4. This document will be transported, stowed, safeguarded and accounted for in accordance with the instructions contained in the effective edition of the security regulations for handling classified matter of the military service of the holder. Reproduction of Top Secret portions of the CINCPAC Command History 1968 is prohibited except with the permission of the Commander in Chief Pacific or higher authority.

J. N. SHAFFER
Deputy Chief of
Staff for Military Assistance
Logistics and Administration

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ADMIRAL JOHN S. McCAIN JR.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
UNCLASSIFIED

PREFACE

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-408-59 of 17 April 1959 require the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS and other agencies of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations and problems faced by CINCPAC and the status of the Pacific Command (PACOM) from the standpoint of its commander. Additionally, the required annual report preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS to the extent that major decisions and directives of the JCS concerning the PACOM may be determined by historians of the JCS without research in the records of the PACOM. This 1968 CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

(U) As in the case of previous historical reports since 1959, this report describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, especially those connected with international crises and those peculiar to a joint command. This history records CINCPAC's command decisions and achievements and omits "detailed" activities of subordinate unified commands or of Allied nations in the PACOM area. Most of the decisions and activities included in this report are related directly with CINCPAC's efforts to preserve the freedom in those areas in the Pacific Command where people still have the right to make a free choice.

(U) To provide continuity, this history is organized in the same manner as previous histories, primarily in line with the objectives of CINCPAC. Chapter I, "The State of Readiness of United States Forces," describes CINCPAC forces and the planning for their employment to carry out United States policies, as well as the multitudinous activities of Headquarters CINCPAC that do not logically fit in the other chapters. Chapter II, "CINCPAC Actions Influencing the State of Readiness of Allied Nations in the PACOM Area," deals with CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program. Chapter III, "CINCPAC Actions Concerning Relationships Between the United States and Other Countries," reports the actions of CINCPAC in his position as United States Military Adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
and with politico-military events pertaining to his command. CINCPAC's mission to counter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia is treated in some detail in Chapter IV, "Actions to Counter Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia."

(U) This year's history is published in four volumes: Volume I - Chapter I; Volume II - Chapters II and III; Volume III - Sections I - V, Chapter IV; and Volume IV - Sections VI - X, Chapter IV. A glossary and an index for the complete history is included in Volume IV only. Pagination is complete within each volume rather than running consecutively throughout the four volumes. As in previous years, the annual histories prepared by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI are included as Annexes A and B, respectively.

(U) The CINCPAC Command Historian, Colonel J.R. Johnson, USA, under the supervision of Colonel A.M. Matthews, USAF, Secretary of the Joint Staff, Headquarters CINCPAC, planned and published the 1968 CINCPAC Command History as required by CINCPAC Staff Instruction 5750.10 of 20 August 1968. COL Johnson personally researched and wrote Chapter IV with exception of Sections V - IX.

(U) Members of the CINCPAC Historical Branch assisted the Command Historian in the preparation of the history. Mr. Truman R. Strobridge, as Senior Historian, researched and wrote Chapters II and III and Sections V and IX of Chapter IV. In addition, he provided technical guidance and shared his professional expertise when and where required throughout the preparation of this history. Mrs. Polly Tallman, Assistant Historian, prepared Chapter I and Sections VI - VIII of Chapter IV.

(U) The manuscript was typed in final format by Mrs. LuElla Saxton, Clerk-Stenographer of CINCPAC Historical Branch and Yeoman First Class Donald J. Cagle, USN. All graphics for this history were prepared under the expert supervision of Master Sergeant John F. Stevenson, USAF, Shop Supervisor, Graphics Section, J0412. Staff Sergeant Leonard L. Powell, USAF, Shop Supervisor, Reproduction Section, J0412, supervised the expeditious printing of the draft manuscript which facilitated staff coordination. Finally, the immeasurable support rendered by the CINCPAC Staff is greatly appreciated.

J. R. Johnson
COLONEL USA
CINCPAC Command Historian
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CHAPTER I

THE STATE OF READINESS OF UNITED STATES FORCES

(U) ... The United States Armed Forces must be able to project power anywhere in the vast Pacific area in the strength and in time to do the job. This military "presence" is well-known to potential trouble-makers and can often avert the escalation of "trouble" to "crisis" and of "crisis" to "hostilities" and of "hostilities" to "full-fledged warfare." It is not necessary to go far back in our history to find occasions when our military "presence" played a vital role in averting more serious trouble by containing that trouble in its incipient stages....

... Military "presence"... ranges from missiles afloat and ashore that could wipe out an entire civilization in a matter of hours or days to lesser forces. It could mean troops airlifted to a trouble spot, or a carrier task force hundreds of miles offshore, or a heavy bomber squadron within a few hours flight time, or an interceptor force poised ready to take off. Or it could mean a fleet of submarines deployed to areas unknown. Or even a combat ready Marine battalion cruising in sight of the beach.

... the threat to peace and security in the Pacific area is and will remain real. It is but one segment of the threat that we face across the world.... Three times we have not only sheathed, but thrown away our sword when the fighting stopped. We did this after World War I, and we did it again after World War II, and to a large extent after the Korean War. Each time we were called upon to re-arm under crisis conditions because we had let slip through our fingers the great deterrent force of "presence." I trust that we have learned our lesson. With the growing threat from many directions, not alone
in the Pacific but across the world, this time we must-- and I repeat must--make certain that our military "presence" is kept alive.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.
(U) The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of forces throughout the PACOM.

Hereafter cited as PACOM Digest Nov 68.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC): CINCPAC is the Commander of a
   unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his
   mission. The mission of CINCPAC, in broad terms, is as follows: "To maintain the security of
   the PACOM and defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean; to support
   and advance the national policies and interests of the United States and discharge U.S.
   military responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East and Southeast Asia to prepare plans,
   conduct operations and coordinate activities of the forces of the PACOM in consonance with
   directives of higher authority." The general area of responsibility for the conduct of normal
   operations is the Pacific Ocean, including the islands therein (Blea Albatross), the Bering
   Sea, the eastern Indian Ocean area, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the countries of South-
   east Asia.

   CINCPAC exercises operational control of assigned forces through his component
   commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of
   joint task forces (when established). CINCPAC is accredited as the U.S. Military Advisor/
   Representative to the following organizations:
   a. SEATO Council: U.S. Military Advisor
   b. ANZUS Council: U.S. Military Representative
   c. Philippine-U.S. Council of Foreign Ministers: U.S. Military Representative and
      co-chairman of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board
   d. Japanese-American Security Consultative Committee: Member and Principal
      Advisor on military defense matters to the Chairman of the U.S. Representation.

2. PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS:
   a. Commander in Chief U.S. Army Pacific (CINCUSARPAC)
   b. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT)
   c. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF)

   The PACOM Service Component Commanders are responsible for accomplishing such
   operational missions and tasks as may be assigned by CINCPAC. The PACOM Service
   Component Commanders consist of the respective component commanders and all those
   individuals, units, detachments, organizations or installations under their command
   which have been assigned to the operational command of CINCPAC. Other individuals,
   units, detachments, organizations or installations may operate directly under the
   appropriate PACOM Service Component Commander in his Service role, and contribute
   to the mission of CINCPAC as appropriate.

   The PACOM Service Component Commanders' responsibilities for the Military
   Assistance Program are prescribed in the current CINCPAC Military Assistance
   Manual (MAM).

3. COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNITED COMMANDS: There are five subordinate
   unified commands in the PACOM:
   a. United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States
      Forces, Korea (COMUSFOR, Korea), Seoul, Korea
   b. United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States
      Forces, Japan (COMUSFOR Japan), Fuchu Air Station, Japan
   c. United States Pacific Command (COMUSPAC), commanded by Commander United
      States Pacific Command (COMUSPAC), Fort Shafter, Hawaii
   d. United States Pacific Command, Pacific Area Command, Pacific Command, (USMC),
      commanded by Commander United States Pacific Command, Pacific Area Command,
      Pacific Command (COMUSPAC, Pacific Command, Pacific Command)
   e. United States Marine Corps, Pacific Command, Pacific Command (USMC, Pacific
      Command, Pacific Command) currently as Chief Joint United States Military Advisory
      Group, Thailand (CJUSMACTHAI)

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES
FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1968

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 18.
### Subordinate Unified Commands and CINCPAC Representatives

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**As of 31 December 1968**

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<td>Phillip P. Cole, USN</td>
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<td>CoS &amp; Aide</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT</td>
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<td>John K. Mishan, USN</td>
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**Source:** PACOM Digest, Feb 69, p. 19.
# U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups

## Far East Region - Key Personnel

**As of 31 December 1968**

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<td>MAJ GEN Lloyd H. Gomes, USA</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>COL William F. Seith, USA</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;IS Plans and Programs</td>
<td>COL Charles W. Hill, Jr., USA</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;IS Staff/Log</td>
<td>COL Richard R. McPherson, USA</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>COL Robert W. Schell, USA</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>MAJ GEN Richard G. Cirillo, USA</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>COL Jack D. Temple, USA</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;IS Plans, Policy</td>
<td>COL Lloyd F. Nobles, USA</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;IS Computer</td>
<td>COL John J. Heck, USA</td>
<td>Army</td>
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### Ministry of National Defense Advisory Section

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# PACIFIC COMMAND PERSONNEL

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**AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1968**

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**SOURCE:** PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 88.
## CINCPAC Component and Subordinate Unified Command Staff Personnel

**As of 31 December 1968**

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**Source:** PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 89.
## MAAG AND SERVICE ADVISORY GROUP PERSONNEL - PACIFIC COMMAND

### AUTHORIZED AND Assigned STRENGTHS BY SERVICE AND CIVILIAN CATEGORY

**AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1968**

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<td>8357</td>
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**SOURCE:** PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 90.
### AVAILABLE FORCES

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<td>Corps</td>
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<td>Artillery</td>
<td>8 8&quot; How Bns</td>
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<td>Special Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engineer Corps (Air Mobility)</td>
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<td>Engineer Const Agencies</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 Sp Op Wg 1 Sp Op SQs (E-2B/U-40) 1 Sp Op SQs (F-102)</td>
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### IN PACOM BUT NOT ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC

- 25 Naval Reserve Training Ships
- Naval Security Groups, Pacific

### MAJOR AUGMENTATION FORCES WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE IN EMERGENCY

- Under Operational Control CINCPAC

### SEE JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITY PLAN (JSCP), PART 1, ANNEX A

---

**SOURCE:** PACOM Digest Nov 68, p. 5.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS

AS OF 1 MAY 1968

Hereafter cited as PACOM Digest May 68.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS
AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1968

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 68, p. 23.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR & SHIP UNITS
AS OF 1 MAY 1968

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR AND SHIP UNITS

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1968

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 68, p. 25.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR UNITS
AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1968

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<td>1 C117D</td>
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DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE
FLYING & MISSILE UNITS
AS OF 1 MAY 1968

SOURCE: PACOM Digest May 68, p. 27.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE FLYING & MISSILE UNITS AS OF 1 MAY 1968

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE
FLYING & MISSILE UNITS
AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1968

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 68, p. 27.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE

FLYING & MISSILE UNITS

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1968

SECTION II - KEY PERSONNEL CHANGES

Change of Command - CINCPAC

(U) Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, relieved Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, USN, as Commander in Chief Pacific in ceremonies on the USS HANCOCK in Pearl Harbor on 31 July 1968. The colorful change of

ADM John S. McCain, Jr., USN, at the rostrum during change of command ceremonies. Behind ADM McCain, from the left, ADM Thomas H. Moorer, USN, GEN Earle G. Wheeler, USA, ADM U.S.G. Sharp, USN, GEN William C. Westmoreland, USA, and CAPT Howard E. Greer, USN, Commanding Officer of the USS HANCOCK.
General Westmoreland presenting the Army Distinguished Service Medal to Admiral Sharp.

Command ceremony was attended by many distinguished military and civilian guests. Three members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were present, including the Chairman, General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, who presented the Navy's Distinguished Service Medal to Admiral Sharp on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. In an extraordinary gesture, and in recognition of the smooth and effective inter-Service cooperation achieved in joint Service relationships in the Pacific Command, the Army Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, USA, presented the Army's Distinguished Service Medal to Admiral Sharp. General Westmoreland, who had personally instigated the idea of the award, had served in the Pacific Command as Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam during the same period that Admiral Sharp was Commander in Chief.
Among other important guests were the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, and Governor of Hawaii John A. Burns.

The impressive ceremonies were in honored Navy tradition. Admiral Sharp ordered, "Haul down my flag," after he read his retirement orders. As his flag was lowered a 17-gun salute was fired. After Admiral McCain read his orders, he ordered his flag broken. Following the ceremony a reception was held at the Pearl Harbor Commissioned Officer's Mess.

That same evening Admiral and Mrs. Sharp departed Oahu for San Diego, California, where they planned to make their home.

Earlier, on 29 July, during a staff reception for the two admirals and their wives, the Chief of Staff, LTGEN Claire E. Hutchin, Jr., USA, summarized in a speech some statistics regarding Admiral Sharp's travels during his term as Commander in Chief Pacific. 1 The Admiral had traveled 572,856 miles in 68 trips that took him away from his headquarters for 420 days. He traveled in a piston-engine aircraft to permit himself more time for work and rest enroute, so he spent 2,346 hours in the air. In addition to his travels, Admiral Sharp received 1,116 official visitors to his office, with countless more visitors attending CINCPAC briefings. He delivered 63 speeches during his 4-year tour. 2

Admiral McCain came to the Pacific Command from an assignment as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. Born in Council Bluffs, Iowa on 17 January 1911, Admiral McCain was a June 1931 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. Many of his early assignments were as a submarine officer. He is married to the former Roberta Wright of Los Angeles. They have three children, Jean Alexandra, John Sidney III, and Joseph Pinckney McCain. His son John, a Navy lieutenant commander and pilot, was downed on a mission over North Vietnam and was believed to be held a prisoner by the North Vietnamese.

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1. J04/Memo/597-68, Hq CINCPAC, from COL E. A. Jurkens, USAF, J04, Joint Secretary, Hq CINCPAC to LTGEN Hutchin, J01, Chief of Staff, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Jul 68, Subj: Historical Information Concerning Admiral Sharp.
2. Ibid.

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UNCLASSIFIED
KEY CINCPAC STAFF PERSONNEL

C E HUTCHIN, JR
LT GEN USA
CHIEF OF STAFF

R A FEAREY
MINISTER
POLITICAL ADVISER

J E McGOWAN
PSYOPS
ADVISER

R B ALLISON
MAJ GEN USAF
DEPUTY C/S
PLANS & OPERATIONS

J N SHAFFER
RADM USN
DEPUTY C/S
MIL ASST/LOG/ADMIN

A M MATTHEWS
COL USAF
JOINT SECRETARY
Psychological Operations Adviser

(U) Mr. John E. McGowan, a United States Information Agency official, was assigned as Psychological Operations Adviser to CINCPAC on 27 May 1968.

Research and Engineering Consultant

(U) Dr. Joel S. Lawson, Jr., Research and Engineering Consultant to CINCPAC, returned to Washington on 30 August. He had not been replaced by the end of the year.

Assistant Chiefs of Staff

(U) MGEN H. M. Elwood, USMC, became Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations on 23 August, replacing BGEN H. G. Hutchinson, Jr., USMC. BGEN Richard N. Cordell, USAF, replaced BGEN H. A. French, USAF, as Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics on 3 September.1

Joint Secretary

(U) COL Albert M. Matthews, USAF, replaced COL E. A. Jurkens, USAF as Joint Secretary on 2 July.

Comptroller

(U) CAPT Charles E. Schmeder, SC, USN, became Comptroller on 1 July, replacing CAPT Keith Bennett, SC, USN.

1. On 18 February 1966 CINCPAC had requested that certain of his key staff officers be of higher rank because of increased responsibilities. His Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, Logistics, and Communications-Electronics were still one grade below that recommended by CINCPAC in 1966. (CINCPAC 180145Z Feb 66; LCOL Robert G. Miller, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, et al., CINCPAC Command History 1966 (Camp H. M. Smith, Oahu: Headquarters, Pacific Command, 1967), Vol. I, pp. 44-45. Hereafter cited as CINCPAC Command History 1966, with appropriate volume and page number.
Legal Affairs Officer

(U) CAPT Richard J. Hogan, Jr., JAGC, USN, replaced CAPT J. B. McDevitt, USN, as Legal Affairs Officer on 1 April.

Commanding Officer, Fleet Operations Control Center, U.S. Pacific Fleet

(U) CAPT Donald F. Ryder, USN, became Commanding Officer of the Fleet Operations Control Center, U.S. Pacific Fleet on 12 September, replacing CAPT Ralph F. Bishop, USN who was relieved on 26 July. CDR Leo W. Harrison, USN, was interim commanding officer.

Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

(U) GEN Creighton W. Abrams, USA, replaced GEN William C. Westmoreland, USA, as Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (and as Commander, U.S. Army, Vietnam) on 12 June. GEN Abrams had been Deputy Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

Commander, U.S. Forces Japan

(U) LTGEN Thomas K. McGehee, USAF, assumed command of U.S. Forces, Japan (and the 5th Air Force) on 15 July. LTGEN Seth J. McKee, USAF, had been commander until 1 July, when MGEN Bruce E. Kendall, USA, assumed command. GEN Kendall was succeeded on 3 July, when RADM Daniel F. Smith, Jr., USN, assumed command. ADM Smith was succeeded by GEN McGehee. 1

CINCPAC Representative, Philippines

(U) RADM Draper L. Kauffman, USN, replaced RADM Herman J. Kossler, USN, as CINCPAC Representative, Philippines (and as Commander, Naval Forces Philippines) on 9 May. 2

2. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
CINCPAC Representative, Marianas

(U) On 26 August 1968 RADM Philip P. Cole, USN, became CINCPAC Representative, Marianas (in addition to his duties as Commander, Naval Forces, Marianas), replacing RADM Carlton B. Jones.
CINCPAC's Joint Tables of Distribution and the JCS Manpower Survey

(U) The JCS scheduled manpower utilization surveys of joint activities directly responsive to or through the JCS on a three-year cycle. The CINCPAC staff was surveyed by a team of JCS officers during the period 15 July through 28 August 1968. Prior to the JCS survey, CINCPAC conducted an internal manpower management study using a work sampling measurement technique. The work measurement was conducted by a team of military and civilian personnel drawn from CINCPAC's Manpower Management Branch and his component command commanders. Activities of the CINCPAC staff were observed and recorded over a period of 15 work days. The observation results were used to determine recommended manning levels, which were later used to request certain realignments within the total manpower resources supported by the JCS survey.

(U) The JCS team was composed of senior officers headed by a general officer. The team reviewed CINCPAC's missions, functions, and management structures in addition to interviewing most of the CINCPAC staff. The team's principal concern was to determine CINCPAC's manpower requirements.

### STRENGTHS OF CINCPAC STAFF DIVISIONS

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<th>31 DECEMBER 1968</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>Joint Secretariat</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>564</td>
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<td>128</td>
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* Joint Administrative Office serving the Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations.

** Includes 1 CAS.

Note: The JT D for the Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia became separate from that for CINCPAC in Calendar Year 1968.
JCS team recommendations were forwarded to CINCPAC for comments on 28 August 1968. On 14 September 1968, CINCPAC concurred in the general survey conclusions and recommendations which authorized CINCPAC a total of 1,775 billets. Early approval was recommended.

The Chief of Staff, CINCPAC, dispatched a letter to VADM Nels C. Johnson, Director of the Joint Staff, JCS, on 14 September 1968. The letter contained principal reasons for not dispatching a reclama, which were summarized as follows:

...is our decision here, despite the fact that many reclamas had bonafide substance and were convincing--preparation, presentation, and subsequent staffing of our reclamas at the Washington level would, in my opinion, only extend further the freeze on our current assets, complicate our personnel programming, and leave unresolved for too many weeks, manpower actions that need attention.

The JCS survey was approved in December 1968 except for eight civilian spaces for FY 70 and the PACOM MAP Data Center JTD. This JTD was still under study at the end of the year.

CINCPAC's FY 70 JTD, less the MAP Data Center, was forwarded to the JCS on 16 December 1968. Recommendations were within the manpower levels authorized by the JCS, although some spaces had been realigned between JTDs. Specifically, 10 spaces were added to the Headquarters CINCPAC JTD: 9 from the Command and Control System Group plus 1 authorized by the JCS for CINCPAC's representative to the Joint Continental Defense Systems Integration Planning Staff. When submitting the FY 70 JTD, CINCPAC stated that the Chief of Naval Operations had been requested to extend the contract for analytical support of CINCPAC through FY 70, thus offsetting the eight civilian spaces not approved. Also, CINCPAC requested the JCS to eliminate the requirement to publish a new FY 69 JTD since personnel offices were already working on matching

1. Ltr, JCS to CINCPAC, 28 Aug 68, n.s.
2. CINCPAC 140444Z Sep 68.
3. Quoted from Point Paper, J13, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Nov 68, Subj: Approval of the JCS Manpower Survey.
4. Ibid.
5. JCS SM 781-68, 2 Dec 68.
on-board assets to the FY 70 JTD and requisitioning replacements because of the lead times required by the Services.  

Staff Reorganizations and Augmentations

Psychological Operations Adviser to CINCPAC

(U) The first Psychological Operations Adviser to CINCPAC, Mr. John E. McGowan, assumed these duties on 27 May 1968. The adviser was an officer in the Foreign Service of the United States Information Agency, assigned by that agency to CINCPAC. He advised CINCPAC and his staff on psychological operations, acting as a consultant on psychological operations aspects of military programs concerned with civic action, civil affairs, special operations, nation building, and community and public affairs. He collaborated with the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans in coordinating plans for psychological operations in the PACOM. He performed liaison between the U.S. Information Agency in Washington and U.S. Information Service posts in the PACOM. Collaterally, he served as a special representative of the Assistant Director (East Asia and the Pacific) of the U.S. Information Agency.  

Terms of Reference for National Security Agency, Pacific

The Chief, National Security Agency, Pacific was the senior representative of the Director of the National Security Agency in the PACOM. He also served as principal signal intelligence (SIGINT) and communications security (COMSEC) adviser to CINCPAC.  

Joint Secretariat

(U) The Joint Secretariat was reorganized on 1 July. The position of Deputy to the Joint Secretary was abolished and the eight branches were

1. Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 16 Dec 68, Subj: Headquarters CINCPAC and Separate Staff Agencies Joint Manpower Programs (U).
4. Ibid.
reduced to five. The new Services Branch comprised the services-supply and the graphics-reproduction functions. The Administrative Branch consisted of the mail and records, classified material control, and awards and decorations sections. The Headquarters Personnel Branch contained Navy, Army, and Air Force sections and the travel section. The Historian and Area Clearance functions remained separate.¹

**CINCPAC Representation to the Joint Continental Defense Systems Integration Planning Staff**

(8) In April 1967 the Director of Defense Research and Engineering asked the JCS and the Services to identify a continuing organization to review aerospace defense systems, including the systems that had a capability of contributing directly to aerospace defense (such as anti-submarine warfare systems) with the objective of attaining an integrated Continental United States (CONUS) aerospace defense system.

(8) In June 1967 CINCPAC replied to a JCS request to comment on the establishment of a permanent group to insure the development of potential aerospace defense systems into an overall integrated CONUS aerospace defense.³

(8) CINCPAC's reply of 17 June discussed the likely interface between CONUS and PACOM forces and stated that the tasks then envisaged did not seem to require a full-time CINCPAC representative to the joint planning staff.⁴

(8) Then in July the JCS proposed two possible organizational structures, one using existing organizations and staff and CINCONAD facilities at Colorado Springs for study and planning aspects with the Joint Staff maintaining overall direction, and the other a specific group in the Washington area--possibly use of an existing JCS agency for the study-planning aspects --again with the Joint Staff maintaining direction. They also asked how

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1. J04/Memo/693-68, 8 Aug 68, Subj: CINCPAC Joint Table of Distribution, 1 July 1968.
2. JCS 1308/132200Z Jul 67.
4. Ibid.
many personnel would be required to properly represent CINCPAC interests in the planning and direction of integrating CONUS defenses.  

CINCPAC, on 25 July 1967, stated that permanent representation was estimated to require two officers (an Air Force colonel, a Navy commander). He recommended that the planning group function under the cognizance of the JCS and said that both Washington and Colorado Springs were satisfactory locations. 

In August the JCS approved the concept of a separate joint integration planning staff, to be established in Washington, D.C. Then in December they asked CINCPAC to comment on terms of reference proposed for the special staff.

CINCPAC did so on 1 January 1968. CINCPAC said that he viewed the proposed continental aerospace defense systems staff:

...as a special joint staff which should be organized along weapon systems lines vice functional staff lines. In general, its purpose should be to complement rather than to alter JCS/Joint Staff relationships and duties. Similarly, it should not alter existing responsibilities of the Unified and Specified Commanders nor their relationships with each other, the Services, and the JCS. The draft Terms of Reference...do not meet these criteria but tend more to create an elevated, independent Joint Staff office having wide ranging prerogatives and authorities. In this regard, the proposed direct relationship of the special joint staff with the Chairman, JCS, tends to elevate this staff above the level of the Joint Staff, even though a responsibility to the JCS is preserved. A preferred and more workable arrangement and one that would preserve essential relationships with the corporate body of the JCS, the Joint Staff, the Unified and Specified Commanders,

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 010210Z Jan 68.
and the Services, would be for this staff to function directly under and through the JCS as part of the OJCS reporting to the JCS through the Director, Joint Staff. This would not preclude physical separation of the special Joint Staff from Washington nor designation as quote outside the Joint Staff unquote.¹

CINCPAC then enumerated his specific recommendations among the terms of reference.

(2) In March the JCS approved terms of reference that placed the Director of the Joint Continental Defense Systems Integration Planning Staff (JSIPS) under the direction of and reporting to the JCS through the Director, Joint Staff. The JSIPS was a separate organization outside the Organization of the JCS, however.² The Director, JSIPS was assigned the mission of assisting the JCS in planning for the effective integration of defensive systems that contributed to continental aerospace defense. He was to monitor such systems and provide advice and recommendations concerning their integration into an aerospace defense system for the CONUS and their interface with other continental defensive and offensive systems. The term Continental United States did not mean that Hawaii and Alaska were excluded from JSIPS consideration.³

(5) The March terms of reference provided for representation, in a liaison status, from all Defense Department commands and agencies directly involved in matters within the scope of the JSIPS. CINCPAC thereon requested such a representative (an Air Force colonel) on a permanent basis.⁴ The JCS approved the recommendation, stipulating, however, that the representative be provided from CINCPAC's existing Air Force manpower authorization and that the requirement be validated by the JCS manpower survey, then in progress.⁵ The compensatory space was identified in the Operations Division and the requirement

¹ Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ ADMINO CINCPAC 102158Z Apr 68.
⁵ JCS 121540Z Jul 68.
validated by the JCS manpower team. The appointee, COL Palmer Nelson of the Plans Division, was detached from the CINCPAC staff on 1 November and became CINCPAC representative to the JSIPS on 30 November.

Coordination of PACOM Transportation Activities

(U) In December 1968 the Chief of the Transportation Branch of the Logistics Division was assigned surveillance responsibility over all Logistic Division transportation activities within the PACOM. These included the Western Pacific Transportation Office in Tachikawa, Japan and the PACOM Movements Priority Agency in Oakland, California. The Transportation Branch was to act as the focal point for all transportation activities in the PACOM. The chiefs of the Western Pacific Transportation Office and the PACOM Movements Priority Agency were to coordinate with that branch on all staff and operational activities falling within their purview and also to process all requests for temporary active duty through that branch.

Budget Working Group

(U) The Comptroller proposed to involve the CINCPAC staff more directly in the budgeting process by formation of a Budget Working Group. Chaired by the Comptroller and composed of representatives of each of the CINCPAC divisions and staff agencies, the group would actively participate in the development, review, evaluation, and approval of the command operating budget estimates and other financial matters. In this way, when funds did not satisfy requirements, key staff members, acting as a group, could determine recommended priorities—which programs would be continued, which reduced, deferred, or eliminated.

(U) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics and Administration would grant final approval to Budget Working Group actions.

1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. Ibid.
3. J4/Memo 1192-68, 16 Dec 68, Subj: J4 Staff Coordination of PACOM Transportation Activities.
4. Ibid.
5. J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Nov and Dec 68.
6. Ibid.
(U) The CINCPAC Staff Instruction implementing the program was published in early January 1969.  

1. CINCPACSTAFFINST 7120.1,  7 Jan 69, Subj: CINCPAC Budget Working Group; establishment of.
SECTION IV - COMMAND FACILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES

Fiscal Year 1968 Fund Authorizations and Utilization

(U) Funds used by CINCPAC came from various sources. The largest amount came from the Navy Department as Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&M, N) funds. These were sub-allocated by the Chief of Naval Operations to support the operations of the PACOM headquarters and the headquarters of the subordinate unified commands and other PACOM activities responsible to CINCPAC. 1

(U) CINCPAC was also allocated Military Assistance Executive (MAE) funds by the Naval Supply Systems Command to provide administrative and logistic support to the Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Missions for which CINCPAC was responsible. 2 Other types of funds were furnished to CINCPAC on an "as needed" basis.

(U) CINCPAC had authority to adjust O&M, N funds between budget projects and between PACOM activities as necessary. MAE funds were allotted by specific function and then allocated by CINCPAC to particular countries and activities. He could shift funds around between countries and activities but not between functions. 3

(U) Amounts for O&M, N and MAE funds for FY 68 are shown in the accompanying tables.

(U) Of the total of $26,537,300 O&M, N funds allocated, $26,087,444 was committed by the CINCPAC activities by the end of FY 68 for a utilization rate of 98 percent 4 Funds for COMUSMACV (50 percent of all O&M, N funds) were 100 percent committed by the end of the fiscal year.

(U) Of the total of $8.5 million in MAE funds allocated, all but $78,000 had been committed by the CINCPAC activities by the end of FY 68, an overall utilization rate of 99 percent. 5

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
5. Ibid.
## OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY FUNDS

Amounts by Budget Projects ($ in thousands)

Fiscal Year 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Base Operations</th>
<th>Support of Navy Aircraft</th>
<th>General Support I</th>
<th>General Support II</th>
<th>Intelligence Data Handling System</th>
<th>Utilities &amp; Engineer Support</th>
<th>Maintenance &amp; Minor Support</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>200.0</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,577.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMUS Taiwan</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Defense Command</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>259.2</td>
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<td>433.1</td>
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<td>CHMAAG China</td>
<td>45.4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>62.9</td>
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<td>PACOM ELINT</td>
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<td><strong>483.4</strong></td>
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# MILITARY ASSISTANCE EXECUTIVE FUNDS

**Fiscal Year 1968**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Use</th>
<th>Annual Requirements ($ in millions)</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Military Mission Expenses</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>26%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAP Housing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics Management</td>
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<td>International Military Headquarters</td>
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<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
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</table>
Fiscal Year 1969 Fund Authorizations and Utilization

(U) Funds used by CINCPAC during the first half of Fiscal Year 1969, which commenced 1 July 1968, came from the same various sources as in the previous fiscal year. The largest amount was from the Navy Department as O&M, N funds. These were received from the Chief of Naval Operations in the form of an Obligation Authority.

(U) Amounts for O&M, N and MAE funds for the first half of FY 69 were as shown in the accompanying tables.

(U) Of the total of $18,111,600 in O&M, N funds distributed, $17,218,665 was committed by 31 December 1968 for a utilization rate of 95 percent.

(U) Of the total of $4,028,509 MAE funds distributed, $3,868,078 was committed by 31 December 1968 for a utilization rate of 96 percent.

Relocation of the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center

(3) In reply, CINCPACAF voiced no objection to the move and offered facilities at Hickam Air Force Base. 3

(3) CINCPACFLT, however, provided a number of reasons for not moving the center from Japan. 4 He cited the center's timely assistance and direct support to deployed PACFLT units. Services that he thought could be seriously disrupted by the move included rapid analysis of high interest signals, assistance in planning specific ELINT collection missions,

2. Ibid.
3. CINCPACAF 162251Z May 68.
4. CINCPACFLT 151828Z May 68.
### OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY FUNDS

**Amounts by Programs ($ in thousands)**

**Fiscal Year 1969 (Anticipated Requirements)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>General Purpose Forces</th>
<th>Intelligence and Communications</th>
<th>Support of Other Nations</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>COMUS Japan</td>
<td>440.6</td>
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<td>COMUS Korea</td>
<td>1,310.9</td>
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<td>23,528.3</td>
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<td><strong>36,130.5</strong></td>
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MILITARY ASSISTANCE EXECUTIVE FUNDS
Fiscal Year 1969

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<th>Functional Use</th>
<th>Annual Requirements ($ in thousands)</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative Expenses</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training Support</td>
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<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP Housing</td>
<td>510.0</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Management</td>
<td>260.2</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Military Headquarters</td>
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<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,617.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mission quality control analysis, provision of an extensive, continually updated computer data base (with a more advanced computer system anticipated), and technical publications and equipment.

(CINCPACFLT) Relocation to Oahu, however, CINCPACFLT continued, could offer the advantage of combining the center's ELINT analysis capability with existing imagery interpretation capabilities and could enhance the center's digital data transmission capability.

(CINCPACFLT) believed that the disadvantages of the relocation outweighed the advantages but proposed that if relocation was to be accomplished consideration be given to forming a joint organization under CINCPAC composed of both the PACOM ELINT Center and the PACOM Air Defense Analysis Facility. He offered space on Ford Island in Pearl Harbor. 1

(CINCPAC) decided to move the center to Hawaii and in June the Defense Intelligence Agency concurred and advised that action would be initiated in the CY 68 Consolidated Intelligence Program Review to obtain required FY 69 funding for the relocation. 2

(U) The Defense Intelligence Agency strongly supported the move to Hospital Point and requested that CINCPAC formally request funds through normal channels. 4 This was accomplished by requests to the JCS and the Chief of Naval Operations for FY 68 or FY 69 contingency funds. 5 The formal request to the Office of the Secretary of Defense was prepared by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command with staffing through the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy to be completed by January 1969. 6

1. Ibid.
2. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
3. Ltr., CINCPAC to Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 6 Aug 68, Subj: Relocation of PACOM ELINT Center (PEC).
4. DIA DIACC-1 757Z/201323Z Aug 68.
5. CINCPACFLT 270344Z Aug 68; ADMINO CINCPAC 300400Z Aug 68.
Report on the War in Vietnam

(U) In March the President suggested to General Wheeler, Chairman of the JCS, that it would be useful to have a report on the war in Vietnam from the beginning to June 1968. General Wheeler asked about the feasibility of producing such a report. CINCPAC agreed that the report should be prepared and suggested a format in which COMUSMACV would prepare a report on the war in South Vietnam and CINCPAC would cover the air and naval campaign against North Vietnam and tie the two reports together with a short prologue. COMUSMACV concurred and suggested that an unclassified version would best fulfill the intent of national authority by permitting wide dissemination and that any material that still needed to be classified to protect our forces or operations would continue to be incorporated in the annual Command History. CINCPAC concurred in the concept of an unclassified report and all agreed on a completion date of 31 July.

(U) CINCPAC and his staff completed the portions of the report assigned to Admiral Sharp by that deadline. As the two parts were to be published in one volume, however, printing was delayed until receipt of General Westmoreland's manuscript.

(U) The first printed copies of the document were available on 9 November and forwarded to the JCS, Admiral Sharp (by then retired), and General Westmoreland (by then Army Chief of Staff). It was decided shortly thereafter in Washington that the publication should have wider dissemination than had been planned by CINCPAC. At the end of the year the manuscript was in the process of being reprinted by the Government Printing Office in Washington for wide public dissemination.

1. On 11 June General William C. Westmoreland was leaving his assignment as COMUSMACV, a post he had held since 20 June 1964. At the end of July Admiral Sharp was completing his tour as CINCPAC, a post he had held since 30 June 1964.
2. CJCS 251824Z Mar 68.
3. CINCPAC 302254Z Apr 68.
4. COMUSMACV 031153Z May 68.
5. CINCPAC 070239Z May 68.
Command and Control System Group Computer Support

(U) A second IBM 360/50 computer\(^1\) was installed in the Command Center at Camp H. M. Smith on 20 June.\(^2\) When tests proved it acceptable, the IBM 1410 computer it replaced was removed on 28 August.\(^3\)

(U) CINCPAC had investigated certain uses of the National Military Command System Information Processing System (NIPS) in 1967.\(^4\) A team from the National Military Control System Support Center visited Camp Smith during the period 20 to 30 August and installed the 360 Formatted File System (NIPS). The installation of the 360 NIPS enabled conversion of existing programs from 1410 to 360 NIPS.\(^5\)

(U) Testing of the NIPS on the 360 computers continued through the end of the year.\(^6\) Conversion of all operational files in the PACOM from 1410 NIPS to 360 NIPS, originally planned for 31 December 1968, was rescheduled to be completed by 15 February 1969. CINCPAC found deficiencies in the 360 NIPS, however, that made total conversion by that date appear doubtful. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS\(^7\) that the 1410 system not be retired before reasonably satisfactory performance of the 360 was assured, which he projected would be about 30 June.

(U) CINCPAC also noted to the JCS that CINCUSARPAC had no approved plans for installation of an IBM 360 computer and that that headquarters consequently planned to convert its one remaining 1410 NIPS file, FORSTAT, to an IBM 1410 FFS (Mark III) by early 1969.

(U) Capacities and uses of computers were matters of continuing study. CINCPAC acknowledged that his computers at Kunia\(^8\) were not fully utilized.

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2. J02C History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
3. J02C History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
5. J02C History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
6. CINCPAC 110305Z Dec 68.
7. Ibid.
8. CINCPAC's Alternate Command Center, about 18 miles from his Camp Smith headquarters.
while he had requested (and later received) an additional computer for Camp Smith, for example. Although the JCS had approved the second IBM 360/50, the Joint Command and Control Requirements Group was assigned to study the interaction between the data processing systems at CINCPAC's headquarters, major subordinate headquarters, and the National Military Control System Support Center; to develop and evaluate a plan for IBM 360 series machines as the standard for the PACOM; and to develop a time-phased plan for reducing the automatic data processing capability at Kunia.

The report by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense as a result of these studies also included the CINCPAC automatic data processing proposal to replace the currently installed AN/FYK-1 computers with an IBM 360/501. The JCS recommended that the Kunia proposal be approved and that the IBM 360 series be the standard for command and control in the PACOM until a World-Wide Military Command and Control System standard is approved.

As a result of an inquiry from the Deputy Secretary of Defense on another matter, the JCS in May asked CINCPAC for his comments and recommendations to be used by the JCS in formulating policy guidance on collocation of Command and Control and Intelligence Data Handling System facilities. The matter of management of these facilities was also studied.

1. CINCPAC 062003Z Jan 68.
2. J02C Brief No. 3-68, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Feb 68, of JCCRG 37-68, Subj: CINCPAC Command and Control ADP Augmentation Proposal (U).
3. J02C Brief No. 16-68, Hq CINCPAC, 7 May 68, of JCSM 273-68, Subj: CINCPAC Command and Control ADP Study (U).
4. Ibid.
5. CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. I, pp. 51-55. The specifications for the World-Wide Military Command and Control System were forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval on 21 Mar 68. A reply was still awaited at the end of the year—the delay causing increasing problems for several World-Wide Military Command and Control System organizations. (J02C Brief No. 1-69, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Jan 69, of JCS 2414/29-10, Subj: Updating Command Center Data Processing Equipment for the Fixed Headquarters of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)).
by a group composed of representatives of the Intelligence, Operations, and Communications-Electronics Divisions and the Command and Control System Group. Members of the study group agreed that collocation was "practical and desirable." All members except the Intelligence Division representative agreed that management should be centralized; the Intelligence Division favored separate management for the Intelligence Data Handling System facilities.

(U) The PACOM Command and Control System ADP Policy Guide of 7 October 1968 (CINCPAC 01197) and the PACOM Command and Control ADP Planning Guide of 1 November 1968 (CINCPAC 01295) were promulgated. These two documents provided policy guidance and planning guidelines for the effective application of ADP technology to increase the ADP processing capability and for the development of the PACOM Command and Control System.

(U) The PACOM Command and Control Reporting System Study was commenced on 21 November 1968. The long-range purpose of the study

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1. Memo, COL William C. Harrison, Jr., USAF, J3A5, Hq CINCPAC, to J3, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Jun 68, Subj: Collocation of Command and Control and IDHS Facilities.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
was to design, develop, and implement a consolidated, standard PACOM Command and Control Reporting System that would combine internal and external reporting requirements into a single integrated reporting system.

**Force Status (FORSTAT) Reporting**

(U) The Force Status (FORSTAT) reporting system, devised by the JCS in 1966, became operational in 1968 after surmounting numerous problems and delays. The report was designed to replace the Operational Status Report (REDOPS), the Nuclear Capability Report (NUCAP), and a part of the Commander's Situation Report (SITREP). It was to have more data elements, cover more subject areas, and have more units in the data base than the reports it replaced. It was to be a single source of unit-oriented force status information for the JCS, the Services, and the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

(U) The FORSTAT was originally scheduled to be implemented in the PACOM by 1 February, and in early January a team from the National Military Command Center installed the first part of the program on CINCPAC's IBM 360/50 computer. Several problems arose almost immediately, which the JCS hoped they could remedy before 1 February. On 23 January the JCS sent the skeleton FORSTAT data base from Washington, but it did not include some 905 units because they lacked Service-validated Unit Identification Codes (UIC). Most of the UIC problems involved Army units. Because of increased requirements on computers caused by the Korean situation in January, the JCS postponed FORSTAT implementation until 1 March, and operations began on that date.

(U) By the end of March, however, the FORSTAT was still not fully operational and parallel Operational Status Report (REDOPS) reporting continued. Most problems continued to involve the Army's UIC troubles.

---

5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
and a team from the Department of the Army began conferring in Hawaii with CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC representatives on 1 April.1

(U) The UIC were finally validated and a skeleton FORSTAT data base for Army units was established in June, at which time the dual REDOPS reporting was discontinued.2 The Nuclear Capability (NUCAP) reporting requirement had been suspended by the JCS.3

(U) The JCS held a post-implementation conference in Washington 23 to 25 July.4 Prior to that conference CINCPAC called a working level meeting on 9 July to recapitulate recommended changes and additions to the FORSTAT from the CINCPAC staff and from CINCPAC's component command commanders and to discuss problems of users of the report.5

(U) Even after the JCS conference, action continued on the CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC staffs to correct the large number of discrepancies concerning the location, administrative control, operational control, major equipment possessed, and combat readiness of CINCUSARPAC's reporting units.6

(U) The JCS held another conference at the Pentagon on 12 and 13 November 1968 to discuss further revisions and proposed revisions to the JCS Unit Identification System with representatives of the commanders of the unified and specified commands and the Services.7

4. JCS 09679/222058Z May 68.
7. JCS 2425/081705Z Oct 68.
(U) One program discussed was the proposed Defense Organizational Entity Standards Program. The Defense Department had been attempting to standardize many data elements and codes for use in automatic data processing throughout the department.¹ In July the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) had forwarded a draft instruction establishing the Defense Organizational Entity Standards (DOES) Program, which would govern the registration and establishment of a unique six-character, alpha-numeric code for each unit or activity--each organizational entity.²

(U) CINCPAC's comments to the JCS on the subject noted that the proposed new program duplicated the Command and Control Unit Identification Code system contained in JCS Publication 7. He stated that a requirement to maintain two such systems plus a cross reference between them did not appear warranted.³

(U) CINCPAC was not alone in his objections. Most of the Services and the commanders of the unified and specified commands had objected to the system as it was proposed and changes were expected before implementation of the program--scheduled for not later than July 1971.⁴

(U) Conversion of all Unit Identification Codes (about 40,000) to Defense Organizational Entity Codes, according to the JCS representatives at the November conference, would not occur until problems in the DOES system were resolved, computer conversion programs written, and time available to disseminate information and instructions to the reporting units.⁵

(U) Another code system with its attendant problems was also discussed at the November meeting. All reportable units in the Unit Identification System file were assigned a Unit Type Code (UTC) by the Services. The UTC was a "five-character alpha-numeric code which permits each unit to be categorized into a kind or class, having distinguishing characteristics in common."⁶ The UTCs had just been revised by the JCS to make them

3. CINCPAC 02010ZZ Aug 68.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
more responsive to JCS requirements. The new UTCs were explained at the conference (and to CINCPAC and his staff in January 1969 by a UTC Briefing and Installation Team from the JCS). No difficulty in implementing them by 15 January 1969 was anticipated.¹

(U) Certain UIC problems, involving principally the proper assignment of codes by the Services, were discussed with representatives of the Services, who said action would be taken to correct discrepancies.²

(U) FORSTAT reporting, therefore, was becoming more current and complete by the end of the year. The CINCPAC FORSTAT database contained approximately 4,000 reporting units (2,500 Army, 1,000 Navy, 300 Marine, and 200 Air Force). Units of CINCPAC's Army and Marine components reported down to battalion or separate company level. Air Force and Navy units reported down to squadrons or separate detachments.³

(U) Reporting units submitted up to 50 essential items of force information on their location, activity, operational control, major equipment possessed and operationally ready, their SIOP status, and combat readiness. Reports were submitted via the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) on an as-occurring basis with reported information to be received by CINCPAC and the JCS not more than 34 hours from the time the change occurred.⁴

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
4. Ibid.
SECTION V - CHANGES IN THE COMMUNIST THREAT DURING 1968

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Soviet armed forces strength in the Far East remained fairly stable during 1968. Ground strength increased by one division while air strength remained at about the same level. The Pacific Ocean Fleet's submarine force increased slightly. The principal change in the threat from the Soviet Union was the sharp increase in ICBM launchers and newer, more sophisticated missiles. These missiles could be deployed against targets in Asia and the Pacific as well as those in the United States.

Communist China

The principal change in the threat from Communist China was in its growing nuclear weapon and guided missile capabilities. One nuclear weapon was detonated and a few missile test firings took place during the year. The Cultural Revolution probably had some adverse effect on China's special weapons development but an operational capability was expected by 1969.

In the war industry sector, a plutonium production facility may have begun production, which would greatly enhance Communist China's nuclear weapons production capability. MIG-19 production continued. These aircraft, replacing the MIG-15/17 series, enhanced China's air defense posture.

Although internal dissension siphoned off some military strength for internal security and administrative control, China continued to support guerrilla activities in Southeast Asia. Subsequent to the bombing halt, China withdrew some of its antiaircraft troops from North Vietnam.

North Vietnam

During the year North Vietnamese air defense posture remained relatively constant despite changes in U.S. target areas. The greater portion of the air defense weapons were concentrated in defense of the heartland. When U.S. air attacks against North Vietnam were restricted to below 19 degrees on 1 April 1968, it was expected that North Vietnam would shift fighters, SAMs, and large caliber AAA southward,

1. Information in this subsection taken from J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
but only a small redistribution of these weapons was observed. The complete cessation of air attacks against North Vietnam on 1 November 1968 provided North Vietnam with the freedom to expand its air defenses to protect the entire country. But by the end of 1968, North Vietnam had not chosen to significantly alter its basic air defense posture from that seen in early 1968.

The North Vietnamese Navy maintained its passive posture during the year with no significant changes in personnel or equipment strengths and locations. Infrequent limited training operations were confined to the Haiphong/Cac Ba area. Some units were noted in the vicinity of Hanoi where they augmented AAA defenses in that area.

There was little change in strength of in-country forces of the North Vietnamese Army during the year. Infiltration to the south continued and largely absorbed increases in military manpower generated in the north. The Army was assessed as a well organized, well equipped, combat effective force.

North Korea

North Korean Army strength increased by 50,000 and a tactical missile division was added. Air Force strength was enhanced by the acquisition of MIG-21s. Navy strength increased slightly with the acquisition of additional patrol craft.

Air defense capabilities were improved by increased numbers of surface-to-air guided missile launchers and modern fighters.

There was a marked increase in guerrilla strength and infiltration of agents and saboteurs into South Korea, and of provocative acts in the Demilitarized Zone area. North Korea's increased belligerence constituted the second most serious threat to peace in the Far East in 1968.
### USSR*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAJOR FIELD UNITS OF SOVIET ARMY</th>
<th>PERSONNEL: 210,000 **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1. Combined Armed Army Hqs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Corp Hqs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Motorized Rifle Divisions</td>
<td>(TO 10,935)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tank Divisions</td>
<td>(TO 8,536)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Airborne Division</td>
<td>(TO 7,100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Artillery (Gun) Divisions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Rifle Brigades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Artillery Brigades</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SS-I [SCUD] Brigades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Does not include; (a) ground units assigned to territorial air defense (PVO); (b) coastal defense forces of Soviet Navy; (c) ground crews & support elements of the air forces; (d) Internal Security Forces 7,900 to 15,600 and Border Guard Troops 20,300 to 40,000.

---

### NORTH KOREA

| N. 5 Army Group Hqs              | (TO 9,167) |
| 19. Infantry Divisions           | (TO 4,727) |
| 1. Tank Division                 | (TO 3,507) |
| 5. Infantry Brigades             | (TO 8,723) |
| 6. Artillery Brigades (Hw/sitter - 152mm) | (TO 1,403) |
| 2. Mortar Brigades (Heavy - 150mm) | (TO 1,200) |
| 1. Rocket Launcher Brigade       | (TO 1,206) |
| 1. Reconnaissance Brigade        |            |
| 4. Medium Tank Regiments         |            |
| 1. Heavy Tank Regiment           |            |
| 1. Independent Infantry Regiment |            |
| 5. Army Group Artillery Regiments|            |
| 9. Army Group AAA Regiments      |            |

** Includes 6 Infantry, 8 Tank, and 5 Cavalry, 24 border/internal defense, 18 artillery, and 67 engineer, signal and service support.

### CHINA

#### PERSONNEL: Army

| 14 ARMIES:                     | 103 Infantry Divisions (TOE 11,910) |
| 24 ARTILLERY DIVISIONS:        |                                      |
| 15 Field Artillery             | (TO HOW-6,344)                     |
| 3 AA                           | (TO 6,220)                         |
| 5 AA                           | (TO 3,143)                         |
| 5 ARMOURED DIVISIONS           | (TO 8,094)                         |
| 3 CAVALRY DIVISIONS (Security) | (TO 5,170)                         |
| 3 AIRBORNE DIVISIONS           | (TO 10,261)                        |
| 20 BORDER DEFENSE/MIS DIVISIONS| (TO 8,538)                         |

### NORTH VIETNAM

#### REGULAR FORCES

| II Inf Div                    | 14,100(est) |
| 1. Army Command               | 115,700(est) |
| 1. AAA Command (89 AAA regts) | 2,600(est)  |
| 1. Armored Command            | 5,100(est)  |
| 1. Inf Brigade                | 2,500(est)  |
| 5 Independent Inf Regiments   | 1,350(est)  |
| 5 Independent Trans Regiments | 450(est)    |

#### MILITIA:

Class I - Full Time Militia Members Armed with Semi and Automatic Weapons.

Class II - Part Time, Lightly Armed Troops.

#### SECURITY FORCES:

Armed Peoples Security Forces ............. 6 Regts and 35 Det

### PERSONNEL:

| Regular Army                  | 446,900 (Note 1) |
| Militia                        | (Note 2)        |
| APSF                           | 16,500          |

### NOTES:

1. Strength does not include seven division equivalents deployed outside SVN.
2. Estimated to consist of 1,000,000 Class I and 2,000,000 Class II.

---

** Includes 6 Infantry, 8 Tank, and 5 Cavalry, 24 border/internal defense, 18 artillery, and 67 engineer, signal and service support.

---

** SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 28
### COMMUNIST NAVAL STRENGTH

#### FAR EAST & PACIFIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>USSR #</th>
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<td>Destroyers (Gun)</td>
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<td>Escorts (DE, PCE)</td>
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<td>Minor Surface Combatants</td>
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<td>503</td>
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<td>Mine Warfare Types</td>
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<td>Personnel Strength</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>125,000e</td>
<td>10,200f</td>
<td>2,500</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* AS OF 1 AUG 68
* * AS OF 1 SEP 68
** AS OF 31 DEC 68

** Source: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 31.**

- a. Does not include personnel in Naval Aviation.
- b. Does not include personnel in Navy Infantry and Coast Defense units.
- c. Does not include 20,000 personnel of Naval Air Force.
## SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST AIR FORCES

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<th></th>
<th>USSR1</th>
<th>CHINA1</th>
<th>NORTH KOREA1</th>
<th>NORTH VIETNAM1</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>HAVAI AIR</td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>HAVAI AIR</td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>COMBAT AIRCRAFT</strong></td>
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<td>Jet Fighter (Day)</td>
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<td>Piston Light Bomber</td>
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<td>Piston Medium Bomber</td>
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<td>Piston Heavy Bomber</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>129</td>
<td>2592</td>
<td>463</td>
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<td><strong>SUPPORT AIRCRAFT</strong></td>
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<td>Piston Transport, Light</td>
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<td>Turboprop Transport, Medium</td>
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<td>Jet Trainer</td>
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<td>Recce, Jet</td>
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<td>Recce, Turboprop</td>
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<td>Recce, Prop</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>638</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT</strong></td>
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<td>1451</td>
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<td>3055</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL COMBAT SUPPORT</strong></td>
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<td>586</td>
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<td>737</td>
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<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>2037</td>
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<td>3792</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PERSONNEL STRENGTHS</strong></td>
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<td>13,500</td>
<td>247,800</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Includes aircraft within Transbaikal & Far East Military Districts & all bomber aircraft attached to the 3rd Long Range Air Army (Transbaikal, Far East & Turkestan Mil Districts).  
2Includes 140,000 personnel assigned to ACW, RAM & AAA units.  
3Includes 100 jet fighters, 4 light jet bombers and 3 MIG 15 trainers in Communist China.  
4Includes all types of utility/transport aircraft, jet fighter trainers.  
5Includes all types of jet trainers.

**COMBAT AIRCRAFT:** Fighter & Bomber aircraft only, which are used in fighter, ground attack or bomber/sanker roles.  
**COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT:** All other aircraft assigned to operational units in support of the combat mission, including light and medium transports, helicopters, all types of reconnaissance aircraft.

**As of 1 Oct 68**

**Source:** PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 33.
### SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST MISSILE FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>As of 1 Oct 68 USSR</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>As of 1 Oct 68 Chinese Communist</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>As of 1 Oct 68 North Korea</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>As of 31 Dec 1968 North Vietnam</th>
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<tr>
<td>Surface to Surface</td>
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- **Notes:**
  - a. Twenty seven sites occupied intermittently or no history of occupancy.
  - b. Three sites occupied intermittently or no history of occupancy.
  - c. Chi Com SA-2 sites may consist of 3-5 launchers.
  - d. Only a few are occupied; battalions frequently move between prepared sites. Estimated 35 to 40 battalions (three to six launchers per battalion).

**Source:** PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 35.
SECTION VI - U. S. BASE REQUIREMENTS OVERSEAS

U.S. Base Requirements Overseas

Special State-Defense Department Study of Overseas Base Requirements

3. Ltr., COL C.S. Seamans, USAF, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff Logistics, Hq CINCPAC to Distribution List, 16 Sep 68, Subj: Revisions to the 1968 Edition of United States Base Requirements Overseas (USBRO) (U).
4. CINCPAC 172221Z Oct 68.
5. JCS 3872/221924Z Oct 68.
was to develop U.S. overseas base requirements and recommendations on an overseas basing system, plus alternatives, to support our global strategy through the next decade.

He asked for information on a number of specific topics related to our base needs as they would be affected by loss or restriction of use at specific locations, technological advances, and changes resulting from British withdrawal or increased Soviet influence in the PACOM.

(U) The group then visited Guam, the Philippines, Okinawa, Japan, and Korea and was briefed at each of those locations before returning to Washington. 2

(U) In August GEN Wood again visited CINCPAC, this time enroute to Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. While in Hawaii he briefed CINCPAC, the component command commanders, and primary staff officers on the depth and format of his study.

(U) The study was expected to be completed and given to the Secretary of Defense by 15 December 68.

(U) Since Chobyo Yara was elected Chief Executive of Okinawa on 10 November on a platform urging immediate and unconditional reversion, pressures for restoration to full Japanese sovereignty

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
intensified in both Okinawa and Japan. Japan's Prime Minister Eisaku Sato favored reversion, but he was more inclined to negotiations for eventual return than to press for immediate action.
(U) On 26 June 1968 the Bonin-Volcano-Marcus Islands

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
(Ogasawaras) reverted formally\(^1\) to Japanese sovereignty and administration.\(^2\) Ceremonies marking the occasion were conducted simultaneously in Chichi Jima, Iwo Jima, and in Tokyo, where the Crown Prince, Prime Minister, and American Ambassador participated.\(^3\)

(U) The Government of Japan provided two new facilities to the U.S. Forces Japan--communications sites on Iwo Jima and Minami Tori Shima (Marcus Island).\(^4\)

(U) The title of the former CINCPAC Representative Mariana-Bonin Islands (CINCPACREP MARBO) was changed to CINCPAC Representative Mariana Islands.\(^5\)

**U.S. Bases in Japan**

(U) Maintained and operational United States bases around the perimeter of the Free World in the PACOM had long been considered essential by CINCPAC if we were to maintain an effective defense posture. Our bases and forces on the borders of the Communist camp provided a key element of our forward defense strategy. In countries where the enemy threat was most evident--South Vietnam, Korea, and Thailand, for example--the host governments welcomed our forces and acknowledged their basing needs. In countries where the threat was not so apparent, however, or countries where anti-U.S. sentiment was more vocal, the pressure for reversion of U.S. owned properties continued to rise.

(U) Japan was such a country. Bound to Japan by a Mutual Security Treaty, U.S. Forces occupied or shared with Japan's Self-Defense Forces a number of bases that had been in use by the United States since World War II. These bases supported military activities in the entire PACOM, from Southeast Asia to Korea. CINCPAC was in

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3. History of Headquarters, United States Forces, Japan, 1 April - 30 June 1968, pp. 28-29.
4. Ibid., p. 11.
5. CINCPACSTAFFNOTE 5400, 12 Jun 68, Subj: CINCPAC Representative, Mariana-Bonin Islands; change in title of.
complete agreement with the national policy that bases and facilities excess to our requirements should be returned to the host country. Our needs, therefore, were continually evaluated with the goal of returning unnecessary land and consolidating our facilities.

Of greater importance was the divergency of views between the two countries. The United States and Japan had not been able to agree on the nature of the threat to Japan and other PACOM countries, nor on the security arrangements necessary for the defense of Asia. The Japanese discounted the threat to them from the U.S.S.R. by conventional warfare. They gave great credence to a U.S.S.R. nuclear threat, but relied on the United States to cope with it--at the same time holding that U.S. bases in Japan were not pertinent to the U.S. capability for offsetting that threat. The Japanese discounted either a nuclear or nonnuclear threat from Communist China. They considered Korea unimportant to the defense of Japan.

The American Ambassador to Japan, U. Alexis Johnson, believed that it was of fundamental importance to bring about soon a closer mutual appreciation of the threat and the security arrangements necessary to cope with it. CINCPAC, as a participant in Security Consultative Committee discussions, was in complete support of this idea and was in a position to expound his views.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
(U) The United States was represented by Ambassador Johnson and ADM John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC. The offer to give up 10 military facilities and to move or share another 40 was accepted by the Japanese at the meeting, with negotiations in the Joint Committee to effect the changes expected to begin quickly.

(TS) In December, when consideration of the base needs situation seemed to have been temporarily concluded, CINCPAC received a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff listing 11 "tentative proposals" from the Secretary of Defense which, if effected, would make major reductions in our base structure in Japan and Okinawa. The reason given for the proposals was "concern about gold losses and size of Defense budget."

1. One problem here was the wide variation in U.S. and Japanese facility standards. That Government was reluctant to furnish or replace facilities to standards that greatly exceeded local practice in Japan. The replacement of facilities for relocated or consolidated installations was to be at Japan's expense under terms of the Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement. (Point Paper, J4222, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Aug 68, Subj: U.S. Facilities Standards in Japan.)
2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
3. Point Paper, J512, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Oct 68, Subj: Review of US Bases in Japan (which contains a list of bases for which change was recommended).
4. J5124 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
5. JCS 7212/081731Z Dec 68.
6. Ibid.
CINCPAC's reply considered each of the specific proposals, which are discussed below, and also contained the following rationale:

...The base structure in the PACOM is directly related to the forces required to implement U.S. strategy supporting national objectives. A viable overall base structure useful in peacetime and responsive to contingency situations or general war serves as the foundation of our military presence in the Pacific area. The base structure is not susceptible to fragmentation and partial examination. Such individual examination is useful only in assessing the requirements for facilities support activities at major base complexes. This has been accomplished for Japan and approved proposals for the adjustment of facilities support will be presented 23 December to the GOJ. While future adjustments may be appropriate as decisions are reached regarding the US post-hostilities posture to be maintained after conclusion of the war in Vietnam, major changes in advance of those decisions preclude future US objectives and strategy. In the time available for study no correlation can be found between proposals required by Ref A (the Secretary's proposals) to be addressed and orderly planning for the future, especially as regards the overall posture to be maintained in the PACOM. The need to reduce gold loss and budgetary expenditures is fully appreciated and means to that end are actively pursued both in operations and planning. However, actions taken in that area must be weighed against the successful accomplishment of assigned missions and the ability to accomplish US objectives in Asia, the failure of which would be far more costly. The impact on overall US posture in the Pacific and on our ability to carry out national objectives which would result from the proposals is not assessed in the subject proposal. The assessment appears almost exclusively concerned with personnel, budget and IBOP considerations, with scant attention to strategic and policy aspects.

1. CINCPAC 170319Z Dec 68, the source for all information and quotations in the remainder of this subsection.
...Future modification of the US base structure in Japan, Okinawa or elsewhere should be related to total requirements in the Pacific and should be the product of orderly planning based on the future course to be pursued by the U.S. over the next decade. Such planning, taking into account an eventual end to the war in Vietnam, is in progress. Results may later show that some of the proposals forwarded by Ref A are feasible. However, until an orderly examination of our future position can be accomplished, CINCPAC strongly non-concurs in an across-the-board implementation of subject proposals for Japan and Okinawa in isolation of PACOM total requirements....

(TS) CINCPAC did concur in several minor recommendations, specifically those he had already either implemented or contemplated. For the most part, however, he did not concur. The eleven proposals and CINCPAC's comments follow:

1. Proposal: Consolidate Hq USARJ with Hq USARYS, close Camp Zama; adjust support.

CINCPAC non-concurred as he considered the move "detrimental to support of the Vietnam War and the control and coordination required for the established logistical support activities." CINCPAC's operational command of forces in Japan, he explained, was through the PACOM Service component commanders to the respective Service commanders in Japan. The proposed change:

...introduces undesirable political implications and would be disruptive to US-GOJ security relationship. Camp Zama was developed with the advice and assistance of the GOJ for the many important activities which are consolidated there. Realignment of command would place an undesirable limitation on CINCPAC with respect to command facilities, storage of operational projects, and contingency force staging for the defense of Japan and NEA.

...USARJ will be heavily involved in the retrograde of Vietnam equipment following the end of hostilities and is charged with reconstitution of the DAFFD (Department of the Army Forward Floating Depot). Both these missions are based on current manning levels of USARJ and USADCJ, and would be difficult and costly to supervise...
from Okinawa. Absorption of these functions by HQ USARYS would require augmentation, construction, and extend already over-committed facilities to accommodate an Airborne Bde, USMC units, and support units under T-day planning. Accommodating to these redeployments would be further complicated by present political climate in Okinawa on reversion and opposition to expansion of present U.S. bases.

CINCPAC estimated that it would cost $114 million to replace Camp Zama facilities, which were provided without cost.


CINCPAC non-concurred and defined the integrated PACOM MAP/AID mission of the USADCJ. He noted that a reduced USADCJ would not be able to react effectively regarding assistance for materiel supplied by CONUS sources and that maintenance was most effectively accomplished close to the source depot for repair parts. He said the current 60-day pipeline of MAP supplies would increase to 220 days and cost $90 million in fund increase. Shortages of skilled personnel would mean less support for MAP inventories of World War II, Korean War, and Japan-procured vehicles, as well as reducing capability for holding in Japan retrograde MAP material from Vietnam, an important source of future MAP supply.

3. Proposal: Consolidate Hospitals (Close Camp Oji and Kishine Barracks; Expand Camp Drake and USAF Hospitals at Tachikawa and Clark, and Tripler Hospital, Hawaii).

CINCPAC non-concurred with the proposal as stated, although he had proposed to release Camp Oji and Kishine Barracks as part of the joint State-Defense Department proposal to the Japanese, provided Japan would fund a new 2,000-bed facility in a less sensitive area. CINCPAC commented that bed capacity alone should not be the measure; treatment capabilities such as operating rooms, laboratories, etc., and the staffs to operate them were necessary to provide appropriate treatment. He stated that further proposals concerning hospital requirements in the PACOM should be held in abeyance until the current PACOM-wide study on this subject was completed.

4. Proposal: Return Naval Base at Sasebo to GOJ; Reassign Ships to Yokosuka.
base at near maximum capability during peacetime, adversely affect operations, and raise the level of vulnerability to enemy disruption of operations. Consolidation would require construction of additional POL tankage.

Regarding Atsugi, CINCPAC said that closure and relocation of aircraft at Yokota would result "in a serious degradation of PACOM capability." The Secretary's proposals did not evaluate the significant reduction in real and potential force efficiency, he said, noting that the most efficient employment of forces (mutually contributable combat, combat support, and support units) cannot be effected from the limited facilities and high degree of saturation at Yokota. Again, new support facilities would be required to be constructed, at Yokota or elsewhere.

Regarding Yamato Air Force Station, CINCPAC said that units could move to Yokota with no impact on the mission.

Iwakuni MCAS and Futema Helicopter Base were discussed next. Making Iwakuni a Dispersed Operating Base would reduce the PACOM capability to respond to contingencies and in the post-hostilities period would leave Marine forces in the WESTPAC without bases required for helicopters and close air or anti-air aviation units and would destroy the integrity of the Marine air/ground team. Aircraft from Iwakuni could not be accommodated on bases in CONUS, nor at either Clark or Naha unless additional facilities were constructed. This, said CINCPAC, is "considered politically infeasible."

Itazuke Air Base could be returned to Dispersed Operating Base status in June 1969 after relocation of certain units; operation of EC-121 aircraft in support of Korea would be a continuing requirement while Itazuke was in Dispersed Operating Base status.

CINCPAC then made several generalizations about the air base proposals. He thought they failed to take into consideration:
...the difference in aircraft physical sizes, degrees of complexities which require varying types and quantities of support facilities, equipments, personnel and geographic base locations of aircraft units to optimize mission performance and reduce costs involved. Saturation of bases as proposed would seriously reduce CINCPAC capability to support approved contingency plans and operations. Reduction of this capability would serve to erode current effect of existing posture and would proportionately limit reaction of PACOM forces as future enemy actions may require.

7. Proposal: Remove LITTLE JOHN Battalion from Okinawa. CINCPAC concurred; the battalion was inactivated 1 December 1968.

9. Proposal: Reduce 2d Logistics Command authorized personnel to previous level, after processing special VN retrograde.

CINCPAC non-concurred, noting that processing the thousands of items being retrograded from Vietnam had "created a serious backlog in other high priority tasks." Reduction would "seriously curtail the capability of the 2nd Log Cmd to perform present and programmed tasks."

10. Proposal: Consolidate Intelligence Facilities, Relocate PACOM ELINT Center to US.
11. Proposal: Move Marine Support Units now on Okinawa to CONUS. Reduce Camp Butler and the 3d Force Service Regiment.

CINCPAC non-concurred, noting that removal of elements of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade from WESTPAC would "derogate responsiveness to CINCPAC requirements in potential contingency areas, particularly Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea." Reduction of the 3d Force Service Regiment and transfer of its mission to the 2d Logistics Command was considered infeasible. Fifth echelon maintenance would have to be performed on CONUS, increasing the amount of equipment in the pipeline and the need for ships. Third and fourth echelon maintenance would have to be transferred to Vietnam, doubling the fourth echelon facilities there in terms of men, tools, and shops and parts storage.

He thought Japan would want assurances, though, that streamlining the base structure would not impair or degrade our capability to participate in the defense of Japan. Also, Japan would need time to adjust to the reduction in force of some 11,038 local national employees (whose severance pay would be $26 million). He noted that certain recommendations did seem to permit some political gain, but others called for consolidating or moving bases to more politically turbulent areas. He said that the favorable political impact would be short-lived as highly vocal base opposition elements would attempt to portray the reduction as a "victory" and redouble their attempts against the remaining bases. Any actual reduction should be timed so that if Japanese forces increase their requirements in the Fourth Defense Buildup the facilities would be available, which would "enhance our capability to 'return' to some of the bases at a future date, if required."
CINCPAC strongly recommended against implementation of any proposed reductions other than those in which he had specifically concurred.

Relocation of Operations from Itazuke to Iwakuni Studied

Itazuke was regularly used for commercial operations. It was normally a standby base, maintained by the USAF for use in support of OPlan 27 or other operations in Northeast Asia. ³

1. CINCPAC 100312Z Oct 68.
2. The crash of an Air Force RF-4C on 2 June 1968 into a computer center building under construction at Kyushu University had caused vigorous protest of U.S. presence and air operations. No one was injured in the nighttime crash. (History of Headquarters, United States Forces, Japan, 1 April - 30 June 68, pp. 3-5, 27-28; 1. August - 30 September 68, pp. 5-6.)
3. Point Paper, J512, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Oct 68, Subj: Joint Use of Iwakuni MCAS.
4. Ibid.
The Fuji-McNair Maneuver Area

(U) Since 1960 CINCPAC had been concerned with U.S. use or return to Japanese control of the Fuji-McNair Maneuver Area on the slopes of Japan's famous mountain.

(S) In reply, CINCUSARPAC listed troop staging sites, some controlled by the United States, some by Japan. CINCUSARPAC, however, still considered retention of the Fuji-McNair area of primary importance as it was the only U.S. held real estate available and large enough to accommodate a U.S. division if one should be deployed to Japan.

(S) CINCPACFLT noted that the Fuji-McNair area was primarily of importance to the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific because its primary value was as a firing range for artillery and armored units and as a maneuver area for units up to regimental size whose training requirements could not be fully met on Okinawa. CINCPACFLT's review of alternate sites concluded that the Ft. Stotsenburg area in the Philippines was the most promising of those he studied in the PACOM.

(S) Japan's representatives to the Joint Committee presented a draft proposal for the conversion of the East Fuji area to Japanese administration in June, a copy of which COMUS Japan forwarded to CINCPAC.

1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
4. Ibid.
5. CINCUSARPAC GPOP-DT 5759/082120Z Feb 68.
6. CINCPACFLT 032138Z Mar 68.
7. Ibid.
8. COMUSJAPAN 080715Z Jun 68.
On 11 June CINCPAC forwarded the draft proposal to the JCS and again made known his views on the matter. He confirmed his previous position that the Fuji-McNair problem should be solved as soon as practicable to remove the United States from the middle of an internal Japanese political controversy.

CINCPAC outlined possible alternate sites, in Japan and elsewhere in the PACOM, and recommended that alternates be selected and developed as rapidly as possible. CINCPAC said, "Continued US insistence on the retention of Fuji-McNair, or relinquishment only on the basis of previously stipulated full usage guarantees, is unrealistic in the face of growing local, economic and political pressures." He recommended the following U.S. objectives in our negotiations with Japan:

a. Early return of the East Fuji area to the GOJ on the best obtainable terms which will reasonably assure its usefulness for US military purposes through FY 70.

b. Return of the North Fuji area to the GOJ by end FY 70, or earlier, if usage rights matching those obtained for East Fuji can be negotiated.

c. Accommodation of Oplan staging and troop stationing requirements, as necessary, through joint usage agreements at suitable JSDF controlled areas.

In July both the U.S.-GOJ Ad Hoc Working Group on the Fuji Maneuver Area and the U.S.-GOJ Joint Committee approved a proposal which permitted a solution satisfactory to both sides. The East Fuji Maneuver Area (FAC 3127) was redesignated the Fuji Maneuver Area (FAC 3183), changing its status to an area under control of the Japan Defense Agency. The part of the former East Fuji Maneuver Area occupied by the United States on a full-time basis was established as Camp Fuji (FAC 3127). This action was necessary because Japan was not prepared for the conversion of the North Fuji Maneuver Area at that time. The actual conversion of the East Fuji Maneuver Area was effected on 31 July 1968.

1. CINCPAC 112335Z Jun 68.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. History of Headquarters, United States Forces, Japan, 1 August - 30 September 68; pp. 4-5.
5. Ibid.
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

(U) As antagonism toward the basing of United States forces in certain allied countries in the PACOM became more evident, attention centered increasingly on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) as a strategically located forward area with sufficient real estate for extensive military installations.

(U) The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 appointed Japan under the League of Nations Mandate System to administer the former German possessions in the Pacific north of the equator. In 1946 the United States agreed to administer the Caroline, Marshall, and Mariana Islands (except Guam) as a trusteeship for the United Nations. The 3 million square mile territory extended from 1° to 20° North and from 130° to 172° East. The area was also known as Micronesia; its administrative center was at Saipan in the Marianas.

(U) The United Nations trusteeship agreement came into effect on 18 July 1947. Article 5 of that agreement stated:

In discharging its obligation under Article 76(a) and Article 84 of the Charter, the administering authority shall insure that the trust territory shall play its part, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority shall be entitled:

1. To establish naval, military and air bases and to erect fortifications in the trust territory.

2. To station and employ armed forces in the territory; and;

3. To make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations toward the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for the local defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

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1. Point Paper, J73, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Dec 67, Subj: Legal Status of the TTPI.
Administration of the TTPI was transferred from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior by Executive Order No. 10265 of 29 June 1951, partly returned to the Navy for certain areas in 1953, and then by Executive Order No. 11021 of 7 May 1962 transferred back so that responsibility for the civil administration of the entire territory was assigned to the Secretary of the Interior. The President appointed the High Commissioner of the territory.

As with any country or area, it was impossible to separate military from political considerations. Therefore, military requirements were viewed in light of political developments in the area. Back on 18 April 1962 President Kennedy had issued National Security Action Memorandum No. 145, a New Policy for the United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. This memo was directed to the Secretaries of the Interior, State, Defense, and Health, Education, and Welfare. The President stated that while in the past the United States had carried out its United Nations obligation so as to change as little as possible the customary way of life of TTPI inhabitants, changes in outlook among the people of the dependent areas and the rest of the world toward them brought a "recognition of the need for a greatly accelerated program of political, economic and social development." The President continued:

...Under the terms of the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement the United States is committed to the preparation of the people of the Trust Territory for self-government or independence, according to the freely expressed wishes of the people. It is unlikely that the Trust Territory could ever become a viable, independent nation. Accordingly, I have concluded that it is in the interest of the United States that the Trust Territory be given a real option at the appropriate time to move into a new and lasting relationship to the United States within our political framework. This, then, should be our goal. If it is to be accomplished, the people of the Trust Territory must become an educated people, prepared to exercise an informed choice, which means a choice by people capable of weighing the realistic alternatives. There is an urgent

1. Point Paper, J5121, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Dec 67, Subj: Legal Status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI).
need for the initiation of programs leading to the improvement of education as a first step. In addition, improvements in other public services and the economic development of the Trust Territory are as important, if not as urgent. ¹

The President asked for an interagency task force to develop and effect programs to achieve these goals. The task force was instructed to bear in mind:

...the importance to the United States of (a) the attitude of the United Nations, the Trusteeship Council, and the neighboring countries of the Pacific toward the United States as the trust administering power; (b) the security requirements of the United States in the area; and (c) the US long-term objectives of developing the Trust Territory as a viable territory permanently associated with the United States and enjoying a standard of living consistent with such association. ²

This area that was of interest and importance to the United States consisted of over 2,100 small islands, but its combined land area was under 700 square miles. About 64 islands were regularly inhabited, with a total population estimated at about 95,000. ³ English was the official language. The economic system was based primarily on subsistence agriculture and fishing. The coconut palm provided food, housing material, and copra, the main cash income.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Point Paper J2216, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Sep 68, Subj: Background Information on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI).
4. The State Department was not represented in the group. (Point Paper J515, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Sep 68, Subj: Debrief of Interagency Group Returning from Visit to TTPI (U)).
Early resolution of the political status of the TTPI was the key to future basing arrangements there.

The military departments have held retention rights for approximately 19,000 acres since World War II; these rights were reviewed every five years. 2

Military retention areas included the following:

a. Saipan - nearly 5,000 acres, Kobler and Isley Airfields, 3 Tanapag Harbor, Coast Guard LORAN station, bomb dump, and roads.

b. Tinian - 8,900 acres, North and West Airfields, bomb dump, depot area, and camp areas. Planning has been initiated by CINCPACFLT to acquire Tinian Harbor as a military retention area.

c. Truk - 85 acres, seaplane ramps, airfield, and radio station. The old Navy seaplane base at Moen Island was released by the Pacific Division Naval Facilities Engineer Command to the High Commissioner on 18 October 1968; the area was to be used for commercial hotel development. CINCPACFLT had initiated action to acquire military retention rights for the old Japanese seaplane base at Dublon Island.

d. Palau - 320 acres, seaplane ramps, airfield, and Coast Guard LORAN station.

e. Marshall Islands - 4,150 acres, Army Kwajalein Missile Test Site, and Coast Guard LORAN station.

1. Point Paper, J5124, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Sep 68, Subj: Interagency Working Group Visit to the TTPI (U).
3. The Government of the TTPI had requested the return of Isley Field for development as a commercial airfield. The USAF had proposed that a joint-use tenancy agreement be negotiated. The Pacific Division Naval Facilities Engineering Command informed the High Commissioner of this proposal on 6 December 1968 and asked him to consider it and also provide area requirements and information on planned improvements.
Operational military facilities were the Army's Kwajalein Missile Test Site and Coast Guard LORAN stations on Saipan, Anguar (Palaus), Yap, and Ebeye (Marshall Islands). 2

Although no specific needs had arisen, in 1968 CINCPAC and his component command commanders were determining tentative land requirements and possible construction programs. 3 Such preliminary indications included that Guam, in conjunction with Tinian and Saipan, could provide adequate land to accommodate FMFPAC basing requirements, although amphibious deployment to the forward perimeter would not be as responsive as from Okinawa. Adequate land for Navy requirements was found in the Palaus, Babelthaup, and Koror, but existing harbor facilities at usable sites were inadequate. Army forces could be based as follows: one division split between Guam and Saipan, one airborne brigade on Babelthaup, and relocation of the Okinawa-based logistic facility to Tinian with some additional support from Guam. Priorities were for the Marianas and Palau Districts. Air Force forces could use Andersen and Hickam Air Force Bases instead of more forward deployments, with Northwest Base, Guam considered an alternate location for additional forward basing. 4

CINCPAC had also been planning for some more immediate purposes. He believed that there were certain construction programs that could be carried out right away to maintain and possibly enhance the desired U.S. position in the TTPI. Accordingly, on 10 October he forwarded to the JCS a list of proposals for restoration or construction of facilities. 5 He listed the following islands as those most important to U.S. strategy: Tinian, Saipan and lesser nearly islands, Babelthaup, Malakal and Koror in the Palaus, and to a lesser degree the Truk Atoll and the Marshalls.

2. Ibid.
3. Point Paper, J5153, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Dec 68, Subj: Planning for Developing New Bases in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) and Guam Augmentation (U).
4. Ibid.
5. CINCPAC 100213Z Oct 68.
CINCPAC listed the following examples of appropriate projects in the TTPI: (a) improve by construction and upgrading the road system between Tanapag Harbor and Isley Field, Saipan—the road would be essential if Isley were reopened as a jet-capable airfield—and arrest and deter further encroachment by the jungle at Isley Field; (b) restore the breakwater at Tinian Harbor; and (c) construct a 4,000 square foot general warehouse at Malakal Harbor, Palau. CINCPAC estimated that the projects would cost somewhat over $1 million if done by civilian contractors and somewhat over a third of a million if done by military construction forces.¹

CINCPAC believed these relatively low cost projects had future military value and would project a favorable U.S. image to the Micronesians. He considered, however, that such advantages had to be balanced against such possible disadvantages as affording countries like Japan and the Philippines with rationale for reducing U.S. presence in their areas, providing counter-productive propaganda for vocal leftist elements in the TTPI, and cost. CINCPAC believed that the projects would be beneficial and recommended them for consideration as a "means of preserving and enhancing U.S. interests in the TTPI."²

In response, the JCS stated that the projects suggested for consideration would be included in any deliberations on actions to be taken by Defense agencies in the Trust Territory and CINCPAC would be kept informed of developments on the subject.³

Meanwhile, the United States continued to control access to the area. An agreement between the Departments of the Interior and Navy,

1. Ibid.  
2. Ibid.  
3. JCS 162041Z Oct 68.
effective 1 July 1963, made the entry of individuals, ships, and aircraft subject to control by the High Commissioner with the Services involved to some extent, as follows. The High Commissioner controlled all U.S. documented entrants. The entry of all other persons, ships, or aircraft—not documented under U.S. or TTPI laws—was controlled by the High Commissioner but each was reviewed by the Navy Department, which had the right to object to the issuance of authorization. Exceptions to these controls were those for Kwajalein Atoll, where entry was controlled by the Department of the Army, and Bikini and Eniwetok Atolls, where the Department of the Air Force exercised control. 1

**Diego Garcia**

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Among additional future uses in strategic operations CINCPAC considered:

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In view of the Soviets' current naval buildup in the Mediterranean, there is a strong possibility that,

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1. Point Paper, J5124, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Dec 67, Subj: Control of Entry Into the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI).
when the Suez Canal is opened, there will be an increase in Soviet fleet activity in the Indian Ocean. In this event, an airfield on Diego Garcia could be used to base VP aircraft to conduct ASW, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions. An airfield on Diego Garcia could have great strategic importance.¹

On 10 April the JCS proposed the establishment of a $44 million joint facility on Diego Garcia. In reply, the Deputy Secretary of Defense categorized the request as one for a "major" facility, which he believed was not justified.³ He did believe, however, that justification existed for a "modest" facility and approved in principle a concept involving austere communications, POL storage, an 8,000-foot runway (the JCS had recommended a 12,500-foot runway), and anchorage dredging—at a cost of about $26 million.⁴

In response to a subsequent JCS request,⁵ CINCPAC outlined his communications-electronics requirements, primarily Navy oriented and with a combined navigational and air traffic control capability.⁶ He listed requirements for an austere initial installation (but one with an expansion capability to "meet further needs of unified/specified commands, MILDEPS, and other government agencies as required"). He also defined requirements for an expanded capability in the event the Navy Communications Station at Asmara, Ethiopia was denied for further United States use.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
The JCS had solicited and received communications-electronics requirements from the Services, the commanders of unified and specified commands, the Defense Communications Agency, the

They approved certain of these stated requirements and established priorities for them before forwarding them to the Chief of Naval Operations for use in preparation of an outline plan for development of the joint communications-electronics facility. The requirements that had been stated by CINCPAC were among those validated by the JCS.2

Among other plans for the facility, the State Department considered that as a minimum the British flag should fly over the facility and that a British liaison officer should be appointed to establish necessary relations with other British government officials and with the local inhabitants.3

In December CINCPAC outlined to the JCS some of the considerations that led him to stress further the urgency of the development of the Diego Garcia facility.4 CINCPAC believed:

...The increasing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean goes far toward confirming the Soviet intent to be the nation which fills the vacuum created in this area by the impending British withdrawal East of Suez, and is therefore a matter of deep concern. Further unopposed expansion of Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean could lead to situations adverse to the interests of the U.S. throughout the sub-continent, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the establishment of a U.S. joint military facility on Diego Garcia would provide visible evidence of U.S. intent to maintain the Free World balance of power in this area of the world, as well as fulfill a realistic requirement for U.S. military operations. Action should be taken to deny this important strategic area from communist take-over or control. A most important step in this

2. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 070406Z Dec 68.
direction is the development of the proposed military facility on Diego Garcia as expeditiously as possible. 1

CINCPAC concluded:

In view of the increasing capability and apparent intent of the Soviets to disrupt the balance of power in the Indian Ocean, and, in view of the CINCPAC strategic and contingency requirements enumerated above, it is recommended that efforts be continued to insure the early establishment of a joint military facility on Diego Garcia. 3

(S) The matter of runway length remained a matter of concern to CINCPAC. Among the potential requirements for Diego Garcia, he envisioned a staging air base, capable of handling strategic and heavily

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. JCS 07572/122303Z Dec 68.

(92)
loaded logistic type aircraft. Accordingly, he queried his component command commanders as to whether an 8,000-foot runway would be adequate in an area of relatively high temperatures.

(CINCPACAF, in reply, listed runway requirements for various logistic, tactical, strategic, and tanker support aircraft. Minimum requirements for some of them exceeded 8,000 feet. Reductions in payload or fuel could reduce these requirements somewhat, but CINCPACAF noted that with the distances involved in that area, fuel reductions might not be practical. CINCPACAF continued:

...The importance of Diego Garcia as a logistic support base, an extension of the air LOCs through the Pacific to the Indian Ocean area or the Middle East, and an enroute staging base cannot be overemphasized. In this regard, the 8,000 ft runway would seriously impair the usefulness of the base for deployment of tactical aircraft and enroute stops for tankers and strategic airlift aircraft....CINCPACAF strongly urges CINCPAC to reclaim the 8,000 ft runway and state a requirement for a 12,500 ft runway to accommodate strategic airlift aircraft, tankers, and tactical fighter aircraft....

(The Chief of Naval Operations advised CINCPACFLT that any effort to reclaim the 8,000-foot runway at that time would be ill-received in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and could compound the opposition to local efforts to keep the project alive and at least a viable possibility for early realization. The Chief of Naval Operations assured that when the time was right and justification valid he would originate a proposal to increase the runway length by an appropriate amount.

(CINCPAC stated to the Chairman of the JCS that it was recognized that a reclaim at that time regarding Diego Garcia construction costs could be met with opposition at the Office of the Secretary of Defense

1. ADMIN CINCPAC 212227Z Dec 68.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPACAF 270238Z Dec 68.
4. Ibid.
5. CNO 281520Z Dec 68.
6. Ibid.
7. CINCPAC 010025Z Jan 69.
level and that such a reclama might not be propitious. CINCPAC\(^1\) recommended continued support for a 12,500-foot runway on Diego Garcia as a long-term planning proposition and that such a runway length be recommended at the appropriate time.

1. Ibid.
SECTION VII - PLANNING

Joint Program for Planning

(U) The JCS prepared five basic planning documents annually. CINCPAC was asked to contribute to the preparation of certain of these and all were used as the basis for further planning by CINCPAC and his staff. The discussion of four of these basic documents, which follows, stresses matters of particular interest in the PACOM.

Joint Long-Range Strategic Study

(U) The JCS concluded that, "To fulfill its many responsibilities, the US military establishment will require, of its individuals, a practical understanding of technological advances and the relevance of force to political goals." \(^1\)

Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning

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1. Ibid.
estimates for the other countries and territories in the PACOM for the most part continued in the trends and directions they were taking in 1968, with the greatest prospect for political instability and change seen in Singapore and Malaysia.

Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

In January the JCS asked CINCPAC for his comments on Volume I of the previous year's plan, JSOP 70-77, and his specific recommendations for inclusion in Volume I of JSOP 71-78. CINCPAC replied:

1. JCS 7323/152347Z Jan 68.
2. CINCPAC 092254Z Mar 68.
that the JSOP 70-77 format was excellent and should be retained. He made specific recommendations for JSOP 71-78 regarding the planned reduction of the United Kingdom in its role as a power in Southeast Asia; the increased danger to South Korea from North Korea, intensification of which could increase pressure on the United States for additional military assistance and continued U.S. presence; and the threat of direct intervention by the U.S.S.R. as well as Communist China in Southeast Asia. As published by the JCS, Volume I did not differ drastically from the previous edition of that work.2

The plan stated:

b. The basic tenet of US military strategy in Asia is containment involving three interrelated elements: (1) deterring or defeating direct or indirect aggression; (2) strengthening the areas threatened by aggression or subversion; and (3) influencing the leaders of the CPR, the USSR, and other Asian communist nations to abandon their expansionist policies and seek a constructive relationship with other countries of the world.3

Added emphasis was placed on certain topics compared to Volume I for the year before. A vigorous U.S. nuclear test program, within the restrictions of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, was considered necessary as was a responsive posture to resume testing expeditiously if

the treaty were abrogated. Any extension toward a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should be opposed.

The strategic potential of the Indian Ocean areas was highlighted. Its important lines of communication and potential base development areas in a part of the world where military forces of Western powers often have difficulty operating, or even transiting, would become even more important when Britain lessened its presence east of Suez. The resulting regional instability could be expected to facilitate the expansion of Soviet and Chinese influence in the area, which ultimately could pose a direct threat to U.S. and Western interests.

As U.K. forces leave Malaysia and Singapore the U.S. "may have to consider the assumption of some added responsibility for the security of the Singapore-Malaysia area." 1

Civil disturbances within the United States arising from social, political, and economic problems were expected to continue with an attendant requirement for military forces to assist civil authorities in maintaining or restoring law and order. Assistance was to be provided primarily by Reserve elements but a continuing requirement would exist for the utilization of Active component forces.

Regarding the strategic concept in the PACOM, the JCS stated:

k. The posthostilities posture in the area should include those military assets, bases, facilities, and pre-positioned war reserve stocks needed to continue the forward deployment of US Forces in order to strengthen

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1. JSOP 70-77, Volume I had stated that the United States was not in a position to assume the added responsibility for the security of the Singapore-Malaysia area. J5 Brief No. 000229-68, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Jul 68, of JCS SM-456-68 of 6 Jul 68, Subj: Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1971-1978 (JSOP FY 71-78), Vol I, Strategy (U).
the resolve of friendly countries, to deter aggres-
sion by communist countries, and to assist in the
defeat of such aggression if it occurs. In this
regard, the United States should seek to encourage
a permanent association of the TTPI with the United
States to include the possibility of US sovereignty
over selected islands.  

The three contingency stipulations addressed, for which general
purpose forces would be required, were identical with those in JSOP 70-
77 and CINCPAC's assumptions regarding them were also unchanged.  

CINCPAC also repeated his position regarding the increasingly
less meaningful terms--strategic as opposed to tactical--when speaking of
forces, missions, weapons systems, and munitions. The Southeast Asia
conflict had demonstrated an overlap and the clear definition between stra-
tegic and tactical missions became ever less clear in light of a Chinese
ballistic missile threat, the increase in U.S.S.R. ballistic missile

   Volume I - Strategy, SM-456-68, 6 Jul 68.
3. Ibid.
4. Ltr. ADM John S. McCain, Jr., USN, JOO, CINCPAC to the JCS,
   CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF, 27 Sep 68, Subj:
   Recommended PACOM U.S. Forces for JSOP 71-78 (U).

(TS) Among his land based ballistic missile force requirements CINCPAC included a phased increase of MINUTEMAN III missiles from 10 in FY 70 to 100 in FY 75. MACE continued to be scheduled for phase-out in FY 71. His requirement for two PERSHING battalions was the same as last year's, as was the requirement for deployment of a SENTINEL unit for the defense of Oahu, Hawaii.

(TS) For his sea-based forces CINCPAC recommended ultimate acquisition of five POSEIDON-equipped fleet ballistic missile nuclear powered submarines, a decrease of six from his recommendation the year before. The lower and therefore more easily attainable requirement was possible for several reasons. The date of introduction of the POSEIDON submarines in the PACOM and certain other advanced guidance systems were other considerations.

(TS) Air defense requirements for the PACOM were outlined, mostly unchanged from last year. A need was seen, however, to improve the Hawaii Air Defense Sector in the mid-range time frame. This involved F-106 or F-4E aircraft for the Hawaii Air National Guard squadron and improved radar and communications equipment.
Following withdrawal of all temporary forces in the PACOM after the end of hostilities, the recommended force structure would be as follows:

1. Three Army infantry divisions (two in Korea, one in Hawaii).
2. One Army airmobile division (scheduled for Vietnam).
3. Two Marine Expeditionary Forces (divided among the Western, Eastern, and Mid-Pacific areas).
4. One Army airborne brigade (scheduled for Okinawa).

1. Ltr. ADM John S. McCain, Jr., USN, J00, CINCPAC to the JCS, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF, 27 Sep 68, Subj: Recommended PACOM U. S. Forces for JSOP 71-78 (U), Encl. 3, p. 35.
2. An Army division was calculated at about 16,000 men, a Marine division about 19,000, each consisting mainly of combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Some of the combat support and most of the combat service support units for each division, however, were provided by non-divisional units, which were classified as initial support increment units and sustaining support increment units. When these support increments were combined with an Army division they formed a division force averaging about 48,000. The Marine Corps division force equivalent, which had initial support increments only, totaled about 35,000. The Marine division force, though, was normally employed as part of a Marine Expeditionary Force of about 46,000 comprising a Marine division/wing team and, if employed in other than its amphibious assault role, required additional Army and Navy support.
(5) One Army armored cavalry regiment (scheduled for Vietnam).

(6) One Army missile command (Korea).

(TS) CINCUSARPAC's recommendation for JSOP 71-78 had included an infantry division in Hawaii during FY 70-71 as a theater Army reserve. ¹ CINCPAC's recommendation, however, did not include this division. The 29th Brigade, in training in Hawaii, could be considered a PACOM strategic reserve, CINCPAC believed, even though it was assigned to CINC STRIKE.

General Purpose Air Forces²

(TS) There was an increase in the number of Air Force tactical fighter and attack aircraft recommended. CINCPAC recommended 27 USAF tactical fighter squadrons with 648 aircraft by FY 72, compared to last year's 21 tactical fighter squadrons (468 aircraft) and 6 air defense squadrons (129 aircraft) for a total of 597 aircraft. CINCPAC considered this a nominal increase in view of the increasing threat and the fact that deterrence was "a function of visibility as well as credibility."³

(TS) Including:

(1) Reconnaissance Forces: 72 aircraft in 4 squadrons by FY 73.

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2. Ltr. ADM John S. McCain, Jr., USN, J00, CINCPAC to the JCS, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF, 27 Sep 68, Subj: Recommended PACOM U.S. Forces for JSOP 71-78 (U), Encl. 4, p. 3.
3. Ibid.
(2) Special Operations Forces (formerly called Special Air Warfare): 2 wings (112 aircraft) by FY 74.

(3) Tactical Electronic Warfare Support Forces: 4 squadrons through FY 72, then 2 squadrons.

(4) Tactical Air Control System Forces: 115 aircraft by FY 75.

(5) Tactical Auxiliary Forces: 1 flight of 5 aircraft for the Airborne Command Post and an Airborne Launch Control Center, half the number requested last year. An objective of 36 AC-130/119 aircraft was recommended. A force of 50 SAC air refueling tankers doubled last year's requirement.\(^1\)

Two Marine air wings were part of the recommended two Marine Expeditionary Forces—the same requirement as that stated in last year's JSOP.

**General Purpose Navy Forces**\(^2\)

He recommended achievement of a 12 CVA/CVAN force, with vigorous pursuit and possible acceleration of the carrier modernization/construction program. He recommended nine antisubmarine support aircraft carriers and also nine naval gunfire support ships. He saw a continuing need for modern major fleet escorts and general purpose destroyer types.

**Airlift and Sealift Forces**\(^3\)

1. Ibid., Encl. 4, pp. 3-5
2. Ibid., Encl. 5.
3. Ibid., Encl. 6, p. 1.
The airlift and sealift forces portion of JSOP 71-78 was more detailed than it had been in the past, in response to revised JCS guidance. CINCPAC's objective, however, was still to "reduce to a minimum the elapsed time between the start of an enemy attack and the confrontation of the enemy by U.S. combat forces of decisive strength."\(^1\)

To accomplish this, CINCPAC believed PACOM needs included Army pre-positioned stocks to equip a two-division force for rapid reaction, an intra-theater airlift capability of 84 aircraft in the FY 78 time frame, a sealift capability of 175,000 short tons per month, and expanded POL distribution and storage capabilities to handle increased POL needs of new equipment.

For airlift requirements CINCPAC thought it would be desirable to replace the C-130 by 1975 with an aircraft with improved characteristics, specifically a vertical short takeoff and landing (medium) aircraft with improved speed, range, and cargo capacity and significantly improved efficiency and economy of operations. Requirement also existed for a small number of high-speed, long-range aircraft, preferably the C-5, which should be available for immediate response to PACOM cargo airlift requirements beyond the capability of the C-130 or its follow-on aircraft.

The 175,000 short tons per month sealift capability was expected to be made up from military assets and dedicated U.S. Government and non-Government owned shipping.

As the military inventory expanded in fuel burning equipment in the 1970's, the types and quantities of fuel were expected to change in proportion. Larger tankers would be in use, with proportionately fewer vessels afloat, requiring more exact scheduling with diversions for operational requirements more difficult to accomplish.\(^2\)

Augmentation Requirements for Contingency Situations

CINCPAC also detailed major augmentation requirements for general purpose land, air, and Navy forces for each of three contingency situations stipulated by the JCS. In doing so, CINCPAC again encountered the current Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan requirement to deploy certain

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
forces to Europe in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. Therefore
CINCPAC's JSOP 71-78 recommendations included deployment of four
CVAs and related ships out of the theater with the possibility of deploying
one Marine Expeditionary Force, to be replaced by a to-be-mobilized
Marine Expeditionary Force. CINCPAC believed, however, that PACOM
forces should remain in the theater and strongly recommended to the
JCS that the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan be revised accordingly. 1

Volume III

CINCPAC was
again asked to rank by priority the nations of the PACOM that were aided
by the Military Assistance Program.

(5) For each country now receiving some military aid, CINCPAC
defined its strategic importance, the threats against it (internal and
external), security arrangements, military objectives, missions, and
capabilities and limitations. He tabulated force structure objectives
and outlined the justifications for each.

(5) Four priorities were defined, based on degree in matters such
as alignment with the United States, the danger from subversion or
aggression contrary to our interests, control of resources, bases, or
lines of communication important to Western military interests, and
vulnerability to threats to internal security that could require significant
military assistance from Free World nations.

1. Ibid.
2. J5 Brief No. 0211-68, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Jul 68, of JCS SM-449-68 of 27
Jun 68, Subj: Guidelines for Development of Volume III of JSOP FY
71-78 (U).
3. Ltr., ADM John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC to the JCS, 12 Sep
68, Subj: Volume III (Free World Forces) to the Joint Strategic Ob-
jectives Plan for FY 1971-1978 (JSOP 71-78) (U), Book II, Sec. VI,
pp. 17-18.
Objecive force cost estimates for those countries that were projected to receive grant aid from the United States were as follows:

**China**

FY 71 objective cost (operations and maintenance funding plus investment costs) was calculated at $797.7 million, of which $30 million
was U.S. grant aid with the Chinese contribution $541.4 million. The shortfall for that year, therefore, would be $226.3 million. Estimates for the following four fiscal years were also tabulated. ¹

**Philippines**

(8) The objective force cost estimate for FY 71 was $189.9 million, of which $22 million was U.S. grant aid with $136.6 million provided by the Philippines. The resulting shortfall would be $31.3 million. The cost estimate rose gradually in each of the next four fiscal years, to $224.1 million, but the U.S. contribution was scheduled to remain constant. ²

**Indonesia**

(8) For Indonesia the objective force cost estimates were the same for each of the fiscal years 1971 through 1975. Each was $6 million, all to come from U.S. grant aid. ³

**Korea**

(8) The largest amounts programmed were those for Korea. The objective force cost estimate for FY 71 was $683.2 million, with $439.6 million to be furnished by the host country and $160 million in planned U.S. grant aid. The cost estimate rose in each of the four succeeding years to $1,171.9 million by FY 75, but the U.S. aid portion diminished by that time to $120 million. ⁴

**Foreign Military Sales**

(8) Recommended foreign military sales for non-grant aid countries were listed for Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore. ⁵

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1. Ibid., Book I, Sec. II, p. 3.
2. Ibid., Book I, Sec. II, p. 20.
3. Ltr., ADM John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC to the JCS, 8 Oct 68, Subj: Addendum to Volume III (Free World Forces) to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1971-1978 (JSOP 71-78) (U), Book I, Sec. II, p. 34.
5. Ltr., ADM John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC to the JCS, 12 Sep 68, Subj: Volume III (Free World Forces) to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1971-78 (JSOP 71-78) (U), Book I, Sec. II, pp. 29-33.
The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), revised annually, was the short range document in the Joint Program for Planning. The JSCP for FY 69 was published by the JCS late in 1967. Its purpose was to provide a statement of military strategy to support the national security objectives based on capabilities during the year (1 July 1968 - 30 June 1969), to provide planning guidance for the unified and specified commands and the Services, and to provide military guidance on our support to allies and the development of plans to cover bilateral and multilateral U. S. agreements. It was published in two volumes. The first contained planning guidance, strategic considerations and concepts, and tasks assigned to CINCPAC and the other unified and specified commanders. Volume II listed major combat forces available, for planning purposes, to accomplish the tasks and conduct the operations prescribed in Volume I. The following discussion will outline some of the differences between JSCP-69 and JSCP-68 of particular interest to CINCPAC.

Plans were to be reviewed at least annually and recommendations on cancellations made to the JCS. New or revised plans were to be prepared by 1 July 1968. If this was not possible, commanders were to report by 1 August the status of such plans as of 1 July.

More definitive guidance was provided on the acquisition of base, access, and transit rights and the need to develop operating facilities. When new facilities were indicated in a contingency plan, time-phased base development plans were to be developed. Alternatives to the acquisition of required base and access rights and facilities which may be denied for political, economic, or military reasons must be considered and included appropriately in plans.

The basic elements of U.S. strategy were unchanged.

General strategic concepts were, in order of priority, deterrence of a strategic nuclear attack on the United States, of conflict and aggression below that level of conflict, and of subversion and insurgency; collective security; and flexible response.

New or revised planning tasks for CINCPAC included:
Planning in coordination with CINCONAD for operations against enemy sea-based aerospace weapons systems which threaten CONUS.

Planning for the exercise of conflict at sea options in support of limited objectives. These options should provide for deterrence or defeat of Soviet initiative that may be taken at sea, as well as response to Soviet political, economic, or military ventures elsewhere.¹

(TS) The JSCP-69 revised and provided more definitive guidance on redeployment of units from the PACOM to reinforce Europe.

(TS) Volume II, which contained the force tabulations and was published twice a year, was in three parts. The first section reflected the projected assignment and availability of major combat forces as of M-Day plus those estimated to become available by mobilization through M+6 months in response to war in Europe. Army forces allocated to the PACOM in this case increased by one infantry division and from one-third to one airborne division, although elements of three infantry divisions and the airborne division were to begin redeployment to USEUCOM. Brigades were reduced from five to three and three air defense battalions (AWSP) were phased out.

(TS) Naval force changes reflected the presence of the battleship NEW JERSEY in the PACOM.

¹. Ibid.
Air Forces changed as follows: (1) tactical bomber squadrons decreased from 2 to 1, which was to be inactivated in FY 69; (2) tactical fighter squadrons increased by 1 to 37; (3) SAWF Squadrons (ACS) increased by 4 to 15 on M-Day.

Active Army units decreased by two-thirds of an airborne division and increased by one infantry division. Reserve forces, mostly to be available by M+6 months, were increased by 1 mechanized division, decreased by 2 armored cavalry regiments to 2, decreased by 2 brigades to 4, and increased from 2 Special Forces companies to 3 Special Forces groups (15 companies).

Naval Reserve forces decreased by 1 antisubmarine warfare aircraft carrier and in destroyer types, but increased by 19 submarines, a new listing.

Air Forces on active Reserve for limited mobilization included a decrease in tactical fighter squadrons from 7 to 6, an increase in troop carrier squadrons from 6 1/2 to 8, and a tactical reconnaissance element of 6 aircraft, a new listing. Reserve and Air National Guard units showed 18 tactical airlift squadrons instead of 13 troop carrier squadrons.

Section III identified major combat forces available to augment assigned forces of the unified commands when mobilization was not authorized. USSTRICOM forces available for planning, compared to those for JSCP-68, were as follows: (1) airborne divisions reduced from 1 2/3 to 1; (2) tactical fighter squadrons reduced from 7 to 6; (3) tactical airlift squadrons increased to 8 from 6 1/2; and (4) a tactical reconnaissance element of 6 aircraft, a new listing. 1

Volume II, it was mentioned earlier, was revised twice a year. In July a revision was published to be used for operations from 1 January 1969 to 30 June 1969. 2 The same three situations were considered--mobilized forces in response to a major NATO/Warsaw Pact war,

1. Ibid.
When mobilization was authorized because of conditions in Europe, M-Day availability of PACOM forces was modified to reflect conversion of the 101st Airborne Division to an airmobile division and Program 6 deployments (an addition of one-third of a mechanized division and one brigade). LITTLE JOHN missile units were removed from the PACOM inventory. PACOM Army forces to reinforce Europe were changed from 3 infantry divisions and 1 airborne division to 4 infantry divisions, 2 air defense battalions (HAWK), and 1/3 of a mechanized division.

PACOM naval forces were changed to take into account scheduled deactivations and new construction. Amphibious ships increased by eight; other changes were not significant. Mobilization was extended from 6 months to 12 to reflect increased time requirements for activation and several types of ships were to be available to PACOM significantly later than previously estimated, including cruisers, destroyer types, and amphibious ships.

Air Forces available on M-Day were modified to reflect Program 6 and Korean deployment, thus 21 instead of 15 SAWF squadrons (ACS) and 41 instead of 37 tactical fighter squadrons. Units to reinforce Europe changed from 14 to 18 tactical fighter squadrons and from 3 to 2 tactical airlift squadrons; the requirement for 2 tactical reconnaissance squadrons was unchanged.

Under a condition of partial mobilization, Army force availability had increased as a result of recent Reserve activation and reorganization. Available Army forces increased by one armored division, seven brigades, four armed cavalry regiments, and three infantry divisions. In general, however, estimated time of availability was increased by one or two months.

Reflecting the increased time requirements for activation, availability of Navy forces was reduced significantly in the period from M-Day to M+6 months. Forces involved included carriers, cruisers, destroyer types, and amphibious ships.

Air Force units available from the USSTRICOM and mobilization resources were reduced by five tactical fighter squadrons and four
tactical airlift squadrons, essentially due to USAF programmed reorganization and the introduction of new equipment. Six F-106 and four EC-12I aircraft were available to augment unified commands from CINCONAD resources.

(PS) In the situation where no mobilization was authorized, in addition to the availability of the CINCONAD forces mentioned just above, forces available from the USSTRICOM were increased by one brigade, three tactical fighter squadrons, and two tactical airlift squadrons. These forces reflected recent Reserve activations. PACOM requirements to augment other unified commands were unchanged.

Annexes to JSCP-69

(U) Various annexes to JSCP-69 were updated during 1968. Those that changed in some noteworthy way are briefly summarized below.

Annex A (Intelligence)

(PS) Annex A listed two new tasks for CINCPAC. One was to identify, record, and disseminate intelligence lessons learned. The second was to prepare an intelligence plan for each operational plan that required intelligence support, to include identification of the total intelligence resources necessary to support the operation.

Annex E (Unconventional Warfare)

(PS) Annex E contained two significant changes from JSCP-68. The second was that plans and programs for training facilities and support for allied and non-U.S. unconventional warfare forces were to be developed on a case-by-case basis only. Existing logistic guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense did not authorize

procurement of equipment for non-U.S. forces with the exception of specified Southeast Asia forces.

Annex F (Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare)

Annex F for JSCP-69 was essentially the same as the one for JSCP-68, with the following modifications.1 There was a statement that, "The President does not now expect to authorize U.S. forces to use lethal anti-personnel CB weapons prior to their use by another nation. In certain situations of national urgency, the President may authorize the use of CB incapacitating weapons." Commanders of unified and specified commands were authorized to use riot-control agents in civil disturbances when they were essential to protect U.S. bases and installations. Certain riot control and lethal agents were not listed as available for development of operations and logistic plans. Riot-control agent CS (tear gas) was now listed as available in 350-pound (BLU-52) bombs, 105mm and 155mm artillery projectiles, and in the 40mm grenade.

Annex G (Map, Chart, and Geodetic)

Annex G was substantially unchanged in JSCP-69. Graphics of available mapping, charting, and geodesic product coverage, previously used to illustrate this annex, were no longer included. They were now contained in a separate publication, "The DOD Guide to Map and Chart Products."2

Annex I (Communications-Electronics)

Both the objectives and tasks assigned to CINCPAC increased in JSCP-69.3 Additional objectives specified for CINCPAC were: (1) capability to establish secure voice and teletypewriter communications between a U.S. contingency force and national command authorities; (2) capability

1. J5 Brief No. 16-68, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Jan 68, of JCSM-878-67 of 28 Dec 67, Subj: Annex F (Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare) to JSCP - 69 (U).
to establish secure communications between a contingency force or element and the U. S. Diplomatic Post in the area of conflict; (3) a secure, reliable capability to identify friendly aircraft and ships; (4) reliable real-time communications-electronics support of reconnaissance and survival operations; and (5) navigation and air traffic control capability for support of U. S. military operations. Additional tasks were: (1) when significant force increases for force development plans occur, communications-electronics annexes should reflect and identify all communications-electronics resources required for force development plans to include both tactical and non-tactical units; (2) more effective use of surveillance, identification, navigation, and air traffic control assets; (3) identification of vulnerability of enemy electronics systems; (4) adjustment to existing communications-electronics systems in foreign sites; (5) plan use of other than electronic means for message delivery to compensate for systems failures or enemy action; (6) consider limited electro-magnetic spectrum availability and difficulty of obtaining frequency clearance in foreign countries; and (7) the continuing requirement to improve both offensive and defensive electronic warfare capabilities.

Annex J (Strategic Movement)

Annex J for JSCP-69 forecast productive airlift and sealift resources that could be generated in FY 69. Except for troop movements by air, our strategic movement capability was considered to have about reached its peacetime limit. For short intervals (about 15 days) airlift support could be curtailed to provide airlift resources for a limited contingency operation elsewhere. Shipping resources were so heavily used that without mobilization of Reserve Fleet assets, ship requisitioning may be required unless a contractual mechanism could be arranged to provide additional resources.

Annex L (Civil Affairs)

Changes in the JSCP-69 Annex L included the following: (1) a reduction of five Army Reserve Civil Affairs Groups; (2) an increase of 21 Army Reserve Civil Affairs Companies; (3) specification of units that may be used to form the basis of a theater civil affairs agency; and (4) in its command support role, a civil affairs group now supported a corps instead of a field army.

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan - Fiscal Year 1970

(TS) Before the end of 1968, the JCS published JSCP-70, Volume I. A new paragraph was added on the scope of the JSCP, more clearly identifying it as a military strategy document.

(TS) Commanders were again tasked to have current plans for the execution of tasks assigned in the JSCP by the first of the new fiscal year, or to submit a report to the JCS on the status of such plans on that day.

(TS) A new annex was added, for electronic warfare.

(TS) Planning guidance contained a number of changes from JSCP-69. The definition of "contingency" was expanded to include the wide range of meanings for the term and the wide ranges of possible responses. The definition of mobilization was changed to one for partial mobilization. T-Day was defined as the day hostilities in Vietnam terminated.

(TS) An additional assumption concerned the conditions under which additional mobilization would occur. A requirement for alternatives in the plans of commanders of unified and specified commands was based on the assumption that residual forces in a post-strategic nuclear war environment may have to function for prolonged periods with minimum outside support.

(TS) In the review of plans, the Operation Plan Package Review was no longer addressed.

(TS) A new addition on non-U. S. military forces stated that commanders should consider options and alternatives involving non-U. S. military forces, to include proposed command arrangements and requirements for combat, combat service, and logistic support of the forces.

The commanders of the unified and specified commands as well as the Service Chiefs were to promptly advise the JCS of logistic deficiencies that would restrict or delay the execution of approved plans. In JSCP-69 the Service Chiefs were responsible for advising both the JCS and the commanders of the unified and specified commands of such deficiencies.

A new paragraph in JSCP-70 concerned psychological operations, plans for which were to be coordinated with other government agencies "to assure optimum utilization of materiel and personnel."¹

The remarks on Strategic Movement were amplified by the addition of factors that impact on total time involved in the deployment of augmentation or mobilization forces.

A new statement regarding domestic emergencies noted that military responsibility in overseas states, possessions, and territories of the United States belonged to the commander of the unified command in whose area assistance was required.

Counterinsurgency planning was now called Foreign Internal Defense Planning. The sources of national policy guidance and joint doctrinal guidance on these matters were more clearly defined.

Remarks about Improved Conventional Munitions permitted delegation of authority to direct initial employment of the weapons to division or comparable level.

In the discussion of strategic considerations, the wording of the basic military objective changed again. In JSCP-70, attacks against the United States should be dealt with by operations that would terminate hostilities under conditions "advantageous" to the United States; JSCP-69 used the phrase "of relative advantage."

Regarding the threat to the United States, the nine most significant possible conflict situations were listed. Since only three were unchanged in JSCP-70, they are quoted:

1. Strategic nuclear war.

2. Outbreak of NATO/Warsaw Pact war.

¹. Ibid.
(5) Continuation of the war in Southeast Asia at present levels or expansion of communist aggression in Laos and/or Thailand.

(8) A crisis arising out of a renewed Soviet threat to Berlin.

Other contingency situations acknowledged included an increasing threat to stability in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas following British withdrawal, compounded by radical Arab nationalist activity and increased Soviet naval forces. Also added in JSCP-70 was the Philippines-Malaysia dispute over Sabah, which could lead to open conflict.

(TS) A strategic concept addition concerned the critical aspect of control of extended air and sea lines of communication.

(TS) Under a discussion of tasks, reports of CBR attacks were to go to the JCS instead of the National Military Command System, a paragraph was added on defense against and operations with CB weapons, and a paragraph was added with a requirement in a contingency situation to plan either as a supported or supporting commander.

(TS) Specific changes in tasks for CINCPAC in JSCP-70 included the following:

(1) Plans should be updated and maintained for a comprehensive and coordinated air and naval campaign in North Vietnam.

1. Ibid.
(2) Five guidelines for countering aggression against South Korea and three guidelines for countering and stopping North Korean violations of the Military Assistance Agreement were added.

(4) Concerning military withdrawal from South Vietnam under the broad terms of the Manila Communiqué, an added task was to prepare and maintain plans in accordance with T-day or other post-hostilities planning as may be directed.

JSOP Terminology Definitions Requested of the JCS

TS. CINCUSARPAC raised a question in September regarding the differing objectives between The question, raised when studying the OPlans and the forces necessary to "successfully conduct and terminate combat operations," was CINCPAC's interpretation of those terms and the differing objectives of the two OPlans.

TS. CINCPAC replied that the distinction in forces required was based on the priorities assigned to those areas and the goals of our response.

1. Ibid.
2. CINCUSARPAC CPOP-PL 39707/240556Z Sep 68.
5. J5154 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
As the phrase "successfully conduct and terminate combat operations" was open to various interpretations, CINCPAC asked the JCS for a more definitive mission assignment when they developed postulated situations in succeeding years of the JSCP. 1

Operational Plans

Two plans relating to Southeast Asia (OPlans 32 and 39) were to be used for post-hostilities planning and were not updated. Eight plans were in the process of being prepared or revised at the end of the year and were expected to be completed early in 1969. The accompanying list shows the actions taken regarding CINCPAC numbered OPlans during the year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Action During CY 68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General War Plan (U)</td>
<td>Change 1 promulgated Jul 68, approved by the JCS in December.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revised by CINCPAC in July; approved by the JCS in December.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scheduled for revision in early 1969.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Ibid.; CINCPAC 080309Z Oct 68.
3. Information for this tabulation taken from Point Paper, J5114, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Dec 68, Subj: Status of CINCPAC Numbered Oplans (U) and review by the War Plans Section, J5, Hq CINCPAC, unless otherwise specified.
CINCPAC OPlans (Cont'd)

Plan

Action During CY 68

Revised by CINCPAC in July; approved by the JCS in October.

New plan, scheduled to be completed early in 1969.

Revision scheduled to be completed early in 1969.

Revision scheduled to be completed early in 1969.

Revision scheduled to be completed early in 1969.

Revised by CINCPAC in Apr 68; Advance Change 3 published.

Revised by CINCPAC in Jul 68; approved by the JCS in November.

Revised by CINCPAC in Mar 68; approved by the JCS in April.

Being retained for post-hostilities planning.

Authority to cancel plan requested of the JCS in Jul 68; authority granted in Sep 68.  

Being retained for post-hostilities planning.

Revised by CINCPAC in Jul 68; approved by the JCS in October.

1. CINCPAC 200222Z Jul 68.
2. JCS 8954/070006Z Sep 68.
Plan

43 PACOM Actions in Event of a NATO/Warsaw Pact Conflict (G)

50 Defense of East Asian Free World States in the Event of a Two Front Communist Aggression (S)

60 Evacuation of Non-combatants (U)

61 Special Contingency Evacuation (U)

62 Emergency Relief to Insular Areas (U)

64 Establishment of U.S. Supply/Training Mission to Laos

65 Evacuation of Selected Personnel and Equipment (U)

67 Withdrawal of U.S./Free World Military Assistance Forces from South Vietnam in Six Months

68 CINCPAC/FAAPAC Relationship (U)

Action During CY 68

Revised by CINCPAC in Jul 68; approved by the JCS in October.

New plan, scheduled to be completed early in 1969.

Revised by CINCPAC in Jul 68; approved by the JCS in October.

New plan, scheduled to be completed early in 1969.

Revised by CINCPAC in Jun 68; approved by the JCS in August.

Revised by CINCPAC in May 68; approved by the JCS in August.

Revised by CINCPAC in Jun 68; approved by the JCS in July.

Revised by CINCPAC in Jun 68; approved by the JCS in August.

Revised by CINCPAC in Mar 68; approved by the JCS in May.

Revised by CINCPAC in Mar 68; approved by the JCS in August.

Revised by CINCPAC in Jul 68; approved by the JCS in November.

New plan promulgated by CINCPAC in Jul 68; approved by the JCS in December.

1. J511 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
2. Ibid.
CINCPAC OPlans (Cont'd)

Plan

69 A T-Day Plan for Redeployment of Forces (U)

70 CINCPAC Cold War Plan (U)

Action During CY 68

New plan promulgated by CINCPAC in Dec 68.

Scheduled to be revised early in 1969.

Revised by CINCPAC in Feb 68; approved by the JCS in April.

Revised by CINCPAC in Apr 68; approval not required.

Revised by CINCPAC in Jul 68; approved by the JCS in October.

Revised by CINCPAC in Jul 68; approved by the JCS in November. 1

CINCPAC recommended cancellation in Jun 68; approval to cancel granted by JCS in July. 3

CINCPAC recommended cancellation in Jun 68; approval to cancel granted by JCS in July. 3

Scheduled for revision early in 1969.

90 Program of Plans - Berlin (Air) (U)

93 Program Plans - Berlin (Air Operations - Laos) (TS)

95 Quadripartite Naval Countermeasures (S)

1. JCS 020024Z Nov 68.
2. CINCPAC 262231Z Jun 68.
3. JCS 231646Z Jul 68.

4. COMUSTDC 150800Z Oct 68.
1. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 2100202Z Oct 68.
4. These terms of reference had not been completed by the end of the year.
5. CINCPAC 082105Z Dec 68.
6. Ibid.
At the end of the year CINCPAC and his staff were awaiting replies from the component command commanders and COMUSTDC with their positions on these questions and issues. Therefore, requested that the basic operation plan be retained and updated as appropriate.

1. The State Department had evidenced a desire to remove possible causes for U. S. engagement in the area and had questioned the need for U. S. -GRC planning. (ADMINO CINCPAC 192357Z Oct 68.)
3. ADMIN CINCPAC 272130Z Dec 68.
5. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
In November a special team from the JCS headed by the Deputy Director of the National Military Command System visited Camp Smith to brief those involved in the study group formed, whose tasks were to:

(2) Review weapon systems, aerospace warning systems, and command and control systems which will have an impact on the CINCPAC Command Center and its alternates; (3) Recommend organizational, functional and procedural changes within the CINCPAC staff which would improve CINCPAC's command and control capability."

Emergency manning was required for CINCPAC's Command Center. Also required was special or supplementary training for various members of the Command Center, the Alternate Command Center, and the Airborne Command Post, BLUE EAGLE.

Contingency Planning Simplification

In 1968 the JCS sought to improve contingency planning in areas such as force listings, force packaging, feasibility testing, mobility requirements, troop listing, resupply, and standardized reporting formats.

CINCPAC was also interested in improving contingency planning, but from this point he did not always agree with the JCS on methods and procedures for improvement.

In January, for example, the JCS provided a draft memorandum that would have required the Service Chiefs and the commanders of the unified and specified commands to submit to the JCS for approval a complete "outline" operational plan for each appropriate JSCP task. Also,

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
for certain tasks so identified in the JSCP, development of a complete operational plan including troop lists and annexes would be required. CINCPAC was asked to comment.\(^1\)

CINCPAC noted that while a plan was ordinarily addressed to a wide range of possible circumstances, the inclusion of a time-phased force deployment list and its time-phased support unit list were necessarily tailored to fixed assumptions—a single postulation within the general planning situation.\(^2\) The outline plan concept, he noted, would take almost as much time and effort as a complete plan. He recommended that commanders of unified commands "not be tasked to provide this added step in their planning system."\(^3\)

Despite CINCPAC's reply, the JCS in March provided a new draft memorandum for consideration—fundamentally the same as the previous one.\(^4\) The "outline" plan, however, was designated a "concept" plan. Plans already written or being prepared would not have to be changed to conform to the new guidance.

The JCS proposed that planning be done as a two-step process. First, a concept plan that included the mission, concept of operations, support and command and control, and a list of forces to be employed, by quantity and type—a time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL). Second, after approval of the "concept plan," designated plans would be submitted in completed form for JCS review.\(^5\)

CINCPAC's comments to the JCS noted:

...While it is agreed that improvement should be sought in the Joint Contingency Planning System, simplification of the planning job must be one of the goals of any improvement proposal. During recent years there has been a massive increase in planning workloads, particularly as a result of the growing tendency to require progressively more detail in the planning document. In

\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^2\) CINCPAC 100113Z Feb 68.
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) J5 Brief No. 82-68, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Apr 68, of J-5 M 527-68 of 29 Mar 68, Subj: Improvement of Joint Contingency Planning System.
\(^5\) J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
turn, this has served to confine the finished plan to progressively more narrow sets of assumptions and to tie the plan to transient detail. The result has been a more voluminous and costly planning documentation but not necessarily a corresponding planning improvement....(the JCS proposal) does not provide the type nor the measure of planning improvement needed. 1

He said that the JCS proposal would require a TPFDL with every plan (as did the existing system of operational plan submission), but that they should be required for only one or two select plans. He reasoned that if sufficient forces were available for the largest plan of a commander, there would be no reason to believe that sufficient forces would not be available for lesser plans. Plans, including the TPFDL, which reflected a particular scenario, would not provide usable information for an assessment or analysis. A war game, for example, would take into account combat attrition and alternate assumptions, which could have wider impact on operations and be more critical to planning realism than TPFDL development and analysis.

CINCPAC brought up the matter of the difficulty of determining "below-the-line" requirements. He recommended a joint study of methods to determine such requirements.

CINCPAC thought that major planning was a continuing action rather than a "two-step" process, as had been suggested by the JCS. The concept plan should not cause cessation of work on the complete plan.

The unified commander, CINCPAC believed, must retain the option of determining the manner and extent to which his component command commanders participated in the planning cycle and prepared the detail, beyond that required by the JCS, that should be included in his own plans.

In summary, CINCPAC said:

...contingency planning provides a basis for action to meet sometime in the future a situation which at best can be defined only generally at the

1. CINCPAC 010011Z Jun 68.
2. Ibid.
time of writing the contingency plan. Thus, the plan provides a general basis for initial actions and a framework on which to build as a situation unfolds. To the extent that contingency plans are tied progressively to more detail and to more narrow planning assumptions, those plans lose their utility for this purpose. Also, the greater the detail introduced into the contingency plan the more that plan tends to be of only temporary or transient utility. Finally, to provide the sort of detail described in ...(the JCS proposal) for all contingency plans and to keep that detail up to date would require a large and perhaps wasteful planning effort, an effort which appears to exceed reasonable available resources. Therefore, CINCPAC does not concur with the two-step concept described.... Certainly, there is a need continually to search for ways in which to improve joint contingency planning. In this effort for improvement, due consideration needs to be given to the need for simplification, conservation of planning effort, usefulness of the amount of detail contained in a contingency plan and the need not to deal with unwarranted precision in the details of planning at each echelon."

(U) When the JCS published their procedures for joint contingency planning, they closely resembled CINCPAC's recommendations. Operational plans, in complete format and detail with TPFDL, were to be submitted only for those contingency situations in which plan execution would tax total force availability or the capability of logistic or military resources or for which plan execution was likely to occur during the JSCP period. Other contingency plans would be submitted in concept format. Commanders of unified commands could recommend which plans should be submitted in detail.

Automatic Data Processing Support in Contingency Planning

1. Ibid.
One project (10A020B), known as the CINCPAC Operations Planning Analysis Support System (PLANS), was designed to support and complement the plans system being developed at the JCS level while at the same time accommodating the requirements unique to CINCPAC planning. 1

Another project was which was forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations in March. 2 recommend time-phased courses of action to meet these requirements. Representatives of the Naval Command Systems Support Activity were scheduled to complete the first phase of the plan by the end of 1968. 3

A third project was the CINCPAC Automatic Deployment Planning System (Project Request 10P513). This project was to provide the capability to generate time-phased force deployment lists (TPFDL) to permit the planner to manipulate and phase the lists as required in a specific contingency.

As portions of CINCSTRIKE's Automated Planning Subsystem (STRAPS) were similar to the system proposed for use by CINCPAC, members of the CINCPAC staff visited CINCSTRIKE's headquarters in April. One problem was that the STRAPS was not compatible with CINCPAC's IBM 360/50 computers. 4

In response to a CINCPAC question, the JCS late in the year notified CINCPAC that no effort had been made by the JCS or by any of the unified commands to convert the STRAPS for operations on the 360/50. Further review of the use of STRAPS in contingency planning was being made by the JCS. 5

1. J513 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
2. Ibid.
3. J513 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
4. J4122 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
5. J02C Brief No. 4-69, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Jan 69, of JCCRG 411-68, Subj: Force Packaging for Contingency Planning.
Strategic Latin American Shipping Routes and ASW Requirements

(TS) In November 1967 the USCINCSO outlined the strategic importance of Latin American shipping routes and voiced concern to the JCS over U. S. policy statements on the area. 1 The JCS asked CINCPAC for his views, which he furnished in January 1968.2

(TS) CINCPAC concurred with the USCINCSO. He emphasized the serious proportions of the total ASW problem, particularly in the Northern Pacific. He considered the Southeast Pacific a "relatively low probable threat area,"3 but acknowledged that the enemy could shift emphasis, in which case we would adjust our ASW effort accordingly.

(TS) CINCPAC stressed the importance of a sea-level canal in Central America, describing such a difficult-to-block canal as having "significant strategic value."4 He also mentioned the desirability of U. S. bases in South America in the event of an ASW campaign, as well as the valuable assistance that could be provided by effective Allied South American ASW forces.

(S) In March the JCS requested further comments from CINCPAC to help them in a review of ASW forces the Latin American countries should be expected to maintain over the next 5 to 10 years.5

(S) In April CINCPAC reiterated that the Southeast Pacific was a low submarine threat area, but that shipping traffic in the area was considerable, so that a collective inter-American ASW effort offered defense potential in the U. S. interest. CINCPAC stated that as PACOM forces rarely operated with Latin American navies he had no

1. USCINCSO SC 6379RP/242155Z Nov 67.
2. CINCPAC 110559Z Jan 68.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. J5152 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
recommendations on the minimum levels or comments on the relative effectiveness of Latin American naval forces. 1

The JCS\textsuperscript{2} provided recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on the Soviet submarine threat and Latin American ASW capabilities to counter the threat. In response, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the detailed views of the JCS on the dimensions of the threat, costs, etc., to counter the threat. The JCS\textsuperscript{3}, in turn, queried CINCPAC for appropriate comment. CINCPAC provided such comment\textsuperscript{4} concerning the threat and Latin American ASW capabilities, but deferred to USCINCSO regarding costs.

1. Ibid.
2. JCS 1976/570-1, 9 May 68.
3. JCS 312246Z Jul 68.
4. CINCPAC 240547Z Aug 68.
6. J516 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
When the JCS replied to the Secretary of Defense, CINCPAC's

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
4. J516 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
5. Ibid.; CINCPAC 160606Z May 68.
2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
3. Ibid., CINCPAC 140306Z Nov 68.
4. Ibid.
5. J5 Brief No. 000313-68, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Sep 68, of JCS SM-585-68
   of 27 Aug 68, Subj: Nuclear Weapons Requirement Study FY 1972 -
   FY 1978.
6. CINCPAC 030009Z Oct 68.
1. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. J516 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.

5. CINCPAC 110253Z Oct 67.

6. CINCPAC 050014Z Jun 68.

8. Ibid.
asked CINCPAC\textsuperscript{1} if comments he had made on the subject in March\textsuperscript{2} still reflected his views. CINCPAC replied\textsuperscript{3} that his comments remained valid. He said:

\begin{quote}
\textit{NNW.}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid.
In April CINCPAC sent a recommendation to the JCS that his section be gamed. He cited a JCS paper that had outlined U.S. military posture worldwide and that emphasized force limitations with respect to the renewal of hostilities in Korea. CINCPAC continued:

... With no ready ground force reserve in PACOM and assuming existing U.S. ground forces cannot be redeployed from SEAsia, major initial U.S. ground force augmentation could not be effected until about M+3 to M+4. This limitation, together with other combat, combat support, combat service support and logistic limitations, creates a potential situation quite different from those analyzed to date.

He outlined appropriate war game assumptions and particular points he wanted studied. He asked that the study be conducted on an expedited basis and against the mid-Calendar Year 1968 situational background. The JCS completed the game in August.

(TS) The Joint War Games Agency war gamed the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and the Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan (RISOP) in Calendar Year 1968. Particular attention was paid to the

2. CINCPAC 272106Z Apr 68.
3. Ibid.
effectiveness of the SIOP in a retaliatory role against ...nvironment. Among the results of the study was the comparison between scheduled vs. delivered POLARIS missiles, which indicated that CINCPAC's launch doctrine appeared to be more effective than doctrines prescribed for use by the commanders of other unified and specified commands analyzed in this game.

In another war game matter, CINCPAC was invited by the Chairman of the JCS in August to participate in KAPPA-I-68, a senior-level, interagency, politico-military war game working with problems growing out of a postulated covert and overt North Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea. CINCPAC's representatives, headed by CINCPAC's Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, participated in the game between 10 September and 3 October.

CINCPAC was advised by the Joint War Games Agency late in December that the next senior-level, interagency, politico-military game, SIGMA I-69, was scheduled to be conducted in the Pentagon between 15 April and 1 May 1969. The purpose of the game was to explore U. S. strategies and options in Asia in the post-Vietnam War era.

2. J511 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
3. JWGA Quarterly Activities Bulletin, 31 Dec 68.
Some problems arose in 1968, however, particularly in Japan.

On 6 May a monitoring team from Japan's Maritime Safety Agency made a radioactivity test of air and water in the vicinity of the SWORDFISH that supposedly showed higher than normal amounts of radioactivity. The Japanese Science and Technology Agency postponed release of information on these readings to the public or to government opposition parties until they could recheck the area the next day. 4 (Leftist newspapers heard of the incident and immediately published stories designed to frighten the public and discredit the Japanese Government and

3. USNAVINVSERVOREP SASEBO 191200Z Jan 68.
the United States for collusion to permit and create radioactive health hazards to the people through nuclear ship operations.)

(5) The Maritime Safety Office's readings on 6 May were from 468 to 1,441 beta counts per minute in the atmosphere (usual readings were between 56 and 72 beta counts), and from 35 to 85 gamma counts per second in water (normal readings were from 4.2 to 5.1 gamma counts). Levels of radioactivity were very low and well within the range of aberrations that could be caused by improper instrument calibration, jostling of the instruments, random variations in reading levels, or exterior influences such as radar emissions.¹

(5) U.S. tests of the SWORDFISH and her surrounding waters revealed less than detectable activity. On 7 May the City of Sasebo and the Science and Technology Agency both conducted sampling and found conditions normal. Both the Japanese Foreign Office and the Science and Technology Agency were satisfied that the abnormal readings in no way related to the operation of the SWORDFISH.²

(5) Leftist newspapers gave the incident sensational coverage with little technical accuracy.³ As a result, and with elections coming up, the Japanese Government asked the United States not to bring any nuclear-powered submarines into Japan until the Science and Technology Agency issued a report on the SWORDFISH incident. Also, both sides agreed that visits should not be resumed until the Japanese monitoring system was improved.⁴ The Government of Japan also wanted assurances from the United States of additional safeguards to be taken by U.S. ships. Agreement to provide such additional safeguards might imply that U.S. reactors had been operated unsafely in the past and were at variance with the U.S. standard statement regarding nuclear reactors. The United States at first was not in agreement with the idea of the proposed assurances, but late in October the Japanese Foreign Minister and the U.S. Ambassador approved them.⁵

1. Point Paper, J3B41, Hq CINCPAC, 8 May 68, Subj: Alleged Radioactivity in Sasebo (5).
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
Hong Kong

Since July 1966 U. S. Navy ship visits to Hong Kong had been governed by the "Guidelines for the Use of Facilities in Hong Kong by U. S. Armed Forces," mutually agreed upon ground rules for the activities of our armed forces. On 19 August 1968 the British proposed changes to the guidelines that would restrict visits, particularly of nuclear-powered ships as to number of visits a year and special considerations for clearance. The original guidelines had been satisfactory to the United States.

In early 1968, during the time of the PUEBLO incident and the Tet offensive, U. S. ships were committed to operations that precluded

1. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. AMEMBASSY Tokyo 14968/260900Z Dec 68.
3. Point Paper, J5124, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Dec 68, Subj: Political Implications of Visits by Nuclear Powered Ships, Particularly to Japan (U).
4. SECSTATE AIRGRAM CA-211, 8 Jul 66, Subj: Guidelines for the Use of Facilities in Hong Kong by the US Armed Forces.
visits to Hong Kong. Then in April and May there was a greater concentration of visits. Although these were within the established guidelines, the concentration seemed to the British to violate the spirit of the guidelines. The Chinese Communist protest over a visit by the USS ENTERPRISE had been stronger than other similar protests, and the British were having some other problems with the Chinese that they believed stemmed from their granting of U.S. Navy ship visit rights. The British therefore requested cancellation of several major ship visits including nuclear-powered ship visits that had been scheduled for June and July. Then the British authorities in Hong Kong commenced talks on changing the guidelines.

(S) The United States made a counter proposal. Instead of changing the guidelines, we suggested amending the "Suggestions for Planning Visits of U.S. Navy Ships to Hong Kong," that was an annex to a letter from the Commodore-in-Charge of Hong Kong (HK QJ/4/4), dated 23 February 1966. 1

(S) CINCPAC considered special restrictions for nuclear-powered warships highly undesirable, particularly as the Pacific Fleet inventory of these ships was increasing. CINCPAC had recommended to the JCS that any attempts by the British to change the proposed guidelines be countered and strongly resisted. 2 The matter was being handled through diplomatic channels at the end of the year.

(S) In the summer, Singapore refused to allow the USS ENTERPRISE to visit the Man of War anchorage, where ships were in full view of most of the population of downtown Singapore. 3 A visit to the British naval base would have been approved. 4 The Commander of the Seventh Fleet

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
4. The Commander, Seventh Fleet did not consider the passage to the naval base safe enough from a navigational standpoint to permit the ENTERPRISE to be berthed there.
began scheduling oilers (AO) and cargo ships (AKA) into the Man of War anchorage to acclimate the Government and people of Singapore to U. S. Navy use of the anchorage. By the end of the year no further attempt had been made by the United States to obtain clearance for nuclear-powered ships to use the Man of War anchorage off Singapore.¹

Chinese Communist Harassment of U. S. Flag Merchant Ships

During October two U. S. flag merchant ships (SS STEEL VENDOR and SS THUNDERHEAD) were harassed by Chinese Communist gunboats in the vicinity of Hong Kong.² They were within China's claimed 12-mile territorial limit, but under the right of innocent passage should have been allowed to proceed without harassment. (Subsequently, on 8 November, a Notice to Mariners furnished a recommended route outside of Communist China's claimed territorial waters to reduce the possibility of harassment when entering or leaving Hong Kong.)

CINCPAC analyzed the incidents for the purpose of promulgating a contingency plan for those sea areas adjacent to the Hong Kong approaches, but decided that such a plan would not necessarily contribute to a solution.³

CINCPAC acknowledged the sensitivity of the area and the possibility of an incident completely out of proportion to the initial harassment growing out of over-reaction by U. S. Forces. Chinese harassment of U. S. flag ships was evaluated as an action intended to demonstrate their claims in the area and publication of the Notice to Mariners was the most effective practical means of avoiding future incidents.

Future courses of action, CINCPAC said, were likely to fall under the following situations and courses of action:

2. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
3. CINCPAC 210422Z Dec 68.
a. If U.S. flag merchant ships choose to disregard the "Notice to Mariners" recommended route for departing and entering Hong Kong and are subjected to similar harassment, no military actions would seem appropriate or justified.

b. If the CHICOMs take an action against U.S. flag merchant ships in claimed CHICOM territorial waters that go beyond simple harassment to include attack, boarding or seizure, CINCPAC would report circumstances to the JCS with pertinent recommendations, alert U.S. forces in proximity to the mainland of China and be prepared to take other actions to include the possible positioning of forces off the sensitive area. Operations would be as directed by the JCS....

Transit of the Sea of Japan

1. CINCPAC 210422Z Dec 68.
4. Ibid.
Saipan Typhoon Relief Project

(U) The most serious natural disaster in the PACOM in 1968 occurred when Typhoon Jean passed directly over Saipan on 11 April. Winds, which peaked at 190 miles-per-hour, caused extensive damage to buildings, power, and utilities, leaving about 10,000 persons homeless and requiring emergency shelter and feeding. 3 No deaths were reported. Damage was also severe on Tinian and other islands in the North Marianas and in the Truk District.

(U) The Commander of Naval Forces, Mariana-Bonin Islands (who was also the CINCPAC Representative in the Mariana-Bonin Islands) immediately began providing emergency assistance and referred requirements beyond his capabilities to CINCPAC.

(U) CINCPAC's component command commanders were tasked to provide kitchens to feed the 10,000 victims and emergency bedding and

1. COMUSKOREA UK 56004/180857Z Nov 68.
2. CINCPACFLT 070252Z Dec 68.
3. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
shelter. All equipment and personnel were delivered within 72 hours from the time of receipt of the request. The CINCPAC Representative, Mariana-Bonin Islands called the response "outstanding."  

Ryukyu Islands - Typhoon Relief

(U) In accordance with CINCPAC Instruction 3050.2, "Employment of Military Resources in Natural Disaster Emergencies within the United States, its Territories and Possessions," dated 10 March 1966, typhoon relief was provided to the inhabitants of Miyako Jima and Kumeshima Islands during the fall of 1968. PACOM C-130s and helicopters provided detergent, lumber, food, and other miscellaneous items.  

Manned Orbiting Laboratory Requirements Working Group

(U) Some work was done by CINCPAC during 1968 regarding planning for Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) recovery support requirements through 1975, as had been requested by the Defense Department in April. Specific planning was impossible because of changing concepts and uncertain launch schedules.

(U) On 17 July the Defense Department Manager for Space Flight Support Operations furnished a briefing on launch and recovery schedules (so far assigned only by calendar quarter) and a revised recovery concept. A MOL Recovery Requirements Working Group met the next day to consider the changes. If the revised recovery concept were approved it would substantially reduce CINCPAC's support requirements. Until the concept was firm and official launch schedules approved, CINCPAC could do only preliminary planning.

1. CINCPACREPMARBO 150305Z Apr 68.
2. CINCPACREP Ryukyus 014989/030717Z Oct 68; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
4. Attended by representatives of CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CTF 130, and the DOD MOL briefing team. CTF 130 (HAWSEAFRON) conducted recovery operations using PACAF Air Rescue and Recovery assets and naval forces tasked as required. He exercised command and control of those forces through the Pacific Control Center located at Kunia.
SECTION X - JOINT EXERCISES

Joint Exercises

(U) The following joint exercises were conducted in the PACOM in 1968.

(EAGLES NEST) was a series of three combined U. S. - Philippine Special Forces exercises. The first of the two-week exercises was held in August in coastal mountains west of Clark Air Base and involved approximately 100 U. S. and 300 Philippine personnel. The State Department had almost asked to have the exercise cancelled because it was being conducted at the same time that the Philippines was conducting an unscheduled exercise on Mindanao and the heating up of the Philippines-Malaysia dispute over Sabah. But the Philippines postponed the Mindanao exercise, the Sabah dispute cooled, and EAGLES NEST I was held on schedule (and went unnoticed). EAGLES NEST II was conducted in November without incident and EAGLES NEST III was scheduled for early 1969.

(FOCUS LENS) was a command post exercise conducted in Korea in October. It involved U. N., U. S., and ROK forces down to Army division, Air Force wing, and Navy task element levels. Exercise play was based on a general attack from the north.

(FORMER CHAMP) was the ninth of a series of joint U. S. - Republic of China unconventional warfare field training exercises. It was completed on 28 March.

HIGH HEELS-68

(HIGH HEELS-68) was a worldwide command post exercise sponsored by the JCS, was held from 17 to 25 October 1968 to exercise command and control procedures and facilities, the continuity of the U. S. worldwide military command and control system with emphasis on emergency facility

3. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
operations, and the executing and reporting procedures of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and general war plans in a simulated situation leading up to the outbreak of general war and execution of the SIOP.  

CINCPAC active staff participation was limited primarily to selected commands on Oahu. Since a major objective of the exercise was to activate and operate alternate command facilities, active play by the CINCPAC and his component command commanders and their designated subordinates was conducted almost entirely from the Alternate Command Center.  

Commands located west of Hawaii did not participate because of existing demands in Southeast Asia and the adverse effect the communications load would have on traffic from CINCPAC to western Pacific areas. Exceptions were the partial activation of the CINCPAC Emergency Alternate Command Center on Guam and the passing of emergency action messages to all delivery forces with a SIOP commitment.  

Command control passed to the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post (BLUE EAGLE) for a brief period during the exercise.  

The exercise scenario depicted a deteriorating politico-military situation, stemming from an initial crisis in Europe, which ultimately developed into a full-scale strategic nuclear war. CINCPAC exercised policies, plans, procedures, and actions that would support the scenario as it pertained to the PACOM.  

The exercise was considered highly successful, with valuable experience gained in all aspects of command center operations and with the exercise providing a means for updating plans, policies, and operational procedures within the PACOM.  

On 15 November CINCPAC sent to the JCS his initial reaction report and his recommendations regarding topics to be included in the JCS critique. The final report was scheduled to be completed early in 1969.  

1. CINCPAC 062018Z Jul 68.  
3. CINCPAC 150444Z Nov 68.  
4. Ibid.  
5. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.  
6. CINCPAC 150444Z Nov 68.  

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SECTION XI - RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Scientific Advisory Group Reports

Personnel of the Scientific Advisory Group continued their analysis of operations in Southeast Asia throughout 1968. Some of their papers were comprehensive and detailed; some were short, one-time analyses prepared in response to specific requirements. The group also reviewed the papers prepared by the operations research personnel of CINCPAC's component command commanders, and published semi-annual listings of all papers prepared and reviewed and highlights of them.

Working papers prepared by the Scientific Advisory Group in 1968 are listed below:

Working Paper 2-68, WALLEYE (AGM-62) Combat Firing Summary, Calendar Year 1967

Working Paper 3-68, Evaluation of MK-36 Seeding of Ferry Crossing

Working Paper 4-68, Standard Arm Missile Firing Summary for March 1968

Report 5-68, Some Characteristics of VC/NVA Attacks

Report 6-68, An Appraisal of Economic, Sociological and Political Results of Air Operations Against North Vietnam

Report 7-68, Operational Employment of DST MK-36

Working Paper 8-68, Preliminary Comparisons of the Effectiveness of BANISH BEACH (Fuel Weapon) Operations with Conventional ARC LIGHT Missions


Navy Laboratory personnel with specialized backgrounds continued to assist CINCPAC and his staff by contributing to Scientific Advisory Group activities. They were principally concerned with analysis of the effectiveness of weapons and weapons systems.

The Chief of Naval Operations in June 1968 advised that the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funded programs that provided these analysts would be terminated not later than 30 June 1969 and asked CINCPAC to reassess and restate his needs for analytical support for incorporation in Navy program planning actions. CINCPAC requested funding for seven contractor and two Naval Laboratory analysts through FY 70 and provided justification for continuing support in FY 69 (for which the Chief of Naval Operations later stated funds were available). The

2. Point Paper, J3A1, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Mar 68, Subj: Analytical Support to CINCPAC by Naval Weapons Center, China Lake and Corona Laboratories; Point Paper, J3A1, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Mar 68, Subj: Analytical Support to CINCPAC by Naval Missile Center, Point Mugu.
3. CINCPAC 030338Z Aug 68.
Chief of Naval Operations then asked CINCPAC to provide information on the number of spaces and grade levels required if a decision were made to replace contractor analysts with Civil Service personnel and to identify funding requirements for additional external analytical assistance that might be required for special projects.

CINCPAC explained:

...The assignment of contractor analysts to CINCPAC has made it possible to provide analytical assistance to CINCPAC's longer range planning activities, an analytical function which had been somewhat neglected in recent past as a result of more immediate analysis requirements relating to SEAsia. Analytical work in progress in support of CINCPAC planning includes an economic analysis of alternative basing postures in the PACOM, a game-theoretical approach to force posturing, and analysis of present and future South Korean capabilities to counter sea infiltration. In these problem areas, planning factors and experience from SEAsia are derived from existing data bases and used wherever applicable. It is expected that the requirement for longer range, in depth planning related analysis will increase in the future. ¹

CINCPAC outlined his requirements for seven Civil Service analysts for FY 70, he recommended continuing the Naval Laboratory support program at a two-man level through FY 70, and he asked for a $50,000 contingency fund for specialized analytical services and requirements. ²

Research and Development Programs of Special CINCPAC Interest

A number of requirements for new weapons or weapons refinements had become apparent as the Vietnam war continued and as the enemy continued to employ increasingly sophisticated weapons. Among projects particularly recommended by CINCPAC for development or refinement were more precise air-to-ground weapons with a smaller delivery probable

¹. Ibid.
². Ibid.
error for use against such targets as caves. Two weapons that had been developed in this regard were the WALLEYE (a missile guided by electro-optical means) and the FOCUS I missile (an anti-searchlight headlight missile).

In the matter of bombing operations in Southeast Asia, a requirement had been demonstrated to develop hardware or techniques to permit attacks under the 2,000- to 3,000-foot ceiling or overcast so often found during the northeast monsoon over North Vietnam. Pilots were precluded from flying in clouds because they needed to be able to see enemy surface-to-air missiles in order to evade them successfully. CINCPAC saw a need for improved weapons, greatly reduced vulnerability, and improved means of suppression of surface-to-air missile and automatic weapons fire. In August he asked for a review of Service research and development programs to ascertain if there were developments in progress to provide these weapons and improvements and thus permit bombing below a low overcast.

CINCPAC monitored the Quiet Aircraft program as a matter of command interest. Quiet Aircraft was a program to develop a covert, low noise, aerial night surveillance aircraft. Testing and evaluation continued at the end of the year.

2. Point Paper, J3A4, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Mar 68, Subj: FOCUS-1 Missile Program (U); Point Paper, J3A4, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Mar 68; Subj: FOCUS-1 Missile Program (U).
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 200150Z Aug 68.
SECTION XII - LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES

PACOM Logistics Overview

(TS) In late November CINC PAC's Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics prepared a "PACOM Logistics Overview" that summarized significant logistic strengths and weaknesses in the PACOM. Selected passages from that paper are quoted below:

The logistics picture in the PACOM is generally good. Logistics support has been responsive to South Vietnam requirements and no combat operation has been curtailed due to lack of logistic support. There is a full pipeline to Southeast Asia, which is capable of being selectively diverted to meet crisis situations elsewhere, such as in Korea. The major area of logistic concern for the future in Southeast Asia is the support of the plan for improvement and modernization of the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces (RVNAF). Execution of this plan will require diversions of service equipment programmed and procured for other purposes and will further degrade the readiness condition of US Forces.

There is an extensive and active transportation network operating in the Pacific. Some reserve stocks previously drawn down are being replaced to improve our overall posture. In South Vietnam and Thailand, major port, airfield and road complexes have been built from which we can support unilateral, bilateral or SEATO operations throughout Southeast Asia. Logistic planning supports a full range of tactical operations, from expanded campaigns on the Asian Mainland to withdrawal and reposturing of our forces through the PACOM even to and including Guam and the Trust Territories. A sophisticated maintenance, storage and procurement base is still available in Japan, and the Republic of China is rapidly developing a rebuild capability that will serve us well.

Petroleum storage and distribution problems, within the Pacific as a whole, are caused by the concentration of storage of war reserves (65 percent) in Hawaii and Japan. This will require movement of products to the combat area by tanker after the outbreak of hostilities. This problem is compounded by generally poor seaports which may limit tankers to the smaller, shallow-draft types.

CINCPAC, in other than Southeast Asia, has only one-sixth of the requirement for air munitions on hand since the production of air munitions, being geared to Southeast Asia consumption, does not permit substantial build-up of reserves for other areas of the command. This critical shortage seriously degrades the Pacific Command's initial capability to respond to a second hot contingency.

The PACOM is somewhat hampered by deteriorated, old facilities and temporary ones of poor quality which had to be quickly built for combat emergencies. These will continue to handicap operating forces until durability of essential bases is improved and high maintenance facilities are eliminated.

The logistic postures of Military Assistance Program countries have shown marked improvement during recent years. Weaknesses and problems do remain, particularly in less developed countries, where the same difficulties which stifle economic growth limit development of logistical systems....

Strategic Movement Capabilities Study, FY 1969 to FY 1973 (MOVECAP 69-73)

MOVECAP 69-73, prepared by the JCS at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, had as its objectives improvement of previous efforts as a mobility planning and analysis tool, the preparation of

1. Ibid.
detailed movement schedules for FY 69, and assessment of movement capabilities for FY 69-73. The Special Assistant for Strategic Mobility (SASM) was assigned preparation responsibility and CINCPAC representatives participated.

MOVECAP 67-71 results were used as point of departure and data base. Major mobility conclusions of the study with PACOM implications were: (1) significant improvements in intertheater lift capability from FY 69 to FY 73; (2) FY 69 intertheater movement capability was inadequate to meet time-phased delivery requirements in situations studied and constrained by CONUS and intratheater conditions; (3) to meet time-phased delivery requirements in Northeast Asia (NEA) and the Middle East (while concurrently reinforcing Europe) it would be necessary to utilize USAF Reserve, Air National Guard, and Civil Reserve Air Fleet Stage III lift, and acquire significant commercial shipping; (4) in NEA more than 50 percent of tonnage discharge requirements would have to be handled by non-U.S. resources; and (5) the network in NEA was ample to support U.S. operations.

CINCPAC comments on MOVECAP 69-73 challenged the study assumption of negligible vulnerability of movement resources in South Korea, and made recommendations for future MOVECAP studies, including: (1) they should address PACOM POL; (2) deployment of a supporting war game for force and logistic degradation and reconstitution capabilities in South Korea; (3) assumption that enemy action will degrade LOCs and port capability; (4) they address movement of USAID supplies to and in Korea; and (5) they continue on an annual basis with objective of reaching fully automated movement planning and analysis capability.

POL Consumption

POL consumption in the PACOM in 1968 increased 18 percent over that for 1967. The 172 million barrels of POL consumed by PACOM

3. MOVECAP 69-73 Study, Vol I.
4. CINCPAC 170254Z Apr 68.
forces cost approximately $776 million. The accompanying chart and tables portray PACOM tankage and consumption statistics for the year.¹

**PACOM TANKAGE**
as of 31 December 1968
(in thousands of barrels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Tankage (Shell Capacity)</th>
<th>Useable Tankage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Guam</td>
<td>2,952</td>
<td>2,952</td>
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<td>689</td>
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<td>1,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1,897</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1,703</td>
<td>1,703</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2,679</td>
<td>2,679</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>33,136</strong></td>
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**1968 POL CONSUMPTION COST**

<table>
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<th>Value</th>
<th>($ in millions)</th>
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<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOGAS</td>
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<td>Diesel</td>
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<td>NSFO</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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</table>

Note: Using standard prices as of 1 January 1969.

¹. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
PACOM POL CONSUMPTION
(in millions of barrels)


UNCLASSIFIED
# 1968 POL Consumption

**By Area**

(in thousands of barrels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
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<td>14,601</td>
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1968 POL CONSUMPTION
BY PRODUCT
(in thousands of barrels)

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<th></th>
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<th>Aug</th>
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<th>Dec</th>
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<td>551</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Transporting and storage of POL in Japan for both current use and reserve stocks continued to present some problems. A major element of U.S. logistic posture, Japanese terminals handled about 25 percent of all POL consumed in the PACOM. About 11 million barrels of tankage was theoretically available in Japan, but storage for about 1 million barrels in 5 tanks at Sasebo was out of service and requiring repair at the beginning of the year. The money had been earmarked by CINC-USARPAC, but the Office of the Secretary of Defense had withheld release of the funds ($1.2 million). CINCUSARPAC in June asked for immediate release of the funds and CINCPAC supported the request to the Department of the Army. Defense Department approval was obtained on the projects prior to the end of the fiscal year and the money was released.

During the year definitized plans were developed for complete overhaul of all major Japan POL facilities. A 5-year phased implementation, costing $27 million, had been proposed to Washington and a portion of the program had been funded. The Japanese terminals were old, but it would cost about $100 million to replace them (at $10 a barrel). To replace them in a forward, strategic location having the harbor facilities and other geographic advantages of Japan would be difficult.

The problems connected with resupplying Yokota Air Base in Japan with POL were unresolved in 1968. In July CINCPAC personally asked U.S. Ambassador Johnson to evaluate the possibility of getting a common carrier POL pipeline from the Tokyo-Yokohama area to Yokota. (Previous overtures to Japanese agencies had not been favorably considered.)

1. Point Paper, J4411, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Nov 68, Subj: Strategic Importance of Japan POL Terminals (U).
2. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
3. Ibid.
4. Point Paper, J4411, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Nov 68, Subj: Strategic Importance of Japan POL Terminals (U).
5. Ibid.
### 1968 POL Consumption By Product

(in thousands of barrels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>6,314</td>
<td>7,351</td>
<td>7,715</td>
<td>7,376</td>
<td>7,763</td>
<td>7,638</td>
<td>7,955</td>
<td>7,815</td>
<td>7,571</td>
<td>7,785</td>
<td>7,433</td>
<td>7,599</td>
<td>90,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP-5</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>509</td>
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<td>463</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>6,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>8,540</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOGAS</td>
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<td>670</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>703</td>
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<td>707</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>8,720</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIESEL</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>1,517</td>
<td>1,409</td>
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<td>1,461</td>
<td>1,535</td>
<td>1,462</td>
<td>1,727</td>
<td>18,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,431</td>
<td>14,435</td>
<td>14,815</td>
<td>14,322</td>
<td>15,119</td>
<td>14,302</td>
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<td>14,668</td>
<td>13,849</td>
<td>14,601</td>
<td>13,835</td>
<td>14,428</td>
<td>172,410</td>
</tr>
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</table>
CINCPAC suggested as a possible other approach the construction of a commercial common carrier POL line that could serve commercial as well as U.S. military customers. The natural trace for such a pipeline, he said, "would be the Japan National Railway right of way from Yokohama past Yokota.... Recognize JNR might object to losing POL rail-haul business, but believe with proper approach the benefit of a common carrier POL line would be recognized and proposal might be favorably received." ¹

The Ambassador replied that some thought had been given to a possible commercial common carrier line, but he also believed that the subject should be pursued with the Japanese Government and he understood from the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan that this was being done. ²

Hawaii

The phase-out of piston aircraft and the phase-in of jet powered aircraft had caused changing consumption patterns of POL worldwide; the need for aviation gasoline diminished, the need for jet fuel storage increased. In June 1968 it was proposed to convert 2 large underground tanks (392,000 barrels each) in Red Hill (Oahu, Hawaii) from aviation gasoline to jet fuel storage. The Air Force had been using the facility. The question arose whether JP-4 (primarily an Air Force fuel) should be stored there or JP-5 (primarily a Navy fuel). ³ From an overall PACOM standpoint, JP-4 fuel storage was needed much more urgently than JP-5, but the Navy owned Red Hill and wanted to store JP-5 there. ⁴

Discussion of the problem at a meeting at CINCPAC's headquarters on 9 July led to CINCPAC approval of a plan to convert 120,000 barrels of storage (at Waikakaluau Gulch) from automotive to aviation gasoline; the emptying and repair of the 2 tanks in Red Hill and conversion

1. CINCPAC 140627Z Jul 68.
2. AMEMBASSY Tokyo 10616/300905Z Jul 68.
3. JP-4 was a much more highly volatile jet fuel than JP-5. Thus JP-5 was the fuel used by Navy carrier aircraft in an effort to diminish the danger of flash fire at sea. More than 50 percent of all POL consumed in the PACOM in Calendar Year 1968 was JP-4.
4. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
to either JP-4 or JP-5, to be decided later; and conversion of an 80,000 barrel JP-5 tank at Pearl City to JP-4 if Red Hill tanks were converted to JP-5.1

At a subsequent meeting on 15 August the justification CINCPAC-FLT had furnished to CINCPAC regarding the dangers inherent in storing JP-4 fuel in Red Hill2 was considered. CINCPAC decided that the risks were unacceptably high and that Red Hill would be placed in JP-5 service. The 80,000 barrels of JP-5 storage at Pearl Harbor would be placed in JP-4 service.3

Taiwan

POL support to Ching Chuan Kang Air Base became a matter of concern to CINCPAC again in 1968.4 Repairs to a new POL discharge buoy, called a monobuoy, were in progress. The newly installed buoy had been damaged by Typhoon Carla in October 1967.

CINCPAC sent a team5 to Ching Chuan Kang in February to assist in making the discharge system operational. The need for a reliable system was made additionally urgent because 15 KC-135 tankers were deployed to the base in February.6

The buoy was repaired to permit fueling operations and the assistance team developed recommendations to modify the buoy for more reliability. These modifications were incorporated into a new buoy built by the Air Force for Ching Chuan Kang. The new buoy was installed in September. The replaced buoy was retained as backup equipment. By the end of the year the monobuoy operation was working well and POL discharge operations were being conducted on schedule.7

1. CINCPAC 130406Z Jul 68.
2. CINCPACFLT 151011Z Aug 68.
3. CINCPAC 262130Z Aug 68; J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
5. Composed of representatives of CINCPAC and his component command commanders.
6. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
7. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
CINCPAC noted that an examination of the options to be considered by the study group revealed several problem areas encountered by the commander of a unified command. These, he said, were:

a. POL requirements must now be submitted to four agencies (DFSC and three ICPs). 3

b. Accounting, reporting, pricing, etc., vary by service. Combat zone accounting procedures require simplification.

1. CINCPAC 132200Z Jul 68.
2. Ibid.
3. The Defense Fuel Supply Center and three inventory control points.
c. Procurement inspection is not centralized or standardized. Quality surveillance programs are extremely limited in forward areas.

d. Longer range changes in product requirements (operating and war reserve) are not readily accompanied by facility construction programs, both commercial and military. ¹

CINCPAC thought that centralized POL management could greatly assist in solving those problems by providing a single point for submission of requirements; standardizing bulk POL handling, terminalling, accounting, pricing, and quality control procedures; expanding use of computers when the number of management agencies was reduced; accomplishing reallocation of terminal tankage more easily between products managed by different Services; and establishing prepositioned war reserve levels with one agency responsible for maintaining those required levels, which would be a material aid to field commands holding reserves for three Services based on three or more documents that were sometimes contradictory. CINCPAC then asked to be allowed to comment on the completed study. ²

(U) The special team visited CINCPAC's headquarters during the last week in August. GEN Colglazier said he had observed that the POL management system was more informal than systems for other commodities, and that procedures were not always uniform between areas, but that the informal system had many virtues. ³ Among his preliminary conclusions were that the strength of the management effort was in the Sub-Area Petroleum Office/Joint Petroleum Office system; that control (vice ownership) of POL must remain with operators as opposed to a central agency; and that paperwork in Vietnam was too much and too cumbersome. ⁴

(U) The team's completed report went to the JCS in October. There were no implications for CINCPAC in the report nor recommended changes in his POL operations. ⁵

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¹ CINCPAC 132200Z Jul 68.
² Ibid.
³ J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
⁴ Ibid.
(U) A new automatic data processing system—the PACOM Petroleum Message Slate ADP System—was designed by CINCPAC in 1968 and approved by the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) in Washington for use in their POL cargo scheduling computer program.\(^1\) Correct data, transmitted by AUTODIN, was expected to provide the DFSC with a firmer grasp of PACOM requirements, provide more data for letting supplemental contracts for petroleum, and provide more data for effective control of tankers to improve tanker service in the PACOM.\(^2\) Known as CINCPAC ADP Project 10L417, the report was submitted by all Sub-Area Petroleum Offices.

(U) The first automated submission, in June, was backed up by a parallel manual submission. Results of the mechanized submission were excellent and the manual submission was discontinued in August.\(^3\)

Daily Mechanized Petroleum Reporting System

(U) Another automatic data processing system, the Daily Mechanized Petroleum Reporting System (Project 10L425), was developed in 1968 and was still being tested at the end of the year. This system was designed to provide CINCPAC's Joint Petroleum Office with the necessary information to monitor, coordinate, and manage bulk POL in the PACOM.\(^4\)

Prepositioned War Reserve Munitions

(S) CINCPAC continued his efforts to replenish prepositioned war reserve munitions in 1968. These stocks had been drawn for emergency use in Southeast Asia during the 1965-1966 buildup of forces. Some replacement had been begun in 1967.\(^5\) Approximately 30,000 tons of air munitions war reserves for all Services in PACOM was authorized by the JCS. Reconstitution problems were primarily due to continued Southeast Asia priority and limited production of munitions. The munitions inventory at PACOM bases, other than at Southeast Asia bases, for all Services reached a total of 247,000 short tons of a 564,000 short tons requirement. This represented a 44 percent fill of munitions war stock.

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1. ADMINO CINCPAC 162141Z May 68.
2. J4121 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
3. J4122 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of May and Jul 68.
4. J4121 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
reserves in the PACOM. CINCPAC's T-Day planning for withdrawal from Southeast Asia included redistribution of Southeast Asia assets to fill PACOM war reserve requirements.¹

¹ Point Paper, J473, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Jan 69, Subj: Munitions War Reserve.
1. J42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
3. CINCPAC 030035Z Sep 68.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
The JCS tasked the major unified commands to vigorously pursue base development planning, to give command attention to "U. S. Base Requirements Overseas," to development of an engineering intelligence program for incorporation into base development plans, and related actions.²

Ocean Terminal Operations in the Philippines

3. J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
4. CINCPAC 310536Z Jan 68.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
2. JCS 7920/232000Z Aug 68.
3. J481 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
4. CINCUSARPAC 060412Z Jun 68.
5. CINCPAC 290246Z Jun 68.
6. CINCPACFLT 250332Z Jun 68; CINCUSARPAC 260628Z Jun 68.
7. CINCPAC 290428Z Jun 68.
8. SECDEF 092317Z Jul 68.
9. CINCPAC 090350Z Jul 68.
PACOM Airlift Reorganization

He proposed to discontinue the 315th Air Division, moving its planning and control functions to Hawaii and reassigning its airlift units to numbered air forces. He thought the reorganization would increase responsiveness to requirements and improve airlift efficiency. 3

CINCPAC acknowledged that the basic relationships between the Chief of the Western Pacific Transportation Office (WTO) and the airlift control agency were such that the two should be in the same geographical vicinity; thus relocation of part of the WTO function appeared necessary and the Chief of the WTO was asked to comment. 4

The Chief of the WTO expressed some qualms about relocating to Hawaii because of the distance that would separate him from his primary airlift customers and questioned the capability of communications systems to handle the increased traffic. 5

CINCPACAF conducted a communications test in June. He recognized the need for a thorough test of communications service and stated that all facets of the new organization would be tested prior to the change. 6

The Commander, Military Sea Transport Service and CINCPACFLT both urged continuance of the WTO sealift function in Japan. 7

After a briefing on the details of the plan by the CINCPACAF staff, the Chief of the WTO withdrew his prior objections except for his

1. CG 2D LOG COMD OKINAWA RYIS RIBCTO-M 294/121100Z Nov 68.
2. From Tachikawa, Japan.
3. CINCPACAF 142252Z May 68.
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 180356Z May 68.
5. CHWTO Japan 210100Z May 68.
6. CINCPACAF 070345Z Jun 68.
7. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
request that communications reliability and a time-phased plan be conditions precedent to the move.¹

(S) On 3 July CINCPAC granted approval of the reorganization and move, provided that the specified requirements of the Chief of the WTO were met.² After a briefing by the staff of CINCPACAF in which more details were furnished, CINCPAC granted final approval to implement the move.³

(U) CINCPAC directed the relocation of the Chief of the Management Analysis Section and the Airlift Section of the WTO to Hickam Air Force Base with an anticipated beneficial occupancy date of March 1969.⁴

Proposed Discontinuance of MAC Cargo Service to Taipei

(U) The Commander of the Military Airlift Command (MAC) proposed in July to discontinue MAC cargo service to Taipei, Taiwan and substitute service to Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, Taiwan.⁵ CINCPAC asked his component command commanders to comment on the proposal so that he could reply to the Air Force Chief of Staff who had asked for CINCPAC's concurrence.⁶ CINCPACFLT concurred.⁷ CINCPACAF, however, stated objections. He pointed out that cargo service to Ching Chuan Kang via theater-owned C-130 aircraft was adequate and that there was, in fact, a genuine need for MAC cargo service to Taipei.⁸ CINCPAC therefore requested that the service to Taipei be continued.⁹

(U) In September the COMAC proposed, for a second time, the shift of the MAC intra-theater cargo terminus from Taipei to Ching Chuan Kang.¹⁰ CINCPAC took exception again. He indicated that the Ching Chuan Kang service was not required, that PACOM C-130s provided adequate lift to Ching Chuan Kang, that MAC commercial charter flights could not land

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 030101Z Jul 68.
3. CINCPAC 140233Z Sep 68.
4. CINCPACNOTE 5400, 06 Jan 69, Subj: Relocation of WESTPAC Transportation Office (J45).
5. MAC 112136Z Jul 68.
6. CINCPAC 190353Z Jul 68.
7. CINCPACFLT 200613Z Jul 68.
8. CINCPACAF 202233Z Jul 68.
9. CINCPAC 292308Z Jul 68.
10. MAC 162230Z Sep 68.
at Ching Chuan Kang and neither could mixed configuration flights as passengers had to transit Taipei. He pointed out that some trucking service would be required between terminals regardless of the terminus used.¹

(U) In view of CINCPAC's objections, the Air Force Chief of Staff decided that no further action would be taken to move the MAC terminus.²

Outsize Airlift Requirements

(S) The Air Force planned to phase out the C-124 and C-133 aircraft which provided outsize cargo movement capabilities. The new C-5 was to have outsize capability, but it was designed for long-haul lift.

(S) When the COMAC queried CINCPAC about the phase-out, CINCPAC indicated that the 22d Military Airlift Squadron, under the operational control of the PACOM airlift system, should be the last C-124 organization phased out.³ He then asked his component and subordinate unified commanders for their recommendations.⁴

(S) CINCPAC considered their responses when he told the JCS:

...Review of forecasts by component and subordinate unified commands indicates that outsize cargo airlift requirements will continue at or exceed present demands. In the foreseeable future, there will be a clear cut need for tactically responsive outsize cargo airlift support.⁵

He requested a continued C-124 capability.

(S) The Air Force Chief of Staff directed continuation of the 50th Military Airlift Wing at Hickam Air Force Base through the 4th quarter of FY 70 to insure continued C-124 support.⁶

1. CINCPAC 210134Z Sep 68.
2. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
3. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
4. CINCPAC 040135Z Oct 68.
5. CINCPAC 100102Z Nov 68.
6. JCS 05659/152026Z Nov 68.

SECRET
Testing began 1 September, monitoring South Vietnam and Thailand ports.

MAC Travel for Teachers to Taiwan

(U) On 24 May COMUSTDC was notified that the Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel would no longer authorize MAC travel for tuition-fee teachers of the Taipei American School, a U.S. Government contract school. COMUSTDC asked CINCPAC to ask for a reconsideration of the decision. COMUSTDC said such MAC travel would only be authorized on a space available basis with its cost reimbursable from the Taipei American School; free travel was not being requested, only authority to travel at MAC rates. Suspension of the authorization and use of commercial air carriers would cost an estimated $14,000 per year.

(U) In response to CINCPAC's request, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics advised that he had reconsidered the matter and that no basis existed to authorize the MAC transportation. CINCPAC passed the information to COMUSTDC.

PACSHIPS Inaugurated

1. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. CINCPAC 021626Z Jul 68.
6. SECDEF ASD (I&L) 04002/231448Z Oct 68.
7. CINCPAC 250055Z Oct 68.
8. ADMINO CINCPAC 200356Z Sep 68.
The rapid and timely manner with which information could be extracted from the PACSHIPS data base proved the worth of the system. For example, as a result of the cessation of bombing in North Vietnam, a question was asked as to the status of all ammunition ships enroute to South Vietnam. PACSHIPS provided the complete status, itinerary, and cargo data for all ships in the PACOM, and provided it within 24 hours of the receipt of the request. 1

(U) In October CINCPAC broadened PACSHIPS reporting to include daily submissions from Naha and Buckner Bay in Okinawa, Subic Bay in the Philippines, and Guam. 2

Consolidation of Household Goods Shipping Activities on Okinawa

(U) In March CINCPAC concurred in CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus' recommendation that household goods shipping activities on Okinawa be consolidated under a centralized office. 3 CINCPAC asked that a detailed memorandum of understanding be developed among the Services by the CINCPAC Representative to reflect the mission, staffing, funding, facilities, cost, and method of operation, and other criteria considered applicable. 4 The memorandum was also to indicate the Service that would have overall responsibility for the operation of the centralized office.

(U) In November the CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus advised CINCPAC that problems with the Services were being experienced in the development of the memorandum. Problems centered around costs to be borne by each Service, personnel staffing, and inadequate office and warehouse space. 5 He asked that the deadline for preparation of the memorandum of understanding be extended until 1 January 1969 to permit resolution of the problems. 6

1. J412 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 120604Z Oct 68.
3. J4831 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
4. Ibid.
5. Ltr., CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus to CINCPAC, n.d., Subj: Consolidation of Personal Property Shipping Activities.
6. Ibid.
except CINCUSARPAC took exception to a portion that assigned responsibility for provision of three billets for operation of a reefer warehouse to the Army. He thought manning and operation of that facility was a Navy responsibility.2

(U) CINCPAC determined that the Navy should assume the responsibility and so notified CINCPACFLT.3

1. J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
2. CINCUSARPAC 050532Z Jan 68; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
3. CINCPAC 210014Z Apr 68.
SECTIOn XIII - COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES

Voice Alert - JCSAN and CVAN Connected

A new CVAN 304 switching system was activated (CINCPAC's Alternate Command Center) in April. It terminated all Western Pacific voice alert circuits. These circuits could be interconnected to offices and residences of CINCPAC and other major commanders and their staffs. It also was connected with other command centers on Oahu and major communications facilities. 3

In August it was discovered that CINCPAC voice alert circuits to the 5th and 13th Air Forces were inoperative due to faulty or improperly installed equipment in those locations. CINCPAC directed CINCPACAF to conduct a detailed technical survey with the assistance of the DCA Pacific (DCA PAC) and the Hawaiian Telephone Company to isolate and correct system or circuit deficiencies. 4

This survey did not isolate and correct all system deficiencies. As a result, a working group consisting of representatives of CINCPAC's Operations and Communications-Electronics Divisions, DCA PAC, the Service component command commanders, and the Hawaiian Telephone Company was established. The purpose of the group was to develop a program to periodically test all segments of the system, isolate and correct system deficiencies, and develop procedures to improve the quality and reliability of the system. 5

1. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
2. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
3. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
4. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
TELECON Alerting Network

CINCPAC's Command and Control Alert Network (the KW-7 Alert Net) was installed and activated for test purposes on 18 April 1968. Members of the net were CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, Commander Submarine Forces Pacific, Commanding Officer Fleet Operations Control Center Pacific, and Commander Naval Communications Station Honolulu. On 9 August, following successful activation of the net, other circuits to certain of these net members were deactivated. After six months of operation the system was judged to have reduced the time required to disseminate urgent operational information.

Command Center Power Supply

A back-up battery supply to provide 40 KW of "no-break" power to critical Command Center communications, installed by the Navy's Public Works Center, was completed on 7 August 1968.

Secure Voice Communications for CINCPAC and Key Staff Officers

Relocation of four KY-3 voice ciphony sets was completed on 26 June 1968. The sets, used for Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) and TALK QUICK, had been installed in the offices of the CINCPAC, his Chief of Staff, and the two Deputy Chiefs of Staff. The sets were relocated to the Telecon Facility in the Command Center, which facilitated maintenance and daily card changes. The key officers had convenient handsets connected to the equipment with no change in their procedures or degradation of service; complete privacy was retained.

1. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan, Apr, Aug 68.
2. Ltr, Commanding Officer, Fleet Operations Control Center, U.S. Pacific Fleet to Chief of Naval Operations (OP-09B9), 26 Feb 69, Subj: Command History (OPNAV Report 5750-1); submission of.
3. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
CINCPAC-FMFPAC Private Auxiliary Exchange

(U) A new 500-line private auxiliary exchange (PAX) switching system was activated on 22 April 1968. All subscriber stations were operational by the summer. This was an intercom system linking key CINCPAC and FMFPAC personnel to improve administrative communications. The system was leased from the Hawaiian Telephone Company.

Automation of the Communications Center

(U) CINCPAC continued to study the automation of certain functions of the Communications Center to speed message handling. On 13 May 1968 he advised the JCS of the urgent and continuing requirement to reduce the time interval between release of a message by the originator and its actual insertion into the message network for electrical transmission. He asked for JCS approval for the DCA to develop a plan. The JCS validated the requirement on 19 June, but tasked the Chief of Naval Operations to prepare the project plan.

Communications Center Message Traffic

Magnetic Tape Terminal

(U) On 15 May the CINCPAC Communications Center began using the magnetic tape terminal for receiving Combat Air Activity (COACT) Reports from CINCPACAF. This did not officially activate the magnetic terminal, but it provided a service to CINCPACAF and provided Communications Center personnel with experience in receipt, transmission, and handling of magnetic tape traffic.

1. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
5. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months Jan through Dec 68.
6. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
# MESSAGE DELIVERY TIME

1 OCT - 31 DEC 68

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**NOTES:**
- ○ No entry indicates lack of sampling in the Computer Data Base
- ○ Time of File by Originator to Time of Receipt by CINCPAC (hrs minsec)

**SOURCE:** PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 84.
CINCPAC STAFF MESSAGE TRAFFIC
BY PRECEDENCE

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 85.
CINCPAC STAFF MESSAGE TRAFFIC
BY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 86.
New Microwave Equipment Installed

A new microwave system was installed in 1968 linking with CINCPAC's Camp Smith headquarters and CINCPACFLT. The modernized system—Philco-Ford LC-8/UCC-2, using AN/FCC-17 and AN/FCC-149 equipment—replaced the AN/FCC-15 and AN/FRG-37 equipment in the deactivated microwave system. The new system was activated on 21 August 1968. This procedure was terminated in November 1968.

AUTODIN - Automatic Switching Centers

New automatic switching centers for the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) were opened throughout the year. The first had been activated at Clark Air Base in the Philippines in October 1967. In 1968 centers were activated at Korat, Thailand (22 January); Phu Lam, South Vietnam and Fort Buckner, Okinawa (March); Finegayan, Guam (April); and Camp Drake, Japan (May). The six switches carried daily traffic that had exceeded 185,000 messages.

CINCPAC desired to add a switch in Korea, rather than interfacing Korea subscribers to the Japan switch, and a switch in Taiwan, rather than interfacing Taiwan subscribers to the Okinawa switch. He therefore submitted a request to the DCA, who advised that, based on a review of validated AUTODIN requirements and existing and planned communications channel capacity, regional AUTODIN switches were not required. At the end of the year CINCPAC was preparing to resubmit the request with re-justification. He believed that record communications should be automated in Taiwan by providing direct access to the AUTODIN to improve the speed and quality of transmission.
Large Volume Data Exchange

On 9 November 1967 CINCPAC had submitted a requirement for the exchange of large volumes of data between selected command centers and he proposed the use of the Circuit Switching Unit (CSU) capabilities of the AUTODIN. This system would use magnetic tape-to-magnetic tape operations and replace use of the old AUTODIN message switching unit, which often delayed large volume data transmissions in increments in a "store-and-forward" technique when circuits were available.

The JCS validated CINCPAC's request in December 1967 and asked the DCA to develop a sub-system project plan to satisfy CINCPAC's requirements. In April the DCA submitted its plan for initial tests between CINCPAC and the National Military Command Center. The Radio Corporation of America was to provide a new AUTODIN terminal for the test to replace the terminal that had been handling normal CINCPAC traffic. The test was scheduled to commence in early 1969.

Interface of PACOM Joint Pacific Command and Control Network with AUTODIN

During March CINCPAC began efforts to interface the Joint Pacific (JP) teletype network with the AUTODIN to take advantage of the faster transmission capability of the AUTODIN. The JP relay would have to be automated and interfaced with AUTODIN. The Southeast Asia JP circuits would be automated and consolidated with the CINCPACAF Command and Operations teletype network relay at Tan Son Nhut and Korat.

2. J6 Brief No. 066-68, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Apr 68, of JCS 2469/176-1 of 1 Apr 68, Subj: CINCPAC Requirements for Large Volume Data Exchange Between Command Centers (U).
3. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
4. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
Secure Teletype Communications for CINCPAC's Aircraft

CINCPAC had defined an urgent requirement for a portable secure teletype system that could be used in various types of aircraft when he traveled throughout the PACOM. A system to fulfill this requirement was being fabricated in Hawaii, but some additional equipment was requested from the Naval Electronic Systems Command Headquarters. In reply that agency stated that certain of the equipment requested was still being designed and would not be available for a year. They offered to design a system around CINCPAC's needs on a priority basis when CINCPAC outlined his operational requirements.

Communications with the Airborne Command Post

In March CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT that the secure teletype operation between his Airborne Command Post and Air Force and Navy ground facilities was less than satisfactory. The two component command commanders jointly reviewed all procedures. As a result, clarifying instructions were sent to all PACOM Navy communications stations and CINCPACAF raised the priority on bench stock parts for Airborne Command Post teletype equipment. The actions have significantly improved the effectiveness of the Airborne Command Post secure teletype operation.

AUTOSEVOCOM

Phase I of the Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) System for 1,850 subscribers worldwide was scheduled to be completed in 1969, with 550 of those subscribers in the PACOM. The remaining 2,150 subscribers were to be included in Phase II, which was still somewhat undefined. A study by the Defense Department's Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, completed in March 1968, concluded

1. CINCPAC 252211Z Sep 68.
2. NAVELECSYSCOMHQ 071801Z Oct 68.
3. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
4. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
that the Phase II expansion should be limited to only 400 (80 to 100 in the PACOM) of the 2,150 subscribers to be added during the 1969-1972 time period with addition of the remaining subscribers sometime after 1972 if less expensive equipment under development could be produced and if new system concepts were developed.¹

This limited expansion would require careful screening of PACOM subscriber requirements to insure that subscribers had a vital requirement for secure voice service and were physically located so that they had no possibility of sharing service in the area with another subscriber.²

CINCPAC continued his activities to prepare for Phase I, meanwhile, throughout the year. CINCPAC and the DCA jointly sponsored a conference at CINCPAC's headquarters 6 to 9 February to review Phase I implementation problems. Subscriber lists were reviewed and changes validated by CINCPAC were presented to DCA and JCS representatives. The network configurations for Phase I were reviewed and modified in light of COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI recommendations for Southeast Asia configurations and recommendations for configurations in the Western Pacific area by the Commanding General, U. S. Army Strategic Communications Command-Pacific. Final configurations were agreed upon for all areas with the exception of Japan because availability of certain subscriber circuits there was in question. This was to be resolved with the Service components in Japan. The implementation schedule for Phase I was discussed. Upon submission of information from COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI on their capabilities to support installation teams, the DCA agreed to prepare a firm installation schedule for Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. Availability of circuit conditioning hardware was identified as the major restraint in establishing starting dates for installation.³

By December 1968 Phase I implementation throughout Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific was approximately 75 percent complete and the forecast completion date for all contractor implementation was

2. Ibid.
3. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
established as February 1969. Any work uncompleted after contractor
cut-off date in February would be accomplished by the Military Departments.

(C) In another matter, while Phase I implementation was still in pro-
gress, CINCPAC asked the JCS to provide a technical evaluation of the
operating portions of the AUTOSEVOCOM system, with emphasis on the
transmission media, in order to determine the reasons for the relatively
poor performance of the operating system on long-haul narrowband circuits.
In October 1968 the JCS tasked the DCA to perform such evaluation and the
DCA in turn tasked the Air Force Communications Service (AFCS) with
organizing joint Service teams and conducting the evaluation. The AFCS,
after coordination with the Military Departments, the DCA, and CINCPAC,
formulated a Joint AUTOSEVOCOM Evaluation Project and by December
1968 published a plan for this project and began indoctrination training of
team personnel in CONUS prior to intended dispatch of these teams to the
PACOM in early 1969. The project was expected to require about 10
months and be completed in October 1969.

Frequency Management

(U) CINCPAC provided frequency management support again in
1968 for the various APOLLO space missions. Frequency support and
protection were provided for the spacecraft, range instrumented ships
and aircraft, and Pacific recovery forces.¹

Long Lines Communications

(C) The Integrated Joint Communications System - Pacific (IJCS-PAC),
the major communications upgrade program in the Western Pacific, was
bogged down again in 1968, principally because of delays in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. No actual progress was made during the year.

(C) Prospects for installation of the submarine cable between the
Philippines and Taiwan² were poor because the Philippine Government
denied the right to land the cable on Luzon and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense failed to approve the site chosen for the cable landing in southern
Taiwan. The Philippine denial was possibly rooted in a fear that U. S. con-
struction would enable the United States to avoid leasing channels on a

¹ J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Sep, Oct, Dec 68.
proposed government-commercial system being constructed between Taiwan and the Philippines. 1

On 15 October CINCPAC recommended that the JCS continue action to obtain landing rights and indicated he would not oppose the leasing of some channels in the commercial radio system if it was advisable to do so to secure landing rights. 2

Processing of Major Telecommunications Requirements

A great deal of anguish and frustration were generated at CINCPAC's headquarters by delays in the Office of the Secretary of Defense that had to process and approve requirements to satisfy growing PACOM communications needs. 3

There were two basic problems: failure to include communications support requirements and funds when processing the basic programs that generated the need for them and the requirement from the Secretary of Defense for a large amount of extremely detailed data before communications requirements would be reviewed or processed. CINCPAC believed it was largely within the ability of the Secretary to control and modify these procedures. It appeared the basic problems were further aggravated by conflicting positions on communications-electronics planning and programming matters by the several Assistant Secretaries, e.g., those for Administration, Installations and Logistics, Comptroller, and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. There were a number of indications that the JCS had attempted to correct his situation but their efforts had not been successful.

1. J6 Brief No. 0203-68, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Dec 68, of JCS 2469-370 of 12 Dec 68, Subj: Integrated Joint Broadband System, Okinawa (Army TPO 1-68), Philippine - Japan Upgrade Programs, and Taiwan Down- Island Communications System (U); Point Paper, J622, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: Submarine Cable, Philippines - Taiwan.
2. CINCPAC 150516Z Nov 68.
3. Material for this subsection was derived from Point Paper, J621, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Jul 68, Subj: Processing of Major Telecommunications Requirements (U) and from Ltr., BGEN H. A. French, USAF, ACoS for Communications-Electronics, Hq CINCPAC, to MGENDayton W. Eddy, USA, Director of Communications and Electronics, JCS, Washington, 9 Mar 68, n.s.
New programs that required computers or other sophisticated equipment—and requiring new and highly complex communications support—were approved but without their associated communications requirements, which then required additional years to develop, justify, and obtain approval and funding for. Another year or two could pass before an actual capability was achieved. The unified command commander could either jury-rig the needed support or take equipment away from someone else who had his requirements already programmed. CINCPAC believed that the senior reviewing authorities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense could eliminate the problem by insisting that communications requirements be processed with the basic programs they supported.

The second cause for delay, the submission of minutely detailed data, put development of communications requirements in sharp contrast with development of plans for requirements for the forces and deployments they would ultimately support. Where force and support requirements concentrated on overall concepts and needs, communications requirements had to be submitted in exhaustive detail, with every circuit, every user, every function clearly justified, but with no overall concept for their satisfaction permitted. The commander of the unified command also had to forecast associated manpower requirements, before a system concept was established. Many manhours were spent in exact computation of inexact trivia. And worst of all were the long delays.

Perhaps the best example of the situation was portrayed by the efforts made to upgrade the communications in Korea, which were wholly unsatisfactory to support U.S. combat operations in that country. Several thousand man-hours were expended to provide the detailed requirements data required by Defense Department Directive 4630.1. Subsequently a working group at the DCA spent in excess of 700 man-hours to accomplish the required sub-system project plan using the same requirements as a basis for the plan which was subsequently sent to the Secretary of Defense for approval. Later, a program budget decision was handed down by the Secretary that approved $15 million for an austere upgrade of Korea communications. It should be noted that the decision was not related in any way to the plan or any of the various communications-electronics improvements for Korea contained therein. Accordingly, it can only be concluded that the COMUS Korea, CINCPAC, JCS, and DCA efforts in this regard were of little or no consequence in the Secretary's action.

Another example was the Integrated Joint Communication System-Pacific, originally submitted in October 1965 for needed improvements in
the Japan-Okinawa-Taiwan-Philippines Troposcatter System, which had been approved but was still under review in Washington--with no improvement to the system in 1968. Another was Phase IV of the Integrated Wideband Communications System for Southeast Asia. This was processed in late 1966 and submitted in February 1967 in connection with Force Planning Conferences. The forces have been deployed but the communications requirements have never been approved. Action on Phase IV, according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was to be deferred until all of Phase III was completed, and then Phase IV would be reviewed on a circuit-by-circuit basis.

CINCPAC considered this somewhat like a bomb-by-bomb justification for every load of a B-52 prior to its deployment, except that he considered the bombs and bombers merely one of a number of instruments to achieve a commander's aims while the communications circuits were, in effect, an extension of the commanders themselves, providing them with the basis for making decisions and managing the resources available to them.

CINCPAC considered communications facilities of the highest quality absolutely essential to effective command and control, that their basic costs were relatively small when compared to the costs of men and materiel they were controlling and managing, that essential freedom of action in pursuing our strategic and tactical concepts was dependent to a large degree on the quality and quantity of our fixed communications facilities, and that comparative costs for high-quality communications in terms of forces and resources controlled and managed, and our tactical and strategic reaction times, led to the conclusion that expenditures for communications facilities were highly cost effective.

Contingency Force Communications with Diplomatic Posts

In July the JCS authorized CINCPAC to proceed with plans for secure radio teletypewriter communications to diplomatic posts after they and the State Department had agreed on the method for this communication. The JCS approved method was to involve direct high frequency

radio from the joint task force commander to a regional relay station of the Diplomatic Telecommunications System (at Clark Air Base in the PACOM). ¹

(§) CINCPAC began developing procedures to implement the new communications channel, specifying that "development of operational procedures for establishment and maintenance of secure communications between selected fleet units and diplomatic posts will be undertaken first. "² He specified that in order to permit proper coordination and control of the use of this method of communication it would not be used or exercised by PACOM units without the express approval of the CINCPAC. He tasked CINCPACFLT to develop operational procedures. ³ Testing was in progress at the end of the year.

General-Limited War Support Plan

(§) The DCA, upon direction of the JCS, had been in the process of preparation of plans for restoration of worldwide DCA circuits utilizing mobile/transportable equipment during nuclear or limited war conditions. CINCPAC commented on three previous draft plans ⁴ before the DCA forwarded a final draft plan to the unified and specified command commanders on 15 April 1968. CINCPAC's comments were forwarded on 14 May. ⁵

(§) In general, CINCPAC concurred in the plan, but he pointed out the apparent lack of consideration for restoral with separate activities within the unified command area, such as the National Security Agency, the Strategic Air Command, and the U.S. Information Agency, in the overall concept. CINCPAC also noted that a requirement existed for provisions for restoral from the National Military Command Center to the various potential command posts of a unified command commander, including those airborne or

2. ADMINO CINCPAC 262311Z Aug 68.
3. Ibid.
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 122050Z Apr 67 and 232301Z Apr 67; CINCPAC 020344Z Feb 68.
5. ADMINO CINCPAC 140312Z May 68.
aflot or alternate relocation sites ashore. He stated that the plan included as CINCPAC assets certain mobile/transportable equipment currently in use in Southeast Asia and recommended that only readily available assets not in use be included in the plan. CINCPAC stated that switching equipment or technical control equipment was not provided for in the Limited War Restoral Plan. He considered the requirement for AUTOVON, AUTODIN, and AUTOSEVOCOM interface and intra-area service and record switching vital to the plan. Finally CINCPAC noted the need for an effective communications grid system. Experience had shown, he said, that a means of rapidly shifting communications-electronics requirements and emphasis from one geographical area to another was vital in a limited war environment.1

(S) Following receipt of comments by the unified and specified commanders the JCS called a meeting regarding the plan in Washington from 20 to 22 May 1968. The plan was rewritten, modified, or clarified as appropriate. The conference finalized changes and recommendations for the DCA to incorporate into the final plan.

(S) In general the planning conference established the following points: (a) Each overseas unified command commander was to be furnished one AN/TSC-54 (satellite) and high frequency transceivers for restoral of communications between the commander and the National Military Command Center. The commanders were directed to formulate their own internal plans for restoral and use of mobile/transportable equipment. These plans would form the basis for funding for required equipment in addition to that listed in the DCA plan; (b) CONUS restoration was to be based on transportable satellite capability as opposed to microwave equipment; and (c) equipment for Limited War was to be procured in increments over the next three years. A total of 120 mobile transportables were required, of which 60 were tropospheric scatter and 60 were microwave. Each year 20 sets of each type were to be procured.2

(S) As the plan had been almost two years in development, and in the interest of expediting the forwarding of the plan to the Defense Department, the JCS requested concurrence in the plan prior to final publishing by the DCA. CINCPAC concurred, but emphasized that the equipment requirements were arbitrary selections and that equipment to be procured must meet DCA standards at the time of delivery.3

1. Ibid.
2. JCS 09962/250402Z May 68; J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 050320Z Jun 68.
CINCPAC Supporting Plan for Deployment of Mobile/Transportable Communications Equipment

Tsunami Warning Message Handling Procedures

(U) During May several message handling problems were identified as a result of tsunami warnings generated by an earthquake in Japan. In the course of researching the reasons for these problems, several meetings were conducted by CINCPAC, attended by representatives of the U.S. Geodetic Survey, the Federal Aviation Administration, the U.S. Weather Bureau, CINCPACFLT, and CINCUSARPAC. As a result of this coordination, streamlined message routing procedures were developed. A complete compilation of all required recipients of these warning messages was subsequently developed. 2

Pacific Sea Launched Ballistic Missile Alerting Network

(S) In April the JCS directed establishment of a Sea Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) voice reporting network for the PACOM similar to one already in operation in the Atlantic. The network was activated on 1 May 1968. It used AUTOVON connections with a conference bridge having FLASH precedence capability. Only the Commander, Western Sea Frontier at Treasure Island, California and three ASW sector commanders (at San Diego and Moffet Field in California and Whidbey Island, Washington) had conference initiation capability. All other conferees (the National Military Commander Center, the Alternate National Military Command Center, CINCSAC, CINCNORAD, CINCLANT, and CINCPAC) had AUTOVON access lines equipped only to receive precedence calls. It was planned to add the

1. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
Commander, Anti-submarine Warfare Forces Pacific and the Commanders of the Hawaiian and Alaskan Sea Frontiers to the network when facilities were available.  

**Frequency Control in the Bonin, Marcus, and Volcano Islands**

(U) On 27 December 1967 CINCPAC designated COMUS Japan as agent for frequency coordination for the Bonin, Marcus, and Volcano Islands. Formerly the matter had been under the cognizance of the CINCPAC Representative Marianas-Bonins, but with reversion of the islands to Japan, U.S. Forces communications would fall under the U.S.-Japan Telecommunications Electronics Agreement supplementing the Security Treaty. Coordination for all frequencies requested was satisfactorily completed by 25 June 1968. The U.S. Forces retained the use of 51 frequencies.  

**Hong Kong Flight Information Region**

(5) Until 1967 aircraft flying in the Hong Kong Flight Information Region (FIR) used visual flight rules, in which the pilot insured separation from other aircraft and which did not necessitate voice communications. In early 1967 procedures were amended to require all aircraft in the FIR to use instrument flight rules (IFR). The new rules required communication with and control by the Hong Kong Air Control Center. Compliance by U.S. aircraft on reconnaissance missions on the periphery of Communist China through the Hong Kong FIR would have unacceptably degraded the intelligence collection effort.  

(5) Negotiations between the two governments resulted in agreements regarding these reconnaissance aircraft. Only in an emergency would an aircraft or the civil authorities initiate communications. A common high altitude track was assigned (for SAC, the Navy, and the USAF) and a low altitude track was assigned for the Navy. Monthly schedules and tracks were to be furnished to Hong Kong radar to assist them in identifying the transiting aircraft.

(S) Plans for evaluation of the communications procedures were devised. After testing, the number of missions would be increased to a number mutually agreeable to the Hong Kong Civil Aviation Department and CINCPAC. ¹

(S) At the end of the year, however, procedures for transit had not been implemented because official British concurrence had not been received. ²

1. J3B5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
2. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
Environmental and Morale Leave

(U) CINCPAC had implemented a long-established, joint Services authorized Environmental and Morale Leave Program in the PACOM whereby eligible Defense Department military and civilian personnel and their dependents could visit specified locations on leave using space available travel privileges. Among the changes proposed in 1968 were the following.

(U) Hawaii was approved as a leave site from the Philippines.

(U) CINCPAC concurred with a COMUSMACV request to use empty space available seats on Rest and Recuperation leave (R&R) aircraft to Bangkok by regular leave personnel providing the total of such leave personnel plus R&R personnel did not exceed the on-ground authorization for R&R in Bangkok.

1. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
2. JCS 9008/231730Z Apr 68.
3. JCS 2414/081543Z Oct 68.
4. JCS 6217/292045Z Dec 67.
5. CINCPACINST 1700.2B, 25 Sep 67, as amended; AFR 34-48/AR 600-19/OPNAVINST 4630.20/MCO 1700/18 of 26 Jun 63.
6. ADMINO CINCPAC 170119Z Jul 68.
7. ADMINO CINCPAC 170234Z Sep 68.
CINCPAC, in response to a request from the CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus, considered authorizing Korea as an environmental and morale leave site from Okinawa. COMUS Korea strongly recommended that the request be denied citing the increased readiness posture of military forces there, already overcrowded recreational facilities, and a civilian economy with little or nothing to offer. 1 CINCPAC advised the CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus that the environmental situation prevented approving Korea as a leave site. 2

(U) CINCPAC asked the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand for his concurrence in authorizing a small pilot environmental and morale leave program to Bangkok from Guam and Okinawa. The Ambassador replied that because of problems stemming from the growing presence of U.S. personnel, he could not agree to the proposed program. 3

Awards - CINCPAC Staff

(U) In 1968, 44 members of CINCPAC's civilian staff received incentive awards for outstanding or superior performance or achievement. In October two staff members—one military, one civilian—received the first cash ever awarded at CINCPAC's headquarters for adopted suggestions. 4

Special Christmas - New Year Work Weeks

(U) To assure more equitable holiday benefits for CINCPAC staff personnel, the administrative work week was changed for the Christmas and New Year holiday period. 5 For the two weekly periods—22 to 28 December 1968 and 29 December 1968 to 4 January 1969—the CINCPAC staff worked a scheduled 40-hour week, 0800 to 1700, Monday through Friday. Otherwise the incidence of holidays on Wednesday would have resulted in loss of four hours of holiday time each holiday for all staff personnel.

(U) The normal work week at CINCPAC's headquarters continued to be from 0800 to 1700 hours on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday and from 0800 to 1200 hours on Wednesday and Saturday.

1. COMUSKOREA UK 54873AJ/090220Z Sep 68.
2. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
3. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
4. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Apr, May, Jun, Oct 68.
5. CINCPACSTAFFNOTE 5330, 18 Nov 68, Subj: Temporary Change in Administrative Workweek during Christmas-New Year Holiday Period 1968.
Joint Service Commendation Medal

(U) In September 1968 CINCPAC recommended that in the PACOM the authority to award the Joint Service Commendation Medal be delegated to subordinate unified commands and joint activities headed by an officer of grade 0-8 or higher. The JCS replied in November that they did not favorably consider the broad delegation of authority but they did state that they would consider specific recommendations on a case-by-case basis.¹

Combined Federal Campaign

(U) The annual Defense Department combined federal fund campaign raised $580,980.50 in the PACOM in 1968.²

Scouting and Other Youth Activities

(U) CINCPAC continued his support of Boy and Girl Scout and other youth activities in the PACOM in 1968.

(U) In March COMUS Japan forwarded a request to CINCPAC for assistance in obtaining approval for continued use of space available military aircraft in support of Girl Scout activities. He believed that suspension of Military Airlift Command space available travel would impact unfavorably on such activities.³

(U) On 29 April the JCS advised CINCPAC that Defense Department policy on space available travel for such activities was the same as that established for active and retired military personnel. This policy provided sufficient latitude to support and encourage the Scouting programs in the overseas commands.⁴

(U) In response to a CINCPAC recommendation, the Secretary of Defense provided guidance regarding the use of Defense Department

¹. J1 Brief No. 56-68, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Dec 68, of JCS SM-759-68 of 23 Nov 68, Subj: Joint Service Commendation Medal.
². J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
³. COMUSJAPAN 220400Z Mar 68.
⁴. JCS 7735/292205Z Apr 68.
transportation to support dependent youth activities in general, to include Scouting and athletic programs. 1 CINCPAC advised COMUS Japan that space available military transportation for these activities can be authorized on a case-by-case basis when it was determined by the commander concerned that such activities contributed to overall public affairs objectives. 2

PACOM Professional Entertainment Program

(U) The costs of the PACOM professional entertainment program had been borne by non-appropriated fund agencies of the Services in accordance with a system that seemed obsolete and disproportionate. Each Service (including the Marines) paid a prorated percentage of the annual cost of the program based on worldwide force strengths as of 1958. This resulted in percentages of the cost for Fiscal Year 1969 as follows: CINCUSARPAC 43.5, CINCPACFLT 6.5, CINCPACAF 43.5, and FMFPAC 6.5

(U) A joint committee composed of representatives of all of these Services proposed changing this to a more equitable distribution based on the number of performances for each of the Services in a year. Percentages based on Calendar Year 1967 performances would have been: CINCUSARPAC 56, CINCPACFLT 14, CINCPACAF 20, and FMFPAC 10. 3

(U) On 20 December CINCPAC directed that appropriate action be taken to revise the proportionate shares as had been proposed. 4

Airline Ticket Sales by Concessionaires in the PACOM

(U) The Secretary of Defense, having rejected a recommendation from the JCS that the PACOM be granted blanket authority to renew or renegotiate airline ticket sales, requested that the details of each individual concession contract be forwarded for a case-by-case review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. South Vietnam was excluded from consideration in this matter as there were separate arrangements there. CINCPAC forwarded details of all Pacific Exchange System airline ticket sales concession contracts along with individual pertinent recommendations. 5 There were 14

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1. SECDEF (OASD/PA) 004666/011546Z Nov 68.
2. CINCPAC 092042Z Dec 68.
3. Ltr, CINCUSARPAC to CINCPAC, 18 Sep 68, Subj: PACOM Professional Entertainment Program.
4. CINCPAC 202326Z Dec 68.
5. CINCPAC 310314Z Aug 68.
concessions with 30 service outlets in Japan, Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Guam.

(U) In September the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics approved continuing all existing agreements until 15 January 1969.¹

Policy Manual for Employment of Third Country Nationals in the PACOM

1. SECDEF DEF 9425/131529Z Sep 68.
2. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
Personnel Administration for Non-U.S. Citizens in Foreign Areas

(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs was considering a change in policy regarding who was to determine compensation and conditions of employment for local national personnel of the U.S. Forces in the USEUCOM and the PACOM. CINCPAC had coordination and implementation authority in local national personnel matters other than compensation when his Service component command commanders agreed on an issue and concurred under blanket or special authority granted them by their respective Service Secretaries. CINCPACUSARPAC and CINCPACAF both possessed such delegated authority on non-compensation matters, but CINCPACFLT had to obtain Navy Department approval on each issue. The Services retained final authority on compensation matters. 1 Vietnam and Okinawa were exceptions—Vietnam compensation matters were controlled by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (and delegated to in-country Service component commanders) and for Okinawa authority had been previously delegated to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyus and the Joint Committee on Okinawa. 2

(U) The new proposal from the Office of the Secretary of Defense proposed that CINCEUR and CINCPAC would establish joint personnel committees, chaired by their representatives and composed of one representative from each of their component command commanders. The following are excerpts from the proposed new policy:

...The joint committees will establish salaries, wages, and fringe benefits and other terms and conditions of employment for local national employees and shall coordinate negotiations with employee unions.... Negotiations with unions shall not encompass matters of security, budget, mission, manpower authorizations or schedules of compensation (but employee unions may participate in the planning and conduct of area wage surveys.)...The joint committees will operate under and be responsible to the commander-in-chief of the unified command who is authorized to resolve component differences and direct a unified U.S. Forces

1. J1 Brief No. 46-68, Hq CINCPAC, 1 Oct 68, of JCSM 571-68, Subj: Coordination of Personnel Administration Affecting Local Nationals in Foreign Areas.
2. JCS 774/212143Z Aug 68.
policy. In order that the joint committees may operate effectively, each Military Department will delegate to its Service commanders authority to establish salaries, wages, fringe benefits and other terms and conditions for local national employees as specified above. Matters having significant budgetary or legal implications, and major policy issues, at the discretion of the CINC may be referred to the ASD (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) for decision. The previous delegation of authority to the High Commissioner, Ryukyus, and the Joint Committee on Okinawa, remains unchanged and is an exception to the above policy.\footnote{1}

(U) After having obtained the comments of his component command commanders, CINCPAC concurred in the proposal with two qualifications: he recommended that the delegation of authority for Okinawa be continued on a provisional basis only and that the term local national be changed to "non-U.S. citizen" to include third country nationals employed by U.S. Forces.\footnote{2} CINCPAC had not been advised of any further action by the end of the year.

Bases Labor Agreement - Philippines

\footnote{1}{Ibid.} 
\footnote{2}{CINCPAC 022001Z Sep 68.} 
\footnote{3}{J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.}
At one point, to avoid the collapse of negotiations and to improve the possibility of acceptance on the part of the Philippine Government and public, a mid-year bonus was authorized to be paid on 1 July and was to be paid on that date each year in the future. ¹

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1. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
2. Ibid.
3. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
4. Ibid.
5. ADMINO CINCPAC 270256 Z Aug 68.
6. Ibid.
7. COMUSMACTHAI 050142 Z Sep 68.
The American Ambassador in Vientiane commented to the effect that while no problem was foreseen for military or contractor employees, the Embassy would terminate all 64 of its direct hire Filipinos rather than face their host government's reaction to an off-shore labor agreement. 3

The reply from Vietnam was sent jointly by the Ambassador and COMUSMACV. They stated, "...the consensus is that the agreement provides nothing of advantage to US interests in Vietnam, will hamper US efforts here and will ultimately result in unnecessary expense to the United States."4 The Mission took four positions they listed in priority:

Position 1. That the off-shore labor agreement not be negotiated.

Position 2. That, if the agreement is negotiated, Vietnam be excluded, at least until the cessation of hostilities.

Position 3. That, if the agreement is negotiated and Vietnam must be included, employees of contractors and subcontractors not be included.

Position 4. That, if the agreement is negotiated, if Vietnam must be included, and if the employees of contractors and subcontractors must be included, a separate agreement be negotiated for this category of employee. 5

The Mission in Saigon also reported that it considered it mandatory that U.S. Government representatives from affected countries be present during any actual negotiation.

1. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 20773/260850Z Sep 68.
2. SECSTATE 242444/202130Z Sep 68.
3. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 9426/011144Z Oct 68.
4. COMUSMACV 29393/040800Z Oct 68.
5. Ibid.
Two matters that bothered CINCPAC particularly were a Christmas bonus to be paid to direct hire employees if the agreement were signed before the end of the year and the fact that direct hire and contractor employees would have no benefits reduced as a result of the agreement. This appeared to mean that those contractor employees in Vietnam reported by COMUSMACV as being highly overpaid would continue to enjoy such overcompensation, and efforts of COMUSMACV to institute uniform compensation practices would be frustrated. 4

1. AMEMBASSY Manila 16736/240457Z Oct 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
2. CINCPAC 272235Z Oct 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
3. AMEMBASSY Manila 18294/060306Z Dec 68. CINCPAC was represented at the negotiations by the Director of Civilian Personnel, Hq CINCPACAF, who served first as a technical adviser to and later a member of the U.S. Negotiating Panel, which was chaired by the Labor Attache, U.S. Embassy Manila.
4. CINCPAC 180400Z Dec 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
When the Secretary of State distributed the text to Embassies in Saigon and Bangkok a similar but more violent reaction occurred.¹

The U.S. Negotiating Panel explained that although certain provisions of the text appeared to be inordinately favorable to the Philippines, this was largely for cosmetic effect and either agreed minutes or exchanged letters nullified those provisions most objectionable to CINCPAC. They also explained that further delay would probably result in less moderate elements of the Philippine Negotiating Panel taking the lead and that the United States could lose some concessions previously won.²

Consideration of these matters, including further explanation from the U.S. Embassy in Manila, led CINCPAC to the conclusion that he should withdraw his previous recommendation to defer approval.³ He did so on 18 December.⁴ He considered the Vietnam employment matter a short-term situation, one that the U.S. Mission could approach in other ways, such as the training of Vietnamese to replace third country nationals. Okinawa and Guam, on the other hand (both labor shortage areas), presented a long-term situation that the agreement was expected to improve.

The agreement was signed by Ambassador Williams for the United States on 28 December at Manila. It was known as the 1968 Offshore Labor Agreement.⁵

Severance Pay for Filipino Workers

In September CINCPAC approved a proposal by the CINCPAC Representative Philippines that severance pay be granted upon voluntary resignation to Filipino employees over age 65 with 5 or more years of service with the U.S. Forces Philippines who were not covered by Philippine Social Security, U.S. Civil Service Retirement, or Non-Appropriated Fund Activity retirement plans.⁶

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1. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 182254Z Dec 68.
5. AMEMBASSY Manila 18988/280420Z Dec 68.
6. CINCPAC 140323Z Sep 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
Philippine Dollar Repatriation

(U) A Philippine mission headed by the Under Secretary of Labor visited several PACOM areas in August to obtain Filipino off-shore employees' voluntary remittance of salary dollars to the Philippine National Bank. The goal was to strengthen the Philippine dollar reserve, to curb dollar black marketeering activities, and to facilitate receipt of salaries by dependents in the Philippines. 1

If the Philippine Government attempted to apply pressures to make the program compulsory, the United States Government would be in a position of either refusing to help (which would be unfortunate politically), or of helping the Philippine Government enforce compliance with a "voluntary" program.

(S) CINCPAC therefore proposed as an alternative the establishment of a joint program with the Philippines in which off-shore Filipino salaries would be returned to the Philippines, but that such dollars would be in blocked dollar credits for expenditure only in the United States. 3 This would give the United States a consistent position—that the program was involuntary and that both Governments would enforce it. It was also estimated to effect a gold flow savings of $25 to $30 million a year.

(S) The main advantage to the Philippines was that it would harness all of the salaries for dollar credits, even if they were blocked. The advantage to both Governments, as well as to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, would be that dollar black marketing would be substantially and virtually controlled. The program would also set a precedent with the

1. CINCPACREP PHIL 260933Z Jul 68.
2. CINCPAC 090420Z Aug 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 200304Z Nov 68.
Government of the Republic of Korea and possibly other countries where the United States had a balance of payments problem.  

