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ROBERT B. SOLOMON
Major General, USA
Deputy Chief of Staff

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VOLUME I

1979

Prepared by the Command History Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861
1980
The decade of the seventies was a time of change. As we enter the eighties, events have transformed the political, economic, social and strategic contours of the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. Oil, trade and access to raw materials are essential to our economy. Since 1972 U.S. trade with Asia has exceeded that with the European Economic Community, even excluding Middle East oil. Japan's acknowledged position as a global economic power in the seventies was balanced by the rapid, sometimes spectacular, economic growth of many newly-industrialized Asian nations. That trend continues. A potential threat to these economic lifelines has been the growing military strength of the Soviet Union in Asia, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and in the littoral nations of the region.

During 1979, Japan became increasingly concerned about Soviet intentions in Northeast Asia. There were encouraging Japanese efforts to improve their defenses. Our security relations continued to progress and Japan assumed a greater share of the costs of mutually beneficial programs.

In Korea, the assassination of President Park, and subsequent political uncertainties, had the potential to endanger stability. However, the decision to defer the withdrawal of U.S. ground combat forces, our official warnings to North Korea, and steps taken to increase our force visibility and readiness, deterred Pyongyang from any overt offensive moves.

In the Philippines, after a decade of intermittent negotiations, an amended Military Bases Agreement was signed on 7 January 1979. This positive step was welcome because these bases are at the hub of Pacific air and sea lines of communication. Philippine training, logistics and repair facilities contribute substantially to the pursuit of our security interests in Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Following Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea in late 1978, hostilities continued throughout 1979. The flood of refugees from Vietnam was matched by a mass exodus of Cambodians to Thailand. During and after the invasion of Vietnam by China in February 1979, the Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea expanded and, by the end of 1979, Soviet ships and aircraft were making frequent use of ports and airfields in Vietnam. The Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea created a potential threat to Thailand and caused other Southeast Asian nations to feel increasingly vulnerable to pressure from Vietnam and the Soviet Union.
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In the South Asia-Indian Ocean region, Soviet-backed strife in the Horn of Africa crossed the Gulf of Aden to involve North and South Yemen and raise serious alarm in Saudi Arabia. After 18 months of violence in Afghanistan, which included the murder of the U.S. Ambassador in February 1979, Soviet military forces occupied the country on Christmas Day, 1979. This moved the Soviets a step nearer the Persian Gulf, and their presence cast a dark shadow on Pakistan, Iran, and the entire Persian Gulf. In neighboring Iran, violence which began in 1978 brought the overthrow of the Shah and the return of the exiled Muslim leader, Khomeini, in early 1979. After months of country-wide strife, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was occupied in November. The U.S. diplomatic and military personnel captured at that time were still being held hostage at the end of the year.

These events had a severe impact on the resources of the Pacific Command. Primarily because of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the hostage situation, and as a signal that vital interests of the United States in the area were involved, a major U.S. naval presence was established in the Arabian Sea-Persian Gulf area. This changed the normal posture of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific. At year's end, two Seventh Fleet battle groups were deployed in the Indian Ocean. Another contingency operation in the command would not only have seriously extended our combat resources, but would have demanded even greater sacrifices and longer separations from family and loved ones by the dedicated men and women of the Pacific Command.

R. L. J. LONG
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific

UNCLASSIFIED
PREFACE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the viewpoint of the CINCPAC. The report also preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS, to the extent that the impact on the PACOM of major decisions and directives of the JCS may be evaluated by the JCS historians without detailed research into PACOM records.

This history describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities and his relationships with U.S. military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions, but does not cover the detailed activities of his component and subordinate unified commands, which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters.

The 1972-1973 historical narrative of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was the terminal history of that organization. It covered the period from 1 January 1972 until the disestablishment of the headquarters on 29 March 1973. Annex B of the 1976 history was the terminal history of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand. Annex E of the 1978 history was the terminal history of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, which covered the period 1 January 1978 to 30 April 1979. The designations of Annex A (MACV), Annex B (MACTHAI) and Annex E (TDC) are reserved to facilitate future research and reference. The histories of U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea will retain the designations of Annexes C and D respectively. The Annexes are included only for those copies retained at CINCPAC or forwarded to the JCS. Further distribution of those histories is the prerogative of the subordinate unified commander.

The 1979 history is published in two volumes, consecutively paginated, with the glossary and index for these volumes at the end of Volume II. Appendix I to this history, entitled Taiwan Wrap-Up, covers the actions during 1979 leading to the expiration of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty on 31 December 1979. Appendix I is paginated separately.

Comprehensive notes on sources and documentation may be found in the 1972 history. Briefly, message traffic footnoted in this history other than General Service (GENSER) is followed by the abbreviations (BOM) or (EX) as appropriate. BOM is the acronym for "by other means" and EX is
used to denote "special category-exclusive" messages. Those CINCPAC messages cited as ALFA messages are staff information transmissions to CINCPAC while he was away from the headquarters.

Chapters II, VI, IX and XI were written by the undersigned. Pauline Tallman wrote Chapters I, III, IV, VIII, and Sections II and III of Chapter X. Mrs. Tallman also supervised the physical layout of the product. Chapters V, VII and Sections I, IV, V and VI of Chapter X were written by Eileen O. Behana. The index was a joint effort and the glossary was compiled by Mrs. Behana.

The manuscript was typed by Shirley A. Streck and Patricia A. Allen. The Navy Publications and Printing Service, Pacific Division, Pearl Harbor, printed and bound the volumes.

CARL O. CLEVER
Command Historian
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THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND

SECTION I--THE PACIFIC COMMAND

(6) PACOM strength declined in 1979 to the lowest point in 20 years, which is as far back as command records go. Strength was down almost 58,000 from the 1959 total and down almost 736,000 from the 1968 (Vietnam War) peak.

(6) A comparison of military strengths by Service follows:1

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<th>31 December 1979</th>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>53,424</td>
<td>50,388</td>
<td>-3,036</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>157,406</td>
<td>151,446</td>
<td>-5,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>73,263</td>
<td>71,829</td>
<td>-1,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>39,450</td>
<td>41,855</td>
<td>+2,405</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>323,543</strong></td>
<td><strong>315,518</strong></td>
<td><strong>-8,025</strong></td>
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Major areas of concentration of military personnel and their dependents in 1979 and the change from 1978 are shown in the following table:

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<th>Change</th>
<th>31 Dec 79</th>
<th>Change</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Guam</td>
<td>9,915</td>
<td>+ 873</td>
<td>12,089</td>
<td>+ 214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>48,531</td>
<td>+ 5,547</td>
<td>85,876</td>
<td>-1,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>48,325</td>
<td>+ 4,893</td>
<td>32,728</td>
<td>- 376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>39,201</td>
<td>- 2,749</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>-2,948</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>37,921</td>
<td>+24,340*</td>
<td>19,941</td>
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* Navy reporting procedures may reflect Manning of ships in port at the time in addition to regularly assigned personnel.

(U) The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of forces throughout the PACOM. The date of information on these charts is as of 31 December 1979, unless otherwise indicated. The chart showing the CINCPAC staff organization is on the inside of the back cover.

1. Strengths were derived from the Unit Status and Identity Report (formerly FORSTAT).
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN PACOM

CINCPAC

CINCPACFLT

CINPCACAF

CDRWESTCOM

CG, 25TH INF DIV

COMUS KOREA

CG EIGHTH
US ARMY

CHUSMAGK

COMUS JAPAN

CGUSARJ
(CG IXCORPS)

COMNAVFOR
JAPAN

COMAFFJ
(COM SAF)

CINPCAC REP
GUAM/TPPI

CINPCAC REP
AUSTRALIA

CINPCAC REP
ALEUTIANS

CINPCAC REP
PHILIPPINES

CINPCAC REP
THAILAND

CINPCAC REP
INDIAN OCEAN

CDR
IPAC

CDR
JCRC

CHIDO JAPAN

CHUSMAGTHAI

CHUSMAG PHIL

CHOC INDIA

OOR PAKISTAN

CHUSLG INDONESIA

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (S/HF), p. 4, REDW 16 Feb 00.
COMMAND ORGANIZATION (U)

1. (U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC):
   a. (C) CINCPAC is the Commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his mission. The mission of CINCPAC, in broad terms, is as follows: To maintain the security and stability of the Far East, to prevent any aggression against the United States, its forces, or its allies in the Pacific, and to ensure the security and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean.
   b. (U) CINCPAC is responsible for the conduct of military operations in the Pacific Ocean and the coastal waters of the United States, its allies, and other nations. CINCPAC also coordinates the activities of the forces of the PACOM in accordance with procedures established at higher authority.
   c. (U) CINCPAC is accountable to the Secretary of Defense for the conduct of military operations in the Pacific Ocean and the coastal waters of the United States, its allies, and other nations. CINCPAC also coordinates the activities of the forces of the PACOM in accordance with procedures established at higher authority.
   d. (U) CINCPAC exercises operational control of U.S. forces assigned to the PACOM.

2. (U) PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS:
   a. (U) Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMUSPACFLT).
   b. (U) Commander of the U.S. Pacific Air Forces (COMUSPACAF).
   c. (U) Commander of the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC).

3. (U) COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS: There are two subordinate unified commands in the PACOM:
   a. (U) United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Korea (COMUSFORKOR), Seoul, Korea.
   b. (U) United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (COMUSFORJAPAN), Yokota Air Base, Japan.
   c. (U) REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC) PERFORM certain functions for the PACOM in accordance with procedures established at higher authority.
   d. (U) CINCPAC representatives serve in certain areas where significant forces of two or more Services are stationed:
      a. (U) Commander U.S. Navy Forces, Marianas in the CINCPAC Representative Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI), Guam.
      b. (U) Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines in the CINCPAC Representative Philippines (CINCPACREP PHILIPPINES), Subic Bay, Philippines.
      c. (U) USAF Liaison Officer to Australia is the CINCPAC Representative Australia (CINCPACREP AUSTRALIA), American Embassy, Canberra, Australia.
      d. (U) U.S. Navy Representative, Thailand (CINCPACREP THAILAND), Bangkok, Thailand.
      e. (U) Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Philippine Islands (CINCPACREP PHILIPPINES), Subic Bay, Philippines.
      f. (U) Commander U.S. Navy Forces, Thailand (CINCPACREP THAILAND), Bangkok, Thailand.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80, p. 5, REW 16 Feb 00.
## SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES

### KEY PERSONNEL

#### UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

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<td>GEN John A. WICKHAM, Jr.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>LT GEN Evan W. ROSENCRANS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>MAJ GEN Kenneth E. DOYLEMAN</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Asst/SO/DEK Military Affairs and CHA/USMAC-Korea</td>
<td>MAJ GEN Orlando E. GONZALEZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary Joint Staff</td>
<td>COL Watha J. EDDINS, Jr.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>COL Joseph R. RUTKOWSKI</td>
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<td>COL Billy M. HUGHS</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>COL Henry L. DANIEL</td>
<td>USAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/2/2</td>
<td>BGEN Schuyler BISSELL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/3/3</td>
<td>MAJ GEN Richard E. PHILLAMAN</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff/3/3</td>
<td>COL William D. McWILLIAMS, III</td>
<td>USAF</td>
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<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/3/4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/3/5</td>
<td>COL Thomas E. MORGEN</td>
<td>USMC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/3/6</td>
<td>COL William R. CRAWFORD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Child, Armaments Affairs Division and Secretary UNCMAC</td>
<td>COL Kenneth J. TRINKLER</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander, Naval Forces Korea</td>
<td>RADM Stephen J. HOSTETTLER</td>
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#### UNITED STATES FORCES JAPAN

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<tr>
<td>Commander/Commander, 5th Air Force</td>
<td>LT GEN William H. GINS, Jr.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>RADM Robert P. McKENZIE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary, Joint Staff</td>
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<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/3/1</td>
<td>CAPT Edward W. HILLER</td>
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<td>COL Jack A. DODGOS</td>
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<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/3/3</td>
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<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/4/6</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/4/7</td>
<td>COL Harold M. DONAH</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief, Okinawa Area Field Office</td>
<td>COL Douglas G. FINGLE</td>
<td>USMC</td>
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| Commanding General, U.S. Army Japan | LT GEN John G. MARRON | USA     |
| Commander, Naval Forces Japan      | RADM Lewis W. EICH, Jr. | USN     |

#### JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

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<td>Commander</td>
<td>LCOL Donald T. MATTHEWS</td>
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#### CINCPACREP GUAM/TPPI

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<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>RADM Robert B. POUNTAIN, Jr.</td>
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<td>Chief of Staff and Aide</td>
<td>CAPT Glenn C. WOLFE</td>
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<td>Naval Base, Subic Bay/COMUSNAV PHIL</td>
<td>RADM Lee E. LEVENSON</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff and Aide</td>
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#### CINCPACREP AUSTRALIA

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#### CINCPACREP ALEUTIANS

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<td>CINCPACREP/COMIDEASTFOR</td>
<td>RADM Robert W. CHEWING</td>
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**Source:** Command Digest, 15 Feb 00 (80), p. 8, REVW 16 Feb 00.
# U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups

## Far East Region - Key Personnel

### Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan

**Chief, MDO (Acting)**
- COL
- **Robert A. Macallum**

**Chief, Training and Program Branch**
- COL
- **John D. Blaik, Jr.**

**Chief, Army Division**
- COL
- **John P. Reidenman**

**Chief, Navy Division**
- CAPT
- **Andrew J. Bergehen**

**Chief, Air Force Division**
- COL
- **Robert G. Bradshaw, Jr.**

### Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand

**Chief**
- COL
- **William R. Dinsmore**

**Office of Defense Cooperation India (ODC)**
- COL
- **Arne J. Kullgren**

**Office of Defense Representative Pakistan (ODRF)**
- COL
- **Gene C. Pettit**

### Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Philippines

**Chair**
- GEN
- **Engen E. Korpal**

**Chief, Management Division**
- CAPT
- **W. Robert Rosen**

**Chief, Logistic Division**
- COL
- **Chester A. Farnette**

**Chief, Air Force Service Section**
- LTC
- **Robert W. Thompson**

**Chief, Marine Service Section**
- LTC
- **Joyce E. Stout**

### Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Korea

**Chief**
- MAJ
- **Orlando R. Gonzales**

**Chief of Staff**
- CAPT
- **Leonard H. Higginsbooth**

**Assistant Chief of Staff/Plans and Programs**
- COL
- **William J. Etters**

**Assistant Chief of Staff/Development and Acquisition**
- COL
- **Mervin C. Sprenger**

**Assistant Chief of Staff/Logistics**
- COL
- **Theodore Hawranek, III**

**Secretary Joint Staff**
- LCOL
- **Frederic J. Caferease**

**Senior Army Assistance Officer**
- COL
- **Cecil A. Chester**

**Senior Naval Assistance Officer**
- CAPT
- **Joseph Mikulak**

**Senior Air Assistance Officer**
- COL
- **James L. Aardsma**

**Senior Marine Assistance Officer**
- COL
- **Bruce M. MacLaren**

### United States Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia

**Chief**
- COL
- **William W. Tombaugh**

**Deputy Chief**
- COL
- **Robert J. Ellis**

**Chief Army Division**
- LCOL
- **Dennis D. Peacock**

**Chief Navy/Marine Division**
- CDR
- **Malcolm C. Reeves, II**

**Chief Air Force Division**
- LCOL
- **Robert G. Hauser Jr.**

**Chief, Plans, Programs, and Training Division**
- LCOL
- **Joseph R. Panzino**

**Chief Communications-Electronics Division**
- MAJ
- **Raymond R. Benson**

**Chief Personnel and Administrative Division**
- LCOL
- **Currie G. Dehnel**

---

Source: Command Digest, 75 Feb 80 (SAF), p. 9.

REV 16 Feb 00.
# PACIFIC COMMAND PERSONNEL - SERVICE - CATEGORY - COUNTRY (U)

## ASSIGNED AS OF: 31 DECEMBER 1979

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*Includes 42N personnel assigned to Operation HOPE FREEZE in Amman, Jordan.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (S/DCR), p. 23.

REW 16 Feb 80.
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<th>ARMY</th>
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<td>CINCPACAF</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>COMUSJAPAN</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>COMUSKOREA</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCRC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>581</td>
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REVW 16 Feb 00.
# Military Assistance Advisory Group Personnel (U)
## Assigned Strengths by Service & Civilian Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>Total Military</th>
<th>US Civ</th>
<th>TOT US Pers</th>
<th>Local Hire</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Off</td>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>Off</td>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>Off</td>
<td>ENL</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODR India</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDLG Indonesia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDO Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG Korea</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODR Pakistan</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG Phil</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG Thai</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47</td>
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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (S/MIL), p. 25, REVW 16 Feb 00.
### MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED STRENGTH IN PACOM (U)

#### AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS</th>
<th>TOTAL NAVY &amp; MC</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FORCES ASSIGNED*</td>
<td>45,233</td>
<td>143,701</td>
<td>67,672</td>
<td>211,373</td>
<td>24,872</td>
<td>281,478</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTHER OPERATIONAL FORCES IN PACOM**</td>
<td>5,155</td>
<td>7,745</td>
<td>4,157</td>
<td>11,902</td>
<td>16,983</td>
<td>34,040</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL IN PACOM</td>
<td>50,388</td>
<td>151,446</td>
<td>71,829</td>
<td>223,275</td>
<td>41,855</td>
<td>315,518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

* Forces assigned PACOM component commanders.

** Forces physically located in PACOM area but not assigned PACOM component commanders.

Source: Command Digest, 19 Feb 80 (S/DE), p. 22.
REVW 16 Feb 00.
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SECTION II--THE CINCPAC STAFF

Key Personnel Changes in 1979

Commander in Chief Pacific

(U) Admiral Robert L.J. Long, USN, succeeded Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN, as Commander in Chief Pacific on 31 October 1979. The change of command and related events are described elsewhere in this section. CINCPAC's Executive Assistant as the year began, COL Andrew L. Cooley, Jr., USA, was promoted to brigadier general on 25 January. He was replaced on 10 November by COL Burton D. Patrick, USA.

Chief of Staff

(U) LT GEN F.L. Poston, USAF, assumed the office of Chief of Staff on 1 June, replacing LT GEN Marion L. Boswell, USAF.

Deputy Chief of Staff

(U) MAJ GEN Robert B. Solomon, USA, became Deputy Chief of Staff on 9 June, replacing MAJ GEN William E. McLeod, USA.

Political Adviser

(U) Mr. Michael V. Connors (FSO-3) became Political Adviser (FSO-1 Equivalent) to CINCPAC on 31 July, replacing Mr. Leo J. Moser, who had departed on 14 July.

Director for Operations

(U) MAJ GEN J.K. Davis, USMC, replaced MAJ GEN William J. White, USMC, as Director for Operations on 18 June.

Director for Logistics and Security Assistance

(U) RADM Ralph G. Bird, USN, relieved RADM Arthur W. Moreau, Jr., USN, as Director for Logistics and Security Assistance on 11 May.

Director for Plans

(U) RADM Ernest E. Tissot, Jr., USN, became Director for Plans on 21 September, replacing RADM D.B. Shelton, USN.
Director for Communications-Data Processing

(U) BGEN Charles B. Jiggetts, USAF, became Director for Communications-Data Processing on 27 June, relieving BGEN Robert F. McCarthy, USAF.

Staff Judge Advocate

(U) CAPT Bruce A. Harlow, JAGC, USN, became Staff Judge Advocate on 9 July, replacing CAPT Gardiner M. Haight, JAGC, USN, who had departed on 30 June.

