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(3) Volume III, CINCPAC Command History 1977

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W. E. McLEOD
Major General, USA
Deputy Chief of Staff

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME I
1977

Prepared by the Command History Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861
1978
ADMIRAL M. F. WEISNER
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
UNCLASSIFIED

FOREWORD

The Pacific Command covers an area of more than 100 million square miles, or roughly half of the earth's surface. Our military mission continued to be deterrence of aggression against U.S. interests or those of our allies and readiness to respond if deterrence fails.

In this vast area there were many potentially destabilizing events in 1977. A U.S. helicopter was shot down by North Koreans; a People's Republic of China pilot defected to Taiwan; border fighting continued between Cambodia and Thailand and between Cambodia and Vietnam; armed insurgent activity continued in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines; military forces assumed active control of the governments in Thailand and Pakistan; and violence and riots occurred in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

Other events directly related to U.S. interests included the announcement of the phased withdrawal of U.S. ground combat forces from Korea, economic discussions with Japan regarding the trade deficit of the United States, initiation of Indian Ocean arms control negotiations with the Soviets, and the discussions with the Philippines on a revised military bases agreement.

Despite these events, there were encouraging signs of greater stability and interdependence within the Asian-Pacific region. The mutual security treaties with Asian-Pacific countries are important components of our national policy and interests. We have bilateral defense agreements with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China and the Philippines, the tripartite ANZUS Treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and the multilateral treaty with the countries of the Manila Pact, which includes Thailand. Subject to our constitutional processes, these treaties commit us to come to the aid of these allies if they are attacked. Joint and combined exercises with some of these nations tested the readiness of U.S. Forces, refined joint operations, and emphasized our continuing presence as a Pacific power.

In 1976 the PRC and USSR initiated diplomatic and economic overtures toward some island nations in the South Pacific. During 1977 the United States initiated political, diplomatic and economic efforts to offset the Chinese and Soviet moves. Discussions centered around possible aid to Western Samoa, Fiji, and Tonga in particular. The U.S. Government also supported and encouraged cohesive economic and political actions by the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) which would promote regional strength and stability. Discussions between ASEAN and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the United States during 1977 revealed that regional economic cooperation is both possible and desirable.
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One of the most critical economic and strategic interests of the United States involves the uninterrupted flow of oil through the Indian Ocean to the industrial economies of the Pacific and to the European community. During 1977 the Pacific Command continued periodically to deploy naval task groups from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean to supplement the U.S. Mideast force normally deployed in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Soviet use of ports, airfields, and other facilities in Somalia was terminated in November when their support of Ethiopia prompted eviction by Somalia. The extent and direction of Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa was unclear as the year ended, but their naval presence in the Indian Ocean was expected to increase.

Negotiations for a revised U.S.-Philippines military bases agreement continued in 1977. Discussions at the diplomatic level and between military officials found common ground on certain issues, but there are substantive issues yet to be resolved. The Pacific Command continues to stress the importance of our bases in the Philippines to support our forward basing posture and to protect vital sea and air lines of communication.

Any future action to alter our military posture should be weighed in the context of its potential impact on area stability. Except for the situation on the Korean peninsula, the United States does not have a classical military threat scenario in the Asian-Pacific region—that is, with opposing forces facing each other across some line or boundary. Therefore, our forward basing posture influences the perception of U.S. power and U.S. resolve. This perception of U.S. power is important in reassuring our friends and deterring potential enemies from actions inimicable to the interests of the United States and our allies.

M. F. WEISNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific
UNCLASSIFIED

PREFACE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the viewpoint of the CINCPAC. The report also preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS, to the extent that the impact on the PACOM of major decisions and directives of the JCS may be evaluated by the JCS historians without detailed research into PACOM records.

This history describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, and his relationships with U.S. military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions, but does not cover the detailed activities of his component and subordinate unified commands, which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters.

The 1972-1973 historical narrative of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was the terminal history of that organization. It covered the period from 1 January 1972 until the disestablishment of the headquarters on 29 March 1973. The identification of the MACV history as Annex A to the CINCPAC history will be retained to facilitate future research. Annex B of the 1976 history is the terminal history of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand. That designation will also be retained. Histories of the U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, and U.S. Forces Korea continue as Annexes C through E respectively, and are included only for those copies retained at CINCPAC or forwarded to the JCS. Further distribution of those histories is a matter for the subordinate unified commanders.

The 1977 CINCPAC history is published in three volumes, consecutively paginated, with the glossary and index for the entire work placed at the end of Volume III. Comprehensive notes on sources and documentation may be found in the 1972 history. Briefly, message traffic footnoted in this history other than General Service (GENSER) is followed by the abbreviations (BOM) or (EX) as appropriate. BOM is the acronym for "by other means" and EX is used to denote "special category-exclusive" messages. Those CINCPAC messages cited as ALFA messages are staff information transmissions to CINCPAC while he was away from the headquarters. Titles of documents cited as footnotes are unclassified unless otherwise indicated.

Chapters II, IX and XI were written by the undersigned. Pauline K. Tallman wrote Chapters I, III, IV, Sections I and III of Chapter X, and supervised the physical layout of the product. Chapters V, VI, VII, VIII and Section II
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of Chapter X were written by Major Stanley E. Henning, USA. Section IV of Chapter X was written by Eileen Behana, Historian Trainee. The index was a joint effort and the glossary was compiled by Mrs. Tallman.

The manuscript was typed by Shirley A. Streck and Rita J. Houston. The Navy Publications and Printing Service, Pacific Division, Pearl Harbor printed and bound the volumes.

\[ Signature \]

CARL O. CLEVER
Command Historian
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CHAPTER I

THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND

SECTION I--THE PACIFIC COMMAND

PACOM assigned strength continued the declining trend that had begun in 1969. This was before the beginning of the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea that had been announced by President Carter. It was expected that forces would be further reduced in the years to come.

A comparison of military strengths by Service follows:

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<th>Service</th>
<th>1 January 1977</th>
<th>31 December 1977</th>
<th>Change</th>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>53,787</td>
<td>53,208</td>
<td>-579</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>164,613</td>
<td>155,030</td>
<td>-9,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>71,982</td>
<td>70,126</td>
<td>-1,856</td>
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<td>Air Force</td>
<td>43,570</td>
<td>40,074</td>
<td>-3,496</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>333,952</strong></td>
<td><strong>318,438</strong></td>
<td><strong>-15,514</strong></td>
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</table>

Major areas of concentration of military personnel and their dependents in 1977 and the amounts of change from the year before are shown in the following table.

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<th>Military</th>
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<th>Dependents</th>
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<td></td>
<td>31 Dec 77</td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>31 Dec 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>8,767</td>
<td>-1,758</td>
<td>11,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>42,735</td>
<td>-1,539</td>
<td>85,062</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>44,554</td>
<td>-4,468</td>
<td>36,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>40,196</td>
<td>+478</td>
<td>12,743</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>14,457</td>
<td>-393</td>
<td>23,769</td>
</tr>
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(U) The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of forces throughout the PACOM. The date of information on these charts is as of 31 December 1977, unless otherwise indicated. The chart showing the CINCPAC staff organization is on the inside of the back cover.

1. Any minor discrepancies would reflect the change to use of the FORSTAT reporting system effective 31 December 1977.
THE PACIFIC COMMAND

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 3.
## SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES

### KEY PERSONNEL

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
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<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>John W. Vessey, Jr.</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>LT GEN</td>
<td>Charles A. Gabriell</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>Robert C. Kingstone</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Asst/COM Military Affairs and CHJCS/MAC-Korea</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Harry A. Griffth</td>
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<td>Secretary, Joint Staff</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Franklyn S. Nelson</td>
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<td>Commander, U.S. Army in Korea</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Joseph R. Ruzkowski</td>
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<td>Assistant Chief of Staff, III</td>
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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 8
## U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups

### Far East Region - Key Personnel

#### Military Assistance Advisory Group, China
- **Chief**
  - CAPT: L. P. TRAVIS
- **Chief, Training Section**
  - MAJ: L. P. SHIFFLET
- **Chief, Army Logistics Section**
  - COL: E. C. ROBINSON
- **Chief, Navy Logistics Section**
  - CDR: R. H. RANDALL
- **Chief, Air Force Logistics Section**
  - COL: J. F. MELCHER

#### Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea
- **Chief**
  - MAJ GEN: H. A. GRIFFITH
- **Chief of Staff**
  - CAPT: W. W. EKONSON
- **Assistant Chief of Staff/Plans and Programs**
  - COL: R. K. LITTLE
- **Assistant Chief of Staff/Development and Acquisition**
  - COL: E. J. HEIN
- **Secretary Joint Staff**
  - COL: A. C. LIVINGSTON
- **Senior Army Assistance Officer**
  - COL: F. J. CALYERSE
- **Senior Navy Assistance Officer**
  - COL: C. J. BLASTOR
- **Senior Air Assistance Officer**
  - CAPT: B. T. LAMB
- **Senior Marine Assistance Officer**
  - COL: B. D. PATTON
  - COL: B. M. MACLAREN

#### Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan
- **Chief**
  - COL: R. A. MELTON
- **Deputy Chief**
  - C. LAWRENCE OWEN

#### Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand
- **Chief**
  - COL: A. E. WALKER
- **Executive Officer**
  - COL: D. H. MOORE
- **Chief, Joint Service Division**
  - COL: L. BRUTON
- **Chief, Army Division**
  - COL: J. H. HAYES
- **Chief, Navy Division**
  - CAPT: J. V. DUNN
- **Chief, Air Force Division**
  - COL: C. K. ROSS, III
- **Staff Judge Advocate**
  - MAJ: G. L. ANDERSON

#### Office of Defense Cooperation, India (ODC)
- **Chief**
  - COL: A. J. KUPPINS

#### Office of Defense Representative, Pakistan (ODRP)
- **Chief**
  - COL: R. P. GIBBS

#### Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Philippines
- **Chief**
  - BGEN: J. H. MAPP
- **Chief, Ground Force Division**
  - COL: H. H. RAY
- **Chief, Navy Division**
  - COL: C. H. SHIRLEY
- **Chief, Air Force Division**
  - COL: T. H. MAUS
- **Chief, Joint Plans and Programs Division**
  - COL: J. K. GOWIE
- **Advisor, Philippine Marine Corps**
  - COL: J. T. GARCIA
- **Chief, Personnel and Administrative Division (AG)**
  - COL: P. D. MIRANO

#### United States Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia
- **Chief**
  - COL: W. W. TOMBAUGH
- **Deputy Chief**
  - COL: J. J. SCHELES
- **Chief, Army Division**
  - COL: D. D. PEARCE
- **Chief, Navy/Marine Division**
  - CDR: C. G. BASSETT
- **Chief, Air Force Division**
  - CDR: G. R. BOUCHAUX
- **Chief, Plans and Programs Division**
  - COL: J. D. DUNCAN
- **Chief, Personnel and Administrative Division**
  - MAJ: J. J. RUTTY

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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 9.
# Pacific Command Personnel - Service - Category - Country

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*Note: Effective 31 December 1977 all military figures will be derived from the FORSTAT reporting system.*

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 23.
# CINCPAC, Component & Subordinate Unified Command Staff Personnel

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<th>USAF</th>
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### MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP PERSONNEL
### ASSIGNED STRENGTHS BY SERVICE & CIVILIAN CATEGORY

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<th>TOTAL MILITARY ENL</th>
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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 25.
### MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED STRENGTH IN PACOM

**AS OF: 31 DECEMBER 1977**

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ARMY</th>
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<th>MARINE CORPS</th>
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<td>45,921</td>
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<td>221,949</td>
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<td>OTHER OPERATIONAL FORCES IN PACOM**</td>
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<td>686</td>
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<td>3,207</td>
<td>10,378</td>
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<td>TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL IN PACOM</td>
<td>53,208</td>
<td>155,030</td>
<td>70,126</td>
<td>225,156</td>
<td>40,074</td>
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Effective 31 December 1977 all military figures will be derived from the FORTSTAT reporting system.

* Forces assigned PACOM component commanders.

** Forces absent located in PACOM area but not assigned PACOM component commanders.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 22.
## AVAILABLE FORCES

### ARMY

| 1 Army Headquarters |
| 2 Corps Headquarters |
| 2 Infantry Divisions |
| 1 Air Defense Brigade w/ 12 HAWK Batteries |
| 8 Separate Aviation Companies |

### NAVY/MARINES

| 2 Numbered Fleets |
| 6 Attack Carriers |
| 16 Cruisers |
| 63 Destroyers/Frigates |
| 10 Submarines (SS-N) |
| 33 Submarines (SSN/SSN) |
| 32 Amphibious Warfare Ships |
| 6 Carrier Air Wings |
| 50 Fighter/Attack Squadrons |
| 10 Reconnaissance/KW Units |
| 7 Early Warning Units |
| 11 Carrier AEW Squads |
| 5 LAMPS Squadrons |
| 12 Pelican Squads |
| 5 Tanker Detachments |
| 5 Light Photo Squadrons |
| 9 E-3A Warning Aircraft (AWACS) |
| 9 SSN/SSN Stations |
| 1 Naval Special Warfare Group |

### AIR FORCE

| 2 Numbered Air Forces |
| 3 Air Divisions |
| 1 Commodity Wing |
| 1 Tactical Airlift Wing |
| 3 Tactical Fighter Wings |
| 1 Armed Airlift Wing |
| 2 Tactical Air Support Sqdns |
| 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Sqdn |
| 1 Special Operations Sqdn |
| 9 Tactical Fighter Sqdns |
| 2 Tactical Airlift Sqdns |
| 1 Airborne Command & Control Sqdn |
| 1 Tactical Fighter Training Aggressor Sqdn |

### OPCOM TO CINCPAC

| 2 Marine Amphibious Forces HQ |
| 2 Marine Divisions |
| 2 Marine Aircraft Wings |
| 13 Fighter/Attack Squadrons |
| 1 Photo/Reconnaissance Sqdn |
| 2 Tanker Sqdns |
| 1 Observation Sqdn |
| 15 Helicopter Sqdn |
| 2 Force Support Group |

### IN PACOM BUT NOT OPCOM TO CINCPAC

| 1 Engineer Group |
| 1 Signal Brigade |
| 1 General Support Group |
| 1 Heavy Base Co |
| UNASA Units in the Pacific |
| Army National Guard Units |
| 1 Infantry Brigade |
| Army Reserve Units |
| 11 Infantry Battalion |
| 1 Civil Affairs Group |
| 1 Engineer Construction Battalion |
| 1 Corps Headquarters (AUG) |

| 10 Destroyers (Navy Reserve Trng) |
| 9 Mine Warfare Ships (Navy Reserve Trng) |
| 2 Amphibious Warfare Ships (Navy Reserve Trng) |
| 56 Auxiliary Ships |
| 1 Fleet Composite Operations Readiness Group |

| 1 Air Division (SAC) |
| 2 Strategic Wings (SAC) |
| 1 Air Refueling Squadron (SAC) |
| 1 Bomber Squadron (SAC) |
| 3 Strategic Reconnaissance Detachment (SAC) |
| 1 Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (MAC) |
| 1 Test Group (AFSC) |
| 1 Tactical Fighter Squadron (Air National Guard) |
| 1 Air Force Security Service Units (AFSS) |
| 1 Air Force Communications Service Units (AFCS) |
| 1 Air-Sea Rescue/Recovery Squadron (MAC) |
| 1 Air Weather Service Units (MAC) |

---

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 10.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS

KOREA

EIGHTH U.S. ARMY
1st CORPS AOR
20th INF DIV

JAPAN

USARJCS CORPS AOR
ELEMENTS OF III MAF

EASTPAC

I MAF
1st MAR DIV
5th MAB
FORCE TROOPS
1st FNG

JAPAN

III MAF
5th MAR DIV 44th GMDP

DEPLOYED w/7TH FLEET

1st MAB (ANG ALFA)
1ST MAB ROK
SDF BRAVO (ANG BRAVO)

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 13.
DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL AIR & SHIPS UNITS
WESTPAC

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 16.
UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION II--THE CINCPAC STAFF

Key Personnel Changes in 1977

Commander in Chief Pacific

(U) Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN, served as Commander in Chief Pacific throughout 1977 except for a few short periods, as follows. General Louis L. Wilson, USAF, CINCPACAF, was designated Acting CINCPAC from 12 to 14 January and again from 30 March to 6 April. Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN, CINCPACFLT, was designated Acting CINCPAC for the periods 7 to 11 May and 3 to 14 September. As Executive Assistant and Aide to CINCPAC, COL Edward L. Trobaugh, USA, replaced COL Maurice O. Edmonds, USA, on 8 June.

Director for Intelligence

(U) BGEN John B. Marks, USAF, replaced BGEN Doyle E. Larson, USAF, on 19 January.

Director for Operations

(U) MAJ GEN Norman W. Gourley, USMC, replaced MAJ GEN Frank C. Lang, USMC, on 1 March.

Director for Logistics and Security Assistance

(U) RADM Arthur S. Moreau, Jr., USN, replaced RADM Hugh A. Benton, USN, effective 12 May.

Director for Plans

(U) RADM D.B. Shelton, USN, replaced RADM William R. McClendon, USN, on 15 August.

Director for Communications-Data Processing

(U) BGEN Robert F. McCarthy, USAF, replaced BGEN Charles E. Williams, Jr., USAF, on 8 February.

Comptroller

(U) CAPT Glenn L. Gaddis, SC, USN, replaced CAPT Bobby L. Hatch, SC, USN, on 15 June.
UNCLASSIFIED

KEY CINCPAC STAFF PERSONNEL

LERoy J. MANOR
LT GEN
Chief of Staff
USAf

WILLIAM E. MC LEOD
MAJ GEN
Deputy Chief of Staff
USAf

LEO J. MOSER
FSO-1
Political Advisor
CIV

ALFRED J. LYNN
GS-15
Chief, Office for Public
and Governmental Affairs
CIV

COL ALAN COVILLE
Joint Secretary
USAf

JAMES H. JOHNSON
BGEn
Director for Personnel
and Inspector General
USA

JOHN B. MARKS
BGEn
Director for Intelligence
USAf

NORMAN W. GOURLEY
MAJ GEN
Director for Operations
USMC
Surgeon

(U) RADM G.E. Gorsuch, MC, USN, replaced RADM Robert G.W. Williams, MC, USN, on 9 August.

Political Adviser to CINCPAC

(S) Mr. Leo J. Moser, a Foreign Service Officer (Grade 1) with the Department of State, served throughout 1977 as the Political Adviser to CINCPAC. With the departure of his deputy, Mr. Maurice N. Gralnek, in July, the State Department eliminated the official position of deputy. This was required as a part of a "sizeable trimming of positions worldwide," the Secretary of State had advised CINCPAC. Under Secretary Philip C. Habib, in a message to CINCPAC, had said, "All of us who have served in EA [East Asia] and its posts share the high value you place on the political advisors' contributions to the command." With the arrival of a replacement CINCPAC adviser from the State Department's U.S. Information Agency, Mr. James T. Pettus, on 19 September, this officer was placed in the office of the Political Adviser, where he served as both USIA adviser and de facto deputy to CINCPAC's Political Adviser, Mr. Moser.¹

Operations Directorate

(U) Effective 5 January the Airborne Command Post began operating as a separate entity reporting directly to the Director for Operations. Formerly the ABNCP had been designated J331. The ABNCP continued to have a separate Joint Manpower Program document.²

1. SECSTATE 032726/122318Z Feb 77.
3. CINCPAC Bulletin, 5 Jan 77.
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<tr>
<td>Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate</td>
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<td>Plans Directorate</td>
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<td>Communications-Data Processing Directorate</td>
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<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
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1. Headquarters CINCPAC FY 78 Joint Table of Distribution approved by JCS 4772/021321Z May 77.
3. Three (3) General Schedule, ten (10) Local Wage Rate.

UNCLASSIFIED

(Reverse Blank p. 20)
UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION III--SENIOR OFFICER RANK STRUCTURE

Flag-General Officer Requirements Studied

(U) A recurring subject of study concerned justification for the grades of billets to which flag and general officers were assigned, in the PACOM and worldwide. Efforts continued to reduce the number of such positions. The matter was studied twice in the PACOM in 1977, first in April.

(U) On 1 April the JCS requested specific information concerning general and flag officer and supergrade civilian positions falling under CINCPAC control, so that a response could be prepared for the Secretary of Defense concerning a proposed reduction to existing authorizations. Two plans for reduction were addressed: a three percent cut and a five percent cut.

(U) The 22 flag and general officer and 1 supergrade civilian authorizations in PACOM (as of the end of FY 78) were considered as a whole. The three percent alternative reduced three military positions, one each in FY 79, 81, and 83. The five percent alternative reduced five military positions, one each in Fiscal Years 1979-1983. The one civilian space was not affected under either alternative.

(U) The final recommended order for reduction was:

Chief, MAAG China
Chief of Staff, COMUSTDC
Deputy Director for Plans, Hq PACOM
Director for Personnel, Hq PACOM
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, COMUS Korea

(U) Later in the year the Defense Department had been directed to submit a comprehensive report with the Congressional FY 79 authorization request that identified the required numbers of general and flag officers and provided justification for deferring, in whole or part, statutory reductions included in the FY 78 Appropriation/Authorization Act. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, therefore, directed a billet-by-billet review of all such positions projected to be filled by the end of FY 78. The material that follows addresses in considerable detail the study conducted in the PACOM in October and November. Specifics regarding flag and general officer billets on Taiwan are addressed in a separate account, which follows this discussion.

1. J132 HistSum Apr 77, which cited JCS 012047Z Apr 77 and CINCPAC 152015Z Apr 77.
2. FLDSUPPACT WASH DC 031943Z Nov 77.
SECRET

On 4 November the JCS requested information on a number of topics: individual general and flag officer position profiles, an organization/activity analysis for flag and general officer positions, and an overall justification for all such positions.

(U) On 19 November CINCPAC provided his response to the requirement for articulating the general philosophy that lay behind the allocation of positions at such ranks. Admiral Weisner said that the mission of the PACOM was well documented. "During my tenure as CINCPAC, I have used a number of forums to amplify this mission and explain its importance in supporting and advancing the national policies and interests of the U.S. In so doing, the vital roles played by components, sub-unified commands, and Security Assistance organizations have been strongly and continually reemphasized. Therefore, believe all concerned are aware of the environment in which key military leaders and staff officers operate in PACOM." 2

(U) Over the years, CINCPAC continued, the PACOM mission had remained basically unchanged. U.S. force presence in the Pacific had diminished, however, while the threat had grown in size and complexity. The commensurate number of flag and general officer positions in the PACOM had been reduced in earlier drawdowns. For his headquarters, for example, the authorizations had been reduced from 14 in 1972 to 10 by 1976. The flag billet in the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in Thailand had been eliminated, and the CINCPACAF position had been reduced from general to lieutenant general. "Now in the face of the growing threat, the continued need for strong, mature leadership provided by flag/general officer personnel in key positions clearly exists." This was true, he said, not only in maintaining the PACOM's capability to respond to direct aggression against U.S. interests and in meeting security commitments in response to aggression against allies, but also in maintaining our vital presence in the Republics of Korea and China as well as continuing our key Security Assistance Programs.

(U) The Admiral noted that, in a peacetime environment, perception by one nation of another became a vital ingredient in promoting and protecting security. Individuals assigned as flag and general officers "must be of proven quality and capable of sound judgement." He said they must also "possess broad background, education and training to enable them to deal with issues and problems which transcend the complexities of military science and economics to include key foreign policy considerations." Secondly, he said, and of no less importance, was the efficacy and representational values those key positions conveyed in terms of U.S. commitment to overall U.S. interests in the PACOM

1. JCS 4059/041846Z Nov 77.
2. CINCPAC 192050Z Nov 77.

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area. Incumbents of key positions dealt with their counterparts of the allied nations, who were normally of equal or higher grade. Any grade less than a flag or general officer, CINCPAC said, would de-emphasize the U.S. commitment and place the individual and the organization he represented in "an untenable position."

(U) CINCPAC briefly outlined the increased Soviet threat to U.S. interests in the PACOM, noting that about a quarter of their forces were deployed in the Far East. "Soviet Pacific forces are modern, well-equipped and have been steadily improved in range, mobility and firepower. The Soviet Pacific Fleet is now routinely seen in the East and South China Seas, the South Pacific, the Philippine Sea and the Indian Ocean."

(U) CINCPAC commented on the reductions in flag and general officer positions already accomplished. "While we can always adapt to changes and operate as effectively as we can within the constraints and guidelines established by higher authority, I do not recommend further reduction at this time. It must be understood that any significant reductions in flag and general officer positions presupposes a corresponding reduction in function, forces, and supporting staff. Such a reduction viewed in the context of a continued sizable Soviet presence in the Asia-Pacific area would be perceived by our allies and foes as further weakening of U.S. commitments and resolve."

(C) As another part of the study for the JCS, CINCPAC provided an organization/activity analysis for PACOM headquarters, the subordinate unified commands in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, and the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Groups in Korea and the Philippines. (The position of COMUS Japan was not addressed, however. This billet was dual-hatted, as others were, but carried in Air Force channels for the purpose of this study.) Thus, there were 20 flag and general officer billets, as follows:

Commander in Chief Pacific
Chief of Staff, PACOM
Deputy Chief of Staff, PACOM
Director for Personnel/Inspector General
Director for Intelligence
Director for Operations
Director for Logistics and Security Assistance
Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Plans
Director for Communications-Data Processing

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 240321Z Nov 77.
CINCPAC also had one civilian supergrade position, the Chief of the Research and Analysis Office (J77), a GS-16/PL-313, but the JCS asked that this billet not be included in the study at that time.

CINCPAC next outlined the significant changes in the PACOM since 1964, a period that had witnessed both intensive and evolutionary changes in terms of military requirements and the scope and magnitude of responsibilities within the PACOM. The year 1964 saw the beginning of the buildup in Southeast Asia in which overall PACOM strength went from approximately 455,000 in 1964 to a peak in excess of 1.05 million in 1968. In the post-Vietnam period, U.S. forces had been drawn down to the 1977 level of approximately 330,000. While the military strength had fallen below the 1964 level, the PACOM mission had remained basically unchanged. "On the contrary, the scope and magnitude of the PACOM responsibility has increased significantly as a result of recent developments." These included Unified Command Plan changes in 1972 and 1976 that had enlarged the command. The increasing Soviet threat, as outlined earlier, was repeated. "Added to these are the new directions in U.S. Government policies, i.e., the Korean drawdown and the new China policy, and the greatly expanded economic interests of the U.S. in the Pacific, all of which dictate strong and creative leadership."

Those developments had caused a renewed emphasis on the relevance of mutual security treaties to the peace and stability in the PACOM and to overall U.S. interests. Base negotiations in the Philippines remained an open issue. Such developments and issues impacted upon the day-to-day relationships of key personnel with Asian allies as well as in the planning of the headquarters staff. The stature and experience of general and flag officer personnel were considered to be requisites in maintaining relationships with the allied nations. Such officers were also able to assess and fuse the politico-military implica-
tions stemming from those developments and issues into coherent strategy, policy, and plans in support of the PACOM mission.¹

(C) CINCPAC was also required to propose a position for deletion in the event a two or four percent reduction was to be required (at least one such position). In both percentage cases, for the PACOM headquarters, the reduction would concern one position, that of the Deputy Director for Plans, which would be downgraded from brigadier general to colonel, both Army. Such a reduction, it was explained, would significantly reduce the flexibility of the Director for Plans, curtailing his extensive travel in order that CINCPAC headquarters decisions concerning plans and policies requiring general/flag officer attention not be unnecessarily delayed. Curtailment of such travel, however, would degrade the maintenance of "those close, personal relationships with officials in the PACOM area requisite to solidify strategy and policy formulations." Additionally, the Deputy Director served as the senior PACOM representative to ANZUS staff level meetings; downgrading of the position would signal a lowering of U.S. interest in the alliance system.²

(U) The detailed profiles on all flag and general officer positions were also provided, for the 20 positions listed above.³

(U) The JCS request in that regard had contained a number of specifics, all of which were covered in the profiles. Included were the title and organization; grade required; whether the position was required by statute, Presidential executive order, or international agreement; grade of incumbent as of 30 Sep 77; whether the position was an "assistant to" or a one-for-one deputy; when a general/flag officer had first been assigned to the billet; whether the grade had changed since July 1972; whether the position had been filled since July 1972 by other than a flag or general officer (other than a rotation gap); whether the position could be filled by a civilian and if not, why not; how the work and responsibility would be reassigned if it could not be filled by a flag or general officer and what would be the effect of such a change on the accomplishment of national security missions; and a ranking of 16 specific criteria in the order in which they were most relevant to the grade requirement for each particular position and a brief description of the application of those criteria. This information, as explained above, was provided on 24 November.⁴

(U) A parallel request for flag and general officer information was received

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 240319Z and 240320Z Nov 77.
4. Ibid.
by the PACOM headquarters from the Navy's Field Support Activity in Washington, but this was cancelled and CINCPAC reported in accordance with JCS requirements.  

Grade Structure of Senior Military Commanders on Taiwan

On 25 February the JCS advised that the National Emergencies Act required that the Navy identify a number of vice admiral billets for downgrading or elimination. They advised that the billet of COMUSTDC was under consideration for downgrading to rear admiral, and requested CINCPAC's views.

On 2 March CINCPAC provided the impact it was anticipated would occur if the billet were downgraded. CINCPAC first addressed counterpart relationships in peacetime. As a three-star officer, COMUSTDC was treated as an equal and had direct access to the highest military levels in the Ministry of National Defense and the individual services. He was also able to exert considerable influence and leverage in activities and policies of the Government of the Republic of China (GROC) by virtue of his seniority and expertise. In wartime, in the matter of counterpart relationships, an experienced three-star commander on scene would facilitate the rapid assimilation of augmenting forces. Particular questions of seniority would be avoided where components would be equal in rank to COMUSTDC as a two-star billet. Upon execution of OPLAN ROCHESTER (a bilateral plan for the mutual defense of Taiwan and the Penghus [let]) COMUSTDC was to assume Operational Control of a significant number of GROC forces—for example, all air defense forces. As a three-star this would be easy because COMUSTDC was senior to ROC Air Force commanders and accepted on a level with the ROC Chief of General Staff. On the level of relationships with higher commands, a three-star subunified commander enjoyed a larger acquaintance and probably wider acceptance of views than would a two-star commander.

In the matter of perceived relationships, specifically pertaining to the Mutual Defense Treaty, CINCPAC advised the JCS that in spite of the impact of base closures, force reductions, and the erosion of the U.S. presence on Taiwan, a strong case had been made to the GROC that U.S. intentions under the Mutual Defense Treaty were unwavering. Downgrading the USTDC billet would weaken that assertive position and could possibly be perceived by the GROC as a lessening of U.S. resolve under the treaty provisions. CINCPAC recommended that COMUSTDC be retained as a three-star billet.

On 12 March CINCPAC provided rationale to the JCS regarding the grade of the Chief of Staff billet, recommending that that billet remain a brigadier

1. FLDSUPPACT Washington DC 031943Z, 041500Z and 042110Z Nov 77.
2. JCS 3157/250040Z Feb 77.
3. CINCPAC 022156Z Mar 77.
general. He noted that a brigadier general chief of staff acting in support of COMUSTDC was given direct access to the highest military and GROC officials. In this capacity he was able to exert "considerable influence and leverage" in GROC policies by virtue of being a general officer. The importance of having a general officer acting for COMUSTDC, in his absence, on sensitive issues was stressed, for the same reasons that had been outlined by CINCPAC in his 2 May discussion of the grade of COMUSTDC. CINCPAC continued that the close working relationships and acceptance of views then being enjoyed by the chief of staff would be greatly reduced if the billet were downgraded. He did concur, however, with changing the billet for the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group China to an 06 upon rotation of the incumbent.¹

(8) On 14 March CINCPAC provided further rationale for the continued assignment of an Air Force general officer as Chief of Staff, which had been provided by COMUSTDC. "The most pressing and vital problem for the ROC national defense is air defense." He noted that until a year earlier there had been three USAF generals on Taiwan to counsel, train, and assist the ROC air force on air warfare matters; only one remained. "As long as the Commander USTDC is charged with the defense of Taiwan, he will need the support of an able, broadly experienced right hand to advise him on the intricacies of the Air Force and air warfare. In my opinion a general is required to do the job." CINCPAC advised that his headquarters concurred with the opinions of COMUSTDC.²

(8) On 27 May, however, the JCS advised that the President had approved that the billet of COMUSTDC would be downgraded to 08 and that the billets of Chief of Staff and MAAG Chief would be downgraded to 06, all upon rotation of incumbents. When the assignment of the new COMUSTDC, Rear Admiral James B. Linder, USN, was announced, the public affairs guidance stated that, if queried, the reduction was to be considered as part of a Department of Defense requirement to reduce the number of senior flag and general officers in all of the Services.³

(U) Late in the year the matter of Service of the MAAG Chief was addressed. The office had been held by a Navy 06 to provide a higher degree of stability and continuity during the transition to a reduced size MAAG. In accordance with regular triennial review of Security Assistance billets in 1975, however, the position remained an Army billet. With the departure of the Navy incumbent filling the Army position, it would become an Air Force billet, the Service that alternated with the Army in the manning of that space.⁴

1. CINCPAC 120321Z Mar 77.
2. CINCPAC 142117Z Mar 77.
3. JCS 4191/272126Z May 77; CINCPAC 141945Z Jun 77.
4. CINCPAC 240106Z Dec 77.
SECRET

SECTION IV--COMMAND AND CONTROL

Commanders' Conference

On 22 and 23 June CINCPAC attended a conference convened by the Chairman of the JCS and held at the headquarters of the Military Airlift Command, newest of the unified and specified commands, at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. This conference was attended by the Secretary of Defense as well as the Service Chiefs and the commanders of the unified and specified commands. At the Chairman's request, Admiral Weisner lead a discussion of defense interests and command relationships in Africa south of the Sahara.

CINCPAC noted that Communist successes in the recent past had provided evidence of a coordinated and aggressive Soviet interventionist policy in Africa. This situation served to highlight the inadequacy of the U.S. policy of "hands off--low profile." CINCPAC believed the National Command Authorities should be encouraged to focus on Africa and develop long-range policy that would enhance the U.S. position and counter Soviet penetration. Of more immediate importance, CINCPAC believed, was the need for action to insure that U.S. military activities were coordinated and carefully orchestrated to obtain maximum benefit from the limited resources available.

CINCPAC also recommended that Sub-Saharan Africa be assigned to a unified commander. The last change to the Unified Command Plan, on 1 May 1976, continued previous policy in which that part of Africa and the Malagasy Republic were not assigned to any unified commander. CINCPAC recommended that such responsibility be assigned to the U.S. Readiness Command (his first choice) or the U.S. European Command. A unified commander would be responsible for evaluating and making recommendations regarding intelligence collection and production requirements; integrating security assistance and other area responsibilities with contingency planning; providing an interface with national military leadership; acting as a focal point for national leadership to express views and to attempt to influence U.S. policy; providing the U.S. point of view to African nations and promoting friendly relations with the military and their governments; and coordinating military activities, good will tours, and VIP visits to insure the best use of limited U.S. resources. This subject is discussed in greater detail in the Planning chapter of this history.

1. JCS 4907/281714Z May 77 (EX); ADMIN CINCPAC 220015Z Jun 77, which retransmitted as ALFA 061 JCS 212257Z Jun 77.
Clarification of PACOM Boundaries

The Unified Command Plan revision that had been effective on 1 May 1976 had enlarged the command westward to include the entire Indian Ocean area, including the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf of Aden. The plan, however, did not define the geographic extent of those gulfs, specifically the lines of demarcation between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Without knowing specific lines of demarcation, potential problems could have occurred between the PACOM and the European Command, which had responsibility for the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. CINCPAC requested that the JCS verify the lines of demarcation. CINCPAC noted that it was his understanding that the Defense Intelligence Agency was the Defense Department agency responsible for standardization of geopolitical data elements and area identifications. DIA Manual 65-18 of 29 Sep 72 had defined the lines as follows:

- Red Sea-Gulf of Aden: a line joining Ra's Hisn Murad (12°40'N, 43°30'E) and Ras Siyan (12°29'N, 43°20'E).

- Persian Gulf-Gulf of Oman: a line joining Ras Liman (25°57'N), on the coast of Arabia and Damagheh-ye Kuh (25°48'N) on the coast of Iran.¹

On 3 December the JCS advised that the boundaries were as CINCPAC had identified them.²

MAC Designated Specified Command

On 1 February the Secretary of Defense designated the Military Airlift Command, headquartered at Scott Air Force Base in Belleville, Illinois, a specified command that reported to the President through the Secretary of Defense. Other unified and specified commands in 1977 were the Aerospace Defense Command, the Readiness Command, the Strategic Air Command, and the regional Atlantic, European, Southern, and Pacific Commands.³

Command Center Modernization Project

As reported in the 1976 Command History, a new and larger Command Center was to be constructed to improve current operations and accommodate other

² JCS 7865/030120Z Dec 77.
³ SECDEF 7388/012249Z Feb 77.
planned system improvements. The project was part of the Navy's Military Construction program for FY 78 and budgeted at $4.2 million. It was expected that the project would be completed by July 1980. During the construction phase, the offices of the Directors for Intelligence and Operations were to be moved to space that had been used by Intelligence Center Pacific personnel and vacated as they moved into their newly refurbished spaces in Building 20. This was expected to take place in the late summer of 1978. In 1977 numerous meetings were held with personnel of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Pacific Division; the Naval Shore Electronic Engineering Activity, Pacific; and architects to define security, public address, communications, and other systems that had to be integrated into the architect's design.

One of the problems confronting CINCPAC in the command center modernization was establishment of space requirements for equipment for two related projects: command and control communications support of a remote or joint task force, whether fixed or air-sea-ground mobile, operating anywhere in the PACOM, and a quality secure voice and record conferencing capability at all major PACOM command facilities, including those remote or joint task forces wherever they operated, and the National Military Command Center. By the end of 1977 the secure voice conferencing capability was provided by a digital conferencing unit. Record conferencing, using the Automatic Digital Network with a MOD 40/8 teletype terminal, was expected to be accomplished early in 1978.

As reported in the 1975 Command History, part of the Command Center modernization was to be a program called CINDIS. The CINDIS, the CINCPAC Information Processing and Display System and Operations/Intelligence Interface, was described by the Operations Directorate as an "internal capability to receive, process and distribute information and displays required for dynamic command and control during both daily routine and crisis operations. System concept of operations specifies that it be responsive to requirements ranging through crisis, contingency and nuclear operations and operate in an SI (Special Intelligence) high mode."

Technical Assistance and Cost Estimate (TA/CE) responsibilities had been assigned to the Navy. Late in 1976 CINCPAC had advised of his intent to reevaluate requirements to reduce costs. The JCS endorsed this in-house effort. In May the study received CINCPAC's approval and the reduced effort, called the PACOM Crisis Action Information Distribution System, or PACAIDS, was validated.

by the JCS in August. The Navy had initiated plans to find funds for this project, the first goal to be funding for the FY 78 portion (approximately $300,000 to $500,000) of the PACAIDS system engineering design and integration study. The Navy had obtained $60,000 of excess FY 77 funds and used them to bring the Naval Electronics Systems Command (NAVELEX) into the project. During October representatives of that command visited CINCPAC. The Operations Directorate subsequently prepared a PACAIDS "concept of operations" to explain the interrelationships of the PACAIDS equipment and the command center personnel. It was to aid NAVELEX in understanding what this headquarters wanted PACAIDS to do and how it was expected that PACAIDS would be used. That concept was forwarded to NAVELEX in November, and CINCPAC officers visited Washington in December to discuss the on-going program. Work continued.  

R2DC3

(U) The Command and Control System Master Plan had stated a general requirement for an air-sea-land transportable command center for a joint task force commander and his staff. The Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) architecture study had been a two-year effort that resulted in Defense Department direction to the Services to develop nine capabilities to enhance joint command and control. One of those tools, which remained under study throughout 1977, was the requirement for a Rapid Reaction Deployable Command Control Communication Capability, or, as it was called, R2DC3.  

Automated Message Processing System and Military Message Experiment

(U) The Military Message Experiment (MME) was a joint CINCPAC-Navy-Advanced Research Projects Agency program designed to improve and speed the handling of message traffic during crisis or contingency operations for the Command Center and associated staff support activities. The MME was expected to provide the "baseline" for the automated message required operating capability that was another of the CINDIS goals. The MME was to be used for general service message traffic to the Top Secret level. A user of the system would be able to scan, read, file, retrieve, compose, annotate, and forward messages. Numerous problems were encountered with software developments, however. The USC/Information Sciences Institute "Sigma" software had been selected. The Local Digital Message Exchange link to the MME was successfully completed in June and training

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid. (The historian has not been able to determine if there is a connection between this acronym and a popular motion picture of this time, "Star Wars," which featured two robots: R2D2 and C3PO).
of actual MME participants began at that time. The terminal and printer installation in the Operations Directorate's administrative offices was completed in late October, but proved to be unsatisfactory. A filter modification was being designed for the terminal to preclude emanations beyond four meters and provide sufficient "attenuation" to comply with security policy. The costs were about $2 million a year for FY 76, 77, and 78, split about half-and-half between the Navy and the Advanced Research Projects Agency.\(^1\)

**CINCPAC Alternate Command Post**

(U) On 11 January the final communication system was connected to the Emergency Action Console in the new CINCPAC-Alternate Command Post, which had been activated at Hickam Air Force Base on 15 October 1976, replacing the former Alternate Command Facility at Kunia. Thus the Alternate Command Post (ALCOP), located in Building 2155, was fully operational. It utilized the working area normally occupied by the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post staff and battle staff crewmembers. The ALCOP was to provide working space and communications for a command center watch team at the primary CINCPAC Command Center at Camp Smith was disabled due to fire, power failure, etc., during peacetime. In the event a crisis situation was in progress when the primary command center was disabled, the ALCOP could also provide working space for the CINC and a very austere support staff.\(^2\)

(U) As discussed above, the Kunia Alternate Command Facility had been phased out. In October 1976 operations there had terminated. Early in 1977 the Fleet Operations Control Center (FOCCPAC) continued in existence pending approval from the Secretary of the Navy to decommission the facility. Permission from Congress had to be obtained on all base and facility closures. Support responsibility transferred to the Naval Air Station at Barbers Point as FOCCPAC personnel were reassigned. Finally Congress approved the closure and the Secretary of the Navy advised of official closure effective 31 March. All major systems had been turned off except for a pumping system that fed water to irrigate the pineapple fields above the underground facility. The Navy Facilities Engineering Command, Pacific Division was to handle negotiations for disposition of the facility, which would first be offered to the other Services, then the State of Hawaii, and, if not taken by a government agency, would revert to the private land ownership of the Campbell Estate.\(^3\)

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1. Ibid.
Airborne Command Post Activities

(U) CINCPAC's Airborne Command Post maintained the ground alert status that had begun in January 1970, prior to which it had maintained a continuous airborne alert for some years. The Airborne Command Post was called BLUE EAGLE.

1. ABNCP HistSums Jan-Dec 77.
3. ABNCP HistSums Jan-May 77.
4. ABNCP HistSums Jan-Dec 77.
1. ABNCP HistSum Aug 77.
2. ABNCP HistSums Jan, Feb, and Nov 77.
1. CINCPAC 220326Z Oct 77.
2. ABNCP HistSum Sep 77.
SECTION V—U.S. FORCES AND BASES OVERSEAS

Forces and Basing in Japan

U.S. bases in Japan that had numbered 3,848 in 1952 were down to fewer than 125 by 1977. Personnel strength, which had numbered almost 400,000 in 1952, was down to less than 45,000 by 1977. The reductions had been largely in response to technological advances, political-military developments in Asia, and U.S. budgetary constraints. In reducing facilities, the United States had attempted to consolidate the base structure around a "core" of facilities, which would allow the United States to implement the Security Treaty and carry out contingency functions.

Certain specific actions regarding forces and basing in 1977 are described in the material that follows. The sensitivity of planning for changes in forces or basing had been a CINCPAC concern for many years. Also, CINCPAC had sought to achieve a coordinated approach, to avoid the problems generated by the Services acting unilaterally. This concern had been not only for dealings with the Japanese, but because the Services were sometimes dependent on one another for support.

3. SECDEF 100049Z Dec 77.
The closure of Tachikawa Air Base had been anticipated for some time. In July 1976 the Air Force Chief of Staff had deferred such closure from 30 April 1977 to 30 September 1977. The programmed reversion of the base to Japanese control was to be declassified upon notification of the Japanese government and public announcement.¹

Tachikawa had been part of the Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan, in which the United States had released major facilities in the area in exchange for replacement facilities constructed by the Japanese at Yokota Air Base. The East Tachikawa Air Base had been released in 1973; this was the runway and warehousing area. The area scheduled for release in the fall of 1977 was the West Tachikawa Air Base, which consisted of family housing.²

In July 1976 when CINCPACAF had advised CINCPAC of the Air Force approval to extend occupancy of Tachikawa until November 1977 he had requested that CINCPAC take action to notify the Japanese government. CINCPAC requested that COMUS Japan provide such notification, but COMUS Japan deferred the notification pending completion of local plans for announcing RIFs and unit deactivations.³

On 29 July 1977 CINCPACAF advised of housing shortfalls in the Kanto Plain area as U.S. operated facilities reverted to Japan. To compensate for the housing shortage, the Air Force determined that it was appropriate to assess the feasibility of retaining a portion of Tachikawa housing in view of the USAF intent to relocate some units from the Philippines to Yokota. CINCPACAF requested that CINCPAC initiate discussions through COMUS Japan with the Japan Defense Agency to effect a three-year delay in reversion of Tachikawa housing. CINCPACAF advised that the State Department was aware of the USAF requirement and was soliciting comments from the Ambassador in Tokyo.⁴

1. CSAF 081340Z Jul 76; J5323 HistSum Sep 77.
3. COMUS Japan 060520Z Aug 76.
4. CINCPACAF 290350Z Jul 77.
CINCPAC passed the COMUS Japan recommendation that retention no longer be considered a viable option to all concerned; CINCPAC concurred. He requested that COMUS Japan continue development of alternate solutions to Air Force as well as other Service housing problems with the Japanese in view of their sympathetic attitudes and offer of assistance in connection with the study of Tachikawa. Reversion took place as scheduled.³

Marine Corps personnel and equipment came under study in 1976 and 1977 as the Corps studied various means of reducing personnel turbulence while maintaining a high state of unit readiness. On 15 February the JCS advised that the Marine Corps Commandant proposed to deploy WESTPAC Marine Amphibious Units (MAU) from the 1st Marine Brigade in Hawaii on temporary additional duty instead of drawing from the 3rd Marine Division on Okinawa. The concept was to deploy one MAU (approximately 1,700 Marines) deploying every six months from the 1st Brigade to form the 31st MAU aboard Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) ALPHA shipping. Then one infantry battalion (minus) (reinforced) was to redeploy from the 3rd Marine Division on Okinawa to the 1st Marine Division in California to preclude exceeding current force levels in Japan. This battalion would represent the ground element of the MAU and would be replaced by the rotating battalion from the 1st Marine Brigade. One helicopter squadron (18 CH-46s) was to redeploy from Okinawa to Hawaii. This squadron was to represent the

1. CINCPAC 022252Z Aug 77; COMUS Japan 050725Z Aug 77; CINCPAC 102050Z Aug 77; SECSTATE 190758/120201Z Aug 77.
2. COMUS Japan 070203Z Sep 77.
3. CINCPAC 151859Z Sep 77.
nucleus of the existing aviation element of the MAU and required assignment to
the 1st Marine Brigade to provide the deployment base for the rotational MAU. The JCS recognized that the projected deployment "every six months" would likely be exceeded in the initial deployments because of amphibious shipping constraints. Only the initial redeploying battalion would return to the 1st Marine Division; subsequent redeploying battalions would return to Hawaii and be replaced by 1st Marine Brigade battalions.

The JCS anticipated no adverse reaction from the Japanese regarding the Marine troop movements, provided that the total force structure remained essentially the same as it had been. He reiterated the sensitivity of the Japanese to unilateral Service activities, again recommending the consolidated position approach. "Proposals of this nature must be fully explained to the GOJ in order to prevent misunderstanding and reduce possible exploitation by the press." He requested that his headquarters be authorized to brief Japanese officials on the proposed USMC force adjustments. 2

The initial deployments began in October, as scheduled. 3

In 1976 the subject of augmenting forces in Europe with two USMC Amphibious Brigades was studied, with CINCPAC stating that preparing for such operations appeared operationally and logistically undesirable. He had requested a change in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, but none had been made in the next revision of that document. In June 1977 the JCS, in response to a CINCPAC query, advised that there were no existing or proposed plans to move a Marine brigade from Okinawa to Europe. Consideration was being given in Washington, however, to basing a Marine brigade in the United Kingdom by shifting one from Okinawa or CONUS. That proposal was being studied by the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense within the concept of NATO long-term defense initiatives. 4

In October the Chief of Naval Operations asked CINCPACFLT to comment on the feasibility and desirability of basing an MAB in the United Kingdom. For his reply CINCPACFLT assumed that the source of the brigade in question was the PACOM, and would include all notional equipment and associated amphibious lift. CINCPACFLT did not support the proposal, citing the already marginal capability of PACOM forces to execute national strategy at a prudent level of risk. "Any further incremental action, particularly the loss of amphibious forces to support a UK forward based MAB would seriously impinge upon PACFLT

1. JCS 411B/151808Z Feb 77.
2. COMUS Japan 230747Z Feb 77, 020901Z Mar 77.
3. CINCPACFLT 220444Z Oct 77.
combat readiness and is unacceptable." Such a move would seriously impact on the Amphibious Ready Group and Battalion Landing Team/MAU forward afloat deployments, completely invalidating existing plans and policies by reducing the power projection capabilities of PACFLT, and also on the unit deployment program, discussed above, which would be infeasible if amphibious shipping were reduced and Fleet Marine Force units transferred.

(C) CINCPACFLT continued that the political implications involved in removing an MAB would directly affect the Korea withdrawal program, as well as "perceptions of U.S. allies and potential adversaries in regard to the constancy of our stated commitments to Asian allies." The CINCPAC OPLAN in support of European contingencies had already identified a requirement for the PACOM to provide two MABs (one to Iceland, the other to the Azores). "The preliminary transfer of one MAB to UK would necessitate the drawdown on residual FMF forces to a level which would virtually terminate all planning for large-scale amphibious actions." He continued:

... The fragmentation of PACOM combat power by transferring ships and FMF units/equipment to the NATO environs appears to be beyond prudent risk. While the primacy of the NATO theater is recognized, history shows that the PACOM theater has consistently required the availability of FMF and amphibious forces. The future shows no diminution of the requirement for these forces. It is considered prudent to continue the existing force balance in PACOM, thus supporting those national objectives encompassed by the ground force withdrawal from Korea and the visible support of our Asian allies, as well as maintaining in-theater combat readiness and forces ready for deployment to NATO. Accordingly, a course of action which would reduce PACFLT FMF and amphibious forces is not supported.

(U) No forces were deployed out of the command in this connection in 1977.

Forces and Basing in Korea

(U) In his successful Presidential campaign in 1976, Jimmy Carter promised to withdraw, eventually, U.S. ground forces from Korea. He planned to withdraw the nearly 32,000 troops over a four or five year period. The political implications of this decision are addressed in the Political-Military Relationships chapter of this history and the measures to strengthen the Republic of Korea's military forces to counter the North Korean threat are discussed in the Security

1. CINCPACFLT 220444Z Oct 77.
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Assistance chapter. The account that follows will address redeployment planning, certain withdrawal offset measures, and command arrangements and relationships.

A discussion of the early planning took place among senior members of the PACOM staff and Mr. John F. Lally, Chief Counsel of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, in June 1977. That committee was looking into matters raised by MAJ GEN John K. Singlaub, USA, former Chief of Staff of the United Nations Command/U.S. Forces Korea, who had been relieved of that position by President Carter for speaking out against the withdrawal. In response to questions from Mr. Lally, the following information was provided.1

CINCPAC had first been informed of the withdrawal (other than media reports) on 2 February 1977, when the Plans Directorate of the JCS informed the CINCPAC Plans Directorate of impending interagency review (Presidential Review Memorandum 13) of U.S. policy regarding Korea. Subsequently various options were developed and examined by appropriate staffs. Limitations in each were surfaced, as were improvements needed in the ROK forces to compensate for the withdrawal. Between 10 March and 26 April these options were examined. PACOM had not been asked specifically, however, whether the forces should be withdrawn. The status quo had not been offered as an option. The PACOM had expressed concern regarding various options, commenting on the timing and limitations of each, and pointing out the various risks involved (as will be discussed later). COMUS Korea had expressed similar reservations regarding the various options. The announced target was based on options for withdrawal by December 1980, July 1981, or June 1982. It was believed that July 1982 provided the best option to minimize risks. At the time of this discussion, June 1977, no detailed plan had been approved. Mr. Lally asked if Admiral Weisner still held the view he had presented in Washington that North Korea would view the U.S. withdrawal as a lessening of resolve, and whether a lessening of resolve increased the probability of attack by North Korea. The Chief of Staff had replied that while he could not provide the Admiral’s personal view, North Korea would have to consider the impact of compensating actions that accompanied the withdrawal. In closing discussions it was noted that once the decision had been made, “we must carry out such decisions in best possible way.”2

Also in June, the Secretary of State provided rationale for the withdrawal to embassies around the world. The Secretary’s message is quoted:3

1. CINCPAC 220910Z Jun 77.
2. Ibid.
3. SECSTATE 130459Z/070040Z Jun 77.
...After careful review of U.S. Force presence in Korea, USG has concluded that a phased withdrawal of U.S. ground forces over a four to five year period is acceptable and feasible. The first increment will be withdrawn in 1978. Our ground force presence in Korea was never meant to be permanent; its purpose was to assist the maintenance of the military balance. We believe that by the time the withdrawal is completed the ROK will have a creditable defense capability on the ground. U.S. Air Forces will remain in Korea and we will continue to provide naval and logistic support. Our treaty commitment to the security of the ROK is, of course, unchanged. With this commitment and our support we are confident the military balance in the peninsula can be maintained.

...Our decision to resume withdrawal reflects the increasing ability of the ROK to defend itself. The ROK economy has grown enormously in the last few years and the ROK has made great progress in modernizing its military establishment. We plan to continue strengthening ROK forces during the withdrawal period and will also continue our support for the development of its defense industries. We intend that the ROK will be fully capable of resisting an attack on the ground from North Korea by the time that we have completed withdrawal.

...The withdrawal will be carried out in a way which will not lead to instability on the peninsula. We will also assure Pyongyang, as well as the PRC and the USSR, understands that our commitment to Korean security is undiminished.

...We intend full consultations on the troop withdrawal with the ROK and will also keep the GOJ fully informed of our plans. These consultations began with the recent visit of Under Secretary [of State Philip C.] Habib and [Chairman of the JCS] General George Brown to Seoul and Tokyo. Although the Koreans have well known reservations about our withdrawal, they have accepted it. They agreed that with appropriate materiel assistance Korea would be able to assume its own ground defense. The ROKG has accepted our outline for ground force withdrawal and we will continue close consultations on it.

(U) The view from COMUS Korea's perspective was presented in an interview with reporters from the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune in August. He outlined publicly known specifics of the withdrawal plan and the accompanying
pledge that it would be done without impairing ROK security. There were thus two parts to the withdrawal: one that it was to be done slowly, in such a fashion that it did not upset security; the second was to improve the ROK forces so that in a few years they would be able to do what combined U.S. and ROK forces could have done in 1977. Asked about the impact of withdrawal on tensions in Korea, COMUS Korea pointed out that North Korea's Kim Il-sung had had, since the 1953 armistice agreement, a major policy objective of getting the U.S. Forces out of Korea. The withdrawal had not changed North Korea's goal of unifying Korea under Kim's leadership. When newsmen asked about pitfalls of the withdrawal for both the United States and the ROK, he said there were risks in changing our policy; obviously there were risks involved in going in any direction. "Our job, in essence, is to help President Carter's vision of the future come true, but none of us control all the wires that will assemble the props on that stage five years from now. Lots of hurdles to jump over between now and then to have the stable, peaceful situation Mr. Carter envisions. Need Congressional support for improving the ROK forces. The most unpredictable element in the whole equation is Kim Il-sung. He's unpredictable--one of the uncertainties." Asked if the ROK was basically equipped in the summer of 1977 to handle a war by itself, COMUS Korea said that the margin was too close for him to be comfortable at that time, "No one is suggesting that Korea go it by itself today. The margin with the U.S. Forces here today is adequate."

(U) COMUS Korea noted that he had been very concerned about the withdrawal initially, but that the President had "assumed away" his concerns. The President had listened to him and when he made his public announcement, Mr. Carter said the United States would withdraw in a fashion that would not upset peace and security. "So I have no quarrel with that. That's our objective here." When asked what could be done to allay ROK concern, COMUS Korea said we don't need more words, we need action. "We will show by our actions--the way we carry out the program to help the Koreans--that our commitment is solid. The Koreans had expressed two fundamental concerns: they heard us say we are going to remain a Pacific power, but they look at what we are doing and our actions seem to say we're moving the power we have out of the Pacific, that's one sentiment. The other sentiment they express is whether we are in fact going to take on the difficult chore of helping them with defense needs that will enable the Koreans to have a force that has the same deterrent capability that the present combined U.S.-ROK force has."

(U) It was thus in this philosophical framework that redeployment planning began in earnest.

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1. COMUS Korea 040130Z Aug 77.
2. Ibid.
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One matter that had already been decided, however, was the status of the SERGEANT Missile Battalion. As noted in the 1976 CINCPAC Command History, this battalion was to be deactivated, the HONEST JOHN battalion was to be transferred to the ROK, and thus the 4th Missile Command was to be deactivated, all in the FY 77-78 time frame. On 19 February 1977 the JCS directed that CINCPAC, in coordination with the Ambassador in Seoul, inform appropriate Korean authorities about inactivation of the SERGEANT battalion. This had been the last remaining SERGEANT battalion in the U.S. Army, and had been in Korea for over 13 years. Other weapons systems had come into use that performed SERGEANT's missions, without the increasingly difficult personnel and logistics support for this older system. This action had been programmed well before the 1976 Presidential campaign and had no relation to the President's force withdrawal plans. The 306 authorized spaces were deleted. There was to be no advance public announcement of the inactivation, which was completed on 30 May 1977.

Redeployment Planning

U.S. Forces in Korea in the summer of 1977 were as follows. The Army had Eighth Army headquarters at Seoul, the 2nd Infantry Division at Camp Casey, the 4th Missile Command (scheduled for deactivation in FY 78) at Camp Page, the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Osan Air Base, the 17th Aviation Group which consisted of six separate companies, and the I Corps (U.S.-ROK) Group Headquarters at Camp Red Cloud.

The Air Forces Korea/314th Air Division Headquarters was at Osan Air Base, as was the 51st Composite Wing, which consisted of one tactical fighter squadron (24 F-4Es) and one tactical air support squadron (16 OV-10s). The division's second wing was the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, at Kunsan Air Base, which had two tactical fighter squadrons (36 F-4Ds).

The Commander, Naval Forces Korea had his headquarters at Seoul, but no U.S. Navy combat forces were permanently assigned in Korea.2

Total Army strength at that time was approximately 32,000. The first formal JCS memorandum regarding reductions was promulgated on 14 May. It addressed the composition, timing, and impact of four redeployment "packages," as follows. Package I called for withdrawal of 6,000 troops by 31 December.  

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1978; Package II an additional 9,000 by 31 July 1980; Package III, remaining U.S. ground forces to be withdrawn by either December 1980, July 1981, or June 1982; and Package IV, the ultimate residual force.

(8) COMUS Korea's organizations nominated to fulfill the 6,000 requirement in Package I included two infantry battalions from the 2nd Infantry Division, a field artillery battalion, a forward support company, a medical company, an engineering company, an HONEST JOHN battalion, and the conversion of one infantry battalion to an armored battalion. These spaces totaled 2,870. Non-divisional units included the 2nd Engineer Group Headquarters, the 44th Engineer Battalion, and the 6th Ordnance Battalion, for another 1,071 spaces. Previously programmed reductions in the 4th Missile Command, including SERGEANT and HONEST JOHN, as discussed above, the 51st Signal Battalion, a NIKE HERCULES Air Defense Artillery battalion, and the headquarters and some units of the 2nd Transportation Group provided another 2,139 spaces, for a grand total of 6,080.2

(8) COMUS Korea noted that the force could not be identified with "reasonable precision at this time," as there were many considerations, including the nature and places of redeployment, consideration of heraldry, availability of lift, decision on armistice maintenance, and disposition of equipment. The same considerations applied to timing of the moves.

(8) Regarding impact, COMUS Korea said that the one-third reduction of the 2nd Division would have military significance beyond the numbers alone. The artillery and infantry battalions removed could not in programmed time frames be replaced by increased ROK Army capabilities. "Even this initial step upsets the tenuous military balance." The HAWK withdrawal required ROK/U.S. willingness to accelerate Improved HAWK absorption. Withdrawal of the transportation capability would require either ROK assumption of the highway transportation mission or the provision of additional funds to perform the mission by contract. He also noted, "The perceptions of others of what will be judged to be the first step down the slippery slope of withdrawal could, if not properly orchestrated, result in major sacrifices of essential security interests. The impact on ROK, regional and world wide considerations of the U.S. willingness to meet challenges to its interests and credibility of U.S. commitments will not be favorable." COMUS Korea next outlined the other three force packages requested by the JCS.3

2. COMUSK 090747Z May 77. (While formal memorandum tasking had not been dispatched until 14 May, there had been countless messages on the subject of withdrawals and this COMUS Korea message was in reply to JCS 2016/061900Z May 77 and CINCPAC 0622112Z May 77.)
3. Ibid.
COMUS Korea believed a few points deserved further stress. Most important, he said, "the withdrawals from the ROK specifically, and Northeast Asia in general, without complete, total, and mutual understandings between the U.S. Government and the governments of our allies--European as well as Asian--could create serious international apprehensions concerning U.S. interests in the Pacific basin." Also, one area that could be exploited to maintain credibility and to protect against the burden of militarily supporting hostilities in the ROK involved the stockpiling of adequate reserves of war reserve materiel and war reserve stocks for allies in Korea. "One of our generally recognized planning shortfall areas is just how we would support, in an adequate and timely fashion, those forces which we are all agreed would be required over here." He also addressed the effect of the withdrawals on the local economy, especially the impacts that a perceived loss of confidence in the future prospects of the ROK by the international investment community could have. Such international perceptions could result in loss to the ROK of investments, credits, contracts, short and long term loans, etc., which could have immediate and lasting, "perhaps irreparable," effects on the ROK economic growth rate and gross national product, and, thus, on their ability to fund the additional military capabilities which they required to offset the loss to the country of U.S. ground forces.1

As options regarding the withdrawal came under study and several urgent taskings were received from the JCS, CINCPAC formed an ad hoc committee, chaired by a Plans Directorate officer. Other members were from other PACOM staff agencies, the Air Force and Navy component commands, and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group. The committee provided a means of timely exchange of information among the various representatives as required.2

At this time CINCPAC recommended certain withdrawal offset measures, such as an expanded exercise program and temporary Air Force deployments; these are discussed later.3

The plan for withdrawal was prepared by the JCS, based on the various recommendations, and forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On 25 August, that office, by memorandum, advised:4

...Ground force withdrawal increments will consist of 6,000 spaces (to include one brigade of the 2nd Division) by 31 December 1978, an additional 9,000 spaces by 30 June 1980, and the remainder (to include 7,000 divisional spaces, ...
the 2nd Division headquarters and two brigades) in 4 to 5 years. A small residual ground element will remain to provide necessary support functions.