CINCPAC anticipated that it would be a matter not easily negotiated, but he wanted it considered by the Defense and State Departments before negotiations between the United States and the Philippines on an off-shore labor agreement began in December.

Credit Unions - Japan

(U) The United Credit Union of Japan was not accredited at the beginning of 1968 pending an audit of its activities. In the summer the Credit Union was audited by Price Waterhouse and Co. according to Bureau of Federal Credit Union standards and in September COMUS Japan forwarded a request to have the Credit Union certified. On 2 October CINCPAC furnished approval and authorization to operate the Credit Union.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
5. Ltr, CINCPAC to Commander U. S. Forces Japan, 5 Oct 68, Subj: United Credit Union.
SECTION XV - INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Intelligence Collection

(S) Various intelligence collection programs conducted by PACOM ships and aircraft continued in 1968. The account of events concerning the USS PUEBLO, seized by North Korea in January, is contained in Chapter IV of this history.

IVY GREEN

(S) Intelligence collection against foreign missile and space activities, a program called IVY GREEN, continued as required by Soviet activity in testing their missiles and rockets. Soviet testing had taken on a kind of pattern, both as to range and season of testing. Four destroyer escort type ships and four aircraft were regularly assigned to CINCPAC's operational control. Ships from the Air Force's Eastern Test Range and SAC aircraft assisted CINCPAC periodically. Chinese Communist ICBM experiments impacting in either the Indian or Pacific Oceans were expected to begin in 1970 or 1971.¹

1. Point Paper J3B41, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Jul 68, Subj: Intelligence Collection Against Foreign Missile and Space Activities (S); J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.

4. By Israeli forces near the Sinai Peninsula on 8 June 1967.
5. CINCPAC 021939Z Jun 68.
proposed responses to specific postulated situations, although CINCPAC acknowledged that probable situations could not be defined precisely and that any response "must be tempered with good judgment." 1

Intelligence Data Handling System Communications Support

[5] In February a meeting was held at Camp Smith to discuss communications support of the Intelligence Data Handling System. It was noted that in view of the critical PACOM communications circuit availability, and other considerations, CINCPAC should continue collaboration with the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Communications Agency, and the National Security Agency in determining the best methods for meeting increased intelligence communications requirements, particularly in the Western Pacific. In this connection, the Defense Communications Agency (in response to a CINCPAC request) was developing a program for selected command and control users via the Circuit Switching Unit capabilities of the AUTODIN. With proper clearances for operators, these Circuit Switching Units were expected to be able to fill most of the critical user requirements. A proposal to obtain the necessary Special Intelligence clearances for personnel in these units was submitted to the JCS. 3

1. Ibid.
2. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
3. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
World-wide Intelligence Products Index

CINCPAC representatives attended the Fifth World-wide Intelligence Production/Automation Management Conference held at the Defense Intelligence Agency in October 1968. A PACOM proposal for a World-wide Intelligence Products Index was well received by conference delegates. The Defense Intelligence Agency accepted a modified version of the index. 1

Defense Human Resources Intelligence Collection Management Manual

A new Defense Intelligence Agency publication, the Defense Human Resources Intelligence Collection Management Manual (DIHUM), DIAM 58-11, was published in 1968. It introduced major revisions in the management, direction, coordination, and conduct of human resources intelligence collection. Altered operating and reporting procedures in the PACOM resulted. It greatly increased emphasis on a formal program of cost effectiveness to balance personnel and money costs against intelligence products.

A series of meetings was held at CINCPAC's headquarters during November, attended by representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency, CINCPAC and his component command commanders, and selected PACOM intelligence collection units. Matters of interpretation of the new manual and its application within the PACOM were resolved. 2

FOOD FAIR

1. J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
2. J23 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jun and Nov 68.
(TS) In December CINCPAC was still urging the retrofit of the RF-104Gs as the only apparent solution to the need for a reconnaissance capability. He strongly recommended to the JCS that a continuing effort be made to fund the proposed modification. No action on funding or reinstatement of the program had been taken by the end of the year.

Mapping, Charting, and Targeting Conferences

(U) CINCPAC staff members attended various national mapping, charting, and geodesy and target materials conferences in 1968.

(S) One of these was the 1968 Target Intelligence Conference for unified and specified commands convened by the Defense Intelligence Agency at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia from 20 to 25 May 1968. Representatives of the unified and specified commands, the Services, the Joint War Games Agency, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, the National Military Command Center Support Center, the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center, and the Defense Intelligence Agency attended. The purpose of the conference was to review target intelligence problems, policies, and requirements pertinent to the unified and specified commands. The conference agenda contained 43 items, of which 13 were submitted by CINCPAC. Of these 13, 8 were concurred in, 4 were withdrawn (of which 3 were to be items for the Worldwide Electronic Order of Battle Conference), and 1 non-concurred in. The item that was non-concurred in recommended that North Vietnam be

1. ADMINO CINCPAC 141956Z Sep 68.
2. Ibid.
4. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
removed from the Eurasian Target Data Inventory. This recommendation was based on the fact that North Vietnam was also in the Southeast Asia Target Data Inventory, for which different selection criteria were used. Geographic coordinates also differed because different chart series were used to determine locations for the two volumes. CINCSAC and CINGAL non-concurred. Their rationale was that their staffs would be required to rely on the Automated Installation Intelligence File in order to retrieve information that would be withheld due to releasibility problems. CINCPAC planned to resubmit this item at the 1969 Target Intelligence conference as it had the full support of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

(U) Later in the year CINCPAC staff members attended the 1968 Defense Department Geodetic-Cartographic-Target Materials Conference held at Cameron Station, Virginia from 10 to 18 October. Each of the two CINCPAC representatives presented two papers.  

SECTION XVI - COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES

Comptroller Symposium

(U) The first Comptroller Symposium was held at CINCPAC's Camp Smith headquarters on 30 August 1968. Convened by the CINCPAC Comptroller for key comptroller personnel of CINCPAC's component command commanders, the purpose was to acquaint these personnel with methods and procedures used by the various Services in dealing with common problems and shared areas of interest.

(U) The agenda for this first meeting included discussions of program budgets, the new Resources Management System (PRIME 69), balance of payments problems, and civic action within the PACOM.¹

Resources Management System - Project PRIME

(U) A new system for financial management of resources, Project PRIME or the Resources Management System, was implemented on 1 July 1968 as directed by the Secretary of the Navy.² It was a system of expense accounting that focused on the total cost of resources consumed, including military personnel costs.

(U) Operating budgets were issued for Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&M, N) funds administered by CINCPAC. For FY 69 CINCPAC was to receive O&M, N funds under Five Year Defense Programs, as follows: Program II, General Purpose Forces; Program III, Intelligence and Communications; Program IX, Administration and Associated Activities; and Program X, Military Assistance Activities. The Resources Management System for operating costs was designed to provide the manager with a budget that would include all costs, instead of an allotment (or group of allotments) to cover only limited costs.³

(U) Work continued throughout 1968 toward refinement of the new system within PACOM headquarters. CINCPAC staff members visited component headquarters and supporting activities to discuss concepts and

¹ J721 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68; J72 Chronology, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
² SECNAV 7000/021740Z Jul 68.
³ J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
detailed operating procedures and resolve technical aspects of the new system. In a related action, a Budget Working Group consisting of representatives from all staff sections was established to develop and review the operating budget and to provide wider participation in funding decisions.

Reports Control

Camp Smith-CINCPAC Host-Tenant Agreement

(U) In May 1968 representatives of CINCPAC met with representatives of FMFPAC and Camp Smith to review and rewrite the existing host-tenant agreement between CINCPAC and Camp Smith. This review was the result of recommendations in a 16 October 1967 Navy audit, in which the auditors recommended that the agreement be revised to state that recurring cost for jointly used facilities would be funded by the host (Camp Smith) without

1. J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. JCS 9286/061807Z Feb 68.
4. CINCPAC Notice 5213, Hq CINCPAC, 1 Apr 68, Subj: Recurring Controlled Reports Required by CINCPAC.
5. J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months 1 Jan - 30 Apr 68.
reimbursement by the tenant (CINCPAC). Representatives at the May meeting found that single channel funding for recurring costs of jointly used facilities and services at Camp Smith was feasible. Work began to rewrite the agreement along these lines, but it had not been completed by the end of the year. 1

1. J721 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
Public Affairs Activities for Presidential Visits

(U) President Johnson arrived in Honolulu on 15 April 1968 for a visit with military and civilian dignitaries on the war in Vietnam. He arrived at Camp Smith by helicopter on 16 April, where he was met by Admirals Sharp and McCain. That evening he greeted President Park Chung-hee of Korea, who also visited Hawaii for several days. 1

(U) President Johnson returned to Hawaii on 18 July, when he met with President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler. 2

(U) Each of these visits was accompanied by hundreds of newsmen. CINCPAC's staff arranged press facilities for them and accredited them on their arrival.

1. J74 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
2. J74 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
East Asian Journalists Tour

(U) From 3 to 6 March 1968, 19 journalists representing news media of 13 Far East nations were the guests of CINCPAC for a 3-day visit to Hawaii. On 5 March they received the CINCPAC briefing, followed by a question and answer session with ADM Sharp.

(U) On 16 August, 19 journalists representing 14 East Asian and Pacific countries and territories were the guests of CINCPAC at a briefing in the Command Center. ADM McCain responded to questions following the briefing. Local press coverage resulted.

2. J74 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
3. J74 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
Mr. Peter Hayes  
Nautilius Pacific Research  
746 Ensenada Avenue  
Berkeley, CA 94707

Dear Mr. Hayes:

Enclosed is a copy of 1968 CINCPAC Command History. Portions of the history are currently and properly classified in accordance with Title 5, United States Code 552(b)(1) and Executive Order 12958 of October 1995, Sections 1.5(a), (c), (d), and (f) and must be denied. You may appeal this determination per Title 5, United States Code 552(b).

If an appeal is to be made, please appeal after you receive the last history you have requested. Appeal procedures will be included in the letter forwarding the last history.

If you have any questions concerning the administrative processing of your request, you may contact Mr. Jimmy Namocot, FOIA Manager, at (808) 477-0996 or write to HQ USCINCPAC, Box 64028, J0421/FOIA, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii 96861-4028. He is familiar with your request and will be glad to help you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

N. ERICKSON  
Chief, Administrative Support Division  
Joint Secretariat

Encl:

(1) 1968 CINCPAC Command History  
Volumes I, II, III & IV
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
ADMIRAL JOHN S. McCAIN JR.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
FOREWORD

(U) The mission of the Commander in Chief Pacific is to maintain the security of the Pacific Command, defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean, support and advance the national policies and interests of the United States, and discharge U.S. military responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East and Southeast Asia.

(U) Geographically, the Pacific Command is the largest U.S. Unified Command. The area of responsibility of the Commander in Chief spreads over 40 percent of the earth's surface -- 85 million square miles of land and sea stretching from the west coast of the Americas into the Indian Ocean and from the Bering Sea to the South Pole.

(U) To carry out CINCPAC's mission and to counter the Communist threat in the Pacific region, the build-up of U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific Command over the past several years has been dramatic. The total strength, which peaked in 1968, was over a million active military personnel, of whom about one-half served in Vietnam.

(U) The seriousness of the Communist threat is not limited to hostilities in Vietnam. In varying degrees of intensity, it is also posed for no less than ten other countries in the Pacific region. Consequently, should hostilities in Vietnam end, the vital necessity for maintaining a powerful and responsive U.S. military "presence" in the Pacific will remain.

(U) Given the required military "presence", the Pacific Command will be ready as it is today to defend and to advance the national policies and interests of the United States.

JOHN S. MCCAIN, Jr.
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific
PREFACE

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-408-59 of 17 April 1959 require the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS and other agencies of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations and problems faced by CINCPAC and the status of the Pacific Command (PACOM) from the standpoint of its commander. Additionally, the required annual report preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS to the extent that major decisions and directives of the JCS concerning the PACOM may be determined by historians of the JCS without research in the records of the PACOM. This 1968 CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

(U) As in the case of previous historical reports since 1959, this report describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, especially those connected with international crises and those peculiar to a joint command. This history records CINCPAC's command decisions and achievements and omits "detailed" activities of subordinate unified commands or of Allied nations in the PACOM area. Most of the decisions and activities included in this report are related directly with CINCPAC's efforts to preserve the freedom in those areas in the Pacific Command where people still have the right to make a free choice.

(U) To provide continuity, this history is organized in the same manner as previous histories, primarily in line with the objectives of CINCPAC. Chapter I, "The State of Readiness of United States Forces," describes CINCPAC forces and the planning for their employment to carry out United States policies, as well as the multitudinous activities of Headquarters CINCPAC that do not logically fit in the other chapters. Chapter II, "CINCPAC Actions Influencing the State of Readiness of Allied Nations in the PACOM Area," deals with CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program. Chapter III, "CINCPAC Actions Concerning Relationships Between the United States and Other Countries," reports the actions of CINCPAC in his position as United States Military Adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
and with politico-military events pertaining to his command. CINCPAC's mission to counter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia is treated in some detail in Chapter IV, "Actions to Counter Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia."

(U) This year's history is published in four volumes: Volume I - Chapter I; Volume II - Chapters II and III; Volume III - Sections I - V, Chapter IV; and Volume IV - Sections VI - X, Chapter IV. A glossary and an index for the complete history is included in Volume IV only. Pagination is complete within each volume rather than running consecutively throughout the four volumes. As in previous years, the annual histories prepared by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI are included as Annexes A and B, respectively.

(U) The CINCPAC Command Historian, Colonel J. R. Johnson, USA, under the supervision of Colonel A. M. Matthews, USAF, Secretary of the Joint Staff, Headquarters CINCPAC, planned and published the 1968 CINCPAC Command History as required by CINCPAC Staff Instruction 5750.10 of 20 August 1968. COL Johnson personally researched and wrote Chapter IV with exception of Sections V - IX.

(U) Members of the CINCPAC Historical Branch assisted the Command Historian in the preparation of the history. Mr. Truman R. Strobridge, as Senior Historian, researched and wrote Chapters II and III and Sections V and IX of Chapter IV. In addition, he provided technical guidance and shared his professional expertise when and where required throughout the preparation of this history. Mrs. Polly Tallman, Assistant Historian, prepared Chapter I and Sections VI - VIII of Chapter IV.

(U) The manuscript was typed in final format by Mrs. LuElla Saxton, Clerk-Stenographer of CINCPAC Historical Branch and Yeoman First Class Donald J. Cagle, USN. All graphics for this history were prepared under the expert supervision of Master Sergeant John F. Stevenson, USAF, Shop Supervisor, Graphics Section, J0412. Staff Sergeant Leonard L. Powell, USAF, Shop Supervisor, Reproduction Section, J0412, supervised the expeditious printing of the draft manuscript which facilitated staff coordination. Finally, the immeasurable support rendered by the CINCPAC Staff is greatly appreciated.

J. R. JOHNSON
COLONEL USA
CINCPAC Command Historian
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CHAPTER II

CINCPAC ACTIONS INFLUENCING THE STATE OF READINESS
OF ALLIED NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA

The FY 69 Military Assistance Program for the Pacific Command is an integral part of our national effort to meet the world communist challenge. There are three main factors that influence the development of that program:

First, the communist threat.
Second, the military posture of those friendly countries which are assisted by the United States in meeting this threat.

Third, the war in Southeast Asia.

During the past year, there has been no indication that Communist China has deviated from a militant, aggressive policy--a policy dedicated to the elimination of United States' influence in Asia and the extension of Chinese Communist domination.

On China's northern flank, we have an increasingly belligerent communist regime in North Korea. On the southern flank, we have North Vietnam aggressively testing the feasibility of so-called "Wars of National Liberation," a strategy championed by the Communist Chinese. We must meet this challenge successfully to convince the communists of its ultimate futility.

Clearly, the United States cannot and should not attempt to meet and contain these multiple threats solely with its own resources. We can provide the major air and naval forces that comprise an adequate deterrent, but the manpower and resources that our allies can make available are at least equally important. Unfortunately, with the exception of Japan, the
national economies of our Asian Allies severely limit the resources they can devote to the maintenance and modernization of their forces. Their military capabilities depend heavily on United States assistance. For this reason, an adequate Military Assistance Program is a vital element in the defense of United States interests in the Pacific.

Admiral U.S.G. Sharp

Introduction

Throughout calendar year 1968, as in every year since the creation of the unified command, PACOM, the challenges and problems posed by the Military Assistance Program (MAP) consumed an inordinate portion of CINCPAC's thoughts and time, as well as those of his staff and his subordinate commands. This chapter is designed to reflect the more significant and pertinent of CINCPAC's multi-faceted activities in the realm of MAP that occurred during the year. The sole exceptions are those concerned with the MAPs for Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, which are wholly service-funded and which are described in Section IV of Volume II of this annual history. This division of CINCPAC MAP activities into two separate chapters, besides providing continuity with earlier CINCPAC histories, is also logically based in the assigned missions and objectives of CINCPAC.

(U) For a person interested in a brief history of PACOM MAP, as well as the importance of MAP and its objectives to the worldwide interests of the United States, pages 236 through 239 of last year's history will tell the story. One topic that does not appear in this chapter, although similar ones had appeared in previous CINCPAC histories, is "Draft Memorandum for the President of MAP FY 69-73." Previously, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) had forwarded each year to CINCPAC, through the JCS, a draft memorandum of his major conclusions and recommendations for a five year period of MAP, so that CINCPAC could review it and comment upon it. For some unknown reason, SECDEF did not circulate his draft memorandum for the President on MAP FY 69-73 among the CINCs of unified and specified commands as he had done in previous years.

(U) Throughout its birth, evolution, and present-day frame of reference—from the original Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, through the Mutual Security Acts of 1951 and 1954, as amended, to the present

3. FONECON, LCOL Raymond A. Poerschke, USAF, J530, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC History Branch, 11 Jul 68.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended each year since its enactment—one of the major objectives of MAP, as well as other forms of foreign aid, has been to further the overall strategic goals of the United States. That MAP has been an effective instrument of national policy is attested to by the fact that this program and its objectives have been "endorsed and supported for seventeen years by every President, every Secretary of State, every Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and every Congress in four different administrations—regardless of political considerations or changes in other aspects of defense planning and foreign policy."1

As for the charge frequently voiced that military assistance retards the developing nations by diverting their scarce resources to arms, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown recently remarked: "It is significant to note that the five nations receiving the lion's share of U.S. military aid today have achieved, or very nearly so, a self-sustaining economic growth."2 Probably the expressed convictions of Secretary of State Dean Rusk on this subject best sums up its importance. When asked on 2 May 1968 by the House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs—before which, CINCPAC also testifies each year on PACOM MAP—whether or not he was of the opinion that the foreign aid program was providing him with the tools that he thought were essential to the conduct of America's present foreign policy, he replied thusly:

That is true, Mr. Chairman. In a very real sense, that has been true of every President and every Secretary of State since the end of World War II.

It is a most vital instrument in trying to build the kind of world in which, as Dean Acheson once put it, our own institutions of freedom can survive and flourish. 3

(U) Actually, the administration, planning, programming, and financing of military assistance (MA) are extremely complex operations involving the various offices of the Department of State (including the Agency for International Development (AID)) and the Department of Defense (including the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)), as well as the Bureau of the Budget. When dealing with such a program, the segments of which vary from the provision of the most advanced and sophisticated weapons systems to the most elementary equipment, as well as the related training of foreign military personnel, it becomes necessary for many agencies to participate together in an intricate chain of command, all members of which operate under numerous uniform regulations and procedures designed to achieve the maximum utilization of the MA dollar.\(^1\)

(U) In general, MA matters within the Department of Defense (DOD) are handled by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD/ISA), who has the three-fold responsibility of: (1) developing, coordinating, and establishing MAP policies and procedures; (2) directing, administering, and supervising MAP (grant aid); (3) directing, administering, and supervising Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The role of the JCS is to recommend military objectives, force objectives, scale of equipping, and priorities, both on a country and an area basis. As a result, the JCS is in a continuous review of the various MA programs to ensure that they are in consonance with global security plans and that MA resources are being distributed in the most efficient manner for the maximum promoting of U.S. strategic concepts.

---

1. This paragraph and the following ones in this "Introduction" have been derived from information contained in the following: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), Military Assistance Facts March 1968; Harold A. Hovey, United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, hereafter cited as Hovey, USMA; Information and Guidance on Military Assistance, prepared by the Evaluation Division, Directorate of Military Assistance, Deputy Chief of Staff, S&L, Hq USAF, 1965, hereafter cited as Hq USAF, MA Guidance.
(U) As for the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force, they have the responsibility for preparing data necessary for the development of programs and budget estimates, and providing advice and recommendations for changes in MAP programs, in accordance with instructions of ASD/ISA with respect to cost, availability, source of supply, delivery forecasts, and funding requirements. They also procure and deliver to the programmed recipient countries the materiel and services included in approved and funded programs, in accordance with established delivery schedules.

(U) CINCPAC and his unified PACOM provides the necessary intermediate level of policy guidance and review between the Departments of State and Defense and the individual Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) in recipient countries. Accordingly, CINCPAC recommends to SECDEF, whenever appropriate, changes in MAP country guidance, program levels and content, and the time-phasing of materiel deliveries and training programs. In turn, as the JCS issues military guidance, CINCPAC passes on the necessary detailed implementing guidance to the MAAGs for their use in formulating planning and programming recommendations. Since CINCPAC commands and supervises the activities of all MAAGs in PACOM, it is only on technical and administrative matters that the MAAGs may communicate directly with the respective military services.

(U) Based upon CINCPAC's guidance and supplementary instructions, each MAAG, in conjunction with the other members of the Country Team, provides CINCPAC with the country plan and program; also supplied to CINCPAC are the views of the U.S. Ambassador to the particular country, who is Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission and who has authority over the Country Team, one member of which is the Chief of the MAAG in that country. After his staff reviews them, CINCPAC submits the various MA plans and programs recommendations to the next highest level in the chain of command. Thus, it can be seen that the route of MAPs is a two-way one, with policies and guidance flowing downward, while recommendations and comments flow upward to the uppermost level of national policy making.
SECTION I - PLANNING AND FUNDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE

MAP Planning Guidance

(U) As of 1 April 1968, the Office of ASD/ISA (OASD/ISA) had not provided current MAP planning guidance to CINCPAC. "In order to expedite planning, a CINCPAC staff officer obtained on an informal basis, a copy of the DOD draft of the Military Assistance Manual (MAM). Of particular concern to CINCPAC was the proposed MAP guidance for the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China."1

(S) As for Korea, the draft guidance contained the following MAP objective: "To support ROK forces sufficiently strong to resist any aggression by North Korea and, in connection with U.S. forces if necessary, aggression from Communist China as well." This statement contrasted sharply with the previously provided objective: "To support those ROK forces which, together with available U.S. forces, are necessary to defend Korea against assault by North Korea and Communist China."2 CINCPAC pointed out the change in the wording of the guidance to the JCS on 17 April 1968, warning that if this new objective "is to be implemented, a significant change in U.S. policy is indicated and major changes in U.S. and Korean forces would be involved."3 The next day, the JCS replied that the implications of this change "are presently subject of discussions between Joint Staff and OASD/ISA. Current guidance remains in effect until new guidance is promulgated. OASD/ISA advises that New MAM I guidance should be issued in approximately two wks."4

(S) When the official MAM guidance was received at Hq CINCPAC on 17 May 1968, however, it contained the same wording for the Korea MAP objective as the draft.5 Once again, CINCPAC called the JCS's attention to this discrepancy on 24 May 1968. After giving his rationale for his strong objection to the new objective, CINCPAC recommended that the MAM guidance be brought "into consonance with the currently approved

1. J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 170154Z Apr 68.
4. JCS 6888/182231Z Apr 68.
5. J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
contingency plans for the defense of South Korea, and U.S. objectives (JSOP). The JCS replied 5 days later, stating that, because of administrative error, the guidance for Korea in the DOD MAM had been sent, and that a correction was forthcoming from SECDEF. The corrected guidance would state the objective as follows:

...Quote: To maintain ROK forces sufficiently strong to resist, (1) with U.S. air and naval support if necessary, any aggression by North Korea, and (2) in conjunction with U.S. forces as required, aggression from Communist China as well. Unquote.

...it reflects a long term objective and nothing in it is intended to change existing plans for defense of South Korea. In any event it is unlikely that the wording change will result in tangible changes to the FY 70 MAP.

(3) As for China, as CINCPAC noted to the JCS on 19 April 1968, the draft guidance omitted any reference to MAP support for GRC (Government of Republic of China) forces defending the offshore islands, and reduced overall support of GRC ground forces from a previously authorized strength of 328,500 to 291,000. The JCS's response on 13 May indicated that the strength figure of 291,000 had been forwarded in error and that the higher figure would prevail; with respect to the offshore islands, however, the JCS stated that this omission was consistent with JSOP guidance issued on 29 March 1968.

(3) On 23 April 1968, the American Ambassador to Laos, William H. Sullivan, notified CINCPAC of his two objections to the planning guidance for Laos MAP contained in the draft. As a result, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS on 3 May that these minor changes be made. One week later,

1. CINCPAC 241950Z May 68.
2. JCS 1275/292216Z May 68.
3. J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
4. JCS 132190Z May 68.
the JCS told CINCPAC that his recommended changes had been adopted and "incorporated in MAM I update airmailed 9 May."\(^1\)

\(\text{(S)}\) In his Draft Memorandum for the President on MAP for FY 1969-1973, dated 1 February 1968, SECDEF outlined a FY 70 MAP which would require $420 million in New Obligation Authority (NOA). Later in the year, however, subsequent Washington level review of this program by DOD and the Inter-agency Group revised this figure to a NOA request of $375 million. As a result of this reduction, the PACOM MAP for FY 70 was revised on 27 November 1968 as follows:\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Old Guidance</th>
<th>Revised Guidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>160.0</td>
<td>164.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>218.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>214.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(\text{MAP Legislation}\)

\(\text{(S)}\) President Johnson forwarded to Congress a Foreign Assistance authorization request for FY 69 of $2.9 billion, which was "the lowest aid request since the program began in 1948."\(^3\)

1. JCS 8710/101930Z May 68; AMEMBASS Y Vientiane 5983/230630Z Apr 68; CINCPAC 032216Z May 68.
2. SECDEF JCS 6569/272343Z Nov 68; J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
3. J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
Of this amount, $420 million was earmarked for MAP. The prospects of securing Congressional approval of this sum, however, were bleak, since Congressional appropriations to support MAP have been gradually reduced over the years. "In the 21-year history of the program, the annual appropriation has always been less than the Executive Branch request for funds."  

As a result, the FY 69 Foreign Assistance issue ran into difficulties in Congress. "From an all-time high of $7.49 billion in 1951, the 1969 program appropriation reached the lowest figure in history." 2 The Congress passed authorization legislation for a $1.97 billion Foreign Assistance Act, instead of the $2.9 billion requested by the President, but the Congressional appropriations bill cut the amount still further to $1.9 billion. Of this amount, only $375 million was for MAP. 

This reduction occurred despite strenuous protest by certain prominent Americans. The following two examples should amply demonstrate this point. As President Johnson told the members of the combined annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in September 1968, any cut back of assistance to the have-nots of the globe "would be a tragic end to two decades of commitment, of trial and error and, I think, magnificent achievement." 4 Reporters covering this event felt the President's remarks were "indirectly aimed at Congress, which this year is cutting foreign aid funds to the lowest point since World War II." 5 Early the next month, Senator Gale W. McGee from Wyoming inserted into the Congressional Record an article by Professor Montgomery "illustrating how by slashing our foreign aid budget, in an attempt to provide more funds for domestic programs, we are undermining our assistance efforts of the past 20 years and impairing our foreign relations without justification." 6

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.; J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68; SECDEF 2951/141756Z Oct 68.
5. Ibid.
(Q) In time, SECDEF officially notified CINCPAC of the fact that the President had signed the FY 69 MA Authorization Bill on 8 October 1968 and the FY 69 MA Appropriation Bill six days later. The table below shows the amount of funds requested for PACOM MAP countries by the President, the same amounts that had been used as guidelines in the development of the PACOM country plans which had been forwarded to SECDEF in July 1968. The column on the right shows the adjustments that were made necessary by the Congressional appropriations cut.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount Requested</th>
<th>Adjusted Guidelines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of China</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>160.0</td>
<td>139.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Accordingly, because of this overall cut of $19 million, the FY 69 PACOM MAP programs had to be revised and the new data forwarded to SECDEF by 25 November 1968. Unaffected by the new guidelines were the MAPs for Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, for these are wholly service-funded. Also, for the first time since the inception of MAP, the funding provision to finance credit FMS was divorced from the Foreign Assistance Act legislation and legislated separately. The new FMS bill provided appropriations in the amount of $296 million, which was the exact amount sought by the President.

---

1. SECDEF 2951/141756Z Oct 68; SECDEF 4745/020002Z Nov 68.
2. Ibid.; J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
(U) Another new feature of the MAP legislation passed in October of 1968 was the abolition of those provisions of the Conte-Long amendments that dealt with the providing of sophisticated military equipment to underdeveloped countries. Under the original Conte-Long amendments (Public Law 90-248, dated 2 January 1968), the following countries were exempt from this restriction: Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, Republic of China, Philippines, and Korea. The new Foreign Assistance Act, however, applied this restriction to any underdeveloped country. Not only are the aforementioned countries no longer exempt from this restriction, but if a country acquires sophisticated equipment by purchase from a third country, the President is directed to withhold economic assistance equivalent to the amount spent on such equipment from the country. Exceptions to this new law, however, can be made, if the President determined that such acquisition is in the interests of U.S. national security.¹

**FY 70 MAP Deferral Priorities**

(U) On 5 September 1968, SECDEF requested CINCPAC to provide the deferral priorities for the "FY 70 PACOM Country Programs" as soon as possible.² "This was the first time deferral priorities had been required for the budget year;" previously, they had "been required for current year programs only."³ Subsequently, on 18 September 1968, CINCPAC advised SECDEF that the FY 70 MAP deferral priorities had been transmitted the previous day via AUTODIN.⁴

**Military Assistance Disclosure Policy**

(C) On 5 December 1968, SECDEF requested CINCPAC's views on the need for modification of current MA disclosure policy, as well as recommendations for specific changes.⁵ CINCPAC's reply came twelve days later. He recommended that the guidance contained in DOD MAM, Part II, remain substantially the same, but admitted that in "some countries, 

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1. Ibid; FONECON, LCOL William M. Kennedy, USA, J5311, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 28 Feb 69.
2. SECDEF 08760/051426Z Sep 68.
3. J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 181858Z Sep 68.
5. SECDEF 7071/052330Z Dec 68.
**MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM**

**DOLLAR GUIDELINES**

**AS OF 1 JANUARY 1969**

(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>68</th>
<th>69</th>
<th>70</th>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total (Millions)</td>
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<td>371.5</td>
<td>370.6</td>
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1/ Includes $100 million MAP add-on and $32.3 million MASF add-on
2/ Includes CONUS training program for Malaysia ($250,000)
3/ Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)
4/ Vietnam not included; not subject to $ restrictions.

**SOURCE:** PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 148.
in actual practice, the above policies are found to be too restrictive to permit the coordination required in MAP planning. "1 It was his recommendation that SECDEF should designate those dollar ceilings which, as an exception to guidance, could be released at the direction of the U.S. Chief of Diplomatic Mission in-country. If the country desired release of dollar ceilings of the first plan and following year ceilings, then the country should fully justify and request such release from DOD. "The purpose of this recommendation was to provide the country team with a tool which would assist the country in advance planning and budgeting. "2

Recommended Exclusions From FMS

(TS) In October 1966, the JCS conducted a review, which resulted in the conclusion that the development of a listing of individual items to be excluded from eligibility for FMS was impractical because of the extent of such a listing and its continuing fluctuation. At that time, the CINCs of unified commands were neither consulted or requested to participate in the review. "However," as the JCS informed CINCPAC on 23 April 1968, "in view of the expansion of the FMS program to include neutral countries such as Sweden, Finland, and Austria; Congressional interest and restrictions on FMS scope and activities; and increasing demands on the U.S. production Base in support of Vietnam and Korean-related requirements; development of such a listing appears to be both possible and appropriate."3 As a result, CINCPAC was requested to furnish comments and recommendations as to items or conventional munitions that should be excluded from eligibility for FMS. 4

(TS) Three days later, CINCPAC requested CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, CGFMFPAC, COMUSMACV, and COMUSKOREA for their views on this subject. 5 In the end, CINCPAC's reply, which he forwarded to the JCS on 21 May 1968, was based primarily upon the recommended exclusions from FMS submitted by these commanders. 6 At the same time,

1. CINCPAC 170335Z Dec 68.
2. J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
3. JCS 7153/231436Z Apr 68.
4. Ibid; J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
5. CINCPAC 260313Z Apr 68.
6. CINCPAC 212153Z May 68; J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68; CINCUSARPAC 20546/1505422Z May 68; CINCPACFLT 162142Z May 68; CINCPACAF 160013Z May 68; ADMINO FMFPAC 112011Z May 68; COMUSMACV 13623/131130Z May 68; COMUSKOREA 52038/110545Z May 68.
CINCPAC offered his view that the presupposition of a change in the exclusion policy for REDEYE following the cessation of the Vietnam conflict was not appropriate; this topic is treated in greater detail in the following subsection, entitled "Sale of REDEYE." "Since numerous and, in many instances ever-changing, factors involved in each case militate against a guideline approach which can be supported by exclusion lists," CINCPAC also recommended that "each FMS be processed on a case-by-case basis to arrive at an appropriate decision, and that CINCPAC be advised routinely of all proposed FMS in PACOM in order to comment on each case."  

Sale of REDEYE

(TS) By means of a memorandum on 28 March 1968, the JCS recommended to SECDEF that all activities relating to FMS (Foreign Military Sales) of REDEYE to all countries, other than Australia be halted for the duration of the Vietnam conflict, since the U.S. could not afford the risk of having this missile fall into enemy hands. Several months later, on 10 June 1968, the JCS solicited CINCPAC's comments and views on a SECDEF proposal to sell REDEYE missiles to Sweden. The essence of the SECDEF proposal, which included comments on the earlier JCS memorandum, follows:

... substantial technical data have been released to NATO countries, Australia, Sweden, Japan and Switzerland, with the release of production know-how limited to Sweden; that illicit Swedish development and production would be enormously difficult, particularly in large quantities, but that it might be possible for Sweden to develop and produce small quantities in a period of time possibly as short as two years... and that the greatest and most immediate risk seems to lie in possible theft of REDEYE from overseas storage.

... we must minimize the risk of any REDEYE missile finding its way into the hands of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong...

1. CINCPAC 212153Z May 68.
In regard to the sale of REDEYE, however, we must recognize the undesirable political consequences of cancelling the Swedish program and the undesirable political/military consequences of denying REDEYE to our allies after some years of urging them to acquire it on the basis of mutual defense.

It is proposed, therefore, that we proceed with the sales to Sweden and Australia but, with respect to Sweden, with the understanding that we will deliver only the minimum equipment required for training and that we will hold the REDEYE missiles in U.S. protected storage for shipment to Sweden only after our disengagement in Vietnam. In regard to other friendly and allied countries we will suspend all sales promotion and we will review all purchase requests on a case-by-case basis. Such reviews will conclude with a U.S. response no more forthcoming than in the case of Sweden, i.e., possible training but no weapon delivery until after Vietnam.¹

¹(TS) Within five days, "CINCPAC strongly" nonconcurred in this SECDEF proposal, pointing out to the JCS that he could foresee "no basic change in this position even after U.S. involvement in Vietnam is terminated"--a position that CINCPAC had taken earlier on 21 May 1968--and was "not cognizant of the manner in which REDEYE technical data and production know-how were released to Sweden."² Besides recommending that measures "be instituted to assist in avoidance of similar problems arising in the future," CINCPAC offered the following rationale for his strong nonconcurrence, as well as additional recommendations:

The military considerations in this matter should be accorded the highest priority. The consequences of the enemy attaining sufficient REDEYE capabilities could force a complete revision of our concept of tactical mobility in Vietnam or elsewhere and greatly restrict the use of close air support....

1. JCS 2053/101257Z Jun 68.
2. CINCPAC 150035Z Jun 68; J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
There is now the problem of preventing Sweden from producing the REDEYE or a facsimile, and preventing release of the hardware and data from Sweden to unfriendly nations....

Sweden should be advised that the highest priorities of supplying REDEYE must be afforded to the Free World Military Assistance Forces in Vietnam and that the present schedule for delivery to these forces prevent a guarantee of a specific schedule of delivery other than the minimum training equipment. This proposal will allow an appropriate reevaluation of FMS of REDEYE to Sweden when our involvement in Vietnam is terminated. The SECDEF proposal can be used as a fall back position if it appears that there is a serious risk of Sweden initiating production unilaterally. In such a case other delaying tactics in negotiations and delivery seem appropriate....

Sales promotion and data release of REDEYE should be restricted now. The only exception should be to countries which have demonstrated the closest identification with our national interests and proper security safeguards. Australia has proven this close association and reliability.¹

(TS) The JCS, in turn, forwarded additional recommendations on this matter to the SECDEF by means of another memorandum on 27 June 1968. CINCPAC was advised of the SECDEF's decision and new policy on the sale of the REDEYE missile on 24 October 1968:

No deliveries of REDEYE missiles will be made to any country except Australia until after the termination of hostilities in Southeast Asia.

Notification of cancellation of the Swedish order will be deferred until the week prior to the commencement of scheduled deliveries.

¹ CINCPAC 150035Z Jun 68.
Current actions in connection with the Swedish order will continue on a normal basis except that no technical information will be furnished which would further enhance Sweden's capability to produce the REDEYE missile.

Technical briefings for qualified foreign countries concerning REDEYE may be given upon request with the understanding that no deliveries can be made until after the fulfillment of Department of the Army requirements. The latter cannot be forecast at the present time. When a foreign government insists on placing an order, it will contain this stipulation.1

(1S) Since the JCS had directed that these new guidelines "be furnished to MAAG's and Missions which are involved in Foreign Military Sales and which have a need to know," CINCPAC informed CHMAAG Japan, CINCPAC informed CHMAAG Japan, CINCPAC informed CHMAAG Japan, CINCPAC informed CHMAAG Japan, and USAD CO Canberra of the new policy on the sale of REDEYE missiles on 6 November 1968. 2

MAP In-Country Ship Overhaul Funding

(1S) On 2 August 1968, SECDEF approved a CHMAAG China request, concurred in by CINCPAC, to exempt the Chinese Navy LST rehabilitation program "from the automatic dollar-line cut off policy" by granting an extension until 30 June 1969. 3 Again, just five days later, SECDEF approved a CINCPAC request to exempt the Philippine Navy in-country overhaul program from automatic cutoff of prior year dollar-line funds by granting an extension until 31 December 1969. 4

(1S) CINCPAC had to ask for exception in both these instances, because the policy "set forth in the Military Assistance Manual provides for automatic recoupment of prior-year dollar-line funds; i.e., funds for items

1. JCS 4139/2422Z Oct 68.
2. Ibid. J531Z History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68; CINCPAC 0604Z Nov 68.
3. SECDEF 6237/0217Z Aug 68; CINCPAC 24228Z Jul 68.
4. SECDEF 6686/07153Z Aug 68; CINCPAC 212013Z Jul 68.
which are not categorized unit of issue "each." Overhauls performed in-country are "dollar-line" as opposed to overhauls in U.S. repair installations which are "each." In the cases of China and the Philippines, CINCPAC had requested exceptions to this policy, because material requirements, procurement lead-time, and overhaul planning factors were applicable regardless of unit of issue considerations. Another important factor in CINCPAC's actions was that many overhaul commencement dates had been delayed as a result of circumstances beyond the control of either of the two countries.

As the policy worked in calendar year 1968, MAP in-country ship overhauls were subject to automatic recoupment of prior year funds, which necessitated specific requests to and approval by SECDEF (OASD/ISA) for each affected program line. Funds, however, are required throughout the planning and execution phases of overhaul, which must be programmed in advance. "In order to provide for orderly overhaul management and to preclude the necessity for requesting extension of automatic cut-off date," CINCPAC recommended to SECDEF on 7 December 1968 that one of the following procedures be adopted:

1. Change the Military Articles and Service Listing (MASL) data to provide for unit of issue "each" vice "xx", thereby placing in-country ship overhauls in the same category as overhauls in U.S. facilities, i.e., they would not be subject to automatic recoupment.

2. Change the provisions of the Military Assistance Manual (MAM) to exclude in-country ship overhauls from automatic cut-off funds, or to provide for automatic cut-off 30 days after scheduled overhaul completion dates.

Service Funding for PACOM MAP Target Submarines

During Calendar Year 1968, the funding responsibility for providing target submarine services to certain PACOM countries was transferred from MAP to the concerned military service budget. The furnishing of

1. J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
2. CINCPAC 072039Z Dec 68; J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
3. FONECON, LCOL C. R. Casey, USMC, J3A23, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 25 Oct 68.
MAP target submarine services to PACOM countries commenced in FY 63. Originally, eight countries were intended to participate in this program; however, Burma and Cambodia declined the offer before the services actually commenced. Japan discontinued its participation following the termination of MAP Grant Aid, and Vietnam had not been participating because of its commitments to Operation MARKET TIME. At the beginning of 1968, therefore, only China, Korea, Philippines, and Thailand were receiving these services.¹

(5) These services had been allocated to participating countries based upon their ASW (Antisubmarine Warfare) force levels in both ships and aircraft, while annual costs had been apportioned among the participating countries based upon the number of allocated training days. Initially, overhaul costs, as well as operating costs, were funded under MAP, but the high price of these overhauls forced CINCPAC to seek relief from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), who eventually agreed to absorb these expenditures.

(5) Although this responsibility for funding overhaul costs had been assumed by CNO in May 1967, operating costs for the target submarines continued to absorb a significant portion of the MAP training funds of participating countries. As CINCPAC informed the JCS on 16 January 1968:

Costs of the target submarine services in FY 68 are 480,000 dollars. Each country's pro-rata share is as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>235,200</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>81,600</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>43,200</td>
<td>9%</td>
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1. Unless otherwise cited, the information contained in this subsection on PACOM MAP Target Submarines was derived from: Point Paper, J3A231, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Apr 68, Subj: Service Funding for PACOM MAP Target Submarines; J3 Brief No. 65-68, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Mar 68, Subj: Service Funding for PACOM MAP Target Submarines; J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
The costs of the FY 69 target submarine services are estimated to be 769,000 dollars and will increase with each succeeding year. 1

(5) Because of the severe cuts in the FY 68 China MAP, CHMAAG China requested CINCPAC on 4 October 1967 that favorable consideration should be given to the elimination of all costs to China MAP for target submarine services. 2 CINCPAC concurred and dispatched the following to the JCS on 16 January 1968:

... The rising costs of the target submarine services coupled with the anticipated major reductions in the China MAP for FY 69 will place a serious burden on China's capability to fund these services under MAP. China's participation in the target submarine services under current funding arrangements is considered essential since the remaining MAP countries would be unable to absorb China's pro rata share of the MAP costs. It is important that these allied navies continue to develop and maintain an ASW capability to complement that of the U.S. Navy.

Recommend that all operating costs for target submarine services to participating PACOM countries be service funded commencing in FY 69. 3

(5) The JCS generally agreed with these conclusions of CINCPAC and recommended to SECDEF in a memorandum (JCSM 137-68) that service funding of target submarine services begin for China in FY 69 and for Korea and the Philippines in FY 70. No mention was made of Thailand, for its MAP functions had been DOD appropriated since 1 July 1967. 4 On 29 May 1968, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA) had

1. CINCPAC 160302Z Jan 68.
2. Ltr, CHMAAG China to CINCPAC, 4 Oct 67, Subj: MAP ASW Target Submarine Services to GRC, cited in J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
3. CINCPAC 160302Z Jan 68.
approved service funding of the operating costs for the two target submarines incident to providing services for China, Korea, and the Philippines; the commencement date was FY 69 as originally requested by CINCPAC. This decision was passed on to the concerned MAAGs by CINCPAC on 3 June 1968.

(6) Just eight days later, COMUSMACVTHAI recommended to CINCPAC "that all operating costs for target submarine services for Thailand be funded by CNO outside the MASF country ceiling commencing FY69." CINCPAC, in turn, passed this same query on to SECDEF on 21 June 1968. The matter was finally settled six days later, when SECDEF advised that "operating costs for target submarine services to Thailand will be funded under the Navy operation and maintenance appropriation outside Thai MASF country ceiling commencing in FY 69."

Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) Codings

(U) "To insure the most realistic and timely funding of FY 70 MAP requirements IAW country priority needs, and yet be within the CRA monies available to ODMA," COMUSKOREA, on 16 December 1968, "requested a new CRA coding system be devised." CINCPAC answered four days later, stating that, although he appreciated COMUSKOREA's comments, the existing procedures would have to be followed until the DOD MAM could be "formally changed." Subsequently, on 26 December 1968, CINCPAC requested approval by SECDEF of a CINCPAC CRA coding proposal in order to improve CRA management within PACOM.

Strategic Mobility Work Projects for MAP and/or AID Funding

(5) Since the inception of the Strategic Mobility Work Projects, their purpose "has been to support and to improve the mobility posture of the

1. JCS SA/MAA 01246/292046Z May 68, cited in J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
2. CINCPAC 032005Z Jun 68.
3. COMUSMACVTHAI 110330Z Jun 68.
4. CINCPAC 210213Z Jun 68.
5. SECDEF 3545/272012Z Jun 68.
6. COMUSKOREA UK 56445/161011Z Dec 68.
7. CINCPAC 202127Z Dec 68; J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
8. ADMIN CINCPAC 262118Z Dec 68.
U.S. in those areas covered by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, by
the most economical and effective means of funding by either AID or
MAP or a combination of both. Projects selected were those that con-
tributed: (1) expediting deployments specified in contingency plans; (2)
furthering the developments of airfields, ports, roads, and rail lines;
and (3) improving cargo and POL handling facilities for both air and
sealift. 1

(5) As explained in last year's history, the status of the most exped-
ious utilization of Strategic Mobility Work Projects within PACOM was
still undecided. 2 In brief, CINCPAC had been informed on 3 May 1967
that an estimated 285 miles of 70 pound rail and associated fittings were
available in CONUS Special Logistics Action Thailand (SLAT) storage
and that another 85 miles of rail existed in OP Project 38-60 stocks at
Korat, Thailand. CINCPAC, therefore, recommended on 7 August 1967
that these rail stocks be offered to the Royal Thai Government (RTG)
for building the Sattahip-Chachoengsao rail extension and the Bangkok
rail by-pass. DA, however, on 24 November 1967, drew CINCPAC's
attention to the railroad construction program in South Vietnam and
indicated that, if these stocks could be utilized in that country, a signif-
icanet savings would result. Since his review of the inventory lists of
the available stocks led him to believe that sufficient stocks might exist
to satisfy the needs of both COMUSMACTHAI and COMUSMACV, CINCPAC
requested these two commanders on 30 November 1967 to furnish him
with their detailed rail material requirements. 3

(5) On 15 December 1967, COMUSMACV replied, stating that he would
require "approximately 52 miles of railroad spurs at various locations
in RVN during FY 68 and FY 69." 4 "COMUSMACTHAI's reply, however,
was still being co-ordinated with the American Embassy in Bangkok at
the end of the year." 5 When it arrived at Hq CINCPAC on 31 January
1968, COMUSMACTHAI stated that "120 miles of rail with fittings should
be adequate for main line construction and limited siding" of the Sattahip-

2. Ibid., pp. 259-262.
3. CINCPAC 300107Z Nov 67.
4. COMUSMACV 41662/150715Z Dec 67.
Chachoengsao rail line and the Bangkok rail by-pass.\(^1\) Contained in this response was the suggestion of the U.S. Embassy that, because of a new interest shown by RTG in the Sattahip line, the OP Project 38-60 and SLAT rail stocks be held out as an inducement to RTG to raise the priority of this project and to expedite its construction.\(^2\)

\(\text{S}\) On 20 February 1968, CINC PAC received authority from the JCS to offer 120 miles of railroad stocks to RTG, with the remaining material to be made available to COMUSMACV. "Chief, JUSMAGTHAI," read the JCS message, "is authorized to consult with AID Director in-country to encourage the Thai Government to include this project on their Five Year Development Plan and to conduct a feasibility study on this project."\(^3\) As a result, on 7 March 1968, CINC PAC provided COMUSMACTHAI and COMUSMACV with final authority to utilize OP Project 38-60 and SLAT railroad stocks to meet rail requirements in Thailand and South Vietnam within the guidelines of the JCS authorization, which had the concurrence of SECDEF, SESTATE, and the AID Director. At the same time, he requested COMUSMACTHAI to keep him informed on the progress of negotiations with RTG and also requested CINCUSARPAC to arrange for the movement and fiscal management of the railstocks.\(^4\)

\(\text{S}\) In August 1968, CINC PAC was advised by CG USARSUPTHAI, through CINCUSARPAC, that the estimated cost of the rail stocks and fittings for the Sattahip-Chachoengsao railroad, including the transportation of the stocks stored in CONUS, was $4.2 million. Unless the rail stocks could be declared surplus, the American Embassy at Bangkok probably would have little basis for serious negotiations with RTG. By September, COMUSMACTHAI advised all concerned that a more definitive project description was being prepared and, after the necessary coordination with the American Embassy, a formal request would be made for the rail and fittings to be made available to RTG without reimbursement. As owners of the stocks, CINCUSARPAC and DA concurred in declaring the stocks excess to U.S. Army requirements and, furthermore, DA stated that the necessary action would be taken to provide the stocks without reimbursement upon RTG agreement to build the railroad.\(^5\)

\textbf{1.} COMUSMACT/JUSMAGT 3II110Z Jan 68.

\textbf{2.} Ibid.; J4113 History, Hq CINC PAC, for the month of Jan 68.

\textbf{3.} JCS 1611/202348Z Feb 68.

\textbf{4.} CINC PAC 070034Z Mar 68; J4113 History, Hq CINC PAC, for the month of Mar 68.

\textbf{5.} Point Paper, J4113, Hq CINC PAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: Strategic Mobility Work Projects for MAP/AID Funding.
When COMUSMACTHAI's revised project description was received in October 1968, it was discovered that the "total rail requirement exceeds the previous allocation of 120 miles by 28,325 miles." Consequently, CINCPAC queried COMUSMACV to learn of any possible impact on South Vietnam spur construction would result if, to meet the increased COMUSMACTHAI requirement, a reduction was made in COMUSMACV's previous allocation of SLAT stocks, that had not yet been called forward. On 28 December 1968, COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that a bill of material (BOM) was still being developed for the railroad spurs in the RVN spur development program. Until these BOMs have been developed, it was impossible to furnish CINCPAC with a definitive statement of requirements. Therefore, he recommended "against reducing COMUSMACV allocation of SLAT rail stock until BOM" has been completed and the availability of rail and components, either 70 pound or 30 kilogram, has been determined.

1. Ibid.
2. COMUSMACV 44857/2807554 Dec 68; J4112 history, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Dec 68.
SECTION II - AREA-WIDE ACTIVITIES

PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference

(U) For the first time since 1960, a PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference was held at Camp H. M. Smith on 24 and 25 October 1968. Lot Gen C. E. Hutchin, Jr., USA, Chief of Staff (JO1), Headquarters CINCPAC, initiated action on this unusual event on 3 September 1968, when he advised RADM J. N. Shaffer, USN (JO3), and RADM W. L. Curtis, USN, (JO3), that CINCPAC was interested in having a MAAG Chiefs' Conference and requested recommendations as to conference dates, agenda, and attendees. Two days later, Chief of Military Assistance Plans Branch (J53), recommended that the initial conference be held at Camp H. M. Smith on 24-25 October and provided potential agenda items. The Chief of Staff approved the recommended dates and agenda the following day and requested that a message be prepared for dispatch to the PACOM MAAGs, military groups, and component commands advising them of the impending conference.

On 14 September, CINCPAC sent this message, which read in part:

The policies and procedures governing the Military Assistance Programs and the MAAG activities in PACOM countries are of continuing importance to the overall CINCPAC mission....

2. JO1/Memo/0200-68 of 3 Sep 68, cited in J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Sep 68.
4. JO1/Memo/0205-68 of 6 Sep 68, cited in ibid.
...To assist in planning, Chiefs of MAAGs and MilGrps are requested to submit subjects which they desire to present, approximate length of time for presentation, and any subjects which they desire be presented by either the CINCPAC Staff or Service component commands. Subjects are requested by 1 October. 1

Thirteen days later, CINCPAC forwarded the following additional instructions to all concerned:

Opening remarks by Chiefs of MAAGs and MilGrps are desired. Presentations should include, but not limited to, status of country progress, problem areas and recommendations. Initial remarks should not exceed 15-20 minutes. 2

(U) By 1 October, all addresses had responded, except CHDLG Indonesia, whose reply arrived seven days later. A final agenda was provided to CINCPAC for approval on 5 October 1968. 3

1. CINCPAC 140129Z Sep 68.
2. CINCPAC 270346Z Sep 68.
(U) Because of the uniqueness of this conference, being the first one of its kind in eight years and covering the entire scope of both current and projected PACOM MAP activities, the following summation of the substance, as well as the highlights, of the meeting has been quoted verbatim from the final report. 1

(U) "At 0845 on 24 October 1968, Admiral McCain convened the conference. He welcomed the Chiefs, stressed the importance of personal exchanges of ideas, and outlined methods for better communication between CINCPAC and the MAAG Chiefs. He advised that the staff would prepare a NEWSLETTER to include current items of interest and new developments. He stressed the importance of the Chiefs keeping him informed on all matters, with particular emphasis on items which he should know about prior to his appearance before Congress in April. The Admiral concluded his opening remarks by advising that he would call another conference before his Congressional appearance, and desired the Chiefs to be prepared to advise him at that time on specifics of the country programs which he might be questioned on and required to defend.

"PRESENTATIONS"

"1. (U) After Admiral McCain's remarks, MAJ GEN Taylor, CHPROVMAAG-K, gave the initial presentation. . . . His presentation was oriented toward the threat from the north, recent defensive actions by U.S. and ROK forces, the Korean Military Assistance Program, and the MAP transfer program. MAJ GEN Taylor concluded by making three recommendations. First, that continuing emphasis be placed by command and supply echelons at all levels on reducing lead times for delivery of MAP materiel. Second, that every opportunity be made to have the MAP transfer program suspension lifted by means of renegotiation of the agreement through political rather than military channels. And, third, that material and equipment excesses in Vietnam be redistributed now or as they become available.

1. This summary report of the PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference was prepared by LCOL Gerald S. Brown, USAF, J5313, Hq CINCPAC, and served as the beginning of the Final Report of PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference - October 1968. This document, with its 16 enclosures, contains the actual texts of the various presentations.
"2. (U) Following MAJ GEN Taylor, BGEN Daughtrey made a report... on MAAG Japan, its history, budget, Government of Japan defense budget, military posture, programs, and the MAAG Japan phaseout. BGEN Daughtrey concluded his presentation by cautioning everyone to learn from the phaseout of MAAG Japan and:

"a. Not terminate grant aid abruptly.

"b. Utilize grant aid for cost-sharing programs to the maximum extent.

"c. Hold on to grant aid training funds as long as possible.

"d. Before grant aid is terminated, encourage:

"(1) Licensed production.

"(2) U.S. industry arrangements with local industry.

"(3) Co-production.

"(4) Foreign Military Sales.

"(5) Foreign industry visits to U.S. military and commercial activities.

"3. (U) MAJ GEN Ciccolella made the next presentation... He discussed the present status of the China MAP including foreign military sales, what the MAAG is doing in China to establish self-sufficiency in that country, and the actions and programs developed by the MAAG to offset the MAP reductions in China.

"4. (U) Progress of the Philippine Army, Navy and Air Force was described by MAJ GEN Gomes... His presentation included delivery and installation of equipment, engineer construction progress, maintenance and operation of F-5 aircraft, aircraft engine rebuild, and ship overhauls. MAJ GEN Gomes' recommendations for Philippines MAP were: (1) To change the requirement for Program Evaluation team visits from one year to either 18 months or two years. (2) To initiate stockage of non-standard parts for support of commercial type engine items used in the Engineer Construction Battalion. (3) To revise cut-off procedures for ship overhaul.
5. (U) BGEN Bolton described...the evolution from a MAAG organization in Vietnam to a combat organization, and the planning and organizational development of the office of ACS for Military Assistance, which can be the nucleus for the organization in Vietnam post T-day.

6. (U) CAPT Klein of the CINCPAC staff then gave a report...on what transpired at the Washington review of the FY 70 Military Assistance Plans for each PACOM country. In addition, he reported on issue papers which were tabled by both CINCPAC and Washington agencies and, finally, he reported on the Draft Memorandum to the President and its implications for the Unified Commands.

7. (U) After a working luncheon hosted by RADM Shaffer, MAJ GEN McCown briefed...the conferees on developments in Thailand. He described the insurgency in Thailand and the JUSMAG efforts to improve the Thais' capability to counter the insurgency. He explained the program to improve the Thai force planning and development, and the bilateral review of the FY 69 MASF program. MAJ GEN McCown concluded by discussing personnel and logistics problems, base defense problems, and the increasing number of VIP visitors which requires time and support.

8. (S) COL Russell then described...the organization arrangements of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI and the problems associated with these arrangements. He discussed conditions in Laos and the various organizations in Thailand which support Laos. COL Russell concluded his remarks by recommending an amendment to the Terms of Reference for DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI as follows: 'To advise and assist Laotian military forces through authorized channels.

9. (U) Next to address the conferees was COL Roye who described...the geography of Indonesia, the various groups and cultures, the political and economic situation, and the military assistance plans and programs for that country. COL Roye concluded by mentioning several items, considered necessary for the Indonesia program, which have been deleted in the past because of a lack of understanding as to their relation with civic action.

10. (S) COL Hamblin ended the Chiefs' presentations by discussing...the conditions in Burma, the attitude of the Burmese toward Americans, the MAP, and the functions of the MEDT. COL Hamblin closed his
presentation by giving the country team recommendations for continuation of military assistance to Burma.

"(U) The conference was continued with presentations by the CINCPAC staff.

"11. (U) COL Gardiner of the J4 staff presented...the problems of rising operating costs and decreasing investment program under declining MAP appropriations, steps being taken to expedite MAP deliveries, the F-5 program in PACOM, and possible follow-on MAP aircraft.

"12. (U) COL Morrison of the J3 staff then gave a report and comments on the OASD/ISA views concerning MAP training and problems related thereto. Specific training areas discussed were: Observer operations, orientation tours, English language training, payment of transportation and per diem charges, college training at civilian institutions, the informational program, and gold flow as related to foreign student training.

"13. (U) Following COL Morrison, LCOL Wilson of the J2 staff gave the intelligence assessment of the PACOM area...His presentation was in two parts. First, the internal threat to friendly countries, with an overview of their military capabilities and contributions to PACOM security. Second, the external threat from North Korea, Communist China, the Soviet Union, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. Following the assessment, Mr. O'Donnell, also of the J2 staff, discussed the Joint Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program (JFIAP)....

"14. (U) The concluding CINCPAC staff report...was provided by CDR Kirch of the J72 staff. The presentation related to the FY 69 budget requirements and the FY 70 estimated requirements by functional category for MAAG support funding.

"CONCLUSION

"1. (U) On Friday, 25 October, the conference reconvened at 0815, and the Chiefs of MAAG's and MilGrp's received the PACOM briefing, followed by the Command briefing. At 1030 there were group discussions and presentations as follows:
"a. Frequency of Program Evaluation Group visits to PACOM MAAG's: It was the consensus of the Chiefs that the current policy of one visit per year should remain in effect. It was concluded that visit schedule and team composition would be examined on a case-by-case basis.

"b. Utilization of excess materiel for MAP grant aid requirements: Presentation by J4.

c. Disposition of DOD long supply items: An ISA/ODMA proposal pertaining to utilization by MAP at no cost of those DOD assets which are in long supply or excess to Service requirements was described to the MAAG Chiefs. All authorized MAP requirements would be screened against these DOD transferrable assets. For dollar line type items, DLSC would do the screening, determine where a match exists, and initiate supply action. Once this procedure is put into operation, there is no way for CINCPAC or ODMA to exercise control. For major items, the procedure would be somewhat different. A method of specific review and approval of program content would be incorporated into the procedure prior to initiation of supply action. After approval, country requirements matched against transferrable assets would be filled, based on a priority system yet to be established. Representatives of unified commands, Services and ODMA are scheduled in early November to meet in Washington to discuss proposal and develop specific implementing procedures. MAAG Chiefs were advised that they will be informed of the implementing procedures when established.

"2. (U) At 1130 on 25 October, LT GEN Hutchin made the closing remarks. He expressed thanks on behalf of CINCPAC for the informative presentations and discussions. He stressed the importance of personal contacts and of keeping ADM McCain informed. He advised that the 'Newsletter' mentioned by ADM McCain in his opening remarks would be forthcoming. The conference was closed at 1150 on 25 October.

"3. (U) The afternoon of 25 October was used by the Chiefs to continue discussions with the CINCPAC staff and Component Command representatives on problems relating to individual countries. Problems and discussions covered the following:

"a. A meeting was held in the J4 LRC to discuss the procedures in developing and submitting Formats E as justification back-up
for the Military Assistance Program. The following personnel attended:

CAPT Paul Boland, USN, MACTHAI
CAPT Terrell F. Becker, USN, J432
COL Richard H. Schuler, USA, J434
LCOL Bob E. Alexander, USAF, J4334

"(1) CAPT Boland had two basic questions. The first had to do with whether or not the Format E should reflect the total requirement or the programmed quantity. The question developed due to the wording of paragraph 1b of ADMIN CINCPAC 060014Z Aug 68. The understanding at the time the message was released was that programmed value must be reflected and justified and that, if the total requirement was greater, shortfall could also be reflected. This was later clarified in ADMIN CINCPAC 282028Z Aug 68. COL Schuler agreed to take action to clarify these instructions in the CSMAM.

"(2) CAPT Boland's second question concerned the requirement to submit new Formats E when program changes are made. It was explained to him that the requirement for new Formats E was when program changes are substantive. This is explained in paragraph 2a(2)(b), Chapter M, CSMAM.

"b. A meeting was held in J4 LRC between LCOL Miller, USMC FMFPAC and CAPT Boland, USN, for JUSMAGTHAI, concerning the requirement for a dollar line requisitioning/receipt report required by FMFPAC. CAPT Boland stated the report placed a heavy workload on the understaffed MarCorps Advisory detachment. COL Miller advised that all he desired was a copy of the requisitions and a listing of receipts by requisition number, which merely required that a basic order/receipt log be maintained. He further stated that an FMFPAC representative had recently visited the MarCorps Advisor to discuss the required report and requested that CAPT Boland, on his return to Thailand, check to see if the problem was now simplified or resolved.

"c. A meeting was held in the Visiting Flag Office to discuss Service funding of the joint U.S./ROK use facilities. Personnel attending were:
MAJ GEN L. N. Taylor, Jr., CHPROVMAAG-K
LCOL W. Kennedy, CINCPAC Staff
LCOL M. Riepma, CINCPAC Staff
LCOL W. Warren, CINCPAC Staff
LCOL D. Martz, CINCPAC Staff

"(1) MAJ GEN Taylor explained that there were several
facilities in Korea, operation of which is MAP-funded. These facilities
are currently being used by U.S. as well as Korean forces and, therefore,
should possibly be funded by both the Service and MAP.

"(2) BGEN Moench inquired whether the cost of operating
the facilities had increased as a result of U.S. Services' use; if not, he
suggested, MAP funding should be continued. It was determined that
there was no increased cost and that the current funding procedures are
appropriate.

"POST-CONFERENCE ACTIONS

"1. (U) As a result of the conference and discussions with the staff,
the following actions are required:

"a. Prepare a CINCPAC NEWSLETTER. Action on first letter
   - J53. Target date - 1 Dec 68.

"b. Clarify instructions in the CSMAM pertaining to Formats
   E. Action - J43. Target date - 1 Jan 69."1

CINCPAC Newsletter to Chiefs of MAAGs and MilGrps

(U) At the PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference in October 1968, CINCPAC
stated that he would require his staff to develop a "Newsletter"
containing information pertinent to the operations of MAAGs and MilGrps.
The Military Assistance Plans and Programs Branch (J53), Hq CINCPAC,
prepared the first "Newsletter," which was approved by CINCPAC on
9 December 1968 and dispatched the next day. "It is planned," said

1. Ibid.
CINCPAC in the introduction, "that future letters will include both general and technical information pertinent to MAP. In this regard, if there are any items which you desire to submit that may be of interest to all MAAG’s, or items which you would like presented by my staff, please send them in." 1

Reports Prepared by MAAGs and Missions

(U) By means of a message on 30 October 1968, SECDEF commented to CINCPAC as follows:

Step 4 of BALPA directs the reduction of "activities which unnecessarily create the need for increasing overseas staffs, e.g., reporting requirements..." In this connection, it has been reported that MAAGs spend a disproportionate amount of their time purely in preparation of reports to various higher headquarters -- Component Commands, Unified Commands, Military Departments, Joint Staff, OSD, and others. 2

(U) At the same time, CINCPAC was requested to submit a consolidated listing of all reports required of MAAGs and Missions within PACOM to OSD by 1 December 1968. The purpose of this one-time report was to enable CINCPAC and OSD to evaluate the reporting requirements of the MAAGs with the objective of reducing the reporting workload wherever possible. CINCPAC, therefore, sent a message on 2 November to all MAAGs in PACOM requesting a listing of reports submitted. Meanwhile, the Comptroller Office of Hq CINCPAC began surveying the CINCPAC staff reporting requirements that were laid on the MAAGs to determine the total reporting requirements. 3

1. Ltr, CINCPAC to Chiefs of MAAGs and MilGrps, 10 Dec 68, Subj: Newsletter # 1, hereafter cited as CINCPAC Newsletter #1; J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
2. SECDEF 4505/302041Z Oct 68.
3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 022350Z Nov 68; J721 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
(U) By letter on 30 November, CINCPAC forwarded the desired listing of reports to SECDEF (OASD/ISA). A review of the MAAG/Mission reporting requirements indicated that CINCPAC and higher authorities required a total of 44 reports from PACOM MAAGs and Missions. "Of the total, four reports were identified for elimination during the CINCPAC review."¹

(U) In addition to the reporting requirements of CINCPAC and higher authorities, MAAGs and Missions submit various reports to other commands and headquarters. Accordingly, CINCPAC "requested that a listing of these reports be submitted, with recommendations for consolidation or elimination by the requiring agency, in order that CINCPAC and SECDEF may evaluate the total reporting requirements of PACOM MAAGs and Missions."² The target date for the completion of this phase of the review was 20 December 1968.

(U) On 26 December 1968, CINCPAC forwarded to SECDEF (OASD/ISA) a listing of all the reporting requirements levied on PACOM MAAGs and Missions by commands other than CINCPAC. It identified 88 reports that had to be prepared on a recurring basis. "This total, when added to the 58 reports required by CINCPAC... combine to make a grand total of 146 recurring reports prepared by PACOM MAAG's and Missions."³ As the calendar year ended, "as a result of this review, 12 reports have been either cancelled or are under consideration for cancellation by the requiring command."⁴

Structure and Service Affiliation of Key MAAG, MAP Mission, and MilGrp Positions

(U) On 1 October 1968, the JCS requested CINCPAC to evaluate the "existing procedures for determining Service affiliation of the various MAAG, MAP Mission and MilGrp positions in consonance with changes that had taken place in the funding levels, personnel strengths and strategic priorities," as well as to give his "views on the possibility of modification to the present selection criteria, whereby scheduled key rotations of each unified command could be addressed in an annual

1. J721 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
2. Ibid.
3. J721 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
4. Ibid.
package in an attempt to eliminate the undesirable amount of time consumed by the present procedure. 1

After making the requested review, CINCPAC replied on 10 November 1968:

Recent adjustments of funding levels and personnel strengths in the existing PACOM MAAGs, MAP Missions and MilGrps do not require changes in the present grade structure of PACOM key positions. Strategic priorities for PACOM countries in JSOP 71-78 are unchanged from those reflected in JSOP 70-77. In the event changes occur in strength, funding levels, or strategic priorities, the determination of grade structure will require re-evaluation on an individual country basis in keeping with U.S. military/political interests and objectives.

Present selection criteria... utilized in determining Service affiliation are considered as the optimum required to arrive at sound conclusions...

Scheduled key rotations, if addressed annually as an entire package, would result in some manhours saved but would not have appreciable effect at CINCPAC headquarters. In the event annual "package" consideration is adopted by the JCS, CINCPAC envisions no problem in compliance. 2

In-Country Military Representation and Organization Required For Conduct of International Logistic Matters

(3) "International Logistics, as defined by DOD Directive 5100.27, includes all logistic functions of the MAAGs." On 19 January 1968, the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments and recommendations on an OASD/ISA proposal to place responsibility for International Logistic

2. CINCPAC 100012Z Nov 68.
3. J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
Matters in the Office of the Counsellor for Politico-Military Affairs in the American Embassies. CINCPAC, in turn, on 24 January, requested "comments and recommendations" from the MAAGs and USDAOs within PACOM in order to have "information on which to base a reply" to the JCS message.

By 2 February 1968, responses had been received from all the addressees. Based upon this information furnished, CINCPAC was able to provide detailed comments and recommendations to the JCS on each allied country within PACOM. "In summation," as CINCPAC wired the JCS on 6 February, he considered the "existing military arrangements for International Logistics Matters in PACOM to be in the best interest of the USG."4

Discontinuation of Military Assistance Institute (MAI)

Early in April 1968, SECDEF decided to "terminate, effective 30 June 1968, contract with American Institute for Research (Air) for operation of the Military Assistance Institute."5 This facility had been providing a four-week course of instruction for officers being assigned to MAP positions. This conclusion to end MAI, following an extensive review and analysis of the training institution, was primarily an economy move, resulting from the declining appropriations for MAP administrative funds and the continuing pressure from Congress to further reduce such expenses.6 While recognizing the valuable service MAI had provided in

1. JCS 7728/192227Z Jan 68, cited in ibid.
2. CINCPAC 242052Z Jan 68.
3. USDAO Singapore 0104/020731Z Feb 68; CHJUSMAGPHIL 300800Z Jan 68; DEPCHJUSMAGT 8043/270315Z Jan 68; USDAO Wellington NZ 0052/270314Z Jan 68; COMUSUK UK 50328/280400Z Jan 68; CHMEDT AMEMBASSY Rangoon MCX-017/290800Z Jan 68; USDAO Canberra 0062/260425Z Jan 68; CHMAAG Japan 5020/290724Z Jan 68; USDAO AMEMBASSY Kuala Lumpur 0070/300615Z Jan 68; COMUSMCT JUSMAGT MACTJ3/300430Z Jan 68; CHDLG Djakarta 270637Z Jan 68; CHMAAG Taiwan 1312/300301Z Jan 68.
4. CINCPAC 060320Z Feb 68.
5. SECDEF 6028/102040Z Apr 68.
6. Ibid.; J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68; J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
past "in providing hard core of military personnel now trained and experienced in all aspects of grant military assistance," and being "fully aware that there is still need for some specialized training and orientation for key personnel being assigned to MAAGs," SECDEF believed "that there is an alternative of a less formal and extensive method of providing such training at minimum cost to U.S. Government." 1 CINCPAC, like other CINCs of unified commands, was asked his views on this subject on 10 April 1968.

(U) After querying his subordinate commanders of MAAGs for their opinions—who were generally in favor of discontinuing MAI but indicated that some type of training, particularly for planners and programmers, was still needed—CINCPAC concurred in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) proposal on 18 April 1968. 2 OSD announced its decision to discontinue MAI on 24 April 1968. 3 On 17 May, a conference was called for later in the month to discuss proposals for alternative training means to be attended by representatives of the Joint Staff, Military Departments, and Unified Commands. 4

(U) At this meeting on 28 and 29 May, a conclusion—with the U.S. Navy non-concurring—was reached that a substitute type of formal MA training was required, which should be provided by CONUS agencies. In addition, DA proposed the establishment of a joint Service course of instruction of about two weeks duration to be conducted at Fort Bragg, with the Air Force requesting more time to study the Army proposal and perhaps present a counter-proposal. Accordingly, a "final decision on providing alternative instruction was held in abeyance until the Military Departments could study the matter further." 5

Training of U.S. Personnel for MAP Duties

(U) Upon the discontinuance of the Military Assistance Institute (MAI) on 30 June 1968, SECDEF conducted a study to determine the training

1. SECDEF 6028/102040Z Apr 68.
2. CINCPAC 182237Z Apr 68; J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
3. SECDEF 7314/242108Z Apr 68.
4. SECDEF 9265/171544Z May 68.
5. J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
requirements for U.S. personnel to be assigned to MAP duties. He announced the results of this study on 19 December 1968. It was concluded that future training for MAP duties would be provided in the following three phases, with CINCPAC being requested to provide plans for implementation and timing of the new program along with estimates of personnel and funding requirements:

Phase I - Washington orientation, presented by State, AID, DIA, SAMAA, OSD, and the Military Departments, for key MAAG and Defense Attache personnel. This orientation of 3-10 days duration would be limited to MAAG Chiefs, their deputies, and the MAAG Service Section Chiefs, key unified command personnel, and the Defense Attaches.

Phase II - Training of planner/programmer personnel would be a responsibility of the unified commands and provided in such manner as determined necessary by the Unified Commander.

Phase III - Adviser training will be the responsibility of the MAAG's and will be accomplished in-country and tailored to the individual country needs. If necessary, some assignment overlap of personnel is authorized in conjunction with this training.

Civilian University Training of Foreign Nationals

On 1 November 1968, SECDEF directed a change in the previous policy that governed the use of MAP-funded grant aid training of foreign nationals at civilian educational institutions. After pointing out "the high dollar cost in relation to number of trainees," SECDEF set forth the following restrictions and guidelines: (1) "the training must be required in direct connection with a military duty and that the training cannot be obtained by other means;" (2) "the duration of subject training will not exceed one year;" (3) reviews will be made of all FY 69...

1. J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68; SECDEF 7997/191830Z Dec 68.
2. J3A2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
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* Estimated costs for entire FY  ** Includes MAAG Training Support for all services  *** Service Funded  **** Includes MASF Supplement for Korea

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 147.
and FY 70 training programs and, "if training has not already begun, or
if no commitments have been made to recipient countries, training which
does not comply with the foregoing guidance should be deleted from the
country program;" (4) exceptions "to the policy above will be referred
to ODMA for approval prior to programming or any commitment to
country concerned."1

(5) CINCPAC submitted a rejoinder to SECDEF on 21 December 1968,
stressing the deteriorative effects this new policy would have upon
countries within his command and recommended a change in the guide-
lines:

... Restriction of subject training duration
to one year will practically preclude future post-
graduate work by MAP students from PACOM
countries.... Many MAP students could not com-
plete requirements for an advanced degree in
these technical curricula in one year.

.................................

... In the majority of PACOM countries an
officer who returns from college or university
abroad without a degree is deemed to have failed
and, under current traditional and historical back-
ground, could rarely accede to position of respons-
ability in military or government.

Establishing 18 months as maximum duration
for subject training would allow the student three
full semesters and one summer session in which to
complete the requirements. This would reduce signifi-
antly the probability of either requesting additional
training or returning the student without the advanced
degree.

Although initial cost of subject training may
be high in relation to other types of training, its long

1. SECDEF 4716/012200Z Nov 68.
range impact in terms of U.S. objectives is far greater. Only outstanding officers with high growth potential in military and government are chosen. In addition IBOP is not involved in this type of training.

Recommend change in policy to reflect maximum duration of 18 months vice one year for PACOM countries. ¹

Utilization of Excess Materiel for MAP Grant Aid Requirements

(C) On 13 February 1968, SECDEF "encouraged utilization of excess materiel for MAP Grant Aid requirements particularly materiel which could be accepted by a country on a self-help as-is/where-is basis without cost to MAP." ² In an effort to utilize to the fullest this new guidance (referred to as "ref A" in his message), CINCPAC gave the following rationale and recommendation to SECDEF on 24 October 1968:

2. While PACOM MAAG's have made significant progress under the impetus of ref A, valid reasons exist which suggest that further changes are in order now to enable fuller utilization of excess material for MAP grant aid requirements.

   a. First area concerns the fleeting availability to MAP of excess items, particularly in Vietnam. Quantities of uneconomically repairable items (by U.S. standards) are being declared excess by the 1st Log Command, RVN. Many of these items, if obtained at no cost to MAP, could be rehabilitated by the recipient country to satisfy MAP shortfall requirements. Alternatively, many of these items could be cannibalized to obtain spare parts needed to meet critical operations and maintenance shortfall requirements. PACOM MAAG's continuously screen Vietnam excesses and initiate programming actions when

¹ CINCPAC 210409Z Dec 68.
² SECDEF 9975/122043Z Feb 68, cited in CINCPAC 272357Z Nov 68.
required items are located. After locating an excess item(s), the time delay in submitting programming data, obtaining approval and the issuance of MAP orders under current procedures is such that in many cases the material is no longer available by the time release authority is received in RVN. Two possible solutions to this problem are presented:

1. Authorize CINCPAC to issue release orders to PDO's *Property Disposal Officers* providing for shipment of MAP required excesses for the holding area to the recipient country. This authorization would be limited to processing requests for defined, unfunded valid MAP requirements under the terms and conditions specified in ref A. Upon receipt of the excess in country, the MAAG would submit appropriate programming data and adjust the shortfall accordingly.¹

(U) "You are authorized to implement immediately the procedure outlined and recommended in Para, 2A (1)' of your message, SECDEF replied to CINCPAC on 12 November 1968.² At the same time, SECDEF approved CINCPAC's request to obtain from supply holding activities in the PACOM area and to utilize in MAP Grant Aid programs the non-reportable excess categories of materiel which had been reported to PDOs for disposal. "This authorization applies to those items having an extended line item value of $25.00 or less and to line items of higher dollar value for which no U.S. Force redistribution requirement is generated through PURA screening."³ As a result, pending publication of specific guidelines, CINCPAC furnished his MAAGs with the procedures by which they would coordinate the acquisition of excess materiel from PDOs and supply holding activities on 27 November 1968.⁴

1. CINCPAC 240216Z Oct 68.
2. SECDEF JCS5362/121704Z Nov 68.
3. J4341 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
4. CINCPAC 272348Z Nov 68.
Standardization of PACOM Wheeled Vehicles Fleet

(C) Nothing of significance occurred on the issue of standardization of PACOM Wheeled Vehicles Fleet during calendar year 1968. As reported in detail in last year's history, CINCPAC first proposed the M-standard vehicles for all PACOM MAP countries to the JCS on 29 July 1966 and planned to readdress this issue to SECDEF in the early part of 1967, but "the overriding importance of the Vietnam crisis kept pushing this issue into the background. Moreover, the possibility of an adverse decision was high. Accordingly, no action was taken by CINCPAC logistics planners on this matter prior to the end of 1967."1

(C) Only one significant message of real import was forwarded by CINCPAC to the JCS on this subject during the year. On 19 March 1968, CINCPAC sent the following, which in effect postponed the issue for another year:

Due to high priority of RVNAF/FWMAF requirements for M-Series vehicles against limited availability, and the current priority requirements for vehicles in other PACOM MAP/MA SF countries, it is considered impractical at this time to proceed with further actions leading to a decision on standardizing M-Series vehicles for other PACOM countries.

A review of the vehicle situation in each PACOM country will be made in the first quarter, FY 70 in light of production level/supply status of U.S. Army M-Series vehicles at that time. 2

(C) Another factor that CINCPAC weighed before dispatching this message to the JCS was the "austere MAP dollar levels which favor continuation (for the present) of the cheaper M600 series vehicles for all MAP

2. CINCPAC 190423Z Mar 68; J4342 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
countries except GRC. 1 Commencing in the summer of 1968, 18,352 U.S. Army M-Series "general purpose" vehicles were scheduled to be co-produced in the Republic of China under a FMS agreement to replace a like quantity of WWII vehicles. Any "special purpose" vehicles, such as fire, fuel, and water trucks, which the Chinese needed, would continue to be MAP furnished. All MAP-furnished vehicles to China would be the M-Series type in lieu of the current MAP standard M600 series.

(S) Meanwhile, CINCPAC had proposed a vehicular modernization program similar to the one negotiated with GRC for Korea. 2 On 28 June 1968, CINCPAC advised COMUSKOREA that, within "the context of MAP, modernization of the ROK wheeled vehicle fleet is considered one of the more serious support problems facing U.S. and ROKG" and requested "country team comments and recommendations on the feasibility of initiating a vehicle assembly/co-production program and any other self-help proposals which should be presented to ROKG" to enable a larger proportion of available MAP dollars to be applied to investment cost items. 3

(S) On 3 August 1968, COMUSKOREA provided the requested Country Team comments on the vehicle co-production proposal and recommended that a team of experts, as in the GRC co-production agreement, conduct a complete study before a concrete proposal was formulated. 4

(S) On 17 August 1968, CINCPAC indicated to the JCS the merit of a vehicle co-production program for Korea in view of the "serious problem facing ROKG in bringing its forces up to strength in vehicles and in replacing worn out vehicles," as well as the benefits to the Korean economy of such a program. 5 He also concurred in the Korean Country

1. Point Paper, J4342, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Jul 68, Subj: Standardization of Wheeled Vehicles in PACOM MAP Countries.
3. CINCPAC 282328Z Jun 68.
Team's recommendation that a team of experts go to Korea to study the feasibility/desirability of such a program. At the close of 1968, the CINCPAC and COMUSKOREA proposals for a feasibility study of a vehicle co-production program in Korea were in the staffing process at the JCS.

(G) As an interim measure, Korea "is rebuilding 1/4 ton OSP-J vehicles from RVN which become available as attrition when replaced by U.S. Army standard M-series vehicles. Korea has agreed to rebuild 1500 1/4 ton OSP-J vehicles under this program as an initial step to extend the life of their OSP-J vehicle fleet." 1

FY 69 MAAG Aircraft and Flying Hour Authorizations

(U) On 28 May 1968, CINCPAC was advised by the JCS that OASD/ISA had approved the following aircraft and flying hours for FY 69 PACOM MAAGs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Flying Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2 U-8</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 OH-23</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 C-54</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 C-47</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>2 O-1A</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 U-6</td>
<td>1,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 OH-23</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1 C-47</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 U-6</td>
<td>480 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(G) Since the authorization for Korea was only half the number of planes and flying hours that he had previously recommended for FY 69, with CINCPAC's concurrence, COMUSKOREA requested CINCPAC on 10 June 1968 to increase the MAP-supported aircraft and flying hours.

1. Point Paper, J4342, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Dec 68, Subj: Standardization of Wheeled Vehicles in PACOM MAP Countries.
2. JCS 00128/2321232 May 68, cited in J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
for his command "from two OH-23's and 720 flying hours to four OH-23's and 1,440 flying hours."1 Five days later, CINCPAC informed COMUSKOREA "additional justification be provided if reclama desired. "2

(§) Early the next month, on 9 July 1968, COMUSKOREA advised CINCPAC that the justification that he had submitted on 8 December 1967 still remained valid.3 CINCPAC, therefore, on 20 July, recommended a reconsideration by the JCS of the aircraft and flying hour allocation for Korea. Among the justifications that CINCPAC offered were the following:

... a total strength of over 310,000 ROK personnel. The combat readiness of this large army, in great measure, is directly proportionate to the intensity of the advisory effort.

Due to a 40 percent reduction in the KMAG manning level in the past two and one-half years, advisory subdetachments have been centralized at corps level (in some cases, two corps per sub detachment). With this centralization of the advisory effort, the requirement for aviation support at Detachment L has become even more critical.

The advisory missions of this detachment require frequent liaison and assistance visits to FROKA units, many of which are located in excess of eight hours driving time versus one hour by air. Travel time over mountainous, narrow and winding roads in order to contact and advise FROKA units is drastically disproportionate to the time available for the advisory visit. In winter and during certain periods of the rainy season, ground travel to some locations is practically impossible. Many areas within FROKA are inaccessible to fixed wing aircraft.

1. COMUSKOREA UK 53522/100040Z Jun 68.
2. CINCPAC 150048Z Jun 68.
3. COMUSKOREA UK 50992/081025Z Dec 67; COMUSKOREA UK 53932/091219Z Jul 68, cited in J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
necessitating the employment of helicopters to facilitate mission accomplishment by advisory personnel.

The importance of the KMAG advisory effort in the Republic of Korea came into sharp focus during the past spring by the recent and continuing intensified enemy infiltration and ambush activity in the interior and within and south of the DMZ. An urgent requirement exists for rapid air mobility of KMAG advisors to assist and assess the validity of tactics employed in countermeasures, and to supervise and advise the ROK Army on the operation and maintenance of several million dollars worth of complex counter-infiltration equipment recently introduced within the ROK Army. 1

(U) Within three days, the JCS replied, requesting a "reevaluation of aircraft requirements...based on reductions in advisory personnel" already approved. 2 On 3 August 1968, CINCPAC advised the JCS that his reevaluation "reveals that additional reduction in advisory personnel will force further centralization of the advisory effort. Because of the magnitude of the advisory effort in Korea...and the travel conditions...further reduction and centralization of advisory personnel place even greater emphasis on the requirement for the" two OH-23's and 720 flying hours. 3

(U) Finally, on 24 October 1968, the JCS informed CINCPAC that "OASD/ISA has approved three additional aircraft and 720 flying hours for KMAG, Korea for FY 69 provided that no over-all increase in the currently authorized manpower ceiling for KMAG is required." 4 This amendment gave a FY 69 MAAG aircraft and flying hour authorization for Korea of: two O-1s - 600 hours; four U-6s - 1,080 hours; and four OH-23s - 1,440 hours. 5

1. CINCPAC 200221Z Jul 68.
2. JCS 5397/231444Z Jul 68.
3. CINCPAC 030040Z Aug 68.
4. JCS 4110/241912Z Oct 68.
5. Ibid.; J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
MAAG Aircraft Requirements

(U) On 8 April 1968, Hq USAF requested CINCPAC, as well as the other unified commanders, for his recommendation for MAAG support during the period Fiscal Years 1970-74. At the same time, the characteristics of a new light transport aircraft were defined; CINCPAC's comments as to the suitability of this aircraft for MAAG support were requested. Exactly a month later, CINCPAC "provided recommendations for total aircraft requirements, and advised that the new aircraft proposed by USAF would improve the airlift support capabilities of PACOM MAAG's and that the requirement for this new type aircraft is considered valid." 1

F-5 Modernization Program

(5) The PACOM MAP Aircraft Modernization Program was established to replace obsolescent F-86F tactical fighters with the more sophisticated and effective F-5A/B. Initial increments of the new aircraft began arriving in China, Korea, and the Philippines in 1965. 2

(5) The majority of the Air Force investment costs for PACOM MAP through the Fiscal Years 1963-73 were earmarked for the F-5 modernization program. As of 15 February 1968, 364 F-5A/Bs were programmed, of which 163 had already been delivered and 39 more were scheduled for delivery before October 1969, thus completing the scheduled deliveries of the 202 aircraft funded through FY 67 MAP. 3

1. J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68, citing Ltr, Hq USAF, 8 Apr 68, Subj: MAAG Aircraft Requirements, and Ltr, Hq CINCPAC, 8 May 68, Subj: MAAG Aircraft Requirements.
3. Point Paper, J4331, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Mar 68, Subj: Status of MAP F-5A/B Aircraft Program; Comments on the draft manuscript by LCOL Majorie L. Riepma, USAF, J4331, Hq CINCPAC, in a memorandum to Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, on 25 October 1968, hereafter cited as LCOL Riepma Memo of 25 Oct 68, proved extremely helpful in the final preparation of this subsection on the F-5 Modernization Program.
On 9 October 1967, SECDEF advised CINCPAC "that imminent FY 68 MAP reductions would directly affect the F-5 procurement and could place the MAP aircraft modernization program in jeopardy;" at the same time, he informally stated that "the minimum buy quantity for FY 68 was 58." CINCPAC planners, in order to accommodate these reductions, deleted 62 F-5s from the PACOM country military programs.

On 20 May 1968, SECDEF requested CINCPAC to "develop alternate FY 69 plans for rounding out F-5 requirements, assuming that MAP F-5 procurement might terminate with the FY 1969 program." Since the FY 69 appropriations might be greatly reduced, he further directed that the number of F-5s, as well as an estimate of the sale of these aircraft, for each country be programmed under the assumptions that funds had been cut by 20, 30, or even 50 percent.

CINCPAC furnished the requested information on 13 June 1968. For China, requirements were 16 aircraft to fill out the Unit Equipment Allowance (UE) of 18 F-5s for each of the 5 squadrons, including attrition aircraft. No F-5s were programmed under MAP for FY 69 and, with a reduction of 20% in credit sales, the Republic of China could procure only 7 aircraft; with a 30% reduction, 6; and with a 50% reduction, 4. Korea had 10 F-5s programmed in FY 69 MAP and a requirement for 17 such aircraft to round out its 5 squadrons with an UE of 18, plus attrition. There were no credit sales anticipated for Korea and, if the FY 69 MAP was reduced by 20% or more, no F-5s could be programmed. Although SECDEF had not inquired about Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) countries, the Thailand "program was examined to determine the feasibility of a buy out in FY 69 of four F-5s programmed in FY 70," and CINCPAC's conclusion was "that the four additional F-5s cannot be included in FY 69 without eliminating items more critical to the Thai program."

1. Point Paper, J4331, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Jul 68, Subj: Status of MAP of F-5 Aircraft Program.
2. SECDEF 9440/201740Z May 68.
3. Ibid.; J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
4. CINCPAC 131925Z Jun 68; J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
As of July 1968, the PACOM MAP F-5 Program called for a total of 333 aircraft, to equip 17 tactical fighter and 1 reconnaissance squadrons, at a total cost of approximately $280,300,000. The following chart depicted the PACOM F-5 posture as then programmed through FY 74 and, also, as if there were no further procurement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>As Programmed</th>
<th>Without Further Procurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Squadrons²</td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>8³</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>333</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Squadrons²</strong></td>
<td><strong>Aircraft</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>222</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 24 September 1968, SECDEF stated that "for planning purposes at this time, Unified Commands should assume that F-5 procurement will continue through FY 70."5

The following charts represent the PACOM F-5 posture in terms of aircraft delivered, on hand, and programmed under MAP, as of 12 December 1968:

2. Normal UE is 18 aircraft per squadron, consisting of 16 F-5As and 2 F-5Bs.
3. Includes one Reconnaissance Squadron of 8 RF-5As.
4. Assumes the delivery of those F-5s scheduled under FY 68 MAP.
### Delivered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>F-5A</th>
<th>F-5B</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total         | 184  | 22   | 206   |

### On Hand

| Country | 70 | 73 | 22 | 10 | 21 |

| Total   | 196 |

---

**Fiscal Years Programmed under MAP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>63-68</th>
<th>69</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>71</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>74</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. Includes attrition.
Personnel Activities

Reduction of Overseas Personnel

"In the separate directives issued by the President on 18 January, addressed to the Secretary of State and Director, Bureau of the Budget and the Heads of Executive Departments and Establishments, the subject of Reduction of Overseas Personnel and official travel was brought to the active stage." The 30th meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) had met on 25 January 1969, and a copy of the SIG's agenda, along with attached copies of the White House releases of 18 January dealing with the reduction in U.S. employees overseas, had been transmitted to CINCPAC for information. This information, however, was quickly overcome by events upon the receipt at Hq CINCPAC of a SECSTATE message on 26 January and the JCS guidance of 1 February, both of which dealt with reductions in overseas personnel.

"The purpose of this message," stated the JCS on 1 February 1968, "is to provide guidance and establish reporting procedures for the implementation of Presidential and Secretary of Defense Directives on the reductions in overseas personnel." Actually, SECDEF, "as a result of Program Budget Decision 412 of 22 December 1967 directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a proposal for the reduction of all MAAGs, Missions, and Military Groups." The JCS subsequently issued instructions to unified commands and established a goal of an overall reduction of 33 percent. The Presidential directive of 18 January 1968, therefore, was a separate but related program to reduce the number of U.S. personnel overseas under the auspices of SECSTATE. "In summary," concluded the JCS in their message on 1 February 1968 to CINCPAC, "two reports are requested:

1. J1 Brief No. 7-68, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Feb 68, of JCS 2464/69, Subj: Record of Discussion of the Senior Interdepartmental Group at Their 30th Meeting on 25 January 1968.
2. J1 Brief No. 5-68, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Feb 68, of JCS 2464/68, Subj: Agenda for the 30th Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, 25 January 1968.
3. JCS 8776/010116Z Feb 68.
a. 10 or 15 PCT proposed initial reductions for MAAGs, Missions, MILGROUPS, and DAOs based on assigned strengths as of 31 December 1967, due 18 February 1968.

b. Proposals for 33 PCT reductions in MAAGs, Missions, MILGROUPS based on authorized strengths in effect on 1 January 1968, due 25 May 1968.¹

² Under Phase I of BALPA (Balance of Payment), the SECSTATE had directed the Chiefs of Missions to "identify for reduction 10 or 15 percent (dependent on the size of the activity) of U.S. and Foreign National assigned strength as of 31 December 1967 by 25 February 1968." Since the JCS guidance of 1 February had placed a requirement on CINCPAC to provide input based on an analysis of the responses of the Chiefs of Missions to SECSTATE, CINCPAC tasked on 3 February the PACOM Chiefs of MAAGs, Missions, and Military Groups to comply with the request of the Chief of Mission in-country and to submit to CINCPAC their comments, along with appropriate rationale, as to exceptions to the proposed reductions.³

² As soon as he received the requested input from the Chiefs of PACOM MAP activities, CINCPAC forwarded this information, plus his comments on each Chief of Mission's proposal, to the JCS. The last one was dispatched on 24 February, despite the JCS-imposed suspense date of 18 February 1968, for late receipts of data from PACOM MAP JTD (Joint Table of Distribution) activities had precluded compliance. In brief, CINCPAC's recommendations on the inputs by the different Chiefs of Missions by these JTD activities were:

(1) JUSMAGPHIL - Concurred in the reduction of 14 spaces as proposed, with Chief of Mission's comments coinciding.

(2) DLG Indonesia - Proposed the reduction of only one of the two spaces identified by Chief DLG Indonesia. Chief of Mission stated

1. JCS 8776/010116Z Feb 68.
3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 030353Z Feb 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
that he reluctantly offered the second position, but desired to retain it, if at all possible.

(3) MAAG China - Concurred in the proposed reduction of 113 spaces, with Chief of Mission's comments coinciding.

(4) MEDT Burma - Concurred in the proposed reduction of 7 spaces based on assigned strength. However, he agreed with the Chief MEDT Burma as to the importance of MEDT Burma as a source of contact with the Burma Defense Forces and the possible unfavorable interpretation by the Burmese Government on a reduction of U.S. personnel at this time.

(5) MAAG Japan - Concurred in the proposed reduction of 26 spaces, which meant a 28% reduction of U.S. and 10% reduction of local national assigned strengths.

(6) MAAG Korea, JUSMAGTHAI, and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI - That these MAP activities not be included in this reduction action. 1

(8) Meanwhile, since the SECSTATE reductions would be based on "assigned strengths as of 31 December 1967," explained the JCS to CINCPAC on 2 February 1968:

A baseline must be established upon which to compute reductions associated with this program. It is requested that each addressee submit a one-time report of all military and U.S. civilian personnel and foreign national employees on board (assigned) as of 31 December 1967 for each MAAG, Mission, MILGROUP, or DAO under his cognizance. 2

(5) CINCPAC, in turn, tasked his subordinate MAP commanders for this JTD data. Their late response to this requirement, no doubt because of the time-consuming nature of these JTD activities, prevented CINCPAC

1. CINCPAC 222130Z Feb 68; CINCPAC 222131Z Feb 68; CINCPAC 222132Z Feb 68; CINCPAC 222133Z Feb 68; CINCPAC 242041Z Feb 68; J1 History, Hq, CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68; Point Paper, J13, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Feb 68, Subj: Reduction in Overseas Personnel.
2. JCS 8986/022250Z Feb 68.
from meeting his suspense date of 13 February 1968 on this matter, as well as his one of 18 February for comments on Chiefs of Missions' proposed 10 to 15 percent reductions. Actually, CINCPAC submitted the desired JTD data as of 31 December 1967 to the JCS on 13 and 21 February 1968. Only for Laos could CINCPAC give no figures, since the Chief of Mission there submitted this information on assigned strengths of all Laos-based personnel direct to SECSTATE, and neither CINCPAC nor DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI had this data. 1

(U) On 8 February 1968, meanwhile, SECDEF suddenly issued the following order:

For Military Departments

Effective at once and until 1 April 1968, stop movement to ports of embarkation all personnel assigned to all MAAGs, Missions, Military Groups, MAP-funded spaces in Hq SOUTHCOM and Hq EUCOM....

For Unified Commands

Request you direct MAAG Chiefs to submit NLT 18 February 1968 to appropriate military departments list of personnel by requisition number and JTD paragraph and line number whom you desire to exclude from above movement restrictions. This list must be limited to those key personnel whom MAAG Chiefs are certain to retain despite 10/15 percent reductions which may be imposed 1 April 1968. 2

(Σ) Although CINCPAC was not cited in this order, coordination with the JCS revealed that input from PACOM was desired. Accordingly, on 13 February 1968, CINCPAC tasked his PACOM MAP activities to reply directly to "appropriate military departments, with info CINCPAC." 3

1. CINCPAC 130318Z Feb 68; ADMINO CINCPAC 210433 Feb 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
2. SECDEF 9520/082005Z Feb 68.
3. CINCPAC 132326Z Feb 68.
"For planning purposes here," SECDEF instructed CINCPAC on 12 February 1968, to "submit, NLT 15 March 68, estimated input MAI during FY 69, considering probable personnel reductions resulting" the proposed reduction of overseas personnel as outlined in the JCS guidance of 1 February. 1 Two days later, CINCPAC tasked his subordinate MAP commanders for their estimated requirements for MAI (Military Assistance Institute) attendance "during FY 69 considering probable personnel reductions resulting" from the aforementioned action. 2 Since he gave them a suspense date of 10 March, CINCPAC had ample time to forward the desired input to SECDEF prior to his own suspense of 15 March 1968. 3

The Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) met on 11 and 12 March 1968:

The meeting was to discuss submissions of Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions and CINCPAC/JCS/OSD for Step One of BALPA and resolve differences when possible. JCS/OSD agreed across the board with CINCPAC submissions. Agreement was reached to hold further discussions on Thailand in abeyance until all facts on which to base a decision were obtained. PROVMAAG-K has been exempt from any cuts at this time but their strength was included in the base for the overall reduction of 10 percent and will be absorbed by MAAGs world-wide that will sustain cuts in excess of 10 percent. The single instance of resolution of disagreements between DOD and STATE recommendations (Indonesia) was resolved in favor of CINCPAC position. 4

On 1 April 1968, the JCS officially notified CINCPAC that the following was a "listing by country of reductions directed by SIG and new manpower ceilings effective 1 April 1968:"

1. SECDEF 9849/122054Z Feb 68.
2. CINCPAC 140221Z Feb 68.
3. Ibid.; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
CINCPAC notified the countries of their reductions on 12 April 1968. The JCS had also discussed the requested submission on the 33 percent reductions. "It is recognized Steps II and III BALPA overlap DOD program for 33 percent reduction in manpower costs for the MAP," commented the JCS on 1 April, and efforts are "underway here to bring these two programs more into line and complement each other since both have the same objective - a reduction in overseas personnel." By letters on 24 and 25 May 1968, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS his recommendations on the proposed 33 percent reduction in PACOM MAP activities. His position was that "no reductions be made in Thailand, Korea, and Laos and no concurrence with reduction of the magnitude proposed in other PACOM countries." 

On 17 June 1968, William J. Porter, U.S. Ambassador to Korea, after mentioning how the State Department, for Phase I of BALPA, had "agreed to deflect consideration of reductions in the four Military Advisory Missions present in Korea," told SECSTATE that he now believed "review of these missions should be undertaken in connection BALPA Phase 2."
Furthermore, he recommended that the Service Advisory Groups be reduced beginning in the latter half of 1968 and abolished completely by the end of 1969. In brief, his reasons for this recommendation were:

(1) The outstanding performance of the ROK military forces in Vietnam demonstrated that an advisory effort in Korea on the existing scale was no longer needed.

(2) The ROK military forces could maintain their equipment as well as U.S. forces.¹

(5) "From the standpoint of COMUSKOREA, and equally from the viewpoint of the responsibilities of CINCUNC and CG Eighth Army, the abolition of the Service MAAG's in Korea at this time, particularly so drastically and rapidly as is suggested in AMEMB cable, ref a, would be adverse to the U.S. national interest."² After making this statement to CINCPAC in a message on 22 June 1968, COMUSKOREA then went on to rebut the reasons given by Ambassador Porter, as well as providing a number of reasons of his own for not implementing the Ambassador's recommendation. Two days later, CINCPAC concurred fully with the three cardinal points made by COMUSKOREA, which were:

(1) Implementation of the proposal to reduce the Manning level in Service MAAGs would significantly weaken the degree of the control and restraint exercised over ROK forces in the present period of crisis in Korea.

(2) The proposal would run the risk of an untimely erosion of ROK confidence in U.S. determination to participate in the defense of South Korea.

(3) The proposal exaggerates the self-sufficiency of ROK forces.³

(5) "It is essential," stated CINCPAC to the JCS on 24 June 1968, "that the present level of Service MAAG Manning be maintained in Korea.

1. Ibid.; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
2. COMUSKOREA UK 53736/221400Z Jun 68.
3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 240454Z Jun 68; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
In addition to stressing the importance of COMUSKOREA's three cardinal points, CINCPAC further elaborated with some of his own, such as the two following:

With the introduction of new equipment authorized since the PUEBLO incident, the need for the Service MAAGs is increased to resolve new problems of supply, maintenance, operations, basing and logistic support.

The largest ROK force with which the U.S. is concerned is, of course, the ROKA. Retention of U.S. influence and control at each major echelon over this important ground force, the exercise of U.S. restraint upon its actions in periods of tension, and the maintenance of our advisory role during the post-PUEBLO force add-on and modernization are of the utmost importance. 2

(S) The East Asia/IRG (EA/IRG) met on 27 June and 2 July 1968 to consider the "recommendations of the Ambassadors concerned and prepared their recommendations for presentation to the Senior Interdepartmental Group. They also considered the recommendation of Ambassador Porter of Korea which was carried over from BALPA Phase I." 3 The recommendations forwarded by EA/IRG to SIG were in line with CINCPAC's for Japan, China, and the Philippines, but not Korea. "In view of the major differences between the recommendations of the MAAG Commander and the Ambassador, an agreement was reached" at the EA/IRG meetings "to consider MAAG reductions" in Korea in two separate phases, but the "Joint Staff did not concur with this and requested this decision be reviewed by the SIG." 4

1. CINCPAC 240454Z Jun 68.
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
Phase I of BALPA, the reduction of overseas personnel program of the State Department, involved a 10 to 15 percent reduction. It was completed, when SIG approved it on 28 March 1968. Phase II of BALPA was an intensive study of 28 selected countries with a goal of 35 percent reduction. The PACOM countries chosen for this study were China, Japan, and the Philippines. Meanwhile, it must be remembered, a separate but related DOD program of reduction of overseas personnel was being conducted with a goal of identifying a 33 percent reduction. Moreover, the goal of both the State and Defense Departments was to have 75 percent of those personnel reduced out of country by 31 December 1968, and the remaining 25 percent by 30 June 1969.1

In implementing the Presidential Directive of 18 January 1968, SECSTATE had issued instructions to establish a SIG Review Panel. It was designed to make the final review of the recommendations of the embassies involved and to make the final approval for reductions of overseas personnel. The final meeting of the SIG Review Panel was held on 6 August 1968, at which time, reductions were approved in all PACOM MAAGs and MilGrps with the exception of DEPCJUSMAGTHAL. Those within CINCPAC’s area of responsibility that were effected follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>31 Dec 67 Assigned</th>
<th>Reductions</th>
<th>New Ceiling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>LN</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1,319</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>1,824</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Ibid.; Point Paper, J13, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Aug 68, Subj: Reduction in Overseas Personnel.
The differing views on Korea had caused SIG to request, and SEC-DEF so directed, as the JCS advised CINCPAC on 27 August 1968, that a study be made:

... of the mission, structure and organization of PROVMAAG-K and the Service Advisory Groups - Korea.

The study is to examine alternative concepts for performing the mission of PROVMAAG-K and the Service Advisory Groups in Korea, and the personnel requirements necessary to support these alternatives. The study is to give special emphasis to the advisory effort. Country Team views must be incorporated.¹

In their advance warning, the JCS also informed CINCPAC that a "suspending of 23 September has been imposed by OSD."² On 30 August 1968, CINCPAC recommended that, in "view of the complexity of the required study and the importance of the subject... OSD suspense date for JCS be changed sufficiently to allow CINCPAC to submit the study to the JCS on or before 30 September."³ On the same day, CINCPAC tasked COMUSKOREA with developing the study and offered three possible alternatives for his consideration.⁴ The JCS approved CINCPAC's new sus- pense date on 5 September 1968.⁵

After COMUSKOREA developed the study, CINCPAC forwarded it to the JCS on 27 September 1968. The key conclusions of COMUSKOREA, supported by CINCPAC, follow in summarized form:

a. The existing organization at current strength should be retained at this time.

b. Personnel remaining after a 414 space reduction would be inadequate to accomplish the

1. JCS 8130/271344Z Aug 68.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 300133Z Aug 68.
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 300134Z Aug 68; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
5. JCS 8838/052329Z Sep 68.
advisory mission in Korea; however, the mission
could be accomplished with reduced effectiveness
with a 300 space reduction.

c. Every effort should be made to restore
the BALPA II reduction (not finally approved by
the President at that time) in the Korea military
assistance organization. This reduction was
initially to have been 414 spaces; but it finally
amounted to 446 spaces because the reduction
was applied to assigned strength instead of author-
ized strength.1

(8) After their review, the JCS concluded the following:

a. The study conclusions were valid.

b. In view of the Presidential decision of
8 October 1968 approving the BALPA II reductions,
it would be inappropriate to seek restoration of
these reductions at this time.

c. COMUSKOREA should be allowed a
significant period of time in which to assess the
impact of operating at the reduced manning level
which has been directed prior to any further
changes in manning or organization.2

(9) In December 1968, SECDEF stated "that some additional reductions
to those made under the BALPA Program can be made without compromis-
ing military assistance program objectives. These additional reductions
are not to alter the phasing of the reductions now being made as a result
of BALPA and become effective 1 July 1970."3 The FY 70 ceilings

1. J5 Brief No. 376-68, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Nov 68, of JCSM-644-68, Subj:
Study of the Mission, Structure, and Organization of MAAG Korea.
2. Ibid.
3. J1 Brief No. 62-68, Hq CINCPAC, 20 Dec 68, of JCS JIDM 735-68 of
13 Dec 68, Subj: Reduction of Personnel in MAAGs, Missions, and
Military Groups (Program Budget Decision 412).
established by BALPA and the adjusted FY 71 ceilings as a result of the Program Budget Decision (PBD) 412 of 22 December 1967 are as follows:1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 70</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>FY 71</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>LN</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>LN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq PACOM</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDT Burma</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG China</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLG Indonesia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG Japan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSMAG Philippines</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROVMAAG - Korea</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td>1,048</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>1,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSMAG - Thailand</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,326</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>2,962</td>
<td>2,225</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>2,846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Throughout this entire affair, CINCPAC's position remained constant on the subject of reduction of overseas personnel. His threefold position, from beginning to end, was:

(1) "The procedures of an arbitrary reduction across the board is not an effective way of achieving desired goals."

(2) "Goals can better be achieved by making greater reductions in certain areas and smaller reductions in others dependent on mission and U.S. commitments."

(3) "No reductions should be made in Korea and Thailand."2

1. Ibid.
Service Responsibility for Manning Position of Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT), Burma

On 16 April 1967, with the concurrence of the American Ambassador to Burma, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the position of Chief MEDT (CHMEDT) Burma be manned by a senior U.S. Army colonel. To support his recommendation, CINCPAC gave the following rationale:

a. Authorized MILGP personnel strength: Army 6; Navy 2; Air Force 3.

b. MAP Grant Aid (token sales) to be managed: Yearly average FY 68 in millions: Army 1.85; Navy .38; Air Force .92.

c. Host country forces in being: Army 122,000; Navy/Air Force (combined) 13,000.

d. Relationship of host country forces to the national objective, strategic plans, and military objectives of the U.S.: Primary mission of Burma Armed Forces in foreseeable future will be counter-insurgency and internal security. Army plays chief role in this mission with other services in supporting role.

...Importance and prestige of Burma Army far overshadows those of other services, and this situation is likely to continue indefinitely. Head of State and Government is an Army officer, as are eleven or twelve other members of governing Revolutionary Council. Similarly, Council of Ministers consists of ten Army officers, one Navy officer, one Air Force officer and one civilian.1

On 6 June 1967, the JCS notified CINCPAC that his recommendation "relative to the designation of Army as the service responsible for manning the Chief, MEDT, Burma, position is approved."2 Late in

1. CINCPAC 161746Z Apr 67.
2. JCS 7136/061610Z Jun 67.
January 1968, a senior Army Colonel arrived in Burma to assume the duties of CHMEDT Burma, vice the incumbent, also a Colonel in the U.S. Army.  

APO 96306 Mail Delivery Service, Rangoon, Burma

(U) During early 1968, CHMEDT Burma requested assistance from CINCPAC concerning postal services. CINCPAC, after proper coordination with CINCPACAF had been affected, referred the matter to CINC-USARPAC.  

He explained the situation to CINCUSARPAC on 30 March 1968 as follows:

CHMEDT Burma's present mail service at APO 96306 is a mail address only and terminates at Bangkok, Thailand. Further movement depends upon Defense Attache airplane, which makes approximately three trips per month. Both official and personal mail have required up to six weeks delivery. CHMEDT Burma has been informed that USAF Postal Service, due to austere funding, can not establish an APO at Rangoon except as a mail address only.

It is militarily desirable that an APO become operational at Rangoon so as to provide more rapid and responsive postal support for the MAP mission there including timely delivery and dispatch of mail on available U.S. commercial and military flights.

(U) In response to CINCPAC's message of 9 April 1968, which tasked CINCUSARPAC with the "mission of estab and operating an APO in Rangoon, Burma," CINCUSARPAC replied on 3 May that two enlisted personnel had been selected for PCS (Permanent Change of Station) to Rangoon and requested that spaces and requisition numbers be identified by

1. J71/Memo/002-68, from COL Edgar R. Poole, USA, Chief, PEG, to JO3, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Feb 68, Subj: Staff Visit to the Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT), Rangoon, Burma; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
2. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
3. CINCPAC 300526Z Mar 68.
CINCPAC. Five days later, CINCPAC advised that the responsibility for the operation of the APO facility had been assigned to CINCUSARPAC and that personnel requirements and assignments were to be handled as CINCUSARPAC directed.

(U) The Honorable Frederick C. Belen, Deputy Postmaster General of the United States, and a party of four visited Hq CINCPAC on 8 October 1968; here, they received briefings by representatives of component commands that covered the field of postal operations in PACOM. Four days later, the Director of Postal Operations, Hq USARPAC, reported to the Honorable Belen's party that the mail service to the U.S. governmental agencies and personnel in Burma were the "worst I've ever seen" and proposed certain actions for DA approval to help correct the situation.

(U) On 29 October 1968, CINCUSARPAC advised both CINCPAC and CHMEDT Burma that two enlisted personnel were scheduled to arrive in Rangoon, Burma, on 2 November 1968, to implement and operate APO 96306, Rangoon, in order to improve the mail service there. Meanwhile, CHMEDT Burma, by means of a letter on 18 October 1968, had expressed his and his men's "sincerest appreciation and thanks" for the "positive interest and resultant actions by CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC... for the outstanding effort in our behalf."

Continued Phasedown of MAAG China

(U) As reported in last year's history, a manpower authorization of 727 spaces for MAAG China for FY 68 had been approved on 29 May 1967 by the Secretary of Defense. The JCS, on 8 June 1967, had requested

1. CINCUSARPAC 030200Z May 68.
2. CINCPAC 082200Z May 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
3. DA 880696/201741Z Sep 68; CINCPAC 280400Z Sep 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
4. AMEMBASSY Rangoon 4523/120930Z Oct 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
5. CINCUSARPAC 44521/290010Z Oct 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
CINCPAC to submit a revised Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) for MAAG China for FY 68 to reflect this new authorization. "CINCPAC forwarded the revised JTD to the JCS on 23 September, and approval was received on 21 September 1967. "¹ Meanwhile, CHMAAG China had initiated a study in April 1967 that resulted in the publication on 1 November 1967 of a new Organization and Functions Manual, and CINCPAC, anticipating that revisions would be necessary, had deferred any manpower survey of MAAG China until 1968.

(§) Early in 1968, on 15 January, CHMAAG China submitted a proposed Joint Manpower Program (JMP), which was based on the results of his 1967 organization and functions analysis. This JMP proposed a reorganization that reflected a more functional concept, vice the service-oriented one, with a gradual reduction of the service sections. As a result, a 1 July 1968 authorization of 670 spaces was proposed. ² Shortly thereafter, however, on 1 February 1968, CINCPAC's review and processing of CHMAAG China JMP for FY 69 was overcome by events with the receipt of a JCS message regarding the implementation of a program of reductions in overseas personnel. CINCPAC was advised that approval actions on FY 69 JTDs were being held in abeyance pending decisions on the reductions and that "FY 1968 or the latest JTDs are continued in effect."³

Service Responsibility for Manning Position of CHMAAG China

(§) Four years ago, CINCPAC supported the designation of the CHMAAG China position as a U.S. Army responsibility. Two years later, upon the termination of the incumbent's tour, CINCPAC again supported the retention of a U.S. Army MAJ GEN for filling the position of CHMAAG China. On 1 June 1968, CINCPAC again supported the position that this assignment be a U.S. Army responsibility. Then, on 12 December 1968, the JCS asked for comments from CINCPAC, upon which to base a reply to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who had posed a query for a further consideration that the senior MAAG representative in China be from the U.S. Air Force or the U.S. Navy. "Considering all factors," concluded CINCPAC in his answer to the JCS, after discussing the various factors

2. JI History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
3. JCS 8776/010116Z Feb 68; JI History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.

69
he had taken into consideration, "it appears militarily advisable and politically astute to retain CHMAAG position as a U.S. Army responsibility for the coming assignment cycle."¹

**Unauthorized Movement of Foreign Beer at U.S. Expense - CHMAAG China**

(U) On 19 April 1968, the JCS set in motion an inquiry to uncover the circumstances surrounding the alleged use of MSTS (Military Sea Transportation Service) transportation to move Heineken beer to the MAAG China NCO Open Mess in Taipei, Taiwan.² CINCPAC, as a result, tasked CHMAAG China with reviewing "the circumstances surrounding the alleged shipment and advise so that a response to JCS may be made."³ CHMAAG China answered CINCPAC on 3 May 1968, stating that the shipment had been made as alleged, that he had been unaware of a restriction against such an activity, and that he had taken corrective action to prevent any recurrence of a similar incident. Six days later, CINCPAC dispatched a reply to the JCS, advising them of CHMAAG China's reply and the corrective action taken.⁴

**Chief, Defense Liaison Group (CHDLG), Indonesia Joint Manpower Program (JMP)**

(SE) On 24 January 1968, CINCPAC submitted the CHDLG Indonesia JMP for FY 69 to the JCS. It recommended approval of 28 spaces; 6 U.S. Army, 3 U.S. Navy, 3 U.S. Marine Corps, 2 U.S. Air Force, and 14 LWR (Local Wage Rate). For the first time, CINCPAC was submitting a separate JMP for CHDLG Indonesia. Previously, this activity had been identified on the CINCPAC Joint Table of Distribution (JTD).⁵

**Service Responsibility for Manning Position of CHDLG Indonesia**

(SE) With the concurrence of the American Ambassador to Indonesia, Marshall Green, CINCPAC recommended on 28 May 1968 that the JCS

1. CINCPAC 042230Z Jan 69, cited in FONECON, LCOL Wilford E. Ovegaard, USMC, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 17 Feb 69.
2. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
3. CINCPAC 270306Z Apr 68.
4. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
5. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
continue to man the position of CHDLG Indonesia with an Army officer upon the completion of the incumbent's tour. "From the standpoint of balanced Service representation in this geographical area," CINCPAC admitted, "a Service other than U.S. Army appears indicated for manning position of CHDLG Indonesia," but he felt other considerations unique to Indonesia, such as the fact that the Indonesian Army "overshadows the other services both politically and in Indonesia's MAP-assisted civic action plans and program" and, in particular, the definite "need to maintain close rapport with the Army-oriented Indonesian regime," were the deciding factors in retaining this position as a U.S. Army one.  

The JCS approved this recommendation on 9 December 1968.  

Continued Phasedown of MAAG Japan

(C) CINCPAC submitted on 1 December 1967 the revised 1 July 1967 Joint Manpower Program (JMP) for MAAG Japan. This revised version reflected a minor reorganization and a phasedown to 120 spaces. 3 The JCS gave their "approval of the subject JMP" on 29 December 1967. 4 Then, on 1 February 1968, the JCS advised CINCPAC that, "pending decisions on the reductions" in overseas personnel, the "FY 1968 or the latest JTD's are continued in effect."  

Service Responsibility for Manning Position of CHMAAG Japan

(C) On 2 January 1968, the JCS approved the U.S. Air Force as the service to man the position of CHMAAG Japan upon the rotation of the incumbent, who was a BGEG in the U.S. Air Force. 6

1. CINCPAC 282238Z May 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of May 68.
2. JCS 7291/092300Z Dec 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
3. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
4. JCS 6219/292047Z Dec 67.
5. JCS 8776/010116Z Feb 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
6. JCS 6332/022003Z Jan 68, cited in J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
CONFIDENTIAL

MAAG Korea (Provisional) (PROVMAAG-K) Joint Manpower Program (JMP)

(8) The PROVMAAG-K 1 July 1968 JMP was submitted by CINCPAC to the JCS in January 1968. No major changes were programmed.¹

CHJUSMAG Philippines (CHJUSMAGPHIL) Joint Table of Distribution (JTD)

(9) During January 1968, CINCPAC staff prepared a change to CHJUSMAGPHIL JTD, which was forwarded by letter to the JCS on 1 February. As a result, the JTD was updated to reflect the establishment of a Philippine Constabulary Division, a complete reorganization of the Army section, and the establishment of a Public Affairs Officer. The CHJUSMAGPHIL JTD, as changed, would provide for the personnel ceiling to remain at 44 officers, 44 enlisted, 9 U.S. civilians, and 16 LWR (Local Wage Rate) spaces, for a total of 113 positions, 7 of which would be non-MAP. In addition, there were 10 LWR spaces being utilized that had been previously approved.² Meanwhile, on 24 January 1968, CHJUSMAGPHIL had requested "immediate action be initiated to fill this billet with a qualified USN info/Public Affairs Officer. Attendance at MAI is desired; however, if this would cause inordinate delay in arrival, this requirement could be waived."³

Service Responsibility for Manning Position of CHJUSMAG Philippines

(9) CHJUSMAG Philippines (CHJUSMAGPHIL) requested on 15 April 1968 that he be advised of the "contemplated branch of service (USAF or USA) of next" CHJUSMAGPHIL, so he could place personnel requisition action on the appropriate service for Chief of Staff position, "who was an USAF COL with a rotation date in September 1968."⁴ CINCPAC, on the 24th of the same month, requested CHJUSMAGPHIL to "proceed with normal submission of requisition action for AF 06 against COS JUSMAGPHIL" position pending determination of service responsible for manning CHJUSMAGPHIL" by the JCS.⁵

1. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
2. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68, citing as a source CINCPAC Ltr Ser 0159 of 1 Feb 68.
3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 240520Z Jan 68.
4. CHJUSMAGPHIL 150200Z Apr 68.
5. CINCPAC 240042Z Apr 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.

CONFIDENTIAL
For the following reasons, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS on 11 May 1968 that the next CHJUSMAGPHIL be a MAJ GEN in the U.S. Army:

Pending implementation of reductions proposed by BALPA and PBD 412 Programs, U.S. strengths are Army 42, Navy 42 (25 civilians), Air Force 29, total 113. Anticipate maintaining Service balance when reductions are imposed.

A small increase in strength of Constabulary, Navy, Marines, and Air Force is projected. Major emphasis in the Philippines is on internal security for which the Constabulary has primary responsibility. The other Services assist the Constabulary as required. All Services participate in military civic action with activities of the Army Engineer Construction Battalions constituting the major program. One major unit, the AF Composite Commando Squadron, will be activated sometime during FY69-72. This unit programmed to support operations of the other Services.

Our over-all national objective is to preserve the Philippines as an independent and democratic nation, friendly to the United States and maintaining a foreign and defense policy in general alignment with our own. JSOP and MAP objectives for the Philippines emphasize the maintenance of internal security and the continuation of U.S. base rights in the Philippines. The functions of the Philippine Army and Constabulary probably contribute more to national, JSOP and MAP objectives than do the functions of the other Services.
The Army and Constabulary constitute approximately seventy percent of the total strength of the Philippine Armed Forces. The major emphasis in the Philippines is on internal security and military civic action. Both the Army and Constabulary have more significant roles in these areas than do the Navy and Air Force.

Embassy Manila recommends replacement for MAJ GEN Gomes be a U.S. Army Officer, that the replacement be well versed in internal security matters, and if possible, have experience in peace and order problems.

Although all but one of the Chiefs of MAAGs and Missions within PACOM are now U.S. Army, the exception being CHMAAG Japan, recommend that U.S. Army remain responsible Service for manning position of CHJUSMAGPHIL. 1

(C) The question was finally settled on 9 December 1968. On that date, the JCS approved the 11 May recommendation of CINCPAC. Upon the rotation of the incumbent CHJUSMAGPHIL, the new one would be provided by the U.S. Army.

1. CINCPAC 112048Z May 68.
2. JCS 7291/092300Z Dec 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) Annual Evaluations

(U) The primary mission of the CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group is to plan, develop, and execute "a program designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the Military Assistance Program and the various Military Assistance Organizations in the PACOM."1 During 1968, as in previous years, CINCPAC PEG teams traveled to selected PACOM countries, making an evaluation of MAP activities in six of them.2 Highlighted in the country by country discussions that follow are some of the general observations, as well as some of the summaries of evaluations, made by the PEG teams during their visits in 1968.

Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT), Rangoon, Burma

(5) A CINCPAC PEG team visited the U.S. MEDT in Rangoon, Burma, during the period, 20-24 January 1968. During this evaluation, each member of the MEDT Burma was contacted by the PEG team. During an official call on the U.S. Ambassador Henry A. Brynade, the Ambassador "reiterated his position expressed to last year's CINCPAC team that the MEDT served a very important purpose in Burma, was useful to the U.S. program as well as to Burma, and was performing its mission in a splendid manner."3 He went on to express his hope that the MEDT would remain in Burma; for his part, he would welcome any initiatives on the part of the Union of Burma concerning purchases of U.S. military material so that the MEDT could continue to function. Some concern was shown by the Ambassador about the situation in northern Burma, when Chinese-supported insurgents had occupied two localities in force. In this instance:

1. CINCPAC Staff Instruction P5400.6A, 17 Jun 67 (Revised as of 24 Dec 68), Subj: Organization and Functions Manual, p. 18-3.
2. Intv. COL William H. Fairbrother, USAF, J712, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 13 Feb 68.
3. J71/Memo/002-68, from COL Edgar R. Poole, USA, Chief, PEG, Hq CINCPAC, to J03, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics, & Administration, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Feb 68, Subj: Staff Visit to the Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT), Rangoon, Burma. This trip report is the sole source of the following account of the PEG evaluation of Burma MAP. Hereafter cited as Burma MAP PEG.
... The Ambassador believed it too early to predict the Union of Burma reaction, but pointed out that the terrain involved was particularly rugged and practically inaccessible to Burma forces except by helicopter. Availability of CH-46 and CH-47 helicopters and of F-5 and T-28 aircraft was discussed in general terms. ¹

(3) The visit of the CINCPAC PEG team coincided with the arrival in Burma of COL Paul W. Hamblin, USA, the new Chief, MEDT, on 20 January 1968 and the departure of the previous one, COL Harrison J. Merritt, USA, on 24 January. The itinerary of the team, therefore, served in many ways as the initial orientation of the new Chief, MEDT, as well as a suitable means of introducing him to several of the Union of Burma Armed Forces senior officials, units, and activities. "Rapport between the MEDT and appropriate Union of Burma military activities," commented the staff visit report, "continued to develop favorably during the past year. Among the positive expressions of this 'warming' atmosphere observed by the team were the attendance of many senior Union of Burma military leaders at a farewell reception for Colonel Merritt (also attended by the Rangoon diplomatic community), and the presence of commanders concerned at all except one of the activities visited by the team." ²

(3) The following activities of the Union of Burma (UB) Armed Forces were visited by the members of the CINCPAC PEG team: Ministry of Defense, Rangoon; Central Vehicle Depot, Rangoon; Joint Equipment Identification Team (JEIT), Rangoon; Naval Training Center, Seikky; UB LCU 603 (ex-USN LCU 1626); Naval Supply Depot, Monkey Point, Rangoon; 502nd Wing, UB Air Force, Mingaladon; UB Air Force Aircraft Maintenance Depot, Mingaladon. "By usual standards," commented the staff visit report, "the appearance and bearing of military personnel observed was exceptional." ³ At his request, the CINCPAC PEG team made an official call on COL Kyi Maung, the Deputy Vice Chief of Staff of the Burmese Army, who is number three in the Army hierarchy, assuming that GEN Ne Win is number one. COL Kyi Maung expressed during this visit, his "appreciation for the support being provided by the

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
MEDT, stated that there were no problems extant, and welcomed the annual visits by the CINCPAC PEG Team. "1

(S) During the visit in 1967, the CINCPAC PEG team had found that the "most serious problem facing the MEDT is the replacement of U.S. Army personnel on the Team."2 Again in 1968, MEDT Burma was continuing to experience difficulties in the timely receipt of replacement personnel. Because of the relatively small number of people assigned to this organization, any extended delay between the loss of an incumbent and the arrival of a replacement causes a serious gap and has a severe impact upon the operation of MEDT Burma. "In view of the particularly sensitive environment in which the MEDT operates," recommended the CINCPAC PEG team, "it would appear prudent to afford the Chief, MEDT an opportunity to review appropriate personnel records prior to the arrival of a senior replacement and his family. Both the outgoing and incumbent Chief, MEDT strongly endorsed such a procedure."3

(S) In addition to the aforementioned topics addressed by the CINCPAC PEG team during its evaluation of MEDT Burma, and leaving out the team's detailed observations on the UB Armed Forces, the following points were considered noteworthy enough for inclusion in the team's report of the visit:

"d. (S) The MEDT was awaiting CINCPAC approval (which is contingent upon Presidential determination) to initiate negotiations of the sixth increment ($3.1 million) of the 1961 phase II sales package. The MEDT was considering the feasibility of handling the residue of the 1963 program as a seventh increment. There had been no expression by the Union of Burma concerning negotiation of another agreement with the United States. However, the insurgent problem in the north and current favorable attitudes of senior Union of Burma military officials may portend such a development.

"e. (U) Since Burma is a sales country, no host country-furnished transportation is made available to the MEDT. Also MEDT personnel are not permitted to bring their private cars to Burma. Thus, MEDT activities and personnel must be supported by U.S. -furnished vehicles.

1. Ibid.
3. Burma MAP PEG.
At the time of the visit, the MEDT had 20 vehicles of various makes and models; average mileage of these vehicles was 48,000 miles. This vehicle fleet was being maintained by one locally hired civilian mechanic. Because of the difficulty and delays in obtaining spare parts, and the absence in Burma of adequate civilian vehicle repair facilities, Chief, MEDT cited the need to standardize his fleet as to make and model, preferably to a Chevrolet sedan. J43 will support CHMEDT, Burma in this respect as attrition vehicles are replaced.

"f. (U) The MEDT has maintained a record of all Burma Armed Forces personnel who have received training in the United States since 1958 and their current Burma locations.

g. (U) The cohesiveness, esprit de corps and willingness to get the job done demonstrated by the MEDT were commendable. The cooperation, assistance and graciousness extended to the team were outstanding." \(^1\)

\(\text{China}\)

\(\S\) The primary mission of MAAG China "is to influence the GRC to maintain and utilize its armed forces in support of U.S. objectives." \(^2\)

From 8 through 26 April 1968, a CINCPAC PEG team conducted an evaluation of China MAP, exactly twelve months later than the previous one. \(^3\) In both instances, the MAP-supported objectives had been the same: (a) "Maintain GRC armed forces sufficient, in combination with available U.S. forces, to defend Taiwan, and the Penghus;" (b) "Maintain a climate in which the United States will continue to enjoy existing and, if required, additional overflight, staging and base rights." \(^4\)

\(\S\) The effectiveness of CHMAAG China in carrying out these objectives was discussed in detail in the final report of the CINCPAC MAP Evaluation of China.

1. Ibid.
2. Ltr, CINCPAC to CHMAAG China, 17 Jun 68, Subj: Evaluation of Military Assistance Program in China, with Encl: Final Report of CINCPAC Evaluation of MAP China. This Final Report is the sole source of the following account of the PEG evaluation of China MAP in 1968. Hereafter cited as China MAP PEG.
4. Ibid., p. 303; China MAP PEG, p. 1.
In this evaluation, as in all PEG evaluations, the scope encompassed a multitude of activities, and the team members visited many people and places. The final report published by Hq CINCPAC, which is crammed full of the team's observations, comments, and recommendations, is indicative of the thoroughness of the evaluation. Since the most significant and noteworthy of the findings of the CINCPAC PEG officers are contained in a special section at the beginning of this final report, this portion is reproduced below:

"a. (U) MAAG China was functioning effectively.

"b. (U) Relationships between U.S. advisors and their Chinese counterparts, based on advisor and GRC Armed Forces personnel statements and evaluation team observations, were splendid. No exceptions were noted.

"c. (U) The Mission Progress Evaluation System implemented by the MAAG as a command management tool for improved MAAG accomplishment of its MAP responsibilities, was a noteworthy achievement, and deserved consideration for establishment in other MAAGs in the CINCPAC area. Included in this system was a series of formal monthly reviews by CHMAAG China of the status of all significant aspects of the MAP, identification of problem or potential problem areas, and methods to solve such problems.

"d. (C) The MAAG was facing a major personnel problem. The DOD Reduction in Overseas Personnel Program was reducing authorized spaces by 33 percent (240 spaces), with 75 percent of the reduction to be eliminated by 31 December 1968, and the entire reduction to be completed by 30 June 1969. The MAAG had submitted to CINCPAC its proposed method of reducing the MAAG's strength.

"e. (C) Related directly to the preceding, there was also the requirement for a major reorganization of the MAAG in recognition of its considerable strength reduction. This aspect had not been resolved at the time of the evaluation. The new organizational structure must be skillfully developed to retain existing effectiveness and close relationships with the GRC Armed Forces.

"f. (C) The accelerated decrease in the magnitude of the MAP for the Republic of China was highlighting a problem in the GRC force structure guidance provided the MAAG. Such guidance was contained in
both the Military Assistance Manual and in the Joint Strategic Objective Plan. Since 1965, the recommended GRC force structure objective had differed in the two documents, compounding the MAAG's problem in advising the GRC Armed Forces.

"g. (U) Many excellent MAAG training staff visits had been made to elements of the GRC Armed Forces. However, this facet of the MAAG's program could be improved if such visits were more frequent, and each coordinated fully both before and after the visit.

"h. (C) The combat readiness of the GRC Armed Forces was excellent. Training programs were well organized and executed, and exercises provided realistic training. Commanders, instructors and training cadres were well motivated and proficient.

"i. (U) Training facilities and aids constructed by GRC Armed Forces tactical units and schools were outstanding, and were a tribute to the imagination and ingenuity of those involved. Most of these splendid facilities had been fabricated locally without outside support.

"j. (C) GRC Armed Forces combat personnel were well qualified with their equipment. However, most of this equipment was of World War II or Korean War vintage. In the event of extended combat, replacement by newer U.S. equipment would create a lack of familiarity which would result in an initial lowered combat effectiveness.

"k. (C) The Chinese Army (CA), Navy (CN), Air Force (CAF) and Marine Corps (CMC) needed increased participation in combined exercises, to include live firing exercises.

"l. (C) The CN needed increased emphasis on antisubmarine warfare training involving surface ships and S-2A aircraft.

"m. (C) The low level of shipboard safety in the CN and logistics support management in the CMC needed increased command attention.

"n. (U) The CA's most significant logistical need continued to be a modern vehicle fleet. Supply support for the World War II-type equipment on hand was becoming more critical each year. The CA's actions to keep its current vehicle fleet functioning were commendable.
"o. (U) It was readily apparent that increased command attention had been given in the CA to PLLs and ASLs, and marked improvement was noted.

"p. (U) The new capabilities of the 3rd Air Depot, CAF, to manufacture and repair life support equipment were excellent.

"q. (U) For improvement of its supply management, the CMC needed a supply career field, and supply courses within the CMC school system.

"r. (G) The long standing MND request for Electronic Warfare training for the GRC Armed Forces should be forwarded by the MAAG to CINCPAC for consideration and processing.

"s. (U) There was insufficient power generating equipment in the CAF inventory for AC&W sites and navigational aids facilities.

"t. (U) The CAF, together with the MAAG, was compiling a consolidated list of training equipment requirements to update schools and training facilities throughout the CAF. It was planned to match these requirements against USAF reported excesses and negotiate acquisition at no cost to the GRC other than packing, crating, handling and transportation. This project should result in needed CAF training equipment modernization at minimum cost. 

Korea

(U) A CINCPAC PEG team visited Korea from 9 through 27 September 1968 to conduct an evaluation "to determine the effectiveness of the MAP and the military assistance organization in Korea." 2 In this country, the senior U.S. military commander has the distinctions of wearing three hats as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA), and Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army. As COMUSKOREA, he is responsible to CINCPAC.

1. China MAP PEG, pp. 2-4.
2. Ltr, CINCPAC to COMUSKOREA, 20 Nov 68, Subj: Evaluation of Military Assistance Program in Korea, with Encl: Final Report of CINCPAC Evaluation of MAP Korea, which is hereafter cited as Korea MAP PEG.
for MAP affairs in Korea. To fulfill this mission, COMUSKOREA has organized his command in a manner that is unique within PACOM. "There is no centralized Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), per se, in Korea as is usually found in many MAP countries and typically expected by most of those involved in MAP affairs at all echelons:"

a. (U) Joint Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea (Provisional) (PROVMAAG-K) is the designation of the principal staff element within Headquarters, United States Forces, Korea charged by COMUSK with overall surveillance of the MAP, with integration of service component programs into a single MAP for Korea, with providing advisory service to the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the National War College and the Armed Forces Staff College, and with assisting in the formulation of the ROK defense budget. The Army, Navy and Air Force advisory organizations are not component parts of PROVMAAG-K, nor is PROVMAAG-K responsible for day to day operational or logistical advisory functions of those service entities.

b. (U) Each of the service advisory organizations (Army: KMA; Navy: Naval Advisory Group, Korea; Air Force: 6146th Air Force Advisory Group) is responsible for MAP affairs directly to their respective service component commands, which in turn are responsible, in MAP matters, to COMUSK. 1

(9) As in the cases of the Philippines, China, and Thailand, the CINCPAC PEG officers prepared a "Summary of Major Findings" to be located at the beginning of their 173-page final report, which was published by Hq CINCPAC following the evaluation of Korea MAP. Since this portion of the final report sums up the most pertinent comments and observations of the CINCPAC PEG team, it is reproduced as follows:

"a. (U) PROVMAAG-K and the service advisory groups were functioning effectively. Varying channels of communications within the

1. Korea MAP PEG, pp. 1, 2.
COMUSK military assistance organization dictated particular care by all concerned to ensure that the several component parts of the MAP were so planned, coordinated and managed that the MAP for Korea was, in fact, a single program responsive fully to COMUSK command guidance and direction. To this end, a formal command management system should be instituted. Worthy of particular note was the mission dedication and professionalism displayed by all advisor personnel, and the fine rapport which had been developed with their respective ROK Armed Forces counterparts.

"b. (U) The MAP for Korea had been demonstrably effective in strengthening the posture of the ROK Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. There was room for further improvement in ROK Armed Forces operations, and these are addressed generally below, and in detail in PART II of this report.

"c. (S-NOT FORN) Current MAP dollar guidelines and ROK Defense Budget were not adequate to sustain properly the present ROK Armed Forces structure. Should additional forces be needed to achieve recently revised MAP objectives, such could not be provided from within current funding resources without further detriment to the forces already activated. The necessity to fit requirements into a less than adequate budget dictated particular care in light of the operational environment of Korea.

"d. (U) Retardation at the POE of KMAG replacements caused by delays in receipt of passports and visas, addressed also in the 1967 Evaluation Report, had not been solved. There were no such Navy, Air Force nor Marine Corps problems.

"e. (S) The impending reduction of 22 percent of the personnel spaces from the COMUSK military assistance organizational structure (414 of 1,861) will impact on the COMUSK MAP and operational missions. Skillful tailoring would be required to minimize adverse affects.

"f. (U) Although there had been some improvement in the grade level of KMAG advisor personnel, there continued to be too many junior officers assigned to advisor positions requiring officers of more experience, maturity and grade.

"g. (C) The COMUSK organizational structure for conduct of the MAP mission had been challenged often in recent years, and as
recently as the period of this evaluation. Under the existing operational environment in Korea, the present COMUSK organization for conduct of the MAP should be supported by CINC PAC, and qualified personnel in sufficient quantities provided to support its retention.

"h. (U) The Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) civic action program should be continued, and funded appropriately. U.S. Military Department funding should be obtained to support the program.

"i. (C) Due to long distances and poor road nets in the FROKA area, adequate aircraft transportation for advisor personnel was needed, and was not available. Should a reduction in strength cause a further concentration of stationing of advisor personnel, the need for air travel would become even more critical to advisor mission accomplishment.

"j. (S-NOTFOR) The tactical mobility of ROK ground forces was being degraded by a combination of factors including vehicle shortages, age of the vehicle fleet, inadequacy of funding and availability of spare parts, and of funding limitations for vehicle fleet modernization.

"k. (C) There had been recent instances of the introduction of new types of equipment into the ROK Armed Forces without adequate provisions for early receipt of concurrent spare parts. This had created undue difficulties in the training, operation and maintenance of such new equipment.

"l. (C) The lack of attention to facilities maintenance by the ROK Armed Forces continued to be a pressing problem meriting command attention.

"m. (U) In view of limited MAP funding, CONUS English language training should be deemphasized and early attainment of an adequate in-country capability emphasized.

"n. (U) There was a strong feeling of confidence and determination in the FROKA that enemy intrusion and infiltration on the DMZ front lines could be detected and defeated. A similar confident feeling of mission accomplishment capability was prevalent throughout the ROK Armed Forces.
"o. (S) Although some improvement had been accomplished in the security of ammunition depot storage areas, additional improvements were required to satisfy minimum requirements.

"p. (C) There was inadequate command attention to basic maintenance procedures and practices. Improvements in preventive maintenance would have measurable benefits in dramatically improving the material readiness of the Korean Armed Forces.

"q. (C) In FY 68, funded requisitions for ROKA Class II & IV items which had been submitted in FY66 and FY67 were canceled. The requirement for the materiel remained valid. The $909,183 which supported the original requisitions may be lost to the MAP.

"r. (S) The ROKA microwave system needed terminal and system control facilities to improve overall management of the system.

"s. (S) The preponderance of MAP funds for the ROKN had been used to improve the combat readiness of the Fleet. Unless a similar emphasis was soon placed on improvement of the Shore Establishment, a serious imbalance between operational and materiel readiness would occur.

"t. (S) Security at the Chinhae Naval Base was unsatisfactory. Loss of critical facilities within this Base would eliminate in-country shore support for the Fleet and preclude sustained operations at sea.

"u. (S) Shortages in ammunition for gunnery training of ROKAF fighter pilots would, if unresolved, affect adversely the combat readiness of the ROKAF.

"v. (C) To adequately protect GCA and TACAN equipment from power fluctuations, voltage regulators were needed on commercial power sources at Kimpo, Suwon, Kwangju and Chinhae ABs.

"w. (C) The Control and Reporting Center plotting boards at Magilson and Paenggsan were too small for effective air battle control and should be replaced.
"x. \(\text{(S)}\) Unreliable communications between Kimpo AB and the Air Materiel Depot at Taegu were affecting adversely materiel readiness of the 11th Fighter Wing at Kimpo AB.

"y. \(\text{(C)}\) Maintenance of the fleet of obsolete LVT-3Cs by the ROKMC was noteworthy and contributed significantly to the maintenance of the ROKMC's amphibious assault capability."\(^1\)

**Philippines**

\(\text{(S)}\) During the period 18 November through 5 December 1968, a CINCPAC PEG evaluation of JUSMAG Philippines was conducted. Its purpose was to examine the progress of the MAP, determine the effectiveness of the MAP, assess the effectiveness of the JUSMAG, and to point out deficiencies that warranted increased command attention."\(^2\) The previous CINCPAC PEG visit to the Philippines had been from 20 May through 9 June 1967, when the MAP objectives for this country had been the same. \(^3\) The primary mission of JUSMAG Philippines was to assist the Armed Forces of the Republic of the Philippines (AFP) to attain the capability to: (a) "Maintain internal security against communist inspired subversion and insurgency or other forces hostile to U.S. interests;" (b) "Contribute to the defense of the Philippines against external aggression;" (c) "Make a modest contribution to the collective defense of the Western Pacific area."\(^4\)

\(\text{(S)}\) In forwarding the final report of the CINCPAC MAP Evaluation of the Philippines, CINCPAC wrote to CHJUSMAG Philippines, the "improvement observed in JUSMAG functioning, and in Armed Forces of the Philippines operations as a result of JUSMAG advisory effort, over that found during the preceding (FY 67) evaluation is commendable."\(^5\)

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1. Korea MAP PEG, pp. 2-4.
2. Ltr, CINCPAC to CHJUSMAGPHIL, 31 Jan 69, Subj: Evaluation of the Military Assistance Program, Philippines, with Encl: CINCPAC PEG Report Philippines. This enclosure, being the final report of the CINCPAC PEG team, is cited hereafter as Philippines MAP PEG.
5. Ltr, CINCPAC to CHJUSMAGPHIL, 31 Jan 69, Subj: Evaluation of the Military Assistance Program, Philippines.
(2) Gathered together at the beginning of the published final report were all the noteworthy and significant observations that the CINCPAC PEG officers had made during their evaluation. This section, entitled "Summary of Major Findings," is reproduced below:

"a. (C) The JUSMAG was functioning effectively in discharging its MAP responsibilities, although improvements were needed in the military assistance planning and programming field and in its internal administrative operations. Worthy of particular note were the dedication, professionalism and counterpart relationships of advisor personnel, and the appreciable improvements within the Armed Forces of the Philippines attributable to effective advisory assistance.

"b. (S) The MAP had been demonstrably effective in furthering the development of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. MAP-supported objectives were being achieved. Diminishing MAP dollar ceilings and limitations in the availability of Government of the Philippines funds would not permit improvement of segments of the Armed Forces of the Philippines at other than a slow rate.

c. (U) JUSMAG planning incident to the Balance of Payments (BALPA) personnel reduction program was effective. The impending consolidation at the joint staff level of the JUSMAG of the military assistance planning and programming functions should serve to solve existing internal coordination problems in that functional area.

d. (U) CHJUSMAG had in existence a command management system involving the monthly, or more frequently if required, review of all significant projects of the JUSMAG. Primarily uniservice oriented, the system minimized formal internal correspondence and emphasized oral analysis presentations.

e. (U) Assignment to the field of a Philippine Constabulary (PC) advisor for each of the four PC Zones since the last CINCPAC evaluation had proved to be very effective. These advisors had also been charged with advisory responsibility for the Philippine Army (PA) Military Area Supply Point located within their respective geographic areas. The resulting close and frequent contacts with PA logistical personnel were paying sizeable dividends to the overall JUSMAG effort.
"f. (G) There were problems developing in the PAF, including inadequate pilot production, that required more intensive and coordinated advisory efforts to prevent degradation of PAF capability.

"g. (G) The JUSMAG obtained excess motor vehicles from USN and USAF property disposal agencies in-country, and had turned them over to the Armed Forces of the Philippines for use in civic action activities. This action, albeit altruistic, was irregular in that the procedures of the transaction were contrary to DOD directives governing the administration of military assistance.

"h. (G) There continued to be excessive rotation of senior officers throughout the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The resulting short tenure of the commanders did not allow the full realization of the talents of these officers, in some cases resulted in frequent changes in policy, and generally caused turbulence throughout the Services.

"i. (G) Available funding, including MAP and Government of the Philippines funds, was not adequate to support the current Armed Forces of the Philippines structure and provide for appropriate modernization.

"j. (U) The Armed Forces of the Philippines Supply Center (AFPSC) had made significant improvements in all functional areas since the last evaluation. The recent complete inventory should have beneficial effects throughout the logistical system of the Armed Forces.

"k. (U) Initiation of a direct exchange program for sub-assemblies and the beginning of a maintenance contact team system were significant first steps towards increasing the effectiveness of the logistical support of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

"l. (S-NOFOR) There were indications of unauthorized proliferation within the Armed Forces of the Philippines of some of the equipment provided for the ten MAP-supported engineer construction battalions of the PA 51st Engineer Brigade. Seventy 1/4 ton trucks had been diverted with the sanction of the JUSMAG. A few other items had been diverted on a temporary loan basis by GHQ, AFP without prior contact with the JUSMAG. The Philippine Military Council had reportedly approved the equipping of one PN and one PAF engineer battalion with equipment from the 51st Engineer Brigade. CHJUSMAG was acting on this major problem area.
m. (C) As reported also in the FY 67 Evaluation Report, there was a real need for a Master Communications-Electronics Plan for the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

n. (U) In the field particularly, fine working arrangements existed between visited PA and PC individuals and units.

o. (U) The Philippine Navy (PN) Supply Center was in need of intensive advisory effort to correct serious problems concerning stock management and supply operations.

p. (C) Two of the three PN ships visited during the evaluation were in a poor state of repair.

q. (S) The PAF was having difficulty producing sufficient new pilots to satisfy the needs of the force, and the situation would become progressively worse unless considerable remedial action was taken. The number of new pilots graduated each year was less than the average PAF annual attrition. The number of T-34 trainer aircraft available was far less than required because of an excessive number out of commission for the lack of engines, the PAF was reluctant to substitute the newly provided T-41 aircraft for the T-34, and the PAF Depot support for T-28 trainer engines was less than satisfactory.

r. (S) The Air Operations Center operated by the PAF 1st Air Division at Nichols Air Base was a fine facility but lacked communications to function effectively as the alternate Air Defense Control Center.

s. (U) Two of the four warehouses at the PAF Depot had been rehabilitated, and a complete inventory had been accomplished. As a result of the inventory, stock record accuracy had improved remarkably.

Thailand

(U) In the early part of 1968, 15 January - 2 February, a CINCPAC PEG evaluation was made of the Thailand MAP. "The purpose of the visit was to evaluate the progress of the MAP for Thailand, determine the effectiveness of JUSMAGTHAI and status of host country activities, ascertain conditions reflected in previous General Accounting Office

and Army Audit Agency reports, and highlight deficiencies that merit command attention.1 The CINCPAC PEG team recognized the dual function of the military commander, being both COMUSMACTHAI and CHJUSMAGTHAI, and addressed itself to that portion of his mission dealing primarily with the MAP for Thailand.

"The mission of COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI is to assist the Royal Thai Government Armed Forces (RTARF) and paramilitary forces in attaining the capability to: maintain internal security against communist-inspired subversion and insurgency; resist external aggression; and to contribute to the collective defense of the SEATO area."2

When he addressed the CINCPAC PEG team at the outset of the evaluation:

...COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI cited accomplishments as well as the problems faced by his command. He emphasized that these accomplishments and problems occur in a "crisis" atmosphere, with the organization, equipping, training and ultimate deployment of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) to the Republic of Vietnam as a current example. Major accomplishments have been improved Thai/U.S. bilateral planning, better Country Team relationships, and improved Thai intelligence coordination. Major problem areas involved limited U.S. personnel resources and the RTAVF project. COMUSMACTHAI emphasized that his highest priority undertakings were the RTAVF, and improving interservice cooperation and the stature and capabilities of the Ministry of Defense within the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF).3

1. Ltr, CINCPAC to COMUSMACTHAI, 2 Apr 68, Subj: Evaluation of Military Assistance Program in Thailand, with Encl: Final Report of CINCPAC Evaluation of MAP Thailand. This letter and accompanying final report served as the sources for the information pertaining to the CINCPAC PEG evaluation of Thailand. Hereafter cited as Thailand MAP PEG.
3. Thailand MAP PEG, p. 2.
After traveling throughout Thailand, visiting the various military organizations and installations and consulting with numerous individuals, the team members departed. Their efforts, however, assumed a more concrete form, when their 144-page final report was published by Hq CINCPAC. Without doubt, the most significant findings of this CINCPAC PEG team were contained in their section, entitled "Summary of Major Findings," which is quoted verbatim as follows:

"a. (U) It was apparent that the MAP for Thailand had progressed satisfactorily since the last evaluation. USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI had been effective. The mission dedication, rapport with counterparts and professional competence of the command were high and reflected a confident capability to meet the challenges ahead.

"b. (U) Duty assignments made when the JTD was pending approval resulted in an excessive turnover of personnel in some staff divisions within extremely short periods of time.

c. (S) Joint U.S./Thai efforts (Project 33) to develop a RTARF structure for a five year planning period were commendable.

d. (U) Execution of the MAPETT concept had paid large dividends in the improvement of the RTARF.

e. (U) Promotion of Foreign Military Sales merited increased attention.

f. (S) Generally, RTARF training had been impeded by lack of budgetary support, lack of training ammunition, the low present-for-duty strength of officers and NCOs, commitment of units to operations, and the high deadline rate of vehicles.

g. (U) Dramatic improvement in aircraft utilization and operationally ready rates had been achieved and resulted in significant improvement in the combat capability of the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF).

h. (C) Base security within the RTAF remained inadequate due to equipment and physical limitations.
"i. (C) Continued decentralized training of recruits at the battalion level absorbed a significant portion of the battalion training effort, and resulted in less than adequate higher level training in the Royal Thai Army (RTA).

"j. (C) It would be advantageous for the Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) infantry battalion assigned to the Chantaburi area to be rotated among the three infantry battalions of the RTMC Brigade to provide all units with valuable experience in ground combat and amphibious operations.

"k. (C) Accelerated development of a Forward Air Controller capability in the RTAF was an urgent requirement.

"l. (C) The Commandant of the RTMC exercised operational command over only approximately one-half of the RTMC, which reduced his capability to conduct amphibious training for a large part of the RTMC.

"m. (U) When Sattahip becomes the primary operating base of the Royal Thai Navy (RTN), the assignment of an officer of the rank of CDR as the principal advisor to the Fleet Commander and the Naval Base Commander would be desirable.

"n. (C) Deadline of wheeled vehicles had increased since the last evaluation. There was a spare parts management problem in the RTAF.

"o. (U) The RTA engine rebuild facility had made commendable progress in increasing production. Expansion of this capability would contribute to RTA self-sufficiency and a concomitant savings by reducing dependence on third country rebuild.

"p. (U) Commendable progress in disposition of excesses had been achieved during the past year. However, considerable excesses still remained.

"q. (C) Organizational maintenance of aerospace ground equipment within the RTAF was generally poor.
"r. (C) The RTN lacked standard procedures within its supply system.

"s. (C) Although operational, the bulk of the RTMC equipment was old and nearing the end of its service life.

"t. (U) The RTMC rebuild program for the LVT-4 was in the process of restoring 30 LVTs for service, and commendable progress had been achieved.

"u. (C) The lack of an optical repair capability within the RTMC was contributing to the deterioration of fire control optical equipment held by the RTMC.

"v. (U) Monitoring of the "MILTELCOM" program for the installation of fixed plant switchboard facilities at various RTARF installations needed improvement to ensure an efficient and reliable communications system for the RTARF.

"w. (C) Communications training of Division Signal Companies during field exercises was inadequate.

"x. (C) The age and quality of C-E equipment in the RTN made it questionable whether the RTN could perform sustained operations at sea.

"y. (U) Reconciliation of outstanding obligations had been delayed by the failure of the U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand (47th Finance Section) to provide USMACHTHAI copies of payment vouchers, and the failure of the USMACHTHAI Headquarters Commandant to provide copies of receipt documents to the USMACHTHAI Comptroller Office.

"z. (U) Procedures involved in the administration of Host Country Support Funds, noted in last year's evaluation report as well as in the Army Audit Agency Report PA 67-13, had been improved.

"aa. (C) COMUSMACHTHAI had not signed the State Department Shared Support Agreement submitted by the Embassy on 10 May 1967, since certain offsets for DOD services furnished to the Embassy were not allowed. Department of State instructions to the Embassy had not been provided,
and CINCPAC recommendations to the DOD Comptroller regarding offsets had not been acted upon.

"ab. (U) Supply support provided USMACHTAI by the 501st Field Depot of U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand was inadequate.

"ac. (U) There was no written policy for the assignment of rooms and utilization of beds in the Chao Phya Transient Officers Billeting Facility, resulting in 2703 "Nonavailability of Quarters" statements being issued when there was less than 50 percent bed occupancy."1

Deputy CHJUSMAG, Thailand (DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI)

(§) An evaluation of the MAP activities of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI was made by a CINCPAC PEG team during the period, 15 January - 2 February 1968. Because of the special situation regarding the activities of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, the evaluation had to be limited to those operations being conducted in Thailand. In brief, the mission of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI is to:

...assist in Laos military assistance planning; develop all Laos MAP programming documents; requisition materiel and receive and store it in Thailand and forward it to Laos when called; represent CINCPAC in managing the Laos MAP; maintain liaison with the USAID Requirements Office and Military Attaches in Laos; and to be prepared to establish a headquarters in Laos. 2

(§) As was true the previous year, the enforced geographical separation of DEPCHUSMAGTHAI from the country for which he had the MAP

1. Ibid., pp. 2-4
2. Ltr, CINCPAC to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, 5 Apr 68, Subj: Evaluation of Military Assistance Program of DEPCHJUSMAG, Thailand, with Encl: Final Report of CINCPAC MAP Evaluation of DEPCHJUSMAG, Thailand, which is the source for the following account of the CINCPAC PEG evaluation of Laos MAP. Hereafter cited as DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI MAP PEG.
responsibility continued to be a problem. Since the CINCPAC PEG team was prohibited from entering Laos:

...arrangements were made for a meeting at Udorn, Thailand with the ARMA, Deputy AIRA and Acting Requirements Officer, USAID to Laos. DEPCHEF also attended the meeting. During the ensuing profitable discussion, the following principal points were made by the conferees from Laos. Laos forces were receptive to advice and assistance, but there was a lack of effective management at all echelons. Although the Laos program had been exempted from the usual U.S. monitorship of end-item utilization, "404" personnel observed and reported such use as time permitted while engaged in their primary functions. Laos artillery was not employed properly, and the French advisors did not appear to be influencing improvement. There were insufficient numbers of personnel available who had the qualifications for training as signal repairmen. Equipment density reports were about 80-90 percent accurate. Initial equipment battle loss reports were usually highly inflated, and in-country U.S. reaction awaited reports submitted after field commanders had time to reassess the situation. There were glaring weaknesses in the Laos military logistics system. The January 1968 debacle at Nam Bac, involving eight battalions, was discussed--particularly the additional materiel requirements which may stem therefrom.  

\(8\) The final report of the CINCPAC evaluation of the MAP activities of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI contained the team's findings and recommendations. The team noted that the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI study to determine the feasibility and desirability of a change in the present Laos MAP management system, developed as a result of the FY 67 PEG evaluation, had been completed and was being considered by the CINCPAC staff. The recommendations made by the CINCPAC PEG team covered the remaining

2. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI MAP PEG, p. 1.
3. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI MAP PEG.
significant findings of the team and are reproduced below:

"(U) That DEPCHIEF reevaluate the entire personnel situation in ARMA, and direct future correspondence on this problem to CINCPAC for support.

"(S) That CINCPAC continue to review the Laos aircraft situation with a view toward timely resolution of continued provision of T-28s or phased introduction of a follow-on type.

"(U) That DEPCHIEF review the requirement for continued lease of the Bangkok warehouse facility.

"(C) That DEPCHIEF closely monitor the Air American contract to ensure that the cost of the contract remains in line with the benefits accrued therefrom.

"(U) That DEPCHIEF (a) initiate action to obtain quantity/distance waivers pertaining to storage of ammunition if required, and (b) maintain a record of periodic security and fire drills at the site.

"(U) That CINCPAC continue to treat this programmed requirement with the necessary priority to expedite installation of a secure voice capability for DEPCHIEF.

"(C) That DEPCHIEF request COMUSMACTHAI to investigate the possibility of increasing trunk service between DEPCHIEF and Vientiane.

"(U) That DEPCHIEF take action to ensure that classified storage rooms meet the standards prescribed in AR 380-5."

1. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI MAP PEG, pp. 4-16 passim.
SECTION III - COUNTRY ACTIVITIES

Burma

Burma is a nation plagued by economic and internal security problems. Economically, Burma has regressed. Internal security problems have increased, particularly in the north where CHICOM-trained dissidents are attempting to incite ethnic groups to rebel against the Ne Win Government. However, as demonstrated by the government's growing anti-Chinese stance, the Burmese are willing to assert their independence in the face of CHICOM provocation. Government forces have thus far been capable of containing insurgent activity.

Planned materiel military assistance to Burma will be completed in FY 68 with the $3.1 million increment for follow-on spare parts for previously provided U.S. equipment. Current plans call for $200,000 per year, for training only, commencing in FY 69. Regardless of its magnitude, the Military Assistance Program for Burma is important in terms of maintaining United States influence in a pivotal area between India and Thailand.

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp

1. CINCPAC 9 Apr 68 MAP Statement.
Burma

As of 1 January 1969

Basic Information

Area: 262,000 sq. mi.
Gross National Product: 1964
Population: 26,389,006
Annual Growth: 2.1% per capita
Natural Land: 17% (Acre/Defense Budget: 1964: $98,994,994)
Literacy Rate: 65 - 70% as % of total government expend
Life Expectancy: 15 years as % of exp.

Overall Objective

Assist all efforts to promote free world influences and resist communism.

U.S. Diplomatic Mission

U.S. Air Representative: Mr. F. William Small

Chairman of Council of Ministers:
Union of Burma Revolutionary Government/Defense Minister - Gen. Ne Win
Vice Chief of Staff Army - Brigadier San Ya
Vice Chief of Staff Air - Brigadier Thaung San
Vice Chief of Staff Navy - Commodore Thaung Tin

Map Objective

General objectives are:
(A) To help assure Burma's continued independence and non-alignment.
(B) To maintain U.S. influence in the Burmese armed forces.
(C) To assist Burma in containing the various factions of ethnic and Communist insurgency.

Major Force Guidelines

Army
99 Inf Bns, 3 Arty Bns, 1 Armd Bn, 1 Armd Car Bn, 1 Mortar Bn

Navy
3 Patrol Ships, 31 Patrol Boats, 1 Naval Landing Force, 4 LSS, 9 LCM, 1 Minesweeper, 5 MTB

Air Force
1 TAC FTR SQ, 2 Trans SQs, 2 Helo SQs, 1 TAC Comp Wg

Total Country Forces

Army
11 Inf Div Hqs, 96 Inf Bns, 9 Lt Inf Bns, 7 Arty Bns, 1 Armd Hqs, 1 Armd Car Bn

Navy
26 Patrol, 1 Mine Warfare, 4 Amphibious, 15 Amphibious Warfare Craft, 3 Auxiliary, and 3 Service Craft; No Principal Combatants

Air Force
1 USN, 1 Air TNG Center, 1 GB ART SQ, 13 T-55 Vampires, 1 Trans SQ, 2 Combat SQ, 1 Trans SQs, 2 Helo SQs, 24 Air REG (1000 Man) II, 3rd Force in Rangoon

Combat Capability

Not yet capable of fully securing internal peace and order, unable to offer sustained effective resistance to direct attack by CIICOM. No significant capability beyond Burma borders.

Capable of giving limited support to the army, discouraging piracy, and conducting modest INSORE PATROL duties.

Limited capability to maintain internal security by supporting the army and navy, negligible air defense capability against air attack by major powers.

Source: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 149.
Burma MAP (C)

(C) The review of Burma MAP FY 69-74 was completed during May 1968 and approved by CINCPAC. The plan provided for only $200,000 annually, which included approximately $86,000 for CHMEDT support, and the money was restricted to expenditures for solely training purposes. On the 24th of the month, the published two volumes of the Burma MAP FY 69-74 were promulgated by Hq CINCPAC. 1

(S) As reported in last year's history, SECDEF had reduced the FY 69 Burma MAP ceiling from $.4 to $.2 million on 16 December 1967 and, when queried by CINCPAC, had replied four days later "that the dollar level shown for FY 68 was intended to complete the Phase II Burma MAP commitment." 2 Actually, Burma MAP "is a sales agreement wherein the U.S. and Burma agree that the U.S. will provide military materiel and services and accept token payment in local non-convertible currency. The agreement is accepted by the U.S. as MAP grant aid and, with minor variations, is implemented in accordance with DOD MAP grant aid procedures. The agreement is accepted and implemented by Burma as a sales agreement." 3 In all, U.S. MA in Burma through the years "has provided about $80 million in equipment, spares, training and related services" and:

... The final increment of Burma MAP amounts to $2.2 million, over half for ordnance. United States aid policy is to close out remaining aid commitments, except training and follow on spares to maintain U.S. equipment. 4

(S) "Burma MAP is administered in-country by the only foreign military mission permitted in Burma, the Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT)... comprised of only 19 U.S. personnel (Off's and EM's) all of

1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68; CINCPAC MA Plan for Burma FY 69-74, Vols. I and II.
4. MAJ J. J. Snyder, USAF, CINCPAC, "Communist Insurgency in Burma," PACOM Intelligence Digest, No. 4-69, 14 Feb 69, p. 4.
which are in mufti and use an old private residence as an office building." 1
In the opinion of the American Ambassador to Burma, Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.:

U.S. contacts with Burma government officials are difficult and circumscribed; U.S. influence on the Government of Burma is minimal; and the only other operating U.S. program in Burma, our AID program is phasing down and out. Under these circumstances I consider that the MAP program in Burma should be looked at in the light of overall U.S. interests, and should be given considerably higher priority, and greater flexibility, than ordinarily would be the case. 2

(5) This uniqueness of Burma MAP has arisen from the determination of Burma, from its independence, to steer clear of the Cold War and to follow in foreign affairs "policy of strict and generally scrupulous neutrality and non-involvement." 3 As a result, MEDT Burma has no official advisory missions, although "the Burmese do frequently ask for and get assistance in supply and other matters although usually in a low key and at a low level." 4 Because of its uniqueness, MEDT Burma provides an excellent channel through which to exert U.S. influence on the military-oriented leadership of the country. In fact, any changes in the status, size, or rank of MEDT Burma would probably "be taken by the Burmese as a barometer of U.S. interest or intent toward Burma." 5

(5) The primary objectives of Burma MAP are: (1) "To help assure Burma's continued independence and non-alignment;" (2) "To maintain U.S. influence in the Burmese Armed Forces;" (3) "To assist Burma in

2. Quoted by CHMEDT Burma in Enclosure 10 of Final Report of PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference - October 1968, which was prepared by LCOL Gerald S. Brown, USAF, J5313, Hq CINCPAC.
5. Ibid.
containing the various factions of ethnic and communist insurgency."¹ The need of Burma for military assistance is self-evident, for the country can not afford to purchase the necessary military equipment needed to either maintain or improve its existing military capabilities. "The economy of Burma has been progressively deteriorating as a result of the ill-conceived and mismanaged socialization of trade and industry," and "there are no indications that the government will modify its unworkable economic policies."² Unless the U.S. provides this needed military assistance, Burma would have to adopt one of several alternatives, any of which "would enhance communist influence; do nothing to enhance U.S. influence in Burma; and weaken the U.S. image and prestige in Southeast Asia."³

(8) As of mid-December 1968, the "sixth and final increment (FY 68) of the current U.S. Military Assistance Program for Burma is now being implemented."⁴ It was signed on 17 November 1968. The $2.5 million authorized will provide for follow-on spares (FOS) support only. American military assistance to Burma over the years, "and the accompanying military presence to manage it and administer it, has been the single most important factor in maintaining U.S. influence in Burma and providing the present Burmese capability to contain insurgency."⁵

(8) On the whole, as the year 1969 began, the outlook for Burma appeared bleak.

...Burma's resources are already extended and would be severely strained to deal with a moderate increase in the level of effectiveness of the insurgents. The Ne Win regime is expected to retain control, but his government is experiencing increasing political and economic problems which potentially could lead to collapse. Overall, Burma's future is fraught with uncertainties....active communist insurgency threatens the northern tribal areas. There is substantially increased Chinese support to subversive anti-government

2. Ibid., p. 17.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
elements through both covert military and overt diplomatic means. China is capable of seriously disrupting Burma's internal security. It is doubtful that Peking will long tolerate a weak Ne Win government plagued with internal problems and increasingly susceptible to western influence.

The future for Burma as seen at this time is a slow and steady deterioration leading to more serious crises as CHICOM pressures increase. 1

Burma MAP Prior Year Funds (0)

(5) On 17 April 1968, the Office of the Secretary of Defense made known by means of a memorandum that approximately $4.2 million of the 1962 MAP commitment of $43 million to Burma still remained undelivered and uncommitted. 2 The American Ambassador to Burma, Mr. Henry A. Byroade, made use of this information to make the following recommendation:

... Burmese up to now have given us no further signs that they are interested in a new program. They are aware, however, that this sixth increment will be last one....

My attitude toward a follow-on program is even stronger than it was two years ago. With Burma no longer officially tolerated by CHICOMs as a "friendly" neighbor but now an open target of CHICOM hostility and subversion, Burma's need for a continuing flow of military equipment to maintain her internal security has become even more pressing. At same time, her economic position has deteriorated to a point where any real prospect of paying for her military needs out of her own foreign exchange earnings is out of the question. More than ever, I am convinced that a new military

1. MAJ J. J. Snyder, USAF, CINCPAC, "Communist Insurgency in Burma," PACOM Intelligence Digest, No. 4-69, 14 Feb 69, p. 14.
2. J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
aid program of about the same magnitude and under
generally similar terms to the one now coming to
an end... would be very beneficial to our interests
here... .

I have just learned, however, that there
may be a way out of our immediate dilemma. It
will not resolve question of whether we and Burmese
can get together on follow-up program, but it will
give us an extra year to work it out... .

Vehicle for obtaining this extra year is
the $4.2 million residue that has accumulated
from unspent balances and cancellations in pre-
vious increments. As I understand it, this money
could either be included in sixth increment, thereby
raising total from $3.1 million to $7.3 million, or
could become separate seventh increment to be
negotiated as additional package in 1969 after sixth
increment finalized. In view foregoing consider-
ations, I recommend that latter course be followed
and that this $4.2 million be held for separate
seventh increment. 1

(5) CINCPAC concurred with Ambassador Byroade's proposal just
five days later, but the Secretary of State non-concurred with it on 14
June 1968. 2 In an attempt to salvage the follow-on spare (FOS) and
spare parts funds that remained from prior year uncommitted FOS
money--an action which would allow the Burmese to keep operable
the U.S. equipment that had previously been furnished to them through
MAP--CINCPAC recommended to SECDEF four days later that when
the "total amount of FOS monies is known, CHMEDT be advised and be
permitted to inform the Burmese of the total amount that exists for
their use, in addition to the FY 67 and FY 68 (fifth and sixth increment)
funds. 3

1. AMEMBASSY Rangoon 3253/060944Z Jun 68.
2. CINCPAC 110250Z Jun 68 and SECSTATE 143214/141552Z Jun 68, both
cited in J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 181915Z Jun 68.
Burma MAP Phase III (C)

(C) As explained in the earlier subsections on Burma MAP in this chapter, Phase II of Burma MAP has expired and, if no new program was forthcoming, then the Burmese would have difficulty in maintaining their struggle against the insurgents within their country. As CHMEDT Burma urged in his briefing at the PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference in October 1968, a follow-on Burma MAP program "could be easily programmed at the level of three to four million initially, with the remainder as short fall and carried forward in future years." Early the next month, upon his return to Rangoon, Burma, CHMEDT forwarded to CINCPAC his schedule for the development of a five-year grant aid Burma MAP (Phase III Burma MAP). 

(S) By means of both a letter and a message on 5 November 1968, CINCRAC requested CHMEDT to proceed immediately with the development of such a plan. "The Phase III Burma MAP should be developed unilaterally by CHMEDT in conjunction with U.S. Embassy personnel," instructed CINCPAC, and "the FY 70 program should contain a maximum of four million dollars with the remaining requirements included in shortfall." By 29 November, CHMEDT Burma notified CINCPAC that the program had been developed and would be handcarried so as to arrive at Hq CINCPAC on 7 December 1968. Upon its scheduled arrival, the CINCPAC staff began reviewing the program.

(S) On 21 December 1968, CINCPAC asked the American Ambassador to Burma, Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., for his comments on the proposed Phase III of Burma MAP and whether or not the Burmese had made a formal request for such a continuation:

1. Enclosure 10 of Final Report of PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference - October 1968, which was prepared by LCOL Gerald S. Brown, USAF, J5313, Hq CINCPAC.
2. CHMEDT Rangoon MCX-110/010800Z Nov 68, cited in CINCPAC 052145Z Nov 68.
3. J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68; CINCPAC 052145Z Nov 68.
4. Ibid.
5. CHMEDT/AMEMBASSY Rangoon MCX-131/290900Z Nov 68.
6. J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
As you know, Burma Military Assistance Program is in the sixth and final increment of the present commitment. Information received at CINCPAC indicates the Burmese informally desire a continuation of the program, as their economy will neither support maintenance of equipment already delivered nor modernization. Informal discussion with OSD/ISA indicated a coordinated CINCPAC/Country Team program for FY 70 could be considered for Burma. However, before this program could be processed through OSD, Government of Burma position would have to be determined to include acceptance of the provisions of regulations governing such assistance.1

(9) Ambassador Hummel's reply on 27 December 1968 supported Phase III of Burma MAP, but regretfully stated that a formal request for such a program had not been received from the Government of Burma. It was his embassy "best estimate...that it would be counter-productive to try to press at this time for a Burmese request to continue MAP."2 He, however, recommended to CINCPAC that the proposed Burma MAP "FY 70 and beyond program for Burma be submitted to Washington for consideration."3

Request for M-16 Rifles for Burma (9)

(9) By a message on 20 November 1968, CHMEDT advised CINCPAC that officials of the Burma Ministry of Defense (MOD) had requested 10 M-16 rifles and 33,000 rounds of ammunition "for test and evaluation to determine suitability for use by Burma Defense Forces (BDF) in counter-insurgency operations."4 Three days later, CINCPAC requested CINC-USARPAC to advise on the "availability of M-16 rifles and ammunition" for the tests.5 At the same time, CINCPAC advised CHMEDT Burma that, if the results of the tests should lead to requests for additional M-16s by Burma, the "earliest date for follow-on deliveries would be

1. CINCPAC 212030Z Dec 68.
2. AMEMBASSY Rangoon 5308/270520Z Dec 68.
3. Ibid.
4. CHMEDT Burma MCX-121/200800Z Nov 68.
5. ADMIN CINCPAC 230350Z Nov 68.
FY 71 due to heavy programmed requirements. 1 Meanwhile, on 26 November, CINCUSARPAC had passed the request on to DA. 2

(Ç) DA indicated on 3 December 1968 that there were no M-16 rifles available for purchase at that time. 3 CINCPAC then queried CINCUSARPAC six days later as to the "availability of 10 M-16 rifles on loan basis and ammunition for requested test." 4 CINCUSARPAC replied that sufficient rifles were available from stocks on a loan basis, but the ammunition would have to be paid for. 5 In the latter part of December 1968, therefore, the J4 Division assumed the action on this matter from the J5 Division, Hq CINCPAC. 6

M79 Grenade Launchers for Burma

(Ç) At a meeting on 9 September 1968, officials from the Burma Ministry of Defense (MOD) "officially requested" of the Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team (CHMEDT), Burma, that 2,000 M79 grenade launchers with concurrent spare parts (CSP) and 200,000 rounds of high explosive (HE) ammunition be included in the sixth increment of the FY 68 Burma MAP. 7 "COL Kyi Maung, Deputy Vice Chief of Staff Army, who chaired the meeting, specifically requested that an answer to this request be provided prior to 30 Sep," a date "important to MOD for governmental budgetary planning purposes because it is the end of the Burma Fiscal Year." 8 "As a highly effective antipersonnel area fire fragmentation weapon," stated CHMEDT Burma two days later in a message to CINCPAC recommending approval, "the M79 will be used by Burma Army Infantry Forces as a tremendous improvement in capability to counter growing insurgency." 9

(Ç) Since these items were "not critical to U.S. and SEAAsia requirements," CINCPAC recommended approval of the Burmese request to

1. Ibid.; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
2. CINCUSARPAC 48439/260532Z Nov 68.
3. DA 889286/032230Z Dec 68.
4. CINCPAC 092041Z Dec 68.
5. CINCUSARPAC 50932/140540Z Dec 68.
6. J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
7. CHMEDT Rangoon MCX-096/1104000Z Sep 68.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
SECDEF on 21 September 1968. Four days later, this approval was granted. As a result, all necessary actions needed to meet this unusual request "were completed prior to 30 September 1968."

1. CINCPAC 210124Z Sep 68.
2. SECDEF 01318 B/251618Z Sep 68.
3. J530 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
China

(5) The Republic of China, whose armed forces approximate 600,000 men, contributes to a balance of power, favorable to the United States, in Asia. The existence of Free China's armed forces has had a deterrent effect on the Chinese Communists and has caused them to concentrate across the Straits a considerable number of troops which might otherwise be employed in aggressive moves in Asia.

The Republic of China is a nation of free, independent, non-communist people, whom we should continue to support in their rejection of communism. Also, Taiwan's strategic location makes it a vital link in the forward defense line of the United States in Asia. Its air bases and harbor facilities provide valuable support for our air and sea forces operating in Southeast Asia. The loss of Taiwan through defeat of our Chinese ally would be a disaster of incalculable proportions to Free World interests in Asia. Such loss would also pose an immediate threat to our Pacific lines of communications and to Okinawa and the Philippines.

Since 1950, through the Military Assistance Program, we have provided the Republic of China substantial material and training assistance. In recent years, our aid has been principally concerned with modernizing GRC equipment to offset the increasing capabilities of Red China. Limitations on Military Assistance funds in FY 68 have curtailed this modernization. For example, all except three F-5 aircraft programmed in FY 68 to replace the obsolete F-86 have been deleted. In attempting to compensate for the large reduction in FY 68, the GRC has increased its already large defense budget to accommodate an expanded military sales program.
The $30.4 million requested for FY 69 is some 40% lower than this year's level of $50.5 million. Of this $18.4 million is programmed to purchase critical aircraft and missile parts, engine overhauls, ship spare parts and other support equipment. Nine million will be required to crate, handle, and transport equipment programmed in prior years, as well as in FY 69. The remaining $3 million includes training, MAAG support and some machine tools to increase the self-sufficiency of the GRC armed forces.

Hopefully, the FY 69 program of $30.4 million, in conjunction with a credit sales program of $40 million, will enable the GRC to maintain a credible deterrent posture, without adversely affecting the economic viability of the government.

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp

1. CINCPAC 9 Apr 68 MAP Statement.
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1969

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA: 14,000 SQ. MI
POPULATION: 13,5 MIL
ANNUAL GROWTH: 1.2%
LITERACY RATE: 90%
LIFE EXPECTANCY: 67 YEARS
EARNED LABOR FORCE: 0.2 ACRE
OVERALL OBJECTIVE: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

DEFENSE BUDGET (SELF-FINANCED) 1968: $2.22 MIL
PER CAPITA: $22.38
AS % OF GNP: 0.76
AS % OF SELF-FINANCED PROVINCE/ CENTRAL GOVERNMENT: 52.7%

OVERALL OBJECTIVE: TO DEFEND TAIWAN AND THE PERSIANS FROM COMMUNIST ATTACK
U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

COUNTRY'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

TO DEFEND TAIWAN AND THE PERSIANS FROM COMMUNIST ATTACK
AND TO RETAIN APPROPRIATE U.S.
BASE RIGHTS ON THE TAIWAN TERRITORY.

MAP: OBJECTIVE

(A) To maintain GRC armed forces sufficient, in combination with
available U.S. forces, to defend Taiwan and the Penghu.

(B) To maintain a command in which the U.S. forces will continue
to enjoy existing and, if required, additional overflight, staging
and base rights.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES

U.S. AIR DIRECTOR

V. GERALD HUFFMAN (ACTING)

CHIEF, MAG

MAJ GEN RICHARD G. CICCOLELLA, USA

U.S. AMBASSADOR

HON. WALTER P. McCONAUGHY

SECRET

SECRET

VISITING OFFICER

VICE PRESIDENT - Chen, Chia-Kind
DEFENSE MINISTER - Chen, Chia-Kao
CHIEF, GEN STAFF - Gen (3rd grade) Kao Kuei Chiang, CA
CINC ARMY - Gen (3rd grade) Chen Tse Ching, CA
CINC NAVY - ADM Fang Chi Chung, CN
CINC AIR FORCE - Gen (3rd grade) Li Ming-Tang, CAF
CINC, COMBINED SERVICE FORCE - ADM (3rd grade) Li Kuang K'ai, CN
COMMANDANT, MARCORPS - LT GEN (temp rank) Chiang
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Wei Yen-Ming

TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

combat capability

maintain internal security; conduct effective ground defense of taiwan, Penghu & offshore islands against small scale attack if provided outside air, naval & logistic support. could contribute approx 3 DBs to collective defense effort. well-organized & combat ready.

THE OVERALL ABILITY OF THE CHINESE NAVY TO PERFORM ITS ASSIGNED MISSION IS CONSIDERED FAIR. THE CHINESE MARINES ARE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING IV, SIZED AMPHIB OPERATIONS, PROVIDED THE REQUIRED AIR & NAVAL SUPPORT, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT. WEAPONS ARE AVAILABLE.

FORCE COMBAT READY: THE AIR FORCE HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO PERFORM ITS PRIMARY FUNCTION, AIR DEFENSE OF TAIWAN, UNDER DAY VIS CONDITIONS. THE LIMITED AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY HAS IMPROVED SINCE THE F-4G0 SO BECAME OPERATIONAL.

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO TAIWAN, DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

HON. WALTER P. McCONAUGHY

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CINC AIR FORCE - Gen (3rd grade) Li Ming-Tang, CAF
CINC, COMBINED SERVICE FORCE - ADM (3rd grade) Li Kuang K'ai, CN
COMMANDANT, MARCORPS - LT GEN (temp rank) Chiang
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Wei Yen-Ming

TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

combat capability

maintain internal security; conduct effective ground defense of taiwan, Penghu & offshore islands against small scale attack if provided outside air, naval & logistic support. could contribute approx 3 DBs to collective defense effort. well-organized & combat ready.

THE OVERALL ABILITY OF THE CHINESE NAVY TO PERFORM ITS ASSIGNED MISSION IS CONSIDERED FAIR. THE CHINESE MARINES ARE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING IV, SIZED AMPHIB OPERATIONS, PROVIDED THE REQUIRED AIR & NAVAL SUPPORT, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT. WEAPONS ARE AVAILABLE.

FORCE COMBAT READY: THE AIR FORCE HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO PERFORM ITS PRIMARY FUNCTION, AIR DEFENSE OF TAIWAN, UNDER DAY VIS CONDITIONS. THE LIMITED AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY HAS IMPROVED SINCE THE F-4G0 SO BECAME OPERATIONAL.

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 155.
China MAP

(5) Toward the end of 1967, the American Ambassador at Taipei, Walter P. McConaughy, dispatched two messages through official channels on 22 and 23 December that clearly revealed the alarm of the Country Team and Chinese officials over the probable impact of the reductions in the China MAP FY 69 that had been proposed by the SECDEF on 16 December. 1 "We further urge," read the second dispatch, "that extensive consultations be held with CINCPAC to review future role of Taiwan and GRC military forces in the years beyond FY 69 when Congressional appropriations for MAP may be expected to be increasingly restricted." 2 When the new year dawned, J5 planners at Hq CINCPAC had this proposal from the ambassador under advisement. 3

(5) Representative of the U.S. Ambassador's rationale for such action was this following paragraph in one of his messages:

If there is a drastic cut in FY 69 MAP, there will be predictable decline in GRC ability to defend itself and serious reduction in the deterrence and tie-down effect of GRC military on CHICOM forces opposite Taiwan. This would call for some reassessment of USG defense posture. USG would have to be prepared to provide additional air, ground and sea forces more rapidly than presently planned in order to fulfill commitments under mutual security treaty. In addition, GRC reaction to MAP cut possibly could result in material weakening of central link in Allied defensive military posture around Far Eastern periphery. 4

In conclusion, he and the Country Team reiterated "recommendation for most careful consideration at high policy levels in U.S. Government to

2. AMEMBASSY Taipei 1718/230640Z Dec 68.
4. AMEMBASSY Taipei 1718/230640Z Dec 68.
any budgetary proposal which would materially reduce FY 69 China MAP to figure below $90 million range which has hitherto been accepted and programmed."1

(5) On 4 January 1968, CINC PAC gave the JCS his opinion that the proposed reduction in the FY 69 China MAP to the level of $30.4 million "would result in the deletion of all investment equipment and half of all programmed operating costs" and, if the costs of PCH&T (Packing, Crating, Handling and Transportation), as well as of MAAG support and training, were subtracted from this amount, "the remaining $18.1 million would not provide the minimum essential spare parts to maintain the Chinese Air Force and Chinese Navy in an acceptable state of operational readiness," a capability that was "essential to meet initial ROC operational requirements under current bilateral contingency plans."2 He also commented on the fact that Congress has consistently reduced MAP dollar ceiling recommendations in the past and to submit the figure of $30.4 million might very well result in a lower one. Accordingly, since China is listed as a Priority 1 nation under General Strategic Priorities, CINC PAC urged "that the current FY 69 China MAP of $90.0 million, which supports the JSOP, not be reduced."3

(5) Seven days later, the JCS reassured CINC PAC that they would give continued support "to the $120.3 million level for FY 69, emphasizing the utter inadequacy of $30.0 million and the risks involved."4 At the same time, they warned that:

Congress manifested a even greater antipathy toward Military Assistance Appropriation in the last session than ever before. The drastic reduction in FY 68 appropriation seems to be precipitous of the downward trend that is now well established. Other Washington agencies appear to be influenced by Congressional attitude in that they are reluctant to support the previously planned figure of $90.0 million for FY 69 GRC MAP. . . . In the face of these attitudes the JCS have frequently justified the requirement for continuing a high level of military assistance to the GRC.5

1. Ibid.
2. CINC PAC 040115Z Jan 68.
3. Ibid.
4. JCS 7074/112330Z Jan 68.
5. Ibid.

SECRET

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MAP T-33 for the Chinese Air Force being unloaded from the USNS KULA GULF onto Pier 17, Kaohsueng Harbor, Taiwan.
Chinese Army troops in the last phase of the infiltration course at the 4th Infantry Training Center, Taichung, Taiwan.
Meanwhile, the American Embassy at Taipei was passing on to the Secretary of State the reaction of Chiang Ching-kuo, GRC Defense Minister, to the cut in the FY 68 China MAP, which had been first imparted to him by a CHMAAG China letter on 30 December 1967. His concern over the possibility of this cut representing a major change in U.S. policy toward GRC eased, when informed by CHMAAG China that other programs had been reduced also. He did, however, express a fear that the "CHICOMs may be tempted to stage attack on Taiwan," once they became aware that the "effectiveness of GRC forces" had deteriorated as a result of the reduced MAP. He was particularly worried about the impact that the cut would have upon the Chinese Air Force, which was considered his country's first line of defense. Although "he knew of U.S. determination to abide by defense treaty commitments," he felt that America was too heavily committed elsewhere and that "GRC should plan to rely on its own defensive strength to a large extent."2

In his talk with Ambassador McConaughy on 11 January 1968, Chiang Ching-kuo exhibited a "notably calm, cooperative and constructive reaction" and said he "understood the budgetary problems that had caused the reduction in MAP, and recognized the necessity of determined joint U.S.-GRC efforts to solve the problems that would arise from the cut."3 The GRC military officers would understand the reasons for the MAP reductions, he continued, and every effort would be made to keep any adverse psychological effects among the Chinese civilians to the minimal. In McConaughy's opinion, the Defense Minister's "commendable attitude of buckling down to solve problems in good spirit, avoiding recriminations or complaints, and apparent determination to see that military requirements do not unduly upset other projects for which the national budget must make provision," constituted a reflection not only of his attitude, but also Generalísimo Chiang Kai-shek's instructions to him.4

On 25 January, the Secretary of State commended both McConaughy and CHMAAG China for their expert handling of the initial discussions with the Chinese Defense Minister following his learning of the sharp cut in FY 68 MAP funds. "In subsequent discussions with GRC," the secretary believed it was important to "provide as detailed and realistic picture as

1. AMEMBASSY Taipei 1869/120905Z Jan 68.
2. Ibid.; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
3. AMEMBASSY Taipei 1869/120905Z Jan 68.
4. Ibid.
possible of consequences of sharp grant MAP cuts for next two years and probable further decline thereafter. 1 In this regard, GRC should be encouraged to re-examine its military requirements with a view toward reducing its force level to one that could be realistically supported by the Chinese economy, aided by U.S. assistance. Because of the highly "political sensitivity of force reductions, with implication that offshore islands could be affected," the SECSTATE did not feel the U.S. should "take initiative in raising issue with GRC in this blunt form," but instead should "let GRC draw their own conclusions from MAP reduction, and await their plan of action to deal with it." 2

5) In concrete terms, the proposed FY 69 China MAP cut caused: (1) "33 additional F-5 aircraft were dropped from the program;" (2) 8 "UH-1H helicopters considered essential for an adequate SAR capability were eliminated;" (3) 1 MSC ( Minesweeper, Coastal (non-magnetic)) "urgently required to replace an old, uneconomical and marginally operable minesweep was dropped," (4) "some $31.0 million in operating costs will have to be absorbed by the GRC in order to forestall degradation of existing ROC armed forces capabilities." 3 Despite the fact that China contains resources, bases, and air lines of communications of major significance to U.S. military strategy, and despite the fact that its lack of coordination could adversely affect American chances of attaining desired objectives in Southeast Asia and could seriously limit U.S. capabilities to meet contingencies, the proposed FY 69 reduction, coupled with the sharp FY 68 cut, would greatly accelerate the degradation of GRC military effectiveness.

5) Based on information obtained from the DOD Table 700, CINCPAC informed CHMAAG China on 2 March 1968 that the tentative MAP dollar guidelines for FY 69 - FY 74 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 69</th>
<th>FY 70</th>
<th>FY 71</th>
<th>FY 72</th>
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1. SECSTATE 104682/250102Z Jan 68.
2. Ibid.
3. Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Feb 68, Subj: FY 69 China MAP.
4. CINCPAC 022112Z Mar 68; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68. All figures are expressed in millions of dollars.
On the same day, Congressman Otto Passman was being briefed by CHMAAG China during a visit to Taiwan. He "expressed surprise and concern" upon learning about the FY 68 reduction, stating that it was "too drastic, too soon and at the wrong time." Upon his return to Washington, he promised to talk to President Johnson about restoring some of the MAP funds to China. "As a result of this initiative by Congressman Passman," the SECDEF notified CINCPAC on 26 March, "STATE/DEFENSE agreed that FY 68 China MAP could be increased by $6.5 million," which would raise it to $50.5 million. Four days later, CINCPAC requested CHMAAG China to submit program additions to raise the program to the new ceiling.

CHMAAG China forwarded a resume of the requested items on 4 April 1968, stating that the detailed information necessary for processing the add-on in the Washington agencies would be forthcoming by hard copy submission. "Operating cost items which includes attrition acct is approximately $4.1 million," he explained, "and the balance of $2.4 million is for investment items which comprise the $6.5M increase." All programs, guidelines, etc. that were affected by this increase, he added, had been updated or were in the process of being updated. In addition, CHMAAG China pointed out that the increase "has impact on and is correlated to the $20.0M FY 68 Credit Sales Program currently in process of being formalized by DOD/EMB/MAAG/CRG officials." Two days later, CINCPAC concurred with CHMAAG China's "proposed FY 68 MAP additions and FY 68 FMS list."

A joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message on 8 April authorized Mr. Frank Fede "to sign credit sales arrangement in amount of $18 million subject to approval by Secretary of Defense," as well as listing the

1. CHMAAG China 331/020601Z Mar 68.
2. Ibid.; J5332A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
3. SECDEF 4703/262218Z Mar 68.
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 300309Z Mar 68.
5. CHMAAG Taipei 435/041331Z Apr 68; Memo, LCOL Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, Nov 68, Subj: China MAP, hereafter cited as LCOL Overgaard, China MAP Memo.
6. CHMAAG Taipei 435/041331Z Apr 68.
7. Ibid.
8. CINCPAC 062140Z Apr 68.
LST-222 undergoing MAP-supported rehabilitation work at Taiwan Shipbuilding Corporation, Keelung, Taiwan. Hull work is already completed and ship is being outfitted.

MAP-supported Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory on Taiwan.
Chinese Air Force personnel illustrate the Self-Help Program as they use a locally-made tester to run a hydraulic system check on an F-86-F.

China Self-Help Program in action as Chinese Air Force personnel use locally-made equipment to disassemble an aircraft tire.
specific changes that would have to be made in the arrangement. The following day, CHMAAG China advised SECDEF that this arrangement, with the directed changes and subject to his approval, "was signed 9 Apr 68 by Minister of National Defense Chiang, Ching-Kuo and Vice Chief of General Staff, MND, LTGEN Louie, Yen-Chen, CAF of the GRC and Mr. Frank J. Fede, OSD Rep for the U.S." Credit sales arrangements for Phase II of the vehicle co-production program was also signed on the same day by the appropriate representatives of the Republic of China and the U.S. On 17 May, SECDEF informed CHMAAG China that a "Draft Presidential Determination has been prepared by State Department for approval of $20 million by FY 68 GRC FMS Credit Program and $20 million Phase II vehicle modernization program," and that he did "not anticipate any problem in obligating funds and implementing letters of offer and acceptance prior to end of Fiscal Year." 

(5) On 26 March 1968, the FY 68 China MAP was officially increased from $44 million to $50 million to cover the $6.5 million add-on package. Then, on the last day of the month, this level was raised further by an additional $9 million. This new increase was merely a bookkeeping transaction to account for the transfer of seven F-TF 104G aircraft--in MAP possessed assets--from their CONUS location to Taiwan. In a final note, Secretary of Defense Clifford, in a letter to the Chinese Minister of National Defense on 21 June, stated that both of the credit sales arrangements between the two countries had been approved and that delay in approval being granted had been a result of the need to satisfy legal requirements so that export-import bank credit resources could be utilized.

(5) Then, on 2 November 1968, SECDEF announced that FY 69 China MAP levels had been increased by $5.6 million. "In your review for adjustment to above approved levels," he instructed CHMAAG China, "training and related requirements should be carefully examined to insure all are essential to country objectives." In his recommendations, which

1. SECDEF 5831/081839Z Apr 68.
2. CHMAAG Taipei 4234/091011Z Apr 68.
3. SECDEF 9261/171533Z May 68.
4. Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Jun 68, Subj: FY68 China MAP; SECDEF 001346/311920Z May 68 and Ltr, SECDEF to MND, GRC, 21 Jun 68, both cited in LCOL Overgaard, China MAP Memo.
5. SECDEF 04745/020002Z Nov 68.
he submitted to CINCPAC on the 15th, CHMAAG China included additions to the FY 69 MAP only in operating and maintenance (O&M) costs, with the exception of $44,234 programmed for radio sets for light aircraft. These radio sets were required to provide communication between high performance aircraft and tactical air control post of the Chinese Air Force. Principally, the increase had been used to provide O&M in such areas as communication spare parts, automotive spare parts, primary batteries, ground hauling equipment, Class IV modifications for aircraft, weapons spare parts, and ship spare parts. Prior to the receipt of these additional funds, the Chinese did "not have sufficient funds available to provide approximately $17 million estimated O&M requirements in order to maintain MAP supported forces at an acceptable combat effective level." 1

(5) "As a result of DOD and Inter-Agency reviews," SECDEF notified CINCPAC on 27 November that program changes were necessary to reduce FY 70 China MAP from $30 to $25 million. 2 Three days later, CINCPAC directed CHMAAG China to take the necessary steps to realign FY 70 China MAP to the new ceiling. 3

(5) CHMAAG China's response on 6 December provided CINCPAC with the requested deletions. With the exception of $25,000 for the Army's program for NIKE investment support equipment, these deletions were in operating costs. Individual service deletions were as follows: Army - $647,670; Air Force - $3,993,415, this figure included 3 F-5 aircraft and jet engine overhauls; Navy - $200,000; Marine Corps - $50,000. 4 Following his concurrence, CINCPAC forwarded the recommended changes to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on 10 December 1968 via AUTODIN. 5

FY 69 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Credit Arrangement for China

(6) On 6 November 1968, CHMAAG China submitted to CINCPAC a list of equipment proposed for purchase by GRC (Government of the Republic of China) under FY 69 FMS credit arrangement. This list had

1. CHMAAG Taipei 11-229/150301Z Nov 68; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
2. SECDEF JCS 6569/272343Z Nov 68.
3. CINCPAC 300356Z Nov 68.
4. CHMAAG Taipei 12-32/060803Z Dec 68.
5. J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
been jointly developed by both MAAG China and the Ministry of National Defense (MND) of GRC, and it represented an update of the one previously submitted by CHMAAG China on 22 January 1968. Included in this updated listing was $5.0 million for Phase I of the helicopter co-production proposal for which a decision had not yet been made, F-100 aircraft (as-is, where-is, no cost, except rehabilitation which was estimated at $7.4 million), M113 personnel carriers, 105mm self-propelled howitzers, modification for a destroyer, 76mm production equipment, and other investment items. CHMAAG China requested "continuation of action necessary to obtain FY 69 FMS credit arrangement for GRC in the amount of U.S. $20 million" in order to commence procurement action for the desired investment items."

(C) CINCPAC concurred in this list recommended by CHMAAG China and forwarded it to SECDEF on 16 November 1968, pointing out the following:

Preliminary discussion between country team and GRC officials should be initiated shortly to develop and update FY 70-75 MAP and FMS programs. Delay in concluding the FY 69 FMS credit sales program restricts MAP and FMS update planning by the country team and could adversely affect U.S. influence with GRC on future sales programs.

(U) Until the end of the calendar year, no response to this recommendation was forthcoming from Washington, D.C. Therefore, CINCPAC MAP planners took no further significant actions on this matter.

Analysis of ROC Defense and MAP Requirements


1. CHMAAG China MGPPP-PR 11-212/061001Z Nov 68; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68; CHMAAG China MGPPP-PR 1251/220815Z Jan 68.
2. CINCPAC 162018Z Nov 68.
3. Intv, LCOL Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 17 Feb 69.
Requirements," which the JCS forwarded to CINCPAC by registered mail on 3 February. Eleven days later, the JCS notified CINCPAC by message that this "study was being reviewed within OSD for the purpose of developing military assistance and sales programs for the Republic of China through FY 1973." CINCPAC was also requested to furnish specific views on particular areas of the study, as well as other considerations of pertinency, by 1 March 1968. He, in turn, the following day, wired for the "Country Team and component commanders' comments and recommendations on subject study...for inclusion in CINCPAC reply to JCS," having already sent the concerned persons a copy by letter on 12 February.

Following receipt of the comments of CHMAAG China and the component commanders on 24 February, CINCPAC prepared his answer. His reply of 3 March 1968 to the JCS made the observation that the study contained assumptions, enemy intentions, and applied tactics that were favorable only to the apparently predetermined study conclusions. "A principal study conclusion, that GRC forces can be reduced without incurring unacceptable U.S. risks," CINCPAC felt, "is derived through assumptions which are overly optimistic concerning GRC capabilities and pessimistic concerning CPR capabilities. Additionally, the study reflects limited courses of action for CPR forces in given situations; assigns doubtful intentions to both CPR and GRC forces; portrays air and naval conflict as isolated incidents instead of an inter-action among forces; uses unsound air and naval tactics; and views GRC force requirements in isolation from PACOM regional requirements."

Among CINCPAC planners, it was ascertained that a point by point rebuttal of the study would end up with a reply as lengthy in volume as the analysis itself. On the other hand, to "refute only selected parts of the study would give the appearance of tacit acceptance of all other parts. Therefore, CINCPAC's response" provided the JCS "with four major examples where factors" had "been misused to reach preconceived defense and MAP requirements for the Republic of China." These were:

1. JCS 1048/141546Z Feb 68.
2. Ibid.; J5332 History, HQ CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
3. CINCPAC 152049Z Feb 68.
4. J5332 History, HQ CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
5. CINCPAC 032256Z Mar 68.
6. J5332 History, HQ CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
a. The assumption that CPR air forces will not attack GRC air power on Taiwan. Application of this assumption is contrary to the sound and well-proven concept of destroying opposing air power as quickly as possible at the initiation of hostilities. Striking opposing air power while it is on the ground is the most effective execution of this concept. The study acknowledges the validity of this concept by stating that "The potency of air attacks on airfields was amply demonstrated by the Israelis," yet fails to apply it.

b. Appreciation of the nature and motivation of the GRC/CHICOM confrontation. While not explicitly stated, a major assumption of the study is that the GRC/CHICOM confrontation is similar in nature and motivation of the U.S./Communist confrontation on a world wide basis. Actually, the GRC/CHICOM confrontation is a civil war which has not been resolved. When these facts are weighed, U.S. interests in the GRC/CHICOM confrontation have strategic implications. The GRC is a useful force in maintaining a balance of power favorable to the U.S. in Asia. A GRC/CHICOM rapprochement should be avoided until such time as CHICOM imperialist efforts have run their course and China is ready to join the world community.

c. Inadequate treatment of the political factors involved in a reduction of GRC forces. The MND has stated, Ref D, that: "Any reduction in the size of our ground force is something we cannot consider. Any such move would be essentially a political one, with grave political repercussions." Therefore, consider that it is erroneous to assume that force reductions would force GRC defense savings. As elaborated in Ref C, the retirement program which would result from a reduced force level would incur increased costs to the ROC defense budget.
d. Inadequate provisions to maintain equipment on hand. Considering possible cash and credit sales, as well as the projected grant aid dollars contained in the study, insufficient funds will be available to procure replacement equipment. Special purpose vehicles, engineer equipment, aircraft, and ships, the majority of which are WW II or Korean vintage, will require increasing annual O&M. These increasing O&M costs are particularly applicable for the WW II general purpose vehicle fleet because the co-production program will not significantly replace them during the time frame of the study. In view of the political aspects described in para 4c above, the idea that reduced force levels will obviate the necessity of maintaining equipment inventory is doubtful.¹

(5) In addition, the System Analysis Study had advocated the use of MAP funds for O&M costs and cash and credit sales for investment, a position that was contrary to a previous one of CINCPAC. "This point, although not pertinent to the study conclusion," in the CINCPAC's opinion, "is an important policy factor requiring continuing application."²

CINCPAC also considered it significant to reaffirm that Volume III "of the JSOP represents the minimum foreign military forces required to support U.S. objectives through the mid-range period. Under existing conditions in the Far East friendly foreign forces should be equipped and trained to deter aggression, either independently or in concert with overall plans," which is the concept expressed in the JSOP.³

(6) Because of the above mentioned reasons, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the study "not be supported as a basis for the purpose of developing military assistance and sales programs for the Republic of China through FY 1973."⁴ This rationale of CINCPAC must have carried weight, for the JCS reaffirmed "the minimum force levels and grant aid program for the GRC," and recommended "that the subject analysis not be supported as a basis for the development of military assistance grant

¹ CINCPAC 032256Z Mar 68.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
aid and sales programs.

One fear of CINCPAC planners was that SECDEF might use this study as a basis for justifying the reduction of GRC MAP levels, but no concrete evidence to this effect appeared during the remainder of calendar year 1968.

Co-Production of Helicopters and Aircraft

On 21 November 1967, SECDEF asked the Country Team in China for additional information before he and SECSTATE would "determine whether the helicopter/aircraft proposal is sufficiently practical to warrant initiating the formation of a technical study team," as had been previously recommended by both CHMAAG China and CINCPAC. As reported in last year's history, this message was the last action prior to the end of Calendar Year 1967.

The requested response was forwarded to SECDEF on 15 January 1968. A major point made in the reply was:

In view of the recent drastic cut in China map and the likelihood that the level of MAP in future years will not be sufficient to fund either the number of F-5 aircraft which GRC has heretofore expected or other major investment items such as helicopters, it is not clear at this time what relative priority the GRC will assign to procurement of F-5 aircraft and/or helicopter through a Taiwan-based manufacturing arrangement when it becomes aware of the magnitude of MAP reduction.

2. Ibid.; Intv, LCOL Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 3 Jan 69.
3. SECDEF 3344/2122462 Nov 67; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
5. CHMAAG Taiwan MGCSF 135/150901Z Jan 68.
Therefore, the Country Team stated that:

...we believe most meaningful approach at this time would be for concerned Washington agencies to explain to relevant U.S. manufacturing firms GRC interest in co-production of helicopters and aircraft ...and to encourage U.S. firms to approach GRC officials directly to determine degree of GRC intent to enter into some type of commercial arrangement which is economically and technically feasible for the production in Taiwan of F-5 aircraft and/or helicopters.¹

(S) Five days later, CINCPAC concurred in the aforementioned recommendation but, in so doing, made the following pertinent observation. When co-production in China was first recommended last year, the circumstances were far different from those existing in early 1968. For instance, it had been assumed then that grant aid would continue at substantially the same levels, thereby leaving co-production to be financed under Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The recent drastic reductions to the FY 68 China MAP, as well as the proposed reduction in the dollar guidelines for FY 69, however, had greatly altered the situation. As a result, CINCPAC felt that the GRC, in order to make sound decisions, "must first be provided realistic knowledge concerning FY 68 and FY 69 MAP levels, including credit assistance and its terms, before discussions with industry can be meaningful."² Accordingly, CINCPAC recommended to SECDEF that the GRC be "advised of the limits on grant aid and credit which may be available in FY 68 and FY 69, prior to encouraging subject discussions."³

(S) Several months slipped by, then, in response to a 27 May 1968 letter from OSD/ISA, CHMAAG commented on 8 June:

While helicopter co-production is technically feasible, because of limited information available from brief Bell report and GRC sources here, it is not possible at this time to determine immediate

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 202208Z Jan 68.
3. Ibid.
economic feasibility. However, it should be noted that since the GRC intends to finance this program on credit over an 8 year period, the per annum cash cost to the GRC is only 2.6 million dollars. The introduction of new manufacturing techniques and processes will improve GRC military production capability and provide long range residual and ancillary benefits to GRC economy. Present plans indicate sixty percent of labor force will be civilian.

MAAG considers this program technically feasible and militarily desirable provided GRC funds are available over and above those required for programmed FY 68 and FY 69 FMS. Country Team would not support this program if it were on basis of substitution for currently approved programs or at sacrifice of FY 68 and FY 69 FMS programs. It is noted that Country Team has not as yet established priorities for FY 70 & future year FMS programs. 1

(8) The same month, on the 14th, the American Embassy at Taipei provided the State Department with the comments of General Lai Ming-Tang, Chief of Staff of the Chinese Air Force, who had called upon the U.S. Ambassador, Walter P. McConaughy, the day before "and made strong pitch for Ambassador's support for consummation of government-to-government agreement for co-production of Bell helicopters on basis similar to current vehicle co-production arrangement. 2

(9) On 21 June, CHMAAG China notified CINCPAC of his concurrence with the Chinese "Minister of Defense desire to reduce the number of F-5 aircraft in the FY 69 FMS package for the purpose of financing Phase I of the Bell helicopter co-production project." 3 He emphasized at the same time that this helicopter program represented "a valid military requirement for the GRC and would be a major forward step towards attaining self-sufficiency," and that he was aware of "a firm and unswerving intention of the GRC to initiate a helicopter co-production program supported by an evident willingness to pay for it." 4

1. CHMAAG Taiwan 6218/080333Z Jun 68.
2. AMEMBASSY Taipei 3393/140900Z Jun 68.
3. CHMAAG Taiwan MGCH 637/210201Z Jun 68.
4. Ibid.
(5) Seven days later, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS support the proposed program. He offered the following comments to support his position:

Although the current Military Assistance Plan and the FY 70-77 JSOP acknowledge a requirement for only 28 helicopters among the five separate aviation companies of the Chinese Army, that number is considered completely inadequate to satisfy the requirements for command and control, and the rapid deployment of forces. An increase will be recommended for next JSOP. The restrictive North-South road net severely limits the ability of the GRC to shift ground forces rapidly on Taiwan. In addition, the lack of a road net in the central and eastern portions of Taiwan, as well as the rugged topography, severely inhibits surface vehicular mobility. To offset this mobility deficiency, the inclusion of an organic helicopter company in the TO&E of each of the GRC's Forward Look Infantry Divisions is a valid military requirement.

Assisting the GRC to achieve greater ground mobility through the helicopter co-production program will improve the prospect of influencing the GRC toward a reduced standing army, in consonance with MAM objectives. ¹

(5) On the same day, the 28th of June, Chiang Ching-Kuo, the GRC Minister of National Defense, called MAJ GEN Richard G. Ciccolella, USA, CHMAAG China, into his office "to express his keen hurt and disappointment that helicopter co-production project had apparently been turned down."² He stated that his government was determined to produce helicopters on Taiwan and would have to turn to other countries for assistance if the U.S. refused to cooperate on this project. In short, he felt that:

1. CINCPAC 281930Z Jun 68.
2. AMEMBASSY Taipei 3558/290615Z Jun 68.
... U.S. is paying no heed to GRC desires. GRC is merely asking for small credit loan for matter of highest priority. He blamed Dept and other Washington agencies for turndown on what he termed erroneous assumption that it would be undue economic burden on GRC. He said if GRC borrows money they want to make their own decision on what to use it for. He said GRC being treated as a child and this patronizing attitude and unconcern for GRC requirements and desires where GRC is paying the bill is unbearable 1

(5) Defense Minister Chiang Ching-Kuo also informed CHMAAG China that the GRC was willing, although reluctantly, to go along with his recommendation to buy 14 F-5 aircraft for FY 68 with added FMS authorization, but only wanted to buy 10 F-5s for FY 69 and to use the savings to finance the first phase of the helicopter project. MAJ GEN Ciccolella replied that, in his opinion, the Chinese government was not fully aware of all the facts. In short, CHMAAG China explained that there was not enough time to conclude an agreement on the helicopter project before the end of the fiscal year, and that a delay by the Chinese in accepting the $14.4 million to pre-finance the 14 F-5s in the hope of getting part of the money for the helicopter project would have resulted almost certainly in losing this credit availability.

(6) On 3 July 1968, the American Embassy at Taipei gave its impression of the foregoing discussion, stating "that the MND remarks serve as evidence that as U.S. grant military assistance decreases the GRC will be less amenable to U.S. suggestions as to the size of forces, relative economic burden, types of equipment to be supplied, and other aspects of the Chinese Armed Forces paid for by the GRC on either a cash or credit basis."2 Since the GRC had repeatedly demonstrated a penchant for working simultaneously through contacts with Country Team members, special emissaries dispatched from Taipei, and Chinese officials in Washington, the American Ambassador expressed a strong desire to insure that the U.S. present a united position to the representatives of China in all stages of negotiations in Taiwan—an action that would require

1. Ibid.
2. J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68, giving AM- EMBASSY Taipei 3607/030815Z Jul 68 as its source.
maximum coordination between U.S. officials in both Taiwan and Washington--so that Chinese representatives in Washington would not be able to discover any divergencies of views among the various concerned American agencies.

Eight days later, the SECDEF informed CINCPAC that there was no "wish to proceed further with GRC on helicopter acquisition, either by end-product purchase or co-production arrangements, until further study and justification of GRC Army requirements have been made," and tasked CINCPAC with providing: "Further rationale for military requirement for helicopters in improved GRC defense of treaty area which includes only Taiwan and Pescadores. Also, in what specific ways and to what extent will helicopter units facilitate reduction in size of ground forces: do we have any indication that GRC viewing helicopters in this light." CINCPAC requested the comments of the China Country Team on these questions on 14 July 1968.

