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FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

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FRANK G. WHITE
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Assistant
Logistics and Administration

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CGFMFPAC	Cy 23
CINCPACAF	Cy 24
National War College	Cy 25
Army War College	Cy 26
Industrial College of the Armed Forces	Cy 27
Naval War College	Cy 28
Air War College	Cy 29
CPREP JSTPS	Cy 30
DODPRO	Cy 31
SAC X-RAY	Cy 32
CINCPAC STAFF	Cy 1, 33 thru 65

[redacted]

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY

(VOLUME I)

1965

[redacted]

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

SUBJECT	PAGE NUMBERS
Letter of Promulgation	i-ii
Title Page	iii
List of Effective Pages	iv
Foreword	v
Table of Contents	vi-xii
List of Illustrations	xiii-xiv
Command History (Volume I)	1-248
Glossary of Terms	249-257
Index	258-271

FOREWORD

"CINCPAC Command History, 1965" consists of Volumes I and II published by Commander in Chief Pacific; and Annexes "A" and "B" published by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI respectively.

The separate elements of the history are classified according to content and distributed on the basis of a need to know.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
	Foreword	
	List of Illustrations	
I	THE STATE OF READINESS OF UNITED STATES FORCES	1
	United States Forces During 1965	1
	PACOM-Wide Military Strength	1
	Personnel Strength of Military Headquarters Within PACOM	2
	Force Disposition	2
	Conflicting Army/Marine Land Requirements in Okinawa	2
	Survey of United States Bases and Installations in PACOM	21
	Communist Force Strength Changes	23
	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)	23
	People's Republic of China (CHICOM)	24
	North Vietnam	24
	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)	26
	Activities to Improve the CINCPAC Staff Organization	26
	Increases in CINCPAC Joint Table of Distribution (JTD)	26
	Projected Manpower Requirements	29
	Personnel for CINCPAC Airborne Command Post (BLUE EAGLE)	30
	Base Development Planning	30
	Chief, WESTPAC Transportation Office Personnel Spaces	30
	CINCPAC Activities to Improve Command Facilities and Command and Control Procedures	31
	Airborne Command Post (BLUE EAGLE)	31
	CINCPAC Headquarters Facilities	33
	PACOM Force Objectives	34
	Free World Forces	34
	Destroyer Force Level	34

Operational Planning 36
OPLAN 1-66, General War Plan 36
OPLAN 22-66, Support of Internal Uprisings and Revolutions (S) 36
OPLAN 65-65, Security of Selected Personnel and Equipment 36
OPLAN 38-64, Military Operations to Terminate Aggression in Southeast Asia 37
[redacted] 37
37
37

Operations of US Forces 38
[redacted] 38
39
Interference with USSR Signal Intelligence Operations 41

Intelligence Activities 42
[redacted]
CINCPAC Assumes Command of PACOM Electronics Intelligence Center 42
Air Target Materials Conference 43

CINCPAC Communications Activities 44
Command and Control Communications 44
Interim Automatic Digital Network 44
Secure Voice Communications 44
CINCPAC Command and Control Alerting/Conferencing Capability 45
CINCPAC Communications Center 46
Teleconference Facility Modernization 47
Automated Message Retrieval 47
Electrical Message Management Program 47
Pacific Command Frequency Management 51
Project Gemini 51
Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) 51
Major Communications Relay Ship ANNAPOLIS 52
Frequency Requirements for Back Porch Tropo System, Vietnam 52
Joint Pacific Triton Authenticator 53
Communications-Electronics Data for OPLANS 53

Public Affairs 54
Honolulu Public Affairs Conference on the War in South Vietnam 54
Voluntary Press Censorship 55
Public Affairs Capabilities Study for PACOM 55
[redacted] 56
Asian Journalist Visit to Hawaii 57

II CINCPAC ACTIONS INFLUENCING THE STATE OF READINESS OF ALLIED NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA 58
Planning and Funding Military Assistance 59
PACOM FY 66 and FY 67 Military Assistance Program 59
Republic of China (ROC) 59
China FY 66 Dollar Ceiling Decrease 62
China FY 67 Dollar Ceiling Reduction 62
Republic of Korea 63
Korea FY 66 Dollar Ceiling Increase 65
Korea FY 67 MA Program 66
Korea FY 67 to FY 71 Dollar Ceilings 67
Philippines 67
Japan 70
Thailand 71
Burma 73
Laos 74
FY 66 MAP Dollar Guidelines 75
MAP Appraisal 78
Republic of China 80
Republic of Korea 81
Thailand 82
Philippines 83
Draft Update of Military Assistance Manual (MAM) 84
PACOM Region and Country Military Assistance Plan Books 84
Changes in MAP Programming Procedures 85
Increased Planning and Programming Efficiency 86
Area Wide Activities 88
Base Development Requirements Eligible for MAP or AID Funding 88
Logistic Support of MAP Forces in Wartime 89
War Reserve Level of Medical Supplies 92

Area Wide Activities (Continued)
MAP Training Workshops 93
C-119G Transport Aircraft Requirements 94
F-5 Aircraft Program 98
Fire Control System 98
Preparatory Training 100
Reports and Maintenance Data Feedback 101
Coordination 102
Republic of Korea 103
Philippines 105
Republic of China 106
Thailand 107
Vietnam 110
Burma Inquiry 114
Helicopter Requirements 114
Small Patrol Craft Requirements 116

Country Activities 119
Republic of Korea 119
MAP Transfer Program 119
Purchase of High Speed Transport (APD) for ROK Navy 124
Retention of F-86F Aircraft in the ROK Air Force 126
C-46D Aircraft for ROKAF 128
Surface-to-Air Missile Units 129
Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) 131
Ammunition Raw Material Reserves 131
ROK Army and Ministry of Communications (ROKA/MOC) Microwave System 132
Chief Air Force Advisory Group Korea 134
Performance Evaluation Group Inspection 134
Republic of China (ROC) 135
Recommendations of the ROC Minister of Defense 136
Expansion of Military Assistance Sales (MAS) Program 140
MAP Support of Equipment Procured Through MAS 141
Purchase of APDs Through Military Assistance Sales (MAS) Program 143
LST Advisory Division of MAAG China 146
Retention of F-104A/B Squadron 147
Retention of F-86F Aircraft 148
Completion of Military Integrated Communications System (MICS) 150
Formation of the Second Marine Division 153
Change of Service Designation of Chief MAAG China 155
Phase-Out of Obsolete Equipment 155

		156
	Philippines	156
	Effort to Improve the Philippine Armed Forces	161
	Philippine Free World Military Assistance Force (FWMAF) for RVN	164
	Replacement of the RAJAH SOLIMAN	165
	Jet Fuel Shortage	166
	RPS MASBATE Attrited	166
	Proposal to Shift Philippine Defenses to the Southern Islands	168
	Thailand	168
	Patrol Ships and S-2A ASW Aircraft	170
	Management Improvement in Royal Thai Navy Dockyard	171
	Performance Evaluation Group Inspection of Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand	172
	Indonesia	172
	Cessation of Indonesia MAP	174
	Deactivation of Military Technical Advisory Group (MILTAG) and Activation of Defense Liaison Group (DLG)	175
	Indonesia Communications System	178
	Possible Future Support for Indonesia	180
	Burma	180
	MAP Support Levels	182
	Suspension of MAP Training	183
	Army Continued as Service Responsible for Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT)	183
	Airlift of MAP Cargo from Thailand to Burma	183
	Japan	183
	Guided Missile Destroyer Commissioned	
III	CINCPAC ACTIONS CONCERNING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES	185
	CINCPAC Activities in Support of SEATO	185
	Changes in Key SEATO Positions	185
	Military Advisors Conference Number 22 (MA 22C)	188
	Military Advisors Conference Number 23 (MA 23C)	193
	[redacted]	196
		199
		199
	SEATO Sixth Logistic Committee Meeting (Log 6M)	200

CINCPAC Activities in Support of SEATO (Continued)
SEATO POL Conference 201
SEATO Communications-Electronics Committee Meeting (C-E 8M) 202
SEATO Training Exercises 203
Exercise LOG TRAIN 203
Exercise SEA HORSE 205
Sand Model Maneuver Exercise 207
Orientation Course 207
[redacted] 208
211

Political-Military Activities 213
Passport Requirements for Thailand 213
Contingency Plan for Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 214
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) Council Meeting 214
United Kingdom Review of Defense Commitments 215
Four Power Talks 219
[redacted] 220
Visits of Japanese Former Residents of Bonin Islands and Iwo Jima 221
Use of Riot Control Agents in Vietnam 223
Impact of US Force Build-Up on RVN Civil Economy 223
Disciplinary Problems 224
United States Forces in Japan 224
Unauthorized Marriage of US Servicemen 225
Legal Jurisdiction Over US Civilian Employees and Dependents 225
Attempted Defection 225
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in PACOM 226
Philippine Criminal Jurisdiction Agreement 229
Republic of China Status of Forces Agreement 233
Republic of Korea Status of Forces Agreement 235
Unfair Trial of United States Serviceman Under Japanese SOFA 237
United States Base Rights in the Philippines 238
Philippine-US Military Base Agreement (MBA) 238
Airlift Through Clark Air Base 240

United States Base Rights in the Philippines (Continued)
United States Use of Mactan Air Base 241
Visits of Third Country Ships and Aircraft to US Bases in the Philippines 243
Improvement of Philippine Air Traffic Control 246
Military Leaders Tour 248

Glossary of Terms 249

Index 258

Appendix A - CINCPAC Headquarters Staff Organization Directory. Inside Back Cover.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Title	Page
The Pacific Command	3
Command Arrangements in PACOM	4
Command Relationships	5
Subordinate Unified Commands and CINCPAC Representatives	6
US Military Assistance Advisory Groups	7
Available Forces	8
Pacific Command Personnel	9
MAAG and Service Advisory Groups Personnel	10
Deployment of Major Ground Units, 1 January 1965	11
Deployment of Major Ground Units, 1 July 1965	12
Deployment of Major Ground Units, 1 November 1965	13
Deployment of Major Air and Ship Units, 1 January 1965	14
Deployment of Major Air and Ship Units, 1 July 1965	15
Deployment of Major Air and Ship Units, 15 November 1965	16
Deployment of Major Air Force Flying and Missile Units, 1 January 1965	17
Deployment of Major Air Force Flying and Missile Units, 1 August 1965	18
Deployment of Major Air Force Flying and Missile Units, 1 November 1965	19
Far East Communist Bloc Military Strength Changes During 1965	25
Commander in Chief Pacific and Staff	27
Message Delivery Time	48
CINCPAC Staff Message Traffic (By Precedence)	49
CINCPAC Staff Message Traffic (By Security Classification)	50
PACOM Military Assistance Dollar Guidelines	60
Laos	76
Republic of Vietnam	77
PACOM F-5 Program	113
Korea	123

Republic of China	139
Military Integrated Communications Systems for Republic of China Armed Forces	151
Philippines	157
Thailand	169
Indonesia	173
Burma	181
Japan	184
SEATO Council	186
SEATO Organization	187
United States Collective Pacific Command	218

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CHAPTER I
THE STATE OF READINESS OF UNITED STATES FORCES

This chapter describes CINCPAC's forces and certain actions to plan for their employment to carry out United States policies. Related items are include in Chapter II, which describes CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program; and in Chapter III which reports CINCPAC actions associated with his position as United States Military Advisor to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and with political military events pertaining to his command. Additionally, CINCPAC's mission to counter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia is treated separately in Chapter IV. (U)

UNITED STATES FORCES DURING 1965

PACOM - Wide Military Strength

Military personnel strength in PACOM rose from 455,689 on 1 January 1965 to 641,825 at the close of the year. All services shared the increase. Comparative strengths of the component services as well as PACOM were as follows:

SERVICE	1 JAN 65	31 DEC 65	CHANGE
Army	107,940	213,911	+105,971
Navy	206,712	255,999	+ 49,287
Marine Corps	69,860	74,210	+ 4,350
Air Force	71,177	97,705	+ 26,528
TOTAL	455,689	641,825	+186,131

The major areas of concentration of military sponsors and dependents and the changes during the year are indicated in the following table:

[redacted]

[redacted]

AREA	MILITARY		DEPENDENTS	
	31 DEC 65	CHANGE	31 DEC 65	CHANGE
Hawaii	55,232	- 15,142	66,442	-4,367
Japan	35,162	- 8,053	48,003	-1,353
Korea	56,798	- 1,674	3,934	+ 944
Marianas	7,616	- 203	11,498	- 325
Okinawa	38,204	- 1,721	26,169	-2,154
Philippines	22,163	+ 6,516	19,741	+4,020
Taiwan	5,232	+ 1,594	6,072	+1,063
Thailand	13,142	+ 8,859	789	- 827
Vietnam	184,314	+160,937	36	- 719

Further information regarding military personnel strength is in the illustration entitled "Pacific Command Personnel."

Personnel Strength of Military Headquarters Within PACOM

The personnel strength of these headquarters is indicated in the table entitled "MAAG and Service Advisory Groups Personnel." (U)

Force Disposition

The disposition of PACOM forces in January, July/August and November is depicted in the following illustrations. Deployments to and within Southeast Asia are discussed in detail in Chapter IV. (U)

Conflicting Army/Marine Land Requirements in Okinawa

Significant CINCPAC effort during the year was directed toward resolution of conflicts in USA/USMC requirements for the limited land area available in Okinawa. The marines required a jet capable airfield for a Marine Air Group (MAG) which was to be relocated from Japan because of Flow of Gold problems and a need to consolidate USMC air/ground forces. CINCPACFLT desired also that the facility be capable of expansion to accommodate major elements of a Marine Air Wing (MAW) and all naval elements from Naha.[1] The army requirement

1. CINCPACFLT 102242Z Sep 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

THE PACIFIC COMMAND



SOURCE: J3B

[redacted]

COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN PACOM



SOURCE: J5111

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COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC): CINCPAC is the Commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. His general area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is the Pacific Ocean, including the islands therein (less Aleutians), the Bering Sea, the eastern Indian Ocean area, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the countries of Southeast Asia.

CINCPAC exercises operational command through the service component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces (when established), and he is accredited as the U.S. Military Representative to the following organizations:

a. SEATO Council: U.S. Military Adviser.

b. ANZUS Council: U.S. Military Representative.

c. Philippine-U.S. Council of Foreign Ministers: U.S. Military Representative and co-chairman of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board.

d. Japanese-American Security Consultative Committee: Member and Principal Adviser on military defense matters to the Chairman of the U.S. Representation.

2. COMPONENT COMMANDERS: There are three service component commanders:

a. Commander in Chief U.S. Army Pacific (CINCUSARPAC).

b. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT).

c. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF).

The service component commanders are responsible for accomplishing such operational missions and tasks as may be assigned by CINCPAC. The PACOM component commands consist of the respective component commanders and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations or installations under their command which have been assigned to the operational command of CINCPAC. Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations or installations may operate directly under the component commander in his service role, and should contribute to the mission of CINCPAC as appropriate.

Service component commanders' responsibilities for the Military Assistance Program are prescribed in CINCPAC Instruction 4900.1 (current revision).

3. COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS: There are five subordinate unified commands in the PACOM:

a. United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Korea (COMUS Korea), Seoul, Korea.

b. United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (COMUS Japan), Fuchu Air Station, Japan.

c. United States Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC), commanded by Commander United States Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC), Taipei, Taiwan.

d. United States Military Assistance Command Thailand (USMACTHAI) commanded by Commander United States Military Assistance Command Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI), Bangkok, Thailand.

e. United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (USMACV) commanded by Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV), Saigon, Republic of Vietnam.

With the approval of the JCS, CINCPAC may establish additional subordinate unified commands or may disestablish or consolidate existing commands.

4. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPACREPS): CINCPACREPs are established in certain areas where no subordinate unified command has been established and where significant forces of two or more services are stationed. There are four:

a. Commanding General, U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands/IX Corps is the CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus (CINCPACREP Ryukyus), Fort Buckner, Okinawa.

b. Commander Naval Forces Marianas is the CINCPAC Representative Mariana-Bonin Islands (CINCPACREP MARBO), Agana, Guam.

c. Commander Naval Forces Philippines is the CINCPAC Representative Philippines (CINCPACREP Philippines), Sangley Point, Philippines.

d. USAF Liaison Officer to Australia is the CINCPAC Representative Australia (CINCPACREP Australia), American Embassy, Canberra, Australia.

e. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Representative to the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (CINCPACREP JSTPS) is also the Commander in Chief Pacific Representative to the Strategic Air Command (CINCPACREP SAC).

CINCPAC may designate additional CINCPACREPs or terminate designations as circumstances dictate.

5. CHIEFS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS (MAAGs): Military Assistance Programs are in effect and have been established in the PACOM area under Chiefs as follows:

a. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Rep of China - Taipei, Taiwan

b. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Japan - Tokyo, Japan

c. Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand - Bangkok, Thailand

d. Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines - Manila, Philippines

e. Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma - Rangoon, Burma

Exceptions:

f. COMUS Korea performs the MAP functions for Korea - Seoul, Korea

g. COMUSMACV performs the MAP functions for Vietnam - Saigon, Rep of Vietnam

h. Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand performs the MAP functions for Laos of planning, programming, requisitioning, receipt and storage in Thailand, and onward shipment to Laos and maintains liaison with USAID Laos and with Attaches. - Bangkok, Thailand

i. Chief, Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia maintains personal contact with Indonesian Armed Forces, basic MAP records, and capability to develop and implement an expanded MAP on short notice. - Djakarta, Indonesia

6. SINGLE SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES (COORDINATING AUTHORITIES): The Secretary of Defense has directed CINCPAC to designate a single senior military representative in each country or area within the Pacific Command where U.S. Military personnel are on duty. The single senior military representatives are:

a. Korea - Commander U.S. Forces, Korea

b. Japan - Commander U.S. Forces, Japan

c. Ryukyu Islands - Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Ryukyus[redacted]

d. Taiwan and Penghu - Commander U.S. Taiwan Defense Command

e. Mariana-Bonin Islands - Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Mariana-Bonin Islands

f. Philippines - Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Philippines

g. South Vietnam - Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

h. Thailand - Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand

i. Indonesia - Chief, Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia

j. Burma - Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma

k. Australia - Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Australia

[redacted]

SOURCE: JS

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES

FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

AS OF 1 FEBRUARY 1966

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

CINCUNC/USFK	Gen	Dwight E. BEACH, USA
CofS	LGen	Benjamin O. DAVIS, Jr., USAF
Spec Asst for Mil Aff & CHPROVMAAG Korea	MGen	Edwin H. BURBA, USA
Spec Asst/Armistice Aff & Sr Mbr UNCMAC	MGen	Harry J. SANDS, Jr., USAF
DCofS	Col	Allen G. PIXTON, USA
ACofS J-1	Col	Walter P. BENJAMIN, USAF
ACofS J-2	Capt	James M. ROBERTSON, USN
ACofS J-3	Col	John A. BROOKS III, USAF
ACofS J-4	Col	Herman W. SHERIFF, USA
ACofS J-5	Capt	George HAGERMAN, USN
Chief, Armistice Aff Div & Sec UNCMAC	Col	George P. CHARLTON, USA

U.S. FORCES JAPAN

Commander	LGen	Maurice A. PRESTON, USAF
CofS	MGen	Ethan A. CHAPMAN, USA
ACofS J-1	Col	Paul J. MALINE, USA
ACofS J-2	Col	Cline J. LAMPKIN, USA
ACofS J-3	Col	Buddy A. STROZIER, USAF
ACofS J-4	Capt	Thomas D. CUNNINGHAM, USN
ACofS J-5	Col	Robert E. CONINE, USA
ACofS J-6	Col	Robert G. RUSHFORTH, USAF
Surgeon (NAVFORJAPAN)	RAdm	Edward P. IRONS, USN
Legal Advisor (5AF)	Col	Robert W. MICHELS, USAF

U.S. TAIWAN DEFENSE COMMAND

Commander	VAdm	William E. GENTNER, Jr., USN
CofS	BGen	(D)Boyd HUBBARD, Jr., USAF
	BGen	(R)Tarleton H. WATKINS, USAF
ACofS J-1	Capt	Glenn E. PHILLIPS, USN
ACofS J-2	Col	James M. AUSTIN, USAF
ACofS J-3	Capt	Leonard E. FIELD, USN
ACofS J-4	Col	Clark W. PORTER, USA
ACofS J-6	Capt	James K. ALLEMAN, USN

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

Commander	Gen	William C. WESTMORELAND, USA
Deputy Commander	LGen	John A. HEINTGES, USA
CofS	MGen	William B. ROSSON, USA
Joint Secretary	Col	Edward BAUTZ, Jr., USA
ACofS J-1	BGen	Ben STERNBERG, USA
ACofS J-2	BGen	Jose McCHRISTIAN, USA
ACofS J-3	BGen	William E. DePUY, USA
ACofS J-4	BGen	John D. CROWLEY, USA
ACofS J-5	MGen	John N. EMBANKS, Jr., USAF
ACofS J-6	BGen	Walter E. LOTZ, Jr., USA
Dir Jnt R&D Act(JRATA)	BGen	John K. BOLES, Jr., USA
COM2AIRDIV	MGen	Joseph H. MOORE, USAF
CH AF Adv Gp	BGen	Albert W. SCHINZ, USAF
Dep CGUSARV	LGen	Jean E. ENGLER, USA
CO HEDSUPPACT	Capt	Archie C. KUNTZE, USN
ComTaskElm 79.3.36	Col	Robert A. MERCHANT, Jr., USMC

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, THAILAND

Commander	MGen	Richard G. STILWELL, USA
Deputy Commander	MGen	Thomas B. WHITEHOUSE, USAF
Ch, Support Acty	Cdr	Gregory E. LAWRENCE, Jr., USN

See MAAG Personnel listing for CofS, J1 thru 6, MAP Dir., & Compt dual functions

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, RYUKYUS

CINCPACREP Ryukyus/ CG USARYIS/IX Corps	LGen	Albert WATSON II, USA

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, PHILIPPINES

CINCPACREP Philippines/ COMNAVPHIL	RAdm	Jack P. MONROE, USN

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, MARIANA-BONIN ISLANDS

CINCPACREP MARBO/ COMNAVMARIANAS	RAdm	Horace V. BIRD, USN

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, AUSTRALIA

CINCPACREP Australia	Col	Berton H. BURNS, USAF

SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION

US MILADREP, SMPO, Bangkok	Col	Richard C. BENDER, USAF

(A) Acting (R) Ordered to Report (D) Ordered Detached

SOURCE: J1

U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS

FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

AS OF 1 FEBRUARY 1966.

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP PHILIPPINES

Chief	MGen	James R. WINN, USA
CofS	Col	Charles D. SONNKALB, USAF
ACofS Prog		Vacant
Ch Army Sec	Col	Jack R. LOONEY, USA
Ch Navy Sec	Capt	Phillip W. PORTER, USN
Ch AF Sec	Col	David GOULD, USAF

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP JAPAN

Chief	RAdm	George R. LUKER, USN
CofS	Col	Robert H. DAMICO, USAF
ACofS Plans & Policies	LCol	Edward B. HRDLICKA, USA
ACofS Admin	Maj	John P. DONNELLY, USA
Ch Army Sec	Col	Robert H. WILLIAMSON,Jr,USA
Ch Navy Sec	Capt	Gordon J. BROWN, USN
Ch AF Sec	Col	Frank T. ELLIS, USAF

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP THAILAND

Chief	MGen	Richard G. STILWELL, USA
Dep CHJUSMAG Thai	Col	Jack G. CORNETT, USA
CofS	Col	John S. CHALFANT, USAF
ACofS Pers	Col	Robert L. GUNDLACH, USA
ACofS Intel	Col	John P. REED, USA
ACofS Opns	Col	William R. BOND, USA
ACofS Log	LCol	Walter J. EISLER, Jr., USA
ACofS Comm/Elec	Col	Frederick O. RITTER, USAF
Comptroller	Col	Maynard C. MILLER, USA
MAP Dir	Capt	John McLAUGHLIN, USN
Ch Army Adv Grp	Col	James M. MOORE, USA
Ch Navy Adv Grp	Capt	George R. BRYAN, Jr., USN
Ch AF Adv Grp	Col	Loren S. NICKELS, USAF
Sr Marine Adv	Col	David H. SIMMONS, USMC

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP KOREA (PROV)

Chief	MGen	Edwin H. BURBA, Jr., USA
CofS	Col	Henry H. ARNOLD, Jr., USA
SJS	LCol	James H. FULMER, USAF
Ch Plans Div	Capt	William R. EASTON, USN
Ch Log Div	Col	Woodrow J. STEICHEN, USA
Sr Adv Gp (ROK) Adv Gp	Col	William F. STARR, USA
Comptroller	Col	Joseph W. SCANLAN, USAF
Sr Adv ROK Natl War College	Col	Aaron E. BLEWETT, USA

NOTE:
Military Assistance advisory functions in the Republic of Vietnam are performed by the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP CHINA

Chief	MGen	Dwight B. JOHNSON, USA
CofS	Col	Julius B. SUMMERS, Jr,USAF
ACofS Svcs	Col	Reed A. BOOTH, USA
ACofS Log	Capt	John S. LEIDEL, USN
ACofS Opns	Col	Clyde L. HARVEY, Jr,USAF
ACofS Programs	Col	Ralph H. WILTAMUTH, USA
ACofS Comm/Elect	Col	Gordon A. MILLER, USA
Comptroller	Col	Caleb P. MOBERLY, USAF
Ch Army Sec	Col	Lucian F. KELLER, USA
Ch Navy Sec	Capt	Lynn S. ORSER, USN
Ch AF Sec	BGen	Thomas N. WILSON, USAF
Sr Mar Corps Adv	Col	Glenn E. NORRIS, USMC

DEFENSE LIAISON GROUP INDONESIA

Chief	Col	Willis A. BYNUM, USAF

MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERY TEAM BURMA

Chief	Col	Harrison J. MERRITT, USA

SOURCE: J13

(A) Acting (R) Ordered to Report (D) Ordered Detached

[redacted]

AVAILABLE FORCES

CINCUSARPAC	CINCPACFLT	CINCPACAF
* ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC AS OF 15 FEBRUARY 1966		
1 Army Hq 2 Corps Hqs 4 Inf Divs 2 Abn Brigade 1 Missile Cmd (AT) 2 Special Forces Group(-) 3 Logistical Commands 3 Nike-Hercules Bns(+) 8 Hawk Bns 2 Corps Arty 1 Sergeant Bn 3 8" How Bns 1 Tgt Acq Bn 7 Engr Bns (Const) 3 Engr Bn (Cmbt) 1 Little John Bn 2 175 MM Gun Bn 1 Arty Gp (AD) 1 Airmobile Div 2 Arty Bdes (AD) 1 Arty Gp 2 175MM Gen/ 8" How Bns	2 Numbered Fleets 9 Attack Carriers (CVA) 4 ASW Support Carriers (CVS) 7 Cruiser Types 58 Submarine Types 121 Destroyer Types + 89 Amphibious Warfare Types 22 Patrol Ships Types 41 Mine Warfare Ships 8 SOSUS Stations 110 Auxiliary Ships 1 Fleet Marine Force (including 2 MARDIV/WING Teams) 11 Carrier Air Wings $ (CVW) 5 Carrier ASW Air Groups 17 Patrol Squadrons $ (VP) 1 AEW Sqn (VW Flt) 2 Carrier AEW Sqn (VAW) 1 Fleet Air Recon Sqn (VQ) 1 Photo Sqn (VAP) 1 Photo Sqn (VFP) 1 Helo Utility Sqn (HC) + 8 Atlantic Fleet DD Augmented $ 1 Atlantic Fleet Unit Augmented	2 Numbered Air Forces/2 Air Div's (1 Separate) 11 Tac Ftr Sqns (F105) 10 Tac Ftr Sqns (F4) 8 Tac Ftr Sqns (F100)/ 2 Tac Bomb Sqn (B57)/1 Tac MSL Gp (Mace) 1 Air Cmdo Ftr Sqn (A1) 1 Air Cmdo Comp Sqn (A1/C47/U10) 4 Air Cmdo Trp Car Sqns (C123) 1 Air Cmdo Fire Supt Sqn (FC47) 1 Air Cmdo Psy Ops Sqn (U10/C47) 1 Air Cmdo Comp Flt (T28/C47/U10) 4 Tac Air Supt Sqns (01) 1 Air Refuel Hvy Wg (Rotnl KC 135) 2 Ftr Intcp Sqn (F102) 1 Trp Car Sqn (C124)/11 Trp Car Sqn (C130) 1 Air Evac Flt (C118) 1 Abn Comd Ctrl Sqn (EC135)/1 Abn EW Flt (EC121) 1 Comp RCN Sqn (C130/RB57) 3 Tac RCN Sqn (RF111) 1 Tac RCN Flt (RF4C)/1 Tac RCN Sq (RB66 B/C) NOTE: Includes Rotational Units
IN PACOM BUT NOT ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC		
USASA Units in Pacific Army Natl Guard Units 2 Nike-Hercules Bn (-) 1 Inf Bde (2-Inf Bns 1-105MM How Bn) Army Reserve Units 1 Special Fcs Gp (Abn)(-) 1 Inf Bn 1 CA Gp 1 Engr Const Bn	12 Naval Reserve Training Ships Naval Security Groups, Pacific	2 Air Refuel Sq Equivs (SAC) 1 Ftr Intcp Sq (Hang F-102 Hickam) 1 Bomb Hvy Sqn (SAC Reflex B-52) 1 Air Transp Sqns (MAC 1 C-124 Hickam) 1 Trp Carrier Sqn (MAC C-124 Hickam) 3½ Wea Rcn Sqns (MAC WB-50, WB-47, B-57 & WC-135) 1 Test Sqn (APSC JC-130 & CH-3) Air Force Security Service Units (AFSS) Air Force Communication Service Units (AFCS) Air Weather Service Units (MAC) Air Rescue Service Units (MAC)
MAJOR AUGMENTATION FORCES WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE IN EMERGENCY		
CONUS Augmentation 1 Corps Hq 2 Inf Division w/support troops 2 Airborne Division w/support troops 1 Mech Brigade 1 Log Comd (Type C) *These columns include all forces assigned. Some may be in various stages of overhaul, repair, or training and thus not available for immediate deployment.		See Part I of Annex A (Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP).

SOURCE: J3B

[redacted]

[redacted]

PACIFIC COMMAND PERSONNEL

SERVICE - CATEGORY - COUNTRY

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1965

	GRAND TOTAL	MILITARY					U.S. CIVILIANS					LOCAL HIRE CIVILIANS					DEPENDENTS				
		TOT	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	TOT	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	TOT	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	TOT	USA	USN	USMC	USAF
ALASKA	6886	3697		3697			281		281			46		46			2842		2842		
AUSTRALIA	256	209	1	28	2	178											49		45	4	
BONIN ISLAND	98	72		21		51											26		26		
BURMA	166	41	29	6		8	13	12	1			88	16	49		3	42	29	7		6
CHINA	12322	9232	1443	780	19	2990	52	6	32		14	966	128	491		347	8072	1836	1292	46	2898
OKINAWA	141242	55232	21012	18626	5444	9950	4465	577	680	7	3001	15103	4855	9769	485		66442	20801	21145	6340	18156
HONG KONG	73	19	8	7		4	6		6			25		25			23	19	4		
INDONESIA	40	30	7	11	1	11						7		7			3	1	2		
JAPAN	115292	35162	4586	7910	4614	18040	3155	1148	464		1543	28972	13602	155	191	15024	48003	7390	10481	668	29464
JOHNSTON ISLAND	114	114				114															
KOREA	79517	56798	52427	183	64	4124	1262	1148	32		82	17523	15704	356	42	1421	3934	2958	302	61	613
LAOS	35	33	32			1											2		2		
MALAYSIA	28	17	5	12													11	11			
MARIANAS	23028	7616	62	4144	277	3133	1555		805		750	2359		2352		7	11498		6580	123	4795
MARSHALLS	82	32	29			3	12	12									38	35	3		
MIDWAY	1794	1107		1091		16	17		17			18		18			652		635		17
NEW ZEALAND	5	4	4														1		1		
PHILIPPINES	54644	22163	433	4964	630	16136	807	6	239		562	11933	50	8006		3877	19741	652	7007	26	12056
RYUKYUS	81142	38204	12227	1616	10229	14132	2025	1649	5	9	362	14744	10874	392	2	3476	26169	10492	1047	211	14419
THAILAND	16879	13142	4839	132	24	8147	134	4	108		22	2814		167		2647	789	444	303		42
VIETNAM	174192	170903	111174	4450	37719	16960	64	2	11	11	40	3789		1	84	3704	36	18	14		4
WAKE ISLAND	48	47				47	1				1										
7th FLEET	85457	85457		85457																	
	793322	494733	208330	133335	59023	94045	13849	4564	2881	27	6377	98367	45229	21828	804	30506	186373	44686	51738	7479	82470
UNITED STATES	137359	133384		118668	14716		3975		3975												
GRAND TOTAL	930681	628117	208330	252003	73739	94045	17824	4564	6856	27	6377	98367	45229	21828	804	30506	186373	44686	51738	7479	82470

* ESTIMATED

SOURCE: J11

[redacted]

[redacted]

MAAG AND SERVICE ADVISORY GROUPS PERSONNEL

PACIFIC COMMAND AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED - BY SERVICE - CATEGORY - GROUP

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1965

CATEGORY	ARMY		NAVY		M C		AIR FORCE		TOT MIL		U S CIV		TOT US PER		LOCAL HIRE	
UNITS INCL IN PACOM CEILING	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD
MAAG CHINA	459	426	94	94	16	16		198	767	734	11	11	778	745	111	111
MAAG JAPAN	46	34	25	26	0	0		25	96	85	31	29	127	114	139	134
PROVMAAG KOR	28	28	8	7	2	2		12	50	49	11	11	61	60	31	31
JUSMAG PHIL	38	39	18	14	0	0		27	83	80	9	8	92	88	25	40
JUSMAG THAI	282	336	82	84	14	15		135	518	570	0	0	518	570	0	0
SEATO	56	53	1	1	2	2		4	62	60	0	0	62	60	0	0
MEDT BURMA	14	12	4	4	0	0		0	3	21	19	1	22	20	49	49
DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI	69	62	0	0	0	0	22	31	91	113	0	0	91	113	0	0
SUB-TOTAL(MAAGS)	992	1010	232	230	34	35	430	435	1688	1710	63	60	1751	1770	355	365
ARMY ADV GP KOR	786	727	0	0	0	0	0	0	786	727	121	110	907	837	339	338
NAVY ADV GP KOR	0	0	103	95	59	59	0	0	162	154	5	4	167	158	151	149
A F ADV GP KOR	0	0	0	0	0	0	211	191	211	191	5	22	216	213	27	29
SUB-TOTAL(SV ADV GP)	786	727	103	95	59	59	211	191	1159	1072	131	136	1290	1208	517	516
GRAND TOTAL	1778	1737	335	325	93	94	641	626	2847	2782	194	196	3041	2978	872	881

SOURCE: J13

[redacted]

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1965



SOURCE: J3I

[redacted]

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS

AS OF 1 JULY 1965



SOURCE: J31

[redacted]

[redacted]

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1965



SOURCE: J31

[redacted]

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR & SHIP UNITS

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1965



SOURCE: J3116/3113

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR & SHIP UNITS

AS OF 1 JULY 1965



SOURCE: J3116/3113

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR & SHIP UNITS

AS OF 15 NOVEMBER 1965



SOURCE: I3116/3113

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE

FLYING & MISSILE UNITS

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1965



SOURCE: J3I

[redacted]

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE

FLYING & MISSILE UNITS

AS OF 1 AUGUST 1965



SOURCE: J31

[redacted]

[redacted]

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE

FLYING & MISSILE UNITS

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1965



[redacted]

SOURCE: J31

[redacted]

was for an extensive ammunition storage area. Both the Army and Marines had proposed to utilize the Motobu peninsula for their respective facility.

Early studies indicated that co-locating was not feasible,[1] and after a preliminary study the Army dropped their interest in the peninsular area. CINCPAC thereon directed that the Army plan to use another site, and he told CINCPACFLT to investigate the feasibility and desirability of locating the airfield at Motobu.[2]

In mid-September the JCS advised that expeditious action would be necessary if the relocation of the MAG was to be included in the FY 67 budget. Action was to include selection of a site, designation of the date required and the probable cost of facilities.[3] In response to a CINCPAC query, CINCPACFLT recommended locating the airfield and associated facilities at Kushi Wan, a coral reef proposed for reclamation off the east coast of the island. This choice, he stated, would cost $39.0 million, and he specificed a beneficial occupation date (BOD) of January 1967. CINCPACFLT also stated that his proposal would cause the least disruption of the civilian community and would cost less than alternate courses of action.[4]

Meanwhile, the Army was planning to establish the ammunition storage area at Oura Wan; and conflicts soon developed between requirements at this location and CINCPACFLT's new proposition.[5] At this, CINCPAC requested the JCS to defer action on the projects pending a later recommendation. He also appointed CINCPACREP Ryukyus to act as coordinating authority to prepare a base development plan that would be consistent with operational requirements.

Further study indicated that the conflicts could be resolved if the Army would agree to relocation of a proposed ammunition pier so Navy activities would have a maximum unlimited harbor area. With

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1. ADMINO CINCPAC 142248Z Aug 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 062110Z Sep 65 (S); CINCPAC 082126Z Sep 65 (S)
3. JCS 1691/152320Z Sep 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 272020Z Oct 65 (S)
5. CGUSARYIS 10775/020600Z Nov 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Army agreement to relocating the proposed pier, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS authorize construction of the jet capable airfield and associated facilities at Kushi Wan and the ammunition storage area at Oura Wan.[1] Decision by higher authority was pending at the end of the year.

Survey of United States Bases and Installations in PACOM

In February a joint State Department/DOD message announced the commencement of a reexamination of US base and installation requirements, both military and non-military, in the Pacific area and Alaska.[2] The Pacific survey was part of a world-wide survey called for in the Basic National Security Planning Task Program. Representatives of OSD, State Department, CINCPAC, the PACOM components and other headquarters met at CINCPAC Headquarters in late February. At this meeting agreements were reached regarding the methods and timing of the survey. Detailed instructions for the completion of installation and activity data and discussion sheets were developed. CINCPAC thereafter issued tentative dates of survey visits to various PACOM areas,[3] and on 12 March he issued a comprehensive instruction for the conduct of the survey and preparation of the data.[4]

Surveys began in mid-March by teams composed of representatives of the national agencies, CINCPAC and subordinate headquarters. Certain aspects of the comprehensive survey, particularly the methods and channels for the coverage of non-military installations and activities, gave rise to procedural uncertainties. For example, procedures to be followed in the Trust Territories, and activities not tenanted on military bases required clarification.[5]

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1. CINCPAC 090641Z Dec 65 (S)
2. STATE 2089 to TOKYO 192245Z Feb 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 032224Z Mar 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 00319 of 12 Mar 65 (S)
5. SSD Losa 072151Z Apr 65 (C); CINCPACREPMARBO 050112Z Apr 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

In late March, Washington instructions were modified so the non-military installations would not require actual survey but would be evaluated from information available in Washington.[1]

In April and May several PACOM area and commands indicated that the scheduled survey would be difficult to carry out and possibly inaccurate because of the tempo of military activities in support of the increased US commitment in Southeast Asia. The component commanders proposed that surveys of some areas be postponed or suspended.[2]

Deferments were authorized by OSD for the Philippines, Okinawa, Guam, the Marianas, Hong Kong and Taiwan.[3] In June OSD informed CINCPAC that these postponements would delay the scheduled August meeting at CINCPAC to prepare the final reports.[4] Instructions given in August cancelled this meeting and postponed until 1966 further action on those areas not yet surveyed. CINCPAC was instructed to have the team chairmen complete draft reports of the surveys of Japan, Korea and Hawaii; these reports were to be forwarded to CINCPAC and the component commanders for comments.[5] Surveys were completed in Japan in April, in Korea in June, and in Hawaii in July.

A draft of Base Utilization Regional Survey Report, Hawaii was sent to CINCPAC and to the component commanders for comment in accordance with OSD instructions.[6] CINCPAC comments were forwarded to OASD (I&L) in November.[7] CINCPAC attempted to relate

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1. STATE 260325Z Mar 65 (C)
2. CINCPACFLT 120237Z Apr 65 (C); CINCPACAF 062215Z May 65 (S); CINCUSARPAC 120128Z May 65 (S)
3. OSD DEF 008834/092331Z Apr 65 (S); OSD DEF 00259/171828Z May 65 (S)
4. OSD DEF 004856/302011Z Jun 65 (C)
5. OASD (I&L), Base Utilization Regional Report, Hawaii, 003173-65
6. CINCUSARPAC GPLO-PA 22212/050112Z Nov 65 (S); CINCPACFLT 062223Z Nov 65 (S); CINCPACAF ltr DPLD of 5 Nov 65 (S)
7. CINCPAC 170021Z Nov 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

the report to actual conditions in the Pacific and to examine each recommendation within the context of possible savings and the need for continued combat readiness. He noted that the report failed to analyze the effect of certain actions on national security or long-range expenditures. Also, because of the short time available for the preparation of the report CINPAC suggested that the use of the report should be limited.

CINCPAC's principal concern was, however, the strategic concept upon which it appeared the report was based; i. e., that the Hawaiian Islands should be abandoned as a base. Abandonment, he stated, would be a serious setback to plans for military operations in the Pacific. Admiral Sharp observed that Hawaiian bases were of increasing importance because of the tenuous occupancy of Okinawa and the dependence on bilateral agreements for use of bases in Japan and the Philippines. He further stated that it was unreasonable to consider eroding a well developed base complex that was fully capable of rapid expension to meet an existing or foreseeable threat.

CINCPAC provided detailed comments on other aspects of the draft report, and he cautioned that implementation of any recommendations in the report should be deferred pending thorough and accurate analysis of the strategic and economic factors involved.

COMMUNIST FORCE STRENGTH CHANGES

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

Soviet ground forces on the Manchurian border were strengthened by a motorized rifle division which was probably redeployed from the western USSR. In addition, within the past year, internal shifts in the Far East moved elements of two other Soviet divisions closer to the Chinese border.

Changes in Soviet naval strength reflected phasing out of obsolete submarines, conversion of some standard destroyers to missile-equipped units, and the inclusion of two additional ECHO class

[redacted]

[redacted]

cruise missile submarines. The old heavy cruiser and one of the light cruisers were believed to be non-operational.

Aircraft changes reflected continual decline in total numbers of fighters, light bombers and medium bombers. Receipt of new generation fighters increased both air defense and tactical air capabilities.

People's Republic of China (CHICOM)

Chinese Communist ground forces continued to show some progress in divisional type weapons and the Air Force registered an increase in number of aircraft. Additional MIG-19 Farmers were added to the aircraft inventory, perhaps the result of an indigenous production capability. Of the estimated 16 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites confirmed in Red China as of late-1965, only one was known to be in southern China. However, there were indications that more SAMs were being deployed to this region. The most significant improvement in air defense capability was in the south and southwest portion of the country, particularly in the immediate region of the Sino-NVN border.

Obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the Nautilus Institute Nuclear Policy Project

There were, during 1965, several indications that Red China was continuing to accord high priority to modern, prestige-type weapons. Most significantly, the Chinese detonated their second nuclear device in May. Missile development programs appeared to progress at an evenly-paced rate. Communist China was probably working on the SS-N-4 missile (range 250 nautical miles) associated with the "G" class submarine which was first detected in late-1964.

North Vietnam

The North Vietnam Army strength was significantly increased in 1965. These additions probably brought existing units up to full strength and were also reflected in their increased AAA manpower requirements. The other significant development in the NVN defenses was the rapidity of the air defense buildup. Surface-to-air missiles were, at the end of the year, deployed in key areas; modern

[redacted]

[redacted] FAR EAST COMMUNIST BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH CHANGES DURING 1965

USSR**

GROUND	As Of Dec 1965	Changes During Yr
Line Divisions*	13	+ 1
NAVY		
Major Craft:		
OCA	1	- 1
CL	4	0
SS	93	- 5
DDG	5	+ 2
DD	26	- 1
DE	15	- 2
AIR		
Major Aircraft (incl Naval Air)		
Jet Hvy Bmr	50	- 5
Turbo Prop Hvy Bmr	45	0
Jet Med Bmr	262	- 42
Jet Lt Bmr	90	- 24
Jet Ftrs	824.	- 101
STRAT RKT FORCES		
Missle Launchers (Reevaluation)		
ICBM	41	0
IRBM	7	0
MRBM	40	0
Cruise	2	0

CHICOM

	As Of Dec 1965	Changes During Yr
Personnel	2,315,000	- 6,000
Line Divisions*	117	- 1
Personnel	62,000	- 4,000
Major Craft:		
SS	34	+ 6
ODD	4	0
DE	4	0
Personnel**	162,600***	+75,600
Major Aircraft**		
Jet Med Bmr	2	0
Pist Med Bmr	13	0
Jet Lt Bmr	277	- 13
Jet Ftrs	1,922	+ 148

N. KOREA

	As Of Dec 1965	Changes During Yr
Personnel	344,700	0
Line Divisions*	21	+ 1
Personnel	9,400	0
Major Craft:		
SS	2	0
Patrol	49	0
Mine	26	0
Personnel	18,400*****	0
Major Aircraft		
Jet Lt Bmr	80	- 5
Jet Ftrs	429	+15

N. VIETNAM

	As Of Dec 1965	Changes During Yr
Personnel	265,000	+15,400
Line Divisions*/ Brigades****	13	0
Personnel	2,500	
Major Craft:		
Patrol	37	0
Mine	4	0
Personnel	2,000	0
Major Aircraft		
Jet Ftrs	73	+ 20
Jet Bmr	8	+ 8

FOOTNOTES:

*Line Divisions/Brigades include infantry (regular motorized, mechanized), armored (tank), airborne (parachute), divisions.

**Personnel strengths for armed forces in Far Eastern area are not estimated at present time with any validity.

***Includes 84,500 personnel assigned to AC&W, SAM and AAA units (not carried in previous order of battle totals).

****Changes in designation from former divisions and separate regiments.

*****Includes 2,400 personnel assigned to AC&W units and SAM units. Does not include 10,000 personnel in three AAA divisions subordinate to Artillery Command of NK Army, but under operational control at NK Air Force for air defense.

[redacted]

[redacted]

jets (MIG-21) operated from Phuc Yen; and the concomitant ground environment (GCI and EW radars) were in place. The overall capability of the air defense system was considered good.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)

The March 1965 announcement of the Soviet-North Korea military aid agreement was expected to result in the provision of new jet fighters and ground equipment to North Korea at an early date.

ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE CINCPAC STAFF ORGANIZATION[1]

Increases in CINCPAC Joint Table of Distribution (JTD)

At the beginning of 1965, because of reclama actions regarding recommendations of the 1964 JCS manpower survey of CINCPAC Headquarters, the CINCPAC Staff was still manned in accordance with the 1 July 1963 Joint Table of Distribution. However, under the pressure of the situation in Southeast Asia an additional 245 personnel authorizations were obtained during 1965. Significant actions associated with this increase are discussed below.

In late 1964 Admiral Sharp again made representation to the JCS concerning certain of the recommendations resulting from the JCS manpower survey of that year. CINCPAC requested additional personnel to cope with the increased workload associated with Southeast Asia planning,[2] and he initiated actions to resolve funding problems which were causing delays in filling newly authorized civilian positions on the staff.

Most of the requested increases were granted near the end of January 1965 when the JCS increased the authorized personnel strength from 665 to 674. Rather than authorize a meteorologist for the CINCPAC

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1. Staff organization changes dictated by the conflict in Southeast Asia are discussed in the "operations" and "logistics" sections. of Chapter IV
2. CINCPAC 302055Z Dec 65 (U)

[redacted]

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC AND STAFF



[redacted]

Staff, however, an additional Navy meteorologist was allocated to CINCPACFLT for duty with CINCPAC. The new authorized personnel strength was as follows:[1]

SERVICE	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
Army	98	97		195
Navy	93	113	44	250
Marine Corps	22	16		38
Air Force	95	96	—	191
TOTAL	308	322	44	674

To meet other requirements originating in the increased activities in Southeast Asia, CINCPAC requested further additions to his staff. These were approved during March and April and authorized additional personnel for public affairs, plans, intelligence and logistics.[2] Also, the responsibility for providing the CINCPAC Chief of Staff was changed from Army to Air Force; and the Army, rather than the Air Force was tasked to provide the CINCPAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations.[3] Additionally, the Special Security Office was reorganized to consist of Navy personnel only, and the Special Intelligence Communications Section was transferred from CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC.

A consolidated CINCPAC request for augmentation was approved by the JCS on 6 May. The total increase was 85, and this included 17 enlisted personnel for the Communications and Electronics Division. Additional officer spaces were authorized for J02, J04, J1, J5, J6 and J73. Several days later the JCS approved the addition of 10 civilian operational analysts to the staff.[4]

Between 1 January and the end of May the staff had increased a total of 178 spaces. At the end of May the CINCPAC authorization was as follows:

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1. JCS 004289/291630Z Jan 65 (C)
2. JCS 007297/181416Z Mar 65 (S); JCS 007405/191505Z Mar 65 (S); JCS 009304/171645Z Apr 65 (S); JCS 009422/202049Z Apr 65 (S)
3. JCS 008450/052149Z Apr 65 (C)
4. JCS 01776/101947Z May 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

SERVICE	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
Army	110	112		222
Navy	108	162	58	328
Marine Corps	26	23		49
Air Force	118	120	—	238
TOTAL	362	417	58	837

In August the JCS approved four additional personnel (3 Off, 1 enl) for the Public Affairs Office. This was the result of a study initiated in December 1964 to determine the adequacy of the number of personnel in the Public Affiars Office.[1] The foregoing additions brought the personnel authorization for the Public Affiars Office to nine officers, eleven enlisted and three civilians.

On 3 September the JCS approved increases in almost every element of the staff. The additions totaled 49, most of which were for the operations and logistics divisions.[2] With this increase the total authorized CINCPAC Staff strength was 910 personnel.[3]

At the end of 1965 the CINCPAC staff personnel authorization was as follows: (See Appendix A for staff organization at end of year.) (C)

SERVICE	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
Army	124	124		248
Navy	114	172	63	349
Marine Corps	30	25		55
Air Force	127	131	—	258
TOTAL	395	452	63	910

Projected Manpower Requirements

On 7 August CINCPAC submitted his projected manpower requirements for FY67 through FY70. This was the first Joint Manpower Program ever submitted for CINCPAC, and it projected a staff strength of 1047 personnel by 1970. It was anticipated, however, that this figure would be required prior to FY67.[4] (C)

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1. JCS 9094/251922Z Aug 65 (U)
2. CINCPAC 120055Z Aug 65 (C); JCS 9868/032954Z Sep 65 (C)
3. This total does not include 68 spaces for the airborne command post.
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 0555 of 7 Aug 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

The 1965 situation in Southeast Asia prompted CINCPAC to ask JCS to assign all CHWTO spaces to the CINCPAC JTD. Rationale for this action was to provide continuity of assignments to the WTO.[1] JCS decision on this matter was pending at the end of the year.

CINCPAC ACTIVITES TO IMPROVE COMMAND FACILITIES AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES

Airborne Command Post (BLUE EAGLE)

CINCPAC's airborne command post, nicknamed BLUE EAGLE, commenced a continuous watch with the launch of an EC-135A from Hickam Air Force Base at 040800W October. Through 31 December BLUE EAGLE was airborne over 2,000 hours, averaging 99.8 per cent on station time. The development of this facility is discussed in previous editions of this history.

July was a special month for BLUE EAGLE; most of the personnel reported for duty, a ground facility (Bldg 2077) became available at Hickam Air Force Base, and the first BLUE EAGLE EC-135A flew non-stop from Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma with several CINCPAC staff members on board. Also, two additional EC-135As were delivered during the month.

Training was a major problem because of the differing experience and qualifications of the BLUE EAGLE personnel. This was further complicated by the fact that their arrival was phased over a period of two months, thus requiring that each aspect of training be repeated several times. Ground training of BLUE EAGLE personnel started in August.

The goal was to have BLUE EAGLE operational about 1 September. This was impractical, however, because of problems associated with personnel, communications and training. The first training involving flight was initiated 1 September, but this was interrupted by runway repairs during the last two weeks of the month.

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1. CINCPAC J4 Memo 094-65 of 10 Sep 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Ultra high frequency (UHF) communications were not available to BLUE EAGLE. It was believed, however, that high frequency (HF) communications were the most reliable and survivable in the event of surprise attack. Therefore, BLUE EAGLE operations were initiated without the UHF capability.

An extensive program of improvements in the ground facility at Hickam AFB was undertaken to provide a suitable facility for continuous operations. From 4 October through the end of the year a minimum of one officer and one noncommissioned officer manned this facility on a 24 hour basis seven days per week.

Space limitations in the aircraft required that BLUE EAGLE team kits contain only essential information in the proper format. The components of the initial kits were improved as data requirements were identified and solutions devised on the basis of operational experience. In some cases this required revising the format of certain documents to meet the unique requirements of an airborne command post. Special security measures were required because these kits contained sealed authenticators for execution of the General War Plan. One objective in establishing the BLUE EAGLE ground facility separate from CINCPAC Headquarters was to preclude frequent transportation of this sensitive material on the public road from Camp Smith to Hickam AFB.

During September BLUE EAGLE aircraft and teams visited Clark Air Base, Yokota Air Base, and Kadena Air Base. Some BLUE EAGLE personnel also made an indoctrination and survey trip to General Lyman Field, Hilo, Hawaii in October. The above bases were designated BLUE EAGLE dispersed operating sites. Additionally, one BLUE EAGLE aircraft visited Bangkok in October and while in-flight assumed CINCPAC's airborne command post mission.[1]

CINCPAC's Chief, Airborne Command Post Section and a BLUE EAGLE team flew with the Strategic Air Command airborne command post for five days during October as a means of gaining further experience.

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1. CINCPAC J34 JC/Memo/0048-66 of 10 Feb 66 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

At the end of 1965 UHF vans were operational in Hawaii and at the dispersed operating sites. These had been exercised during nine BLUE EAGLE deployments to WESTPAC.

CINCPAC Headquarters Facilities

The project for relocating CINCPAC Headquarters to Kunia was abandoned when, in August , the House Appropriations Committee denied funds for the project. Associated with this was a significant increase in staff personnel, and the deployment to Southeast Asia of most of the Marine elements stationed at Camp Smith. During 1965, approximately 16,000 gross square feet of space at Camp Smith were relinquished by Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force Pacific and converted to CINCPAC use. Thus, concurrent with the quickening tempo of staff activities, there was a continuing program of construction and frequent relocation of staff elements through the last half of the year. (C)

At the end of the year, CINCPAC was urgently seeking further improvements for the headquarters. One element in the plan was modernization of the existing communications terminal to improve the security. He also proposed improvement of an unexcavated basement area to provide space for an interim Autodin Subscriber terminal.[1] Other projects were designed to convert enlisted barracks to office space and to improve the electrical power distribution system. (C)

The major project in the plan was a Command Center. CINCPAC proposed a reinforced concrete two-story windowless building with a gross area of 25,000 square feet to house, in a contiguous secure location, the CINCPAC Battle Staff and staff members concerned with current operations and intelligence. In support of this project CINCPAC pointed out that the area wishfully designated "command center" at Camp Smith was a briefing room with a small booth behind it for emergency action officers. Staff members concerned with current intelligence and operations were spread throughout a number of former hospital wings in separated locations which were, in many cases, insecure. (C)

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1. See CINCPAC "Communications Activities" on this chapter

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC emphasized that the command center at Camp H. M. Smith was needed "now" to meet existing requirements and could not be delayed. (C)

CINCPAC requested that the above projects be funded in the FY 66 Supplemental Budget in support of Southeast Asia requirements. He stated that the immediacy of their requirement developed entirely through the growth of his responsibility incident to the Southeast Asia conflict. In closing, he termed the improvements urgent, indispensable, and vital to the exercise of this responsibility.[1]

PACOM FORCES OBJECTIVES

Free World Forces

Annex J (Free World Forces) to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1970-74 (JSOP-70) was promulgated 12 January. It reflected strategic priorities of second and third to Australia and New Zealand respectively. This was a significant change from the first priority assigned in JSOP-69 and recommended by CINCPAC.[2] Nevertheless, the new annex agreed in all significant areas with CINCPAC's recommended mission statements, requests for force development and objective force levels for Free World nations of the Pacific Command area.

For the first time it was recognized in the annex that the attainment of strategically desirable allied force objectives was, in certain key countries, directly related to the size of the Military Assistance Program.

Destroyer Force Level

Prior to the Tonkin Gulf incidents of August 1964 a force level of 32 destroyers in WESTPAC was normal. This force was adequate for the three CVAs assigned, the Antisubmarine Hunter/Killer Group, Taiwan Surface Patrol and minor special task requirements. The

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1. CINCPAC 080152Z Dec 65 (C)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 001703 of 10 Nov 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

seldom achieved operating goal for this force was 50 per cent at sea and the balance in port.

In association with the accelerated attack carrier operations in WESTPAC during the first two months of 1965 the destroyer at sea percentage for February increased to 89.1 percent. The WESTPAC force level was increased to 36 in early March but this achieved only a 66.5 percent at sea average for the month. Additionally, a fourth CVA was stationed in WESTPAC at the end of March and the at sea percentage for April rose to 77.7.

The force level was again increased in mid-May; this time to 40. But the at sea average for the month was 73.9 percent. Additional requirements were imposed on the destroyer force when the number of WESTPAC CVAs was increased to five during June. The force level was raised to 48 but even this was inadequate to support newly assigned additional tasks which included NGFS in RVN, search and rescue in the Gulf of Tonkin and periodic support for the GEMINI space program.

CINCPACFLT concluded, in June, that to maintain the required number of destroyers in WESTPAC it would be necessary to increase the PACFLT destroyer force level from 118 to at least 126. He also stated that this larger force would be required as long as the Southeast Asia combat operations continued.[1]

With approval of this and other increases[2] the PACFLT destroyer force level reached 151 by the end of the year. Of these, 35 were in the South China Sea, 24 elsewhere with the Seventh Fleet and 92 were in MIDPAC/EASTPAC. One squadron (8 ships) of the total force was augmenting Seventh Fleet on a rotational basis from CINCLANT.

The force level at the end of the year tended to alleviate the unsatisfactory WESTPAC/EASTPAC rotation situation and lower the at sea time for forces engaged in operations in WESTPAC. While the larger forces helped resolve some of PACOM's problems, the impact on other commands was viewed with concern by the JCS.

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1. CINCPACFLT 250331Z Jun 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 040237Z Aug 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

This section of the history discusses the operations plans (OPLANs) initiated, issued and changed by CINCPAC during the year. Certain actions related to the conflict in Southeast Asia were guided by the provisions of CINCPAC OPLANs, and these are discussed in Chapter IV. (U)

OPLAN 1-66, General War Plan

In consonance with Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)-66 CINCPAC modified this OPLAN so CINCPACFLT was no longer tasked to operate the seaward extension of the distant early warning (DEW) system from Umnak Island to Midway Island. Accordingly, the operation was discontinued 1 July.

Further, with the promulgation of JSCP-66 CINCPAC was no longer tasked to be prepared to assist in maintaining the security and integrity of Indonesia. Consequently, CINCPAC OPLAN 1-66 did not address this requirement.

OPLAN 22-66, Support of Internal Uprisings and Revolutions (S)

This plan was published on 8 September. It was a unilateral capabilities plan for provision of US military assistance to revolutionary outbreaks in North Korea, Communist China and North Vietnam.[1]

OPLAN 65-65, Security of Selected Personnel and Equipment

This new OPLAN provided guidance for, and assigned tasks to CINCPAC subordinate commanders to ensure the security of selected PACOM personnel. Only COMUS Korea, COMUSTDC, COMUSMACTHAI and COMUSMACV were tasked to prepare supporting plans.

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000304 of 8 Sep 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00471 of 10 Apr 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

OPLAN 38-64, Military Operations to Terminate Aggression in Southeast Asia

This OPLAN was cancelled on 5 November as recommended by CINCPAC in October. The main reason for this action was that the objectives of OPLAN 38-64 duplicated the objectives in CINCPAC 32 and 39 OPLANS.[1]

[redacted]

EXEMPTION #1

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

DONG DECASSIFY EXEMPTION #1

[redacted]

OPERATIONS OF US FORCES

[redacted]

Domos against nuclear ships (P. 683) SSN to Sasebo JAP

[redacted]

[redacted]

EXEMPT



US nuclear ship visits. (p. 683)

[redacted]

[redacted]

EXEMPTION #1



[redacted]

[redacted]

EXEMPTION #1

[redacted]

[redacted]

EXEMPTION #1

[redacted]

[redacted]

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITES

This section discusses theater-wide intelligence activites. Intelligence matters most directly related to Southeast Asia operations are discussed in Chapter IV. (U)



[redacted]

[redacted]

Air Target Materials (ATM) Conference

During the period 15-17 February representatives of CINCPAC and PACOM component commanders attended an air target materials (ATM) conference in Washington, D. C. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES

This section describes activites to improve communications in the Pacific Command. Other communications activities are described in Chapter II, the portion of the history devoted to the Military Assistance Program in PACOM countries. Communications activities most closely related to Southeast Asia are discussed in Chapter IV.

Command and Control Communications

Interim Automatic Digital Network: In August CINCPAC stated a requirement for an interim Automatic digital network (AUTODIN) to serve his headquarters.[1] [redacted] The completed project would provide CINCPAC entry into Defense Communications System (DCS) interim AUTODIN network as well as an adequate electrical data link with FOCCPAC. The latter capability was to be achieved by improving the Manual Data Relay Center (MDRC) Hickam - FOCCPAC circuit from 12 to 200 cards per minute. [redacted] Temporary installation of the equipment was planned to achieve a 1 January 1966 operational date.[4] Because of equipment shortages, however, the completion date of the interim facility was in doubt at the end of the year.

Secure Voice Communications: Planning for secure voice capability in PACOM started in 1963, and progress was very slow. Military actions in Southeast Asia stimulated more interest at other

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1. CINCPAC 072327Z Aug 65 (C)
2. [redacted]
3. [redacted]
4. CINCPAC 080152Z Dec 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

levels in early 1965, and in March a JCS representative visited CINCPAC to prepare a comprehensive requirements list for an interim immediate system. This list, reflecting CINCPAC's most urgent requirements, was austere and led to a project termed TALK QUICK.

[redacted]

CINCPAC Command and Control Alerting/Conferencing Capability: Under the authority of a Defense Communications Service Authorization (CSA) of 14 May, the Hawaiian Telephone Company established a CINCPAC Command and Control Alerting/ Conferencing capability. The installation was scheduled for operational assumption by CINCPAC on 1 January 1966. At that time

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC would have the capability for complete automatic preemption of five Trans-Pacific submarine cable circuits which could be automatically connected to tail circuits routed to PACOM forces.[1]

CINCPAC Communications Center

The sharp increase in the communication/message center workload for 1965 is reflected in the following table. The figures indicate the percentage increase in comparison to 1964:

TYPE WORK UNIT	PERCENTAGE
Average monthly gross message count	14.7
Average monthly group count	30.0
Use of Flash precedence	104.0
Use of Immediate precedence	74.7
Incidence of Top Secret and Secret messages	47.3
Average message length	15.3

The following full period, full-duplex 100 word-per-minute, secure (TSEC/KW-26) teletype circuits were operated by the CINCPAC communications center as of the end of 1965:

[redacted]

1. CSA HADZ NP OCIT 47021 of 14 May 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Teleconference Facility Modernization: This project, completed during February-April, improved conformance with existing "Red-Black" installation security criteria, expanded the capacity for operating secure teletype teleconference circuits and improved traffic handling efficiency.

Automated Message Retrieval: An automated message retrieval system utilizing Recordak MIRACODE coded microfilm equipment became fully operational in the CINCPAC message center on 1 June. Punched cards containing message descriptions were produced as a by-product of the input process into the MIRACODE system. Command messages received after 1 June could be rapidly retrieved by subject, cite number, originator, precedence, classification or other descriptions as well as the date-time-group. To meet retrieval requirements a second reader-printer retrieval station was added in October. The effectiveness and reliability of the system exceeded expectations, and these were expected to increase proportionally with the size of the coded file. The punched cards were also used for comprehensive subject searches, traffic analysis, periodic print-outs describing messages processed, updating the subject index and other related functions.

Electrical Message Management Program: With the increasing US military involvement in Southeast Asia the volume of electrical message traffic saturated PACOM communication facilities and thereby reduced the speed of service. An aggressive message management program was instituted, with JCS support,[1] to cope with the rapid deterioration in service. Under the provisions of CINCPAC Instruction 2300.4 of 5 Oct a communications improvement program was established wherein all detected cases of Allied Communications Publication 121 abuses were documented and brought to the attention of the message originator for corrective action. (U)

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1. JCS ALMILACT 18/65--102029Z Nov 65 (U)

[redacted]

MESSAGE DELIVERY TIME

1 OCTOBER 1965 — 31 DECEMBER 1965

ORIGINATOR	PRECEDENCE	TIME-HRS:MINS(Sample) Text Length		
		1-5 LINES	6-20 LINES	21-90 LINES
CINCUSARPAC	Flash	(1) --	--	--
	Immediate	(2) --	:28	--
	Priority	3:12	2:13	2:45
	Routine	6:44	6:60	9:00
CINCPACAF	Flash	--	:42	--
	Immediate	1:43	1:51	2:36
	Priority	4:08	3:50	4:06
	Routine	--	11:59	12:43
CINCPACFLT	Flash	--	--	--
	Immediate	1:30	1:22	1:29
	Priority	3:12	3:22	3:50
	Routine	6:07	6:56	8:27
TF 77	Flash	:45	1:10	1:27
	Immediate	3:02	3:52	4:08
	Priority	3:42	5:43	12:35
	Routine	4:43	--	6:06
2ND AIR DIV	Flash	:32	:58	1:18
	Immediate	3:44	2:31	3:16
	Priority	6:56	5.52	4:17
	Routine	7:28	3:11	--

ORIGINATOR	TIME-HRS:MINS(Sample) Text Length		
	1-5 LINES	6-20 LINES	21-90 LINES
COMUSMACV	:49	:40	1:08
	1:58	1:56	2:08
	5:07	5:01	5:32
	9:23	7:30	12:20
JCS	:26	:38	:51
	2:02	1:34	2:02
	7:48	6:21	5:21
	10:40	10:09	10:26
SECSTATE	--	--	--
	:53	1:02	--
	:15	1:42	2:46
	5:22	4:36	6:09
3RD AIR DIV	:29	:38	:54
	1:13	1:27	1:33
	3:53	2:02	4:05
	--	3:18	--
CG III MAF	--	--	--
	6:46	9:58	10:36
	14:11	12:46	12:59
	--	--	--

NOTES:
(1) No entry indicates lack of sampling in the Computer Data Base.
(1) Time-of-File by Orignator to Time-of-Receipt by CINCPAC /hrs:mins/.

SOURCE: J622

[redacted]

CINCPAC STAFF MESSAGE TRAFFIC
BY PRECEDENCE



SOURCE: J63

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC STAFF MESSAGE TRAFFIC
BY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION



SOURCE: J63

[redacted]

[redacted]

Pacific Command Frequency Management

Project Gemini: Project Gemini manned space flights during 1965 required detailed frequency coordination throughout PACOM. To ensure completely reliable communications-electronics support to these missions, radio frequencies were provided for spacecraft control, telemetry, tracking and recovery operations. Because of the extensive and expanding use of high frequency it was extremely difficult to acquire the necessary protection for an adequate complement in this band.[1]

As a result of a postponement of the initial GT-6 launch, the combined GT-6/7 flight took place at a time when it competed with frequency requirements in Operation ROUND-UP at Johnston Island. Although both activities had been assigned several of the same frequencies, it was decided to give the priority to Gemini.[2] This negated some ROUND-UP planning and created additional coordination requirements at all levels.

Frequencies were also cleared for Gemini tracking ships in the Pacific. In this regard, Defense Communications Agency-Pacific (DCA-PAC) was given authority to use certain frequency complements at its discretion to overcome frequency blocks or fading, and to ensure communication with participating ships.[3]

Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT): This agency desired to establish an earth receiving station somewhere in the Hawaiian Islands. Oahu was preferred, but initially the dense electro-magnetic environment seemed to block this.[4] To aid in resolving this problem the COMSAT Corporation investigated the extent to which the earth station reception would be influenced by radar sets in the Hawaiian Islands.[5] It was concluded that if filters

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1. CINCPAC 190326Z Nov 65 (C)
2. CINCPAC 170445Z Nov 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC 150516Z Oct 65 (C)
4. FAPUS MCEB 291757Z Jul 65 (C)
5. CC-E WASH DC 132115Z Aug 65 (U); CINCPAC 250453Z Sep 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

were installed on two radar sets to suppress the third harmonic, it would be feasible to install the receiver site at Paumalu, Oahu.[1] At the end of the year the land had been purchased and ground preparation started for the receiver installation. Also, filters were installed on the Army radar at Kahuku and the Air Force radar at Mount Kaala.[2]

Major Communications Relay Ship ANNAPOLIS: The expanded electrical communication associated with the force increase in Southeast Asia caused conflicts in the requirements of several agencies for certain frequencies and/or bands of frequencies. One instance concerned the ANNAPOLIS, a Major Communication Relay Ship that was put into CINCPACFLT service. The ANNAPOLIS had the capability to act as relay between ships and to communicate with shore stations on a multi-channel system. This constituted a considerable threat to Pacific Defense Communications System circuits. After a meeting of representatives of CINCPACFLT, DCA-PAC and CINCPAC a compromise was reached whereby DCA-PAC released certain frequencies for use by the ANNAPOLIS under specific conditions.[3]

Frequency Requirements for Back Porch Tropo System, Vietnam: Another case of conflicting frequency requirements occurred when it was found that five frequencies in the Aeronautical Radionavigation band were included in a new set of frequencies proposed by COMUSMACV to reconfigure the Back Porch Tropo System in Vietnam to Space and Frequency Diversity.[4] CINCPACFLT could not concur with the proposal because the out-of-band frequencies conflicted with Tactical Air Navigation channels assigned by Joint Army Navy Air Force Publication 195 to fleet worldwide operation.[5]

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1. FAPUS MCEB 011953Z Oct 65 (C)
2. COMPACMISRAN 191832Z Nov 65 (U)
3. CINCPAC 112343Z Sep 65 (U); DCA-PAC P366/07243/160211Z Sep 65 (C)
4. COMUSMACV 27882/090945Z Aug 65 (C)
5. CINCPACFLT 230414Z Aug 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Also, the COMUSMACV frequency plan could not be redesigned since the equipment would not tune low enough to allow the required frequency spread. [1]

After a CINCPAC Frequency Coordinator visited South Vietnam it was agreed that Space and Polarization Diversity, rather than Space and Frequency Diversity, would be used on some Tropo Systems. Further, line of sight systems would be installed in some cases. This reduced the number of frequencies required and permitted the frequency plan to be engineered within the proper band. [2]

Joint Pacific Triton Authenticator

To reduce the number of authenticators required by holders in PACOM, a joint/combined authenticator (KAA-38) was devised for US [redacted] use. The KAA-38 was fully implemented on 1 December. In addition, distribution of KAA-60 and KAA-29 systems was substantially reduced. [redacted]. The KAA-29 was used only by SAC aircraft to authenticate with those ground stations specifically designated by SAC and CINCPAC.

Communications - Electronics Data for OPLANS

During the year the CINCPAC Command and Control System group undertook to develop a means of utilizing automatic data processing (ADP) in the maintenance, correction and up-dating of communications-electronics circuits listings required to support contingency plans.

The circuits (approximately 1,000) required to support OPLAN 32-64 were selected for the pilot program, and at the close of the year these were being programmed. The project would provide for the print-out of circuit requirements as appendices to OPLANS, correction of circuit requirements, readout of information on the number of circuits

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1. COMUSMACV 29145/190754Z Aug 65 (C)
2. USASCC-SEA DO-194/280300Z Oct 65 (U)

[redacted]

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passing through a given geographic location, and the number of special circuits required to support the OPLAN.

If the program proved to be of value it was anticipated that the circuit requirements for additional contingency plans would be added. [1]

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Honolulu Public Affairs Conference on the War in South Vietnam

A conference was held at Camp Smith 18-19 March to develop recommendations for improvements in the information policies governing world news coverage of the war. Participants were:

The Honorable James L. Greenfield
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affiars

The Honorable Donald M. Wilson
Deputy Director, United States Information Agency

The Honorable Barry Zorthian
Minister-Counselor for Public Affiars, American Embassy, Saigon

Mr. William E. Odom, Director for Information Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

Colonel Rodger R. Bankson, USA, Special Assistant for Vietnam, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

Colonel Otis E. Hays, USA, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Colonel B. L. Baker, USAF, COMUSMACV Information Officer (Departing)

Colonel B. W. Legare, USA, COMUSMACV Information Officer (Designate)

Mr. William J. Jorden, Special Assistant to the Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

Mr. Dixon Donnelley, State Department Public Affairs (Designate)

Mr. Frank A. Sieverts, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affiars

Mr. James N. Tull, Officer in Charge, Vietnam Affiars, USIA

Colonel Willis L. Helmantoler, USAF, Public Information Officer, CINCPAC

During the two-day conference 21 recommendations were made, 20 of which were subsequently approved either in their original context

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1. CINCPAC J6/Mem/129-65 of 2 Jul 65 (U)

[redacted]

[redacted]

or with minor modifications.[1] The most significant policy decisions emerging from the conference were:

1. That maximum candor allowable by military security continue in force in dealing with newsmen.

2. That censorship not be invoked.

3. Reaffirmation of Minister Barry Zorthian, Counselor for Public Affiars, American Embassy, Saigon as authority for all US public affairs activity in Vietnam.

4. That urgent requests from Governmental agencies in Washington for press and public affairs information from Vietnam be channeled through the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs for screening and approval.

5. That air strikes in South and North Vietnam become a part of the routine daily MACV press release.

6. That a Joint Press Center be established in Saigon as a focal point for news.

Voluntary Press Censorship

Although field press censorship was not invoked, on 15 July COMUSMACV urged newsmen to voluntarily withhold names of casualties, troop movements, and identification of units engaged in operations until such information was announced by the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO).[2] On 30 December the Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA) requested newsmen in the US to voluntary withhold information of troop and ship movements bound for Vietnam until arrival was announced by COMUSMACV.[3] With few exceptions, newsmen honored this voluntary censorship.

Public Affairs Capabilities Study for PACOM

Under a new concept, CINCPAC would be directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for all public affairs matters within PACOM. Accordingly, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance requested Admiral Sharp to study the public Affairs capabilities within the theater commands. (U)

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1. OSD DEF 0083989/032156Z Apr 65 (C); OSD DEF 008518/062110Z Apr 65 (U)
2. MACOI 24135/121620Z Jul 65 (U)
3. SEC DEF 9509/291818Z Dec 65 (U)

[redacted]

[redacted]

A committee, chaired by a CINCPAC representative and consisting of an officer from each of the component services, studied the matter for three weeks. The objective of the study was to determine the personnel, still and motion picture equipment and materials, and other assets needed to enable the CINCPAC Public Affairs Office to become more functional. The committee's recommendation, approved later by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, was to augment the CINCPAC Public Affairs Office to bring it to a total of nine officers, eleven enlisted men and one civilian.[1] (U)

Another result of the committee deliberations was a plan for a Mobile Public Affairs Team to be ready for immediate dispatch to trouble spots such as civil disturbances or disasters anywhere in the PACOM. The team would usually consist of still and motion picture cameramen and an audio man (with tape recorder). It would be headed by the appropriate (CINCPAC Regional Affairs Officer or by one of the Media Branch Officers. The purpose of the team would be to obtain photographic, radio and television coverage at the earliest possible stage of the action and to transmit the material by the most expeditious means available to OSD/PA for national release. (U)

The team would also periodically cover the war in South Vietnam, and activities in other countries in PACOM to gather still and motion material for both public and classified briefings. Additionally, this material would be used to stock a public affairs photographic library. (U)

At the end of the year it was anticipated that the authorized photograph personnel for the team would arrive early in 1966. At that time the Mobile Public Affairs Team concept would be tested. (U)

[redacted]

Arrival of CVN-65 + CGN-25 in PACOM (p. 683)

1. See also "CINCPAC JTD," elsewhere in this chapter

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Asian Journalist Visit to Hawaii

A group of journalists representing countries of the Pacific Command were taken on a thirty day tour of the United States in October 1963. This tour was sponsored by the Departments of State and Defense, the White House and the United Stated Information Agency. (U)

On 21 March 1965, under similar sponsorship, the second group of Asian journalists began a visit in Hawaii. The fifteen participants were selected through US diplomatic representatives in their respective countries and represented Australia, India, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Okinawa, Philippines, Taiwan and South Vietnam. (U)

The CINCPAC Public Affairs Office was responsible for planning, coordinating and conducting the Hawaii itinerary. During their four day stay, the visitors' program included such highlights as briefings at CINCPAC and headquarters of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines; demonstrations by the 25th Infantry Division and by personnel of the Navy Submarine Escape Training Tank; a tour of Pearl Harbor; visits to the East-West Center, Iolani Palace and the Hawaii State Legislature; and lunch with the Mayor of Honolulu. (U)

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CHAPTER II

CINCPAC ACTIONS INFLUENCING THE STATE OF READINESS OF ALLIED NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA

In 1965 there was an increased requirement for readiness in the Pacific Command and greater need for the continuing build-up of the forces of Allied PACOM countries to a level consonant with the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. There was a commensurate increase in CINCPAC's responsibility for supervision of the development of the PACOM Military Assistance Plan and for execution of the Military Assistance Program. In 1965 shifting requirements necessitated programming flexibility. Changes in dollar ceilings and material requirements were the subject of continuing reviews and recommendations. Funding additions were required such as in the Thailand and Korea programs: reductions were required such as the curtailment of the Indonesia program.

In line with the ever-present need to weigh and balance urgency with economy CINCPAC continued to develop and further refine such country self-sufficiency efforts as the MAP transfer of funding to the country budgets and the Military Assistance Sales Program.

The increased scale of military activity in Vietnam forced the Republic of Vietnam, and to an extent the Thailand and Laos programs, out of funding limitations of the Military Assistance Program. Nevertheless, as will be evident in discussion of those countries in Chapter IV, the basic Military Assistance Program data and planning system continued to serve CINCPAC planners regarding those countries. It is more directly the aim of this Chapter to describe the continuing effort to increase force capabilities of those PACOM MAP countries other than South Vietnam, Thailand and Laos. It is relevant to point out that the overall PACOM MAP effort had vital roles in the RVN conflict, not only in Free World Military Assistance but in providing the essential airfield, communications system and basic logistic facilities.

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SECTION A - PLANNING AND FUNDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE

PACOM FY 66 AND FY 67 MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

At the request of OSD the CINCPAC FY 66 program planning was expedited and dispatched to Washington with change cards in late May.[1] The change cards for the FY 67 program were sent in July. This PACOM program, its highlights, justifications and supporting information which reflect CINCPAC's policies concerning each of the recipient MAP countries are discussed in this section.

The basic planning for FY 66 and FY 67 was in accordance with guidance provided by OSD in the Military Assistance Manual (MAM) with particular reference to the dollar guidelines provided in Table 36. The data in the table entitled "PACOM Military Assistance Dollar Guidelines - FY 66 to FY 71" was received early in the year and provided the basis for the formulation of CINCPAC's FY 66 and 67 program which is described by country in the following sections.

Republic of China (ROC)

The China MA program provided for modest modernization and additions to vital JSOP units in all the services. Industrial tools and machinery were programmed to increase the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) self-sufficiency in military force support. Air Force and Navy requirements received generally higher programming priority than the modernization of Army combat units. This was in accord with US objectives and requirements for GRC air and sea defense capability in the Taiwan area.

The China program had undergone considerable change since the last programming of December 1964. Twenty-five million dollars were shifted from FY 65 shortfall into the FY 66-67 programs with subsequent further shifting into the FY 68-70 plan years. Although the

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1. OSD DEF 003860/061536Z Jan 65 (C); CINCPAC ltr ser 00685 of 28 May 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

PACOM MILITARY ASSISTANCE DOLLAR GUIDELINES

FY66 to FY71
($ in millions)

	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71
Burma	4.0	3.7	3.6	-	-	-
Indonesia	-	.8	.8	.8	.8	.8
Japan	1.6	.4	.2	.1	-	-
Korea	150.0	144.9	128.0	155.0	144.0	128.0
Laos	43.3	40.0	35.0	30.0	25.0	25.0
Malaysia	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
Philippines	22.0	22.0	30.0	27.0	22.0	20.0
Rep of China	104.0	110.0	108.2	126.4	113.0	99.1
Thailand	27.0	27.0	27.0	27.0	25.0	22.0
Vietnam	230.0	230.0	185.0	160.0	135.0	110.0
FE Area	46.2	46.0	46.0	46.0	46.0	40.0
Less MAP Owned Assets	-41.5	-31.6	-31.5	-31.1	-30.9	-30.0
TOTALS PACOM	586.7	593.3	532.4	541.3	480.0	415.0

[redacted]

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FY 66 program totaled $104 million and was about $37 million higher than the FY 65 ceiling, the average for FY 65 and FY 66 was only $82 million. Thus, the ceilings for the China program show a steady decline after 1963, and were all below the National Policy Paper (NPP) minimum annual program requirement which was $125 million.

	FY 66	FY 67
	(millions)	
OSD Dollar Guidelines	$104	$110
CINCPAC Recommended Program		
Investment Costs	$47.2	$49.3
Operating Costs	$50.0	$51.0
PCH&T	$ 6.3	$ 9.4
Total	$103.5	$109.7

Highlights of Investment Program	Qty	Cost	Qty	Cost
Air Force				
F-5 A/B Aircraft	30	$21.4	34	$24.3
HH-43 Helicopters			4	$ 1.2
Special Purpose Vehicles	9	$ .1	17	$ .3
Navy				
DD Austere, cost-share	1	$ 2.9	1	$ 2.9
MSC new construction	1	$ 2.7	1	$ 2.7
LST rehabilitation	4	$ 1.6	4	$ 1.6
Army				
Cessna U-17A Light Aircraft			26	$ .5
Armored Personnel Carriers M-113	72	$ 2.1		
Light Tank M-41	36	$ 1.9	65	$ 3.5
General Purpose Vehicles			622	$ 2.8
Howitzers, 8" Towed	13	$ .7		
Marines				
Light Tanks M-41			28	$ 1.5
Howitzers, 105 mm Towed	8	$ .2	6	$ .1

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Modernization with F-5 aircraft continued to dominate the investment list for the Air Force. Additionally the HH-43F helicopters would provide a much needed improvement in the GRC search and rescue capability. The austere DD's and the new MSC's were programmed to increase GRC combat and mine sweeping capability, and LST rehabilitation funds were added to support the second phase of this program. The light tanks and howitzers were the last major items needed during this period to complete JSOP requirements for Marine units. The light tanks for the Army were necessary for the modernization of mobile fire power units.[1] The M-41 was proposed to substitute for M-5s, M-24s, and M-18s. No medium or heavy tanks were included in order to promote standardization and thus increase reliability and decrease operating costs.

China FY 66 Dollar Ceiling Decrease: In October the Secretary of Defense established the new FY 66 China MAP ceilings at $94.5 million including $8.79 million of supply operations cost.[2] CINCPAC advised Chief MAAG China of this reduction from the old ceiling of $104.0, and the necessary deletions to meet the reduced ceiling were made in accordance with a MAAG China priority list for anticipated reductions.[3] Deletions were primarily in Army and Marine investment equipment including the M-113 personnel carriers, M-41 light tanks, howitzers and an MSC in the Navy program.

China FY 67 Dollar Ceiling Reduction: OSD informed CINCPAC of the reduced FY 67 MA Program ceilings for China and gave guidance for planning the reductions.[4] At CINCPAC's request Chief MAAG China

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1. WW II M-5, M-24 and open M-18 gun carriages were filling the requirements in the armored cavalry battalions and the armored divisions. These weapons were under-gunned, unreliable and progressively unsupportable. Over 100 M-5 tanks were no longer operational.
2. SEC DEF 4930/252007Z Oct 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 282012Z Oct 65 (S)
4. TELECON on 26 Nov 65 of Col Berry, OSD/ISA and Col Eidson, CINCPAC Staff

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recommended deviations to meet the new ceiling.[1] In terms of the guidance supplied by OSD, CINCPAC concurred with the MAAG recommendations. He stated, however, that the deletions will seriously damage the GRC Army and Marine readiness.[2] CINCPAC suggested that in order to maintain a balanced force some of the reduction should come from the F-5 program.

The OSD/ISA changes in the FY 67 program were hand carried to CINCPAC by the CINCPAC representative to the conference.[3] The deletions from the FY 67 China MAP program consisted of light aircraft, M-41 light tanks, general purpose vehicles, howitzers, and helicopters. At the end of the year these deletions were being processed through the CINCPAC MAP Data Center.

Republic of Korea

CINCPAC's recommended FY 66 and 67 program for the Republic of Korea provided for modernization and additional support of JSOP units of all the services. Emphasis was placed on the MAP transfer program to reduce operating costs and thus increase investment purchases. In accordance with US plans for the defense of Korea, ROK Army and Air Force requirements received generally higher programming priority than the Navy.

Since the last programming in December 1964 the Korea program underwent some changes due to the shifting of FY 65 shortfalls into the FY 66 and FY 67 programs. The FY 65 dollar ceiling of $130.8 million was increased in the FY 66 program to $150 million. This OSD ceiling and the CINCPAC program were considerably below the NPP annual requirement of $200 million for support of a 600,000-man force.

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1. CHMAAG China MGPR 11-321/291019Z Nov 65 (S)
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 022040Z Dec 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC was represented by Col George Prochoroff, USAF

[redacted]

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		FY 66		FY 67
		(millions)		
OSD Dollar Guidelines		$150		$144.9
CINCPAC Recommended Program				
Investment Costs		$36.3		$31.6
Operating Costs		$101.7		$100.8
PCH&T		$12.0		$12.5
Total		$150.0		$144.9
Highlights of Investment Program	Qty	Cost	Qty	Cost
Air Force				
F-5A/B Aircraft	5	$3.6	14	$9.4
HH-43 F Helicopters			6	$1.8
Taegu Runway		$2.6		$ .13
AC&W Modernization (manual)		$1.8		$ .3
Special Purpose Vehicles	83	$1.4	80	$1.6
Army and Marines				
Tanks M-48 90 mm	90	$2.0		
Howitzer, 105 mm Towed	112	$1.6	148	$ .7
Howitzer, 155 mm Towed	26	$ .7	41	$1.1
General Purpose Vehicles	292	$3.1	80	$1.6
Navy (asterisks indicate later program adjustments)				
MSF/PCE Conversion	3/2*	$5.7/ $3.8*	1	$1.8
MSC 292 Class	1	$2.7		
APD (austere)*	2*	$ .6*		
APD/ASW Modification				$1.0
Sewart Boats (anti-infil)	12	$ .4		

Provisions of the F-5 aircraft continued the effort to modernize the tactical fighter squadrons. The HH-43 helicopters would replace aging H-19s and improve airlift support of remote sites and search and rescue capability. The AC&W modernization would be completed by FY 67 and would improve the existing marginal capability. Rehabilitation of the Taegu runway would enhance ROK fighter operations and air logistics. The allocation of M-48 tanks would fill out the

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authorized 10 Army tank battalions and provide the ROKA with a reasonably modern tank. The artillery and vehicles would provide Army and Marine units with necessary additional light and medium fire support and mobility, and would bring ROK ground forces closer to a wartime equipment status. The MSF/PCE conversions, the MSC and the ASW modifications would modernize the ROKN ship inventory and increase the ASW and patrol capability. The MSC and the MSF/PCE conversions would replace obsolete ships while the APD on hand would be provided with modern ASW capability. The Sewart Boats had a proven anti-infiltration role and this capability would be increased at a minimum of cost.

The FY 66 program for the ROK Navy was adjusted by a deviation in December 1965. This deviation eliminated one of the MSF/PCE conversions shown above, added two austere APDs and provided for larger Sewart boats. These later changes are denoted by asterisks in the preceding table.

Korea FY 66 Dollar Ceiling Increase: In July COMUS Korea requested a $7 million increase in the FY 66 Korea MAP contingent on the expected ROK National Assembly approval of the dispatch of a combat division to RVN.[1] This increase would provide sufficient funds to bring the three ROK Ready Reserve Divisions up to full authorized equipment levels and thus offset the dispatch of the Korean Division to RVN. COMUS Korea stated that the program changes for this additional funding were being prepared and would be forwarded when the Korean legislature completed approval action. CINCPAC requested that COMUS Korea not wait for the National Assembly action and submit the program changes as soon as they were developed.[2] On August 13 the ROK National Assembly approved sending a division to RVN,[3] and COMUS Korea sent program changes for additions to the FY 66 MA Program in September.

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1. COMUSKOREA 52702/310507Z Jul 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 040240Z Aug 65 (S)
3. COMUSKOREA 52799/140408Z Aug 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

In October the Secretary of Defense adjusted the FY 66 Korea MAP ceiling to $157.0 million including $13.39 million for supply operations.[1] CINCPAC advised COMUS Korea that the basic ceiling of $150 million remained unchanged (except for the MAP element 5AAO add package). CINCPAC further advised COMUS Korea, OSD/ISA, and JCS that if price reductions for 155 howitzers[2] materialized the addition would be $6.1 million. If these price reductions did not materialize then the add package would revert to $7.0 million.[3]

In December the US Ambassador officially suspended the MAP transfer program for CY 66. COMUS Korea submitted FY 66 program changes for items that would as a result of the suspension of MAP transfer, be included in FY 66 ceilings.[4] At the end of the year CINCPAC was processing these changes for submission to OSD.

Korea FY 67 MA Program: In November OSD requested that CINCPAC representatives proceed to Washington to update the Korea FY 67 MA Program to a new ceiling of $160.0 million.[5] At CINCPAC's request COMUS Korea provided update data and information based on two assumptions, namely that the MAP transfer program would be suspended and that the program would not be suspended.[6] OSD subsequently added the changes to the FY 67 Korea program based on the assumption that the transfer program would be suspended for CY 67.

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1. SEC DEF 4930/252007Z Oct 65 (S)
2. This possible price reduction was indicated in an AMC message, CGUSAMC 6-3015/221449Z Jun 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC 300413Z Oct 65 (S)
4. Refer to the item in this chapter describing the Korea MAP Transfer Program for discussion of the CINCPAC and country team view that funding for the suspended transfer program should not be included in the MAP ceilings.
5. Telecon OSD to CINCPAC
6. CINCPAC 270219Z Nov 65 (S); COMUSKOREA 53657/291030Z Nov 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

This suspension would necessitate the inclusion of the suspension funding within the FY 67 ceiling. Thus, in addition to the required MAP transfer funds, $3.0 million was made available for expansion of the ROK arsenal.

Korea FY 67 to FY 71 Dollar Ceilings: New dollar ceilings for Korea MAP for FY 67 to 71 were planned at $160.0 million annually.[1] This represented a significant increase over the old dollar guidelines. However, funding for the increased cost of PCH&T over this period would amount to $27.6 million and MAP transfer funding for FY 66 and 67 would cost the program another $67.4 million. Thus $95.0 million of the $100.1 million increase was already committed. This left only $5.1 million over the old ceilings for force improvement. Furthermore, if MAP transfer funding out of the country ceilings continued from FY 66 through FY 71 the cost to the country program would be $127.7 million.

Philippines

The objective of CINCPAC's proposed Philippine MA Program was to increase Air Force tactical fighter capability, improve communications, upgrade the control, mobility and effectiveness of the ground forces, and to improve the antisubmarine and patrol capabilities of the Navy.

	FY 66	FY 67
	(millions)	
OSD Dollar Guidelines	$22.0	$22.0
CINCPAC Recommended Program		
Investment Costs	$11.4	$11.4
Operating Costs	$ 8.7	$ 9.1
PCH&T	$ 1.9	$ 1.8
Total	$22.0	$22.0

1. DOD MAM Proposed dollar ceilings FY 67-71 (S); SEC DEF 7435/292333Z Nov 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Highlights of Investment Program	Qty	Cost	Qty	Cost
		(millions)		
Air Force				
F-5 Aircraft	3	$2.2	7	$5.00
Army				
Long Lines Communication System		$1.04		
Armored Personnel Carriers M-113			10	$ .29
Air Delivery Equipment		$ .08		$ .07
Tactical Communications Equipment		$ .02		$ .37
U-17 Aircraft	6	$ .13	12	$ .24
Navy				
MSF Conversion to PCE	2	$3.9		
MSI	1	$1.8	1	$1.8
PGM			4	$2.0

The modernization of the Philippine Air Force with F-5 aircraft for two tactical fighter squadrons continued to have high priority. The F-5 squadrons would provide a significant improvement to the very marginal air defense and tactical fighter capability of the PAF.

The program completed investment funding for the long lines communications system. Additional communications equipment was planned in order to replace WW II vintage tactical equipment and raise tactical communication capabilities to austere standards. The armored personnel carriers would increase mobility of the infantry and were required for use against internal security threats in the central Luzon area. The M-113 vehicles planned for FY 66 would complement the five previously funded and would be delivered in FY 66.

The light U-17 aircraft would facilitate command and control of army units widely scattered throughout the Philippines. Those were also required for reconnaissance, liaison, surveillance, limited airlift resupply and anti-smuggling patrols. The air delivery equipment would provide the 1st Infantry Division with a quick reaction paratroop capability for counterinsurgency operations.

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The activation of MSFs and conversion to PCEs would increase the antisubmarine warfare patrol capability of the Philippine Navy. Patrolling during the monsoon season would be improved with the addition of these ships which with their speed, endurance and sea-keeping ability were capable of continuous ASW and patrol defense requirements. The PGM's programmed in FY 67 would replace obsolete wooden PCS's and PGM's. The force objective of 22 patrol craft would be maintained against the increasing threat in the Southern Philippines.

During the months which followed the submission of CINCPAC's recommended FY 66 and FY 67 programs the effort to improve the Philippine armed forces resulted in additional commercial consumable support, the deletion of one MSF conversion and consideration of F-5 reductions. These efforts are discussed more fully in a section which follows. Various other adjustments of the Philippine FY 66 and 67 programs were made during CY 65 in the continuing effort to increase the effectiveness of the Philippine armed forces. Investment funds were reduced slightly in favor of increasing operating funds. Ceilings were not greatly altered and the changes in investment items were those which would expedite an increased civic action capability. Three F-5 aircraft were moved from the FY 66 to the FY 67 program and the DE was moved from the FY 65 to the FY 66 program because ship loan legislation had not been enacted. At the close of 1965 the Philippine FY 66 and 67 programs had been adjusted as follows:

	FY 66	FY 67
	(millions)	
Investment Costs	$9.0	$8.9
Operating Costs	$11.1	$10.7
PCH&T	$ 1.9	$ 2.0
	$22.0	$21.6

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investment Changes (units)	FY 66	FY 67
F-5 Aircraft	-3	-3
M-113	+5	-5
U-17 Aircraft	+2	-2
MSF Conversion	-1	
PGM		-1
DE	+1	
MSI	-1	

Japan

CINCPAC's proposed Japan MA Program fulfilled DOD directives in that it was limited to essential training in support of prior commitments. There were no plans to include material even on a cost-share basis.

	FY 66	FY 67
	(millions)	
OSD Dollar Guidelines	$1.6	$ .4
CINCPAC Recommended Program		
Investment Costs	$1.634	$ .263
Operating Costs	$ .200	$ .179
Total	$1.834	$ .442

Approximately ninety percent($1.58 million) of the FY 66 program was commitment training in support of the Nike and Hawk cost-share program. The remaining $ .25 million was to provide ASW and mine warfare training and other essential orientation and influence training for the three services. The ASW and mine warfare training was directly related to the ASW and mine warfare equipment purchased by Japan in FY 64. Orientation and influence training was considered a vital part of the U S Military Assistance Sales program, a program which in Japan amounted to $34.0 million in FY 64.

There were no OSD dollar guidelines beyond FY 69. However, CINCPAC strongly recommended that dollar guidelines of $150,000 be reinstated for each fiscal year in the planning period beyond FY 69.

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He considered it important to provide limited grant aid training to acquaint Japan Defense Agency military and civilian personnel with US methods, procedures and techniques in order to improve joint defense capabilities, and promote military sales by demonstrating equipment.

In July OSD informed CINCPAC that the FY 66 program for Japan must be kept within the ceiling of $1.632 million. CINCPAC was requested to review the program and to submit appropriate changes to this end.[1] After coordination with Chief MAAG Japan[2] the program was adjusted as follows:

	FY 66	FY 67
	(millions)	
Investment Costs	$1.471	$ .257
Operating Costs	$ .155	$ .171
	$1.626	$ .428

Thailand

The FY 66-67 MA Program for Thailand provides tanks, armored personnel carriers and supporting equipment for the Army, a PCE for the Navy and increased airlift and modernization of the Air Force. In general, the Army and Air Force requirements have received higher programming priorities than the Thai Navy.

CINCPAC's recommended FY 66 and FY 67 program for Thailand did not include any of the add-ons requested by the Ambassador. These requested add-ons were placed in shortfall pending a decision by OSD. In addition, Chief JUSMAG Thai has indicated the existence of two apparent commitments to Thailand, one concerns mapping support and the other concerns support of counter-intelligence activities. These apparent commitments should be affirmed or denied by OSD.

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1. OSD 4996/011907Z Jul 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 030446Z Jul 65 (S)

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		FY 66		FY 67
		(millions)		
OSD Dollar Guidelines		$27.0		$27.0
CINCPAC Recommended Program				
Investment		$ 9.1		$ 9.8
Operating		$14.7		$14.0
PCH&T		$ 3.2		$ 3.2
Total		$27.0		$27.0
Highlights of Investment Program	Qty	Cost	Qty	Cost
M-113 Personnel Carriers	13	1.0	41	1.2
M-41 Tanks	16	.8		
PCE (MSF conversion)		.2	1	1.9
F-5 Aircraft			2	1.5
F-5 Mobile Training Unit			1	1.3
C-123 Aircraft	8	1.1		
T-28 Aircraft	11	1.7		

The introduction of modern tracked vehicles will support counterinsurgency and contingency plans and provide for defense of critical airfields. The replacement of M-24 tanks with the M-41 will be completed with the FY 66 additions. The armored personnel carriers will provide required mobility for infantry units across terrain denied to wheeled vehicles.

The Thai Navy counterinsurgency effort requires coastal patrol against infiltration attempts and in the event of external aggression the Thai Navy must patrol the Gulf of Siam and approaches to Bangkok. The Thais have agreed to deactivate units of the present heterogeneous mixture of obsolete ships as new patrol craft are provided. The FY 66 program provides for long lead time items in preparation for the MSF/PCE conversion provided in FY 67.

The eight C-123 aircraft programmed in FY 66 are required for airlift and resupply of Thai forces engaged in counterinsurgency and for Thai support of contingency plans. These aircraft will bring

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the transport squadron to its full TO&E of sixteen aircraft. Nine of the T-28 aircraft in the FY 66 program are for the Fourth Tactical Composite Squadron which was activated in January 1965. The remaining two aircraft are for attrition.

The FY 66-67 programs provided for the completion of the Bangkok-By-Pass Road and construction of the Third Composite Squadron facilities at Chieng Mai. Cost overruns for STARCOM and Don Muang Airfield were also funded along with navigational aids at Chieng Mai, Kokethiem and Udorn.

Changes during CY 65 raised the FY 66 program to $42.9 and the FY 67 program to $35.0 million. These changes are covered elsewhere in this history.

Burma

The Burma FY 66 and FY 67 programs were essentially a continuation of 1958 and 1963 agreements with the Burmese Government which provided for $43 million in military assistance. With minor exceptions the recommended program fulfilled DOD directives in that after FY 65 the program consisted primarily of follow-on spares and equipment. The exceptions were the small investment in printed material and the FY 67 Navy training which was associated with FY 64-65 investments. The FY 66 and FY 67 programs contained an abbreviated dollar line of $170,000 and $270,000 respectively for the purpose of meeting late country requests.

	FY 66	FY 67
	(millions)	
OSD Dollar Guidelines	$4.0	$3.7
CINCPAC Recommended Program		
Investment Costs	$ .2	$ .4
Operating Costs	$3.2	$3.2
PCH&T	$ .6	$ .1
Total	$4.0	$3.7

[redacted]

[redacted]

	FY 66	FY 67
	(millions)	
Highlights of Program		
Aircraft Spares and Support Equipment	$ .7	$ .8
Weapons Spares	$ .2	$ .2
Communications Equipment Spares	$ .1	$ .1
Other Support Equipment and Spares	$ .1	$ .1
Automotive Spares and Equipment	$1.5	$1.5
Navy Training Associated with prior Investments	$ .2	$ .3
Technical Assistance with Engine Overhauls	$ .1	$ .1
Books, Maps and Publications	$ .02	$ .02
Abbreviated Plan Requirements	$ .17	$ .27
Other Material and Services	$ .2	$ .1

Laos

The recommended program for Laos was composed of the basic program of $43.3 million and $21.2 million being carried in shortfall. The total program of $64.5 million contains material and equipment necessary to continue the current level of combat activity on a most austere basis. In view of dollar ceiling limitations it was readily apparent that all requirements to support the Laos force of 67,200 men could not be included in the basic program. Only those items of equipment that were vital to organic units were included in the basic program and where feasible operating costs were included for only six months with the remainder being placed in shortfall. Likewise, certain high-cost items classified as investment items and which are essential to the country were placed in shortfall. The parenthesized figures in the following table indicate shortfall funds.

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[redacted]

		FY 66		FY 67
		(millions)		
OSD Dollar Guidelines		$43.3	$40.0	
CINCPAC Recommended Program				
Investment Costs	$1.9	($3.0)	$ .6	($2.5)
Operating Costs	$37.5	($18.2)	$36.8	($23.3)
PCH&T	$3.9		$ 2.5	
Total	$43.3	($21.2)	$39.9	($25.8)

Contained within $64.5 million were replacement items for old and obsolete equipment which was no longer supportable from US sources, including the 490-odd World War II vehicles and old French radios which were unserviceable and unsupportable. The higher tempo of air operations, increased flying hours and the build-up to 40 T-28 aircraft had increased ammunition and POL requirements. The FY 66 program also replaced aircraft lost in action while on loan from Thailand.

The basic $43.3 million program contained the majority of material and equipment vital to the organic units. Weapons, radios, vehicles, aircraft, ammunition and POL were included on the basis of what was considered vital to the Laotian counterinsurgency effort for the first six months of FY 66. Another criteria used to place items in shortfall was procurement lead times associated with aircraft, ammunition, and spare parts. The majority of trucks in shortfall were required to replace WW II trucks. Likewise the radios in shortfall were to replace the unserviceable French radios. Ten T-28 aircraft were placed in shortfall as one-half of the annual attrition requirement in support of the authorized 40 T-28 aircraft.

FY 66 MAP DOLLAR GUIDELINES

On 20 October the President signed the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Bill which provided new obligated authority for the

[redacted]

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LAOS

AS OF 1 FEBRUARY 1966

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA ..... 91,000 SQ. MI. — ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA 4.3 ACRES

POPULATION .... 2,018,000 — LITERACY RATE 15%

ANNUAL GROWTH ..... 2.5% — LIFE EXPECTANCY ... 35 YEARS

GROSS NAT PROD $185 MILLION — PER CAPITA $76.00

KING - Sri Savang Vathana
PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MINISTER OF SOCIAL ACTION, MINISTER OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND LEADER OF THE NEUTRALIST FACTION -
Prince Souvanna Phouma
VICE PREMIER AND LEADER OF RIGHTIST FACTION -
Leuam Insisiengmay
VICE PREMIER, MINISTER OF ECONOMIC PLANNING AND LEADER OF THE COMMUNIST FACTION -
Prince Souphanouvong



OVERALL OBJECTIVE

TO PREVENT COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER IN LAOS.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. WM. H. SULLIVAN
U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. JOSEPH A. MENDENHALL
DEPUTY CHIEF JUSMAG THAILAND
COL JACK G. CORNETT, USA

MAP OBJECTIVE

1. U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR LAOS WILL BE DESIGNED TO ASSIST THE LAO ARMED FORCES TO ATTAIN AND MAINTAIN THE CAPABILITY TO DEFEND THE AREAS UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS.
2. MILITARY ASSISTANCE WILL BE PLANNED AND PROGRAMMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE:
   A. PROVIDE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF ADEQUATE STOCK-PILES FOR LAOS IN THAILAND OR OTHER NEARBY SITES
   B. RETAIN THE NUCLEUS OF A MAAG/LAOS AS A SECTION OF JUSMAG THAILAND
   C. SUCH EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES WILL BE PROVIDED AS THE LAO ARMED FORCES CAN USE EFFECTIVELY AND WHICH WILL STRENGTHEN THEIR CAPABILITY VIS-A-VIS THE PATHET LAO AND NORTH VIETNAMESE
   D. SUPPORT TO PARTICULAR UNITS SHOULD BE DETERMINED PRIMARILY ON THE BASIS OF TWO CRITERIA: (1) THE ACTUAL UNIT STRENGTH INVOLVED OR BEST ESTIMATE AVAILABLE, AND (2) THE AMOUNT OF MATERIAL EACH UNIT CAN EFFECTIVELY UTILIZE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE
   E. PROVIDE BASIC SUPPORT FOR ARMED FORCES OF 67,200 MEN
   F. U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND AID SUPPORT WILL BE EXTENDED AS APPROPRIATE TO ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST THE ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT TO SUPPORT THE VILLAGE CLUSTER PROGRAM AND ASSOCIATED CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES.

	MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES	TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES *	COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY	FAR FORCES: 18 INF BNS, 6 ABN BNS, 38 VOLUNTEER BNS, 4 FLD ARTY, 1 ARMD BN, 1 PSY WAR BN, 1 RIVER GP NEUTRALIST FORCES: 2 RANGER BN, 11 INF BNS, 2 ABN BNS,	FAR FORCES: 18 INF BNS, 6 ABN BNS, 24 VOL BNS, 15 REG BNS, 4 ARTY BNS, 4 ARMD CDS. NEUTRALIST FORCES: 9 INF BNS, 5 PARA BNS, 1 ARTY BN 2 SPECIAL BNS, 1 COMP BN 90-PARAMILITARY COMPANIES.	MAINTAIN MINIMUM SECURITY IN NEUTRALIST AREA MAIN POPULATION CENTERS. PROVIDE VERY LIMITED GROUND DEFENSE AGAINST LOCAL COMMUNIST INSURGENCY
NAVY	NONE	FAR RIVER FLOTILLA: 52-RIVER CRAFT INCLUDING 7 LCM, 4 LCVP, 25 RIVER PATROL CRAFT, 24-RIVER TRANSPORTS OF WHICH 18 ARE OPERATIONAL	MAINTAIN MINIMUM SECURITY OF RIVER ROUTES IN CONSERVATIVE AREA AND PROVIDE VERY LIMITED LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR CONSERVATIVE FORCES
AIR FORCE	1 COMP SQDN, 1 TRANS SQDN (LT), 4 TAC FTR SQDN, 1 HELO SQDN, 1 RECON SQDN	1 COMPOSITE SQDN: 20 T-28, 12 UH-34, 14 C-47, 5 C-46 + LIAISON ACFT, 2 ALOUETTE II, 3 L-20A	PROVIDE LIMITED FIGHTER BOMBER, LOGISTIC AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT TO GROUND FORCES

* DOES NOT INCLUDE PATHET LAO OR DISSIDENT NEUTRALIST MILITARY FORCES

SOURCE: J53,J2,PA1

[redacted]

[redacted]

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

AS OF 1 FEBRUARY 1966

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	66,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	15.8 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.4%
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	1.1 ACRE
LITERACY RATE	20-40%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	30-35 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1965 (E)	$1.95 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$124
DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCED 1965(E)	$ 43.4 MILLION
AS % OF GNP	22.7
AS % OF CENTRAL GOVT EXP	52.0

CHAIRMAN – LTGEN Nguyen Van Thieu
PRIME MINISTER – Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky
MINISTER OF WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION – LTGEN Nguyen Huu Co
CHIEF, JOINT GEN STAFF – LTGEN Cao Van Vien
COMMANDER VNAF – AVM Nguyen Cao Ky
COMMANDER VNN – CAPT Tran Van Pham
COMMANDER VNMC – MAJGEN Le Nguyen Khang



OVERALL U.S. OBJECTIVE

ASSIST THE GVN TO DEFEAT COMMUNIST INSURGENCY AND TO SURVIVE AS A GOVERNMENT:
1. WITH EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF ITS TERRITORIES AND,
2. ORIENTED TOWARDS THE WEST.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON HENRY CABOT LODGE
DEPUTY AMBASSADOR
HON WILLIAM J. PORTER
U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR CHARLES A. MANN
COMUSMACV
GEN W.C. WESTMORELAND

MAP OBJECTIVE

US MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR VIETNAM WILL BE DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM TO DEFEAT THE VIET CONG INSURGENCY.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES		TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY (ARVN)	4 Corps,10 Inf Divs,1 Sep Inf Rgt,5 Sep Inf Bns,1 Honor Gd Bn, 10 Armd Cav Sqns,8(155mm) Sep Arty Bns,20 Rngr Bns,2 SF Grps, 2 SF Gps, 4PsyWar Bns,1 Abn Bde (6 Abn Bns),5 MP Bns, 20 Engr Bns,5 Tnk Cos,2 Sep Rngr Cos,1 Sep Inf Co,24 APC Cos, 13 Highland Scout Cos,17 Intel PLTs.	4 Corps,10 Inf Divs,1 Sep Inf Regt,6 Abns, 5 Cav Sqdns,20 Rngr Bns, 10 Sep Arty Bns,20 Engr Bns,18 APC Cos, 3 M-8 Cos, 3 Tnk Cos, 2 SF Grps,4 PsyWar Bns. Regional Forces 120,000; Popular Forces 137,000;CIDG 24,500;Armed Cmbt Youth 38,000. (661 RF Cos. 3,237 Pits)	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY IN MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AND ALONG SELECTED LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS,AND OFFER EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE FOR LIMITED TIME AGAINST ATTACK BY EXTERNAL FORCES.
NAVY (VNN)	9 PC/PCE,3 LST,7 LSM,10 PGM,7 LCU,3 MSC,12 MLMS, 1 ARL,7 LSSL,5 LSIL,2 YDG (3 PAT Sqdns,7 River Asslt Gps,2 River Trans Gps,28 Coastal Gps (Junks), 2 MS Sqn,4 LAMSR Sqn,1 UDT Tm.) 1 VN Marine Bde (5 Inf Bns),(1 Arty Bn),(1 Amphib Spt Bn).	12 PGM,9 PC/PCE,3 MSC,12 MLMS,5 LSIL,2 LSSL,3 LST,7 LCU,7 LSM, 2 YDG,1 ARL,475 Junks,58 Asstd Small River Craft. (33 Pat Sqdns. 7 RAGS,2 TRGs,28 Coastal Grps. 2 MS Sqn) 1 VN Marine Bde (5 Inf Bns). (1 Arty Bn).(1 Amphib Spt Bn).	CHARGED WITH PATROLLING INLAND WATERWAYS AND COASTAL WATERS SUPPORTS ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY ACTIONS. MARINE BRIGADE UNDER ARVN CONTROL AS GENERAL RESERVE ELEMENT.
AIR FORCE (VNAF)	5 Wings,6 Tac Ftr/Bmr Sqdns,3 Trans Sqdns,4 Liaison Sqdns,6 Air Base Sqdns, 4 Helo Sqdns, 1 Recon Sqdn.	4 Wings,6 Ftr/Bmr Sqdns,4 Helo Sqdns,4 Liaison Sqdns,2 Transport Sqdns,1 PsyWar Liaison Det,6 Air Base Sqdns.	CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING STRIKE OPERATIONS; PROVIDING CLOSE TACTICAL SUPPORT FOR ARMY, AND LIMITED AERIAL SUPPLY AND SUPPORT OF ABN OPNS.

SOURCE: J53,12,PA1,J51

[redacted]

[redacted]

FY 66 MA Program. Shortly thereafter the Secretary of Defense notified CINCPAC that the dollar levels listed as follows had been established for the PACOM area.[1] (S)

Country/Activity	Previous Level	Revised Level
Burma	4.0	4.0
Japan	1.6	1.6
Korea	150.	157.0
Laos	43.3	63.3
Malaysia	.1	.1
Philippines	22.0	22.0
Rep of China	104.0	94.5
Thailand	27.0	39.5
Vietnam	230.0	510.0
Far East Area	46.2	51.9
Less MAP Assets	-41.5	-47.5
Total	586.7	896.4

MAP APPRAISAL

In late 1964 the Secretary of Defense directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA to undertake a major reappraisal of the Military Assistance Program. The purpose of the study was to recommend a military assistance program for the FY 67-71 period. The task was performed by Deputy Assistant Secretary Townsend Hoopes and a small civilian-military staff in ISA. The reappraisal focused on nine of the eleven forward defense countries, including the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Iran, Greece, and Turkey. The MA programs of RVN and Laos were not included in this long-term study because of the pace of events in those countries. The only PACOM countries studied, therefore, were the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines.

The scope of the reappraisal included an estimate of the threat to MAP countries and an examination of related US objectives and commitments. The study considered the US forces and MAP supported

1. SECDEF DEF 4930/252007 Oct 65 (S)

[redacted]

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indigenous forces likely to be available to counter the estimated threat. Recommendations were made for changes and restructuring believed appropriate, and an assessment was made of the implications of such changes for the Military Assistance Program and US security interests.

The draft study was completed in June and the JCS requested CINCPAC comments.[1] CINCPAC's analysis and recommendations[2] generally paralleled the final JCS report which reflected CINCPAC's contribution.[3]

The ASD/ISA reappraisal utilized the same basic inputs which were used on preparation of Annex J, JSOP. Yet, as CINCPAC pointed out, the study arrived at different conclusions, conclusions which were inconsistent with National Policy Papers for the countries concerned. CINCPAC attributed the reasons to be as follows: 1) the study failed to deal collectively with the PACOM situation; 2) the study underestimated the communist threat and degraded this threat by attempting to forecast communist intentions; and 3) the study overestimated existing US conventional capabilities. CINCPAC pointed out the necessary interrelationship between indigenous MAP supported forces, conventional US forces and US nuclear power. In CINCPAC's view acceptance of the Hoopes recommendations would shift reliance from relatively less expensive indigenous forces to necessarily augmented and more costly US forces. Additionally, adoption of the recommendations would, in CINCPAC's view, increase the possibility of nuclear warfare.

CINCPAC's analysis stated that new intelligence has been developed since the 13 October 1964 publication of the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning. This new intelligence cast doubt on the assumption that CHICOM air and naval capabilities were steadily decreasing. CINCPAC also questioned the ASD/ISA view that the "tacit detente" between the US and the Soviet Union had degraded the

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1. JCS 5156/031337Z Jul 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 270734Z Jul 65 (TS)
3. JCS 2315/360-1 of 11 Aug 1965 (TS)

[redacted]

near-term CHICOM threat. He stressed that it was necessary for the US, in countering this threat, to rely on allied navies for patrol, ASW, and minesweeping and on continued MAP development of all-weather interceptor and aircraft control and warning systems. CINCPAC also pointed out the economic and political inadvisability of reducing MAP ground forces in being.

Republic of China: The nature of the CHICOM threat; the availability of conventional US forces in the PACOM area of endemic crises; the capability of GRC forces of holding during the period of force deployment; and the early use of US nuclear weapons; are factors which CINCPAC considered to have a direct bearing on acceptable GRC force levels, GRC force modernization, and MAP support levels.

CINCPAC did not concur in the ASD/ISA view that CHICOM air and naval forces are likely to deteriorate during the 1967-1971 period. CINCPAC considered that the study underestimated the probable 1969 light bomber inventory and the number of bomber and fighter aircraft which could be available for an initial strike. CINCPAC placed more credence in the possibility of a CHICOM assault with air support against Taiwan or the offshore islands.

Accordingly, CINCPAC did not recommend reducing the GRC marine force and thus eliminating an elite over-the-beach counter-attack unit. Nor did CINCPAC favor reducing naval craft and thus increasing the need for additional US naval craft. Regarding GRC ground forces, CINCPAC recommended against troop cuts and pointed out the unacceptability of troop reductions to the GRC and the economy of maintaining Chinese rather than US units. Moreover, much of the equipment of the GRC was old, unreliable and unsupportable and thus in need of modernization. Modernization without troop cuts was, according to CINCPAC, attainable within existing OSD ceilings, whereas even the reduced force recommended by the Hoopes study could not be modernized and supported within the proposed ceilings.

The necessity for reductions in MAP support was recognized in the Hoopes study, by CINCPAC, and by the GRC. The economies

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recommended by the Hoopes study would be gained largely by troop reduction. CINCPAC favored emphasizing the MAP transfer program, Military Assistance Sales, and reductions of operating support costs to economize and at the same time to further the modernization-investment program. CINCPAC pointed out that these programs were being supported increasingly by the internal GRC defense budget. And this heavy short term burden, if coupled with further large reductions of MAP funding, would delay long-term cost reduction efforts.

CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the JSOP-70 force levels for the Republic of China be maintained in view of the current tensions in Southeast Asia, the tenuous position of the GRC in the United Nations, and the increased US commitment in RVN.

Republic of Korea: The Hoopes study recommended substantial reduction of the Korean armed forces. CINCPAC's rationale for questioning the advisability of these reductions stemmed from the view that the study underestimated the threat of North Korea and Communist China. CINCPAC stated that North Korea could attack with little strategic warning and that Communist China could rapidly introduce reinforcements. Initial enemy air support strikes could be carried out by approximately 330 light bombers. Under these conditions augmentation by US forces by D Day would be unlikely, and it would be improbable that US augmentation could be carried out in South Korea without opposition. Thus, larger and more rapid conventional US force deployments would be required, and the possibility of nuclear conflict would be increased. [redacted]

Ground force reductions recommended by the Hoopes study would eliminate three ROKA divisions from the planned JSOP force. This force was already five divisions short of the minimum ground

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[redacted]

strength necessary to contain a communist assault without recourse to nuclear weapons. Current and future theater contingency requirements and the ROK commitment of forces to RVN further emphasized the critical importance of ROK ground force requirements.

The Hoopes report called for reductions of destroyers, patrol craft and minesweepers of the ROK Navy. This recommendation was in part based on the view that US naval forces in PACOM were adequate to justify the deletions. CINCPAC did not concur with this view and expressed particular concern about the availability of US destroyers in the western Pacific. CINCPAC pointed out that the JSOP-70 force level was the minimum requirement for joint US - ROK naval operations without the unacceptable risk of overcommitting the SEVENTH FLEET to a single contingency. The recommendations to delete the all-weather, transport, and helio aircraft were not favored by CINCPAC. As in the case of ground and naval forces, the result would be to create a greater requirement for US forces to perform these mutually necessary defense missions.

Thailand: CINCPAC's analysis of the communist threat to Thailand differed in several respects from the analysis which served as the basis for the Hoopes recommendations. A CHICOM ground attack combined with air strikes, anti-shipping and mining operations was a contingency which CINCPAC treated with less optimism than the reappraisal. CINCPAC considered that the additional CHICOM effort to improve air capabilities on the south and southwest borders increased the threat to Southeast Asia generally and particularly to Thailand. He noted the large CHICOM jet fighter inventory and the possibility that obsolete fighters might soon be replaced by more modern CHICOM produced or Soviet supplied aircraft. The threat to Thailand was also intensified by the CHICOM capability to deploy submarines on anti-shipping patrols and mining operations in the South China Sea and in the Gulf of Siam.

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The reappraisal overestimated the rapidity with which the two division PACOM ground reserve could be reconstituted and available in Thailand. It also recommended limiting the Thailand ground force to nine RCTs, reorganizing the cavalry division and eliminating anti-aircraft units. CINCPAC thought this would result in a force too small to defend and hold until US/SEATO deployments were made. The phase-out of a Thai tactical fighter squadron and increased reliance on US air units was not recommended by CINCPAC, and he pointed out that the airfields of Southeast Asia could not accommodate the 40 squadron USAF augmentation suggested by the report.

CINCPAC also stated that considerations of US naval capabilities were oversimplified. The increase in the number of attack carriers would require augmentation from the Atlantic. Further, PACOM antisubmarine warfare forces were incapable of controlling the communist threat particularly when other duties were considered. In CINCPAC's opinion reductions of Thai naval strength would impose immediate and unacceptable operational requirements on US forces in the event of communist attack.

Philippines: CINCPAC concurred in general with ASD/ISA conclusions regarding the communist threat to the Philippines. However, he placed greater emphasis on the CHICOM submarine threat. There was agreement on the need to improve the counterinsurgency capability of the Philippine Armed Forces and the capability to shift operations to the southern islands. In CINCPAC's view the ASD/ISA study overestimated the capabilities of the Philippine indigenous forces. Operating funds were inadequate, and Army units were fragmented to support the Philippine Constabulary and civic action efforts. Combat readiness was at an all-time low. CINCPAC favored retaining the destroyer, minesweeper and patrol craft, the fighter interceptor squadrons, the planned F-5 force, and adding a helicopter squadron--all of which would improve indigenous counterinsurgency capabilities.

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[redacted]

DRAFT UPDATE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE MANUAL (MAM)

In his memorandum to the President on 3 December 1965, the Secretary of Defense stated that in the 1967-71 period major MA Programs should take larger account of the growing mobility and combat power of US general purposes forces. The OSD memorandum followed the rationale of the Hoopes study and established guidelines for the preparation of the Draft Update of the Military Assistance Manual (MAM) which was issued by OSD in December. The Draft Update of the MAM included a planned reduction of GRC force levels from 612,000 to 458,000 men and a reduction of ROK ground forces from 18 to 15 divisions.

JCS requested that CINCPAC review and make recommendations on the draft of Part I of the MAM.[1] CINCPAC replied with a detailed consideration of interelated MAP and US force levels. CINCPAC referred to his analysis and recommendations regarding the Hoopes Study (see "MAP Appraisal" above)[2] and to other comments on anticipated military risks for FY 67-71, levels of funding for selected PACOM countries and proposed force levels to offset the risk.[3] CINCPAC did not concur in the proposed indigenous force reductions and reduced ceilings for PACOM MAP countries. In CINCPAC's view the JSOP-71 submission remained valid.[4]

PACOM REGION AND COUNTRY MILITARY ASSISTANCE PLAN BOOKS

The annual review of updating of the Military Assistance Program was carried out by CINCPAC and MAAG representatives during April, May and June. The review concerned the FY 66-71 MA Programs which have been described above. The review resulted in

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1. JCS 7951/062151Z Dec 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 270734Z Jul 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 041950Z Oct 65 (TS); CINCPAC 050355Z Oct 65 (TS); CINCPAC 301210Z Nov 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 000378 of 25 Oct 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

several changes in the Regional and Country Military Assistance Plan Books, documents which explain and justify country forces and supporting programs.[1,2] Because distribution had increased since the initial publication in 1964, it was decided that new books would be printed. Distribution of the new updated books was completed in August.

CHANGES IN MAP PROGRAMMING PROCEDURES

In November CINCPAC informed the MAAGs of new guidance to be used in MAP planning and programming.[3] He pointed out that the revised CINCPAC Supplement to Part II of the DOD MAM directed the MAAGs to forward changes for review and approval as soon as change requirements are know. Past procedure had been to conduct a spring update at CINCPAC Headquarters to make final changes to the budget year program,to harden future plans and to add the next plan year to the data base. CINCPAC stated that the data processing system had been refined to the point that restatement of the data base by CINCPAC to ODMA was not necessary. Instead the MAAGs were requested to forward changes to the data base as the changes developed and to ensure that the current year and budget year programs were correct and current at all times.