The JCS had been requested to refine first increment withdrawal timing and composition. They requested a list of units (to the Unit Identification Code level of detail) to be redeployed or transferred (to include separate companies), the associated spaces for each unit, and the timing of the redeployment or transfer.

(U) COMUS Korea (Commander, U.S. Eighth Army) provided the requested information on 15 September. CINCPAC concurred on 22 September with the first withdrawal increments. 1

(5) On 7 December COMUS Korea submitted the makeup of his proposed second withdrawal increment: 4,270 spaces from the 2nd Division and 4,730 spaces from non-divisional Army units. This met the goal of identifying 9,000 spaces. 2

(5) CINCPAC supported the COMUS Korea proposal on 23 December, offering certain comments. The COMUS Korea recommendation had the 2nd Division retain 7,679 spaces upon completion of the second withdrawal increment, exceeding the 7,000 ceiling established by the JCS in October. This was considered, however, the smallest acceptable structure. CINCPAC agreed that 7,700 was marginal. Every combat element remaining would be manned at reduced levels and CINCPAC believed the two-brigade division "must be a viable organization." He noted that approval of this second increment would reduce the U.S. air defense capability in Korea significantly (which might not be feasible while a U.S. ground combat element remained in Korea). "This appears to be the only way the goal of 9,000 spaces can be achieved...and still maintain a functional U.S. Army force until the final withdrawal." CINCPAC noted that there was serious doubt concerning the feasibility of transferring two Improved HAWK battalions and two aviation companies to the ROK by mid-1980. The training required was technical and lengthy and could not begin until the proposed compensatory actions had been approved. Two Improved HAWK battalions had been programmed under the Security Assistance program, but only one in 1980; acceleration of the second was a potential problem area.

(5) CINCPAC noted that inactivation of the 802d Engineer Battalion removed the last U.S. combat heavy battalion from Korea. "No U.S. Army capability for war damage and airfield repair will be left in-country." CINCPAC concluded that while COMUS Korea's proposal achieved the directed reduction in

1. CDRUSA 150730Z Sep 77; CINCPAC 222043Z Sep 77.
2. COMUS Korea 071023Z Dec 77; J5321 HistSum Dec 77.

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1980, it might require some adjustments, and "it may be prudent to withdraw
less than 9,000 by mid-1980 to assure accomplishment of then existing U.S.
requirements in-country and to allow adequate time for transfer actions." 1

(5) Structure of the Army's residual force in Korea was the subject of a
CINCPAC conference early in December attended by representatives of COMUS Korea,
the Air Force and Navy component commands, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group,
the Fleet Marine Force Pacific, the 5th Air Force, and the 314th Air Division.
The recommendations of the U.S. Forces Korea staff concerning Service function-
al responsibilities were analyzed as a preliminary step to structuring the
force. Conference results were summarized in a message on 12 December. 2

(5) Two factors were highlighted at the conference. No Army spaces in
Korea were excluded from accountability in structuring the 6,000-space residual
force. Also, functional transfers, while reducing Army spaces, would necessi-
tate space increases in Korea for other Services and Defense agencies. There
were 38 specific functions listed in CINCPAC's report on the conference; also
listed were the various functions proposed for other than Army agencies (in-
cluding medical and dental services, police protection, commissaries and ex-
changes, port terminal operations, etc.). 3

(5) When CINCPAC advised the JCS of the conference conclusions he commented
on the fact that the 6,000-space designated residual force had included all
Army functions. He recommended, however, that such activities as the Joint
U.S. Military Assistance Group, the U.S. Army Support Group in the Joint Secu-
rity Area and Armistice Affairs, the Defense Attache Office, and "stovepipe"
organizations be excluded from the ceiling. The "stovepipe" organizations
were those elements such as Engineer agencies, the Special Security Command,
property disposal, etc. CINCPAC said that the tasks of those elements fell
outside the realm of the stated mission of the residual force, and their numbers
(491 spaces at the time) reduced flexibility in the development of a viable
force within existing constraints. CINCPAC subsequently added Headquarters
UNC/USFK and the proposed new Combined Command to the requested exemption from
accountability in the 6,000 ceiling. Those organizations, he said, supported
all U.S. Forces in Korea and should be considered as joint "overhead." 4

(U) No decision had been reached by the end of 1977.

1. CINCPAC 230133Z Dec 77; J5321 HistSum Dec 77.
2. J5321 HistSum Dec 77; CINCPAC 122317Z Dec 77.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 142140Z Dec 77; CINCPAC 300207Z Dec 77.
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Earlier, on 13 July, the JCS had asked for opinions on the sequence and timing of possible withdrawal and disestablishment actions to provide a JCS position for the Secretary of Defense prior to the Security Consultative Meeting. They wanted to know if the Eighth U.S. Army headquarters in Korea should be withdrawn, and if so, when. When should the I Corps (U.S.-ROK) Group be disestablished and the command responsibility transferred to the ROK? What should be the mission of IX Corps? Could the mission of the U.S. company on the Demilitarized Zone be turned over to the ROK, and, if so, what was required to accomplish the turnover and when should it take place?

CINCPAC and COMUS Korea provided recommendations. COMUS Korea said the Eighth Army headquarters should not be withdrawn so long as elements of the 2nd Division remained in Korea. Although it would change in size and form as time passed, "the EUSA HQ and the 2nd Infantry Division symbolize the commitment of the U.S. to the defense of the ROK in the minds of the Korean people." He also said that the I Corps (U.S.-ROK) Group should not be disestablished prior to withdrawal of the final element of the 2nd Division. "Removal...any earlier would sever the U.S. controlled command/OPCON chain to the 2nd Infantry Division, and weaken U.S. CINCUNC (or Combined Command commander [see below]) control in critical western approaches." Regarding the U.S. company on the DMZ, COMUS Korea noted that militarily the company could be withdrawn and its mission assumed by the ROK, but there were several vital factors to be considered in establishing a position of the subject. The matter had been discussed for years. "Total withdrawal of the U.S. Forces from the DMZ could be adversely interpreted by NK as a lessening of U.S. resolve and support of the ROK. This is particularly true at this time when a major concern in the ROK is the impending withdrawal." Specific arrangements would have to be negotiated (the ROK was not a signatory to the Armistice Agreement) to preclude the possibility of a situation in which a non-signatory nation would have operational control of forces in the Joint Security Area. Further:

...The presence of the U.S. company on the DMZ represents a major contribution to the peace keeping and armistice maintenance mission of the UNC. It, more than any other single element, is the actual physical manifestation that the U.S. is committed to maintaining the peace. Practically speaking, this company provides little capability for war fighting and, in this capacity, could be replaced by ROK unit. The real question to be answered is not whether the mission could be turned over to the ROK...It is the command's position that the U.S.

1. JCS 3556/132351Z Jul 77. See the Political-Military Relationships Chapter of this history for a discussion of the SCM.
2. COMUS Korea 150822Z Jul 77.

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company should be retained on the DMZ until at least after withdrawal of the first increment is completed.

(§) CINCPAC advised regarding the mission of IX Corps, which was to provide a deployable corps level headquarters to perform missions as necessary to meet worldwide contingency requirements and to provide a planning headquarters for the development of contingency plans required by higher headquarters. Headquarters IX Corps was tasked in EUSA OPLAN 5027 to, when closed in Korea (from Japan), be prepared to supervise arrival, beddown, and training of forces; thus they would control and coordinate reception, staging, and initial deployment of U.S. Army units arriving in theater. Another task would be to assume a tactical mission in support of I Corps (U.S.-ROK) Group, or the First ROK Army, as a blocking or counterattack force, with priority to I Corps Group. In addition the IX Corps was included in contingency plans for Europe; need for the organization was clearly established. Regardless, CINCPAC emphasized that re-location of the Corps headquarters in the near term was not politically feasible. "Continued presence of HQ IX Corps in Japan is perceived by GOJ as visible evidence that U.S. intends to maintain significant presence and capability (over and above logistic support) to reinforce NEA [Northeast Asia] region if necessary."

(§) In still another matter, on 3 November the JCS requested information on ammunition, material, transportation, and strategy questions related to the defense of Korea. On 28 November CINCPAC responded, supporting the principle of the Forward Defense Concept and pointing out that the alternatives of an unsuccessful forward defense were unacceptable. The staff provided an estimate of how long it would take to establish resupply from CONUS: also a position that the United States should not encourage the Koreans to switch defense funding from end item procurement to ammunition procurement.²

(U) One problem in connection with the overall withdrawals was addressed on 1 July in a personal message from COMUS Korea. He was referring to the "bombardment" of statements and newspaper articles implying that the presence of U.S. ground forces in Korea was no longer required. He worried about the effect of these press accounts on the troops. He said that President Carter viewed a situation in Korea five years in the future in which the forces would not be required, but that in the meantime they provided essential war fighting and deterrent capabilities to maintain peace and U.S. security interests. He planned to increase emphasis on troop indoctrination, pointing out the dangers of war and the requirement for very high standards of readiness. He asked for help of all the Services and civilian leaders in the Defense Department to

1. CINCPAC 150337Z Jul 77.
2. J5211 HistSum Nov 77, which cited CINCPAC 282100Z Nov 77; JCS 1857/030004Z Nov 77.
provide "loud, clear, and public recognition that the American Serviceman in Korea is performing an essential mission in the service of his country." 

(U) When the U.S. Secretary of Defense visited Korea for the Security Consultative Meeting in July he also visited U.S. and ROK field units. To the American troops he said: 

...This is a very important period for the Republic of Korea and Far East Asia as a whole. That period will certainly continue over the next several years. We are entering a period, of over four or five years, in which we will be gradually phasing out the U.S. ground combat forces in Korea.

We are doing so because we have concluded that, over that period, the ROK--its armed forces and its economy--can sustain the burden....

At the end of that period the U.S. will continue to have substantial Air Force capabilities located here in Korea; it will continue to have logistics support providing communications and intelligence support for the Korean forces; and it will also have nearby very substantial units of the Navy's SEVENTH Fleet.

With all this background, however, I'm sure that American Army personnel in Korea ask themselves, "Well if this is so, if the Koreans will be able to carry the load, why are we needed here now?

The answer is that you are here now because it is only through the process that I have described of gradual transfer of training capabilities, anti-tank capability, artillery, communications equipment, air mobility and tanks, that the deterrent can be maintained and peace preserved.

What this means is that during this period of transition, the role that will fall on you will actually be greater....

S) Reentry planning came under study. On 13 July the JCS advised that they were developing a formal position prior to the Security Consultative Meeting on, among other things, retention in Korea of U.S. organizations and manpower that would support reentry of U.S. ground forces in Korea. They asked

1. CINCUNC/COMUSK 011107Z Jul 77.
2. COMUSK 240856Z Jul 77.
if such retention was a valid requirement either during the period of the withdrawal or after the final increment was withdrawn.

COMUS Korea said that retention of a U.S. capability to support reentry of U.S. ground forces into Korea was "one of the visible means of deterrence and helps assure the ROK and other countries that the U.S. will maintain the ability to honor its Mutual Defense Treaty commitments." The logistics structure it was planned to retain in Korea in the residual force, however, was not specifically designed or manned for reentry capability. It did provide the skeleton organization from which to expand the capability if the need arose. OPLAN 5027 for the Defense of Korea, with its associated Time Phased Force Deployment List, called for the capability to be maintained. "The capability should be retained until the ROK armed forces are sufficiently developed so that U.S. ground forces are not required in any capacity for the defense of Korea," COMUS Korea said.

The U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group provided thoughts on 2 September. They fully supported the desirability of showing intent to reenter with U.S. ground forces, but "it is not realistic to assume that North Korea will provide us sufficient warning to permit pre D-Day reentry." Questioning feasibility, they continued, "In view of the fact that reentry units must arrive with their own support slices and that they arrive only after airpower, units to support airpower, and other ground combat support, service support, and aviation units, it is highly unlikely that they would be available in time to affect the outcome of the battle as it is to be fought within the strategy of the forward defense concept." Further, "we should not delude ourselves into believing that reentry will have any appreciable effect on the ground tactical war. This becomes even more pertinent if we want to commence deployment following a 'serious reversal,'" as had been suggested by COMUS Korea. They summarized that nothing was lost in continuing to plan for reentry, but "we should recognize those planning aspects which are feasible and/or infeasible so that our leadership does not accept reentry as a universal or best solution for our commitment to South Korea. In any case we should continue to emphasize actions contributing to deterrence and not withdrawing the division (-) until we are absolutely sure that ROK Army forces are ready."

On 12 August the JCS asked for further views on the pros and cons to strengthen the position to plan for reentry. The reason was the Defense Guidance for FY 80-84 was being drafted in Washington. COMUS Korea's reply reiterated his position regarding reentry planning and presented planning alternatives for two situations, one was prior to the withdrawal of the third increment

1. JCS 3556/140225Z Jul 77.
2. COMUS Korea 150822Z Jul 77.
3. CDRUSACSG 020512Z Sep 77.
(that is, while two brigades of the 2nd Division were still in Korea), and the other when only the residual force was in Korea.1

(S) It was the PACOM position that planning for reentry was required and that Defense Guidance should be changed to allow for such planning. The decision was still pending when COMUS Korea provided further thoughts in response to a JCS request. The forces for reentry would serve to deter attack, or, in the event of a major reversal during the initial stages of a conflict, to counter the attacking force and aid in restoring lost terrain. "Reentering U.S. ground forces must be used as front line combatants," COMUS Korea said. Rear area security was not a viable mission; protection and security for non-combatant evacuation was a temporary role for available forces and should not be a stated goal for reentering forces. JCS guidance had implied that Marines committed to the ROK would be self-supporting, but Marine ground forces employed north of the Han River or committed as a stabilizing force (as in the Korean War) would require extensive support from the U.S. or ROK Army, which would require expansion of the U.S. logistics base in Korea. CINCPACFLT envisioned a substantial building of the Marine logistics base at Pohang, similar to the Danang complex in Vietnam, to support Marines in extended combat ashore, COMUS Korea continued. He believed, however, that a second logistics base was an unnecessary expense, that the Pusan-Kimhae complex could be expanded to support all in-country forces with the advantage of only one main supply route to service and maintain.2

(S) The November 1976 Defense Guidance was amended by a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense on 22 December 1977. It contained the following wording on planning for Korea:3

...Planning for a war in Korea should assume that U.S. ground forces will be withdrawn from Korea in accordance with Presidential directives and that U.S. tactical air forces and a small residual ground force will remain in Korea indefinitely. Although the ROK Army appears capable of self defense without U.S. ground combat forces, we should retain the capability to redeploy ground forces if necessary.

It was expected that the next revision of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan would contain more definitive wording on reentry planning.

1. J5321 HistSum Sep 77; JCS 4209/122225Z Aug 77; COMUS Korea 300850Z Aug 77.
Withdrawal Offset Measures

Early in withdrawal planning, study had begun on measures that might offset the impact of such withdrawals. The JCS said that measures to be considered should include temporary CONUS and PACOM-based deployments to Korea, increased significant exercises, and other actions that would demonstrate U.S. resolve and commitment to the defense of Korea. They asked for CINCPAC's "unconstrained" views and recommendations.¹

CINCPAC considered the recommendations of his Air Force and Navy components, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, and COMUS Korea in preparing his reply of 17 May. CINCPAC said:²

...Withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea will have a profound effect upon both allies and adversaries throughout the Pacific. This pullback will be perceived as evidence of slackening U.S. resolve to play a decisive role in Asia. No combination of actions will offset the psychological, political, economic, and military impact of our withdrawal, but taken together the actions outlined below might soften the impact.

CINCPAC listed four broad categories of actions: military exercises, "quick fixes," permanent improvements (both U.S. and ROK), and other actions outside the military arena.

He noted there were already 52 annual exercises scheduled in the Korean theater, five of which were "significant." He recommended addition of one large-scale annual field training exercise similar to TEAM SPIRIT. Of the 47 routine exercises mentioned above, 35 were suitable candidates for upgrading. He recommended that five of them be upgraded. He also suggested consideration of at least one additional combined amphibious exercise annually. He recommended consideration of selected CONUS-based USN and USMC elements, such as an airborne mine countermeasures unit, Sea-Air-Land teams, underwater demolition teams, recon units, etc. In combined exercises, he said, participation of U.S. Forces should focus on complementing rather than duplicating ROK capabilities. Upgrading public affairs activities regarding exercises could focus attention of both allies and adversaries on U.S. resolve in the defense of Korea. Also, a psychological operations program could reinforce perceptions of U.S. commitment.

¹ JCS 6784/130005Z May 77.
² CINCPAC 170540Z May 77.
Temporary CONUS and PACOM-based deployments were addressed. CINCPAC recommended that F-111 aircraft receive priority deployment, as an all-weather strike capability was required. He recommended periodic deployments of Tactical Air Control System elements, to offset deficiencies in the Korea TACS. He recommended aircraft carrier and surface combatant operations and exercises to increase familiarity with the Sea of Japan, particularly in antisubmarine warfare and in power projection. He recommended increased U.S. Marine deployments from the III Marine Amphibious Force; those deployments could be independent of major exercises depending on shipping, funding, and facility availability. Upon development of Pohang (K-3) and Yechon (K-X) Air Bases in Korea, CINCPAC recommended temporary deployment of USMC tactical air forces from EASTPAC, MID-PAC, and WESTPAC for training and support of exercises. He also recommended increased B-52 range use in Korea.1

Logistics recommendations included increased war reserve stocks, details of which he outlined. Increased security assistance was also outlined. CINCPAC noted that the lessons learned in Vietnam should be applied; "ENHANCE" or "ENHANCE PLUS" programs would not be "appropriate." He made a number of specific recommendations.

CINCPAC also outlined actions outside of the military arena. First was unequivocal affirmation by U.S. national leaders to the world of the U.S. commitment to the ROK. Also, emphasis that the U.S.-Korea security treaty remained in effect. He recommended emphasis on the U.S. economic stake in Korea with the implication that the United States would not abandon this investment to North Korean aggression. He encouraged building the ROK image of being a major national power in its own right, through credible publicity on ROK economic, military, and technological advances. Also, Japan should be encouraged to visibly increase its political, economic, and technological activities with Korea to further demonstrate Japan's interest and interaction with Korea.

CINCPAC concluded:2

...Recognize that above actions, particularly those involving additional major exercises, linkage of 25th Division with

1. On 8 July COMUS Korea advised that Korea had approved $8 million in the FYCY 78 budget to build aircraft parking aprons, JP-4 storage, 23 ammunition magazines, 10 ammunition igloos, a munitions maintenance building, 4 refueling points, and utilities access at Yechon with work to start early in 1978. Similar facilities were programmed for Pohang the following year. (J443 Point Paper, 9 Sep 77, Subj: USMC TACAIR Beddown.)
2. CINCPAC 170540Z May 77.
Korea, and increase of air and naval forces in the area will be highly visible and politically sensitive matters. That is just the point: we want these actions to be unmistakably evident to all parties concerned. Also recognize that these actions would involve very substantial increases in funding for exercises and materiel investment for U.S. Forces and expenditure of ever larger amounts to support improvements for ROK. There simply is no cheap way to offset ground force withdrawal.

On 16 June the JCS asked CINCPAC to develop a compensating package, but considering only two broad offset categories: upgrading or increasing military exercises and the temporary deployment of CONUS and PACOM-based assets. CINCPAC's proposals included an increase of deployed exercise forces to demonstrate reentry capability. Increases were to be phased, starting with increased deployed tactical fighter units in FY 78, a deployed infantry battalion in FY 80, and an additional brigade in FY 81-83. Significant exercises were to be increased from five to eight per year. The increase in force participation was to be concomitant with U.S. ground force withdrawal. Costs would be a major problem in implementing the recommendations. (The cost was already approximately $15 million per year.) The FY 79 increase was estimated at an additional $3.714 million, that amount plus another $11 million in FY 80, and by FY 81-83 involve those costs plus a further addition of over $22 million.

Among COMUS Korea's recommendations had been to round out the 314th Air Division to full strength of at least two standard tactical fighter wings. CINCPAC concurred, and further advised that the additional tactical air assets should be provided from CONUS, not from other PACOM assets. A long-term objective was to increase the 18-UE USAF squadrons in Korea to 24-UE squadrons. Also proposed was an increase in the number of tactical air control parties to support ROK Army requirements. In 1977 the JCS did provide an option for an additional 12 UE (F-4) aircraft in FY 80, when facilities at Kunsan Air Base became available.2

On 12 July CINCPAC commented on a proposal from the 1st Marine Air Wing that USMC tactical air deploy from WESTPAC bases to Korea on a regularly-scheduled basis to increase aircrew training and area familiarization. CINCPAC

1. JCS 5383/162055Z Jun 77; CINCPAC 252130Z Jun 77; J5322 Point Paper, 7 Sep 77, Subj: Exercises as Korean Withdrawal Offset Measure (U).

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advised that he appreciated the initiative and intent of the proposal, but asked that further coordination be held in abeyance because of logistic considerations. This was not intended, however, to stop coordination for on-going or future exercises and deployments.

Combined Forces Command

Planning for establishment of a U.S.-ROK Combined Command in Korea was addressed again in 1977, not as an alternative command arrangement to the United Nations Command as had been the case in previous years, but rather as a compensatory measure in response to President Carter's announced program to withdraw U.S. ground forces over the following five years.²

In March of 1976 the JCS had forwarded a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense containing the details of a proposed combined command as an alternative to the UNC, but it lay dormant throughout the election year of 1976. In response to a JCS request in mid-1976 to begin discussions with the Koreans in this regard, the Secretary directed that no discussion, even on a close-hold basis, be held with the ROK.³

During preparation of Presidential Review Memorandum 13 in the spring of 1977 the Secretary requested from the JCS an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of major alternative command arrangements as part of the planning option for U.S. ground force withdrawal. Alternatives included retention of the status quo, a UNC with a combined command, and separate national commands.

COMUS Korea analysis concluded that the UNC with a combined command was the most viable option. CINCPAC agreed. The JCS concurred and on 11 May recommended that planning proceed, using the proposal they had outlined in 1976 as a model for the command. The Secretary of Defense approved, and on 9 June directed that the planning process begin with the ROK as soon as possible.⁴

Planning continued through June and July. COMUS Korea, in coordination with the ROK military staff, developed refined terms of reference and a basic structure plan. Following review by CINCPAC, the JCS forwarded the proposal to the Secretary of Defense on 21 July with some modifications and changes, and recommended that it be the basis for continuing negotiations with the ROK. The proposal was briefed at the 10th Annual Security Consultative Meeting held in

1. CINCPAC 122037Z Jul 77.
3. JS61 HistSum Dec 77, which cited JCSM 89-76 of 11 Mar 76.
4. Ibid., which cited JCSM 205-77 of 11 May 77, and SECDEF 091150Z Jun 77.
Seoul, Korea in July.¹

(2) Significant provisions of the proposal were as follows. The UNC would continue as a transitional command to administer the Armistice Agreement until such time as alternate arrangements would be worked out to either maintain or replace the Armistice. Regarding the command hierarchy:²

- A plenary military committee consisting of the U.S. and ROK CJCS, CINCPAC, the CINC of the Combined Command, and an additional ROK representative would translate Security Consultative Meeting decisions on strategic guidance from the respective National Command Authorities into appropriate bi-national strategic direction to be issued, in the name of the respective National Command Authorities, to the CINC Combined Command.

- A permanent Military Committee consisting of the CINC Combined Command and the ROK CJCS would remain responsible to the National Command Authorities and coordinate appropriate guidance and directives for day-to-day operations. The U.S. representative would report through CINCPAC to the JCS regarding U.S. Forces, and directly to the JCS on bi-national matters, keeping CINCPAC informed.

Regarding command structure:

- A U.S. general would be the CINC as long as the United States made a significant contribution to the defense of Korea. He would also act as the ground component commander.

  - The Deputy CINC would be a ROK general.
  - The Chief of Staff would be a U.S. three-star general.
  - The Deputy Chief of Staff would be a ROK officer.

  - The principal staff would consist of a C-1 (Personnel), C-2 (intelligence), C-3 (Operations), C-4 (Logistics), C-5 (Plans), and C-6 (Communications-Electronics).

  - The staff would have an approximate 50-50 mix of U.S. and ROK personnel.

¹ Ibid., which cited JCSM 319-77 of 21 Jul 77. See the Political-Military Relationships chapter of this history for a discussion of the SCM.
² Ibid.
The command would have three components: Ground, Air, and Navy. The air component was to be commanded by Commander U.S. Air Forces Korea/Commander 314th Air Division/Commander Korean Air Defense Sector (one person). The Navy component was to be a ROK admiral, but if the ROK insisted that he be a U.S. naval officer, the matter would be reviewed after a year with a view toward designating it to be then filled by a ROK admiral.  

Regarding Operational Control of forces:

- During peacetime, the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade and the aircraft of the 314th Air Division on air defense alert (when not committed to the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program) would be under the OPCON of the CINC Combined Command for air defense purposes.

- In the event of hostilities, OPCON of the 314th Air Division and U.S. Army combat units in Korea would be committed to the CINC Combined Command, in accordance with constitutional processes.

- ROK forces assigned at the time to OPCON of CINCUNC would be shifted to OPCON of the CINC Combined Command.

During consultations at the Security Consultative Meeting, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of National Defense agreed to establish the command prior to completion of the withdrawal of the first ground force increment, scheduled for December 1978. Both agreed that the military staff proposal presented during the meeting would be the basis for implementation of the command.  

In August the Secretary of Defense formally approved the JCS proposal for the command, with certain reservations. These were:

- U.S. negotiations should insist that one component commander be a Korean.

1. The JCS, commenting on COMUS Korea's recommendation that the CINC and all of the components be U.S. officers, in view of the President's decision to reduce U.S. presence and transfer greater responsibilities to the ROK, had requested that further consideration be given to at least making the naval component commander Navy. CINCPAC recommended a U.S. commander at this time, with ROK assumption of responsibility at a later date. (JCS 5991/161340Z Jul 77; CINCPACFLT 190850Z Jul 77; CINCPAC 190650Z Jul 77.)

2. J561 HistSum Dec 77, which cited COMUSK 270805Z Jul 77 and SECSTATE 290158Z Jul 77.
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- The decision on assignment of U.S. Forces to the OPCON of the CINC Combined Command was to be held in abeyance until review of the final organizational proposal and consultations with the U.S. Congress. Target date for establishment of the command was set as 1 October 1978.

Following this approval, the JCS in September and October requested refined terms of reference, a structure plan, and milestones for establishment of the command. COMUS Korea, in coordination with the ROK JCS, organized a ROK-U.S. Combined Command Activation Committee (co-chaired by U.S. Forces Korea and the ROK JCS J5s) to develop an organization proposal.

The organization proposal developed by that committee was received by CINCPAC on 19 December, reviewed, and forwarded to the JCS on 30 December. Significant items of the proposal were as follows:

1. Refined Terms of Reference. There were no major changes from previous TOR proposals. The format changed to reflect mission, functions, and command arrangements as major headings. It was proposed that the command be called the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. Functions of the Deputy CINC were outlined for the first time.

2. Structure Plan. As shown on the accompanying chart, the command element included the CINC (USA four-star), Deputy CINC (ROKA four-star), Chief of Staff (ROK two-star, Service undetermined). The combined staff was patterned after a joint staff with C-1 through C-6, as listed above. Staff principal billets were split three to four between the United States and Korea. The United States was to provide the principals for C-3, C-4, and C-5, with the ROK providing for C-1, C-2, and C-6. The Engineer, separate from the C-4, was to be headed by a ROK general officer. Manning level during peacetime was expected to be about 484, with 213 U.S. and 271 ROK. These figures, it was noted at the time, were to be viewed as "in the ballpark" only, with some refinement likely following development or review of the U.S. Forces Korea Joint Manpower Program.

3. Milestones for the program were as follows:

31 December 1977 Approval by the Military Committee (Permanent)

1 January 1978 Begin preparing equipment and facilities

February 1978 Manning cadre personnel (approximately 1 man per branch and division)

1. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC ltr Ser S617 of 30 December 1977.
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STRUCTURE PLAN

PEACETIME MANNING 1/

<table>
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<th>US</th>
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<td>213</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>484</td>
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- CINCCFC USA 010
  - DEP CINCCFC ROKA 010
    - C OF S USAF 08
      - OAG
    - DC OF S ROK 08
      - PAO
      - SCS
      - JAG
      - C-1 ROKA 07
        - PLANS AND OPS DIV
          - AG DIV
          - INT DIV
          - PSYOP DIV
          - PLANS DIV
          - ENGINEER
        - C-2 ROKA 08
          - PLANS AND SEC DIV
          - OPS DIV
          - SPEC OPS DIV
          - EXER & REG DIV
          - TRANSPORT DIV
        - C-3 USA 08
          - COMMAND CONTROL DIV
          - OPS DIV
          - MUNITIONS DIV
          - MATERIEL DIV
        - C-4 USAO 07
          - PLANS & OPS DIV
          - POLICY PLANNING DIV
          - STRATEGY & FORCE DEVELOPMENT
        - C-5 USMC 07
          - PLANS DIV
        - C-6 ROKA 07
          - OPS DIV

1/ Approximation only
1. J561 HistSum Dec 77, which cited CINCUNC KRA2237/130330Z Jun 77 (BOM).
2. Ibid.
Although he did not close the door on the issue, CINCPAC discouraged a change in USAF command channels at the time, stating, "I believe current USAF command arrangements in NE Asia are satisfactory. I have reservations about initiating a change at an early date pending decisions on other offsetting actions to U.S. ground force withdrawal....USAF tactical units in Korea can and will be chopped to COMUSK in event of emergency. I urge we emphasize this point to dispel concern about USAF management link with 5th Air Force in Japan. On the other hand, should political imperatives dictate that this issue be addressed sooner with the ROK, I believe your proposal (to double-hat Deputy COMUS Korea) may be a workable concept, although double-hatting the Deputy COMUSK could detract from his primary responsibility as your deputy." CINCPAC concluded by recommending that this issue be raised in a broader context (general service vice back channel) in view of the potential ramifications on Air Force structure in the PACOM. At year's end the issue was still "somewhat open."

In July 1977, however, the JCS had decided that the Commander 314th Air Division/Commander U.S. Air Forces Korea/Commander Korean Air Defense Sector would be the air component commander of the Combined Forces Command.2

Continuation or dissolution of the I Corps (U.S.-ROK) Group was also under study in 1977, as discussed above, but no actions were taken. This Group was a combined command that controlled 12 ROK division equivalents. It was responsible for the defense of the western portion of the Demilitarized Zone, the traditional and most likely approach route to Seoul. Commanded by a U.S. general (USA three-star), it had originally been considered a transitional command, and had been scheduled for dissolution as early as 1973, at which time it was to have been replaced by a ROK field army. In March 1976, however, the JCS had recommended that it continue until a favorable military and political climate prevailed on the Korean peninsula. As withdrawal planning proceeded in 1977, COMUS Korea wanted to retain the I Corps Group in position until the 2nd Infantry Division was completely withdrawn. CINCPAC supported this position.3

Use of Panama Bases

On 28 September the JCS requested that CINCPAC (and the other unified and specified commanders and Service chiefs) forecast their requirements for use of bases in Panama. This survey was to form the basis for an assessment.

1. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 1900052 Jun 77 (BOM).
concerning the future use of U.S. bases in Panama for purposes other than defense of the canal.

The only forecast requirements for the PACOM were submitted by CINCPACFLT; these were provided to the JCS. CINCPAC also advised that his earlier assessment of the impact of the closure of the canal remained valid. He provided the following forecast requirements:

- A staging base for one squadron of nine P-3 aircraft in the event USSR submarines commenced conducting Southeast Pacific patrols; the frequency of patrols and size of the force could not yet be accurately predicted.

- The continuing requirement for ship/shore communications from the Naval Communications Station at Balboa to support units transiting from and to West Coast ports from the Canal Zone. Manpower billets were estimated to be 174 military and 59 civilian.

- Repair and drydock facilities in the Canal Zone for approximately 10 ship days per year for voyage repairs.

Forces and Basing on Taiwan

1. JCS 8251/282252Z Sep 77.
2. CINCPAC 140020Z Oct 77, which referenced CINCPAC 111837Z Jun 76; J5325 HistSum Oct 77.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. J5323 HistSum Nov 77; JCS 6575/152342Z Nov 77 (EX).
4. CINCPAC 172019Z Nov 77.
5. CINCPAC 010640Z Dec 77.
1. J5323 Point Paper, 29 Dec 77, Subj: U.S. Troop Reduction on Taiwan (C); JCS 6880/1615112 Dec 77.
Aircraft Programmed Depot Maintenance

Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) facilities provided periodic overhaul, major aircraft modification, and corrosion control for approximately 170 aircraft a year on Taiwan. The Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy had maintenance contracts with E-Systems at Tainan and China Air Lines at Taipei. Tainan was the only U.S. PDM facility in the PACOM fully capable of depot level maintenance. In December 1977 the manning of the Air Force's Contract Management Centers at Tainan and Taipei included 36 military and 35 DOD civilian personnel. The Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC), the parent organization, had stated that minimum manning to keep both facilities operational was 62 U.S. military and DOD civilians.

With the force reduction planning, the Air Force had initiated action to study alternative locations in the PACOM. An AFLC survey team examined locations in Korea and Japan. In his 1 December 1977 message, discussed above, CINCPAC made a strong recommendation to the JCS to retain the facility on Taiwan. Also, as a minimum, he recommended that Detachment 9 at Tainan be retained until development of an equally capable WESTPAC alternate site was established.

One impact would be increased dollar costs. Estimates from the AFLC indicated $6 an hour for labor in Taiwan and Korea, $21 or $22 an hour in Japan, and $23 an hour in CONUS. Transportation costs would be greatly increased because of the long distances involved to CONUS and required tanker support for the aircraft (almost $20 million a year each for the Air Force and the Navy). Equipment and start-up costs at a new PACOM location would be very expensive. Also, there would be fewer aircraft available. (There was a six-day transit to CONUS instead of one day to Taiwan, Korea, or Japan.) PDM in CONUS would increase the PACOM tactical aircraft in the maintenance pipeline from 7 to 12 percent of the total force assigned. Thus, PACAF would require 30 extra aircraft to maintain the same force level.

Navy Medical Research Unit-Two

Navy Medical Research Unit-Two (NAMRU-2) was a 31-man (authorized) agency that had been established in Taipei on 9 May 1955. It conducted research in biomedical sciences; provided essential information on tropical and Asiatic diseases, and medical problems of military and humanitarian significance; recommended control measures for communicable diseases that were endemic or epidemic to specific areas worldwide; and provided medical information essential

1. J5323 Point Paper, 28 Dec 77, Subj: Aircraft Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) on Taiwan (U); CINCPAC 010640Z Dec 77.
to military operational planning. The U.S. personnel were supplemented by 148 Local National employees.

On 22 January 1977 CINCPAC had recommended that NAMRU-2 be excluded from the ceilings being discussed for Taiwan. The recommendation was based on the critical nature of medical research, cost, and the high esteem in which the Government of the Republic of China held the unit. CINCPAC's rationale was based on precedents that had been established with the retention of the SEATO Medical Laboratory in Thailand following the U.S. withdrawal of forces there, and retention of NAMRU-3 in Cairo, Egypt, after suspension of diplomatic relations between the United States and Egypt following the 1967 Middle East war.

The United States had invested over $3 million in NAMRU-2, which had 25,000 animals and the only breeding facility in the PACOM for Rhesus monkeys, used in medical research. They had a computer data base gleaned from over 10 years of medical research. Facilities had been provided by the ROC, virtually rent free, but the lease on the building in which they were located was to expire in October 1978. It was expected to take 12 to 18 months to move to another location. The unit commander desired to move a major portion of his research activity to the Philippines, but the Navy's Bureau of Medicine thought Taiwan better (NAMRU-2 had a detachment in Djakarta and two laboratories in the Philippines). If they moved, the monkeys would have to be disposed of; international agreement had halted the acquisition and international transport of Rhesus monkeys. In his 1 December recommendations to the JCS, CINCPAC had recommended that planning by the Bureau of Medicine begin immediately to solve the issue. If the decision was made to relocate, he said that effort should be made to complete the move by termination of the lease in October 1978.

Reentry

1. CINCPAC 220449Z Jan 77.
2. J5323 Point Paper, 28 Dec 77, Subj: Navy Medical Research Unit-2 (NAMRU-2) (U); CINCPAC 010640Z Dec 77.
On 25 March the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok advised the State Department that an Associated Press story datelined Washington had stated that the JUSMAGTHAI staff was to be reduced from a personnel level of 117 to 40. CHJUSMAGTHAI advised CINCPAC of the same press coverage. Both agencies noted the difficulties of this kind of public announcement that had not been made first to Thai government officials, part of a continuing effort to avoid "surprises."

As reported in a Honolulu newspaper on 1 November, the number of advisers in Thailand had been cut from nearly 100 to 40. Only a handful of advisers spend time outside of Bangkok, the paper reported, and those worked at division headquarters or higher.

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

For many years the status of negotiations regarding the political future of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), a territory assigned to the United States in trusteeship by the United Nations in 1946, had been of interest to CINCPAC. Support facilities in this area served as a hedge against the loss of other U.S. bases in the PACOM. Although at one time negotiations had been with all of Micronesia, there was no longer any one voice.

1. JCS 3556/140225Z Jul 77. CINCPAC 150337Z Jul 77.
2. Ibid.
3. AMEMB Bangkok 6474/250415Z Mar 77; CHJUSMAGTHAI 250545Z Mar 77 (EX).
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for the TTPI. The United States had agreed to form a Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, at such time as the UN Trusteeship Agreement was terminated. Further fragmentation of political entities continued in 1977.

(U) Talks were held among representatives of TTPI groups and U.S. representatives in May, August, and October. The first talks in 1977 were held in Honolulu 18-21 May with the U.S. delegation headed by Ambassador Philip W. Manhard and delegations from the TTPI Districts, Congress, and Government. The purpose of those informal discussions was to investigate an avenue for reopening formal negotiations on the future political status of Micronesia, which had been adjourned since June 1976. The outcome of those meetings was agreement to conduct further multi- and bilateral discussions with Micronesia and those districts desiring separate informal talks. There was a desire expressed to conclude the negotiations and terminate the trusteeship by 1981. CINCPAC was represented by an officer from his Plans Directorate and a staff member of CINCPAC's Representative to Guam and the TTPI.

(U) Further informal talks were held on Guam in August, after which the United States named Ambassador Peter R. Rosenblatt as the President's Personal Representative to the Micronesian Status Negotiations. The United States also invited the Micronesians to convene the Ninth Round of formal negotiations on the Island of Molokai, in Hawaii, 24-27 October. The objective of that round was to be to reach agreement on a two-tiered negotiating framework in which the United States would negotiate bilaterally with separate districts on issues unique to those districts, and multi-laterally with all districts on issues that would affect all regions. The Molokai meetings would attempt to reach agreement on which issues and topics would be addressed bilaterally and which multi-laterally.\(^2\)

(U) In the Guam meetings in August the United States had agreed to negotiate with three separate Micronesian delegations concurrently. These were the Palau Political Status Commission (PPSC), the Marshall Islands Political Status Commission (MIPSC), and the Commission on Future Political Status and Transition (CFPST) of the Congress of Micronesia (COM), representing the four central Caroline Districts of Yap, Truk, Ponape, and Kosrae. (The CINCPAC Command History for 1968, Volume I, contains a map of the TTPI.)

(U) The formal talks resumed on Molokai on 25 October. While major differences of opinion continued regarding status and the degree of centralization of power, the four delegations agreed that there should be a post-trusteeship

1. J5124 HistSum May 77.
2. J5124 HistSum Sep 77.

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all-Micronesian entity and that "Free Association" would be the objective future political status for all Micronesia. All agreed on another round of talks, scheduled for early January 1978 in Honolulu.

(U) Meanwhile, on 24 October the President (of the United States) approved the Northern Marianas constitution, which was thus to become effective on 9 January 1978. A newly elected governor and legislature were expected to assume the reins of power at that time; the U.S. Resident Commissioner on Saipan would no longer be required. The Government of Northern Marianas would continue under that name until the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement for the TTPI (of which the Northern Marianas remained a part) would be dissolved. At that time, the people would become U.S. citizens and the Commonwealth of the Marianas would begin.

(U) The Covenant to Form a Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas in Political Union with the United States provided for the lease of military lands in the Marianas. The United States had five years from 9 January 1978 to consummate those leases by paying approximately $20 million to the government of the Northern Marianas. Such payment would hold two-thirds of Tinian for base and exercise rights; rights to Tanapag harbor on Saipan; rights to small acreage around Tanapag for a war memorial park; and all of Farallon de Medinilla Island as a naval gunnery and bombing range. Such rights would be secured for 50 years plus a no-charge option to extend the agreement an additional 50 years.

(U) The Covenant also provided that on 9 January 1978 all existing use and occupancy agreements between the United States/TTPI Government and the Northern Marianas were void.

(U) On-going operations had included U.S. Marine Corps small amphibious exercises (QUICK JAB) on Tinian and the Navy used Farallon de Medinilla as a gunnery/bombing range on a continuous basis.

(U) The U.S. Navy and CINCPAC were concerned regarding the need for quick action to budget for the long-term lease of Tinian and Farallon. The Air Force was executive agency for Marianas lease lands; CINCPAC sought JCS support for quick budget action.

4. Ibid.
5. CINCPAC 040425Z Nov 77.
(U) In the meantime, the agreements regarding operations would cease to exist on 9 January and the leases could not be consummated until the budget process, not yet initiated, ran its course. The Chief of Naval Operations, therefore, authorized CINCPACFLT to pursue an interim agreement with the Northern Marianas to allow continued military training operations until the lease funding issue was resolved.\(^1\)

(3) Regarding CINCPAC's overall perception of U.S. security interests in Micronesia and land use requirements in particular, on 30 March CINCPAC had updated his comprehensive statement in this regard made in July 1975. CINCPAC advised that he continued to believe the primary objective in the TTPI had to be to establish a post-trusteeship political relationship that guaranteed continued U.S. access to the area and prevent its use for military purposes by any unfriendly foreign power.\(^2\)

(3) CINCPAC considered the Northern Marianas land options of the highest importance because of their larger land area, location, and proximity to Guam. He believed that the U.S. interest had been adequately secured in the Covenant.

(3) Second in importance was the Palau group, which extended deep into the Southwest Pacific--close to Indonesia, the Philippines, and supertanker routes from the Middle East to Japan and the United States. Palau was well-suited for establishment of airfields and port facilities. Exceptionally well-protected anchorages could be developed. Primary military interests included a training area on the island of Babelthuap, an airfield at Airai (or construction of a new runway), harbor development rights at Malakal Harbor, continued access to the airfield on Angaur, and anchorage rights in the Rock Islands.

(3) If land options in the Marianas and Palau were secured, the Marshalls were of less importance. Even though there were excellent harbors and airfields (at Kwajalein and Enewetak), no large areas for potential military basing sites were available. "However, if the Soviet Union and PRC political and economic initiatives in this area expand into military applications, the importance of the Marshalls could increase accordingly." (The Kwajalein Missile Range facilities and land-use agreements continued to be of the highest national priority.)

(3) The Caroline Islands (less Palau) were of lesser importance despite the excellent harbor and airfield potential in Truk and some potential in Ponape. If options in Palau and the Marianas were secured, additional military facilities in the Carolines would not contribute significantly to U.S. military

1. CNO 171554Z Nov 77.
2. CINCPAC 300402Z Mar 77.
capability. The Status Agreement, however, should provide an option to negotiate at some future date for U.S. naval and land access or basing rights in that area, should any be subsequently identified, CINCPAC believed.

(S) CINCPAC also commented on the political status options, but noted that regardless of what form of relationship was negotiated he considered that it was essential that the United States achieve the objectives for basing he had outlined in this message.

(S) CINCPAC had another opportunity to comment on U.S. military interest in Angaur Island in the Palau group on 17 May in response to a request from the Office of the JCS on a CINCPACFLT proposal to the Chief of Naval Operations regarding continued Coast Guard presence on that island to conduct OMEGA monitoring operations. (OMEGA was a worldwide navigation system used by suitably-equipped ships and aircraft.) CINCPAC supported the CINCPACFLT proposal as it provided for retention of the Angaur facility under U.S. control after the 31 December 1977 termination of LORAN (Long-Range Navigation) facilities. The CINCPAC position additionally avoided reversion of the Angaur facilities to the Government of Micronesia under the use and occupancy agreement while maintaining U.S. Government control at low cost and with a low military profile. The rationale supporting that position included the option to use the island as a contingency position for air surveillance operations and logistic support to the Southwest Pacific area. Unlike Airai field on Babelthuap, Angaur could be used exclusively by the military. Long-term considerations included a strategic military benefit because of its geographic location, maintenance of a forward defense posture, and a possible fall-back option giving the United States increased ability to deny military use of the area to other nations. Should the Palau superport complex become a reality, the Palau Islands could become a chokepoint vital to U.S. interests.\(^2\)

**Civic Actions Teams**

(U) The U.S. Services had provided Civic Actions Teams (CAT) on selected islands of the TTPI since 1970. The Defense and Interior Departments shared costs, with Defense paying all military salaries, CONUS support, new team site facilities, and a portion of equipment depreciation. Through the Navy, the DOD also provided administrative, logistic, and equipment support. The Interior Department, through the governments of the TTPI and/or the Northern Marianas, reimbursed DOD for costs of team operations to include travel, O&M, per diem.

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1. Ibid.
2. J5325 HistSum May 77. The potential development of a major oil transshipment port at Palau was discussed in the CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 85.
and various other specified expenses. Interior, through the District Administrator, provided construction materials for CAT projects and medical consumables.

(U) In 1977 CINCPAC published a new instruction relating to the CAT program to provide overall program and command guidance. As outlined in that instruction, operational control of the teams and overall program management was vested in CINCPAC through CINCPACFLT, the CINCPAC Representative Guam/TTPI, the 30th Naval Construction Regiment, and the CAT Officer in Charge, on location. Command, less operational control, was exercised through Service channels through the CINCPAC component commands and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group to the CAT Officer in Charge. The instruction also outlined the objectives of the program, which were to assist the Department of the Interior in its socio-economic program in the TTPI, to demonstrate concern of the U.S. Government for basic needs of the local populace by undertaking projects that were of particular interest to the Governments of the TTPI and the Northern Marianas, and to maintain a military presence in the TTPI.²

(U) CAT teams provided engineering construction and advisory services to the TTPI districts. They concentrated on roads and small buildings. There was also a medical corpsman assigned to each team who provided vital services to the local populace. Teams were normally 9 to 13 men, with engineering skills predominating. They were employed in a temporary additional duty status for approximately 8 months, as a rule.³

(U) On 2 August 1977 CINCPAC forwarded the annual TTPI CAT program review to the JCS. He noted that his representative on Guam/TTPI and his component commanders agreed with him in strongly recommending continuation of the program and continuation of Service funding in FY 79. (The cost-sharing nature of the CAT program required exception to a Defense Department Instruction and annual justification.) CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI had provided a detailed analysis of FY 78 CAT deployment schedules, with insertion of a CAT on Yap early in 1978 and the relocation of a CAT on Truk in the summer of that year. It was expected at that time that the CAT on Kosrae would continue at its existing location with work projects sufficient for the duration of FY 79. A CAT for Palau had been discussed but was uncertain. The FY 79 budget included approximately $300,000 per team for funding and logistic support. This had been depicted in the inter-

2. Ibid.
departmental support agreement as a Department of Interior responsibility. The existing level had been $200,000. The significant increase was due largely to unanticipated costs for CAT resupply in a change from Service-provided airlift to surface resupply.

(U) In 1977 the U.S. Air Force operated a CAT on Dublon Island in the Truk District. The Navy operated a CAT on Kosrae and planned to introduce the team that was scheduled to go to Yap in January 1978. The team on Kosrae had been working there for over a year on projects that included roads and they had completed an emergency airfield. That district did not intend to fund for CAT operations in FY 79. The district also planned to use the existing CAT campsite for new district public buildings. Construction was to begin in January 1978, necessitating movement of the site. As mentioned above, Palau District had been planning for a CAT, so to avoid building a new campsite on Kosrae that would only be used a few months, the TTPI government and CINCPAC approved movement of the Kosrae team to Palau in January 1978 instead of September of that year.²

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1. CINCPAC 020116Z Aug 77.
2. CINCPACREP Guam 152245Z Nov 77; CINCPAC 282057Z Nov 77.
CHAPTER II

THE THREAT

SECTION I--OVERVIEW

(U) Perhaps the most lucid and perceptive view of the threat in the Pacific Command (PACOM) was expressed by CINCPAC in unclassified talks before various official and civic groups during 1977. The following extracts from CINCPAC's presentation are quoted verbatim:

* * * * * * *

(U) Earlier, we mentioned the developing equilibrium among the four Asian-Pacific powers. Of those four powers, only the United States and the Soviet Union currently have the capability to project military power throughout the region.

(U) The Soviets have gradually but very deliberately strengthened their military capabilities on their Pacific side. About one quarter to one third of their forces are deployed to the Soviet Far East. Their ground forces are primarily stationed along the Sino-Soviet border and they shield the Pacific naval base and maritime headquarters at Vladivostok and further to the northeast they protect the airfield complex at Khabarovsk and the Komsomolsk industrial complex, one of the major industrial areas of the U.S.S.R. In the past decade the Soviets have modernized these forces and improved their mobility with the deployment of mechanized vehicles and helicopters.

(U) Soviet tactical Air Forces in the Pacific are based primarily in the area east of Lake Baikal and in the Vladivostok region. Since the early 70's new generation fighters have been added with substantially improved range, payload, avionics, and electronic countermeasures.

(U) Soviet heavy bomber aircraft in this area include jet and turboprop bombers which could strike targets as

distant as Hawaii from their bases near Vladivostok. Their medium bomber force may soon be upgraded with the deployment of the swing-wing BACKFIRE.

(U) The Soviet Pacific Navy has shown a marked improvement in capability in the past ten years—not so much in the quantity of forces assigned, but in improved mobility, range and armament. They have demonstrated an ability and willingness to deploy Navy forces and project their naval presence throughout the region. Whereas ten years ago this naval force seldom ventured outside the Sea of Japan, today the Soviet Pacific Fleet routinely deploys to the East and South China Seas, the Philippine Sea, the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Their Indian Ocean naval presence has increased substantially since 1968, when they made their first Indian Ocean deployment. On the average, they keep about twenty ships there, including about eight combat ships. Until recently, the Soviets enhanced their Indian Ocean military operations and augmentation capabilities by the use of the Port of Berbera, airfields, and other facilities in Somalia. However, the Soviet presence in Somalia came to an abrupt end in November 1977 when the Soviets chose to back neighboring Ethiopia in its fight with Somalia, thus resulting in Soviet eviction from Somalia. Though the extent of future Soviet involvement in the strategic Horn of Africa is now somewhat clouded, we anticipate that the Soviets might negotiate with South Yemen for the use of the Port of Aden and other facilities which could enhance their support of Ethiopia. Meanwhile, the Soviets continue to have access to port facilities in Mozambique, with refueling and port visit privileges at several other locations in the Indian Ocean.

(U) Other Communist military forces in the Pacific include those of the People's Republic of China (PRC), with the world's largest ground force, an improving Air Force and Navy, but limited ability to project military power over great distances. The North Koreans have a large and formidable military establishment, with about 75 percent of their ground forces deployed to within fifty miles of the demilitarized zone. And finally the Vietnamese have by far the largest and strongest military establishment in Southeast Asia. Fighting between Vietnamese and Cambodian Forces
continues, and the Vietnamese may also have as many as 30,000 troops in Laos.

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(U) ...We are not addressing the nuclear threat; United States deterrent forces provide the well-known nuclear umbrella for our allies. But in the case of the non-nuclear or major conventional threat, the threat in the Pacific Command area is just not that obvious. One possible scenario is a world-wide conventional conflict with the Soviet Union, perhaps stemming from the outbreak of war in Europe. In that situation, we would foresee primarily a struggle for control of the lines of communication in the Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions. With our current forces in the Pacific theater, we would have difficulty protecting the important sea lines of communications into the western Pacific. In other words we would have about an even chance in keeping those lines of communications open. But again, the threat definition is not clear-cut and assessments depend heavily on assumptions of where, when, and by whom hostilities are initiated, as well as the actions of allies and other nations. So, the point we are making is that except for the situation on the Korean peninsula, we do not have a classical military threat scenario in the Asia-Pacific region with opposing forces on opposite sides of some line or boundary. Therefore, we believe questions relative to our defense requirements and forward basing strategy should go deeper...what are we trying to deter...what are we trying to prevent from happening?

(U) The foregoing analysis by CINCPAC of the threat in the Pacific Command was made in the context of the important contribution of the forward basing strategy of the United States to the perception of U.S. power and U.S. resolve as deterrents to the threat.

(U) CINCPAC's view of the Soviet threat in the PACOM could by no means be considered isolated or parochial. For example, the January 1977 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine contained an article by Admiral Stansfield Turner, at that time Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, regarding the naval balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. He stated that, as a seagoing power, the United States had moved into a shrinking range of political options and a higher level of risk. The Admiral gave two reasons for this: first, the Soviet Union had built up a Navy in reaction to its perception of the threat from the once-overwhelming armed superiority of the United States
at sea; secondly, competition had intensified in the United States between military expenditures and the budgetary demands of the many social programs.

(U) Discussing the Soviet naval force, the Admiral noted that the Soviet Navy had begun, in the early 1960s, to acquire a more diversified naval force which enabled them, during fleet exercises, to rehearse tactics for the interdiction of open-ocean sea lanes. In less than 30 years, the Soviet Navy had developed from an insignificant coastal defense force to one that aspired to strategic deterrence, naval presence, and sea denial. On the other hand, the U.S. Navy role, from its inception, had concentrated on the concept of sea control. According to Admiral Turner, the Chief of Naval Operations had stated that the U.S. fleets in the Pacific could hold open the sealanes to Hawaii and Alaska. However, because of shortages of sea control forces and mobile logistics support forces, the United States would have difficulty protecting lines of communication into the western Pacific. In that connection, the Admiral postulated that the perception by allies, neutrals, and enemies of the will and capacity of the United States to control sealanes, if necessary, could tip the scale of political action in peacetime.

(U) Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird published an article in December 1977 in which he charged flagrant Soviet violations of the Terms of Agreement contracted in the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). He cited such violations as interference with national technical means of verification, the deployment of mobile components of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, the upgrading of anti-aircraft missile systems into ABM systems, the extensive use of camouflage and concealment, and deliberate encryption of telemetry data from a new missile which, Laird stated, could easily be converted from an intermediate range to an intercontinental range missile. He charged that the Soviet Union had increased its military spending each year since the signing of SALT I. The U.S. intelligence community, according to this article, agreed that the Soviets allocated at least 17 percent of their gross national product to military expenditures, in contrast with the U.S. percentage of less than 6 percent. Laird attributed this Russian deceit and dramatic expansion of conventional military power to the goal of using the threat of overwhelming superiority to drive the United States into headlong retreat and isolation from its vital interests around the world.

2. Ibid.
3. Readers Digest, Dec 77, "Arms Control: The Russians are Cheating!", by Melvin R. Laird.
(U) During a press conference in October 1977, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown discussed the development by Russia of new advanced ICBMs and the deployment of a fourth generation of ICBMs already in the Soviet arsenal. According to Brown, this new generation of deployed ICBMs was accurate enough to pose a substantial threat to the land-based ICBMs of the United States by the early 1980s. The Secretary also stated that the Russians possessed an anti-satellite operational capability, but that the United States did not yet possess such a capability.¹

(U) Among the many journalistic and professional comments on the growth of Soviet armed strength was a monograph published by the Naval War College in 1977. This comprehensive and provocative monograph proceeded from the premise that the balance of power between the United States and Russia and the stability of armed strength between east and west were changing in favor of Moscow. The author analyzed the strategy and doctrine of both countries and postulated means by which, with currently available forces, the United States could counter Russian strategy. As part of the author's dissection of United States and Soviet global military strategies, he noted the Soviet penchant toward the acquisition of geographic bases in developing countries which conformed to the Russian strategy of seapower—a worldwide network of oceanic surveillance, combined with air and naval forces placed for quick reaction. Complementing this network were large numbers of naval oilers and commercial tankers which covered the seas and operated independently of foreign fuel sources. This minimized the demands placed on littoral nations which periodically accommodated Soviet forces and permitted the Soviets to keep their presence low-key, thus avoiding aggravations that might hazard access to the bases. The author noted the connection between civil air agreements executed by the Soviets and arrangements for contingency use of appropriate airfields by naval aircraft. For example, the Russian commercial airline, Aeroflot, maintained regularly scheduled air service to 77 countries and had established separate agreements with other States for overflight rights. Since most Russian naval aircraft systems were compatible with the service and maintenance facilities required by their civil aircraft, the airfields regularly used by Aeroflot had a support structure in place which could be used by the Russian naval air forces.²

(U) Instructive in this regard was a UPI dispatch from Moscow in November 1977. The Soviet Union had marked its 60th anniversary on 7 November 1977 with a traditional parade through Red Square, displaying, according to the wire

1. SECDEF 1688/050540Z 0ct 77.
UNCLASSIFIED

service dispatch, an amount of military muscle unprecedented in recent years. For the first time since 1974 the review showed Soviet Army tanks, including the new T-72 battle tank which had never before been seen in public. According to UPI, the military pageant was double the size of the 1975 and 1976 parades.¹

¹. UPI Wire Service, dateline Moscow, cited in CINCPAC ALFA 84/080235Z Nov 77.
SECTION II--THE SOVIET THREAT

The CINCPAC Assessment

The CINCPAC assessment of the Soviet threat in 1977 differed little from the assessment for 1976, except for the continuing qualitative improvement in Russian weapon systems. The Soviet Union was the only world power which had the potential to challenge the United States militarily. Detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Sino-Soviet confrontation, steps toward normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), Russian economic progress, and strategic parity tended to reduce the probability of overt Soviet moves against the United States. The Soviets were expected to continue to use "detente" as a means of achieving their political, economic and military objectives as well as to enhance their position in negotiations with the United States.

Militarily, the Soviet Union was expected to continue to emphasize the research and development of superior forces. The Soviets placed high priorities on modernization of their tactical air forces, their anti-submarine warfare (ASW), their sea control technology, anti-satellite and advanced air defense systems, surveillance system, and command and control systems.

A highly effective Soviet naval force was designed to challenge U.S. control of the seas and was capable in some areas of achieving that goal. Soviet submarines and aircraft were a particular problem; e.g., DELTA ballistic missile submarines equipped with a 4,900 nautical mile missile were assigned to the Soviet Pacific Fleet and more were expected.

Continued development and operational deployment of new generations of aircraft and missiles gave the Soviets the capability to maintain local air superiority in many areas, as well as the ability to support ground forces. Tactical air forces were being modernized with new third generation tactical fighters having significantly improved range and payload, along with improved low altitude/high speed ordnance delivery capability. The potential of Soviet tactical air forces for conventional offensive operations against U.S. forward bases in Japan and Korea continued to increase. The Soviets had also developed improved air-delivered weapons including tactical air-to-surface missiles. Extensive investments in ground radars and command and control systems, combined with modernization of their interceptor force, improved their capability in all aspects of air defense. Long range and intermediate range naval strike

1. CINCPAC 080011Z Oct 77.
aerial combat capabilities had been increased by the introduction of the new air-
to-surface missile systems.

(S/NODER) CINCPAC expected the large Soviet ground force to continue its
modernization with new tanks, heavy mobile artillery, helicopters, missiles,
armored vehicles and small arms. Because of the continuing Sino-Soviet border
confrontation, the Soviet Union was expected not only to maintain but possibly
to increase its strength along the Chinese border.

(S/NODER) In support of political and economic objectives in the Pacific-
Indian Ocean area, CINCPAC expected Soviet naval and long range air reconnaiss-
sance and ASW presence to continue. Russia was also expected to increase its
capability to interfere with the air and sea lines of communications (LOC) by
establishing its own presence, including port and base facilities, in the area.

(S/NODER) Soviet interpretation of peaceful coexistence and detente
included the support of local armed conflicts, intimidation through display of
military might, propaganda, economic pressures, the use of surrogate forces
when appropriate in "wars of liberation", and the threat of nuclear war.

Comparison of U.S.-Soviet Forces

(5) The most challenging threat to the Pacific Command (PACOM) was believed
by CINCPAC to be a conventional worldwide war with the Soviets accompanied by
a North Korean attack into South Korea. The Soviets probably would accept the
risk of a two-front war, and would engage PACOM forces in theater. Additionally,
the Soviets probably would support a North Korean attack into the South.

(5) Soviet ground forces deployed at the outset of a war in the eastern
part of Russia would be vastly superior in numbers to PACOM ground forces.
However, it was unlikely that direct confrontation between United States and
Soviet ground forces would occur.

(5) Soviet combat tactical assets in the PACOM area consisted of some
nine hundred and fifty aircraft. Significant numbers of their newest fighters
were deployed to the Pacific theater. In addition, one hundred and eighty
bombers were also known to be deployed in the Soviet Far East. By comparison,
the fighter/attack aircraft of the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy in the
theater consisted of 180 and 384 respectively. Marine air assets included 197
fighter/attack aircraft. In addition to the Russian combat aircraft strengths
in the maritime provinces, this force was backed up by some 160 operational
surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. Given this threat, U.S. forces would be

1. Ibid.
capable of providing for the air defense of U.S. territory and bases and assisting in the protection of vital LOC, but would be hard pressed to conduct extensive conventional offensive operations against the Soviet Far East forces or to prevent reinforcement of Warsaw Pact forces.