CHMAAG China responded on 24 July. His response, in which both the American Embassy and COMUSTDC concurred, furnished additional information in justification of the military requirement for helicopters for the GRC. Basically, it concluded that the "tactical concept for a mobile defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores is seriously inhibited at the present by inherent limitations in ground force tactical mobility;" that early provision of an airborne capability to the ground forces "will minimize the tactical problem posed by existing natural obstacles and materiel limitations and will greatly enhance tactical flexibility and combat capability of Chinese ground forces to meet any contingency threat which might develop;" that the increased "tactical flexibility and improved reaction capability afforded by helicopters may permit a reorganization of active Army units to provide a more compact and viable force."

It was the considered opinion of CHMAAG that the minimum and optimum helicopter requirements would be 236 and 324, at the estimated total investment cost of $56 and $73.6 million respectively. The minimum figure would provide for a 22-helicopter company organic to 6 Forward

1. SECDEF 4575/112308Z Jul 68.
2. CINCPAC 140008Z Jul 68.
3. CHMAAG Taiwan MGCH 739/241031Z Jul 68.
Look divisions, 2 armored divisions, 2 marine divisions, and an 8-helicopter platoon for each of the 2 armored cavalry regiments. The optimum figure, on the other hand, would allow the addition of 2 helicopter battalions of 44 helicopters each. The highest priority for MAP and GRC defense expenditures has been the air defense system, with some 71.3% of the total MAP investment program going toward this purpose since 1966. "Consequently, the air defense system has been modernized at the expense of other GRC forces," observed CHMAAG; "The point in time has been reached when other high priority items must be considered" in order to maintain a balanced force capability which would complement the total defense posture of the GRC Armed Forces. \(^1\) In short, he considered the helicopter co-production program highly essential.

(\(\text{\textcopyright} \)) As the Chinese Minister of National Defense had earlier stated to CHMAAG on 28 June, "the GRC need for helicopters was a matter of the highest priority and that any decision to turn down the helicopter request would be viewed most critically and force the GRC to look elsewhere for this support."\(^2\) At the end of his 10-page long message to CINCPAC, CHMAAG warned that:

...we should bear in mind the following aspects of the matter: 1) the GRC estimate of the new importance of helicopters to defense is in line with our own current military tactical doctrine based on our experience in Vietnam; 2) the proposition does not involve grant aid but credit facility which the GRC has the resources to service; 3) a turn-down of the project by us would possibly cause us to lose to foreign countries the export revenue involved, which would be of some benefit to our balance of payments position. Apart from the foregoing, we can anticipate an injection of some element of coolness into our presently very close and cordial political/military relationships with Defense Minister Chiang Ching-Kuo and other key figures in the GRC power structure, if we take an altogether negative posture toward a project which is considered so important to their defense and which they are not asking us to pay for.\(^3\)

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1. Ibid.; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.  
2. CHMAAG Taiwan MGCH 739/241031Z Jul 68.  
3. Ibid.
(5) CINCPAC, in forwarding the Country Team's "strong justification for a helicopter co-production project for Republic of China," strongly recommended JCS-support and, in addition, pointed out that "the diminished U.S. presence in the Taiwan Strait, due to the Vietnam conflict, places increased reliance on GRC forces to defend Taiwan and the Penghus" without immediate U.S. support. On 1 August 1968, the JCS, after reviewing CHMAAG China's comments, stated that there was "a need for amplification and/or clarification of" certain paragraphs. 2

(6) In his response of 5 August to the JCS query, CHMAAG China stated that "a force objective priority of nine (9) had been submitted on the helicopter units for the JSOP revision submitted by CHMAAG. It was pointed out that it was necessary, to provide modernization equipment for mobility of a more balanced force structure for the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus, and to protect the approximate $2.5 billion that the USG has already invested in the total ROC forces." 3

(7) Five days later, CINCPAC notified the JCS of his concurrence in CHMAAG China's latest comments and rationale, concluding with the following statement: "Giving full consideration to fiscal restraints and high priority of air and naval forces, tactical mobility for the ground forces is still an essential element in a balanced GRC defensive posture." 4 As he pointed out, although the air defense, tactical air, and major naval combatant units have been accorded a higher priority, the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus would actually depend upon the combination of balanced ROC forces in an emergency. Therefore, ground "forces with a capability to deploy rapidly to the point of greatest threat are required to complement the defense capabilities of the other Chinese Armed Forces." 5

(8) "In view continued interest focused on GRC helicopter co-production proposal," SECDEF stated on 9 September 1968, "it is appropriate to take inventory current situation." 6 Following an assessment of cost

1. CINCPAC 282023Z Jul 68.
2. JCS 6183/012233Z Aug 68.
4. CINCPAC 100320Z Aug 68.
5. Ibid.
6. SECDEF 09009/091347Z Sep 68.
factors, as well as technological and economic/political considerations, related to the program, the SECDEF analysis, supported by the State Department, concluded that the GRC should not undertake a helicopter co-production program. Since SECDEF had indicated that certain "factors not clearly definitized in previous justifications for the helicopter program," CINCPAC asked CHMAAG China on 11 September to prepare an analysis of the SECDEF comments which would "provide definitive information where exception is taken to the points expressed and/or on any pertinent factors not previously submitted." A reply was desired by 16 September.

Meanwhile, the JCS requested on 12 September additional information from CINCPAC regarding the stated GRC mobility requirements as a basis for supporting the co-production helicopter project. This additional information was "needed to strengthen justification." Two days later, CINCPAC passed this request on to CHMAAG China, who replied on 18 September. In his opinion, the projected reduction of GRC ground forces on Taiwan made the need for helicopters "even greater in order to provide the flexibility and that degree of mobility required by the commander for the positioning and repositioning of blocking forces, and the capability of concentrating combat power at critical points at critical times." Besides making this major contention, CHMAAG China provided detailed answers to the JCS questions.

As for his analysis of the comments by the SECDEF and SECSTATE on the helicopter co-production project, CHMAAG China furnished CINCPAC with his views on the desired date, 16 September 1968. He provided detailed opinions on every factor raised and made the following significant observations:

GRC desire and determination to establish helicopter co-production program continues to be manifested at all levels and particularly from President and Minister of National Defense who never fail to bring up status of this project in

1. Ibid.; J5332A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
2. CINCPAC 110511Z Sep 68.
3. JCS 9352/122147Z Sep 68; J5332A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
4. CHMAAG China MGCH 9314/180803Z Sep 68.
conversations with Ambassador and CHMAAG. There is no question in mind of CHMAAG, and Ambassador McConaughy concurs, that GRC has established this project as the number one priority in their defense program. GRC will view U.S. position on this project as indication of overall U.S. attitude toward GRC, and, in particular, its defense requirements as they see them. Moreover, the recent GRC willingness to consider seriously a reduction and reorganization of their Armed Forces, as consequence of CHMAAG's consultations and influence with the Minister of National Defense, is absolutely tied to tangible evidence of continuing force modernization of which helicopters are number one priority at this time.

...It would be naive to underestimate the GRC competence and capability to make their own assessment in these areas. The GRC assessment of this project has been thorough, detailed, and shrewd and their conclusions are considered sound. While we may not agree fully with them. They have their own reasons and their reasons should be respected. GRC position as stated repeatedly to CHMAAG is very simple--they have a need for helicopters--they want to co-produce them in-country--they are not asking for grant aid--they want to pay for it. They are merely asking us for a loan....

The basic question involved in this project is whether it is more advantageous to the GRC to obtain helicopters by FMS purchase or through a co-production arrangement. The conclusion of the GRC is that co-production is more advantageous to them. CHMAAG fully supports this conclusion....

In summary CHMAAG recommends approval of a US-GRC government-to-government arrangement for co-production of helicopters in Taiwan similar to the current successful vehicle co-production project. CHMAAG considers co-production economically feasible, less expensive in terms of foreign exchange expenditures that FMS, and possessing a beneficial economic impact not accompanying FMS purchase.
Recommend this message be passed to OSD and State. 1

(S) In short, CHMAAG China, with the concurrence of the American Embassy at Taipei, refuted the major unfavorable points that had been raised by the SECDEF analysis and supported the contention that co-production of the minimum requirement of 236 helicopters was more economical than purchase by FMS. 2 When CINCPAC forwarded this information to SECDEF on 26 September 1968, he added his concurrence to the request that "an early decision on the helicopter proposal is required" and stated:

Further delay could imply U.S. indecisiveness and tend to indicate we question GRC’s ability to assess their capability to undertake self-sufficiency projects. Such manifestations could impair future cooperation and mutual understanding between U.S. and GRC officials. 3

(S) Early the next month, on 4 October, a JCS action officer requested by telephone a clarification of the force structure for optimum and minimum helicopter requirements from Hq CINCPAC. 4 CINCPAC forwarded the following to the JCS by message four days later:

Minimum helicopter requirements for GRC remain 236 UH-1H’s with force units as follows:

Six Avn Co’s (UE-22) organic to Inf Divs.

Two Avn PLT’s (UE-8) organic to Armd. Cav. Regt.

Two Avn Co’s (UE-22) one for each Field Army.

1. CHMAAG China MGCH 9231/160801Z Sep 68.
2. Ibid.; AMEMBASSY Taipei 4538/170904Z Sep 68; J5332A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
3. CINCPAC 260313Z Sep 68.
4. J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Oct 68; Intv, LCOL Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 3 Feb 69.
Two Avn Co's (UE-22) organic to Marine Divs.

Optimum helicopter requirements are 280 UH-1H's...

(5) Approximately a month later, on 6 November, CHMAAG China submitted a revised FY 69 credit sales listing totaling $20.0 million which represents a MAAG/GRC MND jointly developed list of equipment proposed for purchase by the GRC. This lists the number one item as $5.0 million for phase I of the Helicopter Co-production program.

 Shortly thereafter, by message to SECDEF, CINCPAC supported CHMAAG China's request for the continuation of action to obtain FMS credit arrangements for the GRC in the amount of $20.0 million. Meanwhile, the JCS had forwarded a memorandum to SECDEF, reiterating previous CINCPAC position submissions in support of the helicopter co-production proposal.

(5) On 15 November, apparently in response to this JCS memorandum, SECDEF:

...directs that DOD personnel should not take a position on this matter with anyone outside of the executive branch. This message additionally states that the USG has a clear interest in the manner that the GRC allocates its resources... SECDEF further pointed out that irrespective of the helicopter question; legitimacy of the U.S. concern should be upheld.

1. CINCPAC 080304Z Oct 68.
2. Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: Bell Helicopter Co-production in China, which, together with the following two sources, provided the information contained in the remainder of the narrative of this subsection on "Co-Production of Helicopters and Aircraft" in China: FONECON, LCOL Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 11 Feb 69; J5 Brief No. 00393-68, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Nov 68, of JCSM 670-68, Subj: Government of the Republic of China Military Requirements for Helicopters.
Four days later, the last significant occurrence in this action came. On 19 November, CHMAAG China forwarded through official channels a copy of his letter to Mr. Peter Feigl, OASD/ISA, who had made a trip to Taiwan during the previous month, commenting on those portions of Mr. Feigl's trip report:

... relative to Mr. Feigl's reported observations concerning GRC Helicopter Co-production proposal. CHMAAG pointedly refers to Mr. Feigl's apparent failure to correctly analyze that data and facts provided him during the course of his Taiwan visit. It seemed apparent that Mr. Feigl's trip not only alienated CHMAAG concerning the propriety of Mr. Feigl's visit but also created an adverse GRC reaction to the manner in which Mr. Feigl initiated and conducted conversations with GRC officials on the helicopter co-production issue. CHMAAG commented that in his judgement Mr. Feigl had come to Taiwan with preconceived opinions which were completely negative regarding GRC proposals. 1

Although the CINC PAC staff had expressed in November a concern that any further "delay in rendering a decision on this proposal could have an adverse affect on future FMS programs," no official decision on the helicopter co-production for China was forthcoming during the last month of calendar year 1968. 2 In retrospect, it appeared that little real progress had been made on this proposal during the year, despite the voluminous message traffic and countless man-hours spent at all levels of command. 3

1. Ibid.
3. FONECON, LCOL Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, J5332, Hq CINC PAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINC PAC HistBr, 11 Feb 69.
HU-16 Aircraft for Chinese Air Force (CAF)

Two HU-16s were made available to the CAF at no cost to China MAP from USAF excess at the 33rd Air Rescue Squadron, Naha AB, Okinawa. One was delivered on 23 April and the other on 6 May 1968. As a result, the 4th Air Sea Rescue Squadron (CAF), stationed at Chiayi Air Base, Taiwan, then possessed a total of 10 active HU-16s. 1

Oceanographic Ship for China

On 23 October 1968, CNO informed CINCPAC that a former U.S. Navy ATA, the ex-USS GERONIMO, which had been converted for oceanographic purposes in 1963 by the Department of Interior, was being returned to U.S. Navy custody and that GRC had informally indicated a desire to obtain the ship. Accordingly, CNO was requesting CINCPAC's comments and recommendations concerning the proposed transfer. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Dean Rusk informed both CNO and CINCPAC on 30 October of the following:

Because the Chinese authorities have requested the loan of a vessel for oceanographic research purposes and because we believe the furtherance of Chinese research plans to be in the U.S. interest, Department of State is most anxious that the U.S. Naval authorities can turn over the GERONIMO to the Republic of China as quickly as possible. 2

On 8 November 1968, CINCPAC concurred in the recommendation of CNO two days previously that the ex-USS GERONIMO be transferred to GRC for oceanographic purposes at no cost to China MAP and "in 'as is', where is' condition with GRC paying all related cost." 3 A joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message on 25 November informed all concerned of the following developments. The U.S. Navy had delivered a "Letter of Offer" to the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., which was accepted, "committing ROC to payment of tow preparation costs ($10,000). . . . U.S. Navy and ROC Naval Attache have been consulting about preparations for

1. MAC MAOCOA/102230Z Apr 68; J 4333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
2. SECSTATE 264089/302225Z Oct 68.
3. CNO 062156Z Nov 68; CINCPAC 080038Z Nov 68.
tow of opportunity, date of which now estimated on or about 22 January 1969.\textsuperscript{1} The State Department had prepared a draft text for the exchange of notes—the purpose of the "text is to insure that in connection with the time the vessel is actually transferred, ROC understands restrictions on the use of the GERONIMO for strictly scientific purposes"—forwarded the draft to the American Embassy in Taipei, Taiwan, and authorized the American officials there to proceed with the official exchange of notes governing the use of the GERONIMO between the two countries.\textsuperscript{2}

(C) When the exchange of notes was signed on 16 December 1968, all required actions for the transfer had been completed. By the end of December, the arrangements for the tow of the vessel from Orange, Texas, to Taiwan were essentially complete. Throughout this entire transaction, CINC PAC's position had been to "support transfer of GERONIMO to GRC; that no MAP support will be provided; and that scientific data derived from oceanographic research be used to support both U.S. and GRC interests."\textsuperscript{3}

Modern Air Munitions for MAP China

(E) As early as 9 November 1967, CINC PAC authorized CHMAAG China to negotiate with the Republic of China (ROC) for the exchange of old air munitions for modern ones. Approximately a year later, on 9 September 1968, CHMAAG China advised CINC PAC that ROC had approved exchange of certain old air munitions for 748 MK28/500 pound bombs. The same month, CINC PAC passed on the word that various types and quantities of older air munitions on hand in China MAP were being offered to PACOM components in Southeast Asia in exchange for modern air munitions.\textsuperscript{4}

(F) By 4 October 1968, CINC PACAF had made a conditional agreement to the exchange, being willing to accept M65 bombs under the following conditions: (a) dependent upon incremental shipments beginning in December 1968; (b) limited components needed; (c) all bombs and

1. SECSTATE 277475/252255Z Nov 68.
2. Ibid.; J432 History, Hq CINC PAC, for the month of Nov 68.
3. Point Paper, J432, Hq CINC PAC, 4 Dec 68, Subj: Oceanographic Ship for China; AMEMBASSY Taipei 5491/160952Z Dec 68; J432 History, Hq CINC PAC, for the month of Dec 68.
4. CINC PAC 202232Z Sep 68; J473 History, Hq CINC PAC, for the month of Sep 68.
needed components would have to be serviceable. CINCPAC, five days later, requested CHMAAG China's "concurrency and/or comments on conditions of exchange."¹

(8) This exchange of modern air munitions (MK82s) for the older munitions (M64s, M65s) of China MAP was dependent upon the availability of pallets and banding material to prepare the older bombs for shipment. On 5 November 1968, CINCPAC requested CSAF to "provide pallet and metal banding requirements or funds to purchase and produce required quantities" and recommended "that 748 MK82 bombs be provided to MAP China at no cost to MAP by diversion from VAMP and PACAF MK82 program."² Then, on the last day of the month, after the availability of China MAP shipping materiel requirements had been confirmed and USAF had agreed to the exchange, CINCPAC began implementing procedures by requesting the appropriate USAF unit at Hill AFB, Utah, to arrange that "the 748 MK82s for MAP China be prorated at 460 from VAMP and 288 from PACAF programs."³ Final implementing instructions to complete the exchange of older bombs for modern bombs were issued by CINCPAC on 5 December 1968.⁴ No further actions occurred during 1968.

An Additional Air Defense Battalion

(9) Because an economy program within DOD had resulted in the decision to deactivate a number of CONUS-based NIKE HERCULES battalions, CHMAAG China "requested that one of these battalions be earmarked and provided to the GRC at no cost to MAP."⁵ The Republic of China (ROC) air defense system in 1968 included both interceptor and fighter aircraft, conventional air defense artillery, and a missile group. The latter was composed of one HAWK battalion and one NIKE HERCULES battalion, units of which were deployed to protect strategic areas located

1. CINCPAC 090013Z Oct 68; CINCPACAF 042348Z Oct 68; J473 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
2. CINCPAC 052355Z Nov 68.
3. CINCPAC 302233Z Nov 68; J473 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
4. CINCPAC 052153Z Dec 68; FONECON, LCOL Thomas E. Buchanan, USA, J473, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 19 Mar 69.
5. Point Paper, J3B15, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Sep 68, Subj: Additional NIKE HERCULES Battalion for GRC (S), which is the source for the information contained in this subsection.
in the northern portion of Taiwan, being concentrated primarily in the Taipei area. It was the need to improve the air defense capabilities in southern Taiwan that had prompted the request for an additional NIKE HERCULES battalion.

Both COMUSTDC and CINCUSARPAC had concurred in this request, and CINCPACAF had provided a qualified response by agreeing that an additional NIKE HERCULES battalion would improve the ROC defense posture. CINCPACAF, however, did not feel that the battalion would be a substitute for all weather fighters, and inputs from the component commanders had surfaced several possible problem areas concerning support requirements. These would have to be resolved before a CINCPAC position on the request could be developed. As a result, CINCPAC requested CINCUSARPAC and CHMAAG China to address themselves to the possible problem areas and to provide him with appropriate comments and recommendations. Once these had been received, the CINCPAC staff "will develop a recommendation for CINCPAC's consideration on the request for the additional NIKE HERCULES Battalion for the GRC."1

Transfer of Destroyer (DD) to China

President Johnson signed Public Law 90-224 on 26 December 1967, which, among other things, "authorized the loan of one additional destroyer to the Republic of China."2 Two months later, on 15 February 1968, CINCPAC was informed of the Chinese willingness to either accepting a destroyer in an "as-is" condition immediately following its inactivation from the U.S. Navy or "towing of previously inactivated ship to Taiwan for activation and overhaul" there.3 CINCPAC queried CNO three days later on these two alternatives and asked: "In view of the limited FY 68 MAP and the proposed reduction in FY 69 MAP, can the DD be provided in an 'as-is, where-is' condition at no cost?"4

CNO replied on 5 March that the second alternative was the "only feasible course if transfer" was desired before the end of the year, that the "DD can be provided in an 'as-is, where-is' condition at no cost,

1. Ibid.
2. J5332A History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Mar 68.
3. CHMAAG China 2228/120943Z Feb 68.
4. CINCPAC 152006Z Feb 68.
except towing," and that the USS YARNALL (DD-541) located at Stockton, Calif. has been tentatively selected. "1 After a discussion with ADM Feng Chi Chung, CINC, Chinese Navy (CN), CHMAAG China informed CINCPAC that the desire of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) "is for expeditious transfer and is prepared for GRC-funded activation (labor and overhead) in CN yards as early as possible, and requests that processing of necessary agreement negotiations commence soonest."2 Accordingly, CINCPAC recommended to CNO on 16 March that negotiations "be initiated for transfer of destroyer to GRC."3

(C) A week later, CNO informed CHMAAG China of a visit by the Chinese Naval Attache in Washington to discuss the transfer. In regard to this ROC official's request for the cost of the towing of the DD to Taiwan to be funded by MAP, CNO was noncommittal. As he advised CHMAAG China, the prospect of a "less expensive fleet tow of opportunity very dim unless considerable delay in delivery acceptable," so he stated either MAP funds would have to be provided or else the Chinese government would have to handle the towing. 4 He also suggested that a CN technical team, accompanied by a MAAG China representative, inspect DD-541 during April in order to start detailed planning for the in-country activation of the destroyer.

(C) CHMAAG China replied on 4 April 1968 that, although the GRC would like MAP funding, the CINCCN had indicated to him that the Chinese government would fund both the activation and the towing, since any delay in the delivery was not desirable. In view of the shortage of travel funds for MAAGs, it was suggested that a U.S. Navy representative be provided from Stockton, California, during the technical inspection by the CN team. 5

(C) By means of a message on 8 April, CINCPAC was informed that SECDEF was inclined to favor the request for the delivery of the DD in "as-is, where-is" condition at GRC expense, but he was "concerned that DD overhaul/activation/modernization in-country will be new element to absorb decreasing USG/GRC funds for investment and O&M and thereby lower the overall CN operational capability."6 Furthermore, he asked

1. CNO 051830Z Mar 68.
2. CHMAAG China 3225/130831Z Mar 68.
3. CINCPAC 162221Z Mar 68.
4. CNO 292300Z Mar 68.
5. CHMAAG China 4213/040203Z Apr 68.
6. SECDEF 5837/082007Z Apr 68.
CINCPAC's views "on the possibility of obtaining GRC/CNO concurrence in scrapping or deactivating some ships/craft in poor condition (e.g., PC's) which could help offset increased costs of subject ship," but warned that this subject was not to be discussed with the GRC. 1

(C) Four days later, SECDEF again requested an answer as soon as possible on the same question and asked the additional one: "Can tow costs be assumed by GRC?" 2 He also stated:

CNO has proposed cost of tow preparation and tow (estimated $200,000) of Congressional authorized DD be funded from FY68 MAP. CNO has also proposed need for most expeditious decision in view of approaching typhoon season. 3

(C) Meanwhile, CINCPAC had queried CHMAAG China on this subject on 10 April and his reply came three days later. In his opinion, he did "not consider that DD overhaul/activation/modernization in-country will adversely affect other programs or lower overall CN operational capability." 4 Nor did CHMAAG China feel that it was appropriate to delay loan of DD to obtain "commitment on scrapping or deactivating ships/craft," since the Chinese Navy had already begun a program with this in mind; as he explained it:

Continuous pressure has been applied to the CN to scrap some older ships, particularly PC/LSM, to conserve maintenance and operating funds. Results ... scrapping of ADG-509 commencing Sep 1966, and deactivation of AP-521, AP-522, and AK-513 effective 16 Apr 1968. The CN realizes the importance of reducing maintenance load of many old ships, and is currently conducting material inspections of all PC and LSM for purpose of determining which craft are uneconomical to repair and maintain. 5

1. Ibid.
2. SECDEF 6348/122247Z Apr 68.
3. Ibid.
4. CHMAAG Taipei 4248/130205Z Apr 68.
5. Ibid.
On 20 April, CINCPAC endorsed these comments of CHMAAG China and recommended that SECDEF not delay the loan of the DD on the basis of obtaining a GRC commitment "on scrapping or deactivating ships/crafts, since routine steps are already in process within the CN with this as objective."\(^1\) Then, on 9 May 1968, the GRC confirmed that they would fund for the tow preparation and tow of the DD. As CHMAAG China informed CINCPAC, the Chinese Navy intended to "start tow ASAP in order to avoid crossing during height of typhoon season" and desired that port clearances be initiated for Treasure Island so that tow could commence on or about 14 June.\(^2\) In view of these developments, CINCPAC felt "that the time is at hand to authorize the transfer of the DD" and recommended to SECDEF on 11 May "that the country to country ship loan agreement be negotiated as expeditiously as possible to permit tow operation to commence as early as feasible."\(^3\)

As of 17 May, the State Department estimated "that cable text of agreement will be transmitted to AmEmbassy Taipei in about two weeks," and the CNO stated that the "DD will be ready to commence tow in San Francisco Bay area by 15 June."\(^4\) On this date, the U.S. Ambassador to China, Walter P. McConaughy informed both the SECSTATE and CINCPAC that the "exchange of notes with GRC on transfer ex-USS YARNALL scheduled take place June 18."\(^5\) This exchange took place as scheduled, the appropriate copies were pouched to Washington, D.C., and, for all practical purposes, as far as Hq CINCPAC was concerned, this action was the terminal one for the calendar year.\(^6\)

**Chinese Air Force (CAF) Force Structure**

As reported in last year's history, the policy decision to delete all F-5s from both the FY 68 and FY 69 China MAP programs had far-reaching repercussions, which caused the new calendar year of 1968 to open on an ominous note.\(^7\) A point to remember is that the F-5 "aircraft

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1. CINCPAC 202359Z Apr 68.
2. CHMAAG Taipei 5217/090221Z May 68.
3. CINCPAC 112031Z May 68.
4. SECDEF 9325/172227Z May 68.
5. AMEMBASSY Taipei 3398/150445Z Jun 68.
6. AMEMBASSY Taipei 3426/190407Z Jun 68; FONECON, LCOL Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 3 Jan 69.
is the major MAP Air Force modernization weapon system" to replace the obsolescent F-86F tactical fighter, and it "accounts for the majority of Air Force investment costs for MAP through the program and plan years FY 63 - FY 73."  

(9) On the 4th day of the new year, CHMAAG China notified CINCPAC that these cuts in MAP funds had "halted CAF modernization and reappraisal of force structure for CAF FY 69 and beyond is necessary."  

His recommendation was to use the expected delivery of 73 F-5s through FY 69 to convert only 3 squadrons of F-5 aircraft instead of the programmed 4.  

If the planned attrition and the experienced CAF F-5 loss rate continued to the end of FY 69 (the planned end of F-5 deliveries), even if no further losses were experienced, the CAF "F-5 force would soon reduce below authorized UE of seventy-two (72) aircraft for four squadrons and therefore, conversion to a fourth F-5 squadron is not advisable."  

The excess 19 F-5s resulting from the proposed 3 squadron conversion could then become advanced attrition aircraft. In addition, CHMAAG China requested that the F-86F combat crew training unit (CCTU) be continued beyond the FY 70 termination date in order to support the 5 F-86F squadrons that would remain because of the curtailment of the F-5 modernization program.

(9) In replying to CHMAAG China on 26 January, CINCPAC stated that approval "for MAP support for excess F-5 aircraft to UE appears inappropriate at a time when efforts are being made to support an increase in the proposed FY 69 MAP level above $30.4 million."  

Moreover, he indicated that the purchase of F-5s through FMS Credit Program would provide the necessary attrition aircraft.

(9) CHMAAG China came back on 9 February with an alternate course of action. His rationale was that failure "to acquire additional F-5 for delivery in early FY 70 would give CAF approx 16 F-5 in excess of three MAP supported squadrons (UE 54)" and, since "only 54 acft could be

2. CHMAAG China MGAF-0 131/041015Z Jan 68.
3. Actually, 76 F-5s had been funded during this period, but 3 had already been lost in accidents.
4. CHMAAG China MGAF-0 131/041015Z Jan 68.
5. CINCPAC 260337Z Jan 68.
supported, the potential combat capability of the 16 excess acft is partially wasted. Therefore, until future F-5 deliveries became firm, he requested CINCPAC’s:

... approval to change the CAF F-5 squadron UE to 20 acft for three squadrons. Aircrew authorization together with attached pilots would provide reasonable manning and permit effective use of all F-5 in the event of a contingency. If expected FMS of additional F-5’s does not occur, 3 squadron strength of 60 acft could be maintained through FY 74 with the present MAP funded acft. Once an FMS is concluded and delivery period firmed, planning would revert to support for four squadrons of F-5 at 18 UE each.

(9) On 14 February, CINCPAC wired a negative response to CHMAAG’s latest proposal, stating that the F-5’s excess to the requirements of 3 squadrons could be more effectively utilized in squadron organization than they would be utilized as advanced attritions or even if partially assigned to existing squadrons by changing the UE to 20 for a period of time. He also pointed out that this proposal would, in effect, increase the CAF force structure with an attendant increase in O&M costs, which was not considered appropriate in view of the MAP reductions. As a result, he requested CHMAAG China to continue to plan "to convert a fourth squadron from F-86F’s to F-5’s."

(9) CINCPAC, on the other hand, strongly supported the 4 January request of CHMAAG China for the retention of the F-86F CCTU in the CAF force structure beyond its scheduled termination date of FY 70. As he explained to the Secretary of Defense on 20 January, 5 F-86F squadrons would still remain in the CAF inventory, since the F-5 modernization program had been curtailed prior to the completion of the scheduled conversion period. If the Republic of China was expected to maintain an adequate air defense posture beyond the termination date, military support for these aircraft would be required. These F-86Fs, moreover, are

1. CHMAAG China MGAF-O 234/090501Z Feb 68.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 142116Z Feb 68; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
more economical to operate, as far as spare parts are concerned, than any other type of plane in the CAF, and the CCTU decreases the requirement for tactical squadrons to conduct initial Combat Crew Training (CCT) for new pilots, thus allowing the tactical squadrons to achieve more flying hours to maintain tactical proficiency. In addition, training costs for CCT have proven to be less in the CCTU than for training previously done in the tactical fighter squadrons. Accordingly, CINCPAC recommended that the "CCTU be retained in the GRC CAF until end of FY 72." 1

(9) In the end, CINCPAC's rationales proved effective for, on 12 February 1968, the SECDEF approved, "in view serious impact of MAP reductions which caused suspension of CAF F-5 modernization program, retention of 25 F-86F aircraft for CCTU in CAF through FY 72." 2 No further significant developments concerning this topic occurred during the rest of the calendar year. 3

Sale of an Attack Transport to ROC

(9) During a visit to CONUS in January 1968, ADM Feng, CINC of the Chinese Navy, learned that an attack transport (APA), "not further identified, was soon to be decommissioned and inactivated" by the U.S. Navy. 4 He no sooner returned to Taiwan, when he contacted MAAG China for information about the possibility of the Government of ROC (GRC) securing this ship for sale, loan, or transfer. Not only would this APA "increase amphibious lift capacity" of the Chinese Navy (CN), but it would also "improve offshore island resupply capabilities." 5

(9) CINCPAC was notified of this expressed interest on 7 February 1968. On this occasion, as on an earlier one in the summer of 1967, the Country Team was opposed to the sale of an APA to GRC. Not only was no APA in any JCS/DOD objectives listing, nor on any previous MAAG China or GRC MAP Foreign Military Sales (FMS) priority list, but the

1. CINCPAC 20221I1Z Jan 68.
2. SECDEF 9870/122149Z Feb 68.
3. FONECON, LCOL Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 3 Jan 69.
4. CHMAAG China 232/070005Z Feb 68.
5. Ibid.
Country Team had already informed the GRC that an APA was an uneconomical investment in terms of maintenance, manning and defensive value. They asked CINCPAC for permission to tell the Chinese "that no ex-USN APA is available for sale, transfer or loan to GRC," using the explanation --in addition to others-- that "recent reductions in MAP and consequent increases in GRC military budget expenditures further reinforce USG decision to decline to sell or loan APA to GRC." 1

(7) On 16 February, CINCPAC concurred in the Country Team's position, but he felt that the reply "to GRC should emphasize higher priority requirements for GRC and MAP funds rather than non-availability of ex-USN APA." 2 Since the Chinese Government had already accepted the MAAG China FMS priority list, this action on the GRC's part should provide the necessary support for such an approach. For all practical purposes, CINCPAC planners encountered no further problems in this area during the remainder of the calendar year. 3

Chinese Communist (CHICOM) Weapons for Republic of China (ROC)

(7) On 9 February 1968, CHMAAG China informed CINCPAC of a Government of ROC inquiry about the availability of captured CHICOM weapons "to evaluate weapon performance as well as to improve realism of current operational exercises." 4 A sufficient amount to equip an aggressor-type battalion was desired, and the specific weapons mentioned were: "pistol, automatic rifle, semi automatic rifle, light machine gun, 60mm mortar, rocket launcher, 82mm mortar, and 57mm recoilless rifle." 5

(7) CINCPAC forwarded this request on 27 February and, on 25 March 1968, DA granted him authority "to release available CHICOM weapons... from theater assets to equip not more than one battalion for operational exercises Taiwan." 6 Except for the necessary coordination by J4 logistics

1. Ibid.; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
2. CINCPAC 160131Z Feb 68.
3. Intv, LCOL Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC Histbr, 3 Jan 69.
4. CHMAAG China MGJS 2213/070505Z Feb 68.
5. Ibid.; CHAMAG China MGCH 10-320/310801Z Oct 68.
6. DA 856759/252105Z Mar 68; J4311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.

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planners to facilitate this action, no further significant developments occurred until October.  

(5) On the last day of this month, CHMAAG China informed CINCPAC that a personal request, "soliciting MAAG assistance in obtaining CHICOM 107 MM (12-tube) rocket launchers," had been made to him by the ROC President through the Chinese Minister of National Defense. In making this request, the minister had:

...emphasized that these weapons, in addition to other systems previously received, were considered essential in providing greater realism in training and in increasing current knowledge of CHICOM capabilities which have been demonstrated by the appearance of new weapon systems in RVN.

(5) CHMAAG China agreed that these weapons would help in improving the combat readiness of the ROC troops, so he forwarded the request for his MAAG to be provided two CHICOM 107mm (12-tube) rocket launchers. Since they could be furnished under authority already granted by both CINCPAC and DA, the action needed to fulfill this requirement was the concern of CINCUSARPAC.

Support for Ching Chuan Kang (CCK)/Tainan Tower and Navigational Aids

(5) Beginning in late June 1968, message traffic started flowing between the 327th Air Division, CINCPACAF, and CSAF on the need to improve the air traffic control facilities at CCK in support of the USAF mission. All were agreed on the need to supply support for CCK tower and navigational

1. Intv, LCOL Charles H. Dunn, USA, J4311, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 31 Oct 68.
2. CHMAAG China MGCH 10-320/310801Z Oct 68.
3. Ibid.
5. Intv, LCOL Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 12 Feb 69; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
aids, and CSAF indicated that the MASF (Military Assistance Service Funded) program might be the appropriate way to meet these requirements.1

(C) On 15 July, CINCPAC forwarded the following message to both CINCPACAF and CSAF:

2. Following criteria are considered appropriate for use in determining funding procedure for improvements to CCK air traffic control facilities.

   a. Provision of equipment/facilities, including spare parts and improvements to CAF owned equipment, which are required to support CAF mission should continue to be funded by country or MAP without regard to residual benefit to USAF.

   b. Requirements in support of USAF mission, but not necessary to support CAF mission, should be funded by USAF without regard to residual benefit to CAF.

   (1) If equipment/facilities are to remain under USAF ownership, even if under an agreement to transfer ownership to country when no longer required for USAF mission, regular USAF budget should be used.

   (2) Equipment/facilities intended for transfer to country ownership upon delivery and services to be performed on CAF owned equipment/facilities should be provided through a MASF program.

3. FOR CINCPACAF. Request you identify deficiencies in CCK air traffic control facilities which must be corrected to support USAF mission. Identify equipment and services and provide order of magnitude

1. CINCPACAF 032031Z Jul 68; CSAF 052131Z Jul 68.
cost required to correct deficiencies. List separately those requirements which fall within country MAP, USAF and MASF criteria as outlined above. Coordinate reply with CHMAAG China.

4. FOR CSAF. Upon receipt of reply from CINCPACAF, CINCPAC will submit recommendations regarding requirements and method of funding. 1

(C) CINCPACAF produced for CINCPAC on 16 September 1968 the identification of deficiencies requested and, in addition, included the USAF requirements for the Tainan Air Base Air Traffic Control. 2 Twelve days later, CINCPAC concurred "in the list of services and equipment required to improve CAF facilities at CCK and Tainan to meet USAF standards." 3 He also reiterated his belief that those requirements generated by increased USAF use of CCK and Tainan should be funded by USAF, while those requirements intended for improvements to GRC facilities or which would be turned over to GRC should become military assistance to ROC.

(C) Like CINCPAC, CSAF concurred in the validity of the requirements for CCK/Tainan tower and navigational aids. "Consensus here," CSAF continued, is that these requirements "should be programmed under FY 69 MAP Grant Aid. MAP funding will be provided from prior year recoupments." 4 His message of 8 October 1968 further stated that ODMA (Office of the Director of Military Assistance) programs staff had concurred in the use of MASL (Military Assistance Program Articles and Services List) data for programming action required and that USAF funding would be taken on those requirements for improvements to USAF facilities at CCK. This message actually constituted the authority necessary to initiate action to fill the tower and navigational aids requirements at CCK and Tainan. Ten days later, CSAF assigned the unclassified nickname of PEACE BIRD to those actions authorized by his previous message. At the same time, he requested AFLC (Air Force Logistics Command) to "provide project management as necessary to effect timely fulfillment of the authorized requirement." 5

1. CINCPAC 152245Z Jul 68.
2. CINCPACAF 162001Z Sep 68.
3. CINCPAC 281941Z Sep 68.
4. CSAF 082238Z Oct 68.
5. CSAF 181955Z Oct 68.
In Indonesia, General Subarto is seeking to lead his nation toward goals of national stability and progress. But improvement is slow and there are signs of impatience—and even sporadic disaffection—among the populace. To improve the Government's chances of survival long enough to prove itself, U.S. assistance should continue. To this end, a modest amount of assistance is being channeled through MAP to support a military civic action program. All indications are that materiel being provided in the Military Assistance Program is being effectively employed. U.S. spare parts have already returned much-needed transportation and construction equipment to service. A number of highly worthwhile civic action projects are in progress.

The FY 69 program will continue to emphasize training, spare parts and equipment, including heavy construction and transportation items, to support civic action and rehabilitation efforts of the Indonesian armed forces.

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp

1. CINCPAC 9 Apr 68 MAP Statement.
INDONESIA
AS OF 1 JANUARY 1969

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA: 736,000 SQ MI
POPULATION: 112.5 MIL
ANNUAL GROWTH: 7.9%
AGRICULTURE LAND PER CAPITA: 0.8 ACRE
LITERACY RATE: 51%
LIFE EXPECTANCY: 32 YEARS
GROSS INT. PROD. 1963 ($): $47.4 BIL
PER CAPITA: $585
DEFENSE BUDGET 1965 ($): $259.7 MIL
AS % OF CENTRAL GOVT EXP. (SELF FINANCED): 32.0
AS % OF GNP: 6.7

PRESIDENT - GEN Suhaeto
MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY - GEN Suhaeto
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Adam Malik
NAVY CDR - ADM Muhammad
AF CDR - AIR MARSHAL Rusmin
COMMANDANT MARCORPS - MGEN Habibullah
ARMY CDR - GEN Panggabean

MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES

ARMY
4 INF BDE, 1 PARA COMMANDO REGT, 1 CAVALRY BDE, 67 INF BN/1 FFB, 1 FMN, 3 ENG BN/600M, 11 ENG BN/200M

NAVY
4 DE, 2 FCE, 22 PG, 6 PT, 6 MRF, 9 MRR, 3 MARINE INF BN, 7 LST, 9 AKL, 2 AP/AFL

AIR FORCE
5 TAC FTR BDS, 1 SAR SQ, 4 TAC COMP BDS, 3 TRANS BDS, 2 HELO BDS

OVERALL OBJECTIVE
CONTINUED AVAILABILITY TO THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES OF SEA AND AIR ROUTES BETWEEN PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN AREAS.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION
U.S.AMBASSADOR
HON. MARSHALL GREEN
USAID REPRESENTATIVE
MR. STOKES M. TOLBERT
CHULS
COL HERBERT F. ROSE, USA

MAP OBJECTIVE

General objectives are:
(A) To encourage the Indonesian government to maintain friendly relations with Indonesia's neighbors and with the United States.
(B) To encourage the Indonesian government to pursue responsible economic and fiscal policies.
(C) To give tangible support to the government's use of Indonesian armed forces in its civic rehabilitation program.
(D) To develop and strengthen contacts between Indonesian military personnel and their counterparts.

CONBAT CAPABILITY

MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL MINOR INCursions BUT NOT A MAJOR ATTACK. LAUNCH AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN BRIGADE STRENGTH.

PARTIALLY SUPPRESS SMUGGLING AND PROVIDE LIMITED SUPPORT FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. CONDUCT ONLY TOKEN SUBMARINE INTERDiction AND ASW OPERATIONS. INDONESIA MARINES ARE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING REGIMENTAL SIZE LANDING FORCES FOR AMPHIBIOUS Assaults.

FORCES ARE MARGINALLY READY TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE BOMBING OPERATIONS AND VFP AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND TO SUPPORT MINOR GROUND OPERATIONS.

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 150.
FY 69 Indonesia MAP

(2) Last year's history treated in detail with the strategic importance of the Indonesian archipelago to the U.S. position in the Far East, the abortive Communist coup of late 1965, and the resumption of MAP, as well as other topics. 1 As early as November 1967, the FY 69 Indonesia MAP had been tentatively set at $6.0 million. 2 A year later, however, SECDEF informed CINCPAC that this amount had been reduced by half a million to a new ceiling of $5.5 million. "In your review for adjustment to above approved levels," SECDEF instructed CINCPAC on 2 November 1968, "training and related requirements should be carefully examined to insure all are essential to country objectives." 3

(5) Based upon recommendations furnished by CHDLG Indonesia, CINCPAC deleted the following items on 22 November 1968 in order to bring FY 69 Indonesia MAP within the new ceiling:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Deferral</th>
<th>Amount Deferred</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-41 aircraft</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>$102,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrapers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>$131,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractors</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>$300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Since the resumption of MAP, a major area of contention has existed between the views of CINCPAC and the Country Team and those of SECDEF concerning certain items "in the fringe area of what support may be included under the 'civic action' restriction." 5 As early as 7 July 1967, Marshall Green, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia had "told Suharto that he would do all possible to help increase U.S. assistance for the Indonesia civic action program." 6 CINCPAC's views on the subject were as follows:

2. Ibid., p. 421.
3. SECDEF 4745/020002Z Nov 68.
4. CHDLG Djakarta 130820Z Nov 68; ADMIN CINCPAC 220352Z Nov 68; J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
The most important contribution of military assistance to the achievement of the U.S. objectives has been the encouragement to the Indonesian military to move into civic action projects which not only contribute to economic stabilization but also enhance the local image of the Armed Forces. MAP is designed to assist this leadership in implementing civic action programs that will contribute to the economic viability of the country. A side benefit of these civic action programs is the utilization of vast amounts of military manpower and skills which are currently unused. 1

(S) "During FY 68 there were three major items requested by the Country Team and supported fully by CINCPAC which were disapproved by SECDEF or approved as a one-time exception to policy." 2 At Inter-Agency Review of worldwide MAP, which was held in Washington, D.C., during September 1968, CINCPAC presented these three types of MAP support as "issue items. SECDEF and State withdrew objections to the purchase of medical supplies for the military civic action program. Decisions on both the three excess HU-16B aircraft along with support of the HU-16 program and the five T-41 aircraft" were pending as of 11 December 1968. 3

(S) One concrete example of MAP accomplishments in the realm of civic action occurred during early 1968. CHDLG Indonesia had obtained the expeditious delivery during 1967 and 1968 of critical repair parts for road building equipment that had been provided by MAP during the early 1960s. When these repair parts arrived, the first MAP support to be provided in several years, the Indonesian Army, assisted by the Police Brigade (Mobrig), "using rag-tag equipment, were attempting to rehabilitate 107km of economically important highway between West and Central

Java. This highway had not been repaired in 20 years and was critical in getting the internal economy moving again.\(^1\) Not only did this MA assist in having the road repairs completed by April 1968, but also encouraged the Indonesian Army in their vital civic action program.

**English Language Laboratories for Indonesia MAP (N)**

(\(\Omega\)) As a result of a program reduction, a number of lines, including all English language laboratories were deleted from the FY 68 Indonesia MAP. On 9 January 1968, these laboratories and some of the other deleted items were placed in the FY 69 Indonesia MAP.\(^2\) Subsequently, on 17 February 1968, in a message to SECDEF, CINCPAC requested that "action be initiated now to provide early funding and reduce lead time as much as possible on" one 30-position English language laboratory with the cost of $22,400 in the FY 69 Indonesia MAP, based upon the following rationale:

Indonesian Army has no labs on hand, and those of other services in operational condition are already fully utilized. Many texts and other publications used in country are in English. Moreover, more English training is required to increase pool of eligibles for CONUS training.\(^3\)

**Project PEACE RAMPART**

(\(\alpha\)) At the request of CHDLG (Chief, Defense Liaison Group) Indonesia, an Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) Evaluation Team made a special

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2. CINCPAC 142146Z Jan 68; J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
3. CINCPAC 170005Z Feb 68.
visit in October 1967. Its report highlighted the "material/publications and other deficiencies which" existed in the Indonesia Air Force (AURI) and "could have slow down effect on national civic rehabilitation program." Since it was "apparent that maximum effort will be required by all concerned to achieve...program objectives as rapidly as possible," the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (CSAF), recommended on 27 October 1967 that CINCPAC consider the use of PACAF personnel to accomplish the desired results in "view of small amount of program/funds currently available and to minimize cost to MAP." This, then, was the origin of the USAF-supported operation known as Project PEACE RAMPART.

The project was designed to assist the AURI by: (1) the expeditious identification and shipment of required parts and materials for 6 grounded C-47s; (2) the providing of a technical field assistance team to help establish technical publication libraries and to furnish sufficient instruction on MILSTRIP procedures and use of technical publications, so that the AURI would be able to identify and requisition future requirements in accordance with established MAP procedures; and (3) the determining of the in-country precision measurement equipment (PME) calibration requirement and capability.

The six-man PEACE RAMPART team arrived in Indonesia on 15 January 1968 and proceeded to Hussein AFB, Bandung, to work in coordination with the AURI. Its initial discussions with the people on the scene, both American and Indonesian, indicated "complete agreement with team mission concept for obtaining optimum value for resources to be applied to support civic action operations of AURI."

The team's final report of 15 February 1968 stated that the basic objectives of PEACE RAMPART had been accomplished, and noted these accomplishments:

1. Of the needed material, tools, and publications, 80% had been received in-country and the balance were en route.

1. AMEMBASSY Djakarta 4718/190930Z Feb 68.
3. Ibid.
4. J4331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
5. Ibid.; AMEMBASSY Djakarta 4718/190930Z Feb 68.
6. GHDLG Djakarta 171015Z Jan 68.
2. Of the six grounded C-47s, two had been restored to flying status, two were in the final test stage, and repairs on the remaining two were progressing smoothly.

3. A Master Library and a Publications Distribution Office (PDO) had been established in the headquarters at Hussein AFB. Other reference libraries had also been located there. Complete maintenance and supply working libraries had been set up in appropriate areas and a partial file had been placed in the main warehouse office to facilitate identification inspection of material in storage. In all, a total of five complete and one partial libraries were established. These provided all the current stocklists, technical orders, documents, indexes, and related publications that would be necessary to identify C-47 and HU-16 material needs and to convert these requirements to Federal Stock Numbers (FSN) and to requisition them under MILSTRIP format and procedures.

4. Forty-four hours of classroom instruction and three hundred and eighty hours of on-the-job training (OJT) was given to Indonesian personnel in the use and management of publications, material management, and maintenance workload management.

5. Approximately 1,400 C-47 and HU-16 depot stock items had been re-identified and re-tagged to FSN, accountable records had been converted to FSN, and a stock inventory had been initiated.

6. A 5-year depot workload schedule for Hussein AFB had been projected, and definitized material requirement lists, based on this schedule, were being prepared for submission to DLC Indonesia in the immediate future. 1

(C) "A survey was conducted during April 1968 of AURI PME calibration capability. Findings of this survey verified the need for basic equipment, parts support, operator maintenance, and an inventory of existing PME." 2 This survey officially terminated Project PEACE RAMPART for, although there was some message traffic later in the year on this topic, the objectives

1. J4331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68; CHDLG Djakarta 150645Z Feb 68.
2. J4331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
of Project PEACE RAMPART had been achieved. 1

(C) In retrospect, it seems evident that longer range and less tangible benefits resulted from Project PEACE RAMPART than the immediate, measurable benefits already mentioned. According to CHDLG Indonesia, its salutary effects included definite present and future improvement of airlift capability for civic action, inspiration for refurbishing and revitalizing AURI aircraft support capability, and the "identification of common aspirations and development of mutual confidence and respect." 2 The American Ambassador, Marshall Green, wired the following to CINCPAC on 19 February 1968:

In recent weeks AURI leaders have shown even greater interest in working with DLG. Project PEACE RAMPART has shown AURI leaders that they have backing of U.S. Govt. They are favorably impressed with the magnitude and quality of expertise PEACE RAMPART provided them through MAP. This has promoted a desire among AURI officers for closer ties with U.S. military....

Most important aspect of the program is manifestation of AURI's support of Govt, bearing in mind that before Sept. 30, 1965 abortive coup, AURI was riddled with Communist sympathizers. Today AURI has cleansed its ranks and gives full support to Suharto's "New Order".

Since Project PEACE RAMPART has been so highly successful and because of DLG's limited personnel, it is recommended that similar projects be planned for the Indonesian Army and Navy. 3

1. Ibid.; CSAF AFSMSDA 032318Z Apr 68; FONECON, LCOL Marjorie L. Riepma, USAF, MAP Officer, J4331, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 2 Oct 68.
2. CHDLG Djakarta 150645Z Feb 68.
3. AMEMBASSY Djakarta 4718/190930Z Feb 68.
Proposed Redesignation, Defense Liaison Group (DLG), Indonesia

(C) The U.S. contingent with the mission of administering the Indonesia MAP was given the name of DLG on 1 September 1965, following the termination of military assistance in May of the same year. 1 Previously, this organization had been the Military Technical Advisory Group (MILTAG) until its disestablishment on 31 August 1965.

(C) As Ambassador Marshall Green advised the Secretary of State on 9 July 1968, some elements within the Government of Indonesia (GOI):

... are still confused about term DLG which in any event does not reflect actual functions of that office since MAP was resumed last year. I therefore believe time is now appropriate to adopt name which more aptly describes functions of U.S. military mission and which is less misleading to Indonesians.

After careful consideration I recommend that we revert to term 'MILTAG' with understanding that 'A' stands for 'Assistance' rather than 'Advisory.' This designation has advantage of being familiar to Indonesian military and at same time clearly describes function now being performed. To allay possibility that change in title might be interpreted by some as change in nature or size of MAP, we would carefully brief Indonesian military and Foreign Department in advance, explaining that we were merely catching up by altering name now to reflect change in functions which took place last year. 2

(5) Three days later, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS approve Ambassador Green's request, at the same time, offering the possible

1. Unless otherwise cited, the information contained in this subsection on DLG redesignation was derived from: J5 Brief No. 269-68, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Aug 68, of JCS 2315/444 of 31 Jul 68, Subj: Change in Designation, Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia; J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
2. AMEMBASSY Djakarta 8064/091045Z Jul 68.
designation of this unit as Military Group (MILGP), Indonesia, as an acceptable alternative. In his explanation why the "present designation does not adequately describe the functions performed by this unit and is confusing to the Indonesian military and to many U.S. Government agencies as well," CINCPAC stated that the "term Defense Liaison Group was selected to fit an organization whose MAP function had been terminated and whose mission and personnel strength had been reduced to a 'caretaker' status. The present function goes well beyond 'liaison.'" The JCS, by means of a memorandum, concurred in the proposal to redesignate DLG Indonesia to MILTAG Indonesia before the end of the month.

(C) Because the American "military assistance agreement with Indonesia is unique in its limitation to assistance to armed forces programs of civic action," Secretary of State Rusk advised the American Embassy in Djakarta on 31 July 1968 that the "designation of 'Defense Liaison Group' for U.S. military team in Djakarta will therefore be retained." This message, which was a joint State/Defense one, further elaborated on the reasoning behind this decision:

While redesignation as MILTAG would undoubtedly have some convenient aspects, 'DLG' designation is of continuing usefulness to symbolize within USG as well as with Indonesians that program is of special nature and not comparable with what usually implemented under MILTAG mission.

Despite any disclaimers EMBASSY/DLG might make, it is difficult to believe Indo counterparts would not attach their own substantive interpretation to title change. Since present title in use for three years, it should not confuse DLG counterparts involved in implementing program. Confusion more likely stems from those who would like to assume that DLG represents more conventional MILTAG relationship. Redesignation as MILTAG would tend to increase misunderstanding of

1. CINCPAC 122019Z Jul 68; Comments on draft manuscript by LCOL E. F. Faust, USA, J5321, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, on 14 Nov 68, also proved helpful concerning this paragraph.
2. SECSTATE 212134/211445Z Jul 68.
USG policy and Indonesian military expectations with regard thereto. 1

Return of Aircraft Engines to Indonesia

(5) On 4 January 1968, CHDLG Indonesia requested assistance in the shipment of six C-130 aircraft engines from the contractor overhaul facility at Lake Charles, Louisiana, to Djakarta. Airlift, at no cost to MAP, was requested to Mactan Air Base, Philippines, from which terminal, the Indonesia Air Force would provide onward airlift to Indonesia. 2

(5) CSAF advised CINCPAC on 9 February that arrangements had been made to airlift the engines by Tactical Air Command (TAC) aircraft to Taipei, Taiwan. 3 CHDLG Indonesia responded that the Indonesia Air Force was unable to provide airlift from Taipei and requested diversion of the engines to a terminal in either Okinawa or the Philippines. 4

(5) Subsequently, TAC aircraft delivered five engines to Andersen AFB, Guam, and one to Clark Air Base, Philippines. Onward airlift to Indonesia was provided from Guam by the Indonesia Air Force on 2 March and from the Philippines by the 314th Tactical Air Wing (TAW) on 29 March. 5 CHDLG Indonesia acknowledged the receipt of the six engines and the completion of the airlift requirement on 8 April 1968. 6

1. Ibid.
2. CSAF 111655Z Jan 68; J4331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68; CHDLG Djakarta 130804Z Jan 68, cited in Memo, LCOL Marjorie L. Riepma, USAF, J4331, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 31 Oct 68, hereafter cited as LCOL Riepma Memo 31 Oct 68.
3. CSAF 091712Z Feb 68.
5. 4440th ACFTD LVRGPDDET, Andersen AFB, Guam 020625Z Mar 68; 315th AIRDIV, Tachikawa AFB, Japan 260111Z Mar 68; CSAF 211739Z Mar 68 and 315AD 260111Z Mar 68, both cited in LCOL Riepma Memo 31 Oct 68.
6. CHDLG Djakarta 080825Z Apr 68.
Justification of Indonesian MAP Civic Action Items

(5) On 10 May 1968, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) questioned the following items in the FY 68 Indonesia MAP: (1) mess gear, cots, tents; (2) drugs, biologicals; (3) T-41 aircraft. Objection to the first two items was because it "is not DOD policy to provide consumables for Civic Action Programs," and furthermore, they were intended for "disaster relief operations, which is not a function of MAP." 1

(5) CINCPAC asked for a reconsideration, eleven days later, since floods, "epidemics, food shortages, etc. occur in Indonesia with such frequency that, collectively, they should be considered not a disaster but a chronic condition," and that the provision of food, shelter, and medical treatment would be a most effective form of civic action. 2 As for the T-41s, CINCPAC believed they were justifiable on the basis that these planes would facilitate the training of pilots for transport aircraft in direct support of the civic action program.

(5) SECDEF reconsidered, and "in light of justification and rationale provided by" CINCPAC and the American Embassy in Djakarta, approved the funding for camping equipment and medical supplies in support of the Indonesia Civic Action Program as an exception to the established policy on a one time basis. 3 At the same time, in his message of 11 June 1968, SECDEF disapproved the request for the 5 T-41s as being items that did not "have a clear and direct application to Civic Action Programs." 4

HU-16 Aircraft for Indonesia

(5) In January 1968, the Chief, Defense Liaison Group (CHDLG), Indonesia asked CINCPAC about the availability of HU-16 aircraft at no "cost to MAP with at least one year spare support." 5 CINCPAC, in turn, contacted CSAF about the availability of HU-16s and spare parts in

1. SECDEF 008728/102118Z May 68; J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
2. CINCPAC 212132Z May 68.
3. SECDEF 2218/112151Z Jun 68; J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68. See also AMEMBASSY Djakarta 6693/140955Z May 68.
4. Ibid.
5. CHDLG Djakarta 200230Z Jan 68; CSAF 111655Z Jan 68.
Okinawa; he also requested CHDLG Indonesia to comment on the Indonesian Air Force (AURI) and its estimated capability to support the existing 6 AURI HU-16s, as well as the 2 additional aircraft programmed. 1

(2) CSAF replied on 20 February, stating that 5 such aircraft were available in Okinawa, although two had been already committed to the Republic of China. To hold these HU-16s, a "program must be established prior to 30 June 68." 2 As for the excess spares, CSAF suggested that CINCPAC query the 33 Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadron at Naha AFB, Okinawa, which he did on 28 February 1968. 3 In the final analysis, however, all these efforts proved fruitless, for SECDEF disapproved the idea on 5 June 1968. As he explained his decision to CINCPAC: "In view of fact that Indonesia does not presently maintain majority its own HU16s in flying condition, it is considered unlikely that it would be prepared to undertake expense of maintaining three additional aircraft of this type." 4

(3) CINCPAC reopened the issue in a message to SECDEF on 15 October 1968, because the justification previously submitted "remains valid. Essentially, HU-16's will provide airlift support to civic action projects located in remote island areas." 5 He recommended that SECDEF grant the authority to furnish the three excess USAF HU-16s then available to the AURI at no cost to MAP; furthermore, CINCPAC requested "authority to program follow-on support for the entire HU-16 program under MAP." 6

(3) In reply on 7 November, SECDEF asked for additional information on this subject, such as the number of HU-16s to be supported under MAP, the estimate of annual O&M (Operations and Maintenance) costs for program, and the rationale for MAP funding of follow-on support, before a final decision could be made. 7 CINCPAC's response on 20 November, which was based upon information provided by CHDLG Indonesia five days earlier, contained the following major points and reiterated conclusions:

1. J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
2. CSAF 202244Z Feb 68.
3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 280332Z Feb 68.
4. SECDEF 1757/052201Z Jun 68; J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
5. CINCPAC 150115Z Oct 68; J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
6. Ibid.
7. SECDEF 5112/071721Z Nov 68.
(1) "Annual O&M cost to support 1820 flying hours by nine HU-16 aircraft is approximately $89,000, based on information contained in AFM 172-4."

(2) "However, the current economic situation and low level of available foreign exchange limits the capability of the GOI to purchase additional military support and militates against provision of support for HU-16 program via FMS at this time."

(3) "Grant Aid support of the current inventory of six HU-16 amphibious aircraft could put back into operation assets that are presently unserviceable. Concurrently GOI civic action emphasis is shifting from Java to the outer islands. Operational HU-16 assets could be directly translated to the civic action role by improved AF/Navy capability to airlift spare parts, medical supplies/teams, and food directly to areas where airfields are non-existent."

(4) "Always present would be the opportunity to gain some degree of beneficial rapport with the Indonesian military by assisting them to acquire an operational HU-16 capability."

(5) "Recommend authority be granted to provide the Indonesian Air Force three excess USAF HU-16B's currently available at no cost to MAP" and to provide follow-on support for the entire program of nine HU-16 aircraft under grant aid. 1

(U) By the end of calendar year 1968, nothing further of significance happened, and the action on this project remained uncompleted. Its status remained the same as what it had been a month earlier in November 1968. 2

1. CINCPAC 200356Z Nov 68; CHDLG Djakarta 150732Z Nov 68; J5321
2. J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
Urgent Requirement for Engineer Equipment, East Java

(C) Although the requested engineer equipment had been rushed at considerable expense by the U.S. to the Indonesian Army in ample time for its use in the East Java flood control project before the rainy season, as reported in last year's history, certain unforeseen complexities appeared to hinder this humanitarian effort. To start with, the American civilian equipment specialist on the scene proved to be unfamiliar with the crawler crane and two bulldozers that was off-loaded at Surabaya on 11 July 1967 and had doubts about his ability to either maintain them in working conditions or to train Indonesian operators how to handle them. The Indonesian engineering officer, on the other hand, felt that he had sufficient personnel, who could be easily trained to operate the construction equipment, if they had the proper operation and maintenance manuals for the equipment.  

(C) CHDLG Indonesia must have had some well-grounded apprehensions about the possible success or failure of this venture for, on 27 July--the same day he reported the crane and tractors in operations at the project site--he warned CINCPAC that "failure of this first major MAP project might produce adverse affect on U.S. objectives as well as Indo civic action efforts." A week later, the situation had deteriorated, for he wired the following to CINCPAC:

...concern the development of a requirement for and supply of a crane crawler and two tractors, crawler for use in clearing a water diversion canal associated with the Brantas River in East Java. In view of recent developments with regard to operation and maintenance of the equip, it is considered appropriate to emphasize certain considerations in order that the situation which exists is fully apparent and appreciated.

1. CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. I, pp. 422-24; Intv, LCOL Robert H. Mathieu, USA, J4312, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 12 Jul 68.
2. CHDLG AMEMBASSY Djakarta 170900Z Jul 67; CHDLG AMEMBASSY Djakarta 201000Z Jul 67; CHDLG AMEMBASSY 270230Z Jul 67; comments on first rough draft by LCOL Robert N. Mathieu, USA, J4312, Hq CINCPAC, on 18 Sep 68.
3. CHDLG AMEMBASSY Djakarta 270230Z Jul 67.
At the present time very limited professional knowledge is available in-country to the Indonesian Armed Forces or the Chief, Defense Liaison Group concerning the engineering, operation, or maintenance aspects of the project. Without the technical expertise necessary, actions must often be taken with a large measure of blind faith.

It is of increasing concern that the project may not be completed within the required time frame, not to mention the large dollar value which has been obligated. Decisions, however well meaning, have been made that make the desired results increasingly difficult to obtain. It is noted from all appearances that the host government is making a valiant and determined effort to complete the clearing within the required time frame. An infantry battalion has been and is engaged in a manual earth moving job and has removed an estimated... however the manual efforts will not complete the job prior to the rainy season which begins in October. Regardless of the history of development of this project, the engineering feasibility, or the utilization of sophisticated equipment, it is of major political importance that current Indo civic action programs succeed. We have recently learned that enemies of new Indo Govt (and of course U.S. as well) are hoping that the Brantas project will fail. This may be construed as a backhand compliment as to the importance of this project, in which U.S. primarily associated...

The purpose of this report is... to insure that all concerned recognize the limited expertise available in-country and the limited study upon which these projects were commenced. CINCPAC's excellent support for entire MAP program deeply appreciated. Any further assistance CINCPAC can provide in connection with above projects will be most helpful in promoting basic U.S. interest in Indonesia.

1. CHDLG AMEMBASSY Djakarta 030625Z Aug 67.
Because of the serious operational difficulties, such as the crane being deadlined, that had arisen within merely 19 days following the arrival of the equipment in-country, CINCPAC sent a J4 engineering officer, LCOL Robert N. Mathieu, USA, on a staff visit to Indonesia during the period 4-14 August 1967. His interim report, which he dispatched on 11 August, threw an entirely new perspective on the situation. "Review of flood control project revealed that urgency originally associated with this project does not rpt not exist," his message to CINCPAC read. "The total value of this project is considered questionable and objectives stated in Refs A and B will not be achieved upon completion of the project." It was his final trip report, however, that specifically set forth the existing conditions in Java. Its more pertinent portions are reproduced below for the purpose of clarification:

On 31 May 1967 CHDLG reported...that a crane, dragline and two bulldozers with angle blade were urgently required for a flood control project in East Java. The urgency of the requirement as reported was to insure clearing of a drainage canal that diverts water from the Brantas river into the Indian Ocean, prior to the start of the rainy season. Clearing of secondary lava from this canal was to stop flooding of the Brantas river and to stop further flow of secondary lava deposits from Mount Kelud which is covering rich rice fields in the Blitar-Kediri area...

Upon my arrival in Indonesia I went directly to the construction site in East Java. The equipment at the site was inspected... The equipment provided met the specifications contained in the DLG request. The items as received were in satisfactory condition and were operable... The problem associated with operation of both the tractors and crane is the lack of skilled operators...

1. Intvs LCOL Robert N. Mathieu, USA, J4321, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 12 Jul and 16 Aug 68.
2. CHDLG AMEMBASSY Djakarta 110725Z Aug 67. Refs A and B were CHDLG AMEMBASSY Djakarta 311010Z May 67 and 050930 Jun 67, respectively.

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Prior to shipment of this equipment CINCPAC requested that CHDLG insure that qualified operators would be on site when the equipment arrived. ... It appears that from discussions on this point that no follow-ups or checks were made to determine the skill level of operators assigned to the project. Had skilled operators been assigned they would have had no difficulty in operating the items of equipment provided....

The construction project in East Java consists of removing approximately one meter (average depth) of sand from the bottom of the first 2,000 meters of a canal used to divert the head waters of the Ngasinan river to the Indian Ocean.... The eruption and secondary lava flows from Mount Kelud (which erupted in 1966) cannot enter this canal and has no effect on the rate at which sand is deposited in the canal. ... The waters of the Ngasinan river empty into the Brantas river approximately 9 kilometers north of the town of Tulungagung.... Clearing of the diversion canal will have little or no effect on flooding in the area of Tulungagung....

The area as described in the DLG messages is approximately 50 kilometers from the actual project. The area described is not subjected to annual flooding. The last flooding in this area occurred in 1964. This area, however, has been subjected to both primary and secondary lava flow from Mount Kelud.... Entry of the lava into the river can be expected to raise the river bed of the Brantas and can cause blocking of streams discharging into the river. As a result it can be expected that more frequent flooding of the areas adjacent to the Brantas river will occur....

Discussions with CHDLG revealed that:

a. The project and equipment requirements were developed from a sand table model of the area.

The sand table model was used during a briefing in Surabaja presented to Mr. Nuechterlein and Consul
Bartley by Mr. Nosker (an equipment maintenance representative from USADCJ, TDY to DLG) who had just been through this area. A decision was made that something should be done to assist the people in this area in controlling flooding and spread of secondary lava flows, apparently confusion reigned. The project and requirements for equipment was presented to the Ambassador by Mr. Nuechterlein and CHDLG. The Ambassador concurred in the urgency of the requirement and request for the equipment. (During initial interview with the Ambassador upon returning from the area, he was surprised at the actual site location and stated he was under the impression the canal was from the Brantas river to the ocean and in the area of Blitar-Sregnat.)

b. The priority of the project and equipment requirements were not cleared with the Indonesian Government. They were informed of this action after the equipment had been requested.

c. A review of Indonesia drainage plans, priority of plans, or engineering feasibility studies was never made with respect to the project and request for equipment.

Upon return to Djakarta, CHDLG was briefed on the above findings. CHDLG requested that Ambassador Green be advised of the findings. Upon completion of the briefing the Ambassador directed CHDLG to contact General Hartono and advise him of the general situation. In addition, the Ambassador stated he did not want the situation to be white-washed and that CINCPAC should be informed.

CHDLG discussed the situation with General Hartono and hinted that it may be wise to move the equipment from the present site to a priority construction project. General Hartono requested technical advice on whether the equipment should remain in the present location or whether it should be moved. After several evasive answers General Hartono asked the CINCPAC staff representative the following question:
"If you were the Commander would you move the equipment to a different job site?" The answer provided was: "Yes, I would move the equipment." In addition, during this meeting it was pointed out that the Indonesians did have a plan to contain the secondary lava flows in Blitar-Srengat area....

RECOMMENDATIONS

That U.S. efforts to push clearing of the diversion canal be discontinued.

Control of the equipment provided to the Indonesians for this project should be turned over to that Government, the same as any other MAP equipment, for use on high priority civic action missions as determined by that government.

That instructor operators be provided on a TDY basis to train Indonesians in equipment operation....

The Engineer Equipment Specialist on TDY from USADCJ be replaced by an equipment specialist qualified to provide instruction in operation and maintenance on all types of equipment.¹

(C) On 19 August 1968, the SECDEF asked CINCPAC for an explanation of the discrepancy between LCOL Mathieu's message of 11 August and the previous ones from Djakarta "concerning importance of flood control project East Java," since the earlier expressed urgency had resulted in "extraordinary effort" being "directed to fund and implement requirements for crane and dozers."² Moreover, in view of the fact that the "crane was damaged due to inexperienced operators," SECDEF wanted to know "what arrangements were made by advisory personnel to ensure proper end item utilization of equipment on arrival in country."³

1. Memo, from LCOL Robert N. Mathieu, USA, J4312, to J4, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Aug 67, Subj: Visit to Indonesia; Trip Report.
2. SECDEF 4307/191950Z Aug 67.
3. Ibid.
On 24 August, CINCPAC passed this SECDEF message on to CH-DLG Indonesia and requested that specific comments be provided for an answer to the SECDEF. He also stated his intention to explain the discrepancy by saying that, as a result of an engineering review of this project, "it was determined that the canal to be cleared diverted waters of Ngasinan river and not those of the Brantas," and that "at the current rate of sedimentation, a problem should not develop with this canal for at least another five (5) years." The same day, CINCPAC informed the JCS of the current status of the problem by summarizing the past actions --including the explanation of the discrepancy quoted above--that "related to urgent request for engineer equipment for use on a flood control project in East Java, Indonesia."

CHDLG Indonesia replied on 29 August, giving his explanation of why inexperienced operators were allowed to handle the construction equipment: "In view of previous ops with host country pers concerned, arrangements were considered appropriate for the situation. In order to prevent similar occurrences in the future, pers concerned will provide closer coordination with Indonesian abilities to operate end items and qualifications of all U.S. pers concerned."

On 9 September 1967, CINCPAC forwarded his answer to the JCS inquiry of 19 August. When no further developments occurred either from up or down the administrative chain of command, Hq CINCPAC assumed that action on this project had been terminated. In his reply, CINCPAC cited his 24 August message to the JCS for an explanation of the questioned discrepancy and added the following comment on why inexperienced operators had been used and what steps had been taken to insure that the equipment would be utilized properly:

Operators were provided by the Indonesian Army. Based on previous dealings with host country personnel concerned, it was assumed by DLG that operators were experienced and qualified.

In view of the above it was considered that arrangements made were appropriate. It was not until

1. CINCPAC 240039Z Aug 67.
2. CINCPAC 242230Z Aug 67.
after the equipment was placed in operation that limited skills of the Indonesian operators were revealed.¹

1. CINCPAC 090343Z Sep 67.
Japan

(3) The Japanese Self Defense Forces are an excellent example of what can be accomplished through the Military Assistance Program. Although Grant Aid Military Assistance to Japan has terminated, the Japanese still rely upon the U.S. for planning advice and as a source for the purchase of sophisticated military hardware.

There is good reason to believe that the close ties between the Japanese and U.S. military that have been developed over the past several years will continue to have a major influence upon Japanese force development.

We have a great interest in the continued development of the Japanese Self Defense Forces so that they may assume an increasing share of responsibility for area defense. It is also desirable that Japanese and U.S. forces complement each other, be logistically compatible, and be mutually supporting.

Continued use of our bases in Japan for logistical support of our forces in Korea is important to our Pacific strategy. Of equal or greater importance is our extensive base complex in Okinawa. In any negotiations regarding return of administrative control of Okinawa to Japan, we should not allow restrictions to be placed on the use of our Okinawa bases.

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp

1. CINCPAC 9 Apr 68 MAP Statement.
JAPAN

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1969

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA

111,000 SQ. MI

POPULATION

100 MILLION

ANNUAL GROWTH

7%

LABOR FORCE

0.2 MILLION

LITERACY RATE

97%

LIFE EXPECTANCY

67 YEARS

GDP (1968) (PINDEX 1958)

$4 BILLION

PER CAPITA

$4

DEFENSE BUDGET (FY 1976) SELF-FUNDED

$11.4 BILLION

AS % OF GNP

1.2%

AS % OF TOTAL BUDGET

5.8%

EMPEROR - Hirohito

PRIME MINISTER - Eisaku Satō

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Kishi Aldai

MINISTER JPN DEFENSE AGENCY (JDA)

General Hidetsugu Hara

JAPAN JNL STAFF COUNCIL (JINSA)

General Katsuhiko Takada, JASDF

STAFF, GROUND STAFF (JGSDF - LT GEN Kazuo Yamada)

STAFF, MARITIME STAFF (JMSDF)

Air Staff, ASDF - GEN Tatsuro Ohrui, AF

GEN, MARITIME SAFETY AGENCY - Ichiro Kusaka

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES

- FT 73-76

ARMS, 12 HVR VLF, 1 MECH RPV, 1 ARM RDP, 1 SCH RDP

15 ARMY BNS, 4 TANK BNS, 24 SPT BNS, 8 HA TNS

1 AAA BNS

Navy

1 CVN, 37 DD/DE TYPE 7, 14 SS, 14 PT/PF/PF

1 MINE WARFARE SHIPS, 19 MISC PAT SQS

1 ASP PAT SQS, 1 ASW HELO SQS, 1 ASW SQS

17 LST/LAM

Air Force

1 AW FTR SQS, 1 ASW SQ, 4 MISC BNS, 1 TAC FTR SQS, 1 TAC Recon SQ, 1 WZ SQ, 3 SAR DEP

1 TRANS SPT SQS

TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONDUCT LIMITED DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

COMBAT CAPABILITY

LIMITED ABILITY TO ESCORT COASTAL CONVOYS, ASW CAPABILITY, HIGH DEGREE OF READINESS;

GOOD UNDER VFR CONDITIONS, AW & C Capability Growing;

SMALL SIZE AND AIRCRAFT FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITS CAPABILITY, ABLE TO PROVIDE TACTICAL SUPPORT FOR BOTH GROUND AND NAVAL FORCES

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 151.
Phase-down of MAAG Japan

(3) By message on 23 March 1968, CINCPAC tasked COMUS Japan to prepare a plan, coordinated with the American Embassy and MAAG Japan, for the phase-down of MAAG Japan to result in its termination not later than end of FY 70. According to CINCPAC's instructions, this plan should identify and provide for the transfer of specific MAAG billets and associated functions to either a FMS Office or to COMUS Japan, who would handle the residual MAAG liaison activities, exclusive of FMS, with JSDF. COMUS Japan forwarded the coordinated study on the phase-down of MAAG Japan to CINCPAC by letter on 1 May 1968. Besides requesting four additional officers to perform the following functions, the plan recommended that COMUS Japan "assume residual functions to include: a. Increased rapport with JDA/JSDF; b. Surveillance of residual rights in MAP equipment; c. Surveillance over security measures in Japanese industry furnished U.S. classified data; and d. Evaluation of JSDF capabilities, advice and influence on force development, weapon systems, equipment modernization and related matters."2

(3) On 29 June 1968, CINCPAC proposed to the JCS that the transfer of associated personnel spaces and termination of MAAG Japan be accomplished by 30 September 1969.3 The residual functions of MAAG Japan would be consolidated under a Defense Material Office (DMO), a DOD organization attached to the American Embassy and consisting of from 8 to 12 U.S. personnel, and under COMUS Japan, who, with 4 additional personnel spaces, would "assume additional responsibility for former MAAG functions as follows: a. Maintain liaison and rapport with JDA and JSDF; b. Observe and participate in JSDF maneuvers and exercises; c. Evaluate JSDF combat and operational capabilities; d. Advise JSDF on force structure; e. Make annual recommendations to CINCPAC on JSDF force structure through annual JSOP inputs; f. Develop operational concepts, tactics and doctrine in coordination with JSDF; and g. Advise JSDF on modernization of weapons and equipment and related operations and training."4

1. CINCPAC 231950Z Mar 68.
In reply to a JCS request on 1 July 1968, CINCPAC stated five days later that, although 75 foreign nationals were employed by MAAG Japan, there was an anticipated requirement for only 6 "foreign nationals for DMO." As for U.S. personnel manning of DMO, he envisaged a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 12.

When advised by CHMAAG Japan on 15 August 1968 of the concern of the American Embassy over the delay in notifying the Government of Japan (GOJ) of MAAG phase-out, CINCPAC requested from the JCS two days later the "status of proposal and guidance on what can be discussed with the GOJ concerning U.S. plans for phase-out of MAAG Japan." You are authorized," SECDEF informed CINCPAC and the American Embassy at Tokyo on 6 September 1968, to inform the Japanese Foreign Office "and JDA of plans to phase-out MAAG and to establish Defense Office (exact title not yet determined, referred to as DMO in ref.s.) with up to 10-man (U.S.) staff on or about 30 June 1969 or ASAP thereafter; Defense Office will be in Embassy." The anticipated functions of DMO and COMUS Japan, as outlined in CINCPAC's message of 29 June 1968, "may similarly be discussed in general terms at your discretion," added SECDEF.

After being informed of these new guidelines by CINCPAC, CHMAAG Japan reported on 10 September 1968 that:

...Mr. Obata, Administrative Vice Minister and General Muta, Chairman, Joint Staff Council, both Japan Defense Agency, were informed 1500 hours 9 September 1968 by Chief, MAAG of the decision to phase-out MAAG-Japan on/about 30 June 1969. It was explained that this decision was a result of their reduced requests for Military Assistance, the discontinuance of Grant Aid and their desire for direct sales and licensed production of defense hardware. In view of this trend it was explained that large staff now in MAAG was not required but to

1. CINCPAC 060213Z Jul 68.
2. CINCPAC 170422Z Aug 68.
3. SECDEF 8861/061352Z Sep 68.
4. Ibid.

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continue meeting functional responsibilities and U.S. obligations under Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954 a Defense Office with a smaller staff would be established prior to the phase-out of MAAG-Japan. The main functions of this office would be directed toward sales. JDA officials were also informed that new Defense Office would be located within American Embassy complex. Assurance was again stressed that new Defense Office would meet JDA's requirements as previously under MAAG concept. JDA officials did not express outward concern over transformation. 1

(6) Meanwhile, although the phase-out of MAAG Japan was not scheduled until 30 June 1969, certain MAAG functions were being gradually transferred to COMUS Japan or other agencies in Japan. 2 During October and November 1968, CINCPAC, CHMAAG Japan, and the American Embassy at Tokyo worked out an agreement on the general terms of reference for a military materiel office to be established in Japan subsequent to the phase-out of MAAG Japan. 3 This topic is discussed at greater length in the following subsection of this chapter.

(6) Actually, the JCS did not transmit CINCPAC's recommendation of 29 June 1968, which provided for the phase-out of MAAG Japan on or about 30 June 1969 with the retaining of 10 U.S. personnel and 6 foreign national spaces in the American Embassy for carrying out the FMS function and other residual MAAG functions, outside of the ones to be assumed by COMUS Japan, to SECDEF until 10 December 1968. 4 If SECDEF approved this JCS-supported CINCPAC recommendation, the Chief of the new Defense Materiel Office (DMO) would be placed in a position similar to that of a Defense Attache in countries where no MAAG existed, thus providing a military chain of command from him through CINCPAC to the JCS. "Plans are underway," read a Hq CINCPAC document towards the

1. CHMAAG Japan 5255/100724 Sep 68; CINCPAC 070013Z Sep 68.
2. History of Headquarters, United States Forces, Japan, 1 August - 30 September 1968, p. 18.
4. J5122 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
end of calendar year 1968, "to establish the DMO in the present MAAG structure to provide an operational shake-down prior to 1 July 1969. MAAG is preparing a JMP which will be forwarded to the JCS for approval upon completion of CINCPAC review."1

Military Materiel Office (MMO), Japan

(S) The Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), on 6 August 1968, approved CINCPAC's proposal of 29 June for the "phase-out of MAAG Japan by the end of FY 69 and the establishment of a 10 man Military Materiel Office (MMO) for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in the Embassy."2 As Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson advised SECSTATE on 14 October 1968:

...I discussed general terms of reference for sales office with Admiral McCain on 13 October, together with Embassy, MAAG, and CINCPAC staff members. Following language is agreeable to Admiral McCain and myself. It seems to me that it handles question of command lines and channels in acceptable manner and I urge Washington review and decision soonest. 3

(S) In a message to Ambassador Johnson four days later, with an information copy to the JCS, CINCPAC concurred in the terms of reference (TOR) as stated by the American Ambassador to Japan to SECSTATE, but he did recommend that the following paragraph in the TOR be changed:

The Chief of the MMO is a representative of the Secretary of Defense in Japan. The Chief MMO is responsible to and receives directions from CINCPAC on equipage associated with military planning and objectives, also on MAP agreements. 4

3. AMEMBASSY Tokyo 12938/141000Z Oct 68.
4. Ibid.; J512 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
CINCPAC's new wording of this paragraph, which follows, was intended to state more clearly the sense of discussions between him and Ambassador Johnson on 13 October and to remove any implication that the Chief of MMO was responsible to CINCPAC only on equipage:

The Chief of the MMO is a representative of the Secretary of Defense in Japan and is responsible to and receives directions from CINCPAC on all military planning objectives, MAP matters, residual MAP material and equipage. ¹

Both CINCPAC and the Ambassador had envisioned the MMO as a DOD organization functioning as an integral part of the Embassy. As a semi-autonomous office, therefore, its Chief would have direct access to the Ambassador. In his message of 14 October 1968 to SECSTATE, however, Ambassador Johnson had stated that he proposed to charge the Political-Military Counselor with day-to-day supervision of the MMO activities within the Embassy. ² Such an arrangement brought forth a request by the JCS on 6 November 1968 for clarification of certain provision in the TOR for the MMO that CINCPAC and the American Embassy were proposing. The JCS was concerned that the Chief of MMO would not have full Country Team status "with direct access to Ambassador at all times." ³ In addition, the JCS wanted assurance that an unfettered channel of responsibility would exist from the Chief of MMO through CINCPAC to the JCS.

In his reply on 11 November 1968, CINCPAC reiterated his position, as stated in his message to Ambassador Johnson on 13 October, which insured a direct chain of command from Chief of MMO through CINCPAC to the JCS, in an effort to resolve the JCS's concern over the proposed command relationships. ⁴ Actually, the Ambassador did not object to a command arrangement which made Chief, MMO, a subordinate of CINCPAC, but he wanted to preserve a strong voice for himself in the policy and execution aspects of military sales to the Japanese. Neither he nor CINCPAC desired "an arrangement such as exists in the UK whereby

1. CINCPAC 180605Z Oct 68.
3. JCS 5078/062307Z Nov 68
4. CINCPAC 110240Z Nov 68; CINCPAC 180605Z Oct 68.
ASD/ISA occupies an almost autonomous position in military sales" and "effectively bypasses CINCEUR in almost every aspect, except for planning." 1

To clarify the position of the MMO, thereby alleviating another of the JCS's concerns, CINCPAC recommended that the TOR be amended to read:

The MMO will function as an integral part of the Diplomatic Mission. The Chief of the MMO will have direct access to the Chief of Mission and will be entitled to call on all other elements of the Mission and the Country Team, including DAO and USFJ, for such specialized advice or assistance as those elements are able to give. The Chief of the MMO will assure that the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission is kept fully informed concerning U.S. military planning objectives and programs. 2

(3) The matter was settled the same day to the satisfaction of all parties, when Ambassador Johnson concurred in CINCPAC's proposed rewordings of the TOR "on understanding that this in no way inhibits inherent right of Ambassador to organize and administer all elements of Diplomatic Mission and working arrangements between them in a way that he considers best." 3

2. CINCPAC 110240Z Nov 68.
3. AMEMBASSY Tokyo 13705/110940Z Nov 68.
U. S. Orientation Training Influence on Japan

(S) For the first time, the FY 68 Japan MAP contained no provisions for an orientation/influence training program. 5 Nor, as of 9 March 1967,

did the State and Defense Departments express any "wish to reinstate such program" and their "review concerning other possible methods of continuing a minimal military orientation/influence training program for Japan outside MAP but still at U.S. expense has not produced any likely possibilities."1 Yet, this lessening of impact on U.S. and western orientation on the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) as a result of the discontinuance of MA Training Program (MATP) to Japan has been a matter of concern to both the American Ambassador to Japan, U. Alexis Johnson, and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.2

(C) As a result, the U.S. Army staff "was directed to recommend ways in which U.S. Army could maintain U.S. orientation without involving substantial added costs."3 Because of austere budget limitations imposed on JSDF, Japan has only very limited funds with which to purchase training from the U.S. For instance, as of mid-1968, the Japanese military budget was approximately 10% of the national budget, as compared to the U.S. military budget which was over 50% of the total U.S. government budget. "Only eight Japanese officers are currently programmed for career type training under non-MAP programs at Army service schools in CONUS for FY 69."4 In these cases, Japan has to pay only student transportation and living allowances. Under FMS for the period FY 69-74, furthermore, Japan is scheduled to purchase annually an estimated $1.5 million worth of technical training, largely missile type for HAWK and NIKE systems.

(C) As of August 1968, the U.S. Army staff (DA) had advanced proposals for review by CHMAAG Japan, CINCUSARPAC, and appropriate Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces (JGSDF) officials. "Among these proposals are increased instructor and student exchanges between U.S. and Japan, offer of observer training to Japanese with U.S. Army units in Japan, exchange of theses and articles for publication in U.S. Japan military periodicals, and exchange of units between U.S. and Japan for a period of training."5

1. SECSTATE 152080/092330Z Mar 67.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
By early October 1968, these proposals had been reviewed and approved in principal by General Yamada, Chief of Staff of JGSDF. Exception noted in formal Japanese reply indicated a desire to send Japanese personnel to U.S. installations and activities with no mention of reciprocal exchange for U.S. personnel at Japanese installations. Comments of CHMAAG Japan were received by CINCPAC on 4 October 1968 recommending acceptance of JGSDF proposals within limits of security provided a provision is added to permit U.S. Army officers access to similar JGSDF units and activities. CINCPAC vigorously endorsed "appropriate extension of U.S. and western influence within Japanese military establishment by all elements of country team." Towards the end of the year, CINCPAC was developing, in coordination with CINCUSARPAC, a position in which early implementation on a reciprocal basis would be sought, thus developing a feeling of partnership rather than additional aid being extended to JGSDF. It was hoped that such an approach would gain the U.S. increased respect from the Japanese.

U.S. Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey visiting Korean forces in Vietnam. At left, LT GEN Chae Myung Shin, commander of the ROKFV.

ROK President Park Chung Hee reviews the honor guard of the RVNAF.
Korea

The North Korean and Chinese Communist threat against South Korea dictates that South Korea maintain an effective defensive posture. This threat includes the ability to launch a conventional attack as well as the ability to harass and disrupt the South Korean government through subversive activities.

While the conventional threat is substantial, probably the most immediate threat to South Korea's security is North Korea's campaign of terrorism, infiltration, and raids across the demilitarized zone. These activities have expanded sharply in the last year, resulting in an increasing number of South Korean and American casualties. This campaign of intensified belligerency, publicly announced by the Premier of North Korea, has been highlighted by the attempt to assassinate President Park and the seizure of the USS PUEBLO in January 1968.

The major problem facing the South Korean Armed Forces is the replacement of worn-out or obsolescent equipment, most of which is of World War II or Korean War vintage. While the sums allocated to Korean military assistance may appear large, it should be remembered that the majority of South Korea's armed forces are in an operational status. Therefore, approximately 71% of the funds requested will be consumed in operating costs. These costs include the materiel to maintain and operate the equipment presently on hand.

The FY 69 program is designed to make a modest contribution toward force modernization. The program includes helicopters, cargo and recovery vehicles, and communication equipment for the Army. The Navy and Marines have programmed a patrol craft, vehicles, and communication equipment. Air Force funds are to be used primarily for the purchase of F-5 fighters to replace obsolescent F-86F's presently in the Korean inventory. The military hardware
and training that the FY 69 Military Assistance Program
will provide will enable the Republic of Korea to main-
tain its own deterrent to the communist threat from the
North, with a minimum of U.S. forces in-country.

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp

1. CINCPAC 9 Apr 68 MAP Statement.
KOREA

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1969

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA: 18,000 SQ. MI
POPULATION: 26,4 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH: 2.44%
AGREABLE LAND PER CAP: 0.17 ACRE
LITERACY RATE: 90%
LIFE EXPECTANCY: 47 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1968: $5.3 BILLION
PER CAPITA: $127
DEFENSE BUDGET: $162.6 MILLION
AS % OF GDP: 6.3%
AS % OF GNP: 12.9%

FOREIGN MINISTERS

PRESIDENT: GEN. Pak Chong-hun, ROKA (Br)
PRIME MINISTER: GEN. Chung Hae-won, ROKA (Br)
DEFENSE MINISTER: GEN. Im Chong-sik, ROKA (Br)
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: CH. YU THANG
CHAIRMAN JCS: GEN. Kim Young-Tae, ROKA

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR: HON. WILLIAM J. PORTER
U.S. AIR DIRECTOR: JR. HENRY J. COSTANZO

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

PROTECT SOUTH KOREA AGAINST RED CHINESE COMMISSARIES AND NAPOLITAN MILITARY OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF RED FORCES.

U.S. SERVICE

CONVOY ROKA:
GEN. CHARLES H. ROSENFELD, JR., USA
SHEPHERD: MAJ. GEN. LIVINGTON N. TAYLOR, JR., USA

MAP OBJECTIVE

(A) To maintain ROK forces sufficiently strong to resist, (B) with U.S. air and naval support if necessary, any aggression by North Korea, and (C) in conjunction with U.S. forces as required, assuage aggression from Communist China as well.

(B) To support the deployment of ROK forces in South Vietnam.

(C) To help create a viable Korean economic and social structure.

(D) To maintain a climate in which the United States will continue to enjoy existing, and if required, additional overflight, staging, and bases rights.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES

ARMY

1. COMBAT DIV, 1 REGT DIV, 1 REG AREA SECT, 1 REG AREA ETC, 3 INF DIVS, 10 TANK BN, 1 SP FORCES GP, 1 KOREAN BN, 1 HAWK RBS, 6" HOW RBS, 10 MED BN, 1 ARMY BN, 1 NCGR CB RBS, 1 155MM HOW, 1 HELICOPTER BDE, 1 AA BATTERY, 1 ARMY AVN DET, 1 105MM RSGN.

NAVY

1. DEVI L, 2 GPC, 2 ASC, 1 SOL BRG BU, 1 SEAL UNIT, 1 LSS, 1 HELICOPTER BDE, 1 ISLAND SECT, 4 ML, 6 PH, 15 SHIP.

AIR FORCE

1. 1 AW SQS, 8 ACGU UNITS, 68 FTS SQS, 1 RECON SQ, 1 FAC CONTROL SQ, 1 HELICOPTER SQ, 1 TRANSPORT SQ, 1 AIR CMD SQ.

TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

2 ARMY REGT DIV, 3 COMP BN, 17 INF DIVS, 20 RES DIVS, 10 TANK BN, 1 SP FORCES GP, 18 KOREAN BN, 1 AA BATTERY, 1 ARMY AVN DET, 1 155MM RSGN.

COMBAT CAPABILITY

MILITARY INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL AGGRESSION FROM NORTH KOREA, ASSUMING ADVERSE LOGISTIC & AIR SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES.

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MINE COUNTERMEASURES, THE ABILITY OF THE ROK NAVY TO PERFORM ITS ASSIGNED MISSION IS SATISFACTORY. THE ROK MARINES ARE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF PROVIDING REMAIN ON SIZE LANDINNG FORCES FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPERATIONS OR LARGER SIZE FORCES, IF LIFT SUPPORT IS MADE AVAILABLE.

FORCES IN BEING OPERATIONALY READY TO SUPPORT GROUND OPERATIONS, AND CONDUCT VFR AIR AND LIMITED A/W DEFENSE MISSIONS.

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 152.
$100 Million FY 68 Korea MAP Augmentation Package

(2) Following the Blue House Raid and the seizure of the USS PUEBLO in January 1968, President Johnson asked Congress for a $100 million augmentation for the FY 68 Korea MAP. Such an action would not only visibly strengthen the ROK military posture and ability to repel and punish infiltrators, but would also "have the greatest political and psychological impact on the ROKG, its people, and the North Koreans." CINCPAC and the Country Team in Korea were informed of the proposed augmentation by a joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message on 7 February 1968. To achieve the purposes mentioned above, the message asked COMUSKOREA to prepare a list of items for inclusion in the augmentation package and to submit it through channels after coordination with the U.S. Ambassador to Korea, William J. Porter, and even offered specific suggestions, such as F-4 aircraft.

(2) In two messages to COMUSKOREA on 16 February, CINCPAC provided both general and specific guidance on the selection of items. "It is recognized that items which have great psychological and political impact on the ROKG are necessary," commented CINCPAC; "however, the augmentation package should also enhance ROK forces capabilities to maneuver and communicate, particularly with regard to the conduct of counter-infiltration operations; and to provide combat service support to its forces." The following day, SECDEF provided additional guidance to CINCPAC on how the list was to be presented to Congress and requested his "evaluation of the military importance and psychological impact of each category" on the list.

(2) In order to meet the SECDEF-imposed suspense date of 23 February 1968, COMUSKOREA submitted a list to CINCPAC on the 20th; because of the lack of time, however, this list had not been coordinated

1. J5 Brief No. 64-68, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Mar 68, of JCSM-136-68, Subj: Korean $100 Million FY 68 MAP Augmentation Package; Point Paper, J5531, Hq CINCPAC 15 Mar 68, Subj: $100 Million Korean FY 68 MAP Augmentation.
2. SECSTATE 111263/070603Z Feb 68, cited in J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
3. CINCPAC 160035Z Feb 68; CINCPAC 160455Z Feb 68.
4. SECDEF 1409/171640Z Feb 68; Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Mar 68, Subj: $100 Million Korean FY 68 MAP Augmentation.
with the ROK Government (ROKG), although it had "been generally dis-
cussed with AMEMB, Seoul."¹ By means of a message dispatched during
the early hours of 24 February, CINCPAC supported COMUSKOREA's
list with some minor exceptions and provided his evaluations of the
importance of each major category of items as requested by SECDEF.²

(5) Just two days later, the Korean Country Team submitted a new
list, one that had been coordinated with the ROKG and which was somewhat
different from the one submitted by COMUSKOREA. The next day, COM-
USKOREA forwarded to CINCPAC a 7-page message, which provided a
"detailed breakout" of the Country Team's list.³ CINCPAC recommended
through channels on 28 February his strong support for the inclusion of
these new items in the augmentation package. He did, however, call
attention to the "significant differences in the prices of the various models
of the F-4 aircraft."⁴ If either the F-4C or F-4D aircraft was acceptable
to the ROKG, CINCPAC suggested that a squadron of these models be
provided to the Koreans from the USAF inventory, rather than purchasing
the F-4Es from production as recommended by the Country Team, since
such an action would result in significant savings.

(5) "Two alternative lists are being prepared for possible presentation
to Congress which differ from the Country Team Korea list" of 26 Feb-
uary, SECDEF informed CINCPAC on 28 February.⁵ Since his comments
on these two alternatives were requested, CINCPAC, in turn, asked for
the reaction of COMUSKOREA, who strongly recommended in a 5-page
message on 1 March 1968 that the package provided by the Country Team
on 26 February be accepted. The same day, by means of a message to
higher headquarters, CINCPAC supported COMUSKOREA's view, since
the list of equipment provided by the Country Team:

... was designed to achieve significant force
improvement while at the same time providing max-
imum political and psychological impact on South
Korea. It represents the judgments and wishes of

1. COMUSKOREA UK 50786/201208Z Feb 68.
2. CINCPAC 240245Z Feb 68.
3. COMUSKOREA UK 50889/271030Z Feb 68; AMEMBASSY Seoul 4506/
   261350Z Feb 68.
4. CINCPAC 282331Z Feb 68.
5. SECDEF 2204/282005Z Feb 68.
the highest officials of the ROKG and thus has their
tacit approval. It has the approval of the Country
Team and CINCPAC. 1

(S) The next day, 2 March 1968, the JCS notified CINCPAC that they
had made a decision that morning "and intend to support Country Team
position" of 26 February 1968. 2 Also forwarded was a JCS-compiled
list based on earlier recommendations of the Country Team, COMUSKOREA,
and CINCPAC concerning the items to be purchased with the augmentation
package. This list provided for the inclusion of F-4C aircraft rather than
the F-4Es contained in the Country Team's list and presented two pro-
posals for using the resultant savings. "We urgently need your recom-
mendations...as soon as possible but no later than noon Washington time
on 3 March," read the JCS message, since the "Chief must make recom-
mandation to the SECDEF by 4 March since Chairman and Dep SECDEF
must testify to Congress on this package early next week." 3

(S) As a result, COMUSKOREA submitted to CINCPAC on the same
day a revised version of the Country Team's list of 26 February, which
provided for the inclusion of F-4Ds in the package, with the resulting
savings to be used for additional items for the F-4D squadron, communica-
tions equipment, and counterinfiltration equipment. CINCPAC con-
curred in this proposal and, in his message to the JCS on 3 March, he
recommended "strong support" for COMUSKOREA's revised list. 4 In
the end, the JCS approved this new package by mid-March, since the
items proposed for inclusion:

...represent an appropriate balance between
political and psychological objectives and the require-
ment for increased counterinfiltration capability. In
addition, they further determined that the alternative
packages prepared by SECDEF do not meet these

1. CINCPAC 010011Z Mar 68; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month
of Feb 68; COMUSKOREA UK 50943/011130Z Mar 68.
2. JCS 2571/020121Z Mar 68.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 030450Z Mar 68; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month
of Mar 68, citing COMUSKOREA UK 50963/021633Z Mar 68.
requirements and are not supported by either the Korean Country Team, CINCPAC or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ¹

(3) The major categories of items to be purchased with the augmentation funds, as approved by the JCS with one reservation, were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost in Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-4D Squadron (UE-18)²</td>
<td>$ 50.545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms for Homeland Reserve Force</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfield Improvement and Hardening</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean National Police (KNP)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16 Rifles for Army-Marines (10,000)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Communications Package</td>
<td>6.615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Patrol Cutters (4)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Counterinfiltration (CI) Package</td>
<td>8.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy CI Package</td>
<td>3.766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine CI Package</td>
<td>1.386³</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. J5 Brief No. 64-68, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Mar 68, of JCSM-136-68, Subj: Korean $100 Million FY 68 MAP Augmentation Package.
2. Contingent upon no drawdown of U.S. Air Force inventory of F-4D aircraft until equivalent number of additional combat-ready F-4Es are delivered to U.S. Air Force and provision of funds to reimburse the U.S. Air Force for the cost differential between an F-4D and F-4E squadron.
3. J5 Brief No. 64-68, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Mar 68, of JCSM-136-68, Subj: Korean $100 Million FY 68 MAP Augmentation Package; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68; Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Mar 68, Subj: $100 Million Korean FY 68 MAP Augmentation.
SECDEF notified CINCPAC on 18 March 1968 that, on the 13th, the package had been "approved in principle... subject to the following" conditions and would "be presented to Congress:"

a. The package is subject to refinement based upon availability of individual items.

b. After approval of the supplemental, a transfer of $5 million from MAP to AID will be required to provide support to the KNP. Approval of KNP support in the package is subject to the absence of Congressional objection to this proposed transfer to AID.

c. M-16's are approved with the proviso that there will be no diversions to Korea until all MACV requirements are filled.\(^1\)

Meanwhile, on 6 March 1968, since the JCS had already recommended approval of this package, SECDEF provided CINCPAC with some initial guidance concerning PCH&T (Packing, Crating, Handling and Transportation) charges for items in the package:

...It can be expected that significant amount of subject package may be delivered during FY 69 which will create requirement for programming additional supply operations costs and other follow-on operating type support within FY 69 Korea MAP. While added supply operations costs cannot be estimated until delivery schedules established could approach $5 million.\(^2\)

"It now appears probable that AID can support the $5.0 million KNP program from AID resources," SECDEF advised CINCPAC on 30 March 1968.\(^3\) Such an action would release this amount of money that had been earmarked for KNP CI equipment for other uses. SECDEF then went on to propose that the funds for the in-country construction of the four Cape class Cutters be deleted from the package and that these funds, together

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1. SECDEF 3971/182310Z Mar 68.
2. SECDEF 2877/062114Z Mar 68; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
3. SECDEF 5140/301905Z Mar 68.
with the released $5 million, be used to procure nine of these cutters from U.S. inventory. Both CINCPAC and COMUSKOREA concurred with this concept. The small amount of funds remaining after these changes had been made in the package would be programmed for first year operating costs of these craft and for off-setting price increases on other items in the package. As CINCPAC remarked:

The 95 ft Cape class COGARD cutter is a steel hulled, four engine boat, with greater endurance and seakeeping ability than any patrol craft now in the ROKN inventory. The USCG has some thirty-five Cape class in commission and has successfully operated them under all climatic conditions. Delivery to a CONUS shipping point could be effected within 30 to 45 days. Additional craft would be in country in time to cope with this year's anticipated increase in North Korean agent boat activity. Having the same type boat in both CIGCOREP and the augmentation package would simplify supply and maintenance problems. 1

(5) As for the $100 Million FY 68 Korea MAP augmentation package, a "Supplemental Defense Appropriation Bill incorporating subject program was approved by Congress" on 8 July 1968 and signed by President Johnson the following day. 2 Subsequently, SECDEF obligated the program and issued the necessary MAP orders to the various military services for the procurement and delivery of the listed items. The package, however, was changed from the one developed by COMUSKOREA and approved by CINCPAC. As of 25 September, the status was as follows:

...The changes involved primarily (1) deleting items requiring direct citation funds, (2) conversion of M-1 carbine (unserviceable) lines to excess at no cost, and (3) utilizing the funds generated to insert in the program priority items from FY 69 MAP. Items

1. CINCPAC 220222Z Mar 68; CNO 062325Z Mar 68; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
2. Point Paper, J434, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Aug 68, Subj: Korean $100 Million FY 68 MAP Augmentation; Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Sep 68, Subj: Korea MAP.
deleted can be reprogrammed in the regular FY 69 MAP as necessary.

Although retained in the program, supply action for the F-4D sqn and M16 rifle packages both of which involve long lead times has been suspended until Congress has acted on the FY 69 MAP. The thinking is that if the Korean FY 69 MAP is cut substantially, the inclusion of the high cost F4's and the M16's in the augmentation program will have to be reassessed.  

(3) In conclusion, because of the USS PUEBLO and Blue House incidents early in 1968, Korea "MAP has received additional funds and delivery of most major items of equipment has been expedited. A further speed-up in deliveries," as of 26 December 1968, "does not appear to be feasible, because of the expediting actions already taken." 2

Equipping ROK Forces (ROKF) with a New Rifle System

(3) The ROK Government (ROKG) had been actively considering the idea of building a small arms plant in Korea to reequip ROKF with a new shoulder weapon for several months. The first formal discussion on this subject came at meeting between representatives of SECDEF and ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) on 27-28 May 1968. 3 The results of this conversation were stated by SECDEF on 3 June 1968 as follows:

...MND Choi expressed his desire to have a small arms manufacturing capability (preferably for production of M-16 type rifles) in Korea. He envisions this undertaking as being a joint venture between U.S. and ROK private enterprises. Mr. Nitze agreed on the desirability of Korea having such a capability. Ambassador Brown made explicit that while the U.S. agreed on the desirability of such a venture, no U.S.

1. Point Paper, J434, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Sep 68, Subj: Korean $100 Million FY 68 MAP Augmentation.
2. J4 Brief No. 179-68, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Dec 68, of JCS 1776/795-1, Subj: Report by the J-5 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on MAP Deliveries to the Republic of Korea.
3. J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
commitment had been made or implied regarding its financing. Both delegations agreed to undertake further consideration on how Korea might develop a small arms production capability.¹

(5) The same month, SECSTATE, in a joint message with SECDEF on 25 June, questioned "whether ROK production of M-16 is in ROK and U.S. mutual interests or U.S. self interest. We request COMUSKOREA, CINCPAC and JCS assessment of optimum future shoulder weapon for ROK forces in Korea.... In this regard, we have in mind possible availability of surplus M-14's in next few years."²

(5) On 14 July 1968, COMUSKOREA informed CINCPAC that ROKG "has expressed intent both publicly and privately, and public opinion is in favor of building a modern arms plant... without cost to MAP" to make either the M-16 or AR-18 rifle.³ At the same time, he provided other alternatives for reequipping ROKF with a new shoulder weapon and further recommended that he "be authorized to develop, in conjunction with ROKG and ROKF, a detailed five year program for shoulder weapon modernization."⁴

(5) In a message to the JCS on 6 August 1968, CINCPAC listed the key advantages and disadvantages of both the M-14 and M-16 rifle, pointed out certain economic and political factors that would have a bearing upon the final selection of an appropriate shoulder weapon for ROKF, and concurred in COMUSKOREA's recommendation concerning the study "with the understanding that the USG is not pre-committed to support the resultant program."⁵ As a result, the JCS approved the proposed study on 23 August and tasked CINCPAC with making a recommendation on the optimum rifle for ROKF in Korea after completion of the study.⁶ Some of the pertinent comments that CINCPAC had forwarded to the JCS in his message follows:

1. SECDEF 1549/032154Z Jun 68.
2. SECSTATE 190090/251951Z Jun 68.
3. COMUSKOREA UK 54014/141030Z Jul 68.
4. Ibid.
5. CINCPAC 060418Z Aug 68.
6. JCS 7875/231405Z Aug 68.
In summary, the M-14 is an excellent weapon for conventional warfare at the extremely long combat ranges found on the relatively barren Korean terrain, while the M-16 has proved an effective weapon for internal defense operations. As the threat indicates a requirement to conduct both types of operations, there are excellent arguments to arm the ROKF with a mix of the weapons.

The relative costs of the two weapons and related items, in competition with other critical requirements of Korea MAP, will be major determining factors.

Decisions of the ROKF with respect to the proposed construction of a small arms plant in Korea will bear directly on the final solution.

The selection of the best weapon for ROKF is a complex matter involving many factors. A major factor is the view of the ROKG, ROKF personnel, together with COMUSKOREA's representatives, should be given the opportunity to compare all weapons to be considered in combat type tests on Korean terrain and under extremes of Korean weather conditions before a final decision is made. The importance of the decision, the probable length of time the selected weapon will remain in the ROKF inventory, and the potential costs to both the ROKG and USG warrant a careful study, which is estimated could be completed in about four months. ¹

¹(S) By letter on 2 August 1968, meanwhile, the ROK MND informed COMUSKOREA that the ROKG considered the establishment in Korea of a M-16 rifle plant was in its best interest, that the ROKG would bear the cost of personnel and operating expenses for such a facility, and that the ROKG desired the U.S. to provide plant construction equipment, raw

1. CINCPAC 060418Z Aug 68.
material, and technical assistance under MAP. In reply, COMUSKOREA pointed out the limitations of MAP funds, as well as the possibilities of credit financing for the project through U.S. /DOD or of a U.S. /ROKG private enterprise, and informed the ROK MND that a DOD specialists team had been requested to assist in development of technical, administrative, and legal aspects of the proposal. COMUSKOREA had asked CINCPAC on 15 August for such a team, to "be headed by Mr. Frank J. Fede, DOD ISA and be accompanied by necessary personnel to evaluate the in-country capability of establishing such a facility," and had advised CINCPAC that senior ROKG officials had indicated a willingness to absorb some current MAP costs in the __won__ defense budget in order that MAP could fund some of the required machinery for the plant. 1

(8) In a message to COMUSKOREA on 25 August 1968, CINCPAC concurred in the need to modernize the ROKF inventory of small arms, but pointed out the following:

a. Replacement of M-1 rifles in infantry battalions (an other units where reasonably frequent, close combat is probable) would add significantly to the ROKA/ROKMC combat power. Equipping support personnel whose primary function does not involve combat with the new weapon would not add significantly and is a matter of less urgency.

b. ROKG resources, and USG resources available to support ROKF, should be expended in a manner which will best contribute to the defense of the ROK.

c. When viewed in competition with critical ROKF requirements, in light of limited USG-ROKG resources, and against the possibility that surplus M-14's may be available in a few years, the proposal to initiate now a ROKF rifle modernization program with the M-16 rifles is questionable.

1. COMUSKOREA UK 54525/151020Z Aug 68; Ltr, ROK MND to COMUSKOREA, 2 Aug 68, n.s., and Ltr, COMUSKOREA to ROK MND, n.d., n.s., both cited in J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
d. Discussions with ROKG officials should emphasize that the USG is not committed to support construction of an M-16 rifle plant in Korea. ¹

² On the same date, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS "that a team of experts be dispatched to Korea to evaluate the in-country capability and desirability of establishing a plant to produce M-16 rifles."² Initial reaction in Washington, D.C., was unfavorable, the feeling being that the dispatch of such a team was "premature."³ After CINCPAC pointed out the strong feelings of the ROKG and Secretary Nitze's commitment on the matter to the JCS on 14 September 1968, however, approval was finally given. The following essential points were to be conveyed to the Koreans, according to instructions of the JCS received by Hq CINCPAC on 30 September:

There are many factors which indicate that an M16 production facility in South Korea is not a wise course of action. U.S. production will soon be able to satisfy any and all requirements; both MAP and economic aid appear to be faced with pressures which will force their reduction in the years ahead: a large investment is required for modernization throughout the ROK forces and this use of limited available resources may not be wise in view of competing demands; for this preliminary estimates of costs indicate that this facility will not be cost effective. Nevertheless, it is our desire to fully explore every facet of the problem in the hope that when a decision is made the South Koreans will agree with us as to the course of action taken. It is against this background that the team is sent.⁴

⁵ To implement the instructions he had received, CINCPAC dispatched a message to COMUSKOREA on 2 October 1968. In it, he requested that the "points" quoted above "be conveyed to the Koreans."⁵

¹ CINCPAC 250957Z Aug 68, cited in J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
² CINCPAC 250947Z Aug 68.
³ JCS 8694/041956Z Sep 68.
⁴ JCS 1749/301930Z Sep 68.
⁵ CINCPAC 0209012Z Oct 68.

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Meanwhile, COMUSKOREA had called CINCPAC's attention to the fact that the areas of expertise represented on the team "revealed deficiency in knowledge of methods of financing and legal aspects of this type venture." Since it could be anticipated that the team members would be queried extensively by ROKG officials in these two areas, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS on 9 October 1968 "that the additional team member with expertise in the financing and legal aspects of subject proposal be dispatch to Korea to join the team there." This request was turned down the following day. Besides not wanting to expand the size of the team, the JCS stated the OSD position was that "for a DOD Rep to be present to discuss financing and legal aspects at this stage would be premature, inconsistent with team task, and counter to present basic objective; i.e., avoid the implication of commitment."3

In early October, CINCPAC made a visit to Korea. At this time, COMUSKOREA submitted to him a joint ROKG-COMUSKOREA proposal to construct a M-16 rifle plant in Korea; to manufacture 600,000 rifles, basic issue items, and ancillary items; and to expand the ROK arsenal to provide it with the capability of manufacturing all of ROKF's training ammunition requirements for caliber 5.56mm, caliber .30, caliber .30 carbine, and caliber .50. In addition, it was proposed that the 5.56mm basic load and war reserve ammunition requirements would be met by increasing the hours of operation of the arsenal. When CINCPAC met ROK President Pak during this visit, he discussed the proposal, and the Korean President expressed a deep interest in the proposed project.4

Meanwhile, the team visited Korea for about a three-week period, beginning on 12 October:

While in-country they made a detailed study of the technical feasibility and costs of manufacturing the M-16 rifle and 5.56mm ammunition in-country. Proposal addressed by the team was the proposal submitted to CINCPAC during his visit to Korea in

1. COMUSKOREA UK 55227/011052Z Oct 68.
2. CINCPAC 0922232Z Oct 68.
3. JCS 2721/102149Z Oct 68.
4. CINCPAC 060517Z Oct 68 and PROVMAAG-K Disposition Form 2496, dtd 30 Sep 68, both cited in J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
early October. Key conclusions of the team were that manufacture in-country was technically feasible, and it would be cheaper to provide new M-16 rifles to ROKF by producing them in Korea than from U.S. production. The team did not establish an overall cost for the proposal as operating costs of the arsenal and the cost of producing basic load and war reserve ammunition were not included in the team's report. 1

(S) Early in November 1968, as a way of determining alternative means of achieving the goal of modernizing the ROKF rifle inventory, CINCPAC attempted to find out the availability and cost of providing M-14 rifles to ROKF. In reply on 7 November, DA indicated that a study was underway to determine whether the U.S. Army should retain both the M-14 and M-16 rifles as standard weapons or should standardize on the M-16. "If DOD decision selects M16 for U.S. Army-wide use," DA informed CINCPAC, "you will be advised estimates of information requested on M14s." 2 The rest of the calendar year passed, however, without any further word from DA on this subject.

(S) Also by early November 1968, it was noted that a number of inconsistencies in COMUSKOREA's position on the provision of a new rifle system to ROKF had developed during the course of the extensive message traffic on this proposal. Furthermore, the debriefing of the survey team at Hq CINCPAC, the survey team's interim report, and previous message traffic from COMUSKOREA all indicated that the cost of basic load and war reserve ammunition had not been included in the cost estimates for the proposal. In order to resolve these problems, CINCPAC dispatched a message to COMUSKOREA on 10 November, outlining the various alternative methods of achieving the modernization goal, such as providing for the use of the M-14, the M-16, or a mix of the two, and asked the following questions concerning these alternatives:


2. DA 886534/072116Z Nov 68; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
a. Number of rounds of ammunition by type required for training, basic loads, and war reserves to implement each alternative and total cost of production in Korea.

b. Clarification as to which alternative COMUSKOREA recommended, with justification of this alternative to include reasons for re-equipping support units whose primary function does not involve combat with small arms and a statement whether it would provide the optimum shoulder weapon(s) for ROKF in Korea.

c. Size of dollar loan desired for the recommended alternative, and other ROKG-USG costs involved in implementing program with method of financing.

d. Views on the priority of the requirement to modernize the ROKF rifle inventory measured against other ROKF requirements and whether expenditure of funds for this project would best contribute to the defense of the ROK.¹

(5) In his response ten days later, COMUSKOREA answered CINCPAC thusly, stating he:

... recommends implementation of Alternative NR 4 (construct an M-16 plant and produce in Korea the 600,000 M-16 rifles needed to completely re-equip the ROKF). In support of this recommendation the following is offered:

a. The M16A1 rifle is ROKG's choice of weapon. This choice was made unilaterally without any influence from U.S. military in Korea.

b. Because of its characteristics and adaptability to the unconventional warfare role, the M16A1 rifle is being introduced into Korea thru the $100 million package (10,000 only).

1. CINCPAC 1000162 Nov 68; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
c. The fully automatic capability of the M16A1 rifle would provide ROKF with a significant capability to cope with the North Korean AK-47 automatic rifle.

d. ROKF are becoming more aware of and trained with the M-16 rifle through service in Vietnam, which would result in a high morale factor when related to the North Korean threat if so armed in ROK.

e. Vietnamese forces are likewise being equipped with the M16A1 rifle to most effectively operate in an unconventional warfare situation.

f. It would appear there is high probability of U.S. Army wide adoption of the M16A1 rifle as the optimum weapon.

g. To modernize with a weapon of older vintage than one tried and tested by her forces in combat could conceivably be far less than palatable to the ROKG as well as detrimental to morale of the ROKF.

h. It is not probable that ROK forces would be committed to combat outside the sphere of U.S. logistical support or tactical association. It would logically follow that compatibility and simplification to the greatest extent possible should be attempted in any upgrading of ROKF capability.

i. While not previously addressed, history reveals that with the exception of mass human wave attacks conducted in the confines of island warfare during World War II, only Korea has experienced the mass human wave attacks which were the forerunner and basis for the development of a light shoulder weapon with a high cyclic rate, full automatic capability. The M-16 rifle has established itself in the unconventional as well as the conventional...
role in RVN and it appears that its cyclic rate of 600-700 rounds per minute would well qualify it against the tactics of the North Koreans and the AK-47 rifle. 1

(5) Along with this proposal for a M-16 rifle plant, COMUSKOREA also recommended that the ROK arsenal be expanded to where it could manufacture ROKF training, basic load, and war reserve ammunition requirements of caliber .30 rifle, caliber .30 carbine, and 5.56mm. He estimated that it would cost from $70 to $75 million to construct the M-16 plant, to produce the 600,000 weapons (less the 10,000 being provided on an expedited MAP shipment) with basic issue items and ancillary items, to expand the ROK arsenal, and to provide a five year supply of training, basic load, and war reserve ammunition. 2

(5) The survey team's final report arrived at Hq CINCPAC in early December 1968 for, following a review of this report, the JCS had already requested that CINCPAC's "comments and recommendations be forwarded for consideration in preparing a JCS report for SECDEF." 3 Actually, there were no significant differences between the interim and final reports, except that in the final report the estimated cost of the materials for 5.56mm ammunition was higher, while the estimated cost of the expansion of the arsenal was lower. Using this revised cost data of the final report would raise COMUSKOREA's cost estimate from $70 to $75 million to an amount of $78 to $83 million. Furthermore, in order to determine the total cost of implementing the proposal contained in the final report—construction of a M-16 plant in Korea and the production of 600,000 rifles there—over a five year period, CINCPAC added the cost estimates for royalties and follow-on spares, which brought the total amount up to around $97 million.

(5) Finally, on 24 December 1968, CINCPAC furnished the JCS for the first time with his views concerning the goal of equipping ROKF with a new rifle system, as well as providing the requested comments and recommendations on the survey team's final report. His major recommendations, which came at the end of his 8-page final message, were:

1. COMUSKOREA UK 56039/200100Z Nov 68.
2. Ibid.; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
3. JCS 6417/262221Z Nov 68; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
a. Early determination to be made of Department of the Army plans to convert U.S. Army units to M-16 rifle or M-16/M-14 mix, and subsequent need availability of M-14 rifle to equip ROKF within the next several years.

b. Results of above determination be reviewed by COMUSKOREA with ROKG along with all pertinent military, political and economic considerations, to insure full ROKG understanding of impact of decision to proceed with M-16 rifle production facility.

c. U.S. support the final ROKG decision regarding small arms modernization, provided no diversions are made from the MAP program for this project in excess of amounts currently programmed for small arms and training ammunition.1

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Expeditied Shipment of M-16 Rifles for Korea MAP

(S) Because the incidents "along the DMZ show a substantial increase during September and October, as well as a pronounced change in tactics of NK infiltrators," both CGUSAEGHT and COMUSKOREA requested in late 1968 the expedited delivery of the 10,000 M-16 rifles and associated equipment programmed for the ROK Army (ROKA) in the $100 million FY 68 Korea MAP supplemental.2 CINCUSARPAC concurred in these recommendations, but he requested CINCPAC on 9 November 1968 to require "every consideration be given to an increase in production in order to provide for early distribution of M16 rifles to ROKA and USAEIGHT, as well as the RVNAF modernization program."3

(S) The same day, DA provided U.S. Army Materiel Command with the necessary data so that a partial shipment of 2,500 weapons could be made immediately and preparations made "to ship 3,000 from November

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1. CINCPAC 240615Z Dec 68.
2. COMUSKOREA UK 55814/050007Z Nov 68; J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68; CGUSAEGHT Korea 71838/041125Z Nov 68.
3. CINCUSARPAC 46322/090712Z Nov 68.
production and 3,000 from January production."¹ On 16 November 1968, after admitting that this expeditious action was a major step in responding to the original request, CINCUSARPAC again expressed his concern "that U.S. Army units in Korea are not receiving similar consideration with ROK Army and Marine units in the issue of M16 rifles."² He then went on to add that experience "has demonstrated that, aside from other considerations, action which would suggest that U.S. forces are not receiving at least equal priority in the issue of improved weapons to that enjoyed by our allies is likely to result in adverse publicity and Congressional inquiry. This has occurred in Vietnam and will probably obtain in Korea."³

(6) In a message to the JCS on 19 November 1968, CINCYPAC pointed out this concern of CINCUSARPAC and then recommended that the "10,000 M16 rifles with associated equipment and ammunition be provided ROK force in Korea as soon as practicable."⁴ He also concurred in the planned shipment of the 8,500 rifles, but recommended that "the remaining 1,500 M16 rifles be provided from other than PACOM allocations."⁵

(8) According to information provided by DA, the first shipment of 2,500 M-16s were scheduled to be airlifted to Korea on or about 28 December 1968, with ammunition deliveries starting in the same month and terminating sometime in January 1969. The remaining 7,500 weapons of this expedited shipment were expected to be delivered in-country during the early months of 1969.⁶

Troop Housing for Security Forces for Air Bases

(8) By message on 22 July 1968, the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army (CGUSAEIGHT), requested "Service funding for materials required to provide semi-permanent housing for ROK Army tactical security forces and air defense elements deployed to provide protection for key air bases."⁷ His rationale for this request follows:

1. DA 886806/091516Z Nov 68.
2. CINCUSARPAC 47153/162243Z Nov 68.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 19233SZ Nov 68.
5. Ibid.
6. DA 890654/140004Z Dec 68; J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
7. CGUSAEIGHT Korea 92388/220710Z Jul 68.
Following the Blue House and Pueblo incidents there was a major buildup of USAF in Korea. This influx of aircraft resulted in overcrowding of both U.S. and ROK bases, particularly Osan, Kunsan, Suwon and Kimpo. There is high density parking on ramps, the concentration and vulnerability of aircraft, primarily U.S., required increased security measures to protect these extremely important and high value assets from infiltrators and saboteurs and from very low level air attack.

Because of other high priority missions and inadequacy of U.S. ground force structure in Korea, U.S. ground forces could not be made available to provide the increased tactical security and air defense necessary at critical and vulnerable air bases. Accordingly, CG, Eighth Army assigned the mission of ROK Army forces which were under his operational control.

ROK Army forces which were redeployed to Osan, Kunsan, Suwon and Kimpo air bases are living primarily in tents, many of which are on loan from Eighth Army. Prior to the coming winter, it is essential that these troops be provided more suitable troop housing. Since these troops were moved primarily to protect extremely important high money value United States assets, it is considered appropriate that the United States, at least, defray the cost of materials for suitable housing for these ROKA troops. Since these forces are performing a normal mission of Army forces, Service funding by the U.S. Army recommended course of action. 1

(S) A week later, CINCPAC informed SECDEF that he concurred in this request and recommended an "early decision on CGUSAEIGHT's request... so that if approval is granted proposed construction can be completed prior to this coming winter." 2 On 9 August 1968, SECDEF

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 291817Z Jul 68.
wired CINCPAC that "utilization of Service funds (including CIGCOREP) for ROK troop housing as proposed...is not authorized" and suggested instead a "program deviation from airfield dispersal and hardening package in the $100 million FY 68 Korea MAP Supplemental," with the understanding that OSP (Off-shore Procurement) was not authorized.  

MA-3 Launchers for ROK Air Force (ROKAF)

(S) To fill a shortage of MA-3 launchers for F-86s in ROKAF WRM (War Reserve Materiel), CSAF issued disposition instructions on 23 February 1968 to Armish MAAG, Iran, for shipment of 950 excess launchers to Korea. The first shipments of 242 MA-3 launchers were effected during May and June 1968, with the rest to follow shortly thereafter.

Ammunition Support System for ROK Forces in Korea

(S) On 14 June 1968, SECDEF approved a procedure for adjusting the regular MAP to ensure the supply of ammunition required to support counterinfiltration operations and training consumption of ROK Forces in Korea. This project was identified as the Korea Ammunition Program (KAMP). 3 The Commanding General, Army Materiel Command (CGUSAMC) provided CINCPAC on 31 July 1968 with the interim procedures to be followed effecting supply and reimbursement under KAMP. Finalization of these procedures were planned to be accomplished during a conference at Hq CINCPAC in August.

(S) A KAMP conference, attended by representatives from concerned commands and agencies, was held at Camp H. M. Smith on 19 and 20 August 1968. The attendees completed a draft Army Regulation (AR 795- ), which provided for the expedited delivery of ammunition for training and

1. SECDEF 6832/092024Z Aug 68; J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
2. CSAF AFMSDA 232047Z Feb 68; CARMSH MAAG Iran 8021/012155Z Jun 68; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
4. CGUSAMC 31137/311921Z Jul 68.
counterinfiltration operations of ROK Forces in Korea. Following the conference, the represented headquarters conducted a review of the draft AR. Once he received the concurrences of CINCUARPC and COMUS-KOREA, CINCPAC forwarded the draft (AR 795- ), along with his concurrence, to CGUSAMC on 30 August 1968.

(C) Within a month, CINCPAC received a copy of (AR 795- ), which had been staffed by DA and was awaiting publication and distribution by the Adjutant General. Pending this publication and distribution, DA advised CINCPAC that KAMP should be implemented as depicted in (AR 795- ) and that the effective date for KAMP implementation was 1 October 1968. Accordingly, on 5 October 1968, CINCPAC requested COMUSKOREA and CINCUARPC to take appropriate action to implement KAMP.

Expedited Delivery of CIGCOREP Material

(S) The Journal of Military Assistance gave in its October 1968 issue a capsule description of the following subject:

The ROK, in conjunction with the U.S. has conducted a careful analysis of security operations in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the interior, and has developed the Counterinfiltration/Counter Guerrilla Concept and Requirements Plan (CIGCOREP). The study pointed out the fact that there were certain deficiencies in ROK forces' organization, equipment, and training that needed correction in order to cope with the type of security challenge that was being mounted by North Korean units. CIGCOREP took on added urgency when a North Korean assassination team infiltrated to Seoul and

1. J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
2. CINCUARPC 36131/290536Z Aug 68; COMUSKOREA UK 54724/ 290315Z Aug 68; CINCPAC 302225Z Aug 68.
3. J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68, citing Ltr, DA LOG/DPD-PB, 1 Oct 68, Subj: Procedure for Selected Support of Ammunition to Republic of Korea Forces in Korea Under MAP (KAMP) AR 795-.
4. CINCPAC 050120Z Oct 68.
attempted to assault the Presidential Mansion, and then, two days later, the North Koreans seized the USS Pueblo. These dangerously provocative acts led to a crisis in the ROK, with some Government members feeling that the North Koreans were now willing to take added risks with the immediate objective of forcing the ROK to recall its forces in Vietnam and with the eventual objective of so discrediting the ROK that Korea would be reunited on Communist terms. It was decided, therefore, to strengthen ROK defense by implementing immediately the major CIGCOREP recommendations.1

(5) "In view of the current situation," COMUSKOREA told CINCPAC on 26 January 1968, "it is operationally urgent that certain CIGCOREP material be delivered to Korea by airlift or other expedited means based on their availability."2 Since he concurred in COMUSKOREA's request, CINCPAC requested CSAF, CNO, CMC, and DA to expedite shipment. "SECDEF and each Military Department concurred in COMUSKOREA request for expedited shipment, and directed their supply agencies to take appropriate action."3

(6) On 9 March 1968, the JCS notified CINCPAC that SECDEF had approved the U.S. portion of CIGCOREP and had requested "Departments of the Army and the Air Force to provide the U.S. materiel requirements of the CIGCOREP as promptly as possible to be financed by the respective military Departments within available resources including reprogramming as necessary."4 As of October 1968, military "equipment valued at some $32.0 million has been funded by the Services (MASF) in support of these objectives, and a preponderance of it has been delivered. . . . It should be borne in mind that the equipment for the ROK Armed Forces, though provided under MASF, will be supported under the MAP."5

2. COMUSKOREA UK 50285/261115Z Jan 68.
3. J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68; CINCPAC 012300Z Feb 68.
4. JCS 3188/091511Z Mar 68; J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
Vegetation Control Items for Korea

(S) On 17 January 1968, CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA requested CINCPAC to secure clearance for implementation and expedited shipment of those Vegetation Control Items listed in Tab W to CIGCOREP.¹ Subsequently, on 26 January, CINCPAC requested an early approval and the expedited shipment of these items from the JCS and DA.² The following JCS response came on 4 March 1968:

Authority is granted to supply defoliants as part of the Vegetation Control Program in Korea. However, the U.S. role in the program should be restricted to providing materiel and guidance and the actual emplacement of chemicals should be carried out by the Republic of Korea Armed Forces.³

Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK)

(S) On 13 February 1968, in support of a COMUSKOREA request, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that "consideration be given to designating Department of Army as Executive Agent for AFAK FY 69 and ensuring that this program is funded in the Army budget in subsequent years."⁴ His rationale for such action follows:

AFAK has paid large dividends for relatively small amounts expended, but it has always experienced difficulty in finding a sponsor for its budget. In view of the significant contribution which this program can make to the civic action program in Korea, early action to resolve funding problems is essential.⁵

(S) By means of a memorandum on 27 May 1968, the JCS forwarded CINCPAC's proposal with their own pertinent recommending comments.

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1. CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA UK 50156/170545Z Jan 68, cited in J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
2. CINCPAC 260114Z Jan 68.
3. JCS 2658/0422225Z Mar 68; J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
4. CINCPAC 132045Z Feb 68.
5. Ibid.

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to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action. However, as the JCS informed CINCPAC on 28 May 1968, "advised that military functions appropriations were not legally available for AFAK and that MAP funds were critically short." However, on 26 August, COMUSKOREA requested that AFAK be provided $120,000 from FY 69 MAP; this request was supported by CINCPAC on 28 September, and SECDEF approved it on 8 November 1968.

Underground Bunkers, ROKA

On 8 June 1968, COMUSKOREA requested CINCPAC's approval to change the scope of construction by the "deletion of nine each 250-man barracks FROKA area, MAP cost $220,787, and substitution, therefore, of two each underground CP's for ROKA." As he explained, this change was necessary "to provide adequate command CPs for ROKA in view of increased NK activity in the ROK. The provision of underground CPs is in keeping with current UNC/USFK plans." CINCPAC concurred in the proposed substitution four days later.

Transfer of ex-USN Ship Hulls to ROK Navy (ROKN)

"The ex-USS PASCO (PF-6) and ex-USS GLOUCESTER (PF-22) are WWII frigates which were given to Japan under MAP and subsequently declared excess to Japanese Navy requirements. Both ships were stricken from U.S. Navy records and authorized to be disposed of by scrap sale or for use as gunnery target ships." Based upon a request from the Korean Navy, CINCPACFLT recommended to CINCPAC on 14 December 1968 that the ship hulls of these two vessels be transferred to ROKN at no cost to

1. J5 Brief No. 160-68, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Jun 68, of JCS 1776/771-1, Subj: Armed Forces Assistance to Korea.
2. J5125 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68, citing JCS 282015Z May 68.
4. COMUSKOREA UK 553513/080511Z Jun 68.
5. Ibid.
6. CINCPAC 122204Z Jun 68; J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
7. J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
MAP in a "where is, as is" condition "for use as non-self-propelled fuel barges." 1

(C) Since CINCPAC considered the proposed ROKN use of the ship hulls would serve a more useful purpose than previously authorized disposal by scrap sale or use as targets," he concurred with CINCPAC-FLT and recommended to CNO on 18 December 1968 that the hulls be so transferred at no cost to MAP, but with the ROK Government (ROKG) paying the "costs involving preparation for tow." 2 Five days later, CNO concurred in CINCPAC's recommendation and "authorized utilizing tow of opportunity to Chinhae as feasible," with the tow "cost preparations estimated at $10,000 per ship, chargeable to ROKG under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procedures." 3

Replacement C-46s for ROK Air Force (ROKAF)

(C) The Korean Counter Infiltration-Counter Guerilla Concept and Requirements Plan (CIGCOREP) was established in early 1968. It was a tri-service MASF program of materiel and services, with a total cost of approximately $32.3 million, designed to augment the FY 68 Korea MAP. Under CIGCOREP, CSAF was to supply 12 C-46s to ROKAF at no cost to MAP. 4 Six of these aircraft would be used to bring "the two ROKAF C-46 Transport Sqdns up to UE of 16 each plus advanced attrition aircraft," while the remainder were "expected to be used to satisfy the requirement for six sea surveillance aircraft." 5

(C) On 8 March 1968, Hq USAF Aerospace Vehicle Project Directive, Project No. MAP 8C-356 was established to cover the delivery of these aircraft. 6 Prior to delivery to ROKAF, the 12 C-46s were reconditioned, a standardized avionics configuration was installed, and a loud-speaker sound capability was provided for the 6 destined as sea surveillance aircraft. 7

1. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 140144Z Dec 68.
2. CINCPAC 182237Z Dec 68.
3. CNO 232310Z Dec 68.
4. J4331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
5. CSAF 182254Z Mar 68.
6. AFLC 292149Z Mar 68.
7. AFLC 172109Z May 68; J4331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
(C) By 25 September 1968, 3 aircraft had been delivered to ROKAF and, on 26 October 1968, the twelfth and last C-46 was received in-country, thus completing the project. 1

Surplus RVN Weapons for ROK Homeland Reserve Force (HRF)

(5) "Agent landings... during the past two months... indicate, among other things," as COMUSKOREA wired CINCPAC on 20 November 1968, "that Kim Il Song is continuing his efforts to subvert ROK and bring Korea under communist domination... These observations indicate that NK aggressions in CY 1969 will probably exceed those of either CY 1967 or CY 1968." 2 As a result, he urgently recommended that up to one-half million M1 rifles and carbines--the number estimated to become excess in South Vietnam during 1969--be transferred to ROK, preferably at no cost, for use by HRF. This force, some 2-million strong, "is a key element in ROK thinking of total defense problem facing ROK and is playing a major role in search operations against infiltrator activity," added COMUSKOREA, and:

Availability of these weapons for use by the ROK HRF would permit arming of approximately fifty percent of the force by summer of 1969, enhancing their capability to cope with the expected increase in rear area infiltrator activity in the coming critical year, enabling them to be a significant influence in preserving the internal security and freedom of the ROK. Active participation by "the people" of Korea in their own defense is considered a major factor in defeating the NK aggressions and propaganda effort to convince the world that the ROK is suffering internally from a popular revolution. 3

(5) Three days later, CINCPAC dispatched a message to four addressees. From CINCUSARPAC, he asked for comments and recommendations on the proposal; from COMUSKOREA, he desired "recommendations on source of funds to support... proposal in the event weapons can be provided at no cost but repair parts and ammunition must be funded; "and from the other two, he inquired:

1. Ibid.; 614AFADVSYGP Seoul Korea 040730Z Nov 68.
2. COMUSKOREA UK 56055/201130Z Nov 68.
3. Ibid.; J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
FOR COMUSMACV: Request estimate of quantity and availability dates of M1 rifles and carbines to become excess to requirements of Free World Forces Vietnam.

FOR DA: Request advise as to possibility of furnishing serviceable/unserviceable M1 rifles and carbines at no cost to ROK as weapons are phased out of Vietnam or from other DA resources. Further request advise as to availability of ammunition and repair parts to support approximately 500,000 excess M1 rifles and/or carbines, and the possibility of furnishing them at no cost or at a reduced cost to Korea. 1

(2) COMUSKOREA was the first to reply on 30 November 1968. The approximate cost of repair parts and ammunition for 500,000 M1 rifles and carbines would be $6.3 million, but, as he explained, finding a "source of funds to procure these items for the HRF is a delicate and complex matter." 2 Since the HRF is not a JSOP (Joint Strategic Objectives Plan) organization, it can not be legally supported through Korea MAP. Furthermore, the "recent $21 million cut in FY 69 MAP for Korea has so reduced the funds available that an additional $6.3 million for the non-MAP supported HRF cannot be supported." 3 As a result, the only solution would be to approach the ROK Government (ROKG) in an attempt to have the cost assumed through FMS (Foreign Military Sales). COMUSKOREA ended by recommending "that every consideration be given to providing the weapons to include repair parts... and ammunition to the ROK at no cost to MAP." 4

(5) CINCUSARPAC advised CINCPAC on 13 December 1968 as follows: "No surplus weapons will be generated in USARPAC as a result of introduction of additional M16 rifles in USARV since the M14 rifles which will be replaced are required to support CONUS training units." 5 Approximately a week later, DA informed CINCPAC of the following, concluding with the statement that repair parts would have to be MAP funded and the

1. CINCPAC 232355Z Nov 68.
2. COMUSKOREA UK 56211/300300Z Nov 68.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. CINCUSARPAC 50638/130006Z Dec 68.
approximate cost for one year for 250,000 carbines would be $4.25 million, while for 250,000 M1 rifles, it would be $12.5 million.

Assuming no reduction to current ammunition programs or increased SEA requirements, limited carbine ammunition can be supplied thru May 1969. This item is on procurement in the PEMA program and must be MAP funded. No caliber .30 ball for the M1 rifle can be supplied without reducing support to SEA. A limited amount of .30 caliber AP is excess to current Army requirements and may be made available to ROK at no cost.

A quantity of 250,000 unserviceable M1 carbines could be made available at no cost for the HRF. An additional 250,000 M1 rifles (130,000 cond F unserviceable; 120,000 cond E require limited restoration) can be made available at a reduced unit cost of $10 per weapon. 1

(5) At the end of the calendar year, this action was not completed, for Hq CINCPAC was busy "staffing a message advising COMUSKOREA that M1 rifles, repair parts, and ammunition are not available at 'no-cost' to Korea MAP."2

Additional Requirements for ROK Armed Forces

(5) The ROK Minister of National Defense gave a brochure, entitled "Problem Areas in the Republic of Korea Defense," to COMUSKOREA on 5 April 1968. By means of a personal letter, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces, Korea, then forwarded a copy to the Chief of Staff, Hq CINCPAC. Listed in this brochure were the additional items that the Korean Government desired in order to significantly improve the capabilities of the ROK Armed Forces, as well as the justifications and rationales for these items. It was estimated that the total cost of these additional requirements would be approximately $1.22 billion over and above the existing MAP dollar guidelines. Moreover, many of the proposed items would have substantially increased the offensive capabilities of the ROK forces. "The President

1. DA 891930/281027Z Dec 68.
2. J431 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
was briefed on the ROKG request during the Honolulu Conference; however, no action was taken on the request by the USG at that time. "1

Additional ROK Force to Vietnam

(5) Because of the U.S. desire for additional FWMAF in Vietnam, Mr. Clark Clifford and General Maxwell Taylor visited the Manila Pact countries during July 1967 to discuss an increase in their commitments. From Korea, the U.S. wanted "an infantry division (14,216) a logistical slice (22,000), a long range patrol company (118), total 36,334."2 Further discussion between the U.S. and ROK Government (ROKG) followed and, in late December 1967, ROKG indicated its willingness to provide a light division, made up of two brigades and totalling 11,000 trained troops. Of this total, 5,000 spaces would be made available by substituting ROK civilians (either soldiers discharged from active duty in-place or veterans from Korea) for logistics and support personnel in truck companies, ammunition supply companies, and other supply and maintenance areas. The remaining 6,000 new spaces would be filled by troops from a ROK regiment in Korea, plus additional units. 3

(5) In this case, as in each of the earlier deployments of the two divisions and one brigade to South Vietnam, the U.S. had to enter into certain agreements with ROKG. Underlying all these American pledges was the overall assurance that not only would the integrity of Korea's defense be maintained and strengthened, but that Korea's economic progress would be further promoted. The quid pro quo that the U.S. was willing to pay this time to obtain additional Korean combat troops was: 2 destroyers ($6); 4 12 UH-1H helicopters ($3.5); an 8-inch Self-Propelled Howitzer Battalion ($3); 8 Counter-Infiltration Battalions ($9.88); CIGCOREP ($32.2); Korean Logistical Service Corps ($5 to $20 per year); reconstitution in Korea of a light division and support of a light division in Vietnam for one year ($62). Cost of this quid pro quo was earmarked. 5

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1. J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
3. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68; Point Paper, J5523, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Apr 68, Subj: ROK Participation in South Vietnam; Point Paper, J4313, Hq CINCPAC, 6 May 68, Subj: Equipment for ROK Light Division.
4. Approximate cost in millions.
5. Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Mar 68, Subj: Commitments (Quid Pro Quo).
(5) Because ROK tightly held any news of the proposed deployment of the Korean light division only within the highest governmental echelon, American planners were unable to hold any discussions with ROKA personnel at the action level as to the types and quantities of equipment that the unit would require. As a result, the preparation of a TOE for the proposed light division had to be an unilateral action, and DA developed the equipment package based upon the TOE of the ROKA Capitol Division then in South Vietnam, less one regiment, one 105mm Howitzer Battalion, and one Engineer Company.1

(6) A SECDEF memorandum of 16 January had required "DA to take all actions necessary now to assure the timely fulfillment of requirements for additional ROK forces to South Vietnam to arrive there as early as 1 March 1968."2 This was the target date that President Park of Korea had given to President Johnson during a luncheon conference at Canberra, Australia, on 21 December 1967, when he promised to do his utmost to get additional ROK troops to Vietnam as soon as possible.3 To meet this in-country date, DA directed shipment of the necessary equipment for a light division from Beaumont, Texas, on 28 January, with the destination of Cam Ranh Bay in South Vietnam. "This shipment," however, could "be diverted in route by DA dependent upon the situation and the desires of CINCUSARPAC."4

(7) Meanwhile, on 20 January 1968, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested the views of the JCS on the ways in which the ROK Air Force (ROKAF) might participate in combat operations in South Vietnam.5 The JCS notified CINCPAC on 29 February that a comparative analysis of three alternatives was being made, to include detailed cost data, available assets, and the impact of U.S. and ROK air capability in Korea and South Vietnam:

2. DA 849270/262349Z Jan 68.
3. Point Paper, J4313, Hq CINCPAC, 6 May 68, Subj: Equipment for ROK Light Division.
4. DA 849270/262349Z Jan 68.
Alternatives being considered are (1) individual ROKAF pilot participation with Vietnamese F-5 Squadron; (2) ROKAF F-5 Squadron complete with aircraft personnel support and equipment deploying to South Vietnam and collocating with U.S. unit. U.S. would replace attrition aircraft but not reconstitute squadron in Korea; (3) ROKAF F-5 Squadron pers without aircraft and equipment deploying to South Vietnam collocating with U.S. unit. U.S. would provide 18 aircraft and support equipment in Vietnam.

Request recommendation on most feasible alternative and general comment on all proposed alternatives. In addition specific comment is needed for each alternative on each aspect of analysis. In addition, the support costs, operating costs, attrition rates and any similar data which is available for the F-5 Vietnamese Air Force Squadron would be useful.  

(2) Exactly a month later, CINCPAC replied in detail to the JCS, concluding with the following comment:

From the standpoint of combat capability in Vietnam, alternative 2 is preferred and might be tried first. On balance, however, in consideration of all factors concerning both Korea and Vietnam, alternative 3 appears to be the most practicable. Recommend that AMEMB Seoul be authorized to approach ROKG on deployment of ROKAF F-5 Squadron to SVN at same time that negotiations on deployment of ROKA light division are resumed.

(2) The reason why negotiations had faltered was the occurrence of two highly-charged incidents during January 1968: the attempted assassination of the President of South Korea (Blue House Incident) and the capture of the USS PUEBLO by the North Koreans. Toward the end of the month, the American Embassy in Seoul recommended to SECSTATE that a

1. JCS 2299/291609Z Feb 68.
2. CINCPAC 292245Z Mar 68; J5523 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
temporary pause should take place in American efforts to induce the
Korean Government to engage in further planning for ROK troop dispatch
to Vietnam, a move that CINCPAC concurred in a week later in a mes-
sage to the JCS.¹

(5) Although the U.S. had continued with actions necessary to provide
certain items of the quid pro quo, negotiations became delayed, and
ultimately stalled, as a result of the Blue House and PUEBLO incidents.
During the Honolulu Conference in April 1968, it became apparent that
the deployment of a full 11,000 force was neither militarily nor politically
feasible at that time, although "President Johnson evidently told President
Park that we still expected the deployment when the situation became more
favorable."²

(5) At this time, the Korean Government was contemplating deploying
two separate bodies of troops, a 5,000- and a 6,000-man force, with the
5,000-man force utilizing the military spaces to be released by the sub-
stitution of civilians in logistic units in South Vietnam. In addition, the
ROK JCS had developed a separate plan for the deployment of a 5,000-
man regimental combat team. The time table for movement was approx-
imately three months after official approval. The additional 6,000 troops
--to make up the 11,000 man light division--would be deployed as soon as
President Park felt that he could prudently propose its deployment.
Approval, however, hinged to a significant degree upon the establishment
of wage scales for the civilians to be substituted for military ROKFV that
would be agreeable to both the Americans and Koreans.³

(5) Since the replacement of 5,000 ROK logistics troops then in South
Vietnam by the civilians of the Korean Logistical Service Corps (KLSC)
was an integral part of the ROK proposal, the wage rates to be paid to the
civilians became a major issue, when the American and Koreans could not
agree on a pay scale. Both CINCPAC and William J. Porter, U.S. Ambass-
ador to Korea, considered the ROKG pay proposal as "exorbitant" and felt

1. AMEMBASSY Seoul 3770/3008452 Jan 68 and CINCPAC 0321482 Feb 68,
both cited in J5523 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
2. Point Paper, J552, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Aug 68, Subj: Additional ROK
Forces for Vietnam; Point Paper, J5521, Hq CINCPAC, 27 May 68,
3. Ibid.
that the U.S. should pay no more than "what is reasonable and proper;" as a result the problem was referred to Washington in May 1968 for a joint decision by the SECDEF and SECSTATE. ¹

(5) By August 1968, the situation in which the original negotiations had been undertaken no longer existed, being altered by such dramatic changes as the restriction on bombing North Vietnam, the commencement of the Paris peace talks, and the trend toward avoiding any appearance of escalating the conflict. In addition, a major improvement and modernization program for the RVNAF had been started. Since such a program would result in an earlier and more economical introduction of troops into combat, it was given the highest priority. Accordingly, SECDEF authorized DA to use the equipment for the ROK light division (Project OBN), which had been stockpiled on Okinawa since early spring, in the RVNAF program. ²

(5) On 9 July 1968, COMUS Korea advised DA that the "estimated time that would be available to reconstitute the OBN package after a Presidential decision and National Assembly approval would be eleven weeks."³ Based upon "this evaluation and the high level interest in improving the combat posture of the ARVN," DA gave two days later the necessary authority to USARPAC to use the OBN equipment to support Southeast Asia requirements "with priority to RVNAF modernization and improvement requirements."⁴ The only restriction placed on this equipment was that Prescribed Load List (PLL) and Authorized Stockage List (ASL) items were to remain intact in Okinawa until a final decision had been made on a ROK deployment. On 14 August 1968, however, DA lifted this restriction, giving USARPAC complete control with the understanding that: "Priority of issue will be to RVNAF requirements."⁵

(5) This action more or less finished off any hopes of deploying a ROK light division to South Vietnam before the end of calendar year 1968. In view of fiscal stringencies and equipment availability, DA would be hard

1. CINCPAC 250111Z May 68; AMEMBASSY Seoul 7494/260630Z May 68.
3. COMUS Korea UK 53936/091252Z Jul 68.
4. DA 871739/111715Z Jul 68.
5. DA 876173/142139Z Aug 68.
pressed to expeditiously provide the required equipment for a ROK light division. Moreover, as the year drew to a close, the political climate did not appear favorable to any further introduction of new troops into the Vietnam conflict, especially in view of the Paris peace talks and the ramifications of the presidential election in the U.S.1

Malaysia

Malaysia Grant Aid Training Program and FMS Arrangements

(5) For FY 69, as for previous fiscal years since 1966, the ceiling for Burma MAP was $200,000 for training purposes in CONUS.2 To date, no training program has been established for the Royal Malaysian Navy; the Royal Malaysian Air Force has utilized its training program primarily for pilot training, while the Royal Malaysian Army has utilized its program to train officers and enlisted men in an assortment of specialties, the principal fields being intelligence, airborne, ranger, medical, and engineer courses. Beginning in FY 68, at the request of the Government of Malaysia (GOM), "increased emphasis has been placed on officer career courses in lieu of technical" ones, a course of action designed "to help provide qualified officers to bridge the gap created by withdrawal of Commonwealth Forces."3

(5) U.S. MA "to Malaysia is designed to assist and encourage Malaysia's development of her military forces to provide defense against limited external threat and control the threat of Communist inspired insurgency in East and West Malaysia."4 The objectives of Malaysia MAP are limited ones: (1) "To foster regional arrangements for area security among the Commonwealth countries of the Southwest Pacific;" (2) "To encourage the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries to continue to be the major source of external assistance for the Malaysian Armed Forces, including their training and equipping;" (3) "To provide, through

appropriate sales, tangible evidence of U.S. support Malaysian Defense Forces.  

"As the current CINCPAC MA Plan read:

This modest plan will have little immediate impact on the capabilities of the Malaysian Armed Forces or its combat effectiveness; however, it will provide much needed training and items of equipment and, in the long term, assist in the development of officers for positions of higher leadership in the Malaysian Armed Forces. In addition, it will further promote Malaysian-American relations and understanding, and give the Malaysian Armed Forces an appreciation of the U.S., its military and its people.  

During 1967, the U.S. and COM agreed upon a $4 million credit sales arrangement for the purchase of U.S. military equipment and services. As of November 1968, the "bulk of this credit has been obligated for 30,000 shotguns, 20 miniguns, 21 105mm Howitzers, and various other items of military equipment. It is anticipated that part of the remaining approximately $100,000 will be utilized for purchase of signal test equipment." During last year, there was also a credit assistance arrangement of $11.6 million for the purchase of 10 Sikorsky S-61A-4 helicopters. Initial deliveries of these helicopters began in January 1968, and all of them had been delivered by November.  

1. Ibid., p. 1.  
2. Ibid.  
Philippines

(8) Turning to the Philippines, the continued unrestricted use of our bases there is important to our efforts in South Vietnam and to our strategic position throughout the area. A stable Philippine government, oriented toward the United States, is essential to our continued use of these bases...

The Philippine Constabulary is the principal law enforcement agency in the Philippines.... As an added task, President Marcos recently assigned the Constabulary the task of capturing or eliminating the leaders of the HUK organization.

The Philippine Army, Air Force, Navy, and the small Marine unit assist the Constabulary in the accomplishment of its mission. The Army conducts major anti-dissident operations, directs most of the Civic Action Centers, and operates ten Engineer Construction Battalions. The Army has had a Civic Action Group of over 2,000 men in South Vietnam since September 1966. A bill authorizing the continuation of this group is before the Philippine Congress.

The Navy patrols Philippine waters in the campaign against infiltration and smuggling, and provides inter-island lift of major items for all government agencies. The Air Force provides airlift and tactical air support for all services. All of the Philippine armed forces are thus largely engaged in humanitarian activities which directly link the central government and the people.

Major areas of emphasis in the FY 69 Military Assistance Program for the Philippines are improvement of the maintenance and supply systems for existing forces and equipment; improved communications and transportation; and increased tactical mobility. Emphasis is on forces and equipment which contribute to
internal security rather than those designed for external defense. The activity of the Philippine economy and the level of central government revenues have increased encouragingly, but substantial further improvement is required before the Republic of the Philippines can fully support its own armed forces. Military assistance helps to insure the continuation of a stable government in the Philippines. At the same time it serves, from the Filipino viewpoint, as partial payment for our use of bases in that country.

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp

1. CINCPAC 9 Apr 68 MAP Statement.
PHILIPPINES
AS OF 1 JANUARY 1969

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA ............................................. 116,000 SQ MI
POPULATION ...................................... 14.6 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH .................................. 2.2%
ANNUAL INF MORTALITY .......................... 1.8 ACRI
LIFE EXPECTANCY ................................. 55 YEARS
GROSS INT. PRODUCT 1967 ($) .................. 4.1 BILLION
PER CAPITA ...................................... 578
DEFENSE BUDGET (SELF-FUNDED) 1967 ($) ...... $770 MILLION
1.1% OF TOTAL BUDGET

GENERAL INFORMATION

PREIDENT - Ferdinand E. MARCOS
VICE PRESIDENT - Fernando LOPEZ
SECRETARY OF STATE - Carlos P. ROMULO
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE - Vacant
CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP - GEN Manuel T. TAN, Army
VICE C/S AFP - MAJ GEN Guadencio J. TORRES, Army
CG, ARMY - BGEN Roberto M. MAGALAY, Army
CG, NAVY - CNO Commodore Nicomedes LOMIBAO, Navy
CG, AIR FORCE - BGEN Jesus E. SINGSON, AF
CHIEF CONTESTABILIT - BGEN Vicente R. RAVAL, PC

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES ** FREL-76

ARMY
2 1/4 DIV, 1 BCT, 1 ENG CONST RDE, 1 ABN
1 SPEC FORCES GCP, 1 CONSTABULARY BN (900)

NAVY
1 DE, 12 PC/PCE, 9 PGM, 1 MISC/MSL, 1 ATR, 1
SEA LNT, 1 MINE BATEL, 6 LST, 1 LMS, 2
ARL, 2 ARL, 24 PCF

AIR FORCE
1 TAC FTR SQ, 1 COIN SQ, 1 COMP RESC SQ, 1
COMP COOMOR SQ, 1 LIASON SQ, 2 TRAN SPT
SQ

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES; TO ENHANCE PHILIPPINE MILITARY SUPPORT OF SEATO; AND TO MAINTAIN U.S. OPERATING MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR - BORIS J. MENEN WILLIAMS
U.S. AIR ATTACHÉ - MR. WESLEY C. HARADON
CHIEF, ECONOMIC - MAJ GEN LLOYD H. GOMES, USA
NIA OBJECTIVE

General objectives are:
A) To support the retention of U.S. base rights in the Philippines.
B) To develop and maintain military/paramilitary forces with a primary mission of maintaining the internal security of the Philippines.
C) To support a capability to deploy limited Philippine forces within the SEATO area for mutual defense tasks.
D) To improve the capability of the Philippine armed forces to provide their own logistic support.

TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

LIGHT INF DIV, 1 SF CO, 1 ENGR RDE, 1 INF BCT,
1 CONSTABULARY BCT, 171 COMPANIES, 1 PRES.
GUARD BN, 1 CAG (Vietnam)

COMBAT CAPABILITY

MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY, OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL ATTACK AND CONTRIBUTE RC TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.

CONDUCT LIMITED OFF-SHORE PATROL AND MINOR AMPHIBIOUS AND ASW OPERATIONS.

LIMITED CAPABILITY TO FULLFILL MISSION OF ASSISTING ARMY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONTRIBUTE TO DEFENSE AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK.

The CINCPAC MA Plan for the Philippines for the period FY 69-74 was designed to assist in achieving the following U.S. objectives: (1) "To support the retention of U.S. base rights in the Philippines;" (2) "To develop and maintain military/paramilitary forces with a primary mission of maintaining internal security of the Philippines;" (3) "To support a capability to deploy limited Philippine forces within the SEATO area for mutual defense tasks;" (4) "To improve the capability of the Philippine Armed Forces to provide their own logistic support." For the first fiscal year, MAP dollar guidelines were established at $22.2 million, and the plan contained the following guidance:

The United States should bear in mind, however, that retention of U.S. base rights is important to the U.S. strategic posture in Southeast Asia as well as to the direct defense of the Philippines. It is a fact, however, that at least in part, U.S. military assistance, along with other U.S. assistance, is currently viewed by the recipient as compensation for U.S. use of his national territory. Renewed effort must be made to impress upon the Philippines that the U.S. use of Philippine territory is a necessary price for U.S. strategic protection of the Philippines. These considerations, plus the Philippine Civic Action Group deployment to Vietnam, will require the United States to watch carefully its relations with the Philippines and to respond to political imperatives.

On 2 November 1968, however, SECDEF informed CINCPAC that a revised FY 69 dollar ceiling of $18.9 million had been established for the Philippines. This was a $3.3 million reduction over what had previously been programmed. "Since the Government of the Philippines does not currently provide an adequate defense budget to support its armed forces," as one Hq CINCPAC staff officer pointed out, "the levels of training, operations, and supply and maintenance are substandard. Further reduction in this area will reduce effectiveness of the armed forces.

2. Ibid., p. 2. See also p. 3.
3. SECDEF 4745/020002Z Nov 68.
It is anticipated that the FY 69 MAP reduction of $3.3 million will result in some adverse political reaction when it becomes known.  

(C) In order to meet the new ceiling, CHJUSMAGPHIL submitted to CINCPAC a revised program which reduced the FY 69 Philippine MAP by $3.465 million. The majority of the items deleted were investment items, with operating costs accounting for only about one-tenth of the total. Major items deleted from the program were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Gunboat (PGM)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$575,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft, Cargo, C-47</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$383,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter, UH-1H</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$250,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft, Trainer, T-41D</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$102,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft, Utility, U-17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Craft (LCM-8)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Craft Swift (PCF)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$200,000²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) One remedial step was possible, but its success seemed highly improbable. Previously, MAP funds had been used for commercial consumables, mostly POL, which was generally considered to be a responsibility of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GOP). "In view of the reduction to FY 69 MAP," noted one Hq CINCPAC staff officer, "these costs should be transferred to GOP responsibility. Past experiences indicate that this endeavor will meet with failure; however, we should continue our efforts to influence the GOP in this direction."

1. Point Paper, J5333A, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Nov 68, Subj: Philippine MAP.
2. J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
3. Point Paper, J5333A, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Nov 68, Subj: Philippine MAP.
Philippine Munitions Plant

(S) On 17 January 1968, SECDEF concurred in CINCPAC's recommendation of 12 October 1967 that the Government of the Philippines (GOP) "be provided, through MAP, the advice and training required to develop an ammunition production capability," that any "decision on support of weapons plants be deferred until such time as experience gained from ammunition plants indicates that weapons production would be a sound venture," and that GOP be advised of limits of U.S. support and procedure for requesting release of manufacturing rights. ¹ CINCPAC, a week later, provided CHJUSMAGPHIL with the necessary guidance on the programming of needed requirements for the munitions plants. ²

Establishment of a Colt Arms Factory in the Philippines

(C) Sometime in mid-1968, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GOP) and the Colt Company of the United States entered into negotiations for the establishment of a Colt arms factory in Philippines. It was envisioned that 10% of the weapons produced by the factory would be submachine guns, 3.9% would be heavy barreled automatic rifles, and the remainder would be the standard M-16s. ³ Approval by the U.S. Government (USG) was required for such a venture.

(C) When queried by President Marcos of the Philippines as to the reason for the delay of USG approval for the factory, the American Ambassador to the Philippines, G. Mennen Williams, replied that he "would look into the matter on an urgent basis." ⁴ Accordingly, on 24 October 1968, he requested a report from the SECSTATE on the status of the Colt application. At this time, he stated the following opinions on the matter:

1. SECDEF 7483/172029Z Jan 68; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68. For the inception of this project and 1967 developments, see pages 400-402 of CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. I.
2. CINCPAC 240046Z Jan 68.
3. AMEMBASSY Manila 17572/150930Z Nov 68; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
4. AMEMBASSY Manila 16772/240921Z Oct 68.
...While the Philippines could benefit more from other kinds of investment, it seems difficult for us to stand in the way if Colt and GOP are ready to go ahead. Establishment of a small arms factory in the Philippines could mean a savings to U.S. treasury since arms produced would no longer have to be provided under military assistance programs. Also, it is extremely doubtful that licensing this factory would inject USG to a significant degree in Philippines problems with Malaysia. 

1. Approximately a month later, on 15 November 1968, the Country Team recommended to SECSTATE that the Colt Company be permitted to enter into an arrangement with the GOP for the arms factory for the following reasons:

(a) the determination of President Marcos, who is under heavy press and political pressure on this issue, to obtain a weapons plant for the Philippines in the near future;

(b) the desirability of standardization of weapons of our allies in Southeast Asia as well as elsewhere in the world;

(c) the insurance that the U.S., together with a U.S. business concern, benefits from the export trade involved;

(d) the probability that if the U.S. turns down Colt factory the GOP will go ahead with some other country, and the ever-present critics of the U.S. will use this as another example of U.S. trying to keep the Philippines from industrializing and tied to U.S. apron strings;

(e) the benefit to MAP described above;

1. Ibid.
(f) the desirability of avoiding the image of no longer supporting the defense needs of a close ally of many years... 1

(C) On 16 December 1968, the State Department informed the American Embassy in Manila that the U.S. had approved the request to negotiate a license agreement, subject to the following conditions: (a) "final license agreement subject to later USG review;" (b) "no USG financial support;" (c) "no third country sales without prior USG approval." 2 In addition, this approval was only for the manufacture of M-16 rifles. Furthermore, the Embassy officials were given precise instruction: "In informing GOP of approval and conditions you should comment that this decision should not be taken to imply we endorse project on either economic or military grounds. On contrary, we continue to believe that project uneconomical." 3

(C) Late in the year, on 29 December 1968, CINCPAC informed both the JCS and CHJUSMAGPHIL that he agreed in the economic analysis that the Colt factory project was not justifiable for financial reasons. Moreover, he expressed the opinion that the project was not supportable on military grounds, since there "are other higher priority, unfunded military requirements which should be satisfied before available resources of GOP are committed to stockpiling of M-16 rifles." 4 To further his point, he offered several alternative ways by which Philippine units engaged in law and order activities could be equipped with the M-16.

Shift of MAP Support from One Philippine Navy Vessel to Another

(C) On 13 November 1968, CHJUSMAGPHIL notified CINCPAC that, after both his representative and a Philippine Naval Officer of Flag Rank had thoroughly examined the deteriorated hull of ex-U.S. PC-1131 (Philippine Navy PS-22) and carefully considered all factors, he recommended the scrapping of this ship, the shifting of its MAP support to ex-U.S. PC-568 (PS-80), and the use of the removable equipment for the remaining four PCs (Submarine Chaser Ships) in the Philippine Navy. 5 "Since funds for PC-568 rehab/outfitting will serve essentially the same purpose

1. AMEMBASSY Manila 17572/150930Z Nov 68.
2. SECSTATE 287967/162331Z Dec 68.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 290624Z Dec 68.
5. CHJUSMAGPHIL JPNV(N3)/130020Z Nov 68; J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
as for PC-1131 overhaul, "CINCPAC concurred in this recommendation and so recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) six days later. Accordingly, on 26 November 1968, "CNO authorized the scrapping or disposition of the ship in the Philippines, with usable "material to be shifted to ex-USS PC-568 or other Grant Aid supported Philippine Navy ship."  

Transfer of USCG NETTLE to the Philippine Navy

Towards the end of 1967, the "former USCG Nettle (WAK 169) became excess to the U.S. Coast Guard while based at Cavite in the Philippines," and "due to stated requirements by both the Philippine Navy and the Trust Territory, an analysis" was conducted to insure that its disposition would be in the best interests of the U.S. As a result, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS on 19 December 1967 that this ship "remain in the Philippines and that steps be taken for early transfer to the Department of the Navy for further loan to the Government of the Philippines as a no-cost addition under the MAP."

CINCPAC supported his conclusion with several pertinent rationales. First and foremost, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) knew that the NETTLE was available and had expressed an urgent requirement for it. Although there also undoubtedly existed an urgent and continuing requirement within the Trust Territory for surface transportation, any disposition of the vessel had to be carefully weighed "within the context of requirements in the Philippines and our overall relationship with the Government of the Philippines." In addition, any possibility of the Philippine Navy (PN) obtaining funds for such a vessel had been virtually eliminated by recent cuts in the current level of Philippine grant aid, while the Trust Territory, on the other hand, would probably be able to obtain requisite shipping from within assets available to the U.S.

1. CINCPAC 190252Z Nov 68.
2. CNO 262305Z Nov 68.
5. CINCPAC 190439Z Dec 67.
6. Ibid., the source also for the following CINCPAC rationales.
Moreover, the PN's logistic shipping was greatly overcommitted at the time. Because the PN was actively engaged in civic action programs throughout the entire archipelago, adequate logistic lift was needed to support the newly-positioned and expanded Philippine Constabulary and Engineering Construction Battalion detachments in the Sulu, Visayas, and Palawan areas, especially through the delivery of prefabricated schoolhouses, rice, and corn to these places. Since there were already ships of the NETTLE class in-country, operating support was possible within the existing Philippine MAP.

Furthermore, the NETTLE was the same class as the USN AKL types that operated in Vietnam, where serious damage or sinking could occur at any moment because of the hazardous environment in which these ships operated. By retaining this vessel in the Philippines, the U.S. would have a readily available asset in the eventuality that an urgent requirement in South Vietnam should present itself. In addition, the possibility of the PN manning the ship as a FWMAF unit would be a most desirable development that could be fully explored.

The Secretary of Defense approved the transfer of the NETTLE on 16 January 1968, and the vessel "was turned over to the U.S. Navy, and was in turn, leased to the PN in 'as is, where is' condition for five years." It was officially transferred to the Philippines on 20 January 1968, with President Ferdinand Marcos accepting custody. The PN subsequently redesignated the ship as the RPS LIIMASAWA (TK 79).

Philippine Engineer Construction Battalions (ECBs)

By means of a letter to CHJUSMAG Philippines on 13 December 1968, the Philippine Secretary of National Defense formally requested authority to attach one ECB to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) and another to the Philippine Navy (PN). Previously, these ECBs had been organized and equipped as part of the 51st Engineer Brigade as a consequence of an agreement between President Johnson and President Marcos of the Philippines.

2. Journal MA, Apr 68, p. 113; SECDEF 221643Z Jan 68.
3. J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
MAP-supplied maintenance trucks, 3/4 ton International pickup trucks, scrapers, and crane in a Philippine Engineer Depot awaiting delivery to using units.
Unloading a TD 20 International tractor for Philippine MAP.

Tractors and dump trucks at a Philippine Engineer Depot being processed for issue to using units.
MAP-supplied 16 cubic feet cement mixers awaiting movement from docks in Manila, Philippines, to an Engineer Depot for further distribution to the Engineer Construction Battalions.

TD 20 International tractor being brought out of ship's hold at Manila, Philippines.
International front loader being unloaded in Philippines.
Actually, as CHJUSMAG Philippines (CHJUSMAGPHIL) informed CINCPAC on 24 December 1968, this letter was:

... actually the result of a suggestion I made to him several weeks ago to forestall a reported AFP plan to inactivate 2 ECB in the 51st Engr Brig and transfer equipment to the PN and the PAF to form like units in these two services. I informed the Secretary that such a move would violate the Presidential Agreement on the ECB's by transferring the equipment out of these two brigade units, and would violate MAP by providing MAP equipment to non-MAP supported units. I suggested instead that on his request, I would seek CINCPAC authority to "attach" these units, in which status they could perform the desired mission, while remaining within the Brigade structure, support posture and engineer technical control. He readily agreed to attachment as an interim measure....

(C) On the first day of 1969, CINCPAC granted the requested approval, since the ECBs, even though attached to the PAF and PN, would still continue to perform those construction and civic action projects as was intended within the spirit of the Presidential agreement. He warned CHJUSMAGPHIL, however, to:

...closely monitor activities of ECBs attached to PN and PAF to assure proper utilization and effective employment of ECBs. Any diversion of MAP assets to non-MAP uses should be brought to attention of responsible AFP personnel and reported to CINCPAC.

Modern Air Munitions for the Philippines

On 1 April 1968, CHJUSMAGPHIL informed CINCPAC that the Philippine Air Force (PAF) had 283 M64/500 pound bombs in its possession, which it was willing to exchange for a like number of Mk82/500 pound bombs.

1. CHJUSMAGPHIL JPC/240600Z Dec 68; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. CINCPAC 010341Z Jan 69.
3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 010602Z Apr 68.
CINCPAC, in turn, requested CSAF (Chief of Staff, Air Force) the same month that "283 MK82 bombs be provided to MAP Philippines at no cost to MAP, by diversion from LAMP MK82 program." 1 CSAF advised CINCPAC on 1 May 1968 that there was no objection to the proposed exchange and confirmed that the exchange would be at no cost to PAF MAP. 2 As a result, on 7 May 1968, CINCPAC took the necessary actions to facilitate this exchange of air munitions between CHJUSMAGPHIL and DEPCJUSMAGTHAI. 3

Reprogramming of Investment Items for PAF in Lieu of POL

(2) On 29 February 1968, there was an undelivered balance of approximately $194,000 from prior Philippine Air Force (PAF) FMS cases for POL. Accordingly, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (CSAF) suggested to the Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Philippines (JUSMAGPHIL), that PAF POL requirements be met through prior and current year FMS cases and that the FY 68 Philippine MAP funds be reprogrammed. 4

(2) CHJUSMAGPHIL replied that, under the existing arrangement, PAF purchased one-half of its POL requirements, while MAP provided the other half. He proposed, subject to higher approval, bargaining with the Commanding General (CG) PAF with the goal of persuading PAF to buy all of its POL and reprogramming MAP funds for the purchase of 3 C-47s and possibly 2 HU-16s. 5 CINCPAC set forth his views on 19 March 1968 to both CSAF and CHJUSMAGPHIL. In his opinion, any such discussions "could be interpreted by CGPAF as constituting a promise or commitment on the part of the USG." 6 He added that the Philippine Government "should be encouraged to more adequately fund for support of their armed forces to permit reprogramming of available MAP funds to urgently needed investment items," but that "normal program deviation and approval procedures apply to reprogramming of MAP funds which become available because of increased GOP support." 7

1. CINCPAC 260325Z Apr 68.
2. CSAF 011558Z May 68, cited in J4711 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
3. CINCPAC 072140Z May 68.
4. CSAF 292308Z Feb 68; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
5. CHJUSMAGPHIL 120720Z Mar 68.
6. CINCPAC 190417Z Mar 68.
7. Ibid.
Meanwhile, CSAF had responded to CHJUSMAGPHIL's suggestion prior to receiving the foregoing comments of CINCPAC. He stated that 3 C-47s being released from VNAF "could be released to PAF in 'as is' condition at no cost" and 2 HU-16s in storage at Davis-Monthan AFB could be programmed as excess with a reconditioning cost of approximately $90,000 per aircraft. On 23 March 1968, CINCPAC advised CSAF that any exception to established policy and standards and waiver from reconditioned criteria for Philippine MAP C-47 requirement was not desirable. He further added that, "before additional HU16's can be considered, PAF should demonstrate capability to operate current HU16 inventory more effectively." 

**U-17B Aircraft for Philippine Air Force (PAF)**

In FY 67, 10 U-17B aircraft were programmed and funded for PAF for assignment to the 601st Liaison Squadron, stationed at Nichols Air Base, Philippines. CHJUSMAG Philippines acknowledged on 8 February 1968 "receipt of ten U-17B acft," which had been received in-country during January 1968.

**HU-16 Aircraft for Philippines**

In the early part of 1968, CG PAF informally asked CHJUSMAGPHIL for "information as to the availability of excess HU-16 aircraft on a no-cost basis;" since he planned "to use additional HU-16 aircraft if available as open water patrol aircraft for anti-smuggling campaigns." CHJUSMAGPHIL, in turn, requested CINCPAC for guidance and information on which he could base a reply. On 9 March 1968, CINCPAC answered that "PAF should be informed that if, as we understand, its current HU-16 resources are inadequately utilized, it would be difficult to justify the provision of additional HU-16's if available."

1. CSAF 182104Z Mar 68.
2. CINCPAC 232228Z Mar 68; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
3. CHJUSMAGPHIL JPAF-PLM/080324Z Feb 68; J4331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
4. CHJUSMAGPHIL 290720Z Feb 68.
5. Ibid.; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
6. CINCPAC 090326Z Mar 68.
Philippine Purchase of Ammunition from China

(5) On 14 October 1968, CHJUSMAGPHIL advised CINCPAC that "Philippine Government desires to purchase, at its own expense, rifle ammunition from Government of Republic of China," an action strongly supported by both himself and U.S. Ambassador Williams, and requested "that CINCPAC proceed without delay to secure State Dept approval of this procedure, as well as such manufacturers clearances as are necessary." 1 Motivation for this move by President Marcos was primarily political in nature, stemming from being "under great pressure by liberal politicians and nationalists who oppose him for personal political reasons." 2

(6) The next day, CINCPAC replied, outlining the proper channels for processing the request and pointing out to CHJUSMAGPHIL that this specific request could encounter resistance at the OSD-State level because of the Philippine-Malaysia friction over Sabah and the impropriety of the use of Philippine funds "to purchase excess ammunition while unable to adequately fund for such activities and requirements as Civic Action Centers, POL, PHILCAG, and ship overhaul work force." 3 Meanwhile, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) had approached the Republic of China, which was reluctant to sell because it "did not want to jeopardize development of future relations with Malaysia;" on the other hand, it "also wanted to preserve close relations with Philippines." 4 On 18 October 1968, the American Embassy at Manila notified the State Department of its continued support for this GOP request. 5

(6) The same day, the SECSTATE stated that the U.S. "would interpose no objection to purchase of ammunition by GOP from GRC, so long as there is no expectation that the U.S. will finance the purchase either directly or indirectly. In other words the Phils should be told that we would consider this a transaction between two friendly governments in which the U.S. should not get involved." 6 Subsequently, on 30 October 1968, the Chinese Consul at Kuala Lumpur informed the American Embassy in Malaysia "that, at least for the time being, GRC does not plan to accept

1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 140730Z Oct 68.
2. Ibid.; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
3. CINCPAC 150421Z Oct 68.
4. AMEMBASSY Taipei 4878/180326Z Oct 68.
5. AMEMBASSY Manila 16535/180909Z Oct 68.
6. SECSTATE 258298/182301Z Oct 68.
Phil order for small arms ammunition. "1 For the remainder of calendar
year 1968, there was no further significant message traffic on this subject
recieved by Hq CINCPAC. 2

Singapore

FMS Program for Singapore

(3) Since there are no U.S. military or economic assistance programs
for Singapore, all U.S. assistance must be conducted as part of the FMS
Program. As reported in last year's history, the U.S. had approved the
export of a substantial number of AR-15 rifles to Singapore in early 1967.
"Immediately, a great deal of furor followed, for this weapon, known in
its military configuration as the M-16, was one that both the U.S. troops
and the Free World Forces in Vietnam valued highly and did not have
enough for their purposes."3 The status of this project, as well as other
ones of the FMS Program for Singapore, as of 12 November 1968, follows:

(1) AR-15 Rifle - GOS has contracted for a
direct commercial sale with Colt Arms Company for
23,300 rifles. By June 1968 only 6,000 rifles had been
delivered and due to higher priority commitments,
 further deliveries were suspended. Release of these
weapons for delivery is controlled by OSD and is
directly related to requirements in SEA versus avail-
able production capacity.

(2) 106mm Recoiless Rifles - Sale of fifty-
seven (57) weapons was approved by OSD/State and
deliveries were completed in May 1968.

(3) 1/4 Ton Trucks - Fifty-seven (57) vehicles
have been delivered. These vehicles are to serve as
mounts for the 106mm Recoiless Rifles.

(4) M-72 Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW) -
Letter of Offer by USG was sent to Singapore in
October 1968. Sale is currently awaiting action by GOS.

1. AMEMBASSY Kuala Lumpur 6183/300820Z Oct 68.
2. J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
(5) Flame Thrower, M93L-7, Portable - On 3 July 1968, OSD/State recommended against the sale of this item to GOS. This action is similar to recommendation previously made concerning sale of this item to other foreign governments.

(6) M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) - OSD/State on 3 July 1968 approved the sale of one vehicle which would be used as a test vehicle towards possible future sales. GOS had previously become disenchanted with the time lapse for obtaining this item and had obtained a similar vehicle from Israel for testing. As a result of this test, the GOS negotiated directly with Cadillac Gage for purchase of 176 V100 "Commando" armored cars.

(7) 155m Howitzer (SP) - An exception to the National Disclosure Policy (NDP) has been granted for the release of the classified ballistics data on the ammunition subject to consummation of sale to GOS.

(8) 155m Howitzer Towed - Same as SP version above.

(9) Hovercraft - Item is manufactured in the U.S. by special licensing arrangement with the UK. USG is awaiting a firm offer from GOS concerning purchase of this item prior to opening negotiations with UK. 1

Sale of HAWK Missiles to Singapore

(6) On 28 December 1967, USDAO Singapore advised CINCPAC that the Government of Singapore (GOS) had expressed an informal interest in obtaining HAWK missile equipment to replace the United Kingdom (U.K.) surface-to-air missile (SAM) squadron then deployed in Singapore. The basis for GOS interest, according to USDAO Singapore, was the possibility of an accelerated withdrawal of the U.K. SAM units. CINCPAC was

requested to furnish information on the cost and availability of such equipment, as well as the authority to provide this information to GOS. 1

(5) The necessary guidance in this matter was forthcoming from the SEOSTATE on 18 January 1968. It stated that, despite the "problems created for Singapore by acceleration of British withdrawal," the U.S. was not prepared to approve any sales to either GOS or the Government of Malaysia of sophisticated weapons systems or arms, which appeared to be in excess of legitimate defense and internal security requirements of either country. 2 In light of this guidance, CINCPAC requested two days later a "reconsideration, in coordination with" the American Embassy, of USDAO Singapore's previous recommendation. 3

(5) On 24 January 1968, USDAO Singapore replied, recommending "that HAWK cost and availability data be furnished with caveat to GOS that such information should not be interpreted at this stage as approval of sale." 4 Four days later, CINCPAC's comments, which supported USDAO recommendation, were forwarded to the JCS. 5 Shortly thereafter, the JCS provided SECDEF with their comments on CINCPAC's request:

The JCS concluded that while there is no military requirement for the HAWK system in Singapore, political considerations may warrant giving the GOS data on cost and characteristics, in accordance with pertinent disclosure regulations. The JCS interposed no objection to providing these data to the GOS, with the caveat that such provision does not constitute approval of sale, if it is deemed advisable from the political point of view. 6

(5) Despite the interest of GOS in the possible purchase of sufficient HAWK equipment for one battalion, nothing further happened in this matter.

1. USDAO Singapore 1292/280823Z Dec 67.
2. SEOSTATE 100982/182316Z Jan 68; J530 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
3. CINCPAC 202021Z Jan 68.
4. USDAO Singapore 78/240525Z Jan 68.
5. CINCPAC 280521Z Jan 68.
as late as 12 November 1968, probably because the American Embassy
in Singapore had "not encouraged this action. It appears GOS will probably
take over the BLOODHOUND guided missile equipment currently employed
by UK forces."1

**Proposed Establishment of a M-16 Rifle Manufacturing Facility**

(S) During 1968, the Government of Singapore (GOS) had "indicated
interest in making private arrangements with Colt Arms Company for
installation of an M-16 rifle production plant in Singapore."2 On 14
December 1968, SECSTATE advised CINCPAC and the American Embassy
in Singapore that the U.S. Government (USG) had:

... approved Colt Industries request for authority
to negotiate license agreement with GOS for establish-
ment of M-16 rifle manufacturing facility. However, it
must be understood that final license agreement will be
subject to detailed USG review prior to approval. Colt
will be informed that no RPT no USG financial support
in any form will be made available for this venture and
no REPEAT no export to third country can be made by
GOS without prior USG approval.3

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1. Point Paper, J5321, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Nov 68, Subj: Military and
   Economic Assistance and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs.
2. Ibid.
3. SECSTATE 287229/140005Z Dec 68; J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, for
   the month of Dec 68.
CHAPTER III

CINCPAC ACTIONS CONCERNING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES

(U) But turning back to the Pacific basin which is our area of primary concern, we find that historic forces have catapulted the United States into a position of Free World leadership with all the resultant responsibilities that entails. With the break up of the old colonial empires came the emergence of a whole new crop of independent nations. This desire of men to be free, and their determination to fight to preserve their freedom from the new imperialism of Communist enslavement, are the sources of conflicts in the Pacific which are the concern of my command.

The newly formed nations of the south and east rim of Asia range in size from India and Indonesia, constituting major segments of the world's population, to tiny nations smaller in population than many of our cities. Some western Pacific nations such as North Korea and North Vietnam have managed to create world tensions far beyond their stature as nations.

... In this modern world we can no longer afford the luxury of the principle of "no foreign entanglements" voiced by George Washington when our nation was founded. We know we must work with other nations under arrangements of collective security. By these means we are joined to other nations in a network of multilateral and bilateral mutual security treaties.

Two major multilateral treaties are of concern to us in the Pacific region. They are the Southeast Asia
Treaty, otherwise known as the Manila Pact, and the ANZUS Pact. Additionally, our nation has bilateral mutual security treaties with four countries in the Pacific Command area. They are Japan and the republics of Korea, China and the Philippines.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.¹

¹ An Address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific, Before the Commonwealth Club of California at San Francisco, California, on 22 November 1968.
UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS
IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND

SECTION I - CINCPAC ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF SEATO

(U) The Southeast Asia Treaty is a cornerstone of our military position in the Pacific. It was created by eight nations at Manila in 1954 and provides for collective action to resist armed attack and to counter subversion. The major purpose of the Pact is to give the peoples of the SEATO countries the security they need to live in peace and freedom and to push forward schemes for economic and social development. Its members are Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, France and the United States.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. 1

(/) ...a few thoughts on the value of SEATO to United States interests and objectives in the area are appropriate. The United States provides 25% of the SEATO budget. Continued expenditures for this purpose are one of the most effective vehicles we have for advancing United States objectives within the Treaty area.

During the past year, the value of the SEATO framework has been dramatically underscored. It has provided the indispensable constitutional base on which all five of the Pacific members of the Alliance have furnished forces to assist South Vietnam. During the past year, the Australians contributed a third Infantry Battalion and a "Canberra" bomber squadron. New Zealand added an additional combat unit and support ground elements. Thailand has contributed a Volunteer Regiment.

1. Ibid.
Looking beyond Vietnam, it is clear that South Asian regional cooperation requires a reasonably secure environment. It is difficult to perceive how, in the short term, this environment could be provided solely in indigenous military efforts. Accordingly, SEATO, including the U.S. contribution, will continue to play an important part in providing Southeast Asia with the essential framework for security and progress.

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp

1. CINCPAC 9 Apr 68 MAP Statement.
Study of SEATO

(PS) Acting on instructions from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Joint Staff directed that a study of SEATO be conducted with the purpose of providing the JCS with possible alternatives to SEATO to the end that a more effective security arrangement might be devised. The study was designed to cover the origins, purpose, and history of SEATO; an evaluation of SEATO's past effectiveness and future adequacy; alternative security arrangements; summary and conclusions. On 10 October 1968, the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on the draft version of the SEATO study.\(^1\)

(PS) After his planners had reviewed the draft study to assure its completeness and accuracy, CINCPAC forwarded his comments to the JCS on 8 November 1968. In his message, he brought out two significant points. Since all SEATO members except France subsequently subscribed in varying terms to the Rusk-Thanat Communiqué of 1962, CINCPAC believed that a statement to this effect should be included in paragraph 7 of the SEATO study. This addition would remove any possible misunderstanding that the 1962 agreement "converted the multilateral obligations of the treaty to bilateral obligations insofar as the United States and Thailand are concerned."\(^2\) Also, the draft study had drawn a parallel between the U.S./Thai Bilateral Plan (Taksin-1) and SEATO MPO Plans 8 and 9, giving the impression that all three plans were identical in purpose and scope. Since this was not the case, CINCPAC requested the JCS to remove this implication.

(PS) When completed in early December 1968, the SEATO study contained the following conclusions:

1. SEATO has served a useful purpose in support of U.S. national policies and objectives.
2. Despite its limitations, SEATO will continue to be useful to the United States.

1. Sources utilized in preparing this subsection on the SEATO Study were: J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68; CINCPAC 080507 Z Nov 68; J5 Brief No. 3-69, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Jan 69, of JCS 2339/280-1 of 4 Dec 69, Subj: Study of SEATO.
2. CINCPAC 080507 Z Nov 68.
(3) In the near term, there is no attainable alternative to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty which would provide a more effective security arrangement.

(4) The United States should continue to pursue policies that foster regionalism and a greater Asian participation in multilateral security arrangements. 1

Military Advisers Conference 28 (MA 28C)

(TS) The Twenty-eighth Conference of the SEATO Military Advisers took place in Wellington, New Zealand, on 29 March and 1 April 1968. 2 Admiral Sharp, as the U.S. Military Adviser (USMILAD), headed the U.S. delegation. The Honorable David Thomson, New Zealand Minister of Defense, first welcomed the Military Advisers (MILADs) to his country, then officially opened MA 28C. As in the previous year, neither France nor Pakistan attended this meeting.

(TS) An unique feature of this conference was the very frank atmosphere in which it was held. The U.S., United Kingdom, Thailand, and Philippines gave the following presentations:

USMILAD - South Vietnam Situation.
UKMILAD - Plans for Withdrawal U.K. Forces from Malaysia/Singapore.
THAIMILAD - Counter-Insurgency in Thailand.
PHILMILAD - Counter-Insurgency in Philippines.

These items led to a free exchange of opinions and other matters effecting the treaty area. Although this type of dialogue had been introduced at previous meetings, it was at MA 28C that it really developed into the most important part of the conference. 3

1. J5 Brief No. 3-69, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Jan 69, of JCS 2339/280-1 of 4 Dec 69, Subj: Study of SEATO.
2. Unless otherwise cited, the information in this subsection on MA 28C was derived from: J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of March 68.
3. Intv, CDR William A. Meyers III, USN, J5141, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 12 Jul 68.
Following a progress report by the Chief of the SEATO Military Planning Office (CMPO), the Secretary General, LT GEN Jesus Vargas, outlined the political developments in the treaty area. He pointed out that the recent TET Offensive in South Vietnam had failed in its primary goal of bringing about a de facto partition of the country, because the Vietnamese people did not rally to the Communists and no substantial defections to the enemy's side occurred within the armed forces of the Republic of South Vietnam. As for the Laotian situation, he noted a "significant shift in the communist activity from the previous pattern of sporadic inconclusive skirmishes to multi-battalion Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese attacks on several government key positions."

He felt, in regard to the withdrawal of British forces from the treaty area, that such a move would indisputably have:

...far-reaching adverse effects, but that one should understand what the United Kingdom hopes to accomplish in the way of strengthening her economy. Since the last meeting of the MILADs in Bangkok, and partly as a reaction to the announced withdrawal of the British forces, there has been a seemingly spontaneous desire and resolve on the part of certain Southeast Asian nations to develop a regional outlook in their policies and relationships by means of new Asian alignments in the field of economic cooperation and defense. He stated that such an outlook need not be prejudicial to their interests, but never voiced concern lest the desire to accelerate the achievement of regional viability should lead to imperfect consideration of the practical realities of defense matters. Specifically, he did not feel that real security could be achieved without the participation of a world power.

As at the previous meeting, the United Kingdom MILAD set forth his country's official position on its withdrawal of troops from the treaty area. Because of the tremendous impact of this decision upon SEATO plans and operations, his presentation follows verbatim:

(1) As Military Advisers will be aware, the United Kingdom Government have had to advance the date of withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore, which is now

1. CINCPAC 020330Z Apr 68.
2. Ibid.
to occur by the end of 1971: and to decide that they cannot thereafter maintain a special military capability for use, if required, in the area. These decisions were announced by the United Kingdom Prime Minister on 16th January this year, and the United Kingdom representative made a statement on them to SEATO Council representatives on 24th January. (2) The decisions of the United Kingdom government have had to be taken for economic reasons. They do not indicate any lessening of our interest in the security and stability of the area. In his statement on 16th January, the United Kingdom Prime Minister explained that the United Kingdom would make the alliances of which it is a member a contribution related to its economic capability; and this applies to SEATO as well as to our other alliances. We shall do what we can in the ways open to us, not only within the military field but also in the social and economic fields, where I understand that we shall continue to support SEATO projects. (3) In the military field, the United Kingdom Prime Minister has made it clear that we shall have to amend our force declarations to SEATO as our forces in the area are rundown. But I am glad to say that, despite the acceleration of our rundown, we shall maintain our present force declarations to SEATO plans until 31st March 1969. This confirms the intention that I stated at MA27C last September. This is of course subject to the qualification which I made at the time that in some cases it will take longer for our forces to reach the area concerned in full strength. (4) As from 1st April 1969, we shall have to terminate the declarations of the United Kingdom elements of the Commonwealth Brigade, which feature in our force declarations to each of Plans 4 through 8. The units concerned will be withdrawn from Malaysia during the following months. (5) We shall be able to continue a force declaration on a reduced scale to Plan 4, for a limited period, drawing from the naval, amphibious and air forces that we shall still have available in Far East Command: it will also be practicable to continue for a time to declare medium bombers from the United Kingdom to this plan. The precise scale and duration of these
continuing declarations cannot be stated at present; I expect to make a further statement at MA29C in October.

(6) With the withdrawal of the United Kingdom elements of the Commonwealth Brigade, the only element of our force declaration to Plan 8 that will still be available after 1st April 1969 will be the "necessary air transport support" for the brigade. At present we declare this support for the brigade as a whole; we intend to discuss with Australia and New Zealand whether they will continue to need it and, if they do, we shall continue to declare it for as long as we can. I will make a further statement on this at MA29C. (7) We shall terminate our force declarations to Plans 5, 6 and 7 in their entirety from 1st April 1969. (8) As Military Advisers will be aware, the United Kingdom has not declared forces to Plan 9 and in present circumstances we cannot undertake a new force declaration. (9) There remain two other matters. The first is that we expect to be able to continue to provide staff for the Military Planning Office, at least until 1971. Secondly, we envisage that we will in general continue to take part in SEATO exercises; our participating forces will normally be drawn from those declared to the relevant plans. However, bearing in mind that our land force declarations are to be terminated in March 1969, we do not now think it appropriate to take part with land forces in Exercise PX 37 next February as it is at present conceived, and I must withdraw our sponsorship from this exercise. 1

(ES) Several significant decisions were made at MA 28C. All of the recommendations of the U.S. in Change 2 to MPO Plan 6/66, for example, were accepted. This plan is for the defense of the Protocol States against an attack by the military forces of North Vietnam. 2 The most substantive feature was Change 2 provided for the relocation of the SEATO Field Forces Commander's main Command Post (CP) from Korat to Saigon and the establishment of a forward operational CP at Korat.

1. CINCPAC 0203302 Apr 68.
(TS) One Agenda Item concerned the roles and functions of the MPO in the event of an implementation of a SEATO plan. It was finally decided to provide more flexibility for the Force Commander and CMPO to work out what the MPO could do to assist the commander. The MILADs directed that CMPO be prepared to report at the next meeting on what assistance could be furnished by the MPO in the event of implementation of Plans 8 or 9.

(TS) Another Agenda Item involved the program of future work, which was approved with three additions. First, the CMPO was directed to update the study of the effect on SEATO plans by the withdrawal of the British forces from Malaysia and Singapore in light of the United Kingdom MILAD's statement at MA 28C and to propose the necessary amendments to the plans. Second, the CMPO was to ascertain whether or not a formal review of MPO Plan 5/61, which was then in abeyance mainly because of a French objection, should be undertaken. This plan was designed to assist the Royal Laoian Government to counter Communist insurgency so as to establish conditions in which it could maintain the security and independence of Laos. Third, the MILADs directed the CMPO to examine and report out of session on the practicability of holding SEATO PX-37, because both the United Kingdom and Thai MILADs stated their countries would not be able to participate in this exercise.

(TS) MA 28C, observed Admiral Sharp immediately after the meeting, provided a useful opportunity for exchange of views. The individual MILAD presentations provide substance to the meetings, enhancing the otherwise routine consideration of much MPO work. This was brought out in the discussion regarding the review for Plan 5, where the U.K. demonstrated reluctance to take timely action to undertake future planning actions.  

Military Advisers Conference 29 (MA 29C)

(TS) MA 29C was held in Bangkok, Thailand, on 17 and 18 October 1968, with ADM John S. McCain, Jr., attending in his capacity as USMILAD. As in the case of MA 28C, neither France nor Pakistan

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 020330Z Apr 68.

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sent MILADs to the meeting, although the MILADREP of Pakistan sat in as an observer. The following narrative covers those items on the agenda that ADM McCain considered significant.¹

(TS) After the CMPO gave his progress report, the Secretary General of SEATO addressed the conference:

...outlining certain political developments in the treaty area. He pointed out that the divergent views of the two main communist powers - the Soviet Union and the Communist China - are well illustrated by their respective attitudes on the Paris talks. On the one hand Communist China in pursuance of its fundamental tenet that a "War of Liberation" must inevitably succeed, has continued to urge the Vietnamese Communists to fight on to the end while the Soviet Union has made clear its belief that a negotiated settlement favorable to communist objectives can be achieved. In Laos, it seemed unlikely that Communists would undertake any major initiative to upset the present delicate political and military equilibrium. He stated that recent months have seen increased diplomatic, economic and cultural activities in Southeast Asia by the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. This has facilitated the placement, by overt means, of select personnel in target countries and has thus increased their capability for espionage, propaganda and subversion. In closing, he expressed his view that the dispute on Sabah would be resolved peacefully to the satisfaction of all concerned.²

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1. Unless otherwise cited, the information in this subsection on MA 29C was derived from: CINCPAC 191156Z Oct 68; CINCPAC 180445Z Aug 68; Intv, LCOL Judson J. Conner, USA, J3B16, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 6 Dec 68; FONECON, LCOL R. F. Fraser, USA, J5141, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, 9 Dec 68; Memo for Record, LCOL Judson J. Conner, USA, J3B16, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Oct 68, Subj: Summary of SEATO Exercise Schedule Deliberations at MA29C.

2. CINCPAC 191156Z Oct 68.
King Phumibol Adulyadej of Thailand meets the U.S. Military Adviser to SEATO, ADM John S. McCain, Jr., at Pattaya on 19 October. Others in the photo are Sir Duncan Watson, left, and U.S. Ambassador to Thailand Leonard Unger.
TOP SECRET

(YS) The resolution of the second agenda item was probably one of the two most important things—the other being the agreement on future SEATO exercises—that took place during MA 29C. Agenda Item B dealt with the "approval of Basic Plan, Concept of Operations, Force Requirements and SEATO Force Commander's Directive to MPO Plan 5/68."\(^1\) The U.S. position of sending the plan back to the CMPO for rewriting and scaling down was finally accepted.\(^2\) As a result, the following guidance was directed to the CMPO, and further discussion among the MILADs added the additional definitive guidance of restricting "the redraft to the mission and content to that stated in MPO Plan 5/61":

Plans of appropriate scope and force levels should be maintained in order that the SEATO family of plans afford the political and military authorities of SEATO adequate flexibility in reacting to insurgency on the one hand or overt aggression in the most extreme situation. It is appreciated that in Draft MPO Plan 5/68 the planners used the lessons of SVN and new SEATO planning factors in their work. In preparing the new draft, the MPO should take these lessons and planning factors into account, together with current intelligence assessments, but should limit the aims and tasks more nearly to the level envisaged in MPO Plan 5/61. It should be made clear that responsibility for counter-insurgency operations rest with the RLG. It is appreciated that in developing the new draft plan the force requirements for accomplishing the stated aims could well be somewhat greater than those included in Plan 5/61, because of the experience factors not available to planners in the 1960-1962 time-frame. Additionally, it is envisaged that a strategic reserve somewhat larger than called for in MPO Plan 5/61 may be necessary in order that the SEATO forces may be prepared for subsequent contingencies and a smooth transition to other SEATO plans. A preparedness for some limited operations of a special nature could be necessary in Southern Panhandle of Laos to achieve the security of the vital areas of Laos.\(^3\)

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1. Ibid.
2. FONECON, LCOL R. F. Fraser, USA, J5141, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 10 Dec 68.
3. CINCPAC 191156 Z Oct 68.

TOP SECRET
Military leaders from six member countries attending the 29th Meeting of SEATO Military Advisers in Thailand on 17-18 October meet with Thailand Prime Minister, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn.
The next two agenda items also dealt with MPO plans and, in both instances, all of the U.S. proposed changes and recommendations were accepted. The first was approval of Change 4 to MPO Plan 4/66, a plan for the defense of Southeast Asia, including Pakistan and the Philippines, against attack by Communist Chinese forces and those of North Vietnam; previously, it had been updated by Change 1 on 16 March 1967, Change 2 on 25 July 1967, and Change 3 on 18 July 1968.\(^1\) When published this plan will be known as MPO Plan 4/68, for the MILADs felt that the range and scope of the changes in Change 4 warranted such retitling.\(^2\) The only real modification of Change 4 resulted from the adamant stand of the Thai delegation against the contingency to withdraw from the Mekong River, and this reference was deleted from Annex B of the Draft Change.

MPO Plan 6/66 is designed for the defense of the SEATO Protocol States against an attack by North Vietnamese forces; it was updated by Change 1 in January 1968, and again at MA 28C, when Change 2 was approved.\(^3\) Following approval of Change 3 at MA 29C, the MILADs noted that this plan "may require further review following approval of Plan 5 to ensure compatibility."\(^4\)

Agenda Item E addressed SEATO Exercises.\(^5\) The first order of business was the approval of the 1969-71 Exercise Schedule, to include commitment of forces, determination of co-sponsors, and agreement on dates for the four exercises proposed for that time frame. MILADs were expected also to note the proposed 1971-74 Exercise Forecast. Preliminary work was done by the SEATO Exercise Sub-Committee which met on 15 October 1968. The U.S. position embodied two principal sets of objectives:

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2. FONECON, LCOL R. F. Fraser, USA J5141, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 10 Dec 68.
4. CINCPAC 191156Z Oct 68.
5. This discussion on SEATO exercises of Agenda Item E was taken verbatim from Memo, LCOL Judson J. Conner, USA, J3B16, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 13 Dec 68.
(1) Attempt to have PX-37, postponed from its original February 1969 position, reinserted into the Exercise Schedule for 1970. This significant ground CPX designed to test the relief of Thai Forces by Task Force Sierra under Plan 4 had a clouded history. UK had withdrawn its offer to co-sponsor (with U.S.) in the spring of 1968 and soon thereafter Thailand proposed postponement due to other commitments. The U.S. had agreed with reluctance. The U.S. proposal for early rescheduling of the exercise was expected to meet with resistance.

(2) The U.S. was prepared to co-sponsor each of the upcoming exercises and offer tentative force commitments. An important objective was to obtain reciprocal response from the other member nations and firm agreements to co-sponsor. An apparent trend toward reluctance on the part of other member nations to co-sponsor and support SEATO exercises had developed over the past year. It was hoped, though not expected, that this trend could be reversed at MA29C. In support of the U.S. position, USMILAD was prepared to deliver a strong statement concerning the importance of participating in the SEATO Exercise Program and adhering to its scheduled dates.

The sub-committee meeting was characterized by unanimous, and somewhat surprising, accord on all matters. PX-37 was rescheduled for 1970. Logical force commitments for all exercises were pledged. The U.S. offer to co-sponsor each exercise was matched by other member nations. The sub-committee meeting adjourned amid a general feeling of good will and accomplishment.

When Agenda Item E came before the MILADs, the Exercise Forecast was noted and the Exercise Schedule approved without debate or comment. In view of the encouraging member-nation response, USMILAD recast his statement concerning exercises to thank the nations that had offered to join U.S. as co-sponsors and to express his confidence in the exercise program. His remarks were echoed by other MILADs, two of whom emphasized the importance of adhering to the exercise schedule.
The Exercise Schedule 1969-71 approved at MA 29C included two ground and two maritime exercises:

1. PX-41, a maritime exercise in the Central Region, will be held in March 1970. U.S. /Australia will co-sponsor.

2. PX-37, a CPX to be held in Thailand in April 1970, will test the relief of Thai Forces by Task Force Sierra in the Central Region under Plan 4. Co-sponsors are U.S. /Thailand.

3. PX-43, a maritime exercise featuring an assault landing in the Philippine Islands, is scheduled for March 1971. The Philippines will co-sponsor with U.S.

4. PX-40 is a CPX dealing with counter-insurgency operations in Thailand. It will be held in Thailand, in April 1971, and Thailand will joint U.S. as co-sponsor.

After approving the program of future work and agreeing upon the chairmanship, date, and location of MA30C, the MILADs passed on to the remaining agenda item of "Other Business." As was expected, both the Australian and New Zealand MILADs made Force Declarations to SEATO MPO Plan 9/67, an emergency plan for the defense of Thailand against attack from forces of North Vietnam, which had been formally approved at MA 27C the previous year. As the USMILAD, ADM McCain gave a presentation on the Vietnam Conflict. The main points raised during the following general discussion "were the progress of the Pacification Program and the methods being used by the Government of South Vietnam to increase its popularity among the people of SVN." In a presentation on communist insurgency and communist suppression operations in his country, the Thai MILAD emphasized "that the Communists are intensifying their operations and scope of activity throughout the country. Nevertheless, the improving coordination and effort among all government agencies concerned have made it extremely difficult for the terrorists to meet even minor goals."

In a post-meeting assessment of MA 29C, Admiral McCain commented:

2. CINCPAC 191156Z Oct 68.
3. Ibid.
The conference afforded an exchange of views which was very productive. It was obvious that these meetings are important in that they afford the principal military officers of SEATO the opportunity to meet personally in order to appreciate fully each others views on matters of concern. This can perhaps be shown best at this meeting citing the results of actions on Plans 4 and 5. By accommodating the sensitivities of the Thai on Plan 4, they were able to reciprocate to our objections to Plan 5. 1

SEATO Military Plans - A Summary

(TS) During calendar year 1968, as in previous years, the military plans prepared by MPO for SEATO were constantly being updated, changed, revised, or modified whenever appropriate. The following summary gives the status of those plans of pertinence to CINCPAC as of early October 1968. Later developments concerning any of these plans that occurred at MA 29C can be found in the earlier subsection on this MILADs conference.

**MPO Plan** A plan for the defense of Southeast Asia, including Pakistan and the Philippines, against attack by Communist Chinese forces and those of North Vietnam. Plan was updated by Change #1, 16 March 1967, Change #2, 25 July 1967, and Change #3, 18 July 1968. Appointed Nation for plan is United States; Force Commander, CINCUSARPAC; Field Forces Commander, COMUSMACV.

**MPO Plan** A plan to assist the Royal Laotian Government to counter communist insurgency in order to establish conditions which will maintain the security and independence of Laos. This plan has not been kept current - mainly because in spirit, it conflicts with the 1962 Geneva Convention on Laos neutralization. It has been on the shelf since 1962. Because of the current situation in Laos, the Military Advisers, at MA 28C,

1. Ibid.
directed the CMPO to seek guidance from the Council representatives with regard to conducting a complete review of MPO Plan. On 19 June 1968, Council Reps authorized a formal MPO review of the plan. Appointed nation for plan is Thailand; Force Commander, Field Marshal Thanom; Field Forces Commander, COMUSMACV.

MPO Plan A plan for the defense of Protocol States against an attack by forces of NVN. Updated by Change #1, January 1968. Change #2 was approved at MA 28C. Appointed Nation for plan is United States; Force Commander, CINCUSARPAC; Field Forces Commander, COMUSMACV.

MPO Plan (with 4 changes). A plan to assist the Government of South Vietnam to counter communist insurgency and regain control of its territory so as to establish conditions in which it can resolve its problems and maintain its security and independence. This plan is not being kept current due to the fact that the events in Vietnam today have made the plan OBE. Prior to MA 23C it was suggested that the plan be dropped because of circumstances in Vietnam. In restricted session the MILADs agreed that the plan would not be maintained current but that it would remain a valid plan to be updated should there be need for it in the future. Appointed Nation, United States; Force Commander CINCUSARPAC; Field Forces Commander, COMUSMACV.

MPO Plan A plan to assist the Royal Thai Government to counter communist insurgency in Thailand. Plan was updated by Change 1, 26 June 1967. Appointed Nation for plan is Thailand; Force Commander, Field Marshal Thanom; Field Forces Commander, COMUSMACV.

MPO Plan A plan for the defense of Thailand against an attack by the forces of NVN. At MA 25C
the Thai's attempted to have the mission of Plan 4 changed to read "...defend against an attack by the Communist Chinese and/or the forces of NVN." It was agreed by the MILAD's that Plan 4 would not be altered, but rather the CMPO was directed to decide and proceed with a modification to MPO Plan 6 or write a new plan to defend Thailand against an attack by the forces of NVN. The CMPO's decision was for a new plan. MPO Plan 9/67 was written, partially reviewed at MA 26C, and finally approved at MA 27C. The Appointed Nation for the plan is Thailand. The SEATO Force Commander is Thai (Field Marshal Thanom), while the SEATO Field Forces Commander is U.S. (COMUSMACTHAI). SEATO Council Representatives have recently concurred in the plan, the Appointed Nation, and the designated Commanders. COMUSMACTHAI will begin to prepare the SEATO Field Forces Plan when all nations have made their forces declarations in support of the plan. Thus far only United States and Thailand have made forces declarations.... The US MILAD, realizing that forces declarations will fall far short of the forces requirements outlined in the plan, has authorized the Field Forces Commander, COMUSMACTHAI, to develop the Field Forces plan on requirements rather than capabilities. CINCPAC msg 210559Z June 68 contains this authorization. In this regard, the U.S. has declared 3-1/3 division equivalents to the plan and the Thais 1-1/3 for a total of 4-2/3 division equivalents. It is expected that the only additional declarations will come from Australia and New Zealand. With a total force requirement of 12 divisions, the shortfall, therefore, will amount to about 6 divisions.¹

Study of the Logistic Feasibility of SEATO MPO Plan

¹. By MS/619/8/67 of 29 November 1967, CMPO forwarded a Study of the Logistic Feasibility for SEATO MPO Plan 4/66 to all MILADs and recommended "that the study be considered at LOG 8M

and that, contingent on the study's consideration at LOG 8M, comments be forwarded to CMPO. USMILAD instructed his USMILADREP in Bangkok, Thailand, on 22 February 1968, as follows:

Request advise CMPO that USMILAD finds the study in Ref A of value. However, since it was determined to limit the study to movement facilities and to Thailand the benefits to accrue from consideration of the study at LOG 8M appear marginal.

Recommend that CMPO continue to update and expand the study to include all facets of logistic feasibility as well as coverage of the entire Central Region. If MILAD's consensus favors consideration of study at LOG 8M, USMILAD will concur.

(S) LOG 8M, however, did not take place during calendar year 1968, because "Insufficient agenda items exist to justify a Logistics Committee Meeting this year." But, in November 1968, New Zealand asked USMILAD several questions -- answers of which were needed to develop ammunition and explosive supply planning for a wartime situation arising from a SEATO Plan 4 situation. USMILAD, in turn, requested the necessary information on which to base a reply from the JCS. By virtue of past correspondence, the JCS was "well aware of New Zealand requirements for ammunition and explosives in a SEATO Plan 4 situation" and, via memorandum, advised USMILAD "of ammunition and explosive availability to include substitutions." In the first month of 1969, therefore, USMILAD's staff was preparing a reply to the questions posed by New Zealand.

1. CINCPAC 100531Z Jan 68; J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
2. CINCPAC 220011Z Feb 68.
3. CINCPAC 210131Z Sep 68.
4. J4 Brief No. 007-69, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Jan 69, of a JCS Memo, Subj: Supply of Ammunition and Explosives to New Zealand in a SEATO Plan 4 Situation (S).
SEATO Field Forces (SFF) OPlan 8/66

(NS) As reported in last year's history, USMILAD forwarded on 15 August 1967 his comments and recommendations to COMUSMACHTHAI, the Field Forces Commander (Designate) on Draft SFF OPlan 8/66. 1 The draft plan was "revised to incorporate CINCPAC's comments and was introduced into SEATO channels for comments on 2 October 1967."2

(NS) "In order to proceed with further development of SFF OPlan 8," USMILAD asked CINCPACAF on 27 June 1968 for his "recommendation on the U. S. Commander to be designated as the Air Component Commander (planning) for the plan. "3 CINCPACAF's reply came on 17 July 1968, and USMILAD, five days later, notified COMUSMACHTHAI that:

CG 13th AF is hereby designated the Air Component Commander (Designate), SFF OPlan 8/66, for planning purposes. Direct liaison is authorized between COMUSMACHTHAI and CG 13th AF for preparation of ACC's supporting OPlan. 4

SEATO MPO Plan 9/67 and SFF OPlan 9/67

(NS) At MA 27C, which convened at Bangkok on 12 September 1967, all of USMILAD's proposed amendments to SEATO MPO Plan 9/67 were "approved with minor changes. ",5 "During this meeting Thailand accepted the role as Appointed Nation and the US agreed to designate the Field Force Commander."6 Subsequently, on 8 February 1968, USMILAD named COMUSMACHTHAI as "the United States appointee to the position of Commander SEATO Field Forces (Designate) for Plan 9."7

1. For 1966 and 1967 developments of this plan, see pp. 445 and 446 of CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol I.
2. Hq USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI, Developments in Thailand 4th Qtr FY 68 (U), dtd 1 Jul 68, p. 21.
3. CINCPAC 272036Z Jun 68.
4. CINCPAC 222258Z Jul 68; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68; CINCPACAF 170100Z Jul 68.
5. CINCPAC 140138Z Sep 67; see also pp. 446 and 447 of CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol I.
6. Hq USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI, Developments in Thailand 4th Qtr FY 68 (U), dtd 1 Jul 68, p. 21.
7. CINPAC 080142Z Feb 68; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
(TS) On 21 June 1968, USMILAD forwarded the following instructions to COMUSMACTHAI:

Because of the limited number of forces declarations made or anticipated to be made by SEATO Member Nations, SEATO Field Forces OPlan 9 is to be developed using the requirements outlined in MPO Plan 9/67 rather than member nations' declarations only.