Provisional Plans Office

(U) COL Jack H. Sandstrom, USAF, served as Director of the Provisional Plans Office, J78, the CINCPAC staff agency created to complete actions associated with the phase-out of the Taiwan Defense Command, from the inception of that office on 1 May 1979 to disestablishment on 31 December 1979. The Provisional Plans Office additionally monitored continuing U.S.-Taiwan military relations until termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty on 31 December.

Intelligence Center Pacific

(U) COL Richard E. Littlefield, USA, replaced COL D.T. Waddle, USAF, as Commander of the Intelligence Center Pacific on 21 May.
### AVAILABLE FORCES (U)

#### ARMY
- 1 Army Headquarters
- 2 Corps Headquarters
- 2nd Infantry Division with
  - 2 Infantry Battalions
  - 2 Armored Battalions
  - 4 Artillery Battalions
  - 1 Air Defense Artillery Battalion
- 25th Infantry Division with
  - 6 Infantry Battalions
  - 3 Artillery Battalions
  - 1 Air Defense Artillery Battalion
  - 1 Air Defense Brigade with 12 HAWK Batteries
  - 8 Separate Aviation Companies

#### NAVY/MARINES
- OP-COM TO CINCPAC
  - 2 Numbered Fleets
  - 8 Attack Carriers
  - 15 Cruisers
  - 64 Destroyers/Frigates
  - 10 Submari
  - 41 Submarines (SSBN)
  - 80 Amphibious Warfare Ships
  - 6 Carrier Air Wings
  - 46 Fighter/Attack Squadrons
  - 12 Reconnaissance/EW Units
  - 7 Early Warning Units
  - 15 Carrier ASW Squadrions
  - 4 LAMPS Squadrons
  - 13 Patrol Squadrons
  - 8 Tasker detachments
  - 1 Light Photo Squadron
  - 2 E-135Q VLF Relay (TACAMO) Aircraft
  - 9 SHL-1A Stations
  - 1 Naval Special Warfare Group

*Includes Naval Air Units deployed to LANTCOM/EUCOM.

#### AIR FORCE
- 2 Numbered Air Forces
- 3 Air Divisions
- 1 Composite Wing
- 1 Tactical Airlift Wing
- 2 Tactical Fighter Wings
- 1 Assimilated Airlift Squadron
- 2 Tactical Air Support Squadrons
- 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
- 1 Special Operations Squadron
- 10 Tactical Fighter Squadrons
- 2 Tactical Airlift Squadrons
- 1 Airborne Command & Control Squadron
- 1 Tactical Fighter Training Aggressor Squadron

#### IN PACOM BUT NOT OP-COM TO CINCPAC
- 1 Engineer Group
- 1 Signal Brigade
- 1 General Support Group
- 1 Heavy Bass Company
- US Army Units in the Pacific
- Army National Guard Units
- 1 Infantry Brigade
- 1 Army Reserve Unit
- 1 Civil Affairs Group
- 1 Engineer Construction Battalion
- 1 Corps Headquarters (AEI)

- 9 Destroyers (Naval Reserve Training)
- 9 Mine Warfare Ships (Naval Reserve Training)
- 3 Amphibious Warfare Ships (Naval Reserve Training)
- 45 Auxiliary Ships
- 1 Fleet Composite Operations Readiness Group
- Naval Oceanography Command Units
- 1 Air Division (SAC)
- 2 Strategic Wings (SAC)
- 1 Air Refueling Squadron (SAC)
- 1 Bomber Squadron (SAC)
- 1 Weather Reconnaissance Detachments (SAC)
- 1 Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (MAC)
- 1 Reserves Group (AFSOC)
- 1 Tactical Fighter Squadron (Air National Guard)
- 1 Air Force Security Services Unit (AFSSI)
- 1 Air Force Communications Service Unit (AFCSU)
- 1 Air-Sea Rescue/Recovery Squadron (MAC)
- 1 Air Weather Service Unit (MAC)

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (S/N), p. 10, REW 16 Feb 80.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS (U)

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (SYNE), p. 13,
REW 15 Feb 00.
DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL AIR & SHIP UNITS (U)
WESTPAC

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (S/NF), p. 16.
REW 16 Feb 00.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE UNITS (U)

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (SARF), p. 19, REM 16 Feb 00.
UNCLASSIFIED

AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS OF CINCPAC STAFF DIRECTORATES

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 January 1979</th>
<th>31 December 1979</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Office for Public and Governmental Affairs</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>Plans Directorate</td>
<td>49</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications &amp; Data Processing Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comptroller</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Surgeon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research &amp; Analysis Office</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>Airborne Command Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
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<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td>173</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>516</td>
<td>485</td>
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</table>

a. Headquarters CINCPAC FY 80 Joint Table of Distribution approved by JCS 3681/1417212 Mar 79 at 736 billets. One CSH E9 was approved for transfer to Naval Communication Area Master Station Eastern Pacific by this same JCS message.

b. Authorization as of 31 December 1979 and as submitted in proposed FY 81 JTD for Headquarters CINCPAC.

c. Airborne Command Post JTD approved by JCS 2658/0220312 Mar 79, extended for FY 81 by JCS 4279/0412152 Feb 80.

d. ADP Systems Support Group: one civilian transferred to CINCPACFLT, approved by CNO 2218252 Oct 79 and one USN E6 for Theater Cryptologic Planning Site, approved by JCS 4455/2130072 Apr 79.

e. Intelligence Center Pacific JTD extended by FY 80. Change 1, approved by JCS 6446/1822512 May 79. Increased 3 USN enlisted and 1 civilian by transfer from Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific to PAC increased a total of 109 officers, 150 enlisted, and 59 civilians, a total of 318. JCS 7524/1732512 Sep 79 approved addition of 4 officers and 3 enlisted from the Provisional Plans Office and approved civilianization of one enlisted billet, bringing the total authorization to 325.

f. Approved by JCS 6457/0723502 Jan 80; however, deletion of Ammunition in Thailand function resulted in lower end strength.

g. Three General Schedule, ten local wage rate.
h. Two General Schedule, four local wage rate.
i. One other attached unit, the Provisional Plans Office that was established on 1 May 1979 to handle Taiwan-related matters, was staffed by 17 officers, 6 enlisted and 1 civilian, for a total of 24. This number was reduced incrementally as work proceeded and the unit was disestablished on 31 December.

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Change of Command

(U) Admiral Robert L. J. Long, USN, relieved Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN, as Commander in Chief Pacific in a ceremony at Hickam Air Force Base on 31 October. The splendidly planned and professionally executed ceremony climaxed months of work. The pageantry served not only to reflect military tradition, but furnished another example of the importance of the command, and provided to allies and adversaries alike further evidence of U.S. intent and resolve to remain a Pacific power.

(U) In earlier years change of command ceremonies had been held on board U.S. Navy ships in Pearl Harbor or at the small Bordelon Field at CINCPAC’s Camp Smith headquarters. In 1968, for example, aboard the carrier USS HANCOCK in Pearl Harbor, in what was then considered an extraordinary gesture, General William C. Westmoreland, the Army Chief of Staff, presented the Army’s Distinguished Service Medal to the retiring CINCPAC, Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, USN.

(U) In 1972, however, the joint nature of the command was well demonstrated. The ceremony was held on the mall at Hickam Air Force Base, and troops of all Services were massed there. Then President Nixon, who was in Hawaii to confer with the Japanese Prime Minister, presented the Distinguished Service Medal to the departing CINCPAC, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN. Also attending were Secretary of State William P. Rogers and the Director of the National Security Council, Henry A. Kissinger. The troops passed in review and the ceremony was climaxed by a flyover of aircraft from all the Services. There was also an element of special sentiment for Admiral McCain, who had served his entire tour as CINCPAC while his son, John S. McCain, III, a Navy pilot, was a prisoner of war in North Vietnam.

(U) Right after the ceremony ended, it rained hard, so weather remained a consideration in planning for future ceremonies. The 1976 ceremony was similar to that in 1972, but not on so grand a scale. The 1979 ceremony was again held at Hickam, but this time in a large aircraft hangar (#35). This precluded the need for an alternate site in the event of bad weather. (It was later learned that in heavy rain the hangar leaked profusely, so again it was fortunate that the weather was good during the ceremony.)

(U) The principal guest and speaker in 1979 was the Honorable W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, who presented Admiral Weisner with the Defense Distinguished Service Medal. Then, in an unprecedented sequence, the Admiral received the Navy, Army, and Air Force Distinguished Service Medals. These were presented by Secretary of the Navy Edward Hidalgo;
Adm. Weisner, left, being congratulated by Adm. Long.

General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on behalf of the Secretary of the Army; and General James A. Hill, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force. Among numerous other important visitors were Adm. Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. Kenneth McLennan, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Honorable Richard C. Holbrook, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Distinguished foreign visitors included Adm. Sir Anthony M. Synnot, Chief of the Australian Defense Force Staff. Other guests included the Governor of Hawaii and two retired CINCPACs, Adm. Harry D. Felt, and U.S. Grant Sharp.

(U) Units from each of the Services were assembled in the hangar for the ceremony. After according honors to the principal guest, the bands of each of the Service headquarters in Hawaii passed in review in the hangar, each playing its Service song, a very dramatic military effect in the midst of the colorful flags and bunting. Red and white striped parachutes had also been hung from the ceiling to enhance the festive appearance of the huge structure.
(U) Outside the hangar, near the salute battery, was a static display of equipment of all the Services, another first. The Air Force had a BLUE EAGLE aircraft, an O-2, and an F-4 of the Hawaii Air National Guard. The Army had a CHAPARAL, a TOW, and a COBRA helicopter. The Navy had a P-3
aircraft, and the Marines had an F-4, a CH-53, and an LVT. It had been
hoped by the planners that some more sophisticated equipment might be tran-
siting Hawaii and be used in the display, but deployment schedules did not
permit and no special equipment was brought in for this purpose.

(U) Following the ceremony, guests attended a reception in the same hangar
building; an adjoining area had been set aside and decorated for this purpose.
This was more convenient than the previous arrangements by which guests had to
leave the site of the ceremony to attend the reception.

(U) The ceremony and reception had been planned so as not to interfere
with normal operations in the hangar, and all special construction and
decorations were removed on the same day as the ceremony.

(U) Admiral Long was born in Kansas City, Missouri, on 29 May 1920, the
son of Margaret Franklin and Trigg Allen Long. He entered the U.S. Naval
Academy in 1940 and graduated with distinction in June 1943 in a program
accelerated because of World War II. From September 1943 until December
1945 he was at sea in USS COLORADO (BB-45). During the ceremony in which
he became CINCPAC, he said that his hometown paper had noted his commissioning
and the fact that he was serving "with Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific." Admiral
Long commented that he was serving among five million other Americans
and allies and, "Little did I dream that 36 years later I would be assigned
to the top military job in the Pacific."

(U) While serving aboard COLORADO, he participated in the Gilbert and
Marshall Islands operations; the capture and occupation of Saipan and Guam;
Leyte, Mindoro, and Lingayen Gulf landings; the assault and occupation of
Okinawa; and the capture and occupation of Tinian. He was awarded the Bronze
Star Medal with Combat "V" for service during operations against enemy Japa-
nese forces in the Philippines and Ryukyu Islands.

(U) Following the war he attended submarine school and then served in
various capacities related to submarine service both ashore and at sea. In
August 1960 he assumed command of the Gold Crew of USS PATRICK HENRY (SSBN-
599), and in October 1963 assumed command of the Blue Crew of USS CASIMIR
PULASKI (SSBN-633). He had duty in connection with the Fleet Ballistic Mis-
sile Project and then became Executive Assistant and Naval Aide to the Under
Secretary of the Navy. In September 1968 he became Commander of Service
Group THREE, and he was promoted to rear admiral to date from 1 July 1969.

(U) In November 1969 he became Deputy Commander for Fleet Mainten ance
and Logistic Support in the Naval Ship Systems Command. In June 1972 he was
advanced to Vice Admiral and reported as Commander Submarine Force, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet, with additional duty as submarine operations adviser for POLARIS/POSEIDON operations in the Atlantic Command and Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic and as Commander Submarines Allied Command and Commander, Submarine Force, Western Atlantic Area. In August 1974 he became Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Submarine Warfare). In July 1977 he was promoted to the rank of Admiral and reported as the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

(U) In addition to the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V" and the Legion of Merit with two Gold Stars, Admiral Long has the American Defense Service Medal; American Campaign Medal; Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal; World War II Victory Medal; Naval Occupation Service Medal, Europe and Asia Clasps; National Defense Service Medal and bronze star; and the Philippine Liberation Medal. He also has the Philippine Republic Presidential Unit Citation Badge.

(U) Admiral Long is married to the former Sara Helms of Jacksonville, Florida, and they have three sons, Charles Allen, William Trigg, and Robert Helms Long. His home town is Gale's Ferry, Connecticut.

CINCPAC Headquarters Staff

(U) CINCPAC Headquarters organization remained fairly stable throughout 1979, with only minor internal realignments experienced. The original Joint Table of Distribution submission for 737 total billets was reduced to 736 when approved as the result of the transfer of one USN enlisted communications billet to the Naval Communications Master Station.

(U) As a result of a change in title of the Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT) to the Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP), the Operations Directorate's Force Status/Operational Reports Branch became the Unit Status/Operational Reports Branch effective 18 December.\(^1\)

(U) In another redesignation, the Operations Directorate's Duty Director for Operations became the CINCPAC Command Duty Officer effective 15 November.\(^2\)

(U) The General Accounting Office commenced a survey of the unified command structure in the PACOM in October 1979 at the request of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense. The study was to encompass CINCPAC headquarters, attached, component, and subordinate unified commands. The study was expected to be completed in March

\(^1\) CINCPACNOTE 5400 (U), 18 Dec 79, Subj: Title Change.
\(^2\) CINCPACNOTE 5400 (U), 15 Nov 79, Subj: Redesignation of Title.
1980. The objective of the study was to examine the role and missions of those headquarters to determine the cost of operating the PACOM, and to examine the structure and recommend possible alternative command structures.¹

Provisional Plans Office

(U) The Provisional Plans Office was established on 1 May as an attached unit at CINCPAC headquarters incidental to the withdrawal from Taiwan and subsequent disestablishment of the Taiwan Defense Command.

(U) The mission of the office was to advise and assist CINCPAC in all matters pertaining to Taiwan and official entities located thereon. Specific responsibilities were oriented toward coordination of U.S. Forces and activities in support of the Mutual Defense Treaty. As an integral special staff section, the office coordinated OPLANS; provided a central location for residual actions related to the withdrawal; maintained a nucleus to provide continuity and expertise about which a more extensive staff could have been built; coordinated specified intelligence activities; coordinated with appropriate agencies, as necessary, to provide liaison for communications, landing rights, support agreements, and other matters; provided recommendations, as appropriate, regarding on-going future activities on Taiwan; and formulated directives and guidance concerning PACOM relationships with Taiwan. Additionally, the office responded to taskings involving residual actions or activities related to the retrograde of U.S. Forces from Taiwan.

(U) The work of the office and wrap-up of all activities associated with the withdrawal and creation of follow-on organizations is published separately as Appendix I to this history.

(U) As the various missions of the office were completed or transferred to other CINCPAC staff agencies, as appropriate, the office drew down its personnel incrementally and was officially disestablished on 31 December.²

1. J13 HistSum Dec 79 (U).
2. J13 HistSum Dec 79 (U).
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SECTION III--COMMAND AND CONTROL

Defense Agency Review

(U) The Deputy Secretary of Defense chaired a steering committee that had general direction over a number of studies of the organization and functions of the Defense Department that had been ordered by President Carter in 1977. One of the studies in the series was a Defense Agency Review under the direction of retired Major General Theodore Antonelli, USA, former commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. The JCS informed all concerned of the study and urged fullest cooperation.1

(U) By mid-February 1979 the study group had identified six potentially significant cross-cutting issues as a result of their review of the roles, functions, and responsibilities of the Defense agencies. These were:2

- Amount of efficiency and economy which had actually been achieved.
- Capability of existing system to support fighting forces in crisis or wartime.
- Effectiveness and accountability of chain of command for agencies.
- Adequacy of their Planning, Programming, and Budgeting procedures.
- Programs for development and management of specialist personnel.
- Division of authority and responsibility among the agencies, Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the JCS.

(U) Over the previous 20 years an evolutionary trend had resulted in major changes in the nature of the support and services system of the Armed Forces. A primary cause had been the inability of the Military Services to agree on

1. CINCPAC Command History 1978 (TS/FRD), Vol. 1, pp. 25-31; J564 HistSum May 79 (U); JCS 7821/201354Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. JCS 5112/130136Z Feb 79 (U).

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common procedures. Control of many aspects of strategic services, therefore, had been unified in Defense Agencies. The Services continued to provide tactical and "retail" services and support, but the "wholesale" provision of support in such fields as POL, fuel, and maps was provided by the agencies.¹

(U) As the agencies had grown from 2 to 12, their size, scope, and influence had steadily grown. By 1979 they had over 80,000 civilian and 8,000 military personnel and operating budgets exceeding $3 billion. In FY 78 they had expended or directly controlled approximately $15 billion--50 percent of a Military Service budget--through their appropriations, revolving funds, and program management responsibilities. They also had extensive audit and oversight responsibilities over $31 billion in defense contracts and $9 billion in Foreign Military Sales trust funds. "Yet their programs were not subject to the same review process as the Services."²

(U) The trend toward unified support and services was seen by the study group as continuing. The JCS, for example, had assigned all mobilization deployment functions to the Readiness Command as a result of Exercise NIFTY NUGGET-78 (reported in the 1978 history). Recommendations were being considered for consolidation of audio-visual, command and control, and postal functions, and for the expansion of the Defense Logistics Agency supply management to all consumable items. The "ultimate result of this trend could be a fifth Military Service or a multiplicity of heterogeneous organizations covering the spectrum of support." There were differing views in the Defense Department with some favoring continued expansion of the agency concept, some believing that the inter-Service competition of the 1960's had matured and many functions could be returned to the Services, and some believing that there was an upper limit to the effectiveness and efficiency that might be derived from consolidation.³

(U) CINCPAC welcomed the visit of a three-man team to his headquarters in February and March. The focus of the interviews during the visit was on issues relating to CINCPAC and his component commanders' interface with the Defence Intelligence, Mapping, Logistics, Nuclear, and Communications Agencies.


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.
and the National Security Agency. The visit also generated some questions that were answered in follow-on messages to the JCS after the visit ended. A copy of the completed report was forwarded to CINCPAC, who provided his comments to the JCS on 26 April.¹

CINCPAC found that the study contained many "general and agreeable" observations, such as comments suggesting the need for management improvement. He said, however, that the general nature of the study and its conclusions did not justify an immediate requirement for the recommended near-term improvements. He agreed that substantive changes should not be made pending more detailed analyses that confirmed the wisdom and necessity of changes. He did believe that the study succeeded as an exploratory review that identified options for further study.

While the proliferation of agencies had in some cases been accompanied by multiple lines of control, he saw no need for the creation of a fifth Military Service as a central support organization. "Any trends in this direction should be resisted." Also, while consolidation of some functions might eliminate redundancies, the unique missions and requirements of each Service should be taken into account. Also to be considered were the threat of communications saturation and destruction of central command and control facilities in a war situation that could render impotent the essential centralized support functions in terms of ability to support dispersed combat commands. "In such situation, redundancies reflect sound planning, not inefficiency."