(5) In the PACOM area, the Soviet Pacific Fleet had some 112 submarines and 64 principal surface combatants. Soviet naval forces were expected to attempt to interdict sea LOC and deny local sea control. By comparison, PACOM naval forces included 6 aircraft carriers, 32 submarines and 80 principal surface combatants. United States naval strength and flexibility stemmed from its capability to deploy rapidly at least five carriers with 315 fighter/attack aircraft. The U.S. naval task groups would be subject to attack by Soviet submarines, aircraft armed with anti-submarine missiles, and elements of the Soviet surface fleet equipped with anti-ship missiles. In such a two-front conventional war scenario, PACOM efforts to protect essential LOC against the Soviets would be greatly reduced if substantial PACOM forces were redeployed to support NATO. In this case, the PACOM could provide protection only for sea LOC linking the Continental United States with Hawaii, the Panama Canal and Alaska.

**Soviet Pacific Fleet Dispersal**

(5) The Soviet Pacific Fleet was concentrated in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. Patterns of deployment included two YANKEE nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to the eastern Pacific and occasionally one DELTA SSBN to the Northwest Pacific. Other areas of intermittent submarine patrols included north of Midway, the Philippine Sea, the east China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Intelligence collectors maintained patrols off Kwajalein, Guam, the east China Sea and sometimes Diego Garcia, the Hormuz Strait, and the U.S. West Coast. Hydrographic ships operated throughout the Pacific Ocean, the Philippines, east China and Arabian Seas. Although Soviet surface combatants normally operated in the area of Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, they also deployed to the Indian Ocean and occasionally conducted exercises in the Philippine Sea.¹

(5) The Soviet Pacific Fleet's powerful force of 77 attack submarines, armed with cruise missiles and torpedos and backed by 64 principal surface combatants, posed a significant threat to Japan's sea LOC and to U.S. presence in Asia. The 32 Soviet ballistic missile submarines were capable of strategic nuclear strikes against Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. DELTA-class SSBNs were capable of striking 30 of the U.S. mainland from their home waters off Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok. The Soviets also possessed intermediate and long-range bombers which posed a conventional and nuclear threat.

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¹. IPAC Point Paper, 29 Sep 77, Subj: Soviet Naval Presence in the Pacific.
to all of Japan and to U.S. forces throughout all of Asia. Far East naval aviation in particular posed a serious threat to Japanese ports, harbors, naval forces and maritime LOC.1

There were many examples of fleet and air activity within the theater during the year. For example, on 7 January 1977 two Soviet aircraft conducted intelligence collection missions against U.S. facilities in the Marianas Islands. The aircraft were spotted by U.S. high frequency direction finding equipment before they penetrated the Guam air defense identification zone (ADIZ), and were intercepted and accompanied by U.S. aircraft during their flight in the Guam ADIZ. The Soviet aircraft were operating without running lights and, in addition to U.S. surveillance aircraft, one B-52 was airborne. This had been the first penetration by Soviet aircraft of the Guam ADIZ since 13 May 1976.2

On 20 December 1976, 30-40 Soviet sailors landed at an atoll in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, asking if the island had ties with the United States and if U.S. maneuvers were conducted on the island. In February 1977 the U.S. State Department directed the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to submit an oral statement regarding this incident to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands had asked the Department of State to invite the attention of the Soviet Government to the unauthorized landing of Russian seamen in the Trust Territory. The Embassy was requested to express the concern of the Government of the United States regarding such unauthorized landings.3

In June 1977 the Commander of the U.S. Third Fleet was informed by the Scripps Institute that one of their vessels, conducting bio-chemical oceanographic research north of Hawaii, had been harassed by a Soviet vessel. The Scripps Institute reported that the Soviet vessel had attempted, during the night, to retrieve instruments which had been placed in the water by the Scripps vessel. The Scripps vessel sent a boat to the Soviet ship in an attempt to resolve the situation; however, with no interpreter, that attempt failed. The Scripps Institute signified its concern that the instruments which had been successfully placed in the water and were scheduled to rise to the surface later in June would be retrieved by the Russian vessel. They were advised by the commander of the U.S. Third Fleet to obtain photographs and to document all actions which were considered harassment.4

2. CINCPAC ALFA 65/080436Z Jan 77.
3. SECSTATE 039490/222112Z Feb 77, which cited CINCPACFLT 012100Z Feb 77.
4. CINCPACFLT 240131Z Jun 77, which transmitted COMTHIRDFLT 232337Z Jun 77.
In August 1977 the Strategic Air Command (SAC) advised of the addition of one YANKEE Class Soviet SSBN in the Pacific and two in the Atlantic and its concern about the permanency of such deployments. SAC postulated that if the extra deployments were related to a Russian naval alert exercise, conducted from 29 July to 6 August, the extra deployments would appear to be one-time occurrences. SAC intelligence considered that the addition of two or three SSBN in the patrol area for the exercise was a realistic simulation of SSBN operations in a crisis situation, because the Soviets would probably augment the day-to-day force of YANKEES on station during a period of increased tension. However, if the larger force of YANKEES on patrol were maintained, a change in the Soviet's overall strategic targeting philosophy could have occurred. Although a shift to greater reliance on submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) could be a result of a temporary decrease in ICBM capability because of launch site conversions, it was also possible that the Soviets felt the need for more land-targeted SLBMs even without their temporary decrease in ICBMs.¹

### Soviet Penetration in the Southwest Pacific

In 1976 growing evidence from diplomatic and intelligence sources of Soviet and PRC initiatives to establish close diplomatic and economic ties with the developing States of the Southwest Pacific had caused CINCPAC to request a staff analysis of the situation. The military value of these island nations accrued because they were astride or near sea and air LOC not only to Australia and New Zealand but also to the mid-East. It was important, stated CINCPAC, that Russia or any other unfriendly power be denied a significant foothold from which these vital LOC could be interdicted.²

The reasons for Soviet interest in the Southwest Pacific were summarized in a paper by the Intelligence Center of the Pacific (IPAC) in December 1977. One possible reason for Soviet interest was the need to exercise the world-wide presence it perceived as the prerogative of a super power of equal rank to the United States. Another factor was Soviet competition with China, since the PRC had diplomatic relations with Fiji, Tonga, Western Samoa, and Papua New Guinea. Port calls in the area by Soviet merchant and cruise ships had doubled since 1974. Regular merchant shipping services had been established with Australia, and Russia had shown interest in establishing the same services with New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. By the end of 1977, there were between eight and 30 Soviet fishing trawlers operating off New Zealand. From the military standpoint, IPAC considered that Russia needed to acquire global knowledge of the oceans in order to broaden its options for contingency deployments of its SSBNs. Moreover, the area covered the southern flank of LOC between the

1. SSO SAC 112032Z Aug 77 (BOM).
United States and Japan, between the United States and forward bases in the Philippines, Guam, and the Marianas Islands, and between United States and Australia and New Zealand. There was also the increase in intelligence collection which could result from the use of Soviet aircraft, merchant and research ships in the Southwest Pacific.\(^1\)

Soviet activity in the Southwest Pacific first occurred in 1947 when Russia began whaling in Antarctica. Little additional activity, apart from the establishment of scientific research stations in Antarctica, was shown until Fiji and Tonga became independent in 1970. Since then Russia had established diplomatic relations with Fiji, Tonga, Western Samoa and Papua New Guinea. IPAC considered that the Soviets would continue to approach the South Pacific countries, and provided the following recapitulation of Soviet activity as of the end of 1977:\(^2\)

**Fiji.** In 1970, and again in 1974 and 1975, the Soviets reportedly offered economic assistance in return for shipping and port facilities. In 1971 the Soviets also offered scholarships. None of these offers were accepted. In June 74, diplomatic relations were established. In 1977, the Soviets reportedly attempted twice to establish a permanent mission (PRC has had a mission in Suva since May 76 and an embassy since May 77). The latest attempt in late Nov was firmly rejected by Fiji who claimed it was satisfied with present conditions whereby the Soviet Ambassador in Australia is accredited to Fiji. Fiji's suspicions have been underscored by Soviet dealings with the often disruptive Fiji dock workers' union.

**Tonga.** Diplomatic relations were established in Oct 75. In Apr 76 and in May 77, the Soviets offered economic assistance including airfield upgrading, fisheries assistance and provisions of aircraft on concessionary terms. To date, nothing has resulted from these offers.

**Western Samoa.** Diplomatic relations were established in Jul 76. In the same month, the USSR proposed an agreement which included a fish cannery, fishing vessels and perhaps a

dry-dock in return for the use of Western Samoa as a fishing base. In 1977, the Soviets reportedly offered 50 scholarships; these too were not accepted.

Papua New Guinea. Diplomatic relations were established in May 76 after more than a year of negotiations. The USSR's attempts to establish a resident mission in Port Moresby have been firmly rejected. The USSR has indicated its interest in economic and cultural cooperations, fishing, forestry, shipping projects and hydroelectric schemes. In mid-Jul 76, a senior PNG minister visited the USSR. In 1977, the Soviet Council of Trade Unions reportedly offered funds to the Port Moresby Council of Trade Unions to establish an activity center; these were not accepted.

The Africa-Indian Ocean Area

(U) Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean had increased since the first actual deployment in 1968 until 1972. Since that time the Soviet force level had remained nearly constant. These activities, and the establishment of Soviet facilities and bases in Somalia, were discussed in several previous CINCPAC histories. By April 1977 the Soviets had completed construction on a new airfield at Berbera with a runway exceeding 14,000 feet. This runway was long enough to accommodate Soviet long-range reconnaissance and transport aircraft. Construction of another airfield at Dafet, about 58 miles northwest of Mogadiscio, had also been completed. This runway was over 10,000 feet long and Soviet MIG-21 aircraft were based there. The Soviets had also begun construction of SAM sites at Berbera and at Hargeisa in northern Somalia. Sufficient equipment was available for at least four launch positions at Berbera and six at Hargeisa. Prior to these developments, only Mogadiscio had SAM sites. It was estimated that approximately 2,500 to 3,000 Soviet personnel were in Somalia. About 1,500 of those were believed to be military advisors and technicians working with the Somalia defense forces down to lower unit levels.1

(8) In April 1977 the JCS requested CINCPAC's views on the subject of arms control in the Indian Ocean area. In reply, the CINCPAC Director for Plans provided a summary of U.S. security interests and objectives in the Indian Ocean area. Regarding the facilities available to the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean, he noted that Russian seaborne logistics support was sufficient to maintain the readiness and mobility of the normally deployed Russian

1. DIA 832-132241Z Apr 77.
naval squadron in the Indian Ocean. At that time, the support facilities at
Berbera supplemented the capability and gave the Soviets the potential to
increase the Indian Ocean force levels. In addition to the facilities at
Berbera, the Soviets also had access to airfields at Mogadiscio, Hargeisa,
Chisimaio and Dafet. Limited logistic support, such as fuel and subsistence,
was also available in other Indian Ocean countries, including India, Iraq,
South Yemen, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka. Russia also had a large merchant fleet
which could be used to augment military logistics vessels in support of Middle
East/Indian Ocean operations. The typical Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean
was comprised of a naval squadron consisting of at least one submarine, as
many as three destroyers, a small amphibious contingent, and assorted auxiliary
vessels as well as scientific research and merchant ships. On the other hand,
the U.S. Middle East Force, consisting of a flag ship and two rotational de-
stroyers, was the only permanent U.S. presence in and around the Indian Ocean.
Task Forces from the PACOM conducted an average of three deployments to the
Indian Ocean per year. In addition, intelligence-gathering ships were occasion-
ally deployed and maritime air patrol/logistics flights were made periodic-
ally to Nairobi, Masirah, Bandar Abbas, and Diego Garcia. This periodic and
modest deployment of PACFLT naval forces limited sea/air control capability to
the immediate vicinity of deployed forces except for air strikes from carriers.
It was impossible for the United States forces to patrol all LOC and choke
points simultaneously even on the surface and the U.S. ASW capability was
limited.1

By November 1977 the Soviet Indian Ocean naval squadron had been
reduced from the normal twenty ships to eighteen. IPAC speculated that this
reduction in number could be related to the U.S.-Soviet Indian Ocean arms
limitation talks. Nearly all Soviet units continued to deploy from the Pacific
fleet bases via the Malacca Strait despite the reopening of the Suez Canal,
which provided a potential route for rapid reinforcement of the Indian Ocean
squadron. IPAC noted that Somalia had ejected the Russians in retaliation for
their support of Ethiopia, but the loss of access to the Somali facilities
was not expected to preclude the maintenance of some level of presence in the
Indian Ocean.2

S/NCP/ROM) Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean were, of course,
under U.S. surveillance. One example of such activity involved a Soviet ocean-
ographic research vessel which appeared to be tracking a U.S. submarine.

1. CINCPAC 130752Z Apr 77, RADM McClendon to VADM Hannfin (BOM). (The sub-
ject of arms control in the Indian Ocean area is discussed in the Political-
Military Chapter.)
2. IPAC Point Paper, 11 Nov 77, Subj: Soviet Naval Activities in the Indian
Ocean.
Intelligence sources speculated that the mission of the Soviet vessel was to lay an automatic buoy station (ABS) adjacent to Timor Straits, so that the ABS could be used to chart an underwater route into the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean, as well as to provide navigational assistance to Soviet submarines. It could also be used to position a vertical/horizontal/bottom sonar array to monitor U.S. submarine activity. The ABS was believed to have the ability to collect, store and transmit such data. Although the Russians claimed that the purpose of the vessel was to study tidal waves, U.S. intelligence sources assessed the activities of the vessel to be unrelated to such an objective. The Soviet research vessel was observed to be operating in two separate positions some 200 nautical miles apart and some 50 nautical miles off the south Timor coast. Both these positions were astride the one-thousand meter bottom contour line, and had a geographic relationship to the southern exits/entrance to the strategically significant deep water Ombat/Sela Straits. If the assessment of the mission of the vessel was correct, it was speculated that Soviet efforts to monitor traffic into the Indian Ocean which by-passed the Malacca Strait would be enhanced.

1. USDAO Canberra 134/092319Z Feb 77.
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SECTION III-THE PRC THREAT

Overview

1. CHMAAG Taipei 200817Z Jan 77.
2. DIA 4349/171755Z Jan 77.
3. COMUSTDC 190907Z May 77.
   Ibid.
1. AMEMB Taipei 2937/200908Z May 77 and 2947/210345Z May 77.
2. CINCPAC ALFA 16/201939Z Jun 77 (EX), which passed SECSTATE 142465/201420Z Jun 77.
3. SECSTATE 146108/231710Z Jun 77 (EX), which transmitted AMEMB Taipei 3735/230925Z Jun 77.
1. COMUSTDC 060822Z Jul 77.
1. AMEMB Taipei 5077/190507Z Aug 77 (EX).
2. SECSTATE 198749/200232Z Aug 77 (EX).
1. FBIS Okinawa 220308Z Aug 77.
2. UPI Wire Service, dateline Hong Kong, cited in CINCPAC ALFA 66/220220Z Jul 77.
3. UPI Wire Service, dateline Hong Kong, cited in CINCPAC ALFA 146/110212Z May 77.
4. COMUSKOREA 051110Z Jun 77 and 071245Z Jun 77.
1. DIA 7449/100400Z Jun 77.
2. CINCPAC ALFA 001/201007Z Jun 77, which transmitted USLO Peking 1235/200359Z Jun 77.
2. COMUSKOREA 110855Z Jul 77.
1. COMUSKOREA 110445Z May 77; CINCPAC ALFA 150/111110Z May 77; COMUSKOREA 120140Z May 77.
2. HQ PACAF 112015Z Jul 77; OSAN AB Korea 111010Z Jul 77.
1. CINCUN1 1223/080206Z Apr 77, GEN Vessey to GEN Brown and ADM Weisner (BOM) and 1287/120334Z Apr 77, GEN Vessey to GEN Brown and ADM Weisner (BOM); JCS 1567/212041Z Apr 77 (EX).

2. CINCUN1 3990/190337Z Sep 77, GEN Vessey to GEN Brown and ADM Weisner (BOM).
3. SECSTATE 041849/251659Z Feb 77.
1. CINCUNC 081350Z Feb 77.
2. COMUSKOREA 210448Z Nov 77.
2. Ibid.
2. UPI Wire Service, dateline Tokyo, cited in CINCPAC ALFA 226/140030Z May 77.
2. Ibid.
1. JCS 2022/082205Z Sep 77.
2. CINCPAC 080017Z Oct 77.
1. Ibid.
2. JCS 4907/032247Z Dec 76.
3. CINCPAC 242221Z Jan 77.
1. Ibid.
2. JCS 3647/131353Z Apr 77.
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2. Ibid.
3. J5 Memo T21-77, 24 May 77, Subj: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for
  FY 1978 (JSCP-78).
1. CINCPAC 110213Z May 77.
2. CINCPAC 030005Z Nov 77.
3. Ibid.


SECTION II--CINCPAC PLANS

CINCPAC Operation Plans

The CINCPAC staff was continuously in the process of preparing, revising, or studying the requirements for planning for many contingencies and operations. Most numbered CINCPAC Operation Plans were the responsibility of the Plans Directorate, although other staff elements contributed directly with specialized input, particularly for detailed functional annexes to plans. Some plans were prepared or revised by the Operations Directorate, in which case they were usually promulgated by letter or message. The following list identifies CINCPAC contingency plans and their status as of 31 December 1977.

CINCPAC Numbered Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date of Issue/ Last Change</th>
<th>Status/Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5001</td>
<td>PACOM Defense Plan (U)</td>
<td>Ch 1, 29 Aug 77</td>
<td>(U) Under revision. Latest JCS approval on 18 May 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5020</td>
<td>Concept Plans for Korean Contingency (C)</td>
<td>Ch 6, 15 Mar 77</td>
<td>(C) Under revision. To be forwarded for JCS approval following review by components/staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5026</td>
<td>Control of Maritime Traffic (C)</td>
<td>Ch 1, 16 Dec 77</td>
<td>(C) Current. CONPLAN to provide for control of maritime traffic serving hostile nations to counter a threat or use by a hostile nation against the U.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. CINCPAC Plans Status Report, Ser T6, 1 Jan 78; J5 Memo T22-78, 28 Jul 78, Subj: CINCPAC 1977 Command History, review of.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date of Issue/Last Change</th>
<th>Status/Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5028</td>
<td>ASW and Control and Protection of Shipping (U)</td>
<td>Ch 1, 19 Apr 72</td>
<td>(U) Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5031</td>
<td>Pacific Mining</td>
<td>Ch 1, 18 Jul 77</td>
<td>(U) Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5060</td>
<td>Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan (NEMVAC)(U)</td>
<td>Ch 1, 3 Feb 77</td>
<td>(U) New plan completed. Submitted to JCS in Dec 77.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5065</td>
<td>Security of Selected Personnel and Equipment (U)</td>
<td>26 Jul 77</td>
<td>(U) Under revision. Estimated completion date Apr 78.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5068</td>
<td>CINCPAC/FAAPAC Relationships (U)</td>
<td>Ch 3, 8 Dec 75</td>
<td>(U) Under revision. CONPLAN delineates tasks and responsibilities within PACOM to assist in security and evacuation of selected crypto-logic personnel and equipment from endangered areas.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(U) Under revision. CONPLAN provides for CINCPAC and FAAPAC relationships in wartime and during national emergencies. It provides for the wartime control and movement of all aircraft using PACOM airspace. Revised CONPLAN completed and under review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date of Issue/Last Change</td>
<td>Status/Remarks</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5076</td>
<td>Supplementary Collection Operations Against Foreign Missile &amp; Associated Activities (C) PONY EXPRESS (U)</td>
<td>5 Sep 74</td>
<td>(U) Under revision. Being updated and resubmitted to JCS as a CONPLAN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5088</td>
<td>Fishery Conservation Zone Ch 1, Contingency (U)</td>
<td>8 Jun 77</td>
<td>(C) Current. CONPLAN provides for operations to oppose foreign military forces in supporting vessels fishing in the US fishery conservation zone without proper permit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5090</td>
<td>Air Harassment (U)</td>
<td>Ch 1, 20 Jan 77</td>
<td>(C) Current. CONPLAN provides series of air harassment options for PACOM in response to infringement of basic US/allied rights by hostile nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5095</td>
<td>Quadripartite Countermeasures (S)</td>
<td>Ch 1, 27 May 76</td>
<td>(S) Current. CONPLAN with naval countermeasures and reprisal action designed to demonstrate determination of quadripartite governments of France, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, and US to act in concert to preserve their mutual rights in Berlin against USSR encroachment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date of Issue/Last Change</th>
<th>Status/Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5125</td>
<td>Augmentation/Support of Other Unified Commands (U)</td>
<td>Ch 4, 10 Mar 77</td>
<td>(U) Under revision. PACOM omnibus OPLAN consolidates in a single supporting plan all CINCPAC augmentation and support force requirements identified in JCS-approved plans of other unified commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5125A</td>
<td>Augmentation of USCINC-EUR in NATO/Warsaw Pact War (TS) (Supports USCINC-EUR OPLAN 4102)</td>
<td>CINCEUR 30 Dec 74</td>
<td>(U) Under revision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5125B</td>
<td>Augmentation of CINCLANT in NATO/Warsaw Pact War (TS) (Supports CINCLANT OPLAN 2200)</td>
<td>CINCLANT 31 Dec 76</td>
<td>(U) Under revision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5125C</td>
<td>Support to USCINC-EUR in Event of Soviet Intervention in Arab-Israeli Conflict (TS) (Supports USCINC-EUR CONPLAN 4224)</td>
<td>CINCEUR 30 Dec 74</td>
<td>(U) Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5125E</td>
<td>Augmentation to CINCLANT for Military Operations Against Cuba (TS) (Will support CINCLANT CON-PLAN 2348)</td>
<td>CINCLANT 9 Dec 76 Ch 4, 17 Nov 77</td>
<td>(U) Current. Ch 3 to OPLAN 5125, dated 28 Jan 77, incorporated new 5125E which replaced the old 5125E and 5125F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5125F</td>
<td>Augmentation of CINCLANT for Defense of Guantanamo (TS) (Supports CINCLANT OPLAN 2325)</td>
<td>17 Nov 77</td>
<td>(U) Deleted. See above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date of Issue/ Last Change</td>
<td>Status/Remarks</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5125G</td>
<td>Augmentation of CINCLANT to Support USCINCSO (U)</td>
<td>31 Jan 75</td>
<td>(U) Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Supports USCINCSO OPLAN 6500)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5125H</td>
<td>Support to COMJTF Alaska COMAAC for Defense of Alaska (U)</td>
<td>1 Feb 77</td>
<td>(U) Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Supports COMJTF Alaska OPLAN 9600)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Supports CINCAD OPLAN 3003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5131</td>
<td>Operations Order for Airborne Command Post Ground Alert (U)</td>
<td>8 Sep 76</td>
<td>(U) Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5555</td>
<td>Protection of Vessels Engaged in Oil Survey Operations on the Continental Shelf (U)</td>
<td>2 Jun 71</td>
<td>(U) Held in abeyance. No updating actions planned until receipt of current JCS guidance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5718</td>
<td>Operations in International Waters (U)</td>
<td>18 Nov 77</td>
<td>(U) OPLAN is at JCS for approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0200</td>
<td>Disaster Relief Africa South of the Sahara (CL)</td>
<td>12 Aug 77</td>
<td>(U) Under review. Supporting CINCPAC CONPLAN to JCS 0200. Approved by JCS 9 Nov 77. Ch 1 to be published Jan 78.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Unnumbered CINCPAC Contingency Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date of Issue/Last Change</th>
<th>Status/Remarks</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>of PACOM, Responsibility and Command Authority for (U)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base/Installation Security (U) 21 May 76</td>
<td></td>
<td>(U) Current. Requires commanders to have security plan responsive to various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supports CINCPACINST 5510.12, Base/Installation Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>DEFCONS and other emergency situations. Plans will provide for increased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During Defense Readiness Conditions and Other Emergency Situations</td>
<td></td>
<td>security during DEFCONS and emergency conditions to protect key facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(U)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(U) MCC 100/22</td>
<td></td>
<td>tasks for supporting plans. Names CINCPAC as US planning agent for Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defense (U). Supports CINCPACINST 3025.1A, Military Support of</td>
<td>11 Mar 76</td>
<td>naval operations. See also MARWESTOP, above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defense (U)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(U) Under review. Establishes CINCPAC policy, assigns responsibilities and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Disturbance (U). Supports CINCPACINST 3050.3E, Employment of</td>
<td>13 Apr 77</td>
<td>sets forth guidance regarding military support of civil defense under a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Resources in Event of Civil Disturbances within the PACOM</td>
<td></td>
<td>national emergency involving nuclear attack on US territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (U).</td>
<td></td>
<td>(U) Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date of Issue/ Last Change</td>
<td>Status/Remarks</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Relief (U). Supports CINCPACINST 3050.1 and 3050.2 (3050.1)</td>
<td>28 Oct 75, 6 Nov 72</td>
<td>(U) Current. 3050.1 concerns foreign relief; 3050.2 domestic relief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dealing with employment of military resources in natural disasters,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign and domestic.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORMAL MIST (U)</td>
<td>Ch 3, 25 Jun 76</td>
<td>(U) Current. Limited distribution OPLAN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation of Aerospace Defense Command Sites in Aerospace Defense</td>
<td>Modified by CINCONAD 192125Z</td>
<td>(U) Current. Provides agreed CINCPAC-CINCAD procedures for emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command (U)</td>
<td>Mar 75</td>
<td>situations involving ADCOM sites/facilities in PACOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARDEN PLOT (PACOM)(U) Cdr, USACSG is CINCPAC planning agent.</td>
<td>8 Mar 77</td>
<td>(U) Current. Also see Civil Disturbance. Provides for organization of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JTF 110 from PACOM resources for employment in event of directed Federal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>military intervention in civil disturbances in Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, TTPI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijacking of Civil Aircraft in PACOM (U). Supports CINCPACINST 3722.2</td>
<td>27 Jan 77</td>
<td>(U) Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment of Military Resources in Event of Civil Disturbance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date of Issue/ Last Change</td>
<td>Status/Remarks</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships Subjected to Harassing or Hostile Action (U). Supports CINCPACINST S3100.4.</td>
<td>4 Dec 75</td>
<td>(C) Current. Provides guidance and actions to be taken by certain US ships engaged in sensitive operations or operating in sensitive areas. Ships concerned are primarily those operated by MSC and hydrographic survey ships when under CINCPAC operational control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorized Aircraft Landing at US Bases (U). Supports CINCPACINST S3700.1F, Policy Concerning Aircraft from the USSR, PRC, or Allied Countries Landing on Airfields where US Military Operational Units are Based (U).</td>
<td>15 Jun 76</td>
<td>(U) Current. Annual staff review to begin Jan 78.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. CINCPAC 162145Z Apr 77.
SECTION III--MISCELLANEOUS PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Africa South of the Sahara: Defense Interest and Command Relations

(U) In May 1976 the Unified Command Plan had assigned CINCPAC responsibility for the entire Indian Ocean area, putting the countries of East Africa at the PACOM border. Communist successes in Africa provided evidence of a coordinated and aggressive Soviet interventionist policy. It was the staff view that the United States needed a comprehensive and well-defined statement of U.S. national policy and objectives. There were two goals: one was to encourage the National Command Authorities to focus on Africa and develop long-range policy that would enhance the U.S. position and counter Soviet penetration; the other, in the near term, was to take action to insure that U.S. military activities were coordinated and carefully orchestrated to obtain maximum benefit from the limited resources available.

(U) In December 1976 the JCS had forwarded a study entitled, "Assessment of US Military Interests in Africa South of the Sahara." (JCS SM-966-76 of 13 December 1976.) They requested CINCPAC's comments. As Africa was not part of the PACOM, perhaps a brief summary of circumstances in Africa at that time is appropriate. This discussion concerns Africa "south of the Sahara."

(U) A vast area comprised of 37 major nations with a population of 316 million, Africa was plagued by deep-rooted tribal, regional, ethnic, and religious animosities, economic underdevelopment, a tenuous political infrastructure, recurring drought and famine, and a lingering fear of colonialism.

(U) U.S. interests were varied. Since 1954, 47 nations in all of Africa had gained independence and comprised one-third of the membership of the United Nations. It was an arena for big-power competition: the United States, the USSR, and, to a lesser extent, China. It was an increasingly important source of raw materials for industrial nations. It was important to have free and competitive access to its natural resources, some with strategic significance. U.S. investment was $4 billion by 1976, with 35,000 U.S. citizens there. African mines yielded the majority of Free World production of six of the most essential resources required by a modern technological society (chromium, cobalt, industrial diamonds, manganese, metals in the platinum group, and vanadium).

(U) There were significant air and sea lines of communication in the area: the Cape of Good Hope, the 250-mile wide Mozambique Channel, the Suez Canal.

and the 20-mile-wide Bab Al Mandeb Strait between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. In military matters, the primary focus was on the littoral states. The United States needed airfields, port facilities, and lines of communication through and around Africa in order to prevent Soviet or Chinese domination of the region, to promote internal security, to prevent direct great-power conflict, to resolve sub-regional conflicts peacefully, to maintain freedom of transit for Persian Gulf oil to the United States and its allies, to open economic LOC, to oppose Soviet efforts to create a base structure that would facilitate projection of power into the South Atlantic and Western Indian Ocean, to guarantee protection of U.S. citizens, and to insure access to strategic resources.

There were a number of troubled areas. In the Horn of Africa a clash between Somalia and Ethiopia. Angola had continued guerrilla activity. South Africa had Apartheid. Namibia wanted self-determination. In Rhodesia the issue was majority rule. Uganda was troubled by irrational leadership.

The Soviet presence was apparent with the existence of a port, airfield, and missile storage in Somalia, base rights in Guinea, and port and airfield rights in Angola. Additional facilities were likely in Angola and Mozambique. The Soviet willingness to provide arms and advisory assistance to virtually any African country requesting help was a powerful lever. They had privileged access to resources and a military-political operations base. They had the ability to quickly deploy air and naval combatants in crisis situations on the continent. Overflight rights and base facilities enabled the USSR to project air power into the South Atlantic and Western Indian Ocean to cover naval deployments. The Soviet (and Cuban) successes and lack of a visible U.S. presence or stated policy gave the appearance of no alternatives to Soviet influence or domination.

Chinese efforts had been limited but effective. China's reputation was as a non-exploitative aid partner. They aimed at long-term influence, and were unable to effectively compete with the USSR in the near term. China was the self-proclaimed third world leader "fighting forces of imperialism."

The United States had Military Assistance Advisory Groups in Liberia, Zaire, Kenya, and Morocco. The only other contact was by means of infrequent port calls, disaster relief operations, military aircraft transits, and training of African military personnel. In FY 75 the USSR had provided almost $280 million in security assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa. U.S. support in Grant Aid and Foreign Military Sales for the same period was less than $54 million, with another $76 million in commercial assistance.

1. Ibid.
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(6) In the light of these circumstances, the JCS had requested that CINCPAC review U.S. military, strategic, and intelligence priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa and consider reorienting the Unified Command structure to provide clear responsibility for planning in the area. They requested the unified commands' comments on restructuring Unified Command Plan lines of responsibility and methods for obtaining support from U.S. allies, and, based on the foregoing, determine the need to develop additional concepts and plans for Sub-Saharan Africa.

(6) CINCPAC provided his reply on 22 January. He viewed the study as a comprehensive evaluation of factors affecting U.S. policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, but he believed that two areas should be expanded. First, if higher priorities were to be assigned to military interests in the area, he believed that the study should be expanded to address communication-electronic requirements. For example, he saw the need for additional transportable satellite communications terminals to support possible contingency operations. Secondly, in light of Congressional reaction to attempted U.S. military initiatives in Angola, CINCPAC suggested that the study include an assessment of U.S. internal and international political reaction to increased U.S. military involvement in Africa.

(6) In commenting on the study's recommendations, CINCPAC believed that current strategic priorities for Africa south of the Sahara were appropriate for the countries of the area. In view of the strategic location of and conflict potential on the Horn of Africa, CINCPAC suggested that the intelligence priorities for Somalia and the French Territory of Afars and Issas (which became the Republic of Djibouti on 27 June 1977) be raised. Intelligence priorities for Tanzania, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South Africa, CINCPAC continued, should be raised because of the potential for expanded Communist influence in Southern Africa, which could limit future U.S. access to vital raw materials. Intelligence priority for Kenya "should be raised because it is the only Western-oriented black nation on the East African coast," and was bordered on three sides by leftist-oriented nations. An alternative to changing intelligence priorities for the area would be to raise priorities of selected items of intelligence that were outlined in intelligence priorities for strategic planning 1976-1985.

(6) The current edition of the Unified Command Plan at that time tasked the CINC of the Readiness Command, when directed by the JCS, to provide contingency planning, joint task force headquarters, and forces for the conduct of contingency operations in areas not assigned to another unified commander. Africa south of the Sahara was such a non-assigned area. While the JCS study had

1. CINCPAC 220234Z Jan 77.
suggested that the Unified Command Plan should be reoriented to place Sub-Saharan Africa under a unified command to provide a clear assignment of planning responsibilities for African contingencies, CINCPAC interpreted the previous guidance to be clear; no reorientation of the unified command structure would be required to satisfy the planning requirement.

(5) If, however, as suggested by the JCS study, the rather general tasking was not considered adequate to provide the necessary focus on this "increasingly turbulent area," CINCPAC suggested that the JCS assign area responsibility for all of Sub-Saharan Africa to a single unified commander. He recommended that USCINRED be given first consideration. He offered a number of thoughts, pro and con. In favor of his recommendation, he cited that as USCINRED was tasked under the current plan, assignment of area responsibility to him would simply implement and expand this tasking and would serve to integrate security assistance and other area responsibilities with contingency planning. Such an assignment would result in less impact on other unified commands whose assets and planning capability were fully committed to their presently assigned areas. Also, recognizing that forces for any given contingency had been and would continue to be drawn from the most readily available source, as directed by the JCS, it was considered most likely that CONUS-based forces, available to USCINRED, would be tasked initially for Sub-Saharan contingencies.

(5) On the other hand, such an assignment could detract from the assigned Readiness Command missions to plan for and provide augmentation forces to other unified commands and develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint employment of forces assigned.

(5) CINCPAC recommended that the CINC of the European Command be given second consideration for area responsibility because of his proximity to the area, his existing responsibility for Africa north of the Sahara, the traditional European-African ties, and the secondary advantage of emphasizing U.S. interest in Sub-Saharan Africa to other NATO nations. The overriding disadvantage, however, was the diminution of CINCEUR's primary responsibility to his basic mission in the priority area of NATO Europe.

(5) CINCPAC did not recommend assignment of area responsibility to either CINCLANT or CINCPAC. He cited existing commitments, lack of current area responsibility for any part of the African continent, and the absence of significant traditional ties between countries in already assigned areas and the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. He continued:

1. Ibid.

...From the PACOM point of view, restructuring lines of responsibility to place any part of Sub-Saharan Africa
under CINCPAC would present large scale logistic problems. PACOM mobile logistics support forces (MLSF) are barely adequate to support current naval deployments. Support for an additional carrier task group, in the Cape of Good Hope area, for example, would overtax MLSF assets. Air LOCs to Sub-Saharan Africa through PACOM are severely constrained by size and other physical limitations of Diego Garcia, the logical enroute aerial port. This choke point, coupled with the lack of adequate aerial port facilities readily available in the region, makes large scale aerial resupply operations extremely tenuous. The nearest PACOM ship and aircraft repair/maintenance facilities are in the Philippines. As a minimum, it seems that additional MLSF and a regional airbase facility would be necessary if CINCPAC were to assume responsibility for the area.

...Splitting Sub-Saharan Africa between CINCLANT and CINCPAC was also considered and is not recommended for the same reasons stated above, plus the following: would split responsibility for an area commonly viewed as an entity, with associated increase in command relations complexities.

(S) In the matter of allied support, CINCPAC believed that the methods of obtaining such support could be best developed in Washington, where all political, economic, and military facts could be weighed. "In terms of military involvement with allies in the African/Indian Ocean region, present relationships with our CENTO allies and the French, who have a visible presence in the area, should be continued and expanded."

(S) CINCPAC believed that the study was a useful basis for JCS examination of methods for increasing emphasis on the area and assigning more definitive responsibilities. He said he would welcome the opportunity to participate in future actions to develop additional military concepts or operation plans for the region.

(S) The CINC of the Readiness Command recommended that the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and the Unified Command Plan all be changed to reflect an increased U.S. interest in the area and to provide for a clear assignment of responsibility for the area. An alternative would be formal tasking of USREDCOM to provide contingency planning for the unassigned areas as currently provided for within the Unified Command Plan.

1. Ibid.
The CINC of the U.S. European Command recommended that the area be assigned to him.

The CINCLANT recommended consideration of reorienting the unified command structure and suggested that the assignment of the area to a unified commander "might improve" responsiveness and effectiveness of U.S. Forces and planning responsibilities. Reassignment of responsibility for the surrounding ocean areas to CINCLANT would aid in the improvement of NATO receptiveness to expansion of interest and operations into the African lines of communication, CINCLANT believed.¹

The matter was discussed at the conference of the CINCs and Service Chiefs convened by the Chairman of the JCS in June, as discussed in Chapter I. The matter remained under study throughout 1977; there were no changes to the Unified Command Plan and Sub-Saharan Africa remained an unassigned area at the end of December.

Doctrinal Guidance on "Coalition" War

On 24 August the JCS requested views on the need for and publication of general JCS doctrinal guidance for the conduct of "coalition" war. CINCPAC's reply follows.²

To the question whether there was a need for guidance to address combined/alliance/coalition operations during peacetime, transition from peacetime to war, or during a general war situation, CINCPAC said that such doctrine statements were neither necessary nor desirable. "Each major geographical area of the globe in which combined wars might be planned as a contingency or eventually fought is different politically, militarily, and sociologically." The manner in which both peacetime and wartime U.S. military goals, objectives, and missions were prosecuted and attained was a function of those differences. Flexibility to tailor the U.S. approach to each possible major theater of operations was considered a prerequisite to success. "Policy/doctrine statements, even though broad and general, could conceivably reduce this flexibility. Further, generalized guidance of the type suggested would be of little assistance to the military planner."

In reply to the question whether publication of broad doctrinal guidance would assist CINCPAC or clarify international command issues, CINCPAC said,

2. JCS 3722/121250Z Aug 77; CINCPAC 242213Z Aug 77.
"No, unified action doctrine together with guidance currently available and that reflected in approved operational plans is considered adequate." In reply to the question of means of promulgating such guidance, CINCPAC replied that if it were determined that such guidance were needed, publish it as a memorandum or separate JCS publication, not as part of JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, as that document dealt exclusively with unified and joint doctrine of the U.S. Armed Forces. Finally, he recommended against further use or adoption of the term "coalition" to describe a combined effort by allies. The term "combined" as defined in JCS Publication 1 was considered more appropriate.

Quarterly Report of Major Issues and Activities

(U) In June the JCS advised that the Secretary of Defense had requested that each of the commanders of unified and specified commands provide him with quarterly reports listing the major issues and activities of his command. The Secretary said that the reports need not be lengthy, two or three pages maximum. CINCPAC welcomed the opportunity and sent the first such report on 6 July, with an information copy to the Chairman of the JCS.

(S) Reports were thus prepared and forwarded for the last three quarters of 1977 in a continuing series. Each was unique, not an update of previous reports, although some of the subject matter was of continuing importance and was the subject of regular reporting. Each of the topics is addressed in some detail elsewhere in this History. The issues addressed in the quarterly reports, in random order, included the perception of U.S. staying power in the Pacific and Asia, troop reductions in Korea, Indian Ocean arms control, PACOM force levels, exercises, Philippine base negotiations, the USSR-People's Republic of China penetration in the Southwest Pacific, air and sea lines of communication, the implementation of policy guidelines against the promotion of arms sales, Law of the Sea, labor cost-sharing negotiations with Japan, and other matters concerning Japan and Taiwan.

CINCPAC Appearance Before U.S. Senate Subcommittee

(U) On 20 January the JCS advised Admiral Weisner that his appearance had been requested by the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee to testify on the subject of overseas troop deployments in Asia and the Pacific. The Admiral thus appeared on 11 March.

1. Ibid.
2. JCS 1684/211552Z Jun and 3783/242306Z Jun 77.
4. JCS 8599/200027Z Jan 77.
In his prepared statement the Admiral noted that he was providing his assessment of U.S. interests in "this very large and increasingly complex area," the current situation as he saw it, and a balance of that perception against the potential military threat and U.S. capabilities to meet that threat. He said:

...The primary U.S. interest in the Pacific is peace, with the kind of stability which permits continued progress. It is likewise in our interest that all nations are assured free and open access throughout the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas; and that no nation is dominant either politically or militarily, or perceived by others of the region to be dominant there. It would be inimical to U.S. interests and those of our allies if either the Soviets or People's Republic of China were seen as dominant in this part of the world. In a very fundamental sense, peace, stability, and the protection of our interests can best be achieved if all nations feel secure from unwanted external influence.

The Admiral outlined our security treaties and increased U.S. economic involvement in Asia and the Pacific. He then outlined the current situation in the PACOM as he saw it. He said that as deployed U.S. forces had been reduced, Security Assistance Programs had "remained important as instruments of foreign policy that required careful judgment to maintain favorable poli-
tico-military relationships with recipients." The very necessary requirement for involvement of the Pacific Command in Security Assistance continued to increase even as the people for administering and planning those programs continued to be reduced. "This is a trend I personally find disturbing."

CINCPAC addressed the power of the Soviet Union. He also discussed the importance of forward deployed forces in response to the tree-cutting incident in the Korean Demilitarized Zone in August 1976 and the MAYAGÜEZ incident of May 1975. In most such situations, ready availability was every bit as important as the size or composition of a force that could ultimately be generated from bases in Hawaii or the mainland of the United States, but which might not arrive on the scene in time.

CINCPAC outlined the existing situation in each of the PACOM countries and regions, and for the Communist countries, the USSR, PRC, North Korea, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, he highlighted the military forces in the

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1. Statement by Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN, CINCPAC, before the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, U.S. Senate, First Session, 95th Congress, 11 Mar 77.
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PACOM area. He went on to describe the U.S. forces available in the PACOM.

(U) Calling attention to the expanded area of the PACOM, he noted that
the dynamics of the area also had a significant effect on the size, location,
and organization of our headquarters and forces. He said:

...I am mindful of the fact that generally the United
States does not enjoy the same type of relationships with
most of the Pacific Basin and Indian Ocean countries that
we do with Western European countries. For example, the
degree of mutual political, economic, and military coopera-
tion in the Pacific is drastically different (and varied)
from that found in Europe. The Pacific Command structure
is thus quite different from the NATO/European Command
structure, being built, for the most part, on a group of
bilateral relationships. It is, however, a workable
arrangement for the specific political and military en-
vironment that exists today in this region.

(U) CINCPAC noted that the forward deployment strategy and associated
U.S. military forces in East Asia and the Western Pacific was based on the need
to perform three major tasks: defense of the United States from attack through
the Pacific; security of sea and air lines of communication vital to the sur-
vival of the United States, our allies, and friends; and, through the mainten-
ance of our presence in the area, the visible expression of our intent to
honor our treaty commitments, and thus contribute to stability. CINCPAC
continued:

...In this regard, our forward deployment strategy
is fundamentally based on deterrence. There can be little
argument that a posture which deters aggression is superior
to one which requires deployment of forces from great dis-
tances into a fray which could have perhaps been prevented
by our being there in the first place. In addition we need
a forward deployed posture to face any challenge to us in
the Pacific.

Pacific Command forces presently assigned are capable of
dealing with some potential contingencies. However, any major
contingency would require augmentation from the United States.
We should maintain sufficient forward deployed forces to assure
an adequate response. Without a strategic forward basing
posture, there is no guarantee that augmentation forces, even
if available, could be readily employed.

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With regard to augmentation forces, specific Air Force and Navy units are not predesignated or earmarked for deployment to the Pacific Command but rather are assigned as needed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff after a Service determination of unit readiness, availability and capability. Army and Marine Corps augmentation forces are also made available by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for planning purposes. However, no major augmentation combat forces in the Continental United States are earmarked exclusively for the Pacific Command. Rather, these forces form the reserve U.S. capability to respond to contingencies anywhere in the world, as directed by national authority. Consequently, other Unified Commanders are also authorized to consider those forces in their planning. The actual availability of augmenting forces for the Pacific Command will determine how far forward our defense line can be maintained and how effective we will be in keeping the lines of communication open. If a major portion of currently assigned PACOM forces were withdrawn for any reason—say to reinforce NATO—the remaining capability would allow us to defend only a small portion of the Pacific Theater.

Our present basing structure is based on our minimal needs for wartime and also supports our peacetime posture. It provides us the ability to immediately respond to situations which threaten U.S. interests. Force deployments can be changed to react to a new situation only if base rights and the base structure are in-being.

(U) CINCPAC observed that forward deployed forces in the Western Pacific numbered nearly 50,000 fewer than in 1960. He outlined strengths by Service, noting that those "personnel continue to be our most important asset." To continue retention programs that focused on keeping the good people, the Admiral solicited the committee's support to preclude any further erosion of Servicemen's entitlements and benefits, which were generally incurred at the time of their initial enlistment. CINCPAC expressed some concern regarding the rate/grade imbalance of enlisted personnel of all Services and commented on the continuing shortage of qualified enlisted supervisory personnel, "which negatively affects training, maintenance and operational capabilities." The Manning picture of PACOM forces, he said, was generally favorable, although skill levels of some assigned personnel were less than required. The Services were well aware of the problem and working on it.

(U) In the matter of force readiness, CINCPAC said, "The biggest problem...is the lack of sufficient funding to permit exercise and routine opera-
tional activity at the level necessary to assure a high state of readiness."
As he outlined the forces of the various Services, he noted that the forward
base structure consisted of facilities in Japan, the Republics of Korea, China,
and the Philippines, and Guam. He listed the principal forces and bases in
those areas.

(U) CINCPAC next addressed the role of U.S. forces in complementing the
capabilities of friends and allies in the PACOM. While those friends and allies
were improving their military capabilities, "we should not be overly optimistic,
even over the long term, about their ability to substitute for the role that
U.S. forces perform in the Pacific Command. They face the universal problem
of cost, and many others." In the event they were threatened, the United States
would expect them to contribute to the defense of their respective countries
and certain air and sea lines of communication. In this regard, their capabili-
ties would be limited in almost every case to local waters and airspace. "We
want to improve their capabilities by modernizing together with some adjust-
ments in defense levels. Nevertheless, U.S. forces are seen as an essential
complementary adjunct to allied capabilities for the foreseeable future."

(U) CINCPAC concluded his prepared statement with a brief discussion of
the Philippine base negotiations. He said he was "reasonably confident" that
when negotiations resumed a satisfactory agreement would be reached that would
insure our unhampered operations.

Improving U.S. Force Structure in the Western Pacific

(S) In a letter to the Service Secretaries of 12 November, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs stated that, in manag-
ing U.S. ground force withdrawals from Korea, the United States wanted to
assure that our actions neither destabilized the area nor caused serious ques-
tions among our allies or potential adversaries about our continued commit-
ment. Considerable concern had arisen in Japan on that score, the Assistant Secretary
continued, centering around the troop withdrawal from Korea but exacerbated
by the apparent uncertainty about U.S. bases in the Philippines and by normal
U.S. force adjustments that in less sensitive times would draw little attention.
That agency, therefore, had begun an effort to identify projects that could be
initiated to stabilize a pattern of U.S. activity, principally in Japan, that
would permit the United States to assert, convincingly, its intention to main-
tain a sustained presence in the Pacific. At the same time, those projects
should be designed to strengthen important defense capabilities. In the two
weeks that followed, the request had been transmitted through Service channels

1. Ibid.

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to CINCPAC's Air Force and Navy component commanders and the Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group.¹

On 10 December CINCPAC's Director for Plans advised the JCS that this headquarters had learned of the study from PACAF. Subsequent informal coordination with the Office of the JCS had indicated that that agency viewed the study as emphasizing facilities improvement. The PACOM view was that larger issues were involved. "...Some areas included in the OASD/ISA study directive include unified command operational considerations, such as regional force adjustments and improvements in operational and logistical efficiency of forces. These issues are of such significance that they should also be addressed through unified command channels." He requested, therefore, that PACOM headquarters be apprised of milestones and progress of the study in order that unified commander views might be made available to the Office of the JCS for consideration.²

The JCS reply of 13 December provided the study milestones as they had initially been proposed, with Service inputs to be analyzed by staff-officer-level working groups and a Deputy Assistant Secretary-level steering group prior to submission to the Secretary for decision. It had been hoped that, where applicable, such decisions would serve as the basis for possible discussion topics with the Japanese during the January 1978 session of the Subcommittee of the Security Consultative Committee. But the Service inputs had not been on time and requests for further extension of deadlines were anticipated. They doubted that any decisions would be made in time for the mid-January discussions.

They continued that they considered CINCPAC's views on the Service proposals "a fundamental element" in developing final recommendations. Accordingly, they would provide the substance of the Service proposals as soon as they were available so that CINCPAC's views might be considered in the process of developing final recommendations to the Secretary. They agreed with CINCPAC's view that larger issues than facilities were involved, but they thought the major focus of Service inputs would be concerned with facility improvements. They regretted the failure to provide background earlier, but "have had no intention of pursuing this without CINCPAC input and recommendations."³

¹ HQ DA WASH DC 011215Z Dec 77, retransmitted from CDRUSACSG as 070215Z Dec 77; CNO 240030Z Nov 77, retransmitted from CINCPACFLT as 160620Z Dec 77; and HQ PACAF 060400Z Dec 77, referenced in CINCPAC 102254Z Dec 77.
² CINCPAC 102254Z Dec 77.
³ JCS 4287/132305Z Dec 77.
1. JCS 7529/202317Z Apr 77.
2. COMUS Japan 020800Z May and 060535Z May 77.
3. CINCPAC 142015Z May 77.
1. Ibid., J5311 HistSum May 77.
2. Ibid.
1. Ibid.
1. Ibid.
2. J5311 HistSum Nov 77.
1. CINCPAC 262212Z Nov 77 (BOM), which referenced AMEMB Tokyo 17287/0908182 Nov 77.
2. CINCPAC 202220Z Sep 77.
3. JCS 8760/311759Z Oct 77.
1. CINCPAC 062009Z Nov 77.
2. Ltr, Deputy Director, Regional Programs, Office of the Director, Planning and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense to Admiral Weisner, 21 Dec 76, n.s.; J5311 HistSum Feb 77; CINCPAC 101919Z Jan 77 (EX).
1. CINCPAC ltr Ser S101, 2 Mar 77, Subj: Japan's Ground Defense Capability Study (U). CINCPAC's Research and Analysis Office provided comments and recommendations on the OSD (P&E) studies (J77 HistSum Dec 77).

2. CINCPAC 140215Z May 77.
1. J5323 HistSums Aug 77; CINCPACAF 152105Z Aug 77; CINCPAC 182221Z Aug 77; COMUS Japan 230431Z Aug 77; and CINCPACAF 250144Z Aug 77.
2. CINCPAC 262222Z Aug 77; SECDEF 7506/291307Z Aug 77.
3. COMUS Japan 020641Z Nov 77; CINCPAC 050101Z Nov 77; PACAF 222300Z Nov 77; PACAF 170100Z Dec 77; CINCPAC 202321Z Dec 77; COMUS Japan 310020Z Dec 77; J5323 HistSums Nov, Dec 77.
Omega Navigation System

(U) The Omega Navigation System was a U.S. Navy initiated and funded project approved by the JCS as part of the Master Navigation Plan. Eight installations were needed to provide adequate worldwide Omega coverage: the Continental United States, Hawaii, Japan, Norway, Liberia, Argentina, La Reunion (a small French island near Madagascar), and Australia. The authority to negotiate and conclude Omega agreements had been granted in 1968. The chief negotiator was from the Foreign Military Rights Affairs office of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, although he had traditionally been a Foreign Service Officer on exchange to the Defense Department from the State Department.

1. J54 HistSum Dec 77, which cited JCS 232100Z Aug 77.
3. J54 HistSum Dec 77.
CINCPAC Briefing Team to Australia

(U) A series of biannual visits to Australia by CINCPAC staff briefing teams continued in 1977 with presentations in May and November. The briefings were on unified and specified command organization and on PACOM command, control, deployment, and responsibilities. Presentations were made on 9 November at the Australian Joint Services Staff College, on 10 November at the Australian Joint Warfare Element at Williamtown Royal Australian Air Force Base, and on 14 November at the Australian Staff College at Queenscliff. In the request for the May briefing, Air Commodore Egerton, who was Commandant of the Joint Services Staff College, notified the CINCPAC Representative, Australia, "You may care to inform CINCPAC that these visits have always been highlights of our courses and we sincerely hope that they will continue."2

2. USAFSO/CINCPACREP/AUST 050159Z and 260249Z Sep 77; J5131 HistSum Nov 77.
1. CINCPAC 142210Z Oct 77 as amended by CINCPAC 220140Z Oct 77. The earlier report on this subject in 1977 had been transmitted as CINCPAC 150238Z Apr 77.
2. JCS 1875/042054Z Jan 77.
3. J313 HistSum Jan 77; JCS 3896/201950Z Nov 76; SECSTATE 011001/1/180029Z Jan 77.
1. J313 HistSum Feb 77; ADMIN CINCPAC 020310Z Feb 77.
2. CINCPACFLT 041707Z Mar 77; J313 HistSum Feb 77
3. J313 HistSums May, Jul 77; JCS 3089/051039Z Jun 77; CINCPAC 051040Z Jun 77; JCS 3138/051507Z Jun 77.

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1. J313 Point Paper, 29 Sep 77, Subj: Indian Ocean Deployment (U); CINCPACFLT 112113Z Nov 77.
2. CINCPACFLT 050027Z Nov 77. See the Political-Military Relationships Chapter of this history.
1. CTF '73 160745Z Dec 76; ADMIN CINCPAC 190212Z Jan 77.
2. SECSTATE 030235/1/102050Z Feb 77 and 063401/1/222038Z Mar 77 (both EX); SECSTATE 141742/1/222211Z Jun 77; and CINCPACFLT 030440Z Jun 77.

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1. CINCPAC 240103Z Jan 76; SECSTATE 056262/082215Z Mar 76; USDAO New Delhi 201215Z Oct 76; JCS 9504/280008Z Feb 76.
2. CNO 270034Z Nov 76.
1. Ibid.
1. J313 HistSum Oct 77; SECSTATE 116870/1/201854Z May 77; AMEMB Canberra
   4366/141830Z Jul 77; CNO 062036Z Oct 77, which cited CNO 120046Z Feb 77.
2. CINCPAC 102131Z Dec 77.
3. AMEMB Wellington 4218/160507Z Sep 77.

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1. AMEMB Wellington 4218/160507Z Sep 77; CNO 062036Z Oct 77.
2. AMEMB Wellington 4284/210221Z Sep 77.
4. AMEMB Wellington 4435/281715Z Sep 77.
5. USDAO Wellington 4394/271744Z Sep 77.
1. CINCPACFLT 202031Z Aug 77, which cited AMEMB Nairobi 190845Z Aug 77.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 292149Z Aug 77.
2. CINCPACFLT 192201Z Feb 77.
3. AMEMB Muscat 0263/190510Z Feb 77; SECSTATE 062009/1/201631Z Mar 77 (EX).

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1. SECSTATE 107016/111619Z May 77, which quoted Muscat 0735.
2. COMSEVENTHFLT 020838Z Jun 77.
1. SECSTATE 143132/21627Z Jun 77, which cited CINCPAC 170129Z Jun 77.
2. SECSTATE 151408/291852Z Jun 77, which retransmitted AMEMB Victoria 371.
3. JCS 1451/302322Z Jun 77, citing JCS 051354Z Jun 77; CINCPAC 010310Z Jul 77.
1. CINCPACFLT 300204Z Nov 77.
2. CINCPACFLT 150551Z Jan 77.
3. SECSTATE 214532/080204Z Sep 77.
4. AMEMB Bangkok 20807/190909Z Sep 77; CINCPAC 212222Z Sep 77; J311 HistSum Oct 77.
1. SECSTATE 244688/121555Z Oct 77.
2. CINCPAC 142227Z Oct 77.
2. J313 HistSum May 77.
4. ADMIN CINCPAC 300045Z Sep 77.
5. CNO 182214Z Oct 77, which cited CINCPAC 080248Z Oct 77; CINCPAC 032035Z Dec 77, which cited NAVREGMEDCEN Oakland 260922Z Nov 77.
1. CNO 182215Z Oct 77, which also cited CINCPAC 080248Z Oct 77.
3. CINCPAC 290317Z Nov 77; ADMIN CINCPAC 020319Z Dec 77.
be given the crew by the North. "We are deeply concerned about the regrettable incident and request prompt information from your side." The low-key manner in which the incident was handled by both sides was quite different from the tree-cutting incident of 18 August 1976 in which two U.S. Army officers were murdered and in response to which both sides increased their defense posture prior to the execution of Operation PAUL BUNYAN.\(^1\)

(U) Shortly after 1000 hours local the helicopter of the 17th Battalion Aviation Group was shot down by a North Korean guard post. It had not responded to warning shots fired by a South Korean guard post and had crashed in the vicinity of 38°38'N, 128°21'E. Three of the four crew members were killed and the fourth, the co-pilot, was detained briefly by North Korea. The following is taken from a debriefing of the survivor, Chief Warrant Officer W-2 Glenn M. Schwanke:\(^2\)

...The US CH-47 intruded into NK territory inadvertently. Schwanke says aircraft followed correct flight pattern to Chuncheon and then due east to the coast of ROK. He and crew felt flight should take 1 hour 10 minutes. When they were about 1 hour out, he looked down and saw an airfield (which he now believes was 413, their correct destination). But, because they were early, the pilot (CWO A. Miles) said to continue due N. for another 10 minutes. [The pilot was Chief Warrant Officer W-2 Joseph A. Miles; other crew members were SGT Robert C. Haynes and SGT Ronald F. Wells.]

...As they flew N. Schwanke says he heard funny cracking sound like gunfire, but the crew agreed it was more like engine noise. The noise continued, so they decided to set down and check the aircraft. Upon landing, they saw 2-300 villagers, children and soldiers run towards the aircraft. He thought they were being welcomed. They shut down the engines and the 2 crewmen jumped out to check the helicopter for trouble. Suddenly, they realized that the soldiers were NK and were firing at them. The crewmen jumped back in and the pilot said "Get out of here." As they ascended, the aircraft took heavy fire. CWO Miles yelled he was hit and slumped. CWO Schwanke took the controls.

...By that time, more gunfire had hit the aircraft and CWO Miles took a round in the head. Blood and smoke filled

\(^2\) COMUS Korea 161945Z Jul 77; J311 HistSum Jul 77.
the cockpit. CWO Schwanke executed emergency measures, jettisoned the doors, and lost control of the aircraft. A crewman hollered "Set it down." The helicopter crashed into 12-15 feet of water. Schwanke was still strapped in his seat, but had been thrown clear. He reached the surface and tried to swim to shore. NK soldiers were firing at him as he swam. He raised his arms to surrender, but they kept firing--then stopped. He was pulled to shore, kicked and beaten and his hands were tied behind his back. He was blindfolded.

...Schwanke was taken to a nearby village. He was interrogated at great length, but did receive medical care and food and water. His first day of questioning was long and he was threatened with death by shooting many times for not talking. He was taken back to the aircraft at dusk and made to stand near the aircraft for photos. The dead bodies of all three others were stripped to the waist, but were in the aircraft. He does not know how the others died, but does remember sounds of shooting after he was taken prisoner.

...Schwanke was then taken for further interrogation. On Friday, he was moved in early A.M. to a village about 2½ hours by car. He was treated well that day, given medical treatment and questioning was done in an easier manner. He was told he would be repatriated soon. (He didn't believe it.) On Friday eve he was flown to Panmunjom, where he had a suite in a hotel and was well treated.

...On Saturday, early A.M., he was driven to a military checkpoint near the JSA [Joint Security Area] and was later returned to Panmunjom and the hotel where a press conference was held. At 161959 hours July 77, he was repatriated. He is in good spirits, has seen and talked with his wife and has had extensive medical checks. He has a lacerated right leg and has a bit of trouble with his right eye. (Aircraft fuel got in his eyes as he swam to shore.)