In Annex A (Task Organization and Deployment of Forces) of SEATO Field Forces OPlan 9, those forces that are declared by Member Nations will be listed showing the unit and the nation making the declaration. In those instances where there are no declarations to match the requirements of MPO Plan 9, the unit requirement will be listed with the Term TBDL (to be determined later).

It is anticipated that those Nations that have not already stated their intentions with regard to forces declarations will do so at MA 29C, 17 - 18 October 1968.¹

(ES) Following MA 29C, where both Australia and New Zealand made force declarations to the plan, USMILAD directed on 30 October 1968 that COMUSMACTHAI "proceed with preparation of Field Force OPlan 9."² "Particular attention," added USMILAD, should be paid to the force declarations of Australia and New Zealand, as well as "the requirement to assign specific planning responsibility for major commands," and "your plan should be completed and forwarded to the MPO within 120 days of receipt of this message."³

1. CINCPAC 210559Z Jun 68; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
2. CINCPAC 200318Z Oct 68; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68; J5 Historical Chronology, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
3. CINCPAC 300318Z Oct 68.
Base Area Commander for Central Region SFF (CRSFF) OPlan 4/67

(TS) On 17 November 1967, USMILAD forwarded his 40 pages of comments and recommendations on an updated revision of CRSFF OPlan 4/64 to CMPO in Bangkok, Thailand; at the same time, he designated COMUSMAGTHAI as the Base Area Commander (planning) vice CINCUSARPAC for the plan. Almost a year later, on 10 October 1968, COMUSMAGTHAI suggested that he "and CGUSARSGUPTHAI exchange responsibilities in SEATO Plans; COMUSMAGTHAI would become Task Force Sierra Commander for planning and CGUSARSGUPTHAI would become Commander of the Base Area Command." 2

(S) USMILAD took almost a month to answer this recommendation. When he did, on 8 November 1968, he stuck by his decision of the previous year (Ref A in the following quotation refers to CINCPAC 170305Z Nov 67) and provided new reasons why COMUSMAGTHAI's suggestion should not be accepted:

Reasons for the designation of COMUSMAGTHAI as BAC are listed in Ref A. CGUSARSGUPTHAI is tasked in a majority of SEA currently approved operations plans to prepare plans for the tactical employment of major ground combat elements. HQ USARSGUPTHAI is designated in CINCPAC/CINCUSARPAC OPlans to become HQ U.S. Army Thailand/Laos (a Field Army HQ). In SEATO plans, HQ USARSGUPTHAI is designated HQ Task Force Sierra (a Corps type Tactical Force).

Retention by CGUSARSGUPTHAI of responsibility for service planning for and providing nucleus of an Army Corps Headquarters is in accordance with current responsibilities and with those missions assigned by pertinent OPlans. Assumption by COMUSMAGTHAI of planning responsibilities for U.S. Army Corps HQ would detract from COMUSMAGTHAI's principal orientation toward highly important theater level responsibilities.

1. CINCPAC 170305Z Nov 67; for last year's development on this plan, see pp. 444 and 445 of CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol I.
2. COMUSMAGTHAI 100050Z Oct 68, cited in CINCPAC 080347Z Nov 68.
Although CGUSARSUPTHAI's principal responsibilities at this moment are logistical, this has not inhibited or detracted from the discharge of his planning responsibilities in all areas of Army Service responsibility. For reasons stated in Ref A for designating COMUSMACTHAI as BAC and additional reasons outlined in this message COMUSMACTHAI will retain the BAC mission.  

**SEATO Military Exercises**

(5) Unlike NATO, SEATO does not have any standing military forces; therefore, the most tangible means of displaying its military prowess and expertise is through its annual military exercises.  

To this end, a total of 35 combined SEATO military exercises have been conducted. During calendar year 1968, Exercise RAMASOON was conducted in the early part, while Exercise TAMARAW--the last scheduled exercise for FY 68--had to be postponed indefinitely in the midst of its final stages of planning; developments occurring this year for both of these exercises are discussed in the following two subsections of this chapter.

(5) Always, one of the agenda items at the MILADs' annual fall conferences is the Exercise Schedule for the next two fiscal years and a forecast for the subsequent four ones. As described earlier in this chapter, agreement was reached at MA 29C among the MILADs on the 1969-71 Exercise Schedule and the proposed 1971-74 Exercise Forecast. Approximately a year earlier, in September 1967, at MA 27C, a modification of the number and types of exercises to be conducted annually occurred. Then, because certain Member Nations of SEATO had made considerable commitment of combat forces to the Vietnam conflict, the "U.S. positions were adopted resulting in a reduction of the number of SEATO Exercises to (only) one maritime and one CPX or field maneuver during a single training year."  

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1. CINCPAC 080347Z Nov 68.  
2. Unless otherwise cited, the following source furnished the information contained in this subsection on SEATO military exercises: Point Paper, J514, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Oct 68, Subj: SEATO Military Exercises.  
4. CINCPAC 140138Z Sep 67.
(5) All of the SEATO military exercises are co-sponsored. For the majority of the thirty-five already conducted, the U.S. has been a co-sponsor. In these instances, the U.S., whenever possible, has attempted to persuade the other co-sponsor to provide the Exercise Director. By such an action, the U.S. was attempting to prod the other Member Nations of SEATO into positions of more active participation, to obtain more experience in such matters as possible for the staff officers of the Member Nations, and to play down the role of the U.S. in the conducting of these combined exercises.

SEATO Exercise RAMASOON

(5) Exercise RAMASOON, the first major Communications-Electronics (C-E) exercise in the history of SEATO was conducted in Thailand from 5 through 15 March 1968.1 The exercise was primarily designed to test the communications concepts set forth in Draft Central Region SEATO Field Force (CRSFF) OPlan 4/67, its objectives being "to test the establishment of long haul communications between SEATO Headquarters and member nations and long line communications to forward areas; to test SEATO arrangements for the use of 'in country' communications; to test the interface of long line and tactical communications and to exercise SEATO communication procedures."2 Over 2,500 personnel were involved in RAMASOON from all the member nations, except France and Pakistan. Thailand, alone, furnished 700 of this total.

(5) The Final Planning Conference for RAMASOON was held at Bangkok, Thailand, from 5 through 8 December 1967.3 Unilateral discussion by U.S. delegates also took place at the same time concerning the determination of up-to-date personnel and equipment shortfall with tentative numbers assigned to components.

(5) During the conference, the multi-national planners modified the exercise documents somewhat and prepared the final plans for the conduct

1. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68, which summarized the conduct of RAMASOON. Another excellent source that brought enlightening insights and C-E expertise to this RAMASOON item was the comments of LCOL Donald G. Robison, USMC, J611, War Plans/SEATO Coordinator, Hq CINCPAC, on the first rough draft in August 1968.
of RAMASOON with the emphasis on the determination of equipment shortfall, communications channels available, and interface problems. Certain subjects and policies that had been developed during C-E 10M, for instance, were incorporated into the evaluation and reports section of the exercise plan, such as the evaluation of the draft SEATO Communications Systems Status Reporting Guide (SEAP 44) and the in-country Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS) for evacuation, destruction and/or restoral. Although the question of air play did not enter the discussions to any great extent, this activity was considered desirable, with the result that a C-E support requirement was met by the establishment of a Tactical Air Request net. To resolve problems that arose concerning cryptographic interface and communication security--topics that evoked considerable discussion--a later conference of specialized experts was scheduled.

(C) C-E personnel representing all of the nations scheduled to participate in Exercise RAMASOON met in the SEATO Headquarters, Bangkok, Thailand, during the period, 9-12 January 1968. The purpose was to advise the CMPO on the technical aspects of coordinating C-E and crypto support during the forthcoming exercise. The recommendations of the conference were submitted to the CMPO, who subsequently disseminated this information. 1

(S) Planning and day-to-day actions by U.S. planning staffs continued throughout January. When CINCUSARPAC reported an equipment shortfall that could not be met without adversely affecting C-E support of combat operations, USMILAD recommended that CINCPACAF fill it, which was done. 2

(S) During the last week of January, a reappraisal of available C-E assets was undertaken. Because of the increased tempo of the fighting in South Vietnam and the contingency buildup in Korea resulting from the capture of the USS PUEBLO, a reduction in the scope of the exercise became a distinct possibility as a solution to U.S. shortfalls in both personnel and equipment.

(S) This possibility became a reality during February 1968, as liaison and coordination continued among member nations in final preparation for RAMASOON. 3 The U.S. was required to withdraw certain

1. J6423 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
2. CINCPAC 172207Z Jan 68; J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
3. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
designated C-E support elements as a result of increased commitments in both Southeast Asia and Korea. At a special unilateral U.S. conference at Exercise Headquarters on 10-11 February, U.S. C-E planners attempted to modify and tailor the existing plans and to obtain U.S. personnel and equipment shortfalls from other sources. Fortunately, the other participating nations were able to furnish additional men and equipment, and it was then decided that the "exercise objectives can still be accomplished."¹

(5) Nevertheless, RAMASOON was conducted as scheduled. As one observer noted in his afteraction report, "The exercise objectives of establishing and operating communication among participating nations, were met."² Besides testing the existing plans and doctrines, the exercise opened up new areas of examination for determining potential requirements and up-dating C-E plans and policies within SEATO. In addition, it evaluated Draft SEAP 44, Communications Status Reporting Guide, Draft SEAP 45, SEATO Communications Engineering Manual, and SEATO codes and cyphers, as well as demonstration that the interface of tactical equipment with IWCS and between allied forces was practical for support of SEATO operations. "Although several problem areas were discovered," read another afteraction comment, "the objectives were successfully met."³ All in all, the participants and control personnel of the exercise "were unanimous in their comments as to the success of and value of RAMASOON."⁴

(6) An afteraction report of four volumes was prepared on this exercise. The first volume summarized the exercise and indicated the major lessons learned, while the following three examined in detail the several functional areas of RAMASOON. This report was officially presented to the SEATO MPO on 20 June 1968.⁵

1. SEATO Exercise RAMASOON, Bangkok, Thai 159-68/110945Z Feb 68.
2. Ltr, USASTRATCOM-PAC to CINCUSARPAC, 16 Apr 68, Subj: After Exercise Report, Exercise RAMASOON, USASTRATCOM-PAC Observer Group; J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
3. Hq USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI, Developments in Thailand 4th Qtr FY 68, dtd 1 Jul 68, p. 21.
4. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
5. Hq USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI, Developments in Thailand 4th Qtr FY 68, dtd 1 Jul 68, p. 22.
SEATO Exercise TAMARAW (SMPO PX-38)

As originally placed on the SEATO exercise schedule, SEATO Exercise TAMARAW was an airborne/amphibious exercise in the Philippines. At MA 25C, however, its nature had been changed to maritime/amphibious, because of the non-availability of both U.S. and Philippine airborne units for participation in the exercise. Preliminary exercise planning had been initiated in September 1967, with the Philippines naming the Exercise Director and the U.S. naming his deputy.¹

As 1968 began, Exercise TAMARAW, co-sponsored by the U.S. and the Republic of the Philippines, was scheduled to be conducted during the period 15-24 May 1968. All SEATO participating nations had confirmed their force commitments to the exercise. Representatives of the participating member nations, as well as representatives from all participating PACOM commands, met in an initial planning conference at Sangley Point, Philippines, during the period 12-15 January 1968. All indications were that the exercise was "proceeding according to schedule."²

The final planning conference met at Exercise Headquarters, Fort Bonifacio, Philippines, during the period 4-7 March, where all exercise documents were reviewed. Despite certain force reductions, such as withdrawal by the U.S. of a Marine Battalion Landing Team in mid-February because of priority operational commitments, the outlook for the conducting of PX-38 still looked promising as late as 18 March 1968.³

Then, on 10 April, the senior U.K. representative on the exercise planning staff confirmed the announcement made by UKMILAD at MA 28C, i.e., that the force commitments of a LPH (Landing Platform Helicopter), 40th Commando Group, a helicopter squadron, and 3 escort ships were being withdrawn from Exercise TAMARAW. As a direct result of the progressive force reductions, culminated by the latest U.K. withdrawal of forces, the Exercise Director announced the

postponement of TAMARAW. In response to CMPO's request for approval of this action, USMILAD recommended that the "exercise be postponed indefinitely."¹ The MILADs of the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Thailand also agreed to postponement, while the MILAD from Australia, although preferring not to postpone, would do so if unavoidable. At MA 29C, Exercise 43, designed as a replacement for Exercise TAMARAW, was scheduled to be held in March 1973. U.S. and the Philippines have agreed to co-sponsor.²

SEATO Intelligence Committee Fourteenth Meeting (INT 14M)

(5) The United States Military Advisor's (USMILAD) report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff summarized the SEATO Intelligence Committee Fourteenth Meeting (INT 14) as follows:

INT 14M, chaired by Australia, was conducted in a cordial and cooperative atmosphere during period 4-19 Nov 1968 in Bangkok. Routine matters were approved by chief delegates of member nations in attendance.... All member nations were represented except France and Pakistan.³

(5) The committee's assessment of the combined threat of the Chinese Communists (CHICOM) and the North Vietnamese (NVN) remained essentially unchanged from the one arrived at a year earlier at INT 13M. The overall threat estimate, as derived from all SEATO intelligence documents that could be updated, was found to be generally in accord with the intelligence holdings of Hq CINCPAC and was considered suitable for SEATO planning. "All supporting intelligence documents were updated with the exception of those which U.S. could not update due to releasability restrictions. All of these are U.S. responsibilities as author nation."⁴

1. CINCPAC 042119Z May 68; Point Paper, J3B16, Hq CINCPAC, 6 May 68, Subj: SEATO Exercise TAMARAW (SMPO PX-38).
2. FONECON, LCOL Judson J. Conner, USA, J3B16, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC Hist Br, 9 Jan 69.
3. CINCPAC 040335Z Dec 68, which, together with J2214 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68, are the sources for the information in this subsection on INT 14M.
4. CINCPAC 040335Z Dec 68.
a. SEAP 7 -- Handbook on CHICOM Forces.
b. SEAP 27 -- Communist Forces in South China.
c. SEAP 34 -- Targeting Data, South China and NVN.

(S) At INT 14M, the failure of the U.S. to have updated the CHICOM air and naval OB (Order of Battle) for the past two years:

...and ground OB this year added to U.S. delegation's embarrassment over failure to update targeting data (SEAP 34) for past four years. Noticeable concern was evident among delegates over CHICOM OB although the point was not pressed heavily, except by Thai delegate who tabled a request that future OB updates include chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities... for NVN and CHICOM forces. The situation was offset somewhat by sincere appreciation expressed by all delegates for U.S. contribution of six completely revised country studies with SEAMILS.¹

(S) Agenda Item D at INT 14M concerned the recommendations of the U.S. that the format and contents of Part I, SEAP 26A (Land Routes Connected with the Threat to the Treaty Area) be altered. It was proposed to depict LOC data by individual countries rather than on a regional basis, to designate routes according to a system used by the author nation, and to consolidate and standardize data presentation. The U.S. position was that these changes would greatly facilitate preparation of U.S. inputs and would result in a more comprehensive and useful SEATO document. In the end, these recommendations were agreed to by the delegates present.

(S) The Mekong River Study had been programmed as a U.S. contribution at INT 14M. Although it had been completed in May 1968, the study had encountered releasability problems, for "Thailand had proposed minor modification of the Study to delete detailed information on Thai military installations."² Despite the fact the Mekong River Study had not been printed and available for distribution at INT 14M, it was expected that published copies of it would be forwarded through SEATO channels within

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
two or three months following the meeting. In December, the first SEATO Intelligence Committee Report was forwarded to all member nations and appropriate U.S. addressees.¹

SEATO Intelligence Assessment Committee Tenth Meeting (IAC 10M)

(C) From 12 through 15 February 1968, CDR Andrew C. Stratton, USN, of the J2 Division, Hq CINCPAC, represented USMILAD at the Tenth semi-annual SEATO Intelligence Assessment Committee Meeting. At IAC 10M, all Member Nations of SEATO, except France were represented, although Pakistan was represented only by an observer.²

(C) The military subcommittee of IAC 10M convened on 12 February. Following his election, the United Kingdom delegate assumed the chairmanship, and the subcommittee then proceeded to review all contributions dealing with insurgency. At a point in subcommittee discussion, the U.S. delegation recommended that appropriate substitutes be used for DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North)) and CPR (Chinese Peoples Republic (Communist China)), which was agreed to by all delegates.

(C) The main committee meeting of IAC 10M was opened on 14 February by the SEATO Secretary General Jesus Vargas. Following Vargas' opening address came a talk by U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger as the Chairman of the SEATO Council Representatives. In his remarks, Ambassador Unger pointed up the importance of the IAC Report to both the SEATO Council and the Military Planning Office. Under the agreed rotation of chairmanship, it was the U.S. turn to chair the meeting, so Mr. Robert Jantzen, the chief American delegate, was duly elected.

(C) A significant contribution was made by the New Zealand delegate, who recommended that Part I of the IAC Report be expanded by several pages in order to allow the inclusion of a broader assessment of communist strategy affecting the Treaty Area. This additional assessment was not to be limited exclusively to country paper submissions nor limited solely to those events directly affecting SEATO territory. For instance, the situation in Korea was mentioned as an example of a possible inclusion,

1. J2214 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
2. J222 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68, which is the source for the information contained in this subsection on IAC 10M.

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since events there could have an important—though indirect—effect upon SEATO. Agreeing that the New Zealand delegate's suggestion would be a valuable addition to the IAC Report, the committee recommended that such a paper be produced by the SEATO Secretariat in time for the next meeting, IAC 11M. Secretary General Vargas closed the conference at 1600 hours on 15 February 1968.

SEATO Intelligence Assessment Committee Eleventh Meeting (IAC 11M)

(U) IAC 11M convened in Bangkok, Thailand, on 23 August 1968. Representing USMILAD at this meeting were COL Lloyd C. Edwards, Jr., USAF, and CDR Andrew C. Straton, USN, both of the J2 Division, Hq CINCPAC. The coordinated comments of both the State Department and the Defense Intelligence Agency on the IAC submission had been hand carried to Hq CINCPAC, where they were reviewed prior to the departure of the U.S. delegates for Bangkok. These IAC papers were further coordinated with the IAC delegates from the American Embassy in Bangkok on 24 August.¹

(5) The military subcommittee of IAC 11M met on 26 and 27 August, during which time the insurgency portions of all the country submissions were reviewed. Of the SEATO Member Nations, only France and Pakistan did not have a representative on the military subcommittee, although Pakistan did have two observers at the main committee meeting that followed on 28 and 29 August. At only one time during the entire conference did a serious point of contention arise that challenged the U.S. position and this concerned the probably enemy near-term course of action in South Vietnam. In the end, both the military subcommittee and the political main committee accepted the U.S. position that the enemy would be limited to large scale localized attacks.

SEATO Intelligence Working Party Meeting

(5) At the Thirteenth Meeting of the SEATO Intelligence Committee (INT 13M), conducted in Bangkok, Thailand, between 14 and 21 November 1967, it was decided that, although "the establishment of a permanent Intelligence Working Party appeared impracticable, it was felt that the

¹ J22 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68, which is the source for the information contained in this subsection on IAC 11M.
requirement for more frequent reviews of the threat estimate could be adequately met by temporary Intelligence Working Parties convening between SEATO Intelligence Committee Meetings. Early the following year, one such working party was convened in Bangkok on 22 May 1968. USMILAD delegates from Hq CINCPAC were CDR Andrew C. Straton, USN, and LCOL James R. Smith, USA, both of the Operational Intelligence Branch. Prior to the main meeting, these individuals arranged preliminary consultations with the USMILADREP SEATO, MPO Intelligence Staff members, as well as with the Australian, New Zealand, and U.K. delegates, in order to resolve the Terms of Reference and the scope of the report to be produced by the SEATO Intelligence Working Party.

(5) MAJ GEN Abhichart Dhiradhamrong, the SEATO CMPO, presided over the opening ceremony that convened the meeting. His request to the assembled delegates was to give particular attention to the threat as it related to an overt attack on Thailand or South Vietnam. Thereafter, the senior U.S. military officer present was elected to chair the meeting. The following subjects were included in the final report issued by the SEATO Intelligence Working Party:

1. Increased deployment of NVA forces into SVN and Laos and increased armor and artillery capability of enemy forces.

2. Local disturbances in northeast Cambodia.

3. Increase of insurgency in two different areas of the northern provinces of Thailand.

4. Improvement of enemy LOC capabilities through NVN and Laos into SVN and improvement in Burma LOC's.

5. Effect of these changes on enemy courses of action and concept of operations would be to facilitate attacks on Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand due to forward disposition of more enemy forces and improved LOC's. Increased Thai insurgency could facilitate an enemy covert buildup of forces in northern Thailand.

2. J22 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
3. Ibid.
SEATO Communications-Electronics (C-E) Committee Eleventh Meeting (C-E 11M)

(C) C-E 10M, the previous annual C-E committee meeting, had been held in October 1967. 1 Approximately a year later, from 25 November through 6 December 1968, members of Hq CINCPAC staff and representatives of the various U.S. commands within PACOM attended C-E 11M, which was conducted at SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand. All member nations, with the exception of France and Pakistan, participated in the conference. Australia provided the conference chairman, and the U.S. provided two of the three subcommittee chairmen. 2

(U) In preparation for C-E 11M, those PACOM commands based on Oahu, Hawaii, were requested to have their delegates selected for the conference to meet at Hq CINCPAC in the "J6 Conference Room 0900, Wednesday, 16 Oct 68, to discuss tentative agenda items, review MPO positions if available and commence planning toward development of U.S. positions." 3 Furthermore, it was intended that the U.S. "delegates to conduct preliminary meeting 0900-1600, 23 Nov at J-6 Conference Rm, COMUSMACTHAL," prior to the main C-E 11M. 4

(C) During C-E 11M, a total of 21 agenda items were discussed and acted upon. According to LCOL Donald G. Robison, USMC, J611, Hq CINCPAC, who was a delegate to this conference:

Significant tasks accomplished included a review of SEATO cryptographic requirements, instructions and distribution, review of C-E problem areas discovered during Exercise RAMASOON and the inclusion into current MPO plans of the concept and organization of a SEATO Communications Technical Coordination Group (SCTCG). The concept of this organization was developed during the working party following C-E 10M to act as an arm of the C-6 to coordinate and control the various national in-country C-E systems in the event of implementation.

2. J611 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68, which is the source for the following account of C-E 11M, unless otherwise cited.
3. CINCPAC 280324Z Sep 68.
4. CINCUSARPAC 46550/140046Z Nov 68.
of SEATO contingency plans. Other tasks undertaken included discussion of the C-E requirements to support the Base Area Command and a review and updating of existing C-E portions of MPO plans.

C It was determined during the meeting that several C-E working parties would be required in order to complete the requirements generated during C-E 11M. "These included a working party to review and up-date channel requirements for MPO Plans 4 and 6, determination of the requirements of a SEATO Cryptographic Distribution System, updating of ACP 167 (Glossary of C-E Terms) and rewriting the Air Courier Service Appendix, (F11), to all MPO plans." 2

C-E 11M also noted that there was a need for a SEATO Orientation Course for SEATO C-E officers, as well as a program of small-scale C-E exercises. Both of these would be designed to increase the knowledge and familiarity of not only C-E officer personnel, but also potential participating units, in the correct SEATO C-E procedures, plans, and doctrine.

C-E 11M "further pointed out the urgent requirements for development of the Naval component commander's basic plans in order to prepare the necessary, detailed C-E support plans for SEATO Naval operations and the pressing need for a SEATO Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions (CEOI) to be prepared by the C-E Division, MPO." 3

SEATO Communications-Electronics (C-E) Working Party

C During the Tenth SEATO Conference C-E (C-E 10M), which was held at Bangkok, Thailand, in October 1967, it was determined that a common SEATO Trunking System Engineering Manual was required. This manual would be used to furnish information to all Member Nations of SEATO as to the engineering requirements necessary to link mobile tactical equipment to the Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS). Following C-E 10M, a joint engineering committee, composed of all the SEATO nations less France and Pakistan, accomplished this task.

1. J611 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68; Intv, LCOL Donald G. Robison, USMC, J611, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 15 Feb 69.
2. J611 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
3. Ibid.
The draft manual SEAP 45: SEATO Trunking Systems Engineering Manual, Volumes I and II was forwarded to Member Nations in December 1967 by the SEATO MPO requesting comments and/or concurrence. In general, USMILAD agreed to the value of the draft manual and, on 18 May 1968, submitted recommendations, specific changes, and additions, especially those remedying defects that had been uncovered in March 1968, when Draft SEAP 45 had been tested in SEATO Exercise RAMASOON. For example, he recommended that:

...a SEAP 45 Working Group consisting of engineering personnel from SEATO Member Nations be convened at the earliest to determine engineering requirements peculiar to SEATO, evaluate findings regarding the use of SEAP 45 during RAMASOON and change the draft manuals to reflect national comments submitted. ...

When the SEATO C-E Working Party convened at the SEATO MPO in Bangkok, Thailand, on 15 July 1968, the scope of the problems it faced entailed much more than just Draft SEAP 45. At this conference were representatives from every major U.S. command with SEATO planning responsibility. Primarily, this working party had the mission of studying those C-E problems that had arisen during the conduct of SEATO Exercise RAMASOON on 1-15 March 1968 in Thailand. Because of the numerous problems requiring resolutions, the Chief, C-E Division, MPO, recommended that the working party address itself to the three major areas of immediate concern:

a. Telephone Communications.

1. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
2. CINCPAC 180305Z May 68.
4. The information contained in the following narrative of this subsection on the SEATO C-E Working Party was derived from: J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
c. Draft SEAP 45 (SEATO Trunking Systems Engineering Manual). Draft SEAPs 44 and 45 were developed following the 10th Communications-Electronics Conference, October 1967 and procedures described were to be tested during Exercise RAMASOON.

(C) As a result, three subcommittees were established, each assigned to one of the broad areas described above. U.S. delegates chaired the two subcommittees that undertook the resolution of the last two aforementioned problem areas, which meant the completion of the new requirement for Draft SEAP 44 and a rewrite of SEAP 45.

(C) The subcommittee of the working party that addressed itself to telephone communications developed the following documents or concepts:

a. The production of a SEATO Tactical Telephone Directory.

b. The establishment of a telephone numbering system based upon functional areas using the United States, Philippine, and Thai system of numerical designation for the various staff functions. Also included in the directory was a listing of appointment numbers used by the U.S., Thailand, and the Philippines and a comparative code word system used by the ANZUK nations.

c. A minimize procedure was developed and placed in the telephone directory. This information is also to be included in the CECI when published by the MPO.

d. A new SEATO Supplement to ACP 121 was developed incorporating the SEATO Basegram system and the draft four precedence designation system approved by the United States. This system was previously intended for inclusion as a SEATO Supplement to ACP 134, but was found to be more appropriate as a part of a SEATO Supplement to ACP 121.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
The subcommittee assigned to Draft SEAP 44 addressed itself to the Systems Control in a SEATO C-E environment. It noted that:

a. There is at present no SEATO agency capable of coordinating all the actions necessary to place and maintain SEATO communications on a war footing.

b. No procedures are established for the conversion of C-E requirements to specific engineering orders or to ensure implementation of these orders.

c. There are no mechanisms for accomplishing the detailed multinational coordination required between national and tactical systems.

After consideration of the problem confronting it, the SEATO C-E Working Party developed the following concepts and doctrine:

a. A draft position paper was developed establishing the formation of a multinational SEATO Communications Coordinating Group to function as an arm of J6, SEATO Force. This organization would be composed of representatives from each participating nation and each representative would have detailed knowledge of his own national systems.

b. SEAP 41 (Procedures for Submission and Allocation of Circuit Requirements) was rewritten and expanded.

c. Draft SEAP 44 was rewritten and retitled "SEATO Communications Control, Reporting and Coordinating Procedures."

Once the working party decided to produce SEAP 46—which would incorporate certain areas formerly included in Draft SEAP 45, such as details of system control or system/circuit numbering—it then became necessary to modify Draft SEAP 45 so that it would include only

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
technical or engineering functions. As a result, a second Draft 45 (Circuit Engineering Manual) was prepared. Upon the conclusion of the conference, the SEATO C-E Working Party prepared its final report and forwarded it to the Member Nations of SEATO for review and concurrence during August 1968.

SEATO Cartographic Committee Eighth Meeting

(U) The eighth meeting of the SEATO Cartographic Committee was held in Bangkok, Thailand, from 19 through 24 February 1968. Thailand provided the chairman for the meeting, which was attended by delegates from all Member Nations of SEATO except Pakistan. CAPT Francis L. Slattery, USN, Chief, Mapping, Charting & Geodesy (MC&G) Branch, J2 Division, Hq CINCPAC, with one other member of his office attended as representatives of USMILAD. 1

Commander, CRSFF (Designate) (CCRSFF (D)), Base Area Command (BAC) Coordination Conference

(S) "A SEATO Central Region Commander's (D) Base Area Command Coordination Conference was held at SEATO Headquarters 16-20 December 1968 with all Member Nations contributing forces to the Central Region in Attendance."2 Previously, from 29 through 31 July 1968, planners from both Hq CINCPAC and Hq COMUSMACTHAI met at Camp H. M. Smith "for the purpose of clarifying BAC parameters, resolving points of misunderstanding and disagreement, and to initiate BAC SOP refinement."3 USMILAD's reasons for holding a BAC Coordination Conference during calendar year 1968 were clearly stated in a message of his on 21 September 1968:

Insufficient agenda items exist to justify a Logistics Committee Meeting this year. Therefore
...a BAC Coordination Conference would be appropriate....

1. J26 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
2. Unless otherwise cited, the information in this subsection was derived from: J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68, which also cited the final SEATO Report of CCRSFF(D) Base Area Command Coordination Conference of 20 Dec 68 for documentation purposes.
Considerable progress has been made by COMUSMACVTHAI as the planning agent for the BAC in (1) designing the BAC headquarters structure (2) identifying functions and personnel strengths (3) developing intra-headquarters and intra-command standard operating procedures and (4) identifying types and quantities of units to be placed under the operational control of Hq BAC.

Since progress in BAC development had been so rapid it is now time to brief other nations contributing forces to the Central Region and solicit their comments and recommendations before finalizing BAC development. The BAC must not be known as strictly a US organization since other nations will in due course be asked to declare headquarters staff personnel as well as units to it.

Other matters which could be profitably considered at a BAC Coordination Conference are (1) relationship of CBAC to CRSFF, C4 and Senior National Officers (2) BAC equipment requirements (3) real estate requirements to include review of requirements established at the Real Estate Conference of July 1967 (4) adequacy of Central Region SEATO Logistics Planning Factors and (5) updated LOC and facilities planning data.

It would be desirable if COMUSMACV in his role as CCRSFF(D) would designate COMUSMACVTHAI as his agent for convening a multinational CCRSFF(D) BAC Coordination Conference at SEATO headquarters during the period 16 - 20 Dec 68.

CINCPAC assistance in Conference organization, agenda and position papers can be provided on request.¹

¹ On 7 December 1968, "LCOL Emil L. Konopnicki, USA," located in the Logistics Plans and Operations Branch (J41), Hq CINCPAC, was designated by USMILAD to "represent CINCPAC at the BAC Coordination Conference and will chair the Conference for the U.S."²

1. CINCPAC 210131Z Sep 68.
2. CINCPAC 070416Z Dec 68.
Actually, because of COMUSMACV's workload, this staff officer, acting on behalf of CCRSFF(D), "planned, organized and directed" the meeting "in its entirety." Approximately 60 persons from the various member nations attended the conference, which was organized into a Steering Committee and two subcommittees. As an attendee to the meeting later reported, its "goals were more than met with the quality and quantity of products produced exceeding expectations. All the participating Member Nations to include the Chief Military Planning Office were extremely pleased with Conference results."2

(5) In order to present a united front, as well as to protect U.S. interests, a 3-day U.S. unilateral meeting had been held in Bangkok prior to the BAC Coordination Conference. Here, the U.S. delegates were given a clear understanding of the U.S. position on all agenda items that would be brought up at the conference, as well as sufficient background information on SEATO in order to operate competently in areas and matters affected by or concerning SEATO.

(5) The following were the highlights of the conference:

(1) The U.S. interest in keeping SEATO strong and viable was expressed.

(2) Channels of communications with other Member Nation planners and logisticians were established.

(3) Draft BAC Headquarters structure and the number and types of units required under BAC Control were refined.

(4) The Draft BAC SOP received multinational staffing and revision.

(5) The command relationships between Commander, BAC; Commander, Central Region; Senior National Officers and the Host Nation Coordination Office were clarified.

(6) Member Nations were briefed on the new U.S. 10 Classes of Supply as well as the new U.S. planning factors. Adoption by SEATO was recommended.

1. J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. Ibid.
(7) Incipient problem areas were identified for solution in 1969.

(8) U.S. SEATO knowledge was expanded thus facilitating future SEATO logistical planning. ¹

U.S. SEATO Logistics Planning

(S) Early in 1968, COMUSMACV recommended, by message to USMILAD, that a U.S. SEATO Logistics Working Level Meeting be held at Hq COMUSMACHTAI under MACV sponsorship. The overall rationale given for such a meeting was to expedite and improve U.S. SEATO logistics planning. Following CINCPAC's concurrence on 14 February, COMUSMACV suggested that the "conference convene on 18 March 1968 at J4, MACTHAI at 0900 hrs with representation from CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, MACV and MACT." ²

(S) The J41 Office of Hq CINCPAC "was represented at the meeting which proved most beneficial... Particular progress was made in the organization, functions and unit composition of the Base Area Command." ³

Shortly thereafter, by an airmail letter on 16 April 1968, COMUSMACV forwarded to USMILAD a proposed Base Area Command (BAC) structure for review and comment. The pertinent portions of USMILAD's reply by message on 5 June 1968 follow:

...Subject to the following comments and recommendations CINCPAC concurs in the Base Area Command structure as contained in ref A as an initial effort for planning purposes. It is realized that as operating procedures are developed, and requirements and availability of facilities, equipment and personnel are determined, changes to the BAC structure may be required....

CINCPAC BAC recommended changes should not preclude the immediate initiation of SOP development. These changes can be reflected in the first draft of the BAC SOP.

1. Ibid.
2. COMUSMACV 05418/23005S Z Feb 68; CINCPAC 142115Z Feb 68; J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
3. J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
To foster SEATO concurrent planning and BAC development request COMUSMACTHAI assist COMUSMACV in BAC planning and SOP development... ¹

SEATO POL Meeting

(U) A SEATO Meeting was held in Bangkok from 9-13 Dec 68 to discuss POL interchangeability and to develop a Draft SEASTAG (SEATO Standardization Agreement) on POL interchangeability data.² The U.S. delegation at this meeting consisted of CAPT Franklin B. Goodspeed, USN, and LCDR William R. Drury, USN, both from the Joint Petroleum Office of Hq CINCPAC, MAJ S. Ambro from the Sub-Area POL Office Vietnam, and MAJ W. Riley from the Sub-Area POL Office Thailand.

(U) These U.S. representatives, with their counterparts from the other member nations, developed a draft SEATO publication on POL interchangeability data (SEASTAG 1135). Shortly thereafter, on 6 January 1969, the SEATO MPO forwarded this proposed SEASTAG to the MILADs for ratification. As for USMILAD, he planned on requesting a technical review of the draft SEASTAG by the military services in Washington, D.C., where CNO, as sponsor for POL agreements (Series 1135), would chair the necessary actions. Following the completion of this review, USMILAD expected to furnish ratification sometime during the summer of 1969.

SEATO Military Medical Committee Second Meeting (MED 2M)

(U) The first SEATO Military Medical Committee Meeting had been held in 1966.³ The second meeting of the military medical representatives of the SEATO Member Nations was held in Bangkok, Thailand, from 4 through 7 June 1968.⁴ RADM John S. Cowan, USN, MC, CINCPAC Medical Officer, who was also the chief of the numerous U.S. delegates, served as the chairman of MED 2M.

1. CINCPAC 052324Z Jun 68; J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
2. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68, which cites its documentation as SEATO MPO MS/767/5/68 of 12 Dec 68 and SEATO MPO MS/454A/1/69 of 6 Jan 69 and is the source for the information contained in this subsection on the 1968 SEATO POL Meeting.
3. Intv, LCOL E. R. Heine, USAF, MC, J762, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 3 Feb 69.
4. Memo, J76, Hq CINCPAC, to CINCPAC HistBr, 20 Feb 69, Subj: SEATO Military Medical Committee Meeting; Command History, which is the sole source for the following narrative on MED 2M.

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(U) The following were the significant occurrences at MED 2M:

Twenty-five agenda items in the areas of communicable disease control, medical civic action programs, aviation medicine and medical organization and administration were discussed and recommendations made. Many of these items were originally considered at the first meeting of the SEATO Military Medical Committee which was held in August 1966.

A result of the meeting was the establishment of a SEATO Military Medical Bulletin published by the Military Planning Office. This constitutes a new channel for the exchange of medical information among the SEATO Nations. Additionally, recommendations were made for the revision of several medical SEASTAGS to achieve improved standardization of procedures.

The third meeting of the SEATO Military Medical Committee was tentatively scheduled for June 1969.\(^1\)

**SEATO Internal Security Seminar**

\((\text{NS})\) Because of his "interest in this field, particularly as it relates to insurgency in SEASIA, "CINCPAC asked the JCS on 10 December 1967 to arrange "for CINCPAC rep(s) to attend" the SEATO Internal Security Seminar on "Internal Security in Rural Areas" that was scheduled to be held in Manila sometime in June 1968.\(^2\) The JCS replied, as follows, on 3 May 1968:

Each SEATO Member Nation has been invited to nominate two official representatives to attend the seminar and present papers on an appropriate subject. Participants from non-member countries and from certain interested institutions and organizations will also be invited.

One US civilian representative will be designated by Department of State. CINCPAC is requested to

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 100128Z Dec 67.
nominate other US official representative. In addition, both CINCPAC and COMUSMACV are invited to nominate an observer. ¹

(C) As a result, CINCPAC nominated BGEN Charles W. Ryder, Jr., USA, G-1, Hq, USARPAC, as an official U.S. representative, and CDR Howard N. Kay, USN, Head, Civil Military Relations Section, J5 Division, Hq CINCPAC, as the CINCPAC observer.² The State Department, in selecting the second official U.S. representative, named "Dr. George Tanham, Embassy Bangkok's Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency," while COL Erwin R. Brigham, USA, "Chief Research and Analysis Division, MACCORDS, "was nominated as the COMUSMACV observer.³ On 25 May 1968, CINCPAC forwarded by mail to the seminar coordinator five papers dealing with the subject of security and internal development for presentation and discussion.⁴

(C) The Internal Security Seminar, sponsored by the Philippine Government in cooperation with SEATO, was conducted in Manila from 3 through 9 June 1968. Attending were representatives from the United States, United Kingdom, Thailand, Australia, Korea, Philippines, Republic of South Vietnam, and New Zealand. The objectives of the conference were:

a. To discuss the elements of internal security in rural areas.

b. To share knowledge and experience on selected problems relating to security in rural areas of Southeast Asia.

c. To examine specific techniques and approaches which might usefully be adopted for solution to rural problems in Southeast Asia.

d. To promote regional cooperation in solving rural problems.⁵

1. JCS 8150/031912Z May 68.
2. CINCPAC 140218Z May 68.
3. SECSTATE 161878/101957Z May 68; COMUSMACV 13979/161102Z May 68.
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 2093 dtd 25 May 68, cited in J555 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
5. J555 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
(C) To achieve these objectives, the participants presented and commented upon a number of papers during the six-day seminar. As for the U.S. representatives, they presented the following papers: (1) "The Role of Military Civic Action in Internal Development"; (2) "Physical Protection of Villages in Rural Areas"; (3) "An Overview of Insurgency in Rural Areas and Government Responses"; (4) "Pacification Measurement in Vietnam." Among the resolutions adopted at the conclusion of the seminar were the following:

a. Future seminars should be scheduled dealing with the subject of internal security.

b. Future seminars should be more restricted in scope so that there might be a greater concentration of efforts and sharper focus by country experts.

c. Experts in various fields such as development economics, public administration, etc., should be invited to take part.

d. A balance of military and civilian experts should be invited to attend.

U.S. Memorandum of Understanding with Australia and New Zealand

(C) Action by Hq CINCPAC and negotiations with both Australia and New Zealand over U.S. support of their forces in Thailand upon implementation of a SEATO plan continued during 1968. The authority of CINCPAC/USMILAD to negotiate bilateral agreements in the SEATO area is contained in Paragraph XII B of the Australian and New Zealand Cooperative Logistics Arrangements signed on 9 February and 20 May 1965, respectively. Both Australia and New Zealand desire that:

a. If it is necessary under SEATO plans to move their forces from Vietnam to Thailand that the US support being furnished in Vietnam will continue in Thailand until other agreements can be negotiated.

2. For background, see pp. 459, 460, 474, and 475 of CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. I.
b. If it is necessary to deploy forces to Thailand from other than SVN that the US will do what it can to support deployed forces as requested.

c. The US provide POL support under all plans.

d. Regardless of materiel provided reimbursement will be either in advance of items being issued or at time of issue.¹

(C) The negotiations dragged on so long because the changing requirements on both the U.S. and the Australian/New Zealand sides made it difficult to arrive at a Memorandum of Understanding that would be satisfactory to all parties.² Constant efforts, however, managed to practically finalize the two memorandums by the end of calendar year 1968.³

(C) On 17 February 1968, a copy of a redrafted Memorandum of Understanding—one that was satisfactory to the U.S.--was airmailed to the Minister of Defence of the Government of Australia at Canberra. "The Australians were advised that should they find the memorandum satisfactory as written, signature at Wellington out of session during MA 28C will be possible."⁴ As for New Zealand, a copy of a similar redrafted memorandum was airmailed to their Minister of Defence on 1 March 1968, with the understanding that signature at MA 28C would be possible if the memorandum was acceptable.⁵

(C) On 26 March 1968, the USDAO, American Embassy, Canberra, informed USMILAD that "Sir John Wilton advised that before out of session signing of the Memorandum at MA 28C could take place, Australia

2. Ibid.; J4 Brief No. 012-68, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Feb 68, of MJCS-44-68 of 24 Jan 68, Subj: Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and the Commonwealth of Australia.
4. J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
5. J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
would require clarification of certain aspects of the Memorandum and its relationship to the Cooperative Logistics Arrangement. 1 CINCPACREP Australia queried USMILAD on 14 May as to when a reply might be expected. 2 As a result, USMILAD dispatched a message on 19 May to the JCS, requesting their comments as to the validity of the answers he proposed to give to the Australian questions that had been raised on the redrafted memorandum, since the Australians would not sign until their questions had been answered. 3 The JCS agreed to the proposed answers on 11 June 1968. 4

(C) USMILAD furnished the Australians the approved answers to their questions on 3 July and suggested that a "member of the CINCPAC staff could be made available to discuss the questions and answers...with members of your staff, as well as any other questions you might have." 5 Australia accepted this offer. 6 Meanwhile, on 27 July 1968, USMILAD advised New Zealand that a CINCPAC staff representative would be in Australia during the week of 5 August 1968 to discuss bilateral arrangements and "could be made available to visit Wellington to discuss memorandum implications, should it be desired." 7 New Zealand also accepted the offer of a staff visit. 8

(C) As a result, LCOL Emil L. Konopnicki, USA, J4117, Hq CINCPAC, visited Australia and New Zealand on 4-6 August and 9-11 August, respectively. His activities in these two countries in regard to their Memorandums of Understanding are described below as of early September 1968:

1. USDAO AMEMBASSY Canberra 0245/260300Z Mar 68, cited in CINCPAC 162235Z May 68.
2. CINCPACREP Australia 140845Z May 68, cited in CINCPAC 162235Z May 68.
3. CINCPAC 190638Z May 68; J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
4. JCS 2188/112022Z Jun 68; J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
5. CINCPAC 030312Z Jul 68.
6. DEFENCE Canberra 190605Z Jul 68; J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
7. CINCPAC 272116Z Jul 68; CINCPAC 272115Z Jul 68.
Parameters around which the Australian and New Zealand memorandums were originally written have changed and because of this both countries requested a redrafting of the agreements. Redrafting was accomplished in-country after considerable difficulty. These drafts currently in possession of the CINCPAC Staff are acceptable to Australia and New Zealand up through MILAD level. ¹

These new draft memorandums secured by LCOL Konopnicki, appeared "to contain all previous CINCPAC and JCS guidance" and since "previous drafts of the memorandums have been sent to JCS for review to assure standardization of format and content, "they were hand carried to the JCS on 19 September 1968."² By early December 1968, USMILAD was informed by the JCS that the "format of the draft Memorandums of Understanding is satisfactory and that the content of the memorandums is also satisfactory with one minor exception."³ As a result, preparation was started immediately for typing the draft memorandums in final form.

SEATO Military Information Flow

In late January 1968, Leonard Unger, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, opened the floodgates of a sensitive line of inquiry, when he proposed that a policy review be made on whether or not France should continue to receive information prepared by SEATO MPO. ⁴ USMILAD concurred in the desirability of such an undertaking. In his amplifying information in support of the Ambassador's proposal, which he dispatched

1. J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68; CINCPAC 040011Z Aug 68; CINCPAC 300631Z Jul 68.
2. Point Paper, J4117, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Nov 68, Subj: Memorandums of Understanding with Australia and New Zealand; J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
4. Unless otherwise cited, the information contained in this subsection has been derived from: J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68; CINCPAC 160258Z Feb 68; CINCPAC 220105Z Aug 68; CINCPAC 230535Z Aug 68; J5 Brief No. 290-68, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Sep 68, of JCS 2339/277, Subj: SEATO Military Information.
to the JCS on 16 February, USMILAD stated that, although France had not been participating actively in SEATO during recent years, she:

... continues to receive normal distribution of MPO produced OP plans and specialist reports on a routine basis, which is a likely reason for continued French financial participation, SEATO provides an inexpensive listening post. There is no evidence of misuse of SEATO information; however, French relations with communist nations, coupled with the De Gaulle administration's propensity to action not in accord with U.S. interests, increases the risk of misuse of this information. From a military viewpoint, French withdrawal from SEATO would have no effect on SEATO plans or planning.

... However, it is doubtful that stopping the flow of information from the MPO alone would significantly reduce France's potential capability for mischief...

A study of this matter should include consideration of the fact that the MPO is not France's only source of military information from SEATO. The Intelligence Assessment Committee (IAC) which meets annually to provide an assessment of the threat to the Treaty Area, is presided over and conducted by the civil side of the SEATO house for the Secretary General, the SEATO Council and Council Representatives. France has not participated in recent Intelligence Assessment conferences, yet she has received their final reports. Information from the INT and IAC meetings form the basis of the intelligence annexes for all SEATO Plans.

Although France has not filled any billets in the MPO since June 1965, she continues to fill billets in the SEATO Secretariat (civil), which includes the Director of Information and the Security Coordinator both of whom have access to all SEATO documents. Complete denial of SEATO military information to France would require that she withdraw from SEATO altogether.
In summary, continued release of military planning information and intelligence to France is not considered to be in consonance with the best interests of either the U.S. or SEATO. Furthermore, there would be no deleterious effect upon SEATO military plans or military planning if the decision to stop the flow of MPO papers to France should cause her to withdraw from SEATO.  

(TS) The next month, the U.S. Ambassador to France added a note of caution to this discussion. He warned that any decision regarding the withholding of SEATO information to France should be weighed in light of the broader considerations of Franco-American relations. Nevertheless, USMILAD proposed on 16 July 1968 that not only France but Pakistan also should be excluded from any distribution of U.S. papers prepared for the 14th meeting of the SEATO Intelligence Committee, scheduled to convene in Bangkok, Thailand, in November of the same year. The rationale that he furnished the JCS for such a course of action was the fact that:

Both France and Pakistan have not fulfilled military planning responsibilities in SEATO, have made no constructive contribution to SEATO military side for several years, and do not require military information to meet their present SEATO commitments. Both have demonstrated lack of interest in military side to the extent that neither provides even observer representation at MILAD meetings, intelligence committee meetings, or other military meetings with exception of Pakistan attendance at MILADREP meetings. Continued flow of classified military information to France and Pakistan is contrary to the fundamental US security principle of dissemination of information on the basis of "need to know." It is also contrary to the same principle as stated in Part II of SEATO Security Manual agreed to by all member nations including France and Pakistan.  

(S) As the JCS advised USMILAD on 14 August, it would be in appropriate to adopt his suggestion, especially since the National

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1. CINCPAC 160258Z Feb 68.
2. CINCPAC 161249Z Jul 68.
Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) had decided on 9 July to continue the current release policy toward France and Pakistan. The JCS, however, stated that the problem was a continuing one and requested USMILAD to forward all available justification for curtailing this flow of information to the two countries through SEATO. In reply, USMILAD answered that the supporting rationales already submitted by Ambassador Unger and himself contained all available information, but his staff was "continuing to study this problem and will forward any helpful information which may be developed."  

Numerous other factors had weighed in the JCS judgment, such as the desirability of continued French participation in SEATO and NATO, the possible adverse effects on the Paris peace talks, international problems including monetary agreements, the Common Market, as well as the JSOP goals for Pakistan to accept U.S. influence to counteract the growing communist presence and to increase its participation in the activities of both CENTO and SEATO. Although they would continue to study the problem and make recommendations for further USMILAD action whenever appropriate, USMILAD's staff summed up the situation very well in the following:

Because of the lack of proof that France and Pakistan have abused information obtained through SEATO and because of the possible adverse effects from retaliatory actions by France and Pakistan, no change can be expected in the disclosure policy. Despite this, we may expect DIA to continue to be restrictive when granting authority to CINCPAC to release information to SEATO. This could gradually degrade the quality of information available for use in the development of SEATO plans and other SEATO documents and publications with some reduction in their quality and usefulness. 

SEATO Orientation Courses

During Calendar Year 1968, as in the previous year, three SEATO Orientation Courses were held in Bangkok, Thailand. 

1. CINCPAC 230535Z Aug 68.
2. J5 Brief No. 290-68, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Sep 68, of JCS 2339/277, Subj: SEATO Military Information.
3. For last year's developments on SEATO Orientation Courses, see pp. 434 and 456 of CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. I.
CMPO announced late in November 1967 that the "United States has been allocated thirteen spaces" for SEATO Orientation Course -168, scheduled in February 1968.¹ These spaces were distributed as follows:
JCS - 2; CINCPAC - 2; CINCPACFLT - 2; CINCPACAF - 2;
CINCUSARPAC - 2; COMUSMACV - 2; COMUSMACTHAI - 1.²

On 26 April 1968, COMUSMACTHAI, after querying at the Office of USMILADREP SEATO and discovering that his command did not have an allocation for the next course, requested of USMILAD a quota of one for SEATO Orientation Course 2-68, scheduled for 10-17 June 1968.³ USMILAD replied the next day as follows:

Review of SEATO orientation quota requests since Sept 67 shows that requests from JCS, CINCPAC Staff, Component and Sub-Unified Commands geographically located outside Thailand, far exceed the total of 13 U.S. spaces allocated for each course. Responses to Ref C for student requirements to the three courses in CY 68 were 24, 29 and 31 respectively.

Recognizing the important part which COMUSMACTHAI and staff now have in SEATO planning, the overall shortage of U.S. Quotas and the collocation of MACTHAI and SEATO Hqs in Bangkok, recommend direct liaison be effected between USMILADREP, the CMPO and COMUSMACTHAI to have as many appropriately cleared members of COMUSMACTHAI staff as can be accommodated, attend the lecture portion of the Orientation Course in SEATO Hqs.⁴

By MS/80/44/68 of 18 July 1968, CMPO announced that SEATO Orientation Course 3-68 would be held from 28 October through 4 November 1968 and that the U.S. was allocated a quota of 14 spaces. The following month, this quota was increased to 15. On 21 August 1968, USMILAD

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1. CINCPAC 131728Z Jan 68.
2. Ibid.; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
3. COMUSMACTHAI 260935Z Apr 68; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
4. CINCPAC 272035Z Apr 68.
distributed these spaces as follows: JCS - 2; CINCPAC - 3; CINCUSAR-PAC - 2; CINCPACFLT - 2; CINCPACAF - 2; COMUSMACTHAI - 2. Then, on 4 September 1968, USMILADREP SEATO requested a presentation on the Vietnam situation to the SEATO Orientation Course 3-68 by the CINCPAC Briefing Team. He was advised thirteen days later "that CINCPAC Briefing Team will be available for briefings at SEATO Hqs, 0800 - 0930 hrs, Oct 68, as requested."  

**Increased Staff for C-E Division, SEATO MPO**

(U) During C-E 10M, held in October 1967, the SEATO MPO reiterated its request for additional staff manning of its C-E Division. Each Member Nation was asked to provide one senior NCO for the billet. The U.S., however, because of its already heavy commitment of personnel to SEATO, declined to furnish an individual. 

(U) The circumstances changed substantially, when the USMILADREP received the new Australian-initiated proposal of 29 April 1968. It "recommended that the post be established as a multinational appointment with Australia offering to fill the position for the first two years." In view of American approval of the recommendation of C-E 10M that additional personnel be added to the C-E Division and the offer of Australia to fill the billet for the first two years, the U.S. agreed to the new proposal in May 1968.

**U.S. Nominee for Chief, SEATO Military Planning Office (CMPO)**

(C) As reported in last year's history, the U.S. nominee for the CMPO billet was to be selected by the Department of the Army (DA), an action that was being "closely monitored to meet the request that the selectee be able to attend MA 28C as an observer." DA, on 18 February

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1. J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68; CINCPAC 210315Z Aug 68.
2. CINCPAC 170136Z Sep 68; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
3. Unless otherwise cited, the information contained in this subsection was derived from: J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
4. Ibid.
1968, announced that MAJ GEN Autrey J. Maroun, USA, had been selected.¹ Six days later, USMILAD notified the other MILADs of this nomination and stated that "General Maroun will attend MA 28C as a member of USMILAD's delegation."²

(C) By written communication on 28 February 1968, CMPO notified the Secretary-General of SEATO that the MILADs had approved the appointment of MAJ GEN Maroun to relieve MAJ GEN Abhichart Dhiradhamrong, Royal Thai Army, in the post of CMPO. The Secretary-General, in turn, announced this approval to the SEATO Council Representatives on 4 March, and CINCPAC, 12 days later, recommended to the Chief of Staff, USA, that PCS (Permanent Change of Station) orders be cut on MA GEN Maroun, allowing 2 days at Hq CINCPAC for briefing purposes. At MA 28C, held during the latter part of March in Wellington, New Zealand, it was established that the relief would take place on 1 July 1968.³

Designation of SEATO Force Commander

(By message on 8 August 1968, USMILAD instructed USMILADREP, SEATO MPO, in Bangkok, Thailand, that he may:

...make known informally to CMPO and MILADs that General Ralph E. Haines Jr., USA, has been selected by the JCS for the position of Commander, SEATO Force (Designate) for SEATO Plans 4, 6 and 7 for planning purposes, vice General Dwight E. Beach, USA. An official and formalized announcement will be made when the necessity for implementing plans warrants such action.⁴

1. DA 2528/182220Z Feb 68, cited in J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
2. CINCPAC 242145Z Feb 68; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
3. CINCPAC 162124Z Mar 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Mar 68.
4. CINCPAC 080205Z Aug 68; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
MPO Organization, Personnel Establishment, and Staffing

By SMPO/MS/4/1/68 of 13 September 1968, CMPO's proposed amendments to the organization and staffing of the SEATO MPO were forwarded to all concerned. USMILAD's comments on them were forthcoming in a message to USMILADERP, SEATO, MPO, in Bangkok, Thailand, on 7 December 1968. In it, USMILAD stated that he "concurs in all proposed amendments," and again, as he had previously in early November, instructed USMILADEP that "consideration should be given to the establishment of a permanent SEATO Exercise Planning Group if justified by requirements."^2

SEATO MPO Joint Table of Distribution (JTD)

On 16 July 1968, the JCS approved an increase of one space for an enlisted Aide, which resulted "in a revised FY 1969 Manpower Authorization for the SEATO MPO JTD of 17 spaces."^3 Previously, on 30 November 1967, USMILAD had recommended to the JCS that such a billet be established and filled by the U.S. in FY 69. ^4

1. J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. CINCPAC 070422Z Dec 68.
3. JCS 4870/162027Z Jul 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Jul 68.
SECTION II - CINCPAC POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES

(U) ... There are many encouraging aspects to the East Asian and Pacific scene. We have good friends and allies among the free Southeast Asian nations who are determined to maintain their independence and to contain and defeat those subversive threats from the communists. There has been progress by the free Southeast Asian nations in regional cooperation...

There are no less than eight other Pacific Command areas which must be classed as actual or potential trouble spots. These are Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Taiwan Strait...

We must continuously reckon with the long term threat of the Soviet Union and Communist China to the smaller countries along their borders and in adjacent areas. This is the major reason for our maintaining a strong "presence" in the Pacific...

The Pacific Command which must deal with these threats covers some 85 million square miles of ocean, islands and mainland, or about two-fifths of the entire surface of the earth.... There are 20 different flags in addition to our own flown in this vast segment of our planet. Of these, nine can be considered firm, consistent friends of our country. The alignments of the remainder are either definitely hostile to our interests or vary between latent hostility and non-alignment.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.

1. An Address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific, Before the Commonwealth Club of California at San Francisco, California, on 22 November 1968.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
OVER U. S. FORCES IN THE PACOM

THAILAND
SOTA NEGOTIATIONS COMMENCED 20 NOVEMBER
1966. PEDNING COMPLETION OF SOTA, INTERIM
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AGREEMENT REACHED ON
2 JULY 1969 WHICH CONTAINED SAFEGUARDS TO
BE GRANTED U.S. ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL IN
THE EVENT OF TRIAL BY THAI COURTS.

JAPAN
CONCURRENT U.S. HOST
COUNTRY JURISDICTION

KOREA
CONCURRENT U.S. HOST
COUNTRY JURISDICTION

REPUBLIC OF CHINA
CONCURRENT U.S. HOST
COUNTRY JURISDICTION

PHILIPPINES
CONCURRENT U.S. HOST
COUNTRY JURISDICTION

AUSTRALIA
CONCURRENT U.S. HOST
COUNTRY JURISDICTION

BURMA
"INDONESIA
"VIETNAM
U.S. EXERCISES EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
U.S. PERSONNEL UNDER MILITARY ASSISTANCE
AGREEMENTS
"WEONE EXCEPTIONS

MALAYSIA
SINGAPORE
COUNTRY TO COUNTRY
AGREEMENTS PROVIDE TOURIST
STATUS ONLY FOR RNZ
PERSONNEL

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 92.
Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. (ANZUS) Treaty

Security Consultations

(5) On 1 July 1968, SECSTATE proposed "scheduling periodic, detailed substantive discussions of security matters of mutual interest among representatives of the member nations of ANZUS. Objective would be broader ranging discussion of Pacific security problems, and more detailed examination of particular topics, than is possible in existing ANZUS meetings." In a message to the JCS on 10 July, CINCPAC concurred in these proposed discussions and pointed out that:

...the proposed meetings obviously are of major interest to CINCPAC as the U.S. regional commander and as the U.S. Military Representative to the ANZUS Council. CINCPAC representation should be provided for at such meetings. 2

(5) The ANZUS Council held its eighteenth meeting (ANZUS 18M) in Washington, D.C., on 10 October 1968. Mr. Paul Hasluck, Minister of External Affairs, represented Australia; Mr. Keith Holyoake, Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs, represented New Zealand; and Mr. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, represented the United States and served as chairman of ANZUS 18M in the review of the world situation, with special attention to recent developments in Southeast Asia and in Europe. During the meeting, "Australia suggested that the ANZUS Security Consultations (18-19 November 1968) confine itself to identifying and describing situations and problems that the governments should be thinking about rather than formulating policy for same. U.S. and New Zealand accepted this concept." 3

1. CINCPAC 102229 Z Jul 68.
2. Ibid; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
SECRET

(2) On 7 November 1968, CINCPAC notified the JCS that RADM Walter L. Curtis, Jr., USN, J5, Hq CINCPAC, would be the CINCPAC representative to the ANZUS Security Consultations scheduled to meet later in the month in Washington, D.C.¹ On 18 and 19 November 1968, these consultations took place, and the agenda items included the "concept of ANZUS Security Consultations covering scope, frequency and procedures of future talks; East Asian security situation and problems, especially China, Japan, and Indo-China area; security situation in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore; and security and defense problems in South Pacific."²

(3) During the discussion on these agenda items, the U.S. was represented by personnel from the State Department, the Defense Department, the JCS, and Hq CINCPAC. The other two countries sent representatives from the Assistant/Deputy Secretary level, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Attache personnel and, in the specific case of Australia, their Ambassador to the U.S. The person who served as chairman of the talks was Ambassador Winthrop Brown of the U.S. State Department. "It was agreed that the first round of talks had proved worthwhile and that further similar forums be continued."³ The next session was tentatively scheduled for May 1969 at a site to be determined later.

Australia

An Attempt to Retrieve a U.S. Army Deserter from Australia

(3) On 4 September 1968, Private Anton (NMI) Hartman, USA, presented himself of his "own free will" to U.S. consular authorities in Sydney, Australia, for return to military control.⁴ As an Australian national who had enlisted in the U.S. Army, he had been AWOL from his unit at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, since 27 June 1968. The United States Defense Attache Officer (USDAO) in Canberra, Australia, immediately notified CINCPAC that the AWOL soldier would be arriving at

1. CINCPAC 071853Z Nov 68.
2. J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
3. Ibid.
4. USDAO/Canberra 0246/040700Z Sep 68. Unless otherwise cited, the information concerning the Hartman incident has been derived from: J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
Hickam AFB, Hawaii, on 6 September and requested that "arrangements for apprehension and return to military control... be made upon his arrival."\(^1\) Private Hartman, however, missed this scheduled flight, being apprehended later by Australian Army authorities with the intention of returning him to U.S. military control.\(^2\)

(U) Before this happened, Private Hartman filed a petition for a writ of habeus corpus in an Australian court and won his release. In essence, the Australian court ruled that, since "Hartman arrived in Australia individually in civilian capacity," being AWOL from Fort Bragg, "and not as a member of the United States forces," that portion of the Australian Defense Act authorizing apprehension of a member of the U.S. visiting forces did not apply.\(^3\) As a result, the Australian Army authorities were ordered to release him, and the non-applicability of that portion also precluded "apprehension of Hartman by U.S. authorities."\(^4\)

(U) For a brief time, American officials maintained close liaison "with Australian authorities," and the Attorney General of Australia even gave consideration to a possible appeal from the lower court's decision.\(^5\) When it became apparent that an appeal would be fruitless, the State Department indicated to CINCPAC in September 1968 "that no further action can or should be taken by the Army in Hartman's case."\(^6\)

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCUSARPAC 0258/060202Z Sep 68; USSSO Canberra 190652Z Sep 68, cited in J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
3. USSSO/Canberra 250448Z Sep 68.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
Australian Arrest of U.S. Serviceman on R&R for Alleged Homicide

(G) On 18 December 1968, a 20-year old American serviceman on R&R from Vietnam, WO-1 Lawrence J. Hull, USA, was apprehended by Australian authorities "in Adelaide in connection with murder of young Australian woman whose body was found yesterday in serviceman's hotel room in Sydney." 1 Although U.S. officials planned to request a waiver of Australian jurisdiction, the Government of Australia was not expected to grant it, "since Australia has not in past waived its primary jurisdiction on any occasion in connection with offences by servicemen on R&R." 2 As the year ended, the American soldier had been charged and was being held without bail.

Cambodia

Cambodian Conference

(6) Immediately following IAC llM, the Cambodian Conference was held at the American Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, on 30 and 31 August 1968. The same USMILAD delegation that attended IAC llM, COL Lloyd C. Edwards, Jr., USAF, and CDR Andrew C. Stratton, USN, both of the J2 Division, Hq, CINCPAC, were also representatives at the Cambodian Conference. The discussion included the following general items of interest:

1. Sihanouk's long term view that the U.S. will eventually leave SEA and the Chicoms will take over.

2. Influence of the Vesuvius packages in forcing Sihanouk to allow ICC teams to inspect suspected base areas.

3. Travel restrictions imposed on the U.K. and Australian attache's.

4. Arms and ammunition which had been delivered to Cambodia by the Soviets and the Chicoms.

1. AMEMBASSY Canberra 9862/180650Z Dec 68.
2. Ibid.; CONMAVPHIL Det/Sydney 170710Z Dec 68; CINCPACREP Australia 170639Z Dec 68; CONMAVPHIL Det/Sydney 300600Z Dec 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
5. Arrival of Soviet technicians to train Cambodians on Soviet artillery and antiaircraft weapons.¹

China

SOF A - Increase of Punishment on Appeal

(U) Storekeeper First Class (SK1) Jack P. Betts, USN, was sentenced on 29 January 1968 by the Taipei District Court for a term of imprisonment of one year and five months for the offense of attempted homicide on 1 September 1967.² SK1 Betts appealed his verdict. The Taiwan High Court, Criminal Division, Judicial Building, Taipei, Taiwan held a preliminary hearing from 0900 hours to 1200 hours on 3 April and a second and final hearing from 0900 hours to 1100 hours on 7 May 1968. As a result of SK1 Betts' appeal, the original judgement of the Taipei District Court was set aside. The Taiwan High Court, however, reaffirmed the accused's conviction and resentenced SK1 Betts to an imprisonment term of two years and six months. In addition, the court ordered the immediate confiscation of SK1 Betts' registered .22 caliber pistol.

(U) "In my opinion," wrote COMUSTDC to the Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Navy on 1 November 1968, "the appellate review of Petty Officer Betts' case was fair and the Republic of China did not fail to comply with the procedural safeguards secured by SOFA-China."³ The official U.S. trial observer agreed with this conclusion, although he did call attention to an "unprecedented move" by the Chinese Court:

1. J22 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
2. The sources utilized in preparing this subsection on China SOFA were: J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68; Ltr, COMUSTDC to Judge Advocate General of the Navy, 1 Nov 68, Subj: Trial Observer's Report in the case of SK1 Jack P. Betts, U.S. Navy; Trial Observer's Report for the Appeal of Storekeeper First Class Jack Phillip Betts, USN, 457 09 25, United States Naval Security Group Activity, Taipei, in the Taiwan High Court, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, prepared by LT David N. Manchoe, USNR, Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters Support Activity, Taipei, Republic of China, cited hereafter as Trial Observer's Report.
The relevant provisions and protections of the Status of Forces Agreement and the Chinese Code of Criminal Procedure were followed during the appellate proceedings. Although the interpretation of the psychiatric evaluation by the court is questionable, it is within the court's province to interpret, and determine the probative force of the evidence presented. (Article 155 of the Chinese Code of Criminal Procedure). Possible errors in official court translation could have been and were taken care of by English-speaking counsel. Considering all factors, it is determined that the accused was afforded a fair appellate review.

While recognizing that the appellate review was fair, there is however, a point that deserves comment: The Taiwan High Court, in an unprecedented move, with regard to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel in the Republic of China, on appeal, not only set aside the decision of the court of first instance but increased the sentence. While this is apparently within the appellate court's power, (Article 369 and 370 of the Chinese Code of Criminal Procedure) it is completely foreign to the western juristic system and in the mind of this trial observer, approaches infringement of the rights of the member as protected under the Status of Forces Agreement.¹

(U) Subsequently, SK1 Betts appealed this verdict of the Taiwan High Court to the Taiwan Supreme Court. As of December 1968, the accused had not yet been notified of the decision of the Taiwan Supreme Court.

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¹ Trial Observer's Report.

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Hong Kong

Application of Visiting Forces Act to R&R Personnel in Hong Kong

As early as August 1966, the State Department had authorized the American Consul at Hong Kong to request the Hong Kong Government (HKG) approval of an intergovernmental arrangement whereby British Military Police (MP) would have the authority to arrest and hand over to U.S. military authorities those U.S. personnel subject to punishable offenses under U.S. law. By September of the same year, HKG approval had been obtained, subject to concurrence of the British Government in London. Since then, until 1968, no further progress had been made. When CINCPAC learned of "possible defection of U.S. military personnel through Hong Kong" in May 1968, he wired the following to the Defense Attache Office (DAO) in Hong Kong:

...Recognize that U.S. military personnel in Hong Kong in an AWOL/Desertion status are not members of the "visiting forces"; however close working relationship which could result from foregoing arrangement would serve to strengthen our hand in ferreting out such individuals. Request early renewed effort to achieve formalization of the intergovernmental arrangement.1

The major stumbling block was London's questions as to whether or not U.S. R&R personnel constituted an organized force and were in Hong Kong at British invitation, conditions that were required to be fulfilled before they could qualify as "visiting forces." At the U.S.-HKG Consulate Group meeting on 18 June 1968, the HKG Attorney General Representative expressed "concern that accused might plead unlawful arrest and HKG would be unable to legally prove visiting force status," but, after receiving assurances "that such defense only very remote possibility, and in any event would be pleaded in U.S. military not Hong Kong court," he agreed to restudy application of Visiting Forces Act to R&R personnel.2

1. CINCPAC 272011Z May 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan-Jun 68.
2. USDAO AMCONSUL Hong Kong 190620Z Jun 68.
Finally, in August, the HKG accepted the general position "that reporting to R&R Office sufficient to constitute member of visiting force;" as a result, they "requested outline of authority to be granted and definition of offenses in which British MPs may act." The U.S. officials in Hong Kong notified CINCPAC on 27 August that they intended to forward a letter, which would offer authority for the British MPs to apprehend U.S. military personnel for violations of Articles 86 (AWOL), 92 (Disobedience of Orders), and 134 (Drunk and Disorderly) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), to the HKG on 3 September 1968. Before this could happen, however, COMUSMACV unexpectedly non-concurred in the proposal, and CINCPAC had to "postpone delivery of letter to HKG offering authority to apprehend for offenses... until matter is studied further."  

When representatives of the U.S. military services on R&R matters held a meeting on 19 September in Hong Kong, however, there was general agreement that offering the proposed limited authority to British MPs "would materially assist R&R Detachment in carrying out its mission," and that such action was "not believed legally objectionable." After all of the PACOM component commands concurred in this decision, CINCPAC requested a re-evaluation of the proposal by COMUSMACV.  

On 11 October, having received concurrence from all the military services, CINCPAC requested approval from SECDEF to give HKG limited British MP authority over U.S. personnel visiting Hong Kong, which was granted on the last day of the month. As a result, this authority was delivered to HKG on 13 November 1968.

1. USDAO AMCONSUL Hong Kong 1296/270135Z Aug 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.  
2. CINCPAC 032125Z Sep 68; COMUSMACV 25860/022330Z Sep 68.  
3. CINCPACREP PHIL 210123Z Sep 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.  
4. CINCUSARPAC 39733/242142 Sep 68; CINCPACAF JAA/260135Z Sep 68; CINCPACFLT 240247Z Sep 68 and CINCPAC 270350Z Sep 68, both cited in J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.  
5. CINCPAC 110507Z Oct 68; SECDEF JCS4591/312105Z Oct 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.  
6. USDAO AMCONSUL Hong Kong 1803/150801Z Nov 68.
(C) By early December, CINCPAC was notified that violations involving marihuana by R&R personnel visiting Hong Kong had reached such proportions that the Hong Kong civil authorities probably would grant few waivers of HKG jurisdiction in the future; instead, "jail sentences and/or heavy fines will be imposed upon conviction."  

Indonesia

Airlift of Special Medical Team to Java

(U) In early April 1968, the Chief, Western Pacific Transportation Office (CHWTO), received a request to airlift a medical research team and laboratory equipment from Taiwan to central Java for long term studies of the bubonic plague on the behalf of the Ministry of Health for the Government of Indonesia. Since the requested support would "not adversely affect support other commands located WESTPAC," CHWTO recommended approval of this request to CINCPAC on 12 April, which was given the next day.

(U) Toward the end of the following month, this special medical team requested airlift for themselves and their specimen collection from Java to Taiwan. CHWTO recommend on 28 May, and CINCPAC approved the next day, the use of a theater C-130 for this purpose, for such an action would not adversely "affect other high priority missions."

1. CINCPACREP PHIL 020715Z Dec 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. NAMRU TWO Taipei 110428Z Apr 68; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
3. CHWTO 121155Z Apr 68; CINCPAC 130457Z Apr 68.
4. CHWTO 280501Z May 68; CINCPAC 290500Z May 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
Iran

CINCPAC Briefing Team Visit to Iran

By a joint STATE/DOD message on 12 December 1967, CINCPAC was notified by the JCS that the Chief, Supreme Commander's Staff of Iran had heard of the presentation by the MACV Briefing Team in Pakistan and had requested that such a briefing be made in Tehran, Iran. COMUSMACV replied that he had no objections to providing a MACV Briefing Team to Iran on 26 December 1967.

The next day, CINCPAC concurred in the idea, stating that there is no doubt that such briefings would be beneficial in furthering our efforts to publicize the nature of the war, put it in proper perspective and eliminate misconceptions. He further went on to state that if we are to embark on an expanded out-of-country military briefing effort, we should provide a briefing that gives comprehensive coverage to all aspects of the war. The problem should be treated as a whole in order to keep it in proper balance and at the same time ensure the briefings are not misinterpreted due to a limited discussion of specific military operations. In the event that urgent operational requirements should preclude COMUSMACV from sending a team, CINCPAC offered to field a team to give the briefings.

On 19 January 1968, the JCS approved the sending of a briefing team to Iran to present briefings similar to those given in Pakistan in November 1967. At the same time, the JCS outlined the parameters for the classification of information that could be divulged during the discussion period. Then, on the last day of the month, COMUSMACV reported that current "operational requirements preclude this headquarters from providing the MACV Briefing Team to Iran in the foreseeable future" and requested the CINCPAC Briefing Team to fulfill this commitment as well as future ones. Eight days later, CINCPAC agreed to assume the responsibility.

1. JCS 4992/122315Z Dec 67.
2. COMUSMACV 42813/260735Z Dec 67, cited in J5533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
3. CINCPAC 281949Z Dec 67.
4. Ibid.
5. JCS 7659/190029Z Jan 68.
6. COMUSMACV 03369/310020Z Jan 68.
7. CINCPAC 080141Z Feb 68.
(U) From 3 through 14 March 1968, a CINCPAC Briefing Team visited Iran "and presented the CINCPAC Six-Pak briefing to personnel of the Iranian Armed Forces.... The briefings were well received. The audience was attentive and demonstrated a sincere interest in U.S. policy and military activity in Southeast Asia."¹

(U) During this visit, briefings were conducted on the following schedule and to the persons indicated:

a. Tehran - 4 March - 250 officers of the Iranian Armed Forces, including the Chief Supreme Commander's staff and all general officers in the Tehran area, were present for this briefing.

b. Isfahan - 6 March - A briefing for about 150 officers including the Commander and staff of the Iranian Artillery Center, and senior officers of the Gendarmerie.

c. Kermanshah - 9 March - 250 officers of the Command and staff of the 3rd Army and senior officers of the Gendarmerie were present for this briefing.

d. Tehran - 11 March

(1) a. m. - About 400 officers consisting of the student bodies of the Armed Forces Staff College, the Army Command and General Staff College, Cadre of the Military Academy plus senior officers of the Gendarmerie, were present for the morning briefing.

(2) p. m. - About 200 personnel of the MAAG Iran and of the Embassy were present for this briefing. ²

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¹ J5533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
² Ibid.

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Japan

U.S. - Japanese Security Consultative Committee Meeting

(U) The seventh meeting of the U.S. - Japanese Security Consultative Committee (SCC) took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, Japan, on 15 May 1967. 1 Almost a year later, on 13 May 1968, the eighth meeting of the SCC was convened. The numerous U.S. representatives were headed by Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and Admiral Sharp, while the equally numerous Japanese side was headed by the Honorable Takeo Miki, Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Honorable Kaneshichi Masuda, Director General of the Defense Agency. "Almost the entire time was devoted to the Vietnam presentation, with Ambassador Johnson giving an over-all rundown, and Admiral Sharp following with a balanced military situation report. During the meeting, Mr. Masuda made some extemporaneous remarks which strongly supported the U.S. course in Vietnam." 2

(U) Another meeting of the SCC was held again in Tokyo on 23 December 1968. As previously planned, the U.S. was represented by Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC. "In compliance with the directive of SECDEF and SECSTATE the approved proposals of the joint CINCPAC/AMEMB Tokyo review of Japan bases were formally presented to the GOJ. It was mutually agreed that the proposals would be presented to the Joint Committee for resolution of the details involved in completing final arrangements as appropriate in the case of each proposal. Members of the Joint Committee will report back to their respective governments on the progress of the negotiations every six months." 3

3. J5124 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
Security Consultative Committee Subcommittee (SCC SC)

CINCPAC had first broached the idea of establishing a subcommittee within the SCC for highly informal, "working level" talks as early as September 1965. Although this concept was initially turned down, CINCPAC continued to advocate it, for he felt that a SCC subcommittee "could prove a worthwhile means of maintaining momentum and achieving useful exchanges between SCC meetings." Finally, agreement was reached, with the first meeting taking place in May 1967, followed by a second one in August.

On 22-23 January 1968, the third SCC SC meeting was held in Tokyo among U.S. and Japanese representatives of SECGATE/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SECDEF/Japan Defense Agency, and U.S. military/Japanese Joint Staff Office. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson presided for the U.S. side and Vice Minister Ushiba for Japan. Among the other U.S. representatives was RADM Walter L. Curtis, USN, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans (J5), Hq, CINCPAC. The agenda included a follow-up discussion from the previous meeting on the Korean situation, an exchange of views on a new paper tabled by Japan, entitled "Long Range Asian Security," and a U.S. presentation on the "Missile and Air Defense of Japan." No mention was made of either the Bonins or Okinawa, items which had been discussed at previous meetings. The time and site of the next SCC SC was suggested as July 1968 in Washington, D.C. Originally, the Japanese "had indicated a desire to relax the tight security surrounding these meetings, but due to the proximity of the ENTERPRISE visit, it was decided to retain the classification."

2. CINCPAC 112141Z Feb 67.
4. This account of the third SCC SC meeting was derived from: J5123 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68; History of Headquarters, United States Forces, Japan, 1 January - 31 March 1968, pp. 1, 2.
The fourth SCC SC meeting was held in Washington, D.C., on 6 and 7 June 1968. RADM Curtis again represented CINCPAC. On the first day, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, William P. Bundy, gave an oral presentation on the current Vietnam situation. Then, the U.S. representatives commented on the Japanese paper on Asian security that had been introduced earlier at SCC SC III. The next day, the representatives of Japan presented an updated estimate on the activities and intentions of North Korea. The location of the next SCC SC meeting was tentatively planned for Tokyo.

This meeting, SCC SC V, was held in the Foreign Ministry Building, Tokyo, on 11 and 12 September 1968. As before, RADM Curtis represented CINCPAC. The agenda item for the first day dealt with long range security problems in Asia. The American representation gave a briefing on those U.S. programs designed to assist Asian countries in the area of internal security, while sub-topics discussed that day included Korea, Vietnam, Asian and Pacific Council, and Czechoslovakia. The second day's agenda concentrated on a general discussion of U.S. bases in Japan.

Korea

Thai Company in Korea

As reported in last year's history, "Thailand has maintained a military company in Korea under the United Nations Command (UNC)," and "CINCPAC has consistently supported the retention of the Thai Company in Korea." Early in 1968, CINCPAC had the occasion to assist in preserving this "tangible evidence that the Asian Pacific nations have elected an interconnected common front as a means of countering the threat of Communism in Asia." On 9 April 1968,

1. This account of the fourth SCC SC meeting was derived from: J512 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68; History of Headquarters, United States Forces, Japan, 1 April - 30 June 1968, pp. 1, 2.
2. This account of SCC SC V was derived from: History of Headquarters, United States Forces, Japan, 1 August - 30 September 1968, pp. 1, 2.
3. Ibid., p. 2.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. I, p. 474, which also gives the reasons why the physical presence of these troops in Korea are of such importance to the interests of the U.S.
5. Ibid.; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
COMUSMACVTHAI requested MAC airlift support from CINCPAC for the rotation of the "19th and 20th Thai Infantry Companies" between Thailand and Korea.¹ CINCPAC advised COMUSMACVTHAI three days later of the proper procedures for "resubmission of requirement through appropriate service channels."²

Malaysia

CINCPAC Briefing Team Visit to Malaysia

(5) The U.S. DAO (Defense Attache Office), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, informed COMUSMACV on 11 March 1968, the briefing "program conducted by representatives your command last fall for Malaysia military and other governmental officials was highly successful and greatly appreciated."³ Since the officials of the Government of Malaysia (GOM) continue to have a "keen interest" in the Vietnam conflict, continued USDAO Kuala Lumpur, "believe current situation type briefing on Vietnam by representative your command would be most welcomed by GOM and in overall best interest U.S. efforts SEASIA."⁴ Four days later, COMUSMACV replied that operational "requirements preclude this headquarters from providing" a briefing team "in the foreseeable future" and requested that the CINCPAC Briefing Team, which has had "considerable experience briefing on the Vietnam situation in CONUS as well as in countries in the PACOM area," fulfill this request instead.⁵

(5) On 16 March 1968, therefore, USDAO Kuala Lumpur requested a visit by the CINCPAC Briefing Team, and CINCPAC accepted this requirement, suggesting that the period from 12 through 16 June 1968 would be an appropriate time for the briefings. On 29 March, USDAO Kuala Lumpur stated that GOM Minister of Defense had accepted this time frame and had suggested that the briefing be presented in Kuala Lumpur and East

1. COMUSMACV 090905Z Apr 68.
2. CINCPAC 120501Z Apr 68.
3. USDAO/Kuala Lumpur 0166/110911Z Mar 68.
4. Ibid.
5. COMUSMACV 07330/150145Z Mar 68.
Malaysia, offering in-country transportation for the CINCPAC Briefing Team. CINCPAC concurred with this proposal of GOM Minister of Defense on 2 April 1968. It was planned to have the CINCPAC Briefing Team visit Malaysia during the period, 12-18 June, in conjunction with the 10 June 1968 briefing to the SEATO Orientation Course in Bangkok, Thailand.  

The CINCPAC Briefing Team completed its ten-day trip to Malaysia on 19 June 1968. During this visit, the team presented its briefing six times; for the GOM Ministry of Defense, for the guests of the American Embassy, for the students of the GOM military academy, and for the personnel at brigade and division headquarters in Ipoh, Labua, and Kuching. In the opinion of USDAO Kuala Lumpur:

Believe recently departed CINCPAC Briefing Team successfully accomplished objectives...in "furthering our efforts to publicize nature of the war, put it in proper perspective and eliminate misconceptions."

Much appreciation for briefing expressed by all who received it, particularly by MAJ GEN Ibrahim, Dir of Operations, East Malaysia who...used briefing as vehicle to exhort senior officers present at briefing "to keep up their guard in stamping out communism."

Officers giving briefing obviously well informed. They were also articulate and discreet. Team's visit unquestionably contributed to development closer relations American/Malaysian military authorities.

1. USDAO Kuala Lumpur 0182/160413Z Mar 68; CINCPAC 2400222Z Mar 68; USDAO Kuala Lumpur 0207/2909442Z Mar 68; CINCPAC 0222542Z Apr 68; J5531 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68; J555 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
2. USDAO Kuala Lumpur 0417/2103002Z Jun 68; J5551 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
Philippines

A Fatal Shooting by U.S. Sentry at Sangley Point

☑ Lance Corporal [REDACTED] Smith, USMC, a sentry at the Naval Station, Sangley Point, Philippines, "whose duties included the prevention of pilferage from the base he was guarding, and the apprehension of persons attempting to commit crimes thereon, and whose instructions permitted the use of his weapon under certain limited circumstances," shot and killed on 26 July 1968 a Philippine national named "Gonzales, a known and dangerous hoodlum... At the time he was killed, Gonzales was attempting to escape custody of, and arrest by the sentry."1 Shortly thereafter, the question arose as to whether the fatal shooting was done in the performance of official duty or whether the Marine's action was a substantial enough departure from his instructions and duties as to be outside his official duty. In the first instance, under the Military Base Arrangement (MBA), the U.S. would have primary jurisdiction, while in the second case, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) would have primary jurisdiction.

☑ Even the American Embassy in Manila and the various military services were at odds over this question. As the American Ambassador told SECSTATE on 5 August, it was his "conviction that both legal obligation and political advantage require that we recognize Phil primary jurisdiction in this case."2 The military argument for retention of jurisdiction by the U.S. was probably best expressed by the following:

There is no peacetime military duty that is more peculiarly "official" than that of a sentry. A sentry on his post carries the authority of the command which has posted him, and under certain circumstances is permitted to perform acts of force which, if committed by a person otherwise situated, would constitute assault or even unlawful homicide. He is accountable to his military commander for carrying out his orders as a sentry. Whether he has committed a criminal offense in the use of force depends in large measure on an interpretation of his orders. To create a situation in which a foreign sovereign will interpret those orders and hold an individual criminally responsible based

1. CINCPAC 110432Z Aug 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
2. AMEMBASSY Manila 13655/050944Z Aug 68.
on that interpretation is anomalous. In the case at hand, the crucial issue would appear to be an interpretation of the guard orders... and the inclusion of the phrase "et cetera" certainly creates the possibility of varied interpretation by young, non-legally trained sentries.¹

³ (5) In a 8-page message to SECDEF on 11 August, CINCPAC explained in detail the various reasons why he opposed relinquishing jurisdiction to the GOP. First, the facts of the case indicated that the shooting occurred while the sentry was performing official duty, automatically giving primary jurisdiction to the U.S. Secondly, in this case, where the GOP authorities were already on record as to their intention to try the sentry for murder, any relinquishment of jurisdiction would have an adverse effect on the morale of other U.S. servicemen in the Philippines. In addition, under the existing circumstances, the Marine could hardly expect a fair trial by the GOP. Finally, CINCPAC pointed out that "past actions of the GOP, should convince us that we should not be so sanguine as to expect that any concessions to the Phils in the Smith case will lead to better relations between us."² Therefore, in summation, he "strongly recommended that every effort be made to retain jurisdiction over this case."³

³ (5) On 24 August, SECSTATE announced that, "after careful study of the Smith case at the highest levels in State and Defense... We have decided that the Smith case is one that must be considered an official duty case over which the U.S. has primary jurisdiction."⁴ On the civil side, the appropriate Foreign Claims Commission authorized an ex gratia compensation payment of 15,000 pesos to the mother of the deceased. This settlement of the claim was made on 28 August, and a release in favor of the United States and the Marine sentry was obtained.⁵

1. CINCPACREP PHIL/COMNAVPHIL 0214152 Aug 68; COMNAVBASE 060447Z Aug 68; Hq 13th AF Clark AB 060847Z Aug 68.
2. CINCPAC 110432Z Aug 68.
3. Ibid.
4. SECSTATE 227177/1/241726Z Aug 68.
5. COMNAVPHIL 280401Z Aug 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
A local Manila radio station carried on 4 September a "low key"
broadcast of an interview the previous day with the GOP Minister of
Justice, who had stated that he was going to send a letter to the American
Ambassador on the Smith case "and that probably a meeting would then
be set up to discuss jurisdiction."\(^1\) Actually, the American Embassy had
received this letter ten days prior to the broadcast. Six days later, during
an informal conversation, GOP Speaker Laurel asked the American Ambass-
ador, "Why can't the United States assert jurisdiction just as hard as it
wants to, but then say it will turn Smith over to the Filipinos for trial?"\(^2\)
Laurel assured the Ambassador that "Smith would get off very lightly in
a Philippine court, and repeated several times: "We can fix that."\(^3\) By
20 September, however, the U.S. position—that primary jurisdiction
rested with the U.S.—had been officially conveyed to President Marcos
of the Philippines, who then stated that the time had come for further
discussion.\(^4\)

The GOP Department of Foreign Affairs delivered a note on the
Smith case to the American Embassy in Manila on 27 November 1968.
Written the previous day, it stated that, in the opinion of the GOP Secre-
tary of Justice as expressed on 14 November, the 1965 criminal jurisdic-
tion amendment to the 1947 Military Bases Agreement was invalid in
"the present case for the simple reason that the aforesaid amendments
have not yet been ratified by the Senate as required by the constitution
of the Philippines;" therefore, the U.S. had exclusive jurisdiction over
the Marine sentry, since the offense had occurred on-base.\(^5\) This
decision did away with the issue that had threatened to rise between the
two countries as to whether or not the shooting had occurred as a result
of the sentry's official duties or not, for the 1965 amendments, which
had been accomplished by an exchange of diplomatic notes, had provided
for concurrent jurisdiction in cases of offenses punishable by the laws
of both countries—as a homicide would be—with special provisions for
primary jurisdiction going to the U.S. in cases of offenses arising out
of official duty.

1. AMEMBASSY Manila 14752/041019Z Sep 68.
2. AMEMBASSY Manila 14972/101050Z Sep 68.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPACREP PHIL 200309Z Sep 68, cited in J73 History, Hq CINCPAC,
   for the month of Sep 68.
5. CINCPACREP PHIL/COMNAVPHIL 270913Z Nov 68; J73 History, Hq
   CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
As of December 1968, this case had been referred to trial by a U.S. general court-martial "on one charge of negligent homicide and two specifications under charge of violating lawful orders." Although the court-martial was scheduled to commence on 21 December, it was expected to adjourn over the Christmas holiday, if the proceedings were not completed on that day.

Privately Owned Vehicle (POV) Registration

In the past, POVs of U.S. military and civilian personnel in the Philippines have been exempted from paying Philippine vehicle registration fees, ranging from 75 to 180 pesos, apparently on the theory that, since the Americans need their vehicles for travel to and from work, these vehicles were considered as being used for "military purposes" and thus were exempt from any fees under Article XII, Paragraph 3, Military Base Arrangement (MBA). The 4 pesos for license plate fees, however, had always been paid. Recently, however, Commissioner Edu of the Philippine Local Land Transportation Commissioner questioned this practice and attempted to impose registration fees on POVs on the theory that these vehicles were not "used for military purposes" and thus were not exempt. When this problem arose in June 1968, the American Embassy in Manila arranged a meeting with appropriate Philippine officials to discuss the matter and warned SECSTATE that:

Edu is rough, tough head of one of country's most corrupt agencies and we do not relish publicity to effect that he and Collantes, who builds his career on anti-Americanism, have caught U.S. in nefarious practice and forced them to capitulate. This will only lead to other and perhaps less meritorious demands in field of taxes, customs and immigration where we already have plethora of problems.

1. CINCPACREP PHIL/COMNAVPHIL 191021Z Dec 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. AMEMBASSY Manila 12134/261009Z Jun 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan-Jun 68.
(C) At this meeting on 31 July, an agreement was reached between the American Embassy officials and representatives of the Government of the Philippines (GOP) to terminate the POV registration exemption. On the same day, the Vice Commander, 13th Air Force, expressed his strong opposition to such a termination and his deep concern "that this complete acquiescence to the abrogation of a practice which has been in effect for twenty-one years under the provisions of the MBA will have a highly adverse affect on our ability to resist further encroachments by the GOP in other matters covered by the MBA, not to mention matters which are not specifically covered in the MBA" and the failure of U.S. negotiators to use previously recommended "alternative and fall-back positions which were discussed at the Country Team meeting on 8 July 1968," and requested that his views be made "known through unified command channels to JCS." 1

(C) Generally, CINCPACAF concurred with the views of the Vice Commander, 13th Air Force and, in a message to CINCPAC on 1 August, agreed "that CINCPACREP PHIL should strongly represent to the Ambassador PACOM concern with these developments and the failure to press for concessions in exchange for the termination of the twenty-year-old understanding." 2 Seven days later, CINCPAC forwarded his own concurrence to his representative in the Philippines, emphasizing "the importance of careful adherence to the provisions of the MBA and the hazards of too easy U.S. acquiescence to Phil demands." 3 Again, on 13 August, Hq, 13th Air Force reiterated to CINCPAC its "strong recommendation that State and DOD approval of the tentative agreement be denied" and warned that an early "resolution of this problem is most necessary in order to avoid major confrontation on 1 September." 4

(C) As CINCPACREP Philippines clarified the situation to CINCPAC on 14 August, the American Embassy in Manila had received "no impression that Edu had any willingness to back down to the 15 peso level for all POV," as argued by Hq, 13th Air Force, instead of sticking to the rates first

1. 13AF 311130Z Jul 68, cited in CINCPACAF 010302Z Aug 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
2. CINCPACAF 010302Z Aug 68.
3. CINCPAC 080207Z Aug 68.
4. Hq 13th AF 130907Z Aug 68.
requested, "15 pesos for POV that never leaves base or 75 to 180 pesos per POV that does leave base." Moreover, Embassy officials were hindered by a recent joint State/Defense message "which urged that this question be resolved ASAP and that POV problem should not be permitted to continue exacerbate Phil-U.S. relations," and they had given the impression that it was "very late in game to reopen battle on registration;" as a result, CINCPACREP Philippines "regretfully" recommended approval of the tentative agreement reached on 31 July in the belief that "no useful results could come from reopening whole question." 

The problem was finally solved on 28 August at a meeting attended on the Philippine side by Commissioner Edu and his regional officials and on the American side by representatives from the Embassy and major U.S. bases in the Philippines. Here, GOP concurrence was gained on the necessary procedures to expedite POV registration by U.S. military and civilian personnel in order to meet the 1 September 1968 deadline. In fact, for the "1968 registration, Commissioner Edu agreed to waive all technical requirements for registration, including inspection, and there will be no penalties for late registration."

Customs Problems in Philippine Ports

Towards the end of September 1968, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) initiated harassing actions against U.S. vessels bearing military cargo that entered the Port of Manila. "Harassment began with a GOP demand for long vice short form tax exemption certificates." As CINCPACREP Philippines reported to CINCPAC on 28 September, "Manila Port operations virtually ceased Friday 27 Sep" and the filing of "long form tax exemption certificates could be expected to delay clearance, increase costs and increase material losses."

On 2 October, representatives of the American Embassy in Manila, USA support elements, and CINCPACREP Philippines met with the GOP Commissioner of Customs "in an effort to define problem and to obtain return to short form procedure until problem resolved." The intent of

1. CINCPACREP PHIL/COMNAVPHIL 140945Z Aug 68.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPACREP PHIL 280919Z Aug 68.
5. CINCPACREP PHIL 280329Z Sep 68.
6. CINCPACREP PHIL 030127Z Oct 68.
the Philippine customs officials in departing from existing Philippine-American arrangements on U.S. military importations, it appeared from this meeting, was to obtain more information on household effects, automobiles, and post exchange merchandise than was obtainable from ship manifests. Then, on 18 October, the American Embassy received notification from the Manila Port Collector of Customs "that all MSTS vessels must comply with all port entrance and clearance formalities and specifically with Section 2703 of Tariff and Customs Code which imposes 'Harbor Fees: Harbor Fee is that amount which the owner, agent, operator master of a vessel has to pay for each entrance into or departure from a port of entry in the Philippines.' Fee is approximately 100 pesos." 1

(Q) Since MSTS vessels had not been required to pay this fee in the past, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, G. Mennen Williams, proposed the diversion of an American vessel, loaded with MAP equipment for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), to Subic for unloading. 2 CINCPAC concurred in this diversion the next day. 3 "Harassment continued," meanwhile, "causing delays in offloading of U.S. ships." 4

(Q) On 23 October, Ambassador Williams told CINCPAC that he had an urgent need for "information on form of manifests and tax exemption certificates used and procedures followed for custom clearance of U.S. military cargoes, and ships carrying them," not only in U.S., but in other countries and in Japan, Korea, Thailand and Viet-Nam. 5 Three days later, CINCPAC asked his subordinate commanders to pass on the requested information directly to the American Embassy in Manila. 6

(Q) As early as 17 October 1968, Ambassador Williams had proposed three immediate actions and eleven long term countermeasures which he

1. AMEMBASSY Manila 16541/181102Z Oct 68.
2. Ibid.; J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
3. CINCPAC 190350Z Oct 68.
5. AMEMBASSY Manila 16723/231031Z Oct 68.
6. CINCPAC 260140Z Oct 68.
felt could be employed to dissuade the GOP from its course of continued
harassments. CINCPAC requested comments and recommendations on
countermeasures to the GOP customs clearance problem from his compo-
ment commanders the next day; these were promptly forwarded to him.2
While several of those countermeasures proposed by Ambassador Williams,
such, for example, as shifting R&R flights from Manila, looked like they
might be productive, after "all proposed actions and countermeasures
were reviewed, the position taken by the CINCPAC staff was that discus-
sions with President Marcos and other key officials were necessary and
that any action taken should be carefully weighed for immediate productive
impact and its effect on long range Phil-American relations, and that no
action that would involve third countries should be taken."3

(C) Meanwhile, on 24 October 1968, Ambassador Williams met with
President Marcos of the GOP to discuss the situation. President Marcos
stated that he was aware of the many problems caused by the new customs
procedures. To partially remedy the existing confusion, he suspended
application of the unilaterally imposed changed procedures on U.S. vessels
carrying military cargoes until 1 January 1969. In the meantime, both the
U.S. and the GOP could discuss the problem in detail.4 The first such
meeting took place four days later, "at which time both sides expressed
belief that they should be able to work out legal and technical problems
in ways that would meet objectives of both governments."5 The same
day, 28 October, the American Embassy reported on the meeting as
follows:

... GOP, in concert with U.S. representatives
will work out new agreement on customs procedures

1. AMEMBASSY Manila 170444Z Oct 68, cited in J48/Memo/0399-68 to
J4, Hq CINCPAC, 22 Oct 68, Subj: Philippine Customs Problem -
SITREP 1 (Background); Point Paper, J512, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Nov 68,
Subj: Manila Customs.
2. CINCPAC 180331Z Oct 68; CINCPACAF 242235Z Oct 68; J4811 History,
Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
4. AMEMBASSY Manila 240906Z Oct 68, cited in J48/Memo/0426-68 to
J4, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Oct 68, Subj: SITREP THREE - Philippine
Customs Problem.
to be effective 1 January 1969. Until that time old procedures will apply. Cargo now blocked in Manila (particularly HHC) will be released under old procedures. New procedures will also include air cargo, however, no specific mention was made of MAC charter flights. Re: harbor fees, GOP accepted USNS and GAA vessels as "public vessels" and exempt from fees but not time and voyage charters. GOP agreed not to collect fees on time and voyage at Subic but will collect at Manila over U.S. protest. Legal briefs on this latter matter will be submitted by U.S. Fines paid by commercial vessels have been placed on deposit pending outcome of discussions. CINCPACREP PHIL is considering diversion of time and voyage charter enroute to PHIL to Subic. 

(1) On the last day of the month, 31 October, a joint State Department/DOD message, commenting on the aforementioned report of the American Embassy at Manila, replied as following concerning the GOP suggestion that U.S. time and voyage charters pay harbor fees at Manila on deposit pending outcome of discussions:

...this procedure is not desirable because of possible legal precedent and requests informing GOP that status quo ante should be maintained during discussions and our initial action should be firm refusal to pay. If GOP insists on collecting deposit fees there, all time and voyage charters should be diverted to Subic. Diversion of all DOD sponsored ships and cargo to Subic, although not considered necessary at this time, remains a possible course of action. 

The second meeting between representatives of the U.S. and Philippine governments on the problem of custom examination and harbor fees was held on 4 November 1968. At this time, "the GOP representative implied that it should be possible to work out procedures for strictly military cargoes, but that customs would like to assert greater control over other categories such as household effects, automobiles, PX goods and commissary goods so that it could determine whether importations within these categories are entitled to tax exemption."\(^1\) CINCPAC's position at this time, as it was earlier, was that "the problem be resolved through frank discussions with the GOP vice retaliatory measures."\(^2\)

Late in November 1968, CINCPAC, at the request of CINCPACAF, sent the following message to the JCS:

1. Current discussions with the GOP development of new mutually agreed customs procedures for military cargoes, including those arriving by aircraft, are being conducted against the backdrop of a GOP established 1 January 1969 implementation date. At this time 1 January 1969 appears unreasonable and unrealistic, particularly in view of lack of definition of GOP demands and the time required to implement any substantive new procedures.

2. Possible adverse impact on CINCPAC mission requirements which could result from an arbitrary implementation date, allowing insufficient time and compliance with agreed procedures and opening the door to GOP delays, is viewed with concern. Action should be taken to avoid potential interference with sealift and airlift operations.

3. Recommend avoidance of any U.S. commitment to an arbitrary GOP deadline for new customs procedures, and further recommend that date be established through mutual agreement after all GOP demands are known with sufficient time for implementation.\(^3\)

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2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 232336Z Nov 68; CINCPACAF 071916Z Nov 68; J512 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
Request for Airlift Assistance

Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Philippines (CHJUSMAGPHIL), advised CINCPAC on 13 October 1968, that President Marcos of the Philippines had asked for U.S. airlift assistance in moving approximately 10,000 pounds of vehicle radios and allied equipment from the continental United States. This equipment was "being procured for Philippine Constabulary and is urgently required for law and order campaign in vicinity of Manila and environs," the U.S. Ambassador had endorsed this request.1 The same day, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS coordinate "with State Department to determine whether formal request to SECDEF is anticipated."2

Two days later, the JCS informed CINCPAC that Office of the Secretary of Defense representatives were "discussing the matter with the State Department and U.S. Air Force."3 Subsequently, on 24 October, the JCS further advised CINCPAC that the State Department had obtained SECDEF approval for this airlift and the project had been given to the Military Airlift Command for action.4 In light of the recent harassment of American ships by the Manila Customs, Secretary Rusk instructed his ambassador in the Philippines to "advise Marcos that by bending the rules and regulations in this case, you will be able to arrange for a rotating USAF transport aircraft to deliver the material as he had requested" and to inform the President "or other appropriate officials of our goodwill in taking action we have in this case and we hope it will be reciprocated."5

Thailand

Thai SOFA Negotiations

Despite the progress made last year towards implementing a SOFA agreement with Thailand, the first half of 1968 witnessed no formal

1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 130500Z Oct 68; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
2. CINCPAC 132116Z Oct 68.
3. JCS 03077/152126Z Oct 68.
4. JCS 04087/241332Z Oct 68; SECSTATE 259593/222114Z Oct 68; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
5. SECSTATE 259593/222114Z Oct 68.
negotiating sessions since the last one of 3 November 1967, although the U.S. had presented a new draft SOFA to the Thais on 1 February 1968. 1 Meanwhile, in January 1968, the Thai authorities indicated that they would begin exercising criminal jurisdiction over American servicemen, stating their "belief that not all U.S. military personnel stationed in Thailand were entitled to diplomatic immunity but only those officially listed on the diplomatic register." 2

(C) By June, the Thai had exercised criminal jurisdiction over a U.S. serviceman and had indicated their intentions to exercise jurisdiction in other cases. 3 As Leonard Unger, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, reported on the 7th:

...we anticipate no possibility that the Thai will reverse their decision to press forward with prosecution in these two cases once the exchange has been completed. Any further attempts by Embassy to alter RTG decision to try these cases might well have effect of prejudicing our position on duty and inter se cases. 4

(C) On 29 April 1968, meanwhile, an American official of the U.S. Embassy in a discussion with representatives of the Royal Thai Government, "emphasized our desire to conclude SOFA soon as possible and reviewed briefly our desire to reach an interim understanding with the RTG regarding the protections and guarantees afforded an accused, as well as procedure for consultation regarding particular cases." 5 The Thai agreed to the U.S. proposal, and notes were exchanged between the two countries confirming these pre-SOFA criminal jurisdiction arrangements. 6 In a report to the Secretary of State on 5 July, Ambassador Unger cabled:

2. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 8662/120825Z Jan 68.
3. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 15712/070600Z Jun 68; AMEMBASSY Bangkok 15536/040409Z Jun 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan-Jun 68.
4. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 15712/070600Z Jun 68.
5. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 13957/301120Z Apr 68.
6. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan-Jun 68.
During discussion at July 4 reception, DEPRIMIN Prince Wan referred with evident pleasure to fact that exchange of notes on interim guarantees pending SOFA had taken place and found particular satisfaction in stating that Cabinet decision had been unanimous. Prince Wan found this fact noteworthy because of prior discussions over hypothetical problem of prosecutions for treason, offense against the Crown, etc. that would involve military trial without protective guarantees. Prince Wan said he was prepared to recognize that such cases would not arise, and therefore that the problem between us need not have arisen, but that not all his colleagues had been so disposed.  

(C) In September, the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok notified the State Department that the Thai were apparently willing, on an informal basis, to agree to certain SOFA-type interim procedures, without, however, incorporating them into any formal, written agreement. Under this arrangement, the Royal Thai Government would be agreeable to transferring jurisdiction over U.S. personnel to the U.S. in all but "odious" cases, recognizing "special importance of official duty cases," and having the Allied Coordinating Committee designated as the agency for consultation and transfer of jurisdiction.  

(C) The Secretary of State expressed his misgivings to the American Embassy in Bangkok early the next month about an informal Thai SOFA arrangements on criminal jurisdiction and requested the Embassy to continue working for criminal jurisdiction procedures along conventional lines; the pertinent portions of the joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message of 3 October 1968 follow:  

1. EMB correct in believing that a mini-SOFA of the kind proposed by FONMIN Thanat... is not acceptable. Among the reasons behind our position are the following:

1. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 17064/051146Z Jul 68.
2. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68; AMEMBASSY Bangkok 20249/131118Z Sep 68.
A. We consider the "odious case" concept not susceptible of a sufficiently precise definition to be reliable as a criterion for the right to exercise jurisdiction.

B. The "transfer of jurisdiction" concept appears inconsistent with the theory of concurrent jurisdiction underlying our position.

C. Recognizing the "special importance" of duty cases does not meet our need to retain the primary right to exercise jurisdiction in all duty cases.

2. Such an interim agreement would not obtain what we want in the way of a SOFA criminal jurisdiction article, would represent adverse precedent for criminal jurisdiction arrangements elsewhere, and we fear, would probably greatly diminish incentive for Thai to seriously consider a SOFA provision of the kind we do desire. Accordingly, we agree you should work closely with appropriate Thai for resolution of cases without need for judicial proceedings and continue to pursue agreement on criminal jurisdiction along the conventional lines of our draft.

3. We welcome RTG recognition of need to conduct courts-martial, including general courts-martial in Thailand. We assume trials will of course be held within bases and in a manner best designed to avoid attracting public attention. We assume that the appropriate military commanders may now proceed to bring to trial those cases involving only U.S. personnel without Thai witnesses or interest. AMB and military commanders should work out agreed procedures for consultations in those cases in which the RTG may have an interest to ensure that no case that will have unacceptable political implications will be tried by courts-martial in Thailand.\(^1\)

\(^1\) In a reply to a question posed in the aforesaid message, Ambassador Unger informed the SECSTATE on 22 October that procedures were

1. SECSTATE 249526/032136Z Oct 68.
being worked out with the Thai to permit trial by General Court-Martial in Thailand, with the appearance of Thai witnesses on a voluntary bases.\(^1\) In addition, he stated that:

\[\ldots\] Efforts to work out resolution of cases informally are bearing fruit. If by the very informal methods now employed the old incidents can be satisfactorily handled quietly. Action on claims for damages in, of course, a major element in the resolution of the criminal jurisdiction aspects of incidents involving U.S. servicemen. In this regard, the military services are doing an outstanding job without which we very likely would not be able to secure release without judicial proceedings of the individuals involved in many of the vehicular homicide cases.

Believe RTG is aware of special importance we attach to inter se cases. Duty cases and inter se cases have always been discussed as categories in which the U.S. has a special interest.\(\ldots\) In discussions of procedures or principles regarding criminal jurisdiction, duty cases and inter se cases are taken up together.\(^2\)

\((C)\) Approximately a month later, Ambassador Unger further informed the SECSTATE that the informal arrangements with the Government of Thailand were functioning:

\[\ldots\] exceptionally well and has resulted in informal disposition of cases without the exercise of jurisdiction by RTG. The nineteen cases referred to in Ref C have all been resolved and the individuals concerned have been rotated or cleared for rotation from Thailand. Although the RTG continues to maintain its position that it may be required to exercise jurisdiction in "odious cases", to date it has not yet categorized any incident in this manner.

\(^1\) Ibid.; AMEMBASSY Bangkok 21876/220850Z Oct 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.

\(^2\) AMEMBASSY Bangkok 21876/220850Z Oct 68.
Along with the procedures to handling incidents we have proceeded to implement an informal understanding that U.S. military authorities might convene trials by General Court-Martial in Thailand without RTG objection, provided they can be handled quietly, without publicity within the bases. During the past two months five cases have been tried with no repercussions thus far in the local community or comment by Thai authorities.

The informal discussions concerning our revised Draft SOFA are continuing. The talks are having the effect of laying an excellent groundwork for later formal negotiations as well as assisting the RTG in its study of our revised Draft tabled on February 1, 1968.

We cannot yet predict when more formal negotiations will commence as the local political climate remains somewhat dynamic.¹

(S) In December 1968, CINCPAC's position remained the same. He favored "early resumption of negotiations and ultimate agreement on SOFA;" meanwhile, he was continuing "to monitor the implementation of the interim criminal jurisdiction arrangement we have concluded with the Thais and the SOFA negotiations," ready to interject his views when appropriate.²

Importation of POVs into Thailand

Beginning in June 1967 and thereafter intermittently, the Thais have imposed restrictions on the importation of POVs (Privately Owned Vehicles) by U.S. personnel assigned other than to JUSMAG (Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group) Thailand. The explanation of the Thai officials was that the duty-free privileges of the Military Assistance Agreement

1. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 23341/230505Z Nov 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
2. Point Paper, J73, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and Interim Criminal Jurisdiction Safeguards in Thailand.
of 1950 did not apply to these persons. A number of efforts, through various channels, in attempting to resolve this difficulty proved unsuccessful. A major stumbling block, evidently, was the attitude of the Thai Foreign Minister Thanat, who opposed the U.S. position in Cabinet meetings. By September 1968, however, it appeared that the American Embassy in Bangkok was on the verge of a significant breakthrough. Since 8 July 1968, 87 POV applications had been approved by the Thai Foreign Office, and a number of previously disapproved applications had been resubmitted. As U.S. Ambassador Unger said: "We will plan our next steps in the light of whatever action the Foreign Office takes on these cases."1

Airlift Request for Royal Thai Armed Forces Staff College (RTAFSC) Orientation Tour

(U) By letter on 21 December 1967, COMUSMACTHAI requested military airlift support for the RTAFSC annual orientation tour, scheduled for the period 3-17 April 1968.2 Early in January 1968, CINCPAC queried CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT to ascertain airlift availability. On the last day of the month, he notified COMUSMACTHAI the types and capacities of the aircrafts available and further stated that if neither "offer of assistance acceptable, request arrangements be completed directly with appropriate headquarters."3

Vietnam

Court-Martial Jurisdiction over U.S. Civilians in Vietnam

(C) Because of State Department instructions, reported the American Embassy at Saigon on 21 August 1968, no waiver of GVN jurisdiction was sought to permit the trial of two U.S. civilians, John N. Morris and Arlen R. Johnson, by court-martial for currency offenses. As a result, both secured "prompt release from military custody" and, since the GVN declined to prosecute them, they "both escaped any punishment by either U.S. or GVN authorities."4

1. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 20237/131042Z Sep 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
2. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
3. CINCPAC 310408Z Jan 68; CINCPACAF 110010Z Jan 68.
4. AMEMBASSY Saigon 35964/210945Z Aug 68.
The "fundamental inequity" involved in this situation was pointed out by Embassy officials, for the court-martial and subsequent punishment of the USMC segeant accomplice "will cost him very considerable financial loss and punish him for the rest of his career and through retirement," while "Johnson and Morris are going scot free." Such "policies baffle and confuse military personnel who are tried and sentenced for their part in these crimes, while civilian co-conspirators go free" and, since this "policy of not trying civilians is known throughout RVN," continued the Embassy officials, "we are experiencing an increasing number of serious offenses by U.S. civilian employees." Because of the "seriousness of money manipulation problems" in Vietnam and of injustice in the existing policies, Ambassador Bunker recommended that his "Embassy be authorized determine what civilian offender cases should be the subject of requests for waiver of GVN jurisdiction," and CINCPAC, subsequently, supported his position.

The next month, court-martial charges were preferred against C. A. Branum, a U.S. civilian employee of Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc., a U.S.-invited contractor performing solely in support of U.S. mission in Vietnam, for his part in the larceny and illegal disposition of some $150,000.00 worth of U.S. Government property. As Ambassador Bunker wired SECSTATE on 21 September, the RVN Minister of Justice had stated that "GVN not interested in prosecution where no Vietnamese involvement. Therefore, Embassy requests permission to seek waiver of GVN primary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction in this case in order that the Army Commander concerned may proceed in taking appropriate action."4

A decision in this matter had to be postponed, however, for the State Department had information "that habeas corpus proceeding on behalf of Branum has been initiated in U.S. District Court for District of Columbia" and wanted "discussions with Assistant U.S. Attorney handling

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
4. AMEMBASSY Saigon 38398/211059Z Sep 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
case prior to making that decision."\(^1\) Concern over this delay was expressed by COMUSMACV on 3 October:

Request SECDEF assist MACV by coordination with SECSTATE in order that AMEMBASSY, Saigon may be authorized to seek the requested waiver, and MACV be authorized to proceed in this matter. Approval of request to seek waiver will not hamper or interfere with habeas corpus proceeding and if a writ ultimately issues, Branum will not have been harmed. MACV is concerned that no excessive time lag or inactivity either violate or complicate Branum's right to a speedy trial.\(^2\)

\(^{(C)}\) Although the State Department agreed "that magnitude of alleged larceny and criminal operations of defendant render it significant case and one in which prosecution ought to ensue," it declined to give the necessary approval.\(^3\) Instead, the suggestion was made that the GVN be urged to take jurisdiction of this particular case or, if this attempt failed, that arrangements be made to try Branum in a U.S. Federal District Court.

\(^{(C)}\) On 13 October, COMUSMACV vigorously requested a reconsideration of the Branum case by SECSTATE--a position supported by CINCPAC--and pointed out the following:

...Minister of Justice reviewed case, including personnel involved and actions taken and after noting absence of involvement of GVN police or Vietnamese personnel and property, advised he does not, repeat not, wish to try Branum in GVN court...

Trial in U.S. District Court presents formidable problems and possibility that no action will be taken against Branum because of difficulties and expense involved.

1. SECSTATE 248413/020041Z Oct 68.
2. COMUSMACV 29284/030747Z Oct 68
3. SECSTATE 251554/081652Z Oct 68.
This case involves wrongful appropriation and disposition of approximately $150,000 in U.S. property and high officials of government contractors. Wide publicity has attended this case, and companion cases involving Degill Corporation officials are nearing completion of investigative process and shortly will be subject to request for exercise of Court-Martial jurisdiction. Lack of punitive action will adversely affect U.S. image with GVN and endanger high priority goal of elimination of corruption and favoritism in GVN. We must be able to clean our own house and terminate such misconduct by persons subject to our control. Further it is believed that Branum, and Degill Corporation officials with whom he dealt, have considerable holdings in the Philippines and it is not likely they will ever return to the United States.¹

² Although recognizing the "adverse impact on U.S. morale of permitting Branum to go unpunished," the State Department adhered to its previous position, for reasons which it considered "overriding." Subsequently, on 25 October, Ambassador Bunker substantiated COMUSMACV's information and echoed the same recommendations, when he stated that the Vietnamese Minister of Justice:

...after pondering over information provided, stated GVN would not take jurisdiction over Branum since he not Vietnamese and there was no Vietnamese involvement at all, and theft of property was from U.S. Government. U.S. Government obviously best prepared to cope with this type of offender and protect own interests....

Mission fears Department's Branum decision is near emasculation of mission effort to cope with problem of American civilian lawbreakers. If Court-Martial not forthcoming and Branum escapes punishment completely, this will be interpreted as license to steal from USG by those American civilians whose sole purpose in being in Vietnam is self-enrichment. U.S. military authorities, both enforcement and investigative, throughout Vietnam feel frustrated in efforts to enforce regulations and laws because civilian violators escape with impunity....

1. COMUSMACV 30422/130843Z Oct 68; CINCPAC 191145Z Oct 68.
2. SECSTATE 256507/162200Z Oct 68.
we convinced interests USG and simple justice demand and deserve the utilization of easily available legal processes (U.S. Military Court-Martial)-including Branum's rights of appeal to higher courts.1

(2) For the better part of the next month, the State Department explored the possibility of having Branum tried in a U.S. District Court on Guam; Branum would be extradited from South Vietnam to Guam, and the necessary Vietnamese witnesses would be transported there for the trial.2 Although the Saigon Embassy officials were confident that the Vietnamese witnesses would be willing to go to Guam to testify, they pointed out the complication to any extradition process against Branum, because he had been "forcibly returned to Saigon via U.S. military aircraft from Tokyo," had probably never cleared through GVN immigration and, as a result, was likely to be "in Vietnam illegally."3 During an "informal frank discussion" with the Vietnamese Minister of Justice on the morning of 19 November, it was suggested to Ambassador Bunker that, since the Vietnamese Government would object to any formal extradition proceedings against Branum, the U.S. should "take Branum out of Vietnam same way he was brought in; i.e., through military, provided that such action could be taken without public knowledge."4

(2) As for its opinion, the U.S. Department of Justice informed the State Department on 5 November 1968 that "after examination of Branum case from a legal and practical point of view, a Court-Martial would be the most desirable alternative."5 Noting this opinion, COMUSMACV then asked SECDEF on 17 December for either permission to proceed with the Court-Martial or disposition instructions, as Branum had been in confinement since 23 August 1968.6 Meanwhile, CINCPAC had

1. AMEMBASSY Saigon 40792/211300Z Oct 68.
2. SECSTATE 270311/122213Z Nov 68; AMEMBASSY Saigon 42363/090850Z Nov 68; SECSTATE 271448/141744Z Nov 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
3. AMEMBASSY Saigon 42811/160536Z Nov 68.
4. AMEMBASSY Saigon 43090/201015Z Nov 68; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
5. COMUSMACV 42603/170905Z Dec 68.
6. Ibid.
expressed concern to SECDEF over the policy of the State Department that permitted U.S. civilian offenders, such as Branum, to escape punishment completely, and pointed out:

...that the statement of the GVN Minister of Justice that Branum would not be prosecuted in a GVN court was, in effect, a waiver of jurisdiction which would permit the USG to try Branum by military court.¹

SECDEF concurred with CINCPAC and COMUSMACV in their views on the Branum case. As a result, he wrote to SECSTATE, expressing the opinion that "the statement by the Vietnamese Minister of Justice that the GVN will not exercise jurisdiction over Branum is, in effect, a waiver of GVN jurisdiction."² The calendar year ended without any further developments.

¹ CINCPAC 210352Z Dec 68.
² CJCS 171858Z Dec 68, cited in J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME III

1968

Prepared by the Historical Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII
1969
ADMIRAL JOHN S. McCAIN JR.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
FOREWORD

(U) The mission of the Commander in Chief Pacific is to maintain the security of the Pacific Command, defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean, support and advance the national policies and interests of the United States, and discharge U.S. military responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East and Southeast Asia.

(U) Geographically, the Pacific Command is the largest U.S. Unified Command. The area of responsibility of the Commander in Chief spreads over 40 percent of the earth's surface -- 85 million square miles of land and sea stretching from the west coast of the Americas into the Indian Ocean and from the Bering Sea to the South Pole.

(U) To carry out CINCPAC's mission and to counter the Communist threat in the Pacific region, the build-up of U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific Command over the past several years has been dramatic. The total strength, which peaked in 1968, was over a million active military personnel, of whom about one-half served in Vietnam.

(U) The seriousness of the Communist threat is not limited to hostilities in Vietnam. In varying degrees of intensity, it is also posed for no less than ten other countries in the Pacific region. Consequently, should hostilities in Vietnam end, the vital necessity for maintaining a powerful and responsive U.S. military "presence" in the Pacific will remain.

(U) Given the required military "presence", the Pacific Command will be ready as it is today to defend and to advance the national policies and interests of the United States.

JOHN S. MCCAIN, Jr.
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific

iii
PREFACE

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-408-59 of 17 April 1959 require the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS and other agencies of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations and problems faced by CINCPAC and the status of the Pacific Command (PACOM) from the standpoint of its commander. Additionally, the required annual report preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS to the extent that major decisions and directives of the JCS concerning the PACOM may be determined by historians of the JCS without research in the records of the PACOM. This 1968 CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

(U) As in the case of previous historical reports since 1959, this report describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, especially those connected with international crises and those peculiar to a joint command. This history records CINCPAC's command decisions and achievements and omits "detailed" activities of subordinate unified commands or of Allied nations in the PACOM area. Most of the decisions and activities included in this report are related directly with CINCPAC's efforts to preserve the freedom in those areas in the Pacific Command where people still have the right to make a free choice.

(U) To provide continuity, this history is organized in the same manner as previous histories, primarily in line with the objectives of CINCPAC. Chapter I, "The State of Readiness of United States Forces," describes CINCPAC forces and the planning for their employment to carry out United States policies, as well as the multitudinous activities of Headquarters CINCPAC that do not logically fit in the other chapters. Chapter II, "CINCPAC Actions Influencing the State of Readiness of Allied Nations in the PACOM Area," deals with CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program. Chapter III, "CINCPAC Actions Concerning Relationships Between the United States and Other Countries," reports the actions of CINCPAC in his position as United States Military Adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and with politico-military events pertaining to his command. CINCPAC's mission to counter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia is treated in
some detail in Chapter IV, "Actions to Counter Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia."

(U)  This year's history is published in four volumes: Volume I - Chapter I; Volume II - Chapters II and III; Volume III - Sections I - V, Chapter IV; and Volume IV - Sections VI - X, Chapter IV. A glossary and an index for the complete history is included in Volume IV only. Pagination is complete within each volume rather than running consecutively throughout the four volumes. As in previous years, the annual histories prepared by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI are included as Annexes A and B, respectively.

(U)  The CINCPAC Command Historian, Colonel J.R. Johnson, USA, under the supervision of Colonel A.M. Matthews, USAF, Secretary of the Joint Staff, Headquarters CINCPAC, planned and published the 1968 CINCPAC Command History as required by CINCPAC Staff Instruction 5750.10 of 20 August 1968. COL Johnson personally researched and wrote Chapter IV with exception of Sections V - IX and prepared the glossary.

(U)  Members of the CINCPAC Historical Branch assisted the Command Historian in the preparation of the history. Mr. Truman R. Strobridge, as Senior Historian, researched and wrote Chapters II and III and Sections V and IX of Chapter IV. In addition, he provided technical guidance and shared his professional expertise when and where required throughout the preparation of this history. Mrs. Polly Tallman, Assistant Historian, prepared Chapter I and Sections VI - VIII of Chapter IV.

(U)  The manuscript was typed in final format by Mrs. LuElla Saxton, Clerk-Stenographer of CINCPAC Historical Branch, Miss Maggie Kaonchi and Yeoman First Class Donald J. Cagle, USN. The index was prepared by Mrs. Mary Jane Garrett. All graphics for this history were prepared under the expert supervision of Master Sergeant John F. Stevenson, USAF, Shop Supervisor, Graphics Section, J0412. Staff Sergeant Leonard L. Powell, USAF, Shop Supervisor, Reproduction Section, J0412, supervised the expeditious printing of the draft manuscript which facilitated staff coordination. Finally, the immeasurable support rendered by the CINCPAC Staff is greatly appreciated.

J. R. JOHNSON
COLONEL USA
CINCPAC Command Historian
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CHAPTER IV

ACTIONS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(U) To the uninitiated our troubles in the Pacific consist of little more than the present hostilities in Vietnam. What is known but not generally understood in all its seriousness is the threat the communist world poses to no less than ten other countries in the Pacific region. Communist insurgencies disguised as wars of national liberation have as their major aim the infiltration and subversion of the newly independent states of Southeast Asia and East Asia. Their goal is to turn these countries into communist satellites. These countries value their independence, but alone they are unable to withstand communist aggression. If we stand around and allow country after country to be overwhelmed, it will be only a matter of time before there is another major Asian war. We have allies in the area and it is our task to support them, if they are willing to fight for themselves. This is in our vital national interest, and the way to avert World War III.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. ¹

(U) This chapter discusses CINCPAC's plans, policies, programs, operations, decisions and actions associated with his mission of countering Communist aggression in Southeast Asia and Korea. Annexes A and B to the CINCPAC 1968 Command History published by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI respectively, complement the CINCPAC coverage of Southeast Asia and provide additional details.

¹ Address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC, before the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, Cal., 22 Nov 68.
SECTION I - SOUTHEAST ASIA PLANS, POLICY AND PROGRAMS

(U) Section I of Chapter IV treats with CINCPAC contingency planning and force requirements in Southeast Asia.

Contingency Planning Southeast Asia

Corps-Sized Operations in Laos

(TS) In 1965 and 1966, plans were formulated for the use of a U.S. Army corps to conduct operations in southern Laos. Two of the plans were Operation RAINFALL and Operation SEAFREE. Operation RAINFALL envisioned operations in Laos with forces deployed from Thailand while Operation SEAFREE introduced the forces through South Vietnam into Laos. In 1967, the concept of a corps-sized force to conduct operations in Laos surfaced in the form of Operation FULLCRI. This plan, like its two predecessor plans, became inactive when it reached the JCS. In 1968, another conceptual plan for a corps-sized operation in Laos was prepared. On 30 January, COMUSMACV proposed Operation Plan EL PASO. The concept involved a provisional three-division corps consisting of two U.S. and one ARVN division and a possible armored cavalry regiment.

(TS) The first version of the plan committed the three-division corps astride NVA infiltration routes as far west as Muong Phine, approximately 40 miles from South Vietnam's western boundary. In March, COMUSMACV reviewed the plan and directed that the troop list be reduced and that objectives deeper in Laos than Ban Dong and Four Corners, about 16 miles from the western boundary of SVN, be eliminated. New guidance required the development of a concept to seize objectives along Route 9 between RVN-Laos border and territory controlled by the Royal Lao Government, limit Operation EL PASO to a single dry season in Laos, November through March, and limit the troop list to forces available in RVN.

(TS) In the initial plan, for planning purposes, D-Day was established as 1 October 1968. In the revised plan D-Day was tentatively set for...

2. COMUSMACV 300116Z Jan 68; J5533 History, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Mar 68 for month of Feb 68.
3. CINCPAC received the revised plan 6 Jul 68; Point Paper, J5531, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Oct 68, Subj: Operation Plan EL PASO.
15 November with no year designated. COMUSMACV considered this version of Operation Plan EL PASO to be a contingency plan, which could be updated for execution at anytime if required. The plan projected a two-division force, a U.S. airmobile and an ARVN airborne division, in a blocking-screening mission astride major NVA infiltration routes in Laos. The operation would take approximately 165 days and would be supported logistically over Routes 9 and 12 and by air from a logistics base in northern I CTZ. Engineer support for the operation would have to begin early June or force requirements would be prohibitive. 

(TS) On the first plan, CINCPAC commented that the planning and logistics requirements and limitations inherent in EL PASO were many and that the cost of the operation in terms of men and material would be high. He doubted the feasibility of diverting major combat and support forces from operations in SVN. CINCPAC felt that the political consequences in Laos and worldwide would be extremely adverse and that it was doubtful that the results which might be achieved by EL PASO would compensate for the effort and possible risks involved. The Component Commanders review of the plan did not support the proposed concept.

(TS) U.S. Ambassador to Laos Sullivan expressed concern over the plan. In a message to CINCPAC on 15 July, he expressed the assumption that under present political-military contexts, the plan was "very much on the back burner." While he did not comment on the concept of the plan, he did discuss some of the features of the plan. Unfortunately, his comments were based on the erroneous impression that 15 November 1968 had been designated as D-Day. Ambassador Sullivan seemed mainly concerned about the requirement for subordinate commands of MACV to submit supporting plans for EL PASO by 15 August 1968. He felt that these commands would initiate programs which would re-orient their activities to meet EL PASO planning objectives and that in turn, these activities would develop signatures that would be identifiable by Hanoi, thus creating an adverse impact on peace talks in Paris.

(TS) On 19 July, General Abrams suspended the 15 August submission date pending revision of the basic plan by MACV. Revision of the plan

1. Ibid: J5533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
2. Point Paper, J5533, Hq CINCPAC, 20 Feb 68, Subj: Operation Plan EL PASO.
was necessary since changed circumstances in northern I CTZ area negated certain assumptions and planning factors of Operation Plan EL PASO.¹

(TS) General Abrams notified CINCPAC that EL PASO would remain as an internal MACV planning document and was being prepared as a contingency plan against possible future requirements. On 21 July, Admiral Sharp informed Ambassador Sullivan of General Abrams' action and informed Mr. Sullivan that he would be consulted before further action was taken on the plan. Admiral Sharp directed his staff to take no further action pending revision of the plan.²

(TS) A review of the plan indicated three important objections to the plan - political implications, availability of forces and vulnerability of logistic support. On the political side, overt military operations by U.S. forces could be construed as open contravention of the 1962 Geneva Agreements. Political repercussions would be world-wide and support of the U.S. effort in Vietnam would be further impaired. The availability of the proposed two-division force would be at the expense of on-going in-country programs and operations in SVN unless the situation there was greatly improved. The logistic support of the operation would be based on the ability to keep Route 9 in Laos open, supplemented with air-delivered supplies. The high vulnerability of Route 9 to enemy interdiction could require complete air delivered support for a force of about 48,000 men. It appeared doubtful that the JCS would approve the plan if requested to do so.³

Anti-Infiltration Interdiction Systems

(U) ...we have for two years or more been examining into the possibilities of using ground obstacles and other devices to help impede the flow of men and supplies into South Vietnam. Many persons, some inside the Department of Defense and some in research organizations outside the Department, have recommended different proposals.

1. Ibid; COMUSMACV 190159 Z Jul 68.
3. Ibid.
Some of these proposals have been examined in detail and discarded. Others appear to have more promise. You are all aware that work has been started on clearing the jungle south of the DMZ for a stretch of roughly 15 miles. We are preparing to initiate late this year or early next year the operation of a system to make infiltration more difficult. The system's objective will be consistent with those of our air campaign against the lines of communication. We know, of course, that no obstacle system can stop the infiltration of personnel or supplies.

Secretary of Defense McNamara

(9) An anti-infiltration system which will impede or stop the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam is highly desirable. There has been little, if any, argument over the need for the system, however, there has been serious discussion and disagreement over the method of its implementation. Nevertheless, the anti-infiltration program has been implemented and the following is a resume of its background.

1. SECDEF 5695, ASD (PA) 072049Z Sep 67.
3. Detailed background of the program has been covered in the 1966 and 1967 CINCPAC Command History. However, the above background resume is provided in order to give clarity and understanding to the events that took place in 1968. The resume is verbatim from a report prepared by the IGLOO WHITE/DUEL BLADE/DUCK BLIND Committee, on 15 October 1968. The chairman of the committee was Admiral James S. Russell, USN (Retired). The report was forwarded as an enclosure to: Memorandum for the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the CJCS from Defense Communication Planning Group, 15 Oct 68, signed by James S. Russell, Admiral U.S. Navy (Retired) Chairman, IGLOO WHITE/DUEL BLADE/DUCK BLIND Committee. Hereafter, referred to as the "Russell Report."
In August 1966, the Jason Division of the Institute of Defense Analyses (IDA) completed a study of an air supported anti-infiltration barrier designed to help isolate the South Vietnam battlefield from North Vietnam. This study was presented to the Secretary of Defense in early September with the suggestion that a period of months be devoted to examining the concept in detail. The Secretary of Defense decided on immediate implementation, noting that, if the fulfillment of the concept was not going well, it could be stopped in three months with only minor expenditures of funds. Consequently, on 15 September 1966, the Secretary issued a memorandum naming Lt. Gen. Alfred D. Starbird, USA, as Director of Joint Task Force 728 and charging him with implementation of the infiltration interdiction system. The project office established as headquarters for the Director became known as the Defense Communications Planning Group (DCPG), and the Director was endowed with rather sweeping powers, reporting directly to the Secretary while "keeping informed" other senior defense officials. The system was to be installed in-theater and operating by 15 September 1967.

As then conceived the anti-infiltration system was to have two parts—one against foot traffic, and the other against vehicles. That against foot traffic was to extend along, but south of, the southern border of the Demilitarized Zone on into Laos ending northwest of Tcheponne; that against

1. The initial nickname of the anti-infiltration system was PRACTICE NINE. It included both the part against foot traffic and the subsystem against vehicle traffic. Later it was redesignated ILLINOIS CITY and then DYE MARKER. Eventually, the air-supported system, which included a part of the anti-personnel subsystem and all of the anti-vehicle subsystem, was designated MUSCLE SHOALS. When this occurred, the physical anti-personnel barrier on the east retained the name DYE MARKER and the air-supported system became MUSCLE SHOALS. MUSCLE SHOALS in turn had two subsystems: in the center, the air-supported anti-personnel system known as DUMP TRUCK and the air-supported anti-vehicle system on the west known as MUD RIVER. On 28 May, DYE MARKER was redesignated DUEL BLADE and MUSCLE SHOALS was redesignated IGLOO WHITE.
vehicles was to cover the road networks in Laos from Mu Gia Pass to south of Route 9, an area approximately 100 by 40 kilometers. The eastern end of the anti-foot traffic system in the coastal plains was to be a "wide ground barrier of minefields, concertina, fences, sensing devices, patrols, and air mobile troops, the remainder of the anti-foot and all of the anti-vehicle system was " to be effectuated entirely by air action." Antipersonnel mines of the type known as Gravel were to be employed in large quantities, as were noise making button bomblets to actuate acoustic sensors. The initial system was estimated, by the IDA/Jason Report and repeated in an attachment to General Starbird's directive, to cost $800 million per year, with key requirements: 20 million Gravel mines, 25 million button bomblets, 10 thousand SADYE bomb clusters, and 1600 acoustic sensors per month; 70 OP-2 aircraft, 20 mine dispensing C-123 aircraft, and 500 strike sorties and photo reconnaissance to cover 2500 square miles per week. That the Secretary recognized many changes would be necessary in effecting an anti-infiltration barrier is indicated by his reference to the "first generation" of the system.

Three systems comprise the barrier as originally conceived: on the east, a physical barrier; in the center, an air supported antipersonnel system; and on the west, air supported anti-vehicular system.

Various technological, political, and financial difficulties were encountered which, as time progressed, delayed or forced modification or partial implementation of the separate segments. On 22 December 1966 a modified plan, incorporating the results of a continuing exchange of views between the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), and the Director of DCPG was issued by the Director establishing among others these key milestones:

"1. For the Linear Barrier. Procure the materials for the linear section so as to be ready in-theater by July 1967, but without commitment now as to when they might later be used.
2. For the Air Supported Capability. Develop and prepare the aircraft elements and other resources unique to the air supported capability on a schedule to permit operational availability in-theater by 1 November 1967. Readying for this date would not constitute a decision as to deployment."

It is of interest that actions detailed in subsequent portions of the 22 December memorandum commence with the requirement to obtain from CINCPAC/COMUSMACV their specific plan for the interdiction of infiltration.

The highest national priority was accorded this project in a SECDEF memorandum dated 19 January 1967 to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Despite this emphasis on the total system, effort and resources were concentrated on that portion considered the most promising or important. Accordingly, the antipersonnel portion, in a SECDEF memorandum dated 22 April 1967, was downgraded to the status of "operational test and limited operational capability."

By his memorandum of 22 September 1967, SECDEF, because of the practical difficulties involved in meeting previously determined deployment dates, authorized further slippage of the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the anti-vehicular subsystem from 1 November to 1 December 1967, and, for the air supported antipersonnel subsystem, to 1 January 1968.

The former date was substantially met, but the enemy's Tet offensive and the subsequent Khe Sanh battle effectively suspended implementation of the antipersonnel subsystem.

On the eastern end, logistical problems, enemy actions, and concern for mobility, combined with an early and intense monsoon to force suspension of the installation of the linear barrier.

Thus, early in calendar year 1968, only one of the three planned segments of the proposed barrier - the anti-vehicular subsystem - was in operation. As the year progressed,
a program of continuing refinement aimed at the improvement of this subsystem was being carried out. The middle sector of the proposed barrier remained essentially unimplemented. On the eastern end efforts were devoted to the construction of a series of mutually supporting strong points, three of which were connected by a 600-meter-wide-path cleared of vegetation. Simultaneously, as an outgrowth of sensor employment during the defense of Khe Sanh, an examination of the value of sensor systems in tactical applications in ground battle was directed by COMUSMACV.

MUD RIVER, the air-supported anti-vehicular subsystem of IGLOO WHITE was executed on 1 December 1967. DUMP TRUCK, the air-supported anti-personnel system of IGLOO WHITE was scheduled for execution on 20 January 1968, however, the system has yet to be emplaced in a configuration similar to that of the initial concept.

The overall effectiveness of IGLOO WHITE came under extensive review by CINCPAC in 1968. During the first seven months that IGLOO WHITE was in operation the percentage of MUD RIVER truck kills attributable to the Infiltration Surveillance Centers (ISC) were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The above percentages indicated a low ISC effectiveness level. The increase in effectiveness during February was due to a greatly increased percentage of ISC-detected tracks being investigated and confirmed while the increased percentage in June resulted from extremely poor weather which permitted a majority of targets to be identified by sensors. However, during June the number of trucks destroyed was minimal compared to the number destroyed in the other months.

CINCPAC recommended to the CJCS, that preparations be made to phase out IGLOO WHITE, as constituted, by the end of CY 68. CINCPAC's

1. Ibid; Point Paper, J3B39, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Mar 68, Subj: MUSCLE SHOALS/DYE MARKER.
basis for the recommendation was the high costs associated with the program and the limited contribution to the destruction of trucks in the panhandle of Laos compared with standard interdiction efforts. Subsequently, COMUSMACV recommended that IGLOO WHITE operations continue during a second phase when second generation sensors and improved munitions would be available. This would carry operations into CY 69. The Commanding General, FMFPAC, also recommended that IGLOO WHITE should continue through CY 69 in order to fully test and exploit the system.\(^1\)

Before replying to CINCPAC's proposal, the SECDEF and the JCS decided to evaluate the effectiveness of the IGLOO WHITE/DUEL BLADE/DUCK BLIND (to be discussed later in this section) programs. On 7 August, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, in a memorandum to Admiral James S. Russell, USN (Retired), Chairman, IGLOO WHITE/DUEL BLADE/DUCK BLIND Evaluation Committee, requested the committee to review in depth the three programs. The Director of DR&E in his memorandum stated:\(^2\)

I am concerned with the multiple statements of costs and effectiveness which have been made relative to the DUEL BLADE/IGLOO WHITE/DUCK BLIND programs. The military worth and potential of this newly developed technology should be assessed at this time with a view for determining if a redirection of the program to capitalize this technology and new hardware is desirable. Therefore, I am forming a committee of senior military and scientific personnel to review the program and present a detailed authoritative analysis of its contributions and proposed programs. ...committee will also consist of one General or Flag rank officer appointed from each of the four Military Services plus four or five senior scientific representatives to be appointed by DDR&E.

In general your committee will have two main missions:

1. Evaluate the past programs, IGLOO WHITE/DUEL BLADE, to determine the overall value of the newly developed technology to complement existing target acquisition and combat surveillance means and their impact on the overall counter-infiltration campaign in Southeast Asia.

2. Analyze the current programs, DUEL BLADE/IGLOO WHITE/DUCK BLIND to determine current validity, possible reorientation, suggest modification in equipment priorities, and recommend budgetary changes within planned resources to support findings.

The committee's report, Evaluation of an Anti-Infiltration System, was published on 15 October. The report reflected an in depth review of the three programs as requested. A summary of the committee's major conclusions and recommendations are presented below:¹

As a matter of simple fact, none of the programs and systems set in motion by the 15 September 1966 directive of the Secretary of Defense "to stop (or at a minimum to substantially reduce) the flow of men and supplies from North to South Vietnam" has stopped or materially diminished the infiltration--whether through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) or the Laotian Panhandle. A complete anti-infiltration system based on the concepts embodied in that directive has not been fielded for many reasons. However, the systems have made significant contributions to past operations, and, in the anti-vehicular area, play a key role in the plan for the forthcoming air interdiction campaign. The reasons for the lack of success to date of the anti-infiltration effort are instructive.

The Air Supported Barrier (IGLOO WHITE)

The directed goal of the IGLOO WHITE program was to stop, or at least impede substantially the infiltration flow; the measure of the system's effectiveness is that

¹ Russell Report, pages 1-4.
it has at least as yet failed to do this. But as a generalization such an assessment is too severe and too short range to be useful as a measure of past performance or helpful for future guidance. Rewarding results have indeed been obtained. While the system has not achieved the ends sought, -- and here we must point out that the system which currently exists is not the system originally conceived, nor are the present conditions those which the system was intended to counter, -- it does show great promise in several, perhaps unanticipated ways. The results from the IGLOO WHITE employment of sensor derived intelligence suggests that we may be on the threshold of new and exciting military capabilities.

We are particularly impressed (1) by the system's potential for battlefield surveillance, even in enemy held areas, (2) by its demonstrated utility in target acquisition, surveillance, and intelligence gathering, and (3) by its demonstrated utility as a useful aid to interdiction of vehicular targets. The United States has been particularly ineffective in this area of limited warfare especially when the enemy is afforded sanctuary for political reasons.

IGLOO WHITE has not yet had applied to it, strike resources capable of seriously deterring or greatly slowing infiltration at the present increased rate. Given the operating constraints and the everyday realities of war, it is, of course, difficult to dedicate a strike system exclusively for air supported barriers. The tactical situation and the anticipated enemy course of action at a given time will frequently require shifts in the weighting of military effort to exploit immediate opportunities or to counter developing enemy threats.

The Antipersonnel System (DUMP TRUCK)

The implementation of the antipersonnel segment of IGLOO WHITE was superseded by the events of January and February 1968. The character of the enemy threat has changed since the latter part of 1966, and the Commanding General, Third Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) has moved to counter the current threat by establishing the Defile System, backed by air, artillery, and infantry, in
the northwestern portion of the I Corps area. This system is oriented to the threat in I Corps and does very little about the infiltration of people through the Laotian Panhandle into the Central Highlands, and on through Cambodia into the area of III Corps and the Mekong Delta. That part of the DUMP TRUCK System which extends into Laos beyond the Defile System, and is intended to thwart this latter infiltration, must, by the present rules of engagement, be completely air-supported. We have examined the possibility of the successful conduct of this portion of DUMP TRUCK and conclude that there are unknown factors including the response of the North Vietnamese which make the outcome and the return for the expenditure of resources most difficult to predict. However, because of the importance of denying enemy passage through the area, we recommend a small scale test in a suitable portion of the area. For this test, unusually rapid strike response is necessary, but the test should be designed so as not to detract appreciably from the effort made in MUD RIVER.

The Anti-Vehicular System (MUD RIVER)

A new interdiction plan, COMMANDO HUNT, has been developed which offers promise of greater effectiveness against the vehicular infiltration threat. In view of the importance of the task and our assessment of the likelihood of success we hope that COMMANDO HUNT can be provided those resources needed to attempt effective interdiction. (We emphasize that neither we nor the plan as approved contemplate an inflexible dedication of forces to the task). As a by-product an adequate test of the air supported anti-vehicular barrier -- a test that heretofore has not been provided -- will result.

The Strong Point/Obstacle System (DUEL BLADE)

In the past two years the enemy's presence in northern I Corps has changed from scattered groups to major units with large scale mortar support, supplemented by artillery firing from the Demilitarized Zone. In the circumstances, commanders on the scene completed the strong points, but concluded that construction of the
planned linear obstacle was not appropriate. In brief, they felt it would impede unacceptably their own freedom of maneuver, and casualties incurred during construction would make the barrier too costly to install.

A barrier of the type proposed may be valuable in a situation of reduced military activity and could assist in preservation of a truce. However, in the extant situation, the North Vietnamese could, at only modest cost to themselves, subject the barrier to continuous, dispersed probing and attack along its length. The objectives would be to force allied units to waste supporting fires over a long period; to erode the barrier; to make the defenders undertake maintenance of wire, sensors, and minefields under fire, and to establish pre-conditions for a massive crossing against a defense rendered insensitive by sustained over-stimulation. Also, to the extent that the current Allied mobile defense in the western defiles could be penetrated, the barrier would be susceptible to outflanking at its western end and it could be attacked from the south by organized units which are effectively supplied and reinforced from Laos.

Our interviews and observations on the scene have made it clear that COMUSMACV and his subordinate commanders and staffs have weighed the tactical advantages and limitations of the linear obstacle planned for the coastal plain south of the Demilitarized Zone. They have stored the barrier material and developed a plan to commence installation on five days notice when it is militarily advantageous to do so. We recommend that the material for the linear obstacle be kept available and that development of tactics for the use of barriers, and techniques for their rapid installation with acceptably low casualties be stimulated.

The committee made recommendations regarding: the continuation of the anti-infiltration interdiction system; DCPG related programs; development of sensors and air munitions; and the development of doctrine, standing operating procedures and training programs in the use of sensor systems. Specific recommendations included the following:

a. Sensor development proceed with expedition into Phases II and III, and DCPG lay plans for developments beyond Phase III.

b. The 7th Air Force Plan (COMMAND HUNT) for air interdiction be given priority for required resources consistent with the developing tactical situation within South Vietnam.

c. A small scale test of the air-supported anti-personnel infiltration system (DUMP TRUCK) be carefully designed and conducted in a suitable area in Laos.

d. The Defile System, proposed by the Third Marine Amphibious Force be implemented.

e. Capability be maintained to install the linear obstacle on short notice when COMUSMACV considers installation desirable. Development of Service capability for more efficient installation of such obstacles be emphasized in research and development programs.

f. Testing and development of in-country (DUCK BLIND) sensor applications be continued as additional resources became available, with training to be conducted primarily outside of South Vietnam and prior to deployment.

g. In order to attack effectively sensor-derived and interdiction targets in the IGLOO WHITE area, on a near-real-time basis, strike approval authority be predelegated by the U.S. Ambassador to Laos to his representative located at Nakhon Phanom.

h. In order that the Military Services derive maximum benefit from sensors and other DCPG-sponsored programs, and to assist in the further development of such capabilities, each Service be tasked to develop plans for the coordinated further development and employment of this technology. These plans should embody concrete organizational procedures to insure efficient cross-service coordination of development and procurement. When this has been accomplished the Services would be in position to assume DCPG's responsibilities.

[5] On 7 November, the JCS gave their views and comments on the IGLOO WHITE/DUEL BLADE/DUFFEL BAG Evaluation Committee report to the SECDEF. The JCS informed the SECDEF that CINCPAC and COMUSMACV should retain the flexibility and perogatives to reallocate
resources in order to adjust to an everchanging situation. They concluded that experience in Southeast Asia with sensor hardware and associated readout devices provided by DCPG had demonstrated enough promise to enable the resources to be applied to on-going operations. The JCS recommended that Service studies be completed and that the Director, DCPG be tasked to develop in coordination with the Services, an orderly transition plan to phase out the DCPG. A tentative target date of July 1969 was suggested for initiation of the transition.¹

By the end of 1968, CINCPAC had not been informed of the SECDEF's reaction to the Russell Committee report nor to the JCS recommendations.

During the construction of DUEL BLADE (DYE MARKER), the strong point obstacle system south of the DMZ, enemy activity in the area of interest increased from small unit infiltrations to a three-division equivalent threat. As a result, construction was delayed and later suspended indefinitely by COMUSMACV. On 21 October, General Abrams informed CINCPAC and the CJCS that new sensor developments, present requirements, and current and planned operational tactics prompted a re-evaluation of the system. Upon completion of the re-evaluation General Abrams approved for planning purposes a concept for an anti-infiltration program which proposed the establishment of a sensor screen to be emplaced immediately south of the Ben Hai river, extending from the Gulf of Tonkin to the Laoctian border. The system would interface with COMMANDO HUNT; all intelligence gathering means to include sensors would be used; DUEL BLADE would not be resumed as originally planned, but appropriate portions already constructed would be used, where tactically feasible, in support of the concept; and the remainder of DUEL BLADE assets would be used to support the new concept unless CINCPAC directed otherwise.² COMUSMACV was scheduled to brief CINCPAC on the completed plan at Camp Smith during December; however, the briefing was rescheduled for 9 January 1969.³

   Previously DUCK BLIND) Evaluation Committee Report (C).
2. Point Paper, J3B1, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Nov 68, Subj: DUEL BLADE (U).
3. Intv, LCOL H. J. Blumhardt, USA, J3B13A, Hq CINCPAC, with
   COL J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 6 Dec 68.
DUFFEL BAG (DUCK BLIND)

A plan for the in-country application of sensors to a wide variety of tactical situations was developed during 1968. On 5 April 1968, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the Director of the DCPG to assist CINCPAC-COMUSMACV-CG, 7th Air Force in the introduction and use of available "MUSCLE SHOALS and DYE MARKER" assets in a program that would enhance our detection and surveillance capability in SVN and to prepare in conjunction with them a plan for application of "MUSCLE SHOALS and DYE MARKER" technology and assets to a wide range of applications in operations against the enemy. The nickname for this program was DUCK BLIND. DUCK BLIND has the secret meaning "Employment of MUSCLE SHOALS-DYE MARKER type resources, other than to impede overland infiltration from NVN to SVN, in operations against enemy forces in Southeast Asia." The unclassified meaning of DUCK BLIND is "A program associated with the DCPG."¹

The JCS, on 10 April requested CINCPAC to submit a plan to implement the DUCK BLIND concept. In turn, on 14 April, CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV in coordination with DCPG to prepare and submit the plan. The plan was submitted by COMUSMACV to CINCPAC on 1 May.² The concept of the plan envisioned phased operations. Phase I consisted of operational evaluations of sensor employment in eight different tactical applications. Favorable results of tactical operations were to be exploited as rapidly as possible during follow-on operations to be conducted during Phase II. The tactical applications of Phase I were: combat sweeps, targeting enemy troop locations, surveillance of enemy base areas, route surveillance including waterways, ambushes, convoy protection, base defense, and monitoring of landing zones (LZ).³

In a message to the JCS on 8 May, CINCPAC concurred in principle with COMUSMACV's DUCK BLIND plan as qualified by his comments on many unresolved questions. CINCPAC recommended that the DUCK BLIND plan be approved for planning purposes on a limited basis only; implementation of the plan be on an incremental basis, by phase, as recommended by COMUSMACV and approved by CINCPAC; continuing review be made of DUCK BLIND operations to identify and

₁ Point Paper, J3B13, Hq CINCPAC, 10 May 68, Subj: DUCK BLIND (U); DCPG 101A/1217/201700Z Apr 68.
₂ JCS 6087/102352Z Apr 68; COMUSMACV 011052Z May 68; CINCPAC 142146Z Apr 68.
₃ COMUSMACV 011052Z May 68.
discontinue non-productive applications; and that sensor procurement be maintained at a level to support MUSCLE SHOALS (IGLOO WHITE) – DYE MARKER (DUEL BLADE) operations and the introductory DUCK BLIND Phase I operations. Procurement for Phase II should be anticipated but subject to a later more definitive statement of requirements based on results of operational evaluation conducted during Phase I.\(^1\)

\(^{(\S)}\) The JCS submission date to the Deputy SECDEF was 15 May. The JCS told the DEPSECDEF that they agreed with CINCPAC's recommendations except as to necessary procurement action related to Phase II. They recommended that Phase I, DUCK BLIND be approved for execution and supported with currently programmed funds and manpower resources; Phase II of DUCK BLIND be approved for planning purposes; appropriate FY 68 procurement decisions to support Phases I and II of DUCK BLIND be made by the Director of DCPG; and that the FY 69 apportionment of MUSCLE SHOALS/DYE MARKER funds incorporate allocations which would support possible CY 69 usage requirements.\(^2\)

\(^{(\S)}\) The eight tactical applications of DUCK BLIND began in June and were completed during August and the final report prepared in September.\(^3\)

\(^{(\S)}\) In commenting on DUCK BLIND the Russell committee concluded:\(^4\)

The application of sensors to a wide variety of battlefield applications was not part of the original concept. However, after the remarkable success at Khe Sanh of sensor intelligence coupled with massive strike response, COMUSMACV moved to broaden the scope of sensor battlefield surveillance. An evaluation of a number of possible applications was started in-country in June. On the basis of the evaluation report of COMUSMACV and of our other experience in this matter we conclude that enough success had already been indicated to warrant continued and expanded effort in this area. It is our opinion that the priority of this effort should be approximately equal to that of IGLOO WHITE, but that the development of concepts of use, the

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1. CINCPAC 080215Z May 68.
4. Ibid.
training of troops, and the necessity to develop equipment such as sensor readout, display, and analysis, will make it wise for the near future to give first priority on sensor assets to IGLOO WHITE.

(5) Evaluation of the effectiveness of DUFFEL BAG (DUCK BLIND)\(^1\) was forwarded with CINCPAC concurrence to the JCS by COMUSMACV. The concept and objectives were confirmed by the JCS and approval was granted to start into Phase II.\(^2\)

(5) The revision of DUEL BLADE and the implementation of COMMANDO HUNT, required a review of intended use and allocations of sensors. COMUSMACV assigned sensor priorities in the order of: (1) COMMANDO HUNT, (2) DUEL BLADE, and (3) DUFFEL BAG. This had the effect of deferring DUFFEL BAG operations until such time as adequate numbers of sensors became available or a change in the situation dictated a diversion.\(^3\)

**COMMANDO HUNT**

(5S) COMMANDO HUNT was the second significant plan developed in 1968 for in-country application of sensors to a tactical operation. COMMANDO HUNT was a Seventh Air Force developed plan for conducting an intensified interdiction campaign in Laos during the 1968-69 "Northeast Monsoon" season in Southeast Asia. The general objective was to reduce the flow of enemy resources into South Vietnam. Specific objectives were to destroy trucks and caches of military supplies along the routes leading south, to tie down substantial forces and resources supporting the infiltration route structure and to exploit the effectiveness of the IGLOO WHITE sensor system as a participant in the truck killing effort.\(^4\) Operations in the COMMANDO HUNT area were to be directed primarily against key traffic control points (TCP) along major LOC's; perishable area targets such as occupied truck parks, storage areas, transshipment points and troop encampments; fleeting targets of opportunity such as trucks, waterborne logistic craft, rolling stock, etc., and AAA/SAM/MIG defenses. To close interdiction routes for as long as possible, various

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1. The nickname DUCK BLIND was compromised and DUFFEL BAG was substituted for it.
3. Ibid.
4. Point Paper, J3B27, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Oct 68, Subj: COMMANDO HUNT (U)
combinations of weapons were to be utilized, including BULLPUPS, GP.
bombs and laser guided bombs to crater the routes. Anti-personnel,
anti-vehicular mines, destructor weapons and CS agent were to be utilized
to deter reconstruction efforts. Perishable area targets would be selected
based on all-source intelligence and would be struck by both tactical forces
and ARC LIGHT B-52's. Extensive use of radar bombing procedures,
both internal aircraft radar, and ground-directed radar bombing (combat
SKY SPOT) was to be made. Fleeting targets of opportunity would be
attacked whenever located, day or night, unless specifically prohibited
by the Rules of Engagement. On 30 August 1968, COMUSMACV enumerated
certain reservations regarding the COMMANDO HUNT plan. Specifically,
he did not want to earmark a dedicated force to the interdiction plan, he
was concerned that sensor frequencies required were not available in the
number proposed and he had reservations about the operational control
aspects of the plan in view of the retention of tight control by Ambassador
Sullivan over the Rules of Engagement in Laos. As a result of these
deficiencies, COMUSMACV did not approve the plan at that time. However,
on 9 September 1968, the JCS, after receiving the COMMANDO HUNT Plan
briefing, considered the plan to have merit within the context of the views
expressed by COMUSMACV and shared by CINCPAC. The JCS asked if
COMUSMACV could revise the plan to achieve a substantial portion of the
objectives while at the same time eliminating the features which COMUS-
MACV found unacceptable. On 22 September 1968, CINCPAC forwarded to
the JCS a "Northeast Monsoon Plan," including a COMUSMACV-revised
COMMANDO HUNT input. Additionally, improved munitions levels
required were submitted per JCS direction.  
On 23 September 1968,
Ambassador Sullivan recommended that the proposed COMMANDO HUNT
area be changed to encompass all of Zones I and II from Mu Gia Pass
South to sixteen degrees North. The intent of the recommendation was
to ensure that the interdiction campaign was focused on primary panhandle
supply arteries as well as to avoid complicating COMMANDO HUNT
operating procedures by unnecessarily involving more restrictive Zone
III operating rules. COMUSMACV, on 26 September 1968, in a message to
Ambassador Sullivan, told him that the defined operating area for
COMMANDO HUNT merely denoted the geographic limit for Task Force
ALPHA's operational direction of forces scheduled to targets in the area
as part of the total interdiction effort.  

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
On 10 October, the JCS notified CINCPAC that they considered the concepts provided by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC as sound, realistic and within current capabilities and supported CINCPAC's proposed conduct of the "Northeast Monsoon" operation. The plan was implemented on 1 Nov 68.  

Withdrawal of Forces from South Vietnam

CINCPAC began planning for the withdrawal of U.S. and Free World Military Assistance forces in November 1966. A preliminary analysis by his staff determined that it was logistically possible at that time to withdraw U.S. and FWMA forces from SVN within a six-month period. Withdrawal within the six-month period was in consonance with the Seven-Nation Manila Communiqué of 25 October 1966.  

CINCPAC OPLAN 67

On 25 January 1967, the JCS requested CINCPAC to submit a post-hostilities plan which included a withdrawal of forces under the provision of paragraph 29 of the Manila Communiqué. The plan, known as CINCPAC OPLAN 67-68 "Withdrawal of US/FWMA Forces from South Vietnam Within a Six-Month Period (S)," was prepared and forwarded to the JCS on 31 March 1968. The plan was approved by the JCS subject to certain modifications and the title was changed to "A Post-Hostilities Plan for Vietnam (U)."

OPLAN 67-68 which provided for the withdrawal of U.S.-FWMA forces from SVN within a six-month period under the broad terms of the Manila Communiqué provided for a MAAG of 13,425 personnel to be left in SVN. It did not provide for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Thailand nor for a fixed date to withdraw from SVN. OPLAN 67-68 was

1. Ibid. JCSM 2339/285 of 10 Oct 68; Point Paper, J3B27, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Nov 68, Subj: COMMANDO HUNT (U).
5. Point Paper, J5513, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: Post Hostilities Planning Thailand; Intv, LCOL E. M. Markham III, USA, J5511, Hq CINCPAC, with COL J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 11 Dec 68.
updated during 1968 as OPLAN 67-69 and was maintained separate from T-Day planning.

**T-Day Planning**

(S) The SECDEF, on 10 October 1967, requested the CJCS and the Military Departments to review six draft memoranda containing special policies and procedures to be applied as necessary during the post-T-Day conversion period. CINCPAC was requested to make comment on the memoranda and forward them to the JCS by 3 November 1967. CINCPAC's comments were forwarded on 10 November 1967. All of CINCPAC's recommendations were incorporated into the JCS response to the SECDEF in December 1967 except the recommendation that a cease-fire and truce should apply to both South Vietnam and Laos. 2

(S) CINCPAC was tasked, on 16 January 1968, by the JCS to recommend specific force levels as planning assumptions ranging from a MAAG to a corps-sized force of approximately three divisions with appropriate air force and naval units. CINCPAC's recommendations were desired by 7 February. 3 On 22 January, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to provide, by 30 January, the force composition of the force levels desired in SVN after a cessation of hostilities in South Vietnam, assuming that the conditions of the Manila Communiqué are not met. The force levels and criteria upon which the force composition was to be based were provided to COMUSMACV by CINCPAC. 4

(S) On 24 February, CINCPAC provided the JCS with four alternative forces: 5

a. **Alternative A** - A MAAG plus a U.S. force which included a corps headquarters, two Infantry and one airborne division, an armored cavalry regiment, a Special Forces group and three air cavalry squadrons with supporting air (12 TFS, 2 TRS, 2 TCS) and naval units (MARKET TIME

2. Ibid.
3. JCS 7382/162117Z Jan 68.
4. CINCPAC 221939Z Jan 68.
5. CINCPAC 240334Z Feb 68.
and Riverine) and a Free World force of one ROK Division, a three-battalion force from Australia/N. Z. and a Thai infantry battalion.

b. **Alternative B** - A MAAG plus a U.S. force which included a corps headquarters, one Infantry and one airborne division, an armored cavalry regiment, a Special Forces Group and two air cavalry squadrons with supporting air (8 TFS, 2 TRS, 2 TCS) and naval units (MARKET TIME and Riverine) and a Free World force of one ROK regiment, two-battalion task force from Australia/N. Z. and a Thai infantry battalion.

c. **Alternative C** - A MAAG plus a U.S. force which includes one airborne division, one infantry brigade, one armored cavalry squadron, one air cavalry squadron, and a Special Forces group with supporting air (6 TFS, 2 TRS, 1 TCS) and naval units (MARKET TIME) and a Free World force of 1 ROK infantry regiment, a two-battalion Australian/N. Z. task force, and a Thai infantry battalion.

d. **Alternative D** - A MAAG only. Includes 13,424 personnel as outlined in CINCPAC OPLAN 67-68.

(S) CINCPAC told the JCS that:¹

...planning factors used in this plan provide the basis for withdrawal planning and should be used for withdrawal under T-Day conditions. Withdrawal should be effected as a gradual reduction of U.S. and free world forces in a step by step plan, reducing from the current level of forces to other levels of forces. The United States should seek to retain forces of other allied countries at all levels above alternative D (MAAG only) so that the assistance in Vietnam is one of a multinational nature rather than a U.S./Vietnam bilateral effort.

The alternatives provided above are examples of forces that might be desired for retention in Vietnam in the event of cessation of hostilities. The situation at the time, and intelligence of the moment may indicate other levels of forces.

¹ Ibid.
On 28 March, the JCS provided the SECDEF with four force levels. The major combat units reflected in the JCS submission were the same as provided by CINCPAC. However, except for the MAAG, the personnel totals for each of the force levels exceeded those submitted by CINCPAC.  

On 25 July, the Deputy SECDEF provided the JCS with a revised set of draft memoranda based on the JCS comments submitted in December 1967. CINCPAC's recommendation to redefine T-Day planning so that planning would be based on the actual cessation of hostilities rather than a temporary cease-fire was incorporated in the memoranda. The proposal to relate T-Day planning specifically to SVN and not refer generally to Southeast Asia was not incorporated. The rationale for this was given as: "...forces currently engaged in or supporting that conflict are deployed throughout the area...a cessation of hostilities in South Vietnam, then, will affect forces elsewhere in Southeast Asia, and any withdrawal or redeployment planning must include them." No reference was made to the proposals to limit initial force withdrawal planning to South Vietnam and to assess the impact of withdrawal from South Vietnam or other areas before withdrawal from Thailand.  

The SECDEF memoranda of 25 July required the JCS to prepare, by 3 September, a time-phased redeployment plan for three alternatives. The alternatives were: (A) withdrawal from SVN in six months to a level of 30,000 including a MAAG; (B) withdrawal from SVN in 12 months to a level of 30,000 including a MAAG, and (C) withdrawal from SVN in 12 months to a level of a MAAG and a two-division corps plus. On 6 August, the JCS directed CINCPAC to submit to them an "Outline Time-Phased Force Deployment Plan" in consonance with the Deputy SECDEF guidance. The plan was submitted to the JCS on 14 August with the caveat that the plan should not be construed as a PACOM post-hostilities paper or a concurrence with the residual forces left in SVN under each alternative. 

1. JCSM-189-68, 28 Mar 68; J5512 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.  
3. Ibid; JCS 06359/031450Z Aug 68; Ltr, CINCPAC, Serial 000362, 14 Aug 68.
On 3 September, the JCS forwarded their T-Day Outline Plan to the SECDEF. The JCS outline plans for the three alternatives closely paralleled CINCPAC's plan with one exception. The JCS plan for Alternatives A and B did not include an air cavalry division for the Pacific Command force structure after the withdrawal from SVN. CINCPAC had proposed an air cavalry division to be located either in Thailand or Guam.¹

On 17 September CINCPAC initiated planning to develop alternatives which would leave a combat support, combat service support, air and naval residual in SVN to support to RVNAF modernization program. Concurrently, planning to provide for redeployments from Thailand was underway.²

On 22 October, the JCS forwarded to CINCPAC a verbatim transcript of a Deputy SECDEF directive on T-Day planning. In the same message the JCS warned CINCPAC that implementing instructions would follow. A summary of the requirements in the Deputy SECDEF directive included the following:³

a. A review of the corps residual to be left in SVN.

b. Prepare a redeployment list for the SVN-based support force.

c. Determine the destination of major units.

d. Periodically review MAAG.

e. Plan for the redeployment of non-SVN forces.

f. Review the CINCPAC OPlan 67-YR to include withdrawal of all forces.

g. Make no adjustments to the 1971 baseline force.


3. JCS 03729/212230Z Oct 68; JCS 4207/252223Z Oct 68.
On 25 October, CINCPAC was given implementing instructions by the JCS. CINCPAC was to provide by 13 November: (1) a plan for a revised MAAG in SVN, (2) recommendations on a corps residual in SVN, (3) a proposed program for T-Day planning, and (4) an emergency response capability. CINCPAC was also directed to maintain CINCPAC OPLAN 67-Year as a separate plan from T-Day planning. Consequently, CINCPAC planned to publish CINCPAC OPLAN 69-69, "A T-Day Plan for Redeployment of Forces."

In compliance with the instructions received on 25 October, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS on 15 November a package containing: (1) goals for development of T-Day plans, (2) a U.S. force package in the event the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program was not completed, (3) a post-hostilities Command-MAAG organization, (4) a corps-sized force under alternative C, and (5) the redeployment of U.S. forces from Thailand.

As of 6 December the CINCPAC recommended T-Day alternatives awaiting the JCS approval were:

a. Alternative A - A six-month withdrawal from SVN with roll-up operations continuing until R + 9 months with a Command/MAAG residual remaining (39,010 personnel in the Command/MAAG and 3,356 NSA).

b. Alternative B - A twelve-month withdrawal from SVN with a Command/MAAG residual the same as Alternative A.

c. Alternative C - A twelve-month withdrawal from SVN. A Command/MAAG and a two U.S. Army Division Corps plus supporting air, naval and Free World forces would remain (131,519 personnel in Corps force, 39,010 personnel in the Command/MAAG and 3,356 NSA).

d. Alternative D - A U.S. support force to cover shortfalls in the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Phases I and II. This force

4. Ibid.
would diminish with time, from 32,303 in FY 70 to zero in FY 75. The
force was also recommended to be used with Alternatives A and B.

(£) On 13 December 68, JCS acknowledged receipt of the five part
package forwarded by CINCPAC on 15 November and approved the
automated program for Time-Phased Force/Materiel withdrawal schedules
subject to the following:¹

   a. Interim estimated gross tonnages requirements
      for the movement of forces and materiel must be available
      by 15 February 69.

   b. Program must contain provisions to permit the
      service National Inventory Control Points (NICPs) to
      control, as necessary, on a Federal Stock Number basis
      (FSN), the return of materiel designated by the NICP.

   c. The Time-Phased Force Withdrawal and re-
      deployment data should be developed to contain all items
      of information outlined in paragraph 3, enclosure (C) to
      JCS 2472/170-9.

(£) On 30 December 68, CINCPAC OPlan 69-69 "A T-Day Plan
for Redeployment of Forces" was promulgated.²

Plans for Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia

(££) Four of the CINCPAC contingency plans that pertain to the
defense of mainland Southeast Asia are Operation Plans 32, 39, 41 and
42. Operation Plans 32 and 39 deal with contingencies based on a normal
PACOM deployment situation as a starting point. Both of these plans
are on "the shelf" being retained for use in a post-hostilities situation.
Operation Plans 41 and 42 deal with CHICOM intervention in current
combat operations.³

(££) OPLAN 41-68 provides for the defense of mainland Southeast
Asia in the event of CHICOM aggression in current operations. For the
purpose of this plan, mainland Southeast Asia consists of Vietnam,

¹ JCS 7594/131501Z Dec 68.
² CINCPAC ltr 5513, ser 003350 dtd 30 Dec 68.
³ Point Paper, J5513, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Nov 68, Subj: Numbered
   Contingency Plans for Southeast Asia; see CINCPAC Command
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Burma. The plan makes maximum use of local national forces and resources and the selective employment of U.S. and allied forces. The plan envisions two levels of CHICOM aggression. The first level is CHICOM intervention with four to six divisions. Under this condition CINCPAC subordinate headquarters remain unchanged. The second level of intervention is a maximum capability CHICOM intervention. For this contingency COMUSMACV becomes COMUSSEASIA. 1

(TS) OPlan 41 was approved by the JCS on 24 October 1967 subject to minor changes which were incorporated into change No. 1 to the plan. On 12 May 1968, COMUSMACV recommended that provisions for five Army Corps Commands be incorporated into the plan. 2 CINCPAC notified COMUSMACV that the Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) for the plan was being prepared to accommodate only four Army Corps headquarters. However, upon receipt of COMUSSEASIA OPlan 41-68, the requirement for five Army Corps would be reassessed at that time. 3

(TS) OPlan 42-68 is an optional offensive air-naval strike campaign against Communist China, North Vietnam, and North Korea to counter CHICOM aggression in Southeast Asia or against Taiwan or South Korea. On 24 October 1967, the JCS approved OPlan 42 subject to CINCPAC enlarging the plan to include the contingency of CHICOM aggression against Korea and Taiwan. This change was incorporated into the plan as required in 1968. 4

(TS) In a message to CINCPAC on 12 May, COMUSMACV suggested that OPlan 42-68 was infeasible and recommended that additional assumptions be included in the plan. The assumptions were: (1) infiltration has been reduced to the degree that insurgency is marginal; (2) the GVN and RVNAF are able to assume predominant role in controlling insurgency; (3) LOCs are secure; (4) air superiority continues to exist throughout

2. Point Paper, J551, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Jun 68; Subj: Status of OPlans 41 and 42 (U): COMUSMACV 121020Z May 68.
3. CINCPAC 181850Z May 68; Point Paper, J5511, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Jun 68, Subj: Status of OPlans 41 and 42 (U).
Southeast Asia; and (5) large scale movement of CHICOM forces and support equipment will be detected 30 days prior to reaching the DMZ. COMUSMACV further requested that a mobile reserve of two divisions be added to the plan and that B-52 support be increased from 70 to 100 in both OPlan 41 and 42.  

(TS) On 4 June, CINCPAC provided COMUSMACV with additional guidance on OPlan 42. CINCPAC emphasized that the plan had been prepared in accordance with the JCS guidance, that it was an air and naval option to counter CHICOM intervention in current operations, and that being an option does not preclude it from being implemented in conjunction with another plan. COMUSMACV was also informed that during the next Joint Strategic Capability Plan planning cycle, CINCPAC would recommend that the number of B-52s be increased to 100. Although CINCPAC did not include it in his guidance, the two divisions requested by COMUSMACV were in effect being provided in a proposed Change 1 to the plan. Proposed Change 1 to OPlan 41 and Change 2 to OPlan 42 increased the number of B-52s from 70 to 80.

(TS) During 1968, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS cancellation of three plans effecting Southeast Asia - OPlans 37-65, 93-68 and 94-64.

(TS) OPlan 37-65 (Military Actions to Stabilize the Situation in RVN and/or Laos) addressed four courses of action: (1) border control operations in Laos; (2) retaliatory actions against NVN; (3) graduated overt pressure against NVN; and (4) crippling action against NVN. Since the operations envisioned in this plan were, in general, being implemented, the plan was no longer required. CINCPAC told the JCS that the current forces in Southeast Asia exceeded those envisaged in the plan and that the targeting of NVN, which was a key portion of OPlan 37-65, was covered adequately by CINCPAC OPlan 42-68 and Annex X (Consolidated Target List) for CINCPAC Operations Plans. Also, CINCPAC planned to incorporate as appropriate into OPlan 32-64 (discussed above) those operations envisaged in OPlan 37. JCS approved cancellation of the plan on 7 September.

1. Point Paper, J5511, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Jun 68, Subj: Status of OPlans 41 and 42 (U); COMUSMACV 121022Z May 68.
2. Point Paper, J5511, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Jun 68, Subj: Status of OPlans 41 and 42 (U); CINCPAC 040312Z Jun 68; COMUSMACV 121022Z May 68.
3. CINCPAC 200222Z Jul 68; CINCPAC 262231Z Jun 68.
4. CINCPAC 200222Z Jul 68.
5. JCS 8954/070006Z Sep 68.
(TS) OPlan 93-68 (Program of Plans - Berlin - Air Operations - Laos) (TS) was overtaken by events. The plan was formulated when the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia was at a low level. CINCPAC recommended on 26 June that the plan be cancelled. The JCS approved cancellation on 23 July.¹

(TS) At the same time that CINCPAC recommended cancellation of OPlan 93-68, he recommended to the JCS cancellation of 94-64².

PACOM Force Requirements and Capabilities

(U) In 1968, problems attendant with programming PACOM force requirements were fewer than in 1967. This phenomenon can be attributed in part to the 1967 resolution of problems dealing with precise force structure in Programs 4 and 5 and to the establishment of better accounting procedures and controls designed to keep within the approved force ceilings.³

(C) Force requirement programming during 1968 consisted primarily of those actions leading up to Program 6 and the usual deployment adjustment requests. The increase in spaces authorized by Program 6 was relatively insignificant when compared to the increase authorized by Program 5.

(S) Another significant action in 1968 was the emphasis placed on the modernization of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). This project, which received high priority at all echelons, is covered in some detail in this section.

1. CINCPAC 262231Z Jun 68; JCS 05415/231646Z Jul 68; J5511 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
2. Ibid.
3. For a discussion of Programs 4 and 5 and for accounting procedures and controls of these programs see CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol.II, pp. 520-554.
Southeast Asia Deployment Program 5

Southeast Asia Deployment Program 5 was in effect on 1 January 1968 and included all forces previously approved for Southeast Asia in Program 4, and the 525,000 spaces authorized for South Vietnam in Program 5. The following is a recapitulation of the approved Program 5 end strengths for end of FY 69 including changes 1 through 8.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>348,900</td>
<td>35,500</td>
<td>58,700</td>
<td>81,900</td>
<td>525,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>12,200</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>35,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>15,800</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>40,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>19,900</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>36,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>25,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Area PACOM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals       | 384,900| 97,100| 159,500| 92,900| 734,400 |

The 525,000 military spaces authorized for Vietnam was an imposed ceiling by the SECDEF. Accordingly, COMUSMACV and CINCPAC had to select the optimum mix of forces which could be obtained within the ceiling. "... many other units and personnel which were required could not be included within the ceiling."  

Prior to the approval of Program 5 by the SECDEF, the JCS had recommended 537,545 military personnel spaces for the program rather than 525,000 spaces authorized. To offset this action, Mr. McNamara authorized 12,545 civilian spaces—an aggregate of 537,545 total spaces.  

1. Memo, Assistant Secretary Defense/Systems Analysis for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, CJCS, and Asst. Secretaries of Defense, 29 Dec 67, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #5, through Change #8 (U); Intv, CDR H. E. Beilflower, USN, J5542, Hq CINCPAC with COL J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 8 Oct 68.  
2. Figures have been rounded off.  
3. Ltr, 000450, CINCPAC to the JCS, 1 Sep 67, Subj: CINCPAC Refined Troop List Southeast Asia Deployment Program 5.  
Civilization Program

\(\text{S}\) The provisions of Program 5 required that a civilization report be prepared on a quarterly basis and submitted to the SECDEF - COMUSMACV's original civilization schedule was based on the then current unit analysis and projections of the South Vietnamese labor market. The schedule was provided initially for planning purposes only. On 14 January, COMUSMACV provided the JCS with an updated schedule; however, one month later COMUSMACV requested a six-month deferral of the civilization program.\(^1\) Admiral Sharp concurred in the proposal and recommended to the JCS that the Program 5 Civilization Program be deferred until 1 July 1968 to permit an interim re-evaluation of the SVN labor force and the civilization plan. He further recommended that the "reduction of military spaces or personnel requisitioning authority should be deferred until completion of review and until civilian Manning, if directed, is in place."\(^2\)

\(\text{S}\) CINCPAC was notified by the JCS on 6 April that the recommended deferral was conditionally approved for a period of approximately six months. The JCS required that the revised schedule of civilization provide for a build-up of civilian spaces to the original number of 12,545 spaces at a rate that would preclude exceeding the new military space authorization of 549,500.\(^3\)

\(\text{S}\) In the same message the JCS notified CINCPAC that the report covering the fourth quarter of FY 68 would be required. The report was to be as of 30 June 1968 and would include civilization accomplished or scheduled to remain within the 549,500 space authorization and a full analysis of problems encountered or expected in connection with Civilization Program 6.\(^4\)

\(\text{S}\) COMUSMACV forwarded his 4th Quarter FY 68 Civilization Report to CINCPAC and an information copy to the JCS on 15 July. The report contained the required civilization schedule. On 19 July, CINCPAC

1. COMUSMACV 04754/151058Z Feb 68.
2. CINCPAC 240400Z Feb 68.
3. JCS 5766/061710Z Apr 68. This message also authorized an increase of 24,500 military spaces as part of Program 6 which will be discussed later in this section.
4. Ibid.
notified the JCS that a review and analysis of the COMUSMACV schedule had been conducted by CINCPAC, that as of 30 June 1968, 1496 military spaces had been civilianized and, that the civilianization schedule of the remaining 11,049 spaces should prevent the 549,500 space ceiling from being exceeded provided deployments remained as programmed.  

(5) As of 10 September, the status of the civilianization program was as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Accomplished FY 68</th>
<th>Scheduled FY 69 by Qtr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>2545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1367</strong></td>
<td><strong>3026</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COMUSMACV anticipated difficulty in the implementation of the program. He recognized that the FY 69 RVNAF force goal of 801,215 would seriously drain manpower from the approximate 150,000 local nationals employed by the U.S. and limit the availability of personnel for the additional hire. Since TET, there had been increasing local national reluctance to work for the U.S. and absenteeism increased significantly. The work force either disappeared or reduced drastically when attacks occurred or appeared imminent. Integration of local nationals into military units also created problems of security and inability to deploy the unit to areas of need. For example, as a result of the TET offensive, 65 combat service support units of 1st Logistical Command were deployed from II and III Corps Tactical Zone to I Corps Tactical Zone.

(6) The JCS, on 12 September 1968, proposed a one-time adjustment to the Program 6 troop list by reducing appropriate unit strengths.

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1. CINCPAC 192202Z Jul 68.
2. Point Paper, J554, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Sep 68, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #6 (U).
3. The exact cause of the discrepancy between the figures reported in this column and 1496 figure reported in the paragraph above is unknown. However, errors in bookkeeping is the probable cause.
in accordance with the civilianization plan. The JCS reasoned that if a one-time adjustment were made, the Civilianization Program could be considered as accomplished, the quarterly civilianization report could be terminated, and the Program 6 Civilianization Report could be handled as part of the overall Local National Direct Hire-Contract Program. Another advantage would be better control of adjustments to the Program 6 authorized troop structure.¹

(C) CINCPAC concurred in the proposal and recommended that the adjustment be accomplished by the JCS based on a special MACV Report of Program Number 6 Civilization.² The special MACV report necessary to accomplish the one-time adjustment was provided the JCS on 14 October 1968.³ The final civilianization report was promulgated on 10 December. The report concluded the quarterly reporting of civilianization and adjusted Program 6 authorized and military strengths by reduction of FRN strengths in accordance with the civilianization plan.⁴

Actions Leading to Southeast Asia Deployment Program 6

(S) General Earle Wheeler, CJCS, visited COMUSMACV at the time of the TET offensive in February. During this visit COMUSMACV, on 23-24 February, provided him with a package of additional force requirements for SVN. This package was hand-carried by the CJCS through CINCPAC to Washington.⁵

1. JCS 9351/122146Z Sep 68.
2. CINCPAC 041948Z Oct 68.
3. COMUSMACV 30560/141821Z Oct 68; COMUSMACV ltr MACJ 312, 18 Oct 68.
4. J3M-2369-68, 10 Dec 68.
5. In an interview between COL H. D. Pinney, USA, J554, Head Force Dev/Prog Section, Hq CINCPAC and COL J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 7 Oct 68, COL Pinney provided COL Johnson an undated Memorandum For Record (MFR) prepared by COL Pinney. Subject of MFR is "Additional SVN Requirements (U)." The MFR contains a synopsis of 31 messages between COMUSMACV, CJCS and CINCPAC. Most of the messages were BOM. Hereafter cited as Pinney MFR.
The MACV Force Package proposed an increase of 206,756 military spaces in the force structure. It included 27 maneuver battalions—18 Army, 6 Marine and a three-battalion-equivalent armored cavalry regiment, and 15 tactical fighter squadrons—four Marine and 11 Air Force TFS. The following is a recapitulation of the proposed force structure:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program 5</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proposed Increase</td>
<td>348,880</td>
<td>13,311</td>
<td>81,939</td>
<td>58,709</td>
<td>525,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>481,180</td>
<td>48,783</td>
<td>121,075</td>
<td>80,718</td>
<td>731,756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The CJCS in a message on 29 February, outlined the various options being considered in the JCS and requested COMUSMACV to provide comments on what the impact would be if he received less than the full force package. The options being considered in Washington are listed below:

a. Option 1 - COMUSMACV proposal as submitted.

b. Option 1A - Honor the COMUSMACV proposal but limit expansion of operations in Cambodia, Laos and NVN.

c. Option 2 - Increase the 525,000 ceiling by only the six maneuver battalions currently deployed in a temporary status. A total of 112 maneuver battalions.

d. Option 3 - Provide 50,000 troops above the 535,000 in Option 2. A total of between 121 and 126 maneuver battalions.

e. Option 4 - Provide 100,000 troops above the 525,000 ceiling.

On 2 March, COMUSMACV responded to the request and continued to state the full requirements contained in his force package. On the next day, CINCPAC made his recommendation to the JCS. He recommended an increase of 40,000 military spaces consisting of 12

1. Pinney MFR.
2. Ibid.
3. The 3d Bde, 82d Airborne Division and the Marine RLT 27 totaling over 11,000 military spaces were authorized for an emergency temporary deployment to SVN in February 1968.
maneuver battalions, six TFS, necessary support elements and 12,545
spaces to offset the civilianization program. In addition, CINCPAC
recommended expansion of the ROLLING THUNDER campaign. 1

(TS) On 4 March, the CJCS recommended a total increase of 22,000
personnel to the President. The recommended increase included three
maneuver battalions, ten TFS, one Navy Mobile Construction Battalion,
and various service support elements. COMUSMACV commented that he
could use the force proposed by the CJCS to the President, however,
combat service support personnel would continue to be a shortfall.
Again, he reaffirmed the requirement for the forces contained in his
initial force package. 2

(TS) COMUSMACV requested 3316 additional personnel on 6 March
to provide support to the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, the Marine
RLT 27 and the Army units relocated in the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ).
The additional forces were to consist of 1,197 Army personnel, 1,685 Navy
and 434 Air Force personnel. Two days later CINCPAC recommended to
the JCS that the COMUSMACV request be approved. 3

(TS) The CJCS, on 5 March, notified CINCPAC and COMUSMACV
that the SECDEF had been requested to cancel the Program 5 Civilization
Program thereby raising the military space ceiling to 537,545 spaces. On
9 March, the JCS notified all concerned that the civilianization program had
been cancelled. In the same message the JCS stated that there was sub-
stantive high level agreement to deploy by 15 June 1968 an additional
30,000 troops above those in Program 5 (now 537,545), the troops in the
3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, and the Marine RLT 27 which were
deployed during the TET emergency on a temporary basis. 4

(TS) Also in the same message, the JCS requested COMUSMACV to
provide the CJCS as quickly as possible the composition of forces
COMUSMACV desired by 15 June, not to exceed 30,000 spaces. 5

(TS) A shopping list of units which the Services could deploy by
15 June was furnished by the CJCS. With the shopping list there was a
warning that even though a reserve call up could be expected, COMUSMACV

1. Pinney MFR.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
should not count on approval of any other future deployments. The shopping list provided 26,098 Marine, 2,903 Air Force, and 4,493 Navy spaces for COMUSMACV's use in developing the 30,000 man package. The list included three Marine maneuver battalions, three Marine and six Air Force TFS, and one Navy Mobile Construction Battalion. The following table is a recapitulation of the proposed forced structure:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program 5</td>
<td>348,880</td>
<td>35,472</td>
<td>81,939</td>
<td>58,709</td>
<td>525,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilianization</td>
<td>9,595</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>12,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp deployment</td>
<td>3,681</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,363</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping list</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(30,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>362,156</strong></td>
<td><strong>37,522</strong></td>
<td><strong>89,602</strong></td>
<td><strong>59,309</strong></td>
<td><strong>578,589</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(TS) COMUSMACV responded on 11 March and provided two alternative force packages, both within the 30,000 ceiling.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Alt:</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>2,752</td>
<td>25,712</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Alt:</td>
<td>10,580</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>14,628</td>
<td>2,692</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first alternative consisted of forces available by 15 June 1968, except for a small number of Army combat service support troops. The second alternative included some forces which would not be available until after 15 June 1968. The force structure in this alternative provided for seven maneuver battalions as opposed to three in the first alternative. CINCPAC supported the second alternative proposed by COMUSMACV and reemphasized to the CJCS the urgency of the I CTZ support requirement. He recommended that the 3,316 personnel previously requested to provide support to forces recently deployed to I CTZ be treated separately and deployed as soon as possible even though these forces were included as part of the 30,000 man package.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
TOP SECRET

(TS) On 13 March, the CJCS advised CINCPAC and COMUSMACV that the Joint Staff was working on a callup of reserves to support the deployments discussed by the JCS, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV. Incremental callup for the 30,000 man package with a capability of providing additional forces at a later date was under consideration. COMUSMACV was asked to provide an estimate of his command's limitation for absorbing a high proportion of the required forces during the period September-December 1968 and his desired schedule for the introduction of the remaining requirements for SVN. The CJCS reiterated that a final decision on force employments of any kind had not been made.  

(TS) On 14 March, the CJCS advised that current personnel policies for all practical purposes precluded additional Marine deployments. Therefore, the SECDEF proposed to eliminate all Marine personnel from any additional force packages and to substitute Army personnel. The SECDEF proposal provided for seven maneuver battalions, four TFSs, a military police battalion and the 3,316 additional personnel to provide support for the emergency temporary deployments and for Army units relocated to the I CTZ. In addition, he proposed to substitute in July 1968 an Army infantry brigade for the Marine RLT 27 which deployed in February 1968. COMUSMACV concurred with the SECDEF proposal and recommended that the Army force involved in the package be treated as a division, with the division containing up to five infantry battalions.  

(TS) The following table compares COMUSMACV's first and second alternative with the SECDEF proposal:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Alt.</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>2,752</td>
<td>25,712</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Alt.</td>
<td>10,580</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>14,628</td>
<td>2,692</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>24,200</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,025</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(TS) After conferring with General Wheeler at Clark Air Force Base (AFB) on 24 March and reviewing the additional requirements in "the light of the present situation, "COMUSMACV on 27 March provided a

1. Pinney MFR.
2. Pinney MFR: Point Paper J5542, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Apr 68, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #5 (U); J5542 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68, Subj: Additional Forces for SVN (U).
3. Pinney MFR.

TOP SECRET
concept for employment and the composition of a force requirement package for SVN. The proposed package consisted primarily of two Army brigades, two TFS, an armored cavalry regiment and additional support forces. COMUSMACV also proposed the civilianization of 7,000 spaces to provide a force structure of 560,000 military spaces. CINCPAC concurred in principle with the COMUSMACV concept but quickly cautioned against an overly ambitious civilianization program.  

(TS) On 28 March, COMUSMACV provided a detailed troop list of the additional troop requirements.  

a. Major Units:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt Inf Bde, Sep (3rd Bde, 82nd Abn Div Modified)</td>
<td>4,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>4,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Cavalry Squadron</td>
<td>1,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 TFS (AF)</td>
<td>938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,239</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Support and Service Support Units:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>9,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,264</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Spaces by Service:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>19,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>2,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,503</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(S) CINCPAC, on 29 March, concurred in the troop list proposed by COMUSMACV and recommended to the CJCS that the forces involved be deployed as rapidly as possible and that the three TFS deferred from Program 5 be deployed in addition to the reduced force package.  

2. Ibid.  
3. Pinney MFR: J5542 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
Southeast Asia Deployment Program 6

The JCS informed CINCPAC on 6 April that the SECDEF approved on 4 April a new ceiling of 549,500 military spaces in SVN. The new total strength in-country or authorized for deployment included: all spaces in Program 5--525,000 plus 12,545 spaces to be civilianized, 11,000 spaces representing the 3rd Brigade, 82d Airborne Division and the Marine RLT 27 which were provided as an emergency employment; and 13,500 new spaces to provide support for ground combat forces. This new total military personnel strength authorization of 549,500 spaces was promulgated by SECDEF as Southeast Asia Deployment Program 6. Each Service's strength authorization within the new ceiling was as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Program 5</th>
<th>Program 6 Add-On</th>
<th>Program 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>348,896</td>
<td>19,692</td>
<td>368,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>35,447</td>
<td>1,775</td>
<td>37,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>58,977</td>
<td>2,540</td>
<td>61,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>81,680</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>82,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>525,000</td>
<td>24,500</td>
<td>549,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following are some of the major changes to Program 5 through change 13 made by Program 6:

a. Addition of 24,500 personnel including seven maneuver battalions, four artillery battalions, one engineer battalion and two tactical fighter squadrons. This included permanent deployment of a separate infantry brigade as a substitute for the 3rd Brigade, 82d Airborne Division and replacement of the 27 Marine RLT with an Army brigade.

b. Deployment of one Air Force TFS (18 F-100s and 484 personnel) and one Marine TFS (20 A-4s and 297 personnel transferred from Iwakuni, Japan) in April 1968 and a second AF F-100 squadron in May. The personnel for these squadrons were included in the 525,000 personnel established by Program #5, but were not previously authorized to deploy.

c. Acceleration of one infantry battalion, 920 personnel, from April to March 1968.

1. JCS 2472/263 of 5 Apr 68; JCS 5766/061702 Apr 68.
d. Increase in the B-52 sortie rate from 1200 to 1800 in March-June 1968 and 1400 thereafter.

e. Slippage to June of the MUSCLE SHOALS tactical fighter squadron (18 F-4s and 607 personnel) originally scheduled to deploy to Thailand in February 1968. As a result, an eight-plane SP-2 patrol detachment (330 personnel) remained in Thailand until June instead of April, and an Air Force TFS (18 A-1 and 353 personnel) scheduled to return to SVN in May 1968 was scheduled to remain until July.¹

(S) In conjunction with notifying CINCPAC of the approved Program 6 the JCS requested CINCPAC to review the requirement for additional PACOM forces outside of SVN to support the SVN deployments.² The Service Component commanders provided CINCPAC with their requirements. CINCPAC, after reviewing these requirements submitted a recommendation for 710 spaces to JCS:³

Army 356  Navy 161
Marine 151  Air Force 42

(S) By 2 August, 19 changes to Program 6 had been approved by SECDEF. Significant changes to Program 6 are indicated below:⁴

Change 1. Projected personnel phasing was revised based on detailed troop lists and projected close dates of additional forces approved for Program #6. Civilianization to begin by September.

Change 2. The battleship NEW JERSEY was approved for deployment and a cruiser was withdrawn from Naval gunfire support during the battleship deployment period (September 1968 - March 1969).

Change 3. In February an F-100 squadron replaced an F-4 squadron which was deployed on temporary duty to Korea. This change was approved as a permanent deployment change by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on May 22, 1968.

Change 4. The Air Force adjusted squadron deployments so that three TFSs closed Southeast Asia in May and one in June vice two in May, one in July.

1. JCS 2472/263 of 5 Apr 68.
2. JCS 57766/061701Z Apr 68
3. CINCPAC 052002Z May 68.
4. JCS 2472/263-1 of 5 Jun 68; JCS 2472/263-3 of 5 Aug 68.
Change 5. As a result of the 101st Division reorganizing as an airborne division, 10 airborne infantry battalions were redesignated airmobile battalions effective July 1, 1968.

Change 6. The tables were expanded to include RVNAF authorization and a breakdown of third country maneuver battalions and strengths.

Change 7. Navy EKA-3/KA-3 aircraft were shifted from the attack to the non-attack aircraft table and the projected losses and loss rates were adjusted. OV-12 aircraft were added to the Navy non-attack aircraft tables.

Change 8. Tentative approval by the Secretary of Defense, 22 June 1968, to deploy ten additional Air Force B-52s and 851 personnel to Thailand and an increase in B-52 sorties from 1400 to 1800 in July through December 1968.

Change 9. Approved the withdrawal of one Army HAWK Battalion (873 personnel) and one Marine HAWK Battalion (586 personnel) from SVN to CONUS in October 1968. In addition, one Army HAWK Battery (172 personnel) was scheduled to deploy to Thailand from SVN before June 1969.

Change 10. Approved Air Force DAR AF-68-107 which authorized permanent deployment of 1540 personnel to Japan and 77 support personnel to Okinawa by the end of August 1968.

Change 11. Approved Air Force DAR AF-68-102 which authorized the deployment of an Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (six C-130s and 497 personnel) to Thailand from South Vietnam (350 personnel) and Taiwan (147 personnel).

Change 12. Approved deployment of two DC-130 Air Force special purpose aircraft and 76 personnel to Thailand in August 1968.

Change 13. Approved JCS CM-3375-68 which scheduled the removal from Thailand by July 1969, the temporarily deployed Army units supporting the Royal Thai Volunteer Forces (RTVF). Previously, the units were only approved through July 1968.

Change 14. Approved on 21 June 1968 the deployment of four A-37 squadrons and two F-4 squadrons to replace four Air Force National Guard F-100 squadrons which are to return to CONUS in FY 70.

Change 15. Approved Army DAR A-68-5 authorizing the deployment of 143 combat service support personnel to Japan in December 1968.
In addition, Army DAN A-68-30 reorganized units in-country and reduced 75 military spaces from the present level.

**Change 16.** Approved Air Force DAR AF-68-4 authorizing the deployment of six additional UH-1s to Thailand in December 1968.

**Change 17.** Air Force DAN AF-68-100 established a validated database of Air Force personnel in Thailand and deleted 1154 authorized spaces.

**Change 18.** The Army revised its aircraft phasing schedule for Southeast Asia reducing planned deployment by 11 aircraft and 32 helicopters.

**Change 19.** The Air Force revised its aircraft phasing schedule within previously approved force levels. Among other changes, one B-57 squadron, originally scheduled to phase out of Southeast Asia was reinstated for TROPIC MOON operations.

---

As of 15 August, the approved Program 6 end strengths for FY 70 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>368,600</td>
<td>37,200</td>
<td>61,500</td>
<td>82,200</td>
<td>549,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>15,900</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>40,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>21,400</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>37,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>25,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>9,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Navy Offshore</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** | 405,000 | 99,100 | 164,000 | 92,900 | 761,000 |

---

Between 3 August and 25 November the SECDEF approved changes 20 through 33 to Program 6. Significant changes were:

1. **Point Paper, J554, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Aug 68, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #6 (U); all figures are rounded off.**
2. **ASD/SA Memorandum, 1 Oct 68; J5541 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68; ASD/SA Memorandum #2-0071, 25 Nov 68.**
Change 20. The Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized deployment of the following Air Force personnel and aircraft to Thailand: (1) eight AC-130 GUNSHIP II aircraft and 414 personnel in October 1968; ten B-52s and 851 personnel in September 1968; forty-six propeller aircraft and 914 personnel by February 1969; three EC-121 IGLOO WHITE aircraft in October 1968. The Deputy Secretary accepted the recommendation that the Air Force use 500 maintenance and 30 C-130 personnel spaces, along with 974 military spaces to be replaced with local nationals, in order to offset a portion of the increases. In addition, approval was withdrawn for two DC-130 COMBAT ANGEL aircraft and 76 personnel scheduled to deploy in August 1968. The Thailand personnel ceiling remained unchanged.

Change 21. Approved MACV's civilianization schedule beginning June 1968. It included two Navy and one Army construction battalions to be civilianized in December 1968 and March 1969, respectively.

Change 22. The 27th Marine Regimental Landing Team (5,636 personnel) was rescheduled to redeploy from SVN in September rather than June 1968.

Change 23. Authorized the deployment of 59 military personnel to Japan.

Change 24. Approved the permanent deployment of 76 Air Force aeromedical evacuation personnel in Japan in September 1968. In addition, the Deputy Secretary approved the deployment of 92 Air Force personnel to the Philippines.

Change 25. Approved 23 Army Special Warfare personnel for Okinawa.


Change 27. Tactical fighter squadron projections on the Summary Table were revised to include A-1s and A-26s which had been excluded from the squadron totals.

Change 28. All services revised their aircraft phasing schedules within previously approved force levels. The principal revisions were: (1) the U.S. Army changed the mix between OH-6/58 and OH-13/23, extending
the older OH-13/23 in SVN, and rephased the mix between UH-1s and
AH-1Gs reflecting revised availability of the AH-1G; (2) the U.S. Air
Force changed the phasing of four F-4 squadrons which replaced four
ANG F-100 squadrons and extended F-100 aircraft because of a
slippage in production of A-37s; and (3) U.S. Navy ship-based helicopters
were added to the tables and the OV-12 was deleted since its deployment
date was uncertain.

Change 29. U.S. Army maneuver battalions decreased by one re-
reflecting the cancellation of the deployment of the 1/18 Armored Cavalry
Squadron.

Change 30. Approval of DAR AF-68-111 authorized six added KC-135s
at U-Tapao, Thailand (no personnel increase) and six additional KC-135s
and 255 personnel in Taiwan.

Change 31. Approved 13 additional Navy personnel in Japan, 71 in
the Philippines and 7 in Guam, and authorized 26 additional Army
personnel in Japan.

Change 32. Deputy Secretary of Defense's memorandum, Subject:
Increase in RVNAF Phase I Force Structure, 1 November 1968,
authorized the RVNAF to increase their armed forces to 850,000 and the
para-military forces to 239,300. Additionally the RVNAF expansion was
accelerated.

Change 33. Realigned the Air Force force structure in SVN, converting
1625 recurring TDY spaces to permanent spaces, and reducing the TDY
authorization to 1075.

(S) On 10 September, J5 provided CINCPAC with an evaluation of
the rigid manpower ceilings imposed on deployments to SVN and Thailand.
The J5 pointed out that this restriction was not conducive to maintaining
the operational readiness of combat forces. The deployment of required
additional forces was possible only by providing trade-offs which reduced
the strength of operating units, or by eliminating a function and deleting
the entire unit involved. The ceilings imposed on deployments was unduly
restrictive to the introduction of new concepts and recently developed or
improved weapons systems which were not included in the original
ceiling.1 In his Vietnam trip report, Mr. Leonard Sullivan, Jr.,

1. Point Paper, J554, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Sep 68, Subj: Southeast Asia
Deployment Program #6 (U).
Deputy Director, Southeast Asia Matters, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering addressed this same subject in relation to RVNAF "Federation" with U.S. Forces. He stated:

...In many areas, our own U.S. ceilings on spaces in-theater are a subject of considerable inconvenience; making it considerable more difficult to introduce the new capabilities we have found necessary. For instance, the 7th AF is finding their new high resolution cameras extremely valuable; yet they have been turned down on their request for additional Photo Interpreters to exploit the additional data. The entire AF GUN SHIP III force of AC-119's has to come "out of their hide." Crews to man the TPS-25's in I Corps came out of somebody's hide, while the Navy OP-2E's have to be traded in for AP-2H's even though they might contribute "as is" to DUCK BLIND. Augmentation and streamlining of U.S. divisional intelligence gathering (being tried in TACSIH II) requires a "temporary" allocation of TDY people to the 1st Infantry Division, thereby biasing the experiment and its chances of permanent adoption. ¹

(S) The J5 also commented on the problems encountered in the civilianization program. The SECDEF had directed that the civilianization schedule provide a rate of civilianization which would preclude the in-country ceiling from exceeding 549,500 military spaces authorized for deployment by OSD Program 6.² The difficulties encountered by COMUSMACV are discussed above in subsection, "Civilization Program."

(S) On 16 November, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS: (1) that a Navy VP squadron detachment (154 spaces) which had been carried in a TDY status be carried as a permanent part of the Program 6 force structure; (2) that 103 spaces be used to increase an Air Force tactical air support squadron, the MACV Naval Advisory Group, and the Air Force portion of the MACV Field Advisory Element; and (3) that the 257 military

2. Point Paper, J554 Hq CINCPAC, 10 Sep 68, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #6 (U).
spaces involved be obtained from the CINCPAC Army RVN debit-credit account. On 19 November, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that an additional 18 spaces for the MACV Naval Advisory Group be obtained from the CINCPAC Army RVN debit-credit account.

On 14 December the JCS approved CINCPAC's recommendations to use 275 CINCPAC Army spaces to accommodate high-priority Navy and Air Force requirements in RVN. This action supported COMUSMACV and CINCPAC in the first significant application of the transfer of space authorizations from one MACV component command to another. This decision resulted in the following adjustments to the Army, Navy and Air Force space authorizations in Vietnam:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>368,584</td>
<td>368,309</td>
<td>-275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>37,204</td>
<td>37,409</td>
<td>+205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>61,471</td>
<td>61,541</td>
<td>+70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Southeast Asia Marine Corps Force Structure and Manpower

On 23 August, the Deputy Secretary of Defense received a request by the Marine Corps for 95,300 TO/TD structure spaces in Southeast Asia and for an increase of 4,100 in the FY 69 end strength. The Deputy SECDEF disapproved the proposed end strength increase and requested a detailed troop list of the 89,500 TO/TD structure spaces for the Marine Corps in Southeast Asia. SECNAV provided, on 2 October 1968, the troop list and supporting rationale requested by the Deputy SECDEF. Two alternative courses of action, each based on 95,300 Marine space structure for Southeast Asia, were submitted because of the magnitude of the reductions and the importance of retaining a balanced force capability of Marine Corps forces in Southeast Asia. Alternative No. 1 proposed a concurrent increase of 5,500 spaces in SVN, 200 in

1. CINCPAC 160523Z Nov 68.
2. CINCPAC 190058Z Nov 68.
3. J5541 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Dec 68; J5 Brief 005-69, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Jan 69 of JCS 2472/403 of 14 Dec 68, Subj: Program 6 Adjustment-RVN (U).
4. Ibid.
5. JCS 003150/161749Z Oct 68.
6. JCS 3006/142333Z Oct 68.
Okinawa and 100 in Japan. Alternative No. 2 proposed an increase of 2,100 in SVN, 3,400 in Okinawa and 300 in Japan. Alternative No. 2 withdrew two Battalion Landing Teams and one Marine attack squadron from SVN and reconstituted the 9th MAB out of country. A third alternative was subsequently submitted by SECNAV. The third alternative required a Marine Corps augmentation in RVN of 1,147 spaces. The spaces were to be used principally for helicopter door gunners, division base augmentation and airfield security. CINCPAC did not support alternatives No. 1 and No. 2 and was not asked to comment on alternative No. 3. However, on 4 December CINCPAC recommended that any Marine forces removed from SVN be retained in WESTPAC in order to rapidly reconstitute a full amphibious capability.  

1. CINCPAC 250414Z Oct 68.  
2. CINCPAC 040405Z Dec 68.
US/ALLIED MANEUVER FORCES
BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER
1 CORPS - 59 BNS

USMC
3d MAR DIV
10 INF BNS
1 TANK BN

US ARMY
1st BDE, 5th MECH DIV
3 BNS

US ARMY
1st CAV DIV (AM)
9 BNS
3/5 ARM SOD - 1 BN

US ARMY
101st ABN DIV
9 BNS

USMC
III MAR AMPHIB FORCE
1st MAR DIV
11 INF BNS
1 TANK BN

US ARMY
23d INF DIV (AMERICAN)
198th INF BDE-3 INF BNS
196th INF BDE-3 INF BNS
11th INF BDE-4 INF BNS
1/1 ARM CAV SOD-1 BN

KOREA
2d ROK MAR BDE
4 BNS

AS OF 1 DECEMBER 1968
US/ALLIED MANEUVER FORCES
BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER
II CORPS - 36 BNS

US ARMY
4th INF DIV (-)
11 INF BNS
1 TANK BN

US ARMY
173d ABN BDE
5 INF BNS

KOREA
ROK CAPITAL DIV
9 BNS

KOREA
9th INF DIV
9 BNS

US ARMY
1 FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

US ARMY
DETACHMENT, 101 ABN DIV
1 BN (3/506)

AS OF 1 DECEMBER 1966
US/ALLIED MANEUVER FORCES
BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER
III CORPS - 40 BNS

US ARMY
1st INF DIV
9 INF BNS

US ARMY
25th INF DIV
9 INF BNS
1 TANK BN

US ARMY
II FIELD FORCE
VIETNAM

US ARMY
199th INF BDE
4 BNS

US ARMY
11th ARM CAV REGT
3 ARM CAV SOD

AUS/NZ
AUS TASK FORCE
3 BNS

THAI
RTAVF TASK GROUP
3 BNS

US ARMY
3rd BDE, 82nd ABN DIV
3 BNS

US ARMY
1st BDE, 9th INF DIV
5 BNS

SECRET
US/ALLIED MANEUVER FORCES
BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER
IV CORPS - 5 BNS

US ARMY
9th INF DIV (-)
5 INF BNS

AS OF 1 DECEMBER 1968
Force Level Accountability Procedures

During 1967, CINCPAC resolved the problems dealing with force level accountability and established accounting procedures to control the force level. As a result, problems in Southeast Asia force level accountability during 1968 were minimal.

On 15 August, the JCS expressed concern over the possibility that actual strengths in-country might exceed the authorized ceiling starting in November. Because of this concern, the JCS reviewed the strength accounting procedures and reporting policy and gave the following policy guidance:

a. The reported actual in-country strength consisting of operating strength, patients, and TDY will not exceed the approved force level.

b. Transients consisting of intransits-in, intransits-out, replacements, and returnees (will) continue to be excluded from reported actual in-country strength.

c. Prompt action should be taken to establish procedures to keep the actual in-country strength within the ceiling.

d. The current MACV reporting requirement, procedures and format...is not changed.

In the same message the JCS requested the CINCPAC to make recommendations concerning actions required to preclude exceeding the ceiling of 549,500. After receiving recommendations and comments from COMUSMACV and the Service Component Commanders, CINCPAC informed the JCS that, "analysis of deployments authorized...scheduled civilanization, and known changes to deployment data indicates that the authorized ceiling for SVN will not be exceeded in the foreseeable future." He outlined for the JCS specific actions taken to preclude exceeding the authorized ceiling and recommended:

2. JCS 7302/152243Z Aug 68.
3. Ibid.
The Military Services concerned identify personnel in transit, replacement and returnee status for exclusion from strength accountability, as is done with Army personnel in these categories.

The Military Services provide replacement input not greater than the rate required to maintain units at authorized strengths and respond to requests to limit the replacement flow on a selective MOS basis as required.

Program 6 deployments and the civilianization program continue as presently scheduled, subject to revision as required by further review.