CINCPAC agreed in principle with recommendations for internal management improvements that agencies could adopt without affecting other agencies. He also offered specific comments on a number of recommendations. He said that a proposal to establish a system of periodic JCS and unified and specified commander review of agency plans was neither practical nor desirable, although consultation and coordination between agencies and affected commands was appropriate. He agreed that greater agency participation in JCS-sponsored and directed exercise programs would benefit both the agencies and the commands they supported. A recommendation that might provide an expanded role for the Chairman of the JCS in providing recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on programs and budgets of the agencies implied periodic JCS or unified and specified command review of agency plans. Inclusion of the CINCs in such a process "should be approached with considerable caution." (CINCPAC had expressed similar thoughts in 1978 in response to similar recommendations in the Steadman study.) He said that while the Chairman and the CINCs should provide input and have a strong influence with regard to force levels needed, and thus a

¹ CINCPAC 260204Z Apr 79, DECL 24 Apr 85.
generalized input on resource allocation, program and budget analysis should remain a Service matter.

CINCPAC agreed that appropriate Defense agencies operating in the geographical area of a unified commander should designate a single senior agency representative for coordination. This situation existed in the PACOM with representatives of Defense agencies interacting and coordinating daily with his staff. Such relations were "excellent and mutually beneficial."

CINCPAC strongly agreed with the recommendation that agencies supporting operating forces coordinate significant policy or program issues with the Services, the JCS, and the unified or specified commanders prior to implementation. He welcomed the opportunity to comment on all of these recommendations and looked forward to cooperating on future studies suggested by the Defense Agency Review.

Army Command Relations in PACOM

As explained in considerable detail in the 1978 history, many senior officers had come to believe that the disestablishment of the Army component command to CINCPAC, the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), on 31 December 1974 had not been the best course of action. From the beginning CINCPAC and his staff had opposed disestablishment and then firmly supported 1978 actions by the Department of the Army to reestablish such a command in Hawaii, a plan called Pacific Phoenix. Under this plan, in phases, USARPAC would be reactivated as a Major Army Command by consolidating the assets of the CINCPAC Support Group (a field operating agency of the Department of the Army) and the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii. Subsequent planned actions would subordinate U.S. Army Japan under USARPAC and, finally, subordinate U.S. Army Forces in Korea to the Army component command.

On 26 December 1978, however, the Secretary of Defense announced his decision on the subject. Early in January 1979 CINCPAC advised his component and subordinate unified commanders of the new structure. The Secretary had approved the consolidation of the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group while disapproving a three-star commander, reestablishment of USARPAC, or the realignment of the U.S. Army Japan "at this time." The new command, the U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM), was assigned three major functions by the Department of the Army. It was to

1. Ibid.
function as the Army's Major Command for Army units and installations in the
Pacific less Korea and Japan; serve as the Army component command of PACOM
responsible for matters not assigned to Army components of PACOM subordinate
unified commands; and command and support assigned and attached active and
reserve units, installations, and activities.1

(U) Department of the Army and CINCPAC Support Group unilateral planning
for implementation of the Secretary's decision continued through March. PACOM
Headquarters was informally advised on 22 March that activation of the U.S.
Army Western Command would take place at Fort Shafter on 23 March, at which
time a small in-house flag raising was to take place, with a larger, more
elaborate ceremony scheduled for April.

(U) The Army announced the activation of WESTCOM on 23 March. Department
of the Army General Order No. 8, dated 28 March, formally established the
command and assigned missions that included functioning as the Army com-
ponent for the PACOM, less the geographical areas of Japan and Korea, and for
acting on Army matters of CINCPAC concern beyond the exclusive authority or
transcending the geographical area of Commander, Eighth U.S. Army and Commander,
U.S. Army Japan. The Commander of WESTCOM, a major general, would report
directly to the Department of the Army. On 30 March CINCPAC readdressed to
his component and subordinate unified commands and the CINCPAC Representatives
the Army message promulgating the redesignation of the Army headquarters in
Hawaii. The formal activation ceremony took place as scheduled on 12 April
at Fort Shafter with CINCPAC and other Service commands participating.2

(U) In early April CINCPAC Plans Directorate personnel met with WESTCOM
staff officers to discuss revision of the terms of reference regulating the
conduct of business among CINCPAC, its Army component, and the subordinate
unified commands. WESTCOM prepared a "strawman" statement of terms of reference
on 2 May. After extensive staffing, both internal and with the component and
subordinate unified commands, the CINCPAC Instruction on Terms of Reference
(S3020.2H, Change 4), which included terms for WESTCOM, was published on 10
December.3

(S) CINCPAC considered the Army reorganization issue temporarily shelved
after WESTCOM activation. In August, however, the Department of the Army again

1. J564 HistSum Dec 79 (S/NF), DECL 20 Sep 86; CINCPAC 100033Z Jan 79 (S),
GDS-86.
2. J564 HistSum Dec 79 (S/NF), DECL 20 Sep 86; CINCPAC 310304Z Mar 79 (U).
3. WESTCOM Memo to J50 of 2 May 79, Subj: Revision of CINCPACINST S3020.2H (U).

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raised the issue of implementing Phase II of Project Pacific Phoenix, which involved the subordination of the Army in Japan to WESTCOM. Subsequent events in this regard in 1979 remained basically within the Department of the Army and did not formally surface in the joint arena. CINCPAC, however, was kept informed and in communication with the Army agencies directly involved. The Army's message announcing its intentions to proceed with Phase II in 1980 was passed informally to CINCPAC's Executive Assistant. The positive tone of the Army's message seemed to consider approval of Phase II as a "virtual fait accompli," which, in fact, it was not. Army requested replies by 14 September from CDRWESTCOM, USARJ, and EUSA.1

(C) CDRWESTCOM formally advised Admiral Weisner of the Army plan on 31 August, noting that he strongly believed that the timing was propitious for the change. He said that recent JCS exercises had pointed out the folly of trying to rearrange command alignments in the face of imminent or on-going hostilities and that budget and manpower constraints did not allow the "wasteful redundancy and layering inherent in our current configuration." Finally, he said, the evolution of bilateral planning with the Japanese was progressing from on-going concerns with the defense of metropolitan Japan to broader Pacific-wide concerns with defense of sea lanes and integration of bilateral Japanese defense with other PACOM plans. He believed that the Army portion of those planning activities demanded the wider scope and outlook than WESTCOM could provide. He asked for CINCPAC's support.2

(C) In his reply to the Department of the Army, CDRWESTCOM said he, with the strong concurrence of CINCPAC, fully supported the initiative to proceed with Phase II. He said, "CINCPAC has repeatedly gone on record with JCS and OSD in support of Phase II implementation at the earliest possible date. CINCPAC agrees that Phase II realignment could be viewed in Japan as a positive step to strengthen bilateral ties, and if handled properly, would not adversely affect the already close contacts established by USARJ." He recommended that Phase II be implemented without delay.3

(C) The U.S. Army Japan's Commander provided his comments, which, while not negative, were less enthusiastic and reflected a more cautious tone on how to proceed. He believed that there was a need to refine the original concept in light of political, military, and economic changes and events that

1. J564 HistSum Dec 79 (S/NE), DECL 20 Sep 86.
2. WESTCOM Memo to Admiral Weisner (CS), 31 August 79, Subj: US Army Command Relationships in the Pacific (U), DECL 31 Dec 84.
3. CRDWESTCOM 142330Z Sep 79 (CS), DECL 31 Dec 85.
had occurred since publication of the plan in March 1978. As examples he cited the agreements between the two governments and U.S. Army-Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces agreements, imposed mission-manpower-realignment actions, development of the Rapid Deployment Force-Army concept, and the status of the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Korea. He noted that the Japanese had historically viewed U.S. ground forces as an indicator of permanence of commitment that could be depended upon to a greater degree than the relatively mobile naval and air forces. Subordination of USARJ to a reemergent USARPAC could damage U.S.-Japan defense relationships, particularly if Headquarters IX Corps was concurrently withdrawn. He believed that two separate but interrelated elements of Japanese perception were at issue. One was the political view as evidenced by the people of Japan and their politicians. The second was the Japan Self-Defense Force's view as USARJ's sister component service.

"Subordination of USARJ to WESTCOM will solidify both Japanese military and civilian perceptions that US Army is methodically reducing its presence here. In this period of intensified Japanese concern over the Soviet threat, this perception could have far-reaching political ramifications." He went on, however, to outline ways to minimize the impact of such a change on the various facets of USARJ's activities.1

(U) In a later telephone conversation between a CINCPAC Plans Directorate division chief and COMUS Japan's Assistant Chief of Staff/J3, that officer noted that Admiral Weisner had discussed the issue with both COMUS Japan and CDRUSARJ during his recent visit to Japan and the officer in Japan believed that Admiral Weisner supported Phase II implementation, but not at the expense of the three-star Army billet in Japan. Also, there had been sufficient changes in Japan in bilateral planning and cost sharing in the previous year to cause CINCPAC and/or COMUS Japan to revise positions taken in 1978. Adverse Japanese perceptions could be a problem. The bottom line, however, according to the COMUS Japan officer, was that Phase II was viewed as an unfortunate

1. CDRUSARJ 130001Z Sep 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 84.
2. USARJ/IX Corps Memo to Admiral Weisner (SYNF) of 20 Sep 79, Subj: Project Pacific Phoenix (U), DECL 31 Dec 85.
action that could denigrate COMUS Japan's mission accomplishment.¹

SYNOFORM: Throughout most of the written and oral exchanges on this issue, there ran a thread of basic agreement that Phase II or something similar to it would eventually occur. There was, however, disagreement on the timing, with WESTCOM urging speed and USARJ urging caution and delay. In 1979 the subject had not formally surfaced in the joint arena and CINCPAC had not provided any formal comments on the timing of the implementation of Phase II.²

Airborne Command Post Activities³

(U) CINCPAC's Airborne Command Post, called BLUE EAGLE, completed 10 years in a ground alert status at the end of 1979. Prior to January 1970 the Airborne Command Post had maintained a continuous airborne alert for some years.

(U) There were four EC-135J aircraft assigned to the operation. During the first part of 1979 two mission-configured aircraft were available and a third non mission-configured aircraft was available for aircrew training. Aircraft 055 remained in depot maintenance at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma until it returned to Hawaii on 14 March.

(U) On 30 April the non mission-configured aircraft (62-3584) was taken to the Electrospac, Inc., facility at Love Field in Texas for major modification and configuration changes relating to installation of special back-end electronics systems. Aircraft 584 was expected to return as a fourth fully mission capable BLUE EAGLE J-model aircraft. That return had originally been expected about the end of 1979, but at the end of the year the satellite communications system modification was not expected to be completed before 28 February 1980. The other three aircraft remained available for service throughout 1979.

(U) The five Battle Staffs deployed periodically to the Western Pacific area with each staff deploying, typically, approximately five times a year. The most frequent calls were at Yokota Air Base, Japan; Clark Air Base in the Philippines; Kadéna (Okinawa), Japan; and Andersen Air Force Base on Guam; with less frequent stops at Osan, Kunsan, and Kimpo in Korea; Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska, and Richmond Royal Australian Air Force Base in Australia.

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¹ J56 Memo For Record 26 Sep 79 (U).
² Ibid.
³ ABNCP HistSums Jan-Dec 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 85.
(U) Every month, also, from two to five sorties were flown in the Hawaiian orbit area to exercise communications systems and provide Battle Staff communications support training.

There were two basic kinds of training exercises conducted throughout the year. BLUE EAGLE TWO was an alert training exercise in which the aircraft taxied to a runway hold area; BLUE EAGLE FOUR was an exercise that launched the aircraft on a local flight. For each the standard of completion was to be less than 15 minutes. The 36 BLUE EAGLE TWO and 27 BLUE EAGLE FOUR exercises conducted in 1979 were well within that standard with the greatest number taking from 6 to 9 minutes.\(^1\)

A third kind of exercise had been added in 1977. This was BLUE EAGLE FIVE, also known as FOREVER GONE, an exercise for relocating the CINC (or an Alternate Command Authority for exercise purposes) to an Airborne Command Post by means of helicopter as specified in the CINCPAC instruction on continuity of operations. Relocation from Camp Smith to BLUE EAGLE was accomplished by helicopters assigned to the 1st Marine Brigade at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station. There were two exercises in this series conducted in 1979, the first on 9 November. To check procedures and equipment, the deputy chief of the Command and Control Division of the Operations Directorate simulated CINC relocation and flew from Camp Smith to Hickam Air Force Base. Minor procedural and equipment problems were identified and corrected. A second was conducted 17 December with CINCPAC's Director for Logistics and Security Assistance simulating CINC relocation. Admiral Bird then flew on a local training flight with BLUE EAGLE.\(^2\)

**Command Center Modernization**

(U) A new and larger Command Center was under construction throughout 1979 to improve facilities for current operations and accommodate other planned system improvements. The modifications were being made in Buildings 4 and 80. The project was designated Military Construction Project P-200 and was expected to be completed in 1980. The passageway separating the construction area from the rest of the third floor was sealed on 22 January, and demolition by the Teval Corporation began two days later. By February the Hawaiian Telephone Company and the Naval Shore Electronic Engineering Activity, Pacific had finished their work on the emergency action booth, and it was ready for reinstallation of equipment later in the year. By June a final check was made of

\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^2\) J332 HistSum Nov 79 (S), DECL 6 Dec 85; J332 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 8 Jan 86.
planned locations for curtain, light, and public address controls in the center. All furniture requirements were approved by the General Services Administration, but delivery was not planned until 1980. In November podiums for briefing officers and the clock system were ordered.1

(U) The Nuclear Support Center personnel moved from Fort Shafter, Hawaii to Building 80, Room 1120 the week of 8 October.2

PACOM Crisis Action Information Distribution System

(U) One of the features of the modernized Command Center was to be the PACOM Crisis Action Information Distribution System (PACAIDS). It was an audio and video distribution system that would provide, on cathode ray tubes and large group displays, information that might be passed among CINCPAC, his immediate staff, the Command Center Watch Team, the Operations Planning Group, the Logistics Readiness Center, the Nuclear Operating Center, the Intelligence Center Pacific, the Emergency Action Booth, the Joint Reconnaissance Center, and the Directors for Intelligence and Operations.3

(U) Highlights of developments in 1979 follow. Map boards were studied in January and tested for legibility and resolution on both AOBCC cameras and regular TV cameras. In February representatives of two agencies that were active in creation of the system visited CINCPAC Headquarters. The agencies were the Naval Electronics Systems Command and the Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Activity. During the February visit they studied the physical location of IPAC link hardware to be installed and the exact inter-communications requirements for the Command Center; crisis action nodes were confirmed, and it was agreed that two Versatec printers would be provided to allow paper archival storage of PACAIDS displays.4

(U) A message from the office of the Chief of Naval Operations in March reported that full funding would be provided as requested; the importance of the project and need to avoid costly delays and Command Center disruption were recognized.5

(U) In further regard to funding, on 18 April the Naval Electronics Systems Command confirmed that that agency would be responsible for all PACAIDS

5. CNO 021315Z Mar 79 (U).
funding support through FY 80; CINCPAC was to pick up the Operations and Maintenance (Navy) funding responsibility in FY 81.¹

(U) In May a representative of the Naval Electronics Systems Command provided a "statement of work." This document was to be the basis for bids for a maintenance contract that would be let for PACOM bid. Later, it was determined that if the Eaton Corporation were selected, the Electronics Systems Command should initiate the maintenance contract and CINCPAC would have the option of extending the same contract when maintenance responsibility passed in FY 81.²

(U) Large Group Display funding survived a budget review at CNO in August. The displays were to be two 13' x 11½' screens and associated rear view projection devices capable of displaying images and digital information received through the new system. The Large Group Displays were becoming less expensive, with $250,000 programmed in August, down from an earlier $400,000. A CINCPAC representative attended a Hughes Company demonstration at the North American Air Defense Command headquarters of a liquid crystal projector designed for Large Group Displays. The projector was compact, relatively portable (260 pounds), and appeared to be easily operated and maintained. Although it functioned smoothly in a computer driven mode, there remained serious questions about whether or not it would perform in the PACAIDS closed-circuit TV system. It was decided that whatever system CINCPAC purchased should first be tested in the actual operating environment of the CINCPAC Command Center. The Naval Electronics Systems Command was requested to interface the Hughes and General Electric Large Group Displays with PACAIDS equipment during their demonstration of 20 September at St. Inigoes, Maryland.³

(U) In September the distribution of 7705 Type Visual Information Processors throughout CINCPAC headquarters was discussed and the new Command Center was to be given priority for them when they were available in FY 80. Also in September, CINCPAC requested that the Warner Robbins Air Logistics Center place the maintenance of PACAIDS under an existing PACOM Eaton Corporation contract. The requirement was to provide for primary on-site coverage by one man with an on-call, 2-hour response coverage at other times.⁴

(U) Everything appeared on schedule at the end of the year.

¹. J330 HistSum Apr 79 (U).
Increased CINCPAC Participation in Command and Control Operations

(U) In July the JCS requested information on initiatives to enhance PACOM operational capabilities and interoperability. CINCPAC was told to assume funding levels of $500,000 for FY 80 and $3 million for FY 81. Based on inputs from the staff and component commanders, CINCPAC provided the JCS with his recommendations on 28 July. Listed in order of priority they were:

- Extension of CINCPAC's crisis response communications (the lightweight communications capability and the "attache case repeater" with digital voice protection circuitry).
- Airborne Command Post secure voice capability.
- Teletype equipment on CINCPAC's aircraft.
- Interim facsimile network.
- Computer system data monitoring equipment.
- Joint U.S.-Japan Coordination Center.
- Graphic display of order of battle data in the CINCPAC Command Center.
- Retention of the Military Message Experiment equipment through FY 81.

Military Message Experiment

(U) The Military Message Experiment that had been begun in 1977 was concluded in 1979 and the system removed. The experiment had been a joint program of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the U.S. Navy (represented by the Naval Telecommunications Command and the Naval Electronics Systems Command), and CINCPAC. It had been a program designed to improve and speed the handling of message traffic during crisis or contingency operations for the Command Center and associated staff support activities. A user was to be able to scan, read, file, retrieve, compose, annotate, and forward messages.

1. J3412 HistSum Jul 79 (U); CINCPAC 282335Z Jul 79 (S); DECL 30 Jul 85.

As noted elsewhere in this chapter, the Military Message Experiment equipment was removed from the headquarters in 1979.
Actual users during the experiment were selected divisions in the Operations Directorate.  

(U) The primary objective was to determine the usefulness of an interactive message handling system in a major military headquarters. Many valuable lessons were learned concerning the advantages and disadvantages of the system, which should be of benefit in the development of future systems. The experiment showed that the system was usable, but as a result of the limited number of terminals supported by the system's hardware and persistent system reliability problems, the experiment was not able to demonstrate the required degree of usefulness of an automated system compared to a manual message-handling system. The multi-million dollar cost had been split about half-and-half between the Navy and the Advanced Research Projects Agency.

2. Ibid.
(U) As a candidate, President Carter had promised to eventually withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea. His plan originally involved nearly 32,000 troops and covered a period of four to five years. Early in his presidency he had announced that he was proceeding with his plans, despite some protests from the military community, and some troops were actually withdrawn in 1978 and early 1979. In February 1979, however, the President announced that further ground force withdrawals had been held in abeyance pending the completion of a reassessment of North Korea's military strength and the implications of ongoing political developments in the region. On 20 July 1979 the President announced that withdrawal of combat elements of the 2nd Infantry Division would remain in abeyance.1

(SL) COMUS Korea provided his thoughts to CINCPAC on 8 January 1979. He said, based on the preliminary assessment, that the planned withdrawal of the 2nd Division should be cancelled until the balance was redressed or until other political moves were made toward a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. He also indicated that U.S. credibility was at stake if the withdrawal continued, although U.S. officials had repeatedly implied that the withdrawal would take place only if the military situation permitted. He further indicated that some aspects of the withdrawal could and probably should take place. As

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2. JCS 3089/0223442 Jan 79 (SYW)(EX), DECL 2 Jan 85; SECSTATE 327067/01/3000000Z Dec 78 (S)(EX), GDS 12/29/84.