(5) The aircraft (A/C 67-18498) had departed Camp Humphries on a mission carrying sand and gravel for a fortification under construction. Weather was 3/10 cloud cover with good visibility. The crew carried no firearms. The aircraft carried a KY-28 secure communications equipment, which was not keyed. No Standard Signal Instructions, CAC codes, or Signal Operating Instructions were carried by the crew. The helicopter flew to the east coast. About 500 meters off the coast the pilot turned north. Two ROK guard posts and one
observation post reported seeing the aircraft and firing warning shots, but the aircraft continued north along the coast. It landed and remained on the ground for one or two minutes, then took off, turned south, was fired on by North Korean heavy machineguns, and crashed. The helicopter was down on a sandbar, right side up and partially in the water. It appeared badly damaged; one rotor appeared off and in the water. Trucks were observed near the crash site.1

S COMUS Korea alerted a company-size force from the 2d Division for possible contingency operations and a helicopter force of UH-1Hs, AH-1Gs, and CH-47s was assembled. Twelve F-4s were put on alert. The Defense Readiness Condition was not raised, however. Air Force actions included the alerting of additional search and rescue resources on Okinawa and photo reconnaissance of the area. But, as noted above, the U.S. response from the President on down was that it was an American intrusion of North Korean airspace, inadvertent, and no further action was required other than through the Military Armistice Commission.2

U The United States had requested the return of the crew and aircraft. The one survivor and three deceased crew members were returned in the Joint Security Area. The United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission secretary gave the North Korean side two receipts, one for the survivor, the other for the deceased. The only statement of regret made during the meetings was one made in the UNC opening statement at a Commission meeting that morning. The North Koreans had said at that meeting that it was impossible to return the helicopter "in that it was destroyed." ROK Army intelligence reported, however, that the CH-47 had been loaded by crane on four large trucks and the trucks had proceeded north.3

S The last time a United Nations Command aircraft had violated the Demilitarized Zone and been fired on was 21 August 1976. The last aircraft shot down prior to this incident had been a helicopter shot down on 17 August 1969 with three injured, later returned to the United States.4

Marine Corps F-4 Crash in Japan

U On 27 September a U.S. Marine Corps F-4 crashed shortly after takeoff from Atsugi Naval Air Facility into a Yokohama suburb, destroying three homes and injuring nine people, five of them seriously. The two American pilots

1. COMUS Korea 151215Z Jul 77; SSO Korea 140855Z Jul 77 (BOM).
2. Ibid.; COMUS Korea OPSCOM MSG 141900Z Jul 77.
3. AMEMB Seoul 5921/161155Z Jul 77; COMUS Korea 160440Z and 190425Z Jul 77.
4. COMUS Korea OPSCOM MSG 141900Z Jul 77.
aboard had ejected and were picked up by a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force helicopter and returned to Atsugi. The plane had been assigned to Marine Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron 3, based at the Marine Corps Air Station at Iwakuni.¹

(☉) The Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture and the Mayor of Yokohama called on the U.S. Ambassador on 3 October to present a petition requesting the removal of the Atsugi Naval Air Facility, publication of the investigation report, suspension of overflight of residential areas until the investigation was completed, and prompt payment of adequate compensation. The Ambassador assured the Japanese officials that the United States intended to cooperate fully in investigation and compensation measures. (The Ambassador noted that personal messages from President Carter and the Secretaries of State and Defense had been much appreciated and had helped a good deal in containing adverse reaction.)²

(☉) There was subsequently some confusion regarding procedures and announcements by Japanese officials. The United States had shipped the aircraft engines to North Island, California, and the crew had returned to USS MIDWAY (CVA-41) on 4 October, and while it was being announced in Japan that both the aircraft and crew were in Japan until the investigation was completed, the crew members were actually in Australia.³

(☉) Meanwhile, the Air Force restricted flight activity for all USAF F-4s pending inspection for cracks and corrosion in an assembly that controlled aircraft stabilization. The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo notified the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the Air Force announcement to avoid any misunderstandings, but asked whether USMC and USN F-4s were also placed under a similar restriction, and if not why not. The Secretary of State advised that the Navy and Marine Corps aircraft would not be placed under a similar restriction because all had gone through a modification to correct the cited discrepancy. An on-going inspection program had revealed no current problems.⁴

(☉) On 19 October CINCPAC advised that actions had been taken to return the crew members to Iwakuni without publicity. On the 21st the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan outlined the Navy position on on-going matters. Regarding the aircraft engines, questions would be solicited from the Japan Defense Agency and a summary of the engine analysis would be furnished; engines would be returned if the Joint Committee desired. The JDA would not be invited to send a

1. ADMIN CINCPAC 271745Z Sep 77.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 15367/040859Z Oct 77.
representative to North Island. The flight crew, and upon their return, the
ground crew, would remain in Japan until the investigation was completed. If
their departure from Japan was required, advance notice would be given that
government. Japanese representatives would not be permitted to interview the
crew, but questions would be entertained and information provided. Interim
reports would be provided to the Japanese members of the Joint Committee before
information that was likely to find its way into the press was released.¹

**Airspace Violation**

(Ç) In May the U.S. Defense Attache in Colombo, Sri Lanka, advised of a
case of the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Maldives and the
Maldivian Minister in Charge of the Department of External Affairs concerning
the "positive identification" of an American aircraft flying low over Gan air-
field in Addu Atoll on 29 April. On that same day an unidentified aircraft was
observed in national airspace low over Hulule Airport in Male. The Government
of Maldives voiced concern over this apparent violation of national airspace,
but did not indicate that a formal protest would be made at that time. The
Defense Attache asked CINCPAC to investigate.²

(Ç) CINCPAC asked his Air Force and Navy components and the Military Air-
Lift Command to look into the matter. CINCPACFLT advised that a P-3 had flown
at low level in the Maldives on 29 April following completion of Maritime Air
Patrol 775. The route of the flight had brought the aircraft to about three
nautical miles of South Male and one mile of Addu Atoll (Gan Airfield). The
minimum altitude had been 500 feet while passing abreast of the islands, and no
landmasses, with the exception of occasional reef pinnacles, were overflown.
CINCPACFLT had taken action to prevent future incidents of this nature, reempha-
sizing closest point of approach limits and Maldivian sensitivity.³

(Ç) The matter surfaced again in late November when the U.S. Ambassador
quoted from a Hong Kong English-language magazine article entitled "The Little
Nation that Said No." Discussing Soviet negotiating and maritime activities
in Maldives, the article continued, "Still, the arrogance with which the Soviets
threaten the defenceless Maldivians is also practiced by the Americans, whose
military aircraft frequently violate the Republic's airspace. Maldivians posted
on Gan report that large U.S. surveillance aircraft can be seen several times
a week, swooping low over Addu Atoll. The planes have been spotted as far
north as Male, but complaints to the U.S. Government have gone unheeded." The

2. USDAO Colombo 210/091621Z May 77.
3. CINCPAC 072021Z May 77; CINCPACFLT 280444Z May 77.
TOP SECRET

Ambassador asked CINCPAC if there had been any U.S. military aircraft operating in the vicinity of the Maldives since the April violation. He also asked the current instructions to U.S. military pilots operating in the vicinity of Maldives airspace.

CINCPAC's reply of 8 December advised that since 30 April there had been 98 P-3 flights with the potential to fly within 100 nautical miles of Addu Atoll. Of these, only five had flown a track that would place them at low altitude in the vicinity of Addu. "No known overflights of Addu Atoll occurred during these five flights." CINCPAC also outlined the content of flight crew briefings and noted that all mission commanders and pilots were held strictly accountable to maintain a 25 nautical mile closest point of approach. Crews were also briefed on the 29 April airspace violation to emphasize the sensitivity of Indian Ocean states to unauthorized penetration of their airspace. CINCPAC concluded that a violation of Maldivian airspace by a U.S. military aircraft subsequent to the 29 April incident was "highly unlikely."

In another airspace matter, the U.S. Ambassador in Antananarivo advised on 22 November that the government of Madagascar had issued a threat to shoot down any aircraft that entered Madagascar airspace without authorization. CINCPAC, accordingly, requested that his component commands and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group take the necessary steps to insure that all concerned were alerted to the warning and that proper procedures were followed in overflight or landing requests.

Aerial Surveillance of Foreign Ships

1. AMEMB Colombo 4653/290940Z Nov 77.
2. CINCPAC 082113Z Dec 77.
3. CINCPAC 262110Z Nov 77.
4. CINCPAC 250253Z Mar 77.
MIJI was the acronym for meaconing, interference, intrusion, and jamming. Meaconing was defined as the clandestine generation or retransmission of a radio navigation signal to confuse navigation. Jamming was the deliberate

1. JCS 1774/21323Z Apr 77.
2. CINCPACFLT 260140Z Apr 77, which cited CINCPAC 231930Z Apr 77.
3. JCS 8089/290202Z Apr 77.
4. CINCPAC 300252Z Apr 77.
5. CINCPACFLT 120230Z May 77.
radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electro-magnetic energy with the object of impairing the use of electronic devices, equipment, or systems.¹

On 15 December 1977 the Air Force Electronic Warfare Center (the center for all MIJI reporting) described an incident of meaconing (TACAN-Tactical Air Navigation) and radar jamming (BRAVO band) involving four aircraft (two S-3As and two E-2Cs) from USS KITTY HAWK (CVA-63). For a 40-minute period, during night flying operations, erroneous TACAN and radar jamming had been experienced. The Soviet AGI ANEROID was the presumed source.

CINCPAC advised his component and subordinate unified commands of this incident. He said that while incidents of combined meaconing and radar or communications jamming had commonly occurred in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, this was the first such combined incident in the PACOM. Based on experience in those other theaters, "an increase in such incidents can be anticipated for the PACOM." He requested that the incident and the potential for increased Soviet activity of that nature be given wide dissemination. He noted that prompt and accurate reports, such as that which had been provided by KITTY HAWK, were "essential."²

Clearance for FAA Planes into the Philippines

Questions surfaced in the Philippines in 1977 regarding proper notification to that country of the proposed arrival of U.S. aircraft. At issue were flights by aircraft of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), MAC flights, and aero clubs on U.S. bases in the Philippines. At one point the Philippines was asking for formal seven-day diplomatic clearances for FAA aircraft, but it was explained that special calibration aircraft flights were generated on short notice, generally in response to an aircraft accident or a navigation aid system failure. The timeliness of that response was directly related to the impact of such problems on military operations, particularly navigation aid problems. As the Philippine Air Force used the same aids for en route and terminal operations, it was of mutual benefit for that government to permit FAA aircraft entry on short notice.

FAA ELECTRA flights that originated in Honolulu and transited the Philippines, however, required diplomatic clearance. Although the Philippine officials who discussed the matter said they could not understand U.S. resistance to the seven-day clearance, they agreed to go along with prior practice and even to accept a proposed streamlined military-to-military clearance procedure. One official warned, however, that FAA flights had to adhere

². CINCPAC 210256Z Dec 77.
strictly to established procedures (as had been the case in recent months) or
the Philippines would "clamp down." The Ambassador believed that procedures
would loosen up with time, but noted that right then the authorities were very
sensitive to short cuts that might appear to challenge their authority to
control Philippine air space. The status of aero clubs was also under discus-
sion and unresolved at year's end.

Republic of China Air Operations

1. SECSTATE 148705/142200Z Jul 77; AMEMB Manila 2705/220827Z and 11394/250801Z
Jul 77. See the Political-Military Relationships chapter of this history.
2. JCS 6867/112338Z Jan 77, which cited CINCPAC 070043Z Jan 77; CINCPAC 120429Z
Jan 77; COMUSTDC 130125Z Jan 77.
3. SECSTATE 026385/050125Z Feb 77 and SECSTATE 030251/100633Z Feb 77, which
readdressed AMEMB Taipei 766 (both EX).
JCS Staff Assistance Visit to PACOM

(U) On 31 October and 1 November a 24-man team headed by the JCS Director for Operations visited the CINCPAC headquarters. Arriving on the National Emergency Airborne Command Post, the party consisted of representatives of the JCS Operations, Logistics, and Plans Directorates, the Office of the Inspector

General, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Among subjects addressed was the standardization of Emergency Action Procedures and training, handling of sealed authenticators, and the administration of the Human Reliability Program. The visit afforded CINCPAC staff officers the opportunity to exchange ideas on ongoing issues with their counterparts in the Office of the JCS. The annual JCS exercise ELK TREE was conducted on 31 October, with LT GEN Leroy J. Manor, CINCPAC's Chief of Staff, representing CINCPAC.¹

PRIME TARGET 77

(U) Exercise PRIME TARGET-77 was one of a series of biennial, worldwide, procedural, general war, command post exercises, sponsored and conducted by the JCS in conjunction with the biennial NATO exercise WINTEX, scheduled for the spring of 1977.

[85] In 1976 CINCPAC, as he had two years earlier in the planning for PRIME RATE 75, had voiced his concern that exercises in this series failed to provide realism and recognize situations that would probably exist. The plan had depicted a simulated PACOM force deployment to the Atlantic and European Commands prior to the start of NATO-Warsaw Pact war. This assumed away, CINCPAC said, the "real problems dealing with military practicality and operational feasibility inherent in the redeployment strategy." Further, he discussed the problems of disengagement, time lost in transit when forces were available to neither theater, and the effect on a Pacific-Asian conflict, including the possible loss of Asian allies. The JCS advised at that time that they were committed to adhere closely to the WINTEX 77 scenario developed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and agreed to by NATO nations and commands and the current U.S. military strategy as enunciated in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.²

[8] On 15 February 1977 the JCS advised that the scope and level of participation in the exercise were being reduced to the minimum required to support U.S. national play adequately in Exercise WINTEX 77. PACOM participation was no longer required. CINCPAC advised all concerned on 17 February.³

TEAM SPIRIT 77

[8] The largest, most comprehensive exercise ever conducted in the PACOM, TEAM SPIRIT 77, was conducted in Korea and its contiguous waters from 26 March through 11 April 1977. Its purpose was to test deployment, reception, and

3. JCS 4437/152333Z Feb 77; CINCPAC 170314Z Feb 77.
employment of ROK and U.S. Forces responding to likely contingencies in the Korean theater. Forces deploying included elements of air cavalry from Schofield Barracks, an A-7 detachment and an F-4 squadron from CONUS, and Marine amphibious units and a carrier task force led by USS MIDWAY (CVA-41).¹

The exercise was phased in four parts. Phase I was a 48-hour indications and warning command post exercise simulating an impending attack by North Korean forces. Phase II was a defensive operation designed primarily to test joint and combined procedures at the United Nations Command staff and subordinate command level. Phase III, a counteroffensive, continued testing joint and combined staff procedures, featuring a combined amphibious operation with Marines and some naval air support. Phase III culminated in a joint/combined river crossing exercise observed by distinguished Korean visitors, including President Park Chung-hee. The fourth phase was an administrative redeployment of out-of-country forces.

TEAM SPIRIT featured several "firsts" for the Korean theater. It was the first time a combined field training exercise included staff play at the UNC level. The Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force was activated for the first time in a field training exercise. B-52 air strikes were integrated into the exercise for the first time, and the amphibious operation was the first combined effort conducted at night.²

As noted above, CINCPAC activated a Special Operations Task Force (Minus). Positions listed for the Special Operations Cadre in the CINCPAC policy and planning guide for Unconventional Warfare were used as a guide to form the U.S. element of the CINCUNC Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force (CUWTF). CINCPAC provided seven personnel to fill CUWTF positions, with the U.S. element commanded by the chief of CINCPAC's Special Operations Division of the Operations Directorate. Additional personnel were designated by CINCPAC's Air Force and Navy components, the Commander CINCPAC Support Group, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, the Intelligence Center Pacific, and the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific. Additional USAF officer augmentation was provided by the 1st Special Operations Squadron, the 1st Special Operations Wing, the 13th Air Force, and the Military Airlift Command. COMUS Korea provided communications and transportation support and an officer from the U.S. Special Forces detachment, Korea. The Army's John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance provided five psychological operations/civil affairs augmentees. A ROK major general, commander of the ROK Army's Special Warfare Center, commanded the CUWTF under the operational control of CINCUNC. Major special

¹ J3513 HistSum Apr 77.
² Ibid.
operations forces participating in the exercise were two ROK Army Special Forces brigades, the 7th Special Forces Group (an augmented U.S. Special Forces battalion), the 19th Special Forces Group (National Guard, a U.S. Special Forces company), the 1st Special Operations Squadron (three MC-130E(V)), 1st Special Operations Wing (one MC-130), four USAF C-130 Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System aircraft, the ROK Air Force (four C-123s), USN SEAL (Sea-Air-Land) Team One (two SEAL platoons), and four Underwater Demolition Teams/Underwater Demolition Unit platoons of the ROK Navy. The CUWTF and the Combined Special Forces Operations Base were established at the ROK Special Warfare Center. The Combined Special Air Operations Base was at Taegu. The Combined Navy Special Warfare Task Group was located at Chinhae with a task unit deployed to Chuju Island. During the exercise, 2,517 Special Operations Forces were infiltrated into operational areas (61 air sorties inserted 1,372 by parachute). A total of 340 targets were hit with an 80 percent success rate. Two Surface-to-Air-Recovery (STAR) training missions and 10 air resupply sorties were completed.¹

CINCPAC Operations Directorate personnel (J34) also participated in both the planning and evaluation of TEAM SPIRIT 77. In November 1976 they had attended a planning conference in Korea to assist the Chief Evaluator of the Exercise, a member of COMUS Korea’s staff. (COMUS Korea’s Deputy had been named Exercise Director.) Subsequent meetings were held to complete an evaluation plan for the exercise. CINCPAC staff members assisted in the management of the evaluation effort with J34 acting as Deputy Chief Evaluator. The evaluation was conducted using a team of 22 ROK personnel and 79 U.S. personnel, 12 of which were from the CINCPAC staff. Some CINCPAC staff personnel remained in Korea through 15 April to assist in managing the evaluation data collection effort and preparing the evaluation report. The final report on the exercise was published on 7 July and briefed to CINCPAC and his staff on 29 August.²

CINCPAC staff officers also conducted an Operations Security (OPSEC) survey from 26 March to 9 April during TEAM SPIRIT 77. The purpose of the survey was to evaluate and identify operational techniques and procedures that had the potential for providing foreknowledge or intelligence information that could be exploited by hostile sources.

The survey was limited to the CINCUNC/COMUS Korea area of responsibility to include adjacent waters where U.S. Naval Forces were deployed. The survey team visited various headquarters elements and operational and supporting units within South Korea. Additionally, in support of CINCPAC’s survey

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1. J361 HistSum Apr 77.
2. J3422 HistSum Apr 77; J34 HistSum Dec 76; J3422 HistSum Aug 77.
effort, Commander CARRIER GROUP ONE conducted a survey of U.S. Naval Forces that participated in the exercise. Communications Security (COMSEC) monitoring of in-country and participating naval forces was also conducted. The OPSEC survey report was completed on 18 July.  

Planning for TEAM SPIRIT 78 began almost as soon as TEAM SPIRIT 77 had been completed.

Exercise ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 77

For the second consecutive year the Republic of Korea's mobility exercise ULCHI, a large-scale command post exercise with limited field training exercise play, was combined with the UNC command post exercise called FOCUS LENS. The exercise was conducted in Korea from 8 to 14 July with ROK and U.S. military personnel, ROK National Ministries, and selected ROK civilian agencies participating. The purpose of ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 77 was to exercise joint and combined ROK-U.S. procedures for the defense of the ROK and to evaluate the effectiveness of integrated governmental and military plans to support a short, decisive war.

Earlier, on 1 May, CINCUNC had requested that, if feasible, the JCS provide active headquarters participation from within the Washington area or Hawaii to include simulation of the National Command Authorities. The JCS declined the offer, but offered no objection to the simulation of the JCS and the National Command Authorities by CINCPAC from Hawaii.

Thus, PACOM headquarters participated in the exercise with a response cell at Camp Smith to provide the UNC Combined Battle Staff with an opportunity to extend play to higher and other headquarters. The response cell functioned as PACOM Headquarters and simulated the JCS, the National Command Authorities, and other high-level agencies. This was the first time PACOM participation had taken place from Camp Smith; in 1976 the exercise response cell members played from Camp TANGO, Korea, the UNC underground command post south of Seoul. As with TEAM SPIRIT 77, CINCPAC staff J34 officers observed the evaluation methods and procedures used by the exercise evaluation team, directed by the ROK/U.S. Operations Planning Group of the COMUS Korea staff. The observation of exercise evaluation provided many useful concepts, details, and background information that would aid exercise evaluation personnel in plans for future exercises.

2. J3523 HistSum Jul 77.
3. JCS 5927/192137Z May 77.
1. ADMIN CINCPAC 03040Z Dec 77, a chronology of significant events concerning Taiwan exercises prepared for Admiral Weisner for possible discussions with COMUSTDC.

2. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 010039Z Apr 76; COMUSTDC 090728Z Apr 76, and SECSTATE 230205Z Apr 76.

3. Ibid., which cited COMUSTDC 260939Z Apr 76, CINCPAC 270441Z Apr 76, SECSTATE 182252Z Oct 76, and COMUSTDC 221030Z Oct 76.

4. SECSTATE 061289/190241Z Mar 77; J3521 HistSum Apr 77.
1. SECSTATE 061320/190248Z Mar 77.
2. COMUSTDC 142345Z Jul 77.
3. CINCPAC 041939Z Apr 77; CINCPAC 092138Z Apr 77 (BOM).
4. J3514 HistSum Apr 77, J3422 HistSum May 77.
5. AMEMB Taipei 4158/111030Z Jul 77.
1. COMUSTDC 140345Z Jul 77; AMEMB Taipei 4280/150900Z Jul 77.
2. CINCPACFLT 290043Z Jun 77; COMUSTDC 131635Z Jul 77; CINCPAC 030401Z Dec 77, which cited CINCPAC 280245Z Jul 77.
3. SECSTATE 211939/032325Z Sep 77.
1. CINCPAC 032326Z Sep 77.
2. CINCPAC 030401Z Dec 77, which cited JCS 091938Z Sep 77.
3. COMUSTDC 130905Z Sep 77; CINCPAC 020050Z Dec 77.
4. CINCPAC 030401Z Dec 77, which cited COMUSTDC 230319Z Nov 77 and CINCPAC 020052Z Dec 77.
TOP SECRET

Exercise IVORY ITEM

An IVORY ITEM exercise was initiated by the Secretary of Defense on 30 September 1977. Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN, CINCPACFLT, represented Admiral Weisner, who was off the island of Oahu. An exercise scenario that had been received from the JCS on 23 September was utilized during the secure conference.2

(U) Another exercise was conducted on 3 October. Participants included the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski from the White House, and the Volume IV CINCs. Admiral Weisner was present for the conference call. A decision was made, presumably by the Secretary of Defense, that another exercise would be conducted on 6 October with the express purpose of including the President in the deliberations; such an exercise was conducted.3

FOCUS WEST

(S) In August 1975 CINCPAC had advised his PACOM commanders and the JCS of a series of crisis management exercises that were to be periodic command post exercises to be initiated by CINCPAC to evaluate capabilities to handle contingencies in the PACOM. The exercises had begun in that year and continued in 1977.4

(S) FOCUS WEST VII, for example, occurred in February. The scenario depicted the hijacking of an American flag aircraft in WESTPAC. FOCUS WEST

1. JCS 1006/052009Z May 77 (EX).
2. J3322 HistSum Sep 77.

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VIII, in July, depicted a terrorist raid on Johnston Island. CINCPAC’s component commands and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group participated.¹

**NAVSPECWAREX 1-78**

The fourth in a series of annual COMSEVENTHFLT-sponsored special warfare exercises, NAVSPECWAREX 1-78, was conducted at Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay Naval Station in the Philippines 31 October to 18 November 1977. The combined exercise included participants from the Republic of the Philippines and U.S. personnel from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. A total of 46 officers and 162 enlisted participated. Participation by Australian and New Zealand Army Special Air Service Regiment detachments was precluded by non-availability of diplomatic clearance from the Philippines.

The exercise was divided into two phases to emphasize the development of joint and combined planning and to exchange operational techniques through joint and combined cross-training. Phase One, 31 October to 8 November, emphasized cross-training, with classroom presentations and practical field evolutions designed to maximize the training value of operations in the second phase. That phase, 8-19 November, consisted of field training exercises in which units were assigned direct-action missions by the Combined Special Operations Task Group staff against designated targets. Additionally, aggressor force personnel were assigned for each evolution to provide resistance to friendly force activities and to enhance mission planning and tactical considerations for evolutions.

Non-participation by Australian and New Zealand SAS units reduced the amount and type of cross-training that could have been accomplished. As it was a diplomatic clearance problem that prevented the participation of those units, the possibility of cross-training with those units within other exercises was to be investigated. Location of the SPECWAREX could be changed; New Zealand had expressed an interest in hosting the next annual exercise.²

**RIMPAC 77**

RIMPAC 77 was the fifth in a series of multi-national exercises sponsored by the U.S. Navy (CINCPACFLT and Commander THIRD Fleet) and was conducted over the period 17 February-11 March 1977. The primary objective was to conduct a realistic multi-threat exercise to improve coordination of the combined forces of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States in conducting

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1. J3415 HistSum Feb 77; J3522 HistSum Jul 77.
2. J363 HistSum Nov 77.

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maritime operations and to facilitate the mutual exchange of ideas, tactics, and procedures among participating nations. That objective was achieved and all other broad objectives of the exercise were successfully accomplished.

The first phase of the exercise, 31 January to 15 February, was port training. The second, 17 to 26 February, was an open ocean transit from the vicinity of the Santa Cruz Islands and from San Diego to the area south of the Hawaiian Islands. This was a major departure from previous RIMPAC scenarios and, while there were some periods of limited threat opposition because of the distance from land, the open ocean transit phase was considered highly successful. The participants considered this phase beneficial in terms of the more realistic threat environment inherent in "blue water" operations. Phase three, from 27 February to 1 March, was a strike-holding phase with three carriers mounting strikes against targets on Kahoolawe, Kaula Rock, and a sinking-exercise target, an old tug, while encountering air, surface, and subsurface opposition. Phase four was in two parts: missile firings and non-missile ships conducting an opposed entry into Pearl Harbor. The fifth phase consisted of antisubmarine warfare firings.

The most significant feature of the exercise was the demonstration of the viability of an open ocean transit scenario and of its acceptance by all allied participants. Past RIMPAC exercises had not capitalized on the transit periods from the participant's respective homeports to the mid-Pacific and consequently training had not been realized during those periods. Although the threat levels during the transit were not as high as those normally experienced in exercises conducted in relatively small areas and within the strike range of opposition tactical air, the levels of opposition were considered to be sufficient to approximate a real-world situation.

PACOM Participation in CENTO Exercises

SHABAZ and MIDLINK exercises continued to be conducted in 1977, and PACFLT forces participated in the MIDLINK exercise conducted 9-21 November. This was a combined CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) maritime exercise. It examined tactics and procedures required for CENTO forces to deter aggression, withstand enemy attacks, and retaliate to the maximum effect with non-nuclear weapons against both air and maritime threats. CINCPACFLT forces that participated included one aircraft carrier with embarked air wing, one guided missile cruiser, three destroyers/frigates, three auxiliaries, and three P-3 aircraft.2

1. CINCPACFLT 192213Z Mar 77.
2. J3521 Point Paper, 19 Sep 77, Subj: MIDLINK 77 (U). The CENTO nations were Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom; the United States participated as an observer.
The Chief of the U.S. Element to CENTO had recommended that considera-
tion be given to changing the CINCPACFLT Indian Ocean ship deployment schedule
to permit the carrier task group scheduled for January and February 1977 to be
revised to permit participating in SHABAZ 77 in April. CINCPACFLT advised that
this was not feasible. He noted the reduced force levels for Indian Ocean
deployments and the concomitant reduction in the ability to accept additional
commitments that had to be taken into consideration in the planning of major
exercises and operations. The CENTO officer then suggested other activities
that might use the task group in the CENTO area. CINCPAC agreed that mutual
training benefits could be derived through a bilateral exercise program and
suggested that the timing of future SHAHBAZ exercises be coordinated further
in advance to enhance the possibility of concurrent deployment of a carrier
task group. Meanwhile, he authorized direct liaison between the CENTO element
and CINCPACFLT regarding the early 1977 deployment exercise program.¹

The Iranian Air Force participated in combined exercises with the
ENTERPRISE task group 8-10 February, which the CENTO element described as the
best passing exercise experienced by the USN in that part of the Indian Ocean.²

In October 1977 CINCPACFLT informed CINCPAC and the Chief of Naval
Operations that PACFLT participation in SHAHBAZ 78 also would not be feasible.
The only carrier deployment in FY 78 was that of MIDWAY in late 1977. The
remaining FY 78 Indian Ocean deployments would be by surface combatant task
groups.³

**Indian Ocean Small-Scale Bilateral Naval Training Exercises**

On 18 July the JCS advised CINCPAC, and others, that they were revis-
ing their memorandum (SM-481-76) that promulgated procedures for scheduling
Indian Ocean small-scale bilateral naval training exercises. They advised
that two procedures had been proposed. Alternative one provided for the uni-
fied commander to schedule the exercise through Commander Mid-East Force who
would coordinate it with the local embassy. Upon completion of embassy noti-
fication with the local government, COMIDEASTFOR would notify the unified,
commander, who would notify the JCS, who, in turn, would effect further Washin-
ton notification if it was required. If there was no response within five days,
the unified commander could assume concurrence. Under alternative two, the
unified commander would schedule the exercise through COMIDEASTFOR who would
send the action request for the exercise to the applicable embassy, with informa-
tion copies to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the JCS, the unified

1. CINCPACFLT 060601Z Nov 76; CH US ELM CENTO ANKARA 230740Z Nov 76, CINCPAC
    270107Z Nov 76.
2. CH US ELM CENTO ANKARA 100812Z Mar 77.
3. CINCPACFLT 012018Z Oct 77.
commander, and his component commander. If the exercise was not desired at
the Washington level, a negative response was to be provided to the embassy
within five days. If there was no response within that time, Washington con-
currence was assumed and the embassy would coordinate with the local government.
Upon receipt of local government approval, the embassy would notify COMIDEAST-
FOR, the JCS, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the unified commander and
his component commander.¹

(0) CINCPAC recommended alternative two, with the following modification.
Exercises should be scheduled by CINCPAC through COMIDEASTFOR, with that com-
mander forwarding the action request to the ambassador concerned and CINCPAC
with information copies to the JCS, the Secretary of State, appropriate compo-
ponent commanders, and appropriate subordinate unified commanders. The passing
exercise message was to include the final date, approximately five days follow-
ing the request, by which addressees might comment. Negative response by that
date would signify concurrence.²

(0) Alternative two, modified by certain of the CINCPAC recommendations,
was adopted and JCS SM-1056-77 was promulgated, incorporating those procedures.²

COPE THUNDER

(U) On 16 August CINCPACAF reported the first full year of COPE THUNDER,
in which eight exercises were conducted (with one cancelled during Operation
PAUL BUNYAN, the August 1976 incident in the Korean Demilitarized Zone). More
than 700 aircrews (from PACAF, Marine Corps, Navy, Army, Military Airlift
Command, Strategic Air Command, and the Philippine Air Force) had flown 3,251
sorties and 4,950 accident-free flying hours during that first year. The first
COPE THUNDER had consisted of 27 PACAF aircraft flying 123 sorties during five
flying days. In contrast, COPE THUNDER IX, completed in July 1977, included
forces from all of the commands listed above with more than 70 aircraft partici-
pating in the two-week exercise, flying 632 sorties in nine flying days.

(U) CINCPACAF reported that they had "come a long way" in developing the
Crow Valley Range complex at Clark Air Base, which was used for all air-to-
ground operations in the exercise series. The range complex had come to
include, in addition to two training ranges, a tactical range complex and an
electronic warfare range complex capable of simulating a low, medium, or high
threat environment.

1. JCS 6968/182341Z Jul 78.
2. CINCPAC 280319Z Jul 77.
(U) Besides acquiring increased operational proficiency, an equally important aspect of the training, CINCPACAF continued, involved the development of an aircrew's skills in such areas as mission planning and tactics. The exercises also proved to be a "sound concept for providing invaluable 'first mission' experience and for supplying a realistic threat environment in which units could employ the actual integrated tactics and operations that would be required in time of war. This capability is becoming increasingly important as the number of PACAF crews with combat experience decreases." CINCPACAF continued that he planned to continue the program and modify it as necessary to insure its fundamental objective of providing combat equivalent experience, accomplished in the most realistic and effective way possible.1

Unconventional Warfare Forces

(5) In June 1976 the JCS had proposed to deploy one U.S. Army Special Forces Battalion with command, service, and support elements to the Western Pacific. CINCPAC's evaluation of that proposal at the time had been that the political conditions then precluded stationing a unit of that type on foreign soil in the PACOM, and that stationing on U.S. or U.S.-controlled territory raised serious problems with respect to facilities, training areas, and remoteness from other Service unconventional warfare forces. Nevertheless, CINCPAC supported the deployment if those difficulties could be resolved. Subsequently the JCS reviewed and reaffirmed the broad requirement for a U.S. military unconventional warfare capability and requested that studies be initiated to determine the feasibility of such a deployment in order to afford a complete tri-Service UW capability under CINCPAC's operational command. By agreement among JCS and Department of the Army action officers, CINCPAC would address the issue in terms of operational desirability of stationing such a unit in WESTPAC and of the political feasibility of various locations. The Department of the Army would provide input to the JCS in terms of beddown, billeting requirements, training areas, administrative and logistic support, and where those needs could best be met.2

(5) On 4 May 1977 CINCPAC advised the JCS that deployment of an SF battalion to WESTPAC was "highly desirable." His concept for employment of the battalion, as the Army component of a joint special operations task force, would include the initial timely response to a variety of crisis situations requiring special skills and capabilities found in Army Special Forces. Situations could vary from disaster relief and assistance in peacetime, through

1. CINCPACAF 160416Z Aug 77.
crises such as the MAYAGUEZ incident, to early deep penetration of hostile areas in wartime for intelligence, personnel recovery, target identification, and strike operations. The presence of that organization would also enhance training and operational effectiveness of forward deployed Navy and Air Force special operations forces and of similar allied forces, and would emphasize the U.S. intent to maintain a military presence and honor commitments in the Far East.¹

(6) The Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, and Indonesia were thought, at that time, to be unfeasible as stationing alternatives for political reasons. Also Korea had been eliminated as a realistic option. COMUS Korea had advised that "announced policies to reduce US presence in ROK make it infeasible to permanently station a USSF Bn here." He noted, however, that the battalion "could be accommodated for training on a company-by-company rotational basis garrisoned under austere field conditions." CINCPAC concurred with this COMUS Korea position.²

(6) Remaining locations under consideration, CINCPAC continued, in order of priority, included Okinawa, Honshu, Guam/Marianas, and Hawaii. Okinawa it was explained, was the most centrally located with respect to likely areas of employment, and to the widest variety of desirable training environments. The Air Force's 1st Special Operations Squadron was based at Kadena; collocation of the SF battalion would enhance and facilitate joint training, operations, planning, and coordination. It would also reduce the expense of deploying SF battalion elements elsewhere for training by using COMBAT TALON aircraft to deploy tactically. Okinawa was also the closest stationing to the Navy Special Warfare Détachment at Subic Bay. This would significantly increase opportunities for tri-Service joint training and exercises, and would improve liaison, planning, and coordination. Army UN operational project stocks were already stored on Okinawa, and the precedent existed for such a unit's presence; stationing could be treated as a "return" instead of introduction of a new unit. (Special Forces had been withdrawn from the PACOM in 1974.)³

(6) Stationing on Honshu retained many of the advantages of Okinawa, but was not as centrally located with respect to all potential areas of employment or to the full range of training environments. CINCPAC noted, however, that the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo had advised of "serious reservations about reintroduction of Special Forces into Japan. Public reaction would be far out of proportion to numbers involved (less than 300) because of perception of Special Forces as US instrument for aggressive intervention in insurgency situations, which most Japanese view as internal problem of nation involved. As they did

¹ CINCPAC 040221Z May 77.
² Ibid., CDR USAEIGHT Seoul 280852Z Feb 77.
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in past, opposition would charge that presence of Special Forces and their role create risk of Japanese entanglement in US intervention. These feelings would run particularly high on Okinawa, but would also come into play on Honshu.¹

Both COMUS Japan and the Commander, U.S. Army Japan had cited difficulties to be anticipated in attempting to reintroduce the forces and the need for early and detailed negotiations with the Japanese government. The Army commander in Japan had indicated, however, that the unit could be accommodated in either the Makiminato Service Area on Okinawa or the Camp Zama/Sagami Depot area on Honshu. CINCPAC said that he recognized and appreciated the difficulties and objections related to stationing in either Okinawa or Honshu, but believed that the military advantages and benefits of those locations over the alternatives were sufficient to warrant further investigation.

The other alternatives had been either Guam/Marianas or Hawaii. Deployment to either site would avoid political problems, CINCPAC had noted, and would achieve a degree of permanence and stability by using U.S. soil. Facilities could be made available either place, but both were remote from areas of likely employment and from desirable training areas. CINCPAC preferred Guam of the two choices, with Hawaii a last resort.²

As noted above, Headquarters, Department of the Army was also studying the matter, particularly the basing and training requirements. One of the sites outlined, in addition to those named above, was Fort Lewis, Washington, which they said, "could afford an increased capability for PACOM." The Army went on to discuss employment and deployment considerations. Regarding the mission of Special Forces troops, the Army said, "There currently exists no viable approved CINCPAC OPLAN which identifies the role USSF would fulfill in a contingency situation." Peacetime missions identified in CINCPAC's 4 May message were not considered applicable solely to the role/mission of a USSF Bn. Foreign internal defense and combined UW planning/training "could be considered feasible missions for such a unit, however, there is no statement of PACOM UW requirements in those areas." Wartime missions identified by

Once CINCPAC's requirements had been specifically identified, the Army would be better equipped to recommend types of units that best satisfied operational requirements. In the interim, the Army supported rotational deployment of CONUS

1. Ibid.; AMEMB Tokyo 2658/250815Z Feb 77.
2. CINCPAC 040221Z May 77.
Special Forces elements for participation in joint/combined tactical exercises in WESTPAC "as may be requested by appropriate unified commanders."\(^1\)

CINCPAC provided his thoughts to the JCS on 28 June. He noted that when the JCS had asked CINCPAC to assess the feasibility of deploying the battalion, he had prepared his reply with the understanding that the request constituted a tentative proposal to do so. His brief allusion to employment concepts in his 4 May message was intended only to place an affirmative response in perspective. CINCPAC then outlined both contingency and peacetime uses of Special Forces. He advised that PACOM headquarters was preparing revised plans that provided for immediate initiation of UW operations in the event of hostilities. An essential feature of those plans was the availability of Army Special Forces units at the outset of hostilities, or prior thereto if sufficient warning was available. Further, in dealing with peacetime needs and crisis situations, capabilities attributed to Army forces (including Special Forces) were valuable and would be employed when appropriate, if they were available. Otherwise, other resources would have to be used. CINCPAC deferred to the Army with respect to identifying Army units best suited to meet PACOM operational requirements. The comments in this message and prior related communications, CINCPAC concluded, had addressed only Army Special Forces in response to specific JCS tasking.\(^2\)

The question of deploying Army Special Forces to the PACOM remained under study in Washington through the end of the year.

Casualty Resolution

Attempts to resolve the status of Americans who were missing in action and recover, if possible, the bodies of the dead still in Southeast Asia were the tasks of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). Twice during 1977 the Socialist Republic of Vietnam returned the bodies of Americans, as discussed below. The JCRC also continued work on the declassification of casualty file documents as well as the fundamental task of analyzing and correlating casualty resolution data.

In March a Presidential Commission on Americans missing and unaccounted for in Southeast Asia, headed by United Auto Workers President Leonard Woodcock, visited PACOM headquarters en route to Vietnam. The commission met with Admiral Weisner, was briefed on JCRC procedures, and toured the facilities of the Central Identification Laboratory (CIL) before leaving for Clark Air Base in the Philippines. They arrived in Hanoi on 15 March and on 19 March received in a

1. HQ DA WASH DC 111100Z May 77.
2. CINCPAC 280359Z Jun 77.
plane-side ceremony the remains of 12 persons. The U.S. C-141 took the commission members to Vientiane, Laos, and then returned to Clark with the remains for transfer for a flight to Hawaii. The remains were received at Hickam Air Force Base on 19 March with an appropriate joint ceremony and then transported to the CIL for identification. The Presidential Commission passed through Hawaii on 21 March en route back to Washington.

(U) The remains announced by Vietnam as being Major Curtis A. Eaton, USAF, were identified by the CIL as a Southeast Asian, not an American. Also, the remains identified by Vietnam as Captain Lawrence H. Goldberg, USAF, were identified by the CIL as Major Patrick E. Wynne, USAF. The remains of the 11 Americans were flown from Hickam to Travis, with appropriate ceremony, on 29 March, escorted by 2 CIL personnel.¹

(U) President Carter greeted the Woodcock commission on its return to Washington, describing the visit as "superb." He said, "Every hope that we had for the mission has been realized. The commission members and the staff were received with great friendship." Explaining that there had been one mistake, the President noted that positive identification procedures were continuing in Hawaii. "We feel that without delay this is a very careful and meticulous process, that we can notify the families when positive identification is assured." He said that the Vietnamese had not tied together economic allocations of American funds with the MIA question. "We believe that they have acted in good faith. They have promised to set up a permanent study mechanism by which the United States Government can provide information that we have about the potential whereabouts or identity of Servicemen who were lost, and the Vietnamese have promised to cooperate in pursuing the evidence that we might present to them in the future."²

(U) After the President finished speaking, Mr. Woodcock answered reporters' questions. He noted that of those lost in World War II and Korea, 22 percent were finally not accounted for. For Vietnam, the number was less than 4½ percent. He said they recommended, among other things, that the Vietnamese be invited to send representatives to the CIL in Honolulu, "because they do really quite extraordinary things with regard to identification on evidence that at first blush would seem to me to be very little." When asked if he came away with the view to the central question that the MIAs really were all dead, he said, "That is the general conclusion of the commission." He said that when they went to Vietnam there were 2,546 unaccounted for, including civilians. "We do not think that there are any Americans left alive in either Vietnam or Laos who are being held against their will." He said they had held a relatively

¹ J361 HistSum Apr 77; JCRC Historical Report 1 Jan 77-30 Mar 77.
² THE WHITE HOUSE 240438Z Mar 77.
brief formal discussion with Laos in which they indicated they would set up an agency for the purpose of seeing what could be done relative to the recovery of those missing in action. "Then they confirmed that in an official broadcast on the day after we left. We came away with some hope which we think has been confirmed, but all of that lies in the future."  

(U) The second repatriation of remains took place on 30 September, again in Vietnam. The JCRC again participated in the return with a joint State and Defense Department mission. They returned the remains of 21 U.S. Servicemen and one civilian. After processing by the CIL in Hawaii, they were transported to Travis Air Force Base on 26 October and 4 November, with appropriate plane-side ceremonies on both occasions. The Department of the Army then transported them to the Army Mortuary at Oakland for subsequent release to the deceased Serviceman's parent unit. The Vietnamese accepted the remains that had been delivered to the Woodcock commission as those of Major Eaton.  

(U) The continuation of the existence of the JCRC was directed by the JCS in March. They noted that CINCPAC's Joint Manpower Program had reflected no JCRC manpower requirements beyond FY 77. Regarding the Woodcock mission, they noted that the JCRC was providing support and could incur increased responsibilities depending upon the results of negotiations. In addition, the moratorium on general status changes for MIAs was being continued, which would prolong the requirement for JCRC support of the review process. They advised that continued existence of the JCRC was "essential," and extended the manpower ceiling through FY 78. The JCS advised that the State Department concurred.  

(U) The JCRC continued to provide a monthly statistical report to CINCPAC. The December 1977 report listed 3,494 total cases in the JCRC system, of which 2,595 were active and 899 inactive. There were 1,322 sites of JCRC interest, of which 909 were in Vietnam and 295 in Laos.  

(U) Next of kin of the MIAs continued to visit the JCRC regularly.  

Asia-Pacific Defense Forum  

(U) The Asia-Pacific Defense Forum was a quarterly magazine published by CINCPAC and distributed to the foreign military audience in PACOM countries. It provided a military communication channel to enhance foreign understanding.  

1. Ibid.  
3. JCS 212042Z Mar 77.  
4. JCRC Historical Report, 1 Oct 77-31 Dec 77.
and perceptions in support of U.S. national objectives. First published in June 1976 with about 3,300 subscribers, by the end of 1977 there were 10,234 copies being distributed. Korea, Japan, and the Philippines received 73 percent of the copies. Content was primarily reprinted material from other U.S. publications, selected by the editorial board and approved by the Chief of Staff. Foreign source material was encouraged.¹

(U) The magazine was to have a two-year trial period to establish the publication and obtain sufficient feedback for evaluation to determine if the project should continue. A published reader survey, U.S. agency comments, unsolicited letters, and subscription requests were examined, and publication would be continued. It was considered to meet its objectives and was produced at what was considered a reasonable cost ($105,906 for the second year of publication).²

Kahoolawe

(U) Kahoolawe was a small, uninhabited island off the coast of Maui in the Hawaiian Islands. It had been used as a target area for many years and was covered with live, unexploded ordnance. Certain Hawaiian groups had begun calling for a halt to the bombing and individuals began visiting the island, illegally, in 1976. The news media gave this matter extensive coverage in Hawaii.³

(U) In 1977 the Commander THIRD Fleet monitored activity there as both live firing and unauthorized entry continued. (In earlier years it had been considered a 14th Naval District matter.) The activists who called for a halt to the bombing and restoration of the land to the Hawaiian people were organized loosely in a Protect Kahoolawe Ohana (ohana was the Hawaiian word for "family"). It should be noted that in this highly emotional issue many Hawaiian people did not agree with the actions of the ohana and supported the operations of U.S. military forces. From February to July 1977 there were instances of illegal arrival on the island; in many cases these intruders were removed by USMC personnel on the island who returned them to Oahu for action by civil authorities. The Coast Guard also conducted frequent surveillance. Two ohana members were lost at sea between Kahoolawe and Maui. A number of lawsuits were in progress throughout the year with the ohana members on trial for trespassing at the same time they had filed suit against the Defense Department to enjoin the Navy's

target use of the island. CINCPAC monitored the matter, aware that the outcome of this confrontation could affect other training sites, both in the United States and overseas.¹

**Offshore Oil Exploration in the PACOM**

(TS) A message from the U.S. Ambassador in Manila in March reported the possible commencement of oil drilling operations on Reed Bank in late March by AMOCO employing a U.S. registered ship flying the U.S. flag. In view of the potential for dispute over drilling in that area, CINCPAC conducted a review of all known guidance pertaining to protection of oil exploration vessels. He cited State Department guidance of 1971 and 1975. He recommended that the 1971 guidance be updated to include the South China Sea area, particularly covering the Paracel and Spratley Island areas and Reed Bank. Pending such revised guidance, CINCPAC advised that he intended to apply existing guidance to any incident arising out of the oil exploration activities; specifically, no foreign military force would be engaged by CINCPAC forces, unless such engagement was directed by the JCS. The JCS concurred.²

1. NAVLEG/SVCOFF Pearl Harbor 122118Z Feb 77; CDRUSACSG 190605Z Jul 77; 5th Air Force SSO 160555Z Feb 77 (BOM).
2. CINCPAC 210535Z Apr 77; JCS 8623/202242Z Apr 77; J5123 HistSum Apr 77.
4. J323 HistSum Apr 77.
PACOM Tropical Cyclone Conference

(U) The 19th PACOM Tropical Cyclone Conference was held at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan, 7-10 February 1977, with the Commander of the 313th Air Division acting as host on behalf of CINCPACAF. An agenda of 25 items was dealt with by the ad hoc committees made up from the 51 attendees. Conferees represented 39 commands in the PACOM, plus the National Weather Service, Naval Weather Service, Air Weather Service, and the Navy Environmental Prediction Research Facility. The Commander of the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, MAJ GEN R.S. Saunders, USAF, was the senior conferee. The objective of the annual conference was to evaluate the performance of the PACOM Tropical Cyclone Warning and Reconnaissance System and to prepare for the forthcoming storm season through revision of procedures.

Research and Development Objectives

(U) For many years one of the documents in the JCS Joint Strategic Planning System had been the annual Joint Research and Development Objectives Document. (Among others in this series were the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.) In April 1977 the Secretary of Defense discontinued the JRDO, noting that while it was essential that he receive advice and assistance from both the Service Chiefs and the CINCs of unified and specified commands in planning the Department's research, development, test, and evaluation program, the JRDO did not give sufficient visibility to the priorities involved. "In fact," the Secretary said, "the JRDO appears to have little influence in shaping the Defense RDT&E program." In place of the JRDO, he said, he would prefer an annual letter from each CINC, to be forwarded with

1. J322 HistSums Jan, Sep 77.
a covering letter from the Chairman of the JCS, neither of which would require coordination by the Military Departments.\(^1\)

(U) The Secretary transmitted the memorandum to Admiral Weisner by letter on 7 June. He advised that he was writing to underline that he was looking for the Admiral's personal view of how the R&D community could best help in CINCPAC's area of responsibility. The JCS were to obtain and collate the views of all CINC's, and the Chairman of the JCS would offer JCS views on the total package.\(^2\)

(U) In addition to the new CINC letters, the office of the JCS planned to maintain the information in a new annex to Volume II of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. (For further discussion of the JSOP see the Planning chapter of this history.)\(^3\)

(C) CINCPAC provided his statement of research and development objectives to the Secretary and the Chairman of the JCS on 2 September. He said that he welcomed this opportunity to provide his views on R&D needs to improve the operational capabilities of the PACOM. The great geographical area of the PACOM required, he said, that emphasis be placed on R&D programs that supported surveillance and early warning over or under large land and water areas, the ability to reinforce rapidly with a credible combat capability over long distances, and the ability to provide command and control of forces over long distances.\(^4\)

(U) CINCPAC also emphasized in his cover letter that during the R&D process continued emphasis should be placed on ultimately achieving reliable, simple, and maintainable systems and equipment.

(C) Some of the specific statements of operational deficiencies and R&D objectives were as follows. These first were assigned priority one.

- Tactical Communications

CINCPAC noted that while numerous command, control, and communications systems were being developed separately, there were continuing deficiencies in interoperability, compatibility, systems integration, reliability, reliability, reliability.

1. Memorandum for the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff and Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands from the Secretary of Defense, The Honorable Harold Brown, 13 Apr 77.
2. Ltr, SECDEF Brown to Admiral Weisner, 7 Jun 77.
4. CINCPAC Ltr Ser S460, 2 Sep 77, Subj: Research and Development (R&D) Objectives. The summary that follows is based on that letter.
survivability, and vulnerability to electronic warfare. Additionally, he said, as new automated personnel, logistic, fire control, air defense, and intelligence systems were "fielded," requirements to provide a means of rapidly reviewing, sorting, and assimilating data increased. His R&D objective was to develop a survivable and air transportable tactical command, control, and communications system that integrated and displayed air and surface situations in meaningful displays, that provided fully secure, automatic switching communications, increased secure voice capability with conferencing capability, and the potential of integration into strategic command, control, and communications systems. ADP systems should be capable of automatic data exchange to decrease message traffic and improve efficiency.

- Airlift/Sealift

Because of the large area of the PACOM and the proposed land force withdrawal from Korea, introduction of combat forces with logistics support into a crisis situation was entirely dependent on strategic airlift and sea transportation. There was insufficient air and sea transport capability to transport personnel, heavy equipment, and logistics support and supplies on a timely basis. Improved methods were required to distribute supplies and equipment to operational units when they arrived at staging bases, unloading facilities, or harbors. CINCPAC sought improved strategic mobility systems to include flexible and efficient sealift (roll on-roll off, etc.) in addition to improved air cargo lift capabilities. He also sought to improve distribution and unloading capabilities through development of heavy lift helicopters, amphibious craft with over-the-beach capability, and tactical air resupply systems and methods. Increased mobility might also be sought by decreasing logistics requirements; examples were standardized multi-function fuzes for artillery and bombs, communications equipment, etc.

- Electronic Warfare

The electronic warfare (EW) environment to be encountered would continue to increase with the introduction of new threat weapon systems in the air, on the surface, and below the surface. New and improved EW support measures were needed to counter those new threats. These would include passive acquisition methods, such as quiet radars; passive electronic countermeasures; and radio transmissions that neither revealed transmitter location nor suggested jamming and detection techniques. The R&D objective was to develop new EW techniques to counter the existing and future surface, air, and subsurface threats. Techniques should increase the flexibility of operating through increased ranges of response, enhance efficiency of operation, enhance portability/mobility, and minimize the effects on self-protection and threat destruction systems employed by U.S. forces.
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- Battlefield Surveillance

The major operational deficiency that R&D might overcome on the Korean Peninsula, CINCPAC said, was the lack of warning time available to United Nations forces. The North Korean strategy of hardening and placing major forces underground presented additional warning and surveillance problems for UNC forces. The R&D objective was to develop a system capable of all-weather, day or night surveillance and warning to include:

- Detection of caves or tunnels and associated countermeasures.
- Monitoring ground forces disposition.
- Detection of small cross-section low-flying aircraft or helicopters over rough terrain.
- Near realtime data transfer into the command, control, and communications system.
- Ability to look far into enemy territory while maintaining self-protection.
- Sufficient accuracy for targeting and possible use to assess damage after an attack.
- Measure and observe tactical meteorological conditions and report them to command, control, and communications elements.

- Antisubmarine Warfare

The PACOM was confronted with an extensive underwater threat that ranged from nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to older cruise missile platforms. An extensive antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability was required to counter this serious threat. The R&D objective was to develop improved systems and methods of detecting underwater threats to include:

- Detection by ships, aircraft, helicopters, or satellites using magnetic, infrared emissions, or sound systems.
- Movable underwater acoustic devices and arrays controlled by ASW forces and capable of satellite readout.
- Secure air-surface, subsurface realtime communications for ASW coordination.
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- Strategic Command, Control, and Communications

Major areas of concern were being addressed in both the selected and long-range architecture for the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). Regardless of the platforms, mission-essential communications should be survivable, secure, jam resistant, and range independent. The need was for real-time interactive data exchange of operational, intelligence, and logistic information between commands to provide the basis for informal planning and decision making. The R&D objective was to continue the existing efforts of the WWMCCS System Engineering Office.

- Antisurface, Antiair Warfare

The ability to maintain surveillance and control of major ocean areas and protect the sea lines of communication was influenced to a great extent by the enemies' use of surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles against major surface combatants. "New systems must be developed to detect, classify-track and destroy these threat weapons systems." The R&D objective was to develop such means, including countermeasures (expendable jammers, chaff, flares, etc.) and new techniques to maintain defensive systems operations in this environment (passive surveillance, data links, etc.).

- Fire Support-Interdiction-Air Defense Suppression

The terrain features and projected wartime defense environment within the PACOM required munitions with the capability to penetrate hard surfaces, be delivered with accuracy, provide maximum probability of kill, minimize air-crew exposure to hostile fire, employ standard fuzes, require minimum maintenance, and extract minimum performance penalties on the delivery aircraft. The R&D objectives were to develop a family of munitions incorporating the following capabilities:

- Hard surface penetration (shelters and caves).
- Stand-off release with high delivery accuracy and high probability of kill.
- Multiple target capability against armor.
- Light weight and low drag while maintaining destructive ability.
- Low maintenance requirements (assembly and preventive).
- Standardized multi-weapon, multi-function fuzes with long shelf life.

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- Technology Base Support-Energy Sources

A major concern of the command was the development and incorporation of methods and technologies to improve the efficiency of energy consumption and enhance the availability of alternate energy sources in the mid- and long-term timeframe. A shortage of usable energy would severely impact on all facets of the command mission. The R&D objective was to develop more efficient and alternate or new energy sources for air, surface, land, and subsurface systems.

- Information Processing and Display

Discussion of matters with a lower priority began with a statement that the problem of the numbers and types of equipment required to support command ADP requirements was compounded by the need to provide data security, restrictions on release to foreign nationals, protection of multi-level security data, and the need for short processing lags (to provide near-realtime information). The R&D objective was to develop equipment and techniques that could process data at multisecurity levels simultaneously and that were interoperable while maintaining short processing lags.

- Air Superiority

Two objectives were development of an Identification Friend, Foe or Neutral system or capability for identifying targets in a combined operations environment, and development of a light-weight, medium-range, radar-guided missile to provide beyond-visual-range and all-weather capability while reducing operational constraints on air superiority aircraft.

- Command and Control Communications

Accomplishment of the command mission required extensive communications between U.S. Forces, friendly forces, and noncombatants. The need for security was apparent, but present-day technology required extensive and bulky cryptologic devices and codes with concomitant maintenance and physical security problems. New methods were required for securing communications and data transmissions to reduce equipment, coding, and support requirements.

- Chemical and Biological Warfare

Existing detection and identification means did not provide positive determination that chemical or biological agents had been employed against friendly forces. Protective devices (masks and clothing) were of limited utility because they restricted mobility and communication. R&D objectives included:
- Development of rapid detection and warning systems to warn of the presence of a chemical or biological attack.

- Development of protective equipment that would allow increased personnel and equipment mobility and enhance communications.

- Development of tactical systems to decontaminate personnel, clothing, equipment, terrain, food, and water. "An additional bonus would be realized if these systems could function as laundries, showers, and sanitation facilities."

- **Ocean Surveillance and Targeting**

Listed under the heading "Other Defensewide Mission Support" was a statement noting that Soviet anti-satellite, reconnaissance, and communications systems increased the threat to major surface combatants and endangered the U.S. ability to provide surveillance over enemy territory and sea lanes. Anti-satellite systems (offensive or defensive) and a quick-reaction capability to launch surveillance and communications satellites were needed to assure continual surveillance of Soviet and Chinese land areas and the sea lanes in the PACOM. R&D objectives were:

- Development of improved reconnaissance satellites (electronic intelligence, imagery, radar, etc.) that could also defend against and survive anti-satellite attacks.

- Development of anti-satellite systems to deny foreign satellite access to crisis situation data.

- Development of quick reaction capability to launch temporary communications and surveillance satellites if operational spacecraft were disabled.

**Hard Structure Munitions Program**

(5) As discussed in the 1976 Command History, CINCPAC had provided his support to an Air Force program testing munitions designed to destroy hard structures. CINCPAC sought development of the technique "soonest" to meet Korean and other hard target requirements. Studies at that time supported using laser-guided bomb configurations in the prototype.¹

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Admiral Weisner was briefed on the hard structure munition program on 4 June 1977 when he visited Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. Following a briefing on weaponization of the HSM (GBU-17), his comment was, "We need it." The Admiral was also briefed on some potential problem areas in the matter of advanced technology and Foreign Military Sales.1

In a further HSM test on 24 June (at Eglin), the fuze access hatch cover separated prior to impact. The forward charge fuze functioned at the right time but the penetrator fuze did not. Additional testing was planned with a redesigned hatch cover. Wind tunnel and flight tests of the fuze and laser guided GBU-17 were scheduled for mid-1978.2

2. Ibid.
CHAPTER VII--SECURITY ASSISTANCE

SECTION I--PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
Funding the Security Assistance Program During 1977
Arms Transfer Policy Guidelines
International Security Assistance Act of 1977
Military Assistance Advisory Group Aircraft Requirements
1977 PACOM Security Assistance Conference
Release of High Technology to PACOM Countries
  Release of Improved CHAPARRAL to the Republic of China and
    Republic of Korea
  Release of AIM-9L to Australia and Japan
Training
PACOM Tri-Service Training Workshop
DOD Training Workshop Conference
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CHAPTER V--LOGISTICS

SECTION I--PLANS/POLICY

Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS)

JOPS Users Conference

(U) At a 27-30 June 1977 JOPS Users' Conference in Norfolk, Virginia, CINCPAC recommended and the other conference representatives unanimously, concurred that the P23 automatic data processing module become integrated into the movement requirements generator (MRG) as the standard JOPS module. CINCPAC representatives also proposed other revisions be accomplished by CINCPAC. The Users' Conference supported this position and a recommendation was made to the OJCS J3.1

Civil Engineering Support Planning


(U) At a JCS-sponsored T-54 Module Planners Conference held in Washington, D.C. from 29 August to 2 September 1977, CINCPAC representatives presented their version of the war damage modification and suggested numerous improvements to the system. The T-54 Module was also renamed the Civil Engineering Support Plan Generator (CESPG). The final JOPS standard CESPG was scheduled for completion in mid-1978. Until then CINCPAC continued to work with the old T-54.3

CONUS/Surface Movement Study 5027N

(U) During the period 21 August-21 September 1977 CINCPAC participated in a throughput study to analyze the CONUS movement and surface movement requirements for OPLAN 5027N. The study, conducted jointly with the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) and Military Sealift Command (MSC), recommended several improvements to the automated support of the transportation planning system within the JOPS. The following observations were brought out by this study.4

2. J444 HistSum Jan 77.

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Defense Retail Interservice Support (DRIS) Program

DRIS Chairman's Conference

(U) The DRIS Program Annual Sub-Zone Group (SZG) Chairman's Conference was held at Yokota AB, Japan on 18-19 January 1977. CINCPAC (J42) chaired the meeting which had attendees from Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Guam, Philippines, Hawaii and Defense Supply Agency (DSA) Headquarters. The SZG chairmen made country presentations on their local DRIS program organization and actions, and the DSA representative discussed the DOD program on DRIS and relayed the information that PACOM served as the worldwide model of a successful, active program.3

Joint Interservice Support Board (JISB) Meeting

(U) A JISB meeting was held at CINCPAC Headquarters on 10 May 1977 to discuss the following agenda items:4

- Need for guidance in the DOD Manual 4000.19-M whenever support was provided to nonfederal agencies.
- Overview of PACOM Interservice Support Agreements (ISA) statistics.
- Extension of ISAs beyond termination date.
- Changes proposed to CINCPACINST 4000.2J which would more accurately reflect the military structure within the locality whenever requiring seniority of membership in area Sub-Zone Groups.

1. J4371 HistSum Sep 77.
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- Status of PACOM Interservice Support Summary Program (ISSP).

- Difficulties experienced at the Makimato Service Area (Japan) in reacquiring a smooth, orderly support effort from among the fragmented supporting elements which remained after the Program Budget Decision (PBD) 253 realignment.

- Inclusion of stock fund reimbursement values in the resources summary section of the Support Agreement for (DD 1144).

- Development of a matrix which indicated the Army, Navy and Marine Corps position on types of support which the Air Force considered nonreimbursable between DOD components.

Interservice Support Agreement (ISA) Reconciliation

(U) Between 7-12 March 1977 CINCPAC sent a representative to the Defense Logistics Services Center (DLSC), Battle Creek, Michigan, to verify that the DLSC data base included all ISA's contained in the CINCPAC Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate files and to discuss DLSC capability to produce CINCPAC-requested automated summary reports. The reconciliation revealed that CINCPAC files contained 79 ISA's with total value of $5.14 million that were not registered with DLSC. Conversely, DLSC held 86 ISA's valued at $1.38 million that were not on file with CINCPAC. There was enough file disparity during this and two previous reconciliations to warrant periodic reconciliations in the future. Detailed discussions with DLSC personnel revealed that current programming would not produce automated summary reports in sufficient detail to satisfy CINCPAC requirements.¹

PACOM Interservice Support Summary Program (ISSP)

(U) On 28 July 1977 the PACOM ISSP became the official automated data system in support of the PACOM interservice support effort. The PACOM ISSP was designed to simplify the overall effort required to maintain interservice support information and to facilitate reconciliations between the Defense Logistics Services Center DRIS data banks and CINCPAC files, and between CINCPAC and PACOM field activity files. The PACOM ISSP could generate timely reports in the following formats:²


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Total PACOM ISA data by providing agency.

- Total PACOM ISA data by recipient.
- Summary data by providing agency and location.
- Detailed information on each ISA by location.

Honshu Calibration Consolidation

(U) A study completed in February 1976 for consolidation of calibration facilities on Honshu (Mainland), Japan indicated the possibility of realizing an annual savings of $101,590 and one-time savings of $608,036. In August 1977 an implementation plan was issued by the Naval Air Systems Command Representative, Pacific, San Diego, but U.S. Army, Japan (USARJ) advised that instruction in the plan pertaining to the Army had already been rendered invalid in the wake of realignments which had taken place prior to its issuance. Through year's end efforts were made to reconcile problem areas caused by this realignment and to formulate a revised implementation plan.