Personnel out of country for TDY and leave be excluded from strength accountability.¹

U.S. Forces in Thailand

(3) The SECDEF on 13 October 1967, placed a ceiling of 45,724 on U.S. military spaces in Thailand. At the same time he required that all future recommendations for new units or augmentations to deploy to Thailand follow the same ground rules that applied to South Vietnam.² By 21 February 1968, the authorized ceiling for U.S. deployments to Thailand was raised to 47,461 and by 15 August the ceiling had been increased by only 327 additional spaces to a total of 47,778.³

(3) This relative lack of increase can be attributed primarily to two factors, the SECDEF's reluctance to increase his imposed ceiling and the reluctance of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to authorize any new deployments which would lead to a net increase in the total number of U.S. troops in Thailand. In this regard, U.S. Ambassador Unger warned that the RTG from the beginning expected the U.S. to review its military needs and proposed deployments "precisely" to assure that the RTG was asked

1. CINCPAC 142345Z Sep 68.
3. Point Paper, J5542, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Feb 68, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #5 (U); Point Paper, J5542, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Sep 68, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #6 (U).
to approve the entry into Thailand of no more U.S. military personnel than were absolutely essential to the effective prosecution of the war. ¹

(S) In several cases the deployment of new units or augmentations was justified to the RTG by concurrent reductions that offset new deployments. This created a problem in that the RTG could draw an inference that a policy of man-for-man trade-offs had been established. This situation was recognized when Secretary of State Rusk, on 22 August, requested Ambassador Unger to seek RTG clearance for new deployments to Thailand. The Secretary of Defense had approved for deployment to Thailand eight AC-130 GUN SHIP II aircraft and 414 personnel to Ubon, ten B-52s and 851 personnel to U-Tapao and 46 propeller aircraft and 914 personnel to Nakhon Phanom. This increase was to be balanced by offsetting reductions in other units. In his message to Ambassador Unger, Mr. Rusk instructed the Ambassador to tell the RTG, "That changes in other requirements produced concurrent reductions which offset these new deployments. Under no circumstances should the Thai draw the inference that an absolute ceiling has been imposed necessitating man-for-man trade-offs for future deployments."²

Withdrawal of HAWK Units from South Vietnam

(S) In a message to CINCPAC on 9 January, COMUSMACV recommended replacing the two Marine HAWK battalions located at Danang and Chu Lai with the two U.S. Army HAWK battalions located at Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay. COMUSMACV pointed out that the two Army battalions would receive modifications to their equipment in June which would further improve their operational reliability. Based on this, his recommended course of action would provide an immediate improvement in overall operational reliability of HAWK air defense in the area where the threat is considered the most critical, eliminate duplicative logistic support systems, enable Marine HAWK units to be released to PACOM, and release spaces to meet other MACV high priority requirements.³

(S) CINCPAC reviewed and evaluated COMUSMACV's recommendation and alternative courses of action and on 20 January he approved redeployment of one U.S. Army HAWK battalion to Chu Lai as relief

1. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 16991/031006 Jul 68.
2. SECSTATE 226022/222203Z Aug 68.
3. COMUSMACV 090146Z Jan 68.
for one Marine HAWK battalion. Upon relief, the Marine battalion was
to transfer sufficient equipment and personnel to the Marine battalion at
Danang to reinforce that unit with the sustained support capability required.
CINCPAC then stated to the JCS that it did not appear essential to retain
the relieved Army and Marine HAWK battalions in a forward deployed
posture provided both units were maintained elsewhere in a combat readiness
condition which would permit rapid redeployment by airlift should such
need arise. He recommended that both units be withdrawn to CONUS and
that the HAWK battery and necessary augmentation approved for Thailand,
could be provided from the released Army battalion.¹

(5) The JCS responded to CINCPAC's recommendation on 14 February
and stated that because of the recent enemy air threat in SVN in the vicinity
of the DMZ and the situation in Korea "no action is being taken by the JCS
at this time" on CINCPAC's recommendation. The JCS requested CINCPAC
to review his recommendation "in view of the current situation in PACOM"
and inform the JCS if relocation to CONUS or elsewhere outside of SVN was
still desired.²

(5) On 6 May, CINCPAC notified the JCS that the requirement for
HAWK units in SVN had been reevaluated and that his previous recommenda-
tion to withdraw two battalions was still considered the proper course of
action. He suggested that the Army HAWK battalion recommended for
withdrawal could fill one of the two HAWK battalions currently required
for Korea.³

(5) The JCS supported the CINCPAC position and on 4 June approved
a Joint Staff report which contained the following conclusions:⁴

a. The Army and Marine HAWK units designated by CINCPAC
should be withdrawn from South Vietnam as separately directed by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. One Army HAWK battery, appropriately augmented, should
be moved from South Vietnam to Thailand when site and facilities con-
struction are completed.

1. CINCPAC 202207Z Jan 68.
2. JCS 1041/141213Z Feb 68.
3. CINCPAC 060605Z May 68.
4. Point Paper, J3B15, Hq CINCPAC, 20 June 68, Subj: Withdrawal of
   HAWK Units from RVN (5).
c. One available Army HAWK battalion should be moved from South Vietnam to Korea on a temporary basis when approved by the SECDEF.

d. The remaining available Army HAWK units (AD Group Headquarters and support units) and the Marine HAWK battalion (-), should be moved from South Vietnam to the United States and maintained in a combat readiness condition prepared for rapid redeployment overseas if needed.

(8) On 8 June, the JCS notified CINCPAC that his recommendations were approved and advised that the Army HAWK battalion could not be deployed to Korea until approved by the SECDEF. Should the SECDEF disapprove the proposed deployment to Korea, or if the RTG should decline to accept the offered HAWK battery, the units would be withdrawn from SVN to CONUS. The JCS then warned:

Withdrawal of units from SVN during the period of Paris peace talks and national elections is a sensitive matter. Specific OSD public affairs guidance concerning the movements will be forwarded separately or with JCS deployment directives. Meanwhile, no repeat no public announcements or comment concerning this action will be made. 1

(8) Withdrawal of the Army and Marine HAWK battalions to CONUS and deactivation of associated Army support units was directed by the JCS on 8 August 1968. 2

(8) In a joint State-Defense message on 22 August, CINCPAC received public affairs guidance on the withdrawal of the HAWK units from SVN. The message stated: 3

Withdrawal of units from SVN during the period of the Paris peace talks and national elections is a sensitive matter. However, following announcement should be made routinely after coordination with GVN: "As part of a continuous study of force effectiveness conducted by

1. JCS 2042/081616Z Jun 68.
2. JCS 06760/082258Z Aug 68.
3. SECDEF 7853 DEF from OASD(PA)/222251Z Aug 68.
COMUSMACV and CINCPAC, it has been determined that certain of the air defense resources in South Vietnam should be repositioned. One U.S. Marine HAWK battalion and one U.S. Army HAWK battalion will be positioned in the continental United States. This program adjustment will enable COMUSMACV to increase his force effectiveness by permitting, within the current approved manpower levels for U.S. forces in South Vietnam, deployment of other type forces. This action will not reduce the level of forces authorized for South Vietnam.

If asked if this redeployment means that we now assess the air threat as less than before, you are authorized to reply: "We maintain sufficient air defense capabilities to meet the requirement."

If asked if the RVN was consulted on this decision, you are authorized to reply: "Yes." We plan no announcement here and if queried, will not go beyond above guidance. We require twenty-four hours prior notice before release is made in order that key congressmen can be notified two hours in advance.

RVNAF Force Levels and Modernization Program

During 1968, President Johnson was the impetus behind the RVNAF force level increase and the RVNAF modernization program. Early in the year he expressed "intense interest in and placed great emphasis on the expansion of the RVNAF to attain a posture of self-sufficiency at the earliest possible time." ¹

The approved RVNAF force levels for FY 68, in effect on 1 January, are shown below:²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>301,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>16,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>7,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>16,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>341,240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Paramilitary Forces:
- Regional Forces (RF) 183,546
- Popular Forces (PF) 160,953

Total: 344,499

Total regular and paramilitary forces: 685,739

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(S) On 9 March, COMUSMACV proposed that the FY 69 RVNAF force level be raised to 779,154, an increase of 93,415 spaces over FY 68. At the same time he proposed that the FY 70 ceiling be raised to 801,215, an increase of 22,061 spaces over the proposed FY 69 ceiling. The proposal reflected the results of a restudy of the RVNAF force development program in the FY 69-70 time frame. COMUSMACV furnished CINCPAC complete justification for the increase. He told CINCPAC that MACV would control the authority to activate the units that were to be added to the proposed force structure in FY 69-70. Activation would be granted contingent upon manpower availability, recruiting experience, the continued development of leadership potential, the maintenance of adequate present-for-operation strengths, availability of equipment and capability of the support base. 1

(S) CINCPAC on 16 March, notified the JCS that his approval of COMUSMACV's proposed increase in the RVNAF force levels was contingent upon receipt of the additional equipment requirements and dollar costs. CINCPAC concurred in COMUSMACV's rationale and told the JCS that recommendation for approval could be anticipated. In the same message he told the JCS that he recommended approval of 31,475 additional pipeline spaces that COMUSMACV requested on 9 March and again on 16 March. 2

(S) The JCS, on 6 April, notified CINCPAC that COMUSMACV's request for 31,475 additional pipeline spaces was approved and that his authority to adjust forces within the authorized level was continued. The proposed add-on forces for FY 69, when approved, would be reduced by 31,475 spaces. 3

(S) In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, on 15 April, discussed the accelerated expansion of the RVNAF. They stated: 4

COMUSMACV has estimated that SVN can reach and maintain an RVNAF force level of approximately 801,215 by end FY 1970. As a result of the current momentum being imparted to the mobilization of SVN

1. COMUSMACV 06882/091250Z Mar 68.
2. CINCPAC 162121Z Mar 68; COMUSMACV 06882/091250Z Mar 68; COMUSMACV 07372/150106Z Mar 68.
3. JCS 005687/060058Z Apr 68.
4. JCSM-233-68, 15 Apr 68.
manpower by President Thieu, it is possible that this force level may be reached earlier. ... In view of the possibility of negotiations with Hanoi, there may be a freeze applied to RVNAF force levels and armaments. Anticipating this situation, we should strive to bring the RVNAF to a self-sufficient posture prior to any freeze, and thus create the largest sustainable RVNAF in-being prior to a negotiated settlement.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the further RVNAF increase of 115,475 spaces, which includes 31,475 FY 1969 pipeline spaces previously approved, is required to improve the capability of the GVN forces. This action should enable the RVNAF to become self-sufficient against a residual internal insurgency threat.

Since equipment may not be available to keep pace with this expansion, it is planned temporarily to place personnel authorized for armor, artillery, transport, construction, engineer, and other special units into infantry-type units of the existing force structure. Basic infantry equipment can be provided from existing stocks, particularly the M2 carbine until the M16 rifle becomes available. This action has an advantage of providing unit fillers and overstrength with minimum impact on requirements for leaders and long lead-time training. As necessary leaders and the specialized equipment become available, personnel can be reassigned to newly activated units to round out the RVNAF force structure.

...additional information concerning RVNAF force structure, combat effectiveness, equipment shortages, and studies which support the RVNAF force requirements will be developed, and submitted to you separately.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended:¹

a. Approval be provided for the expansion of RVNAF to a total force level of 801,215, to be reached as soon as possible.

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¹ Ibid.
b. Approval be provided for funds necessary to support the recommended expansion, subject to final determination of the force structure, associated equipment requirements, and detailed costs.

c. Approval be provided to furnish the M2 carbine as an interim weapon pending availability of M16 rifles.

d. Approval be provided to furnish RVNAF (including RF/PF) M16 rifles.

(8) The JCS proposed RVNAF force levels are shown on the following chart.
Previously Approved and JCS Proposed Force Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>SECDEF Approved FY 68 RVNAF</th>
<th>Proposed FY 69 Increases 2/</th>
<th>Proposed FY 69 Add-on 4/</th>
<th>Proposed FY 69 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force Levels 1/ Basic</td>
<td>Pipeline 3/ Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army (ARVN)</td>
<td>303,356</td>
<td>20,813</td>
<td>17,700</td>
<td>38,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy (VNN)</td>
<td>16,003</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td>1,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps (VNMC)</td>
<td>7,321</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>1,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force (VNAF)</td>
<td>16,448</td>
<td>2,497</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>3,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Regular</td>
<td>343,128</td>
<td>24,504</td>
<td>20,575</td>
<td>45,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Force (RF)</td>
<td>182,971</td>
<td>26,061</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>28,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Force (PF)</td>
<td>159,640</td>
<td>11,375</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>19,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Paramilitary</td>
<td>342,611</td>
<td>37,436</td>
<td>10,900</td>
<td>48,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>685,739</td>
<td>61,940</td>
<td>31,475</td>
<td>93,415</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ COMUSMACV was authorized to adjust spaces among forces within the level of 685,739.

2/ Approved by Mission Council and CINCPAC.


4/ Concurred in by Mission Council and CINCPAC. This FY 69 add-on incorporates the previous FY 70 proposed increase.

SOURCE: JCSM-233-68, 15 Apr 68.
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze, in a memorandum to the CJCS on 16 April, stated to General Wheeler:

We have embarked on a course of gradually shifting the burden of the war to GVN forces. We now must support as quickly as possible and to the maximum extent feasible efforts of the GVN to enlarge, improve, and modernize their armed forces.

There is urgency to accomplishing these objectives. In the course of negotiations, we may find it desirable to agree to mutual restriction on the military efforts of North Vietnam and the U.S. Accordingly, the structure of GVN forces must be reoriented to provide as soon as possible for self sufficiency in logistic, airlift, and air and artillery support categories.

I recognize that this policy will require extraordinary actions from all of us and that we may have to alter past and present priorities for equipment deliveries and allocation of available logistic, transport and firepower support for forces in Vietnam.

I desire that the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a comprehensive, feasible action plan to achieve the above objectives.

The plan should identify (and provide a regular reporting system on) the deficiencies of the RVNAF, specify corrective actions and resources required, and establish time-phased goals. It should concentrate on those actions most likely to provide immediate substantial improvements. While equipment modernization (particularly mobility and firepower) is needed, we all recognize we must also concentrate on such areas as leadership, personnel management, higher pay and allowances (including fringe benefits) and a promotion system based on merit. The plan should of course be selective, so that we do not dilute our efforts, and our leverage on the GVN, by attempting to do everything at once.

1. Memo, Asst SECDEF to the CJCS, 16 Apr 68, Subj: RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (U), attached to JCS 2472/272, 16 Apr 68.
I recognize that we can re-equip the ARVN much faster if we give this requirement priority over our non-SEA active and reserve forces. This will require some hard alternative choices. Consequently, your plan should identify those equipment items which are competitive with our non-SEA requirements, and your recommendations for allocating the equipment between the competing forces.

(5) On 17 April, the JCS outlined for CINCPAC the Assistant SECDEF's requirement for the JCS to provide a comprehensive, feasible action plan. In order to prepare the plan, the JCS directed CINCPAC to submit by 24 April a report identifying, "critical mission essential modernization equipment over and above current programs by nomenclature, quantity, and required delivery date." By 6 May, CINCPAC was to submit a plan for the optimum RVNAF force structure identifying add-on units, equipment lists, unit activations, and cost estimates. In addition, CINCPAC was required to submit on the same date a "proposed plan to turn over mission essential equipment required by the RVNAF to complete the formation of a balanced self-sufficient force structure in the event of an agreement for an early mutual withdrawal of US/FW and NVA forces."¹ In connection with the optimum RVNAF structure against the ultimate goal of self-sufficiency, the JCS required a time-phased plan for the provision of adequate naval, air, artillery, helicopter, airlift, and logistic support for or within the RVNAF.²

(5) On 24 April, COMUSMACV submitted requirements for mission essential equipment³ and the JCS responded with a time schedule which represented the Services' capability to provide the equipment.⁴ Both CINCPAC and COMUSMACV agreed to the schedule.⁵

(5) COMUSMACV submitted the RVNAF optimum force schedule in three parts: the force structure plan which included a 801,215-force level; a schedule of activations; and equipment lists with dollar costs.⁶

1. JCS 6703/17Z1162 Apr 68.
2. JCS 6703/17Z1162 Apr 68; JCS 56809/18Z114Z Apr 68.
3. COMUSMACV 11G12/240205Z Apr 68; J5Z21 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of May 68.
4. JCS 7793/Z031817Z Apr 68.
5. COMUSMACV 12G40/03G610Z May 68; CINCPAC 08G207Z May 68.
6. COMUSMACV 12G40/03G610Z May 68; COMUSMACV 12G29/03G345Z May 68.
U.S. weapons for RVNAF improvement and modernization program arrive at ARVN Ordnance Base Depot, Saigon. Above, M60 machineguns and 106mm recoilless rifles. Below, 105mm howitzers.
Comments of the Service Component Commanders indicated several areas of disagreement which did not appear insurmountable but would require time to resolve. Areas which required examination and resolution included:

a. Eliminating an ARVN infantry division in FY 71 to provide spaces for the activation of VNN and VNAF units.

b. Reorganizing all ARVN infantry regiments by providing three battalions of four companies instead of four battalions of three companies.

c. Providing VNAF with a photo and electronic reconnaissance capability by providing RF-5s, U-17s and RB-57s to the VNAF inventory.

d. Accelerating the F-5 program.

e. Determining the capability of the RVNAF to manage and operate the logistic structure.

(C) CINCPAC recommended to the JCS approval of the COMUSMACV plan for the transfer of equipment to the RVNAF provided that all forces scheduled for redeployment in PACOM retained their full equipment allocation. In the interest of time, CINCPAC recommended early approval of the proposed FY 69 force structure in order that the momentum which had been generated in accelerating the expansion and modernization of the RVNAF could continue. Review and resolution of problem areas which would exist after FY 70 would take place later.

(C) COMUSMACV's plan to turn over from U.S. units mission essential equipment was compatible with his time-phased plan which provided for U.S. combat and logistical support to sustain the RVNAF should the U.S. withdraw. The most important consideration in these plans was that the Vietnamese would be provided equipment only after they were trained and prepared to accept it.

1. J5521 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of May 68 citing CINCUSARPAC Itr, 6 May 68 Subj: RVNAF Improvement and Modernization; FMFPAC 042213Z May 68; CINCPACFLT 052020Z May 68; CINCPACAF 050135Z May 68.
2. CINCPAC 082027Z May 68.
3. Ibid.
4. J5521 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of May 68.
Based on the plans and comments provided by CINCPAC and
COMUSMACV, the JCS prepared the plan requested by Assistant
Secretary of Defense Nitze and submitted it on 23 May. In their
memorandum of transmittal, the JCS discussed the background against
which the plan was prepared, set forth their conclusions and made
recommendations. 1

... At the outset, it should be recognized that the
RVNAF, even though expanded and modernized, may
continue to suffer from important deficiencies, such as
training, leadership, and morale, which may limit
RVNAF capability to achieve the objectives established
for it. Careful consideration must be given to the capacity
of the GVN not only to apply effectively the modern equip-
ment resources to the purposes for which they are intended
but also to safeguard and administer them.

In the event of a US/Free World and North Vietnamese
Army withdrawal, resulting from negotiations which do not
also provide for subsidence of Viet Cong activity and a
degree of assurance against further conflict, the Viet Cong
will continue to present a significant threat to the GVN.
Under these circumstances, it is possible that Hanoi
might continue to support Viet Cong insurgency and could
leave behind sufficient filler personnel to bring Viet Cong
units to peak strength - approximating 150,000 to 190,000
men. While, in the longer term, Viet Cong forces opposed
by an enlarged and modernized RVNAF probably would be
unable to take over the GVN, there can be no assurance
that an improved RVNAF could cope with extensive
infiltration should Hanoi fail to adhere to the terms of
a negotiated withdrawal of forces.

... to develop this plan, it has been assumed that:

a. There will be a gradual shift of the burden of
the war to the forces of the GVN.

b. The GVN will be supported as quickly as possible
and to the maximum extent feasible in the effort to enlarge,
modernize, and improve its Armed Forces.

1. JCSM-324-68, 23 May 68.
c. US forces and support will be provided to offset certain deficiencies in the South Vietnamese Air Force and Navy and other support areas.

d. An enlarged, modernized, and improved RVNAF can counter effectively Viet Cong operations not supported by extensive infiltration in the long term.

The concept of this plan involves three increments:

a. The first increment includes the necessary actions to accelerate the equipping of the FY 1968 structure under current programs and to provide the structure with modern arms. Evaluated in this step were deficiencies, equipment resources and availability, and the impact upon other US ongoing programs and actions to support the increase of RVNAF strength to 801,215 as rapidly as possible, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff....

b. The second increment includes further development of the FY 1968 force into an enlarged, modernized, and improved RVNAF within the 801,215 manpower ceiling. This increment contains time-phased goals, corrective actions, training, and equipment required. Included in this increment are the deficiencies that will continue to exist in this structure, equipment sources and availability, and the impact of the expansion on other programs.

The third increment includes contingency measures which would enable the RVNAF to take over equipment of selected US units which might be withdrawn in the event of a mutual withdrawal of US/Free World and North Vietnamese Army forces.

The major limitations in the creation of an enlarged, modernized, and improved RVNAF are trained personnel and currently available equipment. The equipment problem related to the force expansion can be overcome, within the time frame required, by diversion and redistribution of US assets and the provision of additional funds and procurement authority. Availability dates indicated in the plan are relatively consistent with the RVNAF capability to receive
and to operate effectively the modern equipment. However, it is not expected that the shortage of equipment will slow the induction of personnel and their assimilation into the RVNAF, and it is planned to reach an 801,215 ceiling by the 4th quarter, FY 1969. Faster growth would be beyond the RVNAF capability to mobilize and train personnel. In the South Vietnamese Air Force and Navy, training of personnel is the primary limiting factor in building the enlarged, modernized, and improved force structure. Short-falls in trained personnel will still exist at the end of FY 1973, due to this constraint. The GVNV has a limited base of qualified personnel and, while no major problems are foreseen for the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) in the initial mobilization stage, qualified officers and noncommissioned officers will be in short supply. In the FY 1970-1973 time frame, the ARVN and Regional Force/Popular Force personnel strength will be reduced by approximately 21,900, in order to provide for expansion in the South Vietnamese Air Force and Navy.

The force level in the plan is developed over the FY 1969-1973 time frame. Combat conditions and the availability of manpower will undoubtedly require some refinement and modification in the force structure in the later years. Modernization of the existing structure will lay the groundwork for creation of the expanded force. For FY 1969, it is possible to determine specific activation schedules and the availability of equipment necessary to proceed with this incremental expansion, modernization, and improvement. Beyond FY 1969, the plan is less precise because of uncertainties in the capability of the RVNAF to train personnel and to absorb modern equipment. These RVNAF capabilities will need to be examined in greater depth before more detailed plans are formulated.

Of the many items of materiel required to support the increase in military strength, certain mission-essential equipment has been subjected to specific analysis to determine availability within the time frame under consideration. The results of this analysis indicate that the provision of certain mission-essential required equipment by diversion, redistribution, or withdrawal of resources from existing forces
will have an adverse impact on US force readiness. Complete fill of requirements cannot be accomplished in the appropriate time frame without approval for add-on procurement and supplemental funding. However, in reviewing asset data for this equipment, the managing Service has proposed specific solutions for the provision of critical items, identified items of serious impact, and indicated the military risk involved to satisfy the most critical need and still provide a prudent quantity for other priority users. The time allowed for preparation of this plan was necessarily short. Thus, it should be noted that continued examination and analysis of equipment requirements and availability and costs for these items, as well as additional equipment and ammunition requirements not specifically considered in this study, will be necessary as the RVNAF is developed and subsequent programs are approved.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that:

a. The plan for expansion, modernization, and improvement of the RVNAF and the contingency plan for turnover of US equipment (Appendix here to) are feasible and responsive to the requirements of the situation in South Vietnam; however, the FY 1970-1973 force structure and associated equipment requires further refinement.

b. Execution of the plan will require significant diversion of Service equipment programmed and procured for other purposes and the withdrawal of limited amounts of equipment from Active and Reserve units, which will decrease the readiness condition of US forces worldwide. Immediate funding and procurement authority will be required to restore US force capability.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The FY 1968 modernization and the FY 1969 force structure and equipment requirements be approved now for execution.

b. Additional funding and procurement authority for the FY 1968 and FY 1969 portions of this plan be provided.
c. The FY 1970-1973 force structure and associated equipment requirements be used as a basis for further planning.

§ On 28 May, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the Assistant SECDEF had approved, on 24 May, the JCS recommendation to increase the FY 69 RVNAF force level to 801,215 but deferred approval of the funding to support the force structure.  

§ The Assistant SECDEF in a memorandum to the JCS on 25 June approved the FY 1968 RVNAF equipment modernization program except for the Vietnamese Navy. In the same memorandum he approved the FY 69 force structure for ARVN combat units, the ARVN and VNMC 105mm and 155mm artillery battalions, additional RF and PF units, and the two VNAF UH-1 helicopter squadrons. Costs of the program would have to be absorbed by reducing other Southeast Asia and non-Southeast Asia programs.

§ Mr. Nitze requested that the entire program be reviewed in two phases:

a. **Phase I:** Provide for the indefinite future a force structure which would give the maximum possible GVN ground combat capability, assuming continued U.S. participation in the war at presently approved levels. Thus, an increase during Phase I of the tactical air, naval, and certain other combat support and logistic forces might not be necessary.

b. **Phase II:** Provide for an RVNAF which would be self-sufficient and capable of meeting insurgency requirements that would remain if NVA and U.S. forces should withdraw. It would not provide the equipment required to deal with renewed large scale aggression from North Vietnam.

§ On 9 July, COMUSMACV requested necessary authority to activate additional logistic support units in RVNAF to support that portion of the RVNAF FY 69 program approved by OSD on 25 June, requested approval of selected items of equipment for approval of FY 69 force structure increase,

1. JCS 1107/282020Z May 68.
2. JCS 3391/261857Z Jun 68.
3. Ibid.
and a 15 day extension of the submission dates for Phase I and II reports.\footnote{COMUSMACV 19762/091207Z Jul 68.} CINCPAC concurred in the requests and gave additional rationale to support COMUSMACV's requests.\footnote{CINCPAC 122017Z Jul 68.}

\footnote{JCSM-455-68, 19 Jul 68.}

On 19 July, the JCS in a memorandum to the SECDEF stated:\footnote{JCSM-455-68, 19 Jul 68.}

The authorized force level ceiling of 801,215 will be achieved ahead of initial estimates if the accelerated pace of the Government of Vietnam mobilization continues. … the 30 June 1968 strength of the RVNAF was 765,050.

…the Government of Vietnam measures to expand the RVNAF are outrunning our support. Equipment assets in-country and due to arrive under previously approved programs must be diverted now to permit training and limited operational employment of new units. This action impacts adversely upon the existing combat units which are already under-equipped. Refinements and application of all known factors have resulted in an irreducible hard-core equipment requirement for new units. Filling this requirement will not alleviate present shortages in existing units or provide for attrition or modernization. The mission-essential combat and combat support equipment required now is estimated to (cost)… $5,310,061.

… To sustain effective ground combat operations and improve supply distribution to the regional force/popular force, an austere addition to the logistic forces is considered necessary prior to completing the force structure review currently underway. Increased densities of equipment and implementation of the modernization program require early activation of certain units, totalling 3,093 spaces… The equipment cost estimate of this requirement is $6,665,145, and delivery is required early in FY 1969.

As to planning for Phase I and Phase II, COMUSMACV has determined that additional time will be needed to improve
the accuracy of his submission. Authorization documents are the controlling factor in computation of true total costs as well as equipment requirements. Since nearly 400 such documents must be refined and coordinated with Joint General Staff, RVNAF, COMUSMACV has requested an extension of at least 15 days for submission of his preliminary report on Phase I and final reports on Phases I and II.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are continuing to develop the FY 1969 RVNAF force structure, equipment, and cost requirements for resubmission under revised guidance, which established the objective of maximizing ground combat power at the expense of a balanced force. It is essential that continuing support to the Government of Vietnam be provided in order to sustain the momentum of their accelerated efforts to shoulder an ever-increasing portion of the burden of the war. Although the recommendations set forth herein should be approved on the basis of being absolute minimum-essential requirements at this time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that these measures do not constitute, and should not be construed, as substitutes for those proposed for improving and modernizing the RVNAF...

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. Approval be provided to program equipment... for the FY 1969 RVNAF (ARVN) combat and combat support force structure increase.

b. Approval be provided to activate the combat service support elements....

c. Approval be provided to program equipment... for above logistic units.

d. Additional funds to support these programs be requested.

e. The submission dates for reports be established as follows: Preliminary Phase I, 30 August 1968; Final Phase I, 30 September 1968; and Final Phase II, 15 November 1968.
On 29 July, COMUSMACV forwarded his preliminary Phase I plan to CINCPAC with an information copy to the JCS. Of the 84,000 spaces included in the plan, over 64,000 were allocated to ground combat forces. COMUSMACV told CINCPAC:

The proposed Phase I force development plan presents two potential problem areas which are unavoidable in view of the guidance. First, JGS has already begun execution of induction, activation and training plans based on the May submission structure. Second, the Phase I Plan continues to emphasize ARVN combat and combat support elements, at the expense of VNN, VNAF and ARVN logistical elements which require long lead time training. The loss of civilian skilled labor as mobilization progresses, without compensating increases in military technical spaces during Phase I, may require... costs in excess of current in-country costs. The first problem will be largely resolved before the final Phase I Plan is to be submitted. The second will be addressed in Phase II planning.

On 1 August, the SECDEF responded to the JCS recommendations set forth in their 19 July memorandum. He approved a total of $5,310,061 in hard-core equipment requirements for new units, approved 3,093 logistics spaces and $6,665,145 for essential RVNAF logistic units and associated equipment, and the 15-day extension for Phase I and II plans.

The quality and quantity of Vietnamese leadership was a key consideration in the improvement and modernization of the RVNAF forces. The SECDEF raised serious questions on this subject and on 13 September, the Chairman of the JCS addressed the RVNAF leadership situation. The memorandum pointed out that the RVNAF had about 87 percent of the number of officers required for the 801,215 force level; the 87 percent figure was further reduced by the number of officers engaged in non-military duties; time was required to develop the leadership necessary to realize the effectiveness of the enlarged force, and that leadership would be a central problem in the RF and PF expansion.

1. COMUSMACV 290859Z Jul 68.
2. J5 Brief No. 00278-68, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Aug 68, of JCS 2472/272-6, Subj: RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (U).
U.S. engineer equipment for RVNAF improvement and modernization program in ARVN Engineer Base Depot. Above, rough terrain forklift. Below, rollers, graders, and bulldozers.
(S) The memorandum reviewed the development of the RVNAF since 1964 calling attention to the various restrictions, political climate, U.S. funding procedures and economic measures which substantially influenced the development of leadership in the RVNAF. The memorandum concluded:  

The point in time has not been reached when many obstacles encountered in the past have been removed or reduced to manageable proportions. However, the most important continuing task is improving the leadership at all echelons in the RVNAF. The RVNAF in the summer of 1968 is enormously improved over the RVNAF of 1965/1966. There is a long way to go; however, commanders in the field understand the problem and its importance.

(5) On 2 October 1968, the JCS forwarded their final report for Phase I to the SECDEF. The plan provided concept rationale and the overall force structure which was identical to the preliminary Phase I plan. The JCS pointed out that even though expanded and modernized, the RVNAF would probably continue to suffer from important deficiencies in training, leadership and morale which might limit the RVNAF capability to achieve the objectives established for them. Also, continuing attention needed to be devoted to increasing the capabilities of the Government of South Vietnam to apply effectively the modern equipment resources to the purpose intended as well as to maintain, safeguard and administer the resources.

(5) The estimated total cost of the 5-year Phase I plan was $8 billion plus $1.147 billion dollars of this estimated cost was included in the FY 69 program and the remaining 6.882 billion dollars was the unprogrammed cost of providing the required equipment. The estimated unprogrammed costs by military Service in thousands of dollars were as follows:

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY69</th>
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The JCS recommended that the Phase I force structure and equipment requirements be approved, that additional funding and procurement authority be provided on an urgent basis for the unprogrammed portions of Phase I, and COMUSMACV be granted authority to make minor adjustments or revisions in the RVNAF force structure within Service ceilings and in-country material assets approved for Phase I.\(^1\)

On 4 October, COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that:

The present mobilization by GVN has pushed the total strength of RVNAF above 801,215. From 1 April to 1 September, the strength of RVNAF has increased 133,903 from 677,616 to 811,319. Recent indications are that RVNAF will reach 850,000 as the momentum of mobilization continues. While the long term sustainability of this increase is subject to question, sustaining it even for the short term could have a substantial effect on VC efforts to rebuild their forces by denying them a ready source of manpower. In this connection, the main thrust of the recruiting effort could be directed toward peripheral rural areas which are carried as contested or which are largely VC controlled. It would therefore appear desirable to increase the authorized strength of RVNAF to 850,000.\(^2\)

COMUSMACV suggested that 39,000 spaces of the 48,785 increase could be used to expand the Regional Forces and the remaining spaces applied to the pipeline. He recommended that the ceiling of the RVNAF be increased from 801,215 to 850,000. His recommendation had been

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2. COMUSMACV 29424/041215Z Oct 68.
coordinated with the American Embassy, Vietnam, and concurred in by CINCPAC on 11 October. CINCPAC recognized that the GVN would be unable to sustain an 850,000 force level over the long term. However, he felt that a short term increase would along with other advantages provide a procurement source for long lead time training programs without drawing down on existing units. In order to preclude over-absorption of personnel in existing units, CINCPAC also recommended the immediate activation of certain ARVN and VNMC units.

(8) On 8 October, COMUSMACV submitted his Phase II plan which provided for a self-sufficient RVNAF in the event of a U.S. withdrawal. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS approval of the force ceilings, force structure and overall concept of the Phase II plan to include COMUSMACV's plan for progressing from Phase I to Phase II. However, there were areas of the plan, with regards to equipment which required further examination and resolution prior to implementation. He told the JCS that he would address these areas separately.

(8) On 25 October, the SECDEF approved Phase I of the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan except M-16 rifles would not be issued to RVNAF logistical units and that no increase in 105 or 155 mm ammunition consumption for Vietnam would be authorized.

(8) On 5 November, the SECDEF approved COMUSMACV's request to raise the RVNAF force level to 850,000 and on 9 November, COMUSMACV requested authority to raise the RVNAF force level ceiling to 877,000. COMUSMACV told CINCPAC that:

In view of recent developments, which have resulted in discontinuing all offensive actions in NVN and increased expectations for progress in the peace

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 110505 Z Oct 68.
3. Ibid.
4. COMUSMACV 29815/080425 Z Oct 68.
5. CINCPAC 272240 Z Oct 68.
6. JCS 4196/252158 Z Oct 68.
7. JCS 04972/052202 Z Nov 68.
8. COMUSMACV 34325/090515 Z Nov 68.
talks, it appears prudent to go beyond Phase I and to move rapidly toward a Phase II posture. The Phase I plan is no longer consistent with the situation in South Vietnam and the political considerations associated with the negotiations in Paris. The Phase II structure is better suited to the present anticipated conditions in SVN. ...the increased authorized strengths are necessary to enable initiation of training and other long leadtime requirements incident to Phase II without further delay.

(S) CINCPAC concurred with COMUSMACV and recommended to the JCS on 18 November that the ceiling be raised to 877,000. 1

(S) The JCS, on 12 December, defined three situations which could occur in SVN. In the optimum situation all U.S. objectives were achieved, the intermediate situation was somewhat less than the optimum situation, and the worse corresponded with the current situation. 2 At the same time the JCS requested CINCPAC to prepare conceptual plans to deal with the optimum and intermediate situation. The plans were to include an estimate of the threat, assumed intensity of combat, overall RVNAF force level structure and level of U.S. support forces required. 3

(S) On 13 December COMUSMACV identified U.S. units scheduled to turn over equipment to RVNAF in order that equipment deliveries could be made to RVNAF units activated under the Phase II plan. 4 On 18 December, the Secretary of Defense approved the Phase II plan and requested the submission of an Accelerated Phase II Plan. 5 COMUSMACV submitted his Accelerated Phase II Plan on 26 December, 6 and CINCPAC recommended approval on 29 December. 7 This plan recommended completion of all RVNAF activation by end FY 72. On 20 December, the JCS requested comments on the reduction of USARV projected deliveries of UH-1 helicopters to fill VNNAF requirements. On 25 December COMUSMACV recommended that 60 UH-1 helicopters scheduled for delivery

1. CINCPAC 182120Z Nov 68.
2. JCSM-732-68, 12 Dec 68.
3. JCS 07580/122335Z Dec 68.
4. COMUSMACV 41801/130900Z Dec 68.
5. COMUSMACV 44494/261320Z Dec 68.
6. CINCPAC 290625Z Dec 68.
7. JCS 8148/202243Z Dec 68.
to USARV be diverted to fill VNAF requirements for conversion of four VNAF H-34 squadrons. ¹ CINCPAC recommended approval on 31 December. ²

Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF)

A large majority of the governments of the free world are sympathetic to our efforts in Southeast Asia and would be alarmed were they to fail.

Secretary of State Rusk ³

(U) Since 1964, a large majority of the countries of the free world have provided either economic, technical and/or military assistance to South Vietnam. ⁴ These countries are located in Asia, Europe, the Western Hemisphere, Africa and the Middle East. Understandably, the nations closest to the threat of Communist expansion are making the most substantial contributions in military assistance after that of the United States.

(3) A recapitulation of military forces furnished by Free World Forces is shown on the following chart.

1. COMUSMACV 44368/251139Z Dec 68.
2. CINCPAC 310336Z Dec 68.
4. A detail discussion of the assistance provided by these countries from 1964 through 1967 can be found on pp. 561-571, CINCPAC Command History 1967. A comprehensive discussion of FWMAF will be found in Annex A (COMUSMACV Command History, 1968) to CINCPAC Command History 1968.
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Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) 1968
Australia - New Zealand Forces

(5) During 1967, Australia provided a wide and substantial range of assistance to South Vietnam. The military assistance provided consisted primarily of combat troops, comprising a brigade task force with supporting personnel; approximately 100 combat advisors; a Canberra Squadron; helicopter squadron (UH-1); a Caribou squadron; and two destroyers which alternated on station for SEA DRAGON operations. New Zealand forces consisting mainly of two infantry companies and a 105mm artillery battery operated with the Australian forces.\(^1\)

Additional Republic of China (ROC) Support to SVN

(5) During the later part of 1967, SVN officials proposed that a 200-man ROC augmentation composed of equipment repair specialist be attached to RVNAF support units. The U.S. Chief of MAAG, China stated that the ROC Army was capable of providing the specialist and felt that the ROC would approve the proposal. CINCPAC concurred and recommended to the JCS that DOD and State "approval in principle" be sought.\(^2\) The JCS concurred in the proposal and so recommended to the SECDEF on 23 January 1968.\(^3\)

(5) Secretary of State Rusk, on 14 March, in a Joint State-Defense message to the American Embassy, Saigon, concurred in the proposal subject to following conditions:\(^4\)

(a) Request should be from GVN to GRC and negotiation of conditions for specialists deployment should be directly between GVN and GRC. We (are) not now prepared to underwrite cost of such deployment. ... However, if GRC (is) unable to meet GVN request without some kind of compensating assistance from USG, we (are) willing (to) consider reasonable request but cannot make any advance commitment. We are not ... interested in considering commitment involving economic or procurement preferences.

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1. Data was obtained from several J3B35, Hq CINCPAC, Point Papers, 1968 Subj: Australia/New Zealand Operations in RVN (U).
2. CHMAAG Taipei, 170841Z Nov 67; CINCPAC 022330Z Dec 67.
3. J5521 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Jan 68.
4. State 129891/140054Z 68.
(b) Specialists should be civilian personnel rather than military. Although military personnel normally can be more tightly controlled than civilians, believe that specialists supplied by organization such as quasi-military Retired Servicemen's Engineering Agency, which already has dredging contract, would be subject (to) adequate control. GVN should emphasize to GRC that tight control (is) essential, including clear line of command. Our desire for civilian personnel based principally on concern to avoid such qualitative change in current GRC contribution as would be represented by introduction (of) 200 military personnel.

(c) GRC personnel should be employed only at major logistical base areas in noncombatant roles limited to equipment repair and OJT.

(TS) COMUSMACV and CINCPAC discussed the possibility of utilizing GRC troops in a non-combatant role in the Mekong Delta. COMUSMACV felt that the troops could be profitably employed and suggested the deployment of an engineer battalion with an accompanying security force to secure and maintain lines of communication in the Mekong Delta. The Chief of MAAG China and the American Embassy Taipei concurred in the proposal, however, the American Embassy, Saigon recommended that the proposal be held in abeyance until approval of the use of 200 GRC repair specialist was obtained.¹

(TS) On 28 February, CINCPAC suggested to the JCS the advisability of reexamining alternative troop sources. He recommended approval of the concept for using one or more GRC engineer battalions in the non-combat role of maintaining lines of communication in the Mekong Delta for exploration with the Government of South Vietnam. On 14 June, the JCS disapproved CINCPAC's proposal.²

1. J5521 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68; Intv, LCOL W. C. Stanton, USA, J5521, Hq CINCPAC, with COL J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 30 Oct 68.
2. J5521 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Feb 68; Intv, W. C. Stanton, USA, J5521, Hq CINCPAC, with COL J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 30 Oct 68; CINCPAC 280134Z Feb 68; JCS 02566/142220Z Jun 68.
Philippine Civic Action Group II (PHILCAG II)

(3) In August 1967, the Philippine Government assembled volunteers for PHILCAG II which was scheduled to deploy to Vietnam in December 1967 to replace PHILCAG I. The unit began training in September 1967 using field equipment and ammunition provided by CINCUSARPAC from Theater stocks and M-16 rifles on an on-loan basis by FMFPAC from stocks in Okinawa. ¹

(5) By 15 January 1968, training of PHILCAG II had been completed and the Chief, Joint U. S. Military Assistance Group, Philippines had requested transportation for the PHILCAG II advanced party which was to depart 1 February for South Vietnam. The request for transportation was based on expected congressional approval of a PHILCAG replacement bill by late January. ² PHILCAG I was funded through February 1968. New funds were required to extend PHILCAG operations. ³

(6) As events unfolded, serious opposition to the appropriation bill which would continue the life of the 2,048 man PHILCAG developed in the Philippine Senate. The Philippine House had overwhelmingly approved 35 million pesos to continue support of PHILCAG. Opposition to the bill was in two forms. Some of the opposition wanted to change the engineering configuration of the PHILCAG to medical-dental. Others wanted complete withdrawal of the PHILCAG from RVN. President Marcos' administration, while trying hard to keep PHILCAG in its original composition, ⁴ indicated possible support for compromise which would provide 30 million pesos and an unchanged total size of PHILCAG and security elements, but with a reduced number of engineer personnel and an increase in medical personnel. ⁵

(8) The American Embassy in Manila reported "that liberals see opportunity to stage a reorganization coup in Senate using PHILCAG bill as the issue upon which to break the newly established Nationalist majority." ⁶

2. Ibid.
3. Background Paper, J5123, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Jan 68.
4. PHILCAG I consisted of one engineering battalion, a security battalion, one field artillery 105 (How) battery and various support and service troops.
6. AMEMBASSY Manila 8316/141121Z Mar 68.
President Marcos decided to return a token of the PHILCAG I from SVN to the Philippines. The rationale for this action was to demonstrate that PHILCAG was at the end of its budgetary rope and unless Congress acted soon, the Administration would be forced to return PHILCAG personnel to the Philippines for lack of funds. The object of this strategy was "to keep Congressional feet to the fire" and avoid delaying action by Senate "Doves." The strategy was also intended to meet internal criticism of spending without appropriation.

Philippine SECDEF Mata, on 18 March, made a statement to the press that scheduled return of PHILCAG personnel would be made in phases in accordance with normal routine of rotating officers and men on special duty. He stated that reports about an impending PHILCAG withdrawal were "absolutely without basis." Approximately 75 members of the PHILCAG were returned to the Philippines on 21 March.

By 10 June, 221 personnel had been returned to the Philippines and no other withdrawals were contemplated until 28 July when it was reported that President Marcos had instructed Armed Forces of the Philippines to reduce the number of PHILCAG personnel from 1800 to 1000 between 1-15 August 1968. COMUSMACV was informed of the proposed action by the PHILCAG Commanding General. General Abrams personally requested CINCPAC to take all possible action to forestall the reduction. Admiral Sharp supported COMUSMACV's request and in direct communication with the CJCS stated that the move by President Marcos would be unfortunate and that diplomatic pressure should be intensified to resolve the PHILCAG political problems in the Philippine Senate.

During August the PHILCAG was reduced to 1500 men. The plans of the Philippine government at that time called for complete rotation of personnel by the middle of October. Philippine defense funds were earmarked for PHILCAG expenditures justified on the grounds that the force had to be maintained until action in Congress on PHILCAG II was completed. The next regular session of Congress was scheduled for January 1969.

1. AMEMBASSY Manila 8424/190100Z Mar 68.
3. AMEMBASSY Manila 8425/190109Z Mar 68.
4. AMEMBASSY Manila 8613/230502Z Mar 68.
5. DOD/PRO 2801102Z Jul 68.
7. Point Paper, J555A/10, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Sep 68, Subj: PHILCAG (U).
Proposed Increase in South Korean Forces in SVN

(S) As a result of a visit to Korea in 1967 by Mr. Clark Clifford and General Maxwell Taylor, negotiations were opened in December 1967 with the government of South Korea to obtain a light division of 11,000 troops for deployment to SVN.¹ A detailed discussion of this subject will be found in Section II, Chapter II, CINCPAC Command History 1968.

Increase in Royal Thai Army Forces in SVN

(S) In July 1967, the visit of Mr. Clark Clifford and General Maxwell Taylor formally established the U.S. request for an RTA force of approximately 11,000 men. The force was to be a two-brigade division consisting of six infantry battalions of four rifle companies each and a reconnaissance battalion.² A discussion of the training, deployment and logistical support of the unit will be found in the "Capabilities of Friendly Forces in Southeast Asia" Section of this chapter.

Impact of Piaster Expenditure Program

(U) In 1966, the President of the United States recognized the need to implement measures designed to strengthen the Government of South Vietnam and preserve economic stability. Accordingly, the SECDEF, on 13 July 1966, established the "Piaster Limitation Program," which was later designated the "Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program."³

(S) Supervision of the program was vested in the JCS with management of the program vested in CINCPAC. Operational control of the program in-country to reduce both official and personal spending was the responsibility of COMUSMACV and the Component Commanders.⁴

(U) Provisions of the program included a system for assessing expenditure ceilings and reporting of monthly expenditure data. The three

major spending categories to be reported were "Operations and Maintenance and Other (O&M)", "Construction", and "Personal Spending." Action programs designed to control piaster expenditures included: restriction of items procured in-country; austere contractor construction; movement of DOD personnel from leased facilities; and encouraging personnel to limit personal spending on the economy by diverting pay to U.S. post exchanges and recreational facilities and to the U.S. sponsored savings programs.

(U) From its inception the DOD Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program has been neither restrictive to our military efforts nor imposed a hardship on personnel in South Vietnam. The expenditure ceilings and action programs instituted to support the DOD program have been effective and the results achieved were excellent. The effectiveness of the various measures instituted to implement the piaster reduction program and the impact of the piaster ceiling on U.S. force requirements for SVN are best summarized by testimony before the Preparedness Investigative Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services on 16 August 1967.

A vigorous effort by CINCPAC and COMUSMACV to reduce piaster spending by the U.S. Department of Defense forces in South Vietnam has been highly successful... in view of the success in reducing piaster expenditures, piaster expenditure limitation is not considered to have been a substantial factor in the decision, made in July 1967, on the additive forces for South Vietnam for FY 1968... in late 1966, limitation on piaster expenditures was a factor with regard to the decision to deploy additional U.S. troops to South Vietnam.

(U) The effectiveness of the in-country programs to control expenditures is also evident from the results achieved to date as indicated on chart, "DOD Piaster Expenditures vs Ceilings." Total expenditures have been held below ceilings in every six-month period.

1. Ibid; Point Paper, J72, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Jan 68, Subj: DOD Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program, South Vietnam.
2. Point Paper, J72, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Jun 68, Subj: Progress in DOD Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program (U).
3. Hearings before the Preparedness Investigative Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 16 Aug 67.
DOD PIASTER EXPENDITURES VS CEILINGS

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SOURCE: J722, CINCPAC
(U) On 18 December 1967, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS approval of his 42 billion CY 68 piaster expenditure projection. This projection was higher than earlier projections primarily because of increased local national hire included in Program 5, wage increases, and an additional 1.5 billion piasters to support the CORDS program. However, after reviewing the progress of the piaster expenditure reduction program and the problem of inflation in SVN, OSD concluded that the DOD piaster expenditure ceiling for the first half of CY 68 should be 19.6 billion piasters rather than 21 billion. For planning purposes, OSD recommended that spending be held below 9.7 billion for the first quarter of CY 68 and 9.9 billion for the second quarter CY 68.

(U) During the first quarter of CY 68, expenditures were 7.55 billion piaster, or 2.15 billion below the OSD recommended limit of 9.7 billion. Also during this period there was a sharp decline in personal spending caused by increased tactical operations and curfews in metropolitan areas during and after the TET offensive. However, the second quarter CY 68 expenditures were 766 million piasters greater than the first quarter of CY 68. This increase in expenditures in each major spending category resulted from a decrease in tactical operations and an improvement in security. Overall in the first half of CY 68, expenditures were 80.9 percent of the ceiling.

(C) On 4 June, the JCS informed CINCPAC of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis desire to conduct a review of wage policy and piaster ceilings in SVN during the period 10-12 July in Washington. The purpose of the review was to decide what piaster ceiling for July-December 1968 to recommend to the SECDEF, review status of MACV and contractor wages to determine if they are higher than GVN military and civil wages and to determine whether to continue the DOD activities cost index.

1. CINCPAC 180002 Z Dec 67.
5. JCS 1569/041426 Z Jun 68.
CINCPAC concurred in the proposed review on 7 June and told the JCS that he would make specific recommendations concerning the proposed dates after coordination with COMUSMACV. In the same message he told the JCS:

Continued and concerted effort is being exerted to hold DOD piaster spending in Vietnam to the lowest level possible. This effort cannot be directed toward a realistic goal unless this goal is announced early enough to provide component and unified commands in Vietnam sufficient time to complete necessary advance planning. For this reason, it is requested that a tentative piaster ceiling for the period Jul-Sep 1968 be modified to direct attention to piaster ceilings for October 1968 and beyond. A tentative ceiling of 8.550 billion piasters, subject to increase by a 200 million carry-over from first half CY 1968 targets, is recommended.

The JCS, on 26 June, advised CINCPAC that the OASD/SA had approved a tentative ceiling on piaster expenditures for July through September of 8.550 billion subject to change following the spring review of U.S. wage policy and piaster ceilings scheduled for 10-12 July.

Representatives of the JCS, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV met with OASD officials in Washington as scheduled. During the review, expenditure projections of 19.482 billion piasters for July through December 1968 and 20.06 billion piasters for January through June 1969 were recommended to the OASD members for review. During the discussions, it was determined by the OASD Chairman that the second half CY 68 ceiling would be released after receipt of the stabilization review report prepared by the Joint Economic Office, Saigon. The report was released in mid-July, however, an official SECDEF ceiling was not received by CINCPAC as late as 22 October.

On 11 September, CINCPAC notified the JCS that the, "delay in release of second half 1968 piaster ceiling causing administrative

1. CINCPAC 070103Z Jun 68.
2. JCS 03451/262341Z Jun 68.
difficulties on subject program."\(^1\) On 24 September, CINC PAC notified the JCS that an analysis of current piaster expenditures indicated that the tentative third quarter ceiling would be exceeded. He then told the JCS that the action he recommended on 11 September was necessary for management action by MACV and requested earliest consideration.\(^2\)

(U) As pointed out by CINC PAC, third quarter expenditures for CY 68 (9.136 billion piasters) exceeded the tentative projection of 8.550 billion piasters by 586 million piasters. The expenditures of the third quarter did not, however, exceed the projection of 9.747 billion piasters previously submitted to OASD.\(^3\)

(U) On 1 December 1968, CINC PAC forwarded to the JCS the semi-annual Plaster Expenditure Projection for CY 1969. The January-June 1969 expenditure was estimated at 21.033 billion piasters and the July-December 1969 expenditure was estimated at 21.194 billion piasters, a total of 42.227 billion piasters for CY 1969.\(^4\) The projection for the first half of 1969 exceeded by approximately one billion piasters the estimate made in June 1968 for the same period. The change in the estimate was due primarily to an increase in Operations and Maintenance and Other funds. The increase was consistent with expenditure trends. However, it did not provide for an increase in personal spending should there be a relaxation of curfew restrictions.\(^5\)

(U) On 24 October, the DEPSECDEF approved an 18.2 billion piaster expenditure ceiling for the second half of CY 68.\(^6\) Since a review of the July-November expenditure trend revealed an increase in expenditures it was assumed that the December expenditures would cause the second half CY 68 expenditures to exceed the ceiling. Therefore, CINC PAC, using authority granted by the JCS in February 1967, adjusted the ceiling to 18.4 billion piasters by using a 200 million piaster carry-over. This action proved unnecessary since expenditures for the second half of CY 68 totaled 18.192 billion piasters, 99.96 percent of the original ceiling and 98.8

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1. CINC PAC 110337Z Sep 68.
2. CINC PAC 242131Z Sep 68.
4. CINC PAC 302329Z Nov 68.
5. J722 History, Hq CINC PAC for the month of December 68.
6. JCS 4437/292257Z Oct 68.
percent of the revised ceiling. Despite the high expenditure rate for the last half of CY 68, total expenditures for the year were approximately 500 million piasters less than 1967. This was due to a great extent to the sharp decline in piaster spending during the TET and May enemy offensive.  

Combined Campaign Plan 1968

(16) The RVNAF, Joint General Staff and MACV in a joint effort developed a Combined Campaign Plan (CCP) for 1968. The objectives of the 1968 CCP were the same as for 1967:2

a. First to seek out and destroy communist forces and infrastructure by applying unrelenting pressure across the entire spectrum of the enemy threat ranging from the infrastructure, local guerrilla, to the NVA divisions crossing the SVN frontier.

b. Second to assist the GVN in extending control in the Republic of Vietnam, emphasizing territorial security, opening and securing LOCs, resources control, and other operations in support of pacification.

(16) The number of goals set to accomplish the two objectives, increased from six in 1967 to 25 for 1968. These 25 goals, which provided a vehicle for quantitative measurement of progress were:3

a. Render ineffective all known enemy main force units.

b. Inflict losses on the VC/NVA forces at a rate greater than the enemy can replace.

c. Increase by 50% the number of enemy weapons taken in 1967.

d. Neutralize a minimum of 80% of known base areas.

1. JCS 6819/211523Z Feb 67; CINCPAC 240341Z Dec 68; Intv, LCOL F. H. Pless, USAF, J722, Hq CINCPAC with COL. J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 5 Feb 69.
3. Ibid.
e. Increase the effectiveness of coastal surveillance and interdiction of inland waterways to deny their use of the enemy.

f. Increase surveillance and operations along corps, province and district boundaries.

g. Improve the use and integration of RVNAF and U.S. Agency Intelligence collection assets.

h. Intensify intelligence collection by increasing the number of reconnaissance patrols.

i. Triple the number of volunteer informers.

j. Improve the processing and exploitation of PWs and detainees.

k. In support of the pacification effort increase the number of ARVN battalions.

l. Increase the number of RD campaign areas.

m. Increase the number of pacified hamlets.

n. Improve the handling and care of refugees.

o. Increase the number of Hoi Chanh over the number taken in 1967.

p. Neutralize the VC infrastructure, particularly in the priority areas for pacification.

q. Relieve the national PFF from security missions and target them against the VC infrastructure.

r. Secure a greater number of lines of communication so that the flow of commerce can be increased.

s. Meet the approved RVNAF force levels.

t. Increase effectiveness of RVNAF with emphasis on RF/PF.
u. Improve morale, welfare and patriotic sentiment of RVNAF personnel.

v. Develop a balanced logistical system in RVNAF responsive to tactical operations.

w. Improve the outpost system by constructing a selected number of new outposts in each corps and repairing 50% of those now in existence which are considered useful.

x. Meet approved requirements for organizing, equipping and training hamlet and village defense forces.

y. Protect 95% of the rice harvested in contested rice deficit areas and secure major salt producing areas in the coastal provinces.

(TS) The concept of operations for the 1968 Combined Campaign Plan provided for the input of combined military power and the application of civilian skills and economic resources into priority areas, the control or domination of which was essential to the accomplishment of the tasks. Within this context, forces were to deploy into three mutually supporting roles:

a. **Frontier Defense Forces** operating along the DMZ and opposite the enemy's Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries to prevent major incursions into South Vietnam.

b. **Mobile Strike Forces** seeking out and destroying VC/NVA forces and neutralizing his main base areas in SVN.

c. **Territorial Security Forces** committed behind the protective shield of the frontier defense and mobile strike forces supporting the GVN pacification program.

(TS) The RVNAF was assigned primary responsibility for supporting pacification with priority of effort to provide territorial security for selected priority areas to include responsibility for providing territorial

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security for selected LOCs. US-FWMAF were assigned responsibility for destroying the VC/NVA main forces, base areas and resources, containment operations along the DMZ and adjacent border sanctuary areas to deny the enemy infiltration and invasion routes; and assisting and reinforcing RVNAF as necessary in opening and securing LOCs, providing security for selected priority areas and protecting national resources.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Ibid.
SECTION II - OPERATIONS SOUTHEAST ASIA

(U) ... regarding South Vietnam, there is no need for me to tell you that we are engaged in a difficult and frustrating conflict. The aggressor regime in Hanoi, driven by an ambition of twenty-five years to dominate a unified, Communist Vietnam, is prepared to use any means to achieve its purpose. On the other hand, we have chosen to use restraint in our attacks on the base of aggression in North Vietnam. We respect the international boundaries of Laos and Cambodia, and therefore are unable to prevent the enemy's use of vitally important transit, storage and recuperation sanctuaries in those countries.

Notwithstanding these factors, the situation as of late summer (1967) had moved steadily in our favor. The Communist military position over most of South Vietnam was being gradually eroded. The South Vietnamese people were in the final stages of electing a representative government. Pacification was being approached with new determination and more promising techniques. Our bombing of the North was continuing with mounting cumulative effect in the destruction of North Vietnam's war-supporting facilities, intensifying manpower shortages and growing war weariness.

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp

(U) This section of Chapter IV reviews military operations in SVN in 1967 and covers operations in Southeast Asia during 1968. Ground operations have not been included due to the extensive coverage in Annex A. However, CINCPAC's air operations have received considerable coverage in this section.

1. Address by Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, USN, CINCPAC before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 9 Apr 68.

(U) Allied strategy for the war consists of three elements: our military campaign in South Vietnam, the nation-building program in South Vietnam, and our air and naval offensive against North Vietnam. These three interdependent and mutually supporting undertakings constitute an integrated concept for the conduct of the war.

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp


(TS) CINCPAC pointed out that military operations in SVN, NVN, and Laos resulted in a definite shift in the military situation favorable to "us". As a result the enemy was no longer capable of a military victory. U.S. and FWMAF operations, supported by close air support and ARC LIGHT strikes, increasingly neutralized enemy base areas; located and destroyed the supplies on which the enemy depended; and drove him into sparsely populated regions where food was scarce. Steady and continuing progress was made in destroying communist forces and infrastructure. The overall trend in enemy defections and losses from killed, wounded, disease, and capture was favorable to the Allies. Enemy control over the population and areas in SVN declined. As a consequence of a decline in in-country recruitment, the replacement burden fell increasingly on the North Vietnamese. Evidence indicated that NVN resorted to wider use of women in the labor force and use of 16-year old boys and men over 38 years of age as military replacements.

(TS) An analysis of the enemy's reaction to Allied operation was included in CINCPAC's report. It revealed that, "The enemy did not

1. Address by Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, USN, CINCPAC before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, 12 Jun 68.
2. CINCPAC 010156Z Jan 68.
3. Ibid.
win a major battle in Vietnam in 1967. When severely punished in battle he retreated across the borders of Cambodia and Laos to lick his wounds, refit and prepare for another operation. The enemy strategy reflected an effort to draw Allied forces into a remote area of his choosing, especially to areas adjacent to his border sanctuaries, thereby enabling his local and guerrilla forces to harass, attack and generally impede the SVN nation building effort. The enemy showed a willingness to engage Allied forces in combat. Large unit deployments from NVN indicated that the enemy might be seeking a spectacular win in SVN in 1968.

(TS) In taking the war to the enemy in NVN, CINCPAC reported that systematic U.S. air strikes on NVN lines of communication greatly impeded the flow of goods once in-country despite a 40 percent increase in NVN sea import tonnages during 1967. From 1 January to 15 December 1967, a total of 20,143 attack sorties was flown in Route Packages VIA and VIB. The overall effect of the Allied effort to reduce external assistance resulted not only in destruction and damage to the transportation systems and goods being transported thereon but created additional management, distribution, and manpower problems. 1

(TS) CINCPAC assessed the progress made toward impeding the movement of men and material of the enemy. He stated that even though men and material needed for the level of combat prevailing in 1967 in SVN continued to flow despite Allied attacks on LOCs, the attacks made it very costly to the enemy in terms of material, manpower, management, and distribution. A primary effect of Allied efforts to impede movement of the enemy was the forcing of Hanoi to engage 500,000 to 600,000 civilians in full-time and part-time war-related activities, in particular for air defense and repair of LOCs. The diversion of manpower from other pursuits, such as from the agriculture sector, caused a drawdown on manpower. 2

(TS) During 1967 the nation-building efforts were concentrated on laying a solid foundation for on-going programs. CINCPAC reported gains in a number of significant areas: the SVN political structure, U.S. support in the pacification program, economic stability, population security, and the Chieu Hoi program. 3

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
(TS) In setting forth the prospects for 1968, CINCPAC told the JCS that combat operations in SVN would be intensified in 1968. Increased combat strength under Program 5, as well as programmed additions to RVNAF and FWMAF Forces during 1968 would provide increased allied capability to intensify in-country operations. Concept of operations envisioned the introduction of military power, civilian skills and economic resources into selected priority areas. Within this context, forces would be deployed in three mutually supporting roles. Frontier Defense Forces would operate along the DMZ and opposite the enemy's Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries to prevent major incursions into South Vietnam. Mobile Strike Forces would seek out and destroy VC/NVA forces and neutralize his main base areas. Territorial Security Forces, committed behind the protective shield of the frontier defense and mobile strike forces, would support the Pacification program. The RVNAF would have primary responsibility for supporting pacification with priority of effort to providing security for specified areas, to include responsibility for selected LOCs. US/FWMAF operations would concentrate on the destruction of VC/NVA main forces, base areas and resources; denial of infiltration and supply routes; and in providing assistance and reinforcing the RVNAF as necessary in opening and securing vital LOCs, providing security for priority areas, and destruction of the VC infrastructure. Every attempt would be made to keep the enemy in SVN constantly on the move and deny him the opportunity to refit, resupply, rest or retrain in-country. The overall nation-building effort in 1968 would focus on helping the GVN to provide security for its people and to develop a rapport with them. The U.S. goal would be to encourage the feeling among the populace that the government is deserving of their support. 1

(TS) CINCPAC concluded his message to the JCS by stating: 2

The air and naval campaign against North Vietnam continues to be the one element of our strategy where we truly have the initiative. We must continue to press this advantage. There is no doubt that our past efforts have hurt the enemy and that continued support of the war in South Vietnam is causing him severe hardships. To increase the effectiveness of our operations in SVN, the

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
air and naval forces need additional operational latitudes. With such additional authorities, the air and naval campaign against NVN can be designed and executed to bring about a more rapid deterioration of the enemy's economy and total war supporting structure. When this curtailment of enemy efforts is achieved by drains on his resources, the ultimate result should be a reduction of the insurgency and aggression in South Vietnam to a level where effective internal political and military actions can achieve and maintain stability.

**Implications of Vietnam Negotiations**

(U) As we have told Hanoi time and time again, the heart of the matter is this: The US is willing immediately to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussion. We of course would assume that, while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation.

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**President Lyndon B. Johnson**

(TS) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the establishment of an ad hoc committee under Lieutenant General A. J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army, to investigate the implications of President Johnson's offer to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of NVN should North Vietnam accept the offer. The JCS sent a memorandum to the SECDEF on 16 November 1967 informing him of the study (SEA CABIN) and that they would analyze the findings and submit their judgements on

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1. President Lyndon B. Johnson in an address in San Antonio, Texas to the National Legislative Council on 29 Sep 67.
substantive issues as early as practicable. The study was completed on 22 November and copies were sent to CINCPAC for his comments and return to the JCS by 5 January 1968.¹

(TS) CINCPAC requested and received authority to reproduce copies of the study and forward them to COMUSMACV and the Component Commanders. The suspense date to the JCS was extended to 12 January.

(TS) On 15 January, CINCPAC submitted his comments to the JCS:²

...within the limits of its addressal, it provides a useful analysis of the problem areas which may be encountered. The study does not, however, attach adequate value to our air and naval campaign in North Vietnam. The study leaves the impression that we might achieve our national objectives in Vietnam without the air campaign. It does not demand a satisfactory quid pro quo for cessation of the bombing. In view of the above, the conclusions in the study cannot be validated, nor does CINCPAC concur in recommendation 2.a. of the study group director .... CINCPAC views on the conditions upon which we should insist prior to any lessening of pressure on Hanoi [were submitted to the JCS on 12 October 1967 and 5 January 1968]. The conditions are that the NVN:

a. Stop infiltration of personnel and material into SVN and Laos.

b. Demonstrate conclusively that all NVA units are being withdrawn from SVN, Laos, and the DMZ.

c. Stop support and direction of the VC and Pathet Lao insurgencies.

1. Ibid; J5 Brief No. 1-68, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Jan 68, Subj: Study of the Political Military Implications in Southeast Asia of the Cessation of Aerial Bombardment and the Initiation of Negotiations [5], Short Title: SEA CABIN (U).

2. CINCPAC 152227Z Jan 68.
...The study undervalues the impact of the air and naval campaign in North Vietnam and could lead us to negotiate from a weak position. Though available intelligence may not provide a precise evaluation of the impact of the bombing in North Vietnam, it is adequate to substantiate that the campaign is imposing significant, accumulating pressure on NVN. This pressure is our strongest bargaining point and should not be stopped or reduced without a fully equivalent quid pro quo.

It would be ill-advised and dangerous to rely on enemy commitments to respect the President’s requirement that the other side "not take advantage" of a U.S. bombing cessation or limitation. There are too many means of evasion. Four to six months delay is required to assess infiltration levels. The same applies to grounds for renewal of bombing. The overall pattern of enemy activity in response to cessation/limitation of bombing must be evaluated, and resumption of bombing recommended when military judgment determines the enemy is gaining significant advantage from the bombing halt. In this respect the minimum safeguards contained in the study are considered inadequate to preclude the enemy’s accruing such advantage from the bombing halt.

The permitted time period between cessation of bombing and initiation of discussions (30-60 days), and the time period by which the discussions must have become productive (four months), are far too long. The study effectively portrays the enemy’s extensive regeneration capabilities over such periods... Even if domestic and foreign opinion permitted a resumption of bombing after such long periods, the great military advantages the enemy would have derived are clear.

The limitation imposed upon FWF by a cease fire or freeze in place in SVN would tend to prevent the GVN from extending its control over the land
areas of SVN and therefore will militate against achievement of U.S. objectives. Either a cease-fire or a freeze in place would be greatly to our disadvantage. Either action would free the VC and NVN to rebuild units and reestablish infrastructure with no increase in infiltration. A cease-fire should occur only after the settlement by negotiations of the main political problems.

In summary, SEA CABIN is too lenient in its interpretation of the President's San Antonio statement on cessation of bombing. Further consideration or interpretation of that statement or the development of future statements should adhere to basic U.S. demand that NVN stop infiltration of men and material, withdraw forces, and stop support and direction of insurgency in SEA. This is vital to attainment of our national objective of an independent non-communist SVN.

(TS) Early in February, the JCS furnished the SECDEF their judgement of the substantive issues raised in the study. The substantive issues pointed out by the JCS were:

1. What is the importance and impact of the air and naval campaign against North Vietnam?

2. If the bombardment of North Vietnam is ceased, what should be the operational definition of "not take advantage"?

3. What criteria should be used in measuring "productive" discussions?

4. Under what conditions should bombardment be resumed?

(TS) In addressing "productive discussions" the JCS commented that the U.S. should consider that negotiations were not being productive unless

NVN withdraws all NVA troops from the DMZ within 15 days of cessation, ceases all personnel movement into SVN within 30 days, agrees within 30 days to withdraw all NVN Army troops to SVN within 120 days, and agrees within 15 days to complete exchanges of prisoners of war within 60 days.¹

³ On 31 March, President Johnson announced that he had directed the cessation of air strikes against NVN except in that area immediately north of the DMZ. As a result of the President's action, the CJCS directed that all air strikes against NVN be discontinued north of 20 degrees North parallel effective 0800 hours, 1 April 1968.² On 3 April, it was reported that NVN offered to talk with U.S. about arrangements for Vietnam peace negotiations. President Johnson said that he would "establish contact with the representatives of North Vietnam."³ On 9 April, President Johnson stated that he received his first formal word on 8 April through diplomatic channels from Hanoi on preparation for preliminary talks leading to peace negotiations.⁴

⁵ On 3 May, President Johnson announced that Paris had been accepted as the site for preliminary Vietnam peace talks. Talks were scheduled to begin on 10 May between the U.S. and Hanoi. In light of the military implications of the Paris discussion, on 8 May, the JCS informed the SECDEF of their desire to provide the negotiators with their views on certain substantive issues. The JCS considered of prime importance the achievement of the U.S. national objective of Vietnam - the attainment of an independent noncommunist South Vietnam.⁵

⁶ The JCS informed the SECDEF that the U.S. negotiating objective, in support of our national objective, should insure the sovereignty of the GVN by:

1. Ibid.
2. Point Paper, J3B27, Hq CINCPAC, 6 May 68, Subj: ROLLING THUNDER (U).
3. Merriman Smith, UPI White House Reporter in Honolulu Advertiser, 4 Apr 68.
4. Honolulu Advertiser, 9 Apr 68
6. Ibid.
a. Causing NVN to stop the movement of NVA troops and supplies into SVN and to withdraw its military and subversive forces from SVN, Cambodia, and Laos.

b. Restoring the integrity of the DMZ.

c. Ensuring GVN control throughout SVN.


e. Providing for the effective inspection and verification of the above.

(TS) The JCS felt that another negotiating objective must be the prompt repatriation of prisoners of war. High priority should be afforded this objective since NVN's possession of U.S. POWs provides them with a significant negotiating lever. Initiatives in this area would provide a means of testing the enemy's good faith in negotiating.¹

(TS) The JCS in the same message listed major concessions which could prevent the accomplishment of the U.S. objective for SVN:²

a. Establishment of a coalition government with NLF representation.

b. Agreement to a cease-fire in place which included ARVN forces.

c. Premature withdrawal of US/Free World forces from Southeast Asia.

d. Cessation of air reconnaissance and surveillance over NVN and the DMZ.

(TS) The JCS considered that the U.S. limitation on bombing in NVN was a significant de-escalatory step and that the NVN had not responded in kind. On the contrary, the NVN had increased the infiltration of men

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
and material from NVN and planned continued major offensives against urban centers in SVN. The JCS believed the U.S. would be bargaining from a position of strength and consequently opposed further reduction of military pressure against NVN in the absence of substantial achievement of the above stated negotiating objectives.\(^1\)

**(TS)** During the year the position of CINCPAC and the JCS did not change. They felt the U.S. was in a position to bargain from strength and should continue to apply pressure on NVN. They considered it undesirable to accept circumstances which would lead to precipitous withdrawal or to negotiations from weakness. CINCPAC and the JCS were in agreement that if negotiations break down or fail and it should become necessary to resume full scale hostilities in Southeast Asia, such an undertaking should be free of the military constraints which had characterized the conduct of the war so far and a concerted air and naval campaign capable of accomplishing U.S. objectives must be of such scope and timeliness as to exceed NVN's ability to accommodate.\(^2\)

**(U)** President Johnson and President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam met at Camp Smith in Aiea, Hawaii on 19 and 20 July. The primary purpose of the meeting was to allow the two leaders to discuss current military and diplomatic developments in SVN and Paris. Included among the various subjects discussed was the negative position of the NVN negotiators at Paris. They concluded that there had been no response to the major limitation of bombing put into effect on 31 March (1 April Saigon time) which freed 90 percent of the people of NVN and 78 percent of its territory from attack. Hanoi appeared to be continuing to follow the policy of "fighting while negotiating."\(^3\)

**(U)** The two Presidents agreed that in the face of this NVN strategy the fundamental aims of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam must be:\(^4\)

1. Ibid.
3. Joint Communiqué, The White House, Office of the White House Press Secretary (Honolulu, Hawaii); p. 2.
4. Ibid. p. 5.
a. To meet and defeat whatever military and terrorist actions might be initiated by the other side, under direction from Hanoi.

b. To strengthen the South Vietnamese armed forces.

c. To continue to seek a reduction in the level of hostilities and an honorable and secure peace that would assure the right of the South Vietnamese people to decide their own affairs without external interference.

(U) At the meeting President Johnson described the American policy in Vietnam in the following way:¹

U.S. forces are fighting to repel external aggression. The United States has no other ambitions in Vietnam. It desires no bases, no continued military presence, and no political role in Vietnamese affairs.

As North Vietnam takes its men home and ends its aggression against South Vietnam, U.S. forces will be withdrawn, in accordance with the Manila Communiqué.

The United States will not support the imposition of a "coalition government," or any other form of government, on the people of South Vietnam. The people of South Vietnam—and only the people of South Vietnam—have the right to choose the form of their government.

The United States wants to help the people of Southeast Asia—including the people of North Vietnam—develop their rich region in conditions of peace. Though the United States is prepared to fight if necessary, it much prefers to reach a just settlement at the conference table. In search of such a settlement, U.S. negotiators are meeting with those of North Vietnam in Paris now. The American people are deeply hopeful of their success.

(U) On 31 October, President Johnson announced to the world his decision to halt the bombing of North Vietnam and a broadening of the Paris peace talks to include the South Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. He said that the U.S. had made it clear to Hanoi that productive talks could begin and would continue only if South Vietnam cities were not shelled.

¹ Ibid.
and the DMZ was respected. He warned that there was no agreement on a cease-fire and that "there may well be very hard fighting ahead." He felt that the time had come to test North Vietnam's good faith with a bombing halt and "to ascertain if an early peace is possible." President Johnson said, "we could be misled and we are prepared for such a contingency. We pray to God it does not occur." He stated that he had acted on "unanimous military and diplomatic advice and judgement" of his advisers, including General Creighton W. Abrams, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The military, he continued, had assured him of his oft-stated condition that a bombing halt would not result in increased American casualties. Immediately after President Johnson's announcement of a bombing halt, Admiral McCain, issued a formal statement that, "As a result of instructions received from the President, orders have been issued halting all bombing of North Vietnam, effective 9 P.M., November 1, Saigon time. Pacific Command forces are now in the process of carrying out these instructions. Every member of this command will act in consonance with the President's orders and his desire to seek peaceful solutions to the war in Vietnam." As the year 1968 ended, the NVN continued to violate the DMZ and to shell cities in SVN.

Holiday Stand-Downs in Vietnam

(U) ...In late January [1968], in treacherous violation of the TET truce, the enemy lashed out in a major effort to achieve country-wide control if possible, and, at the least, to disrupt the machinery of government, shake the people's faith in the Allied Forces' ability to protect them, and stimulate anti-war sentiment in the U.S. and other Allied countries.

The TET assault cost the enemy dearly and failed of its larger purposes. But it also unquestionably was a major setback to our side.

Admiral U.S. G. Sharp

1. Honolulu Advertiser, 1 Nov 68.
2. Ibid.
3. Statement by ADM U.S. G. Sharp, USN, CINCPAC before Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 9 Apr 68.
(U) Prior to 1968 seven stand-downs (cease-fires) were observed in SVN: Christmas 1965 - 30 hours; TET 1966 - over four days; Christmas 1966 - 48 hours; New Year's 1967 - 48 hours; TET 1967 - over five days; Buddha's Birthday 1967 - 24 hours; and Christmas 1967 - 24 hours. From the first stand-down to the last only the enemy's purpose was served. Each cease-fire granted the enemy the opportunity to conduct major resupply operations and to reconstitute and replenish his forces, all at the expense of U.S. and Free World Military Forces. The enemy took advantage of every opportunity. He violated every cease-fire. ¹

(5) Prior to 1967, the enemy on two occasions gained a political-psychological advantage by announcing cease-fires before the U.S. and her allies did. In 1967, Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland wanted to avoid being pre-empted by the NLF and Hanoi by announcing an official U.S. position on stand-downs for Christmas 1967, New Year's 1968 and TET 1968 by 31 October 1967. Both agreed that from a military point of view cease-fires for the holidays should not be observed. It was equally obvious to both that precedent and public pressures would necessitate some action for the holidays. Consequently, they recommended, if stand-downs were to be observed that: (1) Christmas 1967 be for a twenty-four hour period with justification based on religious considerations; (2) New Year's 1967-68 cease-fire not to exceed twenty-four hours, no justification existed; and (3) TET 1968 cease-fire of forty-eight hours with a fall back position of seventy-two hours. ²

(5) On 20 October 1967, CINCPAC told the JCS that he also felt that the U.S. position should be announced at the earliest opportunity to avoid pre-emption. He reiterated again that he was opposed to any stand-down and he pointed out that previous stand-downs had neither affected Hanoi's willingness to negotiate nor to diminish military action in SVN to any discernable degree. Conversely, the enemy had shown only flagrant violation of cease-fires. On 23 October 1967, the JCS recommended to the SECEF that the U.S. urge the Republic of Vietnam and its allies to announce their intention not to stand-down for any holiday period as soon as possible. The JCS requested the SECEF to make their views

known to the President and that a joint State-Defense message which they had prepared be passed to the State Department for concurrence and dispatch.①

(U) The deadline of 31 October 1967 passed without the announce-
ment of an official U.S. position. On 18 November 1967, the NLF announced stand-downs for Christmas, New Year's and TET. This made the third consecutive year the enemy was first to announce holiday cease-fires.②

(S) Prior to the Christmas-New Year stand-downs of 1967-68, there were many indications the enemy planned to take full advantage of these cease-fires. Events proved that he conducted a massive and well organized resupply of his forces. On 10 January 1968, CINCPAC told the JCS that the enemy's action in the recent Christmas-New Year's stand-downs bore out that Hanoi's complete disregard of declared cease-
fires permits him to initiate incidents and carry out massive logistical efforts which make a mockery of stand-downs. He then told the JCS that an incomplete evaluation of the recent New Year's stand-down indicated a significant amount of logistical movement. Reconnaissance reports showed 1,612 vehicles, 336 WBLC, three locomotives and 159 railroad cars were in transit in NVN. Viewed in its entirety, the NVN's resupply effort was a vivid illustration of the tremendous use the enemy makes of such opportunities to move men and supplies to the South. CINCPAC again strongly recommended that if a TET stand-down in 1968 were unavoidable, it should be of the shortest possible duration.③

(S) On 16 January, COMUSMACV in a message to CINCPAC stated that in view of the magnitude of the enemy initiated violence experienced during the extended New Year's cease-fire, the issue of a TET cease-
fire had been raised again. While COMUSMACV's position of a no cease-
fire remained unchanged, General Vien, Chairman of the Joint General Staff, RVNAF was bound by "traditional and morale reasons to favoring observances of at least a token respite for the TET celebration."

② Honolulu Advertiser, 18 Nov 67.
③ CINCPAC 100249Z Jan 68.
④ The original New Year's cease-fire was extended 12 hours by the GVN in response to an appeal by Pope Paul VI to make 1 January 1968 a "day of peace;" CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. II, p. 597.
COMUSMACV then told CINCPAC that he had met with President Thieu on 13 January and that he was agreeable to a shortened cease-fire period of 36 hours from 1800 hours, 29 January to 0600 hours, 31 January 1968 for TET. Ambassador Bunker concurred and notified the State Department. CINCPAC concurred in COMUSMACV's position for a shortened cease-fire period of 36 hours and so recommended to the JCS. On the other hand, the VC declared a TET stand-down for the period 27 January through 0100 hours, 3 February 1968.

(U) On 29 January, as a result of the NVN build-up in the DMZ area, the SVN government announced that the Allies would not observe a stand-down in the five northern provinces of SVN and would maintain their air interdiction in southernmost SVN. On the afternoon of 30 January the Allied stand-down was cancelled when the enemy began his biggest most treacherous cease-fire violation since the first stand-down in 1965. The Communist's TET offensive was well under way when the stand-down was cancelled.

(FOUO) The TET offensive was part of the overall Communist 1967-68 winter-spring campaign. In mid-1967 the enemy had revised his strategy in order to generate widespread internal uprisings, cause wholesale desertions from the ranks of the SVN Army, and lay the ground work for a political effort, including negotiations, along with his military effort to attain victory. With the approach of TET, the Communist felt that the time was ripe to go all out.

(U) The enemy timed their strikes to hit precisely when the SVN would be away from their normal residences and posts of duty and least on their guard. These well coordinated attacks reflected the detailed planning.

1. COMUSMACV 160415Z Jan 68.
2. CINCPAC 170548Z Jan 68.
3. Honolulu Advertiser, 18 Nov 68.
4. Address by Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, CINCPAC, 17 Feb 68, before the Western Sectional Meeting of the Navy League in Anaheim, Cal., hereafter cited as CINCPAC 17 Feb 68 Navy League Address.
and preparations that had taken place well in advance of the TET season. The magnitude of the offensive, the prior infiltration and stationing of personnel, and the pre-positioning of munitions clearly indicated the thorough and lengthy preparation involved. Approximately 65,000 Viet Cong and NVN troops launched concerted, carefully planned and extraordinarily brutal attacks in over 40 SVN cities and towns, and numerous villages, where people were celebrating the nation’s major annual festival in an illusion of safety. At a dozen air bases coordinated mortar, rocket and sapper attacks were simultaneously directed at allied air strength.¹

(FOUO) Contrary to the enemy’s expectation, the people of SVN did not swing over to their side and there were few defections from the South Vietnamese Army. Once in the open enemy troops were more vulnerable to our superior fire power, mobility and flexibility. The result for the enemy was extremely high personnel losses. However, the tempo of the war was intensified. The enemy used new Soviet supplied rockets to initiate assaults on urban centers, notably Hue and Saigon, which were heretofore relatively free from attacks.²

(FOUO) "The RVNAF, instead of disintegrating and defecting, fought well and with determination. They successfully defended off the enemy's attacks, defeated him, and emerged from the battle with new pride, self-confidence and resolve." These were the comments of COMUSMACV, the on-the-ground commander. He also commented that:

The TET offensive, while a "Pearl Harbor" for the Vietnamese was for the enemy and for us more a "Battle of the Bulge." In retrospect, it was actually a very fortuitous development for the Allies. It enabled, if not forced, much progress to be made that otherwise would have taken years. Not only did it unify the people, strengthen the government, instill confidence in the Vietnamese Armed Forces and solidify the country, it allowed us to inflict damage to the heretofore elusive enemy of a magnitude never before approached.³

(U) On 2 December, President Thieu announced a 24-hour truce for Christmas' 1968. The truce was to be observed from "6 p.m. 24 Dec to 6 p.m. Dec 25." At the same time the announcement stated the truce would be observed for Christmas only and not for New Year or for TET. The U.S. command confirmed the stand-down for Christmas. Both U.S. military and embassy officials in Saigon had been consulted by SVN and the truce agreed to prior to President Thieu's announcement. For the first time in four years, the Allies had beat the NLF and Hanoi to the punch. On 5 December, the VC announced its forces would observe three-day ceasefires during Christmas and the New Year holidays.

Air Operations Southeast Asia 1968

(U) As a result of instructions received from the President, orders have been issued halting all bombing in North Vietnam effective 9 p.m. November 1st, Saigon time. Pacific Command forces are now in the process of carrying out these instructions. Every member of this Command will act in consonance with the President's order and his desire to seek peaceful solutions to the war in Vietnam.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.

(C) U.S. air operations in North Vietnam during 1968 were curtailed on 31 March and halted altogether on 31 October. This section of Volume II, CINCPAC Command History 1968, not only discusses air operations in NVN - ROLLING THUNDER, but also includes air operations conducted in Laos - BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER, Strategic Air Command B-52 operations - ARC LIGHT, and related significant items of interest to CINCPAC. Additional information on air operations in Southeast Asia can be found in the 1968 annual histories prepared by CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF.

1. Honolulu Advertiser, 2 Dec 68; Associated Press Wire Service, Saigon, 3 Dec 68.
2. UPI Wire Service, Saigon, 5 Dec 68.
3. CINCPAC 010439Z Nov 68.
ROLLING THUNDER

ROLLING THUNDER is the nickname assigned to air strikes conducted by tactical forces against selected targets and LOCs in NVN. The ROLLING THUNDER mission is to conduct air operations against NVN with unremitting but selective use of air power and supporting operations to reduce the flow of men and material to SVN and increase the cost to NVN of continuing aggression and supporting insurgencies in SVN and Laos. To accomplish this mission three basic tasks have been undertaken:

a. Reduce or deny economic, material and war supporting assistance to NVN from external sources.

b. Disrupt and destroy in depth those resources that contribute to the support of aggression.

c. Harass, disrupt, and impede movement of men and materials to Laos and SVN.

These tasks are interdependent and, in a broad sense, represent a three pronged approach which requires an integrated targeting concept responsive to the collective accomplishment of the tasks.¹

The application of increased pressure was necessary to accomplish these tasks. CINCPAC had determined that the best way to increase pressure was to apply continuing steady power on a long term targeting basis against key target systems. CINCPAC's concept for a long term targeting program placed emphasis on target systems and stressed steady pressure on a continuing basis. CINCPAC evaluated the NVN target structure and determined there were six target systems: (1) electric power, (2) war supporting industry, (3) transportation support, (4) military complexes, (5) petroleum, and (6) Haiphong and other ports. These target systems were considered a single package with each system inter-related to each other. Consequently, the systems should be attacked as a package rather than one system at a time.²


(S) CINCPAC's targeting concept was approved with modifications and was in effect as the year 1968 began. However, the concept, for all practical purposes became inoperative on 1 April 1968 when air operations were restricted to below 20° N latitude. The majority of the targets in the target systems were in Route Package VI and therefore were immune from strikes. (See following illustration "ROLLING THUNDER ROUTE PACKAGE AREAS"). Air operations were further restricted on 3 April when ROLLING THUNDER was confined to the area south of 19° N. On 1 November all air operations, except reconnaissance missions, over NVN ceased.

1. Point Paper, J3B27, Ho CINCPAC, 4 Apr 68, Subj: Air and Naval Campaign Against NVN (U) citing JCS 5145/310044Z Mar 68.
2. CINCPAC 010439Z Nov 68.
A-4 on way to target in Route Package I.

Bomb racks empty, an A-4 Skyhawk lands on the carrier HANCOCK.
Effects of ROLLING THUNDER Against NVN - 1967

The major impact of ROLLING THUNDER operations in 1967 against NVN was the forcing of Hanoi to accommodate to serious disruptions in normal economic activity, particularly in the fields of industry, power generation, transportation and distribution of material. Additionally, there was impact in other areas including military, political and socio-psychological effects.

The greatest impact of bombing was in the economic field, the disruption of vital lines of communication. The disruption of LOCs caused secondary effects. The port of Haiphong became clogged with imported material which could not be distributed effectively. Industrial output of NVN was reduced because the flow of raw materials to plants was impeded. Strikes against electrical power generation plants caused widespread power shortages. It was estimated that the industrial output of NVN was reduced to one-half of its original capacity with the major portion of production being accomplished in handicraft, small workshop or "cottage" type plants.

Air strikes against military targets were primarily in the form of harassment, except for attacks against air and air defense facilities. Attacks against barrack areas denied living areas for troops and forced them to resort to underground or cave facilities for major headquarters and storage sites. Attacks against ground troops, particularly those in the vicinity of the DMZ, resulted in damage and destruction of weapons, ammunition, storage areas and transportation vehicles and facilities. Attacks against all elements of the air defense system forced the adoption of inefficient mobility tactics and the expenditure of valuable manpower and equipment resources.

The ROLLING THUNDER campaign caused the Hanoi leadership to launch a major propaganda drive to discredit U.S. involvement in Vietnam in an effort to influence Washington into calling a halt to the bombing. Major themes accused the U.S. of hitting other than military targets and dwelled at length on the "heroic and valiant" effort of the

1. Point Paper, J2212A, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Jan 68, Subj: The Effects of the Air Campaign Against North Vietnam (U).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
ROLLING THUNDER ROUTE PACKAGE AREAS

CHINA

30 NM CHICOM BUFFER ZONE

NORTH VIETNAM

VIA

VIB

25 NM CHICOM BUFFER ZONE

HAIPHONG RESTRICTED AREA

20° NORTH EFFECTIVE
1 APRIL 1968

ROLLING THUNDER OPERATIONS CONFINED TO THE AREA SOUTH OF THE LATITUDE AS INDICATED

19° NORTH EFFECTIVE
3 APRIL 1968

GULF OF TONKIN

V-VIA CINCPACAF

II-IV VIB CINCPACFLT

I COMUSMACV

DEMARcation LINE EFFECTIVE
1 NOV 1968
people who are winning despite all odds against "American sky pirates". Bombing had various effects on the minds of the people. Generally, people in urban areas tended to demonstrate a fanatic determination to continue the war, apparently accepting the government's explanation that the nation was engaged in a national salvation effort. In contrast, other segments of the population, particularly peasants and fishermen, preferred to see the war come to an end, apparently seeing more clearly the true position of the government as it affected their daily living. 1

Politically, there appeared to be little change in Hanoi's attitude toward continuing the war in the south as a result of the bombing campaign in the north. Continued moral, political, and especially material support from the communist world reinforced the regime's decision to persevere in a hard line stance.

Perhaps the most important measure of the effects of the bombing would be the consideration of the situation if there had been no bombing at all. The uninhibited flow of men, weapons and supplies through North Vietnam to confront our forces in South Vietnam could have had only one result for the United States and its Allies--considerably heavier casualties at a smaller cost to the enemy. Since this alternative was unacceptable, the bombing of Vietnam, as an essential element of the overall strategy, was clearly successful in fulfilling its purposes.

ROLLING THUNDER Restrictions

The degree of effectiveness of ROLLING THUNDER operations can to some extent be measured in relation to restrictions placed on ROLLING THUNDER operations. For example, the single most important action that the U.S. could take to reduce the ability of NVN to support the military effort of the Viet Cong and the NVN Army in SVN would be to bomb the Haiphong port complex. Approximately 85 percent of all NVN

1. Ibid.
imports enter the country through the port complex of Haiphong, Cam Pha, Hon Gai and Port Wallut; however, virtually none of the port facilities in this complex have been approved as targets for air strikes. The restriction against bombing the Haiphong port complex was based on political considerations.\(^1\)

\(^{(TS)}\) The restrictions, prohibitions, and limitations imposed on ROLLING THUNDER operations in 1967 were essentially the same as those in effect in early 1968 before the partial bombing limitation imposed on 1 April. Prohibited areas in which no strikes were authorized except as specifically directed in the execute message were:\(^2\)

a. Hanoi prohibited area. The area within 10 nautical miles of the center of Hanoi.

b. CHICOM buffer zone. The area within 30 nautical miles of the CHICOM border from the Laotian border east to 106\(^0\) E and thence within 25 nautical miles of the CHICOM border to the Tonkin Gulf.

c. Haiphong prohibited area. The area within four nautical miles of Haiphong, with strikes approved by Washington.

\(^{(TS)}\) In the restricted areas strikes could be made only against targets specifically stated in operation orders and in execute messages. The restricted areas were:\(^3\)

a. Hanoi restricted area. The area within 30 nautical miles of the center of Hanoi excluding the Hanoi prohibited area.

b. Haiphong restricted area. The area within 10 nautical miles of the center of Haiphong.

\(^{(TS)}\) Further limitations imposed on ROLLING THUNDER included:\(^4\)

a. Strikes against Cam Pha and Hon Gai Ports were authorized only when there are no foreign ships berthed within 2000 yards of the docking area.

b. Dispersed POL and SAM support facilities within the Hanoi and Haiphong restricted areas (excluding prohibited areas) could be attacked only after positive identification and after notification to Washington of plan to attack.

c. Attacks against JCS numbered targets that had not been authorized were prohibited. However, attacks were authorized against POL collocated with such targets, provided they were in the military barracks category and provided they were outside the CHICOM buffer zone, and the Hanoi-Haiphong prohibited and restricted areas.

d. Strike forces, including flak-SAM suppression and MIGCAP for air strikes in the CHICOM buffer zone were to be kept to an absolute minimum consistent with safety and damage objectives.

e. Strikes against Haiphong Shipyard #4 and Haiphong Railroad-Highway bridge could not be conducted unless pre-strike recce determined that no foreign ships were berthed in the channel adjacent to the target or at hospital wharf.

f. When engaged in immediate pursuit of hostile aircraft, U.S. forces were not authorized to attack the NVN airfield from which the enemy might be operating, except those airfields that had been specifically authorized for attack.

g. Use of DST MK-36 munitions were not authorized within the Hanoi-Haiphong prohibited areas except against authorized JCS Alpha targets and by-passes.

h. Coastal armed recce in the special coastal armed recce area (20° 42' N to the 25 NM CHICOM buffer zone) was authorized against positively identified NVN attack-type naval craft within three nautical miles of NVN territory avoiding a ten NM circle from the center of Haiphong. Naval craft north of 20° 42' N and outside the three mile limit of the NVN coast and off shore islands were not authorized for attack unless U.S. aircraft were first fired upon by these vessels.
i. Strikes and armed recce missions had to be planned so that flight paths of U.S. aircraft did not approach closer than 20NM to the CHICOM border. (This restriction did not apply for strikes conducted against authorized targets in the CHICOM buffer zone or when conducting strikes against rolling stock located to the south of JCS 18 (Lang Son Railroad-Highway Bridge) on the northeast rail line.

j. Photo reconnaissance (BLUE TREE) aircraft were restricted from approaching closer than 20NM to the CHICOM border except when performing missions in support of ROLLING THUNDER strikes in the CHICOM buffer zone.

(FOUO) On 31 March, President Johnson in a further attempt to get Hanoi to the peace conference table, announced that he had directed the cessation of bombing attacks over the principal populated and producing areas of NVN except in that area north of the DMZ where enemy actions directly threatened U.S. and FWMA forces in SVN. 1

(S) As a result of the President's announcement, the JCS directed CINCPAC to discontinue all air strikes against NVN north of 20° north latitude effective 0800 hours, 1 April 1968, Saigon time. However, unescorted photo and visual recce north of 20° N was authorized at CINCPAC's discretion. 2 On 3 April ROLLING THUNDER operations were further restricted above 19° N. 3 On 31 October, President Johnson announced a complete halt in the bombing of NVN and a broadening of the Paris peace talks to include the SVN and the VC. As a result of instructions received from the President, CINCPAC issued orders halting all bombing in North Vietnam effective 2100 hours, 1 November, Saigon time. 4 This action in effect terminated ROLLING THUNDER.

North Vietnam's Reaction to the Bombing Pause

(S) An estimate of the military, economic, psychological, and political consequences resulting from the cessation of bombing NVN was made by J2, CINCPAC. The estimate indicated that NVN could be

2. Point Paper, J3B27, Hq CINCPAC, 6 May 68, Subj: ROLLING THUNDER (U) citing JCS 5145/310044Z Mar 68 and CINCPAC 311225Z Mar 68.
3. ROLLING THUNDER Digest, Hq CINCPAC, Edition 8, 16 Aug 68.
4. CINCPAC 010439Z Nov 68.
expected to move large quantities of food, ammunition, new military hardware and other required items to its forces in the south. Major secure supply depots would be established in caves or underground safe from air attacks yet available to combat forces. Over 200 heavy artillery weapons, 150 rocket launchers, and 300 AAA guns, in calibers up to 100 mm, plus complete surface-to-air missile coverage, would be placed from Mu Gia pass southward. As stock piles grow just north of the DMZ, the NVN could be expected to send additional supplies through Laos to the central provinces of South Vietnam. Within the short span of a few months, enemy capabilities in the II and III Corps Tactical Zones would improve to an all-time high, especially in terms of crew served weapons and artillery. The morale and health of enemy forces in the DMZ, Laos and South Vietnam would improve immeasurably as they received adequate supplies of food, clothing and medicine - items which are now in short supply. With the enemy posture improving as a result of stepped-up logistical support, friendly casualties would surely multiply. The potential sources of military manpower in North Vietnam consisting of the 120,000 physically fit males who reach the draft age of 17 annually; the 142,000 engaged in air defense; and the male segment of the 600,000 or more work force engaged in LOC repair and civil defense would all become available for the armed forces.

In addition to enhancing Hanoi's capability to prolong the war in South Vietnam, a permanent cessation of offensive operations against NVN would permit the improvement of North Vietnam's defensive posture. Airfields in North Vietnam would be restored to operational status, aircraft presently deployed to Chinese Communist airfields would return, air defense facilities would be improved by construction and hardening of AA and SAM sites and stockpiling of munitions; military units would be brought up to TOE strengths and provided improved training. Also, the U.S. and FWMA forces could fully expect to see the construction of new air facilities in the southern portion of North Vietnam with modern jet fighters deployed within striking distance of U.S. and Free World forces in South Vietnam - and should the enemy so choose, friendly forces in Laos and northeast Thailand. 1

(§) NVN could be expected to take full advantage of a partial or complete bombing halt by rebuilding its heavy industries, repairing its LOCs, rebuilding and repairing its major power plants and increasing

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As expected, Hanoi took full advantage of the bombing halt to repair NVN LOCs. Above, repair work in progress on the Thinh Lac RR Bridge. Below, Hanoi RR/Highway Bridge over the Red River fully repaired.
its food production. In less than a year all major power plants would be back in operation. With the willing help of the communist and certain free world nations, within two years North Vietnam's economic status would surpass the levels of January 1965. As a result of the resumption of production, requirements for imports would be drastically reduced, especially in terms of cement, food and fertilizer. In less than six months all land LOCs would be fully operational and a significant number of laborers could be returned to agricultural pursuits. Permanent cessation of offensive operations against NVN would permit Hanoi to broaden import manifests, without hindering combat needs, to include badly needed civilian consumer items. Replacement and repair of transportation facilities would, in a relatively short time provide an efficient and effective distribution system which would enhance North Vietnam's ability to support the war and upgrade combat operations in SVN and Laos. ¹

Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine

¹ Ibid.
Possible psychological consequences include the possibility of solidifying Hanoi's position, unifying the NVN people, strengthening morale and resolve, and enhancing the prestige of communist and anti-Vietnam war movements around the world. The Hanoi government could be expected to interpret the situation as reflecting U.S. and free world weakness and adopt a stronger posture relative to any future negotiations. Cessation of bombing could be taken as evidence of U.S. failure to achieve objectives rather than as a concession toward peace, would reinforce beliefs and fears that communism must emerge triumphant over imperialism.

Politically, the cessation of bombing could be taken as evidence of U.S. failure to impose its will on the NVN and could undermine allied support of the U.S. and GVN effort as well as to turn neutral countries further away. Cessation of bombing would establish, at least so far as the communists were concerned, the correctness of "people's wars" of "national liberation," encouraging these wars elsewhere.

The validity of the estimate is attested to by NVN reaction to the partial bombing halt on 1 April and the complete bombing halt on 1 November. As a means of measuring the enemy's accommodation to the partial bombing halt of 1 and 3 April, an analysis of the ROLLING THUNDER Target List (RTTL) was made for the period 31 March through 30 June. The analysis examined each of the six target systems in terms of total installations targeted versus the percentage of those targets evaluated as serviceable or operational.

The most significant increase in target serviceability from 31 March to 30 June was the 30 percent increase in the power system. Between 31 March 1968 and 30 June 1968 the percentage of serviceable transportation targets rose sharply resulting from repair or construction of some 23 targets. The most graphic example was the Doumer Bridge which had not been repaired for approximately three months. When bombing restrictions north of 19 degrees North were imposed, it took less than a month for photo reconnaissance to document extensive repairs to this vital rail bridge. Work barges cleared away debris and prefabricated

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Pacific Command Intelligence Digest, Number 14-68, 19 July 68, Special Issue, Subj: North Vietnam's Reaction to the Bombing Pause.
spans were in place by 18 June 1968. The Haiphong Railroad-Highway Bridge destroyed in late 1967 was also repaired and open to rail traffic. Considerable expansion of the port facility at Haiphong and a significant increase in activity of Hanoi port facility was also observed since 31 March 1968. The RTTL transportation targets evaluated as serviceable to the enemy rose sharply since the bombing pause from 54 percent to 67 percent.1

(S) The status of the fixed POL target system remained relatively unchanged. However, POL imports through the port of Haiphong remained well above the 1967 monthly average of 20,548 metric tons. The 1968 monthly average for POL imports was 38,000 metric tons with an all-time high of 45,700 metric tons during April. Photographic evidence conclusively showed that the enemy rapidly dispersed this vital war supporting commodity along key lines of communication through NVN.2

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
There were 33 targets in the air defense target system, of which the jet-capable fields were the most important. All of these fields, with the exception of Vinh and Dong Hoi, were located north of 19 degrees. Prior to the cessation of bombing in the northern area, all jet airfields (except Gia Lam), were occasionally unserviceable for short periods of time following air attacks. Since 1 April 1968, repair and reconstruction activity was noted at Bai Thuong, Kep, Yen Bai and Dien Bien Phu. As of 30 June 1968 jet flight operations were noted from Phuc Yen, Gia Lam, Kep, Hoa Lac, Bai Thuong, Vinh, Kien An and probably Yen Bai on multiple occasions. Completion of construction noted above enhanced North Vietnam's air defense posture by increasing the facilities from which tactical operations could be conducted.  

Since 1 April when the partial bombing pause went into effect, North Vietnam demonstrated again its ability to regenerate key military installations north of the bombing line. Documentation in the form of hard photographic evidence left little doubt that the initial NVN accommodation to the bombing pause was an extensive repair and rebuilding effort in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. In the Hanoi area, regeneration efforts were concentrated in rebuilding the rail network. The increased activity along the major rail lines offered proof of enemy intentions to replenish supplies and prepare new by-pass routes. Photographic evidence also indicated repair and reconstruction activity at major power facilities and airfields. An analysis of the rail traffic trends and the dispersion of rail rolling stock in and around Hanoi revealed that the North Vietnamese decided that it was safe to resume the normal concentrations of rolling stock in the rail yards around the capitol. Photography of 30 March 1968 revealed some 215 pieces of rolling stock in the Hanoi classification yard and 299 along the rail lines. Photography of 27 April 1968 of the same area showed 140 in the classification yard and 481 pieces along the rail lines. The drop in quantity of rolling stock in the previously immune Hanoi classification yard contrasted with the total increase of rolling stock from 514 to 621 indicated that the enemy freely moved rail traffic throughout the entire rail system in the Hanoi area. By 22 May 1968, photography indicated that the total amount of rolling stock in this target system rose to 1,100.  

1. Ibid.  
2. Ibid. An analysis for the period 1 July - 31 Dec 68 is not available, however, indications are that NVN regeneration of targets continued full force.
Hanoi Railroad Station-Classification Yard

As expected the enemy's psychological warfare took full advantage of the 1 November halt in the bombing of NVN. During November the tone of the enemy's propaganda was set by the U.S. decision to halt the bombing of NVN. The VC-NVA proclaimed the bombing halt a "great victory". The propaganda treatises alleged that the following factors led to the U.S. decision to halt the bombing.


b. The failure of the bombing in the North, even after several years to obtain the intended results.

c. Pressures brought to bear upon the "American Government" by the progressive elements of the American population and by world opinion.

1. Periodic Intelligence Report 11-68, USMACV, AC/S J2, Nov 68.
d. The presidential election and President Johnson's desire to save his party have played only minor roles. No matter who succeeds Johnson, he will have to follow the same course toward withdrawal from Vietnam as the result of the above factors.

Operations

(U) The following is an account of ROLLING THUNDER operations from January through October 1968.¹

(S) January 1968 - Adverse weather prevailed over most of NVN during January. There were only three days of weather suitable for visual strikes from 1 through 15 January and two afternoons during the remainder of the month. Although the attack sorties flown during January increased (6,359 compared to the 5,758² flown in December), the sorties flown were nearly 2,000 less than planned. Of the attack sorties flown, over half were diverted to other than planned targets, with the majority diverted to southern Route Packages. Although weather restricted strikes in the northern Route Packages, COMMANDO CLUB missions and A-6 systems attacks were effective during January. Over 40% of the Air Force effort over Route Packages V and VI were accomplished by the use of COMMANDO CLUB, while Navy and Marine A-6 aircraft flew 377 systems attacks during periods when adverse weather precluded visual attacks. Sortie distribution for January was nearly the same as for December. Route Package I was down 10% from December; however, Route Packages III and IV increased by 4% and 2% respectively. For distribution of attack sorties by Route Package see following chart, "DISTRIBUTION OF ATTACK SORTIES BY ROUTE PACKAGE."

1. The data for ROLLING THUNDER operations was taken directly from the ROLLING THUNDER Digests, a quarterly CINCPAC publication prepared by LCOL W. N. Tomlin, USAF, J3A523, Hq CINCPAC and the CINCPAC ROLLING THUNDER Summary submitted monthly to the JCS. Statistics contained in ROLLING THUNDER Digest are subject to change upon final evaluation. As a result some of the data in this section on ROLLING THUNDER differs from some of the statistics in the RT Digest. The up-dated figures were furnished by MAJ I. G. Meith, USAF, J3A531, Hq CINCPAC. Hereafter cited as J3A531.

2. J3A531.
Armed recce operations against logistic vehicles of all types increased during January despite poor weather. Railroad rolling stock destroyed or damaged was nearly double that of December and the same was true of motor vehicles, while the number of watercraft destroyed or damaged increased about 50%. A total of 1,605 logistic vehicles was destroyed during January as compared to 942 in December.

As of 31 January, Annex A to the RTTL contained 450 targets of which 329 had been attacked one or more times. The number of targets in each of the four appendices was: Appendix I, 82; Appendix II, 81; Appendix III, 43; and Appendix IV, 244. Adverse weather and the restrictions which precluded strikes within 5NM of Hanoi and Haiphong contributed to the downward trend in the number of Alpha strike sorties to 123 in January. A total of 164 were flown in December and 300 in November. The total damage level to the basic RTTL target system remained relatively unchanged. 1

Desteror MK-36. Navy and Air Force aircraft seeded 4,785 Desteror MK-36 weapons during January. The majority were seeded in inland waterways in the northeast sector. River mouths were reseeded in areas where activity had been detected.

WALLEYE. As in previous periods, poor weather restricted the use of WALLEYE. Thirty two WALLEYE's were fired during January with 23 recorded as hits, six missed the target, and three were not observed. During 1967 (first employed on 11 March 67), 145 WALLEYE were launched against over 45 different types of targets. Of these, 107 or about 75% were classified as direct hits.

NVN Air Defense. The North Vietnamese Air Defense System was relatively inactive during the early portion of the month due largely to poor weather and the New Year's stand-down. A total of four U.S. aircraft was lost to SAMs and six as a result of MIG encounters. The North Vietnamese lost four MIGs as a result of U.S. air action. NVN MIG order of battle was 18 fighters in-country and some 100 fighters in Communist China.

1. Appendix I is authorized targets; II is unauthorized targets; III is under consideration; IV is targets unserviceable; and V is neutralized or abandoned targets.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
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<td>MAY</td>
<td>44%</td>
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<td>JULY</td>
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<tr>
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<td>OCTOBER</td>
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SOURCE: ROLLING THUNDER DIGEST. HQ CINCPAC. 1967 EDITIONS 7, 8, 9; CINCPAC 100009Z NOV 68.
February 1968 - Extremely poor weather prevailed over most of NVN throughout the month with no periods of fully operational weather. In comparison with preceding reporting periods, operational weather decreased in all of NVN during February resulting in the poorest flying conditions experienced for any given month during the past three years. The number of attack sorties flown during February attests to the adverse weather conditions - only, 3,286 attack sorties were flown. Although poor weather existed during the preceding two months, the attack sorties flown during both December and January were nearly double the number flown in February. Nearly 7,000 attack sorties were scheduled during February.

Use of COMMANDO CLUB and COMMANDO NAIL all weather delivery systems enabled strikes to be accomplished in the northeast sector on 26 of the 29 days during February. Of the 309 attack sorties in Route Packages VIA and VIB, nearly all were accomplished by COMMANDO CLUB, COMMANDO NAIL and Navy A-6 systems runs.

The total damage level to the basic target systems of the RTTL remained relatively unchanged during the month. There were no strikes conducted against the industrial and POL target systems, and only a small effort was made against the military complex target system due to adverse weather. As of 29 February, the RTTL contained 451 targets of which 328 had been attacked one or more times. On 15 February, Appendix V to the RTTL was created. This Appendix contained a list of neutralized or abandoned targets that had shown no evidence of regeneration or reactivation. The number of targets in each of the five appendices as of 29 February was: 82 in Appendix I, 79 in Appendix II, 46 in Appendix III, 104 in Appendix IV, and 140 in Appendix V.

Armed recce operations remained at a low level. Poor weather continued to restrict operations, pilot sightings and BDA. Logistic vehicles destroyed and damaged by the 414 armed recce sorties in NVN totaled only 449.

Air Defense Activities. Activity by SAM elements of the NVN air defense system was relatively low during the month of February. Only 170 SAM firings were observed as U.S. strike activity in the northern sectors was limited by poor weather, TET stand-down, and overriding priorities in the southern area. As of the end of February, an estimated 25-30 SAM battalions and 189 usable SAM sites were located in NVN. Four U.S. aircraft were lost to SAMs during February.
(S) NVN MIG operations continued to be aggressive during the month. Whereas earlier tactics involved flights of more than one MIG, on several occasions during February single MIG-21s attacked U.S. aircraft utilizing variations in approach direction and apparently initiating the attack from a position of considerable altitude advantage. This variation probably reflected a growing confidence on the part of the pilots. Four\(^1\) aircraft were lost to MIG's while U.S. fighters shot down two MIG-17s and three MIG-21s. During the month, several NVN IL-28s returned from Communist Chinese bases. During a strike against Phu Yen on 8 February, pilots reported sighting at least two of these light jet bombers parked on the field. One of them was probably damaged during the attack, although photography of 14 February failed to show any present.

(S) March 1968 - Although the Northeast monsoon was intermittently breaking at the end of March, extremely poor weather prevailed throughout the month. In spite of the adverse weather over much of NVN, 5,106\(^2\) attack sorties were flown during March as compared to the low of 3,286\(^3\) flown during February. With the exception of a few brief periods, operations in the northern Route Packages were limited to Air Force COMMANDO NAIL (aircraft radar bombing system), COMMANDO CLUB (ground controlled radar bombing) and Navy A-6 full weapon systems attacks.

(3) The total damage level to the basic target systems of the RTTL remained relatively unchanged during the month. Due to poor weather, nearly all RTTL strikes utilized radar all-weather bombing techniques. Weather precluded BDA in most instances and eliminated the capability to evaluate many RTTL strikes. As of 31 March, the RTTL contained 456 targets of which 331 had been attacked one or more times. The number of targets in each of the five appendices was: Appendix I, 83; Appendix II, 84; Appendix III, 44; Appendix IV, 105; and Appendix V, 140.

(S) Armed recce operations against logistic vehicles of all types in NVN remained at a low level. Weather restricted operations which limited visual sightings of LOC traffic.

1. J3A531.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
Distributor MK-36. Evidence continued to indicate that MK-36 destructors were harassing and hampering movements in many instances but in some instances had only limited effect upon traffic movements and repairs. A total of 2,382 Distributor MK-36s was seeded during March.

Air Defense Activities. The poor weather that prevailed over North Vietnam during the entire month curtailed enemy air activity to a significant degree. North Vietnamese air defense elements were noticeably less active during the period, primarily as a direct result of diminished U.S. presence. Five MIG engagements occurred in March but no enemy or U.S. aircraft were downed. No U.S. aircraft were lost to SAMs, although there were 216 reported SAM firings.

April 1968 - Although April marks the normal transition period of the Northeast monsoon, poor weather continued to restrict visual strike operations in southern NVN.

Effective 3 April, ROLLING THUNDER offensive air operations were confined to the southern portion of NVN, below 19° North. Primary strike emphasis was against truck parks, storage areas, and military complexes. Armed reconnaissance strikes were directed against logistic vehicles and interdiction points along the main lines of communication. Selected traffic control areas were struck and seeded with Distributor MK-36s. Despite variable weather conditions and the bombing restrictions, a total of 7,294 attack sorties was flown in Route Packages I, II, and III. RP I, with 62 percent of the attack sorties, accounted for the major effort, while RP II received 28 percent, and RP III-10 percent.

As of 30 April, Annex A to the RTTL contained 462 targets of which 331 had been attacked one or more times. The number of targets in each of the five Appendices was: Appendix I-83, Appendix II-90, Appendix III-43, Appendix IV-104, and Appendix V-142. The total damage level to the basic target systems of the RTTL remained relatively unchanged during the month of April. Available RTTL targets south of 19° North totaled 69, of which 64 were in Appendix IV or V.

Reporting during the period provided evidence that North Vietnam used the bombing pause to improve roads, railroads and bridges and to move materiel rapidly into the Panhandle of NVN, Laos, and SVN. Repairs were made on the Paul Doumer Bridge and other Red River crossing sites in the Hanoi area, improving distribution through this choke point. There was evidence to indicate concern and planning to
# RESULTS OF AIR STRIKES

**1st QUARTER CY68**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET CATEGORY</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
<th>TOTAL D/D</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAA/AW SITES</td>
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<td>83</td>
<td>103</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>209</td>
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<td>BUILDINGS</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>105</td>
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<td>LOC'S</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>MOTOR VEHICLES</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAILROAD VEHICLES</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>263</td>
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<tr>
<td>WATER VEHICLES</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>1,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>3,047</td>
<td>4,614</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistical data includes restrikes on many of the fixed targets. Source: Rolling Thunder Digest, HQ CINCPAC, 1967 Edition 7*
insure a maximum effort toward keeping LOCs open. Scheduling appeared to provide for efficient utilization of motor vehicle assets. In the area south of the 20th parallel, reports indicated a significant increase in logistical activity. During the period 1-18 April, an estimated 5,000 tons were moved within the southern portion of NVN. This was approximately 2,000 tons more than the monthly average of the previous five months. During the period of 1-24 April some 9,700 vehicles (7,200 in Laos and 2,500 in North Vietnam) were sighted by pilots; this compared with a previous high of 9,600 in all of January 1968. The priority Hanoi attached to these movements was evident in the increased daylight travel in North Vietnam, a lack of camouflage and the use of headlights during night movements in Laos, even though convoys were sometimes under attack.

(5) Port and Harbor Activities. A total of 40 foreign merchant ships arrived in North Vietnam during the month, including 19 Soviet, 7 Chinese Communist, 1 Polish, and 13 from the Free World. The harbor agent at Haiphong reportedly told a visiting merchant marine officer in the first quarter of 1968 that dredging had "been stopped for some time due to air raids." The return of North Vietnam's largest dredge, ZEMLESES 8, from an unknown location in recent weeks suggested Hanoi's high interest in taking advantage of the bombing stand-down to dredge its silted harbors and sea approaches.

(5) NVN Air and Air Defense Activity. The North Vietnamese took advantage of the absence of U.S. strike activity in the north to conduct extensive air defense training of pilots, control personnel, SAM crews, and support organizations. During the month, NVN accelerated its airfield programs and resumed construction projects. North Vietnam's in-country MIG count varied considerably during the period as flights to and from bases in Communist China continued and new aircraft were received. At the end of the month the number of tactical aircraft in-country was estimated as follows: Phuc Yen-nine MIG-21, three IL-28; Gia Lam-five MIG-17; Kep-four MIG-17, two MIG-21.

(5) As of 30 April, there had been no large-scale build-up of SAMs or AAA in the southern Route Packages following institution of U.S. bombing restrictions on 1 April. Except for SAM battalions already in the vicinity of Vinh and the DMZ, the SAM system was relatively inactive as the stimulus of U.S. aircraft was removed from the northern area. Monthly statistics for April reflect the effect of strike limitations—there were no MIG engagements and no aircraft were lost to SAMs, although eight SA-2s were observed being fired.
May 1968 - Improved weather over the southern Route Packages of NVN during May marked the yearly transitional change from the Northeast monsoon to the Southwest monsoon season. With improved weather conditions over the lower route packages during May, 9738 attack sorties were flown over NVN, representing a 24% increase over the previous month. RP I received 44 percent of the total effort in May as compared to 62 percent during April. RP II was up from 28 to 34 percent in May, and RP III more than doubled with an increase from 10 in April to 22 percent in May.

As of 31 May, Annex A to the RTTL, contained 465 targets of which 330 had been attacked one or more times. The number of targets in each of the five appendices was: Appendix I-82, Appendix II-93, Appendix III-45, Appendix IV-103, and Appendix V-142. The total damage level to the target systems declined due to the lack of air strikes in the northern sector of NVN for the previous 60 days. The percentage of RTTL targets that were unserviceable was down some eight percent (from 53 to 45 percent) as photo recce continued to document NVN regeneration efforts of the past 60 days.

Truck and WBLC activity in southern Route Packages was up from sightings during the previous month. The total logistic vehicles destroyed and damaged, as reported by pilots, totaled over 1,540. Trucks destroyed and damaged were up from 758 in April to 1,100 in May, and water craft increased from 411 in April to 502 in May.

NVN Air and Air Defense Activity. Enemy MIG activity during the period was highlighted by the penetration on 23 May of the southern area of NVN by a sizeable MIG 17/21 force and the destruction of one of the MIG-21s by a Navy TALOS missile. On 25 May, MIGs again penetrated the area below 20 degrees N. Such penetrations, when considered with NVN persistence in maintaining a radar and aircraft control capability in the area, indicated that the enemy intends to continue MIG forays southward whenever the tactical situation is favorable. Enemy GCI capability in the southern area suffered at least a temporary setback as a result of air strikes against a GCI facility at Vinh on 14 May. This facility, with effective coverage well below the DMZ, probably participated in directing recent MIG flights within its control area. Enemy surface-to-air missile and AAA capabilities in the southern

1. J3A531,
route packages did not show any substantial increase during the period. However, SAM launchings were reported for the first time in the vicinity of Dong Hoi. Air strikes against field deployed SAM sites in the vicinity of the DMZ were believed to have suppressed activity of some enemy firing elements, although NVN continued to maintain a threat in the area as evidenced by the 25 May SAM launch against a flight of B-52s. During May, there were two MIG engagements which resulted in the loss of one F-4. Two MIGs were destroyed, one by a TALOS surface-to-air missile and one on the ground at Vinh Airfield by U.S. fighter bombers. A total of 30 SAM firings was reported with no loss of U.S. aircraft to SAM's. Fifteen additional aircraft were lost over NVN, 13 to AAA, four unknown.1

June 1968 - Improved weather conditions over North Vietnam during June permitted an increase in visual strike efforts. Primary emphasis was against truck parks, storage areas, and military complexes. Day and night armed reconnaissance sorties were directed against logistic vehicles and interdiction points along the main lines of communications. Selected traffic control areas were struck and seeded with nearly 8,000 Destructor MK-36s. A total of 10,374 attack sorties was flown over the southern Route Packages representing an eight percent increase over the May effort--5,144 in RP I or 50 percent, 3,045 in RP II or 29 percent, and 2,185 in RP III or 21 percent. The improved weather permitted a more balanced effort within the three Route Packages.

The total damage level of the basic CINCPAC RTTL remained relatively unchanged during the month of June due to the absence of air strikes north of 19°. However, logistic vehicle activity south of 19° North increased from the previous month. The destroyed or damaged railroad stock was up from 32 to 43 units; motor vehicles from 1,100 to 1,202; and water craft from 411 to 666.

PAVEWAY Weapons. The laser guided bomb of the PAVEWAY weapons family was introduced early in June on a test basis. Two F-4s operated as a team while employing this weapon. One aircraft illuminates the target with a special modified illuminator located in the rear cockpit, while the other aircraft delivers the bomb(s). By the end of June, 25 modified M-117 (750 lbs) had been expended. Although the evaluation is

1. J3A531.
not complete and tactics are still being modified, it is significant to note
that of the 25 weapons dropped, six have scored direct hits while the
overall CEP has been 125 feet.

(5) **North Vietnamese Air Defense.** North Vietnam's air defense
activity during the month was a continuation of the overall expansion and
improvement trends that had been evident since the 1 April bombing re-
strictions. MIG activity was highlighted by a marked increase in frequency
of flights into the lower route packages. The SAM element of the air de-
fense system was moderately active during the month. Pilots reported
16 SAM firings during June.

During June there were nine MIG engagements resulting in the
downing of one MIG-21 and the loss of one F-4. Ten additional U.S.
aircraft were lost over NVN, one to SAM, six to AAA, 1 and three to
unknown causes.

(5) **July 1968 -** The attack sorties flown in NVN during July showed
an increase over June. During the month, 14,391 attack sorties were
flown as compared to 10,374 during June--an increase of 4,017. The good
weather experienced during July was the dominant factor in producing the
large number of attack sorties. During the first seven days of the month,
neither 2,000 sorties were flown in support of Operation THOR, an opera-
tion conducted in the eastern portion of the DMZ area (RP I), against NVN
field artillery and AAA sites. Operation THOR was a combined effort by
Navy, Marine and Air Force strike aircraft, accounting for an increased
effort in RP I--62 percent as compared to 50 percent in June.

(5) During the month, heavy emphasis was placed on locating and
attacking waterborne logistic craft (WBLC) and trucks, plus strikes
against associated logistic facilities such as storage areas, transshipment
points and truck parks. In RP I during July, WBLC traffic volume was
up from 925 to 1,110 with a major shift in observed activity from inland
to the coastal network. Truck sightings declined about 20 percent from
the June total. Convoy activity was most prevalent at night and was well
documented by increased employment of night photo reconnaissance and
the use of F-100 forward air controllers in the night visual recce role.

1. J3A531.
## RESULTS OF AIR STRIKES
### 2nd QUARTER CY68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET CATEGORY</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAA/AW SITES</td>
<td>123</td>
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<td>SAM SITES</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>3,029</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,215</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,244</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistical data includes restrikes on many of the fixed targets.

SECRET
This also accounted for the increase in truck attrition in RP I—over 525 destroyed or damaged in July compared to about 450 in June. In RPs II and III, truck traffic appeared to be returning to the coastal routes the first part of the month, but again shifted to the inland roads the remainder of the month. Sightings totaled about 2,500 with over 700 destroyed or damaged. WBLC sightings in RP II and III during the last two weeks in July increased considerably when compared to the previous two week period. On 27 and 28 July over 1,000 WBLC were taken under attack along the Song Ca, with 369 reported as destroyed or damaged. Over 2,200 WBLC were attacked in RPs II and III with approximately 685 destroyed or damaged.

Evidence indicated that NVN continued to improve and restore rail and highway systems. In the northern portion of the country, the main rail lines were reported as open; both the Paul Doumer and Canal des Rapides Bridges in Hanoi were serviceable. LOC construction, repair and maintenance activity in the southern NVN/Laos panhandle continued during the period. One pilot reported sighting labor gangs working under flood lights, indicating that repair and maintenance activity was conducted around-the-clock. Evidence also indicated that high levels of materiel tonnages continued to move south through RP I to the combat zones in SVN.

In addition to the attack sorties, over 1,500 tactical reconnaissance sorties were flown during the month. The photo and infrared acquisition capability of the recce aircraft continued to be the primary factor in achieving increased logistic vehicle attrition.

Destructor MK-36. The Destructor MK-36 continued to be used in support of the LOC interdiction campaign and as an area denial weapon for both WBLC and vehicle traffic. At selected "choke points" and after the area had been interdicted, extensive seeding of MK-36's was conducted to further inhibit traffic movement as well as to impede or delay repair of the "choke point" or LOC. As an example; between 18 and 19 degrees north, 77 "choke points" had been identified, 21 were considered as critical. Over 9,000 Destructor MK-36's were seeded in Route Packages I, II and III during July.

Air and Air Defense Activity. MIG penetrations of the southern area were resumed during the early hours of 29 July when a mixed flight
of MIG-17s and MIG-21s were detected on a flight south from the
Bai Thuong area. An engagement ensued in which one MIG-17 was
downed by air missiles. As with recent forays southward, these MIGs
apparently executed most of the mission under strict EMCON conditions
and were not detected until IFF and ground control radars in the vicinity
of Bai Thuong were activated.

Continual review of photography of NVN SAM sites and near
simultaneous coverage of a large number of sites made possible a more
accurate estimate of battalion strength. There were believed to be 35-40
firing battalions located in NVN, at least 30 of which were probably
located in the Red River area. SAM firing battalion strength below 19
degrees was not known to have increased appreciably during July but
movement of missile equipment and crews southward may have occurred
in order to replace those lost to concerted strike action near the DMZ.

During recent weeks AA gun count for the southern three Route
Packages showed a moderate shift from RPs II and III into RP I. As
could be expected, the greatest increase was in the light AA category
comprised of 37 and 57 mm weapons. During July, 17 U.S. aircraft
were lost in NVN: 14 to ground fire, three to unknown causes, and none
to either MIGs or SAMs. U.S. pilots shot down three MIGs, one MIG-21,
and two MIG-17s.

August 1968 - Good weather conditions over NVN prevailed
throughout most of August. Over the southern portion of Laos, low
cloud ceilings existed almost continuously. Low ceilings were also
common over central Laos and over mountain areas of Route Packages
I, II and III. The one exception to the predominantly good weather in the
southern RP's in NVN occurred during the period 10-14 August and was
due to tropical storm ROSE. Total attack sorties flown over NVN declined
slightly during August. During July, 14, 391 attack sorties were flown,
as compared to 13,1051 during August. Of the total attack sorties flown,
3,544 were flown at night. These were flown in an effort to maintain
around-the-clock pressure on the enemy. The night effort included
visual armed recce, COMMANDO NAIL radar strikes, and COMBAT SKY
SPOT releases under control of ground radar sites.

As of 31 August, the appendices to Annex A of the CINCPAC
ROLLING THUNDER Basic Operations Order contained 464 targets of
which 330 had been attacked one or more times. The number of targets
in each of the five Appendices was: Appendix I--81, Appendix II--89,
Appendix III-39, Appendix IV--53, Appendix V--202. The total damage
level to the six basic target systems remained relatively unchanged as restrictions on strike operations north of 19 degrees North remained in effect. Only 12 RTTL targets (11 already in Appendix IV or V) were struck during the month of August.

(3) The intensified interdiction campaign against enemy logistic traffic continued throughout the month. The effort resulted in a sharply curtailed logistic movement into the DMZ and the backdoor of the Laotian Panhandle. Trucks destroyed or damaged in NVN decreased from 1286 in July to 1042 in August. The number of trucks sighted during August was about 25 percent less than July. This reduction was attributed in the main to the sustained interdiction effort. The number of waterborne logistic craft (WBLC) destroyed or damaged during August was about 30 percent greater than July and reflected an increased reliance on water transport by the enemy. As an example of the heavy interdiction campaign, more than 650 road interdictions were conducted against three key road segments in RP I during August. Visual and photo surveillance confirmed these three road segments were closed, with no bypass, for an estimated percentage of the period as indicated: (1) Route 15—closed 30 percent of August, (2) Route 101—closed 23 percent of August, and (3) Route 137—closed 68 percent of August.

(3) During the month, 31 WALLEYE weapons were expended. The targets included bridges, tunnels and highway fords. The weapon continued to demonstrate outstanding capabilities against selected targets. The seeding of MK-36 Destructors continued as an integral part of the overall interdiction effort in NVN. Over 3,750 MK-36s were seeded at selected interdiction points during August.

(3) Air and Air Defense Activity. MIG reactions resumed again on 17 August—the first since 1 August when a MIG-21 was shot down in an air engagement with U.S. aircraft. The 17th and the 25th of August air engagements resulted in an exchange of ordnance with no kills by either side. No U.S. aircraft were lost to MIGs during August. The North Vietnam SAM defense was comparatively ineffective in RPs I, II and III, due to an effective electronic, photo, and visual reconnaissance program coupled with an aggressive strike and SAM suppressive program. Only one aircraft had been lost to SAMs since 1 April 1968 and that occurred during June. Nineteen SAMs were fired at U.S. aircraft during the month of August, an increase of nine SAM firings from the previous month. A new SAM site was confirmed in RP III during August. The AAA
gun count in RP I rose from 1230 to 2145 in the last two months. The greatest increase was in light and medium AAA guns. A recent PACOM ELINT Center study indicated that the inventory of NVN AAA fire control radars had doubled between 17 degrees North and 19 degrees North in NVN since the 1 April bombing pause. Eight U.S. aircraft were lost to AAA and six to unknown causes in NVN during August.

September 1968 - During the first half of September, poor weather conditions prevailed over RPs I, II and III. Two tropical storms disrupted the normal Southwest monsoon and produced the adverse weather. Tropical storm BESS advanced across the South China Sea during the first four days of September and crossed the coastline 20 miles north of Hue early on 5 September. Typhoon WENDY crossed the coast near Haiphong on 9 September and continued to move westward during the next several days, spreading clouds and precipitation southward into NVN and Laos. Varying weather conditions prevailed over the southern RPs of NVN during the remainder of September and variable to a northeasterly flow gave some indications of the transition from the Southwest to the Northeast Monsoon. The effect of the two tropical storms was a slight reduction in attack sorties flown during September. A total of 10,704 sorties were flown during the month as compared to 13,105 during August. The distribution of attack sorties by RPs remained nearly identical with August. Of the total attack sorties, over 3,500 were flown at night, representing 32 percent of the total attack sorties flown. The extensive night effort provided an around-the-clock pressure on the enemy logistics system.

Destructor MK-36. As a continued part of the interdiction effort, over 5,000 MK-36 Destructor were seeded in the three southern RPs. In addition, there are other areas which contained MK-36s seeded previously and which still remained active.

Despite good operational flying weather the second half of September, the number of motor vehicles sighted dropped significantly during the month. Photography confirmed that LOC traffic moved primarily in small groups and at night. During the day, vehicular traffic was camouflaged and concentrated in truck parks and villages.

As of 30 September, the appendices to Annex A of the CINCPAC ROLLING THUNDER Basic Operation Order contained 465 targets, of
which 330 had been attacked one or more times. The number of targets in each of the five appendices was: Appendix I--81, Appendix II--88, Appendix III--39, Appendix IV--54, Appendix V--203. The total damage level to the six basic target systems remained relatively unchanged as restrictions on strike operations north of 19 degrees North latitude remained in effect. Ten RTTL targets were struck during the month of September. Nine of these were in Appendix V.

During the first half of September, there was no contact between U.S. aircraft and the MIGs flying out of Bai Thuong; however, a more aggressive NVNAF attitude was apparent in the second half of September. On 17 September, two F-8s engaged two MIG-21s near Vinh. This encounter did not result in any losses by either side, however, one F-8 subsequently ran out of fuel and went down at sea. On 19 September, four F-8s in pursuit of MIG-17s were attacked by two MIG-21s and in the ensuing engagement, one MIG-21 was downed. On 22 September, the presence of USN aircraft near Vinh was again contested by MIG-21s and a USN TALOS successfully downed one MIG-21. After losing two MIG's in three days, none ventured south of 19 degrees during the remainder of the month. SAM firings for the month of September decreased from those fired in August. Fifteen were launched in September as compared to 19 launches in August. All SAMs were fired at USN aircraft near the DMZ. It was noted that nearly all of the September firings occurred in the late afternoon and early evening hours which may have been a tactic designed to take advantage of reduced visibility and thus avoid retaliation. There was one A-6A downed by SAMs NW of Vinh on 30 September 1968. In the northern RPs, above 19 degrees, an increasing number of 100 mm guns were photographed, some in positions formerly occupied by 35/37 mm guns. The increase, since 1 April, in the number of 37/57 mm batteries and automatic weapons located below 19 degrees, was nearly matched by a decrease in the number of these lighter caliber weapons above the 19 degree line. In spite of the increase in the heavier caliber AAA guns in the north, there remained a large number of 37/57 mm batteries in the north including those organic to SAM battalions. During September, 12 U.S. aircraft were lost to enemy ground fire and one loss was from an unknown cause.

October 1968 - The weather pattern that existed in the southern RPs during the first half of October was typical of the variable weather conditions that exist during the transition between the monsoon seasons.
# RESULTS OF AIR STRIKES

## 3rd QUARTER CY68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET CATEGORY</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
<th>TOTAL D/D</th>
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<td>AAA/AW SITES</td>
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<td><strong>6,308</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,515</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Statistical data includes restrikes on many of the fixed targets.
Source: Rolling Thunder Digest, HQ CINCPAC. 1967 Edition 9*
The weather was generally operational during the first week, but during the second week onshore Northeast monsoon winds generated broken ceilings from 1,000 to 3,000 feet over most of the area from the DMZ northward. During the last half of October the weather was generally poor for more than 50 percent of the time. Flooding was observed at most of the primary traffic control and choke points in all three of the southern RPs. Although there was an increase in the percentage of sorties that were affected by weather, 11,973\textsuperscript{1} attack sorties were flown in October as compared with 10,704 in September. The increase in attack sorties was due primarily to the around-the-clock delivery capability provided by ground and airborne radar bombing systems. The distribution of attack sorties by RPs remained nearly identical with September. Photo analysis and pilot sightings indicated that air interdiction and MK-36 seedings caused the enemy to place greater emphasis upon use of WBLCs for movement of materiel. Additionally, evidence indicated that choke points remained closed for extended periods, thus limiting their use. Armed recce operations in NVN against vehicles of all types were limited to the area south of the 19th parallel. The number of trucks destroyed or damaged was down from the September total of 1,660.

\textsuperscript{1} J3A531.
As of 31 October, the appendices to Annex A of the CINCPAC ROLLING THUNDER Basic Operation Order contained 467 targets of which 330 had been attacked one or more times. The number of targets in each of the five appendices was: Appendix I--81, Appendix II--91, Appendix III--38, Appendix IV--55, Appendix--202. The total damage level to the six basic target systems was unchanged as restrictions on air strikes north of 19° latitude remained in effect.

In support of the interdiction campaign, over 6,350 Destructor MK-36s were seeded in RPs I, II and III during October. In addition to the MK-36, Destructor MK-40s were employed for the first time on 13 October. The MK-40 is the designation for the destructor fuse incorporated with the 1,000 pound bomb while the MK-36 employs the same destructor fuse on the 500 pound bomb. Poor weather prevented sufficient coverage of the MK-40 seeded areas to provide an evaluation of the MK-40.

During the month of October the North Vietnamese air defense establishment continued to train, improve, and refine their weapons systems without changing significantly their existing overall defense envelope. North Vietnam had seven airfields suitable for MIG operations but the majority of MIG operations remained concentrated on only three fields--Phuc Yen, Gia Lam and Kep. MIG operations at Bai Thuong continued the same pattern of off and on presence by small groups of aircraft. Similar activity was observed briefly at Hoa Lac and Kien. The North Vietnamese still appeared to be reluctant to commit more than a small turn around component to other than their three prime bases, although they are capable of deploying additional MIGs from the CHICOM sanctuaries. Such a deployment, if made, could place about 25 MIGs on each jet-capable air base in North Vietnam. In addition, reconnaissance photography of 20 October revealed an earth clearing operation taking place 14 nautical miles south southeast of Hoa Lac that may eventually produce a 7,500 foot jet-capable airfield. The operation began on 3 October and the rapidity of its progress indicated a concerted effort. However, the requirement for another jet airfield in this part of North Vietnam was not apparent at the time. There were no MIG engagements or encounters since 19 September. MIGs are believed to have flown south of 19 degrees only twice during October. During this reporting period most observed SAM activity occurred between Vinh and the 19th parallel. One USN A-7A was lost to SAMs in this area on 6 October. On 23 and 26 October a SPOON REST radar was detected near the DMZ. This was the first appearance of SPOON REST radar in this area since July 1968 and indicated that at least
one SAM firing unit remained deployed near the DMZ. A total of eleven U.S. combat aircraft were lost in North Vietnam during the month. Seven aircraft were lost to ground fire, one to SAMs and three were classified as unknown.

(U) On 1 November 1968, all offensive operations against North Vietnam, to include the DMZ, and within the claimed 12 NM territorial waters were discontinued.
## RESULTS OF AIR STRIKES  
**OCTOBER 1968**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET CATEGORY</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
<th>TOTAL D/D</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAA/AW SITES</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>68</td>
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<td>SAM SITES</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td><strong>1284</strong></td>
<td><strong>2148</strong></td>
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*Statistical data includes restrikes on many of the fixed targets.*
**DISPOSITION**
**TACTICAL AIRCRAFT UNITS**
**REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM**

**SUMMARY**

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</table>

**AS OF 1 DECEMBER 1968**

*3 CARRIERS (15 SQDN) ON STATION FOR MOST OF 1968*
DISPOSITION
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT UNITS
THAILAND

SUMMARY
LOC  SQDN
UDORN  2
TAKHLI  3
KORAT  3
UBON  4
NAKHON  4
PHAM  4
Total  16

AS OF 1 DECEMBER 1969
US/VNAF SORTIES-ALL SERVICES
ROLLING THUNDER 1968

SOURCE: LTC G. O. COWAN, USAF, J3A53—CINCPAC
# USAF SORTIES 1968
## BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

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@ INCLUDES: STRIKE, ARMED RECC AND FLAK SUPP.
# INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SLAR, RDF/E1

USN/USMC SORTIES 1968
BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

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<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
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<th>TOTAL</th>
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@ INCLUDES: STRIKE, ARMED RECCE AND FLAK SUPP.
# INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SLAR, RDF/E1

USAF LOSS RATES - NVN - CY 68

CUMULATIVE TOTAL LOSS RATE SINCE 1 JULY 1965
(PRIOR TO 1 JAN 66, EXCLUDES HELOS, OBS,
CARGO TYPE ACFT [COMBAT SUPPORT])
MONTHLY TOTAL LOSS RATE (CBT + OPNL)
MONTHLY COMBAT LOSS RATE

SOURCE: LTC G.O. COWAN, USAF, J3A53-CINCPAC
# U.S. AIR FORCE LOSSES-NVN 1968
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**LEGEND:**
- GROUND FIRE
- UNKNOWN
- SAM
- MIG
- OPERATIONAL

**SOURCE:** LTC G. O. COWAN, USAF J3A53 - CINCPAC: OPREP-5.
USN LOSS RATES - NVN - CY 68

CUMULATIVE TOTAL LOSS RATE SINCE 1 JULY 1965
(PRIOR TO 1 JAN 66, EXCLUDES HELOS, OBS,
CARGO TYPE ACFT [COMBAT SUPPORT])

MONTHLY TOTAL LOSS RATE (CBT + OPNL)

MONTHLY COMBAT LOSS RATE

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**LEGEND:**
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- OPERATIONAL

**SOURCE:** LTC G.O. COWAN, USAF, J3A50 - CINCPAC: OPREP-5.
USMC LOSS RATES - NVN - CY 68

CUMULATIVE TOTAL LOSS RATE SINCE 1 JULY 1965
MONTHLY TOTAL LOSS RATE (CBT + OPNL)
MONTHLY COMBAT LOSS RATE

PERCENTAGE

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

SOURCE: LTC G.O. COWAN, USAF, J3A53.CINCPAC
### U.S. Marine Corps Losses - NVN 1968
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### U.S. Airforce Losses - Thailand 1968
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**Legend:**
- Ground Fire
- Unknown
- SAM
- Operational

**Source:** LTC G.O. Cowan, USAF, J3A53 - CINCPAC: OPREP - 5.
# ENEMY AIR-TO-AIR LOSSES

## 1968

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*TOTAL LOSS: 15 CONFIRMED
2 PROBABLE

*DOES NOT INCLUDE 1-MIG 17 DESTROYED ON THE GROUND AT VINH ON 23 MAY AND 1-MIG 21 DESTROYED BY TALOS ON 23 MAY AND 22 SEP.*

**LEGEND:**

- CONFIRMED
- PROBABLE

**SOURCE:** LTC G. O. COWAN, USAF; J3A53
MK-36 Destructor Effectiveness

(5) In June, CINCPAC made an evaluation of the effectiveness of the MK-36 Destructor seedings against LOC's in NVN. Evidence to substantiate the effect of the seedings was sparse and difficult to obtain since the majority of the seedings were in waterways which virtually precluded photographic evidence. Evaluation of photography of land interdiction points was complicated by the problem of identifying MK-36 craters in an area liberally cratered by U.S. Air Force and Navy air strikes and in many areas by SEA DRAGON forces. An estimate of effectiveness could be deduced by observation of traffic flow patterns when weather permitted a continuity of coverage. The best source proved to be the interrogation of prisoners.  

(5) The majority of prisoners interrogated were fishermen who revealed that MK-36s had been responsible for destruction of watercraft varying in size and type (including large barges loaded with rice), ferries, and small fishing craft. The prisoners confirmed that fishermen ceased fishing in seeded areas and lived in fear of the MK-36 Destructor in many areas where seedings had been made. In some cases, waterborne traffic was temporarily stopped or forced into narrow channels. Attempts were made, according to the prisoners, to sweep MK-36 fields in waterways by dragging a rock-weighted rope stretched across the channel. Evidence indicated that the NVN seemed unable to devise a suitable technique for sweeping the MK-36 Destructor fields.  

(5) Observation of traffic flow patterns in the vicinity of MK-36 seedings indicated an immediate shift of traffic away from areas implanted with M-36s. However, within eight days traffic moved back into the implanted areas. Thus, area denial was achieved if only on a temporary basis. An example of minimum effectiveness was the 12 March air strike on the Haiphong Railroad Yards, West. Approximately 15 tons of conventional ordnance was dropped and the target was then seeded with 90 MK-36s. Four days later, photography revealed a reconstructed rail line through the yard. While damage by MK-36s to repair crews and equipment while restoring the line could not be documented, it was evident that the MK-36 was not as effective area-denial weapon for long periods of time in this instance.  

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
Seeding of MK-36s. Above, retarding fins open after weapons are released. Below, MK-36s impacting in waterway.
A CINCPAC J3 analysis of the effectiveness of MK-36 Destorers concludes:

"Intelligence available does not definitely establish a meaningful measurement of MK-36 effectiveness; nor does it indicate the program is ineffective. The evidence available suggests the MK-36 makes an important contribution to the overall program of increasing the costs and efforts of NVN's war support by imposing another factor for North Vietnamese consideration in logistical distribution planning and imposing a significant degree of harassment and delay to LOC repairs."

Vulnerability of Thai Airfields

U.S. Air Force units in Thailand are tenants on Royal Thai air bases. Consequently the RTG has the responsibility for the security of these bases. The U.S. Air Force commanders on Thai bases have the limited responsibility for close-in protection of U.S. property. Thai Air Force base commanders are responsible for perimeter and internal defense except at U-Tapao where the RT Navy has the mission. Therefore, they have no authority to deploy forces outside the perimeter of the base, or to intercept potential attacking forces, or to pursue the enemy after an attack. External defense -- an area from the base perimeter fencing to 10,000 meters -- is the responsibility of the RTG.

Internal defense of the Thai bases was marginally adequate but lacking in many areas. At all the bases there was a shortage of personnel and a serious lack of communications, vehicles, weapons and other necessary equipment. RTAF security forces were, in general, untrained, ill-equipped and failed to pursue aggressively their responsibilities. Therefore, of necessity, USAF forces provided base wide security instead of only providing security for U.S. resources and supplementing the Thai effort when requested. All USAF-used bases lacked in varying degrees, certain vital physical security facilities such as perimeter fencing, security towers, perimeter lighting, internal fencing and revetments around vital base components and sensitive areas.

Thai forces responsible for external defense were limited in effectiveness by a lack of knowledge of area defense doctrine, insufficient personnel and a shortage of vehicles and other equipment. Coordination procedures and control of limited forces available were weak and incomplete or did not exist. 1

To offset the precarious security situation, USAF combat support commanders at each base programmed and requested funds for the improvement of physical security. The requested funds were to be used for the erection of perimeter fences, night lighting, perimeter roads, and other security devices. However, due to limited MCP funds, these requests were deleted by PACAF from the FY 68 and FY 69 budgets. 2 On the other hand an aggressive aircraft revetment program was undertaken on six heavily used Thai bases. A total of 585 revetments was programmed. By 2 March, 198 were completed and the remaining revetments were scheduled for completion by 30 June. 3

In early 1968, an analysis of the security threat indicated that insurgent forces in Thailand were capable of launching small scale limited attacks against individual bases in Thailand. The insurgent forces were considered not capable of coordinated sustained attacks employing crew-served weapons. A capability did exist for small external forces to mount a small scale but damaging mortar or rocket attack at any time. 4

On 26 July, infiltrators fired on U.S. personnel and aircraft in the U.S. facilities at Udorn RTAFB, and planted explosive devices on one C-141 and one F-4D aircraft. The F-4D was damaged by an explosive device and the C-141 was punctured by small arms fire. Three aircrew members of the C-141 and three USAF security guards were wounded, one seriously. Two infiltrators were killed and two were captured. 5

After the 26 July attack on Udorn CINCPAC directed CINCPAC and COMUSMACTHAI to conduct a review of base security in Thailand. At the same time Ambassador Unger initiated a review of

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. CINCPAC Command Center 0730 Briefing Notes, 27 July 68.
air base security. Ambassador Unger's review resulted in increased measures by the Thai Government to strengthen base security. COMUSMACTHAI's review resulted in praise for the general effectiveness of the Thai guards. His report also stated that the RTG had willingly accepted its responsibility for base security. The situation outlined in the two reports contrasted sharply with the situation that existed at the beginning of the year.

On 14 September, CINCPAC requested the JCS to approve an immediate increase of 569 Thai security guards and to increase the ceiling to 6,031 - 5,766 reservists and 215 regulars. On 27 September, Ambassador Unger sent a message to the DOD in which he stated:

It is increasingly difficult to explain to the RTG the protracted delays in U.S. approval of the Thai security guard augmentation which was requested by the Prime Minister in Washington in May and which has become an obviously high priority requirement since the July 26 attack on the RTAF base at Udorn. Thai security guards are a critical element in base defense, as we have repeatedly made clear. The present shortage, in the face of a high alert frequency, is imposing unreasonable demands on TSG personnel.

.../COMUSMACTHAI/ provided an exhaustive explanation and justification for an increase to 6031 in the TSG ceiling. As we emphasized in our previous message on this subject..., the lead time for recruitment of Thai security guards varies, but at best will require several months. The final class of TSG trainees recruited in February 1968 will graduate October 5. The pipeline is now dry, with prospective disuse of the training center and risk of dispersal of the training cadre.

2. CINCPAC 140038Z Sep 68.
3. AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 20877/271110Z Sep 68.
At a time when we are pressing the RTG to exert special efforts to meet its responsibility to protect these bases, it is important to demonstrate U.S. willingness to make promptly parallel (and obviously essential) moves to strengthen base security.

We urgently need a favorable response to our request to increase the overall Thai security guard ceiling to 6031.

The JCS, on 15 November, advised CINCPAC that the SECDEF had authorized the requested ceiling of 6,031 Thai security guards (5,766 reservists and 265 regulars) and that funding for the approved increase would be handled through normal Service channels. 1

Violations of Airspace

On 14 February the JCS was requested by higher authority to investigate and report on violations of CHICOM airspace during the last year and the actions taken to avoid future violations. The request was triggered by an incident on the same date when two U.S. Navy A-1 aircraft enroute from the Philippines to a U.S. air carrier in the Tonkin Gulf violated the airspace of Hainan Island. One of the two U.S. Navy planes was shot down by a Chinese MIG interceptor and the other plane flew to Danang Air Base, SVN. An investigation of this incident concluded that poor navigation was the cause. 2

The JCS report took into consideration seven other CHICOM airspace violations, four of which occurred over Hainan and those which were CHICOM-NVN border violations. The primary cause for these violations was charged to human error with weather and equipment malfunctions being contributing factors. Also considered was CINCPAC instructions to his Component Commanders which directed: (1) CINCPAC Component Commanders to take immediate action to revitalize measures to prevent future Chinese Communist border violations by aircraft transiting from the Philippine Islands to the Republic of Vietnam; (2) CINCPACFLT to modify procedures to conform to more southerly boundaries for flights of single engine aircraft flying from the Philippine Islands to RVN or to aircraft carriers on YANKEE STATION; and (3) CINCPACAF

1. JCS 05658/152012Z Nov 68.
to ensure that PACAF single engine aircraft flying from the Philippine Islands to RVN do not fly north of present boundaries. CJCS considered the actions taken by CINCPAC to establish more southerly flight routes and boundaries as adequate to reduce the likelihood of future violations of Hainan Island airspace for aircraft operating between the Philippines and SVN or YANKEE STATION. He further stated that he believed that adequate steps were being taken to prevent future violations of CHICOM airspace and that all personnel were aware of the extreme sensitivity surrounding incidents of this nature.\footnote{1}

\section*{Deployment of the F-111 to Southeast Asia}

\footnote{(S)} On 19 December 1967, the SECDEF approved for planning purposes the deployment of six F-111A aircraft and 369 personnel to Southeast Asia for combat testing of the aircraft. The project was named COMBAT LANCER and Takli, Thailand was designated as the bed down base. On 29 February the JCS approved the deployment of the COMBAT LANCER unit with initial deployment of supporting equipment and personnel commencing on 1 March and the aircraft deployment scheduled for 15 March.\footnote{2}

\footnote{(S)} Six aircraft deployed from Nellis AFB on schedule and arrived at Takli on 17 March. The planned operational concept for the F-111s envisioned single aircraft strikes at night or during bad weather at extremely low altitudes, taking maximum advantage of terrain masking enroute to and from the target. The first sorties were made in Route Package I on 25 March and eventual use against key lucrative targets in high threat areas, as necessary, were planned. Two planes were lost during March. The first on 28 March was believed to have crashed in Thailand in an area of extremely rugged jungle terrain, parts of which are uninhabited and inaccessible. The second accident occurred on 30 March in Thailand. The pilots safely ejected and were rescued. Both planes were lost from unknown causes. After the second loss, the remaining planes were grounded.\footnote{3}

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] Ibid.
\item[3.] SECDEF 6603/162357Z Apr 68; Southeast Asia Air Operations, March 1968, Hq PACAF.
\end{itemize}
The F-111s began normal operations on 12 April after having been released on 5 April for local training and night training on 10 April. On 22 April, the third F-111 was lost due to unknown causes during a night mission. The plane was believed to have crashed in Thailand. Once again the planes were grounded (See footnote).  

On 20 August, the State Department requested the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand to seek approval of the RTG to extend the COMBAT LANCER program through December. The original six-month combat test program expired on 15 September. Since the stand-down of the F-111s precluded the successful combat testing of the aircraft, an extension of time was needed for uninterrupted combat operations to collect sufficient data for a meaningful evaluation of the F-111 combat capability. On 4 September the RTG approved the request.

Even though the test period was extended, no combat missions were flown after May. However, over 500 training missions were flown in-country before the F-111s departed for the U.S. on 21 November.

BLACK SPOT Operations

A new weapons system operating under the nickname BLACK SPOT was introduced into the IV Corps delta campaign during November 1968. Two sensor-equipped NC-123K aircraft based at Phan Rang Air Base made 12 successful attacks against sampans, docks and base camps in lower and central IV Corps on the 29th and 30th of November. Subsequent operations were conducted in Southern Laos along LOCs and on truck parks in the Attopeu-Ban Phiaha area. Truck interdiction was very successful, with an estimated 5 - 7 trucks destroyed or damaged per sortie. On 31 December, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's comments or concurrence on CINCPACAF's request for a 120 day TDY extension of BLACK SPOT aircraft. It was expected that COMUSMACV would concur.

1. Southeast Asia Air Operations, April and May 1968, Hq PACAF. It should be noted that J3A53, Hq CINCPAC has reported the first and third loss in Laos and the second loss in Thailand; PACAF (DOCSC) Machine Listing, Subj: Combined Services Combat/Operational A/C Losses (U), 10 Jan 69 substantiates CINCPAC's report.
2. SECSTATE 224268/202112Z Aug 68.
3. AMEMBASSY BANGkok 19838/040959Z Sep 68.
5. J3B2 (A) History, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Jan 69 for the month of December; CINCPAC 310208Z Dec 68.
The BLACK SPOT NC-123K aircraft is a self-contained night ground attack system equipped with multiple night sensors. The weapon system utilizes Forward Looking Radar (FLR) for target detection plus Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR) and/or Low Light Level TV (LLLTV) with automatic tracking capability for examination of the target at close range and for carrying out the attack. The attack is programmed to be conducted as the terminal phase on a single detection, track and attack run. Each aircraft carries an internally mounted SUU-24 dispenser which has 24 cells, each capable of holding three ADU-253 or ADU-272 munitions canisters. The ADU-253 canister contains 74 BLU-3 bomblets and the ADU-272 contains 177 BLUE-26 bomblets. Cells can be released singularly, in train or salvo. Releases are automatic, with timing and trajectory based on sensor and navigation inputs to an on board analog computer.

COMBAT TRAP Operations

The Air Force completed the evaluation in Vietnam of a 10,000 pound bomb (MK-1211) that was being tested as a possible helicopter landing zone (HLZ) clearance weapon. Based on the reported results of the weapons evaluation, COMUSMACV on 29 November 1968 requested ten of the bombs be deployed to RVN as an urgent operational requirement. The weapons were required by 12 December 1968. CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV and requested that CINCPACAF expedite the action. The bombs were subsequently moved by air to RVN and employed. No spectacular results were achieved. Of the 10 bombs dropped, only one was evaluated as a complete success and one as a partial success.

Air Operations in Laos

Air operations in Laos were an essential part of the overall campaign against communist aggression in Laos and SVN. In 1968, tactical air continued its mission of locating and striking the enemy, his LOCs, and his logistic bases in Laos. Significant numbers of NVN personnel and large quantities of supplies and equipment continued to

1. J3B2(A) History, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Jan 69, for the month of Dec 68.
2. J3A4 History, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Jan 69, for the month of Dec 68.
be infiltrated into and through Laos into SVN. This traffic passed over approximately 1600 miles of fair-weather motorable roads, trails and waterways into the Laos Panhandle.

After making an analysis of air operations in Laos in 1967, the CINCPAC J2 recommended that night armed recce of infiltration routes in the BARREL ROLL-STEEL TIGER areas in 1968 be increased in frequency and in the numbers of routes covered, especially in the BARREL ROLL area, to detect and destroy enemy vehicles and supplies, of which an estimated 75-80 percent moved at night. He also recommended for 1968 as he did for 1967, that road interdiction, such as road cratering, bridge and ford destruction, be conducted only in the event more profitable targets were not found and then only on a selective basis. The results of operations in 1968 coincided with the recommendations.

An example of a traffic jam that occurred at a river crossing near the Laos border. This involved 27 trucks, all empty with the exception of 8, which have been modified to carry a large POL tank in the truck bed.

Summary of Air Operations in Laos

The number of sorties employed against the Laos target system in 1968 was largely affected by weather. When the northeast monsoon adversely affected air operations in NVN, large numbers of sorties were diverted to Laos where more favorable flying weather was prevalent. This, coupled with Operation NIAGARA, resulted in 7,752 strike sorties in January, 6,149 in February, and 7,118 in March. During the peak months of the southwest monsoon when flying weather throughout Laos was generally poor, only 2,508 strike sorties were flown in June, 2,872 in July, 2,765 in August. With the passing of the rainy season and the bombing halt in NVN, the sortie rate climbed to 12,491 strike sorties in November and 15,086 in December. Total strike sorties expending ordnance in Laos during 1968 was 75,712 as shown on following chart, "Air Operations in Laos 1968." The 1968 total was nearly double the number of sorties flown in 1967.¹

Throughout the year, 86 percent of the strike effort in Laos was devoted to the STEEL TIGER area of operation where the key infiltration routes from NVN through Laos into SVN are located. Eighty-nine percent of the strike sorties were used for armed recce and interdiction, the remaining sorties were used in the attrition of validated RLAF fixed targets. Night operations accounted for 18,372 sorties of the armed recce effort as compared to 8,227 sorties for 1967.² (See following charts for type sortie flown and area in which flown.)

The introduction of new concepts, equipment, tactics, and techniques greatly improved the ability of U.S. pilots to locate and destroy enemy targets. The sensor anti-infiltration detection program (IGLOO WHITE) began in January 1968, but its full effectiveness was not realized until the inception of COMMANDO HUNT in November 1968. With COMMANDO HUNT in full operation by mid-November the sensors were able to provide real time intelligence for tactical air strikes. The AC-130 Gunship II was employed from February through mid-June and again in late November and December with good results. The NC-123K was very successful in detecting and destroying enemy vehicles during

1. J2 Memo/0030-69, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Jan 69, to GEN Nazzaro, Acting CINCPAC, Subj: Effects of Air Operations in Laos, CY 68 (C). The statistics in this section differ slightly from the statistics held by J3A531, Hq CINCPAC.
2. Ibid.
AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS 1968
(ORDNANCE EXPENDING SORTIES)

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- **BARREL ROLL**
- **STEEL TIGER/TIGER HOUND**

TOTAL 1968
AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS 1968 - NIGHT ARMED RECCE

(ORDNANCE EXPENDING SORTIES)

- BARREL ROLL
- STEEL TIGER/TIGER HOUND

JAN  FEB  MAR  APR  MAY  JUN  JUL  AUG  SEP  OCT  NOV  DEC

46  54  85  14  24  12  610  592  540  520  764  128

1833  1595  1704  1541  1038  610  592  540  520  764  2975  3856
AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS 1968 - RLAF NUMBERED TARGETS

(ORDNANCE EXPENDING SORTIES)

BARREL ROLL

STEEL TIGER/TIGER HOUND

SECRET

182
November and December. Mark-36s were employed against primary Laotian LOCs, both highways and waterways. As of 31 December, 2, 335 Mark-36 Destroyers were dropped by aircraft in 212 sorties. An intense interdiction program was initiated during September in the STEEL TIGER area. The areas of primary concentration were the Ban La Boy Ford complex and the Ban Pha Nop vulnerable highway segment. These two areas were hit continually from September through December. As a result of this interdiction program the enemy was forced to construct bypasses around these primary choke points. 

The U.S. air campaign in Laos during 1968 produced significant results as indicated on following chart, "Enemy Losses - Laos." When compared to 1967, there were more attack sorties flown in 1968 with better results in five target categories - trucks, structures, AAA/AW destroyed, secondary explosions and road cuts. However, there were not as many WBLC and bridges destroyed as in 1967. Efforts to locate and destroy enemy vehicles during the dry season were particularly successful. The reasons for this success were due primarily to increased enemy logistic movement, increased night recce, and proficient use of the Starlight Scope. On the other hand, during the rainy season the average number of sorties required to kill one truck appears to be excessive when related to cost effectiveness (See Chart, BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER Trucks destroyed 1968).

In the final analysis, the overall effects of air strikes in Laos for 1968 were impressive; however, the enemy still retains sufficient resources to meet his logistic requirements.

Constraints

As in 1967, air operations in Laos during 1968 were conducted under constraints that did not permit maximum flexibility in the use of friendly air power. For political reasons a certain amount of restraint had to be imposed. However, on the whole, Ambassador Sullivan responded favorably to many requests for relaxation of restrictions.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER
TRUCKS DESTROYED
1968

JAN  FEB  MAR  APR  MAY  JUN  JUL  AUG  SEP  OCT  NOV  DEC

10,000
5,000
1,000

6752  6149  7118  6982  3666  2508  2872  2765  3302  5021  12,491  15,086

1,000
800
600
400
200

1254  885  966  1445  632  418  437  131  175  165  330  719

LEGEND:
- SORTIES EXECUTED
- AVERAGE SORTIES PER TRUCK
- TRUCKS DESTROYED

SECRET
(TS) In the BARREL ROLL operating area, armed recce was authorized in Areas A, B, and C shown on following map, "BARREL ROLL Armed Recce Areas." However, after the 3 April stand-down restrictions limited armed recce in Area A to route 19 to within 10 NM of the NVN border. In Area B attack of all LOCs west of 104 degrees, 15 minutes East was authorized. In Area C, armed recce on Routes 6 and 61 was authorized within their entirety and attack on Route 7 was approved within 10 NM of the NVN border. RLAF validated fixed targets outside these areas could be struck with prior coordination with the U.S. Air Attache Vientiane and under FAC control.1

(TS) In 1967, the STEEL TIGER operating area was divided into 4 areas called Zones I, II, III, and IV and are shown on following chart, "STEEL TIGER Armed Recce Areas."2 Separate operating rules were promulgated for each zone. Zone I was established as FREE FIRE area and attack against all forms of military activity was authorized except tactical air strikes were not authorized within 500 meters of active villages. However, any area from which ground fire was received could be attacked, including villages. In Zone II, armed recce was authorized. Targets of opportunity within 200 yards of a motorable road or trail could be attacked, day or night, if outside of villages. Fixed targets and targets of opportunity outside of 200 yards from a road or trail could be attacked provided they were validated RLAF priority A or B targets, if the target was approved by the U.S. Air Attache in Vientiane, Savannakhet, or RAVEN FAC, or if the target was approved by a Laos observer aboard a FAC or an ABCCC aircraft. Any area from which ground fire was received could be attacked without FAC or MSQ control. MSQ radar could be utilized for ground directed bombing under all weather conditions.3

(TS) In Zone III all targets, regardless of location, except areas from which ground fire was received, could be attacked under FAC or MSQ-77 control. The MSQ-77 ground directed system could be utilized in all weather conditions against any RLAF validated priority A or B target or any other target appropriately approved by the U.S. Air Attache in Vientiane. All strikes in Zone IV required the approval of the U.S. Air

3. Ibid, p. 663.
Attache in Vientiane, Savannakhet, or RAVEN in addition to FAC control by U.S. FACs. Within Zone IV a special operating area called CRICKET WEST was established. Within this area all targets required validation prior to strike by either an airborne Laos FAC or by radio request to the U.S. Air Attache in Savannakhet. All strikes, except self-defense strikes, had to be under FAC control. On 12 April, U.S. Ambassador to Laos Sullivan approved a change to the armed recce rules of engagement in Zone IV. He permitted ground fire to be returned in Zone IV by helicopter and escort aircraft when actually engaged in CAS infiltration or exfiltration and during U.S. Air Force search and rescue operations. The authority was limited to an area 1,000 meters in all directions from the exact location in which an operation was being conducted. Prior to the above change in rules of engagement in Zone IV, the 7th AF asked the U.S. Embassy, Vientiane if strike aircraft could return ground fire if received from villages in Zone IV or restricted areas of Savannakhet, Saravan, Pakse, Thakhek, Meuang Phalane and Attopeu. Ambassador Sullivan replied that in order to prevent incidents in Zone IV, which has a large friendly population, all strikes had to have approval of the U.S. Air Attache in Vientiane or Savannakhet. The only exception to the rule was the authority granted during CAS or Air Force SAR operations.

(TS) Certain geographical areas in both the STEEL TIGER and BARREL ROLL areas were designated prohibited and restricted areas. For example, U.S. strike aircraft could not fly within a 25-mile area of Vientiane or Luang Prabang and as indicated on maps, "STEEL TIGER/ BARREL ROLL Armed Recce Areas." U.S. strike aircraft could not fly within 10 miles of 6 other cities. Additional restrictions prohibited U.S. aircraft operations in close proximity to the Burma border and certain other areas were restricted from strikes because of the far ranging CAS Road Watch Teams. Strikes could be made only if in positive radio contact with a team through FAC or ABCCC.

(TS) As in 1967, COMUSMACV made several requests to relax the restrictions imposed on air operations in Laos. He requested: a change in the operating concept for ARC LIGHT strikes in Laos to permit more flexibility in diverting to more lucrative targets in the COMMANDO HUNT area; relaxation of operating rules in some zones of the COMMANDO HUNT

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1. Ibid; OUSAIRA Vientiane, Laos 00453/121059Z Apr 68.
2. OUSAIRA Vientiane Laos 00450/130518Z Apr 68.
area; use of CS (riot control) agents for road interdiction during the COMMANDO HUNT campaign; and approval to place SOG (PRAIRIE FIRE) teams in Laos in the vicinity of Mu Gia, Ban Karai, and Nape passes to locate suitable targets and direct tactical air strikes against them. As of 7 November, the first request was under active consideration by the Ambassador, the second request was not approved, the third request to use CS had not received CINCPAC's approval, and the fourth request met with substantial disagreement in Vientiane.¹

(5) On 6 July, COMUSMACV requested Ambassador Sullivan to extend to Zones II and III of the STEEL TIGER area and areas A, B and C of BARREL ROLL the rules applicable to Zone I of STEEL TIGER. COMUSMACV's request was based on intelligence sources indications that the area along the SVN-Laotian border and ingressing LOCs were being used at an increased rate to support enemy infiltration into SVN. He felt that his recommended changes would permit more effective utilization of U.S. air power in Laos.²

(5) In reply to COMUSMACV's request Ambassador Sullivan pointed out that the air operating rules for Laos had been carefully developed over several years to provide the maximum operating flexibility for U.S. air power imposed by prevailing political and operating requirements. He stated:

These rules are designed to (1) protect non-combatants and friendly military elements from inadvertent airstrike and (2) minimize risk of public disclosure of US airstrike program in Laos. Operating rules have been modified from time to time to meet new patterns of enemy activity when it could be determined that such modifications would fall within acceptable limits of above criteria. Occasional inadvertent strikes on friendly positions or villages, as well as periodic press reports of US air activity in Laos, indicate that current operating procedures have already approached these limits. We believe that this is confirmed by analysis of rules currently prevailing in each air operating zone in Laos.

2. COMUSMACV 19438/060756Z Jul 68.
He then analyzed the rules in effect for the zones in STEEL TIGER and told COMUSMACV:

Since rules for BARREL ROLL areas Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie were specifically established by JCS following March 31 reduction of operations in NVN, they are not currently open for modification at this level. However, if they were, we would point out that friendly and enemy elements are often so closely mixed in these areas that precise validation procedures are essential. While we currently hold no persuasive evidence to indicate that present rules of engagement are inadequate to cope with enemy infiltration into South Vietnam we would welcome any specific examples you may have of significant enemy movement into RVN which could not... be countered under current rules of engagement.  

(S) In closing his reply to COMUSMACV, Ambassador Sullivan suggested that when General Brown, the new 7th AF Commander, was ready, that a meeting was essential to discuss not only the general question of air operations in Laos but specifically what contingency arrangements should be made if there were a complete stand-down of operations in NVN. Udorn was suggested as the most suitable site.  

STEEL TIGER-TIGER HOUND Area

(S) January 1968 - The STEEL TIGER area received the majority of the air strikes conducted in Laos - 6,960 sorties of the total 7,752 sorties flown were in the area. This was a considerable increase over the 5,610 sorties flown in the STEEL TIGER area in December 1967. The trucks destroyed and secondary explosions were the highest reported for any one month since air operations began in Laos.  

(S) February 1968 - The total sorties flown decreased from 6,960 in January to 5,196 in February. However, the number of secondary explosions reported - 6,496 - was the highest number for any one month since air operations began in Laos. With the exception of secondary

1. AMEMBASSY Vientiane Laos 7695/091005Z Jul 68.
2. Ibid.
explosions and WBLC destroyed, enemy losses decreased in the remaining categories. Operation SHOCK V, a combined CAS, USAF and RLAF operation aimed at the destruction of enemy logistical facilities and troops in the STEEL TIGER area, began 20 January and terminated 6 February. A bomb damage assessment revealed 20 secondary explosions, 18 secondary fires, several roadcuts, 5 caves sealed and 2 trucks destroyed.  

(S) March 1968 - The total number of sorties increased from 5,196 in February to 6,155 for March. Compared to February there was an increase in vehicles, bridges, and AAA/AW destroyed and interdiction points attacked, but a decrease in all other target categories.  

(S) April 1968 - Total sorties increased from 6,155 in March to 6,649 for the month of April. The number of vehicles sighted, attacked and destroyed by combat aircraft was the highest reported for any one month since air operations began in Laos.  

(S) May 1968 - During May the total number of sorties decreased significantly. Only 2,797 were flown as compared to 6,649 in April. Also when compared to April there was a decrease in BDA in all categories of targets. However, the number of trucks destroyed compared to sorties flown was impressive. An analysis of trucks destroyed at night and during the day revealed 587 for night armed recce and 34 for day armed recce. Between 94 to 95 percent of the trucks destroyed was accomplished by 37 percent of the sorties flown - one truck destroyed for every two sorties flown during darkness.  

(S) June 1968 - The total number of sorties flown continued to decline. This decrease which began in May was attributed to the southwest monsoon. Only 1,892 sorties were flown in June compared to 2,797 in May and 6,649 in April. There was a decrease in all BDA

categories except WBLC when compared to May. Again, the number of trucks destroyed compared to the number of sorties flown continued to be impressive. Approximately 95 percent of the 313 trucks destroyed by night armed recce was accomplished by 36 percent of the sorties flown, 1 truck destroyed for every 2 night armed recce sorties flown. There was a definite decline of truck traffic in the Laos Panhandle which was due primarily to the onset of the rainy season and the deterioration of the road systems.  

(5) July 1968 - Due to improved weather conditions, the number of sorties flown increased from 1,892 in June to 2,064 in July. Of the total sorties flown approximately one-third - 719 - were flown under MSQ - 77 control. BDA for July remained relatively unchanged from June.  

(8) August 1968 - Adverse weather conditions resulted in an increase in the number of sorties flown under MSQ - 77 (COMBAT SKYSPOT) control. A total of 1,972 sorties were flown in August compared to 2,064 in July. Reported bomb damage was light.  

(5) September 1968 - During September 2,340 combat sorties were flown, an increase of 16 percent over the 2,064 flown in July. There were increases in all BDA categories except secondary explosions. Significantly there was a considerable increase in road interdiction which seems to develop whenever the sortie rate is increased. Road interdiction increased almost 5 times that reported in August. While road interdiction occurred throughout the STEEL TIGER area, special emphasis was placed on Route 966 where approximately 20 sorties per day were flown. A new trend was the emphasis placed on the destruction of RLAF validated targets. Approximately 25 percent of the sorties were flown against these targets with one-third of these sorties flown against the Ban La Boy complex on Route 912. About 50 percent of the RLAF targets struck were under MSQ-77 control.  

October 1968 - The total sorties flown increased 53 percent over September - 4,375 compared to 2,340. Due to bad weather, 1,028 sorties were flown under MSQ-77 control. When compared to September, BDA increased in all categories except trucks and WBLC destroyed. The LOC interdiction campaign to impede vehicle movement continued at an increased pace throughout the month with emphasis on Route 966 and the Ban La Boy Ford complex.  

November 1968 - During the month, there was a 259 percent increase in total sorties flown over the preceding month - 11,3562 compared to 4,375. Because weather was a limiting factor during part of the month, 2,815 strike sorties were flown under MSQ-77 control. BDA results increased in all categories except bridges destroyed. As in the 2 previous months, the LOC interdiction campaign continued at an increased pace. The Ban La Boy Ford complex and the vulnerable road segment at Ban Pha Nop received the weight of the combat sortie effort. A total of 514 Mark 36s was seeded during November, the first seedings since March 1968. Total trucks destroyed - 330 - was the lightest since July.  

December 1968 - Total sorties for the month increased 19 percent over November - 13,5004 compared to 11,356. Since weather was a limiting factor for part of the month, 1,363 sorties were flown under MSQ-77 control. BDA results increased in all categories except in WBLC and structures destroyed. Of the 662 vehicles destroyed, the highest total since April 1968, 618 were destroyed by night armed recce. Ban La Boy and the Ban Pha Nop vulnerable road segment continued to receive the weight of the LOC interdiction effort. Mark 36 seedings in Laos were the highest ever recorded for one month - 601 sown.  

2. This total includes Operation COMMANDO HUNT and IGLOO WHITE statistics.  
4. Includes COMMANDO HUNT and IGLOO WHITE statistics.  
This road segment in Laos is an excellent interdiction point due to a lack of ground cover and its susceptibility to bomb-produced land slides. These 2 trucks are part of the total of 277 trucks destroyed in southern Laos during the period 15 to 30 November 1968.

BARREL ROLL Area

(5) January - June 1968 - During January, the total sorties flown decreased from 858 in December 1967 to 792 in January. In February the total number increased to 953, the highest number of sorties flown in the BARREL ROLL area since January 1966. Approximately 46 percent of the sorties flown in February were under COMMANDO CLUB control in defense of Site 85. In March the total sorties flown rose to 963, an increase of 10 over the previous month while in April the number decreased by approximately two-thirds to 333. However, in May the total sorties flown registered an increase to 869. Most of the sorties were concentrated around LIMA Site 36 and on enemy controlled routes feeding into the area. In June the total sorties flown dropped to 616. 1

1. J2 Memo 0069-68, 15 Feb 68; unnumbered for Feb, undated; 00135-68, 8 Apr 68; 00177-68, 11 May 68; 00203-68, 9 Jul 68; Subj: Effects of Air Operations in Laos for the months of Jan thru Jun 68, respectively.
July - December 1968 - Combat sorties increased to 808 in July over the 616 flown in June. Although total sorties increased, RLAF target sorties decreased by over 50 percent. While total sorties dropped to 793 in August from July, RLAF target sorties increased by nearly 60 percent, most of which were under MSQ-77 control. During September, 962 combat sorties were flown, the second highest rate for 1968. These sorties were flown primarily along Route 7 and in the Sam Neua area.

Twenty-six percent of the sorties were against 30 RLAF validated targets in and around the Ban Ban area. BDA for the number of sorties flown was not impressive since pilots and FACs in many instances were unable to obtain BDA due to foliage and weather. In October 646 sorties were flown. This represented a decrease compared to the 962 flown in September. Most of the sorties in October were flown against CAS identified targets in Laos, many of which were in the vicinity of LIMA Site 85. The targets were mainly enemy troop concentrations and bunker complexes. About 400 structures were damaged or destroyed by these strikes. In November, 1,135 sorties were flown, the highest total in 1968 and the highest total since 1 January 1966. As in October, CAS identified targets received the weight of the sortie effort. Many of the targets consisted of troop concentrations and bunker complexes in the vicinity of LIMA Sites 36 and 85. A total of 1,586 combat sorties was flown in December, the highest number of sorties ever flown in the BARREL ROLL area since air operations began over Laos in 1964. For the third consecutive month emphasis was placed on CAS identified targets in northern Laos. In addition, combat air support was provided General Vang Pao's Operation PIG FAT.¹

RLAF T-28 Operations

RLAF pilots flew 8,729 combat sorties primarily in close air support of FAR troops against enemy troop concentrations in 1968.² This total was 840 more sorties than the 7,889 flown in 1967. The daily

1. J2 Memos 00303-68, 15 Aug 68; 00334-68, 7 Sep 68; 00396-68, 16 Oct 68; 00437-68, 16 Nov 68; unnumbered for Nov 68 and undated; 0021-69, 18 Jun 69; Subj: Effects of Air Operations over Laos for the months of Jul thru Dec 68, respectively.

2. This total was derived from the J 2 1968 monthly memorandums "Effects of Air Operations in Laos," previously cited.
average and the total sorties per month are shown on following chart, "Air Operations in Laos 1968-RLAF T-28 Operations."¹

Target Validation in Laos

(5) The planning and execution of U.S. air operations in Laos had to be approved by the U.S. Ambassador to Laos prior to implementation. This policy was established by President Johnson since Laos did not have, "U.S. forces under area military command." Consequently the U.S. Ambassador was required to validate all targets in Laos. The channel for validation was through the U.S. Air Attaché (AIRA) to Laos. ²

(5) As of 1 January 1968, there were 556 validated targets in the combined BARREL ROLL-STEEL TIGER areas. Three targets were deleted in February and 1 was added in May reducing the total to 554. During August, RLAF Validation Message Number 69, dated 1 April, was received and it added 11 new targets bringing the total validated targets to 565. At the end of 1968, 505 of the validated targets had been struck at least one time. At the end of December, the RLAF target number system was discontinued. Beginning in January 1969, a new TIGER Target system was to go into effect. The new system was reported to provide a more flexible response to targeting in Laos by combining armed recce type targets with the permanent fixed targets. ³

Air Support for Laotian Operations (5)

(5) On 20 February, Ambassador Sullivan requested a total of 1,050 A-1, A-26, and T-28 aircraft sorties per month to support Laotian operations. He recommended that the 56th Air Commando Wing at Nakhon Phanom be designated to support Laotian operations only. His request was based on the problems associated with adequate and timely air support of Laotian operations. ⁴

2. OAIRA AMEMBASSY Vientiane, Laos 00476/110703Z Mar 66.
CINCPAC in reply to Ambassador Sullivan's request stated that there were not sufficient assets available in Southeast Asia to permit the dedication of a specific unit or units for exclusive use in Laos to provide the number of sorties requested.¹

The problem of air support was spotlighted again when the enemy overran Site 85. The JCS requested CINCPAC to provide a list of additional resources required to meet Ambassador Sullivan's sortie requirement. In response CINCPAC told the JCS that the following source increase would be required: (1) 2 A-1 squadrons, (2) increase the A-26s in the 609th Air Commando Squadron from 12 to 16 A-26s, and (3) increase the C-123s in the 606th Air Commando Squadron from 6 to 10 C-123s. In addition, he proposed to delete all T-28s from the 606th Air Commando Squadron because of their limited effectiveness and that the first A-1 Squadron should be scheduled to arrive by 1 July and the second by 1 September and both squadrons would need to increase the number of A-1 aircraft from 18 to 25 by December 1968.²

The total source capability of the units requested by CINCPAC exceeded by 342 sorties the 1,052 requested by Ambassador Sullivan. It was expected that the excess sorties would be absorbed in close air support for Laotian forces in close contact with the enemy.³

On 17 June, the JCS recommended to the SECDEF that the additional forces recommended by CINCPAC be approved as an addition to the Thailand based U.S. forces authorized by Program 6. On 21 August, the request was approved including eight C-130 gunships.⁴

Use of Propeller and Jet Aircraft in Laos

In late December 1967, the JCS provided CINCPAC with a SECDEF study of the use of propeller and jet aircraft in Laos. The study, based on an analysis of air operations in Laos during the first 9 months of 1967, concluded that propeller aircraft were 9 times more effective than jet aircraft in destroying trucks and WBLC in Laos. The study also

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1. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
indicated that the propeller aircraft loss rate was 4.3 times higher than jet aircraft. The study recommended that 2 Thailand based F-4 squadrons be replaced by 2 A-1 propeller squadrons. The JCS requested CINCPAC’s comments on the study.¹

(3) CINCPAC, on 26 December 1967, responded as requested. He non-concurred in the recommendation to substitute the two A-1 squadrons for two F-4 squadrons. His rationale was that the substitution would reduce the jet strike capability in Southeast Asia. Some flexibility would be lost since A-1 aircraft could not operate in highly defended areas of NVN and parts of Laos. A reduction in the jet strike capability was considered undesirable to the overall campaign in Southeast Asia. CINCPAC suggested that if additional propeller aircraft were available, the aircraft could be better utilized by increasing the number assigned to squadrons already deployed to Southeast Asia.² The JCS sent a memorandum to the SECDEF which reflected CINCPAC’s position. The


2. Ibid.
JCS position was that the SECDEF study was too narrow in scope to form a firm basis for a decision to substitute two squadrons of A-1 aircraft for two squadrons of F-4s. The CJCS told the SECDEF that a more comprehensive study of the subject in the overall context of Southeast Asia operations was underway and that the results of the study with appropriate recommendations would be forwarded to the SECDEF by 1 March. The CJCS further stated that, based upon the evidence at hand, he would be against the proposed substitution.  

(5) On 25 January, the SECDEF approved the CJCS recommendation. He requested that the JCS study specifically address:  

1. day versus night sortie effectiveness in Laos, and the reasons for large numbers of jet sorties during the day in view of the high efficiency of night time prop sorties;  
2. the degree to which observed differences in jet and prop efficiency are due to differences in mission versus characteristics inherent in aircraft design;  
3. the impact of enemy air defenses.

(5) The JCS requested CINCPAC to furnish an analysis of the SECDEF questions and any other comment which would improve effectiveness and efficiency of operations against trucks in Laos. CINCPAC provided the requested analysis and his recommendation to the JCS on 17 February. The JCS study which included CINCPAC's position in the matter was forwarded to the SECDEF on 29 February. Based on the conclusions reached in the study, the JCS recommended that the proposed substitution of A-1 for F-4 squadrons be removed from further consideration.  

CINCPAC Policy Regarding Air Strikes in Vicinity of Prisoner of War (PW) Camps

(5) Requests for ARC LIGHT strikes north of Ban La Boy Ford raised the question of PW site validation and CINCPAC policy for air strikes in vicinity of PW sites. The issue arose after several requests by the 7th Air Force to strike ARC LIGHT target boxes which the U.S. Embassy, Vientiane had refused to validate because they were too near

1. Ibid.  
2. J3 Brief No. 59-68, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Mar 68, Subj: The Use of Propeller and Jet Aircraft in Laos (U); JCSM-129-68 of 29 Feb 68.  
3. Ibid.
# U.S. Air Force Losses-Laos 1968

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## Legend:
- Ground Fire
- Unknown
- Operational
- Destroyed on Ground

**Source:** LTC G.O. Cowan, USAF, J3A53 - CINCPAC OPREP -5.
# USN-USMC Losses - Laos 1968

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| USMC A-4 |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | 1   |     |     |     | 1     |
| F-8      | 1   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | 1     |
| **Total USMC Losses** | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3     |

## Legend:
- Ground Fire
- Unknown
- Operational

## Source:
a suspected PW camp. Ambassador Sullivan asked CINCPAC for his policy regarding criteria establishing the location of PW camps and air strikes in the vicinity of PW sites. Ambassador Sullivan's policy was to lean toward the safety of PWs and to use FAC controlled tactical air only in the vicinity of these camps. CINCPAC requested his Component Commander's comments on the subject and following the receipt of their replies he promulgated a policy that was approved by the JCS. He announced that: (1) target nominations would be judged on a case by case basis; (2) PW site locations are those sites reported within the last 12 months by multiple sources or by a single reliable source; (3) the use of ARC LIGHT or tactical air will be determined by proximity of the target to an active PW site and the military worth of the target; and (4) in application of these criteria, every precaution will be taken to assure the safety of PWs.  

**SAC B-52 Strikes in Southeast Asia (ARC LIGHT)**

The first B-52 strike against a target in Southeast Asia was launched from Guam on 18 June 1965. The operation, nicknamed ARC LIGHT, grew from a 30 aircraft, 150 sortie per month operation to a 104 aircraft, 1,800 sortie per month operation in 1968. The SAC B-52 aircraft are based at Andersen AFB at Guam, U-Tapao AB in Thailand and Kadena AFB in Okinawa.

The mission of ARC LIGHT is to assist in the defeat of the enemy through maximum destruction, disruption, and harassment of major control centers, supply storage facilities, logistic systems, enemy troops, and lines of communications in selected target areas. Targets are selected to accomplish:

(a) Systematic destruction of base areas.

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1. Point Paper, J3B22, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Oct 68, Subj: Air Strikes in Ban La Boy Ford Area (Laos) (U).
3. Ibid., pp. 2 and 3.
(b) Harassment and interdiction of troop concentrations, movement of enemy supplies, bunkers, fortifications, automatic weapons positions, and trenches and foxholes.

(c) Support of friendly ground operations by preventing the massing of enemy forces and by destroying prepared defenses of enemy attack units.

(d) Spoiling operations against the enemy for the purpose of preventing the reinforcement or orderly withdrawal of enemy units and operations directed against enemy troop concentrations for the purpose of upsetting known or estimated military plans.

Approval Authority for ARC LIGHT Missions

(1) Approval authority for ARC LIGHT missions has evolved from joint CINCPAC-CINCSAC approval authority for targets in SVN and JCS approval outside SVN to a less restricted approval authority for missions.1 On 24 January 1968, CINCPAC published mission approval authority in the ARC LIGHT Basic Operation Order. COMUSMACV was the approving authority for ARC LIGHT targets in SVN, the DMZ and in NVN below 17 degrees, 10 minutes north latitude with CINCPAC retaining veto authority. The JCS approval was required for execution of those above 17 degrees, 10 minutes north latitude. In conjunction with the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, CINCPAC approved requests for targets throughout Laos. In 1967, CINCPAC was the approval authority for targets in the DMZ north of the FDML to 17 degrees, 19 minutes north latitude. With this exception, approval authority in 1968 was the same as in 1967.2 The following is a summary of approval authority by target category and geographical area:3

1. Point Paper, J2434, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Mar 66, Subj: Evaluation of "ARC LIGHT."
B-52 bombers releasing their bombs on suspected artillery positions near the Demilitarized Zone.
Category | Geographical Area | Approval Authority
--- | --- | ---
I | SVN up to PMDL | COMUSMACV
II | NVN from PMDL to 17° 10'N | COMUSMACV
IIW | NVN - North of 17° 10'N | JCS
IIIA | SE Portion of Laos bordering SVN | AMEMB Vientiane concurrence; CINCPAC approval.
III | Laos, except for IIIA above | AMEMB Vientiane concurrence; CINCPAC approval.

(B-52 targets in each of the above categories are checked by CINCPAC J2 targeting section. The normal B-52 target is a one kilometer by two kilometer rectangle commonly referred to as a target box. These dimensions may be altered to accommodate the number of aircraft scheduled for a strike. Each target regardless of its location is checked to determine if it falls within the following parameters: (a) target is not situated in a population center; (b) target is a minimum of three kilometers from friendly units, and one kilometer from non-combatants. The distance between the target and friendly units may be reduced to one kilometer under emergency conditions; (c) proximity of the target to enemy SAM sites; (d) target is not close to temples, monuments, landmarks, etc., the destruction of which would cause serious political problems; and (e) no Roadwatch Teams or suspected POW camps are closer that three kilometers from the target. 1

B-52 Sortie Rate and Basing

(B) Although the ARC LIGHT program began the year 1968 with a continuation of 800 sorties per month, increased enemy activity necessitated additional sorties. On 21 November 1967, the SECDEF approved a sustained sortie rate of 1,200 per month. To execute this decision, the JCS directed CINCPAC-CINCSAC: to phase in additional B-52s at U-Tapao; to accomplish the maximum number of sorties with U-Tapao


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based aircraft; develop an interim capability to surge to a 1,200 sortie rate within 72 hours; and, to use available munitions reserves to sustain the increased sortie rate until production and delivery reach necessary levels. In the same message, the JCS requested CINCPAC to coordinate with CINCSAC in developing a target date for the attainment of a sustained 1,200 sortie rate.\(^1\) On 30 December 1967, CINCPAC notified the JCS that CINCSAC had an immediate capability to surge to 1,200 sorties and recommended that the sustained sortie rate of 1,200 per month be initiated on 1 February 1968. The target date of 1 February was keyed to the availability of munitions, required facilities, and support capabilities.\(^2\) The 1,200 per-month sustained sortie rate was implemented on 1 February.\(^3\)

\underline{(TS)} On 14 January, COMUSMACV stated that a significant enemy build-up was taking place in northwest Quang Tri Province - Khe Sanh area - and requested additional ARC LIGHT sorties.\(^4\) The JCS requested CINCSAC to provide a schedule reflecting the maximum rate at which SAC could provide the increased sorties under the then-present deployment plan.\(^5\) CINCSAC agreed to a gradual increase in the sortie rate during deployment of additional B-52s in the last 10 days of January. As a result, 921 sorties were flown during the month.\(^6\)

\underline{(TS)} Recognizing the importance of maximum support of friendly forces at Khe Sanh, SAC proposed the use of a new concept--BUGLE NOTE--which provided 3 B-52s every one and one-half hours to bomb a target of COMUSMACV's selection under MSQ-77 (COMBAT SKYSPOT) control. The execution of BUGLE NOTE was dependent upon eliminating the Quick Reaction Force at Andersen. COMUSMACV concurred in the proposal and at the same time requested 12 additional sorties each day for use against targets in other areas.\(^7\) CINCSAC agreed to provide the additional 12 sorties requested by COMUSMACV on a surge basis with

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1. JCS 4267/041607Z Dec 67.
2. CINCPAC 301739Z Dec 67.
3. CINCPAC Command Center 0730 Briefing Notes, 1 Feb 68.
4. COMUSMACV 140550Z Jan 68.
5. JCS 7264/151713Z Jan 68.
7. Ibid; COMUSMACV 1511131Z Jan 68.
the caveat that it would be necessary to include the 15 aircraft at Kadena.¹ The JCS approved the action by authorizing CINCSAC to temporarily exceed the 1,200 per month sortie rate to support COMUSMACV's Khe Sanh---DMZ emergency requirements.² The BUGLE NOTE concept thus became associated with the provisions of 60 sorties per day---1,800 per month---and became effective on 14 February 1968.³

(9) On 19 February, COMUSMACV advised CINCSAC that a cycle of six-aircraft strikes every three hours would more nearly satisfy his requirements than the cycle of three-aircraft strikes every one and one-half hours.⁴ CINCSAC responded on 21 February and agreed to COMUSMACV's request.⁵

(8) Initially, the 1,800 sortie rate was considered to be a short-term surge, but enemy activity continued at such intensity that COMUSMACV, after describing the situation, stated: "Until there is positive evidence of a significant change in enemy capabilities and deployment of forces, it is considered mandatory to continue the B-52 program at the present level. Therefore it is recommended that the 1,800/month sortie rate be maintained at its present level."⁶ CINCPAC concurred and so recommended to the JCS.⁷ The JCS responded on 8 April and advised CINCPAC-CINCSAC that the Southeast Asia Deployment Program 6 authorized an ARC LIGHT sortie rate of 1,800 sorties per month from March through June 1968 and 1,400 sorties per month thereafter. The JCS requested that CINCPAC evaluate requirements for the period after 30 June and should the requirements exceed 1,400 sorties per month to submit complete justification by 1 May 1968. In addition, a CINCPAC-CINCSAC proposal for basing was also to be submitted as well as a statement of capability to provide base and logistical support for the proposed force structure.⁸

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1. Because of the PUEBLO incident 26 additional B-52s were dispatched to WESTPAC, 11 were deployed to Andersen and 15 to Kadena. CINCPAC was referring to the 15 deployed to Kadena; CINCSAC 132344Z Feb 68.
2. JCS 9947/131611Z Feb 68.
3. Summary of ARC LIGHT Events.
4. COMUSMACV 05142/191333Z Feb 68.
5. CINCSAC 211540Z Feb 68.
6. COMUSMACV 08069/220008Z Mar 68.
7. CINCPAC 220346Z Mar 68.
8. JCS 5797/081712Z Apr 68.

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On 16 April, the JCS notified CINCPAC that in view of serious political implications in continuing to fly ARC LIGHT sorties from Kadena on a regular basis, consideration was being given to reducing the sortie rate to 1,400 sorties per month by 25 April. Sorties would be flown from Guam and Thailand with Kadena available for emergencies, such as weather refuge and for a quick surge to 1,800 sorties per month on short notice. CINCPAC was requested to comment on the impact of the proposal. Two days later, CINCPAC told the JCS that it was not desirable to reduce the ARC LIGHT sortie rate to 1,400 per month at that time. His justification was that recent operations at the 1,800 sortie level demonstrated the effects which concentrated and sustained area bombing could inflict on the enemy. Also, that the time was not appropriate to reduce pressure on the enemy forces in SVN since the enemy's infiltration plans and his movements in Laos, Route Package I and in-country LOCs actually required an expansion of the U.S. interdiction program. CINCPAC recommended maintaining the 1,800 sorties rate per month.

Study to Determine Sortie Rate Required Under Normal Conditions

On 25 April, the JCS notified CINCPAC-CINCSAC that the DEPSECDEF believed it was time to reconsider how many sorties should be flown under "normal conditions." He pointed out that a 1,400 sortie level per month would cost about "50 billion," reducing the sortie rate to 800 sorties would "nearly cut the cost in half." Thus the funds saved could be used to meet other military program needs. The DEPSECDEF recognized that determining an appropriate sortie level would be difficult since there was limited and fragmentary evidence available on B-52 effectiveness. Therefore, he wanted a comprehensive all-source study of the ARC LIGHT program. He desired that the study be made in cooperation with the CIA, other interested agencies, and with members of his Systems Analysis staff. The DEPSECDEF directed the JCS to provide him an assessment of the relative effectiveness of an 800 sortie per month level, a 1,200 sortie level and a 1,400 sortie level together with recommendations of a permanent sortie level for the ARC LIGHT program. The assessment and recommendations were to be based on the study and the requirements submitted by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC.

1. JCS 6571/162050Z Apr 68.
2. CINCPAC 180203Z Apr 68.
3. JCS 7351/250035Z Apr 68.
The JCS told CINCPAC that the Joint Staff would make the study and that command representation was not required, however, command representation would be included, if so desired. Both CINCPAC and COMUSMACV concurred in the importance of the JCS study and COMUSMACV suggested that members of the study group and a CINCPAC representative should go to his headquarters for a detailed review of the ARC LIGHT program. COMUSMACV's suggestion was adopted.

In a memorandum to the SECDEF on 29 May, the JCS provided the SECDEF the results of their review of the ARC LIGHT program based on the results of the JCS study (directed by the DEPSECDEF) and the requirements stated by CINCPAC and COMUSMACV. The JCS concluded that "current level of ARC LIGHT sorties is justified and that it would be imprudent to reduce the B-52 sortie rate below 1,800 per month." The JCS recommended that the ARC LIGHT sortie rate be programmed at 1,800 sorties per month through December 1968 and that 35 B-52s be based at U-Tapao, as construction permitted, with the remaining 70 aircraft based at Kadena and Andersen AFB. On 24 June, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the SECDEF approved for planning purposes an 1,800 per-month sortie rate through December 1968. In approving the sortie rate the SECDEF stated:

I have carefully reviewed your analysis of ARC LIGHT operations and recommendation to continue the 1,800 sortie rate using Kadena Air Base. I approve for planning purposes your proposal to fly up to 1,800 B-52 sorties per month through December 1968. It is my intention to review B-52 sortie rate requirements within the next 60 days and periodically thereafter.

It is my view that in the light of current political developments in Okinawa, and in Japan, it is in our national interests to remove the B-52 aircraft from

1. JCS 7351/250035Z Apr 68.
2. COMUSMACV 12054/281645Z Apr 68.
3. JCS 7849/010105Z May 68.
4. JCSM-333-68, 29 May 68, Subj: B-52 Sortie Rate (U).
5. JCS 3210/242103Z Jun 68.
Kadena Air Base as soon as possible. The Department of State believes that the Korean situation no longer requires the basing of B-52s in Okinawa. You state that we can support 1,710 ARC LIGHT sorties per month without using Kadena; however, your calculations assume only 900 sorties from Thailand, 0.85 sorties per aircraft per day. It should be possible to fly at least 1,000 sorties per month from Thailand (0.95 sorties per day per aircraft). Please review again in detail the feasibility of supporting 1,800 sorties per month from bases in Guam and Thailand and provide your recommendations by July 1.

On 30 June, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS his position on supporting 1,800 sorties from bases on Guam and Thailand. On 1 July, the JCS forwarded their position, which was in consonance with CINCPAC's position to the SECDEF. The JCS informed the SECDEF that it was feasible to support 1,800 sorties per month with 35 aircraft at U-Tapao and 70 aircraft at Andersen. Even though feasible, the JCS recommended retaining Okinawa as a B-52 operating base. Their reasons for operating a base at Okinawa were: (1) provided a visible deterrent posture to FRESH STORM; (2) withdrawal could restrict future U.S., freedom of actions with Japan, and, (3) ARC LIGHT operating costs would be increased by $1.8 million per month. 1

On 26 November, the DEPSECDEF again requested the views of the JCS on a variable B-52 sortie rate of 1,400 to 1,800 sorties per month and their recommendations on the optimum ARC LIGHT sortie rate for CY 1969 and CY 1970. In a memorandum on 30 November, subsequently revised on 4 December, the JCS supported the CINCPAC position of retaining 1,800 sorties per month beyond December 1968. They based their recommendation on the rationale that: (1) it would be imprudent to reduce the sortie rate below 1,800 sorties per month until some major change in the strategic or tactical situation warrants a reduction; (2) field commanders unanimously agreed that the ARC LIGHT program was an important factor in preventing the enemy from pressing his offensive plans; (3) target nominations to MACV continue to far exceed the capability for strikes; and (4) curtailment of air operations over NVN

1. J3 Brief 171-68, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Jul 68, Subj: B-52 Sortie Rate (U); (JCSM 412-68, 1 Jul 68).
## ARC LIGHT SORTIES - 1968

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*GROUND EXPLOITATION OF MISSIONS FLOWN

**LEGEND:**

TOTAL SOUTHEAST ASIA

LAOS (INCLUDED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA TOTAL)

SOURCE: J382. HQ. CINCPAC
made it necessary to increase the ARC LIGHT force employed in Laos. ¹

(S) At the end of December, CINCPAC was awaiting a SECDEF approved sortie rate.

Basing

(S) At the beginning of the year 1968, CINCPAC-CINCSAC were making preparations to implement the SECDEF approved 1,200 sortie rate by 1 February. To do this, 10 B-52s were to redeploy to U-Tapao, 5 by 1 February and 5 more by 1 June. Thus, the 15 at U-Tapao would be increased to 25. The remaining B-52s required to support the 1,200 per month sortie rate would be based at Guam. ² As of 21 February, B-52s were based at the following locations:³

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<th>ARC LIGHT</th>
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<td><strong>79</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
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(S) To support the 1,800 per month sortie rate authorized by Southeast Asia Deployment Program 6 for the period March through

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1. J3 Brief 280-68, Hq CINCPAC; 13 Dec 68, Subj: ARC LIGHT Sortie Rate (U); (JCSM-711-68, 4 Dec 68; JCS 2472/389-1, 30 Nov 68 revised 4 Dec 68.) (U).
3. Point Paper J3B22, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Feb 68, Subj: ARC LIGHT.
4. PORT BOW B-52s were deployed on 6 Feb 68 to Kadena as indicated as part of the U.S. build-up which took place as a result of the PUEBLO incident.
June 1968, CINCSAC recommended the following basing of B-52s:

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<td>Andersen, Guam</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadena, Okinawa</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ching Chuan Kang (CCK), Formosa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-Tapao, Thailand</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>103</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both CINCPAC and JCS supported the CINCSAC recommended beddown of B-52s except that 70 B-52s were to be based at Andersen and Kadena rather than 68 recommended by CINCSAC.

(2) On 24 June, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the SECDEF, on 22 June, had approved the basing plan recommended by CINCPAC and the JCS. At the same time, the SECDEF stated: "It is my view that in light of current political developments in Okinawa, and in Japan, it is in our national interests to remove the B-52 aircraft from Kadena Air Base as soon as possible." The JCS then directed CINCSAC to assess the capability and feasibility to support 1,800 sorties per month from U-Tapao and Andersen, 35 B-52s at U-Tapao and 70 at Andersen.  

(2) CINCPAC had made his views on the removal of the B-52s from Okinawa known to the JCS on 18 April when he stated:

B-52 operations from Okinawa are part of current operations against NVA/VC in Southeast Asia and their presence provides useful visibility as a quick reaction force for possible contingency operations against North Korea.

The continued presence of B-52 aircraft on Okinawa, rather than any particular number of ARC

1. Point Paper, J3B15, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Jun 68, Subj: SAC Aircraft Beddown (U).
2. JCS 3210/242103Z Jun 68.
3. CINCPAC 180203Z Apr 68.
LIGHT sorties flown from Kadena, appears to be the major issue being exploited by the...opposition. With this as a lever, pressure is exerted on the Government of the Ryukyus. While the issue provides a convenient exploitable vehicle with a significant emotional appeal among a sizeable Okinawan element, US acquiescence to demands by pressure groups or other dissident elements that B-52 operations be stopped and that B-52s be redeployed would likely lead to increased demands and contribute to undermining our position on other Okinawan matters.

CINCPAC reaffirmed this position on 30 June.¹

(5) On 11 July, the SECSTATE requested the U.S. Embassy at Bangkok to obtain RTG clearance to increase the number of B-52s based at U-Tapao from 25 to 35.² RTG clearance was obtained and construction of 10 additional revetted stubs began on 26 September. Half the stubs were to be completed by mid-December and the other 5 by February 1969.³

(5) By the end of 1968, the basing of B-52s and KC-135s to support the 1,800 per month sortie rate was as indicated:⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Basing, Dec 68</th>
<th>Basing, After 1 Jan 69</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B-52</td>
<td>KC-135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andersen, Guam</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadena, Okinawa</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-Tapao, Thailand</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCK, Formosa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>105</strong></td>
<td><strong>98</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹. CINCPAC 300600Z Jun 68.
³. Point Paper, J3B1, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Oct 68, Subj: B-52/KC-135 Basing and ARC LIGHT Sortie Rate (U).
⁴. Point Paper, J3B221, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Dec 68, Subj: B-52/KC-135 Basing and ARC LIGHT Sortie Rate (U).
Restrictions on ARC LIGHT Flights from U-Tapao, Thailand

Prior to 5 December 1967, all Thailand-based B-52s were restricted from flying over Laos regardless of whether their targets were in NVN, SVN or Laos. Restrictions also precluded the daylight bombing of targets in Laos. On 5 December, both of these restrictions were removed.1 The removal of these restrictions was beneficial to the ARC LIGHT program. The monetary savings realized by overflight of Laos were significant and operational flexibility improved.2

On 19 April, CINCSAC suggested that attempts be made to obtain approval for the use of a "northern gate" between Thakhek and Paksane for overflights of Laos. CINCPAC supported this suggestion when on 27 April he requested the U.S. Embassy, Laos to seek approval for use of a "north" gate between Thakhek and Paksane. In addition, he requested approval be sought for elimination of the requirement to enter and exit over the eastern frontier when conducting daylight strikes in Laos. CINCPAC pointed out to the Ambassador that as a result of an increased sortie rate the operational limitations in effect in Laos were having a more significant effect than was the case when the limitations were first established. The increase in Laotian operations, in conjunction with a lack of a "northern gate" and the requirement for exit and entry over the SVN-Laos border when conducting daylight strikes in Laos, necessitated changes to current limitations.3

The U.S. Embassy, Thailand, on 29 April, informed CINCPAC that if Premier Souvanna Phouma, Laos approved the routing of B-52s through the proposed "northern gate" and eliminated the requirement to enter and exit the eastern boundary for daylight strikes in Laos, new routing over Thailand would have to be submitted to the RTG for approval. The Embassy anticipated RTG approval of such a request.4

On 6 May, CINCPAC was informed by the U.S. Embassy, Laos that Souvanna remained unconvinced of the requirement for a "north gate."

2. CINCPAC 2721292Z Apr 68.
3. Ibid.
4. AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 13875/2909542Z Apr 68.
The Premier was of the opinion that B-52s operating that far north "could only be considered as operating in Laos since the proposed gate was well north of the operating area in SVN." Thus, he didn't agree to open the gate. In fact he was a "little annoyed" about recent headline stories attributed to military sources concerning B-52 strikes in Laos west of Ashau. He did nevertheless, agree to permit overflight of Laos to and from the west in conjunction with daylight flights in Laos. The next day CINCPAC informed the JCS of the lifting of this restriction and recommended authority be granted for ARC LIGHT strikes to enter and exit Laos by the western border through the "central gate" when conducting daylight strikes in Laos.²

(3) The SECSTATE, on 8 May, approved the overflight when he notified the U.S. Embassy, Vientiane that: "Change of rules to permit daylight bombing in Laos with entry and/or departure across western Laos border...approved." He directed that no further action be taken on the "northern gate" concept at "this time."³ Shortly thereafter the opportunity to reopen the "northern gate" concept arose. The U.S. Embassy, Vientiane in a message to the SECSTATE and the JCS expressed concern regarding Site 36 in Laos and requested "approval soonest" for ARC LIGHT strikes in the vicinity of the site.⁴ Since ARC LIGHT operations had never been conducted that far north and the request constituted a significant departure from past policy, CINCSAC seized upon this opportunity to reopen the subject of a "northern gate." He told the JCS and CINCPAC that the "northern gate" previously requested was essential to tactical flexibility and safe separation in striking targets in northeastern Laos to include the area around Site 36.⁵

(3) CINCPAC concurred in U.S. Embassy request to strike targets in the vicinity of Site 36 and requested JCS approval.⁶ Two days later on 17 May, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS approval for the use of the "north gate" between Thakhek and Paksane and further recommended that the U.S. Embassy in Thailand be authorized to seek approval of the RTG

1. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 6306/061032Z May 68.
2. CINCPAC 072108Z May 68.
3. SECSTATE 160360/082115Z May 68.
4. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 130640Z May 68 cited in Summary of ARC LIGHT Events.
5. CINCSAC 131745Z May 68.
6. CINCPAC 151025Z May 68.
for overflight of northern Thailand in conjunction with the use of the "north gate." ¹

(FS) On 16 May, the U.S. Embassy, Vientiane notified CINCPAC that Souvanna had given his approval to use of the "north gate" with the caveat that the aircraft must keep away from Vientiane. The message warned that, "Addressee should continue to bear in mind Souvanna's sensitivities regarding publicity on matters such as this. He is easily capable of withdrawing his authorization." ² On the same day the SECSTATE advised that the "requirement for air support of Site 36 must be met by tactical air assets without employment of B-52 strikes." ³ The JCS responded to the SECSTATE message to U.S. Embassy, Vientiane by requesting all concerned to provide optimum air assets on a priority basis in coordination with the U.S. Embassy to support Site 36. ⁴

(5) After the passing of messages between the SECDEF, the JCS, CINCPAC and the U.S. Embassies at Vientiane and Bangkok, the use of the "north gate" was solved. On 18 May, the SECSTATE approved use of the "north gate" as defined by the U.S. Embassy, Vientiane and subject to RTG approval of overflight of northeastern Thailand. ⁵ On 19 May the U.S. Embassy, Vientiane defined the gate as: "an area between ten-mile restricted zones around Paksane and Thakhek. In terms of geographic coordinates this would be that segment of Laos border between 1820N/10350E and 1732N/10442E." ⁶ On 21 May the JCS authorized CINCPAC to seek approval for overflight and to use the "north gate" when routing approvals were obtained. ⁷ CINCPAC, on 22 May, requested U.S. Embassy, Bangkok to seek RTG approval for overflight of Thailand and advised U.S. Embassy, Vientiane that stipulations outlined in its 19 May message would be promulgated after receipt of overflight approval from Bangkok. ⁸ Bangkok responded on 31 May with approval of the routing proposed by CINCPAC on 16 May modified by Bangkok on 23

1. CINCPAC 170421Z May 68.
2. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 161106Z May 68, cited in Summary of ARC LIGHT Events.
3. SECSTATE 165223/161956Z May 68.
4. JCS 9243/162303 Z May 68.
5. SECSTATE 182024Z May 68, cited in Summary of ARC LIGHT Events.
6. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 190702Z May 68, cited in Summary of ARC LIGHT Events.
7. JCS 9526/211803Z May 68.
8. CINCPAC 221819Z May 68.
May. CINCPAC, on 1 June, promulgated use of the "north gate" and advised all concerned that operations were not to be conducted within the ten-mile restricted zones of Paksane and Thakhek. The effective date was 3 June.

ARC LIGHT Effectiveness

The availability of direct evidence of the effectiveness of the ARC LIGHT program is limited and fragmentary. This situation is caused by a lack of bomb damage assessment (BDA) results which is severely limited by terrain, weather and a lack of follow-up ground operations to assess the results.

One of the factors in determining the sortie rate is the effectiveness of the ARC LIGHT program. In April, the DEPSECDEF recognized this when he directed the JCS to provide him with an assessment of the relative effectiveness of various sortie levels and a permanent per month--sortie level. This requirement necessitated a JCS study that would review and appraise the ARC LIGHT program. On 23 May, the Combat Analysis Group and Strategic Operation Division, Operations Directorate (J3), OJCS, in collaboration with the DIA, completed the study. The report, entitled, "Review and Appraisal of ARC LIGHT Operations," examined the entire scope of the ARC LIGHT program, from target identification and validation procedures to an assessment of results.

In regards to the effectiveness of the program, the report concluded:

1. AMEMBASSY 15018/230811Z and 15392/310810Z May 68; CINCSAC 161750Z May 68 cited in Summary of ARC LIGHT Events.
2. CINCPAC 010151Z Jun 68.
4. Discussed earlier in this section under B-52 Sortie Rate and Basing.
5. JCS 7351/250035Z May 68.
6. CAG-1.
ARC LIGHT forces while successfully accomplishing the assigned mission and specified tasks, are operationally effective...

...Complete bomb damage assessment is limited by terrain inaccessibility, jungle canopy, weather, inability to insert ground follow-up forces, and the relative priority of using resources for this purpose.

The report pointed out that the ARC LIGHT program falls in two general categories: (1) physical destruction of the enemy's troops, equipment, supplies, fortification and LOC; and (2) impedence of the achievement of his objectives. A finite measurement of the results achieved has been hampered by assessment problems. Specifically, the study group found that even though all collection sources available were tasked to provide BDA for the ARC LIGHT program, none of the sources have proven capable of developing a single source of intelligence to permit a definitive systematic assessment of ARC LIGHT bombing effectiveness. However, the conglomerate of all reporting had enough common indications to support generalized conclusions.¹

In addressing the physical destruction caused by B-52 bombings the study group found: (1) that target selection procedures were valid; (2) while insufficient evidence to estimate total KIA-WIA was not available, it was almost certain that the totals greatly exceeded those reported; and (3) that the magnitude of secondary explosions strongly suggested that ARC LIGHT is causing considerable attrition of ammunition and vehicles. The report also indicated that a few strikes had caused little or no damage due to invalid intelligence, movement of the enemy from the target area, and strikes missing the target.²

In discussing the impedence of the enemy's achievement of objectives, the report stated the psychological effects of a B-52 strike on an individual in or near the impact area were terrifying. Captured enemy reports indicated that the noise, shock, and destruction produced

1. Ibid, pp. 18 and 26.
an intense fear accompanied by a sense of helplessness, isolation and disorientation.  

The contribution of the B-52 interdiction program was discussed by COMUSMACV in his evaluation of in-country B-52 and tactical air strikes. In the 10 July report to CINCPAC, he discussed the contribution of the B-52s in the 14 June - 1 July 1968 interdiction campaign in the III Corps area. He considered the B-52 effort as "impressive." In addition to the III Corps campaign COMUSMACV discussed the contribution of the B-52 effort in the success in the Dak To, Khe Sanh and Kontum engagements. He ended the report with the comment:

My conclusion is that the ARC LIGHT weapon system gives me a capability to influence battles throughout South Vietnam. It is more responsive to daily shifts in battle intensity than the most mobile troop reserve could be, and is being used in concentration with decisive results.