With this system of updating the country programs by the program change procedure (PCP) the annual spring updating by the country team liaison visit to CINCPAC was no longer required.

To accomplish an orderly and timely updating of the FY 67-72 MA Programs the MAAGs were directed to adopt the following procedures: 1) use the current authorized dollar ceilings for all years; 2) submit desired changes to the FY 67 program by mail on formats X in incremental numbers rather than all at once; 3) make final changes to the FY 67 program in sufficient time for CINCPAC's (S)

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1. CINCPAC 210110Z Feb 65 (C)
2. OSD DEF 955028/102205Z Feb 1964
3. CINCPAC 160435Z Nov 65 (C)

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[redacted]

submission to ODMA by 1 May 1966; 4) harden the FY 68 data base as much as possible by 1 June 66; and 5) update and forward as required the changes to the MAP Plan Books with emphasis on updating the justifications.

CINCPAC pointed out that an audit was recently completed with ODMA, and both agencies were in agreement on the FY 67 data base. CINCPAC reprinted and distributed the FY 67-71 data base to all MAAGs so this printout could be used as the data base to show subsequent changes. In conclusion CINCPAC informed the MAAGs that if they determined it to be in their interests they could at any time send one or two representatives to CINCPAC for discussion and clarification of programming problems. He reiterated that there would be no spring update meeting at CINCPAC Headquarters and that program changes were to be forwarded by mail as required.

INCREASED PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING EFFICIENCY

During November 1964 CINCPAC submitted to ASD/ISA proposals to reduce program line proliferation and increase program efficiency.[1,2] He proposed to shift certain miscellaneous "each item lines" into pre-existing dollar item lines and to consolidate numerous dollar item lines in the Military Articles and Services List (MASL). In addition to this generic code roll up CINCPAC proposed to reduce program lines by coding identical army combatant units in aggregates. OSD replied with a draft implementation instruction. CINCPAC desired additional consideration of the changes and a conference to discuss implementation was held in Washington in January. At this conference CINCPAC was authorized to implement the new MAP element structure gradually and in areas where the most program line reduction could be accomplished.[3] (C)

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1. CINCPAC 140433Z Nov 64 (S)
2. CINCPAC 280552Z Nov 65 (S)
3. OSD DEF Memo for Record, ser I-788/65 of 21 Jan 65

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In February 1965 OSD published a new MASL which combined many generic code dollar items. In addition an OSD revision of Part II, Section B, Chapter 6 of the Military Assistance Manual authorized the combining of tactical units at the 3rd level MAP element code and established a pattern for programming secondary items such as ammunition, attrition and follow on spares.

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SECTION B - AREA WIDE ACTIVITIES

BASE DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS ELIGIBLE FOR MAP OR AID FUNDING

In March the JCS requested that CINCPAC review base development requirements for the support of contingency plans and indicate those projects which might be eligible for MAP or AID funding in FY67.[1] CINCPAC described the trend toward US service funding of base development projects in Southeast Asia and asked confirmation that the review was required.[2] The Joint Chiefs replied that the report was still required for Korea and Taiwan.[3] At CINCPAC's request COMUS Korea and COMUSTDC recommended base development projects in their respective areas.[4]

CINCPAC concurred in the projects nominated by the subordinate unified commanders. Priorities were assigned and a list of base development projects recommended for MAP or AID funding was sent to the JCS.[5] The list, in order of priority, included the following projects:

LOCATION	DESCRIPTION
Taiwan	Cross connection of US/GRC line communications
Korea	Rehabilitation of Pusan Seoul MSR
Taiwan	Submarine POL pipelines
Korea	Improve alternative Pusan-Seoul MSR
Korea	Improve forward area MSRs
Korea	Improve ports
Korea	Improve Seoul, Cheju, Chinhae, Mokpo antennae
Korea	Install large crane at Chinhae
Korea	Replace drydock caisson at Chinhae
Korea	Improve dispersal airfields

The JCS concurred in the above list of base projects and recommended to the Secretary of Defense that they be funded under MAP

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1. JCSM-295-65 of 31 Mar 65 (S)
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 130457Z Aug 65 (S)
3. JCS 8588/199415Z Aug 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 212132Z Aug 65 (S); COMUSKOREA UK TWOTR DJ-O/020445Z Sep 65 (S); COMUSTDC 010402Z Sep (S)
5. CINCPAC 082125Z Sep 65 (S); OSD DEF 002633/050104Z Dec 64 (S)

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and/or AID procedures. In the event MAP funds were to be used the JCS recommended that the funds allocated be in addition to current approved MAP levels.[1]

In a related action the JCS tasked CINCPAC to make a critical analysis of the Strategic Mobility Capability Plan FY 66 to FY 70 (MOVECAP 66-70).[2] In reply CINCPAC noted that MOVECAP 66-70 provides a more realistic appraisal of US programmed movement capabilities than was portrayed by the interim MOVECAP 65-69.[3] CINCPAC concluded that one real value of the MOVECAP type of study was to identify for remedial action the major constraints which precluded optimum use of movement resources.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF MAP FORCES IN WARTIME

The responsibility for computation of supply requirements to support MAP forces in wartime had been a matter of considerable review and discussion in the past.[4] CINCPAC held the position that PACOM did not have the capability to compute the requirements, prepare requisitions, and keep current a system similar to QUICK TRIP in Korea. Therefore, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that appropriate DA agencies compute resupply requirements based on densities furnished by CINCPAC and by using US consumption rates.[5]

In March the Department of the Army requested that CINCPAC furnish a listing of major US Army items of equipment and ammunition required to fill TOE and authorized stock levels for four Thai infantry divisions. The list would include initial requirement plus resupply for six months of operations in accordance with OPLANS 32 and 39.[6]

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1. JCS 570/585-8: Strategic Mobility Projects for MAP and USAID Funding Nov 65 (S)
2. JCS 2147/350-12 of 26 Aug 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC 262010Z Nov 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC Command History,1964, p. 150
5. CINCPACINSTR 004000.1E of 17 Jul 63; CINCPAC 280331Z Jan 64 (S)
6. DA 706269/082158Z Mar 65 (TS)

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In reply, CINCPAC referred to his previously stated inability to provide similar type of information, and he again recommended that DA should compute such requirements.[1] CINCPAC reiterated that the best information on total densities of each item, except ammunition, was the MAP EAM S-2 summary which was forwarded to US Army Materiel Command (USAMC) by CINCUSARPAC in March 1965.

In April the Department of the Army requested that CINCPAC take action on a request from CGUSAMC to DA for specific information on which to base an order of magnitude estimate of funds required to support Thai forces for 150 days of operations in accordance with OPLAN 32.[2] In addition, USAMC recommended that a scheme similar to QUICK TRIP be established for supply planning for Thailand and other MAP supported countries of Southeast Asia. In response CINCPAC furnished USAMC a troop list, applicable TOEs and a listing of equipment to be supported. He also stated that the establishment of resupply procedures, similar to QUICK TRIP, was not considered desirable. In this connection, CINCPAC stated that supply actions conducted through MAP channels should provide accurate information on Thai force requirements and assure timely resupply.[3]

In May OSD/ISA requested information on stockage, supply objectives, order-shipping time and requirements objectives for each of the PACOM MAP countries.[4] CINCPAC provided the required information for Vietnam, China, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and the Philippines.[5] The data included only the requirements of major forces these countries were expected to contribute in support of CINCPAC contingency plans.

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1. CINCPAC 160210Z Mar 65 (TS)
2. DA 710438/081659Z Apr 65 (S): CG USAMC 4-1503 FM AMCCP PC/051520Z Apr 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC ser 001134 of 27 Aug 65 (S); CINCPAC 250615Z Apr 65 (S); CHJUSMAGTHAI 012400Z Jun 65 (C); CINCPAC 070526Z Aug 64 (C); CINCPAC 050337Z Jun 65 (C)
4. OSD DEF 006355/041819Z May 65 (S)
5. CINCPAC 4900 ser 0261 of 3 May 65 (S); CINCPAC 18044Z May 65 (S)

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CINCPAC forwarded, in June, to the military services an updated edition of MAP S-2 (on hand) summaries.[1] He noted that the MAP S-2 summaries presented equipment density data as of 1 June and could be used in compiling resupply requirements as outlined in CINCPAC Instruction 004000.1E.

In July the JCS informed CINCPAC of a Secretary of Defense memorandum of 15 May which requested, among other matters, an analysis of the likely demands of allied countries on the US logistics system, particularly in PACOM.[2] The Joint Chiefs, in turn, requested an analysis of the following considerations for each country ally: 1) current and planned level of self support; 2) ability to increase self-support; 3) cost of US augmentation and subsequent allied willingness to increase self-help. The purpose of this exercise was to determine service order of magnitude costs of support to allied countries. The JCS noted that previous CINCPAC considerations of MAP support[3] had contained essential elements of information required for this analysis. However, the JCS requested that the scope of consideration be broadened to include Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps requirements for OPLAN 32, and total armed forces requirements in Korea for CINCPAC OPLAN 27.

CINCPAC stated[4] that the requirement being imposed for Korea was closely related to one conducted in January 1964.[5] In that instance the information was provided by the services and based on density data contained in earlier S-2 summaries to which US rates of consumption and attrition were applied. CINCPAC recommended that this earlier study be updated and projected through 180 days instead of 90 days and used for the estimate of ROK requirements. He also recommended that

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1. CINCPAC ser 00845 of 25 Jun 65, Navy (S); CINCPAC ser 00797 of 16 Jun 64 (S); CINCPAC ser 00796 of 16 Jun 65 (S)
2. JCS 5391/081950Z Jul 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 090053Z May 65 (S); CINCPAC 081922Z May 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 140211Z Jul 65 (S)
5. DA 950823/081719Z Jan 64 (S); CNO 202109Z Jan 64 (S); CSAF AFSMSA 85176/162246Z Jan 64 (S)

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if this revision was not acceptable, the JCS should task the service departments to provide the information required. Concerning the country self-help program, CINCPAC stated that the existing and projected capability was as outlined in the revised Military Assistance Plan forwarded in June.[1]

WAR RESERVE LEVEL OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES

In April COMUS Korea advised CINCPAC of a need to stockpile certain medical supplies as war reserve material. Only ammunition and auxiliary fuel tanks were authorized for war reserve stockpiling: other material including medical was supplied by normal replenishment procedures.[2] Basically, CINCPAC agreed with the policy of limiting war reserves to ammunition and fuel tanks. However, in view of the critical need for medical supplies during military operations and the limited dollar value involved, CINCPAC agreed that a policy change was warranted.[3] He forwarded COMUS Korea's proposal to the JCS. Since the merits of the proposal applied to other PACOM counties, CINCPAC recommended that war reserves of certain medical items be authorized in PACOM.

In December CINCPAC requested that authority to prestock medical supplies be granted prior to the publication of changes to the DOD Military Assistance Manual (MAM).[4] DOD stated that the authority would not be granted because the draft of the updated MAM was still under policy review.[5] CINCPAC again asked DOD to reconsider the previous CINCPAC request for authority to prestock these supplies, particularly in view of the serious shortages of medical supplies for ROK forces.[6]

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00783 of 15 Jun 65 (S); CINCPAC ltr ser 00843 of 25 Jun3 65 (S)
2. USFK ltr PROVMAAG-K-PL of 22 Apr 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 00667 ot 24 May 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 290414Z Dec 65 (C)
5. SEC DEF 2668/272216Z Jan 66 (C)
6. CINCPAC 291925Z Jan 66 (C)

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MAP TRAINING WORKSHOPS

Early in 1965 the annual PACOM FY66 MAP Training Workshops were held.[1] The purpose was to review MAP Training projected for the FY66 to 71 period to determine the validity of requirements and to ensure that training requirements were consistent with PACOM MAP objectives, plans and priorities. In addition, details for execution of the program were clarified and disseminated to the responsible component agency.

General sessions were held the first day of each week of the conferences. At these sessions representatives of CINCPAC, Office of the Director of Military Assistance (ODMA), the military departments, the component commanders and the Defense Language Institute described aspects of their particular responsibilities for MAP training. These presentations emphasized a central theme of stretching the MAP dollar to obtain the most training at the least cost. As a part of the general session, representatives of the Army and Air Force instructed country representatives on the costing of MAP training.

Following the general meetings, country sessions were held during which each line-item in the FY66-71 training program was reviewed. In-country training and training with US units in PACOM were given priority, and CONUS training was programmed only when the requirement could not be met overseas. Requirements for Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and Contract Technical Services Personnel (CTSPs) were closely examined, and accepted by CINCPAC representatives only if fully justified.

After the workshops had refined the FY66-71 PACOM MAP Training Program, the service programs reflected the following

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1. The Army MAP Training Workshop was held at Ft. Shafter, Hawaii, from 11 to 23 Jan; The Navy Workshop was held at FLTSUPPACT, Yokosuka, Japan from 18 to 29 Jan; and the Air Force Workshop was held at MAAG Hqs, Pershing Heights, Tokyo, Japan from 1 to 13 Feb.

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dollar levels: Army - 12.4 million; Navy - 17.4 million; and Air Force-8.0 million.

C-119G TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS

In June OSD completed a study of the best methods to meet MAP air transportation requirements through 1975.[1] It was determined that the C-119G aircraft could meet the majority of MAP transport aircraft requirements, and that the C-119G could be made available in FY66 and be supportable until 1975. OSD, therefore, suggested to CINCPAC that information be developed on possible theater requirements for FY66 and 67 and that the C-119G be considered as a replacement for C-46 aircraft in the Republic of China and Korea.[2] CINCPAC referred the request to CINCPACAF, CHMAAG China, COMUS Korea, COMUSMACV, Chief JUSMAG Thailand, and Chief JUSMAG Philippines.[3]

Before the subordinate commands could respond, OSD advised CINCPAC that due to developments in Southeast Asia DOD had alerted certain Air Force Reserve units for possible recall to active duty and that this eventuality could affect the availability to MAP of the C-119G aircraft. OSD, therefore, recommended that evaluation of the air transport replacement program continue but that FY66-67 programming be suspended.[4]

On 25 July CINCPAC forwarded to OSD a preliminary analysis which contained comments of the MAAGs together with CINCPAC's recommendations regarding the PACOM air transport program.[5] CINCPAC agreed that the C-119G appeared to be an acceptable replacement aircraft and that the price appeared to be reasonable. However, it was noted that the MAAGs in general indicated little enthusiasm for the conversion program, primarily because of logistic training problems generated by the introduction of a new type aircraft

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1. OSD Military Assistance Transport Aircraft Study of 1 Jun 65 (S)
2. OSD DEF 004787/292105Z Jun 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC 04002Z Jul 65 (C); CINCPAC 030413Z Jul 65 (C); CINCPAC 030414Z Jul 65 (C); CINCPAC 030415Z Jul (C)
4. OSD DEF 6042/162226Z Jul 65 (C)
5. CINCPAC 250135Z Jul 65 (S)

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and because of lack of funds. Except in the case of the Republic of China, the increased capabilities of the C-119G tended, from the point of view of the MAAGs, to be marginal when costs were considered. The requirements of each country varied as follows:

Republic of Korea: ROKAF was authorized two C-46 transport squadrons but had only one on hand. MAP ceilings precluded action to acquire the second squadron so the primary aim was to provide the existing squadron with six more C-46 aircraft bringing it to the authorized level of 16 aircraft. As for the C-119 aircraft, COMUS Korea did not desire a program change due to lack of funds. CINCPAC believed that the C-46 aircraft was adequate for ROKAF needs and should also be used to equip the second squadron. He also noted that consideration was being given to the possibility of transferring excess C-46 resources from the Republic of China conversion program to the ROK in order to extend the period of service of the ROK C-46 assets.

Philippines: The Philippine air transport requirements were based on the two existing C-47 squadrons of 16 aircraft each and four additional transport aircraft in a composite squadron. Programming for modernization of the C-47 squadrons of the PAF included one C-130 in fiscal year 1970. CINCPAC took note of the higher cost of the C-130 aircraft compared with the C-119Gs in the OSD program and indicated that future replacement with the C-119 would be reconsidered with Chief JUSMAG Philippines. However, limited funds and PAF operational capabilities would preclude action before FY69.

Vietnam: Vietnam air transport requirements of three C-47 squadrons of 16 planes each was limited by pilot shortages and the need for other types of aircraft. Because of logistic and training problems CINCPAC did not recommend conversion to the C-119G. However, should USAF C-119G reserve units be deployed to RVN, CINCPAC would favor considering in-country transfer of equipment to the RVNAF when the emergency abated.

Thailand: The Royal Thai Air Force was developing an acceptable capability to operate C-47 and C-123 aircraft. Because of operational and maintenance limitations CINCPAC did not recommend introducing

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another aircraft such as the C-119G. Possible improvements in Thai operations by FY69 might permit reconsideration of the C-119G at that time. In the event of interim deployment of USAF C-119G reserve units to Thailand CINCPAC would favor considering the transfer of unit equipment to the RTAF.

Laos: The existing MAP squadron of nineteen C-47 aircraft combined with Air America contract support was considered by CINCPAC to be adequate. Any expansion of air transport in the Royal Laotain Air Force was limited by a pilot shortage and requirements for other types of aircraft. CINCPAC recommended increased Air America contract support or the addition of C-47 aircraft rather than modernization with C-119G aircraft.

Republic of China: The Chinese Air Force air transport force was the largest of the PACOM MAP countries; and it was composed of seven squadrons including five C-46, one C-119, and one C-47. All squadrons were equipped with fifteen planes. This force was extensively used for air logistics, troop transportation, airborne training and to supplement civil air operations. The GRC transport squadrons also provide US courier support and were the primary backup for supply of the off-shore islands. CAF had successfully used C-119 type aircraft and intended to convert the five C-46 squadrons to C-119s. CHMAAG China reported requirements for sixteen C-119G aircraft in FY66 and thirty-two in each of the fiscal years 1967 and 1968. The GRC desired that all C-119Gs be in flyable condition and be available at no cost other than an estimated $220,000 per aircraft for associated ground equipment and transportation charges.[1]

In concluding the preliminary assessment CINCPAC stated that Annex J, JSOP-70 forces for PACOM air transport squadrons were minimum requirements which depended on US force augmentation in the event of hostilities. CINCPAC stated that the MAAGs should have additional time to study the proposed programs and that after further study the MAAGs might reconsider conversions to C-119G aircraft. It was requested that final recommendations on MAP air transport be made

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1. CHMAAG China MGPP-SF 7253/240845Z Jul 65 (S)

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after the development of Annex J, JSOP-71. CINCPAC requested that meanwhile OSD verify C-119 costs and provide additional information about packages and the number of aircraft available during the period FY67 to FY71. CINCPAC also recommended that six C-46s be provided to Korea as soon as possible.[1]

The OSD response indicated that a sufficient number of C-119Gs were available to fill GRC requirements beginning with twelve aircraft in FY66 and the remainder during the period FY67 to FY69.[2]

Replying to CINCPAC's request to forward an FY66 program deviation, CHMAAG China advised that under-programming had left sufficient funds to permit acquistion of the C-119Gs without deviation action. CHMAAG China outlined the urgency of the replacements and asked to be instructed about details of delivery, funding of repairs enroute if required, and shipment of the C-46 aircraft being replaced. CHMAAG pointed out that shipping arrangements for the C-46s should be clarified by the time the C-119s arrived in order to preclude possible complications should shipment out of Taiwan be delayed.[3] In November CINCPAC submitted a request to OASD/ISA for an add-on change to the GRC FY66 MAP in order to expedite action on the twelve aircraft. Another program change request was made for four additional C-119Gs for the GRC. This total of sixteen aircraft would complete the modernization of the 6th CAF Troop Carrier Squadron based at Ping Tung AB.[4]

Meanwhile it was necessary to allow time for CHMAAG China to complete negotiations with the GRC to recover the C-46 aircraft on a one-for-one basis. Arrangements were being made through CSAF for redistribution of the C-46s, possibly to the Republic of Korea in accordance with CINCPAC's recommendation.

Thus, arrangements had progressed to modernize one of the GRC air transport squadrons, possibly in the first half of 1966. Considerations continue for the addition of C-46 aircraft to the ROK air transport force.

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1. CINCPAC 250135Z Jul 65 (S); CINCPAC 112112Z Oct 65 (S)
2. SEC DEF 151444Z Oct 65 (S)
3. CHMAAG CHINA 190901Z Nov 65 (S)
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 262322Z Nov 65 (S); ADMINO CINCPAC 180424Z Dec 65 (S)

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Regarding later-year GRC air transport modernizations CINCPAC called CHMAAG China's attention to ceiling reductions forecast for FY67 and requested that attention be devoted to funding capabilities for programming additional C-119Gs in FY67 and 68.[1]

F-5 AIRCRAFT PROGRAM

Early in the year, as the time approached for delivery of the initial increment of the F-5 aircraft to three of the PACOM MAP countries, CINCPAC addressed a wide range of problems associated with the implementation of this important MA Program. Among these were evaluation of a fire control system, monitoring the preparatory training, establishment of a reporting system and data feedback, coordinating requirements for associated equipment and reviewing country implementation plans.

Fire Control System: Early in the year the MAAGs studied the F-5 and recommended that some form of fire control be considered. At OSD's request the USAF conducted a study of the feasibility of equipping the F-5A/B with a fire control system. The study concluded that the operational effectiveness of a fire control system installed on the F-5 would not justify the added cost.[2] OSD concurred and recommended that retrofit be limited to a lead computing optical sight and possibly radar ranging equipment. Chief MAAG China agreed with the Air Force finding that the costs and complexity of a fire control system would outweigh the benefits. He also thought that a lead computing optical sight was required.[3] Chief MAAG China suggested that the minimum sight capability of the F-5 should be similar to the APC-30 sight which had the radar ranging feature.

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1. CINCPAC 072211Z Dec 65 (S)
2. OSD DEF 007940/270001Z Mar 65 (C)
3. CHMAAG China MGAF-0-4215/070757Z Apr 65 (C)

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CINCPAC also agreed that the F-5 should retain the simplest possible configuration.[1] He stated that even without a fire control system the F-5 would possess considerable air defense capability when coupled with radar ground environment, radar ranging sight and air-to-air infra-red missiles. These conclusions, however, suggested limitations in the F-5 as an all weather intercepter (AWX). CINCPAC stated that since the F-5 with fire control equipment was visualized as the possible follow-on all weather interceptor for MAP F-86D and F-86L equipped units the time had come to reevaluate PACOM MAP AWX requirements. CINCPAC proposed that under existing MAP ceilings PACOM might not be able to afford an expensive but ineffective all weather interceptor capability and that he had in the past relied on US AWX forces when contingencies required.

In line with these considerations CINCPAC asked CINCPACAF to study PACOM MAP AWX requirements, including an evaluation of US force AWX capabilities and the advisability of redesignating the MAP F-86D/L squadrons as tactical fighter squadrons and equipping them with either F-86Fs or F-5s. CINCPACAF stated that if approval could be obtained to rebuild US forces to the pre-CLEARWATER strength of five AWX squadrons then the redesignation of MAP squadrons to fighter squadrons could be pursued and the F-5 could be used to replace the F-86D/L aircraft.[2] If pre-CLEARWATER strengths were not returned to PACOM, however, CINCPACAF recommended various alternatives which in essence required a century series AWX aircraft to be provided MAP countries.

Thus the role of the F-5 in PACOM planning was clarified as a clear air mass fighter interceptor which with radar ground environment, improved sight and missiles possessed considerable air defense capability extending to marginal weather. However, without the fire control system the F-5 could not be considered an adequate substitute for a modern AWX aircraft.

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1. CINCPAC 132217Z Apr 65 (S)
2. CINCPACAF 230135Z May 65 (S)

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In October USAF informed CINCPAC that there were no plans to modify the existing MAP grant aid F-5 fire control system other than a possible retrofit of a lead computing optical sight. CASF stated that a decision on the sight retrofit was pending. [1]

Preparatory Training: To prepare personnel of the recipient MAP countries the USAF established an F-5A/B training package.[2] During the first half of the year CINCPAC staff coordinated with other agencies to ensure that Mobile Training Detachments (Mobile Training Teams plus training equipment) would initiate training in Korea, China and the Philippines prior to the arrival of the aircraft. [3] These instruction teams conducted training in the three recipient countries from May to July. [4] Civilian technical service personnel were assigned to Korea for 12 months. [5]

Early in the year CINCPAC and the MAAGs were concerned about the need for support equipment and flight instrumentation training in preparation for receipt of the aircraft. [6] In response to CINCPAC queries on flight training equipment OSD stated that fund limitations would preclude extensive programs and requested that the MAAGs make maximum use of modified in-country equipment and aircraft. [7]

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1. CSAF 062026Z Oct 65 (C)
2. Under the plan MAP country instructor pilots, technical instructors and key maintenance personnel were trained at the MAP F-5 school at Williams Air Base. These personnel returned to their countries and set up country training programs prior to the arrival of the aircraft. In this task they were assisted by US Mobile Training Detachments and a Pilot Transition Team. Civilian technical service personnel assisted in on-the-job and upgrade training. In addition one AF advisor from each of the MAAG missions of the recipient countries was sent to the F-5 Combat Crew Training School at Williams.
3. CINCPAC 2903474Z Jan 65 (C); CINCPAC 150136Z May 65 (C); ADMINO CINCPAC 100454Z Sep (U)
4. CSAF 242019Z May 65 (C)
5. CINCPAC 252226Z May 65 (C)
6. CINCPAC 092239Z Dec 65; CINCPAC 300548Z Mar 65 (C)
7. OSD 232353Z Dec 64 (C); CSAF 291542Z Jun 65 (U)

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Reports and Maintenance Data Feedback: In order to provide Air Force Logistic Command (AFLC) with the required data for material management and logistic support, feedback data from the MAP country was required. This problem was discussed at a logistics conference held in November 1964 at Tachikawa. Thereafter preliminary procedures were developed by MAAMA Systems Support Manager and AFLC. These were refined at a meeting of MAAG representatives held at North American in January 1965 and in July AFLC issued a proposed Technical Order (00-20-2-12). CINCPAC and the MAAGs reviewed the Technical Order at the request of AFLC and provided comments and recommendations which were incorporated.[1] At the end of the year publication of the technical order was pending. However, the field agencies and the MAAGs were operating on the basis of an interim acceptance and accumulating data for feed back to AFLC. Meanwhile, in accordance with AFR67-11 reports on the progress in the F-5 program were submitted by the MAAGs every 10 days and monthly.

On occasion more detailed information was requested by CSAF and by AFLC. In October CSAF requested a complete review of projected F-5 flying hours for the purpose of taking timely procurement action, planning CONUS component repair and maintaining stock levels in support of the program.[2] Also, coincident with evidence of a need to increase CONUS supply responsiveness, AFLC requested that MAAGs submit a daily Non-Operational Ready Supplies (NORS) report.[3] CINCPAC considered that a daily NORS report was not necessary in view of the general adequacy of the reports on the program.[4]

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1. CHMAAG China 3107412 Aug 65 (C); CINCPAC 110458Z Sep 65 (C); CSAF 201616Z Sep 65 (U)
2. CSAF 121600Z Oct 65 (S)
3. AFLC 101600Z Dec 65 (U)
4. CINCPAC 110348Z Dec 65 (U); CINCPAC 040426Z Jan 66 (U)

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Coordination: During a May meeting at Kelly Field the implementation of the F-5 weapons system was reviewed. A representative of CINCPAC attended in order to obtain first hand information from the various agencies responsible for implementing the MAP F-5 program. Previously CINCPAC had requested that the MAAGs of the recipient countries submit a plan for the receipt and introduction of the aircraft.[1] These country plans encompassed conversion training, equipment; and attaining and maintaining operational or combat ready status.

There were numerous requirements which arose and required clarification prior to delivery of the initial increments of F-5's and during the first few months of program implementation. OSD issued guidance on support equipment and bomb handling equipment.[2] AFLC informed the MAAGs of the types of ordnance that the F-5 was certified to carry.[3] Requirements for bomb and rocket dispensers were resolved and submitted to AFLC[4] and USAF. Bomb handling equipment required improvisation on the part of MAAG China. Auxiliary drop fuel tanks for WRM had been authorized by the CINCPAC Supplement to the MAM on the assumption that they could be jettisoned in flight. The assumption was not correct and revised quantities were authorized by a change to the MAM.[5] AFLC was informed of total PACOM requirements for WRM drop tanks since by the end of the year none had been procured for WRM stocks.

After the aircraft were delivered training programs were delayed by a lag in availability of the bomb and rocket dispenser, the target equipment and training ammunition.

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1. CINCPAC 200222Z Apr 65 (C)
2. OSD 202137Z May 65 (U)
3. AFL 272517Z May 65 (U)
4. CINCPAC 030426Z Sep 65 (C); CSAF 012207 Oct 65 (C); CINCPAC 210344Z Aug 65 (C)
5. CINCPAC ltr ser 001113, of 3 Aug 65 (S) CINCPAC 220421Z Sep 65 (C)

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In October CSAF informed CINCPAC that the reconnaissance configuration of the F-5A aircraft had been determined to be feasible. CINCPAC informed the MAAGs of this and requested them to prepare to adjust programs in accordance with their requirements for the reconnaissance configuration.[1] Requirements of the MAAGs for on the job training packages and job proficiency guides were determined.[2]

In November Northrop proposed that in May of 1966 a USAF/Northrop team would visit each of the countries flying F-5 aircraft to assure that all had the latest information on the operational status of the aircraft and related systems. CINCPAC concurred in this proposal under the conditions that the team be requested by the MAAGs and report to and function under CHMAAG control while in-country.[3] The Philippine and China MAAGs thereafter requested visits by the USAF/Northrop team.[4]

In February 1966 the F-5 weapons system review and implementation group held a meeting at Northrop which was attended by representatives from CINCPAC.[5] MAAG representatives from the Republic of China, Republic of Korea and the Philippines and Thailand discussed the status of their programs and made observations on problems encountered. The CINCPAC representatives reported that there was a similarity in the problems and requirements associated with implementing the F-5 program in the various MAP countries.

Republic of Korea: By March the ROKAF was making satisfactory progress in preparing two squadrons, the 105th and 102d Tactical Fighter Squadrons (TFS), for the receipt of the F-5 aircraft. The 105th Squadron, which had been activated in October 1964, had 20 pilots assigned and undergoing training. By mid year in-country

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1. CINCPAC 242031Z Oct 65 (U)
2. CINCPAC 29228Z Nov 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC 072140Z Nov 65 (U)
4. CHJUSMAG PHIL 160022Z Nov 65 (C); CHMAAG China 230759Z Nov 65 (C)
5. Trip Report of 24 February (C) Lt Col George Strand, USAF, and Lt Col Alvin Banner USAF.

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training (by the team of CONUS trained ROKAF pilot-instructors) of the first class of pilots was one-half completed. Upgrade training of the 105th personnel was completed in August. The 102d Squadron completed ground school, started flying August, and finished upgrade training in the fall.

The first twenty F-5 aircraft (sixteen F-5As and four F-5Bs) arrived on 5 April and were unloaded and deprocessed by civilian contractor personnel. USAF pilots completed acceptance checks by 17 April and the F-5s were delivered to Suwon Air Base.[1] On 6 September an additional six aircraft were delivered.

Supply support problems developed during the initial phase of the Korea program.[2] Utilization of aircraft was considered good although it was below the CINCPAC authorized 20 hours per month. This low utilization was partly a result of the fact that the initial issue of spare parts for the first six months of operations was programmed on the basis of 13 hours per month for each aircraft. Limited quantities or omission of spares and short allocations of spares resulted in higher than average NORS rates. An initial lag in ground equipment and unsuitable spare communications and electronic sub-assemblies was partially resolved by the end of the year. The insufficient supply of training ammunition and training equipment had not yet been overcome. Nevertheless, the 105th Squadron became operationally ready by September and the squadron assumed its air defense alert commitment on 1 September as programmed. The 102nd Squadron became operationally ready on 13 December.[3] A CINCPAC inspection team reported in December that improved ROKAF planning contributed to a very efficient beginning of the Korea F-5 program.[4]

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1. Noair Activity Report 8842-65-7412 of 28 Apr 65, Subj: Korea F-5 Offloading; 614AF ADY GP Seoul 020743Z Sep 65 (C)
2. 6146th AF ADVY GP Seoul 102315Z Sep 65 (S) and 080730 Oct 65 (U)
3. 6146th AF ADVY GP MAP Report Jul-Sep, AFV-12 (S)
4. CINCPAC 5040, ser 001817 of 21 Dec 65 (S)

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Philippine: The first increment of nine F-5's (seven F-5As and two F-5Bs) arrived in the Philippines on 27 August.[1] The aircraft were transferred from the USS Princeton to Basa Air Base by 3 September, and Chief JUSMAAG Philippines reported that the off-loading and ferrying went as planned.

The most adverse aspect of this early phase of in-country implementation of the F-5 program concerned a shortage of support equipment. The non-delivery of the necessary liquid oxygen servicing cart necessitated borrowing older equipment from the USAF and Navy to keep the nine planes going on a shoestring basis while Chief JUSMAAG Philippines requested expedited shipment from AFLC.[2] Chief JUSMAAG requested that in the future such equipment be shipped so as to arrive prior to or along with the aircraft. CINCPAC passed the recommendations to AFLC for action.[3] A shift of the F-5 support management responsibility to San Antonio Air Material Area had taken place at about the same time that the F-5s were delivered to the Philippines, thus there was some delay in verification of the shipping action.[4] However, in early October CINCPAC was informed that part of the required equipment had been shipped and the remaining items would be released on an emergency basis in 30 to 45 days.

Chief JUSMAG Philippines continued to report inadequacies in aerospace ground equipment and spares which were causing difficulties in maintenance and repair. In September he informed CINCPAC and AFLC that the forecast for delivery of training items associated with the F-5 was unsatisfactory.[5] However, by the end of September progress in implementing the Philippine F-5 program was satisfactory. The construction of F-5 facilities at Basa Air Base was almost completed by the end of the year and training by the Mobile Training Team in maintenance and engine test stand operation was well under way.

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1. CHJUSMAG Phil AFM 1401/130500Z Sep 65 (C)
2. CHJUSMAG Phil 130500Z Sep 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC 152237Z Sep 65 (C)
4. SAAMA SANA 44550/171425Z Sep 65 (U)
5. CHJUSMAG Phil 130716Z Sep 65 (C)

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A pilot transition training team had arrived in-country in August and completed pilot conversion prior to the end of the year. The in-country Combat Crew Training School was progressing normally. Six pilots were graduated by the end of the year and these pilots plus the six that had been trained at Williams Air Base brought the 6th TFS up to combat ready status in so far as manning was concerned. At the end of the year the 6th TFS was waiting for certification to be declared fully operationally ready.[1]

Republic of China: The nine F-5 aircraft (seven F-5As and two F-5Bs) funded by FY 64 MA Program were scheduled to arrive in-country in September. Despite assurances to Taipei[2] that the delivery date was firm there was a delay in arrival of the aircraft. Due to Southeast Asia shipping requirements the F-5s were not received from MAP until 26 November.

Meanwhile the Mobile Training Unit arrived in June and conducted preparatory training. Offloading and deprocessing arrangements were completed by CHMAAG China,[3] and considerable attention was devoted both before and after delivery to such requirements as the bomb and rocket dispenser, bomb lift equipment and other aerospace ground equipment. In October Chief MAAG China pointed out a lack of rocket training equipment and CINCPAC authorized alternative equipment so training could move ahead.[4]

Action was taken to determine in-country accessory overhaul capability, and by the end of the year a good inventory of tools and equipment for depot level maintenance of F-5 components and accessories was being acquired with FY 65 MAP funds. CHMAAG China reported that this inventory would increase in-country maintenance capability and result in large savings of funds for follow-on spares during the 1966 to 1970 period.

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1. JUSMAG Phil MAP Report AF-V12 of 30 Sep 65 (S)
2. STATE 34 to TAIPEI 140115Z Jul 65 (C)
3. CHMAAG China 210432Z Apr 65 (C); CSAF 292118Z Jun 65 (C); CINCPAC 162005Z Jul 65 (C)
4. CHMAAG China 210847Z Oct 65 (C); CINCPAC 171914Z Nov 65 (C)

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In December CHMAAG China continued to be concerned about munitions support.[1] However, by the end of the year the nine F-5 aircraft were active and had flown 132 hours during the last quarter of the year. The China F-5 program continued at the end of the year to progress through the early stages of conversion of the 1st Tactical Fighter Squadron at Tainan Air Base from F-86Fs to F-5 aircraft.[2]

Thailand: Early in 1965 Chief JUSMAG Thailand advised CINCPAC that it would be difficult to accommodate the F-5 program[3] within the reduced ceilings of the MA Program for Thailand.[4] He suggested that the F-5s programmed for Thailand for FY 67 be dropped. CINCPAC asked OSD if the F-5 program could be reduced and, if so, could the funds allocated in a particular country for the F-5 be used in that country for other MAP requirements.[5]

OSD explained that the F-5 program for FY 63 through FY 66 was fixed; however, the program for FY 67 and beyond was subject to change.[6] OSD stated that no F-5 program funds could be used for other requirements of a country. The necessary inter-relationship

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1. CHMAAG China 060825Z Dec 65 (C)
2. AF SEC MAAG China MAP Report AF-V12 of 19 Jan 65 (S)
3. Force objectives for Thailand included two tactical fighter squadrons during the period FY68-71. However, these squadrons had existed for several years. They were equipped with F-86Fs, and it was envisioned these would be replaced by F-5s. Thai pressure to this end was increased since the F-5 had received favorable publicity and had been delivered to other MAP countries. CHJUSMAG Thai considered the need to allocate more MAP funds to counterinsurgency and initiated a searching review of the FY66-70 MAP plan. This review was reflected in the last Thai Force Objectives Study which concluded that only one F-5 squadron should be programmed in FY67 for delivery in FY 68.
4. CHJUSMAG Thailand 170725Z Feb 65 (S)
5. CINCPAC 210116Z Feb 65 (S)
6. OSD 052100Z Mar 65 (S)

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of all PACOM F-5 programs in production, schedules, prices and the possibility of a premature buy-out were pointed out. OSD gave CINCPAC the authority to change the FY 67-69 allocations of F-5s among PACOM MAP countries without, however, changing the annual PACOM totals. The Secretary of Defense emphasized the overall need for F-5 modernization and, alluding to the relatively large F-5 allocations to Korea and the GRC, suggested that these countries might be able to absorb the smaller Thailand allocation if it were necessary to curtail the Thai program.

CINCPAC informed Chief JUSMAG Thailand of the OSD guidance, and he stressed the importance of the F-5 program because of Southeast Asia tensions and the age of the F-86F fleet.[1] CINCPAC recommended that Thailand continue the existing F-5 program schedules for FY 67 to FY 70.[2] Chief JUSMAG Thailand was also asked to develop an alternative program of other investment items that would increase capabilities. This was to be done with the assumption that all or some F-5 aircraft could in the future be deleted without a reduction of country dollar ceilings..

In June CSAF proposed that the delivery of F-5 aircraft to Thailand be accelerated. Chief JUSMAG Thailand's reaction to the proposal was favorable but qualified. He stated that advancing the date of the F-5 input would have a favorable effect.[3] He also stated that the Thai forces needed a marked improvement in command supervision; that it would be necessary to phase-out one existing F-86F squadron in order to provide personnel for the F-5 squadron; that the development of the operational capability of the composite squadron had a higher priority; and that any required reprogramming should not adversely effect the MA Program of other services.

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1. CINCPAC 232310Z Mar 65 (S)
2. The schedule called for 2 aircraft in FY 67, 5 in FY 68, 8 in FY 69 and 3 in FY 70.
3. CHJUSMAG THAI 110915Z Jun 65 (S)

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CINCPAC informed OSD of his concurrence with the CSAF proposal to accelerate the delivery of F-5 aircraft to Thailand.[1] However, CINCPACAF recommended caution and CINCPAC requested that COMUSMACTHAI continue action based on the established delivery schedule.[2]

In the following weeks CSAF announced that action was planned for early delivery (April 66) of two F-5B aircraft.[3] He also advised that the additional funds had been approved for material costs of the F-5Bs. CINCPAC staff directed attention to additional aspects of funding, the required Mobile Training Unit and management aspects of the expedited delivery.[4] CINCPAC informed COMUSMACTHAI of the FY 66 fund increase for the F-5s, and issued guidance for the preparation of a definitized program.[5]

In response to a request for additional information, OSD advised CINCPAC that the total amount funded for the Thai F-5s was $3.4 million, an amount sufficient for the required training.[6]

At the close of the year CINCPAC was addressing aspects of implementing the accelerated delivery of F-5s to Thailand, particularly the follow-on to insure orderly activation. COMUSMACTHAI responded with a definitized program and requested an add-on to FY 66 and FY 67 MAP for the balance of the 16 F-5s required for one squadron, the aircraft to be delivered in increments of 8 in November 1966 and July 1967.[7] CINCPAC endorsed this recommendation favorably to OSD.[8]

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1. CINCPAC 150413Z Jun 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 271911Z Sep 65 (S)
3. CSAF 232129Z Nov 65 (C); CSAF 232201Z Nov 65 (C); CSAF 250005Z Nov 65 (C)
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 010234Z Dec 65 (S); ADMINO CINCPAC 012209Z Dec 65 (C); CSAF 012237Z Dec 65 (C); CINCPAC 0303555Z Dec 65 (C)
5. CINCPAC 052250Z Dec 65 (C)
6. CINCPAC 052750Z Dec 65 (S); SEC DEF 081848Z Dec 65 (S)
7. COMUSMACTHAI 270950Z Nov 65 (S)
8. CINCPAC 052750Z Dec 65 (S)

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Vietnam: In July COMUSMACV repeated his previous request for the introduction of F-5s into Vietnam. He outlined a plan with which Ambassador Taylor concurred, for phasing F-5s into the VNAF. COMUSMACV also informed CINCPAC of the intense interest that Air Marshal Ky had in the F-5 program, and he stated that Marshal Ky seemed willing to go to almost any length to get a program started.[1] Admiral Sharp restated his view to the JCS and OSD that from a military point of view it would be most logical to await the results of the SKOSHI TIGER combat evaluation of the F-5 before introducing the aircraft into the VNAF.[2] CINCPAC noted, however, that the political aspects must also be considered, that Marshal Ky was most eager for the program and that Ambassador Taylor supported the request for immediate implementation. Admiral Sharp recommended that COMUSMACV's proposal be approved.[3] The Joint Chiefs replied that the program should be held in abeyance until the F-5 combat test results were available,[4] and the Secretary of Defense supported the JCS decision to wait.[5]

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1. COMUSMACV 061255Z Jul 65 (TS)
2. In July 65 the Secretary of Defense, on the recommendation of CSAF, authorized combat trials of the F-5 in Vietnam. Thereafter twelve F-5 were diverted from MAP production and modified for combat in RVN. The aircraft began operations in October. As the trials progressed utilization rates were high and maintenance requirements were low. Only one of the aircraft had been lost--this to ground fire in December. It was intended that the test operation would end in late Feb 1966 at which time the F-5s were to be returned to CONUS for overhaul and restoration to the MA Program. See USAFTAWC Eglin AB/281400Z Jul 65 (S) for a discussion of the SKOSHI TIGER program.
3. CINCPAC 100504Z Jul 65 (TS)
4. JCS 5968/161535Z Jul 65 (TS)
5. CJCS 25185/2000453Z Jul 65 (S)

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At this time the Secretary of Defense became concerned about the availability of A-1 aircraft and suspended delivery of A-1s to the VNAF while consideration was given to the B-57 as a substitute for the A-1.[1] CINCPAC recommended that the B-57 not be substituted for the A-1 in the VNAF, and he suggested that the operational evaluation of the F-5 aircraft be accelerated to expedite the decision on the proposal to replace the A-1 with the F-5.[2] Subsequently OSD and the CNO determined that sufficient A-1 aircraft were available through FY 66 for the needs of both the USN and the VNAF.[3]

In October the Joint Chiefs requested that CINCPAC reconsider the VNAF F-5 program and submit his views on the conversion of a portion of the six VNAF strike squadrons from A-1s to F-5s. CINCPAC was also asked to recommend the number of VNAF squadrons that should be converted and to consider the feasibility of using F-84 and F-86 aircraft instead of F-5s.[4]

Prior to CINCPAC's response, the JCS indicated that the Secretary of Defense had directed that action be taken on a numbered list of items, one of which was to add one F-5 squadron to the FY 1967 MA Program for RVN.[5] On 10 December CINCPAC recommended that the conversion of the first A-1 squadron to F-5 aircraft take place at the end of the third quarter of FY 67, also that most of the conversion costs be inserted into the FY 66 RVN program because of the long lead times required for the acquisition of equipment and for training.[6] CINCPAC recommended that four A-1 squadrons be retained and that the decision as to the timing of the conversion of the second squadron to F-5s be withheld until the SKOSHI TIGER operation had been evaluated. Admiral Sharp emphasized that the F-84 and the F-86 aircraft were inadequate for VNAF requirements.[7]

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1. OSD DEF 10070/081601Z Sep 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 060420Z Aug 65 (S)
3. CNO 242327Z Sep 65 (S)
4. JCS 4610/202110Z Oct 65 (S)
5. JCS 032025Z Dec 65 (TS); SEC DEF 8252/092023Z Dec 65 (TS)
6. CINCPAC 100400Z Dec 65 (S)
7. CINCPAC 140255Z Dec 65 (S)

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Preparatory planning was continued by CINCPAC staff on implementation of the RVN F-5 program. CINCPACAF was brought up to date on the planning, and details of the MAP Training package were sent to COMUSMACV with a request that he send his recommendations on the training concept and F-5 training requirements.[1] COMUSMACV forwarded his concept of F-5 training and his requirements for advisors, Mobile Training Teams and civilian technicians.[3] CINCPAC comments on the COMUSMACV training program were prepared and CSAF was asked to evaluate the VNAF F-5 training requirements.[4]

On the first of February the JCS made the following recommendations:[5]

1. That no consideration be given to the introduction of F-84F, F-86Fs or T-28s into the VNAF as strike or air defense aircraft.

2. That consideration of the OV-10A as a strike aircraft for the VNAF be deferred until after the completion of service evaluations.

3. That one strike squadron of the VNAF be converted to F-5s at the end of the third quarter of FY 67.

4. That the decision on the timing of the conversion of the second F-5 squadron be held in abeyance until after the completion of the SKOSHI TIGER evaluation, and it should in any case not be undertaken until after the first F-5 squadron was fully operational.

5. That $14.9 million dollars be made available by July 1966 for training and long-lead-time items required for the conversion of the first F-5 squadron and an additional $34.6 million dollars be included in the FY 1967 budget.

At the close of the year the JCS recommendations which closely paralled those of Admiral Sharp were under consideration by the

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 001768 of 14 Dec 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 211910Z Dec 65 (S)
3. AF ADVSY GP MACV ltr AFGP-PTR of 3 Jan 66, Subj: F-5 Training (S)
4. CINCPAC 220438Z Jan 65 (S); CINCPAC ltr ser 00131 of 25 Jan 66 (S)
5. JCSM-70-66 of 1 Feb 66 (S)

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PACOM F-5 PROGRAM*
MARCH 1966

	FY64 & Prior	FY65	FY66	FY67	FY68	FY69	FY70	FY71
CHINA								
F-5 Sq	-	/9	1/18	2/36	4/72	5/90	7/126	8/144
F-5 Program	9	10	30	33	30	32	18	-
Delivered (Cumul)	-	-	9 (19 Nov)					
KOREA								
F-5 Sq	-	1/18	2/36	3/54	4/72	4/72	5/90	6/108
RF-5 Sq	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1/8
F- Program	36	19	5	14	16	17	29	15
Delivered (Cumul)	-	-	34 (14 Mar)					
PHILIPPINES								
F-5 Sq	-	/9	1/18	1/18	1/18	2/36	2/36	2/36
F-5 Program	9	13	-	4	12	-	-	-
Delivered (Cumul)	-	-	9					
THAILAND								
F-5 Sq	-	-	-	-	-	/7	1/15	1/18
F-5 Program	-	-	2	2	5	8	3	-
Delivered (Cumul)	-	-	0					

F-5 PROGRAM RECAP									Total
China	9	10	30	33	30	32	18	-	162
Korea	36	19	5	14	16	17	29	15	151
Philippines	9	13	-	4	12	-	-	-	38
Thailand	-	-	2	2	5	8	3	-	20
Total	54	42	37	53	63	57	50	15	371

Total Invest Acft	325	Total UE	313	Total F-5 FY 66 thru FY71 - 277
Total Attrit Acft	46	Trng Invest	12	
Total Acft	371	Total Inv	325	

*Converts all JSOP Tac Ftr F-86F Sqdns except for one Thai squadron.

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Defense Department. Consideration was also being given to the problem of funding the RVN F-5 program.[1]

Burma Inquiry: In mid-1964 the Burmese indicated an interest in purchasing F-5 aircraft. In response to a request from the Chief of the Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT), OSD provided estimates of cost for the F-5A/B aircraft.[2] In May Chief MEDT asked for an affirmation of this information, and indicated Burmese Air Force interest in the Sidewinder missile.[3] OSD affirmed the prices previously quoted but noted that buyers would have to share the R&D costs of the F-5 which would amount to about $750,000 per aircraft. OSD listed the unclassified weapons which were approved for use with the F-5 by the Burmese. Chief MEDT was informed that the Sidewinder missile was classified and that the possibility of it being released to the Burmese appeared to be remote.[4]

HELICOPTER REQUIREMENTS

In response to an April JCS request, CINCPAC made a detailed review of MAP helicopter requirements through FY 71.[5] The review included the requirements for Korea, China, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and Laos. Indonesia was not included because of the political developments which affected the MA Program. Burma had no helicopter requirements programmed after FY 65 and Japan was excluded from consideration because of the phase-out of MAP. It was pointed out that Malaysia could conceivably generate future helicopter requirements, however, the possibility was limited and there were indications that Malaysia planned to use French helicopters.[6]

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1. SEC DEF 8587/150053Z Dec 65 (S)
2. OSD Memo I-14,479/64 of 13 Oct 65 (C)
3. CHMEDT 123/050810Z May 65 (C)
4. OSD DEF 081528Z Jul 65 (C)
5. JCE 009448/202304Z Apr 65 (S)
6. CINCPAC 300435Z Apr 65 (S); CINCPAC 142319Z May 65 (S)

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The CINCPAC helicopter requirement study included requirements by type, with a breakdown of those programmed within existing ceilings and those for which additional funds would be required. It was noted that only a limited number of PACOM requirements could be accommodated within existing country ceilings. With the exception of Thailand the recipient countries could effectively utilize all of the additional unfunded helicopters which CINCPAC recommended. Major improvements of facilities and maintenance in Thailand would be required before programming the additions. The number and types of helicopters recommended were in accordance with JSOP-70 force objectives. Attrition aircraft were added to sustain a higher rate of operation under conditions similar to those experienced in RVN. UH-34D aircraft were used for standard airlift of troops and material. H/HH-43 aircraft are used for search and rescue and in Korea for resupply of AC&W sites. It was considered that H-19 type aircraft would be replaced by H-43 and H-43D aircraft. LOH/OH-13H aircraft were planned for reconnaissance and command and control of army units; and in some instances they would replace light fixed-wing aircraft. CINCPAC noted that consideration was being given to the need in Korea for greater load carrying capability than provided by the H-43 for resupply missions.

CINCPAC recommended that actions be taken to accommodate PACOM helicopter requirements with the following priorities:

1. Ensure delivery of helicopters now programmed within country ceilings.

2. Provide the recommended unfunded additions to Laos for an increased rate of operations.

3. Provide the recommended increase of UH-34D aircraft to Thailand to counter the insurgency threat (assuming that the country developed a capability to utilize).

4. Provide OH-13H or LOH aircraft for China.

5. Provide additional attrition aircraft for Thailand and China by an increase in ceilings.

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SMALL PATROL CRAFT REQUIREMENTS

In late 1964 the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) asked CINCPAC to review projected 15 year requirements for patrol craft in the PACOM MA and MA Sales Programs.[1] CNO and the Bureau of Ships provided information on the characteristics of certain high performance patrol and PT-type craft for use in CINCPAC's review.[2]

CINCPAC described the requirements of PACOM countries for small patrol craft and noted that the limiting factors in supporting these requirements were the availability of MAP funds and the maintenance capabilities of the various countries.[3] With available MAP dollars, CINCPAC recommended that the best course of action would be to support larger and more sophisticated patrol ships such as MSF/PCE conversions in the GRC and ROK navies, and to support other PACOM navies with smaller (100 foot) and austere PGMs. CINCPAC comments regarding small patrol craft requirements of specific countries were as follows:

Republic of Korea: To patrol the waters of the east and southern coast, the Korean straits, the Yellow Sea, and approaches to important ports and estuaries the ROKN requires MSF/PCE conversions; WWII Elco PT boats to counter North Korean agent boats; a limited number of austere 100 foot PGMs; and in-country constructed 30 and 50 foot wooden hulled craft the cost of which would be shared by the ROKG and MAP.

Republic of China: The Chinese Navy (CN) must operate during the four to six months of adverse weather to conduct ASW, surface warfare, escort and patrol operations and maintain coastal security and harbor defense. The CN has expressed a desire to purchase 11

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1. CNO 312115Z Jan 65 (S)
2. CNO ltr ser 0253P34 of 23 Dec 64 (C) BUSHIPS 191517Z Dec 64 (C)
3. CINCPAC 050036Z Mar 65 (S)

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APDs during the next five or six years. If this augmentation materializes there will be no requirement against MAP to provide the CN with the larger patrol craft. If MA Sales of APDs do not eventuate, the requirement will be filled by programming 220 foot MSF/PCE or newly constructed PF-103s. The Chinese Navy has also shown interest in cost-share local construction of PGM type craft.

Philippines: The primary requirement is to conduct surface patrol of island waters to prevent infiltration and smuggling. Austere 100 foot PGMs and WWII Elco PT boats are required.

Thailand: Thai craft must be capable of sustained anti-infiltration patrol operations in choppy and shoal coastal waters. The low cost and easily maintained austere PGMs are suitable for these operations.

South Vietnam: In addition to the austere PGMs there is a need for a COIN ship of sufficient size to be seaworthy and to provide a fairly stable gun platform. This craft should be capable of river and ocean patrol, gunfire interception of fast targets, troop-lift, gunfire and civic action support. The ship that comes closest to meeting these requirements is the WWII LSSL. The plan for recovery of up to 11 LSSLs from Japan will temporarily fill most of the COIN requirement.[1]

Japan: The JSDF is capable of determining its small craft requirements, all of which can be designed and produced in Japan.

Laos: Laos has no requirement for the small craft under consideration since such craft are not suitable for use on the upper Mekong River.

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1. See "Landing Ship Support Large for VNN," Chapter IV.

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Burma: Since the Burma MA Program has shifted to Military Assistance Sales, future requirements are difficult to estimate. The most suitable craft for the Burmese Navy would be the austere PMG.

Indonesia: Should the political situation change and MAP deliveries resume, the 100 foot austere PGM and similar internal-security and anti-infiltration type craft should be considered.

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SECTION C - COUNTRY ACTIVITIES

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

MAP Transfer Program

As in other countries receiving military assistance, it was the desire of the US to utilize available Korea MAP funds for procurement of essential military items, leaving the purchase of commercial consumables to be arranged by the Korean government. The Korea MAP transfer program was thus a planned transfer of procurement and funding responsibilities for commercial type consumable items from the MA Program to the Republic of Korea won defense budget. It was considered that such consumer items required by the armed forces could be purchased locally (or the raw material imported for local manufacture-purchase) for considerably less than US source MAP costs.

An important factor in the Korea MAP transfer program was the use of Korean Oil Company (KOCO) Ulsan Oil Refinery POL products for ROK military requirements. The Department of Defense had granted an exemption for KOCO products from restrictions on offshore procurement of items supplied by MAP. MAP funded procurement of bulk Ulsan POL for use by the ROK military forces was authorized in late 1964 to stimulate the operations of the refinery and to improve the future Korean foreign exchange position.

The transfer program was first initiated in 1960 with a shift of $4.2 million of subsistence items. In 1961 an additional $14.3 million of subsistence and clothing was transferred. The program was carefully monitored by the Country Team because of its direct relationship to annual MAP allocation, military equipment requirements, and the economic and foreign exchange position of South Korea. Planned transfers to the won budget in FY62 and 63 were reluctantly suspended because of adverse economic conditions. In FY64 the transfer program was resumed with the transfer of $2.8 million of soybeans.

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In December 1964 (DOD, State and AID drew up a program for FY65 which would increase the emphasis on transfer of funding to the ROK budget. Guidance was sent to the country team in Korea outlining a program which would substitute POL for other items and extend the period of certain raw material imports.[1] Washington concurred with the Country Team recommendation[2] and requested a revised transfer schedule.[3] The country team schedule submitted in January included increments of $3.3 million of POL to be transferred during each of the fiscal years 66, 67, and 68 for a total of $9.9 million. The schedule of transfer was stretched out to FY72 and other items in the amount of $9.9 million were slipped to FY71 and FY72 to compensate for the inclusion of POL.[4]

The schedule proposed by the country team was in keeping with CINCPAC's position favoring the transfer program and the inclusion of POL. The Washington agencies gave preliminary concurrence to the new schedule, but final approval depended on the conclusion of negotiations then being conducted in Washington between the Defense Supply Agency and KOCO representatives.[5] On 10 March these negotiations for offshore procurement of POL by MAP were completed. In addition to price, quality and delivery arrangements it was agreed that the Korean Government would accept the US proposed transfer of $3.3 million of POL in 1966, 1967, and 1968.[6]

In May Korean President Pak Chung-hui visited President Johnson in Washington. Among matters discussed was ROK support in the RVN conflict, MA support levels for the ROK defense effort and the MAP transfer program. President Johnson noted that the revised

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1. DOD/STATE/AID msg DEF 002862 of 11 Dec 64 (S)
2. SEOUL 547 to STATE, 18 Dec 64 (S)
3. STATE 556 to SEOUL, 3 Dec 64 (S)
4. SEOUL, 623 to STATE, 12 Jan 65 (S)
5. STATE 627 to SEOUL, 19 Jan 65 (S)
6. DFSC Wash DC DFSC-OB-C 0450/101635Z Mary 65 (U); DFSC 172219Z Feb 65, COMUSKOREA MSLIDTG 050755Z Mar 65

[redacted]

[redacted]

transfer program would enable the Korean Government to realize a saving of foreign exchange, and it was agreed that the program would be reviewed annually in the light of the condition of the Korean economy.[1]

In July the Korean Government was faced with increased political opposition in the National Assembly. The opposition centered around the two problems of securing assembly ratification of the ROK/Japan treaty and the dispatch of additional troops to RVN. Ambassador Brown, with the approval of the country team, made an urgent recommendation that the ROK funding requirement of the transfer program be suspended and that the US provide funds for procurement in Korea of items scheduled for transfer.[2] CINCPAC noted with concern the possibility that these political difficulties could delay dispatch of the badly needed ROK Division Task Force (ROKDTF) to RVN. CINCPAC strongly recommended to the JCS that Ambassador Brown's request be approved.[3]

In a joint message the State Department, DOD and AID informed the Country Team that the transfer program would be suspended for as long as Korea maintained the ROKDTF in RVN. Offshore procurement in Korea of items planned for FY66 transfer (including POL, construction material and blankets) would be funded by the US during FY66. In subsequent years offshore procurement in Korea would be determined on an individual item basis. The Washington agencies tempered this concession with the provision that the cost of US funding of FY66 MAP transfer items (about $4.6 million) would be included in the FY66 Korea MAP dollar ceiling of about $157 million. This would necessitate some reduction of investment or operation and maintenance input to Korean MAP and the practice would be followed in subsequent years.[4]

The country team in Korea pointed out that the decision to charge MAP funds for the cost of offshore procurement of transfer

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1. Dept of State 181955Z May 65 (C), SEOUL 104 to STATE 29 Jul 65 (S)
2. SEOUL 40 to STATE 100510Z Jul 65; SEOUL 38 to STATE 100200Z Jul 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC 122328Z Jul 65 (S)
4. STATE 47 to SEOUL 130210Z Jul 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

items in FY66 negated the benefits of the suspension which had been granted. The team also noted that the cumulative effects of absorbing transfer costs within planned dollar ceilings would drastically reduce investment during the period FY66 to FY71.[1] CINCPAC again supported Ambassador Brown and the Country Team and recommended that US funding for the suspended transfer program should not be charged against planned Korea MAP ceilings but should be funded over and above the existing program levels.[2]

Washington disapproved these reclamas and declined to increase the Korea MAP by the amount of the transfer program. Washington stressed the necessity for adjustments within the planned program levels, the need for flexibility in making up the shortages, and the necessity for the US to retain the initiative in determining the annual support levels.[3] The country team continued to study the MAP transfer problem.

In October the ROK Minister of Defense presented an aide memoire to COMUS Korea. Among other items was a report on the status of the ROK armed forces pay increase. The ROK Ministry noted that the one year suspension of the transfer program was a major source for financing the initial increment of the increase. The Ministry stated that to make the final increment of the pay increase, additional recourses, possibly a further suspension of the MAP, should be considered.[4]

COMUS Korea forwarded the aide memoire with the comment that if the transfer program was suspended in FY67, the resultant savings should be used for underwriting the second increment of the pay increase. If the transfer was not suspended in FY67, COMUS Korea thought the second increment would have to be funded by increased US support of the won budget.[5]

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1. SEOUL 53 to STATE 141110Z Jul 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 142141Z Jul 65 (S)
3. STATE 60 to SEOUL 152225Z Jul 65 (S)
4. CPRS 003322-65
5. USFK ltr PROVMAAG-K-LP of 21 Oct 1965

[redacted]

[redacted]

KOREA

AS OF 1 FEBRUARY 1966

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	38,000 SQ. MI.
POPULATION	28.1 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.9%
ARABLE LAND PERCAP	.0.2 ACRE
LITERACY RATE	75-80%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	.47 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1965 (E)	$ 1.7 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$ 60
DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCED 1965	$ 109.8 MILLION
AS % OF GNP	4.9%
AS % OF CENT GOVT	33.0 %

PRESIDENT - GEN Pak Chong Hui, ROKA (Ret)
PRIME MINISTER - GEN Chong Il-kwon, ROKA (Ret)
DEFENSE MINISTER - LTGEN Kim, Sung-eun, ROKMC (Ret)
CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF - GEN Chang Chang-kuk
C/S ARMY - GEN Kim, Yong-pae, ARMY
CNO - VADM Hahm, Myong-soo, NAVY
C/S AIR FORCE - LTGEN Pak, Won-suk, AF
COMMANDANT, MARCORPS - LTGEN Kong Jung-sik
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Yi, Tong-won



OVERALL OBJECTIVE

PROTECT SOUTH KOREA AGAINST RENEWED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND MAINTAIN C IN C UNC OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. WINTHROP G. BROWN

U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. JOEL BERNSTEIN

CONUS KOREA
GEN. DWIGHT E. BEACH, USA

CHIEF PROVMAAGK
MAJ GEN EDWIN H. BURBA, USA

MAP OBJECTIVE

GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE:
(A) THE MAINTENANCE AND IMPROVEMENT OF ADEQUATE FORCES WITH AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE POSTURE;
(B) THE MAINTENANCE OF A CLIMATE IN WHICH THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO ENJOY EXISTING AND, IF REQUIRED, ADDITIONAL OVERFLIGHT, STAGING, AND BASE RIGHTS;
(C) THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PROJECTS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT IMPAIRING THE PRIMARY MILITARY MISSION;
(D) BE EFFECTIVE ENOUGH TO LESSEN EXISTING AND POTENTIAL DEMANDS ON U.S. COMBAT AND SUPPORT FORCES IN EVENT OF COMMUNIST AGGRESSION;
(E) TO BE CAPABLE OF:
(1) MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY.
(2) DETERRING OVERT COMMUNIST ATTACK.
(3) DEFENDING AGAINST SUCH ATTACK WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IF SHORT OF AN ALL-OUT COMMUNIST EFFORT.
(4) ASSISTING, WITHIN THEIR CAPABILITIES, U.S. FORCES IN THE EVENT OF GENERAL WAR.

	MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES	TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY	18 INF DIVS, 3 RES DIVS, 7 RES REAR AREA SECURITY DIVS, 10 TANK BNS, 1 SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 2 NIKE BNS, 3 HAWK BNS, 6 8" HOW BNS, 10 MED ARTY BNS, 1 PSY WAR LOUDSPEAKER LEAFLET CO, 30 ENGR COMBAT BNS	2 ARMIES, 17-1/3 INF DIVS, 10 RES DIVS, 1 HAWK MISSILE BN, 10 TK BNS, 1 SP FORCES GP, 11 105 HOW BNS, 1 155 GSM, 3 8" HOW BNS, 5 MORTAR BNS, (2 ARMY, 5 CORPS HQDS) 30 ENGR COMBAT BNS, 1 AAA BRIGADE, 15 FA BNS, 1 ARMY AVN DETACH	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL AGGRESSION FROM NORTH KOREA, ASSUMING ADEQUATE LOGISTIC & AIR SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES
NAVY	8 DD/DE, 12 LST, 12 LSM, 19 PATROL SHIPS, 2 APD, 9 PCM, 1 MAR DIV, 20 MINESWEEPER, 1 SEAL UNIT, 16 FAST PATROL CRAFT.	1 OB, 3 DE, 20 PATROL, 11 MINE, 21 AMPHIBIOUS, 12 AUXILIARY, 45 SERVICE, 1 MARINE DIV (-), 1 PROV MARINE BDE, 1 ISLAND SECURITY UNIT, 1 SEAL UNIT	WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MINE COUNTERMEASURES THE ABILITY OF THE ROK NAVY TO PERFORM ITS ASSIGNED MISSION IS CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY. THE ROK MARINES ARE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF PROVIDING REGIMENTAL SIZE LANDING FORCES FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPNS OR LARGER SIZED FORCES, IF LIFT AND OTHER SUPPORT IS MADE AVAILABLE
AIR FORCE	6 TACTICAL FTR SQNS, 2 TRANSPORT SQNS, 1 RECON SQN, 4 FTR INTCP SQN, 1 TAC CONTROL SQN, 1 HELO SQN	3 FIGHTER WINGS, 3 FTR-INTERC SQNS, 5 FTR SQNS 1 TACTICAL RECON SQN, 1 TRANSPORT SQ, 1 SAR SQ.	FORCES IN BEING OPERATIONALLY READY TO SUPPORT GROUND OPERATIONS, AND CONDUCT VFR AIR AND LIMITED A/W DEFENSE MISSIONS.

◀ 1 ROK DIVISION (-) PLUS 1 ROKMC BDE IN SVN
(TO INCLUDE: 2 ROKA INF REGTS, 1 ROKMC ARTY BN, 1 ROKMC BDE, 4 SPTG UNITS, 2 ROKA ARTY BNS)

SOURCE: J53,J2,PA1,J51

[redacted]

[redacted]

Toward the end of the year it was necessary for CINCPAC to consider the matter of suspension as tentative, and to make plans based on both suspension and non-suspension.[1] The US Ambassador withheld for a time the official announcement of the approved CY66 suspension until the ROK Assembly met certain requirements regarding allocation of resultant savings to the armed forces pay increase. These requirements were met and in December the Ambassador officially suspended the MAP Transfer Program for CY66 and COMUS Korea submitted program changes for those items which had to be included in the FY66 MA Program. In so far as possible the adjusted decrease was made in materials and training.[2] COMUS Korea stated that decisions regarding suspension for CY67 would not be made until a much later date. However, OSD made changes to Korea FY67 MAP based on the assumption that the suspension would continue into CY67.[3]

Purchase of High Speed Transport (APD) for ROK Navy

In April the ROK Minister of Defense expressed an interest to COMUS Korea in the possibility of purchasing a scrap high speed naval transport (APD)[4] for in-country activation by the ROK Navy. COMUS Korea forwarded the inquiry with the opinion that the ship could probably be purchased and activated in Korea at a cost considerably below the regular MAP price. He noted also that ROK naval forces could expeditiously be increased by this purchase and requested CINCPAC's concurrence.[5] (C)

CINCPAC recognized that the purchase plan was consistent with MAP policy to encourage self-sufficiency. He interposed no objection to informing the ROK Minister that the APD might be available and advising the Minister on MAS procedures. However, CINCPAC recommended to COMUS Korea that, for the moment, the purchase action (C)

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1. CINCPAC 270219Z Nov 65 (S).
2. COMUS KOREA 53845/210115Z Dec 65 (S)
3. COMUS KOREA 53657/291030 Nov 65 (S)
4. Destroyer type ship configured for troop movement and support.
5. COMUSKOREA 51963/300835Z Apr 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

not be encouraged in order that any available ROK funds be used to implement the MAP transfer program.[1]

Subsequently ROK funding of MAP transfer items was suspended, and in October the Korean Ambassador in Washington again raised the matter of obtaining APDs on a Military Assistance Grant basis. OSD reported to CINCPAC that such purchase would not require Congressional approval and that Washington viewed with favor the ROK purchase of an APD "as is where is." OSD estimated that the cost would be between $350,000 and $400,000 as compared with $2.7 million through regular MAP procedures. In view of ROK participation in Vietnam, increased ROKN anti-infiltration requirements and unfilled JSOP force requirements OSD proposed that an APD be purchased and towed to Chinhae for reactivation.[2]

CINCPAC, together with COMUS Korea and CINCPACFLT, reviewed the OSD proposal. COMUS Korea suggested savings and advantages that would derive from the acquisition of two APDs at one time, and he proposed a means to expedite the purchase by split funding of an FY66 programmed coastal minesweeper (MSC) between FY66 and FY67. CINCPAC recommended approval of COMUS Korea's suggestion.[3]

OSD disapproved the split funding of the MSC but authorized a deviation with FY66 ceilings for the purchase, tow and activation of the two APDs for Korea. OSD suggested that one MSF/PCE conversion in the FY66 program be deleted in order to fund the two APDs.[4]

COMUS Korea accepted the OSD suggestion and submitted a request for FY66 program deviation for the procurement of the two APDs. Also included in the deviation request were provisions to substitute a larger Sewart fast patrol craft for those in the program.[5]

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1. CINCPAC 110523Z May 65 (C)
2. SEC DEF 4300/161623Z Oct 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC 102239Z Nov 65 (C)
4. SEC DEF 6976/222308 Nov 65 (C)
5. COMUSKOREA 53745/080311Z Dec 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Retention of F-86F Aircraft in the ROK Air Force

An important part of the five year plan to modernize and improve the air defense capability of the ROK Air Force was the conversion of four fighter squadrons from F-86Fs to F-5s. An additional aspect of force planning was to provide four squadrons of all weather interceptors. The F-5 conversion program was proceeding, but progress in the development of the all weather interceptor squadrons was delayed by the non-availability to MAP of a supersonic all weather aircraft. This shortage created an appreciable gap between the accepted JSOP-70 force requirements and MAP programming to meet those requirements.

As an interim substitute for the supersonic all weather interceptor force COMUS Korea proposed that a sufficient number of F-86s be retained in Korea to form two additional interceptor squadrons. This would augment the existing two F-86D squadrons and make a total of four force objective squadrons. COMUS Korea noted that although the F-86F did not meet the criteria for all weather interception it could be used as an effective interceptor for a considerable part of the year in South Korea. He stated that the increased defense capability would be well worth the relatively small cost due to such factors as in-country acquisition, ROKAF experience with the F-86F and the small personnel increase required.[1]

CINCPACAF supported COMUS Korea's proposal, and CINCPAC proposed retention of sufficient F-86Fs in Korea to activate two additional interceptor squadrons, providing satisfactory arrangements could be made between COMUS Korea and the ROK Minister of Defense.[2]

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1. USFK ltr USFK-CJ of 3 May 1965 (S)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00615 of 13 May 65 (S); PACAF ltr DPLYM of 23 June 65 (S); CINCPAC 012318 Jul 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

OSD stated that, in view of the situation in the Far East and the possible cost advantages, full consideration would be given to the retention proposal. OSD asked for additional information on personnel requirements, estimate of salaries, future operation and maintenance cost, and anticipated spare parts and support problems. OSD also requested comments on supporting the additional aircraft without an increase in MAP levels. Deferrals of other items or ROKG absorption of some of the costs were suggested as means to this end.

CINCPAC passed to OSD two COMUS Korea messages which included additional data supporting the request to retain F-86Fs. COMUS Korea stated that the two squadrons could be manned from existing resources including pilots reassigned from the reduced inventory F-5 squadrons, those on non-flying assignments and new graduates from flight school. Only twelve additional direct-maintenance personnel would be required. Estimated operating costs of one squadron for FY'67 were $479,940 and the operating costs of two squadrons for FY68 and beyond were estimated at $959,880. Since ROKAF was successfully operating and maintaining MAP F-86Fs, no special logistics problems were anticipated.

COMUS Korea stated that incorporation of some support costs into the MAP ceilings would require continued emphasis on cost reduction, and if it became absolutely necessary investment items of less mission impact would be slipped or placed in shortfall category. COMUS Korea foresaw no change in the next five years of the threat posed by the numerically superior North Korean and Chinese communist air forces. Surprise attack could neutralize ROKAF and severely damage a high percent of key targets in South Korea. [redacted]

[redacted]

1. OSD DEF 9031/242115Z August 65 (S)
2. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Friedman was advised during his visit with Chief MAAG Japan in October that two Japanese Air Self Defense Force F-86D squadrons would be deactivated in the near future and that these aircraft would be available for US disposition. Thereafter, ASD/ISA sent a request to CINCPAC for comments and views on the feasibility of using the F-86Ds to fill out Korean JSOP-70 force requirements.[1] CINCPAC together with CINCPACAF and COMUS Korea considered the proposal and determined that retention of the F-86Fs in Korea was the preferable and more economical solution. CINCPAC pointed out that the F-86Fs would provide a greater operational improvement of Korean air defense. Also, maintenance of the F-86Fs would be simpler than F-86Ds and support equipment and spares more readily available. Costs would be less for the F-86Fs, and political difficulties which could result from the Japanese source of the F-86Ds would be avoided. Thus CINCPAC again recommended the retention of sufficient F-86Fs in Korea for the activation of two interceptor squadrons beginning in FY67.[2] The recommendation was still under consideration in Washington at the end of the year.

C-46D Aircraft for ROKAF

The JSOP force objectives for ROKAF included two air transport squadrons as a minimum requirement for logistic and personnel airlift. One squadron of C-46Ds was operating with 13 of the authorized 18 aircraft, and the second squadron was in shortfall. Until late in the year budgetary limitations had focused concern on filling out the existing squadron rather than attempting to acquire aircraft for the second squadron. However, the November decision to modernize one Republic of China transport squadron with C-119C aircraft would make 16 C-46D aircraft available to PACOM MAP for redistribution to the Republic of Korea.[3] Thus, in December CINCPAC requested that

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1. SEC DEF 4495/192126Z Oct 65 (S)
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 012221Z Dec 65 (S)
3. See "C-119G Transport Aircraft Requirements" elsewhere in this chapter.

[redacted]

[redacted]

ASD/ISA expedite a FY66 MAP change order to shift the sixteen C-46Ds to the Korea program.[1] CINCPAC's justification noted the one-squadron shortfall in Korea and the excess generated in the Chinese Air Force (CAF) by the conversion to C-119Gs. Redistribution in "as-is" condition would provide the aircraft to the ROK at no cost while the cost of associated ground equipment and spares would be below MAP costs.

CINCPAC requested that Chief MAAG China arrange for the release of the 16 C-47s in serviceable condition and with a maximum of associated ground equipment and spares. In addition, he informed COMUS Korea that any required support items not forthcoming from the CAF must be programmed within the FY67 Korea ceilings.

Delivery of the aircraft to Korea was contingent on the arrival in Taiwan of the C-119 replacements and was expected to begin in July 1966. With the additional C-46D aircraft ROKAF would organize the 6th Air Transport Squadron at Taegu Air Base.

Surface-to-Air Missile Units

For several years COMUS Korea had reservations about the ROKA SAM program. High investment costs, future operation and maintenance costs, limited indigenous technical capabilities and the declining annual MAP dollar ceilings prompted COMUS Korea requests for reduction of the SAM program. In 1964 CINCPAC and OSD approved a reduction of force objectives leaving, at the end of FY64, one NIKE and two HAWK battalions in the Korea program. When FY65 MAP ceilings were reduced in September 1964 COMUS Korea again requested that two additional battalions be deleted.[2] The discussions and considerations which followed this request hinged on the level of support forthcoming in the FY66 budget for Korea MAP. CINCPAC supported COMUS Korea's request because of budgetary limitations.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 290420Z Dec 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 200234Z Oct 64 (S)
3. CINCPAC 240417Z Nov 64 (S); CINCPAC 090710Z Dec 64 (S); CINCPAC 260309Z Dec 64 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

In January 1965 OSD advised that no reduction would be made of NIKE and HAWK battalions in the Korea program. OSD cited as reasons prior SAM deletions, and adequate projected MAP fund levels of $144.3 annually coupled with difficulties of disposing of undelivered SAM allocations.[1] In late July, however, OSD advised CINCPAC that a possibility had developed whereby the undelivered second HAWK battalion could be sold elsewhere. In light of this development, OSD requested an updating of CINCPAC's view on the retention of the second HAWK battalion in the Korea program.[2]

CINCPAC pointed out that developments during the preceding few months had increased the military requirement for a second HAWK battalion, a unit which was technically the only MAP programmed force for low-level air defense of vital air fields at Taegu and Kwangju. He pointed out that the activation of the battalion was well advanced with the bulk of the investment package already funded, and site construction well under way. Also, two ROK antiaircraft battalions were already disestablished and HAWK crew training had progressed to an advanced stage. Even more significant were interim political developments, particularly the sensitivity of the ROK to reduction of forces or planning levels at a time when the ROKG was preparing to dispatch the ROK Division Task Force to RVN. CINCPAC stated that the earlier recommendations favoring deletion were made in the face of budgetary considerations and that the above factors had since overridden funding aspects. Thus CINCPAC recommended that the Second HAWK battalion be retained in the Korea program.[3]

In October OSD approved retention of the second HAWK battalion in the Korea program and delivery of the unit equipment to Korea would remain mid-1967 as previously scheduled.[4]

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1. OSD DEF 004129/261332Z Jan 65 (S)
2. OSD DEF 6774/271414Z July 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 042306Z Sep 65 (S)
4. OSD DEF 4282/152202Z Oct 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK)

MAP funds had been used during the past three years to support AFAK, a program which served to identify US armed forces with the Korean civilian populace by providing construction materials and relief supplies. United States Agency for International Development (AID) in Korea had felt that AFAK allocations were an improper use of MAP funds. AID, Department of State, Department of Defense and CINCPAC considered the problem and a decision was made to fund AFAK projects through the military service budgets in FY65 and beyond.[1] (C)

In mid-1964 OSD issued new guidance to the effect that AFAK projects could be funded by AID and MAP should the Country Team determine that such projects offered an appropriate means of carrying out priority economic and social programs. Additionally, some specific programs not meeting the foregoing criteria, but serving an appropriate military purpose, could be considered for MAP funding.[2] The country team considered this decision and adopted a plan to use local currency generated by AID (PL 480) for procurement in Korea of most of the AFAK provided materials. Local procurement would eliminate delayed deliveries, something which hampered the program in the past. The method of funding through AID would permit maximum utilization of MAP dollars for military hardware.[3] (C)

Ammunition Raw Material Reserves

COMUS Korea requested that CINCPAC authorize an exception to the MAM which would increase the ROKA reserve of raw material for ammunition production. His request was to increase raw material reserves to a level sufficient for the manufacture of 10 million rounds of .30 caliber rifle grade ammunition.[4] COMUS Korea noted that there

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1. STATE 879 to SEOUL 31 Jan, 7 PM 64 (C)
2. OSD DEF 8372/050041Z Sep 64 (C)
3. SEOUL 977 to AID 27 Jan, 5 PM 65 (C); CINCPAC ltr ser 001817 of 21 Dec 65 (C)
4. USFK ltr PROVMAAG-K-LP of 14 June 1965 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

appeared to be no CONUS reserves of raw material for ROK production of .30 caliber ammunition. According to COMUS Korea, shortages of material and long lead times for delivery from CONUS had interrupted peacetime production. The requested increases in reserves would alleviate these peacetime logistic problems. Higher stock levels would also significantly enhance ROKA capability to support combat operations during the important period of transition to wartime production.

At CINCPAC's request CINCUSARPAC studied the proposal and gave additional guidance which CINCPAC sent to COMUS Korea with a request that the proposal be restudied.[1] Members of a CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group discussed the problem with COMUS Korea's staff during a visit to Korea in August. Afterward, COMUS Korea decided to raise the authorized 90 day raw material stock levels by the amount required during the average actual order and shipping time.[2] CINCPAC concurred and granted interim authority to initiate the necessary deviation action.[3] CINCPAC Supplement to the DOD MAM would be changed as appropriate.

ROK Army and Ministry of Communications (ROKA/MOC)Microwave System

In January 1965 the Department of the Army assigned responsibility for the procurement of the ROKA/MOC microwave system[4] to the US Army Materiel Command (USAMC) and responsibility for the preparation of specifications and project management to the US Army Strategic Communications Command (USASCC).[5] Because of past (C)

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00847 of 25 Jun 65 (S); ADMINO CINCPAC 210204Z July 65 (S)
2. COMUS KOREA 52884/240900Z Aug 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 292030Z Aug 65 (C)
4. CINCPAC Command History, 1964, p. 134
5. DA, ltr. Subj: Joint Procurement ROKA and Korean Ministry of Communications Microwave System of 18 Jan 65

[redacted]

[redacted]

delays CINCPAC recommended establishment of a new schedule which would expedite the award of the construction contract.[1] DA, thereafter, issued a time-table which called for awarding the contract by 1 December 1965.[2] Technical details were discussed at a ROKA/MOC Microwave Conference held in Korea during March and April.[3] At this time COMUS Korea recommended that when possible the ROKA/MOC system be used for air defense communications instead of tactical VHF systems.[4] CINCPAC concurred and recommended to OSD that the ROKA/MOC microwave system be configured to provide air defense channels and that funds programmed for VHF equipment be deviated for this purpose.[5] OSD approved this change and the necessary deviation which resulted in a savings to MAP of $587,602.[6]

In May representatives of USASCC, USAMC, KMAG, AID Korea and the Korean Ministry of Communications met in Washington and reviewed the specifications of the ROKA/MOC system.[7] Thereafter a pre-bid conference with ROK officials and prospective bidders was held and bids were received in late September.[8] USASCC estimated that the contract would be awarded in late December.[9]

As planned at the end of the year, the ROKA/MOC microwave system would cost approximately $13.0 million of which $6.0 million would be funded by MAP and $7.0 million by AID. The up-to-date system would serve the ROK Army, provide channels for air defense communication and give expanded service to the civilian community.

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1. CINCPAC 190224Z Feb 65 (C)
2. CC-E WashDC DA 705374/020109Z May 65 (C)
3. CHIEMAG 8X0901/210845Z Apr 65 (U)
4. COMUSK 51903/220437Z Apr 65 (C)
5. CINCPAC 040801Z May 65 (C)
6. OSD 00716/0722254Z May 65 (C)
7. CGUSASCC 151401/161842Z Jun 65 (U)
8. Office of the Project Manager Unicom/Starcom, USAECOM/ 292100Z June 65 (U)
9. CGUSASCC 17498/101413 Sep 65 (U)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Chief Air Force Advisory Group Korea

CINCPACAF recommended to CINCPAC that the Commander of the 314th Air Division be assigned the additional duty of Chief of the Air Force Advisory Group in Korea.[1] CINCPACAF stated that the appointment would upgrade the diplomatic and protocol status of the advisory group; improve higher level coordination between ROKAF and USAF; and provide senior air force advice to the country team through MAAG channels. COMUS Korea responded favorably[2] and CINCPAC approved the additional duty appointment of the 314th AD Commander.[3]

Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) Inspection

A CINCPAC MAP Evaluation Team conducted an inspection of the Military Assistance Program in Korea during the period 16 August to 3 September.[4] The purpose was to evaluate the effectiveness of ROK units, the status of ROK activities, progress made by the MA Program, and to determine deficiencies which should receive further attention. The PEG reported that the Korea MA Program was progressing in a commendable manner. Improved ROK planning was noted by the inspection team, and this improvement was reflected in the efficient receipt and processing of the aircraft for the first F-5 squadron. Also, the quality of aircraft maintenance was considered noteworthy despite an excessive Non-Operational Ready Supply (NORS) rating. A major logistic problem was evident in the inadequate supply of spare parts from CONUS and USALCJ. This problem was for the most part due to slow supply response rather than deficiencies in programming, funding or requisition actions. Follow-up action continued with recommendations and assistance from CINCPAC.[5]

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1. CINCPACAF/DOD 53108/090003Z Apr 65 (S)
2. COMUSKOREA 51880/200512Z Apr 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 250317Z Apr 65 (C)
4. PEG rpt CINCPAC 5040 ser 001817 of 21 Dec 65 (S)
5. CINCPAC ltr 4900 ser 2900 of 28 Oct (U); CINCPAC 262353 Oct 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Despite improvement in logistics during the past year, major problems in maintenance and supply operations continued to exist in the armed forces, particularly in ROKA. These included non-utilization of equipment, stock imbalances, diversion of spare parts, inadequate exercise of command responsibility for maintenance, lengthy repair lags and inadequate calibration capability. Of particular concern was an increasing large backlog of engineer reparable equipment at the Engineer Base Depot.

Low pay and allowances continued to have an adverse influence on morale and retention rates in the armed forces. However, US-ROK agreements calling for a substantial raise in pay and allowances appeared to be forthcoming.

Various deficiencies having less overall impact on Korea MA were reported. There was, for example, a continuing need in all services to improve English language proficiency in order to expedite training. Also, pressure for army replacements made it difficult for the ROKA Replacement Training Center to schedule cycle breaks needed for the morale and efficiency of the cadre. Improper ROKA assignment of priorities resulted in some POL shortages and this hampered training. Additionally, vehicles in storage were not being rotated with the operational fleet in the interests of decreasing deterioration.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA (ROC)

As the conflict in Southeast Asia intensified the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) took steps to put the armed forces in a higher state of readiness. Many of these steps are reflected in the China MA Program discussed in this chapter. Included are the recommendations made by the GRC Minister of Defense for increased US support, the desire of the GRC to retain F-86F and F-104A/B aircraft, the formation of the 2nd Marine Division, support of the LST rehabilitation program, MAS purchase of APDs and patrol aircraft, and a heightened overall interest in the MAS purchase program.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Even though the US approved the measures taken by MAP countries to enhance readiness and effectiveness of MAP-supported forces, there was concern that the GRC preparedness measures could impose a serious strain on the GRC budget.

Recommendations of the ROC Minister of Defense

During his September visit to Washington, the Defense Minister of the Republic of China passed to Defense Secretary McNamara a letter which contained numerous recommendations and requests for additional support of military forces of Taiwan. The letter included the following requests:[1]

Rapid conversion of nine squadrons to F-5 aircraft
Replacement of C-46 transports with C-119 or C-130 aircraft
Replacement of T-28 trainers with jet trainers
Retention in the Chinese Air Force of F-104A aircraft
Provision of two submarines
Provision of 12 PGM-84 patrol craft
Provision of tactical missiles for naval use
Provision of army helicopter transport units
Replacement of obsolete armored vehicles
Increases in AGM-12B Bullpup missiles
Increase in SAM missile allowance
Deployment of US ballistic missile to Taiwan
Provision of Bullpup missile and Zuni rocket for F-104 aircraft
Resumption of MAP commercial consumables for aircraft
Increase in Ammunition War Reserve levels
Assistance in Military Sales Program procurement of listed items
Utilization of GRC productivity for US MAP procurement
Provision of mobile radar sets and improved height finding radar
Assistance in the manufacture of smoke and illuminating ordnance

The JCS asked that CINCPAC comment on each of the recommendations.[2] CINCPAC requested CHMAAG China views and these were incorporated in CINCPAC's reply to JCS.[3]

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1. MND China ltr to SEC DEF Subj: Strengthening Sino-US Military Cooperation, 15 Sep 65 (S)
2. JCS 4609/202120Z Oct 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 220120Z Oct 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Among the requests were several which CINCPAC considered to be desirable or meeting with general approval if funds could be arranged and if equipment were made available. These included the replacement of C-46 transports, T-28 trainers, and obsolete armored vehicles, provision of an improved height finding radar, and assistance in Military Sales Program acquisitions.

CINCPAC reported an awareness of the limitations of the C-46 transports and recommended the C-119G as a suitable replacement. Subsequently, MAP deviations were made to provide 16 C-119Gs to complete the conversion of one troop carrier squadron in FY66. Completion of the conversion was programmed for the period FY67-69.

CINCPAC agreed that retention of the F-104 aircraft was desirable, however, the Secretary of Defense stated that additional funds would not be available for this.[1] While final disposition of the aircraft was pending CINCPAC continued to study the increased operation costs which would result from retaining the F-104.

In connection with the GRC request for replacement of obsolete armored vehicles, CINCPAC considered that there is no tactical requirement for the M-44 tank or the 155mm self propelled howitzer. The M-41 tank was recommended as an adequate replacement for the M5A1, M-24 and M-18 vehicles. However, the newer vehicles including the M-41, the M-113 personnel carrier and the M-52 self propelled howitzers were critically short for effective modernization. Operating costs were excessive and many necessary support items were not available to the GRC except at premium costs from CONUS. Even this newer equipment was being maintained by cannibalization methods. Since MAP funds were allocated mostly for essential operation costs little remains for investment/modernization. CINCPAC concurred in the GRC request to purchase M-41 tanks and M-113 personnel carriers through MAS as a means of accelerating modernization. Barring such procurement and until MAP ceilings permited more rapid funding the GRC armored fleet would continue to deteriorate because of other priorities.

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1. SEC DEF 5136/272004Z Sep 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Numerous requests included by the GRC were not recommended for approval because of limited funds, other higher priorities, or because of technical problems. This applied generally to the requests for rapid conversion to F-5 aircraft, increases in Bullpup missile allocation, increases in the Ammunition War Reserve level, additional mobile radar equipment, provision of PGM patrol craft, tactical missiles for naval use and army helicopter units.

Regarding the request for PGM patrol craft, CINCPAC noted that these were too small for operations in the Taiwan Straits, and he favored GRC acquisition of additional DD/DE type ships. However, since recent ship loan legislation eliminated procurement of such vessels, CINCPAC recommended MAS purchase of APD's for conversion in order to increase the GRC patrol force and ASW capability. CINCPAC considered the two submarines to be unattainable for reasons of cost, sophistication and possible inconsistencies with the defense mission.

CINCPAC did not consider the MND request for army helicopter transport units to have sufficient justification. Further evaluation and cost study was required and was being carried out by MAAG China. CINCPAC would review the completed study and provide appropriate comments.

CINCPAC considered that an increase in the SAM allowance was not justified due to limited test facilities, weather problems and a lack of maintenance supervision. Also, CINCPAC viewed any resumption of MAP programming of aircraft commercial consumables to be inconsistent with MAP objectives. As for providing assistance for local manufacture of smoke and illuminating ordnance, CINCPAC noted that MAAG China was studying the problem and that recommendations would be provided.

In the matter of increased US MAP procurement of GRC arms production, CINCPAC supported the use of in-country facilities for the country needs, but he looked to the US service departments to provide MAP funded ammunition which the GRC could not provide. The service departments indicated no plans for offshore procurement of ammunition.

[redacted]

[redacted]

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

AS OF 1 FEBRUARY 1966

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	14,000 SQ MI	GROSS NAT PROD 1965(E)	$2.8 BILLION
POPULATION	12.4 MILLION	PER CAPITA	$160
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.7%	DEFENSE BUDGET(SELF FINANCED) 1965(E)	$ 218 MILLION
LITERACY RATE	60-65%	AS % OF GNP	1.0
LIFE EXPECTANCY	55 YEARS	AS % OF SELF FINANCED PROVINCIAL/CENTRAL GOVT EXP	7%.1
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	0.2 ACRE		

PRESIDENT - Generalissimo Chiang, Kai-shek
VICE PRESIDENT - Vacant
DEFENSE MINISTER - GEN Chiang, Ching-kuo
CHIEF, GEN STAFF - ADM Ni, Yue-su, NAVY
CINC ARMY - GEN Kao Kuei Yuan, ARMY
CINC NAVY - ADM Feng Chi Tsung, NAVY
CINC AIR FORCE - GEN Hsu, Huan-sheng, AF
CINC, COMBINED SERVICE FORCE - GEN FIRST CLASS Lai, Ming-Tang
COMMANDANT, MARCORPS - LGEN Yu, Hao-Chang



OVERALL OBJECTIVE

TO DEFEND TAIWAN AND THE PENGHUS FROM COMMUNIST ATTACK AND TO RETAIN APPROPRIATE U.S. BASE RIGHTS ON ROC TERRITORY.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
ARTHUR W. HUMMEL, CH D'AF

U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. GERALD HUFFMAN (ACTING)

CHIEF, MAAG
MGEN DWIGHT B. JOHNSON, USA

MAP OBJECTIVE

GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE:
(A) THE MAINTENANCE AND IMPROVEMENT OF ADEQUATE FORCES WITH AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE POSTURE;
(B) THE MAINTENANCE OF A CLIMATE IN WHICH THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO ENJOY EXISTING AND, IF REQUIRED, ADDITIONAL OVERFLIGHT, STAGING, AND BASE RIGHTS;
(C) THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PROJECTS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT IMPAIRING THE PRIMARY MILITARY MISSION;
(D) BE EFFECTIVE ENOUGH TO LESSEN EXISTING AND POTENTIAL DEMANDS ON U.S. COMBAT AND SUPPORT FORCES IN EVENT OF COMMUNIST AGGRESSION;
(E) TO BE CAPABLE OF:
(1) MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY.
(2) DETERRING OVERT COMMUNIST ATTACK.
(3) DEFENDING AGAINST SUCH ATTACK WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IF SHORT OF AN ALL-OUT COMMUNIST EFFORT.
(4) ASSISTING WITHIN THEIR CAPABILITIES, U.S. FORCES IN THE EVENT OF GENERAL WAR
(F) TO MAINTAIN THE GRC CAPABILITY TO DEFEND TAIWAN, THE PENGHUS AND THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS AGAINST ANYTHING SHORT OF A FULL-SCALE COMMUNIST ATTACK.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES		TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY	2 NIKE BNS, 2 ARMD DIV, 1 HAWK BN, 15 FWD LOOK INF DIV, 2 ARMD CAV REGT, 1 ADN INF REGT, 4 SPECIAL FORCES GRPS, 1 PSY WAR CP, 4 TANK BNS, 15 ENG COMBAT BNS, 22 FIELD ARTY BNS, 2 PSY WAR LOUD SPEAKER/LEAF COS, 1 RESERVE INF DIV	2-ARMIES, 6 CORPS HQ, 21 INF DIVS, 2 ARMD DIV, 1 ADN REGT, 1 NIKE HERCULES BN, 4 SPECIAL FORCES GRP, 4 TANK BNS, 2 ARMD CAV REGT, 22 FIELD ARTY BNS, 1 FLD ARTY GP, 10-AAA BN (40 MM), 1 HAWK BN	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONDUCT EFFECTIVE GROUND DEFENSE OF TAIWAN, PENGHUS AND OFFSHORE ISLANDS AGAINST SMALL SCALE ATTACK IF PROVIDED OUTSIDE AIR, NAVAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT. COULD CONTRIBUTE APPROXIMATELY 3 DIVS TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE EFFORT. WELL ORGANIZED AND COMBAT READY.
NAVY	12 DD/DE, 28 PATROL SHIPS, 14 MSC, 1 MMC, 1 ACC, 2 APD, 32 LST/LSM, 11 LSD, 1 SEAL UNIT, 1 MAR DIV, 1 MAR BRIG, 1 LVT BN, 1 LVTA BN, 2 AK/AP, 5 TANKERS	4 DD, 5 DE, 26 PATROL, 19 MINE, 379 AMPHIBIOUS/MINOR AMPH 14 AUXILIARY, 37 SERVICE, 1 MAR DIV, 1 BDE, 2 LVT BNS, 1 CMB SERV REGT	THE OVERALL ABILITY OF THE CHINESE NAVY TO PERFORM ITS ASSIGNED MISSION IS CONSIDERED FAIR. THE CHINESE MARINES ARE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING DIVISION SIZED AMPHIB OPERATIONS PROVIDED THE REQUIRED AIR & NAVAL SUPPORT, INCLUDING AMPHIB SHIPPING, ARE AVAILABLE.
AIR FORCE	3 FTR INTCP (ANBX), 11 TAC FTR SQN, 1 TAC RECCE SQN, 1 COMP RECON SQN, 1 ASW PATROL SQN, 1 SAR SQN, 7 TRANSPORT SQN.	5 FIGHTER WING, 11 TAC FTR SQNS, 1 A/W FTR SQN, 3 FTR/INTER SQN, 2 TAC RCN SQN, 1 AIR RESCUE SQN, 7 TRANSPORT SQN, 1 HAWK BN, 1 NIKE HERCULES BN	FORCE COMBAT READY.

SOURCE: J53,J2,PA1,J51

[redacted]

[redacted]

Regarding the deployment of US ballistic missiles to Taiwan, CINCPAC recommended the deployment of MRBMs to Taiwan as part of US JSOP forces. The deployment of MACE was not recommended due to high construction costs and the scheduled phase-out of the MACE system in FY69. However, CINCPAC was studying PACOM ballistic missile requirements, and he would consider Taiwan deployments in the final recommendation.

Expansion of Military Assistance Sales (MAS) Program

From a small beginning in FY63 the GRC Military Assistance Sales (MAS) program developed into a large potential addition to the GRC self-sufficiency effort and MA Program. Until FY65 MAS acquisitions by the GRC had been limited to medical and special POL supplies. The GRC MAS purchase of APDs and other equipment is discussed later in this chapter.

In February the GRC announced a desire to buy through the MAS program a multi-million dollar Straits Surveillance System,[1] the prime contractor of which is Raytheon Corporation.[2] The country team, however, unanimously agreed that the expenditure of such a large sum for an item having such a low military priority was not recommended. CINCPAC, OSD and the Department of State also took a negative view of this request and recommended that GRC funds be used to purchase an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrol squadron. In May the GRC agreed to the purchase of the ASW squadron through MAS prior to giving further consideration to the Straits Surveillance System.[3] The CNO informed CHMAAG that S-2A aircraft were not immediately available but might become available in six months, however, P2V5 aircraft were immediately available.[4] Chief MAAG China provided additional information on the intended use of the ASW squadron in order that the CNO could refine the estimated costs of associated ground equipment. Chief MAAG also indicated that a partial delivery

1. Also referred to as the Straits Navigation System
2. CHMAAG China MGGC-OPS 2328/260841Z Feb 65 (S)
3. TAIPEI 1168 to STATE/250928Z May 65 (S)
4. CNO 201454Z May 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

of S-2A aircraft for the squadron would be acceptable to the GRC if the remaining aircraft could be made available in FY67. The S-2As appeared to be most appropriate aircraft from the standpoint of GRC defense requirements, and both initial and supporting costs. The CNO quoted a MAS price of $5.1 million dollars for 9 S-2A aircraft, including support and training needs.[1] Acquisition of the ASW squadron through MAS purchase would further the attainment of JSOP-70 Force Objectives because the existing MAP planning did not include funds for this squadron until 1970.

The GRC had also shown some interest in the purchase of an ocean fleet tug (ATF) from the US reserve fleet. A price of $100,000 was suggested.[2]

In June CHMAAG China requested that OSD provide a list of production machinery and significant military weapons that could be made available for additional MAS purchase as more GRC funds were appropriated.[3] Shortly thereafter the problem of the funding capability of the GRC was raised by a US Embassy official while visiting CINCPAC headquarters.[4] It was stated that the US must go slow in pushing MAS sales as the GRC defense budget was going into deficit financing.

MAP Support of Equipment Procured Through MAS

During the negotiations for the MAS purchase of S-2A patrol aircraft the problem of future MAP support of MAS purchased equipment was raised, and in July CHMAAG China addressed the problem and made tentative recommendations to CINCPAC.[5] Chief MAAG concluded that with certain exceptions each individual MAS purchase by the GRC should comprise a package to include follow on spares, associated equipment

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1. BUWEPS 222204Z Jun 65 (C)
2. CNO 181230Z May 65 (C)
3. CHMAAG China MGGC-OPS 631/040545Z Jun 65 (S)
4. Comments of Mr. Ralph Clough, Deputy Chief of Mission, Taipei, to Col G. Prochoroff and Cdr. F.C. Mead of the CINCPAC J5 Staff
5. CHMAAG China 190811Z Jul 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

and other items for a one to two year period of time. Chief MAAG considered that determination of MAP support must be made according to the type of equipment and the degree of direct US interest involved. But he felt there were moral and operational factors which would tend to make eventual MAP support necessary for many if not most MAS items. This support should be arranged to coincide with the termination of the one-to-two year package.

CINCPAC generally concurred in the views expressed by CHMAAG China, and he conceded that operational necessity might require MAP support of MAS purchased items. However, CINCPAC did not agree that a moral obligation existed to MAP support MAS purchased items, particularly those items which were not consistent with US objectives and advice on GRC force development.[1]

In August the GRC Minister of Defense submitted a list of 31 items of equipment and material which the GRC planned to purchase through MAS on a phased basis.[2] Further, Minister Chaing requested relevant price and availability information, and assurance that the equipment procured through MAS would be supported in the MAP Grant Aid Program. CINCPAC reviewed the development of the problem of MAP support in a message to OSD, and he noted that the GRC request for assurance of MAP support of equipment purchased through MAS pointed up a need to provide CHMAAG China with additional guidance from the Department of Defense.[3]

In October CHMAAG had refined and definitized the list of requested items to the extent possible and forwarded it to CINCPAC with comments and recommendations on each item.[4] At the end of the year CINCPAC, CHMAAG China and appropriate service departments were continuing to refine the list and identify items that were in the best GRC and US interests, and to assemble price and availability data.

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1. CINCPAC 250131Z Jul 65 (S)
2. CHMAAG China MGGD-L 931/010301Z Sep 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 080250Z Sep 65 (S)
4. CHMAAG China ltr MGGD-L of 8 Oct 65; Subj, GRC MAS Purchase (S)

[redacted]

Purchase of APDs Through Military Assistance Sales (MAS) Program

In late 1964 the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) announced that funds had been appropriated to purchase the first two of eleven high speed transports (APD) from the US reserve fleet. These APDs have been declared obsolete by US standards, however, they had a significant life span remaining by GRC standards of use and need.[1] In response to a CHMAAG request for information, CNO advised that two APDs berthed in the San Francisco area were available for MAS in an "as is where is" condition at an estimated cost of $45,000 exclusive of towing expenses.[2] The CNO asked CHMAAG China to advise the GRC to submit a request for purchase through the State Department. President Chaing approved the APD purchase and funds were made available for purchase, towing expenses, and the costs of labor, activation and overhaul.[3]

In January 1965 the GRC announced that they would like to purchase eleven of the US reserve APDs through MAS procedures.[4] CINCPAC concurred with the views of Chief MAAG China and the Embassy in Taipei in that: 1) there was need for these eleven APDs; 2) the GRC had the capability to overhaul and make them fully operational; and 3) under current ceilings MAP could provide limited funds for austere activation.[5]

JCS concurred in the affirmative views of CINCPAC and the country team regarding the purchase of APDs.[6] The Joint Chiefs recommended to the State Department that the sale of up to eleven hulls be authorized, but that for the time being, a commitment to the GRC for the sale of only two hulls be given. JCS also notified CINCPAC that JSOP-70 force objectives were changed from 28 to 18 patrol ships

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1964, p. 209
2. CHMAAG CHINA 050732Z Nov 65 (C); CNO 062127Z Nov 65 (C)
3. CHMAAG CHINA 310333Z Dec 65 (C)
4. STATE 627 to TAIPEI 7 PM 30 Dec 65 (C)
5. CHMAAG CHINA MGNA 12-262/310333Z Dec 65 (C); TAIPEI 576 to STATE 4:20 PM 5 Jan 65 (C); CINCPAC 151951Z Jan 65 (S)
6. JCS 005032/112033Z Feb 65 (S)

[redacted]

(PC/PCE) and a new and equivalent force objective of 10 patrol ships (PG) was established. Thereafter the US State Department informed the GRC Minister that two hulls were available immediately and that the additional nine vessels would be considered after the US and GRC had evaluated the commissioning of the first two.[1] The GRC was also informed of the US understanding that the APDs would be configured as patrol craft and used on patrol duties.

In March the CNO assisted a representative of the Chinese Navy in an inspection of the two APDs and making preparations for towing them to Taiwan.[2] Hull numbers 91 and 129 were selected and deleted from US lists on the 1st of March. Activation of the two ships was completed within 55 days after they arrived in Taiwan and successful sea trials were made on the 1st of September.[3] The GRC then requested that another four vessels be sold to them.[4] OSD requested a report of problems encountered in the recommissioning of the first two APDs, evaluation of costs, and an assessment of the GRC capbility to handle additional hulls.[5]

Chief MAAG China reported that no major problems had been encountered and that the GRC was capable of activating APD type ships without any apparent dilatory effect on regularly scheduled overhauls.[6] The programmed conversion work was judged outstanding, and the quality of GRC work was stated to be equal to US standards. CHMAAG China, after coordination with the country team, stated that the sale of an additional four APDs should be approved. CINCPAC also favored the sale of four more APDs to reinforce the Chinese Navy.[7] He pointed out that the cost to MAP for activation of each APD would be about $120,000 of which $45,000 was returned to the US by the initial purchase. CINCPAC further stated that approval of the MAS purchase program was essential

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1. STATE 837 to TAIPEI, 7 PM, 4 Mar 65 (C)
2. CNO 102110Z Mar 65 (U)
3. CHNAVSEC MAAG CHINA 010600Z Sep 65 (C)
4. CNO 141958Z Sep 65 (S)
5. ODS DEF 1407/111718Z Sep 65 (S)
6. CHMAAG CHINA 200901Z Sep 65 (S)
7. CINCPAC 210433Z Sep 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

to provide the required support of the Chinese Navy patrol and ASW capability which was lost through deletions of DD/DE type ships.

Discussions in Washington between CINCPAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance and OSD/ISA indicated that OSD considered that the APDs purchased and commissioned by the GRC through MAS were to replace old PC/PCE type ships of the patrol force on a one-for-one basis. CINCPAC notified OSD and JCS that this was not his understanding of the program. In CINCPAC's view the recommissioned APDs should be applied to fulfilling the force objective for patrol force and APDs. When the force objectives for patrol force and APDs were reached, then the old PC/PCE type ships would be scrapped on a one-for-one basis as additional APDs were acquired. [1]

In November the GRC signed an acceptance offer for the purchase of an additional four APDs and at the close of the year the four transports were being readied for movement to Taiwan. The GRC continued to show interest in gaining early approval for purchase of the last five of the eleven APDs so the ships could be moved to Taiwan before the onset of the Taiwan Straits storm season. GRC officials stated that this prompt acquisition would give continuity to the conversion program and result in an early increase in GRC Naval ASW capability.

The following is a recapitulation of the cost to both MAP and the GRC of the acquisition and recommissioning of the first two APDs:

MAP		GRC	
Equipment	$16,127	Purchase	$ 90,000
CONUS	$19,764	Activation Cost	$ 42,536
Local Currency	$29,194	Towing & Insurance	$100,000
Total	$69,962	Total	$232,536

The two converted APDs would be classified as PG ships which the GRC refer to as PFs. Of the next four, one would fill the force objectives of APD requirements and the other three would be applied

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1. CINCPAC 220147Z Oct 65 (S)
2. CNO ltr 1541 P42 of 22 Nov 65 (U)

[redacted]

[redacted]

toward the PGs in the patrol force. When the force objective for the patrol force was filled any additional APD conversions would replace old PC/PCE ships on a one-for-one basis.[1]

LST Advisory Division of MAAG China

In January JCS approved CINCPAC's request for authorization to establish an LST Advisory Division within MAAG China. The function of the new division was to advise and assist the Chief, Navy Section in the effort to rehabilitate the Chinese Navy LST fleet. The JCS authorized early manning of the LST Advisory Division with 5 military personnel and 1 civilian. (C)

The rehabilitation program got under way with arrangements for funding, cost sharing and ship surveys continuing for the first few months of the year.[2] By March the MAP rehabilitation lines had been definitized and MAP order ammendment promulgated.[3] Material priorities and the time required for engine overhaul required continuing supply support action,[4] however, by July the contract for the first ship rehabilitation had been signed and LST Advisory Division personnel were on duty in Taiwan.[5] (C)

At the end of the year the various systems of the first LST were 75 to 100 per cent complete. Procurement continued to be delayed by lost requisitions both in CONUS and in Taiwan. Delays in CONUS engine overhaul requisitions and lack of supply implementing action caused a three month slip. Nevertheless, it was expected that the first LST rehabilitation would be complete in mid-February or early (C)

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1. Interview with Major W. E. Overgaard, USMC, CINCPAC J5 Division
2. CHMAAG China MGNA 1227/140603Z Jan 65 (C); CINCPAC 150323Z Jan 65 (C); MAAG CHINA, Navy Section ltr, MGNA/EF 16/24 of 18 Jan 65 (C)
3. OSD DEF 0061144/020056Z Mar 65 (C); BUSANDA 172100Z Mar 65 (C); CINCPAC 172317Z Mar 65 (C)
4. CINCPAC 020338Z Apr 65 (C); CHNAVSEC MAAG CHINA 03011Z May 65 (C); CHNAVSEC MAAG CHINA 300333Z Jun 65 (U); CNO 041445Z May 65 (C)
5. MAAG CHINA Navy Section, ltr MGNA of 19 Jul 65 (C)

[redacted]

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March 1966. Work was begun on the second LST in September. Electric cable and steel procurement problems and the delayed launching of the first rehabilitated LST forced the anticipated completion date of the second LST to be slipped from March to May 1966. The rehabilitation of six other LSTs was scheduled to begin during CY 1966 at various Chinese Navy shipyards and Taiwan-Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation.[1] (C)

Retention of F-104A/B Squadron

Arrangements were made in 1964 for the Chinese Air Force (CAF) to exchange its 18 F-104A and three F-104B aircraft for 21 F-104Gs. The F-104A/B were then to be made available to Pakistan, the only other country having this type of MAP aircraft. The exchange would not alter the number of CAF aircraft or squadrons but would simplify training, maintenance and support in that the F-104s of the CAF would all be of the same basic series.

In September Chief MAAG China suggested that the GRC be permitted to retain the F-104A/Bs in Taiwan.[2] Chief MAAG noted that the squadron was scheduled to be transferred to Pakistan in exchange for an F-104G squadron coming from US recoupment sources. In view of the Pakistan/India conflict, Chief MAAG commented that if the MAP support for the squadron could be transferred from Pakistan MAP to the China program, the squadron could be maintained in the active inventory of the CAF. Chief MAAG considered that the suggestion was consistent with the increased tension in the Western Pacific and requested a policy review and approval in principle of the suggestion.

CINCPACAF favored the GRC retention of the F-104A/B squadron and suggested that these should be integrated into three F-104G squadrons with an increase in the UE from 16 to 22.[3]

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1. NAVSEC CHMAAG China, ltr MGNA-29, ser 07 of 14 Jan 66 (C)
2. CHMAAG China MGAF-A 9312/101033Z Sep 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC CAF 212018Z Sep 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Admiral Sharp informed OSD that he agreed that retention of the aircraft would be desirable.[1] He pointed out, however, that possible FY66 China MAP reductions of at least $10 million negated the retention unless support dollars initially programmed for Pakistan could be transferred to the China program with no loss to existing GRC ceilings. Otherwise the additional support costs required for retention of the F-104s could only be made up by additional deferments of the GRC Army and Navy modernization programs.

Retention of F-86F Aircraft

In mid-1964 CINCPAC was informed by CSAF that world-wide requirements for F-86F aircraft which were expected to become excess in the China program had become more urgent than in-country retention for parts support.[2] CINCPAC informed CHMAAG China that after satisfying attrition needs the remainder of the F-86Fs should be made available for redistribution and that a schedule for the phase-out of F-86Fs should be forwarded.[3] Chief MAAG forwarded a phase-out schedule, but he noted that the timing and the number of F-86s for phase-out would depend on attrition and on the actual input of the F-5 replacements.[4] He considered that the F-86F redistribution action should be withheld until the F-5 program was firmed up.

During his force review in September of 1964, CHMAAG recommended that two squadrons of MAP supported F-86Fs be turned over to the GRC for their exclusive support as a means of maintaining an adequate number of tactical fighter aircraft in Taiwan during the period of conversion to F-5 aircraft. Since the F-5 squadrons would consist of only 18 aircraft compared with the 25 aircraft in the F-86 squadrons, CHMAAG considered that conversion would result in a reduction of in-country tactical fighters of about one-third.[5] CINCPAC did not approve this recommendation because of the difficulty of keeping

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1. CINCPAC 250519Z Sep 65 (S)
2. CSAF AFSMSA 62327/072158Z Aug 64 (S)
3. CINCPAC 120442Z Aug 64 (S)
4. CHMAAG China MGAF-OT-8314/211007Z Aug 64 (S)
5. CHMAAG China ltr ser 0749 of 30 Sep 64 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

MAP and GRC supplied support equipment separate.[1] He also pointed out that the increased capability of the F-5 compensated for the overall numerical decrease.

Early in 1965 OSD requested information concerning support planning for the F-5 program, and this again raised the problem of the scheduled phase-out of F-86F aircraft in the CAF.[2] Chief MAAG responded with another schedule for the phase-out of the F-86Fs and took the occasion to note several factors which should be considered along with the schedule.[3] He pointed out: 1) that actual F-5 deliveries were considerably later than the FY planning dates; 2) that attrition rates for F-86s were lower than planning indications--a factor which may also apply to the F5; and 3) that higher headquarters might not issue prompt disposition instructions for the F-86Fs. OSD thereafter requested CINCPAC/CHMAAG comments on disposition instructions for the F-86F. Chief MAAG replied that disposition instructions for surplus F-86F aircraft had not been requested and the aging condition of the F-86 fleet made it less likely that transfers should be affected. Chief MAAG also referred to the country team policy that no F-86Fs would be released until actual delivery of F-5s, and he stated that meanwhile excess F-86s were being held as advance attrition.[4]

CINCPAC informed OSD and CHMAAG China that retention of two F-86F squadrons as advance attrition was approved and that excess F-86s could be retained in Taiwan until F-5s were in-country.[5] CSAF was asked to expedite disposition instructions when F-5 aircraft arrived in Taiwan. Chief MAAG informed CINCPAC that this authorization would probably mean that no F-86F aircraft would be available to CSAF for about two years, and excesses would then depend on such factors as actual attrition and condition of the aging fleet.[6]

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1. CINCPAC 110221Z Nov 64 (S)
2. OSD DEF 003787/142336Z Jan 65 (S)
3. CHMAAG China 290801Z Jan 65 (S)
4. CHMAAG China 050811Z Feb 65 (S)
5. CINCPAC 082312Z Feb 65 (S)
6. CHMAAG China 160815Z Feb 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

In April 1965 CHMAAG China again raised the problem of retaining the F-86Fs made excess by phase-in of F-5s. He suggested that the F-86s be used to establish a GRC supported advance combat crew training school.[1] CINCPAC did not approve establishment of a training school with F-86s because of the inappropriate type of aircraft, the limited number of students to be trained and the costs of the plan.[2] As an alternative he suggested that a force change would be more favorably considered. CINCPAC informed CHMAAG that an increase in CAF tactical figher strength would require full justification to CINCPAC; it would also require CINCPACAF concurrence and would entail a change in JSOP-70 fighter aircraft force levels. Such a change in force levels could take the form of either an increase in tactical fighter squadrons or an increase from 18 to 25 in the number of aircraft authorized for the F-5 squadrons. At the end of the year it was anticipated that CHMAAG China would request a change in force levels during the 1966 review of JSOP.

Completion of Military Integrated Communications System (MICS)

Following CINCPAC's approval in 1962, CHMAAG China administered the program for the establishment, installation and operation of a tri-service Military Integrated Communication System (MICS) in the Republic of China.[3] The MICS was to replace a complex of five parallel, inflexible networks which relied for the most part on obsolescent World War II equipment. The contract was awarded to the Collins Radio Company in June 1963. Shortly thereafter it was necessary to resolve a question raised by the State Department as to whether the MICS duplicated commercial communications funded by AID.[4] A programming error became apparent as the program progressed and funds were obtained which were not actually needed. This problem was resolved in

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1. CHMAAG China MGAF-OT 2459/280307Z Apr 65 (C)
2. CINCPAC 070227Z May 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC Command History,1962, p. 72, 119
4. CINCPAC Command History,1963, p. 96

[redacted]

[redacted]

MILITARY INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
FOR
REPUBLIC OF CHINA ARMED FORCES
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1965



DIAGRAM XXIII

SOURCE: J615

[redacted]

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June 1964 when the contractor proposed, and MAAG China accepted, a plan to establish a round-the-island microwave which was interconnected to the east-west links for maximum survivability and multi-path capability.

In early 1965 the MICS entered the final stages of completion. GRC officials had given full support to the project, particularly in their responsibility for funding, constructing and rehabilitating some 56 microwave and VHF sites. Site preparation and access roads were completed early in 1965.

As the May 1st scheduled completion date approached, it appeared that a great deal of equipment installation by the contractor remained to be accomplished.[1] Initial acceptance inspections and tests indicated that acceptance of the completed contract would have to be based on numerous exceptions which would be corrected later. In addition, a contractual problem arose over the responsibility of the contractor for providing test equipment for depot-level mobile maintenance team use. The contractor's position was that the provision of this equipment was contingent on their receiving the operations and maintenance contract for the completed system. A CINCPAC inspection team indicated in June that CHMAAG procurement of the test equipment with FY 66 MAP funds would delay the scheduled beginning operations of the system.

In line with the initial target date of 15 June 1965, CHMAAG accepted the system from the contractor on April 30th with eleven major installation deficiencies to be corrected. The following day the MICS system was formally transferred to the GRC.[2] The contractor continued to correct deficiencies, and in August it was agreed that all deficiencies had been corrected. In order to avoid a lengthy impairment of operations, CHMAAG programmed FY 66 funds for the procurement of test equipment. In October this requirement had not been funded and CHMAAG requisitioned some test equipment using previously approved funds which were available.

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1. CINCPAC ltr 5040 ser: 00826 of 22 Jun 65 (S)
2. CHMAAG CHINA Monthly Progress Report, MICS Taiwan Microwave System, Jun 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

In February 1964 a MICS school had been opened in conjunction with the installation of the system. It was intended that the school, which was initially staffed by contractor civilian technicians, would train the personnel required to staff the MICS. When the school was turned over to CHMAAG in mid-1965, both he and the contractor considered the training program adequate despite a continuing deficiency of qualified students and lack of technical manuals published in Chinese.

In August 1965 the GRC began to transfer circuits from the old system. During installation and activation of the complex system parts procurement action and the establishment of an internal supply system lagged. The shortage of test equipment delayed the transfer of circuits. By October about half of the circuits had been transferred and were operational, but the cutover completion date of 31 December was set back for the following reasons: 1) There was a limited capability of the Military Integrated Communications Agency to operate and maintain the system; 2) There was a limited capability to logistically support the system; and 3) the original test equipment provisions were too austere. At the end of the year, additional CHMAAG efforts in coordination with the Military Integrated Communications Agency were being directed to correct deficiencies and expedite completion of the system. When completely operational the MICS would provide a single, modern, flexible system. The high capacity of the MICS would meet all the requirements of the GRC armed forces including an expanded air defense communications requirement.[1]

Formation of the Second Marine Division

Chief of the GRC General Staff Admiral Ni informed CHMAAG China in September that the GRC intended to integrate the 81st Infantry Division of the Chinese Army and the 1st Marine Brigade to form a Second Marine Division in October 1965.[2] Subsequently CHMAAG discussed the matter with Minister of National Defense Chaing Ching-kuo.

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1. USAR Audit Agency report, Military Integrated Communications System, Republic of China, 14 February 1966 (S)
2. CHMAAG China 170915Z Sep 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Chief MAAG explained some of the difficulties involved in a change of this scope, including the need to alter the JCS force structure, the requirement for DOD approval, and the relatively inflexible MAAG procedures which would not permit such rapid changes. Minister Chaing noted that it was not intended to increase the overall number of Chinese armed forces but merely to align the force structure to gain a greater amphibious capability.

Chief MAAG again talked with Admiral Ni and told him that the MAAG staff was studying the proposal and that this type of transformation would require a long lead time. Later in the month it was reported that Admiral Ni had announced that the GRC intended to form the 2nd Marine Division on the first of November. United States officials considered that this announcement was intended to convey the firm intention of the GRC Minister of Defense to proceed with the formation of the Marine division.[1]

Late in the year Admiral Sharp requested CHMAAG China to advise him of the current status of the GRC proposal to form the 2nd Marine Division and to forward comments and recommendations of the country team.[2] If the country team considered the restructuring to be acceptable, CHMAAG was asked to forward justification for it. In response CHMAAG verified the fact that the GRC was going ahead with the integration of the 81st Division and the 1st Marine Brigade to form the 2nd Marine Division. He supported the merger and considered the move would increase the flexibility of the GRC forces in contingency operations and enhance GRC defensive capabilities.[3]

Chief MAAG air mailed amplifying information, recommendations, and justification to CINCPAC.[4]

This included Minister Chaing's plan for the reorganization, and Admiral Ni's comments. Chief MAAG included his own recommendation that the force structure of the GRC armed forces be changed to reflect

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1. USDAO Taipei 220755Z Sep 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 240424Z Dec 65 (S)
3. CHMAAG China 140725Z Jan 66 (S)
4. MAAG China ltr MGOP of 25 Jan 66 w/3 encls (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

the new marine division and that MAP support of this new unit be approved. He further stated that all members of the country team concurred in this recommendation. Early in 1966 CINCPAC was preparing to request approval from Washington of the defacto formation of the new marine division and the extension of MAP support to the unit.

Change of Service Designation of Chief MAAG China

In accordance with CINCPAC's recommendation,[1] the JCS approved the designation of the Army as the service responsible for providing the next CHMAAG China.[2] In addition it was decided that the billet for the Chief of Staff, MAAG would rotate from Army responsibility to the Air Force. This change of service responsibility took place upon the completion of Air Force Major General Sanborn's tour of duty in August. These changes were requested not only because of the benefits inherent in a rotational system, but because of other factors in the current advisory requirements of the Chinese armed forces. The Chinese Army had achieved relatively little modernization and thus had the greatest need to increase effectiveness. This depended largely on programming more investment type equipment which was costly and had suffered most directly from fluctuations in MAP dollar ceilings. The availability of investment dollars was closely tied to the furtherance of the MAP transfer program, a program in which the Army aspect of the MA Program had the greatest interest.

Phase-Out of Obsolete Equipment

Most of the investment items of the existing China MA Program were intended to modernize the GRC forces. The objective was to replace World War II equipment which was unreliable, uneconomical to operate, and incapable of performance compatible with the GRC mission. The GRC had been advised that they must give up a unit of equipment when its replacement arrived but actual turnover of old equipment was

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1. CINCPAC 142118Z Jan 65 (S)
2. JCS 008335/022320Z Apr 65 (C)

[redacted]

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frustrated by GRC officials for artificial reasons.