Catalog of PACOM Logistic Rationalization Initiatives (CPLRI)

The CPLRI, completed in February 1977, was under review by the JCS for the remainder of 1977. Its main thrust was to increase commonality and standardization between the United States and the countries it supported militarily, and to decrease duplication and waste in logistics. In conjunction with this effort, CINCPAC produced a patrol boat study to determine which Western-manufactured patrol craft would most effectively meet area needs; however, it was realized that logistic rationalization and standardization in the PACOM presented more difficulties than among North Atlantic Treaty Alliance countries because:

- There was no overall formal alliance to serve as a basis.

- There was considerable political diversity in the area confronted by a multiplicity of arms suppliers.

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- There were differences in threat perception.

Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel Stocks (PWRMS)

2. Ibid.
From 4-7 October 1977 CINCPAC hosted the seventh PASOLS in Honolulu with nine PACOM countries represented (Australia, China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand). The theme of this tri-Service, multi-national seminar was "Regional Logistics Cooperation." The keynote speaker, Mr. Donald S. Cuffe, Director of International Logistics in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, provided the framework by noting areas that had a potential for regional logistic cooperation as well as the constraints that tended to limit such cooperation.

Areas for Cooperation

- Cooperative production
- Maintenance programs
- Supply support
- Technical logistic assistance
- Transportation
- Standardization and interoperability

Constraints on Cooperation

- Political/sovereignty issue
- Geography
- Lack of standardization

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- Defense technology exchange articles
- Transfers of defense items to third countries
- Royalty charges/licensing costs
- Arms transfer policy limits on coproduction
- Military considerations

(U) The principal conclusions of the seventh PASOLS were that:

- Nations located in the Pacific region would benefit from:
  - A more lenient U.S. policy concerning third country transfer of spare parts and maintenance services and,
  - Development and implementation of procedures for lateral redistribution of excess materiel.

- Participating nations in the Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar should provide, as desired, representation to international work groups (established on a bilateral or multilateral basis as necessary) to pursue principal problem areas identified during the seminar and to develop proposals for expanded regional logistics cooperation.

- CINCPAC would coordinate establishment of the initial work group.

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1. Ibid., p. 5.

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SECTION II--PETROLEUM, OIL, LUBRICANTS (POL)

PACOM POL Storage Posture

(U) The quarterly update of the Defense Fuels Supply Center (DFSC) Inventory Management Plan (IMP) effective 1 October 1977 reflected a 0.1 percent decrease in total theater requirements coupled with a 3.3 percent increase in the overall percentage of PACOM requirements covered either within the theater or on the West Coast. The decrease in theater requirements was attributed primarily to a decrease in aviation gas and Navy Special Fuel Oil requirements. Increase in coverage of requirements was attributed to a 25.7 percent increase in the quantity of PACOM requirements stored on the West Coast. Effective 1 October 1977, 86.2 percent of combined theater assets were covered with 75.1 percent being covered within theater.¹

PACOM POL Storage Facilities

( fail) As of 1977 the current theater tankage deficit was 3,606 thousand barrels (MBBLs). In an effort to alleviate the deficit, the Navy had an intensive program of tank repair in Japan (1,375 MBBLs) while the Air Force program consisted of construction of tankage in Korea (500 MBBLs) and Guam (540 MBBLs). In addition to Service efforts, the DFSC was pursuing the lease of tankage on a long-term basis in Hawaii and Guam, and on a short-term basis in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines; however, leasing on a Service-funded basis did not appear to be a practical solution to PACOM storage needs. Initial response to availability of tankage for leasing in Japan, Korea, Okinawa, and the Philippines indicated it was minimal or nonexistent. Oil companies in Guam and Hawaii had expressed interest in constructing tankage for this requirement.²

Standard Bulk Petroleum Prices

(U) On 1 October 1977 the DFSC adjusted standard bulk petroleum prices as follows:³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 77</th>
<th>FY 78 (1 Oct 77)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP-5</td>
<td>$0.358</td>
<td>$0.441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFM</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>0.457</td>
<td>0.557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOGAS</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>0.433</td>
<td>0.420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ J4226 HistSum Oct 77.
² J4226 HistSum Nov 77.
³ J4226 HistSum Oct 77.
BULK POL DATA, PACOM

RECEIPTS DURING LAST 180 DAYS
TOTAL...12.95

MILITARY STORAGE AVAILABLE
TOTAL...26.8

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 39.
(U) Standard prices were adjusted to cover changes in procurement and delivery costs to ensure that the Services would adequately replenish the DFSC revolving stock fund.\(^1\)

**Tsurumi Tank Farm**

(U) The Navy POL facility at Tsurumi was a small part of an enormous POL complex. The area was identified under a new Government of Japan law as being especially susceptible to earthquakes and as a potential disaster area. Based on a Japan-U.S. Joint Committee Agreement of 2 December 1976, 19 Japanese officials, including those from the Yokohama City Fire Board, and five technical personnel from the U.S. forces conducted a survey of the Tsurumi oil storage area on 6 July 1977. The survey found 11 of the 19 open-air oil tanks not in compliance with local regulations, and the Yokohama City office requested the Japan Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) and other Government offices concerned to take steps for reworking the depot in accordance with local regulations.\(^2\)

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1. Ibid.
Guam Oil and Refining Company (GORCO)

(U) In 1977 commercial petroleum refining capacity in the Pacific area including that of GORCO was as follows:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>MBBLS/DAY</th>
<th>NO. OF REFINERIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5,552</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,832.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>92</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Ibid.
2. J422(A) HistSum Apr 77.
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(U) Located on Guam, GORCO was a fully U.S.-owned, multi-product refinery complex with a total production output of 29.5 thousand barrels per day for all individual products. The plant was strategically important with its relatively central location although it was four to six days steaming time from most WESTPAC users. In addition to satisfying the majority of Guam’s military fuel requirements, millions of barrels were provided other defense fuel terminals throughout the Pacific. Approximately 34.4 percent of U.S. military requirements in the Pacific area were furnished by GORCO, the majority of whose crude stocks were obtained from mid-East sources such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia.¹

(U) From its inception, GORCO had encountered a myriad of problems which infringed on its ability to perform adequately and maintain appropriate stocks to meet contract commitments. This in turn had an adverse effect on PWRM levels in the PACOM. Default actions were the responsibility of the Defense Fuel Supply Center.²

(U) One problem encountered by GORCO during 1977 was an adverse interpretive ruling on 11 February by the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) acting General Counsel. The ruling reduced GORCO's future entitlements under the old Oil Entitlement Program and could be retroactive. As a result of the ruling, on 15 March 1977 GORCO raised oil prices $1.53 per barrel (16.4 percent increase) with the possibility of adding $3.25 per barrel (34 percent increase) depending upon the final U.S. Government decision on the FEA ruling. CINCPAC advised the JCS of these circumstances and requested JCS assistance. The JCS provided the status of actions planned or in progress by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), DFSC, and the military Services with further developments to be reported as they occurred, but no final decision was reached as of year's end.³

POL Storage on Diego Garcia

(U) The plans for permanent POL storage, currently under construction on Diego Garcia, originally called for storage of marine diesel fuel (DFM), JP-5, and JP-4. The Navy, however, was converting their DFM to JP-5 and desired to substitute JP-5 for JP-4 to reduce storage and resupply problems. As JP-5 was considered an alternate fuel for the types of Air Force aircraft transiting Diego Garcia, CINCPAC queried Air Force users who concurred with the use of JP-5 only. On 16 December 1977 Headquarters, United States Air Force approved cross-manifolding the Air Force JP-4 and Navy JP-5 systems and use of JP-5 only to

¹. Ibid.
². Ibid.
³. J422 HistSum Mar 77.
satisfy all requirements on Diego Garcia.¹

**Kunsan Army POL Terminal**

On 8 December 1976 fire destroyed two of three 10,000-barrel tanks at the Kunsan Army POL terminal in Korea. On 14 May 1977 the Commander, Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) submitted an outline of proposed short and long range actions that impacted on POL resupply to Kunsan Air Base, and asked DFSC concurrence on an interim supply plan. On 12 April 1977 CINCPAC had requested the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUS Korea) to examine future requirements of the Kunsan terminal, and on 21 May, CINCPAC requested the Commander, EUSA to refer such matters to CINCPAC via COMUS Korea to insure proper coordination in view of the Unified Command responsibility for POL matters. At the same time CINCPAC concurred in the EUSA plan not to construct a 20,000-barrel tank at Kunsan and to continue resupply of the air base directly from tankers as an interim solution.²

**Military Sealift Command (MSC) Petroleum Relocation Requirements**

In November 1977 the CINCPAC Joint Petroleum Office submitted the results of a study to Headquarters MSC which showed the quantity of fuel (in thousands of barrels) that had to be moved throughout the PACOM during the first 60 days, by location, to meet the most demanding needs.

1. J4226 HistSums Nov and Dec 77.
2. J4226 HistSum May 77; CINCPAC 210052Z May 77.
3. CINCPAC Ltr 4223 Serial S552, 14 Nov 77, Subj: PACOM Tanker Requirement.
1. J4226 HistSum Nov 77.
SECTION III--MUNITIONS

PACOM Munitions Summary

a. Storage objectives and on hand assets for Navy/Marine are based on OPNAVNOTE C8000, calling for 3 Carrier Task Groups. CINCPAC OPLAN 5027N requirements included 5 Carrier Task Groups and 7 Marine Air Squadrons approximately doubling previous ammunition requirements. A CNO/CINCPACFLT meeting was scheduled for Jan 78 to resolve planning factors used in compiling OPNAVNOTE C8000 and to include the OPLAN ammunition requirements in Navy POM for FY 80.

b. On hand asset totals include approximately 43,000 short tons of training (27,500 short tons) and excess/obsolete (15,500 short tons) ammunition. This ammunition was not included in CINCPAC OPLAN support.

Logistic Planning for Defense of Korea

(3) The ground munitions requirement, based on 60 days as the time needed to establish resupply, was 717,000 short tons with an end FY 77 shortfall projection of 236,000 short tons at a cost of $961 million. Munitions for the ROK

1. J4232 HistSum Mar 77; J4236 HistSum Dec 77.
• Urging the ROK to concentrate more of its own resources on reducing ammunition and other logistic deficiencies.

SECTION IV--TRANSPORTATION

Military Airlift Command (MAC) Channel Service to Thailand

(U) In January 1977 MAC channel service was requested by the Royal Thai Armed Forces through the Chief, U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (CHJUSMAGTHAI), primarily to improve delivery time for hazardous cargo, spare parts, and the return of repaired items under the Security Assistance program. The Country Team concurred, and CINCPAC recommended to Headquarters MAC, U.S. Air Force Headquarters and the JCS that the channel be established. On 3 February 1977 the Air Force questioned the economic viability of the proposed channel and requested that Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) make a review and analysis of anticipated traffic and channel operation. On 9 February CINCPAC reemphasized to the JCS the value of the proposed channel to U.S.-Thai relations and to U.S. regional interests, and also asked CHJUSMAGTHAI to seek American Embassy Bangkok support for the proposed channel.1

(U) After an economic analysis by MAC and Service approvals, the Air Force directed MAC to implement a Clark-Bangkok channel to operate under the following State Department-mandated constraints.2

- No more than two flights per month.
- No additional U.S. personnel in Thailand for channel support.

(U) The first flights operated on 12-13 and 26-27 March 1977, and subsequent flights were scheduled for the second and fourth Saturday of each month. The Bangkok stop was added to Clark-Diego Garcia missions, both in and outbound. MAC personnel from Clark AB accompanied the first flight to survey ground handling capability at Don Muang International Airport. Ground handling for MAC flights through Bangkok was contracted commercially.3

(U) On 21 April 1977 CHJUSMAGTHAI requested CINCPAC concurrence with a proposal limiting space available travel to and from Bangkok to personnel stationed in Thailand and emergency cases from out-of-country. CINCPAC nonconcurred because such limits would set an undesirable precedent, as there were no similar restrictions worldwide. Since the Ambassador shared the CHJUSMAGTHAI view, CINCPAC chose to restrict all space available travel except for emergency cases. From May to July there was an average of 7.5 open seats

3. Ibid.
per flight that could have been used for space available travel and an average of 1.3 space required passengers were moved to Thailand on each flight. At year's end the CINCPAC staff recommended that the space available travel question be discussed with Ambassador Whitehouse and that his reconsideration for approval of space available travel be requested.¹

MAC Flights via Singapore

(U) On 28 April 1977 CINCPAC, with American Embassy Singapore concurrence, proposed to the JCS that MAC flights to Diego Garcia via Singapore be increased from three per month to one per week. At State Department request, the Embassy obtained Government of Singapore (GOS) approval for the proposed flight frequency increase, and on 26 May 1977, the JCS approved the increase with scheduling subject to Embassy approval. CINCPAC then obtained the Embassy's approval for scheduling flights the 4th and 5th week in June 1977 and requested the 22nd Air Force to operate additional missions accordingly. On 1 June 1977 CINCPAC advised that one flight per week via Singapore was the maximum foreseeable requirement to support Diego Garcia.²

(U) On 29 July 1977 the U.S. Defense Attache Office (DAO) in Singapore expressed concern that the 50 percent late arrival rate for MAC flights in May and June could prompt the GOS to revoke Paya Lebar Airport operating approval if commercial operations were disrupted by MAC activity at other than scheduled ground time. The use of Paya Lebar from 12 August to 12 September had been approved by the GOS because of a temporary Tengah Air Base closure for repairs. CINCPAC interceded with a request that MAC's 22nd Air Force make every effort to maintain schedule reliability. On 4 and 10 August 1977, 22nd Air Force advised of actions being taken to minimize delays. Specifically, they were:³

- Each aircraft would carry an avionics support kit and technician, as well as an aircraft maintenance technician.
- A back-up aircraft would be available at Clark AB (originating station).
- Aircrews would be augmented by an extra pilot and navigator to extend crew duty day from 15 to 24 hours; this would avoid crew rest in situations where time consuming maintenance was required.

1. J434 Point Paper, 4 Nov 77, Subj: Space Available (S/A) Travel to/from Thailand.
(U) Reliability improved in late August, and the problem did not again surface through the reopening of Tengah Air Base in September 1977.

PACOM Surface Shipping Conference

(U) A Pacific Command Surface Shipping Conference was held 13 through 15 May 1977 at Camp Zama, Japan, sponsored by the CINCPAC Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate and hosted by the Commander, USARJ. Seventy-four persons, representing the principal shippers, transportation operating agencies, and military port operators within PACOM, as well as the Military Sealift Command, the Military Traffic Management Command, and other transportation agencies or shipping activities from the Continental United States, participated in the Conference. The keynote address was made by LT GEN John R. Guthrie, Commander, USARJ, who spoke on the significance of surface transportation and the impact on strategic mobility.

(U) Objectives of the conference were to provide a forum for discussion of common problems, to promote better communication, and to define areas for collective effort. Specific areas singled out for follow-up action were:

- Missing required delivery date on Army and Air Force exchange cargo to Okinawa.
- Shipment of ammunition.
- Control of classified and sensitive shipments.
- Incomplete documentation on containers stuffed at Oakland commercial terminals.
- Discharge of break-bulk cargo at Aja Port rather than Naha.
- Late receipt of manifests.
- Use of Manila as entry port.
- Liberalization of free time provisions of MSC Container Agreement and Rate Guide.

1. Ibid.
2. J433 HistSum Apr 77.
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- Delays in AAFES cargo to Europe.
- Expedited shipment of POVs to East Coast.
- Container bailment agreement standardization.
- Legality of CULT Operator billing another Service.
- Excessive requests for changes in shipping terms.
- Delays in shipment of POVs to Guam.
- Single integrated container control system.
- Guidelines for shipping small arms ammunition.
- MAP/FMS cargo.

Airlift Assistance to the Government of Western Samoa

On 18 January 1977 Asi Eikeni, Minister of Economic Affairs, Government of Western Samoa, visited CINCPAC to discuss the possible airlift of vehicles from Hawaii to Western Samoa for the official visit of HRM Queen Elizabeth II

2. Ibid.

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on 10 February 1977. He was advised that DOD airlift was unlikely if a
commercial capability was available. He was then assisted in dealing with
Pan American Airlines (PANAM); however, PANAM advised that the vehicles pur-
chased (one 1963 Lincoln Continental, and one 1971 Cadillac Eldorado) were too
long to belly-load in a Boeing 747 aircraft. CINCPAC therefore reported that
Minister Eikeni would request DOD airlift through the Secretary of State.

On 25 January 1977 the Secretary of State informed Mr. Eikeni that
free DOD airlift could not be provided, but on 28 January CINCPAC advised that
three MAC missions would operate to Pago Pago, American Samoa, between 28-31
January, and that MAC airlift could be provided for $21,400 via channel lift
or $27,500 via SAAM (as opposed to as much as $67,000 by commercial airlift).
This arrangement was accepted by the Government of Western Samoa and on 31
January the Secretary of State approved the airlift to Pago Pago. On 3
February 1977 Acting Governor Jenson, American Samoa, received a Government of
Western Samoa check for $21,473 to cover airlift costs and the two vehicles
departed American Samoa on 4 February for Western Samoa. 2

1. J436 HistSum Jan 77.
2. Ibid.
SECTION V.--FACILITIES AND CONSTRUCTION

Military Real Property Requirements in Hawaii (MILPRO-HI)

(U) On 2 February 1977 CINCPAC forwarded comments to the JCS on the Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command draft MILPRO-HI report. CINCPAC concurred with the report, commenting on the following points:

- CINCPAC advised deletion of the recommendation to release the Waiau Gulch National Guard Storage Facility and NIKE Hawaii sites 3 and 4, as they were used by the Hawaii Army National Guard and should be retained on the Army inventory to assure their continued use for military purposes.

- CINCPAC recommended that the Executive Summary include a clarifying statement of the fact that Kahoolawe and Fort DeRussy were specifically excluded from the study.

- CINCPAC emphasized the use of Bellows AFS by the Marine Corps for training, noting that it was the only available DOD facility on Oahu suitable for amphibious landing exercises and training, and that increased use was anticipated.

(U) As of 1977 DOD landholdings in Hawaii totaled 269,298 acres as compared with 284,965 acres in 1973; 1,300 acres needed to be acquired for safety reasons, while 2,100 acres were considered releasable.2

Facilities in Japan

Japan Facilities Adjustment Program (JFAP)

(U) The JFAP was a multi-Service plan to move all U.S. air units off Naha Air Base, Okinawa, in return for Government of Japan (GOJ) projects at Kadena, Futenma, Iwakuni, and Misawa. As of 22 October 1976 the GOJ recognized 52 remaining projects, 35 of which it was ready to implement in accordance with the U.S. Government priorities, and 17 that they could not reconcile with the

"Ohira View," which allowed for quid pro quo replacement only. On 7 January 1977 COMUS Japan confirmed the GOJ intent to complete the remainder of the JFAP program except a helicopter support facility and access road at Futenma; aircraft maintenance area, alterations to apron, and aerospace equipment shop at Kadena; and a staging area at White Beach, none of which were supportable under the "Ohira View."

(U) On 12 January 1977 the United States accepted the GOJ proposal to complete the JFAP with the following understanding:

- The United States would continue to press for an acceptable cost-sharing agreement for airfield restoration at Misawa, and all replacement construction required to accommodate expansion of Japan Air Self-Defense Forces areas at Misawa would be funded outside the JFAP.

- The United States accepted the total scope of BOQ and BEQ projects on Okinawa and understood that their siting would be selected by the United States.

(U) On 9 March 1977 COMUS Japan reported the recommendation of the ad hoc committee on allocation between the Services of JFAP BEQ and BOQ construction. The recommendation had used a CINCPAC priority list, developed in March 1976 in a meeting with the components, with which the Air Force now nonconcurred. On 19 March 1977 CINCPAC noted that the priority list was a product of in-depth study of overall requirements and remained valid. CINCPAC further requested COMUS Japan notify the GOJ of sites for JFAP BEQ and BOQ construction based on the recommendation of the ad hoc committee.

Integrated Relocation Construction Program

(U) On 9 August 1977 COMUS Japan submitted the proposed Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) 78 Integrated Relocation Construction Program for review by CINCPAC and approval by the Secretary of Defense prior to submission to the Government of Japan. CINCPAC concurred in the proposed program and it was approved by the Secretary of Defense on 14 September 1977. The funding summary by program was (in thousands of dollars):

2. J441 HistSum Jan 77.
4. COMUSJ 090435Z Aug 77; SECDEF 6521/141909Z Sep 77; CINCPAC 192323Z Sep 77.
CONFIDENTIAL

Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan Facilities Adjustment Program (JFAP)</td>
<td>70,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa Base Consolidation Plan (OBCP)</td>
<td>69,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama Housing Relocation Program (YHRP)</td>
<td>39,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation and Reduction of Okinawa Facilities (CROF)</td>
<td>7,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanagawa Facilities Consolidation Plan (KFCP)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Communication System Reconfiguration (DCSR)</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>223,923</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) It was realized that the GOJ would not necessarily fund the projects according to the priorities as listed by COMUS Japan, but GOJ officials had indicated that the listing was influential during the preparation of their budget.¹

Kanagawa Facilities Consolidation Plan (KFCP)

(U) The KFCP involved relocation and consolidation of medical facilities in Japan. It centered around release of the U.S. Army Medical Center at Sagami-Ono for facilities at Camp Zama, and a replacement for the Naval Regional Medical Center at Yokosuka.²

(U) In January 1977 the GOJ accepted the U.S. KFCP proposal contingent on total release of Sagami-Ono; however, the U.S. proposal had stipulated the retention of water facilities at Sagami-Ono which supported the Sagamihara Dependent Housing Area. Also, the GOJ considered that medical and personnel support facilities at Camp Zama and Yokosuka should not exceed 405,000 square feet, a shortfall of 50,601 square feet under the U.S. requested 455,601 square feet.³

(U) COMUS Japan recommended accepting the GOJ response of 405,000 square feet. CINCPAC agreed, with the stipulation that satisfactory arrangements for provision of water to Sagamihara Dependent Housing Area be identified prior to discussing release of water facilities at Sagami-Ono. The shortfall of 50,601 square feet was to be absorbed by Army and Navy reduction of facilities by 6,000 and 44,601 square feet respectively. On 18 February 1977 the JCS concurred in CINCPAC's course of action and COMUS Japan was requested to inform the GOJ.⁴

4. Ibid; J441 HistSum Feb 77.
Family Housing in Japan

On 18 November 1977 COMUS Japan provided an overview of the family housing situation in Japan and informed CINCPAC that a request to construct 400 sets of housing at Yokota would be presented to the GOJ prior to the 30 November 1977 release of Tachikawa Air Base, unless otherwise directed by CINCPAC. In response, CINCPAC requested COMUS Japan not to table the request as it did not follow DOD construction criteria and policy guidance from DOD on Japan relocation construction. Also, CINCPAC did not consider the 30 November release of Tachikawa as having any bearing on the ability of the GOJ to provide additional housing for U.S. Forces, since the terms for the release of Tachikawa had already been concluded in the 14th Security Consultative Conference. CINCPAC did, however, authorize COMUS Japan to provide the GOJ notice that the United States might refer to the unused quid at Tachikawa when presenting an anticipated future request for assistance in relieving the U.S. Forces, Japan housing problem.

In the meantime, CINCPAC requested COMUS Japan approach the GOJ on a working-group level to seek GOJ assistance in identifying the housing problem of all services in Japan and explore all possible methods for GOJ assistance for relief.

Sanno Hotel

In December 1976 the Navy had announced its intention to withdraw support to the Sanno Hotel, which was operated as a Joint Services transient billeting facility in metropolitan Tokyo. It was feared that this action would close the Sanno, relieving the GOJ of the responsibility to provide a replacement facility. On 13 June 1977 the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) confirmed FY 78 funding support totaling $321,000, but advised that FY 79 and out-year funding continued to be a matter of serious concern, with commitment of Navy funding support for future years contingent on positive action to stabilize or reduce the impact on appropriated funds. On 18 June 1977 CINCPAC requested COMUS Japan to provide a course of action to alleviate CINCPACFLT's concern. COMUS Japan advised that CINCPACFLT's concern over future year funding support could not be alleviated, but that positive action was being taken to stabilize appropriated fund support and the GOJ DFAA appeared prepared to officially table a position in the near future which would satisfy U.S. requirements for a replacement facility.

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1. J441 HistSum Nov 77.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1976, Vol. I, p. 260; CINCPACFLT 130330Z Jun 77; CINCPAC 180439Z Jun 77 which also advised that this subject should be classified Confidential until matter finally resolved.
A major concern of the Navy was failure of the Marines to pay their prorated share for Sanno support which was approximately $80,000 in FY 77 and $95,000 in FY 78. The Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC) had, however, requested Headquarters Marine Corps to budget funds for their share beginning in FY 79; carry the Marine share as an unfunded requirement for FY 78; and provide $25,000 in nonappropriated fund support for FY 77.  

Through year's end the Services in Japan wanted and claimed to need a Sanno-type facility and, assuming the Sanno continued to receive Service funding support, COMUS Japan intended to continue negotiations with the GOJ for a replacement.  

Okinawa Land Law  

(U) The land occupied by U.S. facilities on Okinawa was on property owned by the GOJ and approximately 30,000 land owners. In most cases individual land holdings were very small (few square meters) and were not suitable for economic gain except for lease. All Okinawa land records were destroyed during the war and many ownership disputes existed. After reversion in 1972 several thousand landowners refused to negotiate new leases as Japanese citizens, so the Diet passed special legislation classifying land on U.S. bases in a special category and allowing the GOJ to furnish the land to the United States. The special legislation was to run for five years (May 1977) and the Diet instructed the GOJ to obtain agreement with landowners during this period.  

(U) The GOJ had failed to obtain agreement with approximately 300 landowners and, after heated debate, the Diet extended the special law on 18 May 1977 for another five years (May 1982). The Diet also instructed the GOJ to conduct new surveys of land parcels and determine true ownership. The United States was prepared to assist the GOJ in these surveys.  

Okinawa Military Port Phase-out Proposal  

In January 1977 the Chief of Naval Operations tasked CINCPACFLT, Commander Naval Forces Japan (COMNAVFORJ), the Commanding Officer, Military Sealift Command (COMSC), and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) to comment on a Defense Department proposal to close all U.S. military ports in Okinawa and rely solely on commercial operations. All strongly opposed release.

2. COMUSJ 030339Z Aug 77.  
4. Ibid., J441 HistSum May 77.
of White Beach and Tengan because:

- White Beach was the only location capable of supporting large-scale Marine force operations, and the only Marine diesel fuel terminal and inport refueling facility for Navy ships.

- Tengan was the primary ammunition facility and only authorized munitions transshipment port in Okinawa (limited capability existed at White Beach on waiver of explosive safety criteria). It was also the main anchorage for discharge of JP-4.

- White Beach and Tengan were never commercial ports. Commercial developments in vicinity were unlikely to support their commercialization as port facilities. Transfer to Japan would probably result in their loss to U.S. as port facilities.

Retention of Naha military port was viewed as less essential with the following reservations:

- CINCPACFLT: Army and Air Force should be consulted for their views.

- COMSC: Release acceptable provided SOFA or other agreement assured necessary priority for U.S. military movements.

- COMNAVFORJ: Based on long history of labor strife in Okinawa, foresaw delays in cargo movement and higher stevedore labor costs if military port phased out.

- CTF Seven Nine: No immediate operational impact if phased out; prime consideration for retention: III MAF contingency load out.

- DEPCOMMARCORBASES PAC FWD: Transfer to GOJ and reliance on commercial capabilities could seriously impair MARCORPS operational capabilities.

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2. Ibid.
CINCPAC had not been formally queried on this subject; however, informal liaison with the JCS indicated that the Army and Air Force would be contacted in the future. CINCPAC's initial impression was that the above responses seemed reasonable and prudent; however, CINCPAC chose to wait for comments from the Army and Air Force before weighing in with an official position. Through year's end this subject remained open.  

Diego Garcia MILCON Program Status

(U) As of November 1977 the status of Diego Garcia MILCON programs, funded at $63.3 million for the period FY 71 through FY 78, was as shown on the accompanying chart:  

1. Ibid.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Funded</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Estimated Start Date / Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 71-72</td>
<td>$18.0M</td>
<td>Subsistence Building</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Roads and Paving</td>
<td>Continuing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>POL (Causeway)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Laundry</td>
<td>Apr 78a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EM Club</td>
<td>Apr 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NEX - Post Office</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gymnasium</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Swimming Pool</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recreation Facilities</td>
<td>Dec 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Final Water System</td>
<td>Dec 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial Yard Operations</td>
<td>Continuing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Seabees Camp Operations</td>
<td>Continuing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 73</td>
<td>$ 6.1M</td>
<td>Harbor Dredging</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 75-76</td>
<td>$31.9M</td>
<td>Airfield Expansion</td>
<td>Under Const Dec 78b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>POL Facility</td>
<td>Under Const Feb 80c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pier Facility</td>
<td>Under Const Jul 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Subsistence Building Addition</td>
<td>Under Const Jul 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Power Plant Expansion</td>
<td>Under Const May 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BEQ/BOQs</td>
<td>Under Const Jun 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ammunition Storage</td>
<td>Dec 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Airfield Facilities</td>
<td>Dec 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>Under Const Mar 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Receiver Building Addition</td>
<td>Nov 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Causeway Hardstand</td>
<td>Apr 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AFR&amp;T Building</td>
<td>Jan 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Utilities Distribution System</td>
<td>Nov 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 78d</td>
<td>$ 7.3M</td>
<td>Crash/Structural Fire Stations</td>
<td>Under Const Jan 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ready Issue Refueler</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shed/Flammable Storage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fleet Recreation Pavilion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Works Expansion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Club Addition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Special Services/Hobby Shop</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education Center/Library Addition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:

a. Waste treatment pond added to project.
b. Paving only to be completed Apr 78.
c. POL facility not usable until pier facility completed (Jul 79).
d. Navy had all projects on hold pending DOD response to questions raised by Senator Stennis regarding BEQs and airfield facilities.
As of year's end no formal agreement had been signed between the United States and the ROKG. Both sides wanted the other to fund filling of the JP-4 tanks, to cost an estimated $6,458,000, and the ROKG also wanted the United States to provide $1,739,000 for construction materials not available in Korea. The ROKG funding estimate on the above projects had been revised to $4 million in CY 77, $4 million in CY 78, and $12 million in CY 79.3

Enewetak Cleanup

(U) On 17 January 1977 the JCS approved a conceptual plan for an Enewetak cleanup for which Congress had authorized $20 million in the FY 77 MILCON bill; however, unfunded, non-reimbursable support (troop labor, subsistence, equipment,

1. J444 HistSums Feb and Mar 77.
3. J443 HistSum Dec 77.
supplies, and transportation) by the Defense Department was actually expected
to exceed $50 million. On 24 January the JCS tasked the Services to support
the cleanup, and the following were the resulting estimated manpower require-
ments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Service</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Type Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>Heavy Construction Engineer Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Helicopter Evacuation Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Laundry Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chaplains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.S. Navy</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>Harbor Clearance Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Inter-atoll Boat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radiation Lab Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.S. Air Force</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Medical Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fuels Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAC Airfield Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Field Radiation Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radiation Lab Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Postal Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Communicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Task Group Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>Contractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,110</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) On 3 and 4 February 1977 a detailed planning conference was held at
field Command, DNA (FCDNA) Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, and on 8
February the contract to salvage 27,000 tons of noncontaminated scrap metal was
awarded to Kolar, Inc., of Tucson, Arizona. Kolar was to pay $544,000, of
which nearly $435,000 was to go to Holmes and Narver for operation of the
newetak base camp, and the remaining $109,000 was to go to the Defense Logis-
tics Agency to administer the contract.\(^2\)
(U) Between 22 February and 9 March 1977 a detailed operations plan was developed. The 84th Engineer Battalion (Heavy) from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii was tasked to provide the nucleus for the cleanup, while the 76th Engineer Battalion (Heavy), Fort Meade, Maryland assumed the 84th's contingency mission. D-Day was established as 15 June 1977, with the actual cleanup to commence on 15 November, upon completion of the Lojwa Base Camp.  

(U) On 15 March 1977, 50 Dri-Enewetak returned to Japtan Island with American Broadcasting Corporation film news coverage.  

(U) On 8 April 1977 Service component and CINCPAC staff comments and recommendations on draft OPLAN 600-77, Cleanup of Enewetak Atoll, were submitted to FCDNA, and a final resolution conference was held at FCDNA from 26 to 29 April 1977.  

(U) On 17 May 1977 the Enewetak cleanup Joint Task Group was activated, situation reports started on 26 May, and the 84th Engineer Battalion (Heavy) started construction of the Lojwa Base Camp on 7 June. Beneficial occupancy of the camp was delayed from 15 November 1977 to 15 January 1978 due to an initial shortage of construction materiel; however, the cleanup began officially on 15 November 1977, as scheduled.  

(U) During 1977 there were two fatalities among personnel involved in the cleanup, neither of which was related directly to the cleanup. The first case (19 August 1977) was a sailor who was killed in an explosion while welding on the bow ramp of an LCM. The second (18 November 1977) was a member of the 84th Engineer Battalion (Heavy), who collapsed, apparently of cardiac arrest, following a basketball game.  

(U) On 26 December 1977, 839 personnel were evacuated to Guam because of Typhoon MARY. Twenty-one remained behind to secure property. Damage was moderate, the most serious being loss of three causeway sections. COMAVSURFPAC was tasked to replace the causeways, and all evacuees were returned to Enewetak by 29 December 1977. By the end of the year the Atoll population had grown to 855, of which 49 were Dri-Enewetak.

1. J443 HistSum Feb 77.  
2. Ibid.  
3. J443 HistSum Dec 77.  
4. Ibid.  
5. Ibid.  
6. Ibid.
UNCLASSIFIED

(U) At year's end a major technical question remained as to whether or not to include transuranic elements other than 239 or 240 plutonium isotopes in calculating soil contamination levels. This question was scheduled to be resolved between DOE and DNA at a meeting to be held in Washington, D.C. in January 1978.1

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
SECTION II--COMMAND AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES

Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)

PACOM WWMCCS Regional ADP Center (PACWRAC)

(U) To improve automatic data processing (ADP) utility and availability while decreasing manpower levels, CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT agreed to consolidate their WWMCCS ADP assets in the PACWRAC to be established at Makalapa. Facility construction was underway during 1977 and scheduled for completion in 1978. On 18 November 1977 acceptance testing of the Honeywell H-735G Remote Terminal System (RTS) minicomputer began. This equipment would link data communications between WWMCCS ADP terminals located at Camp Smith and the PACWRAC.1

WWMCCS ADP Support to COMUS Japan

(U) On 12 November 1976 the JCS approved installation of the Honeywell H-735G RTS to support COMUS Japan's WWMCCS ADP requirements. The approved system was to be installed in three phases between September 1977 and July 1979, and would give COMUS Japan the following capabilities:2

- Operations and logistics planning and monitoring, and forces and installations reporting and monitoring, using WWMCCS ADP programs and data bases.
- Automated AUTODIN message processing.
- Expanded command and control support if required.
- ADP support for coordination and interface responsibilities with the Government of Japan.

(U) Site preparation and electronics fabrication for the new system was underway as of September 1977.3

3. Ibid.
CINCPAC ABNCP Satellite Capability

(U) In July 1976 the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy agreed that one channel of the 500 KHZ bands on the Atlantic and Pacific satellites be reserved for use by airborne command posts (ABNCP). After the necessary hardware was installed on the CINCPAC ABNCP, more reliable communications were possible with the Navy Airborne Very Low Frequency Radio Broadcasting Aircraft (TACAMO) within the bounds of the Pacific GAPSAT footprint. By March 1977 a 100 word-per-minute secure teletype could be dispatched from the CINCPAC ABNCP to any PACOM location within the Pacific GAPSAT footprint via the teletype ground entry point at Hickam Air Force Base and the tactical satellite communications terminal at Wahiawa, Oahu.

CINCPAC Alternate Command Post (ALCOP)

(U) With the acceptance of the final piece of major communications equipment on 11 January 1977, the CINCPAC ALCOP at the CINCPAC Airborne Operations Facility, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, was considered operational. This act culminated just less than one year of effort and the expenditure of approximately $600,000 by the CINCPAC staff and component commands to relocate the CINCPAC Alternate Command Facility from Kunia, Hawaii to Hickam AFB, Hawaii. The relocation was one part of the major project to vacate and disestablish the Kunia Facility. The new facility at Hickam was to be activated periodically to ensure its availability in time of need.

2. J6225 HistSum, Jan 77
SECTION III--COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY PROGRAMS

PACOM Required Operational Capabilities (ROCs) 4 and 9

(U) ROCs 4 and 9 established the requirement for a secure voice and secure record conferencing capability, respectively, to a remote task force anywhere in the PACOM. They were submitted in January 1975 as part of the CINCPAC C2 Master Plan, validated by the JCS in August 1976, and the Navy was tasked to implement them.3

(U) A status review meeting attended by representatives from CINCPAC, Defense Communications Agency, Defense Engineering Center, and the Naval Oceans Systems Center was held 15-20 September 1977. Three specific actions to satisfy ROCs 4 and 9 were reviewed and operational dates assigned:4

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2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
Digital Conferencing Unit (DCU). The current capability of the Pearl Harbor secure voice switch was up to ten wideband conference subscribers and only one narrowband subscriber. The addition of a DCU would permit up to nine narrowband subscribers to be brought into the conference. Two units were delivered to Pearl Harbor in October 1977 and operational on 17 November 1977.

Secure Record Conferencing. It was decided that CINCPAC's secure record conference requirement could be met by use of the AUTODIN networks' query/response capability. This would allow real-time exchange of information without a dedicated network. The initial operating capability for the first five sites (NMCC, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, the BLUE RIDGE amphibious command and control ship, and COMUS Korea) was expected to be April 1978.

Advanced Satellite Conferences. In ROCs 4 and 9, CINCPAC proposed a new technique to satisfy the secure voice conference requirement. This technique made use of the satellite itself for conferences, eliminating the need for terrestrial switches such as Pearl Harbor. The Defense Communications Agency was to begin an engineering study of this technique in 1978, with a limited operational capability scheduled for 1980.

Communications Security (COMSEC) Equipment

SECTION IV--OTHER COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES

Joint Multichannel Trunking and Switching System (JMTSS)

(U) The JMTSS was a JCS-initiated planning effort to analyze selected operation plans and identify communications requirements to determine adequacy of transportable contingency assets. Shortfalls in equipment were to be reported to the JCS for validation and service programming. Analysis of OPLANS 5027N, 5025, and 5001 started in 1977 and would continue into 1978. An interim report was forwarded to the JCS in June 1977 and completion was scheduled for May 1978.2

1. JCS 3464/061439Z Oct 77.
3. CINCPAC J62N1 ltr, Ser T82, of 25 Apr 77, Subj: Project FORMER TAIHO.
1. J621 HistSum Dec 77.
3. J622 Point Paper, 6 Sep 77, Subj: COMMANDO LION.
4. Ibid.
Military Message Experiment (MME)

(U) By formal agreement among CINCPAC, the U.S. Navy, and the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) a two-year MME was planned at Camp Smith. Navy and ARPA had provided approximately $6.5 million for the test. Bolt, Baranek and Newman Incorporated was responsible for installation and operation of the hardware, and Information Sciences Institute was providing the software. The objective of the experiment was to determine the utility of an automated message service in an operational environment and to provide improved message handling in the command center. Major actions accomplished were reconfiguration of the computer room, installation and operational test of the computers, selection of the software, and training of CINCPAC operators. Actions remaining included installation of remaining user terminals in the CINCPAC Operations Directorate area, user training, and system testing. At year's end, software problems revealed during initial testing had proved serious enough to delay the start of the experiment until mid-July 1978.3

CINCPAC Message Traffic - 1977

(U) CINCPAC's message traffic was handled by the Camp Smith Telecommunications Center under the operational control of the Naval Communication Station, Honolulu. A summary of CINCPAC message traffic for 1977 follows:

-----------------------------------------------
1. Ibid.
2. Op. Cit., BWEBs, 21 Nov-4 Dec 77 and 19 Dec 77-1 Jan 78.
-----------------------------------------------
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Messages Sent</th>
<th>Messages Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>5,622</td>
<td>38,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>4,999</td>
<td>35,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>6,004</td>
<td>41,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>5,329</td>
<td>39,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4,720</td>
<td>37,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>6,186</td>
<td>42,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>4,933</td>
<td>38,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>3,976</td>
<td>38,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>5,521</td>
<td>40,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>5,580</td>
<td>42,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>5,021</td>
<td>38,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>5,191</td>
<td>39,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>63,082</td>
<td>472,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly average</td>
<td>5,257</td>
<td>39,402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER VII
SECURITY ASSISTANCE

SECTION I--PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

Funding the Security Assistance Program During 1977

(U) Actual funds expended for the FY 77 PACOM security assistance program and funds proposed and allocated for the FY 78 program are shown on the following two charts.

FY 77 PACOM Security Assistance Program
(Actual amount in thousands of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FMS Credit</th>
<th>MAP (Grant Materiel)</th>
<th>IMETP (Grant Training)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (Taiwan)</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>39^a</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
<td>35^a</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>23,100</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>2,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>152,425</td>
<td>1,185^a</td>
<td>1,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>1,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>296,525</strong></td>
<td><strong>49,259</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,435</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^a. Supply operations only.

SOURCE: FY 79 Congressional Presentation Document (CPD)
FY 78 PACOM Security Assistance Program Allocations  
(In thousands of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FMS CREDIT</th>
<th>MAP (Grant Materiel)</th>
<th>IMETP (Grant Training)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (Taiwan)</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>275,000</td>
<td>1,284.8</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>525</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>18,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>18,100</td>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>29,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>286,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>408,000</td>
<td>42,459.2</td>
<td>9,170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. SECSTATE 012271/171451Z Jan 78.
b. SECSTATE 289084/1030336Z Dec 77.
c. Supply operations only.

Arms Transfer Policy Guidelines

(C) On 31 August 1977 the Secretary of State provided guidelines for implementing the President's statement on conventional arms-transfer policy that "U.S. Embassies and military elements will not promote or assist in the promotion of arms sales without specific authorization...." In the PACOM Australia, New Zealand, and Japan were specifically excluded from the terms of the President's decision based on their special treaty relationships with the
United States.¹

(Ü) In essence the new policy guidelines strictly forbade active encouragement of foreign interest in United States defense articles, and sought to restrict all actions pertaining to such interest to diplomatic channels. CINCPAC's immediate reaction to the new guidelines was to express concern over the possible dangers of stringent interpretation, which could preclude virtually all preliminary discussion concerning major defense equipment by assigned U.S. military personnel with host country planners. He also noted the apparent exclusion of the Unified Command as an addressee on Embassy communications dealing with Security Assistance requests. On 3 September 1977 CINCPAC, understanding that additional instructions were forthcoming, specifically requested that they include Unified Commanders on all American Embassy message traffic relating to security assistance, and that in-country, military-to-military discussions be sanctioned to the degree that they did not violate the intent of existing arms transfer control policies. On 21 October 1977 the Secretary of State directed that Unified Commanders be information addressees on all sales communications and encouraged development of military views on sales within the mission; however, through year's end, CINCPAC still saw a need to lift the prohibition on military-to-military talks. Meanwhile, the American Embassies in Thailand, Pakistan, and the Republic of China had all requested and been granted exception, on a case-by-case-basis, to allow military-to-military discussion on arms requests.²

International Security Assistance Act of 1977

(U) The International Security Assistance Act of 1977 (PL 95-92), as implemented jointly by the Secretaries of State and Defense on 14 September 1977, included the following provisions:³

- Limitations were placed on individual country and worldwide security assistance-related strengths.
- Security Assistance program management was to be the primary function of MAAGs in those countries where authorized, while military advisory and training functions were to be performed primarily by personnel detailed for limited periods to perform specific tasks under FMS or the IMETP.

¹ STATE 207984/1/310241Z Aug 77.
² Ibid.; CINCPAC 030347Z Sep 77; J451 Point Paper, 28 Dec 77, Subj: Arms Transfer Policy.
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- Personnel assigned to remaining security assistance organizations were to perform security assistance-related management and accounting functions.

(U) Security assistance-related strength limitations for PACOM countries effective FY 78 were as follows:\footnote{Ibid.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAAGs</th>
<th>MIL</th>
<th>U.S. CIV</th>
<th>LOCAL CIV</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>237</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Authorized Augmentation
To Perform Security Assistance Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAOs</th>
<th>MIL</th>
<th>U.S. CIV</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Authorized Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OTHER*</th>
<th>MIL</th>
<th>U.S. CIV</th>
<th>LOCAL CIV</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (Taiwan)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PACOM TOTALS 261 69 109 439

*Retained former organizational titles.

1. Ibid.
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Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Aircraft Requirements

(U) On 27 May 1977 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Security Assistance (ASD/ISA/SA) advised that, in view of the recent reorientation of overseas Security Assistance operations (as enumerated in the Security Assistance Act of 1977) it had become necessary to review and revalidate the requirement for assignment of aircraft to MAAGs. On 17 June 1977 CINCPAC, based on detailed input from the field, notified ASD/ISA/SA that the current allocation of aircraft to PACOM agencies performing Security Assistance missions (less MAAG China) was essential for accomplishment of their missions. The status of MAAG aircraft at the time of this appraisal was as follows:1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT SUPPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHMAAG China</td>
<td>U-21A to be turned in Sep 77 due to lack of further justification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHUSDLG Indonesia</td>
<td>C-12A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAK</td>
<td>Approved flying hours on Eighth U.S. Army UH-1, OH-58 and U-21 aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODR Pakistan</td>
<td>C-12A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMA PHIL</td>
<td>C-12A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMA THAI</td>
<td>C-12A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) Through year's end no reductions were made in MAAG aircraft support except for turn-in of the CHMAAG China U-21A.

1977 PACOM Security Assistance Conference

(U) The 1977 PACOM Security Assistance Conference (formerly the PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference), held at Camp Smith, HI from 15 to 17 November 1977, was attended by representatives from the Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Departments, European Command, MAAGs, ODCs, DLGs, DAOs, PACOM components, and PACOM staff directorates.2

1. J434 HistSum Jun 77; CINCPAC 170420Z Jun 77; SECDEF 3188/270011Z May 77.
2. J454 HistSum Nov 77.

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The conference agenda included security assistance policy issues, implementation matters, programming and budgeting, classified data exchange, technology transfer, and training issues.\textsuperscript{1}

Results of the conference indicated:\textsuperscript{2}

- There still remained a strong negative perception within a major portion of Congress and certain elements within the Executive Branch toward security assistance programs and organization. Congressional inquiries into security assistance matters had increased considerably over the past years.

- Current guidance to the field on implementing the President's Arms Transfer Policy was well understood but possessed major management problems in carrying it out. The Secretary of State, Defense Security Assistance Agency, and Joint Chiefs of Staff were working together to achieve more definitive guidance. Four major functions for MAAGs appeared, to be developing from this effort. These included:

  - To provide host governments an avenue to acquire information for decisions leading to the acquisition of new or replacement equipment or training.

  - To serve as a U.S. liaison to acquire information required to evaluate host country military capabilities and to process foreign government requests.

  - To provide means by which the U.S. could request the foreign government to take action to implement approved programs.

  - To serve as a mechanism to acquire information concerning potential future defense acquisitions by foreign governments and thereby anticipate demands on U.S. resources.

- Total coordination on major Security Assistance Policy and implementation matters within the Washington community was essential prior to release to the field.

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
The unified command played a major role in assessing arms requests in relation to mutual security commitments and regional balance.

Funds for training in future years would remain the same or even decrease unless more convincing arguments were provided to Congress.

Future funding ceiling provisions for Security Assistance would require major, yet undefined, management initiatives. Major problem would be to ensure that large purchases by a few countries would not prevent smaller countries from obtaining their required materiel and training.

The U.S. Arms Transfer Policy remained essentially unilateral. An opposite effect was apparent within some of our major European allies who were actively pursuing arms sales.

PACOM countries' reaction to the new Arms Transfer Policy was generally not favorable. This had reinforced their negative perception of U.S. resolve to remain a Pacific power.

Human rights policy and its impact on security assistance remained a major issue, both within Congress and in the Executive Branch.

Processing of arms requests through State Department channels, vice Defense channels, posed no serious problem provided major principals within the military chain were kept informed.

MAAG-Ambassador relationships were defined by law and by President Carter's letter to Ambassadors on 26 October 1977.

Continued funding constraints were expected in the security assistance field which were consistent with the Federal Government's effort to balance the budget.

Admiral Weisner closed the conference with a note of caution as to the need for those dealing with their counterparts in PACOM countries to be better informed on top level policy statements so as to relieve apparent apprehensions.
and concerns resulting from misinformation on U.S. intentions. ¹

Release of High Technology to PACOM Countries

Release of Improved CHAPARRAL to the Republic of China (ROC) and Republic of Korea (ROK)

(5) During 1976 CINCPAC had been queried as to the releasability of Improved CHAPARRAL to the ROC and ROK. CINCPAC noncurred, but recommended that if a decision were made to release Improved CHAPARRAL (export model) or AIM-9L to NATO or other European countries, the Improved CHAPARRAL export model should also be released to the ROC and ROK. On 17 February 1977 the JCS requested clarification of CINCPAC's position in view of an agreement being negotiated with the Federal Republic of Germany for release of the AIM-9L. On 26 February CINCPAC reiterated the recommendation against release to any foreign country, but recommended that if AIM-9L were released to the Federal Republic of Germany then briefings, without sensitive data and with no commitment to sell the Improved CHAPARRAL (export model), should be given to the ROC and ROK. By mid-year, approval had been given for export of operational maintenance and budgetary data necessary for an acquisition decision on Improved CHAPARRAL (export model) to Denmark, the Netherlands, and Canada, the sale of the AIM-9L to the United Kingdom, and the release of a technical data package leading to the eventual coproduction of the AIM-9L in the Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, CINCPAC recommended that the Improved CHAPARRAL (export model) be released to both the ROC and ROK.²

Release of AIM-9L to Australia and Japan

(5) On 29 December 1977 the JCS requested CINCPAC views on the releasability of the AIM-9L air-to-air missile to Australia and Japan. Officials of the Australian Department of Defense and the Japan Defense Agency had asked that it be made available with the planned delivery of F-15 fighter aircraft in 1981 for Japan, and 1983 for Australia. The subject had surfaced previously, in June 1976, at which time CINCPAC registered a strong noncurrence, and in March 1977, when the Australian Navy had requested P&B data. CINCPAC remained on record as not supporting release of the AIM-9L, but views and recommendations on this latest request were to be forwarded during January 1978.³


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Training

PACOM Tri-Service Training Workshop

(U) CINCPAC hosted the tri-Service training workshop at Hickam Air Force Base between 21-28 March 1977. The purpose of the workshop was to refine the FY 78 International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP) for each PACOM country, and submit the initial FY 79 IMETP. During the workshop a special meeting was held at which Defense, Army, and Air Force participants were persuaded to accept the Navy simplified method for submitting IMETP changes to the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). Other significant items introduced by CINCPAC participants, and later standardized for worldwide implementation, involved Informational Program (IP) costs; in-country, on-the-job training costs; BOQ/BEQ daily charges; and the training priority system reflected on the Secretary of Defense's Detail Listing. These were seen as part of the continuing effort to reduce MAAG workload and standardize security assistance procedures.\(^1\)

DOD Training Workshop Conference

(U) A DOD training workshop conference, initiated and hosted by the Secretary of Defense (DSAA-TC), was held on 23 August 1977 to discuss current training workshop policy to include the necessity for continuing such workshops. Efforts to standardize all workshops according to PACOM's tri-Service concept were found to be inadvisable, although this concept was considered the most efficient. It was determined that Unified Commands would continue hosting annual training workshops, PACOM according to the tri-Service concept and EUCOM according to a separate Service concept. The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) had not conducted workshops, an approach not favored by the Service representatives attending the conference.\(^2\)

Phase IV Training for U.S. Security Assistance Personnel

(U) During the period 28 November-12 December 1977 a CINCPAC Mobile Training Team conducted Phase IV training of U.S. personnel assigned to security assistance duties in the PACOM. This session continued the "circuit rider" concept started in 1976, and included training at Jakarta, Indonesia; Bangkok, Thailand; and Seoul, Korea. A total of 74 personnel from 13 different MAAGs/DAOs attended.\(^3\)

2. J452 HistSum Aug 77.

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U.S. Army War College International Fellows Program (IFP)

(U) The first IFP at the United States Army War College commenced in August 1977 with an actual worldwide total input of six (out of 10 allocated spaces) of which three were from the PACOM countries of Australia, Japan, and Korea. Fellows were in the grades 05-07 (national-level leadership positions).¹

CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) Schedule

(U) During CY 77 the CINCPAC PEG evaluated the following PACOM security assistance program activities:²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
<th>Date of Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>FY 77</td>
<td>28 Feb-10 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>FY 77</td>
<td>4-20 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of the Philippines</td>
<td>FY 77</td>
<td>16-25 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>FY 77</td>
<td>1-09 Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>FY 78</td>
<td>17-19 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>FY 78</td>
<td>20-21 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>FY 78</td>
<td>25-27 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>FY 78</td>
<td>31 Oct-01 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>FY 78</td>
<td>30 Nov-02 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of China</td>
<td>FY 78</td>
<td>3-12 Dec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² CINCPAC PEG Reports, Thailand, FY 77, 14 Mar 77; Korea, FY 77, 13 May 77; Republic of the Philippines, FY 77, 29 Jun 77; Indonesia, FY 77, 2 Sep 77; Singapore, FY 78, 29 Nov 77; Malaysia, FY 78, 29 Nov 77; Australia, FY 78, 29 Nov 77; New Zealand, FY 78, 29 Nov 77; Japan, FY 78, 6 Jan 78; Republic of China, FY 78, 17 Jan 78.

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SECTION II--COUNTRY PROGRAMS

Afghanistan

Afghanistan balanced military equipment from the Soviet Union with training from the United States. The Afgans had resisted offers for staff college training in the U.S.S.R., and there were no known Soviet-trained officers in national-level command or staff positions. During FY 77, $193,000 was expended to train 14 Afgans under the IMETP, and $525,000 was programmed for FY 78.¹

Australia

During FY 77 Australia made actual Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchases worth $132,002,000, and purchases worth $300,000,000 were estimated for FY 78.²

MIRAGE Replacement

During 1977 the Government of Australia (GOA) was well along in plans to replace three squadrons (75 aircraft) of French MIRAGE tactical fighter aircraft. U.S. aircraft in contention were the A-7, A-10, F-5E, F-14, F-15, and F-16. By December Australia was expected to select the F-15 and to purchase 80 aircraft, but a final decision was still pending at year's end.³

S-2 Antisubmarine Warfare Aircraft (ASW) Replacement

On 16 March 1977 the Australian aircraft carrier MELBOURNE picked up 16 S-2G ASW aircraft from Naval Air Station, North Island, California. These aircraft, purchased to replace the Royal Australian Navy S-2E squadron destroyed by fire on 5 December 1976, were important to maritime surveillance, which was a major feature of a GOA program to improve continental defenses.⁴

Purchase of FFG-7 Frigate

On 28 October 1977 the GOA accepted a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to purchase one FFG-7 frigate for a cost of $179,970,000.⁵

2. FY 79 CPD, p. 19.
Trainer Aircraft Replacement

F-111 Aircraft

(3) During 1977 the Australians were showing an interest in replacing their attrited F-111s as well as in acquiring an additional F-111 squadron composed of eight type A or E aircraft. 2

P-3 Aircraft

(3) Australia had on contract a purchase of 10 P-3C aircraft scheduled for delivery starting in December 1977 and running through September 1978. The RAAF was further showing an interest in purchasing two additional P-3Cs. Also during 1977, the RAAF was examining options to improve the capability of 10 P-3B aircraft purchased from the United States in 1968. The alternatives ranged from avionics modernization to replacement of a portion of the P-3B inventory with P-3C aircraft. 3

HARPOON Missiles

(3) During 1977 it appeared as if the HARPOON antisurface missile was destined to play an important role in Australian maritime defense. The Australians desired to fit 2 FFG-7s and 10 P-3C aircraft with the HARPOON, and studies on equipping Royal Australian Navy OBRON submarines with the HARPOON

3. Ibid.
were in progress. There was also the possibility that they would want to equip their F-111Cs and other existing or future naval vessels with the HARPOON.

Bangladesh

(5) The IMETP for Bangladesh was administered by the U.S. Embassy and consisted of $49,000 actually expended in FY 77 with $200,000 programmed for FY 78. The Bengalees had sought, with some success, to obtain items such as ships and aircraft on a concessionary basis from the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China; however, the U.S. Embassy did not consider it in the U.S. interest to compete in supplying such equipment at U.S. expense.2

Burma

Overview

(6) The grant aid program for Burma from FY 50 to FY 71 totaled $76.3 million, including training for 794 students. From FY 50 to FY 68 excess defense articles valued at $12.2 million were provided, and from FY 50 to FY 75 FMS cash orders totaled $2.7 million. Grant aid ceased with disestablishment of the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma on 30 June 1971.3

(7) Since July 1971 FMS transactions involved automotive, aircraft, and weapon spare parts; small caliber ammunition (up to 40mm); and publications. Then, in April 1975, the Government of the Union of Burma (GUB) expressed its first interest in five years to obtain training in the United States; however, the request was cancelled on 25 March 1976 after the LOA for the desired T-37 instructor pilot training course was issued.4

(7) In January 1976 the GUB requested up to four spaces for the Infantry Officer Advanced Course and one space to the Command and General Staff Course. Department of the Army offered three spaces to the former and one to the latter, but the GUB turned down the offer on 6 March 1976, the same day the Minister of Defense resigned. Also, a space in the Naval Staff Course for International Officers was refused on 6 May 1976.5

1. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
BANGLADESH

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA .................................. 56,126 Sq Miles
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS ............ 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE .................. 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION .................................. 77,601,000
ANNUAL GROWTH .......................... 2.8 Percent
LITERACY RATE .......................... 25 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY .......................... 42 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA ................. 3 Acres
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ................. $14,240 Million
PER CAPITA GNP ......................... $1,892
DEFENSE BUDGET OFY 77 ................. $101.4 Million
10% TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ......... 3.5 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT ..................... Independent Republic
under Martial Law

PRESIDENT, CHIEF MARTIAL LAW
ADMINISTRATOR, MINISTER OF
DEFENSE ........................................ MGEN Ziaur Rahman
CHIEF OF ARMED FORCES ................ MGEN Ziaur Rahman
DEPUTY CHIEF OF ARMED FORCES .... MGEN Humayun Kabir
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF .................... RAJNIXAYI KHALIF
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF ..................... AIR COMMODORE H.F. Sadruddin

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR ...................... HON. David T. Schneider
ATTY ........................................ LtCol. John D. Mussella, USA

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

5 Infantry Divisions
Strength: 75,000

Incapped of waging successful offensive or conventional defensive operations against neighboring countries. In conjunction with paramilitary forces, it could stage a guerrilla campaign in defense of the country. Marginally capable of maintaining internal security.

NAVY

1 Frigate
Strength: 1,500

Incapped of satisfactorily performing its mission of protecting coastal waterways.

AIR FORCE

9 Jet Fighters, 3 Short Range Transports, 11 Helicopters, 5 Trainers, and 3 Utility aircraft. The Bangladesh Air Force recently received 6 F-4 (RF-4C) Fighter, 2 FT-2 (HS-121) Jet Trainers, and 4 FT-2 Piston trainers from the PRC.

Strength: 2,000

Incapped of effectively accomplishing mission of defending national air space and furnishing tactical air support for ground and naval forces. Incapped of providing civic action support.

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

TO INCREASE THE COUNTRY'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL STABILITY

TO ASSIST BANGLADESH IN MAINTAINING NON ALIGNMENT THROUGH ACCESS TO U.S. MILITARY TRAINING AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO SOVIET AND CHINESE TRAINING.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 64.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
BURMA

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA: 382,000 sq. miles
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS: 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE: 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION: 31.6 million
ANNUAL GROWTH: 2.3%
LITERACY RATE: 50%
LIFE EXPECTANCY: 53 years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA: 0.8 acres
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT: $12 billion
PER CAPITA: $100
DEFENSE BUDGET: $1,145 million
TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET: $2.5 billion
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT: Socialist Republic
Headed by a President
PRESIDENT: U. NE Win
PRIME MINISTER: Maj. Gen. Maung Maung Maung
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: U. Hla Phone
MINISTER OF DEFENSE: Gen. Kyaw Htin
CHIEF OF STAFF: Gen. Myo Aung Myo
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF: Gen. U Aye Ko
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF: Gen. Hlaing Hlaing
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF: Gen. Saw Phyu

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR: HON. Maurice D. Dean
DCG: Maj. Gen. Harry L. Moore

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASED BURMESE NATIONAL UNITY, SELF-CONFIDENCE AND OUTWARD-LOOKING TENDENCIES IN ORDER TO FOSTER INTEGRATION OF BURMA IN A STABLE, SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGION, BY USING AVAILABLE MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE INSTRUMENTALITIES WHERE APPROPRIATE.

RESPOND TO BURMESE REQUEST FOR COMMERICAL SALES OF MILITARY ECONOMY, TRAINING AND SERVICES, AND IN GENERAL MAINTAIN AN ATTITUDE OF HELPFULNESS TOWARD THE BURMESE ARMED FORCES.


FOSTER SOCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL CONTACTS BETWEEN BURMESE OFFICERS AND THOSE OF THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES, WITH PROMOTING FRIENDSHIP TO THE WORLD WITHIN THE BURMESE MILITARY OFFICER CORPS.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

1 Infantry Division with 10 Battalions each: 75 Infantry Battalions assigned to 9 Area Commands; 4 Artillery Battalions; 1 Armored Car Battalion; 1 Tank Battalion; 2 Light AAA Batteries

Strength: 156,000
Paramilitary Forces: 73,000
(People's Police Force: 20,000)
(People's Militia: 53,000)

Only capable of containing insurgency at existing levels of intensity.

NAVY

9 Coastal patrol ships; 21 River/Roadster Patrol Crafts; 1 Mine Warfare Ship; 8 Amphibious Warfare Craft; 4 Auxiliary, 14 River Craft

Strength: 7,700

1 capable of effective river and coastal counternagging, counterinsurgency support operations within limited areas.