A different type appraisal of ARC LIGHT was prepared by an Air Force operational analysis group. This study, which was requested to aid in determining the sortie rate of the expensive B-52 program, related ARC LIGHT results to the costs of doing the same mission with other weapons systems. To arrive at cost comparisons, ARC LIGHT operational procedures were followed in detail from the original target nomination through final approval procedures employed by COMUSMACV. Conclusions favorable to retaining the B-52 effort were reached when cost comparisons were made with two alternative methods; one a substitution of tactical air or artillery and the second, an increase in ground forces. The limitations and advantages of each form of fire power were recognized. However, the report concluded that to saturate a 1 X 2 Km target box the B-52 is a clearly superior weapon for two reasons: (1) it is more economical and, (2) has the capability to deliver the ordnance in a shorter time span.

1. Ibid, p. 34.
2. Ltr, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 10 Jul 68, Subj: Evaluation of In-Country B-52 and Tac Air Strikes (U).
The study stated that 36,000 additional ground troops would equal in cost the present level of 1,800 ARC LIGHT sorties per month. In a comparison of kill ratios the study group used the rationale that 36,000 troops would produce approximately 12,200 enemy KIA per year, while the low figure estimate for B-52s was 20,200 enemy KIA per year. It commented that no combat casualties had resulted from B-52 operations, whereas a friendly force of 36,000 troops could be expected to suffer 1,900 KIA in one year. Cost comparisons were made between 3 different tactical fighters, artillery, and B-52s. Artillery required 10 batteries of 18 155 MM howitzers to equal within the same time period the ordnance delivered by 1 ARC LIGHT strike of 6 aircraft. With tactical air each strike would require a minimum of 60 aircraft. 1

From 9-17 September, an ARC LIGHT Planning Conference was held at the Pentagon to plan a methodology for a follow-on study of the Combat Analysis Group study completed in May. The purpose of the follow-on study was: (1) to determine the effectiveness of the ARC LIGHT program by means of an assessment resulting from "systematic analyses" and, (2) develop ARC LIGHT sortie rates to support the expected level of US-FWMAF combat activity. 2

Representation to the conference was provided by CINCPAC; CINCSAC; COMUSMACV; U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps; DIA; and the JCS Combat Analysis Group of J3. The members reviewed the entire program with emphasis on target intelligence-nomination and selection, strike and weapon delivery efficiency, and post-strike information collection and analysis. They recommended "that a more detailed data base be established on ARC LIGHT operations ...from target intelligence estimates of objectives and target selection, to all-source collation of mission results." 3

The follow-on study – JCS CAG 4-68 – was completed 18 November. The study was characterized by its efforts to better define the commander’s objective in ARC LIGHT employment and to provide means to measure its success. The report discussed a new systematic method for analyzing ARC LIGHT operations. The new method includes

1. Ibid.
2. J3 Brief 243-68, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Oct 68, Subj: JCS CAG-3-68, "ARC LIGHT Follow-on Study Preliminary Planning Conference."
3. Ibid.
procedures which are expected to improve the capability for qualitative analysis; facilitate, in some degree, quantitative analysis, and most importantly, include the estimate of ARC LIGHT effectiveness by COMUSMACV's commanders.\footnote{1}

\footnote{1} The new method is predicated on the commander's specification of the tactical objective of the strike as well as a designation of the type of target to be struck. This new ARC LIGHT objective-target classification system was implemented by COMUSMACV on 18 October. The method provides: (1) emphasis on the importance of the commander's estimate of ARC LIGHT effectiveness as a tool for analysis; (2) a uniform framework for qualitative analysis through the "commander's objective-target classification system;" (3) a more complete range of data with which to conduct in-depth analysis of effectiveness; and (4) a basis for a continuing analysis of the ARC LIGHT program.\footnote{2}

\footnote{2} The study group felt:\footnote{3}

The most important expression of ARC LIGHT effectiveness is the subjective judgment of how well ARC LIGHT strikes fulfill the commander's objectives. All quantitative measurements are dwarfed by the importance the commander assigns to ARC LIGHT in its role of contributing to the success of the ground campaign.

\footnote{3} The conclusions reached by the study group included:\footnote{4}

No feasible method of approach to the analysis of ARC LIGHT effectiveness can be identified which could, if implemented, give rise to a definitive sortie rate requirement.

\footnote{4}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{1.} CAG-4, 18 Nov 68.
\item \textbf{2.} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 42-43
\item \textbf{3.} \textit{Ibid.}, p. i.
\item \textbf{4.} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 49-50.
\end{itemize}

\footnote{\textit{SECRET}}
Field commanders in Vietnam are currently exploiting with significant success, the massive firepower capabilities of the B-52 by integrating ARC LIGHT into the overall fire support requirements for execution of ground tactical operations. For example, the overall effect of a massive concentration of B-52 strikes in an objective area was highlighted as one of the major factors in preventing a general enemy offensive in northwest Kontum Province and the Saigon area.

The ARC LIGHT force represents a highly mobile reserve with firepower equivalent to a multi-division ground force. ARC LIGHT strikes have been effective in fulfilling the theater commander's requirement for a highly mobile reserve to use in responding to daily shifts in battle intensity and to tactical emergencies. B-52 sorties have very effectively provided the field commanders with a capability to influence the combat situation over a much larger area than available ground forces would permit.

Because of the limitation on available B-52 sorties only one out of five targets nominated for B-52 strikes are actually selected, yet, all nominations represent lucrative targets.

The effectiveness of ARC LIGHT strikes cannot be measured solely by quantitative bomb damage assessment. Often, the only "visible" BDA is a permissive environment in which friendly forces conduct operations, or enemy attacks which were spoiled, or a reduced flow of enemy troops and supplies to the battle area. In reality, these may be the best measures of effectiveness of the ARC LIGHT Program.

The study group recommended, among other recommendations, that the ARC LIGHT program be continued at a minimum of 1,800 sorties per month through June 1969. "This is understood to be the current capability of the assigned forces." 1

1. CAG-4, 18 Nov 68, p. 52.
Electronic Warfare

(U) The air war over North Vietnam continued to focus attention on the role of electronic warfare in tactical combat operations. The PUEBLO crisis in Korea emphasized the need for flexibility in and availability of electronic warfare resources in the PACOM. In Southeast Asia, electronic warfare continued to be employed in counterinsurgency and anti-infiltration activities.

(S) Most uses of electronic warfare in the PACOM were in support of air operations over North Vietnam and Laos. In the air war, electronic countermeasures (ECM) devices were carried by electronic warfare aircraft to provide support for strike and reconnaissance missions. Most aircraft penetrating hostile territory carried Radar Homing and Warning (RHAW) equipment to warn them when they were "painted" by hostile ground-based and airborne intercept radars, and to enable them to counter those threats by evasive action or electronic jamming. Electronic warfare aircraft were specially configured platforms that supported strike and reconnaissance missions by providing jamming and/or threat warning support. Standoff electronic warfare aircraft (EB-66, EA-6A, EK-A3B, etc.) remained outside the range of hostile surface-to-air (SAM) missiles to give ECM aid to penetrating strike and reconnaissance aircraft.

(S) There was no doubt that electronic warfare had emerged from the air war over North Vietnam as an essential ingredient to a successful air campaign. U.S. air operations were conducted in an extremely dense and sophisticated air defense environment that was well integrated with antiaircraft artillery type guns (many of which were radar controlled), SAMs, and MIG aircraft with an associated early warning/ground control intercept capability. Antiaircraft artillery had taken its toll, and SAMs, in addition to hits, caused jettisoning and less accurate bombing. Additionally, the North Vietnamese radar order of battle had grown from approximately 22 sets in mid-1964 to around 500 sets by late 1968.

1. All material in this sub-section was derived from J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68, unless otherwise specified.
CINCPAC forces combined tactics and technology to counter these threats. Special support operations (IRON HAND) were conducted using SHRIKE, Standard ARM, and other weapons to suppress and destroy North Vietnam's SA-2 system and reduce the effectiveness of radar controlled AAA. Other U.S. support resources included defensive ECM, including RHAW, and active ECM on strike and reconnaissance aircraft, in addition to support jamming, passive ECM, signal intelligence, and air control aircraft. CINCPAC stated the priority PACOM electronic warfare requirement as self-protection ECM for all aircraft required to penetrate North Vietnam in a message to the JCS on 7 February. Electronic warfare support was also provided for SAC B-52 missions as well as special reconnaissance, such as BUMPY ACTION drones.

With the curtailment of the air war in North Vietnam above 19° North on 1 April 1968, active ECM efforts primarily concentrated on support of strike operations below that line. Passive ECM concentrated throughout North Vietnam to detect any changes in the North Vietnam electronic order of battle. Electronic warfare actions centered around optimum use of assigned assets and installation of programmed equipment. A major concern at this time was the expanded use of MIGs in the southern route packages of North Vietnam and frequent excursions below 19° North. Very high frequency (VHF) communications jamming was emphasized and previous VHF jamming restrictions for jamming below 19° North were rescinded. Communications jamming played an active part against MIG activity. Additionally, previous restrictions on the use of equipment designed to interrogate enemy Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) were relaxed. Upon cessation of offensive operations against North Vietnam on 1 November 1968, active ECM were concentrated in support of reconnaissance operations being conducted over North Vietnam and strike operations in Laos. Passive ECM continued against North Vietnam while added emphasis was placed on detection, identification, and location of radars in Laos, particularly acquisition and fire control radars.

It was apparent during operations against the North Vietnam air defense system that North Vietnam reacted to U.S. electronic warfare efforts with counter countermeasures. Continuing changes in

1. CINCPAC 310100Z Jan 68; CINCPAC 191800Z Aug 68.
2. CINCPAC 010145Z Oct 68.
tactics and technology were needed to keep the enemy off balance and to counter his efforts. As a result, consideration was given to seeding high threat areas such as Hanoi and Haiphong with slow fall chaff. Due to the high risk involved to seeding aircraft, the Air Force Chief of Staff developed a plan—COMBAT ANGEL—to seed chaff with drones, and he notified CINCPAC of an operational capability by 15 August 1968. In view of the restriction to air operations above 19° North at that time, a limited capability to immediately handle COMBAT ANGEL, and a requirement for its use should air operations be resumed in the high threat areas of North Vietnam or other PACOM areas, CINCPAC forwarded a concept of operations to the JCS recommending that COMBAT ANGEL be retained in a standby status in CONUS while further development and testing continued. The COMBAT ANGEL force was assigned to Davis Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona and was capable of being deployed to the PACOM in ten days if required.

Airborne Radio Direction Finding was another of the electronic warfare endeavors in Southeast Asia. It was the largest electronic warfare operation in South Vietnam. It used electronic warfare equipped aircraft to determine the location of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units and gathered information on which a great many ARC LIGHT strikes were planned. There was a significant increase in results of the Airborne Radio Direction Finding program during CY 1968 due to increased resources, increased equipment capability, improved targeting, and improved operational procedures.

Navy surface operations were also concerned with electronic warfare. Electronic "blocking" operations were conducted by ships in the Tonkin Gulf. Enemy trawlers and junks continued to shadow U. S. carriers. To hamper their intercept of U. S. Navy communications, ships with blocking transmitters, or jammers, were positioned between the enemy ships and U. S. carriers, primarily during launch operations.

While U. S. ships in the Tonkin Gulf operated with relative immunity from radar-directed weapons systems, CINCPAC was alert to the possible enemy use of the STYX, or other electronically aided weaponry, against surface vessels. Some U. S. ships had a limited self-protection capability in the form of on-board passive ECM; noise

1. CSAF 2013022Z May 68.
2. CINCPAC 232237Z Aug 68.

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jammers; deception repeaters; or chaff rockets, mortars, or shells. A study conducted in January and February 1968 by CINCPAC highlighted the deficiencies in ship electronic warfare capabilities.

(U) Management of electronic warfare placed added requirements on CINCPAC's command and control functions to meet the increasing emphasis on the need for and use of electronic warfare. CINCPAC's Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations was assigned the overall responsibility for recommendation of electronic warfare policy, doctrine, plans, and directives. Representatives of the Intelligence and Communications-Electronics Divisions also participated in these management functions. An Electronic Warfare Branch was formed in the Operations Division in July 1968 to assist in the performance of these tasks. The branch consisted of two electronic warfare officers and a civilian electronic warfare technical adviser (plus clerical support). Its primary function was to facilitate professional electronic warfare management at the command level. 1

(S) During the period 15 to 18 October 1968, CINCPAC hosted a PACOM electronic warfare conference. The objectives of the conference were to provide a current update of electronic warfare activities on Southeast Asia, provide a mutual exchange of information, and to address significant problem areas. Representatives from all major U. S. commands throughout the world as well as from CINCPAC's operational commands attended. In addition to the invaluable exchange of information between personnel, the highlights of the conference were the results of working group discussions on significant electronic warfare problems and positive recommendations for actions to alleviate them.

(TS) The Pueblo incident off North Korea in January 1968 highlighted the need for additional electronic warfare forces and equipment. The North Korean air order of battle included more than 60 enemy all-weather fighters and 14 SAM battalions. RHAW was needed in all tactical aircraft to minimize loss rates but equipment was not then on hand for all tactical aircraft available for immediate deployment to Korea. A limited electronic warfare support capability was available by 6 EB-66 aircraft and CINCPAC was prepared to initiate active ECM against communications and radar targets in North Korea with this limited capability to support friendly forces had hostilities been initiated.

1. CINCPACINST 5400.68 of 17 Jun 67 (as amended).
Many lessons were learned or relearned as a result of electronic warfare operations during CY 1968. In August, the JCS asked CINCPAC to update information he had previously provided regarding these lessons learned. CINCPAC did so on 1 September. The following is excerpted from that report:

...Following has been concluded from a review of SEASIA EW operations since their beginning in Apr 1965:

a. EW is an integral part of combat operations and an effective broad-based EW program is vital to a successful air campaign. Equipment and trained personnel must be on hand before hostilities start, and deployed under the control of the theater commander.

b. Aircraft penetrating a hostile environment require ECM to counter and/or exploit both intentional and unintentional enemy electromagnetic emissions. Self-protection ECM must provide maximum operational flexibility and not rely on restrictive formations or maneuvers to insure effectiveness. A capability to penetrate enemy defenses must be a prime consideration in design of future weapon systems.

c. For the immediate future, most tactical aircraft will have an ECM capability against only terminal threats such as emitters directing AAA, SAMs, and AAMs. Therefore, EW support systems, both manned and unmanned, are required to degrade the overall defense system, provide threat warnings, assist in exploiting enemy emissions, and perform passive ECM operations.

d. During combat operations, continuous passive ECM coverage of the battle area is required to provide timely data on source and parameters of enemy emissions. Systems performing this function must be directly responsive to tactical tasking by operational commanders and accorded a priority commensurate with the demands of the tactical situation.
e. A means of quantifying EW effectiveness is required. This includes test of equipment in a realistic environment as well as evaluation of EW during combat.

f. Compromise of operational EW equipment and techniques should be considered as attrition of a part of current EW capability. New systems must contain a means of limiting such compromise.

g. The EW community at all levels of the Defense establishment must take initiatives to insure future EW capability remains ahead of enemy weapons systems development, rather than reacting after the fact to an established threat.

h. Progress in EW is heavily dependent on professional management. To be fully effective, such management must be integrated into the operational command structure.  

(S) CINCPAC concluded that the electronic warfare effort had been concentrated on the air war with "noteworthy success considering the limited EW capability at the start of hostilities," but that "future planning must provide ground and fleet forces with a comparable capability."  

1. CINCPAC 010036Z Sep 68.
2. Ibid.
Naval Surface Operations

(U) The coverage of Naval surface operations in this section is limited primarily to CINCPAC’s policies and decisions and actions by higher authority affecting CINCPAC’s mission. In addition, the mission and the exercise of operational control of the various operations conducted in SVN or off-shore are briefly reviewed. Detailed coverage of Naval surface operations can be found in Annex A (COMUSMACV Command History 1968) to the CINCPAC Command History 1968; in the monthly editions of the "Pacific Area Naval Operations Review" published by CINCPAC Fleet; and, in the monthly editions of "United States Naval Operations, Vietnam" published by Chief of Naval Operations.

(SECRET) Naval surface operations conducted either in-country in Vietnam or out-of-country consisted of MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN, Mobile Riverine Force, SEA DRAGON and naval gunfire support operations. The latter two were considered as out-of-country.

MARKET TIME and GAME WARDEN Operations

(SECRET) The mission of MARKET TIME operations is to detect and prevent waterborne logistics craft from infiltrating into SVN. The Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFOR), exercises operational control of the forces assigned to MARKET TIME (Coastal/Surveillance Force - TF-115). The mission of GAME WARDEN is to interdict VC waterborne traffic on the inland waterways of SVN, particularly in the Mekong Delta and to open waterways to legitimate traffic. Like MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN forces (The River Patrol Force - TF-116), are under the operational control of COMNAVFOR. ¹

Mobile Riverine Force

(SECRET) The Mekong Delta Mobile Riverine Force (MDMRF) was initially called the Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Forces (MDMAF). The force is a joint U.S. Army and U.S. Navy force designed to operate from a fixed base and a mobile base consisting of barrack and support ships. This force projects a U.S. military presence into the Delta thereby assisting in bringing the population and resources of the Delta more effectively under SVN control. ²

2. Ibid, p. 479.
The self-propelled barracks ship USS COLLETON (APB-36) at anchor in the Mekong River in South Vietnam. Alongside the ship are river boats that form part of the Mobile Riverine Force small craft armada.

**SEA DRAGON**

(5) The ROLLING THUNDER air campaign was one of two principal means of taking the war to the enemy in North Vietnam. The other was by naval surface operations. These operations were conducted under the nickname SEA DRAGON. ¹

(5) To augment ROLLING THUNDER operations, particularly during periods of adverse weather and reduced visibility, CINCPAC

believed that naval gunfire could be employed effectively against North Vietnam. There were significant Navy resources with such capability already in the Gulf of Tonkin. These were engaged in missions of early warning and search and rescue, and they supported our aircraft carrier operations. Except for defensive action, however, this capability had not yet been exploited against North Vietnam. Accordingly, CINCPAC suggested to the JCS that naval gunfire could divert and dilute some of North Vietnam's defensive efforts, which were concentrated on air defense, and thereby aid in reducing pilot and aircraft exposure and attrition. On 13 May 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that naval gunfire be authorized against targets ashore and in the coastal waters of North Vietnam in the area 17° to 20° North.  

Authority was received on 15 October 1966 to conduct surface ship operations against waterborne traffic in the coastal waters south of 17°30' North, but shore bombardment was only authorized in self-defense. Attacks on watercraft engaged in fishing or in non-military pursuits were prohibited. Operations were initiated on 25 October 1966 by the destroyers MANSFIELD and HANSON. Both ships proceeded to the assigned interdiction zone, which was limited to a 12-mile belt of water extending from the DMZ to 17°30' North. Both ships came under fire from NVN shore batteries on the first day of operation. The fire was returned.  

On 27 February 1967, with ROLLING THUNDER 54, the area of operation was extended to 20° North. At the same time, naval gunfire against military and logistic targets ashore was also authorized. To more effectively complement ROLLING THUNDER operations, SEA DRAGON forces were increased to one cruiser and four destroyers composing two separate task units. Attendant with the increase in ships there was a decrease in waterborne logistic craft traffic during the first quarter of 1967.  

3. Ibid, p. 77.
Early in 1967, the SEA DRAGON effort was enhanced by the assignment of the first Australian destroyer to the task force. Since that time, an Australian ship has been on station off Vietnam either as part of the SEA DRAGON force or providing naval gunfire support to Allied forces in SVN. As the year 1968 began, SEA DRAGON forces were operating between the 17th and 20th parallels as indicated on the map, "SEA DRAGON Operations." On 3 April, in conjunction with the restrictions placed on ROLLING THUNDER operations, SEA DRAGON operations were confined to below 19° North. All offensive SEA DRAGON operations against NVN were discontinued on 1 November.

Naval Gunfire (NGF)

On 12 April 1967, CINCPAC recommended the activation of two IOWA-class battleships. He told the JCS that he considered it prudent to relate his previous recommendations for additional ships (DDs and CAs) to the long term need for heavy naval gunfire of the type available only in the IOWA-class battleship. His rationale included the increased range and destructive power of the battleship's armament, its all weather capability and psychological impact on the enemy. In addition to the two battleships, he recommended that two additional 8" cruisers be activated. On 1 August 1967, after the battleship had been approved by SECDEF, the CNO directed the activation of the USS NEW JERSEY.

On the morning of 30 September 1968, the NEW JERSEY entered her third war when her 16" main battery opened fire at an enemy fortified storage area in the DMZ. Thus, CINCPAC efforts to obtain two battleships had reached partial fruition.

Additional Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS)

On 3 April 1968, after a proposal by CINCPACFLT, CINCPAC requested that the deployment schedule of the USS NEWPORT NEWS (CA-148) be changed from August 1968 through March 1969 to November

1. Ibid, p. 76.
2. Ibid; CINCPAC 010439Z Nov 68.

SECRET

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## RESULTS OF SEA DRAGON OPERATIONS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
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* NOT AVAILABLE

**SOURCE:** ROLLING THUNDER DIGEST EDITION 7, 8, 9.
A shell from the NEW JERSEY...goes through the air at Mach 4--four times the speed of sound--and there is nothing in Vietnam that can stop it. The name battleship is a misnomer. It is, in fact, a floating artillery platform with the nine largest artillery tubes in the world. These 16" shells can penetrate 30 inches of solid rock. It can destroy Communist caves that otherwise can only be taken by infantry walking with flamethrowers and explosives.

Captain J. Edward Snyder, Jr., USN
Commanding Officer, USS NEW JERSEY
Long Beach, California, 6 May 1969
1968 through July 1969. The rationale behind the request included the fact that the northeast monsoon period during the winter months severely limited flying over North Vietnam. Historically, the NVN used this comparative respite from attack to move supplies and rebuild LOCs at reduced risk. Therefore, it would be highly desirable to have the long range guns of the maximum number of battleships and cruisers possible to compensate for the reduced aerial interdiction. 1

(S) Normally, two heavy cruisers were kept on the line off the coast of Vietnam. One cruiser supported NGFS in SVN and the other supported SEA DRAGON. Since 1 January 1968, both cruisers were required to support NGFS in the I and II CTZ. No cruiser was available to support SEA DRAGON. To partially alleviate the situation and to obtain the maximum effectiveness of heavy gunfire assets which could be realized by a combination of battleship and cruiser armaments, the request was made to the JCS to reschedule the NEWPORT NEWS. 2

(S) The request was approved on 2 May by the JCS but the approval was rescinded on 21 May because the SECDEF, when he approved the initial deployment of the NEW JERSEY, disapproved deploying more than two major naval gunfire ships to the Western Pacific at the same time "unless additional justification in terms of increased effectiveness can be provided. ... increase in gunfire capability was not intended when the battleship activation was approved." On 12 June, CINCPAC made a reclamation to the 21 May disapproval providing justification for his request to change the schedule of the USS NEWPORT NEWS. The JCS never replied to this CINCPAC message but the NEWPORT NEWS was rescheduled as requested. 3

Seaward Extension of the DMZ

(S) On 23 November 1968, COMUSMACV recommended that, in order to permit NGFS ships to fire on targets in the southern portion

1. Point Paper, J3B42, Hq CINCPAC, 16 July 68, Subj: Battleship/Cruiser Deployments.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid; CINCPAC 121939Z Jun 68; FONECON CMDR R. T. Whitlock, USN, J3B42, Hq CINCPAC, with COL J. R. Johnson, CINCPAC Command Historian, 5 Mar 68.
Firepower of the USS NEW JERSEY. Above, 5" guns firing an opening shoot. Below, 16" guns firing on inland targets.
of the DMZ without firing over friendly troops, naval surface forces be authorized to operate south of a line bearing 045°T from the eastern land point of the southern boundary of the DMZ. This recommendation was based on Article IV of the 1954 Geneva Accords which indicates that the PMDL extends into territorial waters "perpendicular to the general line of the coast." On 27 November 1968, CINCPAC concurred with the COMUSMACV recommendation and further recommended to the JCS that NGFS ships be authorized to operate up to three miles from Hon Co (TIGER) Island to provide adequate maneuvering room and permit increased ship surveillance of WBLC traffic in the area. ¹

(5) The JCS concurred that the northern boundary for naval operations in the vicinity of the DMZ, proposed by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC, was more compatible with the demarcation line set forth in the Geneva Accords than the 17°N latitude line. In addition, the extension would provide the advantage of an increased probability that NGFS ships could be positioned to conduct operations without firing over friendly troops and an increased area of surveillance of WBLC traffic. ²

(5) On 12 December, the JCS informed CINCPAC that due to the acceptance by the national level planning community of 17°N latitude as the current northern limit for NGFS operations, coupled with the desire not to infringe on NVN claimed territorial waters and the delicate nature of the Paris talks, the JCS would not seek authority for an increase in the naval operating area from the highest national authority at that time. ³

Attack Aircraft Carrier (CVA) Posture for Southeast Asia

(75) In late 1967, the SECDEF requested the JCS to study the feasibility and desirability of a cut-back in CVA operations in the Tonkin Gulf in favor of land-based aircraft. On 27 December, the JCS requested CINCPAC's views on such trade-off during FY 1969. In establishing the CINCPAC position and preparing a reply to the JCS, many factors were considered. In the Vietnam war, U.S. forces were exploiting the utility and combined capabilities of both land and sea-based air power. Air

2. Ibid.
operations against NVN had enjoyed optimum operational flexibility with maximum surge and quick reaction capability. After approximately two and one-half years of operations against NVN, the Commanders of the 7th Air Force and 7th Fleet had developed a high degree of teamwork and perfected a system of integrated tactics based on use of maximum advantage of the capabilities of the two bases concepts. Reduction or trade-off of CVA based air for land based air would degrade current operational flexibility and thus affect adversely the capability to execute the air campaign in NVN and to provide support for other Tonkin Gulf seaborne operations. CINCPAC opposed the cut-back in CVA operations. 1

On 16 November, CINCPACFLT notified CINCPAC that the Chief of Naval Operations had advised that OSD was considering the reduction of Navy force levels from 16 to 15 CVAs and from 7 to 6 CVSs in FY 70 for budgetary reasons. CINCPACFLT pointed out in some detail, the adverse impact of the reduction in Southeast Asia operations and requested CINCPAC's views on the acceptability of three alternative CVA postures. 2

CINCPAC addressed this situation on 19 and 23 November. In his 23 November message, to the JCS and CINCPACFLT, he told CINCPACFLT: 3

In view of the present uncertainties relating to the bombing halt in NVN, the present posture of five CVAs in WESTPAC with three CVAs in SEASIA should be retained. . . . a drawdown should be contemplated only when negotiations have reached a point where there can be no doubt that the withdrawal will not compromise U.S. objectives in Vietnam. . . . should reclaims against reducing CVA/CVS force levels prove ineffective and Navy carrier force levels be reduced to 15 CVA and 6 CVS in FY 70, the situation prevailing in SEASIA at the time will have to be considered in determining SIXTH/SEVENTH FLEET posturing. So long as the current situation in SEASIA continues, there should be no reduction in the U.S. capability to resume a concerted air offensive against NVN.

1. J553 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68, citing JCS 6053/272256Z Dec 67 and CINCPAC 190419Z Jan 68.
2. CINCPACFLT 160053Z Nov 68.
3. CINCPAC 232338Z Nov 68.
Should NVN...exhibit a sincere interest in negotiating for a settlement, a reduction to a level of four CVAs in WESTPAC...would be an acceptable force posture.

(5) In the same message CINCPAC told the JCS, "since the five CVA force level cannot be maintained in WESTPAC concurrently with the 2 CVAs deployed in Sixth Fleet under a reduction to an overall 15 CVA force level, recommend strong support for efforts to maintain the present CVA/CVS force levels."

(5) On 30 November, CINCPACFLT submitted a proposed Western Pacific CVA schedule which provided for a periodic reduction in the number of CVAs assigned to YANK EE STATION to two CVAs in order to reduce the tempo of operations to permit increased maintenance. In connection with this operating schedule, CINCPACFLT had also proposed to delay USS KITTY HAWK (CVA-63) and USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65) deployment dates. The two proposals were approved by CINCPAC on 7 December with the stipulation that there would be no reduction in the rapid reaction capability of CVAs to meet any Southeast Asia contingency.

(5) On 11 December, based on intelligence which indicated the possible commencement of a VC/NVA winter offensive, CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to maintain 3 CVAs on YANK EE STATION until further advised. A third CVA, USS RANGER (CVA-61), which sailed from Subic Bay to meet this requirement, arrived at YANK EE STATION in less than 48 hours after notification. The enemy winter offensive did not materialize as anticipated and, on 21 December, CINCPAC authorized CINCPACFLT to resume the posture previously approved on 7 December.

Capture of U.S. Army LCU by Cambodia

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPACFLT 302201Z Nov 68.
3. CINCPACFLT 272243Z Nov 68; CINCPAC 070405Z Dec 68.
4. CINCPAC 112053Z Dec 68.
5. CINCPAC 210406Z Dec 68.
On 17 July, the U.S. Army LCU 1577 (landing craft, utility), inadvertently crossed the Cambodian border and was captured by Cambodia. On the same day the State Department requested the Royal Cambodian Government to release the crew and the LCU. The U.S. received two messages from Cambodia one of which was dated 22 July and concerned the detention of the LCU and its crew. After receipt of the 22 July note, the SECSTATE in a message to the U.S. Embassy, Saigon advised Ambassador Bunker that the SECSTATE thought it advisable to renew the request for release and present evidence showing the inadvertent nature of the intrusion. The SECSTATE in his message furnished the Ambassador the proposed text of the message to Cambodia and requested Mr. Bunker to: (1) discuss with SVN government the possibility of permitting Cambodian investigators in SVN and (2) furnish details on how the LCU crossed the Cambodian border.  

CINCPAC received a copy of the SECSTATE message to Ambassador Bunker and on 28 July he informed the JCS he agreed that one more attempt via diplomatic channels should be made to release the LCU and its crew as proposed in the SECSTATE message. CINCPAC added, "In the event that this request is also refused, positive measures should be initiated immediately to obtain the release of the LCU and personnel and to impress the Cambodian government with US resolve not to tolerate further delay." He then listed the measures he felt appropriate to apply pressure on Cambodia to release the LCU and its crew: (1) rigid enforcement of RVN customs, sanitation and navigation rules and regulations—violators engaged in traffic with Cambodia could be brought to trial and heavy fines levied, (2) harass river traffic to and from Cambodia imposing excessive delays for the purpose of inspecting ship's papers and requiring off loading cargo for complete customs inspection, and, (3) gradual reduction of Mekong traffic to and from Cambodia concentrating on POL and other key cargoes citing as reasons security and the necessity to improve navigational aids to insure safe passage along the river, and, as necessary, closing the Mekong, indicating that no definite time of reopening of the river can be predicted. In closing he recommended that the above actions be readied for implementation as a means of applying graduated pressure if the RKG did not respond favorably to the request in the SECSTATE message or took punitive action against the LCU personnel.

1. SECSTATE 208274/1 - 242217Z Jul 68.
2. CINCPAC 282024Z Jul 68.
(TS) On 31 July, the JCS in a memorandum to the SECDEF recommended essentially the same measures to be taken as CINCPAC recommended. In addition, the JCS recommended that MARKET TIME forces in the Gulf of Siam be directed to apprehend Cambodian naval craft which might enter territorial waters and also to ban U.S. travel to Cambodia.  

(TS) On 14 August, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the SECDEF approved the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that CINCPAC be instructed to make contingency plans to assist the GVN, as necessary, in carrying out the proposals to impose extraordinary controls on Mekong and Bassac River traffic to and from Cambodia, and to increase MARKET TIME surveillance in the Gulf of Siam. He desired, however, that no officials or agencies of the GVN, or any other foreign government, be contacted at this stage regarding these plans. The fact that such planning was being conducted was to be closely held on a strict need-to-know basis by the U.S. personnel concerned. The JCS requested CINCPAC to submit the necessary contingency plans.  

(S) After the plans were submitted by CINCPAC, the action remained in the State Department until the prisoners were released on 19 December.  

Use of Shipboard Surface-to-Air Missiles  

(S) In November 1966, CINCPAC recommended that shipboard surface-to-air missiles be utilized against hostile aircraft. Employment of missiles was authorized by the JCS in December 1966 for air defense purposes against clearly identified hostile aircraft over the Gulf of Tonkin. No missiles were to be fired if friendly aircraft were within these safety areas. A provision for self-destruct five seconds after programed intercept point afforded additional safety to friendly aircraft.  

2. JCS 7165-142302Z Aug 68.  
3. Intv. LTC C. H. Reynolds, USA, J3B3, Hq CINCPAC, with COL J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 6 Mar 68.  
The USS LONG BEACH while on PIRAZ station fired the first missile on 29 May 1967. No intercept was made since the missile self-destructed for unknown reasons after two minutes flight time in position 20-30.2N, 105-42-7E. This location is over the land mass of NVN. As was to be expected, considerable concern was expressed by the JCS since authority for use of the weapons was limited only to the air space above the Gulf of Tonkin. Efforts were continued to obtain authorization for use of missiles over the land mass of NVN. In December 1967, CINCPAC described the high degree of success which had been experienced in identification and tracking hostile aircraft. It was stated that during the period between mid-October and mid-December, 454 NVN aircraft were tracked and identified by PIRAZ ships using various means to confirm their identity. Of these, 67 could have been taken under fire. During the same time frame, 59 non-combatant/neutral aircraft were tracked and identified as to type, destination and nationality. This information and other previous messages convinced the JCS of the ability of PIRAZ ships to discriminate between friendly and hostile aircraft. Accordingly, authorization was granted in January 1968 for the ships assigned to PIRAZ station to employ SAMs south of 20 North in the offensive as well as defensive role.

Further authority to use missiles was sought in February 1968 in view of the potential air threat in northern SVN and southern NVN. CINCPAC recommended to JCS that missile capable ships be stationed off the NVN coast out of range of coastal defense batteries to provide an all-weather capability to interdict hostile aircraft. Authority was granted for any surface-to-air equipped ship to fire against hostile aircraft south of 20° North. Effective 3 April, this authority was changed to south of 19° North and on 1 November to south of 17° North. Missiles were fired on approximately nine occasions. All missiles fired were TALOS with the exception of one TERRIER firing. One MIG kill was achieved on 23 May 1968 by a TALOS fired from USS LONG BEACH and another kill was registered by a TALOS on 22 September, also, from the LONG BEACH.

1. Ibid; Fleet Operations Review, Hq PACFLT for the month of April, October and November 1968. NOTE: Official policy precluded announcement of U.S. SAM MIG kills.
Early in June 1968, ground observers in the vicinity of the DMZ reported sighting lights which they evaluated as enemy helicopters. These sightings increased and during the nights of 15-17 June, 164 visual sightings and 41 radar detections were reported. All sightings were at night and of lights only. The radar detections were also at night and primarily by counter-mortar radar. To counter this threat, USAF and US Navy aircraft were launched into the area to destroy these reported enemy helicopters. The aircraft detected targets on the aircraft radar and were cleared to engage by control authorities. During the same time frame, Navy surface units in the area reported being attacked by enemy helicopters and fixed wing aircraft.

An investigation of six reported attacks revealed that one PCF (Patrol Craft, Fast) was sunk, two ships damaged and five personnel were killed, nine wounded and two missing in action. Between 0030H and 0100H, on 16 June, PCF 19, a MARKET TIME patrol craft, was sunk by two rocket rounds. Three crewmen were killed, two were wounded and rescued and two were lost. At 0118H on 17 June, one of four rockets detonated close aboard the USS BOSTON (CAG 1) causing minor shrapnel damage. A serial number on some recovered missile fragments found aboard were later matched to a SPARROW missile launched by friendly aircraft. Between 0313H and 0316H on 17 June, HMAS HOBART, a SEA DRAGON unit, was hit by three rockets. Two Australians were killed and seven were wounded. The guided missile destroyer's air-search radar, missile system and after five-inch gun were heavily damaged.

The possibility that friendly aircraft were attacking ships and craft in the area appeared not to have been considered by the command and control authorities or the aircrews until parts of expended SPARROW missiles were found aboard HMAS HOBART and USS BOSTON.

A joint Board of Investigation was ordered convened by CINCPAC. The Board concluded that all attacks on friendly navy units in the area were made by USAF aircraft. The investigation found no tangible evidence of any claimed destroyed helicopters. Further, the

investigation did not find any tangible, conclusive evidence to prove the existence of helicopters in the area, however, the Board considered that there were sufficient reports that tend to substantiate at least limited enemy helicopters in the vicinity of DMZ. CINCPAC did not concur with this opinion of the Board concerning limited enemy helicopter activity in the vicinity of the DMZ. Extensive reconnaissance of the area and review of all intelligence sources failed to reveal any evidence of helicopter activity in the area during this period. While the Board did not state any conclusions whether correct air defense procedures were used throughout this period, particularly if the rules of engagement were adhered to in all instances, CINCPAC, after reviewing the record, was of the opinion that the rules of engagement were not followed. There was inadequate identification of the airborne radar targets to authorize engagement. Differing instructions to the aircrews by their ground controllers during the two nights were also noted.

Following the incidents CINCPAC directed necessary actions be taken to provide improved coordination and control to preclude mutual interference by forces in the area, and to minimize the possibility of such attacks on friendly forces in the future. Corrective measures to be taken included the following requirements and restrictions: 1. (1) Control centers ashore must have knowledge of the location of all friendly naval vessels in the area; (2) aircraft will not be scrambled against air vehicles below 3,000 feet and below 150 knots without 7th Air Force TACC approval; (3) a positive and established radar track must be carried by the tactical air control system before engagement; (4) precise location of friendly aircraft, vessels and ground forces must be ascertained prior to issuing clearance to engage—clearance will not be granted to engage if track extends into an area occupied by ships; (5) hostile track designation may be made by air defense battle commander but engagement order will be given only by 7th Air Force TACC; (6) visual identification of airborne objects will be made before firing unless track has been designated hostile by proper authority or it is committing a hostile act; and, (7) shore based tracking of ship IFF responses and establishment of a common secure voice communication net between CRC/CRP ashore and major naval units in the DMZ area.

A copy of the investigation and CINCPAC's comments on it were forwarded to the JCS on 31 July.

1. Ibid.

SECRET
Amphibious Operations in SVN

(S) In January 1968, COMUSMACV expressed dissatisfaction with policies and directives involving certain aspects of the conduct of amphibious operations in South Vietnam. He urged that future amphibious operations be planned and executed under the operational control of CG III MAF, or other field commanders designated by COMUSMACV, and criticized present policies, primarily regarding procedures for reporting and coordination. CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV that he considered present command relations and policies for conduct of amphibious operations in SVN valid and that they would remain in effect pending completion of a more detailed study. He tasked CINCPACFLT to conduct a detailed study. The CINCPACFLT study generally verified the validity of present policies and doctrines and made recommendations to improve coordinating and reporting procedures. CINCPAC endorsed the PACFLT study; however, he took exception to two items involving communications. These recommended establishment of a separate communication circuit for informal reporting by liaison officers and a procedure to raise message precedence to "Immediate" on all traffic in order to solve communications delays. In these two recommendations, CINCPAC non-concurred. CINCPACFLT agreed with CINCPAC rationale on non-concurred items and directed COMSEVENTHFLT to initiate appropriate action for improvement in ARG/SLF planning and operations within the framework of existing doctrine, procedures and agreements.1

Revolutionary Development

(U) COMUSMACV was assigned the responsibility for direction of all U.S. civilian and military pacification activities in SVN on 9 May 1967. This concept envisioned that the separate U.S. civilian agencies would continue to deal with their functional equivalents at the national level in Saigon, but the management and coordination would funnel through MACV to the field. To carry out this mission, a new principal staff agency called Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) was established by COMUSMACV at the Assistant Chief of Staff level. Mr. Robert W. Komer was assigned as the Deputy for CORDS with the personal rank of Ambassador.2

1. J5531 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of May 1968; CINCPAC 182215Z Jan 68; CINCPAC 012309Z Jun 68; CINCPACFLT 050123Z Jun 68.
(U) The reorganization required to direct the pacification effort and the history of CORDS operations in 1967 and 1968 will be found in Annex A (COMUSMACV Command History 1967 and 1968) to the CINCPAC Command History for the years 1967 and 1968. Therefore, coverage of Revolutionary Development in this section is limited.

(U) On 16 November 1967, CINCPAC requested the JCS to initiate action to have U.S. Government departments and agencies adopt the terms "Pacification," "Revolutionary Development" and Nation Building" as defined by COMUSMACV and Ambassador Bunker on 7 November 1967. The JCS responded to CINCPAC's request with the reply that the terms had been accepted by the Services and the JCS for CY 1968 and that Ambassador Leonhart, Special Assistant to the President, would be requested to issue them as guidance to concerned departments and agencies during 1968. The JCS then told CINCPAC that they would request, at a later date, further restaffing of the terms on a permanent basis since the terms were developed for a specific geographic area and a combined campaign plan which was subject to annual change.

(5) On 27 March, CINCPAC expressed concern at the currency being attached to speculative reports that pacification was dealt a fatal blow by the TET offensive. He noted that the basic pacification structure was still intact, units in support of pacification were for the most part on station, economic lifelines were being reopened and "although progressing slower than we would like, the GVN is taking steps to regain the initiative in the country-side." The pacification program, as seen by CINCPAC, "is conceptually sound, viable and indispensable to the attainment of our goals in RVN."

(5) COMUSMACV reinforced this position by noting that there had not been nearly as much damage to the pacification as initially feared. The biggest problem was not the loss of physical assets, but rather one of the Vietnamese defensive-mindedness. MACV's assessment of pacification suggested a 3- to- 6-month setback in 19 provinces, a 1-to- 2-month setback in 17, and little or no setback in 8. The real

2. JCS 8108/2500132 Jan 68.
3. CINCPAC 270258Z Mar 68 cited in J555 History, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Apr 68 for the month of Mar 68.
question was whether SVN could recover and forge ahead more quickly than the enemy. ¹

Funding for Revolutionary Development Cadre Program (RDCP)

(8) In April 1968, the responsibility for the overall direction of the RDCP program was assumed by DOD. Prior to this time the CIA was responsible for the funding of the RDCP. The Department of the Army was designated as the executive agent of DOD for the program to include policy, planning, programming and accounting; however, the CIA continued to support the program with personnel and logistics. It was anticipated at that time that CINCPAC would be brought into the picture on matters having budget and funding implications. ²

(9) As expected, CINCPAC became involved on 6 June when the SECDEF sent a message to the JCS with information copies to CINCPAC, SECSTATE, U.S. Embassy, Saigon, and the CIA. The SECDEF informed the JCS that the RDCP had been "tentatively identified...as a prime candidate for funding transfer to the GVN. The gold flow budget benefits to us of such a transfer are obvious and extremely appealing in current budgetary situation." The SECDEF recognized that the transfer of funding would greatly reduce "our control over it" and that "increased confusion and corruption could result..." On the other hand GVN funding of RDCP would be "consistent with and emphasize our intention to turn to Vietnamese increasing share of control and responsibility for the war." The SECDEF then told the JCS that "we are aware preliminary CINCPAC and MACV reaction" to the proposal. He requested the JCS views and recommendations on the proposal and welcomed comments from the information addressees. ³

(9) On 14 June, COMUSMACV forwarded his views to CINCPAC. General Westmoreland opposed changing RDCP funding arrangements. He pointed out that when the decision was made "a few months ago to shift funding from CIA to DOD, all parties agreed that the financial mechanism for the program within Vietnam would remain unchanged."

1. COMUSMACV 08814/290740Z Mar 68, cited in J555 History, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Apr 68 for the month of Mar 68.
2. COMUSMACV 17085/141024Z Jun 68; DA 859207/102215Z Apr 68 cited in J555 History, Hq CINCPAC, 9 May 68 for the month of Apr 68.
3. SECDEF 1822/061932Z Jun 68.
COMUSMACV felt that even though the SECDEF message had listed advantages and disadvantages of the proposal, there were important omissions. One omission COMUSMACV cited was, "it (the message) fails to acknowledge that the RD Cadre Program is one of the highest priority in Vietnam and that the war may be entering a critical phase wherein non-military programs become relatively a much more important element in our overall efforts." He continued, "at this juncture every effort must be made to minimize disruption of the high priority RD Cadre Program and to insure its rapid and effective implementation." COMUSMACV was currently formulating a plan for a phased transfer under favorable conditions with a tentative target date of January 1970. ¹

(5) In a message to the JCS on 16 June, CINCPAC acknowledged the advantages of the SECDEF proposal. However, he felt the time was not ripe for implementing the proposal. His reasoning, which supported COMUSMACV, included: (1) the RD Cadre Program is the linch pin of the GVN Revolutionary Development effort and one of the ingredients most required for the success of pacification. Transferring of funding and budgeting for the program to the GVN would, to a large degree, limit the U.S. opportunity to influence and effectively monitor the RD Program; (2) transferral of funds would open up new avenues for financial irregularities; and (3) a further consideration concerns the program's being used as a political base for anyone able to control it. CINCPAC suggested that the matter be studied carefully before consummating the plan for transfer of funding responsibility to the GVN and proposed a tentative target date of January 1970. ²

(3) The JCS supported CINCPAC and COMUSMACV recommendations and agreed that the GVN should accept the responsibility for the program commencing in CY 1970 as soon as the shift could be accomplished without loss of continuity and effort. ³

(5) On 27 September 1968, the DEPSECDEF in a memorandum to the Secretary of the Army and the JCS directed that necessary action be taken to reduce U.S. funding for the RDCP by 10 percent of the planned level during the second half of FY 1969 and not less than 50 percent of

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1. COMUSMACV 17085/141024Z Jun 68.
2. CINCPAC 161926Z Jun 68.
the total program in FY 1970. On 3 October, the JCS requested CINCPAC and COMUSMACV to provide a plan which the JCS could use as a basis to reply to the DEPSECDEF. On 6 October, COMUSMACV responded with a plan which was concurred in by CINCPAC. The plan provided for GVN funding of approximately 13 percent in the second half of FY 1969 and approximately 21 percent during FY 1970, which was believed to be the maximum amount the GVN budget could absorb in 1970. On 29 November, the JCS in a memorandum to the SECDEF stated that they considered the COMUSMACV plan was in consonance with the President's desire to encourage the GVN to assume a greater role in the defense and development of SVN. They recommended that the funding level for FY 1970 of approximately 21 percent be approved and the requirement for additional U.S. funding in the amount of $11.835 million be recognized.¹

¹ J72 Brief 002-68, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Dec 68, Subj: Funding of Revolutionary Development Cadre Program JCS 2472/315-2 (U).
SECTION III - SPECIAL WARFARE

(U) This section of Chapter IV covers CINCPAC's actions and decisions pertaining to certain special operations in Southeast Asia. These operations are sensitive in nature and should be treated accordingly.

PRAIRIE FIRE

(TS) PRAIRIE FIRE (initially called SHINING BRASS) has the unclassified meaning, "Special Operations Southeast Asia." PRAIRIE FIRE operations involve U.S. and SVN forces under operational control of COMUSMACV which conduct special operations to counter infiltration of enemy forces through Laos as concurred in by US Embassy Vientiane and authorized by CINCPAC. 1

(TS) Concept of Operations:

a. General: Operations to counter NVA/VC infiltration through Laos into SVN were conducted by US/SVN personnel/forces. Operations were phased to provide for progressive expansion. Extensive air and artillery support were provided. The original concept envisioned three phases of operations:

(1) Phase I: Intelligence collection/reconnaissance patrols.

(2) Phase II: Increased intelligence collection activities to include establishment of an indigenous intelligence net in Laos and exploitation of targets by raiding forces.

(3) Phase III: Increased reconnaissance, raid and exploitation activities and development of guerrilla forces.

b. Ground Operations: Reconnaissance teams (RTs) and/or platoons infiltrate into Laos to conduct Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA), gather intelligence, locate caches, emplace sensors, interdict, and conduct attacks against enemy troops, supply installations, infiltration routes and other enemy activities, as required.

1. Unless otherwise cited the data in this section is based on J3 Memo 000740-69, 11 Apr 69, Subj: 1968 CINCPAC Command History; draft review.
c. Air Operations: US/VNAF aircraft infiltrate, exfiltrate, support, and/or resupply PRAIRIE FIRE forces. Airborne forward air controllers (FAC), visual/photo reconnaissance, and radio relay flights are employed in addition to tactical air, ARC LIGHT, helicopter gunship and helicopter troopship operations.

d. PRAIRIE FIRE Area of Operations (PFAO): The authorized PFAO in Laos extended from UTM grid coordinate XD 430980, south to XD 430400, to XD 700000, to XC 800950, to YC 030890, to YB 496801, to YB 497380, to YB 400380, to YB 400020, thence along the Laos - Cambodian border to SVN.

(TS) Authority to conduct Phase I and Phase II PRAIRIE FIRE operations was granted in 1966, however, authority to conduct Phase III operations in SVN for later expansion into Laos was not recommended to JCS until 1 April 1967. The concept visualized strong U.S. control and participation, which was opposed by the US Embassy Vientiane. On 7 December 1967, COMUSMACV submitted a modified Phase III concept that visualized Laos leadership and very limited U.S. influence. The concept was supported by Embassy Vientiane but strongly opposed by CINCPAC and the JCS. On 15 January 1968, COMUSMACV withdrew his modified Phase III proposal.¹

(TS) During 1968 Phase I and II operations were conducted from the five forward operational bases at Kontum, Dak To, Khan Duc, Khe Sainh and Hue-Phu Bai. These operations consisted of observing enemy movements, uncovering enemy storage-staging facilities, conducting psywar operations, emplacing anti-personnel-anti-vehicular devices on LOCs, tapping enemy telephone lines, capturing-killing enemy personnel, calling in air strikes, validating SAC targets, conducting BDA following air strikes, and providing reconnaissance for major ground operations as directed by COMUSMACV.²

(TS) PRAIRIE FIRE operations were conducted with the following limitations and authorizations. Operations launched from Thailand required concurrence from US Embassy Bangkok. Ground exploitation

1. Point Paper, JSA322, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Feb 68, Subj: PRAIRIE FIRE (U) CROSS BORDER SVN/LAOS (TS).
2. Ibid.
forces could not exceed three platoons in any single operation. These forces could be replaced by like forces as necessary, so long as the three platoon limit was not exceeded. The maximum number of U.S. personnel authorized per platoon was three. Use of helicopters, tactical air and employment of exploitation forces was authorized to full depth of PFAO. PRAIRIE FIRE operations in Laos, outside the PFAO, required concurrence of Embassy Vientiane.

(TS) On 15 January, COMUSMACV outlined a proposal to enhance the effectiveness of PRAIRIE FIRE intelligence collection for air strikes by contacting and recruiting cooperative natives in the PRAIRIE FIRE zone. The volunteers were to be extracted from the zone, taken to SVN for training, and upon completion of training returned to home areas to establish and expand intelligence nets. The concept was considered a continuation of Phase II; therefore no requirement would exist for additional funds or U.S. personnel to initiate the program. Both CINCPAC and the JCS endorsed COMUSMACV's proposal to improve the PRAIRIE FIRE intelligence collection capability. However, the SECSTATE requested the comments of Ambassador Sullivan before commenting on COMUSMACV's proposal. Ambassador Sullivan concurred in the proposal with the following exceptions:

All recruiting will be conducted by indigenous PRAIRIE FIRE personnel; recruits (later agents) will have no contact with US PRAIRIE FIRE personnel.

Training in RVN will take place in sanitized setting with minimum contact with US personnel. Airlift of recruits and agents to and from RVN will be by VNAF helicopters.

Intelligence net, when fully operational, will not exceed a total of sixty agent personnel. Ten principal agents are to be recruited and trained during six-month period. After training, each principal agent will in turn attempt to recruit five sub-agents or informers.

(TS) Final approval of the proposal was given by the JCS on 11 April 1968 subject to the above mentioned exceptions which were agreed to by

MACSOG and Embassy Vientiane at a SEACOORD meeting on 20 February.¹

(TS) On 17 April 1968, COMUSMACV presented a proposal to conduct a battalion (HAYMAKER)² sized operation in enemy base area 607, located in Laos, in conjunction with Operation DELAWARE. On 19 April 1968, CINCPAC recommended approval of this proposal to the JCS and on 23 April 1968, the JCS granted authority to employ PRAIRIE FIRE units of up to battalion size in base area 607 in conjunction with Operation DELAWARE. The JCS directed that extreme caution be exercised to avoid compromise by unauthorized persons to include the press. On 3 May, COMUSMACV determined that it would be extremely difficult to prevent press compromise of an operation of this magnitude. COMUSMACV stated that the military gain resulting from a successful foray into base area 607 did not appear sufficient to offset the potential political and diplomatic embarrassment which disclosure of the operations could cause at that time. Accordingly, the PRAIRIE FIRE HAYMAKER size operation into base area 607 was cancelled.³

(TS) At the SEACOORD meeting on 7 March, COMUSMACV proposed that "Washington" accept the principle that the then-current PRAIRIE FIRE west boundary be recognized as a coordinating line and authorize COMUSMACV and Embassy Vientiane to coordinate locally for exploitation of targets west of the boundary. The U.S. Embassy considered the then-current system of coordinating on a case-by-case basis and then submitting the request through CINCPAC for approval by DOD-SECSTATE to be adequate; however, the Ambassador agreed to leave the decision on the subject up to DOD-SECSTATE.⁴ On 6 April, the JCS notified CINCPAC that approval procedures had been simplified by the following modifications to PRAIRIE FIRE operational authorities:⁵

2. HAYMAKER: code name for battalion size operations.
a. Operations in Laos west of the limits established by CINCPAC are authorized subject to the concurrence of U.S. Embassy Vientiane.

b. Concurrence of U.S. Embassy Vientiane is required for cases involving use of forward refueling sites in Laos.

c. Operations requiring launch from Thailand are authorized subject to concurrence of U.S. Embassy Bangkok.

(TS) At the request of COMUSMACV, CINCPAC proposed to U.S. Embassy, Vientiane that the PRAIRIE FIRE area of operations be expanded to include the Nape, Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes. 1 Ambassador Sullivan nonconcurred. 2

(TS) On 20 November, Admiral McCain tried again. This time he dropped the Nape pass from the proposal but again Ambassador Sullivan nonconcurred. 3 CINCPAC then informed COMUSMACV that unless COMUSMACV had strong objections, CINCPAC intended to withhold action on the message. In reply, COMUSMACV provided additional rationale and strongly urged support for his proposal. On 11 December, CINCPAC in a message to the JCS fully supported COMUSMACV and requested that the JCS obtain authority as expeditiously as possible to permit expansion of the PRAIRIE FIRE area of operation to include the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes. 4 On 31 December, a joint State-Defense message advised Ambassador Sullivan that after thorough discussions, there was an inclination to approve CINCPAC's recommendation but would appreciate the Ambassador's current views in the light of his informal discussions with Admiral McCain on 26 December. 5 Also on 31 December, the JCS requested CINCPAC's views on the proposal since his conversation with Ambassador Sullivan. 6

(TS) As of 31 December, PRAIRIE FIRE teams had conducted a total of 684 missions since inception and the status of forces and aircraft were as indicated below:

1. CINCPAC 020910Z Nov 68.
2. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 10045/030642Z Nov 68.
3. CINCPAC 202321Z Nov 68; J3A3 Memo 0003-69, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Jan 69.
5. SECDEF 8630/312303Z Dec 68.
6. JCS (SACSA-No number) 312318Z Dec 68.
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<td>42</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
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</table>

b. Exploit-Forces:

(1) Battalions 
   2      0      1      1
(2) Companies (4Co per Bn) 
   12     3      1      8
(3) Platoons (3 per Co) 
   36     18     2      16

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c. Aircraft:

(1) Helicopters (VNAF H-34) 
   16     5      11
(2) Fixed Wing (VNAF U-17) 
   2      1      1

DANIEL BOONE

(TS) In 1966, the SECDEF approved CINCPAC's recommendation to develop a cross-border capability for operations in Cambodia. Approval included the authority to: (1) organize and train 20 intelligence agents, 16 reconnaissance teams, 4 reaction companies, and a security force; (2) deployment of 156 U.S. Army Special Forces personnel; and (3) to expend supporting funds—initially $3.5 million. In November 1967, the 20 intelligence teams were deleted from the program.¹

(TS) Approval to conduct DANIEL BOONE operations was not requested initially. However, on 30 April 1967, CINCPAC did request authority to conduct limited ground reconnaissance and intelligence activities in the tri-border area of Cambodia. On 22 May 1967, the JCS notified CINCPAC that approval had been granted subject to restrictions:²

a. Area of operations was limited as specified by the JCS.

b. Only reconnaissance teams could be committed and teams could not exceed an overall strength of 12 men, to include not more than 3 U.S. advisors.

c. Tactical air strikes and/or the commitment of exploitation forces were not authorized across the SVN-Royal Cambodian Government (RKG) border of Cambodia.

d. Infiltration and exfiltration of Cambodia was to be by foot. Exfiltration by helicopter was authorized in emergency situations only.

e. Duration of infiltration was to be held to the minimum time required for investigation.

f. Teams would take all possible precautions to avoid contact with Cambodian military forces or civilian population in the area.

g. The purpose of the operations was intelligence collection and/or verification. Teams would engage in combat only as a last resort to avoid capture.

h. No more than three reconnaissance teams could be committed on operations into Cambodia at any one time.

i. The total number of missions could not exceed ten in any 30-day period.

(TS) On 29 May 1967, the SECDEF amended the restrictions by permitting the use of approved PRAIRIE FIRE areas for infiltration or exfiltration of DANIEL BOONE reconnaissance teams. Additionally, he permitted use of forward air controller (FAC) aircraft to penetrate the Cambodian border the minimum distance in the DANIEL BOONE area to support emergency exfiltration of DANIEL BOONE teams, and for this purpose only. Also, SECDEF required direct coordination with the American Embassy, Vientiane in those cases where DANIEL BOONE operations involved Laos. If Ambassador Sullivan nonconcurred the mission could not be conducted. On 23 September 1967, the DANIEL BOONE boundary at the Laos-Cambodian border was adjusted to coincide with the PRAIRIE FIRE boundary. All DANIEL BOONE ground forces developed for these operations were placed under the operational control of MACSOG for the conduct of DANIEL BOONE missions. On 20 October 1967, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the original area of operation was extended southward to the Gulf of Siam at a uniform depth of 20 kilometers into Cambodia. This area in turn was divided into two zones.  

1. Ibid, p. 749.
2. Ibid, pp. 749-750.
a. Zone A - from the tri-border area to Route 13. In this zone limitation on the number of missions at any one time was removed, but operations could not exceed 30 during any 30-day period. No more than five of these could be helicopter operations. Helicopter infiltrations could not exceed a depth of ten kilometers.

b. Zone B - Route 13 to the Gulf of Siam. Request for authority to conduct operations in Zone BRAVO would be considered on a case-by-case basis only.

(TS) Operations in the area defined on 20 October 1967 were subject to these additional restrictions:

a. Only reconnaissance teams could be committed. These teams could not exceed an overall strength of 12 men, to include not more than 3 U.S. advisors.

b. Tactical air strikes and/or the commitment of exploitation forces were not authorized across the SVN/RKG border of Cambodia.

c. Except for 5 helicopter missions discussed in Zone A above, infiltration and exfiltration of Cambodia would be by foot. Exfiltration by helicopter of foot-infiltrated teams was authorized for emergency situations only.

d. Duration of infiltration would be held to minimum time required for investigation.

e. Teams would take all possible precautions to avoid contact with Cambodian military forces or civilian population in the area.

f. The purpose of the operations was intelligence collection and/or verification. Teams would engage in combat only as a last resort to avoid capture.

(TS) CINCPAC had requested authority to employ FAC aircraft to support DANIEL BOONE operations. On 23 December, the JCS notified CINCPAC that FAC aircraft could be used for reconnaissance and control purposes in Cambodia on the basis of 2 reconnaissance flights per DANIEL BOONE mission and for control of authorized helicopter infiltration missions.¹

¹ Ibid, p. 750.
At the beginning of 1968, approval had been given by the U.S. State Department to conduct operations in a segment of Cambodia approximately 20 miles deep. Operations outside of that area and in Zone B required a decision from Washington. As part of the BLACK BEARD intelligence collection program, COMUSMACV (by back channel) recommended expansion of DANIEL BOONE to include all of Cambodia east of the Mekong River, use of tactical air and artillery for extraction of teams, 24-hour intent messages, authority to launch from Thailand, and deletion of restrictions on U.S. personnel on reconnaissance teams. CINCPAC (also by back channel) concurred to CJCS in the BLACK BEARD concept, but recommended that the DANIEL BOONE area not be expanded. On various occasions, to include SEACOORD conferences, CINCPAC advocated lifting of restrictions and expansion of DANIEL BOONE operations. JCS has supported this position. SEACOORD recommendations include future expansion of DANIEL BOONE operations. These were concurred in by Embassy Saigon, Vientiane, and Bangkok. The State Department had been against any lifting of restrictions and expansion of DANIEL BOONE operations. Approvals in 1968 of CINCPAC requests for establishment of Zone CHARLIE and for expanded authorities in Zone ALPHA indicate lesser State Department objections to this program. 1

On 8 January 1968, CINCPAC authorized eight additional reconnaissance teams to be formed from existing assets. This brought the total teams authorized to 24. 2

The DANIEL BOONE Operations Order was published by CINCPAC on 20 March 1968. 3 Effective FY-69, the DANIEL BOONE program was removed from SWITCHBACK funding.

On 29 August, COMUSMACV recommended that DANIEL BOONE forces in Cambodia be authorized to emplace anti-personnel mines in the DANIEL BOONE area north of the Srepok River. The M-14 plastic mines to be used would not be identifiable as U.S. equipment and would have a self-destruct capability adjustable up to 50 days. The mines would be used to harass the enemy thereby lowering his troop morale, discouraging enemy night movement and discouraging pursuit of DANIEL BOONE teams. CINCPAC concurred in the proposed use of the mines and on 8 September recommended approval to the JCS. On 4 October, the JCS recommended

1. Point Paper, J3A321, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Dec 68, Subj: DANIEL BOONE.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
that SECDEF approve the proposal and seek SECSTATE concurrence. The
use of the M-14 anti-personnel mines as proposed was approved. 1

(TS) On 25 September, COMUSMACV recommended that authority be
granted to employ tactical aircraft and artillery in conjunction with
DANIEL BOONE operations with priority of support to emergency extrac-
tion and then to the attack of well defined NVA/VC targets of a transient
nature. CINCPAC concurred in the recommendation but had not received
approval of the recommendation by the end of 1968. 2

(NS) On 14 December 1968, the JCS granted authority to establish
DANIEL BOONE Zone CHARLIE extending south from Route 13 to Logo
(WT 9775), excluding a five kilometer area around Snuol and Memut. 3

(NS) On 17 December, the JCS rescinded certain DANIEL BOONE
operating authorities and replaced them with up-dated authorities.
Approval of recommendations for additional authorities made by CINCPAC
prior to 17 December were included in these new authorities. Specifically,
these were the use of the M-14 mine and the establishment of Zone C. The
following is a listing of the authorities that replaced the rescinded author-
ties: 4

Area of operation includes the entire Cambodian
color with RVN. This area is in turn divided into
three zones as follows:

a. Zone Alpha from the tri-border area to Route
13 to a uniform depth of 30 km. There are no numerical
limitations on Zone Alpha missions. Helicopter infiltra-
tion/exfiltration on all missions is authorized but will
not repeat not exceed a 30 km depth. Helicopter infil-
tration within ten kilometers of Mondolkiri (Sen Monorom)
(YU 3878) or within one kilometer of Routes 14, 131, or

1. J3 Brief 247-68, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Oct 68, Subj: DANIEL BOONE
Operational Authorities (S), (JCSM-588-68, 4 Oct 68).
2. Point Paper, J3A321, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Oct 68, Subj: DANIEL BOONE
(U), Point Paper, same office, same subject, 7 Nov 68.
3. JCS 7732/141806Z Dec 68.
4. JCS 07830/172009Z Dec 68.
141 will require Washington level approval. Teams are authorized to emplace M-14 anti-personnel mines in Zone Alpha north of Srepok River. Mines will be equipped with a self destruction attachment and the location and dates of emplacement will be recorded.

b. Zone Bravo from Logo (WT9775) to the Gulf of Siam at a uniform depth of 20 km. Requests for authority to conduct operations in Zone Bravo will be considered on a case-by-case basis only. Washington level approval is required and requests should be submitted at least five days prior to launch.

c. Zone Charlie from Route 13 to Logo (WT9775) at a uniform depth of 20 km into Cambodia, excepting those areas within five km of Snuol (XU 542346) and Memut (XU 293077). Operation will not exceed ten in number during any 30-day period. Helicopter infiltration/exfiltration is authorized, and 48-hour notice of intent to launch is required.

Additional operational restrictions and guidance are as follows:

a. Purpose of operation is intelligence collection and/or verification. For this purpose, teams are authorized to capture VC/NVA soldiers and immediately evacuate them to SVN for interrogation and disposition. However, in order to retain the focus of these operations on intelligence-type missions, operations to take prisoners will be conducted with discretion. Prisoners, whether wounded or otherwise, may be taken as a result of combat action, but teams will only initiate action for the purpose of taking prisoners when isolated groups of two or three VC/NVA soldiers are encountered. Teams will otherwise engage in combat only for self preservation and avoidance of capture.

b. Teams will take all possible precautions to avoid contact with Cambodian military forces or civilian population.
c. Tactical air strikes and/or the commitment of exploitation forces are not, repeat not, authorized in Cambodia. The use in Cambodia of helicopter gunships to escort helicopter troop ships as required is authorized. Gunships will engage the enemy only when necessary for their own defense or that of the team.

d. Teams are authorized to destroy significant enemy caches found during reconnaissance operations.

e. Reconnaissance teams may not, repeat not, exceed an overall strength of 12 men. Restrictions on the number of US personnel per team are removed.

f. Authority is granted for immediate reinsertion of teams into an area from which a team has been emergency extracted. This reinsertion authority expires 48 hours after the final emergency extraction of a reinserted team.

g. Notification of intent to launch all teams should be provided to Washington 48 hours in advance. Silence on the part of JCS indicates approval of launch.

h. Authority is granted for FAC type aircraft to overfly the DANIEL BOONE portion of the Cambodian border area on minimum duration, mission essential flights. These flights will be limited to visual reconnaissance of target areas, selection of LZs, communications relay and control of helicopter troop ships and gunships during infiltration and exfiltration. Reconnaissance flights will be limited to two per DANIEL BOONE mission. FAC flights over Zone Bravo must be approved on a case-by-case basis at the Washington level.
j. Reporting will include infiltration and exfiltration of teams, spot reports of significant contact with the enemy, significant team losses and any possible contact with Cambodians.

(TS) Following is a statistical summary of reconnaissance teams operations for the period 1 January - 31 December 1968:

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SECTION IV - PROGRESS OF THE VIETNAM WAR DURING 1968

(U) This section is in two parts. The first part deals with the measurement of progress in Southeast Asia and is based on the data presented in the CINCPAC quarterly publication, "Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia." The second part, entitled, "CINCPAC Report on the Progress of the Vietnam War During 1968," is based on the year-end report submitted by Admiral McCain to the JCS on 1 January 1969.

Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia

(3) A system for measuring progress of the war effort in Vietnam evolved from the goals established at the Honolulu Conference in February 1966. At the conference, attended by President Johnson, high ranking government officials of SVN, and others, six goals were established as objectives for operations in SVN during 1966. These goals became the basis for measuring progress. 1

(3) In October 1966, CINCPAC's strategy for Vietnam was promulgated and it included three interdependent undertakings which together constituted the concept for the conduct of military operations against North Vietnam and in Laos and South Vietnam. 2 Initially, there were only nine goals for 1967; 3 however, another goal was added in March 1967—secure the water lines of communication in the National Priority Areas of III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. 4 In July 1967, a second change occurred. The goal to open 65 percent of the railroads and secure those in National Priority Areas was changed to opening 55 percent of the railroads and securing those in the National Priority Areas of II and III Corps. 5

(3) The ten goals for 1967 were modified to reflect changing programs and to establish progressively higher goal objectives to be achieved during 1968. In addition, because of increasing emphasis directed toward reducing the VC infrastructure—political cadre—and improving RVNAF effectiveness, two new goals related to these areas were added for 1968. The strategy and the goals for 1968 were as indicated below.

2. CINCPAC Itr, Ser 000438, 20 Oct 66.
4. CINCPAC 162232Z Apr 67.
5. COMUSMACV 24773/260536 Jul 67.
Strategy and Goals Toward Which Progress Was Measured

(8) In South Vietnam. ¹

a. Strategy

(1) Seek out and destroy communist forces and infrastructure by expanded, offensive military operations.

(2) Extend the secure areas of South Vietnam by military operations and assist the GVN in building an independent, viable, non-communist society by civic actions coordinated with military operations.

b. Goals

I. Continue to inflict personnel losses on the VC/NVA forces which exceed their input.

II. Neutralize by end CY 68 80 percent of the identified enemy base areas in RVN.

III. Open 100 percent and secure 70 percent of waterways in III and IV Corps essential to military operations and economic progress.

IV. Open 100 percent and secure 75 percent of roads essential to military operations and economic progress.

V. Open 75 percent and secure 40 percent of railroads essential to military operations and economic progress.

VI. Increase the number of secure hamlets to 6,200; correspondingly increase the population living within secure areas to 72 percent.

VII. Reduce the influence of the VC infrastructure in all pacification priority areas.

VIII. Enhance RVNAF effectiveness.

¹ CINCPAC Measurement of Progress, 31 Dec 68, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Mar 69, hereafter cited as CINCPAC Measurement of Progress.
Outside of South Vietnam:

a. Strategy

In the North—take the war to the enemy by unremitting but selective application of United States air and naval power thus reducing Hanoi's capability to support and direct military operations in South Vietnam.

b. Goals

IX. Achieve and maintain a level of damage to war supporting targets which will render those targets unusable for their intended purpose.

X. Reduce capability of NVN to move men and material within NVN and into Laos and SVN.

XI. Reduce imports into NVN.

XII. Reduce enemy capability to interfere with our air operations over NVN and Laos.

Progress Toward Goals in 1968

Goal I: Inflict personnel losses on VC/NVA exceeding their input. Total estimated enemy input for 1968 was 299,900 and reported losses were 289,120. Although losses inflicted on the enemy during the year exceeded 1967 losses by more than 117,000, the goal was not achieved for the year as total enemy input exceeded total losses by 10,780. It was estimated that 247,000 NVN personnel infiltrated into SVN during 1968. This rate of infiltration was nearly three times the rate for 1966 or 1967. The personnel that infiltrated were believed to be a cross section of all types of NVN personnel required by the enemy in SVN. They probably include combat and combat support units and replacements and some administrative service and political type personnel. The average in-country recruitment and conscription was estimated at 7,000 personnel per month for 1966 and 3,500 personnel per month for 1967. During the first three months of 1968, in-country recruitment was estimated to have averaged 7,000 personnel per month. Since April 1968, it was estimated to have averaged 3,500 personnel per month. Total

1. Ibid.
GOAL I
VC/NVN LOSSES VS. INPUT

LEGEND:
- Reported Total Input
- Total Losses

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 31 DEC 68, PREPARED BY LCOL J.F. JEWELL, USA, J3A52
losses shown on following chart, "VC/NVA Losses Vs. Input" include VC/NVA killed in action - body count, Chieu Hoi returnees - military only, VC/NVA prisoners of war that eventually died of wounds or became permanently disabled. Non-battle losses, currently estimated at 2,000 men per month, include personnel lost to such causes as simple desertion, sickness and accidents. The total VC/NVA personnel losses reported for 1968 - 289,120 - represented a 41 percent increase over the 171,240 loss reported for 1967. ¹

(5) Goal II: Neutralize 80 percent of Base Areas. During 1968, the percent of identified base areas neutralized or inactive rose to 28 percent by the end of December. Progress toward the goal was 52 percentage points below the goal as shown on chart, "Base Areas Neutralized." Due to the temporary nature of base area neutralization, it was necessary to reevaluate base area status each month. The increase in intensity of the campaign against the VC base areas was indicated by the average of 2,844 penetrations per month into base areas during the last six months of 1968, compared to the monthly average of 1,422 during the first six months. It is to be noted that during the last quarter, Base Area 483, along a safe VC rear service area, was penetrated for the first time in two years.

(6) Goal III: Open and Secure Essential Waterways in III and IV Corps. A total of 1,504 kilometers of waterways were considered in measuring the progress toward opening 100 percent and securing 70 percent of those waterways in the III and IV Corps essential to military operations and economic progress. As indicated on chart, "Waterways III and IV Corps," the Open portion of the goal began at 93 percent on 31 January 1968 and progress toward the Open goal was 99 percent at the end of December. The goal for waterways in a Secure category began at 28 percent on 31 January and projected to 70 percent by 31 December 1968. Progress toward the goal was 65 percent at the end of the year, 5 percent below the goal. The security status of waterways in the Open category remained basically unchanged from August to the end of the year. However, during the year, the Mekong Waterway and Bassac River were secured from the sea to the Cambodian border. In addition, a water passage from Ca Mau in the Delta to Saigon and Bien Hoa was opened. Only on the Vam Co Dong River were sections considered to be in Closed status. ²

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
GOAL II
BASE AREAS NEUTRALIZED

LEGEND:

- PERCENT NEUTRALIZED
- GOAL

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
31 DEC 68, PREPARED BY LCOL J.F. JEWELL, USA, J3A52

SECRET
GOAL III
WATERWAYS
III and IV Corps
1504 TOTAL KILOMETERS CONSIDERED

1968

LEGEND:

- PERCENT OPEN
- PERCENT SECURE
- GOAL

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
31 DEC 68, PREPARED BY LCOL J.F. JEWELL, USA, J3A52
Goal IV: Open and Secure Essential Roads. During 1968, 3,759 kilometers of road were considered in the measurement of the status of progress in opening 100 percent and securing 75 percent of roads essential to military operations and economic progress. The percent of the total road network in Open status on 31 January 1968 was 96 percent and Secure was 43 percent as shown on chart, "Road Goal IV." Operations directed toward attaining the Open goal resulted in 98 percent of the roads being open at the end of the year. Progress toward the goal of securing 75 percent of the roads essential to military operations and economic progress stood at 59 percent on 31 December, 16 percentage points below the goal. During the year, Route 1 from Danang to Dong Ha was secured and a secure route from Chau Doc in the Delta to Saigon via Can Tho and My Tho was opened. Only 2 sections of roads considered under the goal remained closed—the road from Danang to An Hoa and 47 kilometers along the route from Ham Tan to Phuoc Le. 1

Goal V: Open and Secure Essential Railroads. As shown on chart, "Railroads Open - RVN," the measurement for railroads Open started at 37.5 percent on 1 January with progress toward the goal at 43 percent at the end of the year. As shown on chart, "Railroads Secure - RVN," the goal for Secure started at 31 percent on 31 January and regressed to 18 percent—22 percent below the goal. Major changes in railway status occurred during the year. The Lien Chien to Danang segment of railroad was Closed during part of the year, but at the end of December had improved to Open status. The Dalat spur line was mined at 3 vital bridges and was closed at the end of the year. The vulnerability of the railroad to VC interdiction where security forces were not available was a major cause of lack of progress toward this goal. As noted, the yearly trend in the security status of the railroads changed constantly. This was due to high vulnerability to VC interdiction where security forces were not provided. Railroad security was in competition with other phases of revolutionary development. The availability of security forces was based on a priority of needs at province level. The downward trend in the Secure status reflected the increase in the severity of damage to bridges and vital rolling stock. This damage factor proved more meaningful when determining the impact of VC action on rail operations than the absolute number of incidents against the railroads. 2

Goal VI: Increase the Number of Secure Hamlets and Population in Secure Areas. As shown on chart, "Hamlet Status," the goal for

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
ROAD GOAL IV
3759 TOTAL KILOMETERS CONSIDERED

LEGEND:

- PERCENT OPEN
- PERCENT SECURE
- ----- GOAL

CONFIDENTIAL
GOAL V
RAILROADS OPEN-RVN

LEGEND:

PERCENT OPEN

GOAL

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
31 DEC 68, PREPARED BY LCOL J.F. JEWELL, USA, J3A52
GOAL V
RAILROADS SECURE-RVN

LEGEND:
- PERCENT SECURE
- GOAL

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
31 DEC 68, PREPARED BY LCOL J.F. JEWEILL, USA, J3A52
GOAL VI
HAMLET STATUS

LEGEND:
- - - - GOAL

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
31 DEC 68, PREPARED BY LCOL J.F. JEWELL, USA, J3A52
hamlets in a Relatively Secure category was 6,200. At the end of the year 6,425 hamlets were considered to be in the Relatively Secure status, thus the goal was exceeded by 225 hamlets.\(^1\) The population control goal shown on chart, "Population Goal," began at 66.9 percent on 1 January and by the end of the year the goal of 72 percent was exceeded by 4.3 percent. At the end of the year, 76.3 percent of the population was considered to be living in Relatively Secure areas.\(^2\)

1. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) was designed to evaluate rural pacification status at the hamlet level. The urban, ARVN and other Secure "non-hamlet" populations were added to the data base to develop a total RVN population count. The hamlets and the total RVN population count are categorized as follows:

RELATIVELY SECURE - Hamlets in the HES "A", "B", and "C" Categories are considered Relatively Secure and under GVN control when the following minimum requirements are met:

Military control of the VC has been broken and most party apparatus has been identified and neutralized; there exist adequate friendly forces and the local communications system is operative; GVN managerial groups are usually resident and the census grievance program has been completed; full time external medical support as well as formal education are available; some welfare needs are being met; and, interested residents are participating in self-help projects and basic economic programs are underway.

CONTESTED - HES Categories "D" and "E" hamlets are considered Contested and under neither GVN nor VC control. HES Category "Other" hamlets includes non-evaluated, abandoned, or planned hamlets and are considered Contested. The following maximum conditions exist in Contested hamlets.

Although VC military activities have been reduced somewhat, there is VC activity in the hamlet at night; a few VC cadre have been eliminated but terrorism and taxation are frequent; hamlet defense by friendly external and Popular Forces exist and voluntary informants are increasing; local participation in hamlet management has begun and the census grievance program has started; and some economic planning, formal education, and MEDCAP visits have been initiated.

VC - HES Category "VC" hamlets are considered under enemy control.

2. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress.
GOAL VI
POPULATION CONTROL

LEGEND:

- - - - GOAL

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
31 DEC 68, PREPARED BY LCOL J.F. JEWELL, USA, 13A52

CONFIDENTIAL
Goal VII: Reduce the Influence of VC Infrastructure (VCI). The GVN PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX program, instituted in July 1968 by Presidential decree, was a milestone in GVN efforts to neutralize the VCI. The important factor in the PHUNG HOANG program was that for the first time an integrated effort, from the national to district levels, which included intelligence collection and immediate operational exploitation, was made. As shown on chart, "VC Infrastructure Loss Trend," the PHUNG HOANG program had a significant degree of success, particularly during the last 2 months of the year. The 2,372 verified VC infrastructure members neutralized during December represented a slight increase over November, when 2,338 VCI were neutralized and a large increase over October when 1,459 VCI were neutralized. Some success was achieved against the 3 priority targets of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign--liberation committee members, VC security personnel and VC finance and economy cadre. The yearly total of VCI neutralized was 15,776. Targets became more wary and elusive and a substantial number of low-level, easy targets were probably already eliminated. However, to sustain the momentum and to generate maximum pressure on the VCI, a goal of 3,000 VCI neutralizations per month was set for 1969.

Goal VIII: Enhance RVNAF Effectiveness. The System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER) was instituted on 1 January to provide: (1) a quantified objective evaluation of the effectiveness of RVNAF units in performing their assigned mission and (2) to identify problem areas which reduce RVNAF combat and pacification effectiveness. Progress toward the achievement of Goal VIII was based only on operational results. Results of regular ground forces of RVNAF measured in terms of enemy KIA per battalion and weapons captured per battalion, declined throughout the year due to the reluctance of the enemy to stand and fight. KIA ratios and weapons captured to weapons lost ratios generally improved or remained at high levels which was indicative of improved leadership and command interest placed on combat operations. During the last 2 months of the year, a significant downturn occurred in the RVNAF desertion rate generally reflecting emphasis given to the program to reduce this rate to a manageable level. December reports for the RF/PF indicated that 70 percent of the RF units and 63 percent of the PF units have attained a status where these units possess firepower equal or better to nearby VC units due to issuance of the M16 rifle and M-2 carbines. The VN Navy continued to improve operational capability, and planning continued for turnover of in-country U.S. naval assets to VNN. The modernization and operational improvement of the VN Air Force also progressed despite a shortage of
GOAL VII
VC INFRASTRUCTURE LOSS TREND

1968

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
31 DEC 68, PREPARED BY LCOL J.F. JEWELL, USA, J3A52
helicopter flight mechanics and some spare parts shortages. 1

(§) Goal IX: Render War Supporting Targets Unusable. As of 1 November, 71 percent of the 467 targets on the ROLLING THUNDER Target List had been struck at least once and 55 percent were not considered for further strikes. The most significant regeneration of target systems in NVN was achieved in the electrical power, transportation and air defense systems. Although pressure was maintained, adverse weather during the first quarter, the April bombing restriction, and the November cessation prevented any measurable progress toward this goal. 2

(§) Goal X: Reduce Capability of NVN to Move Men and Materiel. Truck sightings in NVN drastically increased after the bombing halt to 9,567 trucks in November and 14,738 in December. Truck losses for the year were 79 percent greater than in 1967 as losses in Laos increased by 150 percent. Waterborne logistic craft losses in NVN for the year were 35 percent less than in 1967. Beginning in July there was a significant increase in monthly losses which continued until operations were curtailed on 1 November. Although the enemy paid a high price for his logistical movements, as indicated by the 9,500 trucks destroyed during 1968, there was no significant change in his ability to move men and materiel. 3

(§) Goal XI: Reduce Imports Into NVN: Imports and exports were up 47 and 27 percent respectively during 1968. Ship arrivals increased from 387 in 1967 to 500 in 1968. Seaborne deliveries of aid established record highs during 1968. Total imports were up 640,000 MT over 1967. Foodstuffs increased some 67 percent and POL increased nearly 54 percent. Restrictions on air strikes have continued to prohibit any effort toward achievement of this goal. 4

(§) Goal XII: Reduce Enemy Capability to Interfere With Our Air Operations. Total enemy jet fighter inventory consisted of 153 aircraft, 98 in Southern China and 55 in NVN. During the year, 15 MIGs were destroyed in air-to-air engagements compared to 10 U.S. losses. Twelve U.S. aircraft were downed by SAMs from a total of 665 SAMs sighted. This was a loss of 1.8 aircraft per 100 SAMs sighted. During 1968, the

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
aircraft combat loss rate was .084 percent for NVN and .06 percent for Laos. The shift of the strike force after the bombing halt more than tripled the combat sorties in Laos. Although the NVN anti-aircraft capability in Laos increased significantly throughout the year, the loss rate continued to decrease. In the currently authorized areas of operation progress was made toward this goal.

CINCPAC Report on the Progress of the Vietnam War During 1968

(U) In response to a 14 December message from the JCS, Admiral McCain submitted his, "Year End Review of Vietnam - 1968," to that body on 1 January 1969. His report reviewed the Allied objectives and the purpose of the objectives. The report examined the enemy situation, the military progress made by the Allies in 1968 and the prospects for 1969. 1

Objectives

(5) In 1968, Allied military programs and actions were designed to support two major objectives. The first objective was to defeat the VC/NVA forces in SVN by vigorously executed offensive and psychological actions, destruction of enemy base areas, interdiction of LOCs, denial of vital resources, and the conduct of intensified intelligence and surveillance programs. The second objective was to extend GVN control in SVN by providing urban and rural territorial security, identifying and eliminating the VC infrastructure, opening and securing major lines of communication, and conducting civic actions. The purpose of the two objectives was "to drain enemy resources and curtail enemy efforts, thus achieving a reduction of the insurgency in South Vietnam and establishment of a secure environment for economic and political development."

The Enemy Situation

(5) Admiral McCain reported that by the summer of 1967, the enemy was aware that his Phase II insurgency tactics were failing. The enemy's losses were heavy, his units were being soundly defeated and he was losing his control over the RVN population. To reverse the situation the enemy attempted to escalate the conflict by countrywide coordinated attacks with emphasis on urban centers. His goals were to provoke a popular uprising, topple the government, cause the collapse of RVNAF,

1. This part of Section II is based in its entirety on CINCPAC 012225Z Jan 69.
isolate the American Forces from the war, and permit the expansion of enemy control in the rural areas.

**Enemy's Campaign**

\(\text{KC}\) The campaign which began in late October 1967 and continued into 1968 was called the "67-68 Winter-Spring Campaign". Logistic preparations, undertaken on an unparalleled scale, included the building of new roads and the extensive stockpiling of supplies. Personnel infiltration and recruitment rose sharply. His "TET Offensive," launched late in January 1968 consisted of large ground attacks directed at selected major urban areas, supported by smaller ground attacks and attacks by fire on other targets. The enemy "achieved a measure of surprise by the very breadth of his assaults and some tactical surprise in certain urban areas. The most dramatic action was in Saigon, where the enemy was contained and ejected from the city at great expense to both sides." The enemy failed in his apparent hope to seize Quang Tri Province due to Allied counter operations. His attack on the Khe Sanh combat base did not materialize and his attack on Quang Tri City was repulsed. He also attacked Hue and severe damage was done to the city in clearing him from its environs. Attacks were launched on Nha Trang and Phan Thiet, in the II CTZ as well as key cities of the Western Highlands. Action in the IV CTZ was widespread, but individual attacks were smaller. The enemy failed to achieve his goals. The GVN and RVNAF "did not collapse, but gained further confidence and a new measure of respect." The enemy's gains in the rural areas were much less than he had hoped for. In the final analysis "he was unable to hold any cities attacked and in many areas lost much of his political infrastructures and impaired troop morale. He lost approximately 40,000 men, seriously degrading his combat capability." His major gain from the TET offensive was psychological. A second offensive was initiated in early May at a time to influence the peace talks just commencing in Paris. Saigon was the major target, but the attacks failed. Though smaller than the attacks made during TET, he still paid with heavy casualties. Overall, the enemy lost almost 30,000 men in his second offensive, and once again he withdrew into his base areas and border sanctuaries to refit, retrain, and receive replacements. His "third general offensive," launched on 17-18 August was intended to be more violent, of longer duration, and to have greater impact than the previous major attacks. The enemy plan was to concentrate on 2 major objectives, Saigon and Da Nang, while keeping FWMAF tied down in the DMZ area and initiating harassing attacks in the Western Highlands. His attacks in III and IV CTZs failed to draw off Saigon's defensive forces. He
lost some 20,000 more men before his effort faded about mid-September. His military efforts defeated, he was forced to turn to political activities as a means of salvaging his deteriorating position in SVN.

**Enemy's Strength**

As of 30 November, the VC/NVA combined strength committed against SVN totaled about 266,000 men. This total included 125,000 NVA located in SVN and the contiguous areas of Cambodia, Laos and southern NVN. NVN infiltration into SVN during 1968 was estimated to be approximately 252,800 men. Since TET, local recruiting, though less significant in the total picture than the influx of NVA personnel, has been intensified. This effort continued, but there were increasing signs of major difficulties in meeting manpower requirements from in-country sources. An estimated 50,500 were recruited in SVN. His losses in the first 10 months of 1968 totalled 251,100, including KIA, died of wounds, permanently disabled, PW, and returnees.

**Enemy Disposition and Activity in SVN at Close of 1968**

Many major enemy units were in border sanctuaries or in remote base areas, however, there was increasing evidence that some major units were moving into I CTZ and northern III CTZ. He was making small-scale attacks against minor objectives throughout SVN and attacking population centers by fire except Saigon. He was still committing acts of terrorism as he pursued his efforts to consolidate and expand his control of the population. The enemy remained flexible and by virtue of his deployment, retained multiple options. His forces could start a full-scale return to NVN or could return in force for major attacks in SVN. He may "believe that, as currently disposed, his forces pose a counterweight to a possible resumption of bombing, and are in a position to respond to any military or political opportunity which might appear."

**Enemy Activity Within NVN**

Within NVN, the enemy's movement of materiel was heavy in the early months of 1968 and it reached its peak in April. This activity probably was intended to replace TET losses and to provide him with sufficient stockpiles for use during the southwest monsoon season. With the cessation of the bombing of NVN, the enemy accelerated road, bridge, and rail repair activities in southern NVN, and moved record quantities of supplies toward the southern panhandle area and to the Laos border. In Laos, his logistic traffic increased during the last half of November.
as routes became motorable. The movement of enemy vehicles and materiel in NVN is expected to continue at high levels. It is expected that the enemy logistic effort will increase commensurate with his ability to counter our interdiction program.

**Enemy Personnel Adjustments to the Bombing Halt**

(5) Admiral McCain reported that since the bombing halt, more manpower became available for NVA/VC forces in the south, mainly as a result of a reduction in civil defense and emergency repair needs. "The North Vietnamese have always managed to adjust their aggressive activity to troop availability. Yet to be seen is how the enemy will utilize any additional manpower realized from the bombing halt."

**Air Operations Over NVN and Laos**

(5) In addressing friendly air operations over NVN and Laos, Admiral McCain reported that the "air war over NVN and Laos was conducted in three separate and distinct phases due to operating authorities and limitations imposed." During the first phase, 1 January to 31 March, air operations were authorized throughout NVN and Laos. "Weather was the dominant factor influencing ROLLING THUNDER operations during this period and with the New Year and TET standdowns, combined to reduce the air effort." Nearly all strikes required the use of the all-weather bombing techniques. In most cases weather precluded BDA and eliminated the capability to evaluate many of the strikes. Air operations in Laos, BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER, were devoted to interdiction operations.

(5) In the second phase, 1 April to 31 October, offensive air operations were limited to Laos and that area of NVN south of 19 degrees N. Emphasis was placed on the harassment, disruption and interdiction of the movement of men and materiel into SVN. The area was void of lucrative industrial or military fixed targets. The detection and destruction of fleeting targets were emphasized and interdiction operations continued in Laos against trucks, vital supplies and support personnel.

(5) The third phase took place from 1 November to 31 December with air strikes being limited to Laos. The air effort was "diverted to an intensified interdiction campaign in Laos (COMMANDO HUNT) and additional air support to in-country operations."
Allied Operations in RVN

In his report, Admiral McCain pointed out that "Allied operations in Vietnam during 1968 were greatly enhanced by the mobility of the Free World forces. COMUSMACV was able, by virtue of tactical mobility, to operate without committing major portions of his forces to a reserve role." He cited the redeployment of the 1st Cavalry Division to the I CTZ in February and to the III CTZ in October as a "classic example of the use of mobility to achieve maximum utilization of combat assets." As a result of these rapid deployments the enemy's operational plans were frustrated and friendly forces won major victories. Admiral McCain then stated that, "COMUSMACV has been able to apply maximum effective combat power at decisive times and places as a...result of superior tactical mobility."

In-Country Air Effort

CINCPAC told the JCS:

The in-country air effort was dedicated to the support of ground forces in SVN and the interdiction of the extended battle area.

Air attacks were a key factor in the high enemy casualties during February and they were vital to the disruption of enemy plans and the destruction of his units. In the most concentrated bombardment program since World War II, tactical air and B-52s flew over 22,500 strike sorties into the area around Khe Sanh, disorganizing heavy enemy attacks on the base. The forces at Khe Sanh were supported by more than 1,000 airlift sorties which delivered more than 12,000 tons of cargo in spite of heavy enemy ground fire. During the May offensive, 500 fixed wing sorties struck within a radius of eight kilometers of Saigon, with VNAF aircraft accounting for 185 of these. During the period 5 May to 30 June there were 997 ARC LIGHT sorties flown within 40 kilometers of Saigon. These strikes, in coordination with multi-division ground operations,
did much to disorganize and destroy enemy forces in and around Saigon.

As the year 1968 began, 32 AC-47 aircraft were available in-country for base and helmet defense and for support of combat troops. During the year, 2 squadrons of AC-119G gunships were brought into the theater as well as the AC-130 gunship which was operational on a test basis in SVN. "Performance was excellent and the more effective AC-119 and AC-130 gunships added significantly to the night air operations capability." The ARC LIGHT program, limited to 800 sorties per month until 1 February was increased to 1,200 sorties and increased again on 15 February to 1,800 sorties. The increase was approved for the purpose counter the "increasing enemy threat in SVN." Failure of the enemy, "to attain his objectives at Khe Sanh, Dak To and in the Saigon/Gia Dinh area can be credited in large measure to the B-52 support of ground elements."

Naval Surface Operations

During 1968, coastal surveillance of RVN was provided in 63 naval patrol areas. Also, patrol aircraft operated 70 miles off-shore on 3 air barrier patrols. Two large scale infiltration attempts were thwarted on 21 February and 1 March when 2 trawlers were turned back and 3 others were destroyed or damaged on 1 March. More than 770,000 junks and sampans used for coastal movement and fishing were detected in MARKET TIME areas. More than 65 percent were boarded and inspected. "In addition to river patrols in the Delta and Rung Sat Special Zone, inshore surveillance was accomplished to enforce curfews and to prevent enemy infiltration, movement and resupply along the Delta coastline and across the major rivers of the Mekong Delta and the Rung Sat Special Zone."

Admiral McCain also commented on minesweeping operations along the main Saigon shipping channels, the expansion of GAME WARDEN operations into I CTZ, operations of the River Assault Force in extending the IV CTZ Pacification-Revolutionary Development Program into the provinces north of and adjacent to the Mekong River, the dominant role played by the Mobile Riverine Force in the destruction of enemy forces during TET, and Operation SEA LORDS--a joint operation into previously secure enemy strongholds along rivers and canals south of the Bassac River.

Anti-Infiltration System

CINCPAC commented that the IGLOO WHITE program, one of three programs in the anti-infiltration system, "has been developed into a
highly refined system and has provided a major contribution to the effectiveness of the air interdiction effort."

**Herbicide Program**

(5) The herbicide program was reported as having accomplished its objective. "The year was characterized by the most searching review to be undertaken since the advent of the program in 1962. This review found the program to be successful, the PSYWAR and Indemnification Program to make herbicide operations exceed the aircraft delivery capability by 55 percent on an annual basis."

**RVNAF Improvement and Modernization**

(5) The RVNAF improvement and modernization plan is a two-phased plan. Phase I force structure provided a maximum combat capability within a force level of 801,215 while the Phase II plan called for an increase in the logistical base of RVNAF to provide a better balance between combat and combat service support elements. The increase was 48,785 bringing the total Phase II force to 855,594. An accelerated Phase II program, which was forwarded to the JCS on 9 November for approval, provided for the replacement of obsolescent weapons in RVNAF.

**RVNAF Effectiveness**

(5) In reviewing the effectiveness of the RVNAF during 1968, Admiral McCain told the JCS that the RVNAF met the enemy offensives with "vigorous counteraction." Although the RVNAF suffered heavy casualties defeating the VC/VNA and ejecting them from urban areas, these victories improved "RVNAF self confidence and resulted in increased aggressiveness throughout the year." Increased effectiveness also resulted from better coordination and liaison with U.S. units, improved aggressiveness of new leaders at the middle and upper levels of command and re-equipping with modern weapons. However, problem areas remained. "There are still insufficient competent small unit leaders. Rigidity in the chain of command has not been eliminated, limiting flexibility in organization and the delegation of authority. Reluctance to exploit contacts by rapid reinforcement of units in contact and to pursue the enemy aggressively, has not been entirely overcome."
Planning remains weak for large units, and for operations of long
duration. The problem of high desertion rates, though subjected to con-
cerned attention, is not solved. At this stage, the RVNAF is not a balanced
force capable of going it alone and depends, to a large degree, on US sup-
port capabilities. Recommendations have been made for an accelerated
transition to the Phase II force structure to provide improved fire support,
tactical airlift, transportation, communications and engineer capabilities.
When this force structure is reached, RVNAF will be capable of coping
with the internal threat. Even then, however, it will not be able to handle,
by itself, the threat of sizable NVA forces which may remain in SVN or in
the contiguous areas of Cambodia, Laos, and Southern NVN."

**Free World Military Assistance Forces**

(5) The strength and status of FWMAF remained essentially the same
in 1968 as in 1967. The most significant change in the strength of the
FWMAF was the increase in Thai forces. In July 1968, the first incre-
ment of the RTAVF arrived bringing the Thai in-country strength to
approximately 6,000 men.

**Nation Building Effort**

(5) CINCPAC reported that progress in the pacification program
during the "first half of 1968 was characterized by a slow recovery from
the TET offensive. The threat of follow-on attacks acted as a deterrent
to prompt and decisive pacification efforts." However, the program was
"gradually reoriented" toward an "offensive posture" as the Allies' opera-
tions blunted and turned back the enemy effort. The end of October saw a
gain in the momentum of the pacification program. During the last three
months of 1968, the GVN initiated the Accelerated Pacification Campaign
(APC) which was designed to take advantage of the enemy's weakened
posture and to extend GVN influence in previously "contested" and VC
areas. By the end of the year, the shifts of population to GVN control was
"significant."

**Communications and Electronics**

(5) The expansion of the Integrated Communications System (ICS) in
South Vietnam continued during 1968. A much needed increase in circuit
capacity was provided. Over 2,200 voice equivalent channel legs were
added to the system when 24 new fixed tropospheric scatter and microwave
links and 6 link expansions were completed. Local telephone service was
improved with the installation of 7 dial central offices. The first phase of the Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) program, providing secure voice service to 115 subscribers was implemented as was the basic program for providing communications equipment to CORDS. Other C-E achievements included: the establishment of automatic digital network (AUTODIN) switches at Phu Lam and Nha Trang; the establishment of a single sideband radio system between Korea and Vietnam for the use of ROK forces; the addition of off-line cryptographic equipment to the RVNAF inventory; the increased efficiency in radio frequency management resulting in improvements both in frequency spectrum use and in the elimination of harmful frequency interference; and the securing of significant numbers of tactical FM radio nets with tactical radio ciphony equipment.

Logistics Overview

Admiral McCain reported that a sound logistical structure, which evolved from crash efforts in the build-up years of 1965-66, had been established in Vietnam. The structure "has both flexibility and staying power" and provides the commanders with "all logistics support required to prosecute their mission."

Support to RVNAF

The objective of arming all ARVN maneuver elements with M16 rifles by the end of FY 68 was achieved. The RVNAF expansion and modernization program and increased ARVN combat operations increased ammunition supply requirements. To alleviate these situations management control was exercised; available supply rates (ASR) were established; and ammunition stockage levels were realigned to provide a 30-day supply in-country at intense combat rates (ICR), a 30-day supply in-country at theater sustaining rates (TSR), and a 30-day supply in off-shore reserves at the ICR.

POL

The first 4 months of CY 68 saw bulk POL monthly consumption increase by 400,000 BBLs—from 3,300,000 to 3,700,000. However, the first significant change in the increasing trend which started in 1965 occurred when consumption remained stable during the remainder of 1968. Pipelines made a significant impact on POL operations by providing
a reliable means of fuel distribution during the monsoon season and by reducing line-haul requirements.

Construction

(S) In 1968, "construction at major complexes reached a state of completion permitting maximum utilization." Major ports at Cam Ranh Bay, Saigon, Qui Nhon and Da Nang were highly developed permitting greater throughput and "practically removing logistic support limitations on tactical operations." Increased effectiveness in logistics activities resulted from the integration of key cargo-handling facilities into support operations.

Lines of Communication

(S) At the end of the year,

...the massive effort on bases and logistical facilities in SVN could be tapered off. Logistic support activity grew proportionately and the highway restoration program emerged as one of the highest priorities. It is the last of the large U.S. construction endeavors in SVN and its timely completion serves not only tactical requirements but contributes significantly to the solution of many Vietnamese problems. Restoration of over 750 kms of highway has been completed and another 820 kms is under construction. An additional 1,030 kms is funded awaiting construction start and 1,440 kms are programmed for FY 70 funds. Significant progress was also made on restoration of the Vietnamese National Railroad System. Almost 50 percent of the main line has been restored and is operating and the Da Nang to Hue section of the line is scheduled for completion in Feb 69.
Outlook for the Future

The Enemy

The enemy can no longer mount large-scale attacks against urban areas without fear of heavy losses. His capability to provide food and other essentials has been reduced. At the same time he has been compelled to withdraw into base areas and sanctuaries.

This does not mean, however, that he has been defeated, since the war remains fundamentally political in nature. While being frustrated...militarily..., the enemy is placing greater emphasis on political efforts to gain his goals.

These political goals are: (a) withdrawal of the US presence in SVN, (b) overthrow of the legal government of SVN, and (c) the establishment of a revolutionary authority in SVN. Although the enemy obviously has a long hard way to go toward achieving these goals and success is problematical, his efforts to do so continue unabated.

The VC are now endeavoring to establish province and hamlet organizations which can be used as a basis for demanding participation in a post-hostilities government.

It is expected that the enemy will revert to lower levels of protracted warfare.

This would enable the enemy to devote more assets to guerrilla and local force support of the political struggle and he will continue to use the
tactics of assassination, terror, harassment and destruction. By conducting this type of protracted warfare, he would retain the ability to conduct small-scale attacks on limited objectives and avoid any large-scale coordinated countrywide offensive which would result in heavy losses and again degrade seriously his combat capability. The enemy thus can maintain the necessary combat forces, without significant reinforcements from SVN.

Notwithstanding his current military weakness, there are no indications that the enemy has deviated from his goal of both a military and political victory in SVN. The enemy has utilized the respite from our air and naval attacks to improve his military position in the Laos/Cambodian base areas and throughout SVN. He has rapidly rebuilt key war supporting installations and repaired his industrial base. Additionally, recent large increases in the movement of men and supplies toward SVN indicate that the enemy intends to greatly increase his forces in SVN either in preparation for an anticipated FWF withdrawal or to re-engage in serious ground conflict as occurred in the first nine months of 1968. If this trend continues, and there appears to be little reason to anticipate otherwise, a direct and continuing threat of substantial proportions will be created for Free World Forces early in 1969.

US-FWF Ground Strategy 1969

(8) Admiral McCain in outlining his strategy for 1969 stated:

The ground strategy for CY 69 will be a continuation of that of CY 68 but emphasis will change. Allied forces...
will attack the full spectrum of communist organizations, activities and facilities in a coordinated effort. The enemy's political, military and proselyting campaigns are mutually supporting but by the same token, mutually vulnerable.

In the densely populated areas, including the coastal plains and the Delta, the basic objective will be to eliminate all VC/NVA political infrastructure and military forces. Operations will have as a goal denial to the enemy of bases and operating areas essential to him for liaison routes, unit movement, stockage of supplies and evacuation. An accompanying objective is to establish firm GVN control in these areas. In the areas adjacent to the coastal plain, the basic objective will be to deny these areas to the enemy, effectively preventing their use for rest, refitting, training, resupply and as staging areas for mounting attacks against populated areas. In the remote, essentially uninhabited area, the basic objective will be to interdict and disrupt the enemy's resupply and infiltration routes and major bases.

The GVN Pacification and Development Plan undertakes to continue and extend the current Accelerated Pacification Campaign through 1969. The plan complements the Combined Campaign Plan and lists eight objectives to be accomplished by the end of 1969:

(a) Bring security to 90 percent of the population.

(b) Eliminate 33,000 VCI by the end of 1969.

(c) Involve additional people in the Self-defense groups to bring this strength up to 2,000,000 members and arm 400,000.

(d) Establish effective local government at the village level.

(e) Rally 20,000 Hoi Chanh.
(f) Decrease the number of refugees to less than 1,000,000 and resettle or return to their native places 300,000 people.

(g) Increase the information and propaganda effort.

(h) Encourage the rural economy.

Air Operations

CINCPAC told the JCS that he expected the mission, objectives and goals of air operations in Southeast Asia would remain essentially unchanged from 1968. He stated that under "current" bombing restrictions "tactical strike forces would continue large-scale interdiction operations in Laos and close direct air support operations in SVN." He emphasized that "CINCPAC forces must maintain the full capability to strike NVN in the event negotiations fail and a resumption of ROLLING THUNDER air campaign is directed."

Air Operations in SVN

In regards to air operations in SVN he stated:

Air operations in SVN will continue to pursue the broad objectives of support of Free World Forces, defeat of VC/NVA forces and extension of government control in SVN. Overall modernization and improvement of VNAF will continue. The conversion of three VNAF A-1 squadrons to A-37 aircraft is planned, while four of the existing five helicopter squadrons will continue transition to the UH-1. The VNAF reconnaissance squadron has been scheduled to convert from RC-47 to RF-5s, while retaining its EC-47s and U-64s.

Air Operations Out-of-Country

Air operations out of country will continue to be directed against the flow of enemy personnel and materiel from NVN to SVN. Interdiction operations in Laos will continue to receive primary emphasis and the IGLOO WHITE sensor system will continue to be
used in an intelligence gathering role in support of those operations. With the advent of the Commando Hunt anti-vehicular infiltration operation, IGLOO WHITE will transition from an evaluation to a fully operational status. Task Force Alpha will continue to exercise operational control over strike forces allocated by 7AF, with line-of-sight communications capability.

B-52 Operations

The requirement for 1,800 ARC LIGHT sorties per month was expected to continue during 1969.

The flexible capability of this heavy firepower support has been equated to the punching power of several ground divisions and is viewed by COMUSMACV as his theater reserve. As a military requirement, CINCPAC strongly supports 1,800 ARC LIGHT sorties per month for CY 1969.

Naval Operations

In addressing U.S. and SVN naval operations for 1969, Admiral McCain advised the JCS that:

... naval operations against the enemy in CY 69 will be expanded to include areas previously considered enemy sanctuaries. Mobile Riverine Force and amphibious operations will be launched into VC/NVA operating areas in SVN in order to restore these areas to GVN control. Intensified GAME WARDEN operations, particularly in IV CTZ, will seek effectively to interdict the enemy's use of the major rivers, as well as counter the VC/NVA efforts at mining and ambushing friendly shipping. Riverine operations along the water LOCs in the vicinity of the Cambodian Border will be stepped up to deny increasingly this supply route to the Viet Cong in IV Corps. The highly successful SEA LORDS operation utilizing forces from TF115, 116 and 117 will be continued to increase control of all waterways in IV CTZ. Coordinated USN and VNN MARKET TIME surveillance
patrols of the coastal waters off SVN will be continued to interdict efforts to infiltrate men and materiel into SVN by water routes. Naval gunfire will be utilized to interdict enemy LOCs, destroy enemy base camps and storage areas, and to support both amphibious and land operations which require mobile, on-call fire support. Modernization and improvement of the VNN RAGS and patrol forces will continue at an accelerated pace. Additional GAME WARDEN helicopter gunships and fixed wing aircraft are scheduled to augment the helicopter gunships in-country in early CY 69.

Post Hostilities Planning

Prior to summarizing his "Year-end Review," CINCPAC commented on CINCPAC OPlan 67--phased withdrawal of US-FWMA forces from SVN within a six-month period in accordance with the Manila Communiqué--and CINCPAC OPlan 69--T-Day planning with Alternatives A-D. He warned:

...certain considerations are relevant to CINCPAC post hostilities planning efforts:

A six months withdrawal of all forces with a 15 day lead time, and no roll-up forces, appears to be economically hazardous. Definitive figures will be developed as this alternative is developed and added to CINCPAC OPlan 67-69.

Successful completion of the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program is fundamental to all withdrawal conditions, and a US military force package will be required for T-Day Alternatives A and B and for CINCPAC OPlan 67-69.

The precise date established for T-Day will be critical to military planning. Plans, inventories, studies and automated support for T-Day planning are in the developmental stage. Should T-Day be announced prematurely, these efforts will not be available to provide for an orderly and economical redeployment.
In summarizing his report, CINCPAC listed several major developments which had a direct effect on operations in SVN during 1968. The major developments included: (1) the maturing of the RVNAF; (2) the virtual attainment of Program 6 force levels; (3) distribution of forces in accordance with area priorities; (4) establishment of single management of tactical air resources; (5) appreciation of constant and relentless pressure on the enemy and improved intelligence gathering capabilities; (6) attainment of a military posture and command procedures that permit emphasis to be shifted or increased rapidly to meet changing situations; and (7) development of logistic capabilities that provide improved support of operations throughout SVN.

After discussing the major developments that took place in 1968, Admiral McCain stated:

As the situation now exists in South Vietnam the enemy has no chance for military victory. Our firepower and mobility deny him the capability to mass his forces except at great expense of manpower. The momentum developed in the last half of 1968 will be maintained in 1969. Continuous pressures will be exerted on enemy forces by operations aimed at denying the use of base areas, locating and destroying supply caches, interception of infiltrators, interdiction of Laotian supply routes, elimination of VC infrastructure and complete pacification of the country. To accomplish these objectives, the current tempo and intensity of operations and commitment of forces must be maintained. A too early relaxation of these pressures on the enemy would be a most serious strategic error.
SECTION V - CAPABILITIES OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(3) In addition to those Asian countries receiving military assistance through the Foreign Assistance Act, there are three countries receiving military assistance through the Department of Defense budget: Vietnam, Laos and Thailand. These three countries are, in varying degrees, the objectives of North Vietnamese aggression. Plans and programs for these three countries must be closely integrated to meet most effectively the communist threat.

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp

(U) There has been almost constant fighting in Laos since 1962, when the fighting was supposed to have stopped. The weak Pathet Lao are not the problem. The problem is that 40,000 North Vietnamese regular troops have been sent into Laos in violation of the 1962 accords. There can be no end to the conflict in Laos, even after the end of the Vietnam war, unless North Vietnam removes its troops from Laos.

In Thailand the externally directed and supported Communist insurgency is being met by the Thai Government with U. S. training and material assistance. The Thai Government's efforts have been increasingly effective, but rooting out Communist agents and agitators in remote mountain areas is a slow process. Thailand has been called the "rice bowl" of Southeast Asia because of its rich agricultural land, a tempting prize to an aggressor.

The "CORDS" teams operating in revolutionary development support in Vietnam include officers from the State Department, AID, the U.S. Information Agency, Army, Navy and Marines working together in close cooperation with Vietnamese military civilian elements at the national provincial and hamlet levels.

The massive military construction program in Vietnam was over 50 percent accomplished with Vietnamese labor working through U.S. private industrial firms under construction contract to the Navy.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. 1

Military Assistance Program (MAP), Southeast Asia

Introduction

(1) This section of Chapter IV is designed to cover only those items concerning MAP in Southeast Asia that are not elsewhere treated in this annual history, specifically the service-funded MAPs of South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. As explained in the "Introduction" to Chapter II, the organization of CINCPAC's multi-faceted MAP activities in such a manner, besides being logically based in the assigned missions and objectives of CINCPAC, also helps to provide a certain desirable continuity with earlier CINCPAC histories. Because of the unique character, complexity, and magnitude of the conflict in South Vietnam, many military assistance topics are mentioned in other portions of Chapter IV, especially in the logistics section. In this regard, the annual histories submitted by COMUSMACV and COMUSMAGTHAI, both of which are attached as Annexes A and B, respectively, to CINCPAC Command History 1968, provide more detailed information of MAP activities in Southeast Asia.

Other topics, such as personnel matters, concerning MAP activities in Southeast Asia are discussed in both Chapter I and II. The latter chapter also contains the Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) annual evaluations of all PACOM countries, as well as the item, "Strategic Mobility Work Projects for MAP and/or AID Funding," which deals primarily with MAP railroad stocks both in Thailand and South Vietnam. In addition, Chapter II covers in detail the MAPs in Burma, Malaysia, and Singapore, as well as Indonesia and the Philippines, which some geographers insist properly belong in the area encompassed by the term, Southeast Asia.

(U) "Nowhere have the Communists taken the offensive more openly than in Southeast Asia," observed the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow in an address early in 1968. He elaborated further:

Mindful of the rebuff the free world dealt the North Korean attempt at direct aggression in 1950, Communists in Southeast Asia are trying a newer and more sophisticated form of aggression. They call it the "War of National Liberation." It is a formidable weapon, as we have reason to know.

The nations of Southeast Asia are still weak, militarily and economically. Left to their own resources, it is unlikely that even the most determined of them would be able to resist the combination of external pressure and subversion from within. Should this Communist strategy succeed, a Communist-dominated Southeast Asia would result.

(S) Undoubtedly, "the most immediate Asian communist threat to the Far East is represented by current North Vietnamese incursions in SVN, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia, supported by the Soviet Union, Communist China, and some East European countries." In 1968, as in previous years, MAP-supported allied nations, not only in

2. Statement by LCOL J. S. Wilson, J2221A, Hq CINCPAC, in Enclosure 13 of Final Report of PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference - October 1968, which was prepared by LCOL Gerald S. Brown, USAF, J5313, Hq CINCPAC.
Southeast Asia, but in all of PACOM have been provided with the "requisite capabilities to maintain their own internal security and to counter communist-directed subversion or insurgency;" in fact, the significance of U.S. military assistance to threatened countries in Southeast Asia is well stated in a current CINCPAC MAP plan:

Demonstrated U.S. determination to preserve freedom in Southeast Asia has had a continuing beneficial effect on the resolve of free world nations in the Pacific to contribute to their common security, and to develop a sense of regional cooperation for their mutual benefit. The example of Free World Military Assistance Forces sent to Vietnam, which have continued to grow, illustrates most clearly the basic willingness of these nations to forcefully oppose the communist threat. Furthermore, the contribution of these Free World Forces has been significant, and can be expected to continue to be a rallying point in the combined efforts to free Vietnam and all of Asia of communist aggression. This fact cannot be ignored by world opinion when serious negotiations for a settlement are undertaken.

The free world forces of the Pacific, bolstered by the power of the United States, as demonstrated in Vietnam, are frustrating communist plans for "Wars of National Liberation." Success in Vietnam, combined with appropriate continuation of regional MAP support as an integral part of the U.S. assistance program, will assist in providing the secure conditions required for economic and political growth of the nations in the Pacific region.  

Effectiveness of Military Assistance Service Funded Programs (MASF)

(3) MAP, as ADM Sharp, CINCPAC, stated on 13 April 1967, "was neither designed nor intended to fight a war. Its purpose is to provide...

forces for internal security, deterrence and initial defense."1 Actually, by 1967, because of the Vietnam conflict, U.S. military assistance to both Laos and Thailand was directly related to the overall U.S. military effort in Southeast Asia. "Laos is in a combat situation where requirements fluctuate rapidly," wrote SECDEF on 14 February 1967, and "Thailand, where over 35,000 U.S. troops are now stationed, has become a base area vital to U.S. efforts to interdict Communist supply lines in Southeast Asia."2 SECDEF, therefore, proposed in early 1967 to the U.S. Congress that, like South Vietnam, "Laos and Thailand fell into a similar category of being actively involved, or engaged in open hostilities, in the conflict in Southeast Asia."3 As a result, he "waged a relentless campaign to secure the necessary legislation for transferring support responsibilities for the two forward defense countries to military service budgets."4 In the end, SECDEF's logic proved effective, and the "needed authority for the transfer of Laos and Thailand programs from MAP to DOD appropriations was enacted on 5 June 1967. It became effective at the first of the 1968 Fiscal Year on 1 July 1967."5

(2) "Congressional Committees are expected to ask Defense witnesses for Foreign Assistance Act about increase or decrease in effectiveness of assistance to Laos and Thailand resulting from transfer these programs to Defense budget," SECDEF informed CINCPAC on 11 March 1968; at the same time, he requested CINCPAC's "evaluation for use by Defense witnesses."6 Among the aspects to be considered were the effect of MASF on operations, logistics and common support, and delivery times, as well as the ability to respond to changing requirements under the new system. Specific examples to support CINCPAC's evaluation were also desired. In addition, the CINCPAC witness would have to be prepared to discuss this subject in all its ramifications, when he appeared before the Congressional Committees during the week of 8 April 1968.7

2. Ltr, SECDEF to Honorable Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 14 Feb 67, n.s.
5. Ibid., p. 246.
6. SECDEF 3246/112029Z Mar 68.
7. Ibid.; J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
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For preparing his response, CINCPAC tasked his component commanders, COMUSMACHTHAI, and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI with providing him the necessary input.¹ Their replies, coupled with the comments of William H. Sullivan, U.S. Ambassador to Laos, formed the basis for CINCPAC's response to SECDEF.² CINCPAC's message on 16 March 1968, as a result, provided "a consensus evaluation of the change in effectiveness of the Laos and Thai programs resulting from transfer to service funding."³

Actually, the basic purpose in transferring the Laos and Thailand programs from MAP to MASF, thereby removing their MAPs from the Foreign Assistance Act, "was to protect their dollar ceilings from reductions by Foreign Affairs Committees. The inclusion of the programs in Service appropriations in the Defense Budget presented a more compatible package to more sympathetic military affairs committees in Congress."² When the change was made on 1 July 1967, the programs for both countries were retained under MAP procedures, although their funding were included in the military services' budgets. As of mid-March 1968, the:

...only procedure exception concerned the processing of construction justification formats, and this currently is one problem area. A second problem area appears to be the difficulty the Services experience in accommodating program deviations from one Service appropriation to another or within a Service from one fiscal appropriation to another. This could be minimized by better country planning, but this is difficult in a fast changing situation. It could also be reduced if the country ceilings were considerably above the program, as in the case in FY 68 for Laos but not Thailand, and neither country in FY 69.⁴

³1. ADMINO CINCPAC 1202217 Mar 68.
²2. DEPCHJUSMAGT 8125/130835Z Mar 68; COMUSMACHT JUSMAGT MACTMAP 130927Z Mar 68; CINCUSARPAC 11386/140506Z Mar 68; ADMINO CINCPACFLT 131954Z Mar 68; CINCPACAF 141815Z Mar 68; AMEMBASSY Vientiane 5125/131106Z Mar 68; Point Paper, J532, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Mar 68, Subj: Effectiveness of Military Assistance to Laos and Thailand (C).
³3. J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
⁵5. Ibid.

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Besides providing a "consensus evaluation," CINCPAC's reply to SECDEF on 16 March 1968 contained a discussion on all the aspects requested by SECDEF as to the effects resulting from the changeover to service funding for Laos and Thailand, as well as specific examples to bolster his evaluation. CINCPAC ended his message with the following comments:

The continued use of MAP procedures and channels has materially assisted in program approval and processing of requirements, without disruption of support or reeducation of personnel on new techniques. However, the MASF program in Laos and Thailand has been in effect for less than one year. The MAP organizations remained intact and the transfer to MASF was completed with only minor difficulties. Time is required to adjust these minor matters. A better judgment can then be made on the increase or decrease in effectiveness of assistance to Laos and Thailand resulting from the transfer of these programs to the Defense Budget.

In summary, the transfers have had no significant adverse effect on program execution, although there are areas for improvements requiring attention. On the positive side, effectiveness has been increased through the responsiveness of the Service logistic systems to special requirements.1

T-28D Aircraft/Availability/Replacement

SECDEF, in mid-1967, had requested CINCPAC's "recommendations concerning future programs in Laos and Thailand for T-28D and/or replacement aircraft."2 Although sufficient T-28Ds were available in U.S. inventory for CINCPAC's projected attrition rates through FY 69, a decision was in process in Washington, D.C., on a suitable replacement for the T-28D in a COIN (Counterinsurgency) environment, such as in Laos and Thailand. Especially under consideration was the A-37B, which the U.S. Air Force thought was "the most cost-effective candidate aircraft."3 CINCPAC, however, had reservation about the A-37B, which he relayed to SECDEF on 9 October 1967.4

1. CINCPAC 162140Z Mar 68.
2. SECDEF 4366/191948Z Aug 67; for background, see p. 756 of CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. I.
3. Ibid.
Finally, on 19 April 1968, SECDEF advised CINCPAC that it had been agreed "that it is in best interest of USG to keep T-28 in inventory of both Laos and Thailand as long as possible. Therefore, CINCPAC is requested to program T-28D requirements for Laos and Thailand in updating FY 69-74 MA Plan." This decision negated any "requirement for early identification of a new COIN aircraft to replace the T-28D." As a result, on 27 April 1968, CINCPAC advised COMUSMAGTHAI and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI of the SECDEF message and requested that "T-28D aircraft be programmed until CSAF advises of non-availability, or that costs of T-28D procurement and modification exceed the estimated fly-away cost of a suitable replacement."^3

Language Survey in Countries of Southeast Asia

(U) During the early part of 1968, a Defense Language Institute (DLI) team made a language survey in countries of Southeast Asia. The field portion of the survey was conducted from 25 March through 17 April 1968. Representatives of the MAP Training Branch (J3A2), Hq CINCPAC, accompanied this team and participated in the survey. The purpose of the "survey was to conduct fact finding study of current in-country language programs, capabilities and requirements with objective toward improving effectiveness and economy of both English and" foreign language program in Southeast Asia. The final DLI report was to be prepared in Washington, D.C.; however, DLI preliminary comments were presented at a debriefing held at Hq CINCPAC on 18 April 1968. A summary of the significant items of this debriefing follows:

1. Coordination of language programs in-country by one senior language coordinator would reduce much duplication of effort and save substantial funds. Focal point control would increase effectiveness in terms of both quality and cost.

2. Expert DLI language trained personnel currently in the field who can provide assistance to a widespread number of language training programs

1. SECDEF 6931/191448Z Apr 68.
2. J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
3. CINCPAC 272213Z Apr 68.
4. J3A2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
are not properly utilized. These personnel often are retained in a static position at one installation resulting in many errors in language programming, laboratory equipment procurement, and operation in other locations which could be avoided by more effective utilization of available DLI personnel in-country.

3. An inadequate standardization of language training course material and an ineffective distribution of text and taped material hampers the operation and conduct of most language programs.

4. The Services have a limited ability to translate general requirements into a specific and effective language training plan.

5. Language training courses are prolonged by a variable general education level of trainees.

6. Identification of language-trained personnel is a continuing problem and results in mismanagement.

7. Capability of DLI to train U.S. personnel in foreign languages at CONUS schools has increased to the extent that the Services could consider termination of many in-country language programs developed by commanders to meet an immediate need.

8. Current joint regulations and instructions pertaining to the conduct and support of Defense Language Programs need updating to meet present requirements and conditions. An updating of CINCPAC instruction on English Language Programs is currently being staffed. ¹

Laos

Laos continues to be a critical area in Southeast Asia, as the war there has become ever more closely related to the war in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese continue to use the Laotian corridor as

¹ Ibid.
the main route to infiltrate men and supplies into South Vietnam. Recent actions in the vicinity of Attopeu and Saravane indicate a probable enemy attempt to expand their infiltration route to include Route 23, an all-weather road running north and south to the west of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

U.S. military assistance for Laos continues to follow the policy of providing only austere equipment and operating funds to meet immediate needs for military and paramilitary forces. The major items in the program are ammunition for the Lao Army and Air Force, and attrition replacement of unsophisticated aircraft, weapons and vehicles.

U.S. assistance to Laos is provided within the political restrictions of the Geneva agreements and with the objectives of maintaining a neutral buffer between North Vietnam and Thailand, and reducing enemy infiltration into South Vietnam. Expenditures will be required in proportion to the efforts of the North Vietnamese to thwart these objectives.

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp

Objectives of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI MASF

"United States Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) to Laos is designed to support the following objectives:"

1. To support the Armed Forces of the Royal Lao Government (RLG) to defeat insurgency in areas that are, or may, come under RLG control.

2. To support the Government of Prince Souvanna Phouma and to assist it to maintain its policy of non-alignment.

1. CINCPAC 9 Apr 68 MAP Statement.
LAOS
AS OF 1 JANUARY 1969

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA ......... 91,000 SQ. KM

ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA 4 ACRES

POPULATION ....... 2,700,000

LITERACY RATE .......... 12%

ANNUAL GROWTH ....... 2.4%

LIFE EXPECTANCY .. 35 YEARS

GROSS NATO PROD $186 MIL. PER CAPITA 67.35

KING - Sisavang Vatiana
PRIME MINISTER - MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MINISTER OF SOCIALIZED ACTION, MINISTER OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND LEADER OF THE NEUTRALIST FACTION - Prince Souvanna Phouma
VICE PREMIER, MINISTER OF EDUCATION, AND LEADER OF NATIONALIST FRACTION - Lounan Louvengui
VICE PREMIER, MINISTER OF ECONOMIC PLANNING AND LEADER OF THE COMMUNIST FRACTION - Prince Souphanouvong

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

TO PREVENT COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER IN LAOS.

U.S. AMBASSADOR
MR. WM. H. SULLIVAN

U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. CHARLES A. MANN

DEPUTY CHIEF, RNCMA THAILAND
MR. PAUL T. ROSS, USA

MILITARY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

(A) To support the armed forces of the Royal Lao Government (RLG) to defeat insurgency in areas that are or may come under LCI control.

(B) To support the government of Prince Souvanna Phouma, and to assist it to maintain its policy of non-alignment.

(C) To maintain Laos as a neutral buffer between Thailand and North Vietnam and Communist China.

(D) To disrupt the flow of North Vietnamese forces and material through Laos into South Vietnam.

MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES

ARMY

20 GM, 63 INF BNS, 4 ABN BNS, 40 VOLS, 10 FLD ARTY, 6 RECON TRPS.
1 ENG BNS, 59 PARA MIL CO, 1 PET WAR BN, 1 RIVER CP BN.

NAVY

NAVY

AIR FORCE

4 TAC FTR WINGS, 4 AIRLIFT WINGS.

TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

FAW FORCES, 10 GM, 24 INF BNS, 5 PARA BNS, 38 VOLS, 4 ARMY BNS, 6 ARTY BNS, 3 ENG BNS, 30 PARA MIL CO, 5 PARA MIL CO, 1 PARA MIL CO, 2 PARA MIL COMP, 1 ARMY MIL CO.

TRANSPORT

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, MILITARY AMBASSADOR COMMAND, AIR MATERIAL COMMAND, TRAINING WING, 1 T-28, 10 OH-34, 17 C-47, 2 MISCellanEOUS.

25 T-28 AVAILABLE FOR USE IN Laos. ONLY 2 ARE Lao OWNED. ADDITIONALLY 15 OH-34's OPERATE BY AIR AMERICA.


* DOES NOT INCLUDE PART OF AFRICAN PEACEKEEPER MILITARY FORCES

** AS OF 1 JULY 1968

*** AS OF 1 JULY 1968

DOES NOT REFLECT PROPOSED CONCEPT

SECRET
(3) To maintain Laos as a neutral buffer between Thailand, North Vietnam and Communist China.

(4) To disrupt the flow of North Vietnamese forces and materiel through Laos into South Vietnam. 1

**Brief Background on DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI MAP**

(5) In order to better understand the unique nature of U.S. military assistance in Laos, the following brief background has been furnished:

(6) In 1964, training for Lao officers and men was resumed. To date, three of these battalions have engaged in a sustained battle with the PL and have deported themselves well.

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During the past five years military operations in Laos have gradually increased in scope. Both the government forces and the Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese frequently use regimental size forces. This intensification of the conflict after the Geneva Accords demanded an increase in ammunition outlays and in the replacement of war damaged and lost equipment. Added to this were the demands of a more sophisticated logistical system, increases in the inventory used by the Royal Lao Air Force, the formation of the two new Groups Mobile (GMs), continuing requirements for maintenance assistance, and the reorganization of the Neutralists. An additional burden was imposed in 1966 when the Lao Armed Forces increased to the present military assistance supported force of 75,000 men.¹

**Major FY 68 MASF Add-On**

As early as 22 March 1968, CINCPAC advised "that increased ammunition requirements will create a large shortfall in FY 69 MASF Program for Laos and recommends action required to eliminate the shortfall."² By April, it was apparent that the requirements, primary ammunition, would exceed the FY 69 MASF ceiling of $96 million. "Meanwhile, FY 68 MASF was below the $97 million ceiling by approximately $19 million. In order to preclude shortfall in FY 69 or having to exceed the ceiling," DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI "was requested to consider programming some FY 69 requirements in FY 68 for FY 68 funding."³

DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI replied to CINCPAC on 2 April, replying that ammunition would be the ideal vehicle for accomplishing this goal. FY 68 U.S. Army ammunition funds were exhausted and U.S. Air Force ammunition was running low, while three more months still remained in the fiscal year. In addition, there was a requirement to increase the stockage level. This increase, however, was quantitative only, since the days supply of stockage remained the same. "It is emphasized

2. CINCPAC 222334Z Mar 68, cited in DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 8156/020540Z Apr 68.
3. J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
that stockage objectives must be increased now," stated DEPCHJUSMAG-THAI, "in FY 68, and so maintained into FY 69 to insure availability of critical items of ammunition to fully and adequately support combat operations in Laos." 1

(S) To secure FY 68 Laos MASF Program Add-On that was needed, CINCPAC sent a message to SECDEF on 12 April 1968. The more pertinent portions of CINCPAC's message follows:

1. Military activities in Laos during the past six months have not followed historical patterns whereby increases and decreases are experienced dependent upon season. This current period has been marked by sustained enemy ground actions and resultant increased ground and air activities of Royal Lao Armed Forces. . . . It is anticipated that no decrease in military activity will be experienced during the forthcoming rainy season, and that the unusually high rate of ammunition consumption will continue. . . .

3. In order to attain required ammunition stockage objectives and to support projected ammunition consumption through FY 69, an additional $11 million is required in the Laos MASF program. It appears more feasible to fund a program increase in FY 68 within the established ceiling rather than to increase the FY 69 MASF program and ceiling at this time.

4. FY 68 funding would also permit attainment of increased stockage objectives at the earliest possible date. However, because the close of the fiscal year is near, an exception to cut-off policy . . . will be required to use FY 68 funds through the first quarter of FY 69 for this purpose.

1. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 8156/020540Z Apr 68; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
5. Recommend that:

a. $4,909,400 be added to RCN 8AS21 and $6,242,600 to RCN 8AS20 in the FY 68 program.

b. An exception to cut-off policy as outlined in para 4 above, be approved.¹

(S) "The rationale voiced in para 3," in CINCPAC's message, answered SECDEF on 25 April 1968, "concerning the increase within established FY 68 ceilings is concurred in."² As a result, the requests by CINCPAC for increases in Laos MASF ammunition funding for FY 68 in the amounts of approximately $4.9 million for Army ammunition and $6.2 million for Air force ammunition were approved.³

FY 69 MASF Program

MAGTHAI refines these requirements and submits them to CINCPAC. "The Laos MASF is unique in that while a ceiling is provided, planning guidance states that programming should be to requirements without regard to ceiling."⁴ The FY 68 Laos MASF, for instance, with a ceiling of $97.0 million, resulted in a program of only $89.9 million. The reason for this discrepancy was that, at SECDEF's direction, some of the FY 68 ammunition requirements had been funded in FY 67, while planned attrition aircraft had also been funded in FY 67 instead of FY 68. As explained in the preceding subsection, $6.2 million of the $89.9 million for FY 68 actually represented FY 69 ammunition requirements that had been programmed in FY 68, with SECDEF's approval, in order to prevent the FY 69 ceiling from being exceeded. As calendar year 1968 drew to a close, the FY 69 Laos MASF program was being "closely monitored in order to ferret out any dollar lines, particularly in ammunition, which might result in a savings not only in FY 69 but in subsequent years."⁵

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1. CINCPAC 120230Z Apr 68.
2. SECDEF 7445/252138Z Apr 68.
3. Ibid.; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
5. Ibid.
FY 70 MASF Program

(5) On 22 November 1968, SECDEF advised CINCPAC that the FY 70 Laos MASF program was below the dollar ceiling and requested CINCPAC to "submit program changes necessary to adjust ODMA program file to approved levels." ¹ CINCPAC, in turn, requested DEPCJUSMAGTHAI four days later that "the necessary additional program data in the amount of $218 thousand be submitted ASAP to adjust the FY 70 MASF, to the approved level of $96 million." ²

(5) When DEPCJUSMAGTHAI replied on 29 November 1968, he provided program changes for $600,000 in order to increase the FY 70 Laos MASF program to the approved level. This amount was necessary, since there had been a recent reduction in Air Force Ammunition requirements of $411,000. ³ The "Laos Program data to increase ODMA file to the $96 million ceiling were transmitted by AUTODIN Station SER # 5725 dtd 29 Nov 68," reported CINCPAC to SECDEF on 3 December 1968. ⁴

River Patrol Craft (RPC)

(5) In a message to DEPCJUSMAGTHAI on 2 May 1966, ⁵ related the following:

"We are left with an unacceptable delay in satisfying the urgent operational needs for patrol craft on the upper Mekong. Current situation serious enough to restrict all convoy movement and has necessitated airlift of rice from Ban Houei Sai at a prohibitive cost.

Request discussion earliest with COMUSMACTHAI for loan of two RPC from RTN: preferably the RPC not configured with radar. Discussion should consider benefit to be gained to RTG by improving river security as well as possible assistance in evaluation on suitability for use of RPC on Mekong." ⁵

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1. SECDEF 6140/221658Z Nov 68.
2. CINCPAC 260305Z Nov 68.
3. DEPCJUSMAGTHAI 8513/291031Z Nov 68; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
4. CINCPAC 032341Z Dec 68.
5. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 6227/021026Z May 68.
had asked for these two RPCs on a loan basis from the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) but, according to the USDAO in Bangkok, Thailand, the "DOD Military Assistance Manual does not permit direct transfer or loan of MAP supplied equipment by a receiving country to a third country. However, the manual does provide for the return to the U.S. of items not meeting a need or that are in excess of requirements." The USDAO in Bangkok, therefore proposed that the Royal Thai Government (RTG) be asked to declare as excess the three RPCs not then in use so that they could be returned to the U.S. and given to Laos under the U.S. AID program. He pointed out, however, that "if Thai agree, they will want assurance of either replacement or equivalent compensation under MAP."  

On 20 May 1968, CINCPAC concurred in the proposed discussions, but he insisted that they "must not include any agreement or statement which might be construed as committing the United States to replacement or equivalent compensation under MAP." Two days later, the USDAO in Bangkok, Thailand, questioned "the necessity for this restrictive caveat."  

In a joint message on 24 May 1968 to both SECDEF and the USDAO in Bangkok, CINCPAC set forth his views on the subject:  

FOR USDAO BANGKOK. Caveat is considered necessary in that availability of RPCs from Vietnam in FY 69 through excess is not firm and should not be used for bargaining purposes. In addition, Part II, Chap I, MAM states that no discussions or written agreements which imply future performance or future expenditure of US funds will be made or implied without specific approval of DMA.

FOR OASD/ISA. In view of urgency expressed... and contingent upon approval by RTG, request

1. USDAO/Bangkok Thailand 761/130705Z May 68; AMEMBASSY Vientiane 6227/021026Z May 68.
2. USDAO/Bangkok Thailand 761/130705Z May 68.
3. CINCPAC 201912Z May 68; J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
4. USDAO Bangkok 835/221044Z May 68, cited in CINCPAC 241958Z May 68.
authorization for loan of two RPCs from RTN to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI for use in Laos. Though contrary to provisions of MAP, loan is the most feasible and expedient means to satisfy immediate requirements on upper Mekong. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI is taking action to procure engines for French built craft. When these boats are operational RPCs on loan will be returned to RTG.  

(U) Four days later, SECDEF granted the necessary authorization to CINCPAC for carrying out his request.  

Expedited Shipment of T-28 Aircraft  

"In view of present tactical situation, pilot availability, and training requirement," the Lao "Prime Minister has requested expedited delivery of at least twelve T-28D acft. We strongly endorse this request." The next day, the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force asked CINCPAC's comments concerning this request and the airlift of the 12 T-28s. "Considering the current attrition rate of three T-28 acft per month and the requirement...," replied CINCPAC on 1 March 1968, he concurred "with recommendation to airlift 12 acft as suggested..." As a result, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI could report on 23 April 1968:  

...All actions were handled in a most expeditious and outstanding manner, permitting the request to be fulfilled in an amazingly short time. From date of initial request, 27 Feb 68, expedited deliveries by C-133 aircraft to Udorn RTAFB, Thailand, began on 11 March 68 with the last aircraft delivered on 10 April 68.  

1. CINCPAC 241958Z May 68.  
2. SECDEF 1125/282120Z May 68; J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.  
3. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 4765/271114Z Feb 68.  
4. CSAF AFMSMSDA 282056Z Feb 68.  
5. CINCPAC 010441Z Mar 68.  
6. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 3194/250858Z Apr 68; J4334 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
Side Firing C-47s

(5) On 26 August 1968, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI requested "immediate action" by CINCPAC on approving and authorizing the modification of four C-47s to provide side firing—three .50 caliber M-3 machine guns on two mounts utilizing a MK-20 Mod 4 gun sight—and flare drop capability. Besides citing a message from the American Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, of 17 August 1968, which established "a requirement for .50 cal side firing capability in four (4) each MAP Laos C-47 acft," DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI stated:

It is presently planned that subject acft, when modified, will be deployed one (1) each at the four (4) major Laos bases (Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Savannakhet and Pakse) in support of Base/area defenses. The actual loss of acft to date at Luang Prabang as a result of enemy action and the continuing threat to all four bases justify the cost and urgent need for the requested capability. 2

(5) CINCPAC took three separate actions on 31 August 1968. To facilitate his evaluation of the proposal, he requested DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI for additional information. From CINCPACAF, he requested comments and recommendations on the proposal. In addition, he asked the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (CSAF) to provide DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI with availability information and the MASL (Military Assistance Program Articles and Services List) data for the requested modification. CINCPACAF’s recommendation was to take no further action until the results of WRAMA (Warner Robbins Air Material Area) evaluations were available and the cost of the installation was known. WRAMA provided the desired information, but the issue was further complicated on 11 October 1968, when DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI informed CINCPAC that he was "reviewing the possibility of installing a PSYOPS capability" in the four C-47s and requested information on this subject. 3 Once this information was provided, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI told the American Embassy in Vientiane that "Hq USAF has rejected this proposal on the grounds that

1. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 8418/260900Z Aug 68.
2. Ibid.
3. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 2497/111000Z Oct 68; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68; CINCPAC 310403Z Aug 68.
loudspeakers installed in the same acft with guns and flares presents a hazard to the crew" and passed on the cost of the Class V Mod 2165 for giving the C-47 a side firing capability. ¹

By letter on 19 November 1968, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI requested the installation of the Class V Mod 2165 to give the C-47 a side firing capability.² "In order to evaluate suitability for use by DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI," CINCPAC requested of CSAF on 30 November "details of this Mod to include number of guns, rate of fire and effect on cargo space."³ The U.S. Air Force Logistics Command provided CINCPAC with the desired information on 11 December 1968.⁴ After further evaluation, CINCPAC decided before the end of the calendar year to modify the four C-47s in Laos with a side firing capability by using Class V Mod 2165, with an estimated leadtime of one year.⁵

Thailand

Thailand is of key importance in our Southeast Asian strategy. Air operations in Southeast Asia are, to a large extent, dependent upon our bases and facilities in that country. Our bombers and fighters, staging from Thai bases, have flown over 7000 sorties each month against targets in Laos and in the execution of the air war over North Vietnam. Many of our air crews have been rescued in Laos and Vietnam by helicopters based in Thailand. The security of Thailand is important to U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia. This security is increasingly threatened by a major communist effort in the north and northeast areas. Through military assistance, we are aiding the Royal Thai Government to counter this externally supported and directed subversion. The priority of U.S. military assistance effort in Thailand is directed toward improving the operational readiness of the Thai

1. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 1160/010850Z Nov 68.
2. J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
3. CINCPAC 302257Z Nov 68.
4. AFLC MCO1A 112011Z Dec 68.
5. J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.

SECRET

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Armed Forces through expanded and accelerated programs of training, equipment modernization and facilities improvements.

At the same time, Thailand is making a notable contribution to the Free World Forces in South Vietnam. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment, which deployed to Vietnam last September, is earning a creditable combat record. The Thais have announced their intention to expand this regiment to divisional size. A brigade of this divisional force is currently in training and is expected to deploy to Vietnam in July.

Military Assistance for Thailand in FY 69 will continue to enhance the capabilities of Thai forces to deter overt communist aggression and will assist these forces in their efforts to promote internal security. A successful program is important to the retention of Thailand as a cooperative and capable member of the Free World community.

Admiral U.S. G. Sharp

Objectives of Thailand MAF

(S) United States Military Assistance, Service Funded (MASF) Plan Thailand is designed to support the following objectives:

a. To assist Thailand in defending its independence and sovereignty against communist aggression, infiltration, insurgency and subversion.

b. To assist Thailand in increasing the safety and stability, and improving the economic status of the strategically important North, Northeast and Southern Peninsula with particular emphasis on greater counter-subversion and anti-guerrilla capabilities.

1. CINCPAC 9 Apr 68 MAP Statement.
THAILAND
AS OF 1 JANUARY 1969

### BASIC INFORMATION

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**Defense Budget Includes Internal Security**

**KING:** Phumipon Adul Phem
**Prime Minister Supreme Commander Thai:** Armed Forces - Field Marshal Thammar Kittikachorn
**CINC NAVY:** Adm. Charoom Chakrutharan
**CINC AF:** Air Marshal Komath Chantubhones
**CINC ARMY:** Gen. Poompee Chantubhones

### MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES

- 1 INF DIV, 2 PST WAR CO, 1 RC (2 SEPS), 1 SF OP, 1 ABN BN, 1 ARTY BN (955), 1 MECH BN, 5 MCH (10, 187), 1 ENGR BN, 1 MECR BN (SEPS), 1 ARTY BN, 1 MED (LARA BN)
- 4 DE/FP, 43 PATROL CRAFT, 35 MINESWAR, 2 ASR, 2 MMC, 9 LANDING SHIPS, 1 REPAIR SHIP, 1 MAR REGT

### TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

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<td>Air Force</td>
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</table>

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1966

### OVERALL OBJECTIVES

- Promote Thai-U.S. relations in defense of Thailand's vital importance to U.S. military positions in Southeast Asia and to U.S. goals of increasing the efficiency of Thai defense, maintaining the political stability of the area.

### U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

- **U.S. Ambassador:** Maj. Gen. Hal D. McCormick
- **U.S. Air Director:** Maj. Gen. Howard L. Parsons
- **Consul General & Chief Mission Officer:** Maj. Gen. Hal D. McCormick

### MILITARY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

(A) To assist Thailand in defending its independence and sovereignty against Communist aggression, infiltration, insurgency, and subversion.
(B) To assist Thailand in increasing the safety and stability, and improving the economic status of the strategically important North, Northeast, and Southern Peninsulas with particular emphasis on greater counterinsurgency and guerrilla capabilities.
(C) To assist Thailand to make a force contribution for the defense of Free World countries threatened by Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Cost of Thai force in Vietnam and associated replacement training are a Vietnam related cost excluded from the Dollar Guidelines, Annual Programs.
(D) To ensure the availability for United States of base and port facilities, overflight rights, transit or staging services, and landing privileges, as required.

### COMBAT CAPABILITY

- Maintain internal security and offer limited resistance to external aggression.
- Marginally satisfactory, patrol capability in Gulf of Thailand and internal waterways.
- Limited airborne operations and close support for Army; Day Air Defense. Army air arm has little capability to perform observation and some logistical support. Source: PACOM Digest Feb. 69, p. 157.
c. To assist Thailand to make a force contribution for the defense of Free World countries threatened by Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Cost of Thai force in Vietnam and associated replacement training are a Vietnam related cost excluded from the Dollar Guidelines, Annual Programs.

d. To insure availability to the United States of base and port facilities, overflight rights, intransit or staging services, and landing privileges, as required.1

**Brief Summary of Past Accomplishments of Thailand MAP**

(2) The following is a generalized summary of what U.S. military assistance to Thailand has accomplished since the incipience of MAP:

During the past 17 years of Military Assistance to Thailand, over $663 million has been expended to weld the small fragmented RTARF units into a relatively modern, effective force. The Armed Forces total strength has increased from 67,000 to 146,000. With MAP assistance the Royal Thai Army (RTA) has evolved into an effective force capable of meeting most of the requirements related to countering the initial phases of an insurgency; the RTN has developed a small fleet with limited capabilities in patrol, anti-submarine, mine warfare and amphibious operations; the Marines (RTMC) field capabilities have constantly improved; and the Air Force (RTAF) has been transformed into an effective combat force with ten tactical squadrons. Without MAP, Thailand would have been much more susceptible to communist aggression, external and internal.2

2. Ibid., p. 21.
FY 68 Thailand MASF Add-On

(S) Early in October 1967, at the instructions of President Johnson, the Foreign Minister of Thailand was informed that the U.S. was prepared to increase its MA support for Thailand from $60 to $75 million for both FY 68 and FY 69.\(^1\) By letter on 9 November 1967, the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Leonard Unger, "set forth the U.S. commitment to the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to assist in maintaining the capability and accelerating the modernization of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF)."\(^2\) This agreement between the U.S. and the RTG on the FY 68 MASF add-on was to have been negotiated concurrently with another agreement on the organization and deployment of additional Thai military forces to South Vietnam. This latter agreement was resolved without any major delay, but the RTG did delay negotiations on the composition of the FY 68 MASF add-on.\(^3\)

(S) In fact, COMUSMACTHAI spent 'almost four months negotiating the add-on with the RTG.\(^4\) SECDEF, on 20 December 1967, requested "that the $15 million add-on package for FY 68 be submitted to SECDEF ASAP."\(^5\) Based upon priority requirements expressed by the Chief of Staff, Royal Thai Army (RTA), COMUSMACTHAI developed tri-service priority lists for the add-on package, which, with certain revisions, was approved by the U.S. Mission and RTG officials. This recommended add-on package was submitted by COMUSMACTHAI to CINCPAC by letter on 23 January 1968.\(^6\)

(S) The discussions with the Thai had resulted in a modification in the composition of the FY 68 MASF add-on. "The requirement for modernization has been recognized," explained CINCPAC to SECDEF on 2 February 1968, "but the highest priority has been placed on increased

1. SECSTATE 50591/071752Z Oct 67, cited in J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68 and CINCPAC 020149Z Feb 68.
2. Point Paper, J5323, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Apr 68, Subj: Thailand FY 68 MASF $15 Million Add-on; CINCPAC 020149Z Feb 68.
3. J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
6. J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
Above, an 81mm mortar drill at the 7th RCT, Chiang Mai, Thailand. Below, an artillery battalion of the 7th RCT with a 75mm pack howitzer (disassembled).
mobility, communications and operational readiness for counterinsurgency (CI) operations. After recommending SECDEF's "approval and expeditious funding of the $15 million FY 68 add-on," CINCPAC went on to state that the "add-on is being forwarded via Autodin as a supplemental and separate program which will be combined with the basic $60 million program after approval." By mid-1968, approval on this matter had been made and the additional equipment was being provided the Thai.

FY 69 Thailand MASF

(5) As with the FY 68 MASF program, Ambassador Unger made a U.S. commitment to the Thai to raise the dollar ceiling for FY 69 Thailand MASF "from $60 to $75 million and for a joint U.S.-Thai review of the FY 69 MASF program." During the following discussions, agreement was reached by the RTG and U.S. Country Team on the FY 69 Thailand MASF program.

(6) Then, on 10 September 1968, SECDEF notified CINCPAC that the recommendation "for 30 M-41 tanks in FY 69 Thailand MASF program...is disapproved. Request program input in comparable amount for other priority RTA requirements directed towards counterinsurgency needs." CINCPAC, in turn, made COMUSMACTHAI aware of this new development five days later, and he submitted a Country Team reclamation of the SECDEF's decision to CINCPAC on 28 September.

(5) Meanwhile, on 2 October 1968, Ambassador Unger made SECSTATE aware of the Country Team reclamation and expanded on the force structure planning implications of the deletion of the tanks;

After a thorough review, we concluded that whatever additional CI input we might gather from

1. CINCPAC 020149Z Feb 68.
2. Ibid.
5. SECDEF 9138/101942Z Sep 68.
6. COMUSMACTHAI 280520Z Sep 68.
UH-3H helicopter ready for test hop at the Aeronautical Depot, Bangsue, Thailand. Below, F-86F undergoing inspection and repair at the Aeronautical Depot, Don Muang.
an alternate spending of the $813,000 would be more than outweighed by the adverse effects of not providing the tanks, among which would be RTA reconditioning of M24, using funds which would otherwise be used for CI operations support....

As Dept aware, the FY 69 program was developed by joint review. Whatever the USG's ultimate prerogatives may be in formulating MAP programs, the fact remains that, in view of the background stated in the reclama, a unilateral decision on our part to delete this major item would seriously disturb our relations with the RTA.

The Embassy however agrees that there are serious reasons for reexamining the force structure... particularly in relation to units with heavy equipment such as tanks which absorb what may be an undue proportion of over-stretched resources in relation to their applicability to the priority security threats facing Thailand. For this reason Mission is exploring means... Meanwhile we believe that any action which would telegraph to the Thai that we have made any basic unilateral decisions regarding force structure should await the results of studies. Otherwise we would run serious risks of compromising the ongoing bilateral discussions of force planning which are our best hope of influencing the RTARF to adopt the type of force structure which would both meet the contingencies of the future and be fully effective within resource limitations.

.................................

Lastly, it should be pointed out that the FY 69 program retains enough flexibility, especially because of time slippage on HAWK support, to finance contingency CI items which may arise.

1. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 21034/0207072 Oct 68.
Above, new MAP construction at the Naval Rating School, Sattahip, Thailand. Below, construction of a reefer warehouse at the deep water port, Sattahip.
After passing on the Country Team's reclamation and Ambassador Unger's remarks, as well as his own comments, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS on 11 October 1968 "that the decision to delete the 30 M-41 tanks from the FY 69 program be reconsidered and that a program directive be issued to the Department of the Army." Just five days later, SECDEF expressed appreciation for the "detailed rationale supporting" the reclamation by the Country Team, Ambassador Unger, and CINCPAC and admitted that the earlier "OSD disapproval was based on insufficient justification received in Washington." Subsequently, after this reversal of his earlier decision, SECDEF arranged for a program directive for the 30 M-41 tanks in the FY 69 Thailand MASF to be issued to the Department of the Army.

FY 70 Thailand MASF

On 22 November 1968, SECDEF advised CINCPAC that the FY 70 Thailand MASF program was above its dollar ceiling and requested the submission of:

...program changes necessary to adjust ODMA program file to approved levels. Further request definitization of Thailand ABBR plan reqmts RCN AU39 MAPEL 7DIVA for $202,185 and RCN TA10 MAPEL 2BDA for $1,200,000, MAPEL description not sufficiently specific to relate requirement to particular military function appropriation account. If definitization not feasible at the present, narrative statement indicating types of additional equipment or operating maintenance costs will be acceptable.

COMUSMACTHAI provided CINCPAC on 26 November with the line items to be changed through deletes, decreases, and adjustments in order to reduce the FY 70 Thailand MASF program to the $60.3 million level. This program data was transmitted by CINCPAC via AUTODIN the next day. As CINCPAC explained it to SECDEF on 3 December 1967:

1. CINCPAC 112124Z Oct 68.
2. SECDEF 3132/161549Z Oct 68.
3. J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
4. SECDEF 6140/221658Z Nov 68.
MAAG/Mission expenses, Generic Code T2.A, at $300,000 was not included in the CINCPAC submission of the Thailand FY 70 MASF program at the $60 million level and has not been included in subsequent year programs. These costs, under MAP procedures, (which apply to Thailand) are non-regional costs outside of country ceiling. The FY 68 and FY 69 country program levels were increased to absorb the T2A costs. Therefore, the FY 70 and subsequent year program dollar ceilings should be increased accordingly to accommodate the MAAG/Mission expenses.¹

At the same time, CINCPAC furnished SECDEF with the desired information and changes concerning the two ABBR line items. "All Thailand program changes cited" in this message of CINCPAC's on 3 December 1968, reported SECDEF on 6 December, "have been processed. ODMA file now reflects requirements totalling $60,289,993 which includes $300,000 MAAG/Mission expenses."²

Closed Circuit TV

The proposal, contained in a CINCPAC message of 27 September 1967, for a closed circuit TV for the Supreme Command Operations Center in Thailand was subsequently disapproved by SECDEF for inclusion in the FY 68 Thailand MASF funding. Early in 1968, however, SECDEF reconsidered this decision. "Determination has now been made," CINCPAC was advised by SECDEF on 13 January 1968, "that project is justified."³

Policy Guidelines for U.S. MA to Thai Counterinsurgency Effort

As of June 1968, the internal threat analysis of Thailand was generally as follows:

1. CINCPAC 032341Z Dec 68; J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68; COMUSMACTHAI 261130Z Nov 68.
2. SECDEF 7163/062216Z Dec 68; CINCPAC 032341Z Dec 68.
3. SECDEF 7225/131714Z Jan 68; J4311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68; CINCPAC 270057Z Sep 67, cited in SECDEF 7225/131714Z Jan 68.
Events of the last half of 1967 and early 1968 indicate that the Communist threat to Thailand is not diminishing. The well-organized ambushes in the west-central region plus the outbreak of armed clashes in the north characterized by a high degree of professionalism on the part of the insurgent units, offers evidence of the intensification and spread of the Communist effort. Insurgent activities outside of Northeast Thailand is not merely of a diversionary nature, but represents a determined effort to broaden the Communist influence in those areas for the eventual overthrow of the Royal Thai Government.1

Speaking before the PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference in October 1968, MAJ GEN Hal D. McCown, USA, COMUSMACV/CHJUSMAGTHAI, stressed the importance of Thai's efforts to suppress the communist-directed insurgency and the role of the United States in aiding this effort:

This afternoon I will elaborate on some of the main items of general interest in developments in Thailand regarding the MAAG. First and foremost is insurgency in Thailand and our efforts to improve the Thais capability to counter insurgency.

Today the Thai Government is faced with the problem of eliminating over 2,000 armed insurgents, most of whom are in the Northeast. In addition, the Thai confront an estimated 800 communist terrorists operating in its southern provinces and controlled by the communist party of Malaysia.

The Thai Government has established a Communist Suppression Operations Command to control and coordinate the insurgency problem. Within this organization, civil-police-military organizations provide province Governors a means to control activities in their provinces. Last fall the Army commanders in the Northeast and North

were given authority under martial law to control all CI activities in the most threatened provinces.

The first priority in our MAP support has been to improve these deployed forces in firepower, mobility, communications and logistics support. The RTA has supported this priority by directing that CI Training will have first priority in the RTA training program. ¹

(5) As early as March 1967, as reported in last year's history, the JCS had proposed to SECDEF certain guidelines, which they "considered consistent with the advisory and training role and present U.S. military assistance activities in Thai counterinsurgency."² The resultant "Policy Guidelines for U.S. Military Assistance to the Thai Counterinsurgency Efforts," were still in the process of being refined at the end of calendar year 1967.³

(5) In a message to the JCS on 1 January 1968, CINCPAC stated that no air commando support of Thai counterinsurgency operations after 31 March 1968 "will be performed except in an overriding circumstance and then after appropriate approvals have been obtained;" however, he "recommended that there be no withdrawal of 606th ACS (now 56th ACW) assets from Thailand," since U.S. "operational requirements will exceed current and projected air commando assets in Thailand."⁴ In addition, he recommended that two C-123 aircraft and a twenty-man U.S. Mobile Training Team (MTT) (for maintenance) be provided to the Royal Thailand Air Force (RTAF) through MASF. On 26 April 1968, the JCS informed CINCPAC that his recommendations had all been approved and that the two C-123s and a MTT would be provided to RTAF by 1 June 1968.⁵

1. Address in Enclosure 7 of Final Report of PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference - October 1968, which was prepared by LCOL Gerald S. Brown, USAF, J5313, Hq CINCPAC.
3. Ibid., pp. 763-765.
4. CINCPAC 010209Z Jan 68.
5. JCS 7511/261314Z Apr 68; J5531 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
As a result, CINCPAC dispatched the following message to COMUSMACTHAI on the revised policy guidelines:

Based on DEPSECEDEF decision on 18 April 68
the following is provided for information and compliance.

a. 606th ACS assets will not be withdrawn
from Thailand.

b. The RTG should not be notified that U.S.
support is being terminated. COMUSMACTHAI should
emphasize the development by RTG of a capability to
handle its own problems. COMUSMACTHAI should
keep the AMEMB Bangkok fully informed and coordinate
any actions with respect to the above with AMEMB
Bangkok.

c. The request for five O-1E aircraft to free
U-10s for liaison lift for province governors should be
programmed and justified in accordance with MAP/MASF
procedures. Aircraft requirements are to be considered
within the present country MASF dollar ceilings.

d. The loan of H-34 aircraft to the RTG pending
delivery of UH-1s has been disapproved.¹

For those interested, a detailed listing of the "Policy Guidelines
for U.S. Military Assistance to Thai Counterinsurgency Efforts," to
include "CINCPAC Policy Guidelines" and "Mission Policy Guidelines,"
as well as "COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI Implementing and
Procedural Instructions," can be found on page 144 of Developments in
Thailand Report 1st Quarter FY 69, published by Headquarters,
COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI, on 1 October 1968.

Replacement AC-47 for Thailand

During the night of 12 December 1967, a RTAF AC-47, which
was equipped with searchlights and mini-guns, crashed and burned on the

1. ADMINO CINCPAC 140400Z May 68.
runway of the Nakhon Phanom RTAF Base. Its destruction was allegedly the fault of an USAF Staff Sergeant, who perished in the accident. Four days later, COMUSMACTHAI asked CINCPAC for guidance on what assurances he could give the RTG on this aircraft being replaced, thus preventing any unfavorable repercussions. CINCPAC advised him on 19 December 1967 to make no commitment until further notice. Meanwhile, CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF for information and recommendations upon which to base a reply to COMUSMACTHAI. On 30 December 1967, CINCPACAF recommended to CSAF that an AC-47 should be declared excess to USAF and furnished to Thailand. The same day, "pending permanent resolution of problem," he requested the 7th Air Force to "investigate feasibility providing acft on temporary loan basis" to RTAF until one could be permanently furnished. 1

(9) CSAF advised CINCPAC on 19 January 1968 that "AC-47 aircraft are not available.... At present, 7.62 guns are in short supply.... In addition, RTAF is authorized aircraft only for an airlift type mission, not a defensive/attack type similar to the AC-47." 2 The following day, CINCPACAF requested the 7th Air Force "to prepare one AC-47E... for temporary loan to Royal Thai Air Force." 3 Accordingly, this plane was in place in Thailand on 25 January 1968. 4

(1C) Early tht next month, on 2 February, CINCPAC reopened the problem of a suitable replacement aircraft with his following message to CSAF:

The AC-47 allegedly destroyed by USAF airman was property of RTG. Because of political considerations, it is essential that the destroyed RTAF AC-47 be replaced in kind.

RTAF FY 68 MAP RCN to add one AC-47 at no cost to MAP as replacement can be submitted to

2. CSAF AFOAPE 192249Z Jan 68.
3. CINCPACAF 200315Z Jan 68.
4. 7thAF Tan Son Nhut AFLD RVN 261155Z Jan 68; J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
OASD/ISA on your confirmation that an AC-47
(same configuration as destroyed RTAF acft) will
be provided.

...temporary loan AC-47 in place. Decision
on permanent replacement AC-47 needed earliest. 1

(2) "We concur with your position that the RTAF AC-47 allegedly
destroyed by USAF airman," replied CSAF on 8 February 1968, "should
be replaced in kind." 2 Once CINCPACAF had made a determination as to
which AC-47 was to be assigned to RTAF on a permanent basis, continued
CSAF, CINCPAC was requested to provide the necessary programming
information. 3

Overhaul of a Royal Thailand Navy (RTN) HU-16 Aircraft

(2) On 20 March 1968, CINCPAC requested the concurrence of the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to overhaul a RTN HU-16 aircraft in
Taiwan by the Chinese Air Force (CAF). "In light of the reduction to
China MAP ceiling," CINCPAC pointed out, "contracts which may generate
credit payments to the GRC are encouraged. " 4 Not only was CAF capable
of performing the desired overhaul and ready to commence work imme-
diately, but repayment could "be in form of barter by establishing credit
in the amount of contracted price against which CAF could draw desired
defense items." 5

(2) CNO informed CINCPAC on 7 May 1968 that he could not concur
with CINCPAC's proposal, because this procedure was "of doubtful legality
under existing authorities. Position confirmed by NAVCOMPT General
Counsel." 6 Approximately a week later, CINCPAC then suggested that
the overhaul be made at U.S. Fleet Air WESTPAC Repair Activity
(FAWPRA), at Konan, Japan. 7 CNO approved this new proposal of CINCPAC's

1. CINCPAC 020358Z Feb 68.
2. CSAF AFOAPE/AFSMS 081511Z Feb 68.
3. Ibid.; J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
4. CINCPAC 202215Z Mar 68.
5. Ibid.; J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
6. CNO 071458Z May 68.
7. ADMINO CINCPAC 151940Z May 68.
on 23 May 1968, since flow-of-gold "(if any) for this ovhl will be within Navy target for gold flow expenditures." ¹

**Ubon Cut-Off Road**

(5) "For reasons indicated below," Ambassador Unger wired SECSTATE on 6 September 1968, "we would like to take this occasion to raise once more the question of the Ubon cut-off road in the hope that it might be possible at this time to obtain enough support to start on that road." ² During a visit to Washington, D. C. continued the Ambassador, the Thai Prime Minister (PM):

...following upon General Kriangsak's repeated requests, asked assistance in constructing 126 kilometers of road Phutthaisong to Yasothon. Despite the discouraging, but indefinite reply which referred to relative priorities, the Thai regard the question as still open and the PM's continued interest has been repeatedly driven home to us most recently by General Kriangsak's request for an early indication of willingness to support this road. We have sought to discourage Thai but their interest is intense and arguments in favor are sufficiently compelling to warrant another look.

We recognize the existing priorities which, narrowly construed, put this road after certain other projects for which there is a more immediate need, but the proposed road still has a high priority and would tend further to increase the value of other higher priority projects which are part of the same system. The full argumentation for this road is set forth in RefTels.

Also, this road is something important to Thai leadership, which they consider important to RTG efforts in Northeast. The PM took it up with Secy Clifford and through the Supreme Command has

1. CNO 232208Z May 68.
2. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 19963/061100Z Sep 68.
continued to press for it. In particular, it has been strongly pushed by Gen. Kriangsak who has been one of the most helpful and effective officers in the whole Thai military structure and who has been heavily responsible for our success in effecting the many U.S. military deployments we have made in past 3 or 4 years. He has stuck his neck out often for us and is deeply committed within his own government with respect to this road. He will view our response to his request against the background of the vast expenditures we have already made on our own priority needs.

Finally, we would reiterate the point in Ref A that a decision to help on this road would increase Thai future capability for self-defense without outside help.

In light of the foregoing, we would appreciate it if Washington would make one more effort to put us in a position to offer some financial support so as to start moving ahead on this road.¹

(5) Later the same month, on the 27th, Ambassador Unger again recommended the construction of the Ubon Cut-Off Road, stating that at least one U.S. Engineer Company should be funded to begin pioneer work on it. His justification, which had been prepared in great detail, is summarized as follows:

a. The RTG attaches great importance to this road project.

b. General Kriangsat attaches great importance to this project and its importance to Thai-US relationships.

c. Dawee considers it "The most important project for the strategic security of bases in Thailand and the economic development of the northeast."

d. The cut-off road is 65 KM's shorter than the present road to Ubon.

¹ Ibid.

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e. The cut-off road would provide an alternate route to Ubon and Nakhon Phanom.

d. Full funding is not required as Thai engineer troops would work alongside US engineer troops and bear some costs of building materials.  

Actually, there was no question that road improvements in Thailand were "required to support current U.S. military operations, U.S. contingency plans and RTG counterinsurgency operations." When briefed as early as 29 April 1968 on the same justifications as those again offered by Ambassador Unger later the same year on 27 September, CINCPAC approved building the Ubon Cut-Off Road. However, as he recommended to SECDEF on 6 May 1968, CINCPAC felt that fund sources other than military construction (MILCON) or MASF "should be explored and that State Department or AID funds would be appropriate. CINCPAC also noted that the military requirement for the road is for contingency and improved efficiency and that the primary immediate value is as a nation building project." SECDEF concurred in CINCPAC's decision that the project was primarily country development on 21 May 1968. Not only had Congress "clearly demonstrated that it does not consider such projects appropriate for MILCON programs, but SECDEF also advised CINCPAC "that the feasibility of AID funding was explored with negative results."

Finally, in response to the 27 September 1968 message of Ambassador Unger, a joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message on 29 October 1968 reaffirmed the fact that Ubon road project could not be justified on the basis of U.S. military requirements, but offered, instead, "to seek approval of road as a Thai military requirement under Military Assistance Service-Funded Program for FY 70, if RTG would absorb all local currency costs." Comments from both CINCPAC and Ambassador Unger were requested on this new approach.

1. Point Paper, J4222, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: Ubon Cut-Off Road.
4. Ibid.
5. SECDEF 4410/292158Z Oct 68.
On 1 November 1968, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACHTAI's comments on this subject. Six days later, COMUSMACHTAI expressed his opinion that RTG would not agree to the use of $1.8 million of MASF funds of the FY 70 ceiling being allocated to the Ubon Cut-Off Road for materials not available locally and the cost of U.S. engineer unit operations. Furthermore, he stated that RTG would not provide the $3.6 million to meet the local currency costs for materials, hired labor, and the contracted-construction of one bridge. In short, COMUSMACHTAI's message to CINCPAC on 7 November recommended that the project be funded under MILCON or MASF programs, but only in its proper order of priority in support of military operations.  

This message by COMUSMACHTAI, according to Ambassador Unger the next day, had been sent to CINCPAC "without any consultation within the Mission. It contains critical errors of fact particularly with regard to RTG views, fails to address important policy questions and makes reference to MAP and Embassy views without coordination." As a result, Ambassador Unger expressed his regrets to CINCPAC on 8 November of "any inconvenience this may have caused and request you hold up comments to SECDEF until you have mission position...." CINCPAC received this information on 20 November, when Ambassador Unger advised him that:

Mission officers have informally explored the proposition contained Ref A with Supreme Command (Kriangsak) in broad terms. It was pointed out that one way we might be able to help on the road would be through the MAP program but that this would probably involve the Thai picking up the local costs. Kriangsak replied that Supreme Command could pick up land acquisition costs and the costs of gravel, laterite and local hire....

1. Point Paper, J4222, Hq CINCPAC, Subj: Ubon Cut-Off Road; COMUSMACHTAI 070430Z Nov 68, cited in AMEMBASSY Bangkok 22703/081000Z Nov 68; J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
2. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 22703/081000Z Nov 68.
3. Ibid.
Accordingly, recommend Mission be authorized to indicate to RTG that we will be prepared to consider the Ubon cut-off road as a cost-shared project under MAP which we will discuss at the time the FY 70 program is jointly reviewed. 1

Eight days later, CINCPAC expressed his concern to SECDEF about disclosing the proposed FY 70 Thailand MASF ceiling to RTG and of negotiating changes to the contents of this FY 70 MASF program with the Thai after it had already been concurred in by CINCPAC and SECDEF and even presented to the Congress. "To be responsive to the Thai request for assistance on the Ubon road," CINCPAC suggested that the following actions would provide a feasible alternative:

a. Establish the Ubon road as a Thai project, with Thai design and management.

b. Provide U.S. engineer units, as available, to assist the Thais with proposed project, at no cost to the MASF program other than out-of-country materials.

c. Fund the U.S. dollar costs...for out-of-country materials as part of the FY 69 MASF program as construction supplies, Generic Code K7.

d. Reduce the HAWK operation cost, RCN FY 69 TA 10, to provide funds for the out-of-country materials. The HAWK Btry will not be operational in Thailand prior to FY 70. 2

This alternative, recommended CINCPAC, was to "be implemented if the Thai accept this approach and the responsibility for project management, and absorb all local currency costs." 3 Approximately a month later, on 24 December 1968, SECDEF notified CINCPAC that, following

1. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 23145/200357Z Nov 68.
2. CINCPAC 280150Z Nov 68.
3. Ibid.
a review, the decision had been made on the Ubon Cut-Off Road funding alternatives, "i.e., to finance $1.819 million U.S. Portion from FY 70 Thailand MASF Program of $60.3 million." As a result, CINCPAC was requested to submit the necessary program data to accomplish the financing of this project. In addition, SECDEF fully concurred "in CINCPAC concern... regarding discussion of FY 70 program content with RTG" and so informed the American Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand.

CINCPAC, on 28 December 1968, requested COMUSMACHTHAI to submit the desired FY 70 Thailand MASF data not later than 5 January 1969. In an interim reply to CINCPAC on 30 December 1968, COMUSMACHTHAI reported that his reply was under study with the American Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand.

Modern Air Munitions for MAP Thailand

Primarily because of an urgent need for CBU-14 munitions within Thailand, CINCPAC granted COMUSMACHTHAI on 14 May 1968 the authorization to negotiate the exchange of certain modern for old air munitions. By 12 September 1968, COMUSMACHTHAI notified CINCPAC that the negotiations with RTG for the exchange of old bombs for modern ones had been completed. Three days later, CINCPAC requested advise from CINCPACAF and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI "on possible exchange of modern air munitions from your assets in-country for RTAF older munitions as follows," with the ratio of munitions listed being considered an approximate dollar value for dollar value exchange:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modern Item</th>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Old Item</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBU-14 Dispenser and Bomb</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>M-81/260 lb bomb</td>
<td>2,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-82/500 lb Bomb</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>M-64/500 lb bomb</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. SECDEF 8284/241753Z Dec 68.
2. Ibid.
3. J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
4. COMUSMACHTHAI 300332Z Dec 68.
5. ADMINO CINCPAC 140331Z May 68; J473 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
6. COMUSMACHTHAI 120543Z Sep 68.
7. ADMINO CINCPAC 150011Z Sep 68; J473 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
"Because of increased use CBU-14," responded CINCPACAF on 4 October 1968, "and concern over explosive storage problems, exchange of munitions with MAP Thailand not appropriate at this time."

DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, meanwhile, had also nonconcurred in the proposed exchange. Accordingly, when Air Force Advisory Group (AFADVSYGP), Hq MACV, expressed an interest on 3 October in some of the older munitions involved, CINCPAC offered an exchange to them also. On 20 November 1968, AFADVSYGP replied that neither its Hq or the VNAF, primarily because of the modernization program and the exchange that was pending with MAP China that would provide sufficient old bombs, desired to make an exchange of new munitions for old munitions with MAP Thailand. As a result, CINCPAC, eventually, had to notify COMUSMACTHAI on 27 November 1968 that the proposed "exchange of bombs was not desired at this time due to previous commitments, explosive safety considerations and resultant imbalance of assets."

PF-105 Design Frigate for Royal Thai Navy (RTN)

Letter of Offer and Memorandum of Understanding signed by Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Navy," on 11 September 1968 and concerning the Thailand-funded portions of the cost-shared PF-105 design frigate were both mailed to the CNO on the same date. The total cost of this new construction frigate was $7,800,000, of which the U.S. share of the cost was $3,900,000. The frigate was included in the Thailand MASF program.

UH-1H Helicopters for Thailand

During 1967, the Thai Ministry of Defense and the Supreme Command Headquarters decided that a helicopter lift capability, in the form of Air Mobile Companies, should be in the RTA rather than in the RTAF.

1. CINCPACAF 042348Z Oct 68.
2. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 68-2282/190700Z Sep 68, cited in ibid.
3. CINCPAC 072236Z Oct 68; J473 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
4. AFADVSYGP Tan Son Nhut AFB AFGP/MAA 200914Z Nov 68; J473 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
5. CINCPAC 270133Z Nov 68.
6. COMUSMACTHAI 130712Z Sep 68; J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68, citing CNO 062228Z Sep 68.
Accordingly, CINCPAC had requested on 24 June 1967 the early funding of 10 helicopters for the RTA in the FY 68 Thailand MAP.¹

(U) For the expedited shipment of the "essential equipment required for Army aircraft support units," the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) assigned on 2 April 1968 the code name of "NFD" to the project "to control deliveries UH-1H aircraft and equipment directly associated therewith."² Sixteen days later, the U.S. Army International Logistics Center (USAILC) requested AMC to upgrade the requisitions for this equipment destined for Thailand to priority 05, which was done.³

(S) COMUSMACTHAI advised USAILC on 5 July 1968 that the "essential support equipment" had not arrived in-country concurrently with the UH-1Hs; as a result, he requested "status and immediate assistance to expedite delivery of" of these items, which were in Project NFD.⁴ Three days later, COMUSMACTHAI informed CINCPAC that "ten (10) of these aircraft was received in Thailand in late June 1968."⁵

Purchase of Destroyer Escort (DE)

(S) "Last night," Ambassador Unger informed SECSTATE on 20 June 1968:

...I learned that RTG consideration of $20 million purchase of a UK destroyer escort which I had considered a dead issue following my June 5 conversation with the Prime Minister, is again very active and there is danger of an affirmative

² CGUSAMC 19318/021347Z Apr 68.
³ COUSAILC 182100Z Apr 68; J 4311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68; FONECON, Office of LCOL James N. Vinton, USA, J 4314, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 25 Mar 69.
⁴ COMUSMACTHAI TAAGMAP 050950Z Jul 68; J 4314 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
⁵ COMUSMACTHAI TAAGMAP 081100Z Jul 68; J 4311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
decision on the matter despite my strong representation earlier and over the last 24 hours. 1

(S) Eight days later, Ambassador Unger explained the various options, "which could be adopted to satisfy the RTN in an attempt to dissuade them from going through with the DE purchase, to include a U.S. offer to sell the RTG several new Patrol Frigates (PF) or a modernized Destroyer (DD) which would be faster and bigger than the UK purchase." 2 On 27 June 1968, the State Department "advised that DOD held out little hope that any of the alternatives outlined would be feasible, and that the U.S. should try to get the issue deferred." 3

(S) CINCPAC, in a message to the JCS on 28 June 1968, expressed his opinion that the "alternative offers to a new DE would not satisfy the RTN and if the U.S. were successful in forcing one of the suggested alternatives upon the RTN, the resulting bitterness could be most damaging to U.S.-Thai relations and to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia." 4 Furthermore, the DE that the Thai were contemplating purchasing from the United Kingdom could not be considered a sophisticated weapon system. As a result, "CINCPAC recommended that action be initiated to add Thailand to those countries exempted from the provisions of the Conte-Long Amendment and that in the interim a Presidential determination be solicited and applied to the purchase of the proposed DE or a new ship." 5

(S) Meanwhile, on the same day in a letter to RTG, SECDEF pointed out:

1. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 16/333/201633Z Jun 68.
2. Point Paper, J5323, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Dec 68, Subj: Royal Thai Navy Purchase of Destroyer Escort (C); AMEMBASSY Bangkok 16/379/251234Z Jun 68, cited in J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
3. J5 Brief No. 221-68, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Jul 68, of JCS 2353/150-1, Subj: Royal Thai Navy Purchase of Destroyer Escort (DE) (C); SECSTATE 192423/272348Z Jun 68, cited in J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
4. CINCPAC 280429Z Jun 68, cited in J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
5. Ibid.

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...that U.S. efforts to dissuade Thailand from the purchase of the DE was not an attempt to infringe upon their sovereignty but that there are higher priority needs for which the expenditure of funds could be applied. The U.S. was particularly concerned at the possible purchase of the DE because of the Conte-Long provision. The Conte-Long Amendment restricts the use of military assistance credit sales revolving fund for the purchase or acquisition of sophisticated weapon systems and directs the President to withhold economic assistance in the amount spent for the purchase of these weapon systems for any underdeveloped country other than Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China, Philippines and Korea unless the President determines that such purchases or acquisition of weapons systems are vital to the national security of the United States and reports within 30 days each such determination to the Congress.  

(3) On 2 July 1968, in order to preclude a serious breach in the U.S./Thai relations, the JCS recommended to SECDEF the following three alternative offers to the RTG, which might dissuade the RTN from purchasing the DE from the United Kingdom: (1) up to three additional Patrol Frigates (PF); (2) the sale or loan of a modernized FLETCHER Class Destroyer; (3) a new HAMILTON Class Coast Guard Cutter. In the event that none of these alternatives were acceptable to the RTG and it was determined that the Conte-Long Amendment applied, then the JCS recommended that "a Presidential waiver should be sought. In any event, Thailand should be added to the list of countries exempt from Conte-Long provisions. 2 Despite these recommendations, the joint SECSTATE/SECDEF "guidance of 11 July 1968 to American Embassy, Bangkok, was to continue to attempt to defer a final RTG decision on the DE purchase; to offer no

1. Point Paper, J5323, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Dec 68, Subj: Royal Thai Navy Purchase of Destroyer Escort (DE); SECSTATE 192590/280024Z Jun 68, cited in J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
2. J5 Brief No. 221-68, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Jul 68, of JCS 2353/150-1, Subj: Royal Thai Navy Purchase of Destroyer Escort (DE) (C).
alternative U.S. ships; and to proceed with consummation of the agreement of the U.S./Thai cost shared PF included in the FY 68 Military Assistance Program. "1

SECSTATE was advised by Ambassador Unger on 17 September 1968 that the Thai Prime Minister probably intended to postpone a decision on the purchase of the UK DE, perhaps until the end of the month. The Ambassador, therefore:

...believed that all things considered it would be in the U.S. interest to remove the "Hold Action" imposed at the U.S. request. Further, our position vis-à-vis the Thai Government would be considerably better if the U.S. does this on their own initiative rather than waiting for a Thai request. Therefore, unless instructed otherwise, Ambassador Unger would take an appropriate opportunity during the next 10 days to inform the RTG orally that the U.S. hopes the Thai will not go ahead with the DE purchase. 2

The same day, SECSTATE replied to Ambassador Unger thusly:

...that his reasoning and desires to go ahead to remove the U.S. restraint before the Thai raise the issue was appreciated. However, despite the passage of the Foreign Aid Authorization Bill, there remain significant steps in that and other legislation which STATE is reviewing and which may point to the U.S. holding the lid on for perhaps two weeks longer. Moreover, STATE must be in a position to provide the Ambassador with judgment on applicability of Conte-Long Amendment on how far we can go in committing ourselves to a Presidential Determination in the event the Thai should go ahead with the DE purchase. 3

1. Point Paper, J5323, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Dec 68, Subj: Royal Thai Navy Purchase of Destroyer Escort (C).
2. J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68, citing AMEMBASSY Bangkok 20398/171132Z Sep 68.
3. J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68, citing SECSTATE 240321/172356Z Sep 68.
SECSTATE subsequently advised on 16 October 1968 "that since Congressional action on foreign assistance legislation had been completed, that Ambassador Unger was free to proceed as proposed on 17 Sept 68." Accordingly, the next day, Ambassador Unger advised the Thai Prime Minister (PM) that:

...AID legislation had now passed U.S. Congress and therefore the period of postponement that the U.S. had requested of RTG in reaching a decision on DE purchase was at an end. Further the U.S. hoped the RTG decision on the DE would be negative, but it was the Thai decision to make. Further discussion between Ambassador Unger and ACM Dawee indicated the Thai PM was not now favorably disposed toward spending large sums for DE purchase although the Thai Navy was pressing for it. The U.S. Ambassador concluded the conversation requesting that the U.S. be informed of whatever action RTG decides to take since, if purchase contemplated, the U.S. would have to study matter to determine whether the U.S. was obligated to report this under the new law. 2

The rest of the calendar year passed without anything more of significance occurring regarding the RTN's proposed purchase of a DE from the United Kingdom. 3

Support of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF)

As 1967 ended, the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR) (Queen's Cobras) had already "received valuable experience and conducted its operations in an excellent manner," although it had been in South Vietnam only since 15 September of that year. 4 First indications that this contingent

1. Point Paper, J5323, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Dec 68, Subj: Royal Thai Navy Purchase of Destroyer Escort (SS).
2. Ibid.
3. J5323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
might be increased had come in the summer of 1967, following a visit by King Sri Savang Vathana to the United States, and the joint fact-finding trip of Clark Clifford and Gen Maxwell Taylor to Thailand in July "formally established the U.S. request for an RTA Force of about 10,000."¹

Planning activities had to be strictly unilateral until November, for certain political and economic agreements relating to these additional troops had to be negotiated by the two countries but, once bilateral discussions were authorized, they proceeded on the highest priority basis in delineating the type of army division best suited for deployment to South Vietnam. By early December 1967, COMUSMACVTHAI and RTA reached agreement. The volunteer division, approximately 11,000 strong, would comprise of two brigades and a reconnaissance battalion; each brigade would be formed into six infantry battalions, containing four rifle companies apiece. Such a well-balanced force would be ideally suited for its anticipated area of operations, the terrain surrounding Camp Bearcat, some 30 kilometers to the southeast of Saigon, where it would encounter, in general, rice paddies with stretches of mangrove swamp and delta area.²

It was planned to activate, train, and deploy the division to South Vietnam in two increments, the first to reach its destination by mid-July 1968 in order to overlap with and serve as a replacement for the RTAVR already in RVN, while the remainder of the division would deploy as the second increment in January 1969. In addition, a brigade force would be activated and trained in Thailand and deployed on a six months cycle basis to form a rotational base for the RTAVF. In return for this increase of its commitment in the Vietnam Conflict, the Royal Thai Government had received the assurance of the U.S. that it would do the following:

a. Fully equip and provide logistical support for the RTAVF.

b. Assume the cost of overseas allowances at the rates now paid the RTAVR.

¹ Point Paper, J4225, Hq CINCPAC, 19 Feb 68, Subj: Status of RTAVF for RVN.
c. Provide equipment and consumables to meet the agreed requirements of forces in training for replacement deployment and assist in the training.

d. Assume responsibility for the repair and rehabilitation of facilities required for rotational training.

e. Assume additional costs associated with the preparation, training (including subsistence), maintenance, equipment, transportation, supply and mustering out of the additional forces to be deployed to SVN. ¹

(5) As the new year began, Hq CINCPAC logistics planners were heavily involved in the preparation for the deploying of this Thai force to South Vietnam. On 2 January 1968, DA asked CINCUSARPAC for information on weapon densities by type for RTAVF planned to be operational in USARV by month through December 1969. When Hq USARPAC advised CINCPAC that it did not have the requested information, he tasked COMUSMACHAI on 16 January to provide it to CINCUSARPAC, who received the necessary information on the 26th and passed it on to DA five days later.²

(5) On 5 January, meanwhile, DA had released $2.9 million "to construct training facilities in Thailand for" RTAVF, the funds being reprogrammed from the U.S. Army Oura Wan Ammunition Storage Facility on Okinawa.³ Most of this work would be concentrated at Kanchanaburi, where it was proposed to build a major combined-arms training and support installation on a permanent basis. Contract construction, scheduled to begin almost immediately, would perform all the required vertical construction, while U.S. engineer troops would complete all the horizontal construction, such as ranges, access roads, and airstrip. Once the requirements could be fully determined, CINCPAC would submit a definitive line item list of facilities to OSD. In the meantime, CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC had jointly submitted a list of facilities needed to support the U.S. troops to be stationed at Kanchanaburi, with a total

1. Point Paper, J4225, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Mar 68, Subj: Status of RTAVF for RVN.
2. COMUSMACT/JUSMAGT 260330Z Jan 68; CINCUSARPAC 4430/210324Z Jan 68; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
3. DA 846238/052024Z Jan 68.
estimated cost of $2.071 million. On 27 January, DA stated that
"authorization and funding are approved for $1.8 million for an MCA
project to construct facilities in Thailand for U.S. personnel in support
of RTAVF," again reprogramming the necessary funds from the same
U.S. Army facility on Okinawa. 1

(3) A U.S. requirement also existed to receive, store, process,
transport, issue, account for, and maintain the equipment needed to outfit
the Thai division, as well as for the rotational training base. Another
U.S. requirement existed to assist in the training essential in the pre-
paration of troops for combat. COMUSMAGTHAI had tasked this mission
to CG USARSUPTHAI, who was so heavily committed that he needed a
sizeable augmentation to handle this support—764 PCS and 77 TDY
personnel. 2 SECDEF approved this CINCPAC-supported increase on
12 January and, three days later, the JCS provided CINCPAC with a
deployment plan for the additional U.S. forces needed to support the
activation, training, and deployment of RTAVF. 3

(5) Accordingly, again three days later, CINCPAC gave CINC-
USARPAC and COMUSMAGTHAI "authority to deploy forces listed to
Kanchanaburi, Thailand," with a close date of March 1968. 4 At the same
time, he requested COMUSMAGTHAI to submit by 15 May 1968 a plan
designed to reduce U.S. support as Thai capabilities increased, identifying
those forces required beyond 31 July 1968 with anticipated phasedown
dates. In addition, DA provided CINCUSARPAC on 22 February with a
proposed personnel phasedown concept dealing with the same problems
and requested comments. 5

(5) Originally, there had been a U.S. requirement of 231 local
nationals and 110 Thai Security Guards to insure the necessary support

1. DA 849301/272247Z Jan 68; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month
   of Jan 68; Point Paper, J4225, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Feb 68, Subj:
   Status of RTAVF for RVN.
2. Point Paper, J4225, Hq CINCPAC, 19 Feb 68, Subj: Status of RTAVF
   for RVN.
3. JCS 7274/152017Z Jan 68, cited in CINCPAC 180106Z Jan 68 and J4
   History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
4. CINCPAC 180106Z Jan 68.
5. DA 222137Z Feb 68.
of RTAVF, and CINCPAC had requested the JCS on 30 January to obtain approval for these additional spaces. Just three days later, CINCUSARPAC requested DA to approve an additional 150 local nationals as a new requirement needed to support the military construction projects. Underscoring the urgency of this need was the message of Ambassador Leonard Unger on 27 January to the Secretary of State stating that "there is immediate operational requirement for action to be taken to raise local national ceiling of USARSUPHTAI, both for continuing performance of its regular mission and to support the RTAVF." In the end, SECDEF approved 756 temporary direct-line local national spaces for Thailand in support of RTAVF; these were to be phased down concurrently with the phase down of U.S. advisor and support augmentation.

In the meantime, on 15 January 1968, COMUSMACTHAI advised all concerned that: "At the request of General Prphas, CINC RTA, the title of the RTA add-on force to Vietnam is hereby changed from the Royal Thai Army Expeditionary Division (RTAED) to the one already in use by the Americans--RTAVF.

Four days earlier, COMUSMACTHAI had already advised all concerned that SECDEF had approved a total of $23 million for TO&E/TA (Table of Organization and Equipment/Table of Allowances) for RTAVF. Then, on 17 January, he provided CINCPAC with an analysis of the funding requirements for RTAVF and requested the following actions be taken:
(a) "Allotment of FY 68 O&MA funds to USARSUPHTAI in the amount of $16,950,000;" (b) "Authorize and provide to MACT accounting classifications to be cited for MPA identified costs, except for overseas allowances and death/disability gratuities, which have been previously furnished;" (c) "Allotment of MCA funds in the amount of $5,285,000."

1. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
2. CINCUSARPAC 4845/020540Z Feb 68.
3. AMEHBASSY Bangkok 271025Z Feb 68.
4. Point Paper, J4311, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Jun 68, Subj: Status of RTAVF for RVN.
5. COMUSMACTHAI MACT J33/150728Z Jan 68.
6. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68; Point Paper, J4225, Hq CINCPAC, 19 Feb 68, Subj: Status of RTAVF for RVN.
7. COMUSMACT/JUJSMAGT MACTCMP 170550Z Jan 68.
forwarded this message to CINCUSARPAC on 23 January, requesting
him to take it "for action and provide ALCON the results of your
analysis, recommendations and action taken in regard to COMUSMACTHAI's
request."\(^1\)

(3) During the month of January, certain SITREP (Situation Report)
reporting procedures were clarified. In the past, COMUSMACTHAI had
submitted a bi-weekly report to CINCPAC, for which, he required an
input from CG USARSUPTHAI. CINCUSARPAC, meanwhile, was tasking
CG USARSUPTHAI for a weekly report, based upon a DA requirement
and in a format specified by that higher headquarters. In mid-month,
CG USARSUPTHAI brought up the problem it faced in submitting separate
SITREPs to both COMUSMACTHAI and CINCUSARPAC, which created an
intolerable administrative burden, as well as an useless duplication of
effort, and requested that action be taken to establish only a single SITREP.
Hq COMUSMACTHAI had also indicated by telephone to Hq CINCPAC J4
planners that the DA SITREP required much more detail than was needed
by either COMUSMACTHAI or CINCPAC, and the report's preparation
created an unmanageable workload. CINCPAC, however, had no authority
to eliminate the DA SITREP, reduce its frequency, or modify its contents,
because it was service directed. Since this report satisfied his infor-
mational needs and the only issue raised by CG USARSUPTHAI involved
the submission of two separate SITREPs, CINCPAC resolved the matter
by suspending on 26 January the requirement for the COMUSMACTHAI
SITREP, thereby providing the relief from duplicate reporting that CG
USARSUPTHAI had requested.\(^2\)

(3) In all, a requirement of $7.55 million existed in order to
reimburse the Royal Thai Government (RTG) for funds expended in
connection with preparing its division for combat in South Vietnam.
Such items as the following would be covered: (a) subsistence (in
Thailand); (b) inspection visits to RVN; (c) extra office equipment and
supplies; (d) morale equipment for troop units; (e) family bonus (advance
per diem before departure); (f) mustering out bonuses for volunteers;
(g) return home transportation allowance for enlisted personnel; (h) trans-
portation and mobilization expenses for the troops; (i) training supplies
and expenses; (j) representation funds for units.\(^3\)

1. CINCPAC 230145Z Jan 68.
2. CINCPAC 260538Z Jan 68; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of
Jan 68.
3. Point Paper, J4225, Hq CINCPAC, 19 Feb 68, Subj: Status of RTAVF
for RVN.

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SECDEF notified CINCPAC on 6 February 1968 that he had "approved the funding of certain budget costs associated with the Thai deployment for which reimbursement would be made to the RTG."\(^1\)

Only $3.3 million had been approved out of a required total of $7.55 million, however, and additional "justification and definitization...will be required before approval of additional amounts can be sought," advised SECDEF. The next day, CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACTHAI with the follow-up action on this matter.\(^2\) On 26 March, SECDEF "approved the funding of the extra budgetary costs," even including "reimbursement to RTG for separation allowance to be paid RTARF personnel now in SVN who return to Thailand after 15 July 1968," but requested that "every effort be exerted to keep to the absolute minimum U. S. funding support of these cost categories."\(^3\)

On 10 February, DA directed CINCUSARPAC to furnish eight OH-13 helicopters and four O-1 aircraft from USARV assets to RTAVF for its aviation company. The four additional O-1s that would be required by RTAVF in September 1968 would be provided from CONUS assets. DA intended to accelerate the issue of OH-6 aircraft (replacement for OH-13) to USARV and would replace the withdrawn O-1s at the earliest possible date.\(^4\)

DA, with the concurrence of OASD(ISA) and SECSTATE, directed CINCUSARPAC on 6 March to take action "at the earliest practical date to formally transfer title of the RTAVF TOE and TA equipment to the RTG."\(^5\)

Originally, the guidance had been that the U. S. Army would retain title to the equipment issued until such time as the final withdrawal of the Thai forces from Vietnam.\(^6\) The following was the rationale for DA's drastic shift in policy:

As long as the US Army retains title to this equipment, it is considered to be an Army asset.

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1. SECDEF 9277/061701Z Feb 68.
2. CINCPAC 072300Z Feb 68.
3. SECDEF 4659/262015Z Mar 68.
4. DA 100130Z Feb 68, cited in J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
5. DA 854220/062105Z Mar 68.
6. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68; Point Paper, J4311, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Jun 68, Subj: Status of RTAVF for RVN.
and no procurement action can be taken to obtain replacement items. Because of heavy demands upon the Army supply system, it is essential that procurement action be taken for replacement items ASAP.

(C) COMUSMACVTHAI, on the other hand, had strong objections to such a course of action, since he did not believe it was necessary. In his message of 16 March 1968, which he had coordinated with USMACV, USARV, USARSUPTHAI, and the American Embassy in Bangkok, he set forth his reasons against such a drastic change and recommended a solution that apparently satisfied DA:

2. (C) It would be politically undesirable to reopen the terms of the U.S. commitment to the RTG.

3. (U) Transfer of title at this time would hamper efforts of USMACV to change authorization as required to react to tactical and other changes in requirements. These changes are now frequently made by a change to the TA and TO&E. It would also create a special case for U.S. support in RVN since it would place the RTAVF in a different status than other Free World Forces. Maintenance support, evacuation and replacement of unserviceable items would be greatly complicated.

4. (U) Concur that the present status of "on loan" reporting is not appropriate, and that AR 795-10 procedures should be applied. USARPAC and USARSUPTHAI representatives have developed procedures for the RTAVF supply office to report equipment status. AR 711-5 and AR 795-10 requirements are thereby being satisfied.

5. (C) Recommend that RTAVF equipment be reported as issued rather than as on loan, and that

1. DA 854220/062105Z Mar 68.
any further transfer of title be postponed until MAP procedures are applied to this equipment and MAP support begins when returned to Thailand upon termination of hostilities.¹

(5) Representatives of COMUSMACHTAI gave up-to-date briefings on the status of RTAVF to the staffs of CINCUSARPAC and CINCPAC on 5 and 7 March 1968, respectively. They reported that all actions regarding RTAVF were progressing satisfactorily with no major problems evident. CINCPAC received another briefing on the same subject later in the month, on 18 March.² As of 29 April, COMUSMACHTAI reported to CINCPAC that the RTAVF project was continuing to progress satisfactorily with no significant problems; all Thai personnel for the first increment were on board, training was progressing well and on schedule, equipment was arriving as scheduled, and required delivery dates were being met with no major problems.³ In the end, following the successful deployment of the first increment to South Vietnam, it could be reported that there had "been no significant logistical problems."⁴

(5) The new Hq RTAVF deployed by aircraft to Vietnam on 15 July 1968. Complete deployment of the regimental-size first RTAVF increment, except for a rear party of 40 men that deployed by air on 20 August, was successfully achieved by 5 August. The 1st Battalion arrived at Camp Dearcat in South Vietnam on 22 July, the 2d Battalion on 29 July, and the 3d Battalion on 5 August 1968. Upon arrival, RTAVF came under the operational control of II Field Forces, Vietnam, and was supported logistically by USARV. This deployment was followed in September by

1. COMUSMACHTAI/CHJUSMACHTAI TAAGOD 160821Z Mar 68.
2. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
3. COMUSMACHTAI/CHJUSMACHTAI TAAGOD 291147Z Apr 68; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
4. Point Paper, J4314, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Oct 68, Subj: Status of RTAVF for RVN.
the return of RTAVR to Thailand. In January 1969, the 2d increment of RTAVF was scheduled to deploy to South Vietnam, thus bringing the Thai division up to full strength. 1

(S) On 8 August 1968, COMUSMACTHRANI requested an increase in the Thai force ceiling to accommodate an 80-man augmentation, an action which CINCUSARPAC concurred in on the 13th. CINCPAC granted the necessary authority on the 18th, but he added that the funds required "to support this expansion must come from the FY 69 approved program." 2 This augmentation allowed 80 former members of RTAVR to complete their normal one-year tours in Vietnam, with the increase being only temporary and eventually being offset by normal attrition. By early September, CINCPAC also gave his concurrence to a COMUSMACTHRANI request for a 38-man communications security augmentation to Hq RTAVF. 3

(S) By the beginning of October, construction of the various training and support facilities at Kanchanaburi were completed. Here, the RTA planned to establish an Overseas Replacement and Training Center (ORTC), which would eventually assume all of the functions performed by certain USARSUPTHAI units, thus allowing them to be phased out. Included among these functions would be the training of RTAVF rotational replacements, as well as normal post, camp, and station functions. The U.S. units were scheduled to be completely phased out sometime between April and July 1969. At this time, the supply support of ORTC was expected to switch from a USARSUPTHAI operation to a pseudo-MAP system controlled by USARPAC.

1. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Aug 68; Point Paper, J3B35, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Sep 68, Subj: Status of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR) and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) in Vietnam; Point Paper, J4 314, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Sep 68, Subj: Status of RTAVF for RVN; OIC TRANS SUPT ACT BKK THAI THLCT 90-35-68/200806Z Aug 68.
2. CINCPAC 182022Z Aug 68; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
3. Point Paper, J4 314, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Sep 68, Subj: Status of RTAVF for RVN; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
Meanwhile, over 5,000 second increment personnel had reported for duty at Kanchanaburi and an average of 85 percent of their essential items of equipment were in-country and on-hand. A cadre of over 1,000 had been trained. Phase I, individual basic training, was complete for second increment personnel, and squad and platoon training of Phase II had begun. In addition, specialist and technical training had begun on 30 September in maintenance procedures, heavy truck driving, and third echelon mechanics skills. No major supply problems had developed, scheduled dates for training were being met, and the deployment of the second RTAVF increment on or about 15 January 1969 appeared certain. For the remainder of 1968, as he had so far throughout the year, CINCPAC would "continue to monitor, coordinate and, when required, provide guidance to assure continuity and timely response to all actions relating to the RTAVF."  

South Vietnam

Finally, regarding South Vietnam, there is no need for me to tell you that we are engaged in a difficult and frustrating conflict. The aggressor regime in Hanoi, driven by an ambition of twenty-five years to dominate a unified, Communist Vietnam, is prepared to use any means to achieve its purpose. On the other hand, we have chosen to use restraint in our attacks on the base of the aggression in North Vietnam. We respect the international boundaries of Laos and Cambodia and, therefore, are unable to prevent the enemy's use of vitally important transit, storage and recuperation sanctuaries in those countries.

... On the Allied side, the South Vietnamese Government has initiated reform and mobilization measures which should result in a significant

1. Point Paper, J4314, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Oct 68, Subj: Status of RTAVF for RVN; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68; CG USARSUPTHAI 271145Z Aug 68; CG USARSUPTHAI 201000Z Aug 68.
strengthening of South Vietnam's political and military posture. The South Vietnamese Government with Allied support is moving to re-establish and expand its control in the countryside and to advance its pacification program.

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp

(U) There are many paradoxes in the Vietnam war little known to the general public....

.................................

(U) ... Difficulties and frustrations have developed in this conflict which are foreign to our basic thinking processes and methods. Yet I am convinced that the enemy has been hurt far more seriously than many suppose....

(U) As one who has closely witnessed developments in Vietnam at firsthand, I am convinced the enemy has abandoned hope of a military victory.... Perhaps we can begin to think in terms of a foreseeable end to the war in Vietnam.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.

1. CINCPAC 9 Apr 68 MAP Statement.
2. ADM McCain 22 Nov 68 Commonwealth Club Address.
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
AS OF 1 JANUARY 1969

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA: 66,000 SQ. MI
POPULATION: 17.0 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH: 4.0%
AVAIL. LAND PER CAPITA: 1.4 ACRES
LITERACY RATE: 50-65%
LIFE EXPECTANCY: 10-15 YEARS
GROSS NNP 1967 (US$): 2.1 BILLION
PER CAPITA: $154.0
DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCED 1967 (US$): $216.4 MILLION
AS % OF GNP: 2.9
AS % OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXP: 33.2

PRESIDENT: Nguyen Van Thieu
VICE PRESIDENT: Nguyen Cao Ky
PRIME MINISTER: Tran Van Huong
CHIEF, JOINT GEN STAFF: Gen Gao Van Vien
COMMANDER VNAP: Gen Nguyen Van Minh
COMMANDER VNN: Caft Tran Van Chom
COMMANDER VMRC: Maj Gen Le Nguyen Khang

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES

ARMY
- 10 INF DIV, 1 ARMY DIV, 1 HONOR GD BN, 10 ARM REG BNS, 15 ARTY BNS, 17 ENG BNS, 1 SP GP, 5 PSTWAR BNS, 5 MP BNS, 25 ENG BNS, 2 SAD BNS, 1 MP GP, 5 PSTWAR BNS, PARAMIL FORCES: 13 BT CTR, 1091 COS, 4659 PLTS.

NAVY
- 40 PBR, 13 RV, 48 LST (67) RN, 18 RTEC, 56 ASPB, 51 CM, 60 LCP, 4 RCTE, 8 PCE, 22 PGM, 24 PCT, 1/4 MSC/MLMS, 255 JUNKS, 5 MARINE INF BNS, 155 LST/LSM, 57 LST/LSL.

AIR FORCE
- 4 TAC FTR SQS, 4 LIAISON SQS, 1 RECON SQ, 3 TRANSP SQS, 1 TAC HELO SQ, 4 TRAN SP HELO SQ, 5 ACW.

TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

- 4 CORPS, 10 INF DIV, 1 ARMY DIV, 10 ARM REG BNS, 15 ARTY BNS, 17 ENG BNS, 1 SP GP, 5 PSTWAR BNS, 5 MP BNS, 25 ENG BNS, 2 SAD BNS, 1 MP GP, 5 PSTWAR BNS, PARAMIL FORCES: 35 CT CTR, 1091 COS, 4659 PLTS.

COMBAT CAPABILITY

- MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY IN MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AND ALONG SELECTED LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, AND OFFER EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE FOR LIMITED TIME AGAINST ATTACK BY EXTERNAL FORCES.

CHARGED WITH PATROLLING INLAND WATERWAYS AND COASTAL WATERS, SUPPORTS ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY ACTIONS, MARINE BRIGADE UNDER ARVN CONTROL AS GENERAL RESERVE ELEMENT.

CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING STRIKE OPERATIONS; PROVIDING CLOSE TACTICAL SUPPORT FOR ARMY AND LIMITED AERIAL SUPPLY AND SUPPORT OF ARVN OPNS.

OVERALL U.S. OBJECTIVES

- TO ATTAIN A STABLE AND INDEPENDENT NORDICMUSEUM GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM FUNCTIONING IN A SECURE ENVIRONMENT.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

- U.S. AMBASSADOR: Wm. Ellsworth Bunker
- DEPUTY AMBASSADOR: Col. Samuel C. Bedinger
- U.S. AIR ATTACHÉ: Mr. Donald G. Mac Donald

MILITARY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

- (A) To assist in developing and maintaining South Vietnamese armed forces of sufficient and operational capabilities to enable them to defeat the Viet Cong, and with U.S. and other allied assistance, to defeat North Vietnamese forces operating in South Vietnam.

- (B) To assist the South Vietnamese armed forces in pacificating and revolutionary development activities.

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb '69, p. 156.

* AS OF 10 JULY 1968
Military Objectives of South Vietnam MASF

During calendar year 1968, as in the previous year, the U.S. military objectives of South Vietnam MASF remained practically the same:

a. The objective of military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) is to defeat communist efforts to seize control of the Government of Vietnam (GVN). This objective includes the development and maintenance of suitably balanced forces that will become capable of defending the nation against either internal or external aggression, so that a militarily secure posture exists within which control by the GVN over its territory and people can be extended, consolidated and sustained. Associated with the nation building aspects of the Military Assistance Program is the requirement for the construction and maintenance of facilities suitable for the support of friendly military forces in the furtherance of US national objectives in Southeast Asia.

b. As these purposes are achieved, and the RVN government and economy grow stronger and less dependent on outside assistance or military participation in civil government, the military objectives should shift toward maintaining active and reserve armed forces sufficient to provide for the defense of the nation from National Liberation Front (NLF) and Viet Cong (VC) aggression. 1

How U.S. Support of RVNAF Contributes to the Achievement of U.S. Objectives

According to the current CINCPAC MA Plan for FY 69-74, American support of RVNAF will contribute to the achievement of U.S. objectives in the following three ways:

a. **Counterinsurgency.** In the development of forces, it is necessary to provide material and training support, and to develop and maintain bases, facilities, and an associated military environment. In addition, supporting logistic organizations must be developed concurrently with the development of combat forces to insure adequate supply and support of operations. Military assistance is enabling RVNAF, in conjunction with US/FWMAF, to conduct military offensive operations against VC/NVA main forces. Military assistance is also aiding RVNAF to support pacification programs aimed at restoring and maintaining security and establishing firm governmental control throughout SVN. Pacification involves both military and civil elements. It includes the extension of operating government to the populated areas, destruction of the VC infrastructure, control and organization of the population, improvement of social-economic conditions, and the prevention of incursion of VC/NVA main forces into areas being pacified. In secured areas, nation building will be in progress; in other areas, revolutionary development will be underway; while in less secure areas, the military offensive will be continued. As the insurgency is brought under control, the RVNAF must assist CVN civil agencies in maintaining internal security.

b. **Limited War.** Improving rapport with the populace, the experience received by elements of the RVNAF, a more balanced force structure and modernization of equipment all combine to provide the forces with the capability to conclude successfully the present hostilities. This, in turn, will better prepare them to withstand overt aggression and to conduct successfully operations under the concept of limited war.

c. **Contingency.** Achievement of the planned objectives by RVNAF eventually should permit a reduction in US support of the RVNAF. In addition, the accomplishment of pacification program objectives will result in the achievement of US contingency objectives, i.e., free RVN
forces for repelling or holding an external attack, further development of forces within the SEATO area for mutual defense tasks, and making available facilities capable of supporting SEATO military operations. However, the RVN is not a formal member of the SEATO organization, but is covered by the provisions of a protocol to the SEATO Treaty (Manila Pact). 1

Brief Background on South Vietnam MASF

(5) Prior to 25 March 1966, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and other Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) in South Vietnam were supported through MAP funds. As early as December 1965, CINCPAC had been notified of SECDEF's decision "to transfer responsibility for support of allied forces in Vietnam from MAP to the Military Departments. Date of transfer was established as date of approval of the FY 66 Supplemental Appropriation Bill by the President," which turned out to be 25 March 1966. 2 Effective with this transfer, "the U.S. Military Services assumed responsibility for programming, budgeting, and financing for the support of their counterpart military services in Vietnam (RVNAF & FWMAF)." 3

(5) Approximately a year later, for the same reason—that MAP had been neither designed nor intended to prosecute a fighting war—that South Vietnam MAP was transferred to Service funded, the programs for Laos and Thailand were also shifted on 1 July 1967 from MAP to Service funded. 4 In the case of the latter two, their MASF programs have retained a dollar ceiling and MAP procedures have remained in effect. For the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), however, "a dollar ceiling has not been applied and only those MAP procedures desired by the

Services and those essential to maintaining the CINCPAC data bank have been retained. 1 This data bank, fed with the necessary inputs from each Military Department and Defense Agency, as well as from MACV, "is designed to provide an up-to-date accounting of funds expended for support of Vietnamese and other Free World forces." 2

Unlike other MAP program channels, therefore, the proper channel for RVNAF MASF programming is through CINCPAC's component commanders directly to the respective Military Service Departments with only information to CINCPAC. The responsibility for planning and programming changes in force structure, force composition, and the introduction of new or different equipment, however, was retained by CINCPAC. Moreover, although:

...the responsibility for funding the Vietnam MASF program was transferred to the Service Departments, CINCPAC considered that MACV should continue to submit a Military Assistance Five Year Plan for Vietnam in order to retain, in a plan format, all the essential data regarding the activities associated with military assistance in Vietnam. This plan is prepared by the MACV Military Assistance Directorate in coordination with the Service Sections and Free World Military Assistance Headquarters. The plan is reviewed by the CINCPAC staff and published yearly as a CINCPAC Plan for information purposes only. 3

Because of the unique characteristics of the South Vietnam MASF program, in contrast to those of Laos and Thailand, there has been a different treatment for U.S. military assistance to RVN in this annual history from that given to similar programs in Laos and Thailand. The reason for this has already been given in the "Introduction" to this section of the history.

2. Ibid.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME IV

1968

Prepared by the Historical Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII

1969
FOREWORD

(U) The mission of the Commander in Chief Pacific is to maintain the security of the Pacific Command, defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean, support and advance the national policies and interests of the United States, and discharge U.S. military responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East and Southeast Asia.

(U) Geographically, the Pacific Command is the largest U.S. Unified Command. The area of responsibility of the Commander in Chief spreads over 40 percent of the earth's surface -- 85 million square miles of land and sea stretching from the west coast of the Americas into the Indian Ocean and from the Bering Sea to the South Pole.

(U) To carry out CINCPAC's mission and to counter the Communist threat in the Pacific region, the build-up of U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific Command over the past several years has been dramatic. The total strength, which peaked in 1968, was over a million active military personnel, of whom about one-half served in Vietnam.

(U) The seriousness of the Communist threat is not limited to hostilities in Vietnam. In varying degrees of intensity, it is also posed for no less than ten other countries in the Pacific region. Consequently, should hostilities in Vietnam end, the vital necessity for maintaining a powerful and responsive U.S. military "presence" in the Pacific will remain.