Strong representations by CHMAAG China to cognizant GRC officers brought about better acceptance of the requirement to turn in replaced equipment as part of the effort to streamline forces and reduce operating costs. The Chinese Navy turned in and scrapped a medium landing ship and a submarine chaser (PC) in response to the arrival of the first replacement escort (PCE) and the commencement of the LST rehabilitation program.[1] Reports from Taiwan also indicated that 85 old M-5A light tanks had been isolated in a field and would be scrapped when their M-41 replacements arrive. However, as of May, deliveries of M-41 tanks had not resulted in turn-ins and a total of 137 excess light tanks were being retained by the GRC.[2]

Those members of MAAG China having close dealings with the GRC on this problem indicated that the GRC reluctance to turn in old equipment was in part generated by past MAP failure to provide replacements. Thus, despite the gains noted above in the turn-in of naval vessels, the GRC continued to be reluctant to make the first step without visible assurance that replacements would arrive.[3]

PHILIPPINES

Effort to Improve the Philippine Armed Forces

Indications of substandard operational capability of the Armed Forces Philippine (AFP) became an increasing concern of CINCPAC in mid-1965. Accordingly, Chief JUSMAG Philippines was requested to assess with the country team the effectiveness of the AFP and the civic action program and to suggest corrective action. Chief JUSMAG and the country team cited the following reasons for the marginal capability of the AFP:

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1. CHMAAG China MGNA 3234/150821Z Mar 65 (C); CHMAAG China 230315Z Dec 65 (C)
2. CINCPAC ltr 5040 ser 00826 of 22 Jun 65 (S)
3. CHMAAG China 3213/080345Z Mar 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

PHILIPPINES

AS OF 15 FEBRUARY 1966

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA 115,800 SQ. MI.
POPULATION 31.7 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH 3.2%
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA 0.8 ACRE
LITERACY RATE 80%
LIFE EXPECTANCY 55 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1965(E) $4.7 BILLION
PER CAPITA $133
DEFENSE BUDGET (SELF FINANCED)
FY 1965(E) $ 75.3 MILLION
AS % OF GNP 1.6
AS % OF (SELF FINANCED) CENTRAL GOVT EXP 13.9

PRESIDENT - Ferdinand E. Marcos
VICE-PRESIDENT - Fernando Lopez
SECTY FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Narciso Ramos
SECTY NATL DEFENSE - Alfonso Arellano Jr.
CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP - GEN Ernesto S. Mata, ARMY
CG, ARMY - BGEN Santo S. Garcia, ARMY (Acting)
FOIC, NAVY - COMMODORE Felix M. Apolarnario, NAVY
CG, AIR FORCE - BGEN Jose B. Ramos AF
CHIEF CONSTABULARY - BGEN Segundo P. Velasco, ARMY



OVERALL OBJECTIVE

TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES; TO ENCOURAGE PHILIPPINE MILITARY SUPPORT OF SEATO; AND TO MAINTAIN U.S. OPERATED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR.....
HON. W.M. Mc C. BLAIR, JR.
U.S. AID DIRECTOR.....
MR. WESLEY C. HARALDSON
CHIEF, JUSMAG.....
MAJ GEN JAMES R. WINN, USA

MAP OBJECTIVE

GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE:
(A) TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN BALANCED MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES EQUIPPED, TRAINED AND MOTIVATED TO PREVENT OR DEFEAT COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES WITHOUT DIRECT INTERVENTION BY U.S. OR OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES;
(B) TO PROMOTE CONDITIONS OF INTERNAL STABILITY AND SECURITY WITHIN WHICH DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES CAN BE STRENGTHENED;
(C) AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK BE PREPARED TO OFFER SUFFICIENT DEFENSIVE STRENGTH TO COMPEL AN INVASION TO BE OF UNMISTAKEABLE MAGNITUDE AND CHARACTER, TO HOLD AREAS ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL RESISTANCE AND POINTS OF EGRESS FOR U.S. FORCES, TO COMPLEMENT U.S OPERATIONS DURING AND AFTER SUCH A PHASE, AND TO ASSUME A VIGOROUS GUERRILLA ROLE AS REQUIRED;
(D) THE DEVELOPMENT OF FACILITIES FOR:
(1) LOCAL MILITARY PURPOSES, AND
(2) SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS BY U.S. AND/OR ALLIED FORCES CONSISTENT WITH U.S /SEATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING;
(E) TO EXPAND THE CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT BY THE ARMED FORCES THROUGH CIVIC ACTION IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMIC BASE AND ESTABLISH CLOSER BONDS BETWEEN THE FORCES AND THE POPULACE;
(F) TO DEVELOP FORCES DEPLOYABLE IN SEATO AREAS FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE TASKS;
(G) CONTINUE THE AVAILABILITY OF U.S. BASES AND OPERATIONAL RIGHTS.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES		TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY	2 INF DIV, 1 SPEC FORCES GP, 3 INF BRIGADES (BCTS), PHIL CONSTABULARY (15,000)	1 LIGHT INFANTRY DIV, 1 REDUCED INF DIV, 3 INF BDE, CONSTABULARY (1 BCT, 144 COMPANIES, 1 PRES GUARD BN)	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY, OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL ATTACK AND CONTRIBUTE BCT TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.
NAVY	22 PATROL SHIPS, 6 LST, 3 LSM, 2 DE, 1 PATROL SQN, 1 MARINE BLT, 4 MSC/MSP; 1 SEAL UNIT,	5 PF, 4 PC, 2 PCS, 2 SC, 3 LSM, 13 PGM, 2 MSC, 3 LST, 1 MSF 27 LCM/LCVP, 15 SERVICE, 5 AUXILIARY, (2 ARL, 1 ATR, 1 ARL, 1 AGI, 1 MARINE CORPS BN	CONDUCT LIMITED OFF SHORE PATROL & MINOR AMPHIBIOUS AND ASW OPERATIONS
AIR FORCE	2 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQNS, 2 TRANSPORT SQNS, 1 COMPOSITE SAR SQN., 1 COMP SQN	3 DAY FTR SQNS, 1 A/W FTR SQN, 2 TRP CARRIER SQN, 1 AIR RESCUE SQN, 1 LIAISON SQN	LIMITED CAPABILITY TO FULFILL MISSION OF ASSIST ARMY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY & CONTRIBUTE TO DEFENSE AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK.

SOURCE: J53,J2,PA1,J51

[redacted]

[redacted]

1. The GOP had not provided adequate financial support for the AFP.

2. The AFP civic action program had not received sufficient AID funds.

3. United States advisors and light aircraft were insufficient in number.

4. Philippine Army units were fragmented.

5. There was political interference in AFP matters.

6. There was a shortage of responsible military leadership.

To correct these shortcomings Chief JUSMAG Philippines and the country team recommended the following:

1. Delete one minesweeper (MSI) funded for $1.8 million in FY66 and provide an increase in the FY66 level of commercial consumable support and an increase in selective investment.

2. Increase commercial consumer support of the AFP from $.6 million to $1.6 million to provide one-half of AFP needs; the other half to be the responsiblity of the GOP.

3. Use the remaining $.8 million from the MSI deletion to provide additional selective investment items for the Army and Philippine Constabulary.

4. Provide $1.3 million of US AID PL 480 funds for AFP mogas and diesel requirements and expand the civic action program. [1]

OSD responded to these recommendations by requesting information on the status of the MAP Surplus Property Agreement being negoitiated[2]

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1. CINAPC 032339Z Aug 65 (S)
2. This negotiation refers to the large quantities of obsolete unserviceable or excess equipment in the possession of the AFP. In 1959 CINCPAC implemented Operation CLEAN SWEEP in PACOM to identify and redistribute or dispose of excess property. The program made the most progress in the Philippines from mid-1962 to mid-1963. This progress was due in a large measure to the fact that CHJUSMAG Philippines was authorized to allow the AFP to sell excess equipment and to place the proceeds in a Special Project Fund. (Cont'd)

[redacted]

[redacted]

with the GOP and a current estimation of the dollar value involved in the negotiations. OSD requested specific assurances that the GOP would provide half of the funds for the commercial consumer program. Information was also requested regarding country team efforts to elicit increased GOP financial support of the AFP.[1]

Chief JUSMAG Philippines replied that the Philippine officials continued to be reluctant to sign the MAP Surplus Property Agreement and progress in the negotiations was unlikely until after the November elections. He reported that the dollar values involved were $663,000 and $480,000.[2] Regarding increased GOP support of the armed forces the continuing efforts of the country team to elicit support were noted. However, according to Chief JUSMAG the prospects for increased funding for defense were not promising because of the many pressures on the Philippine budget.

OSD stated that consideration was being give to deletion of F-5 aircraft in addition to the minesweeper in order to provide even more

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(Cont'd)
Projects of mutual benefit to the AFP and the US were selected by the Philippine Defense Secretary subject to the approval of CHJUSMAG. Early in 1963 OSD directed that all MAP excess sales must be made by a US disposal agency. CHJUSMAG Philippines and others requested that the directive be reconsidered, and GOP protested through diplomatic and political channels. During the SEATO Conference in Manila in April 1964 agreement was reached that AFP would sell sufficient excess property to reimburse the AFP for expenses incurred in the program. The remainder of the equipment would be turned over to a US disposal agency for sale. The inventory for disposal continues to be suspended pending aggreement on the use of the proceeds derived from the disposal action. CINCPAC Command History,1959, p. 196; 1960, p. 108; CHJUSMAG ltr of 27 Apr 64, Subj: Disposal of Excess MAP Material in the Philippines; and CHJUSMAGPHIL 230350Z Apr 65 (S)

1. OSD DEF 1507/132327Z Sep 65 (S)
2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 070500Z Oct 65 (S)

[redacted]

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commercial consumable support for PAF including the Philippine Constabulary, and to improve air and sea lift capability for counter-insurgency action.[1] In forwarding the suggestion to the country team CINCPAC reminded Chief JUSMAG Philippines of the recent proposal to delete the F-86D interceptor squadron during the 1965 to 1968 period and retain the F-86F squadron plus the two programmed F-5 squadrons.[2] Chief JUSMAG Philippines recommended reprogramming rather than deletion as a means of providing commercial consumables and improving air and sea lift capability. He recommended that the 19 aircraft of the second F-5 squadron remain in the program as a force objective.[3] CINCPAC approved this and recommended to OSD that the increased level of commercial consumables for FY66 be approved and reprogrammed as soon as possible and without awaiting settlement of the uncertain MAP Surplus Property Agreement.[4]

In October OSD agreed not to delay approval of the commercial consumable increase until the Philippine Government agreed on the MAP surplus problem. The deletion of the minesweeper was approved and substitution of commercial consumables up to the amount of $1.6 million was approved for FY66. OSD stated that support of the Philippine Constabulary had been the subject of Washington discussions and requested estimates of MAP support levels for the Constabulary during the period FY66 to FY67. OSD also asked that funds generated by MAP surplus sales should be earmarked for commercial consumer requirements not covered by the $1.6 million dollars and that the Philippine Constabulary should be given priority in the use of these funds.

CINCPAC forwarded the estimates of Constabulary support levels. He also advised OSD that the proposed total commercial consumable program for FY66 was $1.9 million of which $1.6 million would be MAP funded and $.3 million would be funded by AID or by

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1. OSD DEF 1979/180021Z Sep 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 240431Z Sep 55 (S)
3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 110840Z Oct 65 (S)
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 152326Z Oct 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

an increase of the commercial consumable level within FY66 ceilings. On Chief JUSMAG's recommendation CINCPAC did not advise re-negotiation of the politically sensitive AID construction program in order to make up the $. 3 million. The $1. 9 million covered half of AFP commercial consumable requirements and the program continued to be based on the assumption that the GOP would provide the remainder.[1] OSD approved increase of commercial consumables by $. 3 million within FY66 ceilings.[2]

Philippine Free World Military Assistance Force (FWMAF) for RVN

Approximately 35 medical and civic action personnel began serving in Vietnam in August 1964. A second contingent was sent to Vietnam in April 1965 and shortly thereafter the GOP dispatched a replacement team to relieve the first group.[3] These Philippine personnel were provided support by COMUSMACV and by the local Vietnamese units to which they were assigned. There was no formal working agreement with either the GVN or MACV. However, late in 1965 such an agreement was drafted by representatives of the GVN and COMUS MACV. At the end of the year efforts were continuing in Vietnam to secure endorsement of the proposed working agreement by Philippine representatives in RVN.

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC 260333Z Oct 65 (S)
2. SEC DEF 8154/082112Z Dec 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC Command History,1964, p. 386; SAIGON to MANILA 20 Apr 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC Command History,1964, p. 228

[redacted]

[redacted]

During the first half of 1965 discussions continued but internal Philippine political factors prevented decisive action. At this time the emphasis in the discussions shifted from consideration of a combat type force to a consideration of a support type force. In April Ambassador Blair reported that the GOP Defense Secretary had ordered officer training to be started in preparation for the dispatch of an engineer battalion task force. Philippine officials considered dispatching the engineer battalion without integral security elements in order to reduce political opposition. [1]

Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) enabling legislation was introduced in the Philippine Congress in May and subsequently approved by the House. This heightened the prospects for enlarged Philippine support of South Vietnam, and Ambassador Blair requested an estimate of the time required to provide equipment for the FWMAF. [2] Thereafter, CINCPAC was requested to provide the JCS with the coordinated views of COMUSMACV and Chief JUSMAG Philippines as to the best way to equip the units. [3]

April negotiations between Chief JUSMAG Philippines and GOP defense officials furthered US-Philippine understandings and the country team submitted organizational planning details, operational concepts and an an equipment list for a proposed 1,859-man Philippine FWMAF. An alternative force without the security elements was included. [4] CINCPAC followed up with a recommendation to OSD that consideration be given to providing most of the required equipment directly to the Philippine FWMAF upon arrival in RVN and that a meeting of representatives for the commanders concerned be held promptly to consider requirements and sources of supply. [5]

COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC in July that the Philippine units be activated promptly and earmarked for RVN deployment.

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1. MANILA 2018 to STATE 27 Apr 65 (S)
2. MANILA to STATE 2162/041005Z May 65 (S)
3. STATE to MANILA 1934/142310Z May 65 (S)
4. MANILA to STATE 2271/280054Z May 65 (S)
5. CINCPAC 302242Z May 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC requested Chief JUSMAG Philippines to comment after coordination with the country team on COMUSMACV's proposal. The country team took the position that activation of the units should be held in abeyance until the Philippine Congress had taken positive action. CINCPAC agreed that activation should wait but recommended that planning and supply actions should continue.[1]

CINCPAC further stated certain assumptions and proposed a concept for the deployment of the Philippine group. He assumed: 1) that the date for final approval of the FWMAF by the Philippine Congress would follow the Philippine general elections in November by 30 to 90 days; and 2) that the departure of the FWMAF would begin 60 to 75 days after a favorable decision was reached. CINCPAC recommended that DA preposition all material requirements on the CONUS west coast or at the minimum pack and hold the equipment in readiness at the source.[2] COMUSMACV,[3] Chief JUSMAG Philippines[4] and DA[5] concurred in CINCPAC's assumptions and concept. ASD/ISA[6] also approved and supply action was initiated in accordance with the concept.

In October Ambassador Blair clarified the status of Philippine enabling legislation. After having passed the House, as noted above, the bill was not presented to the Senate. The Congressional session adjourned until January 1966 without acting on the measure. During the November election period and throughout December the country team reported that no progress in securing the necessary legislative approval was possible until the newly elected administration took over and began to function.[7]

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1. CINCPAC 312125Z Jul 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 312125Z Jul 65 (S)
3. COMUSMACV 030247Z Aug 65 (S)
4. CHJUSMAGPHIL 030804Z Aug 65 (S)
5. DA 062235Z Aug 65 (S)
6. SEC DEF 071307Z Aug 65 (S)
7. MANILA 120048Z Oct 65 (S); CHJUSMAGPHIL 060100Z Dec 65 (S); CHJUSMAGPHIL 280306Z Dec 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC recommended to OSD and others that planning and supply actions, consistent with the previously approved concept, continue and that authority and funds be granted so DA could proceed.[1] In November CINCPAC reaffirmed the desirability of sending the Philippine FWMAF to RVN. He also forwarded to ASD/ISA a list of materiel costing $4.87 million which would be required for FY66 operation of the proposed force. Shortly thereafter Secretary of State Rusk informed the country team and CINCPAC of sustained high level US interest in obtaining maximum Philippine assistance to RVN as early as possible.[3]

Early in 1966 there were indications that the enabling bill would be reintroduced in the GOP Congress and that the bill would probably again pass the House. There were also indications that resistance might develop in the Senate. Thus, at the end of the year officials of the newly elected Philippine administration had the initiative for further action on the dispatch of larger support to RVN.

Replacement of the RAJAH SOLIMAN

During his visit to Washington in October 1964, President Macapagal requested a MAP replacement for the sunken Philippine Navy flagship RAJAH SOLIMAN. Austere dollar ceilings made the prospects for funding a replacement seem poor. However, CINCPAC pointed out to OSD that the FY65 program had included $1.2 million dollars for repair of the RAJAH SOLIMAN. He therefore requested that OSD approve the use of these repair funds for the acquisition of a replacement and that the necessary additional funds be provided as an add-on.[4] Early in 1965 OSD approved CINCPAC's request

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1. CINCPAC 240124Z Oct 65 (C)
2. CINCPAC 272354Z Nov 65 (S)
3. STATE to MANILA 032250Z Dec 65 (S); also CHJUSMAGPHIL JPAR-G-3 130600Z Dec 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 300257Z Dec 64 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

and authorized the add-on.[1] Chief JUSMAG Philippines informed CINCPAC of the country team's concurrence in this means of replacement[2] and CNO initiated action to obtain Congressional ship loan approval. Authorization to transfer the DE (escort vessel) to the Philippines was granted in October.[3] While awaiting ship loan legislation, substitutions were made in the Philippine FY65 and FY66 programs. One result of these substitutions was to slip the DE replacement to the FY66 program.

In August Chief JUSMAG Philippines recommended the desired configuration of the new DE,[4] and CNO completed the cost studies based on the configuration of DE 170 which had been designated as available for the Philippine requirement.[5] In early January 1966 CNO notified OSD that the cost of activating the DE would exceed by $300,000 the $2.6 million approved for the project. CNO stated that the activation would proceed but the additional funds would be required to complete the work.[6]

Jet Fuel Shortage

In previous years the MA Program had funded 55 per cent of the jet fuel for the Philippine Air Force. In the FY65 program all jet fuel was deleted from MAP in an effort to shift funding and procurement responsibilities to the Philippine defense budget. However, in December 1964 CHJUSMAG Philippines informed CINCPAC that the Philippine Government was in a serious financial crisis and had not provided funds for jet fuel. The result was greatly reduced flying program and serious deterioration of PAF operational readiness.[7]

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1. OSD DEF 003785/142385Z Jan 65 (S)
2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 1082/110034Z Feb 65 (S)
3. CNO 051955Z Nov 65 (C)
4. JUSMAGPHIL 4900/DE/006 of 11 Aug. 65 (S)
5. CNO ltr ser 00411P42 of 23 Nov 65, Subj: DE Programmed FY66 Phil MAP
6. CNO Op-412D/mam ser 0516P42 of 3 Jan 66 (C)
7. CHJUSMAGPHIL ltr of 24 December, 1964, Subj: Commercial Consumables (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

To alleviate the situation CINCPAC authorized CHJUSMAG Philippines to reinstate funds from FY65 program ceilings up to the amount of $650,000.[1] Thereafter JUSMAG Philippine submitted an FY65 program deviation request for $209,773, an amount sufficient to pay for 55 per cent of the jet fuel required for the remainder of FY65.[2]

RPS MASBATE Attrited

The RPS MASBATE, an ex-US PG/PGM ran aground off Palawan in March. Salvage of the ship's hull was not feasible, but the Philippine Navy succeeded in recovering most of the ship's equipment and fittings.[3] The salvaged engines were purchased by the Philippine Navy to provide spares for rapid engine exchange for the nine PGMs remaining in the inventory.[4]

Proposal to Shift Philippine Defenses to the Southern Islands

A consequence of President Johnson's meeting in October 1964 with Philippine President Macapagal was an agreement that the US would cooperate with the Philippine Government in a study of a Philippine proposal to shift their defenses to the southern islands. In response to a JCS request CINCPAC forwarded a study on this subject.[5] As suggested by the JCS the CINCPAC study emphasized counter-insurgency concepts rather than overt aggression.[6] The study included an appraisal of the strategic threat to the Philippines and the need for a continuation of US responsibility for defense of the Philippines against overt attack. A comprehensive review of the Philippine Military Assistance Program was recommended to further the realistic development of forces capable of dealing with insurgency, pacification and law enforcement. CINCPAC advised the JCS that he would initiate such a

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1. CINCPAC 161952Z Jan 65 (S)
2. CHJUSMAG PHIL FFO 1062/280650Z Jan 65 (S)
3. JUSMAG PHIL ltr ser 030 of 19 Mar 65 (C)
4. JUSMAG PHIL ltr ser 051 of 23 Jun 65 (S)
5. JCS 002376/272329Z Nov 65 (S)
6. CINCPAC ltr ser 00133 of 1 Feb 65 (S); JCS 1145/232026Z Oct 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

review when the courses of action recommended in the study were approved and when appropriate US policies regarding the proposed southward shift of defenses were established.

CINCPAC considered it fundamental that the GOP demonstrate new resolution in supporting their armed forces. With improved GOP support, CINCPAC recommended that certain units be redeployed south as part of a joint US/Philippine effort. Philippine armed forces capabilities should be strengthened in counterinsurgency, special operations, civic action and law enforcement. CINCPAC proposed that the US contribute more to the economic and technical type of nation-building civic action effort. The US should also assist in intelligence and counter intelligence operations, and in the event of serious insurgency threat, the US should provide active operational support. CINCPAC also recommended that consideration be given to the establishment of joint-use facilities in the southern islands in order to enhance the US/Philippine capability for counterinsurgency or contingency operations.

CINCPAC further recommended certain equipment be considered for funding as an add-on to the FY65-70 MA Program to increase the operational effectiveness of the Philippine forces in the southern islands. Included were PT and PGM patrol craft, light aircraft, helicopters, communications equipment and unit equipment for a composite commando squadron, an airborne battalion combat team, and an engineer construction battalion.

After receipt of the study, JCS requested that CINCPAC refine the list of recommended major items to items which could be funded by a $10 million increase in the FY66-71 Philippine MA Program.[1] CINCPAC responded in February,[2] and he stated that the most important items were the helicopter squadron, a reduced number of PGM patrol craft, and unit equipment for the construction battalion and the airborne battalion combat team.

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1. JCS 005135/121938Z Feb 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 202224Z Feb 65 (S)

[redacted]

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THAILAND

Patrol Ships and S-2A ASW Aircraft

In May, OSD requested that CINCPAC provide detailed rationale for the PCE (conversion from MSF) which CINCPAC had proposed for the Thailand FY 65 MA Program.[1] CINCPAC obtained comments from CINCPACFLT and Chief JUSMAG THAI in preparing a response to OSD.[2] CINCPAC considered that a large patrol craft, such as the 220' PCE, with extended duration and capability to operate in severe weather was preferred over smaller 100' PGMs but agreed that 158' LSSL and smaller 180' PCEs would be acceptable for use by the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) to accomplish its patrol mission.[3]

As a related matter, CINCPAC again noted his support for providing S-2A aircraft to the Thai Navy and informed OSD of his intention to substitute six S-2A aircraft for the 220 foot PCE, discussed above, if the proposed FY 65 MAP add-on for S-2A aircraft was not approved.[4] The FY 65 MAP add-on approved in June did not include funds for the six S-2A patrol aircraft.[5] Accordingly, the PCE was deleted and six S-2A aircraft were proposed as a substitute.

In July CINCPAC was authorized to approach the Japan Defense Agency regarding the return to US custody of one LSSL to be provided to Thailand with MAP FY 65 funds for use as a patrol craft after modification.[6] When it was determined that the Japanese would release one LSSL, a request was sent by CINCPAC to the Embassy and CINCPACFLT to initiate action to obtain the LSSL and to rehabilitate the ship at Yokosuka.[7] It was indicated that the LSSL would be released in April 1966 and rehabilitation would proceed promptly to prepare the

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1. OSD DEF 002829/261314Z May 65 (S)
2. CINCPACFLT 022222Z Jun 65 (S); CHJUSMAG THAI 290435Z May 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC 062045Z Jun 65 (S); CINCPAC 192038Z Jun 65 (S)
4. CHJUSMAGTHAI 050645Z Mar 65 (S)
5. STATE 2167 to BANGKOK/231610Z Jun 65 (S)
6. CINCPAC 130557Z Jul 65 (S)
7. CINCPAC 182219Z Oct 65 (C)

[redacted]

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THAILAND

AS OF 1 FEBRUARY 1966

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA . . . . . 200,000 SQ. MI.
POPULATION . . . . . 30 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH 3.1%
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA . . . . 0.8 ACRE
LITERACY RATE 60%

LIFE EXPECTANCY . . . . . 50 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1965(E) . . . $3.7 BILLION
PER CAPITA $120
DEFENSE BUDGET SELF FINANCED 1965 . . . . . $ 104 MILLION
AS % GNP 2.6
AS % CENTRAL GOV-EXP. . . . 15

KING - Phumiphon Adundet
PRIME MINISTER SUPREME COMMANDER THAI ARMED FORCES - FIELD MARSHAL Thanom Kittikachorn
CINC NAVY - ADM Kanjitpol Abhakorn
CINC AF - AIR MARSHAL Boonchon Chandrubeksa
CINC ARMY - GEN Praphat Charusathien



OVERALL OBJECTIVE

PROMOTE THAI/U.S. RELATIONS IN RECOGNITION OF THAILAND'S VITAL IMPORTANCE TO U.S. MILITARY POSTURE IN SEASIA; ENSURE RETENTION OF U.S. BASE RIGHTS; INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THAI ARMED FORCES; AND ENCOURAGE THAI MILITARY SUPPORT OF SEATO.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. GRAHAM A. MARTIN
U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. TRACY S. PARKS
COMUSMACTHAI & CHIEF JUSMAG
MAJ GEN RICHARD G. STILWELL, USA

MAP OBJECTIVE

GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE:
(A) TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN BALANCED MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES EQUIPPED, TRAINED AND MOTIVATED TO PREVENT OR DEFEAT COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES WITHOUT DIRECT INTERVENTION BY U.S. OR OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES;
(B) TO PROVIDE CONDITIONS OF INTERNAL STABILITY AND SECURITY WITHIN WHICH DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES CAN BE STRENGTHENED;
(C) AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK BE PREPARED TO OFFER SUFFICIENT DEFENSIVE STRENGTH TO COMPEL AN INVASION TO BE OF UNDERTAKING INDICATIVE AND CHARACTER, TO HOLD AREAS ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL RESISTANCE AND POINTS OF EGRESS FOR U.S. FORCES, TO COMPLEMENT U.S. OPERATIONS DURING AND AFTER SUCH A PHASE, AND TO ASSUME A VIGOROUS GUERRILLA ROLE AS REQUIRED;
(D) TO DEVELOP FACILITIES FOR:
(1) LOCAL MILITARY PURPOSES, AND
(2) SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS OF U.S. AND/OR ALLIED FORCES CONSISTENT WITH U.S./SEATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING;
(E) TO EXPAND THE CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT BY THE ARMED FORCES THROUGH CIVIC ACTION IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMIC BASE AND ESTABLISH CLOSER BONDS BETWEEN THE FORCES AND THE POPULACE, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS IN THE CRITICAL NORTH & NE.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES		TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY	4 INFANTRY DIVS, 2 PSY WAR CO, 1 RCT (SEP) 1 SF GRP, 1 ABN BN, 3 ARTY BN (155), 2 ENGR BN 1 MECH CAV REGT (SEP)	3 INFANTRY DIVISIONS 1 SPECIAL FORCE GP 1 SIG BN 1 MECH CAV DIV 2 ARTY BN 1 ENGR BN 1 RCT 1 AAA BDE 1 ABN BN	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION.
NAVY	3 DE, 34 PATROL CRAFTS, 8 MINESWEEPERS, 1 ASWRON 2 MMC, 8 LANDING SHIPS, 1 SEAL UNIT, 1 MAR BRIC	1 DE, 4 PCH, 1 PCE, 8 SC, 2 MMR, 10 PF, 7 PC, 3 MSC 7 LANDSHIP, 45 LANDING CRAFT, 9 AUX, 16 MISC 10 SERVICE CRAFT	MARGINALLY SATISFACTORY, PATROL CAPABILITY IN GULF OF THAILAND AND INTERNAL WATERWAYS
AIR FORCE	2 TACTICAL FTR (JET) SQNS, 1 TRANSPT SQN, 1 RECON SQN, 6 TAC COMPOSITE SQNS, 2 HELICOPTER SQNS, 1 AUX INTCP SQN	1 FTR INTCP SQN, 3 FTR BMR/INTCP SQN, 1 FTR BMR SQN, 1 PHOTO RECON SQN, 1 TRANS/RECON SQN, 1 PROF FLYING SQN, 1 TRANS/SAR SQN	LIMITED AIRBORNE OPERATIONS AND CLOSE SUPPORT OF THE ARMY; DAY AIR DEFENSE.

SOURCE: J53,J2,PA1,J51

[redacted]

[redacted]

ship for turn over to the Royal Thai Navy. In September high level Thai interest in small patrol craft and the concept of Thai support of RVN by manning shallow draft shipping prompted the Ambassador to ask the Secretary of State to support the approval of one PGM in the Thai FY 66 MA Program. CINCPAC notified OSD of his concurrence in the inclusion of one austere PGM in the FY 66 program.[1] Royal Thai Naval patrol capabilities would be increased considerably by addition of the S-2A aircraft and the PGM.

Management Improvement in Royal Thai Navy Dockyard

Chief JUSMAG Thailand reported, in July 1964, critical ship maintenance and repair problems in the Royal Thai Navy Dockyard. He requested that two mobile training teams (MTT) be provided as follows:[2]

Phase I -- three civilians to analyze repair management and operating procedures and to identify problem areas.

Phase II -- personnel to assist in resolving the problems identified during Phase I. (C)

The Phase I MTT reached Thailand in October 1964 and departed in mid-December 1964. The team recommended that the Phase II MTT be sent to Thailand in mid-February 1965. It was further recommended that Chief JUSMAG Thailand revise long range training plans to support a reorganization of the Dockyard as proposed by the team. The final recommendation was that a qualified Navy officer or US Civil Service employee be assigned for duty at the Dockyard. (C)

CINCPAC strongly supported these recommendations.[3] The Phase II team, five civilians from Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (NSY), arrived in Thailand in mid-February 1965 and stayed for four months. This team aided in reorganizing the Dockyard along the lines of a US NSY. The team also assisted in overhauling a YOG (gasoline barge, self-propelled) under the new organization structure. (C)

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1. CINCPAC 222255Z Sep 65 (S)
2. CHJUSMAGTHAI 180302Z Jul 64 (C)
3. COBUSHIPS MGTOWESPAC ltr ser 2141-106 of 12 Jan 65 with 1st, 2d and 3d Endorsements (U)

[redacted]

[redacted]

To provide supplemental advisory service to the Dockyard a civilian from Pearl Harbor NSY (MTT 4-66) was programmed under grant aid and arrived in Thailand for six months duty about 1 September 1965. Additionally, the JUSMAG Thailand Joint Table of Distribution was modified to authorize a Navy Engineering Duty Officer (CODE 14) for a two year duty tour; this officer was expected to reach Thailand in July 1966.[1]

Performance Evaluation Group Inspection of Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand

The CINCPAC PEG team made a limited evaluation on 15th and 16th of November of the MA Program as administered by Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand.[2] The mission of Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand was to plan, program, requisition, receive, store and ship forward the MAP support of Laos. Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand represented CINCPAC in supervising the Lao MA Program and kept CINCPAC informed. He also maintained liaison with USAID Requirements Office and Military Attaches in Laos.[3]

Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand was commended by the inspection team for the manner in which he was carrying out MAP planning and programming responsibilities under the difficult conditions wherein the command was geographically separated from the host country. The team noted that the command had a valuable reservoir of experts on Lao operations, logistics and intelligence. It was recommended that more formalization be established in the coordination and planning responsibilities of Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand, COMUSMACTHAI and the

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1. CINCPAC 170302Z Jul 65 (U)
2. CINCPAC 5040 ser 001814 of 21 Dec 65 (S); also CINCPAC 5040 ser 001 of 2 Jan 65 (S)
3. See CINCPAC ser 001 of 2 Jan 65 (S); and particularly CPRS 003981-64 (S) which includes information on other major activities of DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand including Project 008, Contingency Plans, the status of DEPCHJUSMAG's Headquarters, Sierra Romeo I, MAP force structure, the manual translation program, the Mu Ban Sanakai program, the organization of indigenous forces, and the English language training program.

[redacted]

[redacted]

appropriate US Embassy agencies. Under existing procedures, which stemmed from international political considerations, there were potential problems including the tendency to fragmentize responsibilities, and the possibility of misunderstandings. The divided responsibility for processing CONUS bound Laotain trainees suggested the need for continuing review of procedures to assure maximum results. English language training continued to deter expansion of CONUS training for Laos. Concerning logistics, it had taken an inordinately long time for the rebuild and return of engines and components in Japan. Additional safety and control measures were recommended for the PEPPERGRINDER storage areas.

INDONESIA

Cessation of Indonesia MAP

In early 1965 it became clear that Indonesian MAP would be terminated, at least for the time being. By Presidential determination Indonesia MAP and AID were omitted from the budget presented to Congress in January.[1] OSD requested that CINCPAC take immediate action to reduce the Military Technical Advisory Group (MILTAG) Indonesia to caretaker status. CINCPAC was instructed to accomplish the reduction by attrition and to submit a JTD and plan for reduction to 7 to 10 personnel by the end of August.[2] Coordination between CINCPAC, MILTAG and the Ambassador in Indonesia was delayed so on 20 February CINCPAC forwarded a JTD which was contingent on MILTAG's justifications and the Ambassador's concurrence.[3] The plan called for a phase down to 12 personnel by 31 Oct.

In February OSD, with the concurrence of the State Department, ordered the suspension of all further MAP shipments to Indonesia with delivery of those items already enroute authorized.[4] This order

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1. STATE 647 to DJAKARTA 2 PM 25 Jan 65 (S)
2. OSD 292049Z Jan 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 200428Z Feb 65 (S)
4. OSD DEF 006067/272348Z 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

INDONESIA

AS OF 1 FEBRUARY 1966

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	576,000 SQ MI	GROSS NATL PROD 1965 (E)	$ 8.5 BILLION
POPULATION	105 MILLION	PER CAPITA	$ 77
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.3 %	DEFENSE BUDGET 1965 (E)	$424 MILLION
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	0.5 ACRE	AS % OF CENTRAL GOVT EXPENSE FINANCED	34.0
LITERACY RATE	25-30 %	AS % OF GNP	05.0
LIFE EXPECTANCY	32 YEARS		

PRESIDENT/PRIME MINISTER - Achmed Sukarno
DEFENSE MINISTER - MGEN Sarbini, ARMY
C/S ARMY - LGEN Suharto, ARMY
C/S NAVY - RADM Martadi, NAVY
C/S AIR FORCE - AVM Herlambang Sri Muljono, AF
COMMANDANT MARCORPS - MGEN Hartono, MARCORPS
MIN FOREIGN AFFAIRS/FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER- Dr. Subandrio

(As of 24 February 1966)



OVERALL OBJECTIVE

CONTINUED AVAILABILITY TO THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES OF SEA AND AIR ROUTES BETWEEN PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN AREAS.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S.AMBASSADOR
HON. MARSHALL GREEN

DEP.CONTROLLER
MR. CHARLES C. CHRISTIAN

CHDLG
COL WILLIS A. BYNUM

MAP OBJECTIVE

MAP CANCELLED COMMENCING FY66 BY PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION.

MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES		TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY	90 INF BNS, 10 TANK & ARMED VEH BNS, 9 ARTY BNS, 25 RAT POLICE BNS	133 INF BN, 3 PARA/COMMANDO BNS, 3 PARA BN, 17 INF BNS, 8 ARMOR BNS, 13 FA BNS, 1 RKT BN, 8 AAA BN, 9 ENG BN.	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL MINOR INCURSIONS BUT NOT A MAJOR ATTACK. LAUNCH AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN BRIGADE STRENGTH.
NAVY	1 MAR RLT, 8 DD/DE 22 PATROL SHIPS 15 MINESWEEPERS 1 ASW PAT SQN, 11 LOG SHIPS	1 CL, 8 DD, 10 DE, 12 SS, 88 PATROL, 16 MINE, 10 AMPHIB, 43 AUXILIARY, 36 SERVICE, 8 MISC, 6 MARINE BN, 1 ASW SQN (GANNET), 1 HELO SQ, 10 BEAGLE	PARTIALLY SUPPRESS SMUGGLING AND SUPPORT A TWO BATTALION SIZE LANDING FORCE. CONDUCT ONLY TOKEN SUBMARINE INTERDICTION AND ASW OPERATIONS. INDONESIAN MARINES ARE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING BATTALION SIZE LANDING FORCES FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS.
AIR FORCE	1 TAC FTR SQN 3 TRANS SQN, 1 SAR SQN, 2 FTR INTER SQN, 1 RECON SQN, 4 TAC COMP SQNS, 2 HELO SQNS	2 LTBOM SQN, 2 MEDBOM SQN, 1 FTR/BOM SQN, 2 A/BFTR SQN, 3 TRANS SQN, 1 RECON SQN, 1 AIR RESCUE, 1 HELO SQN, 5 GM SQ (SAM), 1 FTR-BMR INTERC SQN, 1 U/I (HELO & TRANS) SQN.	FORCES IN BEING ARE OPERATIONALLY READY TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE BOMBING OPERATIONS AND VFR AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND TO SUPPORT MINOR CROWD OPERATIONS.

SOURCE: J53,J2,PA1

[redacted]

[redacted]

affected several million dollars worth of material and equipment funded under FY64 and earlier programs which was in a suspended shipping status. This MAP equipment would not now be delivered.

Upon receipt, in early March, of Chief MILTAG's recommendations CINCPAC forwarded an amendment to the JTD previously submitted.[1] Minor adjustments in projected strengths were made and it was noted that the US Ambassador concurred in the personnel recommendations. The Ambassador agreed to provide complete administrative support to the reduced MILTAG. CINCPAC also recommended that ten military spaces would be the maximum authorized for MILTAG on the assumption that "caretaker"status implied a responsibility for the following: maintaining personal contacts within the Indonesian armed forces; continuing residual MAP functions; maintaining MAP files and records; and maintaining a limited capability to resume the MA Program on short notice.

Deactivation of Military Technical Advisory Group (MILTAG) and Activation of Defense Liaison Group (DLG)

Chief MILTAG recommended that MILTAG be deactivated as such and reestablished with the Embassy under a title acceptable to DOD and the Indonesian Defense Minister.[2] The Chief considered that the group should be reduced to 6 or 8 personnel. In line with Chief MILTAG's view, OSD outlined a concept for the new mission in Indonesia and indicated that reductions, in addition to those recommended by CINCPAC, were required.[3] CINCPAC, therefore, proposed to the JCS that MILTAG be reduced to 8 persons headed by a Colonel. He had no objections to the establishment of the group within the Embassy with a name such as Defense Liaison Group. However, CINCPAC urged that the MILTAG retain its basic organization in so far as possible and continue to retain its military reporting channel.

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1. CINCPAC 020125Z Mar 65 (S)
2. CHMILTAG INDON 100100Z Mar 65 (C)
3. OSD DEF 006169/021736Z Mar 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 121115Z Mar 65 (S)

[redacted]

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The CINCPAC recommendations as modified by the views of the country team in Indonesia were approved by OSD in May.[1] The JCS notified the service chiefs and CINCPAC that the disestablishment of MILTAG was effective on 31 August and the establishment of the Defense Liaison Group (DLG) was effective on 1 September.[2] The mission of the DLG was to maintain personal contact with the Indonesian armed forces, maintain MAP files and a limited capability to implement the Military Assistance Program on short notice. The JCS requested that CINCPAC carry the seven spaces of the Defense Liaison Group on the JTD for CINCPAC Headquarters with annotations to indicate a duty station at the American Embassy in Indonesia. This would establish the military channel recommended by CINCPAC. The JCS requested CINCPAC to instruct the Chief of the DLG that any discussions with Indonesian officials on the status of MAP and the MILTAG reduction be undertaken only under the guidance of the US Ambassador.

Indonesia Communications System

The deterioration of United States-Indonesian relations in early 1965 resulted in the deletion of FY65 MAP funds for the Indonesian fixed tropo communications system.[3] Thereafter OSD instructed CINCPAC to prepare plans for the use of undelivered Indonesian communications equipment in other PACOM countries but to include, on a tentative basis, a small amount of FY 65 funds for Indonesia in the event that relations with the US improved.[4] However, relations continued to deteriorate and in March OSD suspended future delivery of electronic equipment for the Indonesian communications projects.[5]

In April 1964 Ambassador Jones in Indonesia had stated that the Indonesians would have three of the projected twelve sites prepared

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1. OSD 2965/271948Z May 65 (C)
2. JCS 003766/112022Z Jun 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 080331Z Feb 64 (S)
4. OSD DEF 955897/150032Z Feb 64 (S)
5. OSD DEF 937748/110246Z Mar 64 (S)

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and completed in early 1965.[1] The Ambassador recommended that equipment for these three sites be called forward. CINCPAC did not concur in continued delivery of MAP support.[2]

In September the Defense and State Departments clearly stated that the deterioration of US and Indonesia relations prevented a MAP supported completion of the communications system.[3] CINCPAC concurred and recommended that the electronic equipment, already purchased by MAP and stored in California, be made available for the use in the Thailand communications system.[4]

During the period from September 1964 to May 1965 Chief MILTAG and the Ambassador in Indonesia continued to recommend MAP completion of the Indonesian communications system as the only remaining avenue through which MILTAG could maintain liaison with the Indonesian armed forces.[5] However, the State Department held to the view that the political climate was not right for US completion of the project. The Secretary of State also pointed out that after three years Indonesia had made little progress in the necessary preparation of the twelve sites.[6] Out of the considerable discussions that took place among State, OSD, CINCPAC and the country team, a general tactic of delay and non-delivery evolved.[7]

On the 1st of March 1965 Chief MILTAG reported on the status of the Indonesian communications project and commented on relations with key Indonesian Army officers as they were affected by the lengthy US delay. Chief MILTAG stated that the US could either cancel support

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1. The three sites of the curtailed project were Djakarta, Bandung and Palemburg.
2. CINCPAC 110407Z Jul 64 (S)
3. STATE 058 to DJAKARTA 4 PM 9 Sep 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 282218Z Sep 65 (S)
5. DJAKARTA 647 to STATE 12:15 PM 3 Oct 65 (S)
6. STATE 368 to DJAKARTA 8 Oct 64 (S); STATE to DJAKARTA 6 PM 30 Sep 65 (C)
7. STATE 1144 to CINCPAC 4 PM 9 Sep 64 (S); STATE to CINCPAC 6 PM 30 Sep 64 (C); STATE to CINCPAC 8 Oct 64 (S); ADMINO CINCPAC 100223Z Oct 64 (C); OSD DEF 9970/192141Z Oct 64 (C); OSD DEF 1196/262129Z Oct 64 (S)

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of the communications project or continue what was in effect a "delaying" support of three sites.[1] CINCPAC again recommended that the contract for the project be terminated and that the equipment in CONUS storage be used for US communications needs in Thailand.[2] The Secretary of State tentatively concurred in the release of the equipment for use elsewhere.[3]

Ambassador Jones recommended that the contract with Philco be converted to a commercial contract between Philco and Indonesia and that Philco be given the option to repurchase the stored equipment. The Ambassador further recommended that in any case the temporary link between Djakarta and Bandung should be maintained and operated by Philco. CINCPAC notified the JCS that he considered the Philco repurchase of the equipment to be inimical to US military interests.[4] He urged that priority action be taken to allocate the equipment for the US project in Thailand.

In May the State Department and OSD outlined three possible course of action which might permit partial completion of the communications project.[5] The Ambassador was authorized to discuss with General Yani the following three alternatives: 1) MAP completion of three sites of the project; 2) release of and Grant Aid funding of the equipment for three sites with Indonesia arranging for installation directly with Philco; and 3) all phases of completion of the three sites to be funded by Indonesia and accomplished by direct commercial contractual arrangements between Indonesia and Philco. General Yani tentatively chose the alternative calling for direct arrangements with Philco which was in fact the only solution acceptable to Washington. The only part to be played by the US was to approve the license required to export Philco supplied equipment. The MAP purchased equipment would then be made available for other requirements. OSD thereafter extended the support contract for the Indonesian communi-

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1. CHMILTAG INDO 010351Z Mar 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 060345Z Mar 65 (S)
3. STATE to CINCPAC 172350 Mar 65 (C)
4. CINCPAC 060151Z Apr 65 (C)
5. STATE 1197 to DJAKARTA/212045Z Mar 65 (C)

[redacted]

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cations project through the first quarter of 1966 and authorized Philco to enter into contract negotiations with the Indonesian Army for completion of the three sites.[1] (S)

During the initial discussions with Philco, the Chief of the Indonesian Army indicated that he wanted the contract to cover completion of all twelve sites of the system. The Ambassador pointed out the advantages of this course of action and requested the views of Washington.[2] The Secretary of State replied that only three sites could be approved because of the Indonesian confrontation of Malaysia.[3] The Ambassador then informed Washington that : 1) Philco had decided not to contract with the Indonesian Army for completion of any of the sites and that Philco was not interested in operating the temporary link on a commercial basis; and that 2) the Indonesian Army had notified Philco that they were not interested in completing only three sites of the system.[4] In accordance with guidance from ASD/ISA the Department of the Army instructed USAMC to terminate the Indonesian communications contract with Philco and this was done in September.[5] (S)

Following OSD instructions, Department of the Army deleted from MAP all of the stored equipment for the Indonesian communications project and released it to USAMC for use in Thailand.[6] (S)

In September the US Government informed the Indonesian Army that the temporary link between Djakarta and Bandung would be left in place for their use.[7] (S)

Possible Future Support for Indonesia

In late October the State Department dispatched an analysis of the Indonesian internal situation and requested the Embassy in Djakarta

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1. OSD DEF 003930/151903Z Jun 65 (C)
2. DJAKARTA to STATE 220030Z Jun 65 (C)
3. STATE to DJAKARTA 161442Z Jul 65 (C)
4. DJAKARTA to STATE 190900Z Aug 65 (C); DJAKARTA to STATE 080915Z Sep 65 (C)
5. DA 732103/132232Z Sep 65 (C)
6. DA 725376/262302Z Jul 65 (C); DA 728152/132113Z Aug 65 (C)
7. DJAKARTA to STATE 080915Z Sep 65 (C)

[redacted]

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to furnish comments on the analysis.[1] Ambassador Marshall Green in Indonesia generally agreed with Washington's comments but stressed that the outcome of the struggle betwen Sukarno and the Indonesian Army was not yet clear.[2] Thereafter the State Department requested that the Ambassador furnish information regarding the status of Indonesian Army equipment including items that the army was most likely to request if the situation should rapidly deteriorate into insurgency.[3]

The JCS informed CINCPAC that the Joint Staff was reviewing US policies in Indonesia, with particular attention to the Indonesian Army's struggle with Sukarno and the possibility of the US supporting the army.[4] The JCS requested CINCPAC's views on these matters along with any additional comment or recommendation considered appropriate. Admiral Sharp concurred with the State Department assessment and with Ambassador Green's reply.[5] With the outcome difficult to foresee, CINCPAC considered that the US should be prepared to provide limited covert support to the army. The further possibility of a major military confrontation between the army and the PKI would raise the possibility of a future requirement for substantial overt US assistance. Such overt assistance would in turn generate new or intensified Malaysia/Indonesia problems.

Regarding the state of equipment in the Indonesian Army, CINCPAC noted that approximately $66 million worth of MAP items, including large quantities of small arms, vehicles and radios for the army, had been delivered since 1960. Defense Liaison Group, (DLG), the successor to MILTAG, had been operating on too limited a basis to provide past or current information on the status of in-country army equipment.

CINCPAC suggested to the JCS the possibility of stockpiling a number of company and battalion-sized equipment packages in

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1. STATE 545 to DJAKARTA 29 Oct 65 (TS)
2. DJAKARTA 1302 to STATE 021300Z Nov 65 (TS)
3. STATE 544 to DJAKARTA 292005Z Oct 65 (TS)
4. JCS 5544/022235Z Nov 65 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 072045Z Nov 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

WESTPAC to facilitate equipping Indonesian units on an interim basis while definitive requirements were determined. The undelivered items from the suspended MA Program included approximately 2,000 submachine guns, 97,000 rifles, 300 trucks and 150 radios. CINCPAC felt that this undelivered balance probably represented the existing requirements.

CINCPAC also suggested alternate arrangements for support of Indonesian airlift.

CINCPAC recommended that the assistance being considered should be kept out of MAP channels and some other method be used for implementing the support.

BURMA

MAP Support Levels

In March Ambassador Henry A. Byroade reported that the draft Third Increment of Phase II agreement as finalized by the Burma Ministry of Defense and Chief MEDT was acceptable to the Revolutionary Government, Union of Burma (RGUB). The Ambassador urged early action as Burma officials were most anxious to exchange official notes.[1] He also stated that he had delivered a letter to the Defense Ministry outlining the FY 66-68 MA Program for Burma. Later in the month the Ambassador noted indication of growing concern at higher levels of the Burmese Government that the US was reconsidering the Burma MA Program. Again the Ambassador asked the Secretary of State to expedite the FY 65 Presidential Determination.[2] (S)

The Presidential Determination authorizing $7.3 million for Burma MA Program was signed on 31 March.[3] Notes were exchanged between the US Government and the RGUB on 2 April. (S)

In July OSD authorized the Ambassador to negotiate for the Fourth Increment of Phase II (FY66) at a $4 million level. The FY66 program (S)

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1. RANGOON 435 to STATE 11 AM 4 Mar 65 (S)
2. RANGOON to STATE 240545Z Mar 65 (S)
3. STATE 261 to RANGOON 1 Apr 65 (S)

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BURMA

AS OF 1 FEBRUARY 1966

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	262,000 SQ.MI.	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 1964(E)	$1.6 BILLION
POPULATION	24,000,000	PER CAPITA	$70
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.8%	DEFENSE BUDGET	$100 MILLION
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	1.6 ACRE	AS % OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPEND.	31%
LITERACY RATE	60%	AS % OF GNP	7.0%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	35 YEARS		

CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
UNION OF BURMA REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT/DEFENSE MINISTER - GEN Ne Win
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY - BRIGADIER San Yu
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF AIR - BRIGADIER Thaung Dan
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF NAVY - COMMODORE Thaung Tin



OVERALL OBJECTIVE

ASSIST ALL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE FREE WORLD INFLUENCES AND RESIST COMMUNISM.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. HENRY A BYROADE

U.S. AID REPRESENTATIVE
MR. F. WILLIAM SMALL

CHIEF, MEDT
COL HARRISON J. MERRITT, USA

MAP OBJECTIVE

GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE:

(A) TO DEMONSTRATE GENERAL U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE, NATIONAL UNITY, AND INTERNAL SECURITY OF BURMA.

(B) TO CONTINUE A CHANNEL FOR UNITED STATES INFLUENCE IN THE BURMESE ARMED FORCES, SEEKING THEREBY TO PROMOTE ATTITUDES FAVORABLE TOWARD THE U.S. AND TO PLANT SEEDS OF CLOSER U.S.-BURMESE COOPERATION AMONG DEFENSE SERVICES PERSONNEL.

(C) TO PROVIDE BURMA AN ALTERNATIVE TO ACCEPTANCE OF MILITARY AID FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, THUS ENABLING BURMA TO CONTINUE ITS CURRENT REFUSAL OF SUCH AID AND DEMONSTRATE A POSTURE OF STRATEGIC NON-ALIGNMENT.

MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES		TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY	98 INF & LT INF BN, 3 ARTY BN, 1 ARMD CAR BN, 1 MORTAR BN, 1 ARMD BN	89 INF BNS, 9 LT INF BNS, 3 ARTY BNS, 1 ARMD BN, 1 ARMD CAR BN, 1 MORTAR BN	NOT YET CAPABLE OF FULLY SECURING INTERNAL PEACE AND ORDER. UNABLE TO OFFER SUSTAINED EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE TO DIRECT ATTACK BY CHICOMS. NO SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY BEYOND BURMA BORDERS.
NAVY	3 PATROL SHIP; 20 PATROL BOATS; 1 NAVAL LANDING FORCE; 4 LSSL; 1 MINESWEEPER	1 PCE, 1 PF, 12 PR, 6 PCH, 5 PT; 1 MSF, 4 LSSL, 8 LCM, 3 AUXILIARIES; 50 SERVICE CRAFT	CAPABLE OF GIVING LIGHT SUPPORT TO THE ARMY, DISCOURAGING PIRACY, AND CONDUCTING INSHORE PATROL DUTIES.
AIR FORCE	1 TAC FTR SQN, 2 TRANS SQNS, 2 HELO SQNS; 1 TAC COMP SQN	2 TRANS SQN, 1 HELO SQN, 1 TAC FTR SQN, 1 TAC COMP SQN	IT IS CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS PRIMARY MISSION OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY BY SUPPORTING THE ARMY AND NAVY. NEGLIGIBLE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY AGAINST AIR ATTACK BY MAJOR POWER.

SOURCE: JS3,J2,PA1

[redacted]

[redacted]

used true dollar values instead of token "sales" as previously employed.[1] The Ambassador indicated his complete concurrence with the FY66 Program.[2] On 26 November President Johnson signed the Presidential Determination authorizing $3.1 million for defense articles and a total FY66 Burma MA Program of $4 million.[3]

Suspension of MAP Training

In May the Chief MEDT advised CINCPAC that the Director of Military Training and Plans, Burma Ministry of Defense, had declined to accept any student training under MAP for the Army and Air force during FY66.[4] Further, Chief MEDT stated that it appeared that FY66 Navy training would also be cancelled except for ship transfer training. Chief MEDT indicated that the reason for the cancellation was to implement a political indoctrination course for prospective CONUS students.

In June, Chief MEDT submitted a deviation to the FY66 program which deleted all CONUS training from the Burma MA program except a limited amount in the Navy program associated with ship transfer.[5] The only other training was one MTT in the Air Force program. Chief MEDT requested that the funds programmed for training be made available for follow on spares and operating costs. CINCPAC concurred and requested that OSD adjust the program prior to its presentation for Presidential Determination.[6] OSD concurred and CINCPAC submitted deviation requests to affect the shift from training to material.[7]

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1. OSD DEF 5148/030125Z Jul 65 (S)
2. RANGOON 35 to STATE 230700Z Jul 65 (C)
3. OSD DEF 7823/032152Z Dec 65 (C)
4. CHMEDT Amemb Rangoon MCS-146/240810Z May 65 (S)
5. CHMEDT Amemb Rangoon MCS-157/010800Z Jun 65 (C)
6. CINCPAC 110422Z Jun 65 (C)
7. OSD 004265/191335Z Jun (C); CINCPAC 020428Z Jul 65 (C); CINCPAC 082238Z Jul 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Army Continued as Service Responsible for Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT)

The tour of the Chief Military Equipment Delivery Team in Burma was to expire in February 1966. CINCPAC recommended that MEDT continue to be an Army responsibility and that the position of Chief be filled by a Colonel.[1] The US Ambassador in Burma concurred.[2] (C)

Airlift of MAP Cargo from Thailand to Burma

In January Chief JUSMAG Thailand advised that ammunition destined for Rangoon was backlogged at air terminals in Thailand. Chief MEDT Burma was questioned as to the effectiveness of existing procedures whereby MEDT made requests for airlift based on reports from Thailand.[3] CINCPAC determined that prompt airlift of the ammunition to Burma was necessary and requested all concerned to verify the tonnage involved. Chief Western Pacific Transportation Office was given a priority to reduce the backlog, and Chief MEDT was asked to advise all concerned as to the adequacy of procedures.[4] (C)

JAPAN

Guided Missile Destroyer Commissioned

The guided missile destroyer (DDG) AMATSSUKAZE, a 3,050-ton ship equipped with Tartar missiles, was commissioned by the Maritime Self Defense Force in 1965. The AMATSSUKAZE was the largest combat vessel in the Japanese force and represented a significant advance in antiaircraft capability, since it would carry the first air defense guided missiles employed by the Japanese. While most of the DDG's construction costs were funded by the Japanese, the MA Program provided 36 Tartar missiles, launchers and electronic equipment.[5]

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1. CINCPAC 212330Z Apr 65 (C)
2. AMEMB RANGOON 79/200800Z Apr 65 (C)
3. CHJUSMAG THAI 260730Z Jan 65 (C)
4. CINCPAC 270357Z Jan 65 (C)
5. CNO ltr ser 0515P41 of 7 May 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

JAPAN

AS OF 1 FEBRUARY 1966

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA - 143,000 SQ MILES
POPULATION -97.7 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH - .9%
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA - 0.2 ACRE
LITERACY RATE 97%
LIFE EXPECTANCY - 67 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1965[E] $ 70.0 BILLION
PER CAPITA - $ 794
DEFENSE BUDGET 1965[E] SELF FINANCED - $ 837 MILLION
AS % GNP – 1.1
AS % OF NAT'L BUDGET – 8.2

EMPEROR - Hirohito
PRIME MINISTER - Eisaku Sato
MIN FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Etsusaburo Shiina
DIR-GEN JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY (JDA) - Raizo Matsuno
CHAIRMAN, JOINT STAFF COUNCIL (JDA)
ADM Ichizo Sugia, NAVY
CHIEF, GROUND STAFF GSDF - GEN Yoshifusa Asano, ARMY
CHIEF, MARITIME STAFF MSDF -
ADM Tomoharu Nishimura, NAVY
CHIEF, AIR STAFF, ASDF - GEN Shigeru Ura, AF
DIR-GEN, MARITIME SAFETY AGENCY (MSA) Kazuhiko Tochinai



OVERALL OBJECTIVE

TO RETAIN U.S. BASES AND FACILITIES WITH ATTENDENT RIGHTS (PORT ACCESS AND OVERFLIGHT); AND ASSIST ALL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE AMERICAN INFLUENCE.

U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR.....
HON. EDWIN O. REISCHAUER

CHIEF, MAAG.....
RADM C.R.LUKER USN

MAP OBJECTIVE

GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE:
(A) ASSIST IN THE QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF JAPANESE FORCES.
(B) ELICIT AN INCREASE AND AN IMPROVED ALLOCATION OF JAPANESE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES.
(C) MAINTAIN A CLIMATE IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO ENJOY EXISTING AND, IF REQUIRED, ADDITIONAL OVERFLIGHT, STAGING, AND BASE RIGHTS.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES		TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY	12 INF DIVS, 6 HAWK BNS, 3 TANK BNS, 1 MECHANIZED DIV, 1 SCHOOL BDE, 3 AAA BNS, 14 ARTY BNS, 1 ABN BDE	5-ARMIES, 12-INF DIV (4-FULL STRENGTH, 8-REDUCED STRENGTH) 1-MECH DIV, 1-AD BDE, 5-ENGR BDES, 1 ARTY BDE (1-AAA GP, 2-ARTY GPS), 1-AAA GP, 1-TANK GP, 1-HAWK BN & 2-AAA BNS (SEPARATE).	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONDUCT LIMITED DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
NAVY	1 CVHE, 45 DESTROYER/ESCORT TYPES, 26 PATROL SHIPS, 16 SS, 46 MINESWEEPERS, 2 MMC, 7 LST/LSM, 13 ASW PAT SQNS 5 HELO SQNS 5 STRAT SURVEILLANCE UNITS, 10 PT'S	1 DDG, 18 DD, 2 DDH, 10 DE, 61 PATROL, 8 SS, 50 MINE, 81 AMPHIB, 3 AUX, 191 SERVICE CRAFT, 12 ASW A/C SQNS 1 VX SQN	LIMITED ABILITY TO ESCORT COASTAL CONVOYS, 1 ASW SQN OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE, GOOD MINESWEEPING CAPABILITY.
AIR FORCE	13 A/W FTR SQNS, 2 TRANSPORT SQNS, 1 RECON SQN, 4 TAC FTR SQNS, 11 SAR DETACHMENTS, 6 MIKE, 1 WEATHER RECON SQN	7 FIGHTER WING, 1 TRANSPORT WING, 1 RECON GRP, 2 AIR GP	GOOD UNDER VFR CONDITIONS, AWX CAPABILITY GROWING. SMALL SIZE AND AIRCRAFT FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITS CAPABILITY.

SOURCE: J53,J2,PAT

[redacted]

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CHAPTER III

CINCPAC ACTIONS CONCERNING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) retained its value in US collective security arrangements. SEATO afforded CINCPAC points of contact with US and foreign diplomatic and military policy makers for exchange of views and recommendations. This chapter discusses these CINCPAC actions and a wide range of non-SEATO political-military aspects of US military interests in PACOM.

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UNCLASSIFIED

SEATO COUNCIL
(MARCH 1966)

US	UK	AUS	NZ	PHIL	THAI	PAK	FRANCE
HONORABLE DEAN RUSK	R.H. MICHAEL STEWART	HONORABLE PAUL HASLUCK	HONORABLE D.J. EYRE	HONORABLE LIBRADO D. CAYCO	H.E. MR. THANAT KHOMAN	MR. ZULFIKAN ALI BHUTTO	H.E.M. ACHILLE CLARAC

MILITARY ADVISORS

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UK AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR JOHN GRANDY

AUS AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR FREDRICK SCHERGER

NZ LGEN L. W. "BILL" THORNTON

PHIL GEN ERNESTO S. MATA, AFP

THAI AIR CHIEF MARSHAL DAWEE CHULLASAPYA

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FRANCE VICE ADM CLAUDE BURIN DES ROZIERS

CHIEF SMPO MGEN H.A. PRINCE, CBE *

DEPUTY CHIEF SMPO BGEN WILLIAM J. MENG, USAF

HEAD OF PLANNING CAPT ROBERT C SAVAGE, RAN

COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVES

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NZ H.E. SIR STEPHEN WEIR, K.B.E.,C.B., D.S.O.

PHIL H.E. DR. JOSE D. INGLES

THAI MR. VIVADH NA POMBEJRA

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MILADREPS

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UK	GP CAPT P. R. MALLORIE, RAF
AUS	GP CAPT J. M. SUTHERLAND, RAAF
NZ	COL R. H. DYSON, RNZA
PHIL	CAPT R. G. LAVADIA, PN
THAI	COL KRISN CHEECHARERN, RTA
PAK	GP CAPT KAMAL AHMAD, PAF
FRANCE	----------

* To be replaced by MGEN ABHICHART DHIRADHAMRONG, RTA, JUN 1966

UNCLASSIFIED

SEATO ORGANIZATION



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



















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

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

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

SEATO Sixth Logistic Committee Meeting (Log 6M)

The Logistic Committee Sixth Meeting was held at SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok from 21 June to 30 June. In preparation for Log 6M, CINCPAC drew up position papers on road and rail methodology, logisticactions to be taken prior to the activation of Base Area Command, and follow-up actions on CRSFF Movement Tables and real estate conferences.

The committee reviewed the Logistics Handbook and Supplement 1 to update policy and doctrine not amenable to routine changes. It was agreed that certain revisions might be necessary and that the MPO

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would draw up recommended revisions for approval of the MILADs. The use of the Logistic Data Handbook compiled for Exercise LOG TRAIN was considered for use as a reference document to eliminate repetition in annexes to MPO plans. The member nations agreed to request that the MPO update the Logistic Data Handbook for future issue.

Another agenda item considered was a review of progress in the establishment of a system for control of movements in coordination with the host nation. The UK proposed that the final report of Exercise LOG TRAIN be used as a basis for examination of this item. The Final Report of Exercise LOG TRAIN did address this problem and would serve as a basis for further action as requested by the UK. Other problems considered at Log 6M were Thai logistic development priorities, the need for another POL conference, the need to review SOPs and to revise Movement Tables for Plan 4.

SEATO POL Conference

Following recommendations approved at the Sixth Logistic Committee Meeting (Log 6M), the Commander Central Region SEATO Field Forces (Designate) held a POL Conference in Bangkok from 15 to 19 November.

The Conference reviewed SEATO and member-nation petroleum organizations and recommended changes in the Central Region Field Forces POL organization to delineate the scope of authority, functions and responsibilities. Bilateral agreements were reviewed and the need for a US/Thailand agreement was recognized. Product requirements for SEATO Plan 4 were reviewed in terms of storage and distribution facilities. Arrangements were made to provide POL transport requirements for use at the forthcoming Central Region Field Forces Movements Conference.

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SEATO Communications-Electronics Committee Meeting (C-E 8M)

The SEATO Communications-Electronics Eighth Meeting was held in Bangkok during the period from 10 to 20 August.[1] CINCPAC received the proposed agenda from the CMPO and convened a meeting of representatives of the component commands to discuss the agenda prior to the departure of the CINCPAC representative to Bangkok.[2]

At the meeting in Bangkok the Chief of the Thailand delegation presided as chairman. With the exception of France all member nations were represented, however, the Pakistan MILADREP attended as an observer only.

During the course of C-E 8M sessions the Committee recommended that action be taken on a large number of measures which would improve SEATO communications capabilities. The US was asked to take action on nineteen of these items and the CMPO was requested to initiate action on most of the remainder.

Of the several accomplishments during the session the most important were as follows: 1) The Communications Annex for MPO Plan 4 was rewritten; 2) The Terms of Reference for the Communications-Electronics Committee were revised; 3) Several communications publications were updated and revised; and 4) C-E accomplishments were reviewed and work not yet accomplished was assessed. In addition, the Committee identified several important problem areas which would improve or decrease the reaction time for implementation of MPO plans. The most significant of these problems areas discussed were as follows:

1. The existing C-E Base System, essentially the US communication complex in Thailand, was inadequate for the minimum requirements of a Plan 4 situation.

2. The lack of a designated SEATO Field Force headquarters site or building in Bangkok prevented the preparation of minimum communications for support during the initial period after headquarters activation. Despite considerable

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1. Report of the Communications-Electronics Eighth Meeting, August 1965 (S)
2. MS/804/4/65 of 16 Jun 65 (S); CINCPAC 172250Z Jul 65 (C) [redacted]

[redacted]

discussion Thailand would volunteer no information on the subject.

3. The SEATO frequency register was not up to date.

4. There were deficiencies in the C-E Annexes of the MPO Plans.

After the C-E 8 Meeting the US delegation evaluated the accomplishments of the committee and concluded that there was a reluctance on the part of Thailand in matters which affected SEATO requirements for communications and electronic support. Thailand would not agree to the inclusion of even a diagram of the Telephone System of Thailand (TOT) in the MPO Plans. The TOT was a vital part of communication required for implementation of MPO Plans, however, interconnects between the TOT and the US C-E Base System in Thailand have not been established. Thailand had stated that it was not proper to include the TOT diagram in the MPO Plan 4 until the facilities were allocated for SEATO use.[1] (C)

SEATO Training Exercises

The final communique of the 10th SEATO Ministerial Council, which followed the London MA 22 Meeting, stated the views of the Council members on the value of SEATO Exercises. The Council reaffirmed its belief that the capability and readiness of defense forces served as a deterrent to aggression and thus contributed to peace. The communique stated that SEATO's military defense exercises have provided valuable experience to the armed forces of member nations; experience which constitutes an important asset should the alliance be called upon to meet common danger.

Exercise LOG TRAIN: This SEATO command post exercise was held in Korat, Thailand during the period 17 to 30 March. It was sponsored by the US and hosted by Thailand. Those participating were the appropriate staff personnel of the various SMPO Plan 4 Headquarters,

1. The US has assisted in the establishment of the TOT with $12.0 million in AID funds and $3.0 million in MAP funds.

[redacted]

[redacted]

including representatives of CINCPAC, the Pacific service commands and COMUSMACV.

The purpose of this combined logistics exercise was to test the deployment and logistic support of forces assigned to the SEATO Central Region under MPO Plan 4. The objective was particularly aimed at testing the flow of inter-theater air transport against a predetermined time schedule. Member nations were given practice in transporting forces by sea and air to points of entry in the Central Region. SEATO arrangements for the coordinated flow of national forces through disembarkation points and staging areas to assembly areas were tested.

In the play of the exercise aggressor forces were considered to have built up so as to constitute a threat to Thailand and South Vietnam. After several acts of overt aggression Country "A" appealed to SEATO for aid. The SEATO Council approved the request and alerted member nations of possible implementation of SMPO Plan 4. Seven days after this alert the SEATO Council directed implementation of Plan 4 and "S" Day marked the beginning of Exercise LOG TRAIN on 17 March. On S-7 member nations began preparing for movement of forces and supplies. The Commander of Central Region Field Forces, an advance party, elements of the Base Command and Air Component Command began movement to establish headquarters in Korat. The OPLAN paralled Plan 4 in so far as was practical.[1]

The desired results of the exercise were achieved in that the logistic aspects of the implementation of SEATO Plan 4 were tested and those areas requiring modification were identified. Reports indicated that member nations assigned well qualified and conscientious personnel who contributed to the success of the exercise. Some 63 per cent of the participating officers were actual designees for billets or were in billets closely related to and in the same headquarters as they would occupy on implementation of Plan 4.

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1. CINCPAC 150221Z Jan 65 (S)

[redacted]

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Exercise SEA HORSE: This SEATO Maritime Exercise was conducted in the South China Sea between the ports of Manila, the Philippines, and Bangkok, Thailand during the period 8 May to 24 May. SEA HORSE was co-sponsored by the US and Australia and hosted by Thailand. The exercise was one of the largest of its kind and provided realistic training for Australia, Britain, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and the US.

The complex and long term preparations for the exercise required considerable planning by the member nations.[1] A pre-planning conference was held in late 1964.[2] Rear Admiral R. L. Fowler was appointed Exercise Director and matters of force assignments, observers, release of classified information and clearance for the post exercise flyover of Bangkok were ironed out.[3]

About a month before Exercise SEA HORSE was to begin, a high level inquiry from Washington through the JCS to CINCPAC questioned whether or not it was appropriate to hold the exercise in view of increased US commitments in Southeast Asia and the commitment of US forces which could be required to meet other contingencies.[4] CINCPAC requested CINCPACFLT views on whether to go through with the exercise or not.[5]

In response CINCPACFLT stated that there was no foreseeable situation which might require cancellation of SEA HORSE. CINCPACFLT noted the proximity of the exercise area to Southeast Asia and the fact that forces could be withdrawn from the exercise in the event contingency plans were implemented. CINCPACFLT also stated that in view of the tempo of activity in Southeast Asia it would be preferable not to participate in the exercise, however, if it was politically inadvisable to cancel the exercise CINCPACFLT could provide the forces.[6] (C)

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1. CINCPACFLT 200048Z Sept 65 (S)
2. COMSEVENTH FLT 130152Z Nov 65 (C)
3. USMILADREP 120530Z Feb 65 (C); USMILADREP 090915Z Mar 65 (C); USMILADREP 0910000Z May 65 (C)
4. JCS 008331/022303Z Apr 65 (C)
5. CINCPAC 031805Z Apr 65 (U)
6. CINCPACFLT 040057Z Apr 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the exercise should go as scheduled even if some reduction of US participation might eventually be necessary. Because of the considerable planning effort and sizeable force commitments by other SEATO members, Admiral Sharp considered that a late cancellation would be politically undesirable.[1] The JCS acknowledged CINCPAC's recommendation and approved the execution of Exercise SEA HORSE.[2]

The purpose of SEA HORSE was to exercise member nation naval forces in the defense of convoys against nuclear and conventional air attacks and submarine attacks; to develop cooperation and coordination of navies; and to test the navies in operational doctrine and combined communications procedures. Exercise SEA HORSE involved the assembly of a convoy in Manila Bay and sortie toward Saigon with re-route to Bangkok. The convoy was accompanied by surface and air escort for protection against air, surface and submarine attack. The defense of the convoy was an international task demanding the integrated effort of four navies. The opposing British, Philippine and US forces made air, surface and submarine attacks against the convoy. The exercise was a difficult test requiring the protection of the convoy in a 2,000 mile route across the China Sea.

The after action assessments of SEA HORSE stated that the opposing forces showed initiative and skill in pressing home their attacks and the defensive forces exercised coordination and teamwork of a high order. Exercise SEA HORSE clearly demonstrated that in the past ten years the navies of SEATO have developed the ability to work together. The smooth way in which complex underway replenishments were carried out was further evidence of the degree of integration achieved. SEA HORSE showed that the different navies were flexible and could perform maneuvers quickly and effectively in the defense of the aims of SEATO.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 040300Z Apr 65 (C)
2. JCS 008893/121730Z Apr 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC 092259Z Mar 65 (C); SEATO Record VOL IV, No. 4 Aug 65; Director of SEATO EX SEA HORSE Statement by RADM R. L. Fowler, USN

[redacted]

[redacted]

A post-exercise critique of SEA HORSE was held in Bangkok on the 24th of May. The critique was very detailed and presented in an outstanding manner. Each Admiral personally gave a resume from his point of view. The following day the Exercise Director called at the MPO and briefed all officers on SEA HORSE. An excellent reaction was reported from the planners, particularly those who had participated in the preliminary planning for the exercise. (C)

Sand Model Maneuver Exercise: At MA 19C the Australian MILAD suggested an indoor map maneuver to test initial tactical operations and logistic support of Plan 4 in the Central Region. The objective was to be very similar to that in Exercise LOG TRAIN. However, the Australians did not desire to sponsor the exercise. To encourage another member nation to undertake the sponsorship, the US expressed a willingness to co-sponsor. No volunteer was forthcoming so Admiral Sharp directed the USMILADREP in Bangkok to discuss the matter with the CMPO and to propose cancellation.[1]

Orientation Course

In accordance with a 1964 agreement of the MILADs, the Military Planning Office began conducting a period of orientation as an annual event in the SEATO calendar of activities.[2] The purpose of the orientation was to provide selected planning officers of the member nations with a background knowledge of SEATO aims, plans, policies, and procedures.[3] A pilot orientation course held in Bangkok in mid-April 1964 was considered a success by the participants. (C)

The United States MILAD agreed in November 1965 to the scheduling of an orientation period from 8 to 13 March of 1965. It was intended that the course would immediately precede the SEATO sponsored exercise LOG TRAIN. In January CINCPAC requested the names of nominees from the component commanders who were asked

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1. CINCPAC 020323Z Mar 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 110036Z Jul 65 (C)
3. MS/80/10/65 of 10 Jun 64 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

to give preference to officers already scheduled to participate in Exercise LOG TRAIN.[1]

Originally a quota of 30 officers had been established for the orientation course. However, because of the high interest shown by the member nations the CMPO informed the MILADs that all nominations to the course would be accepted.[2] Thus, participation was expanded to approximately 45 planning officers.

In response to a query from the CMPO to all MILADs, CINCPAC recommended that due to the increased activity in Southeast Asia two periods of SEATO orientation be held annually.[3] At the close of the year arrangements were being completed for the first 1966 orientation period to be held in February.

French Position in SEATO

In late 1964 the French position in SEATO assumed greater clarity in terms of French political objectives. The objectives of the French in SEATO tended increasingly to aim at dampening SEATO activities which were inconsistent with the French view that the Geneva Conference and not SEATO or the UN provided the necessary framework for approaching problems in Southeast Asia. The French Government increasingly stressed that their aid to RVN was bilateral and non-military in character and that French aid to Laos was, with certain exceptions, also bilateral. As such, these efforts were, in the French view, incompatible with SEATO efforts.[4]

Just prior to the London MA 22 Conference CINCPAC informed the JCS that the CMPO had stated that the French participation in MA 22 would be limited to one Colonel who would be acting in the capacity of an observer. The JCS was also informed that the French had withdrawn the commitment of one frigate and the observers from the SEATO Maritime exercise SEA HORSE scheduled to begin on 1 May. CINCPAC considered that the French withdrawal would not adversely affect

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1. CINCPAC 120439Z Jan 65 (C)
2. USMILADREP SMPO 220230Z Feb 65 (U)
3. CINCPAC 221846Z May 65 (C)
4. PARIS 2366 to STATE, 5 PM, 23 Oct 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

the conduct of the exercise although it would reduce somewhat the multinational flavor of the event.[1]

The French MILADREP returned to Bangkok from London earlier than he had planned and carried instructions to phase-out the French staff members of the Military Planning Office in early June. Col Pialat and one clerk only were to be left in the MPO. One of the French Officers inferred that the rationale for the phase-out was similar to that which attended the French changes in NATO planning. The US Embassy in Bangkok considered the pull-out a further confirmation that France planned to have as little to do with SEATO as possible.[2]

The French military planning staff departed from Bangkok in early June and for a time the status of the position of the French MILADREP was not clear.[3] However, near the end of June the French MILADREP, Col Pialat, announced that he would leave Bangkok on the 2nd of July and that it was unlikely that a successor would be named before the MA 24 Conference in early 1966. The departing French MILADREP stated that the French Military Attache in Bangkok would receive SEATO MPO papers for the French MILAD.[4]

In early August the MPO proposed a revision of the roster for the rotation among member nations of appointments to various positions in the SEATO Secretariat.[5] CINCPAC authorized his representative in Bangkok to inform the CMPO that he agreed with the proposed roster for planning purposes until the French position was clarified.[5]

In September the CMPO sent the MILADs a suggested procedure for handling French papers in the absence of the French officers and

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1. CINCPAC 240215Z Apr 65 (C)
2. USMILADREP SMPO BANGKOK 120230Z May 65 (C); USMILADREP SMPO BANGKOK 190030Z May 65 (C); BANGKOK 1872 to STATE 250943Z May 65 (S)
3. USMILADREP SMPO BANGKOK 260230Z May 65 (S); USMILADREP SMPO BANGKOK 020300Z Jun 65 (C); USMILADREP SMPO BANGKOK 090250 Jun 65 (S)
4. USMILADREP SMPO BANGKOK 250230Z Jun 65 (U)
5. MS/6A/7/65 of 4 Aug 65 (C)
6. CINCPAC 232245Z Aug 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

MILADREP. The CMPO noted that the French Government had authorized the French Military Attache to collect and forward all papers for the MILAD. CMPO also indicated that in the future the French would probably ackowledge receipt of papers and make no official reply. An arrangement was made wherein the French Attache would receipt for the papers and at the same time ackowledge that if no reply was made to CMPO by a certain date the item would be processed by SEATO.[1] CINCPAC/US MILAD approved this procedure.[2]

In July the CMPO initiated efforts to have the US and Australia assume responsibility for prepartation of certain SEATO Country Studies. These papers had previously been prepared by France and were required as agenda items for use at the forthcoming INT 11 Meeting.[3] CINCPAC informed the CMPO that the US was prepared to contribute studies on North Vietnam, South Vietnam and Laos, providing that the French formally relinquished responsibility for the studies.[4] In October the US and Australia accepted the invitation of the SMPO to prepare the studies.[5]

For the remainder of the year French activities in SEATO were handled by their attache in Bangkok. In November the attache informed the MPO that the French had approved the proposed agenda for Cartographic 6 Meeting and that the French representative would be a civilian with the equivalent rank of Colonel.[6] The Embassy in Bangkok indicated that authorization from Paris for representation to Cart 6 M had been difficult to secure and was only granted on the basis that it would be civilian.[7]

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1. MS/25/23/65 of 24 Sep 65 (C)
2. CINCPAC 302228Z Oct 65 (C)
3. USMILADREP SMPO BANGKOK 0202030Z Jul 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 270155Z Jul 65 (S)
5. ADMINO CINCPAC 190311Z Oct 65 (S)
6. USMILADREP SMPO BANGKOK 300200Z Nov 65 (C)
7. BANGKOK 1159 to STATE 091058Z Dec 65 (C)

[redacted]

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Shortly before the October MA 23 Conference, the French indicated that their attache had been appointed French observer to the conference. During the meeting the French observer did not participate actively. [1]

[redacted]

[redacted]



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SECTION B - POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Passport Requirements for Thailand

In September CINCPACAF recommended to CINCPAC that some action be taken regarding the variations in passport requirements for entry to Thailand.[1] He pointed out that military personnel entering or transiting Thailand by military aircraft were not required to have a passport. Yet those military personnel traveling by commercial airlines were required to have a passport. CINCPACAF noted that there were recent instances of high priority military passengers being unable to complete scheduled transits of Thailand because of lack of passports. Personnel had thus been delayed and paid commercial transport spaces were lost. In view of the impracticality of providing all such personnel with passports CINCPACAF recommended that the Thai Government be approached for a change of entry requirements.

The US Ambassador in Bangkok confirmed the increased number of US military personnel arriving in Thailand without passports.[2] However, he did not consider it advisable to approach the Thai Government for changes in entry requirements. Such action could cause the Thai Government to press for a Status of Forces Agreement which both State and DOD have sought to avoid.[3]

CINCPAC informed the component commanders that a request to the Thai Government for relaxation of passport requirements would be untimely. The component commanders were requested to reemphasize passport and visa requirements and to ensure a more complete screening by Air Transportation Coordination Officers and others responsible for processing travelers to or through Southeast Asia.[4]

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1. CINCPACAF DP 15866/262144Z Aug 65 (C)
2. BANGKOK 109 to CINCPAC 130529Z Sep 65 (C)
3. See CINCPAC Command History 1964, p. 250.
4. CINCPAC 250339Z Sep 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Contingency Plan for Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute

A Contingency Coordinating Committee with representatives from State, DOD, the Joint Staff and other governmental agencies had been established to insure proper progress in contingency planning at the national level. The working group of this committee developed a study which addressed itself to the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute and examined associated political and military contingencies. The JCS forwarded the study to CINCPAC and requested comments on the study. (S)

Interalia CINCPAC noted that although an inter-agency Contingency Coordinating Committee may be worthwhile to focus the attention of State, DOD, the Joint Staff and other government agencies on mutual responsibilities for contingency planning, nevertheless, the military chain of command must continue to be responsible for the development and review of military plans.[1] (S)

Addressing himself to the study, CINCPAC stressed the significance of the Singapore-Malaysia split in the Indonesia-Malaysia problem and the strategic value of United Kingdom bases in Singapore. He emphasized the importance of maintaining United Kingdom and Commonwealth responsibility in Malaysia. In the event of Indonesian actions against Malaysia-Singapore. [redacted]

ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) Council Meeting

It was decided among the member nations[3] to hold a one-day ANZUS Council Meeting in Washington in late June. The Secretary of State invited comments from CINCPAC on the proposed US agenda

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1. CINCPAC 211116Z Sep 65 (TS)
2. [redacted]
3. Represented by Australian External Affairs Minister Hasluck, New Zealand Prime Minister Holyoake, and U.S. Secretary of State Rusk

[redacted]

[redacted]

and expressed the hope that CINCPAC and his Political Advisor would be able to attend.[1] The US proposed agenda included discussions of the primacy of the CHICOM threat in Southeast Asia, the situation in Southeast Asia and in Indonesia/Malaysia. CINCPAC advised State/OSD that the agenda appeared to adequately cover the principal security problems in the treaty area, and that the invitation to attend was accepted.[2]

In mid-April the first ANZUS discussion group meeting was held in Washington with three delegates from each of the member nations discussing the following topics: CHICOM prospects over the next five years; the Sino-Soviet dispute; CHICOM nuclear policy; CHICOM representation in the United Nations; and problems of unity in Southeast Asia. During the subsequent ANZUS Council Meeting which CINCPAC attended on 28 June the agenda was broadened to include the matters covered by the first ANZUS Discussion Group. During the discussion, CINCPAC pointed out to the ministers that the development of combined command arrangements do not appear to be likely in RVN since the South Vietnamese do not want them and operations were effective without such arrangements. Other aspects most relevant to CINCPAC's mission were discussions of North Vietnamese antiaircraft weapons and the effectiveness of air operations.

United Kingdom Review of Defense Commitments

In late 1964 the JCS requested the views of the unified commanders concerning key British interests in their areas. The unified commanders were asked to consider US aid should it be requested to help the British meet overseas commitments which were of mutual interest.[3] (S)

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1. STATE 1045 to CANBERRA 041750Z Jun 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 050249Z Jun 65 (C)
3. JCS 002483/020157Z Dec 64 (S)

[redacted]

CINCPAC considered that in the PACOM area British interests centered around the three major objectives of maintaining the viability of Malaysia, retaining the British position in Hong Kong, and meeting SEATO and Commonwealth commitments.[1]

The most critical British defense commitment in PACOM was the preservation of the newly formed nation of Malaysia and the retention of Singapore and Malay bases. CINCPAC stated that UK, Australian, New Zealand and Malaysian forces had been adequate, and even in the unlikely event of Indonesian aggression these forces should still be able to cope with the situation. Admiral Sharp noted that the British CINCFE had consistently assured CINCPAC that he could handle the Far East situation with forces at his disposal. Thus CINCPAC considered it unlikely that the British would seek US assistance unless the situation deteriorated into a major conflict. Admiral Sharp considered that the maintenance of Commonwealth bases in Malaysia were of vital interest to the US and the US should be prepared to intervene if the loss of the Malaysian and Commonwealth bases was imminent. Regarding Hong Kong, CINCPAC stated that there were no indications that the British intend to pull out, but in the unlikely event of a threat, Admiral Sharp noted that he had plans to support the evacuation. In other respects British support of SEATO was firm and in Admiral Sharp's view there were no British problems in SEATO that might lead to requests for US assistance.

In August the JCS again asked CINCPAC to consider British defense commitments in the light of the latest information from London.[2] CINCPAC considered that it was necessary for the UK to remain firm in commitments in Malaysia.[3] Admiral Sharp felt that the US should

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1. CINCPAC 060145Z Dec 65 (S)
2. JCS 252146Z Aug 65 (S); LONDON 833 to STATE 241735Z Aug 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 300541Z Aug 65 (S)

[redacted]

not accept UK pessimism uncritically. The US should insist on the necessity of retaining Singapore and point out to the British the inadequacies of alternate bases.[1]

In late 1965 London initiated an extensive review of British defense commitments in order to determine where reductions could be made to meet a budgetary limitation on defense spending. In December official British views on the world-wide defense assessment were given.[2] Statements relevant to CINCPAC's mission in PACOM were as follows: 1) The British had not yet made a decision on developing activities or stationing forces in the Indian Ocean island territories; 2) The UK planned to stay in Hong Kong but hoped to accomplish some reduction in internal security forces stationed there; 3) The UK will remain in Malaysia, Singapore and Borneo with current force as long as the confrontation with Indonesia continues. However, the UK pointed out that this is the area where reductions in manpower must be made if the defense expenditure target was met. It was hoped that long term confrontation could be avoided either by negotiation or by escalation. 4) The UK hoped for a new four power security arrangement with the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.

JCS forwarded the State Department report of British views as outlined above along with a JCS study of future US/UK security interests.[3] Since the JCS study had adequately covered the problem of UK commitments in Malaysia and Singapore, CINCPAC directed attention to the proposed four power security arrangements.

CINCPAC considered that the basic threat in Southeast Asia was against Asian territories and Asian people who controlled the critical and essential support facilities. In Admiral Sharp's view, it would be illogical not to include these Asiatic nations in any arrangement for defense of the area. The proposed "white-man's" club of the

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1. For a summary of the British view of Singapore see DA 261618Z Oct 65 (S)
2. LONDON 2886 to STATE 212100Z Dec 65 (S)
3. JCS 9491/291518Z Dec 65 (S); JCSM-726-65

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UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS
IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND



SOURCE: J73

four powers would exclude the Asiatics who of necessity must rally to any successful effort to resist the threat to their vital national interests. CINCPAC also pointed out that the proposed four power arrangement would likely reduce confidence in SEATO and other existing arrangements. In addition he considered it unwise to form a permanent joint planning staff since the present SEATO arrangements permitted frequent informal planning discussions and reviews, and the existing unilateral arrangements permitted coordination of US plans. For these reasons Admiral Sharp did not consider the new four power security arrangement proposed by the UK to be either practical or desirable.[1] (S)

Four Power Talks

Following the London MA 22 Conference, Admiral Sharp described to the JCS his views on the holding of four power talks with the MILADs of the UK, Australia and New Zealand. Admiral Sharp noted that at the ad hoc meeting which was held at the direction of the four SEATO Council delegates it was agreed that it would be desirable for the four MILADs or their staff representatives to meet from time to time for discussions of common problems. At each SEATO MILAD Conference the four MILADs would meet discreetly and at ANZUS and ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia) meetings arrangements could be made for a staff representative of the country not attending to participate in discussions outside the formal meetings. Staff level discussions would be possible on the above noted occasions and precirculated position papers would be used. Admiral Sharp noted that the next occasion for a staff meeting would be at the ANZAM Joint Planning Committee Meeting scheduled in Singapore in August or September or the next ANZUS Meeting. Admiral Sharp informed the JCS that this proposal was considered to be consistent with general policy and the increasing need for close, informal, but discreet military coordination.[2]

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1. CINCPAC 070147Z Jan 66 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 182210Z May 65 (TS)

[redacted]

JCS agreed that quadripartite discussions from time to time would be helpful, but questioned the desirability of broadening ANZUS and ANZAM meetings. JCS considered that these meetings have value without UK participation. JCS also noted that State had reservations about meetings of senior military representatives. JCS suggested that quadripartite objectives could be achieved by discreet meeting of the four MILADs at SEATO MILAD conferences or by lower level staff meetings in Washington of the military missions.[1]

CINCPAC subsequently clarified his view of the suggested quadripartite meetings in conjunction with ANZUS/ANZAM meetings as completely separate from the treaty meetings and thus in no way intended to broaden the pact relationships. CINCPAC stated that the proposed mission level meetings in Washington would not serve the purpose that the four MILADs had in mind. In view of reservations in Washington CINCPAC stated that neither he nor his staff will become involved in any informal quadripartite discussions except on the occasion of the SEATO meetings. Admiral Sharp noted that these opportunities should be sufficient and could be supplemented by continued informal correspondence when the need arose.

After an initial inquiry in July from Admiral Grandy, the British Commander in Chief, Far East, concerning the possibility of a four power meeting after the late-July ANZAM meeting in Singapore, it was agreed to postpone the next quadripartite discussion until the October MILAD Conference in Bangkok.[2]

[redacted]

1. JCS 003438/051537Z Jun 65 (TS)
2. CINCFE 031335Z Jul 65 (S); CINCPAC 090153Z Jul 65 (S) DEFENSE CANBERRA 130405Z Jul 65 (S)

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

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CINCPACFLT directed the US Naval Commanders in Japan and in the Marianas to work out the details of the visit with the Ambassador in Tokyo and to keep CINCPAC informed of progress and details.

Two groups of Japanese former residents of the Bonins and Iwo Jima made visits to ancestral graves on those islands in May. Each group was accompanied by a Buddhist priest, a doctor, and Japanese Government and press representatives. The visits proceeded according to prior plans and there were no untoward incidents or difficulties reported. The Japanese press representatives appeared to be interested in some aspect which would be more sensational than merely recording the graves visits. The press requested interviews with islanders and this was arranged. Their requests to investigate the Chichi Jima school and to interview the commander of the US Naval facility were denied.

After the visit, the US Ambassador in Tokyo reported that the Japanese probably would not consider the visits a one-time-only matter. The under-utilization of land in the islands was noted by the Japanese press and officials. In the opinion of the Ambassador under-use of land would probably be used by the Japanese in future arguments for return of settlers to the islands and ultimately for reversion of the islands to Japanese control.[1]

The after-visit report of COMNAVMARIANAS made certain suggestions and recommendations regarding future visits. He stated that a large influx of visitors, particularly to the Bonin and Chichi Islands, would present problems. For example, during the visits the requirements for boat crews, drivers and security guards and the limited number of personnel available resulted in bringing the routine of the naval facility to a virtual standstill. COMNAVMARIANAS recommended that the islands remain closed as much as possible and that future requests be denied as not being in the best interests of US national defense.[2]

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1. TOKYO A-25 to STATE 9 Jul 65 (LOUO)
2. COMNAVMARIANAS FF5-9/NI 5050 ltr ser 092 of 22 Jun 65, Subj: Japanese Bonin-Volcano Island Ancestral Graves Visit (S)

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Use of Riot Control Agents in Vietnam

In accordance with the authority granted in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), CINCPAC authorized major subordinate PACOM commanders to employ riot control agents in military operations.[1] Early in 1965 the Vietnamese Army used riot control agents several times with poor tactical results, and some US and neutral news media reacted with expressions of alarm at what was termed "gas warfare". During a July press conference in Saigon, Defense Secretary McNamara stated that gas would not be used in RVN.

During the ensuing months the military advantages of using riot control agents became more manifest. The Viet Cong practice of fighting.from caves and tunnels and the use of noncombatant women and children as shields presented US and RVN tactical commanders with the unacceptable alternatives of firing on innocent civilians or inordinately exposing their own troops. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV considered the use of riot control agents to be particularly appropriate in such circumstances and strongly urged that authority to use riot control agents in Vietnam be confirmed.[2] JCS fully supported the request to use riot control agents in the Vietnam fighting.[3]

In September OSD authorized the use of tear gas in operations of the 173d Abn Bde on 25 September.[4] General authority such as that contained in JSCP was confirmed by OSD on 3 November. CINCPAC in turn reconfirmed authority for COMUSMACV to use riot control agents at his discretion.

Impact of US Force Build-up on RVN Civil Economy

The rapid increase of US forces in RVN had a disruptive effect on the RVN civilian economy. Shortages of a variety of goods

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1. CINCPAC ltr 3402 ser 000118 of 1 Apr 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 100330Z Sep 65 (S); COMUSMACV 090625Z Sep 65 (S)
3. JCS NMCC 111610Z Sep 65 (S)
4. OSD DEF 2425/232218Z Sep 65 (S)

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and services resulted in inflation which in turn created hardship conditions for the civilian populace. In a message to COMUSMACV,[1] CINCPAC pointed out some of the numerous actions taken to counter unfavorable economic trends, and recommended that such actions be expanded. CINCPAC recommended the expansion of Post Exchange facilities, the establishment of US controlled recreation activities, the use of Military Payment Certificates (MPC) and cooperation with USOM to counteract activities detrimental to the civil economy. CINCPAC asked JCS to approve increases in manpower needed to establish branch and field exchanges and to request that the services promptly staff these exchanges as a contribution to solving the problem.[2]

In October the country team efforts to alleviate unfavorable economic conditions were examined in detail in Saigon.[3] COMUSMACV stated that he was attempting to reduce the inflationary effects of US troop pay by encouraging pay allotments to home banks and the establishment of more MPC/piaster conversion centers in order to decrease the appeal of the MPC blackmarket.

Disciplinary Problems

United States Forces in Japan: CINCPAC became concerned in mid-year by several serious incidents involving US forces in Japan. CINCPAC emphasized to his component commanders that such lapses in discipline were prejudicial to US interests and prestige in Japan and in other Asian countries where a sensitive political climate surrounded US activities and interests.[4] The component commanders were enjoined to ensure that standards of control and discipline were maintained and that emphatic and continuing programs of personnel indoctrination were in effect. Such programs were to be adequate to prevent or limit unfavorable incidents. CINCPAC's injunction effectively generated similar and amplified component directives to subordinated commands.[5]

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1. CINCPAC 182237Z Sep 65 (C)
2. CINCPAC 240207Z Jul 65 (C)
3. SAIGON 1507 to STATE 301030Z Oct 65 (C)
4. CINCPAC 050112Z Oct 65 (C)
5. CINCPACFLT 060317Z Oct 65 (C); CINCUSARPAC/20087/080238Z Oct 65 (C); CINCPACAF 97095/090415Z Oct 65 (C)

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Unauthorized Marriage of US Servicemen: CINCPAC recommended that requests for notarial services on American servicemen's affidavits of competency to marry should be denied when military permission to marry had not yet been obtained.[1] Acting on this recommendation, the Department of State instructed US Consular Posts in all foreign countries that such requests by servicemen should ordinarily be denied when military permission has not been obtained, except in those cases wherein the consular officer determined, after full deliberation, that rendering the service would be in the best interests of the United States.[2] (U)

Legal Jurisdiction Over US Civilian Employees and Dependents: CINCPAC had made numerous recommendations urging remedial legislation which would make US civilian employees and dependents subject to US legal jurisdiction.[3] The problem was brought to the attention of DOD in 1964 and had been held under advisement. At CINCPAC's request, subordinate headquarters in PACOM furnished statistical data on the number and types of offenses committed overseas by civilian employees and dependents.[4] The information was consolidated into a one-time report covering a six month period. The report was submitted to DOD for use in justifying the need for remedial legislation to make overseas civilians subject to US jurisdiction.[5] (C)

Attempted Defection: On 1 December Edwin Rose Armstrong, SA, USN, being absent over leave from USS WILHOITE, swam from Hong Kong territory into Communist China with the evident intent of defecting and seeking political asylum. Armstrong was returned by the Chinese to British Crown Colony authorities on 10 December.[6] He was subsequently transferred to the US Naval Station, Subic Bay, Philippines for appropriate disciplinary action.[7]

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1. CINCPAC 280336Z May 65 (U)
2. JCS 6125/102226Z Nov 65 (U)
3. CINCPAC Command History 1964, p. 252
4. CINCPAC 18003Z Oct 65 (U)
5. CINCPAC 152320Z Apr 65 (C)
6. NAVCINTSUPPGRUPAC 140058Z Dec 65 (S)
7. COMNAVPHIL 241143Z Dec 65 (C)

[redacted]

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Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in PACOM

Although the State Department had primary responsibility for the conduct of Status of Forces negotiations, CINCPAC was interested in assuring that any agreements reached would not impair his ability to carry out his mission or adversely affect the rights, welfare and morale of his military forces. The procedure followed by the US in negotiating agreements with host countries generally involved the development of a proposed draft which the appropriate Embassy used as a basis for talks. CINCPAC assisted in the construction of this draft by furnishing through the JCS and the Department of Defense his detailed recommendations on aspects that were desirable or undesirable from the military standpoint. He drew on the senior US commander in each country for assistance in formulating his recommendations. In addition, during the period that the negotiations were in progress the Embassy normally sought the continuing advice of the senior military commander on the country team. In some instances the military commander took an active part in the negotiations.

In a large measure 1965 was a "year of the SOFA" in the Pacific Command. The year began with three SOFA in effect and it ended with one major revision of an existing agreement and completed negotiations of two others. The agreements with Japan and Australia remained unchanged. The Military Base Agreement with the Philippines was revised after extensive negotiations, and SOFA with the Republic of China (ROC) and the Republic of Korea were completed except for final formalities.

SOFA negotiations tended increasingly to become interrelated. In 1959 the provisions of the German-NATO Agreement affected the US negotiations with Japan in that the terms were slightly more favorable than those which had been offered to the Japanese. The Japanese requested comparable treatment. The US subsequently reached agreement with Japan on terms which would maintain those US rights that were essential to the operation of US forces but would

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relinquish, to a degree, the rights of individual members of the US forces.[1] In 1965 a similar interplay developed with the agreement or discussion in one country affecting the talks in another. The solutions were also similar in that in accordance with the German-NATO formula the rights of individual members of US forces were reduced somewhat in the overriding necessity to preserve those in-country rights which are essential for the military operation of US forces.

A new round of discussions was initiated in early 1965 with Philippine officials concerning the renegotiation of the criminal jurisdiction aspects of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement. These discussions had an impact on the conduct of the continuing negotiations with both China and Korea.[2] Early in the year Ambassador Jerauld Wright in Taiwan pointed out that in his opinion a satisfactory agreement with the ROC could be concluded at any time. However, the Ambassador felt that an agreement on terms considerably less favorable to the ROC than those accorded the Philippine Government would be a source of continuing dissatisfaction to the ROC and might prejudice both the Philippines and the ROK negotiations.[3]

In a similar vein Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown, with the concurrence of COMUS Korea, indicated his strong belief that the Korean Government would not accept any agreement less favorable than that reached with the ROC, and might insist on the same type of agreement that was being offered the Philippine Government.[4] Ambassador Brown repeated a previous request for authority to relax the US negotiating position.[5]

CINCPAC noted that the Korean and Chinese jurisdiction formulas were developed after full consideration of the judicial systems and custodial standards of those countries. He pointed out to the JCS that the reasons for attempting to limit exposure of US

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1959, p.. 168
2. STATE 975 to MANILA 8 PM 31 Dec 64 (S)
3. TAIPEI 767 to STATE 10 PM 26 Feb 65 (C)
4. SEOUL 648 to STATE 5 PM 21 Jan 65 (C)
5. SEOUL 821 to STATE 5 PM 3 Mar 65 (C)

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forces personnel to Korean and Chinese courts had not changed, and recommended that no additional concessions be made merely on the basis of the Philippine negotiations.[1] CINCPAC's position was strongly supported by the JCS.[2]

The problem was discussed by the three Ambassadors with State/Defense representatives at the Baguio conference in March. In April the Ambassadors to Seoul and Taipei were instructed to offer the so-called "NATO-Germany" formula to the Korean and Chinese negotiators. In effect, this formula provided for a general waiver of jurisdiction by the host country. When a US serviceman committed an offense, the type of which the host country had jurisdiction, the US would notify the host country of such offense and the waiver would be operative unless recalled by the host country within a specified period of time. The waiver would be recalled only when the host country decided, by reason of the circumstances of a particular case, that major interests of host country administration of justice made imperative the exercise of jurisdiction.[3]

In view of the impending need for SOFA implementation arrangements in Taiwan, Korea, and the Philippines, the continuing need in Australia, and related problems in the Ryukus, CINCPAC sponsored a PACOM SOFA workshop in September. The workshop was hosted by COMUS Japan.[4] Representatives of each command gave briefings on the status of US forces in the host countries including Korea, China, the Philippines and Australia. The structure and methods for implementing the Japan SOFA, together with the historical development of US policies, procedures and implementation were reviewed by the legal staff of COMUS Japan. The staff also presented a detailed analysis of agreements and implementing procedures

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1. CINCPAC 052355Z Mar 65 (C)
2. JCS 1776/702-1 of 27 Mar 65 (S)
3. STATE 990 to SEOUL 15 Apr 65 (C); STATE 1022 to TAIPEI 15 Apr 65 (C)
4. CINCPAC 100032Z Aug 65 (C)

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concerning criminal jurisdiction, facilities, entry and exit, labor, communication frequencies and claims. The political advisor of the American Embassy in Japan reviewed the role of the Embassy in the US - Japan SOFA relation.[1]

Philippine Criminal Jurisdiction Agreement: In late 1964 a series of incidents involved US military personnel shooting Philippine nationals at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. These incidents stimulated considerable clamor on the part of elements of the Philippine press and populace for renegotiation of existing US/Philippine agreements. To preclude serious damage to US/Philippine relations the Ambassador in Manila was authorized, by a joint State/Defense message, to enter into negotiations with the Government of the Philippines (GOP) to revise the criminal jurisdiction provisions and other aspects of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947.[2]

In early January Ambassador William McCormick Blair, Jr. and the Philippine Foreign Secretary Mauro Mendez met to discuss renegotiations of the 1947 MBA.[3] It was decided that the initial effort would be directed toward a revision of Article XIII which concerned criminal jurisdiction. An agreement patterned after the "NATO-Netherlands" formula formed the basis for further talks.

CINCPAC had a keen interest in the negotiations and requested that CINCPACREP Philippines keep him informed on all aspects of the discussions. In response CINCPACREP Philippines informed CINCPAC that Ambassador Blair would ensure that CINCPAC was kept fully informed and that CINCPACREP Philippines would be permitted to participate in the negotiations.[4] As the new round of negotiations got under way Admiral Sharp also communicated his views and recommendations to the JCS.[5] Admiral Sharp stated that it was

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1. COMUSJAPAN 170531Z Aug 65 (C)
2. STATE 975 to MANILA 8 PM 31 Dec 64 (S); STATE 1008 to MANILA 4 PM 9 Jan 65 (C); MANILA 1220 to STATE 3 PM 13 Jan 65 (C)
3. MANILA 1171 to STATE 5 Jan 65 (C)
4. CINCPACREP PHIL 220211Z Jan 65 (S)
5. CINCPAC 290215Z Jan 65 (S)

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important for the US to emphasize during these negotiations that US forces were in the Philippines to assist in the Philippine defense, a point all too often obscured when Philippine logic had rationalized US presence for other purposes. CINCPAC stated that the majority of Philippine officials and people were aware of the need for US defense assistance and would view any loss or curtailment of base rights as the first step in withdrawal and ultimate abandonment. He also pointed out to the JCS that expanded use of Philippine bases will be essential to the defense of the Western Pacific and a key element in US efforts to weaken and confine Asian communism and deter overt Indonesian encroachment. CINCPAC suggested that the matter of the shift of internal security forces toward the southern islands provided a useful point of departure in the negotiations, particularly since the GOP had taken the initiative in asking for US support in the move.[1]

A series of ten negotiating meetings was held from January through April 1965. These meetings proved to be productive in reaching agreement on the major issues involved in the revisions of Article XIII. The problem of implementing the new criminal jurisdiction formula was raised by Ambassador Blair's suggestion to a Philippine official that the amendments be implemented when a final agreement was reached. This would have provided experience under a NATO-type formula which would be helpful in obtaining Philippine Senate approval of an overall MBA revision if such approval was necessary.[2] This suggestion was an outgrowth of a discussion of the implementation issue with President Diosdado Macapagal which indicated that the Philippine administration was doubtful as to whether the matter could be handled as an executive agreement or would require Philippine Senate approval.[3] Admiral Sharp noted this uncertainty on the part of the GOP and pointed out to the JCS that the US should not

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1. JCS 1145/232026Z Oct 65 (S); JCS 002376/272329Z Nov 64 (S)
2. MANILA 1738 to STATE 4 PM 19 Mar 65 (C)
3. MANILA 1730 to STATE 6 PM 8 Mar 65 (C)

[redacted]

become legally bound and politically committed to any formula while the GOP retained the possibility of reviewing and perhaps even rejecting the provisions of that formula. CINCPAC recommended that the executive agreement method not be used if it was to be only an interim procedure subject to later approval by the Philippine Senate.[1]

With agreement firmed up by late May on all major modifications of the criminal jurisdiction provisions, attention continued to focus on completing the details required prior to implementation. After being queried by Washington for his views on the inclusion of specified trial safeguards in the implementing arrangements,[2] Ambassador Blair recommended dropping the idea on the basis of his discussion with a GOP negotiator.[3] CINCPAC recommended that efforts be continued to include additional trial safeguards in the agreed implementation arrangements.[4] However, State/DOD concurred with the Ambassador's approach.[5]

At the 12th negotiating meeting on the 21st of May, the problem of how to reach formal agreement was again discussed by Secretary Mendez and Ambassador Blair. Secretary Mendez indicated uncertainty about the authority of the GOP administration to enter into the new agreement by an Executive Agreement or on a treaty basis which would be subject to the approval of the Philippine Senate.[6] There were also indications that the delay on the Philippine side was a result of the GOP administration's uncertainty about the political consequences of announcing the agreement prior to the national elections in the fall. By mid-June it appeared that the only remaining problem was the timing of the contemplated exchange of formal notes.[7]

By an exchange of notes on 10 August 1965 the revised Article XIII (Criminal Jurisdiction Provisions) of the US/Philippine Military

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1. CINCPAC 310018Z Mar 65 (C)
2. STATE 1854 to MANILA 050048Z May 65 (C)
3. MANILA 2135 to STATE 120000Z May 65 (C)
4. CINCPAC 131945Z May 65 (C)
5. STATE 1930 to MANILA 142203Z May 65 (C)
6. MANILA 2227 to STATE 220430Z May 65 (C)
7. MANILA 2415 to STATE 160855Z Jun 65 (C)

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Bases Agreement of 1947 became effective. The primary differences between the old article and the "NATO/Netherlands" revision were as follows:

Original Article VIII	Revised Article VIII
US had right to exercise jurisdiction over;	US has primary jurisdiction over:
1) any offense by any person within US bases (except where all parties involved were PI citizens or offense against PI security)	1) all offenses arising out of acts or omissions in the performance of official duty
2) all off-base offenses against US security	2) offenses solely against property or security of the US
	3) offenses solely against person or property of US personnel in the PI in connection with the US bases
Philippines had right to exercise jurisdiction over all other off-base offenses	Philippines have primary jurisdiction over all other cases including those arising on the US bases

The agreed implementing arrangements required the establishment of a "Criminal Jurisdiction Implementation Committee" as a means of consultation between the two governments. Any matters which could not be resolved at this level were to be referred to the diplomatic level for further consideration and resolution.[1]

In October it was reported that the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, had arbitrarily and unilaterally determined that the term "families," as used in Article XI of the MBA, included only spouses and unmarried children under eighteen. On that basis, the Philippine Embassy in Washington began to refuse visas to dependent parents and married children of US military personnel ordered to duty in the Philippines.[2] In line with CINCPAC recommendations,[3] discussions between US and GOP officials resulted in reconsideration and redetermination that the definition of the word "families" in article XI should be

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1. MANILA to STATE 100900Z Aug 65 (U)
2. STATE 499 to MANILA 210138Z Sep 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC 020122Z Oct 65 (C)

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considered to include spouses, unmarried children, step-children under twenty-one and dependent parents if they were included on official military travel orders.[1] This redetermination by the GOP was formalized in November by an exchange of notes between the US Government and GOP.[2]

Republic of China Status of Forces Agreement: Cognizant of the pressure in Taiwan for greater equality in status of forces arrangements, the US Ambassador pointed out that a much less favorable agreement with the ROC would be a source of continuing dissatisfaction.[3] With authorization from Washington,[4] US negotiators offered a straight German criminal jurisdiction formula to the ROC. The presentation stressed that the US expected the GRC to use great restraint in making a determination for recall of waiver of jurisdiction. Dr. Tsai Wei Ping, the chief Chinese negotiator, welcomed the German formula on jurisdiction but had reservations about accepting the formula on custody.[5] Ambassador Wright concluded that the offer of the straight German formula placed the US in a strong position on both problems of jurisdiction and custody. He suggested that for a few weeks the US make it clear at every opportunity both in Taipei and Washington that the US could not consider any further concessions.[6] (C)

Negotiations on all provisions of China SOFA were concluded in July[7] and the agreement was signed on 31 August.[8] The agreement was to become effective when the two governments notified each (C)

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1. MANILA 720 to STATE 150801Z Oct 65 (C)
2. CINCPACREPPHIL 241213Z Nov 65 (U)
3. TAIPEI 767 to STATE 10 PM 26 Feb 65 (C)
4. STATE 1022 to TAIPEI 15 Apr 65 (C)
5. TAIPEI 1019 to STATE 22 Apr 65 (C)
6. TAIPEI 110 to STATE 130040Z May 65 (C)
7. COMUSTDC 300844Z Jul 65 (U)
8. TAIPEI 251 to STATE 310510Z Aug 65 (U)

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other that they had approved it in accordance with their respective legal procedures. Enabling legislation by the Government of the Republic of China was expected to require from three to six months.[1]

Subsequently efforts were devoted to the establishment of a joint committee for SOFA consultations similar to the successful arrangement in Japan. Discussions were held after the signing of the agreement to consider the composition and structure of the committee. Early in these discussions the GRC was advised of the strong US view that the committee should be established at a military level rather than ministry level. This arrangement would permit routine matters to be handled at the most useful level, and would reserve the diplomatic level for problems which might deadlock the joint committee. The representative of the GRC revealed a strong consensus within his government that the joint committee should be established at the diplomatic level.[2] The Department of State continued to press for the establishment of the joint committee at the military level. The US Ambassador was instructed by the State Department to point out that the SOFA specifically called for certain arrangements to be worked out between respective military authorities and provided for diplomatic representations in special circumstances.[3]

The GRC continued to indicate the view that the committee should be staffed at diplomatic level. However, at one point in the discussions their representative suggested that the alternative of not establishing a joint committee be considered. He suggested that operational and administrative matters concerning SOFA could be dealt with effectively in existing well-established channels without a committee and that matters of policy could be handled on a government-to-government diplomatic basis.[4] Based on these views CINCPAC considered that the GRC was not firmly committed to diplomatic level composition of the joint committee.[5]

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1. STATE UNN to CINCPAC 240232Z Jul 65 (C)
2. TAIPEI 337 to STATE 170935Z Sep 65 (C)
3. STATE 289 to TAIPEI 212335Z Sep 65 (C)
4. TAIPEI 477 to STATE 261015Z Oct 65 (C)
5. COMUSTDC 290716Z Oct 65 (C)

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Nevertheless the continuing discussions highlighted US and GRC differences in the desired composition of the joint committee provisions of Article XVIII of the SOFA. Toward the end of the year COMUSTDC proposed that no committee be formed until a later date and that both COMUSTDC and the GRC Minister of Defense form military executive groups headed by general or flag officers. These groups would be the focal point for all SOFA subjects and military matters would be processed with the assistance as necessary from military working groups. "Other than military" problems, such as jurisdiction and customs, would be referred by the Chinese military executive group to "other than military groups". It appeared that the GRC was not receptive to this arrangement. A counter-proposal was expected but had not been made by the end of the year.[1] CINCPAC opposed the COMUSTDC proposal because it departed from Article XVIII of the agreed SOFA in that all SOFA matters were military and that use of undefined terms such as "military" and "non-military" opened the door to a wide range of future disagreement with the GRC on SOFA problems. (C)

Republic of Korea Status of Forces Agreement: Negotiations on several aspects of the Republic of Korea (ROK) SOFA, including criminal jurisdiction, continued during the first half of the year. Korean negotiators were unwilling to accept the concessions which had been made by the US in late 1964.[2] The initiation of talks with Philippine officials concerning criminal jurisdiction made it appear possible that the Korean negotiators might insist on the type of agreement that was being offered the Philippines.

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1. COMUSTDC 210834Z Dec 65 (C)
2. SEOUL Airgram A-305 of 24 Dec 64 (C)

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Despite CINCPAC's recommendation to the contrary, State/Defense granted authority to offer a "NATO-Germany" type formula to the Korean negotiators.[1] This offer was generally acceptable to the ROK and attention shifted from criminal jurisdiction to the claims and labor articles.

The Ambassador recommended a modification of the US draft of the claims article so as to permit the ROKG to dispose of claims falling within the scope of the SOFA when it had demonstrated a capability to settle these claims in a competent manner.[2] However, the ROKG contined to insist on a US 85 per cent - ROK 15 per cent distribution of costs incurred in settling SOFA claims. The US proposed the normal ratio of 75 per cent - 25 per cent.

The remaining major issue was in the labor article. The ROKG insisted that local hire employees of US forces should be accorded all rights guaranteed the ROK labor force by ROK law and constitution. Civilian employees of the ROK armed forces and other ROK governmental workers were not permitted to strike, whereas the non-governmental laborers were permitted to engage in work disruptive practices, including strikes. The ROK negotiators chose to consider USFK employees as laborers rather than governmental employees or members of the armed forces. The effect of this would be to increase the threat of work disruption and strikes by USFK employees. This basic disagreement over the "no-strike" provision became more pronounced as several less important variances in the labor articles were resolved satisfactorily.

The impasse on the provision for waiver of criminal jurisdiction and the "no-strike" provision was broken as a result of President Pak's discussions with President Johnson and Secretary Rusk during his May visit to Washington.[3] With all major issues thus resolved, final negotiations began on the remaining less significant aspects of the SOFA.

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1. SEOUL Airgram A-399 of 19 Feb 65 (C)
2. SEOUL Airgram A-471 of 20 Mar 65 (C)
3. STATE 1168 to SEOUL 200035Z May 65 (C)

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By mid-July full agreement had been reached and the way was clear to make final negotiating entries at the 82nd negotiating meeting.[1] This meeting was delayed by the normalization treaty.[2] Toward the end of the year it was anticipated that the 82nd meeting would be held in early 1966 and a signing ceremony would follow as soon as both governments had approved final texts. It appeared that the ROK/US Status of Forces Agreement would be in effect by mid-1966.

Unfair Trial of United States Serviceman under Japanese SOFA:

The fairness of Sergeant Stumpel's 1962 trial in a Japanese court was challenged in 1964 when the US trial observer reported that the court-appointed interpreter for the case was grossly inadequate.[3] During the year a practical solution to the Stumpel case was finally reached. Although Japanese officials did not officially agree with the US view that the trial was unfair, they granted a stay of execution of the sentence on the grounds of Sergeant Stumpel's need for specialized medical treatment. The stay of execution was granted in December. Thereafter, the Japanese Ministry of Justice agreed to permit Sergeant Stumpel to return to the United States upon the personal assurance of the 5th Air Force Staff Judge Advocate that the US would initiate procedures, in accordance with applicable US law and regulation and after consultation between the Japanese Government and the US Government, to cause Sergeant Stumpel to return to Japan to carry out his sentence if such action became appropriate. (C)

The Japanese indicated that this assurance was only a formality, and informed Sergeant Stumpel that six months after the date of the stay of execution he could submit an application for special amnesty to have the sentence completely expunged. The Staff Judge Advocate of the 5th Air Force stated that he is reasonably assured that Sergeant Stumpel's request for amnesty will be favorably considered by the Japanese Government.[4] (C)

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1. SEOUL 50 to STATE 140715Z Jul 65 (C)
2. SEOUL 151 to STATE 130750Z Aug 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC Command History 1964, p. 251
4. 5TH AF 220500Z Jan 65 (C)

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United States Base Rights in the Philippines

Philippine-US Military Base Agreement (MBA): In late 1964 the intensified use of the US base complex in the Philippines became an essential requirement for the support of operations in Vietnam. Simultaneously there had been an increase in Philippine press, public and official pressure centered on a wide range of overlapping issues including criminal jurisdiction over US personnel, consultation with the Philippine Government (GOP) on use of the bases, length of US tenure rights and release of certain portions of the base lands.

In April the GOP advised the US Ambassador that the Philippines desired to discuss and complete arrangements to formalize the interim Bohlen-Serrano agreements of August-October 1959.[1] United States officials informed the GOP of willingness to formalize the relinquishment of base lands covered in the Bohlen-Serrano agreements. Soon thereafter the JCS requested that CINCPAC review a proposed State/Defense draft instruction to the US Ambassador in Manila. The draft proposal authorized the Ambassador to proceed with base land relinquishment as provided in the Bohlen-Serrano agreements, but to obtain an operational use agreement providing US use of Mactan Air Base on a combined-use basis as military requirements arose.[2] CINCPAC concurred in the proposed text, considering that it was practical for negotiations in that concurrently with relinquishment some latitude could be gained for US operational use of Mactan Air Base.[3]

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1. Under the Bohlen-Serrano agreements, which never became legally binding, the US was to consult with the Philippines before introducing missiles to or using US bases for any combat operations other than those conducted in accordance with the US Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and SEATO. The agreement memoranda also provided for a reduction of US tenure from 99 years to 25 years and in the meantime total or partial relinquishment of certain scattered and less important base lands. MANILA A-1051 to STATE 17 Jun 65 (C). Despite the lack of legal force in the Bohlen-Serrano memoranda the US kept President Macapagal informed on the use of American bases to support operations in Southeast Asia.
2. JCS 002522/202114Z May 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 220244Z May 65(S)

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Ambassador Blair was then authorized to proceed with arrangements with the GOP on the basis of this instruction.[1]

In June the Ambassador proposed that he be authorized to conclude an exchange of notes making legally binding other provisions of the Bohlen-Serrano memoranda including consultation, a minimum of 25 years duration of the renegotiated 1947 military bases agreement, and mutual defense commitments.[2] The JCS requested CINCPAC's comments or concurrence on a proposed joint State/Defense response to the Ambassador's proposal.[3] Admiral Sharp informed the JCS that, while he could concur in that part of the text which concerned consultation and the mutual defense commitment, he could not agree that a 25 year tenure for the renegotiated 1947 MBA was in the best US interests.[4] Admiral Sharp recommended that representation be made to the State Department that a personal approach be made to President Macapagal to extend the tenure to at least 50 years, emphasizing to him the absolute essentiality of these bases to the protection of the Philippines as well as the rest of Southeast Asia.

In July the Ambassador indicated to the GOP that the US was prepared to formalize the Bohlen-Serrano agreement on the relinquishment of certain base lands and to formalize the recommendations of the US/Philippine Mutual Defense Board to release portions of Clark Air Base.[5] No action on the exchange of notes took place during the Philippine national election period. After the election Washington and the US mission in Manila weighed the advantages of proceeding with the exchange of notes or delaying until the new administration came into office.[6] On the 22nd of December the negotiations for the relinquishment of base lands were concluded by a formal exchange of notes.[7]

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1. STATE 2016 to MANILA 270035Z May 65 (C)
2. MANILA A-1051 to STATE 17 Jun 65 (C)
3. JCS 004799/292208Z Jun 65 (C)
4. CINCPAC 030247Z Jul 65 (C)
5. MANILA 35 to STATE 060929Z Jul (C)
6. STATE 972 to MANILA 032224Z Dec 65 (C); MANILA 1121 to STATE 090947Z Dec 65 (C)
7. MANILA 1236 to STATE 220807Z Dec 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Airlift Through Clark Air Base: Prior to the recent US/Philippine government commercial airline talks, Philippine Government officials indicated that they were preparing to bring into question the arrangements whereby US commercial civilian charter flights used Clark Air Base. The continuation of these arrangements had been based on a US Embassy note dated 4 April 1958 which provided that MATS contract carriers used in the movement of military traffic and cargos were the equivalent of Military Transport aircraft within the context of Articles three and four of the Military Base Agreement (MBA).[1]

In June 1965 the Philippines Ministry of Foreign Affairs raised the issue by stating that the contract carriers were not covered by the MBA and that their use of Clark Field was a violation of Philippine sovereignty. The issue was raised in the same context as the Philippine desire to extend the routes of the Philippine Air Lines which was to be discussed in Washington. The US Ambassador in Manila stated that the GOP intend to negotiate on the basis of political considerations.[2]

The 13th Air Force furnished the Embassy information regarding the magnitude of MATS charter operations through Clark Air Base[3] and commented on the expected results of any change requiring the charter flights to land at Manila International Airport (MIA). 13th Air Force pointed out that costly renegotiations would be required and duplicate medical, eating and washroom facilities at MIA would have to be provided. In addition, extra crews stationed at MIA would probably be required because maximum flight times for crews were barely met on the Hickam-Clark flight. The Ambassador concluded that landing at MIA would be a costly operation with which MATS probably could not live.

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1. A Philippine requirement that MATS charter aircraft be diverted to Manila International Airport was lifted in 1958 by President Garcia, who without conceding that such aircraft were an integral part of the MATS fleet directed that they be permitted to land at Clark.
2. MANILA 2413 to STATE 151010Z Jun 65 (C)
3. MANILA 2436 to STATE 180915Z Jun 65 (C)

[redacted]

CINCPAC considered the problem and notified the JCS that he strongly supported the Ambassador's conclusion that shifting the points of entry for the large charter operation would be a costly operational hinderance to the US airlift.[1] Admiral Sharp urged that US representatives at the US/Philippine commercial airline discussions be cognizant of the extreme importance of these flights through Clark to current military operations. Admiral Sharp urged that representation be made to the State Department in order that there be no interference with the vital military pipeline through Clark Field to Southeast Asia. (C)

United States Use of Mactan Air Base: Early in the year, as operational facilities of Mactan Air Base were nearing completion, attention of Philippine civil and military officials was focused on arrangements for the use of the base by both civil and military agencies.[2] Some confusion existed as to what agency had the responsibility to assure that the base was used in accordance with the intent of the Mactan development program. The Philippine Air Force (PAF) had various plans for future activities at Mactan but early in the year budget cuts made it appear unlikely that PAF could be very active at Mactan for many months. A housekeeping force of about one-hundred men was stationed at the base and the facility was used for training exercises and periodic deployments from Basa Air Base. Mactan was also used in January for joint US/Philippine Marine mobility exercises.

