changes to Burma FY65-64 and Prior Year MAP, 17 Dec 1964 (S)
5. Additional background in CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 122
6. CHMAAG Cambodia ltr subj: Discontinuance of U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Cambodia, 10 Jan 1964 (U)
During a stopover in Hawaii, enroute from Cambodia, General Taber prepared a report of MAAG operations. He listed as primary accomplishments of the MAAG during its almost nine years of existence the following: delivery of a substantial amount of arms, ammunition, and equipment; construction of numerous facilities; a planned elimination of grant aid type assistance, although the end was not in a manner or at the time of U.S. choosing; and some progress in developing the country's ability to produce basic items of military clothing and to maintain, repair, and rebuild MAP weapons and equipment.

As for failures, General Taber listed them as basically stemming from the constant conflict between what Sihanouk wanted from the United States and what the United States wanted for Cambodia, Sihanouk wanted U.S. military assistance but preferred to take French advice. The U.S. erred in not recognizing that the Cambodians, who being militantly neutral and arrogantly airing their age old grudge against colonialism, would not listen to an occidental power that tried to tell them what to do and how to do it. U.S. failures included the inability to change the Cambodians' preference for French rather than MAAG training and to gain acceptance of suggestions regarding TO&E; inability to resolve or mitigate disputes between Cambodia and her neighbors; failure to preclude or limit communist assistance; lack of coordination between MAAG and AID; and failure to support adequately the U.S. commitment to the maintenance of Cambodian independence.

General Taber recommended, in the event the U.S. was invited to resume delivery of equipment to Cambodia and not allowed to act in an advisory or training capacity, that the U.S. unit formed should be organized as a tri-service equipment delivery team and operate as a satellite of the Embassy. Further Cambodia should receive aid on a "Presidential determination" basis (this would provide more flexibility in controlling assistance); the U.S. should not resume pay, allowance, and subsistence support of the FARK; and the U.S. should insist on permission to perform end-use inspections.

1. CHMAAG Cambodia After Action Report, 14 Jan 1964 (S)
CINCPAC in attached comments to General Taber's report, which was forwarded to OASD/ISA, differed somewhat with his recommendations. CINCPAC stated that if a decision was made to resume military assistance in Cambodia for purely political reasons, the assistance should be administered by a small MAAG on a basis similar to other PACOM MAAGs and not by a Military Equipment Delivery Team or Military Technical Advisory Group. He agreed with General Taber that the U.S. should have a firm agreement empowering end-use equipment inspections and recommended that assistance not be resumed unless this agreement was obtained.

Indonesia

Due to the militant confrontation policies of the Indonesian Government, the Indonesian MA Programs for FY64 and subsequent years were greatly curtailed. All deliveries of weapons and ammunition programmed in FY63 and prior years were suspended and other major items programmed in those years had to be approved by OSD on a case-by-case basis before deliveries could be made. 1 Materiel was taken out of the FY64 program, leaving only an austere training program of $1.9 million. The FY65 program ($1.7 million) also contained only a minimum amount of training plus funds for a few engineer spare parts, and training equipment. The U.S. suspended all materiel and training which could be tied directly with combat operations. Therefore, the training in the FY65 Program was of technical and professional types only. This restriction was not fully supported by the Country Team since they felt it would weaken the U.S. position in Indonesia.

OSD provided dollar guidelines for Indonesia for the years FY65 through FY70 but did not require an add-on plan for FY70 as was normally the case with MAP countries. These guidelines were as follows: FY65 - $1.7 million; FY66 - $1.4 million; FY67 through FY70 - $2.0 million each year.

1. OSD DEF 937748 DTG241803Z Sep 1963 (S)
**INDONESIA**

**AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1964**

### BASIC INFORMATION
- **Area:** 516,000 sq mi (1.34 million km²)
- **Population:** 101 million
- **Population Increase:** 2.3% annually
- **Labor Force:** 34.1 million
- **Agricultural Population:** 55%
- **Literacy Rate:** 60%
- **Life Expectancy:** 52 years

### OVERALL OBJECTIVE
- **Support Efforts to Promote Free World Influences and Resist Communist Intrusions.**

### U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION
- **U.S. Ambassador:** M. Howard G. Jones
- **USAID Director:** T. Edward Fox
- **Chief, Multlns:** Col. William Harney, USA

### MAP OBJECTIVE
- **Defend Indonesia Against External Aggression and Counter Communist Subversion and Defeat Insurgents.**
- **Maintain Security and Effectively Repel Minor Incursions But Not a Major Attack.**
- **Support Smuggling and Support a Three Battalion Size Landing Force.**
- **Conduct Only Token Submarine Interdiction and ASM Operations.**
- **Indonesian Marines Are Capable of Providing Battalion Size Landing Force for Amphibious Assaults.**

### MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES

#### ARMY
- **30 INF BN**, 10 TANK & ARMED VEH BNs, 9 ARTY BNs, 1 MINE BATT, 1 INF BATT, 1 AAA BATT, 1 CENG BATT

#### NAVY
- **1 MAR DIV**, 6 DD/DE
- **27 PATROL SHIPS**
- **15 MINE WARRIORS**
- **1 TASS PAT SGN, 11 LOG SHIPS**

#### AIR FORCE
- **1 TAC FTR SGN, 1 TAC ICBM SGN, 2 TRANS SGN, 1 ASR SGN**

### TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES
- **130 INF BN**, 3 ARMORED BATT, 17 HP BNs, 10 ARMOR BNs, 12 FA BNs, 11 ART BNs, 8 AAA BNs, 1 CENG BN

### COMBAT CAPABILITY
- **Maintain Internal Security and Effectively Repel Minor Incursions But Not a Major Attack.**
- **Launch an Expeditionary Force in Brigade Strength.**
- **Suppress Smuggling and Support a Three Battalion Size Landing Force.**
- **Conduct Only Token Submarine Interdiction and ASM Operations.**
- **Indonesian Marines Are Capable of Providing Battalion Size Landing Force for Amphibious Assaults.**

### FORCES IN BEING
In September, when OSD was adjusting MA Programs in anticipation of congressional appropriations, the FY65 Indonesia dollar ceiling was reduced to $1.2 million. There was no need for reprogramming since Indonesia's FY65 program had not been filled out above the new ceiling.  

**U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia**

In late August the JCS solicited CINCPAC comment on a State Department proposal that the U.S. should cease viewing Indonesia as just an errant friend and recognize that Sukarno's government was essentially "hostile" to the U.S. As a first step in this direction State proposed to terminate MAP and AID programs for Indonesia. A problem posed by State was how to accomplish this termination without precipitating a break in diplomatic relations with a more friendly post Sukarno government.

The CINCPAC reply to the JCS concurred in the tenor and rationale of State's proposal and commented on the military implication which would accompany or follow implementation of the new attitude. While recognizing several less significant aspects of the problem, CINCPAC emphasized that the most serious military implication was that Indonesia's reaction might demand that some PACOM resources be diverted to safeguard U.S./British citizens or to execute deterrent offensive actions. This, he felt, might interfere with a more fundamental application of PACOM forces in connection with problems associated with Southeast Asia.

The cessation of MAP to Indonesia would mean deactivation of the existing MILTAG with a consequent barrier to communication between the U.S. forces and some of the Indonesian senior military and civilian officials who were known to favor U.S. aid. As a partial solution to this, CINCPAC recommended that after the MILTAG task was terminated, some of its personnel should be assigned to the U.S. legation in Djakarta.

1. CINCPAC 270111Z Dec 1964 (S)
2. JCS 8038 DTG 212300Z Aug 1964 (S)
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 230900Z Aug 1964 (S)
Japan

The objectives of U.S. military assistance to Japan in 1964 were as follows:

1. To assist in the qualitative improvement of Japanese forces.
2. To elicit increased and improved allocation of Japanese defense expenditures.
3. To maintain a climate in which the U.S. would continue to enjoy existing and, if required, additional overflight, staging and base rights. (Limited grant aid training could be planned and programmed for Japan if such training was for orientation or in direct support of Military Assistance Sales (MAS) of defense articles or services.)

In 1964 the Terms of Reference for MAAG Japan were revised to include a specific MAS function for the MAAG. This was accomplished because of the need to increase sales of U.S. produced military equipment and because of the phase out of Military Assistance to Japan, except for a Basic Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system which was to be cost shared with Japan in the FY65 program.

Following is an end of year report on MAS items for which negotiations had been completed, or which were rejected by Japan, or still under consideration. (Numbers are "each" unless otherwise specified.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Under Consideration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 How (SP)</td>
<td>7 1/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 How (SP)</td>
<td>30 2/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-41 Tank</td>
<td>42 3/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWK Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMERCIAL</td>
<td>18 4/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OV-1C (Mohawk)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nike-Hercules</td>
<td>20-30 (Btr)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. CHMAAG Japan 260722Z Jun 1964 (C)
2. Ibid.
3. CHMAAG Japan 230720Z Mar 1964 (C)
4. CHMAAG Japan ltr, subj: Potential U.S. Military Equipment Sales, 22 Nov 1963 (S)
JAPAN

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1964

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA: 163,000 SQ MI
POPULATION: 115 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH: 1%
AGRICULTURE: 2%
LITERACY RATE: 97%

LIFE EXPECTANCY: 61 YEARS
CROSS-WAY, PROD, 1964: $76.9 BILLION PER CAPITA
DEFENSE BUDGET: $6.9 BILLION SELF-FINANCED

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

TO RETAIN U.S. BASES AND FACILITIES WITH ATTENDANT RIGHTS (PORT ACCESS AND OVERFLIGHT); AND ASSIST ALL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE AMERICAN INFLUENCE.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR: MARK L. HIGGENDON
CHIEF, HAG: RON C. LUKER, AID

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES

ARMY
12 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 3 HANDBN, 3 TANK BN,
1 MECHANIZED DIVISION, 1 SCHOOL BDE, 5 AAA BN, 16 ARTY BN, 16 BMB BN.

NAVY
10 CR, 66 DESTROYER ESCORT TYPES, 56 PATROL SHIPS, 55, 48 MINECROPS, 44 NUCLEAR, 12 ASW PAT SOH, 1 HELD SOH, 1 TRANS Pk, 5 STRAIGHT SURVEILLANCE UNITS

AIR FORCE
11 turbo, 18 SOAR, 17 TC AR, 17 TAC AR, 11 SAR DETACHMENTS, 22 SMB BN.

TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

12 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 1 MECHANIZED DIVISION, 1 AIRBORNE Bn, 1 TANK BN, 1 ARMY BDE, 2 ARTY CP, 1 AAA CP, 2 AAA BN (GEP), 5 ARMY Bn, 3 AAA BN.

COMBAT CAPABILITY

MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONDUCT LIMITED DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

LIMITED ABILITY TO ESCORT COASTAL CONVOYS, TASM SOON OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVE, GOOD MINE-SWEEPING CAPABILITY

GOOD UNDER WP CONDITIONS, ANY AIRCRAFT, MOVING SMALL SIZE AND AIRCRAFT FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITS CAPABILITY

MAP OBJECTIVE

GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE:
(A) ASSIST IN THE QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF JAPANESE FORCES,
(B) ELICIT AN INCREASE AND AN IMPROVED ALLOCATION OF JAPANESE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES.
(C) MAINTAIN A CLIMATE IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO ENJOY EXISTING AND, IF REQUIRED, ADDITIONAL OVERFLIGHT, STAGING, AND BASE RIGHTS.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Under Consideration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH-34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCVP</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP-5B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14 1/</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMMERCIAL</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univac</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(Tactical Data System for small ships)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidewinder</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-102</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>($62.0 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*BADGE</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>T-38B (F-5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-104 AWX Mod</td>
<td>180</td>
<td></td>
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<td>F-104J Aircraft</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-2A Aircraft</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*$14.0 million is U.S. cost-share with 50% of total amount to be spent in U.S. This means that Japan would be required to spend approximately $24.0 million for U.S. material.

In March CINCPAC received a letter from CHMAAG Japan advising that the Military Assistance Sales program was not receiving adequate emphasis. CHMAAG Japan outlined actions that had been taken by the MAAG to solve the problem and indicated that improvement in supply support provided by the services was necessary in order to promote further sales.

3. Admiral Felt subsequently dispatched

1. CHMAAG Japan 110720Z Aug 1964 (C)
2. CHMAAG Japan 290724Z Jul 1964 (C)
3. CHMAAG Japan ltr Subj: MAS Supply Performance, 9 Mar 1964 (U)
personal letters to Generals Wheeler and LeMay, and to Admiral McDonald, soliciting their assistance in assuring that the MAS program received proper service emphasis.

Although OSD dollar guidelines for FY65-70 provided for only one item, 16 million in FY65 for the U.S. part of the BADGE system, CINCPAC recommended programs that provided for some grant aid military assistance to Japan through FY69. The CINCPAC recommended programs were as follows:

($ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY65</th>
<th>FY66</th>
<th>FY67</th>
<th>FY68</th>
<th>FY69</th>
<th>FY70</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
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<td>$1.58</td>
<td>$0.27</td>
<td>$0.11</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operating</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$15.90</td>
<td>$1.73</td>
<td>$0.38</td>
<td>$0.23</td>
<td>$0.11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Funds in the FY66-70 CINCPAC recommended programs were for training only and were to be funded from the PACOM Regional Account.

**Japan Air Weapons Control System:** In 1963 the Japanese government indicated their intent to procure a Semi-Automated Air Weapons Control System (BADGE) from the Hughes Aircraft Company. This system, when operational, would provide a semi-automated defense environment for Japan which would add materially to its defense posture. At the end of 1963 the Japanese were considering a U.S. offer to fund 25 percent of the equipment costs.  

The basic BADGE system bid by the Hughes Aircraft Company was for $36 million of which the U.S. offered to provide $9 million. A follow-on electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) package was expected to cost $20 million of which the U.S. was willing to fund $5 million.  

Based on tentative agreements $14 million was programmed in the FY65 MAP for BADGE.

A Memorandum of Understanding was negotiated between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Japanese Defense Agency in May 1964 which resulted in the establishment of a BADGE Project.

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 125
2. STATE 1510 to TOKYO, 12 Dec 1963, 7 PM (S)
Office in the Japanese Self Defense Force. The BADGE Project Office constituted a base from which to manage the project. In addition, a BADGE Technical Support Team became functional in August. (See BADGE Technical Support Team, this Section)

In July the U.S. Air Force sent an ECCM Technical Assistance Team to Tokyo. This team was to advise the Japanese Self Defense Force in the selection of ECCM equipment and the modifications of radar equipment essential for the successful operation of the BADGE System. The Japanese Self Defense Force received manufacturers' proposals for these items from Airborne Instrument Laboratory, General Electric, and Bendix Corporation. It was expected that a letter of intent would be issued to the successful bidder once the U.S. and Japan had completed negotiation of a government-to-government note clearly delineating the financial and technical assistance the U.S. was to provide for the BADGE project.

Although the U.S. State Department and CHMAAG Japan worked diligently, they did not meet the target date of October 1964 for completing negotiations of the government-to-government note and deciding upon the amount of technical assistance to be provided. Therefore, the contract to Hughes for the basic BADGE System could not be negotiated. Some areas which had not been agreed upon were, method of payment, flow back of technical information, and status of contractor personnel.

The Japanese delayed matters considerably by questioning in the most minute detail the terms of the Technical Agreement, which had been prepared by the U.S. Air Force. Representatives of the Japanese government finally signed the Technical Agreement and exchanged government-to-government notes with the U.S. on 4 December.

The planned completion date for the BADGE project was March 1968.

1. CHMAAG Japan 140720Z Jul 1964 (C)
2. CHMAAG Japan 040722Z Dec 1964 (C)
3. CHMAAG Japan 230722Z Oct 1964 (C)
BADGE Technical Support Team: OSD, in July, advised CINC PAC that there was a requirement for $256,000 to support a Basic Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) Support Team and asked if CINC PAC had included this amount in the FY65 MAP for Japan.  

CINC PAC informed OSD that $14.0 million was programmed in the FY65 MAP for Japan as the U.S. share of the BADGE system and that no part of this amount was specifically identified as being for any particular item. CINC PAC recommended that if any portion of the $14.0 million was to be reserved for a particular requirement this fact should be made part of the BADGE Technical Agreement so the Japanese would clearly understand that total U.S. support would have to be within the $14.0 million figure.

The U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff did not agree with CINC PAC's position and stated that the support team was in fact U.S. advisory personnel. He implied that this was, therefore, routine technical assistance which was normally funded through the MAP Administrative Account. Upon a CINC PAC request for clarification of his statement, Chief of Staff, Air Force replied that there were no funds available from DOD for the Support Team and that the USAF would underwrite the provision of such funds from sources to be determined in coordination with OSD.

Military Assistance Sale of E2A and C2A Aircraft to Japan: The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA), which had periodically considered the procurement of E2A (Early Warning Aircraft) as an extension to their low altitude off-shore radar coverage, revived this subject in 1964. 

Chief MAAG Japan advised CINC PAC that the JDA showed strong interest in the E2A and C2A companion aircraft as follow-on replacements for the C-46. CINC PAC was asked for technical information on

1. OSD DEF 978675 DTG 212341Z Jul 1964 (S)
2. ADMINO CINC PAC 310536Z Jul 1964 (C)
3. CSAF AFSMSA 67656 DTG 271630Z Aug 1964 (C)
4. CINC PAC 170140Z Sep 1964 (C)
5. CSAF SAF-RR 76143 DTG 252355Z Sep 1964 (C)
6. CHMAAG Japan 050720Z Jun 1964 (C)
the two types of aircraft and whether or not they were available through Military Assistance Sales channels. ¹

Sale of F-102 Aircraft to Japan: Under Project CLEARWATER three F-102 fighter interceptor squadrons were to be returned to CONUS by July 1965. ² The U.S. Embassy in Japan, in December 1963 voiced concern about the Japanese reaction to such a move and the Secretary of State suggested that the U.S. assist Japan in the assumption of full responsibility for Air Defense by offering to sell them the aircraft of the three squadrons of F-102s that were scheduled for return to the U.S. ³, ⁴

To assist MAAG Japan in negotiations with the Japanese Defense Agency on the sale, CINCPAC obtained F-102 technical data from CSAF. ⁵, ⁶ CSAF advised that in order to deliver the F-102s to Japan in "as is" condition it would be necessary to obtain release authority on the classified equipment that was installed in the aircraft and the final offer to Japan was contingent upon obtaining this authority. Later the CSAF stated that Japan would have to confirm their intentions by 1 April 1964 in regards to buying the aircraft of the first squadron to be removed, since the withdrawal date for this squadron was fast approaching. ⁷

CINCPAC and CHMAAG Japan questioned the consistency of the Air Force on this matter since CSAF had not obtained the classified equipment release which would allow MAAG to go ahead with their negotiations to meet the 1 April deadline. ⁸, ⁹ Subsequently the American Embassy, Japan advised that during the fifth meeting of the Defense Study Group held on 10 April, the Chief Defense Bureau, ⁴

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1. CHMAAG Japan 220722Z Sep 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC 270125Z Sep 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 274
4. TOKYO 1658 to STATE, Dec 1963 (S)
5. STATE 1538 to TOKYO, Dec 1963 (S)
6. CINCPAC 142155Z Feb 1964 (S)
7. CSAF 94866 DTG 202347Z Feb 1964 (S)
8. CSAF 96652 DTG 281725Z Feb 1964 (S)
9. CINCPAC 042126Z Mar 1964 (S)
Japanese Defense Agency had informed the U.S. representatives that it was impossible to give the U.S. an answer regarding purchase of the first squadron scheduled for rotation. Therefore, he recommended that the U.S. proceed with plans to withdraw these aircraft.¹

**Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM) in Japan:** In 1963 the CHMAAG Japan advised CINCPAC that approximately $600,000 in equipment for the first Nike Battalion in Japan could be recouped if the system was redesigned from its current semi-mobile configuration to a fixed installation. This was possible because the battalion was already deployed as a fixed installation and the mobile equipment was in storage. The MAAG indicated that $700,000 would be saved on the planned second Nike battalion, if the recommended configuration was adopted, and requested approval to negotiate with the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) in an attempt to sell them on the proposal.²

CINCPAC obtained authority to negotiate from OSD, and CHMAAG Japan held discussions with the JDA.³-⁵

- After numerous exchanges of letters with the JDA; Chief MAAG Japan advised CINCPAC that the JDA still desired to retain the semi-mobile capability for all Nike Battalions.⁶
- CINCPAC informed Chief MAAG Japan that the U.S. had no recourse but to go along with the JDA's desire in the matter and that no further action should be taken to change the configuration of the Japanese Nike Battalions.⁷

In May, Chief MAAG Japan informed CINCPAC that the Japanese Defense Agency had taken a firm stand for the 2nd Japanese Nike battalion to occupy sites which Chief MAAG considered tactically unsatisfactory.⁸ He requested guidance as to whether to accept these sites or to continue negotiations in the face of the Japanese position.

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1. TOKYO 3050 to STATE, Apr 1964 (S)
2. CHMAAG Japan 130722Z Sep 1963 (C)
3. CINCPAC 202329Z Sep 1963 (C)
4. OSD DEF 938823 DTG 012148Z Oct 1963 (C)
5. CINCPAC 060300Z Mar 1964 (C)
6. CHMAAG Japan ltr ser 0122, 25 Feb 1964 (C)
7. CINCPAC 060300Z Mar 1964 (C)
8. CHMAAG Japan ltr 0312, 21 May 1964 (C)
that alternative sites were unobtainable for political reasons. At CINCPAC's request CINCUSARPAC sent a team to Japan which evaluated the sites and reported that they were unsatisfactory because of excessive radar mask, but recommended that they be accepted as "temporary sites." CINCUSARPAC approved the report and recommended to CINCPAC that the Japanese be urged to select permanent sites by FY66.

Debriefing Report of Chief MAAG Japan: In mid-April Brigadier General J. W. Worthington, the Chief MAAG Japan who was to be replaced later that month by Rear Admiral G. R. Luker, sent to CINCPAC a summation of the MAAG's accomplishments during his two year tenure. The essential features of this summation are included as Appendix G of this Command History.

In addition, General Worthington gave CINCPAC his capsule opinion of the value of the MAAG and its relation with the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA). He stated that there had been minor problems in working with the JDA, but "the main problem which the JDA could not control was the lack of a budget which would enable it to modernize and support even a modest military establishment. Although the JDA had been reluctant to accept the fact that MAP for Japan was virtually dead and continued to seek revival of certain programs, it was not as quick as it had formerly been to seek MAAG assistance and advice. In the two years of General Worthington's tenure MAAG Japan had undergone numerous manpower surveys and studies, some of which had proposed eliminating or phasing out the MAAG. General Worthington pointed out that the MAAG was very inexpensive to operate since it was funded with contributed currency and the MAAG could achieve many objectives of significant importance to the U.S., such as force evaluation, at a relatively small cost. Therefore it was his belief that it would be worthwhile for the U.S. to keep its "foot in

1. CINCPAC 160346Z Jun 1964 (C)
2. CHMAAG Japan 170724Z Jul 1964 (C)
3. CINCUSARPAC ARP 11161 DTG 230009Z Jul 1964 (C)
the door, "not only for as long as the Japanese were willing to pay to keep it there, but as long as U.S. interests continued to be served by the influence that the MAAG could bring to bear on the Japanese military."

Korea

In 1964, U.S. military assistance to the Republic of Korea was designed to assist in the achievement of objectives as follows:

1. Maintenance and improvement of large, powerful ROK forces which, taking into account the role of U.S. forces under current plans, were capable of: maintaining internal security; deterring overt communist attack; defending against attack if short of a full-scale communist attack; assisting U.S. forces in the event of general war.

2. Maintenance of a climate in which the U.S. would continue to enjoy existing and, if required, additional over-flight, staging and base rights.

3. Expanded participation by the ROK Armed Forces in projects which contributed to economic and social development while not materially impairing performance of their primary military mission.

Military assistance was planned and programmed in accordance with the following CINCPAC guidance:

1. The transfer under the MAP Transfer Program of commercial consumables and related items, including POL, was to be completed no later than FY70.

2. The defense budget of the ROK was to be held at about 22 billion Won, except that the ceiling was to be adjusted to allow for price increases affecting defense costs, cost-of-living pay adjustments, and the amount of the MAP Transfer Program.

3. U.S. Defense Budget Support was to be planned at approximately two-thirds of the ROK defense budget.

1. CHMAAG Japan ltr CM 0022 subj: Debriefing Report of Chief MAAG Japan, 13 Apr 1964 (U)
4. The expansion and improvement of light industry in Korea would enable the ROK to assume a progressively greater responsibility for providing commercial-type items and light military hardware for its armed forces from its own economy.

5. The ASW and mine warfare missions of the ROK armed forces were limited to waters contiguous to Korea and military assistance planning and programming in support of these missions would: Provide for the replacement and/or modernization of existing ships; provide equipment and training tailored to complement Seventh Fleet missions; provide equipment which was within the technical capability of the ROK Armed Forces to employ effectively.

CINCPAC conducted reviews of the Korea FY65-69 MAP in April and August and added a proposed plan for FY70 during the second review. OSD dollar guidelines for this period were as follows:

($ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY65</th>
<th>FY66</th>
<th>FY67</th>
<th>FY68</th>
<th>FY69</th>
<th>FY70</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
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<td>123.0</td>
<td>130.0</td>
<td>129.0</td>
<td>126.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*PACOM ADD</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>145.8</td>
<td>115.8</td>
<td>126.2</td>
<td>134.5</td>
<td>134.4</td>
<td>132.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Dollars added from the PACOM Regional Account.

CINCPAC's recommended FY65-66 programs for Korea contained investment items amounting to $35.6 and $14.2 million respectively. Major items in these programs are reflected in the chart below.

Program Highlights ($ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY65</th>
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<tr>
<td>AIR &amp; MISSILE DEFENSE FORCES</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC&amp;W Manual System</td>
<td>$2.2</td>
<td>$1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nike Bns (1) &amp; HAWK Bns (2)</td>
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Page 190 of 495 Pages
(cont'd)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES</th>
<th>FY65 Qty</th>
<th>FY65 Cost</th>
<th>FY66 Qty</th>
<th>FY66 Cost</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton Prime Movers</td>
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<td>$1.5</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>$.5</td>
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<td>3.4</td>
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<td>AIR &amp; SEALIFT FORCES</td>
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<td>C-46D Transport Aircraft</td>
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<td>GENERAL SUPPORT</td>
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<td>TAEGU Runway Repair</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>.6</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Programming and Deployment of Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Units - Korea: During 1964 one and one-half U.S. Nike Hercules and four U.S. HAWK battalions were operational in Korea. In addition, two Nike Hercules and three HAWK battalions were programmed for delivery to the ROKA during the period FY65-68. A total objective of ten and one-half battalions was strongly supported by CINCUSARPAC, CINCPAC, and JCS as a high priority requirement. Approximately $95 million in Military Assistance for FY64 and prior years had been funded for ROKA SAM to meet this objective. The SAM program’s high cost to MAP, together with its generation of future overhaul and maintenance costs and doubtful ROK competence to man and operate this sophisticated equipment, had disturbed COMUSKOREA for several years. Annually decreasing Korea MAP dollar ceilings.
prompted efforts by COMUSKOREA to alter the SAM objective.

In November 1963 COMUSKOREA recommended to CINCPAC that the program for providing five surface-to-air battalions to the ROK be cancelled and that the ROK forces take over the equipment of the five and one-half U.S. SAM battalions then existing in Korea. Surface-to-air missile training and the construction of one Nike and three HAWK sites would be kept in the program. As part of the proposal, four SAM batteries would be relocated to the Pusan area to provide defense of the Pusan logistic complex.

CINCPAC requested that COMUSKOREA submit additional details on possible MAP savings, considering the risk involved in reducing air defense for Korea. The resulting justification was reviewed by CINCPAC in coordination with CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF. The reviewers recognized that decreasing MAP dollar ceilings were creating a critical situation as far as being able to adhere to established ROK force objectives was concerned. However, COMUSKOREA's proposal did not provide any savings in MAP funds although U.S. Army costs would be reduced. The critical deficiency in air defense was aggravated by severe reductions of USAF fighter strength through CLEARWATER actions. This, together with cancellation of programmed modernization of ROKAF all weather fighter capabilities and semi-automation of the AC&W system in Korea, weighed against reducing programmed U.S./ROK SAM force levels by five battalions. For these reasons, on 27 March, CINCPAC disapproved COMUSKOREA's proposal.

In April CINCPAC queried OSD as to the possibility of recoupment of FY64 and prior funds programmed for Korea surface-to-air missiles and as to the effect on future MAP ceilings in the event one or more ROK SAM battalions were eliminated. In reply OSD stated that little if any recoupment of funds would accrue if Korea SAM

1. COMUSKOREA ltr ser 482-63, 24 Nov 1963 (TS)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 000113-64, 27 Mar 1964 (TS)
3. COMUSKOREA ltr ser 0048-64, 14 Feb 1964
4. CINCPAC 080046Z Apr 1964 (S)
battalions were eliminated. OSD gave no assurance that FY65-69 ceilings would not be lowered as a direct result of any successful efforts to eliminate SAM battalions.¹

CINCPAC then offered COMUSKOREA alternatives for reduction of one Nike, one HAWK, or one Nike and one HAWK battalions.² COMUSKOREA, introducing a new alternative, preferred to eliminate one Nike and two HAWK battalions.³ COMUSKOREA visualized dollar savings to the FY65-69 MAP of as much as $22.3 million if his preference were adopted. He felt these funds might become available to use for high priority equipment other than surface-to-air missiles and stated that even if no savings accrued, ROKA SAM force objectives should be reduced in order to limit future overhaul and maintenance costs and to make force objectives compatible with the ROK capability. CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF recommended that no reductions be made but voted for various combinations of reductions so their ballots could be considered if the decision was made to reduce.⁴,⁵

CINCPAC selected the alternative of reducing ROKA SAM objectives by one Nike and one HAWK battalion and made his recommendation to OSD.⁶ OSD approved CINCPAC’s recommendation and COMUSKOREA was informed of the reduction of Korea SAM objectives to eight and one-half battalions of which only one Nike and two HAWKs were yet to be delivered.⁷,⁸

In September the programming figure for the FY65 Korea MAP was cut from $132 million to $114 million. This prompted COMUSKOREA to recommend deletion of an additional Nike and an additional HAWK battalion. CINCPAC informed OSD of his concurrence with the recommendation.⁹

1. OSD 250132Z Apr 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 042116Z May 1964 (S)
3. COMUSKOREA 260215Z May 1964 (S)
4. CINCUSARPAC 282136Z May 1964 (S)
5. CINCPACAF 282045Z May 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC 292129Z May 1964 (S)
7. OSD DEF 973371 DTG 130040Z Jun 1964 (S)
8. CINCPAC 160211Z Jun 1964 (S)
9. CINCPAC 200234Z Oct 1964 (S)
The Secretary of Defense asked CINCPAC to reconsider in view of the following: high priority of air defense for Korea; a possible upward adjustment in the FY65 ROK MAP; only $1.7 million per year requirement for support of the battalions; the Nike battalions being already in CONUS training; and problems of disposition and storage of equipment already purchased by MAP which would be made surplus by deletion of an additional two battalions.¹ At first CINCPAC adhered to his recommendation but then the JCS also asked him to reconsider.² The JCS request was based on the favorable outlook of a FY66 budget of $150 million for Korea. CINCPAC withdrew his request that two additional battalions be deleted, "under the supposition that future year ceilings will be at the FY66 level."

**Petroleum Operating Agreement - Korea:** In 1955 a Petroleum Operating Agreement was signed by the U.S., Republic of Korea, and Korea Oil Storage Company (KOSCO - a corporation formed by Esso, Caltex and Shell). Under its provisions U.S. AID-financed POL was delivered through the U.S. military POL system, to KOSCO to meet ROK civil requirements. Further, KOSCO operated certain POL facilities to receive, store and distribute POL to the ROK civil economy via agent dealers in accordance with a program established by the ROK Government.³

The above agreement proved workable but it did not anticipate the establishment of a Korean owned POL refinery in the ROK. The Korean Oil Corporation (KOCO) built such a refinery at Ulsan, Korea with an estimated production, by 1 April 1964, of 21,000 barrels of crude oil per day and a design capacity for refining 35,000 barrels per day. This prompted ROK officials to request termination of the 1955 agreement and transfer of facilities being operated by KOSCO to KOCO.³

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1. OSD DEF 001837 DTG 131821Z Nov 1964 (S)
2. JCS 002635 DTG 051547Z Dec 1964 (S)
3. AMEMB SEOUL A-353, 1 Nov 1963 (C)
Accordingly, the U. S. and ROK began negotiating a new Petroleum Operating Agreement (POA). A U. S. version was drafted by the Country Team in Korea and approved by the State Department for negotiation. Essentially, it contained safeguards deemed necessary by COMUS Korea with respect to KOCO POL products, facilities, and operations. Some of these safeguards were the following:

1. That representatives of the Commander of United States Force Korea would have rights of access and inspection with respect to facilities for the handling, storage, and distribution of petroleum products within the territory of the Republic of Korea. The purpose being to determine the role of these facilities in defensive planning.

2. In the event the Commander of U. S. Forces in Korea declared a state of emergency with respect to the availability to his command of petroleum products or facilities, the ROK would provide such of these as the Commander of U. S. Forces considered necessary to resolve the emergency.

3. The ROK to guarantee the U. S. off-loading and storage space.

4. The Commander of U. S. Forces, Korea would notify the ROK Government of required minimum petroleum stocks to be held as defense reserves; to be held at the expense of the ROK and within geographical areas designated by the Commander of U. S. Forces, Korea.

In February 1964, CINCPAC was advised of a Washington decision to the effect that:

1. Supply of ROK civil requirements, except aviation gasoline, from the U.S. military supply system would be discontinued effective 1 April 1964 and the KOCO Refinery would supply commercial grade motor gasoline and diesel fuel to the civil economy.

2. The supply of U. S., UN, and ROK Forces (MAP) requirements from the U.S. military system would remain unchanged for the time being.

1. AMEMB SEOUL A-558, 6 Feb 1964 (C)
2. SEOUL 930 to STATE, 16 Jan 1964, 7PM (C)
3. STATE 793 to SEOUL, 6 Mar 1964, 1PM (C)
4. COUSAPC SSMPC-CI46 DTG 141835Z Feb 1964 (C)
As a result of this decision, CINCPAC notified subordinate unified commanders to adjust their petroleum plans accordingly and told CINCUSARPAC to initiate action to receive, store, and outload, at the Inchon POL terminal, KOCO owned POL destined for the civil economy in the Seoul area.¹

In anticipation of possible additional POL actions, as a result of the existence of the refinery at Ulsan, the JCS asked CINCPAC for comments to be used as input to a JCS paper which was being prepared for OASD/ISA.² CINCPAC was asked his views regarding the main military and logistical factors which should be weighed before any steps were taken to drop POL for ROK forces from the MAP and/or procure POL for U.S. forces from the Ulsan refinery as a means of assisting the Korean economy. (³)

CINCPAC replied that either solution would diminish the influence that the Commander of U.S. Forces, Korea was able to exert over ROK forces through this commodity and would possibly have an adverse effect on existing favorable contractual arrangements. However, CINCPAC concluded that the contribution an in-country POL system would make to the economic viability plus the improvement in overall emergency military POL capability, were over-riding advantages of either of the above proposals.³ CINCPAC views on this subject were incorporated into the JCS paper, which was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. However, DOD advised U.S. AID that DOD was not anxious to shift procurement of U.S. and UN (other than ROK) POL requirements in Korea to the KOCO Refinery. Department of Defense proposed that ROK MAP POL be shifted to the ROK military budget beginning in FY65. This would permit procurement of ROK military POL from the KOCO Refinery.⁴

In May, U.S. Ambassador to Korea, Berger and the ROK Minister of Commerce and Industry signed a new Petroleum Operating

1. CINCPAC 210330Z Feb 1964 (C)
2. JCS 5051 DTG 262235Z Feb 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 042355Z Mar 1964 (C)
4. JCS 1741/162-2, 1 Apr 1964 (S)
Agreement which shifted supply of POL for ROK civil requirements to KOCO.\(^1\) In the meantime, during April, the Ulsan Refinery began producing and supplying the ROK civil economy requirements.

Near the end of the year CINCPAC received word from the Secretary of State that a decision had been made, dependent upon competitive prices, to begin supplying ROK MAP POL from the Ulsan refinery in the first quarter of 1965.\(^2\) Incremental transfer of funding from MAP to the ROK Government would begin in January 1966 and be completed at the end of Fiscal Year 1968.

After transfer of MAP requirements to the Ulsan refinery, the U.S. terminals in Japan would supply only U.S. and United Nations (other than Korea) Forces requirements in Korea. The tanker ships (T-AOGs) used to shuttle oil products from Japan had a greater capacity than was needed to fill this requirement. All of the ships were retained, however, to meet wartime requirements.\(^3,4\)

A graphic illustration of major POL installations in South Korea and a map depicting location of the Ulsan refinery are found at figures II-8 and II-9.

**Republic of Korea Civic Action Program (ROKCAP):** Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) was administered by the U.S. Armed Forces to promote and maintain good relations with the Korean people. This program was established in 1953, using the great stocks of military construction materials which were made surplus by the end of hostilities. Successful implementation led to its continuation through funding support provided on a yearly basis starting in 1954. The second U.S. aid program for Korea, Republic of Korea Civic Action Program (ROKCAP), employed ROK forces in civic action activities, as authorized by CINCUNC, and received U.S. supplemental support through MAP and AID funds.

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1. SEOUL 1464 to STATE, 13 May 1964 (U)
2. SECSTATE 556 to SEOUL, 23 Dec 1964, 7PM (S)
3. CINCPACFLT 120602Z Dec 1964 (S)
4. COMSTS 142004Z Dec 1964 (C)
In 1963, State, DOD, and AID jointly directed that a project totaling $500,000, entitled Civic Action, be included in the Korean MAP submission for FY64. Additional Washington guidance, however, caused the Country Team to prepare a breakout of funds for Civic Action of which $401,000 was to come from AID and only $93,000 from MAP. The Country Team did not consider this breakout to be realistic and recommended that an appropriate funding determination for MAP and AID funds be made by AID and DOD. CINCPAC, in December of 1963, pointed out to DOD that, in view of Korea MAP reductions at that time, the MAP share of Civic Action and Armed Forces Aid to Korea should not exceed $500,000.

State, AID, and DOD then realigned the FY64 funding for Civic Action and Armed Forces Aid to Korea as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KOREA</th>
<th>AID</th>
<th>MAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Action</td>
<td>$308,000</td>
<td>$93,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFAK</td>
<td>$308,000</td>
<td>376,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$308,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$469,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Armed Forces Aid to Korea funding for FY65 and beyond was to be accomplished as part of U.S. Military Service budgets.

In September CINCPAC received new guidance from OSD concerning funding for AFAK projects. This guidance allowed funding by AID or MAP of priority economic and social programs. Also AFAK programs that were not in these categories might, in some specific cases in which appropriate military purposes were served, be considered for MAP funding.

If, under the existing or possible future ceilings, the Country Team desired to submit an AFAK program (under MAP), it would have to be submitted as a deviation action to the FY65-70 MA Plan/

1. OSD DEF 926629 DTG 042242Z Apr 1963 (C)
2. OSD DEF 931056 DTG 020052Z Aug 1963 (C)
3. CINCPAC 240234Z Dec 1963 (C)
4. STATE 879 to SEOUL, 31 Jan 1964, 7PM (C)
5. OSD DEF 8372 DIG 050041Z Sep 1964 (C)
Program. The Korea Country Team was expected to indicate the status of a possible submission by February 1965.\(^1\) (C)

Supply of ROK Shortages Under Wartime Conditions: In April CINCPAC received a communication from CG EUSA via CINCUSARPAC which expressed concern over an apparent inability of the ROK Army to perform adequately in combat unless major materiel requirements were filled from Eighth Army assets. CG EUSA recommended that certain ROK Army shortages be programmed for airlift arrival in Korea by D plus 5 and that other items be programmed for fast surface lift to arrive by D plus 15 or shortly thereafter.

The airlift recommended by CG EUSA called for approximately 2,165 short tons of materiel to be delivered to the ROK Army by D plus 5. The sealift D plus 15 requirement came to approximately 150,000 short tons. The size of the airlift could quickly be imagined by looking at one line item which contained 175 105mm Howitzers; the sea lift required approximately 45 ships.

CINCPAC was surprised by the combined magnitude and urgency of the requirements that CG EUSA had listed in enclosures to his communication which, if validated, appeared to be such as to render CINCPAC OPLAN 27-64 (Defense of Korea) logistically unfeasible. CG EUSA's listings were not in consonance with his recent letter to General Taylor (Chairman JCS) which indicated that the ROK Armed Forces were in generally good shape, although CG EUSA forecast a steady deterioration in combat effectiveness under prospective funding programs.\(^2\) Nor were the listings in consonance with a PROVMAG Korea letter which stated: "Except for certain categories of equipment, primarily communications and engineer, the major active combat units of the ROK Army are equipped to the extent that they should be able to accomplish their assigned mission."

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1. COMUSKOREA UK 50909 DTG 1904492 Dec 1964 (U)
2. General Howze ltr to General Taylor, 2 Apr 1964 (S)
Because transportation at the time of an emergency would be tied up with deployment and resupply movements, these additional shipments were virtual impossibilities. It appeared that the only alternative to satisfy the requirements would be for DA to preposition stocks in WESTPAC and, although CINCPAC was not in a position to evaluate DA's capability to do this, it seemed unlikely that the capability existed.

CINCPAC returned the CG EUSA letter to CINCUSARPAC for further study and reevaluation. 1 CINCPAC stated that before serious consideration was given to the CG EUSA requirement, an extremely critical evaluation should be made of ROK Army capabilities to receive and effectively employ, during initial stages of OPLAN 27-64 action, the items and quantities asked for. CINCPAC thought it likely that the ROK Army would have to fight during the initial stages of limited war with equipment and supplies on hand and that the first massive resupply which could be expected would be shipments under DA plan QUICK TRIP.

Cannibalization of WWII Vehicles: In April CINCUSARPAC recommended that 4,000 WWII vehicles, the bulk of which were in Korea, be shipped to the Republic of China (ROC) for cannibalization. 2 Alternate CINCUSARPAC recommendations were to cannibalize the vehicles in Korea or at the U.S. Army Logistics Center Japan (USALCJ). Under the alternate solutions, CINCUSARPAC recommended that after cannibalization the resulting parts and assemblies should be shipped to ROC. 3 CINCPAC disapproved shipment of the vehicles to the ROC for cannibalization because of the undesirability of introducing more WWII end items into that country. 3 Because a relatively large direct cost to MAP would occur if the cannibalization took place in Japan, this solution was also discounted. 4

CINCPAC felt that the best course of action would be to take the vehicles apart in Korea, under COMUS Korea direction and using either

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00585, 27 Apr 1964 (S)
2. CINCUSARPAC ltr GPPSU-MA subj: China WWII Vehicle Life-of-Type Repair Parts Requirements, 2 Apr 1964 (U)
3. CINCPAC 232134Z Apr 1964 (C)
ROK Army labor or "assistance in kind" obtained from the Republic of Korea. CINCPAC requested CINCUSARPAC to proceed with this course of action. CINCPAC directed that first priority for the reclaimed parts and assemblies would be to meet known and anticipated PACOM requirements other than the ROC requirement. Requirements under the first priority were to be shipped to USALCJ for storage and issue as needed. Second priority was to the ROC; parts and assemblies were to be shipped there directly from Korea. Third priority was to meet world-wide requirements as determined by the CG U.S. Army Materiel Command. To extent possible, shipment would be from Korea directly to the customer without processing through USALCJ.

Philippines

In 1964 military assistance for the Philippines was designed to assist in the achievement of the following objectives:

1. Development and maintenance of balanced military and paramilitary forces progressively better equipped, trained and motivated to prevent or defeat communist insurgencies without direct intervention by U.S. or other free world forces and to provide conditions of internal stability and security within which democratic institutions and procedures could be strengthened.

2. Development and maintenance of forces prepared to offer sufficient defensive strength to compel any external attack to be of an unambiguous magnitude and character. To hold areas essential to the continuation of national resistance and points of ingress for U.S. forces. To complement U.S. operations during and after such phases, and to assume a vigorous guerrilla role as required.

3. Development on a high priority basis of facilities useful both for local military purposes and for introducing and supporting operations by U.S. and/or Allied forces consistent with U.S. /SEATO contingency planning.

4. Expanded contribution to economic and social development by the Armed Forces through civic action as an indispensable means of strengthening the economic base and establishing closer links between the forces and the populace.
PHILIPPINES

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1964

**BASIC INFORMATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (sq. mi.)</th>
<th>115,000</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>30 million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual Growth</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>Rice Yiel</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arable Land Per Capita (acres)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>55 years</td>
<td>Gross National Product (GNP)</td>
<td>$3.8 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definate Budget (Self Financed) FY1963</td>
<td>576.4 million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of GNPI</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>As % of Self</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OVERALL OBJECTIVE**

To increase the efficiency of the Philippine armed forces, to encourage Philippine military support of U.S. forces; and to maintain U.S. operated military installations in the Philippines.

**U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION**

U.S. Ambassador: Mr. W. H. Blair

**MAP OBJECTIVE**

General objectives are:

1. To develop and maintain balanced military and paramilitary forces equipped, trained and motivated to prevent or deter Communist incursions without direct intervention by U.S. or other free world forces;
2. To provide continuous training in stabilization and security within which democratic institutions and relations can be strengthened;
3. To maintain a military capability adequate to secure national defense, to keep open areas essential to national resistance and to defend U.S. forces in conflict;
4. To develop and maintain a coordinated relationship between the forces and the Philippine government;
5. To train and organize units for deployment in the United States and other areas in accordance with U.S. guidelines.

**MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES**

**TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES**

**COMBAT CAPABILITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Infantry Div, 1 Spec Forces Co</td>
<td>2 FR, 12 FR, 12 Fr, 1 FR, 11 Can, 2 MIL, 2 MIL, 2 MIL</td>
<td>2 Tactical Fighter Sqn, 2 Transport Sqn, 1 AWR, 1 ASB, 1 Composite RCH Sqn, 1 Composite SAR Sqn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Artillery Bn, 1 Spec Forces Co</td>
<td>1 Spec Forces Co</td>
<td>2 AWR, 1 ASB, 1 Composite SAR Sqn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Spec Forces Co</td>
<td>2 ASB, 1 Composite SAR Sqn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Maintains internal security, offers limited resistance to external attack and contributes to collective defense | Conduct limited off shore patrol & minor amphibious and ash operations | Limited capability to fulfill mission of assist arm to maintain internal security & contribute to defense against external attack |

**U.S. AID DIRECTOR**

Mr. James H. Ingalls

**CHIEF, DIPLOMATIC MISSION**

Mr. James H. Ingalls
5. Development of forces deployable within the SEATO area for mutual defense tasks.

6. Continued availability to the U.S. of bases and operational rights.¹

CINCPAC directed that military assistance to the Philippines be planned and programmed so as to exert leverage to induce the Philippine Government to increase support of its armed forces to meet essential readiness standards. Further, CINCPAC wished to place continued emphasis on development of at least one Battalion Combat Team for SEATO employment, and to design military assistance so as to encourage effective implementation of the Philippine Army reorganization plan of 1963.²

After a second review of the Philippines MA Plan/Program, completed in August, the CINCPAC recommended MAP appeared as follows:

($ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY65</th>
<th>FY66</th>
<th>FY67</th>
<th>FY68</th>
<th>FY69</th>
<th>FY70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The FY65 Program completed the equipping of one F-5 Squadron (10 aircraft), provided two amphibious U-17 aircraft for the Philippine Navy, and provided funds for the Army to continue the installation of equipment for Long Lines communications which were planned for completion from funds in the FY66 Program. Operating costs in the FY65 Program were: Army - tool kits, ammunition, follow-on-spare parts, technical assistance and training to support forces in being ($2.1 million); Navy - two LST overhauls, one LSM overhaul, one APD overhaul and modification, ships spares, technical assistance and training $5.0 million); Air Force - aircraft spares, overhauls, technical assistance, modifications and training ($4.5 million).

¹. CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual, Revision 1-4, p. 1, Chap VII, 6 Jun 1964 (S)
². CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 133
Mactan Air Base: In January 1964 Chief JUSMAG Philippines informed CINCPAC that the General Accounting Office (GAO) was pressuring him to defend past expenditures and to justify projected future facilities at Mactan Air Base.\(^1\) The GAO had previously, in 1962, looked at Mactan Air Base with a critical eye.

CINCPAC, in reply, reviewed the history of Mactan Air Base and pointed out that it was initially conceived as an alternate for Manila in support of Philippine commercial aviation and to promote economic development in the Cebu area but that it had developed into a dual commercial-military facility.\(^2\) CINCPAC emphasized the fact that major expenditures on the base had been non-MAP. AID expenditures through FY62 had been close to $10 million and the FY63 and FY64-69 AID construction programs were $120,000 and $950,000 respectively. In comparison, MAP expenditures were: FY59 - $180,000, FY62 - $60,000, FY63 - $41,900, and FY64 - $44,222. The MAP funds had been used for construction materials, navigational aids, communications equipment and a jet arrester barrier. JCS views on operational use of Mactan Air Base were contained in the U.S. Base Requirements Overseas document.\(^3\)

CINCPAC advised Chief JUSMAG Philippines that, since the air base was developed as a joint Philippine Civilian-Military facility to be constructed with economic assistance funds, most GAO inquiries should be directed to the American Embassy, Manila.

Salvage of RAJAH SOLIMAN: The Republic of Philippines ship RAJAH SOLIMAN RPS-66 (Ex U.S. APD-40) was sunk in Manila Harbor during typhoon Winnie on 29 June 1964. The Philippine Navy attempted to refloat and salvage the ship but, after unsuccessful tries, asked for U.S. assistance.

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1. CHJUSMAG PHIL 230754Z Jan 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC 140346Z Feb 1964 (S)
3. JCS 570/574, 24 Jun 1963 (TS)
Chief JUSMAGPHIL surveyed damage to the ship and evaluated the cost of refloating and repair. He recommended that no MAP funds be expended for these purposes, but that it be returned to U.S. custody and sold for scrap in "as is" condition. 1 CINCPAC concurred but also approved a CINCPACFLT request to undertake salvage operations as a training project for the U.S. Fleet Salvage Forces. 2-4 Of course CINCPAC's approval was contingent upon return of the ship to U.S. custody and the granting of appropriate clearances by the Philippine Government.

CINCPACFLT established the tentative lift date as 15 January 1965 and requested that negotiations be undertaken for use of a British Royal Navy lift craft, located at Singapore, once the RAJAH SOLIMAN had been released. 5 It was expected that the cost of refloating would be more than offset by the invaluable salvage training and the increased valuation of a "floating hulk." 6

On 8 December the U.S. received a document declaring the RAJAH SOLIMAN excess to the needs of the Republic of Philippines. 6 JUSMAGPHIL cautioned that physical custody and title transfer should be accomplished prior to commencement of salvage operations. (C)

At the end of 1964 CINCPAC was evaluating plans whereby the RAJAH SOLIMAN would be replaced by a diesel driven Escort Ship (DE) programmed in FY65 and/or FY66 MAP. 7

Republic of China (ROC)

In 1964 the objectives of military assistance to the Republic of China were:

1. The maintenance of a climate in which the U.S.

1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 091424Z Sep 1964 (C)
2. CINCPACFLT 292303Z Sep 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 030448Z Oct 1964 (C)
4. CINCPAC 290456Z Sep 1964 (C)
5. CINCPACFLT 042339Z Dec 1964 (C)
6. CHNAVSEC JUSMAGPHIL 090048Z Dec 1964 (C)
7. CINCPAC 300257Z Dec 1964 (C)
would continue to enjoy existing and, if required, additional
overflight, staging, and base rights.

2. The maintenance and improvement of adequate
forces with an effective defense posture.

3. Expanded participation of the Armed Forces in
projects which contributed to economic and social
development while not materially impairing performance
of the primary military mission.

CINCPAC directed that military assistance be designed to main-
tain the GRC capability to defend Taiwan, the Penghu and the offshore
islands against anything short of a full scale communist attack. ¹

The CINCPAC review of the ROC MAP was completed in April
and, although a second review was made in August, there were no
changes made to the FY65-66 Programs. OSD dollar guidelines were:
FY65 - $97.0 million; FY66 - $76.0 million; FY67 - $92.0 million;
FY68 to FY70 - $95.0 million each year.

Major items in the FY65 and FY66 Programs were as follows:
($ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIR &amp; MISSILE DEFENSE FORCES</th>
<th>FY65</th>
<th>FY66</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>AG&amp;W Improvement</td>
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<td>Military Integrated</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications System</td>
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<td>$.5</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M41 Light Tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC M-113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; How (Towed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm How (SP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna U-17A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engr Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tac Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Navy                    |
| DD (Austere)            | 1    |

¹. CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual, Chap VII, p. 1, 6 Jun 1964 (S)
## Republic of China
### As of 31 December 1964

#### Basic Information
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>14,000 sq. mi.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross National Product (GNP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita</td>
<td>$156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Growth</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>55 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arable Land Per Capita</td>
<td>0.2 acre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Major Force Objectives

**Army**
- 2 Nike DCS, 2 Aardvark, 18 Hawk, 65 FL-208 interpreter, 2 Aardvark C1, 3 Hawk B, 3 Nike, 4 special forces, 2 P-3B Orion, 4 Aardvark, 4 Hawk, 22 Field Artillery, 250 MLRS, 2 Speer, 1 LEAF CoS, 1 reserve MLRS.

**Navy**
- 12 SSKs, 12 Patrol, 40 Frigates, 24 40mm, 230mm ashore, 15 MRL, 15 service, 15 MRL, 15 EML, 3 TANKS.

**Air Force**
- 31 F-104, 19 TFR, 5 TFR, 2 M-19s, 2 M-28s, 1 TAC, 350C, 1 TAC, 160C, 1 TAC, 150C, 1 TAC, 100C, 1 TAC, 50C, 1 TAC, 30C, 1 TAC, 20C, 1 TAC, 10C, 1 TAC, 5C, 1 TAC, 1C.

#### Total Country Forces

- 21 HF DCS, 2 Aardvark, 18 Hawk, 65 FL-208 interpreter, 2 Aardvark C1, 3 Hawk B, 3 Nike, 4 special forces, 2 P-3B Orion, 4 Aardvark, 4 Hawk, 22 Field Artillery, 250 MLRS, 2 Speer, 1 LEAF CoS, 1 reserve MLRS.

#### Combat Capability

- Maintain internal security and conduct effective ground defense of Taiwan, Penghu, and offshore islands.
- The overall ability of the Chinese navy to perform its assigned mission is considered fair. The Chinese marine is considered capable of conducting division-sized amphibious operations provided the required air and naval support are available.

#### Overall Objective

To defend Taiwan and the Penghu from Communist attack and to retain appropriate U.S. base rights on ROC territory.

#### U.S. Diplomatic Mission

- U.S. Ambassador
- U.S. Mission Director
- Chief, MAC

#### Map Objective

- General objectives:
  1. The maintenance and improvement of adequate forces with an effective defense posture.
  2. The maintenance of a buffer in which the U.S. will continue to enjoy existing and, if necessary, additional, overflight, landing, and base rights.
  3. The participation of the armed forces in such a manner as to contribute to economic and social development without impinging upon the primary military mission.
  4. By effective means to lessen existing and potential demands on U.S. combat and support forces in the event of Communist aggression.

- The overall ability of the Chinese navy to perform its assigned mission is considered fair. The Chinese marine is considered capable of conducting division-sized amphibious operations provided the required air and naval support are available.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY65 Qty</th>
<th>FY66 Qty</th>
<th>FY65 Cost</th>
<th>FY66 Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy (cont'd)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD (Austere)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE (220' MSF Conv)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC (New Constr)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/DE ASW Mod</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST Overhaul</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$1.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marines</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>M41 Light Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm How (Towed)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tac Communication Equipment</td>
<td></td>
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<td>$ .2</td>
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<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>F-5A/B</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAM-83 Missiles</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Special Purpose Vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AIRLIFT &amp; SEALIFT FORCES</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>H-43 Helo</td>
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<td><strong>TRAINING</strong></td>
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<td>Army</td>
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<td>$1.0</td>
<td>$ .9</td>
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<td>$.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$1.3</td>
<td>$.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ROC MAP Transfer Program:** For several years prior to 1964, Chief MAAG China had instituted measures designed to reduce the percentage of MAP funds applied towards operating costs. In this regard steps had been taken to eliminate all Commercial Consumable items from the MAP. By FY65 there were only a few Commercial Consumables appearing in the GRC MAP.

In 1964, the State Department proposed guidelines for a China MAP Transfer Program to be effected during the FY65-70 time period.\(^1\) The China Country Team and CINCPAC approved these guidelines and in September the program went into effect.\(^2-4\) Country officials were informed so that they could plan accordingly.

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1. OSD DEF 973357 DTG 130013Z Jun 1964 (S)
2. TAIPEI 26 to STATE, 10 Jul 1964, 7PM (S)
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 180220Z Jul 1964 (S)
4. STATE 175 to AID, 5 Sep 1964, 2PM (C)
Guidelines to be followed in the implementation of this program included authorization of annual MAP Commercial Consumable amounts as follows:

($ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY65</th>
<th>FY66</th>
<th>FY67</th>
<th>FY68</th>
<th>FY69</th>
<th>FY70</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$2.2</td>
<td>$4.4</td>
<td>$3.0</td>
<td>$3.0</td>
<td>$4.0</td>
<td>$5.0</td>
<td>$21.6</td>
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</table>

Republic of China Shipyard Capability: Beginning in FY64 all ship overhauls for ROC Navy units were programmed for ROC shipyards. This new capability caused many program changes that resulted in substantial MAP savings.

Although MAP generally continued to supply critical overhaul materials, the less expensive in-country labor supply resulted in much lower overall job costs. MAAG supervision assured a satisfactory quality of yard work. In FY64 ASW modification and overhauls of DD and DE type ships were being completed at less than half the U.S. shipyard cost. Attrition replacements for DD and DE ships were programmed for about half of their original Military Assistance Sales List cost because in-country shipyards were to activate them. United States yards were scheduled to do only enough work to satisfy safe voyage requirements. The in-country LST construction and rehabilitation program (see below) was another beneficial result of improved ROC shipyards. These programs were making a substantial contribution to ROC naval self-sufficiency and helping the civilian economy.

ROC Construction and Rehabilitation of LSTs: In January CHMAAG China asked for CINCPAC approval to program ROC MAP funds in FY65-69 to support a GRC project to construct its own LSTs. This move was brought about by the impending obsolescence of seven ROC LSTs and the fact that there were no more U.S. LSTs available for MAP.

1. CHMAAG China MGNA 1323 DTG 2703333Z Jan 1964 (S)
2. CNO 052017Z Feb 1964 (S)
CHMAAG China stated that the GRC would finance and build the LSTs but would require MAP to furnish main engines, propellers and shafts, generators, and some ordnance and electrical cables. The 542 Class LST (same as already in-country) best suited the GRC needs.

After obtaining information regarding the cost of parts required and their lead times, CINCPAC informed the Chinese that the China MAP would support, within the framework of declining MAP dollars, an in-country program to either build new LSTs or overhaul old ones.\(^1\) The primary intent of the program was to keep the existing 22 GRC LSTs operational by major in-country overhauls. However, where hulls were found to be deteriorated beyond economical repair, new construction was authorized. Initial estimates put MAP costs, to support equipment not available to the Chinese, at about $350,000 per hull to be overhauled or constructed. The Taiwan-Ingalls civilian shipyard at Keelung was designated to perform the rehabilitation or new construction. MAP dollars, planned in the FY65-69 time period, were expected to provide support for about seven LSTs.

The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, in December, provided the final blessing so the cost-share program for rehabilitation of the aging Chinese LST fleet could get underway.\(^4\) Rehabilitations were to be handled in one of three categories as follows:

1. Overhaul of all equipment and replacement of specific hull deterioration. (cost $250,000)

2. Overhaul of all equipment and replacement of all hull and tank parts below the waterline. (cost $400,000)

3. Overhaul of all equipment, scrapping of old hull, and complete rebuild of new hull. (cost $600,000)

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1. CINCPACFLT 071751Z Feb 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 0351, 8 May 1964 (C)
3. Personal ltr from Admiral Felt to Admiral Ni, CN, 6 May 1964 (U)
4. CNO 172029Z Dec 1964 (C)
Surveys indicated that the second type rehabilitation would be appropriate in most cases. The third type of work, being more expensive, would not be undertaken unless extensive surveys ensured that less drastic action would not be sufficient.

Funds were provided in the FY65 MAP for rehabilitation of about three hulls. Additional funds were programmed for FY66, FY67, and FY69 to complete the project. A special military team of ship hull experts became a part of the China MAAG JTD. They and a U.S. civilian expert had the job of supervising and controlling the progress and quality of work.

This program had the effect of providing a new LST at a cost of less than a million MAP dollars. In comparison, prior LST procurement through MAP had cost over $2 million per ship. The Republic of China was paying for all labor, shipyard support, and materials that could not be provided by the limited MAP funds available.

**ROC Purchase of Old APDs Through Military Assistance Sales (MAS):** The Government of the Republic of China (GRC) announced in late 1964 that it had appropriated funds to finance the purchase of two High Speed Transports (APDs) from the U.S. Reserve Fleet. The GRC also intended to eventually purchase nine more APDs. (C)

This represented a sizeable advance in the use of MAS procedures by the GRC. CINCPAC welcomed the announcement because the purchase represented an addition to Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) Forces not otherwise available through limited MAP funds. Though the ships would require extensive overhaul and modernization prior to commencing fleet operations, this work would be done in Chinese Navy yards. Thus, by the use of in-country facilities, another significant step would be taken towards reducing MAP investment costs. (C)

The cost to the GRC for the APDs was to be $45,000 per ship; the low price, essentially representing their scrap value was possible because the ships did not measure up to U.S. fleet standards. Hulls
and machinery, however, were repairable and China could install some electronic units salvaged from ships being scrapped.

The forthcoming purchase would give China APDs in excess of JSOP Force goals. No decision had been made as of the end of 1964 as to the extent of U.S. support to be given toward the activation and operation costs of those APDs which exceeded force goals. Because destroyer and escort ships available were insufficient to meet GRC force requirements, it seemed that there might be a future readjustment of force objectives to accept APDs in place of destroyers and escort ships previously considered necessary. 1

SAM and AAA Artillery in the Republic of China: Prior to 1963 it was intended that the Air Defense of Taiwan would eventually be handled by two Nike and one HAWK surface-to-air missile (SAM) battalions. One Nike battalion was already operational in the Republic of China during 1963. Due to the limitation of MAP funds in the FY63-64 period, the GRC and U.S. decided to cancel the second Nike battalion. 2

During 1964 the HAWK battalion became operational but the cancellation of the second Nike battalion caused a question to be raised regarding the need for retention of anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) guns on Taiwan. The U.S. MAAG and the GRC both strongly contended that the guns (40mm and 90mm) were necessary for the defense of the southern part of Taiwan, where there were few SAM units.

CINCPAC concurred in the continued need for these weapons for AAA defense and for possible use in coastal defense. CINCPAC agreed to continue support for 25 anti-aircraft battalions (ten 90mm and fifteen 40 mm) through FY70 at which time the question of their continued support would be studied again. 3

1. CHMAAG China MGNA 12-217 DTG 110409Z Dec 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 117
3. CINCPAC 290151Z Feb 1964 (S)
CHAPTER III
CINCPAC ACTIONS CONCERNING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES

CINCPAC, played a significant role in the conduct of United States relations with non-communist foreign governments in the Pacific Command area. Acting through a variety of mediums and at different levels, CINCPAC was frequently in contact with representatives of foreign countries.

This chapter, containing CINCPAC actions concerning relationships between the U.S. and other countries, includes the following sections:

CINCPAC Activities in Support of SEATO
Combined Exercises (Non-SEATO)
Political-Military Activities
Visits in the Pacific Command Area
Weapons Demonstration for Foreign Military Officials

CINCPAC ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF SEATO

On September 8, 1954 representatives of eight nations signed the Pacific Charter and the South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty in Manila. These eight nations were the United States, Britain, France, Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. ¹

The reason for SEATO was well narrated in a speech made at the opening of the Manila Conference by President Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines.

"Ours is a nation whose love of peace and devotion to freedom have been tested by suffering and sacrifice. We want peace because we have borne the cruelties of war. But stronger than our fear is our love of freedom. In the past we have stood up to be counted; in the future we

¹ Those signing for the U.S. were; John Foster Dulles, H. Alexander Smith, Michael J. Mansfield.
propose to do the same. For the present we regard with high hope this conference of like-minded states that are ready to stand up and be counted in the struggle against aggression and tyranny.

"It is the task of this conference to help build an adequate system of defense around an exposed and threatened sector of the free world. On the success of this conference may well depend the peace of Asia in the next ten years and the future of freedom in the world for the next thousand years."

The main features of the 1954 treaty:

1. Armed aggression against any of the signatories or against Cambodia, Laos, or South Vietnam, would be met with action by each party to the treaty "in accordance with its constitutional processes."

2. In case of threats other than armed attack from outside (such as subversion and terrorism) the signatories "shall consult immediately" on measures "for common defense."

3. The signatories shall cooperate in "economic measures and technical assistance" for the promotion of economic and social progress in the treaty area.

4. The U.S., by a special understanding, specified that aggression meant "communist aggression."

5. The Pacific Charter was annexed to the treaty to "promote self-government and secure the independence of all countries who desire it."

In 1964, ten years after the signing of the pact, SEATO had proven itself an effective deterrent to overt aggression in Southeast Asia as well as an instrument of mutual cooperation toward improving cultural and economic interests. CINCPAC, as senior U.S. commander in the Pacific and Military Advisor to SEATO, sought continually to refine and improve the military deterrent provided for by the alliance.

Military Advisors Conference Number 20 (MA20C)

The Military Advisors (MILADs) 20th Conference was held in Manila on 9 and 10 April 1964. Seven agenda items were considered.

1. CINCPAC111100Z Apr 1964 (TS); MILADs for all SEATO nations are listed in Appendix.
UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS
IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND

U.S.-JAPAN
SECURITY TREATY

U.S.-ROK
INITIAL DEFENSE TREATY

U.S.-CHINA
INITIAL DEFENSE TREATY

U.S.-PHILIPPINE
INITIAL DEFENSE TREATY

CINCPAC

SEATO
U.S., UK, FRANCE, AUSTRALIA,
PAKISTAN, NEW ZEALAND,
PHILIPPINES, THAILAND

ANZUS
AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, US
by the MILADs. Some significant aspects of the conference are discussed below.

In accordance with the desires of the MILADs as stated in the 19th Conference, the Chief Military Planning Office (CHMPO) had prepared recommendations for amendments to SEATO plans, facilitating transition from one plan to another. The MILADs agreed with CHMPO recommendations but their discussion on this subject revealed two areas which required considerable debate and exploration.

The first area of concern involved location of the highest SEATO military headquarters. This came up when the Thailand MILAD stated that he had heard a rumor to the effect that the Commander SEATO Field Forces Central Region did not intend to establish his headquarters in Thailand for Plan 4 situations but intended to remain in Saigon at his MACV Headquarters. After considerable discussion, the MILADs agreed to a statement by the U.S. MILAD for insertion in the record. In the statement, Admiral Felt pointed out that there were two major problems to be resolved, namely the location of SEATO Force Headquarters and the location of SEATO Field Forces Headquarters. He stated that when MPO Plans 4, 6, and 7 were developed, there had never been any question that SEATO Force Headquarters would be located anywhere other than in Bangkok. Since Bangkok was the site of the SEATO Council Representatives and Military Planning Office, it followed that SEATO Force Headquarters should remain in Bangkok. With regard to plan 7 and the Field Forces Commander's Headquarters, the U.S. MILAD stated that in his opinion the Headquarters should be in Saigon. He stated that should a Plan 7 situation develop into a Plan 6 and 4 situation, the Field Forces Commander should be prepared to move his headquarters to Thailand in an orderly manner so as not to disrupt the continuity of command. Further, should Plan 6 or 4 be

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 141
2. Plan 4: Defense of Southeast Asia Against Aggression from the DRV or Communist China
implemented without developing from a Plan 7 situation, the Central Region Field Forces Commander's Headquarters should be in Thailand.

The second area of debate was triggered by the MPO transition study which, among other things, concluded that units and supporting units declared to more than one plan should have, so far as possible, the same initial deployment area in each plan. Discussion revolved around that Field Force Commander's Plan which positioned the Commonwealth Brigade in Vietnam for a Plan 7 situation and in Thailand for Plan 4. After considering leaving the decision of positioning to the Field Force Commander it was decided that Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom would consider the alternatives and make a recommendation to the Field Forces Commander. The U.S. MILAD suggested this hoping that with several nations sharing in the decision, an additional force lift load would not be shifted to the U.S.