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an example he cited the turnover of the equipment of the HONEST JOHN battalion (the 1st Battalion of the 31st Field Artillery) to the ROK Army and the inactivation of several ordnance units, actions that had been planned for the spring of 1979. He summed up by saying there was a whole new situation requiring a complete review of all war plans, the early warning situation, the ROK Force Improvement Plan, and the ground force withdrawal program.¹

(CINCPAC(2)(EX)) CINCPAC's response of 13 January to the JCS reaffirmed the need for continued U.S. support of ROK efforts to keep pace with North Korean improvements. While one combat battalion had already been withdrawn, the 1979 increment and those beyond depleted the combat capability of U.S. forces. CINCPAC expressed the belief that the credibility of the United States demanded that the withdrawal of the remainder of the 2nd Division be postponed until such time as the North Korean order of battle was firmed up and the military balance reassessed and redressed as necessary.²

Meanwhile, in 1978 the JCS had established reporting requirements associated with the troop withdrawals. Among those requirements was a 120-day notification to be provided to the Congress prior to the withdrawal or inactivation of each increment. CINCPAC's input for the first such report pertaining to units scheduled for inactivation in Increment IB had been forwarded to the JCS on 1 December of that year (the increments were explained in some detail in the 1978 history).³

³ On 16 February 1979 COMUS Korea provided information for the second 120-day report, for the remainder of Increment IB. He recommended that the execution of the withdrawal program be indefinitely suspended effective with Increment IB and that only those previously planned actions that involved transfer of selected weapons systems to the ROK be continued. He also highlighted the concern that if the withdrawal was not cancelled, approval of Increment IB was needed not later than 1 July 1979 in order to accomplish the necessary logistic transactions and facilitate ROK planning, funding, and training associated with the equipment transfers.⁴

⁴ On 7 March CINCPAC advised the JCS that he concurred with COMUS Korea's

¹ J5321 HistSum Jan 79 (ES)(EX), DECL 6 Feb 85; COMUS Korea 080710Z Jan 79 (ES)(EX), DECL Jan 85.
² CINCPAC 130129Z Jan 79 (EX), DECL 12 Jan 85.
³ J5321 HistSum Mar 79 (ES), DECL 2 Apr 85; CINCPAC 010224Z Dec 78 (ES), XGDS-2.
⁴ COMUS Korea 160516Z Feb 79 (EX), DECL 31 Dec 85.
comments and emphasized that if the withdrawal was not cancelled, approval was required on 18 on 1 July.1

(U) On 20 July the President's announcement concerning Korean withdrawals was presented to the press by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, a copy of which was provided to CINCPAC by the Secretary of Defense. The withdrawal of combat elements of the 2nd Infantry Division would continue to be held in abeyance. The structure and function of the Combined Forces Command that had been established in 1978 was to be continued. Before the end of 1980 some reductions of personnel in U.S. support units were to continue. These included the one Improved HAWK air defense battalion whose transfer to the ROK had been planned since 1976. The timing and pace of the withdrawals beyond those announced would be reexamined in 1981. The review at that time would pay special attention to restoration of a satisfactory North-South military balance and evidence of tangible progress toward a reduction of tensions on the peninsula.2

(U) The President's decision had been shaped by a number of considerations. First was the confirmation that North Korea's ground forces were larger than previously estimated. Second was the judgment that further reductions in combat elements in Korea should await credible indications that a satisfactory military balance had been restored and that a reduction in tension was underway. Third was the steady growth of Soviet military power, the eruption of renewed conflict and new uncertainties in Southeast Asia, the stabilization of the base agreement with the Philippines, and the initiation of defense planning discussions with Japan. These, together with an adjustment in the withdrawal schedule would serve wider U.S. security interests and demonstrate U.S. steadiness and resolve.3

1. CINCPAC 070129Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 2 Mar 85.
2. J5321 HistSum Jul 79 (U); SECDEF 6889/201822Z Jul 79 (U).
3. Ibid.
On 12 April the JCS requested practical near-term measures (aside from the ground force withdrawal issue) that could be taken to improve U.S. deterrence and warfighting capability in Korea and the region within the next year. CINCPAC sought and received the comments of his subordinate unified commands in Korea and Japan and his component commanders.²

COMUS Korea highlighted the desirability of additional air and intelligence gathering assets; improved command, control, and communications; and increased War Reserve Materiel and munitions. COMUS Japan provided no comments but reserved the right to provide appropriate comments or recommendations on proposals or plans impacting on his headquarters. CINCPACAF provided a variety of alternative measures for enhancing combat capabilities and positioning of aircraft to respond rapidly to any Korean contingency. CINCPACFLT indicated that the existing level of naval activity in the Korean region and the number of ship visits were expected to continue through 1979. Carrier presence, however, would be limited primarily because of the increased contingency presence requirements in the Indian Ocean.³

On 19 April CINCPAC provided his thoughts to the JCS. He concurred with the proposals that had been submitted by COMUS Korea, strongly supporting recommendations concerning improvements in areas of intelligence; command, control, and communications; and firepower to help offset the existing force imbalance. Other initiatives proposed by CINCPAC included assignment of additional F-4E/D aircraft to Osan and Kunsan Air Base; rotation of A-10/AC-130 aircraft to Korea prior to developing permanent change of station beddown of A-10s in the future; short-term deployment of F-105/F-4Gs, F-3As, F-15s, and B-52s to Korea; an increase of the PACOM carrier force level to seven; increased efforts to reduce shortages of air-launched missiles and ground ammunition.

1. J5311 HistSum Mar 79 (S), DECL 10 Apr 85; SSO Korea 121207Z Mar 79 (S), (BOM), DECL 31 Dec 85; CINCPAC 140023Z Mar 79 (S) (BOM), REVW 31 Dec 85.
2. J5321 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 2 May 85; JCS 3668/121959Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 12 Apr 85.
3. COMUS Korea 170900Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 17 Apr 85; COMUS Japan 170120Z Apr 79 (U); CINCPACAF 180400Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 12 Apr 85; CINCPACFLT 180214Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 12 Apr 85.
stocks and reorientation of the 25th Infantry Division (in Hawaii) as the primary Army force for Asian contingencies as soon as politically feasible.1

($) The JCS requested that CINCPAC provide comments and any refinement of discussion factors and priorities relating to those measures CINCPAC had just proposed. CINCPAC again sought the opinions of the subordinate and component commanders in the preparation of his reply of 15 May. CINCPAC again advised that he concurred with the priorities recommended by COMUS Korea. CINCPAC's reply highlighted the following subjects. He believed that continued U.S. ground force presence in Korea remained paramount to all other offset measures. He believed early announcement of any approved future force initiative was needed to maximize the effect of such an initiative on the perceptions of allies and potential adversaries. Actions to increase the permanent beddown of additional USAF forces in the PACOM were clearly preferred and the most credible means of increasing capabilities and sending strong signals. He requested reconsideration of prepositioned ammunition and War Reserve Stocks for Allies initiatives that had not been supported by the Army staff. He indicated that an additional carrier would provide the strongest possible Navy offset measure (while also recognizing and appreciating the costs involved). (Both the munitions and carrier force levels remained under study because of their relationship with requirements for the European and Atlantic Commands in support of NATO; see the Plans chapter of this history.) Finally, CINCPAC recognized the need for supplemental funding to support most initiatives in order that other Service programs did not suffer.2

($) In 1978 a number of USN-ROK Navy initiatives had been explored. On 12 March 1979 the JCS advised that they concurred in CINCPAC's recommendations to continue PACAF-ROK Air Force negotiations for a Korean Air-to-Ground Tactical Range (KOTAR), incorporating U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps tactical air usage of the KOTAR; discussions with ROK Navy and ROK Defense Ministry officials on the subject of a naval gunfire support (NGFS) range; and investigation of the possible collocation of the naval and air ranges. The JCS authorized CINCPAC to proceed with bilateral negotiations on all three projects.3

($) On 11 June COMUS Korea requested assistance in obtaining the services of a naval science adviser in designing a modular naval gunfire support range.

1. J5321 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 2 May 85; CINCPAC 190225Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 18 Apr 85.
2. J5321 HistSum May 79 (S), DECL 9 May 85; JCS 7660/092147Z May 79 (S), DECL 9 May 85; CINCPAC 152142Z May 79 (S), DECL 14 May 85.
3. JCS 7538/121957Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 1 Dec 84.
On further investigation by CINCPACFLT, it was determined that COMUS Korea had envisioned greater U.S. involvement and expense than that recommended by CINCPAC and subsequently authorized by the U.S. Secretary of Defense. CINCPAC directed COMUS Korea's attention to the historic facts of the case, stated there was limited U.S. funding support for the naval gunfire range, and further stated that once the degree of Korean commitment had been determined, technical help could be provided.

(§) It was because of the limited USN usage anticipated for the range that it was believed that it should be funded by the ROK Government. On 20 October the Secretary of Defense announced that there was to be a Korean Review Group meeting in Washington in late November. One of the proposed discussion items was the status of the range (and the KOTAR range). CINCPAC requested that COMUS Korea provide an update on the status of the range. COMUS Korea said that the range had to compete with high priority projects in the ROK Navy's budget and the outlook was marginal. A feasibility, cost, and safety analysis continued, however, but was incomplete. Until such time as the naval science adviser could estimate the cost of the range, the ROK Government was expected to withhold a decision on their unilateral funding of the project.²

Combined Forces Command

(§) As discussed in earlier histories, the Combined Forces Command was established in Korea in 1978. Following the 12th Security Consultative Meeting, at which it had been confirmed that the command was making a contribution to the ROK-U.S. defense capability on the peninsula, the ROK Defense Minister and the U.S. Secretary of Defense agreed to seek ways to increase even further the responsibilities and effectiveness of the CFC. In support of that commitment, the Secretary of Defense directed a review of options for closer peacetime and wartime integration of U.S. and Korean combat capability within the CFC structure. "You should specifically examine command arrangements including peacetime operational control of combat units."²

(§) On 21 November CINCPAC advised that the study would be conducted in three phases. He noted that the projected scope of the assessment involved PACOM component and subordinate unified commanders, possibly other unified and specified commands, and the Military Services. Phase I would identify existing CFC problem areas that required the alteration of existing arrangements. Phase II would be a detailed examination of those problems and options for solving them. Phase III would commence with the submission of study results to the PACOM component and subordinate unified commands for comment prior to forwarding CINCPAC's recommendations to the JCS. The study was expected to be completed in 1980. Also under study throughout 1979 had been the grade, Service, and assignment of U.S. flag and general officers on the CFC staff, as well as on the staffs of the UNC and COMUS Korea. This subject will also be addressed in 1980.³

(U) See the Personnel chapter of this history for information on a detailed manpower survey of the UNC, U.S. Forces Korea, Eighth U.S. Army, and the CFC.

1. J5112 HistSum Sep 79 (§), DECL 31 Aug 85; CINCPAC 012245Z Sep 79 (S)(EX), DECL 31 Aug 85.
2. JCS 6286/162140Z Nov 79 (§), DECL 16 Nov 85, which cited SECDEF Memo, 2 Nov 79, Subj: "Combined Forces Command." FORM 00-80T
3. CINCPAC 210130Z Nov 79 (§), REVW Nov 85.
On 26 January 1979 the Secretary of State outlined the requirement for continuing existing arrangements. He called the UN-Japan SOFA important to U.S. interests in East Asia; in event of hostilities in Korea it would provide a ready, legal basis for support effort, U.S. and otherwise. In peacetime it conferred convenient privileges of passage into and out of Japan of the military personnel, ships, and aircraft of signatory nations. He believed that the minimal cost to third countries of maintaining the SOFA was slight compared to the adverse impact of allowing it to lapse.2

Shortly thereafter, the JCS requested that CINCUNC provide a historical tracking of representatives to that command. CINCUNC’s reply of 4 April indicated that nine countries had been represented upon inception of the organization on 1 January 1957: Australia, Canada, France, Greece, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. By April 1979 six countries had liaison groups accredited to UNC Rear, but in all cases they were dual-hatted as Chief of the Liaison Group and military attache. France (in September 1978) and Turkey (in December 1977) had withdrawn representation with no reason disclosed. Greece had withdrawn in 1964 for financial reasons. The remaining countries had from one to nine representatives, but all were attaches.3

Only one officer was assigned to UNC Rear with no other job assignment, a Philippine captain, (as further explained in the 1978 CINCPAC history). He did not serve as a representative to the UNC, Korea. On 26 January 1979 CINCPAC learned that the Philippines was sending a replacement officer to continue to provide representation to preserve the UNC-Japan SOFA.4

2. SECSTATE 021847Z Jan 79 (S), EO 12065, GDS.
3. CINCUNC 040300Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 27 Feb 87, REVW 31 Dec 79, REAS PARA 2-301 (S) 5 & 7, DG/C/27 Feb 81.
4. Ibid.; SS0 Korea 260156Z Jan 79 (S) (BOM), DECL 25 Jan 83.
Taiwan Forces and Basing

(U) The withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Taiwan, the disestablishment of the Taiwan Defense Command, and the development of new agencies to handle U.S.-Taiwan matters are discussed in a separate appendix to this history.

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

(U) For many years the status of negotiations regarding the political future of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, a territory that had been assigned to the United States in trusteeship by the United Nations in 1946, had been of interest to CINCPAC. Support facilities in this area served as a hedge against the loss of other U.S. bases in the PACOM. The United States and the Northern Marianas had signed a covenant in 1975 to form the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas at such time as the trustee agreement between the United States and the United Nations was terminated, scheduled for 1981. For other islands, negotiations were still in progress. The island groups had become fragmented, however, and were three separate entities: Palau; the Marshall Islands; and the Federated States of Micronesia, which consisted of Kosrae, Yap, Truk, and Ponape.

(8) On 2 May 1979 the JCS quoted from a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations requesting that an agency of the joint staff initiate a review of the near and long-term security interests in Micronesia as a matter of priority as a result of events since the last review. The CNO listed the U.S. normalization of relations with China and the subsequent loss of facilities in Taiwan, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, the fall of the Shah's regime in Iran, the trouble in Yemen. All of these had contributed to a shift in the U.S.-USSR naval balance in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. "The importance of the Micronesian status negotiations may have become more crucial as a result of our growing Indian Ocean involvement and other events. It is believed that at a minimum our objectives in the negotiations and our strategic interests in Micronesia must be reviewed and reaffirmed." The JCS asked for CINCPAC's comments. 1

(8) CINCPAC said that his position on U.S. defense requirements, interests, and objectives in Micronesia had been consistent over a long period of time. The fundamental objectives remained to secure a lasting political status agreement with the Micronesian entities that would insure a quality relationship supportive of U.S. security interests and concomitantly deny the area to unfriendly powers, and to secure land leases and airfield and anchorage rights

1. JCS 4013/021822Z May 79 (8), DECL 1 May 85.
in Palau, the Marshalls, and the Northern Marianas that would provide for long-range U.S. interests. CINCPAC agreed that recent events had underscored the importance of the region. Rather than eliciting a major review of U.S. strategic interests and objectives, however, CINCPAC believed in the need to carry out the actions already identified by the PACOM as essential to defense long-range interests, perceptions of U.S. staying power in the Pacific, and continuing good will of the Micronesians. Such actions would be to secure in the FY 81 budget the required lease monies for defense lands in the Northern Marianas, support for an increase in the Civic Action Team program and insure its continuity into the post-termination period, and support for the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations' efforts to forge an agreement with Palau that would meld military land and airfield/harbor access requirements with the development program being discussed in on-going status talks. CINCPAC outlined a number of particulars that needed attention.1

CINCPAC noted that recent events had reinforced both near and long-term security interests and objectives. A major strategic review would only revalidate those objectives and requirements, but would fail to solve the major problem, which was financial. What he believed was needed was recognition of the Asia-Pacific area (including Micronesia) vis-a-vis other competing global strategic interests. "Hopefully such a review would result in an evaluation of priorities assigned to funding for land and other requirements in the region."2

Problems continued with the Northern Marianas lease money. The covenant to form the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas included provisions for the United States to lease three land areas for approximately $23 million (in 1979 dollars). The lease was to be paid by January 1983 and was to extend for 100 years. Lease lands included two-thirds of Tinian Island for exercises, all of Farallon de Medinilla Island for a bomb/gunery range, and small acreage on Saipan for a memorial park bordering Tanapag Harbor. The $23 million was deleted from the FY 80 budget during review by the Office of Management and Budget in Washington. The Navy continued to use Tinian and Farallion on the basis of a $25,000 per year interim permit. News of failure to retain the lease money in the FY 80 budget caused the Northern Marianas legislature to pass resolutions asking for revocations of the interim use permit and new negotiations to obtain higher rental.3

On 16 March CINCPAC advised the JCS of his concern and reemphasized

1. CINCPAC 210910Z May 79 (CONFIDENTIAL), DECL 15 May 85.
2. Ibid.
the importance of funding the convenant leases at the earliest possible time. He said that urgent action was needed to get the lease back in the President's FY 80 budget. If that action failed, "we need best effort possible to include and retain this budget item in the FY 81 budget submission, by assigning a high enough priority to ensure that it survives OMB scrutiny."  

The JCS advised CINCPAC that the subject had been discussed with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and while there was concurrence in the importance of exercising the options at the earliest time, restoration of funds in the FY 80 budget was probably not feasible. Their plan was to include the funding in the FY 81 budget. An OSD representative had testified to a subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, noting that the Defense Department intended to exercise the lease options before their expiration in 1983 and provide funding for that purpose in the FY 81 budget. The FY 81 Service Program Objectives Memorandums, however, did not include the item, which by this time was up to $30.8 million.

CINCPAC reminded the Chairman of the JCS that both CINCPAC and the JCS had consistently supported the prompt appropriation of these funds and despite assurances to the contrary they were not in the proposed budget. He believed it was necessary to restate the importance of correcting this omission and insuring that funding was approved. He cited the fact that the leases were becoming more expensive each year and that procrastination on the part of the United States was causing ill feelings in the Northern Marianas. In that regard, their legislature and public land corporation had become more convinced that the United States would simply let the options lapse and the Marianas would have gotten nothing from their holdings. They had drafted a resolution asking the land commission to revoke the interim use permit and were asking that the agreement be renegotiated at a much higher figure as it might be their only source of income from the land areas identified in the compact. The U.S. Government had continuously reassured the legislature, governor, and land commission that it was doing everything possible to insure that the money was to be provided soon.

CINCPAC said that continuing difficulties with the Marshallese in status negotiations reflected doubts on the future of the Kwajalein Missile Range, as discussed below in more detail. CINCPAC described Micronesia as

1. CINCPAC 160159Z Mar 79 (C), DECL 12 Mar 85.
2. JCS 3232/191500Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 18 Apr 85; J5124 HistSum Jun 79 (C), DECL 31 Jul 85.
3. CINCPAC 202025Z Jun 79 (C), DECL 30 Jun 85.
of increasing importance in Western Pacific long-range planning, particularly along the Palau-Guam-Marianas line, the northernmost point of which would be secured by the leases. He requested the assistance of the Chairman to obtain a priority for the lease money to assure it survived in the FY 81 budget.1

(U) The Chairman replied that he had raised the matter with the Chief of Naval Operations and asked for his personal intervention to insert the funding in subsequent revisions of the Navy's FY 81-85 POM. He reassured CINC PAC of his interest and "will do all we can" to assure inclusion in the FY 81 budget.2

(U) The money had not been appropriated by the end of 1979.