In April CINCPACAF requested CINCPAC's approval to develop an immediate enroute airlift staging capability at Mactan to support the build-up in Southeast Asia.[3] CINCPACAF noted that capability studies had established a requirement for use of both Mactan and Kung Kuan in Taiwan.[4] He stated that current planning was

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1. CINCPAC 220034Z Jun 65 (C)
2. CINCPAC Command History 1964 p. 203
3. CINCPACAF 102106Z Apr 65 (S)
4. PACAF/MATS Capability Study, 15 Feb 65 (TS); PACAF Capability Study, 12 Mar 65 (TS)

[redacted]

for a bare strip operation for up to 46 aircraft per day and the establishment of a support squadron at Mactan consisting of approximately 300 personnel.

Admiral Sharp referred the CINCPACAF request to the JCS and asked that the Joint Chiefs obtain approval for establishing the required enroute staging capability at Mactan.[1] Admiral Sharp recommended that the State Department be requested to obtain approval of joint US/Philippine use of Mactan and that the Ambassador present the requirement to the GOP on the basis of the Southeast Asia build-up and the need to relieve congestion at Clark Air Base. Thereafter, US and Philippine officials initialed an aide-memoire which stated that the establishment of a small US contingent at Mactan would be mutually beneficial and that local arrangements would be worked out between the armed forces of the two countries.[2] The initial increment of the USAF unit arrived at Mactan on 30 April.

In late June the Ambassador informed CINCPAC that information was developing on the more permanent coloration of US manning and construction at Mactan.[3] He advised that the 13th Air Force intended to undertake a $2.7 million construction program. The Ambassador also advised that he intended to inform President Macapagal that he considered the activity to be consistent with the existing 22 April aide-memoire. CINCPAC informed the CINCPACREP Philippines and the service components of the increasing sensitivity of all aspects of US use of Philippine bases and the necessity for the Ambassador and CINCPAC to be kept informed of all matters concerning bases and US military operations or program likely to raise a political storm.[4] Those concerned were also requested to keep CINCPACREP Philippines fully informed on Philippine programs and operations and Admiral Monroe would in turn keep the Ambassador advised.

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1. CINCPAC 132214Z Apr 65 (S)
2. MANILA 1984 to STATE 22 Apr 65 (S)
3. MANILA 2484 to STATE 251111Z Jun 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 020316Z Jul 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

In August the Secretary of State questioned whether the expanded US activity at Mactan could be continued under the provisions of the April 22 agreement and suggested that a new aide-memoire be considered.[1] This coordination between Embassy officials, the GOP, and PAF concerning 13th AF requirements at Mactan continued through the end of the year.[2]

Late in the year the pressure for enlarged US use of Mactan Air Base decreased in favor of stationing air carrier units at Sattahip, Thailand.[3] In December CINCPACREP Philippines summarized the status of US use of Mactan.[4] He noted that the Philippines had agreed to the stationing of up to 2,500 personnel at Mactan and that base use negotiations were completed except for a tenure agreement and legal aspects. Previous USAF intentions to construct permanent type facilities for both troop carrier and Military Air Transport activities had been reduced to construction for Military Air Transport support only. CINCPACREP suggested that there was a need to clarify the longer-range US requirements for the use of Mactan and to inform Philippine officials and the PAF.

Visits of Third Country Ships and Aircraft to US Bases in the Philippines: Philippine Officials became annoyed in June because of instances of improper clearance procedures on the part of Australia and New Zealand. CINCPACREP Philippines reported that Philippine officials had decided to drop the simple notification procedure which had been in effect since 1953 and to require the more formal diplomatic clearance for third country visits to US bases in the Philippines.[5]

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1. STATE 245 to MANILA 122259Z Aug 65 (S)
2. MANILA to STATE 210449Z Aug 65 (S); STATE to MANILA 300136Z Oct 65 (S); MANILA 854 to STATE 050630Z Nov 65 (S)
3. JCS 4860/230035Z Oct 65 (S); CINCPAC 300312Z Oct 65 (S); PACAF 160356Z Dec 65 (S)
4. CINCPACREP PHIL 020223Z Dec 65 (S)
5. CINCPACREP PHIL 100619Z Jun 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC queried CINCPACREP Philippines on the anticipated effect of these changes and was informed that US operations would not be hampered as long as clearances from the Philippines were not delayed longer than 72 hours for aircraft and seven days for ships.[1]

Efforts through the Mutual Defense Board (MDB) to dissuade the Philippines in this matter were unsuccessful. Ambassador Blair requested permission from State to agree to a procedural change in the event he was unable to get the Philippine officials to revise their position.[2] He proposed to agree to discontinue the old notification procedure on the understanding that diplomatic clearance of third country entry would be assumed to have been granted if no notice to the contrary was received from the Philippine Foreign Office within a certain period. The essential change would be to shift the channel for third country clearances from the informal US Embassy and military channels to the appropriate third country embassy. The State Department informed Ambassador Blair that the US desired to retain the informal procedure but would agree to the shift to diplomatic procedures if efforts to retain the informal procedure failed.[3]

Discussions continued for a time without resolve. In August Philippine officials announced a complete change in GOP policy by stating that henceforth visiting third country ships and aircraft would be expected to enter only through Manila International Airport and regular ports of entry and that request for clearance of third country visits would be granted promptly but only on the basis of the formal procedure.[4] United States officials requested time to consider a number of factors before such a rapid change in policy. Philippine officials agreed to a delay but stated that the GOP would not defer action very long. The Ambassador requested comments on these developments from CINCPAC.

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1. CINCPACREP PHIL 030732Z July 65 (S)
2. MANILA 2391 to STATE 120229Z Jun 65 (S)
3. STATE 2173 to MANILA/191730Z Jun 65 (C)
4. MANILA 240 to STATE 051004Z Aug 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC conceded that the Philippine procedural requirement would not seriously degrade US operations.[1] However, he pointed out certain legal and politico-military ramifications of the problem for use as argumentation by the Embassy in Manila. Admiral Sharp in addition recommended a fall-back position requiring an explicit exemption from the use of regular ports of entry and Manila International Airport for the visits of third country ships and aircraft engaged in Free World resistance to aggression. The Secretary of State authorized Ambassador Blair to draw on the substance of CINCPAC's views as necessary and appropriate.[2]

Diplomatic level discussions were carried on within the mechanism of the US/Philippine MDB until October.[3] In the meantime three Australian ships (HMAS SYDNEY, HMAS VENDETTA, HMAS DUCHESS) were scheduled for refueling stops at Subic Bay on the 25th of September while enroute to South Vietnam. The Australian Commonwealth Naval Board (ACNB) requested information from CINCPACFLT on any recent changes of procedures for obtaining clearances for such a visit.[4] CINCPACFLT advised the ACNB that although the Philippine and US Governments were in the process of negotiating a change in clearance arrangements, the informal procedure of "notification only" through US channels still obtained.[5]

In October the problem of clearances for the visits of third country ships and aircraft was resolved by the Mutual Defense Board.[6] A letter outlining the new procedure was signed by General Atienza and Rear Admiral Monroe and sent to the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The procedure required that requests for diplomatic clearance be made by the country concerned to the GOP. Direct entry to US bases without a prior stop at the Port of Manila or Manila

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1. CINCPAC 111938Z Aug 65 (C)
2. STATE 262 to MANILA 170120Z Aug 65 (C)
3. MANILA 501 to STATE 101005Z Sep 65 (C)
4. ACNB 071753Z Sep 65 (S)
5. CINCPACFLT 082032Z Sep 65 (S)
6. MANILA A-384 to STATE 17 Nov 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

International Airport would be allowed when justified by the circumstances of each case. The requirement for direct entry without prior stops at ports of entry must be directly related to the Free World fight against communism in Southeast Asia. Third country requests for clearance and direct entry to US bases would be submitted to the Philippine Foreign Affairs Department at least 72 hours in advance of the intended arrival of military aircraft and 7 days before the intended arrival of warships.

The US preferred to continue with the previous informal procedures, however, the new arrangements were considered acceptable. The Ambassador reported that the GOP pressure for change of entry procedures was primarily a manifestation of the Philippine sense of sovereignty and national dignity.

Improvement of Philippine Air Traffic Control: Several near accidents involving US military and civilian aircraft have occurred because of deficiencies in the Philippine air traffic control system. These deficiencies were directly related to problems that have required considerable effort on the part of various US agencies. The first problem was the lengthy delay on the part of the GOP in making contractual arrangements for the installation of Air Traffic Control (ATC) equipment which had been funded by AID, shipped to the Philippines and for about two years remained in storage. The second problem concerned the marginal capabilities of Philippine Civil Aviation Agency (CAA) personnel to operate and manage Philippine air traffic, and the related fact that USAID had planned to phase-out the US Civil Aviation Advisory Group (CAAG) in June.

These problems were of primary concern to the Department of State, USAID and their GOP and Philippine CAA counterparts. However, the considerable increase in US civil and military use of Philippine airspace for the support of operations in Southeast Asia taxed the already marginal Philippine traffic management capabilities to the extent that CINCPAC, CINCPACAF and 13th Air Force became directly concerned about the safety and flexibility of US air operations.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Early in the year representatives of the FAA inspected Philippine facilities and, thereafter, contacted CINCPAC and requested that he provide command emphasis in support of in-country efforts to get the ATC equipment out of storage and installed and to ensure continuation of CAAG training of Philippine personnel. 13th Air Force at Clark Air Base considered the problem to be of immediate concern in March and requested assistance from the US Embassy.[1] CINCPACAF informally apprised CINCPAC of the continuing effort to reduce the air traffic hazards, particularly in the Manila area.

CINCPAC requested that CINCPACREP Philippines and Chief JUSMAG Philippines take all possible action within the country team to press the GOP to install the ATC equipment and to improve training and civil aviation advice.[2] In May CINCPACREP informed CINCPAC that the equipment remained stored in crates under conditions which had resulted in an unknown amount of damage to the equipment. It appeared that the delay in installation was occasioned by a controversy between GOP agencies, a controversy which was political in nature and concerned whether to let the installation contract by negotiation or by bidding.[3] MAAG Philippines reported that the installation problem was receiving the full attention of the country team.[4]

In June the difficulties over the contractual arrangements began to move toward a solution in the Philippines, and about the same time AID and OSD representatives in Washington approved continuation of the Philippine CAAG with an expanded advisory staff.[5] In July CINCPAC was informed that contracts for the installation of the ATC equipment had been signed and work was to begin in early August on a new air control center, control tower and communications center.[6]

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1. 13th AF Clark AB 13 CCR 2408290 Mar 65 (C)
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 080245Z May 65 (C); CINCPAC 160025Z May 65 (C)
3. CINCPACREP PHIL 210833Z May 65 (C)
4. CHJUSMAG PHIL 210638Z May 65 (C)
5. CINCPAC PHIL 211643Z Jun 65 (C)
6. CINCPACREP PHIL 292307Z Jul 65 (C); CINCPACREP PHIL 100390Z Aug 65 (C)

[redacted]

Military Leaders Tour

Between December 1964 and February 1965 a plan was devised to demonstrate US military power to prominent foreign military leaders. The concept was developed through an exchange of notes between Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral David L. McDonald and Admiral Sharp. CINCPAC formally proposed the tour in February to the JCS, and in May Secretary of Defense approval was received.

The one-time tour was to be complementary to the CINCPAC Weapons Demonstrations.[1] It was to provide a more complete picture of US military power, to demonstrate the back-up and rapid delivery capability that could be committed to defend our WESTPAC friends, and to dramatize the common interests of US allies.

Invitations were extended in early June and the tour took place 12-23 September.[2] The jet itinerary for the tour originated in Bangkok and included North Island, Camp Pendleton, Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB), George AFB, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Travis AFB, Fort Lewis, Seattle, Yokota and Saigon. The flight terminated in Bangkok.

Displays and demonstrations of military resources and power were conducted at Hawaii and West Coast installations. The tour was considered a success. The participants were favorably impressed with the US capability and determination to support allies against aggression.

Participating in the tour were representatives of the following: Australia, Republic of China, France, Japan, Republic of Korea, Federation of Malaysia, New Zealand, Kingdom of Thailand, United Kingdom and Republic of Vietnam. The Philippines did not accept the invitation. Pakistan and India also declined; hostilities between these two countries began 7 September and ended in a cease fire on 23 September, the same date the tour ended.[3]

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1. See previous CINCPAC Command Histories
2. CINCPAC 092226Z Jun 65 (C)
3. See CINCPAC J046 files for names of participants(CINCPAC J51210 Sep)

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

A

AA	Air America; Anti-Aircraft
AAFV	Australian Army Forces, Vietnam
Abn Bde	Airborne Brigade
ACB	Amphibious Construction Battalions
ACM	Air Chief Marshall
ACNB	Australian Commonwealth Naval Board
ACT	Air Control Team
ACU	Assault Craft Units
AC&W	Aircraft Control and Warning
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
A&E	Architectural and Engineering
AFAK	Armed Forces Assistance to Korea
AFB	Air Force Base
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFSTRIKF	USAF Forces, Strike Command
AGE	Associated Ground Equipment
AID	Agency for International Development
AIF	Automated Intelligence File
ALZ	ARC LIGHT Zones
ANGLICO	Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
ANZAC	Commander, Australia-New Zealand Battalion
ANZAM	Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States
APD	High Speed Transport
ARMA	Army Attache
ARPA	Advance Research Projects Agency
ARSTRIKE	Army Forces, Strike Command
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASD/ISA	Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare
ATC	Air Target Chart/Air Traffic Control
ATF	Fleet Ocean Tugs
ATM	Air Target Materials
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network
AWR	Ammunition War Reserve
AWX	All Weather Interceptor

B

BADGE	Base Air Defense Ground Environment (Japan)
BAHT	Thailand Currency
BDL	Beach Discharge Lighter
BE	Bombing Encyclopedia

BLT	Battalion Landing Team
BOD	Beneficial Occupancy Date
BR	Barrel Roll
BRO	Base Requirements Overseas
BTW	Boat Wave

C

CAA	Civil Aviation Agency
CAAG	Civil Aviation Advisory Group
CAF	Chinese Air Force
CART	Cartographic Committee Meeting (SEATO)
CAS	Controlled American Source
CD	Combat Developments
CDSC	Coastal District Surveillance Center
C-E	Communications-Electronics
CG	Civil Guard; Commanding General
CGUSAMC	Commanding General US Army Materiel Command
CGUSARYIS/IXCORPS	Commanding General US Army Ryukyus Island; IX Corps
CHB	Cargo Handling Battalions
CHICOM	Chinese Communists
CHJUSMAGTHAI	Chief Joint US Military Advisory Group, Thailand
CHKMAG	Chief Korea Military Assistance Group
CHMAAG	Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group
CHMEDT	Chief Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma
CHMPO	Chief Military Planning Office
CHNAVADGRU	Chief Naval Advisory Group, Korea
CHWTO	Chief Western Transportation Office
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CINCFES	Commander in Chief Far East Station (British)
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief Pacific Air Force
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
CINCPACREP	Commander in Chief Pacific Representative
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command
CINCSTRIKE	Commander in Chief of the Strike Command
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief United Nations Command
CINCUSARPAC	Commander in Chief United States Army Pacific
CINCUSTAF	Commander in Chief US/Thai Forces
CITG	Current Intelligence Targets Groups
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMPO	Chief of Military Planning Office
CN	Chinese Navy
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COC	CINCPAC Operation Center; Combat Operation Center
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COMNAVFMARIANNAS	Commander Naval Forces, Mariannas
COMNAVFOR	Commander Naval Forces

COMSAT	Civil Communications Satellite
COMSTAFF	Commander, US/Thai Field Forces
COMUSJAPAN	Commander US Forces Japan
COMUSKOREA	Commander US Forces Korea
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander US Military Assistance Command, Thailand
COMUSMACV	Commander US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
COMUSTDC	Commander US Taiwan Defense Command
CONUS	Continental United States
CPFF	Cost-plus-fixed-fee
CPFL	Contingency Planning Facilities Lists
CPRS	CINCPAC Route Slip
CRB	Cam Ranh Bay
CRSFF	Central Region SEATO Field Force
CSAF	Chief of Staff Air Force
CSP	Concurrent Spare Parts
CTF	Commander Task Force
CTG	Commander Task Group
CTSP	Contract Technical Service Personnel
CVA	Attack Aircraft Carrier
CVS	Antisubmarine Support Aircraft Carrier
CY	Calendar Year

D

DA	Department of the Army
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCMPO	Deputy Chief of Military Planning Office
DCS	Defense Communications System
DD	Destroyer
DDG	Guided Missile Destroyer
DE	Destroyer Escort
DEPCH	Deputy Chief
DER	Radar Picket Escort Vessel
DEW	Distant Early Warning
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DLG	Defense Liaison Group
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North)

E

E&E	Escape and Evasion or Evasion and Escape
EASTPAC	Eastern Pacific
ELINT	Electronics Intelligence
EMCP	Emergency Military Construction Program
EW	Early Warning; Electronic Warfare

F

FAA	Federal Aviation Agency
FAC	Forward Air Control/Controller
FAR	Forces Armees du Royaume (Royal Armed Forces of Laos)
FFORCEV	Field Forces Vietnam
FICPAC	Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific
FLF	Friendly Laotian Forces
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FOCCPAC	Fleet Operation Control Center, Pacific
FOS	Follow on Spares
FULRO	Front Unifie de la Lutte de la Race Opprime (United Front for the Struggle of Oppressed Races)
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces

G

GCI	Ground Controlled Intercept
GOP	Government of the Philippines
GP	General Purpose Bomb
GRC	Government of the Republic of China
GVN	Government of the Republic of Vietnam

H

HEDSUPPACT	Headquarters Support Activity
HMAS	Her Majesty's Australian Ship
HQAAFV	Headquarters Australian Army Forces, Vietnam
HSAS	Headquarters Support Activity - Saigon

I

IAC	Intelligence Assessment Committee
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IDCSP	Initial Defense Communications Satellite Project
IPIR	Immediate Photo Interpretation Reports
ISA	International Security Agency.
IWCS	Integrated Wideband Communications System

J

JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JMP	Joint Manpower Program
JOG	Joint Operations Graphics
JP-4	Jet Fuel
JPRC	Joint Personnel Recovery Center
JRC	Joint Reconnaissance Center
JSDF	Japan Self Defense Force
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JUSMAG	Joint US Military Advisory Group
JUSPAO	Joint United States Public Affairs Office

K

KIA	Killed in Action
KKK	Khmer Kampuchea Krom
KMAG	United States Army Advisory Group, Korea
KOCO	Korean Oil Corporation
KY-9	Secure Voice Communication

L

LAAM	Light Anti-Aircraft Missile (Bn)
LCM	Mechanized Landing Craft
LCPL	Landing Craft Personnel
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LOC	Lines of Communication
LOG CMD	Logistical Command
LOGIMP	Logistic Improvement Program
LPD	Landing Platform, Deck
LPH	Landing Platform Helicopter
LST	Landing Ship Tank

M

MA	Military Assistance
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAAMA	Middletown Air Material Area
MAB	Marine Amphibious Brigade
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MAG	Marine Air Group
MAM	Military Assistance Manual
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MAS	Military Assistance Sales
MASL	Military Assistance Program Articles & Services List
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MAW	Marine Air Wing
MBA	Military Base Agreement
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MDB	Mutual Defense Board (US - Philippines)
MDRC	Manual Data Relay Center
MEDT	Military Equipment Delivery Team (Burma)
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MIA	Manila International Airport; Missing in Action
MICS	Military Integrated Communications System
MIDPAC	Middle Pacific
MILAD	Military Advisor (to SEATO or ANZUS Council)
MILADREP	Military Advisors Representative
MILTAG	Military Technical Advisory Group (Indonesia)
MILTELCOMM	Military Telecommunications
MOC	Ministry of Communications
MPC	Military Payment Certificate
MPO	Military Planning Office (SEATO)

MS	Minesweepers
MSF	Fleet Minesweeper
MSO	Ocean Minesweepers
MSR	Main Supply Route
MSTS	Military Sea Transport Service
MTMTS	Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service
MTT	Mobile Training Team

N

NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVADGRU	Naval Advisory Group
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NLF	National Liberation Front (Communist in SVN)
NMCB	Naval Mobile Construction Battalion
NOG	National Security Agency, Pacific Operations Group
NORS	Non-Operational Ready Supplies
NSA	National Security Agency
NSAPAC	National Security Agency Pacific
NSTL	National Strategic Target List
NVA	North Vietnam Army
NVN	North Vietnam
NZ	New Zealand

O

ODDR&E	Office of Director Defense Research and Engineering
ODMA	Office of the Director of Military Assistance
OICC	Officer in Charge of Construction
OICC SEA	Officer in Charge of Construction Southeast Asia
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OSAD (I&L)	Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)
OSD	Office of Secretary of Defense
OUSAIRMA	Office of US Air Attache
OUSARMA	Office of US Army Attache

P

PA	Public Affairs
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACFLT	Pacific Fleet
PACOM	Pacific Command
PAF	Philippine Air Force
PCE	Submarine Chaser Escort
PCF	Patrol Craft Fast
PCH&T	Packing, Crating, Handling and Transportation

PCP	Program Change Proposals; Program Change Procedure
PCS	Submarine Chaser
PEG	Performance Evaluation Group
PF	Popular Force
PGM	Motor Gunboat
PIRRB	Photo Intelligence Requirements Review Board
PL	Pathet Lao
PL-VM	Pathet Lao - Viet Minh
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
PT	Patrol Boat

Q

QM	Quartermaster

R

R&D	Research and Development
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAR	Royal Australian Regiment
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
RDT&E	Research, Development, Test and Engineering
RF	Regional Force
RGUB	Revolutionary Government-Union of Burma
RLAF	Royal Laotian Air Force
RLG	Royal Laotian Government; Regional Liaison Group
RLT	Regimental Landing Team; Rolling Liquid Transporter
ROC	Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army
ROKAF	Republic of Korea Air Force
ROKDTF	Republic of Korea Division Task Force
ROKF	Republic of Korea Forces
ROKFV	Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam
ROKG	Republic of Korea Government
RO/RO	Roll on, roll off
RTA	Royal Thailand Army
RTAF	Royal Thailand Air Forces
RTG	Royal Thailand Government
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

S

SAAMA	San Antonio Air Materiel Area
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAM	Surface-to-air missile

SAR	Search and Rescue
SATS	Short Airfield Tactical System
SEACOORD	Coordinating Committee for US Missions Southeast Asia
SEAP	SEATO Military Publication
SEASIA	Southeast Asia
SEASTAG	SEATO Standardization Agreement
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SHOULDER	A maneuver by a vessel to force right-of-way (physical block)
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
SL	STEEL TIGER
SLF	Special Landing Force
SMPO	SEATO Military Planning Office
SMRIS	Soviet Missile Range Instrumented Ship
SOC	Squadron Operations Center
SOCPAC	Special Operations Center Pacific Command
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SPDHF	Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire
STAT	Seabee Technical Assistance Team
STOL	Short take-off and Landing
SVN	South Vietnam

T

TACAN	Tactical Air Navigation
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TFS	Tactical Fighter Squadron
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOC	Technical Order Compliance; Tactical Operations Center
TOR	Terms of Reference
TOT	Telephone Organization Thailand; Time on Target
TSN	Tan Son Nhut Air Field
TTI	Tactical Target Illustrations
TTM	Tactical Target Materials

U

UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USAIRA	United States Air Attache
USALCJ	US Army Logistics Center Japan
USAMC	US Army Materiel Command
USARSCV	US Army Support Command Vietnam
USARV	US Army, Vietnam
USARYIS	United States Army Ryukyus Islands

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
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J042
5720/FOIA-39F/5-84
J042 Ser: 084-93
28 July 1993

Mr. Peter Hayes
Nautilus Pacific Research
746 Ensenada Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94707

Dear Mr. Hayes:

(Reference your FOI329/USCINCPAC ltr Ser 047 of 13 May 91

We have just completed processing the our 1965 Command History when we received your undated letter inquiring about the command histories.

Enclosed is the 1965 CINCPAC Command History (Volumes I and II). Certain portions of the attached history are current and properly classified per sections 1.1(a), (2), (3), 1.3(a)(3), (4), (5), (7) and (8) of the Executive Order 12356 of April 1982 and they must be denied. You may appeal this determination per Title 5, U.S.C. 552(b).

If an appeal is made, we understand that you will appeal after you receive the last history (1984). Appeal procedures will be included in the letter forwarding the last history.

Command Histories for the years 1962, 1963 and 1964 are still being reviewed. As soon as we complete the review, we will forward them to you.

Sincerely,

K. KIBOTA
Chief, Administrative
Support Division
Joint Secretariat

Enclosure:
1965 CINCPAC Command History
(Volumes I and II)

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

CINCPAC
5750
Ser 000202
13 May 1966

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FRANK G. WHITE
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff
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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY

(VOLUME II)

1965

[redacted]

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

SUBJECT	PAGE NUMBERS
Letter of Promulgation	i-ii
Title Page	iii
List of Effective Pages	iv
Foreword	v
Table of Contents	vi-xii
List of Illustrations	xiii-xiv
Command History (Volume II)	273-595
Glossary of Terms	596-604
Index ~~(distributed separately)~~	605-685

FOREWORD

"CINCPAC Command History, 1965" consists of Volumes I and II published by Commander in Chief Pacific; and Annexes "A" and "B" published by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI respectively.

The separate elements of the history are classified according to content and distributed on the basis of a need to know.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
	Foreword	v
	List of Illustrations	xiii
IV	ACTIONS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA	273
	Southeast Asia Plans, Policy and Programs	274
	Contingency Planning, Southeast Asia	275
	Air Attacks Against North Vietnam	275
	POL Prestockage Level	276
	Stockpiling Construction Material and Equipment	276
	Contingency Planning Southeast Asia/WESTPAC	278
	Contingency Operational Programming	279
	CINCPAC Concept for Southeast Asia, April 1965	279
	South Vietnam	280
	III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF)	282
	ROK Division Force	282
	Army Airmobile Division	282
	173d Airborne Brigade	283
	Command Arrangements, RVN	283
	Thailand	284
	Command Arrangements, Thailand	285
	WESTPAC/Hawaii	286
	Transportation	286
	Base Development	287
	Action by JCS	288
	Strategy and Concept	289
	June Recommendation: More and Faster Build-Up	291
	Coordinating Committee for US Missions, Southeast Asia (SEACOORD)	292
	August Planning	292
	September-October Planning	292
	Concept, COMUSMACV	295
	Additional Force Requirement (Phase I Add-ons)	297
	CINCPAC Concept	298
	Analysis of Force Capability (Phase I, Phase II)	306
	Momentum, The Most Important Ingredient	307
	Action by JCS	307
	Planning Status, End of Year	308

Military Telecommunications (MILTELCOMM) System, Vietnam 526
Build-Up of C-E Personnel in SVN 527

Logistics, Southeast Asia 528
Base Development, Southeast Asia 528
CINCPAC Responsibility in Base Development Planning 528
Cam Ranh Bay Logistical Base 528
Harbor and Port Development 534
Permanent Airfields 534
Expeditionary Airfields 536
Consolidated MACV Headquarters 537
Saigon Hospital 538
Salvage Capability, Saigon 538
Real Estate in Southeast Asia 538
Integrated PACOM Construction Priority List 541
Emergency Military Construction Program 541
Base Development in Thailand 541
Bangkok By-Pass Road 543
Conflicting Requirements for Military Construction Personnel 543
Seaports and Beaches, Southeast Asia 545
Naval Support Activity, Danang 546
US Army 1st Logistical Command, South Vietnam 548
US Army 9th Logistical Command, Thailand 553
Logistical Arrangements in Thailand 553
Port Congestion 554
Tank Landing Ships 558
Lighterage and Stevedoring 561
Army Lighterage in South Vietnam 561
Lighterage/Stevedoring Service at Danang 562
Lighterage/Stevedoring Capability at Danang, Cam Ranh Bay, Phang Rang, and Saigon 562
Beach Discharge Lighter (BDL) 562
Shallow Draft Shipping and Terminal Service Contract 563
Ammunition Unloading/Distribution Procedures 563
POL Supply in Southeast Asia 563
POL Pipeline, Thailand 564
Problems Associated with Basing KC-135s at Takhli 567
POL Supply, South Vietnam 568
POL Support in the Philippines 571
POL for ROKFV 572
Theater Airlift 572
Increased Airlift Capability 573
MATS Extension to Cam Ranh Bay/Danang 573
Airlift Exercises and Training 574

Future US Requirements in WESTPAC 574
Evacuation of US Nationals 574
Control of Theater Transportation Resources 576
Ammunition, Southeast Asia 576
Ammunition for Laos 577
Substitutes for 250 Pound General Purpose Bombs 577
Year-End Ammunition Situation 578
Miscellaneous Logistical Actions, Southeast Asia 578
Funding for Increased Force Level 578
Project SLY LADY 578
Vietnam Support Expediting Task Force 579
Transfer of MAP Redistributable Property to US Forces 579
Support of US Military Attache Personnel, Laos 580
Transfer of Responsibility for Support of Allied Forces in South Vietnam 581

Additional Intelligence Activities, Southeast Asia 583
Joint Operations Graphics 583
Escape and Evasion (E&E) Charts 583

US Personnel, Southeast Asia 585
Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire (SPDHF) 585
Recovery of Prisoners, Southeast Asia 586
Courses of Action with Respect to Execution of US Personnel 587
Missing or Detained Personnel 587
Alleged Aiding the Enemy 588
Military Personnel Strength in South Vietnam 588
Expansion of COMUSMACV Rest and Recreation Program 590
Casualties, 1965 590
US Casualties in RVN During 1959 590

Glossary of Terms 596

Index ~~(distributed separately)~~ 605

[redacted]

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Title	Page
Proposed Bases and Major Force Deployments (April: 1965)	281
Concept, Phase I South Vietnam	300
Concept, Phase II South Vietnam	301
II A Force Requirements--RVN	310
US/Allied Maneuver Forces in South Vietnam; Anticipated Dispositions End CY 66	311
Rolling Thunder Command Arrangements	327
Rolling Thunder Planning Procedures Cycle	340
Rolling Thunder (Program Illustrations)	343-376
North Vietnam SAM Sites	382
Ordnance Expenditure, ROLLING THUNDER Program	386
ROLLING THUNDER Armed Reconnaissance Boundary Extensions	388
BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER Combat Sorties	415
US Combat Sorties in Laos	416
Air Operations in Laos, Target Types	417
Results of US Air Operations in Laos	418
BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER Operations Areas, 31 Dec 1965	419
South Vietnam Combat Sorties	422
ROLLING THUNDER Combat Sorties	423
ARC LIGHT Strikes by War Zone and Military Region	432
CTF 71 (Organization)	439
CTF 71 (Organization)	441
South Vietnam (Map)	450
Task Force ALPHA Forces	465
US/Allied Maneuver Forces, RVN	474
Republic of Vietnam, Ground Forces	475
South Vietnam Highlights, 1965	478
Thailand Security Developments, October-December	488
Situation in Laos	500
Location of US Unconventional Warfare (UW) Training Units in PACOM	517
Military Construction Program, South Vietnam	535

[redacted]

Military Construction Program, South Vietnam; Location and Cost of Funded Construction 540

Emergency Military Construction Program, FY 66 542

Military Construction, Thailand and Other Sites; Location and Cost of Funded Construction 544

Approximate Location of US Personnel in South Vietnam (Early 1965) 549

Port and Major Air Facilities, South Vietnam 555

Ship Activity in RVN Ports 557

Strategic Reserve of Merchant-Type Shipping 559

Pacific Command Intra-Theater Airlift 575

US Forces in Republic of Vietnam, Thailand 589

US Killed in Action, 1965 591

US Wounded in Action, 1965 592

Command and Control, Southeast Asia 312
Contingency Planning for Laos 312
Naval Component Commander-Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force 312
Deputy Commander for Air Operations 313
Separation of COMUSMACV/COMUSMACTHAI 313
Activation of US Army, Vietnam 313
Field Force Headquarters, Vietnam 314
Flag Officer As Chief, Naval Advisory Group, MACV 314
Consolidation of Headquarters USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI 314
Air Force Command and Control Arrangements, Thailand 315
Combat Operations Center (COC) 315
Command Arrangements, Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (ROKFV) 316

Operations, Southeast Asia 317
FLAMING DART 1 317
FLAMING DART 2 322
Dependents Evacuated from South Vietnam 323
ROLLING THUNDER 324
General Background 324
Command and Control 326
Ad Hoc Study Group on Air Operations in Southeast Asia 328
Constraints 330
Reconnaissance Intensified: Strikes Suspended 335
Recommended Future Course, ROLLING THUNDER 335
Strikes Resumed 337
VNAF Role in ROLLING THUNDER 337
Thailand Based Aircraft Operations 338
Coordination 339
Target Systems Analysis Section 339
Target Planning Review Group 339
ROLLING THUNDER Planning Staff 339
Planning Cycle 341
JCS Study of Armed Reconnaissance 341
Pressure on NVN Relaxed 342
Mining NVN Harbors 342
ROLLING THUNDER Suspension 377
Surface-To-Air-Missiles 377
ROLLING THUNDER: December Appraisal 383
US/GVN Cease-Fire, Christmas 384
Ordnance Expended 385
Air Operations in Laos 389
Origin of BARREL ROLL 389
BARREL ROLL Extended 391
Coordination Procedures 392
SEACOORD Recommendations 393
Problems in Scheduling 394

BARREL ROLL Operations Suspended 395
Air Defense Versus Force Capability 396
Proposed Measures to Increase Effectiveness 397
CINCPAC Comments on Target Selection 398
Problems in Coordination 399
Choke Point Reseeding Schedule 401
Armed Reconnaissance Technique 401
STEEL TIGER 402
Alert Aircraft for Targets of Opportunity (BANGO/WHIPLASH) 403
STEEL TIGER Armed Reconnaissance Suspended 403
Decentralization of Control 404
Mid-Year Assessment 406
Rainy Season Tactics and Rationale 406
Measures to Increase Effectiveness 407
Constraint on Armed Reconnaissance 408
Changes in Concept of Operations 408
Bombing Through Overcast 408
Authorization to Jettison Ordnance in NVN 409
Diverting STEEL TIGER Aircraft 409
BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER Operations Interrupted 409
Southern Laos Opened to STEEL TIGER Operations 410
TIGER HOUND Operations 411
Proposed Extension of ROLLING THUNDER Armed Reconnaissance Into Laos 411
Policy on Air Strikes in Cambodia 412
Rules for FC-47 Operations 412
Target Development 412
Intensified Effort Versus Results 414
Summary of US Air Operations in Laos, October 1965 Through January 1966 414
US Air Support in South Vietnam 414
Decision to Commit US Aircraft 414
US Navy Air Support 420
Strategic Air Command B-52 Strikes in Southeast Asia (ARC LIGHT) 424
Free Bomb Zones 426
CINCPAC Recommendations Regarding Control Procedures 426
Safety of Non-Combatants 428
SAC in the Close Air Support Role 429
Disapproval of B-52 Strikes in Cambodia 429
SAC Strikes in Laos 430
Ordnance for ARC LIGHT 430
Contingency Target Areas 430
ARC LIGHT Strikes, 1965 431
Photographic Reconnaissance, Southeast Asia Management 431
433

Operation of the Reconnaissance Program 433
Photo Intelligence Requirements Review Board (PIRRB) 434
Reconnaissance Film Exploitation 434
Naval Surface Operations 435
Naval Gunfire Support 447
Soviet Trawlers Harass US Aircraft Carriers 448

United States/Free World Military Assistance Force Deployments 449
Marine Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) Unit to RVN 449
Military Situation in RVN, March-April 452
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade to RVN 452
First Marine Brigade to Okinawa 453
Marines to Hue/Phu Bai 453
Military Situation in RVN, May-June 454
III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) Established; Naval Component Commander Appointed 455
Marine Expeditionary Airfield, Chu Lai 455
EASTPAC Marines Deployed to WESTPAC/Hawaii 455
173d Airborne Brigade to RVN 456
Australia/New Zealand Combat Forces to South Vietnam 457
Military Situation in RVN, July 460
Marines Land at Qui Nhon, Reinforce Danang 461
25th Infantry Division Alerted for Deployment to RVN 462
2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division to RVN 462
1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to RVN 463
Military Situation in RVN, August 463
US Army Task Force Alpha Established 464
Marine Amphibious Brigade to RVN 466
Military Situation in RVN, September 466
1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) to RVN 467
Military Situation in RVN, October 468
1st Infantry Division (Main Body) to RVN 469
Korean Forces to RVN 469
Military Situation in RVN, November 472
Build-Up of Enemy Force 473

CINCPAC Actions to Improve the Military Capabilities of Friendly Forces in Southeast Asia 477
South Vietnam 477
South Vietnam Highlights, 1965 477
RVNAF Force Strength 480
Landing Ship Support Large (LSSL) for VNN 481
A-1s for VNAF 482
M16 Rifles/XM 148 Grenade Launchers 482
B-57s Loaned to VNAF 482
Research and Development (R&D) and Combat Developments (CD) in South Vietnam 483

Television Communications for RVN 485
Thailand 486
Security Developments in Thailand 486
Insurgency in Thailand 486
Security of US Personnel and Facilities 491
Thai MAP increase in Support of United States Actions and Policies in Thailand 492
Bilateral Planning--US/Thailand 497
Thailand Airfield Improvements 498
Thai National Defense College Curriculum 498
Laos 498
Situation in Laos 498
Laos Helicopter Authorization/Search and Rescue in Laos 502
Laos Aircraft Requirements 505
Airlift 505
T-28s for Laos 506
Light Automatic Weapons for Laos 507
Laos Army Unit Training in Thailand 507
Leadership Training for Laotian Officers 507

Special Warfare 509
Psychological Warfare 509
Theater Psychological Operations Capability 509
Viet Cong Psychological Vulnerabilities 510
Rewards for Information Concerning Leaders of Insurgency 510
Psychological Operations in South Vietnam 511
Aircraft for Psychological Operations 511
Army Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) Units 511
Joint United States Public Affairs Office/ MACV Political Warfare Directorate 512
Service Representation in PSYOPS Effort 512
Effectiveness of PSYOPS in SVN 513
Leaflet Operations Over North Vietnam 513
PACOM Leaflet Guide 516
Unconventional Warfare 516
Unconventional Warfare Planning Agency 516
Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) 516
Recruiting Refugees for Regional and Popular Forces 519

Communications in Southeast Asia 520
Integrated Wideband Communications System 520
Wideband Communications Restoral 522
Common User Relays, Southeast Asia 523
Synchronous Communications (SYNCOM) Satellites 524
Automatic Telephone Service, Southeast Asia 525
Improved Navigational System for Southeast Asia 525

CHAPTER IV

ACTIONS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Major United States air, ground and naval forces were committed in Southeast Asia during 1965. CINCPAC's associated actions and decisions are described in this chapter. The material is arranged in sections as follows:

SECTION	TITLE AND SYNOPSIS
A	SOUTHEAST ASIA PLANS, POLICY AND PROGRAMS Describes the early phases of contingency planning, the evolution of policy and the development of contingency operational programs.
B	COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS, SOUTHEAST ASIA A discussion of major changes during hostilities to achieve workable command and control arrangements for the multi-national force.
C	OPERATIONS, SOUTHEAST ASIA Traces the development of the air and surface naval operational programs.
D	UNITED STATES/FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCE DEPLOYMENTS Describes the deployment of US forces and the events leading to the arrival of Australian, New Zealand and Korean combatant forces in South Vietnam.
E	CINCPAC ACTIONS TO IMPROVE THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. Portrays CINCPAC actions related to South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.

SECTION	TITLE AND SYNOPSIS
F	SPECIAL WARFARE, SOUTHEAST ASIA Concerns psychological and unconventional warfare activities.
G	COMMUNICATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA The communications capabilities were unequal to Southeast Asia requirements. Plans and progress in the improvement of these capabilities are discussed in this section.
H	LOGISTICS, SOUTHEAST ASIA Emphasizes base development, seaports and beaches, and POL supply.
I	ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, SOUTHEAST ASIA Addresses only those intelligence activities directly related to Southeast Asia and not covered under the "Operations" section.
J	US PERSONNEL, SOUTHEAST ASIA Discusses subjects ranging from special pay provisions to allegations of aiding the enemy.

SECTION A - SOUTHEAST ASIA PLANS, POLICY AND PROGRAMS

Early in the year much of CINCPAC's planning was conducted in the context of existing operations plans. Some actions were later guided by the provisions of these plans, but no OPLAN was implemented in its entirety. In response to the changing situation and requirements several conferences were held in PACOM to prepare detailed programs which reflected force requirements and policy recommendations. The material in this section[1] is arranged under

---

1. See also Chapter II for MAP associated actions prompted by events in Southeast Asia.

the headings of "Contingency Planning" and "Contingency Operational Programming." Major emphasis is on the programs submitted after conferences held during April, August, September/October, and December. Actions in implementation of these plans and programs are described elsewhere in this chapter. (U)

CONTINGENCY PLANNING, SOUTHEAST ASIA

Air Attacks Against North Vietnam

Planned air attacks against targets in North Vietnam, as reflected in Annex R, CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64, were revised to schedule attacks against 94 selected targets so as to inflict the maximum feasible level of damage commensurate with forces available. The revised annex was promulgated on 17 December 1964, and distribution was accomplished during the first week of January 1965. (S)

In February CINCPAC stated to the JCS his basic concept and plans for coordination of air operations under OPLAN 37-65. He noted that during border control operations it was appropriate that COMUSMACV exercise operational control of certain US land based air units in Southeast Asia, with CINCPACFLT carrier based air operating in support. During air attacks on North Vietnam, the operational control of USAF forces in Southeast Asia, except FARM GATE and certain assigned support type aircraft, would be passed to CINCPACAF. COMUSMACV would be the coordinating authority for air attacks conducted by VNAF/FARM GATE alone. Normally, CINCPACAF would be coordinating authority for air strikes involving forces under the operational control of CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and COMUSMACV. CINCPAC further stated that the Commander, 2d Air Division, as a subordinate of both CINCPACAF and COMUSMACV, had been delegated this coordinating authority.[1]

Comments stemming from the JCS review and approval of this plan were reflected in a change promulgated by CINCPAC on 14 June.

---

1. CINCPAC 262353Z Feb 65 (TS)

The major changes were to assign specific size and distance limitations to cross-border actions (Category I) and to delete cross-border actions on the RVN/Cambodian border. [1]

POL Prestockage Level

During February the policy on prestockage of POL requirements of Phase IV, CINCPAC OPLAN 32 was revised to raise the level from 20 days to 30 days. This action was based on the unreliability of the commercial POL distribution system and the vulnerability of this system to sabotage. [2] (S)

Stockpiling Construction Material and Equipment

Following a visit to PACOM the Chief of Staff US Army recommended establishment of a COMUSMACV-controlled stockpile of construction equipment and material. [3] CINCPAC agreed to the extent that construction material should be stockpiled for military construction units only; but he indicated to the JCS that there was no need to stockpile additional construction equipment for engineer units. He believed that the equipment requirements for cost-plus-fixed fee (CPFF) contractor, RVN would be satisfied if the previously requested $6.0 million in MAP construction funds was approved. CINCPAC further proposed that a thirty day supply level be maintained in South Vietnam and that an additional sixty day supply be held on Okinawa. He stated that it would require $10.0 million to fund the initial stockpile. [4]

These recommendations were fully supported by higher authority. On 1 April OSD indicated that the $6.0 million in MAP construction funds was approved for inclusion in the add-on package to Vietnam FY 65 MAP. [5] (S)

---

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000212 of 14 June 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 260146Z Feb 65 (C)
3. JCS 007434/200019Z Mar 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 310212Z Mar 65 (S)
5. OSD 008217/011835Z Apr 65 (C)

[redacted]

Further, CINCUSARPAC was authorized by Department of the Army to obligate for the stockpile $10.0 million of stock fund mobilization reserve obligation authority.[1] At CINCPAC's direction CINCUSARPAC also consolidated the PACOM requirements on the basis of:[2] (S)

1. Stockage objective of 30 days supply level in RVN and 60 days in Okinawa.

2. Construction material to support five engineer construction battalions and one naval mobile construction battalion.

The adequacy of existing and planned prepositioning of material in support of PACOM Contingency/General War Plans was studied in the CINCPAC J4 Division during March. From this study it was concluded:

1. The prepositioning policy directives of all services were adequate to support CINCPAC OPLANs.

2. All services had sufficient materiel prepositioned in the theater to support PACOM forces at the force level of Phase IV, CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64 for not less than the first 60 days of hostilities.

3. Army forces deploying to PACOM from CONUS must provide their own initial and follow-on support from other than PACOM resources.

4. The Air Force and Navy components had identified the prepositioning requirements to support all existing CINCPAC OPLAN forces including those to deploy from CONUS. Prepositioning was underway and would proceed as facilities could accommodate the materiel.

5. All services had actions underway to reach the prepositioning objectives of the most recent CINCPAC OPLANS, i.e., OPLANs 38-64 and 39-65.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

CHICOM mks production/storage area, target, strike planning (p. 635)

[redacted]



Contingency Planning Southeast Asia/WESTPAC

On 13 March the JCS requested CINCPAC to develop a time-phased course of action which, without prejudice to existing OPLANs, would:

1. Propose minimum ground forces which should be sent to South Vietnam to oppose successfully a NVN/CHICOM attack into northern South Vietnam.

2. Propose minimum ground forces which should be deployed to Thailand/Laos to successfully defend vital areas in the event of Chinese attack through Laos and Burma.

3. Propose minimum air and naval forces required in WESTPAC/Southeast Asia to enable the US to hold in either contingency above and concurrently strike North Vietnam and Communist China from the air.

[redacted]

4. Include logistic actions and facilities required to deploy the above forces in a timely manner and sustain them under combat conditions.

After considering recommendations from his subordinate commanders CINCPAC submitted a time-phased course of action. This specified force deployments and logistic actions, and it identified what should be done immediately and what should be accomplished after arrangements with Thailand. It also stated actions to be taken upon receipt of warning, and what remained to be done in event of attack.

In general, ground force deployments were those of OPLAN 32, and air and naval deployments were tied to OPLAN 39. Logistics actions were similarly divided in time to speed deployments and to ease the total logistic load identified with support of either OPLAN 32 or 39.[1]

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONAL PROGRAMMING

CINCPAC Concept For Southeast Asia, April 1965

By mid-March the US was applying additional military pressure against the Viet Cong and North Vietnam, and the COMUSMACV logistic capability was being expanded by increments. Two USMC BLTs from CINCPAC Marine resources were ashore at Danang, but the VC were enjoying continued success in their efforts to segment the RVN and to weaken the GVN and RVNAF.

To improve the security and readiness in the Republic of Vietnam, the JCS proposed, on 20 March, deployment to Southeast Asia of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), a US Army division force, and a Republic of Korea division force. At the time there was little prospect that the ROK force would be available at an early date, and the source of the US Army division force was subject to several variables. Marines were immediately available, however, and on 4 April orders went out directing two additional USMC battalions to RVN, thus further eroding CINCPAC's reserve of ground combat forces.

---

1. CINCPAC 280050Z Mar 65 (TS)

On 5 April the Secretary of Defense asked the JCS for a plan and schedule of logistic action to support the forces to be deployed. To develop the plan a conference was hurriedly convened at CINCPAC Headquarters in Hawaii, with representation from the JCS and major CONUS and PACOM commands and agencies. Prerequisite for the plan under consideration was a concept of operations for the force. This had been the subject of intense study and discussions for several months, but in early April the issue remained unresolved.

Thus, one of the first actions associated with the conference was a statement of CINCPAC's general concept that would guide force deployments. In it he proposed deployment of combatant US and Allied ground forces in South Vietnam and a small combatant ground force in Thailand. He further proposed to deploy additional air elements in South Vietnam, Thailand and WESTPAC to offer a north-south array of air power that would tie the CHICOM air units to north and central China.[1]

South Vietnam: In South Vietnam, CINCPAC proposed that forces first occupy and secure coastal bases from which they would engage in counterinsurgency operations in coordination with RVNAF. These bases, logistically supportable from the sea, would be utilized to support a campaign of increasing magnitude against the Viet Cong. The areas selected for bases, or enclaves, and the major forces to be deployed to them are shown in the associated illustration.

It was recognized that security of the enclaves would be heavily dependent upon friendly Vietnamese aiding in the identification of the Viet Cong. CINCPAC also noted that it would be necessary to place great reliance on the Army of South Vietnam and other GVN forces to accomplish most of the tasks involved in population control. On this basis he thought RVN forces would be preferable for operations in thickly populated areas.

Operations in South Vietnam would be paced to coincide with the incremental increase in the capability of the deployed forces. First would

---

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000131 of 10 Apr 65 (TS)

PROPOSED BASES And MAJOR FORCE DEPLOYMENTS

(April:1965)



be an increase in the security of vital US installations and occupancy and improvement of the coastal enclaves, and support of RVNAF operations from the enclaves. Next would be operations more distant from the enclaves. This would be followed by securing inland bases and areas which would be subsequently occupied, improved and used as bases for operations.

It should be noted that the enclave concept featured an orderly extension of combat power inland from successive bases which were secure and logistically supportable. Also, operations could be scaled down or terminated at about any time with minimum risk to the forces involved. The most apparent disadvantage of the concept was the size of the forces required to provide security to the multiple base areas.

The anticipated initial operations of the deployed forces in RVN are summarized below:

III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF): USMC units ashore at Danang would be augmented, designated as III Marine Expeditionary Force and based in the Danang-Hue area. As additional forces became available the Tam Ky and Chu Lai areas would be secured. Securing Chu Lai was particularly important to permit early installation of an expeditionary airfield and to initiate construction of a permanent jet capable airfield. III MEF would be prepared to defend critical port facilities and airfields in the Danang-Hue area and to block the coastal avenue of approach in the event of overt NVN/CHICOM aggression.

ROK Division Force: Principal mission would be to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Quang Ngai Province and the Do Xa Viet Cong base. Additionally, it would provide security for construction and air operations at Chu Lai.

Army Airmobile Division: After securing its logistic bases in the Qui Nhon/Nha Trang areas this unit would conduct counterinsurgency combat operations in the highlands or elsewhere when logistically feasible. An initial input of logistic forces supported by necessary combat units

would be required. It was expected that the Airmobile Division would permit release of ARVN forces in the highlands so they could conduct operations in the more densely populated coastal regions. This division would be prepared to defend the central highlands if NVN/CHICOM overt aggression occurred; also, to assist in maintaining friendly control of coastal communications.

173d Airborne Brigade: Conduct security and counterinsurgency operations in the Bien Hoa/Vung Tau areas immediately. The brigade was to be relieved in South Vietnam as soon as possible by a USA brigade from CONUS. Thereafter, the 173d would revert to its role as a PACOM reserve in Okinawa.

Before logistic forces were deployed to Chu Lai, Tam Ky, Quang Ngai, Qui Nhon and Nha Trang it was planned that combat operations of US, ROK or ARVN forces would provide a requisite degree of security. A PACOM TFS was to be moved to Tan Son Nhut to support increased US/RVNAF counterinsurgency operations, as well as to conduct air operations beyond the borders of RVN.

Command Arrangements, RVN: Commander in Chief Pacific was to exercise over-all operational command through his component commanders and COMUSMACV as appropriate. COMUSMACV was to be designated as the operational joint commander for operations in South Vietnam. His USAF component functions would be exercised by Commander,Second Air Division who would report in that capacity to COMUSMACV. For air actions against NVN, operational control of USAF forces in Southeast Asia was to be exercised by CINCPACAF through Commander, 13th Air Force and Commander, 2d Air Division when directed by CINCPAC. Additionally, CINCPACAF would operate in support of COMUSMACV when directed.

Naval component command functions in South Vietnam were to be exercised by Commanding General, III MEF who would report in that capacity to COMUSMACV. Other offensive naval actions were to be conducted under the operational control of CINCPACFLT who

would operate forces in support of COMUSMACV when directed. Amphibious operations in Southeast Asia would be conducted under CINCPACFLT's operational control. Forces employed in amphibious operations would remain under the operational control of CINCPACFLT until assigned to the operational control of COMUSMACV when ashore.

COMUSMACV would exercise operational control over Commanding General, III MEF; Commanding General, ROK Division Force; US Army divisions and brigades; Commander, Australia-New Zealand (ANZAC) Battalion; and any additional combat force contingents from allied nations.

Upon deployment of the balance of III MEF and second US Army division, a US Army corps headquarters would be established. The Commanding General, USA corps would assume operational control of the USA and ROK divisions and report to COMUSMACV. No conbined headquarters was planned for the operation of the multi-nation force. COMUSMACV would plan and conduct operations on a coordinate/cooperative basis with CINCRVNAF, but COMUSMACV was to retain operational control of non-RVN forces.

A small combined staff for COMUSMACV and CINCRVNAF was to correlate activities and perform liaison on combat operations in which forces under operational control of COMUSMACV and forces under CINCRVNAF participated. COMUSMACV and CINCRVNAF were to mutually supervise this staff's activities and individually approve/disapprove its actions. The staff was to exercise no directive power or command authority, and directives to subordinate forces were to be transmitted exclusively through the appropriate operational control channels of COMUSMACV and CINCRVNAF respectively.

Thailand: CINCPAC's recommended deployments to Thailand were substantially less than those to South Vietnam and were intended to:

1. Provide adequate USAF forces to continue and intensify armed reconnaissance and air strike missions against the Pathet Lao /Viet Minh and NVN.

[redacted]

2. Increase Thai confidence in US determination by positioning US ground combat units in the country.

3. Position a US ground combat unit to conduct operations against communist forces advancing to South Vietnam through Laos.

4. Provide forces to construct the Siracha to Don Muang segment of a prepositioned petroleum pipeline.

5. Constitute a visible deterrent to an overt CHICOM/NVN attack.

6. Facilitate a subsequent force increase in Thailand.

Several USAF units were arriving in Thailand even while additional deployments were being discussed at the conference in Hawaii. A squadron of F4C's reached Ubon/Udorn 7 April and an F-105 squadron bedded down at Takhli on 11 April. These units were intended for use in air operations outside Thailand (e.g., ROLLING THUNDER), and as a visible deterrent and an air defense force.

The ground combat force contemplated for Thailand was a brigade force of the 25th Infantry Division positioned at Korat in northeast Thailand. It was expected that the brigade would accomplish reconnaisance, security, training and civic action missions. It would also be prepared to secure crossing sites on the Mekong at Nong Khai and Nakhon Phanom.

The construction force for the Siracha to Don Muang Petroleum pipeline, an Army engineer construction battalion and essential support elements, was to be moved without delay by surface to Thailand. The operating unit for the pipeline was to be requested by CINCPAC at the appropriate time as construction progressed.

Command Arrangements, Thailand: CINCPAC reiterated his previous recommendation that the position of COMUSMACTHAI be established separate from COMUSMACV. Until this was accomplished, however, his view was that the US brigade and its attached units would be under the operational control of DEPCOMUSMACTHAI. Combat services support units were to be attached to the 9th Logistics Command,

[redacted]

[redacted]

and CINCPACAF was to exercise operational control of the USAF units in Thailand.

WESTPAC/Hawaii: Proposed USAF deployments to WESTPAC were designed to offer a north-south array of air power to tie the CHICOM air units to north and central China. In recognition of a near saturation level at Clark Air Base, it was planned to route much air traffic through Kung Kuan (Taiwan) and probably Mactan Air Base (Philippines). Additionally, the I Marine Expeditionary Force was to be moved from EASTPAC to Hawaii-WESTPAC to reconstitute the PACOM forward-deployment amphibious capability.

Transportation: CINCPAC pointed out to the JCS certain limitations then existing in the lift forces, support facilities, and port and beach clearance. The most significant of these were:

1. Intra-theater airlift was fully committed and it was anticipated that this would prevail for the next three months.

2. Military Air Transport Service (MATS) was programmed to phase out a substantial number of its airlift units, and one C-135 squadron would be non-productive because its personnel would be converting to C-141 aircraft.

3. Several months would lapse before the MATS C-141 lift capability would be sufficient to offset losses.

4. MATS had purchased almost all of the available commercial airlift for the balance of FY 65.

5. Tactical Air Command C-130s were overcommitted for the remainder of the FY.

6. Only four US flag cargo vessels were potentially available for exclusive military use.

7. The only LSD available to MSTS was committed to NASA at an early date.

8. One of the four MSTS aircraft ferries was also committed to NASA and would not be available until 24 May.

9. Clark Air Base, the focal point for airlift into Southeast Asia, was frequently saturated by current operations. Additional traffic would require alternate bases for support of inter-theater through traffic.

[redacted]

10. Terminal base capability to accept transport aircraft in South Vietnam was critical.

11. The available indigenous resources to offload and receive cargo over-the-beach at Qui Nhon and Nha Trang was extremely limited. The existing capability at Qui Nhon was approximately 90 short tons per day and at Nha Trang about 200 short tons per day.

Assumptions associated with the transportation concept for the deployments included: 1) maneuvers, exercises and joint training would be cancelled during the deployments; 2) gold flow restrictions would be relaxed to the extent that foreign flag shipping could be chartered to support deployments; 3) forty per cent of MATS capability would be reserved to meet priority and emergency requirements; 4) there would be a seven day delay between the decision to deploy and the date the first units would be available for deployment.

Base Development: The task of developing bases and facilities to support the existing and anticipated deployments was formidable. It was estimated to require $125.1 million from FY 65 funds, and $146.9 million from FY 66 funds. Various projects at Danang would require 21 battalion-months for Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB). Elsewhere in South Vietnam, and in Thailand, projects would require 113 battalion-months effort by Army engineer units, and the estimated monthly materials requirement to support the USA engineer units was 23,000 tons; most of which would have to be imported.

Significant construction would be required to establish an adequate base for POL support to an expanded force level in Southeast Asia. Some of these projects were under construction and some had been funded only. Others had been previously recommended by CINCPAC and were awaiting approval.

The POL operations in South Vietnam were based entirely on a commercial supply system that received, stored, and distributed POL products. Continued operation of this system was often dependent on paying tax to the Viet Cong and if the VC chose to forego this benefit

[redacted]

they could seriously disrupt major segments of the distribution system. The entire commercial system was dependent on the POL terminals at Nha Be.

It was considered that the existing system could support the initial deployments. At the same time, it was believed prudent to establish an emergency floating POL storage capability, and to provide for Army and Marine troop units to transport POL products from commercial terminals to forward areas.

Several major improvements to POL facilities in Thailand were considered essential to support significant additional deployments. These included storage facilities at Siracha, Don Muang, Korat, Udorn and Ubon; and the pipeline from Siracha to Don Muang. The approval of the Thai government, however, had not been obtained. CINCPAC proposed that the remainder of the pipeline should be installed if the decision was made to deploy significant additional forces. Construction time was estimated at three months.

Action by JCS: After reviewing CINCPAC's 10 April recommendation the JCS proposed to the Secretary of Defense, on 17 April, a concept and schedule for deployment of three division forces and other forces to Southeast Asia. These deployments were further discussed in Honolulu on 20 April by the Ambassador to South Vietnam, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV.

As a result of the 20 April discussions the JCS decided to recommend eight US battalion equivalents as an early reinforcement to the GVN ground effort; an additional twelve US battalions were considered required at a later date. Four third country battalion equivalents were considered appropriate initial deployments with a possibility that the equivalent of six additional battalions would follow. Three US air squadrons and US logistic support for the enlarged force were also recommended.

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The concept of operations recommended by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense was fundamentally the same as that contained in CINCPAC's proposal of 10 April. [1]

Strategy and Concept

During the first half of the year, concurrent with the increasing US force deployments to Southeast Asia, there was frequent interchange of comments related to the appropriate strategy for the developing situation. CINCPAC, in June, was stating that the focus of strategy should be on control of the economically, politically and militarily important coastal areas of Central and North Vietnam and the Mekong Delta. The thrust of the strategy, he felt, should aim at reducing the Viet Cong mobility, morale and offensive capability; forcing the VC to the defensive in or near the friendly held area by progressively increasing the size of the tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) and connecting one friendly area to another by means of cleared zones. [2]

In early August CINCPAC was asked to comment or recommend regarding a JCS concept for South Vietnam. Admiral Sharp observed that the JCS listed almost all of South Vietnam as being of major significance. He noted that the relative importance of the various areas should be recognized to provide direction and thrust to the strategy and to guide employment and positioning of forces. In his opinion the Saigon area and Mekong Delta were of primary importance; the coastal plain second; and the highlands third. He also believed it important to control the food producing areas so as to feed the people under friendly control and to export the surplus; thus causing the VC to either import their food or fight for it. [3]

CINCPAC emphasized the necessity for the basic US military strategy to include for Thailand: a build-up of logistic support bases,

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1. JCSM-321-65 of 30 April 65 (TS); CINCPAC ltr ser 000131 10 April 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 112210Z June 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 180120Z Aug 65 (TS)

improvements of existing airbases and construction of new airfields, and improvement in lines of communications and the state of readiness of Thai Armed forces. These actions, he stated, were vitally necessary for a US/Thai posture that would deter CHICOM aggression or, this failing, facilitate logistic support of US forces.

Perhaps the most significant of CINCPAC's statements was a reminder that the military actions envisaged by the JCS were but a part of the single integrated US strategy for Southeast Asia including North and South Vietnam, Thailand and Laos; and that military operations should be conducted in concert with major political, economic and social programs.[1] This was, however, neither the first nor last time CINCPAC had to emphasize the broad scope of actions required by the situation.

The strategy proposed by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense on 27 August indicated acceptance of most of CINCPAC's views.[2] The JCS stated that the US strategy for Vietnam should not allow the communists to keep pace with or more than match US military efforts. In this regard they made clear their conviction that such a course of action might lead to a creeping intervention by the Soviets and Chinese that would eventually explode into an expanded war.

Just prior to submitting their concept to Secretary McNamara, the JCS asked CINCPAC's views on the basic undertakings, courses of action, and force requirements to carry out the proposed concept. Additionally, they requested an evaluation of the capabilities of the forces thus far approved, and the rationale for any additional forces.[3] It was subsequently determined that these tasks could be most conveniently accomplished in connection with conferences, already scheduled for an early date, in Saigon and Hawaii.

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1. CINCPAC 180120Z Aug 65 (TS)
2. JCSM-652-65 of 27 Aug 65 (TS)
3. JCS 9143/252211Z Aug 65 (TS)

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1. CINCPAC 180120Z Aug 65 (TS)
2. JCSM-652-65 of 27 Aug 65 (TS)
3. JCS 9143/252211Z Aug 65 (TS)

June Recommendation - More and Faster Build-up

In early June the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense, on the basis of CINCPAC and COMUSMACV recommendations,[1] that the Communists might be on the threshold of increasing the intensity of the Southeast Asia conflict. The VC were capable of mounting regimental-size operations in any of the Corps areas and battalion-size operations in virtually any province in RVN. Further, Viet Cong units were equipped with a new family of weapons which represented a formidable accretion of firepower. Elements of one NVA regiment (101st) and perhaps elements of two additional regiments were in the northern zone of the II Corps area, and it appeared that some of the 304th NVA Division was in southern Laos capable of early deployment to South Vietnam.

Only two of the nine VC regiments in RVN had been heavily engaged and it was believed that the commitment of their separate battalions was in about the same proportion. Meanwhile, the highlands were virtually isolated and an incomplete but damaging seige of Saigon was causing serious economic and military consequences. The badly mauled RVN ground forces were in a precarious position and some doubt was expressed that they would continue steadfast under fire. A planned RVN force increase was deferred because the available resources were needed to reconstitute forces suffering heavy battle losses.[2]

This situation, concluded the JCS, required a further build-up of US and allied forces in the RVN at the most rapid rate feasible. This included the immediate advance of the remaining ground forces of III MAF (2 BLTs) and USA logistics and other support units totalling more than 9,000 men. The major additional forces included the Air Mobile Division with its combat and logistic support elements

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1. COMUSMACV 19118/070335Z Jun 65 (TS); CINCPAC 072325Z Jun 65 (TS)
2. COMUSMACV ser 00630 Monthly Evaluation, Jun 65 (S); Jules Roy's Battle of Dienbien Phu became required reading for key CINCPAC staff members.

[redacted]

to close about 20 August; and four additional tactical fighter squadrons and support forces as soon as possible after 1 September. Intensified air action against North Vietnam was also recommended.[1]

Coordinating Committee for US Missions Southeast Asia (SEACOORD), July Meeting

Admiral Sharp attended a SEACOORD meeting in Bangkok 23-24 July. Some of the decisions, agreements and recommendations resulting from these discussions were as follows:[2]

1. It was decided to investigate the Laos/Thailand air capabilities with a view toward increasing their reconnaissance efforts in the Laos Panhandle.

2. It was agreed to investigate the scope and extent of possible infiltration of arms, ammunition and supplies via the Nam Nua, Nam How and Mekong rivers.

3. It was agreed that planning for Thai/US Special Forces operations from Thailand should continue in an effort to develop a trained force. Meanwhile, attention would be devoted to possibilities and related preparations for future action on an ascending scale in the Laos corridor as political considerations permitted. It was further agreed that a concept, of parallel or complementary pattern, to utilize Thai/US Special Forces teams aimed at the strategic Bolovens Plateau area and other portions of the Laos Panhandle was of importance.

4. Approval was recommended for the proposed revitalization of Thai MAP and the program to man and equip Thai forces for the joint US/Thai defense of Thailand.

5. Admiral Sharp and Generals Westmoreland and Esterbrook expressed the opinion that Thai ground forces should be brought to combat-ready status for use in the Mekong Valley.

August Planning

In early July the JCS had recommended to the Secretary of Defense a revised program for building US forces in South Vietnam to approximately 175,000 personnel and thirty-four maneuver battalions. Subsequently, on 20 July, the Secretary of Defense was in Saigon and

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1. JCSM-457-65 of 11 June 1965 (TS) CPRS 000333-65
2. BANGKOK to STATE 240617Z Jul 65 (TS)

[redacted]

at his request COMUSMACV gave him a "shopping list" of units needed to facilitate and accelerate the accomplishment of the MACV mission. General Westmoreland's list differed significantly in strength and units from previous recommendations to the JCS.[1] It was concluded, in Washington, that another conference should be convened in Hawaii to prepare a coordinated program of deployments that would provide the capability to stem the tide in South Vietnam.[2,3]

Accordingly, CINCPAC conducted a planning conference 3-6 August with participation by representatives from the Joint Staff, Military Services, OSD(I&I), MATS, MSTS, MTMTS, CINCPAC, PACOM component commanders, CINCSTRIKE, ARSTRIKE, AFSTRIKE, COMUSMACV, 2d Air Division, US Army Vietnam, and COMUSKOREA.

The resulting program covered the movement to South Vietnam and WESTPAC of US and ROK military units, and personnel and materiel considered adequate to achieve a military stalemate with the Viet Cong (Phase I). Based on the CINCPAC April concept, the program consisted of an integrated listing of force requirements, troop lists, deployment priorities, jet-capable airfield construction and schedules and transportation schedules. Deployment priorities of the program were first established and submitted by representatives of COMUSMACV and then adjusted according to the availability of units and/or equipment.

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1. "Items designed to facilitate and accelerate accomplishment of MACV Mission," 20 July 65 (TS)
2. JCS 2343/602-6 of 25 July 65 (TS)
3. As of 29 July the US forces in South Vietnam totaled 80,079 and equated to 17 battalions, 12 fighter squadrons and 16 1/3 helicopter companies. Additional US forces either enroute or approved for movement totaled 54,316. The total of the in-country, enroute or approved force was as follows:

Personnel	Battalions	Fighter Squadrons
134,395	28	36 2/3

Other forces in South Vietnam on 29 July included approximately 2,500 ROK troops, 100 New Zealand artillerymen and 1,150 Australian soldiers.

Four critical problems were identified during the conference and reported by CINCPAC to the JCS. These were:

1. Decision dates: Thirteen units were ready to meet desired closure dates but if the date was to be met the deployment decision had to be made by 15 August.

2. ROK Division Force: Deployment dates were dependent upon a ROK National Assembly decision. Assuming that a favorable decision would be made by 15 August, it was estimated that the last element would close RVN approximately 5 November. However, if the ROK decision was unfavorable or too late, an additional US division would be required during the period contemplated for the ROK deployment.

3. Port of Saigon: Port capacity would be strained by the arrival of the 1st Infantry Division force. A ship sunk in the Saigon River would seriously delay schedules and it might be necessary to utilize the over-the-beach capacity at Vung Tau with a resultant delay.

4. Schedule Slippage: Lack of shipping or cargo handling facilities, enemy action or adverse weather conditions could induce unloading delays and port congestion. This might require diversion of forces or temporary delays in PACOM with associated deferrments in CONUS.

The program as submitted to the JCS was a joint product of agreement by the commands and agencies participating in the conference, and CINCPAC considered that it would meet an urgent requirement for a basic document for coordination. He noted, however, that it should be maintained in a current status as the situation changed.

CINCPAC's recommendation was that a total of thirty-four US and ten Allied maneuver battalions be in RVN by the end of 1965. The total number of US personnel recommended for deployment to SVN was 206,906 and the Free World Military Assistance Forces (non-RVNAF) would total 21,104 personnel. Deployments recommended to areas other than RVN totaled 50,961 US personnel. Grand total: 300,115 personnel.[1]

Subsequently, on 23 August, the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense most of the major force deployments proposed by CINCPAC's program. Deployment of an army brigade force to Thailand was not recommended, however, on the premise that it was not politically and militarily desirable at the time. Other exceptions including deferring,

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000259 of 6 Aug 65 (TS)

for further study, action regarding certain units which were not in the approved active force structure or which were committed to other priority areas.[1]

September - October Planning

Shortly after termination of the August conference, CINCPAC issued preliminary guidance for later planning conferences at Saigon and Honolulu. These were to address the force requirements for the next stage of operations when the military offensive would be resumed and pacification measures reinstituted in high priority areas in RVN.[2, 3] The purpose of the Saigon conference was to develop COMUSMACV's concept of operations, basic undertakings and courses of action, force requirements, and phasing for the RVN. During the later conference in Hawaii CINCPAC was to develop his plans for all of Southeast Asia and for WESTPAC. Afterward CINCPAC would submit his recommendations to the JCS.[4]

Concept , COMUSMACV: Following a 1-10 September Saigon conference, General Westmoreland submitted his concept and supporting trooplist for the next phase of operations against the Viet Cong.[5]

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1. JCSM-643 of 23 Aug 65 (TS) CPRS 000489-65
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 290143Z Aug 65 (TS)
3. For the purposes of discussing these conferences the following definitions apply:
   Phase I. Forces to halt the VC offensive and stem the tide. Tasks: Defense of major bases; defense of minor bases; reserve/reaction and offensive operations; security of province capitals and critical areas. Termination of Phase I was arbitrarily set for 31 December 1965.
   Phase II. Additional forces to resume the military offensive and to reinstitute pacification measures in high priority areas where this would be highly visible, plus additional reserve/reaction forces required for their support. For planning purposes, Phase II embraced the period 1 January 1966 to 30 June 1966 inclusive.
   Phase III. Additional forces in the RVN to defeat the remaining organized VC units and to pacify the country. Phase III was arbitrarily defined as beginning 1 July 1966.
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 290143Z Aug 65 (TS)
5. COMUSMACV ltr ser 12315 Subj: MACV Phase II Force Requirements (C) 18 Sept 65 (TS) .

[redacted]

The objective, General Westmoreland stated, was to assist the GVN to defeat the Viet Cong and to extend government control over all of South Vietnam. He noted that it was not possible to predict the precise level and scope of military operations necessary to achieve the objective. However, his analysis of the objectives indicated certain conditions would be prerequisite to achieving the goal, and he thought fairly precise US force levels could be associated with these. The first condition (Phase I) was to stop losing; the second condition, a logical extension and improvement of the military situation established in Phase I, would be to start winning (Phase II).

He considered that when viewed as an integrated whole, the following tasks offered promise of convincing the Viet Cong that military victory was impossible and would provide a tangible framework for the development of an operational concept:

1. Successfully defend all important areas.
2. Frustrate Viet Cong strategy.
3. Open or control selected portions of important roads.
4. Destroy Viet Cong forces and organizational structure in selected areas.
5. Destroy selected Viet Cong base areas, or render portions of them untenable.
6. Expand control in selected important areas.

In his concept of operations, General Westmoreland noted that the transition between phases would be gradual and would amount to a shift of emphasis rather than a change in direction. He recognized that Phase I was strategically defensive but that it would employ offensive tactical operations. The US and other forces would secure substantial areas for operational and logistic bases which would be oriented on the main population centers along the coastal plain and around Saigon. Presence of US forces in these bases would, he thought, provide absolute control of the base areas and military domination in contiguous areas. They would also provide defense of other critical locations through participation in reaction operations and by opening and controlling of vulnerable portions of main communication arteries.

[redacted]

US forces would further provide for offensive operations into Viet Cong war zones and for frustration of Viet Cong efforts to consolidate and join these havens. He visualized that US forces would periodically conduct operations from advanced bases in the areas adjacent to Kontum, Pleiku, Cheo Reo, Ban Me Thout and others. He did not anticipate that US troops would remain permanently in these areas but their operations would help create conditions under which progress might be made by the RVN.

During Phase II General Westmoreland would retain the tactical offensive and shift, in a strategic sense, into a sustained offensive. Military control would be extended over the areas contiguous to the bases which had been subjected to military domination in Phase I. This would extend protection around the populated areas and permit deliberate and meaningful pacification efforts by the RVN. Forrays from the base areas would be more frequent and include more territory than in Phase I. The weight of offensive operations would be placed against the VC bases which most directly threatened the priority pacification efforts of ARVN.

In summing up his concept, General Westmoreland stated that the tasks would be accomplished along two avenues of approach that were central to the concept of operations.[1] These were:

1. The steady expansion of the area subject to absolute military control - and within which the pacification effort of GVN could encompass the majority of the Vietnamese population.

2. The selective but relentless application of force, including sustained air attacks, leading to disruption and destruction of VC main force units.

Additional Force Requirement (Phase I Add-ons): Determining the additional forces required to recover the military initiative from the Viet Cong was the first action completed during the October conference. The additional force requirement was submitted by letter on 5 October, after coordination in Saigon and elsewhere, and totaled 19,954 personnel.

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1. COMUSMACV ltr ser 12315 Subj: MACV Phase II Force Requirements (C) 18 Sep 65 (TS)

[redacted]

These additions were believed necessary: to complement the force level in South Vietnam; to provide the essential combat and combat service support; to provide the command and control elements for numerous small units; to provide an enlarged offshore base capability necessary to support the combat efforts in Vietnam; to provide a logistic support capability for US forces in Thailand and to provide a means of supporting existing combat operations launched from that country.[1]

CINCPAC Concept: As a partial response to the JCS requirement of 25 August[2] CINCPAC submitted a concept that included the US objectives and military tasks in Southeast Asia, and the objectives and tasks of US forces which supported operations from bases in the Philippines, Okinawa, Taiwan, Guam and Japan.[3]

First, CINCPAC noted that the purpose of operations and related deployments was to aid the national objective of terminating the war in South Vietnam under conditions satisfactory to the US and GVN. This, he stated, would include causing NVN to cease its direction and support of the Viet Cong insurgency; and defeating the Viet Cong and extending GVN control over all the Republic of Vietnam.

In broad terms, CINCPAC listed the essential military measures that would achieve these objectives. These were:

1. Conduct offensive operations to seize and hold the initiative in the Republic of Vietnam.

2. Intensify action against ground infiltration through Laos and Cambodia.

3. Intensify action against waterborne infiltration.

4. Improve the PACOM posture to deter direct CHICOM intervention.

5. Increase the scale, scope and intensity of air and naval operations against the DRV.

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000345Z 5 Oct 65 (TS)
2. JCS 9143/252211Z Aug 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 000347 of 7 Oct 65 (TS)

[redacted]

CINCPAC's general concept visualized a continuation of combat operations by PACOM forces against the enemy in Southeast Asia in conformance with US strategy and guidelines. Military operations would be conducted in concert with appropriate political, economic and social programs; and combat operations would be mounted and supported from South Vietnam, the South China Sea and Thailand. Strategic Air Command forces would continue to conduct supporting combat operations in South Vietnam and be prepared to strike targets in North Vietnam. While additional forces were deployed and conducted or prepared to conduct combat and combat supporting operations, a US logistic build-up in Thailand would improve the US posture in case of direct CHICOM aggression. During this period a balanced force posture would be maintained to deter direct CHICOM intervention.

PACOM forces would conduct operations in coordination with the armed forces of the Government of Vietnam, Royal Thai Government and the Royal Laotian Government. Under the operational control of COMUSMACV, US and FWMAF in RVN would participate in these operations. CINCPAC, through his subordinate commanders, would execute these operations in consonance with the forces, support and general policy guidance provided to him by the JCS.

The role of US military forces in SVN was defined as that of assisting the people, government, and Armed Forces of the RVN in winning their war against internal subversion and externally supported insurgency. COMUSMACV forces would contribute to GVN military operations in advisory and assistance roles and through active combat operations by US forces. US forces would also provide security and, in cooperation with other US agencies, assist the GVN in executing the country pacification plan.

If the Viet Cong operated in large formations, US forces with RVNAF would find, fix and destroy them. If the Viet Cong reverted to deliberate small actions or guerrilla warfare only, US forces in coordination with the RVNAF would give emphasis to clearing, securing and pacifying areas as fast as circumstances and capabilities permitted.


MILITARY CONTROL
US/THIRD COUNTRY BASE
VC BASE AREA
OFFENSIVE OPERATION
QUANG TRI
HUE
DANANG
QUANG NGAI
KONTUM
PLEIKU
QUI NHON
BAN ME THUOT
NHA TRANG
DALAT
PHAN RANG
PHAN THIET
BIEN HOA
SAIGON
VUNG TAU
MY THO
CAN THO
RACH GIA
SOC TRANG
BAC LIEU
CONCEPT
PHASE I
SOUTH VIETNAM
SOURCE: CINCPAC ltr ser 000347
of 7 OCT 65(TS)


CONCEPT
PHASE II
SOUTH VIETNAM
SOURCE: CINCPAC ltr ser 000347
of 7 OCT 65(TS)
QUANG TRI
HUE
DANANG
QUANG NGAI
XXX
II
KONTUM
PLEIKU
QUI NHON
BAN ME THUOT
NHA TRANG
DALAT
PHAN RANG
NINH
XXX
III
BIEN HOA
SAIGON
PHAN THIET
XXX
IV
VUNG TAU
MY THO
RACH GIA
CAN THO
SOC TRANG
MAU
BAC LIEU
MILITARY CONTROL
US/THIRD COUNTRY BASE
VC BASE AREA
OFFENSIVE OPERATION

[redacted]

In this case the VC would either come out and fight or lose control of substantial areas. In either case US forces would contribute to the basic tasks of destroying the VC and assisting the extension of GVN control over the nation.

Control of population and resources was termed essential to success in countering guerrilla warfare. In this regard CINCPAC identified the areas of greatest military significance as: the Saigon area and the Mekong Delta; the coastal plain; and the central highlands. Noting that it was imperative that friendly forces have the support of the people in these areas, CINCPAC stated it was particularly important that the GVN gain control of the rice producing areas so the people could be fed and so the VC would have to import or fight for their own food.

A paramount requirement to achieve this was a series of secure bases and secure lines of communications to key localities along the sea coast, in the Mekong Delta and elsewhere. From these bases and over the lines of communication, offensive operations could be launched and sustained to enlarge and expand the secure areas.

If reasonably attainable with available forces, the population would be given security and food resources would be controlled by clearing the VC from the area, and the area then protected and secured. The GVN, assisted by US forces, would consolidate the gains achieved, develop the area, and expand it.

When area control was not reasonably attainable or if the GVN was not yet ready or able to initiate pacification measures, the objective of military operations would be to deny the VC access to secure bases, communications, manufacturing facilities, and sources of food. Additionally, offensive operations would be conducted in nominally VC controlled areas. US operations would be coordinated with GVN efforts to improve the GVN standing with, and control over, its people as well as to stimulate improved battle performance by RVNAF. A key function of US forces would be to sustain the momentum already achieved.

[redacted]

[redacted]

The above operations would be directed toward gaining control of the population and resources of South Vietnam. Concurrent actions would be directed toward the destruction of Viet Cong main force units and bases. This would require improved intelligence to guide the effort, adequate forces to sustain offensive operations, and sufficient GVN controlled areas to inhibit the VC freedom of action. A significant feature of the concept was the prominence of civic actions by US combat and combat support forces even though GVN agencies might not contribute. [1]

The concept for operations against North Vietnam envisioned air, naval and special operations within the country and in the adjacent coastal waters to cause the government to cease its direction and support of the insurgency in the RVN. Air forces from both land and sea bases would progressively destroy the GNVN war supporting power. Naval patrol aircraft, surface ships and strike aircraft would detect and destroy or immobilize confirmed and designated enemy military seaborne traffic. Special operations would restrict the movement of military supplies along the DRV coast north of 17°. Special boats and crews with air support would stop and sink ships with military cargo and capture the crews for psychological/intelligence exploitation. Other special operations would develop a tribal resistance potential in northwestern NVN.

Additionally, preparations would be made to destroy the vital targets within NVN, to mine the coastal and inland waterways, and to conduct operations against NVN/CHICOM forces in the event of "overt" aggression.

The objectives of these operations were: to make it as difficult and costly as possible for NVN to direct and support the VC in SVN; to convince the leaders of the GNVN that US determination and staying power was greater than their own; to convince the GNVN that they would eventually be defeated in South Vietnam; to create a feeling of pessimism

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1. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV concepts were briefed to Secretary McNamara and the JCS on 18 Oct. See NNCC Telecon 242145Z Oct 65 (TS)

[redacted]

and helplessness among the military and civilians forces and civilians of NVN; to turn NVN attention inward by presenting the government and the military officials with an ever-growing management problem; and to reduce the NVN capability for overt intervention in South Vietnam.

The concept for US operations against the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh forces in Laos was primarily one of continuing the actions under way. It featured US forces based in the South China Sea, Thailand, and SVN conducting air operations against fixed military targets and lines of communication. Day and night reconnaissance would continue to provide intelligence in support of Friendly Laotian Forces (FLF) and US operations. Also, intelligence teams consisting of RVN and US Special Forces personnel would operate in the Southern panhandle region of Laos adjacent to the SVN border. These operations would be selectively and gradually increased to develop a guerrilla force sufficiently strong to interdict communist LOC along the SVN/Laos border and to harass the enemy.

The foregoing operations in Laos would have the following objectives:

1. Reduce communist military incursion into selected buffer areas in Laos.
2. Reduce the GNVN capability to direct and support the insurgency in South Vietnam.
3. Reduce the effectiveness of the VC supporting base in Cambodia.
4. Improve the military posture of friendly Laotian forces.
5. Demonstrate to the people and government of Laos a US interest in their security.
6. Reduce the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh effectiveness.

The concept of operations for US forces based in Thailand was: to continue air operations against communist forces in NVN and Laos; to develop a base structure to support US operations in Thailand; to plan counterinsurgency operations in coordination with the Royal Thai Armed Forces and to achieve an improved air defense system. As in RVN, special operations from Thai bases into Laos were to be executed to reduce enemy infiltration into RVN. It was expected that the initial

operations would concentrate on gathering intelligence and that early effort would be exerted to resurrect the guerrilla movement started in the Bolovens area in 1962.

The objectives of these operations were to reduce the GNVN capability to direct and support insurgency in South Vietnam and Laos; to improve the US/Thai military posture; to achieve a build-up in Thailand to facilitate expeditious deployment of major US forces to Thailand; and to deter direct CHICOM intervention.

Under CINCPAC's concept the logistical support and rear echelon maintenance facilities for forward based ground, air, and sea forces would be provided from the Philippines, Okinawa, Guam, and Japan.

Specifically, US forces based in the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, and Korea would continue operations and offshore combat service support for forces committed to the Western Pacific and mainland Southeast Asia. CINCPAC component commanders, within their area of responsibility would ensure:

1. Continued and improved utilization of Clark, Mactan and Subic Bay as operational logistic support bases.

2. Continued and improved utilization of Taiwan, Okinawa, and Korea as an operational and logistic support base.

3. Continued operation of established operational and logistic facilities on Guam, and provision of combat and logistic support to US forces committed to the Western Pacific.

4. Continued and improved utilization of Japanese bases as operational and logistic bases in Japan.

Strategic Air Command would bomb suitable targets in South Vietnam as requested by COMUSMACV and approved by CINCPAC and the JCS. Additionally, US forces would maintain a high state of readiness and operational capability as a means of deterring overt Communist Chinese aggression. Strategic Air Command forces would also be prepared to attack designated targets in North Vietnam, and would augment the strike capability of PACAF and PACFLT forces as required.

[redacted]

Analysis of Force Capability (Phase I, Phase II): On analysis CINCPAC concluded that additional US forces were required to execute some of the specific tasks that would achieve the US objectives in Southeast Asia.[1] Major additional force deployments and their purpose were as follows:

1. Eight-inch gun cruiser: required to maintain a capability to perform naval shore bombardment in North Vietnam in addition to increased NGF missions in South Vietnam.

2. Combat service support units in Thailand to provide the nucleus of a US logistics system that would permit deployment of combat elements and their support troops when required.

3. Air Commando elements to support expanded program to train the Thai and Laotian air forces in counterinsurgency operations.

4. Twenty-eight maneuver battalions to provide a capability to conduct offensive operations while the US bases and lines of communications were secured. This force was considered essential to expand, enlarge, and connect the secure areas; also to aid the GVN in expanding its control over major political, economic, and population centers, and in aiding the RVNAF in regaining the military initiative. This force could achieve and maintain an accelerated rural construction program in RVN, assist the GVN in gaining and maintaining control and developing key population/food-producing areas, open about 60 per cent of the critical highways and about 65 per cent of the railroad mileage needed to sustain US forces and facilitate their operations. It was needed to restore and develop the economic and political organization of South Vietnam and to support a sustained ground effort aiming at the destruction of VC base areas and forces.

5. Four combat air squadrons to satisfy sortie requirements of the maneuver battalions.

6. Thirty SWIFT[2] craft and 9 WPB to achieve an estimated 20 per cent attrition of possible infiltrators or Viet Cong coastal traffic.

Part of CINCPAC's report of the October planning conference[3] was a graphic portrayal of the percentage of various MACV tasks which

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000347 of 7 Oct 65 (TS); JCSM-811-65 of 10 Nov 65 (TS)
2. See "Surface Naval Operations" in this chapter.
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 000347 of 7 Oct 65 (TS)

[redacted]

had been accomplished by Phase I forces and the approximate percentage which could be achieved using Phase II forces. This comparison was later forwarded, unchanged, by the JCS to Secretary McNamara.[1]

Momentum, the Most Important Ingredient: In reporting the results of the Honolulu conference,[2] CINCPAC emphasized the primacy of "momentum" and pointed out that there was a clear and unmistakable surge of confidence and enthusiasm in South Vietnam and that it apparently stemmed from the presence and performance of US forces. He thought that the people of South Vietnam were beginning to gain some hope of getting security as a result of the US forces commitment in their country. This hope, a fragile and intangible feeling, represented perhaps the most important ingredient required for victory; and CINCPAC warned that it might be lost if the US effort was permitted to bog down. He therefore considered that a "plateau" in the level of effort would increase US political vulnerability and might lead to the loss of the real battle for South Vietnam.

Action by JCS: On 10 November the JCS forwarded to the Secretary of Defense a concept which was, in effect, a condensation of CINCPAC's proposal.[3] They also stated that air operations against North Vietnam should be immediately and dramatically accelerated to leave no doubt that the US intended to win and achieve a level of destruction which the DRV would find unacceptable. The JCS further proposed that a follow-up air program of increasing pressure was necessary and at a significantly higher level than the existing ROLLING THUNDER program.

Additionally, the JCS proposed to the Secretary of Defense the main features of CINCPAC's concept for integrating the operations of RVN military and para military/security forces with operations of other national forces deployed in South Vietnam.[4] The overall JCS concept

1. JCSM-811-65 of 10 Nov 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 000347 of 7 Oct 65 (TS)
3. JCSM-811-65 of 10 Nov 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 022214Z Nov 65 (C)

[redacted]

visualized employing RVNAF, US and other national forces for the basic mission of search and destroy, and for participation in clear and secure operations and civic action as well as the defense of government centers and critical installations.

To meet the CINCPAC desired Phase II closure dates, the JCS requested early authority to call up selected reserve units and individuals, to activate new units, and to extend terms of service.[1]

Planning Status, End of Year

Following a 28-29 November Secretary of Defense conference in Saigon and a deployment planning conference at Camp H. M. Smith,[2] Admiral Sharp submitted, on 16 December 1965, his force requirements for CY 1966. At the same time he provided a deployment priority list, by quarter, which included all forces not deployed to Southeast Asia or WESTPAC whether they had been originally scheduled as Phase I, Phase 1 add-on or Phase II forces.[3]

The program indicated a total of 101 US/Allied maneuver battalions[4] in RVN by the end of 1966. It also incorporated the Secretary of Defense decision to close two brigades of the 25th Infantry Division (one to Pleiku and one to Saigon) in January 1966 and the balance of the division in April 1966; and to close the 1st Marine Division (-) by the end of March. CINCPAC noted that deployment of the 25th Division would fully commit the PACOM reserve of Army forces, and he proposed an additional Army force of ten maneuver battalions to close PACOM by June. To preserve a Marine contingency force in PACOM he indicated that an additional RLT, not then in PACOM, should be deployed to Okinawa concurrent with the deployment of the last 1st Marine Division RLT (3 BLTs) from Okinawa to RVN.

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1. JCSM-811-65 of 10 November 65 (TS); CINCPAC J5 Brief #58
2. JCS 7699/022247Z Dec 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 000473 of 16 Dec 65 (TS)
4. "Maneuver battalion" defined as applying to infantry (including airmobile and airborne infantry) battalions, tank and mechanized battalions and armored cavalry squadrons only.

[redacted]

[redacted]

The planned 1966 force increase and dispositions at the end of CY 66 are portrayed in the following illustrations.



Other developments related to recommendations for future operations included deployment of an advance party of the 25th Division to South Vietnam in December. This seemed to portend an increasing campaign against enemy forces within South Vietnam.

Air strikes against North Vietnam territory were suspended after 24 December as part of the United States effort to test communist willingness to engage in negotiations. At the end of the year there was doubt as to when, if at all, these operations might be resumed. Taking advantage of this bonus offering, the GNVN mustered all resources to expedite infiltration of men, supplies and equipment and to improve their LOC capabilities for further support of their forces in South Vietnam.

[redacted]

[redacted]

II A FORCE REQUIREMENTS – RVN

CY 66 FORCES FOR OTHER THAN RVN:

PHASE I PACOM - 43,562

PHASE II & II A: THAILAND, JAPAN, OKINAWA, GUAM, PHILIPPINES = 63,904

{ ABOUT 75% OF EFFORT HERE IS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF WAR IN SE ASIA

PHASE II & II A: PACOM RESERVE ARMY & MARINE FORCES = 61,656

TOTAL: 169,060

CY 66 GRAND TOTAL: 654,926

US/ALLIED

GROUND – 101 Bns – 11 DIV EQUIV

AIR – 35 TAC SQ (AIR FORCE - 25 TAC SQ; MARINE - 10 TAC SQ)

TOTAL STRENGTH - 485,804

(US - 441,150; ALLIED - 44,654)

No. OF TRP's 200,000

AIR: AF - 12 TFS; MAR - 7 TAC SQ

IN RVN - AS OF 20 JAN

I CTZ
- III MAF
- 3RD MAR DIV (-)(+) - 14 1/3 BNS (INCL 1 1/3 TK BN)

II CTZ
- HQ, FIELD FORCE VN
- 1ST CAV DIV - 8 BNS
- ROK CAPITOL DIV - 6 BNS
- BDE, 101ST ABN DIV - 3 BNS
- 2ND ROK MAR BDE - 3 BNS
- BDE, 25TH INF DIV - 3 BNS

III CTZ
- 1ST BN RAR (AUSSY) - 1 BN
- 173RD ABN BDE - 2 BNS
- 1ST INF DIV - 9 BNS
- BDE, 25TH INF DIV - 3 BNS

TOTAL: 52 1/3 BNS

FEB
- AF - 1 TFS - DANANG - 30 JAN
- AF - 1 TFS - CAM RANH BAY - 25 JAN

MAR
- MAR - 1 BN
- ARMY - 1 BN FOR 173RD ABN BDE

APR
- ARMY - 25TH INF DIV (-)(3 BNS)
- MAR - 1 BN
- ROK - 1 RCT (3 BNS)

MAY
- HQ II FIELD FORCE VN
- MAR - 1 1/3 BNS AND 1 TAC SQ.
- ARMY - SEP TANK BN
- AUSSY - 1 BN
- AF - 1 TFS - PHAN RANG - 15 MARCH

JUN
- MAR - 1 BN
- AF - 2 TFS - TUY HOA
- ROK - 1 RCT (3 BNS)

JUL
- ARMY - ARMD CAV REGT (3 BNS)
- 4TH INF DIV (-) (6 BNS)
- 1 BN FOR 1ST CAV DIV
- ROK - 1 RCT (3 BNS)
- AF - 1 TFS - TUY HOA
- 1 TFS - BASE "Y"

AUG
- ARMY - BDE, 4TH INF DIV (3 BNS)
- MAR - 1 1/3 BNS
- 2 TAC SQ
- ROK - 1 RCT (3 BNS)

SEP
- AF - 2 TFS BASE "Y"

OCT
- AF - 1 TFS BASE "Z"

NOV
- ARMY - "Z" INF DIV (9 BNS)

31 DEC 66
- ARMY - SEP INF BDE (3 BNS)
- AF - 2 TFS - BASE "Z"
- AF - 1 TFS PHAN RANG

LEGEND: US; ROK; AUSSY N Z

CY 66

US/ALLIED MANEUVER FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
ANTICIPATED DISPOSITIONS

END CY 66



★ DURING FIRST PART OF YEAR A BRIGADE OF THE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION WILL BE AT PLEIKU. THIS BRIGADE WILL RETURN TO 25TH DIVISION IN III CTZ. IT WILL BE REPLACED BY A BRIGADE OF 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION OR A SEPARATE INFANTRY BRIGADE.. BATTALIONS IN BRIGADE AT PLEIKU ARE INCLUDED IN TOTAL FOR PARENT UNIT.

CINCPAC Ser: 000473 of 16 Dec 65(TS)

SECTION B - CHANGES IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS, SOUTHEAST ASIA

Throughout 1965 the US command structure for Southeast Asia was modified to meet requirements of the expanding involvement in operations. The following list of changes is arranged chronologically and discusses only the most significant actions: (U)

Contingency Planning for Laos: COMUSMACTHAI was vested with responsibility for certain residual planning for Laos. Accordingly, CINCPAC approved his request for permission to task Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand with specific planning functions in military assistance and operational matters.[1] (S)

Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand subsequently requested a review of his over-all responsibility for planning in view of his limited staff and primary responsibility in other matters.[2] CINCPAC advised him that planning functions involving military assistance support to friendly Laotian forces, and estimates for additional US advisory personnel should be undertaken by Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand as arranged by COMUSMACTHAI in his OPLAN. Planning functions involving commitment of US combat, combat support and combat service support units in Laos should be prepared by COMUSMACTHAI, utilizing appropriate recommendations from Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand.[3] (S)

Naval Component Commander--Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force: Major General W. R. Collins, USMC was designated Naval Component Commander for COMUSMACV on 6 May. On the same date the III Marine Amphibious Force, consisting of Third Marine Division/First Marine Air Wing elements, was established ashore at Danang with General Collins as Commanding General.

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 000569/130545Z Jul 64 (TS)
2. DEPCHJUSMACTHAI 0021-64/030845Z Dec 64 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 120230Z Feb 65 (S)

[redacted]

Deputy Commander for Air Operations: Major General Joseph H. Moore, USAF was assigned on 25 June as COMUSMACV's Deputy Commander for Air Operations in the grade of Lieutenant General. General Moore also commanded 2d Air Division.[1]

Separation of COMUSMACV/COMUSMACTHAI: The positions of COMUSMACV/COMUSMACTHAI were quietly separated on 10 July when Major General Ernest F. Easterbrook, USA, Chief Joint United States Military Advisory Group Thailand assumed additional duties as COMUSMACTHAI. This action provided a politically acceptable atmosphere for US force deployments into Thailand, and it tended to satisfy long standing Thai objections to the previous arrangements. Major General Richard G. Stilwell, former Chief of Staff for COMUSMACV, replaced General Easterbrook in August.[2]

Activation of US Army, Vietnam: In consideration of the imminent deployment of brigade and larger size Army elements, CINCUSARPAC proposed that US Army Support Command, Vietnam (USARSCV) be redesignated as US Army, Vietnam (USARV). CINCPAC concurred, and on 20 July Brigadier General John Norton became Deputy, CGUSARV with headquarters of Tan Son Nhut. General Westmoreland became CGUSARV, and the new command reported direct to CINCUSARPAC. General Westmoreland continued to exercise direct operational control and command over all US Army forces in South Vietnam.[3]

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1. JCS 002159/142228Z May 65 (S); CSAF 83318/252129Z Jun 65 (U)
2. CINCPAC 290608Z May 65 (TS); CINCPAC 091900Z Jul 65 (S)
3. CINCUSARPAC 13951/170226Z Jul 65 (TS); CINCPAC 180208Z Jul 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Field Force Headquarters, Vietnam: In June the JCS directed CINCPAC to plan for the organization of a joint US Field Force Headquarters, South Vietnam. At CINCPAC's request COMUSMACV submitted his concept for immediate activation of a US Army Task Force Headquarters in the II Corps Tactical Zone, to be followed by establishment of a Field Force Headquarters two weeks before the arrival in RVN of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). CINCPAC concurred in the concept and recommended immediate deployment of personnel for the headquarters and for the necessary corps troops. In August, pending establishment of the Field Force Headquarters, Major General Stanley Larsen assumed command of US Army Task Force ALFA (US Army Task Force Headquarters).[1] USATFA was redesignated Field Forces Vietnam (FFORCEV) on 25 September, and CG, FFORCEV became Senior Advisor, II Corps at 210001H October.

Flag Officer as Chief, Naval Advisory Group, MACV: Rear Admiral N. B. Ward, USN, was assigned as Chief, Naval Advisory Group, MACV in preparation for the transfer of responsibility for anti-seaborne infiltration operations from CINCPACFLT to COMUSMACV on 30 July.

Consolidation of Headquarters USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI: COMUSMACTHAI requested authority, on 20 September, to consolidate the headquarters of USMACTHAI and JUSMAGTHAI. This merger, he stated, would be on a provisional basis and within existing personnel assets. Several days later CINCPAC requested COMUSMACTHAI to provide a comprehensive analysis and detailed rationale for (C)

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1. CINCPAC 160250Z June 65 (S); JCS 004561/242249Z Jun 65 (TS); CINCPAC 060555Z Jul 65 (TS); COMUSMACV 23438/080020Z Jul 65 (TS) CINCPAC 110437Z Jul 65 (TS); JCS 2343/632 of 19 July 1965 (S) CPRS 00313-65

[redacted]

disestablishing JUSMAGTHAI and merging its functions with USMACTHAI.[1] COMUSMACTHAI's response reached CINCPAC in November.[2] (C)

The key issue evolving during studies of the problem at CINCPAC Headquarters was identification of, and provision for, the Military Assistance Program function in the merged headquarters.

At the end of the year CINCPAC was considering a staff proposed organization which would ensure that the MAP functions would not be subordinated to the more glamorous planning and operational functions. (C

Air Force Command and Control Arrangements, Thailand: On 23 November CINCPACAF announced establishment of Deputy Commander 2/13 - Thailand (DEPCOM 2/13 - THAI) in Udorn as the single senior CINCPACAF representative in Thailand. DEPCOM 2/13 - THAI was to represent both Commander, 2d Air Division and Commander, 13th Air Force. (C)

The functions of DEPCOM 2/13 - THAI included those previously performed by Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division. The encumbent Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division assumed the position of DEPCOM 2/13 - THAI in December. (C)

Command and control arrangements provided that Commander, 2d Air Division would exercise operational control of CINCPACAF forces based in Thailand through the DEPCOM 2/13 - THAI; and that Commander, 13th Air Force would accomplish his support responsibilities in Thailand through DEPCOM 2/13 - THAI.[3] (C)

COMUSMACV Combat Operations Center (COC): COMUSMACV requested, on 11 November, authority to establish a COC within the USMACV organization under J3 supervision. The reasons cited were

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1. CINCPAC 251462Z Sep 65 (TS)
2. COMUSMACTHAI 030130Z Nov 65 (C)
3. CINCPACAF 232032Z Nov 65 (C)

the increased tempo of the war and the overall change in balance of forces; also plans for large increases in Marine and Army combat forces as well as the growing air effort.

The concept for the new staff element was approved by CINCPAC and he recommended that the JCS approve a Brigadier General, USMC to head the COC.[1] This was approved by the JCS on 17 December.[2]

Command Arrangements, Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (ROKFV): Early in December General Westmoreland recommended abandoning efforts to conclude a formal command arrangement agreement with General Chae, Commander ROKFV. His reasons were that a signed arrangement could be a source of political embarrassment and might place Commander ROKFV in a politically untenable position. General Westmoreland affirmed that complete agreement had been reached with General Chae on operational control of ROKFV, and although directives to ROK elements would be phrased as requests, the ROKs would honor them as directives.[3]

CINCPAC agreed with COMUSMACV; and to pave the way for participating in staff operations and in matters related to ROK forces, COMUSMACV was authorized to ask General Chae to place a few ROK officers on duty with FFORCEV. This arrangement was to be accomplished without raising the term "combined staff" or suggesting the assignment of ROK officers to the FFORCEV staff. These ROK representatives were to be designated as liaison personnel to minimize the possibility of interpreting the above arrangement as constituting a combined staff.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 270423Z Nov 65 (TS); CINCPAC 262011Z Nov 65 (TS)
2. JCS 8858/172121Z Dec 65 (S)
3. COMUSMACV 42909/070531Z Dec 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 150438Z Dec 65 (TS)

SECTION C - OPERATIONS, SOUTHEAST ASIA

United States air forces were engaged in limited combat operations in Southeast Asia at the beginning of the year. By mid-1965 the United States had committed major ground, air and naval forces against the enemy in Southeast Asia. These forces had engaged the enemy on the ground in South Vietnam; from the air in Laos, South Vietnam and North Vietnam; and from the sea in South Vietnam. (C)

This section describes CINCPAC's actions and decisions regarding the evolution of objectives, plans and policies applicable to these operations. The material is arranged in the following sequence: (C)

Air Operations in North Vietnam
Air Operations in Laos
US Air Support in RVN
Strategic Air Command B-52 Strikes in Southeast Asia
Photographic Reconnaissance
Naval Surface Operations

FLAMING DART 1:

By late January there was a widespread conviction that the absence of US response to VC/NVN attacks against US personnel and forces in South Vietnam (e.g., Bien Hoa and Brink BOQ) might be encouraging further anti-US incidents.[1] With this in mind, and in accord with procedures developed during 1964,[2] Admiral Sharp issued an operation order outlining reprisal air strikes which might be executed if a DESOTO patrol schedules for early February was attacked. The CINCPAC Operation Order was nicknamed FLAMING DART[3] and specified the following:

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1. JCSM-70-65 of 29 Jan 65 (TS) CPRS 00055-65
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1964, pp. 380-381
3. CINCPAC 040014Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPAC 280254Z Jan 65 (TS); CINCPACFLT 290427Z Jan 65 (S)

FLAMING DART TARGET OPTIONS[4]

OPTION 1:

Tgt No.	Name	Strike	Flak/CAP	Command
33	Don Hoi Bks	24	16	CINCPACFLT
36	Vit Thu Lu Army Bks	24	12	CINCPACFLT
39	Chap Le Bks	40	16	CINCPACAF

OPTION 2: (Included Option 1 targets plus:)

Tgt No.	Name	Strike	Flak/CAP	Command
24	Cham Hoa Bks	28	24	CINCPACFLT
32	Vu Con Bks	10	12	CINCPACAF

OPTION 3: (Included Options 1 and 2 targets plus:)

Tgt No.	Name	Strike	Flak/CAP	Command
14	Than Hoa Bridge	32	16	CINCPACAF
74	Quang Khe Naval Base	22	6	CINCPACFLT

The February DESOTO patrol was first deferred and then cancelled because the planned date, 7 February, would coincide with the visit of one of the USSR's highest officials. Alexi N. Kosygin, to Hanoi.[2] Accordingly, two of the three aircraft carriers positioned in the South China Sea to provide FLAMING DART forces turned toward Subic to await further orders.[3]

Within hours after release of this force the Viet Cong attacked US billets and forces in the vicinity of Pleiku (061800Z Feb) leaving 7 dead and 109 wounded Americans. This was one of the first of a series of VC attacks timed to coincide with Kosygin's visit.

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1. CINCPAC 040014Z Feb 65 (TS)
2. JCS 004612/042117Z Feb 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 060220Z Feb 65 (TS)

CINCPAC immediately directed CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF to place their forces in the readiness posture they had so recently relaxed.[1] The aircraft carriers CORAL SEA (CVA 43) and HANCOCK (CVA 19) turned their course from Subic and steamed back toward the South China Sea at 25 knots.[2] Shortly, CINCPAC placed PACAF elements based in mainland Southeast Asia under CINCPACAF operational control and alerted his air and naval component commanders to be prepared to execute FLAMING DART.[3] Admiral Sharp then informed the JCS that his forces would be ready to execute either Option 1 or 2 on 7 February (Saigon date) if the order was received by 071200H; and he recommended Option 2 as appropriate retaliation.[4]

The JCS execute order, however, specified Option 1 plus a VNAF/FARM GATE strike at Vu Con Barracks.[5] CINCPAC's execute order specified that a simultaneous 070700Z TOT was desired for US forces; with a VNAF/FARM GATE TOT as close as practicable.[6] The HANCOCK strike on Don Hoi Barracks was successful,[7] but the other strikes were not completed because of weather conditions.[8]

With the reprisal thus launched, force augmentations were undertaken to deter or counter NVN/CHICOM reaction.[9] One battery of USMC light anti-aircraft missiles (LAAM) was ordered to move by airlift from Okinawa to RVN to protect the Danang airfield. The balance of the battalion was to follow by sealift.[10] Additionally, the 173d

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1. CINCPAC 062049Z Feb 65 (S); CINCPAC 062352Z Feb 65 (S)
2. CINCPACFLT 062051Z Feb 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 062309Z Feb 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 062350Z Feb 65 (TS)
5. JCS 004753/062336Z Feb 65 (TS) CINCPAC 070055Z Feb 65 (S)
6. CINCPAC 070300Z Feb 65 (S)
7. CTG 77.7/070328Z Feb 65 (S)
8. CINCPAC 080139Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPACAF 070729Z Feb 64 (S); CTG 77.4/070813Z Feb 64 (TS)
9. JCS 2339/152-1 of 9 Nov 64 (TS)
10. On 4 Jan CINCPAC had recommended this deployment. CINCPAC 042050Z Jan 65 (TS)

[redacted]

Airborne Brigade was alerted to move by air from Okinawa to Tan Son Nhut.[1] Augmentation forces from CONUS included: two tactical fighter squadrons to Kadena; one tactical fighter squadron each for Yokota and Clark Field; a C-120 squadron to Okinawa; a C-124 squadron for Tachikawa; reconnaissance aircraft elements to Kadena and Tan Son Nhut; and a terminal service company for Bangkok. Additionally, the JCS approved deployment of an amphibious assault ship (LPH) from CINCLANT to CINCPAC.[2]

The ashes at Dong Hoi Barracks were still warm when Admiral Sharp suggested to the JCS a series of additional actions to increase the military pressure against NVN. He proposed that US aircraft be authorized to participate on a continuing basis with the VNAF against Viet Cong within South Vietnam. He also proposed to include direct support of friendly air and ground operations in the tasking of US air operations in Laos.

Additionally, CINCPAC recommended frequent DESOTO patrols to place the communists on the defensive in their home grounds. Another proposal was for fighter escorted photographic reconnaissance missions in the southern portion of NVN. CINCPAC further suggested that, after an assessment of the communist response to the above moves, US/VNAF reconnaissance should begin to penetrate NVN. These incursions, shallow at least at the outset, should be profitable military operations; more important, he thought this would make communists take note of the purpose of BARREL ROLL.[3]

Admiral Sharp thought these actions would be profitable from the political and militarystandpoint without binding the US to a course of action that had to be concluded swiftly in partnership with the existing government of South Vietnam.[4]

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1. JCS 04760/070531Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPAC 072041Z Feb 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 070925Z Feb 65 (TS); JCS 004768/071808Z Feb 65 (TS); JCS 004769/071809Z Feb 65 (TS)
3. BARREL ROLL is discussed later in this section. CINCPAC 07 071035Z Feb 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 071035Z Feb 65 (TS); This recommendation reiterated several features of a 1964 CINCPAC proposal. CINCPAC Command History, 1964, pp. 384-385.

[redacted]

[redacted]

In a separate action, Admiral Sharp pressed for completion of the FLAMING DART operation which had been interrupted by adverse weather. While admitting that additional strikes could be interpreted by the communists as a US bid to broaden the war, he thought it was more likely that they would correctly view them as the completion of reprisal action for the Pleiku incident.[1] The JCS soon informed CINCPAC that further air strikes by US forces was not favorably considered.

When Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and General Westmoreland further emphasized the overriding importance of VNAF participation in the reprisal action[2, 3] the JCS authorized a strike with VNAF resources against Vu Con Barracks, with Chap Le Barracks as a weather alternate.[4]

The VNAF, in association with US pathfinder,[5] flak suppression, and other forces executed a successful strike against Chap Le Barracks with 24 AlHs.[6] A key issue in the decision to permit US assistance to the VNAF during this operation was the strong desire for a successful VNAF first strike.[7] CINCPAC commended both the VNAF and the US personnel who had helped train them.[8] It is significant that CINCPAC gave verbal approval for participating FARM GATE Als to use US aircraft markings for this strike. This was subsequently confirmed in a message to CINCPACAF AND COMUSMACV.[9]

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1. CINCPAC 071040 Feb 65 (TS); CINCPAC 042216Z Feb 65 (TS)
2. COMUSMACV 3739/071321Z Feb 65 (TS)
3. General enthusiasm of RVN officials toward VNAF participation in the reprisal is detailed in SAIGON 2427 to STATE 7 PM 7 Feb 65 (TS) and CINCPACAF DOCOS 0039/071853Z Feb 65 (TS)
4. JCS 0004764/071459Z (TS); CINCPAC 071630 Feb 65 (TS)
5. COMUSMACV 4215/101727Z Feb 65 (TS)
6. 2d A Div 081525Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPAC 081036Z Feb 65 (TS)
7. JCS 004764/071459Z Feb 65 (TS)
8. CINCPAC 090022Z Feb 65 (U); CINCPAC 090018Z Feb 65 (U)
9. CINCPAC 100335Z Feb 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

FLAMING DART 2

At 101205Z February the VC bombed a hotel used as an enlisted billet at Qui Nhon. The initial report of American casualties listed 1 dead, 15 wounded, and 26 men buried in the rubble. Admiral Sharp immediately recommended a prompt and emphatic retaliation, consisting of the full range of FLAMING DART Option 3 actions. He also proposed that the VNAF be used to strike Vu Con Barracks.[1] Ambassador Taylor and COMUSMACV were in general agreement with CINCPAC's views.[2]

In a little more than an hour after CINCPAC's recommendation was prepared, the JCS issued a warning order directing Admiral Sharp to be prepared to conduct coordinated attacks during daylight hours on 11 February (Saigon time). The primary targets for US forces were Thanh Hoa Bridge and Chanh Hoa Barracks; VNAF was to strike Vu Con Barracks. Weather alternates for each target were specified. The VNAF was again authorized flak suppression and other support by US elements. FARM GATE pathfinders were authorized, but it was specified that only VNAF pilots would execute the strike on Vu Con Barracks.[3] CINCPAC assigned Chan Hoa Barracks to CINCPACFLT and Thanh Hoa Bridge to CINCPACAF.

He also directed COMUSMACV to prepare the plan for a VNAF strike on Vu Con Barracks with a weather alternate of Vit Thu Lu Barracks. COMUSMACV was cautioned to exclude GVN/VNAF officials from the planning process until the inclusion of this strike in retaliation, "if directed."[4] This procedure honored the JCS admonishment to exercise extreme care to preclude jeopardizing the mission during coordination with GVN/VNAF.[5] Admiral Sharp also raised the PACOM forces readiness posture and directed COMUSMACV to relinquish to CINCPACAF the operational control of PACAF forces deployed on mainland Southeast Asia.[6]

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1. CINCPAC 101450Z Feb (TS)
2. SAIGON 2491 to STATE 12 PM 10 Feb 65 (S)
3. JCS 004926/101641Z Feb 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 101705Z Feb 65 (TS)
5. JCS 004926/101641Z Feb 65 (TS)
6. CINCPAC 101712Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPAC 110430Z Feb 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

When the JCS execution order reached CINCPAC, it limited the US strikes to Chanh Hoa Barracks. Vu Con Barracks was, however, assigned as the primary VNAF target.[1] CINCPAC modified the target assignments accordingly, deleting the CINCPACAF strike on Target 14 (Thanh Hoa Bridge).[2]

On 11 February (Saigon time) weather conditions dictated that the VNAF attack its alternate target, Vit Thu Lu Barracks. This strike destroyed five buildings at Vit Thu Lu and caused two secondary explosions during an attack on antiaircraft positions elsewhere.[3] The naval aircraft strike at Chanh Hoa Barracks was reported successful but three aircraft were lost.[4]

Thai based aircraft were not used during FLAMING DART 1 or 2. It appeared, however, that the RTG would not object to use of airfields in their country if the US would cooperate in concealing this action.

On 12 February PACOM reduced the defense posture. The movement of the 173d Airborne Brigade to RVN was deferred, but Marine amphibious elements were maintained off Danang and Cap St. Jacques (Vung Tau).[6]

DEPENDENTS EVACUATED FROM SOUTH VIETNAM

Concurrent with the retaliatory strikes planned for 7 February, the JCS directed the orderly withdrawal of all US dependents from RVN.

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1. Weather alternates were specified for each force. JCS 004926/102212Z Feb 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 102322Z Feb 65 (TS)
3. 2d Air Div 111327Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPAC 111248Z Feb 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 111248Z Feb 65 (TS); CTG 77.5/110921Z Feb 65 (S). Two pilots were recovered.
5. BANGKOK 1103 to State 3 AM 11 Feb 65 (TS); JCS 004973/ 102212Z Feb 65 (TS)
6. CINCPAC 121255Z Feb 65 (TS)

[redacted]

The evacuation of 1623 personnel was accomplished via Pan American Airlines and was completed, except for a few medical deferrals, by 18 February.[1,2] This served the dual purpose of removing a sensitive target for VC terrorist attacks, and opening the way for more decisive action against the communist forces.

ROLLING THUNDER

General Background

Until the middle of February 1965 all US air strikes against North Vietnam[1] had been in the form of a response to specific communist violence directed against US forces. However, there had been substantial planning action in preparation for a possible US decision to undertake a program of air strikes, perhaps unrelated to reprisal action, against North Vietnam. The contemplated objective of the air strikes was to cause the GNVN to cease supporting and directing the insurgencies in RVN and Laos.

Before these strikes could be launched it was essential to make adequate preparations for the possible reaction by NVN and CHICOM. Some preparatory moves were accomplished in connection with FLAMING DART air strikes, to include the evacuation of dependents from RVN and augmentation of strategic air power in PACOM.[2]

Immediately after the retaliatory strike for Pleiku (FLAMING DART) Admiral Sharp proposed to increase the military pressure against NVN through the application of air power against the communists

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1. JCS 004759/070428Z Feb 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 070805Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPAC 070700Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPAC 080155Z Feb 65 (TS) CINCPAC 081555Z Feb 65 (U); SAIGON 1564 to CINCPAC 3 PM 10 Feb 65 (C); SAIGON 1810 to CINCPAC 19 Feb 65 (U)
3. CINCPAC Command History, 1964 pp. 367-377; and FLAMING DART elsewhere in this chapter.
4. JCSM-955-64 14 Nov 65 (TS) CPRS 000366-64; JCSM-967-64 of 18 Nov 65 (TS); JCSM 100-65 of 11 Feb 65 (TS) CPRS 00073-65; JCS 005148/122140Z Feb 65 (TS)

in Laos and North Vietnam. He also recommended that US aircraft be released to participate on a continuing basis with the VNAF in RVN.[1] His concept closely resembled a plan he had proposed during 1964[2] and a JCS recommendation, prepared in response to a request from the Secretary of Defense, for a broad program that could be undertaken in reprisal for provocative acts by the Viet Cong, NVN or CHICOM.

On 11 February Admiral Sharp again urged a program of continued and increasing application of military force against the NVN. He noted that the FLAMING DART air strikes had surely given NVN the message that the US would retaliate, and he proposed that the response to the next VC blow be a "good clobbering" of NVN. This, he thought, might help convince the communists that they were involved in an unprofitable venture.[3] Also, CINCPAC proposed low level photography of NVN ---- a measure which would assist future covert operations, amphibious operations, shore bombardment and air strikes.[4]

Although there were no further FLAMING DART actions there was continued planning for additional air strikes,[5] and the JCS soon authorized CINCPAC to use US forces for an air strike against Quang Khe Naval Base and to employ VNAF to strike Dong Hoi Airfield. These strikes, planned for daylight 20 February (Saigon time), were given the unclassified nickname ROLLING THUNDER I.[6]

The first ROLLING THUNDER strikes, scheduled for 20 February by US/VNAF forces, were postponed on 19 February[7] because of a coup in Saigon. The next three ROLLING THUNDER operations were cancelled for reasons of RVN politics, weather conditions, or constraints regarding the manner in which the strikes were to be conducted.

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1. CINCPAC 071032Z Feb 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1964 pp. 384-385.
3. CINCPAC 110735Z Feb 65 (TS) Other recommendations were submitted in CINCPAC 110942Z, 112200Z, Feb 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 130405Z Feb 65 (TS)
5. JCS 005332/161959Z Feb 65 (TS)
6. JCS 005555/182327Z Feb 65 (TS)
7. JCS 005572/191516Z Feb 65 (TS)

[redacted]

During this initial and unproductive period of ROLLING THUNDER activity, CINCPAC suggested to the JCS that it was erroneous to overestimate the favorable effects that could be achieved by limited destruction of key targets and a GNVN desire to preserve its resources from destruction. While recognizing that air power could not prevent NVN support of the VC, CINCPAC stated that it would be wrong to assume that air operations were only marginally capable of achieving a physical reduction of this support. CINCPAC noted that Ho Chi Minh never doubted ultimate victory. He proposed that the US aim should be to raise just this doubt, and that this spectre of eventual defeat in South Vietnam would be most likely to bring the NVN to the conference table on US terms.

In summing up, CINCPAC proposed that the US make use of its abundant air power to increase the destruction of Viet Cong supplies and manpower in South Vietnam while making it more difficult to get men and materials into the NVN end of the pipeline. This, he suggested should slowly strangle the Viet Cong.[1]

The first air strikes under the new program were executed during ROLLING THUNDER 5 on 2 March. US aircraft struck Xom Bang Ammunition Depot, and 19 VNAF A1Hs struck Quang Khe Naval Base with the support of 20 US aircraft. This was the first of a series of air strikes extending to 31 March and emphasizing radar facilities as targets. These and other ROLLING THUNDER operations are depicted in graphics in this chapter. It is worth noting that SAC B-52 night air strikes against Xom Bang Ammunition Depot were included in the warning order for RT5. However, SAC participation was not reflected in the execute message.[2]

Command and Control

The command and control arrangement for ROLLING THUNDER strike and armed reconnaissance operations is shown in the accompanying

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1. CINCPAC 271945Z Feb 65 (TS)
2. Appendix 2 to Annex C of Draft Report, JCS Armed Reconnaissance Study Group, 15 November 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]



ROLLING THUNDER COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS
(See text)

*Number of CVAs vary
** Coordination/Cooperation

◀·····▶ Liaison
Source; CINCPAC J3

[redacted]

illustration titled "Command and Control: ROLLING THUNDER." The following comments should be considered in association with the illustration.

CINCPAC exercised operational control of the strike forces through CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF and COMUSMACV. Coordination authority was assigned to CINCPACAF with the tacit understanding that it would be further delegated to Commander, 2d Air Division located in RVN. This authority was to the extent required to preclude mutual interference of the different forces during the strike/armed reconnaissance missions. A SEVENTH FLEET liaison officer with 2d Air Division accomplished liaison with CTF 77 who exercised operational command and control over the CVAs.

COMUSMACV exercised an informal operational control over VNAF through Commander, 2d Air Division, his air component commander. Commander, 2d Air Division also exercised operational control for CINCPACAF over the mission-required USAF forces in Southeast Asia (including those in Thailand).

The above system conformed to accepted doctrine for control of US forces, and it functioned smoothly for this purpose. It also proved to be an effective means of exercising control over VNAF operations in North Vietnam without a combined command structure. Although there were refinements within this system there was no significant change.[1]

Ad Hoc Study Group on Air Operations in Southeast Asia

In February CINCPAC established an Ad Hoc Study Group with the mission of producing a concept and initial program for the optimum use of air weapon systems to attrit, harass and interdict NVN support of insurgency in Laos and South Vietnam. In addition to CINCPAC staff members, the group included representatives from the PACOM components.

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1. CINCPAC Staff Members Colonel R. G. Coleman, USAF, and Colonel W. W. Dick, USAF, (J3 Division) were closely associated with the early phases of the ROLLING THUNDER program.

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Many of the members of the Study Group were involved in the day to day coordination and development of the air campaign. In that capacity they often injected the information and ideas developed by the Study Group into the stream of current operations and aided in formulation of CINCPAC proposals to the JCS. When their report was published in May,[1] it was in several cases already overtaken by events. However, the Group's findings and recommendations are reproduced here for their value in identifying some of the major problems and in explaining the early stages of the air campaign.

FINDINGS

1. In southern NVN, all road traffic to Laos and South Vietnam is channeled through four funnels; Barthelemy, Mugia and Nape Passes and the route structure approaching the DMZ and feeding to the Laos border. Each of these funnels is susceptible to effective disruption with attendant development of a new series of targets at cut-points such as backed up convoys, temporary truck parks, and supply/troop staging areas.

2. Target types in enemy Laos vary from a few major, fixed supply/cantonment installations and route interdiction points to ill-defined, transitory, small logistic/personnel staging areas.

3. Disruption of these LOCs, and destruction of developing targets will require constant and unrelenting surveillance and attack.

4. Forces presently deployed in Southeast Asia have the capability to interdict the LOCs and harass and attrit DRV activities supporting the insurgency in Laos and South Vietnam.

5. Target intelligence support graphics were, in some instances, inadequate for identification of separate target elements. Further, some graphics did not provide sufficient data for optimum weaponeering.

6. An expanded Laos intelligence data acquisition program is required to provide a base from which targets and target systems can be developed.

7. The majority of the southern area of North Vietnam is lowlands and can be expected to have improving weather for operations during late spring and early summer.

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1. Enclosure 1 to CINCPAC ser 000185 of 24 May 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

8. Climatological studies and discussions with on-scene Laos operational personnel indicates that weather conditions will be suitable for flight operations in the low altitude levels under cloud decks during the southwest monsoon.