There was considerable discussion in subcommittee on a U.S. paper concerning Limited Military Intervention. France took the position that the MILAD Intelligence Committee had to assess military threats but that subversion was the province of the International Commission for Supervision and Control. The French interpreted introduction of military cadre and technicians as subversion and only of civilian concern. The U.S. MILAD's representative argued that clear distinctions between insurgency and limited military intervention was difficult and that efforts to make the distinction might restrict the MILAD Intelligence Committee and the SEATO Intelligence Assessment Committee. The French agreed that an enemy course of action falling between insurgency and overt aggression was possible and therefore, in the interest of harmony, the French MILAD withdrew his position paper. The MILADs agreed that there should be no change in the U.S. paper on Limited Military Intervention.

The MILADs stated their individual positions in regard to a Philippine MILAD query concerning force declarations to Eastern Region (Philippines) Field Forces Plan 4.¹ The United Kingdom might

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¹ Eastern Region - Philippines
Central Region- RVN, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand
Western Region - Pakistan
be able to declare some naval and air forces upon completion of the
plan for maritime support of Plan 4; Australian and New Zealand forces
were committed to the Central Region but could possibly provide some
air and naval forces; Thailand would not declare forces and France
would not say yes or no; Pakistan would make no commitment outside
of their area of responsibility (Western Region). The U.S. MILAD
suggested that force declarations by SEATO member nations would
have to be guided by requirements which might exist after the Philippines
had declared their forces. The Philippine MILAD stated that the
Commander Eastern Region SEATO Field Forces had already reassessed
force requirements, and contributions from other member nations were
necessary. The MILADs agreed to consider, out of session, the
Philippine reassessment paper.

In an off-the-record meeting the Pakistan MILAD expressed,
as he had done in the 19th Conference, his concern that the Indian Army
was being improved by the U.S. and the United Kingdom and that India
would eventually attempt to destroy Pakistan. Also in this meeting,
the French MILAD stated his country's intent to remain in SEATO.

The next MILAD Conference was scheduled to be held at Bangkok
on 14 and 15 October 1964.

Military Advisors Conference Number 21 (MA21C)

Admiral Sharp, in the capacity of U.S. MILAD, attended his first
SEATO Military Advisors Conference at Bangkok on 14-15 October. He
conducted the meeting as Chairman. 1,2(S)

The meeting opened with the progress report of the Chief Military
Planning Office (CHMPO) and, as was customary, the SEATO Secretary
General was invited to sit in on that part of the meeting and address the
MILADs. In the course of his remarks, the Secretary General stated
that the cornerstone of the new SEATO Headquarters building was laid
by the King of Thailand and that it was hoped the new building would be
ready for use in less than two years. (S)

1. CINCPAC 151255 Z Oct 1964 (S)
2. A complete list of SEATO MILADs, by name, may be found at
Appendix H.
One of the agenda items concerned a study regarding the assistance which the MPO could provide to SEATO Commanders when a SEATO plan was implemented. There was general agreement among the MILADs that there was a need for continuance of the MPO subsequent to the implementation of Plans 5, 6, and 7. There were differences of opinion as to the role of the MPO once Plan 4 was implemented. Because of the uncertainty of the role that the MILADs would play in the event of Plan 4 implementation, the MPO was directed to make further analysis on that part of the study.

The MILADs also considered a study to improve reaction time in order to facilitate implementation of MPO plans. The study provided, among other things, for reassessment of the Thai Railway System and was approved without serious differences of opinion.

The third agenda item was a review of MPO responsibility to designated SEATO Commanders in development of SEATO plans. One minor change to this concerned review of SEATO Field Force subordinate plans. Attempts to totally eliminate the MPO review of these plans raised the question of the opportunity of member nations to review the plans. The change that was finally approved by the MILADs could be interpreted to mean that the Commander SEATO Field Forces would determine which subordinate plans should be reviewed by the MPO.

The MILADs approved items which addressed the principles and procedures for staging SEATO exercises and which forecast exercises for 1967 to 1970. They then took up items under the heading of "Other Business" and settled them as follows:

1. Force Declarations for Eastern Region SEATO Field Force Plan 4. MILADs agreed to submit individual positions on a Philippine paper (which asked for force declarations) to the Philippine MILAD, through the CHMPO, out-of-session.

2. Pakistan position papers recommending approval of additional assumptions for inclusion in MPO Plan 4. A proposal outlined by Pakistan, upon which considerable political interest was focused, asked that it be assumed that in the event of communist aggression, India would mend its differences with China and attack Pakistan. The MILADs agreed that because of the political overtones of this assumption
the Pakistan MILAD should be invited to submit the matter through the Pakistan Council member to the Council of Ministers.

3. Another Pakistan proposal was to broaden the terms of reference of the Intelligence Committee to cover the military threat of Southeast Asia without limitation to the "Communist" threat. Pakistan was specifically concerned with possible aggression from India. The MILADs, with the exception of the Philippine representative, deferred any formal commitment by saying they would have to give their position "out of session" because the Pakistan proposal had been presented too late for consideration at the meeting. The Philippine MILAD fully supported the Pakistan position paper. Philippine support could be seen as allied to their own concern of the non-communist threat from Indonesia.

In addition to the regular meeting, a one-hour restricted session was held which was attended by the MILADs without their staffs. During this session United Kingdom, Pakistan and U.S. MILADs reviewed the situation respectively with regard to Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation, Pakistan-India problem, and Vietnam. Admiral Sharp, in discussing South Vietnam, said that despite all political problems the GVN had been facing, the military situation had not deteriorated as might have been expected and in some respects had shown recent small signs of improving. Admiral Sharp later confided to the JCS that this was perhaps a too optimistic view.

Subsequent to the MILAD Conference, Admiral Sharp made some interpretive observations to the JCS which he felt indicated the atmosphere of the meeting and reflected future trends and problems. One of Admiral Sharp's observations concerned the Pakistan position. He stated that there did seem to be an element of logic underlying the Pakistan belief that it was impossible to plan against communist aggression without in some way taking into account the probable position of India. Another observation was that the Philippine-Pakistan coalition for broadening SEATO's scope beyond the communist threat, which put them in a position opposed to other members, tended to cast a "White Man's Club" aura around SEATO which might weaken Thai support of the alliance.

1. CINCPAC 182135Z Oct 1964 (C)
SEATO Operations Plans

The Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization at its April 1964 meeting recorded its conviction that adequate defenses, individual and collective, were essential to the maintenance of security. The experience gained and the deterrent provided by regular and systematic military planning among the eight member nations was one of the most important and valuable assets of the Alliance. Although no new SEATO plans were completed in 1964, the Military Planning Office, under the supervision of the Military Advisors, continued to revise and refine existing plans in the light of changes or anticipated changes in the defense situation. Deployment schedules, under SEATO plans, may be seen at figures III-3, III-4, III-5, and III-6.

Plan 4: This plan provided for the defense of Southeast Asia including Pakistan and the Philippines against attack by Chinese Communist forces and those of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The aims of SEATO operations under this plan would be:

1. To secure the territories of Member States and halt communist aggression as soon as possible.
2. To inflict a quick and decisive defeat on the military forces of the enemy by conducting military operations which would include operations against the territories of South China and North Vietnam.
3. To liberate enemy occupied territories and restore peace in the treaty area.
4. To deter communist aggression in the future.

The concept of Plan 4 was to hold the enemy as far forward as possible and destroy his capacity and break his morale and will to continue aggression in Southeast Asia. When appropriate, SEATO Forces would mount a general counter-offensive, including a major amphibious assault against the enemy in North Vietnam, and inflict a decisive defeat.

Plan 5: In the event the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) should make a request for military assistance and a favorable response was made by the SEATO Council, a SEATO force would deploy rapidly to Laos.
**SEATO PLAN-5 DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L DAY - L + 15</td>
<td>ALL MBRS</td>
<td>HQ FIELD FORCES CLOSE VIENTIANE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L DAY - L + 2</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>2 MARINE BLT'S CLOSE VIENTIANE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D DAY - D + 1</td>
<td>THAILAND</td>
<td>2 INF BNS CLOSE THAKHEK AND PAKSANE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L DAY - L + 10</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>INF BN CLOSES SENO/SAVANNAH KET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L DAY - L + 10</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>USMC MAG (-) CLOSES UDORN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L DAY - L + 2</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>PACAF MOBILE STRIKE FORCE CLOSES TAKHLI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D DAY</td>
<td>THAILAND</td>
<td>FTR BMR SQ &amp; 1/2 TRANS SQ CLOSES DON MUANG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L +1 - L + 12</td>
<td>NZ, AUS</td>
<td>2 INF BNS CLOSE SENO/SAVANNAH KET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L +1 - L + 8</td>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>TAC FTR SQ CLOSES UBON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L +11 - L + 11</td>
<td>PHIL</td>
<td>LOG/ADMIN UNIT VIENTIANE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L +5 - L + 30</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>2 INF B/G (REINF) CLOSE PAKSE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FRANCE - INF BN**
- ABN BG (REINF)

**US - N. Z. - LT BMR SQ**
- LT BMR SQ

**PHIL - U. K. - LT BMR SQ**
- ENGR CO & MED DET

**THAI - RCT(-) & RANGERS**

**NOTE:** D-Day is the day on which forces of the SEATO Force begin movement toward the objective area; L Day is defined as the day on which combat forces from outside S. E. Asia land in objective area.
### SEATO

**PLAN 4—DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE**

#### GROUND FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETA</th>
<th>NATION</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Place</td>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>5 INF DIV (I AND II CORPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+15-S+30</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>INF DIV fr HAWAII to UDORN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+1-S+30</td>
<td>ANZ/UK</td>
<td>INF DIV fr AUS/NZ/UK to SENO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+2-S+35</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>III MEF fr OKINAWA to DANANG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+15-S+35</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>ABN DIV fr CONUS to PAKSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+45</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>MECH BDE fr CONUS to UDORN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>THAI</td>
<td>2 INF DIV (CHIANG MAI/UTTARADIT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>ABN BDE fr SAIGON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>MAR BDE fr CAM RANH BAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+45</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>INF DIV fr CONUS to NHA TRANG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+10</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>ABN BDE fr OKINAWA to SAIGON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+45</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>INF DIV fr CONUS to BANGKOK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+30-S+75</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1 MEF fr EASTPAC to OKINAWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+75</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>INF DIV fr CONUS to HAWAII in RES</td>
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</table>

#### AIR UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETA</th>
<th>NATION</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>THAI</td>
<td>FTR BOMBER SQ to CHIANG MAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>THAI</td>
<td>1/2 TRANS SQ (6C47) to DON MUANG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>LT TRANS SQ to UDORN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>FTR SQ to UDORN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>MED TRANS SQ to KOKE KATHIEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>LT TRANS SQ to KOKE KATHIEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+1</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>LT BOMBER SQ to KOET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+1</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>TAC RECON TASK FORCE to KOET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+1</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>FTR INTC SQ (-) to KOET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+1-S+2</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>2 TAC FTR SQ to KOET/TAKHLI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+1</td>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>2 FTR SQ to UBON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+1</td>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>2 LT BOMBER SQ to TAN SON NHUT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+1</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>TAC BOMBER SQ to TAN SON NHUT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to assist the RLG to counter communist insurgency so as to establish conditions under which the RLG could solve its problem, and maintain the security and independence of Laos. Operations would involve:

1. SEATO Forces deploying to secure initially, Vientiane, Paksane, Thakhek, Seno, Savannakhet and Pakse, including their bridges and lines of communications.

2. SEATO Forces assisting in securing and denying to the insurgents other vital areas, such as the seat of government and important population and communications centers.

3. SEATO Forces participating in offensive operations against the insurgents by the provision of assistance such as air support, communications, psychological warfare and other special operations.

Plan 6: Provided for defense of the Protocol States (Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia) against attack by the forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The aims of SEATO operations would be to:

1. Halt the enemy invasion as soon as possible.

2. Inflict a quick and decisive defeat on the military forces of the DRV and forestall overt Chinese Communist intervention.

3. Limit the war geographically.

4. Drive communist forces from the Protocol States.

5. Deter communist aggression in the future.

The concept of Plan 6 was to hold the enemy as far forward as possible and destroy his forces, his lines of communication and his capacity to wage war. Appropriate SEATO Forces would then mount a general counter-offensive, including a major amphibious assault against the enemy in North Vietnam, and inflict a decisive defeat. SEATO Forces would then be prepared for intensification and extension of the war in the event of subsequent Chinese Communist intervention. In 1964 the Chief Military planning Office forwarded an updated version of Plan 6 to the U.S. MILAD for review. CINCPAC, after receiving comments of his
component commanders approved the updated version subject to substantive changes.¹

Plan 7: This was a plan for the military measures to be taken if the SEATO Council should agree (to a request by GVN) to provide direct military assistance by SEATO Forces to the GVN. Such a situation was possible in that the communist insurgency in South Vietnam could reach a stage where the GVN recognized that it was no longer able to cope adequately with the insurgents by application of its own resources or other remedies available to it. Operations envisioned included immediate assistance to the GVN by externally based air and naval forces. This would be followed as rapidly as possible by the deployment of a substantial SEATO Force to key strategic areas of South Vietnam. The initial aims of SEATO Forces would be to assist in securing the Seat of Government and releasing the maximum GVN forces for offensive operations. Subsequently the SEATO Forces would assist the GVN forces in destroying the Viet Cong and, in areas cleared of insurgents, assist in ensuring a proper environment for the reestablishment of the normal civil authority and the protection of the local population on an effective and continuing basis.

SEATO Intelligence Meeting (INT1OM)

The United States delegation to the annual SEATO Intelligence Meeting consisted of five intelligence representatives from the CINCPAC Staff. The highlight of the meeting, held in Bangkok during November, came when [REDACTED] representatives insisted that the Terms of Reference for the Intelligence Committee be amended to permit the committee to consider all military threats to the Treaty Area whether they were communist or non-communist. (S)

Such action would have been in conflict with the U.S. understanding

¹. CINCPAC 120027 Z Dec 1964 (TS)
**SEATO**

**PLAN 6 - DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETA</th>
<th>NATION</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>5 INF DIV'S (I AND II CORPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+15-S+30</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>INF Div fr Hawaii to UDORN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+1-S+30</td>
<td>ANZUK</td>
<td>DIV fr AUS/NZ/UK to SENO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+2-S+35</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>III MEF fr Okinawa to Danang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+15-S+35</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>ABN DIV fr CONUS to PAKSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+45</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>MECH BDE fr CONUS to UDORN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>THAI</td>
<td>INF RCT TO UDORN</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>THAI</td>
<td>INF DIV TO KORAT</td>
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<td>S+40</td>
<td>PHIL</td>
<td>INF BCT TO QUI NHON</td>
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<tr>
<td>S+45</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>INF DIV fr CONUS to NHA TRANG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>MAR BDE to CAM RANH BAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>AIRBORNE BDE to SAIGON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S+10-S+20</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>AIRBORNE BDE fr Okinawa to Saigon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>THAI</td>
<td>FTR BMBR SQ to CHIANG MAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Country</td>
<td>THAI</td>
<td>1/2 TRANS SQ (8 C-47) to DON MUANG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>LT TRANS SQ TO UDORN</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>FTR SQ TO UDORN</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>MED TRANS SQ TO KOKE KATHIEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>LT TRANS SQ TO KOKE KATHIEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>LT BMBR'SQ TO KORAT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>2 TAC FTR SQ TO KORAT/TAKHLI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>TAG RECCE TASK FORCE to KORAT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Diagram:**

- A map showing various locations with arrows indicating movement or deployment routes.
- Key locations include Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Vientiane, Chiang Mai, and others.
- Arrows connect these locations, showing the planned deployment schedule.

**Legend:**

- RVN: Republic of Vietnam
- US: United States
- ANZUK: Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom
- THAI: Thailand
- PHIL: Philippines
- UK: United Kingdom
- NZ: New Zealand
- AUS: Australia
- RVN: Republic of Vietnam
- THAI: Thailand
- FTR: Fighter
- SQ: Squadron
- BMBR: Bomber
- TRANS: Transport
- TAC: Tactical
- BDE: Brigade
- INF: Infantry
- DIV: Division
- CORPS: Corps
- MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force
- CONUS: Continental United States
- PAKSE: Pakse
- UDORN: Udorn
- CAM RANH BAY: Cam Ranh Bay
- SAIGON: Saigon
- CHIANG MAI: Chiang Mai
- DON MUANG: Don Muang
- KOKE KATHIEM: Koke Kathiém
- TAKHLI: Takhli
- FTR INTEGR SQ: Fighter Integration Squard
attached to the Manila Pact which prohibited the U.S. from considering any non-communist military threat in SEATO.

This was a question which had arisen in the 21st SEATO Military Advisors Conference also, and one which it appeared would have to eventually be reckoned with. (See Military Advisors Conference Number 21 (MA21C), this section.)

the Committee held it did not have the authority under the current Terms of Reference to consider any threat that was not communist.

Surface Movement Allocation SEATO Plan 4

In April COMUSMACV reported that Thai delegates to the Central Region SEATO Field Force Coordination Conference, held in Bangkok.

1. CINCPAC 260301Z Nov 1964 (S)
had indicated that only 2000 tons of rail capacity and only 40 percent of port and highway capacity could be allocated daily to SEATO Plan 4 in the event of implementation of the plan. COMUSMACV stated that Air Chief Marshall Dawee (Thai Deputy Minister of Defense) later told him informally that the rail restriction was political and assured him that in fact all rail capacity possible would be available in case of implementation of Plan 4. COMUSMACV, however, thought the Thai should be pushed for a firm commitment of 50 percent of rail, port, and highway capacity and asked CINCPAC's advice as to the appropriate way to do this. 1

CINCPAC, in replying, told COMUSMACV that the rail allocation situation did not present a real problem in view of: Air Chief Marshall Dawee's assurances; taking into consideration the report of the SEATO Coordination Conference which indicated that total SEATO rail requirements were less than 50 percent of capacity; and finally considering the statement in a SEATO study that 65 percent of Thailand rail capacity could be allocated to military needs without serious damage to the economy. 2, 3 CINCPAC assumed that the port and highway availability was roughly parallel to the rail situation. 4

CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV that the U.S. should not push the Thai for a firm 50 percent commitment since a hard-sell in the face of political sensitivity might cause an uncompromising reaction on the part of the Thai. CINCPAC stated that COMUSMACV could present estimated SEATO Plan 4 movement requirements to the Thai (through Chief Military Planning Office) for consideration in accordance with procedures set up by the 1963 Logistical Committee Meeting (5LogM). During that meeting it was agreed that the SEATO Plan 4 host nation (Thailand) would establish a National Transportation Board to control local movements and to allocate movement facilities to SEATO. It was also agreed that the host nation machinery for control should be exercised in peacetime and that SEATO military

1. COMUSMACV J41 2688 DTG 072301Z Apr 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 010334Z May 1964 (TS)
3. Report of the SEATO Coordination Conference of March 1964 (S)
4. MS/753/18/63, 4 Nov 1963 (S)
movement plans should be prepared in coordination with the host nation. CINCPAC did not guarantee this procedure to obtain an ironclad commitment from Thailand but thought it might give the Thai a feeling of importance which could be all that was necessary to get the desired commitment. 1

SEATO Training Exercises

SEATO had no standing forces of its own. However, military exercises were staged each year to give the defense forces of the member nations training and practical experience in combined operations. These exercises followed five general lines of development: maritime exercises involving sea and air forces; air-ground exercises, in which air units supported army units; sea-land exercises involving the support of land operations by naval forces; air defense exercises; and command-post exercises, in which decisions were made and orders executed without the actual deployment of forces.

Through the years these training operations developed from relatively simple demonstrations of coordinated movement into highly complicated maneuvers which developed the skills of the participating armed services in combined action. Two such exercises were held in 1964, bringing the total number of SEATO Exercises held, since their beginning in 1956, to 27.

AIR BOON CHOO: This SEATO tactical air exercise was conducted in Thailand during the period 20 April - 2 May 1964. It was sponsored jointly by Thailand, UK, and the U.S. Tactical air units participated from five SEATO nations and staff personnel were present from all eight member countries.

AIR BOON CHOO featured training in air-ground procedures for SEATO tactical air units participating in combined defensive operations and was designed to create a situation leading into SEATO Airborne/Amphibious Exercise LIGTAS. Approximately 780 sorties of all types were flown including interdiction, close air support, and reconnaissance. 1. CINCPAC 010335Z May 1964 (TS)
Five of the six exercise aims of Exercise AIR BOON CHOO were accomplished; it therefore was considered to be a highly successful exercise. Those exercise objectives accomplished were as follows:

1. To develop, practice, and evaluate procedures for control and coordination of operations in the Combat Operations Center and in the Air Operations Center.

2. To develop, practice, and evaluate procedures for the control, coordination, and reporting of Tactical Air Operations.

3. To develop and evaluate security procedures for control and handling of classified documents which were necessary for exercise combat operations.

4. Practice limited Civic Action.

5. Practice Counterinsurgency Operations played as a national exercise by the Thai Armed Forces.

The remaining aim was to develop, practice, and evaluate the Command Logistic System; this was partially accomplished. It was difficult to accomplish this aim because the exercise was primarily tactical with only representative ground headquarters portrayed, and no Base Area Command was activated. National logistic systems were exercised and to some extent the Command Logistic System was exercised through the cooperation required among participating nations in movements, POL coordination, and airfield usage. Because most of the participating units did not bring logistical staffs, there was but little capability to respond to logistical problems when they were occasionally introduced. The initial airlift carried all personnel, equipment, and supplies required for the duration of the exercise, so there was very little need for actual resupply.

To ensure that the time schedule of the exercise was met, and that the exercise did not suffer due to communication failures, a certain amount of C-E equipment and personnel were pre-positioned. The equipment included AN/TRC-24 radio relay, AN/MRC Tropospheric scatter, and portions of the AN/TSC-28 "TRANSCOM" terminal facility. Circuits were also leased in the Telephone Organization of

1. COMUSMACTHAI EP10016 DTG 070030Z May 1964 (S)
Thailand commercial cable/microwave system to provide back-up for the military system. Communication support for the exercise was outstanding.

**LIGTAS**: More than 20,000 military personnel of the SEATO member nations participated in Exercise LIGTAS, (the Philippine word "LIGTAS" means "rescue") a coordinated amphibious/airborne assault exercise which was conducted on the Philippine Island of Mindoro during the period 20 May - 10 June 1964. Although the Republic of the Philippines was the exercise host, the U.S. was designated as sponsoring nation and CINCPACFLT was the U.S. agency responsible for planning, preparation, and execution of the exercise.

The aim of Exercise LIGTAS was to provide combined training of SEATO assigned forces in planning and execution of an amphibious/airborne operation under conditions similar to those possible in Southeast Asia; to improve amphibious and airborne tactics, techniques, and doctrines, and to develop close working relationships and understandings between participating SEATO forces. Operations included Special Forces employment, anti-submarine warfare, airborne operations, anti-air warfare, and helicopter assault.

Participating in the exercise were naval, ground, and air units from New Zealand; air transport from France; and official observers from Pakistan and Thailand. U.S. forces included an Airborne Brigade Task Force, a Special Landing Force, aggressor marines, and ships and aircraft.

Exercise LIGTAS results indicated a definite need for improved techniques in the detection and removal of emplaced Limpet mines from ships being used by friendly countries. The naval exercise coordinator recommended that ships visiting ports where the possibility of mining existed, should be provided with qualified divers and equipment necessary to respond adequately to this threat.

The commander of ground forces (SEATO Expeditionary Brigade) pointed to shortcomings in coordination and reporting of reconnaissance activities. He recommended that more attention be given to this during
turn down of their request to the Thai government for a new Civil Airfield. He further stated that the problem would resolve itself without prejudice to planned SEATO utilization of Don Muang.

The Chief Military Planning Office advised CINCPAC that he believed the best course of action was to do nothing and see if the problem would resolve itself. CINCPAC agreed with this but hoped to convince Thai Deputy Minister of Defense Dawee of SEATO's need for Don Muang and stated that the Thai Tactical Fighter Squadron and Fighter Interceptor Squadron should be re-declared "under SEATO Command." Centralized control was needed for optimum air defense and tactical air operations and to get maximum utilization of the rather limited air resources available.

Logistic Support of Philippines Battalion Combat Team

General Santos, Chief of Staff Armed Forces Philippines, wrote to Admiral Felt in June proposing a bilateral conference to resolve details of logistic support the U.S. had agreed to provide the Philippine Battalion Combat Team committed in support of Central Region SEATO Field Forces OPLAN 4-64.

CINCPAC directed CINCPACREP Philippines to determine the nature and specific details of logistic support the Filipinos wished to discuss, and any problems likely to be encountered. CINCPACREP Philippines advised CINCPAC that the areas requiring solution were as follows:

1. Buildup of MAP equipment to support the 1425 man Battalion Combat Team for Southeast Asia deployment.
2. Logistic support of the Philippine Battalion Combat Team after arrival in the Republic of Vietnam.

1. USMILADREP 160200Z Jan 1964 (S)
2. USMILADREP 100500Z Jan 1964 (S)
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 180705Z Jan 1964 (S)
4. Personal ltr from General Santos to Admiral Felt, 16 Jun 1964 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 270126Z Jun 1964 (TS)
6. CINCPACREP PHIL 010905Z Jul 1964 (TS)
3. Determination that the immediate senior to the Battalion Combat Team Commander would be U.S. instead of Vietnamese.

CINCPAC proposed that General Santos' staff and CINCPAC Philippines conduct preliminary negotiations to identify details of support and coordination requirements and forward the results through national channels. General Santos concurred in holding a proposed meeting and his staff met in October with CINCPACREPhilippines and the JUSMAG Philippines staffs. During the meeting between the staffs a question of the command of the Philippines Battalion Combat Team arose. Previous negotiations had established the Combat Team strength at 1425 men. Filipinos were not trying to increase the strength of the Combat Team. A newly proposed organization had implications of requirements for expensive support (primarily radar equipment) not previously envisaged. CINCPAC authorized CINCPACREP Philippines to negotiate the position of the Philippine Battalion Combat Team and negotiations were underway at the end of 1964.

Pacific Defense College

Proposals to establish a Pacific Defense College had been sporadically under consideration since 1956. The development of capabilities by Communist China caused the proposal to be reconsidered in 1964. (C)

CINCPAC initially supported the Pacific Defense College in 1956 and submitted plans to JCS envisioning a unilaterally established school, supported by MAP and operated by the U.S. without SE Asian sponsorship. During the same period the Philippine MILAD table...

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1. Personal ltr from Admiral Sharp to General Santos, ser: 000 7 Jul 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPACREP PHIL ltr FF5-6:70 5200, ser: 0001-64, 31 Aug 1966
3. CINCPAC ltr 4000, ser: 000368, 25 Sep 1964 (TS)
4. CINCPACREP PHIL 161339Z Oct 1964 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 210308Z Sep 1962 (TS)
6. CINCPAC 280400Z Oct 1964 (S)
paper at the 6th meeting of the SEATO Military Advisors, proposing formation of a SEATO Defense College. Bilateral U.S. and Philippines discussions followed, leading to plans for a Pacific Military Staff College, in Baguio, in lieu of the SEATO College. In 1958 the Philippine Advisor withdrew his proposal for a SEATO College and the U.S. and Philippine Advisors announced intent to establish a college to be jointly operated by the two countries.  

Cost and feasibility studies led to confirmation of Baguio as the location for the proposed school, which was renamed Pacific Defense College. As planning proceeded, however, it became apparent that the Filipinos wanted more out of the college than the U.S. could afford to pay. Not only was the U.S. expected to pay most of the costs, including supplemental living allowances for Filipino staff members, but was also expected to permit appointment of a Filipino Commandant. This caused differences that could not be resolved and, eventually, it was jointly agreed by the two countries to abandon the idea of a bilateral college and return the project to the SEATO MILADs.  

The MILADs took the matter under advisement and members were asked for a statement of national requirements for the school. In June 1963 CINCPAC advised the SEATO Military Planning Office that "a SEATO Defense College is unnecessary from the U.S. point of view" and in December 1963 the Military Advisors, having reviewed requirements of members, agreed "that no further action be taken at this stage" toward establishment of a SEATO Defense College.  

In July 1964 the JCS asked for CINCPAC views on a Department of State paper, being circulated, which proposed a Pacific Defense College. The gist of this paper was that a Pacific Defense College was needed to offset the growing international feeling that Red China, with the development of nuclear capabilities, was the pre-eminent power in Asia.  

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1959, p. 153  
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1960, p. 200  
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 0403, 11 Jun 1963 (C)  
4. JCS 7276 DTG 072103Z Jul 1964 (C)  
5. JCS 2118/222-1, Subj: Draft Program of Action; Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Capability, Tab C, 27 Jul 1964 (S)
CINCPAC considered it doubtful that the establishment of a Pacific Defense College on a unilateral basis would offer appreciable advantages over courses already available to foreign officers in existing U.S. service schools and felt that difficulty would be experienced in student availability since most Asian countries did not have enough talented military men who could be spared for long periods of time. While concluding that there might be cogent reasons from the political-psychological viewpoint for establishing the College, CINCPAC did not consider such a school essential to his mission. He therefore recommended to the JCS that the Pacific Defense College not be established.  

The JCS concurred with CINCPAC's position and informed OSD that the training of foreign officers by the U.S. on a unilateral basis could be accomplished satisfactorily in CONUS service schools.

Ammunition Agreement with Australia

In December 1961 the Australian MILAD made an inquiry to CINCPAC regarding the possibility of the U.S. providing Australian forces with 105mm howitzer ammunition on a reimbursable basis if SEATO Plan 4 or 6 should be implemented before Australian production could be built up. CINCPAC informed the JCS that the Australian requirement could be worked into DA Plan QUICK TRIP (which contemplated supplying MAP allies in limited war from available U.S. Army reserves and/or peacetime assets). CINCPAC, in November 1962, forwarded a draft agreement to the Australian MILAD which estimated requirements at 31,325 rounds of 105mm ammunition per month plus a build-up of reserves at U.S. rates. The draft agreement provided for the Australians to reimburse the U.S. for the ammunition at standard price plus 19 percent.

In 1963 the Australian MILAD asked CINCPAC about the possibility of the U.S. including in the agreement an estimated 20,000 rounds per

1. CINCPAC 150250Z Jul 1964 (C)
2. JCS 2118/222-1, Subj: Draft Program of Action; Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Capability, Tab C, 27 Jul 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 060345Z Dec 1961 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 072254Z Nov 1962 (S)
month of 81mm mortar ammunition plus a reserve build-up for the Australian Battle Group committed to SEATO Plan 4 and 6. CINCPAC informed the JCS that he intended to respond favorably to this request and in January 1964 sent the JCS a draft agreement covering both 105mm Howitzer and 81mm mortar ammunition which had been agreed upon by the U.S. and Australian MILADs. 1

The JCS objected to the draft agreement; opposing a U.S. stockpile of ammunition for Australia; claiming an inconsistency with U.S. policy on military sales; and citing a lack of provisions for joint serviceability and an expiration date of the agreement. 2 As alternatives, the JCS proposed that Australia purchase the ammunition stockpile and pay costs of storage if stored by the U.S.; Australia purchase the initially required ammunition with follow up supply to be from U.S. production; U.S. make ammunition available from stocks on priority basis, subject to availability after consideration of U.S. requirements. CINCPAC, in February, requested the JCS to reconsider their objections to the proposed agreement for reasons as follows: 3

1. An additional stockpile of ammunition was not contemplated. As envisioned, requisitions would be readied but no stock draw down would be incurred unless SEATO Plan 4 or 6 were implemented. Australian requirements were small and could be supplied from U.S. Army stocks and production outputs without significant effect on U.S. requirements.

2. The proposed agreement did not appear to be in conflict with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

3. The circumstances under which the ammunition would be supplied, as provided for by the draft agreement, rendered joint determination of serviceability unfeasible and the U.S. should be willing to rely upon Australian determination.

4. Concerning need for expiration date in the agreement, precise date was unknown when Australian production would provide enough ammunition to meet requirements. U.S. interests appeared to be fully protected by provisions in the

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00130, 28 Jan 1964 (S)
2. MJCS 23-64, 11 Feb 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 292345Z Feb 1964 (S)
draft agreement which allowed the U.S. to withdraw from the commitment upon giving a 90-day notice to Australia.

The alternatives proposed by the JCS were not satisfactory to CINCPAC. CINCPAC felt that the draft agreement had already experienced a prolonged gestation and that ample opportunity had existed at earlier stages for the U.S. to raise such points as brought up by the JCS. Introduction of further negotiations might unnecessarily upset a staunch ally and also have an adverse impact on the current Australian trend of working toward compatibility of their weapons with those of the U.S.

After a long delay, during which the JCS consulted with OSD regarding the proposed agreement, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the U.S. could not assure availability or promise to deliver ammunition without appropriate Australian payment. The JCS provided CINCPAC with a text that he was authorized to use if he felt it desirable to offer an alternate arrangement to Australia. The JCS text assured Australia of no more support than it could get under its existing Military Assistance Sales eligibility, except that it provided for requisitions prepared in advance and the availability of stocks was made fairly certain because of the contemplated replacement of a U.S. battalion by an Australian battalion during execution of SEATO Plans 4 and 6. CINCPAC noted that the wording of the agreement might oblige the U.S. to provide ammunition to the Australian battalion of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade Group. Inasmuch as this was already covered in a bilateral arrangement for providing ammunition to SEATO forces, CINCPAC modified the JCS text to preclude duplicating the U.S. responsibility for ammunition supply. He then forwarded the revised agreement to the Australian government for comment. 2, 3, 4

1. JCS 6202 DTG 072143Z May 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 220313Z May 1964 (S)
3. JCS 6500 DTG 262159Z May 1964 (U)
4. CINCPAC ltr 8010 ser 00764, 2 Jun 1964 (S)
OSD Mission to Australia and New Zealand

In February OSD proposed to send, in March, a mission to the Ministers of Defense of Australia and New Zealand. The purpose of the mission was to establish cooperative logistic arrangements. CINCPAC was asked by OSD to furnish recommendations for advance planning and to comment on feasibility of supporting Australian Army Forces from U.S. stocks in the PACOM. Cooperative logistic arrangements were those arrangements providing for cooperative logistic support; cooperative logistic support was defined as "the logistic support provided a foreign government through its participation in the U.S. Department of Defense logistic system with reimbursement to the U.S. for support performed".

CINCPAC, in answering the OSD queries, made clear that he had not been engaged in any program of support to Australian or New Zealand forces except for support of SEATO Plans. In this regard CINCPAC recapitulated existing and proposed agreements as follows:

1. Existing agreement with Australia for U.S. to supply POL to RAAF for SEATO Plan 5.

2. Existing agreement with the United Kingdom for U.S. to supply POL to United Kingdom and New Zealand forces and Australian ground forces for SEATO Plan 5.

3. Proposed agreement with Australia for U.S. to supply POL to Australian forces for SEATO Plans 4, 6, and 7 (did not include POL for Australian element of Commonwealth Brigade Group). Minor details of this agreement were yet to be worked out.

4. Proposed agreement with Australia for U.S. (pending Australian production build up) to supply 105mm mortar ammunition to Australian forces for SEATO Plans 4 and 6. (See Ammunition Agreement with Australia, this section)

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1. OSD DEF 955357 DTG 121443Z Feb 1964 (C)
2. OSD DEF 955517 DTG 130017Z Feb 1964 (C)
3. OSD DEF 955905 DTG 150742Z Feb 1964 (C)
4. DOD Instruction 2000.8, 14 Feb 1964 (U)
5. CINCPAC 250230Z Feb 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC 210335Z Nov 1962 (S)
7. CINCPAC ltr 4020 ser 00674, 13 May 1964 (S)
5. U.S. offer to enter into bilateral agreement to supply POL to Central Region Forces under SEATO Plans 4, 6, and 7. There had been no takers of the offer but the United Kingdom was expected to negotiate for Commonwealth Brigade requirements (the brigade included battalions from the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand).

CINCPAC stated that his rule in regard to materials in short supply had been that U.S. interests automatically come first. He felt that support of the Australian Army from U.S. stocks in PACOM was feasible provided USARPAC was allotted additional resources needed to acquire and maintain items in addition to those stocked to support USARPAC missions. CINCPAC recommended that replies to any country asking for this type of support be deferred until specifics of support desired were developed and mutual economic feasibility was established.

CINCPAC further stated that any Navy or Air Force supply and maintenance support which might be agreed upon would have to be CONUS in source in order to parallel support of similar PACFLT and PACAF forces. This would be necessary in order to insure compatibility (a prime U.S. objective) with PACFLT and PACAF forces, which were supported by CONUS fixed facilities. CINCPAC suggested that OSD obtain service recommendations for the Mission Team's consideration concerning development of communication and electronics systems compatible with U.S. systems and possible sale of related U.S. equipment; and further development of compatible reconnaissance and intelligence gathering systems and capabilities through expanded use of U.S. air and ground equipment by Australia and New Zealand.

In March the OSD Mission Team, headed by Mr. Leonard A. Alne of OASD/ISA, made the planned visit to Australia and New Zealand and visited CINCPAC both enroute and on the return trip. CINCPAC did not desire to participate in visits of this nature to allied countries except where MAP interests or specialized theater knowledge made participation advisable. CINCPAC did not object to his Service Component Commanders assisting their respective Services in developing implementing procedures for cooperative logistic support to
allies in PACOM, nor in USARPAC providing common type logistic support to allies in the theater, provided there was no infringement upon the Component Commanders' primary logistic roles of supporting U.S. PACOM forces in peace and war.

The Mission Team left copies of draft cooperative logistic support agreements with both Australia and New Zealand governments. The draft agreements allowed for country participation in U.S. Service Department logistic systems, with the country paying for its share of stock levels and pro rata share of stockage costs, maintenance, and other miscellaneous costs. CINCPAC, in order to make clear the proper channel for SEATO contingency plans support, recommended that the following be added to both drafts: "arrangements for support in the SEATO treaty area, which are contingent upon the implementation of a SEATO plan, will be the subject of negotiations between the respective SEATO military advisors."

COMBINED EXERCISES (NON-SEATO)

Combined exercises in the PACOM area were designed to demonstrate the U.S. determination to prevent, in concert with allies, the further spread of communism, and in some cases, provide a means whereby U.S. forces could become familiar with areas where future combat operations might be conducted. Moreover, these exercises required a mutual effort which provided an excellent vehicle for the refinement of doctrines and procedures for use in combined operations. At the same time they afforded an opportunity to bring participating forces to the desired level of training. The scheduling of and preparation for combined exercises was a function of the Component Commanders and subordinate Unified Commanders incident to the training of their assigned forces. However, for significant combined exercises, considered to be beyond the scope of operational visits, routine maneuvering, or the training of comparatively small combined units or forces,
CINCPAC approval was required before any commitments could be made. Significant 1964 combined exercises conducted in the PACOM involving the U.S. and other forces are reported below.¹
POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES

During the year PACOM forces played an important role in supporting U.S. policy in the Western Pacific area. The increased pace of communist military operations in the Indochina Peninsula, the leftward drift of Indonesia and Cambodia and the mounting truculence of Communist China (which entered the nuclear club in October) gave heightened importance to the function of the Pacific Command as an instrument of U.S. policy. By the judicious display and use of military power in the Western Pacific\(^1\) and the direction of a vast military assistance program\(^2\) designed to bolster friendly nations threatened by communist attack or subversion, CINCPAC contributed to the achievement of U.S. political objectives in the area. In addition, as the U.S. military representative to a number of organizations set up under multilateral and bilateral security agreements between the United States and various Pacific powers, CINCPAC dealt with a multitude of problems of a political-military nature.

Because of the intimate involvement of the Pacific Command in the formulation and execution of U.S. national policy, a senior Foreign Service Officer with broad experience in the Far East area was assigned to CINCPAC’s staff in 1957 to act as his Political Advisor (POLAD). That officer was provided with information on significant political developments directly by the Department of State and by the various U.S. diplomatic missions in the PACOM area. His role was to advise

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1. See Chapter I & IV
2. See Chapter II & IV
the Commander in Chief of political developments which might influence the execution of CINCPAC's mission or, conversely, concerning the political impact of actions taken or contemplated by the Pacific Command. The POLAD, as a senior staff officer of the command, attended CINCPAC's staff meetings and accompanied him on his frequent trips throughout the PACOM area. The above political-military aspects of CINCPAC's function are covered elsewhere in this and previous histories.

This portion of the history covers CINCPAC's actions in relation to a variety of negotiations between the United States and the countries in the PACOM area. The continuing discussions concerning Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) with South Korea and the Republic of China merited particular attention because of their potential for affecting CINCPAC's capability to accomplish his mission. The criminal jurisdiction aspects of the SOFA with the ROK and GRC remained key issues, and were not resolved despite prolonged discussions. Further, Thailand opened the subject of a SOFA, outside the SEATO organization, on a bilateral basis with the U.S.

Enforcing the fair trial provisions of the existing SOFA with Japan also required CINCPAC's attention. And, the problem created by exempting U.S. civilian employees and dependents from military law placed the U.S. forces in the position of seeking to encourage the Japanese authorities to exercise criminal jurisdiction in certain instances. CINCPAC attained some success in having higher authorities adopt his views concerning these issues.

South Korea Status of Forces Agreement

During 1964 the U.S. and Korea continued negotiations aimed at a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Early in the year the negotiating teams agreed to an article related to the Military Post Offices.

1. See CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 154 for the Department of State/CINCPAC relationships in association with these negotiations.
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, pp. 154-155
3. SEOUL 562 to STATE 7 Feb 1964 (C)
However, both sides found it more difficult to reach agreement on certain of the fundamental, and consequently more controversial, subjects such as criminal jurisdiction and labor policy.

**Criminal Jurisdiction:** In February the negotiators exchanged drafts of the criminal jurisdiction article for the SOFA. One of the key issues in the subsequent discussions was whether the certificate of a United States commander would be accepted as conclusive evidence that an alleged offense arose out of an act done in the performance of "official duty." The Koreans soon proposed that if the U.S. would agree to a very restrictive definition of the term "official duty" they would accept the certificates as a valid basis for determining which country should have primary jurisdiction in a specific case. CINCPAC recommended that this proposal be rejected because it would deny the U.S. the freedom to include acts or omissions which were of ultimate benefit to the U.S. but outside the wording of the Korean definition of "official duty." However, the CINCPAC recommendation was overruled and State authorized the American Ambassador in Seoul to accept the Korean proposal. CINCPAC also objected to a Korean proposal that the United States commander's certificate concerning "official duty" be subject to review by a joint U.S.-ROK committee. Recognizing this would clutter the agenda of the Joint Committee and cheapen the certificates, CINCPAC recommended that any review be conducted in diplomatic channels only.

To break a September stalemate in discussions, the State Department negotiators proposed to offer a "package deal" that would grant limited concessions to the ROK in exchange for ROK agreement to certain terms the U.S. considered most significant. At that, CINCPAC commented that the U.S. should not concede to the ROK the

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1. Figure III-7 illustrates the arrangements for criminal jurisdiction over U.S. forces in PACOM at the end of 1964.
2. SEOUL 1226 to STATE, 4PM 26 Mar 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 010216Z Apr 1964 (C)
4. STATE 890 to SEOUL, 7PM 1 Apr 1964 (C)
5. CINCPAC 010216Z Apr 1964 (C)
6. SEOUL A133 to STATE, 1 Sep 1964 (C)
ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
OVER U.S. FORCES IN THE PACOM

JAPAN
CONCURRENT U.S. HOST
COUNTRY JURISDICTION

KOREA
U.S. HAS EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION
NOW UNDER NEGOTIATION

REPUBLIC OF CHINA
'ALL U.S. PERSONNEL ENJOY
MAAG DIPLOMATIC STATUS
NOW UNDER NEGOTIATION

PHILIPPINES
CONCURRENT U.S. HOST
COUNTRY JURISDICTION

AUSTRALIA
CONCURRENT U.S. HOST
COUNTRY JURISDICTION

MAAGS
ALL MAAGS IN PACOM ENJOY
DIPLOMATIC STATUS
primary right to criminal jurisdiction unless the U.S. and ROK "mutually agreed" that the case was of "particular importance" to the Koreans. Lacking that agreement, CINCPAC's position was that the question should be referred directly to diplomatic channels for resolution. Admiral Sharp also desired that the "package deal" be expanded to require the ROK to agree to U.S. proposed safeguards to assure a fair trial for U.S. personnel. He further suggested that the State Department proposal be modified to reserve to the U.S. the right to deny the ROK custody of a U.S. accused unless it was mutually agreed that all fair trial safeguards specified in the SOFA had been applied.  

Later, when a State/Defense effort failed to obtain a decisive assessment of the existence of bribery and susceptibility to political influence in the ROK judicial system, 2, 3 CINCPAC tasked COMUSK to review the U.S. Army Country Law Study on Korea 4 and report on the actual operation of the ROK judicial system. 5

At the 67th meeting of the SOFA negotiating teams, held in Seoul on 16 December, the U.S. representatives tabled a proposal 6, 7 that reflected CINCPAC's recommendations 8 that the ROK automatically waive primary jurisdiction except in cases involving ROK security, forcible rape, and malicious killing. In those instances, there was to be a joint U.S. -ROK consultation prior to determination of jurisdiction. The U.S. offer also provided that disputes related to "official duty certificates" would be resolved in diplomatic channels. The modified U.S. offer was made contingent on the ROK accepting the American position on custody of defendants and fair trial safeguards. In that offer the U.S. was adopting the same approach taken in the SOFA negotiations with the GRC.

1. CINCPAC 220120Z Sep 1964 (C)
2. STATE 319 to SEOUL, 9 Oct 1964 (C)
3. SEOUL 358 to STATE, 21 Oct 1964 (C)
4. EUSA Country Law Study for the Republic of Korea, 1 Apr 1964 (S)
5. CINCPAC 262315Z Oct 1964 (C)
6. STATE/DEFENSE 152130Z Dec 1964 (C)
7. SEOUL A305 to STATE, 24 Dec 1964 (C)
8. CINCPAC 220129Z Sep 1964 (C)
Another issue in the criminal jurisdiction was a Korean proposal that the U.S. surrender jurisdiction over U.S. civilians except to the extent that they were subject to military law. CINCPAC objected to this because such an agreement could interfere with the exercise of authority which might be granted by future legislation that would subject civilians to U.S. judicial processes.  

Labor Policy: The U.S. negotiators favored a labor policy wherein U.S. agencies would hire Korean employees and observe the general provisions of Korean labor practice. Conversely, the Korean proposal, apparently based on the labor provisions of the Japanese SOFA, sought authority for the ROK to hire, fire, and pay their nationals employed by the U.S. with the U.S. later paying the cost of the process.  

The American Ambassador in Seoul proposed, in February, to amend the United States position and agree to permit the Koreans to recruit labor, surrender the U.S. right to discharge Korean employees, and authorize Korean agencies to review U.S. decisions to dismiss Korean employees for security or disciplinary reasons. CINCPAC took exception to this proposal because it would accept the most objectionable features of an indirect hire system without any corresponding benefit. Consequently he recommended to the JCS that the U.S. resist any trend which would require compliance with ROK labor law or limit the U.S. right to discharge Korean employees. DOD accepted these views and subsequently a joint State-Defense message disapproved the Ambassador's proposal.  

Late in the year the ROK negotiators agreed, in principle, that the U.S. would continue to hire Koreans directly and further indicated agreement with the premise that the U.S., even as an employer of South Korean Nationals, could not submit to the jurisdiction of ROK courts or labor tribunals.

1. CINCPAC 151852Z Jun 1964 (C)
2. SEOUL A569 to STATE, 10 Feb 1964 (C)
3. SEOUL 1040 to STATE, 4PM 17 Feb 1964 (C)
4. STATE 761 to SEOUL, 8PM 28 Feb 1964 (C)
5. SEOUL A231 to STATE, 2 Nov 1964 (C)
Unauthorized Marriages Between U.S. Servicemen and Korean Nationals.

For cogent reasons the U.S. military authorities in Korea had attempted to establish certain minimum standards that should be met before a U.S. serviceman's marriage to a Korean National was sanctioned. However, in many instances the American Embassy in Seoul had processed marriage applications that resulted in valid marriages without prior military approval. The Department of State position was that the Embassy action was required because the U.S. Court of Military Appeals had previously questioned the validity of certain service regulations which required military approval prior to marriage with foreign nationals.

In June CINCPAC recommended that the Department of State change its procedure so as to make military approval of the marriage an antecedent condition to the processing of marriage papers by the Embassy. The JCS subsequently approved CINCPAC's recommendation and the Department of State implemented the new procedures.

Republic of China Status of Forces Agreement

Discussions relative to a GRC/U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) entered their eleventh year without any signs of immediate agreement. There, as in Korea, the text of the criminal jurisdiction article was the main obstacle to an early accord. At mid-year the Chinese were demanding the right to try any serious cases involving U.S. personnel. Further, GRC indicated that if there were any "disturbances" over a case they would insist on exercising jurisdiction.

CINCPAC interpreted that as a GRC move to acquire jurisdiction in any case with political implications. Recognizing that this would reduce the possibility of a fair trial for a U.S. serviceman, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that this maneuver be resisted.

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1. CINCPAC 1tr ser 0472, 15 Jun 1964 (C)
2. JCSM 618-64, 18 Jul 1964 (C)
3. JCS 1776/694-2, 21 Dec 1964 (C)
4. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, pp. 155-158
5. TAIPEI A-1035 to STATE, 29 May 1964 (C)
6. CINCPAC 252133Z Jun 1964 (C)
Toward the end of the year the GRC announced a conditional acceptance of the U.S. proposal that the GRC agree to a general waiver of its primary right to exercise jurisdiction and the right to reclaim criminal jurisdiction over American service personnel only with respect to offenses specified in a definitive list. However, the GRC condition was that they be allowed to have pretrial custody in those cases in which the GRC would exercise jurisdiction. 1

At the end of the year it appeared that the pressure for a successful conclusion of the SOFA negotiations weighed heavier on the Chinese than the U.S. That analysis suggested that a firm U.S. stand could triumph on the issues of a definitive list and pretrial custody. 2, 3

Thailand Proposal for Status of Forces Agreement

Intermittent and inconclusive discussions related to a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Thailand had been conducted since 1959, and in 1961 the U.S. tabled a multilateral "Memorandum of Agreement", similar to a SOFA for SEATO forces. In 1964 that proposal was still under SEATO consideration for applicability to all MPO plans.

On 30 April the SEATO Council Representative of Thailand presented the U.S. a draft Status of Forces Agreement and expressed the hope that it could be acceptable as a basis for negotiating a bilateral agreement. 4 The draft was similar to the NATO SOFA, except that it conformed to the Thai judicial procedure applying under the extant condition of modified martial law and made no provision for the accused to be represented by counsel in a trial before a Thai court.

CINCPAC consulted CHJUSMAGTHAI and the U.S. Ambassador in Bangkok and found that both of them were satisfied with the informal procedures they were employing and that they opposed negotiating a SOFA. 5 Although convinced that the disadvantages of entering into SOFA

1. TAIPEI A-453 to STATE, 2 Dec 1964 (C)
2. TAIPEI A-493 to SEOUL, 18 Dec 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 300443Z Dec 1964 (C)
4. BANGKOK A1039 to STATE, 25 May 1964 (C)
5. CHJUSMAGTHAI 6513 DTG 240602Z Jul 1964 (C)
negotiations with the Thai Government would far outweigh any benefits accruing to the U.S., Admiral Sharp nevertheless felt that a summary rejection of the Thai proposal could adversely affect the U.S. military posture. Accordingly, he recommended to the JCS that SOFA negotiations be limited to a multilateral basis within the SEATO structure and any agreement be limited to contingency situations only.  

Unfair Trial of U.S. Serviceman Under Japanese SOFA

Early in 1964 a trial observer in a Japanese court reported that a U.S. enlisted man, tried in 1962 on a charge of negligent driving, had not been provided a competent interpreter during the trial. The man had been found guilty, sentenced to imprisonment for 10 months, and the conviction was sustained in appellate proceedings although the sentence was reduced to 6 months confinement. CINCPAC recommended that the Department of State act to protect the serviceman's rights. Twenty days later, in anticipation of an early Japanese request for custody of the man, CINCPAC asked that the State Department action be expedited.

Subsequently, the American Embassy in Tokyo discussed the case with Japanese authorities and ascertained that no decision had been reached in the matter. This case had not been resolved at the end of the year.

Criminal Jurisdiction Over U.S. Civilian Employees and Dependents in Japan

Receiving considerable publicity in Japan was testimony before the Senate Status of Forces Subcommittee to the effect that the reluctance of the Japanese to try American minor children and other American civilians had an adverse impact on the morale and discipline of U.S.

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1. CINCPAC 152354Z Aug 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC ser 738, 2 Apr 1964 (U)
3. CINCPAC 222255Z Apr 1964 (U)
4. STATE to TOKYO, 20 Apr 1964 (C)
5. TOKYO 3455 to STATE, 21 May 1964 (C)
forces in Japan. To counter expected opposition pressure for revision of the U.S. - Japanese SOFA, the GOJ requested that the U.S. give it a formal statement that civilians were no longer subject to courts-martial jurisdiction. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that any such statement emphasize the availability of administrative disciplinary sanction which might be applied to civilians and indicate that full use would be made of these measures by U.S. authorities. CINCPAC's view was accepted and incorporated in the instructions sent to the American Ambassador in Tokyo.

Thereafter OSD authorized CINCPAC to establish procedures designed to increase the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by Japanese authorities where the administrative and disciplinary sanctions available to U.S. commanders were inadequate. CINCPAC directed Commander United States Forces, Japan in coordination with Commander 5th Air Force, Commander Navy Forces Japan, Commanding General United States Army Japan, and American Embassy to formulate the procedures.

Proposals Concerning Criminal Jurisdiction Over U.S. Civilians

In June, CINCPAC pointed out to the JCS the necessity for remedial legislation to make dependents and civilian employees overseas subject to U.S. jurisdiction. He recommended that the DOD promote the establishment of a U.S. civil court which would have jurisdiction over offenses committed overseas by U.S. citizens; also, that DOD advocate sufficiently broad authority in SOFA agreements to accommodate trials by such a court if and when established. These recommendations have been concurred in by other major unified commanders and by the JCS and transmitted to the DOD. In addition, CINCPAC's recommendations were placed on the agenda of a September OSD conference.

1. TOKYO 2116 to STATE, 18 Jan 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC 220119Z Jan 1964 (C)
3. STATE 1969 to TOKYO, 29 Jan 1964 (C)
4. DEF 954939, DTG 072245Z Feb 1964 (C)
5. CINCPAC 140130Z Mar 1964 (C)
6. CINCPAC ltr ser 0466, 13 Jun 1964 (C)
7. JCS 1776/695-2, 10 Aug 1964 (C)
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concerning a review of legal aspects of Status of Forces policies. At the end of the year OSD held the question under advisement.

Claims Arising from SEATO Exercise LIKTAS

Early in 1964 the Government of the Philippines opened negotiations to develop an agreement that would govern the handling of claims arising from Exercise LIKTAS, a SEATO exercise scheduled to begin in the Philippines in May. CINCPACREP PHIL represented the U.S. in preliminary discussions related to the agreement, and when the first Philippine draft was forwarded to Washington, CINCPAC was asked to comment on it.

Following a conference with representatives of the Component Commanders, Admiral Felt recommended certain changes intended to make the agreement consistent with prior exercise claims agreements and U.S. claims statutes. One provision of the initial Philippine draft agreement would have authorized the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines to resolve conflicts as to whether a specific death, injury, or property damage was caused by personnel of one or another participating nation. CINCPAC recommended that the U.S. make a statement for the record that such a proviso should not be interpreted to require the U.S. to make any award except in accordance with established U.S. law and procedures. He made the same comment on a subsequent draft and on 24 March, the Department of State directed the American Ambassador in the Philippines to delete that provision of the agreement that would have allowed the Philippine Chief of Staff to resolve disputes.

The Philippine Government continued to manifest concern that there might be instances when it would be impossible to determine which

1. OSD DEF 983502 DTG 241641Z Aug 1964 (U)
2. OSD DEF 956370 DTG 192050Z Feb 1964 (C)
3. MANILA A-669 to STATE, 26 Feb 1964 (U)
4. CINCPAC 110353Z Mar 1964 (C)
5. CINCPACREP PHIL 130801Z Mar 1964 (C)
6. CINCPAC 170350Z Mar 1964 (C)
7. STATE 1415 to MANILA, 9PM 23 Mar 1964 (C)
country's force was responsible for damage. However, the issue was resolved when the U.S. and the Philippine Government reached an agreed interpretation to the effect that the U.S. Foreign Claims Commission would give great weight to the findings of an investigating committee composed of representatives of the Philippine Government and countries whose forces might have given cause for a claim. Just before the exercise started in May, military representatives of the Philippines, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. signed the claims agreement.

The arrangement thus concluded was significant because it was the first multilateral claims system established for SEATO, and the precedents established by it would undoubtedly influence future exercises. (For details of the Exercise LIGTAS see the "SEATO Training Exercises" portion of this chapter.)

VISITS IN THE PACOM AREA

U.S. relations with the nations in the PACOM were materially influenced by visits to CINCPAC and the Component Commanders by numerous foreign dignitaries and by personal contact of CINCPAC and his representatives who visited foreign countries in the area. (U)

Visits by U.S. Civil and Military Officials

A large number of U.S. government representatives visited CINCPAC in Hawaii during the year. Among these were 143 groups headed by officials of flag rank or comparable civilian status. The visitors usually received background briefings from CINCPAC on their outward journey to one or more of the countries in the PACOM area and presented debriefings to CINCPAC on their return. The total number

1. MANILA 1460 to STATE, 30 Mar 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC 010323Z Apr 1964 (C)
3. MANILA 1629 to STATE, 6PM 21 Apr 1964 (C)
4. STATE 1704 to MANILA, 4PM 28 Apr 1964 (C)
5. COMNAVPHIL 190637Z May 1964 (C)
of CINCPAC visitors of flag rank or above was 202; an additional 409 were members of the official parties of these groups. (Comparable figures for 1963 were 288 and 514 respectively.) The principal offices or committees represented by visitors to CINCPAC during 1964 are listed in Appendix I. (U)

Visits by Representatives of Foreign Countries

During the year, 36 groups of high ranking foreign civilian and military dignitaries visited CINCPAC. The total visitors of flag or general rank was 42; an additional 77 members comprised the official parties of these groups. (Comparable figures for 1963 were 36, and 34 respectively.) Most of the visits were made specifically for briefings and discussions on matters of mutual interest. A list showing some of the more important foreign visitors to CINCPAC, grouped according to countries, appears in Appendix J. (U)

WEAPONS DEMONSTRATION FOR FOREIGN MILITARY OFFICIALS

A CINCPAC Weapons Demonstration was conducted during the period 28 November through 5 December 1964. The objective, as in previous years, was to promote mutual understanding and friendship among the top military leaders of the free nations of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific area with emphasis on informal social activities and a demonstration of the military equipment, techniques, and tactics of the PACOM Armed Forces. 1 To that end special attention was devoted to maintaining an atmosphere devoid of political considerations. 2,3

Invitations were extended to seventeen countries. Countries accepting the invitations were: Australia, Republic of China, France, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, and Republic of Vietnam. India

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1962, p. 143
2. CINCPAC 222215Z Sep 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 220338Z Sep 1964 (C)
and Burma sent their regrets. Canada was invited to send representation to the demonstration for the first time, but declined. Indonesia, although accepting the invitation once, changed its position on 19 November and announced that its representatives would not attend. Prince Souvanna Phouma, head of the coalition government of Laos, felt that acceptance would be inopportune and implied that Lao participation might compound the complex international problems he already faced. He further believed that his military leaders might be needed at home at the time of the demonstration because he anticipated a serious enemy offensive as soon as the rains ceased. Cambodia was not invited. Of the thirty-four foreign officers who attended the Demonstration, eighteen held positions of Deputy Chief of Service or higher, and twenty-nine had flag rank.

The group gathered at John Hay Air Base in Baguio, Philippines on 28 November where visitors were welcomed by their host, Admiral Sharp, at the American Embassy residence. Serving as co-hosts for the group at Baguio were: General Alfredo M. Santos, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Rear Admiral J. P. Monroe, USN, CINCPACREP, Philippines, Major General Sam Maddux, Jr., USAF, Commander, 13th Air Force, and Major General A. P. Tacon, USAF, CHJUSMAC, Philippines.

The group embarked in the USS CONSTITUTION on the morning of 30 November. Enroute to Okinawa guests witnessed daily air operations, night air operations, an ASW demonstration, an air defense operation and a naval firepower demonstration. Admiral T. H. Moorer, USN, CINCPACFLT, Vice Admiral R. L. Johnson, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, and Rear Admiral W. S. Guest, USN, COMCARDIV NINE were co-hosts during the cruise at sea.

The group disembarked in Buckner Bay, Okinawa on 3 December.
During the period 3-5 December, firepower demonstrations were conducted by USARPAC, PACAF, and FMFPAC units; weapons, equipment and weapons systems were displayed statically; Nike-Hercules and Hawk missiles were fired as part of annual service practice. General J. K. Waters, USA, CINCUSARPAC, General H. Harris, Jr., USAF, CINCPACAF, Lieutenant General A. Watson, II, USA, CINCPACREP Ryukyu, and Lieutenant General V. H. Krulak, USMC, CG FMFPAC, served as co-hosts on Okinawa. CINCPAC commended all hands for the outstanding demonstrations.  

A budget of $23,000 was made available for direct support expenses (Military Assistance, Executive, $17,000; Operations and Maintenance, Navy, $3,000; Representation, State Department, $3,000). This amount was sufficient to cover costs incurred by CINCPAC. One-half of actual cost was for the subsistence, billeting, and entertainment of official guests ($16 per guest day); the remaining one-half was for transportation and per diem of support personnel and other administrative expenses. 

The degree to which objectives of the Demonstration were achieved can be measured by direct quotes from a few of the letters received subsequent to the Demonstration.

"We keep a wonderful memory of the trip to the Pacific and are extremely grateful for your kind invitation to the CINCPAC Weapons Demonstration which allowed us to verify once again the high state of training of the American Armed Forces, the guardians of freedom in that part of the world presently so threatened by communist subversion."

Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Staff, France

"I found all the Demonstrations of the greatest interest and, speaking for myself, they illustrated once again the speed and strength with which your forces could deploy in the unhappy event of its becoming necessary. I am sure that all the spectators were as impressed as I was with the contribution that this capability makes to ensuring peace in this area."

Commander, British Forces Hong Kong, United Kingdom

1. CINCPAC 050825Z Dec 1964 (U)
"I have renewed friendships and enjoyed seeking new ones. It has been most useful for me to meet my counterparts of the neighboring countries and I appreciate the opportunities that you created."

Chief of the General Staff,
Malaysia

"It was educational to see the awesome might at your disposal but it was most rewarding to meet you and your Admirals and Generals on such pleasant terms and to find what an impressive array of talent and ability you have with and about you. It was most enjoyable for every minute and it is surely the high light of my entire career - it was impossible to estimate the value to me."

Commander, 1st Division,
Australia
CHAPTER IV

ACTIONS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION
AND INTERNAL UPRISINGS

CINCPAC ACTIVITIES TO PRESERVE FREEDOM IN LAOS

On December 31, 1963, in Laos, a troubled year died amidst political lull. Moments later an equally troubled year was born. The New Year was punctuated principally by an unsuccessful FAR attack southwest of Xiang Khuong and by the twilight firing, 1 in the general direction of the moon, of virtually every hand weapon in Vientiane in a traditional effort to divert the spirits responsible for Lunar eclipse.

The new year began with the Laotian public watching, somewhat apprehensively, to see the effect of a new monetary stabilization program which went into effect on January 1, 1964. Further political activity centered around the possibility of neutralization of the Royal Capitol at Luang Prabang and a meeting between the two princes, Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong. 2

The fundamental military objective of the U.S. in connection with Laos remained the same — to hold and consolidate non-communist areas of Laos under the umbrella of the Geneva formula. There was, however, no known amulet that would talk the Lao out of their fear of the Viet Minh; no theory of political administration that would energize an archaic, undermanned, and incoherent bureaucracy. Sudden strengthening or stiffening would, it seemed to the American Ambassador to Laos, require inordinately large increments of U.S. money and manpower and would probably consign the Geneva Accords to oblivion.

1. CINCPAC later pointed to the shooting as one of the many cases of uneconomic dissipation of limited U.S. assets.

2. The meeting of the princes took place, the neutralization of Luang Prabang did not.
Although by February the Pathet Lao-Viet Minh (PL-VM) were on the march, as was usual in the dry season, there was no evidence of any decision that an all out drive to take Laos had been launched. Very few persons in Laos would deny that the Communists could, if they wished, take Thakhek, cut route 13 in numerous places and reach the Mekong. The question remained; would the PL-VM continue to be satisfied with harassing-nibbling tactics or would they sometime in the near future grow bolder and be willing to risk a SEATO response by making an all-out assault?

In April the political situation in Laos became even more uncertain when a group of right-wing Laotian military officers who called themselves the National Army Revolutionary Committee (NARC) executed a briefly successful coup against the government of Premier Souvanna Phouma. Phouma, however, was soon returned to a semblance of power under the auspices of the NARC and the situation returned generally to a pre-coup status. Soon Souvanna effectively took over the duties of Minister of Defense, a position which he had held in theory since the signing of the Geneva agreements, but which prior to the coup had in practice been in the hands of General Phoumi.

On the 16th of May the Pathet Lao kicked off an offensive in the Plaine des Jarres (PDJ) which drove Kong Le forces into the hills west of the Plaine. The Neutralists departed in such haste that they neglected to take along much of their U.S. supplied equipment.

Resumption of open communist attack in Laos stimulated many different interpretations as to its motives and objectives. One theory interpreted the PL attack as simply another "annual bite." Another saw it as a reaction to the right-wing coup, while still others saw it as the beginning of a drive to seize all of Laos. CINCPAC gave the JCS his own analysis of communist intentions, pointing out that Western attempts to fix precise estimates of communist intent within specific time frames were sometimes artificial because communist objectives were not limited by or geared to precise time fixing. In Laos, their objective was to take over the country completely, stem to stern. When? Whenever possible. In how many bites? As few as possible but as
many as necessary. CINCPAC did not think that communist moves could be explained as simple reactions to outside stimuli, such as the April 19 coup. CINCPAC asked, "if the April coup stimulated the current PL attack, did assassination of Quinim Pholsena stimulate last year's PL attack in the eastern Plaine des Jarres?" 1 "Was the communist seizure of Na Kay last February simply a reaction to the FAR drive to Lak Sao? If so, why do they all come in the dry season?"

Evidently there was some pattern to PL attacks and the coup was only one of many items in it. CINCPAC also felt that the "annual bite" theory was inadequate because it didn't give a clue as to how big the bite would be and it did not take into account that with each bite the "correlation of forces" changed, making bigger bites possible and leading eventually, if the process was not interrupted, to one last big bite. "Was the current attack just another nibble or is it the last big bite?" CINCPAC concluded that the Communists would either stop and digest the current bite while waiting for the next year or drive to the Mekong, depending upon their estimate of the "correlation of forces" and the U.S. determination to fight to save Laos. CINCPAC suspected, correctly, that the existing offensive would stop short of the Mekong. However, CINCPAC felt that even if his estimate was correct, there was little consolation to be taken since the same problem would have to be faced later and from a position already weakened by the recent losses.

As a result of the Pathet Lao offensive in the PDJ, Ambassador Unger, on 17 May, released the bomb fuzes and Lao T-28 pilots started cracking Pathet Lao positions with 100, 260, and 500 pound bombs. Ironically, the first really lucrative targets for bombing were the supplies and material left behind by Kong Le forces. T-28's proved effective and, following seizure of the PDJ, the communist offensive stopped and Neutralist forces were able to regroup and stabilize their positions.

In May the U.S. began reconnaissance flights over Laos (Yankee Team) in order to gather information on the Pathet Lao and prove the infiltrations of supplies and men from North Vietnam. When the U.S.

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 168
gave out press information that the reconnaissance flights were being
supported by armed escorts, Prince Souvanna Phouma became alarmed
and a little miffed with the U.S. He was afraid that this admission
would allow Hanoi to whip up some effective publicity claims regarding
U.S. and Laotian violation of the Geneva Accords. Souvanna was also
afraid that it might set in motion some effective retaliation by the Com-
munists. The flights were discontinued for the first couple of weeks in
June but with some effective coaxing from the American Ambassador,
Souvanna came around to asking that they be resumed in mid-June and
even made comments to the press himself in which he supported the
armed escorts. The U.S., in the meantime, clamped down on public
talk by officials regarding Yankee Team operations. To press ques-
tions about this, the standard answer was, "We do not answer questions
about operations."

During June U.S. efforts were directed toward strengthening the
Neutralist stronghold at Muong Soui against an expected communist
attack. The Thai furnished personnel to man an artillery battery at
Muong Soui and the U.S. brought in supplies and equipment as well as
U.S. advisors to help plan the defense of the area.