AIR FORCE

1 Attack Squadron: 1 Transport Squadron: 1 Training Unit. Total aircraft: 70

Strength: 7,400

1 capable of supporting the Army's counterinsurgency and narco-suppression operations.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 65.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
On March 1977 the Secretary of State approved an export license for Uniflite, Inc. to sell six 32-foot river patrol boats (similar to U.S. PBR MKII, less radar, radios, and armament) to Burma for $500,000. The U.S. Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) Rangoon opined that more orders for low-level military equipment might follow as senior Burmese naval officers were well-disposed to the West.¹

C-47 MAP Aircraft

In July 1977 word was received that the Burmese intended to recommission three Burma Air Force C-47s which had been grounded since July 1976. Burma had been provided six C-47s through the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Three were now to be recommissioned and the other three were to be cannibalized for spares.²

Request for 57mm Recoilless Rifles

In December 1977 the USDAO Rangoon inquired as to the availability of 105 57mm recoilless rifles being offered as Major Item Excess Program (MIMEX) from Iran. They were needed by the Burmese Army to provide a standoff point-fire fragmentation weapon for operations against insurgent forces and narcotics traffickers. The requested weapons were allotted to Burma by the Secretary of Defense and the action was being processed at year's end.³

1. Ibid.
1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 240426Z Sep 77; J465 HistSums, Jan, Mar, May and Sep 77.
3. JCS 2868/282255Z Nov 77.
1. Ibid.; J465 HistSum Jan 77.
3. SECSTATE 311086/271846Z Dec 76.
4. AMEMB Taipei 839/140755Z Feb 77.
1. Ibid.; HQ MAAG ROC Ltr MGCH, dated 30 Aug 77, Subj: End of Tour Report.
1. Ibid.
2. CHMAAG Taipei 140801Z Jul 77; CINCPAC 231153Z Jul 77.
3. SECDEF 4951/220043Z Nov 77.
5. J465 HistSums Sep, Dec 77.
4. CHMAAG Taiwan 120807Z Jul 77.
2. CHMAAG Taipei 130804Z May 77.
3. CINCPAC 232350Z May 77; CNO 4929/032305Z Jun 77; J4/Memo/S105-78, 24 May 78, 
   and Sep 77.
INDONESIA

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA ........................................ 1,030,000 Sq Miles
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS .................. 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE ...................... 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION ...................................... 177,700,000
ANNUAL GROWTH .................................. 2.2 Percent
LITERACY RATE .................................. 60 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY .................................. 65 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA ......................... 13 Acres
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (1975 Est) ............ $28 Billion
PER CAPITA ....................................... $210
DEFENSE BUDGET (1975 Est) ...................... $1.5 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ............... 14.7 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT ................................... Republic, Presidential
Cabinet, unicameral legislature

PREVIOUS ........................................ GEN SUHARTO
MINISTER FOR DEFENSE ......................... GEN Murad, PANANGKARAH
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS .............. LELIT THAYER
CINC ARMED FORCES ...................... GEN PANANGKARAH
CINC CINC ARMED FORCES ..................... GEN SUGRONO
ARMY COMMANDER ......................... GEN MAHENDRA
NAVY COMMANDER .............................. NAVY COMMANDER
AIR FORCE COMMANDER ....................... AIR FORCE COMMANDER
COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS .............. COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR .............................. HON. Edward E. Masters
U.S. AIR REPRESENTATIVE .................. MR. Thomas C. Mildorck
CHARGE D' ECOUS ......................... COL. William W. Tombaugh, USA

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE
INDONESIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT CAPABLE OF
MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND SELF-DEFENSE.

PROVIDE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF U.S. SUPPORT TO AN
INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ABLE TO PROMOTE
INTERESTS, CONTRIBUTE TO FRIENDLY MILITARY RELATIONS
WITH NEIGHBORS AND THE UNITED STATES

HELP PRESERVE U.S. ACCESS TO INDONESIAN RAW MATERIALS
AND AIR AND SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS.

PROMOTE EQUIPMENT COMMODITY, BOTH INTERNALLY
AND EXTERNALLY, AND ASSIST THE GOI IN ATTAINING A
DEGREE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT
AND MUNITIONS.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

13 Infantry Brigades, 2 Airborne Brigades, 1 Paratroop-Commando
Regiment, 1 Cavalry Brigade, 5 Field Artillery Regiments, 4 Antiaircraft
Army Artillery Regiments, 14 Infantry Battalions (Separate), 7 Cavalry
Battalions (Separate), 5 Field Artillery Battalions, 7 Combat Engineer
Battalions, 5 Airborne Infantry Battalions, 1 Antiaircraft Artillery
Battalion (Separate), 2 Signal Battalions, 1 Air Defense-Radar Battalion,
2 Quarterly Engineer Battalions, 8 Transportation Battalions, 5 Military
Police Battalions.

Strength: 130,000

Maintain internal security and effectively repel minor incursions
but not a major attack. Limited offensive capability. Overall readiness
restricted by long lines of communication and logistical problems.

NAVY

9 Frigates, 3 Submarines, 70 Patrol Ships/Craft, 7 Mine Warfare Ships,
11 Amphibious Warfare Ships/Craft, 22 Amphibious

Strength: 36,000 Navy; 12,000 Marines

Partially supports smuggling and provide limited support for
amphibious operations. Conduct only submarine interdiction and
anti-submarine warfare operations. Marines are capable of providing a
regimental size landing force for amphibious assaults.

AIR FORCE

2 Bombers, 15 Ground Attack, 16 Day Fighters, 61 Transports, 63
Trainers, 29 Utility, 6 Search/Huone

Strength: 28,000

Forces in use can provide only limited tactical air support and air
defense. Transport capability is growing but still cannot support only minor
ground operations. Early warning radar and antiaircraft artillery
defense systems extremely weak.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 68.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
decision to terminate MAP grant aid for Indonesia after FY 78 rather than FY 81 as previously scheduled. This action, added to continuing Indonesian dissatisfaction with FMS credit repayment terms, supported the assessment that the Government of Indonesia (GOI) could be expected to turn to third countries when credit terms were more attractive or when desired items were not readily available from U.S. sources. During 1976 Corvette-class destroyers had been purchased from the Netherlands and multi-mission patrol ships had been purchased from Korea. During 1977 purchases being considered included two submarines from Germany and two squadrons of Italian MB-326KB or MD-339 aircraft.\(^1\)

\(\phi\) In January 1977 the American Embassy Jakarta argued for improving FY 77 FMS credit terms to 8-year repayment with 2-year grace period, and this approach was supported by CINCPAC. In June the Embassy reaffirmed the desirability of more favorable FMS credit terms for Indonesia based on the increase in the Indonesian debt service burden projected for the last two years of the current decade, and the Indonesian association of the liberality of FMS credit terms with the degree of U.S. Government interest in Indonesia's security; however, these requests to ease credit terms were not acted upon during 1977.\(^2\)

Major Ongoing Programs

\(\phi\) Ongoing programs were directed at force modernization, including vehicles, small arms, communications equipment, shipyard upgrade equipment, ship overhaul, and aircraft replacement. Major programs were as follows:\(^3\)

- **INDOCOM** - This was an $18 million dollar countrywide, single channel, high frequency, command and control communications system. $12.3 million had been spent through FY 76, and FY 77 grant aid funds were provided to complete equipment purchase for this project.

- **OV-10 Aircraft** - This was an FMS cash case for 16 aircraft, all of which had been delivered by May 1977. One of these aircraft (OV-10F, S-105) had crashed in January 1977 (apparently through pilot error), leaving 15 in service.

- **V-150 Armored Cars** - A total of 58 (13 provided under the MAP, and 45 purchased through FMS) of these vehi- 

cles were in-country and, by July 1977, the GOI was indicating an interest to purchase 24 more for an estimated $3,307,000.

- Bell 204-A Helicopters - 16 of these commercial version UH-1H aircraft had been purchased through FMS. Delivery was scheduled from the end of 1977 and into 1978.

**Major Projected Requirements**

(U) During February 1977 the Embassy received a request from the Indonesian Department of Defense and Security (HANKAM) to investigate the availability, through FMS credit, of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Squadron (16) of T-34 Aircraft</td>
<td>$10 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadron (12) of F-5E Aircraft</td>
<td>80 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16A1 Coproduction Facility</td>
<td>30 million</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(U) In March 1977 the GOI officially requested P&A data for the 16 T-34C aircraft with desired delivery during the February-April 1978 time frame.

(U) In May 1977 the GOI requested an LOA for the F-5 aircraft. The request received Presidential approval; however, when informed that a Congressional recess could cause delay in receipt of the LOA until March 1978, the GOI allegedly threatened to purchase the French MIRAGE instead, if the LOA was not received by 15 November 1977. By December 1977 information was that the Indonesians were not satisfied with credit terms proposed by the French and that they would opt for the F-5.

(U) The GOI desired to convert the Indonesian Army Military Industries (PINDAD) Small Arms Factory in Bandung to coproduction of the M-16A1 rifles, and both Colt Industries and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had submitted proposals. As of 13 December 1977 the DSAA was acting on a request from Colt for an export license. At year's end DSAA was waiting to receive contract information to prepare a Memorandum of Understanding for Secretary of State and Congressional approval.

3. J473 Point Paper, 16 Dec 77, Subj: Indonesia Security Assistance Program
4. Ibid.
1. J473 HistSums Feb, Jun, and Dec 77.
3. Ibid.
CONFIDENTIAL

2. J462 HistSum Dec 77.
2. J462 HistSum Dec 77.
3. SECDEF 5135/070119Z Jul 77.
1. COMUSJ 312359Z Jun 77.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 110543Z Jun 77.
1. CHMDAO Tokyo 040731Z Apr 77; CINCPAC 232125Z Apr 77.
3. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
1. Ibid.

2. COMUSKOREA 040807Z Mar 77; CINCPAC 082340Z Mar 77; JCS 4253/102306Z Mar 77; J4/Memo/S105-78, 24 May 78, Subj: CINCPAC Command History 1977; Review of Draft.
1. J463 HistSum Dec 77; AMEMB Seoul 10409/100300Z Dec 77.
2. CINCPAC 190514Z Feb 77; J463 HistSum Dec 77.
1. J461 HistSum Feb 77; J463 HistSums Apr and Sep 77; J462 HistSum Jun 77.
3. CHJUSMAGK 280820Z Jun 77.
5. J461 HistSum Feb 77.
1. JCS 2896/222114Z Apr 77; CINCPAC 152247Z Apr 77; MAJ GEN Oliver D. Street, III (USA), CHJUSMAGK End of Tour Report, 1 Jun 77, pp. 163-64.
3. AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 8608/140920Z Nov 77; CINCPAC 011947Z Dec 77; SECDEF 6846/082216Z Dec 77; CNO 4920/142116Z Dec 77.
MALAYSIA

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA: 129,480 Sq Miles
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS: 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE: None
POPULATION: 12,583,000
ANNUAL GROWTH: 2.7 Percent
LITERACY RATE: 45.6 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY: 60 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA: 0.88 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT: $1,169 Billion
PER CAPITA: $8,951
DEFENSE BUDGET: $729 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET: 12.5 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT: Constitutional Monarchy headed by Paramount Ruler (King: Mr. Sultan Sharafuddin)
PARAMOUNT RULER: Ya'ha Petra Iskandar
PRIME MINISTER: Tun Hussein bin Haji Mohd. Attan
ACTING DEFENSE MINISTER: Tun Haji Ahmad bin Haji Chew
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Tun Haji Ahmad bin Haji Chew
MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS: Tun Haji Ahmad bin Haji Chew
CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES:GEN Mohd. Thuaffir bin Salleh
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF: LGEN Mohd. Thuaffir bin Salleh
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF: ADMM Mohd. Zain bin Salleh
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF: AVM Mohd. Zain bin Salleh

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR: DON. Robert A. Miller
ATTACHMENTS: COM. Richard L. Swain, JR., USA

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

PROVIDE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF SUPPORT FOR A STABLE NON-COMMUNIST MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT.

ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF FORCES CapABLE OF ASSURING INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY, AND IN FACILITATING THE SALE OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

ENCOURAGE REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN MALAYSIA AND ITS NON-COMMUNIST NEIGHBORS.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

3 Divisions, 9 Brigades, 30 Infantry Battalions
Strength: 91,000

Essentially an infantry force trained and experienced in jungle operations. Fairly effective in internal security and counter-insurgency missions up to battalion level. Very slight capability at brigade level and incapable of resolving a significant external attack or engaging in operations outside Malaysia without considerable outside assistance.

NAVY

2 Frigates, 11 Coastal Patrol types, 6 Mine Warfare types, 3 Amphibious Warfare Ships, 19 Landing Craft
Strength: 5,000

Offshore patrol, defense of sea lines of communication and territorial waters, as well as support of internal security operations. Limited by small size, maintenance problems, long coastline and geographic separation of the country into two portions.

AIR FORCE

29 Jets, 41 Turboprops, 41 Propeller Aircraft, 62 Helicopters
Strength: 5,900

Can provide relatively effective transport support to Army, Navy, and Police for internal security missions. Modest ground support capability with CT-41s and P-92 aircraft.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 71.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
NEPAL

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA ........................................ 54,000 Sq Miles
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS .............. Land-locked Country
POPULATION ...................................... 11,190,000
ANNUAL GROWTH .................................. 2.0 Percent
LITERACY RATE ................................... 12 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY .................................. 40 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA ......................... 3 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ....................... $1.4 Billion
PER CAPITA ...................................... $ 212
DEFENSE BUDGET (FY 77) ......................... $ 12.8 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ............... 6.2 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT ................................ Constitutional Monarchy

KING AND CINC .................................... Bir Bikram Shah Deva DHENDRA
PRIME MINISTER ................................... Kiriti Nidhi BISTA
AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE ...................... Krishna Raj ARYA
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ............. GEN Guna S.D.H. RANA
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF ............................. COL. Robert A. FARR, USA

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR ................................ HON. L. Douglas HECK
U.S. AID DIRECTOR ................................. MR. Charles R. GRADER
DATT ............................................... COL. Robert A. FARR, USA

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVE

SUPPORT THE INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT OF NEPAL BY AFFORDING THE ROYAL NEPAL ARMY A CHANCE TO RECEIVE U.S. MILITARY TRAINING.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

12 Infantry Battalions. 1 Parachute Battalion. 1 Artillery Battalion.
1 Cavalry Squadron. 23 Militia Companies. The Army Aviation element has 4 light transports and 5 helicopters.

Strength: 20,000

Incapable of offensive or defensive operations against India or the PRC. Capable of maintaining internal security, unless widespread disturbance is supported by outside powers. Extremely poor logistics.

NAVY

None.

AIR FORCE

None.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 72.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
during the period 1965 to 1968, but Defense Attache Office attempts to get a major end-item asset inventory had received no response. Also, end-item supervision was limited to country-submitted reports. Some elements of the Government of Nepal were apparently sensitive about the Nepal Human Rights Report given to Congress, as required on recipients of security assistance, which categorized Nepal as not free. This had caused some officials to wonder if the modest IMETP was worth the adverse publicity on human rights.¹

**New Zealand**

³ New Zealand received security assistance equipment and training on a cash basis, and generally followed Australia's lead in procurement of major weapon systems. During 1977 the New Zealand Ministry of Defense was forecasting the following requirements, which were to be procured from U.S. commercial sources in FY 79:²

- Armored personnel carriers
- P-3B ORION aircraft modernization
- A-4 SKYHAWK aircraft modernization
- Ship target detection system modernization
- Tactical, strategic, and secure voice communications equipment.
- Training related to proposed modernization programs.

³ The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) was faced with the problem of replacing aging frigates beginning in 1982. U.S. Coast Guard HAMILTON-class cutters were among the possible candidates. During 1977 there were indications that the RNZN staff was split into pro-United States and pro-United Kingdom camps on the replacement issue. Two United Kingdom firms were vigorously pushing a stretched type platform of about 3,000 tons, and consideration was being given to purchasing four or five ships at $60 million apiece. No decision had been made through year's end.³

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NEW ZEALAND

BASIC INFORMATION
LAND AREA ........................................ 103,736 Sq Miles
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS .......... 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE ................. 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION .................................... 2,611,000
ANNUAL GROWTH ................................ 1.1 Percent
LITERACY RATE ................................ 98 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY ............................... 67 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA ................. 0.64 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ................. $ 1,177 Billion
PER CAPITA ................................... $ 5,950
DEFENSE BUDGET ............................... $ 223.4 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET .......... 3.7 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT ......................... Federal State within Commonwealth
recognizing Queen Elizabeth II as Sovereign or Head of State

GOVERNOR GENERAL ......................... SIR KATH HOLYOAKE
PRIME MINISTER ............................... ROBERT D. MULDOON
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER .............. BRIAN K. TALBOYS
MINISTER OF DEFENSE ....................... BILL MCNEAL
CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF ................. AIR MARSHAL RICHARD H. HOLT
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF ............

ARMY ............................................ MG HENRY D. P. HANETT
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF ....................... RADM WILLIAM D. ANDERSON
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF ........................... ADM CYRIL L. MILLER

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION
U.S. AMBASSADOR ............................. HON. ARMISTED J. SELDEN, JR.
DATT ............................................ CAPT WILLIAM C. KEMP III, USN

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY ........................................
1 Infantry Battalion, 2 Infantry Brigades, 1 Special Air Service Squadron
Strength: 8,441

Navy ........................................
4 Frigates, 16 Patrol Craft, 2 Auxiliaries
Strength: 2,000

Air Force ....................................
100 Aircraft, of which 19 are jets, 2 Attack Squadrons, 2 Transport Squadrons, 1 Reconnaissance Squadron, 2 Battlefield Support Squadrons, 1 Training Wing, and 1 Base Wing
Strength: 4,500

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

FOMOTE CONTINUED AND ENHANCED COOPERATION BETWEEN U.S. AND NEW ZEALAND FORCES

MINIMIZE DIFFERENCES WHICH MIGHT COMPLICATE OUR CONTINUED ACCESS TO NEW ZEALAND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

ASSIST IN DEVELOPING, MAINTAINING, AND STRENGTHENING MODERN SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

FOMOTE STANDARDIZATION OF METHODS, TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 73.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
During 1977 security assistance to Pakistan was further complicated by Pakistani plans to purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant from France. To prevent this from happening the State Department was prepared to offer a package of military equipment as an inducement. The possible military package options (FMS sales), as developed by the JCS and concurred in by CINCPAC, included:

- **Air Defense Systems Assistance** - Would include up to three USAF experts to assist in system implementation for three to four years, as an FMS case.

- **AH-IS (COBRA) Helicopters with TOWs** - The GOP had requested 12 Bell AH-IS. U.S. had previously provided them

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1. J471 Point Paper, 26 Apr 77, Subj: Security Assistance Program-Pakistan
PAKISTAN

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA ........................................... 310,000 Sq Miles
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS .................. 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE ......................... 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION ....................................... 74,247,000
ANNUAL GROWTH ................................... 5.0 Percent
LITERACY RATE .................................... 14 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY .................................. About 40 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA ........................... 1.1 Acres
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ........................ $12.7 Billion
PER CAPITA ......................................... $1,900
DEFENSE BUDGET .................................... $888 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET .................. 20 Percent
TYPE: GOVERNMENT .................................... Federal Republic

PRESIDENT .............................................. Fazal Elahi CHAUDHRY
CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR AND
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF ................................ GEN ZIA U-HAQ
MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR AND
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF ............................. GEN Mohammed SHARIF
MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR AND
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF ................................. ACM Zafrul ak KHAN

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR .................................... HON. Arthur HUMMEL, JR.
U.S. AIR DIRECTOR ..................................... MIR. Joseph C. WHEELER
U.S. OIP .................................................. COL. Richard F. GIBBS, USAF

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

PROMOTE STABILITY IN THE AREA BY ASSISTING
PAKISTAN'S CAPABILITIES TO ASSURE INTERNAL
DEFENSE AND CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE TO THREATENING
AGGRESSION.

ASSIST IN OBTAINING NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. AND
ALLIED FORCES.

MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN CONTACTS BETWEEN HOST
COUNTRY AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, FOSTERING
FAVORABLE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE U.S. AND ENCOURAGING
PROMOTION WITHIN THE MILITARY OF OBJECTIVES
COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. INTERESTS AND STRATEGY.

ASSIST IN IMPROVING PAKISTAN'S CAPABILITY TO DEFEND
CONTIGUOUS AIRSPACE/SEA AREAS & SEA-ROUTE ROUTES.

DEVELOP CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH MILITARY FORCES
OF OTHER ALLIED FRIENDLY NATIONS ENCOURAGING
REGIONAL COOPERATION.

STRENGTHEN PAKISTAN'S WILL AND ABILITY TO RESIST
AND DEFEND EXPANSION OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN
PAKISTAN.

ENCOURAGE PAKISTAN'S INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF CENTO AND STRENGTHEN
MILITARY FORCES TO ASSURE ITS VIABLE MEMBERSHIP.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

6 Corps Headquarters, 16 Infantry Divisions, 2 Armored Divisions
Strength: 400,000
(Paramilitary Strength: 11,000)

Capable of maintaining internal security and limited capability to
resist external aggression. Dependent on foreign sources of supply for
most war materiel.

NAVY

1 Anti-aircraft Cruiser, 7 Destroyers, 2 Frigates, 2 Large Submarine
Chasers, 4 Submarines, 13 Motor Gunboats, 4 Hydrofoil Motor Torpedo
Boats, 7 Mine Warfare, 2 Auxiliaries
Strength: 9,900

Marginally capable of defending coastline and has very limited
antiship warfare and mine warfare capability. No transport or
amphibious capability.

AIR FORCE

1 Light Bomber Squadron (B-57D), 4 Fighter-Bomber Squadrons
(Mirage II, Sabre Mk-4, F-4D), 8 Fighter-Interceptor Squadrons (F-16
and Mirage III), 2 Transport Squadrons (C-130, C-14, F-27
Mystere 20)
Strength: 17,000

Moderate intercepter and limited close air support capability.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 74.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
ground-launched TOW missile systems.

- **Utility Helicopters** - The GOP had purchased 30 PUMAS from France, but might seek more from U.S.

- **C-130 Aircraft** - GOP turned down a previous U.S. sales offer due to lack of funds, but might wish to purchase a quantity later with U.S. sales assurance.

- **Artillery** - A Letter of Offer and Acceptance for 64 self-propelled 155mm howitzers had been held by the State Department as leverage. The GOP had also requested up to 150 towed 105mm howitzers. The U.S. had insisted upon one for one turn-in of old U.S. equipment, but this stipulation could be removed.

- **Communications Equipment** - The GOP was considering purchase of about $87 million worth of commo equipment. Future sales could also prove sizable.

- **Two Fram I Destroyers and Repair Ship** - The Navy would have these ships available for transfer in August. The GOP had purchased two GEARING FRAM-I destroyers and had indicated a desire for additional when available.

- **Combat Aircraft** - The GOP requested 110 A-7s on 19 May 1976. The Indians, some Congressmen, and some officials in State considered the A-7 provocative or destabilizing in the South Asian context. F-5Es (which the Pakistani Air Force had indicated they did not want) or the A-4M (the GOP's second choice) or a mix, might prove acceptable in negotiations. If the GOP insisted on A-7s, the State Department would discuss it further with the President and Congress. (CINCPAC had originally supported the sale of 59 A-7s). On 2 June 1977 the United States turned down the request for A-7s.

Transfer of Destroyers

(U) Two U.S. Navy destroyers (DD's), ex-WILTSIE (DD-716) and ex-EPPERSON (DD-719), were transferred to the Pakistan Navy on 29 April 1977. They were purchased by the GOP under FMS procedures for $225,000 each. Separate FMS cases for ship checks, overhaul, and training had also been signed. Overhaul
and training were expected to be completed in the Spring of 1978.¹

Republic of the Philippines

Overview

During 1977 the major focus in U.S.-Philippine relations remained on the base negotiations, which appeared to provide leverage for Philippine requests for expensive, sophisticated equipment. In addition, the continuing conflict in Mindanao resulted in more Philippine requests for accelerated availability and delivery of equipment, U.S. response to which gave the appearance of support for the conflict.²

Major security assistance programs in progress during 1977 included the following:

- M-16 rifle coproduction.
- Air defense communications modernization.
- Ship acquisition to include 54 ex-JMSDF ships being overhauled for $30 million in Japanese shipyards between Oct 77-Feb 78; and 37 ex-Southeast Asia (Vietnam/Cambodia) ships.
- Aircraft Cooperative Logistics Agreements.
- M-113 APC and M-41 tank rebuild and training.
- Ship overhaul (7 ships in FY 78 for $878,000).

Accelerated Availability and Delivery of Defense Items

On 1 March 1977 the American Embassy, Manila reported a meeting between the Ambassador and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Enrile in which the latter revealed correspondence confirming that the Tripoli talks on the Muslim problem in the South were at an impasse, and that the Libyans threatened renewed hostilities with the Government of the Philippines. In the midst of this situation, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) requested accelerated

1. CINCPAC 070545Z Dec 76; COMTHIRTEEN Seattle 291605Z Apr 77.
PHILIPPINES

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA ------------------------------- 110,000 sq. Miles
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS ------------------------------- 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE ------------------------------- 12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION ---------------------------------- 19,000,000
ANNUAL GROWTH ------------------------------- 2.9 Percent
LITERACY RATE ------------------------------- 61 Percent
DIESEASEM PRACTICE ------------------------------- 20 Years
AVERAGE LIFESPAN PER CAPITA ------------------------------- 62 Years
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GDP) -------------- 8.5 Trillion
GDP PER CAPITA ------------------------------- 8,100
DEFENSE BUDGET FY 72 ------------------------------- $1,275.9 Billion
DEFENSE BUDGET FY 73 ------------------------------- $1,324 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ------------------------------- 16.0 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT ------------------------------- *Republic

* Martial Law in effect since September 1972 and the constitution suspended

PRESDENT ------------------------------- Ferdinand E. MARCOS
SECRETARY FOREIGN AFFAIRS ------------------------------- Carlos P. ROMULO
SECRETARY NATIONAL DEFENSE ------------------------------- Juan P. Vargas
CHIEF OF STAFF AF ------------------------------- GEN Renato ESPINOSA
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF ------------------------------- GEN Rafael H. IREO
CG, ARMY ------------------------------- MGGEN Francisco U. ABAD
CG, AIR FORCE ------------------------------- MGGEN Samuel D. SARMIENTO
CHIEF DIPLOMATIC MISSION ------------------------------- MGGEN Fidel RAMOS

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR ------------------------------- ROX. David H. NEWSMITH
U.S. AIR DIRECTOR ------------------------------- MR. Thomas C. NELSON
CHIEF JFSAG ------------------------------- MGGEN James H. MATT, USA

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

ASSIST IN ORGANIZING AND MAINTAINING NECESSARY
RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS AND FACILITY ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES AND DEPLOY THEM TO
FORCES OPPOSED TO U.S. INTERESTS.

SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED INTERNAL
SECURITY TO MEET RECOGNIZED THREAT WHILE
PREVENTING THE SECURITY OF U.S. FACILITIES.

PROVIDE EQUIPMENT COMMODITY, BOTH INNERNALLY
AND REGIONALLY, TO ENHANCE MATERIAL COMPATI-
LITY, WHEN APPROPRIATE.

PROVIDE SELF-RELIANCE.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

1 Division, 1 Infantry Brigade, 1 Artillery Regiment,
2 Engineer Brigades, 1 Home Defense Force Company (Airborne)

Strength: 7,000

Army: 2 Zone Commands (Brigade), 11 Battalions,
1 Airborne (Brigade), 1 Presidential Guard Battalion

Strength: 45,445

In conjunction with the Constabulary, the Army must maintain internal security and perform counter-insurgency and civic action missions. Not capable of resisting a major external attack without considerable outside assistance. Budget limitations, understrength combat units, and lack of operational experience and training assure limited ability level and retard combat readiness.

NAVY

1 Frigate, 14 Coastal Patrol Vessels, 3 Mine Warfare Types, 18 Amphibious-
Types, 20 Auxiliaries, 1 Marine Brigade

Strength: 13,000, which includes 4,000 Marines

Conduct limited offshore patrol and minor amphibious and anti-
nuclear warfare operations.

AIR FORCE

1 Interceptor Attack Squadrons (F-5A, A-7D), 2 Attack Squadrons
C/20-1, 12 OPE-3B/3M, 3/2 A-7C/C, 1 EC-121C, 2/2 EC-130, 12 A-10
 Huff, 2 Training Squadrons (C-290, 200 Marauder Trainers, 
T-33A, 1 BT-21A, 1 T-34A, 2 T-44A, 34 T-41, 1 Air Command Squadron (T-34A, LH-115), 2 Air Traffic Control Squads (2 MHS-300, 2 HU-16B),
Strength: 14,600

Limited capability to assist the Army in maintaining internal
security and contributing to the defense against external attack.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 75.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
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availability for a number of security assistance items. By 18 March 1977 13
items out of an initial total of 81 had been identified for acceleration:¹

MAP Items

• 65-foot Patrol Boats (2)
• Mini-ATCs (2)
• M-60D Machine Guns (26)

FMS Items

• Navy 5"/38 and 3"/50 Rapid-Fire Ammunition (7 orders)
• Ammunition and Combat Vehicle related items (3 orders)

¹ In April 1977 a request was made for accelerated availability of the
balance (72) of 108 LAU-68A launchers and 14 other items, most critical of
which were cited as 105mm cartridges, fuzes, and 40mm cartridges.²

² In September 1977 the AFP requested accelerated delivery of M-113
armored personnel carriers, M-101 howitzers, and 40mm grenade launchers. On
4 November the Secretary of State notified the American Embassy, Manila, that
a schedule was being worked out to ready the following requested items for
shipment in early 1978:³

• M-113A1 APC (36)
• M-101A1 Howitzer (30)
• M-203 40mm Grenade Launchers (1,500)

³ In October 1977 the AFP further requested immediate delivery of 1,504
rounds of 155mm ammunition, as the Philippine Army was down to 80 rounds. On
22 October CINCPAC coordinated and directed the release of U.S. Marine Corps
stocks at Subic Bay to satisfy this requirement. The Philippine LOA and down

1. AMEMB Manila 3003/010601Z Mar 77, 4073/180952Z Mar 77.
2. J464 HistSum, Apr 77.
Availability and Delivery; STATE 264330/040241Z Nov 77; J475 Hist Sum
Oct 77; J474 HistSum Nov 77.
payment of $180,000 were received on 27 October, and the transfer was made on 2 November.

In his 4 November 1977 notification of expedited delivery of defense articles, the Secretary of State stressed the exceptional nature of such requests, the difficulties they posed for the United States (to include diverting already programmed U.S. defense material), and the need to keep them to a minimum. Over the years since 1972 such requests had been frequent, and the United States generally responsive to those requests for items within approved program levels; however, items above those levels posed problems, which provided the GOP an opportunity to complain from time to time as an apparent bargaining tactic. 2

Selection of F-8H Aircraft

During 1976 the Philippines had shown an interest in various aircraft to include the F-5E, F-8H, A-4C, and other similar aircraft. An LOA had been provided on the F-5E, but it had been turned down by January 1977, leaving the F-8H and A-4C as the primary remaining contenders. CINCPAC, concerned with the proliferation of types and quantities of aircraft which had already diluted Philippine Air Force (PAF) effectiveness, was against the introduction of either sophisticated weaponry or out-of-date aircraft having doubtful future maintainability such as the F-8H. This concern was expressed to the JCS along with a recommendation that any aircraft offer to the GOP include provisions for maintenance management by the U.S. military and a supply support team for the initial 5 to 10-year period. CINCPAC further believed it appropriate to consider A-37/OV-10 aircraft to meet Philippine air-to-ground needs as opposed to other weapons systems being considered. 3

In March 1977 the JCS noted that an LOA would not be effected on the F-8H until a satisfactory commercial support contract had been executed. CINCPAC advised that a contractual 10-year guarantee of technical and logistics support would relieve much concern, but suggested that the PAF should be encouraged to retire their F-86s concurrent with introduction of another fighter. 4

2. STATE 264330/040241Z Nov 77; J475 Point Paper, 10 Nov 77, Subj: U.S. Responsiveness to GOP for Accelerated Delivery/Availability of MAP/FMS Defense Items.
Through May 1977 the Philippines was still considering the F-8H and A-4, but on 16 June a request was submitted for an LOA for 35 F-8H aircraft. On 23 August the CNO forwarded the LOA for 35 F-8H aircraft "as-is-where-is" for an estimated $11.7 million. The LOA was signed on 17 October and $6,339,760 was provided for the initial deposit. For the remainder of the year the PAF continued to further define their requirements to introduce the F-8H aircraft.

M-41/M-113 Rebuild Program

During 1977 action was taken to assist the Philippine Army in establishing a direct support repair facility for M-113 armored personnel carriers and M-41 tanks. The program included identifying repair part and tool requirements and the provision of overhaul training and technical assistance teams which covered the various aspects of organizational maintenance and actual rebuild.

Release of Bomb Fuzes

On 8 December 1977 JUSMAG requested information on the releasability of long-delay bomb fuzes. The Secretary of Defense replied that the State Department and Department of Defense had determined not to release the requested fuzes to the Philippine Armed Forces, reasoning that civilian casualties might result from their use during counterinsurgency operations in or near civilian occupied areas.

Ex-USN/JMSDF Ships in Japan

On 16 September 1977 Admiral Ogbunar, Philippine Navy, signed a $30 million repair package with private Japanese shipyards for activation of 54 ex-USN/JMSDF ships and craft. Chief, JUSMAGPHIL authorized the MDAO Japan to release the above ships and craft to the Philippine Navy representatives for further transfer to designated Japanese shipyards. This action culminated over one year of attempts to get the Philippine Navy to consummate plans for activation of these ships and craft.

Infrared Countermeasures (IRCM)

With the breakdown in the Tripoli negotiations, expected renewal of fighting in the South, and the possible introduction of SA-7 missiles, President

3. JUSMAGPHIL 080915Z Dec 77; SECDEF 5312/150031Z Dec 77.
Marcos requested "smart bombs" to counter this possible threat. On 2 March 1977 the American Ambassador, noting that "smart bombs" were irrelevant, suggested assisting the GOP in developing T-28 aircraft IRCM to counter the possible SA-7 threat. On 11 March CINCPAC forwarded extracts from a working paper titled, "Cost-effectiveness of Infrared Countermeasures (IRCM) for Aircraft," to assist the AFP to understand the threat and the countermeasures available. On 15 March CINCPAC sent a two-man briefing team to further assist the AFP in determining appropriate countermeasures. By May 1977 the most viable solution to the T-28 countermeasure problem was confirmed by the USAF Tactical Air Command as the application of infrared paint and installation of heat shields. Through year's end efforts were continuing toward the development and certification of an effective infrared heat shield for AFP T-28s.

Also requiring IRCM protection against the SA-7 threat were UH-1 helicopters, and on 9 March 1977 the Chief, JUSMAGPHIL advised that the Philippine Undersecretary of Defense for Munitions had requested immediate issuance of an FMS LOA for infrared suppressors, paint supplies, and a U.S. Army installation/application team for 34 UH-1H helicopters then in-country. The LOA was forwarded by Department of the Army at the end of March, and by year's end the material had been shipped and installation begun.²

Expanded Training Program

On 21 April 1977 the Embassy in Manila forwarded a plan, developed jointly with Chief, JUSMAGPHIL, to increase Philippine IMETP funding from $600,000 to $2 million annually. This proposal sought to blend the technical training needs of the AFP with the U.S. need for more contact and influence with current and future AFP leaders by providing them the opportunity personally to observe American institutions in action. CINCPAC supported this plan, noting that favorable and timely action could indirectly assist in base negotiations. CINCPAC further expressed support for increased training levels, not only for the Philippines, but for all PACOM countries. On 23 May 1977 the State Department advised that a budget amendment for FY 78 was not feasible based on the following:³

- Human rights considerations.
- Administration's commitment to minimum budgetary expenditures.

2. Ibid.
SECRET

- Lateness in Congressional review process.

In turning down the program for FY 78, the Secretary of State promised to review the proposals when the FY 79 program was to be prepared.

Sophisticated Weaponry

Related to the conflict in the South and earlier request for "smart bombs" were further Philippine requests for information concerning terminal guided weapons, including the RGM-84 HARPOON, the WALLEYE extended-range weapon, and its compatibility with F-8H aircraft. By the end of March 1977 this interest had also spread to intermediate range weapons systems such as the PAVEWAY I laser target designator system. On 25 March 1977 Chief, JUSMAGPHIL requested authority to release information on these systems to point out their excessive cost and technical complexity. On 26 March CINCPAC supported Chief, JUSMAGPHIL's position to the JCS, noting that no existing or projected threat to the Philippines warranted release of terminal guided weapons. On 21 April 1977 Chief, JUSMAGPHIL again requested, and CINCPAC supported, release of information, but the Secretary of State advised that neither the weapons or the information were releasable.²

Singapore

Overview

(SINGOFORN) By January 1977 the majority of approved items recommended by the June 1975 Crowe-Shackley (DOD-CIA) interdepartmental team visit to Singapore had been purchased. Major commercial sales contracted in FY 77 were 300 M-113 armored personnel carriers and 20 UH-1H helicopters. Major FMS cases in process during 1977 included:³

- On 25 February 1977 the Government of Singapore (GOS) requested two C-130Bs on concessional terms. The Secretary of Defense advised that none were available and suggested the purchase of Australian C-130As, but the GOS found these in poor condition. At year's end the GOS was negotiating purchase of two C-130B's from Jordan.

2. J464 HistSum Mar, Apr 77.

SECRET

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SINGAPORE

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA .................................................. 235 Sq Miles
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS .................. 3 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF EXCLUSIVE ZONE ......................... None Claimed
POPULATION .............................................. 2,207,000
ANNUAL GROWTH ....................................... 1.3 Percent
LITERACY RATE .......................................... 78 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY .................................. 73 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA .......................... 0.1 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ....................... $ 5.62 Billion
PER CAPITA ................................................ $ 2,456
DEFENSE BUDGET ......................................... $ 399.5 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET .................. 16.5 Percent
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT ................................ Republic within Commonwealth

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

CONTINUED ACCESS TO SINGAPORE'S NAVAL AND AIR FACILITIES

CONTINUATION OF SINGAPORE SUPPORT FOR THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT IN AND OVER THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE

CONTINUED PROGRESS TOWARDS AN ENHANCED CAPABILITY OF SINGAPORE TO MAINTAIN ITS OWN SECURITY

CONTINUATION OF MODERATE, NONCOMMUNIST GOVERNMENT NOT SUBJECT TO INDIRECT PRI OR SOVIET INFLUENCE

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

1 Division, 3 Infantry Brigades, 1 Artillery Brigade, 1 Armored Brigade, 1 Commando Battalion, 1 Engineer Brigade, 1 Signal Brigade

Strength: 22,000

Capable of maintaining internal security, but would need outside assistance to resist external attack. No operational capability above battalion level.

NAVY

6 Missile Boats, 7 Coastal types, 7 Amphibious Warfare Craft, 2 Mine Warfare, 1 Service type

Strength: 1,200

Fair patrol capability in territorial waters. Incapable of defending against a major naval attack.

AIR FORCE

101 Jets, 2 Turboprop, 12 Prop, 18 Helicopters

Strength: 1,200

Potentially good ground support capability with A-4D aircraft. Limited air defense and transport rerescapability.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 76.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
In March 1977 the GOS requested an LOA for coproduction of M-203 grenade launchers. This was to be a joint effort with the Royal Thai Government (RTG), and production was expected to be around 8,000 launchers, 2,000 for Singapore and 6,000 for the RTG. The request was approved by a letter from President Carter to Prime Minister Lee dated 15 November 1977.

LOAs were signed on 18 F-5E and three F-5F aircraft including AIM-9J1 missiles, for a total cost of $108 million. Three F-5Fs were to be delivered in late 1978; 15 F-5Es at two a month starting January 1979 and three F-5Es (attrition) in December 1979.

A five-man USAF Management Training Assistance Team (MTAT) was organized to train and assist in developing a managerially self-sufficient Singapore Air Force. The LOA and Terms of Reference were signed on 19 May 1977 and the team was on station beginning 5 July 1977 for two years at a total cost of $750 thousand.

Between September and December 1977 the GOS requested purchase of 30 UH-1B helicopters under MIMEX offers 1758 and 1672. The State Department approved the sale, which had an FMS value of $2,447,510.

An LOA was requested on 9 May 1977 for an Improved HAWK (I-HAWK) Battery and Assault Fire Unit (two sites with total of six launchers and 36 missiles) at a total cost of $50 million. The I-HAWK was planned to replace the current UK BLOODHOUND system which would reach the end of its service life in 1981.

I-HAWK

CINCPAC had supported acquisition of the I-HAWK in the FY 78 and FY 79 JSOP/MSAP; however, Washington representatives to the Security Assistance Conference, 15-17 November 1977, indicated that the I-HAWK for Singapore might be refused. CINCPAC on 29 November 1977 emphasized in a message to the JCS that this request had come at a crucial time in US-GOS relations, and recommended that the JCS initiate immediate action to secure approval for the sale of I-HAWK to Singapore. On 6 December 1977 the JCS advised that President Carter had turned down the Singapore request in the same personal letter to Prime Minister Lee in which the grenade launcher FMS had been approved. However,
sufficient concern had been generated as a result of the Singapore decision and other recent actions, where large Security Assistance programs in one region were crowding out small but important programs in other regions, to merit a broader statement of JCS views on the problem. 1

Armored Vehicles to Somalia

On 8 December 1977 the USDAO Singapore advised that the Ministry of Defense, Republic of Singapore formally notified the USDAO that the GOS had been approached by the Somali Government, which desired to buy 40 Cadillac Gage V-200 armored cars from the GOS. These vehicles were bought under a direct commercial contract, and the GOS view was that they were not obligated to seek clearance of the resale from the U.S. Government. The Secretary of State advised that their preliminary review indicated that the GOS signed DSP-83 (consignee/purchase statement) agreeing to obtain advance U.S. Government approval before exporting or otherwise disposing of vehicles outside Singapore. They further advised that they could not approve the third-party transfer of these vehicles to Somalia. At year's end, the Secretary of State hoped to obtain the actual consignee/purchase statement to prevent shipment of the vehicles to Somalia. 2

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka was allocated security assistance funds under the IMETP; however, since FY 70 the Government of Sri Lanka had not elected to use available funds except for an orientation tour to Hawaii for Lieutenant General Attygalle, Commander, Sri Lankan Army, in 1976. At the end of 1977 indications were that Sri Lanka might resume use of IMETP funds after 1 January 1978. 3

Sri Lanka had received four Cessna 337 aircraft and four Bell 206 helicopters through grant aid in 1971 and 1972. At U.S. Embassy request, these were substituted for originally offered C-47 and OH-13 aircraft to allow support from commercial sources. Subsequent indications were that the aircraft were being used for "tourist hire," which apparently funded spare parts support. This use conflicted with the intent of the Foreign Assistance Act and during 1977 the question was being staffed at the State Department for resolution.

1. J475 HistSum Jun 77; CINCPAC TANGO One 291900Z Nov 77; JCS 3436;061420Z Nov 77.
2. USDAO Singapore 2376/080345Z Dec 77; SECSTATE 304188/212203Z Dec 77.
SRI LANKA

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA .................................................. 25,300 Sq Miles
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS ....................... 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE ......................... 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION .............................................. 14,219,000
ANNUAL GROWTH ..................................... 2.0 Percent
LITERACY RATE ........................................... 80 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY .......................................... 62 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA ................................ 3 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ........................... $ 3.8 Billion
PER CAPITA ................................................ $ 110
DEFENSE BUDGET ......................................... $ 271 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ..................... 20.0 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT ....................................... Republic with French
Style President

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR ........................................ Hon. W. Howard Wriggiess
U.S. AID DIRECTOR ........................................ Mr. Ernest Goffin
DATT ...................................................... CDR Paul G. Cutchens

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

PROVIDE A TANGIBLE REMINDER OF U.S. INTERESTS IN SRI
LANKA TO ACT AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO IXIC AND PRC
PRESENCE.

MAINTAIN GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH ALL
POLITICAL AND MILITARY ELEMENTS TO INFLUENCE
DEVELOPMENT OF A STABLE AND NON-ALIGNED
GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA FRIENDLY TO UNITED
STATES.

ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA IN DEVELOPING
EXPERTISE FOR EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF ITS
DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

3 Infantry Battalions, 1 Artillery Regiment (Battalion), 1 Reconnaissance Regiment (Battalion).

Strength: 10,000

Air Force: 2,000

Incapable of repelling an invasion. In conjunction with police and
other services, can maintain internal security, but has serious command
and control deficiencies. Completely reliant on foreign sources for
logistical support.

NAVY

7 Large Patrol Craft, 23 Patrol boats

Strength: 2,000

No capability against even minor enemy naval attack. Adequate in
assisting internal security operations. Limited anti-smuggling
capability.

AIR FORCE

1 Tactical Squadron (BH-17, T-51), 2 Transport Squadron (DH-141),
3 C-47, 1 Corsair F-5, Constellation 445, P-3A, Hornet 126, 1 Heli-scoot
Squadron (OH-1H, B-26B, KA-250, 1 Training Squadron (T-51,
OH-1H, C-47)

Strength: 2,180

Marginal capability to provide close support to the Army and air
defense capability is virtually nonexistent. Adequate in assisting
internal security, in anti-smuggling operations, and military transport
needs.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 77.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
During his October 1977 Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar visit, RADM Goonesekara, Commander, Sri Lanka Navy, discussed with CINCPAC the possibility of acquiring a "training ship." He was informed that availability of destroyer/frigate type ships was not optimistic, but that smaller type vessels could be explored. At year's end a letter request was being forwarded through diplomatic channels.

Thailand

Overview

The principal objectives of the Security Assistance Program in Thailand were:

- Maintain U.S. influence with the possibility of access to Thai facilities to support U.S. strategic objectives.
- Assist the Royal Thai Armed Forces in attaining a degree of self-sufficiency adequate to meet the internal insurgency threat and cope with the limited external threat.

Thailand's dependence on Grant Aid for military assistance had shifted from 54 percent of total defense expenditures in FY 62 to 2.6 percent in FY 77. FMS purchases had jumped from over $3.8 million in FY 69 to over $103 million in FY 77.

Major MAP items for FY 78 included (in millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical support vehicles (trucks, tractors, cranes, etc.)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications equipment</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm howitzers</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft components, parts, ground equipment</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. J47 Point Paper, 16 Dec 77, Subj: Security Assistance Program-Thailand
3. PACOM Security Assistance Conference, 15-17 Nov 77, Executive Summary, 31 Jan 78, p. 32.

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THAILAND

**U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES**

Provide support for the development of Thai military capabilities to defend against limited external military threats and protect maritime lines of communication.

Assist the Royal Thai Government to develop the capability to suppress insurgency and to maintain internal security.

Enhance defense materiel compatibility.

Provide support for cost effective programs that develop Thai military self-sufficiency.

**MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY**

**ARMY**
7 Infantry Divisions: 1 Regional Combat Team (Separate), 3 Special Forces Groups

Strength: 116,300

Moderate capability to maintain internal security and limited resistance to external aggression. Military leadership prescribes with political-economic affairs. Inadequate officer command and staff supervision of operational missions. Shortage of modern equipment. Ineffective logistics system, insufficient combined arms training. Needs in modernize and standardize basic weapons and equipment of infantry divisions. To improve amphibious capabilities and to supply and maintain a more responsive logistics system.

**NAVY**
7 Destroyer types, 18 Coastal Patrol types, 21 Riverine Patrol, 18 Mine Warfare types, 19 Amphibious types, 7 Auxiliary types, 1 Anti-Submarine Warfare Squadron (6-21), 1 Marine Brigade, 3 Marine Infantry Battalions, 3 Marine Light Infantry Battalions, 3 Marine Artillery Battalions.

Strength: 25,752, which includes 6,392 Marines.

Limited ability to conduct coastal defense and patrol in Gulf of Thailand and internal waterways. Limited anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, transport, and amphibious support. Varies in operations of ships and equipment. Use of foreign supply sources. Shortage of trained personnel.

**AIR FORCE**

35 Jet, 57 Turbo-prop, 28 Helicopters. Strength: 42,100

Limited airborne operations, close support of the Army and day air defense.

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**BASIC INFORMATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
<td>196,600 Sq Miles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limits of Territorial Waters</td>
<td>12 Nautical Miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits of Economic Zone</td>
<td>None Claimed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>41,189,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual Growth</td>
<td>2.8 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>70 Percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>61 Years</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARABLE Land Per Capita</td>
<td>20 Acres</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross National Product (1979)</td>
<td>102 Billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per Capita</td>
<td>2,490</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense Budget (FY 77)</td>
<td>767.7 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of Total Government Budget</td>
<td>17.8 Percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION**

- **U.S. Ambassador**: Mr. Charles K. Whitehouse
- **U.S. Aid Director**: Mr. Roger Frost
- **Chief of Mission**: Col. James E. Walker USA

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 78, p. 78. Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
(C) Thai FMS credit purchase plans for FY 78 included the following: 1

- Personnel carriers (M113A1).
- 60 cal. machine guns.
- War reserve munitions.
- Medium transport aircraft (C-130).
- Medium tanks (17).
- Medium patrol boats (3).

(6) In addition to the above items, the Thai had requested P&B data for A-4 aircraft, and the MSAP indicated Thai interest in procuring another squadron of F-5E aircraft (one purchased FY 76), and one squadron of A-10 type aircraft in FY 81 time frame. 2

(6) On 25 February 1977 the Secretary of State announced that grant aid for Thailand would be terminated after FY 78. 3

Request for F-8 CRUSADER Information

(6) In November 1977 General Hill, CINCPACAF, received a personal letter from General Kriangsak Chomanan, Supreme Commander, Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) requesting his opinion on the F-8 CRUSADER as a replacement for Thai T-28 aircraft. The letter also referred to recent Laotian acquisition of 10 MIG-21s and revealed RTARF concern over this new threat. General Hill, in turn, requested CINCPAC's assistance in developing an appropriate response to General Kriangsak's letter. CINCPAC did not support F-8 acquisition because a new aircraft system would further complicate the RTARF logistics system, spare parts support for the F-8 was uncertain, and the F-8 was considered too sophisticated for Thai maintenance capabilities. CINCPACAF's response to General Kriangsak's personal letter supported CINCPAC's position and discouraged F-8 acquisition. 4

3. SECSTATE 043000/252330Z Feb 77.
Tube-Launched, Optically-Trackged, Wire-Command Link Guided Missile (TOW) System

(U) On 29 September 1976 CINCPAC assessed the armor capability of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) for the post-1980 time frame. As a result, CINCPAC recommended that Thailand include TOW in the next MSAP submission. The FY 79-83 MSAP for Thailand was approved and the TOW system was included. Chief, JUSMAGTHAI on 21 April 1977 stated that the RTA strongly desired the TOW system, but that, even if approved immediately, procurement lead time would delay system acquisition until early 1980. The request for release of TOW to Thailand was being evaluated by the Secretary of Defense through year's end.1

Release of CHAPARRAL (Basic)

(U) On 17 May 1977 the Department of the Army advised that commercial representatives for CHAPARRAL wanted to provide Thailand with data on the system, and requested the Country Team to provide a coordinated position for recommending an exception to the National Disclosure Policy. A joint JUSMAGTHAI/American Embassy reply on 24 May 1977 supported release of the information to the RTARF. On 28 May 1977 CINCPAC requested the Secretary of Defense to delay approval of release until the Chief, JUSMAGTHAI obtained additional information on overall Thai air defense requirements. At the same time, CINCPAC requested Chief, JUSMAGTHAI to propose to the Thai that a study be accomplished, if one had not already been done, examining total air defense needs for Thailand. Upon receipt by CINCPAC a better assessment could be made of individual elements of the Thai air defense system. Chief, JUSMAGTHAI advised that air defense studies had been accomplished but that they were unable to get hard copies from the Thai. On 7 June 1977 the Secretary of Defense concurred with CINCPAC's position. On 19 July 1977 the Secretary of Defense advised that the review process for exception to National Disclosure Policy would be lengthy. Acquisition was supported by the JCS and the case was under State Department review through year's end.2

AGM-65A MAVERICK for Thailand

(U) On 20 May 1977 the Chief, JUSMAGTHAI requested P&B data for the AGM-65A weapon system, including F-5E/F modification, weapons, test equipment, and associated training. CINCPAC viewed the request as premature and advised that the system had not been included in either the current JSOP or MSAP, and that it was considered a high technology system which had only been released to one PACOM

1. J476 HistSum Apr 77.
country (Korea). CINCPAC requested complete rationale and planned acquisition time frame if the Country Team considered the system to be a valid requirement. The rationale to include AGM-65A in the Thai weapons inventory was based on Thai perception of a significant external armor threat in the post-1980 time frame. It was thought that this system would provide much the same anti-tank, air-to-ground, kill capability as in a proposed MSAP A-10/AX purchase, but at a greatly reduced cost.

Replacement for Aging T-28 Aircraft

(5) During the second half of 1977 the RTAF continued its quest for an air-to-ground capability to counter the perceived external armor threat in the mid-1980's. With the possibility of obtaining the AGM-65A MAVERICK weapons system eliminated, the Thai submitted requests for P&B data on one squadron of 12-to-16 A-10A aircraft; A-37 aircraft; and A-4M aircraft as possible replacements for their aging T-28 aircraft. CINCPAC supported release of P&B data on the A-10 but, because it was considered to comprise advanced technology, chose to reserve judgment on actual procurement until the Thai response could be assessed. CINCPAC also recommended approval to release P&B data on the A-4M. P&B data was provided by Headquarters, USAF on the A-37 on 17 August 1977.3

Tonga

(6) During May 1977 the American Embassy, Wellington, New Zealand informed CINCPAC and the State Department that the Crown Price of Tonga had inquired if it would be possible for Tonga to purchase some new military vehicles for transportation purposes. Tonga was not currently listed as one of the foreign countries eligible to purchase defense articles and services under the FMS Act;

1. J476 HistSum May 77.
therefore, on 13 May CINCPAC requested that Tonga be added to the list of approved countries. On 20 May the JCS informed CINCPAC and the American Embassy, Wellington that the issue was under review. In June 1977 the Secretary of State advised the Ambassador in Wellington that the State Department did not support the addition of Tonga to the list of countries eligible for procurement of U.S. defense equipment, since such action would be counter to the President's announced policy on restraint of new arms sales.

CHAPTER VIII--PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES
SECTION I--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
CINCPAC Headquarters

Outstanding Performance Ratings (OPRs) for Civilian Personnel

(U) The following were the results of OPRs, including Quality Step Increases (QSI) and Sustained Superior Performance Awards (SSPA), for civilian employees of CINCPAC for the rating period 1 April 1976 to 31 March 1977:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilians Assigned</th>
<th>OPRs Recommended</th>
<th>OPRs Approved</th>
<th>Cash Awards Recommended QSI</th>
<th>Cash Awards Approved SSPA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>51 (41%)</td>
<td>30 (24%)</td>
<td>25 (20%) 5 (4%)</td>
<td>4 (3%) 11 (9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Federal Day 1977 Awards Program

(U) Mr. Lehman L. Henry, Operations Research Analyst, Research and Analysis Office (J77), was selected as the "Outstanding Federal Employee of the Year--Non-Supervisory" at an awards luncheon on 24 June 1977. He was selected from a field of more than 30,000 Federal employees in Hawaii and the Pacific region.

UMP Training Program

(U) On 14 December 1976 the first training vacancy, Computer Aid (Typing) GS-335-5, Analysis and Programming Branch, Communications-Data Processing Directorate, was announced under the Navy's Upward Mobility Program (UMP). The goal of the UMP was to provide an opportunity for advancement in another occupational field for employees with competitive Civil Service status and potential, whose current assignment did not so provide. The length of training could range from six months to two years, depending on the time required to prepare the employee to perform successfully in the target position.

(U) During the latter part of 1977 a potential UMP position was identified within the Command History Branch, Headquarters Administrative Division, Office of the Joint Secretary; however, extensive assessment of the professional

2. J144 HistSum Jun 77.
requirements of the position vis-a-vis UMP delayed formal designation and announcement past the end of the year.¹

PACOM Country Activities

Civilian Care at U.S. Military Medical Facilities

(U) The Secretary of Defense announced new reimbursement rates for civilian inpatient ($168 per day) and outpatient ($20 a visit) care at overseas military medical facilities effective 1 April 1977. The rates were to apply for the first time to non-U.S. citizen employees at overseas posts. Excepted were those covered at other rates specified in current labor agreements or country-to-country agreements.²

(U) The following CINCPAC-initiated exemptions were granted for PACOM third country national (TCN) employees of the U.S. Forces:³

- U.S.-Republic of Philippines Offshore Labor Agreement (OLA) of 1968. This agreement provided for U.S. Forces Filipino employees employed outside the Philippines to be given medical and emergency dental care or health insurance equivalent to that provided Filipino employees of the U.S. Forces in the Philippines, to include hospitalization where necessary and appropriate. U.S. Forces in the Philippines also provided free health insurance to Filipino employees in the Philippines.

- Extension of the same medical coverage, as contained in the 1968 OLA, to all U.S. Forces-employed TCNs in the PACOM, as approved by the Secretary of Defense in 1969.

(U) In addition to the above exceptions, CINCPAC requested subordinate unified commanders and CINCPACREPs to identify any other country-to-country agreement or union contract which might be a basis for exception. Negative responses were received from all but CINCPACREP PHIL, who reported free emergency medical and dental care being given Filipino employees under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. That information was relayed to the Secretary of Defense.⁴

2. Jl21 HistSum Apr 77.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
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GAO Survey of LN Compensation Plans and Retirement Benefits

(U) The General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted surveys of U.S. Government local national (LN) compensation plans and retirement benefits in Korea and the Philippines during the period February-June 1977. The surveys were part of a larger GAO review at the direction of the Senate Appropriations Committee, which also covered Japan, Germany and Italy; however, the survey for Japan was deferred during 1977.1

(U) The GAO interim memoranda of findings confirmed most U.S. pay setting methods and practices; however, a number of recommendations were made. These included: making the survey of key jobs more representative of the U.S. Forces workforce (Korea and Philippines); including representative host government organizations in the survey sample (Korea); pulling allowances and payments-in-kind out of base pay (Philippines); developing statistical data on length of service pay practices (Korea and Philippines); and some tightening up of survey procedures.2

(U) One non-survey item singled out for study was the method of computation and accrual of severance pay in Korea. The GAO recommended that the severance pay obligation for each employee be calculated annually or bi-annually and deposited to an employee-designated Korean bank account. Withdrawal would be authorized only at the time of separation. With a current 18 percent annual interest rate for Korean bank deposits, the GAO estimated the employee would benefit as well or better than under the existing escalating accrual plan, at considerable savings to the U.S. Government.3

(U) A GAO recommendation which received strong objections from PACOM headquarters and Service representatives advocated a change in the method for setting pay rates in both countries whereby the industrial average pay rate (developed by survey of private industrial practices) would be matched to a step (at all pay levels) that represented the average in-grade length of service of U.S. Forces employees. The current method matched the industrial average rate to the mid-step rate of the pay scale. The PACOM Service representatives argued that industrial average pay rates had no direct relationship to U.S. Forces employee tenure and that the average tenure step would shift upward with a stable workforce, thereby denying employees a warranted portion of pay increases. The GAO team, however, had estimated that a $4.7 million one-time savings in Korea would result from that recommendation, so the House Appropriations

1. J121 HistSum Aug 77.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

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Civilian Participation in Guam Constitutional Convention

(U) On 14 March 1977 CINCPACREP GUAM requested that DOD employees who might be elected to serve as representatives at the Guam Constitutional Convention be permitted to serve without charge to leave or pay. The duration of the convention was to be about 120 days. Reasons cited for such a procedure included:

- The Convention was considered important to the Territory's political growth.
- Federal employees comprised 20 percent of the working population.
- DOD interest would be best represented by those working for the DOD and knowledgeable of military needs.
- There was a strong interrelationship between DOD and the Territorial government.
- The Guam Legislature had passed a law permitting this benefit for Territorial employees elected to serve.

(U) CINCPAC referred this issue to the Secretary of Defense, who advised that there was no authority for such extended excuse of employees despite the interest to the Federal service. It was further clarified that such excusals were generally limited to five days at the most. The issue had been reviewed with the Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel and the U.S. Civil Service Commission and no further action was taken.

Labor Cost Sharing in Japan

(U) Periodic CINCPAC urging resulted in action during 1976 to begin joint U.S.-Government of Japan (GOJ) working level discussions on sharing the cost of the U.S. Forces local national workforce which, by the end of FY 77, totaled $340 million for annual wages plus an accrued retirement pay obligation of about $496 million, not to mention insurance, differential, language allowance, and labor administrative fees.

2. Ibid.
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The joint discussions, beginning in March, continued through 1977. At the second negotiation meeting on 28 April, the U.S. panel formally proposed that the GOJ assume all of the following costs:

- Retirement allowance costs and liabilities.
- Labor costs which exceeded prevailing Japanese local practice (10% USF pay differential above base pay, and language allowance).
- Social insurance costs (3.5% of base pay).
- GOJ Defense Facilities Administration Agency labor administration costs (projected JFY 76-81, $27.2 million).

At the third meeting in June 1977 the GOJ presented a paper, noting that the U.S. side had widened the scope of negotiations beyond the December 1976 joint study; questioning the legality of the U.S. requests based on the U.S.-GOJ Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA); and seeking further rationale for the U.S. concept of cost sharing. Furthermore, the Japanese press disclosed the negotiations to the public, focusing on the SOFA provision that the United States would bear all expenditures incident to maintaining the U.S. Forces in Japan.

An August 1977 press report revealed that the GOJ had tentatively determined to bear ¥6 billion (about $25 million) of the labor costs (currently totaling about ¥100 billion annually), which could only be expected to cover such items as social insurance and GOJ administrative expenses. The U.S. side had hoped for more than this token ¥6 billion cost relief; however, further negotiations resulted in both sides signing an agreement on 19 December 1977 (approved by the U.S.-Japan Joint SOFA Committee on 22 December 1977) as a first step toward cost sharing. The agreement provided for:

- GOJ absorption, beginning 1 April 1978, of yearly USF Japanese labor costs for employer's social security related premiums and labor management charges (first year totaled ¥6 billion).

2. J121 HistSum Jun 77.

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CONFIDENTIAL

- U.S. agreement to one-year smooth implementation of annual wage increase (averaging 6.92%, retroactive to 1 April 1977), and willingness to endeavor to do the same in future years.