9. A shortage of personnel trained in conventional weaponeering exists in CINCPAC and component staffs in relation to the workload presently underway and contemplated.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that:

a. The conceptual elements and specifics of this program where not overtaken by events, be authorized for execution.

b. All target acquisition methods be fully exploited. Expanded use of infra-red photography, high resolution (SLAR), and color and camouflage detection photography is recommended.

c. CAS and cross-border operations be tasked to assist in developing targets which evolve due to road interdiction operations.

d. A CINCPAC/DIA team visit Southeast Asia to conduct on-scene discussions with operational mission planner and strike reconnaissance crews to determine if existing target materials and target intelligence support graphics are providing adequate support, or if modifications are required to on-going theater and national level target intelligence production programs.

e. CINCPAC reiterate to the JCS that the pressure program against North Vietnam and complementary Laotian areas should be constant and unrelenting to keep the LOC network cut and harassed in depth. Local flexibility in determining numbers of aircraft, strike timing and selection of launch bases is a prerequisite to this program.

f. Fleeting and developing targets dictate a requirement to strike rapidly. Delegation of authority to appropriate commanders to execute strike missions is necessary to exploit these targets.

Constraints

It was clear that ROLLING THUNDER was not a classical military campaign. Rather, it was a limited campaign to place enough military pressure on North Vietnam to halt their support of insurgencies in RVN and Laos. The initial JCS restrictions were designed to tightly control

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all facets of the air strikes. Specific examples of these control measures were:

1. The strike day was specified.

2. It was mandatory that VNAF participation be accomplished prior to or concurrent with US air strikes.

3. The number of sorties by task on each target was specified and there could be no variation without prior justification and approval.

4. Only the primary target or one of two alternate targets could be attacked.

5. Prestrike reconnaissance was prohibited.

6. Maximum feasible damage was to be achieved by a single strike.

7. No aircraft were to be recycled.[1]

8. Bomb damage assessment aircraft were to accompany or immediately follow the strike.

9. Subsequent bomb damage assessment was to be accomplished at a medium altitude only without escort. Any variation from this required approval by the JCS.

10. There could be no armed reconnaissance.

In the course of ROLLING THUNDER operations, and usually in response to a CINCPAC request, additional operational flexibility was gained during almost every period of the ROLLING THUNDER campaign. For example, two days after ROLLING THUNDER 5 strikes, CINCPAC informed the JCS that some of their restrictions were denying the full benefit that operations might achieve. Specifically, he suggested that the situation could be improved if the following conditions applied:[2]

1. US and VNAF strikes could be conducted on a schedule other than the same day and hour.

2. Strikes could be conducted on more than one day when the character of the target or when weather considerations made it desirable to limit the size of the strike force.

3. Scheduling could be sufficiently flexible to take advantage of good weather conditions.

4. Napalm could be used when indicated by the nature of the target.

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1. For origin of this constraint see ADMINO CINCPAC 100030Z Mar 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 040710Z Mar 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

As ROLLING THUNDER (RT) continued there was a further relaxation of constraints on operations and a corresponding increase in the military effectiveness of the campaign. Highlights in this transition were as follows:

RT 6: Use of napalm was authorized.

RT 7: US forces were assigned more than one target. Armed reconnaissance was introduced but was limited to three segments on coastal Route 1. The weekly concept was introduced whereby authorized strikes could be conducted over a seven day period as dictated by the judgment of the tactical commander.

RT 8: A program of strikes against radar installations was authorized and the area for armed reconnaissance was extended to 20 degrees north. New armed reconnaissance target: NVN naval craft. [1]

RT 9: Additional armed reconnaissance was authorized with more emphasis on rolling stock as targets. Ordnance not otherwise expended could be used in strikes on rolling stock or against Ile De Tigre instead of being dumped into the sea.

RT 10: Armed reconnaissance against locomotives, infiltration support structures.

RT 11: Military targets in the immediate vicinity of armed reconnaissance or fixed targets could be struck.

RT 12: Fifteen fixed targets were authorized, and for the first time it was permitted to strike in waves against a particular target. [2] However, restrikes on the following day required JCS approval. Night armed reconnaissance was emphasized and a reserve allowance of sorties, beyond the usual allowance of 24, [3] was assigned for employment against trucks and rolling stock. Unexpended ordnance could be used against any armed reconnaissance route. [4] New targets for armed reconnaissance: military movement facilities, ferries, secondary bridges, cratering and reseeding highways. [5]

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1. CINCPAC 150411Z Jun 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 040240Z Apr 65 (TS); CINCPAC 240400Z Apr 65 (TS); CINCPAC 120314Z May 65 (TS); CINCPAC 220421 Jun 65 (TS); CINCPAC 050236Z Jun 65 (TS); CINCPAC 020426Z Jun 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 190805Z Apr 65 (TS); CINCPAC 112055Z Apr 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 230036Z Apr 65 (TS); CINCPAC 012255Z May 65 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 172216Z Apr 65 (TS)

[redacted]

RT 13: New targets for armed reconnaissance: lighters, road repair equipment, bivouac and staging areas.

RT 14: New target for armed reconnaissance: any surface cr that fired on friendly aircraft. [1]

RT 15: Strike against one DRV SAM site; JCS later directed that SAM sites be avoided.

RT 16: Strikes could be conducted in small increments over a ten day period. [2]

RT 17: Armed reconnaissance concentrated on roads emanating from Vinh. New armed reconnaissance target: maintenance areas.

RT 18: Barges were added to the list of authorized armed reconnaissance targets.

RT 19: Armed reconnaissance area slightly expanded north and northwest. [3] Three fixed targets north of 20 degrees were assigned for RT 19. New railroad construction authorized as target for armed reconnaissance.

RT 20: Seven fixed targets were assigned, five of which were in the northwest. Armed reconnaissance area expanded into the northwest and strikes against pre-selected small military targets were authorized. [4] At CINCPAC's request, restrike authorized against Dong Hoi and Vinh airfield.

RT 21: Ten fixed targets assigned, seven of them north of 20 degrees. Armed reconnaissance extended to Laos border in the northwest. The total number of sorties for the week: 250. Dien Bien Phu struck on 2 and 8 July.

RT 22/23: Period to strike specified targets expanded to two weeks with each seven day period having a separate RT number. [5] Armed reconnaissance area again expanded. Armed reconnaissance authorized against airfields or any previously struck JCS numbered target. [6]

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1. CINCPAC 140448Z May 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 102202Z Jun 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 302310Z Jun 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 070012Z Aug 65 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 162221Z Jun 65 (TS); CINCPAC 302310Z Jun 65 (TS); CINCPAC 120314Z May 65 (TS)
6. CINCPAC 302310Z Jun 65 (TS)

[redacted]

RT 24/25: Thailand based aircraft returning over Laos with unexpended ordnance authorized to employ it against Laotian road segments that had been targeted.[1] New armed reconnaissance targets: ferry approaches, fords, pontoon bridges, pontoon construction sites.

RT 26/27: Armed reconnaissance against naval berthing areas authorized.[2]

RT 28/29: Number of armed reconnaissance sorties expanded to 1,000. Armed reconnaissance against surface-to-air missile systems (in mobile mode) authorized and several additional JCS numbered targets designated as approved for use of unexpended ordnance. "Naval craft berthing areas" changed to read "Naval berthing areas and bases."

RT 30/31: Armed reconnaissance area further increased and number of sorties increased to 1,200. Any JCS target could be struck provided it appeared to be recovering from a previous strike. BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER missions authorized to use ROLLING THUNDER targets, including those for armed reconnaissance, as alternates.

As ROLLING THUNDER progressed and the operational commanders were granted increased flexibility in conducting operations CINCPAC found it advisable to impress on the subordinate commanders the unique character of the campaign. One reason was that a failure to comply with the remaining constraints might lead to the loss of a significant portion of the recently gained flexibility.

For example, in an April message to his subordinate commanders CINCPAC noted that in the day-to-day pressure of an operational environment it was not easy to remember that the air campaign in North Vietnam was not just another war with the objective of inflicting maximum damage to the enemy. He described ROLLING THUNDER as a precise application of military pressure for the specific purpose of halting aggression in South Vietnam, and he commented that there was no doubt as to the damage the strikes had accomplished. He emphasized that the commanders could continue to expect various types of restrictions on their operations, citing that some would be explicitly

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1. CINCPAC 031912Z Jul 65 (TS); CINCPAC 300426Z Jun 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 301916Z Jul 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

stated while others would be indicated. Noting that these would not always be understandable at the operating level, he emphasized that they must be obeyed nevertheless. CINCPAC also pointed out that because the air campaign was fundamental to the success of national polity, the air crews must continue to demonstrate extraordinarily high professional standards. [1]

Reconnaissance Intensified; Strikes Suspended

At 2400 hours 12 May (Saigon time) the air strike and armed reconnaissance operations within NVN were temporarily suspended to permit an evaluation of the results obtained thus far. The strike aircraft released by this move were made available for use against the Viet Cong within RVN. [2] An intensive special reconnaissance program was launched to observe the reaction of the NVN rail and road transportation system. [3] This suspension was reported by the press as a temporary lull imposed to encourage Hanoi to enter into negotiations.

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC 281445Z Apr 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 12035Z May 65 (TS); CINCPAC 140410Z May 65 (TS); CINCPAC 160314Z May 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 122328Z May 65 (TS); CINCPAC 130200Z May 65 (TS); CINCPAC 130202Z May 65 (TS); CINCPAC 132210Z May 65 (S); CINCPAC 140141Z May 65 (TS); CINCPAC 160152Z May 65 (TS)

[redacted]







[redacted]

Coordination

Expanding air operations in North Vietnam required multiple adjustments in the organization and functioning of CINCPAC Staff. The Battle Staff was augmented for 24 hour duty and certain increases were recommended in personnel for J2 and J3. PACOM components were levied to fill immediate requirements on a temporary basis during March and April. Some staff increases were approved by the JCS during April and additional personnel arrived during July-August.

Target Systems Analysis Section: This staff element (J243) was established on a temporary basis in early March with the title of PACOM Current Intelligence Targets Group (CITG). The initial group consisted of CINCPAC J2/J3 personnel and representatives of each PACOM component. The objectives were to coordinate the analytical talent within PACOM in guiding the ROLLING THUNDER effort and to assign the responsibilities associated with the program.

Target Planning Review Group: This group was formed in April to formulate coordinated recommendations pertaining to ROLLING THUNDER targets; also, to perform other functions related to CINCPAC's responsibility for submitting concepts and recommendations to the JCS. It consisted of CINCPAC J2/J3 personnel and representatives of the component commanders.[1]

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC 210117Z May 65 (TS)
[redacted]

[redacted]

PACOM

ROLLING THUNDER PLANNING PROCEDURES CYCLE...

DAY	DAYS PRIOR TO NEXT CYCLE	ACTION
TUE/WED	24/23	COMPONENTS REVIEW & NOMINATE TGTS
THUR	22	COMPONENTS/CINCPAC J-2 TARGET LIST REVIEW GROUP MEETING
MON	17	COMPONENTS /J-STAFF PLANNING CONF
WED	15	CINC BRIEFED /PROPOSALS APPROVED OR MODIFIED
FRI	13	CINCPAC RECOMMENDATIONS TO JCS
MON	11	JCS CONSIDERATIONS NEXT CYCLE COMMENCE



EXAMPLE OF CYCLE RT 36-37





[redacted]

Pressure on NVN Relaxed

Until the end of August North Vietnam was subjected to steadily increasing pressure by ROLLING THUNDER operations. The NVN freedom of movement was progressively eroded as the number and value of ROLLING THUNDER fixed targets grew and the area and intensity of armed reconnaissance expanded at a measured pace. These operations implied an inexorable crescendo of destruction, but this aspect of ROLLING THUNDER terminated 1 September 1965.

Thereafter CINCPAC recommended target options designed to achieve gradual closure of the external supply lines, land and sea, through which NVN drew about 75 per cent of its outside support. He also proposed destruction of basic POL, power and other resources which supported North Vietnam's aggression. Instead, the targets assigned by the JCS were primarily bridges. Further, armed reconnaissance operating areas and sortie level remained constant. In effect the pressure on North Vietnam decreased after 1 September. [1]

Mining NVN Harbors

This project was considered throughout 1965 and CINCPAC generally favored mining, particularly of Hong Ga and Cau Pha, as safer and more effective than blockade in reducing imports of essential material to North Vietnam. [2]

Although various proposals were approved for planning, [3] there was no mining and the ports functioned without hinderance throughout the year. Meanwhile, the air defense of these entry ports increased steadily.

---

1. CINCPAC 150101Z Nov 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 090303Z Apr 65 (TS); CINCPAC 130043Z Apr 65 (TS); CINCPAC 290743Z Apr 65 (TS); CINCPAC 300541Z Jul 65 (TS); CINCPAC 301916Z Jul 65 (TS); CINCPAC 262148Z Nov 65 (TS)
3. JCSM 608-65 of 6 Aug 65 (TS) CPRS 000465-65

[redacted]



[redacted]

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3. JCSM 608-65 of 6 Aug 65 (TS) CPRS 000465-65

[redacted]

ROLLING THUNDER 5 THRU 8
2 - 31 MARCH 1965

STRIKE RECAP 2 THRU 31 MAR 65	
TARGETS	**MISSIONS**
RADARS	15
AMMO/BKS/SUPPLY	8
NAVAL BASES	1
AIRFIELDS	1
ARMED RECCE	3

TOTAL MISSIONS 28

 # 1 TARGET - RADAR

 # 2 TARGET-AMMO/BKS/& SUPPLY



NORTH VIET-NAM

ROLLING THUNDER V, VI, VII, VIII

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

0 25 50
Statute Miles


COMMUNIST CHINA
LAOS
THAILAND
VIET-NAM
DONG PHUONG HWY BRIDGE
3 APR 65
THANH HOA BRIDGE
STRIKE ON ROUTES 7 & 8
4 APR 65
ROUTE 1
4 APR 65
RESTRIKE
7 APR 65
4 APR 65
4 APR 65
3 APR 65
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER 9
SECRET
no foreign dissem
Statute Miles
8 APR 65


COMMUNIST CHINA
LAOS
THAILAND
HANOI
HAIPHONG
DONG HOI
VINH
BT 7 & 8
ARMED RECCE
4 APR 65
10 APR 65
13 APR 65
14 APR 65
15 APR 65
RR/HWY BRIDGE
THANH HA
9 APR 65
BIN CHUONG
HWY/BRIDGE S.W.
10 APR 65
ROUTE 1
4 APR 65
RESTRIKE
7 APR 65
BT 13
ARMED RECCE
14 APR 65
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
REP. OF
VIET-NAM
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER 10
7 APR - 15 APR
SECRET
no foreign dissem
0 25 50
Statute Miles
17 APR 65


COMMUNIST CHINA
LAOS
THAILAND
ROLLING THUNDER 11
NORTH VIET-NAM
BRIDGES STRUCK
16-18 APRIL 1965
SECRET
no foreign dissem
0 25 50
Statute Miles
19 APR 65
REP. OF VIET-NAM


RECAP OF ROLLING THUNDER 12
SPECIAL ROUTE AND COASTAL ARMED RECCE 23-28 APR 65
*32 MISSIONS VERSUS ROUTES
*14 MISSIONS VERSUS COASTAL TARGETS
HANOI
LAOS
THAILAND
RTE #7
24 APR
25 APR
26 APR
27 APR
4
RTE #15
24 APR
25 APR 2X
26 APR 2X
27 APR 2X
28 APR
8
RTE #1
24 APR
25 APR 2X
26 APR
27 APR
28 APR
6
COASTAL
24 APR
25 APR 2X
26 APR 4X
27 APR
28 APR 6X
14
VINH
RTE's #1, #101, & LATERAL ROADS TO RTE #15
23 APR
24 APR
25 APR
27 APR
28 APR
5
QUANG KHE
RTE #8
24 APR
25 APR
26 APR
27 APR
4
RTE #12
24 APR
25 APR 2X
26 APR
27 APR 2X
28 APR
7
DONG HOI
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER 12
ARMED RECONNAISSANCE
US
VNAF


BRIDGES STRUCK
ROLLING THUNDER 12
23-24 APR 65
TARGETS
MISSIONS
BRIDGES
16
ROUTE A/R
32
COASTAL A/R
14
PHU GIAI HWY FWYS (2)
PHUC THIEM HWY BR
23 APR 65 BR DESTROYED
LY NHAN HWY BR
23 APR 65 TWO SPANS DESTROYED
XOM THAI XA HWY BR
24 APR 65 2 SPANS DESTROYED
PHU THACH HWY FWY
23 APR 65 APPROACHES CRATERED
VINH SON HWY FWY
24 APR 65 FWY DAMAGED
SAN DINH HWY BR
23 APR 65 BR DESTROYED
XOM GIA HWY BR
23 APR 65 SPAN COLLAPSED
THO SON HWY
23 APR 65 SPAN COLLAPSED
RON HWY FWY
25 APR 65
PIERS AND APPROACHES DAMAGED
HUU HUNG HWY FWY
23 APR 65 DAMAGED
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
THAILAND
SECRET
NORTH VIET-NAM
US/VNAF STRIKES
WEEK ENDING 29 APR 65
REP. OF VIET-NAM


RECAP OF ROLLING THUNDER 12
SPECIAL ROUTE AND COASTAL ARMED RECCE 23-28 APR 65
*32 MISSIONS VERSUS ROUTES
* 14 MISSIONS VERSUS COASTAL TARGETS
LAOS
THAILAND
HANOI
VINH
QUANG KHE
DONG HOI
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
RTE #7
24 APR
25 APR
26 APR 4
27 APR
RTE #15
24 APR
25 APR 2X
26 APR 2X
27 APR 2X 8
28 APR
RTE #1
24 APR
25 APR 2X
26 APR 6
27 APR
28 APR
COASTAL
24 APR
25 APR 2X
26 APR 4X 14
27 APR
28 APR 6X
RTE's #1, #101, & LATERAL ROADS TO RTE #15
23 APR
24 APR
25 APR 5
27 APR
28 APR
RTE #12
24 APR
25 APR 2X
26 APR
27 APR 2X 7
28 APR
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER 12
ARMED RECONNAISSANCE
US
VNAF


BRIDGES STRUCK
ROLLING THUNDER 12
23-24 APR 65
TARGETS
MISSIONS
BRIDGES
16
ROUTE A/R
32
COASTAL A/R
14
PHU GIA HWY FWYS (2)
PHUC THIEM HWY BR
LY NHAN HWY BR
XOM THAI XA HWY BR
PHU THACH HWY FWY
VINH SON HWY FWY
SAN DINH HWY BR
XOM GIA HWY BR
THO SON HWY
HA TINH HWY BR
SON HWY FWY
HUU HUNG HWY FWY
XUAN SON HWY FWY
XOM PHUONG HWY BRS
MI LE HWY FWY
THAILAND
SECRET
NORTH VIET-NAM
US/VNAF STRIKES
WEEK ENDING 29 APR 65
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
REP. OF VIET-NAM


ROLLING THUNDER 15
18-24 MAY 65
* SPECIFIED GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS ASSIGNED FOR ARMED RECCE
* FIRST FIXED TARGET NORTH OF 20°N
HANOI
HAIPHONG
THANH HOA
LAOS
THAILAND
NORTH VIET-NAM
SECRET
US
VNAF
USN
USAF
DEMILITARIZED ZONE


ROLLING THUNDER 18
11-17 JUNE 65
FIXED TARGETS MOVING NORTHWEST
ARMED RECCE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA CHANGED
HANOI
LAOS
USN RECCE
USAF RECCE
VNAF RECCE
19 JUNE
SECRET
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER #18
US
VNAF
PREVIOUS STRIKE
Statute Miles


ROLLING THUNDER 19
18-24 JUNE 65
* 3 TARGETS NORTH 20°N
* A/R GEOGRAPHICAL AREA CHANGED
PHUC YEN
HANOI
HON GAI
HAIPHONG
BACH LONG IS.
LAOS
ROLLING THUNDER 19C
USN RECCE
USAF RECCE
ROLLING THUNDER 19A
DAN HUOC CHIEU AMMO DPO
MOC CHAU ARMY BKS
SON LA MIL COMPLEX
PHU QUI BKS SUP DPO
VINH SON SUP DPO
HON MAT IS.
ROLLING THUNDER 19B
DONG THANH WHSE S
DONG HOI BKS CITADEL
VINH
MAPE PASS
MU GIA PASS
ROLLING THUNDER 19D
VNAF RECCE
TIGER IS.
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
SECRET
no foreign dissem
NORTH VIET-NAM
US
VNAF
16 JUN 65

ROLLING THUNDER 21

2-8 JULY 65

- FIXED TARGETS IN N. INCLUDED DIEN BIEN PHU & NAM DINH POL
- ARMED RECCE EXTENDED NW TO LAOS BORDER
- 250 A/R SORTIES FOR PERIOD




ROLLING THUNDER 22/23
FIRST TWO WEEK PERIOD (9-22 JULY)
A/R LINE EXTENDED
A/R OK TO HIT A/F & LOC PREVIOUSLY STRUCK
#44 YEN BAY ORD DEPO
#23 SON LA MILITARY COMPLEX
#97 YEN SON ORD AMMO DPO
#71.13 HAM RONG PORT FAC E/W
LAOS
#9.25 VINH SON BKS 5
#71 BEN THUY PORT FAC
TOP SECRET
NORTH VIET-NAM
USAF/USN
VNAF
RESTRIKE
Statute Miles
DEMILITARIZED ZONE


COMMUNIST CHINA
LAO CAY
#47.13 TAI XOUAN AMMO DPO SE
#18.64 BAN PA HUONE HWY BR
#26 DIEN BIEN PHU BKS/BDE HQ
#47.2 LANG CHI EXP PL
#47.19 BAN NHUOC CHIEU AMMO DPO
#18.41 BAN POM LOT HWY BR
#52.15 NAM DINH TPP
#29 QUANG XUYEN BKS NR
LAOS
#52.1 THANH HOA TPP
#39.26 BAI THUONG BKS NR
#38 VINH BKS
#47.16 XOM BUNG AMMO DPO
THAILAND
TOP SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER 24
USAF/USN
VNAF
RESTRIKE
Statute Miles


COMMUNIST CHINA
LAO CAY
BAC LAC
#18.64 BAN PA NHUONE HWY BR
#26 DIEN BIEN PHU BKS/BDE HQ
#18.41 BAN PON LOT HWY BR
#47.13 TAI XOUAN AMMO DPO SE
#47.2 LANG CHI EXP PL
#47.19 BAN NUOC CHIEU AMMO DPO
LANG SON
#82.3 NAM DINH TPP
#29 QUANG KHUI BKS NE
#82.1 THANH HOA TPP
#39.28 BAI THUONG BKS NE
#47.17 VINH BKS/NME
#38 VINH BKS
#47.18 XOM RUNG AMMO DPO
USAF/USN RECCE
LAOS
THAILAND
TOP SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER 25
USAF/USN
VNAF
RESTRIKE
REP. OF VIET-NAM


COMMUNIST CHINA
VINH TUY HWY BR
LAO CAI
THUAN CHAU BKS/DPO
10 AUG 65
DIEN BIEN PHU BKS/BDE HQ
10 AUG 65
11 AUG 65
12 AUG 65
SON LA BKS/SUP DPO
10 AUG 65
11 AUG 65
SAN NUOC CHIEU AMMO DPO
9 AUG 65
TAI XOUAN AMMO DPO 65
LANG CHI EKPLOS PLANT
7 AUG 65
8 AUG 65
YEN SON DEP/AMMO DPO
SAM NUA
5 AUG 65
PHUC YEN
HANOI
HAIPHONG
LAOS
RSAF/RSN RECCE
VINH ARMY SUP DPO I
7 AUG 65
8 AUG 65
9 AUG 65
THAILAND
SECRET
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER 26
6-12 AUGUST 1965
USAF/RSN
VNAF
RESTRIKE
0 25 50
Statute Miles
DMA-ISIC
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
REP OF
VIET-NAM


CHINA
CHINA
Lao Cai
Red River
Black River
Newly Discovered SAM Site
Newly Discovered SAM Site Under Construction
AREA OF SAM SEARCH
RF101 Down
A4C Down
F8 Down
LAOS
A4C Down
GULF
RF8A Down
OF
TONKIN
AIH Down
Nam Ngum
Nam Thai
Mekong
THAILAND
SOUTH
VIETNAM
LAOS
Mekong
STRIKE TARGETS
ROLLING THUNDER 27
13 AUGUST 1965
Limit of Rolling Thunder Armed Recce Missions
SECRET

ROLLING THUNDER 28/29
AUTHORIZED FIXED TARGETS




CHINA
CHINA
Lao Kay
LANG BON RR BR
LAOS
BICH PHUONG LOCK
BAN THACH HPD
BAI THUONG BKS
THANH HOA BKS
VINH LOC STOR
PHU DUC WHSE
GULF OF TONKIN
XOM TRUNG HOA BKS/AMMO DPO
THAILAND
VINH LINH BKS
SOUTH VIETNAM
LAOS
Mekong
STRIKE TARGETS
ROLLING THUNDER 29
27 August-2 September
Limit of Rolling Thunder
Armed Recce Missions
SECRET


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
LAO CAY
LANG
DIEN BIEN PHU
SON LA
PHUC YEN
HANOI
HAIPHONG
LAOS
USAF/USN RECCE
THAILAND
VINH ARMY SKS NW
HA TINH SUP DPO
XOM SANG SKS E
VINH LINH SKS SW
NORTH VIET-NAM
3-9 SEPT 1965
ROLLING THUNDER #30
USAF/USN
VNAF
RESTRIKE
Statute Miles


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
LAO CAY
10–12–14–15 SEPT 65
BAC KAN AMMO DPO
PHUC YEN
HANOI
HAIPHONG
LAOS
USAF/USN RECCE
10–12–14–15–16 SEPT 65
CO DINH BKS NW
11–15 SEPT 65
VINH POL STO
10–14–16 SEPT 65
VINH ARMY BKS NW
10–15 SEPT 65
XOM BANG BKS E
16 SEPT 65
VINH LINH BKS SW
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
REP. OF VIET-NAM
NORTH VIET-NAM
10-16 SEPT 65
ROLLING THUNDER #31
USAF/USN
VNAF
RESTRIKE
Statute Miles


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
YEN SON ORD & AMMO DPO #47
TAI XOUAN AMMO DPO
BAN NUOC CHIEU AMMO DPO #47.19
CAO
DIEN BIEN PHU
KEP HWY 88
HANOI
HAIPHONG
XOM CHANG BKS
LAOS
VINH ARMY SUP DPO
USAF/USN RECCE
HOAN LAO BKS
VINH LINH BKS CENT
THAILAND
TOP SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER #32
17-23 Sept 65
USAF/USN
VNAF
RESTRIKE
Statute Miles
20 SEP 65
VIET-NAM


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
YEN SON ORD & AMMO DPO
LAO CAY
TAI XOUAN AMMO DPO
DIEN BIEN PHU
SON LA
PHUC YEN
HANOI
HAIPHONG
XOM CHIENG SKS
NINH BIN
LAOS
THANH HOA
PHU QUI
USAF/USN RECCE
VINH SOAI
CAP MUI SON
VINH LINH SKS CENT NE
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER #33
24-30 SEP 65
USAF/USN
VNAF
RESTRIKE
Statute Miles
6 OCT 65


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
LAO CAY
5 OCT 65
LANG HET AMMO DPS
7 OCT 65
VU CHUA RR BR S
DIEN BIEN PHU
SON LA
PHUC YEN
5 OCT 65
KEP HWY BR
HANOI
HAIPHONG
LAOS
USAF/USN RECCE
PHU QUI
6 OCT 65
CHUC A SUPPLY AREA
THAILAND
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER #34
1 - 7 OCTOBER 1965
USAF/USN
VNAF
DESTROYED
Statute Miles
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
REP. OF
VIET-NAM


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
LAO CAY
LANG MET AMMO DPO #47.12
LANG MET/HWY BR 18.78
VU CHUA RR BR 5 #18.74
KEP NWY BR #18.31
PHUC YEN
HANOI
HAI PHONG
NINH BINH
THANH HOA
LAOS
USAF/USN RECCE
PHU QUI
CHUC A SUPPLY AREA #63.13
VINH SON
THAILAND
TOP SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER #35
8-13 Oct 65
USAF/USN
VNAF
RESTRIKE
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
REP. OF
VIET-NAM


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
VINH TUY
BAC CAN HWY 85
CHO MOI HWY 85
THAI NGUYEN HWY 18
YEN SON
THUAN CHAU
DIEN BIEN PHU
SON LA
SAN NUOC
PHUC YEN
HANOI
HAIPHONG
NINH BINH
HAM RONG
THANH HOA
LAOS
USAF/USN RECCE
PHU QUI
HA TINH
VINH SON
DONG HOI
THAILAND
REP. OF VIET-NAM
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER #36
14 – 21 OCT 65
USAF/USN
VNAF
Statute Miles


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
CAO BANG
VINH YEN
CHO MOI HWY BR
THAI NGUYEN HWY BR
BAC CAN HWY BR
LANG LUONG HWY BR
THUAN CHAU
DIEN BIEN PHU
SON LA
YEN BAI
PHUC YEN
HANOI
HAIPHONG
LAOS
DSAF/USN RECCE
PHU QUAN BRS
TINH
THAILAND
TOP SECRET
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER #37
DSAF/USN
VNAF
RESTRIKE
22-28 Oct 65
Statute Miles
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
REP. OF
VIET-NAM


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
VINH TUY
LANG CHI
THUAN CHAU
DIEN BIEN PHU
SON LA
BAN HUOC
HANOI
LAOS
USAF/USN RECCE
VINH LINH ARMY BKS
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER #38
29 Oct-4 Nov 65
USAF/USN
VNAF
RESTRIKE
Statute Miles
29 OCT 65


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
CAO BAY
VINH TUY
LANG SON
TAI KOUAN
YEN SON
LANG CHI
THUAN CHAU
SON LA
DIEN BIEN PHU
BAN NUOC
PHUC YEN
KEP
NANOI
HAIPHONG
QUOI HO SAM SPT FACILITY
PHU LY RR BR
LAOS
THANH HOA
BACH LONG ISLAND
PHU QUI
USAF/USN RECCE
HON MATT ISLAND
VINH SON
THAILAND
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER # 39
5-11 NOV 65
USAF/USN
Statute Miles
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
REP. OF
VIET-NAM


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
LANG CHI
THUAN CHAU
DIEN BIEN PHU
PHUC YEN
HANOI
HAIPHONG
HON MATT ISLAND
LAOS
THAILAND
REP. OF VIET-NAM
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
CAO NUNG RR BR
LANG LUONG HWY BR
DONG THANH WHSE AREA
16 NOV 65
USAF/USN RECCE
SECRET
NO FORNON DISSEM
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER #40
12-18 NOV 65
USAF/USN
VNAF
RESTRIKE
Statute Miles
22 NOV 65


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
CAO BAY
VINH TUY
BAC KAN HWY BR #10.61
CAO NUNG RR BR #15.24
LANG LUONG HWY BR #10.62
HA CHANH HWY BR N. #10.77
HA CHANH HWY BR #10.76
HANOI
MIE XA HWY BR #10.68
NAM DUONG RR & HWY BR #10.75
HAI PHONG
CAT BA ISLAND
Red River
YEN BAI
LANG CHI
THUAN CHAU
SON LA
SAN NUOC
PHUC YEN
LAOS
QUI VINH RR BRIDGE
USAF/USN RECCE
HON MATT ISLAND
VINH
DONG THANH WHSE AREA #63.21
THAILAND
TOP SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER #41
19 Nov-25 Nov 65
USAF/USN
VNAF
RESTRIKE
0 25 50
Statute Miles
22 NOV 65
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
REP. OF
VIET-NAM


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
TAO CAY
VINH TUY
Red River
1 DEC 65
CAO NUNG RR BR
DONG DANG
LANG SON
TAN KOUAN
YEN SON
LANG CHI
THUAN CHAU
DIEN BIEN PHU
SON LA
BAN NUOC
PHUC YEN
28 NOV 65
HA CHANH HWY BR
HANOI
CAM PHA
HON GAY
CAT BA ISLAND
HAIPHONG
1 DEC 65
HAI DUONG RR & HWY BR
BACH LONG ISLAND
LAOS
THANH HOA
PHU QUI
USAF/USN RECCE
HON MATT ISLAND
VINH SON
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
THAILAND
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER #42
26 NOV-2 DEC 65
USAF/USN
RESTRIKE
0 25 50
Statute Miles
8 DEC 65
102°
104°
106°
108°


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
LAO CAY
VINH TUY
DONG DANG
LANG SON
TAI TOUAN
YEN SON
LANG CHI
THUAN CHAU
DIEN BIEN PHU
SON LA
BAN NUOC
PHUC YEN
XEP
HANOI
CAM PHA
HON GAY
CAT BA ISLAND
HAIPHONG
BACH LONG ISLAND
NAM DONG
THANH HOA
LAOS
PHU QUI
3 DEC 65
DIAP DONG BKS
USAF/USN RECCE
HON MATT ISLAND
VINH
DIAP MUI EON
THANH HOA
THAILAND
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER 43
3-9 DEC 65
USAF
Statute Miles
TIGER IS.
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
REP OF VIET NAM


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
LAO CAY
VINH TUY
DONG DANG
LANG SON
TAI XOUAN
YEN SON
LANG CHI
THUAN CHAU
DIEN BIEN PHU
SON LA
BAN NUOC
PHUC YEN
KEP
HANOI
CAM PHA
HON GAY
CAT BA ISLAND
HAIPHONG
BACH LONG ISLAND
HAM RONG
THANH HOA
15 DEC 65
UONG BI THERMAL POWER PLANT
LAOS
PHU QUI
USAF/USN RECCE
HON MATT ISLAND
VINH SON
QUANG KHE
DONG THANH
DONG HOI
TIGER IS.
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
REP. OF
VIET-NAM
THAILAND
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER #44
10-16 DEC 65
0 25 50
Statute Miles
DIA—15IC
20 DEC 65
102°
104°
106°
108°
20°
18°


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
LAO CAY
VINH TUY
Red River
BAC CAN HWY BR #16.61
DONG DANG
LANG SON
LANG LUONG HWY BR #16.62
TAI KOUAN
YEN SON
LANG CHI
THUAN CHAU
DIEN BIEN PHU
SON LA
SAN NUOC
HA CHANH HWY BR N. #18.77
PHUC YEN
KEP
HANOI
HE XA HWY BR #18.66
CAM PHA
HON GAY
CAT BA ISLAND
HAIPHONG
HAI DUONG BR & HWY BR #11
HAIPHONG HWY BR #17
BACH LONG ISLAND
HAM RONG
THANH HOA
UONG BI THERMAL POWER PLANT #62
LAOS
PHU QUI
USAF/USN RECCE
HON MATT ISLAND
VINH
MUI RON
VINH SON
QUANG KHE BRS #39.49
QUANG KHE
DONG THANH
THAILAND
TOP SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER 45
17-23 Dec 65
USAF/USN
VNAF
RESTRIKE
0 25 50
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97 DEC 65
TIGER IS.
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
REP OF
VIET-NAM
103°
104°
105°
22°
20°
18°


COMMUNIST CHINA
BAC LAC
LAO CAY
VINH TUY
VU CHUA RR BR #18.74
TAI XOUAN
YEN SON
LANG CHI
THUAN CHAU
DIEN BIEN PHU
SON LA
BAC GIANG RR & HWY BR #18.23
LAN NUOC
PHUC YEN
KEP
VIET-TRI RR & HWY BR #18
HANOI
HAI DUONG RR & HWY BR #11
DONG DANG
LANG SON
YA CHANH HWY BR N #18.77
LAM HWY BR NE #18.78
CAM PHA
HON GAY
CAT BA ISLAND
HAI PHONG
UONG BI THERMAL POWER PLANT #82
BACH LONG ISLAND
NAM DONG
THANH HOA
LAOS
USAF/USN RECCE
PHU QUI
NAM SON DKS #39.51
HON MAT ISLAND
VINH
MUI RON
VINH SON
QUANG KHE
DONG THANH
DONG HOI
TIGER IS.
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
THAILAND
REP OF VIET-NAM
TOP SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIET-NAM
ROLLING THUNDER 46
24-31 Dec 65
USAF/USN
VNAF
RESTRIKE
0 25 50
Statute Miles
27 DEC 65
102°
104
106
22°
20°
18°

[redacted]

ROLLING THUNDER Suspension

All ROLLING THUNDER operations were suspended as of 24 December for an indefinite period. Just previously CINCPAC had advised the JCS that the program, conducted without increasing pressure and at a level which military and civilian activities had accommodated, was not accomplishing its purpose.[1]

Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM)

On 24 July an F4C on ROLLING THUNDER 24A7 was destroyed at about ten thousand feet by a surface-to-air (SAM) missile near 21° 07' N., 105° 09' E over North Vietnam. The pilot of an accompanying aircraft described the missile as two spots of light "hunting" the planes.[2] This was the first known loss of a US aircraft to a SAM during operations over North Vietnam. It did not come as a surprise, however, because it had been known for several months that SAMs would be operational at an early date.[3]

There had been multiple but futile requests for authority to destroy the missile installations while they were under construction. On 25 July CINCPAC submitted to the JCS plans which had been previously prepared for this task by CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT. At the same time he recommended an early attack on the known SAM sites.[4] The JCS soon authorized a one time anti-missile operation nicknamed SPRING HIGH. CINCPAC alerted CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF[5] and the execute message was dispatched at 262320Z July with precautions specified to preclude the strike aircraft being lured into the cone of fire from a SAM.[6]

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1. CINCPAC 092121Z Jan 66 (TS); CINCPAC 120205Z Jan 66 (TS)
2. CTG 77:6 111803Z Aug 65 (S); CINCPAC 250252Z Jul 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 200305Z July 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 260230Z Jul 65 (S); CINCPAC 252115Z Jul 65 (TS); CINCPAC 250507Z July 65 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 261935Z July 65 (TS); CINCPAC 252115Z July 65 (TS); CINCPAC 262115Z July 65 (TS)
6. CINCPAC 262320Z Jul 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

SPRING HIGH, conducted 26 and 27 July, was unsuccessful in destroying the missiles;[1] and it demonstrated that conventional anti-aircraft fires made low level attacks expensive, particularly when the NVN could expect a reaction on a specific site after a missile was fired.[2]

An immediate effort was initiated to develop effective methods of destroying the SAM sites.[3] Additionally, an intensified reconnaissance program was directed with the objective of gaining more specific information, particularly through ELINT.[4] CINCPAC initiated an ELINT program against the SAM associated radars with a flight every three hours. CINCPACFLT was assigned the period 1200 to 2400 hours and CINCPACAF had the period 0001 to 1200 hours.[5]

CINCPAC also sought to intensify exploitation of photographic sources to promote early discovery of additional SAM capabilities,[6] and information on various countermeasures was gathered and disseminated within the command.[7]

On 3 August the JCS authorized low altitude photographic coverage of SAM sites tentatively located by ELINT; they further authorized the destruction of sites confirmed by field readout of photography. CINCPAC passed this to his air and naval component commanders[8] and encouraged them to submit recommendations on targets considered worth striking.

On 9 August 12 F-105s attacked a site that had been confirmed by photography as occupied the previous day. However, the strike aircraft could find no evidence of occupancy when they executed their attack.[10]

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1. CINCPAC 280210Z Jul 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 292344Z Jul 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 282140Z Jul 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 282304Z July 65 (S)
5. CINCPAC 292125Z Jul 65 (TS)
6. CINCPAC 312320Z Jul 65 (TS)
7. CINCPAC 032003Z Aug 65 (S); CINCPAC 032011Z Aug 65 (S); CINCPAC 032237Z Aug 65 (TS); CINCPAC 040233Z Aug 65 (TS); CINCPAC 032244 Aug 65 (TS); CINCPAC 060400Z Aug 65 (TS); CINCPAC 070200Z Aug 65 (S)
8. CINCPAC 040315Z Aug 65 (TS)
9. CINCPAC 090029Z Aug 65 (TS)
10. CINCPAC 100236Z Aug 65 (S); CINCPAC 100404Z Aug 65 (TS)

[redacted]

The JCS moved the armed reconnaissance boundary for ROLLING THUNDER operations northward to 20° 30' on 11 August. They authorized CINCPAC, at his discretion, to destroy SAM sites tentatively identified by ELINT or other means in the area south of the new boundary. Sites outside the ROLLING THUNDER armed reconnaissance area, with exceptions noted below, could be struck if confirmed by field readout of photography. The exclusion areas specified were:

1. Within thirty nautical miles of the CHICOM border.
2. Five known established sites around Hanoi and the Hanoi area bordered by these sites.
3. Within ten nautical miles of Haiphong.
4. Phuc Yen Airfield.

These missions against SAM sites were to be reported and counted under the nickname IRON HAND and were not to be charged against the authorized number of sorties for ROLLING THUNDER. [1]

CINCPAC's IRON HAND implementing order was sent to CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF on 12 August. In accordance with the JCS instructions CINCPAC specified that the decision authority for a strike could not be delegated lower than COMSEVENTHFLT or Commander, 2d Air Division. It was also specified that aircraft operating within range of possible SA-2 sites would remain below the lower limits of the missile effectiveness. [2] In a separate message CINCPAC authorized intensive armed reconnaissance to detect and destroy an SA-2 installation believed responsible for the recent loss of an A-4 aircraft. [3]

The requirement, originating with the JCS, that IRON HAND aircraft remain below the lower limit of the SA-2 effective range was soon relaxed because of the high attrition rate from ground fire. [4]

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1. JCS 7961/111427 Aug 65 (TS); JCS 7990/112042Z Aug 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 120017Z Aug 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 120032Z Aug 65 (TS)
4. CINCPACFLT 130802Z Aug 65 (TS); CINCPAC 131000Z Aug 65 (S); CINCPAC 250233Z Aug 65 (TS); JCS 9197/261936Z Aug 65 (TS): CINCPAC 290144Z Aug (U)

[redacted]

The results of IRON HAND were meager. By 24 August there had been approximately one hundred low level photographic sorties based on ELINT or photographic indications of missile sites. This effort had located and verified one operational site with missiles, but these had been moved by the time an attack was launched. Also nine aircraft had been shot down by antiaircraft fire in the search areas and two more had been destroyed by a mid-air collision as a direct result of battle damage. ELINT measures were not locating the sites, even when an elaborate drone operation (LEFT HOOK) was conducted.

[redacted]

The lack of success in IRON HAND operations prompted CINCPACFLT to suggest a strike against the Haiphong POL stores. CINCPAC supported the idea to the JCS, noting that this might be more meaningful in Hanoi's eyes than the ROLLING THUNDER and IRON HAND operations.[2] This recommendation was, however, not favorably considered.

The restricted area in the vicinity of the CHICOM border was reduced on 1 September from thirty to twenty-five nautical miles between 106°E. and the Gulf of Tonkin. At the same time the sanctuary area around Hanoi was reduced from fifteen to ten miles.[3] (S)

The first successful IRON HAND strike against an occupied SAM installation occurred 17 October when five aircraft from the INDEPENDENCE struck SAM installation 32 in the vicinity of 21° 22' N., 106° 36' E. This strike, similar in technique and procedures

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[redacted]

2. CINCPAC 250415Z Aug 65 (TS)
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 010427Z Sep 65 (TS); ADMINO CINCPAC 011309Z Sep 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

to many others, accompanied a ROLLING THUNDER mission at low level until in the general vicinity of the missile installation. The IRON HAND aircraft then broke off, popped up to 8,000 feet, and attacked the missiles and the associated equipment simultaneously from two directions. One missile was destroyed by bombs and the other one was ignited and observed snaking around on the ground. Additionally, ten transporters were destroyed as well as a number of control vans. All aircraft recovered safely. Electronic equipment in INDEPENDENCE aircraft successfully broke several missile associated radar lock-ons during the approach. [1]

On 31 October and again on 7 November other successful attacks were conducted against installations with missiles and support equipmem in place. (S)

The missile launch rate steadily increased, 89 missiles were observed in flight between 24 July and 15 November and seven US aircraft were destroyed by these weapons. Most probably, there were additional launches which were not observed, but the kill ratio on observed launches was one per 12-13 launches. This was less destructive than prior theoretical estimates which had indicated a kill capability of approximately 75 per cent. Pilots observing a missile in flight found that violent maneuvers, particularly a sharp break down, were a usually effective evasion technique. It appeared that this was because the guidance system for the missile was not sufficiently responsive. Another factor which tended to degrade the effectiveness was missile crew proficiency. Additionally, the delicate electronic equipment effectiveness was degraded by movement over the relatively poor lines of communication in North Vietnam. (S)

[redacted]

1. CTG 77.7/170714Z Oct 65 (S)

[redacted]


56 SAM SITES
6 SAM INSTALLATIONS
1 SAM SUPPORT FACILITY
RESTRICTED AREA
22 SAM COMPLEXES STRUCK BY U.S. (Nos. 20, 30, 33, STRUCK TWICE)
1 SAM SUPPORT FACILITY STRUCK TWICE BY U.S.
1 POSSIBLE SAM SUPPORT FACILITY STRUCK TWICE BY U.S.
125 SAMs FIRED BY NVN
10 U.S. ACFT DOWNED BY SAMs
AS OF: 5 JANUARY 1966
NORTH VIETNAM SAM Sites

[redacted]



At the end of the year, the NVN SAM system seemed to provide a very economical means of degrading US air superiority. Known SAM sites are indicated on the accompanying graphic.[1] (S)

ROLLING THUNDER: December Appraisal

After some eleven months of ROLLING THUNDER operations Hanoi was demonstrating no willingness to terminate support of the military struggle in South Vietnam despite some signs that the NVN economy was weakening.

During November air operations had, for the first time, concentrated on the transportation system connecting the major industrial areas of North Vietnam. Additional injury was inflicted during December, e.g., dropping several spans of the Hanoi - Dong Dang railroad bridge and damaging the Uong Bi Thermal Power Plant. These actions disrupted production schedules and created further drains on resources of manpower and material. Yet, material continued to move via trucks, waterways, and make-shift rail lines; and there were other and untouched sources of electrical energy. Nevertheless, maintaining this flow of material was costly to NVN because it was draining men and material resources away from long range economic programs.

The North Vietnam capability to sustain their course of action was augmented later in the year with two Chinese railroad engineer divisions to help keep transportation lines open. Also, the influx of motor trucks and construction material as well as technical and economic advisors was increasing during the final weeks of the year.

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1. PACOM WID 47-65 of 19 Nov 65 (S); PACOM WID 1-66 of 7 Jan 66 (S

[redacted]

There was, near the end of 1965, no indication of any significant decline in NVN morale or of any softening of Hanoi's attitude toward negotiations. Conversely, preparation for a prolonged struggle was indicated.

US/GVN Cease-Fire, Christmas

The Viet Cong offered a Christmas truce in South Vietnam.[1] Secretary of State Dean Rusk subsequently proposed that the US suspend bombing operations against North Vietnam for 24 hours and that air operations in South Vietnam be limited to support of forces in contact with the Viet Cong. CINCPAC concurred, feeling that such operations could be suspended without significant military advantage to the Viet Cong.[2]

Air operations were suspended over North Vietnam for the period of 241800H to 252400H December. Similarly, air and ground operations in South Vietnam were limited in accordance with COMUSMACV instructions.[3] CINCPAC policy guidelines were stated for operations in North and South Vietnam and Laos during the Christmas holiday period.[4]

Higher authorities extended the ground cease-fire period by six hours; with this, the cease-fire was to end 260600H December. Also, the air operations over North Vietnam were not resumed until 1966. Casualties reported for the truce period, 241800H through 260600H December, were as follows:[5]

	Killed in Action	Wounded in Action
US	3	23
ARVN(RF/PF)	54	55
SVN civilians	15	19

On 26 December Admiral Sharp commented to the JCS on the difficulties faced by a commander in the presence of the enemy when a

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1. SAIGON 2169 to STATE 170532Z Dec 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 201933Z Dec 65 (TS)
3. COMUSMACV 44706/221221Z Dec 65 (TS)
4. JCS 9198/230038Z Dec 65 (TS); CINCPAC 230410Z Dec 65 (TS)
5. CINCPAC Briefing Notes, 26 Dec 65 (TS); 84 separate incidents.

cease-fire was extended on short notice. CINCPAC also stated that the advantage of a cease-fire accrued to the enemy and he suggested that any future cease-fire should be planned in detail well in advance. Admiral Sharp further proposed that aerial observation of key enemy installations in North Vietnam should continue even during a cease-fire.[1]

Admiral Sharp thought enemy morale and tenacity was supported by a strong conviction that US patience would expire before their own. Hanoi officials had stated that the enormous costs and future casualties would persuade the US to negotiate on North Vietnamese terms. They also boasted that Operation STARLIGHT and the battle at Ia Drang were actually victories for their side. CINCPAC thought that the NVN evaluation might be true in a strategic sense unless US strategy made full use of the superior air power to reduce casualties and foreshorten the time required to achieve the limited objective sought by the United States.[1]

Ordnance Expended

This discussion should be considered in conjunction with the associated table portraying ordnance expenditure during ROLLING THUNDER.

The general purpose (GP) bomb was the weapon employed against the majority of ROLLING THUNDER targets. The Navy used principally the 250, 500, and 1000 pound bombs; USAF relied mainly on the 750 pound bomb supplemented by a small number of 250, 500, and 3000 pound bombs. Optimum weapons were not always used during these operations, however, and some of the reasons for this situation are described below.

Use of napalm against North Vietnam targets was prohibited until RT 6, thereafter it was employed if merited by the targets or other considerations. CBU-2A was a preferred weapon (by USAF) for flak suppression, but it was withdrawn for a time to permit testing of safety features.

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1. CINCPAC 262159Z Dec 65 (TS)

[redacted]

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE*
ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM

ROLLING THUNDER PERIOD	GP BOMBS	ROCKETS 2.75" & ZUNI	AGM 12B & 12C	CBU 2A	NAPALM
5	720	--	--	72	--
6	750	3660	--	--	18
7	920	5720	--	8	22
8	1520	4310	--	12	24
9	1570	3500	32	4	5
10	410	150	--	12	6
11	1080	3490	8	--	26
12	2260	6860	36	--	14
13/14	2670	9620	42	--	62
15/16	4140	11880	167	--	--
17	2070	4630	28	--	--
18/19	4890	8870	24	--	--
20/21	5860	7960	84	11	--
22/23	4700	8050	15	12	27
24/25	5600	9680	90	28	123
26/27	4490	9460	15	70	16
28/29	4930	10280	82	40	65
30/31	8020	9020	23	20	52
32/33	7400	11360	69	--	5
TOTAL	64000	128500	715	289	465

*Number of bombs, dispensers, etc.

[redacted]

[redacted] Cbt [illegible] USA info

[redacted]



Throughout ROLLING THUNDER operations there was no case where sorties were cancelled because weapons were unavailable. However, local shortages of certain weapons did require substitution of alternate weapons for others which were preferable. This often led to a less than planned level of damage or a higher sortie commitment to achieve the desired result.

[redacted]

[redacted]



ROLLING THUNDER

ARMED RECONNAISSANCE BOUNDARY EXTENSIONS

[redacted]

[redacted]

AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS

Origin of Barrel Roll

During May 1964 the United States began to conduct aerial reconnaissance flights over Laos. These operations, nicknamed YANKEE TEAM, were intended to obtain intelligence and to impress the leaders of both friendly and hostile forces of US military presence. Following the loss of a YANKEE TEAM aircraft in early June the US response was to use napalm and conventional weapons to strike back at the offending antiaircraft installations at Xieng Khouang Ville.[1]

Throughout the summer and fall of 1964 there were discussions of other US air operations, primarily combat strikes, in Laos. One project concerned armed reconnaissance along Laotian Route 7;[2] another, LONE STAR, was in regard to night interdiction of routes 7, 71, 23, 9, 12, 121 and 8 in Laos.[3] Some features of these plans were reflected in later operations in Laos.

[redacted]

This opened the door for more intensive air operations in Laos, and on 11 December 1964 the JCS alerted CINCPAC to a plan for two

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1964, pp. 269-272
2. CINCPACFLT 030238Z Jul 64 (S); AMEMBASSY Vientiane AIRA CX-366/011236Z Jul 64 (S); JCS 7253/062255Z Jul 64 (S)
3. CINCPAC Command History, 1964, pp. 299-300

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

missions (4 aircraft each) involving US armed reconnaissance/prebriefed air strikes in the Laos corridor. CINCPAC immediately informed COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT[1] and a few hours later the execute message from CINCPAC specified that USAF forces under COMUSMACV would accomplish the first operation on 14 December, 1964. COMUSMACV was to coordinate the operations of his USAF forces and the naval aircraft under CINCPACFLT[2] with Ambassador Sullivan in Laos. The operation was assigned the nickname "BARREL ROLL."

The first BARREL ROLL operation was conducted on 14 December 1964. A three day delay was required between missions, and during this time CINCPAC approved a COMUSMACV recommendation that the familiar and time tested coordination procedures of YANKEE TEAM be adopted for future BARREL ROLL missions.[3]

During the combat air operations in Laos it was particularly important to keep the American Ambassador in Laos fully informed. Legitimate military targets were often located close to friendly elements of the population, and RLAF combat aircraft were also operating in the same area as BARREL ROLL (BR). During the second BR mission, on 17 December 1964, naval aircraft under CTG 77.4 struck as a target of opportunity a bridge that could have been under RLAF attack at the same time as the BR strike. To prevent a recurrence of this and to promote future understanding, CINCPAC instructed his operational commanders that targets of opportunity were confined to unmistakable military activity of a transient or mobile nature. He further stated that fixed installations would be struck only in connection with attacks on clearly identified military convoys and military personnel, or when specifically assigned as a secondary target.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 120612Z Dec 64 (TS)
2. COMUSMACV 17273/130546 Dec 64 (TS); CINCPAC 130750Z Dec 64 (S)
3. COMUSMACV 17559/160631Z Dec 64 (TS); CINCPAC 161958Z Dec 64 (TS); CINCPAC 190156Z Dec 64 (S)
4. CINCPAC 190052Z Dec 64 (TS); CINCPAC 190156Z Dec 64 (S); VIENTIANE 69 to CINCPAC 21 Dec 64 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

BARREL ROLL Extended

Following completion of the second BR mission the program was extended an additional two weeks during which four separate route reconnaissance missions, with fixed installations as secondary targets, were to be conducted. Each mission was to consist of one flight of four aircraft armed with optimum conventional ordnance excluding napalm. It was specified that no Thailand based aircraft were authorized for use in these operations.

The first two missions would be flown during the period 21-27 December, but it was required that the second of these missions would take place "not earlier than (the) third day following the first."[1] A similar time schedule was dictated for the third and fourth BARREL ROLL missions. Weather reconnaissance, combat air patrol, post strike reconnaissance and search and rescue were authorized.[2]

[redacted]

1. JCS 003081/191725Z Dec 64 (TS)
2. JCS 003082/192025Z Dec 64 (TS); CINCPAC 192145Z Dec 64 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Meanwhile COMUSMACV promulgated refined coordination procedures for BARREL ROLL missions. If time permitted, he would announce 48 hours in advance the plan to execute a mission. This message would be given wide distribution and would serve the primary function of coordination. Subsequent operational reports would advise of the progress and results of the missions.[1]

Coordination Procedures

On Christmas Eve 1964 CINCPACAF asked CINCPAC to reconsider the decision to conduct BARREL ROLL operations under YANKEE TEAM procedures. Instead, CINCPACAF requested that the air component chain of command be utilized for the operations by USAF units beyond the boundaries of RVN. Noting that COMUSMACV was already burdened with operations within RVN, CINCPACAF proposed that PACAF staff was better qualified at all levels to handle the air operations. He also stated that his command and control communications were immediately responsive and that both strategic and tactical intelligence were readily available to his headquarters.[2] This aspect of BARREL ROLL activities was resolved between CINCPAC and CINCPACAF; there was no change.

Two days later COMUSMACV also proposed a change in BARREL ROLL procedures by suggesting that MACV/2d Air Division allocate targets as was practiced in YANKEE TEAM. He supported his proposal by pointing out that YANKEE TEAM and BARREL ROLL utilized the same aircraft and bases, had the same objective area and required similar in-theater coordination. COMUSMACV further observed that adoption of his proposal would provide a central point for coordinating with the American Embassy in Laos, on covert operations under COMUSMACV and with operations of SEVENTH FLEET and 2d Air Division.[3] In responding, CINCPAC stated that target selection and

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1. COMUSMACV 17905/200600Z Dec 64 (TS)
2. CINCPACAF C 64-136 240055Z Dec 64 (TS)
3. COMUSMACV 18493/270448Z Dec 64 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

target allocation could be accomplished at one of several levels. However, he elected to continue to allocate BARREL ROLL targets.[1]

The third and fourth BARREL ROLL missions of the second series were postponed briefly while more suitable secondary targets were selected, but they were rescheduled for the original period of 28 December to 3 January.[2]

SEACOORD Recommendations

In early January, General Milton, CINCPAC J02, attended a SEACOORD meeting in Saigon with Ambassadors Taylor (RVN), Sullivan (Laos), and Martin (Thailand). During the meeting it was concluded that the RLAF T-28 operations and US Air operations in Laos had produced minimal effect upon the enemy infiltration into RVN and upon Hanoi's willingness to continue the effort. Nevertheless, it was considered that there had been some beneficial side effects with respect to Thai and Laos morale, US pilot proficiency in Laos, and deterrence to vehicular-borne infiltration over main routes into Laos. Also, some of the supporting installations had been dispersed and the VM/PL were presumed to be using conscripted coolie labor, something that was becoming scarce because of the peasant fear of air attacks. Even so, it seemed probable that such minor scale air operations were unrecognized by Hanoi and Peiping as increments of pressure designed to influence the GNVN will to continue aggression.[3] This is not surprising, since NVN was unscathed and the damage achieved in twice a week operations was less than spectacular in scope.

The SEACOORD group recommended the following actions to increase the effectiveness of US assets employed in air operations in Laos:

1. Air strike against the bridge at Ban Ken. Success in this would relieve some pressure in the northern section of Laos and might also reduce the requirement for some of the armed and photographic reconnaissance missions flown by US aircraft along Route 7.

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1. CINCPAC 290045Z Dec 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 282123Z Dec 64 (TS)
3. SAIGON 1210 to CINCPAC 1 PM 7 Jan 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

2. Intensive low level oblique photography in the Laos corridor because YANKEE TEAM photo missions, conducted above the range of antiaircraft fire, were obtaining information of limited value for any purpose.

3. BARREL ROLL operations should be concentrated on night armed reconnaissance missions against the Laos corridor routes and Route 7, and on day operations emphasizing strikes against fixed targets.[1]

Washington authorities were quick to approve the mission against Ban Ken bridge.[2] In anticipation of the lucrative target that might be produced by this blockage of Route 7, COMUSMACV proposed that a scheduled night armed reconnaissance of the route be executed on the same date as the bridge strike. CINCPAC[3] and Ambassador Sullivan concurred,[4] but despite the logic of the idea higher authority would not approve conducting the two missions with less than a 48 hour delay between them.[5]

[redacted]

Problems in Scheduling

From the earliest stage of BARREL ROLL operations there was a requirement for a sterile period, i.e., a delay between missions. These periods were initially three days and were intended to preclude giving an impression of a sudden escalation in the air operations in Laos. The sterile period was later reduced to 48 hours; but there was a specified time, usually a week, for the execution of two missions.

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1. SAIGON 2073 to STATE 1 PM 7 Jan 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 100616Z Jan 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 112000Z Jan 65 (TS)
4. VIENTIANE 1040 to STATE 4 PM 12 Jan 65 (TS)
5. JCS 003681/121618Z Jan 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Weather or other factors sometimes caused repeated deferrals of missions and as the end of a BR period approached there was profound uncertainty at nearly all command levels regarding the authority to execute a particular mission. Attempting to clarify the situation took valuable time of higher ranking staff officers and imposed additional burdens on the overloaded communications circuits.

On 9 January a decision was made that there would be no expiration date for the execution of a specific mission that had been aborted because of weather or for other operational reasons. At the same time it was announced that the deferred missions would constitute a "bank" of approved tasks that could be executed as feasible. The JCS also authorized missions to be flown without regard to their numerical designations. [1]

[redacted]

1. JCS 3631/092258Z Jar 65 (TS); COMUSMACV 1161/131482Z Jan 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

These measures and time soothed the General's feelings, but he insisted that future US air operations (both day and night) be confined to the area east of Muong Phine and that Route 23 south of Route 9 would be the exclusive preserve of the RLAF. General Ma also stated that campfires should not be attacked because they were more than likely attended by friendly villagers or forces.[1]

Following this incident, night BARREL ROLL operations were conducted without secondary targets. For an extended period ammunition not expended on route reconnaissance was jettisoned in the sea or returned to base.

Air Defense vs. Force Capability

BARREL ROLL 11 was scheduled for a day armed reconnaissance against routes 8 and 12; and BARREL ROLL 12 was to be a day armed reconnaissance against routes 23 and 12.[2] Secondary targets (fixed) selected in Washington were specified for each mission, and there was no provision for flak suppression forces. However, it was determined that the antiaircraft defenses of these secondary targets, as of December, consisted of ten AA sites and a total of 24 guns. CINCPAC concluded that the specified force composition for the two missions did not provide an acceptable risk for the strike force. He therefore recommended to the JCS that four flak suppression aircraft be authorized for each mission or that different secondary targets, compatible with the force capability, be selected. Pending JCS action on this recommendation CINCPAC authorized COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT to defer the two missions.[3] The following day new secondary targets were selected, and it was directed that areas of heavy AA concentration would be avoided.[4]

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1. VIENTIANE 1081 to STATE 5 PM 18 Jan 65 (TS); CINCPAC 182111Z Jan 65 (TS); VIENTIANE 868 to CINCPAC 9 AM 19 Jan 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 200406Z Jan 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 202053Z Jan 65 (TS)
4. JCS 003999/212337Z Jan 65 (TS); CINCPAC 220320Z Jan 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Proposed Measures To Increase Effectiveness

When the JCS sought comments/recommendations regarding the expansion of the air interdiction program in Laos, CINCPAC stated that the greatest damage to enemy lines of communications (LOCs) could be attained through day strikes on fixed components of the enemy logistics system. He also indicated that the BARREL ROLL effort had been handicapped by an absence of operational flexibility and continuity of effort. Summing up his thoughts on the subject, CINCPAC stated his belief that the resources and capability were available for an effective interdiction program in Laos. However, he noted that the effort to date had been piecemeal rather than comprehensive. He further emphasized that an effective interdiction program in the Laos environment must feature frequent coverage of routes and targets and immediate flexible reaction to factors of intelligence and operational nature.[1]

On 29 January COMUSMACV proposed other modifications to BARREL ROLL. The essence of his suggestion was to: 1) continue BARREL ROLL operations under the existing rules; 2) establish three key choke points which would be periodically reseeded with delay fuze and anti-disturbance munitions; 3) conduct armed reconnaissance to destroy the traffic build-up near the choke points; 4) accomplish the choke point reseeding and armed reconnaissance as required. It was hoped that these procedures would give form and direction to the whole interdiction program in Laos.[2]

Plans for BARREL ROLL 13, 14, and 15 required that there be at least 48 hours between day missions and at least 36 hours between day and night, or night and day missions. CINCPACFLT, charged with executing BARREL ROLL 14, pointed out that if the specified timing intervals were observed the late afternoon shadows would complicate obtaining good photography and there would be only about three hours daylight for search and rescue operations. He therefore requested

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1. CINCPAC 211959Z Jan 65 (TS); COMUSMACV 2813/290233Z Jan 65 (TS)
2. COMUSMACV 2813/290233Z Jan 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

authority to reduce the time between BR 13 and BR 14 from 48 hours to 44 hours or less. In response CINCPAC authorized the execution of BR 14 any time during daylight hours 2 February.[1]

The commander's prerogative to vary his tactics in accordance with the situation was often stringently limited during BARREL ROLL operations. For example, the JCS instructions for the conduct of BR 15 prescribed night armed reconnaissance traversing Route 7 from west to east. After the mission was flown CINCPACAF pointed out that the operational commander should have been able to vary the direction of flight if the existing weather conditions made such a variation logical. Accordingly, CINCPAC submitted another of his multiple appeals for greater latitude for the commanders of the operating forces.[2] In response the phrase "direction of flight on armed recce at your discretion" began to appear in BARREL ROLL planning messages.[3]

CINCPAC Comments on Target Selection

In early February OSD/ISA asked CINCPAC to comment on a proposed system to achieve improved target selection, coordination, and mission approval. At the same time it was specified that all BARREL ROLL missions would receive final approval in Washington and that the RLAF would provide rapid reaction capability against targets developed by immediate intelligence assets. With these provisos, the OSD/ISA proposal featured development of a coordinated and approved target list; nomination by the American Ambassador, Laos, of targets to be struck during a specified BARREL ROLL operational period of two weeks; COMUSMACV planning of the missions; CINCPAC comment

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1. CINCPAC 011956Z Feb 65 (TS)
2. CINCPACAF 50079/132203Z Feb 65 (TS); 2d A Div 0833/041815Z Feb 65 (TS); 2d A Div 0828/041600Z Feb 65 (TS); 2d A Div 0841/042210Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPAC 062230Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPAC 050207Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPACFLT 170508Z Feb 65 (TS); COMUSMACV 3444/050950Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPAC 062230Z Feb 65 (TS)
3. JCS 004898/092149Z Feb 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

or concurrence on the proposed plan; and review in Washington for interagency approval and expeditious answer to CINCPAC.[1]

The results of BARREL ROLL armed reconnaissance mission were, by early February, negligible in comparison to the effort expended. To a high degree, Admiral Sharp attributed this to the targets selected, and he observed that the RLAF, operating with fewer restrictions and flying many more sorties than the US aircraft, had been quite successful in locating and destroying fixed installations. CINCPAC recommended that future BARREL ROLL programs provide for low level reconnaissance and current target information; and minimum restrictions so commanders could respond to changing tactical situations and intelligence. He also proposed developing a bank of targets, selected by COMUSMACV in coordination with the American Ambassador to Laos, which could be struck on COMUSMACV initiative after giving CINCPAC or Washington 24 hours advance notice.[2]

Admiral Sharp's response also included comments on another JCS proposal to concentrate BARREL ROLL missions against known PL/VM antiaircraft sites. He noted, as he had previously, that force composition should be based on the desired degree of target damage and the security of the strike force. As to sortie requirements to ensure 85 per cent probability of destruction of at least one weapon per site, CINCPAC stated that there was no magic figure of force composition that would apply to all missions. He also suggested that the enemy logistics system, not the protective antiaircraft weapons, was the most appropriate target for BARREL ROLL.[3]

Problems in Coordination

Coordination was one of the knottiest problems encountered during the early stages of BARREL ROLL. The principal issue was the number of US agencies involved. Other factors were the changing disposition of friendly Laotian forces, the presence of enemy forces

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1. OSD/ISA 004489/031256 Feb 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 050207Z Feb 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 050207Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPAC 040005Z Feb 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

in non-enemy villages, and a broad range of problems regarding acquisition and distribution of current target materials.

To illustrate, on 15 February the JCS authorized the conduct of a number of day and night armed reconnaissance missions between 1 and 14 March; they requested that CINCPAC submit a target list not later than 22 February.[1] CINCPAC, on 17 February, designated COMUSMACV as the coordinating authority for development and assignment of these missions. In coordination with the US Ambassador in Laos and with CINCPACFLT, COMUSMACV was to submit a plan (OP-00) for the strikes to CINCPAC by 20 February.[2]

On 18 February COMUSMACV provided Commander, 2d Air Division with the basic target data on the missions and directed him to prepare the plan. Concurrently, he provided identical data to the US Ambassador in Laos and asked his concurrence.[3] When there had been no comment from the Ambassador by late 21 February COMUSMACV interpreted silence as consent and submitted his plan by message to CINCPAC with the JCS and AMEMB VIENTIANE (Laos) and others as information addressees.[4]

The US Air Attache in Vientiane responded, on 22 February to the COMUSMACV request for concurrence. He agreed with several of the proposed missions, but he took exception to a number of the elements of the plan. For example, he requested delay of one strike to permit coordination with the RLAF and local covert agencies; he proposed to change the size of the armed reconnaissance area for another mission to give greater assurance that friendly forces would not be injured; and he requested substitutes or deletions regarding other missions.[5]

These changes were of such substance that CINCPAC cancelled the plan and directed COMUSMACV to resubmit a coordinated recommendation immediately. On the same day, Ambassador Sullivan stated

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1. JCS 005242/151700Z Feb 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 170405Z Feb 65 (TS)
3. COMUSMACV 5154/181600Z Feb 65 (TS); COMUSMACV 5852/250245Z Feb 65 (TS)
4. COMUSMACV 5488/211801Z Feb 65 (TS)
5. USAIRA VIENTIANE 02110/220930Z Feb 65 (TS)
6. CINCPAC 240126Z Feb 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

that the Air Attache recommendations were only preliminary comments and that COMUSMACV could expect the Ambassador's concurrence shortly.[1] Even so, the plan was ultimately completed.

Equally trying problems were encountered during subsequent planning activities, but coordination procedures were gradually refined while combat operations were conducted.

Choke Point Reseeding Schedule

The JCS had maintained a requirement for a 48 hour interval between BARREL ROLL missions to reseed choke points. On 3 March COMUSMACV proposed that choke point missions should be exempt from this requirement. He proposed that one of the three choke points should be reseeded daily with delayed fuze munitions. This procedure would provide continuous and daily strikes at each choke point.[2] CINCPAC recommended JCS approve this concept.[3]

On 23 March, without reference to COMUSMACV/CINCPAC comments, the JCS rescinded the restrictions on the number of choke points that could be reseeded each day, and on the frequency of reseeding any one choke point. The reason for this JCS action was "to provide more operational flexibility."[4]

Armed Reconnaissance Technique

COMUSMACV concurred, on 2 March, with a CINCPACAF proposal to provide surveillance of a selected route for extended periods of time; for example, an extended period during daylight and another period at night on a random schedule. Routes 12 and 23 were selected by COMUSMAC for the initial application of this technique. It was expected that this procedure would replace the stereotyped 36-48 hour interval between BARREL ROLL missions and introduce the element of surprise.[5]

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1. VIENTIANE 1087 to COMUSMACV 6 PM 24 Feb 65 (TS)
2. COMUSMACV 6577/031130Z Mar 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 040014Z Mar 65 (TS)
4. JCS 231549Z Mar 65 (TS)
5. CINCPACAF 240013Z Feb 65 (TS); COMUSMACV 021218Z Mar 65 (TS)

[redacted]

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STEEL TIGER

Following a March visit to Southeast Asia by the US Army Chief of Staff, the decision was made in Washington to "reorient BARREL ROLL to increase its military effectiveness against infiltration routes into SVN." One aspect of this modification was to divide Laos into two distinct air operations areas--one sector to be given a new nickname (STEEL TIGER) and the other to retain the designation BARREL ROLL.

CINCPAC agreed to the division of operating areas as did Ambassador Sullivan in Vientiane. The Ambassador noted that the division would promote effective management, and he reiterated a suggestion that a special unit be situated at Udorn to carry out the "bread-and-butter" portion of BARREL ROLL; with additional help from CINCPACFLT and Commander, 2d Air Division for larger operations.

The subject of air operations in Laos was considered at a SEACOORD Conference at Udorn on 27 March. CINCPAC authorized 2d Air Division and CTF 77 to send representatives to the meeting, but because of the short notice of the assembly he was unable to have a direct representative. In this regard, he stipulated that he should have the opportunity to review any proposals before they were implemented. Further, he advised that there was no necessity to have a special unit at Udorn or elsewhere designated specifically for BARREL ROLL operations.[1]

CINCPAC was advised of the tentative decisions reached at the meeting. Of particular interest was the Ambassador's statement on what the Lao wished to derive from the BARREL ROLL program (as affected by the division of operating areas). The RLG particularly desired systematic interdiction of Viet Minh infiltration routes 6, 65 and 7, plus rapid response to their calls for help if the VM/PL launched a major military push in north Laos. The Ambassador also recognized that certain factors in the sphere of military responsibility limited the effectiveness of air operations in Laos, and he attributed this to Washington's desire to keep firm control of air operations. The JCS

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1. CINCPAC 261930Z Mar 65 (TS)

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announced that effective 3 April US air operations in Laos directed against routes and targets in the panhandle and associated with infiltration into South Vietnam would be considered a separate program and identified by the unclassified nickname of STEEL TIGER. The existing BARREL ROLL procedures, except as specifically modified, would apply to the new program.[1]

Alert Aircraft for Targets of Opportunity (BANGO/WHIPLASH)

On 9 May, in response to an earlier COMUSMACV proposal, four Ubon based F-4s were placed on daily alert to operate against targets of opportunity in Laos. BANGO, the call sign of these aircraft, was used as a nickname or short title for these aircraft.[2] Thailand based F-105s, termed WHIPLASH, were subsequently designated for the same purpose as BANGO. (S)

Development of the above quick response capability represented a significant advance in both operational and procedural flexibility. Just about 90 days previous to the first BANGO operation the armed escorts of a YANKEE TEAM mission sighted 15-20 enemy trucks on Route 12 in Laos. The rules of engagement rendered the trucks immune to attack, and there was no quick response force capable of dealing with this target.[3] (S)

[redacted]

1. JCS 007624/231953Z Mar 65 (TS)
2. COMUSMACV 270345Z Apr 65 (TS); COMUSMACV 181110Z Apr 65 (TS); CINCPAC 291708Z Apr 65 (TS)
3. COMUSMACV 3683/062238Z Feb 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

The STEEL TIGER armed reconnaissance area of operations was modified in the interests of providing further safeguards for friendly personnel. In this reduced area, reconnaissance aircraft were authorized to attack clearly identifiable military convoys, vehicles and troops within 200 yards of roads. Installations, however, were to be struck only in conjunction with an attack on troops, vehicles, etc. All US aircraft overflying Laos were to observe a minimum altitude of 10,000 feet and avoid major towns, such as Saravane and Vientiane, in friendly areas.[1] COMUSMACV specified additional precautionary measures regarding radar flight following and study of route photography.[2] The US Air Attache, Vientiane also proposed various precautionary rules of engagement in the interests of securing clearance to resume STEEL TIGER armed reconnaissance.[3]

CINCPAC concurred in the above proposals and directed that if the RLAF needed assistance against targets along Route 92 either BANGO alert or a special mission should be set up using an RLAF T-28 as pathfinder.[4] By 7 June the RLG permitted resumption of STEEL TIGER armed reconnaissance.[5]

Decentralization of Control

The first signs of the JCS relinquishing the day-to-day control of air operations in Laos appeared during April in connection with an effort to intensify air operations, particularly route blocking missions, in the panhandle. CINCPAC was authorized to determine the number of missions, the number of aircraft per mission and the division of effort between day and night operations.[6] Under this increased authority CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV and the US Ambassador in Laos that the weight of effort should be shifted from armed reconnaissance and

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1. USAIRA VIENTIANE 251038Z May 65 (TS)
2. COMUSMACV 18148/290940Z May 65 (TS)
3. USAIRA 741/050400Z Jun 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 052142Z Jun 65 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 072318Z June 65 (TS)
6. JCS 008381/031828Z, 009314/171853Z Apr 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

choke point reseeding to increased attacks on fixed targets prior to the onset of the monsoon season. The objective, he stated, was to destroy the enemy's supply bases and to further delay their spring offensive.[1]

To this end COMUSMACV proposed a revised armed reconnaissance concept. Under it, specified routes approved by RLAF would be subjected to armed reconnaissance once each day and once each night. The goal of this approach would be approximately 12 hour daily coverage of each route. Adoption of the new concept would mean abandoning the previous practice of conducting separate armed reconnaissance missions four times daily.[2]

In response to JCS and CINCPAC guidance, COMUSMACV added to the above concept on 22 April. He proposed that a list of fixed targets be developed for the STEEL TIGER area in coordination with Ambassador Sullivan (Laos) and the RLAF. COMUSMACV proposed that tactical commanders select targets from this authorized list and allow each armed reconnaissance element in-flight choice of a secondary target appropriate to the route being flown. Also, if the secondary strike was impossible there would be alternate targets, consisting of road segments, against which the munitions could be expended. Lastly, it was proposed that aircraft on BARREL ROLL missions and STEEL TIGER choke point missions be permitted to strike targets of opportunity enroute to or from the assigned target area.[3] Several days later COMUSMACV proposed that STEEL TIGER armed reconnaissance missions strike specified fixed targets before conducting the reconnaissance. In effect this was the reverse of his earlier recommendation. On 30 April CINCPAC approved the changes discussed above.[4] BARREL ROLL/ STEEL TIGER rules were further relaxed during the first half of June when daylight armed reconnaissance sorties were authorized to strike any bridge on an approved mission route segment.[5]

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1. CINCPAC 242212Z Apr 65 (TS)
2. COMUSMACV 12877/201132Z Apr 65 (TS)
3. COMUSMACV 220728Z Apr 65 (TS)
4. COMUSMACV 300242Z Apr 65 (TS); CINCPAC 302055Z Apr 65 (TS) CINCPAC 041707Z May 65 (TS)
5. COMUSMACV 100619Z Jun 65 (TS); CINCPAC 130017Z Jun 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Mid-year Assessment

Between 1 April and the end of June there had been multiple changes in US rules regulating air operations in Laos. The trend was toward added flexibility for tactical commanders, more liberal rules of engagement, improved concepts, and less operational control from Washington. Collectively, these changes enhanced the possibility of effectively impeding the flow of enemy personnel and materiel into Laos and South Vietnam.[1]

There remained, however, significant operational restrictions which degraded the military effectiveness of BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER operations. Perhaps the most significant of these was the severe limitations, imposed by General Ma, regarding air operations in Southern Laos. This was where the most significant enemy activity was concentrated, but General Ma would not accept US estimates of the threat. Also during the mid-year period there were repeated requests for permission to use napalm in Laos. Without exception, these were disapproved by Ambassador Sullivan.[2]

Rainy Season Tactics and Rationale

In late June, after considering the views of COMUSMACV and CINCPACAF, and with particular emphasis on the imminent rainy season in Laos, CINCPAC outlined certain changes in tactics and rationale regarding the interdiction campaign.[3] He first mentioned the absence of a definite measure of effectiveness of cratering and reseeding of choke points and portions of the lines of communication. CINCPAC then noted the general agreement that the weight of effort should be shifted from armed reconnaissance to strikes against fixed targets. The primary objectives, he stated, should be fixed and validated targets; if practical, some of these missions should have the secondary objective of armed reconnaissance.

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1. CINCPAC 072312Z Jun 65 (TS); COMUSMACV 120805Z Jun 65 (TS)
2. COMUSMACV 270120Z Jun 65 (TS)
3. COMUSMACV 191915/120900Z Jun 65 (TS); CINCPAC 20847/122140Z Jun 65 (TS)

[redacted]

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The second most important and urgent task was immediate development of a ground-air observer intelligence collection operation and a tactical air control system that would facilitate finding and attacking both fleeting and fixed targets which escaped detection by conventional photographic reconnaissance. In this regard CINCPAC noted that the road watch teams which had rendered valuable service during the dry season would accomplish very little by remaining in fixed positions during the rainy season. He also suggested that the role and capability of road watch resources should be expanded. [1]

Measures to Increase Effectiveness

In early July the JCS solicited comments on several possible actions designed to improve the effectiveness of air operations in Laos. CINCPAC's response noted that armed reconnaissance was not very effective and often totally non-productive because the LOC were difficult to identify and were often only trails under the jungle canopy. He also pointed out that road cratering was being reduced during the rainy season, but it would be increased during the dry season with emphasis on choke points. CINCPAC stated that as soon as additional fixed targets were developed, night missions would be assigned secondary targets.

CINCPAC listed several policy changes which were permitting more effective use of capabilities. Among these were the following:

1. ROLLING THUNDER missions returning to Thailand bases were authorized to use unexpended ordnance against designated portions of the roads in Laos. Additionally, CINCPAC was considering having USN sorties weathered out in Laos dispose of their ordnance in North Vietnam.

2. Another source of increased effectiveness was the practice of having fixed target missions conduct armed reconnaissance both to and from their objective. CINCPAC predicted that as Thailand aircraft basing increased there would be more continuous route coverage. [2]

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1. CINCPAC 260330Z Jun 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 180403Z Aug 65 (TS)
3. COMUSMACV 34091/281425Z Sept 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Constraint on Armed Reconnaissance

Armed Reconnaissance in Laos had been prohibited closer than two miles to the North Vietnamese border. At COMUSMACV's initiative this restriction was lifted effective 19 July.[1]

Change in Concept of Operations

A major change in operational concept occurred when COMUSMACV announced, on 28 September, that his planning directives would no longer direct specific missions for specified dates. Instead, minimum operational guidelines would be laid down with the objective of providing increased mission planning flexibility and more effective use of resources. These guidelines were:

1. All approved armed reconnaissance routes would be covered once each day in the BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER areas.

2. Extended armed reconnaissance missions must be combined with strikes on fixed targets to improve sortie utilization.

3. Effective 1 October pure choke point missions would be discontinued as COMUSMACV scheduled missions.

4. Road cratering would cover extended distances instead of concentrating on repeated cratering of designated segments.

5. Day missions in the STEEL TIGER/BARREL ROLL area could strike any category "A" target designated by COMUSMACV as a pre-reconnaissance strike or as a secondary or weather alternate.

Bombing Through Overcast

COMUSMACV ruled, on 1 August, that no BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER flight would drop live ordnance through an overcast either with or without radar control.[2] This control measure was first stated in response to a CTG 77.6 query, and it was incorporated into a CINCPAC Frag Order of 10 October.[3] (S)

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1. COMUSMACV 34091/281425Z Sept 65 (TS)
2. COMUSMACV 28821/170845Z Aug 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 102142Z Oct 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Authorization to Jettison Ordnance in NVN

CINCPACFLT requested, on 12 August, that BARREL ROLL/ STEEL TIGER rules be changed to permit weather aborted missions over Laos to attack appropriate targets in North Vietnam. This, he stated, would be in the interest of economical ordnance expenditure.[1] CINCPAC concurred and stated that missions of this type could jettison ordnance on any suitable and previously struck JCS numbered target or on rail and highway LOC in North Vietnam. It was required that all targets be within the armed reconnaissance area of ROLLING THUNDER.[2]

Diverting STEEL TIGER Aircraft

The US Air Attache, Vientiane proposed, in September, that STEEL TIGER aircraft be diverted to strike targets marked by RLAF aircraft. CINCPAC confirmed, in concurrence with COMUSMACV, that special USAIRA requirements should continue to be met by the Thailand based F-4s and F-105s (BANGO/WHIPLASH) designated for such tasks. Further he stated that airborne diversion of STEEL TIGER strikes was to be limited to instances of an urgent operational nature when BANGO/ WHIPLASH aircraft could not affect a timely response.[3] (S)

BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER Operations Interrupted

The unique environment of BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER operations was demonstrated during October and early November when, after two alleged USAF strikes on friendly Laotians in the STEEL TIGER area, these operations were suspended 1-6 October. Thereafter, operations were resumed except there was no armed reconnaissance authorized south of 16° 42' N.; this limitation lasted until mid-November.[4]

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1. CINCPACFLT 120902Z Aug 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 102142Z Oct 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 162033Z Sept 65 (TS)
4. USAIRA VIENTIANE 011711Z Oct 65 (S) COMUSMACV 020103Z Oct 65 (S); COMUSMACV 050220Z Oct 65 (TS); CINCPAC 142146Z Nov 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

In another incident BARREL ROLL operations were discontinued for the period 19-23 October after the loss of an ICC aircraft enroute from Vientiane to Hanoi. This interruption was intended to preclude interference with USAF SAR efforts, and to avoid publicity for US air operations in Laos.[1]

Southern Laos Opened to STEEL TIGER Operations

By November it was evident that more effective counteraction was necessary to interdict the infiltration through Laos. The major obstacle to this action had been, however, General Ma's reluctance to accept the high rate of enemy movement reported by US sources. But after observing the lights of enemy vehicular traffic during a night flight, General Ma began to alter his views.[2] Meanwhile, strong effort was devoted to persuading the General to authorize resumption of STEEL TIGER operations.

CINCPAC had directed, on 3 November, that the southeastern portion of the Laos panhandle receive the highest priority for YANKEE TEAM photography. He also urged COMUSMACV and the component commanders to provide Ambassador Sullivan with photography in the most useful form for target validation.[3] He further proposed, in response to a JCS query, to shift the emphasis of air operations from choke point interdiction to the harassment, disruption and attrition of LOC support facilities.[4]

To facilitate obtaining authority to resume full scale STEEL TIGER operations, CINCPAC concurred in providing General Ma with information about anticipated activities in the STEEL TIGER zone.[5] This and other actions induced General Ma to agree, near the middle of November, to the resumption and expansion of air operations in Southern Laos.[6]

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1. USAIRA VIENTIANE 191057Z Oct 65 (S); COMUSMACV 252000Z Oct 65 (S); USAIRA VIENTIANE 310320Z Oct 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 050146Z Nov 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 032328Z Nov 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 030419Z Nov 65 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 072050Z Nov 65 (TS)
6. CINCPAC 142146Z Nov 65 (TS); USAIRA VIENTIANE 030416Z Nov 65 (TS)

[redacted]

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Accordingly, COMUSMACV published new operating rules for BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER. The most significant policy change was establishment of armed reconnaissance sectors adjacent to RVN in which strikes could be conducted with minimum restriction along any motorable trail or road.[1]



Proposed Extension of ROLLING THUNDER Armed Reconnaissance into Laos

On 1 December COMUSMACV proposed that ROLLING THUNDER armed reconnaissance, operating under STEEL TIGER rules, be extended into Laos in the vicinity of the DMZ.[4] CINCPAC did not concur. One reason was the limited number of armed reconnaissance sorties available

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1. COMUSMACV 40831/171630Z Nov 65 (TS)

[redacted]

4. COMUSMACV 302323Z Nov 65 (TS); VIENTIANE to STATE 604/031135Z Dec 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

for North Vietnam; another was that weather experience indicated that a continuous mission covering the STEEL TIGER/ROLLING THUNDER areas would not be productive in both areas.[1]

Policy on Air Strikes in Cambodia

On 9 December COMUSMACV requested authority to employ air and ground forces against enemy weapons firing from Cambodia on US troops in RVN; the proposed zone for these operations was 10 kilometers inside Cambodia. CINCPAC's response stated that planned operations of this nature would require advance approval. However, COMUSMACV was granted authority to conduct the proposed operations when necessary to defend against VC/NVA attack directed at friendly forces.[2]

Rules for FC-47 Operations

Operating rules for BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER required that aircraft be under positive radar control except during the actual conduct of a strike. This constraint was intended to aid in solving navigational problems inherent to high speed jet operations over the confined and often featureless operational areas. With the advent of the FC-47, a fighter configuration of the ancient C-47, the above control measure was modified. The revised rule stated that after FC-47 pilots established their starting positions by radar, they could conduct armed reconnaissance and maintain radar contact as permitted by terrain.[3]

Target Development

Development of worthwhile targets was prerequisite to effective interdiction of the enemy LOC in Laos. It was not until December, however, that the rate of target development became marginally adequate.

1. CINCPAC 070204Z Dec 65 (TS)
2. COMUSMACV 43199/091149Z Dec 65 (TS); CINCPAC 170438Z Dec 65 (TS)
3. COMUSMACV 42501/030222Z Dec 65 (TS); CINCPAC 112333Z Dec 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

In early March CINCPAC tasked the component commanders to prepare intelligence studies from aerial photography to identify targets and to determine route alignments in the Laotian panhandle.[1] A conference at CINCPAC Headquarters on 22 March adjusted responsibilities in this regard[2] and subsequent directives provided further guidance.[3]

These measures achieved a degree of improvement, but by the middle of the year target validation was averaging about 15 monthly while 30-45 monthly was necessary to provide adequate targeting for available air strikes and to optimize sortie utilization. In July CINCPAC tasked the component commanders to review the aerial reconnaissance program with special attention to the panhandle south of Route 9 and east of Route 23. Concurrently, he added the requirement to direct attention to the stream networks in southeastern Laos.[4]

In early August CINCPAC promulgated a directive regarding the manifold problems attendant to target development. This directive provided a sound basis for progress toward the goal of developing at least 30 new targets monthly, and toward ferreting out enemy facilities scattered along the jungle routes of eastern Laos.[5]

Target development and validation continued to be hampered by cumbersome and complex procedures as a result of conditions prerequisite to RLG approval for strikes on fixed installations. Even so, some progress occurred, and improved procedures were developed to expedite nomination of targets and distribution of photography and target lists.[6]

In November the RLG made the decision to open the southern part of Laos to US jet operations. This, in conjunction with the improved procedures developed throughout the year, permitted development of

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1. CINCPAC 070253Z Mar 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 240415Z Mar 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 210326Z Apr 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 132219Z July 65 (S)
5. CINCPAC 050225Z Aug 65 (S)
6. CINCPAC 260345Z Oct 65 (S); CINCPAC 180408Z Dec 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

30 targets during December. At the end of the year there were indications that a greater number of targets would be developed during the months immediately ahead.

Intensified Effort vs. Results

The following graphics portray the sharp increase in combat sorties in Laos during between October and December. The results, however, were not increasing at a rate equal to the additional sortie effort. This is illustrated in the chart titled "Total Results." This aspect of air operations was under close study at the end of the year.[1]

Summary of US Air Operations in Laos, October 1965 through January 1966

The following series of illustrations summarize US air operations in Laos and indicate the operating areas (as of 31 December 1965) of the various air programs.

UNITED STATES AIR SUPPORT IN RVN

Decision to Commit United States Aircraft

At the beginning of 1965, the only US aircraft authorized to engage in combat operations in RVN were the USAF FARM GATE AIEs, and it was required that a VNAF observer be aboard on these occasions.

Late in January, COMUSMACV obtained authority to use US jet aircraft in an emergency strike role within RVN with the proviso, however, that if operationally feasible the JCS and CINCPAC would be notified before such use or as soon as possible thereafter.[2]

On 10 March COMUSMACV was authorized to use US aircraft under his operational control for operations in South Vietnam. No Thailand

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1. Scientific Research Advisory Group Working Paper No. 9-66, Effectiveness of BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER October 1965 Through January 1966, of 7 February 1966 (S)
2. CINCPAC 262005Z Jan 65 (TS); CINCPAC 281916Z Jan 65 (TS)

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BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER COMBAT SORTIES



[redacted] US COMBAT SORTIES IN LAOS



SOURCE: CINCPAC 131A

[redacted]

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AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS

TARGET TYPES

BARREL ROLL



STEEL TIGER



TIGER HOUND



LEGEND

- VEHICLES
- BRIDGES
- MILITARY AREAS
- ROADS

NOTE:

MILITARY AREAS INCLUDE STRUCTURES, BUNKERS, TRUCK PARKS AND LIKE ITEMS.

[redacted]

[redacted]

	OCTOBER		NOVEMBER		DECEMBER		JANUARY	
	Strike	Armed Recce	Strike	Armed Recce	Strike	Armed Recce	Strike	Armec Recce
BARREL ROLL:								
Vehicles	-	3	-	15	-	12	-	6
Structures	118	35	17	12	42	60	35	18
Bridges & Fords	6	10	2	8	3	9	11	6
Secondary Explosions	1	7	4	1	6	-	18	17
Road Cuts	9	42	7	50	28	64	13	76
STEEL TIGER:								
Vehicles	-	8	1	30	13	53	18	37
Structures	16	17	20	15	43	34	118	46
Bridges & Fords	8	36	2	90	12	24	44	125
Secondary Explosions	-	1	5	6	7	21	41	30
Road Cuts	6	49	14	215	41	281	208	553
TIGER HOUND:								
Vehicles					2	4	12	8
Structures					182	70	455	108
Bridges & Fords					15	32	104	23
Secondary Explosions					12	14	97	23
Road Cuts					11	79	30	172
BANGO/WHIPLASH:								
Vehicles			1				3	
Structures	9		27		3		8	
Bridges & Fords			3		6		6	
Secondary Explosions					4		3	
Road Cuts	1		5		8		22	

RESULTS OF US AIR OPERATION IN LAOS
(Target elements reported as destroyed or damaged)

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BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER OPERATIONS AREAS 31 DEC 1965



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[redacted]

based strike aircraft were permitted to engage in these operations, and US aircraft were not to be used if VNAF could execute the mission on a timely basis. Further, US Air Commando Squadrons (FARM GATE) were to be permanently marked with USAF insignia and could be used for operations in RVN or elsewhere without VNAF observers aboard. [1]

United States Navy Support

From the earliest stage of US air operations in RVN these missions had priority over those in Laos or North Vietnam. Carrier and land based aircraft were used for ROLLING THUNDER and BARREL ROLL operations, but it was initially considered that the land based aircraft under COMUSMACV's operational control were sufficient to meet sortie requirements within the boundaries of RVN.

On 29 March, the number of CVAs in WESTPAC was increased from three to four. In part, this was to permit essential in port time for the ships. For example, the RANGER had recently been at sea off RVN for 117 days out of 125, and had gone 70 days without entering port. [2]

By April there were indications that Navy planes might be required for operations in RVN, but CINCPAC sought to assure that this was not done until it was clearly a case where RVN based aircraft were insufficient to meet requirements. [3] This proved to be the case at the end of April and CINCPAC allocated 38 USN carrier based sorties to COMUSMACV for 1 May. [4] More than twice this number were provided on 2 and 3 May; [5] on 5 May CINCPAC authorized temporary southward deployment of one carrier to support COMUSMACV. [6]

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1. CINCPAC 051959Z Mar 65 (S); CINCPAC 052200Z Mar 65 (TS); ADMINO CINCPAC 100032Z Mar 65 (TS); ADMINO CINCPAC 120153Z Mar 65 (TS)
2. CINCPACFLT 151912Z Apr 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 230316Z Apr 65 (TS); CINCPAC 240442Z Apr 65 (TS)
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 301409Z Apr 65 (TS)
5. ADMINO CINCPAC 010900Z May 65 (TS); ADMINO CINCPAC 020745Z May 65 (TS)
6. ADMINO CINCPAC 030055Z May 65 (S); CINCPAC 040653Z May 65 (TS); ADMINO CINCPAC 051005Z May 65 (TS);

see page 415 for CVA based sorties in Laos.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Also on 5 May CINCPAC approved a COMUSMACV concept for preplanned CVA support in RVN. He directed that COMUSMACV provide CTF 77 a "bank" of targets which would be valid for a significant period of time. CINCPACFLT, considering other commitments (e.g., ROLLING THUNDER) would advise COMUSMACV of preferred dates for utilization of his aircraft. In turn, COMUSMACV would indicate preferred strike dates when the target bank was of a size to warrant Navy support for a two to four day period. CINCPAC was to make the decision as to when the support would be provided. Procedures were also specified whereby COMUSMACV might obtain immediate support.[1]

On 16 May CINCPACFLT directed that a CVA be maintained until further notice in position to provide air support in RVN,[2] and by 20 May the ORISKANY was on DIXIE Station in vicinity of 11° N., 110° E.[3] Thereafter, a DIXIE Station CVA provided almost continuous support within RVN, and from about 11 June to 31 December a CVA was permanently assigned to accomplish this mission.[4]

Carrier based aircraft delivered approximately 1,600 tons of ordnance in support of ground operations in RVN during June. Meanwhile, the existing and projected sortie requirements for Southeast Asia dictated that the CVA CORAL SEA be retained in PACOM rather than returning it to CONUS. This permitted increasing the CVAs in WESTPAC to five.[5] Considerations in the decision to provide increased Navy air support in RVN included the deteriorating situation in RVN, increased deployments of friendly forces, and the rate of constructing additional land bases in Southeast Asia.[6]

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1. CINCPAC 051017Z May 65 (TS); CINCPAC 121305Z May 65 (TS); CINCPAC 150144Z May 65 (TS) CINCPAC 312253Z May 65 (S)
2. CINCPACFLT 160513Z May 65 (S)
3. CINCPACFLT 202247Z May 65 (S)
4. CINCPACFLT 110203Z Jun 65 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 050341Z Jun 65 (TS); CINCPAC 110213Z Jun 65 (TS); CINCPAC 230217Z Jun 65 (TS); CINCPAC 260222Z Jun 65 (TS); CINCPACFLT 110203Z Jun 65 (TS); CINCPACFLT 190629Z Jun (TS); CINCPACFLT 250331Z Jun 65 (S)
6. CTE 70.2.1.1/100945Z Jun 65 (S); CINCPAC 110148Z Aug 65 (S)

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SOUTH VIET NAM COMBAT SORTIES



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ROLLING THUNDER — COMBAT SORTIES



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STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND B-52 STRIKES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (ARC LIGHT)

In late April the JCS directed CINCSAC and CINCPAC to prepare a plan for the use of B-52s in South Vietnam. The JCS considered that multiple ejection rack equipped B-52s might be used for area saturation attacks against Viet Cong resources when there was insufficient target data to permit more precise bombing.[1] During a 6-7 May conference at Camp Smith representatives of CINCPAC, CINCSAC, COMUSMACV and CINCPACAF agreed on the assignment of targeting responsibility and coordination procedures. CINCSAC was tasked to develop the operation plan.[2]

CINCPAC recommended, on 15 May, that the JCS approve targets proposed by COMUSMACV for immediate B-52 strikes.[3] As a first step, CINCPAC proposed that SAC be authorized to conduct radar photography over target areas in RVN to assist in strike planning.[4] It was approximately one month, however, before the JCS authorized 30 B-52 sorties (ARC LIGHT I) against a known VC base area in Binh Duong Provice with a TOT of 172300Z June.[5] The strike was executed under rigid radar control, but a ground investigation of strike results by US/RVANF personnel found no VC casualties. This strike was further marred by loss of two B-52s in a mid-air collision off the Philippines enroute to the target. The press criticized this use of strategic bombers against guerrillas as being both expensive and ineffective.[6] General Westmoreland considered it worthwhile, however, because the B-52s delivered tons of explosives in a matter of minutes on a previously untouched VC sanctuary.[7] He later recommended that press releases concerning

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1. JCS 292141Z Apr 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 040405Z May 65 (S); CINCPAC 070236Z May 65 (TS)
3. COMUSMACV 15546/110834Z May 65 (TS); COMUSMACV 16006/140805Z May 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 150214Z May 65 (TS)
5. 11° 15' 21" N., 106°31 54" E.; JCS 004027/161943Z June 65 (TS)
6. "TIME" 25 June 65
7. COMUSMACV 02578/191524Z Jun 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

ARC LIGHT strikes should be initiated in Saigon rather than the Pentagon to avoid alienating the Saigon press.[1]

CINCPAC agreed with the above comments and recommendations of COMUSMACV. In regard to ARC LIGHT I he further stated that the concept for use of SAC forces should have objectives of harassment and attrition as well as destruction of the VC and their facilities. CINCPAC also proposed that large scale (30 aircraft) strikes against targets especially selected for ground follow-up should continue. He further suggested restrike of areas which proved to be strong redoubts or where reoccupancy appeared probable; and he proposed use of delay fuzed and tamper proof antipersonnel munitions.[2]

ARC LIGHT B-52 sorties totaled 149 in July. A summary of these strike operations follows.

DRUM FIRE I: 30 sorties on 4 July in Phoc Thanh Province.[3] No ground follow-up bomb damage assessment limited to crater count, 759 craters in the target area and 209 outside.

DRUM FIRE II: 30 sorties on 6 July, again in Phuoc Thanh Province. No ground follow-up. Crater count revealed 810 on target and 40 outside target area.

FOX DEN: 30 sorties on 16 July in Binh Dinh Province. Crater count revealed 615 on target and 120 outside target area. Heavy undergrowth limited ground follow-up to a 500 meter penetration of the target area. Evidence of VC field fortifications was noted but no VC casualties were reported.

CAR PARK II: 30 sorties on 23 July in Binh Duong Province. No ground exploitation.

CHAIN SAW: 29 sorties on 28 July in Bien Hoa Province. The 173d Airborne Brigade conducted a successful ground operation in association with this strike.

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1. COMUSMACV 21538/231545Z Jun 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 240440Z June 65 (TS)
3. In northern portion of what became Long Khanh Province after 1965 provincial reorganization

[redacted]

[redacted]

Free Bomb Zones

COMUSMACV proposed designation of five "free bomb zones" approved by the GVN and US Ambassador in Saigon, and within which B-52 strikes could be conducted with a minimum of coordination. With CINCPAC and JCS approval this practice went into effect in August. The principal requirements for strikes in a free bomb zone were that the area be free of friendly units and that the RVNAF General Staff be informed of the date of the strike. The number of aircraft, TOT, and target were divulged to RVNAF only when specifically requested. The JCS retained final execution authority for strikes within the free bomb zones.[1]

The free bomb zones covered Viet Cong base areas wherein strong defenses had precluded or minimized friendly operations. These ARC LIGHT Zones (ALZs) are described below.[2]

ALPHA: Encompassed an irregular shaped area 40 km x 50 km within War Zone Delta, in Phuoc Than Province.

BRAVO: About 30 km inland from the US base at Chu Lai in Quang Tin Province. Approximately 15 km x 20 km.

CHARLIE: In the southernmost RVN province of An Xuyen. Approximately 20 km x 25 km.

DELTA: Also in An Xuyen Province. Approximately 18 km x 40 km.

ECHO: In Vinh Binh Province. Approximately 7 km x 12 km.

A sixth free bomb zone, FOXTROT, was selected by COMUSMACV in September. This zone was in Tay Ninh Province and encompassed an area of approximately 25 km x 50 km.[3]

CINCPAC Recommendations Regarding Control Procedures

Details of the B-52 strikes in SVN were coordinated with the White House Staff and Department of State prior to the execution decision by the Secretary of Defense.

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1. COMUSMACV 18722/161147Z Aug 65 (TS); COMUSMACV 34560/020642Z Oct 65 (TS); CINCPAC 180341Z Aug 65 (TS)
2. COMUSMACV 161147Z Aug 65 (TS)
3. COMUSMACV 31622/090320Z Sep 65 (TS); JCS 9077/212237Z Dec 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

During September CINCPAC sought, in vain, to decentralize control in the B-52 strike operations and to reduce traffic which the existing procedures imposed on an already overburdened communications system. The main features of his recommendation was as follows:[1]

1. JCS and CINCPAC exercise approving authority for establishment of ARC LIGHT ZONES (ALZs) proposed by COMUSMACV. JCS approval to include directing CINCSAC to support CINCPAC as required for strikes in the ALZs.

2. COMUSMACV propose strikes in authorized ALZs on a recurring basis as necessary to CINCPAC for action, JCS and CINCSAC for information. CINCPAC's approval to be indicated with an execute message, with JCS retaining veto authority.

3. CINCPAC and JCS exercise approval authority for strikes outside an authorized ALZ. JCS approval to include the execution directive.

4. Requests for B-52 strikes either in or out of an authorized ALZ to be considered a planning message, and no additional planning messages be required.

5. Minor changes in TOTs, placement of radar beacons, axes of approach, and number of aircraft be as mutually agreed between CINCSAC/COMUSMACV, keeping JCS and CINCPAC informed.

6. For simplicity in identifying strikes, use the nickname of the ALZ followed by a sequential number (i.e., Alpha 1).

The above recommendation was disapproved by the JCS on 6 October.[2]

On 6 November CINCPAC again proposed to JCS measures designed to streamline ARC LIGHT operations. Noting that the existing system required separate approval and execute messages for all missions, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS promulgate a basic ARC LIGHT directive which would state to CINCPAC and CINCSAC the appropriate guidelines and restrictions. CINCPAC also proposed that the JCS specify to CINCSAC a specific number of B-52 sorties which would be in support of CINCPAC.[3] CINCPAC further proposed that he issue a

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1. CINCPAC 222135Z Sept 65 (TS)
2. JCS 3448/061825Z Oct 65 (TS)
3. COMUSMACV 38777/310137Z Oct 65 (TS); CINCPAC 060140Z Nov 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

basic ARC LIGHT directive which would amplify the JCS instructions and specify:

1. COMUSMACV request strikes at least 48 hours in advance; action 3d Air Division (CINCSAC); information to JCS, CINCPAC, CINCSAC (3d Air Division). Approval would be indicated by the absence of objection from JCS, CINCPAC or CINCSAC.

2. 3d Air Division issue intent message 24 hours prior to strike TOT.

3. Direct liaison authorized between COMUSMACV and Commander, 3d Air Division regarding minor deviations such as changes in TOT, beacon placement, changes in number of aircraft or bomb loading/fusing.

4. COMUSMACV submit to CINCPAC for JCS approval any special requests such as waiver of restrictions or increase in monthly sortie allocation.

The above procedures, CINCPAC stated, would not degrade control of ARC LIGHT at either CINCPAC or JCS level. Further, he observed that operations could be monitored adequately and time would be available for cancellation of a strike.[1] CINCSAC, however, took exception to the command relationship that would provide direct liaison between COMUSMACV and Commander, 3d Air Division. He stated that this would not reduce reaction time, and he announced that he must retain demurral authority on strikes when cogent reasons existed.[2]

At the end of the year the JCS had not responded to CINCPAC's 6 November recommendations.

Safety of Non-combatants

After disapproving two proposed B-52 strikes in Binh Dinh Province, the JCS informed CINCPAC that ARC LIGHT target approval procedures involved the closest scrutiny of instances where occupied friendly non-combatant areas were within one nautical mile of a proposed target. Regarding targets in this category, they stated that intelligence information and all other military justification should be provided in exhaustive detail.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 060140Z Nov 65 (TS)
2. CINCSAC CS10087/092130Z Nov 65 (TS)
3. JCS 4630/202244Z Oct 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC continued his policy of relying on COMUSMACV's knowledge and judgement regarding safety of non-combatant and friendly military personnel during ARC LIGHT operations.

SAC in the Close Air Support Role

On 14 November elements of the 1st Cavalry engaged a significant VC/NVNA force in western Pleiku Province (Operation SILVER BAYONET),, and COMUSMACV requested B-52 support for the US force. Scheduled strikes in Binh Duong Province were deferred,and within 14 hours and 57 minutes of the COMUSMACV request 18 B-52s launched from Guam to provide the support (IVORY TUSK).

To ensure continued and more effective air support of Operation SILVER BAYONET, COMUSMACV suggested that he be authorized to deal directly with Commander, 3d Air Division and have blanket approval on conducting the bombing effort.[1] CINCPAC recommended that the JCS approve the COMUSMACV proposal, but CINCSAC desired to retain control rather than delegate it to Commander, 3rd Air Division. In supporting his view, CINCSAC cited the reaction time achieved in IVORY TUSK.

The JCS authorized CINCPAC and CINCSAC to delegate to COMUSMACV and Commander 3d Air Division respectively the authority for direct liaison regarding SILVER BAYONET B-52 strikes.[2] However, CINCPAC and CINCSAC chose to retain their authority regarding execution of these strikes.[3]

During the period 11-13 December 38 ARC LIGHT sorties were used effectively in close support of Operation HARVEST MOON, a III MAF operation in Quang Tin Province.

Disapproval of B-52 Strikes in Cambodia

COMUSMACV submitted a grid of 65 targets, each 2 km x 3 km for use in support of Operation SILVER BAYONET. Seventeen of these targets involved Cambodian territory. CINCPAC disapproved, in

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1. COMUSMACV 40613/160457Z Nov 65 (TS)
2. JCS 6459/16124Z Nov 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 170011Z Nov 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

accordance with policy, striking targets in Cambodia or any portion of a target within 2 kilometers of the border.[1] Within two days, however, this restriction was tempered to allow bombing up to the RVN/Cambodian border.[2]

SAC Strikes in Laos

November reports by ground reconnaissance teams (SHINING BRASS) and airborne forward air controllers, and assessment of tactical air strikes indicated many targets in the Laos panhandle suitable for B-52 strikes.

On 23 November COMUSMACV proposed B-52 strikes in southeastern Laos in an area near the RVN/Laos border. The American Ambassador in Vientiane concurred, but he cautioned that the strike should be announced as just another mission in South Vietnam and not related to air strikes in Laos. CINCPAC added his recommendation that the strikes be approved.

It was not until 10 December, however, that 24 B-52s struck targets in Laos. Strike results were undetermined. Despite the strong US desire to the contrary, the US press carried headline stories about B-52 operations in Laos.

Ordnance for ARC LIGHT

Prior to the 10 December strikes in Laos all ARC LIGHT aircraft were armed with 51 M-117 750 pound bombs. In an effort to conserve these bombs, six of the 24 B-52s on the Laos mission used BLU-3B bomblets. However, from 22 December to the end of the year each B-52 carried 27 M-64 500 pound bombs internally and 24 M-117 750 pound bombs externally.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 170248Z Nov 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 192304Z Nov 65 (TS)
3. COMUSMACV 41477/231009Z Nov 65 (TS)
4. CINCSAC 211700Z Dec 65 (TS); CINCSAC 180015Z Dec 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Contingency Target Areas

Near the end of 1965 there were strong indications of an early attack on a Special Forces Camp in I Corps. COMUSMACV requested establishment of "contingency target areas" defined by him and covering likely enemy assembly areas and avenues of approach. He proposed that these areas would facilitate SAC planning in case of enemy attack. Contingency target areas were recommended at Plei Mrong, Polei Djereng and Khe Sanh - all isolated Special Forces Camps. CINCPAC favorably endorsed these proposals. The JCS subsequently approved the contingency target areas, thus providing decentralized execution authority and quick reaction in case of an enemy attack.[1]

ARC LIGHT Strikes, 1965

A total of 1,580 ARC LIGHT sorties were employed in 1965 on 93 separate strikes. See the associated illustration for the general areas of ARC LIGHT strikes. (C)

PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE, SOUTHEAST ASIA

Photographic reconnaissance support for Southeast Asia was provided under the following programs:[2] (S)

Program	Assets Employed	Area Emphasis: Remar
YANKEE TEAM	2d Air Div; SEVENTH FLT	Laos
BARREL ROLL & STEEL TIGER	2d Air Div; SEVENTH FLT	Laos, pre and post strike
BLUE TREE	2d Air Div; SEVENTH FLT	North Vietnam
ROLLING THUNDER	2d Air Div; SEVENTH FLT	North Vietnam; pre and post strike
IRON HAND	2d Air Div; SEVENTH FLT	North Vietnam, suspected SA-2 locations
WATER PUMP	RLAF RT-28s from Udorn	Laos, medium/low altitude

1. CINCPAC 222255Z Dec 65 (TS)
2. This portion of the history is based on Annex H of Draft Report JCS Armed Reconnaissance Study Group of 15 November 1965 (TS)

[redacted]



ARC LIGHT STRIKES BY WAR ZONE AND MILITARY REGION
As of 31 December 1965
Total strikes, 93; total sorties, 1580.

[redacted]

Continued - Program	Assets Employed	Area Emphasis ;Remarks
TROJAN HORSE	SAC U-2	North Vietnam, Laos, RVN, Cambodia, Thailand
BLUE SPRINGS	SAC pilotless drones	Communist China, North Vietnam, Laos. High altitude
MARKET TIME	SEVENTH FLEET	RVN coastal anti-infiltration. Controlled by SEVENTH FLEET in coordination with COMUSMACV
ABLE MABLE	2d Air Div	RVN, supported COMUSMACV requirements

Management: CINCPAC maintained management control over YANKEE TEAM, BARREL ROLL, STEEL TIGER, BLUE TREE, ROLLING THUNDER and IRON HAND photographic reconnaissance activities. He coordinated with CINCSAC on employment of TROJAN HORSE and BLUE SPRINGS assets and provided management guidance for exploitation of the products of these programs. Through coordination with RLAF, CINCPAC provided guidance for exploitation of WATER PUMP photography. To achieve further management control, CINCPAC also:

1. Issued instructions on exploitation of photography.

2. Levied requirements for analysis in depth on selected geographic areas.

3. Instructed subordinates on methods of nominating targets for strike, requesting photographic coverage, requesting photographs and graphic material related to reconnaissance programs.

4. Assigned flight routes and determined, in general, the type coverage and sensors to be used in fulfilling validated requirements.

5. Reviewed readouts, correlated information therein and nominated (to JCS) new targets for armed reconnaissance.

Operation of the Reconnaissance Program

At the beginning of the year photographic reconnaissance of Laos was acquired through YANKEE TEAM using aircraft of the 2d Air Division

[redacted]

[redacted]

and SEVENTH FLEET. This included pre and post strike photography and was subject to the rigid sortie and altitude limitations of YANKEE TEAM.

In late March, however, CINCPAC authorized COMUSMACV to obtain both pre and post strike photographic reconnaissance under the more liberal BARREL ROLL rules.[1] BLUE TREE was established in March and was also executed from YANKEE TEAM limitations.

On 27 April CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT were authorized to obtain reconnaissance photographs while enroute to strike targets.[2] Subsequently, the majority of photographic reconnaissance was accomplished on strike identified missions, although YANKEE TEAM and BLUE TREE missions were continued.

Photo Intelligence Requirements Review Board (PIRRB)

A PIRRB was established in May. It was chaired by a representative of CINCPAC J2, and there were representatives from each PACOM component; from Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific (FICPAC); and from the CINCPAC Joint Reconnaissance Center. Occasionally, other interested commanders were represented at their request during PIRRB meetings.

This board met at least monthly to review coverage obtained during the previous period and to review photographic requirements. The validated requirements were then issued for YANKEE TEAM, BLUE TREE, and TROJAN HORSE. Within each of these categories CINCPAC priorities were stated.

Reconnaissance Film Exploitation

Procedures for exploiting the reconnaissance film depended on the characteristics of the acquiring program and service facilities. However, reports of readout were sent out as follows:

1. Flash Report - highly significant findings which affected combat or air operations.

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1. CINCPAC 212222Z Mar 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 270249Z Apr 65 (TS)

[redacted]

2. Immediate Photo Interpretation Reports (IPIRs) - made within 24 hours and contained essential findings, and new developments plus an account of what geographic area was covered by interpretable photography.

3. Supplemental IPIRs - made within 72 hours and contained more detailed information derived from photography and not previously reported.

4. Continuing review reports - content similar to IPIRs but forwarded after 72 hours.

The above reports were transmitted electrically to about 20 national level and PACOM offices and by mail to approximately 45 additional offices. FICPAC summarized the reports monthly and distributed this as IPIR Summaries. DIA produced monthly summaries for YANKEE TEAM and BLUE TREE programs; DIA also summarized BLUE SPRINGS photography on a mission basis. (S)

NAVAL SURFACE OPERATIONS

Seaborne infiltration of personnel, supplies and equipment from NVN to the insurgents in South Vietnam had long been a subject of inquiry. Counter effort, primarily by VNN Junk and River Forces, had produced virtually no evidence that this activity provided any significant support.

In July and September 1964 US SP-2 aircraft conducted air surveillance flights of the coastal waters from the Ca Mau Peninsula to the 17th parallel without significant results.[1] During January 1965 similar flights were conducted, and VNN observers aboard the aircraft became convinced that the patrol elements of the RVN Sea and Coastal forces were not vigorously pursuing their anti-infiltration mission, a fact long recognized by US Navy advisors. Following the report of the VNN observers, the Chief, Naval Advisory Group succeeded in having the VNN Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (for operations) go on one of the flights. Afterward, there was an improvement of VNN patrols.[2]

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1. USMACV Historical Review of Naval Advisory Group Activities, CY 1964, ser 0024, 1 Jan 65 (S) CPRS 001620-65 p. 16.
2. USMACV ltr, NAVGP/N3: pr ser 0051 of 11 May 65 (S) CPRS 002145-65

[redacted]

Firm evidence of substantial weapon and ammunition infiltration into South Vietnam was first obtained from a diesel powered steel hulled ship of about 100 tons sunk at Vung Ro Bay on 16 February, and from several caches discovered on the nearby shore. Ammunition, medical stores, and weapons to include 57 mm recoilless rifles were recovered from these sources.[1] From the amount of arms cached, it was concluded that more than one trip must have been made to this area.

At COMUSMACV's request a conference was convened in Saigon, with the objective of planning for a combined USN-VNN patrol effort to oppose the waterborne infiltration. During the period 3-10 March this committee developed a concept for a combined effort. It was emphasized that the best tactic to interdict coastal traffic infiltration would be to "assist and inspire the Vietnamese Navy to increase the quality and quantity of their searches." To counter activities of seagoing craft of trawler or larger size which approached the coast more or less perpendicularly, it was concluded that conventional patrol efforts by US naval ships and aircraft employing radar and visual search would be effective.

This patrol concept divided the RVN coast into eight areas between the 17th parallel and the Cambodian border and extended approximately 40 miles to sea. Within these areas USN units with embarked VNN liaison personnel would detect, track and report all suspicious contacts to VNN units which would intercept and investigate vessels. VNN was authorized to board and search vessels operating within RVN territorial waters and within 12 mile contiguous zone. It was proposed that RVN "authorize USN forces to stop, board, and search and if necessary, capture or destroy" vessels in this same area.[2]

Regarding this subject, CINCPAC proposed to the JCS that USN forces operate in support of COMUSMACV and that the MACV Naval

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1. Details of this recovery operation, conducted in the presence of a Viet Cong force, are in USMACV ltr NAVGP/N3:pr ser 0030 of 26 Mar 65 (S) CPRS 001722-65
2. USMACV ltr NAVGP/N3:pr ser 0042 of 30 Apr 65 (S) CPRS 002088-65

[redacted]

Advisory Group provide liaison between the US and RVN naval forces. He proposed a program geared to three levels of naval effort ranging from simple surface and air patrols through boardings and extending to amphibious raids and naval bombardment. He also proposed rules of engagement for the operation and submitted a detailed list of men, ships and equipment augmentations necessary to implement the plan. [1]

Meanwhile, single-sideband communications equipment had been obtained to link US forces, VNN ships, junk bases, junk patrols and coastal surveillance centers. The JCS approved the operating concept on 16 March, the same date that the first ships reported for duty. By the end of the month, an austere Surveillance Operations Center (SOC) was functioning in NAVADGRU Headquarters at Saigon, and five Coastal District Surveillance Centers (CDSC) [2] were manned on a 24 hour basis. This anti seaborne infiltration operation was nicknamed MARKET TIME on 24 March. [3]

To assist the MARKET TIME efforts, CINCPAC proposed that Ile Du Tigre, a NVN island located approximately opposite the demilitarized zone and used as a sanctuary and staging area for North Vietnam junks infiltrating military supplies into RVN, be designated as a dump target for naval aircraft returning from missions with unexpended ammunition. He also proposed that the island be subjected to naval ship bombardment and that periodic US destroyer sweeps be conducted to destroy hostile vessles in its vicinity. [4] The use of Ile Du Tigre as a dump target was approved by the JCS on 17 April, but the other measures were not approved. [5]

Coordinated aircraft and surface patrols were instituted on 10 April to increase the effectiveness of MARKET TIME operations. [6]

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1. CINCPAC 152206Z Mar 65 (TS)
2. An Thoi on Phu Quoc Island, Vung Tau, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Danang
3. USMACV ltr NAVGP/N3:pr ser 0042 of 30 Apr 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 301839Z Mar 65 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 240602Z Apr 65 (TS)
6. CINCPAC 142254Z Apr 65 (S)

[redacted]

However, the efforts to persuade the RVN government to grant authority to board and search ships in their waters were not immediately successful.[1]

Following a 12 April conference at Camp H. M. Smith with the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations, CINCPAC gave additional guidance on planning amphibious operations, naval gunfire support and naval air strikes against infiltration targets. The specific purpose of amphibious raids would be destruction of Viet Cong personnel, destruction or seizure of their materiel, capture of prisoners, and rendering the infiltration associated area unusable for subsequent VC activity. In this regard, COMUSMACV would provide accurate and timely intelligence, COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT would nominate targets, and CINCPACFLT would prepare the detailed attack concept. Should an amphibious force be retained ashore for an appreciable time, the operational control of the force would pass to the appropriate commander ashore in accordance with established doctrine.[2]

There was a slight reduction in effectiveness of the VNN when, on 8 April, the three Force Commanders and several other officers mutinied against the Commander in Chief, VNN (Rear Admiral Cang). Despite this, the coordination between the naval forces of South Vietnam and the United States improved throughout the month.

By the end of April there were neither dramatic nor conclusive results from MARKET TIME operations. The basic organization of the Vietnam Patrol Force (CTF 71) was as shown in the accompanying illustration.

Detailed US planning for amphibious raids continued, and the RVNAF High Command directed CINC VNN to develop a permanent capability for amphibious raid operations.[3]

CINCPAC had meanwhile directed that COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT achieve agreement on the procedures which would be used in implementing naval gunfire support missions.[4] Also, CINCPAC

1. CINCPAC 160148Z Apr 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 172010Z Apr 65 (TS)
3. USMACV ltr NAVGP/N3:ldn ser 0059 of 25 May 65 (S) CPRS 002245-65
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 280825Z Apr 65 (S)

[redacted]

CTF 71
RADM E. S. MILLER
in USS CANBERRA (CAG-2)



arranged for inexpensive "Good Will" kits, containing items highly prized by the junk crews and fishermen, which might lessen the resentment caused by repeated intercept.[1]

Near the end of April it was announced that responsibility for US MARKET TIME forces would be assigned to COMUSMACV about 1 August with Chief, Naval Advisory Group exercising operational control. Thereafter, an intense effort was turned toward improving the communications and operations net of Chief, Naval Advisory Group,[2] and toward refining the equipment, training, and organization of the force. Particular attention was devoted to logistics support arrangements and development of an improved intelligence network. CINCPAC anticipated passing certain functions to COMUSMACV on an incremental basis as soon as adequate facilities were established ashore. He also directed COMUSMACV to prepare a concept for the changes to include proposed operational employment and logistic requirements.[3]

On 24 April the United States Government agreed to assist the GVN by entering RVN territorial waters as deemed necessary in the execution of MARKET TIME operations. With RVNAF personnel aboard US vessels to assist in liaison, interrogation and boarding activities, it would thus be unnecessary to call in VNN units to investigate each suspicious contact. The Brevie Line, an administrative creation of the French colonial government in Southeast Asia, was to be honored as the Cambodian/RVN boundary and immediate pursuit would be limited by this line.

Wthin the RVN defensive sea area (territorial sea 12 miles offshore) US MARKET TIME forces were authorized to stop, visit, and search ships or craft (except warships) of any nation not clearly engaged in innocent passage. On the high seas, contiguous to the RVN territorial sea but extending to a maximum of 12 miles seaward from the baseline from which the territorial sea was measured, US forces were authorized to demand identification and a declaration of intent of ships/craft (less warships) of any nation. These vessels could be

1. ADMINO CINCPAC 280302Z Apr 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 291707Z Apr 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 051016Z May 65 (S)


CTF 71
RADM R. L. FOWLER, USN
COMPATFORSEVENFLT
in USS CURRITUCK (AV-7)
CTG 71.1
surface
units
CTG 71.2
SP-2 A/C
Saigon
CTG 71.3
Photo-rec
carrier
based
CTG 71.4
HUK
Group
(not
activated)
CTG 71.5
SP-5 A/C
seadrome
CTG 71.6
SP-3 A/C
Sangley
CTG 71.7
(not assigned)
CTG 71.8
NGFS
RADM E.S. MILLER
in USS CANBERRA
(CAG-2)
CTU 71.1.1
through
CTU71.1.8
: CTU's in each of the 8 patrol areas.

[redacted]

stopped, visited, and searched if they rendered a manifestly false response to such demands or gave other valid grounds for suspicion that they were or had been engaged in infiltration activities.

In international waters beyond the contiguous zone US units were authorized to stop, visit and search all vessels flying the RVN flag or reasonably believed to be South Vietnamese even though flying another flag or refusing to show a flag; the purpose being to prevent or punish any infringement of the law of RVN. If identified as other than RVN, the craft would be allowed to proceed. Minimum force necessary to accomplish the mission was to be exercised, but this did not preclude destruction of the ship if required. [1]

On 5 May CINCPAC reported to the JCS that after seven weeks of operation by MARKET TIME forces there was no evidence of sea infiltration. This, he thought, might either indicate that it was essential to increase countermeasures or that MARKET TIME had been highly effective. He also noted that VNN units were displaying improved participation and cooperation. [2]

The first US capture of infiltrators occurred when personnel from the destroyer USS BUCK boarded a junk in the vicinity of the 17th parallel late in May.