The attack on Muong Soui never came and in June Muong Soui
became the kickoff point for an unexpectedly successful government
operation (Operation Triangle) to open Route 13 from Vang Vieng north
to Luang Prabang and Route 7 from its junction with Route 13 eastward
to Muong Soui. In this case the enemy dispersed without putting forth
effective resistance, thus exhibiting reluctance to concentrate his forces
in the face of potential T-28 attacks. The most significant aspect of
Operation Triangle was that, although geographical objectives were
attained, no substantial enemy forces were destroyed. The Pathet Lao
probably had excellent intelligence on friendly plans and the estimated
three communist battalions, in the area before the start of operations,
withdrew before advancing FAR and Neutralist forces arrived.

Through the summer and fall months Pathet Lao military activity
was at a very reduced level. During this time Pathet Lao defections in
small groups rose, thus indicating morale problems on the communist side. After a visit to Khang Khay, the Soviet Ambassador reported that T-28 strikes had adversely affected Pathet Lao morale.

The success of Operation Triangle instilled new spirit into the FAR/Neutralist forces. Souvanna Phouma wanted to undertake bold actions against the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh, including airborne operations to cut off Viet Minh infiltration routes and movements to regain the Plaine des Jarres. The U.S., however, felt that Souvanna sought to get so involved in schemes totally beyond the capabilities of the FAR and Neutralists as to create a situation of sufficient danger and drama, and containing enough world-wide publicity, that the U.S. and/or SEATO would be forced to come to his rescue. Coupled with this was a probable Souvanna conviction that the entry of U.S. forces under such circumstances would result in an immediate breakup of the existing government and the opportunity for Souvanna to present himself as a Prime Minister qualified militarily and diplomatically with financial ties and capabilities beyond that of others.

In August, friendly Laotians were cheered by the U.S. retaliation against North Vietnam for attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Throughout 1964 various factions, including the Chinese Communists, USSR, and the French, were pushing for a new 14 Nation Geneva Conference on Laos. The U.S. saw the fruitlessness of this, especially since the Communists had not honored their previous Geneva promises to withdraw North Vietnamese troops from Laos and keep a cease fire. Souvanna, at U.S. urging, made withdrawal of the Pathet Lao from the Plaine des Jarres a precondition to holding an international conference on Laos; a precondition that made it fairly unlikely that a conference would take place. After much discussion over agenda items, however, meetings were arranged among the three Laotian Princes beginning 24 August in Paris. The purpose of these meetings was to lay the groundwork for another Geneva Conference. Premier-Prince Souvanna Phouma, chief of the Neutralist group, Prince Boun Oum, chief of the Rightist faction, and Prince Souphanouvong, chief of the Pro-communist Pathet Lao, convened formally on 21 September after
several weeks of informal and unproductive talks. This meeting was similarly unproductive. About all the princes could agree to was that they each desired to settle their problems by peaceful means; the particulars of doing this were a different matter. The princes departed from Paris but left delegates there to continue talks.

The International Commission for Supervision and Control, which had the responsibility of enforcing the Geneva Agreements for Laos, remained ineffective in 1964. Phouma made numerous requests of this body to investigate cease fire violations and the presence of Viet Minh troops in Laos. The Commission was slow to act, primarily because of the stalling tactics of the Polish member whose whole purpose on the Commission seemed to be to see that nothing was accomplished by it.

**Recommendations for Stabilizing the Situation**

As a result of deterioration of FAR-Neutralist positions in central Laos and a general weakening of the U.S. position in Southeast Asia, the JCS, in mid-February, asked CINCPAC for his comments and recommendations concerning the implementation of certain actions contained in a National Security Agency memorandum. The JCS also asked for recommendations concerning the feasibility of advancing SEATO Tactical Air Exercise AIR BOON CHOO, then scheduled for April, and any other actions that CINCPAC felt might improve the Laos situation.

Admiral Felt, who was in Bangkok at the time, answered the JCS questions and reviewed the seriousness of the situation by summarizing a Vientiane Embassy evaluation as follows:

1. FAR had again betrayed its essential weakness in the face of determined communist military pressure.
2. Neutralist morale and leadership appeared better but it was hard to tell how they would perform under heavy pressure.

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1. JCS 4941 DTG 191719Z Feb 1964 (TS)
2. JCS 2344/68-6, 31 Jul 1963 containing NSAM 256
3. Vientiane Airgram A-274 to State, 19 Feb 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 231010Z Feb 1964 (TS)
3. Meos would do a good job of protecting their own homes but had not been impressive when called to support other military efforts.

4. French recognition of the communist regime in China, perhaps to be followed by expanded relations with Hanoi, reduced the deterrent which had been presented by a single voice of western governments.

5. The Viet Minh continued to be the critical element in the situation.

6. The International Control Commission was powerless to do more than deter and indite.

7. In political and psychological realm, the way was being paved even closer to a situation favoring an eventual Pathet Lao takeover.

8. The U.S. holding action "may be" threatened seriously. (Admiral Felt thought "is" should be substituted for "may be")

Taking into consideration the above analysis and his own analysis of the situation in Laos, which had been previously forwarded to the JCS, Admiral Felt stated that in his opinion the badly deteriorated situation could not be retrieved or stabilized by half-way measures. ¹

CINCPAC commented on the actions contained in the National Security Agency Memorandum as follows:

1. Delivery of additional T-28 aircraft to Laos — Two T-28s were to be delivered the next week and discussion with the Thailand Government was scheduled concerning the deployment of four T-28s from the USAF Special Air Warfare Center in Thailand.

2. Commitment of Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (Thailand) to support operations in Laos — The unit could maintain the commitment but Admiral Felt recommended that the CIA make a new assessment of the program.

3. Expanding use of South Vietnam border patrols — An urgent item in the COMUSMACV portfolio; although the action would have a modest effect, it was one of several things which had to be done to close the Viet Cong pipeline.

4. Indigenous potential for expansion of the pro-western guerrilla program in Laos — This should be developed.

¹ CINCPAC 211135Z Feb 1964 (S)
5. Thai volunteer Special Forces to operate in Laos—CINCPAC could see no way of getting these forces to operate in Laos unless U.S. soldiers or marines went along. Chances were better to get RVN units to do this and a plan was being developed by COMUSMACV.

6. Movement of selected U.S. units into Thailand—All was in readiness for movements but CINCPAC felt that moves should not be made prematurely. CINCPAC favored a sequence of air strikes against targets in North Vietnam and Laos, followed closely by moving into Thailand a Ground-Air Brigade size unit to pose a threat from another source and to buck up the Thai backbone.

7. Use of "sanitized" combat aircraft and contract U.S. and third country pilots and maintenance crews for offensive air strikes in Laos—CINCPAC was doubtful that Thai pilots would volunteer but certain that Chinese Nationals would do so.

CINCPAC stated that, if his analysis and that of the Vientiane Embassy concerning the situation in Laos were correct, the time had come to go beyond the above actions. He then recommended more severe actions including use of the VNAF to hit selected targets in North Vietnam with A-1H aircraft loads and more of the same against Tchepone. CINCPAC believed the GVN would welcome the opportunity to make these strikes: CINCPAC said that the U.S. should then be ready to execute CINCPAC OPLANs 99-64 (Military Operations Against NVN to Stabilize the Situation in Laos) and 33-62 (U.S. Military Operation Against NVN); then to deploy to Thailand a Ground-Air Brigade size unit while assuming the appropriate readiness posture for possible execution of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64 (Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia).

Admiral Felt discussed with Air Chief Marshall Dawee of Thailand the possibility of moving up the date for the beginning of SEATO Exercise AIR BOON CHOO and they agreed that it would not be a good idea. Changes to SEATO Exercises required agreement of the eight member nations and it was not likely that all nations would be receptive to a change. Therefore Admiral Felt recommended to the JCS that the exercise be started on the scheduled date and this recommendation was accepted.
Recommended Actions as Result of 19 April Coup

As a result of the successful coup against the government of Premier Souvanna Phouma, the JCS asked CINCPAC which actions in National Security Agency Memorandum 256 were applicable to the situation and which actions should be prepared for implementation.1 Before CINCPAC could prepare an answer to the JCS questions, Souvanna had been returned to power and the situation had returned generally to pre-coup status. CINCPAC prepared an answer, however, stating that military moves should be considered carefully because of the tightrope represented by the U.S. objective of maintaining a ceasefire and restoring the situation completely to a pre-coup status while not encouraging the Pathet Lao to take advantage of the existing confusion.2 CINCPAC's only recommendations for immediate moves were that publicity be blown up on exercise AIR BOON CHOO, which was then underway, and that a Carrier Task Group be brought into the western part of the South China Sea to operate for a short time and then disappear. Other available actions were reviewed and CINCPAC stated that he did not expect the Communists to move against major cities on the Mekong because they did not wish to assume responsibility for the people living in the river valley nor did they wish to cause a U.S. or SEATO armed reaction.

Carrier Task Group Positioning Subsequent to Laos Coup

After CINCPAC's initial recommendations for action as a result of the Laos Coup (see above), the JCS asked CINCPAC what he thought about moving a CVA Task Group to an area within 48 steaming hours from Danang.3 In addition to wanting recommendations on the desirability of the proposed move, the JCS wanted to know the most effective way to deploy the force so as to achieve a stabilizing influence on the governments of both Laos and RVN and to impress Hanoi by evidence of U.S. interest in the area.4

1. JCS 5930 DTG 192005Z Apr 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 231427Z Apr 1964 (TS)
3. JCS 5954 DTG 212102Z Apr 1964 (TS)
4. JCS 5966 DTG 221512Z Apr 1964 (S)
CINCPAC recommended that the aircraft carrier KITTY HAWK, flagship for CTG 77.4, proceed from a position near Okinawa to a position close off Quang Ngai and south of Danang (16°N 110°E) where she would conduct air operations for about two days and then disappear. If further action was required, the MIDWAY would be close enough to reach the area in about two days and take over. After making the above recommendations, CINCPAC gave directions for the KITTY HAWK to sail southwesterly toward the recommended positioning area. On 28 April the JCS advised CINCPAC that a decision to position a CVA Task Group as CINCPAC had recommended had not yet been made but that it was desired that one CVA Task Group stay within 48 hours steaming time of Danang. On 1 May CINCPAC authorized CINCPACFLT to release the KITTY HAWK to normal operations but required that a CVA Task Group be within 48 hours steaming time of 16 degrees north, 110 degrees south (a position in the South China Sea opposite Quang Ngai).

CVA Positioning during May

In May, when Kong Le was driven off the Plaine des Jarres and non-communist forces position in Laos reached a new low, the KITTY HAWK was again diverted from normal operations to stand guard near Southeast Asia. Beefed up with four RA3Bs and with a mission of reconnaissance as well as show of force, the KITTY HAWK moved to the 16 degrees north, 110 degrees east, the area previously designated by CINCPAC after the April Coup (see above). A 200 mile diameter operating area was established which allowed the CVA to move north of the 17 degree latitude which separated North and South Vietnam.

In addition to the KITTY HAWK movement, the Commander of the Seventh Fleet placed two other task groups on short steaming notice for the Southeast Asia area.

1. ADMINO CINCPAC 222333Z Apr 1964 (C)
2. JCS 171556Z May 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 172111Z May 1964 (S)
4. CINCPACFLT 171911Z May 1964 (S)
5. CINCPAC 180059Z May 1964 (TS)
6. COMSEVENTHFLT 180418Z May 1964 (S)
On 20 May CINCPACFLT reported that the KITTY HAWK had arrived in her designated operating area. Consideration was given to releasing the KITTY HAWK after 23 May and putting the BON HOMME RICHARD on 48 hour reaction duty but it was decided to hold the KITTY HAWK in the area pending outcome of other current operations. For the remainder of May the KITTY HAWK stayed in her designated operating area and conducted Yankee Team reconnaissance flights over Laos. On guidance from CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT directed that the USS CONSTELLATION be sailed to the South China Sea to relieve the KITTY HAWK.

On 6 June, Commander Task Group 77.6 in the USS CONSTELLATION assumed Yankee Team responsibilities from Commander Task Group 77.4 in the KITTY HAWK. The KITTY HAWK was held on station until 10 June when she resumed normal operations as a result of JCS directions.

Reconnaissance Flights over Laos (YANKEE TEAM)

On 18 May the JCS directed the first low level reconnaissance flights over Laos. These were conducted during daylight hours on 19 May using RF-101s from the 2nd Air Division in South Vietnam. Overflight of North Vietnam or areas west of 105 degrees (which included Northern Laos) was not authorized for these flights. Soon after, a second operation was directed by the JCS, using both RF-101s from South Vietnam and RF-8As off the aircraft carrier KITTY HAWK. The JCS then gave the Laos reconnaissance flights the nickname of "YANKEE TEAM" and CINCPAC appointed MACV as coordinating.

1. CINCPACFLT 200314Z May 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 201905Z May 1964 (S)
3. CINCPACFLT 202207Z May 1964 (TS)
4. CINCPACFLT 260317Z May 1964 (TS)
5. CINCPACFLT 232201Z May 1964 (C)
6. CINCPACFLT 070537Z Jun 1964 (TS)
7. JCS 6700 DTG 071556Z Jun 1964 (S)
8. ADMINO COMSEVENTH FLT 072307Z Jun 1964 (S)
9. CINCPACFLT 090301Z Jun 1964 (S)
10. JCS 6710 DTG 011945Z Jun 1964 (S)
11. JCS 2215-64 DTG 181742Z May 1964 (S)
12. JCS 2274-64 DTG 201653Z May 1964 (S)
authority for YANKEE TEAM operations. Overflights of North Vietnam were still not authorized but the restriction of not being able to fly west of 105 degrees in Laos was removed.

The purpose of YANKEE TEAM operations was twofold—to obtain intelligence information to support military and political planning—to remind friendly and hostile leaders of U.S. military presence. The JCS authorized YANKEE TEAM operations to be conducted on a continuing basis, responsive to CINCPAC, MACV, Vientiane and JCS requirements for reconnaissance. Occasional night flights were also authorized and an operational reporting system was established by CINCPAC that required five reports as follows:

1. Planned sorties.
2. Actual launch time of sorties.
3. Actual landing time of sorties.
4. Post flight reports.
5. Consolidated 24-hour operations report.

The JCS would not allow Thai bases to be used for reconnaissance operations in Laos but they could be used to launch Search and Rescue operations into Laos.

The JCS approved policy for YANKEE TEAM operations that would provide the maximum benefit to the U.S. consistent with minimum-level flights were conducted at altitudes above effective hostile ground fire. Low-level reconnaissance flights were accompanied by fighter-bomber escort and were utilized only when medium level reconnaissance would not give satisfactory results. Low level flights normally avoided strong antiaircraft areas found on part of the Plaine des Jarres and on route 7. When low level flights above strong areas of defense were sufficiently warranted so as to accept the risk, flights were escorted and, when

1. JCS 2302-64 DTG 21216Z May 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 240510Z May 1964 (S)
3. JCS 6470-64 DTG 251747Z May 1964 (S)
suppression was essential to safety, the escorts could attack known positions in advance of the reconnaissance aircraft's arrival.

Initially three routes were covered on a recurring basis at 48-hour intervals. These flights were flown at medium level only, for the purpose of obtaining intelligence on possible border infiltration from North Vietnam into Laos, and were in addition to flights scheduled on an as required basis.¹ In addition the JCS approved 48-hour interval unescorted flights for shallow penetration of the Laotion border areas to obtain photos in support of cross-border operations.²

On 7 June an RF-8A from the KITTY HAWK, flying at 1200 feet near Xieng Khouang Ville, was shot down by communist ground fire. On 8 June a reconnaissance escort F8D was shot down in the same general area.³,⁴ Both pilots were subsequently recovered, although one, Navy Lieutenant Charles Klusmann, was captured and held by the Communists for 83 days before he escaped and made his way to friendly lines.

To demonstrate that the U.S. was going to continue reconnaissance, by force if necessary, the JCS directed a 9 June strike mission against the antiaircraft installation at Xieng Khouang Ville, using conventional weapons and napalm.⁵ Napalm was subsequently deleted from the strike mission which was conducted with an estimated 50-percent success.⁶

As of 31 August a total of 205 YANKEE TEAM reconnaissance sorties had been flown; 102 by the 2nd Air Division and 103 by the Seventh Fleet. These flights were supported by 68 escort aircraft sorties from the 2nd Air Division and 102 by the Seventh Fleet. The above sorties do not include those that were scheduled and cancelled or aborted for weather, nor do they include ELINT, weather, or search and rescue sorties, which were also conducted in conjunction with the YANKEE TEAM flights.

¹ JCS 7798-64 DTG 071806Z Aug 1964 (S)
² JCS 8062-64 DTG 242224Z Aug 1964 (S)
³ CTG 77.4 061415Z Jun 1964 (S)
⁴ CTG 77.6 070605Z Jun 1964 (S)
⁵ JCS 6706 DTG 072022Z Jun 1964 (S)
⁶ 1st ASOC 090715Z Jun 1964 (S)
During September 113 missions were flown. One photo aircraft received ground fire and on other missions two escort aircraft were fired upon; only one aircraft received a hit. There were 177 missions flown in October. Eighteen aircraft received ground fire but none were hit. The November count was 125 missions flown with an RF-101 and an F-100 receiving ground fire and both aircraft being shot down. Of the 145 December missions, none were fired upon. A proposal for YANKEE TEAM leaflet operations was not considered desirable by the American Ambassador, Vientiane who considered it better that the Lao conduct their own PSYWAR operations. ¹

A synopsis of YANKEE TEAM missions flown from their beginning in May until the end of 1964 is given as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Photo</th>
<th>Escort</th>
<th>Weather</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Air Div</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>98</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the total 880 missions flown, 56 received fire. Eleven of the 115 aircraft involved in the 56 missions receiving fire were hit and a total of four were shot down. Total sorties was 1257.

YANKEE TEAM Data Base

The establishment of the YANKEE TEAM and related programs during 1964, and the requirement to maintain close control over these programs, led CINCPAC to establish a YANKEE TEAM Data Base System using the techniques of automatic data processing. ¹

CINCPAC maintained a history of each YANKEE TEAM or related mission broken into seven file categories: (1) weather reconnaissance missions, (2) photo/armed reconnaissance missions, (3) support missions, (4) target description, (5) enemy antiaircraft defenses, (6) damage to mission aircraft, and (7) remarks. The information

¹. VIENTIANE 1170 to CINCPAC, 26 Jun 1964 (TS)
included: number and type of aircraft, takeoff and recovery time, flight profile data, conditions of weather and visibility, location and description of enemy ground reaction, hits and damage to mission aircraft, suppressive/retaliatory reaction of armed escort aircraft if appropriate, and a short description of the target objective and results.

Routine bi-weekly summary reports of YANKEE TEAM activity were distributed to the CINCPAC Staff. The system also responded to selective queries concerning the vulnerability to ground fire of mission aircraft at various flight altitudes, vulnerability of aircraft over specific target areas, and effect of altitude on reconnaissance coverage.

Proposed Laos FARM GATE

In May the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on possible introduction of FARM GATE type operations in Laos. 1 The JCS had previously asked for CINCPAC's comments on a study titled "Military Actions Related to Breach of Ceasefire in Laos" which contained a discussion of Laos FARM GATE possibilities. 2

In his answer to the above queries CINCPAC reviewed the evolution of the RVN FARM GATE because the term FARM GATE had come to mean different things to different people. The original FARM GATE, then known as JUNGLE JIM, was introduced into the RVN as a training unit in 1961. Rules of engagement initially prohibited the participation of the unit in combat but by the end of 1961 the JCS relaxed this requirement and permitted JUNGLE JIM aircraft to go on combat missions with combined U.S./GVN crews aboard. 3 However, JUNGLE JIM aircraft could only be employed on combat missions when the GVNAir Force did not otherwise have the capability to perform such missions. 4 The stated purpose of JUNGLE JIM combat missions was to train Vietnamese crew members so that the GVNAir Force could perform all required missions alone at the earliest possible time.

1. JCS 6552 DTG 282049Z May 1964 (S)
2. JCS 6254 DTG 111845Z May 1964 (S)
3. JCS 2488 DTG 062053Z Dec 1961 (S)
4. JCS 2706 DTG 260116Z Dec 1961 (S)
CINCPAC presumed that rules for a Laos FARM GATE operation would be the same as those for RVN and stated that the limiting factor would be the requirement for host country crew members. The RLAF currently had available 24 T/RT-28s, 13 C-47s and a mixture of eight liaison aircraft.

The RLAF had 20 T/RT-28s (four T/RT-28s were used by the SAW Detachment for tactical crew training) and 23 pilots available for operational sorties; there were not enough RLAF pilots to man RLAF aircraft and be available for a FARM GATE effort. CINCPAC pointed out that the Laos antiaircraft environment was known to be more sophisticated than that in the RVN and this would cause a U.S. crew to sooner or later be shot down. Since the operation would not remain covert or deniable for very long CINCPAC could see no advantage in a covert action utilizing U.S. crews. He therefore recommended against a FARM GATE type operation for Laos but stated that if and when the U.S. was willing to accept the known risk involved, plans should be made for overt operations using modern aircraft.

Requirements for Occupation of Laos Panhandle

The JCS, in the process of an examination requested by higher authority, asked CINCPAC for his views as to 'what would be required to occupy the Panhandle section of Laos?" The JCS specifically wanted to know what type and scope operations would be within the capabilities of South Vietnamese Forces alone and what concept of operations would be employed, what U.S. Forces, in addition to RVN and

1. JCS 6676 DTG 052237Z Jun 1964 (TS)
FAR Forces, would be required to give "assured control" of the area, with deployments extending generally along the 17th parallel from the Mekong to the sea?

CINCPAC recognized the Panhandle section of Laos as that area of Laos south of the general line Seno-Tchepone to the Cambodian border. This was an extremely rugged area of about 22,000 square miles, containing some 23 enemy battalions. These were scattered in company and platoon size elements but could be readily augmented from North Vietnam. CINCPAC did not feel that the friendly Laotion units in southern Laos, although numerically impressive, were capable of standing up to Pathet Lao encadred by Viet Minh. Lines of communications for U.S. forces in the Parhandle area were among the worst in South-east Asia.

CINCPAC, after obtaining the views of his Component Commanders and COMUSMACV, replied to the JCS query. 1 CINCPAC stated that the RVN armed forces capability for conducting operations across the border into Laos was limited to intelligence collection, harassing guerrilla type operations, and air strikes. Even these capabilities were not realizable until COMUSMACV training programs were completed and re-equipping of the VNAF was accomplished.

CINCPAC interpreted "assured control of the area", as used in the JCS query, to entail freedom of friendly military movement from significant harassment, freedom of the RLG to organize and administer the country side, and a definitive sealing of the Panhandle from further encroachments. This would entail establishing U.S. ground forces in strength immediately north of the general line Savannakhet-Seno-Tchepone-Lao Bao Pass and an extensive patrol and punitive effort throughout the Panhandle area, all supported by extensive air interdiction and logistic support. The Component Commanders and COMUSMACV had given force requirement estimates ranging from two plus divisions to five divisions, with appropriate air and other support. CINCPAC thought it unproductive to use these numbers of forces for a "clearing"

1. CINCPAC 100448Z Jun 1964 (TS)
action unless there were to be "holding" operations also. Clearing forces would have to remain in Laos for an indefinite period of time and CINCPAC thought it appalling for U.S. divisions to be scattered across Laos defending scattered strong points in a posture reminiscent of the French in the Indochina War.

CINCPAC stated that, with a massive effort, a system of forts could be occupied in the Panhandle area but "we will have shot a big wad at a point of no decision." This would make a relatively minor impact on throttling infiltration into the RVN and could be done better by air strikes and guerrilla warfare. CINCPAC felt that the important thing was to remove the inhibitions placed on U.S. operations against North Vietnam by "a technical border which exists only on the map and not on the ground."

Preparation for Defense of Muong Soui

In late June the U.S. received reports that the Pathet Lao might be preparing to attack Muong Soui. This was the last of the Neutralist/FAR strongholds on the Plaine des Jarres (PDJ) and was located along the western edge of the PDJ and astride Route 7. The main Pathet Lao forces in the PDJ could attack Muong Soui by moving west along Route 7. A smaller force, estimated at three battalions and located in the Phou Koun/Muong Kassy region, could attack Muong Soui from the rear by moving east along Route 7.

The JCS asked CINCPAC for preliminary comments on possible U.S. actions in response to Pathet Lao preparations to attack Muong Soui and retaliatory actions to be used if Muong Soui fell. CINCPAC was also directed to prepare a unilateral capabilities plan outlining U.S. air strikes to be made in Laos. One purpose of the air strikes would be to aid in the defense of Muong Soui and a second purpose involved punitive air strikes in the Muong Soui area and elsewhere in

1. JCS 7085 DTG 252303Z Jun 1964 (TS)
2. JCS 7086 DTG 260011Z Jun 1964 (TS)
3. JCS 7124 DTG 262300Z Jun 1964 (TS)
Laos to make it apparent that the Pathet Lao had paid a big price if they were to take Muong Soui.

The JCS message, requesting preliminary CINCPAC comments, contained extensive proposed U.S. air strikes of an offensive nature. In responding to the JCS regarding these strikes, CINCPAC stated that when the U.S. was ready to engage in air strikes in Laos to the extent envisioned by the JCS message, the U.S. should consider implementing actions against North Vietnam and be prepared with OPLAN 32 forces to carry through to the end. In addition, CINCPAC recommended that low level reconnaissance flights, to be conducted against Pathet Lao forces in the Muong Soui area, should be preceded by suppressive fire from escort aircraft and that suppressive fire should be employed also during low level passes by reconnaissance aircraft. CINCPAC concluded that if the U.S. should decide to wait until Muong Soui fell and then take retaliatory action, targets in CINCPAC OPLAN 38 could be struck as directed but at the same time the U.S. should look at North Vietnam targets and be prepared to call all bluffs.¹

CINCPAC prepared the air strike plan which had been directed by the JCS.² The plan called for COMUSMACVTHAI to exercise operational command of assigned forces and envisioned USAF air strike forces deploying rapidly to Thailand and the RVN to augment forces already in place. Their purpose would be to conduct air strikes against enemy forces, bases, and lines of communications. Carrier based aircraft of the Seventh Fleet, operating in the South China Sea, might also be assigned the primary mission of supporting COMUSMACVTHAI. COMUSMACV would provide operational and logistic support. Deploying air strike forces would come from PACAF. The plan contained provisions for reconnaissance and for striking fixed targets under two contingencies; in defense of Muong Soui, and for punitive actions if

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1. CINCPAC 260707Z Jun 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 300605Z Jun 1964 (TS)
Muong Soui should fall. Napalm would be used extensively. CINCPAC emphasized that the best single measure to make the plan effective would be for the U.S. Government to recognize that direction of tactical operations should be vested in the commander present in the field and that he should be empowered to act within well defined but broad parameters.

**Air/Ground Control**

In early July, when FAR/Neutralist forces were being built up for the defense of Muong Soui and planning for Operation Triangle was underway, the JCS requested CINCPAC views on the best means to establish an effective air/ground control system in Laos on both a short and long term basis. ¹

CINCPAC outlined requirements for an effective air/ground control system as follows: ²

1. Air request net throughout combat units of FAR/Neutralist forces for communicating close air support requests. ³

2. Control agencies at ground force echelons to integrate air strikes and artillery support into the scheme of maneuver. ⁴

3. RLAF control agencies co-located at designated echelons of ground forces to receive, plan, coordinate and commit aircraft to close air support strikes. ⁵

4. Air Liaison Officers with designated ground units to advise and assist ground commanders in planning close air support requirements. ⁶

5. Forward Air Controllers, on the ground or in the air, to indicate targets and control close air support strikes. ⁷

6. Necessary communications and electronics gear to tie the entire system together. ⁸

7. Qualified air and ground personnel in position of leadership and with knowledge of air operations. Trained technicians to maintain and operate the equipment, and lastly, a need to apply the system.

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1. JCS 7127 DTG 271725Z Jun 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 030312Z Jul 1964 (S)
CINCPAC stated that there was no quick fix for an effective air/ground control system in Laos and that although actions were then underway to improve this capability in connection with the defense of Muong Soui, most of the capability was coming from the U.S. and Thailand. Under the circumstances CINCPAC felt the best use of the RLAF was in an interdiction role against fixed targets, or armed reconnaissance against targets of opportunity. With proper delineation of bomb lines and adequate target folders, ground control of air strikes was not required for these missions. CINCPAC acknowledged that air/ground control of close support air strikes was necessary but these type air strikes were most effective when friendly forces were on the offensive and ready to follow through after strikes. The reputation of FAR/Neutralist forces in this regard was known to be very poor, particularly against Pathet Lao encadred with Viet Minh.

The best short range air/ground control system, in CINCPAC's opinion, was to provide U.S. and Thai Air Liaison Officers to selected ground units expected to have a requirement for close air support. Further, equip Air Liaison Officers with vehicles, bi-lingual radio operators, and communications gear which could be used for contacting Forward Air Controllers. Also, to use U-17 radios for Airborne Forward Air Controller/ground observers and provide an Air Operations Support Center in Vientiane for centralized control, development of the interdiction program, and assignment of air strike missions. All of this was currently underway and implementation of the Muong Soui plan was expected to test its effectiveness.

Equipment for Neutralist Contingency Force

In 1963 the U.S. authorized basic equipment and supply support for 40,000 FAR and 6,500 Neutralists. In addition, contingency support was to be readied in Thailand for an additional 10,000 FAR, 9,000 Auto Defense Choc (ADC), and 1,700 Neutralists.¹ Reductions to the

¹. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 190
FY64 MAP rendered support of the contingency forces almost imp...
the FY64 MAP contained only $300,000 for contingency forces wea...

In February the American Ambassador to Laos informed the S...
Department that he was prepared to call forward weapons from con...
gency stocks to re-equip the 1,700 man Neutralist Contingency For...
CINCPAC noted the Ambassador's intent and reminded OSD that no...
weapons were included in the FY63 MAP for support of contingency...
forces and that the FY64 Laos MAP had not yet been funded; in addi...
no ammunition was included in the FY64 MAP for the weapons that...
in the program. 1 CINCPAC stated that the $15.6 million FY64 MAP...
provided support for the 46,500 man basic force only and was not su...
cient to provide continuing routine support or attrition for an increa...
force.

It was CINCPAC's opinion that one-time support of the 1,700 Neutra...
lists would set a precedent that would do more harm than go...
CINCPAC therefore recommended that contingency force stockpile...
together with stocks in Thailand depots REDCAP and PEPPERGRINDE...
be utilized as operating and safety stocks for the agreed upon force le...
(46,500) to be supported in Laos.

Subsequently the Ambassador obtained approval of the State Depa...
dpartment for a one-time re-equipping of the remaining 1,700 Neutra...
lists. 2 His rationale in requesting the additional support was that the to...
total Neutralist strength numbered 8,200 and limiting suppor...
to the existing authorized strength of 6,500 was unrealistic from a po...
itical point of view; also the small USAID Staff was not capable of preven...
ting the diversion of MAP supplies to those Neutralists not autho...
ized support. The approval was for a one-time re-equipping from ma...
terial currently programmed and to be available as the result of an add...
crement of $2.3 million to the FY64 MAP. Upon completion of the re-equi...
ning action, Neutralists were to be supported at the existing autho...
ized strength level of 6,500.

1. CINCPAC 131742Z Feb 1964 (S)
2. Joint State/Defense msg State 816 to Vientiane 2 Apr 1964 (S)
Supplies for PDJ

Because of anticipated transportation difficulties during the rainy season, Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand and the U.S. AID Requirements Office planned, and CINCPAC approved, the establishment in the PDJ of a 60 day level of ammunition, POL, and items susceptible to damage from free fall air drop. It was anticipated that furnishing these supplies prior to the rainy season would result in improved morale, show determination to hold the PDJ, permit more flexible response to Neutralist requests, and reduce costly damage due to air drops. CINCPAC specified that proper storage facilities be provided to prevent deterioration of ammunition and to offer reasonable protection against enemy artillery action and sabotage. (These supplies were among those later abandoned when Kong Le retreated from the PDJ. They then became targets for the Laotian T-28s)

Additional Equipment for Neutralists

The Laotian Neutralist Forces made a hasty withdrawal from the Plaine des Jarres in May after being set upon by the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh. The Neutralists left a great deal of their equipment behind, thus prompting the U.S. Ambassador to Laos to request replacement of small arms, howitzers, trucks, and mortars.

CINCPAC took action to release small arms from SALTSHAKER for this purpose but non-concurred in replacement of howitzers, prime movers, and mortars since these heavy equipment items were habitually abandoned to the enemy because of the difficulty of evacuating them in a withdrawal situation. However, CINCPAC was directed jointly by State and Defense to airlift to REDCAP, from PACOM stocks, four 105mm howitzers, three 81mm mortars, four 4.2 mortars, and four 75mm pack howitzers. CINCPAC took immediate action to implement

1. CHJUSMAG Thai Dep Chief-L 20043 DTG 240926Z Mar 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 281942Z Mar 1964 (S)
3. Vientiane 1453 to State, 29 May 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 300548Z May 1964 (S)
the directive and obtained the 81mm mortars from SALTSHAKER. This equipment was subsequently delivered to the Neutralists.

Furnishing Aircraft Support to Laos

C-47 Augmentation and Training: The USAF made five C-47 aircraft available to the Laos MAP in 1964 at no cost. These aircraft, excess to USAF requirements, were located in the PACOM.

CINCPAC recommended to Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand that the aircraft be accepted and turned over to Air America for use until Lao pilots and crews could be trained. Ambassador Unger stated that the aircraft could not be used by the commercial carrier (Air America) because of Geneva Accord limitations but that 16 Lao pilots and 51 student mechanics were ready to commence training. This proposal was agreeable to CINCPAC and it was decided that the quickest and most efficient method of training the Lao would be to augment the T-28 SAW Detachment at Udorn with a 21 man C-47 SAW Detachment. This permitted the use of existing facilities. The plan was approved by the JCS, Ambassador Martin obtained RTG clearance of the project, and U.S. Strike Command took action to have the C-47 training detachment on station and ready to commence training by 1 August.

Three of the five aircraft arrived in Thailand in late June and the additional aircraft were to be brought in as soon as they could effectively be used in training.

CV2B (Caribou) Aircraft in Laos: During late May, Muong Soui was being built up for its defense and urgent requirements existed for troop, refugee, and cargo lift into short fields. Ambassador Unger stated that the Caribou was the only aircraft that could adequately meet

1. CINCPAC 312242Z May 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 100250Z Jun 1964 (S)
3. Vientiane 1096 to CINCPAC, 13 Jun 1964 (S)
4. JCS J3 7110 DTG 262056Z Jun 1964 (S)
5. CHJUSMAG Thailand 270751Z Jun 1964 (S)
6. USSTRICOM OC6966 DTG 302325Z Jun 1964 (S)
7. DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand A20256 DTG 290830Z Jun 1964 (S)
the requirement and CINCPAC was in agreement. As a result JCS approved a COMUSMACV loan of five Caribou to Air America which, together with one Caribou owned by Air America, provided six of these aircraft to operate in Laos.

In early July when troops and supplies were being flown to Muong Son in preparation for Operation Triangle, it was found that the Caribou was the only cargo aircraft that could fly in and out of the muddy Muong Son landing strip on a fairly consistent basis. When C-123s tried to deliver the heavy equipment for a Thai 105mm Artillery Battery, the first aircraft to land became mired in the mud at the end of the runway and the C-123s could not land for several days although the Caribou continued to use the airstrip.

Arrangements were made to return to MACV three of the five borrowed Caribou. Ambassador Unger's Requirements Office and Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand representatives determined that a continuing requirement existed in Laos for the other two aircraft. Department of the Army asked that, if a continuing need for Caribou existed in Laos, they be programmed in MAP in order that those aircraft on loan might be returned promptly. 1 Therefore, during the July review of the Laos MAP, two of these aircraft were added to the augmented FY65 Program. 2 To meet the immediate needs, Department of the Army authorized extension of the MACV loan of two Caribou on bailment to Air America. (The bailment provision allowed Air America to operate the aircraft without liability for replacement in the event of loss; this in turn, allowed them to charge lower prices for their services.)

Ambassador Unger objected to Caribou aircraft having been placed in the FY65 MAP because he thought this might eventually result in title to the aircraft being passed to Laos; a possibility which he considered undesirable. 3, 4 Because of this objection CINCPAC directed Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand to delete the programmed Caribou and deviate the unused funds to provide for three additional UH-34D helicopters

1. DA 978851 DTG 212325Z Jul 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 222316Z Jul 1964 (S)
3. Vientiane 353 to State, 25 Aug 1964 (C)
4. Vientiane 298 to State, 15 Aug 1964 (S)
which had developed as a new requirement. CINCPAC directed that the
two Caribou still on loan to Laos be extended on bailment for six months
as formerly authorized by Department of the Army. 1

Ambassador Unger took exception to limiting the aircraft bailment
to six months and asked that bailment be on an indefinite basis. 2 CINCPAC
disagreed, due to the limited and non-replaceable Caribou assets in the
Army inventory, and stated that the Caribou requirement for Laos would
again be reviewed prior to termination of the existing bailment action. 3

Search and Rescue (SAR) Helicopters for Laos: On 1 July the
U.S. Air Attaché in Laos requested immediate delivery of four H-34
helicopters to support YANKEE TEAM and other SAR operations in
Laos. 4 He justified his request on the basis that the existing four
UH-34D, MAP furnished-Air America operated, helicopters in Laos
at that time, were averaging 9-11 hours per day normal utilization and
therefore could not be spared to stand SAR alerts. CINCPAC obtained
JCS concurrence in providing four UH-34D helicopters from CINCPACFLT
resources and arranged airlift of the helo's from the Marine Corps Air
Station at Kaneohe, Hawaii to Udorn, Thailand. 5, 6, 7 Delivery was com-
pleted by 19 July.

Because it was essential that the on-loan Marine helicopters be
returned to combat ready Marine units, all PACOM sources were
canvassed for spare UH-34Ds, but with no success. Consideration was
given to using other models of the H-34 but because of need for mainte-
nance and logistic support compatibility and non availability of other
models, this idea was dropped.

As of November there were two UH-34D helicopters programmed
in the FY64 Laos MAP and seven in the FY65 MAP. One of the FY64
helicopters was to replace a Marine helo lost in a crash, and the other

1. CINCPAC 170215Z Sep 1964 (S)
2. Vientiane 543 to State, 30 Sep 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 030446Z Oct 1964 (S)
4. USAIRA CX 7367 DTG 010630Z Jul 1964 (C)
5. CINCPAC 140336Z Jul 1964 (S)
6. JCS 7384 DTG 141829Z Jul 1964 (S)
7. CINCPACFLT 160617Z Jul 1964 (S)
was for attrition purposes. Four of those in the FY65 program were to replace the on-loan Marine helicopters and the other three would build the Laotian helicopter inventory to 11. CINCPAC asked both OSD and the JCS where the nine FY64 and FY65 MAP helicopters were to be obtained. The JCS forwarded a Secretary of Defense decision which, at least temporarily, resolved the Laos UH-34D problem as follows:

1. The four Marine helicopters which were on loan to Laos would be turned over to the Laos MAP.
2. The Marines would provide three additional UH-34Ds to bring the Laotian inventory to 11.
3. Four Thailand MAP UH-34Ds, being held by the U.S. at Don Muang, would be turned over to Thailand. Ambassador Martin (U.S. Ambassador to Thailand) was asked to obtain permission for three of these helicopters to be loaned to Laos as an interim measure until the three additional Marine helicopters arrived.
4. Eight of the nine Laos FY64-65 MAP helicopters would be reprogrammed to provide reimbursement to the Marines.

At the end of 1964 CINCPAC had accumulated a file on the Laos SAR helicopter problem which contained more than 60 messages and involved approximately 10 headquarters. These, together with associated briefs, summaries, and studies, seemed to represent an effort out of proportion to the size of the problem to be solved.

**USAF SAW T-28 Detachment for Laos Contingencies:** To provide realistic operational experience to Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) aircrews and to provide a ready operational force to augment the RLAF if required, U.S. Air Attache, in November 1963 recommended the deployment of a Special Air Warfare (SAW) T-28 detachment to Udorn Thailand. CINCPAC concurred in the recommendation and asked the

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1. CINCPAC 060020Z Sep 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 060348Z Oct 1964 (S)
3. JCS 2396 DTG 281451Z Nov 1964 (S)
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 020127Z Dec 1964 (S)
5. USAIRA Bangkok C-078 DTG 151040Z Nov 1963 (S)
JCS to deploy a SAW detachment of four T-28 aircraft and 30-40 support personnel to Thailand to perform the mission. The RTG agreed to allow the detachment in-country and the JCS, after receiving DOD's approval, directed that the detachment be deployed. 1,2

CINCPAC, in turn, directed PACAF to attach the detachment of T-28 aircraft and supporting personnel to the 2nd Air Division to be stationed at Udorn. 3 CINCPAC spelled out the mission of the detachment as follows:

1. Provide advanced training in Thailand to Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) pilots and maintenance personnel.
2. Provide maintenance support in Thailand for the RLAF.
3. Provide readily available source of aircraft, under U.S. control, to augment RLAF if required.
4. Provide experienced supervisory personnel to assist Air Attache, Vientiane in planning air support operations if required.

CINCPAC directed that the detachment would be responsive to the requirements of Chief JUSMAG and Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand in respect to performing the above functions and stated that introduction of the detachment into Laos as a FARMGATE unit was not contemplated at that time. United States costs were not to be chargeable either to the Laos or Thailand MAP, except for training expenses of Thai and Lao personnel trained by the detachment.

Laos T-28 Aircraft Requirements: As of 20 February 1964 the Royal Laotian Air Force had an inventory of six T-28D aircraft (one of which was subsequently lost in a crash). 4

In June Ambassador Unger stated that the number of T-28s available in Laos was sufficient. 5 This statement was immediately

1. Bangkok 1451 to State  Mar 1964 (S)
2. JCS 5197 DTG 052153Z Mar 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 130443Z Mar 1964 (S)
4. CHJUSMAG Thailand 200613Z Feb 1964 (S)
5. Vientiane 140540Z Jun 1964 (S)
followed by a request from Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand to increase the Laos T-28 force to twenty aircraft by the addition of 10 T-28s and four RT-28s. \(^1\)

The requirement to increase the Laos inventory resulted in a decision to provide excess T-28s from Vietnam. In contrast to his thoughts in June, Ambassador Unger asked that all surplus T-28s in Vietnam be turned over to Laos. \(^2\) By September the requirement had risen beyond the twenty level and a new force level of forty T-28s for Laos was established by Presidential Determination as necessary to meet the existing requirements.

CINCPAC in October, sent a proposal to OSD for the FY65 Southeast Asia T-28 program. \(^3,4\) The objective of the Laos portion of this program was to meet the authorization of 40 T-28s for Laos as established by Presidential Determination. A summary of CINCPAC's recommendations to furnish T-28s to Laos, subsequently approved by OSD, is given as follows: \(^5\)

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<td></td>
<td>5 T-28D</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Remain Laos</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 T-28B</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
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<td></td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Deliver in FY65 MAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 T-28B</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Transfer to Laos - no cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 RT-28D</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Transfer to Laos - no cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 RT-28D</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Transfer to Laos - no cost</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand 020206 DTG 140646Z Jun 1964 (S)
2. Vientiane 475 to State, 19 Sep 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 032325Z Oct 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 110028Z Oct 1964 (S)
5. OSD DEF 1142 DTG 231950Z Oct 1964 (S)
The transfers reflected above, which were to be completed by June 1965, would give a total of 51 T-28 aircraft to Laos. The 11 aircraft above the number authorized (total of planned and on hand) were for attrition purposes.

Upon notification by Ambassador Unger, in late September, that the Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) was then in possession of sufficient pilots and mechanics to permit increasing the RLAF owned inventory to 10 T-28s, CINCPAC asked OSD to authorize the transfer of five from excess RVN sources.\(^1\),\(^2\) OSD approved the transfer, thus the program as reflected in the above chart was moved into the initial stages of implementation and the Laotian owned inventory was increased to 10 T/RT-28Ds.\(^3\)

In December the Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force informed CINCPAC that T-28s withdrawn from CONUS storage and rehabilitated would be delivered to Laos and Thailand between February and April 1965. Fourteen of these aircraft would be transferred to Laos and six to Thailand.\(^4\)

On 29 December the Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force informed CINCPAC that the Air Force would turn five T-28s currently in Laos over to the Laos MAP at no cost.\(^5\) The next day the American Ambassador in Vientiane agreed that for the time being, the T-28 inventory in Laos was adequate.\(^6\)

**Logistic Support for Increased Aircraft in Laos:** A sharpening of combat operations in Laos during the latter portion of May required an immediate augmentation of T-28 aircraft to perform interdiction and close air support. T-28 aircraft were borrowed from Vietnamese and U.S. Air Force resources resulting in an increase from six RLAF assigned T-28s to a total of nearly 40 by the end of July.

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1. Vientiane 543 to State, 30 Sep 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 030446Z Oct 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 110028Z Oct 1964 (S)
4. CSAF 172041Z Dec 1964 (S)
5. CSAF 292102Z Dec 1964 (S)
6. Vientiane 974 to State, 30 Dec 1964 (S)
air munitions in the PEPPERGRINDER storage point at Udorn was geared to support only the training requirements of the six RLAF T-28s. When Laos began to receive additional aircraft and their mission was expanded, it became obvious that quantities of rockets, bombs, and 50 caliber ammunition would have to be moved into PEPPERGRINDER stocks to support the sortie rates envisioned by the U.S. Ambassador.

In May, when 10 aircraft had been loaned to Laos by MACV, CINCPAC obtained a munitions status report from Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand and took immediate action to arrange a loan of munitions from USAF assets in the PACOM area. This loan filled the critical need for bombs, rockets, and rocket launchers. Meanwhile the four SAW detachment T-28s were made available to the RLAF on a loan basis and CINCPAC borrowed additional munitions from PACAF stocks for their support.

CINCPAC submitted to OASD/ISA a program increase for the Laos FY64 MAP which was designed to pay back the munitions loans, establish a 30 day operating level, and commence flow of a 90 day pipeline. The program increase, which contained a request for funds totalling $6.7 million, was subsequently approved by OASD/ISA. The establishment of Laos Ammunition Procedures (LAMP) later minimized the priority actions required of Laos agencies in support of Laos air munition requirements.

Laos Ammunition Procedures (LAMP)

Military Assistance Program policy as stated in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was not intended to support a friendly foreign country in an all out war for its survival against armed subversive aggression. MAP procedures made no provisions for promptly replacing combat losses or quickly making up for surges in usage; MAP procedures were slow and thorough. Because of this a number of procedures had
been adopted for speeding up supply to support combat operations in South Vietnam. One of these programs was the Vietnam Ammunition Procedures (VAMP). This system, which went into effect 1 July 1963, replaced the conventional programming system and proved to be effective and fully responsive to country requirements. Although, under VAMP, ammunition was still programmed by fiscal year for funding purposes, deviations could be made from types and quantities forecast in the program while remaining within the total funding limitations approved. VAMP, by permitting the country to place monthly demands on CONUS as to type and quantities of ammunition currently required, gave the necessary flexibility needed to maintain quantitative and balanced stocks in country. In 1964 a similar system (LAMP) was to go into effect for Laos.

In July OSD asked CINCPAC to determine the feasibility of establishing a monthly stock status report upon which to base ammunition supply for Laos. Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand, who was deeply involved in ammunition supply for Laos, recommended to CINCPAC that resupply be based upon the monthly PEPPERGRINDER stock status report plus a 12 month forecast of requirements. He stated that the only other sources were semi-monthly reports from the five ammunition depots in Laos or monthly forecasts furnished by the FAR. Both of these reports would have to be obtained through AID and experience indicated that they would be very inaccurate. CINCPAC agreed with Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand's recommendations and proposed that DOD approve them. DOD approved LAMP with ammunition to be funded by the services on a reimbursable basis from MAP. DOD stated that LAMP would provide timely ammunition deliveries to Laos, provide military departments with adequate procurement and supply planning data, reduce costly priority procurement and shipping actions,

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1. Debriefing Report, Major General Charles Timmes, 10 Jun 1964, CINCPAC R/S 002521-64 (S) - On file in CINCPAC J04
2. OSD DEF 978510 DTG 172338Z Jul 1964 (S)
3. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI DCH-L 20461 DTG 300915Z Jul 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 190138Z Jul 1964 (S)
5. OSD DEF 981492 DTG 072317Z Aug 1964 (S)
6. OSD DEF 980084 DTG 300058Z Jul 1964 (S)
and prevent military departments from reducing their contingency reserves for critical items.

In subsequent smoothing out of the new program, decisions were made as follows:

1. CINCPAC volunteered to submit the first Air Force ammunition requirements forecast to concerned supply agencies. (This covered the period 1 September through December and was submitted by CINCPAC in early September.)

2. OSD designated the "constructive delivery point" for ammunition to be "on arrival in Thailand." This meant that the service departments would be reimbursed from MAP upon proof of receipt of delivery of ammunition in Thailand. CINCPAC had formerly recommended that the constructive delivery point be "on arrival at PEPPERGRINDER." The amendment to CINCPAC's recommendation was necessary in order to accommodate all modes of transportation and to avoid the administrative complications which would result from a diversion of assets after arrival in Thailand to destinations other than PEPPERGRINDER.

3. Safety levels in PEPPERGRINDER were established by CINCPAC as being 60 days for Army and 30 days for Air Force ammunition. Operating levels were to be 30 days each for Air Force and Army.

4. PEPPERGRINDER support costs would be funded from MAP by USARHAW with the stipulation that if later determined that PEPPERGRINDER was part of the ammunition pipeline, which was to be funded by the military services, MAP funds for support would be discontinued.

In mid-August CINCPAC informed OSD that immediate adoption of LAMP procedures would reduce funding requirements for the Army by 33 percent and for the Air Force by 22 percent. Total reduction in FY64 ammunition funds would be $6.3 million.

Although OSD had approved formal implementation of LAMP to begin 1 September, the first complete monthly stock status report was:

1. CINCPAC 140402Z Aug 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 040410Z Sep 1964 (S)
3. OSD DEF 984035 DTG 270029Z Aug 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 262317Z Aug 1964 (S)
5. OSD DEF 982403 DTG 142201Z Aug 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC 180431Z Aug 1964 (S)
submitted by Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand commencing 1 October. CINCPAC's continuing function in connection with LAMP would be to maintain an active monitorship over the reports to insure that requirements remained within programmed dollars.

The U.S. Military Assistance Program for Laos

In a 1964 revision to the CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual, CINCPAC spelled out the objectives of military assistance to Laos and provided guidance upon which programs were to be based.¹

Military assistance to Laos was designed to assist the Neutralist and FAR forces to attain and maintain the capability to control the areas they occupied at the time of the signing of the Geneva Agreements. Assistance was planned and programmed so as to provide for the maintenance of adequate stock-piles for Laos in Thailand or other nearby sites and so as to retain the nucleus of a MAAG Laos as a section of MAAG Thailand. Equipment and supplies were provided to FAR and Neutralist forces authorized MAP support.² This MAP support was of the type that the FAR and Neutralists could use most effectively and was intended to strengthen their capability against the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh.

Presidential Determination Increases to Laos FY64 MAP: To provide for replacing combat losses of equipment suffered both by the FAR and Neutralist forces and to equip these forces for future operations and provide for intensified air operations, a series of Presidential Determinations increased the Laos FY64 MAP from $15.6 to $36.8 million.

The first increment of $2.3 million was authorized by the President on 15 May and was earmarked for re-equipping Kong Le's forces who abandoned their equipment on the PDJ.³ After this, Presidential Determinations were signed on 2 June and 9 July authorizing increases of

1. CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual, Revision 1-4, p. 1, 6 Jun 1964 (S)
2. See story this section FY65 and FY66 MAP for Laos
3. Presidential Determination 64-6A, 15 May 1964
# Laos

## As of 31 December 1964

### Basic Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>91,000 sq. mi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livable Land per Capita</td>
<td>3.8 acres</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>2.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Growth</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>35 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross Nat. Prod.</td>
<td>$400 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita</td>
<td>$64.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Overall Objective

To prevent Communist take-over in Laos.

### U.S. Diplomatic Mission

- **U.S. Ambassador**: Mr. W. E. Sullivan
- **U.S. Aid Director**: Mr. Charles Hand
- **Depot Chief Jusmag Thailand**: Col. Jack C. Connell, USA

### Map Objective

A. U.S. military assistance for Laos will be designed to assist the neutralist and conservative forces to attain and maintain the capability to control the areas they occupy at the time of signing the Geneva agreements.

B. Military assistance will be planned and programmed in accordance with the following guidance:

1. Provide for the maintenance of adequate storage facilities for Laos in Thailand or other nearby sites.
2. Retain the nucleus of a PAVN unit as a sector of PAVN forces to support the local government.
3. Provide such equipment and supplies to Lao and neutralist forces authorized to support which can be used effectively and which will strengthen their capability, VSA-AVS, the parent, and the French.
4. Provide neutralist units on the basis of reliability of each and its model for decisive position.
5. Provide basic support for 40,000 men and 6,000 neutralists, although it is recognized that CAF/neutralist authorities are in fact spreading support over a greater number of military units.
6. Extend U.S. military assistance and aid support, as appropriate, to encourage and assist the Royal Lao Government to undertake a pilot defense program and associated civic action activities.

### Major Force Guidelines

#### Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conservative Forces:</th>
<th>19 INF Bns, 3 ARN Bns, 5 Volunteer Bns, 2 PST War Bns, 1 INF (Regional) PAVN Bns, 1 STU Bns, 1 SPG Bns, 2 ARTY Bns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neutrals Forces:</td>
<td>1 RANGER BN, 1 INF BN, 2 ARN Bns, 2 ARTY Bns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Navy

None

#### Air Force

1. 1 COMB SOON, 1 TRANS SOON (Lt), 1 TAC TFR SOON, 1 HELO SOON

### Total Country Forces

#### Conservative Forces: 21 INF Bns, 3 Para Bns

- 19 INF Bns, 20 INF Bns, 5 PARA Bns, 3 ARTY Bns, 1 ARTY BN, 1 STU Bns, 1 SPG Bns, 2 ARTY Bns, 2 AVIATION BNS

#### Neutrals Forces: 3 INF Bns, 3 PARA Bns, 2 ARTY Bns

- 3 INF Bns, 3 PARA Bns, 2 ARTY Bns

### Combat Capability

- Maintain limited security of main population centers in conservative or neutralist area. Provide limited ground defense against local communist insurgency.
- Maintain limited security of river routes in conservative area and provide limited logistic support for conservative forces.
- Provide limited fighter-bomber, logistic and reconnaissance support to ground forces.

*Does not include Pathet Lao military forces*
$10 million and $8.9 million respectively. 1, 2

FY65 and FY66 MAP for Laos: During parts of March and April a review of the Laos FY65-FY66 MAP was conducted at CINCPAC. Based on OSD dollar guidelines, programs were formulated consisting of $14.3 million for FY65 and $15.0 million for FY66. These programs, which mostly provided for operating costs, were to give basic support to the 46,500 man Laotian force formerly approved by OSD to receive U.S. MAP support. 3, 4

In July OSD requested CINCPAC to provide an estimate of a revised FY65 MAP for Laos to include a list of major items. OSD wanted this information in order to justify additional funds and a new Presidential Determination to support the increased level of operations in Laos. OSD did not set specific dollar or force guidelines for development of the revised FY65 Program.

CINCPAC relayed the OSD request to both Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand and Ambassador Unger and lifted previous CINCPAC dollar and force programming limitations. 5 The Ambassador responded that the total Laos force to be supported should be 67,200 instead of the previous force ceiling of 46,500.

After consultations at PACOM Headquarters with representatives of Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand and the Vientiane Requirements Office, CINCPAC proposed a revised FY65 MAP of $99.6 million and sent to OSD a list of the major items in the revised program. 6 The revised program was based on a force level of 67,200 and represented a significant increase over the previous $14.3 million ceiling. After submission of the FY65 MAP revision to OSD, both FY65 and FY66 programs were prepared in line item detail so that the necessary program change cards could be prepared for submission to OSD. The revised

1. Presidential Determination 64-6B, 2 Jun 1964
2. OSD DEF 978267 DTG 170124Z Jul 1964 (S)
3. OSD DEF 959616 DTG 132352Z Mar 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 210311Z Feb 1964 (S)
5. CINCPAC 120020Z Jul 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC 222316Z Jul 1964 (S)
FY66 Program totalled $45.3 million. Operating costs constituted $44.3 million of the FY65 Program and $44.4 million of the FY66 Program.

Emergency Program Controls for Laos: In July, as a result of increased operational activity of MAP supported forces (both Neutralist and FAR) in Laos, Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand originated many urgent requests for logistic support which were beyond the limits of approved program elements. Since these requests could not be accommodated within restrictions imposed by normal MAP programming, funding, deviations, and supply procedures, CINCPAC asked OSD to instruct the Department of the Army to implement emergency program controls which would permit Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand to requisition consumables and repair parts in amounts up to the total programmed dollar value of each of these two supply groups. This procedure would provide for realignment of funds behind appropriate program elements after supply was accomplished. It would also cause a sense of urgency in handling requisitions that was considered desirable.

OSD approved CINCPAC's proposal in late July and in early August the Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command issued implementing instructions to all elements of the U.S. Army supply system.

Laos Army MAP Training in Thailand: In 1963 the Thai Army developed and got underway a program for training FAR and Neutralist artillery and infantry units at Camp Erawan, Thailand. At the end of 1963 CINCPAC was trying to get the program extended to include individual training for Laotian officers and enlisted men.

Near the end of February 1964, the U.S. Department of the Army authorized Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand to issue travel orders for individuals to begin training in Thailand. The first group of Laotian

1. CINCPAC 212042Z Jul 1964 (S)
2. CGUSARMC 5-8479 DTG 281428Z May 1964 (S)
3. OSD DEF 980084 DTG 300058Z Jul 1964 (S)
4. CGUSARMC 072054Z Aug 1964 (S)
5. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 192
6. DA 957433 DTG 281837Z Feb 1964 (C)
soldiers for individual training in Thailand was comprised of eight men
who arrived on 8 May to take on-the-job training at the Thailand Army
Ordnance School. By September, 50 officers and men had completed
various types of technical and orientation training and 18 others were
undergoing training. Agreement on continuing individual training at
Thailand Army service schools was deferred pending approval of a
Thailand Army budget request.

Unit training continued in 1964 and by the end of August approx-
imately 2500 men had been trained under this program. This comprised
about 32 small units such as infantry and heavy weapons companies,
mortar platoons and artillery batteries. Only a few of the infantry units
had been committed to combat, however, the others maintained a con-
tinuing training program and morale was high. The same was not true
of artillery units trained under the Camp Erawan project. The artillery
units were said to have a poor quality of leadership; two units had not
fired for some time after finishing training and another was being used
for camp construction.

As of 31 December 1964 the status of unit and individual training
conducted at Camp Erawan was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Unit</th>
<th>Completed Training</th>
<th>In Training</th>
<th>Projected (30 Jun 65)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Battery</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Company (100 men per company)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Weapons Company (112 men per company)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Groups (50 NCOs each)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Mortar Platoon</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar Section</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. CINCPAC 032057Z Sep 1964 (S)
2. CHJUSMAG Thailand DEPCHIEF -0 20001 DTG 051004Z Mar 1964 (S)
INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Completed Training</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogation, Prisoner of War</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
<td>14</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Officer</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consideration of Reconvening Geneva Conference on Laos

The U.S. State Department, on 30 June, rejected a Soviet proposal to reconvene the Geneva Conference on Laos. The rejection was based on communist forces refusal to agree on three preconditions: (1) an immediate cease fire, (2) Pathet Lao withdrawal to the positions they held prior to the May seizure of the Plaine des Jarres, and (3) Pathet Lao recognition of Souvanna Phouma as Premier. However, by 8 July the State Department was wondering if, because of recent gains of the FAR/Neutralists on Route 13 east of the Plaine des Jarres, it might be a good idea to reconvene the International Conference on Laos. The State Department, therefore, solicited comments as to what might result if the conference was reconvened. The State Department further suggested that it might be feasible, under the auspices of the Geneva Conference, for the Pathet Lao to keep the PDJ area they had taken in return for agreeing that the FAR/Neutralists could retain their recent gains.¹

CINCPAC forwarded his comments on the State Department inquiry to the JCS.² CINCPAC stated that on face value, a swap of PDJ territory to the Pathet Lao for ground regained by the non-communist side on Route 13 did seem more coherent than the former division of territory. However, the apparent "equilibrium" provided by this exchange of real estate could be illusory since the Pathet Lao was capable of

1. State 136 to Vientiane DTG 080245Z Aug 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 111949Z Aug 1964 (S)
retaking the vacated ground. FAR/Neutralist successes did not accurately reflect actual relative military strengths on the ground and were largely attributable to the new factor of air strikes. A new Geneva pact based on such a swap and a cease fire would in effect legalize the Pathet Lao seizure of the PDJ. Experience gave reason to believe that it would not inhibit future Pathet Lao military advances.

CINCPAC recognized that a genuine, fully-controlled cease fire would be desirable. However, it was likely that a cease fire would only result in a shut-down of anti-communist activities while those of the Pathet Lao-Viet Minh, which were easier to conceal than those of friendly forces which depended so heavily on the T-28 and armed reconnaissance, would continue. In addition CINCPAC doubted if the conference could be limited to Northern Laos without bringing in the undesirable topic of the Laos Panhandle and South Vietnam. A new formal blessing by a Geneva-type conference to the existing situation in the Laos Panhandle would in effect confirm South Vietnamese vulnerability to continued and perhaps increased infiltration, while developing anti-communist efforts in the Panhandle would be greatly inhibited if not absolutely stopped.

CINCPAC felt that a new conference on Laos would only further demonstrate the reluctance of the U.S. to become militarily involved on the ground in Laos and would more than wipe out the psychological advantages accrued from the recent naval action (see Vietnam Section) in the Gulf of Tonkin. CINCPAC concluded with the hope that any new conference on Laos would not be convened until after the next dry season. This would provide time for strengthening the FAR and Neutralists and for giving the new U.S.-GVN efforts in South Vietnam an opportunity to produce some results. If these were successful, the U.S. would be in a better position at the bargaining table; if not, the U.S. was prepared to respond militarily in whatever way was judged essential to protect her interests in Southeast Asia.
Plans to Re-Introduce U.S. Military Advisory Role in Laos

Since the removal of the U.S. MAAG from Laos in October 1962, CINCPAC and other U.S. agencies periodically considered the merits of possible reintroduction of a U.S. advisory group into Laos, and CINCPAC had a plan (OPLAN 64-64) to provide for just such a contingency. ¹

In June 1964 the JCS asked CINCPAC for comments and recommendations covering the reintroduction into Laos of a MAAG and/or advisory teams on an overt basis as a "means of demonstrating U.S. intent."² CINCPAC, in replying, stated that CINCPAC OPLAN 64-64 set forth his concept of functions and missions for a U.S. advisory effort in Laos.³ This plan provided for a Supply and Training Mission (SATM) capable of performing the usual MAAG functions including supervising the delivery and use of MAP equipment and advising on plans and operations. The organization would also have the capability of providing intelligence information. The proposed structure, designed to be austere, combined a basic MAP supervisory element with 15 battalion advisory teams. CINCPAC stated that he would not recommend introduction of a MAAG solely for supervision of MAP equipment delivery and use. Nor would he recommend introducing advisory teams alone, charged with advising on plans and operations and with essentially complete responsibility for the Military Assistance Program, without the central catalyst of a MAAG Headquarters to provide direction and administrative and logistical support to field advisors.

The planned SATM combined the office of Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand (68 spaces), augmentation to the Attache Staff (15 spaces), USAID Requirements Office (19 spaces), and an augmentation of 220 spaces of which 180 were organized into the 15 twelve-man battalion advisory teams. Under expanded operations the SATM would also be

² JCS 6677 DTG 052255Z Jun 1964 (TS)
³ CINCPAC 112140Z Jun 1964 (TS)
augmented by approximately 83 personnel to provide for adequate communications, a capability to control the advisory teams, and a psychological warfare advisory capability. USARPAC and PACAF were prepared to furnish, on short notice, augmentation personnel to meet the above requirements.

CINCPAC concluded that from a military viewpoint some advantages might accrue from reintroduction of a MAAG into Laos. Primarily, these would be closer supervision of equipment issue and use, intelligence, and possibly more efficient planning and conduct of operations. Combat units would be stiffened to a degree by the presence of advisors. However, because of the lack of virtues in the Lao military they would still not be able to stand up against the Pathet Lao encadred with Viet Minh.

Command Arrangements

The JCS asked CINCPAC's views on the possibility of establishing an element to furnish a military channel from Vientiane to Washington since the situation existed whereby military recommendations were being forwarded through State Department channels. 1 CINCPAC, during a visit to Southeast Asia, discussed the problem with COMUSMACV, Chief JUSMAG Thailand, the Ambassador to Thailand, and the Ambassador to Laos. CINCPAC then recommended to the JCS that arrangements for military advice and direction remain unchanged as they were functioning quite satisfactorily. 2 (S)

Plans for Night Air Operations in Laos

In early December the JCS asked CINCPAC to prepare an operations plan for night interdiction by U.S. aircraft of Pathet Lao/Viet Minh vehicular traffic on routes in Laos. 3 (S)

CINCPAC's plan, given the unclassified nickname "LONE STAR", was forwarded to the JCS a few days later. 4 COMUSMACV was to have

1. JCS 7496 DTG 212034Z Jul 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 060230Z Aug 1964 (TS)
3. JCS 002474 DTG 020031Z Dec 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 070930Z Dec 1964 (S)
primary responsibility for the plan and exercise required coordination using the existing YANKEE TEAM system and procedures.

The plan provided for night armed aerial reconnaissance of selected lines of communication (LOC) in Laos, which were used for enemy logistic operations and personnel movements, and interdiction of remunerative targets by U.S. air strikes. Targets and reconnaissance objectives in order of priority were: Routes 7 and 71, Route 23, Route 9, Route 12, Route 121, and Route 8. If Route 23 opened for large scale truck traffic, it would be raised to first priority.

A typical mission, conducted under CINCPAC's plan, would begin with launch of flare aircraft one hour prior to sunset to determine weather conditions. Weather permitting, two to four strike aircraft would launch and rendezvous with flare aircraft for reconnaissance of the selected LOC. If targets were located, flare aircraft would illuminate them and strike aircraft would attack. If additional strike aircraft were required, the flare aircraft would call for ground alert aircraft to be launched. When no targets were located on routine reconnaissance missions, flare aircraft would illuminate preselected fixed interdiction targets upon which strike aircraft would expend their ordnance. Fixed targets were to be those associated with Pathet Lao/Viet Minh road transportation, such as bridges, fords, defiles, or suspected truck parks.

September to February Strategy for Laotian Forces

In late August Leonard Unger, the American Ambassador in Vientiane, recommended to the State Department operations for the FAR and Neutralists to undertake in the ensuing six months, assuming there was neither a cease fire nor a major enemy offensive during that period. Upon receiving approval of the State Department, the Embassy planned to consult with friendly Laotians on a plan of action.¹

The purpose of Ambassador Unger's recommendations, which were based on a proposal by the Army Military Attache, was to secure

¹ AMEMBASSY Vientiane 387 to State, 31 Aug 5PM 1964 (S)
The route designations depicted here are standardized for use by United States agencies concerned with Laos. They supersede all previous designations and are effective immediately. They do not necessarily agree with designations by the Royal Lao Government because the RG uses various letter prefixes which are unsuitable for certain US users.

Road conditions are subject to rapid change. During the rainy season from May to October, road conditions throughout the country deteriorate significantly. Washouts and collapsed bridges are common during periods of heavy rains. Trafficability of any specific road segment is largely dependent upon road conditions currently available for repair and maintenance operations.

Towns names in many cases differ from those previously used. Laos, like many emerging nations, is emphasizing link with the colonial past by changing the names of towns.
the area around Muong Soui and further engage Lao military forces in limited but productive dry season operations designed to consolidate Royal Laotian Government control over the area within its recognized zone of influence. Further, the Embassy wanted to improve the FAR and Neutralist defensive perimeter, maintain moderate pressure on the enemy, and place the FAR and Neutralists in a stronger position to initiate or support more extensive future operations in the Panhandle, if such should become advisable.

The JCS asked CINCPAC for his judgment of the Vientiane Ambassador's recommendations and CINCPAC concurred with the basic intent of the proposal, stating that the U.S. should encourage only limited offensive operations with emphasis on clearing the western Panhandle and mopping up the area south and west of Luang Prabang. CINCPAC said that the success of OPERATION TRIANGLE, in which little resistance had been encountered, had no doubt instilled new spirit in the FAR and Neutralist forces. CINCPAC thought the U.S. should capitalize on this but should not lose sight of the fact that when the Pathet Lao chose to do so they could prevent FAR and Neutralist forces from attaining their objectives. CINCPAC took exception with an Embassy recommendation that a special Air Operations Center (AOC) be established in Savannakhet to coordinate both air support operations in southern Laos and possible Laotian corridor strikes. CINCPAC agreed that a control agency in this area was necessary, but believed that the correct command and control arrangement would be for the AOC at Vientiane to retain centralized control of all Royal Laotian Air Force efforts in Laos. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that an Air Support Operations Center be established at Savannakhet, subordinate to the Vientiane AOC. 1

This CINCPAC recommendation was later incorporated into a Secretary of State message which approved the Ambassador's proposal of operations to be conducted in Laos. The Secretary of State cautioned that the U.S. wished to insure that the FAR and Neutralists would not embark on military ventures liable to trigger

1. CINCPAC 060326Z Sep 1964 (S)
intensive enemy response and requiring a larger U.S. commitment.\footnote{SECSTATE to Vientiane 293, 5 Oct 11 AM 1964 (S)}

Before the end of 1964 many of Ambassador Unger's recommendations had been implemented.