(U) Given the required military "presence", the Pacific Command will be ready as it is today to defend and to advance the national policies and interests of the United States.

JOHN S. MCCAIN, Jr.
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific
PREFACE

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-408-59 of 17 April 1959 require the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS and other agencies of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations and problems faced by CINCPAC and the status of the Pacific Command (PACOM) from the standpoint of its commander. Additionally, the required annual report preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS to the extent that major decisions and directives of the JCS concerning the PACOM may be determined by historians of the JCS without research in the records of the PACOM. This 1968 CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

(U) As in the case of previous historical reports since 1959, this report describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, especially those connected with international crises and those peculiar to a joint command. This history records CINCPAC's command decisions and achievements and omits "detailed" activities of subordinate unified commands or of Allied nations in the PACOM area. Most of the decisions and activities included in this report are related directly with CINCPAC's efforts to preserve the freedom in those areas in the Pacific Command where people still have the right to make a free choice.

(U) To provide continuity, this history is organized in the same manner as previous histories, primarily in line with the objectives of CINCPAC. Chapter I, "The State of Readiness of United States Forces," describes CINCPAC forces and the planning for their employment to carry out United States policies, as well as the multitudinous activities of Headquarters CINCPAC that do not logically fit in the other chapters. Chapter II, "CINCPAC Actions Influencing the State of Readiness of Allied Nations in the PACOM Area," deals with CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program. Chapter III, "CINCPAC Actions Concerning Relationships Between the United States and Other Countries," reports the actions of CINCPAC in his position as United States Military Adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and with politico-military events pertaining to his command. CINCPAC's mission to counter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia is treated in
some detail in Chapter IV, "Actions to Counter Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia."

(U) This year's history is published in four volumes: Volume I - Chapter I; Volume II - Chapters II and III; Volume III - Sections I - V, Chapter IV; and Volume IV - Sections VI - X, Chapter IV. A glossary and an index for the complete history is included in Volume IV only. Pagination is complete within each volume rather than running consecutively throughout the four volumes. As in previous years, the annual histories prepared by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI are included as Annexes A and B, respectively.

(U) The CINCPAC Command Historian, Colonel J.R. Johnson, USA, under the supervision of Colonel A.M. Matthews, USAF, Secretary of the Joint Staff, Headquarters CINCPAC, planned and published the 1968 CINCPAC Command History as required by CINCPAC Staff Instruction 5750.10 of 20 August 1968. COL Johnson personally researched and wrote Chapter IV with exception of Sections V - IX and prepared the glossary.

(U) Members of the CINCPAC Historical Branch assisted the Command Historian in the preparation of the history. Mr. Truman R. Strobridge, as Senior Historian, researched and wrote Chapters II and III and Sections V and IX of Chapter IV. In addition, he provided technical guidance and shared his professional expertise when and where required throughout the preparation of this history. Mrs. Polly Tallman, Assistant Historian, prepared Chapter I and Sections VI - VIII of Chapter IV.

(U) The manuscript was typed in final format by Mrs. LuElla Saxton, Clerk-Stenographer of CINCPAC Historical Branch, Miss Maggie Kaonohi and Yeoman First Class Donald J. Cagle, USN. The index was prepared by Mrs. Mary Jane Garrett. All graphics for this history were prepared under the expert supervision of Master Sergeant John F. Stevenson, USAF, Shop Supervisor, Graphics Section, J0412. Staff Sergeant Leonard L. Powell, USAF, Shop Supervisor, Reproduction Section, J0412, supervised the expeditious printing of the draft manuscript which facilitated staff coordination. Finally, the immeasurable support rendered by the CINCPAC Staff is greatly appreciated.

J. R. JOHNSON
COLONEL USA
CINCPAC Command Historian
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SECTION VI - COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS

Communications-Electronics Lessons Learned in Southeast Asia

(U) On 26 August 1968 CINCPAC sent to the JCS a collection of 36 communications-electronics experiences gained in Southeast Asia. The purpose, he said, was "to record for further investigation and analysis the observations and opinions of communications-electronics personnel in the Pacific Command on experiences and lessons learned in the conflict in Vietnam." \(^1\)

(U) CINCPAC noted that some of the problems encountered or lessons learned might not be peculiar to Vietnam, and he also stated that the paper was not meant to be a "recommendation for sweeping changes" to existing procedures. He thought that prior to any doctrinal changes, additional study and analysis were necessary. The viewpoint in the papers, he stated, was entirely that of the communications-electronics officer, and he allowed that other considerations than optimum communications capability "sometimes must govern decisions affecting communications." The problem, then, became one of getting optimum communications capability despite the restraints imposed by these other considerations. CINCPAC noted that "the balancing of the sometimes conflicting requirements of security, speed and reliability of communications as influenced by the factors outside the realm of communications presents the communications planner and operator with his greatest challenge."

(U) The experiences furnished to the JCS that originated with the CINCPAC staff will be outlined below. This will be followed by a listing of those experiences and lessons learned by other communications-electronics personnel in the PACOM that were forwarded to the JCS. Other contributing commanders were CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, and the Defense Communications Agency-Pacific (DCA-PAC). CINCPAC staff submissions were as follows.

Requirements for Communications

(C) The demand for long-distance communications capacity exceeded expectations. As CINCPAC discussed the problem:

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1. Material for this subsection was derived from Ltr., CINCPAC to the JCS, 26 Aug 68, Subj: PACOM Communications-Electronics Experiences (U).
The political situation in the United States and the diplomatic constraints under which the Vietnam conflict was fought dictated the requirement for close monitoring and control of the war effort from the national command level. This long range control of combat activities created a demand for a two way long distance flow of information between Saigon and Washington unparalleled in history. Detailed daily message reports, which in previous conflicts would have remained within the theater, were required by Washington. Each report required feeder reports from subordinate units in PACOM. The geographic distribution of command and supporting headquarters in PACOM demanded a network of reliable, secure, high quality voice and record communications. Air and naval attacks on North Vietnam were directed from PACFLT and PACAF headquarters in Hawaii. The ground war in South Vietnam was directed from Saigon and supporting and logistical bases were located in such widely separated bases as Guam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan and Thailand. The diplomatic implications of the war on other friendly nations required a continual electrical exchange of information between the State Department and U.S. embassies all over the world. The interest of the American people in the war dictated the presence of a large active corps of correspondents. The relative unpopularity of the war effort and critical stories by some correspondents required that Washington be kept informed on all possible facts and information which might become an issue due to its publication in news media. Over 600 correspondents covered the war in South Vietnam. Of these, over 200 were American. High frequency radio, which in former conflicts had provided the long distance circuits from the theater of operations to the Washington headquarters, had neither the required reliability nor capacity to handle the traffic volume required. Fortunately a commercial undersea cable was available from the West Coast of the U.S. to the Philippine Islands. Without this cable, direct control of the war effort from higher headquarters outside of Saigon would have been impossible.

CINCPAC recommended that if similar control and direction was envisioned for possible contingency operations, wideband communications equipment of sufficient range and capacity for both intra- and
inter-theater use be procured and maintained for contingency support.

**Transportable Communications-Electronics Equipment Qualitative Requirements**

(C) The problem was that tactical communications equipment installed during the initial buildup of fixed administrative and logistical headquarters was unsatisfactory. An early capability installed with tactical communications equipment and other temporary expedients permitted some satisfactory local calls, but long distance calls were "often impossible." Calls had to be routed through too many switchboards, operators were too busy, and practices evolved that tied up the boards, which effectively negated the precedence system because whatever the precedence the board presented a "busy" signal.

(C) Use of Field Army radio relay equipment in semi-permanent locations also proved deficient. CINCPAC said:

...The quality and capacity of trunks provided by this equipment were inadequate. Due to operator space limitations and the excessive heat in the transportable shelters, equipment for fixed locations was removed from the vans and re-installed in a variety of temporary structures. The installation invariably used make-shift wiring, inadequate power and poor design. Equipment in which capacity, power, reliability and other desirable features had been compromised in order to achieve transportability was used when in fact transportability was not required.

When fixed plant equipment became available and was installed to replace the transportable equipment, a massive problem arose in cutting over circuits from the field equipment to fixed equipment. Interface problems of ringing frequencies, circuit levels and voice frequency telegraph channel deriving equipment existed.

(C) CINCPAC recommended that prepackaged, expandable modules of communications equipment meeting Defense Communications Agency standards be developed, procured, and maintained in a state of readiness for use in large headquarters and logistical complexes in contingency operations.
Delay in Availability of Fixed Communications-Electronics Facilities

The problem here was that the requirement for building construction and equipment installation delayed the availability of high capacity communications in South Vietnam. As CINCPAC discussed the matter:

Due to the demonstrated inability of field army communications equipment to meet the communications requirement in South Vietnam, programs were initiated to install fixed communications facilities. These programs included the Integrated Wideband Communication System (IWCS), Dial Central Offices, AUTOSEVOCOM, AUTODIN, Tandem Switching Centers, tape relay stations and communications centers. The managerial problems of transporting the thousands of required items from the CONUS to South Vietnam, routing them to the right place at the right time and assembling them into an operating station was almost impossible. Delays caused by missing bits and pieces, tools and test equipment which were delayed, lost or stolen in shipment were common. Construction and transportation assistance were rationed in small precise increments despite the top priority of the project and the urgent priority for its completion. The number of top priority projects, all of which were secondary to the support of combat forces, made a mockery of the priority system.

...Another major problem was the obvious requirement for all stations to be operational as soon as possible, and the practical necessity to schedule construction and installation crews from station to station to take advantage of economies in personnel utilization. The progressive availability of circuits in the IWCS, spread over a two year period, not only caused inefficient use of those stations which had been completed, with circuits delayed pending completion of other connecting stations, but denied the use of badly needed circuits to operational units and caused continued extensive use of tactical equipment. The serial completion schedule required by the fixed IWCS system to take advantage of economies in construction and installation violated the precepts of speed and mass, which are as fundamental in the art of communications as to the art of war.
The disadvantages of using transportable C-E equipment all vanish when fixed C-E systems are installed in buildings especially designed for and built for the particular system. System capacity, whether measured in circuits, operating positions, transmitter power or other terms, is not limited. The original installation can be as large as necessary, and later expansion can be more readily accomplished. Aisles are wide, headspace ample, and the backs of equipment racks and main frames are readily accessible for trouble shooting and maintenance. Air conditioning is available and the operating space can be kept clean and dry. Economies in size can be realized in the use of personnel by efficient use of operating space. However, these advantages do not come cheaply. From the OSD approval of the IWCS concept on 21 April 1965, 20 months elapsed before the first link of the system became operational in South Vietnam. Another year elapsed before the size of the system in operation became significant. This delay in availability of the system was largely caused by construction and installation delays. System design and equipment availability were simplified by the use of off-the-shelf equipment.

CINCPAC recommended that a family of recoverable communications-electronics equipment be developed in which size and ease of transportation were secondary to system capacity, operational efficiency, reliability, and flexibility.

Requirements for Close Staff Coordination on Communications-Electronics Requirements

Here the problem was to keep the communications-electronics staff informed and insure that other staff officers consulted with them upon initiation of actions that required communications support. If the communications-electronics staff was not kept informed, incomplete staff actions could be submitted that ultimately required much additional work. Even with the extra work, however, adequate communications support frequently was not available in time to support the project.

CINCPAC recommended that commanders and senior staff officers at all echelons insure that their communications-electronics staffs were properly informed and consulted and that communications-electronics staff officers should be aggressive in their efforts to keep
abreast of developments and insure that their counterparts in other staff agencies recognize and understand the need for coordination. He also recommended that courses at Service schools be examined and evaluated to determine if increased emphasis was required on the nature of communications-electronics requirements and the functions of the communications-electronics staff.

**Inadequacies of the System for Processing Major Telecommunications Requirements**

The problem here was that the current system for processing major telecommunications requirements provided "too little, too late, at excessively high cost." CINCPAC said that improvements in the system were "essential."1

CINCPAC recommended that:

1. Action be taken to streamline procedures to reduce processing time.

2. Action be taken to require concurrent processing of communications support through the same channels as the plan or program generating the communications requirement.

3. OSD and JCS review of communications programs recognize the inevitability of increased demand for communications and cost effectiveness of providing a moderate initial system capability in excess of current need and systems engineering to provide for future expansion at minimum cost.

4. Further consideration be given to the CINCPAC recommendation that the CINC of an active theater be provided funds, under appropriate controls, to enable him to make system adjustments to meet urgent requirements.

5. OSD and JCS provide more precise guidance on what will be supported.

1. See also Chapter I of this history, "Processing of Major Telecommunications Requirements," for further information on this subject.
6. Agencies tasked with program submission to OSD be required to develop complete and thorough survey and costing information prior to such submission.

Failure to Recognize the Requirement for Communications-Electronics Support When Initiating Command and Control Plans and Programs

(C) CINCPAC stated that there was a:

...mushrooming problem in the command and control area which is threatening to submerge the communicator. Frequently, the validators of the command and control requirements are not the same as the validators of the communications requirements essential for the development of an effective system. All too often, the command and control part of the system is validated but the requisite communications are not. This is a highly undesirable situation for a number of reasons. In the first place, the communications cost of the system may approach or exceed the command and control costs and may have a major impact on communications capabilities. Therefore, it seems clear that validators of these systems should consider the total costs being incurred and the impact on communications capabilities when they make their decisions.

In the second place, without such concurrent consideration, at some later date, communicators are found wanting and unresponsive because they cannot produce the requisite communications to support the command and control system. These circumstances present two undesirable alternatives: (1) to program new communications to meet the requirement, or (2) to provide the communications from the assets already available to the commander. As to programming new communications, often the task is to justify a requirement about which little or nothing is known; through channels different from those used to validate the original project; to people who know nothing about it. If, on the other hand, it is necessary to try to provide
the communications from assets available to the commander, there is no basis for judging the validity and priority of this new requirement as compared with those requirements already being met in a system, which in PACOM is already saturated.

This problem is compounded by the arbitrary separation of the staff functions of command and control on the one hand and communications on the other at many echelons of command. This separation of functions will create increasing problems if current trends continue into the future.

CINCPAC recommended the establishment of procedures which:

a. Require the specific processing and validation of communications requirements in the same package with the plan or program which is going to generate the requirements.

b. Require that the Command and Control and Communications package contain the decision as to whether the required communications are to be provided by the procurement of additional facilities or by the use of existing assets.

c. Require that, if required communications are to be provided by new procurement, the funds be approved in the package, and if provided from existing assets, the package contain the decision as to what is to be given up or the basis for giving up assets to meet the requirement.

He also recommended that the doctrine of separating the staff function of Command and Control from the staff function of communications be carefully studied, particularly in view of "current trends and future developments."

A list of the experiences and lessons learned by other communications-electronics agencies in the PACOM follows:
PACFLT C-E Experiences

Delta River Patrol Communications
Vanized Communications
Delivery of Equipment to Supporting Fleet Units
Support of New or Different Types of Equipment
Flow of Information to National Command Authorities
Environmental Conditions Affecting Shipboard C-E Equipment
Personnel Requirements
Training Requirements
Lightweight Expeditionary Type (Tactical) Generators
C-E Support of Host and Allied Nation's Forces

PACAF C-E Experiences

Family of Transportable C-E Equipment
Pre-Fabricated, Multi-Purpose Buildings

USARPAC C-E Experiences

Organization and Reorganization of Army Signal Units in Vietnam
Class IV Projects, Shipping and Installation Problems
C-E Support of Tactical Units

MACV C-E Experiences

Inability to Rely on Programmed Fixed Facilities to Meet Programmed Requirements

1. Ltr., CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC, 3 Nov 66, Subj: PACOM Communications-Electronics Experiences.
2. Ltr., CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 8 Sep 67, Subj: PACOM Communications-Electronics Experiences.
4. Ltr., COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 7 Sep 67, Subj: PACOM Communications-Electronics Experiences.
MACTHAII C-E Experiences

C-E Equipment Capabilities
C-E Equipment Air Conditioning and Filtering
Class IV Project Problems
Long Distance Telephone Switching System
Single Manager for C-E Systems Control
Manpower Validation Requirements
U. S. Army Capability for Quick Reaction C-E Units
Requirement for a Joint Theater C-E Planning Group
Excessive Requirements for Dedicated Circuits

DCA-PAC C-E Experiences

Communications Requirements
Systems Planning
Engineering and Equipment
Funding, Procurement and Implementation
Operations

Integrated Communications System - Southeast Asia

(1) The Integrated Communications System - Southeast Asia (ICS-SEA) was a system of fixed and semi-fixed communications facilities providing the long haul, backbone communications system for circuits in South Vietnam and Thailand. The Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS) provided the long haul military communication trunks.

(2) Completion of the Vung Cha-Nha Trang upgrade completed the Phase III IWCS expansion program. Only four approved IWCS links remained to be installed and those were to be transportable equipment, as directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(3) The Thai Government accepted additional links in the Thailand IWCS, completing that installation program with the exception of two

1. Ltr., COMUSMACTHAII to CINCPAC, 31 Aug 67, Subj: PACOM Communications-Electronics Experiences.
2. Ltr., DCA-PAC to CINCPAC, 8 Dec 67, Subj: PACOM Communications-Electronics Experiences.
4. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia, 31 Dec 68.
links to the Chiang Mai Air Base. Installation of these was delayed pending approval of funds for an access road to the radar site at Doi Inthanon, with which the IWCS site was to be collocated.¹

(5) Manning of the ICS-SEA was the subject of study in 1968. In June CINCPAC objected to a position taken by the JCS accepting policy from the Office of the Secretary of Defense leading toward military manning of the ICS-SEA by 1 July 1969.² CINCPAC stated that civilian contractor operation and maintenance of the system at or near existing levels was required to insure continued efficient functioning of the ICS-SEA.³ In August, the JCS notified CINCPAC that they had concurred in his position and forwarded their views to the Secretary of Defense.⁴

(5) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics acknowledged the CINCPAC concept but reiterated the decision that the ICS-SEA would be operated and maintained by U. S. military personnel assisted by a "limited number" of contract personnel. This meant that CINCPAC post-hostilities planning should recognize that contractor personnel would not be available in sufficient numbers and emphasized the need for training and using local national personnel for system operation and maintenance as soon as possible.⁵

(5) COMUSMACV obtained the military spaces required to replace civilian contractor personnel by trade-off of other spaces under the Program 6 ceiling. COMUSMACVTHAI, however, determined that 317 additional military spaces would be required for Thailand. CINCPAC notified the JCS of this requirement on 12 December.⁶

(5) Under Phase II of the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan, COMUSMACV programmed in-country or CONUS training from FY 69 to FY 76 for approximately 1,800 RVNAF personnel for operation and

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 082202Z Jun 68.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
maintenance of the Vietnam portion of the system. This program was competing with other urgent requirements of the RVNAF, however, for the limited number of Vietnamese with electronic skills or the aptitude to acquire them. 1

(S) CINCPAC believed that the total withdrawal of U. S. military personnel from South Vietnam prior to the Vietnamese attaining the capability to operate and maintain the ICS-SEA would "seriously impair CINCPAC command and control communications capability not only to RVN but also to Thailand and Laos." 2

Post-Hostilities Communications-Electronics Planning

(S) In August CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS a general concept for the post-hostilities use of communications-electronics systems in South Vietnam. CINCPAC stated:

... This concept provides for turnover of designated systems to appropriate RVN agencies as the U. S. requirements for the systems decrease and as the RVN agencies managerial and maintenance capabilities increase. The communications system to be developed for the RVN should be a single, integrated system, designed and managed so as to satisfy the entire range of both civil and military communications requirements in SEAsia. However, the present limitations of the GVN civil communications organization to effectively manage the system and the present greater capability of the RVNAF to acquire, train and retain personnel for the operation and maintenance of the system make it apparent that we should plan for the initial turnover of the communications assets to the RVNAF until an effective civil communications management structure can be developed by the GVN with USAID advice and assistance. Civilian contract operations and maintenance support at approximately the present levels and DCA system management support would be required.
during the post-hostilities period for either U. S. military or RVNAF operation and maintenance of the system. After system turnover to the GVN, advice and assistance on these functions should become the responsibility of USAID. Agreements under which the systems are turned over to GVN should contain provisions for free support of U. S. military circuit requirements in both SVN and Thailand and resumption of U. S. system management in event of renewed hostilities. ¹

CINCPAC asked for guidance on several questions concerning the concept.

(5) The JCS modified the concept and forwarded it to the Secretary of Defense for resolution and guidance. ² The revisions made by the JCS limited the application of the concept to the fixed wideband communication system in South Vietnam rather than to the general application envisioned by CINCPAC to all fixed communications-electronics systems in South Vietnam.

(5) The JCS also reaffirmed a requirement to exclude the Government of Vietnam from T-Day planning until further guidance was received from the Secretary of Defense. ³ CINCPAC heard no more on the matter during 1968.

Dial Central Offices and Tandem Switches Program - Southeast Asia

(5) Dial Central Offices (DCO) were being installed at "large population centers, depots and command control centers in RVN and Thailand to provide more rapid and efficient telephone service." ⁴ An allied program was under way for the installation of long distance dial trunk switching equipment (tandem switches) between DCO to improve the long distance telephone service in Southeast Asia. ⁵

1. CINCPAC 240546Z Aug 68.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia, 31 Dec 68.
5. Ibid.
SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 68, p. 66.
By the end of 1968, 36 of a programmed 40 DCO were installed in South Vietnam and 23 of a programmed 26 in Thailand. The remaining DCO for South Vietnam (Camp Enari, Phu Tai, Long Binh North, and Dong Tam) were scheduled for completion early in 1969. Except for the USAF DCO at Nam Phong and the MAP DCOs at Chiang Mai and Kamphaen Saen, the Thailand DCO installation program was essentially complete. 1

Fast Reaction Procedures (RED ROCKET)

On 11 April the Chairman of the JCS established the requirement to transmit expeditiously key instructions from high-level authority to Southeast Asia operating forces. 2 He designated the flagword RED ROCKET to be used to identify such messages, which would originate only with the President, the Secretary of Defense or his Deputy, or the Chairman (or Acting Chairman) of the JCS. Any such message was to be afforded top priority over all other flash precedence messages at manual relay centers. He specified that the goal for transmission time from the National Military Command Center to the division, task group, wing/base level forces was to be not more than 20 minutes.

Initially the JCS wanted a new circuit direct from the National Military Command Center to the MACV/7th Air Force level with intermediate connects at SAC, CINCPAC, and the CINCPAC components, 3 but CINCPAC recommended using existing command and control circuitry, which he considered sufficient. The JCS tentatively approved CINCPAC's proposed circuit arrangements on 23 April. 4

A dedicated teletype network was installed, but terminals at Camp Smith and Hickam Air Force Base were deactivated on 9 August 5 because of a critical shortage of terminating equipment. Use of the KW-7 Alert Net for these messages had "proved successful." 6

1. Ibid.
2. JCS 6100/110033Z Apr 68.
3. J627 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 202335Z Apr 68; JCS 7149/231424Z Apr 68.
5. CINCPAC 092329Z Aug 68.
6. J63 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
Tactical Secure Voice

Actions to implement the Secure Voice Program to support tactical air-land-sea operations in Southeast Asia within the PACOM continued throughout the year. The PACOM-validated tactical secure voice requirements at the end of 1968 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Component</th>
<th>Wideband</th>
<th>Narrowband</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACAF</td>
<td>3,598</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>7,298</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUSARPAC</td>
<td>10,442</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,338</strong></td>
<td><strong>927</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To meet validated requirements, a procurement contract for a total of 18,797 wideband equipments was approved in 1968. No narrow-band equipment contracts were completed. Of the 18,797 wideband equipments authorized for procurement, only 15,371 were delivered to the PACOM. The remainder were to be delivered in 1969.

Implementation of the Tactical Secure Voice Program had been hampered by installation delays due to lack of required modification kits to connect ciphony equipment with radios. Action by the Military Departments to obtain required equipment installation kits continued.

Republic of Vietnam Request for Secure Communications Between Saigon and Paris

The Chief of the JGS, RVNAF asked for U. S. support in providing one direct secure voice circuit and one direct secure teletype circuit from Saigon to Paris. CINCPAC referred the matter to Washington for a "decision by appropriate higher authority."

1. J6/Memo/000357-69, BGEN R. N. Cordell, USAF, J6, Hq CINCPAC, to JO4, CINCPAC HistBr, 15 Apr 69, Subj: 1968 Command History; Draft Review.
2. COMUSMACV 28386/251015Z Sep 68.
3. CINCPAC 290026Z Sep 68.
The JCS forwarded the matter to the Secretary of Defense on 11 October, noting that it could not be justified as a military requirement, but U.S. military facilities were the only access to South Vietnam capable of carrying secure voice.

On 30 October a decision was made to provide the service, using military terminal equipment, military circuits from Saigon to the Philippines, and military funding (estimated at $60,000 a month) for leased circuits from the Philippines to Paris. KY-3 secure voice equipment was used from the Presidential Palace in Saigon to the Vietnamese consulate in Paris. The teletype circuit was from COMUSMACV's headquarters to Paris.

Commercial Use of U.S. Military Communications Systems Requested

COMUSMACTHAI forwarded a request by the Thailand Ministry of Posts and Telegraph for use of two voice channels in the U.S. military submarine cable between Sattahip, Thailand and Vung Tau, South Vietnam. COMUSMACTHAI recommended acceding to the request and stated that the U.S. Ambassador had concurred in the recommendation.

In view of long standing U.S. policy against use of military facilities in competition with civil enterprise, the many areas in the PACOM for which Thailand's commercial use of U.S. facilities could be taken as a precedent, and outstanding military circuit requirements, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the United States not favorably consider the Thai request. A further factor in the CINCPAC recommendation was existence of plans for early installation of an INTELSAT satellite ground station in Vietnam and for expansion of the existing station in Thailand. Thailand's request was denied.

Interface of Tactical Air Control Systems in Southeast Asia

The Deputy Secretary of Defense on 10 January 1967 directed a reexamination of the U.S. tactical air campaign against the air defense

2. Point Paper, J623, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Nov 68, Subj: GVN Secure Communications (U).
3. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
4. CINCPAC 230231Z Jan 68.
systems of North Vietnam. An ad hoc working group of the Joint Standardization Group for Tactical Communications and Control Systems studied the matter of technical interface of semi-automatic tactical air control systems being deployed to Southeast Asia. The systems considered were the Air Force SEEK DAWN (BUIC II), the Navy Tactical Data System, the Marine Tactical Data System, and the National Security Agency's IRON HORSE.

The purpose of the interface was to provide improved coordination of friendly offensive and defensive air operations, to prevent violations of the border of Communist China, and to pass MIG and SAM alerts for U. S. aircraft operating over North Vietnam.

CINCPAC concurred in the need to interface the systems and submitted a concept of operations to the JCS and requested approval authority over the interface development to insure its readiness prior to its employment. The Air Force Chief of Staff was appointed executive agent.

Tests and demonstrations were to be in two phases, the first in CONUS, the second in Southeast Asia. Phase I tests were held in California in August and September 1968. CINCPAC staff members and representatives of CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, and the CG, FMFPAC observed these tests and concluded:

a. Although the concept is feasible, it is neither technically nor operationally ready for deployment to SEA now.

b. Deployment to SEA now would degrade the existing SEA Tactical Data Systems.

c. Serious deficiencies exist which must be corrected prior to deployment of the programs.

2. A joint Air Force-Navy team chaired by a representative of the JCS.
3. Point Paper, J3B8, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Sep 68, Subj: Southeast Asia Tactical Data Systems Interface (U).
d. Upon correction of the above deficiencies, CINCPAC should reevaluate the interface prior to SEA deployment and commencement of Phase II.

e. Other deficiencies exist which should be corrected but need not hinder deployment.

f. Certain actions should be initiated prior to reevaluation test to facilitate overall accomplishment of the test objectives.

g. The new programs not be deployed until the total interface is considered ready to enter Phase II SEA testing and implementation.

At the end of the year, the CONUS Test Force was in the process of correcting deficiencies uncovered during the tests and a re-run of the test was expected early in 1969 with an anticipated implementation in Southeast Asia by 1 April 1969.

Doi Inthanon Radar/IWCS Site

In August 1967 CINCPAC concurred in a COMUSMACTHAI recommendation to substitute a site at Doi Inthanon for construction of a joint radar/IWCS site instead of a site at Chiang Mai that was unacceptable to the Thai Government. The JCS agreed to the selection and it was tentatively placed in Air Force and Army FY 68 budget funds for construction of the site and an access road to it. Site surveys were completed in February 1968.

The Secretary of Defense, however, did not include funds in the budget of either Service, primarily because of the "excessive cost of access road and failure to demonstrate sufficient urgency in support of current operations to justify funding at this time." About $5 million was required for equipment and construction costs.

1. Ibid.
4. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
5. JCS 3377/122214Z Mar 68.
CINCPAC had asked for project documents from CINCPACAF for site facility construction and from CINCUSARPAC for access road construction. CINCUSARPAC strongly objected to the use of Army funds for an Air Force installation and recommended inclusion of all funds in a single Air Force package. CINCPAC agreed and asked CINCPACAF on 9 November to include road funds in his FY 71 request.

On 29 October 1968 COMUSMACTHAI sent a detailed rejustification for the Doi Inthanon site, stating that the Thailand Government had an urgent requirement for the site to improve their air defense posture in northwest Thailand, to improve tactical control of air strikes against the increasing insurgency problem, and to provide an intelligence collection platform.

CINCPACAF disagreed. His position was that, "There is no urgent requirement for a fixed long-range radar at Doi Inthanon and no foreseeable requirement for utilization of this radar by USAF tactical aircraft in SEAsia." In place of a fixed site he recommended use of mobile tactical radar to provide a more flexible tactical and defensive coverage with greater operational effectiveness at far less cost. CINCPACAF placed Doi Inthanon as number 73 of a list of 77 projects programmed for Thailand based upon the urgency of the requirement.

CINCPAC asked COMUSMACTHAI to comment on the CINCPACAF position and to indicate the level of Thai Government interest so that he could resolve the problem. No resolution had been reached by the end of the year.

Communications - Korea

CINCPAC believed that U.S. communications in Korea were inadequate to effectively support modern combat operations. The systems in Korea were made up of "obsolete or obsolescent,

1. Point Paper, J617, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Dec 68, Subj: Doi Inthanon Radar/IWCS Site (U).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

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heterogeneous equipment, and ... suffered from the effects of being assigned relatively low priority for improvement."

There were four long-lines communications systems within South Korea—the U. S. Army Backbone System; the ROK Air Force's System, BLUE FORTUNE-ITT Tropo; and the ROK Army and ROK Ministry of Communications Microwave Systems. CINCPAC had described the capability of the first two of those systems as ranging from "marginally effective" to "unsatisfactory on the interconnections between these systems and spurs to the tactical units."

CINCPAC had been concerned with these deficiencies for a long time, but they became increasingly critical as a result of the PUEBLO incident and the deployment of additional U. S. Forces into the area.

The U. S. Army Backbone System had been installed in 1961. By 1968 it was made up of obsolescent equipment and was difficult and costly to maintain. It did not have the quality and capacity required to support and sustain modern combat operations. The ROKAF BLUE FORTUNE System also consisted of obsolescent equipment that had gradually degraded because of low priorities for upkeep and maintenance. It lacked the quality and capacity to support the assigned U. S. and ROK combined air defense and tactical air operations.

The related (to one another) ROK Army and Ministry of Communications Microwave Systems were provided by the United States and both were relatively new and of good quality.

A meeting was held at Camp Smith from 8 to 10 October to consider the status of progress to upgrade in-country and out-of-country telecommunications capabilities. On 11 October, CINCPAC validated to

1. Point Paper, J-621, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Nov 68, Subj: Communications Deficiencies in Korea (U).
4. Ltr., CINCPAC to the JCS, 11 Oct 68, Subj: Communications-Electronics (C-E) Requirements in Support of COMUSKOREA (U).
5. J-6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
the JCS a consolidated statement of communications circuit requirements in support of COMUS Korea. ¹

(C) CINCPAC stated:

...The quality and capacity of the systems, both in-country and out-of-country are not adequate to support modern combat operations. At present, there are a number of tactical, quasi-tactical and administrative communications networks in Korea which permit little or no interoperability. It is therefore apparent that the single most important need is for an integrated in-country communications capability that would provide for rapid, secure and reliable exchange of information between and among U. S. and Allied forces.

...To the extent feasible advantage has been taken of existing Republic of Korea systems to provide channels to meet U. S. requirements. These ROK systems will provide some redundancy and alternative routing capabilities if adequate interface and interconnections are provided. ²

(C) CINCPAC recommended certain engineering considerations to be used for the development of plans. Then he stated:

...The CINCPAC objective is the establishment of an upgraded, expanded and integrated U. S. long-haul communications system in Korea to meet U. S. and Allied forces requirements as economically as possible. To accomplish this objective, it is also recommended that the Defense Communications Agency be tasked to develop a sub-system project plan to meet the requirements identified (herein) and that the U. S. Army be tasked to accomplish the necessary upgrade and expansion of the Army backbone system and provide for interface and interconnection.

¹ Ltr., CINCPAC to the JCS, 11 Oct 68, Subj: Communications Electronics (C-E) Requirements in Support of COMUSKOREA (U).
² Ibid.

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capabilities to the ROK systems. It is further recommended that actions previously recommended...
for U. S. military use of the ROK Army - Ministry of Communications (ROKA/MOC) Microwave Systems be approved and the U. S. Army be tasked to accomplish the necessary implementing actions.

...It is also recommended that the U.S. Air Force be tasked to upgrade and expand the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) Blue Fortune - ITT Tropo Systems consistent with priorities... (from COMUS Korea). 1

(2) The initial estimate for cost of an upgraded-expanded U. S. Army Backbone System and BLUE FORTUNE System was approximately $49.2 million. The JCS tasked the DCA to prepare a sub-system/project plan showing various alternatives for making the required improvements. The plan was scheduled to be submitted to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS about the end of the year. 2 CINCPAC was unable to take further action until a decision was reached by the Secretary.

(3) Communications to and from Korea also left much to be desired and a number of actions to improve various means of such communications were planned, undertaken, or completed during 1968. For example, a full duplex Top Secret TELECON circuit was established between CINCPAC's headquarters and that of COMUS Korea on 24 January. 3

(5) Shortly after the PUEBLO incident the Secretaries of State and Defense directed the establishment of dedicated secure voice and teletype circuitry connecting principals of the State and Defense Departments and the JCS in Washington, D. C., with principals in Seoul, Korea. The JCS tasked the DCA to provide a full period secure 100-word-per-minute teletype conference network from the Department of State and the National Military Command Center to COMUS Korea, the U. S. Ambassador in

1. Ibid.
2. Point Paper, J621, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Nov 68, Subj: Communications Deficiencies in Korea (U).
3. CINCPAC 252108Z Jan 68.
Korea, and CINCPAC's Camp Smith headquarters. This was installed and operational by 12 February.

The JCS also directed establishment of a full period secure voice network through the Automatic Secure Voice Communications System (AUTOSEVOCOM) switches in Washington to both the offices and quarters of COMUS Korea and the U. S. Ambassador and to Panmunjom and the Joint Overseas Switchboard in Seoul. AUTOSEVOCOM subscribers in Hawaii had access to this switchboard. These dedicated voice and teletype nets were called "Dummy Board."

The dedicated voice circuit cost about $30,000 a month, but circuit usage was extremely low, as it turned out. Additionally, it tied up a trunk circuit from the Seoul cord switchboard to the Joint Overseas Switchboard, Seoul, which was intended and required for handling common-user traffic for all Seoul secure cord switchboard subscribers to other secure voice subscribers in Korea or worldwide. The secure voice paths from Korea to Washington could be used with as acceptable a grade of service as that provided by the dedicated Dummy Board.

Similarly, the dedicated teletype network had experienced very low usage and the same service could be provided by other existing command and control teletype circuits also connecting the National Military Command Center with CINCPAC and on to COMUS Korea.

The JCS, therefore, in November asked the Secretary of Defense to approve cancellation of the dedicated voice and teletype networks. The Deputy Secretary approved the recommendation on 6

2. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
5. Ibid.
The Dummy Board dedicated teletype network was dis-established and the secure voice circuitry was reterminated on the Joint Overseas Switchboard to open it to common-user service in early January 1969, as directed by the JCS.

The October conference mentioned earlier had been preceded by a conference at CINCPAC's headquarters from 12 to 15 February 1968. The purpose had been to survey the situation, verify long-term improvements needed, and identify immediate actions that could be taken to alleviate near-term requirements for COMUS Korea. Some tasks required immediate action and as a result several improvements were made rather quickly. CINCPAC had established a program to modernize the cross-channel very high frequency radio path from Changsan, Korea to Itazuke, Japan for additional out-of-country access. CINCPAC asked CINCPACAF to study the desirability of starting action to lease 24 to 36 channels from Itazuke to the Kanto Plains area so that facilities would be available to extend the cross-channel circuits to the outside world. A transportable communications satellite terminal (AN/TSC-54) was diverted from Pakistan and installed at Yong Son in March 1968. It provided an emergency path for one high quality voice and three teletype circuits in the event the primary microwave and tropospheric communications routes were disrupted. Negotiations were completed at the Washington level for the provision of a commercial communications satellite terminal at Taegu as recommended by the CINCPAC. It was expected to be operational by March 1970.

CINCPAC asked the DCA to expedite activation of a UNIVAC Set 8 at Taegu to provide a high speed interface to the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) system. All local teletype and AUTODIN subscribers were to have access to the system. The DCA, however, recommended an alternate plan for providing common-user teletype in and out of Korea. The DCA did not believe the UNIVAC Set 8 would perform the functions required. The DCA plan expanded teletype relays in Korea from one to

2. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
3. Point Paper, J621, Hq CINCPAC, 29 May 68, Subj: Communications Deficiencies in Korea (U).
4. Ibid.
5. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
four with Mode V interface to the Camp Drake, Japan AUTODIN switch. 1

Lastly at the February conference came the recommendations to task the DCA and the Services to:

...stud... and, if feasible, initiate programs to provide transportable C-E packages for contingencies and tactical mobility based upon modern equipment, which can be assembled either as systems or system elements, complete with sizeable prefabricated air transportable shelters and adequate power....Task CSAF to screen and provide available tactical/mobile C-E assets to satisfy tactical air requirements. 2

In other actions, additional AUTODIN terminals were installed with additional AUTODIN expansion under way. 3 In August the DCA submitted a plan to CINCPAC for the development of an automatic switching capability to handle record traffic and for interconnection to the worldwide AUTODIN system. 4

Additional Automatic Secure Voice Communication System (AUTOSEVOCOM) terminals were installed throughout 1968, and Phase II AUTOSEVOCOM, expected to be implemented in FY 70, was to permit automatic switching and intercommunication with the Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON). 5

In April 1968 CINCPAC validated and forwarded to the JCS the long-term communications requirements of COMUS Korea and the associated Telecommunications Program Objective calling for a $67 million improvement program. This program would provide the improved circuit quality and expansion of communications links necessary to support reliable, secure voice and high-speed data transmission. 6

1. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 08.
2. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
3. Point Paper, J621, Hq CINCPAC, 29 May 68, Subj: Communications Deficiencies in Korea (U).
4. J626 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
6. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
DCA-Korea Established

(U) A DCA element for Korea was established in 1968. The Director of the DCA had recommended 18 personnel spaces and annual operations and maintenance funding of $193,000. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, however, decided to establish the Korea DCA element with 9 manpower spaces, with consideration to be given to proposed changes based upon experience gained and new developments.

(U) Both COMUS Korea and CINCUSARPAC had objected to a provision placing the DCA-Korea under the DCA-Far East. The Deputy Secretary removed this provision and directed that the DCA Korea be organizationally assigned by the DCA in coordination with COMUS Korea.

(U) The DCA advised COMUS Korea on 18 March that the DCA Korea would be established as a unit subordinate to the DCA Pacific and completely responsive to the operational requirements of COMUS Korea.

(U) The following sites and links were designated as DCS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sites</th>
<th>Links</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changsan</td>
<td>Namsan - Yongdongpu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>Namsan - Kimpo</td>
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<td>Dartboard</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taegu</td>
<td>Bucket - Osan</td>
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<td>Salem</td>
<td>Bucket - CP Humphreys</td>
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<td>Richmond</td>
<td>Bucket - Kunsan</td>
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<td>Madison</td>
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<td>Yongsan</td>
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</tbody>
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4. Ibid.
5. History of Headquarters, United States Forces, Korea, 1 January - 31 March 1968, p. 16.
Increased Communications Security Assistance and Responsibility for ROK Navy

(5) In February 1966 the JCS approved the initial release of 20 TSEC/KL-7 cryptographic units to the ROK Navy. In January 1968 the Chief of the U.S. Navy Advisory Group, Korea recommended that this cryptographic capability be expanded by 48 additional units to provide secure record communications to 4 additional naval shore stations and 34 additional ships plus reserve equipment. CINCPAC forwarded this request to the JCS recommending approval, which was granted in March 1968.1

(5) With the initial release of the cryptographic system, stringent accounting safeguards had been applied. These safeguards required that U.S. personnel monitor accounting procedures although this was normally the responsibility of the user. The intent was to insure that the ROK Navy provided the proper degree of security protection. In December 1967, however, the Chief of the U.S. Navy Advisory Group recommended that many of these cryptographic accounting responsibilities be transferred to the ROK Navy to give them a greater degree of responsibility and to make the procedures more in line with those used by the ROK Army and Marines. The JCS approved the revised procedures in April 1968.2

Increased Communications Security Assistance for ROK Air Force

(C) In April 1968 the U.S. Air Force requested release of KL-7 cryptographic equipment to the ROK Air Force to extend USAF air defense control communications in Korea. They asked for 42 machines in 14 separate locations.3 The U.S. Communications Security Board

approved, the release and responsibility for implementation was assigned to the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Air Force. 1

SECTION VII - INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy

(U) Mapping, charting, and geodesy efforts in the PACOM were concentrated mostly on Southeast Asia again in 1968. A number of new products were introduced, a number of refinements to existing products were made, and a vast amount of data was collected to satisfy aerial cartographic and hydrographic oceanographic survey requirements. Certain of these projects are described below.

Orthophoto Pictomaps - CAVALCADE PONY

(E) A project to furnish photogrammetric control points and more accurate pictomaps was known as CAVALCADE PONY (formerly Project WAYSIDE). The need was for large-scale maps that permitted easier correlation of ground features to map detail. The 1:25,000 scale pictomap (basically a photo mosaic) did not always satisfy the requirements of field artillery, particularly in areas of high relief, due to the horizontal displacement of features due to relief, a fault inherent in any aerial photographic mosaic. The Army Map Service found a solution to the problem. They produced an ortho photo pictomap eliminating relief displacement and added marginal data to assist in ground identification of selected control points determined by photogrammetric methods during the orthophoto compilation. For prototypes they produced maps of the Dak To and Khe Sanh areas; these were distributed in the summer for evaluation.  In December CINCPAC forwarded command comments on the prototypes. Although the maps were well received in South Vietnam, CINCPAC thought this could be for various reasons and he recommended production of the new maps only on areas deemed essential by COMUSMACV. 2 Late in December, COMUSMACV forwarded recommended CAVALCADE PONY priorities; these were under study by the CINCPAC staff at the end of the year. 3

Orthophoto Maps, Scale 1:10,000

(E) In May 1968 COMUSMACV validated and forwarded a request from the III Marine Amphibious Force for a new map product, orthophoto

2. Ltr., CINCPAC to Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 19 Dec 68, Subj: Cavalcade Pony Evaluations.
maps at a scale of 1:2,500 with a two-meter contour system, to be used to support a sensor/strong point system being emplaced south of the DMZ. On 1 June CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to reevaluate the requirement at the scale and accuracy requested. The Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force restressed the need for the scale and accuracy requested, so CINCPAC tasked CINCPACFLT to acquire the necessary photography and he asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to compile a test orthophoto map at 1:10,000 scale with best contour interval. The prototype, produced by the Engineer Topographic Laboratory at Fort Belvoir using new automatic plotting equipment, was evaluated by the III Marine Amphibious Force and found adequate. CINCPAC, therefore, validated the extension of the program to include all of the III Marine Amphibious Force's requirements at 1:10,000 scale. The Defense Intelligence Agency concurred and confirmed production.

Fluorescent Charts and Tactical Maps

(U) Navigation and operations at night posed additional problems to those encountered by day, including the limitations of night vision. The Navy's Oceanographic Office produced a prototype fluorescent chart for use by craft operating in the Rung Sat Special Zone. Reaction was generally favorable, but an adequate ultra-violet power/light source was still required.

(U) In November CINCPACFLT validated a requirement from the III Marine Amphibious Force for prototype fluorescent maps in I CTZ.

1. Ltr., CG, III MAF to COMUSMACV, 10 May 68, Subj: New Photomaps; request for.
2. CINCPAC 012221Z Jun 68.
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 220259Z Jun 68.
4. CINCPAC 052324Z Jul 68.
5. CINCPAC 090318Z Oct 68.
6. Ltr., DIA to CINCPAC, 30 Oct 68, Subj: 1:10,000 Scale Orthophotomaps (U).
8. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 050311Z Nov 68.
CINCPAC validated the requirement to the Defense Intelligence Agency on 4 December, contingent on development of an adequate power/light source.\(^1\) The Defense Intelligence Agency assigned the project to the Oceanographer of the Navy to be completed by early 1969, at which time the light/power source would be delivered. The prototypes were to be printed on both plastic and paper and were to be evaluated as a package with the light/power source.\(^2\)

**Special Southeast Asia Tactical VFR Chart**

(U) The first overprinted-in-PACOM edition of the Special Southeast Asia Tactical Visual Flight Rules Chart was completed in March by the 7651st Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron at Hickam Air Force Base. This chart showed an airways route structure overprinted on a 1:500,000 Pilotage Chart. The initial production run had been completed by the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center in St. Louis in 1967. Overprinting of subsequent editions was to be done in the PACOM. The chart received wide use and acceptance.\(^3\)

**LORAN Overprinted 1:50,000 Maps**

(3) On 1 May COMUSMACV identified a requirement for LORAN graphics for use by LORAN equipped aircraft and for LORAN manpack receivers as a part of the DUCK BLIND plan.\(^4\) On 6 November the Defense Intelligence Agency asked if the requirement was still valid; test methods for providing calibrated LORAN data showed promise toward obtaining data needed for production of the LORAN overprinted charts.\(^5\) COMUSMACV, in response to a CINCPAC query, reaffirmed the requirement and identified priorities.\(^6\) On 13 November CINCPAC validated the requirement to the Defense Intelligence Agency.\(^7\) Subsequent proposals were exchanged between the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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1. CINCPAC 040054Z Dec 68.
2. Ltr., DIA to Oceanographer of the Navy, 23 Dec 68, Subj: Prototype Fluorescent Tactical Maps for III MAF.
4. COMUSMACV 12363/011052Z May 68.
5. CINCPACAF 082214Z Oct 68.
6. COMUSMACV 120147Z Nov 68.
7. CINCPAC 130314Z Nov 68.
and COMUSMACV through CINCPAC for obtaining high and low altitude and ground level calibration of LORAN data. The latest proposal called for a test to be performed in Southeast Asia to determine a suitable method for calibrating LORAN readings at high altitude; a separate method was being studied for obtaining ground level calibration. 1

Aerial Survey Operations

(3) During 1968, Aerial Survey Team 3, on temporary duty in South Vietnam, completed 57 percent of the total mapping requirement for Project AF 68-15 (COMBAT STEEL), HIRAN-controlled cartographic aerial photography of South Vietnam. 2 This photography was in support of Project CAVALCADE PONY. The team worked on various other special projects, some assigned by COMUSMACV after he was authorized to do so. 3

(6) The matter of extending the team's duty in Vietnam was considered, and COMUSMACV concurred in an extension through June 1969. He said he would also concur in an earlier departure if the team finished its assigned projects and proposed to reconfirm a requirement for the team every 90 days. 4 On 12 December CINCPAC extended the team's clearance through June 1969. 5

Ground Survey Operations

(6) In January 1968 the U.S. Army Vietnam submitted a request to upgrade the geodetic net in Vietnam. 6 This control was essential for topographic mapping, artillery positioning, navigational systems, and communications station positioning. The geodetic net had deteriorated to an alarming extent. 7 Numerous first order stations had been

4. COMUSMACV 100602Z Dec 68.
5. CINCPAC 122255Z Dec 68.
6. Ltr., Hq USARV to Director, DIA, 30 Jan 68, Subj: Request for Topographic Survey Support.
7. The net had been established by the French in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
destroyed or were in contested or Viet Cong-controlled areas. Many second and third order stations were also in contested areas or were not recoverable due to poor monumentation and station description, or destruction during construction or military operations. Although COMUSMACV had validated the requirement to upgrade the net, CINCPAC returned it recommending that Service channels be used to acquire the required support.

On 7 June COMUSMACV further defined the requirement and requested CINCPAC and Defense Intelligence Agency approval. In July CINCPAC forwarded the proposals to CINCUSARPAC and recommended that Service channels be used for temporary duty deployment of a geodetic team. CINCUSARPAC forwarded the request to the Army Chief of Engineers, who dispatched a survey team that arrived in Vietnam on 11 August and began operations. On 6 August the Defense Intelligence Agency notified CINCPAC that there were no objections to the deployment of the team but that additional support would not be provided until the basic requirement was submitted for validation as a mapping, charting, and geodesy requirement.

On 30 November COMUSMACV requested that CINCPAC validate and forward to the Defense Intelligence Agency the requirement for upgrading the geodetic net. Accomplishments of the temporary duty geodetic team, HIRAN teams, and USARV surveyors had proved the feasibility of the basic plan, he said.

CINCPAC, therefore, validated Project HONER, as it was called, to the Defense Intelligence Agency as a mapping, charting, and geodesy requirement and asked that the Department of the Army be assigned to manage and report on the project. The Defense Intelligence

2. Ltr., COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 7 Jun 68, Subj: Request for Topographic Survey Support.
3. Ltr., CINCPAC to CINCUSARPAC, 8 Jul 68, Subj: Topographic Survey Support; request for
5. Ltr., DIA to CINCPAC, 6 Aug 68, Subj: Geodetic Survey Team for MACV.
6. COMUSMACV 301422Z Nov 68.
Agency replied that insufficient justification had been furnished and requested that substantiating data be forwarded to assist in their evaluation. They also commented on some of the details of the plan in such manner that CINCPAC recommended to COMUSMACV that Project HONER be accomplished solely with in-country survey assets. No additional support, other than continued Army Map Service control adjustment computations, was required to accomplish the desired results, CINCPAC said. He also recommended a review of certain detailed requirements stated in the basic plan in light of the technical disagreement by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

**Naval Survey Operations**

(U) In April the hydrographic survey of the west coast of South Vietnam, begun in September 1967, was completed. The ships collected over 45,000 miles of echo-sounding profiles. From this data one of the survey ships produced 9 field charts that were distributed to users in the area to satisfy their immediate operating needs.

(U) Survey operations on the east coast of Vietnam were conducted from March through September 1968. These ships collected nearly 20,000 miles of sounding data and produced 12 field charts to satisfy immediate operational requirements. With the completion of this survey, all priority requirements for coastal hydrographic surveys in South Vietnam were satisfied and no additional surveys were scheduled.

(U) The Riverine Survey Team (a Marine-Navy-civilian team) operated in the Mekong Delta area collecting hydrographic data in the rivers and canals until August 1968 when it was disestablished. Prior to being withdrawn from Vietnam the team had satisfied all stated requirements in areas that were accessible to survey operations. Subsequently an Army Hydrographic Survey Team (HST 1) was activated to provide the capability for hydrographic reconnaissance previously accomplished by the Riverine Survey Team. It was the only unit of its type in the U. S. Army and was constituted from in-country engineer personnel.

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1. DIA DIAMC-3 8346/261605Z Dec 68.
2. ADMIN CINCPAC 280321Z Dec 68.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid. p. 8.
6. Ibid.
COMmando HUNT Support

On 13 December 1968 the Commander, 7th Air Force identified requirements in support of his operations in the COMmando HUNT area of Laos. He asked for HIRAN-controlled photography of the area, precise location of control points, and production of 1:25,000 orthopictomaps of the area. COMUSMACV endorsed the request on 21 December, identifying priorities. CINCPACAF also validated the requirement to CINCPAC, who in turn validated the requirement to the Defense Intelligence Agency. CINCPAC suggested that existing IGLOO WHITE graphics be used as interim graphics pending possible production of the required 1:25,000 orthopictomaps.

Aerial Photography - Thailand

U. S. Navy Heavy Photographic Squadron 61 (VAP-61) began collecting cartographic aerial photography of all of Thailand to support a joint U. S.-Thai remapping program. A detachment from Don Muang worked almost continuously on the project during 1968, flying over 25,000 flight line miles of photography, and by the end of the year the collection part of the project was 72 percent complete. VAP-61 also collected photography of 7 major air bases where U. S. Forces were stationed to be made into photo mosaics for use in joint U. S.-Thai planning for the security of those bases.

1:100,000 Scale Maps for Korea

In September 1968 the Eighth Army requested 1:100,000 scale coverage of Korea to supplement existing 1:50,000 and 1:250,000

1. 7AF TAN SON NHUT AFLD VIETNAM 130750Z Dec 68.
2. Ibid.
3. COMUSMACV 211549Z Dec 68.
4. CINCPACAF 242243Z Dec 68.
5. ADMIN CINCPAC 280314Z Dec 68.
6. Ibid.
7. The squadron's primary mission was to provide reconnaissance support to the operating forces of the 7th Fleet; in 1968 conditions were such that the aircraft could be continuously assigned to the cartographic requirement.
maps. 1 CINCUSARPAC concurred, but recommended limiting coverage to South Korea to include the DMZ and contiguous areas. In October CINCPAC validated the project to the Defense Intelligence Agency, with the stipulation that coverage be limited as recommended by CINCUSARPAC and the production process be the same as that accomplished previously for similar coverage of Vietnam. 2 The Defense Intelligence Agency concurred with this proposal. 3

(U) On 5 December CINCPAC tasked CINCUSARPAC to produce the requested 1:100,000 scale maps. Production was to follow the process of two to one photo reduction as previously done in Vietnam. Series L752, scale 1:50,000 reproduction materials were to be used and the Korean Army Map Service was to be asked to participate. 4

Cambodia Mapping Agreement

(S) The United States continued to furnish maps of Cambodia to Cambodia in accord with a 1957 agreement. After Cambodia broke diplomatic relations with the United States, CINCPAC had repeatedly expressed the desire that maps of sensitive areas containing militarily useful data not be furnished to that Government. 5 The Army Map Service had furnished 60 map sheets during 1968 as directed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and only 21 non-sensitive maps remained to be shipped. In December CINCPAC reaffirmed to the Defense Intelligence Agency his position that the release of any sensitive maps to Cambodia was "militarily unacceptable," but he identified 66 additional sheets for possible release if it was considered at National level to be in the best interests of the United States to continue the map release program. 6

1. Ltr., CG, 8th U.S. Army to CINCUSARPAC, 24 Sep 68, Subj: 1:100,000 Scale Topographic Maps.
2. Ltr., CINCPAC to DIA, 31 Oct 68, Subj: Korea 1:100,000 Scale Topographic Maps.
3. Ltr., DIA to CINCPAC, 26 Nov 68, Subj: Korea 1:100,000 Scale Topographic Maps.
4. Ltr., CINCPAC to CINCUSARPAC, 5 Dec 68, Subj: Korea 1:100,000 Scale Topographic Maps.
6. Ltr., CINCPAC to DIA, 10 Dec 68, Subj: Large Scale US Topographic Maps of Cambodia (U).
Escape and Evasion Charts

In January CINCPAC validated to the Defense Intelligence Agency a requirement for new evasion charts at scales of 1:250,000 and 1:500,000 to replace World War II 1:2,000,000 cloth charts still in use. He listed eight areas in the PACOM in order of production priority. In June CINCPAC proposed shifting Korea from third to first priority. The Defense Intelligence Agency proposed to produce the Korea charts based on some new air charts; CINCPAC concurred and delivery was expected in the PACOM by the end of August 1969.

Integrated Research Information System

CINCPAC undertook the system design and initiated programming support for the Integrated Research Information System (IRIS) in June 1968. The IRIS was designed to fill the need for computer manipulation of data on the effectiveness of Southeast Asia air operations and the infiltration of men and materiel into South Vietnam. The disk file format of the system provided the capability to efficiently integrate data from the various IRIS files. In addition, the system was expected to eventually provide a capability that would facilitate analytical intelligence queries and responses.

The initial IRIS report was produced and disseminated in December. It was the first CINCPAC intelligence report developed wholly from a disk file, and the first machine processing of Special Intelligence. Programming of the IRIS was well advanced with the modifications and testing phase expected to continue until about mid-1969.

Intelligence Coordination Group Formed

CINCPAC formed the Intelligence Coordination Group (ICG) on 24 April 1968. The ICG was composed of the principal intelligence officers of CINCPAC (Chairman), CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CGFMFPAC, and CHNSAPAC for the purposes of overall supervision.

1. Ltr., CINCPAC to DIA, 23 Jan 68, Subj: Evasion Chart Requirement (U).
2. Ltr., CINCPAC to DIA, 3 Aug 68, Subj: E & E Charts of North Korea (U).
3. J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jun and Dec 68.
of ICG activities and providing policy guidance. A working level ICG composed of intelligence officers from the CINCPAC Intelligence Division staff was formed concurrently for the purpose of conducting day to day data analysis and assessments of the nature and extent of enemy infiltration into South Vietnam and adjacent border areas.

BLACK BEARD Conference

(5) During the period 17 to 20 December CINCPAC hosted a conference on the COMUSMACV program BLACK BEARD, which was an intelligence collection program to determine the extent of the use of Cambodia by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army as a logistics base and safe haven. The conference was attended by representatives of CINCPAC, his component command commanders, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMACHTAI. Its purpose was to brief attendees on the overall BLACK BEARD collection program, identify problem areas relative to implementing the program, and to determine actions to be undertaken by attendees in furtherance of the program.²

CINCPAC Infiltration Study

(U) Representatives of CINCPAC, his component command commanders, and COMUSMACV met at Camp Smith on 30 April to update and revise the CINCPAC Infiltration Study. The first such study had been prepared in July 1967 by a similar group. The new study addressed three main areas: the North Vietnamese support base, sea infiltration, and the infiltration of personnel and materiel. The conclusions were published and sent to the JCS, the Services, and interested agencies in the PACOM.³

Counter Subversion Operations Command

(5) In 1968 CINCPAC studied the matter of military participation in the operation of the Joint Thai-U. S. Interrogation Center (JIC) of the CAS sponsored and supported Counter Subversion Operations

2. J23 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
3. J22 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68; CINCPAC Infiltration Study, 1 May 68.
Command (CSOC) in Bangkok. The CSOC was essentially a Police Special Branch operation concerned with the interrogation of alleged Communists. As a result of the study, COMUSMACTHAI was asked to review the basis for and need for continued CINCPAC support of the CSOC. 1

COMUSMACTHAI completed the study in September. He concluded that the interrogation effort demonstrated sufficient military potential to warrant continued COMUSMACTHAI participation on a limited bases under some changes in arrangements for interrogation access. To complement the CSOC interrogation effort, COMUSMACTHAI recommended the initiation of discussions with the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) to assure access to detainees being processed by AFSC interrogation teams.

CINCPAC, in October, concurred in the conclusions and recommendations of COMUSMACTHAI. He provided additional background information to assist COMUSMACTHAI during discussions, required primary emphasis on the establishment of a bilateral interrogation effort with the AFSC, and provided that proposed changes and additions to existing agreements and any new agreements be submitted to CINCPAC for approval prior to their formalization. 2

1. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
2. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
SECTION VIII - PERSONNEL AND MEDICAL ACTIVITIES

Joint Tables of Distribution - Vietnam

Headquarters Staff, COMUSMACV

The Staff Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) stayed more or less constant during 1968, although there were a number of minor transfers of functions or personnel among the various JTDs associated with the Headquarters activity. The authorization that had been approved by the JCS at the end of the year was for 2,131 spaces.1

USMACV Naval Advisory Group

The JTD authorized strength stood at 603 at the beginning of the year and gained one more space in February.2 In a manpower adjustment that had been requested by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC, the JCS approved a new June 1968 JTD for 565 spaces on 7 August.3 The JCS approved a 3 space reduction requested by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC for a year end strength of 562 spaces.4

Air Force Advisory Group

The JTD authorized strength stood at 493 at the beginning of the year.5 Minor changes during the year resulted in a year end strength of 451 spaces.6

Field Advisory Elements

The JTD for the Field Advisory Elements rose from 8,543 spaces at the beginning of 19687 to 9,616.8 Some of the larger changes made during the year were for the Intelligence Coordination and

1. JCS 07854/172211Z Dec 68.
2. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan, Feb 68; JCS 1719/212123Z Feb 68.
3. JCS 6570/071607Z Aug 68.
4. JCS 07854/172211Z Dec 68.
5. JCS 3775/271603Z Apr 67.
6. JCS 05662/152042Z Mar 68.
8. JCS 07854/172211Z Dec 68.
Exploitation Program and because of the discontinuance of the ARVN Military Assistance JTD.

American Forces Vietnam Network

(6) A new JTD for American Forces Vietnam Network (AFVN) MACV for 186 spaces was approved by the JCS in March.¹ A request from COMUSMACV for 12 new spaces was approved by the JCS in July, bringing the total to 178 spaces.² A request from COMUSMACV for 4 new spaces was approved resulting in a year end strength of 182 spaces.³

MAC Studies and Observation Group (MACSOG)

(6) A new JTD for the MACSOG was approved by the JCS in March. The new approval authorization totaled 362 spaces.⁴

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS)

(6) A new JTD was approved by the JCS on 22 January for the MACV CORDS for 345 spaces.⁵ This was increased to 388 spaces in May.⁶

Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office

(6) The JTD for the Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was approved by the JCS in March for 104 spaces, a result of the manpower management survey of COMUSMACV.⁷

Joint Research and Test Activity

(6) There were no changes to the authorized strength of 13 during the year.

ARVN Military Assistance

(6) At the request of COMUSMACV and CINCPAC the JCS approved discontinuance of the ARVN Military Assistance JTD, with the discontinued

1. JCS 4761/271732Z Mar 68.
2. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
3. JCS 07854/172211Z Dec 68.
4. JCS 4339/221849Z Mar 68.
5. JCS 7851/222053Z Jan 68.
6. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
7. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
spaces transferred to the Headquarters Staff and Field Advisory Elements
JTDs. ¹

COMUSMACV Manpower Management Survey

(Ê) The survey of COMUSMACV manpower management requested
by the JCS was completed and forwarded in January. ² CINCPAC validated
the recommendations of the survey team for a revised JTD of 1,944
spaces. This was a decrease of spaces for 53 officers, 149 enlisted, and
28 civilians.

(Ê) One task of the survey group was to study the further use of
Vietnamese civilians to replace U. S. personnel. Those civilians were
not carried on the JTD but numbered about 3,400 more personnel.

Personnel Support of Headquarters MACV Forward

(Ê) Plans for establishment of Headquarters MACV Forward in the
I CTZ, required because of the intensification of operations and an
enemy buildup in that area, required manpower resources from Hq
USMACV and the USMACV component command commanders. The total
requirement was for 156 officers and 171 enlisted personnel. Hq USMACV
provided 105 officers and 88 enlisted, and tasked his components to pro-
vide the balance. COMUSMACV also requested 45 temporary duty per-
sonnel to alleviate the shortage thus created. ³ CINCPAC’s component
command commanders provided personnel within their capabilities and
referred the additional requirements to their respective Military De-
partments when necessary. ⁴

COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI JTD

(Ê) The Joint Manpower Program (JMP) for COMUSMACTHAI/
CHJUSMAGTHAI for FY 69, forwarded to the JCS on 25 January, was
approved in April. It listed 858 spaces representing the FY 68 total of
828 plus 29 spaces approved by the JCS for the Army Advisory Group in

1. JCS 8615/0919072 May 68.
to the JCS, 15 Jan 68, Subj: Manpower Management Study, HQ
USMACV (U).
3. COMUSMACV 14981/170153Z Feb 68.
4. CINCPAC 240316Z Feb 68.
Bangkok in support of the enlarged Royal Thai Army forces for South Vietnam and one space realigned from DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI.¹

DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI JTD

(1) The 1 July 1968 JTD, submitted to the JCS by CINCPAC² and requesting a 20 space increase, was approved by the JCS. Approval resulted in an authorized strength of 419 spaces—297 for DEPCHJUSMAG and 122 spaces for ARMA/AIRA.³

Service Responsibility for Manning the Position of COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI and His Deputy

(5) The JCS required annual recommendations regarding the Service to be responsible for assigning the chiefs of Military Assistance agencies. In June 1968 CINCPACAF stated he believed the position of COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI should be changed to an Air Force major general position on the basis of the preponderance of USAF presence in Thailand and the requirement for a large air effort in the event of contingency operations.⁴ He said the principal duties were matters of coordination or direction in areas of primary interest to the Air Force.

(5) CINCUSARPAC non-concurred and stated that he felt that the COMUSMACTHAI should continue to be an Army major general.⁵

(5) CINCPAC's recommendation to the Chairman of the JCS stated that the major problems and on-going U. S. military interests in Thailand principally involved Air Force forces and indicated the necessity for USAF leadership at the highest level. He recommended that the next COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI be an Air Force major general and that his deputy be an Army brigadier general. The U. S. Ambassador to Thailand concurred in this recommendation.⁶

1. JCS 5842/081016Z Apr 68.
2. Ltr., CINCPAC to the JCS, 2 Jan 68, Subj: 1 July 1968 JMP, Deputy Chief, Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (U).
3. JCS 9452/072127Z Feb 68.
4. CINCPACAF 132200Z Jun 68.
5. History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
6. Ibid.
The Director of the Joint Staff presented rationale for continuing the Army assignment and asked CINCPAC to reconsider. The Ambassador to Thailand was also asked for his views. On 15 May he recommended that the next COMUSMACTHAI be an Air Force officer. He based his rationale on his idea of future U.S. strategy and posture in Southeast Asia and he suggested possible changes that would in effect call upon Southeast Asia countries to provide ground forces in the event of contingency operations with the U.S. contribution primarily air and logistic support.

CINCPAC also repeated his request for an Air Force COMUSMACTHAI in August to the JCS, again stating the reasons that had led him to this conclusion. The JCS approved the recommendation in December.

Earlier, while discussing the impact of the proposed change, COMUSMACTHAI had recommended that if the position was converted to Air Force it would be desirable if the new Deputy COMUSMACTHAI were either a junior Army major general or a senior brigadier general who was to be soon promoted.

CINCPAC agreed and recommended the arrangement to the JCS, noting that the assignment "would be more in consonance with relative US/THAI rank structure thus facilitating mission accomplishment."

Manpower Requirements and Changes - Headquarters, Commander U.S. Forces Korea

The JTD for Headquarters, Commander U.S. Forces Korea was increased to 191 spaces on 11 January 1968 by the JCS. In May

1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68. When the incumbent COMUSMACTHAI, MAJ GEN Hal D. Mc Cown, USA, commented on the Ambassador's proposal he strongly recommended that the position remain Army and expressed concern over the possible changes suggested by the Ambassador. CINCPAC informed COMUSMACTHAI that he was proposing converting the position to Air Force but reassured him that no immediate changes were envisioned to CINCPAC's Southeast Asian strategy.
3. CINCPAC 152143Z Aug 68.
4. JCS 7291/092300Z Dec 68.
5. COMUSMACTHAI 141105Z Oct 68.
6. CINCPAC 251724Z Oct 68.
7. JCS 7016/111928Z Jan 68.
the JCS approved emergency manpower requirements to permit an additional 24 spaces for the Engineer Division1 and 32 spaces for augmentation of other elements of the U. S. Forces Korea staff, bringing the total authorization to 247. 2 In October this emergency figure, 247, became the FY 69 manpower authorization approved by the JCS. 3 The increases that followed were JCS approval for an Engineer Division, U. S. Forces Korea and a U. S.-Republic of Korea Operational Planning Staff, bringing the total authorization at the end of the year to 278 spaces. 4

Personnel Strength Reporting - Korea

The accuracy and timeliness of personnel strength data on U. S. and Korean forces in Korea did not satisfy the CINCPAC requirement to monitor the buildup and Manning status of forces in Korea. 5 CINCPAC therefore tasked COMUS Korea with the submission of a weekly strength report of all U. S., Korea, and Third Country military personnel in Korea. 6 The report had a format and information cut-off time consistent with the weekly strength reports of COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI, for standardization and to facilitate correlation of the data in each report.

Through coordination with the JCS, early development of the COMUS Korea strength report preempted the initiation of a separate strength reporting requirement by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The addressees of the report were initially limited to the PACOM. On 15 April it was determined that the data would be disseminated to the JCS and the Services. 7 Through prior agreement with CINCUSARPAC, this action allowed the submission of a recommendation that the Department of the Army accept the CINCPAC report on a weekly basis.

1. To serve under the Eighth U. S. Army Engineer, who was double-hatted as United Nations Command/U. S. Forces Korea Engineer.
2. JCS 09302/172049Z May 68.
3. JCS 2060/032020Z Oct 68.
4. JCS 5103/071600Z Nov 68 and 7363/102202Z Dec 68.
5. JI History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
6. ADMINO CINCPAC 200521Z Mar 68.
7. ADMINO CINCPAC 190335Z Apr 68.
basis in lieu of the Eighth Army daily strength reports. The Department of the Army cancelled the daily strength reporting requirement and began monitoring the CINCPAC weekly report on 30 April 1968. 1

Assistant Division Commanders for USMC Divisions

(✓) In January COMUSMACV asked for CINCPAC's support in establishing a requirement for a second Assistant Division Commander (brigadier general) for each of the two Marine divisions in South Vietnam. Wide dispersion of divisional maneuver elements required two assistant commanders for effective command and control; the Army used two. 2 He pointed out that the Marines had concurred. CINCPAC did also, and so advised the Chairman of the JCS in January. 3 This request was approved.

Assistant Wing Commanders for USMC Air Wing

(✓) Discussions regarding a second Assistant Division Commander for USMC divisions (see preceding item) led to discussions of the desirability of having a second Assistant Wing Commander for the First Marine Air Wing. Again the Commandant of the Marine Corps concurred. 4 COMUSMACV based his request on the "demanding operation and management responsibility of CG, 1st MAW, who concurrently functions as Deputy Commander, III MAF for air." 5

(✓) CINCPAC concurred, stating to the Chairman of the JCS that the "large in-country resources of the First MAW, geographical spread of forces, collateral functions of the CG, and establishment of a forward headquarters in the vital Quang Tri area clearly validate a requirement for two brigadier generals to serve as Assistant Wing Commanders in I CTZ." 6 This request was approved.

Rest and Recuperation (R&R)

(✓) One of the biggest and most successful personnel programs in the PACOM was the R&R program from combat areas of Southeast Asia.

1. DA 861259/242238Z Apr 68.
2. COMUSMACV 180118Z Jan 68.
3. CINCPAC 250447Z Jan 68.
4. COMUSMACV 150130Z Feb 68.
5. Ibid.
6. CINCPAC 181854Z Feb 68.
Personnel were authorized to visit sites in Bangkok, Hawaii, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Penang, Singapore, Sydney, Taipei, and Tokyo. A supplemental program was conducted by the III Marine Amphibious Force to Okinawa on a space available basis and Guam was a limited R&R site for personnel of Guamanian origin.¹ A discussion follows regarding each of those sites for which problems arose or changes occurred in 1968.

Guam

(6) In 1968 the provisions for limited R&R to Guam were expanded to include also servicemen whose families resided on Guam.² In June CINCPAC concurred in a proposal to provide space required transportation for R&R personnel to Guam,³ and space was reserved for them on aircraft enroute to or returning from Hawaii.⁴

Bangkok

(5) In February the JCS provided authority to implement a five-day in-country R&R program for combat support personnel stationed in Thailand (outside of the Bangkok-Don Muang area) if they were on permanently assigned, unaccompanied tours.⁵ The U. S. Ambassador withheld approval, however, placing a prerequisite that military personnel (other than R&R) coming to Bangkok on leave and pass must be reduced by approximately 3,000 personnel a month.⁶ COMUSMACTHAI recommended that leave, pass, permissive temporary duty, and other unofficial travel not be granted to Bangkok except for authorized R&R or standby leave to fill empty seats on R&R aircraft, and that aircraft not remain overnight in Bangkok unless on official business.⁷ CINCPAC asked CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT to preclude aircraft from staying over unless on official business.⁸

(6) The Ambassador granted his approval on 29 March and the program was implemented on 8 April 1968.

² J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
³ ADMINO CINCPAC 202240Z Jun 68.
⁴ COMUSMACV 15671/311138Z May 68.
⁵ CINCPAC 070108Z Feb 68.
⁶ CINCPAC 250313Z Mar 68.
⁷ COMUSMACTHAI 221145Z Mar 68.
⁸ ADMINO CINCPAC 032309Z Apr 68.

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(C) In May the JCS asked CINCPAC to review his FY 69 R&R requirements to Bangkok because COMUSMACV's stated requirements were quite a bit higher than the quota recommended by the JCS. CINCPAC explained that the increase had been caused by an increased troop strength and the addition of combat personnel from Thailand—Bangkok was a very popular site. CINCPAC also noted that existing R&R and Environmental and Morale Leave programs were approved by the American Ambassador and that modifications were not considered necessary.

(C) In August CINCPAC approved a COMUSMACV request to temporarily increase the daily on-ground authorization for Bangkok from 996 to 1,050. CINCPAC also asked COMUSMACVTHAI's concurrence in a proposal to authorize 1,050 on a permanent basis beginning 1 December 1968. The American Ambassador concurred on 4 November with the permanent increase to 1,050 scheduled to start on or after 1 January 1969.

Hawaii

(U) In November COMUSMACV had proposed that the wearing of civilian clothing while traveling on R&R aircraft be authorized. CINCPAC authorized such attire for personnel enroute to or from Hawaii or Guam only. Approval for such apparel for travel to foreign R&R sites was still under study.

Kuala Lumpur

(C) The CINCPACREP Philippines proposed in November that the Kuala Lumpur R&R site be closed after repair of the airfield at Penang (scheduled for the spring of 1969) or for planning purposes on 1 July 1969. COMUSMACV noted that Kuala Lumpur had a very low utilization rate and in a recent survey of preferred R&R and leave sites it had come

1. JCS 8032/022056Z May 68.
2. CINCPAC 042151Z May 68.
3. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 270325Z Aug 68.
5. COMUSMACVTHAI 040902Z Nov 68.
6. COMUSMACV 35009/100532Z Nov 68.
7. CINCPAC 030142Z and 030144Z Dec 68.
8. COMUSMACV 38289/271256Z Nov 68.
in last in both categories. 1 The American Ambassador to Kuala Lumpur had no objection to the closing 2 and the Secretary of State also concurred in December. 3 CINCPAC asked the JCS for approval to terminate the program when the airfield to Penang was reopened. 4 Planning for an orderly transition continued with Kuala Lumpur scheduled to be closed so as to permit transfer of personnel and equipment. 5

Manila

(Ç) Manila was the only R&R site served by CINCPACAF's military aircraft rather than Military Airlift Command (MAC) commercial contract carriers. 6 In May COMUSMACV asked CINCPAC to consider the use of larger or more military aircraft to support the R&R program to Manila. 7 It was anticipated that when the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) II replaced PHILCAG I, an additional 250 aircraft seats a month would be required for the personnel from PHILCAG II.

(Ç) Also in May the Chief of the Western Pacific Transportation Office asked CINCPAC for a more precise forecast of passenger requirements for Manila. He also recommended that the R&R program for the PHILCAG II force, if activated and deployed, be supported by 13th Air Force organic aircraft, which already provided C-54 service for Americans on R&R to Manila. 8

(Ç) CINCPACAF analyzed the possibility of using MAC contract airlift to the Philippines. 9 CINCPAC provided a detailed analysis of alternate approaches and finally recommended to the JCS the use of MAC military flights to Manila in lieu of CINCPACAF's support. The urgency of action in the matter was emphasized by pointing out that the PHILCAG replacement personnel would exceed CINCPACAF's airlift capability. 10 The JCS approved CINCPAC's recommendation and requested that service be

1. Ibid.
2. AMEMBASSY Kuala Lumpur 6468/291000Z Nov 68.
3. SECSTATE 286859/132044Z Dec 68.
4. CINCPAC 060327Z Dec 68.
5. AMEMBASSY Kuala Lumpur 6723/270912Z Dec 68; ADMIN CINCPAC 280318Z Dec 68.
7. COMUSMACV 15642/310646Z May 68.
8. CHWTO Japan 140545Z May 68.
9. CINCPACAF 140127Z Sep 68.
10. CINCPAC 290028Z Sep 68.
initiated; not later than 1 December 1968. 1 COMAC advised that airlift support would be provided by C-141 type aircraft. 2

(C) In November CINCPAC agreed to a suggestion by COMUSMACV and COMAC to defer inauguration of the flights to 1 January 1969 when PHILCAG requirements began and the requirements for both forces could be satisfied by MAC airlift. 3

Penang

(C) In February CINCPAC proposed that the R&R site at Penang be closed on 1 October to permit an increased use of Australia for R&R and because Penang (and Kuala Lumpur) lacked troop popularity. 4 When the matter of implementing an R&R program for New Zealand was being considered in September, one of the prerequisites was considered to be termination of R&R to Penang to permit transfer of equipment and personnel spaces in order to keep expense at a minimum. 5 The Office of the Secretary of Defense later advised that R&R program expansion to New Zealand was not contemplated so Penang was unaffected. 6

(C) In November the Commander Naval Forces Philippines advised that the Royal Australian Air Force Base Butterworth (the air base used for R&R aircraft into and out of Penang) would be closed to R&R aircraft from 1 March to 31 May 1969 because of runway repairs. 7 During this period the R&R site at Penang would have to be temporarily closed. Approval was obtained to terminate R&R to Kuala Lumpur when Penang reopened. These plans were announced with care to reassure the Malaysians that it was the "intention of the United States Government to resume the Penang program when runway repairs are completed." 8

Sydney

(C) In early January 1968 the JCS asked CINCPAC to consider increasing R&R to Australia to help strengthen the international position

1. JCS 4923/051741Z Nov 68.
2. MAC 272125Z Nov 68.
3. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
4. CINCPAC 130355Z Feb 68.
5. CINCPAC 260311Z Sep 68.
6. JCS 4980/052315Z Nov 68.
7. COMNAVPHIL 220959Z Nov 68.
8. AMEMBASSY Kuala Lumpur 6649/180916Z Dec 68.
of the U. S. dollar and to help the Australian foreign exchange position. CINCPAC replied that servicemen should be permitted to choose their desired R&R site to enhance morale benefits and that the Australian program should continue as proposed until results of the winter season could be evaluated. The JCS asked CINCPAC for a plan, however, to increase R&R personnel in Australia by 2,000 a month to a goal of 6,480 by October 1968. CINCPAC did so.

On 31 May the American Ambassador in Canberra advised that the Australian Government had approved a CINCPAC request to increase the on-ground authorization from 1,000 to 1,500 but suggested that the increase be put in the Gold Coast area rather than Sydney. CINCPAC did not agree with the use of the Gold Coast, particularly during the winter, because it would increase workload and be uneconomical. The Secretary of State accepted CINCPAC's recommendation and advised the Ambassador that Sydney would be maintained as the only R&R site.

Throughout the year there had been some problems with the smuggling of marijuana into Australia in tobacco products by U. S. Forces. To preclude this method, COMUSMACV recommended a procedure whereby R&R passengers could carry only enough tobacco to smoke enroute and then be permitted to buy duty-free cigarettes on their arrival. CINCPAC staffing of the proposal indicated that it would not be practical to attempt to sell duty-free tobacco products to R&R personnel in Sydney. CINCPAC did concur, however, in implementing the restriction procedure recommended by COMUSMACV effective 15 November 1968.

1. JCS 6955/102222Z Jan 68.
2. CINCPAC 180006Z Jan 68.
3. JCS 8509/292209Z Jan 68.
4. In January CINCPAC also approved an increase to a yearly quota of 3,000 airlift seats for Australian troops in Vietnam. (CINCPAC 270301Z Jan 68.)
5. CINCPAC 130355Z Feb 68.
6. A surfing area about 30 miles south of Brisbane.
7. AMEMBASSY Canberra 5940/310656Z May 68.
8. CINCPAC 040114Z Jun 68.
9. SECSTATE 191319/262213Z Jun 68.
10. COMUSMACV 31965/270650Z Oct 68.
11. CINCPAC 151950Z Nov 68; COMUSMACV 131135Z Nov 68.
Tokyo

U. S. Army Japan reported that many R&R personnel processed through the Camp Zama R&R Center were being returned to Vietnam by other means. This meant that U. S. Army Japan was required to carry them as AWOL until their presence in Vietnam could be traced and confirmed. This gave an erroneous picture of the AWOL situation in Japan with attendant political connotations. The Commander, U. S. Forces Japan, therefore, asked his Service commanders to process returning personnel only through the R&R Center.¹

New Zealand

New Zealand was considered as a new R&R site during 1968. CINCPAC, asked to comment, told the JCS ² that a new site was not feasible until requirements for R&R more nearly approached the capability of already operational sites or until one or more of the existing sites was closed.³ On 17 May the Secretary of State advised the New Zealand Ambassador in Washington that the United States could not approve New Zealand as an R&R site at that time as other sites were not used to maximum capability.⁴

The matter was raised again in September by the JCS. After considering COMUSMACV's comments, CINCPAC recommended favorable consideration, contingent upon closing an existing R&R site elsewhere (Penang) to provide operating equipment and personnel spaces in order to keep expense to a minimum, and also contingent upon a survey in New Zealand by representatives of CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, COMAC, and the CINCPAC Representative Philippines to determine the adequacy of facilities to support a successful program.⁵

¹ History of Headquarters, United States Forces, Japan, 1 April - 30 June 1968, p. 18.
² CINCPAC 180208Z Apr 68.
³ One consideration was that Korea was also pressing for Seoul for an R&R site, which we had denied for lack of requirement for another site. Korea pointed out that most FWMAF had R&R sites on their home grounds. Establishment of a site in New Zealand would leave Korea the only force not so favored. (Ibid.)
⁴ SECSTATE 166423/172259Z May 68.
⁵ CINCPAC 260311Z Sep 68.
(O) The JCS advised CINCPAC on 5 November, however, that the Office of the Secretary of Defense did not contemplate expansion of the R&R program.  

**R&R for Tour Extension in Vietnam**

(U) A new policy offered a second R&R for personnel who extended their tour in Vietnam for 90 to 180 days. The JCS asked for statistics on the program. CINCPAC advised that the results had been less than expected but enough to warrant continuation. As of 31 July, 1,199 personnel had elected to participate (856 Army, 101 Navy, 40 Air Force, and 202 Marines).  

**Southeast Asia Benefits**

(5) The matter of uniform benefits for U. S. personnel serving in various areas in Southeast Asia was not resolved during 1968. It was still being studied in Washington, despite urging by CINCPAC to resolve inequities. The benefits under study were such matters as hostile fire pay, combat zone income tax exemption, a $50 customs exemption for mailed gifts, and free mailing privileges.

(5) In July CINCPAC learned that priority was being given to grant additional benefits to personnel serving in Thailand but not to those in Laos. CINCPAC advised the JCS that personnel in Laos were serving in a hostile fire pay area and therefore should be given priority consideration for the authorization of other benefits. Thailand was not recommended for hostile fire pay and therefore "should be of lower priority for the obtaining of benefits." CINCPAC recommended that Executive Order 11216 be revised prior to 31 December 1968 to include Laos and thereby authorize income tax exemption for personnel in Thailand who receive hostile fire pay for operations conducted in Laos.

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1. JCS 4980/052315Z Nov 68.
2. CINCPAC 061950Z Sep 68.
4. CINCPAC 160402Z Aug 68.
5. CINCPAC 270150Z Dec 68.
Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire - Korea

In November 1967, COMUS Korea recommended that U. S. Forces in a prescribed area near the Korean Demilitarized Zone be authorized special pay for duty subject to hostile fire. ¹ CINCUSARPAC had asked that the matter of other benefits available to some personnel in Southeast Asia also be considered. CINCUSARPAC decided in January 1968, however, not to pursue the matter of other benefits because it might prejudice a decision regarding the hostile fire pay. ³

CINCPAC proposed to the JCS that the U. S. Army 2d Infantry Division zone north of the Imjin River be designated as a hostile fire area and that forces serving there that met other legal qualifications be paid an extra $65 a month. ⁴

(U) The Office of the Secretary of Defense on 1 April 1968 authorized the special pay to uniformed Service personnel serving on or after 1 April in:

...that portion of the Republic of Korea north of the Imjin River and south of the DMZ extending from the intersection of that river and the DMZ on the west (coordinates 969903) along the DMZ to a point in the vicinity of Pinil (coordinates 097095), then southwest to the north bank of the Imjin River in the vicinity of Chajip'o (coordinates 119060). ⁵

Casualty Reporting

(U) Casualty statistics received from CINCPAC's component command commanders, because of normal variations in origin and distribution, differed slightly from the data provided by the Services to the Secretary of Defense. CINCPAC, therefore, in November 1967 asked the JCS to establish a single source of personnel casualty data as recorded by the Military Departments to be provided to the PACOM from Washington.

2. Tax exemption, free mailing privileges, R&R, etc.
3. CINCUSARPAC 082244Z Jan 68.
4. CINCPAC 060242Z Feb 68.
5. JCS 5520/042010Z Apr 68.
This would avoid the duplicative effort of compilation and eliminate differing statistics.  

(U) The JCS arranged for CINCPAC to receive the required data. After a three-month test of the new channel proved it satisfactory, CINCPAC discontinued the requirement for casualty reporting by his component command commanders.

**U. S. Personnel Casualties**

(U) The first U. S. casualties in Vietnam were sustained by advisors in 1961. From that time the combined U. S. killed and wounded each year more than doubled that for the preceding year, until 1968. The trend continued in the first half of 1968 but then the loss rate decreased. Nevertheless, by the end of 1968 the combined killed and wounded total was half again as much as the total for 1967. See accompanying tables.

### Casualties Incurred by U. S. Military Personnel in Connection with the War in Vietnam - 1 January 1961 through 31 December 1968

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed in Action</th>
<th>Wounded in Action</th>
<th>Missing in Action</th>
<th>Captured</th>
<th>Non-hostile Missing</th>
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1. CINCPAC 182031Z Nov 67.
2. JCS 3584/242026Z Nov 67.
3. CINCPAC 260319Z Mar 68.
4. Defense Department figures.
### U. S. Casualties - 1968
(By Service and Month)

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|                   | 135  | 26   | 108          | 308       |

**Confidential**
U. S. Personnel Missing and Taken Prisoner

(U) CINCPAC formed a Prisoner of War Policy Advisory Committee in January 1968 to insure a coordinated effort to help American PWs. 1 Repatriation planning and efforts to improve the treatment of American PWs were matters of concern to the committee, which held its first monthly meeting at Camp Smith on 16 February. 2

(U) In June the Defense Department published the first policy for processing returned U. S. PWs and other detained military personnel. 3 The JCS enjoined uniformity of treatment for returnees. They emphasized the inherent responsibility of the Services for processing their own personnel, but stated that the commander of the unified command in the area in which the personnel were released would exercise initial control. 4 In December the JCS asked CINCPAC about his plans for exercising this "initial control." 5 The 19 December meeting of the PACOM PW Policy Advisory Committee reviewed all related plans and CINCPAC forwarded the requested information to the JCS early in 1969. 6

(U) Not many prisoners were released in 1968. On 16 February, North Vietnam released three captured pilots, Captain Jon David Black, USAF; Major Norris Miller Overly, USAF; and LTJG David Paul Matheny, USN. 7

(U) Three more pilots, all USAF, were released on 2 August. 8 They were Major James F. Lam, Major Fred M. Thompson, and Captain Joe V. Carpenter.

1. CINCPAC 270818Z Jan 68.
2. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC published his command policy on these matters in CINCPACINST 03461.1, 6 Jul 68, Subj: Policy for Processing of Returned U. S. Prisoners of War, Other Detained Personnel, and Evaders (U).
5. JCS 7364/102203Z Dec 68.
6. CINCPAC 042130Z Jan 69.
7. AMEMBASSY Saigon 17222/290248Z Jan 68.
8. STATE 214628/030009Z Aug 68; VIEN TIANE 8243/021943Z Aug 68.
On 20 December the 11 U.S. Army crewmen of an LCU that was detained by Cambodia on 17 July 1968 after it erroneously entered Cambodian territory while navigating on the Mekong were released by Prince Sihanouk. 1

The 82 crewmen of the USS PUEBLO were released by North Korea on 23 December 1968. 2 They had been returned to the United States by Christmas for a reunion with their families. A formal inquiry into the facts of their detention was scheduled to begin shortly after the first of the year.

At year's end over 1,200 U.S. personnel were listed as prisoners of war or missing in action and possibly detained. 3

Communist Prisoners of War

By the end of 1968 there were nearly 20,000 enemy PW in 6 camps in South Vietnam, 5 on the mainland and the large main camp on Phu Quoc Island. Enlargement of Phu Quoc toward a planned capacity of 20,000 continued. 4 The screening of prisoners continued in 1968. 5 Before a formal PW system was begun in late 1965, PW were held in civilian jails, indiscriminately mixed with political and civil prisoners. Screening had been in progress since that time to classify persons as true PW (NVA or VC military), ralliers (Chieu Hoi), civil defendants (VC political or criminal prisoners), or innocent civilians. 6

CINC PAC continued to monitor all programs to insure compliance with international agreements on the treatment of prisoners of war.

U.S. Army Medals for Foreign Forces in Vietnam

On 8 November 1968 CINC PAC advised COMUSMACV and CINCUSARPAC that, subject to Department of the Army approval, he had no objection to delegation of authority for COMUSMACV and CGUSARV to award the Bronze Star Medal and Army Commendation

1. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 24481/201115Z Dec 68.
2. COMUSKOREA 230010Z Dec 68.
4. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
Medal to foreign military forces in grade 0-5 and below for outstanding meritorious service in Vietnam.\footnote{1} A recommendation for such delegation of authority to COMUSMACV was submitted by CINCPAC to the JCS later in November.\footnote{2} A similar recommendation for delegation of authority to CGUSARV was submitted to the Department of the Army by CINCUSARPAC.\footnote{3}

**Letters of Commendation for Korean Officers**

(\textit{U}) On 14 December 1968 CINCPAC advised the CINCUNC that the JCS had approved a procedure for recognizing the service of Korean officers on the United Nations component of the Military Armistice Commission whereby the CINCUNC would submit a letter to the ROK Ministry of National Defense commending the individual officer and citing his contribution to ROK security.\footnote{4} This procedure was proposed by the CINCUNC and concurred in by CINCPAC\footnote{5} following notification by the Secretary of Defense that the State Department was no longer disposed to approve U.S. awards for Korean officers serving with the UN component of the Military Armistice Commission because such awards could strengthen the arguments of those who claimed that UN presence in Korea was merely a "front" for the United States.\footnote{6}

**Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for Korea**

(\textit{U}) In March 1968 COMUS Korea proposed that the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal be authorized for members of all Military Services who have served in Korea or its adjacent waters from 1 October 1966 to a date to be announced.\footnote{7} On 2 August the Defense Department authorized the award as requested.\footnote{8}

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1. CINCPAC 080348Z Nov 68.
2. ADMIN CINCPAC 230046Z Nov 68.
3. CINCUSARPAC GPPE-SP 48773/150216Z Nov 68.
4. CINCPAC 140255Z Dec 68.
5. CINCPAC 080350Z Nov 68.
8. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68; COMUSKOREA UK 54603AJ/210530Z Aug 68.
Severance Pay for Korean National Employees

(U) Based on a recommendation from the Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army, and with the concurrence of CINCPAC's Joint Civilian Employee Advisory Group, CINCPAC authorized severance pay for Korean National employees who were removed from their positions for committing felonies or for grave misconduct including serious theft. This revised provision was consistent with local custom and practices in Korea and Korean labor law, which considered severance pay an earned retirement allowance. The modification, however, included a provision for deducting from all monies due employees the cost of stolen or damaged items in all cases of separation for these reasons. 1

Dependent Travel to Thailand

(U) CINCPAC had recommended to the JCS that a single unified policy for all dependent travel to Thailand2 be established and that COMUSMACTHAI be designated the Overseas Commander with authority to approve or disapprove such travel. 3 The JCS approved CINCPAC's recommendations in January 1968. 4

Defense Department Civilian Wage Policy in Vietnam

(U) On 24 November 1967 the Secretary of Defense asked the JCS to review Defense Department wage policy in Vietnam and provide details of proposed wage increases for local Vietnamese employees for the next 12 months to be considered with the Defense Department's review of piaster ceilings. 5

(U) CINCPAC advised the JCS that no wage adjustment was anticipated for 1968. If environmental conditions in Vietnam were sufficiently stable, a locality wage survey--of private sector wages for comparable positions--was scheduled for October or November with an estimated minimum 30 percent wage increase anticipated for January 1969. 6 He recommended that alternatives to a warranted wage increase (delayed or phased raises)

1. CINCPAC 222057Z Sep 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
2. Certain Air Force regulations were in conflict with COMUSMACTHAI's policy.
4. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
5. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
6. ADMINO CINCPAC 272205Z Mar 68.

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not be adopted as they had proved disruptive to U. S. Forces management and not effective in terms of plaster management. 1 CINCPAC believed that by "remaining more reasonably competitive with private sector wages, the U. S. Forces can better manage and utilize, stabilize and increase skill levels of the Vietnamese work force." 2

Local National Employees in Thailand

(O) CINCPAC decided on two matters affecting local national employees in Thailand in 1968. The separation allowance eligibility time criterion and the trial (probationary) period were both set at 180 days. 3 The minimum time following resignation from the U. S. Forces or a Defense Department contractor that a local national employee had to wait to become eligible for reemployment by another such activity was confirmed at 30 days, to try to preclude proselyting. 4

Summer Employment for U. S. Dependents - Thailand

(U) COMUSMACTHAI asked for authority to establish a student summer program to hire 40 U. S. citizen dependents for about 3 months. The Chief of Naval Operations approved the program under the conditions that funds were available, 5 the employment was for productive work, the youths must be between 16 and 21, assignments that placed them in working relationships with lower paid indigenous personnel were to be avoided, and certain Navy restrictions regarding nepotism were to be observed. 6

Standardized Free Mailing Privileges

(U) COMUSMACV asked that the Services adopt uniform postal regulations regarding the size of envelopes accepted for free first-class mail. The Army limited envelope size to 5 x 11-1/2 inches. The other Services did not. The Army Exchange sold Christmas cards with 5-1/2 inch wide envelopes the Army Post Office refused to handle as free. 7

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 240331Z Aug 68.
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 230611Z Aug 68.
5. Pay was to be $1.15 an hour.
6. CINCPAC 220316Z May 68.
7. COMUSMACV 38710/290944Z Nov 68.
(U) CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that uniform Service procedures be established in view of the morale implications involved. 1 In December the Army withdrew its size limitation. 2

USO Clubs in Thailand

(U) Three new USO clubs for Thailand were recommended by CINCPAC in 1968 to provide needed wholesome recreational facilities. The new clubs were approved for establishment at Takhli Air Base, 3 Bangkok, 4 and at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Base. 5

Equal Opportunity and Treatment Policies and Programs Evaluated

(U) Mr. Jack Moskowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Rights and Industrial Relations, led a study group to Vietnam, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Hawaii in October. The purpose of the visit was to assess and evaluate the implementation of Defense Department policies and programs in the areas of equal opportunity and treatment for all personnel through command visits, briefings, and personal interviews with members of minority racial groups. 6

(//) COMUSMACV reported that Mr. Moskowitz, during an exit interview, expressed "pleasure and satisfaction" with the management of the civil rights program in Vietnam. 7 The group expressed concern about the effect of CONUS racial incidents on personnel in Vietnam. They also indicated an interest in obtaining more Negro entertainers and more Negro girls for Red Cross, Service Club, and USO staff work.

(//) COMUSMACTHAI reported no problem areas except at U-Tapao, where complaints were made about inequities in the rendering of Airman

1. CINCPAC 300140Z Nov 68.
2. JCS 6930/042103Z Dec 68.
4. CINCPAC 132233Z Nov 68; J1 Brief No. 54-68, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Nov 68 of JCS J1DM-616-68 of 6 Nov 68, Subj: Establishment of USO Facilities in Bangkok, Thailand.
5. J1 Brief No. 4-69, Hq CINCPAC, 20 Jan 69, of JCS J1DM-17-69 of 6 Jan 69, Subj: Establishment of USO Facilities in Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.
6. ASD (M&RA) 1073/211654Z Sep 68.
7. COMUSMACV 31099/190738Z Oct 68.
Performance Reports (thus affecting promotions) and in the administration of military justice. The visitors praised the attitudes of the Ambassador and COMUSMAC THAI and commended the Equal Opportunity Advisory Board at Camp Vayama.

(U) The group visited Rest and Recuperation sites in Hong Kong and Honolulu and some of the recreational facilities available in those areas.

Medical Affairs

(U) An unprecedented number of war casualties was generated in Southeast Asia in 1968 by the increased tempo of operations. Support of the outstanding forward area medical effort required for the care and treatment of these casualties was effectively provided by the off-shore PACOM medical system. Ten armed forces hospitals in the system provided definitive medical and surgical care for 55,422 casualties evacuated from South Vietnam in 1968 to these hospitals. While an average bed occupancy rate of 71 percent was experienced by these hospitals during the year, the constantly recurring need for beds for Vietnam casualties necessitated a decrease in the length of patient hospital stay and a speed-up of patient movements to CONUS hospitals. All functional components of the PACOM medical support system met the demands for increased service in an outstanding manner.

(U) Even though the requirement for approximately 6,900 beds in the off-shore PACOM hospitals was well validated during 1968, the necessity for the continued operation of the Army 7th Field Hospital (400 beds) at Camp Oji, Japan became a matter of concern to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs because of an Army request for additional personnel for the Camp Oji Hospital. In September 1968, upon direction of the Assistant Secretary, a survey of the PACOM off-shore hospital system was conducted to analyze the system with a view towards developing and analyzing alternative plans for the accomplishment of the mission performed by the off-shore hospitals. While the findings and recommendations of the Defense Department study group had not been announced by the end of the year, the CINCPAC Medical Officer had supported the continued utilization of facilities and manpower in the existing system.

1. COMUSMAC THAI 200225Z Oct 68.
2. Ibid.
3. JF History, HQ CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
4. J76 History, HQ CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
5. Ibid.
CINCPAC Second Conference on War Surgery

(U) The CINCPAC Second Conference on War Surgery was held at John Hay Air Base, Baguio, Philippines from 25 to 28 March 1968. Thirty experienced military surgeons attending represented the three Services and the three geographic areas that provided care to U. S. casualties in Vietnam--hospitals in Vietnam, PACOM off-shore hospitals, and CONUS hospitals. 1

(U) The conferees reviewed the proceedings of the First Conference held in May 1967 and developed new consensus recommendations for the surgical care of casualties. Numerous changes and modifications of previous guidance were incorporated into the Second Conference Proceedings, which was the most current and authoritative professional treatise dealing with war surgery in existence. Approximately 1,200 copies were distributed in response to requests from military surgeons throughout the world. 2

1. J76 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. Ibid.
SECTION IX - LOGISTICS

(U) Never in the history of the Vietnam conflict has a combat mission been canceled or delayed for lack of logistical support.

General William C. Westmoreland, USA

(U) Victory is the beautiful bright-colored flower. Supply is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.

Winston Churchill

(S) The logistic posture in SVN continued to show improvement....

During the fourth quarter of 1968 the availability of supplies to support operations in Vietnam remained generally satisfactory, with no significant problem areas....

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN

2. Ibid.
Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURĀ)

(U) On 17 November 1967, COMUSMACV acknowledged the fact that there were excess supplies of many categories in South Vietnam and provided summarized information on this problem of excess stock as to background and actions then being taken. Exactly a week later, SECDEF designated the Secretary of the Army as the DOD "Executive Agent" to assure that the excess materiel of all services in Southeast Asia was promptly identified and made available for redistribution and CINCPAC was tasked to establish a special agency to be known as 'Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency' (PURĀ). ¹ The Secretary of the Army, in turn, designated MAJ GEN J. M. Heiser, Jr., USA, as the DOD Project Coordinator. On 27 November, Heiser "announced his visit to Hawaii, Okinawa and SEA to assist and coordinate in the formulation of integrated planning for timely establishment of program objectives."²

(U) By 2 December 1967, a "PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Committee composed of the ACoS Logistics CINCPAC (Chairman) and the Logistics Chiefs of the Component Commands and FMFPAC has been established to coordinate materiel utilization activities within PACOM."³ Moreover, an ad hoc planning group had been formed to develop special policies and general procedures for the establishment, operation, and management of PURA. This group, whose membership included representatives of Hq CINCPAC, component commands, and FMFPAC, prepared a draft CINCPAC Instruction, which proposed "that USARPAC be tasked to establish, operate and manage PURA" and included "special policies and general procedures which maximizes the use of current service procedures rather than developing new systems."⁴

(U) MAJ GEN Heiser made his proposed trip during the period 5-12 December 1967. He was accompanied by Hq CINCPAC, USARPAC, and PACAF representatives during his visit to Okinawa, Thailand, and Vietnam.⁵

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
(U) CINCPAC approved the ad hoc planning group's suggestion that CINCUSARPAC be tasked to establish, operate, and manage PURA, whose location was to be on Okinawa. Subsequently, a PACOM plan was prepared, which CINCPAC approved on 7 January 1968. It consisted of the draft CINCPAC Instruction, interim operating procedures for the period prior to the acquisition of additional computer equipment and general procedures for the centralized program to be initiated in April 1968 when additional computer equipment is expected. The next day, the plan was hand-carried to DA for departmental and DOD level staffing. By mid-January 1968, informal reports indicated that the CINCPAC plan has been briefed and discussed with all Services, USAF, USAF and FMFPAC are currently in Okinawa meeting with USAF, USAF and 2d LOG COMD personnel to assist in the development of detailed operational procedures. Meanwhile, on 16 January 1968, a CINCPAC working group representative visited RVN to brief J4, Hq USMACV, and to coordinate PURA matters with COMUSMACV's staff, before returning to Okinawa.

(U) On 1 February 1968, the Secretary of the Army forwarded the PURA plan to SECDEF. He had approved the plan with the following two fiscal constraints, which the DOD Project Coordinator was attempting to resolve:

a. Reimbursement versus non-reimbursement.

Dr. Anthony, DOD Comptroller, opposes redistribution of excesses on a non-reimbursable basis. The problem is apparently not one of DOD policy or regulations, but one of legality, congressional restrictions and problems involving capital and stock funds.

b. Issues to MAP/AID. Prospects of approval of MAP/AID do not appear good.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
due to the same legal and congressional constraints mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 1

(U) Exactly a month later, on 1 March 1968, SECDEF approved the PURA plan. To coordinate and discuss implementation of the plan, MAJ GEN Heiser visited CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, and 2d Logistical Command on Okinawa. The first test phase of the plan started on 8 March. In addition, a meeting was scheduled on 2-3 May 1968 at Okinawa "to discuss evaluation procedures and the interface between the COMUSMACV and CINCPAC plans." 2

(U) On 26 April 1968, DA announced its approval of the CINCPAC plan, dated 2 April 1968, for the accomplishment of utilization and redistribution of excesses in the Pacific. Furthermore, this plan was to be used as the basis for the development of detailed procedures and the conducting of the PURA operation. The Secretary of the Army, as the Executive Agent for DOD in this matter, had tasked CINCPAC with the responsibility for organizing and operating PURA. CINCPAC, in turn, delegated this responsibility to CINCUSARPAC, who designated the Commanding General (CG), 2d Logistical Command, Okinawa, as the person to perform this task. 3 Actually, the final plan, "Project for Utilization and Redistribution of Materiel in Pacific Area (PURM)," as approved by DA, was revised on 15 April 1968. 4

(U) As scheduled, the PURA committee meeting was held at Hq, 2d Logistical Command, on 2-3 May 1968. At this time, the following PURA procedures had been or were being tested in three increments:

a. Cycle 1 consisted of offering 104,000 items of GSA/DSA materiel owned by the Army located on Okinawa to the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps in PACOM. The dollar value was $37 million. This cycle started 8 March 1968 and was completed 29 April 1968. Approximately $1.48 million worth of materiel was redistributed. This test cycle has proven the PURA procedures to be sound and workable.

2. J422 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
4. DA 867064/061817Z Jun 68.
b. Cycle 2 consists of offerings from all services of materiel worth $50 million. The offering was made 29 April. The scheduled date of completion of screening actions is 25 May 68.

c. Cycle 3 will consist of 46,000 line items of materiel on the records of USARV. The dollar value is unknown at this time. Redistribution will begin in late May 68.¹

(U) Also, a special computer system (IBM 1401) had already been installed and programmed by the 2d Logistical Command in Okinawa to be utilized solely for PURA. As a result of this action, the permanent PURA plan would be able to commence on 25 May 1968, with all services providing their excesses from all PACOM locations to be processed by PURA. This plan required continuing monthly cycle processing, and each cycle would require up to 90 days to complete the process of redistribution.

(U) By 4 May 1968, approximately $100 million worth of Army materiel had been returned to Okinawa from South Vietnam. This materiel was being processed for PACOM redistribution or return to CONUS by the 2d Logistical Command.

(U) To staff the PURA operation, the 2d Logistical Command needed immediately additional personnel, as well as permanent liaison personnel from each of CINCPAC's component commands and FMFPAC. As a result, DA authorized 26 spaces for staffing PURA operation, and CINCPAC directed that one officer and one senior enlisted man be immediately provided to the 2d Logistical Command from each of his component commands, as well as FMFPAC.²

(U) PURA, as finally set up, and it varied very little from early June through December 1968—only the last category being added—included the utilization and redistribution of all classes of materiel for all services prior to reporting to CONUS inventory managers, or disposal, except the following:

2. Ibid.
a. Bulk petroleum.

b. Single service use materiel.

c. Nonappropriated fund supplies and equipment.

d. Other materiel specifically planned for exclusion by the military services. (Normally critical or controlled items.)

e. Military construction contractor inventory.

f. Lots of materiel with a value less than $25.00.

(U) On 5 June 1968, CINCPAC notified COMUSMACV that his proposed in-country interservice redistribution plan "would be held in abeyance until such time as inventories are improved and" Automatic Data Processing (ADP) equipment "is available for this program." The next day, DA informed CINCPAC that the "MILSTRIP issue priority designator 99...will be re-established by the DSA as requested by the PURM Project Coordinator for use by the PURM/PURA Project." Meanwhile, on 7 June, DA took action to establish an interchangeability and substitute item file at PURA. The same month, on 24 June, PURA actions were expanded to "screening of identified excess construction materiel against AID requirements in South Vietnam" and Thailand.

(U) On 9 July 1968, CINCPAC submitted to DA the third PURM/PURA monthly report for the period 1-30 June 1968. He concluded it with the following statements: "The test cycles of Phase I are considered to have progressed without incident. Current transition to operational Phase II is progressing smoothly. No procedural difficulties are foreseen."

2. CINCPAC 050258Z Jun 68.
3. DA 867064/061817Z Jun 68.
4. DA 867335/072132Z Jun 68; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
5. CINCPAC 242331Z Jun 68.
6. CINCPAC 090422Z Jul 68.
Meanwhile, plans were being finalized for a PURA conference to be held in Okinawa in the latter part of August.¹ CG, 2d Logistical Command, on 15 July 1968, reported to CINCPAC that PURA had "established and tested an off-line teletype procedure here with successful results concerning handling of selected excess bulk assets," an innovation that would permit expedited screening of selected high dollar candidates for retrograde to CONUS.²

(U) Meanwhile, on 11 July 1968, DA advised CINCPAC that "OSD has requested that action be taken to extend the PURA screening of PACOM excesses to CONUS Inventory Managers."³ CINCPAC requested a 90 to 120 day deferral of this extension on 20 July, and DA approved this extension five days later.⁴ CINCPAC desired this deferral in order "to permit a 'shake-down' of the PURA operation."⁵

(U) From 20 through 23 August 1968, a PURA conference was held in Okinawa. Here, procedures were reviewed and minor changes were adopted, thereby updating the operating PURA procedures.⁶

(U) During the early part of September 1968, DA clarified PURA reimbursement policies, because "there continues to be a misunderstanding of the funding arrangements contained in the PURM Plan, 15 April 1968;" this action permitted a greater utilization of excesses without reimbursement.⁷ Then, on 10 September 1968, based "on a recommendation resulting from the August PURA Conference and a subsequent study of the PURA excess file," DA approved the excluding from PURA those lots of materiel with a value of less than $25.00.⁸ The next day, CINCPAC

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1. CINCPAC 100448Z Jul 68.
2. CG 2d LOG COMD Okinawa 150910Z Jul 68; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68; Point Paper, J4134, Hq CINCPAC, 1 Aug 68, Subj: Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA).
3. DA 871778/112002Z Jul 68.
4. CINCPAC 200225Z Jul 68, cited in J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68; DA 873584/251729Z Jul 68.
6. CINCPAC 100448Z Jul 68; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68; Point Paper, J4134, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Sep 68, Subj: Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA).
7. DA 879128/091953Z Sep 68; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
8. DA 879325/102124Z Sep 68.
submitted the fifth PURM/PURA monthly report for August 1968 to DA. His concluding comments were: "The PURA operation is still in the shake-down phase. It is considered that the September 68 operation will present a valid reflection of continuing operation. Procedures are considered sound and no operational difficulties are foreseen."1

(U) "In order to insure proper interface and to expedite coordination with the CINCPAC component commands," DA wired CINCPAC on 12 September 1968, "request a representative from CINCPAC and members of the CINCPAC PURA AD HOC Working Group as determined necessary meet in Washington with the PURM Interservice AD HOC Working Group to resolve possible problem areas and finalize procedures."2 This meeting was held in the latter part of the month.3

(U) On the second day of October, DA requested CINCPAC to implement certain procedures so that the residue of the bulk lot materiel processed by the PURA off-line teletype procedure would be expedited in the reporting system, thereby speeding up the retrograde movement to CONUS.4 Meanwhile, on the same day, because a "requirement exists to report inter-service transfers of excess materiels in PACOM to the DOD PURM/PURA Project Coordinator," CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to report on "such transfers within SVN...on a monthly basis," so that the report "may completely reflect inter-service transfers within PACOM."5

(U) Then, on 9 October 1968, while forwarding the sixth PURM/PURA monthly report, covering the September operations, CINCPAC furnished an evaluation of the PURA. The more pertinent portions are reproduced below:

a. The effectiveness of the PURA operation is continuing to improve. The history of the PURA operation has proven the validity of the concept and procedures. The rate of utilization is increasing. Early low rates were anticipated due to the types

1. CINCPAC 110053Z Sep 68.
2. DA 879606/121945Z Sep 68.
3. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
4. DA 882231/021852Z Oct 68; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
5. ADMINO CINCPAC 022234Z Oct 68.
of items (non-stockage) and the fact that they had previously been offered. They were used to test the procedures yet $5,017 million worth were redistributed out of $88,454 million offered during Phase I. Total redistribution including September 68 operations amount to $22,097 million.

b. During early phases of PURA, Marine Corps participation was restricted... Management changes and a policy decision now make it possible to offer all excesses and to accept offerings into a 12 month economic retention quantity (ERQ). This will result in increased redistribution of materiel.

c. The decision to exclude materiel lots with a value of less than $25.00 is permitting concentration of effort in the high dollar area and it is believed will result in expedited redistribution.

d. The off-line teletype system has proven itself to be a definite asset to PURA operations. $18,657 million worth of materiel has and is being circulated with $2,052 million being sold to date. It shows great potential for increasing utilization of PACOM excesses. With USARV's participation in the off-line procedure, greater utilization by PACOM Services of previously inaccessible assets will be possible.

e. The courier service instituted by the PURA, alleviated many of the Phase II implementation problems associated with distribution of data. The increased refinement of the Service Interest Report (SIR) continued stabilization of the PURA operations and purification of the PURA procedures should provide an optimum base for maximum utilization of the PURA.

.........................

g. Maximum redistribution of excesses within PACOM is dependent upon full participation of USARV
in the PURA operation. The latest inter-service screening in SVN has not been successful. It still appears that the best and most expeditious way of screening is through the automated PURA program. Present participation is limited to off-line screening pending installation of the Simplified Supply System (SSS) to be completed Jan 69. CINCUAR/PAC is currently considering a plan to release USARV retrograde assets to PURA in a more timely fashion...

h. It is believed PURM/PURA procedures are overly restrictive because of the complexity of funding policies which cause the requisitioner to constantly modify procedures in the allocation of current year funds for current year consumption versus deferred funding for whatever part of the ERQ falls into future years. The ideal policy would be that recommended by CINCPAC at the inception of the PURA wherein all transfers of excess would be on a completely non-reimbursable basis. While the ideal may not be attainable, any relaxation of constraints will be beneficial. It is hoped that relief in this area as indicated at the PURM/PURA meeting a DCSLOG, 25-26 September 1968, will be forthcoming.

i. Overall progress is considered promising and under current programs should continue to work toward high pay-off areas.1

(U) Towards the end of October 1968, CINCPAC requested DA that "consideration be given to MAP purchased materiel when the problem of removal of PDO materiel from SVN is presented for possible procedural change. This will preclude a potential problem area."2 By mid-December 1968, SECDEF had indicated that materiel eligible to Property Disposal Office (PDO) "may be made available to MAP countries on a non-reimbursable basis. A concept is currently being staffed for submission to SECDEF...."3

1. CINCPAC 092250Z Oct 68.
2. ADMIN CINCPAC 251956Z Oct 68.
On 9 November 1968, CINCPAC submitted the PURA monthly report, covering operations during October, to the DOD PURM/PURA Project Coordinator. During this reporting period, $49.7 million in excess was nominated to PURA for redistribution, and $14.2 million in excess was redistributed. Also, during the month, on the 14th and 15th, a PURA conference was held on Okinawa. The PURA Coordinating Committee, chaired by BGEN John D. McLaughlin, USA, J4, Hq CINCPAC, convened on 19 November 1968, with MAJ GEN Hayes, the DOD Project Coordinator, attending.

Later in the month, on 26 November, DA announced new requisitioning challenge procedures. Henceforth, challenges would be limited to PURA participants whenever requisition exceeded worldwide 30-day requirement of the item or whenever the item was out of stock nationally. Three days later, DA provided new funding guidance for PURA requisition, which withdrew all billing actions for PURA transactions from PACOM to CONUS.

On 11 December 1968, CINCPAC forwarded the PURA monthly report on operations during November. During the reporting period $102.8 million in excess was nominated to PURA for redistribution, and $20.151 million was redistributed. Nothing further of significance to PURA occurred during the remainder of the month.

Common Supply System (CSS) in RVN

As early as November 1965, the U.S. Army was charged with the responsibility for development of a plan to manage, receive, store and distribute common items of supply to all U.S. Forces in Vietnam. The first U.S. Army implementation plan provided for the development of supply requirements, programming, budgeting, funding and provision

1. CINCPAC 090546Z Nov 68.
2. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
3. DA 888567/262325Z Nov 68; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
4. Ibid.; DA 888824/291844Z Nov 68.
5. CINCPAC 110414Z Dec 68; J4132 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
6. Point Paper, J4133, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Jun 68, Subj: Common Supply System in RVN.
of designated supplies through a single integrated logistic system, in support of all US, RVN and other Free World Assistance Forces in RVN; this CSS was to be operated by the U.S. Army as "an integral part of its own logistic system." 1 On 4 February 1966, the Secretary of the Army, via the JCS, submitted this plan for an Army-operated CSS in RVN to SECDEF. Eight days later, by means of a memorandum, "SECDEF recognized progress but stated the Army CSS had not developed sufficiently to greatly expand it in the II, III and IV CTZ nor to extend it to the I CTZ. Additional guidance was given concerning revision of the plan and implementation directed via service channels." 2

(©) At a DA-hosted conference in February 1967, attended by representatives of all the Services, another detailed CSS plan was drafted. It was submitted by the Secretary of the Army to SECDEF on 9 May 1967. SECDEF returned the plan on 21 July 1967, "withholding approval pending further modification, definition of requirements and establishment of the 14th Inventory Control Center. The revised plan was staffed with the other Services and resubmitted to SECDEF on 11 Mar 68." 3 SECDEF disapproved this Department of the Army Plan for Common Supply Support in RVN on 31 May 1968, although he did state that "the objectives of CSS remain valid and should continue to be sought as long term goals." 4 CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV, along with all of his component commanders, of this SECDEF decision on 14 June 1968. "No further action," commented CINCPAC, "is indicated in view of" the SECDEF's decision, "which withholds further expansion of the CSS in RVN." 5

(©) Although the SECDEF's memorandum of 31 May 1968 to the Secretary of the Army, which was written only "after a detailed review of the revised Army Plan for CSS in RVN by Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Installations and Logistics, Comptroller and Systems Analysis),"

2. Point Paper, J4133, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Sep 68, Subj: Common Supply System in RVN.
3. Point Paper, J4133, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Jun 68, Subj: Common Supply System in RVN.
5. CINCPAC 140338 Z Jun 68.
AUTHORIZED STOCK LEVELS (SUPPLY CLASS/DAYS OF SUPPLY)
FOR U. S. FORCES IN VIETNAM
AS OF 1 JANUARY 1969

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 105.

* Part of Depot Level
had not approved the plan, "since it would generate a disruptive effect," the "extension of the Army operated common supply system to I CTZ is a long term goal of SECDEF and preliminary planning by all services has been in this direction, although CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT CG FMFPAC, and CINCPAC are on record in favor of continuing Navy support in this area." Apparently, some of the considerations against expansion of the Army-operated CSS in May 1968 that SECDEF weighed before making his decision included:

...reestablishment of the Navy's own pipeline for support of common supply items in the II, III and IV CTZ; the recent establishment of a direct Navy pipeline for requisitioning common packaged Class III POL products in support of I CTZ; the reported poor response experienced by the Air Force for common supply items in the II, III and IV CTZ; and the continued low demand satisfaction provided by 1st Log Command depots.

(5) "As U.S. military involvement in Vietnam increased, an urgent requirement developed for immediate and responsive combat service support." COMUSMACV, in a letter to CINCPAC on 28 October 1964, recommended the establishment of an Army Logistical Command in RVN. CINCPAC concurred and recommended to the JCS on 20 November 1964 "that DA in cooperation with CINCPAC and COMUSMACV be tasked with developing such command ASAP." As a result, the 1st Logistical Command was established in Saigon--later its headquarters was moved to Long Binh--on 1 April 1965. By the end of 1968, it was "responsible

1. Point Paper, J4133, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Sep 68, Subj: Common Supply System in RVN.
2. Ibid.
5. Ibid., citing CINCPAC 200220Z Nov 64.
for nearly all logistical support to Free World Forces in Vietnam. 1

(C) In response to CINCPAC's request of 19 May 1965, COMUSMACV proposed and both CINCPAC and the JCS agreed to a time-phased schedule for the transfer of 17 functions from Headquarters Support Activity Saigon (HSAS) to USARV. 2 On 31 July 1965, CINCPAC directed CINC-USARPAC "to assume responsibility for providing common Class III packaged POL products to all U.S. Forces in RVN." 3 Then, on 1 March 1966, the 1st Logistical Command "relieved Headquarters Support Activity Saigon of responsibility for support of U.S. Forces in II, III and IV CTZ with Class I subsistence and approximately 3,500 common items in Classes II and IV. The Naval Support Activity Danang continued to provide common supply and subsistence support to all U.S. Forces in I CTZ." 4 Because of a SECDEF-directed phasedown of the responsibilities of the 2d Logistical Command "for support of U.S. Forces in RVN, CINCPAC directed establishment of Navy requisitioning channels for packaged Class III support in I CTZ effective 1 Jul 68." 5

(C) As 1968 drew to a close, a massive effort was in progress to improve the supply posture of the U.S. Army in RVN. Upon completion of this undertaking, the further expansion of CSS would again be considered. CINCPAC's position in this matter was as follows:

Implementaion of the CSS in RVN, when approved, will be service directed. CINCPAC's role is interpreted to be one of monitoring and coordination of procedures, where required, to assure the best possible support of all U.S. Forces in RVN. 6

1. Ibid.
2. Point Paper, J4117, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Dec 65, Subj: Status of Transfer Common Item Support to Army in RVN.
4. Ibid.
5. Point Paper, J4133, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Sep 68, Subj: Common Supply System in RVN.
6. Ibid.
Ship-Helicopter Extended Delivery System (SHEDS)

(1) During the TET offensive in January 1968, the increased enemy activity in the Northern I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) resulted in a buildup in the number of FWMAF in the area, as well as a proportionate increase in logistical support. "Notwithstanding improvements made in the I CTZ port throughput, access routes to port and depot areas were saturated due to increased tempo of combat operations."¹

(2) Meanwhile, Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service (COMSTS), with CINCPAC's concurrence, had been developing plans to provide an integrated helicopter and cargo ship system on a test basis, which was designed to permit delivery of unitized cargo directly from the ships anchored off-shore to depots or marshalling areas in the I CTZ area beyond the congested port complexes. "Approximately 20 - 30,000 M/T of cargo per month were programmed for delivery by this means. The test aspects of the operation were to be conducted on a 'not to interfere' basis. The test data would be used in the development of doctrine, procedures, techniques, and organizational concepts."² The Port of Danang, Republic of Vietnam, was chosen as the primary port of call, as well as the base camp for the operation.

(3) On 15 January 1968, COMSTS solicited proposals from prospective private contractors for providing the necessary ships, personnel, helicopters, equipment, and services to permit the testing of the SHEDS concept. Approximately a month later, CINCPAC notified his component commanders of the SHEDS Bid Evaluation Conference that would "be convened in Room 1119, 0900 hrs, 13 March 1968, Hq, MSTS, Wash, D. C.," and requested them "to designate representatives for attendance at subject conference to assist in reviewing operational aspects of proposals received from industry."³ For his representative, CINCPAC designated COL Floyd W. Crouch, USA, J483, Hq CINCPAC. On 29 February 1968, he also asked

2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 142323Z Feb 68.
CINCPACFLT to provide cost data regarding cargo handling at Danang to permit the development of a preliminary cost analysis prior to the arrival of the SHEDS evaluation team at Hq, MSTS.  

COMSTS was requested by CINCPAC on 9 March 1968 to expedite, to maximum extent possible, operational availability contractor-operated SHEDS capability for extended use in RVN.  

A few days later, PACOM representatives participated in the three-day conference at Hq, MSTS, from 13 through 15 March.  Here, a technical evaluation of bids submitted by interested contractors in response to COMSTS's requests for proposals was conducted. Subsequently, on 26 March 1968, at the request of the JCS, CINCPAC confirmed the "acceptability of commercial SHEDS as an operational concept, i.e., operations uninhibited by test criteria with data collection substantially as in the MSTS SHEDS Request for Proposals on a not to interfere basis."

In reply to CINCPAC's request of 9 March to expedite the SHEDS project, "COMSTS advised that the earliest date a contract could be awarded was July 1968.  For planning purposes it was projected that the first SHEDS containership would out-load from CONUS in November 1968 and arrive in RVN on or about 1 December 1968."  

On 9 March, CINCPAC had also requested the JCS's "advice as to earliest possible availability of five heavy lift Helos (CH 54 preferred, and/or CH 47C), with crews for temporary deployment to RVN in support of interim helicopter discharge operations in I CTZ."  

By 26 March 1968, however, CINCPAC "stated that the immediate requirement for an interim SHEDS operation had been eliminated" and requested COMUSMACV to "develop a contingency plan which would implement the interim SHEDS concept if needed."

1. CINCPAC 290110Z Feb 68; J483 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
2. CINCPAC 090434Z Mar 68.
3. CINCPAC 260541Z Mar 68; J483 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68; JCS 4342/221956Z Mar 68.
4. SHEDS Point Paper of 12 Nov 68.
5. CINCPAC 090434Z Mar 68.
6. CINCPAC 260542Z Mar 68, cited in CINCPACFLT 112102Z Apr 68.
Following CINCPACFLT's proposal to CINCPAC on 11 April 1968 that the "implementation of an interim SHEDS program prior to the employment of the contractor operated system would provide" several definite benefits, COMUSMACV replied as follows to CINCPAC on 27 April:

...is presently developing a contingency plan for interim SHEDS. Target date for completion is 5 May 1968.

...implementation of an interim SHEDS program, except in an emergency, is not considered feasible or necessary. The limited in-country heavy lift helicopter assets, coupled with the considerable requirements for their use in the direct support of tactical operations, precludes initiation of a military operated test program.¹

At the PACOM Joint Transportation Board (JTB) Working Group meetings in early June 1968, the COMNAVFORV Da nang representative indicated that difficulties had been encountered "in obtaining personnel, material handling equipment, real estate, construction effort, and other requirements in which to support the operation in the Danang area. As a result, the Board recommended that CINCPAC request status of MACV's planning to conduct the SHEDS operation."² CINCPAC, in turn, acted upon this suggestion.

In his response to CINCPAC on 19 June 1968, COMUSMACV explained how the "original rationale for conducting SHEDS test in Danang has been overtaken by operational and logistical events in I CTZ during past six months."³ He recommended, therefore, that "no further consideration be given to SHEDS test in SVN."⁴

At a meeting on 21 June 1968, representatives of Hq CINCPAC and component commands concluded that Thailand "did not offer a suitable alternative to SVN for testing of the concept inasmuch as operational and

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1. COMUSMACV 11944/271303Z Apr 68; CINCPACFLT 112102Z Apr 68; J481 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
2. SHEDS Point Paper of 12 Nov 68.
3. COMUSMACV 17569/190118Z Jun 68.
4. Ibid.
logistical constraints needed to gain the most benefit from the test are not present in that country.\(^1\) Meanwhile, the urgency to implement SHEDS had diminished, because cargo discharge by conventional methods had proven adequate.\(^2\) Additionally, a modified SHEDS contingency plan (COMNAVFORV OPLAN 106-68) had been developed and approved by COMUSMACV. This plan and supporting plan (COMNAVSUPPACT Danang OPLAN 106-68) satisfied the CINCPAC requirement for support of combat operations utilizing Government-owned helicopters and MSTS-controlled SEATRAIN shipping.\(^3\) On 3 July 1968, therefore, CINCPAC recommended to COMSTS that a letter of intent to award a SHEDS contract should not be issued prior to 1 August 1968, pending further analysis of the problem.

\(\text{O}\) On 20 July 1968, CNO advised CINCPAC "that objectives, location, and timing of the SHEDS test were being reviewed" and requested comments.\(^4\) In his reply, CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's position that it was not feasible to conduct a test of the concept in RVN under the existing operational environment.\(^5\) In his conclusion, CINCPAC recommended that "consideration be given to testing the SHEDS system at some future date in PACOM or elsewhere as a part of a JCS-directed exercise."

\(\text{O}\) The next development came on 29 October 1968, when CNO requested CINCPACFLT:

...to explore the feasibility of a limited Navy operation which, although more modest than the original SHEDS project, would demonstrate a capability and provide information on problem areas. The concept proposed would be to conduct some of the resupply in the Northern I Corps by ship/helicopter delivery from Danang, having in mind the value of such a capability in case deliveries to Dong Ha, Camp Evans, or other key base areas by normal means were interrupted for an appreciable time.\(^6\)

\[\text{\footnotesize 1. J483 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.}\
\[\text{\footnotesize 2. SHEDS Point Paper of 12 Nov 68.}\
\[\text{\footnotesize 3. CNO 201425Z Jul 68, cited in CINCPAC 302331Z Jul 68.}\
\[\text{\footnotesize 4. J483 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.}\
\[\text{\footnotesize 5. CINCPAC 302331Z Jul 68.}\
\[\text{\footnotesize 6. CNO 291958Z Oct 68; J483 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.}\

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When queried on this subject by CINCPACFLT, "COMNAVFORV advised that the COMNAVFORV OPLAN 106-68 encompassed the concept and scope envisaged in the CNO proposal. He stated the concept was feasible but considered the use of SEATRAIN shipping more advantageous than the LST for ship/helo operations."\(^1\) Actually, the implementation in RVN of this COMUSMACV-approved COMNAVFORV OPlan 106-68, along with its supporting plan (COMNAVSUPPACT Danang OPlan 106-68), would have provided the desired test on an austere basis, since the COMUSMACV-planned "employment of vertical replenishment cargo delivery techniques intra-coastally for emergency resupply of critical materials in RVN is titled 'INTERIM SHEDS:'"

As developed by COMUSMACV, the INTERIM SHEDS plan could be executed on a limited scale at any time to assess the feasibility of conducting a future operational test of the original SHEDS concept of the magnitude previously envisioned in the MSTS six month test--but which was turned down by COMUSMACV because it did not appear to have a direct relationship to the war effort. If the INTERIM SHEDS operation proves successful and merits further validation on a larger scale, then the MSTS version of SHEDS could be inaugurated to satisfy this requirement. Hopefully, the tactical situation in RVN would by this time permit the test to be conducted to ensure a true appraisal of this highly claimed but yet untested system in a combat environment.\(^2\)

Although CINCPAC's position, as of mid-November 1968, was "that a modified version of the contractor-operated SHEDS concept should be tested within PACOM as soon as possible," the rest of the calendar year passed without any further noteworthy developments occurring on this proposed project.\(^3\)

1. SHEDS Point Paper of 12 Nov 68.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.; Intv, Mr. Louis A. Moccia, J4832, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 27 Mar 69.
Revised Terminology and Planning Factors for Supply Categories of Material

(U) During 1968, the "Service Component Commander Planning Factors and Stockage Objectives were reviewed and updated by the Services to reflect current usage rates and stockage objectives for RVN as well as those projected for Limited and General War."¹ As of the end of the year, these factors were "being consolidated into a single reference document to be published by CINCPAC for use by the PACOM Service Components and the JCS."²

M8A1 Steel Matting Assets

(U) During the initial buildup in RVN, approximately two-years in duration, M8A1 and other types of matting were in critical demand. CINCPAC, of necessity, had to maintain a rigid control of matting management and allocation. By November 1967, however, this criticality had lessened, "and action was taken to decentralize management/ allocation of matting from CINCPAC/JCS level to Service Department levels."³

(U) The Defense Supply Agency (DSA), apparently unaware of this decentralized matting control that was effected in November 1967 and learning of reported large quantities of M8A1 steel matting accumulating in RVN depots, was prompted on 4 June 1968 to contact CINCPAC, questioning the existing requisitioning actions, prior statements of requirements, and the disposition of excesses.⁴ CINCPAC immediately requested matting information from his component and subordinate commands. Once this information was received and summarized, CINCPAC forwarded on 2 September 1968 "a summarization of M8A1 assets versus requirements to DSA for FY 69 and FY 70, and reiterated policy which decentralized management of M8A1 matting from JCS/ CINCPAC level to Service Departments."⁵

1. J4115 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
2. Ibid.; FONECON, LCDR George Oncea, USN, J4115, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 7 Apr 69.
3. Point Paper, J4221, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: M8A1 Steel Matting, which is the source for the information contained in this subsection, unless otherwise cited.
4. DSA 3882-68/041416Z Jun 68, cited in J42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
5. J42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68, citing CINCPAC 022354Z Sep 68.
PACOM Stockage Objectives and Consumption Planning Factors

On 21 July 1967, the JCS "established a new terminology for supply categories of materiel, commonly referred to as ten classes of supply."1 Subsequently, on 5 January 1968, the JCS "forwarded information on planning factors recommended by the Services for use with the ten classes of supply."2 Following a review of these factors, as well as other current logistics planning data, CINCPAC's component commanders forwarded stockage objectives and consumption planning factors recommended for use in PACOM joint logistic planning.

On 16 November 1968, therefore, CINCPAC, provided the JCS, for their information, the PACOM stockage objectives and consumption planning factors for current Southeast Asia operations, as well as for contingency and general war joint logistic planning. This data was based upon applicable Service logistic planning documents, modified whenever appropriate based upon currently available information. Moreover, these factors were to be subject to revision based upon experience and future study. On the same day, CINCPAC furnished copies of the PACOM stockage objectives and consumption planning factors to his component commanders, stating that the "factors reported to the JCS will become effective for planning on 1 December 1968 to allow a one month trial period prior to their full implementation on 1 January 1969."3

MACV Critical Items Distribution/Allocation Committee (MACVDAC)

"RVNAF is currently engaged in a rapid mobilization and expansion program," commented COMUSMACV to CINCPAC on 21 July 1968.

2. Ltr, CINCPAC to the JCS, 16 Nov 68, Subj: PACOM Stockage and Consumption Planning Factors, citing JCS J4DM-7-68 of 5 January 1968.
3. Ltr, CINCPAC to CINCSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF, 16 Nov 68, Subj: PACOM Stockage Objectives and Consumption Planning Factors; J4114 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68; Ltr, CINCPAC to the JCS, 16 Nov 68, Subj: PACOM Stockage Objectives and Consumption Planning Factors.
"which MACV has aided and encouraged... It is most desirable that this momentum be maintained and accelerated toward goal of RVNAF shouldering ever increased portion of military burden in RVN."²

However, continued COMUSMACV, he was concerned that "we are being overtaken by events and equipment will not be available to meet requirements of new units and to fill critical shortages in existing units."² COMUSMACV, therefore, requested CINCPAC's approval of the concept of establishing a MACVDAC "to allocate and/or control the distribution of critical materiel in-country and due-in-country for approved RVNAF improvement and modernization programs."³

(U) On 14-16 August 1968, a conference was held at Hq CINCPAC. It was chaired by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, BGEN John D. McLaughlin, USA, J4, Hq CINCPAC, "and attended by the Materiel Chiefs of the Service Components as well as representatives from COMUSMACV and interested Departments."⁴ Here, revised Terms of Reference (TOR) were developed for MACVDAC and, two days after the conference ended, these "were distributed to COMUSMACV and the Service Components for concurrence and/or comment."⁵ With but minor modifications, the revised TOR was subsequently approved by CINCPAC and provided to COMUSMACV for implementation on 8 September 1968.⁶

Recommended Contractual Privileges

(U) On 15 August 1968, CINCPAC received the following message from SECDEF:

Recent action has been taken by Headquarters, Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS) to maintain four Through Government Bill of Lading (TGBL) carriers on a long term basis in connection with the movement of personal property

1. COMUSMACV 21112/211109Z Jul 68.
2. Ibid.
3. Point Paper, J4132, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: MACV Distribution/Allocation Committee (MACVDAC).
4. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
5. Ibid.; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68, citing CINCPAC 180008Z Aug 68.
6. CINCPAC 082316Z Sep 68.
from Vietnam to the United States. As a result, MTMTS has recommended that the four carriers be considered as contractors and given the regular granted to other Defense contractors such as customs clearance for carrier equipment and use of exchange facilities. MTMTS states that this should result in lower rates charged Defense by the four carriers.

Your comments on the MTMTS recommendation are requested.1

(U) Five days later, CINCPAC requested comments and recommendations from COMUSMACV on this matter. After another five days, COMUSMACV concurred in the MTMTS-recommended contractual privileges being granted to the carriers, provided "that a substantial rate reduction is obtained;" in addition, he "recommended that this privilege be provided to U.S. citizen employees only."2 On 28 August 1968, in a message to SECDEF, CINCPAC concurred with COMUSMACV in his comments and recommendation.3

Saigon Port Advisory Plan

(U) On 29 August 1967, SECDEF requested MACV/USAID prepare a plan for USAID to assume advisory mission to the Saigon Port Authority (SPA) presently assigned to the US Army 125 Transportation Terminal Command.4 By 1 December 1967, a Saigon Port Advisory Plan, prepared jointly by MACV and USAID, was ready. It "provided a detailed, time-phased plan for transfer of the advisory mission to USAID."5 Then, on 23 May 1968, COMUSMACV proposed to CINCPAC that this plan be implemented in early FY 69. Before taking action, CINCPAC requested CINCUSARPAC's comments on the proposal two days later.6

1. SECDEF 7223/151550Z Aug 68.
2. COMUSMACV 24926/250325Z Aug 68; ADMINO CINCPAC 200427Z Aug 68.
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 280523Z Aug 68; J4831 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
5. COMUSMACV 14818/231141Z May 68.
6. CINCPAC 252304Z May 68; J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
(U) By mid-June 1968, CINCPAC had considered the various factors and had made his decision. Basically, COMUSMACV was pushing for an early implementation date, while USAID wanted to delay implementation, thus leaving the military providing advisory services to the Saigon Port Authority (commercial port). USAID's rationale for a later implementation date was primarily its own budgetary and personnel ceiling limitations. In the end, CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's position in a message to the JCS on 15 June 1968. The pertinent portions of this message follow:

The advisory services which MACV provides to Saigon Port Authority with 134 personnel can be performed by 56 USAID personnel. These advisory functions are not connected with military activity nor with the limited amount of military support provided to the discharge of selected USAID cargo.

The advisory functions involved are more properly the responsibility of USAID than MACV. The continuing favorable posture of Saigon Port supports the timeliness of transferring the functions at this time.

Recommend that OSD and AID Washington be requested to establish an implementation date...to be effective early in FY 69.1

(U) The JCS replied on 14 October 1968, stating that SECDEF had requested USAID to implement the Saigon Port Authority Plan as of 1 October 1968 and that, after review and further evaluation, USAID concurred in the proposed implementation date.2 In a message to COMUSMACV on 16 October, CINCPAC requested that the plan be implemented in consonance with the JCS guidance "and CINCPAC advised, on bi-monthly basis, progress of turnover of advisory functions."3

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1. ADMNO CINCPAC 150045Z Jun 68; J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
2. JCS 2974/142051Z Oct 68, cited in both CINCPAC 162237Z Oct 68 and J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
3. CINCPAC 162237Z Oct 68.
As a result, the plan was implemented shortly thereafter, and CINCPAC began receiving the bi-monthly progress reports.¹

Joint Study of Break Bulk Versus Containerized Shipment of Perishable Subsistence for Overseas Support

(U) By letters on 24 January and 7 February 1968, the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) requested CINCPAC to "furnish data for a study to determine the cost effectiveness of a containerized system as the sole method for shipment of perishable subsistence."² CINCPAC, by means of a letter on 9 February 1968, tasked CINCUSARPAC with providing the necessary data for Saigon, Cam Ranh, Okinawa, Manila, and Honolulu; at the same time, CINCPAC tasked CINCPACFLT to provide similar data for Danang, Subic Bay, and Pearl Harbor.³

(U) On 27 February 1968, DSA notified CINCPAC that it was sending a study team to visit selected PACOM areas, primarily for the purpose of designing the "complete containerized system."⁴ In view of the comprehensive research necessary to furnish the desired data for the study, as well as the time needed for consolidation of this data by his staff, CINCPAC requested DSA the next day for an "extension of due date for all data to 4 Apr 68. If approved, recommend study team plan visit to coincide with data submission in late March or early April."⁵

(U) Anticipating DSA's approval for the extension of the due date, which was forthcoming, CINCPAC went ahead and extended the due date for the submission of the requested data from his component commands until 29 March 1968. The study team toured PACOM, as planned, but the results of this visit had not been released to CINCPAC by the end of Calendar Year 1968.⁶

1. Intv, LCOL Cecil R. Scott, USA, J4812, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 28 Mar 69.
2. J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68, citing the DSA letters.
4. DSA 1009-68/271617Z Feb 68.
5. CINCPAC 280545Z Feb 68.
6. J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68; Handwritten Memo, CDR Robert W. Freeman, USN, J4813, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 27 Mar 69, n.s.
Through Intermodal Container Operation (TICO)

(U) On 29 March 1968, CMDR MTMTS advised CINCPAC that TICO would soon be implemented world-wide.\(^1\) The TICO concept would provide containership service by commercial carriers from shipper to consignee on a single bill of lading, thereby completely bypassing military ports. Because of the potential impact upon both flow and control of cargo into PACOM, CINCPAC requested the next day that briefings be provided by MTMTS project officers in Honolulu during April 1968 for CINCPAC's and component commanders' representatives.\(^2\)

(U) Subsequently, on 9 May 1968, CMDR MTMTS requested approval from CINCPAC to test the Through-Bill Container Service from "Toole Army Depot, Utah to Sagami, Japan... on one time basis until the program has been established on a formal basis."\(^3\) Four days later, CINCPAC approved the test and requested CINCUSARPAC to "monitor to secure cost comparison and operational data for forthcoming TICO evaluation."\(^4\) On 25 May 1968, CINCPAC advised the JCS and CMDR MTMTS that an evaluation of TICO "will be furnished within 45 days."\(^5\) CINCPAC, at the same time, requested his component commanders to provide him with their evaluation and suggestions on the TICO concept not later than 24 June 1968.

(U) On 29 July 1968, CMDR MTMTS requested approval from CINCPAC to institute regular Through Government Bill of Lading (TGBL) service to Hawaii and suggested "initial TGBL service be started to Japan on or about 1 Sept 1968."\(^6\) He also indicated that procedures, "with CINCPAC requirements included therein, will be promulgated in near future."\(^7\)

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1. CMDRMTMTS 2406/291410Z Mar 68, cited in J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 302304Z Mar 68; J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
3. CMDRMTMTS 2852/091630Z May 68.
4. CINCPAC 120001Z May 68.
5. CINCPAC 250528Z May 68; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
6. CMDRMTMTS 3553/291510Z Jul 68.
7. Ibid.
CINCPAC's reply to both CMDR MTMTS and the JCS on 20 July 1968, was his last significant action on TICO during Calendar Year 1968. The substance of his message was that he wanted to defer approval, until procedures covering TICO had been promulgated and evaluated. Some pertinent portions of this message follow:

TICO service to PACOM has been utilized to a minor degree on a test basis. Results have been generally favorable and have paralleled the established advantages of containerization in reducing handling costs, pilferage, loss and damage, and in providing simplified handling.  

The effect of TICO on PACOM terminals cannot be fully determined at this time.  

Initially not more than ten percent of the measurement tonnage moving to PACOM should be utilized to support the through bill of lading intermodal container operations program. Impact on the inland transportation systems in PACOM area should be minor provided authority to divert movement of containers via military modes of transportation is arranged.  

In summary, TICO, as well as container shipments under MSTS shipping agreements, is acceptable. Concur in implementation of TICO; however, it is requested that CINCPAC approval be obtained prior to initiation of service into each subordinate command. CINCPAC approval will be contingent upon review of arrangements in effect, area command capability to operate within the concept, and impact of TICO upon the individual area logistic/transportation system.  

1. CINCPAC 202128Z Jul 68; Handwritten Memo, Mr. William J. Besser, J4815, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 28 Mar 68, n.s.; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
Transportation - Control Measures

PACOM Joint Transportation Board (JTB)

(U) The PACOM JTB, which was established in August 1966 to provide for the effective and economical utilization of PACOM transportation resources, convened four times during Calendar Year 1968 at the following places and on the following dates:

(1) 21 March 1968 - At Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.

(2) 6 June 1968 - At Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.

(3) Section I - 11 September 1968 - At Camp H.M. Smith.

Section II - 12 September 1968 - At Western Area Military Traffic Management and Terminal Services, Oakland, California.

(4) 12 December 1968 - At Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. 1

(S) Summarized below are some of the more significant actions taken during Calendar Year 1968 through the medium of the PACOM JTB:

a. The establishment of a FREIGHTER CARGO Working Group for the redeployment of personnel and equipment from Southeast Asia when T-Day is implemented.

b. Reduced turnaround time of ammunition ships to RVN and Thailand.

c. Developed justification to the JCS for permanent retention of CINCSTRIKE C-130 squadron on loan to PACOM from CONUS.

1. Memo, Mr. Louis A. Moccia, JTB Recorder/Secretary, J4832, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 28 Mar 69, Subj: CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board (JTB).
d. Developed procedures to improve the delivery of fresh fruits and vegetables to RVN.

e. Developed procedures for diversion of ships while in the PACOM area.

f. Improved delivery of Stars and Stripes to WESTPAC area.

g. Monitored actions involved in Military Airlift Command (MAC) assumption of airlift support of fixed and recurring requirements over channels in WESTPAC, thus relieving PACOM C-130s for primary tactical support mission.

CINCPAC J4 Staff Coordination of PACOM Transportation Activities

(U) "To achieve unity of effort and reduce span of control," BGEN John D. McLaughlin, USA, Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics (J4), Hq CINCPAC, tasked his Transportation Branch (J48) on 16 December 1968 "with surveillance responsibility over all J4 CINCPAC transportation activities within PACOM." His rationale for such action follows:

Prior to and during the SEAasia military buildup in 1965 the J4 CINCPAC transportation staff functions were performed by a small officer staff assigned to J41. During this period reliance was placed primarily upon J45 and J46 to perform necessary staff functions in connection with the management of PACOM transportation operational activities. Escalation of transportation requirements in PACOM subsequent to the buildup dictated that the J4 be continuously and accurately informed on current transportation activities.

1. Ibid.; see also J483 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Mar, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, and Dec 68.
2. J4 Memo/192-68, from BGEN John D. McLaughlin, USA, J4 Hq CINCPAC, to COLs Papik, Knox, Norris, 16 Dec 68, Subj: J4 Staff Coordination of PACOM Transportation Activities.
This requirement prompted the establishment of a separate transportation branch (J48) as the focal point on both staff and operational activities within PACOM to provide a response to queries on pressing transportation problems.  

Change in Format of PACOM Monthly Port Operational Summary

(U) On 6 May 1968, CINCPAC established the format for the PACOM Monthly Port Operational Summary.  

A revision to this report was suggested by COMUSMACV on 19 November 1968.  

"Para 3 of current report format does not adequately reflect appropriate management data pertaining to reefer ships and ships in a backloading status;" therefore, COMUSMACV recommended a change "in order to more accurately reflect RVN port performance."  

(U) Since CINCPAC concurred in the change, he recommended to the JCS (Special Assistant For Strategic Mobility (SASM)) on 22 November 1968 that the new reporting format be approved.  

"If new reporting format is approved," continued CINCPAC, "recommend favorable consideration be given to MACV proposal...that reefer ship information be reflected separately in Monthly SASM Statistical Digest, and that reefer ship data be excluded from averages for general cargo turnaround time."  

Before the end of 1968, the JCS had given approval to these recommendations of COMUSMACV and CINCPAC.  

Troop Embarkation Procedures

(U) COMSTSFE, by a letter on 22 September 1968, "quoted difficulties experienced in embarking ROK returnee troops to MSTS transports at Qui Nhon and possible corrective measures to be taken to correct or mitigate the problems."

The existing procedures seemed to

1. Ibid.  
2. CINCPAC 062016Z May 68, cited in COMUSMACV 36368/190155Z Nov 68.  
3. J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.  
4. COMUSMACV 36368/190155Z Nov 68.  
5. ADMINO CINCPAC 220400Z Nov 68.  
6. Handwritten Memo, CDR Robert W. Freeman, USN, J4813, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 27 Mar 69, n.s.  
7. ADMINO CINCPAC 010023Z Oct 68, citing this letter; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
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indicate a "lack of control of advance party, no officer in charge, and arrivals in groups of two's and three's."¹

(U) CINCPAC forwarded this letter to COMUSMACV and asked on 1 October 1968 to be advised of "actions taken to assist Commanding Officer of the Military Department of MSTS transports to alleviate problems ref A or, of assistance required to preclude future occurrences."² COMUSMACV replied five days later that he had instituted changes "in ROKFV embarkation practices," which "will result in a more orderly and efficient embarkation."³ These requested adjustments were:

a. That an officer be placed in charge of the advance party.

b. That the advance party board as a single group on the day prior to the departure of the ship.

c. That the main body embark at 0900 on the day of the ship's departure from Vietnam.⁴

Ship Control Procedures

(U) On 13 September 1968, COMSTSFE requested COMSTS to "advise whereabouts" of a non-MSTS controlled ship.⁵ To CINCPAC:

... This message illustrates the present lack of movement information for berth term ships which carry DOD cargo but are not required to report movements IAW the Navy Movement Report System or the Naval Control of Shipping Organization. Present information on non-controlled ships is limited to a departure date and ETA included in MILSTAMP Cargo Traffic Messages.⁶

� ¹ Ibid.
² ADMINO CINCPAC 010023Z Oct 68.
³ COMUSMACV 29581/060159Z Oct 68.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ COMSTSFE 130450Z Sep 68; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
⁶ CINCPAC 272225Z Sep 68.
(U) In order to "more effectively monitor the in-transit movement of DOD ocean cargo destined PACOM," CINCPAC requested assistance from COMSTS on 27 September 1968 "in determining if procedures can be initiated whereby changes in the movement status of berth term/non-controlled ships can be routinely received." If this was done, then CINCPAC would be able "to include updated information on these ships in the PACOM Ship Inventory and Port Status Reporting System (PACSHIPS)." Subsequently, COMSTS acted upon CINCPAC's proposal. "Effective 1 July 1969, 'Shipping Agreements' for cargo carried by non-MSTS controlled ships would obligate the ship to report to ALCON any changes in the ship's itinerary and ETAs."3

PACOM Port Capability Projections (less RVN)

(U) "In order to provide more accurate basis for planning shipments," the JCS requested CINCPAC on 25 March 1966 to "provide monthly throughput capability" for the Ports of Bangkok, Buckner Bay, and Naha. This data was "to be forecast for a four-month period and updated monthly," and CINCPAC was to provide it "for each subject port for military cargoes in measurement tons broken down as follows:

A. Total capability.

B. Less allocation for outloading.

C. Less allocation for discharging PACOM origin cargo.

D. Balance available for discharging CONUS shipments.5

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Handwritten Memo, CDR Robert W. Freeman, USN, J4813, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 27 Mar 69, n.s.
4. JCS 6952/251721Z Mar 66.
5. Ibid.
(C) As requested, CINCPAC supplied the JCS with the monthly PACOM port capabilities projections report, based upon data furnished by his component commanders. By September 1968, CINCPAC was providing the JCS with the desired data on the following Ports of Naha, Buckner Bay, Bangkok, Sattahip, Manila, Pusan, Inchon, Suyong, Yokosuka, Guam, Sasebo, Keelung, Kaohsiung, and Subic Bay.

Administrative Support of Commercial Transportation Activities

(C) As of 3 July 1968, USDAO Canberra indicated that his "post has been saturated with incoming/outgoing military commercial transportation shipments" and not only did this volume "exceeds full time efforts of one man," but he believed that it was of such magnitude "that best interest of U.S. Government would be establishment of Military Transportation Office in Sydney immediately available to customs, shipping offices, and wharves." CINCPACREP Australia concurred in this proposal. Previously, by means of a letter on 23 February 1968, he had "requested a three billet increase in manning authorization which was granted" on 13 June 1968. As a result, on 28 August 1968, CINCPAC requested CINCPACREP Australia to:

...advise if personnel increase authorized in Ref E satisfies current requirement and obviates requirement for separate military transportation office in Sydney.

Request advise of further CINCPAC action required, if any, to evaluate problems caused by CONUS shipping/consignment practices and military transportation procedural requirements.

1. ADMINO CINCPAC 071932Z Sep 67, cited in ADMINO CINCPAC 200138Z Sep 68; J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 200138Z Sep 68.
3. USDAO Canberra 0747/030737 Jul 68; J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 280526Z Aug 68.
5. Ibid.
As of the end of Calendar Year 1968, this matter of a separate U.S. Military Transportation Office in Sydney, Australia, was still under investigation. 1

**USNS LST Beaching Policy**

(5) The policy of CINCPAC is to restrict the employment of MSTS-controlled, civilian-manned LSTs on any shore not secured by friendly forces; the "overall intent of this restriction is to preclude undue exposure of these ships and their crews to a hostile environment." 2 On 21 February 1968, COMSTSO Vietnam advised COMSTSFE of the probable use of three Japanese-crewed LSTs to deliver ammunition to Cua Viet under significant risk conditions. 3

(5) "In event extreme emergency leaves no other choice," COMSTSFE replied to MSTSO Vietnam on 22 February 1968, "Korean manned vice Japanese should be used." 4 At the same time, he requested that "Fleet assets be used to maximum extent possible at Cua Viet and similar situations." 5 Three days later, CINCPAC concurred with COMSTSFE, but reemphasized the existing policy:

... Armed U.S. manned LSTs should be employed in high risk areas. If unusual situations indicate that deviation from this policy is essential to best interest of U.S. or friendly forces, request CINCPAC be advised prior to commitment of LSTs. 6

**Control of Air Cargo 463L Pallets**

(U) On 21 March 1968, the JCS indicated to CINCPAC the "impact on effectiveness 463L materiel handling system caused by shortage of 463L pallets." 7 The importance of controlling 463L air cargo

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1. Intv, LCOL Williams R. Huggins, USA, J4811, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 27 Mar 69.
2. J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68, citing CINCPAC 020914Z Mar 66; CINCPAC 082125Z Apr 67.
3. MSTSO Vietnam 211058Z Feb 68.
4. COMSTSFE 220100Z Feb 68.
5. Ibid.
6. CINCPAC 250002Z Feb 68.
7. JCS 4210/212023Z Mar 68, cited in CINCPAC 232247Z Mar 68 and J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
pallets, in actuality, had "been repeatedly emphasized at all levels of command" from 19 March 1967 through 22 January 1968. 1 Nevertheless, on 23 March 1968, CINCPAC requested his component and subordinate commanders to "again stress the importance of pallet control. Shortage of pallets seriously delays movement of high priority air cargo and disrupts timely aircraft scheduling within the airlift system."

Despite CINCPAC's solicitation for "help in controlling the use of 463L pallets and in ensuring the prompt return of the pallets to airlift use" in early 1968, this matter was still a problem at the end of the year. 3 By November, both DOD and CSAF were expressing concern over the high loss rate of pallets. As a result, CINCPAC again requested on 26 December 1968 the "maximum possible command emphasis be given" by component and subordinate commanders in PACOM to control the use and accountability of 463L pallets, stating that:

The continued high loss rate of 463L pallets could ultimately result in floor loading aircraft and possibly delay delivery of supplies to users. Thus, it is essential that every effort be made to locate and return these assets to the airlift system. 4

Two days later, COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that an aggressive program to recover pallets had been established in Vietnam. Moreover, he assured CINCPAC that the "pallet recovery program will remain a matter of continuing concern to MACV and will be supported to the fullest." 5

Critical Review of Airlift Requirements

On 13 February 1968, CINCPAC stated that all component and subordinate commanders in PACOM 'are enjoined to critically review airlift requirements. Requests for airlift should be limited, insofar as

1. CINCPAC 232247 Z Mar 68.
2. Ibid.
3. J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
4. ADMIN CINCPAC 260444 Z Dec 68.
5. COMUSMACV 44941/281810 Z Dec 68; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
possible, to direct support of current operations in RVN and Korea.\(^1\) CINCPAC was forced to announce this direction, "because of the strain placed on the airlift system by recent events in Korea and SVN.\(^2\)

**Transportation - Surface**

**Containership Service to RVN**

\(^{(1)}\) The requirement for containership service to RVN was determined at a March 1966 conference held at Hq CINCPAC; at that time, it was planned to inaugurate the new service in mid-October 1966. This initiation was delayed, however, because SECDEF requested the development of additional justification. After COMUSMACV responded with a plan for integrating conventional containership service within the overall RVN logistic system, SECDEF then approved this concept, and COMSTS awarded a contract for providing such service to Sea-Land Service, Inc.\(^3\)

\(^{(2)}\) The commencement of containership service to RVN occurred at Danang on 1 August 1967, with self-sustaining C-2 ships arriving every 15 days and delivering 15,000 tons of supplies per month. The first containership to an Army port in RVN arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 8 November 1967. Here, every 15 days, non-self-sustaining C-4 ships arrive to discharge their 609 containers each by pier-installed 40-ton gantry cranes. Service from Cam Ranh Bay to Saigon and Qui Nhon was provided via a C-2 shuttle ship, which was self-sustaining and carried 226 containers, 60 of which could be reefers. The capability for each of these three ports—Cam Ranh Bay, Saigon, and Qui Nhon—was 15,000 tons of supplies per month, for a total of 45,000 tons per month. This, then, was the situation as Calendar Year 1967 drew to a close. "Under the RVN contract, Sea-Land discharges the containerships and delivers within a 30-mile radius of the pier. Deliveries beyond the 30-mile radius are by military tractors and drivers. Retrograde cargo can be moved at rates approximating 70% to 80% of the outbound charges."\(^4\)

1. CINCPAC 130352Z Feb 68.
2. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
3. Point Paper, J4811, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Dec 67, Subj: Containership Service to RVN.
4. Ibid.
By July 1968, CONUS containerizable cargo for Danang was overgenerating in the amount of 200 container loads per month. The Naval Support Activity (NSA) at Danang could have accommodated an additional 100 containers per ship arrival, provided that a ten-day arrival of ships was maintained. Sea-Land Service, Inc., proposed a change of ships and schedules to meet this overgeneration, but COMSTS first queried the Services as to the feasibility of this proposal. By the middle of the next month, after evaluating the replies from the Services, COMSTS "determined there would be no change of ships and schedules. Excess cargo would be diverted to breakbulk shipping."2

On 30 August 1968, however, COMSTSPAC recommended changes to the "Sea-Land schedule to reduce containerizable cargo excesses."3 Although the excess CONUS containerizable cargo for Danang that was overgenerating in West Coast ports was being diverted to conventional break-bulk shipping, there now was developing excess CONUS containerizable cargo for Cam Ranh Bay. As a result, COMSTS concurred in COMSTSPAC's proposal on a one time basis, since a permanent change would require an amendment to the contract, "under which container service to RVN was approved by shipper services and DOD."4

Meanwhile, on 23 August 1968, COMSTS requested comments and recommendations from CINCPAC on the capability of RVN ports to receive increased containership service, additional number of tractors, bogies and chassis required, ability of shuttle ship to distribute additional containers, and requirements for intra-coastal movement.5 Five days later, CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACV with providing this desired data.6 COMUSMACV furnished CINCPAC with the maximum capabilities of the RVN ports to receive containers, as well as partial requirements needed to meet the maximum, on 6 September 1968.7 CINCPAC, in

1. Point Paper, J4815, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Jul 68, Subj: Containership Service to PACOM.
2. Point Paper, J4815, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Aug 68, Subj: Containership Service to PACOM.
3. Point Paper, J4815, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Sep 68, Subj: Containership Service to PACOM; COMSTSPAC 302343Z Aug 68, cited in COMSTS 042044Z Sep 68.
4. COMSTS 042044Z Sep 68.
5. COMSTS 231925Z Aug 68; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for Sep 68.
6. ADMINO CINCPAC 280113Z Aug 68, cited in ADMINO CINCPAC 172231Z Sep 68; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
7. COMUSMACV 26194/060101Z Sep 68.
reply on 17 September 1968, requested from COMUSMACV the "number of tractors, bogies and chassis, to meet maximum capability, required at Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon, plus additional hardstand required." 1

Also, on 23 August 1968, COMSTS had proposed" preliminary meeting 13 Sep COMSTS Hqtrs for purpose of discussing possible increased requirements for RVN and development of management controls to assure that container requirements for SEALAND service to RVN do not exceed the contracted capability of the present and future systems." 2 Then, on 6 September, COMSTS advised CINCPAC that this conference had been "deferred to 18 Sept," and asked that CINCPAC send a representative. 3 CINCPAC replied on 13 September, stating that "LCOL R. A. Borges, USA, 080593, CINCPAC Staff, TOP SECRET clearance certified, will attend." 4

The "CINCPAC representative at MSTS container requirements conference of 18 September 1968 provided preliminary information," which COMSTS had requested on 23 August. 5 At this container conference, "CINCPAC, the shipper services, and COMTMTS representatives emphasized the need for increased container service to RVN in the earliest practicable time frame." 6 On 27 September, therefore, COMSTS advised CINCPAC of a plan to issue a Request for Procurement (RFP) for additional container requirements, proposed increased sea-land containership service frequency to RVN ports, and an increased shuttle ship capacity "as interim measure pending response to RFP." 7

The next day, CINCPAC requested concurrence or comments from COMUSMACV, CINCUSARPAC, and CINCPACFLT on COMSTS's proposed interim measure, as well as any "comment regarding any special provisions/considerations which should be incorporated in proposed RFP." 8 By 30 September, CINCPAC had received verbal concurrence from these three commanders. As a result, in a message to COMSTS on 2 October 1968, CINCPAC concurred in this interim action. 9

1. ADMINO CINCPAC 172231Z Sep 68.
2. COMSTS 231925Z Aug 68.
3. COMSTS 061958Z Sep 68; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
4. CINCPAC 130504Z Sep 68.
5. J481 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
6. COMSTS 272033Z Sep 68.
7. Ibid.; J481 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
8. CINCPAC 280423Z Sep 68.
9. ADMINO CINCPAC 020349Z Oct 68; J481 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
MSTSPAC/FE NUCLEUS (USNS) SEALIFT CAPABILITY

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1969

ASSIGNED SEALIFT PACIFIC COMMAND

Passenger:
1 - TAP (ple) 1200 Troops (ea) in active status and 9 FZ's in RRF Status

Cargo:
2 - TAF (Ferry), 6,500 M/T (ea)
1 - TAF (Ferry), 3,170 M/T
1 - TAK (Heavy Lift), 17,192 M/T (150 Ton B-w-o)
1 - TAK (HL), 16,800 M/T
7 - TAK (VC2), 11,255 M/T (ea)
5 - TAK CI-M-AVI, 5,700 M/T (ea)
6 - TAKV (5-40 ACPIT)
42 - LST, 1,000 S/T Landing Craft (ea)
1 - TLSV (Ro-Ro) (CI), 19,184 M/T
1 - TLSV (Ro-Ro) (CI), 24,456 M/T

Tanker:
6 - TAOG-T-1, 10,000 BBL Capacity (ea)

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 114.
By 13 October 1968, CINCPAC could report to COMSTS that a comprehensive study of PACOM containership service requirements/capabilities has been completed. He, therefore, was able to confirm and provide statistics in his seven-page message to COMSTS, indicating the expanded capabilities of RVN ports to receive additional containership service, the requirements of RVN ports in order to accept this increase, and additional information on other PACOM ports.

On 14 December 1968, COMUSMACV asked CINCPAC to advise latest date MACV requirements can be presented to MSTs for RFP consideration. In response, COMSTS informed CINCPAC that the plan was:

...to issue RFP for augmented containership service to RVN about 1 January. It would be desirable to have in hand intra-RVN requirements by that date. However, addendum to RFP could be issued if info received later. Consider 10 January as latest date addendum could be issued without extending closing date and further delaying program development.

CINCPAC passed on this information to COMUSMACV on 18 December 1968. At the same time, he requested COMUSMACV, in his development of requirements, to give consideration to the existing intra-RVN container rates plus the possible expansion of intra-RVN RO/RO barge service. For the remainder of the month, no further significant actions on containership service to RVN occurred, although the forthcoming year of 1969 would see the actual carrying out of these proposed improvements.

Importation of Food Products into Thailand

The agriculture laws of Thailand require that a International Phyto Sanitary Certificate (IPS) be furnished for fruits and vegetables imported into Thailand. On 2 April 1968, CINCPAC was advised by

1. ADMINO CINCPAC 130028Z Oct 68.
2. Ibid.; J481 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
3. COMUSMACV 41978/140439Z Dec 68.
4. COMSTS 162050Z Dec 68.
5. CINCPAC 180411Z Dec 68; J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68; Intv, LCOL Cecil R. Scott, USA, J4812, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 28 Mar 69.
6. COMUSMACX 020924Z Apr 68.
COMUSMACVTHAI that these certificates had been omitted on several recent shipments and that entry into Thailand without these certificates could not be obtained. Accordingly, on 6 April 1968, CINCPAC informed CINCUSARPAC and CGWAMTMPS of this requirement and requested air mailing of the missing documents. Following this expeditious action to remedy the existing situation, later shipments have all been properly certified, and "there has been no problem since April 1968."

Request for Transport of GRC-Donated Rice to RVN

(CG) COMUSTDC advised CINCPAC on 16 February 1968 "that GRC has 5000 metric tons of rice in 100 kilo bags at Keelung as a gift for RVN and requests U.S. assistance in providing transportation free of charge to Danang by 1 Mar 1968." On 24 February 1968, SECSTATE notified the American Embassy at Taipei that "DOD funds were not available to support MSTS lift of this material and that AMEMB Taipei should explore possibility of GRC payment for this lift." Five days later, the American Embassy at Taipei stated that "GRC planning to ship rice to Saigon at own expense.... Loading will begin in few days." As it turned out, this shipment was made in April 1968.

Augmentation of U.S. Navy-Manned LSTs for Delta Operations

(CG) To augment the logistic support being provided by four armed U.S. Navy-manned LSTs, COMSTSFE authorized the use of Korean-manned LSTs "in Delta on run from Vung Tau to Can Tho via lower Bassac and Mekong to Dong Tam until such time as current Delta cargo backlog is resolved." This authorization was given on 11 May 1968.

1. Ibid.; J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
2. CINCPAC 06023Z Apr 68.
3. Handwritten Memo, LCDR Fred L. Brady, USN, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 28 Mar 69, n.s.
4. ADMINO COMUSTDC 160348Z Feb 68.
5. J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68, citing SECSTATE 120332/242312Z Feb 68.
6. AMEMBASSY Taipei 2311/290841Z Feb 68.
7. Handwritten Memo, LCDR Fred L. Brady, USN, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 28 Mar 69, n.s.
8. COMSTSFE 110158Z May 68; Handwritten Memo, CDR Robert W. Freeman, USN, J4813, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 28 Mar 69, n.s.; J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
and under the proviso, unless otherwise directed (UNODIR) by higher authority, but the status of this authorization remained the same at the end of Calendar Year 1968.

**RVN Port Throughput Capabilities**

(C) Annex F of CINCPAC OPlan 67-69 "tasks COMUSMACV to identify existing LOC's and terminals; and the known or estimated throughput capability of aerial and ocean ports, stated in three parts: retrograde, forward movement, and total throughput capability, under expected conditions and usage."¹ At the PACOM Joint Transportation Board (JTB) Meeting held from 9 through 12 December 1968, a MACV representative briefed the attendees on a recently completed study on RVN port export available capability. The study was considered valid:

...under parameter that identified capacity was the optimum based on a perfect operation, requiring extensive support by additional technically qualified personnel and equipment, some physical facility expansion and implementation of recommendations within the study. Study is further considered valuable in identifying concept of operation plus shortfalls that when met would increase port export capacities.²

(C) Since Hq CINCPAC was planning a computer simulation movement feasibility study, data on "present day and/or programmed RVN ocean port export capability as set forth" in Annex F of CINCPAC OPlan 67-69 was required.³ Accordingly, on 20 December 1968, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to furnish this data not later than 15 January 1969.⁴

**Reefer Ships to RVN**

(U) During the discussions at the December 1968 meeting of PACOM JTB, it was concluded that intra-WESTPAC shuttle reefer ships were not being fully utilized. As a result, transportation costs were high. If air

1. CINCPAC 200535Z Dec 68.
2. Ibid.; J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
3. CINCPAC 200535Z Dec 68.
4. Ibid.; J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
movement was used for the shipment of fresh fruits and vegetables from Japan and Taiwan to RVN, however, it was believed that improved service would be provided at an acceptable cost. CINCPAC, therefore, on 18 December 1968, requested CINCUSARPAC to prepare an analysis of this proposal to use air for shipment of these items. This analysis, which was to be forwarded to CINCPAC by 15 January 1969, was to include such factors as capabilities of air terminals at origin and destination to ship and receive, methods to move cargo to and from air terminals, additional facilities and equipment required, comparative costs, etc.

Prestocking of Preservation and Packaging Materials

(5) On 12 December 1968, COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that "an initial 60-day supply of essential preservation and packaging materials for each of the five major ARVN deep draft ports be pre-loaded aboard MSTS cargo ships presently in, or to be placed in, ready reserve status (RRS)." This concept, with lashing gear and dunnage added as material to be pre-loaded, was favorably received at the PACOM JTB meeting then in session. As a result, on 28 December 1968, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the "concept be considered for implementation. Upon favorable determination," continued CINCPAC, "recommend action be taken to cause nomination of five ships" and that the appropriate Military Departments be tasked to take the necessary coordinated action for the desired prestockage.

Late or Non-Receipt of Documentation for RVN-bound Ships

(U) "As discussed during JTB meeting 9-12 Dec 68," wired COMUSMACV to CINCPAC on 21 December 1968, "late or non-receipt of manifests, stow plans, and MILSTAMP cargo traffic messages on ships outloaded at other WESTPAC ports for RVN is a continuing problem."

1. J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. CINCPAC 180417Z Dec 68.
3. COMUSMACV 41563/120709Z Dec 68.
4. J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
5. CINCPAC 280151Z Dec 68.
6. COMUSMACV 43617/211534Z Dec 68.
A need for expedited distribution of such documentation had, in fact, been highlighted by the presentations at the PACOM JTB meeting. 1 "An expedient method of partially solving the situation," continued COMUSMACV, "might be the use of scheduled MAC mission flights to the Tan Son Nhut Airbase" to carry the necessary documentation. 2 In an effort to remedy the problem, CINCPAC requested CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACFLT seven days later to take action "to test method of manifest distribution between PACOM ports as proposed" by COMUSMACV, to provide "comments/recommendations for improvement of manifest distribution procedures within PACOM," as well as "an evaluation of improvement or degradation in timeliness of manifest receipt resulting from test," and to be "prepared to discuss subject during working group sessions at the first PACOM JTB subsequent to 30 April 1969:"

...Manifests should also be forwarded via normal method of transmission during a ninety day test period to insure ultimate receipt of manifests, and to provide a comparative analysis of time required for delivery. Originating ports should maintain chronological record of manifest preparation, transmission and receipt.

Each originating and receiving port should also examine internal handling procedures to determine if there are in-house areas that can be revised to provide more expeditious dissemination and delivery of manifests. 3

Automatic Hold System for Ships Bound for Cam Ranh Bay (CRB)

(8) On COMUSMACV's recommendation, based on the overgeneration of CRB cargo in CONUS, Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, Far East (COMSTSFE), implemented an automatic hold system for CRB-bound ships in early December 1968. 4 "Data available here," commented CINCUSARPAC on 19 December 1968, "indicates that actual performance at CRB is exceeding rated capability when overall workload

1. J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. COMUSMACV 43617/211534Z Dec 68.
3. ADMIN CINCPAC 280011Z Dec 68.
4. CINCUSARPAC 51388/190122Z Dec 68; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
i.e., import, intra-theater, in-country diversion and backloading) is considered;" as a result, he recommended to COMUSMACV "that controls established at PAMPA and in-country be revised as necessary to assure shipments do not knowingly exceed capability, resulting in inevitable port congestion and additional demurrage."

After reviewing PAMPA Port Analysis Charts, CINCPAC determined that "tonnages en route Cam Ranh Bay have been consistently within or close to desired 45 day workload for CONUS-RVN pipeline," except for two periods in February and March of 1968. Basing his decision on present and forecast CRB general cargo workload, CINCPAC concurred on 24 December 1968 with CINCUSARPAC's request "that general cargo ships en route Cam Ranh no longer be routed automatically to hold port."

**Release of Floating Storage Reefers**

At the PACOM JTB December 1968 meeting, discussions in the working group sessions had indicated that release dates for the floating storage reefers at Vung Tau and Qui Nhon would be 31 December 1968 and 1 April 1969, respectively. On 11 December 1968, however, COMSERVPAC had advised CINCPAC that the release date "at Danang changed from 22 Jan 69 to 28 Dec 68." As a result, CINCPAC requested confirmation of these dates from COMUSMACV on 14 December 1968.

**Evaluation of SEA EXPRESS Service to PACOM**

To answer a SECDEF memorandum of 21 February 1968, the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on 1 March 1968 as to the following:

a. Necessity for SEA EXPRESS and circumstances under which it could be required.

b. Feasibility of providing special handling for SEA EXPRESS cargo at theater receiving terminal and to ultimate consignee.

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1. CINCUSARPAC 51388/190122Z Dec 68.
2. ADMIN CINCPAC 240110Z Dec 68.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 142357Z Dec 68; J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
...Request your comments be framed not only by experience to date, but also by anticipated changes within theater and transportation resources serving it. The ultimate question to be answered is whether or not SEA EXPRESS provides an adequate service which is actually needed and which is worth the added expense of the extra handling it entails.  

(U) When CINCPAC answered these questions of the JCS on 28 March 1968, he reiterated his position on this subject that he had stated in a 13 November 1967 message to the JCS. The pertinent portions of his answer on 28 March 1968 follow:

3. Foresee no circumstances under which the SEA EXPRESS system would be needed. ... 

4. Experience in PACOM with SEA EXPRESS has shown that cargo which has been designated SEA EXPRESS in CONUS is not necessarily the most critically needed cargo aboard available ships upon arrival in the destination area. Priority of ship discharge is determined by the urgency of need for specific cargoes. Priority of port clearance to consignees which has been previously accorded SEA EXPRESS cargo is not essential. Port clearance IAW assigned transportation priorities, modified by local exigencies as required, will suffice. 

5. In summary, do not anticipate any circumstances which would require reinstatement of the SEA EXPRESS system.  

Tugs and Barges for the Delta Transportation Plan

(C) Under COMUSMACV's Delta Transportation Plan, dated 27 December 1967, MSTS was assigned the responsibility for transporting crushed rock within the delta, while USARV was tasked to provide barges

1. JCS 2524/012255Z Mar 68. 
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 130159Z Nov 67. 
3. CINCPAC 282151Z Mar 68; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
from its assets for transporting crushed rock and sufficient tugs for port operation. Because of "duplication of solicitation by MSTS and USARV for procurement of tugs and barges for movement of rock to the delta," COMUSMACV proposed to CINCPAC on 1 June 1968 that the contractual arrangement for this service be placed under a single agency, more specific, MSTS. On 29 June 1968, however, CINCPAC replied as follows:

In view of the relatively small Army rock haul requirement and USARV's considerable experience in procurement and operation of barges and tugs in connection with its extensive port and beach operations, consider that USARV should continue to contract for the limited Army movement of rock in the Delta.  

Meanwhile, during a visit to RVN, COMSTS discussed this problem with personnel of MACV and 1st Logistical Command. Since he did not like to see split operations, he felt that responsibility should be delegated either to MSTS or USARV for contractual purposes. "In view of the position of COMSTS," COMUSMACV stated to CINCPAC on 27 October 1968, "it is recommended that total responsibility for tug and barge contracting for the Delta Transportation Plan be transferred to USARV. The transfer of contract responsibility should include contracts now in existence." As a result, in the interest of avoiding procurement competition, CINCPAC designated MSTS on 16 November 1968 to be solely responsible for procurement of tugs and barges to support the Delta Transportation Plan. At the same time, CINCPAC requested that "USARV transfer to MSTS responsibility for administering all USARPA contracts now in effect for tugs and barges being used in support of" the plan.

1. COMUSMACV 15716/010332Z Jun 68; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
2. CINCPAC 290203Z Jun 68.
3. COMUSMACV 31976/271010Z Oct 68.
4. CINCPAC 160514Z Nov 68; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68; Point Paper, 74813, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: Tugs and Barges for Support of COMUSMACV Delta Transportation Plan.
In a message to COMUSMACV on 30 November 1968 and referring to the CINCPAC message of 16 November 1968, COMSTSFE stated that it "interprets that all afloat assets presently employed in movement of rock under the Delta Transportation Plan (including 21 Army provided barges) will remain under permanent control of MSTs. Request confirmation."\(^1\) In brief, COMUSMACV's reply to COMSTSFE on 5 December 1968 indicated that a difference existed in the interpretation of the CINCPAC message. COMUSMACV stated that it was his understanding that only those barges and tugs under contract to support the Delta Transportation Plan were involved and that only two barges were under contract to support the plan.\(^2\) On 12 December 1968, in a message to COMSTSFE, CINCPAC concurred that COMUSMACV's assumption was correct and requested MSTs to "provide additional barges needed to permit release of 21 USARV barges presently employed in support of" the Delta Transportation Plan.\(^3\) Moreover, at the same time, CINCPAC instructed CINC-USARPAC not to withdraw the 21 USARV barges, until "MSTS can provide replacement barges."\(^4\)

**A Staging Base for Retrograde Equipment and Personnel**

On 18 November 1968, DA, whose staff was "studying alternative methods of withdrawing US forces from Vietnam," advised COMUSMACV that, in "view of the anticipated congestion of South Vietnamese ports, the possibility of flying Army aircraft to Thailand for outloading from Thai seaports would appear to merit consideration."\(^5\) In addition, COMUSMACV was requested by DA to submit his views on certain matters or aspects that could effect movement to and through Thailand. Then, on 10 December 1968, DA queried COMUSMACV on an "estimate of when views would be made available."\(^6\) Just seven days later, however, CINCPAC requested

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1. COMSTSFE 300116Z Nov 68.
2. COMUSMACV 39967/050545Z Dec 68; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
3. CINCPAC 120235Z Dec 68.
4. Ibid.; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
5. DA 887571/182152Z Nov 68; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
both COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI to submit answers to DA's questions "direct to CINCPAC" for staffing and forwarding to DA by CINCPAC. At the same time, CINCPAC notified DA of this action he had taken.

**Increased Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) Assets for WESTPAC**

(3) The projected RO/RO requirements for the first quarter of CY 69, provided at the PACOM JTB meeting in mid-December 1968, indicated a need to increase RO/RO ship assets available for WESTPAC service. Although COMSTSFTE has assigned LSTs and SEATRAINs to satisfy the shortfall of insufficient RO/RO ships, as CINCPAC noted on 21 December 1968, "the objective of the PACOM RO/RO system of delivery of ready-to-use vehicles is not fully met by use of these substitute assets." Therefore, CINCPAC requested COMSTSFTE to review "overall requirement to determine validity of securing services of SEALIFT for WestPac service vice CONUS to Okinawa," an action that would "reduce the amount of RO/RO cargo shipped by conventional ships." 

**Increased RO/RO Port Capability for Qui Nhon**

(3) Information gained at the PACOM JTB meeting from 9 through 13 December 1968, CINCPAC pointed out to COMUSMACV on 21 December 1968, "indicates that RO/RO service to Qui Nhon was unsatisfactory, because installation of the facility to accommodate the available RO/RO stern ramp barge is of low priority." In CINCPAC's opinion, the completion of this facility was a part of the total solution to RO/RO assets problem. Accordingly, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV on 21 December 1968 to give his "best estimate on starting date and completion date of RO/RO stern ramp facility at Qui Nhon."

1. CINCPAC 170147Z Dec 68; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. CINCPAC 210342Z Dec 68; J4814 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
3. CINCPAC 210342Z Dec 68.
4. CINCPAC 210337Z Dec 68.
5. J4814 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
6. CINCPAC 210337Z Dec 68.
Intra-RVN Sealift Study - RO/RO Barge Requirements in RVN

During 1968, a study of intra-RVN sealift requirements by COMSTSFE illustrated how $9.2 million could be saved by the use of tugs and barges. Although the economic objectives of this study are recognized and endorsed," commented COMUSMACV on 12 October 1968, "the requirements for responsiveness and capabilities to meet requirements of combat operation in this command remain paramount." COMUSMACV, therefore, recommended to COMSTSFE that RO/RO barges be placed in service in RVN prior to the withdrawal of any LSTs.

"To provide more flexibility and responsiveness," read a COMUSMACV message to CINCPAC on 19 October 1968, "it is recommended that RO/RO barge capability be made available to supplement present common user assets." COMUSMACV then went to propose that the existing Sealand Container Contract be amended to include provisions for the use of RO/RO barges for the movement of Sealand containers and military vehicles between certain ports in I and II CTZ. His concept envisioned Sealand "providing the required tugs, barges, containers and personnel to sustain the operation."

COMSTSFE agreed with COMUSMACV's proposals on 13 November 1968, but nonconcurred in any amending of the Sealand Container Contract, since "present AB&T contract can provide tugs, barges and personnel for expanded intra-RVN RO/RO service, including transshipment Sealand vans." On 6 December 1968, CINCPAC set forth his position in this matter. "If expanded intra-RVN RO/RO barge service is determined to be feasible," CINCPAC concurred with COMSTSFE that such "service should be provided by AB&T under existing contract rather than by amendment of Sealand RVN container contract." At the same time, he concurred

1. J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Dec 68.
2. COMUSMACV 30295/120459Z Oct 68.
3. Ibid.; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
4. COMUSMACV 31183/191651Z Oct 68.
5. Ibid.; J4818 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
6. COMSTSFE 130140Z Nov 68.
7. CINCPAC 060309Z Dec 68.
with COMUSMACV "that prior to considering withdrawal of any LST's from RVN service, a sufficient number of RO/RO barges should be placed in RVN for evaluation of RO/RO barge concept. Evaluation period should include a representative period of NE monsoon season."

**Augmentation of LCU and LCM-8 Assets in RVN**

(5) On 18 February 1968, COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that he had "an immediate requirement for additional small boats for use in I Corps. Request six LCU's and eight LCM-8s, all with crews be furnished on TDY ASAP." Three days later, CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to "deploy, to the extent operationally feasible, maximum number LCUs and LCM 8s with crews to RVN to meet requirement" stated by COMUSMACV.  

(5) CINCPACFLT's immediate response provided quick support for COMUSMACV's LCU/LCM-8 requirement, with all TDY assets arriving in-country during March or early April. The eight LCM-8s would begin deploying to RVN, with four on 1 June 1968 and two each week thereafter. This augmentation of LCUs and LCM-8s was accomplished as scheduled.  

**Transportation - Air**

**C-130 Augmentation of 315th Air Division**

(5) A definite need for augmentation of the 315th Air Division's C-130 fleet was pointed up by events occurring both in Korea and South Vietnam during the latter part of January 1968. As an interim measure, not only to ease the rapidly increasing intra-theater airlift requirements, but also to furnish airlift support for the Korean area buildup following 22 January, CINCPAC told the JCS on 31 January that

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1. Ibid.  
2. COMUSMACV 05066/181358Z Feb 68.  
3. CINCPAC 210031Z Feb 68.  
4. CINCPACFLT 240121Z Feb 68; CINCPACFLT 252237Z Feb 68; J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68; Handwritten Memo, CDR Robert W. Freeman, USN, J4813, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 1 Apr 69.
"it appears prudent to consider temporary retention in theater of 16 AFSTRIKE C130's until peak requirements are reduced."¹ The same day, the JCS approved this augmentation, assigning the 16 aircraft until 15 February.² Because PACOM airlift assets were fully committed in support of Southeast Asia and any diversion "to support the buildup in South Korea would adversely affect operations in Vietnam," CINCPAC recommended to the JCS on 2 February the "immediate deployment of two C-130E squadrons to PACOM, with beddown at Tachikawa, as augmentation to support the US forces in South Korea," with the understanding that the 16 CINCSTRIKE C-130's could then "be released for return to the CONUS."³ Meanwhile, while this request was still pending, COMUSMACV asked CINCPAC on 4 February for two additional C-130 squadrons, because of the increased activities in South Vietnam.⁴ One was to be deployed immediately, while the other could be placed on a standby basis, ready for use whenever needed.

The same day, with JCS permission, one squadron was immediately deployed to South Vietnam, while another in CONUS was placed on alert awaiting "CINCPAC's call."⁵ CINCPAC, the following day, ordered the "immediate deployment of second C-130 (38th TAS) to Tachikawa AB, " Japan, where they would be available for fast deployment to South Vietnam, but also capable of other utilization.⁶ As the deadline for the release of the 16 CINCSTRIKE C-130s—the equivalent of a squadron—approached, CINCPAC asked the JCS for their retention to insure continued support of the Korean area.⁷

1. CINCPAC 310330Z Jan 68; J482 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68; Point Paper, J4821, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: C-130 Airlift Augmentation of 315th Air Division.
2. JCS 8729/312236Z Jan 68.
3. CINCPAC 020147Z Feb 68.
4. COMUSMACV 03614/040624Z Feb 68.
5. JCS 9143/040026Z Feb 68.
6. CINCPAC 050608Z Feb 68; Point Paper, J4821, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: C-130 Airlift Augmentation of 315th Air Division.
7. CINCPAC 120750Z Feb 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.

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Following JCS approval, these aircraft were transferred to the 315th Air Division, thus satisfying one-half of CINCPAC's original request for two squadrons for supporting activities arising from the Korean situation. Also assimilated into this division's PACOM C-130 airfleet were the two squadrons requested by COMUSMACV, which had also been furnished by CINCSTRIKE. Subsequently, CINCPAC recommended on 14 February that two more C-130 squadrons in CONUS be placed on alert for deployment on CINCPAC's call, one for probable support of the Korean area and the other for anticipated support of the newly approved troop augmentation of forces in South Vietnam. "To insure a complete evaluation of this request in relation to other airlift requirements," the JCS replied two days later, a complete analysis of both current and projected PACOM C-130 requirements was needed.  

This requested airlift data on C-130 operations in PACOM, which was forwarded early the next month, demonstrated the fact that requirements in support of both South Vietnam and the Korean area had risen sharply. On the base of flying hour utilization, the need for a total of 15 C-130 squadrons in the Western Pacific was substantiated. Accordingly, CINCPAC reiterated his recommendation that "two additional squadrons be placed on alert status available on CINCPAC call." He also informed the JCS that 8 additional C-130s had been deployed to South Vietnam, bringing the total in-country C-130 strength up to 96 and indicated that, conceivably, some C-130 sorties could be handled by MAC aircraft. Subsequently, CINCPAC asked his component commands to comment on and to identify by route segment any C-130 sorties that could be transferred to MAC. Discussion at the working group level at the CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board meeting in March, meanwhile, revealed that any transfer of current C-130 requirements to MAC would be extremely limited, because of tactical requirements.

Following further guidance received from SECDEF and the JCS, CINCPAC requested on 10 April that appropriate subordinate commanders

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1. JCS 1271/160009Z Feb 68; JCS 1014/132357Z Feb 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68; CINCPAC 140840Z Feb 68.
2. CINCPAC 020441Z Mar 68.
3. CINCPAC 102206Z Mar 68.
4. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
identify those theater channel type operations for which MAC service could be substituted, thereby releasing tactical C-130s for use in either Korea or South Vietnam.\(^1\) Two days later, CINCPAC advised the JCS that 4 "C-130 aircraft can be released upon establishment of increased MAC intra-theater channel service" between off-shore islands and South Vietnam, Korea, and Thailand.\(^2\) On 13 April, CINCPAC expanded his review of PACOM C-130 requirements, following COMUSMACV's turn-back of 8 C-130s to 315th Air Division control on the 11th.\(^3\) Upon completion of this close review, CINCPAC took action on 20 April to release one CINCSTRIKE C-130 squadron—less 4 aircraft that would be returned when MAC increased Western Pacific channel service—for return to CONUS, and also released one of the two CINCSTRIKE C-130 squadrons on alert in CONUS.\(^4\)

\((S)\) Toward the latter part of May, the JCS asked "CINCPAC confirmation" that a decision would be made by 1 July as to whether or not the two C-130 squadrons on loan to PACOM from CINCSTRIKE would be retained or released.\(^5\) CINCPAC agreed to advise by the desired date, which would follow the PACOM Joint Transportation Board (JTB) meeting in June, when a "review of future C-130 aircraft requirements" would be conducted.\(^6\) Meanwhile, on 28 May, CINCPAC directed the release on or about 3 June 1968 of the remaining 4 C-130s of the CINCSTRIKE squadron already returned to CONUS.\(^7\)

\((S)\) Following a discussion in depth during the PACOM JTB Meeting on 6 June, CINCPAC requested comments and recommendations from concerned commanders on the possible courses of action to be taken in the matter of the future status of the two C-130 squadrons on loan from CINCSTRIKE. After much message traffic and a careful evaluation of the various data and alternatives presented to him, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS on 30 June 1968 that one of those squadrons be assigned permanently to PACOM and the other be retained on a TDY basis.

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1. JCS 5903/091706Z Apr 68; CINCPAC 100216Z Apr 68.
2. CINCPAC 122015Z Apr 68.
3. COMUSMACV 10241/111030Z Apr 68; CINCPAC 130410Z Apr 68.
4. CINCPAC 201935Z Apr 68.
5. JCS 09584/212343Z May 68.
6. CINCPAC 240128Z May 68.
7. CINCPAC 282008Z May 68.
His rationale follows:

There is a requirement to have 104 operationally ready aircraft available for MACV use to meet surge needs within 24 hours of request to deploy in-country. Currently there are 82 aircraft in RVN and forecasted requirements for 84-85 aircraft in months ahead. Additionally, the Korean situation is not stable. Also, the inauguration of new MAC channel service in WestPac is scheduled for 1 August or later. Analysis of requirements indicates that even with the introduction of new MAC service at least one of the two CINCRSTRIKE augmentation squadrons will be required for the foreseeable future. Further, upcoming factory MOD Program may impact on C-130 availability in PACOM.

Requirements for C-130's in RVN are currently undergoing reevaluation in the light of the present military situation. The results of this review are anticipated by the end of July, at which time appropriate recommendations will be forwarded. ¹

² In reply, the JCS approved the temporary retention of one of these two squadrons, but requested that sufficient justification for the permanent assignment of the other to PACOM be submitted so that a deployment change request could be prepared and forwarded to SECDEF. The necessary justification, based on information solicited from CINCPACAF, was sent to the JCS before the end of July. ³ COMUSMACV, meanwhile, furnished CINCPAC with data that indicated a firm basis for releasing the C-130 squadron being retained temporarily in PACOM. ⁴ Accordingly,

1. CINCPAC 302320Z Jun 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68; CINCPAC 082333Z Jun 68; CINCPACAF DPL/140225Z Jun 68; COMUSMACV 17459/171225Z Jun 68; MAC MAODCT/221516Z Jun 68; CINCPAC 260255Z Jun 68; CINCPACFLT 272153Z Jun 68.
2. JCS 4731/131947Z Jul 68.
3. CINCPAC 170415Z Jul 68; CINCPACAF 260506Z Jul 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
4. COMUSMACV 22159/310845Z Jul 68.
on 3 August, CINCPAC released the TDY squadron, and it left PACOM in mid-August. At this time, the PACOM airlift system possessed 13 squadrons, with one squadron in CONUS on alert status.

(5) In September, CINCPAC updated the information in the Deployment Adjustment Request, whereby the TDY C-130 squadron could be retained permanently in PACOM, to reflect an increase in existing requirements from 74 to 84 aircraft on rotational support of South Vietnam. The effect of this increased C-130 requirements upon the capability of the theater airlift system, reported the 315th Air Division the same month, necessitated the cancelling of training, disregarding flying hour restrictions, and reducing maintenance to a minimum.

(5) On 11 October, the JCS notified CINCPAC that SECDEF had disapproved the Deployment Adjustment Request, this action being based on an interpretation of Operational Ready (OR) rate as applied to aircraft in South Vietnam. Two days later, CINCPAC indicated his willingness to assist in a JCS reclama of the SECDEF decision, stating that the chief "difficulty appears to be understanding of OR rate as applied to off-shore and in-country RVN aircraft." Accordingly, he asked COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, and CHWTO for comments, "to include additional statistics and rationale based on operational requirements to support" an adequate reclama of the following reasons for the SECDEF's disapproval:

Rationale of disapproval action noted that requirement to be able to surge to 94 Operationally Ready (OR) aircraft represents a 30 per cent increase over most demanding month to date, March 1968, when there were 72 OR aircraft in SVN, and no

1. CINCPAC 030204Z Aug 68; 315AIRDIV, Tachikawa AB 110750Z Aug 68.
2. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
3. CINCPAC 070434Z Sep 68.
4. 315AIRDIV 060400Z Sep 68, cited in J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
5. JCS 112242Z Oct 68, cited in J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
6. CINCPAC 130001Z Oct 68.
justification for increased requirement was apparent. Further, 12 C-130 squadrons, it was stated, should be able to maintain 72 OR aircraft in SVN and provide surge capability of 12-18 more C-130's within 24 hours by temporarily reducing training and holding rotational aircraft in SVN beyond scheduled return to off-shore bases.¹

² While waiting for replies to his request, CINCPAC dispatched a PACOM team of airlift experts to Washington, D.C., where they could discuss with and assist the JCS staff in preparing a reclama to SECDEF's decision. Then, on 24 October, he submitted a formal review of the entire case, including rationale and supporting data to justify the retention of the CINCSTRIKE C-130 squadron, to the JCS. "This solution," he emphasized,

...would eliminate continued dependence on C-130's on extended TDY and would permit satisfaction of present requirements in RVN with some measure of support available to meet other PACOM needs. Further, it would provide surge level capability for brief periods with immediate response from off-shore bases available as previously requested by COMUSMACV. MACV forecast reflects an average requirement level of more than 80 C-130 aircraft for future months. There is a distinct possibility that, with the advent of the C-130B and C-130E center wing modification program in December, there may be a requirement for additional augmentation on a temporary basis in addition to the thirteenth squadron.³

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1. CINCPAC 150516Z Oct 68.
2. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68; CINCPAC 130001Z Oct 68; CINCPAC 190325Z Oct 68; Point Paper, J4821, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: C-130 Augmentation of 315th Air Division.
Following the receipt of this CINCPAC-supplied data on which to base a reclama to SECDEF's disapproval, the JCS, by means of JCSM-683-68, dated 19 November 1968, requested SECDEF to reconsider his previous decision. As a result, on 9 December 1968, SECDEF approved the JCS recommendation "to permanently assign a 13th C-130 squadron to CINCPAC and locate it at Ching Chuan Kang, Taiwan." Since the SECDEF had reversed his original position, the JCS was busy at the year's end in arranging "the transfer of the squadron to PACOM."  

New MAC Channels in WESTPAC

On 9 March 1968, the JCS "requested CINCPAC to identify requirements in terms of tons/troops per month between specific PACOM terminals...with recommendations for new MAC Channels, to determine MAC capability to expand PACOM intratheater airlift, and to release C-130 assets for more urgent missions." MAC informed CINCPAC on 4 May 1968 that it had begun a study of new routes and schedules in WESTPAC, but needed specifics on requirements by route segments. The next day, CINCPAC replied:

Requirements will be submitted along with support capability statement by 15 May 1968. Delay in establishment of CONUS - KOREA MAC service had impact on forecast of requirements from Japan to Korea.

After receiving inputs from his component commanders, especially CINCPACAF's confirmation that the proposed MAC operations

1. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
2. Memo, SECDEF to CJCS, 9 Dec 68, Subj: Deployment Adjustment Request (AF-68-116); J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
3. J4 Brief No. 001-69, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Jan 69, of JCS 2339/284-2 of 11 Dec 68, Subj: Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Deployment Adjustment Request (AF-68-116).
4. MAC MAODC 041530Z May 68, citing JCS 3203/092128Z Mar 68.
5. MAC MAODC 041530Z May 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
6. CINCPAC 050735Z May 68.
could be supported, CINCPAC then requested on 15 May 1968 that new MAC channels be established to RVN, Thailand, and Korea, from offshore islands and stated monthly "average airlift requirements, by route segments."\(^1\) Towards this end, members of the CINCPAC staff and MAC officials met to discuss details soon after.\(^2\)

On 22 June 1968, MAC proposed new routes and services in WESTPAC, and CSAF requested comments and recommendations on them from CINCPAC.\(^3\) In response to CINCPAC's request for his comments on the proposed new MAC channels, CINCPACAF, on 13 July 1968, stated the requirements needed for daily service to various destinations in Korea and requested direct flight service from Kadena to Korat, Thailand.\(^4\) Meanwhile, the previous day, COMUSMACV had informed CINCPAC that "RVN common service airlift system will satisfy Danang and Phu Cat to Cam Ranh Bay requirements."\(^5\) A few days later, CINCUSARPAC expressed concern that the daily delivery of the *Stars and Stripes* to Korea could possibly be interrupted by the proposed MAC channel changes.\(^6\) CINCPAC assembled these comments and recommendations of his component and subordinate unified commanders, endorsed them to CSAF and MAC, and, in addition, recommended on 23 July 1968 the following:

a. Daily direct MAC jet service between Yokota and Kimpo.

b. Off-load of *Stars and Stripes* at Kunsan and Kwanju, if feasible.

c. Scheduling flights to Seoul and Bangkok to conform to required delivery times for *Stars and Stripes*.

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1. ADMINO CINCPAC 150530Z May 68; CINCPAC 050735Z May 68; CINCPACAF 062332Z May 68; CINCPAC 100200Z May 68; CGUSARJ CPZAMA Japan 5939/090203Z May 68; CINCPACAF 142026Z May 68.
2. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68; MAC MAOCO 231400Z May 68; CINCPAC 252257Z May 68.
3. MAC MAODCT 221516Z Jun 68 and CSAF AFXOPH 282317Z Jun 68, both cited in CINCPAC 230409Z Jul 68.
4. CINCPACAF 132147Z Jul 68.
5. COMUSMACV 20108/120836Z Jul 68.
6. CINCUSARPAC 29942/180536Z Jul 68.
d. Meeting at Camp Smith Hawaii to discuss final details of proposed service prior to inauguration of new channels.¹

Throughout the next three months, a sizable amount of planning and message traffic occurred over the proposed new MAC channels in WESTPAC.² Then, on 5 November 1968, CSAF dispatched the following:

MAC is authorized to provide channel service between the below listed destinations to begin 1 Dec 68.... Following list of channels is approved:

Okinawa/Korat
Okinawa/Osan
Okinawa/Kwang-ju
Itazuke/Kunsan
Itazuke/Okinawa
Cam Ranh Bay/Bangkok
Clark/U-Tapao
Yokota/Taegu
Yokota/Kwang-ju
Yokota/Kunsan
Yokota/Osan
Tachikawa/Taegu
Tachikawa/Kwang-ju
Tachikawa/Kunsan
Tachikawa/Osan
Misawa/Taegu
Misawa/Kwang-ju

1. CINCPAC 230409Z Jul 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
On 12 and 13 November 1968, a meeting was held at Camp Smith, Hawaii, with all pertinent commands represented, and "the final arrangements were completed on the inauguration of new MAC channel service in WESTPAC on 1 December 1968. This culminated efforts began in May 1968 under direction provided by SECDEF and the JCS to cause the takeover by MAC of airlift services originally furnished by PACOM theater airlift connecting off-shore points with Korea, Vietnam, and Thailand." Because of the six-month delay from first proposal to implementation, CHWTO submitted updated requirements for the new MAC channels, MAC directed that the new service would commence on 1 December 1968, and CHWTO advised customers of the discontinuance of theater-operated C-130 service effective that date.

"On 1 December 1968, the new MAC service was implemented with service to Korea and intra-Japan followed by new service to Thailand from RVN, Okinawa and the Philippines." This switch from theater to MAC airlift on these routes had been designed to free PACOM C-130s for use in a tactical environment, principally in the support of COMUSMACV's requirements.

Airline Ticket Sales

During December 1967, the JCS queried CINCPAC on the advisability of establishing Joint Airline Military Ticket Offices (JAMTOs) in RVN vice the U.S. Army and Air Force Pacific Exchange Service (PACEX)

1. CSAF AFSTP 052000Z Nov 68.
2. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68; CINCPAC 160605Z Nov 68.
3. CHWTO 070745Z Nov 68; MAC MAOTRA/MAODCT 161650Z Nov 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
4. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68; MAC MAOTRA 052303Z Dec 68.
concessionaire arrangement. SECDEF (OASD(I&L)) had become interested in this subject, because of the gold flow problem and the fact that PACEX had been using some foreign concessionaires.\footnote{1}

(U) In response to the JCS query, CINCPAC supported on 20 January 1968 COMUSMACV’s position that U.S. concessionaire travel office under PACEX control, with "limiting contracts to U.S. Flag airlines or travel agencies," would be more effective in controlling gold flow than the establishment of JAMTOs.\footnote{2} On 20 February 1968, the JCS asked CINCPAC to defer all actions on this matter, pending a study at the SECDEF level; this information, CINCPAC passed on to COMUSMACV and PACEX two days later.\footnote{3}

(U) While the concept of JAMTO was still under study in PACOM, the JCS advised CINCPAC on 19 March 1968 that OSD(I&L) had decided to establish Pan American Airways (PAN AM) as the sole airline ticket sales agent in RVN.\footnote{4} On 21 March 1968, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to take the necessary action to implement the new system vice the PACOM-proposed arrangement, whereby PACEX would have used U.S. concessionaires at 28 locations throughout RVN.\footnote{5}

(U) On 5 April 1968, COMUSMACV provided to the JCS, through CINCPAC, a report on the progress in establishing PAN AM as the Joint Airlines Military Ticket Office in RVN with outlets at various locations. He pointed out that the quality of service would be lowered and certain disadvantages would accrue to the servicemen in RVN as compared with the existing PACEX concessionaire operations.\footnote{6}

\begin{footnotes}
1. Point Paper, J4821, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Jul 68, Subj: Airline Ticket Sales in PACOM; J4 Brief No. 131-68, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Oct 68, of JCS 2472/319-4 of 2 Oct 68, Subj: Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Airline Ticket Sales in Vietnam.
2. COMUSMACV 1149/110843Z Jan 68; CINCPAC 202206Z Jan 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
3. JCS 1531/201644Z Feb 68; CINCPAC 220041Z Feb 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
4. JCS 4061/192227Z Mar 68.
5. Ibid.; CINCPAC 212140Z Mar 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
6. COMUSMACV 050239Z Apr 68, cited in J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
\end{footnotes}
Meanwhile, on 17 April, the Pacific Joint Board of Directors (PAC JBD) for PACEX expressed concern to CINCPAC over the continuation of PACEX ticket sales operations in PACOM and concluded with the following:

In any event, reclamation of requirement to obtain prior OASD approval...for contracting by PACEX for travel/ticketing service on all other military installations in the Pacific area appears justified.¹

(U) The next day, SECDEF queried CINCPAC on COMUSMACV's opposition to the new JAMTO arrangement.² CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV for his specific comments on this SECDEF query on 20 April 1968.³ The previous day, CINCUSARPAC had informed CINCPAC of his support of the use of PACEX ticket sales operations in PACOM.⁴ Finally, on 27 April, COMUSMACV announced his support of PAN AM sales activity in RVN, provided that servicemen would get "a reduction in the cost of individual tickets by establishing a special military fare," and "PAN AM be directed to install ticket and travel service offices at the following locations: Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, Long Binh, Cam Ranh Bay with a sub-outlet at the adjacent 22d REPL BN, Danang with a sub-outlet at the adjacent III MAF transit facility, Chu Lai, Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang, An Khe and Pleiku."⁵

(U) For review purposes, CINCPAC asked the Commander PACEX on 8 May to provide detailed information on concessionaires, then selling airline tickets to servicemen in PACOM outside of RVN.⁶ Two days later, CINCPAC recommended to SECDEF that PAN AM set up additional outlets in RVN and that action be taken to obtain fare reductions for servicemen in RVN.⁷ Meanwhile, on 22 May, PAC JBD advised CINCPAC that the JCS was examining the question of whether PAN AM should be the agency in RVN.⁸ The JCS did ask CINCPAC's comments

1. PACJBD, Hickam AFB 170054Z Apr 68.
2. SECDEF 182123Z Apr 68.
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 200132Z Apr 68.
4. CINCUSARPAC 16911/192224Z Apr 68.
5. COMUSMACV 11912/271037Z Apr 68.
6. CINCPAC 080412Z May 68.
7. CINCPAC 100214Z May 68.
8. USARPAC/PACAF (JBD) 222327Z May 68.
on this matter three days later, and CINCPAC, in turn, asked COMUSMACV to comment also. 1

(U) CINCPAC had always supported the PACEX administration of airline ticket sales in PACOM. "However, in the light of the fact that PAN AM has installed equipment and assigned supervisory personnel to RVN to commence operations on 1 June 1968," CINCPAC replied to the JCS query on 4 June 1968, a trial basis "of the PAN AM service in RVN is the most appropriate course of action to pursue at this time." 2

(U) At the same time, on 25 May 1968, based on data received from PACEX, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS grant blanket approval of PACEX operation of airline ticket sales outside of RVN; under this proposal, only American firms, which were general sales agencies, would provide full travel service to servicemen. 3 The next month, on 21 June 1968, the JCS notified CINCPAC that his recommendations "have been supported and forwarded to OSD for decision." 4

(U) On 3 July, the JCS requested CINCPAC "to furnish comments/recommendations concerning the level of service provided by the Pan American operation vis-a-vis the service formerly provided by the Pacific Exchange." 5 Four days later, CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACV with submitting such a report by late August. 6 On 26 August, COMUSMACV answered as follows:

Where located, the quality of service being provided by PAN AM is in general superior to former PACEX concessions.

1. JCS 251542Z May 68; CINCPAC 252259Z May 68.
2. CINCPAC 040149Z Jun 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
3. PACEX Hickam AFB 220037Z May 68; CINCPAC 272205Z May 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
4. JCS 3093/212227Z Jun 68.
5. JCS 3958/031815Z Jul 68.
6. CINCPAC 072201Z Jul 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
Component command comments indicate the service provided by PAN AM in July 1968 was less convenient and accessible than the former concession service.

Recommendation: In order to provide an acceptable level of service, consistent with the need for maintaining a minimum number of sales locations, it is recommended that PAN AM be required and authorized to open sales location at Chu Lai, Tuy Hoa, Pleiku and Nha Trang.¹

(U) Accordingly, CINCPAC told the JCS on 31 August 1968 that the quality of service now provided by PAN AM is an improvement over the PACEX concession arrangement.² Furthermore, he supported COMUSMACV's position that "additional PAN AM sales outlets are required at Chu Lai, Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang and Pleiku."³

(U) After rejecting the JCS recommendation that PACOM be "granted blanket authority to renew or renegotiate airline ticket sales, SECDEF had requested that the details of each individual concession contract be forwarded for a case-by-case review at OSD level."⁴ In an eight-page message on 31 August 1968, CINCPAC complied with this SECDEF request and forwarded details on all PACEX airline ticket sales concession contracts, along with individual pertinent recommendations.⁵

(U) On 14 September 1968, the JCS advised CINCPAC that his recommendations for additional operating locations for PAN AM in RVN had been endorsed and forwarded to SECDEF.⁶ Meanwhile, concerning PACEX contracts in PACOM outside of RVN, the SECDEF extended all these contracts until mid-January 1969, since they required a prior review at the OSD level on an individual basis.⁷

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1. COMUSMACV 25052/260744Z Aug 68.
2. CINCPAC 310311Z Aug 68.
3. Ibid.
4. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 68.
5. CINCPAC 310314Z Aug 68.
6. JCS 9555/141608Z Sep 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
7. Point Paper, J4821, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Oct 68, Subj: Airline Ticket Sales in PACOM.
All Jet Service for R&R Channels in Southeast Asia

(U) On 27 December 1967, MACV requested CINCPAC's "comments regarding acceptability l Mar 68 of four engine jet aircraft for support of R&R channels now serviced by DC-6B type aircraft." 1 CINCPAC concurred in this proposal on 10 January 1968. At the same time, he approved COMUSMACV's "revised R&R requirements, March - June 68, based on all jet service," which had been forwarded to him the previous day. 2

New MAC Cargo Airlift Service Between Kadena and Phu Cat

(2) While new MAC channel proposals were being studied to provide new WESTPAC intra-theater airlift service, a newly-generated Army airlift cargo requirement between Okinawa and Qui Nhon arose in November 1968. 3 As a result, on 25 November, CINCPAC was asked to obtain the establishment of a new MAC channel from Kadena, Okinawa, to Phu Cat, RVN, to meet this workload. 4 After querying his component commanders, CINCPAC learned that MAC service was already available from CONUS to Phu Cat, transiting Kadena. As November ended, CINCPAC was planning to arrange space allocations to meet the new requirement by using the existing MAC channel, thereby getting the PACOM airlift system out of the operation. 5

(2) On 6 December 1968, CHWTO advised CINCPAC that the "PACOM airlift will provide service to meet" this new requirement "through January 1969." 6 Since "Kadena - Phu Cat is a segment of an existing CONUS to RVN MAC channel," remarked CINCPAC on 7 December 1968, theater "airlift is no longer appropriate in view of recent SECDEF/JCS guidance." 7 Accordingly, CINCPAC requested CSAF and MAC for the "establishment of MAC cargo service from Kadena to Phu Cat effective 1 Feb 69." 8

1. MAC MAMPCAI 272145Z Dec 67, cited in CINCPAC 101946Z Jan 68; J482 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
2. CINCPAC 101946Z Jan 68.
3. J4821 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Nov and Dec 68.
4. CG 2D Log Comd Okinawa 11-83890/251023Z Nov 68.
5. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
6. CHWTO 060730Z Dec 68, cited in CINCPAC 070415Z Dec 68.
7. CINCPAC 070415Z Dec 68.
8. Ibid.
CSAF approved CINCPAC's request on 11 December, and MAC published the necessary details to enable the new operation to commence on 1 February 1969 on 17 December 1968.¹

**Delivery of Stars and Stripes to Southeast Asia**

(U) On 5 December 1968, CHWTO advised CINCPAC that the Stars and Stripes delivery service to Thailand and RVN had been improved with the new MAC service that commenced on 1 December 1968. Although he stated that no "significant problems" had been encountered, elsewhere on the circuit from Japan, there still remained some concern.²

(U) COMUSTDC advised CINCPAC on 13 December 1968 that the new service "has proved unsatisfactory, as many subscribers don't receive their paper until following day."³ The next day, CINCPAC advised MAC of this fact and, three days later, the 22d Air Force stated that the flight could "depart Yokota 1 or 2 hours earlier than presently scheduled."⁴ On 19 December 1968, CINCPAC asked CHWTO to look into the matter and to coordinate with all customers in order "to assure timely delivery of Stars and Stripes...to all destinations concerned."⁵ On the last day of year, CHWTO also began exploring the possibility of better connections with the MAC deliveries to Bangkok, Thailand, to assure rapid up-country Thailand service.⁶

**Support of In-Country Thailand R&R Program**

(U) On 7 February 1968, CINCPAC approved the utilization of available in-country military transportation in Thailand for the R&R program of combat support personnel, if it could be done without "jeopardizing prime military missions."⁷ Within a month, however,

1. CSAF AFSTPK 111357Z Dec 68; MAC MAOTRA 172220Z Dec 68.
2. CHWTO 052338Z Dec 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
3. COMUSTDC 130320Z Dec 68.
4. 22AF Travis AFB 22(OCAM) 170110Z Dec 68; CINCPAC 142358Z Dec 68.
5. CINCPAC 190002Z Dec 68.
6. MCE-Det 4 315 Air Div, Don Muang RTAFB 210732Z Dec 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
7. CINCPAC 070108Z Feb 68, cited in CINCPAC 050247Z Mar 68.