At the end of May, three additional task groups were formed under CTF 71, resulting in the organization shown on the accompanying illustration. Seaplane MARKET TIME operations became more efficient after a seadrome was established by USS CURRITUCK at POULO CONDORES on 13 May. [3]

MARKET TIME rules of engagement were modified, in early June, to recognize a five mile territorial water right claimed by Cambodia. [4] A further change directed that the GVN representative aboard US ships would, when feasible, physically lead the boarding and search parties for MARKET TIME operations. He would also determine, in consultation

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1. CINCPAC 081947Z May 65 (TS)
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 051948 May 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 192223Z May 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 012355Z Jun 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

with the US ship commander, whether a boat or ship had, or was preparing to violate the GVN laws or whether there were sufficient grounds for believing this had occurred. The final determination as to detention of a ship was, however, to rest with the US ship commander.[1]

Intelligence indicated, in early July, that two steel hulled vessels had departed Hong Kong carrying CHICOM munitions bound for RVN.[2] One of these ships, the DONG HAI, -- translated into English as EAST SEA -- was boarded from the USS SAVAGE 12 miles off Danang on 17 July and found to have nothing more lethal than milk.[4] However, prior to apprehension, the ship had transited a major portion of the MARKET TIME operations area without detection, perhaps because its identity was lost by alternate references to it as the EAST SEA and DON HAI without indicating that EAST SEA was the English translation of DONG HAI.[5]

The VNN was, by July, exhibiting increased aggressiveness in their operations; and placing seventeen sea force ships on station (in comparison to 14 or less at earlier dates) with greater regularity. This was attributed to the increased number of USN advisors with Junk Divisions and VNN ships, as well as the favorable impressions gained by Vietnamese liaison personnel serving on US ships.[6]

Operational control of MARKET TIME forces was transferred from Commander SEVENTH FLEET to COMUSMACV at 301000H July 65. At the time the area was divided into nine patrol areas of 30 to 40 miles in depth and 80 to 120 miles in length. DERs (radar picket destroyer escorts) were normally assigned to each patrol area, but if a sufficient number was not available Commander SEVENTH FLEET assigned MSOs (ocean minesweepers) as substitutes. The initial force assigned was:

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1. CINCPAC 050026Z Jun 65 (TS)
2. CTE 70.2.1.1/011149Z Jul 65 (S); CTG 71.1/031520Z Jul 65 (S)
3. Second ship was RUBI, which did not depart as reported.
4. CINCPAC 212008Z Jul 65 (S)
5. CINCPAC 150006Z Jul 65 (S)
6. COMUSMACV 221100Z Jul 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

seven DERs, two MSOs, two LSTs, 17 WPBs (82' cutters) and five SP-2H aircraft.[1] Task Force 115 was activated,commanded by Rear Admiral N. G. Ward, USN, CHNAVADVGRP as Commander Coastal Surveillance Force (CTF115). Coast Guard Squadron ONE provided units on sea barrier patrol along the 17th parallel and in the Gulf of Thailand. To accomplish the task on the 17th parallel, eight WPB were based at Danang and supported by an LST; nine WPBs based at An Thoi on the southern coast of Phu Quoc Island and similarly supported by an ARL (amphibious repair ship) were assigned to barrier operations in the Gulf of Thailand.

Aerial surveillance along the coastline and off-shore was provided by seven SP-2H aircraft based at Tan Son Nhut, and it covered the sea area between Vung Tau and the Brevie Line. The sea area between Vung Tau and the 17th parallel was covered by CTF 72 P3A aircraft based at Sangley Point (Philippines). Naval gunfire support was provided by SEVENTH FLEET units, and TF 115 DERs were available for NGFS on a not-to-interfere basis with their primary mission in support of MARKET TIME objectives.[2]

In early August a MARKET TIME surveillance aircraft employed multiple passes, visual signals, close approach and photo flash illumination while attempting night identification of a ship off Quang Ngai. These were normal procedures. However, it developed that the vessel was the USSR cargo ship POLOTSK, and the Soviets protested through diplomatic channels that the ship had been fire on.

Although this charge was subsequently proven false, it was directed that when feasible the identification of a ship would be delayed until daylight. If essential to establish identify at night, the sequence of techniques to be employed would be communications followed by searchlight. This failing, the use of photo flash was authorized.

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1. COMUSMACV Monthly Evaluation, ser 00717 of Jul 65 (S) CPRS 003890
2. CINCPAC 072333Z Aug 65 (S); USMACV ltr NAVADVGRP/N3: an ser 00117-65 of 27 Sep 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 090930Z Aug 65 (S); CINCPAC 080605Z Aug 65 (S); JC 7761/090152Z Aug 65 (TS); CINCPAC 091000Z Aug 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Tnese restrictions were not applicable within 12 miles of the RVN coast, however, if the ship's mission was of questionable nature.[1]

Following a later incident involving the USSR merchant ship MINSK, the rules of engagement were changed to provide for close surveillance of Russian ships without harassment. If requiring further and more aggressive measures by US forces, the matter would be referred to the JCS unless the situation was so urgent that such reference was manifestly impossible.[2]

The composition of MARKET TIME forces had been under continuing evaluation from the inception of the program, and on 5 August COMUSMACV proposed that the continuously manned MARKET TIME off-shore patrol stations be increased from nine to twenty-five ships. CINCPAC directed a detailed study of this and related proposals for countering waterborne infiltration.[3] Between 2 and 18 September representatives of CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, CINCPACFLT, OPNAV and CHNAVADVGRP met in Saigon to study and report on the modifications appropriate to the situation.

Their study indicated: that off-shore ships should be increased from 9 to 14; that the patrol aircraft coverages should be doubled to provide four aircraft on patrol at all times; that inshore patrol coverage should be improved by increasing the number of SWIFTS[4] (PCFs) from 54 to 84 and the number of Coast Guard cutters (WPBs) from 17 to 26. It was also proposed to provide coverage of the Mekong River mouths by use of three LSTs as bases and to inaugurate an extensive river patrol with 120 river patrol craft.[5]

Engagements sometimes occurred between US forces and motorized junks apparently engaged in intra-coastal transfer operations. (S)

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1. ADMINO CINCPAC 151828Z Aug 65 (TS)
2. JCS 8721/201614Z (TS)
3. CINCPAC 212218Z Aug 65 (S)
4. 50 ft. diesel powered motor boat, radar equipped, cruising speed 20 knots, draft 4 feet, equated to 5 or more motorized junks in area search capability. Mounted three 50 caliber machine guns and one 81 mm mortar; CPRS 002245-65
5. USMACV ltr CHNAVADVGRP ltr ser 00141-65 of 3 Nov 65 (S) CPRS 003476-65

[redacted]

[redacted]

On 19 September the USCGC POINT GLOVER pursued a high speed 20 foot motor junk moving toward the mainland of RVN. The junk ignored a request to board and warning shots, and when capture was inevitable the junk crew members jumped overboard. Stopped by shots into the engine compartment, the junk was boarded and a search revealed some small arms and 480 rounds of small arms ammunition. One man was captured and salvage operations on the sunken craft recovered two additional weapons and 10,000 RVN piastres. (C)

Next morning, while the USCGC POINT MARONE was attempting to gain a position to board a 40 foot junk, the junk crew opened fire with small arms. They also dropped over the side grenades and mine-like objects, several of which exploded in the water. During the engagement, eight VC were killed and the junk was sunk by small arms fire. One VC crew member escaped to the shore where he was later captured. He confirmed that his own junk and the one engaged by the POINT GLOVER had been performing supply missions from Phu Quoc Island.[1] (C)

SWIFTS were expected to permit effective pursuit of shallow draft junks and sampans which might otherwise evade inspection by MARKET TIME forces by taking advantage of shallow water. The first two SWIFTS reached South Vietnam on 30 October, and their quick reaction capability was demonstrated within 30 hours when they delivered 81 mm mortar fire in support of a friendly outpost on Phu Quoc Island.[2] Six additional SWIFTS were delivered at An Thoi on 24 December and were expected to be operational at an early date.[3] (C)

At the end of the year it was apparent that MARKET TIME operations deterred free access to the coasts of South Vietnam. It was known, however, that the VC were distributing personnel and equipment along the RVN coast but the extent of these operations was not known.

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1. USMACV NAVADVGRP/N3:bt ser 00141-65 of 3 Nov 65 (S) CPRS 003476-65
2. COMUSMACV Monthly Evaluation ser 001058, Oct 65 (S)
3. CTF 115/250615 Dec 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Naval Gunfire Support

On 14 May CINCPAC authorized US ships to render naval gunfire support (NGFS) to friendly forces in South Vietnam[1] under a concept developed jointly by COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT.[2] US observers were to control the fire, and MARKET TIME ships were to provide NGFS only when it could be accomplished without interference with coastal surveillance.

USS TUCKER fired the first mission on 16 May, and after 20 May the number and frequency of missions increased sharply. Air and naval gunfire liaison teams (ANGLICO) were present in each Corps Tactical Zone of RVN by 29 May to aid in spotting fire support missions.[3]

On occasion, ships took station as much as ten miles up rivers to provide the NGFS.[4] Major advantages of NGFS were that it could be delivered with surprise anywhere along the coast, and it could be provided even when weather conditions precluded close air support to friendly positions under attack. NGFS frustrated VC attacks in several instances, destroyed or neutralized bunkers and gun emplacements, and provided illumination to aid friendly forces.

SUMMARY OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT
SOUTH VIETNAM, 1965

MONTH	TARGETS	AMMUNITION EXPENDED
May	25	870
June	82	2,416
July	69	7,575
August	612	14,210
September	583	16,398
October	648	21,818
November	576	10,739
December	486	12,895
	TOTAL	86,921

1. CINCPAC 140140Z May 65 (C)
2. COMUSMACV 15445/101440Z May 65 (C)
3. USMACV ltr NAVGP/N3: ltr ser 0069-65 of 21 June 65 (S) CPRS 002453-65
4. USS MANSFIELD 280815Z Oct 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Soviet Trawlers Harass US Aircraft Carriers

Since mid-1965 Soviet signal intelligence trawlers harassed US operational sea forces in the South China Sea. These actions were usually limited to passive techniques, and routine US communications blocking and shouldering tactics were adequate countermeasures. During December, however, the USSR ship tactics involved active interference with maneuvers of combatant formations--with particular emphasis on carriers engaged in launch/land operations. CINCPAC reported this to the JCS and noted that such boldness could be expected to increase unless positive means were taken to deter the Russians.[1]

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1. CINCPAC 280232Z Dec 65 (S)

[redacted]

SECTION D - UNITED STATES/FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCE DEPLOYMENTS

There was no US ground combatant force in Southeast Asia at the beginning of 1965, nor was there any other friendly combatant force to aid the South Vietnamese. The Viet Cong had the military initiative and they were making significant progress toward destroying the armed forces of the Republic of South Vietnam (RVNAF).

In the course of the year forces of the United States, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea reached the scene and engaged the enemy. At the end of 1965 it appeared that these troops and the RVNAF had achieved a military stalemate in South Vietnam--against the opposing Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army.

This portion of the history portrays the build-up of friendly forces in Southeast Asia from the viewpoint of the Commander in Chief Pacific. It discusses the problems, actions and decisions associated with the deployment of major forces to South Vietnam and establishing a command structure adequate to control the military effort. Most of the material is arranged chronologically, and a brief summary of the military situation is provided to aid in presenting the material in the context of the operations under way. (U)

Marine Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) Unit to RVN

The military situation in South Vietnam at the beginning of 1965 featured a significant defeat of ARVN forces at Binh Gia and a period of Viet Cong (VC) occupation of that prosperous Catholic village. RVNAF leaders continued to devote their attention to political maneuvers rather than the increasing Viet Cong threat.[1] Viet Cong initiated operations increased just before the lunar new year holiday (TET) 1-6 February. During TET, however, VC operations virtually ceased while their forces moved to positions from which they would

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1. COMUSMACV 0686/081520Z Jan 65 (S)


SOUTH VIETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
QUANG TRI
THUA THIEN
QUANG NAM
I CORPS
QUANG TIN
QUANG NGAI
KONTUM
BINH DINH
PLEIKU
PHU BON
PHU YEN
II CORPS
DARLAC
KHANH
QUANG DUC
TUYEN DUC
NINH THUAN
PHUOC LONG
BINH LONG
LAM DONG
TAY NINH
III CORPS
BINH DUONG
BINH TUY
BINH THUAN
LONG KHANH
BIEN HOA
PHUOC TUY
KIEN PHONG
KIEN TUONG
LONG AN
DINH TUONG
KIEN GIANG
VINH LONG
KIEN HOA
PHONG DINH
VINH BINH
IV CORPS
BAC LIEU
AN XUYEN
0

launch a campaign apparently aimed at severing the Republic of South Vietnam (RVN) along the boundary between I and II Corps areas. (See sketch map of South Vietnam).

As a first step the VC struck the US facility at Pleiku and several other installations on 7 February. The US responded with air strikes (FLAMING DART) against targets in North Vietnam, and a USMC LAAM battery was airlifted from Okinawa to RVN where it became operational at Danang airfield at 082030Z February. The headquarters of the parent battalion was also airlifted to RVN. The balance of the battalion moved by sealift and became fully operational at Danang by 180330Z February. These deployments were intended to provide minimum security for the vital Danang jet capable facility. Local security for the battalion was provided by a Marine security detachment previously established at Danang.[1]

Concurrent with the LAAM deployment to RVN, the use of US jet aircraft for strike operations in RVN was authorized (19 February). A total of 219 B-57 sorties and 28 F-100 sorties were flown during the same month. The majority of these were for interdiction of suspected VC concentrations, but a few involved close air support for an emergency heliborne operation.

While additional air strikes were conducted against North Vietnam, VC operations caused a serious deterioration in the GVN situation in the provinces of Binh Dinh, Pleiku, Kontum, and Phu Yen. Shortly after an abortive coup in Saigon, the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) failed in an attempt (20-25 February) to open Mang Yang Pass on Route 19. Thus, the highland centers of Pleiku and Kontum were left dependent on air lines of communication. In I Corps, except for Quang Ngai Province, there was a marked increase in VC operations; the rail

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1. JCS 004762/071341Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPAC 071530Z Feb 65 (TS); JCS 004766/071707Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPAC 072041Z Feb 65 (TS); CTF 79/081349Z Feb 65 (TS); CINCPAC 081035Z Feb 65 (S); COMUSMACV 3789/08415Z Feb 65 (TS)

[redacted]

connection from Danang to Quang Ngai remained out of operation and the VC extended their control over more of the coastal highway.[1]

Military Situation in RVN, March-April: The Government of South Vietnam (GVN) situation improved slightly in March, and events of April gave grounds for guarded optimism. The reported number of Viet Cong killed in action rose to the highest figure since 1961. Also, defections from the VC increased and there was a successful ARVN operation (Dan Chi 129) in early April on the periphery of the U Minh Forest stronghold in IV Corps. Additional encouragement stemmed from an ARVN penetration of another VC strongpoint and an operation which opened Route 1 from Qui Nhon to the Quang Ngai Province border.

Less encouraging was confirmation of a North Vietnam Army (NVA) battalion in Kontum Province; continued dissension in RVN Navy headquarters; and an increasing number of terrorist incidents. GVN resources were further drained by the mission of providing security for newly arrived US logistic units in II Corps.[2]

9th Marine Amphibious Brigade to RVN

Subsequent to an early February national decision for limited commitment of US ground combat forces in RVN, the JCS approved CINCPAC's consistently recommended action of deploying USMC forces to Danang.[3]

Accordingly, on 7 March CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to land the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) command and control elements, the surface battalion landing team (BLT) then afloat off RVN, one helicopter squadron and some logistics elements at Danang. Concurrently, by air and surface movement a second BLT plus related logistic and support elements was to deploy to Danang. The special landing force (SLF) was to be reconstituted from Marine units in Okinawa and maintained in the South China Sea.[4]

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1. COMUSMACV ser 00193 Monthly Evaluation February 65 (S) CPRS 001644-65
2. COMUSMACV ser 00514, Monthly Evaluation 65 (S) CPRS 002235-65
3. CINCPAC 270215Z Feb 65 (TS) CINCPAC 292233Z Mar 65 (TS); CINCPAC 030230Z Mar 65 (TS)
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 070135Z Mar 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Elements of the 9th MAB were positioned in the Philippines, Okinawa, Japan and aboard amphibious ships off the RVN coast when orders were received to land at Danang. Nevertheless, the first wave of eleven LVTs of the 9th MAB touched down on Red Beach Two at Danang at 080102Z March. There was no VC resistance, and the remaining three waves had landed by 080131Z.[1]

MAB Headquarters, Regimental Landing Team (RLT) Headquarters and two battalion landing teams (BLTs) arrived via air and sea lift by 12 March. This force provided additional security for the airfield, but it was specifically directed that the Marines would not engage in day to day actions against the Viet Cong.[2]

First Marine Brigade to Okinawa

Landing the 9th MAB in RVN committed one third of the SEVENTH FLEET Marine ground force and two thirds of the Marine helicopter assets. To restore a balance in SEVENTH FLEET forces the First Marine Brigade of approximately 7,000 personnel was advanced from Kaneohe, Hawaii to Okinawa on 31 March. This left no Marine ground combatant force in Hawaii.[3]

Marines to Hue/Phu Bai

On the eve of the April planning conference in Hawaii, the JCS directed early expansion of the Marine force in RVN and authorized their commitment in counterinsurgency operations.[4] Thereon, CINCPAC directed deployment of one BLT to Hue/Phu Bai and one

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1. ADMINO CINCPAC 070356Z Mar 65 (TS); ADMINO CINCPAC 070356Z Mar 65 (TS); ADMINO CINCPAC 090321Z Mar 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 070135Z Mar 65 (TS); CINCPAC 190530Z Mar 65 (C); Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force, Vietnam, March-September 1965 (S), FMFPAC, undated. Copy filed in CINCPAC Historical Branch. Cited hereafter as Operations... MAF; ADMINO CINCPAC 090321Z Mar 65 (S)
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 091950Z Mar 65 (TS); CINCPAC 100119Z Mar 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 040212Z Apr 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

BLT plus an F-4 squadron and command and control elements to Danang. These forces totaled approximately 4,100 personnel and closed RVN on 13 April.[1]

Military Situation in RVN, May-June: During late April and early May the Viet Cong reorganized, trained and resupplied. Abruptly, they initiated well coordinated large scale attacks and ambushes with the apparent objective of destroying ARVN and undermining the civilian will to continue the war. Saigon was cut off from Dalat's vegetable supply area; Route 13 was closed both north and south of Ben Cat; and six pylons of the Dahiem - Saigon power lines were destroyed. Severing the routes between population centers and agricultural areas led to a marked drop in the amount of food supplies available in urban areas. Accordingly, black market activities flared and food prices rose sharply.

The presence of US Army and Marine units permitted release of additional GVN reserve forces for operations against the VC. US Navy vessels harassed VC seaborne infiltration and began to render naval gunfire support (NGFS) with good effect. Sharply increased USAF and VNAF strikes helped avert certain defeat for the outnumbered GVN forces. An 11 May VC attack on the province capital of Song Be, apparently planned as a spectacular VC victory, was repulsed with strong air support. However, between 28 May and 2 June at Dong Xoai in I Corps the VC rendered three ARVN Battalions ineffective for combat.

On 1 June the USMC expeditionary airfield at Chu Lai became operational, and on 18 June Guam based B-52s dropped fifteen hundred 750/1000 pound bombs into a VC base area in Binh Duong.

Demonstrating formidable accretion of fire power from improved weapons, the VC intensified the pressure. The district headquarters of Thuan Manh, Toumorong and Le Thanh in II Corps were abandoned by GVN forces. VC attacks were particularly intense in the provinces of Kontum, Pleiku and Phu Bon; and in the III Corps generally north of Bien Hoa. Because of the depleted ARVN reserves it appeared probable that determined Viet Cong thrusts in these areas would succeed.

At the end of June the VC had the capability to close any ground LOC at will except in the face of a strong GVN force; isolation of the highlands was virtually a fact and an incomplete but damaging VC seige of Saigon was causing serious economic and military consequences. Further, there were indications of new and uncommitted VC and NVA units which could strike GVN forces.[2]

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1. CINCPAC 090845Z Apr 65 (TS)
2. COMUSMACV ser 00497, Monthly Evaluation, May 65 (S) CPRS 002480 65; COMUSMACV ser 00630, Monthly Evaluation June 65 (S), CPRS 002744-65

[redacted]

[redacted]

III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) Established; Naval Component Commander Appointed

On 6 May the III MAF, composed of Third Marine Division/First Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) elements, was established ashore at Danang.[1] The Commanding General, Major General W. R. Collins, USMC became COMUSMACV's naval component commander.[2]

Marine Expeditionary Airfield, Chu Lai

Two BLTs of RLT-4 were landed at Chu Lai on 7 May to provide security during construction of a jet capable expeditionary airfield.[3] A third BLT was landed on 12 May and by 1 June Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 10 and Marine engineers had the aluminum surfaced airfield operational.[4]

EASTPAC Marines Deployed To WESTPAC/HAWAII

In May CINCPAC's Marine assets were again pulled forward to compensate for deployments to RVN.[5] An EASTPAC Marine Amphibious Brigade (approximately 8,500 personnel) sailed from California ports on 24 May for Okinawa/Japan.[6] An additional forward reserve was established by moving an EASTPAC BLT to Hawaii during the period 16-27 June.[7]

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1. CG III MAF 060900Z May 65 (S); CINCPAC 012316Z May 65 (TS); Also: CINCPAC 292125Z Apr 65 (TS); ADMINO CINCPAC 040402Z May 65 (TS); CINCPAC 070135Z Mar 65 (TS)
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 010808Z May 65 (TS)
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 010808Z May 65 (TS) was the execute order, and the same message directed movement of 173d Airborne Bde to RVN
4. CINCPAC 291706Z Apr 65 (TS); ADMINO CINCPAC 012346Z May 65 (TS); CINCPAC 010808Z May 65 (TS) CTF 76/121130Z May 65 (S) (Operations...MAF, March-September, p. 25)
5. CINCPAC 072133Z May 65 (TS)
6. CINCPAC 302056Z May 65 (TS); CINCPAC 180328Z May 65 (S); CINCPACFLT 150218Z May 65 (S)
7. CINCPAC 052238Z Jun 65 (TS); CINCPACFLT 100244Z Jun 65 (S); CINCPAC 302056Z May 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

173d Airborne Brigade to RVN

During the first half of the year the only PACOM parachute assault unit was the 173d Airborne Brigade (2 battalions) stationed in Okinawa. This organization was an important element in the theater reserve of ground combat power. In February there had been discussion of sending the 173d to RVN at the same time the Marine LAAM battalion was deployed;[1] but the move was not considered appropriate at that time. Soon after the April planning conference, however, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV proposed to advance the 173d to RVN to secure the Vung Tau area and the airfield at Bien Hoa. Both of these facilities were essential to US plans and each was highly vulnerable to VC action.

This deployment was approved by the JCS on 14 April with the proviso that country clearance would be obtained first. Concurrently, CINCSTRIKE was directed to provide a CONUS replacement brigade in RVN so the 173d could revert to PACOM reserve in Okinawa.[2] While awaiting the requisite country clearance, CINCPAC asked CINCSTRIKE to close the CONUS brigade, preferably an airborne unit, in RVN within sixty days after the 173d was ordered to move. He suggested, also, early designation of the replacement unit to enhance the unit effectiveness subsequent to the planned relief.[3] The day after the above request there was a revolt in the Dominican Republic. US forces were committed and since most CONUS airborne brigades had obligations under this contingency they were unavailable for replacement of the 173d.[4]

On 1 May the move of the 173d was cleared with the GVN[5] and four days later the first elements of the brigade were airlifted to South Vietnam. These closed RVN 7 May, with the mission of securing the Vung Tau/Bien Hoa areas until relieved by other US units.

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1. CINCPAC 072257Z Feb 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 132235Z Apr 65 (TS); CINCPAC 140830Z Apr 65 (TS); CINCPAC 170129Z Apr 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 230423Z Apr 65 (TS)
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 070355Z May 65 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 012316Z May 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

This was about the same date that the Marines began landing further north at Chu Lai to secure the site for construction of a jet capable expeditionary airfield.[1] (S)

Several alternate means of replacing the 173d were considered without any concrete progress. Near the middle of May it appeared that a brigade of the 101st Airborne Division might relieve the 173d,[2] but because of the increasingly critical situation in RVN it was concluded that the 173d relief should be deferred until after the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) was ready for operations in RVN.[3] (S)

Late in June the 173d conducted short operations away from Bien Hoa,[4] and early in July the status of the 173d was changed from temporary to permanent assignment in RVN.[5] Accordingly, the dependents of members of the brigade began to leave Okinawa and disperse to the areas where they would await the outcome of the 173d operations in RVN. (S)

In association with the decision to leave the 173d in RVN, CINCPAC asked that the unit be augmented with a third airborne battalion as a means of affording increased operational flexibility in employment of the brigade.[6] This was unsuccessful at that time, but at the end of the year it was planned to provide the additional battalion early in CY 1966. (S)

Australia/New Zealand Combat Forces To South Vietnam

During a visit to Washington in February, Australian Minister of Defense, Shane D. Paltridge, indicated that his country might consider providing combat forces for duty in South Vietnam.[7] The Australian government later accepted a US invitation to participate

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1. CINCPAC 090148Z May 65 (S); CINCPAC 140830Z Apr 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 182208Z May 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 162120Z Jun 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 261955Z Jun 65 (C)
5. CINCPAC 132106Z Jun 65 (TS); CINCPAC 070246Z Jul 65 (S)
6. CINCPAC 090433Z July 65 (TS)
7. CINCPAC 260417Z Feb 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

in military staff talks with CINCPAC on this subject and named Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger to head the Australian planning group. New Zealand accepted a similar invitation from US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and announced that Rear Admiral Sir Peter J. Phipps would head the New Zealand planning group. Subsequent to an exchange of messages between Admiral Sharp, Air Chief Marshal Scherger and Rear Admiral Phipps, the talks were scheduled at CINCPAC Headquarters for 31 March and 1 April.

These talks included CINCPAC briefings on the situation in Southeast Asia and exploratory discussion of possible ways in which ground forces could be used. Admiral Sharp explained that he thought that Australian and New Zealand forces would probably deploy to Danang to work with the Marines. During the talks, it became evident that Australia was ready to send a battalion to South Vietnam. They had done considerable planning for the deployment and had alerted a battalion for movement, although they recognized that deployment of additional combat forces to South Vietnam would require government decision and a request by South Vietnam. New Zealand was less positive about providing forces and indicated that there would be considerable political groundwork to lay with the New Zealand public. However, Rear Admiral Phipps indicated that his government was prepared to deploy a 105mm howitzer battery and perhaps a tank troop. He desired to attach the New Zealand elements to the Australian battalion and label it an ANZAC Force.

Air Chief Marshal Scherger and Rear Admiral Phipps both mentioned the possibility of naval units to augment the sea anti-infiltration force (MARKET TIME). Admiral Sharp indicated that naval forces could be usefully employed and would fit in with US forces very easily as they always had. He recognized, however, that Australian and New Zealand naval units were needed in support of Malaysia. Air Chief Marshal Scherger said that if South Vietnam was invaded, Australia would pull her forces out of Malaysia and come to the defense of South Vietnam. Rear Admiral Phipps indicated that New Zealand would do the same. Both Australia and New Zealand

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representatives inquired as to possibility of some US logistic support on a reimbursable basis. Admiral Sharp assured them that it was our intention to attach their forces to a US contingent to assure logistic support.

CINCPAC forwarded[1] the highlights of the talks to the JCS and recommended that the offered assistance be accepted.

Some Australian clerical and political leaders opposed committing more of their forces in South Vietnam. However, the public apparently accepted the inevitability of deeper involvement,[2] and on 29 April a joint GVN-Australian communique announced South Vietnam's request for additional military assistance. Australia subsequently announced contribution of one infantry battalion, approximately 25 per cent of its infantry strength, to the struggle in South Vietnam. Arrangements were made for an Australian planning staff to work out logistic and administrative arrangements in Saigon early in May.[3]

Headquarters Australian Army Forces Vietnam (HQAAFV), the 1st Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (1/RAR) and a Logistical Support Company arrived in RVN via surface and air lift between 29 May and 10 June. The headquarters remained in Saigon, but the 1/RAR and logistical element went to Bien Hoa where they reported to COMUSMACV for operational control and attachment to the 173d Airborne Brigade.[4] The 1/RAR was soon engaged in active defense of the airfield. Meanwhile, the possibility of additional Australian forces was explored.[5]

New Zealand's Prime Minister Keith J. Holyoake, on 27 May, announced that his government would send an artillery battery to South Vietnam.[6] On 21 July the 161st Battery, Royal New Zealand (S)

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1. CINCPAC 030452Z April 65 (TS)
2. PACOM WID 20-65, pp. 12-13 (S)
3. COMUSMACV 300325Z Apr 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 042220Z Jun 65 (S); COMUSMACV 41200/201240Z 65 (S)
5. CINCPAC 260320Z Jun 65 (TS)
6. WELLINGTON 209 to STATE 270350Z May 65 (U)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Artillery (25 personnel) reached RVN. It, too, was sent to Bien Hoa under COMUSMACV's operational control and attached to the 173d Airborne Brigade.[1]

Early in July Brigadier Jackson, Commanding Officer AAFV, informed COMUSMACV that the Chief of Staff Royal Australian Army preferred that the battalion not be employed in offensive or reaction operations except in defense of the Bien Hoa airfield. This subject was discussed in Saigon by CINCPAC and General Westmoreland; on returning to Hawaii CINCPAC concluded from a review of the problem that the use of Australian troops in offensive operations was consistent with the USG/GOA agreements and a 9 June statement from the White House. He therefore informed COMUSMACV that there were no restrictions on use of the Australian battalion.[2]

Australia's Air Chief Marshal Scherger soon stated that the role of the Australian forces in South Vietnam was in line with that of US forces and that use of the 1/RAR was not limited to some arbitrary distance (e.g., 30-35 kilometers) from Bien Hoa. Permanent deployment of the battalion away from the airfield was to be first referred to Australian Army Headquarters in Canberra; this, he said, was the only restriction of a geographic nature applying to the 1/RAR.[3]

Military Situation in RVN, July: Taking advantage of poor flying weather, a VC force overran the district town of Dak To, north of Kontum on 6 July. A reinforcing ARVN battalion was subsequently ambushed. This was the fifth regimental size VC action in the II Corps since 28 May. Several other large scale VC initiated actions resulted in high VC losses from air strikes.

To temper the undisputed friendly air superiority, the Viet Cong conducted night attacks on a number of airfields; at Danang the base defenses were penetrated and four aircraft destroyed. Even so, the number of air support sorties increased sharply during July and SAC B52s struck base areas in II and III Corps on four occasions.

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1. COMUSMACV 41200/2012402 Nov 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 300143Z Jul 65 (S)
3. Defense Canberra 040616Z Aug 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

A fourteen battalion friendly operation 16-24 July opened the highway from Qui Nhon to Pleiku; and the Pleiku-Kontum road was opened 26 July. These short lived successes permitted delivery of much needed food and other supplies, thereby reducing airlift requirements.

While results of larger scale actions in July tended to favor friendly forces, there was a general loss of areas under GVN control in both II and III Corps, and the number of refugees in GVN areas increased considerably.

Marines Land at Qui Nhon, Reinforce Danang

As of early July more than half of the US combat battalions in RVN were deployed in I Corps with the III MAF; but the increasing threat was in II and III Corps.[1] Meanwhile, various Army logistic units had reached Qui Nhon and both COMUSMACV and CINCPAC concurred that the situation warranted use of Marines to protect Qui Nhon until an army brigade arrived there about mid-July. CINCPAC overruled a COMUSMACV proposal to airlift Marine forces from Okinawa for this mission; but he directed CINCPACFLT to land the Special Landing Force (SLF), then in South China Sea, and to provide the necessary support to secure the area.[2]

The SLF landed at Qui Nhon 1 July and on the same date CINCPACFLT sailed amphibious ships with two embarked BLTs, surface echelons of one aircraft squadron, and supporting elements toward Danang.[3] One of the enroute BLTs was diverted to relieve the SLF at Qui Nhon. This unit landed between 0800H and 0829H 7 July and the SLF embarked the same date.[4]

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1. COMUSMACV 22727/020836Z Jul 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 302049Z June 65 (TS); CINCPAC 220728Z June 65 (TS); CINCPAC 252100Z June 65 (TS) CINCPAC 260327Z June 65 (TS); Operations...III MAF, March-Sept.
3. CINCPAC 012150Z Jul 65 (S); CINCPAC 020115Z Jul 65 (S); CINCPAC 032140 Jun 65 (TS); Force total approximately 8,008 personnel.
4. CINCPAC 030958Z Jul 65 (TS); CINCPAC 04022Z Jul 65 (S) CINCPAC 080213Z Jul 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

The balance of the Marines enroute from Okinawa to Danang, consisting of BLT 2/9, RLT-9 Headquarters and combat support/service elements of the Third Marine Division and First Marine Air Wing landed unopposed over the Danang beach between 1030H July and 2330H 7 July. III MAF forces provided area security and air cover for the landing.[1]

25th Infantry Division Alerted for Deployment to RVN

In association with COMUSMACV's estimate that temporary augmentation of US forces (see above) might be an essential interim measure during the July-August period, a brigade task force of the 25th Infantry Division was alerted in early July for possible deployment to RVN. This task and a concurrent requirement to be prepared to deploy to Thailand inhibited the division training.[2]

2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division to RVN

On 12 July the 1st Battalion of the 18th Infantry landed at Cam Ranh Bay to provide security for the major base that was to be established at that magnificent deep water anchorage.[3] Two days later, on 14 July, the balance of the 2d Brigade (2 battalions) began unloading at Vung Tau (140330Z). This force had been diverted from Qui Nhon after the Marine BLT was provided to secure that area.

Nine hundred of the 1st Infantry Division personnel were airlifted to Bien Hoa on 14 July. The balance were unloaded the next day and by nightfall 15 July the infantry battalions, command and control element, and engineer battalion had closed Bien Hoa.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 080213Z Jul 65 (S)
2. COMUSMACV 12727/020836Z Jul 65 (TS); CINCPAC 032324Z Jul 65 (TS); CINCPAC 042156Z Jul 65 (TS); CINCPAC 201931Z Jul 65 (TS); COMUSMACV 26757/310345Z Jul 65 (TS); CINCUSARPAC 15233/031958Z Aug 65 (TS); CINCUSARPAC 17417/312040Z 65 (TS); CINCPAC 022101Z Jul 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 130003Z Jul 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 150116Z Jul 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to RVN

By May there was a relaxation of tension regarding the revolt in the Dominican Republic, and CINCLANT released the 101st Airborne Division from its contingency alert status.[1] Meanwhile, the decision was made to develop Cam Ranh Bay as a major coastal base and a battalion (1/18) of the 1st Infantry Division had been providing security for the construction and logistic forces in the area.

Thus, when the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (3 battalions) landed in RVN it was at Cam Ranh Bay. Unloading started at 291424H July and terminated at 301900H with Ambassador Maxwell A. Taylor, WWII commander of the 101st Division, present to welcome the newcomers.[2] The brigade assumed operational control of the 1/18 Inf and began to patrol its area, improve the assembly area and distribute equipment. Within four days of landing two men were wounded by sniper fire.

Military Situation in RVN, August: Viet Cong casualties soared under the severe pounding of friendly air: SAC B-52 strikes increased to 10 from the July figure of 5; air cover and close support missions increased 27 per cent; and the number of air mobile operations almost doubled, reaching a total of 51.

More than 900 Khmer Kampuchea Krom (KKK) surrendered to GVN after months of US/GVN covert work and concerted military/psychological operations. This dissident group, also known as the White Turban Gang, had been terrorizing the inhabitants of the Seven Mountains area (Chau Doc Province) and cooperating with the VC for several years. It was planned to ultimately integrate the KKK force into the RVNAF.

Although the communists remained aggressive, friendly forces were capable of disrupting their plans. At Duc Co in II Corps the VC suffered more than 500 killed. In I Corps a USMC spoiling attack, Operation STARLIGHT virtually destroyed a VC regiment, and thus reduced the immediate threat of large scale action in the vicinity of Chu Lai. One of the encouraging aspects of this operation was the willingness of some of the local people to give valid intelligence information regarding VC activities.

The friendly base structure grew in capability and area. In contra t, VC bases were increasingly threatened by ground action of US/GVN/Australian/New Zealand forces. Successful road clearing

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1. CINCLANT 062252Z May 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC Briefing Notes, 31 July (TS)

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operations opened the road from Nha Trang to Ban Me Thuot for seven days. Also, near the end of August US/ARVN forces opened the Qui Nhon-An Khe road in an operation designed to secure a base area for the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile), scheduled for September arrival in RVN.

Less encouraging were several occurrences which served to indicate coming events in II Corps. At the end of July a FULRO (United Front for Liberation of Oppressed Races) sponsored uprising at a CIDG camp in northern Darlac Province resulted in the defection of 192 CIDG troops (predominantly montagnard). They left Camp Vuon Brieng on 2 August taking with them 268 weapons, food, radios and ammunition. None of the USASF or VNAF personnel at the camp were harmed. Several days later, battalions of the 32d NVA Regiment were identified during an ARVN action in the vicinity of Duc Co. This raised to four the number of regimental size enemy units operating in II Corps.[1]

US Army Task Force Alpha Established

Positioning a Marine BLT at Qui Nhon (see above) enabled COMUSMACV to deploy most of the 2d Brigade 1st Infantry Division to Bien Hoa rather than Qui Nhon. This force, in conjunction with the 173d Airborne Brigade and the Australian Battalion was sufficient to secure the airfield and conduct operations elsewhere. Similarly, the addition of the units under 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division at Cam Ranh Bay were adequate to secure that area and spare some for operations at other locations.[2] (C)

Accordingly, at 050001H August US Army Task Force Alpha (USATFA) was established at Nha Trang under command of Major General Stanley Larson, USA. USATFA assumed operational control over all US ground combat units in II and III Corps (see accompanying illustration)[3] USATFA was intended for offensive deployment throughout RVN, with priority to the II Corps and the northern section III Corps. One of the first missions for USATFA was to secure the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) which began to arrive in RVN on 9 September. (See below) (C)

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1. COMUSMACV ser 00875, Monthly Evaluation, August 65 (S) CPRS 003127-65
2. COMUSMACV 22727/020836Z Jul 65 (TS)
3. COMUSMACV 26624/300258Z Jul 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

TASK FORCE ALPHA FORCES

(5 AUGUST 1965)



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Marine Amphibious Brigade to RVN

During August the Marine amphibious brigade and Marine Air Group-36 (MAG-36), which had been shifted from California to Okinawa/Japan in May, was further deployed to RVN.[1] One BLT landed at Danang and one at Chu Lai on 15 August, and the remaining BLT and MAG-36 (3 helicopter squadrons) reinforced Chu Lai on 1 September. A LAAM battalion from 29 Palms, California, was added to the Chu Lai force on 15 September.[2] (C)

To compensate for these deployments from WESTPAC to RVN, another EASTPAC MAB was moved to Okinawa/Japan between 28 August and 15 September.[3] (C)

Military Situation in RVN, September: In late September the Viet Cong shifted the weight of their action from the highlands to the central coastal provinces, particularly Binh Dinh where several multi-battalion attacks were initiated against large RVN units. It became increasingly evident that the extent of enemy unit infiltration had been substantially higher than previously estimated.

Air operations exacted an increased toll of enemy KIA (estimated 3,865). In contrast the friendly KIA total of 609 reflected a 40 per cent decrease in comparison to August experience. COMUSMACV promulgated a policy which sought to minimize noncombatant casualties by exercising discrimination in the application of friendly firepower. Some success was reported in an associated effort to persuade the people to reduce the danger of injury to their person and property by taking certain precautions during operations and revealing the enemy location so "we can shoot only him and not you...."

As the rice crop ripened friendly military operations sought to secure the harvest activities and deny the Viet Cong access to this normal source of food supply. Further inroads in enemy food resources were achieved by spraying extensive VC crop areas with defoliation chemicals and by capturing significant salt, rice, and other food stocks.

An inflationary economy and the increasing number of refugees in GVN areas provided fertile ground for civil discontent. In I Corps there were about a dozen VC inspired demonstrations stressing themes of releasing men from government service, compensating for damaged crops, stopping air strikes and terminating government control of the rice harvest. The largest demonstration was probably not VC inspired, and it involved approximately 7,000 people in Quang Tri City who

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1. CINCPAC 291845Z Aug 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 016142Z Aug 65 (S)
3. CINCPACFLT 040118Z Aug 65 (S)

[redacted]

protested an incident involving US personnel and a local Buddhist temple. The VC also had problems regarding public relations. Particularly in IV Corps, they risked alienation of the people by raising taxes, increasing conscription and kidnapping, and harassing district and provincial capitals with mortar fire.

Late in September the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) reached RVN. By the end of the month the unit assumed full responsibility for its An Khe base and was engaged in improving its facilities and operational capability.

Although more of their attention was being devoted to defense of their bases, the VC retained significant military capability at the end of September.[1]

1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) to RVN

This unit was organized at Fort Benning, Georgia in July 1965. Principles and concepts underlying the division structure were derived from a study originated in 1962 and field tested by the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) and 10th Air Transport Brigade.

CINCPAC and COMUSMACV learned, too late, that the division had been administratively loaded in CONUS. It was recognized that this would cause a delay in achieving combat effectiveness in RVN, but both CINCPAC and COMUSMACV preferred this to the longer delay entailed in reloading the unit.[2]

Qui Nhon was selected as the destination port in RVN. Preparatory actions of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 2/7 Marines, and elements of the RVNAF assured security for the port, the road from Qui Nhon to An Khe, and the area selected as the base at An Khe. The first elements of the division landed 9 September and the first major group arrived about a week later. After achieving a limited degree of operational readiness in the vicinity of Qui Nhon, the units moved to the An Khe base area.

By 14 September approximately 45 per cent of the base area was cleared of brush and 82 of the division helicopters had closed the An Khe. Additionally, supplies and equipment of the division were being moved to the base by truck convoys and airlift with relatively

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1. COMUSMACV ser 00950, Monthly Evaluation, September 1965 (S) CPRS 003386-65
2. CINCPAC 290937Z Jul 65 (S)

[redacted]

minor VC interference. By 17 September more than 9,000 personnel and 220 helicopters were in the An Khe area and elements of the 11th Aviation Group achieved a capability to support operations conducted by other units. Thereafter there was increasing participation by division forces in the security operations conducted by the 1st Bde 101st Airborne Division.

At 281155H September the 1st Air Cav Div (AM) accepted responsibility for the security and defense of the An Khe perimeter and division base area.[1]

Concurrent with the improvement in the combat effectiveness of the 1st Cavalry Division, elements of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division turned to the task of securing the October arrival of ROK forces at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay.

Establishment of the 1st Cav Div base at An Khe provided a logistically supportable advance base for operations and extension of US combat power further into the highlands. Further, the existence of this base afforded a higher degree of security for the Qui Nhon-Pleiku line of communication.

Military Situation in RVN, October: October featured an increase of two, and perhaps more, enemy regiments in RVN. Balancing this accelerated build-up was the addition of the Korean divisional force of more than 18,000, some additional Australians, and two additional brigades of the US 1st Infantry Division.

The October level of Viet Cong activities was extremely high and included significant engagements in all corps areas. A total of 3,502 VC were reported by friendly forces as killed in action.

The 173d Airborne Brigade and 1/RAR swept the "Iron Triangle" area south of Ben Cat 8-14 October, thus demonstrating the vulnerability of the area as well as securing the introduction of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division into its base. Earlier, on 19 October, an estimated NVA regiment attacked the Plei Me CIDG camp in what proved to be an eight day attempt to overrun the camp and ambush the relief force. The camp survived with the aid of continuous and

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1. This narrative is based on information contained in CINCPAC Command Center 0730 Briefing Notes 1-31 Sep 1965 (TS) on file in the CINCPAC Historical Branch. See also ADMINO CINCPAC 261845Z Aug 65 (TS)

[redacted]

close air support and massive aerial resupply. The ambush, involving an estimated second NVA regiment, failed. Both enemy elements suffered heavy casualties. The 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) was moved to the Plei Me area tasked to find, fix and destroy enemy forces threatening the area. (Operation SILVER BAYONET)

Rice harvest security operations continued south and southwest of Danang; and the III MAF also conducted six battalion size search and destroy operations, three of which were coordinated Marine/ARVN actions. Additionally, a reconnaissance battalion probed deeply into the main valleys leading into the Danang area. On 28 October a small scale VC attack on the Marble Mountain Air Facility and the airfield parking at Chu Lai resulted in destruction of 19 helicopters and damage to 35 others.

At the end of October it was apparent that the growing enemy force and increasing Allied aggressiveness would lead to heavy engagements at an early date.[1]

1st Infantry Division (Main Body) to RVN

The main body of the 1st Infantry Division debarked at Vung Tau/Saigon in early October and consolidated in a central staging area secured by the 1st Bde 173d Airborne Infantry. Aided by combat operations of ARVN, Australian and US forces, the 3d Brigade Task Force deployed to the Ben Cat area 12-25 October and the 1st Brigade Task Force deployed to the Phuoc Vinh area 20-24 October.

Both of the above bases were in areas of significant Viet Cong influence. For the balance of the month the two brigades conducted operations up to battalion size to extend perimeters and secure the area surrounding their base camps.

Korean Forces to RVN

In response to US and GVN requests, the Republic of Korea provided self defense instructors (Taekwendo) to RVNAF during 1964. Following additional negotiations, the Republic of Korea (ROK) sent a Military Assistance Group, Vietnam (ROK MAGV), security battalion, supporting units, and an LST to RVN. This task force

totaled 1,937 and arrived in RVN on 16 March 1965. Augmentations between June and September, including a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH), and two LSMs, brought the ROK force total to 2,550.[1]

Meanwhile the US/ROK were negotiating substantial increases in the ROK contribution. During the April 1965 deployment planning conference a ROK divisional force was an important consideration. The decision on deployment of the ROK unit was a matter for the ROK National Assembly, however, and it was possible that this body might veto the additional force. Also, for political reasons the ROK desired that the request for additional forces come from South Vietnam. If these arrangements were not successfully concluded there was a strong possibility that an additional US division would be required in RVN.[2]

Concurrent with the above negotiations, there were discussions of reducing the US commitment in Korea. CINCPAC consistently recommended that this was inadvisable because of the increased tension in WESTPAC and the unchanging North Korean/CHICOM threat to Korea. Too, CINCPAC was confident that the ROK would not approve sending the larger force to South Vietnam unless there was assurance that there would be no US force reduction in Korea.[3]

Regarding the deployment, the ROK proposed that the US equip three combat ready reserve divisions 100 per cent and provide the remaining 17 regular divisions and the Marine division with major items affecting fire power, maneuver and communications. CINCPAC concurred with COMUS Korea that this was excessive, but he thought it would be proper to provide equipment for one ROKA division so one reserve division could be brought to fully active status. In turn, the equipment on hand in the reserve division could be used for activation of a replacement reserve division. Admiral Sharp thought the ROK might demand that there be no reduction in the number of divisions on the line. However, he favored COMUS Korea's proposal to fully

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1. CINCPAC 292209Z Jan 65 (S); COMUSMACV 41200/2012 40Z Nov 65 (S); USFK Historial Report 28 Dec 65 (S) CPRS 003910 - 65
2. CINCPAC 140333Z Apr 65 (TS); COMUSKOREA 2409002 Jun 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 292026Z Jun 65 (TS)

[redacted]

equip three ROK Army ready reserve divisions at an estimated cost of $7.0 million if the ROK would accept the idea.[1]

In May South Vietnam requested the ROK to provide a regimental combat team. Following a visit to Washington,[2] President Pak announced a decision to deploy a full division. Thereon, the GVN altered its request to specify a division force.

The ROKG encountered political difficulties related to the deployment, and this made it advisable to defer US action that might cause the National Assembly to disapprove or delay the division commitment in RVN. Thus, the US slowed action to use US helicopter assets in Korea for an airmobile company needed in RVN.[3] On the same basis, CINCPAC and the US Ambassador in Korea proposed suspending the MAP Transfer Program for Korea because of the urgent military requirement to augment the ROK forces in RVN.[4] In July, despite considerable opposition, the ROK National Assembly approved the deployment.

Planning for deployment of the ROK force was hampered by the fact that political considerations demanded that this activity be highly classified and not conducted below the ROK JCS level. COMUS Korea helped the ROK Joint Staff determine the force structure and mission. ROK authorities demanded excessive allowances and other concessions, but these problems were successfully negotiated.

Command relationships were viewed with particular sensitivity by the ROK. They proposed that a unified command be established in Vietnam in which the ROK Commander would have operational control of the Korean troops. Ultimately, ROK officials refused to sign a formal agreement giving operational control of their force to COMUSMACV; however, verbally they agreed to do this.[5]

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1. CINCPAC 302318Z Jun 65 (TS); CINCPAC 292026Z Jun 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 240336Z Apr 65 (C)
3. SEOUL38toSTATE 100220Z Jul 65(C); CINCPAC 162318Z Jul 65 (S) CINCPAC 070333Z Aug 65 (S); CINCPAC 040138Z Aug 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 122328Z Jul 65 (S); STATE 47toSEOUL130210Z Jul 65 (S)
5. USFK Historical Report, 28 Dec 65 (S) CPRS 003910-65

[redacted]

On 9 October the main body of the 2d Korean Marine Brigade reached Cam Ranh Bay. Protected by 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry the Marine unit achieved an operational status and on 19 October assumed responsibility for its area in the vicinity of Cam Ranh Bay/Dong Ba Thin. Five days later the brigade deployed a battalion size task force to Phan Rang for security of airfield construction.

Also on 9 October, 972 troops of the ROKA Capital (Tiger) Division Headquarters and combat support units debarked the USS GEIGER at Qui Nhon. Secured by combat operations of ARVN; 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division; and 2d Battalion, 7th Marines the Koreans received additional units and by 9 November the deployment of more than 18,000 personnel was completed. ROKMAGV was disestablished and became part of ROK FORCE Vietnam (ROKFV) under the CG ROKA Capital (Tiger) Division.

It was planned that the ROK force would relieve the 2/7 Marines and 1/101 Abn Div of responsibility for the Qui Nhon area in early November.[2, 3]

Military Situation in RVN, November: Viet Cong initiated actions rose to an all time high in November. Their most significant attacks included overrunning Tan Hiep airfield in IV Corps and Hiep Duc District Town in I Corps, and inflicting heavy casualties on the 7th ARVN Regiment at the Michelin Plantation in III Corps.

The major engagement of the month was Operation SILVER BAYONET, a continuation of the October Plei Me action in Pleiku Province. The 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division engaged NVA forces in the Ia Drang Valley/Chu Pong area near the Cambodian border on 14 November. Five GVN airborne battalions joined the

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1. CINCPAC 280030Z Aug 65 (S); CINCPAC 230108Z June 65 (TS); CINCPAC 020344Z July 65 (TS) CINCPAC 140333Z April 65 (TS); COMUSKOREA 52380/240900Z Jun 65 (TS); USFK Historical Report, 28 Dec 65 (S) CPRS 003910-65; CINCPAC Briefing Notes 9 Oct 65 (TS)
2. SVN MAP supported costs of the Korean force in RVN. Equipment required upon deployment of the ROK force was provided at no cost to Korea MAP. MAP supported items were obtained through the RVNAF depot system, non-MAP supported items were drawn from the 1st Log Cmd. COMUSMACV ltr ser 01296 of 30 Sep 65 (C); OSD DEF 3325/051643Z Oct 65 (S)

action between 18-21 November. These units were supported by hundreds of strike sorties, and for the first time SAC B-52s were used in direct support of ground operations. It was estimated that 1,500 of the enemy were killed in these actions.

In I Corps III MAF forces conducted two operations of battalion size or larger; Marines also supported GVN offensive and defensive actions. The enemy in III MAF area appeared to be concentrating on destroying ARVN forces and avoiding large unit combat.

Terrorism continued at a high rate; five officials and one former official were assassi: ted in Capital Military Region. Road and bridge destruction impec friendly operations, and in IV Corps VC action also slowed movement of rice to Saigon markets.

In II Corps the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division completed its mission of securing the Capital (Tiger) Infantry Division and restoring GVN control to much of An Nhon District. The Capital (Tiger) Division received three additional battalions, the final increment of the deployment. The Division assumed responsibility for its area and undertook local search and destroy operations. Thus relieved by the Koreans, the 2/7 Marines resumed its interrupted deployment to III MAF; and the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division moved to Phan Rang where they relieved the Korean 2d Marine Brigade of the security mission for airfield construction. Elements of the Korean Marine Brigade then conducted two search and destroy operations northwest of Nha Trang and assumed the mission of providing close-in security for Cam Ranh Air Force Base.

During November there were numerous friendly operations, in addition to those mentioned above, to search out and destroy the enemy and his material, and to penetrate the previously secure VC strongholds. Despite a continuing influx of large enemy units from outside RVN, the continued aggressive operations by friendly forces interfered with enemy plans. More important was the improved US/GVN/FWMAF capability to maintain and, to a limited degree, increase the scope and intensity of operations. [1]

Build-up of Enemy Force

Concurrent with the US build-up of forces in South Vietnam, the Viet Cong/North Vietnam Army forces were undergoing a steady increase. This was achieved by recruitment from North and South Vietnam, infiltration of personnel and units from North Vietnam and reorganization of VC units in South Vietnam. Near the end of 1965, CINCUSARPAC estimated the 1964-1965 enemy build-up (expressed in combat battalions) as follows:

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1. COMUSMACV ser 001159 Monthly Evaluation, November 1965 (S) CPRS 001163-66

US/ALLIED MANEUVER FORCES RVN
(BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER)

1 JANUARY 1966



REPUBLIC of VIETNAM GROUND FORCES

DISPOSITIONS 31 DEC 1965



[redacted]

YEAR:	64	JUL 65	NOV 65
VIET CONG	46	71	75
NORTH VIETNAM ARMY	0	9	21
TOTAL	46	80	96

The above force increase was achieved despite a continued high loss of personnel and equipment. Also, the ratio of friendly to enemy forces, in terms of available combat battalions, had declined steadily since 1961. CINCUSARPAC's estimate of the ratio, based on the number of combat battalions, was as follows:[1]

	1960	1962	1964	JUL 1965	NOV 1965
Friendly/Enemy	11.1:1	5.6:1	3.6:1	2.2:1	2.24:1

1. CINCUSARPAC GPOP-PL 33592/260015Z Dec 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

SECTION E - CINCPAC ACTIONS TO IMPROVE THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

SOUTH VIETNAM

South Vietnam Highlights, 1965

The following significant occurrences are keyed to the associated map of South Vietnam titled as above.[1]

(1) Piecemeal commitment of GVN forces against a well organized VC task force, starting at the end of 1964, resulted in heavy friendly losses early in 1965.

(2) VC attacked the US compound and airstrip at Pleiku on 7 February. Five aircraft destroyed and 15 damaged.

(3) VC started their intensive central Vietnam campaign in Binh Dinh Province early in February. Campaign lasted several months and drew the bulk of ARVN general reserve to II Corps Tactical Zone.

(4) VNAF sank a steel-hulled gun runner in Vung Ro Bay on 19 February. Large arms cache uncovered.

(5) SVN Regional Force (RF) company near Hoai An conducted a determined stand against a large VC attack. SVN Marine battalion then struck a VC ambush force from the rear. This operation on 9 March involved five VC battalions.

(6) US Embassy in Saigon bombed on 30 March.

(7) Late March operation by 21st Ranger Battalion in Kontum Province was the first known clash with infiltrated NVNA unit.

(8) Aggressive ARVN action near U Minh forest exacted a large VC casualty toll in early April.

(9) Productive April operation by 7th Division in Kien Hoa Province resulted in capture of a large arms cache.

(10) Major VC mortar attacks against Father Hoa's "Sea Swallows" on 6 and 9 May marked first attacks in two years against this special sector.

(11) VC conducted multi-battalion attacks on Song Be, provincial capital, on 11 May. Over 300 VC killed.

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1. PACOM WID 2-66

[redacted]


SOUTH VIETNAM
HIGHLIGHTS
1965
DEMARCATION LINE
I CORPS
II CORPS
III CORPS
IV CORPS
PHU QUOC
CON SON
O POULO CONDORE
1
2
3
4
5
6
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[redacted]

(12) VC destroyed a section of the vital Saigon-Danhim power line on 17 May. Power shortage became more critical.

(13) Three ARVN battalions rendered combat ineffective in actions near Ba Gia beginning 29 May. 1st VC Regiment also suffered heavy losses.

(14) Elements of two VC regiments attacked Dong Xoi on 10 June. Over 700 VC killed.

(15) VC multi-battalion attack overran Tou Mourong on 25 June. NVNA troops were involved.

(16) Le Thanh district town abandoned by ARVN late in June. This gave VC control over a large portion of Route 19 west of Pleiku.

(17) Danang airfield infiltrated by special VC assault teams in July. Five aircraft destroyed, four damaged.

(18) Largest and most complex RVN military operation thus far started 14 July. Twelve battalions and supporting troops cleared Route 19 from Qui Nhon to Pleiku.

(19) Duc Co harassed by VC beginning in July. Major ARVN operations in support resulted in VC losses of over 400 killed.

(20) In Operation STARLIGHT III MAF forces surprised elements of 1st VC Regiment by an amphibious and heliborne operation in 18 August. More than 600 VC killed.

(21) VC fired on Bien Hoa airfield on 24 August and damaged 36 aircraft.

(22) US and SVN forces combined in Operation PIRANHA on 7 September. Heliborne/amphibious assault netted over 200 VC dead.

(23) Late September action by 22d Division inflicted heavy losses on an estimated VC regiment in an attempted VC ambush. Engagements for a two week period resulted in more than 1,350 estimated VC dead.

(24) October ARVN operation uncovered large VC munitions factory and stores in Kien Tuong Province.

(25) VC launched a three battalion attack to drive ARVN out of the key Ba Long Valley in October. Attempt failed with heavy VC losses.

(26) On 26 October the VC attacked US air installations at Chu Lai and Danang.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(27) VC invested Plei Me Camp. Action included two battalion VC attack on 20 October. VC casualties were heavy.

(28) In November elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade engaged VC near Zone D. VC lost 414 dead.

(29) 1st US Infantry Division netted 198 VC killed on 11 November.

(30) Near VC Chu Pong base area US 1st Cavalry and ARVN units engaged large NVNA force beginning 14 November. Over 1,400 enemy killed.

(31) Extensive damage to Metropole BEQ by early December VC bombing.

(32) VC, ARVN and US units suffered heavy casualties in late November - early December actions in plantation area of Binh Duong Province.

(33) VC mauled ARVN Ranger Battalion and then suffered heavy casualties in early December operation which included USMC units.

(34) ARVN operation in canal/paddy area on 22 December killed 282 VC.

(35) RF company at the Bu Prang outpost attacked by VC on 29 December. Defense was successful and the VC lost 125 killed.

RVNAF Force Strength

At the beginning of the year the Secretary of Defense was considering alternate proposals, prepared by COMUSMACV and supported by CINCPAC, for increasing the armed forces of South Vietnam (RVNAF). One proposal provided for a 30,309 increase in regular forces and the other would increase the regulars by 47,556. A common provision of the proposals was an increase of 109,941 in paramilitary forces.[1]

On 20 March COMUSMACV proposed to accelerate activation of RVNAF units and to adopt the larger force alternative. He also desired to form a tenth ARVN division from three existing separate regiments and some units to be formed later. CINCPAC supported this proposal,[2] and on 13 April the JCS approved the following:[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1964, pp. 323-324
2. CINCPAC 25010Z Mar 65 (S)
3. JCS 009003/132241Z Apr 65 (S)

[redacted]

1. Acceleration of the force structure expansion.

2. Addition of 17,247 spaces (15 infantry battalions, 1 artillery battalion)

3. Increased US advisors as required.

4. Funding from FY 65-66 MAP for Vietnam.

On 9 June the JCS authorized organization of the tenth ARVN division, as requested by COMUSMACV in March.[1]

CINCPAC recommended, on 11 November, a further increase of 15,922 in RVNAF. A comparison of his recommended force strength and the 30 October authorized RVNAF personnel strength follows:

SERVICE	AUTHORIZED	CINCPAC PROPOSED
ARVN	262,150	274,769
VNN	14,071	15,491
VNMC	6,555	6,540
VNAF	12,752	14,658
TOTAL	295,536	311,458

Landing Ship Support Large (LSSL) for VNN

In late 1964 COMUSMACV inquired as to the availability of LSSLs, stating that this type ship was desirable for South Vietnam because of its superior firepower, shallow draft, capability for deliberate grounding, integral troop lift capability and minimal maintenance and logistic problems.[2] After confirming the suitability of LSSLs for VNN, CINCPAC initiated action which led to the addition of five LSSLs to the Vietnam supplemental FY 65 MA program.[3]

Following extensive investigation it was determined that these vessels could be obtained from excess LSSL assets in custody of the Japanese Defense Agency.[4] Negotiations with GOJ resulted in the transfer of five LSSLs to US custody on 28 April.[5] Delivery of the ships to VNN

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1. JCS 003617/091916Z Jun 65 (S)
2. COMUSMACV ltr ser 01844 of 31 Dec 64 (C)
3. OSD DEF 08267/012344Z Apr 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 210239Z Mar 65 (S); details in CINCPAC J4 History Report for Mar 65
5. NAVSHIPPREPFAC Yoko 280506Z Apr 65 (C)

was scheduled for July, September, and November of 1965, and January 1966.[1] This was, however, contingent on the VNN capability to provide crews.

A-1s for VNAF

The delivery of A-1s to VNAF was suspended July-September at direction of the Secretary of Defense pending a determination whether B-57s could be substituted for the A-1s. This action seemed necessary because it appeared that there would not be sufficient A-1s to meet USN requirements.[2]

CINCPAC did not want B-57s added to the VNAF, and he proposed that the operational evaluation (SKOSHI TIGER) of the F-5 be accelerated to determine whether it could replace the VNAF A-1s.[3] It was subsequently determined that the A-1 availability was adequate for both USN/RVNAF requirements at least through the end of FY 66. The Secretary of Defense accordingly directed resumption of A-1 delivery to sustain the approved six strike squadron force structure (150 aircraft).[4]

Twenty-two aircraft were later delivered to VNAF; and an additional eight, previously diverted to Subic Bay, were depreserved and flown to South Vietnam.[5]

M16 Rifles/XM148 Grenade Launchers

Following a study made by a special survey team COMUSMACV requested earliest substitution of the M16 rifle on a selective basis for the M1/M14 rifles, M1/M2 carbines and Browning Automatic Rifles in the US, RVNAF, and Free World forces. COMUSMACV considered that this would increase the combat effectiveness of these forces.[6] It was

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1. COMUSMACV 270024Z Apr 65 (S)
2. OSD DEF 01070/081601Z Sep 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 060420Z Aug 65 (S)
4. OSD DEF 1550/141923Z Sep 65 (S); also JCS 001830/131634Z Nov 64 (S)
5. CNO 24237Z Sep 65 (S), CNO 291939Z Sep 65 (S)
6. COMUSMACV 060148Z Dec 65 (S)

[redacted]

estimated that the initial FY 66 MAP requirement would be 106,000 M16 rifles for RVNAF and 17,000 for ROKFV. There was an additional requirement for 5,742 XM-148 grenade launchers for the M-16 rifle. The initial cost of these two items was estimated at $18.87 million.[1]

CINCPAC concurred and recommended immediate JCS action to meet the requirement.[2]

B-57s Loaned to VNAF:

On 19 July COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that the Secretary of Defense had authorized marking four B-57s with VNAF insignia and training eight VNAF pilots. The JCS approved on 2 August, CINCPAC's proposal to loan the aircraft to the VNAF and to place the pilots under operational control of Commander, 2d Air Division.[3]

Research and Development (R&D) and Combat Developments (CD) in South Vietnam

In a February response to a JCS request, CINCPAC forwarded a COMUSMACV list of priority operational and logistical problems needing R&D support. He also expressed agreement with a JCS proposal for a conference related to certain aspects of R&D. (C)

A 24-26 March conference at CINCPAC Headquarters sought to establish the latest status of R&D projects which could help solve operational and logistical problems in RVN and to review research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) procedures and directives. Conferees included representatives from the Joint Staff, the Services, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (ODDR&E), CINCPAC and COMUSMACV. (C).

The conferees concluded that the existing procedures for RDT&E matters related to the counterinsurgency activities in RVN were basically satisfactory. It was nevertheless agreed that (C)

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1. COMUSMACV 070705Z Dec 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 170426Z Dec 65 (S)
3. COMUSMACV 25093/19112Z Jul 65 (S); CINCPACAF 53233/240521Z Jul 65 (S); CINCPAC 010401Z Aug 65 (S); JCS 7264/022148Z Aug 65 (U)

[redacted]

[redacted]

COMUSMACV would, on the basis of information provided by the Services and Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)-Project Agile, request visits by joint technical teams to obtain more information on available equipment, and that which could be developed. Also, there was agreement that in line with policy of the Director of Military Assistance (ISA), the military departments or ARPA would fund RDT&E projects intended solely or primarily for RVN forces.[1]

Subsequent to the conference, the JCS directed CINCPAC to provide information copies of the various COMUSMACV lists and reports required by CINCPAC Instruction 036960.2[2] to the Services, Joint Staff, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and ARPA (Agile). It was believed that this information would aid the interested agencies in supporting RDT&E and CD activities in RVN.[3]

On 28 April OSD proposed visits by teams of experts from military services and ARPA/Agile in the fields of: weapons, munitions and fuzes; surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, and position finding; communications, mobility; and chemical incapacitating agents and dispensers. The purpose as evolved for these teams was to provide MACV and the component services with information pertaining to the status of R&D development items which might have application in solving operational problems. COMUSMACV concurred with the visits of all teams except the one involved with chemical agents. The teams visited one at a time from July through September. At the conclusion of a visit, each team submitted a report containing a brief description of each item presented, the current status and recommendations for action by COMUSMACV.

As a result of urgent operational requirements stated by COMUSMACV, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering initiated a program called PROVOST (Priority R&D objectives for Vietnam operations). Objective of the program was to make available all useful outputs of the Service R&D programs to give maximum support

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1. JCS 2343/527-1 of 11 May 65 (C)
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1964, pp. 345-346
3. JCSM-471-65 of 20 May 65 (U) JCS R/S 059-65

[redacted]

[redacted]

to US Forces in Vietnam as rapidly as possible. A meeting was held at CINCPAC Headquarters 11-12 August to coordinate on a draft prepared jointly in the Washington area. Representatives from the JCS, COMUSMACV and each of the component commanders, together with CINCPAC representatives, coordinated in preparing comments. COMUSMACV would later provide more detailed comments.

Television Communications for RVN

In response to a proposal generated in RVN the Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of a television system in South Vietnam for US/RVN forces and the Vietnamese people.[1] OSD requested that the command and control support of the US aspect of the system should conform to COMUSMACV policies as established for Armed Forces Radio activities. Guidance was issued for the initiation of arrangements between MACV, USAID, and the GVN for facilities, training of GVN personnel and program policies.

It was planned that AID would distribute 1,000 television receiving sets which would be purchased by the Defense Department. Approximately half of these sets would be MAP funded and would be provided to the RVNAF for installation in training centers, mess halls, recreation rooms and other places appropriate for group viewing. Most of the remaining 500 sets would be located in Vietnamese information centers in the Saigon-Cholon area.[2]

In late December OSD approved funding of the 500 sets for the RVNAF as an addition to the FY 66 MA Program.[3] DA was directed to initiate procurement action to make delivery by 14 January 1966. DA issued the necessary MAP order amendments for the purchase and the USAMC authorized expeditious shipment to Vietnam by special mission aircraft.[4]

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1. COMUSMACV 36550/150540Z Oct 65 (C); SEC DEF 7647/021711Z Dec 65 (C)
2. SAIGON 741 to STATE 111400Z Dec 65 (C)
3. SEC DEF 292052Z Dec 65 (C)
4. DA 282307Z Dec 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

To assure set operation and to provide maintenance until in-country capability was developed, COMUSMACV requested an additional deviation of FY 66 MAP funds to pay for the services of Philippine civilian contract technicians for one year.[1] CINCPAC concurred in the request and OSD approved the increase of funds.[2] DA informed COMUSMACV on the 28th of January that funding for the contract technicians had been completed.[3] (C)

The first 500 television sets and associated equipment arrived in Vietnam on 12 January 1966. By early February special transmitting arrangements had been completed and the first phase of the US/RVN forces television broadcasting was started. On 7 February Vietnamese civilians in Saigon were viewing TV for the first time. (C)

THAILAND

Security Developments in Thailand

Insurgency in Thailand: Insurgency is defined in military dictionaries as "a condition of illegal opposition to the existing government of a nation, such opposition directed by an organized group which is not a recognized revolutionary government. Insurgency can include action ranging from passive resistance to large-scale guerrilla-type operations."

At the end of 1965 it was apparent that some of the subversive bands in Thailand were qualified as guerrillas. Communist operations included murder, sabotage, ambushes, and a planned attack against an isolated police post. Government forces attempting to apprehend these bands met armed opposition. It appeared that the communists had at least a modest capability to conduct insurgency, and there were several reports of plans to begin attacking police posts and to waylay vehicles.

It seemed probable that the next year would see the continuation and perhaps intensification of general terrorism, ambushes of vehicles

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1. COMUSMACV 310805Z Dec 65 (C)
2. CINCPAC 310255Z Dec 65 (C); SEC DEF 101631Z Jan 66 (U)
3. DA 2822216Z Jan 66 (U)

[redacted]

[redacted]

and patrols, and attacks against small government posts. Armed attacks against larger and better defended installations did not seem imminent. After the guerrilla bands gained more experience and strength, however, bombing and sabotage operations against US/Thai installations appeared to be distinct possibilities.[1]

The trend of events in Thailand during the last quarter of the year is evident from the following table:

CATEGORY		OCT	NOV	DEC
Subversives	KIA		3	1
	WIA		1	1
Police	KIA			1
	WIA	1	4	1
Civilians	Killed	3	5	4
	WIA		2	2
Ambushes				1
Sabotage			2	
Attack on Government Posts				1

The following significant events occurred in Thailand during the last quarter of 1965. The incidents are keyed to the associated map of Thailand.[2]

(1) NAKHON PHANON PROVINCE:

13 October-- A Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) man was killed in District. The shooting was believed to be the work of communists.

7 November--Police battled a terrorist band and killed two subversives.

16 November--Chuan Sukte was killed about two km west of Ban Non Phayon, and his son was wounded. Police believed Chuan was killed because he told where a subversive was hiding.

17 November--Subversives killed a school principal who had been a police informant; a policeman was wounded near Plapak.

23 November--Two unidentified men killed a police informant about 500 meters from Ban Dong Luang.

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1. PACOM WID 3-66
2. PACOM WID 3-66

[redacted]


[redacted]
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
BURMA
LAOS
NORTH VIETNAM
GULF OF TONKIN
8 SAKON NAKHON PROVINCE
1 NAKHON PHANOM PROVINCE
4 UBON PROVINCE
8 SISAKET PROVINCE
CAMBODIA
SOUTH VIETNAM
7
GULF OF SIAM
8 SURAT THANI PROVINCE
8 YALA PROVINCE
THAILAND
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
OCTOBER - DECEMBER
PACOM WID No. 3-66

[redacted]

27 November--Three subversives killed a member of the VDC and wounded two policemen who were on duty at a festival in Nongsang Village.

2 December--A contractor, building bridges for the RTG in Mukadhan and Kham Cha Districts, received an anonymous letter demanding payment of 40,000 baht or risk having the bridges blown up.

3 December--An unconfirmed report of an air drop of medicine, food and weapons to communist terrorists on Phu Phan Mountain.

5 December--Five members of Mobile Development Unit (MDU) in Ban Phon Tum engaged in a 30 minute fire fight with subversives at the foot of Phu Lom Mountain. No casualties.

8 December--Seven man Provincial Police Patrol engaged subversives in a 20 minute fire fight in the jungle at Ban Don Pu Ta. No police casualties but at least one subversive was wounded. An MDU helicopter in the area at the same time exchanged fire with a subversive group.

10 December--Buppha was shot and killed by two unidentified men in Ban Phaki Tuh, Honghi Precinct, Muang District.

13 December--Village headman was assassinated in district adjacent to Nakae.

21 December--An estimated 12 armed subversives attacked a small police aerial reinforcement unit at Ban Kaeng. There were no police casualties, but one civilian was killed and another was wounded. The leader of the subversives was killed and it was believed that he was not a Thai.

27 December--A sweep by 250 police was started in Lubi I Loet Valley. The RTA later assumed control and employed 750 troops supported by T-28s. One policeman was killed and three were wounded. Air strikes accounted for eight of the 10 communists reported killed. Five supporters of the communist force were captured.

(2) SAKHON NAKHON PROVINCE:

25 November--More than two tons of TNT were stolen from a construction company at the Nam Pong dam site. Also missing were 3,400 electric fuses, 4,500 ordinary fuses and 500 blasting caps.

26 November--MDU personnel were attacked by about 15 subversives in Sawaeng Daen Din District. About 46 subversives were believed to be in this area under command of Champ Khunrak.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1 December--Pheng Kotpraka was wounded soon after returning home after reporting to police on local subversives.

(3) SISAKET PROVINCE:

29 November--Saboteurs blew up a bridge on the road between Sisaket and Kanthraralak District. They returned on the next night and cut communications wires.

(4) UBON PROVINCE:

19 October--A man armed with an M-3 machine gun was captured in Amnat Charoen. He reportedly told police he was a member of a 13 man group trained as subversives in Laos to infiltrate Thailand.

23 October--A communist suspect was shot and killed by an unknown individual while being questioned by police in Phibun Mangsahan District. Police believed the shooting was to silence the prisoner. A police corporal present was wounded.

25 October--A schoolteacher in Chanuman District, who had cooperated with police, was shot and killed by unknown assailants. A note threatening other teachers was left on the body.

3 November--A police informant and his wife were wounded while returning from their rice field to their home at Ban Nong Hai.

6 November--A villager, whose life had been previously threatened by communists, was killed. A note similar to the one left on the teacher was found on the body.

24 November--A policeman was reported wounded at Phu Kosel, Chanuman District when a police detail was fired upon by subversives.

4 December--A police informant was killed at Ban Nong Hai, Amnat Charern District.

7 December--While patrolling in the company of other policemen in Chanuman District, a Border Patrol Police (BPP) constable was seriously wounded by communist terrorists.

27 December--A US truck carrying four US officers and one enlisted man was ambushed on Route 27 north of Ubon. There were no injuries, and a suspect was apprehended.

(5) SURAT THANI PROVINCE:

7 November--Police conducted a major sweep of subversives in Nasan District, Surat Thani. Thirty-eight subversives were arrested and various documents were captured. Four campsites used by subversive groups were discovered, one had apparently been used for military training.

[redacted]

14 November--According to press reports, police involved in a mopping-up operation in Phruphri District, Surat Thani were engaged in a short fire fight with a group of terrorists who subsequently escaped.

(6) YALA PROVINCE:

18 October--A Thai police patrol clashed with a band of Communist Chinese terrorists in Betong District. The terrorists escaped after an hour-long fight, leaving some documents. Police pursuit failed to regain contact. There were no police casualties.

(7) BANGKOK:

23 December--A communist organizer was reported as stating that the party would begin to attack the police in January 1966.

Security of US Personnel and Facilities in Thailand: United States personnel and facilities in Thailand were increasingly exposed to the activities of insurgents and bandits during 1965. CINCPAC expressed strong concern about this during a July meeting of the Coordinating Committee for US Missions Southeast Asia (SEACOORD). He later asked COMUSMACTHAI to appraise the security situation and to consider the possible use of US military police and combat troops in a security role. The Royal Thai Government would not, however, accept the idea of armed US personnel providing the requisite security, nor could they provide security forces from their own resources.[1]

To resolve the problem COMUSMACTHAI proposed in September establishment of a 2,000 man security regiment composed of Thai recalled reservists financed by the US. CINCPAC supported the proposal and recommended approval to the JCS.[2]

COMUSMACTHAI subsequently negotiated a draft agreement with the Thai Minister of Defense on utilization of the security force. During November this draft was under consideration in Washington, and it appeared that debate over claims policy might result in extensive delay.[3] Admiral Sharp supported Ambassador Martin's concept that all concerned should cut through technicalities and establish the force at an early date.

1. CINCPAC 212217Z Aug 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 250526Z Sep 65 (S)
3. DA 741684/242357Z Nov 65 (S)

[redacted]

CINCPAC suggested that if the issues of claims and disability or death benefits could not be quickly resolved, COMUSMACTHAI be authorized to enter into immediate agreement with the Thai on all other provisions of the draft proposal. He further recommended that the Thai be assured that claims, death and disability provisions of the final agreement would assure indemnification of the RTG for expenses occasioned by activities of the Thai guards.[1] (S)

On 24 December the JCS indicated that the Secretary of Defense approved CINCPAC's proposal. The Department of the Air Force was designated Department of Defense agent, and COMUSMACTHAI was appointed contracting officer to negotiate and execute the agreement with the Thai Ministry of Defense for the security service.[2] The text of the agreement was to be subject to approval by the US Ambassador. (S)

Thai MAP Increase in Support of United States Actions and Policies in Thailand

Thai performance with Military Assistance had been characterized by inadequate and poor use and maintenance of equipment. For these reasons Thai MAP dollar ceilings had been low, and this caused dissatisfaction among officials of the Royal Thai Government (RTG). Extensive action had been directed toward improving the situation, and there had been some progress. In 1964, CINCPAC had urged increased support for Thai forces in the interests of American national policy.

During 1965, however, military and political developments in Southeast Asia demanded more action to achieve significant improvement in the combat effectiveness of the Thai armed forces. At the same time, it was urgent to retain the RTG cooperation in permitting the US to use Thai bases for air operations against North Vietnam and in Laos. This portion of the history traces efforts to achieve these objectives.[3]

In connection with his Force Objective Study, CHJUSMAG Thailand proposed, in late 1964, an addition of $9.2 million to the FY 65 program and $15.1 million to the FY 66 plan.

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1. CINCPAC 020833Z Dec 65 (S)
2. CSAF 301632Z Dec 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC Command History, 1964, p. 402

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC concurred in most of the add-ons proposed by CHJUSMAG Thailand, but in recognition of the stringent theater-wide MAP funding situation he stated in early February 1965 that the funding must be from sources other than the existing PACOM MA program. CINCPAC further stated that the add-ons would be included in MAP only if ceilings were raised or add-on money was provided.[1] (S)

In March, while Thailand based US aircraft were involved in combat air programs in Laos and North Vietnam, CHJUSMAG Thailand increased his add-on proposals. He asked $10.6 million for FY 65 and $23.1 million for FY 66 in support of the Thailand Force Objective Study. As he had supported the earlier proposal, Ambassador Graham A. Martin strongly supported the increase. (S)

CINCPAC concurred in most of the proposed additions. He emphasized that the RTG had been extremely cooperative in support of US air operations, and he pointed out that the US could not expect this attitude to continue in the face of reduced MAP ceilings.[2] (S)

At the time a major US force commitment was planned in April, CINCPAC supported in principle Ambassador Martin's proposal that Thailand MAP enjoy equal priority funding with Laos and South Vietnam. He further suggested immediate and favorable consideration for a supplementary appropriation for Thailand FY 65 MAP and an appropriate increase in the FY 66 program.[3]

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC 020250Z Feb 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 192315Z Mar 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 070534Z Apr 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]



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

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



[redacted]

LAOS

Situation in Laos

Near the end of the year there were significant events in Laos, particularly in the vicinity of the Plaines de Jarres and the panhandle. (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

These, as well as incidents of January 1966, are summarized below and keyed to the associated map captioned "Situation in Laos."[1]

(1) On 10 December the enemy recaptured Vien Pou Ka, having lost it in the summer of 1965. Minor skirmishes continued into 1966.

(2) In the fall of 1965 FAR cleared the enemy from a 20 km wide strip north of the Mekong to prevent interference with rice transport on the river. Small enemy patrols were re-entering the area in early 1966.

(3) Elements of an estimated enemy battalion were, at the beginning of 1966, pressing friendly guerrilla units about 65 miles northeast of Luang Prabang in a effort to clear the Nam Hou Valley--a Pathet Lao supply line through the area.

(4) Early in January 1966 clashes occurred between neutralists and the enemy east of Luang Prabang.

(5) Truck convoys as large as 65 vehicles were noted east of Sam Neua near the end of 1965. The apparent purpose was to resupply troops throughout Houa Phan Province (which had been hard hit by friendly air strikes) and to support enemy offensive operations around Hua Muong.

(6) On 21 December the enemy in battalion strength recaptured Hua Muong on Route 6 about 55 km southeast of Sam Neua and advanced to positions about 18 km east of the important FAR strong point at Na Khang. As many as six enemy battalions pushed friendly forces away from Route 6 and threatened four FAR battalions defending Na Khang. An additional five enemy battalions were located north of Ban Ban about 20 km southeast of Na Khang in early 1966.

(7) At the end of 1965 and early in the following year light to moderate truck traffic was noted on Route 7 west of Ban Ban.

(8) A mid-December FAR attack toward enemy positions north of Tha Thom was repulsed, and friendly forces were thrown back to defensive positions about 10 km southwest of the objectives at Muang Phan. In January 1966 friendly forces in defensive positions 20 km northeast of Tha Thom were planning eventual resumption of the offensive toward Muang Phan, Muang Ngan and Xieng Khouang.

(9) In November the enemy recaptured portions of the Nam Theun valley lost to FAR in October. At the end of 1965 the FAR remained in control of the Nam Hin Boun valley, and the enemy was strongly positioned in the hills to the north and east.

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1. PACOM WID 2-66

[redacted]

[redacted]

NO FOREIGN DISSEM



SOURCE: CINCPAC WID 2-66

[redacted]

[redacted]

(10) At the end of December pilots observed many lights along Routes 8 and 12. These could have been an attempt at deception or the fires typical of slash and burn cultivation. Other lights or fires were noted southeast of Muong Phine.

(11) Detection of numerous caves and truck parks substantiated, near the end of 1965, an estimate that the Mahaxay/Nhommarath area was a major enemy strong point and forward supply base.

(12) Through December 1965 and early January 1966 several trucks utilized Route 12. Movement was in both directions and most of it was at night.

(13) At the end of 1965 a by-pass road passing east and south of a large mountain and joining Route 23 near Ban Pha Nhop was used by enemy trucks. The road provided a more direct route south and afforded a by-pass to Route 12 in Mu Gia Pass. Another route entered Laos from North Vietnam about 12 km south of the Mu Gia Pass and joined the first by-pass near Ban Xonne. The latter road was not reported suitable for trucks, but it could eventually serve as a route completely around Mu Gia.

(14) Enemy truck traffic on Route 23 was moderately heavy from mid-November until it was interrupted for about a week at the end of December. Traffic resumed in early January 1966.

(15) Some November and December reports mentioned North Vietnamese women doing road repair work in the north on Route 7, and in the panhandle on Route 911 near the junction of Routes 23 and 911 and in the Mahaxay area.

(16) FAR had pushed the enemy back about 12 km east of Thakhek on Route 12 as of 8 January 1966. The enemy held strong positions in rugged hills west and southwest of Mahaxay. The situation was quiet, but the enemy threatened Thakhek. FAR had cleared Route 13 about 20 km south of Thakhek but encountered strong resistance on the west bank of the Se Bang Fai.

(17) FAR started a limited offensive on 6 January 1966 to regain lost ground along Route 9. Vigorous resistance was anticipated from strong enemy units south of Mahaxay and west of Muong Phine. The same force might also threaten Savannakhet.

(18) Early in January 1966 FAR and Neutralist companies were conducting clearing action south of Saravane.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(19) An enemy force of unknown size attacked units of a FAR volunteer battalion in the Se Kong Valley about 15 miles southeast of Attopeu on 15 December. The enemy was apparently patrolling the valley to insure its retention as a supply line. At the end of 1965 and during the first weeks of 1966, Southwestern Laos was becoming more important to the enemy infiltration into the highlands of South Vietnam. Therefore, it was anticipated that the enemy would increase protective measures against interdiction of this route.

Laos Helicopter Authorization/Search and Rescue in Laos

On 24 February Ambassador Sullivan stated a requirement for additional aircraft (4 UH-34Ds, 3 U-10 Helio Couriers) to meet search and rescue requirements stemming from the intensified US air operations over Laos. He pointed out that his available assets were essential to support critical ground action.

CINCPAC advised the JCS on 2 March that no PACOM assets were available to meet the requirement. He pointed out that the helicopters were to support US air operations; therefore, the requirement was a Service requirement and not associated with MAP. The aircraft should, in CINCPAC's view, be operated by Air America Incorporated (Civilian contracting air service).[1]

The JCS directed Department of the Army, on 10 March, to provide the three U-10 Helio Couriers to Laos on bailment to meet SAR requirements.[2] Similarly, CNO was directed to loan six Marine helicopters from CONUS assets.[3]

Six additional U-10s were subsequently requested by Ambassador Sullivan to meet SAR requirements.[4] With this, his stated requirement for U-10s was 15 versus six on hand. He never received the additional U-10s, although the civilian contractors procured several Pilatus Porter (Swiss) short take-off and landing (STOL) planes.

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1. CINCPAC 020321Z Mar 65 (S); CINCPACAF VC 30540/092308Z Mar 65 (S)
2. JCS 006801/102202Z Mar 65 (S)
3. CG2d MAW 062358Z Apr 65 (S); JCS 001404/042105Z May 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 090050Z May 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

In April CINCPAC reviewed the status of helicopters for Laos and recommended to the JCS a broad range of action related to helicopter requirements in Southeast Asia. The status of the Laos helicopters was as follows:[1] (S)

2 HH-34F owned and operated by RLAF.

10 UH-34D on hand. Seven of these previously diverted fro active Marine units and delivered to DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand in 1964 and operated by Air America.

4 UH-34D on hand. These were borrowed for four months from Marines at El Toro.

4 UH-34D borrowed from Marines for 6 months to meet SAR requirements.

20 Total On Hand (S)

CINCPAC urged increasing the Laos authorization (UE) to 18 to provide the helicopters needed on a permanent basis for contingency and SAR requirements. Observing that procurement sources would not meet requirements on a timely basis, CINCPAC noted that the forward deployment of Marine units required locating an alternate source for the helicopters programmed for actual delivery to Laos. CINCPAC proposed a course of action that would expeditiously and effectively meet the Southeast Asia H-34 requirements. This prompted a JCS survey regarding the worldwide availability of helicopters.[2] (S)

In June Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand proposed to increase the Laos UE for helicopters from a level of 18 to 21. This was supported by Ambassador Sullivan, since in his view Air America was to conduct the primary SAR effort in Laos.[3] The Ambassador also indicated that he did not want USAF marked helicopters used in Laos.

The CINCPACAF view of SAR responsibility differed. He considered that his H-3Cs, stationed at Nakhon Phanom or Udorn, would provide the primary SAR support; thus releasing the Air America aircraft except in an emergency.[4] If this was the case than there would be no requirement to increase the Laos UE.

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1. CINCPAC 150125Z Apr 65 (S)
2. JCS 009448/202304Z Apr 65 (C)
3. VIENTIANE to CINCPAC 1/010409Z July 65 (S); JCS 006527/060002Z Mar 65 (S); CINCPAC 121120Z Mar 65 (S)
4. CINCPACAF 31094/260151Z Jun 65(S)

[redacted]

The Ambassador subsequently agreed[1] to try the USAF helicopters in the SAR task. The US position, stated in a 5 August message from the Secretary of State, was that political factors required that Air American retain the responsibility for all SAR in Laos. Thailand based USAF helicopters could be prepositioned and refueled in Laos for SAR in North Vietnam. Nevertheless, these aircraft were not to remain overnight in Laos. Only "in extremis" would Thailand based USAF helicopters be used for SAR in Laos.[2]

On 10 August CINCPAC recommended investigation of the feasibility of Air America operating USAF provided CH-3Cs.[3] Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand later indicated his requirements could be met with a UE of 21 UH-34Ds, and two CH-3C operated by Air America with maintenance and support by the USAF.[4]

Ambassador Sullivan concluded the CH-3Cs would not be advantageous to Laos. He advocated, as he had earlier, a UE of 26 UH-34Ds.[5] He later modified his position and stated that the UE could be 24 UH-34Ds if the CH-3Cs continued to be staged in Laos.

On 24 September the JCS approved a UE of 26 and reasserted that USAF helicopters would operate under the limitations imposed by the 5 August State Department message.[6]

The FY 66 MA Program for Laos was later modified to provide sufficient UH-34Ds for a UE of 26, to provide for FY 66 attrition, and to pay back 16 helicopters on loan from the Marines.

As a result of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's October visit to Washington, the Secretary of Defense directed that ten H-34s (in addition to two on hand) be turned over to the RLAF consistent with the RLAF capability to utilize the equipment. A Marine mobile training team had been training four RLAF helicopter pilots and maintenance personnel for the H-34 at Udorn since July.[7] Thus Ambassador Sullivan

1. CINCPAC 072228Z July 65 (S)
2. STATE to VIENTIANE 92/052007Z Aug 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC 100033Z Aug 65 (S)
4. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 20613/120520Z Aug 65 (S)
5. VIENTIANE to CINCPAC 125/210336Z Aug 65 (S)
6. JCS 2557/242127Z Sep 65 (TS)
7. ADMINO CINCPAC 260125Z Mar 65 (S)

[redacted]

stated the RLAF could use two helicopters at once, and he submitted a schedule for turn over of eight additional HH-34D helicopters to the RLAF. This latter action was to be consistent with the pilot-crew training schedule.

CINCPAC proposed a plan, coordinated with Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand and the Ambassador, to comply with the directive and to meet requirements within the time frame recommended by Ambassador Sullivan. CINCPAC visualized taking all RVN and Laos new production helicopters and replacing the RVN aircraft from US Army CH-34C assets.[1] The plan provided for 41 helicopters through FY 67; this included repayment of 16 aircraft to the Marines, nine for FY 66/67 attrition, one to repay Thailand for a helicopter borrowed and lost, plus filling a UE of 33 for Laos (12 for RLAF and 21 to be operated by Air America). This proposal gained OSD/ISA approval on 3 January 1966.[2] (S)

Laos Aircraft Requirements

Airlift: Ambassador Sullivan, on 17 February, requested the loan of several helicopters and cargo aircraft (4 UH-34Ds, 3 C-123s, 3 CV-2s) for four months. These, he stated, were needed to air supply friendly forces engaged in countering PL/VM actions, to move six to ten thousand Meo refugees westward and to aid in countering an anticipated increase in enemy activities before the end of the monsoon season. CINCPAC did not favor providing these aircraft from already limited PACOM resources.[3] However, in view of the urgency of the situation the JCS decided the requirement would be met from CINCPAC assets.[4] CINCPAC therefore directed the components to provide the aircraft and to advise the Service departments that replacement would be required.[5]

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1. JCS 6767/191515Z Nov 65 (S)
2. OSD DEF 9689/031456Z Jan 65 (S); CINCPAC 280004Z Nov 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 192Z53Z Feb 65 (S)
4. JCS 005687/202028Z Feb 65 (S)
5. CINCPAC 222204Z, 222205Z, 222146Z Feb 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

The loan was subsequently extended and at the end of the year was subject to bi-annual review.[1]

In late October Ambassador Sullivan cited a need for additional CV-2s for Laos. Again, none were available from limited Army assets and the JCS subsequently requested a review of the existing and future Laos airlift support requirements. The Ambassador's response indicated that he needed an additional two CV-2s and two C-123s. This would bring his assets to seven CV-2s and nine C-123s.[2]

This problem had not been resolved at the end of the year. Although US Service assets were available in the theater to meet the Lao airlift requirement, US policy which precluded overt use of US Service aircraft in Laos prevented matching the assets with the requirement. CINCPAC was still seeking an acceptable means of meeting the requirement.[3]

T-28s For Laos: South Vietnam's requirement for T-28 aircraft terminated as a result of introducing the A-1 family of aircraft. CINCPAC planned to redistribute all "B" and "D" model T-28s to Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand as fighter bombers and the "C" models to Chief JUSMAG Thailand. The transfer of the "B" and and "D" models to DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand took place as planned. Upon delivery of the eight "C" models to Ubon, however, Chief JUSMAGTHAI Thailand advised that because of the deplorable state of the aircraft, the RTAF was incapable of returning them to an acceptable operational standard. Further, the introduction of the "C" model aircraft into the RTAF inventory would present support problems.[4]

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1. JCS 142332Z May 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 040421Z Dec 65 (S); VIENTIANE to CINCPAC 377/130950Z Dec 65 (S) Airlift in Laos was essentially a "bush pilot" type operation, with emphasis on CV-2s for the short unimproved airfields in wet and dry seasons, and the C-123 because of its advantageous space/load capability.
3. CINCPAC 010041Z Jan 66 (S)
4. CHJUSMAGTHAI 01381/110615Z Aug (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC queried Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand as to the possibility of using the aircraft for flight training at Udorn.[1] Following an inspection, Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand replied that the aircraft could be used after extensive maintenance and modification. But he requested that the T-28s not be applied to the Laos authorization of 40 aircraft.[2]

On 20 September the JCS approved CINCPAC's request that the aircraft be transferred to Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand at no cost to Laos MAP and as an authorized overage for use in pilot training at Udorn.[3]

Light Automatic Weapons for Laos: In response to several RLG requests for light automatic weapons, CINCPAC arranged shipment of 1,000 kits to convert US M1 Carbines to the M2 modification. Ambassador Sullivan had cited a possible requirement for as many as thirty thousand additional kits if warranted by an evaluation of the first group of modified weapons.[4]

Laos Army Unit Training in Thailand: At mid-1965 the status of the Laos Army unit training conducted in Thailand under the terms of a JUSMAG-RTA Agreement, was as follows:[5]

TYPE UNIT	COMPLETED	IN TRAINING	SCHEDULED FY 66
Artillery Battery	0	0	8
Infantry Company	6	0	8
Heavy Weapons Company	6	0	4
Leadership Group	10	0	10
Intelligence Unit	1	0	1

1. CINCPAC 140422Z Aug 65 (S)
2. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 20630/200700Z Aug 65 (S).
3. JCS 2034/301903Z Sep 65 (S)
4. VIENTIANE 1665 to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 300607Z Jan 65 (S); CINCPAC 031840Z Feb 65 (S)
5. CINCPAC J3

[redacted]

[redacted]

Leadership Training for Laotian Officers: In response to a 1964 request by Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand, and with CINCPAC concurrence, a program was implemented in March to provide concentrated leadership training to Laotian junior officers. The objective was to improve the standard of leadership and to expose these future leaders of Laos to US methodology, ideals and standards as opposed to the lingering French influence among the senior officers.

After English language training at Lackland Air Base, the Laotian students attended a leadership course at Fort Knox for approximately four months. Students were selected equally from Neutralist and FAR forces.

Reports received by the end of the year were encouraging as to the results of the training from both the military and political point of view.[1]

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1. CINCPAC 200510Z Feb 65 (C); CINCPAC 272114Z Feb 65 (C); CINCPAC 090331Z Apr 65 (C)

[redacted]

SECTION F - SPECIAL WARFARE

This portion of the history deals with CINCPAC actions and decisions regarding Special Warfare activities in Southeast Asia. Some of the information related to Unconventional Warfare is maintained separately.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Theater Psychological Operations Capability

The principal psychological operations capability in PACOM was provided by CINCUSARPAC through the Okinawa based 7th Psychological Operations Group.[1] This unit served as a fixed psychological warfare base, a source for deployments to support CINCPAC subordinate unified command contingency requirements, and as supporting element for cold war/counterinsurgency activities and training in the theater. During 1965 a significant portion of the above assets were deployed to South Vietnam to support COMUSMACV.

On 17 September CINCPAC directed CINCUSARPAC to study the adequacy of his psychological operations resources to fulfill the existing and projected requirements.[2] CINCUSARPAC's preliminary study, submitted to CINCPAC on 24 September, indicated the following tentative requirements: three special operations detachments for unconventional warfare support, one propaganda detachment for support of COMUSMACTHAI, one or more 50 KW radio transmitters, reconstitution of certain resources deployed to RVN, and increased heavy printing equipment.[3]

CINCPAC concurred in CINCUSARPAC's preliminary findings, and he directed development of detailed requirements and justification to provide the basis for further action. This study was in progress at the end of the year.[4]

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1. Formerly US Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific and 14th Psychological Warfare Battalion.
2. CINCPAC 170446Z Sep 65 (TS)
3. CINCUSARPAC GPOP-OP 19116/242334Z Sep 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 280448Z Sep 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Rewards for Information Concerning Leaders of Insurgency

During 1964 there was considerable discussion regarding a program to offer rewards for information leading to the death of high ranking National Liberation Front (NFL) and Viet Cong leaders. The Mission Council Saigon first said "encouragement of such a program not appropriate for US government, "[3] but the idea of a "rewards for leaders" program gained acceptance by the Vietnam Coordinating Committee Washington.[4]

Following a re-evaluation of the proposed program, the Mission Council Saigon proposed a test program for five provinces of South Vietnam.[5] Commenting to the JCS on this plan, CINCPAC stated his concurrence and suggested that the basis for the program should be Vietnam laws, that covert aspects could be included and that the program should be kept small to give it the best chance for success.[6]

[redacted]

3. SAIGON 322 to STATE 5 PM 6 Aug 65 (S)
4. JCS 002663/072307Z Dec 65 (S)
5. COMUSMACV 12168/150011Z Apr 65 (S)
6. CINCPAC 170349Z Apr 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Psychological Operations in South Vietnam

This portion of the history discusses actions related to the improvement of psychological operations program and capabilities in South Vietnam and an analysis of the effectiveness of these efforts. Specific actions covered in this section concern aircraft for psychological operations, Army psychological warfare units, personnel for the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and COMUSMACV headquarters, and service representatives in the psychological operations effort.

Aircraft For Psychological Operations: On 2 April CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's views on deploying 16 loudspeaker aircraft to SVN. The objective was to enhance the capability to exploit the psychological potential associated with air strikes and to promote cooperation of the RVN populace.[1] On 19 July the JCS approved deployment, as recommended by CINCPAC, of 16 U-10 aircraft and four C-47s with the latest loudspeaker equipment.[2, 3]

The C-47s arrived in RVN during August and the U-10s followed in November. They were dispersed to airfields in each of the Corps Tactical Zones for loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflet dissemination, and transport of psychological warfare materials.

Army Psychological Warfare (Psywar) Units: In June COMUSMACV recommended permanent deployment to South Vietnam of four US Army psychological operations (psyops) field detachments. Additionally, he proposed to increase the size of the temporary duty psychological warfare detachment then in South Vietnam. These recommended increases totaled 122 personnel and would provide better integration and control of psychological operations programs.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 020219Z Apr 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 082043Z Jun 65 (S)
3. JCS 6117/191401Z Jul 65 (S)
4. COMUSMACV 19227/071441Z Jun 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC supported this increase and the first psychological operations field detachment was deployed to RVN in August.[1]

On 12 August COMUSMACV submitted additional requirements to support Phase I operations and proposed to expand the previously approved psychological warfare unit deployments to battalion strength (271 personnel). This size force would support the establishment in each Corps Tactical Zone of a Corps Propaganda Support Center to provide quick reaction to psychological operations requirements and missions. It was also hoped that the presence of US psychological operations personnel would stimulate improvements in the RVNAF psychological operations programs.[2]

CINCPAC's Phase I deployment program submitted to the JCS in September included the psychological warfare battalion, and the deployment was subsequently approved.

Joint United States Public Affairs Office/MACV Political Warfare Directorate: In May COMUSMACV submitted a requirement for 14 military personnel to assist in manning the newly-created JUSPAO, and for 25 additional military personnel for the MACV Political Warfare Directorate.[3] These requirements resulted from a Washington decision to expand and realign psychological operations in Vietnam. Significantly, the MACV requirement included a brigadier general to head the JUSPAO field effort. With CINCPAC concurrence the JCS approved the increase.[4]

Service Representation in the Psychological Operations Effort: In association with the expansion and realignment of psychological operations in South Vietnam the JCS solicited CINCPAC's views on the

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1. CINCPAC 220302Z Jun 65 (C); JCS 004872/302226Z Jun 65 (S)
2. COMUSMACV 28286/121209Z Aug 65 (TS)
3. COMUSMACV 15468/102355Z May 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 152043Z May 65 (S); JCS 7524/050512 Aug 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

adequacy of representation by all four Services in the psychological effort in South Vietnam. The JCS intent was to ensure adequate emphasis and support of the program.[1]

CINCPAC's response to the JCS stated that 57 additional military spaces should be authorized for MACV to include 29 Army, 17 Navy, 10 Air Force and one USMC. It was anticipated that these personnel would be used as field and training advisors.[2]

Exempt w/ #1

[redacted]

1. JCS 8469/172145Z Aug 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 162043Z Sep 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]



[redacted]

exemption #



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

PACOM Leaflet Guide

Leaflet operations were the principal means of disseminating psychological warfare messages in PACOM, but there was no doctrinal manual covering these operations. CINCPAC therefore directed preparation of a PACOM leaflet guide. Prepared and published in December by CINCUSARPAC, this guide contained instructions, guidance and techniques for dissemination of leaflets. The PACOM Leaflet guide was based on experience and was expected to aid subordinate commands in planning and conducting leaflet operations. (S)

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Unconventional Warfare Planning Agency

CINCUSARPAC proposed, in July, establishment of an unconventional warfare (UW) planning agency as part of the CINCPAC staff.[3] CINCPAC's subordinate commanders concurred in the proposal and indicated that Okinawa was the most desirable location.[4]

[redacted]

3. CINCUSARPAC 12738/302258Z June 65 (TS)
4. CINCPAC 100204Z Jul 65 (TS); COMUS KOREA UK 52693/300645Z Jul 65 (TS); COMUSTDC 160744Z Jul 65 (TS); CINCPACFLT 242114Z Jul 65 (TS); CINCPACAF 51264/312232Z Jul 65 (TS); CINCPACREPRYIS 29-3 R1JC/170430Z Jul 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted] SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

LOCATION OF U.S. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW) TRAINING UNITS IN PACOM

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1965



SOURCE: J33

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On 7 August CINCPAC submitted to the JCS a concept for the UW planning agency. He noted recent progress toward improving the COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI UW planning capability, but he also pointed out that Communist China, North Korea, and other areas of increasing concern were uncovered in the UW field. Admiral Sharp stated that the existing concept for UW planning actions was deficient in terms of timing and critical skill availability. To assist PACOM subordinate commands in fulfilling their UW planning responsibilities as reflected in JSCP-66, CINCPAC recommended establishment of the PACOM UW planning agency in Okinawa. CINCPAC proposed to activate the agency with temporary duty personnel. Formal JTD and final requirements were to be submitted after the first three months operation.[1]

The JCS approved CINCPAC's recommendation,[2] and on 1 November, Special Operations Center, Pacific Command (SOCPAC) was activated in Okinawa as part of CINCPAC Operations Division. The SOCPAC mission was to develop UW operationsl plans and to provide UW planning assistance to PACOM subordinate commands.[3]

Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG)

Forces of the CIDG performed surveillance functions, interdicted infiltration routes within South Vietnam, operated against Viet Cong war zones, and supported selected districts in which US Special Forces performed the advisory role.

Throughout the four Corps Tactical Zones of South Vietnam there were 200 CIDG companies and 73 US Special Forces detachments in 67 installations. Approved programs specified 94 US Special Forces detachments in 88 installations. In March CINCPAC indicated his support of COMUSMACV's recommendation to authorize 249 companies and an increase of 7,350 CIDG personnel from the authorized 30,000. (S)

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1. CINCPAC 072145Z Aug 65 (TS)
2. JCS 9223/262050Z Aug 65 (TS)
3. CINCPAC Instruction 003010.7 of 13 Sep 65 (S); ADMINO CINCPAC 130002Z Oct 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

He also supported COMUSMACV's proposal to increase funding from $63.3 million to $82.4 million.[1] COMUSMACV's revised budget estimate to support the increased force totaled $84.9 million.

Recruiting Refugees for Regional and Popular Forces, South Vietnam

March floods and Viet Cong activity caused a large number of refugees to concentrate in Binh Dinh Province in South Vietnam. COMUSMACV concluded that there was a high potential for recruiting Regional and Popular Forces from this group. He also thought that with proper training and equipment they could provide a highly motivated force to assist reentry into their VC occupied home area. CINCPAC approved COMUSMACV's request for Special Forces "A" Detachments to train this force.[2] (C)

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1. COMUSMACV 311602Z Oct 65 (S); COMUSMACV 278/220925Z Sep 65 (S); CINCPAC 222317Z Nov 65 (S)
2. COMUSMACV 8839/210831Z Mar 65 (S); CINCPAC 2402/242023Z Mar 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

SECTION G - COMMUNICATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Communications-electronics activities most directly associated with Southeast Asia are discussed below. Related material is contained in the communications section of Chapter I, and in Chapter II. (U)

Integrated Wideband Communications System

In October 1964 CINCPAC submitted a proposal to improve the communications-electronics (C-E) bases in Thailand and South Vietnam and to develop these into an Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS).[1] From this base the Defense Communications Agency developed a system plan that was approved by the JCS in late February 1965; OSD approved the plan in principle on 21 April and tasked the Department of the Army to prepare the Telecommunication Program Objective (TPO).[2]

TPO 53-65, prepared by US Army Strategic Communications Command was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 4 August. Contracts were let on 3 September to Page Communications Engineering Incorporated for South Vietnam (Area I), and to the Philco Corporation for Thailand (Area II). Thus, fourteen months after the original statement of requirements the contractors were designated and the work could begin.

Meanwhile, the force buildup in both RVN and Thailand was under way and by late summer it was apparent that further communications facilities would be required. Therefore, on 11 October CINCPAC stated a requirement for additional overland wideband radio trunks in both countries.[3] JCS and OSD acted quickly and about 1 December an addendum to TPO 53-65 was issued.

During the first half of the year there was consideration of a submarine cable along the coast in association with construction

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1. CINCPAC 030501Z Oct 65 (S)
2. JCSM-124-65 of 5 Feb 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 112235Z Oct 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

of the northern portion of the civil telephone system (Northern Toll System). Later events established a clear military requirement for a cable connecting the coastal enclaves and CINCPAC proposed this project to the JCS on 19 November.[1]

To realize the full benefit of the extensive wideband network programmed for Southeast Asia it became necessary to improve switching capabilities. Under CINCPAC aegis programs were developed for: 1) integration of dial central offices at the bases; 2) acceleration of plans for extension of the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) and Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON) to Southeast Asia; and 3) establishment of a system of teletype relays.

Until the above improvements were a reality, a tenuous web of tactical equipment and the Back Porch system served to provide essential communications between US enclaves, non-military US users, and Vietnamese civil and military users. This expedient, however, absorbed virtually all the PACOM broadband contingency assets. Additionally, Air Force tropo scatter systems (AN/MRC-98) were brought in from Europe and Alaska.

When political developments caused termination of the MAP communications project in Indonesia certain tropo equipment, still in CONUS, was made available for use in the Thailand IWCS. This equipment was shipped to Thailand and at the end of the year was being readied for installation.

To ensure integration of the multiple Southeast Asia communications expansion projects, the JCS directed development of a system plan. At a 15-17 December DCA sponsored conference at CINCPAC Headquarters a draft plan was reviewed and modified. At the same time COMUSMACV presented a definitive statement of long lines communications requirements for RVN on the basis of anticipated force deployments through CY66.[2]

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1. CINCPAC 190053Z Nov 65 (C)
2. COMUSMACV Long Lines Requirements, 8 Dec 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC concurred in principle with the proposed DCA plan and recommended further study of selected items to permit implementation at a later date.[1]

At the end of the year there had been some progress in installing IWCS facilities as initially proposed. There were major problems, however. One was the possibility of delayed funding for contracting of additions to the system. Other problems were related to inadequate port facilities and the competition of other construction requirements in RVN.

Wideband Communications Restoral

During 1965 CINCPAC obtained approval for a project to provide a high quality wideband communications capability which was equal to the communications load associated with US operations in Southeast Asia. (See above) However, if the Trans-Pacific or Clark-Saigon submarine cable network failed, the heavy PACOM long-haul communications load exceeded high frequency radio capacity as an alternate means of meeting communications requirements. To resolve this problem CINCPAC posed a requirement for wideband communications restoral into WESTPAC via communications satellite. His statement of the requirement specified 30 (expandable to 60) four kilocycle channels of sufficiently high quality to support secure voice and high speed digital data.[2]

The Defense Communications Agency responded with a proposal in which CINCPAC subsequently concurred. To meet CINCPAC's requirements, the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) proposed to utilize both the military Initial Defense Communications Satellite Project (IDCSP) assets and the civil Communications Satellite (COMSAT) Corporation satellite. Two IDCSP ground stations (AN/MSC-46) would be deployed to RVN (one from western Europe and one from Asmara, Ethiopia). In conjunction with existing IDCSP stations in Okinawa, the Philippines, and Hawaii this arrangement

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1. CINCPAC 280325Z Dec 65 (C)
2. CINCPAC 060105Z Nov 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

would first support two voice channels at each station. Early in 1967 the capability of each station would be expanded to five voice channels and by mid-1967 further expanded to 11 voice channels. The end result would be 22 channels in Hawaii, 11 channels in the Philippines, 11 in Okinawa and 22 in South Vietnam.

In addition to the IDCSP capability described above, the DCA proposal for wideband communications restoral in PACOM would utilize leased spare channels in the COMSAT civil network which was being installed in the Pacific late in 1966. With this, the following four-kilocycle channel combinations could be made available:

HAWAII TO JAPAN		HAWAII TO THAILAND OR PHILIPPINES
5	plus	26
Or 10	plus	25
Or 20	plus	22

Three possible network combinations of the above military and civil resources were proposed by the Defense Communications Agency.

CINCPAC concurred in the DCS proposal, but he requested that the Philippine IDCSP terminal be moved to Guam when research and development tests were completed.[1]

On 28 December CINCPAC requested expedited action on reconfiguration of the IDCSP ground stations.[2]

Common User Relays, Southeast Asia

CINCPAC OPLAN 32 provided for establishment of extensive common user networks to support operations envisioned by that plan. By the summer of 1965 operations had approached the level of those contemplated by Phase II of OPLAN 32. Two common user relays at Phu Lam and Bangkok operated by STRATCOM were in operation and were handling considerable common user traffic; however, dedicated teletype (TTY) nets also handled common user traffic, notably CINCPAC

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1. CINCPAC 100314Z Dec 65 (C)
2. CINCPAC 281954Z Dec 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Joint Pacific (JP) and CINCPACAF (PAFCO) nets. A Manual Data Relay Center (MDRC) was functioning at Phu Lam on a limited basis with tributaries located at Saigon, Danang and Tan Son Nhut.

Action was initiated in June 1965 to establish two additional common user TTY relays at Nha Trang and Korat; also an MDRC at Nha Trang and Bangkok. The Phu Lam TTY relay and MDRC was also undergoing expansion.

Synchronous Communications (SYNCOM) Satellites

SYNCOM II and SYNCOM III satellites provided alternate communications paths between Hawaii and the western Pacific.[1] At the beginning of 1965 the PACOM ground terminal configuration included a SYNCOM Terminal (AN/MSC-45) on Oahu with nominal two voice or 1 voice plus 16 teletype channels; one AN/MSC-44 at Clark Air Base (same capacity); one transportable terminal (Mark - IV (I)) at Saigon (same capacity); and one Mark - IV (X)(experimental) at Korat with nominal one voice plus one teletype channels.

As a result of tests conducted during August it was concluded that the transportable terminal at Saigon was incapable of supporting a secure voice circuit between Hawaii and RVN, and between Washington and RVN as an alternate path to the submarine cable secure voice circuits.[2] CINCPAC first requested that the terminal at Saigon be exchanged with an AN/MSC-44 located at Asmara, Ethiopia.[3] He soon modified this request and proposed that the Mark IV (I) be moved from Saigon to Bang Ping (Bangkok); that the Mark IV (X) be relocated from Korat to Asmara; and that the AN/MSC-44 at Asmara be moved to Saigon.[4]

By 9 December the AN/MSC-44 from Ethiopia was declared operational at Saigon. Secure voice tests between Hawaii and Saigon

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1964, pp. 130-132
2. DCA 01661/122032 Aug 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC 210103Z Aug 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 210103Z Aug 65 (S); CINCPAC 252250Z Aug 65 (C) DCA 01810/212221Z Aug 65 (C)

[redacted]

were conducted for the remainder of December. The Mark IV (I) from Saigon had been deactivated and shipped to Bang Ping (Bangkok) and the Mark IV (X) terminal previously located at Korat was enroute to Asmara.

Automatic Telephone Service, Southeast Asia

On 10 September COMUSMACV recommended development of a common user Automatic Telephone System for RVN. It was contemplated that the system would utilize the Dial Central Office Telephone Facilities which the US Army and US Air Force had installed or programmed, and would link these facilities with Dial Toll System. This would increase the speed of service and obtain better use of the available communications circuits.[1] (C)

CINCPAC approved COMUSMACV's proposal. At the same time he requested the Defense Communications Agency - Pacific (DCA-PAC) to develop an Automatic Telephone System Plan for Thailand and RVN which would integrate Southeast Asia into a single broadband communications system.[2]

At the end of the year DCA-PAC had begun to develop the Automatic Telephone System for Southeast Asia as requested by CINCPAC. It was expected that establishment of the System would require an extended period of time and would depend upon the completion of improved communications-electronics facilities.[3] (C)

Improved Navigational System for Southeast Asia

The intensification of US air operations throughout Southeast Asia spurred interest in improving navigational systems. On 10 September CINCPAC validated the requirement for an additional Decca Chain (Air Navigational System) to provide coverage in the northern part of RVN for Army aircraft.[4] In doing so CINCPAC

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1. COMUSMACV ltr ser 3855, 10 Sep 65 (U)
2. CINCPAC 071915Z Oct 65 (S)
3. DCA-PAC P502/8183/230207Z Oct 65 (U)
4. CINCPAC 2d Ind 3721 ser 001210 of 10 Sep 65 (S)

[redacted]

recommended early JCS approval and tasking of Department of the Army with expeditious shipment and installation of the additional system. With completion of this Chain, Decca coverage would be available throughout RVN.

About two weeks later CINCPAC reaffirmed the Decca requirement and in addition validated a requirement for a Long Range Air Navigation (LORAN) (Model C/D) System for Southeast Asia.[1] The JCS approved the Decca Chain and on 18 November the Secretary of Defense approved a three-station Southeast Asia LORAN System and the retrofit of an appropriate number of aircraft.[2]

With the objective of having a LORAN system operational by October 1966 a survey team began searching for suitable sites in Thailand and RVN on 4 December. If suitable sites could be acquired it was tentatively planned to locate two stations in Thailand and one on an RVN offshore island.

The new Decca System sites were selected, and the target date for an operational northern system was May 1966.

Military Telecommunications (MILTELCOMM) System, Vietnam

MILTELCOMM was a proposed MAP project to consolidate numerous ARVN manual switchboards into a Dial Central Office Telephone System and to connect the Dial Central Office Facilities of major military complexes such as Saigon or Nha Trang with automatic toll facilities.

Under this project the toll trunking south of Saigon would utilize the civilian telephone system (Southern Toll System). However, the toll trunking north of Saigon would depend on US Communications system because no civilian communications system served that area.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 252031Z Sep 65 (S)
2. JCSM-997-65 of 22 Oct 65 (S); JCS 7076/232323Z Nov 65 (S)
3. COMUSMACV ltr MACJ4-SG of 21 July 65 (U)

[redacted]

[redacted]

In the interests of eliminating duplication of US and MAP C-E, CINCPAC returned the MILTELCOMM proposal to COMUSMACV for consolidation with the planned US automatic telephone switching for South Vietnam.[1] (C)

Build-up of C-E Personnel in SVN

Prior to the force increase implemented in May there were only about 1,800 United States personnel in separate communications-electronics (C-E) units in South Vietnam. Conferences held at CINCPAC in April, August, and October developed C-E personnel requirements to support the troop build-up in Vietnam. As of 1 December 9,123 C-E personnel were in RVN and it was contemplated that the total would exceed 12,000 by mid-February 1966.[2]

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 2759-65 of 9 Oct 65 (U)
2. JCS 2343/655 (TS); JCS 2343/655-26 (TS); Draft USMACV-Concept of Operations, 4 Dec 65 (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted]

SECTION H - LOGISTICS, SOUTHEAST ASIA

This section discusses CINCPAC actions and decisions regarding logistical problems associated with the force expansion in Southeast Asia. One of the most formidable tasks of 1965 was to create a rational and functioning logistical organization in Southeast Asia; another was to develop bases which would support existing and contingency requirements. Actions related to these tasks are arranged under the headings of "Base Development" and "Seaports and Beaches."

Supply and distribution of the petroleum products required by the expanding military effort was a complex problem involving, at times, major construction and prolonged international negotiations. These actions are discussed under "POL Supply."

Movement of men, equipment and supplies over the vast distances in PACOM had been a problem of long standing. During 1965 a significant amount of the theater airlift was required to support immediate operational requirements in Southeast Asia. To do so there were additions to the PACOM airlift resources and organizational changes intended to improve utilization of available assets. These are discussed under "Theater Airlift." Ammunition is discussed separately, and actions not appropriate to the above titles are grouped under "Miscellaneous Logistic Actions." (U)

BASE DEVELOPMENT, SOUTHEAST ASIA

CINCPAC Responsibility in Base Development Plans

Intensified military operations in Southeast Asia and commitment of significant US Forces in South Vietnam had a major impact on CINCPAC in relation to facilities planning and construction coordination during 1965.

In prior years the majority of construction funding for Southeast Asia bases was primarily vested in the Military Assistance Program under the concept of "joint use" bases, sponsored by the host nation and having a possible US contingency application. However, the increasing

[redacted]

requirements for funds of this nature, especially to support the 2nd Air Division, required a re-evaluation of this funding approach.

In the fall of 1964 OSD decided that future construction to support US forces would be service funded. Under this concept the Navy was charged with funding in the FY 65 Military Construction Program a parallel runway at Danang and a new major air base at Chu Lai. These facilities represented the first major US installations (approx $10 million) programmed for support of US units not directly associated with an advisory or military assistance mission. This decision to use service funding led to re-evaluation of many additional projects which were planned to support the increasing US role in Southeast Asia, and funding sources were determined on a case by case basis. As a result, determination of funding source became more difficult and the possibility of duplication of programmed facilities increased.

The JCS directed that as of 7 March 1965 the unified command commanders would take a more direct part in joint base development to ensure: that existing facilities were being properly utilized; that programmed facilities were in fact required to support an approved operation plan or deployment; that priority of the funding requirement was accurately stated; and that an appropriate source of funding was recommended. The JCS further indicated a high priority for the timely preparation and maintenance of base development plans (BDPs) as a management tool in supporting logical and orderly base development. Thus, CINCPAC's role in facility planning and programming was expanded from monitoring and supervision to an active role in stating the validity of an operational requirement in terms of approved operation plans and the priority of funding.

A Facilities Section was formed within the CINCPAC J4 Division to fulfill this function, and it was manned on an emergency basis by CINCPAC and component commander personnel. This section was later staffed by permanent personnel at an approved JTD strength of eight officers, two enlisted and two civilian personnel.

The decision to deploy US ground forces to South Vietnam created the first requirement for the Facilities Section to participate

[redacted]

in the formulation of an emergency construction plan in conjunction with staff personnel of component commanders and COMUSMACV. This plan: 1) was stated in the form of a tri-service priority list for support of increased military operations in Southeast Asia; 2) required funding by the FY 65 Emergency Military Construction Program; and 3) contained approximately $100. 0 million worth of facilities in South Vietnam to support these deployments. In addition, requirements were stated for many facilities outside South Vietnam.

During the remainder of the year additional statements of construction funding requirements were furnished by the Facilities Section. These cited the facilities needed to support additional planned deployments, and specified those which had to be funded by an emergency FY 66 construction program.

A large construction program within the PACOM area was coordinated and forwarded to JCS by CINCPAC after he assumed an active role in this area. CINCPAC attempted to accomplish the assigned mission with a flexible and dynamic program which would not inhibit the operational commands with undue administrative restrictions and yet would provide sufficient information so he could be responsive to the inquiries and requirements of higher headquarters. Management of the minor emergency construction program and reprogramming actions within service department channels, monitored on an exception basis by CINCPAC, were examples of this management approach.

Additionally, the peacetime programming requirements for construction funding were believed to be unduly complicated and unresponsive to requirements of the military commander in the field. These were accordingly programmed by rolled program lines, such as "Army Airfields RVN various" in the emergency military construction program (EMCP) to permit an administrative definition to be developed as the operational situation dictated.

CINCPAC action in this area included a recommendation to the JCS that programming for all future EMCPs be structured around the two digit (type facility general specification) DOD category code without regard to specific location, and that these general "budget type" facility

[redacted]

funding categories be further defined when specifically definitized and designed.

Base development planning had been conducted with an increasing volume of administrative workload. This volume, however, did not create realistic compensation in the form of management advantages. Existing base development plans (a direct product of World War II) were stated in expansive verbal generalizations and were partially obsolete when published due to the cyclic system used in updating. Also, they were not in format susceptible to modern management techniques.

JCS Publications did not contain a suggested format for a base development plan and each service employed different programs to substantiate and justify construction budgets or mobilization facility requirements. Each of these systems had merit, but none was directly applicable to fulfilling CINCPAC's requirement to develop a listing of facilities required to support an approved operation plan by specific geographic locations. It was decided that the best means of defining a base development plan for CINCPAC was to state the requirements, assets and deficiencies (by DOD category code) to support an approved operation plan for each geographic base within PACOM. If the BDPs were structured on these building blocks the entire facilities system within PACOM would be compatible to management by automatic data processing procedures. Therefore, the system could be made responsive to all requirements imposed by CINCPAC, higher headquarters or subordinate commands.

CINCPAC INSTR 11010.1C of 7 July was published and reflected the above concept. In it CINCPAC assigned to the component commanders the responsibility for submission of PACOM BDPs. After coordination with subordinate unified command commanders or CINCPAC representatives the BDPs were to be submitted in accordance with a phased schedule during the first part of calendar year 1966. After promulgation of the above instruction, the JCS adopted the same system for "A Sample Base Development Plan Format" which was to be incorporated into JCS publications.

[redacted]

Events of 1965 validated prior CINCPAC actions which assigned high priorities to MAP funded projects potentially applicable to contingency situations in South Vietnam and Thailand. The two-ship deep water pier at Cam Ranh Bay, constructed with MAP funds for the VNN, became the backbone of the major port activity at this location. Similarly, the one-ship deep water cargo/ammunition pier constructed at Sattahip offered the same potential if military operations were undertaken in Thailand.

Cam Ranh Bay Logistical Base

Cam Ranh Bay (CRB) was the best natural deep water harbor in Southeast Asia. It had been a temporary haven for the Russian Fleet under Vice Admiral Zinoviv Petrovitch Rozhestvensky in 1905 on the eve of the disastrous battle with the Japanese in Tsushima Strait. A description of the area at that time stated".....the hills above the marshes surrounding the basin, with their patches of rough foliage over gray stone and sand, resembled molting, scabby animals; and where the town had once been, only five or six of the houses were inhabited...."[1]

Sixty years later the CRB area was still undeveloped and its appearance revealed inactivity. There was, however, a small VNN base on the penisula and a two-ship deep draft pier constructed with MAP funds.