**Situation in Laos at the End of 1964**

Strangely, after the April coup in Laos, Souvanna's position seemed to be strengthened. Other positive factors which could be counted at the end of 1964 were the success of Operation Triangle, progress of a village cluster project, and the effectiveness of T-28s against the Pathet Lao. Loss of the Plaine des Jarres was the big item on the other side of the ledger. (S)

At the end of the year the rains had stopped; the period of more active military operations was at hand. Already the rainy season had witnessed a surprising amount of military operations by friendly forces. The general feeling was that the enemy would soon reply. (S)

Generally speaking, enemy forces occupied the dominating terrain. They thus had the advantage of better observation and stronger defensive positions than the friendly forces. The tributaries of the Mekong flowed from the high ground occupied by the enemy into the areas held by friendly forces, thereby giving the enemy many good avenues of approach and favoring his waterborne movement of troops and supplies in shallow-draft native craft. (S)

Friendly forces, on the other hand, enjoyed interior lines of communication provided by the Mekong River and Highway 13. However, combat flexibility rested primarily on air movement. In summary, considering that ground operations in Laos would be conducted by light infantry forces with limited artillery support, the terrain favored enemy attack. (S)

The political and psychological nature of the struggle in Laos pointed to a probable renewal of enemy initiative during the new dry season. Friendly forces exhibited their best morale and will to fight since the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1962. However, because of
the volatile Lao nature, morale was subject to rapid deterioration from even minor causes. Training, logistics, and combat effectiveness were in reasonably good shape but friendly forces continued to suffer from poor leadership.

The presence of an unknown number of PAVN forces in Laos provided the decisive difference in combat power. The FAR and Neutralists would probably defeat the Pathet Lao easily if help from North Vietnam were withdrawn. However, the unreasoning fear which the Lao had for the North Vietnamese, deeply rooted in historical, religious, and racial factors, made any estimate of relative combat power highly speculative.

CINCPAC's late-year estimate of the situation in Laos reflected sizeable capabilities of the communist forces in Laos. However, CINCPAC assumed that the Communists would attempt to avoid serious provocations toward the U.S. Such capabilities as the introduction of large numbers of North Vietnamese or Chinese Communist units and offensives which would capture the Mekong River towns were not considered compatible with the existing enemy intentions.

1. PACOM WID 47-64, 27 Nov 1964 (S)
CINCPAC's ACTIVITIES TO COUNTER INSURGENCY IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

The Republic of Vietnam (RVN) was only one element in the complex military scene within CINCPAC's area of responsibility, but it was there that the United States strategic interests were most directly threatened; it was there that the United States had dispatched more than 22,000 military personnel in a massive advisory effort, and it was there that the United States had announced a decision to succeed in defeating communist insurgency. Yet at no time during 1964 was there a leader in the Government of Vietnam (GVN) with the political stature to attract wide popular support or enthusiasm for a struggle against communism.

Several times the U.S. tried to give impetus to the RVN effort against the Communists. Twice the U.S. Secretary of Defense made visits to CINCPAC Headquarters for discussions with senior U.S. officials involved with RVN policy — the first time in March and the second time in June. Subsequent to both visits there were decisions to commit additional U.S. men, money, and materiel to help the RVN throw off the crippling burden of communist insurgency. On each occasion the GVN leaders pledged that they would dispense with palace revolts and politics and dedicate themselves and their nation to the cause of freedom in South Vietnam. However, this pledge was never fully honored. Later in the year, Maxwell D. Taylor was named Ambassador to South Vietnam and General William C. Westmoreland was named Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV).

These moves by the United States did not meet with unqualified success. Against a background replete with riots, revolts, strikes, and personal feuds government stability in RVN deteriorated sharply. Unfortunately, each of the successive governments proved to be equally
incapable of marshaling the resources of the nation for a concerted counterinsurgency effort. The frequent changes in the personnel of the top echelon of the government were accompanied by corresponding shifts among the subordinate civil and military leaders and administrators. That process, repeated several times over, interrupted constructive programs and further deferred the date when competent and experienced individuals would be available to press a pacification campaign. The break down of authority was a made to order invitation for the Viet Cong and they seized the initiative throughout the country.

A new factor was added in August when naval units of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) attacked a U.S. naval patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin and U.S. aircraft struck targets in North Vietnam in reprisal. This prompted intense preparations for the contingency that the DRV and Communist China might openly enter the conflict. The United States courses of action were severely inhibited by the persistent danger that the GVN would simply dissolve, requiring that major PACOM forces be committed to protect U.S. interests in the RVN.

Figure IV-3 illustrates the RVN areas generally controlled by the Viet Cong in October. Since they dominated most of the rural areas, they were capable of severing communication arteries almost at will. Meanwhile, the military officers who constituted the GVN continued to devote their attention to political maneuvers instead of the Viet Cong. At the end of the year, after a Viet Cong force had soundly defeated RVN military units as they were committed, piecemeal, near Binh Ghia, COMUSMACV reported: ¹

"...III Corps Commander was immersed in Armed Forces Council Matters and until 30 December had scant time for tactical operations. His boss, General (Nguyen) Khanh, made himself unavailable to GHQ and to field commanders by holing up in Vung Tau. So preoccupied with non-military matters was the CINC that, though Binh Ghia and Vung Tau are in same province, Khanh appeared oblivious to the severity and implication of the continuing action, at least until 31 December."

1. COMUSMACV MAC J312 0686 DTG 081520Z Jan 1965 (S)
Consequently, late in 1964 the U.S. thought that it would be prudent to avoid the risks inherent in an expansion of hostilities until there was a government in Saigon capable of handling the associated problems. The United States, therefore, began applying various forms of pressure designed to force the advent of an effective GVN. ¹

Despite the ineffectiveness of the central government, 1964 witnessed a continued and substantial improvement in the base for supporting an effective RVN counterinsurgency campaign. This included: an increased flow of military hardware, an expanded construction program, improved logistic procedures, a drastic increase in the number of U.S. military advisors, a streamlined command structure, and a continuing review and refinement of concepts. However, the effective utilization of the improved base appeared to be contingent upon the advent of a competent and stable GVN.

This section of the history is not a record of the battles with the insurgents in South Vietnam, nor is it a record of the full range of the United States efforts to help the people of the Republic of Vietnam help themselves. Rather it attempts to set forth CINCPAC's position on major issues, his decisions and actions, and the net results in relation to the containment and defeat of the Viet Cong in RVN.

Other information related to RVN is contained in the Laos and Thailand portions of this chapter.

Reorganization of COMUSMACV-Discontinuance of MAAG Vietnam

The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the JCS, during a visit to RVN in early March, expressed an interest in a COMUSMACV proposal to amalgamate MACV/MAAG VN, and discontinue MAAG VN. COMUSMACV forwarded the proposal to CINCPAC who did not agree with it and who recommended to the JCS that no major reorganization be undertaken for the time being. CINCPAC said that COMUSMACV should eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort by the two commands; that field advisors should be transferred from the MAAG to MACV; and

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¹. Enclosure 1, SAIGON to STATE A460, 15 Dec 1964 (TS)
that a reduced MAAG should be retained as an entity to conduct detailed assistance programming, receipt and turn over of MAP equipment, and to continue advising the RVNAF in areas not directly involved in combat operations. CINCPAC opposed the proposed reorganization because responsiveness to command would not necessarily result, span of control of COMUSMACV would be increased excessively, duplication of functions could be eliminated without major reorganization, and essential functions would be disrupted for an excessive period during reorganization. Also, he believed that the anticipated personnel savings would be insignificant, and that the resulting organization would interfere with COMUSMACV's disengagement to assume other duties as required by certain U.S. and SEATO contingency plans.

In view of CINCPAC's non-concurrence, COMUSMACV reconsidered his proposal and decided that the reorganization could be accomplished with a disruption of approximately one month as opposed to former estimates of three months to a year. He then asked CINCPAC to allow the reorganization as soon as possible, but CINCPAC held to his former position and advised COMUSMACV and the JCS that the organization proposed by COMUSMACV incorporated certain unsatisfactory conditions which CINCPAC had been trying to eliminate from the COMUSKOREA structure.

On 10 April the JCS, contrary to CINCPAC's recommendation, approved the immediate reorganization of COMUSMACV and the discontinuance of MAAG Vietnam. Acting on CINCPAC directions COMUSMACV submitted a JTD for the new organization. According to COMUSMACV, it would eliminate duplication and produce a personnel savings. Subsequently COMUSMACV announced that the reorganization would be effective on 15 May 1964 as follows:

1. COMUSMACV ltr, 12 Mar 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC 220912Z Mar 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 012308Z Apr 1964 (C)
4. JCS 5802 DTG 101545Z Apr 1964 (C)
5. CINCPAC 110745Z Apr 1964 (C)
6. COMUSMACV ltr ser 0415, 23 Apr 1964 (C)
7. CINCPAC ltr ser 0339, 1 May 1964 (C)
8. COMUSMACV MAC J 3700 DTG 081145Z May 1964 (U)
MAAG Vietnam would be disestablished and COMUSMACV would assume all its missions and functions. The Navy Sections of MAAG would become the Navy Advisory Group, MACV. Headquarters Support Activity - Saigon and U.S. Army Support Command, Vietnam would remain unchanged. The 2nd Air Division would assume command and control of the Air Force Advisory Group, except for AF MAP responsibilities which would be retained by MACV.

The reorganization did not achieve the personnel savings anticipated by COMUSMACV; indeed, the reorganization of COMUSMACV required 308 additional spaces. See Figure IV-4 for a graphic representation of the personnel strength before and after the reorganization, and at the end of the year.

**JCS Policy on JTD Changes**

On 24 June, in a message direct to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, COMUSMACV requested authority to vary the personnel strength of his command within 5% of the JTD figures without submitting a detailed request for a change to the service.\(^1\) CINCPAC strongly opposed the idea because he believed that the established TDY policy could meet sudden fluctuations in personnel requirements, and that the existing procedures to effect JTD changes were effective instruments of control and good personnel management.\(^2\) Subsequently the JCS announced the policy that COMUSMACV should continue to submit proposed JTD changes through CINCPAC, and concurrently submit personnel requisitions to the respective services. They added the provision that "JCS and the service departments be provided information copies of JTD's..." They further noted that final JCS actions on manpower requirements would be deferred until CINCPAC's views were known.

At the same time the JCS announced that unit requirements in RVN would be processed through CINCPAC-Service channels.\(^3\)

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1. COMUSMACV J1 5353 DTG 240257Z Jun 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC 2701002 Jun 1964 (C)
3. JCS 8053 DTG 241851Z Aug 1964 (C)
HEADQUARTERS U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

(Comparison of total approved personnel strength) 1

Prior to 15 May reorganization: 2
Total: 3279

After 15 May reorganization: 3
Total: 3677

As of 31 December 4
Total: 4889

1. Source: Enclosure to CINCPAC J1 Memo 005-65, 22 Jan 65 (S)
2. Includes 72 spaces in Special Operations Group (SOG).
3. Includes 97 spaces in SOG.
Establishment of MACV Historical Program

Prior to 1964 there had been no established historical program at the unified command level in RVN, although each service had pursued a separate historical program to portray its own activities in RVN. However, at the end of the year it appeared that the establishment of a MACV historical program was imminent.

In August, responding to a COMUSMACV request, CINCPAC sent a member of his Historical Branch to RVN to assist and advise on establishing objectives, guidelines, and procedures for a historical program. On 14 November, COMUSMACV approved the establishment of a MACV Command History Program; however, at the end of the year CINCPAC had not yet received the associated request for JTD modifications that would establish the billets to conduct the program.

1. COMUSMACV ltr ser 1405, 17 Jun 1964 (U)
2. CINCPAC 222303Z Jul 1964 (U)
3. CINCPAC J046 memo 48-64, subj: Staff Visit to MACV in Connection with MACV Historical Program, 12 Aug 1964 (U)
4. COMUSMACV ltr ser 3106, 21 Nov 1964 (U)
5. Further references in CINCPAC J04 files related to a historical program in RVN are:

   AMEMB SAIGON 1147 to STATE 12 Dec 4PM 1963 (C)
   SAIGON 206 to STATE 12 Aug 5PM 1963 (C)
   Confidential Memo from J. M. Mecklin to Col E. F. Black (CINCPAC J5 Div), 24 Jul 1963
   CNO memo Op-09B92/wh ser 1085P09B9, 3 Jul 1963
   CNO memo Op-09B9B/wh ser 95P09B9, 27 Jun 1963
   Approved Minutes of Meeting on Historical Account of U.S. Operations in Vietnam, USIS Conference Room Saigon, 28 Jun 1963 (C)
   Memo J. M. Mecklin to Mr. Trueheart, Mr. Brent, Mr. Smith General Harkins and General Charles Timmes, 20 Jun 1963 (C)
   OSD ltr (OSD Historian to Mr. Mecklin), 16 May 1963
   OSD Historian Memo for Record, 15 May 1963
   OSD Historian Memo to Mr. Tull, USIA, 8 May 1963
   OSD Historian Memo to Mr. Gilmartin, 6 May 1963
   OSD Historian Memo for Record, 6 May 1963
   Asst Secretary of State Robert Manning ltr to Mr. R. A. Winnacker, Historian OSD, undated copy
   OSD Historian ltr to R. J. Manning, 11 Apr 1963
   Dep OSD memo for JCS, 5 Apr 1963
   OSD Historian memo to General Lansdale, 27 Mar 1963
   Memo from Mr. Mecklin to R. J. Manning, 15 Mar 1963 (S)
   Ltr Major Russell A. Gugeler to Mr. J. Mecklin, 1 Aug 1963
United States Personnel, Strength, Casualties, and Military Units in RVN

Figure IV-5 illustrates the number of U.S. military personnel serving in RVN at specified dates, from 31 December 1958 to the end of 1964: it is interesting that one source quoted General Creighton H. Abrahms as saying that in 1964 the U.S. Army had in RVN "the equivalent of about 4.8 divisions worth of majors and captains, about 3.5 divisions worth of lieutenants and about three divisions worth of master sergeants."1

Figure IV-6 depicts the number of U.S. casualties resulting from action by hostile forces in RVN during the period 1961 through 1964.

Figure IV-7 indicates the disposition of major U.S. military units in RVN.

Authority to Award Medals and Decorations in RVN

Early in 1964 COMUSMACV sought authority to award certain Army, Navy, Air Force, and Joint Service medals and decorations. By February the Department of the Army had acted favorably on COMUSMACV's request.2 CINCPAC, however, denied the request for authority to award the Joint Service Commendation Medal (JSCM). The basis for disapproval was the previously stated policy of the Secretary of Defense that the JSCM should not be awarded by commanders below the level of unified commands.3,4

Acting on a subsequent COMUSMACV request for authority to award the Legion of Merit and decorations of lower precedence to service members of his command, CINCPAC asked CNO and CSAF to delegate CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF respectively the authority to award certain medals and decorations of a lower order; he also recommended that those Component Commanders be further authorized to sub-delegate the authority to COMUSMACV or the senior officer of their respective service in RVN.5,6

1. Army Times, 30 Dec 1964, p. M2
2. DA 957621 DTG 291758Z Feb 1964 (U)
3. COMUSMACV MAC J1 1263 DTG 190200Z Feb 1964 (U)
4. CINCPAC 201145Z Feb 1964 (U)
5. COMUSMACV MAC J-1832 DTG 100645Z Mar 1964 (U)
6. CINCPAC ltrs ser 699 and 700, 31 Mar 1964 (U)
NOTE:
CASUALTIES AMONG U.S. PERSONNEL IN RVN 1959 - 1964

1961  1
1962  18
1963  10  75
1964  19  149

LEGEND:
- ☐ Death as result of hostile action
- ☑ Missing/Detained

U.S. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES AS RESULT OF HOSTILE ACTION IN RVN 1961 - 1964

DEATHS:
- ARMY: 181
- NAVY: 4
- MARINE CORPS: 11
- AIR FORCE: 51

MISSING:
- ARMY: 9
- NAVY: 1
- MARINE CORPS: 3
- AIR FORCE: 12

DETAINED:
- ARMY: 9
- AIR FORCE: 1
DISPOSITION OF MAJOR U.S. OPERATIONAL UNITS

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
(2 NOVEMBER 1964)

PLEIKU
119th AVN CO (25-UHIB)
52d AVN BN (10-UHIB)

TAN SON NHUT
145th AVN BN (10-UHIB)
120th AVN CO (25-UHIB)
68th AVN CO (25-UHIB)
309th/310th TCS (34-CI23)
DET 8th TBS (2-B57)
DET 509th FIS (6-F102)
DET 615th TFS (6-F100)
DET 405th FW (2-RB57)
15th TRS (12-RF101)

DANANG
HMM 361 SQDN (24-UH34)
311th TCS (16-CI23)
DET 615th TFS (29-F100)
DET 509th FIS (6-F102)

QUI NHON
117th AVN CO (25-UHIB)

NHA TRANG
18th AVN CO (+) (24-UIA)
73d AVN CO (32-TOI)

BIEN HOA
1st AIR CMDO SQDN
(24-AIE, 7-SC47)
118th AVN CO (25-UHIB)
8th/13th TBS (-) (36-B57)

VUNG TAU
61st AVN CO (16-CV2)
HVY LIFT HELO SECT (6-CH37)
23d SP WAR DET (6-DVI)
73d AVN CO (SURVEILLANCE) (32-OID)
Hostile Fire Pay (HFP)

The contradictions and confusion associated with administering the Hostile Fire Pay (HFP) program absorbed an undue amount of CINCPAC's attention during 1964.

In April the Public Health Service (PHS) wanted to have the HFP program extended to cover their officers.\(^1\) CINCPAC, concurring with COMUSMACV, recommended to the JCS that the PHS proposal be disapproved. Among the factors he considered in reaching that conclusion were: the existing pay differential in favor of the PHS officers, the morale of the military personnel, the problem of administering the extended program, and the fact that the PHS officers were not attached to combat units.\(^2,\)\(^3\)

Another issue was whether men who had qualified for HFP would continue to be credited with that special pay while in the status of missing, missing in action, interned in a foreign country, or captured by hostile forces. In CINCPAC's opinion, the DOD Instruction governing HFP\(^4\) did not cover those conditions adequately.\(^5\) However, the JCS advised that the individual Service regulations provided for continuation of the pay under the cited circumstances and that it would be unnecessary to revise the Instruction on the subject.\(^6\) Yet, in October the Navy queried CINCPAC concerning the HFP entitlement of two naval aviators who had been shot down and captured by communist forces.\(^7\) CINCPAC's response pointed out that the regulations of both the Army and Air Force provided for continuation of HFP credit to persons in a captured or missing status and that he considered the captured naval aviators eligible for HFP credit.\(^8\) Admiral Sharp then reiterated to the JCS his earlier recommendation that the DOD Instruction be revised to cover situations

\(^1\) JCS 5612 DTG 020003Z Apr 1964 (U)
\(^2\) COMUSMACV 5107 DTG 260715Z May 1964 (C)
\(^3\) CINCPAC 272302Z May 1964 (C)
\(^4\) DOD Instruction 1340.6, 21 Nov 1963
\(^5\) CINCPAC 132217Z Jun 1964 (U)
\(^6\) JCS 7108 DTG 262037Z Jun 1964 (U)
\(^7\) BUPERS 231928Z Oct 1964 (C) passed to CINCPAC by COMUSMACV 12725 DTG 300820Z Oct 1964 (C)
\(^8\) CINCPAC 072309Z Nov 1964 (C)
involving captured or missing personnel. 1, 2

Another problem associated with HFP was related to Seventh Fleet elements exposed to hostile fire during reconnaissance over Laos. Acting on a CINCPACFLT request, 3 CINCPAC sought to have COMUSMACV, his area administrator for the HFP program, designate the Fleet units entitled to HFP. However, COMUSMACV pointed out that the DOD HFP directive authorized payment to members of units serving in RVN only. To resolve the difficulty, COMUSMACV suggested that CINCPAC arrange to have Laos designated as an eligible area. 4 Subsequently, at CINCPAC's request, the JCS made Laos an eligible area for HFP 5 and Admiral Sharp coordinated the preparation, by the U.S. Army Attache in Laos, of a governing directive. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11

CINCPAC also addressed the problem of how much exposure to hostile fire should be established as a prerequisite to qualify an individual for HFP. The DOD had established six days exposure during one month as the unit of measure. That, of course, barred HFP for Fleet aviators who were subjected to hostile fire while participating in one or two days of air strikes. CINCPACFLT pointed out that the limitation actually served to defeat the purpose for which the special pay had been authorized. 12

Before CINCPAC made a decision on the subject of HFP for naval aviators, he considered the opinions of his subordinate commanders. 13 CINCPACAF concurred with the position of CINCPACFLT. 14 CINCUSARPAC disagreed because he thought that adopting the change proposed by CINCPACFLT would cause a morale problem among the

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1. CINCPAC 132217Z Jun 1964 (U)
2. CINCPAC 012035Z Dec 1964 (C)
3. CINCPACFLT 090231Z Jun 1964 (C)
4. COMUSMACV 21042 DTG 130346Z Jun 1964 (S)
5. JCS 7429 DTG 171331Z Jul 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC 090226Z Dec 1964 (U)
7. CINCPAC ltr ser 3715, 10 Dec 1964 (U)
8. USARMA LAOS ltr M-167-64, 14 Oct 1964 (U)
9. CINCPAC 192311Z Nov 1964 (C)
10. USARMA LAOS ltr M-190-64, 27 Nov 1964 (U)
11. CINCPAC 090226Z Dec 1964 (U)
12. CINCPACFLT ltr ser 13/3518, 31 Aug 1964 (U)
13. CINCPAC 232215Z Sep 1964 (U)
14. CINCPACAF 260347Z Sep 1964 (U)
personnel of all services who were exposed daily to the hazards of combat. He suggested that as an alternate it might be feasible to compute HFP on a per diem system related to the number of days an individual was exposed to hostile fire. COMUSMACV, charged with administering the program, recommended that HFP be either authorized to all U.S. Service personnel in RVN or that the six day exposure to hostile fire be retained.

After considering those shades of opinion, Admiral Sharp recommended to JCS that the HFP prerequisite of six day exposure to hostile fire be retained. He reasoned that the extended program would be too difficult to administer, that for reasons of morale the HFP should be reserved for men habitually exposed to hazardous duty (twenty per cent of the assigned for duty strength in RVN).

Restricted Official Travel to RVN, March

The number of U.S. official visitors to RVN and Thailand increased drastically in early 1964. For example, COMUSMACV was subjected to 220 official visitors in January, 50 of whom were in the category of distinguished visitor (DV) and required special attention. By March the average number of visitors since the first of the year was 47 a week, with 12 of those in the DV category, and the many visitors were distracting resources and personnel from the primary mission of the Command.

On 14 March the JCS promulgated a Secretary of Defense memorandum directing procedures to curtail official trips to or through South Vietnam and Thailand. On 20 March Admiral Felt denied clearance to three DV trips to RVN and exhorted his Component Commanders to disapprove orientation visits and to personally examine all requests for visits to RVN and Thailand. Also, he instructed them to approve only

1. CINCUSARPAC ARP 16720 DTG 150422Z Oct 1964 (U)
2. COMUSMACV 11565 DTG 170059Z Oct 1964 (U)
3. CINCPAC ltr 7200 ser 0827, 5 Nov 1964 (C)
4. CINCPAC 200318Z Mar 1964 (C)
5. JCS 5322 DTG 141559Z Mar 1964 (C)
those trips that would make a direct contribution to military effort in those countries. 1

Limitations on Visits to RVN After Bombing of Brink Hotel Bachelor Officers Quarters

On the day before Christmas the Viet Cong exploded a bomb at the Brink Hotel BOQ in Saigon, killing two Americans and wounding many others. The damage to the building necessitated moving the BOQ occupants to other facilities in Saigon, thus compounding an existing shortage of billeting space. At COMUSMACV's request, CINCPAC directed the Component Commanders to cancel all visits to RVN except those with an absolute direct contribution to COMUSMACV's effort. He further requested JCS assistance in reducing the number of non-PACOM sponsored visits to RVN during January of 1965. 2, 3, 4

The Military Assistance Plan for the Republic of Vietnam

Add-on to FY64 MA Program: During the Secretary of Defense visit to RVN in March an extensive shopping list was developed by CHMAAG Vietnam to reflect additional resources he believed necessary to pursue the counterinsurgency program. When CINCPAC received the list he obtained General Harkins' personal evaluation of the additional requirements and then obtained OSD approval for an add-on of $2.7 million to the FY64 MA Program to fund the major portion of the items. 5, 6, 7

Five Year Programming Suspended: By the time of the Secretary of Defense Conference in Hawaii on 6 March, Admiral Felt was convinced, in light of the turmoil in the GVN and the continuing Viet Cong insurgency, 0

1. CINCPAC 200318Z Mar 1964 (C)
2. COMUSMACV 260645Z Dec 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 282203Z Dec 1964 (C)
4. CINCPAC 290210Z Dec 1964 (C)
5. CINCPAC 220002Z Mar 1964 (S)
6. Telecon CINCPAC/COMUSMACV TT 43-64, 19 Mar 1964 (TS)
7. OSD DEF 961233 DTG 252341Z Mar 1964 (S)
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1964

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

ASSIST THE CVN TO DEFEND COMMUNIST INSURGENCY AND TO SURVIVE AS A GOVERNMENT:
1. WITH EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF ITS TERRITORIES AND
2. ORIENTED TOWARDS THE WEST.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
MR. MAXWELL TAYLOR
DEPUTY: MR. NELSON J. JOHNSON
U.S. AIR DIRECTOR
MR. JAMES S. KILLEN
CONSULS: GEN W.C. WESTMORELAND

MAP OBJECTIVE

US MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR VIETNAM WILL BE DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO
ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM TO DEFEND THE VIETCONG
INSURGENCY.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES

CHIEF OF STATE - PHAN KHAC SANG
PRIME MINISTER & MINISTER OF DEFENSE - TRAN VAN HUNG
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, RVNAF - LTGEN NGUYEN KHANG
CHIEF OF STAFF - MAJGEN TRAN VAN MINH
C/S RN - ADM CHUNG TAN CAY
C/S VMN - ADM NGUYEN VAN QUANG

TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

3 INF BNS, 4 INF BNS, 1 RANGER CMD, 2 SFOB, 1 PSU BD, 1 ARMD BNS
12 ENG BD

3PC/PS, 3HC, 5LS, 3LSS, 5LSL, 7LS, 7LC, 46LC, 46LCP, 42 VED, 12 PCH, 1 AAL
12 MLRS, 4 GMC, 556 JUNKS

2 TRAN SBD, 4 HEL SBD, 4 HEL SBD, 4 FTR/BMBR
200 M, 1 RECO SBD, 1 CH & B GP

COMBAT CAPABILITY

MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY IN MAJOR POPULATION AREAS AND ALONG LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHERS. EFFICIENT RESISTANCE AGAINST ATTACK BY EXTERNAL FORCES.

CAPABILITY FOR PATROLLING RIVERS AND COASTAL WATERS TO COUNTER INFILTRATION AND SUPPORT OF ARMY COUNTER-INSURGENCY ACTIONS. MARINE BRIGADE CAPABLE OF LIMITED ASSAULT LANDINGS.

CAPABILITY OF PROVIDING LIMITED CLOSE SUPPORT FOR ARMY, LIMITED AERIAL SUPPLY AND SUPPORT OF ARMY OPNS.
that the conflict would continue beyond 1965. Concurring in that general
assessment, the Secretary of Defense concluded that the situation de-
manded that attention be focused on the immediate future with planning
for a five year period being clearly subordinate to a plan for FY65.¹
This was confirmed in April by an OSD message which suspended five
year programming until further notice and abandoned the Accelerated
Model Plan adopted in 1963. OSD also directed that requirements above
the FY65 ceiling of $143.1 million and FY66 ceiling of $143.0 million
be identified as a separate package.²

**FY65 Military Assistance Program:** A major objective of the
FY65 MAP for RVN continued to be that of assisting the CVN to defeat
the Viet Cong insurgency.³ Another important objective was to promote
the capability of the RVN armed forces to retain the areas essential to
a continuation of national resistance and the points of entry to ensure
that U.S./SEATO forces could be deployed in the defense of RVN.⁴

To guide the use of his MAP resources along the lines which he
considered most conducive to promoting his objectives, CINCPAC
designated the projects that were to receive the highest priority. The
following list indicates the most significant of these items.

**Army**

1. Complete the initial equipment for ARVN forces
   in being.

2. Complete the organization, equipping, and training
   of Civil Guard (CG) and Self Defense Corps (SDC)

3. Continue training and advice to the ARVN, CG, and
   SDC to improve their combat capability.

4. Complete a telecommunication system.

5. Continue to support the Strategic Hamlet Program
   by providing selected items of Ordnance, Engineer, Signal,
   and QM supplies and equipment.

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1. CINCPAC 110626Z Mar 1964 (TS)
2. OSD DEF 963028 DTG 080015Z Apr 1964 (S)
4. Ibid., p. 2 (S)
Navy - Marine Corps

1. Improve the capability for inland waterway operations including combat lift, logistic and gunfire support, patrol, escort, and mine sweeping.

2. Improve tactical and command communications.

Air Force

1. Continue to improve airfield complexes and facilities to accommodate and support counterinsurgency and contingency operations.

2. Develop an Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) System.

3. Improve tactical air control capability.

4. Develop a primary/basic pilot training capability utilizing Cessna 185 (U17A) aircraft.

5. Activate a composite tactical squadron from existing and programmed resources to meet military/civic action demands.

FY65-66 MA Plan: CINCPAC forwarded his FY65-66 Military Assistance Plan for Vietnam to the OSD on 8 August.\(^1\) The plan abandoned the Accelerated Model Plan\(^2\) assumption that the war would end in CY65. Instead, it was assumed that the war's tempo would be the same in FY66 as in FY65.

The CINCPAC total recommended FY65-66 Programs for RVN were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dollar Requirements</th>
<th>($ in millions)</th>
<th>FY65</th>
<th>FY66</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td></td>
<td>$ 50.0</td>
<td>$ 6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating</td>
<td></td>
<td>164.3</td>
<td>178.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>$214.3</td>
<td>$184.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 001258, 8 Aug 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 207
### FY65

- Construction materials to support regional and popular forces: $4.0 million
- Vehicles and communication equipment to support an increased number of U.S. advisors: $2.3 million
- Replace M24 tanks with M41A3 tanks: $7.5 million
- Six Motor Gunboats (PGM): $2.9 million
- Augmentation of River Assault Groups: $1.6 million
- Aircraft and equipment for the fourth A1H squadron and equipment for the third A1H squadron: $7.9 million
- Equipment for depot maintenance facility at Bien Hoa Airfield: $0.9 million
- VNAF construction to include POL storage to support contingency operations: $16.3 million

### FY66

- Equipment to support increase in popular and regional forces: $2.2 million
- Augmentation of River Assault Groups: $2.9 million

Several items were excluded from both programs pending further study on detailed information from COMUSMACV. Among these were the 5th and 6th A1H squadrons and 13 million dollars for ARVN modernization. The basic dollar ceiling used for FY65 was $198.1 million ($143.1 million ceiling plus $55.0 million OSD directed add-on). The basic dollar ceiling used for FY66 was $143.0 million.

Events of the second half of the year required repeated upward adjustments to the FY65 and FY66 MA plans. The Secretary of Defense reflected the general sense of urgency concerning the RVN situation when he stated "I want it clearly understood by all concerned that there
is an unlimited budget available for the financing of whatever military assistance is required to advance our interests in that country.\(^1\)

At the end of 1964 it appeared that the FY65 plan to be presented to Congress would be approximately $278.8 million, excluding contingency construction for U.S. forces. Similarly, the FY66 plan was expected to be in excess of $230.0 million when presented to Congress.\(^2\)

**Additional Fighter Squadrons for VNAF:** The decision was made early in 1963 to authorize a third VNAF squadron of AlH aircraft in lieu of an existing squadron of T28s. The aircraft for the third AlH squadron began to arrive in April 1964\(^3,4\) and a USN team at Danang started transition training for the pilots and mechanics who would fly and service the new aircraft.

During a May visit to Saigon the Secretary of Defense sanctioned a fourth VNAF AlH squadron, bringing the authorized number of this type aircraft to 100. However, only 75 were on hand (the additional 25 were scheduled to be delivered in October) and 19 of these were being used by the Navy team to train the RVN flying personnel intended for the third squadron. The Secretary of Defense also directed COMUSMACV to train enough pilots to provide a pilot/plane ratio of 2:1 for an ultimate strength of 150 AlHs. COMUSMACV interpreted this last directive to mean that he had a goal of six AlH squadrons (25 aircraft in each), and he consequently developed a plan to acquire the additional 50 airplanes and to meet the goal of 300 pilots by the end of 1964.

CINCPAC, while agreeing with the general requirements for a fifth and sixth AlH squadron for VNAF, held significant reservations about COMUSMACV’s plan to gain them. Admiral Felt believed that COMUSMACV’s plan sought to do "too much too soon." He also objected to an aspect of the COMUSMACV concept which sacrificed an existing VNAF aerial reconnaissance and transport capability by taking

\(^{1}\) OSD 1441 DTG 311505Z Oct 1964 (S)
\(^{2}\) OSD DEF 003223 DTG 242237Z Dec 1964 (S)
\(^{3}\) COMUSMACV AFGP MDC20046 DTG 160130Z May 1964 (C)
\(^{4}\) CHMAAG-V MAGAF 533 DTG 080809Z May 1964 (C)
\(^{5}\) CINCPAC 220026Z Mar 1964 (S)
the pilots from these aircraft and training them for the A1H. As an alternative, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the two additional A1H units be developed at a more studied rate without sacrificing air support capability.

Specifically, he recommended that it was entirely practical to complete training and equipping the third and fourth A1H squadrons if the next increment of 25 aircraft was delivered in August/September rather than October as scheduled. He also suggested that the only inroad which should be made in the VNAF transport pilot resource was to cancel the activation of a third C47 squadron and have the 2nd Air Division fulfill requirements above the existing two squadron VNAF capability. After achieving a fully trained and equipped force of four A1H squadrons, CINCPAC favored a delay of four to six months to study the impact of the accelerated expansion and to determine whether a valid requirement remained for more units. 1

COMUSMACV subsequently prepared another VNAF expansion plan which envisioned a fifth A1H squadron by 31 July 1965 and a sixth by 31 December 1965. 2 This phasing of the additional squadrons, CINCPAC thought, was more realistic. It also removed the objections to the earlier plan. However, CINCPAC was concerned over the funding of the additional A1H units since he did not believe it was feasible to finance them with funds obtained through deletions from the PACOM MA Program. Rather, he proposed to JCS that the PACOM MAP ceiling for FY65 should either be increased or funds provided from some source other than PACOM. He strongly opposed any financing plan which would take MAP funds from one of the other Asian allies to expand the VNAF. As an alternate to this CINCPAC proposed that the USAF be called upon to provide the combat air support which would otherwise come from the envisioned VNAF units. 3

In October the JCS asked CINCPAC to comment on what "effect" there would be if the aircraft for the 5th and 6th A1H squadrons were

1. CINCPAC 172140Z Jun 1964 (S)
2. COMUSMACV MAC AFGP-ODC 8736 DTG 260805Z Aug 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 060111Z Sep 1964 (S)
delivered one and two and one-half months earlier, respectively, than the dates in COMUSMACV's latest expansion plan. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV thought the VNAF had the manpower to absorb the earlier deliveries but that the VNAF supervisory personnel would be "thinly spread" for a rather extensive period. On the 13th of November the JCS authorized the 5th and 6th A1H squadrons with the following accelerated delivery dates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number of Aircraft</th>
<th>Delivery Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th Squadron</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1 May 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1 June 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Squadron</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15 September 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15 October 1965</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Viet Cong destroyed a number of U.S. B57s at Bien Hoa Airfield on 31 October, but on 20 November COMUSMACV proposed a phased program to introduce jets into the VNAF squadrons and the 1st USAF Air Commando (formerly FARMGATE) squadron. The program would start in January 1965 and terminate in January 1967. CINCPAC, however, did not agree and stated that the advantages of such a move at that time did not seem to outweigh the disadvantages. Two weeks later Ambassador Taylor, in a message to the Secretary of State, supported a plan very similar to COMUSMACV's, except that it would delay the activation of the 5th and 6th Squadrons. COMUSMACV commented on the Ambassador's proposal, reiterating his previous plan to integrate the jets into the two fighter squadrons scheduled for 1965.

CINCPAC anticipated that the substitution of B57s for A1Hs would temporarily reduce the embryonic VNAF capability to participate in counterinsurgency operations. Once more he commented that the operational advantage accruing from the move would not outweigh other
military disadvantages. However, he also pointed out that, if it was determined the psychological and political implications of providing jets to the VNAF outweighed the military disadvantage, he would generally concur with COMUSMACV's proposal.

On 12 December the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the AlH squadrons be activated as scheduled in their 13 November message. At the end of the year further action was pending Secretary of Defense decision.

**USN Training Missions to VNAF AlH Squadrons:** The March 1964 Secretary of Defense decision to authorize a third VNAF AlH squadron created an immediate requirement for a capability to train additional VNAF pilots and mechanics for the unit. Accordingly, a U.S. Navy training unit (VA152), consisting of 23 officers and 150 enlisted men, was placed on TDY in RVN to train the VNAF personnel in the operation and maintenance of the AlH. The unit reached RVN on 29 April, only one day ahead of the first 26 AlHs for the new unit; in cooperation with the 1st USAF Air Commando Squadron, VA 152 trained 98 pilots and 277 maintenance personnel. Its mission was completed on 24 November. Some of the pilot trainees subsequently received combat crew training in the dual seat AlEs of the 1st USAF Air Commando Squadron while others went directly to the 3d and 4th VNAF AlH squadrons.

The VNAF AlH squadrons also received follow-on maintenance training assistance at their Bien Hoa base from Navy Mobile Training Team (MTT) 4-65. That team, organized by COMNAVAIRPAC as a

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1. COMUSMACV MAC J01 1872 DTG 111132Z Mar 1964 (TS)
2. See "Additional Fighter Squadrons for VNAF" in this chapter.
3. CINCPAC 220028Z Mar 1964 (S)
5. The scheduled completion date was 1 Dec 1964. See CINCPAC 030132Z Oct 1964 (S) and CINCPACFLT 060039Z Oct 1964 (S)
result of an August COMUSMACV request, arrived in RVN on 21 September for a temporary duty period of approximately 26 weeks and was fulfilling its mission at the end of the year.

**USAF Training Missions Completed:**

**Helicopter Pilot and Mechanic Training** - A 59 man USAF Flight Training Detachment (FTD) with eight H-19 helicopters, started training pilots and mechanics in RVN for the VNAF in January 1963. Following a Secretary of Defense decision in the spring of 1963 to accelerate training of the VNAF the FTD was augmented in July 1963 with an additional 50 men, and 9 helicopters. Training continued throughout 1963 and by the summer of 1964 the mission was completed. The program produced a cadre of 95 helicopter pilots and 92 mechanics who were prepared for subsequent transition training in the H-34, a combat suitable aircraft.

The FTD was deactivated 21 July 1964. Its H-19s had flown a total of 8,392 hours with an average in-commission rate of 74 percent.

**Liaison Pilot and Mechanic Training** - In March 1963 CINCPAC asked for a USAF Flight Training Detachment to conduct liaison pilot...
training for VNAF personnel in RVN. Stimulated by a Secretary of Defense decision in May 1963 to accelerate training of the VNAF, a program deviation was arranged and delivery of training aircraft was expedited. A USAF Flight Training Detachment of 25 officers and 87 airmen, using 25 Cessna 185 aircraft, began the training program in September-October 1963. By the summer of 1964, 117 pilots had been graduated; 48 in December 1963, 45 in March 1964, and 24 in June. Additionally, 32 maintenance personnel were trained.

Eleven of the pilot graduates were upgraded to instructor pilots and formed the cadre of a continuing VNAF liaison pilot training program that would provide a flow of qualified pilots to the VNAF. The other graduates were sufficient to man the four VNAF liaison squadrons, thus replacing a significant number of more experienced aviators who became a potential source of pilots for C47 and A1H units.

During the training program the 25 Cessna 185s flew 12,463 hours with an average in-commission rate of 94 percent. The FTD was deactivated on 1 August 1964.

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**Proposed Increase in RVNAF Force Structure:** In November, following a joint COMUSMACV/RVNAF high command survey of the RVNAF force structure, COMUSMACV concluded that a substantial increase in the 1965 force levels was required to prevent further deterioration in the military situation in South Vietnam and to provide sufficient forces to achieve progress in the pacification programs. From the results of the study COMUSMACV developed two alternatives for a force increase (Figure IV-9 compares the existing force structure with both alternatives).
**Alternative 1** - Provided for a 30,309 increase in regular forces and a 109,941 increase in paramilitary forces with an associated increase of 446 additional U.S. advisors. It was conceived that the force would provide for progress in the Hôp Tac area and elsewhere to arrest the movement of the VC in a number of critical areas. It was also considered to provide sufficient forces for limited implementation of other pacification programs.

**Alternative 2** - Provided for a 47,556 increase in regular forces and a 109,941 increase in paramilitary forces with 606 additional U.S. advisors. The force was considered adequate to permit substantial progress in pacification but would take considerable time to train and equip.

On 24 November, COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that the RVNAF force increase be achieved by adopting Alternative One. He based his request on considerations of the available manpower support base, equipment and training lead times, and the costs involved. COMUSMACV also requested early approval of the increase so negotiations with the GVN could be opened immediately and the necessary MAP programming actions completed by 1 February 1965. 1

On 29 November CINCPAC concurred in the adoption of Alternative One and recommended its early approval to the JCS. 2 Subsequently, on 16 December, the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that Alternative One be approved as a basis for negotiation with the GVN and initiation of detailed MAP programming actions. Additionally, the JCS recommended that funding action be initiated for FY65 and FY66 worldwide MAP to develop funds to support the requirement. They also recommended that the Secretary of Defense approve in principle the requirement for an appropriate increase in service manpower ceilings. 3

1. COMUSMACV MACJ3 14864 DTG 241055Z Nov 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 291030Z Nov 1964 (S)
3. JCS 2343/500-1 subj: Increase in RVNAF Force Structure (U), 11 Dec 1964 (S)
# RVNAF Force Increase Comparisons

(Personnel - Nov. 64)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGULAR</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>INCREASE</th>
<th>NEW TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alternative 1</td>
<td>Alternative 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>217,300</td>
<td>23,653</td>
<td>40,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>8,162</td>
<td>6,314</td>
<td>6,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>6,555</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>11,582</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>243,599</td>
<td>30,309</td>
<td>47,556</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| PARAMILITARY   | END 65*    | END 65       |
| Regional Force | 97,615     | 35,387       | 133,002        |
| Popular Force  | 109,991    | 79,194**     | 189,185        |
| Coastal Force  | 4,640      | -4,640***    | 0              |
| TOTAL          | 212,246    | 109,941      | 322,187        |

| RVN TOTAL      | 455,845    | 140,250      | 157,497        | 596,095 | 613,342 |

* The increase in Paramilitary Forces is the same under both alternatives.

** Includes combat youth merged into Paramilitary Forces by GVN subsequent to Paramilitary Forces authorization.

*** Transferred to VNN.
Logistic Activities in RVN

**Changed Ammunition Supply Procedures (VAMP):** Viet Cong activities during 1963 caused RVN forces to expend substantial quantities of ammunition. The surge of combat operations created a situation quite different from the circumstances envisioned by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. That act, oriented toward a less warlike internal situation than existed in South Vietnam, provided no resupply system equal to the demands of a shooting war. The flow of ammunition into Vietnam was in response to year-by-year MA programs submitted in minute detail. The program could be varied but the procedure to do so was too awkward and complex to meet the requirements in RVN. Compounding this problem was the long lead time, sometimes as much as two years, required to obtain munitions which were out of stock and often no longer used by U.S. forces. It was not unusual for a CONUS supply agency to discover that it would take two years to procure ammunition items which at that moment were urgently needed by Vietnamese forces in their counterinsurgency fight.\(^1,2\)

In May 1963 CINCPAC proposed to remedy the ammunition resupply problems by placing the Army portion of ammunition supply to RVN on a war footing. His plan was to replace ammunition on the basis of amounts consumed and thus avoid problems inherent to long range programming and funding.\(^3\) OSD immediately approved CINCPAC's concept and the resultant system, termed VAMP (Vietnam Ammunition Procedures), began to function in July. However, purely procedural matters continued to delay ammunition deliveries and in October the RVN stock of several types of ammunition was critical.\(^4\)

Several times substantial airlift of small caliber ammunition was required.\(^5,6,7\) But by November the concerted efforts of CINCPAC and

1. Annex D, Debriefing Report, Major General Charles Timmes, 10 Jun 1964 (CINCPAC Route Slip 002521-64) (S)
2. CHUSAOSASF SSMOM-0 95286 DTG 221530Z Oct 1963 (U)
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 140203Z May 1963 (S)
4. OSD DEF 928115 DTG 160026Z May 1963 (S)
5. MAAG-V MAGAR-LO 15052 DTG 150026Z Oct 1963 (U)
6. MAAG-V MAGAR LO 1481 DTG 190701Z Oct 1963 (C)
7. CINCPAC 262322Z Oct 1963 (C)
CONUS agencies caused enough ammunition supplies to be on the move that the threat of a dangerous shortage of ammunition was apparently dispelled.¹ There had been no case of combat operations suffering from lack of ammunition stock in RVN.²,³

In March 1964, OSD suggested that CINCPAC consider a program similar to VAMP for Air Force and Navy ammunition supply to RVN.⁴ CINCPAC's reply admitted the success of VAMP and advised the Secretary of Defense of features appropriate for an expanded VAMP. One of his most significant points was that the Service Departments should be held responsible to provide stocks of ammunition in being in anticipation of RVN requirements.⁵ CINCPAC's concepts were generally reflected in an April OSD memorandum which authorized the Army, Navy, and Air Force to procure and maintain CONUS stocks sufficient to meet the projected demands from RVN. The Secretary of Defense also required all three departments to fund the ammunition until it was delivered in RVN.⁶

Subsequently, representatives of OASD/ISA, OASD/I&L, CNO, BUWEPs, OSA, DA, DAF, AFLC, OOMA, and WRAMA met in Hawaii and devised support plans and procedures to place Air Force and Navy ammunition supply to RVN on a basis similar to the Army's VAMP. Under the plan, effective 1 July 1964, COMUSMACV would continue to program RVN ammunition requirements on a line item basis and submit them to CINCPAC for review and forwarding to Washington for final approval. These actions served mainly to generate MAP funds. Actual requirements and estimates of future needs were to be stated in COMUSMACV's monthly forecasts. Each Service Department was to have a single manager for ammunition supply to RVN, and they would keep CINCPAC and COMUSMACV advised as ammunition shipments were dispatched to RVN. In turn, COMUSMACV's report that a

¹ MAAG-V MAGAR LO 1590 DTG 120921Z Nov 1963 (C)
² CINCPAC 042121Z Mar 1964 (S)
³ DF, COMUSMACV, subj: Answers to CINCPAC Ammunition Questions (U), 9 Feb 1964 (C)
⁴ DEF 959810 DTG 170218Z Mar 1964 (S)
⁵ CINCPAC 240352Z Mar 1964 (S)
⁶ SECDEF Memo, subj: Support of Ammunition requirements for Republic of Vietnam Military Assistance Program, 1 Apr 1964 (C)
shipment had been turned over to RVN custody was to be used to obtain reimbursement of service department funds from MAP sources.  

It is worth noting that concurrent with the Air Force and Navy adoption of VAMP, Army ammunition requirements for Vietnam were being filled almost in their entirety, and the opinion of Americans in Vietnam was that VAMP was "effective and fully responsive to country requirements." The two essential features which seemed to have made VAMP successful, and which were adopted by the Air Force and Navy systems, were:

1. Resupply was based on actual consumption rather than long range programming.
2. The Service Department procured long lead time items in advance and thus could honor RVN requirements from stocks in being.

It was hoped that these modifications to MAP procedures, developed over a period of slightly more than a year, had achieved a system which would assure a comprehensive and prompt response to future RVN ammunition requirements. Also, the experience with RVN ammunition problems helped align the Laos supply system with the requirements of a shooting war. (See Laos Ammunition Procedures, this chapter.)

Emergency Radio Broadcast Communications for COMUSMACV:
In October, recognizing the deteriorating political scene in RVN, COMUSMACV became concerned about the possibility that the Viet Cong or other factions might wrest the Saigon radio broadcast facilities from the control of the GVN. To prepare for that contingency COMUSMACV asked CINCPAC to approve a plan whereby 5KW radio broadcast

1. Memorandum of Understanding for Supply of RVN Navy Ammunition Requirements (U), undated, signed by reps of CNO, BUWEPS, OSO, COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, OSD
2. Memorandum of Understanding for Support of RVN AF Ammunition Requirements (U), undated, signed by reps of DOD, DAF, DN, DA and CINCPAC
3. Pamphlet, VAMP, Army Procedures, Jun 1964 (G)
4. Annex D, Debriefing Report, Major General Charles Timmes, 10 Jun 1964 (CINCPAC Route Slip 002521-64) (S)
equipment of the U.S. Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific (Okinawa) would be predesignated for emergency loan to COMUSMACV for his own or GVN use. CINCPAC approved the plan in principle and directed COMUSMACV to submit a coordinated plan for formal approval. At the end of the year COMUSMACV was still coordinating the final details of his plan. 1,2

Flood Relief Operations in RVN: In early November the northern coastal regions of RVN were deluged with rain from the Northeast monsoon and typhoons IRIS and JOAN. By 10 November the river at Danang was two feet above its banks, several airstrips were inundated, and the AN/FPS-20 search antennas at the Monkey Mountain Control Reporting Post (CPR) were out of service due to wind damage. 3,4 Additionally, many Vietnamese families were homeless and suffering from lack of food and shelter. Following a request by Ambassador Taylor in Saigon, CINCPAC approved the use of elements of the Seventh Fleet, 5,6 to assist the people of the affected area. 7-18

Typhoon LOUISE struck the same area on 18 November and added to the already serious damage and flooding. Continuous rains also silted the Danang harbor, so much so that relief action was hampered, and it was expected a major dredging activity would be required to remedy the

1. COMUSMACV MAC J34 10597 DTG 030811Z Oct 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 230114Z Oct 1964 (S)
3. COMUSMACV 13730 DTG 101925Z Nov 1964 (TS)
4. CTG 77.6 101955Z Nov 1964 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 121904Z Nov 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC 121942Z Nov 1964 (S)
7. SAIGON 830 to CINCPAC, 12 Nov 1964 10PM (S)
8. COMUSMACV 13881 DTG 121350Z Nov 1964 (S)
9. SAIGON 174 to HONG KONG 12 Nov 1964 10PM (S)
10. CTG 76 130020Z Nov 1964 (S)
11. CTG 76 130022Z Nov 1964 (S)
12. USS WINSTON 131007Z Nov 1964 (S)
13. CTG 76.5 160250Z Nov 1964 (S)
14. CINCPACFLT 142359Z Nov 1964 (S)
15. CTG 76.5 151637Z Nov 1964 (S)
16. CTG 76.5 131056Z Nov 1964 (S)
17. COMUSMACV 14117 DTG 160516Z Nov 1964 (C)
18. CTG 76.5 171215Z Nov 1964 (S)
situation. 1, 2, 3

The Deputy Prime Minister of RVN expressed his appreciation for the assistance of the Seventh Fleet. 4 An assessment of Seventh Fleet assistance to the people of the RVN showed that significant amounts of military equipment, supplies, and funds had been involved in the operation. 5 On 15 December CINCPAC commended COMUSMACV and Seventh Fleet elements for their contributions to the flood relief operations. 6

Improvement in U.S. Logistic Support System: In 1962 Admiral Felt had enunciated several principles to govern the logistic support associated with the expansion of U.S. forces in RVN. Among them were: 7

1. Support patterns and responsibilities developed would be, insofar as practicable, compatible with those envisioned under CINCPAC and SEATO contingency plans.

2. Logistic and administrative support would remain an individual service responsibility subject to modification by inter-service agreements.

In April 1962 the Army had established the United States Army Support Group Vietnam, later designated the United States Army Support Command, Vietnam (USASCV), with the following functions.

1. To conduct U.S. Army combat service support operations.

1. COMUSMACV 14930 DTG 250705Z Nov 1964 (U)
2. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 010512Z Dec 1964 (C)
3. Typhoon damage also inhibited covert operations which are not covered in this history because of security classifications. See COMUSMACV MAC SOG 17720 DTG 1802212Z Dec 1964 (S); CINCPAC 220326Z Dec 1964 (S); CNO 241555Z Dec 1964 (S); and COMUSMACV MAC SOG 18670 DTG 290958Z Dec 1964 (S)
4. CTG 76.5 180700Z Nov 1964 (S)
5. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 022029Z Dec 1964 (C)
6. CINCPAC 150004Z Dec 1964 (U)
7. CINCPAC Command History, 1962, p. 159
2. To provide the nucleus for a Type B U.S. Army Logistic Command Headquarters that would command U.S. Army combat service units in RVN under contingency conditions.

DOD Directive 5100.3 had assigned the Navy the logistic support responsibility for unified commands in the Pacific Area. To discharge that responsibility the Navy established, as of 1 July 1962, the Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon (HSAS) to provide administrative and logistic support to the Headquarters U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam; and other activities and units as designated by the Chief of Naval Operations. In general, HSAS served the Saigon area, although it also supported the outlying MAAG compounds. There were, however, inter-service agreements (e.g., those related to operating the up-country ports) which caused HSAS to perform many common-item supply and service support functions for other U.S. forces.

Thus, in 1964, the Army and Navy organizations were performing logistic support functions with an approximately equal number of personnel. 1

The Navy mission was strictly a limited peacetime function while, on the other hand, the Army mission was to provide the nucleus for a logistic command that was to be established under contingency conditions. Further, the contingency augmentation units to build up logistic support in RVN were to be Army elements.

With the implementation of Phases II, III, or IV of CINCPAC OPLAN 32, the Army was to immediately assume the responsibility for U.S. logistic support in RVN. On analysis, it seemed apparent that a transfer of logistic responsibilities at such a critical time would degrade the performance of an extremely important function. Another consideration was that many of the supported units and individuals moved between Saigon (HSAS) and non-MAAG stations up-country (USASCV) so they were

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1. On 30 June, 1964 USASCV had 493 personnel assigned (73 officers, 420 enlisted); HSAS had 484 personnel (95 officers, 361 enlisted, and 25 civilians) assigned.
exposed to the varying, service-oriented, procedures of the Army and Navy support organizations.

Immediately after he became CINCPAC, Admiral Sharp sought to assess the desirability of rationalizing the U.S. force support procedures in RVN. He concluded that:

1. It would be advantageous to have one organization responsible for common logistical support.

2. It should be possible to realign the existing logistic support resources to facilitate the USASCV taking over the functions that it would perform under contingency situations.

3. The overall logistic posture of U.S. forces would be enhanced if the Army assumed in advance that part of the support function that an Army Logistic Command would perform in wartime.

4. HSAS should continue to support the commissary, exchange, and dependent medical care functions for U.S. forces.

5. Since DOD had assigned the Navy the responsibility to provide peacetime logistical support to COMUSMACV and MAAGV, it was not within the authority of CINCPAC to designate another service to perform it.

6. It was both feasible and desirable to establish an Army Logistic Command in RVN.

Admiral Sharp discussed the subject informally with CINCUSARPAC and COMUSMACV in July and referred a staff study reflecting the above conclusions to COMUSMACV in September for formal comment. COMUSMACV concurred in principle with CINCPAC's conclusions. After consulting Ambassador Taylor, COMUSMACV responded with detailed comments on CINCPAC's study and in late October, submitted his own study on the subject. In this study, he recommended the immediate introduction of a U.S. Army Logistic Command to RVN. He felt that it might, in time, displace HSAS and serve as a base for the expansion that U.S. or SEATO contingency plans might require.

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 001421, 14 Sep 1964 (S)
2. COMUSMACV MAC J4 10389 DTG 300255Z Sep 1964 (C)
3. COMUSMACV ltr MAC J02 ser 00478, 28 Oct 1964 (S)
Subsequently, in connection with increased third country participation in RVN, CINCPAC mentioned to the JCS that he was considering an improvement to the RVN logistic support system. In response, the JCS asked CINCPAC to recommend means of developing a flexible U.S. logistic support capability in RVN that could support certain requirements on short notice.

On 27 November, CINCPAC informed the JCS that he agreed with COMUSMACV's concept of introducing a Logistic Command in RVN, but he felt that the COMUSMACV troop list should be modified to provide adequate command and control units and enough maintenance capability to support U.S. operations in outlying areas. Admiral Sharp observed that the immediate establishment of an Army Logistic Command in RVN would improve the support rendered to the U.S. forces already there; it would also facilitate future operations against the DRV, the expansion of forces with contingency plans, and the introduction of third-country forces. CINCPAC placed sufficient urgency on the matter to recommend strongly that the Logistic Command should be introduced at once without waiting for the resolution of third-country requirements or other considerations.

However, on 9 December the JCS informed CINCPAC that the Department of the Army was reluctant to absorb the total personnel and monetary commitments implied by COMUSMACV's plan for improving the logistic system. Accordingly, CINCPAC was directed to prepare a detailed and coordinated plan to achieve an improved logistic system. To expedite an increased capability, the Joint Chiefs asked Admiral Sharp to comment on the introduction of the Logistic Command, as a subordinate element to USASCV, with an initial function of supporting Army units only and later adding the responsibility of common-item support as inter-service support agreements were consummated. Under the procedure thus proposed, the decision covering the phase-out of HSAS could be made later.

1. CINCPAC 150116Z Nov 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 192049Z Nov 1964 (S)
3. JCS 002030 DTG 190047Z Nov 1964 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 272339Z Nov 1964 (S)
5. JCS 002752 DTG 092059Z Dec 1964 (S)
Admiral Sharp considered that the bulk of the planning could best be accomplished in Saigon and offered to send members of his staff and the Component staffs there to assist in planning. However, since COMUSMACV already had a similar study in an advanced state, General Westmoreland volunteered to have his J4 bring the plan to Hawaii for explanation and completion in consultation with CINCPAC and the Component Commanders.

The resulting coordinated plan was submitted to the JCS on 21 December and included the addition of an Engineer Construction Group to meet the construction and maintenance requirements of the buildup. In CINCPAC's opinion the plan represented a realistic concept for the introduction of an Army Logistical Command into RVN.

Ultimate objectives of the plan were to improve the logistic support of American forces in RVN, establish a base for support of third country forces, and provide a basic organization that would accept orderly augmentation in the event of a contingency. However, CINCPAC considered it essential to introduce certain command and control units, and elements for up-country field supply and maintenance complexes, as a prerequisite to the deployment of the main body of the Logistical Command. Consequently, on the day before Christmas he submitted a list of specific units required immediately and asked JCS to deploy them as soon as possible. COMUSMACV soon advised that Ambassador Taylor had approved the introduction of the advance units. JCS reported that the COMUSMACV and CINCPAC recommendations to include the introduction of an engineer construction group, were being considered as a matter of priority.

1. CINCPAC 110347Z Dec 1964 (S)
2. COMUSMACV J4 17527 DTG 160148Z Dec 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 162340Z Dec 1964 (S)
5. CINCPAC 240120Z Dec 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC 240121Z Dec 1964 (S)
7. COMUSMACV MAC 02 18823 DTG 301205Z Dec 1964 (S)
8. JCS 003328 DTG 302141Z Dec 1964 (S)
COMUSMACV's Authority to Exploit Air & Sea Transportation: To conserve his capability to fight in an emergency and to comply with various directives of higher authorities, CINCPAC had adopted a policy that required subordinate commanders to obtain his concurrence before they could employ PACOM assets in support of non-CINCPAC assigned forces.¹ In October, General Westmoreland pointed out that if he implemented that policy it would interfere with his efforts in RVN and impose a heavy administrative workload. Accordingly, the General requested the authority to employ his airlift and sealift assets, without referral to CINCPAC, to support the RVNAF, USOM, Third Country Forces, and others not assigned to CINCPAC when it would contribute to the U.S. objectives in RVN.²

After reviewing the existing policy, CINCPAC concluded that although the limitations were fundamentally sound in their broad application they were unnecessarily restrictive in light of the circumstances existing in RVN. He therefore delegated General Westmoreland authority to exploit the PACOM furnished transportation resources which were under COMUSMACV operational control for any purpose that would promote the U.S. objectives in RVN. However, CINCPAC stipulated that certain records and reports required by law and higher authorities would be maintained.³

Security of U.S. Ships in RVN Ports: The security of RVN ports was a problem of growing concern in 1964. At 012100Z May the USNS CARD, moored at pier 10 K in Saigon after bringing a cargo of aircraft into South Vietnam, was sabotaged and sunk by an explosion below the waterline. There were no personnel casualties but the ship settled in an upright position in 48 feet of water. CINCPAC urged COMUSMACV to act with the U.S. Ambassador to emphasize to the GVN the need for adequate port security.⁴ A USN salvage team raised the CARD and towed it to Subic, arriving there on 25 May.⁵

1. Para 1d(4), CINCPACINSTR 004000.1E, 17 Jul 1963 (S)
2. Ltr General Westmoreland to Admiral Sharpser 01496, 22 Oct 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 142331Z Nov 1964 (C)
4. CINCPAC 022233Z May 1964 (C)
5. COMSEVENTHFLT 071007Z May 1964 (C)
operation thus removed from the RVN capitol a humiliating monument to the GVN inadequacy to protect its major port. The CARD incident served to emphasize the vulnerability of shipping in the Saigon River, and it drew attention to the ever-present danger of having the river blocked by a sunken ship. 1

In another incident, late in October, a young man was apprehended near the USNS MUSKINGUM in Danang harbor. He was carrying a hand bomb wrapped in school books and papers, and he informed his captors that he was under orders to "get" the MUSKINGUM or a nearby LST. Despite the fact that there was no damage to the ship and that the saboteur was captured, the ship's captain termed the GVN security measures for his vessel completely inadequate. 2

Vulnerability of Resupply Routes: The surface lines of communications (LOC) in RVN became increasingly vulnerable to Viet Cong interference during 1964. Using terrorism, tax collection, and other means, the insurgents expanded their influence along the major highways and weakened the GVN ability to secure the roads. 3 With this, CINCPAC became concerned that the various modes of transportation in RVN be so managed that the resupply transportation system for RVNAF and U.S. troops was not overly dependent on land and inland water LOC.

In response to a November query from Admiral Sharp, COMUSMACV provided statistics on the movement of combined U.S. and RVNAF resupply cargo for the period July to September and stated that the percentage of lift by air and rail had remained steady for the previous six months. He also noted that sealift had increased approximately 20 percent and that highway shipments had dropped from 78 percent to approximately 62 percent in the six month period ending in September. 4,5

1. CINCPACFLT 010218Z Aug 1964 (S)
2. COMSTSFE 090555Z Nov 1964 (S)
3. COMUSMACV MAC J312 0686 DTG 081520Z Jan 1965 (S)
4. CINCPAC 102241Z Nov 1964 (S)
5. COMUSMACV J42 R&C 14017 DTG 140645Z Nov 1964 (S)
Railway Security (RVN): Viet Cong harassment of the RVN rail traffic surged in late 1963. Perhaps part of the increased activity was their response to the RVN military coup d'état of early November, but the significant fact was that the Viet Cong (VC) could evade the GVN security system and attack, mine, and sabotage the railways.\(^1\) The Advanced Research Projects Agency, Research and Development (ARPA R&D) had studied VC ambushes of trains and concluded that electrically detonated mines were the most effective derailment weapon. Their study, and COMUSMACV discussions with U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Laboratories (USAERDL) representatives in RVN, prompted CINCPAC in 1964 to ask DA to investigate the development of devices which might detect and locate the noises associated with mine laying.\(^2\)

CINCPAC also noted that air-escort of trains apparently caused a reduction in VC action against the railway system. Accordingly he directed COMUSMACV to increase this protective measure and gather data of the results for future analysis of the correlation between harassment and escort. In a similar vein CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV to seek means of expanding the military use of the railroad in hopes that the ARVN would devise more effective railway security measures to protect their cargos.\(^3\)

Vulnerability of Water Routes to Saigon: In July CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to study the vulnerability of the Saigon River to electrically controlled mines, and the possibility of blocking the river by sinking a ship at a point where the river narrowed.\(^4\) CINCPACFLT's report indicated that the Viet Cong was apparently capable of fabricating and planting a mine capable of sinking a sea-going vessel at many points in the river. A sunken hulk at some of the narrow spots in the channel would block the river to all but small vessels for an extended period.

1. CINCPAC 080120Z Feb 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 190129Z May 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 080120Z Feb 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 291345Z Jul 1964 (TS)
"VC TARGET" - the RAILROADS of South Vietnam

VC Incidents Against The Railroads in South Vietnam 1963 - 1964

- Highest Incident Rate 1963

1963 1964

IV-10
Some of the most vulnerable areas were near the city of Saigon and a
sunken vessel at those points would be a conspicuous monument to Viet
Cong prowess.\textsuperscript{1}

COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC in September that the country
team had concluded that an alternate water access channel to Saigon
should be developed to prepare for the contingency that the normal
deep draft channel might be blocked. The proposal was to dredge and
buoy the Soi Rat River, and CINCPAC was asked to advise on the
availability of buoys and ground tackle to do the job.\textsuperscript{2} CINCPAC
assigned the problem to CINCPACFLT and directed him to take a
careful look, from a cost standpoint, at the extent and feasibility of the
project with particular attention to the dredging involved.\textsuperscript{3, 4}

Although the Component Commanders subsequently explored
several facets of the proposal it finally developed that COMUSMACV
resources were sufficient to meet channel buoy and other requirements
without assistance from CINCPAC.\textsuperscript{5, 6}

\textbf{CINCPAC Policy on Marking Equipment:} Until late 1964 there
had been no question but what the services were privileged to prescribe
the distinctive markings for their equipment, nor had there been any
formal CINCPAC policy in the matter. However, in November
CINCUSARPAC asked CINCPAC's concurrence in granting a CGUSASCV
request for authority to remove prominent markings from Army aircraft
in the RVN in the interest of making them less conspicuous targets for
the Viet Cong. The Department of the Army had already informed
CINCUSARPAC that it interposed no objection to the proposal unless it
conflicted with a CINCPAC or COMUSMACV policy. CINCPAC's re-
response made it a matter of record that the services had the prerogative
to prescribe the markings for their equipment.\textsuperscript{7, 8}

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. CINCPACFLT 010218Z Aug 1964 (S)
\item 2. COMUSMACV MAC J4 22348 DTG 260916Z Sep 1964 (S)
\item 3. CINCPAC 290542Z Sep 1964 (C)
\item 4. CINCPAC 301940Z Sep 1964 (C)
\item 5. COMUSMACV MAC J4 11352 DTG 141029Z Oct 1964 (C)
\item 6. COMUSMACV MAC J4 11900 DTG 210925Z Oct 1964 (U)
\item 7. CINCUSARPAC 091454Z Nov 1964 (U)
\item 8. CINCPAC 180344Z Nov 1964 (U)
\end{itemize}
Construction to Support Contingency Operations in Southeast Asia

Can Tho Airfield: At the end of 1962 COMUSMACV recommended the construction of a new airfield at Can Tho in the Delta area. An improved air facility at this location was expected to ultimately reduce the aircraft reaction time for ground support operations in the counter-insurgency battle. 1 CINCPAC forwarded the proposal to OASD/ISA and asked that it be given the highest priority for approval and funding. He recommended, based on the requirement for speed and economy, an austere forward airfield using mobile facilities for flight operations and line maintenance. 2 OSD approved the construction project immediately, and an RVN dredge began pumping hydraulic fill early in 1965. The dredging operation was hindered by technical problems and at least one VC attack but some progress was made. 3

By mid-summer, because of the urgency of the situation and the need for expanded housing for advisors, the project was modified to provide for a more elaborate facility at increased cost. It was funded in the FY65 MA Program. 4 (C)

Emergency Construction to Support Increased U. S. Advisor Effort:
In early 1964 the construction policy in RVN, adopted when it appeared that there might be a drastic reduction in American forces in South Vietnam, emphasized maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation of facilities. Also, new construction had been geared to the minimum requirements for safety, health, and welfare of personnel. 5 However, just before the middle of the year a broad spectrum of construction requirements developed when the decision was made to expand the U. S. military advisory program as a means of instilling momentum into the counter-insurgency campaign. 6, 7, 8

1. CINCPAC 140300Z Dec 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 082307Z Jan 1964 (S)
3. OSD DEF 961618 DTG 142252Z Jan 1964 (C)
4. COMUSMACV MAP 5127 DTG 200327Z Jun 1964 (S)
5. CINCPAC 012312Z Apr 1964 (S)
6. JCS 6468 DTG 251724Z May 1964 (S)
7. CINCPAC 042320Z Jul 1964 (S)
8. COMUSMACV MAC J32 4460 DTG 011729Z Jun 1964 (S)
SUMMARY OF CONSTRUCTION TO SUPPORT INCREASED ADVISORY EFFORT

IN FY 64 MAP
Danang:
Rehabilitate Runway

IN FY 65 MAP
Danang:
AC&W Site Road
POL Storage
Base Communications Center
Base Expansion
Pleiku:
AC&W Radar Towers
Resurface Runway
Base Communications Center
Ban Me Thuot:
AC&W Radar Towers
Nha Trang:
Base Communications Center
Improve Runways
Bien Hoa:
Airfield Facilities
Base Communications Center
Tan Son Nhut:
Resurface Runways
Base Communications Center
Physical Evaluation Center
Can Tho:
AC&W Site
Complete Airfield
Base Communications Center
Unprogrammed
Chu Lai:
Construct Airfield

Legend
--- SERVICE FUNDING
--- MAP FUNDING

IX-11
Fortunately, several of the construction projects already programmed for MAP FY64 and FY65 offered a partial solution to the requirements of the new situation. But there was a significant amount of additional construction that had to be coordinated by CINCPAC on an emergency basis. During July and August CINCPAC and the Component Commanders developed the new construction program, and in September the Secretary of Defense directed that MAP funds would be used to initiate urgently needed construction associated with the deployment of U.S. units to South Vietnam; he also directed that the MAP would later be reimbursed from service funds.