(U) Regarding the political status of the other parts of Micronesia, a brief summary of 1979 developments follows. The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), consisting of Yap, Truk, Ponape, and Kosrae, began separate government operations on 28 September 1978 under a new constitution. All districts had elected governors. FSM elections were held in March 1979 with the first Congress session from 10 May to 15 June. The Congress elected Tosiwo Nakayama as the first President of the FSM.3

(U) The Marshall Islands constitution was adopted by referendum on 1 March 1979, with elections and a new government in May. Amata Kabua was elected President.4

(U) The Palau constitutional convention met throughout February and drafted a new constitution for implementation on 1 January 1980. Despite warnings by the U.S. Government that the document was not compatible with the status of free association (Law of the Sea, sovereignty, nuclear substances provisions), the convention submitted the document to a referendum on 9 July. The result was overwhelming approval (by a 90 percent voter turnout). Prior to the referendum, however, the Palau legislature had passed a resolution nullifying the convention and the constitution. The resolution had been challenged in court and on 24 July 1979 the high court ruled in favor of the legislature. Thus both constitution and referendum were nullified. The Personal Representative of the President of the United States invited all Palau factions to meet with him on Guam on 3 August to resolve their differences. All factions

1. Ibid.
2. JCS 3481/301736Z Jun 79 (U), DECL 27 Jun 85.
3. JS124 Point Paper (U), 4 Jan 80, Subj: Micronesian Political Status Negotiations (U).
4. Ibid.
accepted and submitted a draft re-write of the troublesome sections for U.S. Government comment. Election of the new government was held on 4 September, with inauguration scheduled for 1 January 1980. A revised constitution was decisively defeated on 23 October 1979.¹

(☐) The Kwajalein Missile Range had some occupation problems in 1979. There were a number of islands leased by the U.S. Government in the Kwajalein Atoll; the islands and lagoon provided an impact area and instrumentation and support facilities for the range's portion of the Pacific Missile Range. Intercontinental ballistic missiles were tested from Vandenberg AFB, California, and MX and TRIDENT missile test programs would be starting. The Kwajalein landowners were pressuring the U.S. Government to renegotiate all 10 land use agreements in 1979, rather than waiting for the $9 million per year offered by the United States after trusteeship ended. The Land Owners Committee had several islets (Kwajalein, Roi-Namur, Bigeje, Omelek, and Enewetak) occupied (mostly by women and children) to make their point. They started the occupation on 12 July. In addition to the lease terms, the land owners were protesting what they called poor work conditions and lack of access to Kwajalein Island shopping and recreational areas. An officer from CINCPAC's Plans Directorate accompanied Defense Department officials to seek solutions to the problem.²

(☐) The U.S. team convinced the landowners to return to Ebeye Island in exchange for good faith negotiations in Honolulu in September. They left Kwajalein on 4 August and the other islands by 29 August. (The CINCPAC Command History for 1976 describes conditions on tiny Ebeye Island, four miles north of Kwajalein, where the population had mushroomed from 450 people in 1950 when they had been moved from Kwajalein to approximately 8,000 by 1979; the island was a slum by U.S. standards but attractive to remote islanders who were attracted by their relatives' money, Coke, beer, television, schools, and a hospital. Only 700 had jobs. There was no water on the island; the U.S. Army barged in 200,000 gallons a week at a cost of $27 per 1,000 gallons.)

(☐) The talks on 17 September in Honolulu turned out to be unsuccessful. The United States believed that valid existing leases should continue in force according to their terms and not be renegotiated. Additional payments for on-going use should be commensurate with other comparable leases in the Pacific area, and made only to the Marshall Islands government. The United States said it was prepared to provide project assistance for Ebeye, on a

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.; J5124 HistSum Jul 79 (☐), DECL 31 Aug 85.
cost-sharing basis. Finally, the Marshalls government should assure unrestricted use of the Missile Range under new terms to be agreed upon. The lawyers from Micronesia presented demands for money in amounts that could not be negotiated in Honolulu, and the talks moved to Washington on 24 September.¹

The Washington talks resulted in a signed agreement for the period 1 October 1979 through 10 September 1980. This was between the U.S. Government and the Marshalls government in which the landowners agreed to not interfere with missile range operations, accepted offered amounts for past use of Roi-Namur Island and three others, and a total financial package offered by the United States. The offer was for approximately $4.5 million in cash and $5.5 million in capital improvement projects for the atoll. Landowners were free to litigate any of the past use leases that they thought were unfair and the Defense Department was to abide by the decision of courts after all appeals had been exhausted. The agreement was to be renegotiated each year until the trusteeship was terminated. The agreement improved attitudes, redressed real or imagined grievances, and promised a trouble-free year for the Kwajalein Missile Range.²

Military Civic Action Teams

As noted in previous CINCPAC histories, CINCPAC managed the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Civic Action Team (CAT) program through the CINCPAC Representative Guam/TTPI. Costs of the program were shared by the Defense Department and the Department of the Interior. Each year the program had to be reviewed and recommendations concerning its effectiveness made to the JCS. The resulting annual report was the basis for a JCS request for a Defense Department exception to a department directive (1000.17) that permitted the Services to continue paying the salaries of CAT members. On 21 July CINCPAC provided the 1979 report, strongly supporting the program and seeking a commitment to continue it in the post-trusteeship period. The 1979 program included a 10-man USAF team in the Truk District and two 13-man SeaBee teams in the Palau and Yap Districts. It was expected that the Ponape District might seek one.³

In his report CINCPAC said the effectiveness of the program had been

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1. J5124 HistSum Sep 79 (CS), DECL 31 Oct 85; CINCPAC 191050Z Sep 79 (CS), DECL 19 Sep 85.
attested to by all agencies concerned. He noted that for many years "denial" of the area to other powers had been a major security objective in Micronesia. With the increased fragmentation of those islands coupled with the high degree of autonomy offered in the draft compact of free association, such "denial" would be a product of the quality of the relationship between the United States and the Micronesian states rather than the result of explicit wording in that compact or in any mutual security treaty. The quality of that future relationship was very sensitive to the acceptance by the Micronesian people of a U.S. military presence; it was possible that the CATs would provide the only permanent military presence in the region. The teams touched many facets of Micronesian life, had a positive impact on the community they served, and contributed in a uniquely beneficial manner to the general acceptance of a visible U.S. military presence, the primary objective of the program. In addition they provided a benefit that could not be expressed in a dollar value: they provided CINCPAC with a wealth of information and insights concerning the political, economic, and social conditions in their districts. As the United States terminated its role as the administering authority, this feature would become more important vis-a-vis our 15-year defense commitment. 1

(U) In August the TTPI High Commissioner approved Ponape District's request for a CAT and CINCPAC asked the JCS to name a Service sponsor for the team and to plan for mid- to late FY 80 deployment. An Army Engineer team was specified for Ponape. 2

(U) The original program had had six teams and CINCPAC hoped that the number would be increased again to six, two from each Service. CINCPAC had proposed a CAT planning conference with all interested agencies invited. Originally scheduled for December 1979, it was rescheduled for early 1980 in conjunction with the next round of Micronesian status negotiations. 3

1. Ibid.
2. J5124 HistSum Aug 79 (U); CINCPAC 290331Z Aug 79 (U); J5124 HistSum Nov 79 (U).
(U) For the past ten years, CINC PAC's annual histories have documented the increasing Soviet strength in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This increase continued in 1979, providing incontrovertible evidence that the USSR considered military force a productive means of extending its influence throughout the world. In Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Afghanistan, and in Vietnam and Kampuchea, Soviet military personnel and equipment were actively promoting armed conflict. The buildup of Soviet forces on islands north of Japan, which had begun in 1978, continued and intensified during 1979. CINC PAC, of course, was not alone in recognizing the growing Soviet threat. During a meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Florida on 25 April 1979, the ministers reviewed Soviet modernization of its theater nuclear forces, particularly with systems at the intermediate range level, which had been undertaken on a scale well in excess of defensive requirements and unprovoked by any NATO developments. During a news conference following the meeting, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated that the Soviets had undertaken a substantial and sustained program to modernize and expand their theater nuclear forces. The long-range component of those theater nuclear forces had increased in capability and also in numbers of warheads deliverable by the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 missile and of the BACKFIRE bomber. That effort, stated Secretary Brown, went well beyond what could be explained as a reasonable defensive need.¹

(U) On 15 May 1979 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Armacost stated, in testimony before a congressional sub-committee, that threats to peace in Europe, "are more easily measured (but) in Asia the interplay among the major powers is more fluid and the threats more diffuse." He described the Western Pacific as, "a volatile and unpredictable region." On the following day, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, stated that the Soviet Union had almost three times as many attack submarines as the United States and almost twice as many nuclear attack submarines. He said the Soviet surface combat fleet outnumbered the United States fleet by 270 to 203. Nevertheless, Admiral Hayward stated, because the U.S. Navy was superior to the Soviets in tactical aviation at sea, the United States Navy was superior to that of the Soviet Union. However, the U.S. Navy stood at the crossroads and

¹ SECDEF 7651/261953Z Apr 79 (U).
could lose the edge by the mid-1980's. He also asserted that the American public was growing increasingly reluctant to face the fact of growing Soviet military strength. ¹

(U) During a speech in Honolulu on 22 May 1979, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Donald Davis, stated that if the United States did not begin immediately to improve its Navy, it would lose its qualitative edge over the Soviet fleet by the end of the next decade. Unless action were taken to increase the level of ship building, the existing margin of superiority would evaporate in the latter half of the 1980s. In addition to increasing the size of the U.S. Navy, modernization of the naval forces was also needed. Admiral Davis noted, as had Admiral Hayward, that the Soviet Navy was the world's largest, with three times as many ships as the United States Navy. It had three times the number of submarines, half again the number of surface combatants, and an advantage in other surface categories as well. On the other hand, Admiral Davis cited the numerical advantage in aircraft carriers of the U.S. Navy (13 to 2), "with both Soviet carriers (and the aircraft on board) far inferior to the least capable of ours."²

(U) During a May 1979 U.S. Naval War College seminar, the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence informed the group that the Soviet Navy would launch a new class of nuclear-powered cruiser approaching the size of a World War II battleship in late 1979. He said that the construction of at least one and probably more of the 30,000-ton ships was part of a continuing Soviet effort to build up the size and quality of what was at best a second-rate fleet just a decade ago. During the seminar, Admiral Hayward noted that the Soviets appeared to be concentrating on smaller numbers of more sophisticated and more expensive ships at the same time that the United States had by-passed the construction of additional $2 billion nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in favor of a larger number of cheaper vessels. "The Soviets today are building ships that run counter to the prevailing wisdom of the pundits that try to tell us what kind of navy we ought to have," Hayward said. "Their navy is getting more like ours every passing day. The ships they build get larger and more capable and more sophisticated and inevitably more expensive." Perhaps the most significant statement by Admiral Hayward during that seminar was that, "today the (U.S.) Navy is marginally capable of carrying out its tasks, but we are headed for a loss of the relative margin we possess today." It was also during this seminar that a representative of the Center for Naval Analysis said the Soviet Navy had become increasingly adept at gunboat diplomacy—a show of force that was intended to affect political events. He stated that the

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1. ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 109/172242Z May 79 (U).
2. ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 205/232210Z May 79 (U).
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Soviet Union had adopted a policy of diplomacy by force, and that its navy was the leading instrument of that policy and its operations reflected that mission.1

(U) During a late June 1979 change of command ceremony, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Harry Train, stated that the aircraft carrier provided the critical balance between the lesser number of ships in the U.S. Navy and the greater number possessed by the Soviet Navy. Other allied strengths he listed were the ability to operate at sea for long periods, amphibious forces, advanced technology, and outstanding commanding officers. He stated that, although the Soviet Union was developing a rudimentary sea-based tactical air capability through ships such as the KIEV and MINSK, the maritime superiority enjoyed by the United States and its allies was based upon technical superiority rather than numbers. This superiority was focused in the ability to sustain battle groups for long periods at sea and in superior naval leadership. "For the first time, the Soviets have developed a capability to threaten our economic life lines from the third world in the case of raw materials and to Europe in the case of manufactured products and trade." Admiral Train stated that the United States and its allies could not afford a drawn-out war of attrition where sea lines of communications were defended. "We must be offensively capable. We must be able to fight on terms advantageous to us."2

(U) Early in December 1979, the Director of U.S. Navy Program Planning told a congressional sub-committee that, with inflationary trends eliminated, the U.S. Navy budget had shown virtually no growth during the past ten years. He noted that naval planners must consider the nation's dependence on overseas resources, the expansion of Soviet naval power, worldwide implications of a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict, potential for regional conflicts, and the likelihood of "proxy" wars. He described the U.S. Fleet as the smallest since before World War II, and said the Soviets' growing navy had three times as many ships as the 529 then in the U.S. Navy. Just to maintain the U.S. Fleet at its then current level, 17-18 ships and about 330 aircraft would be required per year, an investment of $8 billion for ship building and $6 billion for aircraft procurement each year. He stated that, although the U.S. Navy was clearly spread thinly in peacetime, with little surge capability in response to a crisis, the utility of U.S. seapower had never been clearer. It was also in December that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General David C. Jones, told a congressional committee that the Soviet Union had spent more, by a factor of nearly three to one, than the United States in the area of strategic nuclear forces. General Jones predicted that the 1980s would be a

1. Los Angeles Times dispatch, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 185/222055Z May 79 (U).
2. CNO 292329Z Jun 79 (U).

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period of international turmoil and instability, and that the prospects for tension were seriously compounded by the growth in Soviet military power and the resultant options for projecting that power into areas of major interest to the United States.¹

The foregoing unclassified comments regarding the Soviet threat were supplemented throughout 1979 by CINCPAC. In speeches, press conferences, and individual newspaper and television interviews, CINCPAC stressed the growing threat posed by the Soviet military forces in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. In a more specific military context, the JCS requested CINCPAC's personal views for consideration by the Chairman of the JCS in his annual military posture statement. CINCPAC replied that the posture statement for fiscal year 1980 had addressed an up-turn in U.S. defense spending while the military risk to the nation was increasing. CINCPAC noted that adverse trends had edged the United States another year closer to a potentially unstable and dangerous imbalance in the U.S.-Russian military capability. He recommended that the Chairman emphasize in his statement the global dimension of the Soviet challenge to U.S. security and the free world. This challenge, stated CINCPAC, was exhibited most notably by strong Soviet competition with the United States for international influence, especially within the third world, and by continued growth and modernization of Soviet military forces worldwide. Soviet application of these formidable military forces, stated CINCPAC, could be anticipated during periods of heightened tension or open conflict as a means to attain their objectives. The most immediate contribution by the Pacific Command (PACOM) to an early defeat of Soviet forces was to engage those forces, and to keep them on the defensive and in the PACOM. From the military point of view, an early U.S. offensive would require the Soviet Union to adopt a two or possibly three-front strategy which could significantly affect allied capability in the NATO region. This strategy would exploit the global capability of U.S. forces and be the most effective utilization of PACOM forces.²

CINCPAC also noted that, in nearly every area of military strength, there has been a relative decline over the years vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Although qualitative improvements in the combat forces in the Pacific had partially compensated for reduced forces, the overall PACOM combat capability relative to that of the Soviet Union was still declining. Much greater force improvement efforts were required to reverse this adverse trend and to equip the PACOM better to counter expanding Soviet challenges to U.S. security objectives. In this in-house statement, CINCPAC also recommended that the JCS

2. CINCPAC 201347Z Sep 79 (EX), DECL 20 Sep 85.
posture statement further emphasize the strategy-force mismatch. This mismatch provided no assurance that programmed forces could successfully execute national military strategy and suggested that our national security objectives needed to be reexamined. The mismatch could only be eliminated by either reducing U.S. national security objectives, along with a related revision of U.S. military strategy, or by increasing the capabilities of the programmed forces, or by some combination of both. The first alternative, noted CINC PAC, implied a thorough reassessment of the nation's role as the leader of the free world. The other alternative required a commitment of additional resources to national defense.¹

(U) Throughout the year there was other solid evidence of the continuing improvement in the Soviet armed forces. In January a new 30-to-40,000-ton replenishment ship—the largest ever built for the Soviet Navy—entered the Mediterranean in support of the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet. The Soviet ship, named the BEREZINA, had alongside replenishment stations and a vertical replenishment capability with a helicopter deck on the fantail. It was the first Soviet auxiliary to be equipped with surface-to-air missiles. The replenishment stations on the 685-foot BEREZINA appeared to be designed to support the KIEV-class aircraft carrier deployments. In February the Commander in Chief, European Command, advised that the new KIEV-class aircraft carrier MINSK had made an initial deployment from the Black Sea on 26 February.²

(SS) The maiden deployment of the MINSK from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean set into motion plans for the surveillance of the MINSK movements. In mid-March, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) advised the Commanders of the THIRD Fleet and the SEVENTH Fleet to provide coverage should the MINSK either proceed to the Arabian Sea/Gulf of Aden area, continue through the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific, or transit Cape Horn en route to the Soviet Pacific Fleet. The deployment of the MINSK and her escorts from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean assembled what was probably the greatest display of deployed Soviet naval firepower in history. Ten principal Soviet surface combatants were in the Mediterranean, including two KIEV-class carriers, three guided missile cruisers, two guided missile destroyers, two KRIVAK-class destroyers and a frigate. Also present was the Soviet Navy's largest amphibious warfare ship, the IVAN ROGOV. Three Soviet naval oilers, including the newly deployed BEREZINA, were supporting the force. There were several firsts associated with the Soviet force composition in the Mediterranean in mid-March: the deployment by the carrier MINSK; dual-carrier deployment and operations; the deployment by the guided missile cruisers; and the observance of underway alongside replenishment by the oiler BEREZINA.³

1. Ibid.
2. CNO 201254Z Jan 79 (U); USCINCEUR 261527Z Feb 79 (U).
3. CINCPACFLT 170211Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 85; CNO 170834Z Mar 79 (U).
(U) In mid-May 1979 a news service dispatch reported a Soviet aircraft carrier and a new kind of amphibious warfare ship off the Saudi Arabian Peninsula. The new carrier MINSK and the amphibious ship IVAN ROGOV were anchored at the South Yemen island of Socotra, in strategic waters near the entrances of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. According to the news article, the two ships had been watched by planes from the carrier MIDWAY, which headed a U.S. task force cruising within a few hundred miles of the island of Socotra.1

(8) As reported in the news dispatch, the MINSK was under close surveillance by ships of the U.S. task force in the Indian Ocean. Of particular interest from the standpoint of the threat was the report from the USS ELLIOT concerning flight operation cycles conducted by the MINSK in the Indian Ocean. The ELLIOT reported that the varying proficiency of MINSK pilots was evident as the tempo of operations expanded to include more forward flight. Erratic yaw and pitch control as well as bounce landings were observed. Observations during two days of MINSK operations led the ELLIOT Commander to conclude that the present vertical short take-off and landing operations, as demonstrated by the Soviets, had a long way to go. They were ponderously slow, cumbersome, exposed both the carrier and the aircraft during launch and recovery, and would produce limited ordnance on target. The ELLIOT noted that the MINSK conducted flight operations while underway at only 4 knots.2