Revised Wage Schedules for Korean LN Employees

(U) Revised wage schedules for Korean LN employees were based on data obtained during a survey of 97 private sector firms in four Korean urban areas during August and September 1977. Revised compensation benefits, effective 1 November 1977, resulted in an average increase of 15.4 percent for some 23,000 employees paid from appropriated and nonappropriated funds. Included in the increase was the raising of the consolidated allowance payment (represented cash amounts given to private sector for such purposes as meals, lodging, transportation, special skills, and cost of living) from 5.8 percent to 7.0 percent above base pay and continuation of a payment-in-kind allowance (represented an amount equivalent to benefits other than cash received by private sector employees in the form of employer-provided meals, bags of rice, uniforms, and transportation) of 36 won per hour to each employee.

(U) An occupational premium of 15 percent above base pay had been established in September 1977 for senior Korean engineers (KGS-12 and 13) and 10 percent for KGS-11 engineers, based on a modified wage survey of pay practices in Korean engineering firms and following an expression of grave concern by the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUS Korea) about excessive loss of engineers to Korean industry and overseas employment. The current survey did not generate sufficient information to specify precise engineer pay rates, although data indicated that senior level engineers in the private sector received more pay than their U.S. Forces LN peers. As a consequence, the 15 percent occupational premium for KGS-12 and 13 engineers was continued for 90 days pending a more intensive survey of Korean engineering industry pay practices. The 10 percent premium for KGS-11 engineers was curtailed based on lack of evidence that a premium was warranted.

(U) The Foreign Organization Employees Union (FOEU), representing the Korean LN employees, filed notice of a labor dispute with the Republic of Korea Office of Labor Affairs (OLA) concerning the small amount of the proposed pay increase. Threatened strikes against all U.S. activities did not occur, and labor peace was restored upon signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on wage increase acceptance by representatives of FOU, OLA and COMUS Korea on 1 November 1977.

1. J121 HistSum Nov 77.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
Consolidation of Civilian Personnel Services in Korea

(U) In December 1976 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DASD/M&RA) for Civilian Personnel Policy (CPP) requested CINCPAC to develop a PACOM Services-coordinated plan to consolidate civilian personnel servicing arrangements for all Defense organizations in Korea (this paralleled similar requests for consolidation studies on Oahu and in Japan). Department of the Army was by far the dominant employer and had long cross-serviced Department of the Navy civilians successfully, so the DASD asked that the Army servicing be expanded to include Department of the Air Force civilians. Based on the DASD tasking, CINCPAC requested Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and the U.S. Eighth Army to develop separate outline plans.

(U) In February the DASD/M&RA (CPP) requested the U.S. Army Director of Civilian Personnel, in conjunction with the Department of the Air Force, to establish a study group in Korea to explore the following three alternatives for consolidation:

Alternative 1: Reorganize all existing in-country servicing civilian personnel offices. The eight Department of Army offices and the one Department of Air Force office would thus become a single civilian personnel office situated in Seoul with units, as necessary, at installation sites remote from Seoul.

Alternative 2: Transfer the Department of Air Force civilian personnel office located at Osan to the Department of Army. Under this arrangement, there would be a total of nine separate Department of Army civilian personnel offices providing personnel servicing throughout Korea.

Alternative 3: Shift teacher civilian personnel servicing responsibilities from the Department of Air Force civilian personnel office in Osan to the Department of Army civilian personnel office in Seoul.

(U) During the course of the in-country study, President Carter announced his intent to withdraw troops from Korea. This affected the 15 April 1977 study results, which recommended rejection of alternatives 2 and 3, but recognized the need for more information on future workforce size before further

1. J121 HistSum Jul 77.
2. ASD/M&RA/Memo/8 Feb 77, Subj: Consolidation of Civilian Personnel Services in Korea.
consideration could be given to the first alternative. At year's end, consolidation proposals were in abeyance, pending Departmental level consideration of the Eighth Army recommendation to Headquarters, Department of the Army (in August 1977) that such planning was premature in view of the status of U.S. forces drawdown planning.

ROK Medical Insurance Law

(U) The Republic of Korea (ROK) Government enacted a medical insurance law for application to all employers of more than 500 workers in the ROK effective, by Presidential Decree, July 1977. The law required employers to contract for medical coverage of employees and their dependents to provide a significant portion of hospitalization and outpatient care costs and funeral expenses. It further required this coverage to be provided through government-supervised and "company"-established insurance organizations under complex operating regulations. A question arose as to whether the U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK), as a large employer, would be required to comply with the law.

(U) The legal interpretation of the Medical Insurance law by USFK was that they were not required to comply with the provisions of the law but only to "conform with" the intent of the law based on the Status of Forces Agreement. To this end, the USFK Joint Labor Affairs Committee agreed to study the prevailing practices in the Korean private sector to maintain comparability in providing medical benefits. CINCPAC concurred in this approach and in a USFK letter to the ROK Secretary, ROK-U.S. Joint Committee, notified him of this interpretation.

Wage Schedules and Fringe Benefits in the Philippines

(U) Revised schedules of wages for some 21,000 LN employees in the Philippines were based on data obtained during a wage change and fringe benefits survey of 30 private sector employers in the greater Manila area during August 1977. The new wage rates, effective 1 October 1977, resulted in an increase in base pay of 3.6 percent for manual and 10 percent for non-manual employees paid from appropriated and nonappropriated funds.

(U) In addition to base pay increases, an earlier approved emergency allowance of 50 pesos per month was increased to 110 pesos per month for all employees. This was based on prevailing private sector practice in response to

1. J121 HistSum Jul 77.
2. J121 HistSum Aug 77.
3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 042316Z Aug 77.
4. J121 HistSum Sep 77.
Government of the Philippines (GOP) Presidential Decrees in 1974 and 1977. On 30 August 1977 the GOP Undersecretary of Labor officially requested that payment of this allowance be made retroactive to 1 May 1977, the date of the 1977 Presidential Decree. CINCPAC referral of this issue to the DASD/M&RA (CPP) resulted in the finding that, in the absence of a controlling statute to the contrary, no increase in compensation could be made effective prior to the date of final action by the wage fixing authority. This finding was based on the following Comptroller General Decisions: 24 CG 676 (1945); 40 CG 212 (1960); and 55 CG 162 (1975).1

Also, during the 1977 wage survey, data was collected on industrial practices to separate from base pay the cost of payments-in-kind given to employees in the form of commodities and services. In-country Navy commands recommended, and the PACOM Services supported, the position to defer payment-in-kind withdrawal for 1977. Deferral was based on the impracticability of the withdrawal, considering the small blue collar pay increase, as well as questionable PACOM-level authority to take unilateral action within the provisions of Paragraph 2, Article I of the U.S.-RP Bases Labor Agreement.2

Another prevailing fringe benefit practice in surveyed firms in 1977 was to grant cash payments to employees for some portion of accrued but unused sick leave. Based on this practice, PACOM Services approved the placement of all sick leave in excess of 120 hours (15 days) in an employee's sick leave account as of 1 October 1977 into a "banked account." That account was to be held for future use or as a credit towards severance/retirement, in accordance with provisions of the USF-Federation Collective Bargaining Agreement of January 1976. After the "banked account" was set aside, employees (old and new) who accrued more than 120 hours additional unused sick leave would be paid off at the end of each leave year for unused hours in excess of 120 at 50 percent of the then current basic rate of pay. When terminated for other than cause, all unused sick leave except for the "banked account" would be paid off at 50 percent of the final basic pay rate. Disability termination would result in pay off of all unused sick leave, including the "banked account," at 100 percent of the final basic pay rate.3

Night Shift Differential for Filipino LN Patron Service Workers

On 22 March 1977 CINCPACREP PHIL and component commands in the Philippines were authorized to negotiate a written agreement with the Federation of Filipino Civilian Employees Associations (Federation) to provide for payment

1. Ibid.; CINCPAC 222040Z Sep 77; SECDEF 2026/080427Z Oct 77.
2. J12T HistSum Sep 77.
3. Ibid.
of a night shift differential (NSD) to LN patron service employees. An NSD of 15 percent of base pay was approved for shift work between 2200 and 0600 hours, to become effective on or after the date of agreement signing. This action, in effect, changed the USF-Federation three-year Collective Bargaining Agreement, which had specifically excluded patron service employees from NSD eligibility.\footnote{1}

\footnote{1} Agreement on the NSD was reached and initialed at a 24 March 1977 U.S.-RP Joint Labor Committee Meeting. CINCPACREP PHIL requested a retroactive effective date of 1 March 1977, but the Services denied the request based on lack of authority for retroactive approval. Subsequently, CINCPACREP PHIL advised that an interim agreement on NSD eligibility had been signed by a USF representative with the Federation on 7 March 1977 without specifying an effective date. Based on this previous agreement, CINCPAC and the PACOM Services recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the effective date be changed from 24 March to 7 March 1977 in the best interest of the U.S. Government.\footnote{2}

\footnote{2} The Secretary of Defense, in response to the PACOM recommendation, advised that:\footnote{3}

- Regulations governing appropriated fund employees prohibited retroactive wage increases except to correct administrative error, and no "interest of the government" authority existed for this purpose.

- Regulations governing nonappropriated fund employees, such as those affected, allowed discretion in establishing wages retroactively.

- In accordance with Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the Base Labor Agreement of 1968, the U.S. Government was obligated to treat all employees uniformly, regardless of source of funds.

- Since the parties had reached an agreement to pay NSD to the nonappropriated fund patron service employees on 7 March 1977, an exception was made in this instance and approval was given to pay the employees effective that date.

\footnote{1}{J121 HistSum Jul 77.}
\footnote{2}{Ibid.}
\footnote{3}{Ibid.; CINCPAC 280023Z May 77; SECDEF 1720/120011Z Jul 77.}
Philippines Labor Relations

Labor was one of 25 issues unresolved when Military Bases Agreement negotiations were suspended in 1976. Based in part on the increased interest generated during those negotiations, the U.S.-RP Joint Labor Committee became noticeably active in early 1977. The Committee, established under terms of the 1968 U.S.-RP Bases Labor Agreement, served as a safety-valve forum for issues unresolved through collective bargaining between USF management and the Federation.¹

Issues raised to the committee by the union in 1977 included preferential hiring for Filipinos, disciplinary action appeals, arbitration procedures, medical benefits, and cash allowances for employees. Progress was made in resolving most of these and overcoming misunderstandings, although action was not completed on all by year's end.²

In October, following the establishment of the short-lived Joint Task Force (JTF) on Bases Irritants, the GOP Undersecretary of Labor introduced into the JTF 12 labor irritants on which the GOP sought resolution. Most of the 12 were restatements of points not resolved during the 1976 bases negotiations. Six would have required modification to the Bases Labor Agreement, and thereby went beyond the charter of JTF action.³

- U.S. pay rates for all.
- Assurance of Filipino security of employment.
- Extension of Bases Labor Agreement coverage to barracks hires, social entertainers, bag boys.
- Union dues from all Filipino employees—whether or not members.
- Retroactive payment of emergency allowance.
- Increase in Bases Labor Agreement 200 peso once-a-year allowance.

In a subsequent action, the JTF referred all 12 labor items to the U.S.-RP Joint Labor Committee for detailed review and response.⁴

1. J121 HistSum Dec 77.
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
At a November 1977 meeting of the Joint Labor Committee, the U.S. delegation raised its own set of irritants on labor, countering the Philippines list of labor irritants. No action was taken, and no additional committee meetings were held in 1977. In discussions between Ambassador Newsom and President Marcos in mid-November 1977, it was agreed that labor matters were beyond the scope of the JTF and would become a part of broader discussions.¹

Revised Wage Schedules for LN Employees on Taiwan

Revised wage schedules for Chinese LN employees were based on data obtained during a wage change survey of 50 private sector firms in the Taipei area in September and October 1977. The new rates, effective 18 December 1977, resulted in an average total compensation increase of 9 percent for some 1,600 general schedule and patron service employees paid from appropriated and non-appropriated funds. As a part of the increase, the payment-in-kind allowance was raised from 4.3 to 5.0 New Taiwan Dollars per hour for each employee. That allowance represented an amount equivalent to benefits received by private sector employees in the form of employer provided meals, uniforms, transportation, and other non-cash benefits.²

¹ Ibid.
² JT21 HistSum Nov 77.
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SECTION II--MISCELLANEOUS PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

U.S. Customs Service

Accredited Military Customs Program-Thailand

(U) United States Customs Service (USCS) accreditation was withdrawn from the military customs inspection program at the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI), Bangkok, effective 31 December 1977. This action was taken by Headquarters, USCS, based on recommendations by the USCS Military Customs Advisor for Thailand, the CINCPAC staff, and the Military Customs Coordinator, Department of the Army. The recommendations were prompted because the number of assigned personnel at JUSMAGTHAI had dropped below the level required to justify and support a military customs program. Subunified Commands and Service components were advised of the withdrawal of accreditation and, because Thailand was the major heroin transshipment country in the Pacific, they were also cautioned to provide increased customs surveillance to DOD aircraft and shipments transiting Thailand. Subsequent to 31 December 1977 shipments from Thailand to the customs territory of the United States were to be processed by the USCS at the port of entry. \(^1\)

Predeparture Customs Program

(U) During the last half of 1977 the Military Airlift Command (MAC) sought to terminate the predeparture customs clearance program, initiated in August 1971, and return this responsibility to the USCS at U.S. ports of entry. Reasons for termination given by MAC included: the decline in passengers transported by MAC, from over three million to just over one million, because the greater portion of DOD passengers were traveling in the commercial environment; multiple inspections being experienced by DOD passengers under the program; and the unwarranted cost of the program in relation to its results. MAC had reviewed the PACOM Military Customs Report of 8 August 1977, which revealed that 583 full-time and 709 part-time military and DOD civilian personnel had participated in predeparture customs inspections during the first three quarters of FY 77 during which time they inspected 601,000 passengers, crews and baggage and seized 304 controlled substance (.0005 hit rate), and, 1,584 items of contraband (.0026 hit rate). \(^2\)

(U) On 30 November the CINCPAC Chief of Staff expressed the opinion that predeparture military customs inspections should continue, and that their deletion would weaken the PACOM narcotics interdiction effort and remove a

\(^1\) J111 HistSum Dec 77.
\(^2\) Hq MAC/TRAP Background Paper, 5 Nov 77, Subj: Predeparture Customs Program.
strong deterrent to illegal drug trafficking. As for multiple inspections of DOD personnel, CINCPAC noted that the USCS had discontinued routine reexamination of DOD passengers and accompanied baggage on pre-inspected flights.

(U) On 3 December 1977 the Commander in Chief, MAC noted that the Army, as Executive Agent for the DOD program, had undertaken a review of predeparture customs practices at his request, and that Generals Huyser and Blanchard had recommended that they be stopped in the European theater. Further arguments offered against continuing the program included the fact that complete predeparture processing was unattainable, since U.S. law did not permit collecting duties outside the United States; also, the performance of agriculture inspections at the onload point hindered adequate inflight feeding, affecting MAC aircrew health and possibly impacting on flight safety.2

(U) On 19 December 1977 the CINCPAC Chief of Staff responded to CINCMAC that the PACOM position was to be as supportive as possible of MAC's objective of expeditious processing at the customs territory of the United States while continuing with the beneficial military customs program. The CINCPAC Chief of Staff pointed out the aggressive actions being taken by the USCS, Department of the Army, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the overseas commands to eliminate non-essential reexamination of DOD passengers. These actions included a planned joint DOD/USCS/USDA test to be conducted in early 1978 to insure Agriculture's requirements were met during overseas predeparture examinations. Further, the goals of the test included allowing for use of unrestricted foodstuffs in flight and elimination of further USDA examinations of DOD pre-examined flights at the customs territory ports of entry. Successful completion of this test would permit desired convenience for the DOD traveler, while at the same time providing the essential narcotics/contraband deterrence dictated by the DOD military customs program. The CINCPAC Chief of Staff offered to reevaluate the PACOM position should the European test be unsuccessful. The test was pending at years' end.3

Operation DEEP FREEZE

(U) During the latter part of 1977 the CINCPAC staff, at the request of the Commander, Naval Support Forces, Antarctica, at Christchurch, New Zealand, worked to establish a military customs program to facilitate movement of DOD Operation DEEP FREEZE personnel and cargo into the customs territory of the United States. CINCPAC gained approval for the effort from the Department of Army (DOD Executive Agent for military customs), Headquarters, USCS, and pledges

1. CINCPAC 101 1tr, Ser 2463 of 30 Nov 77, n.s.
2. COMAC 1tr, 3 Dec 1977, n.s.
3. CINCPAC 1tr Ser 2587, 9 Dec 77 to CINCMAC, n.s.
of support from the National Science Foundation.  

(U) Unique problems challenged formulation of the military customs inspection program because of joint DOD/National Science Foundation participation, the presence of foreign nationals, and use of non-DOD aircraft in support of the Task Force. New Zealand Customs officials were also cooperating.  

(U) Test examinations of several flights in December 1977 intercepted items of narcotics, prohibited combustibles and agriculture products, and numerous items of Government property. Based on observations by the staff customs representative, CINCPACREP Guam, successful achievement of accreditation by the USCS in February 1978 was predicted. The full benefits of the program would be derived in the next season's DEEP FREEZE redeployment.  

Privately Owned Vehicle Import Controls  

(U) Discussions in mid-February 1977 between the CINCPAC Staff Military Customs Representative and the Chief, Military Transportation Management Command, Pacific Field Office, revealed a problem in importing privately owned vehicles (POVs) back into the U.S. customs territory from U.S. Trust Territories when the vehicles had entered the Territories from other overseas area. Specifically, the Department of Defense/Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had made no provisions to clear U.S. entry of vehicles owned by personnel on consecutive overseas tours to Guam and American Samoa from other overseas areas. Vehicles operated in Guam, American Samoa, and other U.S. Territories were exempt from importation controls because unleaded gasoline was readily available. As a result of the CINCPAC staff inquiry, the Department of the Army, the USCS, and EPA developed a joint policy exempting from EPA controls all POVs entering the United States from U.S. Territories. This policy was expected to result in reduced administrative workload and expense for PACOM units.  

Guam Public Schools  

(U) Over the years many military families on Guam had been disenchanted with the quality of education their children received in the Guam public schools because of the shortage of teachers, crowded classrooms, and student harassment.  

(U) In 1976 the Air Force had hoped to establish a Section VI or DOD School  

1. J1 BWEB, 12-25 Sep 77.  
2. Ibid.  
4. J1 BWEB 19 Dec 77-2 Jan 78.  
5. J114 HistSum Apr 77.
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(PL 81 874, Section VI schools operated under the Department of Health, Education and Welfare). In May 1976 super typhoon PAMELA struck Guam, devastating many school buildings, and adding to an already undesirable situation. Immediate priority then shifted to a phased program for improvement of Guam public schools and, in October, a coordinator of federal resources from the U.S. Office of Education was assigned as special assistant to the Guam Director of Education.1

(U) CINCPAC continued to monitor the Guam school situation through 1977 and, in April 1977, recommended through the DOD that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare continue to monitor for another year the actions started and recommendations made to the Governor of Guam by the task force sent there in 1976.2

(U) Among further efforts to help alleviate crowded classroom conditions, the Air Force, on 29 April 1977, announced the availability of three buildings at Andersen Air Force Base for use as temporary (not more than five years) public high school facilities.3

FY 78 Combined Federal Campaign - Pacific

(U) PACOM contributions to the Combined Federal Campaign pressed the two million mark for the first time in FY 78. The total was $1,995,247.30—a 20 percent increase over FY 77. The first "million-dollar" year was 1974, and donations had nearly doubled since then in spite of significant reductions in the numbers of personnel assigned.4

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4. J113 HistSum Dec 77.

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1. CINCPAC Ltr (J2210 Ser S541), 1 Dec 76 to JCS, Subj: PACOM Intelligence Data Handling Required Operational Capability (ROC), which cited MJCS-149-76 of 10 May 76.
2. Ibid.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(U) In 1975 the Department of Defense (DOD) approved a CINCPAC proposal for a PDSC as a separate command under CINCPAC, with one operating system on a 24-hour per day, seven day per week basis. The PDSC concept was to consolidate automated data processing (ADP) from five locations using 1,000 programs in ten program languages and three operating systems. The component commands would be served by mini-computers with full access to the PDSC main frame.¹

(U) In 1976 required operational capabilities (ROCs) documents for the indications and warning (I&W) data analysis collecting system and the intelligence data handling system (IDHS) were validated by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and forwarded to the JCS for review. By memorandum to CINCPAC in May 1976, the JCS advised that the ROCs were responsive to current guidance and requested CINCPAC to develop an implementation plan to support the ROCs and to initiate the preceding overview study to determine CINCPAC’s long-range intelligence requirements and the resulting resource applications. A five-volume report on the PDSC was completed by the RCA Corporation and a contract for systems engineering/system integration (SE/SI) was awarded to the Hughes Aircraft Corporation (HAC). The first major product under the HAC contract was a master automated data system (ADS) development plan to provide the basis for future budgetary actions regarding the PDSC. This plan, completed on 1 October 1976, designated the CINCPAC Director for Intelligence (J2) as the PDSC Program Manager. The Intelligence Center of the Pacific (IPAC) was tasked with the responsibility for operation and management of the PDSC host complex along with specific subsystems supporting PACOM I&W and IPAC analysis functions.²

During the first part of 1977, pending approval of ADS, the PACOM Systems Architectural Group (PSAG), in conjunction with HAC and IPAC, continued to refine the various complex elements of the PDSC. In January the PDSC functional description was staffed by IPAC and the component commands. The functional description described user and ADP system requirements in detail as a basis for PDSC system design.1

In February, HAC continued the development of the PDSC simulation model, and forwarded the PDSC security plan document to the Rome Air Development Center (RADC) as a contract deliverable, to the DIA for approval, and to the components, IPAC, and the Washington community for information. HAC also forwarded the PDSC functional description document to RADC as a contract deliverable with information to all concerned. Work also continued by HAC on the PDSC preliminary subsystem specification and the automated data processing equipment (ADPE) systems specification-Part II. Also in February, IPAC issued a military inter-departmental purchase request (MIPR) in the amount of $300,000 to RADC for ADP systems design support of the PDSC. The MIPR provided the funds for the continuation of the HAC contract through FY 1977. It was in February also that a CINCPAC J2 representative visited Washington to brief key personnel on PDSC issues and the need to continue the contractual support provided by HAC. On 25 February the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) approved the funds for the follow-on contract with Hughes. The contract, to run through December 1977, provided for a detailed PDSC design.2

The PDSC preliminary subsystems specification document was published and distributed in March. Part II of the ADPE system specifications was distributed by HAC to the Service components and IPAC for comment. The preliminary subsystem specification document defined subsystem functions and interfaces to accomplish the tasks specified in the PDSC functional description document. The ADPE system specification defined the complete computer hardware configuration for the PDSC system. It would be used to prepare procurement specifications for hardware acquisition and detailed equipment base line for all PDSC operating/using organizations. A PDSC installation and engineering plan, which included all information for site planning and equipment installation, was completed and reviewed by the operating organizations. In March the PSAG also rewrote Section VII of the ADS development plan (Project Management). Major changes included the consolidation of software development and hardware integration efforts under a prime contractor and the establishment of a verification and validation (V&V) contractor to provide technical support to the PSAG. A statement of work (SOW) for the V&V contractor was completed and

2. J21 and IPAC HistSums Feb 77.
staffed for comments in April. It was also in April that the feasibility of locating the PDSC host and communications computers in one centralized location (Building 20, Camp Smith) was investigated.\(^1\)

(U) In August the PDSC installation and engineering plan was revised to provide for the centralization of all PDSC computers and the IBM 360/40 in Building 20 at Camp Smith. Also, discussions were initiated between CINCPAC and IPAC representatives and Electronics Systems Division (ESD) regarding the performance by MITRE Corporation of the V&V tasks for the PDSC development. The level of effort envisioned for this task was about six members of the MITRE technical staff beginning October in 1977 and continuing through 1981. The V&V effort would assist CINCPAC PDSC management and staff in the evaluation of proposals by the prime contractor and in the monitoring of the work performed by the prime and sub-contractors.\(^2\)

(U) In September the decision was made that hardware procurement for the PDSC would be from Bunker-Ramo Corporation. Bunker-Ramo representatives had visited CINCPAC J2 to develop equipment lists and "prices and delivery schedules." Word was also received by CINCPAC that the MITRE Corporation would provide people to perform the V&V tasks for PDSC.\(^3\)

(U) The ADS was approved by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management on 14 October 1977. This was a significant milestone in the evolution of the PDSC and was viewed by CINCPAC as legitimizing the PDSC. Representatives of CINCPAC, IPAC and the MITRE Corporation visited the RADC in early November to discuss the SOW for the prime contractor.\(^4\)

(U) Upon his return from RADC the CINCPAC J2 representative reported that the award to the PDSC prime contractor was expected to be made by April 1978. On 2 November the interior design for Building 20 on Camp Smith was finalized and approved. The ADS for the PDSC was revised to reflect changes in the PDSC sites, funding, hardware and milestones which had taken place during the year it was awaiting CNO approval. The delivery schedule of PDSC hardware had been revised to include the receipt of two computers by June 1978 and the remaining 11 computers during the period from September to December 1978. By the end of the year, RADC had advised CINCPAC that the award of a contract for PDSC development would be delayed to June 1978. This delay had caused CINCPAC J2 to revise the original interim operational capability (IOC) and final operational capability (FOC) milestones by six months. The new IOC date was

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1. J21 HistSums Mar, Apr 77.
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1 July 1980, and the FOC was 1 July 1981.¹

(U) Meanwhile, in August 1977 IPAC personnel initiated discussions with HAC toward the development of a PDSC integrated data base. IPAC proposed an in-depth analysis of existing data bases and files in order to develop data elements redundancy and input/output matrices, the construction of data dictionary, and a review of existing reporting requirements so that a "strawman" design could be planned and discussed. A data base design schedule was established with appropriate task responsibilities for HAC and IPAC participation. Initially, HAC consolidated and organized existing material already collected in data calls and analyst interviews and outlined areas in which information was not adequate. By late August IPAC advised HAC that approximately 1,000 data elements had been identified and included in the data element dictionary (DED) file. IPAC proposed to produce a list and pre-punch cards for each item in the DED data base which could be annotated with the appropriate classification "flags" by HAC.²

(U) In September HAC and IPAC personnel discussed the "strawman" data base design document which had been developed by HAC. It presented an approach to integrated data base access and addressed top level indexes, record chaining, and associated record connections. Late in September, IPAC personnel and HAC representatives discussed the SOW for the PDSC prime contractor. The electronic intelligence (ELINT) portion of the PDSC "strawman" data design document was reviewed, and HAC signified readiness to begin ELINT analyst interviews. By October Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) had provided IPAC a magnetic tape containing file descriptions of the PACAF files. IPAC modified the file format table dictionary processor to extract file information from the PACAF tape and load the information into the DED. By the end of October, the DED contained 1,900 data elements on IPAC, PACAF and Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC) files.³

PACOM IDHSC/WICS Network

(U) The PACOM Intelligence Data Handling System Communications (IDHSC) Network was designed to provide the intelligence community with communications up to the special intelligence/special activities office (SI/SAO) level for interactive, on-line query and response, and bulk data exchange using inter-netted IDHS computers on Oahu and in the Continental United States. Related to this system was the Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (WICS) which incorporated the PACOM IDHSC network. For clarity, this intelligence comnu-

1. IPAC HistSum Nov 77; J21 HistSum Dec 77.
2. IPAC HistSum Aug 77.
3. IPAC HistSum Sep, Oct 77.

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cations structure in the PACOM was labeled the PACOM IDHSC/WICS network; it included PACOM access to community on-line intelligence network systems (COINS) and the DIA on-line system (DIAOLS). 1

(U) In 1974 and 1975 the IDHSC/WICS system was extended to terminals in the Western Pacific (WESTPAC) at U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Headquarters in Seoul, U.S. Taiwan Defense (USTDC) Headquarters in Taipei, and had been approved for installation at the U.S. Forces Japan/5th Air Force Headquarters at Yokota Air Base and the 13th Air Force Headquarters at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. CINCPAC had tasked PACAF to establish IDHSC/WICS terminals at both of the Air Force-supported sites (Clark and Yokota), but operational status was dependent upon the acquisition and installation of an AN/GYQ-21(V) computer at Hickam Air Force Base and the delivery of Teletype Corporation Model 40 CRTs to the Air Force Intelligence Service for subsequent shipment to Clark and Yokota. The DIA had formally validated the functional requirement for an IDHSC/WICS terminal at the Fleet Air Intelligence Support Center (FAISC) at Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the Philippines. This task had been given by CINCPAC to the Pacific Fleet (PACFLT). During 1977, all three locations were included in the IDHSC. 2

(U) In March 1976 arrangements had been completed to provide the PACOM IDHSC/WICS network users with a WICS I "store and forward" access to 21 DIA files previously available only in the DIAOLS interactive mode. In May 1976 the DIA promulgated a WICS management implementation plan which called for an implementation of WICS II by May of 1977. In October 1976 the General Services Administration (GSA) determined that competitive bids were required to procure the 21(V) system and refused to delegate procurement authority to the Air Force. Since all planning had revolved around the 21(V) computer as a replacement at the PACOM switch and for the implementation of WICS II, full implementation was slipped into 1977. 3

(U) In September 1976 a contract for $100,000 was let to INCO Incorporated for the software development of WICS II. The contractor personnel were scheduled to arrive in the PACOM when the 21(V) equipment arrived in order to install the software and supervise the installation. However, it was not until June 1977 that procurement authority was given to RADC to procure the AN/GYQ-21(V) PACOM switch. One month before, in May 1977, the WICS nomenclature was officially changed to IDHSC II. Information received by CINCPAC estimated a December/January 1978 date for delivery/installation. The software to be...

2. Ibid.; J2/Memo/565-77 of 30 Sep 77, Subj: Annual Review of Goals and Accomplishments w/2 encl (hereafter referred to as Goals and Accomplishments).
utilized initially was the IDHSC I. Since the IDHSC II (WICS II) software was not expected to be available until at least May 1978, IDHSC I was to be utilized as an interim system. The DIA shipped the software for IDHSC I to CINCPAC for evaluation; no insurmountable problems were expected with the installation because the DIA software and teleprocessor package currently used by the DIA was to be installed.¹

(U) On 29 June 1977 an MPR of $191,000 was forwarded to the RADC for procurement of PACOM IDHSC switch hardware. In August CINCPAC was informed that RADC had accepted the MPR and, in November 1977, CINCPAC submitted a revised equipment procurement list which amended the MPR previously submitted and reflected the final system configuration.²

(U) In August 1977 CINCPAC submitted specifications to the Naval Supply Center, Pearl Harbor for the Fiscal Year 1978 software development contract for the PACOM switch. This contract, for $78,000, was issued to the IBM Corporation, and was expected to provide the necessary software development for smooth transition to the 21(V) switch in early 1978.³

(U) By the end of the year, the installation of AN/UYK-22 crypto ancillary units for USFK, TDC, and FAISC had been completed by the Navy Shore Electronics Engineering Activity Pacific. This capability was expected to provide WESTPAC users an interactive capability over the IDHSC DIALOS/COINS system. However, as the year ended, CINCPAC had been advised that the scheduled January 1978 delivery date for the new PACOM AN/GYQ-21(V) switch had been slipped to June 1978. IDHSC II implementation was expected to begin 60 days after the hardware was delivered.⁴

1. Ibid.; J21 HistSums, Jun-Dec 76 and Jun, Dec 77.
2. IPAC HistSums Jun, Aug, and Nov 77.
1. IPAC HistSum Jan 77.
2. IPAC HistSums Apr, May 77.
3. IPAC HistSum Jun 77.
4. IPAC histSum Aug 77.
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1. DIA 1383/092129Z Feb 77 (BOM); COMUSKOREA 475/110934Z Feb 77 (BOM), 476/110958Z Feb 77 (BOM), and 1393/180854Z Apr (BOM); CINCPAC ALFA 89/081715Z May 77; J34 HistSum May 77.
2. COMUSKOREA 2141/060820Z Jun 77 (BOM).
3. DIA 7082/152233Z Jun 77 (COM).

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2. Ibid.
3. IPAC HistSum Oct 77.

2. IPAC HistSum Aug 77; J22 Point Paper, 10 Nov 77, Subj: Key Defense Intelligence Issues (KDI) Fiscal Year 78, with 1 enclosure: CINCPAC 3003372 Aug 77.
IPAC Zero Base Budgeting

(U) On 11 January 1977 formal guidance was received from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) regarding the development of the Program Objectives Memorandum General Defense Intelligence Program (POM/GDIP) for FY 79-83. IPAC submitted a zero base budget (ZBB) for fiscal year 1979 in September 1977. In October guidance for the development of GDIP input to the FY 79 Congressional Justification Book was received from the CNO. The CNO requested additional backup data in the way of performance highlights, accomplishments and productivity enhancement projects to supplement the previously provided ZBB data and to assist in the development of the Congressional Justification Book.3

(U) On 8 November IPAC submitted a proposed modification to the CNO-prescribed ZBB report formats. This proposal requested that the ZBB formats be modified to accommodate multi-service resource data, with the ultimate acceptance of the modified formats to be incorporated into standard ZBB forms for use by joint-service GDIP activities. Later in November, IPAC was informed that the proposed modifications to the ZBB had been indorsed by the CNO and forwarded to DIA for consideration.4

(U) IPAC's input to Navy military and civilian manpower requirements for the FY 80 POM was submitted through CINCPAC J2 to the CINCPAC Comptroller in November. The submission consisted of the new program manpower resources (Navy personnel) needed for FY 80-84. In December IPAC received a letter from the DIA, dated 28 November 1977, which concurred in IPAC's suggestion to modify

1. Ibid.
2. Memo for Record, JCS (J3MI94/78), dated 17 Jan 78, Subj: Report of the Joint Staff Visit to the Pacific Command, 31 October-1 November 77 (hereafter cited as Joint Staff Memo); JCS 1089/252308Z Nov 77.
3. IPAC HistSums Jan, Aug and Oct 77.
4. IPAC HistSum Nov 77.
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the POM resource data formats to reflect separate breakouts by military Service. IPAC's proposal had been oriented to the objective of one annual POM submission by all joint-Service activities. If the recommended multi-service data formats were adopted, they would satisfy the Service-unique requirements of each military department and, concurrently, provide a composite overview of all-Service resource requirements to the DIA and the Defense Department.¹

IPAC Consolidation

(U) When IPAC was activated by the Secretary of Defense in 1974, the concept was predicated on the consolidation of IPAC assets into a single facility. Since that time, IPAC's functional organizational structure was predicated on the need to operate from several different locations pending the renovation/construction of Building 20 at Camp Smith. In January 1977 the design of Military Construction (MILCON) Project P-001 for the renovation of Building 20 was completed and advertised for bids. It was also in January that CINCPAC requested the Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC) (Naval Facility Engineering Command) to consider the $71,700 relocation costs of the current occupants from Building 20 as part of the MILCON project funding. This would provide for minimal facilities restoration at seven different locations at Camp Smith, These relocations were necessary in order to allow the Building 20 MILCON project to start on time. The OICC agreed to the CINCPAC request and the work was scheduled to be accomplished by the Pearl Harbor Public Works Center prior to 1 April 1977.²

(U) In April 1977, the renovation/construction began on Building 20. By June it was apparent that modifications to the computer area floor layout and the equipment list needed to accommodate additional IPAC ADP equipment could delay completion of the project. IPAC was informed by the OICC that further delay would add to the cost of the modification and an ultimate delay in occupancy.³

(U) Since IPAC had relied on the ADP resources of CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF and the former PACOM Electronic Center to accomplish its analytical and production responsibilities, the approval to proceed with the development of the PDSC was a major milestone in obtaining the ADP support needed by IPAC in the projected 1980 time frame. However, assumption by IPAC of total capability was dependent upon the Building 20 construction which, at the end of the year, was scheduled for completion by July 1978.⁴

1. IPAC HistSum Nov, Dec 77.
2. IPAC HistSum Jan 77.
3. IPAC HistSum Jun 77
SECTION II--COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

2. SECSTATE 25763/111613Z Feb 77: J23 HistSum Jun 77; DIA order No. 31-77 of 25 May 77.
3. J23 HistSum Dec 77, which cited CINCPAC 010640Z Dec 77 (EX).
International Terrorism

(U) In June 1976 Dr. Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation visited CINCPAC to discuss international terrorism. Discussions were held with the CINCPAC staff and with analysts from IPAC. Subsequently, CINCPAC emphasized the need for alertness and vigilance to potential terrorism threats in the PACOM, and directed a staff review of existing directives to ensure a free and rapid exchange of information concerning terrorism. He also directed the formulation by the Crisis Action Group of planned reactions to any terrorist incident and the monitoring by IPAC of terrorist trends on an all-source basis.¹

(U) During a meeting of the PACOM Counterintelligence Advisory Committee in February 1977, it was noted that a recent exercise had revealed that any hijacking situation involving a civil aircraft in the PACOM could involve the military, and that negotiators for hostage situations should be identified before incidents occurred. In March 1977 Dr. Jenkins again visited CINCPAC to conduct a terrorism seminar. During a discussion of aircraft hijacking, it was pointed out that each U.S. Air Force base had its own guidelines for dealing with such situations, and that those guidelines differed because of physical factors concerning the bases. It was also noted that, because there had been fewer protracted hostage negotiations in 1976, the common perception was that terrorism incidents which had occurred had affected a smaller population and a smaller geographic area. Dr. Jenkins noted that the U.S. policy of "no ransom, no concessions, no negotiations," was necessarily flexible. Although there was a need to handle all terrorist incidents at the lowest possible level, Dr. Jenkins acknowledged that major decisions would probably be made by the President.²

(U) After an August 1977 IPAC briefing for representatives of the Federal Aviation Administration they expressed gratitude and appreciation for the excellent support IPAC had provided to the FAA in the past. One representative from the FAA Washington office stated that the Pacific-Asian FAA region had received more information from IPAC about the PACOM area than he received in Washington. By the end of the year, IPAC had consolidated updated assessments of and prepared a probability matrix on the terrorist threat to U.S. personnel in 17 PACOM countries.³

2. J23 HistSums Feb, Mar 77; Minutes, PACOM Counterintelligence Advisory Committee Meeting, 23 Feb 77; J23/Memo/62-77 of 4 Mar 77, Subj: Terrorism Seminar of 1 Mar 77.
3. IPAC HistSums Aug, Dec 77.
1. J23 HistSum Apr 77; J233 Memo for Record, 27 Apr 77, w/2 enclosures.
1. IPAC HistSums Jun, Aug 77.
2. IPAC HistSum Dec 77.
4. CINCPAC 182012Z Dec (BOM); SAC RECONCEN 231625Z Dec 76 (BOM).
1. COMUSKOREA 170805Z Jan 77; CINCPAC 181505Z Jan 77.
3. CINCPAC ALFA 6/312015Z Dec 77, which passed JCS 3852/311758Z Dec 77.
4. COMUSKOREA 2187/090310Z Jun 77 (BOM) and 3267/080250Z Aug 77 (BOM); Op. Cit.,
   Goals and Accomplishments.
1. JCS 6506/152243Z Nov 77; HQ USAF 181140Z Nov 77.
3. IPAC HistSums Aug, Nov 77.
Master ELINT Intercept File (MEIF)

(U) In July 1977 IPAC began a program to provide intelligence analysts with a capability to update the MEIF history file (on magnetic tape) and the MEIF extract file (on disc) using transactions created via the cathode ray tube (CRT). Another program provided the capability to allow the intelligence analyst to identify new and unusual signals for automatic dissemination via the AUTODIN circuit. The intelligence analyst would "flag" each signal determined to be a candidate for the new and unusual category by use of the CRT. These signals would automatically trigger an AUTODIN generator to provide a message in card form acceptable for transmission to the intelligence community.¹

(S/LNFONN) By August of 1977, it had been determined that the volume of special ELINT processed into the MEIF history extract file for the period January-June 1977 exceeded the amount processed during all of 1976.²

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1. IPAC HistSum Jul 77.
2. IPAC HistSum Aug 77.
SECTION III--TARGET INTELLIGENCE

1. Minutes, PACOM Target Action Group (TAG) Meeting of Jan 77; Enclosure 4 to TAG Meeting of Jan 77; Minutes of these meetings will hereafter be cited as TAG Minutes with appropriate month and year.

2. TAG Minutes, Feb 77.

3. IPAC HistSum Apr 77; TAG Minutes, Apr 77.
1. IPAC HistSum May 77; TAG Minutes, May and June 77.
2. IPAC HistSums Nov, Dec 77; TAG Minutes Nov 77
3. TAG Minutes, Jan 77; Enclosure 1 to TAG Minutes, Jan 77.
4. TAG Minutes, Mar and Apr 77.

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1. TAG Minutes, Jun 77; IPAC HistSum Jul 77.
2. TAG Minutes, Jul 77; J22 Point Paper, 2 Aug 77, Subj: Contingency Targeting Analysis, North Korea; J22 HistSum Jul 77.
3. TAG Minutes, Nov 77.
4. TAG Minutes, Jul 77.
1. TAG Minutes, Aug 77.
2. TAG Minutes, Nov 77; IPAC HistSum Nov 77.
3. TAG Minutes, Jun 77; Enclosure 2 to TAG Minutes Jun 77.
1. TAG Minutes, Feb and Mar 77.
2. TAG Minutes, Apr 77.
3. TAG Minutes, Nov 77.
2. IPAC HistSum Jan, Feb 77.
3. TAG Minutes, Apr 77.
4. TAG Minutes, Jul and Aug 77.
2. TAG Minutes, Jan 77; IPAC HistSum Jan 77.
3. TAG Minutes, May 77.
4. COMIPAC 1600472 Jun 77, which passed DET 1, 314AD 1406292 Jun 77; TAG Minutes, Jun 77.
2. TAG Minutes, Mar and Aug 77.
3. Ibid.

Nuclear Targets (p. 288)
2. Ibid., p. 563.
3. TAG Minutes, Sep 77; IPAC HistSum Sep 77.
4. IPAC HistSum June 77.
2. OP. Cit., Goals and Accomplishments; IPAC HistSums Apr, Sep 77.
3. TAG Minutes, Feb 77.
(U) The Weaponneering Automated Support Program (WASP) was designed to provide the strike force planner with a large spectrum of weapon systems/weapons delivery alternatives which could be keyed to current or future target data bases. In January 1977 CINCPAC received word that the WASP was ready for field dissemination by the Air Force Armament Lab (AFAL), Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. In June the DIA requested CINCPAC to analyze the target type list for a module development, which PACAF and IPAC interpreted to mean that no new procedures were involved, but rather a transfer of small computer programs to larger computers. During the June meeting of the TAG, the Chairman voiced concern over the speed with which the WASP was moving without clarification of issues previously raised by the unified and specified commands.²

(U) After a July Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) Working Group Meeting, IPAC reported that the JMEM was taking an active part in the WASP development and that documentation on WASP had been forwarded to PACOM for review. Additionally, according to information received during this meeting, in the next few months WASP was to be installed in the PACOM with a briefing on its operation for all users. During its August meeting, the TAG noted that the WASP was not compatible to the WANG 2200 computer, and the PACFLT representative advised that the Navy would not be able to use the WASP under those circumstances. In a proposed response to a DIA request for unified and specified command assistance regarding WASP, IPAC noted that the proposal was apparently redundant to what the JMEM already did. Moreover, the WASP proposal did not include airfields, bridges or hardened artillery, nor did it differentiate between types of bunkers. The PACFLT representatives again emphasized that the WASP proposal was not yet responsive to PACOM requirements.³

1. IPAC HistSum May 77; TAG Minutes, Jun 77.
2. IPAC HistSum Jan 77; TAG Minutes, Jun 77.
3. TAG Minutes, Jul and Aug 77.
(U) On 31 August IPAC noted in a memorandum to the Chairman of the TAG an apparent discrepancy between information received by the IPAC representative to the JMEM and that conveyed from the AFAL at Eglin AFB. On the one hand copies of the WASP had purportedly been sent to the European Command and the PACOM, and the WASP would be installed in the PACOM later in 1977; on the other, there would be a users conference during the month of September. Since that time, several JMEM working groups had met and, responding to CINCPAC's request, announced a WASP user's conference in October 1977. CINCPAC had also been advised that a WASP model was to be installed at U.S. Air Forces Europe in February 1978. During the TAG meeting in November 1977, the Chairman provided a summary of the 20 October JMEM meeting. It had been determined that the WASP model would be delivered to U.S. Air Forces Europe in February 1978 and that it would be available to other users for evaluation in April 1978. After such evaluation, the final requirement for the development of a successor model could be established which could make the program compatible with the WANG 2200 computer. The estimated date for WASP installation in the PACOM was about May 1978.

Target Material Production

TII/QRG Materials

1. TAG Minutes, Nov 77.
2. TAG Minutes, Jan and Feb 77.
1. TAG Minutes, Mar 77.
2. TAG Minutes, Apr 77.
3. TAG Minutes, Feb 77.
4. TAG Minutes, Feb and Mar 77.
1. TAG Minutes, Apr and May 77.
2. TAG Minutes, Sep 77.
3. IPAC HistSum Oct, Nov 77.
1. TAG Minutes, Jun, Jul 77; IPAC/Memo/S219 of 27 Jul 77, Subj: Possible Replacement of the Major/Minor Target Number System.

2. TAG Minutes, Jul 77.

SECRET
1. TAG Minutes, Aug 77; Enclosure 1 to TAG Minutes, Aug 77.
1. TAG Minutes, May 77.
2. TAG Minutes, Jul and Aug 77.
1. IPAC HistSums Sep, Oct 77; TAG Minutes, Sep and Nov 77; J22 HistSum Nov 77.
SECTION IV--INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES

1. DIA 5121/302326Z Sep 77.
2. Ltr, CINCPAC (J22A) Ser 009S19 of 31 Oct 77, Subj: Foreign Intelligence Contracts and Arrangements, with 1 encl: Outline of Contracts and Arrangements (RODCA).
1. USDAO Canberra 160330Z Nov 76; CINCPAC 020336Z Dec 76.
3. J23 HistSums Dec 76, Jan and Mar 77; INTELDIRINST C5510.7 of 29 Mar 77, Subj: ANZUS INDICOM.
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SAC INDICOM Circuit

(U) On 30 March 1977 the means for more rapid exchange of classified information between SAC and the PACOM became operational when the SAC/PACOM INDICOM was activated. Approval to pass special compartmented intelligence on the circuit was received on 27 May 1977.¹

PACOM Foreign Disclosure Officers Workshop

(U) The first PACOM Foreign Disclosure Officers' workshop was held at Camp Smith, Oahu on 8-9 December 1976. Attendees included representatives from CINCPAC, DIA, USFK, PAGAF, PACFLT and IPAC. Various aspects of the National Disclosure Policy (NDP) were discussed during the meeting.²

(U) The second annual PACOM Foreign Disclosure Officers' workshop was held from 19-21 October 1977 in South Korea. The meeting was co-chaired by CINCPAC and the DIA, with discussions centered on foreign disclosure automated data (FORDAD) reports and other foreign disclosure-related issues. These included the sources of disclosure authority, disclosure decision making processes, implementing directives and regulations, the origin of disclosure requests and processing procedures, processing of requests for exemptions to the NDP, visits and accreditation of foreign representatives, FORDAD reporting, and security and sanitization reviews.³

PACOM Security and Sanitization Review Board

(U) In July 1977 CINCPAC established the PACOM Security and Sanitization Review Board (PSSRB). The PSSRB was established as a subordinate action group to the PACOM Intelligence Board (PIB). The purpose of the PSSRB was to review and recommend to the PIB the approval or denial of requests for release of PACOM sanitized, decompartmented data and foreign disclosure packages prepared for release to foreign governments and international organizations. The Board was composed of representatives of CINCPAC, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, PACFLT, and PAGAF. The CINCPAC Chief of Special Security and the CINCPAC Foreign Disclosure Officer served as Chairman and Vice-Chairman/Secretary, respectively, of the PSSRB. The first meeting of the PSSRB took place on 14 December 1977.⁴

1. Ibid.
2. J23 HistSum Jan 77.

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2. CINCPAC 18022Z Feb 77, which cited COMUSJAPAN 040930Z Feb 77 and JCS Policy Memo 39 of 17 Sep 73; JCS 2683/032141Z Mar 77.
3. J46 HistSum May 77; CMDAO 9056/180740Z May 77.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 2423/010816Z Nov (EX).

SECRET
1. CINCPAC 050547Z Nov 77; COMUSJAPAN 180523Z Nov 77.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 17974/210801Z Nov 77.
3. CINCPAC 060211Z Dec 77.
4. SECSTATE 293572/082303Z Dec 77 (EX).
1. IPAC HistSums Sep, Oct 77.
4. IPAC HistSums Apr, May 77.
Australian Orientation Visits

2. CINCPAC ltr, Serial C136 of 30 Jun 77, Subj: PACOM Intelligence Organization Documents.

SECRET

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2. IPAC HistSum May 77.
3. IPAC HistSum Jul 77; AMEMB Singapore 2551/150520Z Jun 77.
4. IPAC HistSum Apr 77.
5. IPAC HistSums Aug, Dec 77.
1. TAG Minutes, Jan 77.
2. IPAC HistSum Nov 77. J22 Submission, same subject, classified secret.
3. CINCPACFLT 290614Z May 77.
1. J22 HistSum Sep 77.
CHAPTER X

SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) The office of the PACOM Inspector General (IG) was established in 1973. The office was principally concerned with matters of an operational nature; it did not infringe on responsibilities of the Service IGs. The PACOM IG monitored and periodically inspected operational areas essential to mission performance in order to provide CINC PAC with an additional means to evaluate the ability of all echelons of the command to accomplish their missions. Further, the IG continued to serve as CINC PAC's office responsive through the JCS to the Secretary of Defense for the evaluation of command and control, joint operations and readiness, and operational security programs within the command. CINC PAC's Director for Personnel continued to serve in the additional capacity of Inspector General throughout 1977.1

(S/FRD) The physical security of stored nuclear weapons and other munitions was a matter of continuing study and interest. From 5 to 11 February an IG team visited the U.S. Naval Magazine at Guam. From 6 to 10 June another team, this time supplemented by an officer from CINC PAC's Operations Directorate, inspected the physical security of nuclear weapons stored in Korea at Camp Ames and Kunsan and Osan Air Bases. (As noted in the Operations chapter of this history, the nuclear weapons storage site at Osan was deactivated later in the year.) A third visit, again with Operations Directorate support, was made to two branch facilities of the Naval Magazine at Lualualei, Hawaii, the West Loch and Waikiki branches, on Oahu. From 30 October through 3 November an IG team, again with Operations Directorate support, conducted an inspection of the physical security of nuclear weapons stored at the U.S. Naval Magazine at Adak, Alaska.2

(6) Members of the IG staff also observed or evaluated exercises conducted in the PACOM in 1977. From 21 March to 11 April a team served as evaluators for the JCS-directed, CINC PAC-sponsored joint/combined, command post/field training exercise TEAM SPIRIT 77 in Korea. As discussed in the Operations chapter of this history, TEAM SPIRIT 77 was the most comprehensive exercise ever conducted in the PACOM. From 12 to 21 May an IG representative visited FOOD CHAIN VIII, a combined U.S.-Republic of China command post exercise sponsored by COMUSTDC on Taiwan.3

2. IG HistSums Feb, May-Jun, Sep-Oct, and Nov 77.
3. IG HistSums Mar-Apr and May-Jun 77.
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(U) In 1976 members of the IG staff began accompanying CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group teams in their inspections of Security Assistance programs throughout the PACOM. This practice continued in 1977. (See the Security Assistance chapter of this history for a list of the locations and times of PEG visits.)

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SECTION II--LEGAL

1977 PACOM Legal Conference

(U) The CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) sponsored the annual PACOM Legal Conference at the Hale Koa Hotel, Honolulu, from 28 February to 4 March 1977. Sixty-five military and civilian attorneys from countries throughout PACOM participated. In addition, representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Judge Advocates General of all Services attended. ¹

(U) After opening remarks by Admiral Weisner and a presentation by Lieutenant General Manor, the conference discussed the law of war, the authority to negotiate international agreements, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) cases impacting on Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) functions, the impact of host country laws on military operations, disciplinary control over civilians in foreign countries, and foreign claims and compensation of victims in foreign criminal jurisdiction (FCJ) cases. Rear Admiral James W. Moreau, Commander 14th Coast Guard District, gave a most timely presentation on 200-mile fisheries jurisdiction on 3 March, the day the new law went into effect. One of the highlights of the conference was a panel discussion on terrorism/hijacking. Mr. Louis Fields, an Assistant Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, was chairman of the panel and the members were Mr. Bert Goodwin, Chief Counsel for the Federal Aviation Administration; Professor Tom Mallison, Director of the International Law Department at George Washington University; and Dr. Brian Jenkins, a leading authority from the Rand Corporation. ²

(U) One major result of the conference was a better understanding of terrorism/hijacking problems by the planners and operators. Particularly valuable was the opportunity to convey the sense of urgency on reaching an agreement on jurisdiction between the DOD and Department of Transportation (DOT), and issuing instructions to commanders in the field for a hijacking emergency. ³

(U) In 1974 CINCPAC had pointed out to the JCS the void created by PL 93-366, the Anti-hijacking and Air Transportation Security Act of 1974. The Act assigned exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Aviation Administration for anti-hijacking actions and did not make any special provision for military aircraft on military bases or in foreign countries where FAA representatives

1. J731 HistSum, Mar 77.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

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were not present. The JCS obtained DOD support in negotiating an agreement between the DOD and DOT to provide some authority for military commanders to respond to a hijacking emergency. As of 1977, however, the agreement had not been signed, although a draft Memorandum of Understanding had been completed.

(U) Participants at the PACOM Legal Conference concluded that there was substantial agreement on the basic provisions of the draft MOU. Therefore, since conclusion of the MOU would not make any major policy changes, and in order to expedite detailed guidance to the field, it was recommended that JCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 171 should be revised concurrently with staffing of the MOU. CINCPAC adopted this recommendation and submitted it to the JCS. The JCS responded that revision of MOP 171 was dependent on culmination of the MOU between DOD and DOT; however, JCS requested ASD (ISA) to take necessary action to conclude the MOU at the earliest possible date.

Closure of the USSSO, Australia

(U) In 1976 the Navy Judge Advocate General conducted an evaluation of secretarial activities under his control that could be consolidated or realigned to accomplish fiscal and personnel savings. This study indicated that the United States State Sending Office (USSSO), Australia could be disestablished with little interruption of the essential functions being performed if the functions of Single Service Claims Representative and Designated Commanding Officer were transferred to the U.S. Air Force. The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force, indicated that the existing staff of the U.S. Air Force Liaison Officer, Canberra, could readily assume the functions performed by the USSSO.

(U) CINCPAC was asked for comments on the proposal to transfer functions from the USSSO to the Air Force Liaison Officer and close the former office. Since neither CINCPAC components nor CINCPAC staff interposed any objection, CINCPAC concurred in the proposed disestablishment of USSSO, Australia. On 9 February 1977 the Secretary of the Navy approved disestablishment of the office and on 11 February 1977 CINCPAC appointed CINCPACREP Australia as Designated Commanding Officer for Australia and New Zealand vice the OIC, USSSO, effective 1 March 1977.

(U) On 1 March 1977 the USSSO, Australia, was officially closed. This consolidation effected a personnel savings of one Navy captain (O-6), one Navy enlisted man (E-6) and one civilian (FS-5), which equated to a monetary savings

1. Ibid.; CINCPAC 140417Z Nov 74.
2. Ibid.; CINCPAC 180334Z Mar 77; JCS 7486/060521Z Apr 77.
4. Ibid.; CINCPAC 112306Z Feb 77; USSSO Canberra 282129Z Feb 77.

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of approximately $70,000 per annum plus $22,000 PCS costs for each person transferred.\(^1\)

**Processing of International Agreements**

(U) In August 1976 the JCS requested CINCPAC comments on a proposed Executive Order requiring that, "No officer may negotiate, sign, or otherwise conclude a treaty or other international agreement, without...first obtain (ing) the concurrence of the Secretary of State." Based upon then existing criteria as to what constituted an international agreement, prior approval by State would have been required for even the most trivial and inconsequential agreements between the U.S. Government and third countries. CINCPAC requested PACOM Services and other subordinate activities to identify categories of agreements which might be affected, and responded to the JCS that, unless reasonable exceptions concerning minor agreements of special military significance and limited scope were established, unacceptable administrative delays could result.

CINCPAC requested exemption, by category, for thousands of working level agreements which would be affected by the proposed Executive Order, and sought to insure that the unified commander play a major role in coordinating the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements to avoid duplication of effort and confusion by foreign governments.\(^2\)

(U) Through the end of 1976 the DOD General Counsel, drawing on responses from CINCPAC and other unified commands and the Services, sought exemption for various categories of international agreements, and redelegation to the Secretary of Defense of authority to negotiate and conclude other categories of international agreements.\(^3\)

(U) In January 1977 CINCPAC, after coordinating with the components and subordinate commands, responded to a JCS tasking to identify categories of agreements for redelegation through unified command channels, and those which must be redelegated by the Services. The response stressed the following points:\(^4\)

- Redelegation of negotiating authority could not be assigned precisely and exclusively to identifiable agencies;
- Differences in magnitude and importance of agreements within any category may dictate approval level;

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1. Ibid.
3. J733 HistSum Jul 77; JCS 3439/092319Z Nov 76.
4. JCS 1537/131600Z Jan 77; CINCPAC 222220Z Jan 77, 190340Z Apr 77.
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- All negotiation in countries should be coordinated with the unified command structure because of the potential cross-service impact;
- U.S. Defense Representatives were recommended as a logical choice for coordinating agreements;
- Joint Committee should be used for coordination when provided for by SOFA arrangements;
- Identifiable categories for subdelegation would be submitted as identified.

(U) On 10 June 1977, after further refinement, the draft DOD instruction identifying categories of agreements for delegation to the JCS, and the JCS MOP containing proposed categories of agreements for further redelegation to CINCPAC, and through CINCPAC to subordinate commands, was forwarded to CINCPAC. While basically concurring with the draft JCS MOP, CINCPAC proposed to substitute language to permit full use of summary procedures in negotiation and conclusion of international agreements. Summary procedures included approval at lower levels with no specific approval requirements. Standard procedures were cumbersome and entailed submission to ASD/ISA of the following items to accompany each proposed international agreement:

- A legal memorandum setting forth constitutional and statutory authority for the arrangement;
- Draft texts;
- A fiscal memorandum estimating cost of obligations;
- Concurrence of OSD General Counsel and Comptroller;
- An environmental impact statement, if required.

(U) DOD Instruction 2050.1 was signed effective 15 July 1977, and JCS MOP 179, which redelegated approval authority to CINCPAC, was promulgated 1 August 1977.

(U) At CINCPAC level, CINCPAC Instruction 5711.6, effective 1 November 1977, allowed maximum use of less cumbersome summary procedures in negotiating and approving international agreements while preserving for CINCPAC the neces-

1. CINCPAC 210351Z Jun 77.
sary centralized supervision of more significant agreements.¹

Humanitarian Law during Armed Conflict

(U) Protocols I and II of the Humanitarian Law during Armed Conflict were adopted on 10 June 1977 by the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict. The CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate noted the following areas in which there were major changes in the existing international law:²

- Identification and protection of medical aircraft.
- Status of irregular combatants and their entitlement to PW status.
- Prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, including area bombardment of cities, towns and villages.
- Prohibition against widespread, long term and severe damage to national environment.
- Further limitation on reprisals against civilians and civilian objects.
- Other restrictions on targeting.
- Obligation to account for missing and dead.

The Philippine Legal Situation

(U) According to CINCPACREP Philippines, the most significant legal cases that arose during 1977 concerned the exercise of FCJ by Government of the Philippines (GOP) authorities. The GOP perceived, as one aspect of Philippine sovereignty, the complete exercise of their criminal and judicial powers over the U.S. as a visiting force. This approach was contrary to the provisions of the existing SOFA and with customary international law practices involving stationing of visiting forces in a host country. The manifestations of Philippine assertions of sovereignty were nowhere so structured or quantifiable as in the area of FCJ. Other areas of concern described as "irritants" by the

2. J731 HistSum Dec 77; JCS 3888/110950Z Nov 77; J73/Memo/288-77, 2 Dec 77, Subj: Summary-Adoption of Protocols I & II - Humanitarian Law During Armed Conflict.
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GOP included customs, watershed, Aeronautical (Flying) Club, immigration, internal revenue, labor, sanitary landfill, quarantine, and travel tax. In all of these areas, U.S. forces had experienced a diminution of rights and privileges guaranteed in the Military Bases Agreement through unilateral withholding of privilege, or arbitrary or adverse interpretation of implementing GOP directives. During 1977 a Joint Task Force (JTF) and subcommittees thereof operated to attempt to clarify and resolve these irritants. Through the Legal Affairs Committee the Aero Club issue appeared to be in the process of resolution; however, most other areas had been subsumed as part of ongoing base discussions and the JTF proved not to be a viable organization.¹

Cases Initiated by Fidela Vargas

(U) Filipina attorney Fidela Vargas, a member of the Philippine Bar, had acted as civilian counsel for numerous courts-martial at Subic Bay. Most often she was retained by accused of Filipino extraction. In October 1974 and May 1975 she acted as defense attorney for Renato C. Manalo on two separate, but related cases. In both cases, convictions were reversed by Courts of Military Review in Washington, D.C., based upon incompetency of counsel (Vargas). On 5 October 1976 the Judge Advocate General of the Navy recommended that a board be convened in accordance with Section 0142, Navy JAG Manual, to determine whether Attorney Vargas should be barred from appearing as counsel in subsequent courts-martial.²

(U) In December 1976 hearings were scheduled at Subic Bay. On 4 January 1977 Attorney Vargas filed a petition for injunction with the Philippine Supreme Court naming Commander, U.S. Naval Base (COMNAVBASE) Subic Bay, Rear Admiral Kilcline, and the board members as respondents. On 9 February 1977 the Olongapo City Fiscal made "legal hold" requests to COMNAVBASE. The Manila Daily Express carried a front page story concerning placing Rear Admiral Kilcline on legal hold pending determination of criminal charges against him. The Vargas complaint was styled, "usurpation of authority or official function," punishable as a felony under Article 177 of the Philippines Penal Code. The allegation was that the Navy was interfering with the exclusive authority of the Philippines Supreme Court to grant her authority to practice in the Philippines. The Navy response asserted: sovereign immunity; the inherent authority of U.S. officials to police their own bar; Article XIII of the 1947 MBA permitted the U.S. to conduct courts martial; and Vargas voluntarily submitted to the limited jurisdiction of U.S. authorities by appearing before courts-martial.³

¹. Commander U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay (CINCPACREP PHIL) ltr, Ser 1599, of 2 May 78, Subj: Command History; submission of.
². J733 HistSum Sep 77; COMNAVBASE Subic Bay 5720/101428Z Feb 77.
³. COMNAVBASE Subic Bay 151056Z Feb 77.