CINCPAC, as an operator in the MAP system, coordinated the various construction projects and expedited the funding activities associated with them. At the end of the year $13,574,000 in MAP funds had been committed for all the projects which were eventually to be paid for by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The construction program, and the ultimate source of funds to support it, is summarized in Figure IV-11.

Construction to Support Contingency Operations in Southeast Asia:

Events in the second half of 1964 underscored the need for contingency preparations in Southeast Asia. In August, concurrent with the formulation of the emergency construction program to support the expanded advisory effort in RVN, (See above) CINCPAC asked the Component Commanders to formulate their construction requirements related to contingency operations in Southeast Asia.

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 001258, 8 Aug 1964 (S)
2. COMUSMACV ASCV-D 0118 DTG 210731Z Aug 1964 (S)
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 250431Z Aug 1964 (S)
4. COMUSMACV MAC MAP 23276 DTG 250824Z Aug 1964 (S)
5. OSD DEF 983888 DTG 261614Z Aug 1964 (S)
6. ADMINO CINCPAC 212105Z Aug 1964 (S)
7. OSD DEF 8312 DTG 032140Z Sep 1964 (S)
8. JCS 8314 DTG 032200Z Sep 1964 (C)
9. CINCPAC 052008Z Sep 1964 (C)
10. OSD DEF 8532 DTG 111507Z Sep 1964 (S)
11. CINCPAC 160315Z Sep 1964 (C)
12. OSD DEF 8989 DTG 241522Z Sep 1964 (S)
13. CINCPAC 212105Z Aug 1964 (S)
the emergency construction program caused some delay in formulating the contingency construction program. But by early December the recommendations of the Component Commanders had reached CINCPAC and he had submitted them, with the projects listed in the order of priority by component, to the JCS.

Although the contingency projects covered the whole of PACOM, CINCPAC considered that the following were the most significant:

**Saigon Hospital** - See the account of this project on the following page.

**Chu Lai Airfield Complex** - (jet capable) Needed to meet an urgent requirement in the vicinity of Danang.

**Parallel Runway at Danang** - Essential to support the anticipated air traffic in support of contingency operations.

CINCPACFLT prepared the Military Construction Program and Military Construction Line Item Data forms (DD Forms 1390, 1391) on the Chu Lai and Danang projects and submitted them to Admiral Sharp. He approved both, with the addition of POL facilities at each location, and directed CINCPACFLT to expedite processing the projects through Navy military construction program channels.

Meanwhile the JCS asked CINCPAC to submit an integrated PACOM priority list of construction projects in addition to his previous listing by components. The list was provided on 20 December, still reflecting the top priority of the hospital and airfield projects, and was under JCS consideration at the end of the year.

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1. OSD DEF 8312 DTG 032140Z Sep 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 001850, 9 Dec 1964 (S)
3. CINCPACFLT ltr ser 45/00937, 4 Dec 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 001901, 17 Dec 1964 (S)
5. JCS 002371 DTG 272252Z Nov 1964 (S)
6. See CINCPAC 210127Z Sep 1964 and 260536Z Nov 1964, both (TS) for Admiral Sharp's strong recommendations on the need for these two projects
7. JCS 003011 DTG 172207Z Dec 1964 (S)
Improved U.S. Hospital Facilities, Saigon: In September 1963, CINCPAC had approved COMUSMACV's proposal to discontinue planning for a permanent hospital in Saigon and, as an alternate solution, to construct additions to the existing facility. But by mid-1964 conditions had changed to such an extent that COMUSMACV asked General Maxwell Taylor, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Felt to assist in obtaining better medical facilities in Saigon. COMUSMACV cited specific deficiencies in his existing hospital, to include terming it a fire trap where the wounded patients were exposed to numerous discomforts and hazards.

In response to Admiral Felt's query for clarification, COMUSMACV pointed out that he had earlier been willing to accept a marginal facility when it seemed that Americans would be in RVN for a limited period, but, he emphasized, it was apparent that the number of U.S. Military personnel in South Vietnam would increase rather than decrease. He further predicted a rise in the rate of wounded and sick resulting from a recent increase in the density of advisors in the forward areas. As a solution he thought it was essential to develop first class medical installations in Saigon and, of the several possibilities explored, it seemed most feasible to accept General Khanh's offer of a partially completed building that had been intended for Madam Nhu's Womans Solidarity Movement. In the meantime, COMUSMACV proposed to hold in abeyance a $91,000 project, then pending approval, for expansion of the Saigon hospital.

Admiral Felt, while admitting that the Madam Nhu building might provide a better facility than could be obtained by modifying the existing hospital, gave paramount importance to providing improved medical facilities as soon as possible. Accordingly, he urged COMUSMACV to proceed as rapidly as possible with the modification of the existing facility while the highly questionable potential of the Madam Nhu building

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, pp. 220-221
2. COMUSMACV MAC J00 4621 DTG 050947Z Jun 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 090441Z Jun 1964 (S)
4. COMUSMACV MAC J01 DTG 160029Z Jun 1964 (C)
was explored.  Concurrently, CINCPAC asked the Chief of Naval Operations to assist in expediting the funding and approval of the money for the modification and enlargement of the Saigon Hospital.

CINCPAC's judgement of the utility of the Madam Nhu building was confirmed by the Officer in Charge of Construction Southeast Asia who, after studying the problem during a visit to Saigon, confirmed that the existing facility was grossly unsatisfactory and advised that the proposed building should be used only as a desperate last resort.

In July, soon after Admiral Sharp had relieved Admiral Felt as CINCPAC, $100,000 in FY64 funds was approved for the modification project and CINCPAC urged COMUSMACV to arrange with the GVN a site for the proposed new hospital. Immediately after a site was established, Admiral Sharp proposed to ask OSD for approval and funding of the new structure.

Several alternatives, to include using a hospital ship to provide the hospital expansion, were meanwhile studied without reaching a decision on a specific course of action. Following an October conference in Saigon between Ambassador Taylor and Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC appointed a board of flag/general officers to investigate all feasible alternatives for expanding hospital facilities to include, but not limited to the following:

1. Construct a hospital of the "Subic" type or of the U.S. Army Station type providing suitable real estate could be found.
2. Convert an existing building, if suitable and available, to a hospital.
3. Activate and overhaul a hospital ship to be anchored in Saigon or elsewhere, dependent on security, berthing, and accessibility considerations.

1. CINCPAC 230425Z Oct 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC 252333Z Jun 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 150206Z Jul 1964 (S)
4. DIRPACDOCKS 5594 DTG 300755Z Jun 1964 (S)
5. CNO 132044Z Jul 1964 (U)
6. DIRPACDOCKS 010341Z Aug 1964 (U)
7. CINCPACFLT 290421Z Sep 1964 (C)
8. CINCPAC 230425Z Oct 1964 (C)
4. Activate and convert an APL (barracks ship, non-self-propelled) for berthing as in "3" above.

5. A combination of "1" and "2" above, making use of the "Madam Nhu" building for administration and billeting, and constructing the hospital facilities proper on adjacent undeveloped land.

A working group for the board was scheduled to visit Saigon at an early date, but within a week COMUSMACV announced that he had asked the GVN for a 12 acre site at Tan Son Nhut Airport and that he anticipated it would be approved in one or two weeks. Accordingly, he obtained Admiral Sharp's approval to delay the working group visit until the GVN decision was known. 1, 2, 3

On 13 November COMUSMACV received the GVN's written approval for construction of a hospital at the Tan Son Nhut Airport site. 4 CINCPAC then dissolved his flag/general officer board and acted to obtain the funds to accomplish the design and construction of a new 100 bed facility on a basic structure of a 200 bed hospital. 5 Design funds for the hospital were approved on 20 November. 6

Meanwhile, Ambassador Taylor had been concerned as to whether the existing facilities would meet requirements until the permanent hospital was complete. 7 After consulting COMUSMACV, CINCPAC enumerated for Ambassador Taylor various feasible means of meeting requirements during the interim period. 8

In late November, CINCPAC was chagrined to discover that COMUSMACV's arrangement with the GVN for the Tan Son Nhut site would dictate a "Subic" type structure, costing approximately $4.5 million, rather than a station type hospital, costing $1.5 million. COMUSMACV was of the opinion that new and time consuming

1. COMUSMACV 301124Z Oct 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC 310049Z Oct 1964 (U)
3. CINCPAC 310138Z Oct 1964 (C)
4. COMUSMACV MAC J4 131144Z Nov 1964 (C)
5. CINCPAC 140416Z Nov 1964 (C)
6. BUDOCKS 201910Z Nov 1964 (C)
7. SAIGON 851 to CINCPAC 11AM 17 Nov 1964 (C)
8. CINCPAC 180130Z Nov 1964 (C)
negotiations, with doubtful success, would be required to change the
type hospital since the GVN would object that the less attractive sta-
tion type structure would clash with their master plan for developing the
Tan Son Nhut Area. 1, 2

On 9 December, after consultations with CINCPAC's surgeon,
COMUSMACV recommended construction of the "Subic Bay" type hos-
pital and requested immediate funding so that construction could start. 3
By 15 December COMUSMACV further confirmed that he and Ambas-
sador Taylor were in agreement on the design and siting of the new hos-
pital. 4 The next day CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that construc-
tion authority and funds be provided without delay; 5 at the same time he
asked CINCPACFLT to prepare the documents to support the project. 6

At the end of the year the hospital project was under consideration
by the Secretary of Defense for funding under the FY65 MAP. However,
if MAP funding was not possible it appeared that the project would have
to await congressional action. 7

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) — Combat
Development (CD)

Command Relationships for RDT&E and Combat Developments
in RVN: In 1963 CINCPAC provided the JCS a plan for consolidating all
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) projects and all
Combat Developments and related projects into a single activity under
COMUSMACV. In February 1964 the JCS established the Joint Research
and Test Activity (JRATA) which was to be responsive to COMUSMACV. 8
JRATA was made responsible for those functions previously performed
by the Advance Research Projects Agency Field Unit, the Army Concept

1. CINCPAC 210348Z Nov 1964 (C)
2. COMUSMACV MAC J4 15110 DTG 271127Z Nov 1964 (C)
3. COMUSMACV MAC J4 16076 DTG 091022Z Dec 1964 (C)
4. COMUSMACV 17411 DTG 150154Z Dec 1964 (C)
5. CINCPAC 160457Z Dec 1964 (C)
6. CINCPAC 160459Z Dec 1964 (C)
7. JCS 003091 DTG 211508Z Dec 1964 (C)
8. JCS 2343/299-4, 11 Feb 1964 (C)
Team in Vietnam, the 2nd Air Division Air Force Test Unit, and the Joint Operation Evaluation Group, Vietnam.

The JCS charged CINCPAC with the responsibility for the conduct of RDT&E and Combat Developments. CINCPAC was also made responsible for stating requirements and providing support for these activities and for making recommendations to the JCS regarding project establishment and termination.

In March CINCPAC implemented the JCS directive. CINCPAC stated that the goal of RDT&E and Combat Developments in Vietnam was to use all means available to enhance the counterinsurgency capabilities of Vietnamese and U.S. forces in the RVN and to derive therefrom guidance in counterinsurgency for application elsewhere. It was made a matter of policy, however, that primary emphasis would be placed on the direct and significant improvement of combat capability of the forces involved, leaving longer term impact on U.S. forces and doctrine to be derived elsewhere. Therefore, unless national security interests dictated otherwise, only those projects and activities, the main purpose of which were to further the immediate war effort, should be instituted.

CINCPAC Responsibilities for RDT&E and CD in RVN: In mid-December CINCPAC published CINCPAC Instruction 03960.2 to specify a project management and reporting system for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and Combat Development (CD) activities in RVN. The instruction was specifically related to CINCPAC's responsibilities to state RDT&E and CD requirements; to review the programs being conducted in RVN; and to make recommendations to the JCS and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) regarding project establishment, continuation, expansion, consolidation, reduction, and termination.

To help meet these requirements, COMUSMACV was directed to keep CINCPAC advised on significant problems in RVN that could be

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1. CINCPAC Instruction 03960.1 13 Mar 1964 (C)
assisted by improved material, tactics, techniques, and/or knowledge. In addition, COMUSMACV was to conduct an annual review and re-evaluation of requirements and to establish a project management system. CINCPAC also specified a schedule for submission of progress and final reports, and announced that he would review the RDT&E and CD program in RVN subsequent to COMUSMACV's review and re-evaluation and by periodic visits to RVN.

Civic Action

The objective of civic action (CA) in RVN was to enlist popular support to the GVN side of the counterinsurgency struggle, thus improving the environment for military operations. However, during 1964 the GVN officials responsible for executing the Civic Action Program changed with uncomfortable frequency as coup governments came and went, in Saigon. The resulting uncertainty and confusion interrupted any momentum which the Civic Action Program might have gathered, and much of the subsequent effort was devoted to devising and explaining a rationale for the latest turn of the political wheel. 1,2,3,4

During the early part of the year the Civic Action Program was also handicapped by a shortage of funds and equipment. 5,6,7 When, despite that, some success was achieved, the Viet Cong turned its terror mechanism against the most effective civic action workers. Thus, the members of the civic action teams learned to maintain a degree of mediocrity which would not earn the wrath of the Viet Cong.

Another consideration was the traditional enmity between the GVN and the montagnard tribesmen in the uplands. The montagnards, inhabiting the sensitive border area through which the Viet Cong supply lines passed and often nursing grudges against ancient abuses at the

1. COMUSMACV MAC J3 1328 DTG 210915Z Feb 1964 (S)
2. COMUSMACV MAC J3 9001 DTG 310947Z Aug 1964 (S)
3. COMUSMACV MAC J3 9989 DTG 211045Z Sep 1964 (S)
4. COMUSMACV ltr ser 00150A, 18 Apr 1964 (S)
5. COMUSMACV MAC J3 0056 DTG 030459Z Jan 1964 (S)
6. COMUSMACV MAC J3 1965 DTG 141117Z Mar 1964 (S)
7. COMUSMACV MAC J3 4692 DTG 080917Z Jun 1964 (S)
hands of the Vietnamese, were a difficult target for civic action because their sense of kinship toward their fellow highlanders of Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam was often stronger than their loyalty to the GVN.\textsuperscript{1, 2, 3} Also, enlisted men in the ARVN were important agents in the execution of civic action, and it was understandable that they often found it difficult to be enthusiastic about civic action projects which raised their countrymen to a higher state of comfort and security than their own family enjoyed.\textsuperscript{4, 5}

Nonetheless, the Americans persisted in prodding the RVN administrators to develop and execute a Civic Action Program because it was a vital factor in the military struggle. Accordingly, a program was developed to support the GVN National Pacification Plan. Also indoctrination courses in the Civic Action concept were held for the commanders of Army units, and high officials visited Formosa to observe the GRC Civic Action Program.\textsuperscript{6, 7} One result of these measures was an improvement in the speed with which the population was assisted after injury by RVN or VC forces in the course of the fighting.\textsuperscript{8, 9}

At the end of the year there was limited grounds for optimism concerning the future of the Civic Action Program in RVN. The concept, alien to the traditions of the government and the people, was slowly gaining acceptance by some of the key officials, and the men and units implementing the program had more experience after the uncertain earlier activities. However, the success or failure of the Civic Action Program appeared to rest on the creation of a stable and effective national government — something which RVN lacked in 1964.

\textbf{Civic Action Assistance from Other Nations:} In response to appeals from the President of the United States, other nations began to contribute assets which could supplement the RVN capability to conduct:

1. COMUSMACV MAC J3 0056 DTG 030459Z Jan 1964 (S)
2. COMUSMACV MAC J3 0634 DTG 240806Z Jan 1964 (S)
3. COMUSMACV Itr ser 00150A, 18 Apr 1964 (S)
4. COMUSMACV MAC J3 7313 DTG 031001Z Aug 1964 (S)
5. COMUSMACV MAC J3 12964 DTG 020945Z Nov 1964 (S)
6. COMUSMACV MAC J3 3527 DTG 041249Z May 1964 (S)
7. COMUSMACV MAC J3 5780 DTG 061051Z Jul 1964 (S)
8. COMUSMACV J3 3527 DTG 041924Z May 1964 (S)
9. COMUSMACV MAC J3 9989 DTG 211045Z Sep 1964 (S)
a Civic Action Program. The Philippines sent medical and civic action teams, Korea sent a hospital unit, New Zealand sent an engineer unit to perform construction work in support of Civic Action, and the United Kingdom also sent a civic action team. 1, 2, 3, 4

The Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP): This program had one of the most promising fields in which to operate because it could supply technical competence and medicine which the Viet Cong could not match. There were brilliant but isolated examples wherein the RVN Army medical personnel used their skill and resources to earn the respect and confidence of the people, but the total impact was less than had been desired. 5, 6, 7

Developing Water Sources in RVN: At the end of 1963 the AID proposed to start an accelerated program of drilling wells in the Delta region, since the development of dependable, pure water sources in that area was considered to be an important aspect of the effort to wean the population from the VC. 8, 9

CINCPAC's support of the operation was to be limited to providing qualified personnel to operate drilling rigs already in RVN. Admiral Felt canvassed CINCPACFLT and CINCUSARPAC concerning the availability of personnel, 10 and convened a conference to discuss the well drilling project. 11, 12 He then advised OSD/ISA that 70 deep well drilling personnel were available in PACOM but that they would need some training before undertaking the job. A few, however, could be deployed within three weeks after a decision was made to start the project, and

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1. COMUSMACV MAC J3 9989 DTG 211045Z Sep 1964 (S)
2. COMUSMACV MAC J3 10678 DTG 051121Z Oct 1964 (S)
3. COMUSMACV MAC J3 12321 DTG 261005Z Oct 1964 (S)
4. COMUSMACV MAC J3 12964 DTG 020945Z Nov 1964 (S)
5. COMUSMACV MAC J3 8244 DTG 170955Z Aug 1964 (S)
6. COMUSMACV MAC J3 0231 DTG 100454Z Jan 1964 (S)
7. COMUSMACV MAC J3 0986 DTG 070608Z Feb 1964 (S)
8. STATE 1570 to SAIGON 9PM 19 Dec 1963 (C)
9. SAIGON 1644 to STATE 4 PM 31 Dec 1963 (C)
10. CINCPAC 212213Z Dec 1963 (U)
11. CINCPAC 072152Z Jan 1964 (C)
12. CINCPAC 292124Z Jan 1964 (C)
four week period following approval of the project. Admiral Felt also recommended that AID fund the project expenses in RVN, except for the pay and allowances of the service personnel, in a fashion similar to the arrangement for Seabee Technical Assistance Teams (STAT) which were supporting AID programs in RVN and Thailand. CINCPAC further recommended that AID fund travel of the 70 men both to and from RVN. In a similar vein, Admiral Felt informed COMUSMACV that logistical, administrative, and security arrangements would have to be resolved before the additional personnel were committed.

Meanwhile Admiral Felt developed a tentative schedule of deployment for the deep well teams, and urged COMUSMACV to obtain a concept of the operation from the Embassy in Saigon and to furnish a tentative estimate of the total well drilling specialists required from CINCPAC sources through FY65.

By 26 February CINCPAC had the first contingent of 16 men ready to be deployed from Okinawa to RVN. Following a delay while AID funds were made available, the first group arrived in RVN on 15 March.

Other AID projects to develop water sources, to include a surface water program, eventually absorbed a total of 221 PACOM specialists.

CINCPAC Support of RVN Psychological Operations.

Early in 1964 CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV for a comprehensive listing of the requirements for U. S. personnel to conduct psychological operations in RVN. COMUSMACV's reply listed teams to instruct in

1. CINCPAC 082252Z Jan 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC 102333Z Jan 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 292124Z Jan 1964 (C)
4. CINCPAC 312152Z Jan 1964 (C)
5. CINCPAC 260246Z Feb 1964 (C)
6. COMUSMACV MAC J3 1607 DTG 021058Z Mar 1964 (C)
7. COMUSMACV MAC J3 2256 DTG 250401Z Mar 1964 (C)
8. COMUSMACV MAC J3 1012 DTG 080424Z Feb 1964 (C)
9. CINCPAC 200412Z May 1964 (C)
10. COMUSMACV MAC J3 4521 DTG 030809Z Jun 1964 (C)
broad programs concerned with printing, radio, motion picture, programs of instruction, and propaganda analysis and research. ¹ (C)

CINCPAC's principal theater resource for those skills was in the U.S. Army Broadcasting & Visual Activities, Pacific unit in Okinawa, and he deemed it important to commit his limited assets only after a subordinate headquarters had integrated all of its psychological operations capabilities into a comprehensive program. Consequently, he suggested that COMUSMACV develop that type program. ² CINCPAC also proposed certain measures which might improve psychological operations in RVN and asked COMUSMACV to study the possibility of using a permanently assigned detachment to help in administering the campaign. ³

Later, at COMUSMACV's request, CINCPAC provided a psychological operations detachment of two officers and four enlisted men to assist in the MACV advisory and training mission. The detachment was assigned on a permanent change of station basis and provision was made for it to be augmented with temporary duty personnel to meet special requirements. ⁴ ⁵

In March COMUSMACV asked for a substantial number of Special Action Force (SAF) personnel to support the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program. Although CINCPAC was favorably disposed to that use of SAF skills, he deferred action until completion of a COMUSMACV review, then under way, to determine the future of Special Forces and the CIDG program. ⁶ ⁷ At the end of the year CINCPAC was awaiting further COMUSMACV action.

In other actions to improve RVN psychological operations, CINCPAC provided COMUSMACV with a high speed press, ⁸ told

CINCUSARPAC to provide back-up printing of propaganda, and as a

1. COMUSMACV MAC J3 0866 DTG 030916Z Feb 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 162310Z Feb 1964 (C)
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 220312Z Feb 1964 (S)
4. COMUSMACV MAC J3 2153 DTG 210950Z Mar 1964 (C)
5. CINCPAC 270240Z Mar 1964 (C)
6. COMUSMACV MAC J3 2152 DTG 210946Z Mar 1964 (S)
7. CINCPAC 010220Z Apr 1964 (S)
8. CINCPAC 171822Z Jun 1964 (S)
matter of basic importance requested COMUSMACV to emphasize to the U.S. Country Team the need for a master psychological plan for massing and directing the psywar effort. ¹

**Communication Activities in the RVN**

In 1962, during the Sixth Secretary of Defense Conference, the Secretary of Defense made the assumption that the Việt Cong would be eliminated as a disturbing force in Vietnam by December 1965. ² This led to a great deal of effort in planning for the day when communication systems could be turned over to the RVN. In June 1963 COMUSMACV's Comprehensive Plan for Telecommunications envisioned phasing out the U.S. 39th Signal Battalion to reduce U.S. troop strength in the RVN. ³ CINCPAC substituted less expensive and lighter AC&W equipment for that which COMUSMACV had recommended and forwarded the plan to the JCS, where it was approved for planning purposes. ⁴ As 1964 progressed the U.S. increased its advisory effort in Vietnam and increased, instead of phasing out, U.S. communications personnel and equipment. By the end of 1964 it was apparent that prior estimates as to when the U.S. could phase out of Vietnam, with assurance that the RVN had matters under control, were in need of revision. ⁵

Improvements to the Defense Communications System (DCS) station in Saigon were effected by moving tape relay and technical control equipment to a new facility at Phu Lam. However, High Frequency Inner-Sideband (HF ISB) trunks remained poor and it was necessary to reterminate the trunks via Saigon-San Miguel, by-passing Clark, for improved trunk efficiency. Traffic loads increased throughout the year and a two section watch became standard procedure at the Saigon station. ⁶

The Backporch system ⁷ continued to carry the brunt of the in-country communications trunking requirements. Attempts to provide

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1. CINCPAC 161615Z Feb 1964 (S)
2. See CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 221
3. COMUSMACV ltr 2300 ser 0045, 24 Jan 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC ltr 3010 ser 00241, 1 Feb 1964 (S)
5. See CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 221
alternate trunking with tactical troposcatter equipment met with only limited success. Expanding operations caused an urgent COMUSMACV request for additional signal support for RVN. This request and subsequent modifications thereto added over two hundred Signal Corps personnel to the DCS Station Saigon and the 39th Signal Battalion. CINCPAC supported these requests and urged upgrading of the experience and skill level of the Communications Electronics (CE) personnel assigned in Southeast Asia.

The Southern Toll System, an Agency for International Development (AID) sponsored microwave project to provide modern dependable communications to the Vietnamese Delta region, became operational in mid-1964. The approximately four million dollar project had nine terminals, including Saigon. Circuits in the Southern Toll System were placed in service in September, however, some trunks experienced circuit quality problems. A proposed RVN Northern Toll System was deferred by AID due to doubts as to the feasibility of the system. CINCPAC also expressed doubt as to the validity of the Northern Toll System project because of security and other associated problems.

Actions continued throughout 1964 to improve the communications security in South Vietnam. Actions taken included transmission security training, expansion of machine crypto systems, the addition of paper codes, and a revision of the authentication material. Some RVN units, formerly having no secure cryptomaterial, were issued this equipment and plans were made for equipping additional units.

Heavy AC&W at Danang (MONKEY MOUNTAIN)

In April 1962 a civilian contractor started work on a heavy aircraft control and warning (AC&W) station at Danang (MONKEY MOUNTAIN)

1. COMUSMACV msg MAC J6 7212 DTG 010255Z Aug 1964 (S)
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 210230Z Aug 1964 (S)
3. SECSTATE 608 to SAIGON, 31 Jul 1964 (C)
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 300150Z Aug 1964 (S)
5. CINCPAC 110303Z Mar 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC 030255Z Apr 1964 (S)
7. ASAPAC 070722Z Aug 1964 (C)
8. ADMINO CINCPAC 090255Z Oct 1964 (S)
9. COMUSMACV ltr ser 00441 subj: 1964 COMSEC Status Report, 14 Oct 1964 (S)
MOUNTAIN). This installation, initially scheduled for completion in 1963, was intended to provide AC&W service and training for RVN forces. Under friendly control, the station could also enhance USAF combat operations in the northern area of South Vietnam if certain contingency plans were executed.

A variety of difficulties beset the project from the outset. Floods washed out bridges and roads, major items were damaged in shipment, parts were unavailable, and rats ate insulation from the cables. By February 1964, the contractor announced that he could not complete the installation by the 5 March deadline specified in his agreement.¹

After confirming the circumstances, Admiral Felt had the facts presented to General Bradley, Commander AFLC, who was then visiting CINCPACAF. Subsequently, a special installation and maintenance team from the Pacific Mobile Depot Activity (PMDA) went to Danang. They overhauled the radar equipment, determined the material shortages, and started action to obtain the balance of the parts needed to complete the station.²

The civilian contract was then closed out and the PMDA team completed the Monkey Mountain AC&W project on 11 April 1964. The installation was initially manned and operated by a joint USAF/VNAF force, but it was planned to phase out Americans as the VNAF men acquired the capability to operate and maintain the equipment.³

Radio Transmitter (BIG SQUIRT) at Hue

In mid April 1964 CINCPAC learned of a Washington decision to construct, on an emergency basis, a 50 KW medium wave radio transmitter station at Hue. The installation was to be completed not later than 1 July 1964, and it would then beam USIA/Voice of America (VOA)/RVN programs to North Vietnam. The Army Materiel Command, assisted by the Army Strategic Communications Command, was to handle construction, and the project was to be funded by an OSD addition of

¹ CHMAAG-V MAGAF-OAC 172 DTG 140309Z Feb 1964 (S)
² CINCPAC 210051Z Feb 1964 (S)
³ Hq PACAF, CER: Communication-Electronic Review, 1 Jul 1964 (S) p. 8
$835,000 to the RVN MAP. The code name for the project was "BIG SQUIRT" and Page Communications Incorporated was to build the transmitter and operate it for the first year.  

The Department of the Army asked CINCPAC to arrange for site security; provide the equipment and logistic support needed to prepare the station site; and transport, within RVN, equipment to the transmitter position. DA also requested CINCPAC to plan for contractual operations and maintenance (O&M) of the transmitter station beyond the first year. CINCPAC passed the security, logistic, and transportation tasks to COMUSMACV. However, he was concerned that the money for this crash project might be taken from the MAP of another Asian country, and he queried DA on the source of the funds for the project. In addition, Admiral Felt recommended that the MAP not be responsible for funding the future O&M of the project. The Department of the Army assured CINCPAC that the dollars for BIG SQUIRT were being transferred from State/AID sources so it would be unnecessary to delete a portion of MAP to raise the money. CINCPAC did fail in his bid to separate the future O&M of BIG SQUIRT from MAP. Instead, OSD informed him that until other arrangements were negotiated the transmitter's operations and maintenance would be funded by MAP in the interests of legality and continuity. 

The project advanced swiftly with airlift of major items, from Liberia in one instance, to RVN. Despite a delay in site selection, the system was completed and available for operation on a non-directional transmission mode on 14 July and a directional mode on the last day of July.

1. STATE 1667 to SAIGON 8PM 10 Apr 1964 (S)
2. DA msg 963543 DTG 102112Z Apr 1964 (S)
3. DA msg 965534 DTG 232340Z Apr 1964 (S)
4. DA 963543 DTG 102112Z Apr 1964 (S)
5. ADMINO CINCPAC 140359Z Apr 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC 150134Z Apr 1964 (S)
7. OSD DEF 965879 DTG 271843Z Apr 1964 (S)
8. OSD/ISA DEF 965986 DTG 272314Z Apr 1964 (U)
9. CGUSAMC 110 DTG 131845Z May 1964 (C)
10. CGUSAMC 5113 DTG 191731Z May 1964 (C)
11. AC WPD USAECOM AMSEL-PP-CW 191858Z May 1964 (U)
12. CHIEF WPD USAECOM AMSEL-PP-CW 171521Z Jul 1964 (U)
13. CGUSAMC AMSEL-PP-CW 040200Z Aug 1964 (U)
Republic of Vietnam Statistical Data Base

In 1963 CINCPAC developed a system for the storage, processing, and retrieval of counterinsurgency data collected in the RVN. 1 Designed originally to support only CINCPAC, the system used electronic computers to store information concerning each friendly operation and each Viet Cong incident occurring in South Vietnam. In 1964 COMUSMACV began to provide CINCPAC punched data cards summarizing each day’s activity.

During the year the system provided data to support studies requested by the White House, Secretary of Defense, and the military services. Other agencies and staffs addressing questions to the system included the Joint Chiefs of Staff (SACSA), Defense Intelligence Agency, Advanced Research Projects Agency (AGILE), and the institute for Defense Analyses.

At the end of the year the RVN Statistical Base contained all VC incidents and significant operations of record since December 1962, totaling approximately 50,000 entries.

The RVN Statistical Data Base was further expanded during 1964 to extend through CINCPAC to CONUS. The computer programs for processing the data were partially reproduced by the DIA to satisfy an increased Washington area requirement for counterinsurgency information, 2 and the computer data files were made available to the U.S. Army Limited War Laboratory for continuing analysis. 3

1. See CINCPAC Command History, 1963, pp. 239-420
2. Even so, the more versatile CINCPAC Program continued to receive some queries from Washington.
3. The RVN Statistical Data Base system is described in detail in CINCPAC Operations Analysis Technical Memorandum #17, revised October 1964.
Infiltration Control

**Viet Cong Infiltration by Water Routes:** At the beginning of 1964 there was much uncertainty as to the extent of Viet Cong infiltration of men and equipment into RVN via water routes. However, early in the year, CINCPAC sent a team of naval officers to RVN to aid COMUSMACV by exploring in depth the complex Mekong-Delta infiltration problem and recommending remedial action. The study, termed the "Bucklew Report," helped define the issues and was subsequently considered by the JCS in a review of U.S. Navy participation in the RVN counterinsurgency struggle.

After an extensive exchange of messages the JCS produced a comprehensive paper which reviewed the status of specific actions designed to counteract infiltration by water, to include several measures recommended in the Bucklew Report. The JCS paper used the following general headings:

1. Action taken and to be taken to improve the RVN anti-infiltration effort.

2. Action taken and to be taken to contribute to the over-all counterinsurgency effort.

Over a period of several months JCS made multiple inquiries to CINCPAC about the progress of actions taken and to be taken in relation to infiltration. In a November message CINCPAC pointed out to the JCS that COMUSMACV had succeeded in having several anti-infiltration measures incorporated into the RVN National Pacification Program. He further indicated that progress was being made in the implementation of a number of the actions in the "to be taken" category to include augmentation of the Junk Force and River Force elements of the VNN.

1. COMUSMACV ltr to JCS ser 0075 subj: Study of Delta Infiltration Problem, South Vietnam (Captain Bucklew's Report); forwarding of 24 Feb 1964 (S) (TS)
2. For Admiral Felt's views on the report see CINCPAC 042320Z Mar 1964 (TS)
3. JCS 2343/336-3, 23 Jun 1964 (TS)
4. See "Junk Force Construction" and "River Assault Groups" elsewhere in this chapter.
VIET CONG INFILTRATION SYSTEMS

THE LAOS ARTERY
Truck route from DRV through Nape and Mugia Passes. Primarily cargo but personnel have used and continue to use route.

PRIMARY PERSONNEL CORRIDOR
After training at Xuan Mai, troops are trucked below Dong Ho. They then cross into Laos and continue on foot to their objective in RVN.

THE CAMBODIAN ARTERY
After delivery of cargo to Cambodia, distribution to VC crossing points to RVN is made by truck or boat. Western material purchased locally. Possible local connivance on Bloc arms import.

SCALE
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
STATUTE MILES APPROXIMATE

Legend
- VC PERSONNEL INFILTRATION CORRIDOR
- VC PRIMARY SUPPLY ROUTES
Source: CINCPAC WID 16-63

IV-12
CINCPAC also pointed out that the augmented Naval Advisory Group in RVN was obtaining better results and that the VNN Patrol Force was keeping coastal and seaward infiltration down to an acceptable minimum. Admiral Sharp emphasized that the existing plans and ideas were addressing counter-infiltration in an effective and realistic manner, but that the real problem was one of having the GVN implement the available measures while realizing that the destruction of the Viet Cong was the first order of business. 1

At the end of the year, CINCPAC was continuing to press for the implementation of further counter-infiltration measures, but it was recognized that a stable GVN was a prerequisite for any significant progress.

Junk Force Construction: The RVN Navy had the role of countering Viet Cong infiltration by sea and inland waterways. The Junk Force, consisting of motorized and sail-only vessels, had the job of policing the coastal water traffic. It was substantially enlarged in 1963, 2 but the deterioration of the junk, caused by inadequate repair facilities, insufficient personnel, original construction deficiencies, and in some cases devastating attacks by marine borers (Toredo Worms), created an unanticipated maintenance and repair problem. In May 1964 a joint U.S./RVN survey found many junk beyond economical repair. Others had been lost in operations, and 174 were deadline for repairs. Thus, of the 1963 force totaling 632, only 378 were operating in mid-1964. 3 That situation, in association with efforts to halt VC infiltration by water routes, was untenable. 4 Consequently, in May and June 90 replacement motor/sail type junk were added to the RVN FY65 MA Program, the necessary funding was accomplished, and construction

1. CINCPAC 0721552 Nov 1965 (TS)
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 209
3. Annex A to Debriefing Report, MGen Charles J. Timmes, USA, 10 Jun 1964 (S)
4. See "Viet Cong Infiltration by Water Routes" elsewhere this chapter
5. CINCPAC 232334Z May 1964 (C)
planning initiated. Experience had indicated that substantial design changes were needed to improve the sea keeping and durability characteristics of the junks, and that a different power plant was needed to avoid fuel injection system problems caused by contaminated diesel oil. Ultimately, a modified "Yabuta" type junk was approved for construction with the 110 HP GMC 3-71 diesel engine for the power plant. By a joint agreement between the United States and the RVN, construction of the junks started on 1 October in the Saigon Naval Shipyard and the deliveries were scheduled for completion by 1 October 1965. Thirty additional junks were later funded in the FY65 MA Program and it was expected that the ultimate increase in the number of motorized junks in the Delta area would enhance counter-infiltration operations.

River Assault Groups (RAGs)

The VNN had six River Assault Groups at the beginning of 1963, each composed of 19 boats and capable of lifting and supporting one battalion for a 10-14 day operation. The primary mission of the RAG was to provide combat support for ground operations and their secondary mission was to patrol waterways. In May 1964 COMUSMACV asked for additional boats to organize a seventh RAG to augment his counterinsurgency capability. Admiral Felt was convinced that the necessary vessels were then present in RVN and could be made available by better utilization of the LCVPs assigned to Civil Guard Boat Platoons, and the substitution of native craft for the LCVPs used for Province Chiefs. A further consideration was, in

1. CINCPAC 290150Z May 1964 (C)
2. OSD 974192 DTG 182343Z Jun 1964 (C)
3. COMUSMACV MAC NAVGP 4922 DTG 130951Z Jun 1964 (S)
4. COMUSMACV MAC NAVGP 5648 DTG 011127Z Jul 1964 (C)
5. CINCPAC 080454Z Jul 1964 (C)
6. COMUSMACV MAC NAVGP 7332 DTG 040321Z Aug 1964 (C)
7. COMUSMACV ltr ser 0233, 28 Jul 1964 (C)
8. Annex A to Debriefing Report of Major General Charles J. Timmes, COMUSMACV ser 00219, 10 Jun 1964 (S)
9. DEF 970138 DTG 231939Z May 1964 (S)
CINCPAC's view, that the delay involved with bringing new RAGs into RVN would preclude early effective use of a new RAG would hinder the anti-infiltration program then underway. However, in view of COMUSMACV's stated requirement for additional RAG was required, and recognizing that no one could accurately predict the course of the war in the year it would take to programme the new RAG, Admiral Felt voiced no objection to funding the additional unit. Ultimately, the 7th RAG was programmed as an add-on package to the FY64 MA Program. In addition, the funded FY65 MA Program provided that the existing RAGs would be augmented by enough boats to double existing lift capability.

Offensive Guerrilla Force

One of the results of the Secretary of Defense visit to RVN in March was a requirement to develop a program to help the GVN create an "offensive guerrilla force." COMUSMACV considered various means of implementing the action and submitted a broad concept of a program. When the JCS subsequently asked for more specific action COMUSMACV responded that he thought it was neither useful nor feasible to develop programs and forces for the execution of guerrilla operations separate from other aspects of the military effort. Another of his conclusions was that guerrilla activities should be considered within the context of the pacification task and executed by the forces devoted to that end. COMUSMACV supported his position with detailed arguments and summed up his thoughts by noting that he would continue to encourage the ARVN to use guerrilla tactics in Special Forces type operations and other actions associated with the National Pacification Program.

1. See "Viet Cong Infiltration By Water Routes" elsewhere in this chapter.
2. CINCPAC 120201Z Jun 1964 (S)
3. COMUSMACV 130703Z Sep 1964 (C)
4. ADMNIO CINCPAC 170120Z Oct 1964 (C)
5. COMUSMACV MAP Review, 1 Dec 1964 (C)
6. COMUSMACV MAP Review, 1 Dec 1964 (C)
7. COMUSMACV MAC J3 3636 DTG 070725Z May 1964 (S)
8. COMUSMACV MAC J3 4661 DTG 060839Z Jun 1964 (S)
9. COMUSMACV MAC J32 6215 DTG 170651Z Jul 1964 (TS)
Program. He also pointed out that the approach he was following would integrate the guerrilla activities into normal planning and operations rather than holding them as a distinctly separate function. \(^1\) Admiral Sharp agreed with COMUSMACV's view and concept. He reported this to the JCS and they indicated their satisfaction that the requirement of the Secretary of Defense was being met. \(^2, 3\)

**Communist Invasion of Southeast Asia**

The JCS, in February, invited CINCPAC comments on several aspects of the military uncertainties associated with the situation in South Vietnam. \(^4\) CINCPAC's reply reviewed the CHICOM/DRV military capabilities and suggested means of applying enough force against the DRV to cause them to terminate their support of the insurgency in RVN without precipitating a CHICOM invasion of Southeast Asia. One technique CINCPAC suggested was covert U.S. air action, in conjunction with RVN units, against key targets in North Vietnam. Though anticipating some vigorous CHICOM/DRV reaction to this and other actions, (to include introduction of CHICOM jet aircraft into the DRV) CINCPAC believed that selective and subtle pressure applied through military, psychological, and diplomatic means could achieve the objective of stopping DRV interference in RVN without causing an expansion of the conflict.

However, in the event of a communist invasion, CINCPAC was convinced that air and naval power alone could not stop them.

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1. COMUSMACV MAC 349425 DTG 090135Z Sep 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 120528Z Sep 1964 (S)
3. JCS 9061 DTG 251753Z Sep 1964 (TS)
4. JCS 2996 DTG 221800Z Feb 1964 (TS)
This action was a basic factor in the development of CINCPAC OPLAN 38-64.  

Proposed Naval Blockade of North Vietnam

In February, at the request of the JCS, Admiral Felt discussed the feasibility of a naval blockade of the DRV coast and recommended a concept for the operation. He pointed out that the bulk of the ocean going trade of the DRV was carried in Free World ships, and that approximately 85 percent of the DRV maritime commerce moved in shallow draft coastal shipping, most of which was owned by Communist China. That being so, Admiral Felt's concept was that the U.S. would have to adopt a belligerent status to exclude the non-DRV vessels, and, he further observed that it would be necessary to enter the DRV territorial waters and air space to do the job. By excluding foreign vessels, CINCPAC estimated that there would be an 80 percent drop in the total shipping into North Vietnam, and that much of the goods would be diverted to road and rail connections with Red China.

CINCPAC termed the blockade feasible, but he emphasized that it would logically result in CHICOM air strikes on the blockading force. To limit those strikes, Admiral Felt emphasized that the U.S. should be prepared to gain immediate control of the air in the blockade zone by neutralizing the Red Chinese air threat. Thus, if a blockade was to be implemented, the U.S. forces should achieve an advanced state of readiness to implement a "family of war plans."  

Proposal to Deploy B-57s to RVN

Article 17 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam provided that "...the introduction into Viet-Nam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of...jet engines and jet weapons is prohibited." Though not a party to the agreement the U.S. had

1. See Operational Planning, Chapter I
2. JCS 5003 DTG 241912Z Feb 1964 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 280311Z Feb 1964 (TS)
attempted to give the appearance of honoring its provisions. However, in early 1964 the JCS considered the introduction of jet aircraft into RVN as part of an effort to intensify the fight against the Viet Cong.

The idea was particularly attractive for several reasons. Structural problems with the B-26 had imposed limitations which caused a substantial degradation in that aircraft's combat capabilities with a resulting decrease in the combat effectiveness of the U.S. Air Commando unit fighting and training in RVN. Another factor was the improved VC antiaircraft effectiveness which was taking an uncomfortable toll of both U.S. and VNAF aircraft. A solution to these problems, in PACAF eyes could be found in the three B-57 squadrons then stationed in Japan and scheduled for a May or June return to CONUS as part of a scheme to reduce the flow of gold deficit in PACOM.

PACAF's idea was to restore the U.S. air capability by sending one squadron of B-57s direct to RVN and having the other two move to Clark AFB in the Philippines as backup. CINCPAC submitted the PACAF concept to the JCS, and they responded with an order alerting the unit for movement. At JCS direction CINCPAC initiated planning to move the B-57s to RVN. On 4 March Admiral Felt reported to the JCS that the first squadron could be in RVN ready to fight within 48 hours of the order to move, and the second squadron could be in the same posture in an additional 48 hours. CINCPAC further recommended that several B-57s which would otherwise be left in Japan after the departure of the three squadrons (16 aircraft each) should be moved to Clark as additional backup for the aircraft dispatched to RVN. He also cautioned the JCS that the GOJ should be advised in confidence that the B-57s were being withdrawn earlier than planned.

However, when the Secretary of Defense visited Saigon in early March he decided that A-1 type aircraft (propeller driven) would be used.

1. Ibid., pp. 316-317
2. JCS 4904 DTG 172043Z Feb 1964 (TS)
3. PACAF 5011-64 DTG 280536Z Feb 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, Chapter V
5. PACAF 5011-64 DTG 280536Z Feb 1964 (S)
6. JCS 5111 DTG 291942Z Feb 1964 (TS)
7. CINCPAC 040350Z Mar 1964 (TS)
8. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 26
to replace the T-28s and B-26s in both U.S. Air Commando and VNAF units in RVN. Further, the B-57s in Japan were taken off movement alert and the decision to employ them in RVN was held in abeyance. 1 Despite this turn of events CINCPAC was directed to continue planning to assure a rapid reaction in the event of a subsequent decision to execute the move. 2

In response to a later query from the JCS, CINCPAC pointed out that retention of the B-57s at Yokota, Japan was complicated by the fact that the imminent deactivation of the unit had almost stopped the flow of aircraft spares and supply items. Also, he reported that the contemplated gold savings would be denied as long as the B-57 unit remained in Japan, and noted that other unit moves were inhibited by the continued presence of the B-57s at Yokota. 3 To minimize the adverse influence of these factors, CINCPAC recommended to JCS that the B-57s start moving to Clark Air Base not later than 1 April. 4

After a delay while the State Department smoothed the political path for the move, 5, 6 CINCPAC, with JCS approval 7 directed PACAF to move the B-57s to the Philippines. 8 PACAF launched the aircraft, beginning 7 May, for Clark Air Base. 9

Seeking to retain the B-57 capability until future courses of action crystalized, CINCPAC pressed the JCS to delay the return of the aircraft to CONUS until July 1965. He reasoned that air operations would undoubtedly increase in RVN and the B-57s could be very useful in augmenting the VNAF and FARMGATE (Air Commando) operations while they were changing to the new A-1 aircraft. He also reminded JCS of the growing trend to rely on air and naval power to attain U.S. military objectives in Southeast Asia and emphasized that the withdrawal of substantial U.S. air power would undoubtedly give the Communists grounds

1. COMUSMACV MAC 0 011872 DTG 111132Z Mar 1964 (TS)
2. JCS 5288 DTG 122342Z Mar 1964 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 130445Z Mar 1964 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 210752Z Mar 1964 (TS)
5. JCS 5609 DTG 012338Z Apr 1964 (TS)
6. STATE UNN to CINCPAC, 3 Apr 1964, 9PM & 7 Apr 1964, 7PM both (TS)
7. JCS 5710 DTG 070017Z Apr 1964 (TS)
8. ADMNCO CINCPAC 071641Z Apr 1964 (TS)
9. PACAF PFODC 1-623 DTG 072130Z Apr 1964 (S)
to doubt the U.S. resolution to stand firm in Southeast Asia.\footnote{1} Apparently CINCPAC's presentation was effective because, on 16 May, the JCS directed that the B-57s remain at Clark until at least 1 January 1965.\footnote{2}

Meanwhile the JCS solicited CINCPAC comments about training VNAF pilots in the B-57s at Clark Air Base as a means of providing plausibility for those aircraft to operate under FARMGATE in RVN.\footnote{3} After CINCPAC canvassed CINCPACAF and COMUSMACV for their comments, he recommended that six VNAF pilots receive 15 hours each of B-57 VFR familiarization. He further suggested that they be trained in increments of two each.\footnote{4} JCS approved this proposal on 9 May\footnote{5} and the first two VNAF pilots completed training on 27 June.\footnote{6} When the training for the third group terminated on 23 July all of the six pilots had been rated excellent in their ability with the B-57.\footnote{7}

Although jets were not introduced into Vietnam until August, CINCPAC had influenced events between February and July so that B-57s were poised in the Philippines and could be engaged in RVN combat operations in a matter of hours. Further the VFR familiarization of VNAF pilots had created a situation where it was plausible, if desired, to attribute combat operations of B-57s in RVN to the jet qualified pilots of South Vietnam. (See page 372 for the movement of the B-57 squadrons to RVN)

Use of Herbicides for Defoliation and Crop Destruction in RVN:
There was a substantial increase in the frequency and area coverage of chemical defoliation and crop destruction during 1964, primarily because the authority to initiate these operations was passed from Washington to Saigon.\footnote{9}

Severe restrictions concerning the role of defoliation and crop destruction in the RVN counterinsurgency campaign were in effect at

\begin{itemize}
\item CINCPAC 090530Z May 1964 (TS)
\item JCS 6329 DTG 161108Z May 1964 (TS)
\item JCS 6128 DTG 012241Z May 1964 (S)
\item CINCPAC 062230Z May 1964 (S)
\item JCS 6251 DTG 091802Z May 1964 (S)
\item PACAF PFQDC 3-1178 DTG 080357Z Jul 1964 (S)
\item ADMINO CINCPAC 282255Z Jul 1964 (S)
\end{itemize}
the end of 1963. However, on 13 January 1964 the Secretary of State authorized Ambassador Lodge, in the RVN, to approve specific defoliation operations in a limited area; even so, there was a proviso that each operation would be personally approved by the Ambassador and one of the three leading generals in the Military Revolutionary Council or the Prime Minister. Almost immediately the Ambassador approved COMUSMACV's request to decentralize hand-spray defoliation operations down to the ARVN division level.

Much later, after repeated requests from Saigon to Washington, the control over crop destruction operations was also decentralized to the Ambassador and to COMUSMACV. In doing so, the Defense and State Departments reiterated that the political aspects of herbicide operations against food crops should be carefully weighed and that each operation should be personally approved by one senior GVN official at the Premier-Vice Premier level.

Thus, by the summer of 1964, defoliation became a routine practice to improve the security of military installations and lines of communications by reducing the concealment available to Viet Cong forces. Similarly, after July there was a steady increase in the areas subjected to crop destruction by herbicides. To illustrate, 11,079 acres of Viet Cong food crops were destroyed during the last quarter of 1964; that was double the crop destruction total for the previous quarter.

Aircraft, often jointly crewed by U.S. and RVN personnel, were able to reach areas deep in Viet Cong controlled regions. Because the flights were at a very low level the airplanes were frequently hit by small arms fire, and in some cases the damage caused emergency landings.

On one occasion, in Phuoc Thanh Province, 2,470 acres of rice and 556 acres of other crops were destroyed. Concerning this occasion, an agent reported that the Viet Cong committee for the province

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, pp. 227-230
2. STATE 1056 to SAIGON DTG 122055Z Jan 1964 (S)
3. SAIGON 1410 to STATE DTG 280822Z Jan 1964 (S)
4. STATE 294 to SAIGON 8PM 29 Jul 1964 (S)
lamented the fact that the food source destroyed could have fed their troops in the area for two years. Another indication of the effectiveness of herbicide operations was that after defoliation treatment of the Saigon-Nha Trang railroad right-of-way there was a 65 percent reduction in Viet Cong incidents against the railroad.

The psychological aspects of herbicide operations had been a tender point throughout the policy discussions concerning the expansion of these operations in the RVN counterinsurgency battle. Consequently, before a defoliation operation along the waterways in An Xuyen Province in April, more than a million leaflets were distributed over twenty possible defoliation targets explaining the purpose of the forthcoming operation and placing the onus on the Viet Cong. However, no evaluation was made of the effectiveness of the leaflets. Later, in May, leaflets and loudspeakers were employed before chemical crop destruction operations began in Mang Xuen Province.

During the April-June period approximately $24,000 (VN) was paid to 57 persons claiming crop damage from defoliation operations in An Xuyen Province. It was hoped that prompt compensation of civilian losses would limit the peasant resentment against the GVN.

Despite all precautions Cambodia charged, in July, that "poisonous powder" from U.S./GVN sources had caused deaths and property damage within Cambodia. Subsequent investigation revealed that there had been no reported herbicide missions in the area where Cambodia placed the incident.

Hostilities Involving U.S. Forces/Subsequent Developments

Background on Naval Patrols Near Communist China and the DRV:

In March 1962 COMSEVENTHFLT proposed that one of the Taiwan

1. COMUSMACV MAC J3 15891 DTG 081600Z Dec 1964 (S)
2. COMUSMACV MAC J3 5554 DTG 290955Z Jun 1964 (S)
3. COMUSMACV MAC J3 3313 DTG 271146Z Apr 1964 (S)
4. COMUSMACV MAC J3 3753 DTG 110945Z May 1964 (S)
5. COMUSMACV MAC J3 4967 DTG 151135Z Jun 1964 (S)
6. SAIGON 261 to STATE 5PM 30 Jul 1964 (C)
7. STATE 466 to SAIGON 5PM 18 Aug 1964 (C)
8. U S. UN 456 to STATE 5PM 19 Aug 1964 (C)
Patrol destroyers be employed along the coast of Communist China. Following JCS approval, CINCPAC directed that the mission be executed. Communist China protested that and subsequent patrols through the international waters along her coast, but did not take overt action to oppose them.

Patrol routes were later extended north and south and by late December 1962 the USS AGERHOLM had rounded Hainan Island and penetrated the Gulf of Tonkin to 21° N. Communist Chinese naval units followed the AGERHOLM but did not attack it. Succeeding patrols along the Red China, DRV, and Russian coasts during 1963 were subjected to air and surface surveillance, frequently warned away, and on occasion subjected to threatening passes by communist aircraft.

In late February and early March of 1964 the USS CRAIG (DD 885) patrolled the Gulf of Tonkin while another destroyer remained at the southern entrance to the Gulf to support in the event of an incident. The CRAIG's voyage was unique in that it was the first of the DESOTO Patrols that had been authorized to approach closer than 20 miles to the Communist Chinese coast. In fact the CRAIG operated as close as 12 nautical miles to the mainland and four nautical miles off some of the North Vietnamese islands. As a routine matter Peiping issued its 280th "serious warning" of territorial violation.

**Combat Between U.S. and DRV Forces, August:** CINCPAC had proposed in July, that the destroyer MADDOX make a patrol to investigate DRV coastal activity. The JCS approved Admiral Sharp's

1. COMSEVENTHFLT 140536Z Mar 1962 (S)
2. CINCPAC 172231Z Mar 1962 (S)
3. CINCPAC Command History, 1962, pp. 44-45
4. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, pp. 55-57
5. Code name for naval patrols in West Pac. The term was later limited to patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin
6. COMSEVENTHFLT 051132Z Mar 1964 (TS)
7. COMSEVENTHFLT 140200Z Feb 1964 (TS)
8. COMSEVENTHFLT 291015Z Feb 1964 (TS)
9. CINCPAC 100342Z Jul 1964 (S)
10. ADMINO CINCPAC 152123Z Jul 1964 (S)
recommendation and directed that the patrol start not later than 31 July.\textsuperscript{1, 2}

In August the DRV attacked the U.S. destroyer MADDOX while it was on a DESOTO Patrol. That incident, the first shooting battle between U.S. and communist forces since the Korean War, prompted the U.S. to make a punitive air strike against the DRV. In conjunction with the strikes, the U.S. shifted significant additional fighting power to PACOM as a deterrent to further overt communist hostilities toward U.S. forces.

Except for sighting communist torpedo boats and gunboats the first stage of the patrol was peaceful.\textsuperscript{3, 4} However, by 012241Z August, CTU 72.1.0 in the MADDOX, previously warned of DRV hostile intent,\textsuperscript{5} considered that to continue the patrol would incur an unacceptable risk.\textsuperscript{6} Consequently, COMSEVENTHFLT authorized the MADDOX to deviate from its planned course if judged necessary.\textsuperscript{7} CINCPACFLT, at CINCPAC's urging, subsequently directed that the patrol continue as planned. In so doing, CINCPACFLT observed that risk was inherent in the patrol's mission and that the MADDOX could fire on an attacking unit.

The risk was more clearly defined when, in the late afternoon of 2 August (020750Z), the MADDOX's radar detected three boats closing on the ship at high speed. Despite evasive action by the MADDOX, the boats closed to 9000 yards within 15 minutes and by their maneuvers demonstrated hostile intent. At 020805Z the MADDOX fired three warning shots and, when that did not deter the attackers, it opened destructive fire with its 5" battery. One boat was disabled by the fire but it managed to launch two torpedos which missed MADDOX by approximately 200 yards. Another boat retired to the north and lost sight of the MADDOX.

\textsuperscript{1} See CINCPAC 10342Z Jul 1964 (S) and COMSEVENTHFLT 260955Z Jul 1964 (S) for precautions taken to avoid conflict with other action on the DRV coast.
\textsuperscript{2} CTU 72.1.0 DTG 310135Z Aug 1964 (S)
\textsuperscript{3} CTU 72.1.0 DTG 020531Z Aug 1964 (S)
\textsuperscript{4} Details on this warning are beyond the security classification of this publication.
\textsuperscript{5} CTU 72.1.0 DTG 012245Z Aug 1964 (S)
\textsuperscript{6} COMSEVENTHFLT 020100Z Aug 1964 (S)
all power. However, a third boat, hit at least once, passed approximately 1700 yards astern the MADDOX firing a machine gun. One of its 12.7mm projectiles ricocheted into the 3"50 ready service magazine. Later, the projectile provided physical evidence of the attack.

At 0828Z aircraft from the carrier TICONDEROGA joined the attack and the MADDOX broke off a brief pursuit of its attackers to give the aircraft a clear field and to avoid spent torpedos still in the area.\(^1\)

The American government's reaction to the attack was reserved, but it made no secret that another attack could expect a violent reception. Admiral Sharp obtained JCS concurrence in sending the DESOTO Patrol back to the Gulf immediately in two destroyer strength.\(^2,3\) Additionally, the President authorized U.S. forces to pursue and destroy any vessel which attacked them. However, surface pursuit was to approach no closer than 11 nautical miles of the DRV mainland, and aerial pursuit could extend only to the three mile limit in DRV waters.\(^4,5\)

Consequently, on 3 August the MADDOX and C. TURNER JOY entered the Gulf of Tonkin.\(^6,7\) They soon noted that they were under surveillance by radar similar to that used by DRV torpedo boats, and at 031220Z a distant surface contact began paralleling the MADDOX's course. No attack materialized at this time, but in the early evening hours, while the patrol was midway between Hainan and the DRV mainland, the pattern of the DRV boats' maneuvers indicated that attack was imminent.

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1. Encl 11 to ltr Commanding Officer, USS MADDOX (DD731) (CTU 72.1.0) ser 002 subj: July-August DESOTO Patrol conducted during the period 28 July - 8 August 1964 (C), 24 Aug 1964 (S) is the most detailed source for the MADDOX part in this incident. See also: CTG 72.1 DTG 020949Z Aug 1964 (S), CTG 77.5 DTGs 021008Z, 021118Z, 021506Z, Aug 1964 all (S), and COMNAVBASE SUBIC 101155Z Aug 1964 (TS)
2. ADMINO CINC PAC 021255Z Aug 1964 (S)
3. JCS 7680 DTG 021725Z Aug 1964 (S)
4. JCS 7681 DTG 022349Z Aug 1964 (S)
5. CINC PAC 030112Z Aug 1964 (U)
6. CTG 72.1 DTG 022330Z Aug 1964 (S)
7. Appropriate precautions were again prescribed to avoid interference with covert action along the DRV coast: COMUSMA CV 732 DTG 031231Z Aug 1964 (TS)
imminent. Aircraft from the TICONDEROGA arrived to support the patrol and at 041439Z the C. TURNER JOY fired into the stormy darkness at fast-moving targets observed on radar only. The ensuing action involved torpedo evasion and firing on targets of opportunity as the patrol sought to withdraw from the narrow confines of the Gulf. Pilots from the TICONDEROGA, in poor visibility, could see the wakes of the U.S. destroyers but found no enemy to fire on.

When the action ceased at 1635Z the DESOTO Patrol was undamaged and had no casualties. The size and composition of the attacking force and the damage it received during the two hour melee is perhaps known only to the DRV. Evidence tended to confirm that about three torpedo boats had attacked the patrol, and at least one was presumed sunk. Subsequently, PACFLT investigators concluded that the MADDOX and C. TURNER JOY had been ambushed as they were attempting to retire from the Gulf.

At the same time that the DESOTO Patrol was firing in the Gulf of Tonkin, the JCS had shifted the aircraft carrier CONSTELLATION (CTF 77.6) closer to RVN waters. That move, if known in DRV and Chinese Communist circles, might have forewarned them to expect a violent U.S. reaction to their second high seas attack on American warships.

1. The patrol had received other information that the DRV intended to attack, however, the details of that warning are beyond the classification of this publication.
2. CTG 72.1 DTG 041240Z Aug 1964 (S)
3. CTG 72.1 DTG 041442Z Aug 1964 (U)
4. CTG 72 DTG 042158Z Aug 1964 (S)
5. CTG 72.1 DTGs 041727Z Aug 1964 (S)
6. CTF 72 DTG 042158Z Aug 1964 (S)
7. CTG 72.1 DTG 041754Z Aug 1964 (S)
8. CTG 77.5 DTG 041928Z Aug 1964 (S)
9. CINCPACFLT 071101Z Aug 1964 (S)
10. CINCPACFLT 071101Z Aug 1964 (S)
11. COMNAVBASE 101155Z Aug 1964 (TS)
12. CTF 72 DTG 042158Z Aug 1964 (S)
13. Enclosure 12 to ltr Commanding Officer, USS MADDOX (DD 731) (CTU 72.1.0) ser 002 subj: July - August DESOTO Patrol conducted during the period 28 July - 8 August 1964 (C), 24 Aug 1964 (S) is the most detailed source concerning the MADDOX and C. TURNER JOY part in this incident.
Reprisal Air Strikes on DRV Targets: Less than half an hour after the termination of the second attack on the DESOTO Patrol, Admiral Sharp recommended that the JCS authorize him to order immediate punitive air strikes against the DRV. His suggestion involved a series of strikes against selected targets, with each succeeding stage more severe than the one preceding. First, CINCPAC suggested, could be an armed reconnaissance between Hon Me Island and Hon Ne and strikes on PT and Swatow craft at those sites or at sea. Next he suggested strikes against any PTs and Swatows caught in Lach Chao Estuary (19° 46' N., 105° 58' E.) Following were to be strikes against the boat bases of Quang Khe and Ben Thuy. A more severe air strike against Hon Me Island, staging base for PT/Swatow craft, was the next step. The last, and potentially the most severe, blow to the DRV was to be the destruction of the oil storage area near Ben Thuy. Those stocks represented 10 percent of the DRV POL supply and were also thought to be the source of supply for the Swatow boats based nearby. CINCPAC further recommended that the U.S. ships be permitted to operate up to the three mile limit of the DRV and that aircraft be allowed "hot pursuit" into North Vietnam's airspace.¹ ²

Two hours after CINCPAC made his recommendation for punitive air strikes, a message from the JCS³ alerted him to plan the strikes for first light the following day. Admiral Sharp immediately assigned the planning mission to CINCPACFLT.⁴ At 042309Z August, after receiving a confirming JCS message which specified a time for the strikes, CINCPAC passed the word to CINCPACFLT. Concurrent with preparations for the strikes, CINCPAC raised the combat readiness of his forces⁵ and restricted nonessential traffic from his electrical transmission facilities.⁶

1. CINCPAC 041657Z Aug 1964 (S)
3. Formal SDO Log, CINCPAC Command Center, entry for 0912W 4 Aug 1964 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 042035Z Aug 1964 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 050100Z Aug 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC 050432Z Aug 1964 (U)
At about the same time that the strike order was issued, a series of comprehensive air and sea movements, comparable to those contemplated by OPLAN 37-64, were undertaken to discourage enemy reaction to the attack and to improve the U.S. posture for immediate operations against the DRV. ¹

The strike aircraft were launched, TICONDEROGA at 050243Z August and CONSTELLATION at 050500Z August.² Between these times the President announced to the American public, and the world, that the U.S. was making a measured response to the DRV aggression but did not intend to open a war.

After 64 sorties the carrier aircraft had severely mauled the DRV gunboat and torpedo boat fleet, destroying eight and damaging 21 others. Smoke from the Vinh POL storage areas rose to 14,000 feet and the POL stores were estimated 90 percent destroyed. Two pilots were lost, one killed in action and one taken prisoner, and two of the CONSTELLATION's planes were lost to the accurate antiaircraft defense at Hon Gay. Two other aircraft were hit but recovered safely.³ ⁴

Following the attack on the DRV, Admiral Sharp gave PACFLT a "well done"⁵ and continued to improve the PACOM readiness posture in anticipation of the communist reaction. Two brigades of the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii were alerted for immediate deployment,⁶ the 1st MARBRIG was alerted for sealift to WESTPAC, and mine and ASW elements were advanced to the vicinity of the South China Sea.⁷ Thirty-one B-57s were advanced from Clark Air Base in the Philippines to RVN,⁸ and other adjustments achieved a massive buildup in the Pacific Ocean Area.⁹

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1. Figure IV-13 compiled from JCS MSGs 7729 DTG 050043Z (TS), 7732 DTG 051201Z (S), 7782 DTG 060505Z (S) all Aug 1964; and CINCPAC MSGs 050424Z (TS), 050445Z (TS), 060127Z (S), 082205Z (S), 140319Z (TS), all Aug 1964
2. CINCPAC 051051Z Aug 1964 (TS)
3. JCS 7735 DTG 051254Z Aug 1964 (TS)
4. JCS 7762 DTG 052250Z Aug 1964 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 052336Z Aug 1964 (U)
6. CINCUSARPAC ARP 12104 DTG 052340Z Aug 1964 (S)
7. CINCPACFLT 052324Z Aug 1964 (S)
8. PACAF PFOCO-5-64-1260 DTG 061511Z Aug 1964 (TS)
9. CINCSTRIKE 060800Z Aug 1964 (S)
Chinese Jets to the DRV: Along with the shifts already made in connection with the Gulf of Tonkin crises, CINCPAC evaluated his air defense capability in light of the deployments. This was a timely measure, for on 7 August photographs proved that 36 MIG-15/17s had moved to PHUC YEN Air Field. CINCPAC suspected, but lacked evidence to prove, that Chinese pilots were flying the planes. However, he was aware of the possibility that DRV pilots were flying the jets because the USSR had trained a substantial number of DRV personnel in jets since 1959. While admitting that the communist jets could inhibit some U.S. operations, CINCPAC thought that the DRV capabilities were reduced by the fact that the aircraft were not all weather capable, and their accompanying radar had a limited capability. He also thought that the recent experience with the U.S. Navy might dampen the communist ardor for further aggression.

In sum, Admiral Sharp concluded that the jets in the DRV were defensively oriented and aimed at enlisting the North Vietnamese in the Chinese Communist dispute with the USSR.

DESKTOP Patrol Proposed for 19-21 August: On 14 August CINCPAC passed to the JCS a CINCPACFLT proposal for another DESOTO Patrol for the period 19-21 August. The purpose of the patrol was to determine the nature and extent of possible Communist Chinese naval and air deployments to the Hainan and South China Sea areas. CINCPAC thought that an authorization to approach within 20 nautical miles of Communist China's coast would be adequate for the purpose of the patrol. However, on 20 August the JCS disapproved the request and advised CINCPAC to resubmit it about 26 August if the requirement still existed.

1. CINCPAC 070225Z Aug 1964 (TS)
2. Photograph in PACOM WID 33-64, 14 Aug 1964 (S), p. 12
3. CINCPACFLT 080209Z Aug 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 110341Z Sep 1964 (TS)
5. JCS 7818 DTG 082108Z Aug 1964 (TS)
6. CINCPACFLT 140333Z Aug 1964 (S)
7. CINCPAC 142156Z Aug 1964 (S)
8. JCS 8007 DTG 201247Z Aug 1964 (S)
9. ADMINO CINCPAC 220255Z Aug 1964 (S)
10. CINCPAC 230210Z Aug 1964 (S)
Instability in GVN: The buildup in WESTPAC strength after the August conflicts between the DRV and U.S. in the Gulf of Tonkin placed CINCPAC in what should have been an excellent position for action. However, Admiral Sharp's courses of action were limited by the increasing possibility of a total collapse of the GVN. Communist exploitation of that disintegration, in CINCPAC's estimation, could endanger the U.S. position throughout Southeast Asia by requiring the U.S. to depend entirely on its own resources to counter the communist effort to exploit the situation. While admitting that it was improbable that the Chinese or DRV would introduce their troops into SVN for that purpose, Admiral Sharp was aware that the 34,000 Viet Cong in formal combat units and their 60,000 - 80,000 supporting guerrillas in the RVN could be turned on U.S. personnel and material.