(U) At about the same time that the impressive naval display in the Mediterranean was taking place, a U.S. newspaper reported that the Soviet Union had built and tested a nuclear-powered attack submarine which could go faster and dive deeper than any U.S. Navy submarine. Citing government sources, the article stated that the hull of the submarine was built of titanium and the nuclear power plant appeared to produce more horsepower for each pound of weight than its American counterparts. Citing secret data being reviewed by Navy officials, the newspaper reported that the new Russian attack submarine could steam at 40 knots while submerged and dive to a depth of 2,000 feet or more.3

(U) In mid-August 1979 the new edition of Jane's Fighting Ships stated that the United States and other non-communist powers had allowed their naval strength to slump to the point where they soon would be vulnerable to Soviet blackmail. This could mean deprivation of raw materials, markets and the freedom of friends unable to defend themselves. Jane's reported that the Soviets had two aircraft carriers with at least two more expected within three years. The Soviets had also begun construction of a 32,000 ton "Sovietski Soyuuz"-class

1. UPI dispatch, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 129/1822012 May 79 (U).
2. USS ELLIOT 1911562 May 79 (C), DECL 30 Aug 79.
warship at Leningrad--the first of 12 reportedly planned by the 1990s and
twice the size of the strike cruisers originally planned, but abandoned, by
the U.S. Navy. "It bristles with missiles and guns, can carry aircraft and
can best be described by the old-fashioned title battle cruiser." On the
other hand, Jane's said, the U.S. Navy, which ended the Vietnam war with 976
active combatant ships, had only 535 and would have only 528 by September 1980.
However, there were significant capabilities in the U.S. Navy to counter the
Soviet weapons development, according to Jane's. The Jane's editor cited such
things as U.S. computer designs and the resultant capabilities they provided
to new aircraft such as the F-14 and the F-18 aircraft. According to the
Jane's editor, the Soviet Navy had grown beyond merely defensive requirements
and "the West remains dependent on worldwide sea routes, but has surrendered
a large part of its capability to defend and watch over them."\(^1\)

\(^{(U)}\) In another report from London in early September 1979, the Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies stated that the Soviet Union was
modernizing its military arsenal to such a degree that the United States
and its allies could be left far behind. In its annual report entitled
"Military Balance," the Institute described the Soviet modernization program
as "impressive." The report said, "it will be eight to ten years before the
United States could again restore a degree of invulnerability to their land-
based current forces by, we presume, the introduction of a mobile system
which cannot be targeted by Soviet ICBMs."\(^2\)

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1. UPI dispatch, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 18/140234Z Aug 79 (U); CNO
   181106Z Aug 79 (U)
2. Associated Press dispatch, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 18/060221Z Sep 79
   (U).
SECTION II--INDIAN OCEAN-ARABIAN SEA

Early in 1979, in response to the unrest and violence in Iran and the earlier (April 1978) Soviet-supported coup in Afghanistan, Sultan Qaboos of Oman sent a letter to the President of the United States. On 5 January the Sultan informed President Carter that, in his judgment, the situation in that area had continued to deteriorate until it had reached a point which urgently required the attention of President Carter. Events to date, stated the letter, clearly indicated the development of a deliberate plan, ruthlessly pursued, by the Soviet Union to gain total dominance of the area. The "Islamic Marxism" being preached to attract support for the disorders in Iran was nothing more than a cloak for a communist crusade. Many of those posing as sincere religious leaders, stated the letter, were known communists who had been insinuated into their positions as part of a long-term and carefully prepared plan. Writing before the Shah of Iran was deposed, the Sultan noted that the forces arrayed against him were powerful and skillfully directed. If a "socialist" dictatorship could be established in Iran, the foundation of peace and stability of the area would be destroyed and the Soviet Union, which had already established a firm base in South Yemen, would have succeeded in isolating the Gulf states and gaining command of the Strait of Hormuz.¹

Citing the cordial relations, based on friendship and understanding, which had existed between Oman and the United States for over one hundred years, the Sultan called on the spirit of that friendship in his subsequent frank observations to the President. He stated that many heads of state in that area were deeply concerned at the way in which the Soviet Union had been allowed to pursue its expansionist policies unopposed in Africa and in his part of the world. The stage had been reached where not only the freedom of more millions of people was threatened, but also the stability of countries which provided vital oil supplies to the free world. It was his view, stated the Sultan, that this latter development constituted a potential threat to world peace of the gravest magnitude, a threat which became even more acute as the leaders of the Soviet Union gained dangerous confidence from the ease with which they were permitted to achieve their aims. He cited the need for firm and positive action by the United States, the absence of which would only encourage the Soviet Union to further adventures, create fatal disunity and loss of confidence in the small pro-western states of the area, and convince pro-Soviet elements and waverers that to back the Soviet Union was to be on the winning side. He concluded with his belief that, if an eventual great power military confrontation or its alternative, a capitulation to Soviet

¹. SECSTATE 3672/0600122 Jan 79 (C) GDS-1/5/85.

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ambitions in the area were to be avoided, it was essential that effective action be taken without delay.1

(U) The response by President Carter to Sultan Qaboos, if any, was not available to the historian. However, subsequent events during 1979 not only supported the Sultan’s concern, but also indicated that some action had been taken by the United States to protect its interests and those of its allies in the area. As discussed in the Operations chapter of this history, after the hostages were seized in Iran, the United States deployed two carrier task forces to the Indian Ocean area and began negotiations with the littoral nations for operating ports and air bases. As also noted in the Operations chapter, several instances of harassment by Soviet aircraft of task force ships were recorded. In one such incident on 15 May, while only the MIDWAY task force was in the Indian Ocean, two Soviet IL-38 aircraft made repeated in-bound runs on the MIDWAY. The MIDWAY was conducting flight operations en route from Mombasa to the Gulf of Aden. At the time of the incident, the MIDWAY was located 120 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia. During one pass a Soviet aircraft flew through the MIDWAY landing pattern at 500 feet with an A-7 MIDWAY aircraft escort. An A-6 MIDWAY aircraft which was in the landing pattern had to drop to 300 feet to avoid a collision. During another pass by the Soviet aircraft an F-4 had to go high in the landing pattern to avoid collision. The F-4 then had to make another landing attempt. During this incident, one of the Soviet aircraft flew from port to starboard across the MIDWAY bow during the launch cycle. The MIDWAY starboard catapult suspended launch of A-6 aircraft to prevent a possible collision. The second Soviet aircraft passed the bow approximately 30 seconds after the first aircraft, also at one-half nautical mile distance and an altitude of 500 feet.2

(U) On 9 August, an Australian press correspondent in Washington reported that the United States Department of Defense was watching "closely and with concern new deployments of Russian ships in the Indian Ocean and western Pacific." Citing Defense officials, the article discussed the docking of a Soviet nuclear submarine in the South Yemen port of Aden. The article stated that it was the first such missile-equipped vessel to put into the port, which was strategically positioned above the sea lanes which carried half of the western world’s supply of oil. While U.S. officials did not know if this signaled the start of a stronger Russian presence in Aden, according to the article, DOD spokesmen were reported as saying that it could be interpreted as further evidence of the Soviets’ endeavor to improve their strategic posture in the Horn of Africa as well as in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. Although other Russian

1. Ibid.
2. USS MIDWAY 150814Z May 79 ( ), DECL 15 May 85 and 150906Z May 79 ( ), DECL 15 May 85; CTG 77.4 150834Z May 79 ( ), DECL 15 May 85 and 150949Z May 79 ( ), DECL 15 May 85.
ships had routinely called at Aden, the arrival of the nuclear submarine, accompanied by a tender, was of greater significance.1

(U) On the weekend of 24-25 November, the USS KITTY HAWK carrier task group passed through the Strait of Malacca and into the Indian Ocean. Thus, the KITTY HAWK task group joined that of the MIDWAY, bringing the total number of U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean-Arabian Sea area to 19. At that time, there were 15 Soviet ships in the same area. By mid-December, in addition to the 15 ships of the SEVENTH Fleet, two SIXTH Fleet ships had been detached to join the Middle East Force. Thus, in addition to the 33 SIXTH Fleet ships in the Mediterranean, there were six ships in the Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf, making a total of 21 ships in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area. At the time, one syndicated writer speculated on the reasons for the comparative inaction of the Soviet Navy in the face of the largest U.S. Navy build up in the Indian Ocean since World War II. This writer noted the heavy concentration of Soviet divisions in military districts bordering Iran. These were backed by tactical air armies in the military districts to the north of Iran with a total strength of perhaps 800 fighters and spy planes. The Soviet Union, consequently, was far better prepared, stated this writer, for rapid intervention in Iran by airborne or ground forces than was the United States. Noting that the concentration of U.S. naval strength in the Indian Ocean had severely cut the normal strength of the SEVENTH Fleet in the Western Pacific, the writer postulated the possibility that the Soviets would consolidate land installations and air bases around the Vietnamese harbors at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang. The establishment of a Soviet naval squadron based permanently in those ports would increase the danger to American bases in the Philippines in the event of war and complicate the defensive mission of China's South Seas Fleet. A second Soviet tactic, stated this writer, would be for the Soviet Navy to increase deployments in the area from the Kamchatka Peninsula south to the Philippine Sea.2

(U) On 17 December 1979 a joint State/Defense team headed by Reginald Bartholomew, Director for Political-Military Affairs at State and Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East departed Washington on a trip to Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kenya and Somalia. The visits to Oman, Kenya and Somalia were to explore increased access by the United States to existing base and port facilities in those countries. The trip to Saudi Arabia, ostensibly to inform that country of the negotiations impending with

1. USICA Canberra 0922272 Aug 79 (U).
the other three countries, had the overt affect of implicating Saudi Arabia in those negotiations. The visit to Saudi Arabia by the U.S. delegation, for whatever purpose, reportedly angered the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (see Chapter XI chronology).¹

(U) In spite of the massive U.S. Naval strength assembled in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas, and in spite of the publicized U.S. move to establish operating bases along the Indian Ocean littoral, on 25 December 1979 the Soviet Union began a massive airlift of troops and equipment into Afghanistan. The invasion was immediately labeled by State Department officials and President Carter himself as blatant military interference and a grave threat to peace. Some of the world press immediately noted the contrast between the so far non-violent response by the United States to the kidnapping of U.S. Embassy personnel in Iran and the bald power play by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. On 28 December a State Department spokesman said that the United States, "on a number of occasions has made clear its concerns to the Soviet Union regarding its involvement in Afghanistan and we are protesting their involvement and role in the most recent events there." As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet troops were within striking distance of Iran's eastern, and least defensible, frontier. The Soviet presence also raised the threshold of danger for Pakistan, and Soviet possession of airfields in Afghanistan would decrease chances of surprise in any military move in Iran. Operating in conjunction with Soviet fighters based in South Yemen, Soviet planes in Afghanistan could more than balance fighters and attack bombers on the two American aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean. Soviet aircraft based in southwestern Afghanistan would be closer to sea routes through the Arabian Sea and the exit from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz than they would be if they were at Tehran.²

¹. SECDEF 2975/190118Z Dec 79 (U).
SECTION III--SOUTHEAST ASIA

The SRV Threat

(U) On 25 December 1978 the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) invaded Cambodia (Kampuchea). By 7 January 1979 the SRV had captured the capital city of Phnom Penh and Kompong Som in Kampuchea. There were reports that the People's Republic of China (PRC) was building up its forces on the SRV border, while a new Kampuchean government was established with Heng Samrin as Prime Minister.¹

(U) On 10 January, a newspaper in Canberra, Australia provided an example of the kind of speculation prompted by the SRV invasion of Kampuchea in places far removed from Southeast Asia. The paper touched on the "proxy war" theory, but considered that suggestions that the SRV-Khmer war was a "proxy" struggle between the Soviet Union and China were enticing but had too little basis in known fact to be accepted uncritically. More probably, stated the newspaper, the conflict between the two one-time communist allies in Indochina was inevitable--and Moscow, with characteristic opportunism, had cashed in through its recent pact with Vietnam. The article also stated that, if Vietnam showed evidence of further aggressive intent, it should be resisted at all cost, and that, above all, the integrity and independence of Thailand must be preserved. At the same time, another newspaper in Australia, this time in Sydney, editorialized that the immediate impact of a Vietnamese victory in Kampuchea was regional, with shock waves strongest in Bangkok and Peking. However, stated the editorial, the significance of this violent disturbance of the balance of power in Southeast Asia should command concern much further abroad, above all in the West. The Vietnamese invasion, stated the newspaper, was not an isolated or unprecedented upheaval--Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and Kampuchea--all had seen the enlargement, by violent means, of Soviet power and influence. The paper stated that there was some small comfort for Peking in the Kampuchea debacle, because it corroborated Chinese gospel that Moscow was actively pursuing expansionist ambitions under the cover of detente. Although conceding that this "fantastic" PRC view was over-simplified and self-serving, the Chinese were right on one point: it was high time that the West began to view detente more skeptically.²

¹ See Chronology, Chapter XI.
² USICA Canberra 1004542 Jan 79 (U) and 1004582 Jan 79 (U).
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as their most immediate security threat. Fear of the SRV remained strong, both of a conventional invasion sometime in the future and a Vietnamese take over of the communist insurgency within Thailand.¹

(§) The Vietnamese campaign against the remnants of the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea continued throughout the year. In mid-year, a Japanese newspaper and radio Beijing both quoted a Thai English-language newspaper to the effect that facilities at Kompong Som in Kampuchea were being reworked to accept Russian Pacific Fleet ships. Another Japanese newspaper cited Thai military intelligence sources as saying that the Soviets had moved a group of MIG-19s to a place near Kompong Som in June 1979. A wire service report from Bangkok in September 1979 stated that Vietnam had beefed up its forces in Kampuchea to 20 divisions in preparation for renewed offensives after the rainy season. The propaganda radio of the ousted Khmer Rouge government claimed there were more than 200,000 Vietnamese soldiers in Kampuchea, recently reinforced with 20 more Soviet-built tanks and hundreds of anti-aircraft guns. During a press conference, a Thai military spokesman stated that the 20 Vietnamese divisions were supported by 3 divisions of pro-Hanoi Kampuchean troops and opposed by 8 divisions of Khmer Rouge guerrillas. At the same time, an unidentified source had reported to Australian officials that 20 Vietnamese divisions were in Kampuchea, that they had been reinforced by 20,000 men and 60 tanks in July, and that Vietnamese forces in Laos numbered approximately 40,000. This source also alleged that MIG-21s in Laos were being flown by Russian pilots.²

(U) Tensions on the border between Thailand and Kampuchea mounted through the year, with each side accusing the other of violating the border. According to the Bangkok Post, SRV-led forces crossed into Thai territory in hot pursuit of fleeing Khmer Rouge troops on 12 November. Citing a senior Thai naval officer as its source, the article stated that the intrusion was approximately one kilometer and that the intruders retreated after being fired on by Thai artillery. On the other hand, Kampuchean radio on 16 November accused the Thai of increasing armed provocations consisting of reconnaissance aircraft and jet fighters along the Kampuchean border, sometimes intruding up to 22 kilometers. Thai artillery also shelled Kampuchean territory, and Thai commanders crossed the border for operations. On 17 November a 35-man Thai detachment was sent to patrol the Kampuchean border in preparation for a United Nations Fact-Finding Team visit. The patrol was fired on by rifles, mortars and grenade launchers.

2. COMUS Japan 080550Z Aug 79 (U) and 100736Z Jul 79 (U); UPI dispatch, date-line Bangkok, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 72/202020Z Sep 79 (U); IPAC Chronology, Sep 79 (§)(EX), REVW 30 Sep 99.
The Thai called in artillery and grenade launchers and returned the fire until the opposing force withdrew. The engagement lasted approximately one hour and fifteen minutes.1

( migraine) According to press releases in Bangkok, Thai armed forces reported that, from 1-23 November, foreign troops intruded into the Thai border area on 9 occasions, killing 4 Thai soldiers and 21 Thai inhabitants or Kampuchean refugees in 13 incidents of shelling by foreign troops. On 13 December Admiral Long (CINCPAC) informed General Jones, Chairman of the JCS, of his continuing concern with the increasing instability along the Thai-Kampuchean border as a result of the SRV offensive against the Khmer Rouge forces. Admiral Long stated that the enormous refugee problem, competing anti-SRV factions operating in the border region, and the forward deployment of both Thai and SRV forces along the border created a potentially explosive threat to the security of Thailand. Commenting on the appropriate role for the United States in that situation, Admiral Long stated his full support of current and additional initiatives to provide military equipment and material to Thailand on an accelerated basis, as discussed in other chapters of this history. Admiral Long recommended intensified efforts to relieve Thailand of the burden imposed by the massive flow of refugees from Kampuchea. And finally, Admiral Long recommended strong U.S. diplomatic and political support in international forums demanding the withdrawal of SRV forces from Kampuchea. Admiral Long noted that military involvement by U.S. combat forces should be considered only as a last resort, if all other measures failed to prevent a serious SRV threat to Thailand's security. Admiral Long concluded that strong and positive U.S. Government support for Thailand now, without resort to military action, might preclude a situation where Thailand's security was so gravely threatened that U.S. military intervention became necessary.2

The PRC-SRV-Soviet Union Triangle

( migraine) China attacked Vietnam on 17 February 1979, announced its withdrawal on 5 March and completed the withdrawal on 16 March. Prior to the Chinese offensive, there were reports of disagreements in the Chinese leadership over Indochina. In January high-level Chinese remarks on Indochina and on the foreign threat to China contained ambiguities which suggested that some leaders were willing to go further than others in supporting Kampuchea. The differences seemed significant in the light of contradictory PRC media treatment of the threat to China. A late December 1978 Communist party communique made an

1. IPAC Chronology Nov 79 (S/NF), REVW 30 Nov 99.
2. IPAC Chronology Dec 79 (S/NF), REVW 31 Dec 99; CINCPAC 132315Z Dec 79, Admiral Long to General Jones, (S)(BOM), DECL 11 Dec 85.
unusual reference to the need to strengthen national defense in order to repulse "at any moment" aggressors from "any direction," thus implying that China was faced with a serious threat in the South. On the other hand, PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping spoke of Vietnamese "small hegemonism" as merely "making trouble," and pointedly declared that the threat to peace and the possibility of aggression came only "from the North." By early February, however, Deng had apparently changed his point of view. After his visit to the United States in February 1979, Deng visited Japan. The U.S. Embassy in Japan reported that Deng denounced Soviet hegemony and explained why he thought China should take action against the "Cuba of the East." He described Vietnam as a mere instrument of the Soviets, and stated that the Soviet goal was to gain influence in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific which would ultimately converge in the Strait of Malacca. Deng said that the United States and Western Europe had not given Cuba any lessons thus far, but that China would take punitive action against Vietnam in response to its aggression and, in so doing, restrain the Soviets in Asia.\textsuperscript{1}

(U) Just before the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, Japanese newspapers cited JDA sources for the information that China had deployed several hundred jet fighters to the border area near Vietnam, that Russian warships had begun movements in the South China Sea, and that the USS CONSTITUTION of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet was watching the Soviet vessels. On 11 February Japanese papers cited U.S. Naval Forces Japan sources for the information that two SEVENTH Fleet aircraft carriers, the MIDWAY and CONSTITUTION, had been deployed to the South China Sea about 1,200 kilometers from the Gulf of Tonkin. It was speculated that the deployment might be related to the situation in the Sino-Vietnam border area and the moves of the Russian warships.\textsuperscript{2}