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CINCPAC had received so many queries on this subject, that he found it necessary to clarify his position. 1 "It was not the intent of" his February message, stated CINCPAC on 5 March 1968, "to approve space required airlift of subject R&R PAX but rather space available airlift within the present capabilities offered COMUSMACV. 2

**Airlift Support of U.S. Contractors in RVN**

(U) Prompted by a SECDEF memorandum of 6 October 1967, the JCS requested of CINCPAC on 11 January 1968 the detailed U.S. contractor intra-RVN airlift requirements, as well as the capability of theater military airlift to meet these requirements. 3 Two days later, CINCPAC, in turn, requested COMUSMACV to develop this desired information. 4 Subsequently, based on information received from COMUSMACV, CINCPAC forwarded the completed report on airlift support of U.S. contractor activities in RVN to the JCS on 18 February 1968. He specifically recommended against any proposal to transfer airlift support from civilian operations to those of the military. 5

(U) Shortly thereafter, by letter to CINCPAC on 3 April 1968, additional data on airlift support to Page Communications Engineers, Inc., was furnished by COMUSMACV. CINCPAC relayed this information to the JCS on 9 April. He stated that this company had received military airlift support 700 short tons of cargo and 100 passengers per month, and that the movement of the remaining passengers and cargo, principally to points not serviced by military air, had been handled by contract with Air Vietnam. 6

(U) Then, on 3 July 1968, COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that the JCS had inquired whether U.S. contractors in RVN could be provided

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1. J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
2. CINCPAC 050247Z Mar 68.
3. JCS 7046/112155Z Jan 68.
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 130453Z Jan 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
5. ADMINO CINCPAC 180012Z Feb 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68; COMUSMACV 101202Z Feb 68.
6. ADMINO CINCPAC 090433Z Apr 68; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
greater airlift support by the common user military airlift system in RVN. "Informally, the JCS were advised by CINCPAC that the intra-RVN common user service could not absorb all contractor requirements."1

Proposed Expanded Use of Commercial Airlift in RVN

(U) On 15 November 1968, the JCS advised CINCPAC of the fact that negotiations were proceeding between Air Vietnam (AV) and Continental Air Service (CAS) on an agreement to establish a new type of commercial airlift charter service available to DOD agencies in RVN.2 It was suggested "that under the agreement, enough in-country commercial airlift capacity could be made available to permit transfer of a portion of the workload now performed by U.S. military air transport to the commercial sector, thereby reducing the requirements for U.S. military cargo aircraft in Vietnam."3 CINCPAC's views on this proposal, "indicating impact on DOD airlift system and identify any additional advantages which would accrue" were requested.4 Four days later, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's comments on this proposal, before he replied to the JCS.5

(U) "Establishment of commercial service along lines outlined... would provide long term advantage to MACV through reduction of present GVN and contractor dependence on US tactical airlift posture," replied COMUSMACV on 21 November 1968.6 "Under no circumstance," he warned, however, "should commercial contract capability be substituted for in-country tactical airlift during period of hostilities."7 When CINCPAC replied to the JCS on 27 November 1968, his position was consistent with COMUSMACV's views.8 In short, CINCPAC's position was that intra-RVN "commercial air charter service should be encouraged where feasible provided military capability is not degraded."9

1. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68; COMUSMACV 19132/031201Z Jul 68.
2. JCS 5669/152128Z Nov 68.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
5. ADMNO CINCPAC 190514Z Nov 68.
6. COMUSMACV 37031/211339Z Nov 68.
7. Ibid.
8. J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
As a result, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that consideration should be given to the institution of commercial air service in RVN in the following sequence:

a. Scheduled and charter service to support defense contractors.

b. Scheduled and charter service to other U.S. non-military agencies.

c. Use of commercial capability to meet certain military needs only after cessation of hostilities.  

Report on Intra-RVN Movement Data (SASM RCN-12B)

(U) On 31 January 1968, the JCS established the requirement for a Report on Intra-RVN Movement Data (SASM RCN-12B). 2 Subsequently, by means of a letter on 24 February 1968, COMUSMACV "recommended that the passenger and cargo lift information contained in the FOR-52 Report be accepted as the Army Helicopter requirement for" this report, and the JCS approved this request. 3 For purposes of clarification, however, CINCPAC dispatched the following message to COMUSMACV on 15 June 1968:

Present undefined listing of total passengers and cargo movements could lead viewers, not aware that total numbers of PAX transported by Army helicopters and fixed wing aircraft include both logistical and air assault/tactical traffic, to assume that all reported traffic movement is logistical. This could raise questions about the greater numbers of passengers airlifted by Army aircraft than by MACV common service airlift. To prevent this, request you annotate all future

1. CINCPAC 270425Z Nov 68.
2. JCS 8731/312240Z Jan 68, cited in ADMINO CINCPAC 150446Z Jun 68.
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 150446Z Jun 68, citing this letter and JCS 4047/192155Z Mar 68.
MONTHLY SUBJECT REPORTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE TOTALS SHOWN IN PARA 1E(4) (B) COVER PASSENGERS AND CARGO LIFTED IN THE CATEGORIES OF FIXED AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT AND INCLUDE AIR ASSAULT AND TACTICAL OPERATIONS MOVEMENTS.  

MAC AERIAL PORT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

(U) MAC implemented in CONUS on 1 June 1968 a new system for computing aerial port management levels. "The new system was designed to further improve aerial port management and provide better service to our users," MAC informed CINCPAC on 9 July 1968. 2 At the same time, MAC offered to brief interested CINCPAC personnel on the new system. CINCPAC invited all of his component commands to provide representation, and the briefing was presented on 30 July 1968. 3

USE OF RETROGRADE AIRLIFT TO TRANSPORT 3RD AND 4TH CLASS MAIL

(6) With the increasing numbers of MAC aircraft transiting the Pacific, there was a sharp rise in retrograde capability from Southeast Asia to CONUS during the first half of 1968. 4 On 17 June 1968, COMUSMACV proposed to CINCPAC that the MAC C-141 retrograde airlift capability then existing be utilized instead of the slower sealift to transport third and fourth class mail from III and IV CTZs to CONUS. His rationale for such an action was:

Mail, including 3rd and 4th Class parcel post, generated in I and II CTZ is airlifted to CONUS via MAC contract aircraft whereas 3rd and 4th class parcel post, generated in III and IV CTZ, is transported to CONUS via sealift.

Uniformity of procedures on the handling of 3rd and 4th Class mail from Vietnam to CONUS is

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1. ADMINO CINCPAC 150446Z Jun 68; J482 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
2. MAC MAOCT 092020Z Jul 68.
3. CINCPAC 132354Z Jul 68; CINCPAC 240456Z Jul 68; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
4. J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68; JCS 6399/032034Z Jan 68; JCS 1340/062115Z Feb 68.
considered highly desirable for morale purposes. Equity in postal services should exist for all patrons whether they are located in I, II, III, or IV CTZ. ¹

(U) Over the following months, CINCPAC enlarged COMUSMACV's original concept--utilizing available MAC retrograde military airlift space to airlift 3rd and 4th Class mail from Saigon to CONUS, thereby achieving both speedier delivery and a lower rate--to include service from other RVN points, as well as Thailand. ² By mid-October 1968, the JCS had endorsed CINCPAC's proposal to SECDEF. ³ Just a month later, the JCS were able to inform CINCPAC that SECDEF had approved the plan. ⁴ Before the end of November 1968, arrangements had been quickly made to apply the cheaper TP-9 retrograde cargo rate to this 3rd and 4th Class mail from Southeast Asia, a rate that was only 10% of the normal MAC channel cost, and the mail was moving by air instead of the slower sealift. ⁵

Agana Vice Andersen Stop on R&R Flights to Hawaii

(U) In July 1968, the Pan American World Airways (PAA) suggested that the Agana Naval Air Station (NAS), Guam, be used as the refueling stop for R&R flights destined for Hawaii instead of Andersen AFB, Guam. Although MAC had "no objection to PAA using Agana," the "fuel purchased at Agana from the Navy would be at the Navy standard price." ⁶ Therefore, it was determined that the trucking "of Air Force fuel from Andersen to Agana to satisfy PAA needs for these missions is not feasible nor economically justified for the savings of 30 minutes ground time." ⁷ Subsequently, PAA agreed that its proposed concept of operations "would not be valid and withdrew the prior recommendation to use Andersen." ⁸

¹ COMUSMACV 17452/171040Z Jun 68; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Jun 68.
² ADMINO CINCPAC 022342Z Oct 68; see also J4822 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jun-Nov 68.
³ JCS 3118/161413Z Oct 68.
⁴ JCS 5687/152246Z Nov 68.
⁵ 22AF Travis AFB 301816Z Nov 68; Point Paper, J4821, Hq CINCPAC 2 Dec 68, Subj: Airlift of 3rd and 4th Class Mail from RVN.
⁶ MAC MAOCOM 161615Z Nov 68; J482 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
⁷ MAC MAOCOM 161615Z Nov 68.
⁸ J482 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
Forecast of Airlift Requirements for CY 69 in RVN

(U) On 3 December 1968, COMUSMACV stated his annual forecast of airlift requirements to CINCPACAF. His forecast for CY 69, in terms of total tonnage and number of passengers, did not differ appreciably from his forecast for CY 68. Although the breakout by type aircraft showed some change, this, "by judicious substitutions in type of aircraft provided, should pose no serious strain on available airlift capability." ¹ During CY 69, COMUSMACV forecasted 4,409,064 passengers and 1,004,580 short tons of cargo that would require air movement intra-RVN.

Logistics Support Activities

Support Responsibilities in I CTZ

(S) Previous histories have discussed how CINCPAC directed in early 1965 "that military logistics operations at ports, beaches and depots from Chu Lai to the DMZ be accomplished using Navy resources to be provided by CINCPACFLT, " as well as subsequent developments in the support responsibilities in I CTZ through Calendar Year 1967. ² During 1968, only two relatively minor shifts of responsibilities occurred. ³

(S) As of mid-1968, the following logistical and administrative support arrangements, which included the minor responsibility shift that occurred in February 1968, were in effect and remained practically unchanged for the rest of the year:

a. The Naval Support Activity, Danang under COMNAVFORV provides common item support to US/ FWMAF in I CTZ and Navy peculiar support to US Navy and Coast Guard units.

1. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68; COMUSMACV 39659/0314282 Dec 68.
3. Point Paper, J4116, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: Support Responsibilities in I CTZ.
b. On 25 February 1968 the Danang Sub Area Command which provides Army-peculiar support to Army units in I CTZ was upgraded to an Army Support Command. This command:

(1) Coordinates logistical support functions in the two Northern Provinces of I CTZ.

(2) Augments existing Navy and Marine Corps logistical facilities and units on an as-required basis as mutually agreed upon by CG, USARV and COMNAVFORV.

(3) Will establish additional facilities and units where augmentation of existing facilities and units is not feasible. For example, Army units are operating the temporary LOTS site at Thon My Thuy.

c. The Marine Corps Force Logistics Command under CG III MAF provides service peculiar support to US and ROK Marines in I CTZ.¹

³ Within a couple of months, another minor shift in responsibilities occurred, and this one like the one in February continued until the end of Calendar Year 1968. "On 19 July 1968, COMUSMACV announced that Army would assume responsibility on austere basis for new Hue-Quang Tri pipeline about 30 August. The following division of responsibilities is effective which represents a slight shift in emphasis to the Army:

Navy - Operation bulk terminal at Tan My, all water systems, and provide repair support for Navy peculiar equipment in pipeline.

Army - Operate, maintain Tan My-Hue-Phu Bai and Hue-Quang Tri pipelines plus associated pump stations and tank truck line haul.

¹ Point Paper, J4116, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Jun 68, Subj: Support Responsibilities in I CTZ.
Marine Corps - Operate, maintain bulk terminals plus associated facilities at Cua Viet, Dong Ha and Phu Bai and supplement Army tank truck line haul as required.

Helicopters for VNAF

(Confidential) On 7 February 1968, COMUSMACV reported a shortage of 27 H-34 helicopters against an authorization of 105 in the VNAF. Although delivery of replacement UH-1H helicopters was not scheduled to commence until June 1968, the JCS immediately directed both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army to expedite the transfer of 16 H-34s each, for a total of 32, to the VNAF. As a result, the last of these helicopters were airlifted into Vietnam on 16 March 1968.

M2 Carbines for RF/PF

(Confidential) "Recent changes in weapons authorization to increase the firepower of RF/PF units pending receipt of M16 rifles," explained COMUSMACV to CINCPAC on 19 May 1968, has "resulted in an interim requirement for additional M2 carbines and BARs." Accordingly, he requested the expedited shipment of "9,000 M2 carbines and 11,000 BARs," with the stipulation that, if "BARs are not available... M2 carbines are acceptable substitutes." On 3 June 1968, the JCS informed CINCPAC and COMUSMACV that 20,000 M2 carbines would "arrive by required delivery date. BARs not available."

(Confidential) On 13 July 1968, however, COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that a "recent decision to change the distribution plan of M16 rifles will

1. Point Paper, J4116, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: Support Responsibilities in I CTZ.
2. COMUSMACV 070236Z Feb 68, cited in J4334 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68; Point Paper, J4334, Hq CINCPAC, 20 Feb 68, Subj: Helicopters for VNAF.
3. Ibid.; AFLC MCOIA 131847Z Feb 68.
4. AFLDSYGP Tan Son Nhut AB 160942Z May 68, cited in J4334 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
5. COMUSMACV 14360/191123Z May 68.
6. Ibid.
7. JCS 1500/031626Z Jun 68.
enable this command to satisfy" the requirement of 20,000 M2 carbines "by redistribution of in-country resources;" he then requested that the shipment be cancelled.1 CINCPAC, subsequently, informed the JCS of this new development, and they cancelled the shipment on 18 July 1968.2

**Interservice Logistic Services Support in RVN**

On 1 July 1966, the JCS authorized the "implementation of the SECCDEF memo dtd 28 Mar 66 relating to movement and other logistic services furnished by one U.S. Service to other U.S. Services within the Republic of Vietnam on a common service funding (without reimbursement) basis."3 On 10 April, and again on 29 May 1968, CINCUSARPAC requested; "CINCPAC to arbitrate the manner of... CINCPAC reimbursement of:"4

...the Officer in Charge of Construction, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Republic of Vietnam for contract crane services furnished to CG, USARV for port operations in Saigon and to reimbursement of NSA Da Nang for laundry services furnished to U.S. Army personnel at Chu Lai through a contract within the Vietnam Regional Exchange.4

It was CINCUSARPAC's position that these logistic services should be on a common service funding (without reimbursement) basis. To settle the matter, a conference was held at the CINCPAC Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) on 17 June 1968. Here, the CINCUSARPAC representatives agreed that reimbursement was appropriate for these services. Subsequently, on 19 June 1968, CINCPAC advised all concerned of this decision, as well as the rationale for it, for future reference in the matters of interservice logistic services support in RVN.5

1. COMUSMACV 20206/130636Z Jul 68.
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 170212Z Jul 68; JCS 5083/181740Z Jul 68; J4311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 191900Z Jun 68, citing CINCUSARPAC Ltr of 10 Apr 68 and CINCUSARPAC 22660/292048Z May 68.
5. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68; ADMINO CINCPAC 191900Z Jun 68.
Proposed Method of Supporting ARVN Through the U.S. In-Country Logistics System

(U) In October 1968, COMUSMACV proposed to CINCPAC a method of supporting ARVN through the U.S. In-country Logistics System. A CINCPAC Working Conference was conducted at Hq, 2d Logistical Command, on Okinawa, in order to clarify procedures and resolve problems connected with this matter. On 28-30 October, representatives from affected commands met to work on the problem. As a result, a revised proposed plan was forthcoming, which outlined the procedures for requisitioning, demand data, and MASF procedures. The purpose of this proposed system was:

a. To maximize utilization of PACOM excess and long stocks.

b. To decrease order/ship time to ARVN.

c. To build up ARVN stocks to their authorized requisitioning objective.

d. To reduce transportation cost incident to shipment of supplies into or out of Vietnam.

e. To preclude shipment from CONUS of items which are presently available in theater.¹

(U) Subsequently, CINCPAC requested formal concurrence and/or comments from COMUSMACV and CINCUSARPAC on the proposed system. By late November 1968, COMUSMACV had concurred, and CINCUSARPAC had indicated that he would accept it, subject to DA's concurrence, which had been requested.²

Additional Ship-to-Shore Lighterage Support for Northern I CTZ

(S) As 1968 began, a LARC (Lighter, Amphibious, Resupply, Cargo (Amphibious Craft)) unit based in Thailand was scheduled for

1. Point Paper, J4132, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Nov 68, Subj: Proposed Method of Supporting ARVN Through the U.S. In-country Logistics System.

2. Ibid.
deactivation in July, since the development of the new Sattahip port had reduced the requirement for ship-to-shore discharge there. DA suggested to CINCUSARPAC on 10 February 1968 that consideration be given to the deployment of this unit on a TCS (Temporary Change of Station) to meet a requirement for over-the-beach operations in the Northern I CTZ of Vietnam. Ten days later, the appropriate Thailand support command stated its ability to provide the 165th TC (Transportation Corps) Company (LARC) and its associated maintenance detachment to meet the USARV requirement. On 3 March, CINCUSARPAC notified CINCPAC of these developments, stating that if this requirement was valid, then USARV requirements would have to "be formally stated and CINCPAC approval granted for TCS deployment."  

(S) Four days later, USARV formally requested the early TCS deployment of the 165th TC Company (LARC) and its 253d Maintenance Detachment to the Northern I CTZ. CINCUSARPAC concurred and asked CINCPAC on 8 March for authority "to deploy units on a TCS basis to RVN to meet urgent reqts in I CTZ." CINCPAC authorized this transfer, designed to augment the over-the-beach capability in the Northern I CTZ in Vietnam, the following day. Subsequently, the units were moved from Sattahip to the Thon My Thuy beach site in Vietnam.  

Logistical Support for Hq MACV and Field Advisers  

(U) As of December 1968, materiel support for the field advisers of USMACV had become critical. "Basic causes are: lack of approved Joint Table of Allowance (JTA); rapid increase of field advisors from  

1. J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.  
2. CINCUSARPAC 9665/030320Z Mar 68; Memo, CDR Robert W. Freeman, USN, J4812, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 9 Dec 68, Subj: Proposed Draft History Item for the CINCPAC Command History 1968.  
3. CINCUSARPAC 10452/080614Z Mar 68; CG USARV LBN RVN 200186/071315Z Mar 68.  
4. CINCPAC 090205Z Mar 68.  
5. J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
1, 128 (1965) to 11, 205 (1968), to meet RVNAF buildup; and division of responsibility whereby Navy programs funds and Army provides materiel. 1

(U) Upon DA's recommendations, COMUSMACV has attempted to remedy this situation by submitting requisitions citing U. S. Navy funds for Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army (PEMA), to CONUS and notifying "DA of projected Closed Loop Support and FY 70 PEMA requirements." 2 In addition, he submitted a draft JTA to CINCPAC for approval on 8 October 1968, since an "approved JTA is fundamental to the proper programming of funds and procurement." 3

(U) Briefly, the background to this problem is as follows:

The Navy, as the Administrative Agent, has responsibility for support of COMUSMACV. Historically the Army has provided supplies to MACV advisors, and has been reimbursed by Navy under common item procedures. This included providing PEMA items to field advisors, e.g., tactical radios and generators, weapons, starlight scopes. Interpretation at CINCPAC is that the Army, by regulation (AR 1-75), is charged with responsibility for funding and supplying Army peculiar materiel in support of any joint headquarters, and present procedures are incorrect. Based on a CINCPAC request, JCS has secured agreement that in the future DA will program funds and procurement for PEMA items. In addition, DA will expedite MACV current requirements for these items. 4

(U) During the week of 21 October 1968, a conference was held at Hq CINCPAC, attended by representatives from COMUSMACV.

1. Point Paper, J4132, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: Logistical Support for Hqs MACV and Field Advisors, which is the sole source for this subsection.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
CINCUSARPAC, and CNO. Its purpose was to "improve and review the JTA. Draft JTA was forwarded through Army Materiel Command to CNO on 8 November 1968." Since COMUSMACV's FY 70 PEMA requirements had been submitted to DA on 3 October 1968, these had to be revised in order to agree with the forwarded draft JTA. After FY 69, DA will program PEMA requirements, as well as expediting critical items for field advisers. In December 1968, Hq CINCPAC received information from Hq USMACV that indicated "that materiel support for field advisors has improved substantially over the last few months."  

Construction

Military Construction in Support of Southeast Asia

(S) One of the continuing problems for Hq CINCPAC logistics planners is the availability of funds needed for the continuation of required construction in support of approved force deployments to Southeast Asia. For FY 68, SECDEF had recommended a military construction (MILCON) program of "$77 million for RVN, $14 million for Thailand, $7 million for other PACOM areas and a $20 million contingency fund." Primarily based on new construction requirements, CINCPAC then recommended a FY 68 MILCON Supplemental of $137 million for RVN. By 6 June 1968, SECDEF had approved FY 68 contingency funding of projects totaling $72.6 million in both RVN and Thailand. "Additional COMUSMACV projects totaling $26.2 million have been recommended by CINCPAC for contingency funding." Later in the month, the SECDEF total had risen to $77.6 million and, despite CINCPAC's immediate recommendation for $14.9 million of contingency funding for RVN, this SECDEF-approved figure of $77.6 still remained the same in December 1968. "Trying to

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
fit the peacetime MILCON procedure to the rapidly developing and changing construction requirements in RVN, "commented CINCPAC in his recommendations on the FY 68 RVN Program, "is difficult and inefficient.""1

(6) FY 68 MILCON funds in support of Southeast Asia were appropriated as follows:

(Figures in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>RVN</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
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<td>18.0</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) By 10 September 1968, the FY 68 Supplemental appropriation "has now become law."4 MILCON funds in Southeast Asia were provided as follows:

(Figures in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>17.15</td>
<td>42.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand/Laos</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>20.15</td>
<td>45.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Guam and Philippines were allotted 95% of this amount.
5. Ibid.
Left, Seabees resurfacing Da Nang River bridge.

USN Photo

New billets east of Headquarters USARV in the Long Binh military complex.

USA Photo
Right, a Marine from a construction platoon drilling a hole for the installation of a telephone pole near Da Nang. Below, Seabees at work in South Vietnam.

USMC Photo

USN Photo
By 6 November 1968, Hq CINCPAC had received word that MILCON funds for FY 69 had been appropriated and apportionment was underway. At that time, it appeared that the funds apportioned would be less than the funds appropriated. However, the FY 69 contingency fund of $70 million could also be used for urgent projects in Southeast Asia. The FY 69 funds, as appropriated, were as follows:

(Figures in millions of dollars)

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>159.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>.4</td>
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<td>7.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>167.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the early part of August 1968, a JCS Study Group had just completed a review of management procedures for MILCON in Southeast Asia and similar situations. By mid-month, a copy of the group's report and recommendations had been received at Hq CINCPAC. In general, the group had recommended "increased emphasis on base development planning and control of the facility program through the unified command chain." CINCPAC, subsequently, solicited comments on the group's views from his component commanders. By 10 September 1968, "CINCPAC generally concurred in the Study Group position but recommended streamlined O & M funding for construction programs similar to RVN and maintaining service responsibility for management of the construction program."

During the period from 10 July through 28 July 1968, the staff of Hq CINCPAC reviewed the FY 70 Military Construction Program (MCP) in support of Southeast Asia and Korea. CINCPAC was briefed on the

program on 29 July and approval was received on the level of funding to be supported. "The Service programs were forwarded to the JCS with a recommendation that projects totaling $565.9 million be funded and that a contingency fund of $100 million be established." 1

At the JCS level, however, this FY 70 MCP was drastically reduced. The program that the JCS recommended to SECDEF totalled only $118.8 million, which included a contingency fund of $50 million. 2

As of 3 December 1968, "available MILCON funds through FY 68S have totaled: Vietnam - $1.622 million; Thailand - $373 million. Other PACOM Areas (including $87.8 million for Korea) - $314 million for a total of $2,309 million." 3

Covered Aircraft Shelters, Southeast Asia

Early in 1968, the increased tempo of ground attacks, primarily by means of rocket, mortar, and artillery fire, against airfields in RVN generated a construction program for overhead protective shelters for the high-value jet and mission-essential aircraft. "In view of the magnitude of recent losses," CINCPAC tasked his component commanders, in coordination with COMUSMACV, to "develop plans and programs for practical application of overhead protection of aircraft in RVN." 4 On the same day, 18 February 1968, CINCPAC requested "the comments and recommendations of COMUSMACV and THAI on a revetment/covered revetment program for forces deployed to and programmed for Thailand." 5

In reply, CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF submitted urgent and immediate requirements, with an estimated cost of $48 and $80 million, respectively. 6 On 8 March 1968, COMUSMACV concurred "in the

1. J42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
2. Point Paper, J4222, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Nov 68, Subj: Military Construction in Support of SEA. 
3. Point Paper, J4222, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: Military Construction in Support of SEA.
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 182149Z Feb 68.
5. Ibid.; J421 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
6. Ibid.; ADMINO CINCPACFLT 300408Z Mar 68; CINCPACAF 092331Z Mar 68.
requirement of covered revetments for tactical/RECEE/Air Defense aircraft." The same day, the JCS advised CINCPAC that "SECDEF on 6 Mar 68 approved $10 million from the FY 68 contingency fund for procurement by the Air Force of 165 shelters to meet a portion of the most critical need in SVN, including 40 for USMC requirements at Danang. Procurement action initiated."  

(5) The U.S. Army, however, was not convinced of the necessity of a requirement for overhead protection, preferring to operate helicopters directly from open-type revetments:

Study of damage causes reveals that major damage to Army aircraft occurred where aircraft were not parked in revetments. Reports available here indicate that only a small part of damages incurred would have been avoided had the aircraft had overhead cover. Accordingly, the expense and effort involved in purchasing and installing the covered shelters is not considered to be justified at this time. We have presently approximately 600 fixed wing aircraft and 3,800 helicopters. The logistics and initial construction of covered shelters for such a fleet would be a task of major magnitude. A part of the aircraft fleet is redeployed frequently, and much of it operates from expedient field locations. It is necessary, therefore, that protection be afforded wherever the fleet might be. More revetments are necessary than is indicated by the number of aircraft.  

(5) This viewpoint, voiced by the CG, U.S. Army, Vietnam, on 18 March 1968, was concurred in by CINCUSARPAC on 25 March. Then, on 4 April 1968, COMUSMACV concurred in the need for additional protection, but commented that overhead shelters were not practical because of the excessive cost and effort needed to erect a sufficient number of them. "In view of the great amount of funds and construction effort required to provide the necessary protection when

1. COMUSMACT MACTJ42 080920Z Mar 68.
2. JCS 3136/082232Z Mar 68.
3. CG USARV Long Binh, RVN 40966/180940Z Mar 68.
4. CINCUSARPAC 13066/251818Z Mar 68.
USAF aircraft bunkers at Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam.
delayed fuses are used, "he advocated an "investigation of alternate aircraft protection methods to include:"

a. Additional dispersal of aircraft by increasing apron area.

b. Additional protection by enclosing the open end of bin type revetments with a movable barrier, such as armor plate on wheels, ballistic nylon shield or steel draw-bridge type structure.

c. Additional protection by increasing height of revetment walls.¹

(S) Since he believed COMUSMACV's suggestion was "the most practical approach to the shelter problem," CINCPAC promulgated on 1 June 1968 his policy for the protection of aircraft in Southeast Asia to provide a clear definition of the protective measures that were to be taken:

a. Efforts will be concentrated to complete the open bin-type shelter program, and dispersal of aircraft will continue as practicable on the RVN bases.

b. COMUSMACV will be supported in efforts to develop a barrier system to shield the open end of existing revetments and additional height will be added when feasible to shield exposed portions of aircraft against fragment damage.

c. Covered shelters currently authorized for Navy and Air Force aircraft will first be erected in areas of greatest threat (Danang, Bien Hoa).

d. Effectiveness of covered shelters recently authorized will continue to be evaluated vis-a-vis other means of providing protection.²

1. COMUSMACV 9438/040347Z Apr 68.
2. CINCPAC 012302Z Jun 68.
As for Thailand, CINCPAC's policy was that:

...the threat to air bases is not yet sufficient to justify an overhead shelter program. Measures currently being taken to protect personnel, aircraft and equipment are considered adequate for the current risk and are commensurate with availability of construction funds and effort.¹

By 3 December 1968, the open vertical revetment program for RVN was virtually complete. In addition, sufficient open revetment materiel was on hand in-country or en route to permit completion of the entire RVN open revetment program by April 1969. The U.S. Air Force, in coordination with the U.S. Navy, had developed and planned to erect a 48 foot wide trussless arch-type corrugated sheet steel shelter at various locations in RVN. This shelter would be 72 feet long, covered with a concrete surcharge 12 to 18 inches thick depending on local condition, since tests had indicated that such a construction with 18 inches of concrete might provide protection against a delayed fused 122mm Soviet rocket high-order explosion. Of the 564 shelters in the process of being procured, out of a total program of 730, COMUSMACV has allocated 363 shelters to the U.S. Air Force, 165 to the U.S. Navy (Marines), and 36 to VNAF.²

Use of Relocatable Structures in Vietnam

"AF has procured eight relocatable crew quarters for erection in RVN at Danang," read a CINCPACAF message to CINCPAC on 20 June 1968; "Request your headquarters take action to permit expeditious shipment of these facilities which are critically needed at Danang."³ Earlier, COMUSMACV had objected this request, because these buildings substantially "exceed OSD space criteria."⁴ Later, on 27 June 1968,

1. Ibid.
2. Point Paper, J4221, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: Covered Aircraft Shelters.
3. CINCPACAF 200137Z Jun 68.
4. COMUSMACV 11914/271130Z Apr 68.
COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC "that planned increased occupancy of relocatable structures would meet space criteria but costs would be in excess of OSD limit for troop housing."\(^1\) On 10 July 1968, CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV that consideration should be given to the considerable re-use value of this type building and requested him to permit shipment and erection of the buildings.\(^2\)

Construction Requirements for Increased Aircraft Deployment to U-Tapao

\(^{3}\) On 18 April 1968, CINCPAC was requested by the JCS to make a "review of the construction requirements for interim and sustained support of a full VP Squadron at U-Tapao in view of funding requirements expressed in the FY 69 MILCON program and pending B-52 aircraft increases."\(^3\) In his reply on 24 March 1968, CINCPAC stated that this VP (U.S. Navy Patrol Squadron) deployment "will require full use of Apron D (VP Apron) and:

The deployment of additional B-52 aircraft should be accompanied by approval for construction of additional revetted hardstands. Under the presently approved B-52 deployment plan, Apron D will be available for use by additional VP aircraft upon completion of the presently programmed hardstands in June 1968. The deployment of the additional VP aircraft will be coordinated in theater to preclude an aircraft parking problem.\(^4\)

\(^{4}\) As of 3 December 1968, U-Tapao Airbase was supporting "a 25 B-52 ARC LIGHT mission utilizing facilities construction completed February through June 68."\(^5\) By this time, the SECDEF and RTG had

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1. COMUSMACV 18473/270653Z Jun 68, cited in CINCPAC 102011Z Jun 68; J42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
2. Ibid.; CINCPAC 102011Z Jul 68.
3. JCS 6887/182230Z Apr 68, cited in CINCPAC 240240Z Apr 68.
4. CINCPAC 240240Z Apr 68; J42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
5. Point Paper, J4221, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: Construction Requirements to Support Increased ARC LIGHT Mission, U-Tapao.
approved a plan for deploying 10 additional B-52s to U-Tapao to support increased ARC LIGHT sortie requirements. Construction on the required hardstands started on 26 September 1968, with a completion date of 5 February 1969. In CINC PAC's opinion:

Locating 35 B-52s at U-Tapao will increase ARC LIGHT sortie rate, improve reaction time compared to Kadena and Andersen based B-52s, and reduce flying hour wear on the aircraft. Surge requirements up to 45 B-52 aircraft can be handled at U-Tapao, after the 35 parking stubs are available, using the mass apron under a waiver.  

Construction Planning

("Any substantial reduction in the level of U.S. forces in Vietnam, " CINC PAC told his component commanders and COMUSMACV on 3 December 1968, "would change requirements for facilities there."2 As a result, he provided guidance on procedures for obtaining construction funds for high priority facilities needed for redeployment. Since it was doubtful that the JCS would make contingency funds available for this purpose, and since these projects for redeployment facilities would be in competition with all other construction projects, the funds for which would be controlled by the military departments, CINC PAC stated that he would support only those requests for reprogramming for hard core projects needed urgently for the "immediate post-hostilities redeployment of PACOM forces."

On 13 December 1968, in the J4 Logistics Readiness Center at Hq CINC PAC, a "FREIGHTER CARGO briefing was presented to BG EN Chapman, USA, Pacific Ocean Division Engineer, and the Engineer Staffs of PACNAV FAC EN G COM and the Service Components," during which, the status of "the 10 most important facilities actions was discussed. Purposes of the briefing were to bring the Engineer Staffs

1. Ibid.
2. CINC PAC 030330Z Dec 68.
3. Ibid.
up to date on planning for withdrawal from SEAsia and to increase the exchange of information among the Engineer Staffs.1

Development of Nam Phong Airfield in Thailand

(16) On 1 March 1968, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS the initiation of an intensified air campaign against North Vietnam.2 A week later, he stated an urgent requirement for the completion of Nam Phong Airbase, based upon the following considerations:

In order to provide air units for intensified ROLLING THUNDER campaign and air support for additive ground forces which may be deployed to SVN, additional tactical fighter squadrons will be required in SEAsia. While some additional tactical air units can be accommodated on SVN airfields, beddown in SVN of the number of squadrons being considered for deployment would exacerbate unacceptably an already undesirable degree of saturation.

... Nam Phong would provide increased flexibility in aircraft utilization in SEAsia, since aircraft based at Nam Phong are in position to be used either against NVN in the ROLLING THUNDER campaign or in support of the ground war in northern SVN. Completion of Nam Phong provides the earliest practicable means to accommodate the deployment of the required additional tactical aircraft....3

(16) On 11 March 1968, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACHTAI to provide a logistic impact based on the deployment "of three (3) TFS on an austere basis 120 days after construction starts."4 Three days later,

1. J42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. CINCPAC 010823Z Mar 68, cited in both CINCPAC 080302Z Mar 68 and J4112 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68.
3. CINCPAC 080302Z Mar 68.
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 110245Z Mar 68.
COMUSMACTHAI replied that, in essence, there would be no problems relative to the support for the beddown of these squadrons. 1 On 23 March 1968, the "increased Air Force requirements in Thailand, including beddown of additional SAC aircraft to a total of 35 B-52 and 36 KC-135 at U-Tapao, caused CINCUSARPAC to completely review the Sattahip port capability to handle the projected increase in workload. "2

(S) As requested by the JCS on 21 March 1968, CINCPAC submitted three days later the desired information on "personnel and logistic requirements by Service for completion and occupancy of Nam Phong Air Base, to include construction and communications."3 As of 3 April 1968, CINCPAC believed that activation "of Nam Phong represents the earliest solution to relief of the hazardous situation posed by overcrowded bases in SVN, assures operational flexibility in the use of Nam Phong based squadrons, and would enhance CINCPAC's capability to exploit his recommended air campaign against RVN. "4

Space Allowance Criteria for Facilities in Thailand

(U) On 2 July 1968, COMUSMACTHAI requested guidance from CINCPAC, since "there is no firm guidance to DOD agencies in Thailand regarding space allowance criteria applicable to leased facilities nor for new construction financed under O&M appropriations. "5 CINCPAC replied on 23 July 1968. He advised that the criteria he promulgated in his letter of 12 March 1968, subject "Thailand Military Construction Review," for MILCON facilities was applicable to all facilities constructed in Thailand, regardless of fund source. He emphasized that these criteria should be used as a guide with respect to leasing of facilities.6

1. COMUSMACT MACTJ4 141030Z Mar 68.
2. J4112 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 68, citing CINCUSARPAC 232146Z Mar 68.
3. CINCPAC 240440Z Mar 68.
5. COMUSMACTHAI MACTJ42 021108Z Jul 68.
6. ADMINO CINCPAC 232030Z Jul 68; J42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
Sattahip Port Development, Thailand

(•) In 1966, the "JCS tasked CINCPAC with reviewing overall Sattahip development with a view towards incremental construction to reduce immediate funding," since these port facilities "must be provided to support current operations and contingency plans."¹ Such a plan was developed and approved by both CINCPAC and SECDEF. Under the plan, the major port facilities were to be a four berth quay wall and a breakwater. Towards the end of 1967, the construction of "the 4 berth quay wall at Sattahip is well underway. The first berth became operational in August, a second became operational in October and the final two berths have BOD's in January 1968."² Actually, the fourth and final deep draft berth of the Sattahip port reached its beneficial occupancy date (BOD) on 22 January 1968.³ "The Sattahip Port complex was dedicated on 30 May 68. "⁴

Bang Phai Water Reservoir, Thailand

(•) Once engineering investigations revealed that the water situation in the Sattahip area was "especially critical, and the existing MAP reservoir and well field were inadequate to accommodate planned force buildup," a project was immediately developed for the construction of the Bang Phai water reservoir.⁵ The necessary funds for this project were authorized under the FY 67 Southeast Asia Military Construction Authorization (SMCA), as part of the overall Phase II for the Sattahip Port Development project.

(•) Under the direction of the Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC), Thailand, actual work on the Bang Phai reservoir was initiated in December 1967 by the U.S. Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) contractor of Dillingham-Zachary-Kaiser. Final construction was completed in October 1968, at a cost of $3.866 million.

1. Point Paper, J4213, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Jun 66, Subj: Sattahip Port Development.
3. COMUSMACTHAI/JUSMAGT 051240Z Feb 68; J421 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
5. Point Paper, J4221, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Dec 68, Subj: Bang Phai Water Reservoir.

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Located approximately 10 kilometers north of the U-Tapao Airbase, the reservoir encompasses an area of 976 acres, and its impounding embankment is approximately 1.7 kilometers long and 55 meters high at the maximum point.

Water impounding was begun in August 1968, just prior to the completion of the construction work. When filled, the reservoir can contain 2.1 billion gallons. It is planned to pipe the raw water from the new reservoir through a combination of 12" and 24" lines to a water treatment plant at U-Tapao Airbase for use by all services in the Sattahip area. By 4 December 1968, COMUSMACTHAI reported "the project operational and reservoir filled to capacity, with dedication ceremony scheduled for 11 Dec 68."\(^1\)

**Thailand Military Construction Procedures**

On 10 May and 4 June 1968, the JCS requested CINCPAC's "comments on information provided through Service channels concerning facilities not yet started in the FY 67S and prior MILCON programs for Thailand."\(^2\) In reply, CINCPAC provided information on the funds available for projects not yet started in Thailand and concluded his message by recommending "that no action be taken to withdraw funds from the construction projects not yet started in Thailand."\(^3\) Furthermore, he had backed this recommendation up with cogent reasons "why these projects had not been started, e.g., weather, design, extension of current project, etc."\(^4\)

**Thailand Construction Capability**

By memorandum on 31 October 1968, Deputy SECDEF notified the Chairman of the JCS of the following:

a. The foreseeable $80 million backlog of construction in Thailand through FY 69 will be

1. Ibid.
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 062020Z Jun 68, citing JCS 8733/102124Z May 68 and JCS 01591/041851Z Jun 68; J42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 062020Z Jun 68.
4. J42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
completed in less than a year, and projected FY 70 requirements will be $5 million or less.

b. The projected work load does not justify retention of present construction capability.

c. About 1,700 US military personnel could be withdrawn, and 6,000 of the local national work force could be laid off by end FY 69 with resultant savings of $35 million in FY 70.

d. It is more economical to perform construction in Thailand utilizing local contractors than by US Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) contractors or US troops.

\(\$\) "I believe," continued Deputy SECDEF, "we should start promptly, evaluate our construction capability in Thailand, and develop a phase-down plan. . . . I would appreciate having this plan and your recommendations by December 1, 1968."\(^2\) Three days later, the JCS requested CINCPAC to supply the necessary information "on which to base reply."\(^3\) In a seven-page message on 16 November, CINCPAC furnished the desired information to the JCS. He also recommended a deferral of any reduction in troop construction capability in Thailand until March 1969, to allow for a more accurate analysis of the situation.\(^4\)

\(\$\) On 4 December 1968, the JCS forwarded a memorandum, which was based in a good part on input supplied by CINCPAC, in response to the earlier memorandum of the Deputy SECDEF. The JCS memorandum furnished "projected Thailand construction requirements, a construction execution schedule, and a recommendation to hold troop construction capability phase-down planning in abeyance, pending receipt of a CINCPAC

2. JCS 4744/020001Z Nov 68.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 160516Z Nov 68; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
reevaluation of requirements and SECDEF decisions relative to post-hostilities force posture in SEAsia. On the same day, the JCS requested CINCPAC to reevaluate troop construction capability requirements in Thailand and any indicated phase-down plan by 1 March 1969.

On 13 December 1968, Deputy SECDEF agreed to hold a phase-down in abeyance pending receipt of the reevaluation, but he emphasized that expeditious transfer of planned troop construction to contract construction, if feasible, would be expected. His memorandum of this date reflected his "decision to withdraw the Air Force Heavy Repair Squadron (400 Air Force personnel) in Jun 1969, and in addition, after consideration of a CINCPAC analysis in Mar 1969, to withdraw a portion of the Army units in Thailand." It was planned that CINCPAC, in conjunction with CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF, would reexamine troop construction capability and requirements in Thailand during the month of February 1969, with the results of this analysis being due in at the JCS by 1 March 1969.

Munitions

PACOM Air Munitions

In the latter part of 1968, a Briefing Paper on "PACOM Air Munitions" was prepared for the new J3, Hq CINCPAC, MAJ GEN H. M. Elwood, USMC, in order to quickly orient him in the history, background, and current status of this vital subject. This paper covered the topic from the beginning of the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, illustrated the methodology used in the generation of requirements by PACOM component commanders, reviewed the method by which these submissions were consolidated and submitted by CINCPAC to the JCS, and, finally,

AIR MUNITIONS STOCK STATUS

SEA
(THOUS OF SHORT TONS)
JAN 1968 THRU DEC 1968

<table>
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<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
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<td>241</td>
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SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 113.
gave an overview of the total PACOM air munitions requirements, highlighting the critical items. Because of the unique and noteworthy quality of this background paper, which summarizes a significant and important area of CINCPAC's activities, it is reproduced here practically verbatim for historical purposes.¹

"Prior to April 1966, air munition requirements were submitted within military service channels. The SEASIA user worked directly with his service chief in procuring, managing and distributing air munitions. CINCPAC was involved in air munitions programming for MAP supported countries only, with principal attention being given to Vietnam and Laos. Because of problems resulting primarily from mal-distribution of air munitions, including bomb bodies and components such as fuzes and fins, CINCPAC was given control of air munitions by the JCS in April of 1966. This authority included all air munitions in the PACOM area or enroute therein or thereto. With this essentially 'carte blanche' authority, an administrative document titled PACOM Modern Air Munitions Requirements was established to provide the JCS with those quantities of air munitions that are required to support those PACOM forces currently in and planned for deployment to SEASIA in accordance with the authorized SECDEF force level. This document consolidates all PACOM component commanders' operational air munition requirements, which are determined by each commander's total aircraft sortie capability. It updates these requirements as the force level authorization changes and submits these quantities to the JCS with appropriate justification for approval and forwarding to the SECDEF. These requirements are reviewed by the OSD with regard to current production facilities capabilities, feasibility of new production and available funds. The subsequent result is approved production levels of each munition with specific quantities designated as available for use in SEASIA. Ideally, these quantities are the same amounts as requirements, in which case this available production will be distributed or allocated to each user by CINCPAC in the desired quantities. However, due to lack of funds and limited production facilities, many items of air munitions are not available in the desired quantities. In this case, CINCPAC will determine the allocation of these critical items to each user having a requirement on the basis

¹ A xerox copy of this Briefing Paper, entitled "PACOM Air Munitions," is on file in the Office of the CINCPAC Command Historian.
SEASIA AIR MUNITIONS
REQUIREMENTS/ALLOCATIONS/EXPENDITURES
[THOUS OF SHORT TONS]
JAN 1968 THRU DEC 1968

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SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 112
of operational priority and requirement. In many cases a substitute munition can be made available to make up the deficit in order to maintain the total tonnage required to support the total sortie capability.

(§) "In December 1966, JCS promulgated guidance on submission of air munition requirements which would enable the JCS to more thoroughly evaluate PACOM requirements and to provide the Secretary of Defense with recommendations for production schedules in support of these requirements. An air munitions "pure" requirement was defined as a quantity which stems directly from operational necessity and disregards production capabilities and available funding. PACOM requirements have been submitted to date IAW this guidance and, for reasons previously mentioned, have historically been 10 - 20% higher than allocations.

(§) "The origin of an air munition requirement generally begins in service channels as, for example, an Air Force SEAOR (Southeast Asia Operational Requirement) or a Navy SOR (Specific Operational Requirement). The feasibility of the item is examined and if R&D funding is available, engineering development determines if the item has a potential application to SEASIA operations. CINCPAC is apprised of this requirement in the course of each component commanders' periodic submission of air munition requirements. If adequate funding is available within the developing service's budget, the item begins production and distribution is made through CINCPAC. In most cases, however, budget limitations are so stringent that an appeal for additional funding is necessary. Although the service chief can appeal directly to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS, the very nature of CINCPAC authority and control of SEASIA air munitions makes a CINCPAC endorsement advisable on all funding requirements generating in the PACOM area. In the process of justifying this new (or increased) munition requirement, all Component Commander's requirements for this item are solicited and a consolidated requirement is then submitted to the JCS.

(§) "Combat requirements of air-to-ground munitions are a function of (2) the enemy threat and target array, (b) the friendly aircraft engaged, their sortie rates and mission assignments, (c) weapons effectiveness, compatibility, delivery accuracy, availability, cost, and aircraft load-carrying capability and (d) tactical considerations.
The functions that develop combat requirements also generate numerous interacting factors that cannot be evaluated in isolation but must be considered in context. Such factors include but are not limited to the following examples:

1. The target characteristics, location, approaches, vulnerability, enemy defenses.

2. The lethality of various weapons against the target.

3. The delivery tactics required by the various weapons and the associated CEP of the weapons in different delivery modes.

4. The performance characteristics and load-carrying capabilities of the delivery aircraft.

5. Operational considerations such as carrier catapult and landing restrictions, availability of inflight refueling, readying times for various weapon systems, enroute weather, speed and altitude restrictions.

6. Relative vulnerability of the tactical delivery required by the various weapons.

7. The probable mission assignment of the various aircraft.

8. Relative costs and effectiveness ratio of the weapons selection.

The effect of such considerations on weapons requirements can be drastic. For example, a defended target often requires a different release condition than a similar target that is undefended. Frequently this tactic is incompatible with the delivery required by the preferred loading. As a result, the weapon selection process develops a spectrum of weapons for similarly identified targets rather than a universal selection of the preferred load.

Many weapon selection exercises assume that all targets appear in the same frequency to all aircraft and that the same preferred weapon is selected for each target appearance. Such processes tend to result in
SEASIA
AIR MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES (SHORT TONS)
JAN 1967 THRU DEC 1968

THOUSANDS OF TONS

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 111.
erroneous conclusions. Aircraft are assigned a predominate number of sorties according to the mission they perform best; e.g., the A-4 is more often assigned to visual armed reconnaissance missions than other roles; the A-6 is more frequently assigned all weather strike missions. These differences in mission assignment influence both target occurrence frequency and weapons selection for the target.

(2) "Sortie load factors have been developed for each type of ordnance carrying strike aircraft. These factors have evolved from experience obtained since the introduction of tactical air-power into Southeast Asia and are subject to continuous evaluation and adjustment. Factors are developed by determining the normal ordnance carrying configuration and the percent of sorties planned to be flown in that configuration. One hundred percent of the sorties are effectively loaded using this procedure which allows calculation of a mix and quantity of ordnance to be carried on each strike sortie. For example, an aircraft which carries six M117's on 40 percent of its sorties could be said to carry 2.40 M117's on 100 percent of its sorties; thus, the load factor of 2.40 for M117's.

(6) "The number of attack sorties that can be flown by a given force during a given period of time depends primarily upon the composition of the force, how it will be employed, and the availability of logistics support. Based on past history of SEASIA sortie rates, a sortie generation capability for each type of aircraft can be reasonably computed to produce a monthly programmed sortie rate by aircraft type. This total monthly sortie capability is then multiplied by the appropriate load factor to produce monthly munition requirements.

**SAMPLE REQUIREMENT CALCULATION**

- Monthly Sortie Capability
  \[
  = 3 \text{(squadrons)} \times 18 \text{(UE)} \times 1.1 \\
  \times \text{(daily sortie rate)} \times 30 \text{ days} \\
  = 1782
  \]

- Load Factor
  \[
  = 6 \text{(M117 bombs)} \times 40\% \text{(total M117 sorties)} = 2.4
  \]

- Monthly M117 Munition Requirement (at this particular base)
  \[
  = 1782 \times 2.4 = 42,768 \text{ bombs}
  \]

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180
As the monthly requirements are based on total sortie capability, any deviations from this computed rate caused by standdowns, either directed or self-imposed, inclement weather, or mission diversions, will reflect as underexpenditures. Similarly, if operational necessity causes munitions loadings in excess of the forecast effort, the result will indicate an over expenditure. With proper munitions management, over expenditure should result only in cases of extended mission diversion or emergency situations.

(5) Internally at CINCPAC, munitions management is a coordinated effort between the J3 and J4 divisions. All actions of an operational nature are staffed by the J3 division while logistical aspects such as movement, transfers, production and expenditure monitoring originate with the J4 division. The requirements document and the allocations document are revised and disseminated by J3 with appropriate input and coordination by the J4 division. The requirements document is a single source of PACOM air munition requirements. Frequent changes are required to update the quantities contained therein to respond to applicable message traffic transpiring in the time interval between SECDEF authorized force deployment programs. As force structure changes, sortie capability changes and, accordingly, air munition requirements. The latest submission of the requirements document was on 27 June 1968 which was based on Program #6. Change #1 was issued on 23 August 1968. Significant changes submitted were tentative requirements for munitions now in development which will be validated when successful combat evaluations have been completed. These requirements are not included in the total tonnage requirement, as the availability of the items is too far in the future to accurately forecast and an available munition must be load factored to fill the wing station. As these munitions become available, a trade-off for similar quantities of munitions must be effected to stay within total tonnage/sortie capability.

(5) The COMMANDO HUNT air munition requirements reflect a significant shift in weaponeering with accompanying increases in load factors and sortie generation rates. This combines to produce requirements on the order of 8,000 tons per month more than current requirements. This increase is capable of being absorbed by PACAF total sortie capability largely due to the close proximity of the operating area to the staging bases. This reduces external tank and ECM pod requirements, permits increased sortie rates and affords optimum
munition loading for a single dedicated type of targeting. Because of these changes, total PACAF requirements are now being changed to reflect these new load factors and sortie rates. The impact of these requirements on current production capability is significant and particularly for the approximate 25,000 CBU-24 (anti-material bomblet) and CBU-53/54 (incendiary) monthly requirements. The CBU-24/29/49 production base is 10,000 per month which means that any amount in excess of this number will require an additional source or facility to provide. This requires generally a lead time of up to 18 months to two years to yield the end item. A similar situation exists for the CBU-53/54, in that maximum production of this munition will not reach a peak production until September 1969 and then only at a rate of 6,000 per month. Although official action on these requirements has not been received from the JCS, indications are that it is doubtful that funding will be allocated for production facilities to meet these requirements. Therefore, a substitute munition will be required. For the CBU-24, a fragmenting munition such as a GP bomb fuzed with a "daisy cutter" or low altitude VT may be acceptable. A suitable trade-off for the CBU-53/54 wide area incendiary does not exist in the present munitions inventory. Fire bombs are the closest available substitute, although available assets of this type of munition will not fully support the requirement. The action on these requirements then is to find suitable substitutes for any excessive requirements upon OSD/JCS confirmation of production schedules.

(5) "The production levels established by OSD in response to CINCPAC/JCS requirements are transmitted to CINCPAC by the JCS J-4 as forecast production schedules. CINCPAC J3 and J4 action officers then determine allocation of available assets to each Component Commander in accordance with requirements. Where available assets do not meet requirements, a proportional share is allocated to each user and wherever acceptable, an available substitute munition is used to make up the deficit. When no acceptable substitute exists, a shortfall in the allocation and subsequent expenditure results. Normal sortie attrition due to weather, maintenance, and combat loss has absorbed most of these shortfalls and no insurmountable problems have been encountered to date. Unfortunately, this discrepancy between requirements and actual expenditures can result in a two-fold loss.
SEASIA AIR MUNITIONS
(Short Tons)
INTRANSIT CONUS
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1968

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 69, p. 109
In addition to the production associated loss noted above, OSD views requirements in terms of past expenditures. If the total tonnage monthly expenditure decreases, the immediate reaction is to decrease production accordingly without regard to existing operational or weather handicaps. Therefore, under these conditions, new or increased munition requirements must contain sound and thorough justifying rationale before they can penetrate the atmosphere of austerity that reduced expenditures creates in the Pentagon.

(M) "Munition expenditures and re-supply are monitored and controlled by the J47 branch. A monthly expenditure analysis is prepared for dissemination to the staff which compares monthly expenditures to allocations. Expenditure trends which might or eventually will result in exhaustion of the supply pipeline are checked as soon as they are recognizable. Intra-theater transfer of assets via a CINCPAC Ammo Transfer Order (CATO) are used to provide maximum availability of all munitions to users as required. By judicious management policies and occasional guidance, a favorable PACOM munitions status is maintained with due intentions towards keeping a full munitions pipeline to SEASIA while avoiding undesirable over-stockage of any munition for any single user.

(M) "The current air munition requirements submitted to JCS approximate 145,000 tons per month (for November 1968) and are composed of 50 different items....

(M) "PACOM air munitions requirements are updated by periodic munitions conferences and message traffic. The CINCPAC Non-Nuclear Air Munitions Conference (NAMC) is convened approximately semi-annually and timed to accommodate a review of munition requirements just prior to budget reviews and apportionments. As a result, finalized requirements are available to all the services upon which to base procurement funding and initiate requests for supplemental funds as required. The representation at these conferences includes OSD (I&L), JCS, DA, CNO, CSAF, CMC, CSAF, all Component Commanders, and all the supporting staffs concerned with movement and procurement of air munitions. The conference attendance numbers about 80 - 85 representatives of O-6 to O-4 rank. These conferences have been productive as they afford a common meeting ground and discussion opportunity for all agencies and commands directly concerned with air munition requirements and expenditures in SEASIA."
In addition to the NAMC, CSAF convenes periodic munition support conferences at OOAMA, Hill AFB to determine the degree of support that can be given to PACAF and MAP air munition requirements. The end product of this conference is to affirm allocations to these users.

In the interim between conferences, requirement and allocation changes are effected by message traffic or, in the case of PACAF and VNAF, by the Air Munitions Planning and Programming Guide. The processing of requirement changes is as follows:

1. In the case of an increase or decrease, the requirement change request is examined for impact on other users of the munition and for effect on overall PACOM munitions posture. If adverse effects are found, such as depletion of another users stock or non-availability of the item, a negative response is sent back to the originator. Whenever possible, alternative solutions are included. If the requirement has no adverse effects, it is forwarded to the JCS along with supporting rationale for the change. If assets are available, an allocation is given back to the originator to satisfy the requirement. If assets are not available, the response must await JCS/OSD action on production level approval. This analysis is possible by records maintained by the J47 Branch such as:

a. Bi-monthly PACOM Munitions Status Report - A computer readout of the position of all air munitions in SEASIA, those in-ships enroute and those moving in CONUS destined for SEASIA.

b. SEASIA Air Munitions Inventory Forecast - A JCS summary which contains (a) a forecast of production, (b) that production available to SEASIA, both actual and forecast, (c) JCS reserve assets (undelivered production stored in CONUS) and (d) pertinent summaries concerning the above.

c. PACOM Air Munitions Report - A monthly analysis of expenditures versus allocations and PACOM air munitions status.

2. In the event a requirement is submitted for a new munition, data concerning its characteristics, effectiveness, employment, etc., is furnished to all prospective PACOM users to solicit total requirements. These are then forwarded to the JCS with as much justification as is
available such as intended use, predicted results, trade-off munitions involved and rationale as to why the munition is needed in the SEASIA inventory. Subsequent action is dependent on JCS/OSD approval of the requirement.

3. An allocation change receives the same analysis as a requirement change to determine the degree of support available.

"In the original JCS charter giving CINCPAC control of air munitions, authority (and direction) was also given to establish operating stock levels. Over a period of time it was observed that a level of 45 days was suitable to provide adequate SEASIA stockage and yet avoid surplus stockage in the limited SEASIA storage facilities. The 45 days equates to a monthly operating quantity plus a 15 day safety level. Exceptions to this rule are made for ARPAC and the RLAF, where due to internal distribution requirements, a 60 day level is authorized. Certain seasonal or special use munitions which are low use items are authorized an increased stockage level to permit adequate distribution among the staging areas. All air-to-air missiles are allocated as stockage objectives only because of the unpredictable expenditure rate. In certain cases, such as when excess assets are critical due to production short of requirements, a 30 day stockage objective may be authorized to allow maximum use of the munition while attempting to slowly build a reserve. Such is presently the situation with the M117 and MK-82 bombs.

"In summary, PACOM Component Commanders submit air munition requirements to CINCPAC. CINCPAC consolidates, justifies and submits them to the JCS who endorse and forward to the SECDEF. Production levels are then established for each munition for analysis by the OSD. These forecast production schedules are made available to the JCS who forward them, along with appropriate stock status data, to CINCPAC. Allocations are then made to each Component Commander based on this forecast production."
Ground Ammunition in Southeast Asia

(S) From, at least June through September 1968, the ground ammunition posture in Southeast Asia suffered a steady erosion. Several causes, both in Southeast Asia and in CONUS, accounted for this situation. On one hand, increasing requirements stemming from the combat troops have persistently offset gains in ammunition availability while, on the other hand, ammunition availability has depended on production facility capabilities and funds to finance. Generally, the Southeast Asia ammunition base has been constrained by both underfinancing and old facilities operating at higher than efficient production rates. Moreover, fund availability has been based on forecasts tied to the then-current (at budget formulation time) consumption rates, which resulted in underfunding and a necessary reliance on supplemental appropriations.

(S) On 16 June 1968, CINCPAC gave the JCS his assessment of the impact of ground munition shortages on the conduct of future operations in Southeast Asia:

This year has seen a marked increase in the number of ground munitions placed on available supply rates (ASR). Currently USARV has 19 items of ground munitions on ASR, III MAF 5, and ARVN is at less than 30 days of supply on 17 items. In addition, USARV reserve stocks have been drawn down by the increased tempo of ground operations since February. These stocks should be rebuilt as quickly as possible and allocations should be raised to provide required consumption.

The most significant, and visual, impact that will accrue from continued curtailment of certain critical munitions is the adverse effect on the RVNAF modernization program and on RVNAF's further assumption of a more active role in combat. Present allocations of the 40mm CTG HE (DODIC B568) are insufficient to support adequately weapons now in the hands of troops. As a result ARVN has

been asked to withhold further issues of the M79 launcher. RVNAF expansion and arrival of Program Six additions are likely to require additional items be placed under ASR management control while ASRs of those 19 items presently under control may have to be further reduced. Increases in RVNAF will result in higher ground munitions requirements for RVNAF with no decrease in requirements for U.S. forces.

Recommend that appropriate funding and production levels be approved which will assure support of combat operations in SEA at required supply rates (RSR).  

The JCS replied on 22 June 1968 as follows:

...In addition, the DA has recommended a $1.412 billion increase over the current pending $2.637 billion FY 69 program....

If the total program discussed above is approved, and based upon present forecast of requirements, it is anticipated that all existing shortages of ground munitions in your command will be eliminated during the FY 69 funded delivery period....

You will be kept advised of ground munition program developments impacting on your command.  

This add-on of $1.4 billion was designed to eliminate ground munitions shortages in Southeast Asia during the FY 69 funded delivery period. It, however, did not include funds for ground munitions to either support the RVNAF modernization program or the ROK forces ($270 million). "With the shortfall of 200 million and, if the Korea package of 270 million and support of RVNAF modernization program is required to be 'absorbed,' "the situation will worsen," read a Hq CINCPAC document in September 1968. 

1. CINCPAC 161438Z Jun 68.
2. JCS 3132/221523Z Jun 68.
By the end of calendar year 1968, however, the picture of ground munitions in Southeast Asia, especially RVN, had improved substantially. "As a result of the decrease in consumption and an increase in allocations through increased production," reported COMUSMACV at the end of 1968, "the ARVN stockage position has greatly improved. At the conclusion of the year only three items remained on ASR: 40mm HE, Grenade (Frag), and Claymore mines."  

T-Day Planning for Munitions

On 4 August 1967, the JCS affirmed the policy that only SECDEF had the authority to approve any diversion of air munitions from Southeast Asia. Earlier, on 20 June 1967, the SECDEF had approved the recommendations of the JCS to stock 30,000 tons of controlled air munitions--other than Southeast Asia stocks--in other PACOM. Because these constraints hampered T-Day planning, CINCPAC dispatched a message to the JCS on 16 November 1968. The more pertinent portions follow:

T-Day planning has progressed to include review of munitions management in a cease fire situation. Diversions of the continuing pipeline must be planned and rapidly executed. Sufficient latitude is available to CINCPAC and Service Component Commanders to redirect shipments of ground munitions. However, the constraints imposed...preclude the necessary flexibility rapidly to divert controlled air munitions.

Recommend that current limitations governing diversion of controlled air munitions within PACOM be cancelled at this time, or as a less desirable alternative, that such action be planned for release to CINCPAC immediately upon a cessation of hostilities. Diversion actions taken would be reported as occurring. Recommend JCS decision at an early date to facilitate orderly planning.  

2. CINCPAC 160518Z Nov 68.
The JCS advised CINCPAC on 6 December 1968 that his request was being deferred. "Air munitions requisitioned for SEA," however, continued the JCS, "may be positioned at any SEA location, when delivery to original destination would create overstock position and compromise explosive safety." In the event that immediate diversion authority was required and this action would involve locations outside of Southeast Asia, CINCPAC was to report these items to the JCS by quantity and locations involved. "T-Day planning," continued the JCS, is "currently underway to formulate policies and guidelines for actions which would be necessitated by declaration of T-Day. Receipt of your plan for air munitions would expedite planning and result in earlier decision on diversion authorization." As of 10 December 1968, actions were "underway with component commanders to redefine war reserve requirements. Upon compilation of these requirements, CINCPAC will forward recommendations to the JCS."

During November 1968, logistics planners of J4, Hq CINCPAC, held meetings with representatives of CINCPAC's component commands:

...to address actions required for munitions in pipeline upon announcement of cease fire in SEA. A proposed draft "canned" message was formulated for release at T-Day which provides CINCPAC action on munition ship diversions or reconsignment to meet priorities of fill within PACOM. Completed munition appendix to Logistic Annex, CINCPAC OPLAN 69-69. Revised J47 "Top Ten" action items for T-Day Planning. 

During December 1968, similar meetings continued. Logistics planners of J4, Hq CINCPAC, participated in a FREIGHTER CARGO Working Group meeting with PACOM component commands to discuss proposed changes to Annex F, OPLAN 69-69. As a result, the "Top Ten" ammunition actions were revised to include pre-T-Day, T-Day, and post-T-Day actions. On 9 December 1968, a letter was forwarded to PACOM component commands, as well as SAC, requesting air munitions WRM requirements and on hand quantities and storage status at PACOM.

1. JCS 7168/062247Z Dec 68.
2. Ibid.
3. J471 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
4. J473 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
sites—other than Southeast Asia—to "permit preparation of a CINCPAC Air Munitions Management Plan" and to "provide CINCPAC a sound data base from which decisions on diversions of air munitions from SEAsia can be made."¹

Realignment of USARV Ammunition Stocks

(5) On 18 October 1968, COMUSMACV proposed to CINCPAC "that the present USARV authorized stockage objective of 60 days in-country and 30 days offshore be realigned to 45 days in-country, 30 days in offshore and 15 days designated for and controlled by USARV stored in CONUS depots."² According to COMUSMACV, the following advantages would accrue as a result of the reduction in the in-country stock level:

a. Reduce T-Day retrograde requirements by 60,000 tons or twelve ships.

b. Ease storage and distribution problems in SVN.

c. Reduce generation of unserviceable assets.

d. Enable retrograde of unserviceable and current excesses during attrition of stocks to 45 day level, eliminating those requirements when implementing the T-Plan.³

(6) This proposal "was reviewed in depth, together with alternatives, during the ground munitions stockage level conference held in RVN on 13 Nov. Representatives of OSD, JCS, DA, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, USARV, 1st Logistics Command participated in the discussions."⁴

1. Ltr. BGEn John D. McLaughlin, USA, J4, Hq CINCPAC, to CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and CINCSAC, 9 Dec 68, Subj: T-Day Planning - Air Munitions; J473 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. Point Paper, J4713, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Dec 68, Subj: Realignment of USARV Ammunition Stocks; J4713 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
3. COMUSMACV 30914/180311Z Oct 68.
4. CINCPAC 150515Z Nov 68.
All concerned agreed to a two-rate system. As a result, CINCPAC approved on 15 November 1968 the "realignment of USARV ammunition stocks as follows: 30 days in-country at intense combat rate (rate of ammunition consumption experienced during the period February-July 1968); 30 days in-country at theater sustaining rate (rate of ammunition consumption experienced during the period August-October 1968 or May-October 1968, whichever is higher); and 30 days offshore at intense combat rate." In addition, the theater sustaining rate could be adjusted every six months based on the preceding six months experience. By such measures, the in-country stockage levels would be reduced by 39,000 short tons, munitions would be kept at manageable level, and the tonnages that would have to be moved under the T-Day concept would be reduced. Furthermore, such a solution protected PACOM in the eventuality that combat was resumed at the previous high level of intensity, thus creating unforeseen surge requirements.²

LAMP Ground Ammunition Levels

(5) On 23 May 1968, following a review "of FY 68 actual issue," DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI submitted to CINCPAC his Required Supply Rates (RSR) and stockage objective levels for LAMP (Laos Ammunition Procedures) ground munitions.³ These rates were reviewed by CINCPAC, as they were each year. Computation of the new rates was based "on previous year issue experience and the Military Assistance Service Funded Program. CINCPAC forwarded the new rates to the JCS for approval on 22 June 1968."⁴

JCS Worldwide Reporting Instructions on Controlled Air Munitions

(U) On 25 June 1968, the JCS furnished a standard version of the Worldwide Reporting Instruction, which established standardized procedures required to accomplish the task of monitoring the status of

1. Point Paper, J4713, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Dec 68, Subj: Realignment of USARV Ammunition Stocks; CINCPAC 150515Z Nov 68.
2. Ibid.; Point Paper, J4713, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Nov 68, Subj: Realignment of USARV Ammunition Stocks; J4713 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 68.
3. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 8329/231020Z May 68.
4. J4714 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
controlled air munitions on a worldwide basis. Actually, the PACOM Munitions Report had been transmitted to the JCS in this new required format since April 1968.  

Air Munitions Load for CVAs/AEs Departing Southeast Asia

(5) On 19 October 1968, CINCPACFLT advised CINCPAC of "CINCANTFLT policy that LANTFLT CVA's out-chopping from WESTPAC must transit with ninety percent of ammo allowance in order to maintain acceptable readiness posture during transit and to assume contingency commitments upon return to Second FLT OPCON. " Two Some of this ammunition, of necessity, included controlled air munitions. Since he concurred in this requirement, CINCPACFLT requested CINCPAC's concurrence also. CINCPAC replied on 27 October 1968:

In and out-chopping of CVA's are considered temporary exchanges of assets, and not a diversion of controlled munitions. Exceptions, wherein numbers of controlled munitions to be transferred back to LANTFLT are in excess of those received will be treated on an individual basis.  

(5) Early the next month, on 5 November, CINCPACFLT further requested "authority be extended to permit PACFLT CVA's/AE's outchopping from WESTPAC to EASTPAC with a contingency load commensurate with a satisfactory munition asset status as determined by CINCPACFLT. " This request, however, "for blanket authority to retain ship-fill in CVAs/AEs departing SEA for EASTPAC and use of these assets for familiarization and training of air crews and ships company was considered a diversion of controlled air munitions from SEA, " and only SECDEF had the authority to approve requests for

1. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
2. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 19Z224Z Oct 68.
3. CINCPAC 27Z230Z Oct 68; J4712 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
4. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 050423Z Nov 68.
return of Southeast Asia controlled air munitions to CONUS. As for the case of LANTFLT CVAs departing WESTPAC with contingency loads of munitions and in-chopping LANTFLT CVAs returning to WESTPAC with a similar load of munition, such action had been determined to be an exchange of assets and not a diversion of controlled air munitions.

As a result, CINCPAC forwarded CINCPACFLT's request to the JCS on 27 December 1968 and recommended approval. On 8 January 1969, the JCS approved CINCPACFLT's request and granted CINCPAC authority "to outchop CVAs/AEs from WESTPAC with contingency loads of munitions."

MK82 and M117 Bombs for Southeast Asia

On 21 February 1968, CSAF advised that he was "staffing a proposal to OSD to increase production of 500 pound MK82 and 750 pound M117" and requested CINCPAC's "unqualified support through JCS channels of increased production rates."

He also asked CINCPAC's concurrence in the immediate shipment of the February over-production of MK82/M117 bombs to SAC, which CINCPAC gave on 28 February.

As a result of the increased sortie rate to 1800 per month for SAC, CINCPAC wired to the JCS on 26 February 1968, "MK-82/M117 bomb requirements for PACOM have been reviewed." As a result, he submitted increased requirements for these bombs on the basis of 1,800 SAC sorties at the preferred load mix to the JCS. Two days later, CINCPAC informed CSAF that he supported the planned U.S. Air Force production schedule and furnished a tabulation of MK82 and M117 requirements by users of USAF-procured bombs in Southeast Asia, with specific attention to SAC requirements under several different plans.

1. J4712 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. ADMIN CINCPAC 270223Z Dec 68.
3. JCS 9023/081936Z Jan 69.
4. CSAF AFSSSG 212209Z Feb 68.
5. Ibid.; CINCPAC 280351Z Feb 68.
6. CINCPAC 260212Z Feb 68.
7. CINCPAC 280351Z Feb 68; J47 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 68.
During August and early September 1968, CINCPAC learned of an actual shortfall of 30,000 MK82 bombs from the July and August production and a possible shortfall of 30,000 from the September production; moreover, the insufficient production of conical fins for the MK82 bombs had delayed them being shipped to SAC. On 22 September, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that "action be taken to insure that production of MK82 and associated components is maintained at scheduled quantities." In reply on 25 September 1968, the JCS remarked:

Corrective action taken to resolve processing problems which resulted in production shortfalls in Jul and Aug.

Production facilities have been geared to produce shortfall quantities during Oct, Nov, and Dec 68. Sep production forecast for USAF is... This forecast schedule recoups Jul-Aug MK-82 bomb shortfall.

Procurement of concial fins is again on schedule, with emergency procurement having been exercised to recoup previous shortfall.

Special CS Munitions Needs in RVN

On 3 June 1968, COMUSMACV told CINCPAC he had an "urgent requirement for 40mm CS grenade (B567)" and requested "immediate airlift 5,000 rounds subject ammunition shipped to Tan Son Nhat." The same day, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS his recommendations for the necessary increased production to satisfy Southeast Asia requirement, based upon an analysis of current requirements and availability.

"The ARVN approved rate for CS1 (K764)," COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC on 14 June 1968, "is presently 25 lbs per Div/day.

1. OOMA Hill AFB 202029Z Aug 68; OOMA Hill AFB 070341Z Sep 68; OOMA Hill AFB 122341Z Sep 68.
2. CINCPAC 222107Z Sep 68.
3. JCS 1339/252024Z Sep 68; J4711 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 68.
4. COMUSMACV 15961/031225Z Jun 68.
5. CINCPAC 032322Z Jun 68; J473 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 68.
6. COMUSMACV 17101/141103Z Jun 68.
This rate, however, "will not adequately support planned future operations;" therefore, COMUSMACV recommended that the ARVN rate for CS1 be increased to 125 lbs per Div/day. In a message to both the JCS and DA on 18 June 1968, CINC PAC supported COMUSMACV's request and recommended "early approval of RSR for CS1 to permit justification for increased allocation" and that "production facilities be increased to support SEA requirements, as well as that "the ARVN allocation of CS1 (K764) be increased to support operational requirement."  

Production of Selected Ground Munitions

"Analysis of current and future asset position of several critical munitions," CINCUSARPAC advised DA on 16 March 1968, "indicates scheduled production will not meet requirements of this theater." In the case of 14 critical items needed to satisfy Southeast Asia consumption requirements, CINCUSARPAC requested "immediate action be taken to increase production of above critical items to insure current and future ammunition requirements of this theater are satisfied." When DA replied, CINCUSARPAC was provided with the latest available information on the actions taken on the fourteen items. In addition, DA advised that necessary support was required in an early release of the request for additional funds. Accordingly, in a message to the JCS on 12 April 1968, CINCPAC concurred "in the CINCUSARPAC analysis of ground munitions requirements.... Early approval of funding for increased production is required to insure the SEA ammunition requirements are met."  

Allocation of 5.56mm Ammunition

On 1 May 1968, COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that the additional issue of M-16 rifles to ARVN forces, coupled with the initial

1. Ibid.
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 182137Z Jun 68; J4714 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 68.
3. CINCUSARPAC 11903/162336Z Mar 68.
4. Ibid.
5. DA 58212/210057Z Mar 68; J4714, History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
6. CINCPAC 120510Z Apr 68.

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issue of M-16s to support Regional and Popular forces, would require an increase in the allocation of 5.56mm ammunition. In a message to the JCS and DA on 15 May 1968, CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's request and recommended to the JCS that "production be increased to support these additional requirements;" at the same time, he recommended to DA Military Services Ammunition Allocation Board (MSAAB) that "the RVNAF allocation of Ctg 5.56mm Ball and Tracer be increased to support operational requirements and to provide initial basic load and training requirements as" requested by COMUSMACV.

Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL) in Southeast Asia

(U) This portion of the 1968 history, which deals with POL in Southeast Asia, is designed to cover only those topics not treated elsewhere. Chapter I of this history, for instance, discusses POL from a PACOM-wide viewpoint, and its narrative and accompanying charts, of necessity, treats POL in Southeast Asia as a part of the overall PACOM POL picture during 1968. In addition, scattered throughout this history are passing mention of POL activities as they affect MAP, logistics, operations, etc.

POL Support to Southeast Asia

(S) During 1968, POL support to Southeast Asia "continued to be the biggest area of interest and attention in the operations of the Joint Petroleum Office" (J44), Hq CINCPAC. As in the previous year, CINCPAC's goal throughout 1968 was 'to provide tankage (military and commercial) for storing the equivalent of 30 days' POL consumption."

(C) The following is a brief overall summary of CINCPAC's POL support to Southeast Asia during Calendar Year 1968:

1. COMUSMACV 12352/010953Z May 68; J4714 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 68.
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 152320Z May 68.
3. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
... RVN consumption was 3.3 million barrels in Jan 68 and 3.4 million barrels in Dec 68 with a peaking period in mid-year when consumption averaged 3.7 million barrels for about 4 months. In Thailand, consumption continued to rise. From 1.5 million barrels in Jan to 1.8 million barrels in Dec 68, Thailand's POL consumption reflected the continued pressure of the air effort in SEA. Most of the increase in POL consumption in Thailand was due to increased SAC aircraft operations from U-Tapao Airbase. In both Vietnam and Thailand, the commercial oil companies (Shell - Esso - Caltex) continued to play a big role in the POL support of U.S. / Allied Forces in the theater. Offshore, the U.S. Navy 7th Fleet consumed approximately 2 million barrels of POL monthly in support of the SEA effort. 1

POL Lessons Learned in Southeast Asia from 1964 to 1968

(S) At the close of 1968, an in-house review was made by the Joint Petroleum Office (J44), Hq CINCPAC, of the lessons learned in Southeast Asia over the past few years in the field of POL logistics. 2 The months ahead in 1969, undoubtedly, will see much further study and evaluation of these lessons learned by the CINCPAC staff. However, since no such overall summary of the subject has ever been published in previous CINCPAC's annual histories, it is believed worthwhile to take the end of Calendar Year 1968 as a point in time of the Southeast involvement in which to depict the highlights of the lessons learned so far. The following, therefore, is a four-year summary of this subject:

In 1964, the POL System in SEA which supported U.S. Forces was essentially a commercial one. Through evolution, a very responsive, high capacity, bulk POL resupply system, stretching from Washington D.C. to the Arabian Gulf, has been implemented to support the forces in SEA. In 1968, the PACOM POL bill for bulk products was approximately $765 million and consumption was 172 million barrels, over half of which was jet fuel.

1. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
2. Ibid.
II. Background

a. There are certain significant documents related to POL supply and POL management in PACOM during the period 1964 - 1968. These can be considered policy references and are listed below....

b. The POL support system serving PACOM during the period of hostilities in SEA must be considered in its entirety, for in reality, any increase in POL consumption in RVN was usually accompanied by an increase in consumption somewhere else in PACOM due to MAC/SAC/TAC supporting deployments, increased bunkering of MSTS ships, and additional Navy Fleet deployments. Also, not to be forgotten are increased transpacific hauls on rotation and R&R.

III. Discussion

a. The POL system in PACOM has been heavily dependent on Arabian Gulf sources of Supply - especially for NSFO - JP-4, which have been the two single biggest POL products in this conflict.

b. The Mid-East crisis of June 1967 caused considerable concern to CINCPAC regarding the reliability of ocean tankers necessary to shift from an Arabian Gulf Source to a Western Hemisphere source.

c. The build-up of forces in SEA was accomplished in such a gradual manner that pre-1964 Commercial Oil Company capability could be expanded considerably to meet much of the increasing U.S. POL requirements.

d. POL facility construction in SEA was adequate to get the job done in-country, but terminal facilities were never completed (due to $ limitations) to permit fully cost-effective turn-around of resupply tankers.

e. Floating storage/terminal/tankers were prepositioned in SEA in 1965 and were moved to RVN waters as the military situation required. The flexibility offered by employing floating storage, and the attendant increased tactical mobility of major POL assets, were of very definite military value irrespective of cost considerations. Nonetheless, the requirement for afloat POL assets has been continually reviewed by CINCPAC, JCS, and COMUSMACV throughout the entirety of the conflict.

IV. Lessons Learned

a. Use of a Pull System vice Push System for bulk POL was revalidated.

b. Responsiveness and flexibility of the SAPO/JPO/DFSC system for managing bulk POL shipments was re-validated.
c. Use of floating storage during build-up phase and during tactical operations in under-developed areas was proven to be a valuable logistic tool.

d. Collapsible tanks (rubber bladders) of many sizes were used extensively under all kinds of conditions and found to be a very good method of POL storage.

e. Invasion pipelines were used in certain applications. Where they were used for ground products and limited quantities of aviation products, they were effective. Where they were used to supply airbases having very large POL requirements (i.e., SAC and MAC) it was determined that high pressure, high capacity, buried lines were much more desirable and reliable.

f. Financial accounting for bulk POL, down to user-level, was found to be cumbersome and impractical where tri-service military operations existed. Financial adjustments between services should be effected at the Washington level, or all POL procured and issued by one service.

g. The 10,000 barrel, bolted steel tank, while used extensively, was found to be not easily erected and not easily kept operational. A replacement for the "10 MBBL B, S, T. " should be found for use under expeditionary conditions. Either a prefab welded tank (with sufficient trained welders to erect) or a "Frame & bladder" design should be developed.

h. Packaged POL management authority is not clearly defined. In a sense it is neither fish nor fowl. The POL agencies in RVN and in Washington had varying degrees of interest in the subject but not direct control as the major portion of packaged POL was supplied via the MILSTRIP Requisition Processing System. Due to technical considerations.
perhaps packaged POL should be returned to the management control of existing POL control agencies.

i. Heavy reliance was placed on existing commercial POL product supply and delivery capability. This unique arrangement proved very effective and responsive.

j. CINCPAC established a construction policy for POL tankage in the combat area. This was deemed necessary to insure minimum essential facilities at the right places and to assist in compatibility of POL construction plans with centralized construction agency operations.

k. The use of bladder bag-equipped aircraft (C-130 - C-123) to transport bulk POL within the tactical theater of operations is considered a significant breakthrough in improving the logistic mobility of today's forces.1

POL Support to RVN

As 1968 commenced, PACOM logistics planners were confronted with three major items of POL concern in RVN; Cam Ranh Bay storage, Northern I CTZ receiving capability, and the receiving capability at Qui Nhon.2 Five months later, these items were still problems. The Cam Ranh Bay storage construction was "progressing but not nearly as rapidly as had been hoped."3 In Northern I CTZ, a leakage problem had arisen, and it was hoped that "the necessary repair work on the tanker discharge lines will be completed prior to the next NE Monsoon season."4

1. Discussion Paper, J44, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Dec 68, Subj: Lessons Learned in POL in SEA.
2. Point Paper, J441, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Jan 68, Subj: POL Support RVN.
3. Point Paper, J411, Hq CINCPAC, 6 May 68, Subj: POL Support RVN.
4. Ibid.
The T-2 mooring in the inner Qui Nhon harbor had been completed, but, until the dredging to improve the 26 foot draft limitation was completed, "uneconomical POL supply by T-1's or lighter-loaded T-2 continues to be required."\(^1\)

Meanwhile, by May 1968, the POL support to FWMAF in Northern I CTZ had "been tenuous in some instances and could become a bigger problem in the weeks ahead."\(^2\) Because of the deployment of additional troops to the Northern I CTZ, POL consumption there had increased to about 950,000 barrels a month. Moreover, the throughput capability was of continuing concern, because:

a. Receiving lines are not 100 percent operational.

b. Back-loading capability (loading AOG's and YOG's) is weak.

c. Distribution to inland supply points is heavily dependent on the road network.\(^3\)

\(^6\) "The need to keep the I CTZ POL system fully operational is of prime importance and requires continuing emphasis to insure that the necessary repair capability is to be allocated in-country to this vital mission."\(^4\) In May 1968, while tactical units were working to open and secure the road network, pipelines "have been laid to connect Northern I CTZ POL Supply Points. This will improve distribution capability. However, the problems of getting POL ashore remain and may get worse."\(^5\) Meanwhile, to alleviate some of the back-loading problem, a T-2 tanker was retained in Danang as a floating terminal, a necessary but very unprofitable employment of a scarce asset. "The receiving lines for POL are the life lines to our mobility within RVN," read a

1. Ibid.
2. Point Paper, J44A, Hq CINCPAC, 6 May 68, Subj: POL Support I CTZ.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
Hq CINCPAC paper that discussed the Northern I CTZ POL problem, they "must be kept operational." 1

(S) As late as September 1968, it was reported that the "POL support to forces in I CTZ has been tenuous in certain locales lately and could reoccur due to the impact of monsoons." 2 The northeast monsoon season, which lasts from September through April, creates a difficult problem "of getting POL ashore in the I CTZ," since the "heavy surf makes undersea POL discharge lines hard to use and hard to maintain in working order;" yet, "there is no reasonable alternative to the continued use of these lines." 3 Not only does the weather during this monsoon period impede road transportation, thus compounding the problem, but sometime even the large MSTs tankers can not be moved, which "reduces inventories and also necessitates changes to the normal I CTZ distribution patterns." 4

(S) Supplying POL to FWMAF in Vietnam "has grown from a small commercial undertaking in 1963 to a giant military/commercial system today." 5 From the first introduction of U.S. forces into RVN, POL consumption has risen steadily, reaching a level in early December 1968 of "4 million barrels per month. In addition, the Thai-based aircraft consume about 1.8 million barrels each month, and the Navy and USAF Forces in the Philippines consume 2.6 million barrels per month (including Navy Fleet Oilers). Thus direct Southeast Asia military operations currently require 8.4 million barrels of POL costing $39 million each month." 6

1. Ibid.
2. Point Paper, J441, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Sep 68, Subj: POL Support I CTZ.
3. Point Paper, J4411, Hq CINCPAC, 31 Jul 68, Subj: POL Support RVN.
4. Point Paper, J441, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Sep 68, Subj: POL Support I CTZ.
5. Point Paper, J4411, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: POL Support RVN.
6. Ibid.; see the following source for slightly different figures and costs: Point Paper, J4411, Hq CINCPAC, 31 Jul 68, Subj: POL Support RVN.
During 1968, the POL supply in RVN was handled through the use of existing commercial facilities, supplemented by military construction. In December 1968, the U.S. was using about 1.1 million barrels of commercial tankage—located principally in the Saigon, Danang, and Nha Trang areas—and about 2.5 million barrels of military constructed tankage. Moreover, an additional 1/2 million barrels of storage was under construction at various locations in South Vietnam.

CINCPAC has authorized POL storage in RVN in amounts equivalent to 30 days of consumption, and heavy emphasis has been placed on having a strong replenishment system. Thus, "there are minimal facilities to guard (or lose to enemy action) and resupply is effected on a frequent basis. This CINCPAC Policy has proved to be a very workable one."1 Furthermore, for contingency back-up purposes, a T-2 tanker has been kept in coastal shuttle service in the waters off South Vietnam. Therefore, if a major terminal should be lost, this shuttle tanker could proceed to the location involved and assume the function of a floating terminal.

POL support has been a major element in the combat employment of FWMAF deployed in RVN and, as a result, "POL support in RVN receives close management attention by the CINCPAC Joint Petroleum Office and the Sub-Area Petroleum Office on the Staff of COMUSMACV."2 For in-country management purposes, the U.S. Navy has been assigned the responsibility for operating POL terminals in the Northern I CTZ, while the U.S. Army has been assigned this mission for the remaining three CTZs.

In his year-end review of Calendar Year 1968, COMUSMACV summed up the POL situation in RVN as follows:

a. Commercial and military bulk POL tankage for storage of military products increased from 3,259,000 BBLS to 3,739,000 BBLS. Dedicated commercial tankage, which stores approximately 30 percent of all military products, was reduced

1. Point Paper, J4411, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: POL Support RVN.
2. Ibid.
by a net 100,000 BBLs, primarily due to enemy action. An additional 700,000 BBLs of tankage are under construction or programmed for completion by the end of CY 69 to meet the RVN tankage objective of 4,557,000 BBLs.

b. During the first four months of CY 68 bulk POL consumption increased from 3,300,000 BBLs per month to 3,700,000 BBLs per month. During the period Apr through Oct the consumption rate remained constant and was the first significant break in the increasing trend which began in Jan 65. For the remainder of the year, consumption continued at 3,500,000 BBLs.

c. New facilities having a significant impact on POL operations include the Tan My/Hue/Quang Tri pipeline. This 45 mile line will provide a reliable means of distributing fuel to northern I CTZ during the monsoon season. The An Khe/Pleiku extension of the Qui-Nhơn/An Khe pipeline increased multiproduct fuel distribution capability in II CTZ and substantially reduced line haul requirements.¹

Additional T-1 Tanker for Service in RVN

(S) In the spring of 1968, the increasing level of hostilities in the Saigon/Delta area caused new problems in POL support. Traditionally, POL deliveries to the Delta region had been handled by commercial shallow draft tankers operating out of the Nha Be terminals in Saigon. The "recent attack on the Esso CRUSTACEA near Can Tho and on the Shell facilities at Nha Be, " however caused the commercial oil companies and the military to take "a hard look at the long term needs for and methods of delivering POL to Delta locations." ² The situation was further complicated by the fact that additional shallow draft military tanker capability was

2. ADMINO CINCPAC 030417Z Apr 68; J442 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
required at the same time to handle increased requirements in the
Northern I CTZ and to assist in the normal distribution in other
areas of RVN. Moreover, during April 1968, three of the five Army
Y-tankers in RVN suffered mechanical breakdowns, which necessitated
expedited repair action. 1

"In view of the urgent requirement to ensure continued Saigon/
Delta area and II and III CTZ coastal support," CINCPAC requested the
JCS on 3 April 1968 for their "approval for a fourth T-1" tanker to be
deployed to RVN. 2 On 12 April 1968, the JCS approved the assignment
of a fourth MSTS-operated T-1 in RVN, and CINCPAC sent two members
of the Joint Petroleum Office (J44), Hq CINCPAC, to RVN "to review
requirements and tanker distribution patterns." 3

POL Construction Projects for RVN

Because of the high costs—approximately $750,000 per month—
of floating storage/coastal shuttle tankers in RVN, the JCS recommended
on 12 April 1968 the early completion of in-country POL terminals then
under construction at Vung Tau, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh Bay. At the
same time, the JCS requested the "latest BOD for these facilities." 4
Four days later, COMUSMACV provided CINCPAC and the JCS with
the construction status of these terminals and the estimated Beneficial
Occupancy Dates (BODs). 5 As these facilities "are completed and put
into operation," CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV on 17 April 1968, "the
need for floating storage/coastal shuttle tankers will be re-evaluated." 6

1. Ibid.; COMNAVFORV SGN 101101Z Apr 68; CINCUSARPAC
   17290/230330Z Apr 68.
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 030417Z Apr 68.
3. J442 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68; JCS 6248/
   121517Z Apr 68; CINCPAC 300412Z Apr 68.
4. JCS 6248/121517Z Apr 68.
5. COMUSMACV 10755/160731Z Apr 68.
6. CINCPAC 170428Z Apr 68; J4411 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the
   month of Apr 68.
POL Support to RVNAF

(5) As of December 1968, the RVNAF had its own POL distribution systems and, in general, was supported by the commercial terminals in RVN, although sometimes the U.S. systems were used during tactical operations. With the increase of the RVNAF's inventory of fuel-burning equipment aircraft, especially through modernization, however, a need for more Vietnamese POL depots would develop. Consequently, a very great need would also develop for experienced POL personnel to insure quality control of aviation fuel in order to protect the large U.S. investment in aviation equipment. Therefore, to insure safe aviation operations in the early stages of any American withdrawal, the U.S. would have to continue operating POL systems for an interim period. 1

(5) At present, T-Day planning envisions U.S. petroleum capabilities at Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and the Saigon area. In addition, considerable commercial capability will still exist at Saigon, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Danang. Although the level of POL requirements for a million-man RVNAF can not be estimated with precision in advance, there will be good facilities left in Vietnam for use by the RVNAF. Probably, the greatest difficulty will be in training RVNAF personnel to utilize the existing facilities in a careful enough fashion to retain the quality of the fuel and to maintain necessary safety precautions. 2

POL Pipeline Between Sattahip and U-Tapao, Thailand

(5) On 7 May 1968, CINCPAC identified a potential problem area in the POL support to U-Tapao, Thailand. With increasing POL consumption, it had become apparent that the limiting factor in POL resupply would be the capability to transfer fuel from the ocean terminal at Sattahip to the airbase at U-Tapao via pipeline. Since additional pipeline capability would soon be required, the throughput capability for JP-4 was causing increasing concern to CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCSAC, and COMUSMACTHAI. Under plans calling for an additional bed-down of B-52s at U-Tapao, the single existing POL line would have to operate

1. Point Paper, J4411, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: POL Support RVNAF.
2. Ibid.
at its maximum daily level without any flexibility, if the planned sortie rates were to be accomplished. As a result, CINCPACAF, since the USAF was the only service having fundings for B-52 upgrading at U-Tapao, agreed with CINCPAC's suggestion to program a second petroleum transfer line by reprogramming funds within the FY 68 Service Military Construction Program (SMCP), and CINCPAC supported this reprogramming action on 13 July 1968. By mid-September, however, word had been received at Hq CINCPAC that the pipeline project had been deleted from the reprogramming request at the OSD level. Accordingly, CINCPAC asked CSAF on 17 September 1968 for information on the status of the project, while COMUSMACHTAI, CINCSAC, and CINCPACAF emphasized the need for this additional POL capability. In the end, a CSAF-dispatched team arrived in Hawaii on 2 October 1968 and met with POL staff officers from Hqs CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, and CINCUSARPAC to develop additional justification for the pipeline in order to support a CSAF reclama action to OSD. 1

(5) On 31 October 1968, CSAF advised CINCPAC that this reclama, which had been prepared and forwarded to OSD, had been denied; however, OSD had approved the construction of an eight inch, above-ground, temporary pipeline to solve the problem. 2 Since the Royal Thailand Government (RTG) had previously denied use of above-ground temporary pipelines, CINCPAC queried COMUSMACHTAI on 5 November 1968, "as to whether such a project would have RTG approval." 3 COMUSMACHTAI replied that the pipeline would have to be buried. In December 1968, informal information had been received at Hq CINCPAC from the JCS, advising "that OSD had reversed their earlier position and will now support a buried, permanent pipeline at Sattahip." 4

2. CSAF AFOCELB 312255Z Oct 68; Point Paper, J4411, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: POL Facilities at Sattahip; J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 68.
3. CINCPAC 052200Z Nov 68.
SECTION X - ACTION TAKEN TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

(U) ...we must anticipate that North Korea's aggressive activities, both along the demilitarized zone and further south, will persist and perhaps intensify in the months ahead.

The North Koreans are fully aware that as the Republic of Korea grows stronger, their chances of achieving control over the entire peninsula diminish.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara

(U) In 1967, one section of the CINCPAC Command History was devoted for the first time to the coverage of events that took place within the Republic of Korea (ROK) and those external pressures which had a direct impact, and to a lesser extent, those which had an indirect impact on the ROK. The coverage this year will be the same as in 1967. A brief account of the increased North Korean pressure will be included in this section, and the MAP will be included in Chapter II.

The North Korean Threat

North Korean-instigated incidents in the DMZ increased tenfold in 1967 over 1966 - 445 to 44. The number of agents and collaborators captured or killed in 1967 rose to 470 as opposed to 204 in 1966. This increasing pressure on the ROK by North Korea was expected to continue in 1968. Predictably, it did. On 21 January, a group of 31 North Korean agents attempted to attack the "Blue House" and kill President Chung Hee Park and to "shoot to death" other key personnel. Two days later, the USS PUEBLO was captured by North Korea in international waters. The die was cast for 1968 and before the year was over North

Korea had instigated 542 incidents in the DMZ and 334 of North Korean infiltrators had been killed or captured. 1 (See following charts for monthly tabulation of DMZ incidents and agents-collaborators apprehended or neutralized.)

North Korea Unconventional Capability

(S) It is estimated that North Korea had a pool of 2,000 specially trained agents available for subversive operations. These agents are trained in both small, 3 to 7-man groups and in platoon-sized units up to 30 men each. In addition to these 2,000 agents, North Korea has a special forces-type brigade consisting of approximately 9,000 personnel who could be infiltrated by boat or by foot through the DMZ. Most agent teams have had little success in their subversive missions thus far. Nearly all infiltrators have been either captured or killed as a result of effective ROK counter-agent operations and a very cooperative local populace. 2 Nevertheless, the North Korean capability to conduct unconventional warfare is increasing steadily. Evidence indicates that they are planning to construct better, faster and more agent boats and this, in turn, indicates that sea infiltration will constitute the largest slice of the unconventional effort. 3

(S) It is expected that the North Korean program will include air drop by light transport or helicopter on a small scale. Also, they have the capability to conduct piston-type operations along the DMZ at any time. All evidence indicates that unconventional forces are receiving increased emphasis. 4

(S) In 1968, the North Koreans made an accelerated drive of subversion and terror in what might be a "North Korean decisive drive to establish a viable infrastructure of revolution in the south. Increasingly more aggressive actions were initiated along the DMZ and in the ROK rear areas." The high level of North Korean disruptive activity continued into the winter months for the first time. Evidence collected during 1968

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1. CG 8th Army 061035Z Jan 69.
2. Point Paper, J2216, Hq CINCPAC, 27 May 68, Subj: Guerrilla Agents Infiltration into South Korea.
3. CINCPAC 190458Z Dec 68.
4. Ibid.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DMZ Incidents 1968*</th>
<th>Agent Apprehension-Neutralization 1968</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>Jun</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>47</td>
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<td>Aug</td>
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<td>88</td>
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<td>Oct</td>
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<td>Nov</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Between the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and the Civilian Control Line (CCL).

Source: CG 8th U.S. Army 061035Z Jan 69.
### North Korean Infiltrators Killed-Captured 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone*</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Captured</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>321</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>334</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*I - DMZ; II - tactical area between CCL and I Corps (Gp) - FROKA rear boundary; III - rear area (south of tactical area).

### Agents and Collaborators Apprehended-Neutralized 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North Korean Dispatched</th>
<th>ROK Recruited</th>
<th>Jap. Disp. Chosen Soren</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subversive</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Espionage</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Assassination</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Courier</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Undetermined</td>
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<td>294</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collaborator</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>330</strong></td>
<td><strong>183</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>541</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CG 8th U.S. Army 061035Z Jan 69.
indicated North Korea was "attempting to foment revolution in the South via an emerging Korean-style 'Vietnam Strategy'." In consonance with this evaluation was North Korea's pledge of "support" to the "southern revolution."¹

**Conventional Capabilities**

(5) North Korea made steady progress in air defense with an increase in Soviet-furnished high performance fighters, SAMs and air defense radars. Also in 1968, there was an emerging offensive naval capability "in the increasing numbers of STYX-equipped guided missile patrol boats." Parallel improvement in ground forces was less discernible; however, ground forces in being were in a high state of readiness. North Korea could "attack with little or no warning but it is doubtful if it could sustain an offensive for more than a few weeks or penetrate ROK territory deeply." To wage another "Korean" war, North Korea would have to have outside help from the USSR and or Red China.²

(5) Communist China and North Korea have the capability of attacking South Korea during winter conditions with a total combat force of 59 combat divisions. The logistic complexes of Northeast China and North Korea will support a movement of 39 Chinese communist divisions to reinforcement points in North Korea within 11 days in support of 20 North Korean divisions attacking south. During the less favorable summer weather, the combined forces capable of participating in an attack would be about 38 divisions. By 1970, due to expected improvement in transportation facilities, it is estimated that combined force of 62 divisions could be available near the DMZ within 11 days in favorable weather. In air offensive operations against South Korea, a combined air threat of 300 IL-28 BEAGLE light jet bombers and 1,400 jet fighters is estimated with an in-commission rate of 50 to 60 percent on a sustained basis.³

**U.S. -ROK Capabilities to Meet and Deter Conventional--Unconventional North Korean Threat**

(5) In May, J2 developed a position paper for CINCPAC for use at the U.S. -ROK Defense Ministers Meeting scheduled for the end of May.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Background Paper, J2215, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Sep 68, Subj: Military Threat to South Korea.
In addressing the U.S. and ROK ground capability, it was concluded that:

U.S. and ROK ground force capability to meet a concentrated conventional NK offensive attack is constrained at this time. This constraint derives largely from the anticipated delay in availability of augmentation forces required to implement contingency plans for the defense of Korea and the inadequacies of the logistical support and communication systems to provide a proper environment in which the U.S. and ROK ground and supporting forces can conduct sustained and effective combat operations. In contrast, NK forces will be operating from protected and hardened bases; have extensive defenses, both active and passive; and are considered to have stockpiles of essential supplies and materials. Improvements to the U.S. and ROK ground force postures in Korea, including facilities, logistics and communications, are the subjects of various continuing actions.

In assessing the U.S.-ROK capability to meet the North Korean "Sea" threat, COMUSKorea concluded that the ROK Navy was capable of effectively meeting and deterring a conventional North Korean naval attack except that air force support would be necessary to enhance the ROK Navy capability to engage and destroy the North Korean KOMAR missile-equipped patrol craft and enemy submarines. J2 CINCPAC stated:

Periodic U.S. Navy air reconnaissance over waters adjacent to Korea assists the ROKN in deterring the NKN threat. Such U.S. patrols have been effective in detecting enemy agent boats and prosecuting unidentified submarine

1. Position Paper, J2216, Hq CINCPAC, 29 May 68, Part VIIA, Subj: US/ROK Capability to meet and Deter Conventional North Korean Threat-Sea; CINCPAC 250656Z Sep 68. The position developed by J2 was accepted by CINCPAC and included in cited message to the JCS.
2. Ibid. Part VIIB (Sea).
contacts. Moreover, the ROKN has demonstrated the capability of successfully detecting and tracking submarines. With an increasing threat, suitable assets of the U.S. Seventh Fleet could be deployed to Korean waters to act as the major deterrent force.

In the event of overt major NK aggression, U.S. Seventh Fleet units would operate in defense of South Korea and could conduct offensive mine warfare and strike operations against NK targets.

Factors which limited the U.S.-ROK capability to meet the North Korean "Air" threat included:

a. Shortage of jet-capable airfields for adequate dispersal of aircraft.

b. Lack of MAP funds to provide ROK with sufficient resources for both force modernization and infrastructure improvements.

c. U.S. and ROK airfields are highly vulnerable to strafing attacks. Additional shelters for U.S. and ROK aircraft are required, as well as air defense weapons for air base defense.

d. Facilities on ROKAF air bases are inadequate for sustained operations.

e. Although improvements are being made for aircraft control and warning, the system is limited since it is manual; the ROKAF air defense communications network is still considered marginal; and additional facilities are required to fill existing gaps in present radar coverage, to include extending low altitude coverage off the West Coast.

f. Additional measures for base and installation security against infiltration and sabotage are required.

g. There is an inadequate ALOC network to support the ground forces.

h. Additional communications are required for fully effective command and control.

1. Ibid. Part VII C (Air).
i. In U.S. HAWK units, there are shortages in key MOS's, primarily in maintenance personnel of the middle management group.

j. A worldwide shortage of certain spare parts continues to degrade the HAWK System.

k. An urgent requirement exists for two additional HAWK Battalions (with DSU's).

l. U.S. NIKE units in ROK have a limited EW capability; and ROK AW units have obsolete equipment.

m. Counterinfiltration reconnaissance capability is limited by a lack of suitable aircraft and associated equipment.

(5) In commenting on the above limiting factors J2 pointed out:

During the past four months a number of actions have been initiated to improve these capabilities. The completion of these on-going actions and additional improvements require priority consideration if we are to react effectively to a major NK provocation now or in the foreseeable future. Therefore, early correction of U.S. /ROK current vulnerabilities will increase U.S. /ROK air warfare effectiveness.

(5) In assessing U.S. -ROK capability to cope with NK raids in force across the DMZ and multiple guerrilla raids on facilities, J2 CINCPAC concluded:

...it is difficult for US/ROK forces to cope with raids across the DMZ. Such raids, in force would represent an expansion of North Korea's present probing and harassment activity along the DMZ. A raid in force would be the most feasible and likely course of action or logical threat that could be expected. The Blue House raid is an example of such an attempt. The results of that raid might have had

1. Ibid.
a sobering effect on any North Korean plans to continue
in the same vein. From a military point of view such
raids would in fact be counter productive to North
Korean overall political aims.

... North Koreans have a capability to attempt
to conduct multiple raids on US/ROK facilities.
However, because of South Korean security measures
such raids would have to be sharp, selective and
limited in nature and would entail great risk and little
chance of success anywhere in the ROK. To date
agent teams have had little success in such insurgent
endeavors. Most of their members are believed to
have been captured or killed as a result of massive
ROK counteragent operations and full cooperation
from local citizens. Agent teams have not been able
to survive undetected in cities because of effective
security and population control measures of the
Korean National Police. In rural areas strangers
are conspicuous and invariably come under suspicion.
North Korean agents often

Moreover popular anticommunist sentiment is very
strong. A combination of stringent anticommunist
laws and cash rewards both require and encourage
citizens to report all suspicious persons and move-
ments. With the establishment of the Homeland
Reserve Force there will be an even more active
involvement and interest by the local populace in these
counteragent operations.

Action to Counter North Korean Infiltration and Agent-Guerrilla Activities

(U) In 1967, ROK and U.S. forces placed increased emphasis on
programs designed to counter the unconventional warfare being conducted
by North Korea. A detailed discussion of these programs and activities
can be found in the CINCPAC Command History 1967, Volume II on
pages 948-959.

1. Background Paper for CINCPAC, J2215, Hq CINCPAC 12 Sep 68,
Subj: Military Threat to South Korea.
On 3 October 1967, the CINUNC-COMUSK, "Counter-Infiltration-Counter-Guerrilla Concept and Requirement Plan (CIGOREP)" was promulgated. The plan addressed three interlinked courses of action. These were: (1) increase U.S.-ROK capabilities in the DMZ and in adjacent areas; (2) increase capabilities to protect the seaward approaches and to thwart landings of agent teams or resupply missions on shore; and (3) improve ROK counteragent team capabilities in the interior to include better protection of possible key targets. The concept was to be implemented in three phases based on weather and the expected volume of enemy activity during the defined weather periods. 1

The concept for severely limiting NK raids or infiltration through the DMZ and sabotage activities in the forward areas involved the establishment of a DMZ security system comprised of five layers of defense in depth. 2 Within the second layer just south of the DMZ south tape a relatively simple defensive barrier system was to be erected. The basic concept of the system envisioned the erection of a chain link or woven barbed wire fence across the width of South Korea to hamper infiltration. This fence, which would supplement the then-current woven sapling fence, would be supported by manned positions along the fence and by back-up Quick Reaction Forces. Construction of the fence and supporting facilities such as observation points and bunkers continued throughout 1968 as well as construction of other defensive barriers. 3

During 1968, U.S. Army and Air Force units provided tactical and local security for critical U.S. military installations, provided advice to the ROKG on internal security matters and training assistance to ROK military and police forces. Additionally, helicopters and other transportation resources provided lift for Quick Reaction Forces and logistics support. Surveillance of the South Korean coastal areas and adjacent territorial waters was continuous. Korean naval forces established surface patrol stations, habitually covered by 25 or more ships and boats, and established 10 coastal radar stations. Army and KNP personnel conducted visual surveillance from numerous stations along the coast. In addition, U.S. Navy aircraft from Japan and

1. CINCUNC-COMUSK CIGOREP, 3 Oct 67.
3. Ibid.

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Okinawa randomly patrolled in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea and were effective in detecting enemy agent boats and providing early warning to coastal surveillance units.  

(6) Internal security was established on a province basis. ROK forces designated for this purpose included 10 counterinsurgency battalions (organized within the 10 reserve divisions - one each province), 23 specially trained Combat Police companies, and other National Police forces. Home Defense forces consisted of 1,670,000 personnel, 150,000 of which were armed by mid-September, were scheduled for an active counteragent role. Ten additional Coastal Security battalions were scheduled for activation. ROK reserve forces were given contingency missions of assisting internal defense forces when required.  

(U) Materiel requirements to support CIGOREP and a minimum force improvement and modernization program for ROKF is discussed in Korean MAP activities in Chapter II.

Blue House Incident

(3) Two incidents which gave impetus to U.S.-ROK countermeasures against the aggressive acts of NK were the Blue House and PUEBLO incidents which occurred in late January. At approximately 2300 hours on 17 January, 31 North Koreans, wearing ROKA uniforms and armed with submachine guns, pistols, daggers, and hand grenades, infiltrated the ROK through the 2d US Infantry Division sector of the DMZ. At about 1400 hours, 18 January, the North Koreans encountered and detained four local woodcutters. The North Koreans displayed Communist propaganda, praised NK dictator Kim, il-sung, and boasted that Korea would be unified in 1968. They claimed to be part of a 5,000 man North Korean Labor Party organization operating in the area of Kangwon-Do and Kyonggi-Do, ROK. Before releasing the woodcutters, the North Koreans threatened retaliation, if the encounter were reported. However, the woodcutters reported the incident to ROK authorities who later found evidence of the bivouac.  

(3) Both U.S. and ROK tactical forces employed road blocks and patrols in attempting to apprehend the North Koreans who had departed.

2. Ibid.
3. USFK Quarterly Historical Report, 1st Quarter 1968.
the camp at 2100 hours. Moving across rough country at the surprising speed of 10 kilometers per hour, the team outdistanced their pursuers and camped north of Pi-bong during the daylight hours of 20 January. From there they selected routes for infiltration into Seoul which offered good cover and concealment, primarily ridge lines which they could cross by walking along the upper slopes. During the night of 20-21 January, the agents moved to a point just south of Pi-bong where they spent the remainder of the day. Here they cached all supplies and equipment except their submachine guns and hand grenades, and departed on foot for Seoul at 2100 hours, 21 January.¹

(3) At approximately 2200 hours, 21 January, the North Koreans were challenged by members of the KNP while walking in column formation near the National Science Investigation Research Center in northwest Seoul. The police asked the lead man in the column for identification and he replied that they were ROKA CIC members and continued walking. The last man in the column was captured. One of the agents then threw one or more hand grenades at two ROK civilian buses. In the ensuing firefight, two ROK civilians aboard the buses were killed and two were wounded. A ROK police chief, one KNP, and four other ROK civilians were killed. One ROK Army soldier and three KNP were wounded. Throughout the night and into the day of 22 January, a series of firefights occurred between the North Koreans and ROK military and police personnel, including one within 800 meters of the Blue House (Presidential Mansion). Four North Koreans were killed and two agents were captured. One agent later committed suicide. The second one, Lt Kim Sin-cho, became the source of considerable information. Six civilians and two policemen were killed.

(5) Acting primarily on information furnished by Lt Kim Sin-cho concerning the team's exfiltration plans, friendly police and military units initiated search and blocking operations north of Seoul. On 23 January, 3 U.S. Army personnel, 4 ROK Army personnel, and 1 ROK civilian were wounded. In 4 separate encounters on 24 January, 4 North Koreans were killed and 1 U.S. soldier, 2 KATUSA's and 22 ROKA soldiers were wounded. On 25 January, 3 North Koreans were killed and 8 U.S. soldiers, 1 KATUSA, and 1 ROKA soldier were wounded. Between 25 and 31 January 1968, sporadic firefights occurred along the

¹ Ibid.
exfiltration route from Seoul to the DMZ. During these encounters, 15 North Koreans were killed. The body of one was found on 15 February 1968. He apparently died from exposure. A total of 27 members of the North Korean team were killed, one died from exposure and one was captured. Thirty-seven friendly personnel were killed and 65 wounded. 1

The PUEBLO Incident

(U) I am deeply gratified that after a long eleven months of totally unjustified detention by the North Koreans, the crew of the USS Pueblo have been freed. They should be reunited with their families in time for Christmas and I am happy for them that their time of ordeal ends on a note of joy.

I want to pay tribute also to the patience and courage of these relatives while their husbands, fathers and sons were held by the North Koreans.

The negotiations at Panmunjom were cruelly drawn out and I am grateful for the understanding which the Pueblo families showed through the long and painful period during which their Government has sought to free the crew.

I must express my deep sorrow over the death of one crew member, Seaman Duane D. Hodges, who was killed while endeavoring to carry out his duties during the seizure of the ship.

I also want to thank our negotiator at Panmunjom, Major General Gilbert H. Woodward. He carried out his difficult and successful assignment with distinction and has preserved the integrity of the United States while obtaining the release of the men of the Pueblo.

President Lyndon B. Johnson 2

1. Ibid.
2. Text of statement by President Johnson, 22 Dec 68, as reported by Associated Press.
The first indication of the PUEBLO incident was received by telephone in the CINCPAC War Room from the NMCC at 0510Z hours, 23 January. Shortly thereafter, at 0530Z hours, CINCPAC received a PUEBLO message with a date-time group of 230415Z stating that North Koreans were attempting to board and that MIGs were circling overhead. Prior to this, a message was dispatched from the PUEBLO at 0352Z hours, 23 January, which indicated that a patrol boat (North Korean) was circling and signaling; however this message wasn't received by CINCPAC until 0600Z hours the same date.  

Immediately after receiving PUEBLO message 230415Z, the CINCPAC staff under the supervision of LT GEN C. E. Hutchin, Jr., USA, Chief of Staff, assembled in the CINCPAC War Room to assume emergency-type duties. The following is a chronological narrative of the pertinent message traffic activity, including telephone messages, that transpired on 23 January:  

a. At 230515Z, the CG, 5th Air Force was requested by U.S. Naval Forces, Japan to support the PUEBLO.  

b. At 230558Z, CINCPAC was informed by PACAF that the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) stationed on Okinawa was directed to close Osan, Korea to be ready for operations at first light on 24 January.  

c. At 230617Z, CINCPAC was informed by FONECON from the NMCC that CTG 77.5 (USS ENTERPRISE) had been asked to assist if possible and that General Bonesteele in Korea would attempt to help.  

d. At 230630Z, PACAF informed CINCPAC by FONECON that the 5th Air Force had been directed to alert F-4 aircraft at Osan, arm the aircraft with AIM-9 to meet the MIG threat and prepare to launch to engage NK ships escorting the PUEBLO.  

e. At 230638Z, NMCC in FONECON with CINCPAC requested reaction of USS ENTERPRISE.  

f. At 230638Z, CINCPAC in FONECON with PACAF stated that F-4 strikes from Osan could not reach the PUEBLO in time to be of help.

1. ADMNO CINCPAC 240435Z Jan 68.  
2. Ibid.
g. At 230645Z, COMUSKOREA in FONECON with CINCPAC requested permission to release substance of PUEBLO incident to ROK should it be necessary to explain increased defensive posture.

h. At 230650Z, Mr. Walt Rostow in FONECON with CINCPAC requested distance of USS ENTERPRISE from Wonsan area and status of efforts to assist PUEBLO. He was given estimate that aircraft could not reach on time.

i. At 270718Z, NMCC in FONECON with CINCPAC wanted to know if COMUSKOREA had alerted any of his forces as a result of the incident.

j. At 230731Z, NMCC informed CINCPAC to notify all forces not to make a release of information concerning incident. COMUSKOREA was informed at 230750Z and all other forces were notified immediately thereafter. CINCPAC asked COMUSKOREA if he had increased his state of alert. CINCPAC was informed that COMUSKOREA had not gone to DEFCON 3 but had alerted all headquarters to review procedures. COMUSKOREA indicated he would move to DEFCON 3 only on further orders or evidence of need. Contemplating moving to DEFCON 3 but have not made final decision. Also informed that ROK Minister of Defense aware of incident by other means. This information passed to NMCC at 230820Z.

The above chronological narrative was furnished to the JCS in CINCPAC message 240435Z. In the same message the JCS was informed:

Initial reaction to report of PUEBLO incident was to mount fighter sorties into the Wonsan area. Factors considered were types, locations and capabilities of all forces, PUEBLO location, weather, onset of darkness, alerted-enemy forces, and probably enemy reaction. When these factors were assessed against actual times of events associated with PUEBLO incident, time of receipt of information by CINCPAC and force response time, it was readily apparent that the PUEBLO could not be relieved by any action prior to PUEBLO entering Wonsan.

Diversion of ENTERPRISE and repositioning of OKINAWA fighter aircraft was implemented not to relieve PUEBLO but to strengthen posture in KOREA.
PACAF reconnaissance aircraft were repositioned and ENTERPRISE alerted for possible show of force operations or photo coverage of Wonsan area if required.

(5) CINCPAC also informed the JCS that naval surface ships were not in a position to reach the scene of the incident in time to be of assistance nor could Army forces assist the PUEBLO. Available air units and their status were as indicated.¹

(1) OKINAWA - Kadena AB.

| 12 TFS   | 24 F-105 D/F | DEFCON 4 |
| 15 TRS   | 14 RF-4C   | DEFCON 4 |

(2) OKINAWA - Naha AB.

| VMFA 542 | 7 F-4B     | DEFCON 4 |
| VP-6     | 8 P-3A     | DEFCON 4 |
| 82 FIS   | 26 F-102   | DEFCON 4 |

(3) JAPAN - Yokota AB.

| 35 TFS   | 14 F-4C    | DEFCON 4 |
| 36 TFS   | 5 F-4C     | DEFCON 4 |
| 80 TFS   | 8 F-105 D/F | DEFCON 4 |
| 6091 RS  | 6 RB/EB-57 | DEFCON 4 |
| 6091 RS  | 10 EC-130  | DEFCON 4 |

(4) JAPAN - Iwakuni MCAS

| VMA 223  | 10 A-4C    | DEFCON 4 |
| VMFA 542 | 10 F-4B    | DEFCON 4 |
| VP 48    | 8 P-3A     | DEFCON 4 |

(5) JAPAN - Misawa AB.

| 356 TFS  | 14 F-4C    | DEFCON 4 |

¹ Ibid.
(6) KOREA - Osan AB.
Det 1 35 TFS F-4C
Quick strike alert.

(7) KOREA - Kunsan AB.
Det 1, 356 TFS F-4C
Quick strike alert.

(U) A chronological listing of messages relative to the PUEBLO incident can be found in Appendix II to this history.

PUEBLO Mission

(TS) USS PUEBLO departed Sasebo, Japan on 10 January 1968 on a naval surveillance and intelligence collection operation off the east coast of North Korea. The PUEBLO sailing order, as modified, directed the PUEBLO to arrive in the operating area on 12 January 1968 and to depart in time to return to Sasebo by 4 February, or earlier, if necessary, to arrive with at least 10 percent fuel on board. It directed the PUEBLO to conduct operations along the east coast of North Korea in a band 13 to 60 nautical miles off-shore between latitudes 39 and 42 degrees north. Enroute home PUEBLO was to attempt contact with Soviet units on patrol in the Tsushima Straits. Closest point of approach to North Korea and its off-shore islands was set at 13 nautical miles. Strict EMCON (Emission Control) was ordered except when under surveillance or after Soviet units in the Straits were not contacted within 24 hours of PUEBLO's arrival there. 

Chain of Command

(TS) The operation in which PUEBLO (AGER-2) was involved was part of a naval surveillance and intelligence collection program in support of high priority national intelligence objectives. Within the Pacific Command, peripheral reconnaissance is controlled and coordinated by CINCPAC through his service component commanders. Within the Pacific Fleet, CINCPACFLT has promulgated policy for surface reconnaissance

operations. AGER operations, governed by this chain of command, are finally directed by CINCPACFLT and implemented by COMNAVFORJAPAN using the task force designator CTF 96. While in WESTPAC, USS PUEBLO was under the administrative control of COMSERVGRP THREE and under the operational control of CTF 96 (COMNAVFORJAPAN) when on a special mission such as ICHTHYIC I, and under COMSEVENTHFLT at all other times. Thus the operational chain of command at time PUEBLO was captured by North Korean Navy was: PUEBLO to CTF 96 (COMNAVFORJAPAN) to CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC to JCS.\(^1\)

**AGER Patrols**

**Approving Authority for AGER Patrols**

\((\text{NS})\) Planning for AGER patrols starts with COMNAVFORJAPAN. Considering the resources available, and the intelligence requirements generated locally and nationally, COMNAVFORJAPAN establishes a recommended patrol schedule. For each specific mission of that schedule COMNAVFORJAPAN prepares and forwards a proposal for patrol in accordance with CINCPACFLT directives. This proposal is forwarded to CINCPACFLT for review and endorsement, who in turn forwards it to CINCPAC, who then forwards it to the JCS. Each mission must be approved by the JCS, then forwarded to CINCPAC, who in turn notifies CINCPACFLT, who then directs COMNAVFORJAPAN to either carry out the mission, modify it, or cancel it. COMNAVFORJAPAN executes the mission with a sailing order to the ship. As the operational commander of AGER's on patrol in the NAVFORJAPAN area, CTF 96 (COMNAVFORJAPAN) has the authority to modify or abort the mission at any time during the patrol, without reference to higher authority, when he feels the situation dictates. On at least one occasion (CLICKBEETLE IX) he ordered the USS BANNER to retire to a safer area.\(^2\)

**Prior Experience With AGER Patrols**

\((\text{NS})\) Prior experience in AGER patrol missions was gained with USS BANNER in Phase I of the program under the code name CLICKBEETLE in which 17 patrols were planned. Ten were conducted off the Soviet Union, 2 of which included a pass up the East Coast of North Korea and short loitering periods while enroute to station. Three patrols were in the Sea of Japan observing reactions to U.S. Navy ASW Task Group transits.

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
Three patrols were off Communist China.

Two patrols were commenced for Phase II, under the code word ICHTHYIC, but neither was completed since the PUEBLO was lost on 23 January and the BANNER was recalled the following day. Of the 16 patrols actually completed, 10 harassment/interference situations developed. There was 1 collision, 1 signal received "Heave to or I will fire," 3 closing situations with guns trained on the AGER, 2 instances where the ship was surrounded by trawlers, 2 instances of dangerous maneuvers and 1 of shouldering. In addition, on 4 occasions the ship was accused of being in territorial waters and once was requested to depart the area. There was no record of harassment, surveillance or interference by North Korean ships. ¹

Support for AGER Patrols

(TS) Support arrangements for AGER patrols fall into several categories. These include alert and non-alert military forces in two major categories, air and surface. The Navy provides both air and surface support and the Air Force provides air support. Surface support arrangements vary for each mission but may consist of alert destroyers several hours away from the area of the operation, casual support provided by transiting units, or a committed destroyer located just over the horizon near the AGER. This type of support is arranged for between COMNAVFORJAPAN and COMSEVENTHFLT. Air support from Naval resources is arranged between COMNAVFORJAPAN, who establishes the requirement, and COMSEVENTHFLT, who has the resources. It normally consists of support provided by transiting aircraft carriers. Air support of U.S. Air Force resources is arranged by direct liaison between COMNAVFORJAPAN and the Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, subject to final approval by CINCPACAF and CINCPAC. ²

Support for PUEBLO Mission

(TS) PUEBLO mission was to be conducted in international waters outside the claimed North Korean territorial waters of 12 nautical miles, the risk was deemed minimal; therefore, surface and air support was not formally requested by COMNAVFORJAPAN. Fifth Air Force Operations Order 307-67 was the Air Force basic contingency plan in effect. There

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
were no aircraft on strip alert for the PUEBLO mission. When boarding occurred no naval or army forces were in a position to assist PUEBLO before the ship entered Wonsan Harbor. The ENTERPRISE Task Group was about 600 miles away. The only armed aircraft of 5th AF which could possibly have reached the scene prior to darkness would have been Two F-105s were launched from Okinawa for Osan, Korea from a normal non-alert training posture in one hour and twenty-three minutes from the time the order was issued from 5th AF headquarters. These aircraft from Okinawa could not reach Osan, reservice and reach the scene of incident prior to darkness and prior to time PUEBLO arrived inside the three-mile limit of North Korea. The ROK Navy and Army could not have assisted. CINCUNC considered utilization of ROK Air Force aircraft to assist PUEBLO but ruled this out because of NOFORN restrictions, heightened tensions between ROKG and North Korea over the raid on the Blue House and UN Command implications. 1

PUEBLO Negotiations

(U) Apparently the North Koreans believe there is propaganda value even in a worthless document which Maj Gen. Gilbert H. Woodward publicly labeled false before he signed it.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk 2

(U) The U.S. and NK began negotiations through the forum of the Senior Members, United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission on 2 February for the return of the USS PUEBLO and its crew. During the first 15 meetings Rear Admiral John V. Smith, USN, was the Chief U.S. negotiator and Major General Pak Chung Ku represented North Korea. On 8 May 1968, Major General Gilbert H. Woodward, USA, replaced Admiral Smith. 3

(U) During the first 16 meetings very little real progress was made although a "substantial area of agreement" was reached. In the 16th

1. Ibid.
2. As reported by the Associated Press, 23 Dec 68.

TOP SECRET
meeting, NK asked the U.S. to agree: (1) that the evidence and confessions produced from the PUEBLO crew were valid and conclusive; (2) that the PUEBLO intruded closer than 12 nautical miles to the NK coast; (3) that the crew was engaged in espionage and hostile acts; (4) that the U.S. would apologize for these alleged acts; (5) that the U.S. would ensure these acts were not repeated; and (6) that the U.S. should request NK to deal leniently with the crew.

(U) The North Koreans maintained from the beginning of negotiations that they had the right to deal as they wished with members of the PUEBLO crew. In various meetings NK: (1) described the PUEBLO crew "as aggressors and criminals dispatched to North Korean territorial waters;" (2) asserted that "...our (NK) side has a full right to punish in accordance with our national law the crew members of the PUEBLO who...committed grave hostile acts;" and (3) implied that the crew might be punished. In carrying out part of North Korea's propaganda program, a spokesman for the NK Embassy in East Berlin announced that the NK Government, "will be compelled to try crew members of the PUEBLO," if the U.S. persists in not recognizing its responsibilities. To this and similar propaganda, the U.S. State Department announced that the U.S. would consider punishment or the threat of punishment to be a deliberate aggravation of an already serious situation.

(U) In all, 29 private meetings between representatives of the U.S. and NK took place; 13 during February-March; 5 during April-June; 4 during July-September; and 7 during October-23 December. At the 28th meeting at Panmunjom at 1100I hours (Korean time), 22 December, final arrangements were made for the release of the PUEBLO crew.

1. Ibid.
2. Point Paper, J5125, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Jan 68, Subj: Possible Trial and Execution of a Member or Members of the PUEBLO Crews (S).
3. Command Center 0730 Briefing Notes, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Dec 68, Associated Press Wire Service, 23 Dec 68; U.S. Forces Korea Historical Report for the 4th Quarter, CY 68. The USFK quarterly historical report stated that the final details were worked out at the 29th meeting on 23 Dec 68 rather than at the 28th meeting cited by the Command Center 0730 Briefing Notes. Both reports appear to be technically correct since Major General Pak, the Korean negotiator stated that the U.S. State Department had made an announcement at 0600 EST in violation of the agreement. Therefore, a new release date would have to be negotiated. Shortly thereafter, he announced that the crew would be released at 1130I hours, 23 December. It is assumed that the USFK report considered this 29th and final meeting to be the meeting at which the final agreement was reached on the release of the PUEBLO crew.
At 0900I Hours on 23 December, one of the strangest diplomatic procedures in "cold war" history took place. According to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the formula called for Major General Woodward to sign a statement admitting U.S. guilt but only after the North Koreans agreed to let the Chief U.S. negotiator publicly announce beforehand that the statement he was to sign was a lie. At 0900I hours, General Woodward signed the North Korean prepared statement and read into the record the following statement:

The position of the United States Government with regard to the PUEBLO, as consistently expressed in the negotiations at PANMUNJOM and in public, has been that the ship was not engaged in illegal activity, that there is no convincing evidence that the ship at any time intruded into the territorial waters claimed by NORTH KOREA, and that we could not apologize for actions which we did not believe took place. The document which I am going to sign was prepared by the NORTH KOREANS and is at variance with the above position, but my signature will not and cannot alter the facts. I will sign the document to free the crew and only to free the crew.¹

(U) The text of the statement signed by General Woodward as released by the State Department and reported by the Associated Press Wire Service is as follows:

To the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: The Government of the United States of America, acknowledging the validity of the confessions of the crew of the USS Pueblo and of the documents of evidence produced by the representative of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic, ... to the effect that the ship, which was seized by the self-defense measures and the naval vessels of the Korean People's Army in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on January 23, 1968, had illegally intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

At this point the text broadcast by North Korea monitored in Tokyo, differed with the version released by the State Department in Washington by adding these words:

¹ Command Center 0730 Briefing Notes, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Dec 68; COMUSKOREA 230610Z Dec 68.
...on many occasions and conducted espionage activities of spying out important military and state secrets of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Shoulders full responsibility and solemnly apologizes for the grave acts of espionage committed by the U.S. ship against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after having intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and gives firm assurance that no U.S. ships will intrude again in the future into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Meanwhile, the government of the United States of America earnestly requests the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to deal leniently with the former crew members of the USS Pueblo confiscated by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, taking into consideration the fact that these crew members have confessed honestly to their crimes and petitioned the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for leniency.

Simultaneously with the signing of this document, the undersigned acknowledges receipt of 82 former crew members of the Pueblo and one corpse.

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, Gilbert H. Woodward, Major General, USA.

(U) The release of the PUEBLO crew began at 1130I hours. As the crew crossed the Bridge of No Return (Sanchon Bridge) in the Joint Security Area, Operation Plan BREECHES BUOY was implemented. The Armistice Affairs Division received, checked, photographed the crew and loaded them aboard three buses and an ambulance. The crew was then transported to an advance camp south of Freedom Bridge in the U.S. Zone. The crew, less Commander Bucher, was then evacuated to the 121st Medical Evacuation Hospital, closing there at 1332I hours.
Commander Bucher arrived at the 121st by helicopter at 14081 hours.  

(U) At 15301 hours, 24 December, at Kimpo, the responsibility for the crew passed from COMUSKorea to CINCPACFLT. Thirty minutes later the crew departed Kimpo, Korea by two C-141s via Midway Island and arrived Miramar Air Station, San Diego, California at 1400U hours, 24 December, at which time CINCPAC responsibility for BREECHES BUOY operation terminated.  

U. S. Command Relations in Korea

(TS) On 29 January, CINCPAC defined for the Component Commanders, COMUS Korea and COMUS Japan the command relations relative to the then-current situation in Korea. Admiral Sharp reviewed U.S. support for the defense of the ROK since 25 June 1950 and pointed out that as a result of NK actions against the USS PUEBLO and against the territory and officials of the ROK, U.S. actions were underway to reinforce the Korean area. However, those actions did not constitute an implementation of OPLAN 27. At that time the actions were U.S. -ROK rather than UNC. After giving the above background, he admonished his commanders: (1) to continue to prepare for renewal of hostilities in Korea either under UNC or other alternative command arrangements set forth in OPLAN 27, and (2) review existing command and control capability with respect to Korea to insure that this capability was adequate for operation under CINCPAC, CINCUNC or COMUS Korea. 

(TS) Admiral Sharp outlined the command relationships in effect for the then-current situation: ...GENERAL: 

- CINCPAC exercises operational command of all forces assigned to PACOM. CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF exercise command and operational control of assigned forces.

1. Command Center 0730 Briefing Notes, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Dec 68; COMUSKOREA 231035Z Dec 68; USFK Historical Report for the 4th Quarter, CY 68.
2. CINCPACFLT REP San Diego 250017Z Dec 68; COMNAVFOR Korea 231515Z Dec 68.
3. CINCPAC 292242Z Jan 68.
4. Ibid.
b. Commander US Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA) is a subordinate unified commander under the operational command of CINCPAC.

c. Commanding General Eighth US Army, COMNAVFORKOREA, and COMAFLKOREA have been designated as Component Commanders for both CINCUNC and COMUSKOREA.

d. COMUSKOREA serves, in addition, as CINCUNC.

e. As appropriate, CINCPACAF will exercise operational control or coordination of any Allied intra-theater airlift forces as may be made available. Allocation of intra-theater airlift resources will be accomplished by the Chief, WESTPAC transportation office in accordance with CINCPAC established priorities...

f. CINCUNC exercises UN authority over UN operations in Korea. Directives to the UNC from U.S. Government, acting for the UN, will continue to be transmitted to CINCUNC by the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. The JCS also provide to the UNC strategic direction and guidance.

g. In accordance with the agreed Minute between the Governments of the U.S. and the ROK, CINCUNC exercises operational control of ROK forces. In the event the UN authority is terminated and the U.S. fulfills the terms of the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, operational control of these and other UN forces in Korea, with the concurrence of the ROK Government and the governments of other friendly nations who have forces in Korea, will be assigned to COMUSKOREA.

h. In the event of a renewal of hostilities in Korea and military operations are resumed by the UN, military operations in Korea will be conducted by CINCUNC and supported by CINCPAC. COMUSKOREA, as the subordinate Unified Commander under CINCPAC in Korea, will report to CINCUNC for the conduct of UN operations.
i. In the event of a renewal of hostilities in Korea and UN command authority is terminated or not invoked, military operations in Korea will be conducted as directed by CINCPAC through COMUSKOREA and PACOM Service Component Commanders; COMUSKOREA will assume operational control of such Allied forces as may be made available in Korea.

... COMMAND AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. The conduct of air defense in Korea will be in accordance with procedures and agreements coordinated between the U.S. and the ROK and the provisions of CINCPAC OPLAN No. 1-Yr, Annex I, Air Defense, and OPLAN 27-65, Annex C, ....

b. Planning and execution of air operations, other than close air support of UN operations (if required), will be accomplished through established PACOM Service Component Commanders: CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF. Continuing liaison and coordination will be effected between CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF at the component command and subordinate levels as appropriate.

c. Command arrangements for specific offensive air tasks external to S. Korea will be as directed by CINCPAC.

d. CINCPACAF, with approval of CINCPAC, has established SAF ADVON at Osan. CMDR SAF ADVON will exercise operational control of all PACAF forces deployed to Korea and will support CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA, as appropriate.

... COMMAND AND COORDINATION

a. As a matter of policy, U.S. forces will not be placed under the command of Allied commanders. However, this restriction is not intended to preclude the temporary direction of minor U.S. forces by Allied Commanders under particular circumstances so
warranting as mutually agreed by the appropriate commanders. ROK forces will remain under the immediate command of their national officers and will function as national units insofar as practicable.

b. U.S. Commanders will, through joint planning and lateral coordination in the accomplishment of assigned tasks, insure that their operations are mutually supporting.

c. PACOM Service Component Commanders will coordinate the support of U.S., UN and ROK forces in South Korea with CINCUNC/COMUSK.

d. Preplanned nuclear operations will be directed and coordinated in accordance with the procedures set forth in CINCPAC SOP for Nuclear Operations...

e. Naval gunfire support of ground forces, if required, will be coordinated through appropriate Fire Support Coordination Center(s) established by COMUS-KOREA in coordination with CINCPACFLT.

f. Command arrangements pertinent to CINCSAC operations responsive to the Korean situation will be addressed separately.

CINCPAC Oplan 27-69

(NS) The CINCPAC Oplan 27-69 is a unilateral capabilities plan for the defense of Korea. The plan provides for U.S. participation in military operations in Korea in conjunction with the ROK forces and such UN forces as may be made available in the event of renewal of communist aggression against the ROK. The plan addresses U.S. participation in renewed hostilities in two major situations:

a. Under the aegis of the UN. The plan is based upon the provision of the UN Resolution of 1950 and the Declaration of the 16 Nations relating to the Korean Armistice Agreement of 1953. If operations are resumed under the UN, CINCUNC will be responsible for the conduct of operations as directed by the JCS and supported by CINCPAC.

1. CINCPAC OPLAN 27-69, 28 Mar 68; this plan was an update of CINCPAC OPlan 27-65.
b. In the event that the UNC is terminated or abrogated, if the UN Resolution should be terminated and the U.S. and ROK agree to the fulfillment of the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, Commander U.S. Forces Korea as a subordinate unified commander under CINCPAC, will be responsible for the conduct of operations. In addition to U.S. forces, COMUSKOREA will exercise operational control over ROK forces and forces of other friendly nations made available for the execution of the plan.

CINCPAC Mission

(TS) CINCPAC's mission is to assist in the defense of South Korea by: (1) providing military forces to the UN Command and supporting the UN Command as directed; (2) coordinating the provision of logistic support for U.S., UN and ROK forces as directed; and (3) being prepared to counter aggression against South Korea in the event that the UN Command fails to function, employing such U.S. and ROK forces as may be available.¹

Concept of Operations

(TS) The concept of operations envisions the conduct of operations in two phases: (1) Phase I operations extend from initiation of hostilities until U.S., UN, and ROK forces are prepared to launch a counter-offensive. The objective during Phase I is to defeat the enemy assault on the ROK while protecting bases and areas, to remove or minimize the enemy capability to continue their attack, and to prepare to launch a counter offensive; and (2) Phase II counter-offensive operation to defeat communist aggression and to destroy or neutralize enemy forces and means of resistance on the Korean peninsula.²

Task Organization and Deployment of Forces

(TS) The consideration of enemy forces in the plan includes the recognition of the possibility of USSR and other communist countries participating in or overtly supporting hostilities in Northeast Asia. The deployment of U.S. forces in the plan includes JSCP-69 projected force planning levels available for countering overt large-scale CHICOM communist aggression in Northeast Asia. These force listings include M-Day forces, mobilization, and Reserve and National Guard units. U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force forces have been increased over those in Oplan 27-65

¹. Ibid.
². Ibid.
to achieve a balanced force posture with an attendant U.S.-ROK-to-
enemy parity level of firepower. This increase is summarized below:¹

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<td>Army</td>
<td>6 2/3 Div Equiv</td>
<td>9 1/3 Div Equiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(includes reserves)</td>
<td>(includes reserves)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>9 CVA's</td>
<td>12 CVA's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>2 Div (includes reserves)</td>
<td>3 7/9 Divs (includes 7/9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Div from LANTCOM and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>reserves); 2 Marine Air</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>22 Tac Ftr/Bmr Sqdns</td>
<td>40 Tac Ftr Sqdns</td>
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(TS) As indicated above CINCPAC considered that up to 12 1/3 U.S.
division equivalents would be required from Phase I. However, USARPAC
disagreed with this figure as a planning base and recommended a seven
U.S. division requirement. The plan when forwarded to the JCS for
approval on 28 March retained the 12 1/3 U.S. division equivalent.²

War Game of Oplan 27-69

(TS) CINCPAC, on 27 April, recommended to the JCS that the Joint
War Game Agency (JWGA) game the plan against the mid-CY 68 situ-
tional environment. CINCPAC's request to game the plan was prompted
by analysis of the worldwide U.S. military posture contained in JCSM-
221-68 of 10 April and COMUS Korea's belief that the scheduled arrival
time of reinforcing units shown is the JCSM was not realistic.³

(TS) Because of the possibility that the marked increase in NKPR
provocations might be a prelude to a renewal of hostilities in Korea,
Admiral Sharp recommended the war game be conducted on an expedited

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid; Ltr., CINCPAC, ser 000151, 28 Mar 68, cited in J511 History,
   Hq CINCPAC for the month of March 68.
3. Intv, LCOL John F. Bart, USA, J5116, Hq CINCPAC, with COL
   J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 8 Apr 69; J5116
   History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Apr 68.
basis and be designed to assist in strategic and tactical decisions in the current environment. The war game assumptions submitted by CINCPAC were:

a. U. S. Forces committed to Southeast Asia could not be disengaged and redeployed in support of Korea; ROK forces would be redeployed.

b. Combat level in Southeast Asia remained constant.

c. No further commitment of U. S. forces to Southeast Asia was required.

d. D-Day in Korea and M-Day would coincide.

e. Infiltration and insurgency level in Korea was at least as high as 1967 levels and might approach Korean War levels.

(TS) CINCPAC also recommended that the war game analyses develop:

a. Ability of U. S. and ROK forces to defend against surprise or limited tactical warning of NKPR-CPR aggression.


c. Capability of both the in-country and external logistics and C-E systems to sustain the defense and to build up to a counteroffensive level.

(TS) The results obtained from the war gaming were highly questionable because of the limitation discerned in the manual game model, particularly in the area of logistics and in the air war.

1. J511 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 68.
2. Ibid.
3. Intv, LCOL John F. Bart, USA, J5116, Hq CINCPAC, with COL J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 8 Apr 69.
JCS Comment on CINCPAC Oplan 27-69

(TS) On 2 August, the JCS advised CINCPAC that the situation in Korea required Oplan 27-69 to be cast within the framework of hostilities in Southeast Asia and provided additional guidance on which to base the necessary revision:1

a. Assume that the present conflict in SEAsia will continue at least at its present level of US commitment during the period of the plan.

b. Operations will be conducted in defense against attack of South Korea by North Korea, or by North Korea and the CPR.

c. The redeployment of ROK forces committed to SEAsia will be authorized.

d. A planned limited redeployment of US forces from SEAsia to Northeast Asia probably will be required, to the degree you judge necessary.

e. During the period of this plan, any major outbreak of hostilities in Korea, whether a unilateral North Korean attack or a combined North Korea/CHICOM effort, probably would result in additional selective mobilization of US reserve components. Accordingly, the forces included in...JSCP-69, can be assumed to be available for planning purposes as limited by....

(TS) The plan was changed in accordance with the JCS guidance and addressed two situations: (1) a "single contingency" which essentially preserves the previous planning philosophy and addresses the force problem as if there were no other hostilities in PACOM; and (2) a "dual contingency" which addresses the force problem with hostilities continuing in SEASIA concurrently with resumption of hostilities in Korea.2 The revision of CINCPAC Oplan 27-69 was issued as Change 2 on 2 December 1968.3

1. JCS 6249/021800Z Aug 68.
2. J5115 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
3. Ibid.

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In 1967, CINCUNC proposed and CINCPAC concurred in the establishment of a U.S.-ROK planning staff. The JCS approved the plan but withheld authority to enter into negotiations with the ROK pending a formal proposal by the ROK and a reply by the SECDEF regarding an increased manpower space requirement. On 14 September 1967, CINCUNC requested approval to enter into negotiations with the ROK to establish the U.S.-ROK Operational Planning Staff and also requested a prior commitment on the part of the JCS to support the additional manpower requirement. CINCPAC concurred and so recommended. Nothing more was heard on the proposal during 1967.  

The JCS, on 30 January 1968, notified CINCUNC and CINCPAC that they concurred in the proposal to initiate negotiations with the ROK to establish the recommended operational planning staff "for the defense of Korea against external attack including measures to monitor and detect infiltration." The JCS warned that "under present commitments to Korea, the United States has no obligation or responsibility for internal security," therefore, no such commitment should be undertaken in joint operational planning. The JCS message stated that authority to "enter negotiations...along the lines outlined above is pending action by the Secretary of Defense." When the SECDEF approved the proposal and upon completion of negotiations, the JCS promised to ask the SECDEF for the required additional manpower spaces.  

On 1 February, CINCPAC in a message to the JCS recommended that the issue "be pursued urgently as a U.S./ROK matter rather than a UNC/ROK" matter.  Nineteen days later the JCS notified CINCPAC that the SECDEF had authorized CINCUNC to initiate negotiations with the ROK with the guidance furnished by the JCS on 30 January 1968. Negotiations were to be in U.S. channels for a bilateral U.S.-ROK arrangement. The SECDEF deferred decision on the additional manpower spaces pending completion of formal negotiations.

2. JCS 8625/302200Z Jan 68.
3. CINCPAC 012140Z Feb 68.
4. JCS 1586/202047Z Feb 68.
(S) COMUS Korea notified CINCPAC that the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) had agreed in principle to COMUS Korea's proposals relating to the guidance, organization and operations of the proposed planning staff. The MND in turn proposed that the position of Director and Deputy Director be established in the grade of major general rather than colonel.\footnote{1} After studying the proposal CINCPAC requested authority to proceed with negotiations on the basis that general officer rank would be established for the two positions. This meant that a requirement existed for the U.S. to up-grade the position of AC of S, J3, USFK to general officer, USAF-07, (brigadier general) for concurrent duty as Director of the U.S. -ROK Operational Planning Staff.\footnote{2} The JCS granted the requested authority on 30 August.\footnote{3}

(S) In an exchange of letters during the period 30 August-3 September, COMUS Korea and the ROK MND formally agreed on terms of establishment for the staff.\footnote{4} In a message to CINCPAC and the JCS on 7 September, COMUS Korea informed them of the agreement and reaffirmed the requirement for 19 manpower spaces for the U.S. component and the necessity to up-grade the J3 position to 07. The manpower change request was submitted to CINCPAC on 18 September and submitted by CINCPAC to the JCS on 26 September.\footnote{5}

(S) The U.S. -ROK Operational Planning Staff began to function early in October when five ROK officers were assigned and two USFK J3 officers were placed on TDY to this staff. The mission and "terms of reference" for the staff was approved by the JCS on 30 October. The JTD for the staff was approved by the JCS on 10 December and the Services were tasked to provide PCS personnel by May 1969. The authorized strength was as indicated:\footnote{6}

<table>
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<th>OFF</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>CIV</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. COMUSK UK 52236/220508Z May 68.
2. CINCPAC 162328Z Jun 68.
3. JCS 07033/131852Z Aug 68.
4. USFKorea Historical Report for the 3rd Quarter CY 1968.
5. Ibid, citing CINCPAC 261830Z Sep 68.
6. Ibid, citing JCS 102202Z Dec 68.
Personnel Augmentation

(5) North Korea's increasing pressure on the ROK and the capture of the PUEBLO brought to the fore the requirement for additional U.S. personnel in order for U.S. combat and combat support units to be prepared to carry out their mission of meeting the NK threat. Untold man-hours were spent in determining and justifying personnel requirements - requirements that had to compete not only with Southeast Asia requirements but with worldwide U.S. requirements.

(5) CINCPAC on 29 July, as a culmination of actions progressing over 10 months, recommended to the JCS an increase 29,592 manpower spaces for U.S. Army Korea. Of these spaces, 8,500 were for priority space increases in combat and combat support units in-country, 2,393 were for other augmentation spaces, and 18,699 were spaces for additional units to be deployed to Korea.¹

(5) The JCS, on 7 October, in JCSM-612-68 recommended to the SECDEF that the U.S. Army, Korea manpower ceiling be raised by 8,500 spaces and that personnel be provided as soon as possible. The JCS recognized the requirement for 21,999 other spaces - 907 more than CINCPAC supported - to round out and modernize the two-division force, but indicated that the requirement should be viewed in the light of Southeast Asia priorities, NATO force levels, STRAF readiness and budgetary limitations. The JCS added a combat aviation battalion to the CINCPAC recommendation and substituted 2 CHAPARRAL-VULCAN battalions for 7 VULCAN batteries.²

(5) The outlook for a favorable response to the JCS recommendation appeared dim. It was doubtful that any ceiling increase would be approved and as of 31 December the JCS, CINCPAC and COMUS Korea--CG Eighth Army were awaiting DOD final action. The implications of a non-favorable reply by the SECDEF were several:³

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
a. Spaces for modernization of the Eighth Army aviation capability would have to be obtained by trade-off spaces from already seriously undermanned units.

b. The two CHAPARRAL-VULCAN air defense battalions in training in CONUS for deployment to Korea could not be deployed to Korea. Trade-off spaces for the two battalions would require the deactivation of a 7th Division brigade.

c. Without an increase in strength, forces in Korea would continue to be of doubtful capacity for sustained combat.

The biggest increase in authorized personnel spaces went to the USAF—from approximately 4,200 to over 10,000 within 6 months after the PUEBLO incident. Headquarters U.S. Forces Korea increased from an aggregate of 116 authorized spaces as of 31 December 1967 to 225 authorized spaces as of 31 December 1968. ¹

U.S. Air Force Posture in Korea

(TS) As a result of the PUEBLO incident, the JCS directed deployment of 7 tactical fighter and 2 tactical reconnaissance units to Korea. In addition, 26 B-52s and 10 KC-135s were deployed to Okinawa and Guam as part of the PUEBLO incident build-up under the nickname PORT BOW. ² The units initially deployed to Korea came from CONUS, Japan, Okinawa and Vietnam. During the remainder of 1968 various changes in the posture were made as a result of unit rotations in and out of Korea. A total of 151 USAF aircraft were in Korea at the end of the year. ³

(TS) During July several internal beddown changes were made to:
(1) provide for maximum consolidation of like aircraft at each base;
(2) simplify command and control procedures; and (3) provide for the best use of aircrew and support personnel. ⁴

1. J5 Brief 00232-68, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Jul 68, Subj: OASD Memorandum of 10 July 1968 Deployment Tables for Korea (U); USFK Historical Reports for 4th Quarter 1967 and 4th Quarter 1968.
2. See SAC B-52 Strikes in Southeast Asia (ARC LIGHT), Section II of this chapter.
4. Ibid.
On 3 September, the SECDEF notified the JCS that he proposed to withdraw approximately one-half of the augmentation aircraft from Korea. He stated:

The increased permanency which could be imputed to the augmentation force deployment with the passage of time and the acquisition of additional semi-permanent housing for Air Force personnel involved, could tend to limit our future freedom of action with respect to this augmentation force. Further there is concern as to the vulnerability of their aircraft noting that the aircraft shelter program will not be completed until about June 1969 as well as the relatively short distances from North Korean airfields, and less than optimum system of early warning and air defenses in South Korea—a situation not completely correctable with funds available at this time.

...... Request your comments and recommendations by 17 September concerning the advisability of withdrawing approximately one-half of the augmentation aircraft and associated personnel, as well as possible rationale for approach to the ROKG.

On the same day, the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on the SECDEF proposal and on 9 September, CINCPAC replied:

...the North Korean military capability has been undergoing substantive development and modernization. The result is that overall in-country, North vs South Korea, military capabilities favor the North.

Realization of this favorable balance of power and belief that the US power position in Korea lacked credibility are considered, in part, responsible for the increased belligerent actions which culminated in

1. SECDEF 8604/031547Z Sep 68.
2. JCS 8047/032146Z Sep 68; CINCPAC 090541Z Sep 68.
the Blue House raid and the seizure of the PUEBLO. The rapid US reaction in deploying Navy and Air units improved the credibility of US resolve and probably as a result after January, there was a lull in North Korean provocative acts.

The currently authorized 151 Air Force tactical aircraft in Korea continue to represent a visible, deterrent force. It is recognized that deterrence is essentially a psychological state of mind based on forces visibly in-being and the enemy belief both in the effectiveness of those forces and our willingness to employ them decisively if necessary.

Should a portion of these forces be withdrawn, it could well be interpreted by the NKPR as a weakening of US resolve. In recent months the North Koreans have again begun to increase aggressive activity along the DMZ. A reduction of US aircraft in-country would only worsen the situation and could very possibly invite further provocation.

Therefore the tactical air forces in South Korea should, as a minimum, remain at their current level.

Vulnerability of our forces is a factor that warrants consideration. It is recognized that the present forward deployment exposes US aircraft to some risk from surprise NKPR attack. This risk must be weighed against the added risks resulting from a reduced deterrent associated with any partial withdrawal of forces.

(TS) In providing comments on rationale to be used in approaching the ROK on the SECDEF proposal, Admiral McCain stated:

In the light of the current situation it would be extremely difficult to develop plausible rationale to

1. Ibid.
allay fears of ROKG that US lacks resolve or capability to sustain forces in Korea. There have been no indications of any basic change in zealotry of NKPR to continue aggressively to press for the basic objective of reunification of Korea. The USAF augmentation to Korea has lessened ROK concern over US interest and commitment and the North Korean threat. It is questionable that the ROKG would accept any explanation for withdrawal of US forces at this time.

(NS) Admiral McCain then recommended that there be no partial withdrawal of USAF units or personnel from the ROK at this time and that CINCPAC be granted authority to vary PACOM aircraft rotation deployments and to relocate aircraft to Korea, Japan, and Okinawa as required.¹

(NS) The JCS supported CINCPAC's position and on 31 October advised him that on 15 October the SECDEF notified the CJCS that there would be no partial withdrawal of the USAF units and personnel at that time but the air posture in Korea would continue to be "reviewed in light of all relevant politico-military considerations."²

Augmentation of U.S. Naval Forces in Korean Waters

(NS) At the time of the PUEBLO incident on 23 January, there were no U.S. Naval forces available or close enough to assist the PUEBLO. However, in response to the incident the USS ENTERPRISE, TRUXTON and COLLETT were on station by 0100 hours, 24 January (Korean time) in the Sea of Japan. By 31 January, the YORKTOWN, CANBERRA, PROVIDENCE, CHICAGO and several destroyers were also in the Sea of Japan. On 22 March, CINCPAC was authorized to reduce carrier commitment to the Sea of Japan to zero. On the same day, the TICONDEROGA and CORAL SEA with supporting forces were withdrawn with the stipulation that a two-CVA posture could be resumed within four to six days. U.S.

presence in the Sea of Japan was to be provided on a continuing basis by periodic excursions of CVAs and other combatant ships when operationally feasible in conjunction with port visits to Japan. ¹

Foray and Retaliation Activities

(5) One of the many problems of serious concern to the U.S. is the possibility of unilateral ROK retaliatory raids against North Korea in response to raids and other hostile actions by NK.

(5) On 3 February, General Bonesteel reported that President Park raised the matter of retaliatory raids and stated that for the "time being" none would be conducted; however, if the North Koreans pulled another raid similar to the "Blue House" raid he might have to retaliate despite the impact on U.S.-ROK relationships. Two days later General Bonesteel reported to CINCPAC that he had taken action through the Minister of National Defense to head off a "young Turk" foray in the form of a planned ROKAF strike against NK positions. ²

(5) On 6 March, the CG Eighth Army reported the ROK CIA had directed the 351st Detachment, 2325th Intelligence Group (ROK) to train and prepare approximately one company for retaliatory operations. Similar information was also received about the 606th Detachment and a ROK Marine reconnaissance unit. ³ On 16 March, ten ROK agents, upon direction of the G2, 21st ROK Division, penetrated the NKPR in the 23d NKPA Regimental sector in the eastern part of Korea. The number of ROK casualties was unknown. ⁴

(5) The possibility of such unilateral action by ROK was of such grave concern to President Johnson that he dispatched Ambassador Cyrus Vance as a personal Ambassador to President Park in an effort to allay suspicion and calm the "troubled waters." In commenting on Mr. Vance's visit, the CJCS on 17 February, indicated that President Park had informed Mr. Vance that he would not permit ROK retaliation against NKPR

1. Point Paper, J3 B42, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Mar 68, Subj: Augmentation of Forces in the Korean Area Resulting from the PUEBLO Incident (U).
2. Point Paper, J3 B31, Hq CINCPAC, 22 May 68, Subj: ROK Foray and Retaliation Activities (S).
3. CG, 8th Army 84810/060845Z Mar 68; CG, 8th Army 84812/060850Z Mar 68.
4. CG, 8th Army 85752/201007Z Mar 68.
during our negotiations on the PUEBLO and that he would consult with the U.S. before any unilateral retaliatory action. Whether President Park was aware of the ROK incident on 16 March is unknown.

U.S. Tactical Air Warfare Study-Korea

(S) On 6 March, the Deputy SECDEF requested the JCS to conduct a joint study to determine U.S. tactical air warfare requirements and force effectiveness in the Korean Theater. Terms of reference were developed by the J-5 Joint Staff which outlined the scope of the study:

2. J511 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of March 68.
3. Ibid.
The final report was forwarded to CINCPAC for his analysis of the report. On 26 October 1968, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS an analysis of the report which addressed certain issues related to vulnerability of the force, logistic and communications support, and the ability of the force to achieve air superiority within a reasonable time period. Except for specific comments relative to the foregoing aspects of the study, CINCPAC endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained in the final report. The study and CINCPAC's comments were reviewed by the OSD/OJCS Review Group. This review group deemed the final report of the Joint Working Group to be responsive to the terms of reference and provided a useful compilation of information on U.S.-ROK and NK tactical air warfare assets, capabilities, and requirements. The following is a synopsis of the findings:

a. Threat Assessment: NKAF is believed to possess 560 aircraft, including MIG-21s, MIG-19s, MIG-17s and 15s, and IL-28s based on 17 dispersed airfields. All fighters and some of the bombers are dispersed in caves and revetments. POL storage is hardened and dispersed. Air defenses include 42 SAM battalions, 94 EW/GCI radars, and 900 AAA batteries. NK air defenses have been strengthened over the past year and are still growing.

b. US/ROK Force Posture: US/ROK air forces consist of 151 U.S. aircraft, including F-102s, F106s, F100Cs, F-105s and F-4s; and 203 ROKAF F-5s, F-86Ds, F-86Fs and RF-86Fs. Other augmentation can be provided by aircraft based in Japan and Okinawa, or by carrier air groups operating on occasion in contiguous waters. US-ROK aircraft in Korea are located on six unhardened bases. (Since the study was completed, all aircraft have been revetted and some shelters have been funded and construction started). Air defense is provided by 10 NIKE Hercules batteries, 24 HAWK batteries, 106 REDEYE teams, 10 AAA batteries, an air defense EW/GCI radar network and a tactical air control system.

2. J3 Brief 00045-69, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Mar 69, Subj: Study to Determine U.S. Tactical Air Warfare Requirements and Force Effectiveness in the Korean Theater (U); JCS 1776/769-4 of 23 December 1968.
c. US/ROK Susceptibility to NK Air Attack: The study assumed that hostilities were initiated by a NK surprise air attack against US/ROK tactical air warfare assets. With warning times ranging from two to three minutes at Kimpo to 20 minutes at Taegu, US/ROK aircraft losses were estimated at 70 aircraft after the first wave and 110 aircraft after the second wave in an attack centered around aircraft on the ground. The study concluded that under conditions existing at the time, US/ROK aircraft, POL stocks and terminals, radar sites, communications centers, and surface-to-air missile sites were vulnerable to low altitude surprise attack.

d. US/ROK Air Operations: The study did not consider a preemptive air offensive against NK AOB. Initial US/ROK air operations consisted of air defense, a counter-air offensive intended to gain air superiority, and close air support. The working group concluded that US/ROK in-country and augmentation air forces would require significant increases to achieve air superiority during the early phases of the conflict. CINCPAC's analysis of the study suggests as alternatives

(TS) The study recommended extensive hardening, dispersal, and shelter construction to reduce vulnerability and enhance survival. It advocated improvement in communications, electronics, aircraft control and warning capabilities and survivability, and procedural changes in delegation of authority. CINCPAC recommended, and the OSD/OJCS Review Group concurred, that the national disclosure policy be amended to permit case-by-case disclosure of TS information to ROK to improve planning and coordination of new weapons or alternate means of neutralizing targets.  

1. Ibid.
Rules of Engagement for Korea

The rules don't make a damn bit of difference.
I would have done what was best.

Admiral U.S.G. Sharp

Events which occurred in Korea in 1968 prompted several special studies concerning the U.S. -ROK military posture and rules of engagement (ROE) for Korea. On 20 March, CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF to perform a detailed air defense study of Korea. The study when completed discussed the North Korean threat, the way it might be employed against South Korea, and the effectiveness of U.S. -ROK defenses against the threat. One of the recommendations in the study involved a change to the ROE for Korea. It was recommended that U.S. Battle Directors located at the control and reporting centers be granted authority to declare hostiles. The reasons for the recommendation included:

(a) Only four persons were authorized to declare an airborne object hostile: The Commander, Air Forces, Korea, the Vice Commander, Director of Operations, and Deputy Director of Operations, 314th Air Division.

(b) The current command and control procedures introduce unacceptable time delays against a surprise attack.

(c) A better reaction time could be achieved if the US Battle Directors at the control and reporting centers were granted the authority to declare hostiles.

As a result of this and related studies, CINCPAC submitted to the JCS a proposed ROE for Korea on 22 May and by late November 1968, the JCS had not approved the CINCPAC proposal. Therefore, an inquiry was made by CINCPAC to the JCS requesting date response to the proposed ROE for Korea could be expected. The JCS responded that coordination

1. Before a "Special House Subcommittee" examining the PUEBLO seizure, 17 Mar 68.
2. J511 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of December 68.
staffing between DOD and State was continuing and expected action to be completed by the middle of January 1969. As a result, CINCPAC concluded that approval of the ROE appeared indefinite. Therefore, in light of recent events in Korea, CINCPAC decided to delegate, on an interim basis, authorization for US Battle Directors located at the control and reporting centers to declare hostiles. CINCPAC informed CINCPACAF, COMUSKOREA and the JCS of the action on 21 December.  

On 22 May, CINCPAC submitted the following ROE to the JCS for approval:

3. Definitions.

a. Korea Area: For purposes of these rules, Korea area includes:

(1) Airspace, land mass, and territorial/ internal waters of South Korea and North Korea.

(2) International waters and airspace of Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea in or over which U.S. forces operate in relation to U.S. objectives in Korea.

b. Territorial Seas: A belt of sea adjacent to a coastal state three miles in breadth measured from the low water mark along the coast. However, in the states claiming over three miles territorial sea, the distance shall be observed for these rules as if it were the width of their territorial sea. The following are the claims with regard to territorial seas:

South Korea: 3 miles
North Korea: 12 miles
Communist China: 12 miles
Soviet Union: 12 miles
Japan: 3 miles

1. Ibid; CINCPAC 132237Z Jul 68; CINCPAC 222147Z May 68; CINCPAC 070336Z Dec 68; JCS 092209Z Dec 68; CINCPAC 210947Z Dec 68.

2. CINCPAC 222147Z May 68.
c. Internal Waters: Waters to landward of territorial seas.

d. Territorial Airspace: Airspace above land territory, internal waters, and territorial seas of a sovereign state.

e. Immediate Pursuit: Pursuit initiated in exercise of the right of self defense in response to actions or attacks by hostile aircraft or ships as defined in these rules. The pursuit may be extended as necessary and feasible into territorial or international airspace/seas as prescribed herein.

f. Friendly Forces: Includes all South Korean forces and all other non-U.S. air, ground, and naval units operating with South Korea and U.S. forces.

g. Hostile Aircraft:

(1) Any aircraft which is designated hostile by the U.S. Director of Air Operations Center, the commanding officer of a U.S. or allied ship, or their designated representative; or

(2) Any combat/combat support type aircraft in South or North Korean territorial airspace identified visually or otherwise as non-U.S. or non-friendly force; or

(3) Any aircraft observed in one of the following acts:

(a) Attacking or acting in a manner that indicates with reasonable certainty an intent to attack U.S./friendly forces or installations.

(b) Laying mines in the territorial waters of an area under friendly control without permission of the controlling government or laying mines in international waters which could endanger friendly forces.
(c) Releasing free drops, parachutes, or gliders over friendly territory without permission of the controlling government, and obviously not in distress.

(d) Landing personnel or material on friendly territory without permission of the controlling government of the territory.

h. Hostile Vessel (Surface or Sub-surface):

(1) Positively identified North Korean combat/combat support type vessels; or

(2) A vessel which is engaged in one of the following acts:

(a) Attacking or acting in manner which indicates with reasonable certainty, intent to attack U.S. /friendly forces or installations, including unauthorized landing of personnel or materials on friendly territory or in internal waters without permission of government concerned; or,

(b) Laying mines in international waters which could endanger friendly forces; or

(c) Engaged in direct support of attacks against friendly forces.

i. Hostile Ground Forces: Military or paramilitary forces identified as North Korean or North Korean allies operating within the Korea area that operate in a manner which indicates, with reasonable certainty, intentions against U.S. /friendly forces or installations, as follows:

(1) Conducting sabotage, demolition or mining activities against any installation or facility in the ROK.
(2) Firing of any weapon at friendly personnel or facilities.

(3) Ambushing personnel or vehicles.

(4) Conducting a raid of any size against any installation in the ROK.


a. U.S. forces operating in the Korea area are authorized to attack and destroy any hostile aircraft, vessel or ground forces as defined herein.

b. Immediate pursuit may be conducted as necessary and feasible, subject to the following conditions and limitations:

(1) In event U.S. forces in Korea area are attacked by hostile aircraft or vessel, immediate pursuit may be initiated. This immediate pursuit may be conducted into international waters or territorial seas or airspaces of South Korea and North Korea.

(2) No pursuit is authorized into territorial seas or airspace of Communist China or the Soviet Union. In the event it becomes evident that North Korean forces are using Soviet or CHICOM territory for sanctuary on a large scale, this rule will be subject to immediate review to determine the advisability of lifting the prohibition of penetrating the territorial seas or airspace of those nations while in immediate pursuit.

c. Declaration of aircraft or vessels as hostile will be tempered with judgment and discretion. Cases can occur wherein destruction of Communist forces would be contrary to U.S. friendly interests. Examples are: Communist civilian aircraft penetrating South Korea sovereign territory due to navigational error or penetration of Communist aircraft or vessels manned by defectors.

5. In the event U.S. ground forces are attacked by hostile ground forces, authorization is granted to
employ quick reaction forces of not to exceed a company-size force to counter an intrusion of North Korean forces under the following conditions:

a. Assistance to guard posts or patrols under attack.

b. When contact is maintained, quick reaction force with automatic weapons and vehicles, not to include tanks, may pursue enemy force into the DMZ short of the MDL.

6. In the event North Korean forces start hostile action, necessary counter-battery, counter weapon, anti-air and anti-ship suppression fires for self defense may be conducted.

7. Nothing in these rules modifies in any manner the requirement of a military commander to defend his unit against armed attack with all means at his disposal. In event of such attack, the commander will take immediate, aggressive action against the attacking force.
APPENDIX I
ROLLING THUNDER CHRONOLOGY\(^1\)
1968

3 January All air strikes within 5 NM of the center of Hanoi suspended for 72 hours. Suspension was extended indefinitely on 9 January.

14 January The CJCS directed CINCPAC to instruct strike commanders to: (1) execute strikes in the Haiphong "built-up area" only when weather permits accurate navigation and target identification, and (2) employ only small forces close in to Haiphong.

15 January CINCPAC in a message to the CJCS expressed great concern over the mounting restrictions on the RT program and requested relief from present restrictions, with no further impositions.

16 January Six targets in Hanoi area added to RT-57 list. A 5-NM prohibited area around Haiphong was established.

29 January Commenced 36-hour TET stand-down except for the DMZ and south of Vinh in NVN where normal LOC interdictions and attacks were authorized.

6 February The 5-NM Hanoi and Haiphong prohibited areas were canceled.

14 February Hanoi RR/Hwy Canal Bridge destroyed.

17 February Hanoi radio station was added to the RT-57 authorization.

21 February Hanoi Port Facility (Areas A, C, D, E) were authorized for strike by radar system bombing. Five other previously authorized, but unstruck, targets were authorized for radar system bombing.

3 March CINCPAC made strong appeal to the CJCS for an immediate step-up in the air campaign.

---

1. Prepared by CDR T. Barkley Wood, USN, J3A52, Hq CINCPAC.
6 March  Standard ARM (AGM-78)--an improved radar homing air-to-ground missile--was employed in combat for the first time.

13 March  Haiphong RR/Hwy Bridge was destroyed.

16 March  Kien An Highway Bridge and bypass were destroyed.

20 March  A 100-125 truck convoy was attacked in RP II, 98 vehicles destroyed or damaged.

26 March  CINCPAC enumerated to the CJCS the many restrictions imposed on RT forces and recommended that they be reviewed and eliminated, insofar as possible, to permit the execution of a fully effective RT air campaign.

1 April  Air strikes north of 20° N were discontinued. Unescorted photo and visual recce north of 20° N authorized at CINCPAC’s discretion. Primary objective of the restricted air campaign would be maximum destruction and disruption of NVN support of their combat forces south of 20° N.

3 April  CINCPAC requested clarification of rules of engagement regarding hot pursuit of hostile aircraft. Recommended that pursuit break off short of attacking an air base north of 20° N. The CJCS replied that pursuit north of 20° N was not authorized.

3 April  The CJCS directed that, until otherwise directed, no armed attacks would be conducted north of 19° N.

7 May  CINCPAC requested authority to counter the increased MIG threat by: (1) hot pursuit up to 20° N, and (2) employment of SAM south of 20° N.

23 May  TALOS missile fired by USS LONG BEACH destroyed MIG in RP-III, first MIG loss to U.S. SAM. PAVEWAY weapon employed for first time.

24 May  CINCPAC in a message to the JCS compared U.S. restraint to the VC/NVA increased activity in SVN and strongly recommended early positive action against NVN.
1968

14 June  CINCPAC in a message to the CJCS pointed out the extensive target regeneration, new construction and large concentration of logistic vehicles in northern NVN and strongly recommended resumption of air strikes, at least to 20° N.

19 June  CINCPAC made a strong recommendation to the CJCS to counter the increasing MIG threat by use of SAM up to 20° N, to include destruction of aircraft at Bai Thuong airfield. Authority to conduct SAR operations, to include fire support as necessary, to recover downed aircrews was also recommended.

13 July  CINCPAC in a message to the CJCS reaffirmed the need for the recommendations made on 19 June.

16 July  CINCPAC made a strong recommendation to the CJCS for resumption of the air campaign against NVN and that all restrictions be lifted.

17 August  CINCPAC presented to the CJCS a detailed chronology of an initial two day maximum air strike effort, in the event offensive air operations were resumed against NVN.

10 October  The battleship USS NEW JERSEY joined the SEA DRAGON forces.

1 November  All offensive operations against NVN were discontinued, effective 1300Z. Immediate pursuit into NVN territorial waters or airspace was authorized in response to hostile acts and in pursuit of a ship or aircraft that was operating in support of the VC/NVA insurgency in SVN. Supplementary rules of engagement issued the same day authorized naval gunfire and air strikes to silence enemy weapons which fired into SVN from within or north of the DMZ. Air reconnaissance operations over NVN were authorized which included the continuance of drone and SR-71 high and low altitude flights in accordance with current instructions and manned flights south of 19° degrees to begin no sooner than 3 November. Manned recce aircraft were initially to
be unescorted and withdrawn at any indication of NVN hostility. Search and Rescue and fire suppression aircraft were authorized to penetrate NVN territory and expend ordnance to effect recovery of air crews. If manned recce aircraft were fired upon, subsequent flights would be escorted with support necessary to protect aircraft and crew.

23 November CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that COMUSMACV be specifically authorized to destroy AAA and SAM weapons, installations, and immediate supporting facilities which fired from within NVN at our aircraft in Laos. The JCS reaffirmed authority for escort aircraft to suppress hostile fire against U.S. recce aircraft over NVN.

27 November JCS authorized destruction of AAA or SAM weapons, installations, and immediate supporting facilities in NVN south of 19° degrees which fired at U.S. aircraft over Laos.
### APPENDIX II

**CHRONOLOGY OF PUEBLO MESSAGE TRAFFIC - 1968**

The messages contained in the following chronological listing were either received or dispatched as indicated during the period 23 through 25 January. All date-time groups (DTG) are based on Zulu (Z) time unless otherwise shown. The same applies for time-of-receipt (TOR) and time-of-dispatch (TOD). Message precedent is indicated as F (Flash), I (Immediate), P (Priority) and R (Routine).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORIGINATOR</th>
<th>DTG</th>
<th>TOR</th>
<th>PREC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(1)</strong> PUEBLO</td>
<td>220915Z</td>
<td>230802Z</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: 2 NK ships sighted.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>(2)</strong> PUEBLO</td>
<td>230150Z</td>
<td>230815Z</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: 18 night contacts.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(3)</strong> PUEBLO</td>
<td>230352Z</td>
<td>230600Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Patrol boat (NK) circling and signaling.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(4)</strong> PUEBLO</td>
<td>230415Z</td>
<td>230530Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: North Koreans attempting to board - MIGs circling.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(5)</strong> 7thFlt</td>
<td>230606Z</td>
<td>230707Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Sending USS ENTERPRISE and destroyer (DD) to point off southern Korea (TG77.5).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(6)</strong> 7thFlt to CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>230700Z</td>
<td>230720Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: TG going to 32°20', 127°30' and hold.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. CINCPAC 240435Z Jan 68; J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 68.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORIGINATOR</th>
<th>DTG</th>
<th>TOR</th>
<th>PREC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(7) TG77.5 to 7th Flt</td>
<td>230716Z</td>
<td>230752Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Proceeding as directed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) USFK</td>
<td>230717Z</td>
<td>230743Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Reviewing alert status and considering DEFCON 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) ADMI NO CINCPAC</td>
<td>230753Z</td>
<td>230838Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to multiple addressees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Make no public releases on PUEBLO incident.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) TG77.5 to USS OBANNON</td>
<td>230830Z</td>
<td>230900Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Get underway to Yokohama.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) TG77.5 to USS HIGBEE</td>
<td>230845Z</td>
<td>230937Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Join TG 77.5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) TG77.5 to USS COLLETT</td>
<td>230847Z</td>
<td>230923Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Proceed to rendezvous.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) ADMI NO CINCPAC to PACFLT and PACAF</td>
<td>230908Z</td>
<td>231015Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Be ready to conduct recce from ENTERPRISE in Wonsan area. Position RF-4C aircraft in Korea.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) OBANNON to TG77.5</td>
<td>230908Z</td>
<td>231250Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Reference TG77.5 message 230830Z, expected time of arrival (ETA) Yokohama is 232230Z.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15) ADMI NO CINCPAC to JCS</td>
<td>230909Z</td>
<td>230946Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Have alerted forces to recce Wonsan area if required and authorized.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORIGINATOR</td>
<td>DTG</td>
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<tr>
<td>(16) CTF 96 to BANNER</td>
<td>230936Z</td>
<td>231145Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Return to Yokohama.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17) HIGBEE to TG77.5</td>
<td>230948Z</td>
<td>231411Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Fuel Status 60% - refueling to maximum capacity.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(18) PACFLT to 7th Flt</td>
<td>231021Z</td>
<td>231043Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Put DD off Wonsan and be prepared to provide air cover.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(19) PACFLT to 7th Flt</td>
<td>231037Z</td>
<td>231147Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Take ADMINO CINCPAC 230908Z for action.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20) ADMINO CINCPAC to CINCPAC</td>
<td>TOD</td>
<td>231132Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Status report.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(21) 7th Flt to multiple addressees</td>
<td>231126Z</td>
<td>231511Z</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Assignment of Carrier Division One as CTG 70.6.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22) FBIS, Okinawa</td>
<td>231126Z</td>
<td>231242Z</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Pyongyang account of incident.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(23) CINCPAC to ADMINO CINCPAC</td>
<td>231130Z</td>
<td>231139Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Keep me advised. Advise authority for moving DD off Wonsan.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(24) 7th Flt to TG77.5 231136Z 231224Z F

Content: Proceed to Sea of Japan. Send second DD to Wonsan.

(25) CTF 96 to JCS and CNO 231213Z 231330Z F

Content: Gives rundown of incident.

(26) CINCPAC to JCS 231352Z 232322Z I

Content: Recommends stern protest.

(27) CINCPAC to PACAF 231354Z 231633Z I

Content: Suspend movement of F-105 aircraft to Itazuke.

(28) CINCUNC to CINCPAC 231405Z 231454Z I

Content: ROK upset on reaction to this and not to Blue House incident.

(29) 7th Flt to TG70.6 231434Z 231635Z I

Content: Be ready to conduct recce. Gives rules of engagement (ROE).

(30) ADMINO CINCPAC to CINCPAC 231450Z 231524Z I

Content: States ADM Hyland authorized moving DD off Wonsan.

(31) 7th Flt to PACFLT 231456Z 231904Z I

Content: Summary of events.

(32) TG77.5 to PACFLT 231515Z 231654Z I

Content: Ships positions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORIGINATOR</th>
<th>DTG</th>
<th>TOR</th>
<th>PREC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(33) NMCC to CINCPAC</td>
<td>231629Z</td>
<td>231657Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Request armament configuration of F-105 aircraft deployed to Korea.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(34) TG70.6 to PACFLT</td>
<td>231635Z</td>
<td>231856Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Ready to operate at daylight.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(35) JCS to CINCPAC</td>
<td>231651Z</td>
<td>231730Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Wants chronological sequence, forces available, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(36) CINCUNC to CINCPAC</td>
<td>231657Z</td>
<td>231626Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: ROK stated CINCUNC preparations to move toward DEFCON 3 is over reaction.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(37) 7th Flt to CTF 72</td>
<td>231724Z</td>
<td>231828Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Be careful of recce near Korea.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(38) ADMINO CINCPAC to all Component Commanders</td>
<td>231820Z</td>
<td>231833Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Provide input for JCS 231651Z.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(39) SECSTATE to EMB SEOUL</td>
<td>231837Z</td>
<td>231858Z</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Don't postpone discussion of incident. United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) to bring up on 24th meeting.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(40) PACFLT to 7th Flt</td>
<td>231847Z</td>
<td>231901Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: JCS prohibits ships further north than present position.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ORIGINATOR</td>
<td>DTG</td>
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<tr>
<td>(41) TG70.6 to 7th Flt</td>
<td>231929Z</td>
<td>232212Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: ENTERPRISE &amp; TRUXTON maintaining 30°00'N 128°42'E at 231913Z.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(42) 7th Flt to TG70.6</td>
<td>232024Z</td>
<td>232049Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: To provide sea room, proceed all units to vic 32°30'N/127°30'E and hold.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(43) SECDEF to CINCPAC</td>
<td>232059Z</td>
<td>242156Z</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: DOD statement on PUEBLO incident.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(44) SEC STATE to AMB Seoul</td>
<td>232121Z</td>
<td>232148Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Gives instruction on protest to NKG.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(45) CINCPAC to JCS</td>
<td>232210Z</td>
<td>240518Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Recommend ships proceed 100 NM Wonsan.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(46) ADMINO CINCPAC to PACFLT, PACAF, COMUSJapan</td>
<td>232227Z</td>
<td>241035Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: No show of force. No aircraft or ships to reconnoiter or go to area.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47) ADMINO CINCPAC</td>
<td>232240Z</td>
<td>240208Z</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to CINCPAC &amp; multiple addressees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: PIC release on PUEBLO incident.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(48) CINCUNC to JCS &amp; CINCPAC</td>
<td>232255Z</td>
<td>240306Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: UNC action in event future NK attacks on US ships.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ORIGINATOR</td>
<td>DTG</td>
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<tr>
<td>(49) JCS to CINCPAC</td>
<td>232255Z</td>
<td>240003Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Confirms Gen Spivy-Gen Hutchin call on recommended courses of action.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(50) JCS to CINCPAC SAC, UNC, USARPAC</td>
<td>232331Z</td>
<td>232353Z</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: No show of force, remain 80 mi off coast. TG70.6 38°N.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(51) JCS to CINCPAC</td>
<td>232332Z</td>
<td>232353Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Maintain US forces in Korea at present levels unless we okay.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(52) ADMINO CINCPAC to CINCPAC</td>
<td>240217Z</td>
<td>240340Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Gives summary of actions and passes actions. McNamara's call and CINCPAC views to JCS.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(53) OASD(PA) to CINCPAC</td>
<td>240233Z</td>
<td>240515Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Questions &amp; answers--Washington press &amp; OASD(PA). Answers can be used to respond to questions by press.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(54) AMB SEOUL to STATE</td>
<td>240300Z</td>
<td>250213Z</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Talk between Ambassador and ROK Prime Minister.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(55) AMB SEOUL TO STATE</td>
<td>240301Z</td>
<td>240328Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Brief Ambassadors of nations in UNCMAC.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(56) ADMINO CINCPAC to NMCC</td>
<td>240318Z</td>
<td>TOD</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Gives ordnance configuration for F-105s deployed to Osan.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(57) 7th Flt to 70.6</td>
<td>240330Z</td>
<td>240500Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Can go up to 34° North.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ORIGINATOR</td>
<td>DTG</td>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>PREC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(58) ADMINO CINCPAC to Components &amp; JCS</td>
<td>240340Z</td>
<td>240415Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Operating instructions for U.S. Forces.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(59) PACFLT to CINCPAC</td>
<td>240347Z</td>
<td>240420Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Asks about embarking newsmen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(60) EMB SEOUL to SECSTATE</td>
<td>240350Z</td>
<td>240505Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: UNMAC has made strong protest. Will report NK reaction.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(61) ADMINO CINCPAC to Components</td>
<td>240400Z</td>
<td>240423Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Maintain forces in Korea at present level.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(62) PACAF to CINCPAC</td>
<td>240535Z</td>
<td>240544Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Suspends fighter move to Itazuke.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(63) CINCUNC to CINCPAC, JCS</td>
<td>240903Z</td>
<td>241022Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Translation of NK statement.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(64) 70.6 to 7thFlt</td>
<td>240930Z</td>
<td>241113Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: TF proceeding into Sea of Japan. Will conduct routine training in air operations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(65) AMB SEOUL to SECSTATE</td>
<td>240930Z</td>
<td>241624Z</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Press reaction to PUEBLO.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(66) 7thFlt to 70.6</td>
<td>241014Z</td>
<td>241151Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: May proceed and operate in Sea of Japan S of 38°N.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

SECRET

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORIGINATOR</th>
<th>DTG</th>
<th>TOR</th>
<th>PREC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(67) AMB TAIPEI to SECSTATE</td>
<td>241020Z</td>
<td>241501Z</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: States 2 Korean incidents are feelers. We should take strong action.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(68) CINCUNC to JCS &amp; CINCPAC</td>
<td>241242Z</td>
<td>241527Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(69) CINCUNC to JCS &amp; CINCPAC</td>
<td>241252Z</td>
<td>241315Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Does hold on force levels apply to increase in DEFCON or tactical forces.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(70) ADMINO CINCPAC to CINCUNC</td>
<td>241530Z</td>
<td>TOD 241558Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Hold force levels. Does not affect DEFCON.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(71) SECDEF to CINCPAC</td>
<td>241742Z</td>
<td>251140Z</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Wants recommendation on newsmen wanting to go on ENTERPRISE.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(72) JCS to CINCPAC</td>
<td>242125Z</td>
<td>242145Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Photo reconnaissance of Wonsan being considered.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(73) SECDEF to CINCPAC</td>
<td>250055Z</td>
<td>251116Z</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: SECDEF comments concerning propaganda from NK.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(74) CINCUNC to 70.6</td>
<td>250217Z</td>
<td>250547Z</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: CINCUNC wants to be information addressee on all 70.6 messages.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ORIGINATOR</td>
<td>DTG</td>
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<tr>
<td>(75) 70.6 to PACFLT</td>
<td>250403Z</td>
<td>250609Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: SITREP 28, Operation as before, DDs in company--Soviet trawler near.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(76) CINCPAC to SECDEF</td>
<td>250445Z</td>
<td>250541Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Recommends approval for newsmen to go aboard ships.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(77) PACFLT to CINCPAC</td>
<td>250637Z</td>
<td>250710Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Wants authority to photograph and harass Korean recovery of dumped equipment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(78) USFJapan to CINCPAC</td>
<td>250650Z</td>
<td>251027Z</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: GOJ inquiry into PUEBLO incident.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(79) CINCPAC To JCS</td>
<td>250952Z</td>
<td>251014Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Concurred with PACFLT 250637. Requested authority.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(80) AMCONSUL HONG KONG to SECSTATE</td>
<td>251011Z</td>
<td>251108Z</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Peking silent on incident. Gives Hong Kong press reaction.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(81) 5thAF to PACAF</td>
<td>251012Z</td>
<td>251339Z</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Reason why air support not provided.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(82) JCS to CINCPAC</td>
<td>251401Z</td>
<td>251637Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: USS BANNER sail as soon as possible. May position in area of PUEBLO incident with escort.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(83) CINCPAC to PACFLT</td>
<td>251817Z</td>
<td>251909Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content: Sail BANNER for rendezvous with TG70.6. May place with escort in area of incident.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORIGINATOR</td>
<td>DTG</td>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>PREC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(84) SECSTATE to EMB SEOUL</td>
<td>251832Z</td>
<td>251924Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Content:</strong></td>
<td>Try find out names of wounded and dead through neutral nations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(85) JCS to CINCPAC</td>
<td>251957Z</td>
<td>252032Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Content:</strong></td>
<td>Submit detailed plan for BANNER not later than 261200Z.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(86) SECSTATE to AMB TOKYO</td>
<td>252305Z</td>
<td>252333Z</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Content:</strong></td>
<td>Straighten up PUEBLO's distance from shore with GOJ and press.</td>
<td></td>
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GLOSSARY

(U) Some abbreviations appear in the text in both capitals and in upper and lower case letters. To prevent redundancy, only one example has been used in this glossary.

A
AA Air America; Antiaircraft
AAA Antiaircraft Artillery; Army Audit Agency
AAM Air-to-air missile
ABCCC Airborne Command and Control Center
Abn Airborne
A/C Aircraft
AC&W Aircraft Control and Warning
AD Air Defense; Air Division
ADA Air Defense Artillery
ADG Degaussing Ship
ADM Admiral
ADINO Administrative Office
ADP Automatic Data Processing
AE Aeromedical Evacuation
AF Air Force
AFADGRU or AFAG Air Force Advisory Group
AFAK Armed Forces Assistance to Korea
AFB Air Force Base
AFCS Air Force Communications System
AFM Air Force Manual
AFP Armed Forces Philippines
AFPSC Armed Forces Philippines Supply Center
AFR Air Force Regulation
AFSC Armed Forces Security Center
AFSS Air Force Security Services
AID Agency for International Development
AIRA Air Attache
AK Cargo Ship
AKL Light Cargo Ship
ALP Airlift
AM Alert Message; Amplitude Modulation; Air Mobile
AMB Ambassador
AMEMB American Embassy
ANZUK Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom
ANZUS Australia, New Zealand and United States
AO Oiler
AOB Air Order of Battle
AOG Auxiliary Oil and Gasoline Tanker
APA Attack Transport
APC  Armored Personnel Carrier; Accelerated Pacification Campaign
APD  High speed transport
APL  Barracks Craft (non-self-propelled)
ARG  Amphibious Ready Group
ARM  Armored
ARMA Army Attache
ART or Arty Artillery
ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASAP As soon as possible
ASD(I&L) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)
ASD/ISA Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
ASGD Assigned
ASL Authorized Stock Level; Authorized Stockage List
ASR Available Supply Rate
Asst Assistant
ASW Antisubmarine Warfare
ATA Actual time of arrival; Auxiliary Ocean Tug
AUG Augment(ed); August
AURI Indonesian Air Force
Auth Authorized
AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network
AUTOSEVOCOM Automatic Secure Voice Communications System
AUTOVON Automatic Voice Network
AVGAS Aviation Gasoline
Avn Aviation
AW Automatic Weapons; All Weather (acft)
AWOL Absent Without Leave
AWSP Automatic Weapons Self-Propelled

BAC Base Area Command
BALPA Balance of Payment
BAR Browning Automatic Rifle
BDA Bomb Damage Assessment
Bde Brigade
BDL Beach Discharge Lighter
BG Brigadier General
BLT Battalion Landing Team
Bn - BN Battalion - Burmese Navy
BOD  Beneficial Occupancy Date
BOM  Bill of Materiel; By Other Means
BR   BARREL ROLL
Brig Gen  Brigadier General

C

CA  Civil Affairs; Heavy Cruiser; Chinese Army; Civic Action
CAF  Chinese Air Force
CAG  Combat Analysis Group
CAPT  Captain
CAS  Controlled American Source; Close Air Support
CATO  CINCPAC Ammunition Transfer Order
Cav  Cavalry
CB  Construction Battalion (Sea Bees); Chemical-Biological
CBR  Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare
CBU  Cluster Bomb Unit
CCK  Ching Chuan Kang (Taiwan)
CCRSFF  Commander, Central Region SEATO Field Forces
CCT  Combat Crew Training
CCTU  Combat Crew Training Unit
C-E  Communications-Electronics
CENTO  Central Treaty Organization
CEOI  Communications Electronics Operating Instruction
CGFMFPAC  Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific
CGUSAMAC  Commanding General, US Army Materiel Command
CGUSEIGHT  Commanding General, U. S. Eighth Army
CHDLG INDONESIA  Chief, Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia
CHICOM  Chinese Communists
CHJUSMAG  Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group - Country
CHMAAG  Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group - Country
CHMEDT BURMA  Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma
CHPROVMAAGK  Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea (Provisional)
CHWTO  Chief, Western Pacific Transportation Office
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency; counterintelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Combat Information Center; Counterintelligence Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIGCOREP</td>
<td>Counter Infiltration - Counter Guerrilla Concept and Requirement Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCCN</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Chinese Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCEUR</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCLANTFLT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCONAD</td>
<td>Commander in Chief North America Air Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACAF</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACREP</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACSTAFFINSTR</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific Staff Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACSTAFFNOTE</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific Staff Notice</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCSAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSTRIKE</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Strike Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUNC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief United Nations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUSARPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief United States Army Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cmbt or Combt</td>
<td>Combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Commandant Marine Corps; Chinese Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMPO</td>
<td>Chief, SEATO Military Planning Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>Chinese Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Commanding Officer; company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COACT</td>
<td>Combat Air Activity Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comd</td>
<td>Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMNAVFOR</td>
<td>Commander Naval Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMNAVFORJAP</td>
<td>Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMNAVMARIANAS</td>
<td>Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Marianas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comp</td>
<td>Composite</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMSEC</td>
<td>Communications Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMSERVPAC</td>
<td>Commander Service Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMSTS</td>
<td>Commander Military Sea Transportation Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>COMSTSFE</td>
<td>Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS</td>
<td>Commander, United States Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS JAPAN</td>
<td>Commander, United States Forces, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSKOREA</td>
<td>Commander, United States Forces, Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACTHAI</td>
<td>Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMUSTDC</td>
<td>Commander, United States Forces, Taiwan Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Const</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Command Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Closest Point of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Chinese People's Republic (Communist China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRA</td>
<td>Continuing Resolution Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Control and Reporting Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRP</td>
<td>Control and Reporting Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRSFF</td>
<td>Central Region SEATO Field Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GofS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Control Slip used on the CINCPAC Staff to control correspondence; A riot control agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOC</td>
<td>Counter Subversion Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Committed to Scheduled Programs; Concurrent Spare Parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Common Supply System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Circuit Switching Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTZ</td>
<td>Corps Tactical Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVA</td>
<td>Attack Aircraft Carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVA(N)</td>
<td>Attack Aircraft Carrier (Nuclear Propulsion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVS</td>
<td>Antisubmarine Support Aircraft Carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVW</td>
<td>Carrier Air Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY</td>
<td>Calendar Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army; damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAFD</td>
<td>Department of Army Forward Depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAFFD</td>
<td>Department of the Army Forward Floating Depot</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAN</td>
<td>Deployment Adjustment Notification</td>
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</table>
DAO
DAR
DCA
DCO
DCPG
DD
DEFCON
Defol
Dep
DEPCH
DEPUTY CHJUSMAG
Dest/Dam
DFSC
DIA
DLG
DLSC
DMO
DMZ
DOB Status
DOD
DOES
DR&E
DRV
DSA
DST MK-36
ECB
ECM
Elec
ELINT
EMB
EMCON
Eng
Enl
EUCOM
Evac
EW
FA

Defense Attaché Office
Deployment Adjustment Request
Defense Communications Agency
Dial Central Offices
Defense Communications Planning Group
Destroyer
Defense Condition
Defoliation
Deputy
Deputy Chief
Deputy Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group
Destroyed/Damaged
Defense Fuel Supply Center
Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Liaison Group
Defense Logistics Supply Center
Defense Material Office
Demilitarized Zone
Dispersed Operating Base Status
Department of Defense
Defense Organizational Entity Standards Program
Defense Research and Engineering
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North)
Defense Supply Agency
Destructor MK-36
Engineer Construction Battalion
Electronic Countermeasures
Electronics
Electronics Intelligence
Embassy
Emission Control
Engineer
Enlisted
European Command (U.S.)
Evacuation
Electronic Warfare; Early Warning
Field Artillery; Forces Armées; Flag Allowance; Special Forces Operations Team (2 OFF, 10 EM)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Forward Air Control(ler); Facility(ies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAE</td>
<td>Field Advisory Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFV</td>
<td>Field Force Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIR</td>
<td>Flight Information Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLIR</td>
<td>Forward Looking Infra-red Radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLR</td>
<td>Forward Looking Radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLT</td>
<td>Fleet; flight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFPAC</td>
<td>Fleet Marine Force Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Foreign National</td>
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<tr>
<td>FONECON</td>
<td>Telephone Conversation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSTAT</td>
<td>Force Status Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOS</td>
<td>Follow on Spares</td>
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<td>First Republic of Korea Army</td>
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<td>FSR</td>
<td>Force Service Regiment</td>
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<td>Ftr</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
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<tr>
<td>FWMA</td>
<td>Free World Military Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>FWMAF</td>
<td>Free World Military Assistance Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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**G**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>Ground Controlled Approach</td>
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<td>GCI</td>
<td>Ground Controlled Intercept</td>
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<td>Gen</td>
<td>General</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOB</td>
<td>Government of Burma</td>
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<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of Indonesia</td>
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<td>GOJ</td>
<td>Government of Japan</td>
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<td>GOM</td>
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<td>GOP</td>
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<td>GOS</td>
<td>Government of Singapore</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gp - GP</td>
<td>Group - General Purpose</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of Vietnam</td>
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**H**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HA(L)</td>
<td>Helicopter Attack Squadron (Light)</td>
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<td>HC</td>
<td>Helicopter Combat Support Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>High Explosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HES</td>
<td>Hamlet Evaluation System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIRAN</td>
<td>High Range Navigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hist Br</td>
<td>History Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKG</td>
<td>Hong Kong Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMM</td>
<td>Marine Helicopter Squadron Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRF</td>
<td>Homeland Reserve Force (Korea)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>Helicopter Squadron</td>
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<td>HSAS</td>
<td>Headquarters Support Activity - Saigon</td>
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**I**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IAC</td>
<td>Intelligence Assessment Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAW</td>
<td>In accordance with</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>International Business Machine Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBOP</td>
<td>International Balance of Payment</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICP</td>
<td>Inventory Control Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICR</td>
<td>Intense Combat Rates</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Integrated Communications System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>Institute of Defense Analyses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDHS</td>
<td>Intelligence Data Handling System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFF</td>
<td>Identification, friend or foe</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFR</td>
<td>Instrument Flight Rules</td>
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<td>IJCS-PAC</td>
<td>Integrated Joint Communications System, Pacific</td>
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<td>Inf</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
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<td>Int</td>
<td>Interceptor; Intelligence</td>
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<td>Intcp</td>
<td>Interceptor</td>
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<td>Intel</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTELSAT</td>
<td>Intelligence Satellite</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial Operational Capability</td>
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<td>IRAN</td>
<td>Inspect and Repair as Necessary</td>
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<td>IRG</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Regional Group</td>
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<td>IRIS</td>
<td>Integrated Research Information System</td>
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<td>ISA</td>
<td>International Security Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISC</td>
<td>Infiltration Surveillance Center</td>
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<td>IWCS</td>
<td>Integrated Wideband Communications System</td>
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**J**

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<td>JAGC</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General Corp</td>
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<td>JAMTO</td>
<td>Joint Airlines Military Ticket Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCSAN</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff Alert Network; Joint Chiefs of Staff Alerting Network</td>
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</table>
JCSM  Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JDA  Japan Defense Agency
JEIT  Joint Equipment Identification Team
JFIAP  Joint Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program
JMP  Joint Manpower Program
JMSDF  Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force
JNR  Japanese National Railroad
JP  Joint Pacific
JP4 or JP5  Jet Fuel
JPO  Joint Petroleum Office
JSCP  Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSDF  Japan Self Defense Force
JSIPS  Joint Continental Defense Systems Integration Planning Staff
JSOP  Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JSTPS  Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
JTB  PACOM Joint Transportation Board
JTD  Joint Table of Distribution
JTMB  Joint Transportation Movements Board
JUSMAG  Joint United States Military Advisory Group
JUSMAGPHIL  Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Philippines
JUSPAO  Joint United States Public Affairs Office
JWGA  Joint War Games Agency

K

KAMP  Korean Ammunition Program
KIA  Killed in Action
KLSC  Korean Logistic Service Corps
KMAG  Military Advisory Group, Korea
KNP  Korean National Police

L

LAMP  Laos Ammunition Procedures
LANTFLT  U. S. Atlantic Fleet
LARC  Lighter, Amphibious, Resupply, Cargo (Amphibious Craft)
LAW  Light Antitank Weapon
LCM  Landing Craft Medium
LCU  Landing Craft Utility
LN  Local National
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Lines of Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOG</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
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<td>LORAN</td>
<td>Long Range Navigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPH</td>
<td>Landing Platform Helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRC</td>
<td>Logistics Readiness Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM</td>
<td>Medium Landing Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>Tank Landing Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC or Lt Col</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG or Lt Gen</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ltr</td>
<td>Letter</td>
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<td>LZ</td>
<td>Landing Zone</td>
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**M**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>MA</td>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
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<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Military Airlift Command; Military Assistance Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACSOG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command Studies and Observation Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACVDAC</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Distribution/Allocation Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAF</td>
<td>Marine Amphibious Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAI</td>
<td>Military Assistance Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj Gen or MG</td>
<td>Major General</td>
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<td>MAM</td>
<td>Military Assistance Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program (Plan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARBO</td>
<td>Mariana-Bonin Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAR DIV</td>
<td>Marine Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>MASF</td>
<td>Military Assistance Service Funded</td>
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<tr>
<td>MASL</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program Articles &amp; Services List</td>
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<tr>
<td>MATP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Training Program</td>
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<td>MAW</td>
<td>Marine Air Wing; Military Airlift Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBA</td>
<td>Military Base Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCAS</td>
<td>Marine Corps Air Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC&amp;G</td>
<td>Mapping, Charting and Geodesy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>Military Construction Program; Malayan Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDMRF</td>
<td>Mekong Delta Mobile Riverine Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mech</td>
<td>Mechanized</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Med  Medium; medical
MEDT  Military Equipment Delivery Team (Burma)
MEF  Minimum Essential Force; Marine Expeditionary Force

Mil  Military
MILADREP  Military Advisors Representative
MILCON  Military Construction
MILDEPS  Military Departments
MILGRPS  Military Groups
MILSTAMP  Military Standard Transportation & Movement Procedures
MILSTRIP  Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures

MILTAG  Military Technical Advisory Group (Indonesia)
MMO  Military Material Office
MND  Ministry of National Defense
MOBRIG  Police Brigade (Indonesia)
MOC  Ministry of Communications
MOD  Ministry of Defense
MOGAS  Gasoline, Automotive
MOL  Manned Orbiting Laboratory
MOVECAP  Movement Capabilities
MP  Military Police
MPO  Military Planning Office
MSAAB  Military Services Ammunition Allocation Board
MSC  Minesweeper, Coastal (non-magnetic)
Msl  Missile
MSTS  Military Sea Transportation Service
MSTSO  Military Sea Transport Service Officer
MTMTS  Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service

NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO  Non Commissioned Officer; Non Combatant
NDP(C)  Evacuation Order
NEA  National Disclosure Policy (Committee)
NGF(S)  Northeast Asia
NICP  Naval Gunfire (Support)
NIE  National Inventory Control Point (CONUS)
NIPS  National Intelligence Estimate

287
NK  North Korea
NKA  North Korean Army
NKAF  North Korean Air Force
NKN  North Korean Navy
NKPR  North Korea People's Republic
NLF  National Liberation Front (Communist in SVN)
NM  Nautical Mile
NMCB  Navy Mobile Construction Battalion
NOA  New Obligation Authority
NSA  National Security Agency; Naval Supply Agency; Naval Support Activity
NSFO  Navy Special Fuel Oil
NUCAP  Nuclear Capability Report
NVA  North Vietnamese Army
NVN  North Vietnam

OASD  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OASD/ISA  Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs
OB  Order of Battle
OBE  Overtaken by Events
ODMA  Office of the Director of Military Assistance
Off  Officer
OJT  On the Job Training
O&M  Operations and Maintenance
OP  Operational
OPCON  Operational Control
OPD  Operation Plans
Opns  Operations
OPREP  Operational Reporting
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSI  Offshore Islands; Office of Special Investigation
OSPJ  Offshore Procurement-Japan

PA  Philippine Army; Public Affairs
PACAF  Pacific Air Forces
PACEX  Pacific Exchange System
PACFLT  Pacific Fleet
PACOM  Pacific Command
c. Draft SEAP 45 (SEATO Trunking Systems Engineering Manual). Draft SEAPs 44 and 45 were developed following the 10th Communications-Electronics Conference, October 1967 and procedures described were to be tested during Exercise RAMASOON. ¹

(Ø) As a result, three subcommittees were established, each assigned to one of the broad areas described above. U.S. delegates chaired the two subcommittees that undertook the resolution of the last two aforementioned problem areas, which meant the completion of the new requirement for Draft SEAP 44 and a rewrite of SEAP 45.

(Ø) The subcommittee of the working party that addressed itself to telephone communications developed the following documents or concepts:

a. The production of a SEATO Tactical Telephone Directory.

b. The establishment of a telephone numbering system based upon functional areas using the United States, Philippine, and Thai system of numerical designation for the various staff functions. Also included in the directory was a listing of appointment numbers used by the U.S., Thailand, and the Philippines and a comparative code word system used by the ANZUK nations.

c. A minimize procedure was developed and placed in the telephone directory. This information is also to be included in the CEOI when published by the MPO.

d. A new SEATO Supplement to ACP 121 was developed incorporating the SEATO Basegram system and the draft four precedence designation system approved by the United States. This system was previously intended for inclusion as a SEATO Supplement to ACP 134, but was found to be more appropriate as a part of a SEATO Supplement to ACP 121. ²

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
<table>
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>REDOPS</td>
<td>Operational Status Reports</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reinf</td>
<td>Reinforced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Res</td>
<td>Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFP</td>
<td>Request for Procurement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF/PF</td>
<td>Regional and Popular Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHAW</td>
<td>Radar Homing and Warning</td>
</tr>
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<td>RKG</td>
<td>Royal Cambodian Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLAF</td>
<td>Royal Laotian Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLG</td>
<td>Royal Laotian Government; Regional Liaison Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>RLT</td>
<td>Regimental Landing Team; Rolling Liquid Transporter</td>
</tr>
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<td>Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROCAF</td>
<td>Republic of China Air Force</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>Republic of Korea Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROKAF</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Air Force</td>
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<td>ROKFV</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Forces in Vietnam</td>
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<td>ROKMC</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Marine Corps</td>
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<td>Republic of Korea Navy</td>
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<td>RO/RO</td>
<td>Roll On/Roll Off</td>
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<td>RP</td>
<td>Route Package; Reporting Point; Release Point</td>
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<td>R&amp;R</td>
<td>Rest and Recuperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT</td>
<td>ROLLING THUNDER</td>
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<td>RTA</td>
<td>Royal Thailand Army</td>
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<td>Royal Thailand Air Force</td>
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<td>RTAFB</td>
<td>Royal Thailand Air Force Base</td>
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<td>RTAFSC</td>
<td>Royal Thai Armed Forces Staff College</td>
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<td>RTARF</td>
<td>Royal Thailand Armed Forces</td>
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<td>Royal Thailand Army in Vietnam</td>
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<td>Royal Thai Government</td>
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<td>Royal Thailand Marine Corps</td>
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<td>Royal Thailand Navy</td>
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<td>RTTL</td>
<td>ROLLING THUNDER Target List</td>
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<td>Royal Thai Volunteer Forces</td>
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<td>Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<td>Republic of Vietnam Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SABMIS</td>
<td>Sea-based Ballistic Missile Intercept System</td>
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<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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</table>
SAM
SAMA
SAPO
SAR
SASM
SAWF
SCC(SC)
STCG
SEA
SEACOORD
SEAL
SEAMIL
SEAOR
SEAP
SEASIA
SEASTAG
SEATO
SECDEF
SECNAV
SEER
SF
SFF
SHEDS
SIG
SIGINT
SIOP
SITREP
SL
SLAT
SLBM
SLF
SMPO
SOFA
SOG
SOP
SOR
SOS
SOSUS
SOUTHCOM
SP
Spt

Surface to Air Missile; Space Available Mail
Special Assistant for Military Assistance Affairs
Sub Area Petroleum Office
Search and Rescue
Special Assistant for Strategic Mobility
Special Air Warfare Fighter Squadron
Security Consultative Committee (Sub-Committee)
SEATO Communications Technical Coordination Group
Southeast Asia
Coordinating Committee for U.S. Missions
Southeast Asia
Sea, Air and Land (Team)
Separate Military Committee (under SEACOORD)
Southeast Asia Operational Requirement
SEATO Military Publication
Southeast Asia
SEATO Standardization Agreement
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Navy
System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF
Special Forces
SEATO Field Forces
Ship Helicopter Extended Delivery System
Senior Interdepartmental Group
Signal Intelligence
Single Integrated Operational Plan
Situation Report
STEEL TIGER
Special Logistics Actions Thailand
Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile
Special Landing Force
SEATO Military Planning Office
Status of Forces Agreement
Studies and Observation Group; Special Operations Group
Standing Operating Procedure
Specific Operational Requirements
Special Operations Squadron
Sound Surveillance Underwater System
Southern Command
Starting Point; Self Propelled
Support
<table>
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<td>Squadron</td>
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<td>Sqn(s)</td>
<td>Squadron(s)</td>
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<td>SROKA</td>
<td>Second Republic of Korea Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine (nuclear powered)</td>
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<td>STRAPS</td>
<td>CINCSTRIKE's Automated Planning Subsystem</td>
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<td>STRICOM</td>
<td>Strike Command</td>
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<td>SVN</td>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
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<td>TAC</td>
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<td>Tactical Air Navigation</td>
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<td>TACC</td>
<td>Tactical Air Control Center</td>
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<td>TAW</td>
<td>Troop Airlift Wing; Tactical Airlift Wing</td>
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<td>TBDL</td>
<td>To be Designated Later</td>
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<td>TCP</td>
<td>Traffic Control Point</td>
</tr>
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<td>TDC</td>
<td>Taiwan Defense Command</td>
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<td>TDY</td>
<td>Temporary Duty</td>
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<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFS</td>
<td>Tactical Fighter Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFW</td>
<td>Tactical Fighter Wing</td>
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<td>Tgt(s)</td>
<td>Target(s)</td>
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<td>TICO</td>
<td>Through Intermodal Container Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TO&amp;E</td>
<td>Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>TPFDL</td>
<td>Time Phased Force Deployment List</td>
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<td>TRS</td>
<td>Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron; Technical Research Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSG</td>
<td>Thai Security Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSР</td>
<td>Theater Sustaining Rate</td>
</tr>
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<td>TTP1</td>
<td>Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UB</td>
<td>Union of Burma</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Universal Code of Military Justice</td>
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<td>UE</td>
<td>Unit Equipment Allowance</td>
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<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>Unit Identification Codes</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>United Nations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCMAC</td>
<td>United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODIR</td>
<td>Unless Otherwise Directed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USADCJ</td>
<td>US Army Depot Command, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARHAW</td>
<td>United States Army Hawaii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARJ</td>
<td>United States Army, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARPAC</td>
<td>United States Army Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARSUPTHAI</td>
<td>U.S. Army Support, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARV</td>
<td>United States Army, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARYIS</td>
<td>United States Army, Ryukyus Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASA</td>
<td>United States Army Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASCC</td>
<td>United States Army Strategic Communication Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USBRO</td>
<td>U.S. Base Requirements Overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINC5O</td>
<td>US Commander in Chief Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Defense Attache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDAO</td>
<td>United States Defense Attache Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USF</td>
<td>United States Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFJ</td>
<td>United States Forces Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFK</td>
<td>United States Forces Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMACTHAI</td>
<td>United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMACV</td>
<td>United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMILAD</td>
<td>U.S. Military Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMILADREP</td>
<td>United States Military Adviser's Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMILADREPSMPO</td>
<td>United States Military Adviser's Representative, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Military Planning Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSTRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. Strike Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTDTC</td>
<td>United States Forces, Taiwan Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTC</td>
<td>Unit Type Code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VADM          | Vice Admiral |
<p>| VAMP         | Vietnam Ammunition Procedures |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VAP</td>
<td>Heavy Photographic Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAW</td>
<td>Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron (USN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Viet Cong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCI</td>
<td>Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VFP</td>
<td>Light Photographic Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>Very High Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIP</td>
<td>Very Important Person(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNAF</td>
<td>Vietnamese Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNMC</td>
<td>Vietnamese Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNN</td>
<td>Vietnamese Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>U. S. Navy Patrol Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VQ</td>
<td>Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VW</td>
<td>U. S. Navy Airborne Early Warning Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBLC</td>
<td>Waterborne Logistic Craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTPAC</td>
<td>Western Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wg</td>
<td>Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRM</td>
<td>War Reserve Mobilization; War Readiness Materiel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>WESTPAC Transportation Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWMCCS</td>
<td>World Wide Military Command and Control System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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(U) The indexer in preparing this index integrated Volumes I, II, III and IV of the 1968 CINCPAC Command History. Annexes A and B of the CINCPAC 1968 history are not included in this index since each annex contains its own individual index.

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Major program -- Military Assistance, etc.
Regional defense organization -- SEATO, etc.
Ships -- by name under "ships"
Aircraft -- by designation under "aircraft"
Weapons -- by designation
Program, plan, project or system -- by name, CORMORANT, HAWK, etc.

(U) Generally, a country approach has been followed, with cross-references in support of this approach.

(U) Each volume is paged separately, and volumes are indicated in each entry by Roman numerals.
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