Consequently, CINCPAC concluded that his immediate aims should be to maintain the U.S. position in South Vietnam, help maintain continuity and momentum in the RVN war effort, demonstrate U.S. firmness of purpose, and maintain the existing U.S. position in Southeast Asia until the situation stabilized. To promote these aims, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS immediately direct the following measures:

1. Prepare to furnish troops to protect U.S./RVNAF installations and facilities in RVN.
2. Increase U.S. aerial reconnaissance in Laos and RVN to obtain operational intelligence.
3. Prepare to evacuate American aircraft from airfields under attack by the Viet Cong or mobs.

These measures, CINCPAC believed, could maintain the U.S. position in RVN without expanding the conflict at a time when the stability of the GVN was demanding so much attention. 1

1. CINCPAC 290335Z Aug 1964 (TS)
Planned Reprisal for Attack on USS MORTON and USS EDWARDS:

In September another DESOTO Patrol incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. It resulted in plans for a reprisal against the DRV but, because of the absence of positive proof that the action constituted an attack on U.S. Naval units, the punitive action never materialized.

In early September, at CINCPAC's initiative, CINCPACFLT proposed a five day DESOTO Patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin to take place later in the month. The planned route for the patrol was to maintain 20 miles distance from the DRV mainland and at least 12 miles from islands under communist control.\(^1\) Admiral Sharp approved the PACFLT proposal, proposed the rules of engagement for the patrol, and took care to assure that it would not interfere with RVN conducted covert operations.\(^2\)

The JCS approved the patrol for only three days, starting 15 September Saigon time.

Their rules of engagement were:\(^3\)-\(^8\)

1. The patrol ships and aircraft would fire on attackers with the objective of destroying them.

2. The patrol ships could pursue the enemy to the three mile territorial limit.

3. Supporting aircraft were authorized hot pursuit of enemy surface vessels inside territorial waters (three miles), and of attacking aircraft into hostile air-space if necessary to destroy identified attack forces.

4. DESOTO units and the supporting aircraft would confine their action to the attacking ships and aircraft.

\(^1\) CINCPACFLT 090429Z Sep 64 (TS)
\(^2\) CINCPAC 092209Z Sep 64 (TS)
\(^3\) JCS 8518 DTG 102339Z Sep 64 (TS)
\(^4\) JCS 8609 DTG 131836Z Sep 64 (TS)
\(^5\) COMSEVENTHFLT 120633Z Sep 64 (TS)
\(^6\) CINCPAC 110450Z Sep 64 (TS)
\(^7\) CINCPAC 131930Z Sep 64 (C)
\(^8\) CINCPACFLT 132311Z Sep 64 (TS)
The patrol was delayed twice because of weather conditions and did not get underway until 17 September. After an uneventful first day, the MORTON and EDWARDS were night steaming in column when radar sightings indicated fast closing contacts on both bows. On the basis of the radar contacts, and without visual sighting of an enemy craft, CTU 77.6.6 concluded that he was being attacked and opened fire at 1230Z. Aircraft from the carriers CONSTELLATION and BON HOMME RICHARD arrived immediately to provide air cover for the two destroyers and the DESOTO units fired more than 100 rounds of 5" ammunition at their radar detected targets. The action was brief and radar image interpretation indicated that several of the targets were hit.

Immediately after the incident the JCS directed CINCPAC to plan substantial air attacks on the DRV in reprisal. In compliance, CINCPAC issued FRAG Order Number 2 at 182240Z September. The order was effective for planning only and was not to be executed without further orders. It envisaged surprise daylight punitive and crippling reprisal attacks on a number of military installations in North Vietnam. PACFLT carrier based aircraft were to strike from locations in the South China Sea against the Vinh Army Supply Depot.
and against the motor torpedo boats and associated facilities at Ben
Tuy Port. PACAF targets were to be barracks at Vit Thu Lu and
Chap Le, and an ammunition depot at Xom Bang. Another feature
of the order was a relaxation of earlier restrictions so CBU-2A and
napalm could be used on certain targets. 1

Meanwhile, an intensive search was underway to obtain
positive evidence that there had been an unprovoked surprise attack
on U.S. naval units in international waters. Though CTU 77.6.6
was convinced that he had been attacked, neither he nor others
could muster the essential supporting evidence. 2-10

As a consequence the planned attacks did not materialize and
the DESOTO Patrol was resumed, though with added precautions. 11-14
The patrol was completed at 190950Z September without further
incident. 15-17

Failure of 13 September Coup in RVN: Near the middle of
September several of the RVN military officers failed in an attempt
to oust General Nguyen Khanh, Premier of the GVN. The military
leaders again turned their attention to politics at the expense of the
counterinsurgency fight. Religious, political, labor, and ethnic
feuds took heart and the resulting civilian disorders throughout
South Vietnam gave strong evidence that the GVN was weak and
could fall momentarily.

1. CINCPAC 182240Z Sep 64 (TS)
2. CINCPACFLT 18151+Z Sep 64 (S)
3. CINCPACFLT 181517Z Sep 64 (S)
4. CINCPACFLT 181824Z Sep 64 (S)
5. CINCPACFLT 190831Z Sep 64 (S)
6. JCS 8790 DTG 181550Z Sep 64 (TS)
7. CTU 77.6.6 DTG 181925Z Sep 64 (S)
8. CTU 77.6.6 DTG 182000Z Sep 64 (S)
9. CINCPAC 182006Z Sep 64 (TS)
10. CINCPAC 181759Z Sep 64 (C)
11. CINCPAC 182205Z Sep 64 (S)
12. CINCPAC 190047Z Sep 64 (S)
13. CINCPAC 191906Z Sep 64 (TS)
14. JCS 8838 DTG 182358Z Sep 64 (TS)
15. CTU 77.6.6 DTG 191458Z Sep 64 (S)
16. CINCPAC 191907Z Sep 64 (TS)
17. COMSEVENTHFLT 251640Z Sep 64 (C)
Revolt by Montagnard Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG)

Troops: The montagnard tribesmen who inhabited the upland region of the RVN-Laos-Cambodian border had little love or sympathy for any of the governments which had claimed to exercise political power over their region. Racially different from the lowlanders on both sides of the border, the montagnard had traditionally aspired to retain a degree of independence. For years the French had nursed this dream to prevent unity in their colony of Indochina; and the Viet Minh and Viet Cong displayed sympathy toward montagnard independence to earn their support. The general attitude of the successive governments of RVN had been that the montagnard was inferior to the Vietnamese and little deserving of either respect or consideration. But the fact that the strategic trails from the DRV to RVN ran through the montagnard region prompted the U.S. military advisors to encourage the GVN to earn the loyalty of the montagnard and enlist their service in the CIDG to interrupt the flow of communist men and supplies to the Viet Cong.

One of the most literate and politically conscious of the tribes was the Rhade, centered in Darlac Province. Their revered and hereditary leader, Y Bham, was a strong advocate of montagnard independence. Y Bham had been involved in earlier moves for montagnard autonomy and for his efforts the Diem government had jailed him. However, as a result of a government reshuffle in 1964, he was released and appointed deputy province chief of montagnard affairs in Darlac. Despite that, he continued to talk of independence, and through his influence many of the Rhade became stronger advocates of the idea.

There were many Rhade who were members of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG). On 20 September twenty of their companies rebelled against the GVN, killed 26 Vietnam Special Forces (RVNSF) and 17 Popular Force personnel, and held others as hostage. The rebels disarmed and restricted their American Special Forces advisors and moved into positions around the provincial capital of...
Ban Me Thout. There they took over the radio station briefly and overcame several ARVN outposts. The GVN was faced with the threat that other montagnards might turn wholeheartedly to the Viet Cong—leaving the upland region without any element of RVN control or influence.

It was difficult to assess the goal of the revolt because the various groups presented different demands. Similarly, it was difficult to determine the actual leadership and controlling force behind the uprising. Y Bham could not be reached, and there were rumors that the move was promoted by the Viet Cong, the French, and the Cambodians. Some GVN officials accused the Americans of planning the revolt, perhaps because the Rhade gave greater loyalty to the U.S. Special Forces men than they did to the RVNSF personnel who were nominally in charge of the CIDG camps.

Nevertheless, the U.S. officers succeeded in urging restraint on both sides and on 27 September the Rhade released their hostages, including the American Special Forces personnel. Several reasons were advanced to account for the short duration and the indecisive course of the revolt. Among them were poor organization, indifferent communications, and the strong intercession of the U.S. Special Forces men. Y Bham's role was obscure, but it was indisputable that the Rhade participants looked to him as their leader both during and after the revolt. Whatever the motivation, and whatever the goal, it was a fact that the Viet Cong did not attack the dangerously vulnerable camps of the CIDG units participating in the revolt. Other evidence indicated some Viet Cong influence, but there were equally strong indications that several factions might have had a part in precipitating the revolt.

Be that as it may, the bulk of the CIDG forces returned to nominal control of the GVN, and the GVN moved to increase the number of montagnard officers. The Rhade CIDG forces resumed their on-the-job training in combat operations against the Viet Cong, but competent observers predicted further disturbances unless positive action was taken to change the feelings of the individual
montagnard. As matters stood several months after the revolt, many of the CIDG leaders and the rank and file still advocated a separate montagnard government and army.\(^1\)\(^-\)\(^5\) CINCPAC informed JCS that COMUSMACV was taking all measures within his power to discourage further revolts, and referred to a joint U.S./GVN committee organized to study and monitor the montagnard situation.\(^6\)

**CINCPAC Comments on Khanh Government:** In late September CINCPAC considered that the primary problem in RVN was the effectiveness of the Khanh government. Accordingly, he commented to the JCS that Khanh was ineffective as a leader and that his continuation in office would further erode the morale of both the government and the armed forces. Noting also that Khanh’s tenure was keyed to U.S. support, Admiral Sharp suggested that Khanh be informed that U.S. support would be withdrawn unless the downward trend in government effectiveness could be reversed. That failing, CINCPAC suggested that General Minh might be the least unsettling successor to Khanh.

Admiral Sharp admitted that there was no panacea for the weak GVN but he also expressed his concern that the United States might go down with a "losing horse" simply because someone could not think of an alternative.\(^7\) The JCS replied on the same day, saying that the problem was being given serious consideration.\(^8\)

**FRAG Order for Punitive and Crippling Reprisals on Targets in North Vietnam (S):** The August reprisal air strikes against the DRV had been delayed while targets were selected and designated in Washington. To avoid a repetition of that, the JCS directed in October  

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1. Report from American Embassy, Saigon subj: The Montagnard Rebellion in Darlac and Quang Duc Provinces of October 16, 1964 (S)
2. COMUSMACV Montagnard Uprising Reports Nos. 6-13, 21-28 Sep 64 (S)
3. COMUSMACV MACJ 310000 DTG 2111332Z Sep 64 (C)
4. COMUSMACV ltr 12000 ser 01602 of 10 Nov 64 (C)
5. For a summary of montagnard relations with the GVN before the revolt see COMUSMACV MAC J23 3534 DTG 050105Z May 64 (C)
6. CINCPAC 230420Z Dec 64
7. CINCPAC 260406Z Sep 64 (TS)
8. JCS DIASO-4 4638-64 DTG 261702Z Sep 1964 (S) Wheeler to Sharp
that when future DESOTO Patrols were in the Gulf of Tonkin, PACOM forces would maintain a tactical readiness to execute immediate air strikes on preselected DRV targets in retaliation for an attack on a patrol. Admiral Sharp was further instructed to prepare a FRAG ORDER or plan specifically directed toward the above objective. 1

In consequence, CINCPAC prepared FRAG ORDER Number 3 which provided for two levels of response to clearly identifiable attacks against DESOTO Patrols. The first level was to apply if the attack caused little or no damage; it provided two options, one less severe than the other. The second level was to apply in case of significant damage or loss of life to a DESOTO unit and it provided options that permitted execution at two levels of severity. CINCPAC's order prescribed the employment of U.S. land and carrier based air units in punitive and crippling reprisals on targets in North Vietnam and gave specific guidance as to resources, weapons, combat air support, suppressive fire, photographic reconnaissance, and SAR (search and rescue). 2

Viet Cong Attack on Bien Hoa Airfield: The United States Air Force units in RVN occupied base facilities jointly with VNAF elements, and the RVNAF had accepted the responsibility to protect the installa-
tions. The American commanders, aware that the bases were vulnerable to Viet Cong action, had sought to improve the supervision and application of the RVNAF security measures. 3 Despite that, under a quarter moon on the last day of October, a Viet Cong force bypassed the RVNAF security troops at Bien Hoa Airport and set up approximately six mortars within 1500 meters of the control tower. Opening fire on the packed flight line, control tower, and bivouac area at 311628Z October, the VC destroyed five U.S. B-57s and damaged an additional 13. Among the other results of the mortar fire were four dead and 30 wounded American servicemen.

1. JCS 9584 DTG 072313Z Oct 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 280210Z Oct 1964 (TS)
3. COMUSMACV MAC J32 12890 DTG 010913Z Nov 1964 (S)
The losses from the near midnight surprise attack, on the eve of the American presidential election and on the National Day of RVN, was a substantial blow to the bombing capability of the PACAF and to U.S. prestige. Equally disturbing to CINCPAC and the other senior commanders was the fact that the parking areas at Danang and Tan Son Nhut Airfields were also glutted with aircraft and exposed to Viet Cong attacks similar to the one at Bien Hoa.\(^1,2\)

As a precaution against further communist action Admiral Sharp shifted a Marine Special Landing Force (SLF) closer to Danang and directed other measures in preparation for the contingency that a decision might be made to commit U.S. troops to secure key American installations and resources in RVN.\(^3\) At the same time, he was concerned that such action would erode the rapid reaction capability of the PACOM Marine and Airborne forces. To forestall this, he asked COMUSMACV to urge the GVN to improve the protection afforded the U.S. installations and to act vigorously to counter further Viet Cong aggression.\(^4\)

The JCS, COMUSMACV, Ambassador Taylor, and CINCPAC expected higher authority to direct an immediate U.S. reprisal for the Bien Hoa attack. Therefore, they focused their attention on selecting the most appropriate response. CINCPAC's recommendation, submitted at the request of the JCS, pointed out that since there was no identifiable concentration of Viet Cong in RVN the only alternative within the bounds of South Vietnam would be air attacks spread over a broad geographical area.\(^5\) However, CINCPAC was convinced that immediate and heavy retaliatory strikes against targets in North Vietnam would protect American prestige and prevent other similar communist attacks. Accordingly, he recommended a number of possible

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1. COMUSMACV MAC 0 12899 DTG 011541Z Nov 1964 (C)
2. COMUSMACV MAC J312 DTG 021320Z Nov 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 010128Z Nov 1964 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 010500Z Nov 1964 (TS)
5. COMUSMACV J00 12862 DTG 010359Z Nov 1964 (TS)
actions,\(^1\),\(^2\),\(^3\),\(^4\) intensified the observation of Soviet sea and air activity, and arranged SAR support for the air units he thought would execute the strikes on the targets in the DRV.\(^5\) He also stationed a CVA where it could best detect and counter any Communist Chinese air intervention which might be triggered by the U.S. attacks on North Vietnam. To further prepare for contingencies associated with the strikes, CINCPAC recommended specific PACAF augmentation from CONUS resources and suggested that a CONUS division should replace the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii so the 25th could be advanced to Thailand in the event it was decided to expand the attacks on the DRV.\(^6\),\(^7\)

By 4 November it was apparent that, although a higher authority contemplated a specific response for Bien Hoa at some future date, there would be no immediate U.S. punitive action against the DRV or VC.\(^8\),\(^9\) Thereon, the bulk of the PACOM naval forces returned to normal operations,\(^10\) but PACOM air elements were advanced to bases in Thailand. Also, CONUS air augmentation was moved to Clark AB in the Philippines to prepare for future contingencies.\(^11\),\(^12\) Marine HAWK units in CONUS were alerted for deployment to PACOM; some direct to RVN and others to Okinawa for later deployment to Southeast Asia.\(^13\),\(^14\)

Proposal for U.S. Lodgement on the Littoral of the DRV: On 5 October the JCS solicited Admiral Sharp's views on amphibious/airborne operations by U.S. forces to secure one or more lodgements on the coast of the DRV. In response CINCPAC recommended that the

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1. CINCPAC 280210Z Oct 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 010501Z Nov 1964 (TS)
3. SAIGON to STATE 1357 1030PM 1 Nov 1964 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 020230Z Nov 1964 (TS)
5. ADMINO COMSEVENTHFLT 020610Z Nov 1964 (TS)
6. CINCPAC 011913Z Nov 1964 (S)
7. CINCPAC 020400Z Nov 1964 (TS)
8. JCS 001553 DTG 040035Z Nov 1964 (TS)
9. JCS 2239/153, 3 Nov 1964 (TS)
10. CINCPAC 042324Z Nov 1964 (TS)
11. JCS 001646 DTG 062217Z Nov 1964 (TS)
12. CINCPAC 141942Z Nov 1964 (TS)
13. JCS 1452 DTG 012215Z Nov 1964 (TS)
14. COMUSMACV J32 15174 DTG 280605Z Nov 1964 (S)

Page 383 of 495 Pages
Vinh area offered the highest probability of accomplishing the mission and purpose of such operations. He also submitted a concept for the operation and recommended the force requirements.  

CINCPAC's Concept of Campaign Against the DRV: In the absence of an American response for the Bien Hoa incident, CINCPAC concluded that the DRV and Communist China were still unaware that the cost of continued aggression on their part would become prohibitive. Further, he believed that the pattern of U.S. behavior since the reprisals for the August Gulf of Tonkin attack might cause the DRV to believe that it could continue the aggression even raise the level of action with impunity. Admiral Sharp also believed that the RVNAF was barely countering and certainly not reducing the Viet Cong insurgency, and that the only way to give momentum to the counterinsurgency program was through increased U.S. action.

Accordingly CINCPAC recommended to the JCS a military campaign against the DRV, in coordination with supporting diplomatic and psychological programs, to convince the Communists that they must cease their support to the Viet Cong insurgency or accept a continuing and ever increasing level of destruction. CINCPAC believed that his plan held the least risk that the Chinese Communists would decide to intervene. Another advantage, in Admiral Sharp's view, was that the U.S. could gain the initiative in determining how far and in what direction to go in Southeast Asia without becoming irrevocably committed to escalate the conflict to any particular level.

The specific campaign recommended by CINCPAC provided for significant participation of U.S. forces and included the following three steps: (1) progressively intensified strikes against the Viet Cong infiltration routes in the panhandle of Laos; (2) strikes against infiltration-associated targets in North Vietnam; and (3) ultimately a gradual expansion of the strikes to other important targets further north. Thus,

1. JCS 9462 DTG 052237Z Oct 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 000437, 2 Nov 1964 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 230515Z Nov 1964 (TS)
in CINCPAC's concept, the first strikes would be keyed to a relatively low level of severity and would occur in an area geographically remote from Hanoi and Peiping. The pattern of attack was to feature systematic and progressive attacks of ever-increasing intensity and severity, but sufficient time was to be allowed between strikes so the DRV and Chinese Communist reaction could be assessed. If it was determined that the action was not achieving the objective, the campaign was to resume its inexorable and increasingly destructive march toward Hanoi.  

Admiral Sharp received several subsequent JCS proposals concerning future activities in Southeast Asia.  

CINCpac Recommends Additional DESOTO Patrols: Through October and November preparations were underway for additional DESOTO Patrols. More versatile communications equipment was installed in the destroyer EDWARDS to help resolve some of the problems encountered in September. Patrol units accelerated their training in coordinated destroyer/aircraft tactics, tracking high speed craft, and in night photography and illumination. Rules of engagement were discussed, and reprisals were planned for any future attacks on DESOTO Patrols.  

Both the JCS and CINCPAC recommended additional patrols which were not approved. Early in December the patrol ships were released to normal operations, but they could be made available within seven days for another patrol.  

1. Ibid.  
2. CINCPAC 230555Z Nov 1964 (TS) 
3. COMSEVENTHFLT 300434Z Sep 1964 (S) 
4. CINCPAC 142108Z Oct 1964 (TS) 
5. CINCPAC 280210Z Oct 1964 (TS) 
6. CINCPAC 250406Z Nov 1964 (S) 
7. JCS 02279 DTG 251756Z Nov 1964 (S) 
8. CINCPAC 052002Z Dec 1964 (S) 
9. CINCPAC 120025Z Dec 1964 (S)
Increased Amphibious Readiness Posture, December: On 24 December, because of the continued general instability of the GVN and General Khanh's arrest of the High National Council on 20 December, CINCPAC increased the PACOM amphibious readiness by positioning two Task Groups with Battalion Landing Teams (BLT) embarked off Vung Tau (Cap St. Jacques) in RVN. The advanced posture was intended to expedite the movement of U.S. security forces to Saigon if the requirement developed. The alert force was retained on station through the end of the year. 1

Employment of [Redacted] Agents in Combat Operations: On 25 December riot control agents were used in combat operations by the ARVN for the first time. They were used in Tay Ninh Province on two occasions. Though there was no contact with the VC in one instance, the other operation indicated that riot control agents were apparently effective in reducing ground fire against heliborne assaults. Vietnamese troops in Helicopters (UH-1B) delivered on-the-objective area 30 pounds of bulk CS, 250 CS grenades, 550 CN-DM grenades, and 70 CN grenades. 2 (S)

International Military Assistance Force (IMAF): 3 On 23 April 1964 President Johnson called for "more flags" in Vietnam and specifically requested that there be increased Third Country (Nations in addition to RVN and U.S.) support to the people of South Vietnam in their struggle against communist aggression. The concept of third country support was by no means new, since Australia had been providing military aid since July 1962, and Britain, France, Japan, and West Germany had been providing commodity aid and technical assistance for some time. However, the President's interest gave significant emphasis to incorporating the resources of additional nations in the counterinsurgency  

1 CINCPAC 242125Z Dec 1964 (TS)  
2 COMUSMACV MC J3 18578 DTI 281016Z Dec 1964 (S)  
3 Varily referred to as "Third Country Force," "More Flags" and "Free World Assistance Program."
battle in RVN. The State Department subsequently implemented the President's decision on a worldwide basis.¹

When some of the other nations made their first encouraging responses to the U.S. appeal for assistance to RVN, Admiral Felt recommended to the JCS that they point out to the Department of State that the effectiveness of Third Country assistance would be enhanced if the nations concerned established early and close liaison with COMUSMACV, and the GVN through COMUSMACV, in RVN.² He subsequently reiterated his conviction that COMUSMACV should be the authority to rule on offers of aid and went so far as to say that he would prefer not to comment on third country assistance to RVN unless specifically requested to do so.

Admiral Sharp, as CINCPAC, followed that policy until November when he made his first comment on the third country offers in relation to a meeting held in Manila and attended by representatives of COMUSMACV and USOM.³ He concurred with the basic proposal resulting from the Manila planning conference wherein the Philippines was to provide a tri-service task force of approximately 1800 men following further negotiations. CINCPAC also announced that he fully supported the desirability of the Philippines contributing a task force to South Vietnam and pointed out that from a military viewpoint the structure proposed for Philippine forces would provide "severely needed assistance in the construction and civic action areas."⁴

A joint AID/STATE/DCD policy on funding the "More Flags" program was published on 8 October. The essential features of the policy were:

1. Donors should be urged to bear as much of the cost as possible.

¹ STATE 2043 to CIRCULAR 1PM 2 May 1964 (C)
² CINCPAC 232308Z May 1964 (C)
³ CINCPAC 022005Z Nov 1964 (S)
⁴ CINCPAC 022005Z Nov 1964 (S)
⁵ STATE 791 to SAIGON 8 Oct 1964 (C)
2. The donor MAP would bear all costs for MAP supported end items for which title rested with the donor.

3. RVN MAP should be charged for MAP items that would be expended or would remain in South Vietnam.

4. The donors should pay for commercial consumables but if that was not possible, it would be funded by the GVN. However, in the event that the U.S. had to defray the expenses related to a Third Country contribution, the decision as to whether MAP or AID funds would be used would be based on whether the recipient was a military or civil branch of the GVN.

5. The GVN military budget would fund per diem costs of contributed forces; the donor would pay special allowances.

In mid-December President Johnson decided to exert all feasible pressure for increased representation by other nations in RVN, and the JCS informed CINCPAC that teams, detachments, platoons, companies, or battalions that were self contained and capable of performing service type functions were illustrative of the desired types of units. Although combat troops and combat advisors were excluded from the list the JCS stated that those elements might be the subject of later communications. The Joint Chiefs also solicited CINCPAC's comments and informed him that the costs associated with the additional support would be considered and funded separately from the normal MAP.

CINCPAC replied that he thought it unlikely that Malaysia, Indonesia, Laos, Burma, Thailand, or Japan could be counted on to contribute assistance even though they were MAP recipients. On the other hand he believed that Korea, Nationalist China, and the Philippines could be expected to aid.

Summary of Free World Aid to Vietnam: At the end of the year 14 nations were extending various forms of aid to RVN but the overall response to the U.S. appeal had been far short of what could have been

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1. CINCPAC 230443Z Dec 1964 (S)
FREE WORLD AID TO VIETNAM

HUE
FRANCE - Professors
GERMANY - Professors
UNITED KINGDOM - Professors
CANADA - Medical Science
Building Under Construction

DALAT
KOREA - Taekwondo Instructors
FRANCE - Surgical Team;
Professors, Lycees Yersin

DANHIM
JAPAN - Technicians; Installation
of Danhim Dam and Power Plant

QIA DINH
PHILIPPINES - Paywar Team

PHU CUONG
NEW ZEALAND - Army Engineer Detachment

PHU LOI
PHILIPPINES - Paywar Team

TAY NINH
PHILIPPINES - Surgical team

TAN HIEP
PHILIPPINES - Paywar Team

TAN SON NHUT
THAILAND - Air Transport
Deployment

PHU THO
FRANCE - Experts and Equipment; Centre National
Technique

MATIEN
FRANCE - Cement Plant

LONG XUYEN
AUSTRALIA - Surgical Team

VINH LONG
JAPAN - My Thuan Bridge under Construction

TAN AN
PHILIPPINES - Paywar Team

SAIGON
AUSTRALIA - RAAPV: Caribou Transport planes
KOREA - Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
GERMANY - Instructors at Technical High School
ITALY - Surgical Team at Binh Dan Hospital
PHILIPPINES - Paywar Team
UNITED KINGDOM - British Advisory Mission,
Equipment for Governmental Institutions
CANADA - Professor of Medicine at Chie Ray Hospital
REPUBLIC OF CHINA - Agricultural Technical Mission,
Civic Action Team
FRANCE - Medical Experts at Giai Hospital; Experts at
Centre de Developpement industriel; Experts at Ecole
Agronomique, Foresterie et Veterinaire; Professors at
Lycee Marie-Laure Jacques Roux; and Saigon
University; Installation of Centre de Formation de
Techniciens de XX l'Electricite, equipment

Source: Enclosure (3) Free World Aid to Vietnam, to CINCPAC Ttalking Paper Free World Assistance to Vietnam, 17 Jan 65 (6)

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reasonably expected. Figure IV-15 summarizes the Free World aid to RVN as of the end of 1964.

Some of the recognized limiting factors that affected other nations' assistance to South Vietnam were as follows:

Canada - Possible conflict with the Canadian role of providing a member of the International Control Commission (ICC) in the two Vietnams.

United Kingdom - Similar to Canada's situation since UK had the continuing duty of Co-Chairman of the Geneva Convention of 1954. Also, some UK forces were supporting Malaysia's defense against Indonesia.

New Zealand - Increased assistance to RVN was a subject of domestic political conflict.

Australia - The introduction of conscription had increased the training load on the Australian military forces and thereby reduced their capability to add to the number of military advisors in RVN. Further, Australian forces were supporting Malaysia against Indonesian aggression.
CINCPAC ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN THAILAND'S RESISTANCE TO COMMUNISM

Externally, Thailand's security was adversely affected during 1964 by the deterioration of the Free World position in both Laos and South Vietnam and because of the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation. Internally, the security situation looked altogether different as Prime Minister Thanom's regime appeared to be consolidating its power, assisted to some degree, no doubt, by the external threat. Momentum toward greater emphasis on counterinsurgency was generated by Exercise KITTI and AIR BOON CHOO. Up-country deployment of tank companies and deployment of Special Operations Centers for psychological and intelligence operations were accomplished to improve security and the Thai military and police proved the value of their training in their handling of a flow of refugees from Laos during the April Plaine des Jarres crisis. In addition the entire Thai government reflected a high degree of commitment to accelerated economic and security development in rural areas with emphasis on rapid implementation in the field.

Thailand, in 1964, was involved more heavily than ever as the base of logistic support for operations in Laos. Perhaps CINCPAC's greatest involvement with Thailand was in this regard. Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand was the primary individual through which CINCPAC administered the MAP for Laos; this fact was classified secret. ¹

Many of the subjects related to Thailand are reported in the Laos Section of this Chapter.

Planning for Airlift of Thai Forces to Area Opposite Thakhek

In mid-February, when the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh were very active in Laos, Thai government officials began worrying that the Laotian based Communists might penetrate the Thailand border in

¹. OSD 002296 DTG 250529Z Nov 1964 (S)
the Thakhek area. In this connection the Thai SEATO Military Representative, acting on instruction from Air Chief Marshall Dawee, contacted the U.S., Australian, and New Zealand Military Representatives to determine what airlift capability could be made available to airlift Thai Forces to the area opposite Thakhek. \(^1\) (S)

The U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Graham Martin, was called to a meeting with Thai government officials in which the possible use of U.S. transport aircraft to help lift Thai troops to the vital northeast border area was discussed. The Thai capability to airlift troops was vested in 17 C-47s and a C-54 of which about 50 percent were in operating condition. According to the U.S. Air Attache, the U.S. in-country aircraft would lift at least 150 troops. \(^2\)

CINCPAC, who had previously advocated more extensive deployments of Thai forces to Northeastern Thailand, alerted COMUSMACTHAI and CHJUSMAGTHAI to be prepared to respond to Ambassador Martin's request to provide U.S. transport aircraft in the event that the Thai needed support over and above their own resources. CINCPAC asked to be advised if aircraft were requested in excess of the small detachment of C-123s which the U.S. had at Don Muang Airfield. \(^3\)

**Bilateral Planning - U.S. / Thailand**

When, in early June, it appeared that the Communists in Laos might be gathering their forces for a drive toward that portion of the Mekong river which separated Laos and Thailand, the U.S. Secretary of State initiated bilateral planning between the U.S. and Thailand. He directed Ambassador Martin, to inform the Thai Prime Minister that the U.S. urgently desired to consult with the Royal Thai Government (RTG) regarding measures to be taken in the event of a communist drive toward the Mekong.

Secretary Rusk suggested that the Thai send military planners immediately to Honolulu for consultation with CINCPAC and JCS

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1. BANGKOK 1389 to STATE, 13 Feb, 6PM 1964 (S)
2. U.S. AIR ATTACHE, BANGKOK, C-017 DTG 131245Z Feb 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 140544Z Feb 1964 (S)
representatives. The Thai indicated that they were ready to begin consultations but stated a preference that the meetings take place in Bangkok. CINCPAC informed the JCS that he was prepared to dispatch a small planning group to Bangkok to consult with the Thai in an effort to "smoke out Thai view on concepts, force commitments, and command relationships."

The CINCPAC planning group, headed by Major General Milton, the CINCPAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, departed for Bangkok on 14 June and met with Air Chief Marshall Dawee, the Thailand Deputy Minister of Defense, and his planners on 18 June. In discussing his concept of the operation, Dawee made it plain that in order to secure the Mekong river line it was necessary to go across the Mekong and defend in Laos. He was willing to let the U.S. make the decision as to where the specific line of defense should be. In discussing command arrangements, Dawee requested that Prime Minister Thanom be the Commander in Chief and indicated that the pattern of would be an acceptable command arrangement. Dawee thought the force commitments should be "about twice the forces declared in Plan 5" and stated that he was prepared to commit the Second Royal Thai Army (one division) and his tactical air forces. It was agreed that both sides of the planning group would draw up suitable terms of reference which would be used for guidance by the planners who would come up with the detailed plan. General Milton emphasized to the Thai that the terms of reference would have to be approved by the JCS.

The JCS provided guidance for use of the CINCPAC planners but it was received too late to be of assistance at the initial meeting. The JCS guidance message also contained a recommendation to DOD that CINCPAC be authorized to conduct, on a continuing basis, such

1. STATE 2204 to BANGKOK, 4 Jun 1964 (S)
2. BANGKOK 2106 to STATE, 8 Jun 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 091955Z Jun 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 200002Z Jun 1964 (TS)
bilateral U.S./Thai military planning on contingencies of joint interest as might be required. It spelled out the purpose of the bilateral planning, which was fourfold:

1. To improve U.S./Thai readiness to execute measures envisaged.
2. To assure maximum exploitation of Thai military resources in support of common U.S./Thai objectives.
3. To reassure the Thai and to ensure their continued cooperation.
4. To demonstrate a firm U.S. resolve in Southeast Asia.

CINCPAC was tentatively designated by the JCS as the U.S. representative for the development of such U.S./Thai plans as might be agreed upon by the two countries, to include:

1. Defense of the Mekong (In this regard CINCPAC was instructed to impress upon the Thai the need to move their forces rapidly to forestall enemy occupation of principal Mekong cities.)
2. Punitive actions against Pathet Lao/Viet Minh forces in Laos.
3. Reaction to continued or expanded Democratic Republic of Vietnam support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

The JCS recommendation that CINCPAC be authorized to conduct planning with the Thai was approved by the Secretary of Defense, such planning to be within the framework stated above. CINCPAC asked the JCS that bilateral planning not concern itself with border incursions from Burma unless the Thai initiated a request for it to do so; the JCS agreed.

In accordance with the planning group agreement, CINCPAC developed terms of reference for the bilateral planning. They were rewritten by COMUSMACTHAI based on working level discussions.

1. JCS 6914 DTG 172217Z Jun 1964 (TS)
2. JCS 7064 DTG 252242Z Jun 1964 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 270429Z Jun 1964 (TS)
with the Thai, concurred in by Ambassador Martin, and forwarded to the JCS for approval.\textsuperscript{1,2} The JCS reviewed the terms of reference and expanded the language so as to permit subsequent development of additional U.S./Thai bilateral plans once the basic plan for Defense of Thailand against communist forces in Laos had been completed. These terms of reference still had to be approved by the Secretary of Defense, but CINCPAC forwarded them to COMUSMACTHAI to facilitate initial planning by U.S. elements. They were not yet to be divulged to Thai counterparts.

The terms of reference, as concurred in by the JCS, stated the mutual agreement of the U.S. and Thailand to conduct bilateral military planning for contingencies of joint interest and outlined the first step, which was to develop a plan for the defense of Thailand to include military operations to hold the Mekong river valley and its principal cities and military facilities. The situation in which the plan would be enacted was envisioned as beyond that of subversion but less than overt aggression by either Communist China, North Vietnam, or both. The plan would include punitive action against communist forces in Laos and military action against North Vietnam to include interdiction of routes of supply and reinforcements from North Vietnam into Laos. The U.S. and Thailand were to make available adequate force levels consistent with achieving the planned objectives and in addition the U.S. would be prepared to employ, under national command, such additional air, ground, and naval forces as might be required to conduct military actions against North Vietnam. The plan was to be generally compatible with SEATO plans and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Thailand was to be the Commander in Chief. Planning was to begin immediately in Bangkok with a completion goal of September 1964.

The Terms of Reference for U.S. and Thai planners in Bangkok were approved by the Secretary of Defense on 25 August.\textsuperscript{3} Admiral

\begin{itemize}
\item [\textsuperscript{1}] CINCPAC 270429Z Jun 1964 (TS)
\item [\textsuperscript{2}] CINCPAC 100056Z Jul 1964 (TS)
\item [\textsuperscript{3}] JCS 8071 DTG 251933Z Aug 1964 (TS)
\end{itemize}
Sharp advised the planners of this approval and cautioned U.S. planners that establishment of the planning group as authorized by the Terms of Reference was not intended to preclude active participation by CINCPAC or JCS representatives when considered appropriate.\(^1\)

It was determined that two plans would be necessary. The first would be a broad plan for general direction of the effort and promulgated by the Force Commander (Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Thailand). The second would be a detailed operational plan promulgated by the Field Force Commander (U.S. Commander to be designated). Force commitments were tentatively approved on 1 September and the Force Commander's Plan (CINCUSTAF Plan 1/64) was nearing completion in draft form at that time.

**General Praphat's Letter to the Secretary of Defense**

OSD, in July, asked CINCPAC to comment on two points that Thailand Deputy Prime Minister, General Praphat raised in a letter to the Secretary of Defense and which he also discussed with Mr. McNamara while on a trip to Washington.\(^2\) Praphat requested MAP support of an Airborne Regiment and made an allegation that Chief JUSMAG Thailand no longer favored a move of the 21st Regimental Combat Team (RCT) to Petchaburi and that as a result MAP construction to support the move was not being provided. (S)

Admiral Sharp was in Thailand at the time and discussed the matter at length with Chief JUSMAG Thailand and Ambassador Martin. After these discussions Admiral Sharp answered the OSD query, pointing out that General Praphat was emerging as a strong political figure with capabilities not unlike those that enabled Sarit to gain and maintain power.\(^3\) His efforts to obtain military assistance for Thailand while in Washington were, no doubt, designed at least in part to strengthen his position at home. Admiral Sharp stated that

1. CINCPAC 290130Z Aug 1964 (TS)
2. OSD DEF 978913 DTG 221757Z Jul 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 020400Z Aug 1964 (S)
the real reason for the request for MAP support of an Airborne Regiment was obscure, particularly in light of the Thai inability to fully man the existing Airborne Battalion and other Army units. Admiral Sharp thought the proposal might be a gambit to head off a possible JUSMAG recommendation to reduce MAP support to the existing Thai Airborne Battalion. He stated that it might be a good idea to tell the Thai that when they had the Airborne Battalion fully equipped and manned, the U.S. would reconsider MAP support for other units, with the idea of eventually building a regimental size airborne unit.

In regard to the Prathat allegation that the U.S. had reneged on an agreement to move the 21st RCT, CINCPAC stated that neither the Royal Thai Army nor Chief JUSMAG Thailand had ever planned to move the RCT to Petchaburi. In 1960 Chief JUSMAG Thailand did agree to program construction at Cholburi for the RCT, using existing monetary ceilings and in a time frame compatible with future funding. Because of the complexity of the negotiations concerning the 21st RCT as well as some questions yet to be answered regarding the proposed Airborne Regiment, Ambassador Martin decided to reexamine both requests and not take a firm stand until he and Chief JUSMAG Thailand could take another look.

Subsequent to OSD's initial request for comment on two subjects in the Prathat letter, CINCPAC received requests from both State and OSD asking for comment on other subjects contained in the letter. The additional subjects, with a resume of CINCPAC comments, are given as follows:

1. Suggested increase in tour of U.S. advisors to three years.

   CINCPAC COMMENT: A three year minimum tour was not recommended, however, actions could be taken to lengthen tours to some degree. (Primarily through voluntary extensions)

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1. STATE 147 to BANGKOK, 30 Jul 1964 (S)
2. OSD DEF 980377 DTG 311935Z Jul 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 180138Z Aug 1964 (S)
2. Request for U.S. to operate and maintain Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) sites.

CINCPAC COMMENT: The U.S. should attempt to hold the Thai to previous agreements to support all four fixed heavy AC&W sites. If the Thai reneged, the U.S. should initially man the sites if the Thai would agree to take full responsibility for this function within a reasonable period of time. (See also, Thailand AC&W system, Chapter IV)

3. Recommendation that up to 1,000 Thai pilots be trained for use in Southeast Asia.

CINCPAC COMMENT: General Praphat's offer of 1,000 pilot trainees should be acknowledged as an expression of good faith. The magnitude of such assistance should be scaled down to foreseeable requirements. 1

4. Request for more MAP emphasis on patrol ships.

CINCPAC COMMENT: Adequate MAP emphasis, consistent with MAP ceilings and country priorities had been placed on patrol ships in the Thai Navy.

5. Buildup of paratroopers in Ranger units.

CINCPAC COMMENT: Chief JUSMAG proposal to train two existing infantry battalions for special tasks, including air-mobile operations, was a desired alternative to increasing paratroopers in the RTA.

In early October CINCPAC learned that Secretary McNamara had, in September, replied to General Praphat's letter and simply stated that the topics in the Praphat letter were under study. 2 In mid-October the JCS directed that a plan be prepared to train 100 Thai pilots for use in Southeast Asia. CINCPAC delegated this requirement to Chief JUSMAG Thailand. 3, 4 The OSD view on handling most of the other topics in Praphat's letter was that future action should be based on negotiations conducted with the aim of furthering U.S. interests.

In October the subject of construction at Cholburi arose again when Ambassador Martin wrote to OSD saying that he had concluded that the U.S. had a moral commitment to support the Cholburi

1. CINCPAC 142210Z Aug 1964 (S)
2. OSD DEF 9684 DTG 091925Z Oct 1964 (S)
3. JCS 9898 DTG 161819Z Oct 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC 222240Z Oct 1964 (S)
construction. The moral obligation was based on the 1960 Chief JUSMAG Thailand agreement to build facilities at Cholburi for the 21st RCT. The Secretary of Defense did not act on the letter so the Ambassador asked the Secretary of State to force a decision. OSD subsequently asked for CINCPAC's recommendations.

Both Chief JUSMAG Thailand and CINCPAC agreed that a moral commitment existed to pay for the Cholburi construction. CINCPAC recommended to OSD that $3,245,000 be obtained for the construction by diverting Korea FY66 MAP funds.

In late December the State and Defense departments issued a joint message telling Ambassador Martin that he could advise the Royal Thailand Government that the U.S. would support the Cholburi construction. At the same time CINCPAC was advised that construction would be supported as a program item in the FY66 MAP, but that the Architectural and Engineering requirement would be funded in the FY65 MAP as a deviation.

TFS at Takhli

In 1963 the F-100 Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) at Takhli was reduced, in accordance with a DOD decision from 18 to six aircraft. In February of 1964 the State Department and JCS were in agreement to return the F-100 detachment to full squadron strength of 18 aircraft. This additional deployment was one among other planned JCS actions for stabilizing the situation in Laos and Southeast Asia. The JCS were considering providing the additional aircraft from CINCPAC resources at Clark Air Base in the Philippines with subsequent replacement from CONUS.

1. Ambassador Martin ltr to OASD, 7 Oct 1964 (S)
2. BANGKOK 779 to STATE, 15 Dec 1964 (S)
3. OSD DEF 2890 DTG 141619Z Dec 1964 (S)
4. STATE 926 to BANGKOK, 23 Dec 1964 (S)
5. CINCPAC 242357Z Dec 1964 (S)
6. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 254
7. JCS 5066 DTG 271835Z Feb 1964 (S)
8. STATE 1438 to BANGKOK, Feb 1964 (S)
9. JCS 5105 DTG 291709Z Feb 1964 (S)
CINCPAC informed the JCS that, unless the planned deployment signified an intention to employ the F-100s more gainfully than those already in Thailand, he recommended against it. CINCPAC pointed out that the backup squadron, which was located at Clark, could reach Takhli in less than three hours. Given authority for orientation flights along the Mekong and minor incursions into specific areas such as Thakhek, the six F-100s already at Takhli could provide adequate evidence of the United States' deep interest in the area. CINCPAC felt that additional F-100s at Takhli, operating under the existing restrictions, would simply add to the logistic and support requirements at that remote base. He recommended that, if the increased commitment of F-100s should be carried out, it be tied to a specific situation so as to gain maximum psychological impact.

Proposals affecting the status of F-100s at Takhli were dropped until July when an entirely different proposal came from CINCPACAF. CINCPACAF wanted to send the six F-100s at Takhli back to Clark and replace them with a like number of B-57s from Clark. CINCPACAF wanted the additional F-100s at Clark to increase his capability to provide routine continuation training for combat aircrews. The existing dispersement of PACAF F-100s was: Six at Clark; four at Tainan Air Base; eight at Danang Air Base; and the six at Takhli. CINCPACAF reasoned that his proposal would have advantages as follows:

1. Quietly introduce a B-57 unit into mainland Southeast Asia.
2. Enhance the image of U.S. resolve in Southeast Asia.
3. Provide increased unfueled range and ordnance carrying capability at Takhli.
4. Provide 12 F-100s for required pilot continuation training as well as a replacement pool for alert aircraft in Tainan and Danang.

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1. CINCPAC 292200Z Feb 1964 (S)
2. PACAF PFDOP 323 DTG 170432Z Jul 1964 (TS)
Admiral Sharp disapproved CINCPACAF's proposal as an immediate solution but indicated an intent to discuss it with Ambassador Martin and lay the groundwork for its future implementation.

The Military Assistance Plan for Thailand

CINCPAC, in furnishing guidance for the preparation of the Thailand MAP, stated that it would be designed to assist the Royal Thai Government to increase its national capability to defend Thailand's independence and sovereignty against communist aggression, infiltration, insurgency and subversion; to increase national safety and stability, and improve the economic status of the strategically important North and Northeast with particular emphasis on greater counter-subversion and anti-guerrilla capabilities. (S)

MAP priority was given to the development and maintenance of balanced military and paramilitary forces progressively better equipped, trained and motivated to prevent or defeat communist insurgencies without direct intervention by U.S. or other free world forces and to provide conditions of internal stability and security. (S)

Recommended Increases in FY64 MAP for Thailand: In January, Ambassador Martin asked the State Department to support an increase of $8.5 million to the OSD reduced FY64 MAP ceiling of $39.9 million. His reasons were primarily political and reflected concern that the Thai Government would react unfavorably to the large reduction in the FY64 Program from the FY63 Program of $73.5 million. State, AID, and OSD jointly asked the Ambassador for additional justification and cited a $62.0 million pipeline of undelivered balances which they believed sufficient to avoid serious adverse reaction by the Thai. 3 Ambassador Martin's reply played down the equipment in the pipeline and increased the amount of his request to $11.5 million. This included equipment for internal and external defense. 4 (S)

1. CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual, Chap VIII, p. 1, 6 Jun 1964 (S)
2. BANGKOK 1031 to STATE, 8 Jan 1964 (S)
3. STATE 1269 to BANGKOK, 5 Feb 1964 (S)
4. BANGKOK 1328 to STATE, 15 Feb 1964 (S)
THAILAND

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1964

**BASIC INFORMATION**

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<td>AS % CENTRAL GOV EXP</td>
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**OVERALL OBJECTIVE**

- PROMOTE THAI/U.S. RELATIONSHIPS IN RECOGNITION OF THAILAND'S VITAL IMPORTANCE TO U.S. MILITARY POSTURE IN S.E.A. ASIZE; ENCOURAGE U.S. BASE RIGHTS; INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THAI MILITARY FORCES; AND ENCOURAGE THAI MILITARY SUPPORT OF SEATO.

**U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION**

- U.S. AMBASSADOR
  - Name: [Redacted]
- U.S. AID DIRECTOR
  - Name: [Redacted]
- DEPUTY CONSUL GENERAL & C.I.F.
  - Name: [Redacted]

**MAP OBJECTIVE**

- GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE:
  1. TO DEPLOY AND MAINTAIN BALANCED MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES EQUIPPED, TRAINED, AND MANNED TO PREVENT OR DEFEND AGAINST COMMunist INSURGENCIES WITHOUT DIRECT INTERVENTION BY U.S. OR OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES.
  2. TO PROVIDE CONDITIONS OF INTERNAL STABILITY AND SECURITY WITHIN WHICH DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES CAN BE ENSHANCED.
  3. AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK TO BE PREPARED TO OFFER INCREASED DEFENSIVE STRENGTH TO ASSIST IN THE MAINTENANCE OF THAI NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE.
  4. TO ACHIEVE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAI MILITARY CAPABILITIES TO SUSTAIN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE MISSION AND TO PROVIDE A STATE OF DEFENSE CAPABILITY SUFFICIENT TO COPE WITH THREATS FROM WITHOUT.

**MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES**

- ARMY
  - 3 INFANTRY DIVISIONS
  - 1 CAVALRY DIVISION
  - 1 AIR FORCE
  - 1 SAW
  - 1 TACTICAL FORCES
  - 1 TRANSPORT
  - 1 RECON

- NAVY
  - 5 DE, 16 PATROL SHIPS
  - 8 MINESWEEPERS
  - 1 TANKER
  - 2 RECONV
  - 7 ARMS SHIPS
  - 7 MINE DIENS

- AIR FORCE
  - 2 TACTICAL FORCES
  - 1 PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONSTRUCTION
  - 1 TRANS/RECON
  - 1 PHOTOFLYING RECON

**TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES**

- 3 INFANTRY DIVISIONS
- 1 CAVALRY DIVISION
- 1 AIR FORCE
- 1 SAW
- 1 TACTICAL FORCES
- 1 TRANSPORT
- 1 RECON

**COMPETE CAPABILITY**

- MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. THIS CAN CONTRIBUTE UP TO 1/4 TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.

- MARGINAL SATISFACTORY PATROL CAPABILITY IN GULF OF THAILAND AND INTERNAL WATERWAYS.

- LIMITED AIRBORNE OPERATIONS AND CLOSE SUPPORT OF THE ARMY/DAK AIR DEFENSE.
CINCPAC obtained comments from CHJUSMAG-Thailand concerning the proposed increases and subsequently advised OSD that, except for $101,500 of the recommended additions which was for Royal Thailand Marine Corps equipment, most of the items asked for were in the "nice to have" category and were beyond the capability of the Thai to effectively maintain and utilize.\(^1,^2,^3\) CINCPAC stated that he could not underwrite further cuts in programs of other PACOM countries in order to support any increase in Thailand's FY64 MAP.

The Ambassador felt that CINCPAC had been influenced by a GAO report which criticized utilization and maintenance of aircraft within the Royal Thailand Air Force (RTAF) and stated that this would be corrected by a predicted change in RTAF leadership. CINCPAC, however, maintained his position and said that actual improvement should be evident before adding additional aircraft to the Thailand MAP.\(^4,^5\)

On 31 March State, AID, and OSD jointly approved $730,000 of the recommended MAP increase; most of this was for vehicles and for the Royal Thailand Marine Corps equipment that CINCPAC had endorsed.\(^6\) Ambassador Martin was asked to justify the need for $1.5 million which he had requested for Mobile Development Unit (MDU) equipment. (See CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 245 for story on MDU's). The justification was to be used as a basis for determining whether MAP or AID should fund the equipment. Also, as a pre-condition for approval of any added assistance to MDU's, the U.S. would have to be assured of greater participation in MDU planning and given a firm agreement that RTA engineer battalions would be used to support MDU operations.\(^7\)

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1. CHJUSMAG Thailand JTJ4 50148 DTG 020300Z Mar 1964 (S)
2. CHJUSMAG Thailand ltr JTJ4, 11 Mar 1964, Subj: Additional Justification for Add-On-Items for FY64 MAP (S)
3. CINCPAC 080328Z Mar 1964 (S)
4. BANGKOK 1555 to STATE, 14 Mar 1964 (S)
5. CINCPAC 180147Z Mar 1964 (S)
6. STATE 1725 to BANGKOK, 31 Mar 1964 (S)
7. STATE 1776 to BANGKOK, 6 Apr 1964 (S)
The Ambassador provided the requested justification but took strong exception with the pre-conditions for additional MDU support. CINCPAC agreed with Ambassador Martin's objections but insisted, as he had done previously, that AID should fund any additional assistance for MDU's. Later, State, AID, and OSD jointly relaxed the pre-conditions. They concluded that AID was the logical funding source for additional MDU assistance since RTA units would not be directly connected with MDU's.

FY69 Thailand MAP Revisions, FY65 Reduction: The CINCPAC revision of the Thailand FY65-69 MAP was completed in April. Upon completion of revision the Thailand MAP, in relation to OSD guidelines, appeared as follows:

($ in millions)

<table>
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<th></th>
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In October the Secretary of Defense approved reducing the FY65 Thailand MAP ceiling from $30.0 million to $28.7 million. The reduction was based on recommendations made by Chief JUSMAG Thailand. As a result of the reduction, construction at Kokethiem Air Base and Tactical Air Navigation facilities at Udorn and Chieng Mai were deleted from the FY65 program.

Deletion of Tires and Tubes from Thailand MAP

In consonance with the effort to eliminate commercial consumables from the MAP, tires and tubes were eliminated from country programs wherever possible. These items (600x16 and 750x20 tires...
and tubes) still appeared in the Thailand FY65-70 MAP but CINCPAC felt that the Thai economy could support them, utilizing commercial market sources and in-country production capabilities.

CINCPAC asked Chief JUSMAG Thailand to study availability of tires and tubes, from sources which the Thai could utilize, and make recommendations to CINCPAC. Chief JUSMAG, with Ambassador Martin's concurrence, recommended that the tires and tubes be retained in the FY65 MAP but deleted from the FY66-70 MA Plan. CINCPAC concurred in this recommendation to OSD.

**Development of Sattahip Naval Base**

Development of the Naval Base at Sattahip, Thailand was first reported in the CINCPAC Command History of 1963. Development of the base was necessitated by the requirement to move a portion of the operating forces of the Royal Thai Navy from the port of Bangkok to a less vulnerable location further south in the Gulf of Siam. Another reason was because the Sattahip Base supported U.S. contingency plans in the area. (C)

Two LST ramps funded in the FY63 MAP were reported completed and operational in 1964. Three additional LST ramps, funded in the FY64 MAP, were under construction in 1964. (C)

A contract was let for the construction of an ammunition/cargo pier capable of berthing one 10,000 ton ship with control depth of 34 feet. Construction was underway at the end of the year with an estimated completion date of October 1965. (C)

The major remaining problem was that of an adequate water supply for the Sattahip Naval Base complex, estimated at 2.8 million gallons daily. Funds were provided in the FY64 MAP for

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1. CINCPAC 050205Z Sep 64 (C)
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 180001Z Oct 64 (C)
3. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 112
4. CHJUSMAG Thailand 111000Z Dec 1964 (C)
5. CHJUSMAG Thailand 2007002 Aug 1964 (C)
Architectural and Engineering services including exploration and drilling test wells. The FY65 MAP contained $1,000,000 for construction costs associated with expansion of existing wells (Toong Prong) and development of a new source in Klong Bang Pai Valley. (C)

Special Operations Centers (SOCs)

The 1963 CINCPAC Command History reported that Mobile Development Units, Seabee Technical Assistance Teams, and Royal Thailand and U.S. Army units were some of the more important tools with which the Thailand Government was establishing internal security and conducting Civic Action. Emerging along side of these in 1964 was the Thai Special Operations Centers. (See figure IV-17 for SOC Locations).

The U.S. position since the mid-1950s had been to encourage the Royal Thailand Army to deploy more forces to north and northeast Thailand. The Thai had been only lukewarm to a Battalion Post Program, established for this purpose. But on their own initiative they organized Special Operations Centers along the Laos border and one on the Cambodian border which protected against subversion and contributed significantly towards security of the country.

During February 1962 the Royal Thai Army deployed battalion and company sized units to five critical border locations along the north and northeastern Thai/Laos border at Chieng Khong, Pua, Bung Karn, Nakhon Phanom, and Dan Sai. By October 1962, units at the first four of these locations had been reduced to reinforced rifle platoons, and troops at Dan Sai had been completely withdrawn. Since the first four locations were considered extremely sensitive, it was decided to retain troops at these locations. However, the mission was broadened to include the conduct of Civic Action, psychological operations, collection and reporting of intelligence information, and prevention of the spread of subversion. The Royal Thai Army

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 245
organized units and gave them special training for this purpose. After training was conducted for cadre, four SOCs were formed and deployed in October 1963, to the four locations mentioned above, relieving the tactical units. An additional SOC was established at Surin in March 1964.

SOCs were organized with 86 personnel each, consisting of a headquarters and control group of 37 members (including a nine man security team), and five Special Operation Teams (SOTs), each with one officer and eight specialists. A four man psychological operations team was attached to each SOC. The SOC headquarters and control group remained in a fixed location and controlled all operations of their unit in their assigned area of operations which generally encompassed an area with a 70 kilometer radius. Each SOT had a sub-sector of responsibility in which they conducted long range patrols.

In addition to the SOCs previously deployed, the RTA was to deploy, in the fall of 1964, another SOC at Aranya Prathet and a Royal Thai Marine Corps SOC at Chantaburi. Both of these locations were oriented toward the Thai-Cambodian border. Future plans included the establishment of SOCs at Sadao, Betong, and Sungai Kaloke on the Malaysian border and at Ranong, Maesot and Mai Sai on the Burmese border. This would bring the total SOCs to 13.

During April and May 1964 additional officers and men received special training and then replaced SOC personnel at Chieng Khong, Pua, Bung Karn, and Nakhon Phanom. No replacement personnel were designated for the SOC at Surin because of its short period of operation.

In May the Royal Thailand Army asked Chief JUSMAG Thailand for U.S. support of the SOCs. Chief JUSMAG studied the problem and requested that CINCPAC authorize support of the SOC program to the extent of constructing facilities and providing MAP funded medical supplies and communications equipment. The initial estimate of funds required was $100,000 per SOC.

1. Fact Sheet, Chief JUSMAG Thailand Sep 1964 (C) On file in CINCPAC
2. CHJUSMAG Thailand 010930Z Jun 1964 (S)
Chief JUSMAG wanted to build a building at each SOC to house 50 men; build a latrine, wash room, and small messhall; and furnish water supply and generated electrical power. Using RTA troop labor, the estimated cost of construction at each SOC was $12,000 to $15,000.

CINCPAC granted Chief JUSMAG Thailand approval to program medical supplies in FY65 and stated that communication equipment could be supported by MAP provided a study on the types of equipment needed, then being conducted in Thailand, provided justification. Concerning construction at the SOC sites, CINCPAC preferred a cost sharing arrangement with the RTG. It appeared that money was available in local currency to fund construction for the first five and possibly six sites. MAP construction materials would have to be used for the last seven sites if available local currency would not cover the bill. To provide materials from MAP, OSD would have to waive the existing policy concerning non-use of consumables. CINCPAC asked OSD to either waive the consumables policy or provide local currency to fund all construction.\textsuperscript{1} CINCPAC preferred using local currency for construction.\textsuperscript{2}

Chief JUSMAG Thailand informed CINCPAC that $100,000 in local currency was available. OSD placed no restriction on the use of this money for purchase of construction materials.\textsuperscript{3,4} CINCPAC authorized Chief JUSMAG Thailand to purchase construction materials for the SOCs to the extent that local currency was available.\textsuperscript{5}

The SOCs were particularly successful in Civic Action projects and by the end of 1964 had established a fine record of giving medical treatment to inhabitants, improving roads, establishing an information program, and improving sanitary standards.

**Thailand T-28 Aircraft**

Thailand's original requirement for T-28s was for 46 aircraft. By September 1964 forty of these aircraft had been delivered. Six of

\textsuperscript{1} CINCPAC 172208Z Jun 1964 (S)
\textsuperscript{2} CINCPAC 220416Z Jul 1964 (S)
\textsuperscript{3} CHJUSMAG Thailand JTALE 50403 DTG 131015Z Jul 1964 (S)
\textsuperscript{4} OSD DEF 79866 DTG 282358Z Jul 1964 (S)
\textsuperscript{5} CINCPAC 310517Z Jul 1964 (S)
this number had been destroyed in crashes. Eight were transferred to Laos and replaced in June 1964. This left a total of 34 T-28 aircraft in the Thailand inventory. Taking into consideration the fact that CINCPAC had raised the authorizations per squadron from 15 to 18 aircraft, the Thai were 20 aircraft short for their three authorized composite squadrons.

CINCPAC, in April, took action to get the Thai some additional T-28s by obtaining approval of OSD to redistribute 17 T-28s from the RVN to Thailand. Because the current price of T-28D aircraft was $151 thousand and the cost of the aircraft to be redistributed would only be $41,000, there was expected to be a savings to MAP of approximately $110,000 on each aircraft. The T-28Bs were excess to RVN requirements due to their replacement by A-1H aircraft.

In May, because of the crisis on the Plaine des Jarres, 10 T-28s were loaned by the RVN to Laos and the JCS decided to freeze additional VNAF T-28s in South Vietnam. CINCPAC was anxious to complete the activation of the 3rd Tactical Composite Squadron at Chiang Mai and tried to find 17 T-28s from some other source that could make the aircraft available at less than normal Military Assistance Sales List prices. Eventually it was decided to use the funds in the FY64 Program from the scrapped T-28B transfer deal to procure five T-28D aircraft. In addition MAP deviations hopefully would provide funds for procurement of an additional seven T-28Ds. A fourth Thailand T-28 squadron was being planned, bringing the total requirement for T-28s to 72 by FY67. Current programming plans, however, would leave Thailand far short of this requirement by FY67 and still nine short by FY70.

CINCPAC, in October, proposed to OSD a FY65 T-28 aircraft program that would fill the existing authorization for T-28s including

1. CINCPAC 042346Z Apr 1964 (S)
2. OSD DEF 964692 DTG 180032Z Apr 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 210440Z Jul 1965 (S)
4. JUSMAG Thailand Fact Sheet, Subject: T-28s, 15 Sep 1964 (C)
attrition.\(^1\) OSD approved this program as follows:\(^2\)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Auth</th>
<th>Planned</th>
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<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td>34 T-28D</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Remain Thailand</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 T-28D</td>
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<td></td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Thai FY65 MAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 T-28D</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Provide in FY65 MAP - deviated funds to provide</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 RT-28C</td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Transfer FY65 4th Quarter when replaced in RVN by A1G aircraft - no cost to MAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>MAP FY66 program</td>
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Bangkok By-Pass Road

In November 1963 when the Third Mobile Construction Battalion, USN, moved its heavy equipment through the city of Bangkok, they started their move at 0100 hours local time. It took several hours of slow, careful maneuvering, raising low hanging wires, jockeying around tight corners, and clearing the way ahead. During Bangkok's dawn to dusk rush hours, the battalion probably would never have made it through the city. The existence of this teeming bottleneck astride the main route of entry into Thailand was apparent to military planners years before. It was obvious that movement of large military forces into Southeast Asia through the port of Bangkok would be intolerably slow and subject to extreme risks.\(^3\)

To obtain a surface Line of Communication from the Port of Sattahip to Korat, that did not pass through Bangkok, it was proposed late in 1961 to build a road from Chacherngsao to Prachinburi, bypassing Bangkok. The road would be a two-lane all-weather road.

1. CINCPAC 110282Z Oct 1964 (S)
2. OSD 1142 DTG 231950Z Oct 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC Weekly Intelligence Digest, Number 31-64, p. 2, 31 Jul 1964 (S)
approximately 50 miles long and in addition to its military value would have economic benefits to Thailand.

To accomplish the actual construction the U.S. Army 809th Engineer Construction Battalion in Okinawa, scheduled for inactivation, was shipped to Thailand and arrived in February 1962. Utilizing the 809th Engineering Battalion, it was initially estimated that U.S. funds in the amount of $5.6 million would enable completion of the project in August 1964. The Thailand Government was to contribute an additional $375,000. This cost and completion schedule was based on a preliminary Architectural and Engineering study which was a crash action and did not permit adequate soil study and bridge foundation site exploration.

In September 1962 the decision was made to change the originally planned route; the new route would run from Chacherngsao to Kabinburi. The new route would reduce the length of new construction and, due to higher location, save considerable fill material. (See Figure IV-18 for By-Pass Road routes and locations involved).

Though the new route seemed to promise an early completion date, in August 1963 the completion date was extended to May 1965 because of difficulties not foreseen by the Architectural and Engineering study.¹ At the end of 1963 the estimated completion date of the road from Chacherngsao to Kabinburi was brought forward to 15 February 1965 because the 809th Engineer Battalion was to be reinforced effective 15 January 1964 by the 561st Engineer Company.

In February 1964 Deputy COMUSMACTHAI notified CINCPAC that previously unforeseen climatic and engineering problems, and inadequate logistic and personnel support would cause a year's extension of construction time beyond February 1965.² He reported that despite working a two shift day, the 809th Engineering Battalion was unable to maintain the projected construction schedule. He cited instances of a high deadline rate of earthmoving equipment, lack of

¹. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 252
². Deputy COMUSMACTHAI JTJ4 71646 DTG 140515Z Feb 1964 (C)
repair parts and the requisite skills to use them. A year's slippage would not only cause substantial unprogrammed costs, but also would have an adverse affect on CINCPAC's capability to support contingency plans in this critical strategic area.

Admiral Felt, who was about to depart for Bangkok, directed that CINCUSARPAC's "comments and intentions to fix" be provided him prior to arrival at his destination. In reply, General Collins reported that he was aware of the many difficulties experienced by the 809th Engineer Battalion, however, as late as October 1963 he had been advised by responsible commanders on the ground that the anticipated completion date remained 15 February 1965. He also advised CINCPAC that a discussion with Deputy COMUSMAC Thai in February 1964 failed to elicit information of the impending slippage.  

CINCUSARPAC ordered extraordinary action to expedite supply, personnel, and maintenance support, including a team sent to CONUS installations to ferret out causes and remedy the situation. The supply assistance team was very successful; reconciling all outstanding requisitions and expediting supplies, both end items and repair parts.  

In spite of actions taken, and after a re-evaluation of the project status, COMUSMAC THAI informed CINCPAC that the completion date would have to be slipped to the period February - May 1966.  

Later, in April, COMUSMAC THAI submitted to CINCPAC a revised construction schedule based on a completion date of February 1966. If rainfall was heavy the expected completion date was June 1966. The Officer in Charge of Construction in Southeast Asia stated that the revised schedule could be met only if the construction forces were maintained at full strength with competent personnel; if logistical support adequate for the mission was established and maintained; and if adequate MAP funding was available when required in FY65 and 66.  

1. CINCUSARPAC ARP 1459 DTG 180127Z Feb 1964 (C)  
2. CINCUSARPAC ARP 5964 DTG 010206Z May 1964 (C)  
3. COMUSMAC THAI USMAC L&A 72469 DTG 100735Z Mar 1964 (C)  
4. COMUSMAC THAI ltr JTJ4 Subj; Revised Construction Schedule, Bangkok By-Pass Road, 9 Apr 1964 (C)
CINCPAC, other commanders, and supply agencies took constant actions in 1964 to provide the POL, road and bridge materials, and heavy equipment necessary to prevent further slippage of the By-Pass Road completion date. One of the most tenacious problems was that of non-delivery of approximately 560,000 gallons of asphalt due to fraud by the asphalt contractor, Periphon Company Limited of Bangkok. The 9th Logistical Command entered into a contract with Periphon Company in 1962 for purchase of 1,250,000 gallons of asphalt at a cost of $190,625. All except about 560,000 gallons were delivered, but in June 1963 the contractor received payment for the still undelivered portion of asphalt. Because of an unsatisfied loan the contractor had obtained from the Thai Development Bank, the bank obtained a hold against the undelivered asphalt at the Port of Bangkok. Extensive U.S. efforts throughout 1964 failed to get Periphon Company to pay the loan so the asphalt was still being held at the end of the year. It was estimated that, if the undelivered asphalt was not available or replaced by 1 March 1965, completion of the road would again be delayed.

COMUSMACTHAI considered it important that construction not be stopped when the road was completed to Kabinburi but that plans should be made to continue the road on to Korat. He felt this was important because of the requirement to move at least 5000 short tons per day to northeast and eastern deployment areas under planned military contingency operations. The existing route from Kabinburi to Saraburi (See Figure IV-18) would support only about 3,000 short tons and, although that route could be improved, the greater advantage would be gained by extending the By-Pass Road to Korat.

In December Chief JUSMAG Thailand requested CINCPAC's approval to proceed with planning for the second part of the road under one of two alternatives. The first alternative was to try to complete the road as a SEATO project utilizing a composite engineer battalion made up of U.S., Thai, and Commonwealth forces. These

1. DEPCOMUSMACTHAI 140910Z Dec 1964 (C)
2. JUSMAG Study: Force Objectives for Royal Thai Forces, Nov 1964 (S)
forces would be under the control of the 44th Engineer Group as part of the 9th Logistical Command. The second alternative was to proceed bilaterally, with Thai engineers assisting the 44th Engineer Group, which would be in a position to provide some effort on an incremental basis beginning in May 1965 and would increase its tempo as the road neared completion. Either alternative would require delaying the departure of the 809th Engineer Battalion from Thailand. Chief JUSMAG Thailand recommended that the road from Kabinburi to Korat be an all weather laterite road, material for which he estimated would cost somewhere between $155,000 and $1.8 million depending upon the type of construction.\(^1\) CINCPAC concurred in the need for the road construction and placed it on an integrated priority list of construction requirements for Southeast Asia. CINCPAC felt that Chief JUSMAG Thailand had grossly underestimated the cost of the extended road and estimated the project cost at $2,744,000. The project was placed on CINCPAC's priority list as number 30 of 32 projects.\(^2\)

CINCPAC thought that the alternative of completing the road as a SEATO project had merit but wanted to see the funding outlook of the projects on his priority list of construction for Southeast Asia before undertaking discussion with the Thai as to the extent of their contribution.\(^3\)

Prepositioning Aviation Fuels

In 1963 CINCPAC initiated action to preposition aviation fuels in newly constructed MAP tankage at Korat, Takhli, Udorn, and Ubon.\(^4\) The fuels, consisting of approximately 177 thousand barrels of JP-4 and 65 thousand barrels of AVGAS 115/145, were in place by May 1964. The result was a threefold increase in aviation fuel pre-stocks at up-country air bases in Thailand.