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(U) On 18 March 1977 Admiral Weisner, as CINCPACFLT (sic), was requested by Fiscal Anonas to place Rear Admiral Kilcline, et al, on legal hold for charges of incriminatory machinations.

(U) The case was still pending at year's end, and attorney Vargas had filed additional criminal complaints in unrelated matters during the pendency of these proceedings.¹

³ This case was representative of an increasing tendency of the Philippine Courts to entertain criminal and civil complaints against U.S. personnel associated with the U.S. bases in the Philippines. Most frequently the complaints were registered as countercharges to official U.S. actions in terminating employment, denying privileges, or in protecting U.S. lives or property on the bases. In addition, U.S. personnel and dependents had been increasingly named in criminal and civil complaints, many of which appeared to be spurious, reflecting a trend of unreasonable GOP behavior in assertion of Philippine authority.²

King/Verplaetse/Kirwan Cases

(U) Paragraph 3 of the agreed official minutes to Article XIII of the 1974 Military Bases Agreement which concerned the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction, provided for a unilateral determination by the United States as to the applicability of "official duty" status to an accused member of the force. A finding that the member was acting in an "official duty" status assured exclusive U.S. jurisdiction over the member. The official duty cases of King/Verplaetse/Kirwan were unrelated; however, Philippine diplomatic protests, which questioned the appropriateness of the issuance of official duty certificates in these three cases, treated the cases as a single issue. All three cases received considerable notoriety in the Philippine press.³

(U) The case against Commander Roland A. Verplaetse arose from complaints of Filipina employees of the Main Exchange, U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, that on 15 March 1976, at around 1700 hours, Verplaetse directed female civilian subordinate employees to conduct body searches of the Filipina employees, including removal of undergarments. Criminal complaints for slander by deed, grave coercion and unjust vexation were filed with the City Fiscal of Olongapo City.⁴

1. Ibid.  
2. J733 HistSum Sep 77.  
3. Ibid.  
4. Ibid.
The case against Special Agent Robert I. King, and four other OSI agents from Clark Air Base, involved a warrant issued by the Base Commander to search an off-base apartment in Angeles City. Two air-conditioning units and 5,000 pesos were seized. The Filipino lessee filed a criminal complaint for illegal search, trespass to dwelling, and robbery before the City Fiscal of Angeles City.

The case against Corporal Steven Kirwan, USMC, a Marine patrol guard at Subic, involved the shooting and killing of Nonito Kudera, a Filipino national who was seen leaving U.S. housing inside Subic Naval Base with a television under his arm. Kudera was shot by Kirwan after Kudera attacked Kirwan with a knife when Kirwan was attempting to apprehend him.²

In May 1977, after lengthy discussions and exchanges of notes, the Secretary of State requested the American Embassy Manila to comment on the political impact if transfer of the individuals was made within 30 days. Reviewing the history of discussions of the Verplaetse and Kirwan cases, the following points were made:³

- The case against Verplaetse arose in April 1976 and had been the subject of both formal and informal intergovernmental discussions ever since;
- The case against Kirwan arose in December 1976 and had been the subject of extensive discussions since that time; Kirwan's enlistment expired and was involuntarily extended on 27 January 1977;
- The U.S. Government had an obligation to insure the continued physical presence of a service member in the Philippines for a reasonable time after receipt of a request for discussion of an official duty certificate to allow time for full discussion. The request for discussions occurred in May 1976 for Verplaetse and in February 1977 for Kirwan;
- State and DOD believed sufficient time had elapsed.

On 1 June 1977 the Embassy informed the GOP it remained prepared to discuss further the issues raised by the above cases; however, it had been

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.; SECSTATE 107806/120154Z May 77.
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289 days since the official duty certificate was issued in the King case, 147 days in the Kirwan case, and 412 days in the Verplaetse case. Also it had been 63 days since the Embassy had replied to the GOP Department of Foreign Affairs note and suggested further discussion on the diplomatic level.¹

(U) At a meeting with Secretaries Ingles and Macaraig on 14 June, Charge d'Affaires Stull informed these officials of the departure of the individuals concerned. Kirwan departed 2 June 1977, Verplaetse departed 29 June 1977, and King remained in the Philippines until his normal rotation date in December.²

Butler Murder Case

(U) On 3 December 1976 the Philippine Court of First Instance in Zambales found SA Michael J. Butler, USN, 124-54-8519, assigned to the USS HANCOCK (CV-19), guilty of murder aggravated by abuse of superior strength and sentenced him to death.³

(U) Butler was apprehended on 8 August 1975 for the murder of a Filipina national. The murder was committed during the course of sexual activities in the room of the deceased in Olongapo City, Republic of the Philippines. During the incident, the victim was struck on the head with a religious statue, fell upon the bed face down and suffocated during subsequent sexual activity by the assailant. The U.S. made a request for waiver of jurisdiction which was refused by the GOP.⁴

(U) Butler was 17 at the time of the offense. Under Philippine law, (Article 193 of Presidential Decree 603 and Article 68 of the Penal Code) there were provisions that required the penalty for a person under 18 years of age be in the next lower degree—in this case life in prison vice death. The trial court, however, refused to apply these principles. The trial court noted:⁵

- That Butler was an emancipated minor;
- Public policy rendered the articles inapplicable in a capital case;
- The defense only raised Article 193 for the first time in appeal;

1. CINCPAC PHIL 030101Z Jun 77.
2. J733 HistSum Sep 77.
3. Ibid. COMUSNAVPHIL Subic Bay 060735Z Dec 76.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

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- No precedent existed.

(U) The trial was attended by a U.S. Navy lawyer who acted as trial observer and submitted a Trial Observer Report which stated that the trial was "unfair" based upon the failure to apply the foregoing principles. CINCPACREP Philippines, as Designated Commanding Officer for cases involving foreign criminal jurisdiction, concurred in the "unfair trial" opinion of the trial observer. CINCPAC agreed with the previous endorsers.  

(U) The Judge Advocate General of the Navy determined that the action of the trial judge was not arbitrary or capricious and concluded that the procedural safeguards secured by the Military Bases Agreement (1947) were observed and the accused received a fair trial. The Butler case was on appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines at year's end.

FCJ Official Duty Determinations

(U) In October 1977 CINCPAC was requested by the Secretary of Defense to comment on a proposed position on the Philippine bases negotiation issue of FCJ official duty determinations. The Secretary of Defense position would have given the Philippine Fiscal a more active role in determining the jurisdictional issue of official duty.

(C) CINCPAC non-concurred with the nature and extent of the Philippine Fiscal's participation and took the position that the role of the Fiscal should be fact finder to the Criminal Jurisdiction Implementation Committee and not in diplomatic determination of the official duty issue.

Aero Clubs

(U) In December 1977 a draft Philippine Presidential Decree affecting aero clubs came to the attention of the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate. The decree amended Republic Act No. 776 to allow the Philippine Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) to issue air transportation permits to foreigners who were members of the Clark or Subic Bay Aero Clubs as a prerequisite to any aeronautical activities within Philippine airspace. The decree also authorized the CAA to

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register foreign owned or registered aircraft utilized by members of aero clubs as a prerequisite to any aeronautical activities of such clubs with Philippine airspace. The SJA concluded the draft decree introduced substantial ambiguity into the status of aero clubs and aircraft under Article XVIII of the Military Bases Agreement and the International Convention of International Civil Aviation. It was further noted that the potential for disagreement and disruption in respect to aero club activities under the draft decree was great, considering the double registration aspects of the decree.¹

¹ J731 HistSum Dec 77; AMEMB Manila 20220/2309022 Dec 77; J73/Memo/314-77, 23 Dec 77, Subj: Aero Clubs.
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SECTION III--RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OFFICE

Management of Studies and Analyses

(U) In November 1976 CINCPAC had directed the establishment of a formal structure for the management and conduct of studies and analyses within his headquarters. As a result of this, the Research and Analysis Office was redesignated as J77 (formerly J021) and CINCPAC Instruction 5250.1 of 22 November 1976 was promulgated establishing a Steering Committee at the Deputy Director level and a Senior Review Group made up of the Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief Staff, and appropriate Directors. J77 was executive agent. Concurrently, the CINCPAC Studies and Analysis Steering Committee was charged with developing a one-to-two year analytical program, which was briefed to and approved by CINCPAC on 26 January 1977.

(U) Also in January DOD Directive 5010.22, dated 22 November 1976, was received and assigned to J77 for action. The directive established for the first time a Defense Department definition of studies and analyses, and promulgated DOD policy with respect to the conduct of studies and analysis programs within the department. A DOD steering group, chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, was established and a central data bank of all current and past studies and analyses was inaugurated. The directive encouraged the maximum use of DOD personnel in the conduct of studies and analysis rather than the use of contractor personnel. If employed, contractors should be in a support role. The instruction required CINCPAC to establish a mechanism for the management of studies and analysis within the PACOM, which had already been done in November 1976, as noted above.

(U) CINCPAC Instruction 5250.1, "The Management and Conduct of Studies and Analyses," was reviewed and updated to conform with DOD Directive 5010.22 and was promulgated as CINCPAC Instruction 5250.1A on 21 April. The instruction formally established a CINCPAC steering committee for Studies and Analyses (consisting of the deputies, J1 through J6), a Senior Review Group, (the Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff), with CINCPAC being the final authority. The CINCPAC Steering Committee met quarterly during the calendar year. J77, as executive agent for the program, formulated a 1977-1978 PACOM studies and analysis program, which was approved by the Steering Committee, the Senior Review Group, and CINCPAC, and forwarded to the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) on 2 September 1977 per DOD requirements. 

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1. Material for this section was derived from J77 HistSum Dec 77, unless otherwise attributed.
The summary of the FY 78 CINCPAC Annual Studies Program Plan as submitted to DDR&E noted that limited analytical resources available to CINCPAC dictated a need for flexibility in the program to ensure that the program was responsive to CINCPAC’s changing requirements. This flexibility was provided through a continuing review of individual study progress and adjustment of priorities, if needed, by both the CINCPAC Studies and Analyses Steering Committee and the Senior Review Group.

The FY 78 program was responsive to CINCPAC requirements in three major areas: Military Force Planning Analyses, Analytical Support to Subordinate Commands, and C4 Systems Design and Engineering. Individual studies and analyses within those first two areas consisted primarily of military planning assessments and internal evaluations for CINCPAC and his staff. These studies did not meet the manpower or funding requirements for individual reporting and they had thus been aggregated by generic study objectives into the above categories for reporting purposes. In support of these generic categories, CINCPAC Operations and Maintenance funds were used, where appropriate, to procure or contract for highly specialized analytical services in the areas of data analysis, field services, and technical services, to include programming and the application of wargaming and simulation techniques to problems of joint Service interest in the PACOM.

The third major area was C4 Systems Design and Engineering. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) system planning and engineering were being accomplished at PACOM Headquarters by an across-the-staff planning team, with support from the component commands and DOD agencies and contractors such as the Defense Communications Agency, National Security Agency, Advanced Research Projects Agency and the MITRE Corporation. This planning and engineering activity established concepts for providing flexible, high capacity, satellite-based communications throughout the PACOM in support of both fixed and mobile units, and for providing information handling aids to the command and control process. The existing and planned complex of systems had to be transformed into an integrated information network that would support PACOM operational needs. This network was to provide a capability transparent to the traditional boundaries of strategic and tactical operations. To help achieve this objective, arrangements had been made between CINCPAC and Air Force Electronic Systems Division (ESD) to provide MITRE technical assistance in the PACOM. This assistance supported J2, J3, and J6 architectural and engineering efforts aimed at improving the PACOM C4 posture. (See also Chapter I of this history.)

A Studies and Analysis Program Review, including the CINCPAC submission to DDR&E, was presented to the Steering Committee on 9 September, to the Senior Review Group on 12 September, and to CINCPAC on 19 September. Following
this, a CINCPAC staff member visited Washington 26 to 30 September to discuss and coordinate the CINCPAC and OJCS Studies and Analysis Programs with a member of the JCS Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency, the JCS studies point of contact. A number of points regarding definitions and reporting requirements under DOD Directive 5010.22 were clarified. Concurrently, the CINCPAC 1 September Studies and Analysis submission to DDR&E was discussed and coordinated with Dr. Jeanne Mintz, DDR&E/Planning. Dr. Mintz expressed appreciation for the CINCPAC interest and cooperation; the CINCPAC submission was the only one that had been received from the unified or specified commands. Although the DOD directive had been implemented since November 1976, the DOD Steering Committee had yet to have its first meeting.

(U) Of the $300,000 required for FY 77, only $100,000 was made available to J77 for contractor analysis support. Those funds had been spent by January 1977. The Chief of the Research and Analysis Office made a trip in late December 1976 to the Office of Naval Research to appeal for funds to keep the existing contractor personnel on board until such time as additional funds could be made available from the Chief of Naval Operations. ONR funded CINCPAC contractor analysts from January through March 1977, at which time the CINCPAC comptroller was successful in obtaining additional funding of $100,000 from the CNO.

Significant Personnel Activities

(U) During 1977 a concerted effort was made to phase out contractor analysis support to CINCPAC, in accordance with DOD Directive 5010.22, addressed above. Two additional civil service billets were established (a senior analyst GS-14 and analyst GS-13) with the understanding two contractor billets would be eliminated. The hiring process was suspended early in the year because of a DOD-wide civilian hiring "freeze," but the process was resumed in December.

(U) In March a CINCPAC staff member visited the U.S. Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia to discuss the proposed elimination of the Operations Research/Systems Analysis (OR/SA) adviser billet with the Chief of the USDLG and with Indonesian defense officials. At a meeting with officers from the Indonesian Department of Defense and Security, the Indonesians expressed strong support for the ORSA advisory program and urged the Chief USDLG to continue the ORSA advisory program. The billet was reinstated in the Joint Manpower Program.

(U) In April, COMUS Japan requested that a permanent ORSA billet be assigned to his command. The Chief of the Research and Analysis Office strongly

concurred with this request, noting that CINCPAC funds had been used to keep a contractor analyst in place for approximately two years.

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Activities

(U) On 5 January J77 participated in a conference at the University of Hawaii on the subject of utilization of wind energy in the State. It was estimated that millions of dollars could be saved by the military in Hawaii by utilization of this energy resource.

(U) On 13 January J77 was asked to review the U.S. Army's RDT&E program, and recommended that the Army put first priority on the development of an accurate air cargo drop system, noting that in Vietnam frequently less than one-half of the cargo landed within the drop zone. The rest, presumably, supplied the enemy.

(U) In mid-January the J77 staff prepared a critique of an Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) study of the effectiveness of the Soviet HIND missile against U.S. main battle tanks.

(U) In mid-February J77 conducted an in-depth analysis of raw data from SUBROC firings. The analysis showed that the circular error probable for SUBROC was on the order of 1000 feet, and that CEP was relatively independent of range of firing.

(U) In April the USDLG Indonesia requested technical data on commercial and military radar systems suitable for coastal surveillance. The data were assembled from many sources, summarized, and forwarded to the Chief, USDLG Indonesia.

(U) In May the Chief Scientist of the Energy Research Development Administration advised CINCPAC that atmospheric rocket tests from Kauai would be conducted in September. In response to a question from Admiral Weisner, an evaluation was made to determine the statistical probability of a missile fragment falling on land mass in the State of Hawaii. Results indicated chances were less than one in one million.

(U) In June the Chief JUSMAG Thailand advised that Thailand was anxious to obtain research and development advisory assistance from the United States. The R&D advisory program had been discontinued with the withdrawal of forces from Thailand in 1975. The Chief of the Research and Analysis Office dis-

1. J77/Memo/122-77, 6 May 77, Subj: High Altitude Experiments over Island of Kauai: Project LAGOPEDO.
cussed the possibility of the United States entering into a Technical Data Exchange Agreement with Thailand (as it had with Japan, the Republics of China and Korea, and other countries) with representatives of State Department and DOD. The official position was that U.S. policy would not encourage such an agreement at that time. Mr. Linsenmeyer visited the Military Research and Development Center (MRDC) in September to determine what kind of assistance might be provided outside of a formal program. This visit resulted in scheduling a further visit with Dr. Joseph Sperrazza, Director of AMSAA, in early 1978 to discuss both OR and R&D efforts at MRDC and to determine potential areas for informal exchange.

(U) In June 1977 CINCPAC Instruction 5420.3, Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME), was revised. This instruction provided for J77 to be the single point of contact in the PACOM for studies, requirements data, and information exchanges relating to joint-Service and weapon systems effectiveness.

(C) In October J77 advised CINCPAC of a serious problem on the fuze reliability of MK82 - MK84 bombs against steel and concrete targets. JTCG/ME analysis revealed that actual bomb reliability could be on the order of 40-60 percent (under normal delivery conditions) rather than the 95 percent that had been assumed. Since this could significantly impact on weapon stockpile and aircraft sortie requirements, the weaponers in PACOM could now integrate this degradation into their analysis and planning activities.

(U) In September a CINCPAC staff officer attended the Theater-Level Gaming and Analysis Workshop in Leesburg, Virginia. The workshop was sponsored by the Office of Naval Research with the objectives of fostering better communication between the analytical user and research communities, exploring ways of solving problems associated with theater-level gaming, and formulating a logical orderly plan for continuing research in this area. The workshop was organized by SRI International and directed by Steering Committee representatives from ONR, SRI, IDA, Cornell University, and the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Attendees included nearly 100 leading experts in theater-level gaming from Canadian, British, and Federal Republic of Germany defense establishments, the SHAPE Technical Center, U.S. Department of Defense organizations and agencies (including the Services, OJCS, CCTC, OSD, and CINCPAC), Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Congressional Budget Office, and numerous representatives from industry, universities, research centers and contractors.

(U) Throughout the year the Research and Analysis Office provided technical support to the Operations Directorate and to the State Civil Defense agency on the problem of how to divert a lava flow from Mauna Loa volcano threatening the city of Hilo on the Island of Hawaii. Hilo was second in population to
Honolulu in Hawaii. The subject had been under study since 1975.¹

(U) CINCPAC and AMSAA representatives had attended a meeting in September 1976 with all persons concerned with lava flow control, including personnel of the Hawaii Volcano Observatory (HVO), State Civil Defense, CINCPACAF, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. At that meeting State and HVO representatives expressed concern about the use of conventional munitions to control lava flow. Problems such as air turbulence, poor visibility, and possibly unfavorable public reaction were discussed. (The Hawaiian legends about Madam Pele, the Volcano Goddess, were widely respected and many people in Hawaii did not believe in "interfering" with volcanic activity). The Air Force had conducted some munitions tests but these had been inconclusive. Shortly thereafter, the concept of a "water bomb" had been developed as an alternative to or complement of high explosives. (Experience gained in an eruption in Iceland had indicated that the cooling of lava with water was an effective control measure). The water bomb idea was for the molten lava to cover and produce high pressure steam in a pressure vessel that would eventually rupture with explosive force, similar to a boiler explosion. Theoretical calculations indicated an energy release of 30 to 40 percent of the equivalent weight of TNT, to spread and cool the lava faster, forming dikes.

(U) AMSAA had initiated a small-scale test program using 4x16" steel containers to determine optimum design for the bomb. Five containers had been tested in the laboratory when an actual Kilauea eruption began in September 1977.

(U) CINCPAC considered the eruption a "unique opportunity" for further testing of the water bombs, and so advised the Army's CINCPAC Support Group. Scientists from the AMSAA, the CINCPAC Support Group, and J77 began a three-day test on 25 September. Scientists from the HVO, Sandia Laboratories, and the University of Hawaii also provided support and joined in technical discussions.²

(U) The original plan had been to emplace the water containers in front of the flowing lava in such a way that the bomb would be covered. In the absence of flowing lava, the first of the one-gallon containers was tested in a volcano vent in which the temperature was 950-1000°C. The second was tested in a large cave in lava that was 11 hours old. Neither exploded, but information on the use of insulation material as a time delay device was gained. During that second test, however, a large lava flow was generated nearby, and a third bomb, with no insulation, was placed one foot in front of the advancing

². CINCPAC 212004Z Sep 77.
lava. It exploded in 10 minutes and 10 seconds after it was covered and sent molten lava and solidified crusts approximately 15 feet high and 10 feet wide in the air, a force considered equivalent to a half-pound block of TNT.¹

(U) While the scientists were near the lava flow the winds shifted, enveloping the group in smoke and sulphur fumes. There was some concern that they might be stranded overnight when the Army helicopter sent to pick them up became disabled. A second helicopter was rushed in with spare parts; it lifted several out. As darkness fell the second chopper was repaired and the rest lifted out.²

(U) A second series of tests had been planned to begin on 29 September, but they were held in abeyance at the request of the State Governor. In any case the flow stopped on the 29th, just short of the only threatened village, Kalapana. The test program had resulted in some unfavorable publicity for the military, but that situation was somewhat rectified by a State Civil Defense statement to the press and a press release on 5 October. The test program had confirmed that the water-filled devices would explode in molten lava, but as they were not instrumented their force could only be estimated. Deployment of the containers also provided an operational safety advantage over the handling of high explosives, an aspect that was particularly attractive to the HVO geologists. As of that time, approximately $25,000 of AMSAA funds and $5,000 of State funds had been expended.³

(U) A Lava Flow Control Conference was held on 1 December attended by the component commands, the Army CINCPAC Support Group, the Army Corps of Engineers, the State Civil Defense Division, HVO, and AMSAA. A report on the testing was presented. Future actions anticipated involved a revised letter of request from the State of Hawaii requesting CINCPAC assistance to reflect more specific tasking. CINCPAC would in turn request assistance from AMSAA and would request that the HVO prepare a lava flow scenario for use in a State Civil Defense/CINCPAC/Corps of Engineers command post exercise. Further meetings were scheduled for January 1978.⁴

1. J363 HistSum Sep 77.
3. J363 HistSum Sep 77; J77 HistSum Dec 77.
1. CINCPAC Ltr Ser T12, 26 Jan 77, Subj: CINCPAC OPLAN 5001; Analysis and Force Shortfalls(U).
staff members of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. The method of evaluation was static force comparisons using various quantitative measures of effectiveness. It concluded:

- In August 1974 CINCPAC input to the JCS for Joint Strategic Objectives Plan FY 77-84, Volume II, was completed by J77 and J5 using analytic computer models. It concluded

- In April 1975 a North Korea-South Korea computer war-game was completed by the CINCPAC Review and Analysis Office using a computerized theater level model.

- In December 1975 a JSOP exercise was conducted by the CAA.

- In February 1976 a progress briefing on analysis of was completed by the Research and Analysis Office as a follow-on to the April 1975 North Korea/South Korea computerized wargame. The methodology used was an expanded version of the 1975 model.
In November 1976 a computerized wargame of a North Korean attack against the ROK was conducted by CAA; it concluded that...

In January 1977 an annex to a Plans Directorate study on the 2nd Infantry Division was completed by J77. It was essentially a rerun of the February 1976 work with updated orders of battle.
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SECTION IV--OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Trips and Associated Speeches

(U) Admiral Weisner's numerous trips and associated speeches are highlighted below. Distinguished visitors to the Command, meetings with news media personnel, and local addresses are listed separately. These events are listed chronologically.

(U) Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia Trip, 5-14 January: Admiral Weisner, accompanied by principal staff members, arrived at Clark Air Base (AB) in the Philippines on 6 January, where he met with MAJ GEN Freddie L. Poston, Commander 13th Air Force and members of his staff. Later that day, he flew to Manila where he met with Ambassador William H. Sullivan. On Friday 7 January Admiral Weisner met with the Country Team and made an official call on Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos at Malacanang Palace. After additional discussions with U.S. and Filipino officials, the Admiral departed on 9 January for Bangkok. The next day meetings were held with U.S. Ambassador Charles C. Whitehouse and members of the Country Team, Royal Thai Government (RTG) Minister of Foreign Affairs Pachariyangkun Upadit, and RTG Minister of Defense Admiral (Ret.) Chaloyu Sa-Ngat. In the evening Sa-Ngat held a formal dinner for the Weisners in the Ministry of Defense Building. On 11 January Admiral Weisner visited Korat to inspect material being sold to Thailand. The following morning the Admiral's party proceeded to Jakarta, Indonesia where meetings were held with General Hasnan Habib, Chief Deputy, Staff HANKAM and other Indonesian officials, and in the evening Ambassador David D. Newsom held a reception and dinner for the Weisners. On Friday 14 January Admiral Weisner flew to Surabaya and toured the Indonesian Armada and the shipyard at the Surabaya Naval Base. As a result of discussions there, port visits by U.S. Navy ships to Surabaya were subsequently resumed.

(U) Washington DC Trip, 16-19 January: Admiral Weisner arrived Washington early 17 January and discussed with Mr. William Payeff (Assistant Director for East Asia/Pacific of the U.S. Information Agency) the assignment of a U.S. Information Agency advisor to his staff in Hawaii. He also visited other officials and paid a farewell call on J. William Middendorf, II, outgoing Secretary of the Navy. After lunch with VADM Bobby R. Inman, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), he met with General George S. Brown, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs, and the Unified Commanders in Chief. On Tuesday the 18th the Admiral met with Admiral James L. Holloway, Chief of Naval

1. Material for this section was taken from J74 HistSums Jan-Dec 77 and interviews with CINCPAC Staff personnel.

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Operations, General Brown, and Mr. Morton I. Abramowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (East Asia & Pacific Affairs). Later he attended the joint Navy/Marine farewell ceremony and reception for Secretary Middendorf at the Washington Navy Yard.

(U) **Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island, Washington DC, Maxwell AFB, Ft. McPherson Trip, 1-5 February:** On Tuesday, 1 February Admiral Weisner left Hawaii and arrived NAS North Island CA to confer with VADM William R. St. George, COMNAVSURFPAC, and VADM Robert P. Coogan, COMNAVAIRPAC. The following morning he flew to Washington, and on the 3rd of February he addressed the National Defense University student body on PACOM strategic issues. On 4 February the Admiral flew to Maxwell AFB AL where he presented the same address to the Air War College students. From there he continued to Ft. McPherson GA where he met with General Frederick J. Kroesen, USA, Commander USA Forces Command for discussions and orientation briefings.

(U) **NAS North Island Trip, 3-4 March:** This brief trip was for Admiral Weisner's address to the Executive Committee of the Navy League on Pacific issues and strategy at the Hotel Del Coronado (Coronado CA) on 4 March.

(U) **Washington DC trip 8-12 March:** Admiral Weisner, accompanied by two principal staff members, departed Hawaii late 8 March for Washington where the Admiral was scheduled to testify before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Defense Manpower and Personnel concerning Overseas Troop Deployment Asia/Pacific on 11 March. While in Washington the Admiral also met with Mr. Abramowitz, VADM Inman, Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles W. Duncan, General Louis H. Wilson, Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), General Walter T. Kerwin Jr., Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Brown, Admiral Holloway, Secretary of the Navy W. Graham Claytor, Under Secretary of the Navy R. James Woolsey, Under Secretary of State (Political Affairs) Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State (East Asia & Pacific Affairs) Richard E. Holbrooke and Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee. On 10 March Admiral Weisner accompanied Secretary of Defense Brown to a meeting with President Carter in the White House Oval Office.

(U) **Papua New Guinea (PNG), Burma, Sri Lanka Trip, 29 March-7 April:** This trip to PNG, as well as the visits to Burma and Sri Lanka, was Admiral Weisner's initial official visit as CINCPAC and was for the purpose of demonstrating U.S. interest in the welfare of these countries and to strengthen ties with the United States. Admiral Weisner and party arrived Port Moresby, PNG Wednesday 30 March. After arrival ceremonies the Admiral met with Ambassador Mary S. Olmsted and the Country Team and received a briefing by BG E. R. Diro, Commander, PNG Defense Force. On 31 March the Admiral met with Governor General Sir Tore Lokoloko; Deputy Prime Minister/Minister for Defense, Foreign Relations.
and Trade Sir Maori Kiki; and Defense Secretary Thomas Ritako. The party flew to Bangkok that afternoon, and on the following morning Admiral Weisner went to Rangoon via American Embassy Bangkok C-12 flight. He met with Ambassador David L. Osborn and the Burma Country Team; MGEN Kyaw Htin, Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff, Burma Defense Service; and Commodore Chit Hlaing, Vice Chief Naval Staff. Admiral Weisner returned to Bangkok Sunday 3 April where he met with Ambassador Whitehouse. On Monday the party flew to Colombo, Sri Lanka for visits with Ambassador John H. Reed, the Country Team, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and a dinner given by LT GEN D. S. Attygale, Commander Sri Lanka Army. On Tuesday 5 April Admiral Weisner met with the Deputy Minister of Defense & Foreign Affairs Mr. Laksham Jayakody, attended a luncheon by RADM Don Basil Goonesekera, Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy, and returned to Hawaii on 7 April.

(U)  Mauna Kea Trip, 19-21 April: Admiral Weisner made a brief trip to the Island of Hawaii to address the Chief Executives Forum, a group of distinguished American citizens concerned with world affairs, on 20 April. Following his address on economic and strategic issues in the Pacific, he participated in panel discussions on national security.

(U)  Address to Japan-American Society (Honolulu), 25 April: Admiral Weisner was guest speaker at this dinner held at the Ala Moana Hotel. His theme was the importance of U.S. economic and security relationships with Japan. Emphasis was on Japan's strategic geographical position and its significance with regard to the USSR.

(U)  Australia, The Philippines Trip, 4-15 May: Prior to attending Mutual Defense Board (MDB) meetings in the Philippines, Admiral Weisner traveled to Australia to meet with the Australia Defence Council and to represent the United States at the annual Coral Sea celebration. While in Canberra 5-6 May, the Admiral met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrew S. Peacock and the Australian Defence Council headed by Minister of Defence Denis J. Killen and General Arthur L. MacDonald, Chief, Defence Force Staff. On Monday 9 May Admiral Weisner departed from Sydney for Perth to visit the Australian Naval Facility at Cockburn Sound. In the evening the Weisners attended a reception by the Perth Australia-American Association. On 10 May the Admiral called on the Premier of Western Australia Sir Charles Court and represented the United States at a wreath-laying ceremony at the Fremantle War Memorial. After a reception by the Mayor of Fremantle, as part of the annual Coral Sea celebration, he flew to Learmonth for a briefing and tour of the Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station. On 11 May the Admiral's party departed Learmonth for Manila where he was briefed by Charge Lee F. Stull and members of the Country Team. On 12 May he met with General Romeo C. Espino, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and Under Secretary of Defense Jose M. Crisol prior to the 77-5 MDB
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Meeting held at the Philippine Plaza Hotel in Manila.

(U) Ft. Leavenworth, Knoxville, Norfolk, Eglin AFB Trip, 31 May-5 June: Admiral Weisner arrived at Ft. Leavenworth KS where, on 1 June, he addressed the USA Command and General Staff College students on "Strategic Issues Facing the U.S. in the Far East and Pacific During the Period 1977-85" at Eisenhower Auditorium. The following day the Admiral proceeded to Knoxville TN where he visited the Naval Reserve Center prior to delivering an unclassified version of the above address to a joint meeting of Kiwanis Club members. On 3 June he gave the classified presentation on strategic issues to the Armed Forces Staff College students at Norfolk VA. While at Norfolk, Admiral Weisner also met with Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., CINCLANT, and VADM Howard E. Greer, COMNAVAIRLANT. He proceeded to Eglin AFB the following day for briefings on Eglin AFB, the Air Development and Test Center, Hard Structure Munitions, and the GBU-15 laser-guided bomb and munitions load display.

(U) Los Angeles, San Francisco, Scott AFB Trip, 12-23 June: En route to the Unified Commanders' Conference at Scott AFB IL, Admiral Weisner made two speeches in California on his perceptions of issues facing the United States in the Pacific. The first was to the National Security Industrial Association Executive Associates on 20 June at the Beverly Hilton in Los Angeles. The Admiral also met with the Los Angeles Times Editorial Board for a background interview. The second was to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco (members are citizens of California concerned with state, national and world affairs). On 22 June Admiral Weisner flew to Scott AFB where on 23 June he participated with Secretary of Defense General Brown, other members of the JCS and 12 other CINC's in the day-long CINCs Conference.

(U) Washington DC Trip, 11-15 July: Admiral Weisner traveled to Washington to attend a Navy CINCs Conference and to hold discussions on PACOM matters. On 12 July he met with General Brown; General David L. Jones, Air Force Chief of Staff; General Wilson, CMC; General Bernard A. Rogers, Army Chief of Staff; and other State/Defense officials. In addition to attending Navy CINCs Conference sessions on 13-15 July, the Admiral met with VADM James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Personnel; Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology Lucy W. Benson (regarding forthcoming PACOM Security Assistance Conference); Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher; Secretary of the Navy Claytor; Secretary Habib and Secretary Brown.

(U) New Zealand, American Samoa Trip, 25-29 July: Admiral Weisner and three principal staff members traveled to Wellington NZ to attend ANZUS Council sessions and the annual ANZUS Military Representatives (MILREP) Meeting. The party was met by Ambassador Armistead I. Selden, New Zealand Secretary of Defence John F. Robertson, and New Zealand Chief Defence Service Air Marshal
Richard B. Bolt. The first two ANZUS Council Sessions were held 27 July and the third and final Sessions took place on the 28th at Parliament House. These were followed by the ANZUS MILREP Meeting on Friday 29 July. Various official social events were hosted by Deputy Prime Minister Brian E. Talboys, Ambassador Selden, and Prime Minister Robert D. Muldoon. The party departed Wellington 30 July, stopped in Pago Pago for a luncheon by Governor H. Rex Lee, and proceeded to Hickam on 29 July.

(U) Tahiti, Fiji, Tonga, American Samoa, Western Samoa Trip, 2-14 September: This visit was another initial opportunity for Admiral Weisner, as CINCPAC, to meet with military and civil leaders in the Southwest Pacific to demonstrate U.S. concern with the welfare of these island communities and interest in their activities. Since arrival at Papeete, Tahiti was on Saturday 3 September, the only official function that day was a luncheon by RADM (Baron) and Mme. Gerard M.C. deCastelbajac, the Flag Officer in Command of the French Forces in the Pacific. On 5 September there was an honors ceremony at French Forces Headquarters followed by staff meetings with RADM deCastelbajac and Messrs. Charles Schmitt and Francis Sanford of the Government Council. Admiral Weisner departed Tahiti for Fua'amotu airport in Tonga on 7 September where he was met by Baron Vaea of Houma, Minister of Industry, Commerce and Labor and visited with Mrs. Mary George, Director of the Peace Corps in Tonga. On the 8th Admiral Weisner met with Minister of Lands/Deputy Prime Minister Siosata Aleetou'a Laufillonga Tuita and the Prime Minister, His Royal Highness Prince Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake. A luncheon was hosted by His Majesty King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV. The CINCPAC party departed Tonga on the 9th for Fiji. In Fiji Admiral Weisner was met by COL Paul Manuei, Commander, Royal Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) and was given a Fijian Welcoming Ceremony at Queen Elizabeth Barracks. He called on Governor General Ratu Sir George K. Cakobau and Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese K.T. Mara. On the 10th Admiral Weisner held discussions with COL Manuei, received an RFMF brief, and toured Queen Elizabeth Barracks. The next day Admiral Weisner visited the Fiji Naval Station and inspected the Fijian ships prior to departure from Nadi for Pago Pago. (There were no scheduled events on Saturday and Sunday.) On Monday 12 September the party flew to Western Samoa (Faleolo) and were met by the Minister of Justice Ulualofaiga Talamaiavao with an honor guard in attendance. Calls were made by the Admiral on His Highness Head of State Susuga Malietoa Tanumafili II, Prime Minister Tupou Efi, Minister of Economic Affairs Asi Eikeni, and the New Zealand High Commissioner Mr. D. Harper. Prior to departure from Faleolo airport on 13 September a Samoan Feast was hosted by Minister of Agriculture Fuimaono Mimo.

(U) Japan, Korea Trip, 24 September-2 October: Admiral Weisner and principal staff members arrived Yokota AB Japan on 25 September. On the 26th the Admiral met with LT GEN George G. Loving, USAF, Commander, U.S. Forces Japan and members of the USFJ Staff. The party flew to Misawa AB on the 27th where
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Admiral Weisner met with LT GEN Masaji Matsumura, Commander, Northern Air Defense Force, Japan Air Self Defense Force, toured the base and the Naval Air Facility, and received briefings on the various installations there. On 28 September, during a conference of all U.S. Commanders in Japan at the Sanno Hotel, the Admiral received first-hand reports from all major U.S. units in Japan. This was followed by discussions with Ambassador Mike Mansfield and the Country Team; Japan Minister of State for Defense Asao Mihara; Admiral Hiroichi Samejima, Chairman, Joint Staff Council; and other U.S. officials. The party proceeded on 29 September to Kimpo AB, Republic of Korea (ROK) where the Admiral met with General John W. Vessey, Jr., COMUS Korea, General Ro Saehyon, ROK CJCS and U.S. Ambassador Richard L. Sneider. The following day, after a wreath-laying ceremony at the tomb of the Korean Unknown Soldier and at that of the late Mrs. Park Chong-hee, Admiral Weisner met with ROK Minister of Defense Suh Jyong-chul. On Korean Armed Forces Day, 1 October, Admiral Weisner attended the annual ceremony at YoDo Island, after which there was a visit with Prime Minister Choi Kyu-hah and a meeting with President Park Chong-hee. Admiral Weisner and party returned to Hawaii on 2 October.

(U) Houston Trip, 28-30 October: Admiral Weisner flew to Houston TX to address the Houston Council of the Navy League on 29 October, Navy Day. His remarks centered upon U.S. interests and perceptions of power in Asia and the Pacific. He returned to his Hawaii headquarters the following day.

(U) Long Beach, Washington DC, Carlisle Barracks, Norfolk Trip, 3-12 November: CINCPAC flew to CONUS to make three speeches. The first of these was to the National Maritime Council Seminar in Long Beach CA on 4 November. The following day Admiral Weisner visited the NSA National SIGINT Operations Center (NSOC) where he received intelligence update briefings. On Monday 7 November the Admiral departed for Andrews AFB MD and proceeded to Carlisle Barracks PA where he addressed the Army War College students and met with students from allied countries. Immediately thereafter the Admiral returned to Andrews and met with VADM Inman at the NSA in Ft. Meade MD. On the 9th Admiral Weisner had meetings with Admiral Holloway, General Brown, Secretary Holbrooke, and other Defense officials. The next day he again conferred with numerous Defense officials including Secretary Claytor, Secretary Brown, and General Jones. On Friday 11 November the Admiral departed for NAS Norfolk VA where he addressed another class of students at the Armed Forces Staff College on the military force structure and strategic issues in PACOM. While at Norfolk he also conferred with Admiral Kidd, CINCLANT.

(U) Philippines Trip, 29 November-5 December: Admiral Weisner's party, including principal staff members, traveled to the Philippines 29-30 November primarily in connection with the 77-11 MDB Meeting. After arrival at Clark AB, on 30 November, the Admiral went to Manila where he met with the Honorable
David D. Newsom, newly-appointed U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines. He also met with Philippines Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile at Camp Aguinaldo. After chairing the MDB Meeting at the Subic Bay Officers Club, Admiral Weisner met with General Espino and on Friday 2 December had a formal audience with President Marcos in Manila. On 3 December the Admiral proceeded to NAS Cubi Point for a pre-arranged meeting with RADM James B. Linder, Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, to discuss Taiwan issues.

Distinguished Visitors to the Command, Meetings with News Media Personnel, and Local Addresses during 1977

12 January - During a biennial trip to PACOM for review and discussions on civilian personnel affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower & Reserve Affairs (Civilian Personnel Policy) Carl W. Clewlow, presented the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service to William A. Pankonin, Chief of the Civilian Personnel Policy Division, CINCPAC Directorate for Personnel. This was the first presentation of this award to anyone outside of the Washington area.

18 January - The Honorable Asi Eikeni, Minister of Economic Affairs, Western Samoa.

27 January - Admiral Weisner hosted 23 members of the Honolulu press corps/media at a luncheon at the Camp Smith Officers' Club. Immediately following the lunch, the Admiral gave his first formal press conference. He highlighted events during his first five months in command, reviewing his visits throughout the command, exercises conducted to improve readiness, status of U.S. presence preparedness in the Pacific, economic factors and major international events occurring within the Pacific Basin community.

14 February - The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Senator from Hawaii.

18 February - The Honorable Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States.

23 February - General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, CINCUNC/COMUS Korea

1 March - LT GEN Lee M. Paschall, Director, Defense Communications Agency.

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14 March - The Chairman of the Presidential Commission on MIAs, Leonard Woodcock, and members Rep. G. V. Montgomery, Charles Yost, and former Senator Mike Mansfield visited CINCPAC en route to Hanoi to pick up remains of POWs/MIAs. Admiral Weisner met with them again on 21 March to discuss results of their mission, and on 29 March, LT GEN Manor, along with members of the commission, participated in a ceremony at Hickam AFB.

16 March - RADM Geoffrey Gladstone, Flag Officer Commanding, Australian Fleet.


31 March - Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Reed (on his farewell tour of PACOM).

5 April - The Honorable Elliott L. Richardson, U.S. Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Conference, met with the Chief of Staff and other members of the CINCPAC staff to review results of the Conference.

14 April - The Honorable Funihiko Togo, Japanese Ambassador to the United States.

18 April - Senator John J. Sparkman (D-AL) headed a group of three senators, eight congressmen, their wives and 13 staff members who were en route to Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting in Australia. Admiral Weisner presented a PACOM overview briefing to the senators and congressmen.


3 May - The Honorable Nobuhiko Ushiba, Japanese State Minister for External Economic Affairs.

3 May - The Honorable Henry A. Byroade, outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan.

10 May - The Honorable Philip H. Alston, Jr., U.S. Ambassador (Designate) to Australia.
13 May - Mr. John Eisenhour, Senior Budget Examiner for Security Assistance, Office of Management and Budget, and Mr. Joseph M. Notargiacomo, State Department, Security Assistance and Sales, Political-Military Affairs Staff met with LT GEN Manor concerning alternative basing and the Security Assistance Program in PACOM.

23 May - Mr. S. R. Nathan, Director, Security and Intelligence Division, Ministry of Defense, Singapore.

24 May - General William G. Moore, Jr., USAF, CINCMAC and former Chief of Staff, CINCPAC.

26 May - The Honorable Donald R. Cotter, Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, accompanied by Dr. N. Fred Wikner, Consultant to Secretary Cotter.

3 June - LT GEN Manor met informally with Prime Minister Robert D. Muldoon as he transited Honolulu.

3 June - The Honorable Mike Mansfield, U.S. Ambassador (Designate) to Japan, met with LT GEN Manor and key Staff members, and on 6 June met with Admiral Weisner.

4 June - Mr. Morton I. Abramowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (East Asia & Pacific Affairs).


8 June - Air Marshal James A. Rowland, Chief of Air Staff, Australia.

17 June - The Honorable Armistead I. Selden, U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand, Fiji and Western Samoa.

20 June - Mr. Charles W. Bray, III, Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency.

20 June - Prime Minister of Western Samoa Tupuola Efi.

21 June - Mr. John F. Lally, Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Investigative Subcommittee. The purpose of his visit was a fact-finding mission in connection with Korean withdrawal plans.
22 June - Mrs. Rosalynn Carter, wife of the President, visited Hawaii 22-25 June primarily in connection with the dedication ceremony of the Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole Federal Building in Honolulu. Upon arrival at Honolulu International Airport on 22 June, Mrs. Carter was met by the CINCPAC Chief of Staff and other local dignitaries before proceeding to Kona. On 24 June Admiral Weisner attended the dedication of the new Federal Building by Mrs. Carter and the Honolulu Federal Day Awards Luncheon where Mrs. Carter was guest of honor. In the evening the Weisners attended a reception in Mrs. Carter's honor by Governor and Mrs. Ariyoshi. Admiral Weisner bade farewell to Mrs. Carter and Amy at the airport on 25 June.

25 June - The Right Honorable J. Malcolm Fraser, Prime Minister of Australia met with Admiral Weisner at the Kahala Hilton.

27 June - Peter Arnett, Associated Press correspondent on special assignment to write a series of articles on the U.S. military posture in Asia, interviewed Admiral Weisner off-the-record. The thrust of Mr. Arnett's inquiries concerned realities of readiness reporting and U.S. response capabilities today and compared with the Vietnam war time-frame. Following his visit to CINCPAC Mr. Arnett interviewed other major commanders in Hawaii and PACOM.

27 June - Mr. Adrian Winkel, High Commissioner, Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands.

27 June - The Honorable H. Rex Lee, Governor of American Samoa.

30 June - Admiral Weisner attended Marine Corps change of command ceremonies at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station. LT GEN John N. McLaughlin retired and relinquished command of Fleet Marine Forces Pacific (FMFPAC) to LT GEN Leslie E. Brown.

6 July - Sir Arthur Tange, Secretary of Defence Department, Australia.

9 July - Representative Gladys N. Spellman (D-MD) and Representative Trent Lott (R-MS) were in Hawaii to conduct hearings on the cost-of-living allowance. They met with Admiral Weisner to receive a PACOM overview briefing.

21 July - The Honorable Philip W. Manhard, Acting Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations. Ambassador Manhard met again with LT GEN Manor on 30 July.

22 July - Admiral Weisner hosted a working lunch and a dinner for newly-appointed Ambassador Leonard Woodcock, U.S. Liaison Officer to Peking and conferred with him on 23 July.
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23 July - Representative William L. Dickinson (R-AL) received a briefing by Admiral Weisner on PACOM forces and perceptions.

1 August - Admiral Weisner conducted a retirement ceremony for VADM Edwin K. Snyder, USN, Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC) at Camp Smith HI. This was preceded by debriefing discussions on his tour as COMUSTDC with staff members.

2 August - The Honorable Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., Secretary of the Army. Secretary Alexander was returning from a WestPac tour.

2 August - Dr. Hans Binnendijk and LT GEN Herbert L. Beckington, USMC (Ret), Staff Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

5 August - RADM Thomas J. Kilcine, USN, Commander, U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, COMUSNAV Phil/CINCPACREP Phil called on Admiral Weisner.

5 August - The Honorable W. Howard Wriggins, U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka met with Admiral Weisner. In addition, he received PACOM briefings and held discussions on Indian Ocean matters with key staff members.

8 August - LT GEN Charles A. Gabriel, USAF, DepCINC USFK/DepCINC UNC (Designate) called on Admiral Weisner.

9 August - Mr. Charles Corddry, Baltimore Sun reporter, conducted an on-the-record interview with ADM Weisner on 9 August. Corddry had covered the Pentagon for UPI for several years and was a regular panel member of "Washington Week in Review." In July, prior to coming to Hawaii, he attended the Security Consultative Meeting in Korea and toured U.S. bases in the Pacific. Based on his tour and CINCPAC interview he wrote a series of five articles published in the Sun.


18 August - Air Vice Marshal Cyril L. Siegert, Chief Air Staff, Royal New Zealand Air Forces.

18 August - J03 L. G. Baines, of the Pearl Harbor Naval Station Public Affairs Office, interviewed Admiral Weisner for a command information article that appeared in the Hawaii Navy News on 7 September 1977. It focused on the Admiral's position as CINCPAC, PACOM forces, calibre of service people today and the local issue of Kahoolawe Island as a military bombing target.

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20 August - Admiral Weisner addressed a group of Hawaii-based medical officers at Ft. DeRussy. He spoke on the vital contributions of medical personnel to the military services and PACOM military challenges today.

26 August - Mr. Wilheim Chapman, newly assigned Tokyo Correspondent for the Washington Post. Admiral Weisner gave an off-the-record interview and a briefing on the PACOM with emphasis on Japan.

26 August - Admiral Weisner addressed the Honolulu Federal Executive Board on the subject of challenges and issues facing the U.S. in the Pacific and Asia.

30 August - Representative James J. Lloyd (D-CA) met with Admiral Weisner for discussions on PACOM and was guest of LT GEN Manor at dinner.

31 August - Admiral Weisner conducted the retirement ceremony for RADM William R. McClendon, CINCPAC Director for Plans at Camp Smith HI.

8 September - Representative William V. Chappell (D-FL) received a PACOM update briefing by LT GEN Manor in Admiral Weisner's absence.

8 September - Mr. Joseph Sherick, Deputy Comptroller, Program and Budget, OSD.

9 September - Mr. Peter H. Haas, Deputy Director, Science & Technology, Defense Nuclear Agency.

9 September - Commodore Simeon M. Alejandro, Commander Philippine Coast Guard.

13 September - Admiral Noel Gayler, USN (Ret), former CINCPAC and consultant to the Senate Armed Services Committee, met with Admiral Weisner and members of the CINCPAC Staff and component commands as part of his initial study on PACOM for the Committee.

14 September - LT GEN Welborn G. Dolvin, USA (ret), Deputy Negotiator for the Panama Canal Treaty, presented a briefing on the Treaty to selected staff members at Camp Smith and on the 15th, to a group of retired flag and general officers at Ft. DeRussy. He also met privately with Admiral Weisner.

15 September - Mr. Keyes Beech, correspondent, Chicago Daily News, interviewed Admiral Weisner for an article on Taiwan.
16 September - The Honorable Peter R. Rosenblatt, the President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations.

17 September - His Majesty King of Tonga Taufa'ahau Tupou IV.

17 September - His Excellency Asao Mihara, Minister of State for Defense, Japan, received a PACOM overview briefing from Admiral Weisner. While in Hawaii Mihara was also the Admiral's dinner guest and visited Punchbowl National Cemetery for a wreath-laying ceremony.

19 September - The Honorable H. Rex Lee, Governor of American Samoa (luncheon).

20 September - Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) Permanent Military Deputies Group (PMDG) Representatives: Air Marshal Alfred Ball, RAF, United Kingdom; LT GEN Sabri Tavazar, Turkey; LT GEN Thomas H. Tackaberry, USA, United States; LT GEN Y. M. Salch, Iran; and MAJ GEN James A. Young, USAF, COFS, Combined Military Planning Staff, CENTO.

22 September - Prime Minister of Western Samoa Tupuola Efi.

23 September - Mr. Thomas B. Shoesmith, U.S. Consul General (Designate) to Hong Kong.

24 September - The Honorable Carlos P. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, was met at the airport by LT GEN Manor for informal discussion on U.S.-Philippine relationships.

24 September - Prime Minister of Malaysia Hussein bin Onn was greeted in transit by LT GEN Manor.

27 September - COL Yngw Elstak, Commander, Surinam Armed Forces.

1 October - Ceremony for return of MIA/POW remains at Hickam AFB. Representative G. V. Montgomery and Representative Robert K. Dornan (R-CA) attended.

3 October - Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand Brian E. Talboys met with Admiral Weisner.

3 October - Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone, former Director of Japan Defense Agency and currently Chairman Executive Council, LDP (Lower House).
3 October - The Honorable Robert H. Miller, U.S. Ambassador (Designate) to Malaysia.

5 October - Tongyang Broadcasting Company (TBC), Seoul Korea filmed an interview with Admiral Weisner as part of a documentary on U.S. Forces in Asia. The interview centered on U.S. plans for withdrawal of troops from Korea, availability and readiness of U.S. ground, naval and air elements for defense of Korea, and joint U.S./ROK military exercises. TBC representatives also filmed various installations in PACOM for incorporation in the documentary.

5 October - RADM Don Basil Goonesekera, Commander Sri Lanka Navy. He also met with CINCPACFLT, CGFMFPAC and COMTHIRDFLT while in Hawaii.

13 October - LT GEN Julio Vadora, Commander in Chief, Army of Uruguay and MAJ GEN Amauri E. Prantl, Director of Defense Intelligence Service, Uruguay.

13 October - The Honorable Maurice D. Bean, U.S. Ambassador (Designate) to Burma.

13 October - Prime Minister of Western Samoa Tupuola Efi (dinner).

14 October - Mr. Harvey J. Feldman, East Asia/Republic of China (ROC) Director, State Department held discussions with Admiral Weisner on ROC military posture.

14 October - Dr. Guy J. Pauker, Indonesia Specialist, RAND Corporation.

19 October - General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, CINCUNC/COMUS Korea/CG EUSA. On 20 October Admiral Weisner accompanied General Vessey to a "Checkmate West" Briefing at PACAF Headquarters.

24 October - Minister of Foreign Affairs of Singapore Sinnathamby Rajaratnam.

26 October - Departure ceremony for MIA/POW remains from Hickam AFB.


29 October - The Honorable Carol Laise, Director General, U.S. Foreign Service.
30 October - In Admiral Weisner's absence LT GEN Manor hosted a dinner in honor of the Honorable David D. Newsom, U.S. Ambassador (Designate) to the Philippines. The following day Ambassador Newsom met with Admiral Weisner, Component Commanders, and principal CINCPAC staff.

31 October - LT GEN C. J. LeVan, USA, Director, Operations, J-3, JCS called on Admiral Weisner.

3 November - Mrs. Ferdinand E. (Imelda) Marcos, First Lady of the Philippines, met with Admiral Weisner and key members of his staff.

7 November - Prime Minister of New Zealand Robert D. Muldoon (en route to CONUS including visit with President Carter) was met at Honolulu International Airport by LT GEN Manor.

14 November - Representative Charles H. Wilson (D-CA), returning from Korea and Japan as part of a House Armed Services Committee fact-finding mission, met with Admiral Weisner.

14 November - LT GEN Arnold W. Braswell, USAF, Director for Plans, J5, JCS called on Admiral Weisner.

15 November - The Honorable Lucy W. Benson, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. Mrs. Benson represented State Department at the annual PACOM Security Assistance Conference.


18 November - RADM James B. Morin, USN, OJCS Representative to the Law of the Sea Conference.

19 November - The Honorable Charles C. Whitehouse, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand. He met with Admiral Weisner, Component Commanders, and principal CINCPAC staff.

21 November - General William G. Moore, Jr., USAF, CINCMAC.

22 November - General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret) (former CINCUNC/ COMUS Korea).

26 November - The Right Honorable Robert D. Muldoon, Prime Minister of New Zealand received a PACOM overview briefing by Admiral Weisner. The Prime Minister was returning from a visit to the Mainland USA where he had met with President Carter. His stop in Hawaii included a wreath-laying ceremony at Punchbowl National Cemetery, a press conference, a meeting with Governor Ariyoshi, an address to a luncheon sponsored by the Hawaii Chamber of Commerce and Hawaii International Service Agency, and a dinner by Admiral and Mrs. Weisner.

28 November - Senator Robert P. Griffin (R-MI) returning from the Third Ocean Conference in Tokyo and a visit to Taiwan. During his visit at CINCPAC Admiral Weisner provided a PACOM update briefing.

28 November - Admiral Weisner, in response to a request from the Commanding General FMFPAC, gave a classified presentation entitled "Future U.S. Interests in the Pacific" to senior Marine operations and logistics commanders in the Pacific.


28 November - The Honorable Armistead I. Selden, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga, and American Samoa. He was returning from Washington where he had accompanied Prime Minister Muldoon on his visit with President Carter.

30 November - Mr. Frank S. Sato, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Audit) and Director, Defense Audit Service.

5 December - Mr. Richard Steadman, DOD Study Director held discussions with principal staff on the National Military Command Structure study for the Secretary of Defense.

12 December - Senator Robert B. Morgan (D-NC) received a PACOM overview briefing from Admiral Weisner.

13 December - Ambassador Peter R. Rosenblatt, President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations, stopped in Hawaii for discussions with Admiral Weisner on progress of the negotiations after a visit to the Trust Territory.

15 December - RADM William R. McClendon, USN (Ret) met with Admiral Weisner returning from his initial assignment as JCS-designated Senior Military Advisor to Philippine Base Negotiations.
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21 December - Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Adolph Dubs.

27 December - Delegate A. B. Won Pat, D-Guam was given a PACOM update by LT GEN Manor in his office.

27 December - Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Richard C. Holbrooke held discussions with Admiral Weisner and key members of the CINCPAC Staff on force levels in East Asia, Indian Ocean matters, Soviet presence in Asia and the Pacific, Cambodia, Micronesia, and the Philippines in preparation for an extended orientation tour of PACOM. He also briefed the staff on Vietnamese affairs. Secretary Holbrooke conferred again with component commanders and CINCPAC staff members on 30 December.


Miscellaneous Related Activities

The "CINCPAC View" Briefing Project

(U) In July 1977 CINCPAC directed the formation of a special task force to prepare a "CINCPAC View" briefing which would provide a "fresh-look" at the Pacific Command military force posture as related to U.S. national interests in the Asia-Pacific region. A three-officer group, under the supervision of the CINCPAC Military Assistant/Aide de Camp, began the research, interviews, documentation and analysis. In September and October, both classified and unclassified scripts were approved by CINCPAC for presentation to associations, groups and organizations of U.S. and foreign government and business representatives as appropriate. The task force also monitored the submission of magazine articles and developed speeches for CINCPAC based on the prepared scripts.

(U) Subsequent to the completion of the first scripts, the task force was reduced to two officers. One officer billet was created on the CINCPAC staff as the Assistant Executive for Research and Presentations to spearhead the briefing effort and write updated CINCPAC speeches. The incumbent Military

1. CINCPAC (J002) Annual Review of Goals and Accomplishments, Sep 77, hereafter cited as Goals and Accomplishments.
Assistant/Aide de Camp resumed his regular duties and supported the briefing project as required for presentations in Hawaii, the PACOM, and the Continental United States. Through the end of 1977, 32 "CINCPAC View" briefings were presented.¹

Pacific Stars and Stripes Operations

(U) Beginning in 1972 the Pacific Stars and Stripes (PS&S) began to experience operating losses and its financial condition slowly deteriorated. Reserves built up during the war in Vietnam were depleted, and the following losses were registered: 1973 - $470,000; 1974 - $190,000; 1975 - $830,000; and 1976 - $250,000. In October 1976 efforts began to obtain appropriated funds from the U.S. Army. On 26 April 1977 the Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army advised that a $500,000 supplemental appropriation would be provided through the U.S. Army in Japan.²

(U) Early in 1977 CINCPAC submitted to OASD/PA a PS&S "Study to Attain Sound Fiscal Base." This was followed by a Defense Audit Service (DAS) Management Survey Report forwarded to OASD/PA on 21 March which conveyed recommendations to improve the PS&S situation. However, action was held in abeyance because some recommendations concerned Korea, where plans for U.S. Forces withdrawal had been announced.³

(U) Meanwhile, the PS&S management had taken production and distribution measures to reduce expenditures which had shown favorable results. These efforts, however, were offset by continuing inflation and dollar depreciation during the year. Adjustments in reserves amounting to $466,000 were necessary for unanticipated payment toward Japanese employee retirement and separation, and an additional $106,000 was necessary to meet the rising cost of Japanese employee salaries. The PS&S closed out 1977 with losses totaling $423,000 to be applied against the $500,000 supplement provided by the U.S. Army.⁴

(U) As analyzed by the CINCPAC Public Affairs Office, efforts to achieve a sound fiscal base for the PS&S presented a complex challenge in an era of diminishing troop strength, declining sales, and rising costs. There was a need for both the information and the entertainment provided by a Unified Command newspaper; however, the cost of providing that service to the troops, dependents, and U.S. civilian employees suggested that significant changes were

1. JO01D HistSum Aug 78.
3. J01/Memo/14-77 of 8 Apr 77, Subj: PS&S Update.
4. Interview, E. Behana with LCOL John A. Klose (J741), 10 Aug 78.

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needed to reduce reliance on ever-diminishing appropriated funds. One option recommended for consideration by CINCPAC was the consolidation of the PS&S operation with that of the European Stars and Stripes to reduce operational costs. This could result in one or both Unified Commands losing some influence over their Unified Command newspapers; however, the objective was to provide the service to the troops at a minimum cost to the Government. At the end of the year, the response from the European side was negative, but the ultimate solution in the PACOM awaited detailed cost analysis of all possible alternatives in light of the planned troop withdrawals from Korea.¹

PS&S TO NAVCOMMSTA - Australia

(U) When Admiral Weisner visited the Holt U.S. Naval Communication Station, Australia on 10 May 1977 a request was made to receive Pacific Stars and Stripes (PS&S). CINCPAC and PS&S personnel collaborated on arrangements for distribution on a trial basis with shipment by military air and with a parallel survey by mail. Military air proved expensive (loss was $1,350 per month), and delivery time by both military air and mail was excessive. Attempts to have U.S. Army pay for the transportation costs were unsuccessful, as was a subsequent request to CINCPACFLT. Therefore service was discontinued after the six-months trial determined delivery was unsatisfactory and because two English dailies were available at the base.²

Media Visit to Diego Garcia

(U) As early as 1974, the CINCPAC Public Affairs Office and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD/PA) had received numerous requests from U.S. and foreign news media to visit the U.S. facilities at Diego Garcia. CINCPAC had supported the visits in principle on the grounds that, properly escorted, they would reduce speculation regarding the facilities and capabilities of Diego Garcia. However, it was not until late 1976 that CINCPAC efforts to arrange a media visit were approved by OASD/PA. The visit was tentatively scheduled for mid-October 1976, with authorized representation from the United States and the United Kingdom (tenant and owner, respectively). Because of logistics details and international political sensitivity, the visit was delayed until 6 April 1977.³

(U) Transportation was by scheduled Military Airlift Command C-141 with reimbursement to the U.S. Government. A party of 16 U.S. and three United Kingdom representatives were picked up en route, either at Hong Kong or Singa-

1. Op. Cit. CINCPAC (J03), Goals and Accomplishments.
2. Interview, E. Behana with LCOL John A. Klose (J741), 10 Aug 78.
3. CINCPAC 110057Z Dec 76.
pore. Accompanied by four U.S. officials, the group was hosted by the Island Commander and received briefings and tours of the naval communications, docks, supply warehouses, and fuel storage facilities. The articles published as a result of the visit tended to confirm the long-standing Defense Department position that U.S. facilities at Diego Garcia had no sinister or ulterior mission. In a message of congratulations to CINCPAC, OASD/PA stated, "...all coverage here seems to be extraordinarily well-balanced and informative."

1. ISCOM Diego Garcia 061600Z Apr 77; SECDEF 190038Z Apr 77.