(TS/NOFORN) On the day following the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, a U.S. agency reported that two TU-95 BEAR Soviet reconnaissance aircraft had conducted an unprecedented flight to the South China Sea. They were located in an area east of Hainan Island, where they operated for approximately one hour. This was the same area where a Russian cruiser was operating, which raised the possibility of mutual operations.\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{itemize}
  \item 1. IPAC Point Paper 11 May 79 (S), DECL 11 May 85, Subj: International Reaction to SRV/PRC War; SECSTATE RCI 2506/251536Z Jan 79 (S)(BOM), REW 1/25/99; AMEMB Tokyo 2308 of Dec 79, transmitted by SECSTATE 33346/081903Z Feb 79 (S)(EX) XDS-1, 2/8/99.
  \item 2. COMUS Japan 090655Z Feb 79 (U) and 132316Z Feb 79 (U).
  \item 3. FOSIC PAC Pearl Harbor 181021Z Feb 79 (SYNF), DECL 18 Feb 87.
\end{itemize}
On 18 and 19 February, following the PRC invasion, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow attempted to assess the reaction of the Soviet Union to the Chinese attack. The tentative conclusion was that, in addition to propaganda and calls for international action against the PRC, the Soviet Union would provide increased assistance to Vietnam, both economic and military, including additional personnel and materiel. The Embassy assessment was that, in spite of considerations of prestige and of the Soviet image as a super power which could steadfastly support its friends, direct military action was unlikely. However, the Embassy expected the Soviets to move additional units to the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin.1

On 21 February a press dispatch from Tokyo quoted JDA sources for the information that two Soviet warships were traveling southward through the Japan Sea and two Soviet BEAR reconnaissance planes were also sighted flying northward near Okinawa Island. The same news service reported from Bangkok that China had moved another infantry division across the SRV border toward the provincial capital of Lang Son, 12 miles inside the border between the SRV and the PRC. At the same time, thousands of Vietnamese troops had been seen on roads north to Lang Son by French and Japanese reporters at the scene.2

On 22 February the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard Holbrooke, told a conference of editors and broadcasters at the State Department that a Soviet base at Cam Ranh Bay, a former U.S. facility, would be viewed with "considerable concern." Holbrooke stated that if the Soviets used the Chinese military activity in Vietnam as a lever to establish a naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, the "impact would be very unfortunate on the strategic balance in Southeast Asia." Referring to the visit by Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping to Washington in late January, and to Deng's comment that China would "punish" Vietnam for its aggressive actions, Holbrooke stated that President Carter had made it absolutely clear to Deng that the United States would not support Chinese military action against Vietnam. However, Holbrooke said, as had the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, that the Soviet Union would attempt to portray the invasion as a form of Chinese-American collusion.3

On 28 February CINCPAC provided an assessment of the potential for hostilities between the naval forces of the PRC and the Soviet Union in the South China Sea. As both countries increased their activities in the South

1. AMEMB Moscow 4025/181655Z Feb 79 (S), RDS-2, 2/18/99 and 4027/192042Z Feb 79 (S), RDS-2, 2/19/99.
2. UPI dispatch, dateline Tokyo and Bangkok, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 33/212001Z Feb 79 (U).
3. MSG, USICA Diplomatic Correspondent, dateline Washington, 22 Feb 79 (U).
China Sea, the potential for deliberate or inadvertent conflict also increased, stated CINCPAC. CINCPAC noted that the Soviet Union had demonstrated a willingness to use "incidents at sea," such as bumping, ramming, and harassing maneuvers, to exploit maritime encounters for its own interests. Noting the relative inexperience of the PRC Navy in open-ocean encounters and use of harassing maneuvers, CINCPAC stated that such maneuvers could be reacted to with force by the PRC. Additionally, the potential for accidental conflict due to a misunderstanding in a period of heightened tension; i.e., thinking that flashing light signals were flashes of gunfire, could lead to a potential second "Gulf of Tonkin" incident.1

Coinciding with the date announced by the PRC for completion of their withdrawal (16 March 1979), the American Embassy in Bangkok provided an assessment of the impact of the Chinese invasion on Thailand. The Embassy assessment noted that perceptions had changed rapidly during the previous two months. Chinese stock in Thailand went way down when Vietnam quickly overran China's clients in Kampuchea and moved forces to the Thai border. After the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, however, Chinese shares rose to an all-time high, according to the Embassy. The Thai leadership and a broad segment of Thai society were elated over the Chinese action. The Thai considered Vietnam to be their most immediate security threat, although some worried about a long-term Chinese threat. Thai attitudes toward the Soviets were somewhat mixed. Up to the Chinese attack on the SRV, the Soviets had won grudging admiration in Thailand for their willingness to underwrite the SRV invasion of Kampuchea. This appeared to have changed somewhat because of a perceived ineffectual response to the Chinese attack on the Soviet treaty ally. The Thai were concerned that recent events would further the Soviet-Vietnamese expansion into the region. They were also concerned that Indochina was being dragged further into the Sino-Soviet rivalry, but their fear of the Vietnamese overroad such considerations. The Embassy considered that the Thai desired to preserve the essence of close, strong ties with the United States. On the other hand, for concrete action to deal with the Indochinese situation, they were looking more toward Beijing.2

(U) By mid-May a Soviet official was reported to have confirmed indirectly that Soviet warships were calling at Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay. A Soviet official was quoted as saying that, "it is our obligation under the Soviet-Vietnam peace and friendship treaty signed last year to use Cam Ranh Bay." A press report from Washington stated that "U.S. intelligence" had discovered that the Soviet Union was installing an electronic eavesdropping station at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. According to this press report, the Soviet listening post, called a

1. CINCPAC 180116Z Feb 79 (CONF), REVW 27 Feb 85.
2. AMEMB Bangkok 9024/160936Z Mar 79 (EX), XDS-1, 3/15/99.
signals intelligence station, was discovered recently by U.S. Intelligence and was believed ready to begin operations. At the same time, another press report from Washington stated that, if the Soviet Union's growing use of military air and naval bases in Vietnam turned into a permanent presence there, it would profoundly disturb the United States, Japan, and China. A State Department official, in prepared testimony before Congress, said that, "the continuing conflict in Indochina threatens the peace and stability of the entire region and increases the risk of great power involvement." Roger Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, said that Vietnam's "close alignment" with the Soviet Union had already resulted in, "extended calls by Soviet naval vessels at Vietnamese ports and Soviet operation of aircraft from Vietnamese fields."  

(U) Noting that the Soviet Union had acknowledged its use of Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, an editorial in a Honolulu newspaper stated that this was an ominous development for Southeast Asia because the growing Soviet Pacific Fleet would have another operating base, and its first in the Southeast Asia area. This had disturbing implications not only for the United States, but also for Japan and China. Although the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet had dominated the China Sea since the end of World War II, far more was at stake than just national prestige. The editor cited Japan's oil lifeline, the security of South Korea, the Sino-Soviet rivalry, the conflict between China and Vietnam, and the stability of the ASEAN bloc.  

(UC) The editor's mention of the security of South Korea was not only accurate, but recognized by the South Korean leadership. During extensive conversations regarding the threat from North Korea between President Park of South Korea and General Vessey, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, Park discussed naval strategy in the Pacific. He showed considerable concern about the growing power of the Soviet Navy in the Far East, including the Soviet use of Cam Ranh Bay and Danang, and even greater concern about the danger that the Russians might turn the East China Sea into a Soviet rather than an American area of naval influence. Park stated that detente was working when the spheres of influence of the United States and Soviet Union were clearly defined, and when neither ventured into the other's sphere of influence or into areas of the world not included in either's sphere of influence. When those conditions did not prevail, Park stated, detente was in danger and the whole world was in danger. That, he stated, was why he and many other Asian leaders were concerned about the Soviet use of the former U.S. bases in Vietnam.  

1. UPI dispatches, datelines Washington and Tokyo, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 28/131840Z May 79 (U) and 70/152200Z May 79 (U).  
3. CINCUNC 050900Z Jun 79 (EX), DECL 5 Jun 89.
The concern of South Korea regarding the Soviet naval buildup in the South China Sea was shared by Japan. The September deployment of two Soviet cruisers, two destroyers and two oilers to the South China Sea had triggered concern in Japan that an increased Soviet naval presence in the region was a prelude to wider armed conflict in Southeast Asia. Tokyo viewed the Soviet naval buildup in the South China Sea as Soviet posturing to dissuade China from making a second strike at Vietnam. There were also some Japanese officials who believed that the increasing numbers of Soviet warships in the South China Sea was a natural result of very desirable port facilities in the SRV and not directly connected with the prospect of PRC-SRV armed conflict. Nevertheless, Tokyo considered the increasing Soviet naval presence in the South China Sea to support the Chinese concern about Soviet encirclement.¹

It was about this time (September 1979) that the State Department provided Embassies in Southeast Asia with background material and talking points to be used in discussing Soviet requests for port visits to the Southeast Asian nations of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. As part of this background, the State Department noted that Soviet involvement in Indochina was not new. Moscow had been one of Hanoi's principal sources of arms, and during U.S. operations in Vietnam, Soviet intelligence ships had operated off the coast of Vietnam gathering information on U.S. operations. What was new was the availability of Vietnamese ports for ship visits by Soviet combatants, and Soviet access to Vietnamese air and naval facilities. Reviewing the Soviet use of SRV facilities, State noted that it began in late February 1979 when the first of two tank landing ships entered Danang to shuttle cargo for the SRV. Soviet naval auxiliaries followed in March and the first Soviet combatant--a guided missile destroyer--entered Danang on 1 April. Since that time, there had been additional ship visits including submarines. Soviet access to Vietnamese airfields also began in February when the Soviet Union began its airlift of military supplies to the SRV. This was followed by the loan of some AN-12 transports to the Vietnamese to shuttle cargo and personnel throughout Indochina. The first Soviet operational use of a Vietnamese airfield occurred on 11 April, when a pair of TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft landed at Danang and later conducted ocean reconnaissance missions.²

The foregoing State Department information was provided to the Embassies for possible release to their host countries. It was confirmed on an official basis by an IPAC paper on the subject. IPAC also noted that Soviet naval ships had called at four Vietnamese ports: Haiphong, Danang, Cam Ranh

1. USDAO Singapore 9837/2507517 Sep 79 (SKNF), REVW 24 Sep 99.
2. SECSTATE 238554/112158Z Sep 79 (S)(EX), RDS-2, 9/10/85.
Bay and Ho Chi Minh City. Through 5 November 1979, a total of 28 Soviet ships had called at Vietnamese ports for an estimated total of 626 days in port. At that time (November 1979) IPAC also noted that tensions along the Sino-Vietnamese border remained high and border incidents continued. Since a buildup in March-June 1979, Vietnamese army strength along the border remained at approximately 200,000. Chinese strength had been reduced from an estimated high during the invasion of 400,000-450,000 to about 250,000. IPAC also estimated that there were approximately 45-50,000 Vietnamese army troops in Laos. Despite second lesson statements by some Chinese officials, insufficient evidence existed to suggest another Chinese attack in the near future. At the same time, the SRV had stepped-up its operations in Kampuchea, where Vietnamese army strength was estimated to be 175,000-200,000. Although shallow penetration by SRV forces across the Thai border in hot pursuit of Kampuchean troops took place, no major cross-border operation was expected. IPAC also noted that there were up to 5,000 Soviet advisers in Vietnam, primarily engaged in civilian projects, especially in transportation projects. On five occasions since March of 1979, two Soviet reconnaissance aircraft had deployed to Danang. Also, 12 AN-12 aircraft with Soviet air and ground crews had supported Vietnamese army operations since early in March 1979.1

During a meeting of the ASEAN Chiefs of Mission in Manila on 24-25 October 1979, the consensus report noted that grave dangers beset the region. Tension between Vietnam and Thailand on the Kampuchean border was high and accelerating. Border clashes occurred and, while both sides were acting with restraint, emotions were building up. Miscalculation was an ever-present danger and large-scale conflict could not be ruled out. Chinese pressures on Vietnam could erupt into an even larger-scale armed conflict at any time. In that event, though unlikely, Soviet intervention on behalf of Vietnam could set off a chain of disastrous consequences extending far beyond the region. However, both the United States Chiefs of Mission and ASEAN officials shared the assessment that, at least for the time being, the Vietnamese did not intend to follow-up the conquest of Kampuchea with an attack on Thailand. Regarding Soviet activities in the region, the Ambassadors noted that the major Soviet fleet buildup in the region was a matter of concern. However, they reported, the extension of Soviet naval power had not been accompanied by any increase in Soviet influence in the area. For most of the ASEAN nations, China remained a long-term threat. The Ambassadors believed that unrelenting hostility toward Vietnam would be the centerpiece of Chinese policy toward the region for at least the next few years. About one month later, on 28 November, the press cited anonymous authorities in Washington for the information that the Soviet

1. IPAC Point Paper, 5 Nov 79 (S), REVW 5 Nov 85, Subj: Soviet Naval Ship Visits to Vietnam; IPAC Point Paper, 6 Nov 79 (S), DECL 6 Nov 85, Subj: Current Situation in Indochina.
Navy had doubled its activities in Asian waters coinciding with the deployment of U.S. Pacific Fleet ships to the Indian Ocean. The sources reportedly confirmed that Soviet navy ships had visited Vietnamese ports more than 60 times since the beginning of the year.¹

¹ Perhaps the most authoritative statement to emerge concerning the threat in Southeast Asia was provided to CINCPAC by CINCPACFLT in mid-December 1979. CINCPACFLT stated that the increased Soviet presence in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea had strategic implications that must be recognized and possible courses of action to neutralize it considered. Otherwise, the United States could be faced with a permanent significant detrimental change in the strategic situation. The Soviet military activity evolving in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea was in consonance with the established modus operandi of the Soviet Union. Significant increases in forces and port visits, dramatic increases in military and military-associated cargo delivered in the area, out of area deployments to Danang by reconnaissance aircraft, South China Sea submarine operations and port visits, the installation of a radar site near Cam Ranh Bay, and general improvements in the Soviet Pacific force capability were conclusive evidence of Soviet intentions in Southeast Asia. The potential consequences of this change in the strategic situation, stated CINCPACFLT, were of great significance and warranted the highest level of consideration.²

¹ AMEMB Manila 21721/140907Z Nov 79 (TS)(EX), RDS-1, 11/6/99; COMUS Japan 300643Z Nov 79 (U).
² CINCPACFLT 200045Z Dec 79 (TS), REVW 22 Mar 99.
SECTION IV--THE WESTERN PACIFIC THREAT

CINCPAC Projection

As early as April 1979, CINCPAC reviewed the destabilizing events within and among the nations of the Indian Ocean littoral and the need for an increased U.S. naval presence to protect vital U.S. and allied interests and to signal the U.S. commitment in the area. At the same time, there was heightened tension and conflict in Southeast Asia, an increasingly apparent threat of North Korean aggression, and an absolute necessity to reassure Asian allies in the face of an expanding Soviet military presence and capability in the Western Pacific. The Soviet Pacific Fleet had evolved into a major maritime force with an increasingly active and effective means of projecting Soviet influence.1

CINCPAC anticipated a dramatic upgrading of the Soviet Pacific Fleet force composition over the next five years in all areas of combat capability. When, as expected, the MINSK aircraft carrier and the BACKFIRE bomber were added to Soviet naval air power in the Pacific, a new dimension would be added. There would be an increased threat to U.S. forces and to economic and military shipping in the event of active hostilities, and the Soviet Navy would be able to project the image of a force of ever-increasing strength and influence. If, as CINCPAC believed was probable, the Soviet Navy gained permanent access to support facilities in Vietnam, its capability for maritime surveillance and sustained operations throughout Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean would be vastly improved.2

On 30 June a Japanese newspaper reported that on 29 June the MINSK had passed north through the narrowest part of the Tsushima Strait to enter the Sea of Japan. Accompanying were the IVAN ROGOV and cruiser PETROPAVLOVSK. The MINSK and the ROGOV arrived at Vladivostok on 3 July. The PETROPAVLOVSK arrived the day before. Although the task group had entered the Sea of Japan on 29 June (during the economic summit conference in Tokyo attended by President Carter), only the guided missile cruiser made a direct transit to Vladivostok. The MINSK remained in the southern portion of the Sea of Japan, probably to participate in an anti-submarine warfare exercise on 1 and 2 July before proceeding to Vladivostok.3

1. CINCPAC 142209Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 13 Apr 85.
2. Ibid.
Soviet Forces

The Soviet Pacific Fleet presence in the Pacific was concentrated at Vladivostok and Petropavlusk. At the end of 1979, the Soviet Pacific Fleet included 75 major surface combatants and 21 amphibious units. There were 113 submarines, 58 of which were nuclear-powered. While the totals were slowly increasing, the qualitative improvements were more significant. These increased capabilities were particularly apparent in the antiship cruise missiles and the large inventory of nuclear-powered submarines. Regularly observed naval activity included in-area operations of surface and sub-surface units near Vladivostok and Petropavlusk. The Soviets conducted oceanographic research throughout the Pacific Ocean, as well as the East China, Philippine and Arabian Seas. They also conducted intelligence collection patrols off Guam, Kwajalein in the East China Sea, intermittently off Diego Garcia, in the Hormuz Strait, and occasionally off the west coast of the United States.

1. IPAC Point Paper, 5 Nov 79 (S), Subj: Soviet Military Activities in the Pacific Ocean, REVW 5 Nov 85.
2. Ibid.
1. ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 92/162331Z May 79 (TS), DECL 16 May 85; CINCPAC 232309Z Jun 79 (TS), DECL 1 Jun 85.

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SECTION V--THE THREAT TO JAPAN

The Overall Threat

(U) As perceived by Japan, and particularly after the normalization of diplomatic relations between PRC and the United States, the major threat was from the Soviet Union. In April 1979 Prime Minister Ohira, just before a visit to Washington, reportedly stated that Japan must increase its military strength to counter a Soviet arms buildup in Asia. He also reportedly stated that, whether the Soviet buildup was offensive or defensive, it was a development which Japan could not ignore. Ohira's remarks were made in response to questions on the movement of a Soviet aircraft carrier into the Indian Ocean, reports of Soviet planes and ships being sent to Vietnam, and the stationing of Russian BACKFIRE bombers in Siberia. The following months, during a press interview, Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director General Yamashita stated that effective operation of the joint Japan-U.S. security system and full Japanese defense efforts were necessary in order to cope with Russian military reinforcements in the Far East. He said that Russian military reinforcements in recent years had been remarkable, with special mention of the assignment to the Far East of the combat landing ship ROGOV and the aircraft carrier MINSK.1

(U) In the same month, according to Japanese press translations provided by COMUS Japan to CINCPAC, Yamashita denied that the JDA had requested the assignment of another U.S. aircraft carrier to Japanese waters. These statements and trial balloons were meant to condition the Japanese people to an ever-increasing acceptance of the need for Japan to devote more resources to its own defense. For example, a Japanese newspaper commentary on the increased Russian military deployments to the Far East said that it was not wise for the Japanese to be flurried, in disregard of the overall East-West military balance, because of the increased military capabilities of the Soviet Union. Japan should not lose its calmness in estimating the Russian military reinforcements, especially because the Soviet Union was good at "bluff diplomacy" to overawe others through the show of military strength. Nevertheless, stated this commentary, it was to be hoped that the leaders of Japan and the United States would study the most effective operation of the joint security system in order to meet the situation where the Soviet Union had out-stripped the United States quantitatively in the area of naval force.2

1. AP dispatch, dateline Tokyo, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 66/200232Z Apr 79 (U).
2. ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 172/212149Z May 79 (U); COMUS Japan 150550Z May 79 (U) and 032310Z Jun 79 (U).
Following a visit to Washington in June, the Director of the Joint Staff Council, General Takashina, visited Hawaii from 8-20 June. He expressed the need for a common U.S.-Japan perception of the Soviet threat to Japan and considered the time to be appropriate to address the relative weight of the Soviet threat in Asia and Europe. He agreed with U.S. and Western perceptions of the importance of Europe, but believed there was a stand-off between Soviet and NATO forces in Europe while the Soviets expanded into areas of greater fluidity such as Asia and Africa. He also stated that the United States should increase the Pacific carrier force to seven. In his judgment, the Soviet fleet was hampered by straits to the north and south of Hokkaido. Therefore, the Soviets would want Hokkaido and the threat assessment and military planning should take that into account. He did not concur that, if the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) were to be strengthened, maritime and air defense forces should be emphasized at the expense of ground forces.¹

In mid-May 1979 the DIA offered a commentary on tri-service Japanese maneuvers which were underway from 24-29 May. The maneuvers, which emphasized a possible attack on Japan's northern area, included 14,000 personnel, 90 aircraft, 10 ships and 450 military land vehicles, including tanks. The training was meant to emphasize the importance of rapid tactical transport to reinforce the northern area, coordinate the air defense between the air forces and the ground forces, and to consolidate the defense of the Tsugaru Strait.