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1. CHJUSMAG Thailand 220645Z Dec 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 200028Z Dec 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 242322Z Dec 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 255
Thailand POL Pipeline

In March the Director of Pacific Docks informed CINCPAC that the architectural and engineering study for the Siracha-Don Muang leg of the SLAT invasion pipeline, requested by CINCPAC in 1963, had been completed.\(^1\),\(^2\) The contingency pipeline, if needed, would originate at Siracha and proceed, by-passing Bangkok, via Don Muang and Sara Buri to Korat. (S)

Based on the architectural and engineering study of the Siracha-Don Muang leg, CINCUSARPAC developed a list of add-on materials for the leg valued at $49,793. CINCPAC requested and received authority from OASD/ISA to utilize this amount from surplus architectural and engineering funds.\(^3\),\(^4\) (S)

MACTHAI Personnel Augmentation

The Exercise and Plans (E&P) Division, U.S. MACTHAI was activated in December 1962 to perform missions pertaining to contingency planning, SEATO exercises, and procurement and distribution of POL products. The original JTD of the E&P Division provided for 17 officers and 10 enlisted men. As the result of a June 1963 CINCPAC Manpower Survey the E&P Division was reduced by two planning officers, leaving 15 officers and 10 enlisted men. The Chief E&P Division, in May 1964, gave a Fact Sheet to a CINCPAC representative, proposing a JTD of 18 officers and 14 enlisted men. This paper cited long hours of work by the members of the E&P Division and an inability to properly accomplish its work without more people.\(^5\),\(^6\)

In August COMUSMACV sent a message to CINCPAC requesting an augmentation to MACTHAI headquarters of 71 personnel which he

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1. DIRPACDOCKS ltr 1164, 25 Mar 1964 (U)
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 257
3. CINCUSARPAC ARP 6486 DTG 082344Z May 1964 (C)
4. CINCPAC 160151Z May 1964 (C)
5. OSD DEF 972693 DTG 092345Z Jun 64
6. U.S. MACTHAI Fact Sheet, E&P Division Personnel Status, 27 May 1964 (C) - Filed in CINCPAC J046
stated would be adequate to accomplish assigned tasks as follows:

1. Controlling rapidly deploying forces in event of implementation of contingency plans.
2. Planning and executing SEATO Exercises.
3. Developing U.S. Phase II plans for Thailand and Laos, to include Unconventional Warfare planning.
4. Developing SEATO plans for Thailand and Laos.
5. Participating in U.S. /Thai bilateral planning.

CINCPAC noted that participation in U.S. /Thai bilateral planning appeared to be the only new task assigned to COMUSMACTHAI. It was also noted that Unconventional Warfare planning had been assigned to COMUSMACV and not COMUSMACTHAI. CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV that item 1 above was a task which COMUSMACTHAI was only to be prepared to execute. Since forces had not been deployed and assigned to require control by COMUSMACTHAI under any OPLAN, CINCPAC did not feel justified in augmenting the COMUSMACTHAI Staff on this basis. In this connection, CINCPAC stated that COMUSMACTHAI OPLAN 32, Phase II, contained detailed requirements for personnel augmentation which could be filled from PACOM resources when the plan was implemented. COMUSMACTHAI OPLAN 37 did not contain these detailed personnel requirements but CINCPAC felt that they were a desirable inclusion. In conclusion, CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to justify additional personnel spaces for COMUSMACTHAI participation in bilateral planning and to submit justification for Unconventional Warfare planning augmentation.

COMUSMACV and Deputy COMUSMACTHAI urged that Unconventional Warfare spaces (Seven officers and four enlisted men) be approved immediately for augmentation of the COMUSMACTHAI Staff.

1. COMUSMACV 8398 DTG 200433Z Aug 1964 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 052250Z Aug 1964 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 021040Z Dec 1964 (TS)
4. COMUSMACV MAC J5 10266 DTG 270355Z Sep 1964 (TS)
5. DEP COMUSMACTHAI USMACT E&P 000904-64 DTG 270409Z Sep 1964 (TS)
Their justification was that timely augmentation was essential to take advantage of bilateral planning with Thailand, which was proceeding in heartening fashion. Detailed Unconventional Warfare planning, however, had not been possible because qualified Unconventional Warfare planners were not available. COMUSMACV stated that his Unconventional Warfare planning (accomplished by a Study and Observation Group) was oriented toward North Vietnam and that COMUSMACHTHAI headquarters should accomplish this type planning for Thailand and Laos. He proposed two additional Unconventional Warfare planners for his COMUSMACV staff to coordinate and integrate the activities of the two planning groups.

CINCPAC recommended that the JCS approve 10 of the 11 spaces requested by COMUSMACV. CINCPAC considered that Unconventional Warfare could provide valuable support to U.S./Allied operations in defense of Southeast Asia. To provide this support at the earliest time possible it was essential that detailed Unconventional Warfare Task Force plans be quickly completed.

CINCPAC felt also that Burma should be added to the COMUSMACHTHAI planning responsibility, along with Thailand and Laos. The JCS approved the 10 spaces and directed that they be added to the FY64 U.S. MACTHAI JTD. The Unconventional Warfare Plans Branch also received a plans officer slot from the Chief JUSMAG Thailand JTD; this gave the branch a strength of 11 persons.

COMUSMACV gave detailed justification for an additional four officers and eight enlisted men to be added to the COMUSMACHTHAI E&P Division JTD. These were in addition to Unconventional Warfare requirements and were requested to perform bilateral planning and previously assigned tasks. These spaces, along with the 10 spaces previously approved by the JCS and the space transferred from the JUSMAG JTD, were incorporated by CINCPAC into a proposed U.S. MACTHAI FY65 Joint Manpower Program.

1. CINCPAC 230002Z Oct 1964 (TS)
2. JCS 112331Z Dec 1964 (C)
3. COMUSMACV MAC J5 10568 DTG 022305Z Oct 1964 (S)
Manpower Program provided for a total of 50 billets. This represented an increase of 23 spaces above the 1 July 1964 JTD.\textsuperscript{1}

At the end of 1964 the JCS had not yet acted on the proposed COMUSMACTHAI FY65 Joint Manpower Program.

**Communication Activities in Thailand**

As in Vietnam, an AID sponsored microwave/cable telephone system became operational in mid-1964. This system was titled Telephone Organization Thailand (TOT). In Thailand, TOT circuits for U.S. Military use were leased in September and CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS a proposal for contingency use of additional circuits.\textsuperscript{2} This proposal was approved by the JCS and forwarded to DOD for action.\textsuperscript{3} The inadequate capacity of the basic system in Thailand presented a problem and, to meet a portion of U.S. contingency needs, a project for channel expansion was required.\textsuperscript{3}

In October 1963, CINCPAC directed upgrading actions for CE Base Thailand Communications in an attempt to provide a workable backbone trunking system.\textsuperscript{4} CINCPAC's directive also clearly defined DEPCOMUSMACTHAI coordinating responsibilities, and required him to identify trunking requirements and to manage the system. System upgrading, however, was beset by a multitude of problems. Among these were late delivery of equipment, lack of spare parts support, and critical shortages of power supply units.\textsuperscript{3}

It became apparent in early 1964 that Thailand communications would not be able to support SEATO exercise AIR BOON CHOO in April. Looking toward meeting USAF communication requirements for AIR BOON CHOO, PACAF units started unilateral actions to provide the necessary communications in Thailand. By leasing 24 channels in TOT (which was still in test stage) and by deploying a

\textsuperscript{1} CINCPAC 5320 ser 001746, subj: Proposed 1 July 1965 JMP for U.S. MACTHAI, 18 Nov 1964 (S)
\textsuperscript{2} CINCPAC 082228Z Aug 1964 (S)
\textsuperscript{3} JCS 222/813, 8 Oct 1964 (S)
\textsuperscript{4} ADMINO CINCPAC 230242Z Oct 1963 (U)
major portion of available theater mobile/transportable communications assets, a workable trunking system was established. Equipment for this system required 55 airlift missions, over three months of intensive planning and site surveys, and diversion of radio relay and Inter-Sideband equipment from CONUS. Communication support for the exercise was judged excellent.\(^1\) (See SEATO Exercises, Chapter III).

A fresh attempt was made by CINCPAC, beginning in June, to upgrade CE Base Thailand.\(^2\) This effort included an effective interconnection of Thai and U.S. military communication systems, a technical control facility at Korat, and tasking clarification. A 60 day upgrading program was directed.\(^3\) A Joint Wideband Circuit Allocation and Requirements Group, Thailand (JOCARG) was formed to consider upgrading problems. It met in July under the direction of the DEPCOMUSMACTHAI J-6. This group provided a much needed forum for discussion of Southeast Asia, as well as Thailand, CE problems and initiated a number of recommendations.

Establishment of an Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) at Udorn in late July and aircraft deployments in connection with the Gulf of Tonkin incidents imposed a number of urgent circuit requirements on the CE system before interim upgrading actions were completed.\(^4\) The CE Base had difficulty in responding to these requirements.\(^5\) A major stumbling block was the lack of skilled and experienced personnel to solve the problems encountered. Interface problems encountered in integrating various types of tactical tropo-scatter and radio relay equipment accounted for many service problems, particularly with teletype communications. Additional U.S. personnel and equipment were deployed to Thailand to help alleviate the situation and to improve the communications service.

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1. Chapter III, SEATO Exercises  
2. CINCPAC 130324Z Jun 1964 (C)  
3. CINCPAC 280145Z Jun 1964 (C)  
4. RVN section, this chapter  
5. CINCPAC 150307Z Jun 1964 (C)
At the second JOCARG meeting, held in September, a new approach to providing adequate communications was discussed. This approach was based on premises as follows:

1. Southeast Asia should be treated as an entity and an integrated communications system should be provided.

2. Role of AID and MAP sponsored telecommunications projects was supplementary to a U.S. owned and operated backbone system.

3. Tactical troposscatter equipment did not meet backbone trunking criteria and needed to be replaced by fixed plant with good diversity systems.

4. Backbone system capacity should be adequate to meet SEATO, U.S., and national military long haul trunking requirements within Southeast Asia.

5. A reasonable degree of redundancy should be built into the backbone system to provide flexibility.

As a result of JOCARG discussions and inputs from COMUSMACV and DEPCOMUSMACTHAI, CINCPAC submitted a request to JCS for an urgent 12-20 million dollar program to upgrade the CE Base in Southeast Asia. This program was to utilize Troposscatter project equipment, programmed for Indonesia, which was being diverted to Thailand, and include United States Army Strategic Communications Command (USASCC) and COMUSMACV schemes. The ultimate trunking system recommended by CINCPAC is shown in figure IV-20. (C)

Interim upgrading actions were pursued and a major advance was made when the reconfigured Bangkok-Korat-Ubon Troposscatter was brought into service in October. Failure of the direct path communications from Bangkok to Saigon prompted a revised approach.

1. CINCPAC 030501Z Oct 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 110407Z Jul 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC 292145Z Aug 1964 (C)
4. COMUSMACV MAC J6 9832 DTG 180219Z Sep 1964 (S)
5. USASCC 9382 DTG 251254Z Oct 1964 (U)
CE BASE THAILAND TRUNK CAPACITY & LOADING AS OF 1 NOV 64

Legend:

- Trunk
  - Philco Tropo
  - TOT System - cktls leased
  - AN/TRC-90
  - AN/MRC-80
  - AN/TRC-24

CAPACITY (Voice) Teletype REQUIREMENTS (Voice) TTY

Note: TTY capacity is that listed for built in TTY MUX and is not usable without regeneration over more than one hop.
and, after evaluating several courses of action, a reconfiguration to interconnect with the Backporch system at Ubon was decided upon by CINCPAC.\textsuperscript{1,2,3,4} By providing heavy troposscatter trunking between Bangkok, Korat, and Ubon, this reconfigured system, interconnecting with the Backporch system, improved Bangkok to Saigon communications. Figure IV-19 shows CE Base trunking and trunk capacities as of 1 November 1964. (C)

**Thailand AC\&W System**

At the beginning of 1964 the Thailand Aircraft Control and Warning System (AC\&W) consisted of four obsolete MAP provided AN/TPS-ID/10D radars. This system, known to be quite limited, was backed up by two U.S. Air Force owned and operated mobile radars at Don Muang (MPS-11/16) and Ubon (MPS-11/14).\textsuperscript{5}

An ultimate AC\&W system consisting of four radar sites employing the FPS 20/6 Heavy Radar and six radar sites employing the AN/TPS-ID/10D light radar was planned in the Thailand Military Assistance Program. A site at Green Hill, in southern Thailand, was scheduled to be operational in mid-1964 and a site at Chiang Mai was to be operational in December 1965; in between, sites at Udorn and Ubon were to be completed. The RTAF decided to defer the cost of their construction of light weight sites and to utilize the AN/TPS ID/10D radar sets already on hand for this purpose.

Although enthusiastic about air defense in general, the RTG was reluctant to provide RTAF with sufficient funds to operate and maintain the programmed FPS 20/6 Heavy Radar Complex. The Thai were deficient in AC\&W training, maintenance, and operations.

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1. CINCPAC 110210Z Feb 1964 (C)
2. DA 958838 DTG 100016Z Mar 1964 (C)
3. CINCPAC 182117Z Mar 1964 (C)
4. ADMI NO CINCPAC 242034Z Apr 1964 (C)
5. CHJUSMAG THAI 5984 DTG 060911Z Jul 1964 (S)
Despite a Royal Thai Government desire to have and maintain the four new sites, they were not expected to have sufficient trained personnel to operate all the sites by the time the last one was completed. Because of the doubt concerning the Thai ability to support fully the new radar sites, the American Embassy asked the State Department for clarification as to the extent of U.S. interest in the AC&W system in Thailand, with or without full Thai support. CINCPAC fielded this question and stated that it was highly desirable that all of the four sites become operational and that the Thai operate the sites as previously agreed. CINCPAC pointed out that it was planned to move the USAF Mobile Radar at Don Muang out of Thailand when the Green Hill site became operational and the USAF radar at Ubon would be moved when the Thai site at Ubon was operational. At any rate, there were no plans to retain the USAF radars in-country beyond June 1965 or to place additional U.S. radars in Thailand unless OPLANs were implemented. CINCPAC recommended to the Embassy that the Thai be advised that the U.S. planned to cease operation of the radar at Don Muang when the Green Hill site became operational and that the funds for the Chiang Mai and Ubon installations would have to be dropped from the Thailand MAP if the Thai were unwilling to give support.

Subsequent to receiving CINCPAC comments Ambassador Martin explained to Thailand Deputy Minister of Defense Dawee that the time had arrived when a decision would have to be made on whether or not to proceed with the AC&W sites at Chiang Mai and Ubon. The Ambassador noted that there appeared to be some uncertainty as to whether the Royal Thailand Air Force would be in a position to assume the responsibility for maintaining and operating these sites. Marshal Dawee stressed the importance of full radar coverage for Thailand and urged that the U.S. proceed as scheduled for all four sites. He mentioned that a budget, which would ensure maintenance and operation

1. DEPCOMUSMACTHAI 77016 50242 DTG 201330Z Mar 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 112342Z Mar 1964 (S)
3. BANGKOK 1601 to STATE, 20 Mar, 4PM 1964 (S)
of all sites, was under consideration by the Thailand government and that he felt certain the needed funds for operation and maintenance would be approved. A memorandum containing Dawee's assurances was later approved by Prime Minister Thanom and Dawee's Deputy confirmed that this approval meant the Thai would keep their part of the bargain. On the basis of the foregoing, the Ambassador recommended that the AC&W projects proceed as planned.

On the strength of Dawee's assurances of support, Chief JUSMAG Thailand recommended to CINCPAC that the first three sites (Green Hill, Udorn, and Ubon) be continued and that the operational date of Chiang Mai be slipped to December 1966. CINCPAC froze further expenditures for design and/or construction of Ubon and Chiang Mai AC&W sites until a more definite indication of Thai support of these sites could be acquired from the Thailand government.¹

In mid-May Chief JUSMAG Thailand informed CINCPAC that the RTAF had not received the 19.7 million baht which had been requested from the Thai government for the new radar system.² Remarks made by General Praphat in a July letter to the U.S. Secretary of Defense (See General Praphat's Letter to Secretary of Defense, this Chapter) indicated that the Thai government did not intend to fund and man the radar complex. CINCPAC interpreted General Praphat's remarks as a request for the U.S. to man and support all four AC&W sites. This was a complete reversal of the Thai position of March when Dawee had assured Ambassador Martin that operation and maintenance costs for the AC&W sites would be funded.

CINCPAC cited a requirement to OASD/ISA for the four site AC&W complex in support of SEATO contingency plans in Southeast Asia. He proposed that equipment for Chiang Mai and Ubon be bought and held in CONUS. CINCPAC recommended to OASD that the Thai be

¹ CINCPAC 132346 Z May 1964 (S)
² CHJUSMAG Thailand 150944 Z May 1964 (S)
approached at their highest governmental level and urged to support the sites in accordance with their original agreement. In the event that the Thailand government would clearly not man and support all four sites, the first fall back position recommended by CINCPAC was that the Thai man and support Green Hill and Udorn, assisted by U.S. technical and supervisory personnel, and that the U.S. initially man and support the sites at Ubon and Chiang Mai until the Royal Thailand Air Force could take over.


A draft national policy paper on Thailand was prepared in 1964 by an interagency working group which included representatives of Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, and the Treasury, and from AID, CIA, USIA, and the Bureau of the Budget. This paper constituted a comprehensive analysis of the political and military situation in Thailand, its relationship with the U.S. and other countries, and the U.S. strategy for strengthening the Thai capability for defense against both internal and external threats from communism.

CINCPAC, asked to comment, stated that the general tone of the document reflected current U.S. policy with regard to Thailand. Later, CINCPAC provided input information for revising the national policy paper. This consisted of a statement of the communist threat to Thailand, a statement of what the Thai could be expected to do to improve their forces, and what would be left for the U.S. to do; and an analysis of the alternative of providing Thailand a three or four year MAP package based on bilateral planning for the defense of Thailand and the Mekong River Valley. The communist threat statement provided by CINCPAC was that contained in the FY65-70 MAP submission. CINCPAC mentioned a number of things the Thai could be expected to do to improve their forces, including better joint

1. CINCPAC 180138Z Aug 1964 (S)
2. CINCPAC 152307Z Aug 1964 (S)
3. CINCPAC intr ser 001251 of 17 Aug 1964 (S)
operations resulting from issuance of the first Thai Joint Training Directive, up-country deployments such as four reinforced infantry companies and four tank companies in north and northeast Thailand, and activation and deployment of five Special Operations Centers. While these actions were not significant by U.S. standards, they represented sizeable advancements for the Thai. As for what would remain for the U.S. to do; the U.S. would have to continue putting up the tab for almost everything. CINCPAC did not think a MAP package based on the upcoming bilateral planning would in itself produce a more effective force. Bilateral planning, as an initial step, was to consider only the threat of communist aggression from Laos. This excluded the internal threat and that from the DRV and Chinese Communists. CINCPAC felt the key to providing more effective Thai forces was getting the Thai to implement U.S. suggestions for improvements such as up-country deployments, increased force levels, and expanded field training.

At the end of 1964 the National Policy Paper on Thailand was still in draft form and attempts were being made to expedite the inclusion of a force objectives study.1,2 OSD hoped that the paper, when completed, would provide a basis for firm estimates of resources required to carry out essential U.S. objectives in Thailand.3

Coordination of RDT&E and Combat Developments Activities in Thailand

In November 1963 Chief JUSMAG Thailand complained to CINCPAC that Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) projects in Thailand were not being properly coordinated with him by the OSD/ARPA Field Unit in Bangkok as required by the Memorandum for Implementation of RDT&E in the PACOM area. CINCPAC subsequently spoke with the Director of Project AGILE (code name of the

1. OSD 003288 DTG 292210Z Dec 1964 (S)
2. CHJUSMAG THAI 020940Z Nov 1964 (C)
3. OSD 8858 DTG 191357Z Sep 1964 (C)
program for research and development in Remote Area Conflict) who agreed to take remedial action.  

In December 1963, however, Chief JUSMAG Thailand again informed CINCPAC that he was unhappy with the RDT&E effort in Thailand. Resources were frequently allocated before JUSMAG concurrence had been obtained. Several projects had been continued after non-concurrence by Chief JUSMAG Thailand without notification of his being over-ruled by higher authority, and project documentation was unsatisfactory. Chief JUSMAG Thailand recommended that the U.S. R&D program for Thailand be reviewed to ensure consistency with other foreign assistance policies and programs such as MAP and AID.  

As a solution to the problems stated by Chief JUSMAG Thailand, CINCPAC developed proposed terms of reference for the Research and Test Activity, Thailand which would align the RDT&E activities in Thailand under Chief JUSMAG Thailand in a manner similar to the Joint Research and Test Activity (JRATA) in Vietnam. (See Command Relationships for RDT&E and Combat Developments in South Vietnam, this Chapter).

In May 1964 CINCPAC solicited Component Commanders', COMUSMACV'S, and Chief JUSMAG Thailand's opinions of his proposed reorganization of RDT&E activities in Thailand. Component Commanders generally concurred with the CINCPAC proposal but Chief JUSMAG Thailand felt that substantial progress in coordination of activities had been made in the six months which had intervened since his last complaint. Chief JUSMAG Thailand and COMUSMACV

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1963, p. 256
2. CHJUSMAG ltr 02913-63, Subj: Nomenclature Applied to CDTC Activities, 12 Dec 1963 (C)
3. CINCPAC ltr 3900 ser 0346, Subj: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation and Combat Development Activities in Thailand, 5 May 1964 (C)
4. CHJUSMAG Thailand 130503Z Jun 1964 (C)
felt that the reorganization should not take place, therefore CINCPAC dropped further consideration of it.  

Thailand Authorization for General Purpose Vehicles

In late 1963 Chief JUSMAG Thailand asked CINCPAC to increase Thailand's authorization for general purpose vehicles (GPV) to permit retention in-country of vehicles in excess of current authorization. The current authorization of 18,400 vehicles was based on assigned strength in Thai military units. Chief JUSMAG Thailand asked that the authorization be increased to 25,061 and justified his request on the basis that the existing general purpose vehicle equivalent authorizations did not provide sufficient vehicles to meet requirements which would be generated in the event of an external attack on Thailand.  

CINCPAC disapproved the proposed increase of vehicles because of the low manning level of Thai military units, and because of marginal utilization and maintenance of in-country vehicles. CINCPAC did, however, authorize 5,000 Offshore Procurement-Japan vehicles, that were in Thailand and which were excess to authorizations, to be maintained in the current inventory and to receive spare parts programming support. No MAP support of World War II vehicles was authorized nor would replacement vehicles for the current inventory be approved for MAP until the overall total of vehicles had been reduced to the authorized level.

SLAT Locomotives

In 1962 when CINCPAC proposed the logistic concept which came to be known as Special Logistic Actions Thailand (SLAT), it was decided to furnish the Thailand government 10 locomotives and 100 POL tank cars. Subsequently, 10 Plymouth locomotives were formally accepted by the Thai in 1963 but operational tests proved that they were

1. COMUSMACV 5877 DTG 090657 Z Jul 1964 (C)
2. CHJUSMAG Thailand ltr JTAP, 27 Dec 1963 (S)
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 00228, 17 Feb 1964 (S)
4. CINCPAC Command History, 1962, p. 223
not capable of giving satisfactory performance. The main factors contributing to poor performance were:

1. Insufficient horsepower.
2. Incorrect gear reduction.
3. Incorrect marriage of engine, transmission and locomotive weight.
4. Severe shock in locomotive when transmission was shifted.
5. Insufficient air compressor capacity.

Modifications were made to prevent overheating but resulted in only a marginal solution.

Because the locomotives were constantly breaking down, and with no prospect of doing better, the Army Materiel Command recommended to Department of the Army, and Chief JUSMAG Thailand recommended to CINCPAC, that they be replaced.\(^1\) CINCPAC concurred in this recommendation to OSD.

OSD raised questions as to the need for replacement in kind of the SLAT locomotives and whether or not the locomotives had been furnished to fill the gap pending Thai procurement of locomotives.\(^2\) (The Thai in September 1963 had 298 wood burning locomotives and had since purchased 67 diesels). CINCPAC queried the Thailand Country Team on these points and was informed that the agreement to provide the locomotives stated that their purpose was "to improve ability of railroad system to provide logistic support of the U.S. and other SEATO forces in the event of commitment of such forces in defense of Thailand." Under the agreement the Thai were to maintain the equipment and ensure its availability for support of contingency operations of U.S. and other SEATO forces. The arrangement was thus clearly in the interest of U.S. contingency plans, and benefit to the Thai was a secondary consideration.\(^3\)

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1. JUSMAG Thailand Fact Sheet, subj: SLAT Locomotives, 3 Sep 1964 (U)
2. OSD DEF 8885 DTG 211724Z Sep 1964 (C)
3. CHJUSMAG Thailand 300435Z Sep 1964 (C)
CINCPAC again asked OSD to withdraw and replace the locomotives.\textsuperscript{1} Replacement became more urgent in December when it was learned that plans were being made by the Thai to invest considerable funds in spare parts for the Plymouth locomotives.\textsuperscript{2} OASD/ISA then directed Department of the Army to replace the Plymouth locomotives with 10 others which would meet CINCPAC's requirements.\textsuperscript{3} Replacement was to be paid for by MAP but at the end of the year CINCPAC was not sure whether funds would come from the existing PACOM MAP or other MAP sources.

The U.S. planned to negotiate with the Thai to have title to the Plymouth locomotives returned to the U.S. The U.S. then hoped to sell these engines to the Thailand government as foreign excess.

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1. CINCPAC 121110Z Oct 1964 (C)
2. CINCPAC 092102Z Dec 1964 (C)
3. DA 3118402Z Dec 1964 (C)
APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN CONNECTION WITH
THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
1 January 1964 - 31 December 1964

6 Jan  GVN decreed a three-man military command over the armed
forces and government. They were Major General Duong Van
Minh (Chief of State), Major General Tran Van Don, and Major
General Le Van Kim.

9 Jan  RVN Premier Nguyen Ngoc Tho introduced government reform
program which included reorganization of the armed forces,
more rational use of strategic hamlets, improvement to the
judiciary system, reformation of public services and the
economy, and better relations with neighboring states.

13 Jan The Secretary of Defense advised that in order to assist
COMUSMACV, a decision was made to provide him with a Deputy
Commander. Lieutenant General William C. Westmoreland was
designated to fill the position.

14 Jan Announcement of the assignment of the following Generals to
the staff of COMUSMACV: Lieutenant General Westmoreland;
Brigadier General Sternberg; Brigadier General Youngdale.

28 Jan  GVN proclaimed amnesty for 2,418 political prisoners,
imprisoned under the Diem regime.

29 Jan  CINCPAC informed OSD/ISA that 70 deep well drilling
personnel were available in PACOM to support AID's project
of developing water sources in the RVN.

30 Jan MILITARY COUP. Major General Nguyen Khanh ousted
government of Major General Duong Van Minh from power.
Generals Le Van Kim, Tran Van Don, Mai Huu Xuan and
Ton That Dinh were arrested; the first three were charged
with collaborating with French agents to force a neutral
solution on the country, the fourth with committing abuses
under the Diem regime.

1 Feb  President Johnson in a press conference answered President
de Gaulle's proposal of neutralism: "If we could have
neutralization of both North Vietnam and South Vietnam, I
am sure that would be considered sympathetically, but I
see no indication of that at the moment."

4 Feb  1,000 students staged a demonstration in Saigon for inclusion
of Major General Duong Van Minh in the new government.

8 Feb  CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV to increase protective
measures of SVN Railways by aircraft escort and to gather
data on results for future analysis of correlation between
harassment and escort.

Page 428 of 495 Pages
8 Feb  Khanh announced formation of a new government with himself as Premier.

11 Feb  JCS decided to implement CINCPAC's plan (May 63) for consolidating all RDT&E, Combat Developments and related activities in RVN in a single activity under COMUSMACV. Control in RVN was passed to Joint Research and Test Activity (JRATA).

19 Feb  Senator Mansfield urged U.S. Government to revise its policy toward the Republic of Vietnam and encourage French efforts to negotiate with Communist China for a "neutral" settlement in SEAsia.

20 Feb  VNAF Commander felt the VNAF currently needed one more squadron of AD-6 aircraft and that within a year, the VNAF should begin working with jets.

21 Feb  President Johnson warned the North Vietnamese that they were playing a "deeply dangerous game."

COMUSMACV (General Harkins) recommended organization concepts for the U.S. country team in the Republic of Vietnam. He recommended that all agencies come under the command of COMUSMACV and that the Ambassador or Senior State Department Representative function in the capacity of POLAD to COMUSMACV.

24 Feb  JCS requested CINCPAC's comments as to the feasibility of a naval blockade of NVN.

28 Feb  CINCPAC replied to the 24 Feb JCS query, stating that a naval blockade of NVN was feasible.

29 Feb  CINCPAC directed PACAF to prepare plans for movement of B-57 squadrons from Japan to the Republic of Vietnam via Okinawa. CINCPAC also directed COMUSMACV to develop plans for basing these aircraft in the Republic of Vietnam.

1 Mar  PACAF listed some SIOP facts for CINCPAC to consider in view of the movement of one or two B-57 squadrons to the Republic of Vietnam.

3 Mar  UN's U Thant declared that UN could not play an effective role in restoring peace in South Vietnam because the Vietnam conflict was a "cold war" matter.

8-12 Mar  The Secretary of Defense, Director Central Intelligence Agency, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in Saigon to evaluate the new government's war effort against the Viet Cong.

10 Mar  CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to be prepared to deploy two Navy A-1H pilots to the Republic of Vietnam to assist mine laying training team and do a flying job with VNAF A-1H pilots in connection with OPLAN 34A. Also directed CINCPACFLT be prepared to conduct the mine laying operation.
10 Mar  Secretary of Defense issued memorandum on Official
Travel to Vietnam and Thailand in which he stated, "Planned
visits to these countries will be screened carefully and
limited to trips that are clearly essential."

Secretary of Defense made decision that the Chief of Staff,
United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam would
be a ground officer. Major General Stilwell, USA was
approved to fill the position upon departure of the incumbent.

COMUSMACV asked CINCPAC that he be delegated authority
to award the Legion of Merit and all decorations of lower
precedence to all service members of his command.

11 Mar  While in Saigon the Secretary of Defense directed that VNAF
T-28s and B-26s be replaced by a third A-1H squadron.

12 Mar  COMUSMACV recommended a concept for MACV to assume
all functions of the MAAG Vietnam. Secretary of Defense
interest in reorganizing MACV had prompted the proposal.

12-14 Mar  CHMAAG Vietnam Representatives at CINCPAC for review
of FY65-70 MAP.

15 Mar  The first group of PACOM personnel arrived in the RVN to
drill deep water wells for an AID project.

17 Mar  White House issued statement that additional economic and
military aid to South Vietnam was being made available.

18 Mar  JCS directed CINCPAC to consolidate, into one or more
plans the actions contemplated by CINCPAC OPLANS 33,
34A, and 99 (in support of the Republic of Vietnam). The
objective was to enable higher authority to vary the sequence
in which the actions were implemented. Planning was to
be aligned with the following categories: a. Border con-
trol actions; b. Retaliatory actions; c. Graduated overt
military pressures.

Khanh announced the Republic of Vietnam was re-estab-
lishing diplomatic relations with Laos and was dispatching
an 11-man delegation to Cambodia to resolve outstanding
border issues.

19 Mar  CINCPAC commenced development of OPLAN 37-64 which
contained military actions to stabilize the situation in RVN.

20 Mar  CINCPAC disapproved 3 VIP trips to the Republic of Viet-
nam and requested that the Component Commanders per-
sonally examine requests for visits and approve only those
which would make a direct contribution to the efforts of
COMUSMACV.

22 Mar  The 53-member Military Council gave unanimous vote of
confidence to Khanh.

25 Mar  JCS reported that the delivery of 28 A-1E aircraft to RVN
would be made between 20 May and 23 July.
26 Mar The Secretary of Defense in a policy speech at Washington emphatically rejected "withdrawal" or "neutralization" in the war against the Viet Cong.

28-30 CINCPAC urged CSAF and PACAF to insure there was no curtailment of postal service in Vietnam.

30 Mar GVN launched training program for young army officers. Instruction concerned means of bringing effective government to the people of the villages.

1 Apr CINCPAC advised MACV that JCS had his reorganization problem under consideration and, pending a decision, MACV should continue to eliminate duplication without undertaking a massive reorganization.

5 Apr Deputy Premier Do Mau announced additional government reforms: conscription on the provincial and local level to increase the armed forces by 50,000; establishment of a civil defense corps; dissolution of the Council of Notables; a new constitution; and the holding of elections for a National Assembly.

8-10 Heavy Viet Cong attacks in the northern Mekong Delta area.

10 Apr JCS approved reorganization of MACV.

11 Apr Pacific Mobile Depot Activity team completed the Monkey Mountain AC&W site, after the contractor in February announced he could not complete the installation by 5 March.

16 Apr Prime Minister Keith J. Holyoake of New Zealand and British Minister Without Portfolio Lord Carrington arrived in Saigon and stated their respective country's support for Premier Khanh and his country's struggle against the VC. In addition, both discussed the possibility of providing more technical assistance to South Vietnam.

17-19 Secretary of State Rusk in Saigon.

21 Apr JCS approved CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 subject to minor changes.

22 Apr Ngo Dinh Can, brother of former President Ngo Dinh Diem was sentenced to death by a revolutionary tribunal, despite clemency appeals by the U.S. and various Catholic and Buddhist leaders.
23 Apr  President Johnson requested that "other nations" besides the U.S. help South Vietnam in the war against the VC.

24 Apr  CINCPAC was informed by JCS that action was being taken in an effort to provide FARM GATE with two squadrons of 25 A-1E aircraft as recommended by CINCPAC.

25 Apr  President Johnson announced that Lieutenant General William C. Westmoreland would replace General Paul D. Harkins as head of the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam.

29 Apr  A USN Training Unit (VA 152) consisting of 23 officers and 150 enlisted arrived in Vietnam for 179 days TDY to train VNAF personnel of the third VNAF A-1H squadron (516th) in operation and maintenance of the A-1H. On the following day twenty-six A-1H aircraft were delivered to Vietnam.

2 May  COMUSMACV reported to CINCPAC that an explosion occurred aboard the aircraft ferry USNS CARD while docked in Saigon Harbor. Determined to be sabotage.

5 May  CINCPAC was authorized to initiate joint planning in the conduct of cross-border operations. Concept was to include infiltration, exfiltration, and aerial resupply with unmarked VNAF aircraft.

10 May  Second increment of nine A-1 aircraft from USS MIDWAY arrived Bien Hoa.

12 May  Secretary Rusk requested NATO members to give greater political and economic support to South Vietnam. At the same time, the U.S. requested Japan, Australia, Nationalist China and Thailand to supply economic and technical assistance to South Vietnam.

14 May  The Secretary of Defense, in a visit to RVN, expressed doubt that the talents of GVN and U.S. mission had been concentrated on marshalling, integrating, and applying civil and military resources to pacification.

15 May  CINCPAC commented to OSD in regard to a COMUSMACV shopping list of items required in addition to the $143 million FY65 RVN MAP. CINCPAC concurred with the list except for boats to equip an additional River Assault Group, additional junks, radios, and 105mm howitzers. OSD directed CINCPAC to prepare a $55 million add-on to the FY65 RVN MAP.

MAAG Vietnam was disestablished and COMUSMACV assumed all its missions and functions. The reorganization had been approved by the JCS on 10 April although CINCPAC did not concur.

16 May  The Secretary of Defense directed that a plan be developed to expand VNAF A-1H pilot training to provide a 2 for 1 pilot/plane ratio for a tentative strength of 150 A-1Hs.

17 May  USS KITTY HAWK was diverted to a point off Vietnam.
18 May President Johnson (in a special message to Congress) requested $125 million in additional economic and military aid to South Vietnam; $70 million for economic aid and $55 million for military assistance.

19 May CINCPAC informed JCS that CTG 77.4 (KITTY HAWK) would direct no fly-overs of SVN and if Laos overflights were cancelled, recommended that 77.4 depart the area on 23 May.

CINCPAC, in regard to SVN Railway Security, asked DA to investigate the development of devices which might detect and locate noises associated with mine laying.

22 May Secretary of State Rusk linked the outcome of the war in Laos to that of South Vietnam, and warned that the war might be expanded if the Communists persisted in aggression.

23 May In accordance with OSD directions CINCPAC re-evaluated his nonconcurrence with certain items in COMUSMACV's shopping list of FY65 add-ons. As a result CINCPAC recommended that 90 replacement junks be funded in the FY64 Program and this was approved by OSD. OSD approved the 105mm howitzers which had been disapproved by CINCPAC, but the problem of additional boats for the River Assault Group was still under review.

Foreign Minister Phan Huy Quat announced that Nationalist China and South Korea had offered economic and technical aid to South Vietnam.

25 May CINCPAC approved CINCUSARPAC recommendation to deploy two additional 26 man door gunner platoons in RVN and increase strength of the five platoons in-country from 21 to 26 men.

New Zealand reported that it would send 24 military advisors to South Vietnam, and West Germany declared that it would extend additional economic aid. Subsequently, Australia and the Philippines also reported the dispatch of non-combat military advisors to South Vietnam, and Australia sent 6 transport planes as well.

28 May GVN, in daily radio broadcasts, launched propaganda offensive against North Vietnam.

31 May GVN communiqué announced the release of 4 generals (Tran Van Don, Le Van Kim, Ton That Dinh and Mai Huu Xuan) imprisoned when Premier Khanh seized power.

1-2 Secretary of Defense Conference - Honolulu

2 Jun President Johnson reiterated U.S. intentions to defend Southeast Asia, but said he knew of no plans to extend the war into North Vietnam.
12 Jun  CINCPAC informed OSD that, although not completely convinced of the need for boats to form a new River Assault Group in the Republic of Vietnam, and in view of COMUSMACV's stated requirement, he had no objection funding them. On the 13th OSD approved funding of the boats.

15 Jun  Major General Charles J. Timmes, USA, departing Chief MAAG Vietnam was debriefed at CINCPAC Headquarters.

17 Jun  CINCPAC recommended to JCS a more orderly buildup of VNAF A-1Hs with 4 squadrons (100 aircraft) as the immediate objective. CINCPAC also recommended retention of VNAF transport and reconnaissance capability which would be lost under the COMUSMACV plan.

18 Jun  Lieutenant General William C. Westmoreland, who succeeded General Paul D. Harkins, said he wouldn't rule out attacks on Communist North Vietnam. But, he added, such a decision was for the U.S. Government to make.

23 Jun  President Johnson announced the appointment of General Maxwell D. Taylor to the position of U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam, replacing Henry Cabot Lodge. The President also announced the appointment of U. Alexis Johnson as Deputy Ambassador to assist General Taylor.

25 Jun  Premier Khanh endorsed the change in U.S. ambassadors to Saigon. He said the appointment of General Taylor "shows the determination of the U.S. Government in helping the Vietnamese people."

28 Jun  President Johnson (in a speech at Minneapolis) warned that the U.S. was "prepared to risk war" to preserve the peace in Southeast Asia, and that it would continue to "stand firm" in South Vietnam to help maintain its freedom.

30 Jun  Red China warned the U.S. against spreading the South Vietnamese war to North Vietnam. The Red Chinese press said "no threat can intimidate anybody in Southeast Asia today."

1 Jul  COMUSMACV advised JCS that a "rewards for weapons program" had been approved for implementation on 10 July.

    Responsibility for "Operation Switchback" (CIDG program) was turned over to COMUSMACV by CAS. During the period Nov 63 to 1 Jul 64 responsibility for the related programs were also passed from CAS to MACV: Combat Intelligence Teams; Mountain Scouts, Border Surveillance; Border Crossings; VNSF Saigon Base Radio Station.

7 Jul  General Maxwell Taylor upon his arrival in Saigon urged a more vigorous prosecution of the war against the VC.

8 Jul  CINCPAC approved the construction of 90 modified "Yabuta" type junks, approved in message for RVN MAP.
10 Jul First South Vietnamese Air Force Day was celebrated at the expanded air base of Danang.

12 Jul Premier Khanh reported that North Vietnamese troops were taking an increased part in VC attacks.

14 Jul Project BIG SQUIRT was completed and available for operation in a non-directional transmission mode.

15 Jul Secretary McNamara stated that there was no evidence that organized units of North Vietnamese troops were moving into South Vietnam.

19 Jul "Day of National Shame" was observed throughout South Vietnam on the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Accords on Indochina.

20 Jul Communist Chinese Government condemned U.S. introduction of additional military personnel in South Vietnam. This was prompted by the U.S. 14 July announcement that 600 more "military advisors" were being sent to RVN.

President Johnson announced the nomination of Major General John L. Throckmorton to the grade of Lieutenant General and assignment as Deputy Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam.

22 Jul Air Force Commander Nguyen Cao Ky stated that South Vietnamese "combat teams" have been going on sabotage missions to North Vietnam for the past 3 years and that South Vietnamese pilots were being trained for larger-scale attacks on the North.

23 Jul South Vietnam Defense Ministry issued statement that the remarks of Ky did "not reflect" the view of the GVN.

President Charles de Gaulle called for the withdrawal from South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, of all states directly or indirectly responsible for the destiny of these countries. He named France, the U.S., Communist China, and the Soviet Union. He proposed the reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina and the creation of a "massive economic and technical aid" program for the area.

24 Jul President Johnson answered President de Gaulle. He said that the U.S. did "not believe in a conference called to ratify terror, "stating that if the Communists obeyed the already existing Geneva agreements, there would be immediate peace in Southeast Asia.

25 Jul GVN Foreign Ministry made public a letter of Premier Khanh to 34 countries appealing for economic aid in the war against the VC.

27 Jul U.S. announced that it was sending an additional 5,000 men to South Vietnam.
28 Jul Premier Khanh reversed his previous stand and rejected attacking North Vietnam as a solution to the war.

29 Jul U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam reported an increase in VC forces in South Vietnam. It said that due to intensive recruitment and infiltration from North Vietnam, the VC had 28,000 to 34,000 full-time field troops and 60 - 80,000 armed guerrillas who fight part-time.

CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to study vulnerability of Saigon river to electrical mines and blocking of the river by the sinking of a ship at points where the river narrowed.

1 Aug The FTD for training VNAF personnel in Cessna O-17A was deactivated upon completion of its mission.

CINCPACFLT advised CINCPAC that the VC were capable of mining and sinking vessels in the Saigon river.

2 Aug USS Maddox attacked by 3 NVN patrol boats in the Gulf of Tonkin 30 miles off the coast of NVN. After an exchange of fire in which the U.S. destroyer was not damaged, the 3 NVN boats disappeared.

3 Aug Premier Khanh urged the U.S. to take a firm stand against the North Vietnamese and demonstrate that the "U.S. is not a paper tiger."

The U.S. stated that U.S. ships would continue to operate freely in international waters and take whatever measures were necessary for their defense. It also warned NVN against further attacks which would lead to "grave consequences."

President Johnson reported that he had instructed the Navy to add a second destroyer to its patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin, provide an air patrol for the 2 destroyers and attack any forces which attacks it, with the intent "not only of driving off the force but of destroying it."

4 Aug DOD reported that NVN patrol boats had attacked the 2 U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin and after a 3-hour battle in which 2 of the boats were sunk, the NVN boats fled.

President Johnson reported that in retaliation for the unprovoked NVN attack, the U.S. was taking air action "against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam."

5 Aug Secretary McNamara reported that U.S. aircraft yesterday and today made retaliatory attacks on 4 NVN patrol boat bases and a POL storage area on the NVN coast, damaging 25 NVN patrol boats and destroying the oil storage depot at Vinh. He said that 2 U.S. aircraft were shot down in the attacks and 2 damaged.
5 Aug  Secretary Rusk stated the U.S. made its retaliatory air strikes in order to prevent a communist "miscalculation" that the U.S. would not reply in kind.

President Johnson warned NVN and Communist China against being "tempted... to widen the present aggression," and stated that there was "no immunity from reply."

JCS authorized alerting and deployment of certain CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 forces.

7 Aug  Photographs proved that some MIG 15/17s had moved to Phuc Yen airfield in NVN.

U.S. Congress passed a joint resolution assuring President Johnson of full support "for all necessary measures" he might have to take to protect U.S. armed forces in Southeast Asia and gave sanction for "all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, " to assist any member of SEATO that might request help.

Premier Khanh issued decree proclaiming a state of emergency.

8 Aug  President Johnson called the results of the past 7 days "highly gratifying" and U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance announced that the U.S. would withdraw its destroyers from the Gulf of Tonkin "in the next few days," but reserved the right to make similar patrols in the future.

CINCPAC submitted construction requirements to OSD to support increased U.S. advisor effort in RVN.

CINCPAC submitted to OSD/ISA FY65-66 MAP for RVN.

10 Aug  GVN officials announced that 500 air-raid shelters would be built in Saigon.

Premier Khanh stated that Communist China had stationed approximately 15 MIG-jet fighters in Hanoi and that there had been evidence of Communist Chinese troop movements in NVN.

RVN severed diplomatic relations with Indonesia because of Indonesia's decision to exchange ambassadors with NVN.

11 Aug  VC distributed leaflets in hamlets northwest of Saigon warning that they would fire only on government troop units accompanied by U.S. military advisors.

12 Aug  Ambassador Taylor stated that what RVN needed was continuity of government and that "the beginning of unity in government" could already be seen.

15 Aug  CINCPAC replied to a COMUSMACV request (9 Aug) concerning the feasibility of evacuating dependents and civilians from RVN and Laos. CINCPAC pointed out that State was responsible and that CINCPAC OPLAN 60-64 gave details.
16 Aug  Military Council elected Premier Khanh President of the Republic and approved a new Constitution.

19 Aug  Student Association meeting (in Saigon) denounced President Khanh for establishing a military dictatorship.

20 Aug  Buddhist leaders across the nation urged followers to rid the current government of "dishonest elements of the old regime."

21 Aug  Student demonstrators, joined by Buddhists, staged massive rally charging Khanh Government with being "worse than the Ngo Dinh Diem dictatorship."

23-24 Aug  Student and Buddhist demonstrations erupted into riots and spread to all major RVN cities.

25 Aug  GVN proclamation announced the Military Council would "repeal" the constitution, elect a new head of state and then disband to "return to purely military functions."

26 Aug  French Government issued statement asserting that General Khanh's resignation "conforms to France's prediction" that only negotiations and the neutralization of Vietnam can solve the crisis there.

1 Sep  Leader of the Dai Viet (Greater Vietnam) political party Nguyen Ton Hoan resigned position as Vice-Premier in the caretaker government stating that he completely disagreed with the policies of Nguyen Khanh.

2 Sep  COMUSMACV requested immediate funding of the warehouse and cold storage facility in Saigon to support the increase in U.S. advisory personnel.

3 Sep  Major General Nguyen Khanh resumed Premiership of the caretaker government established on August 27.

4 Sep  Premier Khanh announced in a press conference that a civilian government would be established in South Vietnam within two months as previously promised.

6 Sep  Cambodian Government charged that South Vietnamese troops attacked the Cambodian border village of Koh Rokar. Next day, the South Vietnamese Defense Ministry countercharged that Cambodian gunboats shelled a South Vietnamese border base near Hong Ngui to help Viet Cong guerrillas flee from South Vietnamese Government forces. The Defense Ministry also charged that Cambodian aircraft had been harassing South Vietnamese planes near the border.

7-10 Sep  U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam General Maxwell D. Taylor conferred (in Washington) with President Johnson and other officials on the political and military situation in South Vietnam.

8 Sep  Military triumvirate chose Major General Duong Van Minh as its Chairman.

9 Sep  Premier Khanh announced an end to press censorship.
9 Sep  Ambassador Taylor stated (in Washington) that the military situation in South Vietnam had remained "essentially normal" despite the political disturbances and pointed to a "general upward trend."

10 Sep  Ambassador Taylor stated (prior to his departure for Saigon) that "all wars end in negotiations."

11 Sep  Premier Khanh ousted national police director Colonel Tran Thanh Ben, and 2 military leaders Major General Do Cao Tri and Brigadier General Nguyen Van Thieu.

14 Sep  Coup d'etat led by Brigadier Generals Lam Van Phat and Duong Van Duc failed to overthrow the government of Premier Nguyen Khanh.

15 Sep  Premier Khanh ousted 5 military commanders (including Lam Van Phat and Duong Van Duc) from their posts for their part in the abortive coup. They were subsequently arrested.

National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) of South Vietnam called for a general military offensive against Government and U.S. forces in order to take advantage of the "unprecedented disarray" in Saigon. The Viet Cong also called upon the South Vietnamese people to "demand" the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the establishment of "neutrality" in South Vietnam.

17 Sep  USS MORTON and EDWARDS got underway on a DESOTO Patrol.

18 Sep  The MORTON and EDWARDS were under attack by enemy craft and air cover was provided the unit. The DESOTO units fired more than 100 rounds of 5" ammunition, and radar indicated that several targets were hit.

Under JCS direction CINCPAC issued FRAG ORDER Number 2 at 182240Z. The order was effective for planning only and was not executed. Subsequently CTU 77, 6, 6 could not muster essential supporting evidence that he had been under attack.

20 Sep  Approximately 500 Rhide mountain tribesmen (in the central highlands) revolted against the Government. They seized the radio station in Ban Me Thuot, capital of Darlac province, killing about 30 government troops and demanded the establishment of an autonomous tribal state; they also attempted to occupy U.S. Special Forces training camps in the area which had been training them to fight against the VC. On the same day, hundreds of tribesmen of another sect attempted to take over the town of Duc Lap in Quang Duc province, 3 miles from the Cambodian border.

21 Sep  Navy Mobile Training Team 4-65 arrived in RVN for training Vietnamese in A1H follow-on maintenance training.

24 Sep  Government communique reported (following talks between Premier Khanh and tribal leaders in Ban Me Thuot) that
while autonomy for the tribesmen would not be granted, the "aspirations" of the tribal leaders "have been met." At the same time, the Government dispatched about 4,000 troops to Ban Me Thuot as a preventive measure. On 28 September rebellion ended.

26 Sep High National Council consisting of 17 civilians and appointed by Major General Duong Van Minh (Chairman of the military junta) was inaugurated. It was charged with drafting a new constitution and establishing a civilian government in South Vietnam.

COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that the Country Team proposed an alternate water access channel to Saigon. By 21 October it was concluded that MACV had sufficient resources to meet a requirement to dredge and buoy the Soi Rat River for the alternate access channel.

28 Sep President Johnson stated (in a speech in New Hampshire) that he strongly opposed an "escalated" war in Southeast Asia which would involve U.S. soldiers "with 700 million Chinese." He asserted that the U.S. was "not going north and drop bombs at this stage."

30 Sep GVN announced that Lieutenant General Tran Thien Khiem, a member of the ruling triumvirate, would be sent abroad as a foreign diplomat.

1 Oct Construction of modified Yabuta junk was started in Saigon Naval yard and delivery was scheduled for 1 October 1965.

7 Oct JCS directed that provisions be made to conduct immediate punitive and crippling reprisal actions against NVN in retaliation for DRV attacks on DESOTO Patrol.

20 Oct RVN Foreign Ministry reported that 24 nations were providing or had promised aid to South Vietnam in its war against the Communist Viet Cong.

High National Council introduced new Constitution (Charter) providing for a gradual establishment of a "civilian" government in South Vietnam.

23 Oct Military court acquitted 20 military officials and civilians (including Brigadier Generals Lam Van Phat and Duong Van Duc) charged with organizing and carrying out the September 13 coup against the Khanh government.

24 Oct High National Council elected a civilian, Phan Khac Suu, Chief of State. He was sworn in on 26 October. Another civilian Tran Van Huon (formerly Mayor of Saigon) was appointed Premier and sworn in on 1 Nov. This ended the military rule of Major Generals Nguyen Khanh and Duong Van Minh. Nguyen Khanh remained, however, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.
1 Nov VC launched an attack against Bien Hoa air base.

4 Nov Fifteen-man civilian government is installed under the Premiership of Tran Van Huong.

U.S. State Department hails the new government as one "representative" of the people and says "the way is now clear . . . to defeat the Viet Cong."

5 Nov Chairman of the High National Council (the provisional legislature), Nguyen Xuan Chu, resigns in protest against the new government.

7 Nov Premier Huong warned that force would be used if necessary to halt anti-Government demonstrations. On the same day Nguyen Khanh pledged his support to the Huong Government.

9 Nov In regard to a CINCUSARPAC request for the removal of prominent equipment markings in RVN, CINCPAC concurred and said that it was a prerogative of the Services.

17 Nov Philippines government emissary (visiting Saigon) announced that the Philippines would send 6000 men to South Vietnam, including 3000 combat troops to fight the Viet Cong. The remaining 3000 would be civilians involved in economic and technical assistance programs.

20 Nov COMUSMACV prepared a VNAF expansion plan which envisaged a 5th AIH squadron by 31 July 1965 and a sixth by 31 December 1965.

COMUSMACV proposed a phased program for the introduction of jets (B57s and F5s) into VNAF.

23 Nov CINCPAC submitted to JCS a military campaign proposal against the DRV, in coordination with supporting diplomatic and psychological programs, to convince the communists that they must cease their support to the VC insurgency or accept a continuing and ever increasing level of destruction.

25 Nov Following continued student and Buddhist demonstrations in Saigon, Government imposes martial law and a curfew on Saigon and adjoining province of Gia Dinh.


31 Nov After receiving CINCPAC comments on a VNAF AIH plan proposed by MACV, JCS authorized the 5th and 6th AIH squadron on an accelerated basis.

1 Dec White House statement on Ambassador Taylor's conversations with the President and other officials said that they reviewed "the accumulating evidence of continuing and increasing North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong and of North Vietnamese forces in, and passing through, the territory of Laos."
3 Dec Buddhist leaders issued communiqué demanding that the U.S. withdraw its support from the Huong government if it "still wants to be trusted by the... Vietnamese people."

4 Dec Leaders of armed forces issued communiqué stating support for the Huong government and urging the population to unite behind the government to fight "the Communist invasion and the dark designs to neutralize" South Vietnam.

9 Dec CINCPAC, after receiving subordinate's recommendations for Construction in Support of Contingency Operations in RVN, relayed to JCS that the Saigon Hospital, Chu Lai Airfield Complex, and the Parallel Runway at Danang were the most significant projects of a list submitted.

10 Dec Thailand Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman warned that if the U.S. withdraws from South Vietnam, "Laos would be lost. Cambodia would become more or less a satellite of the Asian Communists... the brunt of the danger and of the pressure would fall upon Thailand... Burma would be in danger. Malaysia would go. Indonesia would go, too, from internal Communist pressure."

11 Dec Premier Tran Van Huong issued communiqué (following talks with Ambassador Taylor) stating that the U.S. would extend additional military and economic aid to South Vietnam to strengthen its air defenses, increase its armed forces and police and accelerate economic and rural development. It was also announced that joint U.S.-South Vietnam military planning is under way "to achieve greater effectiveness against the infiltration threat."

12 Dec JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that ALH squadrons be activated as scheduled.

15 Dec CINCPAC commended COMUSMACV and 7th Fleet elements for their contributions to flood relief operations in RVN during the period 10-18 November.

COMUSMACV confirmed to CINCPAC that he and the Ambassador were in agreement on the design and siting of the proposed Saigon Hospital at Tan Son Nhut area.

16 Dec CINCPAC published his Instruction 03960.2 to specify a project management and reporting system for RDT&E and CD activities in RVN.

U.S. Military Assistance Command in South Vietnam announced that the fertile and strategic Anlao valley in the mountain highlands of central Vietnam had fallen to the VC following a 3-day battle.

20 Dec Armed forces in a swift purge dissolved the High National Council arresting 7 of its members and approximately 50 other political leaders who had stated their opposition to the Huong government. The purge did not affect the Chief of
State, Premier, or the Premier's cabinet.

22 Dec Nguyen Khanh stated that the High National Council "will not be reactivated." He strongly criticized Ambassador Taylor for his attempts to reinstate the Council and warned the U.S. that if it wants to win the war against the Viet Cong, it should work with decisive elements in South Vietnam and "not have a dream of having Vietnam be an image of the United States." General Khanh also said that a number of senior army officers would be retired from the service including Major General Duong Van Minh.

U.S. State Department issued warning to the South Vietnamese Government that it supported "a duly constituted government" in South Vietnam "without improper interference" from the armed forces and that this was the "basis" of U.S. support for South Vietnam.

24 Dec VC exploded a bomb at the Brink Hotel BOQ in Saigon, killing two Americans and wounding many others.

CINCPAC increased PACOM Amphibious readiness by positioning two task groups with BLT off Vung Tau. This alert force was retained in position throughout the remainder of 1964.

25 Dec The ARVN employed riot control agents in combat operations for the first time in the Tay Ninh Province.

26 Dec GVN extended martial law for another month and ordered a battalion of paratroopers into Saigon as a result of the attack on the U.S. army billeting facility.

27 Dec Press reported that U.S. Senator Frank Church recommended that the U.S. begin to consider a policy of "neutrality for all of Southeast Asia" as "a proper objective" of U.S. policy with the UN as the guarantor of national boundaries in the area.

30 Dec Soviet news agency Tass announced that the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) of South Vietnam would establish permanent mission in Moscow.
APPENDIX B

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN CONNECTION WITH LAOS

1 January 1956 - 31 December 1964

1956
21 Mar Government led by Souvanna Phouma was invested by National Assembly. This government was elected on 25 Dec 55 in accordance with provisions of Geneva Accords although Pathet Lao refused to participate in elections. Although Geneva Accords did not require formation of coalition government, Souvanna offered to include Souphanouvong's PL.

1957
19 Nov Coalition government including PL members invested by National Assembly.

1958
18 Feb PL forces integrated in Royal Lao Army.
19 Jul International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos adjourned sine die and left Laos.
18 Aug Government headed by Phoumi Sananikone invested by National Assembly. Announced policy of government was to oppose threat of communism.
14 Dec North Vietnamese troops entered Laos and set up positions near Savannakhet.

1959
17 May PL battalion rebelled against RLG Army and escaped to north.
18 Jul PL force overran Lao outposts in Sam Neua Province, ending RLG coalition with communists. RLG arrested 10 communist leaders including Souphanouvong.
23 Jul In conjunction with French Government, RLG asked the U.S. to furnish additional military aid.
Aug CINCPAC reported to JCS that plans were prepared to counter communist aggression in SEAsia.
5 Sep JTF 116 activated for operations & Seventh Fleet in process of improving its readiness.
Dec Phoumi's government replaced by government headed by Kou Abhay which was to rule until general elections scheduled for 24 Apr 60.

1. A previous chronology of events in Laos has not appeared in the CINCPAC Command History. Therefore, for this edition, abbreviated entries are made for a period of eight years prior to 1964.
1960

24 May Souphanouvong and 15 other communists escaped from jail and went north.

9 Aug Kong Le seized Vientiane, announced his intention to return Souvanna to power to establish neutral government.

Aug Souvanna selected to head new government as result of Kong Le duress on National Assembly, but King withheld approval. U.S. State Department followed middle course -- attempted to establish confidence with Souvanna, authorized limited CAS support to Phoumi, and tried to delay investiture of Souvanna Government to gain time for appraising other possibilities.

20 Aug CINCPAC recommended to JCS that U.S. support Phoumi.

31 Aug Souvanna Government invested and adopted policy of bringing PL into government.

14 Sep CINCPAC recommended to JCS that U.S. support Phoumi through Program Evaluations Office or CAS facilities, and encourage Phoumi to reduce Kong Le's influence.

28 Nov Phoumi launched offensive to capture Vientiane.

3 Dec Russian airlift to support Kong Le commenced.

9 Dec Souvanna fled to Phnom Penh and Vientiane fell to Phoumi.

12 Dec Boun Oum government formed.

20 Dec CINCPAC recommended to JCS positive action to halt Soviet airlift - use of T-6 aircraft, program for training Lao pilots.

22 Dec Forces Armees du Laos commenced pursuit of Kong Le forces.

29 Dec PL forces launched offensive against PDJ.

31 Dec CINCPAC established DefCon 2 for forces in support of OPLAN 32-59. (Later relaxed on 6 Jan 61)

1961
1 Jan PL captured PDJ.

9 Mar President authorized program of assistance to RLG.

19 Apr PEO Laos redesignated MAAG Laos.

29 Apr CINCPAC proposed to JCS course of action intended to force communists either to fight for gains in Laos, or seriously to discuss cease-fire agreement. Asked JCS for authority to pre-position 25th Inf Div BG from Hawaii to Okinawa.
3 May  Communists agreed in principle to cease-fire.
8 May  Elements of ICC returned to Laos.
24 May  CINCPAC outlined to CHMAAG Laos program to reorganize and retrain FAL.
15 Sep  FAL redesignated FAR.
19 Oct  King Savang gave Souvanna mandate to form coalition government although Boun Oum government had not resigned.

1962
5 Jan  Geneva conference on Laos reconvened and invited the three princes to come to Geneva to negotiate.
23 Jan  Communists launched attack on Nam Tha.
27 Feb  CINCPAC notified the JCS that intervention by DRV had shifted balance of military in favor of enemy.
28 Feb  President Kennedy urged CINCPAC to inform Sarit that the U.S. would not allow itself to be driven into war in Laos by Phoumi's intransigence.
27 Apr  CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the U.S. plan to resurrect an organization to retain control over MAP deliveries after withdrawal of MAAG.
4 May  Major General Reuben H. Tucker assumed command of MAAG Laos.
6 May  Communists renewed attack on Nam Tha and captured it on 7 May.
10 May  CINCPAC activated Hq JTF 116 and took other precautionary steps.
13 May  Following State Department instructions, CHMAAG Laos told Phoumi that unless he could give concrete evidence that he would take corrective action recommended by the U.S., that the U.S. would not help return his troops from Thailand to Laos.
14 May  U.S. battle group on SEATO training exercise in Thailand, and Thai troops, were moved to Thailand's northern border with Laos.
15 May  President Kennedy ordered U.S. military forces to Thailand.
11 Jun  Souvanna announced that three princes had agreed on composition of a coalition government in which he would be Minister of Defense and another neutralist, Pheng Phongsavan, would be Minister of the Interior.
14 Jun  U.S. resumed aid to RLG.
23 Jul  Foreign Ministers of the countries represented at Geneva Conference signed the 14-nation declaration and protocol on
the neutrality of Laos, ending 15-month conference.

27 Jul  CINCPAC directed CHMAAG Laos to implement Phase I (warning phase) of MAAG Laos OPLAN 63-62.

15 Aug  First detachment of MAAG Laos personnel left Laos.

6 Oct  U.S. MAAG Laos closed at 1000 hours when 193 officers, 470 EM, and 3 civilians completed departure through ICC check point. CINCPAC had informed Chief MAAG Laos, General Tucker that he "must close shop by 7 October." CINCPAC directed, "I want the final departure of personnel to be of significant size with flags flying and tails over the dashboard."

7 Oct  CHMAAG Laos became DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand.

19 Oct  Kong Le asked for United States Military Assistance short of weapons.

10 Nov  ICC stated that only 40 North Vietnamese soldiers had left Laos - also stated that 666 military advisors and 403 Philippine technicians serving with the U.S. had left Laos.

27 Nov  Leaders of the three factions signed agreement to form an integrated 30,000 man national army of 10,000 men from each faction.

1963

14 Jan  State Department agreed with giving aid to Kong Le.

12 Feb  Colonel Ketsana Vongsouvanh assassinated in PDJ.

16 Feb  Although there was no outbreak of fighting, KL forces in the PDJ withdrew to defensive positions and declared a state of emergency.

28 Feb  First U.S. supplies flown into hands of neutral forces.

8 Apr  Neutralists forced to withdraw from Xieng Khouang Ville-MEO units moved to assist neutralists; Souvanna approved support from FAR-U.S. accused PL of serious violation of cease-fire and called on Britain and USSR, co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Laos, and the ICC to take prompt and effective action to stop the fighting.

14 Apr  Souvanna announced a cease-fire.

20 Apr  JCS authorized military actions calculated to demonstrate U.S. determination to stabilize the situation in Laos.

29 May  Souvanna confirmed to the U.S. Ambassador the establishment of a joint neutralist-FAR command in the PDJ.

22 Jun  JCS directive to CINCPAC brought about OPLAN 99-64.
6 Sep 1964 U.S. announced delivery of six jet trainer planes to the RLG.

1 Jan 1964 New Laos Monetary stabilization program in effect.

29 Jan 1964 Neutralist military headquarters reported that six PL and four NVN battalions had launched an attack in southern Laos, defeated neutralist and right-wing forces at Na Kay and were headed towards the strategic post of Thakhek on the road to Vientiane.

1 Feb 1964 The ICC at the request of Souvanna, unanimously agreed to investigate the outbreak of fighting in central Laos.

21 Feb 1964 CINCPAC approved a FY65-66 Laos MAP Program based on a FAR/Neutralist basic support strength of 46,500.

29 Feb 1964 Souvanna asserted that civil war in Laos could not be solved until the war in South Vietnam was ended.

3 Mar 1964 CINCPAC advised DIA of inconsistencies and contradictions within the intelligence community regarding route designations in Laos. On 1 April DIA directed CINCPAC to have USAMSFE coordinate route designations in Laos and provide revised map service starting on 21 April.

27 Mar 1964 DEPCHUSMAG Thailand established total foreseeable FY65 requirements for Laos training in Thailand. The request was for six 100 man infantry companies, six 119 man heavy weapons companies, and four 100 man combat support companies. Individual training at RTA service schools would be sought for 96 officers and 223 enlisted. Badly needed RTA conducted leadership classes for 500 squad, platoon and company commanders were a requirement.

28 Mar 1964 CINCPAC approved establishment in PDJ, prior to rainy season, of 60 day level of ammunition and POL and items susceptible to damage from free fall air drop.

17-18 Apr 1964 Negotiations between Souvanna, Souphanouvong and right wing Phoumi began, but broke down over the question of neutralizing the royal capital of Luang Prabang and making it the administrative capital.

18 Apr 1964 Souvanna announced his intention to resign because of the "impossibility of resolving the Laotian problem."

19 Apr 1964 Military coup in Vientiane ousted government of Souvanna, who was placed under house arrest. Coup leaders General Kourprasith Abhay and General Siho Lamphouthacoul said they acted because Souvanna had failed to establish peace in Laos.

The U.S., Soviet Union, Britain and France protested the coup as a violation of the Geneva Accords. U.S. Ambassador to Laos, Leonard Unger, stated that the U.S. was firmly...
opposed to the right-wing seizure of power, supported the coalition government of Souvanna and demanded the "immediate release" of all "neutralists."

20 Apr Souvanna was permitted by the coup leaders to confer with the King in Luang Prabang, and announced on the 21st that the King had not accepted his resignation from the post of Premier.

21 Apr Phoumi declared his support of Premier Souvanna Phouma and the restoration of the tripartite government.

23 Apr General Abhay issued a communique stating that "in consideration of external policy," the leaders of the military coup were calling on Souvanna to retain the post of Premier and reinstate his coalition government.

30 Apr CINCPAC submitted to JCS an outline plan for holding the general line of the Mekong in Laos.

2 May Souvanna announced that right-wing and neutralist military forces would be merged and that he would henceforth "direct all military affairs" in Laos. He appealed to the PL to join in the merger.

16 May Souvanna reported that NVN troops were involved in the fighting and that the PDJ and Vientiane were seriously threatened by the PL takeover.

17 May PL forces began overruning neutralist positions in the PDJ and General Kong Le fled his command post at Muong Phanh. Ambassador Unger authorized the use of bombs by T-28s on the PDJ.

19 May YANKEE TEAM reconnaissance flights commenced by U.S. 2nd Air Division using RF-101s.

21 May The U.S. State Department announced that the U.S. was flying unarmed jet reconnaissance planes over the PDJ at the request of the Laotian Government in order to gather information on PL positions because of the ICC's inability to function.

22 May Souvanna announced that Laos was requesting economic and military aid from the U.S., France and Britain to defend its "unity."

27 May U.S. State Department disclosed that several T-28 fighter-bombers had been sent to Laos (which already possessed 7). CINCPAC submitted to OASD/ISA a program increase to the Laos FY64 MAP for T-28 aircraft munitions required to pay back loans from USAF assets in the PACOM, establish a 30 day operating level, and start flow of a 90 day pipeline. In recent months the Laotian T-28 inventory had been raised to 20 aircraft. Funds covering the program increase of...
$6.7 million were subsequently approved by OASD/ISA.