During the April planning conference there was discussion of developing CRB as a US logistical base/trans-shipment area. CINCPAC later asked for COMUSMACV's view on the desirability of developing the base, noting that LST hauls from CRB to secondary ports in RVN would be much shorter than the same operation conducted from Saigon. This arrangement would also avoid exposure to the hazards involved in transiting the 40 kilometer river passage to the port at Saigon.[2]

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1. Richard Hough, The Fleet That Had to Die (Viking Press New York, 1958), p. 129
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 080403Z May 65 (S)

[redacted]

COMUSMACV's reply noted that additional considerations were that OPLAN 32 contemplated a logistics installation at Cam Ranh Bay, and SEATO Exercise LOG TRAIN had indicated that port facilities at Qui Nhon/Nha Trang were inadequate for deployment and support of a US corps in the Kontum-Pleiku area. Also, the RVN Joint General Staff enthusiastically supported the concept of a Cam Ranh Bay base. By 21 May COMUSMACV had positioned advanced detachments of several US units there, and he had initiated other actions related to military use of the area.[1] Also on 21 May, CINCPAC proposed to the JCS that the CRB base was essential.

At the end of May CINCPAC cited the inadequacy of the Saigon logistics complex to support planned operations. He also described the characteristics of CRB with its long enclosing peninsula, defensive characteristics, and potential for expansion. On the basis of the over all requirements and the characteristics of CRB, CINCPAC recommended approval of planning to develop the area as a major US port and logistics complex to support the war in RVN. He also proposed construction and development on an emergency basis of a jet capable combat and logistics airfield, and he recommended diverting to CRB some of the logistics and combat forces planned and approved for Qui Nhon/Nha Trang and other locations.[2]

In approximately 90 days, Cam Ranh Bay was transformed from sand dunes and sparse vegetation to a major port/logistical complex with a continued high construction rate planned for 1966. A prefabricated two-ship DeLong (floating) pier was planned for early 1966 along with many other harbor and waterfront facilities. This base complex would be one of the major US installations in South Vietnam when completed. The economic aspects of development of this area of the country was not overlooked, and in conjunction with the military developments discussed above, USOM was sponsoring a major resettlement and economic development project.

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1. COMUSMACV 211124Z May 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 300520Z May 65 (TS)

[redacted]

The major features of the CRB base are portrayed in the following illustration.

Harbor and Port Development

The story of Cam Ranh Bay is typical of other harbor and port development projects within South Vietnam. Very limited deep water ship unloading facilities existed in South Vietnam. To support the US build-up and the required follow-on logistic support, major port development projects were undertaken along the coast from the 17th parallel to Cape Saint Jacques. These included Danang, Chu Lai, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Phan Rang, Tuy Hoa, Vung Tau, Saigon and Newport. All of these facilities would support military operations; they would also have a major impact on the postwar economic development of South Vietnam.

Permanent Airfields

At the beginning of 1965 there were only three jet-capable airfields in South Vietnam. These were at Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut and Danang; and each was crowded with a wide variety of US and VNAF aircraft.

The anticipated force increases and plans for expanded air operations in North Vietnam required not only jet-capable fields but other fields to accommodate the rotary wing and propeller aircraft. As a partial solution, new permanent facilities were planned at Cam Ranh Bay, Chu Lai and Phan Rang; additionally, a parallel runway was to be constructed at Danang.

An Army airfield was under construction at Danang East (subsequently designated Marble Mountain Air Facility), and when this project was completed it was anticipated that some of the congestion at Danang Main could be relieved. An airfield at Pleiku, with an excellent 6,000 foot runway, was nearing completion at mid-year. This field would be suitable for logistic support aircraft. Additionally, airfields at An Khe and Dong Ba Thin were assigned the highest priority in the FY 66 Supplemental Military Construction Program funds requirements.[1]

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1. CINCPAC 290245Z Jul 65 (S)

[redacted]

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

SOUTH VIET NAM



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Permanent airfield construction required from 12 to 18 months to complete; but operational requirements dictated a more immediate solution to the problem of developing jet-capable facilities. Therefore, it was planned to establish an initial jet capability using aluminum runway matting first developed under the USMC short airfield tactical system (SATS) concept. This type of interim facility was first established at Chu Lai and had proven very successful.

Expeditionary Airfields

The deteriorating friendly situation in South Vietnam in May emphasized the fact that air support requirements could not wait until contractors completed permanent type air bases. Thus, Marines were landed at Chu Lai in early May to start construction of a jet-capable airfield utilizing aluminum matting and techniques developed as part of the Marine Corps short airfield tactical system (SATS) concept. A Navy/Marine team undertook construction of an expeditionary (8000' runway) airfield, and in less than thirty days after the initial landing the first aircraft landed on the new field. The total facility was completed in approximately 60 days. At that time four A4D squadrons began operating from the base and providing tactical air support to ground forces.

The success of this operation stimulated an intense interest in jet-capable expeditionary tactical airfields. CINCPAC later approved construction of this type field for the Air Force at Cam Ranh Bay, Phan Rang and Qui Nhon (later changed to Tuy Hoa) on a high priority basis.[1] Only a limited quantity of AM-2 SATS matting had been manufactured, so all Marine Corps AM-2 assets were allocated by the JCS to the Cam Ranh Bay field. Contracts were let for manufacture of an additional 12 million square feet of matting. Additionally, the JCS established an ad hoc Service Department Committee at the Washington level to develop jet-capable expeditionary airfield doctrine.

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1. CINCPAC 060433Z Nov 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Also, CINCPAC directed an exchange of usage, maintenance and experience data between the two main PACOM users of this type field--CINCPACAF and CG FMFMPAC.

The Cam Ranh Bay expeditionary field was completed in 100 days by a combined contractor/US Army Engineer effort,and the base was declared operational on 1 November. It had a 10,000 x 102' runway, cross taxiways, arming pads and an apron capable of accepting three tactical fighter squadrons as well as an interim logistical airfield. Supporting facilities consisted of Grey Eagle Kit items such as bladder tanks for POL, inflatable maintenance shelters, tent camps and other construction of a temporary nature.[1]

At the end of the year additional expeditionary airfields were under construction and more were being planned. Experience with the two operational fields was validating the expeditionary airfield as a technique for rapid construction of large jet-capable air bases.

A shortage of AM-2 matting and the monsoon rains caused deferment of the occupancy date for the field at Phan Rang from 15 January 1966 to 15 March or 1 April 1966.[2]

Consolidated MACV Headquarters

A consolidated MACV Headquarters in Saigon was one of the urgent Southeast Asia construction requirements. The Headquarters was spread between eleven separate sites in the Saigon area; a situation which presented significant security, management, and logistical problems.[3] (C)

CINCUSARPAC acted to provide design funds;[4] and the Secretary of Defense approved construction of a portion of the project. This was funded to the extent of $8.5 million under Section 403, PL 89-188 (Secretary of Defense emergency fund). The specific authorization (C)

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1. COMUSMACV 091042Z Nov 65 (S); COMUSMACV 011113Z Nov 65 (S); COMUSMACV 30613/311519Z Aug 65 (S); CINCPAC 300520Z May 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 110311Z Nov 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 080749Z Sep 65 (U); CJCS 9673/012237Z Sep 65 (C)
4. CINCPAC 240403Z Sep 65 (S); CINCPAC 110236Z Sep 65 (S); CINCUSARPAC 232318Z Sep 65 (U)

[redacted]

[redacted]

was for a Joint Tactical Operations Center, a Commandant Complex and an Administrative Complex with necessary appurtenances and supporting facilities. The letter of approval also advised that the balance of the total project was being programmed in conjunction with the FY 66 "Supplemental."[1] (C)

Saigon Hospital

At the beginning of 1965 a "Subic" type hospital at Tan Son Nhut was under consideration. This project was cancelled in March in favor of converting the Saigon dependent school facility to a hospital since dependents had been evacuated and the school was surplus. It was estimated that at an initial cost of $195,000 the facility could be used for the 2d Section of the 8th Field Hospital. A final increment, estimated to cost two million dollars, could support conversion of the entire school to a 200 bed station type hospital.[2] (C)

Hospital care in the Saigon area was provided by the US Navy Station Hospital, Saigon with a maximum capacity of 100 beds. It was planned to coordinate the patient flow of this facility with the first section of the Army Field Hospital (100 beds) to be established in the dependent school area.[3]

Salvage Capability, Saigon

In September CINCPAC had CINCPACFLT send salvage officers to Saigon to inventory civil assets and salvage equipment that might be used to clear waterways blocked by a sabotaged ship. He also had salvage officers tour sites where clearance operations might be necessary.[4] In addition, CINCPACFLT asked COMUSMACV advice on the feasibility of establishing in Saigon a pool of emergency ship salvage material.[5]

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1. DA 743284 082347Z Dec 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 120415Z Feb 65 (C); COMUSMACV 5915/250958Z Feb 65 (C); CINCPAC 020052Z Mar 65 (C); JCS 006327/040138Z Mar 65 (C)
3. COMUSMACV 7466/110346Z Mar 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 180541Z Sep 65 (S)
5. CINCPACFLT 252358Z Sep 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Real Estate in Southeast Asia

Normally, US funds were not required for the acquisition of real estate rights in Southeast Asia, and the construction programs did not contain the money for this purpose. However, concurrent with the requirement for significant construction to support the 1965 US deployment to Southeast Asia, the host countries had generally exhausted their funds available for real estate, and public land was not available in many areas. As a result, construction programs in both Thailand and South Vietnam were being delayed.[1] Seeking to resolve this problem CINCPAC requested policy guidance from the JCS and Department of Defense.[2]

One of the first conclusions in Washington was that US funds should not be used to acquire real estate rights except as a last resort; we should not "buy the battlefield." While this problem received further study the Secretary of Defense authorized, as an expedient, use of USAF MCP project funds for real estate to permit urgently required extension of the runways at Udorn and Ubon in Thailand.[3]

In late August the Secretary of Defense announced that the preferred policy for Thailand was for the RTG to provide the land. If this was not feasible, land acquisition for military construction should be financed with service military construction funds.[4] The preferred policy for South Vietnam was to use GVN owned land without reimbursement. It was not appropriate to appear to purchase land in RVN for MCP. Instead, the GVN was to obtain the land and provide it to the US without direct reimbursement. The costs would be indirectly covered by continued US support of the deficit in the GVN budget. The GVN established a Real Estate Board to deal with COMUSMACV real estate officers, and detailed procedures were settled by 1 September.[5]

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1. CINCUSARPAC 010120Z Jul 65 (C); BANGKOK 424 to STATE 281223Z Jun 65 (S); COMUSMACV 041050Z Jul 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 040336Z Jun 65 (S); CINCPAC 220415Z Jun 64 (C)
3. SECDEF 5263 071622Z Jul 65 (S); JCS 2339/185 of 8 Jul 65 (S)
4. SECDEF 9565/312127Z Aug 65 (C); COMUSMACTHAI 121205Z Oct 65 (S); CINCPAC 200328Z Oct 65 (S)
5. COMUSMACV 26821/311115Z Jul 65 (S); COMUSMACV 011456Z Sep 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted] SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT Rreleasable TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION VIETNAM

LOCATION AND COST OF FUNDED CONSTRUCTION

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1965



SOURCE: J-421

[redacted]

[redacted]

Integrated PACOM Construction Priority List

After reviewing the construction projects essential to support operations in Southeast Asia CINCPAC submitted to the JCS an FY 65 integrated PACOM priority list totaling $37.4 million and a similar list for FY 66 totaling $140.6 million.[1] These lists were subsequently revised to reflect the modified deployment concepts and construction requirements resulting from the April planning conference.

During this conference the additional requirements were presented to the JCS as a construction plan totaling $104.0 million for FY 65 and $144.0 million for FY 66. The FY 65 program reflected $53.9 million in South Vietnam and $16.2 million in Thailand.

Refined procedures for gaining approval of new programmed projects and for monitoring minor construction projects of an emergency nature were promulgated during April.[2]

Emergency Military Construction Program

During August the FY 66 Emergency Military Construction Program (EMCP), related to major facilities expansion to accommodate an expanded force structure in Southeast Asia, was approved. The program was divided into two segments: Table A contained items to which the FY 66 appropriation bill would apply, and Table B listed items released for planning only. (See next page)

Base Development in Thailand

The increasing number of insurgency problems in Thailand and the possibility of increased US deployments to that country prompted a close examination of the adequacy of the logistics system in Thailand to support US forces. From this CINCPAC concluded it prudent to develop Sattahip as an alternate port for the country at a site which could also serve as a major US logistic base. Preliminary conclusions included: a tactial advantage would be obtained if Siracha was developed as a

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1. CINCPAC 280059Z Mar 65 (S); CINCPAC 310021Z Mar 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 130214Z Apr 65 (S); CINCPAC 230448Z Apr 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

EMERGENCY MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
FY66

	TABLE A ($000,000)			TABLE B ($000,000)		
	ARMY	NAVY	AF	ARMY	NAVY	AF
SVN	29.6	28.0	32.2	40.7	38.9	35.2
PHILIPPINES		8.7	2.0		4.0	5.6
OKINAWA	7.8	1.0	.3	8.3		12.1
THAILAND	7.3		14.0	37.8		14.4
GAUM			1.6		2.9	
TAIWAN						1.8
JAPAN					3.3	
CONUS	7.0	.3				
PLANNING AND DESIGN	7.5	4.9	6.9	86.8	49.1	69.1

TOTAL TABLE NO. A. - $160,000,000
TOTAL TABLE NO. B. - $205,000,000

[redacted]

[redacted]

POL port; a USAF base at Sattahip would be advantageous; and the previously improved Thailand LOCs should be further developed. [1]

CINCPAC subsequently directed COMUSMACTHAI to develop a refined logistics concept and cited the above preliminary conclusions as grounds for the study. [2] COMUSMACTHAI was also tasked to state the costs and proposed LOC, depot and port facilities.

In concert with this, Officer In Charge of Construction Southeast Asia (OICC SEA) was arranging a feasibility study on harbor development, and CG IX Corps undertook base development studies. It was expected that these would be complete by 1 February 1966 and would contribute to CINCPAC's recommendation to JCS/OSD regarding base development in Thailand. [3]

Bangkok By-Pass Road

October rains and the inability of the contractor to produce the required amount of hot mix aggregate had prevented completion of this road by the end of the year. There remained for completion 23.44 km of paving, 19.27 km of base course and 13.67 km of sub base. It was estimated that this work would be completed by the end of February 1966.

Meanwhile, construction of the by-pass extension from Kabin Buri to Korat was approved and a US army construction battalion (-) was establishing a base camp at Camp Essayons, about 44 km south of Korat at Pak Thong Chai. As of 13 November the length of the by-pass extension was open to 1/4 ton vehicles. (U)

Conflicting Requirements for Military Construction Personnel

More than a hundred highly skilled petty officers drawn from PACOM naval mobile construction battalion (NMCB) resources had performed valuable service in Southeast Asia under the Seabee Technical Assistance Team (STAT) program. The work of these teams had been so

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1. CINCPAC J4 Memo/00237-65 of 1 Nov 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 072005Z Nov 65 (C)
3. COMUSMACTHAI 101030Z Nov 65 (S)
4. 9th Log Cmd Quarterly Progress Report, 7 Dec 65 (U); see also Annex B, pp. 115-116.

[redacted]

[redacted] SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION THAILAND AND OTHER SITES

LOCATION AND COST OF FUNDED CONSTRUCTION

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1965

THAILAND

ARMY	$ 16.0 M
AIR FORCE	35.3 M
TOTAL	$ 51.3 M

VARIOUS

ARMY	$ 7.8 M
AIR FORCE	9.3 M
NAVY	14.4 M
TOTAL	$ 31.5 M

OTHER SITES

THAILAND BASE CAMPS (A)	800,000
TAIWAN LOG & SPT FACS (AF)	5,226,000
OKINAWA KADENA SPT FACS (AF)	992,000
PHILIPPINES SPT FACS (N)	13,400,000
OKINAWA (N)	1,000,000
CLARK R/W & POL DESIGN (AF)	1,200,000
OKINAWA STOR FACS	7,800,000



SOURCE: J-4215

[redacted]

[redacted]

valuable that the US Ambassadors in Thailand and Vietnam requested, in August and September, an increase in the STAT program. This manpower requirement was in direct conflict with the heavy commitment of NMCBs in RVN.[1] (C)

By late September, CNO had requested a supplemental allowance of 260 personnel to permit continuation of the STAT program. CINCPAC accordingly planned continuation of four teams in South Vietnam as a minimum pending further study.[2] (C)

The US Ambassador in Saigon also stated a long term requirement for 40 STATs or similarly equipped Army ECAD to restore community facilities in areas cleared by US forces. CINCPAC's position was that his resources of skilled personnel were needed for military construction tasks in Southeast Asia. In his opinion the requirement expressed by the Ambassador should be met with civilians or, if military personnel were essential, by individuals recruited and trained for the purpose.[3] (C)

SEAPORTS AND BEACHES, SOUTHEAST ASIA

With a significant force increase in Southeast Asia imminent, CINCPAC proposed in late March to assign responsibility for all Southeast Asia port and beach operations as follows:[4]

Army -- Thailand and in RVN south of the Chu Lai area.

Navy -- In RVN at Chu Lai and north to the Demilitarized Zone.

After obtaining concurrence of Deputy Commander USARPAC, Chief of Staff PACFLT and CG FMFPAC during an 8 April meeting, CINCPAC decided to implement his proposal.

He directed that military logistic operations at ports and beaches in support of US forces and attached Third Country forces in the Chu Lai area and north to the DMZ would be accomplished using Navy resources. It was specified that this tasking include development of the required

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1. CINCPACFLT 122233Z Aug 65 (C); CINCPAC 180218Z Aug 65 (C); AMEMB Saigon 171022Z Sep 65 (C); AMEMB Bangkok 201142Z Aug 65 (C)
2. CINCPAC 070155Z Oct 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 290314Z Oct 65 (C)
4. CINCPAC 310507Z Mar 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

military port and beach facilities and establishment and operation of base supply depots at water terminals. These depots were to receive, store, maintain, control, and issue common items received through the US supply pipeline for all US and attached third country forces located in the Danang-Chu Lai area. Further, service elements in the area would receive intransit service for items-peculiar through base supply depots. However, Service support for items-peculiar remained a service responsibility.[1]

The remaining ports and beaches in RVN, except Saigon, and in Thailand were to be operated using Army resources. Port and depot operations at Saigon would continue to be conducted by Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon (a Navy activity) until a USA Logistical Command (Log Cmd) could assume this responsibility.[2]

Naval logistic responsibility was extended to the Quang Ngai area in June for "planning purposes only." CINCPAC specified that he would assign specific support responsibility in this regard when additional forces were deployed or scheduled for deployment to the area.[3]

Subsequent amplification of the initial Navy tasking provided that common support (generally provided through HSAS) would be handled as directed by COMUSMACV. All other categories of supply were to be considered Service-peculiar and acquired through service channels. Additionally, maintenance support would be arranged by inter-service agreement but limited to the organic capability of the III Marine Amphibious Force. Other logistical requirements were to be procured through the respective service channels.[4]

Naval Support Activity, Danang

On 24 April CINCPAC tasked CINCPACFLT to conduct military logistic operations at ports and beaches in RVN from Chu Lai to the

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1. CINCPAC 241945Z Apr 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 241945Z Apr 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 032322Z Jul 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 110427Z May 65 (S)

[redacted]

Demilitarized Zone in support of US and attached third country forces.[1] The Navy did not have an existing administrative organization comparable to the US Army Logistical Command for this type mission. Nevertheless, it had developed some appropriate units trained for participation in amphibious type operations. These were: Amphibious Construction Battalions (ACB), Cargo Handling Battalions (CHB), Navy Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) and Assault Craft Units (ACU). Some of these units plus elements of the Amphibious Force SEVENTH FLEET (CTG 76.4) were utilized to provide an interim capability.

As a permanent organization to accomplish the mission, it was planned to establish a naval shore activity at Danang to be known as Naval Support Activity (NAVSUPPACT), Danang with COMSERVPAC as type commander. An interim organization was formed, but CG III MAF became concerned because his readiness porture was degraded by a diversion of FMF and MAF combatant units to these activities.[2] After further levies on the units Admiral Sharp emphasized to the JCS that a continuation of this process would ultimately divert 1,500 Marines and create a requirement for additional units. He reiterated his strong recommendation for early establishment of a Naval Support Activity and immediate deployment of the USN/USMC logistic support personnel.[3]

The Chief of Naval Operations approved establishment of the support activity and provided the initial personnel allocation on 17 July.[4] On 15 October Naval Support Activity, Danang was activated and officially accepted from CTG 76.4 responsibility for direction and control of logistic operations. Some units continued, however, to lend support while NAVSUPPACT built toward its full allowance of men and equipment.[5]

As of the end of 1965 NAVSUPPACT had 68 per cent of its allowance of 3,600 men and was rapidly acquiring a broad range of equipment and facilities. A measure of the improved capability at

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1. CINCPAC 241945Z Apr 65 (S)
2. CG III MAF 251110Z Jun 65 (TS);
3. CINCPAC 030100Z Jul 65 (TS): CINCPAC 152331Z Jul 65 (TS)
4. CNO 171828Z Jul 65 (S)
5. CINCPACFLT 310707Z Jul 65 (U)

[redacted]

Danang is an increase of daily off-load rate from 938 metric tons in July to 2,505 metric tons in December.

US Army 1st Logistical Command, South Vietnam

When organized in July 1962 HSAS was staffed to support approximately 9,000 personnel. However, by early 1965 it was providing limited common user retail support from Saigon to approximately 23,000 personnel situated at about 250 separate locations throughout RVN. Additionally, HSAS provided some support for 2,700 US Government employees and dependents. Within the confines of its organic charter HSAS had reached the limit of its capability.

In late 1964 there were 15 separate logistic systems supporting the counterinsurgency operations in RVN. Four of these were quasi-military and consisted of CAS, USOM, CARE, and the DOICC. The POL logistic system was completely commercialized. In addition, ten military logistic systems, three RVNAF and seven US were being operated. The latter were Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Army Special Forces, Headquarters Commandant, MACV and a special operating group, MACV. Despite the multiplicity of these US logistic systems, common user support was considered inadequate and incomplete. Hence, COMUSMACV submitted to CINCPAC a staff study, to include a proposed troop list, for the establishment of a US Army Logistical Command which would include an Engineer Construction Group in RVN.[1]

Referring to a jointly developed plan[2] developed at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, in December 1964 and revised in early 1965, CINCPAC reiterated[3] a previous recommendation[4] for the introduction and employment of a US Army Logistical Command into RVN.

COMUSMACV's plan envisioned the USA Log Cmd being expanded gradually over a period of several months during which it would supplement HSAS operation. The Log Cmd would occupy a parallel

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1. COMUSMACV ltr ser 00478 of 28 Oct 64 (S)
2. CINCPAC ltr 4000 ser 001931 of 23 Dec 64 (revised 21 Jan 65) (S)
3. CINCPAC 130315Z Jan 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 272339Z Nov 64 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPROXIMATE LOCATION of U S PERSONNEL in SOUTH VIETNAM (EARLY 1965)



SOURCE: JCS 2343/486-4

[redacted]

position with HSAS and would provide supplies and services from local bases. Also, it was contemplated that as the Log Cmd functions expanded some or all of the HSAS logistic functions might be absorbed.

It was believed that a Log Cmd in RVN would remedy the following specific deficiencies:[1]

(1) Inadequate supervision of the handling and forwarding of US cargo at the minor ports and smaller airfields.

(2) Inadequate coordination of logistic (base commander level) functions at locations where US personnel of multiple MACV commands were stationed.

(3) Inefficiency and overlapping of a nonintegrated common-user supply system which operated retail from Saigon to about 240 destinations.

(4) Absence of many categories of common user administrative and supply support for some 8,000 individuals in the Saigon area.

(5) Absence of common user support in most of the common user maintenance categories.

(6) Dependence for many elements of logistic support on an already saturated civilian economy.

COMUSMACV planned to establish logistic support bases at Danang, Qui Nhon, Nhatrang, Vung Tau and Can Tho. US personnel assigned to bases were to supervise US cargo movements and provide consolidated common user supply and maintenance support of US owned and operated equipment. All US personnel situated in the area of a base would be provided services; further, a common user system of supply was to be implemented without altering the service responsibility for service-peculiar support or for weapon system support.

Additionally the Log Cmd would be expanded to provide a broader range of supply coverage and centralized management for military construction, medical services, maintenance policy and transportation operations. Also provided would be a capability to manage the logistic support for a force expansion, and a nucleus for logistic management and technical supervision related to Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF).

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1. JCS 2343/486-4; CINCPAC COMMAND HISTORY, 1964, pp. 329-333.

[redacted]

A separate but significant element of the plan related to a Log Cmd in RVN was a 2,400 man US Army Engineer Construction Group to meet immediate requirements for repair, minor construction, and other projects time sensitive to military operations.[1] At the beginning of the year there was an $80.0 million backlog of high priority US construction, and it was anticipated that there would be an additional $20.0 million requirement soon. This requirement was considered excessive to the indigenous capability. Further, it was believed that the construction group would provide facilities for the Log Cmd quicker and cheaper than contract work, and that the over-all pacification program would not be degraded by diverting scarce resources to this task. The engineer group was also expected to accomplish immediate construction of dispersal areas and revetments for US aircraft. The JCS recommended that the Secretary of Defense approve, in principle, introduction of a USA Log Cmd and an engineer construction group. They further proposed that he approve the early deployment of about 230 men as an advance party to Saigon and Danang.[2] Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Glen Gibson toured South Vietnam and elsewhere in PACOM[3] to develop an action plan to bring about the earliest possible improvement.[4] On the basis of Mr. Gibson's report Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance approved, in principle, introduction of the Log Cmd and the immediate introduction of an advance party totaling 75 personnel.[5] Introduction of the engineer group, however, was disapproved.[6]

The Secretary of Defense instructed the JCS that further planning for staffing of the Log Cmd should explore the possibility of reducing the requirement for military personnel by the following measures:

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1. JCSM-33-65 of 15 Jan 65 (S)
2. JCSM-33-65 of 15 Jan 65 (S); Attachment to JCS 2343/486-4
3. JCS 004195/271856Z Jan 65 (S)
4. Lt Gen Richard D. Meyer, JCS-J4, and Brig Gen Frank White, CINCPAC J4, accompanied the Gibson party to RVN.
5. JCS 5274/152300Z Feb 65 (S)
6. Memo Deputy Secretary of Defense to Chairman, JCS of 15 Feb 65 (S)

[redacted]

1. Plans to utilize local hire personnel and contracting in lieu of US military personnel to the maximum extent feasible, consistent with military security and mission requirements.

2. Tailoring of units selected for deployment to meet actual needs. In this connection, plan maximum utilization within or by Log Command of US military personnel already in Vietnam performing same functions.

3. Relating Log Command strength requirements to troop strengths actually approved for Vietnam. (As strengths change up or down, further consideration can be given to appropriate Log Command adjustments.)

4. Consideration of effect of withdrawal of dependents from Vietnam

In CINCPAC's view these were not completely practical means of accomplishing the mission in RVN. Responding to a JCS request, he pointed out that local hire and contract personnel would be of doubtful dependability if the war assumed a more violent aspect. To support this he observed that some contract personnel had already resigned and that the Japanese crew of one LST had complained of hazards due to the fighting.[1] He further suggested that tailoring units to fill the existing logistic requirements did not provide for self-supportable elements capable of absorbing the workload engendered by a force expansion. It was also noted that combat personnel might be diverted to service support activities unless planned force expansions were given adequate recognition in establishment of the logistic base.[2]

The Logistic Command advance party arrival in RVN commenced in March 1965. However, subsequent augmentation of this unit was on an incremental basis. Each increment required the approval of the Secretary of Defense. In late March CINCPAC advised the JCS that in view of the continued buildup of US forces, augmentation of the logistic capability on a piecemeal basis was no longer adequate. CINCPAC also reiterated the need for the Engineer Construction Group requested previously.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 280638Z Feb 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 280638Z Feb 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 210511Z Mar 65 (S)

Progress in establishing a common item supply system and shifting HSAS functions to the USARV was limited during 1965. In the final months of the year Department of the Army was developing a final time phased implementing plan for the common supply system for RVN.[1] Completed HSAS function transfers were Translation Services (1 Nov), Port Operations (15 Nov), Dental Service (15 Nov) and Post Exchange (26 Dec). COMUSMACV directed that the complete phase out of HSAS be accomplished by 30 June 1965.[2]

US Army 9th Logistical Command, Thailand

Logistical Arrangements in Thailand: The 9th Logistical Command Headquarters was at Korat, Thailand. Units subordinate to this headquarters included an ordnance company; medical, signal, military police and quartermaster elements; and a US Army engineer group.

The mission of the 9th Log Cmd at the beginning of the year was as follows:[3]

1. To exercise command of US Army forces, commands, bases and establishments assigned or attached by CG USARYIS.

2. To provide a base from which to expand activities, and a command element through which to exercise command of additional US Army units which might be assigned.

3. To support US Army units deployed to Thailand for tactical training exercises to the extent that resources permitted.

4. To prepare to receive filler personnel and additional logistical and administrative units to perform the support mission in Thailand in the event a contingency plan was implemented.

5. To maintain operational readiness of assigned US Army units.

6. To support US Army elements deployed in Thailand for the communications-electronics and Special Logistic Actions, Thailand (SLAT) project.

In the summer of 1965 the mission of the 9th Log Cmd was expanded to include planning for construction, operation and maintenance

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1. CA 741698/250112Z Nov 65 (C)
2. COMUSMACV 34321/300802Z Sep 65 (U)
3. COMMAND Report, 9th Logistical Command, 29 April 1965.

of a POL terminal and distribution system in Thailand. This was to augment or replace commercial systems where and when required for the receipt, storage, and issue of POL common items for US forces in Thailand.[1] Further, 9th Log Cmd was charged with providing surface transportation service and supervision of port operations for US Forces, Thailand.[2] At the same time, USAF units accepted responsibility for aerial port and air cargo passenger handling.

Port Congestion

The paucity of port facilities was considered in planning the force increase in Southeast Asia. In April it was recognized that enemy action or adverse weather might cause a severe backlog of shipping extending perhaps from Vietnam ports to CONUS. In the decade prior to the commitment of US ground forces in Vietnam the only major Southeast Asia port improvements were at Sattahip in Thailand and a two-ship deep water pier at Cam Ranh Bay. Saigon was the only real port in South Vietnam and it could not handle the load associated with the increased tempo of operations and US involvement. Accordingly, reliance was placed on over-the-beach operations. This placed a heavy demand on amphibious shipping and lighterage; both of which were scarce. Further, the period of maximum buildup occurred when the weather and sea conditions were worst for beach operations and unloading in the under-developed port areas.

Lacking extensive land lines of communications, a concept was developed to move supplies north and south from the three deep ports of Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Danang to such minor ports as Qui Nhon, Nha Trang and Chu Lai. CINCPAC's resources of LSTs were unequal to the requirement of shallow draft shipping to accomplish this task. Accordingly, additional LSTs were sought on a world-wide basis.[3]

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1. CINCUSARPAC 17854/080132Z Sep 65 (S)
2. CINCUSARPAC 17355/290042Z Aug 65 (S); CINCPAC 220128Z Sep 65 (S)
3. See "Tank Landing Ships" and "Shallow Draft Shipping and Terminal Service Contract" elsewhere in this history.

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[redacted]

PORT AND MAJOR AIR FACILITIES SOUTH VIETNAM



Similarly, Army lighterage was moved to South Vietnam to augment port discharge capabilities.[1]

In late October CINCPAC appointed a team to visit South Vietnam to develop a port by port analysis of bottlenecks in RVN ports, to project the backlog that would exist at the end of CY 65, and to recommend actions to alleviate the port congestion.[2]

This study was conducted at the sites in conjunction with COMUSMACV. It was determined that additional stevedoring, lighterage, port construction effort and intra-coastal transportation by LST and barge were urgently needed to increase the port throughput capability.[3] This analysis served as a catalyst for numerous actions by CINCPAC, PACOM component commanders, services and CONUS agencies. These included a review of all sources of lighterage to alleviate the shortages in RVN.[4]

Another action aimed at reducing port congestion in South Vietnam was establishment of a PACOM Movements Priorities Control Agency. Chaired by a CINCPAC representative (06), this board was to be operational at Oakland Army Base not later than 17 January 1966. In coordination with the JCS, MSTS, COMUSMACV, Military Traffic Management and Terminal Services (MTMTS), and the services, the board would regulate the movement of materials commensurate with RVN port capacities. Membership would be two officers each from PACOM components and MACV, plus a total of five enlisted personnel from the same sources. Western Area MTMTS was to provide logistic administrative support, but CINCPAC was to fund the board operation.[5]

The year end backlog of ships in RVN ports is indicated in the accompanying illustration. Note that on 1 October 24 ships were being worked simultaneously, but by 31 December the number of working ships had risen to 40.[6]

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1. See "Army Lighterage in South Vietnam" elsewhere in this history.
2. CINCPAC 2722382 Oct 65 (S)
3. COMUSMACV 091350Z Nov 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 080421Z Jan 66 (S)
5. CINCPAC 3101552Z Dec 65 (S)
6. See also SECDEF DEF 9473/282350Z Dec 65 (S)

PORT AND MAJOR AIR FACILITIES SOUTH VIETNAM



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SHIP ACTIVITY RVN PORTS

EXCLUDES LST'S, POL, REEFER SHUTTLE & TROOP SHIPS



[redacted]

Tank Landing Ships

PACOM assigned strategic reserve sealift included, at the beginning of the year, 31 tank landing ships (LSTs) of which 14 were mothballed and 17 were operational. It was estimated that the mothballed vessels could be restored to operational condition as follows: four in 20 days, four in 20 additional days, and the remaining ships at a rate of two every 20 additional days.

By February usable land lines of communication were virtually nonexistent in RVN because of VC action; further, there was only one operational deep water port (Saigon) and with the anticipated force increase there was a critical requirement for shallow draft vessels to provide sealift of personnel, supplies, and equipment to the minor port areas on the east RVN coast. There was as yet no definite decision on the extent of the force increase, but by 11 March the JCS approved immediate activation of six LSTs to meet COMUSMACV requirements; two additional LSTs were approved for activation later the same month. [redacted]

Meanwhile, a representative of COMSTSPAC went to RVN to develop with COMUSMACV the rationale for additional vessels; and COMUSMACV, COMUS Korea and the component commanders were queried regarding their overall LST requirements.[3] Concurrently, Chief, WESTPAC Transportation Office was assigned responsibility for exercising centralized control of LST assets in an effort to achieve maximum utilization of resources.[4] To provide CHWTO the personnel to perform this task, each PACOM component commander was directed to provide an officer (05/04) and a clerk typist to man a branch office at Yokohoma.[5]

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1. CINCPAC 020045Z Mar 65 (S); JCS 006835/110042Z Mar 65 (C) [redacted]
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 070449Z May 65 (S); COMSTS 142230Z Apr 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 242201Z Apr 65 (U)
5. CINCPAC 130340Z Jul 65 (U)

[redacted]

STRATEGIC RESERVE OF MERCHANT-TYPE SHIPPING

IN SUPPORT OF CINCPAC OPLANS

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1965



ASSIGNED SEALIFT PACIFIC COMMAND

1 TAK (Heavy Lift) at 17, 397 measurement tons
12 TAK at 13, 500 measurement tons
3 TAP at 2, 700 measurement tons, 3, 350 passengers
3 CI-M-AVI at 5, 700 measurement tons
3 TAOG at 30, 000 bbls capacity
1 TAO at 130, 000 bbls capacity
31 LST at 2, 000 measurement tons, 175 passengers
6 mothballed LSTs are being reactivated

To ensure availability for responsiveness to CINCPAC Contingency Plans, this shipping is normally employed within the following operational limitations:

NO	SHIP TYPE	OPERATE WITHIN DAYS STEAMING	OF PORT
2	TAP	5	Naha
9	TAK	5	Naha
2	CI-M-AVI	6	Naha
1	CI-M-AVI	7	Subic
1	TAK (H)	7	Naha
14	LST	8	Naha
3	LST	9	Subic
1	TAP	9	Yokohama
3	TAK	10	Yokohama
1	TAO	10	Sasebo
3	TAOG	10	Sasebo
8	LST	10	Yokohama

[redacted]

Reactivation of four additional LSTs was approved in late May;[1] this was deferred with CINCPAC concurrence because the existing development of port and beach facilities in RVN would not yet support LSTs in addition to those already in South Vietnam waters.[2]

By mid-July a total of 12 LSTs were assigned in RVN. About the same time the Secretary of Defense approved new airfield construction and improvements to existing airfields; and with these projects came significant additional requirements for coastal movement of construction equipment and material.[3] Accordingly, CINCPAC approved two additional vessels from the[4] shrinking number of mothballed ships.

COMUSMACV's LST requirements increased steadily with the growing US deployments to South Vietnam, and in August he stated a requirement for 10 additional ships: four at once, two on 13 September, and four by 15 October.[5]. Various alternate means of meeting the requirement were investigated[6] and a COMUSMACV/COMSTSFE study validated the requirement.[7] Ultimately, the JCS concurred in CINCPAC's proposal to reactivate an additional nine LSTs (all that remained in the PACOM inactive Strategic Reserve Fleet at Sasebo) and assign the USS Stark County (LST 1134) from PACFLT to Thailand.

At the end of the year 37 LSTs were supporting COMUSMACV intra-coastal lift requirements. A summary of the pending actions to supplement this capability is as follows:

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1. OSD DEF 002783/252036Z May 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 290427Z May 65 (S)
3. COMUSMACV 24980/181048Z July 65 (S); COMUSMACV 25964/250845Z Jul 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 032240Z Aug 65 (S)
5. COMUSMACV 29817/250045Z Aug 65 (S)
6. CINCPACFLT 080542Z Sep 65 (S)
7. COMUSMACV 29817/250045Z Aug 65 (S)

[redacted]

Source	Action & Number of LSTs
CINCPACFLT	Deploying seven additional fleet LSTs to augment SEVENTHFLT lift.
CINCLANT	Transferring eleven reserve LSTs to CINCPACFLT. Under OPCON COMSTSFE These ships would support COMUSMACV requirements.
NAVY RESERVE FLEET	Seventeen LSTs being reactivated for assignment CINCPACFLT use in WESTPAC. Four would support Game Warden operations. Three LSTs being reactivated to function under OPCON COMSTSFE.
PACOM Inactive Strategic Reserve Fleet	Six LSTs being reactivated. Would operated under OPCON COMSTSFE.
CINCPACFLT	USS STARK COUNTY being loaned to Thailand for their participation in RVN. [1]

Additionally, CINCPAC recommended on 31 December that GRC provide six LSTs for FWMAF participation in RVN and that the ROK provide two additional LSTs.

Lighterage and Stevedoring

Army Lighterage in South Vietnam: On 12 February the Department of the Army initiated supply action to preposition US Army lighterage in South Vietnam and Thailand in support of CINCPAC contingency plans.[2] This lighterage consisted of 12 landing craft utility (LCUs) and 52 mechanized landing craft (68' LCM8s). The plan was to position six out-of-storage-in-reserve LCUs at Subic Bay in an on call status, and six at Cam Ranh Bay; and 19 LCM8s were to be at Sattahip in Thailand. All of the lighterage was located in CONUS.[3]

With significant deviation from the plan this project was completed in September. At the end of the year all of the equipment (12 LCUs, 52 LCM8s) was in South Vietnam where it had been diverted to meet immediate requirements.[4] Nevertheless, there remained a substantial

1. CINCPAC 040142Z Dec 65 (S)
2. Operational Project Army USARYIS-GEN-1-65-OP
3. DA 703509/122016Z Mar 65 (C); CGUSARYIS 170330Z Mar 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 072326Z Aug 65 (S)

[redacted]

shortage in lighterage and harbor craft in the harbors of South Vietnam, and CINCPAC was reviewing all sources to alleviate these shortages.[1]

Lighterage/Stevedoring Service at Danang: CINCPAC found it necessary to call a conference at Camp H. M. Smith regarding responsibility for off-loading USAF SPECIAL EXPRESS ammunition ships at Danang. At the conference it was determined that the Navy would continue to provide lighterage and crews for ship/shore movement. In view of the selective nature of the unloading, however, it was decided that CINCPACAF would be responsible for the port throughput.[2] (C)

Lighterage/Stevedoring Capability at Danang, Cam Ranh Bay, Phan Rang and Saigon: In late October COMUSMACV requested OICC-RVN to develop his own lighterage and stevedoring capability at the above ports because of a shortage of Army and Navy terminal service units and associated lighterage equipment. CINCPAC ruled otherwise, however, referring to his April directive on responsibilities for operation of ports and beaches.[3]

Beach Discharge Lighter (BDL): On 23 July COMUSMACV requested a US Army BDL to provide flexible and quick response to sealift requirements in RVN. CINCPAC concurred and recommended to the JCS that the B DL was urgently needed. He also noted a continuing requirement for the roll-on, roll-off (RO/RO) USNS COMET. The latter was proving of great value in transporting vehicles within RVN and contributing to relief of port congestion.[4]

Deployment of the BDL LT COL JOHN PAGE was immediately approved, and it was expected to reach South Vietnam soon after the end of the year.

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1. CINCPAC 080421Z Jan 66 (S)
2. CINCPAC 0357Z Oct 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 241945Z Apr (S); CINCPAC 132353Z Nov 65 (C)
4. CINCPAC 240339Z July 65 (S); CINCPAC 132223Z Jul 65 (S); DA 725964/292156Z Jul 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Shallow Draft Shipping and Terminal Service Contract

During the latter half of November COMUSMACV cited an immediate requirement for additional shallow draft shipping and terminal services in RVN.[1] He proposed contracting with a commercial firm, Alaska Barge and Transport, Inc. for these services. CINCPAC concurred in the urgency of the situation and recommended to the JCS that MSTS negotiate the contract without delay.[2] On 8 December the Secretary of Defense authorized the contract.[3]

Ammunition Unloading/Distribution Procedures

In September there was a significant backlog of ammunition at Nha Be, the principal ammunition unloading port in the Saigon area. After consulting COMUSMACV to determine the problems involved, CINCPAC obtained JCS assistance in increasing palletization of shipments in achieving better stowage and lot identification by consignee and destination, and in increasing the number of direct shipments to up-country ports.[4]

POL SUPPLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Following the Gulf of Tonkin incidents during the second half of 1964, there was a continuing appraisal of PACOM capability to support intensified operations in Southeast Asia.[5]

Normal military operations in Southeast Asia were completely dependent on commercial sources for stocking, distribution and resupply. Prepositioned POL stocks were adequate only for the first stages of

1. COMUSMACV 40601/160105Z Nov 65 (S); COMUSMACV 41456/230600Z NOv 65 (S)
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 270034Z Nov 65 (S); CINCPAC 270035Z Nov 65 (S); SECDEF DEF7302/262136Z Nov (C)
3. SECDEF 8145/082041Z Dec 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 140228Z Sep 65 (C); JCS 3655/082010Z Oct 65 (U); COMUSMACV MAC 30396/291141Z Aug (C)
5. CINCPAC Command History, 1964, pp. 110-112

[redacted]

[redacted]

accelerated operations, and there were serious limitations to the prompt resupply which would be required by a continued high consumption rate.[1]

One of these limitations was the lack of a safety level in the POL storage capacity at Subic Bay. CINCPACFLT had recognized this and gave the highest priority to remedial construction.[2] Also, the explosive situation in Indonesia throughout most of 1965 presented the possibility of denial of the Strait of Malacca, a key point on the resupply line from Persian Gulf sources.[3]

This portion of the history discusses the major events related to providing the essential POL support for Southeast Asia ground, air, and sea operations during 1965.

POL Pipeline, Thailand

In 1962 a tactical pipeline was authorized for Thailand as a sub-project under the 1962 Special Logistics Actions Thailand (SLAT) MAP project. It was conceived that the pipeline would supply POL from Bangkok (later Siracha) to air bases at Don Muang, Korat and Takhli with further supply by tank car and tank truck from Korat to Udorn and Ubon. In 1963 CINCPAC took the position that the pipeline should be installed immediately after it became apparent that combat operations would be undertaken.

An eight inch invasion-type pipeline was stored in Thailand, but not all the engineering equipment to install it and the associated pumping stations was in the country. Further, some components for the extension of the pipeline around Bangkok to Siracha were not in Thailand. If engineer construction personnel were airlifted to Thailand, it was estimated that beneficial utilization of the line could be achieved approximately 100 days after installation was authorized. Also stored in Thailand was tankage for 380,000 barrels of POL products. This tankage would have to be erected, however, before it would be useful in supporting operations.

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1. JCS 2339/152-1 of 9 Nov 64 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 052323Z Jan 65 (S); CINCPAC 200028Z Dec 64 (S)
3. CINCPACFLT 082227Z Feb 65 (TS)

[redacted]

In February 1965 CINCPAC further defined the conditions under which the pipeline should be installed. If a brigade task force was deployed to Thailand, the Siracha-Don Muang segment should be installed. If a division was introduced, the line should be extended to Korat.[1]

In April the US Ambassador in Bangkok undertook negotiations with the RTG to obtain the pipeline right of way and approval for deployment of an engineer construction battalion and a quartermaster petroleum depot company to Thailand. Air Chief Marshall Dawee, when approached by the Ambassador, recited a litany of objections and dangers inherent in a tactical pipeline; and he cited earlier US arguments in support of a permanent pipeline as the basis for his comments. Dawee accordingly refused permission for early deployment of the troops to construct and operate the pipeline. Nevertheless, he was persuaded to approve construction of some POL facilities at Siracha, Don Muang, Korat, Udorn and Ubon. He also approved deployment of an engineer construction battalion to build the agreed to facilities plus other tasks such as the Kabin Buri-Korat extension of the Bangkok by-pass road. In a subsequent meeting with Dawee, Ambassador Martin obtained RTG agreement in principle for installation of the tactical pipeline at such a time as the RTG considered it warranted as a prudent and precautionary measure. At that time, however, the RTG did not consider the action merited by the situation.

On review, CINCPAC determined that the earlier permanent pipeline project was abandoned because of an inability to justify it as a military necessity and the US reluctance to underwrite operating losses that might be incurred after installation. An additional factor was the prolonged difficulty encountered in securing right of way through Bangkok. CINCPAC informed the JCS that he could not justify a permanent pipeline as a military necessity. He did not believe there had been any particular easement of Bangkok right of way problems,

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1. CINCPAC 240327Z Feb 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 200306Z Feb 65 (TS); BANGKOK 1588 to STATE 191733Z Apr 65 (TS); STATE 1953 to BANGKOK 191948Z May 65 (TS); BANGKOK 1869 to STATE 250619Z May 65 (TS)

and it seemed that operating agreements (including possible losses) would be a problem.[1]

CINCPAC also reaffirmed his position that the Siracha to Don Muang portion of the tactical pipeline should be installed if a brigade size US force was to be deployed to Thailand. Further, the entire tactical system should be constructed to Korat if forces of division size or larger were to be deployed.

If the RTG would not accept this position, however, he recommended constructing the permanent line from Siracha to Don Muang (via Klong Toey, or with a leg from Don Muang to Klong Toey) as soon as an agreement could be reached. He also proposed that the permanent line should be funded jointly with AID because it would support military requirements and contribute substantially to the Thai economy.

After stating specific provisions that should be included in any US/RTG agreement for construction of the permanent pipeline, CINCPAC suggested that since the Siracha-Don Muang segment might require two years, it would be desirable to obtain Thai agreement for a tactical line between those two locations when additional US forces were deployed to Thailand.

It was planned, in July, to base additional KC-135 aircraft in Thailand, and some of these were to be at Takhli. This would require establishment of a POL capability at Takhli with a capacity of approximately 500,000 gallons per day.[2] Additionally, the anticipated deployment of more fighter squadrons to Thailand would impose additional requirements on the fuel distribution system.

Consequently, CINCPAC again recommended construction of the permanent pipeline from Siracha to Don Muang.[3] The estimated cost of the welded steel high pressure system, including a marine terminal at Siracha and the Don Muang terminal, was $9,300,000.

The Thailand POL distribution system underwent further analysis, and in October a two day test was conducted with special attention to the three known limiting factors. These were:

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1. CINCPAC 100408Z May 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 302350Z Jul 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 280210Z Sep 65 (S)

1. Loading capability of the commercial oil company.

2. Number of tank trucks and rail cars in service for military support.

3. Receiving capacity at air bases.

From the results of the test it was concluded that requirements projected to 31 December could be supported unless there was a system breakdown. But if this occurred there was no capability to reconstitute stocks reduced by delayed delivery or unprogrammed consumption.[1]

Shortly after this test was completed the JCS concurred in construction of a permanent pipeline from Siracha to Don Muang. The architectural and engineering design study contract of $425,000 was awarded to Bechtel Corporation in December with a completion schedule of 1 April 1966.[2]

With the previously mentioned RTG concurrence in building some SLAT POL facilities, construction started on five 10,000 barrel tanks at Udorn and four of the same size at Ubon.[3] At the end of the year it was expected that the tanks at Udorn would be in use by 15 January 1966 and those at Ubon by 15 February.[4] The 538th Engineer Construction Battalion was deployed to Thailand and this unit started building nine 10,000 barrel tanks at Korat. It was estimated these tanks would be in use by 30 March 1966.[5]

Problems Associated With Basing KC-135s at Takhli

There was a requirement for ten KC-135 tankers at Don Muang to provide refueling service for US combat air operations. The RTG requested, however, that no more than four KC-135s be stationed at Don Muang. Honoring this request prompted a series of moves with the objective of basing the balance of six KC-135s at Takhli.

The key move was to relocate the RTAF Flying School from Korat to another site. After this a squadron of F-105s could be shifted

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1. COMUSMACTHAI ltr USMACT JT J4 of 14 October 65 (C)
2. JCS 2353/80 of 10 Nov 65 (S); CINCPAC 300423Z Nov 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 090150Z Jun 65 (S)
4. COMUSMACTHAI 100740Z Nov 65 (C)
5. 9th Log Cmd B 010435Z Jan 66 (S)

from Takhli to Korat, and this move would release sufficient space and facilities so the KC-135s could at last be bedded down at Takhli.

Once the KC-135s were at Takhli, it would be necessary to increase the sustained JP-4 capability at that base from the existing limit of 330,000 gallons per day to 500,000 gallons per day. It was concluded that the basing problem of the Flying School could be solved by constructing an airfield and related facilities at Nakhon Pathon.[1] The $13.0 million cost of this construction was subsequently programmed in the FY 66 Emergency Military Construction Program (EMCP). But before undertaking negotiations for these multiple moves the US Ambassador to Thailand desired firm assurance that the airfield project would be approved by US higher authorities. Accordingly, a joint State Department/Secretary of Defense action assured him that the funds would be made available for moving the Flying School. Thereon the Ambassador entered into successful negotiations, and funds were released for site investigation and land acquisition related to the Nakhon Pathon airfield.[2] At the end of the year it was anticipated that the Flying School might be at its new location by April 1967.

COMUSMACTHAI proposed that the problem of improving the POL receiving capability at Takhli could be resolved by construction of additional unloading facilities at the railhead. He further suggested construction of a rail spur to the airfield.[3] On 11 September CINCPAC expressed his concurrence in construction of these facilities.[4]

POL Supply, South Vietnam

As in Thailand the POL for military operations in South Vietnam at the beginning of 1965 was supplied, stocked, and distributed by commercial concerns. About 80 per cent of the bulk POL in RVN was stored at commercial terminals at Nha Be. Destruction of this facility

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1. BANGKOK to STATE 151207Z Sep 65 (S)
2. SEC STATE 091745Z Oct 65 (S); CSAF 262127Z Nov 65 (S); SEC DEF 7351/271526Z Nov 65 (S)
3. COMUSMACTHAI 10170/270123Z Aug 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 112245Z Sep 65 (S)

would have a serious impact on operations conducted from Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa airfields. In recognition of this COMUSMACV, jointly with the commercial operators, exercised particular care to protect the facility. [1]

Recognizing that no security system was wholly effective, CINCPAC arranged for positioning at Subic Bay two small tankers with assorted POL loads. These tankers were available for emergency response to requirements in RVN. [2]

CINCPAC had supported a CINCPACAF effort to acquire a capability, independent of commercial transporters, to refuel tactical USAF aircraft at Tan Son Nhut (TSN) airfield. The US Army air element at the field already had a refueling capability. However, both the USA and USAF depended on the Na Be terminal for their POL. To improve the storage capacity at TSN, and to improve the dispersion posture, CINCPACAF had proposed to erect 10,000 barrel tanks. CINCPAC preferred to achieve the same ends by expanding commercial storage at the field, but he left to CINCPACAF the decision as to whether to erect the tanks or request additional commercial storage through service channels.

The situation at Bien Hoa was similar in some respects. Resupply was by commercial tank trucks from Nha Be, and there was a paucity of tankage. However, a 20,000 barrel storage facility was in the FY 65 MAP, and CINCPACAF planned to add one USAF 10,000 barrel bolted steel tank. [3]

At Danang (Lien Chieu) there was a small ESSO terminal, and the FY 65 MAP programmed 25,000 barrels of POL storage at the Danang airfield. Plans for a new runway at the field would require construction of an additional 35,000 barrel storage capability. Similarly, the new airfield planned for Chu Lai would require a 50,000 barrel storage capability. Major additional requirements for accelerated

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1. CINCPAC 052229Z Mar 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 221956Z Feb 65 (TS); JCS 006239/031346Z Mar 65 (TS); COMUSMACV Dir 500-2 of 27 Mar 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 052229Z Mar 65 (TS)

operations included an amphibious assault bulk fuel system with 5,000 feet of buoyant pipeline at Danang Bay. Pending completion of a fuel discharge point and a pipeline suitable for a T-2 or larger tanker, TAOGs were needed to feed the buoyant pipeline and to shuttle the product from T-2s, commercial contractor tankers, or T-5s utilized in the floating storage role.[1]

Within 7 days after the floating reserve was established at Subic the T-1 PETALUMA was used to supply 10,000 barrels of fuel to Qui Nhon because the commercial contractor could not affect resupply. In April the PETALUMA delivered JP-4 at Lien Chieu Esso terminal to meet surge requirements for recently deployed forces and to fill newly installed bladder tankage at Danang. Subsequently the T-2 COSSATOT replenished PETALUMA's cargo at Danang.[2] A second T-1 (CHATTAHOOCHEE) was added in July.[3]

In April, to supplement the POL distribution capability, CINCPAC requested two YOG's (gasoline barge, self propelled). These barges later performed yeoman service in the transfer of bulk POL from floating storage and coastal terminals.[4]

During June and July there was increasing concern over the possibility of the VC destroying major POL terminals in RVN. Early in August, at Esso's Lien Chieu terminal, the VC destroyed two 20,000 barrel JP-4 tanks, burned a 10,000 barrel JP-4 tank and a 2,300 barrel aviation gasoline tank, and damaged a 10,000 barrel tank. Additional damage was sustained by the shore line when a moored ship departed without disconnecting. The tank farm was rendered temporarily unusable, and the COSSATOT was rushed to Danang with 129,000 barrels of assorted POL reserve stocks for Danang, Chu Lai, Hue and Phu Bai.[5]

During July, at CINCPAC's direction, a military POL distribution system was established in South Vietnam to support the expanding US force. This system was to supplement, and replace, if necessary,

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1. CINCPAC 052229Z Mar 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 250500Z Apr 65 (C)
3. JCS 5012/012112Z July 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 010002Z Apr 65 (S)
5. CINCPAC 070601Z Aug 65 (C)

[redacted]

the commercial distribution capability. Responsibilities were assigned as follows:

CINCUSARPAC--II, III, and IV Corps

CINCPACFLT--I Corps

CINCPACAF--Airfields as designated by COMUSMACV[1]

At the end of the year this system was functioning smoothly and meeting the military requirements.

POL Support in the Philippines

Fleet operations associated with the early 1965 crisis in Southeast Asia highlighted the need for additional POL storage at Subic Bay, Philippines. In early January CINCPAC supported to the JCS a high priority construction project to meet additional storage requirements.[2]

At the end of the year additional storage for 350,000 barrels of POL products was under construction at Subic Bay. Projects for storage of an additional 240,000 barrels were funded; and a construction contract had been awarded, and an architectural and engineering study was under way on facilities for another 240,000 barrels.

Leases on the Bataan Ocean Petroleum Depot land were to expire on 30 June 1967. This would necessitate relocation of the supply source for aviation fuels for Clark Air Base. To resolve this, CINCPACAF initiated construction projects in early 1965 to provide 150,000 barrels (later increased to 240,000 barrels) of storage at Subic Bay to facilitate tanker discharge, a pipeline from Subic Bay to Clark Air Base, and additional storage for 310,000 barrels of POL products at Clark Air Base.[3] At the end of the year the pipeline was being designed but no construction had begun.

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1. CINCPAC 180039Z Jul 65 (S); CINCPAC 310429Z Jul 65 (S)
2. CINCPACFLT 290424Z Dec 64 (S); CINCPAC 052323Z Jan 65 (S)
3. CINCPACAF 161824Z Jan 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

POL for ROKFV

In May the Korean Oil Company refinery began supplying the bulk POL for Korean force in RVN under a $4,741,256.58 MAP contract. The products included JP-4, mogas, diesel, kerosene and Navy special fuel oil.[1]

THEATER AIRLIFT

Throughout the year more and more attention was given to the theater airlift capability and its application to those areas where shortages in material and transportation made use of airlift mandatory. Demands exceeded the assigned airlift capability because of the rapid buildup of tactical forces in South Vietnam; continued denial of roads and railroads; limited seaport facilities; and the logistical build-up to support troop fire power and tactical efforts. Use of theater airlift on repetitive scheduled operations changed from 35-45 per cent to less than 30 per cent. A significant amount of the airlift thus released was turned to flare drop missions; special fuel tanker missions; para-drop; and medical air evacuation from remote areas.

Other factors affecting airlift patterns in WESTPAC included airlift requirements for mining equipment and munitions to support fighter-bomber squadrons at newly prepared airports. Also, the surge in combat missions in Southeast Asia caused rapid draw-downs of certain munitions, such as the 750 pound general purpose bomb. In turn, this required airlift of stocks from theater storage points.[2]

Requirements were further increased by the absence of secure road and rail lines of communications (LOCs) in South Vietnam. Therefore, airlift was sometimes used for ammunition of all sorts, food or ration stockage, POL, construction equipment and supplies. In a few cases some combat units were airlifted as little as 35 miles because of tactical or operational requirements.[3]

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1. Contract No. DSA-6-7092
2. CINCPAC 192009Z Apr 65 (S); CHWTO 00117/070712Z Jun 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 131441Z Jun 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Increased Airlift Capability

There were only five C-130A and B squadrons in PACOM at the beginning of 1965. In the face of increased urgent requirements, the theater airlift capability was augmented by six air transport squadrons (16 aircraft each). This brought the end of the year total to 11 squadrons, including newer type C-130E units. These additional squadrons were assigned to operational control of the 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) with utilization being programmed by CINCPAC's CHWTO. The new squadrons were home based at Tachikawa, Japan; Kadena, Okinawa; and at Clark and Mactan in the Philippines. The MATS (later Military Airlift Command) C-124 squadron remained at Tachikawa to provide outsize cargo capability. All units were authorized to increase their productivity by flying more hours per month per aircraft. The newer C-130E types were authorized to double, on a gradual basis, the original goal of 2 1/2 hours per day/aircraft.

MATS Extension to Cam Ranh Bay/Danang

In October, CINCPAC proposed that the Military Air Transport Service be extended to serve the newly developed Cam Ranh Bay Airport and Danang in addition to the heavily used terminal at Tan Son Nhut (Saigon). After a survey by a CSAF, PACAF and MATS team, extensions were approved from CONUS via Clark and Kadena to Danang, also from CONUS via Clark and Kadena to Cam Ranh Bay. It was anticipated that cargo service would start in January 1966 and passenger service at a later date.[1] In addition to providing direct service to users, there would be an improvement in the theater airlift capability by removing these requirements from CINCPAC's airlift workload. (C)

The gradually increasing intra-coastal shipping and over-the-beach discharge capability was expected to further reduce theater airlift requirements.[2] (C)

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1. CINCPAC 282115Z Oct 65 (C); CSAF AFSTP 94750/26221Z Nov 65 (C); MATS MAOTARA 42206/301600Z Nov 65 (C)
2. CINCPAC 012053Z Mar 65 (U)

[redacted]

[redacted]

At year end CINCPAC was considering a CINCPACFLT request for a MATS cargo/mail route from Alemeda, California to Cubi Point, Philippines to Danang. The purpose was to reduce US Navy cargo backlogs in CONUS and at Clark, and to prevent degradation of fleet readiness due to lack of trans-Pacific air transport capability.[1] It was anticipated that CINCPAC would request CSAF and MATS to make stops at Cubi Point/Subic when substantial priority Navy cargo justified full aircraft loads. (C)

Airlift Exercises and Training

In response to a COMUSMACV request,[3] CINCPAC directed CHWTO on 14 December to stage 17 additional C-130 aircraft in RVN to meet, at COMUSMACVs direction, urgent tactical and logistical airlift requirements within South Vietnam. This would provide a total of thirty C-130 aircraft within RVN, in addition to three flare/leaflet drop aircraft and two bulk fuel aircraft for a total of 35. (C)

Future Airlift Requirements in WESTPAC

In mid-November the Secretary of Defense asked CINCPAC to review the PACOM capability to meet civil as well as military airlift requirements in RVN. COMUSMACV stated his military requirements and reported a USOM requirement for 1,850 tons of cargo per month beyond that agency's existing capability.[4] After a CINCPACAF review of programming, which recognized that two more C-130 squadrons were due shortly after the end of the year, CINCPAC replied that the existing and programmed airlift could meet known military and civilian requirements.

Evacuation of US Nationals

Evacuation of US dependents and certain allied personnel from disturbed areas was normally accomplished under State Department

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1. CINCPACFLT 110447Z Dec 65 (C)
2. CINCPAC 050047Z Sep 65 (C)
3. COMUSMACV 130214Z Dec 65 (S); CINCPAC 142210Z Dec 65 (S)
4. COMUSMACV 43578/130237Z Dec 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

PACIFIC COMMAND INTRATHEATER AIRLIFT

MONTH	FLYING HOURS UTILIZED BY WESTERN TRANSPORTATION OFFICE				AIRLIFT ACCOMPLISHMENT											
					UTILIZATION BY SERVICE						SCHEDULED/NONSCHED. UTILIZATION				TOTAL UTILIZATION	
					ARMY		NAVY		AIR FORCE		PASSENGERS		CARGO (S/T)			
	C-124	C-130	OTHER	TOTAL	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	SCHED	NONSCHED	SCHED	NON SCHED	PAX	CARGO
DECEMBER	1,034	2,799	1,058	4,891	7,460	1,883	1,826	379	8,302	3,506	8,893	8,695	1,943	3,825	17,588	5,768
JANUARY - 1965	1,035	2,946	962	4,943	3,635	1,557	2,193	1,811	8,329	3,471	6,866	7,291	2,094	4,745	14,157	6,839
FEBRUARY	953	3,337	907	5,197	4,114	1,146	815	399	5,867	2,810	6,526	4,270	1,724	2,631	10,796	4,355
MARCH	1,265	4,510	1,264	7,039	4,434	2,087	3,861	1,354	7,854	4,927	7,853	8,296	2,275	6,093	16,149	8,368
APRIL	1,260	6,716	1,162	9,138	7,372	2,509	1,987	667	8,711	10,548	8,966	9,104	2,164	11,560	18,070	13,724
MAY	1,151	8,001	1,259	10,411	8,428	5,359	1,491	1,095	8,564	7,503	9,725	8,758	2,511	11,446	18,483	13,957
JUNE	1,376	6,472	1,342	9,190	8,107	8,379	4,379	1,372	10,174	6,067	12,298	10,362	4,008	11,810	22,660	15,818
JULY	1,303	7,875	1,201	10,379	12,338	11,179	3,668	2,456	13,998	7,825	12,906	17,098	4,553	16,907	30,004	21,460
AUGUST	1,283	7,566	1,200	10,049	12,313	12,935	3,930	2,325	10,092	7,597	12,692	13,643	5,713	17,144	26,335	22,857
SEPTEMBER	1,237	9,309	1,266	11,812	21,593	21,321	4,280	3,263	15,651	9,846	13,952	27,576	4,623	29,807	41,524	34,430
OCTOBER	1,255	10,083	1,261	12,599	42,717	25,835	2,691	2,501	18,765	10,074	16,163	48,010	5,385	33,025	64,173	38,410
NOVEMBER	1,212	10,727	1,112	13,051	39,529	34,884	3,311	2,396	20,234	13,109	17,253	45,821	7,168	43,221	63,074	50,389

SOURCE: J45

[redacted]

supervision by commercial air and sealift. However, backup and immediate action resources often came from the theater military transportation capability. On several occasions during 1965 it appeared that evacuation to safe-havens would be required. Theater airlift forces were alerted and prepared to provide the necessary inbound airlift of troops to protect our nationals and outbound airlift to evacuate civilian nationals. During the India-Pakistan war, theater airlift was again alerted for evacuation of US non-combatants. After several delays, seven PACOM C-130s were used to evacuate 485 men, women and children from Dacca, East Pakistan. This action was termed operation Elder Blow.

Control of Theater Transportation Resources

During the year there was continuous review of control procedures and methods to ensure that air and sealift resources were utilized in an efficient and economical manner. A branch WTO office was established in Saigon[1] to monitor and coordinate submission of air and sealift requirements in Southeast Asia as well as to provide prompt application of resources to priority missions.

AMMUNITION, SOUTHEAST ASIA

Ammunition was of particular concern in September, and illuminants (aircraft paraflares and mortar cartridges) required the most immediate attention. The salient factors governing the ammunition situation were: the increased intensity of combat operations; replenishment of stocks was contingent on production, and in some cases the lead time was 12 or more months because production lines had been dismantled; ammunition forecasts regarding newly developed weapons systems were not accurate; and forecasts of expenditures for some ammunition items (e.g., illuminants) were inaccurate.[2]

1. CHWTO offices were already in operation at Tachikawa and Yokohoma to coordinate theater air and sealift.
2. CINCPAC 280403Z Sep 65 (S)

CINCPAC's policy was that he would establish the priority on munitions for MAP Countries, but COMUSMACV would determine priorities within South Vietnam.

Through October there had been no reported curtailment of military operations in Laos or South Vietnam due to an ammunition shortage. However, stocks of certain items were closely controlled because of anticipated shortages of caliber .30 and illuminating ammunition.[1]

Ammunition for Laos

Late in November CINCPAC authorized Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand to withdraw certain items from the Saltshaker ammunition reserve stocks located in Thailand.[2] This action was based on immediate operational requirements and delayed receipt of ammunition carried by the SS SAN MATEO. The specific items released were: cartridge 60 mm mortar HE; cartridge 75 mm howitzer smoke WP; cartridge 4.2" mortar HE; cartridge 4.2" mortar smoke WP; rockets 3.5" HEAT; and detonating cord.[3]

CINCPAC also requested CINCUSARPAC to supply other items not available in Saltshaker reserve stocks. These were cartridge 57R cannister, fuze VT M514, and fuze VT M513.[4]

Substitutes for 250 Pound GP Bombs

The CONUS stocks of 250 pound general purpose bombs were exhausted by October. The MK 81 bomb, a suitable substitute, was not expected to be available until December. CINCPAC proposed a reallocation of MK 81s or a redistribution of another substitute item.[5]

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1. CG USARMC 11115/162051Z Sep 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 240550Z Nov 65 (S); For origin of Saltshaker see CINCPAC Command History, 1961, pp. 161-162
3. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 062481/260900Z Nov 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 280054Z Nov 65 (S)
5. CINCPAC 052004Z Oct 65 (S)

[redacted]

As interim measures, six thousand USAF 250 pound bombs were transferred to VNAF for immediate requirements, and the VNAF was urged to use 500 pound GP and 100 pound PWP bombs.[1]

Year-end Ammunition Situation

At the close of 1965 six items of ammunition were considered critical. Two of these were for new weapons recently introduced into the inventory (2.75 inch rockets and 40 mm grenades for helicopter systems), two items pertained to the obsolete 60 mm mortar still used by Special Forces, and the remaining items were illuminants in the 81 mm and 105 mm classes.

It was anticipated that the supply of the above items would continue critical for the first half of 1966. At that time production should reach a level which would satisfy demands.[2]

MISCELLANEOUS LOGISTICAL ACTIONS, SOUTHEAST ASIA

Funding For Increased Force Level

On 3 January CINCPACFLT undertook to expedite funding actions which would authorize Headquarters Support Activity (HSAS) to increase stock levels so a force level of 34,000 personnel could be supported.[3] This action was expedited through the logistic improvement (LOGIMP) program, and an additional two million dollars in Navy stock fund authority was authorized on 12 February.[4]

Project SLY LADY

Following his February visit in PACOM, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense reported a serious shortage of parts for generators in RVN. Project SLY LADY was established to correct this situation.

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1. CSAF 85064/112124Z Oct 65 (S)
2. CINCUSARPAC 080324Z Jan 65 (S); CINCPACFLT ltr ser 43/038 of 6 Jan 66 (S); CINCPACAF 170321Z Dec 65 (S)
3. CINCPACFLT 030329Z Jan 65 (S)
4. JCS 05151/122225Z Feb 65 (S)
5. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memo to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subj: COMUSMACV Plan for the Introduction and Employment of a US Army Logistical Command, 12 Feb 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC directed the PACOM component commanders and CG USARYIS to send personnel to RVN to identify shortages and to requisition the parts needed to correct the emergency situation. Further, they were to provide the authorized levels of repair parts.[1]

CINCUSARPAC coordinated action on this project through CG USARYIS and by late April the emergency situation in RVN had been rectified and SLY LADY was cancelled.[2]

Vietnam Support Expediting Task Force

This Task Force was established by OSD in August and charged with providing to the Secretary of Defense immediate reports on shortages of resources available to COMUSMACV The Task Force visited CINCPAC, PACOM component commanders and COMUSMACV to establish liaison. Thereafter, CINCPAC submitted periodic lists of critical shortages. These items received particular attention at the highest levels. Actions in this category were identified by the unclassified nickname of FLAG POLE.[3] (U)

Transfer of MAP Redistributable Property to US Forces

Under the provisions of DOD Directive 2110.4 MAP - supported forces reported excess property and it was redistributed with priority to other PACOM MAP requirements. In effect this precluded the use of such property by US forces. (U)

On 5 November ASD/ISA waived the reporting and screening priorities previously prescribed. Under the waiver there could be a direct lateral transfer of Vietnam MAP redistributable property, without reimbursement, to US Forces in Vietnam when needed in support of combat operations. This action was expected to achieve greater flexibility in the allocation of MAP supplies and equipment in Vietnam.[4] (U)

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1. CINCPAC 062142Z Feb 65 (S)
2. CINCUSARPAC ltr GPLO-PO Subj: Project Sly Lady Team Report, 12 April 65 (S); CINCPAC 270537Z Apr 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC 272310Z Aug 65 (U)
4. ASD/ISA Memo I-13123/65 of 5 Nov 65 (U)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Support of US Military Attache Personnel, Laos

Because of the special situation in Laos[1] there were unusual support requirements for the attache augmentation personnel in the US Embassy, Vientiane. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) therefore requested that CINCPAC recommend another channel for supporting these special requirements. In response to a CINCPAC request Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand proposed the following:[2]

1. All current and projected permanent and temporary Attache Augmentation Personnel be included in the Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand Joint Manpower Program.

2. Personnel in (1) above be further attached to Senior Defense Attache Laos for duty in Laos and under his control.

3. DEPCHJUSMAG provide administrative and logistical support to Attache Augmentation Personnel.

4. Personnel not in the Attache Augmentation group continue to be supported through normal channels.

Ambassador Sullivan agreed with the above concept except he desired that the Attache Augmentation Personnel be attached to the Army or Air Attache as appropriate and under supervision of the Defense Attache.[3] CINCPAC directed Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand to prepare a detailed concept, and as an interim response to DIA he forwarded the general concept proposed by Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand as modified to agree with the Ambassador's desires.[4]

A Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand staff officer visited CINCPAC Headquarters 21-27 September to assist in rewriting the detailed recommendation submitted by Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand.[5] CINCPAC's detailed recommendation, forwarded to the JCS on 2 November, contained the following:[6]

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1. See "Air Operations in Laos" elsewhere in this History
2. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 20424 VTN 739/200235Z May 65 (S)
3. VIENTIANE 1480 to CINCPAC 211107Z May 65 (S)
4. CINCPAC 260434Z Jun 65 (TS)
5. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI ltr DCH-O of 5 Oct 65 (S)
6. CINCPAC ltr ser 001532 of 2 Nov 65 (S)

[redacted]

1. Administrative procedures to implement the recommended channel of support.

2. Joint Table of Distribution, organizational chart, functions statements and justifications for Office of US Army Attache (OUSARMA) and Office of US Air Attache (OUSAIRA), budget estimates and a cover plan.

Late in November the JCS asked CINCPAC's view on the desirability of continuing to fill certain spaces for OUSAIRA with personnel on TDY from USAF units rather than establishing JTD spaces.[1] CINCPAC non concurred with the proposal because personnel in TDY status had not been receiving adequate funding and logistic support.[2] Action on CINCPAC's recommendation was pending at the end of the year.

Transfer of Responsibility for Support of Allied Forces in South Vietnam

Responding to a March JCS query regarding more responsive logistic support for combined operations in RVN, CINCPAC recommended that MAP and US service requirements in Vietnam be funded from a single DOD account rather than from multiple sources as was the practice.[3]

CINCPAC learned in November that the Secretary of Defense had approved the transfer of responsibility for funding of RVN and all other Allied Forces in Vietnam to US service budgets for FY 65.[4] It was anticipated that requirements above the existing $540 million FY 66 Vietnam MAP would be funded by the Military Departments when they assumed full responsibility for the Vietnam Military MA Program.[5]

Early guidance was requested to aid CINCPAC and COMUSMACV in revising MAP procedures and organization. CINCPAC also stated that he considered it essential to continue unified command MAP channels until the Military Departments were fully capable of assuming their new responsibility.[6] The Secretary of Defense concurred. He further stated that the objective of the DOD was to establish the policy and procedures

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1. JCS 7386/292035Z Nov 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 240311Z Dec 65 (S)
3. JCS 907245/171936Z Mar 65 (TS)
4. SECDEF 8414/111752Z Dec 65 (S)
5. SECDEF 8587/150053Z Dec 65 (S)
6. CINCPAC 160248Z Dec 65 (S)

[redacted]

which would permit an effective and complete shift of responsibility to the Military Departments on 31 March 1966.[1]

On the last day of the year CINCPAC asked that the JCS brief this subject as a preliminary to a logistics conference scheduled at CINCPAC Headquarters during January 1966.[2]

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1. SECDEF 9452/282219Z Dec 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 312346Z Dec (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

SECTION I - ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, SOUTHEAST ASIA

This section addresses only those intelligence activities directly related to Southeast Asia and not covered under the "Operations" section. (U)

Joint Operations Graphics

Production of Joint Operations Graphics (JOG) for the Southeast Asia area was initiated in mid-1965. Air (JOG (A)) and ground (JOG (G)) versions of these graphics were, by the end of the year, standardized and validated as the primary 1:250,000 scale maps and charts of Southeast Asia. As the JOGs replace them, the 1:250,000 AMS Series 509 and AC/C 1:250,000 AGC charts were declared obsolete. (C)

At the end of 1965 North Vietnam, South Vietnam and Laos were covered by the JOG (A) Series, and JOG (G) Series was completed for the northern half of North Vietnam. A radar version of the graphic (JOG-R) was undergoing test and evaluation to determine the feasibility of using it in lieu of the 200 Series ATC for the Southeast Asia area and other non-Communist bloc areas of the world. (C)

[redacted]

Escape and Evasion (E&E) Charts

A major agenda item during the E&E conference at CINCPAC Headquarters from 6 to 11 December was an urgent PACOM requirement for new E&E charts of Southeast Asia. As recommended by the study group for this problem, DIA was tasked to produce E&E charts of (C)

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1. COMSEVENTHFLT 111604Z June 65 (S); CINCPACFLT 170319Z Jun 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

1:250,000 for North Vietnam and the eastern and panhandle areas of Laos; and 1:500,000 for the remainder of Laos and for South Vietnam, northern Thailand and eastern Cambodia.

These charts were to be produced on plastic material (Organasol) and contain information in the map body and margin of benefit for land navigation. They were to be distributed in accordance with the following priorities: 1:250,000 charts by 30 January 1966 and 1:500,000 charts by 1 March 1966. (C)



[redacted]

[redacted]

SECTION J - US PERSONNEL, SOUTHEAST ASIA

Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire (SPDHF)

On the basis of proposals by COMUSMACV and the PACOM component commanders, CINCPAC asked that the JCS seek approval for several changes to DOD Instruction 1340.6 of 20 August 1964. Specifically it was recommended that the SPDHF policy be liberalized to permit payment to personnel subject to hostile fire without regard to unit assignment. CINCPAC also proposed omitting the special condition that recipients of SPDHF be exposed six days or more each month, and he recommended deletion of the requirement that unified command commanders designate units or detachments whose members were eligible for this pay. In submitting these proposals CINCPAC pointed out that there were no safe havens in Vietnam and cited casualty rates not connected with combat operations.[1] With minor exceptions CINCPAC's recommendations were approved and reflected in a 2 June revision of DOD Instruction 1340.6. On 22 June the JCS announced DOD authorization for hostile fire pay for Laos and Vietnam. Next day CINCPAC promulgated the revised eligibility, and entitlement criteria, and he specified hostile fire areas retroactive to 1 June 1965.[2]

CINCPAC also requested, on 23 June, further revision of the DOD Instruction to adequately cover the sea areas off the coast of Vietnam and to prescribe conditions for SPDHF to personnel serving in Laos.

After further consultation with the JCS CINCPAC published CINCPAC Instruction 7220.5 on 1 July. This prescribed the total criteria for SPDHF. He designated as hostile fire areas the total land area of North and South Vietnam, including inland waters and adjacent sea area from the juncture of Cambodia.

Following review of the CINCPAC Instruction, DOD suggested on 19 July 1965[3] that the eligibility criteria announced therein were more

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1. CINCPAC 060137Z Mar 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 231902Z Jun 65 (S)
3. OSD DEF 6121/191523Z July 65 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

permissive than intended and should be reconsidered. Several changes to the Instruction were proffered. Discussions between OSD and CINCPAC during July and August 1965 culminated in a CINCPAC reclama of the DOD position.[1] He requested that the DOD Directive be revised to provide for payment of SPDHF to persons assigned to MARKET TIME operations, to SAC personnel, and to persons required to perform highly dangerous clandestine missions within a hostile fire area on an intermittent basis. DOD approved the CINCPAC recommendations on 24 September 1965[2] but requested comments on criteria for Laos. DOD Directive 1340.6 was published on 19 November 1965, and the Directive of 1 July 1965, was rescinded. As the year came to a close, DOD had under consideration CINCPAC's recommendations to designate Laos as a hostile fire area on the same basis as Vietnam.[3]

Recovery of Prisoners, Southeast Asia

Approximately 100 US military personnel were missing as of mid-1965 and possibly prisoners of communist forces in Southeast Asia. The US Mission Council in Vietnam proposed terms of reference for a ten man Joint Recovery Center (JRC) to be directly responsible to the US Ambassador in South Vietnam for operational matters concerning recovery of US and allied personnel held by the enemy within South Vietnam.[4] Ambassador Sullivan was of the opinion, however, that he was in the best position to coordinate the recovery of prisoners in Laos, and he proposed that the JRC terms of reference be revised accordingly.[5]

CINCPAC suggested to the JCS that covert collection efforts should be focused on the problem of recovering prisoners.[6] He later concurred in the manning requirements and provided a budget estimate regarding the JRC. He also suggested use of the term Joint Personnel

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1. CINCPAC 110150Z Aug 65 (S)
2. OASD/M DEF 2526/252010Z Sep 65 (S)
3. CINCPAC 100100Z Oct 65 (S)
4. SAIGON 4180 to STATE 144055Z Jun 65 (S)
5. VIENTIANE to SAIGON 211029Z Jun 65 (S)
6. CINCPAC 180022Z Jun 65 (TS)

[redacted]

Recovery Center (JPRC) since JRC was used to designate Joint Reconnaissance Center.[1] CINCPAC subsequently concurred with the command arrangements and terms of reference for the JPRC.[2]

However, the JPRC was not established during 1965. At the end of the year CINCPAC was considering establishment of an agency under his operational command to coordinate the recovery of prisoners throughout Southeast Asia.[3]

Courses of Action With Respect to Executions of US Personnel

During November CINCPAC became concerned with the occasional use of terms such as "reprisal" and "retaliation" in official reports of strike operations. Since reprisals and similar measures were prohibited by UN Charter, CINCPAC pointed out to the JCS that US use of such terms could be providing the Government of North Vietnam with a legalistic basis for treating captured US personnel as "war criminals." CINCPAC recommended that such announcements be phrased with care. He further recommended that operations be justified, if required, on the basis of self-defense as authorized by Article 51 of the UN Charter.[4]

Missing or Detained Personnel

The following table indicates the probable status of US personnel missing or detained in Southeast Asia as of 31 December 1965. (C)

Service	Possibly Held by VC	Possibly Held by NVN	Possibly Held by CHICOM	Unknown	Total
Army	45			2	47
Marine Corps	13			6	19
Navy		15		23	38
Air Force	25	32	1	41	99
Total	83	47	1	72	203

1. CINCPAC 172350Z Jul 65 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 032241Z Aug 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC J5112
4. CINCPAC 222306Z Nov 65 (S)

[redacted]



Military Personnel Strength in Southeast Asia

The build-up of US military personnel strength in South Vietnam during 1965 was as follows:[4]

SERVICE	31 MARCH	30 JUNE	30 SEPT	31 DEC
Army	15,588	27,350	76,178	116,755
Navy	1,271	3,756	5,771	8,446
USMC	4,721	18,112	36,442	38,190
USAF	7,527	10,703	13,637	20,620
USCG			268	303
TOTAL	29,107	59,921	132,296	184,314

The military personnel strength in South Vietnam and Thailand is shown in the accompanying illustration. (C)

[redacted]

4. Strength Reports - Vietnam (CINCPAC RCS 5314-1)

[redacted]

U.S. FORCES IN--

REPUBLIC of VIETNAM

COMUSMACV	
ARMY	6182
NAVY	769
USMC	154
USAF	710
UNITS	
ARMY	110,326
NAVY	6,460
USMC	38,017
USAF	19,820
USCG	303
R and D	12
COMB ST	5
SOG	379
HSAS	1,095
SS DET	41
DOD REP	41
TOTAL	184,314

SOURCE: COMUSMACV 31 DEC 65

THAILAND

UNITS	
ARMY	4,210
NAVY	96
USMC	14
USAF	9,080
DEPUTY	
COMUSMACTHAI	72
JUSMAG	573
DEP CHJUSMAG	113
SEATO	60
R and D	27
TOTAL	14,245

SOURCE: COMUSMACTHAI 31 DEC 65

GRAND TOTAL 198,559

[redacted]

Casualties 1965

The number of United States casualties during 1965 are indicated in the accompanying tables.

US Casualties in RVN During 1959

The following US casualties[1] occurred during a VC attack on RVN 7th Infantry Division US advisor billets at Bien Hoa in July 1959.[2] (U)

Killed in Action[3] 2
Wounded in Action[4] 1

Expansion of COMUSMACV Rest and Recreation (R&R) Program

In August COMUSMACV requested authority to expand the R&R program to include Bangkok, Penang, Singapore, Manila and Hong Kong. He further requested that the program be similar to that used during the Korean conflict, i.e., R&R not chargeable as leave and with quarters and meals in the R&R area provided at little or no expense to the individual.[5]

Initial CINCPAC investigation indicated that Singapore and Penang were unsuitable because of political problems, and Hong Kong officials placed extreme limitations on use of that area by personnel coming from South Vietnam. Bangkok and Manila presented limited possibilities but the Ryukyus Islands were deemed inadequate. However, Taiwan and Tokyo appeared to be suitable.[6]

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1. Not reported in previous editions of this history. See CINCPAC Command History, 1964 p. 310 for 1960-1964 casualties.
2. "Time," 20 Jul 59; USARPAC Intelligence Bulletin, Jun 65 (C), p. 13, col 1.
3. Master Sergeant Chester Ovnand, USA; Major Dale Buis, USA.
4. Capt Howard Boston, USA.
5. COMUSMACV 27644/070259Z Aug 65 (S)
6. AUSARMA Singapore 170700Z Aug 65 (S); USDAO KUALALUMPUR 200910Z Aug 65 (S); AMEMB BANGKOK 140704Z Aug 65 (S); CINCPACREP PHIL 211529Z Sep 65; AMCONGEN HONG KONG 230321Z Aug 65 (S); CINCPACREP RYUKYUS 240535Z Sep 65 (S); COMUSTDC 170832Z Sep 65 ; COMUSJAPAN 140030Z Sep 65 (S)

[redacted]

US KILLED IN ACTION 1965

OPERATING FORCES

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
ARMY	1	39	2	20	6	35	21	10	48	103	423	151	859
MARINE CORP	0	0	5	2	12	13	24	70	40	51	20	98	335
AIR FORCE	0	2	2	5	0	12	5	3	0	5	3	5	42
NAVY	0	1	3	2	2	2	4	5	5	14	5	6	49
TOTAL	1	42	12	29	20	62	54	88	93	173	451	260	1285

ADVISORS

GRAND TOTAL : 1389

ARMY	12	5	0	6	15	20	9	3	2	8	4	9	93
MARINE CORP	0	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	7
AIR FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
NAVY	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3
TOTAL	12	7	0	9	16	21	9	3	2	9	4	12	104

[redacted]

US WOUNDED IN ACTION 1965

OPERATING FORCES

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
ARMY	36	329	88	78	115	170	128	106	170	523	1029	705	3477
MARINE CORP	0	2	22	20	70	61	148	323	40	259	281	490	1716
AIR FORCE	4	4	6	5	22	30	13	6	4	16	4	40	154
NAVY	0	0	6	0	0	1	10	54	1	6	81	62	221
TOTAL	40	335	122	103	207	262	299	489	215	804	1395	1297	5568

ADVISORS

GRAND TOTAL : 5984

ARMY	29	34	7	8	51	55	27	22	38	38	37	61	407
MARINE CORP	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	5
AIR FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
NAVY	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	3
TOTAL	30	36	7	8	51	55	28	22	40	38	38	63	416

[redacted]

On 3 September CINCPAC responded to a JCS request for information on the status of the expansion.[1] After considering CINCPAC's remarks the JCS stated their belief that a major expansion of the R&R program was neither feasible nor desirable. Nevertheless, CINCPAC recommended a concept for expanding the program.[2]

Meanwhile, CINCPAC had proposed three plans to COMUSMACV[3] who indicated that parts of each plan had merit but that none could be considered adequate to meet his needs. COMUSMACV, therefore, requested a meeting in Saigon with CINCPAC representatives to develop a program.[4]

Ultimately, a CINCPAC R&R Team consisting of CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC representatives visited each of the proposed R&R areas and Saigon. As a result of this visit it was concluded that a suitable program could be developed by using Manila, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Tokyo. On 3 November the JCS approved CINCPAC's concept for expanding the R&R program and on 5 November CINCPAC dispatched an implementing message for expanding the program to Taipei, Japan and the Philippines.[5]

The implementing plan indicated that theater airlift would be used to support R&R where necessary, and it did not provide for initial use of MATS airlift. Later investigation confirmed that theater airlift was inadequate to support R&R, and on 19 November the expanded program was limited to that supportable by aircraft available to COMUSMACV.[6]

On Thanksgiving day the first R&R flight left RVN for Taiwan. From then through the end of the year approximately 65 personnel arrived and departed every five days.[7] The number of personnel visiting Japan was limited to the passenger capability of the daily flight

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1. CINCPAC 032325Z Sep 65 (S)
2. CINCPAC 220445Z Sep 65 (U)
3. CINCPAC 051905Z Sep 65 (S)
4. COMUSMACV 31703/091458Z Sep 65 (S)
5. CINCPAC 050034Z Nov 65 (S)
6. CINCPAC 190325Z Nov 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

carrying "Stars and Stripes" to South Vietnam. Travel to the Philippines was not initiated because of disagreement on entrance requirements for R&R personnel.[1]

At the end of the year the area limitations had been overcome, but there had been only a small increase in the number of R&R personnel. The limiting factor was transportation, and CINCPAC had requested additional airlift.[2]

Inflation Countermeasures, South Vietnam

The rapid buildup of US forces in South Vietnam disrupted the local economy by creating shortages in retail goods and services. The resultant inflationary trend was resented by the civilian population.

CINCPAC recommended to the JCS prompt establishment of branch and field exchanges to provide retail sources for US personnel separate from the civil economy. Countermeasures suggested for COMUSMACV's consideration included use of military payment certificates (MPC); establishment of US controlled recreational activities; and cooperation with United States Operations Mission (USOM) to counteract the detrimental effects on the civil economy.[4] (C)

Several of the above actions were undertaken to include the introduction of military payment certificates (Series 641) into RVN on 31 August 1965. Inflation continued, nevertheless, and was a matter of serious concern and continuing action at the end of the year. (C)

Gifts from Public to US Troops in South Vietnam

The US public donated a tremendous volume of Christmas packages for general distribution to US forces in South Vietnam. To a degree these gifts expressed support for the troops in RVN with the objective of bracing (C)

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1. COMUSTDC Historical Report, CY 65, ser 0025 of 28 Feb 66 (S)
2. CINCPAC 110108Z Nov 65 (C); MANILA UNN to COMUSMACV 290940Z Nov 65 (C)
3. CINCPAC 190324Z Nov 65 (C)
4. CINCPAC 182237Z Sep 65 (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

morale against some of the bitter statements made during debates over US policy in Southeast Asia.

Between 18 November and 9 December Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units delivered over 700,000 pounds of these gifts direct to South Vietnam. An additional 580 measurement tons of gifts were diverted to surface transportation.[1]

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1. CINCPAC 102304Z Nov 65 (C); CINCPAC 140222Z Nov 65 (C); CINCPACAF DOIPA 9431/102318Z Dec 65 (U); CSAF AFSTP 78509/152340Z Dec 65 (U)

[redacted]

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

A

AA	Air America; Anti-Aircraft
AAFV	Australian Army Forces, Vietnam
Abn Bde	Airborne Brigade
ACB	Amphibious Construction Battalions
ACM	Air Chief Marshall
ACNB	Australian Commonwealth Naval Board
ACT	Air Control Team
ACU	Assault Craft Units
AC&W	Aircraft Control and Warning
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
A&E	Architectural and Engineering
AFAK	Armed Forces Assistance to Korea
AFB	Air Force Base
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFSTRIKF	USAF Forces, Strike Command
AGE	Associated Ground Equipment
AID	Agency for International Development
AIF	Automated Intelligence File
ALZ	ARC LIGHT Zones
ANGLICO	Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
ANZAC	Australian-New Zealand (Army Corps)
ANZAM	Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States
APD	High Speed Transport
ARMA	Army Attache
ARPA	Advance Research Projects Agency
ARSTRIKE	Army Forces, Strike Command
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASD/ISA	Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare
ATC	Air Target Chart/Air Traffic Control
ATF	Fleet Ocean Tugs
ATM	Air Target Materials
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network
AWR	Ammunition War Reserve
AWX	All Weather Interceptor

B

BADGE	Base Air Defense Ground Environment (Japan)
BAHT	Thailand Currency
BDL	Beach Discharge Lighter
BE	Bombing Encyclopedia

BLT	Battalion Landing Team
BOD	Beneficial Occupancy Date
BR	Barrel Roll
BRO	Base Requirements Overseas
BTW	Boat Wave

C

CAA	Civil Aviation Agency
CAAG	Civil Aviation Advisory Group
CAF	Chinese Air Force
CART	Cartographic Committee Meeting (SEATO)
CAS	Controlled American Source
CD	Combat Developments
CDSC	Coastal District Surveillance Center
C-E	Communications-Electronics
CG	Civil Guard; Commanding General
CGUSAMC	Commanding General US Army Materiel Command
CGUSARYIS/IXCORPS	Commanding General US Army Ryukyus Island; IX Corps
CHB	Cargo Handling Battalions
CHICOM	Chinese Communists
CHJUSMAGTHAI	Chief Joint US Military Advisory Group, Thailand
CHKMAG	Chief Korea Military Assistance Group
CHMAAG	Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group
CHMEDT	Chief Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma
CHMPO	Chief Military Planning Office
CHNAVADGRU	Chief Naval Advisory Group, Korea
CHWTO	Chief Western Transportation Office
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CINCFES	Commander in Chief Far East Station (British)
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief Pacific Air Force
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
CINCPACREP	Commander in Chief Pacific Representative
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command
CINCSTRIKE	Commander in Chief of the Strike Command
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief United Nations Command
CINCUSARPAC	Commander in Chief United States Army Pacific
CINCUSTAF	Commander in Chief US/Thai Forces
CITG	Current Intelligence Targets Groups
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMPO	Chief of Military Planning Office
CN	Chinese Navy
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COC	CINCPAC Operation Center; Combat Operation Center
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COMNAVFMARIANNAS	Commander Naval Forces, Mariannas
COMNAVFOR	Commander Naval Forces

COMSAT	Civil Communications Satellite
COMSTAFF	Commander, US/Thai Field Forces
COMUSJAPAN	Commander US Forces Japan
COMUSKOREA	Commander US Forces Korea
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander US Military Assistance Command, Thailand
COMUSMACV	Commander US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
COMUSTDC	Commander US Taiwan Defense Command
CONUS	Continental United States
CPFF	Cost-plus-fixed-fee
CPFL	Contingency Planning Facilities Lists
CPRS	CINCPAC Route Slip
CRB	Cam Ranh Bay
CRSFF	Central Region SEATO Field Force
CSAF	Chief of Staff Air Force
CSP	Concurrent Spare Parts
CTF	Commander Task Force
CTG	Commander Task Group
CTSP	Contract Technical Service Personnel
CVA	Attack Aircraft Carrier
CVS	Antisubmarine Support Aircraft Carrier
CY	Calendar Year

D

DA	Department of the Army
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCMPO	Deputy Chief of Military Planning Office
DCS	Defense Communications System
DD	Destroyer
DDG	Guided Missile Destroyer
DE	Destroyer Escort
DEPCH	Deputy Chief
DER	Radar Picket Escort Vessel
DEW	Distant Early Warning
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DLG	Defense Liaison Group
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North)

E

E&E	Escape and Evasion or Evasion and Escape
EASTPAC	Eastern Pacific
ELINT	Electronics Intelligence
EMCP	Emergency Military Construction Program
EW	Early Warning; Electronic Warfare

F

FAA	Federal Aviation Agency
FAC	Forward Air Control/Controller
FAR	Forces Armees du Royaume (Royal Armed Forces of Laos)
FFORCEV	Field Forces Vietnam
FICPAC	Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific
FLF	Friendly Laotian Forces
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FOCCPAC	Fleet Operation Control Center, Pacific
FOS	Follow on Spares
FULRO	Front Unifie de la Lutte de la Race Opprime (United Front for the Struggle of Oppressed Races)
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces

G

GCI	Ground Controlled Intercept
GOP	Government of the Philippines
GP	General Purpose Bomb
GRC	Government of the Republic of China
GVN	Government of the Republic of Vietnam

H

HEDSUPPACT	Headquarters Support Activity
HMAS	Her Majesty's Australian Ship
HQAAFV	Headquarters Australian Army Forces, Vietnam
HSAS	Headquarters Support Activity - Saigon

I

IAC	Intelligence Assessment Committee
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IDCSP	Initial Defense Communications Satellite Project
IPIR	Immediate Photo Interpretation Reports
ISA	International Security Agency
IWCS	Integrated Wideband Communications System

J

JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JMP	Joint Manpower Program
JOG	Joint Operations Graphics
JP-4	Jet Fuel
JPRC	Joint Personnel Recovery Center
JRC	Joint Reconnaissance Center
JSDF	Japan Self Defense Force
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JUSMAG	Joint US Military Advisory Group
JUSPAO	Joint United States Public Affairs Office

K

KIA	Killed in Action
KKK	Khmer Kampuchea Krom
KMAG	United States Army Advisory Group, Korea
KOCO	Korean Oil Corporation
KY-9	Secure Voice Communication

L

LAAM	Light Anti-Aircraft Missile (Bn)
LCM	Mechanized Landing Craft
LCPL	Landing Craft Personnel
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LOC	Lines of Communication
LOG CMD	Logistical Command
LOGIMP	Logistic Improvement Program
LPD	Landing Platform, Deck
LPH	Landing Platform Helicopter
LST	Landing Ship Tank

M

MA	Military Assistance
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAAMA	Middletown Air Material Area
MAB	Marine Amphibious Brigade
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MAG	Marine Air Group
MAM	Military Assistance Manual
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MAS	Military Assistance Sales
MASL	Military Assistance Program Articles & Services List
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MAW	Marine Air Wing
MBA	Military Base Agreement
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MDB	Mutual Defense Board (US - Philippines)
MDRC	Manual Data Relay Center
MEDT	Military Equipment Delivery Team (Burma)
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MIA	Manila International Airport; Missing in Action
MICS	Military Integrated Communications System
MIDPAC	Middle Pacific
MILAD	Military Advisor (to SEATO or ANZUS Council)
MILADREP	Military Advisors Representative
MILTAG	Military Technical Advisory Group (Indonesia)
MILTELCOMM	Military Telecommunications
MOC	Ministry of Communications
MPC	Military Payment Certificate
MPO	Military Planning Office (SEATO)

MS	Minesweepers
MSF	Fleet Minesweeper
MSO	Ocean Minesweepers
MSR	Main Supply Route
MSTS	Military Sea Transport Service
MTMTS	Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service
MTT	Mobile Training Team

N

NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVADGRU	Naval Advisory Group
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NLF	National Liberation Front (Communist in SVN)
NMCB	Naval Mobile Construction Battalion
NOG	National Security Agency, Pacific Operations Group
NORS	Non-Operational Ready Supplies
NSA	National Security Agency
NSAPAC	National Security Agency Pacific
NSTL	National Strategic Target List
NVA	North Vietnam Army
NVN	North Vietnam
NZ	New Zealand

O

ODDR&E	Office of Director Defense Research and Engineering
ODMA	Office of the Director of Military Assistance
OICC	Officer in Charge of Construction
OICC SEA	Officer in Charge of Construction Southeast Asia
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OSAD (I&L)	Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)
OSD	Office of Secretary of Defense
OUSAIRMA	Office of US Air Attache
OUSARMA	Office of US Army Attache

P

PA	Public Affairs
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACFLT	Pacific Fleet
PACOM	Pacific Command
PAF	Philippine Air Force
PCE	Submarine Chaser Escort
PCF	Patrol Craft Fast
PCH&T	Packing, Crating, Handling and Transportation

PCP	Program Change Proposals; Program Change Procedure
PCS	Submarine Chaser
PEG	Performance Evaluation Group
PF	Popular Force
PGM	Motor Gunboat
PIRRB	Photo Intelligence Requirements Review Board
PL	Pathet Lao
PL-VM	Pathet Lao - Viet Minh
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
PT	Patrol Boat

Q

QM	Quartermaster

R

R&D	Research and Development
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAR	Royal Australian Regiment
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
RDT&E	Research, Development, Test and Engineering
RF	Regional Force
RGUB	Revolutionary Government-Union of Burma
RLAF	Royal Laotian Air Force
RLG	Royal Laotian Government; Regional Liaison Group
RLT	Regimental Landing Team; Rolling Liquid Transporter
ROC	Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army
ROKAF	Republic of Korea Air Force
ROKDTF	Republic of Korea Division Task Force
ROKF	Republic of Korea Forces
ROKFV	Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam
ROKG	Republic of Korea Government
RO/RO	Roll on, roll off
RTA	Royal Thailand Army
RTAF	Royal Thailand Air Forces
RTG	Royal Thailand Government
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

S

SAAMA	San Antonio Air Materiel Area
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAM	Surface-to-air missile

SAR	Search and Rescue
SATS	Short Airfield Tactical System
SEACOORD	Coordinating Committee for US Missions Southeast Asia
SEAP	SEATO Military Publication
SEASIA	Southeast Asia
SEASTAG	SEATO Standardization Agreement
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SHOULDER	A maneuver by a vessel to force right-of-way (physical block)
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
SL	STEEL TIGER
SLF	Special Landing Force
SMPO	SEATO Military Planning Office
SMRIS	Soviet Missile Range Instrumented Ship
SOC	Squadron Operations Center
SOCPAC	Special Operations Center Pacific Command
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SPDHF	Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire
STAT	Seabee Technical Assistance Team
STOL	Short take-off and Landing
SVN	South Vietnam

T

TACAN	Tactical Air Navigation
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TFS	Tactical Fighter Squadron
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOC	Technical Order Compliance; Tactical Operations Center
TOR	Terms of Reference
TOT	Telephone Organization Thailand; Time on Target
TSN	Tan Son Nhut Air Field
TTI	Tactical Target Illustrations
TTM	Tactical Target Materials

U

UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USAIRA	United States Air Attache
USALCJ	US Army Logistics Center Japan
USAMC	US Army Materiel Command
USARSCV	US Army Support Command Vietnam
USARV	US Army, Vietnam
USARYIS	United States Army Ryukyus Islands

USASCC	United Stations Army Strategic Communication Command
USASGV	United States Army Support Group Vietnam
USATFA	US Army Task Force ALFA
USCINCEUR	US Commande in Chief, Europe
USFK	United States Forces Korea
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USMILADREP	United States Military Advisor's Representative
USN	United States Navy
USOM	United States Operations Mission
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USTAF	US/Thai Forces
UW	Unconventional Warfare

V

VC	Viet Cong
VDC	Volunteer Defense Corps (Thailand)
VHF	Very High Frequency
VM	Viet Minh
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VNN	Vietnamese Navy
VOCOM	Voice Communications

W

WAMTMTS	Western Area Military Traffic Management and Terminal Services
WECO	Western Electric Company
WESTPAC	Western Pacific
WIA	Wounded in Action
WPB	Coast Guard Cutter (82')
WRM	War Reserve Mobilization
WSEG	Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
WTO	Western Pacific Transportation Office

Y

YOG	Gasoline Barge (Self-propelled)

INDEX

CINCPAC COMMAND HISTORY 1965

NOTE:

Detach and destroy this page when pages 605-685 are inserted in the Command History.

Copy No. 65 of 65 copies

Enclosure (1)

[redacted]

I N D E X

This index to CINCPAC COMMAND HISTORY 1965 includes Volume I and II published by CINCPAC, and Annexes "A" and "B" published by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI respectively. Pagination of Volumes I and II is consecutive from page 1 through page 685. The pages of each Annex are numbered consecutively beginning with page 1. The following sample entry refers to page 43 in the Volume I/II series; page 43 in Annex A; pages 43, 89 and 100 in Annex B; and Appendix B of Annex A.

43; A-43; B-43, 89, 100; B app A

* * *

ABLE MABLE, Intelligence, photo recce, 433
ADISORN I, Special Forces training in Thailand, B-129
Advanced Research Projects Agency-Project Agile, 484; A-439; B-51
Agreements, see Negotiations and Agreements
Air America, see Laos
Airborne Command Post, CINCPAC command facilities, 30-32
Air Defense, see specific country
Air Traffic Control in Philippines, 246
Aircraft, see also specific country
Aircraft,
- B-57, ordnance, 387
- C-47s, for psychological operations, 511
- C-120, squadron from CONUS to Okinawa, 320
- C-124, 573
- C-124, squadron from CONUS to Tachikawa, 320
- C-130,
  - evacuation of US non-combatants Pakistan, 576
  - leaflet drops, 515
  - overcommitted for FY 65, 286
  - theater increases, 573
- C-135, squadron conversion to C-141, 286
- C-141, conversion and airlift lag, 286
- F-4C,
  - destroyed by SAM in July, 377
  - ordnance, 387
- F-5 program,
  - interrelationship of PACOM inputs; 107
  - theater requirements, 107
- F-100, ordnance, 387
- F-105,
  - leaflet drops, 515
  - ordnance, 387
- FC-47,
  - rules for operations, 412

[redacted]

[redacted]

combat losses, A-309
Alaska,
AF tropo scatter systems shifted to RVN, 521
Alaska Barge and Transport, Inc., 563; A-121
Ammunition, see also Ordnance
SALTSHAKER withdrawals for Laos, 577
storage in Okinawa, 2
theater requirements, 576-578
Antisubmarine Warfare Group,
transit of Sea of Japan, 41
ANZAM, 219
Joint Planning Committee Meeting, 219
ANZUS,
Council Meeting, 214
ARC LIGHT, SAC B-52 strikes, 424-433
Armed Forces Radio, 485
Armstrong, Seaman Apprentice, 225
Atienza, General, 245
Attempted Defection, 225
Australia, see also SEATO
1st Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, 459
air target materials conference, 43
Australian Army Forces Vietnam, 459
formal clearance required for Philippines, 243
four power talks, 219
FWMAF for RVN, 457-460, 468; A-71
command relations, 460
public opposition, 459
HMAS DUCHESS, 245
HMAS SYDNEY, 245
HMAS VENDETTA, 245
military leaders tour participation, 248
SEA HORSE exercise participation, 205
Status of Forces Agreement, 228
strategic priorities, 34
Australian Commonwealth Naval Board, 245
Automatic Data Processing,
OPLANS, 53

B

BANGO,

Base Development, see also specific country
ammunition storage facility Okinawa, 20
CINCPAC role,
JCS decision to expand, 529
concept,
for RVN requirements, 287

[redacted]

[redacted]

construction,
Emergency Military Construction Program,
approved, 541
personnel,
requirement conflicts, 543
priority list, 541
theater program, 530
Facilities Section in J4 Division,
established, 30, 529
INSTR 11010.1C,
promulgated, 531
jet airfield Okinawa, 2
OSD decision on service funding, 529
planning, 30
April conference, 541
Base Survey,
of National Security Planning, 21
Base Utilization Regional Survey Report, 22
Bechtel Corporation,
Thailand POL pipeline contract, 567
Bennett, Captain, 588
Blair, Ambassador, 163, 229, 231, 245
BLUE EAGLE see Airborne Command Post
BLUE SPRINGS, intelligence photo recce of Communist China, NVN and Laos by SAC drones, 433
BLUE TREE, intelligence photo recce of NVN, 431
Bohlen-Serrano Agreement, 238ff
Bonin Islands,
visits of former residents, 221
Border,
China/North Vietnam, 516
Brevie Line,
border with RVN, 440, 441
Brown, Ambassador, 227
Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State, 248
Burma,
contingency plan, 278
deviation request to shift from training to material, 182
F-5 purchase inquiry, 114
Military Assistance Program, 181
cargo delay in Thailand, 183
CINCPAC FY 66 and FY 67, 73
dollar ceilings, FY 66, 78
dollar ceilings, FY 66 to FY 71, 60
reduction to spares and equipment, 73
support levels, 180
suspension of training, 182
Presidential Determination of FY 65, 180
Sidewinder missile inquiry, 114
small craft considered, 118
US Army continued responsible for MEDT, 183

[redacted]

Byroade, Ambassador, 180

C

Cambodia, 436
avoidance of US violation of airspace, 338
Brevie Line border with RVN, 440, 444
escape and evasion charts, 584
MARKET TIME rules of engagement, 442
Mekong River, 445
photographic reconnaissance, 433
policy on air strikes, 412
Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire, 585
strikes by B-52s disapproved, 429
Camp Smith,
deployment planning conference, 308
Canada,
air target materials conference, 43
RVN aid, A-353
Cang, Rear Admiral, 438
CARE, A-256
RVN logistics, 548
Catholic Relief Services, A-256
Cease-Fire,
casualties during truce, 384
Censorship, see Public Affairs, press
Central Intelligence Agency,
CAS, 330, 548; A-62, 244-248, 249, 402, 406, 458
pacification role,
clarified, A-245
People's Action Teams,
proposal approved, A-403
Chae, General,
agreement with MACV, 316
Chaing, Minister of Defense, 153
CHATTAHOOCHEE, tanker, 570
Chemicals,
crop destruction, 466
Chichi Jima, 222
China Sea, 206
Russian SIGINT trawlers harass US carriers, 448
Chitti, General, B-37
CINCPAC, see also SEATO, MAP
air operations ad hoc study group,
established, 328
ANZUS Council Meeting attended, 215
B-52 strike operations,
effort to decentralize, 427
BARREL ROLL,
recommendation, 397
target selection recommendation, 398

[redacted]

CINCPAC - cont'd

BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER
Frag Order of 10 Oct on bombing thru overcast, 408
Cambodia air strike policy, 412
Chief of Staff, 28
collective defense arrangements,
participation in, 218
command facilities,
airborne command post, 30
BLUE EAGLE team kits, 32
commencement of continuous watch, 31
dispersed operating sites, 32
ground facility, 31
AUTODIN subscriber terminal, 33
command center, 33
funding, 34
communication modernization, 33
Kunia project abandoned, 33
training, 31
training with Strategic Air Command ACP, 32
UHF communications, 32
concept of operations,
against CHICOM, 303
deployments,
to Thailand,
recommended, 284
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, 28
force,
ground reserves depleted, 279
ground reserve of PACOM, A-422
Marine forward reserve, 455
requirement,
additional for Phase I, 297
anticipated at end of CY 66, 311
for CY 66, 308
JCS proposed deployments, 279
PACOM reserve augmentation in lieu of 25th Division, 308
phase II in RVN, 310
ROK Division Task Force, 309
four power arrangement,
opposition to, 217
funding problem, 26
Indonesia/Malaysia dispute,
contingency plan, 214
Joint Reconnaissance Center, 434
Laos helicopter requirements,
proposal, 505
leaflet operation,
authority resolved, 514
manpower,
Joint Manpower Program, 29

[redacted]

[redacted]

personnel strengths, 1
requirements, 29
survey by JCS, 26
political-military activities, 213-248
Public Affairs Office, 29
augmentation, 56
Research and Development,
Instruction 03690.2, 484
ROLLING THUNDER,
moderate level effectiveness
questioned, 377
RVN automatic telephone system plan, 525
RVNAF increases supported, 480
Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire,
recommendation, 586
staff,
J02,
ROLLING THUNDER planning staff, 339
J2,
Photo Intelligence Requirements Review Board,
established, 434
Target Planning Review Group,
formed to coordinated ROLLING THUNDER, 339
Target Systems Analysis Section, 339
J4 division,
Facilities Section,
emergency construction plan, 530
Facilities Section,
formed for planning and programming base
development, 30, 529
Battle Staff,
augmentation for NVN air operations, 33, 339
meteorologist, 26
Operations Division,
Special Operations Center, Pacific,
established on Okinawa, 518
organization, 26
PACOM Movements Priorities Control Agency,
established, 556
Special Intelligence Communications Section,
transferred to CINCPAC, 28
Special Security Office,
reorganized, 28
unconventional warfare planning agency,
established, 516
STEEL TIGER,
rainy season tactics, 406
STEEL TIGER effectiveness,
improvement, 407
Thai passport requirements, 213

[redacted]

[redacted]

UK defense commitments, 216
CINCPACREP,
Ryukyus, 20
Civic Action, see specific country civil affairs, psychological operations
Civilian,
dependents,
evacuated from RVN, 323; A-425
legal jurisdiction, 225
of 173d Abn Bde leave Okinawa, 457
strength, 1
employees,
delays in filling positions, 26
legal jurisdiction, 225
evacuation from Pakistan, 576
non-combatant casualties,
effort to minimize, 408, 466
Clark Air Base, 305, 571, 573
airlift through, 240
land release, 239
saturation level approached, 286
Collins, Major General, A-35
appointed MACV naval component commander, 312, 455
Combat Developments, see Research and Developments
Command and Control, see also Command Relations
alerting/conferencing capability, 45
Command Relations,
2nd Air Division, 283, A-48
delegated authority of PACAF, 275; A-48; B-23
Thai air bases transferred to 13th AF, A-50; B 23-25
9th Logistics Command in Thailand, 285
13th Air Force in NVN, 283
III MEF in RVN, 283; A-97
agreements,
Hawaii, A-98
MARKET TIME, A-100
Air Force in Thailand,
Deputy Commander 2/13-Thai,
PACAF designated single representative, 315; B-23
represents 2nd Air Division, 315; B-23
represents 13th Air Force, 315; B-23
Australian Army Forces Vietnam, 284, 460; A-361
BARREL ROLL coordination problems, 399
changes in SEAsia, 312-316
CINCPAC,
operational control of ROLLING THUNDER, 328
CINCPAC in RVN, 283
CINCPAC recommended separation of MACTHAI and MACV, 285; A-1
Deputy COMUSMACTHAI, 285
Deputy COMUSMACV,
2nd Air Div commander appointed, A-92

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A= A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

[redacted]

CINCPAC view, A-92
FACT SHEET leaflet operations, 514
lighterage/stevedoring RVN, 562
MACTHAI,
consolidation of MACTHAI/MAGTHAI headquarters, 314; A-102; B-21, 27-34
MAP as key issue, B-29
responsibility for contingency planning in Laos, 312
MACV, 283; A-90-103, 276, 277, 298, 299, 300
III Marine Amphibious Force,
established, 312
advisory function placed under tactical ground command, A-99
appointed CGUSARV, 313; A-96
authority for VNAF/FARMGATE air attacks, 275
BARREL ROLL, 408
CAS, A-406
Combat, Operations Center,
establishment approved by JCS, 315; A-95
Deputy Commander for Air Operations,
assigned, 313, A-92
directed to relinquish operational control of mainland air forces to PACAF for FLAMING DART, 322
Field Forces, Vietnam, A-42
designated, 314
joint service imbalance, A-93, 274
JUSPAO, A-405
MACTHAI separated, 285, 313; A-102, B-21
opposition to component/joint command, A-96
Naval Advisory Group, 314; A-99
Naval Component Commander,
designated, 312
responsibility for BARREL ROLL operations, 390-393
responsibility for MARKET TIME shifted from PACFLT to MACV, 314
ROLLING THUNDER, 327
USAID, A-405
US Army Task Force ALFA,
established, 314; A-41, 98
redesignated Field Force, Vietnam, A-42
USARSCV redesignated US Army, Vietnam, 313
US Navy, Marines, Coast Guard, A-99
VNAF,
combined command,
not desired by Vietnam, A-101
informal operational control, 328; A-100
MACV advisory teams,
Special Forces/advisor control, A-77
MARKET TIME, 314, 440, 443

[redacted]

[redacted]

NAVGP command of TF 115, A-88
New Zealand force in RVN, 284; A-362
Operational Control of MARKET TIME,
7th FLT to MACV, 443
PACAF,
coordination authority for PACFLT/MACV operational forces,
requests air chain of command use for BARREL ROLL, 392
Thailand, 286; B-23
PACFLT,
RVN, 283
People's Action Teams, A-403
Philippine contingent,
lack of working agreement, 161; A-368
photographic reconnaissance control, 433
Provincial Team Chief,
trial and evaluation A-404
ROK FWMAF, 284, 471; A-364
informal agreement, 316, A-366
ROLLING THUNDER strike and armed recce, 327
RVN armed forces, 284
SAR responsibility in Laos, 503
US Army Task Force Alpha,
established, 464; A-98
US Army Vietnam, A-96
reports directly to ARPAC, 313
Communications,
authentication equipment, 53
AUTODIN requirement, 44
automatic message retrieval, 47
Automatic Secure Voice Communications, 45
BACK PORCH conflict with Tactical Air Navigation channels, 52
BACK PORCH Tropo System frequency requirements, 52
Clark-Saigon submarine cable, 522; A-379
command and control, 44
command and control alerting/conferencing capability, 45
common user teletype relays,
Nha Trang and Korat additions, 524; B-96
Communications Satellite Corporation, 51
use for wide band restoral, 522
Defense Communications Agency,
agreement with PACFLT on USS ANNAPOLIS frequencies, 52
conference sponsored in Hawaii in Dec, 521
proposal to use IDCSP and COMSAT, 522
requested to prepare automatic telephone system plan, 525
electrical message management program, 47
electronics data for OPLANS, 53
frequency management, 51
GEMINI frequency coordination, 51
improved navigation system SEAsia,
requirement, 525

[redacted]

[redacted]

Communications - cont'd

Initial Defense Communications Satellite,
AN/MSC-46 ground stations,
deployed to RVN, 522; B-98
future capabilities 523; B-98
use for wide band restoral, 522; B-98
Integrated Wide Band Systems,
restoral,
CINCPAC plan, 522
DCA proposal, 522
use of communications satellites, 522
integration SEAsia automatic telephone,
MACV proposal, 525
joint/combined authenticator, 53
Joint Pacific net, 524
manual data relay center,
Nha Trang and Bangkok additions, 524
message center workload, 46
PACAF (PAFCO) net, 524
synchronous satellite (SYNCOM II/III),
Asmara terminal sent to Saigon, 524
Hawaii-Saigon link operational, 524; A-378
transportable terminal in Saigon,
sent to Bang Ping, 524
tested, 524
teleconference facility modernization, 47
Trans-Pacific submarine cable, 522
US Army Strategic Communications Command,
tasked to prepare wide band TPO, 520
Communications Satellite Corporation,
receiver site at Paumalu, Oahu, 52

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

COMNAVMARIANAS,
recommended against future Japanese visits, 222
Conferences, see also SEATO
C&E personnel requirements (Apr, Aug, Oct in Hawaii), 527
communications (Nov),
CINCPAC/MACV, A-388
communications (Dec in Hawaii),
DCA sponsored, 521
escape and evasion (Dec/Hawaii), 583
MACV commanders,
pacification program, A-242
planning (Oct in Hawaii), 298, 306
planning (Nov in Saigon), 308
planning (Mar in Hawaii),
Australia/New Zealand for FWMAF, 458
planning (Apr in Hawaii),
base development, 541
Cam Ranh Bay, 532
deployment, A-48
logistics, 453, A-39
ROKDTF, 470
Thailand, 285
planning (Aug in Hawaii),
deployment,
priorities, 293
decision date, 294; A-42
ROKDTF, 294
schedule slippage, 294
planning (Oct in Hawaii),
deployments,
phase II, A-44
planning (Nov SecDef),
deployment,
phase II and IIA, A-52
planning (Dec in Hawaii),
deployment, 308; A-52
planning (Oct in Hawaii),
importance of momentum, 307
planning (Sept in Saigon),
MACV operations concept, 295
planning (Apr in Hawaii),
MARKET TIME, 438
operations concept RVN/Thai, 280

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

[redacted]

planning (Aug in Hawaii),
port capacity Saigon, 294
planning (Mar in Saigon),
US/VNAF naval anti-infiltration, 436
public affairs (Mar in Hawaii),
RVN information policy, 54
research and development (Mar in Hawaii), 483
research and development (Aug in Hawaii), 485
SEACOORD (Jan in Saigon),
Laos air operations,
evaluated, 393
recommendations, 393
SEACOORD (Mar at Udorn), 402
Laos air operations,
evaluated, 402
SEACOORD (July in Bangkok), 292, 494
concern about security of US personnel and facilities, 481
continuation of Thai/US Special Forces operations planning, 292
infiltration reexamined, 292
need for combat-ready Thai forces in Mekong, 292
reconnaissance increase in Southern Laos, 292
Thai MAP revitalization, 292
target (Feb in Washington),
materials, 43
target (Mar in Hawaii),
assignment of responsibilities, 413
target (May in Hawaii),
SAC assignment & coordination, 424
Construction, see also Base Development
adequacy of prepositioned material studied, 277
base developments in RVN, 535, 540
base developments in Thailand, 544
MAP funds/approved, 276
stockpile of material and equipment, 276
Contingency Coordinating Committee,
established in Washington, 214
Corps Propaganda Support Center, MACV, 512
COSSATOT, tanker, 570

D

Dawee, Air Chief Marshal, 493; B-27, 89
objections to tactical POL pipeline, 565
Defense Communications Agency, 52, 520, 522, 525; B-98
Defense Intelligence Agency, 580; A-246, 458
pacification program evaluation, A-246
photo recce monthly summaries, 435
target numbering/identification, 584
tasked to produce escape and evasion charts, 583

[redacted]

[redacted]



COMNAVMARIANAS,
recommended against future Japanese visits, 222
Conferences, see also SEATO
C&E personnel requirements (Apr, Aug, Oct in Hawaii), 527
communications (Nov),
CINCPAC/MACV, A-388
communications (Dec in Hawaii),
DCA sponsored, 521
escape and evasion (Dec/Hawaii), 583
MACV commanders,
pacification program, A-242
planning (Oct in Hawaii), 298, 306
planning (Nov in Saigon), 308
planning (Mar in Hawaii),
Australia/New Zealand for FWMAF, 458
planning (Apr in Hawaii),
base development, 541
Cam Ranh Bay, 532
deployment, A-48
logistics, 453, A-39
ROKDTF, 470
Thailand, 285
planning (Aug in Hawaii),
deployment,
priorities, 293
decision date, 294; A-42
ROKDTF, 294
schedule slippage, 294
planning (Oct in Hawaii),
deployments,
phase II, A-44
planning (Nov SecDef),
deployment,
phase II and IIA, A-52
planning (Dec in Hawaii),
deployment, 308; A-52
planning (Oct in Hawaii),
importance of momentum, 307
planning (Sept in Saigon),
MACV operations concept, 295
planning (Apr in Hawaii),
MARKET TIME, 438
operations concept RVN/Thai, 280

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; II 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

[redacted]

planning (Aug in Hawaii),
port capacity Saigon, 294
planning (Mar in Saigon),
US/VNAF naval anti-infiltration, 436
public affairs (Mar in Hawaii),
RVN information policy, 54
research and development (Mar in Hawaii), 483
research and development (Aug in Hawaii), 485
SEACOORD (Jan in Saigon),
Laos air operations,
evaluated, 393
recommendations, 393
SEACOORD (Mar at Udorn), 402
Laos air operations,
evaluated, 402
SEACOORD (July in Bangkok), 292, 494
concern about security of US personnel and facilities, 481
continuation of Thai/US Special Forces operations planning, 292
infiltration reexamined, 292
need for combat-ready Thai forces in Mekong, 292
reconnaissance increase in Southern Laos, 292
Thai MAP revitalization, 292
target (Feb in Washington),
materials, 43
target (Mar in Hawaii),
assignment of responsibilities, 413
target (May in Hawaii),
SAC assignment & coordination, 424
Construction, see also Base Development
adequacy of prepositioned material studied, 277
base developments in RVN, 535, 540
base developments in Thailand, 544
MAP funds/approved, 276
stockpile of material and equipment, 276
Contingency Coordinating Committee,
established in Washington, 214
Corps Propaganda Support Center, MACV, 512
COSSATOT, tanker, 570

D

Dawee, Air Chief Marshal, 493; B-27, 89
objections to tactical POL pipeline, 565
Defense Communications Agency, 52, 520, 522, 525; B-98
Defense Intelligence Agency, 580; A-246, 458
pacification program evaluation, A-246
photo recce monthly summaries, 435
target numbering/identification, 584
tasked to produce escape and evasion charts, 583

[redacted]

Defense Liaison Group,
activated in Indonesia, 174
Department of Defense,
A-1 and B-57 aircraft considered for RVN, 482
approval of CINCPAC plan for Laos helicopters, 505
BARREL ROLL target selection proposal, 398
CHICOM target list requested, 277
confirms authority for use of riot control agents in RVN, 223
deployment schedules established, A-52
FLAGPOLE RVN shortage reports initiated, 579
MARKET TIME improvement, A-55
real estate acquisition policy, 539
redistributable property transfer to US forces, 579
SAC B-52 strikes, 425
service funding of construction, 529
shopping list requested from MACV, 293
Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire, 585
Thailand S-2A aircraft approved, B-83
Department of State, see also US Mission Council, Saigon,
ANZUS Council Meeting, 214
conduct of Status of Forces negotiations, 226
decision on Laos SAR, 504
deployment discussion 20 April, 288; A-40
deployment of aircraft requested of Thai Gov't, A-51
effort to reduce inflationary effect of RVN construction, A-22
evacuation of US non-combatants, ELDER BLOW, 576
NATO-German SOFA formula introduced, 236
policy on Republic of China combat troops in RVN, A-371
prisoner of war release efforts in RVN, A-430
reservations on four power talks, 220
strike coordination prior to execution, 426
substitution of 173d for 9th MEB, A-31
suspension of NVN bombing, 384
Dependents,
evacuated from Vietnam, 323
legal jurisdiction over, 225
of 173d Airborne Brigade leave Okinawa, 457
strengths, 1
Deployments,
CINCPAC,
April proposal, 281
coordinated plan for 1965-66, 293
priority list, 308
recommended force to Thailand, 284
December planning conference in Hawaii, 308

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

Deployments - cont'd

decision for build-up, A-29
depletion of PACOM reserves, A-36
discussed 20 April by Ambassador, JCS, CINCPAC and MACV, 288; A-40
force augmentation to deter NVN/CHICOM reaction from FLAMING DART, 319
FWMAF to RVN, 34, 161, 472, 457, 581; A-71, 74, 291, 353-373
  Australia,
    Australian Armed Forces Vietnam, 449, 457-460, 468; A-71, 353, 358
    1st Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, 459
  New Zealand Artillery, 161st Battery, 457-460; A-71, 354, 361
  Philippines, 161-164; A-73, 368
  ROK, 121, 282, 309, 449, 468, 472; A-72, 353, 363-368
    2nd Korean Marine Brigade, 472
    Capital (Tiger) Division, 472, 474
  Thailand, A-73, 354, 372, B-84
Hawk site priorities in RVN, A-53
JCS recommended force to Thailand, A-37
MACV re-evaluation of requirements, A-33
phase II revision, A-45
prior clearance with GVN, A-30
shallow draft shipping to RVN, A-56
US Air Force,
  2nd Air Division,
    augmentation, A-46, 48
    combat support groups, A-50
    dispositions, A-291
  air carrier support squadron to Mactan, 242
  air squadrons, A-51
  Thailand, B-app C
US Army,
  1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile), 314, 457, 467; A-40
  1st Infantry Division, A-469
    2nd Brigade, 462; A-40, 41
    3d Brigade, 468
  25th Division 285, 462; A-44
    accelerated, A-45
    advance party to RVN, 309
    alerted, 462
    contemplated deployment to Thailand, 285
  101st Airborne Division, 57
    1st Brigade, 463; A-40, 41
  173d Airborne Brigade, 283, 319, 456; A-37, 39, 41
    move deferred, 323
  519th MI Battalion, A-466
  538th Eng Const Bn,
    deployed to Korat, 567

[redacted]

[redacted]

704th INTC Detachment, A-467
dispositions in RVN, 311, A-291
helicopter companies, A-38
MP battalion, A-38
psychological operations detachments to RVN, 511
US Coast Guard, A-55
US Marines,
9th Amphibious Brigade, 452, 466
9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, A-30
9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, landing, A-32
III Marine Amphibious Force, 455, 546; A 33-37
dispositions, A-291
III Marine Expeditionary Force, 282; A-29
First Marine Air Wing, 455, 462; A-33, 37
First Marine Brigade, 543
Third Marine Division, 455, 462; A-34
Battalion Landing Team, 453, A-33
EASTPAC to WESTPAC, 455
F-4 squadron, 454; A-33
Hawaii forward reserve, 455
helicopter squadron, 462; A-35
Light Antiaircraft Missile Unit, 449; A-30
Marine Air Group, 466; A-33
Special Landing Force, 452, 461, A-30
US Navy,
air and naval gunfire liaison teams, 35, 447, 454; A 176-179
carrier forces, 56, 420, 421
destroyer forces, 35; A-55
US/FWMAF dispositions in RVN, A-291
Deputy JUSMAGTHAI,
Air America conduct of SAR recommended 503
authorized withdrawal from SALTSHAKER, 577
helicopter increase recommended 503
Joint Manpower Program, 580
review of planning responsibilities requested, 312
strength, 589
DESOTO Patrol, 317, 320
cancelled during Kosygin visit, 318
Dhiradhamrong, Special Colonel, 188
Dispositions,
Pacom forces, 2
Distant Early Warning System,
discontinued, 36
DIXIE Station,
CVA support of RVN, 421
Dodd, Senator, A-23
Dominican Republic,
PACOM contingency forces required, 456

[redacted]

DONG HAI,
CHICOM munitions ship, 443

E

ELDER BLOW, evacuation of US non-combatants, 576
Electronic Equipment,
AN/MRC-98 tropo scatter systems, 521
AN/MSC-44 SYNCOM terminal, 524
AN/MSC-45 SYNCOM terminal, 524
AN/MSC-46 IDCSP ground stations, 522
Decca Chain, 525
LORAN, model C/D, 526
ELUSIVE ELK, see Intelligence collection
Escape and Evasion,
charts,
DIA development task, 583
Easterbrook, General, 292; B-5, 21, 119, 121
assumed additional duty as MACTHAI, 313
Thai air defense request, B-38
Ethiopia, Asmara,
IDCSP ground terminal exchange with WESTPAC, 522, 524
Europe,
AF tropo scatter systems shifted to RVN, 521
Executions of US personnel,
CINCPAC recommended courses of action, 587

F

Facilities, see base development
FACT SHEET., leaflet operation in NVN, 513-516
Father Hoa,
guerrilla force, 477
FLAG POLE,
RVN shortage report program, 579
FLAMING DART,
NVN reprisal air strikes, 317-323, 451
Force Requirement, see CINCPAC, force requirement
Fort Knox, 508
Four Power Talks, 219
Fowler, Rear Admiral, 441
France, see also SEATO, France
Brevie Line in RVN, 440, 444
influence among Laotian officers, 508
military leaders tour participation, 248
position in SEATO, 208
RVN assistance, A-353
Free World Military Assistance Forces, see Republic of Vietnam, FWMAF
Friedman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 128
Fulbright, Senator, A-23

[redacted]

G

GAME WARDEN,
river patrol, A-56
GEMINI Project,
frequency coordination, 51
support, 35
Germany,
RVN aid, A-353
Gibson, Deputy Asst SecDef,
recommendation expediting base construction, 551, A-105
Gold Flow, 287
Okinawa, 2
Thailand construction, B-64
Goure, Leon, Dr., 510; A-457
Grandy, Air Chief Marshal, 188, 220, 221
Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, 248
Guam,
base developments,
Emergency Military Construction Program, 542
Guam,
base survey, 22
Guam,
IDCSP ground station moved from Philippines, 523
Guam,
Naval Ship Repair Facility, A-69
Guam,
operation and logistic facilities in support of WESTPAC forces, 305
Guam,
SAC B-52 strikes, 454
Gulf of Siam, 72
Gulf of Thailand, 444

H

Harkins, General,
designated MACTHAI, B-4
FWMAF policy established, A-358
HARVEST MOON, III MAF operation in Quang Tin, 429, A-164
Hasluck, Minister of External Affairs, 214
Hawaii,
Base Utilization Regional Survey Report, 22
concept of abandonment as a base, 23
IDCSP ground station, 522
Kaneohe, 453
Marine forward reserve, 455
Paumalu COMSAT receiver site, 52
Headquarters,
within PACOM, 2
Ho Chi Minh, President, 326

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Holyoake, Prime Minister, 214, 459
Hong Kong, see United Kingdom
Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
reappraisal of Military Assistance Program, 78-84

I

India,
confrontation with Pakistan, 193
declined military leaders tour, 248
Rann of Kutch, 193
Indonesia, B-118
Military Assistance Program, 60, 172-180
cessation, 172
FY 66 to FY 71, 60
communications system,
equipment released to Thai project, 177
MAP support halted, 175-178
tropo scatter equipment reallocated to Thailand, 521
Defense Liaison Group activated, 174
deleted from JSCP-66, 36
future support considered, 179
Malaysia dispute,
contingency plan, 214
OK planning assessment, 215-219
Military Technical Advisory Group deactivated, 174
small craft requirements considered, 118
Intelligence,
CINCPAC activities, 42-43

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Intelligence - cont'd



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

J

Jackson, Brigadier, 460
Japan,
aircraft, F-86D recoupment available, 128
bases,
Emergency Military Construction Program, 542
operations and logistic use by US, 305
survey of, 22
Bonin and Iwo Jima visit of former residents, 221
destroyer guided missile,
commissioned, 183
Korea treaty ratified, 121
LSSLs for RVN released by Japan Def Agency, 481
Military Assistance Program, 60, 70, 78, 184
adjusted to conform with ceilings, 71
FY 66 guidelines, 78
FY 66 and FY 67, 70
FY 66 to FY 71, 60
Influence training,
continuation recommended by CINCPAC, 70
limited to support training, 70
TARTAR missiles provided, 183

[redacted]

Japan - cont'd

Military Assistance Sales level, 70
military leaders tour participation, 248
RVN assistance, A-353
Status of Forces Agreement,
amnesty offer to Sgt Stumpel, 237
unfair trial under, 237
Tachikawa, 320, 573
Sasebo,
US nuclear submarine visits, 39
Tokyo considered for R&R area, 590; A-436
US forces discipline, 224
US nuclear ship visits, 38
US operated LST crew complaint, 552
Yokosuka,
US nuclear ship visits, 38
Johnson, President, 120, 161, 166, 221, 236; A-26, 71, 444
Johnston Island, 51
Joint Chiefs of Staff,
BARREL ROLL,
effort to improve, 397
reseeding restrictions rescinded, 401
deployment,
30 maneuver bn force,
recommended in July, 292
173d Airborne Bde,
approved in Apr, 456
concept and schedule, 288
discussions 20 April, 288; A-40
force to Thailand recommended, A-37
deterioration of RVN situation and need for rapid build-up, 291
jet capable expeditionary airfield,
development of doctrine, 536
manpower survey of CINCPAC, 26
operations concept,
proposed to Sec Def, 290
operations concept of CINCPAC,
forwarded to Sec Def, 307
ROLLING THUNDER,
boundry moved north, 379
restrictions, 330
study group assessment, 341
RVN port congestion,
action to alleviate, 556
RVNAF increases approved, 480
SEA HORSE exercise cancellation considered, 205
SPRING HIGH anti-missile operation authorized 377
STEEL TIGER control relaxed in Apr, 404
target working group formed, 278
Thai-based aircraft,
use in RVN prohibited, 338

Joint Chiefs of Staff - cont'd

unified commanders,
direct role in base development, 529
views of four power talks, 220
withdrawal of dependents from RVN directed, 323
Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning, 79
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 223, 518
deletion of Indonesia requirement, 36
Joint Tables of Distribution,
MACTHAI/JUSMAG THAI combined, B-28
MACV revision for advisory effort, A-75
Joint Task Force 116,
Thailand mission, B-4
Jones, Ambassador, 177
JUSMAG Thailand,
additional duty as MACTHAI, 313
Forces Objectives Study, 492
headquarters merged with MACTHAI, 314
inception, B-2
mission, B-20
personnel strength, B-app G
roster of commanders, B-app A
roster of key personnel, B-app F
strength, 589
terms of reference,
promulgated by CINCPAC, B-19, 21

K

KITTI 07/08, CI training exercise, B-129
Kriangsak, General, B-127
Kosygin, Premier, 318
Ky, Marshal, 110; A-65, 101, 182, 231, 348

L

Lackland Air Base, 508
Lansdale, Special Asst to the Ambassador, A-244
Laos, see also Deputy JUSMAC THAI, Operations of US Forces, YANKEE TEAM, LONE STAR, BARREL ROLL, STEEL TIGER
Laos,
Air America, 502-505
contract support, 96
Air Attache, Vientiane, 400, 403, 409, 580
aircraft,
A-1H,
bombing error in Laos, 395
C-119G not recommended, 96
C-123, 505

[redacted]

CV-2, 505
F-4,
Udorn based for BANGO, 403
F-105,
missions and operations, 394
H-3C for SAR, 503
Pilatus Porter STOL,
purchase by Air America, 502
T-28,
transferred from RVN, 506
T-28 programmed, 75
U-10 Helio Couriers requested, 502
UH-34D, 502ff, 505
helicopters,
increase recommended, 115
SAR operations, 502
status, 503
loan requested by Ambassador, 505
US service,
overt use policy limitation, 506
airlift requirement,
for Meo refugees, 505
air operations,
endorsed by Lao Gov't, 389
photo reconnaissance, 431-434
publicity, 410
SAC B-52 strike, 430
SAR,
Air America role, 502
helicopters,
CINCPAC plan to increase, 505
increases required, 502
PACAF viewpoint, 503
responsibility, 503
State Department decision, 504
use of Thai based aircraft, 504
southern Laos, 498
jets permitted, 413
STEEL TIGER anti-infiltration, 402-419
targets, 412
Xieng Khouang AA site strike, 389
ammunition,
SALTSHAKER stocks,
withdrawals for operations, 577
attache personnel,
support of, 580
Attopeu, 502
Ban Ban, 499
Ban Ken,
bridge strike, 393
Ban Pha Nhop, 501

[redacted]

Ban Tan Vai,
bombing error, 395
Ban Xonne, 501
Bolovens Plateau,
plan to renew guerrilla operations, 305
escape and evasion,
chart preparation, 584
forces,
automatic weapons,
conversion kits provided 507
FAR,
operations, 499, 501, 508
French influence, 508
guerrilla effort to renew, 305
Neutralist operations, 501, 508
obsolete equipment replacement, 75
Royal Laotian Air Force operations, 390
training in Thailand,
army intelligence units, 507
army leadership, 507
artillery, 507
heavy weapons, 507
infantry unit, 507
training in US,
junior officers, 508
General Ma, 395
increased constraints on STEEL TIGER, 403, 406
induced to resume and expand STEEL TIGER, 410
ground reconnaissance,
SHINING BRASS, 430; A-78
Hua Muong, 499
International Control Commission aircraft lost, 410
Luang Prabang, 499
Mahaxay, 501
Mekong River, 499
Meo refugees, 505
Military Assistance Program, 60, 74, 76, 78
FY 66,
dollar guidelines, 78
FY 66,
helicopter increase, 504
FY 66 and FY 67,
CINCPAC recommended, 74
FY 66 to FY 71,
dollar guidelines, 60
shortfall fundings, 74
support levels, 74
vehicle replacement, 75
military capabilities,
CINCPAC action to increase, 498-509

[redacted]

[redacted]

CV-2, 505
F-4,
Udorn based for BANGO, 403
F-105,
missions and operations, 394
H-3C for SAR, 503
Pilatus Porter STOL,
purchase by Air America, 502
T-28,
transferred from RVN, 506
T-28 programmed, 75
U-10 Helio Couriers requested, 502
UH-34D, 502ff, 505
helicopters,
increase recommended, 115
SAR operations, 502
status, 503
loan requested by Ambassador, 505
US service,
overt use policy limitation, 506
airlift requirement,
for Meo refugees, 505
air operations,
endorsed by Lao Gov't, 389
photo reconnaissance, 431-434
publicity, 410
SAC B-52 strike, 430
SAR,
Air America role, 502
helicopters,
CINCPAC plan to increase, 505
increases required, 502
PACAF viewpoint, 503
responsibility, 503
State Department decision, 504
use of Thai based aircraft, 504
southern Laos, 498
jets permitted, 413
STEEL TIGER anti-infiltration, 402-419
targets, 412
Xieng Khouang AA site strike, 389
ammunition,
SALTSHAKER stocks,
withdrawals for operations, 577
attache personnel,
support of, 580
Attopeu, 502
Ban Ban, 499
Ban Ken,
bridge strike, 393
Ban Pha Nhop, 501

[redacted]

Ban Tan Vai,
bombing error, 395
Ban Xonne, 501
Bolovens Plateau,
plan to renew guerrilla operations, 305
escape and evasion,
chart preparation, 584
forces,
automatic weapons,
conversion kits provided 507
FAR,
operations, 499, 501, 508
French influence, 508
guerrilla effort to renew, 305
Neutralist operations, 501, 508
obsolete equipment replacement, 75
Royal Laotian Air Force operations, 390
training in Thailand,
army intelligence units, 507
army leadership, 507
artillery, 507
heavy weapons, 507
infantry unit, 507
training in US,
junior officers, 508
General Ma, 395
increased constraints on STEEL TIGER, 403, 406
induced to resume and expand STEEL TIGER, 410
ground reconnaissance,
SHINING BRASS, 430; A-78
Hua Muong, 499
International Control Commission aircraft lost, 410
Luang Prabang, 499
Mahaxay, 501
Mekong River, 499
Meo refugees, 505
Military Assistance Program, 60, 74, 76, 78
FY 66,
dollar guidelines, 78
FY 66,
helicopter increase, 504
FY 66 and FY 67,
CINCPAC recommended, 74
FY 66 to FY 71,
dollar guidelines, 60
shortfall fundings, 74
support levels, 74
vehicle replacement, 75
military capabilities,
CINCPAC action to increase, 498-509

[redacted]

Laos, aircraft - cont'd

CV-2, 505
F-4,
Udorn based for BANGO, 403
F-105,
missions and operations, 394
H-3C for SAR, 503
Pilatus Porter STOL,
purchase by Air America, 502
T-28,
transferred from RVN, 506
T-28 programmed, 75
U-10 Helio Couriers requested, 502
UH-34D, 502ff, 505
helicopters,
increase recommended, 115
SAR operations, 502
status, 503
loan requested by Ambassador, 505
US service,
overt use policy limitation, 506
airlift requirement,
for Meo refugees, 505
air operations,
endorsed by Lao Gov't, 389
photo reconnaissance, 431-434
publicity, 410
SAC B-52 strike, 430
SAR,
Air America role, 502
helicopters,
CINCPAC plan to increase, 505
increases required, 502
PACAF viewpoint, 503
responsibility, 503
State Department decision, 504
use of Thai based aircraft, 504
southern Laos, 498
jets permitted, 413
STEEL TIGER anti-infiltration, 402-419
targets, 412
Xieng Khouang AA site strike, 389
ammunition,
SALTSHAKER stocks,
withdrawals for operations, 577
attache personnel,
support of, 580
Attopeu, 502
Ban Ban, 499
Ban Ken,
bridge strike, 393
Ban Pha Nhop, 501

[redacted]

Ban Tan Vai,
bombing error, 395
Ban Xonne, 501
Bolovens Plateau,
plan to renew guerrilla operations, 305
escape and evasion,
chart preparation, 584
forces,
automatic weapons,
conversion kits provided 507
FAR,
operations, 499, 501, 508
French influence, 508
guerrilla effort to renew, 305
Neutralist operations, 501, 508
obsolete equipment replacement, 75
Royal Laotian Air Force operations, 390
training in Thailand,
army intelligence units, 507
army leadership, 507
artillery, 507
heavy weapons, 507
infantry unit, 507
training in US,
junior officers, 508
General Ma, 395
increased constraints on STEEL TIGER, 403, 406
induced to resume and expand STEEL TIGER, 410
ground reconnaissance,
SHINING BRASS, 430; A-78
Hua Muong, 499
International Control Commission aircraft lost, 410
Luang Prabang, 499
Mahaxay, 501
Mekong River, 499
Meo refugees, 505
Military Assistance Program, 60, 74, 76, 78
FY 66,
dollar guidelines, 78
FY 66,
helicopter increase, 504
FY 66 and FY 67,
CINCPAC recommended, 74
FY 66 to FY 71,
dollar guidelines, 60
shortfall fundings, 74
support levels, 74
vehicle replacement, 75
military capabilities,
CINCPAC action to increase, 498-509

[redacted]

Laos - cont'd

military situation map, 498, 500
Mu Gia Pass, 501
Muang Ngan, 499
Muang Phan, 499
Muong Phine, 501
Na Khang, 499
Nam Hin Boun Valley, 499
Nam Hou Valley, 499
Nam Theum, 499
Nhommarath, 501
operations concept,
CINCPAC recommendations, 304
Pathet Lao, 304
AA concentrations, 396
supply line, 499
Pathet Lao/Viet Minh, 505
Plaines de Jarres, 498
planning contingency, 278, 312
Sam Neua Province, 499
Saravane, 501
Savannakhet, 501
Se Bang River, 501
Se Kong Valley, 502
situation map, 500
Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire,585
target development conference, 413
Thakhek, 501
Tha Thom, 499
Vien Pou Ka, 499
Xieng Khouang, 389, 499
Larson, Major General, A-98
appointed commander of Task Force Alpha, 464
assumed command of US Army Field Forces Vietnam, 314
LEFT HOOK,
anti-missile site drone operation, 380
Legal Jurisdiction,
civilian employees and dependents, 225
Logistics, see Ammunition, Base Developments, Construction, POL, Port and Beach Operations, Supply Operations and Transportation

M

Ma, General, 395, 403, 406, 410
MAAG China,
change of service designation, 155
MAAG China,
LST Advisory Division, 146
Macapagal, President, 164, 166, 239, 242
MACTHAI,
Air Defense Study and recommendations, B-39

[redacted]

MACTHAI - cont'd

base developments,
concept and plan requested, 543
Commander US/Thai Field Forces designated, 498
Field Forces Plan (COMSTAFF OPLAN),
received by CINCPAC, 498
headquarters merged with JUSMAG THAI, 314
historical background 1950-1965, B 1-18
joint terms of reference draft, B-21
manpower survey, B-31
merged with JUSMAG THAI, B-6, 21
mission and responsibilities,
CINCPAC Instruction 003020.2D, B-20
organizational evolution, B-28
personnel strength, 589; B-app G
reorganization, B-27-34
replacement of Gen Easterbrook by Gen Stilwell, 313
responsibility for Laos contingency planning, 312
roster of key personnel, B-app F
security force contracting officer, 492
security force negotiation, 491
separation from MACV, 285
Thailand armed forces,
bilateral effort to improve, B-40
MACV, see also Command Relations, Republic of Vietnam, and Westmoreland, General
advisory structure, A-298
advisory program,
expansion, A 74-89
subsector, A-76
ANZAC Brigade,
effort to secure, A-72
automatic telephone service proposal, 525
BARREL ROLL strikes in Laos,
PACAF requests change in responsibility, 392
proposals, 397
refinement of procedures, 392
responsibility specified by CINCPAC, 390
BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER,
bombing through overcast banned, 408
operational control relaxed, 408
Cambodia area airstrike,
authority requested, 412
staff,
Combat Operations Center,
approved by JCS, 316
established, A-95
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, A-466
Political Warfare Advisory Directorate, 572; A-94

[redacted]

MACV, staff - cont'd
Training Directorate, A-94
organization, A-92-299
Special Military Intelligence Activities Team, A-467
consolidated headquarters,
construction of, 537
Joint Tactical Operations Center, 538
deployment discussions 20 April, 288, A-40
economic warfare, A-251
FARMGATE/VNAF air operations,
authority and control, 275
force,
requirements,
stated in Jul to SecDef, A-42
increased in Nov, A-44
Free World Military Assistance Office,
established, A-71
inflation countermeasures, 594, A-20
Joint US Public Affairs Office, 512
key personnel, A-276
Naval Advisory Group,
Surveillance Operations Center, 437
non-combatant casualties,
effort to minimize, 466
operations concept, 295
pacification,
role clarified, A-245
study and recommendations, A 233-240
Real Estate Board established, 539
release of pre-operations information to VNAF approved, 338
research and developments,
priority list of problems, 483
ROLLING THUNDER,
extension into Laos proposed, 411
RVN armed forces,
increase proposed, 480
10th Division organization approved, 480
RVN port congestion, 556
strength, 589; A-91, 274
subordinate commands, A-277
US aircraft, authority for use, 414
Malaysia, 219, B-118
Military Assistance Program, 60, 78, 114
military leaders tour participation, 248
Penang, considered for R&R area, 590
RVN assistance, A-353
Singapore, considered for R&R area, 590
Mansfield, Senator, A-23
Marianas, 222
base survey, 22

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

MARKET TIME, coastal anti-infiltrating operation, see Intelligence, photo recce and Operations of US Forces
Martin, Ambassador, 393, 491
MAP, increase urged, 493
POL pipeline negotiations,565
security problem conference, 494
Marriages,
unauthorized of US servicemen, 225
McClure, SSgt, 588
McDonald, Admiral, 248
McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 290, 307; B-62
Mendez, Foreign Secretary, 229, 231
Meng, Brigadier General, 188
Military Assistance Program, see also specific country, 58-184
aircraft,
C-119C requirements in PACOM, 94
F-5 program,
PACOM, 98-114
Philippines, 105
Republic of China, 106
ROK, 103
RVN, 110
Thailand, 107
helicopter requirements, 114
base development,
joint-use bases, 528
requirements, 88
Burma, 73, 180-183
Deputy JUSMAG THAI, 171, 312, 503, 577
forward defense countries, 78
Japan, 70, 183, 184
Laos, 74-76, 171
logistic support of allied countries in wartime, 89
Malaysia, 70, 78, 114
PACOM FY 66 and FY 67 program, 59
Philippines, 67-70, 156-167
planning and funding, 59-87
planning and programming efficiency, 86
procedures,
changes, 85
draft update of the MAM, 84
MA Plan Books for PACOM and countries, 84
Military Articles and Service List, 86
reappraisal,
Hoopes study, 78-84
Republic of China, 59-63, 135-156
Republic of Korea, 63-67, 119-135
FWMAF support arrangements, 472
Research and Development,
funding policy 484

Military Assistance Program - cont'd

RVN, 60, 77, 78
funding from FY 65-66 approved, 481
funds for FY 65 construction added, 276
small craft requirements, 116
Thailand, 71-73, 179-171, 492-497; B-10,28, 40-47, 64, 71, 100-109, 136
headquarters merger and problem of subordination, 315;B-29
training workshops, 93
war reserve level of medical supplies, 92
Military Assistance Sales, 81, 117, 118, 124, 138, 140-146
Military Leaders Tour, 248
Military Technical Advisory Group in Indonesia deactivated, 174
Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service,
RVN port congestion, 556
Miller, Rear Admiral, 439, 441
Milton, General, 393
MINSK,
Russian cargo ship, 445
Missiles, see also country
Missiles,
PERSHING,
operation test plan, 37
Monroe, Admiral, 242, 245
Montagnard,
CIDG uprising, 464
Moore, Major General, assigned MACV Deputy Commander for Air Operations, 313
MOTORBUS,
interfering with Soviet intelligence collection, 41

N

National Liberation Front, 510
National Policy Paper, 63, 79
National Security Agency, Pacific,
Operations Group, established, 42
Negotiations and Agreements,
ANZAM, 219
Bohlen-Serrano Agreement, 238ff
DCA/PACFLT compromise on use of frequencies by relay ship, 52
four power talks, 219
Hawaii agreements on command relations, A-98
JUSMAG THAI and RTA on Lao training, 507
MACV and CG ROKFV, 316
MARKET TIME operations, A-100
Thailand,
AC&W, B-89

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

initial military assistance agreement, B-2, 19
joint communications, B-97
security of US personnel and facilities, B-127
United Kingdom and STRATCOM, Thailand, B-98
New Zealand,
air target materials conference, 43
four power talks, 219
FWMAF for RVN, 449, 457-460
military leaders tour participation, 248
Philippine entry clearance requirement, 243
SEA HORSE exercise participation, 205
strategic priorities, 34
Ni, Admiral, 153
Nixon, Richard, A-24
North Korea, 518
force,
build-up, 473-476
changes, 24, 26
[redacted]
North Vietnam,
air operations,
photo reconnaissance, 431-434
ROLLING THUNDER,
reaction contingency, 324
strike, 275, 317-385, 424-431
Cau Pha, 342
Chap Le Barracks, 321
Dien Bien Phu, 333, 336
Dong Hoi, 333
escape and evasion charts, 584
force changes, 24
Gulf of Tonkin, 380
Haiphong, 379, 515, 516
area sanctuary, 341
Hanoi, 379, 410, 515, 516
sanctuary area, 341
reduced, 380
Hanoi-Dong Dang rail bridge, 383
harbor mining considered, 342
Hong Ga, 342
Houa Phan Province, 499
Ile Du Tigre, 332
dump target, 437
missiles,
SAM, 24, 332, 341, 377, 378, 380-382
F-4C destroyed, 377
launch rate increased, 381
sites, 382
US operations degraded, 381

[redacted]

[redacted]

North Vietnam, missiles - cont'd

US air strikes against sites, 332, 378, 380-382
operations concept,
air, naval and special, 303
operations objectives,
conference on US terms, 326
Phu Yen Airfield, 26, 379
Quang Khe Naval Base, 326
Quang Suoi, 337
Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire, 585
threat estimate, A-421
Uong Bi Thermal Power Plant, 383
US personnel held, 587
Vinh Airfield, 333
Xom Bang Ammunition Depot, 326
Norton, Brigadier General, A-97
appointed Deputy CGUSARV, 313
Nuclear Powered Ships, 38, 39, 56, 57
Nuclear Weapons,
CHICOM detonation, 24
CHICOM production/storage areas, targeted, 278
strike planning,
[redacted]

O

Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 483
Okinawa, 305, 573
base developments,
ammunition storage, 2
Oura Wan locale, 20
Emergency Military Construction Program, 542
jet airfield, 2
Kushi Wan locale, 20
land requirements, 2
planning, 20
reserve of construction materials, 276
base survey, 22
departure of 173d Airborne Brigade, 457
deployments, 453
Marine, 308
IDCSP ground station, 522
Kadena Air Base, 573
Motobu Peninsula, 20

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

Okinawa - cont'd

Special Operations Center, Pacific,
established, 518
Status of Forces Agreement, 228
Operations Concept,
CINCPAC,
additional US force requirements, 306
August conference and recommendations, 294
coordination with GVN, Thai and Laos Governments, 299
deterrence of CHICOM intervention, 299, 305
integrated strategy required, 290
Laos, 304
logistic bases in Philippines, Okinawa, Guam, and Japan, 305
NVN,
air, naval and special, 303
reduction support in RVN, 304
October recommendation, 300
refined, 295, 297
OPLAN 37, 275
reinforcement of MACV assessment, A-32, 38
RVN coastal base/enclaves, 280, 300
Thailand, 304
inclusion of 289
JCS,
RVN deployments, 279
MACV, A-137-160
air support of Phases I and II, A-151
area expansion and destruction of VC main forces, 295, 297
base enclaves, 65A-38
deployment along Qui Nhon-An Khe-Pleiku axis, A-38
naval support of Phases I and II, A-149
objective, A-141
Phases,
I, II and III, A-141
developed for each Corp Tactical Zone, A-43, 144
psychological operations, A-153
rural construction/pacification, A-152
Special Forces, A-148
specific military tasks, A-142
strategic bases, A-138, 421
tactics and techniques, A-143
Phases I, II, and III of operations against the VC, 295, 300; A-141
reprisal attacks, A-29
Operations of US Forces, see also Special Forces, Psychological Operations, Unconventional Warfare, Intelligence, and specific country
Operations of US Forces,
air,
action to commit US aircraft RVN, 414; A-46ff, 182
action to destroy crops, 591

[redacted]

action intensified/evaluated, 414-419
action of Thai based aircraft, 338; A-48
AF from Thai bases, B-22
ARC LIGHT,
SAC B-52 strikes, 424-433; A-185, 190-199
strike recapitulation, 432
BANGO,
alert aircraft for targets of opportunity in Laos, 403, 409
BANGO/WHIPLASH,
combat sorties, 416, 417
results, 418
BARREL ROLL,
armed reconnaissance technique,
original, 334, 389, 401; A-208-217
avoidance of AA concentrations, 396
Ban Ken bridge strike, 393
bombing through overcast banned, 408
carrier based sorties, 415; A-180
choke-point reseeding restriction rescinded, 401
combat sorties, 415, 416, 417
constraints, 394, 396
extension, 390
FC-47 operation rules eased, 412
initial strikes Dec 64, 390
JCS effort to improve, 397
JCS restrictions on reseeding rescinded, 401
MACV control relaxed, 408
MACV proposals, 397
numerous agencies complicate coordination, 399
operations areas, 419
ordnance jettison in NVN authorized, 409
results, 399, 418
suspended in Oct, 409
suspension after Jan bombing error, 395
target selection,
CINCPAC views, 397
OSD proposal, 398
Thai based, 338
BLUE TREE recce, 337
carrier based, 35, 275, 318, 415, 422, 423; A-179
NVN missile site strikes, 380; A-180
RVN support, 337
CVA positioned, 421; A-180
increased, 420; A-180
procedures, 421
USS HANCOCK at Dong Hoi, 319
USS ORISKANY, A-180
combat losses, A-309
combat sorties in RVN, 422

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

[redacted]

FARM GATE, 275, 321; A-47
rules of employment, 414, 420; A-47
FLAMING DART, 317-323
attack reprisal for VC actions, 317, 324
Chap Le Barracks strike, 321
CINCPAC operations order 317
target options, 318
US aircraft markings approved, 321
IRON HAND,
anti-missile site strikes, 379; A-203
meager results, 380
success in Oct, 380
Laos,
gov't endorses, 389
jets permitted in south,413
publicity, 410
SEACOORD evaluation/communications, 393
target development,
conference in Mar, 413
inadequate, 412
LONE STAR,
night interdiction of Lao routes, 389
degraded by SAMs, 381
photo recc, 431-434
SAM site strikes intensified, 378
strike, 275, 317-385, 424-431
suspensions, 309, 384
personnel increase in Thailand of concern to Thai Gov't, B-26, 93
ROLLING THUNDER,
armed recce and strike operation, 324-388; A-47, 199-208
background and rationale, 324-326; A-199
began strikes, 326; A-199
boundaries extended, 388
boundary moved north, 379
carrier based sorties, 423
CINCPAC,
ad hoc study group,
formed, 328
findings, 329
recommendations, 330
evaluation of effects, 326; A-207
Planning Staff, 339; A-201
recommended future course, 335; A-201
Target Planning Review Group formed, 339
combat sorties, 422, 423
constraints, 330-401; A-204
effects reduced by, 331
reductions increase effectiveness, 332
contingency of NVN/CHICOM reaction, 324

[redacted]

[redacted]

coordination by Target Systems Analysis Section, 339
December appraisal, 383
December suspension, 377
decreased pressure in Sept, 324
extension into Laos proposed, 411
F-4C destroyed by SAM, 377
graphics of missions, routes, targets, 343-376
JCS control restrictions, 330
JCS study group assessment, 341
NVN harbor mining considered, 342
ordnance,
expended, 385
jettison area, 409
problems of limiting planning info to VNAF, 338
recce intensified and strikes suspended, 335; A-202
resumed after special recce effort, 337
Thai based, 338
use of napalm, 331
VNAF participation required, 331
RVN/Cambodia border, 276
SAC B-52 strikes, 463; A-185, 190
CAR PARK, 425
CHAIN SAW, 425
CINCPAC effort to decentralize, 427; A-194
contingency target areas, 431
control retained by CINCPAC and CINCSAC, 429; A-194
DRUM FIRE, 425
first direct support of ground operation, 473; A-186
FOX DEN, 435
free bomb zones designated, 426; A-188
initial res lts limited, 424
locations in RVN, 432
mid-air collision, 424
safety of non-combatants, 428; A-187, 192
SILVER BAYONET,
strikes in Cambodia disapproved, 429
southern Laos, 430; A-196
tactical support role, 429; A-187
safety of non-combatants, 428; A-187, 192
MACV directives, A-190
search and rescue in Laos, 502-505
SPRING HIGH,
anti-missile operation, 377
unsuccessful, 378
STEEL TIGER,
Action to reorient BARREL ROLL, 334, 402
anti-infiltration thru Laos, 402-419; A-208-217
assessment at mid-year, 406
bombing error in Oct, 409
bombing through overcast banned, 408
carrier based sorties, 415

Operations of US Forces, air - cont'd

combat sorties, 415,416, 417
constraints,
increased by Gen Ma, 403, 406
NVN border lifted, 408
control,
relaxed by JCS, 404
relaxed by MACV, 408
diversion of aircraft limited, 409
effectiveness, effort to improve, 407
FC-47 operation rules eased, 412
napalm use disapproved by Ambassador, 406
operations areas, 419
ordnance jettison in NVN authorized, 409
results, 418
resumption and expansion Southern Laos in Nov, 410
strike error, 403
suspended in May, 403
suspended in Oct, 409
tactics during rainy season, 406
Tactical Air Control Center Tan Son Nhut, A-47
tactical support in RVN,
development and expansion, A-180
intensified in July,A-185
Plei Mei battle, A-186
SAC B-52 strikes, 473; A-185
SILVER BAYONET, A-186
TIGER HOUND,
airborne command post, 411
combat sorties, 411, 416
FAC controlled hunter/killer operation, 411; A 208-317
results, 418
commitment in RVN, 414
WHIPLASH,
alert aircraft for targets of opportunity in Laos, 403, 409
YANKEE TEAM,
active photo recce in Laos, 337, 389; A 208-217
CINCPAC directed priority in Nov, 410
coordination procedures,
adopted for BARREL ROLL, 389
Operations of US Forces,
ground,
US Army,
1st Cav Div (AM), 472, 480; A-167, 168
1st Inf Div, 480; A-166, 167, 172, 177
101st Abn Div, A-166, 167, 168
173d Abn Bde, 480; A-166, 167, 170
MACV infusion program, A-82
mission, A-166
Special Forces, A-168

Task Force Alpha, 465
US Marine, A-162-166
III MAF/9th MEB, A-162, 164, 165
4th Marine Reg't, A-162
7th FLT Special Landing Force A-163, 164
Battalion Landing Teams, A-162, 163, 164
dispositions, 474
clearing, A-161
expansion of TAOR A-165
first direct support by B-52, 473
heavy fighting in Binh Duong, 480
Highway 19 security, A-168
reaction forces for outpost attacks, A-165
search and destroy, A-161
securing, A-161
BLUE MARLIN, A-164
BUSHMASTER, A-172
DAGGER THRUST, A-163
GIBRALTAR, A-167
GOLDEN FLEECE, A-164
HARVEST MOON, A-164
HIGHLAND, A-167
HUMP, A-170
LIEN KET, A-162
PIRANHA, 479, A-163
ROADRUNNER, A-171
SHINING BRASS, 430; A-78
SILVER BAYONET, 429, 472, 469; A-168
intelligence, A-465
STARLIGHT, 463, 479; A-162
intelligence, A-465
TIGER HOUND,
intelligence, A-465
THAN PHONG, A-169
UTAH,
intelligence, A-465
Operations of US Forces,
naval, 435-448
carrier forces, 35
destroyer force, 34; A-55
gunfire support, 35, 447, 454; A-176, 179
procedures, A-176
MARKET TIME,
anti-infiltration effort, 435-446; A-54-57, 69, 172-175
area air patrols, 444; A-173
command relations, 440; A-173
control shift from 7th FLT to MACV, 443; A-173
MACV and Naval Adv. GP, 440

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

Operations of US Forces, naval, MARKET TIME - cont'd

communications links between US/RVN, 437; A-69
coordination of air and surface patrols, 437
forces,
assigned, 444; A-173
increased, 445; A-55
interceptions, 442, 443, 446
organization, 438
rules of engagement, 440, 442, 443; A-173
seaplane operations, 442; A-173
Surveillance Operations Center, 437
Swift patrol craft augmentation, 445; A-55, 174
US Coast Guard 444; A-55

outcome in Republic of Vietnam,
accomplishments, A-161-256, 261
build-up, A-257, 290
problems, A-261
reactions, A-259
readiness, 1ff
Republic of Vietnam,
effects on civil economy, 223
requirements,
base developments, 88
bases in the Philippines, 238
riot control agents used in RVN, 223; A-444
security,
ports, A-426
US personnel and installations, A-425
Special Landing Force in South China Sea, 452
types, A-161
US casualties, 591, 592
Operations Planning, see also CINCPAC force requirements, Conferences, Operations of US Forces, and OPLANS
Operations Planning,
anti-infiltration, 436
bilateral US/Thai, 497; A-423; B-35
CINCPAC operations concept, 293
importance of momentum 307
utilized by JCS, 307
contingency,
Burma, 278
deployments,
air/naval forces against NVN/CHICOM attack, 278
forces to Thailand/Laos against NVN/CHICOM attack, 278
planning responsibility for Laos, 312
Australian FWMAF, 459
decision date, 294
priorities, 293
ROKDTF, 294, 470
hampered by political factors, 471

[redacted]

schedule slippage, 294
increased advance planning information to VNAF, 338
MACV operation concept, 294
MARKET TIME,
air strikes, 438
amphibious operations, 438
naval gunfire support, 438
OPLAN 37 revised, 275
port capacity Saigon, 294
ROLLING THUNDER,
planning cycle, 339, 340
Planning Staff, 339
OPLANS,
electronic data support, 53
OPLAN 1, 36
OPLAN 22 (internal uprisings and revolutions), 36
OPLAN 32 (Laos/SEAsia),
communications provisions, 523
construction material and equipment, 277
ground forces used for contingency plan, 279
partial implementation, A-29
prestock levels of POL increased 276
OPLAN 37 (air attacks against NVN),
change of cross border operations, 275
revised schedule for maximum damage, 275
OPLAN 38 (aggression in SEAsia),
actions to preposition construction material, 277
cancelled, 37
OPLAN 39 (contingency against aggression),
actions to preposition construction material, 277
air/naval forces, 279
CHICOM target list refined, 278
OPLAN 65,
promulgated, 36
CINCUSTAF 1/64,
concept, 497, B-36
drafting and approval, 497, B-36
CINCUSTAF 1/65,
republished, 498, B-36
Unconventional Warfare Annex, B-36
COMUSMACV OPLAN 22, A-159
COMUSMACV OPLAN 32 (Phase II), A-157
COMUSMACV/THAI OPLAN 33, A-157
COMUSMACV OPLAN 34, A-158
COMUSMACV OPLAN 34A, A-158
COMUSMACV OPLAN 37, A-158, 160
COMUSMACV OPLAN 38, A-158
COMUSMACV OPLAN 39, A-158
COMUSMACV OPLAN 61, A-159
COMUSMACV OPLAN 60, A-159

[redacted]

[redacted]

COMUSMACV OPLAN 98, A-159
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 1, A-157
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan,
Annex J, A-160
MACTHAI Field Forces Plan/COMSTAFF OPLAN, 498
MACV contingency plans, A-278, 279
MACV Campaign Plan AB 141, A-155
RVNAF JGS Directive AB 140, A-155
RVNAF Plan AB 139, A-137
RVNAF Plan AB 140/US-RVNAF Plan AB 141,
revision of AB 139, A-155
SEATO Plan 4, A-157
Ordnance, see also Ammunition
AGM-12 missiles, 387
ANM64 bombs, 387
BLU-3B bomblets, 430
CBU-2A bombs for flak suppression, 387
M-64 bombs, 430
M-117 bombs, 387, 430
M129E1 leaflet bomb, 515
MK 81 bomb, 387, 577
MK-83 bomb,
with MK-14 and 15 modification, 387
for B-52s, 430
for B-57, 387
for F-4Cs, 387
for F-100, 387
for F-105s, 387
napalm, 387
type and quantity expended, 385
Osias, Brigadier General, 185
Owens Report,
Draft Report of Armed Reconnaissance Study Group, 341

P

Page Communications Engineering Incorporated, 520
Pak, President, 120, 236, 471
Pakistan, see also SEATO
F-104 aircraft transfer to ROC considered, 147
declined military leaders tour, 248
evacuation of US civilians, 576
India confrontation, 193
Paltridge, Minister of Defense, 457
Pan American Airlines,
evacuation of dependents from RVN, 324
PEPPERGRINDER, 172
Performance Evaluation Group Inspections,
Deputy JUSMAG Thailand, 171, B-94
Republic of Korea, 134

[redacted]

Personnel,
casualties of US forces in RVN, A 162-180
during 1959, 590
KIA, 590, 591
WIA, 590-592
casualties,
VC and RVNAF, A-283
RVNAF, A-271
desertion rates,
RVNAF, A-270
disciplinary problems, 224
executions of US personnel,
recommended actions, 587; A-429
key personnel,
CINCPAC, 6
MACTHAI, B-app F
MACV, A-276
location,
RVN, 549
losses,
RVNAF, A-271
morale and welfare,
awards and decorations, A-437
exchange services, A-437
mail service, A-435
R&R program, 590; A-436
Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire, 586; A-435
prisoners held by VC, NVN, CHICOM, 587; A-429
strengths,
PACOM, 1
headquarters, 2
RVN,
MACV headquarters, A-274
FWMAF, A-273
RVNAF, A-272
US forces, 588, 589; A-269
Thailand, 588, 589; B-app G
Thailand passport requirements, 213
US public gifts to US troops, 594
PETALUMA, tanker, 570
Philco Corporation, 178, 520
Philippines, see also MAP and SEATO
aircraft,
C-119Gs considered, 95
F-5 conversion of 6th TFS, 106
F-5 deletion considered, 159
F-5 planning, 68, 70
F-5 program progress, 105
U-17s planned, 68, 70
helicopter requirements, 114

[redacted]

air delivery equipment, 68
armed forces,
1st Infantry Division, 68
effort to improve, 156-161
reasons for marginal capability, 156
shift of defenses to southern islands, 166
Basa Air Base, 105, 241
base developments,
Emergency Military Construction Program, 542
base survey, 22
Bataan Ocean Petroleum Depot, 571
commercial consumable increase, 160
communications,
Clark-Saigon submarine cable, 522
long lines planning, 68
tactical equipment planned, 68
Constabulary support levels, 160
contract technicians for RVN television, 486
Free World Military Force for RVN, 161
CINCPAC concept for planning, 163
IDCSP ground station, 522
improvement of air traffic control,
expansion of Civil Aviation Advisory Group, 247
installation of AID funded equipment, 247
jet fuel shortage, 164
Mactan Air Base, 238, 241, 286, 305, 573
Manila considered for R&R area, 590
Manila Bay, 206
Manila International Airport, 240
medical and civic action teams in RVN, 161
Military Assistance Program,
CINCPAC FY 66 and FY 67, 67
adjustments, 70
dollar ceilings,
FY 66 guidelines, 78
FY 66 to FY 71, 60
investment items, 68
reappraisal,
ASD/ISA study, 83
naval craft,
MSF conversion to PCE, 68, 70
MSI planned, 68, 70
PGMs planned, 68, 70
replacement of the RAJAH SOLIMAN, 164
RPS MASBATE attrited, 166
small craft requirements, 117
surplus property agreement, 158
vehicles,
M-113 personnel carriers, 68, 70

[redacted]

Philippines - cont'd

participation in SEA HORSE exercise, 205
POL,
additional storage,
construction, 571
facilities and pipeline to Clark Air Base, 571
priority requirements, 571
Status of Forces Agreement,
CINCPAC recommendation, 229
criminal jurisdiction negotiations, 229
exchange of formal notes, 231
incidents on US bases, 229
Military Bases Agreement 229, 240
original and revised provisions, 232
participation of CINCPACREP, 229
unilateral interpretation of Article XI, 232
Subic Bay, 245, 305, 482, 571
US base rights,
13th Air Force construction at Mactan, 242
aide-memoire on use of Mactan, 242
airlift through Clark Air Base, 240
Australian ships visit, 245
congestion at Clark Air Base, 242
decreased requirement for Mactan, 243
improvement of air traffic control, 246
length of tenure, 238, 239
Mutual Defense Board, 239, 244, 245
release of land, 238
use of Mactan Air Base, 238, 241
visits of third country ships and aircraft, 243
visits of third country ships and aircraft,
diplomatic clearance adopted, 243
Phipps, Rear Admiral, 458
Pialat, Col, French MILADREP, 209
PIRANHA, ground operation, A-163
Planning and Funding of Military Assistance Program, 59-87
POL,
Philippines,
additional storage priority requirement, 571
pipe line to Clark A. B., 571
Republic of Korea, 119
FWMAF in RVN supplied by KOCO, 572
RVN,
additional facilities required to support deployments, 276
vulnerability of commercial system and requirement for increased prestock, 276
pipeline and storage facilities, B 102-114
POLOTSK,
Russian cargo ship, 444
Prapass, Deputy Prime Minister, B 22, 56, 62

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

Press, see Public Affairs
Prince, Major General, 185
Programming, see Military Assistance Program and Operations Planning
PROVOST, priority R&D objectives for RVN, 484
Psychological Operations, see also Republic of Vietnam
7th Psychological Operations Group,
established on Okinawa, 509
aircraft employed, 511
Army field detachments deployed to RVN, 511
Corps Propaganda Support Center,
activated, 510
effectiveness, 513
FACT SHEET leaflet program in NVN,
CINCPAC authority, 514
MACV POLWAR advisory Directorate, A-94
planning agency,
established as part of CINCPAC staff, 516
theater capabilities studied by ARPAC, 509
theater requirements, 509
Public Affairs,
conference on war in RVN, 54
coordination of Asian journalists visit, 57
PACOM capabilities study, 55
press, A-80
B-52 strikes, A-193, 199
releases, 424
charges of gas warfare in RVN, 223, A-444
cooperation in publicity on US use of Thai air bases, 338
explanation of ROLLING THUNDER suspension, 335
headlined B-52 strike in Laos, 430
limited controls, A-188
publicity ban on air operations from Thai bases, B-22
reports of Plei Mei/Ia Drang operations, A-169
reports of STARLIGHT, A-163
ROLLING THUNDER, A-203
voluntary censorship, 55
war reporting A-24
Public Affairs Office augmentation, 29
US public,
discussion of RVN war, A-23
gifts and mail to troops in RVN, A-23

Q

Quat, Prime Minister, A-101
QUICK TALK, see RVN, communications

[redacted]

R

Rand Corporation, 510
psychological operations research A-457
Thailand study, B-19
Real Estate,
land acquisition RVN/Thai, 539
land requirements Okinawa, 2
RED MARBLE, Thai VHF communications, B-99
Republic of China,
aircraft,
C-119G,
add-on request, 97
recommended by CINCPAC, 137
requirements, 96
F-5 program, 106, 113, 138
conversion of 1st TFS, 107
planning, 61, 63
F-86F retention, 148
CINCPAC recommends force change, 150
F-104 retention, 147
HH-43 helicopters, 61, 63
S-2A ASW patrol aircraft, 141
U-17As programmed, 61, 63
helicopter requirements, 115, 138
base developments,
cross connection of US/GRC line communications, 88
Emergency Military Construction Program, 542
submarine POL lines, 88
base survey, 22
Chief MAAG change of service designation, 155
CINCPAC consideration of MRBM deployment, 140
communications,
Military Integrated Communications System, 150-153
acceptance from contractor, 152
delay in cutover completion, 153
Kung Kuan Air Base, 241, 286
MAP transfer program recommended by CINCPAC, 81
Military Assistance Program, 135-156
CINCPAC FY 66 and FY 67, 59-62
dollar ceilings,
FY 66 decrease, 62, 78
FY 66 to FY 71, 60
FY 67 reduction, 62
investment items, 61, 137
obsolete equipment,
effort to phase-out, 155
reappraisal,
ASD/ISA study, 78, 80

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

[redacted]

draft update of MAM, 84
force reductions recommended, 80, 84
vehicles,
general purpose, 61, 63
M-41 tanks, 61, 63, 137, 156
M-113 personnel carriers, 61, 137
special purpose, 61
Military Assistance Sales, 81, 117, 138
expanded, 140
high speed transports (APD), 143-146
limited funding capability, 141
MAP support of purchased equipment, 141
Minister of Defense listed requests, 142
ocean fleet tug, 141
S-2A ASW patrol aircraft, 140
Straits Surveillance System requested, 140
military leaders tour participation, 248
Minister of Defense recommendations, 136
naval craft,
costs of APD recommissioning, 145
destroyer, 61, 138
LST rehabilitation, 61-146, 156
MSC new construction, 61
purchase of high speed transports, 117
small craft requirements, 116
Ping Tung Air Base, 97
Second Marine Division,
defacto establishment, 154
recommendations of MAAG and CINCPAC, 154
Status of Forces Agreement,
joint committee,
CINCPAC recommendation, 235
effort to establish, 234
negotiations, 233
signed, 233
Tainan Air Base, 107
Taiwan, 305
Taiwan-Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation, 147
Republic of Korea,
AC&W, 64
aircraft,
C-46D increase planned, 128
C-119G not required, 95, 97
F-5 program, 103, 113
105th and 102nd TFS operationally ready, 104
planning, 64
F-86F retention proposed, 126-128

[redacted]

Republic of Korea - cont'd

F-86F retention recommended by CINCPAC, 128
HH-43F helicopters, 64
helicopter requirements, 114
ammunition raw material reserves,
COMUSK request to increase, 131
decision to raise stock level, 132
OSD guidance on use of AID and MAP funds, 131
use of AID funds, 131
arsenal expansion, 67
base development requirements,
crane installation at Chinhae, 88
improve antennae, 88
improve dipersal airfields, 88
main supply routes, 88
port improvements, 88
replace drydock caisson at Chinhae, 88
base support for US operations, 305
base survey, 22
Chief Air Force Advisory Group, 134
Chinhae,
nuclear submarine visit, 39
communications,
ROKA/Ministry of Communications microwave system, 132
procurement and management responsibilies assigned, 132
provision of air defense channels, 133
FWMAF in RVN, 121, 309, 449, 468
command relations, 316, 471
deployment concept for CI mission, 282
LST, 469
MAP support arrangements, 472
Military Assistance Group, Vietnam, 469
deactivation, 472
ROK Force Vietnam, 472
ROKDTF negotiations, 469
security battalion, 469
self-defense instructors, 469
Korean/Japan Normalization Treaty, 38
Korean Oil Company, 572
products exempt from OSP ban, 119
logistic support in wartime, 87
Military Assistance Program, 119-135, 572
CINCPAC FY 66 and FY 67, 63-65
dollar ceilings,
FY 66 increase, 65, 78
FY 66 to FY 71, 60
FY 67 new guidelines, 66
FY 67 to FY 71, 67
investment items, 64

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

naval craft,
high speed transport,
deviation authorized, 125
programmed, 64
purchase, 124
MSF/PCE conversion, 64, 116
Sewart boats, 64, 116
small craft requirements, 116
reappraisal by ASD/ISA study, 78, 81
MAM draft update, 84
ROKA/MOC communications system, 132
special purpose vehicles, 64
tanks, M-48, 64
MAP transfer program, 119-124, 471
CINCPAC recommendation, 122
decision to suspend for CY 66, 124
division task force to RVN, 121
new schedule approved, 120
Presidents Johnson and Pak discuss, 120
military leaders tour participation, 248
POL,
FWMAF supplied by Korean Oil Company, 572
President Pak approval of ROKDTF, 471
QUICK TRIP supply system, 89
reduction of ground forces in MAM, 84
Seventh Fleet overcommitment, 82
Status of Forces Agreement,
implementation pending, 237
labor issue, 236
negotiations, 235
surface-to-air missile units, 129
CINCPAC recommends retention of two HAWK battalions, 130
increased requirement, 130
reduction asked by COMUSK, 129
Suwon Air Base, 104
Taegu Air Base, 129
Taegu Air Base runway, 64
US nuclear positioning threatened, 81
war reserve of medical supplies increase proposed, 92
Republic of Vietnam, see also MACV and Operations of US Forces
aircraft,
A-1, 321
delivery suspended, 482
replacement of T-28, A-65, 67
substitution of B-57s considered, 482
A4D in Chu Lai operation, 536
AM-2 SATS matting, 536
B-52 strikes, 326, 424-433, 454, 460
B-57 loaned to RVNAF, 483; A-47, 66
C-130 augmentation, 574
CH-34 replacement of UH-19, A65

Korea

[redacted]

F-4C, 285
evaluation, A-442
F-5 program, A-66
CINCPAC proposals, 482
evaluation, A-442
F-100, A-47
evaluation, A-442
F-105, 285
August attack on NVN SAM site, 378
FC-47 program development, A-442
O-1A, A-64
SP-2H, RVN coastal surveillance flights, 444, 435
U-2 photo reconnaissance, 433
U-10 psychological operations, 511
U-17, A-65
drones SAC pilotless, 433
types, A-65
airfields, A-305
ammunition,
100 pound GP bomb, 578
250 pound GP bomb substitutes, 577
500 pound GP bomb, 578
AF SPECIAL EXPRESS, 562; A-114
backlog, 563
critical items, 578; A-114
floating depots, A-114
improved procedure, 563
increased consumption, 576
stockage objective, A-114
supply status, A-114
An Khe, 534
base area, 467
An Thoi, 446
An Xuyen, 426
base developments,
airfields, 537, 555; A-307, 415-420
Marine short airfield tactical system, 536
shortage of AM-2 matting, 537
An Khe,
base complex, 467; A-127, 415
airfield, 534
C-130 strip, A-415
heliport, A-415
Bien Hoa,
airfield, A-127, 420
POL facilities, 569
Cam Ranh Bay, 532-535; A-107, 127, 417-419
air base complex,
expeditionary airfield, 536, 537
permanent airfield, 534
CINCPAC recommended development, 533
depot facilities, A-418

planning, 532
port complex, 533; A-418
DeLong floating pier, 533; A-418
POL facilities, A-418
Chu Lai, 534, 535; A-123-127, 415
expeditionary airfield, 454, 536; A-415
permanent airfield, 534
consolidated MACV headquarters,
approval and funding, 537
ARPAC design funds, 537
construction,
conflicting personnel requirements, 543; A-126
Emergency Military Construction Program, 542
location and cost of funded, 540
MACV headquarters complex, A-135
ports/depots/facilities, A-307
projects, 535, 540
stockage of materials, 276
Seabee Technical Assistance Teams requested, 543
Danang,
airfield complex, 534, 535; A-127, 415
Marble Mountain Air Facility, 534; A-415
port facilities, A-415
port status, A-409
Dong Ba Thin,
permanent airfield, 534
enclaves, 535, 281; A-106
Nha Trang, 534; A-127, 417
airfield facilities, A-417
depot facilities, A-417
8th Field Hospital site, A-417
headquarters of FFORCEV, A-417
POL storage, A-417
port status, A-411
Phan Rang, 534, 535; A-127, 419
expeditionary airfield, 535; A-419
permanent airfield, 534; A-419
Pleiku,
permanent airfield, 534; A-127
ports, 534, 555; A-123-128, 307, 409, 414-420
construction status, A-308
inadequate for LOG TRAIN exercise, 533
Qui Nhon, 534, 535; A-127, 416
ammunition storage facilities, A-416
expeditionary airfield, 536; A-416
hospital facilities, A-416
POL facilities, A-416
port facilities, A-416
port status, A-410
real estate acquisition, 539; A-124
OSD policy, 539
Real Estate Board established, 539

requirements, 541; A-123
Saigon,
headquarters complex, A-419
hospital facilities,
army field hospital, 538
conversion of dependent school, 538
POL pipeline and storage facilities, A-419
port facilities,
Newport LST ramps, 534; A-419
port status, A-412
supply complex, 534, 535
Supplemental Military Construction Programs, 534; A-125
Tuy Hoa, 534
jet expeditionary airfield, A-416
Vung Tau, 534, A-127
ammunition storage, A-420
depot facilities, A-420
POL storage and sea terminal, A-420
port facilities, A-419
port status, A-412
Bien Hoa Airfield, 425, 462, 479, 569; A-127
Binh Dinh Province, 425, 428
deterioration, 451
refugees, 519
Binh Duong, 424, 425
blackmarket, 223, 454, 594; A-20
Ca Mau Peninsula, 435
Cam Ranh Bay, 532-535, 537; A-107, 125, 417-419
Can Tho, 550, A-127
Chu Lai, 454, 479, 534-536, 554; A-127, 415
Chu Pong, 472, 480
civil affairs,
bounty program, A-453
civic action by RVNAF, A-454
economic warfare, A 248-252
MACV program, A-251
HOP TAC pacification concept extended, A 231-248
MACV civic action program, A-255
medical civic action, A-455
Pacification Plan, A-243
pacification program, A 229-248
CHIEU HOI returnees, A-462
goals, A-311
MACV study and recommendations, A 233-240
role of MACV, JUSPAO, AID and CAS,
clarified by Ambassador, 245
Peoples Action Teams, A-62
MACV/CAS dual approach, A-403
placed under POLWAR Advisory Directorate, A-94
refugee problem, A-459
Rural Construction Program,
Joint Financial Management Team, A-133

organization, A-310
transferred from Comptroller to J3, A-133
VC prisoners and CHIEU HOI program, A-432
water supply program, A-461
Civilian Irregular Defense Group, 464, 468, 518; A-62, 63, 76, 272, 296 296
communications,
air navigation,
Decca Chain coverage, 525
LORAN/Decca approved, 526
LORAN site acquisition, 526
LORAN system, 526
requirements, 525
Armed Forces Radio, 485; A-394
AUTODIN,
extension program, 521
automatic telephone service,
MACV recommendations, 525
automatic telephone system plan, 525
AUTOVON,
extension program, 521
BACK PORCH tropo scatter terminals, A-377, 386
common user teletype relays,
Nha Trang addition, 524
OPLAN 32,
provisions for, 523
Phu Lam,
expansion, 523
conferences,
Apr in Hawaii, 527
Aug in Hawaii, 527
Oct in Hawaii, 527
CINCPAC/MACV in Nov, A-388
DCA sponsored (Dec in Hawaii), 521
CROSSBOW tropo scatter, A-378, 386
dial central offices,
integration plan, 521
dial central office telephone facilities, 525
MACV proposal, 526
CINCPAC requested consolidation, 527
MAP project, 526
southern toll system link, 526
dial toll system, 525
Integrated Wide Band Communications Systems, 520; A-378
additional trunks required, 520
Army tasked to prepare TPO, 520
contract awarded,
Page Communications Corp., 520; A-385
DCA plan, 520; A-379
approved by Sec Def, 520; A-379

Republic of Vietnam, communications - cont'd

restoral,
CINCPAC plan, 522
planning, 520; A-378
long lines,
MACV requirements presented, 521
system diagram, A-400
manual data relay center,
Danang tributary, 524
Nha Trang addition, 524
Phu Lam expansion, 524
Saigon tributary, 524
Tan Son Nhut tributary, 524
message back log, A-392
Military Affiliate Radio System, A-395
MILTELCOMM, 526
Nha Trang complex, 526
northern toll system microwave, 521; A-378, 387
personnel build-up, 527
problems, A-377
QUICK TALK secure voice, 44; A-390, 401
radio nets for operations, intelligence, advisors, A-387, 388
Saigon complex, 526
SEAsia systems management problems, A 379-396
CINCPAC review and recommendations, A-380-384
conflicting MACV/SecDef solutions, A-383
DCA control, A-383ff
DCA role, A 379-396
submarine cable,
Clark-Saigon link, 522; A-379
considered, 520
northern toll system link, 521
SYNCOM satellite,
declared operational, 524; A-378
test and terminal exchange, 524
teletype relays,
establishment plan, 521
television programming, 485
tropo scatter systems,
AN/MRC-98,
AF augmentation, 521
BACK PORCH and tactical,
assets absorbed, 521
comptroller advisory effort, A-133
construction, see base developments
contingency plan, 278
corps area map, 450
coup attempt, 451
crop destruction, 466
Danang, 452, 454, 479, 534, 550, 569; A-127, 415
demonstrations anti-government, 466
dissension in RVN naval headquarters, 438, 452; A-69, 87

Republic of Vietnam - cont'd

district headquarters abandoned, 454
Dong Ba Thin, 534
Dong Xoai, 454
economic problems,
effect of US build-up, 223, 594
inflation, 454, 466; A-20
MACV inflation countermeasures, 594
MPC blackmarket, 224
escape and evasion charts, 584
Father Hoa guerrillas, attacked by VC, 477
FULRO, see Montagnards
Free World Military Assistance Forces, 34, 161, 472, 457, 581; A-71, 74, 273, 353-373
Australian, 449, 457-460; A-71, 353, 358
Canada, A-353
CINCPAC manual on policy, A 354-357
deployments, A-291
force build-up, A-273
Free World Military Assistance Office, A-95
logistics support, 550; A-71
M16 rifles,
provision of, 482
New Zealand, 457-460; A-71, 354, 361
Philippines, 161-164; A-73, 368
Republic of China, A-73, 353, 370
political problem of intervention, A-371
Republic of Korea, 121, 282, 309, 449, 468, 472; A-72, 353, 363-368
MAP support arrangements, 472
support responsibility transferred, 581
Thailand, A-73, 354, 372; B-84
GVN defense budget, A-132
HOP TAC rural pacification program, A 231-248
Ia Drang, 1st Air Cav combat action, 385, 472; A-168
Iron Triangle area 173d Abn Bde sweep, 468
Joint Financial Management Team,
unable to function, A-133
Khmer Kampuchea Krom surrender, 463
Kien Hoa, 477
Kien Tuong,
VC factory and stores discovered, 479
Kontum, 451, 454
Le Thanh, 454
logistics, see also ammunition, MAP, POL and transportation
1st Logistical Command,
engineer construction group, 551
establishment, 548; A 104-106
recommended by CINCPAC, 548
Sec Def evaluation and approval, A-105
supply responsibility, A-107, 301

ammunition,
FLAGPOLE shortage report program, 579; A-115
CARE, A-104
cargo movements, A-306
CAS, A-104
CINCPAC/SEC DEF discussion, 552
component command systems, A-104
decentralized system at Qui Nhon and Nha Trang, A-108
development of support system, A-106
expanded post exchange facilities, 224, 594
expansion, A 103-136
FWMAF support, 472, 550, 581; A-71, 354
Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon, 546-553, 578; A-104, 301
function-transfer to 1st Log Cmd,
dental service, 553
port operations, 553
post exchange, 553
translation services, 553
functions transfer to USARV, A-108, 301
limitations and deficiencies, 548
stock level increase, 578
inadequacies of system, A-103
lines of communications, A-120
MACV concept, A-106, 301
key role of Cam Ranh Bay, A-107, 301
MACV staff changes, A-134
MACV support bases established, 550; A 105-109
MAP redistributable property transfer to US forces, 579
multiplicity of systems, 548; A-104
Naval Support Activity, Danang, established, 546; A-107
Navy responsibility for common items
CINCPAC decision, A-107, 301
Officer in Charge of Construction, 548; A-104
port and beach operations,
Army responsibility, 545; A-120
base supply depots for common items, 546
component responsibilities assigned, 545
congestion, 554; A-106, 118
CINCPAC/MACV actions to relieve, 556; A-119
PACOM Movements Priorities Control Agency, 556
facilities, 555
Navy responsibility, 545
ship activity, 557
types of cargo, A-118
PUSH supply system, A-109
shortage reports task force established, 579; A-119
spare parts program SLY LADY, 578
spare parts shortages, 578
Studies and Observation Group, A-104

Republic of Vietnam, logistics - cont'd

supply and maintenance, A 109-117
Class I, A-109
Class II and IV, A-110
Class III, A-111
Class V, A-114
M16 rifles provided, 482; A-445
RED BALL express system, A-116
Speed Thru Air Resupply program, A-116
troop support, A-117
supply requirements, A-109
USAID, A-104
US Embassy, A-104
Vietnamese National Railway, A-108
Marble Mountain, see base development and Danang
M16 rifles provided, 482; A-445
Mang Yang Pass,
attempt to open route, 451
Mekong River, 445
Metropole BEQ attacked, 480
Michelin Plantation combat action, 472
military leaders tour participation, 248
Military Assistance Program, 60, 77, 78, 481, 485, 581, 526, 579; A-70, 94, 128-131
DAML absorbed by MACV J4, A-94, 134
dollar ceilings,
FY 65 increases, A-129
FY 66 increase, 77,78; A-129
FY 67 determination, A-131
FY 66 to FY 71, 60
funding for television, 485
funding from FY 65-66 approved, 481
funding responsibility transferred to service budgets, 581
JSOP force increase, A-130
LSSL provided, 481
M16 rifles provided for RVNAF, A-130
MAP Directorate, A-95
OASD/ISA concern over proposed funding increase, A-130
operating cost fluxuations, A-131
peculiar characteristics, A-128
redistributable property transfer to US forces, 579
ship procurement, A-69
switchboard consolidation and interconnects, 526
VN Marines build-up plan, A-70
military payment certificates introduced, 224, 594
military situation, 478
beginning 1965, A-1
deterioration in Jan-Feb, 451
disruption of VC plans in Aug, 463
highest scale of VC attacks in Nov, 472
improvement in Mar-Apr, 452

Republic of Vietnam, military situation - cont'd

increased activity in Oct, 468
July, 460
larger VC attacks in May-June, 454
shift to central coastal areas in Sept, 466
Montagnards,
CIDG camp seized, A-348
FULRO members,
trial and execution, A-349
FULRO political movement, 464; A 347-352
FULRO rebellion,
MACV assessment, A-349
Gia Nghia rebellion, A-348
Y Bham Enoul, A-347
naval gunfire support, 35, 447, 454; A-56, 176-17[illegible]
Newport, 534
Nha Be,
POL terminal, 568
Nha Trang, 464, 524, 534, 550, 554; A-108, 411, 417
North Vietnam
infiltration, A-11
strength, A-13
increase, 468
Operations of RVN forces, 435, 452-454, 477-480; A-55, 162, 175, 217-228, 278
air,
A-1 and B-57 considered, 482
B-57 jet operations, A-83
combat losses, A-85, 309
FLAMING DART, 317-323
need for first success, 321
informal operational control by MACV, 328
ROLLING THUNDER,
advance planning information,
problem of limiting, 338
first strikes, 326
VNAF participation required, 331
VNAF role, 337
amphibious, A-175
anti-infiltration performance poor, 435, A-55
ground,
7th ARVN Regiment, 472
7th Division capture of arms cache, 477
21st Division clash with NVN unit, 477
22nd Division action, 479
Binh Duong action, 480
BLUE MARLIN, A-228
DAN CHI, 452, A-218
DAN THANH, A-223
canal and paddy areas, 480
defeat of three battalions, 454, 479

Republic of Vietnam, operations of RVN forces, ground - cont'd
Dong Xoi action, 479
Duc Co action, 479
general reserves drawn into II Corps, 477
Hoai An action, 477
Le Thanh abandoned, 479
LIEN KET, A-162
Michelin plantation action, A-224
NGUYEN VAN NHO, A-227
piecemeal commitment, 477
PIRANHA, 479
QUYET THANG, A-217
ranger battalion, 480
Regional Forces,
Bu Prang defense, 480
Route 19, 479
Song Be action, 454, 477, 479
TIEN GIANG, A-219
Tou Mourong action, 454, 479
TU LUC, A-221
U Minn forest action, 477
VC factory and stores discovered, 479
missions; A-278
naval,
evaluation of effectiveness, A-88
Junk and River Forces, 435; A-67, 69
Vung Ro Bay sinking of VC gun runner, 477
Phan Rang, 534-536; A-127, 419
Phu Bon, 454
Phu Quoc, 446
Phu Yen,
deterioration, 451
Phuoc Thanh, 425
Plei Mei,
attack on CIDG camp, 468, 480; A-169
Pleiku, 429, 451, 454, A-168
deterioration, 451
forward element for TIGER HOUND, 411
VC attack on US installation, 477
POL,
commercial enterprises,
Caltex system, A-111
dependence on, 568; A-111
ESSO Lien Chieu terminal, 570; A-111
protection, 569, A-112
Shell system, A-111
consumption, A-302
distribution system established, 570; A 111-113
facilities, 569; A 111-113, 415-420
Nha Be, 568; A-112
Tan Son Nhut, 569; A-112
floating storage tankers, 569; A-112

Republic of Vietnam, POL - cont'd

SLAT facilities construction, 567
Subic Bay emergency tankers, 569
supply status, A-113
political problems, A-16
port and air facilities, 555
Poulo Condores, 442
psychological operations,
component command representation, 512
Corps Propaganda Center,
activated, 510
enemy action, A-451
evaluation, 513
FACT SHEET leaflet program in NVN, 513-516; A-458
CINCPAC authority questioned, 514
CINCPAC authority resolved by Washington, 514
integration, A-252-256
Joint US Public Affairs Office, Saigon, 511, 512; A 402,458
establishment, A-253, 448-460
role clarified, A-245, 448-461, 458
organization, A-312
leaflet operations, A-458
objectives, A-450
PACOM leaflet guide,
published by ARPAC, 516
Political Warfare Directorate,
established, 512; A-94, 253, 448-461, 458
RAND Corporation Research, A-457
analysis of VC motivation, 510
Republic of China aid to RVN, A-448
rewards for information on NLF leaders, 510
surrender of Khmer dissident group, 463
troop action, A-450
US/FWMAF troop indoctrination, A-255
VC motivation, 510
VC vulnerabilities, 510
public affairs conference, 54
Quang Ngai,
increased VC operations, 451
Quang Tin, 426, 429
Quang Tri City,
US personnel incident, 467
Qui Nhon, 534-536, 550, 554; A-108, 410, 416
Marine landing, 461
refugees,
increased by flood and VC, 579
recruitment for Regional and Popular Forces, 519
research and development, 110, 433, 483-485, 593; A-49, 51, 68, 436, 439
rural construction, see civil affairs, pacification program

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

RVNAF
10th Division formation approved, 481
actions by CINCPAC to improve military capabilities, 477-486

Air Force,
improvement study by Chief AF Advisory Group, A-66
strength increase, A-64, 65, 272
capability against NVN/CHICOM threat, A-421
CIDG, A-62, 272, 296
advisory effort, A-76
conversion to regular force considered, A-63
desertion rates, A-59, 270
dispositions, 471-475
draft deferment policy of US Mission Council, A-406
increases, 480, 481; A-61, 129, 272, 293-297
deferred to reconstitute battle losses, 291; A-35
difficulties in achieving, A-57
JSOP 70/71 updating, A-130
moratorium, A-35
Marines, A-70, 272
missions, A-278
National Police, A-64
Navy,
evaluation of effectiveness, A-88
LSSL transferred from Japan, A-68
MAP ship procurement, A-69
mutiny, 438, 452; A-69, 87
River Assault Groups, 435; A-67, 69
strength, A-67, 69, 272
Navy and Marine Corps separated, A-90
Popular Forces, 519; A-61-64, 272, 295
build-up, A-294
Regional Force, 519
build-up, A-294
Regular Force,
build-up, A-293
organization, A-57, 292
US advisors increased, 481
US encadrement considered, A-81
Saigon, 224, 534, 538, 551
Saigon-Danhim power line interrupted, 479
scout dogs employed, A-445
Seven Mountains area, 463
SKOSHI TIGER evaluation, 110, 112
Song Be VC attack, 454, 479
Special Pay for Duty Subject fo Hostile Fire, 585
Tan Hiep Airfield overrun, 472
Tan Son Nhut, 444, 538, 569; A-127, 415
POL facilities, 569

[redacted]

Republic of Vietnam, POL - cont'd

SLAT facilities construction, 567
Subic Bay emergency tankers, 569
supply status, A-113
political problems, A-16
port and air facilities, 555
Poulo Condores, 442
psychological operations,
component command representation, 512
Corps Propaganda Center,
activated, 510
enemy action, A-451
evaluation, 513
FACT SHEET leaflet program in NVN, 513-516; A-458
CINCPAC authority questioned, 514
CINCPAC authority resolved by Washington, 514
integration, A-252-256
Joint US Public Affairs Office, Saigon, 511, 512; A 402,458
establishment, A-253, 448-460
role clarified, A-245, 448-461, 458
organization, A-312
leaflet operations, A-458
objectives, A-450
PACOM leaflet guide,
published by ARPAC, 516
Political Warfare Directorate,
established, 512; A-94, 253, 448-461, 458
RAND Corporation Research, A-457
analysis of VC motivation, 510
Republic of China aid to RVN, A-448
rewards for information on NLF leaders, 510
surrender of Khmer dissident group, 463
troop action, A-450
US/FWMAF troop indoctrination, A-255
VC motivation, 510
VC vulnerabilities, 510
public affairs conference, 54
Quang Ngai,
increased VC operations, 451
Quang Tin, 426, 429
Quang Tri City,
US personnel incident, 467
Qui Nhon, 534-536, 550, 554; A-108, 410, 416
Marine landing, 461
refugees,
increased by flood and VC, 579
recruitment for Regional and Popular Forces, 519
research and development, 110, 433, 483-485, 593; A-49, 51, 68, 436, 439
rural construction, see civil affairs, pacification program

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

RVNAF
10th Division formation approved, 481
actions by CINCPAC to improve military capabilities, 477-486

Air Force,
improvement study by Chief AF Advisory Group, A-66
strength increase, A-64, 65, 272
capability against NVN/CHICOM threat, A-421
CIDG, A-62, 272, 296
advisory effort, A-76
conversion to regular force considered, A-63
desertion rates, A-59, 270
dispositions, 471-475
draft deferment policy of US Mission Council, A-406
increases, 480, 481; A-61, 129, 272, 293-297
deferred to reconstitute battle losses, 291; A-35
difficulties in achieving, A-57
JSOP 70/71 updating, A-130
moratorium, A-35
Marines, A-70, 272
missions, A-278
National Police, A-64
Navy,
evaluation of effectiveness, A-88
LSSL transferred from Japan, A-68
MAP ship procurement, A-69
mutiny, 438, 452; A-69, 87
River Assault Groups, 435; A-67, 69
strength, A-67, 69, 272
Navy and Marine Corps separated, A-90
Popular Forces, 519; A-61-64, 272, 295
build-up, A-294
Regional Force, 519
build-up, A-294
Regular Force,
build-up, A-293
organization, A-57, 292
US advisors increased, 481
US encadrement considered, A-81
Saigon, 224, 534, 538, 551
Saigon-Danhim power line interrupted, 479
scout dogs employed, A-445
Seven Mountains area, 463
SKOSHI TIGER evaluation, 110, 112
Song Be VC attack, 454, 479
Special Pay for Duty Subject fo Hostile Fire, 585
Tan Hiep Airfield overrun, 472
Tan Son Nhut, 444, 538, 569; A-127, 415
POL facilities, 569

[redacted]

[redacted]

Tay Ninh, 426
tet holiday, 449
Thuan Manh, 454
Tou Mourong,454
transportation,
airlift, A-123, 306
C-130 augmentation, 574
cargo movement, A-306
MATS,
Alameda/Danang cargo mail, 574
extension to Cam Ranh Bay/Danang, 573
Sec Def review, 574
terminal base facilities critical, 287
cargo movement, A-306
highways, A-304
over-the-road, A-122, 304
port and air facilities, 555, A 409-420
railroads, A-122, 303
status, A-303
sealift,
Army lighterage increased, 561
lighterage of ammunition thru Danang, 562
salvage capability for clearing waterways, 538
shallow draft,
critical requirement, 558
increased, 560
pending actions, 560
Tuy Hoa, 534
U Minh forest, 477
United Front for Liberation of Oppressed Races, 464
US dependents evacuated, 323
US Embassy bombed, 477
US Mission Council, Saigon, 510, A-458
economic warfare, A-249
establishment and organization; A-402
inflationary effect of construction program, A-22
Inter-US Agency Orientation Program, A-405
joint US prisoner recovery center proposed, 586
pacification program, A-230; 244
Provincial Team Chief program, A-231, 404
review of GVN defense budget, A-132
RVN draft deferment policy, A-406
security problem, A-427
VC execution of US captives, A-429
US personnel,
location of, 549
US public gifts to US troops, 594
US military forces, status
in early 1965 ;;A-28, 37, 46, 54, 57, 64, 70, 71
use of riot control agents, 223

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Viet Cong, see also Highlights of 1965, 477-480
attacks, A-282, 284
Bien Hoa, 317
Brinks BOQ, 317
Chu Lai, 479
Danang, 479
Dong Xoai, 454
Father Hoa's guerrillas, 477
Metropole BEQ, 480
Pleiku, 451, 477
Pleiku billet, 318
Plei Mei, 468, 480
Qui Nhon billet, 322
base areas, A-289
bases disrupted, A-421
bombing of US Embassy, 477
captives,
policy for handling, A-431
casualties, A-283
incidents, A-267
propaganda, A-287
sabotage, A-286
terrorism, A-285
logistic system, A-11
losses, 479
motivation, 510
operations during 1965, A-4
psychological vulnerabilities, 510
strength increase, 468
by infiltration/recruitment, 473-476
tactics, A-9
terrorism, 452
US personnel held, 587
Viet Cong/NVN,
courses of action, A-14
force strength, A-268
Viet Minh, 304
Vinh Binh, 426
Vung Ro Bay,
VC ammunition ship, 436; A-54
Vung Tau, 444, 534, 550
War Zone D, 426
White Turban Gang, 463
Research and Development,
Advanced Research Projects Agency - Agile, 484; A-439
Thai combat ration, B-51
Air Force Test Unit - Vietnam, A-439
Army Concept Team in Vietnam, A-439
conference,
conclusions, 483
March in Hawaii, 483

[redacted]

Research and Development, conference - cont'd
August in Hawaii, 485
Joint Research and Test Activity,
establishment, A-439
objectives, A-439
MACV list of priority problems, 483
Navy Research and Development Unit, A-439
Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 483
PROVOST program,
initiated, 484
priority objectives in RVN, 484
RVN funding decision, 484
RVN river patrol, A-68
SKOSHI TIGER F-5 evaluation program, 110; A-49, 51
Rest and Recreation Program
CINCPAC Team,
recommended expansion, 593; A-435
MACV request to expand, 590
Riot Control Agents,
authority for use confirmed by OSD, 223
use in RVN, 223; A-444
Risner, Lt Col, 394
ROADRUNNER, ground operation, A-171
ROLLING THUNDER, see Operations of US Forces, and Intelligence, photo reconnaissance
Roraback, SSgt, 588
Rosson, Maj Gen, A-93
ROUND-UP, Operation, 51
Rowan, Director USIA, A-253
Rules of Engagement,
air operations in RVN,
new dimensions, A-182
Australian Army Forces Vietnam, 460
B-52 strike, 426
BARREL ROLL, 394, 401
BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER, A-211
bombing thru overcast, 408
Cambodia,
air strikes, 412
air space, 338
MARKET TIME, 442
CHICOM border area, 379, 380
FARM GATE, 414, 420; A-47
FC-47 operations, 412
importance to commanders,
CINCPAC instruction, 335
leaflet operations in NVN, 515
MARKET TIME, 440-443; A-173
naval gunfire support, A-177
publicity, 410
ROLLING THUNDER constraints, 330, 379

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

Rules of Engagement - cont'd

SAR aircraft in Laos, 504
STEEL TIGER, 404
US aircraft in Laos, 506
Rusk, Secretary of State, 214, 236, 384

S

Sanborn, Maj Gen, 155
Sangley Point, 444
Sarit Thanarat, Prime Minister, B-133
Sato, Prime Minister, 221
Scherger, Air Chief Marshal, 458
command relations, 460
SEACOORD, see Conferences
Search and Rescue, see Operations of US Forces
SEATO,
air ground support policy document, 192
alert and readiness system approved, 190
assessment of manning and workloads, 189, 195
Australia,
assumed responsibility for French paper, 197, 200
nominates for Head of Plans, 188
Chief Military Planning Officer,
changed, 185
proposed roster for position rotation, 209
CINCPAC,
assumed responsibility for French position papers, 197, 200
informed Pakistan MILAD on TORs, 211
participation in LOG TRAIN exercise, 203
participation in SEA HORSE exercise, 205
sponsorship of LOG TRAIN exercise, 203
support of, 185-212
Commander Central Region SEATO Field Forces, 191, 193, 201
headquarters moved to Korat for LOG TRAIN, 204
communications,
annex for Plan 4 rewritten, 202
lack of designated field force headquarters, 202
Thai base system inadequate, 202
TOR for C-E committee revised, 202
communist subversive and insurgent threat, 199
conferences,
Cartographic Committee Sixth Meeting, 199
Cartographic Committee Seventh Meeting, 200
Central Region Field Forces Movements Conference, 201
Communications-Electronics Committee Eighth Meeting, 202
Intelligence Assessment Committee Fifth Meeting, 199
Intelligence Meeting,
INT 9M, 196
INT 10M, 196
INT 11M, 196-198

[redacted]

August in Hawaii, 485
Joint Research and Test Activity,
establishment, A-439
objectives, A-439
MACV list of priority problems, 483
Navy Research and Development Unit, A-439
Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 483
PROVOST program,
initiated, 484
priority objectives in RVN, 484
RVN funding decision, 484
RVN river patrol, A-68
SKOSHI TIGER F-5 evaluation program, 110; A-49, 51
Rest and Recreation Program
CINCPAC Team,
recommended expansion, 593; A-435
MACV request to expand, 590
Riot Control Agents,
authority for use confirmed by OSD, 223
use in RVN, 223; A-444
Risner, Lt Col, 394
ROADRUNNER, ground operation, A-171
ROLLING THUNDER, see Operations of US Forces, and Intelligence, photo reconnaissance
Roraback, SSgt, 588
Rosson, Maj Gen, A-93
ROUND-UP, Operation, 51
Rowan, Director USIA, A-253
Rules of Engagement,
air operations in RVN,
new dimensions, A-182
Australian Army Forces Vietnam, 460
B-52 strike, 426
BARREL ROLL, 394, 401
BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER, A-211
bombing thru overcast, 408
Cambodia,
air strikes, 412
air space, 338
MARKET TIME, 442
CHICOM border area, 379, 380
FARM GATE, 414, 420; A-47
FC-47 operations, 412
importance to commanders,
CINCPAC instruction, 335
leaflet operations in NVN, 515
MARKET TIME, 440-443; A-173
naval gunfire support, A-177
publicity, 410
ROLLING THUNDER constraints, 330, 379

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Rules of Engagement - cont'd

SAR aircraft in Laos, 504
STEEL TIGER, 404
US aircraft in Laos, 506
Rusk, Secretary of State, 214, 236, 384

S

Sanborn, Maj Gen, 155
Sangley Point, 444
Sarit Thanarat, Prime Minister, B-133
Sato, Prime Minister, 221
Scherger, Air Chief Marshal, 458
command relations, 460
SEACOORD, see Conferences
Search and Rescue, see Operations of US Forces
SEATO,
air ground support policy document, 192
alert and readiness system approved, 190
assessment of manning and workloads, 189, 195
Australia,
assumed responsibility for French paper, 197, 200
nominates for Head of Plans, 188
Chief Military Planning Officer,
changed, 185
proposed roster for position rotation, 209
CINCPAC,
assumed responsibility for French position papers, 197, 200
informed Pakistan MILAD on TORs, 211
participation in LOG TRAIN exercise, 203
participation in SEA HORSE exercise, 205
sponsorship of LOG TRAIN exercise, 203
support of, 185-212
Commander Central Region SEATO Field Forces, 191, 193, 201
headquarters moved to Korat for LOG TRAIN, 204
communications,
annex for Plan 4 rewritten, 202
lack of designated field force headquarters, 202
Thai base system inadequate, 202
TOR for C-E committee revised, 202
communist subversive and insurgent threat, 199
conferences,
Cartographic Committee Sixth Meeting, 199
Cartographic Committee Seventh Meeting, 200
Central Region Field Forces Movements Conference, 201
Communications-Electronics Committee Eighth Meeting, 202
Intelligence Assessment Committee Fifth Meeting, 199
Intelligence Meeting,
INT 9M, 196
INT 10M, 196
INT 11M, 196-198

[redacted]

SEATO, conferences - cont'd

Logistic Committee Sixth Meeting, 200
Military Advisors Conference 22, 188-193
Military Advisors Conference 23, 193-196
Military Advisors Conference 24, 196
Military Advisors Conference 25, 196
POL conference, 201
role in four power talks, 219
counter-subversion matters, 194
Deputy Chief of Military Planning Office changed, 185
France,
position in SEATO, 208
preparation of position papers relinquished, 210
procedure for handling French papers, 209
proposal to combine mapping agreements, 200
reduced participation in MA22, 208
withdrawal from SEA HORSE exercise, 208
withdrawal of MILADREP, 209
headquarters construction, 194
Intelligence Committee Terms of Reference, 197
key positions, 186
changes, 185
lack of progress in Western Region Plan 4, 192
Logistic Handbook updated, 200
Ministerial Council, 203
MPO assistance to Plan 4 commanders, 191, 193
organization chart, 187
orientation course, 207
increase to two per year recommended, 208
scheduling, 207
Pakistan,
divergent view of communist threat, 211
observer status at INT 11M, 212
observer status at MA 23, 212
Philippines,
concern with Indonesian threat, 193
cooperation at INT 11M, 198
Plan 4, 191, 192, 193, 201, 202, 203, 220
Plan 5 references deleted, 190
Plan 6, 191
Plan 7, 191
Terms of Reference study, 189
Thailand,
active at INT 11M, 198
concern with Cambodia threat, 198
nominates for CMPO, 188
reluctance in C-E support, 203
threat estimate updated, 196-198
training exercises,
forecast for 1968 to 1971, 195
LOG TRAIN, 203
RVN port facilities inadequate, 533

[redacted]

reduced commitments to PX-31, 196
sand model maneuver, 207
SEA HORSE, 205
US nominates for Deputy Chief MPO, 188
US personnel strength in Thailand, 589
Sharp, Admiral, see also CINCPAC, 110, 111, 148, 153, 185, 188, 194 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 229, 230, 239, 248, 547
cease-fire disadvantages of, 384
FLAMING DART readiness,
JCS informed of, 319
force requirements submitted for CY 66, 308
importance of restrictions,
commanders instructed, 335
MACV directed to relinquish control of mainland air forces to during FLAMING DART, 322
meeting with Australia/New Zealand representatives, 458
NVN added pressures suggested, 320, 324
NVN low-level photography proposed, 325
psy-ops and ROLLING THUNDER,
intensification recommended, 336
readiness posture,
raised, 322
reduced, 323
reprisal order, 317
retaliation for Qui Nhon bombing recommended, 322
ROLLING THUNDER demonstration ,
US air power expanded, 336
Thai forces needed in Mekong, 292
Thai security force establishment, 491
US aircraft operation in RVN proposed, 320, 325
SHINING BRASS,
ground reconnaissance, 430; A-78
Side Looking Airborne Radar, 330
SILVER BAYONET, see Operations of US Forces, ground
SKOSHI TIGER, F-5 operational evaluation, 110, 482
SLY LADY, spare parts shortage program, 578
Smith, SSgt, 588
South China Sea,
special landing force maintained afloat, 452
Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister, 389, 504
Soviet Russia,
cargo ship MINSK, 445
cargo ship POLOTSK, 444
force changes, 23
interference with Soviet intelligence collection, 41
Kamchatka Peninsula ICBM firings, 39
Kosygin visit to Hanoi, 318
missiles,ICBM firings, 39
trawlers harass US carriers, 448
SPECIAL EXPRESS, AF ammunition supply, 562

[redacted]

[redacted]

Logistic Committee Sixth Meeting, 200
Military Advisors Conference 22, 188-193
Military Advisors Conference 23, 193-196
Military Advisors Conference 24, 196
Military Advisors Conference 25, 196
POL conference, 201
role in four power talks, 219
counter-subversion matters, 194
Deputy Chief of Military Planning Office changed, 185
France,
position in SEATO, 208
preparation of position papers relinquished, 210
procedure for handling French papers, 209
proposal to combine mapping agreements, 200
reduced participation in MA22, 208
withdrawal from SEA HORSE exercise, 208
withdrawal of MILADREP, 209
headquarters construction, 194
Intelligence Committee Terms of Reference, 197
key positions, 186
changes, 185
lack of progress in Western Region Plan 4, 192
Logistic Handbook updated, 200
Ministerial Council, 203
MPO assistance to Plan 4 commanders, 191, 193
organization chart, 187
orientation course, 207
increase to two per year recommended, 208
scheduling, 207
Pakistan,
divergent view of communist threat, 211
observer status at INT 11M, 212
observer status at MA 23, 212
Philippines,
concern with Indonesian threat, 193
cooperation at INT 11M, 198
Plan 4, 191, 192, 193, 201, 202, 203, 220
Plan 5 references deleted, 190
Plan 6, 191
Plan 7, 191
Terms of Reference study, 189
Thailand,
active at INT 11M, 198
concern with Cambodia threat, 198
nominates for CMPO, 188
reluctance in C-E support, 203
threat estimate updated, 196-198
training exercises,
forecast for 1968 to 1971, 195
LOG TRAIN, 203
RVN port facilities inadequate, 533

[redacted]

[redacted]

reduced commitments to PX-31, 196
sand model maneuver, 207
SEA HORSE, 205
US nominates for Deputy Chief MPO, 188
US personnel strength in Thailand, 589
Sharp, Admiral, see also CINCPAC, 110, 111, 148, 153, 185, 188, 194 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 229, 230, 239, 248, 547
cease-fire disadvantages of, 384
FLAMING DART readiness,
JCS informed of, 319
force requirements submitted for CY 66, 308
importance of restrictions,
commanders instructed, 335
MACV directed to relinquish control of mainland air forces to during FLAMING DART, 322
meeting with Australia/New Zealand representatives, 458
NVN added pressures suggested, 320, 324
NVN low-level photography proposed, 325
psy-ops and ROLLING THUNDER,
intensification recommended, 336
readiness posture,
raised, 322
reduced, 323
reprisal order, 317
retaliation for Qui Nhon bombing recommended, 322
ROLLING THUNDER demonstration ,
US air power expanded, 336
Thai forces needed in Mekong, 292
Thai security force establishment, 491
US aircraft operation in RVN proposed, 320, 325
SHINING BRASS,
ground reconnaissance, 430; A-78
Side Looking Airborne Radar, 330
SILVER BAYONET, see Operations of US Forces, ground
SKOSHI TIGER, F-5 operational evaluation, 110, 482
SLY LADY, spare parts shortage program, 578
Smith, SSgt, 588
South China Sea,
special landing force maintained afloat, 452
Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister, 389, 504
Soviet Russia,
cargo ship MINSK, 445
cargo ship POLOTSK, 444
force changes, 23
interference with Soviet intelligence collection, 41
Kamchatka Peninsula ICBM firings, 39
Kosygin visit to Hanoi, 318
missiles,ICBM firings, 39
trawlers harass US carriers, 448
SPECIAL EXPRESS, AF ammunition supply, 562

[redacted]

Special Forces, see also Operations of US Forces, Psychological Operations and US Army
5th Special Forces Group, A-37
advisory effort, A 76-79
ammunition requirements, 578
Apache Force, A-78
CINCPAC concept of operations in Laos, 304
Civilian Irregular Defense Group,
advisory function, 518
camp at Plei Mei, 468
motivational program, A-78
recommended increase, 518
Special Forces detachments, 518
uprising of Montagnards, 464
contingency B-52 tactical support of isolated camps, 431
Delta Force, A-78
Khe Sanh, 431
location of UW training units in PACOM, 517
MACV operations concept, A-148
Mike Force, A-78
Nung reaction forces, A-79
Plei Mrong, 431
Polei Djereng, 431
SHINING BRASS, A-78, 465
Special Operations Center, Pacific,
established on Okinawa, 519
training of refugee recruits for regional and popular forces, 519
training units,
1st Air Commando Squadron in RVN, 517
1st Special Forces in Korea, 517
1st Special Forces in Taiwan, 517
5th Special Forces Group in RVN, 517; A-79
19th ACS in RVN, 517
19th TASS in RVN, 517
20th TASS in RVN, 517
21st TASS in RVN, 517
22nd TASS in RVN, 517
309 ACS in RVN, 517
310 ACS in RVN, 517
311 ACS in RVN, 517
Det 6 ACS,
WATER PUMP in Thailand, 517
USMC Recon Detachment in RVN, 517
USN SEAL MTT in RVN, 517
Special Logistics Actions, Thailand, 553, 564; B-5, 111
Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire,
CINCPAC Instruction 7220.5, 585
DOD/CINCPAC discussion, 585
DOD Instruction 1340.6, 585
revised to include RVN sea areas and Laos, 585

Special Operations Center Pacific - 5/6

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

SPRING HIGH, anti-missile operation, 377
STARLIGHT, Marine ground operation, 385, 463
Status of Forces Agreements, see also Australia, Japan, Okinawa, Philippines, Republic of China, Republic of Korea
CINCPAC activities, 226-237
German-NATO formula influence, 227, 228
interrelationship in PACOM, 226
PACOM workshop, 228
STEEL TIGER, see also Intelligence, photo reconnaissance
Southern Laos anti-infiltration air operations, 402-419
Stilwell, Maj Gen,
biography, B-iv
replaced Gen Easterbrook as MACTHAI, 313
Strategic Concept,
abandonment of Hawaii as base, 23
Strategic Mobility Capability Plan, 89
Strategic Priorities,
Australia and New Zealand, 34
Strategic Reserve of Merchant-Type Shipping, 559
STRIKE Command,
provision of replacement brigade, 456
Stumpel, Sergeant, 237
Sukarno, President, 179
Sullivan, Ambassador, 389, 393, 504, 580
aircraft loan requested for Laos, 505
coordination of BARREL ROLL air strikes, 390
napalm use disapproved, 406
request for additional helicopters, 502
request for M1 carbine conversion kits, 507

T

Targets, see Intelligence
Taiwan, see Republic of China
Taylor, Ambassador, 321, 393
questioned CINCPAC authority over FACT SHEET, 514
Television,
RVN program, 485
Television Associates of Indiana,
Thai telephone system, B-101
Thailand, see also MAP and SEATO
aircraft,
C-119G considered, 96
C-123 programming, 72
CH-34C, 496
F-4C deployment, 285

F-5 program, 107, 113, 496
acceleration, 109
CINCPAC recommends retention, 108
CSAF proposes early delivery, 108
curtailment suggested by JUSMAG, 107
programming, 72
F-84, B-9
F-86, B-9
F-105s deployed, 285
F-105 based in Thailand for WHIPLASH, 403
KC-135 for increased POL requirements, 566
S-2A ASW acquisition supported by CINCPAC, 168
T-28, 496
MAP equipment approved, 494
transfer from RVN, 506
programming, 72
T-37, 496
helicopter facilities needed, 115
helicopter requirements, 115
air defense,
AC&W system,
agreement reached, B-92
divergent evaluations, B-94
equipment and sites, B-87
negotiations with RTG, B-90
concern of Thai officials, B-37
improvement recommended by CINCPAC, B-40
M-42/M-55 artillery, 496
requirements, 497; B 38-40
air operations base, 338
Thai requirement for silence on US use, 338; B-22
airfield improvement, 498; B-110
Ammunition Manufacturing Plant, B-53
assistance and participation,
US proposed increase, 495; B-26
Bangkok,
air defense, B-38
considered for R&R area, 590
SEATO conferences, 198, 199, 201, 202, 209
Bang Ping, 524, B-96
Bang Pla, water supply problem, B-97
Bang Sue, B-94
Bangsung, B-93
base development,
airfield improvement, 498, B-106-112
Bangkok By-Pass Road, 73, 543; B-114
delay, 543
Kabin Buri-Korat extension approved, 543
CINCPAC planning, 541
construction location and costs, 544
construction personnel,
conflicting requirements, 543

Thailand, base development - cont'd

Seabee Technical Assistance Teams requested, 543
Emergency Military Construction Program, 542
LOCs, 543
MACTHAI concept and plan requested, 543
real estate acquisition, 539
real estate policy, 539
Sattahip,
air base, 543; B-110
major logistic base, 541; B-103
Siracha POL port, 541; B-107, 113
US facilities program, B-107
base requirements for US use, 495, 541
Thai concern over magnitude, B-26
bilateral planning with US, 493, 497
Camp Essayors, 543
cargo for Burma backlogged, 183
Chieng Mai, 73
TACAN system, 494; B-94
CINCPAC,
actions to improve military capabilities, 486-498
concept of US operations, 304
Performance Evaluation Report, 171; B-94
communications,
agreement on Bang Ping/Bang Pla facilities, B-96
air navigation site acquisition, 526
automatic telephone system plan, 525; B-101
background of development, B-13
common user teletype relays,
Bangkok, 523
Korat addition, 524
OPLAN 32 provisions, 523
improvements, B 95-102
manual data relay center,
Bangkok addition, 524
SYNCOM satellite, 524; B-98
telephone system, 203; B-101
toll telephone network, B-101
UK/STRATCOM joint use, B-98
VHF trunk project RED MARBLE, B-99
wide band systems, 520; B-100
additional trunks required, 520
Army tasked to prepare TPO, 520
contract let to Philco Corp., 520
DCA developed plan, 520
Indonesia MAP equipment use, 521
plan approved by Sec Def, 520
concern about Cambodia threat, 198
construction programming, 73
construction projects, 544
battalion posts in the north, B-64
RCT post at Cholburi, B-61

[redacted]

Thailand - cont'd

contingency plan, 278
deployments of US forces, 285
Don Muang Airfield, 73, 566
air defense requirements, 497; B-38
economic indicators, B-app B
escape and evasion charts, 584
gold flow restrictions on construction, B-64
Green Hill, B-93
host for LOG TRAIN exercise, 203
Kabin Buri, 543
Klong Toey, 566
Kokethiem Air Base, 73, 494
Korat, 203, 524, 543; B-93, 114
9th Log Cmd, 553
air defense requirements, 497; B-38
logistics, see also base developments, Military Assistance Program, and POL
9th Logistical Command,
construction planning, 553
expansion, 553
mission, 553
POL terminal operation, 554; B-112
port operation, 554
Special Logistic Actions, Thailand, 553, 564; B-5, 111
support in wartime, 87
requirements for OPLANS 32 and 39, 89
use of MAP S-2 summaries for planning, 91
Military Assistance Program, see also communications, and POL, 60, 78, 116, 168; B-10, 28, 40-47, 64, 71, 100-109, 136
AC&W system, B-87
AGE for T-28s, 494
airfield improvement, 498; B-109
Ambassador add-ons placed in shortfall, 71
appraisal by ASD/ISA, 78
CINCPAC non-concurrence, 82
CINCPAC FY 66 and FY 67, 71; B-102
construction,
Kokethiem Air Base, 494
master plan for 6 yrs completed, B-12
Nan and Sakol Nakorn posts, 494, B-64
POL storage, 494; A-106-114
Special Operations Centers, B-45
dissatisfaction of Thai officials, 492
dollar ceilings,
FY 66 increase, 78; B-102
FY 66 to FY 71, 60
Force Objectives Study by JUSMAG THAI, 492
funding VHF communications, B-100
funding priority equal to Laos/RVN urged, 493
increase of FY 65 approved by OSD, 492,494; B-102
increase of FY 66 approved, 495; B-102

[redacted]

[redacted]

increase of FY 67, 496
investment program, 72
MAP Directorate joint staff status, B-29
medical service, B-10
naval craft,
LSSL provided from Japan, 168
MSF/PCE conversion, 72
patrol capabilities, 168
PCE conversion from MSF, 168
small craft requirements, 116
reorganization, B-28
revitalization of, 495; B-40
Sattahip development, B-103
SLAT POL pipeline, 564
tactical air navigation system, 494
telephone cables, 494
training, B-10, 47
vehicle deadline rate, B-49
vehicles,
LVTs, B-86
M-41 tanks and M113 personnel carriers, 72; B-43
village/hamlet radio program, B-136
military leaders tour participation, 248
Mukdahan, B-93
Nakhon Phanom, 503; B-93
Nan, 494, B-64
Narattwat, B-66
participation in SEA HORSE exercise, 205
passport requirements for US personnel, 213
Pattani Battalion, B-66
Performance Evaluation Group inspection of Deputy Chief JUSMAG, 171
Phitsanuloke, B 94
photographic reconnaissance, 433
Phu Mu, B-94
POL, 553; B-106-116
additional KC-135s at Takhli,
problems associated with, 567
distribution facility analysis, 566; B-113
pipeline,
Bangkok/Siracha, 564; B 106-116
negotiation, 565; B-114
permanent line approved from Siracha to Don Muang, 567; B-106, 114
Special Logistics Actions Thailand, 564; B-111
RTA storage facilities required, B-54
storage facilities Udorn/Ubon/Korat, B-114
Takhli facility, 566; B-108
preventive maintenance,
inadequate, B-48
vehicle deadline rate, B-49

[redacted]

[redacted]

Project 009, B-59
Project 22, see Bilateral Planning, OPLANS, Operations Planning
Replacement Training Center Pranburi,
non-utilization, B-56
research and development,
combat ration development, B-51
Royal Thai Air Force,
F-84/F-86 transition, B-9
dispositions, B-app E
Military Assistance, 1950-1956, B-8
relocation of flying school, 567, B-109
Royal Thai Armed Forces,
bilateral improvement effort, B-40
Fourth Tactical Composite Squadron, 73
National Defense College, curriculum improved, 498
Royal Thai Army,
conscription policy, B-57
dispositions, B-app E
Military Assistance, 1950-1956, B-6
strengths, B-57
Royal Thai Marines,
logistics, A-86
LVT requirements and provisions, B-86
personnel problems, B-85
planning limitations, B-85
readiness, B-85
training, B-85
Royal Thai Navy,
dockyard,
management improvement, 170; B-105
MTTs provided, 170
shore bases, B-app E
Royal Thai Navy and Marines,
Military Assistance 1950-1956, B-7
R&R program, A-436
Sakol Nakorn, 494; B-64
Sattahip, 541; B-94, 103-105
air defense requirements, 497; B-38
stationing of air carrier units at, 243
security,
Bangkok, 491; B-118
Communist Suppression Headquarters,
established, B-133
developments, 486-491; B 117-136
Kalasin Province, B-118
Mobile Development Units, B-133
Nakhon Phanon Province, 487; B-117, 119-125
National Security Command, B-120, 132, 134
negotiations, 491
Rand Corporation study, B-19

[redacted]

Thailand, security - cont'd

Sakhon Nakhon Province, 489; B-64, 118
Sisaket Province, 490
situation map, 488
Surat Thani Province, 490
Thailand Independence Movement, B-118, 122
Ubon Province, 490
US personnel and facilities, 491; B-107, 125-129
agreement, B-127
village/hamlet radio program, B-135
Yala Province, 491
Siracha, 541
Special Forces MTT, B 129-133
STARCOM, 73; B-4
Status of Forces Agreements,
US desire to avoid, 213; B-126
tactical air support system,
MAP funding, B-58
planning, B-58
Tak, B-64
Takhli,
air defense requirements, 497; B-38
threat,
Communist Party of Thailand, B-123
Indonesia, B-118
Malaya, B-118
Thailand Patriotic Front, B-119
training,
ADISORN I, counterinsurgency, B-129
JUNGLE DRUM, B-81
KITTI 07/08, B 129-133
Laotian personnel, B-59
Ubon, B-93, 114
Udorn, 73, 503; B-93, 114
TACAN system, 494; B-87
US Army advisory program, B 42-66
US military forces status in early 65; A-46
US personnel,
Thai concern over increase, B-93
USAF Advisory Group, B-67
USAF dispositions, B-app C
Yala, B-66
Thanom, Field Marshal, B 22-37
Thanom, Prime Minister, 495
CINCUSTAF plan approval, 497
THAN PHONG, ground operation, A-169
Throckmorton, Lt Gen, A-96
TIGER HOUND, hunter/killer air operation, 411; A-465
Training,
Laotian leadership in US, 508
Laotian units in Thailand, 507

Transportation,
airlift,
base/terminal support critical in RVN, 287
evacuation of US non-combatants ELDER BLOW, 576
limitation on R&R proposals, 593
MATS, 286, A-120
route extensions in RVN, 573, 574
Meo refugees in Laos, 505
Tactical Air Command C-130 aircraft, 286
theater accomplishments, 575
theater capabilities, 573
authorized increase, 573
theater flying hours utilized, 575
theater limitations,
defined by CINCPAC, 286
theater requirements, 572
control branch of WTO established in RVN, 576
sealift,
activity in RVN ports, 557; A-120
lighterage and stevedoring, 561; A-119
PACOM Movements Priorities Control Agency established, 556
shallow draft shipping/terminal service,
civilian contract, 563; A-121
strategic reserve of merchant-type shipping, 559
theater limitations, 286; A-121
theater LSTs,
MSTS, A-120
requirements, 558
TROJAN HORSE, see also Intelligence, photo recce
Trust Territories, 221
base survey, 21
Tsai, Wei Ping, chief Chinese negotiator, 233

U

Unconventional Warfare, see also psychological operations and Special Forces
CIDG increase recommended, 518
CINCPAC planning agency established, 516
MACV concepts of operations, A-153
Thailand, B-37
unit locations in PACOM, 517
United Kingdom,
air target materials conference, 43
assessment of Indonesian confrontation, 217
CINCFE assurance regarding UK defense capabilities, 216
desire for four power security arrangement, 217
four power talks, 219

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

United Kingdom - cont'd

Hong Kong, 225
base and facilities survey, 22
CHICOM munitions ships depart, 443
CHICOM purchase of piasters, A-249
considered for R&R area, 590; A-436
nuclear submarine visit, 39
joint use of Thai communications facilities, B-98
London, 216
military leaders tour participation, 248
nuclear strike planning coordination with US, 220
participation in SEA HORSE exercise, 205
review of defense commitments, 215
RVN assistance, A-353
SEATO MA 22 Conference, 188, 203, 209
strategic importance of Singapore bases, 214
United Nations,
charter prohibition on retaliation, 587
US Agency for International Development,
Republic of Vietnam, 565; A-235, 244-248, 249, 402, 454, 458, 461
civic action, A-454
economic warfare, A-248
leaflet program, A-458
pacification program, A 229-248
pacification role clarified, A-245
pacification study, A-235
television, 485
water supply program, A-461
Thailand,
rural development, B-16
US Air Force,
—Advisory Group, Thailand, B-67
—Advisory Group, Vietnam,
training program, A-83
— Air National Guard,
delivery of gifts to RVN, 595
— Logistic Command, 101; A-49
— Office of Special Investigations, A-84
— Reserve,
gifts to troops moved to RVN, 595
2nd Air Division, 328, 392
air support of Phases I and II,
MACV operations concept, A-151
augmentation, A-48
commander becomes MACV Deputy Commander for Air Opns, 313
delegated authority of PACAF, 275
new combat support groups, A-50
operational control of B-57s on loan to RVN, 483
support of, 529
13th Air Force, 240, 242, 246
314th Air Division, 134, 573
6250th Air Support Group Thailand, B-92

[redacted]

Transportation,
airlift,
base/terminal support critical in RVN, 287
evacuation of US non-combatants ELDER BLOW, 576
limitation on R&R proposals, 593
MATS, 286, A-120
route extensions in RVN, 573, 574
Meo refugees in Laos, 505
Tactical Air Command C-130 aircraft, 286
theater accomplishments, 575
theater capabilities, 573
authorized increase, 573
theater flying hours utilized, 575
theater limitations,
defined by CINCPAC, 286
theater requirements, 572
control branch of WTO established in RVN, 576
sealift,
activity in RVN ports, 557; A-120
lighterage and stevedoring, 561; A-119
PACOM Movements Priorities Control Agency established, 556
shallow draft shipping/terminal service,
civilian contract, 563; A-121
strategic reserve of merchant-type shipping, 559
theater limitations, 286; A-121
theater LSTs,
MSTS, A-120
requirements, 558
TROJAN HORSE, see also Intelligence, photo recce
Trust Territories, 221
base survey, 21
Tsai, Wei Ping, chief Chinese negotiator, 233

U

Unconventional Warfare, see also psychological operations and Special Forces
CIDG increase recommended, 518
CINCPAC planning agency established, 516
MACV concepts of operations, A-153
Thailand, B-37
unit locations in PACOM, 517
United Kingdom,
air target materials conference, 43
assessment of Indonesian confrontation, 217
CINCFE assurance regarding UK defense capabilities, 216
desire for four power security arrangement, 217
four power talks, 219

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

United Kingdom - cont'd

Hong Kong, 225
base and facilities survey, 22
CHICOM munitions ships depart, 443
CHICOM purchase of piasters, A-249
considered for R&R area, 590; A-436
nuclear submarine visit, 39
joint use of Thai communications facilities, B-98
London, 216
military leaders tour participation, 248
nuclear strike planning coordination with US, 220
participation in SEA HORSE exercise, 205
review of defense commitments, 215
RVN assistance, A-353
SEATO MA 22 Conference, 188, 203, 209
strategic importance of Singapore bases, 214
United Nations,
charter prohibition on retaliation, 587
US Agency for International Development,
Republic of Vietnam, 565; A-235, 244-248, 249, 402, 454, 458, 461
civic action, A-454
economic warfare, A-248
leaflet program, A-458
pacification program, A 229-248
pacification role clarified, A-245
pacification study, A-235
television, 485
water supply program, A-461
Thailand,
rural development, B-16
US Air Force,
—Advisory Group, Thailand, B-67
—Advisory Group, Vietnam,
training program, A-83
— Air National Guard,
delivery of gifts to RVN, 595
— Logistic Command, 101; A-49
— Office of Special Investigations, A-84
— Reserve,
gifts to troops moved to RVN, 595
2nd Air Division, 328, 392
air support of Phases I and II,
MACV operations concept, A-151
augmentation, A-48
commander becomes MACV Deputy Commander for Air Opns, 313
delegated authority of PACAF, 275
new combat support groups, A-50
operational control of B-57s on loan to RVN, 483
support of, 529
13th Air Force, 240, 242, 246
314th Air Division, 134, 573
6250th Air Support Group Thailand, B-92

[redacted]

[redacted]

US Air Force - cont'd

advisory program in RVN, A 82-86
Chief Air Force Advisory Group ROK, 134
C/S desire to appoint Deputy COMUSMACV, A-92
command relations in Thailand, 315
Deputy Commander 2/13 - Thailand,
command relations, 315
DOD agent for Thailand security force, 492
MACV Deputy Commander for Air Operations designated,
313; B-129
MATS, 243, 286, 573
charter flights thru Clark, 240
operations from Thai bases, B-22
PACAF, 573
command relations for ROLLING THUNDER, 328
SAR responsibility in Laos,
differing view, 410, 503
tasked to conduct NVN leaflet operations, 514
PACOM airlift, 573
Strategic Air Command,
B-52 strikes, 424 - 433
3d Air Division, 428
direct liaison MACV and 3d Air Division, opposed, 428
operations in RVN and deterrence of CHICOM, 305
strike of Xom Bang Ammo Depot, 326
Tactical Air Command, 286
Thai communications support, B-100
Thailand dispositions, B-app C
tropo scatter augmentation in RVN 521
US Army,
— Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific and the 14th
Psychological Warfare Battalion, combined
to form 7th Psychological Operations Group, 509
— Field Force, Vietnam,
headquarters established, 314; A-421
— Logistics Center, Japan, 134
— Material Command, 132, 485
—Strategic Communications Command, 132, 520
—Support Command, Vietnam,
redisignated USARV, 313
—Task Force ALFA, 314, 464, 465; A-41
established, 314, 464, 465; A-41
—Vietnam,
activated, 313
1st Cavalry Division, 314
7th Psychological Operations Group, 509
9th Logistics Command, 285; B-5
25th Division, 285, 308, 309, 462; A-44, 45
173d Airborne Brigade,
mission concept and deployment, 283
PACOM reserve in Okinawa, 283
519th MI Battalion, A-466

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

[redacted]

[redacted]

US Army - cont'd

538th Engineer Construction Battalion, 567
704th INTC Det, A-467
809th Engineer Battalion in Thailand, B-4
advisory program in RVN, A 75-82
advisory program in Thailand, B 42-66
airmobile division,
mission concept and deployment, 282
ARPAC
1st Logistical Command established, 472; A-106
proposal to activate USARV, 313
communications RVN
system development and management, A 379-392
C/S recommends construction stockpiles, 276
land requirements Okinawa, 2
logistics in RVN,
lighterage increase, 561
port and beach operations, 545
Military Sea Transportation Service, 286; A-120
aircraft ferries, 286
RVN port congestion, 556
shipping and terminal service contract, 563
operation ports and beaches in SEAsia, 545
service responsibility for MEDT, 183
Special Forces MTT in Thailand, B 129-133
STARCOM in Thailand, B-4
US Base Rights in the Philippines, 238-247
US Coast Guard,
Squadron One, 444
augmentation for MARKET TIME, 445; A-55
port security officer RVN, A-87
US Collective Defense Arrangements in PACOM, 218
US Embassy in Saigon bombed, 477
US Marines,
advisory program in RVN, A-90
Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, A-176
FMFPAC,
operation of ports and beaches in SEAsia, 545
land requirements Okinawa, 2
relocation of Marine Air Group Okinawa, 20
short airfield tactical system, 536
SHUFLY mission in RVN, A-29
US Navy,
——Advisory Group, Thailand, B-78
——Component Commander, MACV,
designated, 312
——Naval Advisory Group, Vietnam, A-86
——Naval Advisory Group, Vietnam,
augmentation for MARKET TIME, A-87
——Naval Support Activity, Danang, 546-548
7th Fleet, 392-547
air support in RVN, A-179

[redacted]

liaison to 2nd Air Division for ROLLING THUNDER, 328
Marine ground force and helicopter strength, 453
advisory program in RVN, A 86-89
air and naval gunfire liaison teams, 447
aircraft carriers,
PACOM increase,
three to four in Mar, 420
to five in June, 421
CNO, 438, A-56
CTF 71, 438, 441
CTG 77.6, 408
destroyer force increase, 35
destroyer force level, 34
logistics in RVN,
port and beach operations, 545
naval gunfire support in RVN, 35
operation of ports and beaches in SEAsia, 545
PACFLT,
ASW advisory team Thailand, B-83
command relations for ROLLING THUNDER, 328
execution of BARREL ROLL missions, 397
Fleet Intelligence Center, 434
Immediate Photo Interpretation Reports,
monthly summaries, 435
nuclear powered ships,
arrival of USS ENTERPRISE and USS BAINBRIDGE in PACOM, 56
demonstrations against visits, 38
port visits, 38
safety factors, 57
submarine port visits, 39
Pearl Harbor Shipyard,
support for Thailand, 170
STAT program, 543
support of Phases I and II in RVN, A-149
SWIFT patrol craft, 445
Task Force 115 activated, 444
US Operations Mission,
RVN,
inflation countermeasures, 594
logistics, 548
Thailand,
police training, B-17
village/hamlet radio program, B-136
US/Philippine Mutual Defense Board, 239, 244, 245
US Policy in SEAsia,
debates and troop morale, 595
US prisoners,
Joint Personnel Recovery Center,
considered, 586
missing or detained personnel status, 587

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

US Vietnam Coordinating Committee Washington, 510
USCGC POINT GLOVER, 446
USCGC POINT MARONE, 446
USNS CARD,
sabotage at Saigon, A-87
USS ANNAPOLIS,
conflict with DCA system, 52
USS BAINBRIDGE arrival in PACOM, 56
USS BANNER,
intelligence collection operations, 40
USS BUCK, 442
USS CANBERRA, 439, 441
USS COMET, 562
USS CORAL SEA, 319
retained in PACOM, 421
USS CURRITUCK, 441
seadrome established for MARKET TIME, 442
USS ENTERPRISE arrival in PACOM, 56
USS HANCOCK, 319, 395
USS INDEPENDENCE, 380
USS ORISKANY, A-180
positioned for RVN air support, 421
USS OXFORD, 583
USS PETALUMA, 570; A-112
USS RANGER, 420
USS SAN MATEO, 577
USS WILHOITE, 225
UTAH, ground operation, A-465

V

Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
1st Logistical Command in RVN approved, 551
Versace, Capt, 588
Visit of Asian Journalists, 57
Visits of Japanese Former Residents of Bonin Islands and Iwo Jima, 221.

W

Walt, Brig Gen, A-35
Ward, Rear Adm, 444
assigned Chief Naval Advisory Group, MACV, in preparation for MARKET TIME, 314
WATER PUMP, see Intelligence, photo recce
Western Electric Company,
awarded QUICK TALK contract, 45
Westmoreland, Gen, see also MACV, 292, 293, 321; A-92; B-6
agreement with Commander ROKDTF, 316
appointed CGUSARV, 313
concept of operations, 295
favors B-52 strikes, 424

liaison to 2nd Air Division for ROLLING THUNDER, 328
Marine ground force and helicopter strength, 453
advisory program in RVN, A 86-89
air and naval gunfire liaison teams, 447
aircraft carriers,
PACOM increase,
three to four in Mar, 420
to five in June, 421
CNO, 438, A-56
CTF 71, 438, 441
CTG 77.6, 408
destroyer force increase, 35
destroyer force level, 34
logistics in RVN,
port and beach operations, 545
naval gunfire support in RVN, 35
operation of ports and beaches in SEAsia, 545
PACFLT,
ASW advisory team Thailand, B-83
command relations for ROLLING THUNDER, 328
execution of BARREL ROLL missions, 397
Fleet Intelligence Center, 434
Immediate Photo Interpretation Reports,
monthly summaries, 435
nuclear powered ships,
arrival of USS ENTERPRISE and USS BAINBRIDGE in PACOM, 56
demonstrations against visits, 38
port visits, 38
safety factors, 57
submarine port visits, 39
Pearl Harbor Shipyard,
support for Thailand, 170
STAT program, 543
support of Phases I and II in RVN, A-149
SWIFT patrol craft, 445
Task Force 115 activated, 444
US Operations Mission,
RVN,
inflation countermeasures, 594
logistics, 548
Thailand,
police training, B-17
village/hamlet radio program, B-136
US/Philippine Mutual Defense Board, 239, 244, 245
US Policy in SEAsia,
debates and troop morale, 595
US prisoners,
Joint Personnel Recovery Center,
considered, 586
missing or detained personnel status, 587

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.

US Vietnam Coordinating Committee Washington, 510
USCGC POINT GLOVER, 446
USCGC POINT MARONE, 446
USNS CARD,
sabotage at Saigon, A-87
USS ANNAPOLIS,
conflict with DCA system, 52
USS BAINBRIDGE arrival in PACOM, 56
USS BANNER,
intelligence collection operations, 40
USS BUCK, 442
USS CANBERRA, 439, 441
USS COMET, 562
USS CORAL SEA, 319
retained in PACOM, 421
USS CURRITUCK, 441
seadrome established for MARKET TIME, 442
USS ENTERPRISE arrival in PACOM, 56
USS HANCOCK, 319, 395
USS INDEPENDENCE, 380
USS ORISKANY, A-180
positioned for RVN air support, 421
USS OXFORD, 583
USS PETALUMA, 570; A-112
USS RANGER, 420
USS SAN MATEO, 577
USS WILHOITE, 225
UTAH, ground operation, A-465

V

Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
1st Logistical Command in RVN approved, 551
Versace, Capt, 588
Visit of Asian Journalists, 57
Visits of Japanese Former Residents of Bonin Islands and Iwo Jima, 221

W

Walt, Brig Gen, A-35
Ward, Rear Adm, 444
assigned Chief Naval Advisory Group, MACV, in preparation for MARKET TIME, 314
WATER PUMP, see Intelligence, photo recce
Western Electric Company,
awarded QUICK TALK contract, 45
Westmoreland, Gen, see also MACV, 292, 293, 321; A-92; B-6
agreement with Commander ROKDTF, 316
appointed CGUSARV, 313
concept of operations, 295
favors B-52 strikes, 424

WESTPAC Transportation Office, 183, 576
billets in JTD, 31
WHIPLASH, alert aircraft for targets of opportunity in Laos, 403
White House Staff, 426
Wright, Ambassador, 227, 233
Wright, Rear Adm, B-82

X - Y - Z

Y Bham Enoul, A-347
Yani, Gen, 177
YANKEE TEAM, see Intelligence, photo recce
Youngdale, Maj Gen, A-93

Sample references to a page or appendix: page 453 of Vol I/II = 453; page 453 of Annex A = A-453; Appendix A of Annex B = B app A.