28 May
JCS requested CINCPAC comment on possible introduction of FARM GATE type operations in Laos. In reply CINCPAC could see no advantage in a covert action in Laos of FARM GATE type.

30 May
CINCPAC took action to release small arms from SALT SHAKER to reequip Lao Neutralist Forces after a hasty withdrawal from the PDJ.

2 Jun
Five C-47 aircraft were made available at no cost to Laos MAP.

6 Jun
An unarmed U.S. Navy photo reconnaissance jet observing communist troop movements in Laos was shot down by ground fire in the PDJ area.

7&8 Jun
An RF-8A and a F8D (YANKEE TEAM craft) were shot down near Xing Khouang Ville, by ground fire.

9 Jun
An armed strike was conducted against Xing Khouang Ville antiaircraft installation to demonstrate the U.S. was going to continue reconnaissance, by force if necessary. Action directed by JCS.

10 Jun
CINCPAC determined that in view of the situation in Laos additional transport aircraft were needed and recommended to DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand that the five C-47 aircraft made available to Laos MAP be accepted immediately and turned over to Air America for use until Laos pilots and crews were trained.

16 Jun
The PL was allowed to quit the coalition government. They received permission by Souvanna.

23 Jun
Souvanna said U.S. reconnaissance flights have proved North Vietnamese intervention in Laos. Red China and NVN had protested the flights.

25 Jun
JCS asked CINCPAC for preliminary comments on possible U.S. action in response to PL preparation to attack Muong Soui, and directed preparation of a unilateral capabilities plan for U.S. air strikes to be made in Laos. CINCPAC forwarded an air strike plan on 30 June.

26 Jun
CINCPAC approved a DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand proposal that three FAR officers and 24 FAR NCOs be trained in Thailand by U.S. MTT in the operation and maintenance of the AN/UIH-1 PA set being provided FAR under MAP.

29 Jun
DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand informed CINCPAC that three of five C-47s for Laos support, had arrived in Thailand.

19 Jul
CINCPAC recommended that modified Vietnamese Ammunition Program (VAMP) procedures be established for Laos.
19 Jul  Delivery of four UH-34D helicopters was made to Udorn in regards to a 1 July U.S. Air Attaché Laos request for SAR support of YANKEE TEAM operations.

22 Jul  CINCPAC proposed to OSD a revised FY65 MAP for Laos of $49.6 million to support a Laotian force level of 67,200. A list of major items and dollar totals for additions to FY65 MAP Laos was submitted as result of Presidential Determination of $8.9 million signed on 9 July.

19 Aug  CINCPAC recommended to OASD/ISA an increase in the safety level of ammunition in PEPPER GRINDER from 30 to 60 days.

27 Aug  OSD approved request for increase in safety level of ammunition in PEPPER GRINDER and formally approved implementation of Laotian Ammunition Procedures (LAMP) effective 1 September 1964.

1 Oct   First complete monthly stock status report was submitted by DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand for LAMP.

11 Oct  CINCPAC proposed to OSD a FY65 SEAsia T-28 program which had an objective of 40 for Laos; this was approved by OSD on 23 October.

2 Dec   JCS asked CINCPAC to prepare an operations plan for night interdiction in Laos of PL/VM vehicular traffic by U.S. aircraft. CINCPAC's plan was forwarded on 7 December and given the nickname "LONE STAR."

14 Dec  First BARREL ROLL operation was conducted. Mission was to attack targets of opportunity along road routes with alternate fixed targets. Five attacks of this type were made by the end of the year.
### APPENDIX D

**Index to PEG Inspection Reports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dates Visited</th>
<th>Final Report Dated</th>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>5-11 Nov 63</td>
<td>24 Feb 64</td>
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<td>12-21 Aug 64</td>
<td>30 Oct 64</td>
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APPENDIX E
CINCPAC PROJECTS COMPLETED BY NAVCOSSACT

The following is a list of projects completed for CINCPAC since January 1961 by the Naval Command Systems Support Activity (NAVCOSSACT). This information has been extracted from the CINCPAC Command and Control System Group (J02C) Report of Personnel Utilization and Manpower Requirements Survey of 1 June 1964 (C). More complete information, including a description of the functions of each project, is contained in NAVCOSSACT Report 0047, U.S. Navy Strategic Command and Control System Automatic Data Processing Applications and Capabilities.

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<td>10G300</td>
<td>Air Battle Simulation Model (704/1401)</td>
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<td>10L100</td>
<td>Material Requirements Estimation (704/1401)</td>
<td>--- 1961</td>
<td>Mar 1964</td>
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<td>Exterior Transportation System (704/1401)</td>
<td>Jan 1961</td>
<td>Aug 1963</td>
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APPENDIX F

Southeast Asia's Monsoons and Military Operations

The following description of Southeast Asia's monsoons and their affect on military operations is quoted from PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest 43-64, dated 23 October 1964.

"Southeast Asia's monsoonal climate probably affects military planning and operations for that region more than any other single factor. The seasonal cycle is comprised of the rainy southwest monsoon followed by the cool and relatively dry northeast monsoon which is then replaced by the hot season. Each of these seasons have special characteristics that profoundly affect military operations. (U)

"Northeast Monsoon (the cool season): This monsoon is in full swing from mid-November through February and it brings to the largest part of Southeast Asia (for exceptions see Figure F-1) clear skies, little rain, and cool nights. The soil of the countryside begins to dry and crack. Although temperatures may run into the 90s during the day, the climate of the northeast monsoon is the least enervating of the seasons. The smallest streams are slowly but inexorably reduced to trickles; roadways and tracks and trails begin to present their optimum capacities; in general this season provides the best conditions for operations by a modern military ground force. (U)

"The Hot Seasons (Transition between NE and SW Monsoon)- The coolest temperatures experienced in Southeast Asia (NE Monsoon) are followed abruptly by the most torrid. The hot season lasts from early March through early May. The sweltering heat combined with high humidity is smothering, particularly in the closeness of dense jungle. The deciduous flora of Southeast Asia drops its leaves during the hottest weather. At this time the extensive bamboo jungles turn yellow leaving the jungle floor littered with a carpet of crackling leaves. In the jungle, fields of ground fire are at their annual maximum; aerial observation of ground targets in the jungle and directly beneath aircraft is the most revealing; the smaller streams.
no longer obstacles, become a series of moss-covered puddles; trafficability is at its best when moving in the restricted areas off roads but convoys on laterite-surfaced roads stir up clouds of red choking dust. The larger rivers are at their lowest levels by May. This is the season when mountain tribes (Meo, Kha, Yang, Yao, etc.) slash and burn new farming plots. Only a few square yards are usually intended to be burned free of vegetation but the fires will often go unchecked, and with little native concern, for miles and miles. This results in a smoky haze that extends over almost all of Southeast Asia. The temperatures drop slightly just before the mid-May arrival of the southwest monsoon. When the rains arrive the spell of maximum temperatures is broken and the southwest monsoon begins to build in intensity.

"Southwest Monsoon (the rainy season): For the largest part of Southeast Asia the southwest monsoon arrives around the middle of May and lasts until mid-October. Everyone anxiously awaits its arrival to break the stifling heat; the farmers need its rain before they can muddle their fields for the new crops. This rather brisk stream of warm wind has traveled hundreds of miles from the equator over warm waters and consequently arrives over Southeast Asia saturated with moisture. The rain is generally triggered in two ways. When it arrives over the hot land it is pushed upward, sometimes to 50,000 feet or more, where it strikes the cooler air, condenses, and produces rainfall (convectional precipitation). This normally occurs in mid or late afternoon when the earth is warmest. When the moisture-laden wind strikes mountain ranges it is pushed upward rapidly toward the rain-triggering cooler air. (See Tavoy, Burma and Val d’Emeraude, Cambodia precipitation figures in the rainfall table at Figures F-3, 4 and 5.) This normally results in heavy rainfall generally throughout the mountains (orographic precipitation) while convectional precipitation normally occurs as scattered thunderstorms in varying intensity and area.
RAINFALL AND PREDOMINANT WINDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1 NOVEMBER - 30 APRIL

Inches
Under 5
5 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 40
Over 40
RAINFALL AND PREDOMINANT WINDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1 MAY - 31 OCTOBER

Inches:
- Under 5
- 5 to 10
- 10 to 20
- 20 to 40
- Over 40

F-2
"During the five months of rainfall, road surfaces puddle, pothole, rut, and oftentimes become untrafficable. Streams leave their banks and inundate large areas; wooden bridges are swept away; fords are no longer fordable; and rice fields are muddled to where even foot soldiers would find crosscountry movement through them an unprofitable enterprise. The large major rivers of Southeast Asia only rarely overflow their banks during the rainy season but they do reach their high water marks around early November — after the rains have ceased. The smaller tributary rivers often overflow after heavy rainfall. Jungle growth becomes luxuriant and the canopy of leaf-bedecked trees nullifies aerial observation of ground movement over large areas. Forest offal becomes dank and is infested by subtle armies of terrestrial leeches. These leeches do not live in streams but rather wait on shrubs to be brushed onto unwary victims — animals or men. Insects swarm in clouds. Leather becomes moldy and bedding mildews and there is little opportunity for a soldier to dry them. At this time the farmers happily check their ripening fields and parks and gardens of Rangoon and Saigon are luxuriant with tropical flowers; however, the rain-soaked countryside does not offer a pleasant prospect to a soldier living and fighting in the field. A few sub-regions, particularly Malaya and parts of peninsular Thailand, are affected by rain from both the northeast and the southwest monsoons and consequently receive rainfall throughout a large part of the year. (U)

"Although weather and climate conditions are generally the same throughout Southeast Asia there are a few variations and special phenomena from country to country which affect military operations. Note statistics of selected stations in the rainfall table for a better understanding of seasonal precipitation. (U)

"The whole of Southeast Asia provides the greatest facility for combined air-ground operations during the period January through May. Although the Southeast Asian rains commence in early May the off-road soils are not yet waterlogged; landslides not yet a deterring factor. By June the southwest monsoon's deteriorating effects are beginning to be felt."
"While the skies are generally clear in November and December, the waterlogged ground is slowly drying; the largest rivers are deepest and are just beginning several months of steady recession. Deteriorated roadways are being cleared of debris and landslides. Village chiefs and national highway departments are repairing roadway base courses and surface. Some flooding of minor rivers still exists up to mid-November although rains have ceased. By January the roadways and major tracks have been sufficiently restored; formerly lake-like lowlands have isolated puddles, and cracks appear in the earth's surface. This condition holds true from Lashio to Saigon and from Bangkok to Hanoi. Only the coastal strip and bordering hills and mountains from Vinh, North Vietnam to Cap Padaran, South Vietnam experience heavy monsoonal rains. Hanoi and the Red River Delta, not included in the coastal strip, provide a marginal exception. This is definitely their driest season but an occasional drachin will cloud the Delta and bring light drizzle (examine rainfall table.)

"A further conclusion is that the period January through May is the best period for all-round military operations and this season is particularly attractive to a modern force equipped with the latest in sophisticated vehicles and weapons of war to include close-support air.

"The period June through December is desirable for neither man nor beast in support of military operations. An infantry force however, tailored to primitive roads and trails that can readily depend on animal and porter logistics, that has few organic motor vehicles, and that relies primarily on the tactics and polished techniques of the foot soldier will have less difficulty negotiating the quagmire of ooze, flooded fords, and dense foliage than will the hordes of trucks, tanks, heavy artillery, and the administrative "tail" of the modern military machine. To be sure, a large part of the technological gains of the modern force must be shed in this primitive arena during the southwest monsoon. Air support would be undependable. The modern force, which depends to no small measure on tremendous firepower in lieu of individuals, must then be prepared to match the potential aggressor man for man in a battleground which is most conducive to aggressor's tactics. It cannot be guaranteed that a large-scale war in Southeast Asia would be finalized before the magic month of June."
**UNCLASSIFIED**

**RAINFALL (INCHES) AT SELECTED STATIONS**

See map for orientation

*Indicates only trace of recorded rainfall.

*Affected by NE Monsoon

Outlined area indicates period of most pronounced rainfall.

| STATION       | J  | F  | M  | A  | M  | J  | J  | A  | S  | O  | N  | D  | J  | F  | ANNUAL |
|---------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-------|
| Ha Giang      | 1  | 2  | 1  | 5  | 12 | 18 | 21 | 17 | 10 | 5  | 4  | 1  | 1  | 2    | 97    |
| Tuyen Quang   | 1  | 2  | 1  | 4  | 9  | 10 | 12 | 12 | 8  | 4  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 2    | 62    |
| Hanoi         | 1  | 1  | 2  | 2  | 8  | 9  | 12 | 13 | 11 | 6  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 1    | 69    |
| Haiphong      | 1  | 2  | 2  | 3  | 7  | 10 | 11 | 14 | 12 | 4  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 2    | 68    |
| Vinh*         | 2  | 2  | 2  | 2  | 5  | 5  | 6  | 6  | 17 | 14 | 8  | 3  | 2  | 2    | 71    |
| Dong Hoi*     | 3  | 2  | 2  | 2  | 4  | 3  | 4  | 6  | 17 | 21 | 14 | 5  | 3  | 2    | 82    |
| Hue*          | 7  | 4  | 2  | 3  | 3  | 4  | 2  | 6  | 21 | 29 | 29 | 17 | 7  | 4    | 127   |
| Danang*       | 4  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 3  | 3  | 3  | 5  | 16 | 23 | 15 | 9  | 4  | 2    | 83    |
| Quang Ngai*   | 6  | 3  | 2  | 1  | 2  | 2  | 2  | 5  | 11 | 22 | 22 | 11 | 6  | 3    | 89    |
| Qui Nhon*     | 2  | 1  | 1  | 2  | 2  | 2  | 2  | 2  | 10 | 17 | 17 | 7  | 2  | 1    | 65    |
| Nha Trang*    | 2  | 1  | 1  | 2  | 2  | 2  | 2  | 2  | 7  | 13 | 15 | 7  | 2  | 1    | 55    |
| Cap Padaran*  | +  | +  | +  | 1  | 4  | 3  | 2  | 1  | 4  | 6  | 6  | 2  | +  | +    | 30    |
| Phan Thiet    | +  | +  | 1  | 7  | 7  | 9  | 7  | 7  | 2  | 1  | +  | +  |     |      |
| Kontum (Hill Loc) | + | + | 2  | 4  | 8  | 10 | 13 | 14 | 13 | 6  | 3  | 1  | +  | +    | 47    |
| Dalat (Hill Loc) | +  | 1  | 2  | 7  | 9  | 7  | 9  | 9  | 13 | 10 | 4  | 1  | +  | 73    |
| Snoul         | +  | +  | 1  | 4  | 10 | 11 | 12 | 10 | 13 | 10 | 3  | 1  | +  | +    | 72    |
| Saigon        | 1  | +  | +  | 2  | 9  | 12 | 12 | 11 | 13 | 10 | 5  | 2  | 1  | +    | 76    |
| Soc Trang     | +  | +  | +  | 3  | 9  | 10 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 7  | 2  | +  | +    | 74    |
**RAINFALL (INCHES) AT SELECTED STATIONS**

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See map for orientation.
+ Indicates only trace of recorded rainfall.
Outlined area indicates period of most pronounced rainfall.

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<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rangoon</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>44</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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</table>

See map for orientation.
+ Indicates only trace of recorded rainfall.
Outlined area indicates period of most pronounced rainfall.
APPENDIX G

Major Accomplishments of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Japan
(A debriefing report by CHMAAG Japan, Brigadier General J. W. Worthington)

April 1962 - April 1964

1. Military Assistance, MAAG Mission:

MAAG efforts during 1963 and early 1964 produced a transformation in the Japanese attitude toward U.S. military assistance. During this period Japanese thinking turned towards increased purchases of military hardware from the United States. The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) Forecast of Purchases from the U.S. in Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) 1964 of $105.2 million - through Military Assistance Sales (MAS), General Import and Commercial Import procedures - exceeded a similar forecast for JFY63 by almost $42 million. The forecast of $29.2 million in MAS alone for JFY64 could be compared with a previous annual average of about $12 million. The program could be expected to yield increasing returns in the future.

Similarly, progress had been made in the promotion of Cooperative Logistic Support Arrangements between Japan and the U.S. Support of the Nike/HAWK package, Japan's first missile-firing destroyer, and support of conventional Army equipment through USALCJ were all considered promising prospects for the conclusion of such agreements.

2. Defense Development Exchange Program:

Upon successful completion of prolonged negotiations, a Defense Data Exchange Agreement with Japan was signed on 15 November 1962. Since its inception, steady program development had been made to the point where eleven approved, active projects were in being, involving exchange of data essential to mutual defense. Three additional proposals were under review for possible adoption as projects.

The Defense Development Exchange Program (DDEP) was providing an influence to fill the void left by the phasing out of military assistance to Japan. It was proving effective in maintaining and strengthening relationships between the military services of the two countries.
Although mutual benefits had accrued during the short existence of this program, its potential was just being understood by the Japanese. Continued active participation by the U.S., involving little or no monetary outlay, would insure its expansion.

3. Army:

During the previous two years, the Japan Ground Self Defense Force had devoted much of its time and resources to the reorganization of its divisions and the establishment of a modern surface-to-air missile defense. The major accomplishments are listed below.

a. The introduction of a Nike Ajax Battalion which had since successfully completed an operational readiness evaluation, CONUS annual service practice, and a command management maintenance inspection. Also, the JSDF had established a direct and general support maintenance and supply complex since the battalion had deployed in March 1962. This unit provided Japan with the first increment of a modern surface-to-air missile defense system.

b. On 10 May 1963, negotiations were completed for a cost-shared Nike/HAWK package, consisting of a second Nike Ajax battalion and two HAWK battalions. Included in this package was a modern fire distribution system for each surface-to-air missile battalion. Elements of the first HAWK and second Nike package training groups were already in CONUS schools and a firm date (January 1965) had been established for initiation of the second HAWK package training. The deployment of these units in February 1965 (HAWK), January 1966 (Nike) and November 1966 (HAWK), would provide Japan a firm foundation upon which to build an adequate ground-to-air defense.

4. Navy:

The Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) had expanded into a sizeable Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and minesweeping force, concerned exclusively with the defense of the ocean areas adjacent to the Japanese islands. The transition from unit to fleet concept of operations was complete and functioning smoothly. JMSDF participation with the U.S. Seventh Fleet in coordinated exercises had clearly shown
a rapid increase in standards of performance, with a high degree of compatibility in all areas. This same period saw the construction of modern ASW ships and aircraft, including helicopters, on a cost-shared basis. Additional ships and aircraft had been budgeted and programmed with modern ASW equipment. Although steady progress had been made in defensive posture, the lack of realistic funding for defense had forced the JMSDF to accept construction of fewer ships and aircraft of the types considered necessary, acceptance of a shallow logistic base without war reserves, and only a token entry into the field of new detection and weapons systems.

5. Air Force:

Beginning in mid-1962, the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) had pursued a course of modernization of equipment to better meet the threat. Although meager annual budgets had precluded rapid modernization and replacement of obsolete aircraft, JASDF had made progress in the field of modernization, notably the F-104J program and the Special Air Warfare Center Basic Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system.

The first two F-104J squadrons, of a total of seven planned, had been activated; the first at Chitose Air Base in March 1963 and the second at Nyutabaru Air Base in March 1964. This was the first step in the JASDF's aircraft modernization program and was a joint cost-sharing project with the U.S. Government involving 180 F-104J and 20 F-104DJ aircraft.

The BADGE program had progressed during the previous two years from the elementary planning stages to a project ready for implementation. The over-all cost of the current project was estimated at about $58 million, of which the U.S. had agreed to provide $9 million. If improvements as suggested by the USAF BADGE working group were incorporated, the total cost could approach $80 million, of which the U.S. investment would be $14 million. A government-to-government agreement was expected to be signed by mid-1964. When this project was completed, it would provide a significant improvement in Japan's over-all air defense capability.
**APPENDIX H**

Military Advisors to SEATO 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Advisor</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Air Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Vice Admiral d'Escadre Claude Burin des Roziers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Rear Admiral Sir Peter Phipps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Air Marshall M. Asghar Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>General Alfredo M. Santos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Air Chief Marshall Dawee Chullasapya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Admiral Sir Varyl Begg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX I

Visits to CINCPAC by U.S. Civil and Military Officials

U.S. DISTINGUISHED VISITORS

Special Meeting on Southeast Asia

Secretary of State (The Hon Dean Rusk)
Secretary of Defense (The Hon Robert S. McNamara)
Chairman JCS (Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, USA)
Director, CIA (The Hon John A. McCone)
Director, USIA (The Hon Carl P. Rowan)
Dep Admin, AID (The Hon William S. Gaud)
Asst Secretary of State for Public Affairs (The Hon Robert J. Manning)
Asst Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (The Hon William P. Bundy)
Asst Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (The Hon Arthur Sylvester)
Asst Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (The Hon John T. McNaughton)
U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam (The Hon Henry Cabot Lodge)
U.S. Ambassador to Thailand (The Hon Graham A. Martin)
Dep COMUSMACV (LtGen William C. Westmoreland, USA)
Asst to the Chairman, JCS (LTGen Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA)
Dir of the Executive Secretariat, State Department (Mr. Benjamin H. Read)
J4, Joint Staff, JCS (MGen Richard D. Meyer, USA)
Spec Asst to Under Secretary of State (Mr. William H. Sullivan)
Senior Staff Mbr, National Security Council (Mr. Michael Forrestal)
Dep Director AID, Vietnam (Mr. Alfred M. Hurt)
Public Affairs Officer, USIA, Vietnam (Mr. Barry Zorthian)
Representative from USIA, Thailand (Mr. John R. O'Brien)
Representative from CIA (Mr. Chester Cooper)
J2, USMACV (BGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC)
Dep Director J3, Joint Staff, JCS (BGen Lucius D. Clay, Jr., USAF)

Plus party of 15. - 31 May - 2 June 1964

U.S. Delegation to the Meeting of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/International Monetary Fund

Secretary of the Treasury (The Hon Douglas Dillon and Mrs. Dillon)
Sen Russell B. Long (D-La) and Mrs. Long
Rep Abraham J. Multer (D-NY) and Mrs. Multer
Rep Henry S. Reuss (D-Wis) and Mrs. Reuss
Rep Clarence E. Kilburn (R-NY) and Mrs. Kilburn
Chairman, Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System
(The Hon William McC. Martin)
Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (The Hon Robert V. Roosa and Mrs. Roosa)
President and Chairman, Export - Import Bank of Washington
(The Hon Harold F. Linder and Mrs. Linder)
Asst Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (The Hon. G. Griffith Johnson and Mrs. Johnson)
Asst Secretary of the Treasury and U.S. Executive Director, IBRD, (The Hon. John C. Bullitt)
Mbr, Council of Economic Advisers (The Hon. Gardner Ackley and Mrs. Ackley)
Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of N. Y. (The Hon. Charles A. Coombs)
U. S. Executive Director, IADB, (The Hon. Tom Killefer)
U. S. Executive Director, IMF, (The Hon. William B. Dale)
Asst to the Secretary of the Treasury for Public Affairs (The Hon. Dixon Donnelley and Mrs. Donnelley)
Dep Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Economic Affairs (The Hon. Robert W. Barnett)
Dep Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Financial Policy (The Hon. Lawrence C. McQuade)
Plus party of 7. – 3-4 September 1964

Secretary of Defense (The Hon. Robert S. McNamara)
Administrator, AID (The Hon. David E. Bell)
Chairman, JCS (Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA)
Director, CIA (The Hon. John A. McConkey)
Asst Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (The Hon. Arthur Sylvester)
Asst Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (The Hon. William P. Bundy)
Asst Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (The Hon. John T. McNaughton)
Chairman, Vietnam Coordinating Committee (The Hon. William H. Sullivan)
Spec Asst for Military Assistance Affairs, JCS (MGen Rollin H. Anthis, USAF)
Plus party of 9. – 6 March 1964 and 12 March 1964

Secretary of Defense (The Hon. Robert S. McNamara)
Chairman, JCS (Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA)
Asst Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (The Hon. Arthur Sylvester)
Asst Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (The Hon. John T. McNaughton)
Spec Asst to Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs (The Hon. William H. Sullivan)
Plus party of 7. – 13 May 1964.

Secretary of the Navy (The Hon. Paul H. Nitze)
Plus party of 4. – 20-21 March 1964

Secretary of the Navy (The Hon. Paul H. Nitze and Mrs. Nitze)
Plus party of 4. – 31 July-1 August 1964 and 8 August 1964
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force (Gen Curtis E. LeMay, USAF, and Mrs. LeMay)
Plus party of 3. - 11-12 December 1964

Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army (Gen Harold K. Johnson, USA, and Mrs. Johnson)
Plus party of 6. - 15-16 December 1964

Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps (Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC)
MGen Robert E. Cushman, USMC, Special Assistant to CMC
MGen Louis B. Robertshaw, USMC, Dep C/S for Air, USMC
BGen William K. Jones, USMC, Legislative Assistant to CMC
BGen Melvin D. Henderson, USMC, Asst C/S G4, USMC
Plus party of 6. - 3-4 and 13-14 January 1964

Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps (Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC)
Plus party of 5. - 29 - 30 June 1964

Director, Defense Research & Engineering (Dr. Harold Brown and Mrs. Brown)
Asst Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development (The Hon Alexander H. Flax)
Director, Advance Research Projects Agency (Dr. Robert L. Sproull)
Director, Directors Staff Group, ODDR&E (MGen John W. O'Neill, USAF)
Plus party of 5. - 27 May 1964

Director, Defense Research & Engineering (Dr. Harold Brown and Mrs. Brown)
18 December 1964 - 3 January 1965

Asst Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (The Hon Roger Hilsman and Mrs. Hilsman)
19-21 January and 3-4 February 1964

Asst Secretary of the Treasury (The Hon James A. Reed)
Dep Commissioner of Customs (The Hon Lawrence Fleishman)
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard (Adm Edwin J. Roland, USCG)
Chief of Personnel, U.S. Coast Guard (RAdm George A. Knudsen, USCG)
Chief of Operations, U.S. Coast Guard (RAdm W. W. Childress, USCG)
Plus party of 9. - 26-30 October and 11-12 November 1964

Asst Secretary of Defense (Dep Director Defense Research & Engineering)
(The Hon Eugene G. Fubini and Mrs. Fubini)

American Ambassadors to:
Afghanistan (The Hon John M. Steeves and Mrs. Steeves)
15-18 April 1964
Australia (The Hon William C. Battle and Mrs. Battle) ll September 1964 (Departing)
Cambodia (The Hon Randolph A. Kidder) 18-20 August 1964
China (The Hon Jerauld Wright and Mrs. Wright) 25 April and 28-29 May 1964
Indonesia (The Hon Howard P. Jones and Mrs. Jones) 5-6 September 1964 and 25-28 October 1964
Korea (The Hon Samuel D. Berger and Mrs. Berger) 12-22 July 1964 (Departing)
   (The Hon Winthrop G. Brown and Mrs. Brown) 1-4 August 1964
Laos (The Hon William H. Sullivan and Mrs. Sullivan) 6-7 December 1964
Malaysia (The Hon Charles F. Baldwin and Mrs. Baldwin) 9-14 March 1964 (Departing)
   (The Hon James Bell) 12-13 July and 5 August 1964
Philippines (The Hon William McC. Blair, Jr., and Mrs. Blair) 10-20 July 1964
   (The Hon William E. Stevenson and Mrs. Stevenson) 14-20 July 1964 (Departing)
Vietnam (The Hon Maxwell D. Taylor) 5-6 July; 6 September;
   10-13 September (accompanied by Mrs. Taylor); 25 November;
   and 4 December 1964
   (The Hon U. Alexis Johnson - Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam)
   26-27 June 1964

Under Secretary of the U.S. Navy (The Hon Paul B. Fay, Jr.)
29 June - 1 July 1964

Director, Military Assistance, OSD (Gen Robert J. Wood, USA, and Mrs. Wood)
   Plus party of 7. - 4-6 December 1964

Director, National Security Agency (LtGen Gordon A. Blake, USAF,
   and Mrs. Blake)

Dep Asst Secretary of Defense for Management (The Hon W. Carl Blaisdell)
24-27 February and 15-20 November 1964

Dep Asst Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel and Industrial Relations (The Hon Stephen N. Shulman)
   Plus 1. - 30 July - 2 August 1964

Director, Advance Research Projects Agency (Dr. Robert L. Sproull)
   Plus 1. 31 January - 2 February 1964

National War College Commandant (LtGen Francis H. Griswold, USAF)
   Plus 34 members of staff and students. - 30-31 March 1964

Industrial College of the Armed Forces
   35 members of staff and students. - 18-20 April 1964
American Legion Group consisting of members of the National Security Commission and Foreign Relations Commission (Mr. Daniel F. Foley, National Commander)
Plus party of 76. — 5-8 May and 21 May 1964.

CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS

Army Congressional Command and Operations Group
Sen Ralph W. Yarborough (D-Tex), Senate Commerce Committee
Rep Harlan Hagen (D-Calif), House Agriculture Committee
Rep W. Pat Jennings (D-Va), House Ways & Means Committee
Rep Graham Purcell, Jr., (D-Tex), House Agriculture Committee
Rep Clark MacGregor (R-Minn), House Judiciary Committee
Rep Frank J. Horton (R-NY), House District of Columbia Committee
Rep Spark M. Matsunaga (D-Haw), House Agriculture Committee
Rep Albert W. Watson (D-SC), House Post Office & Civil Service Committee
Rep Don Fuqua (D-Fla), House Science & Astronautics Committee
Plus party of 5. — 11-12 December 1964

9999th Air Force Reserve Squadron,
Sen Peter H. Dominick (R-Colo), Senate Banking & Currency Committee
Rep Basil L. Whitener (R-NC), House District of Columbia Committee
Rep Harold M. Ryan (D-Mich), House Public Works Committee
Rep Carlton R. Sickles (D-Md), House Education and Labor Committee
BGen James H. Isbell USAF, Cdr, 2d AFR Region, Escort Officer
Plus party of 16. — 5-7 December 1964

Mbr Senate Appropriations Committee (Sen A. S. "Mike" Monroney (D-Okla) and Mrs. Monroney)
27 November - 7 December 1964 and 21-26 December 1964

Mbr Senate Appropriations Committee (Sen Milton R. Young (R-ND))
Plus party of 5. — 6-9 December 1964

Mbr Senate Armed Services Committee (Sen Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash))
30 November - 10 December 1964

Mbr Senate Government Operations Committee (Sen James B. Pearson (R-Kan))
6-19 December 1964

Mbrs of Sub-committee, House Banking & Currency Committee
Rep William A. Barrett (D-Pa)
Rep Thomas L. Ashley (D-Ohio)
Rep Leonor K. Sullivan (D-Mo)
Rep Fernand J. St. Germain (D-R1)
Rep William B. Widnall (R-NJ) and Mrs. Widnall
Rep Paul A. Fino (R-NY) and Mrs. Fino
Rep Joseph M. McDade (R-Pa) and Mrs. McDade
Plus party of 3. - 5-18 November 1964

Mbr House Appropriations Committee (Rep W. R. Hull, Jr. (D-Mo))
15-19 December 1964

Mbr House Appropriations Committee (Rep Charles R. Jonas (R-NC)
    and Mrs. Jonas)
    Plus 1 - 18-29 November 1964

Mbr House Armed Services Committee (Rep Jeffery Cohelan (D-Calif))
12-14 December 1964

Mbr House Armed Services Committee (Rep Clarence D. Long (D-Md))
    Plus 1. - 2-4 December 1964

Mbr House Armed Services Committee (Rep Alvin E. O'Konski (R-Wis)
    and Mrs. O'Konski)
    Plus 1. - 22-26 December 1964
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Visitors and Details</th>
</tr>
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| Australia | Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies and Lady Menzies  
Plus party of 5. — 19 June 1964  
The Hon Allen Fairhall, Mbr of Parliament, Minister for Supply  
Plus 1. — 4-5 October 1964  
The Hon William McMahon, Mbr of Parliament, Minister for Labor and National Service  
7-9 July and 2-6 December 1964  
26 January 1964 |
| China | Gen 1st Class Yu Tai-wei, CA, Minister of National Defense, and Mrs. Yu Tai-wei  
28 April and 26 July 1964  
Gen 1st Class Hsu Huan-sheng, CAF, Commander in Chief, Chinese Air Force  
Plus party of 2. — 22-23 June 1964  
Adm Ni Yue-si, CN, Commander in Chief, Chinese Navy  
Plus 1. — 27-28 October 1964 |
| France | RAdm F. Picard-Destelan, FN, Commander in Chief, French Forces, Pacific  
30 July - 6 August 1964 |
| Japan | The Hon Zenshiro Hoshina, Mbr, Diet House of Representatives and Mrs. Hoshina  
30 September - 2 October 1964  
The Hon Tokuyasu Fukuda, Director General, Japanese Defense Agency, and Mrs. Fukuda  
Plus party of 3. — 4 July 1964  
MGen Eizo Hori, GSDF, J2, Joint Staff Office, Japanese Defense Agency  
Plus party of 2. — 18-25 November 1964 |
Korea

LtGen Kyung Won Park, ROKA, Director, Joint Staff, ROK
Plus 1. — 28 March and 12-14 April 1964

LtGen Song Hwan Chang, ROKAF, Chief of Staff, ROK Air Force, and Mrs. Chang
Plus party of 2. — 8 February and 25-28 February 1964

VAdm Maeng Kee Lee, ROK Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, ROK Navy, and Mrs. Lee
Plus party of 3. — 15 March and 29-31 March 1964

Laos

MGen Phoumi Nosavan, FAR, Vice Premier and Minister of Finance, and Mrs. Nosavan.
The Hon Bouavan Norasing, Minister of Justice
The Hon Pheng Norindr, National Assembly Deputy
Plus party of 2. — 7-9 October 1964

New Zealand

The Hon Keith Holyoake, Prime Minister of New Zealand
Plus party of 2. — 2 July and 21 July 1964

Philippines

His Excellency, Diosdado Macapagal, President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Mrs. Macapagal
His Excellency, Mauro Mendez, Sec of Fgn Affairs
His Excellency, Rufino G. Hechanova, Sec of Finance
His Excellency, Virgilio Reyes, Press Secretary
His Excellency, Oscar Ledesma, Amb to the U.S.
His Excellency, Salvador P. Lopez, Amb to the U.N. and Mrs. Lopez
His Excellency, Eduardo Rosal, Chief of Protocol
BGen Victor Dizon, Military Adviser to the President
Plus party of 30. — 3 October and 13-15 October 1964

SEATO

Mr. Konthi Suphamongkhon, Secretary General, SEATO, and Mrs. Suphamongkhon
18-20 May 1964

Thailand

Gen Praphat Charusathira, RTA, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Interior, Deputy Supreme Commander of Thai Armed Forces, and Deputy Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army.
12-14 June 1964
Gen Chalor Charukalasa, RTA, Assistant Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army
20-24 October 1964

United Kingdom
VAdm John F. D. Bost, RN, Commander, British Naval Staff and Naval Attaché, Washington, D.C.
Plus party of 2. – 23-27 February and 5 March 1964
VAdm Sir Desmond P. Dreyer, RN, Flag Officer, Commander in Chief, Far East Fleet
24-28 February 1964

Vietnam
MGer: Duong Van Minh, Chief of Staff, Member of Triumvirate, and Mrs. Minh
12-27 November 1964
## UNCLASSIFIED

### APPENDIX K

**CINC PAC KEY STAFF OFFICERS**

(31 December 1964)

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<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>INCUMBENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>LGen</td>
<td>Verdi B. Barnes, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Adviser</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Norman B. Hannah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Operations</td>
<td>MGen</td>
<td>Theodore R. Milton, USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff Military Assistance Logistics &amp; Administration</td>
<td>RAdm</td>
<td>Luther C. Heinz, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Secretary</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>William H. Worley, USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historian</td>
<td>LCol</td>
<td>Robert G. Miller, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Ciarence E. Stuart, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence</td>
<td>BGen</td>
<td>Grover C. Brown, USAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations</td>
<td>BGen</td>
<td>Keith B. McCutcheon, USMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics</td>
<td>BGen</td>
<td>Frank G. White, USA</td>
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<td>Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans</td>
<td>RAdm</td>
<td>Donald Gay, Jr., USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications &amp; Electronics</td>
<td>BGen</td>
<td>Harry A. French, USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Performance Evaluation Group</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Thomas L. Mann, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comptroller</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Robert L. Clark Jr., USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal Officer</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Norman G. Lancaster, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Information Officer</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Willis L. Heimantoler, USAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director of Protocol</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Julius W. Ireland, USMC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff Medical Officer</td>
<td>RAdm</td>
<td>Walter Weham, MC, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC PAC Representative JSTPS (Omaha) &amp;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Joseph A. Jaap, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC PAC Representative Strategic Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific Command Operations &amp; Liaison Office, Japan</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Francis E. Winget, USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Pacific Transportation Office</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Thomas E. W. Smith, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Command MAP Data Center</td>
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<td>Lawrence W. Evans, USAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Lawson C. Horner, Jr, USAF</td>
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<td>XRAY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director Department of Defense, Pacific</td>
<td>Mr.</td>
<td>William E. Duggan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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*Assigned to Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
#Assigned to AWS (MATS)
## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACP</th>
<th>Airborne Command Post</th>
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<td>AC&amp;W</td>
<td>Aircraft Control and Warning</td>
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<td>Automatic Data Message Switching Center</td>
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<td>AID</td>
<td>Automated Intelligence File</td>
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<td>Air Operation Center</td>
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<td>Barracks Ship non-self-propelled</td>
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<td>ARPA&amp;RD</td>
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<td>AUTOVON</td>
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<td>Chinese Communist Navy</td>
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<td>CCN</td>
<td>Combat Developments</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>Communications-Electronics</td>
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<td>C-E</td>
<td>Civil Guard/Commanding General</td>
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<td>CG</td>
<td>Chinese Communists</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAGTHAI</td>
<td>Chief Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma</td>
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<td>Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
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Page 475 of 495 Pages
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<td>CHWTO</td>
<td>Chief Western Transportation Office</td>
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<td>CIDG</td>
<td>Civilian Irregular Defense Group</td>
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<td>CINICAL</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Alaska</td>
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<td>CINCEUR</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Europe</td>
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<td>CINCFES</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Far East Station (British)</td>
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<td>Commander in Chief Middle East Southern Asia and Africa South of the Sahara</td>
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<td>CINCPACREP</td>
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<td>Commander in Chief of the Strike Command</td>
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<td>CINCSRAFC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief United Nations Command</td>
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<td>CINCUSARPAC</td>
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<td>CNO</td>
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<td>COMUSMACV</td>
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<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<td>CVA</td>
<td>Attack Aircraft Carrier</td>
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<td>CW</td>
<td>Continuous Wave</td>
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D
- Department of the Army
- DA Forward Depot
- Defense Communications Agency
- Defense Communication System
- Destroyer
- Director, Defense Research and Engineering
- Destroyer Escort
- Deputy Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group
- Defense Intelligence Agency
- Demilitarized Zone
- Department of Defense
- Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North)
- Distinguished Visitor
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<td>F/AIF</td>
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<td>Fleet Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>Fleet Marine Force Pacific</td>
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<td>Flight Training Detachment</td>
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<td>General Accounting Office</td>
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<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
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<td>GOJ</td>
<td>Government of Japan</td>
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<td>GRC</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of China</td>
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<td>GPV</td>
<td>General Purpose Vehicle</td>
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<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Commission for Supervision and Control</td>
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<td>IFF</td>
<td>Identification, Friend or Foe</td>
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<td>ISB</td>
<td>Inner-Sideband</td>
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<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>Mapping, Charting and Geodesy</td>
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<td>MILAD</td>
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<td>MOBEX</td>
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<td>Quartermaster</td>
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<td>SACSA</td>
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<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-air missile</td>
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<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>Satellite Communications</td>
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<td>Supply and Training Mission</td>
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<td>Special Air Warfare</td>
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<td>SIF</td>
<td>Selective Identification Feature</td>
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<td>Special Landing Force</td>
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<td>SMRIS</td>
<td>Soviet Missile Range Instrumentation Ship</td>
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<td>Special Operations Center</td>
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<td>SSBN</td>
<td>Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine (nuclear powered)</td>
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<td>SYNCOM</td>
<td>Synchronous Communication Satellites</td>
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<td>TTMP</td>
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<td>UHF</td>
<td>Ultra High Frequency</td>
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<td>VAMP</td>
<td>Vietnam Ammunition Procedures</td>
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<td>VC</td>
<td>Viet Cong</td>
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<td>VLF</td>
<td>Very Low Frequency</td>
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<td>VNAF</td>
<td>Vietnamese Air Force</td>
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<td>VNN</td>
<td>Vietnamese Navy</td>
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<td>VNSF</td>
<td>Vietnamese Special Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOA</td>
<td>Voice of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTPAC</td>
<td>Western Pacific</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX

A

AH Aircraft: Air Force retention of support responsibility, 157-158; additional squadrons for RVN, 318-321
AAA Artillery, Republic of China, 210
AC&W Systems: Danang (MONKEY MOUNTAIN, 352; Thailand, 419-421
ADP System, CINCPAC, 23
AFAK, see Armed Forces Actions Korea
Agreements: with Australia — ammunition, 231-233; Republic of Korea, petroleum operating, 194-197; between CINCPAC and CINCAL, 18
Air America, 274, 282
AIR BOON CHO0, 223-225, 266
Airborne Command Post, CINCPAC, 24-27
Aircraft: AH—Air Force retention of support responsibility, 157-158; additional fighter squadrons to VNAF, 318-321; air interdiction, Laos, 299-300; support of, Laos, 282; CV2B (Caribou), Laos, 282-284; E2A, sale of to Japan, 185-186; logistic support, Laos, 288-289; SAR helicopters, Laos, 284-285; T-28s — requirements, Laos, 286-288, Thailand, 406-408
Air Defense Control Installations, 57
Air Force Tactical Relationship Study, Southeast Asia, 39-40
Air/Ground Control, Laos, 278-279
Airlift: theater, 106-109; planning for Thai forces to area opposite Thakhek, 390-391
Air Target: chart series 200, p. 95; mosaic series 50, p. 94
Alternate Command Center Afloat, PACOM, 29
Ammunition: War Reserves - proposal to centralize, 153-154; agreement with Australia, 231-233; procedures - RVN (VAMP), 325-327; procedures - Laos (LAMP), 289-292
Amphibious capability, PACOM MAP, 158-159
Amphibious readiness, increased, RVN, 386
Anti-submarine Warfare Exercise - combined, 237
APDs, Republic of China purchase of, 209-210
AUMEE III, 239-241
Australia: OSD Mission to, 234-236; ammunition agreement with, 231-233
Automated Intelligence File, 97
A

Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN), use of in PACOM, 123
Automatic Voice Network, use of in PACOM, 123-124 (AUTOVON)
Automation of Key Indigenous Persons Program, 15-16
Aviation Fuels, prepositioning in Thailand, 412

B

B-57 aircraft; proposal to deploy to RVN, 361-364; destroyed by Viet
Cong attack on Bien Hoa Airfield, 381-383
BACK PACK, 237-238
BADGE, 183-184
Bangkok By-Pass Road, Thailand, 408-412
Bien Hoa, attack on airfield, 381-383
BIG SQUIRT, 353-354
Bilateral Planning, Thailand, 391-395
Blockade, proposed for DRV, 361
Blue Data Base, 60
BON HOMME RICHARD, 376
Border Control, operations in RVN, 50
Border operations, Laos, 275
Burma: aircraft program, 174-177; MAP, 170-174

C

C2A aircraft, sale to Japan, 185-186
C-130 Squadrons, 108-109
Cambodia, closeout of MAAG, 177-179
Canada, combined exercise HARD SHOT, 237
Cannibalization, WWII vehicles, 200-201
Can Tho Airfield, RVN, 338
Carrier Task Force, positioning subsequent to Laos coup, 267
Chemical: technical escort for toxic chemical
munitions, 112
Chief JUSMAG Philippines, change of service designation, 17
Chief MAAGs: change of service designation, China, 17; Japan, 17
China, Communist: jets to DRV, 373; nuclear production facilities
targeted, 58; U.S. naval patrols, 366ff
China, Republic of, see Republic of China
CIDG, revolt in RVN, 378-380
CINCAL, memorandum of agreement between CINCPAC and, 18
CINCLANT OPLAN 315-64, p. 103
CINCPAC: actions to counter aggression, Laos, 259-303; concept of strategy against DRV, 384-385; Military Assistance Manual, 137-138; comments on invasion of Southeast Asia, 360; representative to SAC, 13;
CINCSTRIKE: Liaison officer to CINCPAC, 13-14; CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA OPLAN 531/11, p. 102
Civic Action: Republic of Korea (AFAK), 197-199; RVN, 346-349
Civilians; U.S., proposal concerning criminal jurisdiction, 252-253
Claim, on SEATO Exercise LIGTAS, 253-254
Claymore Mines, British request for, 115
Cold War Activities Group, disestablishment of, 16
Combat Developments, Thailand, 423-425
Combined Exercises, (Non-SEATO), 236-244
Command and Control, communications, 117-118; system, senior staff officers advisory board, 30
Command Arrangements, Laos, 299
Command Center, PACOM's alternate afloat, 29
Command Facilities, effects of nuclear weapons on, 61
Command Post, CINCPAC-airborne, 24-27
Command Post Exercises (CPX), FY65 DUK SOO RI, Korea, 243
Command Relationships: CINCPACREP to SAC, 13; CINCSTRIKE liaison officer to CINCPAC, 13-14; consideration of separating MACV and MACTHAI, 19-21; RVN, RDT&E-CD, 344-346

Commanders in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), listing of, 2
Commando, USAF Air, 320
Commercial Consummables, Republic of China, 206-207
Communications: activities in Thailand, 416-418; AIR BOON CHOO, 224-225; AUTODIN, 123; AUTOVON, 123-124; casualty planning, 129; CINCPAC communications center, 127-128; command and control, 117-118; consolidation of DCS facilities, 124; error detection and correction, 128-129; frequency management within SEATO, 121-122; Operation CROSSCHECK, 122-123; identification
Communications: (Cont'd) system (IFF MARK X), 129-130; joint overseas switchboards, 119; Republic of Korea, 134-135; Philippines - RVN project, 126; plan for upgrading joint on-island, 124-125; Republic of Vietnam, 351-352; Saigon-Bangkok project, 126; satellite tracking stations, 122; Republic of China, security, 133; Taiwan-Phillippines terminal and microwave relay, 125; Trans-Pacific cables, 118-119; Trans-Taiwan system, 126; VLF improvements on Oahu, 119; Western Pacific wide band system, 125-126

Communist Aggression, CINCPAC contingency plan for, 55
Communist Force Strength Changes: CHICOM, North Korea, North Vietnam, 90-92
COMUS Japen, terms of reference for, 17-18
COMUS MACVTHAI, consideration of separating MACV and MACTHAI, 19-21
COMUS MACV: authority to award medals and decorations, 310; authority to exploit air and sea transportation, 334; emergency radio broadcast communications, 327; establishment of historical program, 309; JCS policy on JTD changes, 308; reorganization of, 306-308

CONCORD SQUADRON, 67-70
Conferences (SEATO): Military Advisors Conference number 20 (MA20C), 212; and number 21 (MA21C), 215

Construction: Republic of Vietnam, 338-344

Contingency Plan Facilities List, 98-99
Coordinating Committee for U.S. Mission, Southeast Asia, 21-22
Cost Reduction Program, MAP, 148-150
COUNTER BLOW FY64, 241
Counterinsurgency: field training exercise, Thailand, 243-244
Coups: failure of 13 Sep, RVN, 377; Laos 19 Apr, 267
CPXs, see command post exercises
Criminal Jurisdiction: Japanese over U.S. civilian employees and dependents, 251-252; proposals concerning U.S. civilians, 252-253; Republic of Korea, 246-248
Crop destruction, RVN, 364-366
C. TURNER JOY, 369ff

Data Base: Blue, 60; YANKEE TEAM, 272-273; Republic of Vietnam, 355

Data Link, secure television and, 27-29
Defense Communications System, consolidation of facilities, 124
Defoliation: Republic of Vietnam, 364-366
Dependents: Criminal jurisdiction over, Japan, 251-252
Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia, 45-49
Democratic Republic of Vietnam: CHICOM jets arrive, 373; combat
with U.S. naval patrols, 367; frag order for U.S. punitive and
crippling reprisal, 380-381; planned U.S. reprisal for attack on
USS MORTON and USS EDWARDS, 375ff; proposal for U.S.
lodgement on littoral, 383; proposed naval blockade, 361; U.S.
naval patrols, 366ff; U.S. reprisal air strikes for Gulf of Tonkin
attacks, 371-372

DESMOTO Patrol: 367ff, 373; CINCPAC recommendations for, 385
DICE DROP, joint exercise, 76-77
Dollar (MAP): FY65 appropriations and ceilings, 143-145; OSD
guidelines FY67-71, 148
DRV, see Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DUK SOO RI, 243

E
E2A aircraft sale to Japan, 185-186
EDWARDS, USS, 375ff
Electronic Warfare, 130
Error Detection and Correction (message garbling), 128-129
Evacuation: of dependents, 114; noncombatant, 56
Exercises: AUMEE III, 239; BACK PACK, 237-238; combined (non-
SEATO), 236-244; COUNTER BLOW FY64, 241-242; DUK SOO RI,
243; HARD SHOT, 237; KITTI 07, p. 243; SKY SOLDIER/TIEN
BING VI, 238-239; SEATO, 223-226; STRONG SHIELD, 242;
LOG TRAIN (SEATO) planning, 220; U.S./Canadian, 237; U.S./
GRC, 237-241; U.S./ROK, 241-243; U.S./Thai, 243-244; DICE
DROP, 76-77; FINE ART, planning for, 81-82; QUICK RELEASE,
81-82

F
F-1C aircraft, Burma aircraft program, 174-177
F-5 aircraft program, PACOM wide, 154-157
F-100 aircraft, TFS at Takhli, 398-400
F-102 aircraft, sale to Japan, 186-187
Facilities List, contingency plan, 98-99
FARM GATE: proposal for Laos, p. 273; Republic of Vietnam, 320
Felt, Harry D., Statement to House Foreign Affairs Committee, 136
FINE ART, planning for, 81-82
Flood relief operations, RVN, 328
Flow of Gold: C-130 squadron deployment, 108-109; consideration in
deployment of B-57s, 362-364; proposed withdrawal of U.S.
division from Korea, 7-8
Force Objectives, Pacific Command, 31
Force Requirements and Deployments, 6
Force Strength Changes, communist, 90-92
Forces, free world, 37-39
Forward Floating Depot; test of, Exercise QUICK RELEASE, 81-82
Free World: forces, 37-39; summary of aid to Vietnam, 388-389
Frequency management, SEATO, 121-122

G
GEMINI, support of, 120
Geneva Conference, consideration of reconvening on Laos, 296-297
Geodetic Survey Systems, 100
Goodwill Visit, CONCORD SQUADRON, 67-70
Gravity Base Net, 100
Green Mountain; project cancelled, 113
Gulf of Tonkin, CINCPAC recommendations for DESOTO patrols, 385

H
H-34 aircraft, Air Force retention of support responsibility, 157-158
HARD SHOT, 237
HAWK: modification of, 167; in Republic of Korea, 192-194
Helicopters for SAR, Laos, 284-285
Herbicides, use in Republic of Vietnam, 364-366
HIGH HEELS III, joint exercise, 77-79
Hospital; U.S. improved facilities in Saigon, RVN, 341-344
Hostile Fire Pay, 311-313

I
India, Scheduling of Target Submarine, 164-165
Indian Ocean; visit of CONCORD SQUADRON, 67-70
Indian Ocean Study, consideration of positioning U.S. forces, 74-75
Indonesia: MAP activities, 179-180; Mare Nostrum, 70-74
Infiltration, Republic of Vietnam, 356
Insurgency, Republic of Vietnam, 304-389

Interdiction, CHICOM/NVN movement, 61
International Military Assistance Force (IMAF), in RVN, 386-388
Iwo Jima, service jurisdiction over, 12

Japan: air weapons control system, 183-184; criminal jurisdiction over U.S. civilian employees and dependents, 251-252; debriefing report of CHMAAG, 188-189; MAP activities, 181-183; military assistance sales, 165-166; PACOM force deployment studies, 11; sale of E2A and C2A aircraft, 185-186; sale of F-102 aircraft, 186-187; surface-to-air missiles, 187-188; unfair trial of U.S. serviceman under status of forces agreement

Joint Exercises: DICE DROP, 76-77; HIGH HEELS III, 77-79; planning for FINE ART, 79-81

JSOP 70, pp 32-37
JTD, JCS policy on changes, 308
JUNGLE JIM, 273
Junk Construction, Republic of Vietnam, 357

Key Indigenous Persons Program, automation of, 15-16
KITTI 07, pp 243-244
KITTIE HAWK: positioning subsequent to Laos coup, 268; base for YANKEE TEAM flights, 269
Korea, North, see Communist forces
Korea, South, see Republic of Korea

Labor Policy, Republic of Korea, 248
LAMP, 289-292
Laos: Air America, 274; aircraft support, 282; air interdiction, 299-
300; air/ground control, 278-279; alignment of routes, 89;
ammunitions supply for PDI, 281; border operations, 275;
CINCPAC actions to counter aggression, 259-303; consideration of
reconvening Geneva Conference, 296-297; contingency plan
facilities list, 98; coup of 19 April, 267; CV2B (Caribou), 282-
284; equipment for Neutralists, 281; equipment for Neutralist
contingency, 279-280; FARM GATE, 273-274; LAMP, 280-292;
logistic support for aircraft, 288-289; LONE STAR, 299; MAP,
292-296; MAP FY65 and FY66, 293; MAP emergency program
controls, 294; MAP training in Thailand, 294-296; military
action to stabilize the situation in Republic of Vietnam, 52;
night air operations, 299; plans to re-introduce U.S. military
advisors, 298-299; preparation for defense of Muong Son, 276-
278; princes meet in Paris, 263; reaction to reprisal against
North Vietnam, 263; recommendations for stabilizing the
situation, 264-266; reconnaissance flights over, 269; require-
ments for occupation of Panhandle, 274-276; SAR helicopters,
284-285; SATM, 298; special air warfare, 285-286; September
to February strategy for Laotian forces, 300-302; situation at
end of 1964, 302-303; T-28, requirements, 286-288; USAF SAW
detachment, 285-286; U.S. command arrangements, 299

LIGTAS, 225-226, 253-254
Locomotives, Thailand, 425-427
LOGEX (Korea), 242
Logistics: feasibility evaluation of OPLANS, 103-104; joint activities,
102-116; support of MAP forces in Wartime, 150-153; improve-
ment in U.S. support system in RVN, 129-133; Republic of
Vietnam, 325-337; readiness reporting (REDLOG), 104; supply
of ROK shortages in wartime, 199-200; support of Philippines
battalion combat team, 228-229

LOG TRAIN, 226
LONE STAR, 299
LSTs, Republic of China construction and rehabilitation, 207-209

MAAGs: discontinuance, Republic of Vietnam, 306-308; responsibilities
of for Military Assistance Sales (MAS), 165-166; Republic of China,
change of service designation, 17

Mactan Air Base, Philippines, 203
MACTHAI, personnel augmentation, 413-416
MADDOX, USS, 367ff
Magsaysay, Ramon, President of the Philippines, speech 8 September
1964, Manila Conference opening, 211
MAP: support of forces in wartime, 150-153; emergency program controls, Laos, 294; ammunition war reserves, 153-154; Burma, 170-174; CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual, 137-138; Data Center/PACOM, 169-170; effects of FY66 levels on JSOP-70, 32-37; effects of reduced MAP on PACOM countries, 139-142; FY64 program, 143; FY65 appropriations and dollar ceilings, 143-145; FY66 proposed ceilings, 146-147; FY67-71 dollar guidelines (OSD), 148; FY69 Thailand. revisions, FY65 reduction, 402; Indonesian program, 179-180; Laos, 292-296; Laos, FY65 and FY66, 293; Laos, presidential increase to FY64, 292; Laos, training in Thailand, 294-296; military assistance planning reference books, 138; Philippines, 201-202; recommended increases in Thailand FY64, 400-402; Republic of Vietnam, 314-325; screening of excess navy repair parts, 161-162; ship backup spares, 162-164

Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy, 99-101; shift of functions, 14

Mare Nostrum, Indonesia's Illegal Claim to Territorial Sea Area, 70-74

Marriages, unauthorised between U.S. servicemen and Korean nationals, 249

MATS, transportation of dependent students, 109

MEDCAP, 348

Microwave, Korea system, 135

Military Actions to stabilize the situation in RVN and/or Laos, 52

Military Advisors Conferences (SEATO), MA20C, 212; MA21C, 215

Military Assistance Manual, CINCPAC, 137-138

Military Assistance Planning Reference books, 138

Military Assistance Sales (MAS): Republic of China purchase of APDs, 209-210; responsibilities of MAAGs, 165-166

Missiles: modification of HAWK, 1671

MORTON, USS, 375ff

MPO Plans (SEATO): Plan 4, p. 213; Plan 6, p. 213; Plan 7, p. 213

MuongSoul, defense of, 276-278

N

National Policy Paper, Thailand, 412-413

NEEDLE NOSE Patrols, 66-67

Neutralists, Laos: equipment for contingency force, 279-280; equipment for, 281

New Zealand, OSD mission to, 233-236
Night Air Operations, Laos, 299
Nike, Republic of Korea, 192-194
North Korea, see communist forces
North Vietnam, see Democratic Republic of Vietnam
NVN, see Democratic Republic of Vietnam

O
Oahu: Red Hill POL storage facility, 112; VLF improvements on, 119
Offensive Guerrilla Force, Republic of Vietnam, 359
Operation CROSSCHECK, communication frequencies, 122-123
Operation Triangel, Laos, 262-263
Operational plan to terminate aggression in Southeast Asia, 54
OPLANS, CINCPAC: 1-Yr, 41, 105; 25-Yr, 42, 104; 27-Yr, 42-45, 104; 32-Yr, 45, 104; 33-Yr, 53; 37-Yr, 49-54, 63-64; 38-Yr, 54; 39-Yr, 55, 62, 64; 60-Yr, 56; Logistics feasibility evaluation of CINCPAC OPLANS, 103-104
OPLANS (others): CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA 531/11, p. 103;
CINCLANT 315-64, p. 103;
Order of Battle, assignment of responsibility, 96
OSD Mission to Australia and New Zealand, 234-236

P
Pacific Command (PACOM): brief history, 1; changes in personnel strength of military headquarters, 4-6; force objectives, 31; forces required to meet CHICOM threat, 37; personnel strength, 3-4; visits, U.S. civil and military officials, 254-255; visits, foreign representatives, 255; weapons demonstration, 256-258; MAP Data Center, 169-170; amphibious capability, 158-159; alternate command center, afloat, 29
Pacific Defense College, 229-231
Panhandle, Laos; requirements for occupation, 274-276
Patrols: naval, 366ff; NEEDLE NOSE, 66-67
PEPPERGRINDER, 291
Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) Inspections, 167-169
Pershing Missile, 57
Personnel: CINCPAC staff authorized strength, 17; Pacific Command strength, 3-6; MACTHAI augmentation, 413-416; U.S. strength, Republic of Vietnam, 310
Philippines: claims arising from SEATO Exercise LIGTAS, 253-254;
Philippines: (Cont'd) communications, 132; logistic support of battalion combat team (SEATO), 228-229; Mactan Air Base, 203; salvage of RAJAH SOLMAN, 203-204; SEATO Exercise LIGTAS, 225-226; Chief JUSMAG, change of service designation, 17; Philippines-RVN communications project, 126; MAP, 201-202

Plaine des Jarres, ammunition supply for, 281

Planning: for airlift of Thai forces to area opposite Thakhek, 390-391; for strikes against DRV, 384-385; operational, 40

POL: CINC PAC activities, 110-112; Republic of Korea, 194-197; pipeline, Thailand, 413; Red Hill storage facility, 112; prepositioning aviation fuel in Thailand, 412

Policy: CINC PAC, marking equipment, 337; labor, Republic of Korea, 248

Political-Military Activities, 244-254

Prapat, letter to Secretary of Defense, 395-398

Procedures: ammunition, Laos (LAMP), 289-292; Republic of Vietnam, (VAMP), 325-327

Psychological Operations, Republic of Vietnam, 349-351

QUICK RELEASE, test of Forward Floating Depot, 81-82

QUICK TRIP, 231

RAJAH SOLMAN, salvage of, 203-204

Reconnaissance Flights Over Laos, 269

RDT&E, Thailand, 423-425

RDT&E - CD, Republic of Vietnam, 344-346

Red Hill POL Storage Facility, 112

REDLOG, 104

Regulus, commitment to SIOP, 58

Republic of China: AAA Artillery, 210; commercial consummables, 206-207; communications security, 133; purchase of APDs, 209-210; civic action, 197-199; furnishing ammunition to Republic of Vietnam, 158; LST construction and rehabilitation, 207-209; MAP, 204-206; MAP Transfer Program, 206-207; Status of Forces Agreement, 249-250; surface-to-air missiles, 210; U.S. combined exercises — BACK PACK, 237-238, SKY SOLDIER/ TIEN BING VI, 238-241

Republic of Korea: Communications, 134-135; microwave system, 135; LOGEX, 242; Status of Forces Agreement, 245-246; Ulsan refinery, 194-197; POL, 194-197; civic action, 197-199;
Republic of Korea: (Cont'd) consideration of establishing a MAAG, 19; criminal jurisdiction, U.S. personnel, 246-247; defense of, 42-45; labor policy, 248; MAP, 189-190; Petroleum Operating Agreement, 194-197; proposed withdrawal of U.S. division, 7-8; supply of shortages in wartime, 199-200; surface-to-air missiles, 192-194; unauthorized marriages between Korean nationals and U.S. service personnel, 249; U.S. combined exercises — COUNTER BLOW FY64, 241; STRONG SHIELD FY65, 242, 1965 CPXs, 242, FY65 DUK SOO RI, 243

Republic of Vietnam: AC&W (MONKEY MOUNTAIN), 352; additional fighter squadrons for VNAF, 318-321; ammunition procedures (VAMP), 325-327; attack on Bien Hoa airfield, 381-383; B-57 deployment proposal, 361-364; border control operations, 50; Can Tho airfield, 338; CINCPAC activities to counter insurgency in, 304-389; CINCPAC comments on communist invasion of Southeast Asia, 360; CINCPAC comments on Khanh government, 380; CINCPAC support of psychological operations, 349-351; civic action, 346-349; communication activities, 351-352; construction to support contingency operations, 338-344; crop destruction, 364-366; data base, 355; developing water sources, 348; defoliation, 364-366; emergency construction to support increased U.S. advisor effort, 338-339; employment of chemical agents, 386; employment of International Military Assistance Force, 386-388; failure of 13 September coup, 377; flood relief operations, 328; graduated overt military pressures by GVN and U.S. forces, 50; increased amphibious readiness, 386; improved U.S. hospital facilities, Saigon, 341-344; improvement in U.S. logistic support system, 329-333; infiltration by water routes, 356; instability in government, 374; junk force construction, 357; logistic activities, 325-337; MAP five year programming suspended, 314; MAP FY64, 314; MAP FY65, 315; MAP FY65-66, 316-318; MEDCAP, 348; revolt by CIDG, 378-380; offensive guerrilla force, 359; planning for strikes against DRV, 384-385; proposed increase in RVNAF force structure, 323-324; radio transmitter (BIG SQUIRT) at Hue, 353; railway security, 336; RDT&E-CD, 344-346; reorganization of COMUSMACV, discontinuance of MAAG Vietnam, 306-308; restrictions on visits, 313-314; retaliatory actions, 50; river assault groups, 358; security of U.S. ships, 334; summary of Free World aid, 388-389; TACAN, 132; USAF liaison pilot and mechanic training, 332; USAF training of helicopter pilots and mechanics, 332; U.S. casualties, 310; U.S. military units, 310; U.S. personnel strength, 310; use of herbicides, 364-366; USN training missions to VNAF AH squadrons, 321; VAMP, 325-327; vulnerability of resupply routes, 335; vulnerability of water routes to Saigon, 336

RISOP, 59

River Assault Groups, RVN, 358

ROC, see Republic of China
SECRET

ROK, see Republic of Korea
ROKCAP, Korea civic action, program, 197-199
Routes, alignment of, Laos, 89
RVN, see Republic of Vietnam, also COMUSMACV
Ryukyus, PACOM force deployment studies, 11

SAC, CINCPACREP to, 13
Saigon-Bangkok Communications Project, 126
SAR Helicopters for Laos, 284-285
SATM, 298
Sattahip Naval Base, development of, 403-404
Seabee Technical Assistance Teams (STATs) Program Expansion, 160-161
SEACOORD, establishment of, 21-22
SEAMIL, considerations on establishment of, 21-22

Signal support facilities, SAM, in Korea, 134

SKY SOLDIER/TIEN BING VI, 238, 239
SLAT Locomotives, Thailand, 425-427
Status of Forces Agreement: Republic of China, 249-250; Thailand proposal for, 250-251; unfair trial of U.S. serviceman under, Japan, 251; Republic of Korea, 245-246
Southeast Asia: Air Force tactical relationship study, 39-40; analysis of air interdiction on CHICOM/NVN movement, 61; collective defense treaty (1954), main features, 212; coordinating committee for U.S. missions, 21-22; CINCPAC comments on communist
Southeast Asia: (Cont'd) invasion, 360; communist military threat to, 82-90; operational plan to terminate aggression in, 54

Space Flight Programs: GEMINI, 120; support of SYNCOM II & III, 120-121

Spare Parts, ship backup, 162-164

Special Air Warfare, Laos, 285-286

Special Forces: combined exercise, 239-241; U.S., 378-380

Special Operations Centers (SOC's), Thailand, 405-406

Strategy Against DRV, CINCPAC's concept, 384-385

Strategic Island concept, 6

STRONG SHIELD FY65, 242

Surface-to-air missiles (SAM): Korea, signal support facilities, 134; programming and deployment to Korea, 192-194; Republic of China, 210; Japan, 187-188

SYNCOM: 130-132; II & III, support of, 120-121

T-28 Aircraft: Thailand, 406-408; Laos requirements, 286-288

Tactical Relationship Study, Air Force, 39-40

Tactical Target Materials, 93

Taiwan/Penghus, defense of, 42

Target Assessment, air defense control installation, 57

Target Data Inventory Conference, 97

Target Material, requirements and nominations for production, 95

Technical Escorts, for toxic chemical munitions, 112

Television, secure and data link, 27-29

Terms of Reference: COMUS Japan, 17-18

Thailand: AC&W System, 419-421; authorization for general purpose vehicles, 425; Bangkok By-Pass Road, 408-412; bilateral planning, 391-395; communication activities, 416-418; coordination of RDT&E and combat development activities, 423-425; deletion of tires and tubes from MAP, 402-403; development of Sattahip naval base, 403-409; FY69 MAP revisions; FY65 reduction, 402; General Praphat's letter to Secretary of Defense, 395-398; MACTHAI personnel augmentation, 413-416; National Policy Paper, 412-413; planning for airlift of Thai forces to area opposite Thakhek, 390-391; POL pipeline, 413; prepositioning of aviation fuels, 412; recommended increases in FY64 MAP, 400-402; situation in 1964, 390; SLAT locomotives; 425-427; Special
Thailand; (Cont'd) Operations Centers, 405-406; T-28 aircraft, 406-408; TFS at Takhli, 398-400; proposal for SOFA, 250-251; TACAN, 132; Laos MAP training, 294-296; SEATO training exercise AIR BOON CHOO, 223-225; combined exercises with U.S., 243-244; Exercise KITTI 07, pp 243-244; Thai changes of force and airfield declarations to SEATO, 227-228

Traffic Management, PACOM, 114

Trans-Pacific cable, 118-119

Trial, of U.S. serviceman under Japanese Status of Forces Agreement, 25

Transportation, COMUSMACV authority to exploit, 334

U

Ulsan Refinery, Republic of Korea, 194-197

Unconventional Warfare, combined training, 239-241

U.S. Forces: Frag order for punitive and crippling reprisals on targets in DRV, 380-381; DRV attack on USS MORTON and USS EDWARDS, 375ff; proposal for lodgement on the littoral of DRV

V

VAMP, 325-327

Vehicles: Thai authorization for, 425; cannibalization of WWII types, 200-201

Visits, PACOM: U.S. civil and military officials, 254-255 (see App I for listing); Representatives of foreign countries, 255 (see App J for listing)

VNAF, additional fighter squadrons, 318-321

Ulsan Refinery, Republic of Korea, 194-197

Unauthorized marriages between U.S. servicemen and Korean nationals, 249

Unconventional Warfare, combined training, 239-241

W

Weather; effect on military operations, 85

Weapons Demonstration; PACOM, 255-258

World Geodetic System, 100

Worthington, Brig Gen., J. W.; CHMAAG Japan, 188-189

YANKEE TEAM: 261, 267, 269-272; data base, 272-273