The DIA advisory proved to be prophetic regarding the annual JDA Defense White Paper. COMUS Japan reported that all Japanese newspapers featured the JDA fiscal year 1979 White Paper, authorized by the Cabinet for release on 24 July 1979. The White Paper emphasized, among other things, the Soviet military buildup in the Far East during the past year to an extent where the Soviets were now "on a par" with the United States militarily in Northeast Asia. Most papers, according to COMUS Japan, commented critically on the

1. CINCPAC 1204012 Jun 79 (CONF), DECL 30 Jun 85.
2. DIA 2005/250236Z May 79 (CONF), DECL 24 May 85.
White Paper, stating that it over-emphasized the Soviet military threat without a precise assessment of the reality or a presentation of concrete Japanese remedial plans to set the people at ease. The U.S. Embassy observed that the White Paper appeared to be designed primarily for domestic consumption as a means of moving public opinion toward a more supportive consensus on national security policy. The major features of the White Paper, according to the Embassy analysis, were heightened emphasis on the potential Soviet threat, reaffirmation of current defense policies, and reassurances that the nation's defense policies were and would remain consistent with the constitution and public opinion. The principal weakness of the White Paper, according to the Embassy, appeared to be its failure to consider adequately the economic factors and the total joint strength against the Soviet Union.1

The Embassy noted that media reaction had been generally critical, with most papers stating that the JDA had focused excessively on the Soviet threat without setting forth long-term counter measures. Almost all papers carried editorials suggesting that the White Paper over-played the Soviet military buildup without sufficiently addressing economic and diplomatic factors in its analysis of national power. One paper thought it puzzling that the White Paper emphasized the "crisis" regarding the Soviet buildup, yet did not call for major reexamination of present defense plans. Another newspaper considered the White Paper deficient by not spelling out longer-term measures needed to counter the Soviet threat. The Embassy also noted that Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officials offered some predictable criticism of the White Paper, suggesting that the JDA had learned only too well the lesson that heightened threat perception leads to a smoother defense budget passage. The MOFA officials also thought the paper over-stated the Soviet threat and underestimated the overall strength of Japan and the western nations.2

1. COMUS Japan 250630Z Jul 79 (U); AMEMB Tokyo 13306/260805Z Jul 79 (U), GDS 7/26/85.
2. Ibid.
He requested the immediate forwarding of relevant studies by government agencies which could be made available to give the U.S. side of the picture. He also requested high-level speakers to be designated to address the U.S. strategic posture in Asia with top-level Singapore officials. He also suggested to CINCPAC that the scheduled visit of the SEVENTH Fleet Commander to Singapore would provide an ideal—"and unavoidable"—opportunity to discuss the issues raised by the White Paper with the entire spectrum of military and foreign affairs officials.1

In reply, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo stated disagreement with the Singapore message. The Embassy did not believe that the White Paper raised obvious problems for fundamental U.S. interests in Asia, nor did it call into question the credibility of U.S. military capabilities in the region. The Embassy conceded that the Paper did place considerable emphasis on the Soviet threat, and perhaps underestimated the overall strength of friendly and allied nations in its assessment of the military balance. However, the Paper did not, in the view of the Embassy, reflect a loss of confidence in the U.S. commitment or capabilities, and had not been so interpreted by Japanese commentators. The Embassy concluded that, while a more balanced analysis of the Asian security environment might have been possible, the Paper was basically sound and well-suited to its specific political and bureaucratic purposes—to enhance public understanding of Japanese defense requirements and to provide the rationale for gradual and moderate improvements in JSDF capabilities. These objectives, stated the Embassy, were very much in keeping with U.S. interests; the Embassy could find nothing alarming in the Paper and saw no need to mount a campaign to counter it.2

1. AMEMB Singapore 7855/250914Z Jul 79 (C), DECL 25 Jul 85.  
2. AMEMB Tokyo 13285/260725Z Jul 79 (C), GDS-7/26/85.
(U) On 11 August JDA Director General Yamashita paid a courtesy call on Admiral Weisner, CINCPAC, on his way to the United States and Europe. Mixed signals emerged during media reports of Yamashita's discussions with Weisner. Japanese newspapers reported that Weisner had told Yamashita that the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet was not taking any special precautionary steps because of the newly-assigned Soviet Navy ships (aircraft carrier MINISK and landing assault ship ROGON) in the Far East. This was interpreted as a U.S. military view that the additional deployment of the MINISK and other Soviet military elements had not caused a major change to the U.S.-Soviet sea power balance in the Pacific. The newspaper commented that this Pacific Command presentation of the American assessment of the Soviet military buildup in the Far East differed somewhat from that of Japan as indicated in the recently published JDA White Paper on national defense. On the other hand, as reported by news media in Honolulu, after a day of consultation with CINCPAC, Yamashita said he saw no reason for alarm over Russia's show of power in the Middle East and the Pacific. He said that he saw no indication that American military strength in the Pacific had weakened. "Japan does not consider this intensified presence with any alarm," he said, "it is a fact that the Soviet naval presence has increased, and we are aware of that and ought to recognize it as a fact. But the intensification of forces present in an area did not constitute a threat." Referring to the balance between U.S. and Soviet Union forces, Yamashita was quoted as saying that, "there can be many terms of reference. On one hand it is true that the Soviet presence in some areas has intensified, but the balance is not necessarily broken." 2

1. AMEMB Singapore 8206/060042Z Aug 79 (U), GDS-8/6/85; COMUS Japan 262318Z Jul 79 (U)
2. COMUS Japan 130640Z Aug 79 (U); UPI dispatch and Honolulu Advertiser, dateline Honolulu, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 18/140234Z Aug 79 (U).
The "Northern Territory" Threat

(C/N/O/N) A dispute over the "northern territory" was a major issue blocking the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese post-World War II peace treaty. The dispute involved a group of small islands north of Hokkaido. These were the Habomai Group, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu. The argument depended in part on the question of whether some or all of the disputed islands formed a part of the Kuril chain geographically and historically.

The Soviet Union claimed that the disputed islands were an integral part of the Kuril chain, and that the issue was therefore closed.²

(5) Initial reports of the Soviet buildup in the Kuril Islands were received in May 1978. A DIA assessment was that the Soviet ground, air, and naval forces deployed on the Kuril Islands could be described as token assets and were essentially defensive in nature. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union attached strategic, political, and economic importance to the islands. They served as a defensive barrier to maritime approaches to the Soviet Far East and insured naval access from the Sea of Okhotsk to the Pacific.³

2. IPAC Point Paper, 8 Jan 80 (C/H/E), DECL 20 Mar 85.
(U) The dispute flared again on 29 January 1979, when JDA sources revealed that the Soviet Union had assigned several thousand ground troops with tanks, big guns, and surface-to-air missiles on Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. According to the Japanese media, the JDA sources had also disclosed that construction of a radar site by the Russians on Kunashiri had been confirmed. The JDA sources reportedly foresaw that the Soviets would begin to construct air bases on the two islands. This was because, according to the JDA sources, the Soviet Union had deployed nuclear submarines equipped with strategic missiles capable of striking New York and Washington without leaving the Sea of Okhotsk. Therefore, the Russian Navy was building a strategic nuclear base aimed at the United States and airbases would be needed for air defense, anti-submarine patrol, and reconnaissance to protect the Sea of Okhotsk. Therefore, according to the JDA sources, the base construction on Kunashiri and Etorofu did not mean an immediate increase in the "menace of Russian attack on this country."

(U) On 30 January JDA Director General Yamashita stated, during a press conference, that his agency planned to approach the Soviet military buildup on the two northern islands calmly for the time being and would not take any particular steps to cope with it, such as the movement of JSDF troops. On the same day at a different news conference, the Chief of Staff of the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) stated his belief that the Soviet buildup on the two northern islands in a time of peace was politically oriented to demonstrate effective Soviet control of the two islands. He considered it hasty, therefore, to conclude that the military bases on the two islands could pose an immediate menace to the Japan-U.S. security system. Media editorials protested

1. COMUS Japan 300515Z Jan 79 (U).
2. AMEMB Tokyo 1708/310759Z Jan 79 (C) GDS-1/31/85.
against the buildup on Kunashiri and Etorofu, but one newspaper again surfaced the "delicate difference" between the approaches of the JDA and the Foreign Office to the Soviet military buildup on the two northern islands.¹

(U) On 1 February the Chief of Staff of the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) stated that there was no immediate need for a change of Japanese troop deployments on Hokkaido to cope with the Soviet military reinforcements. However, the United States would be requested to cooperate in intensified surveillance of the "northern territories." He stated that the JSDF was much concerned that Soviet radar sites had been established on the two islands, as well as tanks, other vehicles, and artillery. Most papers carried a statement by a U.S. Department of State spokesman that the United States considered the two islands a portion of "inherent" Japanese territory. At the same time, a Japanese television station broadcast a statement by the Soviet Ambassador to Japan that the Kuril Islands were Soviet territory and that foreign intervention would never be permitted regarding Soviet actions there.²

(γ) Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda told a Diet budget committee on 2 February that the government could not be unconcerned about the Soviet reinforcements, and that appropriate counter-measures would be taken after calm conferences among the government agencies concerned. According to the media reports, Sonoda was against making an uproar over the matter because to do so, "might affect adversely the U.S.-Soviet moves for detente." One newspaper carried aerial photos of Kunashiri taken by its cameraman at an altitude of 5,300 meters, showing a 3,500-meter long runway and a big radar dome on the island. On 5 February the MOFA called in the Soviet Ambassador to Japan to protest the buildup of Soviet troops and installations on two of the four northern islands. In reply, the Soviet Ambassador denied the existence of a territorial question, suggesting that the Japanese protest could be construed as interference in Soviet internal affairs. The U.S. Embassy informed the State Department that the MOFA position was that Soviet activity on Etorofu and Kunashiri was basically an outward extension of a long-range trend towards strengthened Soviet force presence in the Far East. One MOFA official said that, although that larger trend was deeply disturbing, this particular manifestation was not a deliberate provocation against Japan and, as Sonoda had told the Diet, it should not provoke alarm.³

(U) Referring to "secret military materials" which had revealed the whole picture of the Russian military buildup on Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands, one

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1. COMUS Japan 312346Z Jan 79 (U).
2. COMUS Japan 020559Z Feb 79 (U).
3. COMUS Japan 060007Z Feb 79 (U); AMEMB Tokyo 2152/061039Z Feb 79 (γ), GDS-2/6/85.
Tokyo newspaper stated that three airfields were under construction, one on Etorofu and two on Kunashiri. The airfield on Etorofu had three runways and the two on Kunashiri one each. Runway expansion was underway at each airfield, and JDA authorities were cited as believing that the runways were already usable by Russian medium bombers and would be usable by the BACKFIRE strategic bombers when the expansion was completed. They foresaw little possibility, however, that the Soviet Union would deploy BACKFIREs to those islands. Rather, according to the JDA sources cited, the airfields would act as relay bases in Soviet strategic operations against the United States. On 8-9 February Japanese media carried the Russian newspaper Izvestia statement that the base consolidation on Kunashiri and Etorofu islands was a "counter step" to the "anti-Soviet" Japan-U.S.-China rapprochement. The Izvestia article, as reported in the Japanese press, stated that only the Soviet Union had the right to decide how the Kurils, "which are Soviet territory," be used. Japanese Foreign Office sources, on the other hand, criticized the Soviet contention as being unreasonable. Yamashita was reported to have denied that the runways of the Russian bases had been extended as reported by some Japanese newspapers.¹

¹NOFORREL Japan. The northernmost island in the Kurils claimed by Japan and closest to Russia is Etorofu Island (also called Iturup). In July, in response to a request from CINCPAC, the DIA authorized the release to Japan of intelligence information acquired by the United States in March of 1979. Six HIND combat assault helicopters were reported for the first time on the island of Iturup. The DIA was not certain why the HIND deployment had taken place, but the presence of these heavy assault helicopters indicated that the Soviet Union was able to deploy them from the mainland in support of forces on the Kuril Islands. In addition, the Soviets had taken advantage of favorable summer weather to strengthen their forces on the islands. In mid-June, field guns, anti-tank guns, self-propelled air defense guns, armored personnel carriers, and defense weapons were reported on Iturup Island.²

²The issue of the Soviet buildup on the northern islands faded from view until September of 1979, when Foreign Minister Sonoda announced his intention to "watch" the four Soviet-held northern Japanese islands aboard an MSDF patrol boat. On 9 September, the Japanese media reported that Sonoda had "watched" the northern islands for two hours. In a press conference held later, Sonoda explained the objective of his observation tour was to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that the return of those islands was the earnest desire of the whole nation, and to strengthen the determination of the people to realize that desire. He also stated that it was not "wise" to ask the United States for

1. COMUS Japan 132316Z Feb 79 (U) and 090655Z Feb 79 (U).
2. DIA 6020/192159Z Jul 79 (S/NF/REL Japan), REVW 12 Jul 99.
cooperation on the territorial question at that time, and that it was, "too hasty and not appropriate" to regard the Russian military buildup in the Far East as a threat to Japan. Predictably, on the following day, the Soviet news agency Tass branded Sonoda's observation tour of the northern islands as "unfriendly conduct" toward a neighboring country. Tass said Sonoda's action clearly represented an attempt to stir up a territorial question, "which does not exist actually between the two countries," in order to use the issue for the forthcoming general election. As reported by the U.S. Embassy, the motivations of Sonoda's venture were partly political, partly diplomatic. He had been fully briefed and recognized the need to avoid unnecessarily inflaming Soviet sensitivities during the visit. Thus, while reaffirming unequivocally Japan's claim to the northern territories, Sonoda was careful to underscore the Japanese desire for strong relations with the Soviet Union.¹

(U) On 24 September a Japanese newspaper cited reliable U.S. Government sources for information that a new military base was under construction by the Soviet Union on Shikotan Island. According to the newspaper, the U.S. Government sources would not disclose details, but said that the construction was similar to that on Kunashiri and Etorofu. On the following day, according to the newspaper article, Japanese sources said that they had already confirmed construction of a Soviet military base on the island of Shikotan. According to a wire service dispatch from Tokyo, Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira told newsmen that U.S. officials had reported military installations on the island of Shikotan, which was the second smallest of the four disputed islands off Hokkaido.²

(U) Other media reports stated the Prime Minister had told newsmen that if the report proved to be true, Japan would file an immediate protest with the Soviet government. At that time, Foreign Minister Sonoda, who was in the United States, cautioned the Japanese people against making a fuss about the Shikotan case as a new Soviet threat to Japan. As matters then stood, the Foreign Office did not regard the Soviet military facilities there as a base for offensive activities. On the other hand, JDA sources in Japan stated that the Soviets had placed new ground troops on Shikotan where only a frontier guard had been stationed before, and that the Soviet ground forces deployed in the northern territory overall had been increased from a brigade to a division. Other news sources speculated that a weak-kneed Japanese diplomatic posture

1. UPI dispatch, dateline Tokyo, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 18/060221Z Sep 79 (U); COMUS Japan 100642Z Sep 79 (U) and 110533Z Sep 79 (U); AMEMB Tokyo 16323/130618Z Sep 79 (C), XDS-1, 9/12/99.
2. COMUS Japan 260636Z Sep 79 (U) and 270641Z Sep 79 (U); UPI dispatch, dateline Tokyo cited ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 20/270302Z Sep 79 (U)

CONFIDENTIAL
toward the Soviet militarization of Kunashiri and Etorofu had prompted the Soviets to construct a military base on Shikotan. One reporter wrote from Moscow that the Shikotan base construction was part of the Soviet military buildup in the Far East to cope with the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc by the United States and China.¹

(U) During a press conference held on 27 September after Sonoda's return to Japan, he reportedly repeated that he did not feel a threat from the Soviet military reinforcements on the northern islands. However, he said that Japan would take appropriate steps including a protest against the Soviet buildup. Meanwhile, on 26 September, Japanese newspapers carried a "U.S. State Department statement" regarding the Soviet military moves in the north of Japan. The statement included, according to the newspaper reports, the fact that the Soviet Union had increased its military strength and that the buildup still continued on the islands in question. The United States Government was in contact with the Japanese Government about the situation and the United States supported the Japanese claim that the four Soviet-held islands (Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan and the Habomai group) were inherently Japanese territory. Also, according to these reports, the United States regarded the Okhotsk Sea and the near-by straits leading to that sea as international waters and periodically sent Navy ships to the area on routine operations. Most Japanese newspapers also carried a radio Moscow report that the Soviet Union was free to do either military or civil construction at whatever area of her territory. Editorial comment by Japanese newspapers was that the Japan Government should express a clear protest to the Soviet Union about the military buildup on the northern islands.²

1. Ibid.
2. COMUS Japan 280645Z Sep 79 (U)
At a minimum, according to this JDA official, the Russian force could be characterized as having either offensive or defensive capabilities. After reviewing the proposed draft statement, the State Department informed the U.S. Embassy that, with minor changes, there was no objection to its use. However, the State Department did not intend to make any statement on the offensive or defensive nature of the Soviet force.¹

On 16 December the Soviet Ambassador to Japan presented the Soviet response to the Japan protest of 2 October concerning the Soviet military activity on Shikotan. The U.S. Embassy reported a Japanese newspaper account of the meeting, which a MOFA official said was entirely accurate, in which the Soviet Ambassador denied the existence of any territorial problem and asserted that Japanese complaints, therefore, were interference in Soviet internal affairs. A Japanese MOFA official referred to past Japanese protests and reviewed the Japanese position on the northern territories, rejecting the Soviet contention that the problem did not exist. He said that the Japanese viewed the Soviet military buildup in the northern territories with grave concern. The Embassy postulated that this exchange should end the formal dialogue regarding the latest round of northern territories disputes. The situation, according to the Embassy, had not been permitted to get too far out of bounds and the negative effects on the overall relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union had probably been limited. However, the status quo ante had not been restored. The Japanese were more wary than ever of Soviet activities and underlying motives in the northern territories and would watch developments there even more closely in the future. Although the Soviet military presence on Shikotan had not yet done serious damage to other aspects of Japan-Soviet relations, it had chilled the atmosphere and probably reinforced the mistrust and thinly veiled hostility many Japanese felt toward the Soviet Union.²

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2. AME Memb Tokyo 18452/180410Z Oct 79 (C), XDS-3, 10/18/99.
1. SSO DIA 150401Z Oct 79 (S/NL)(80M), REVW 10/10/09; COMUS Japan 170635Z Oct 79 (U).
2. DIA 4737/250747Z Oct 79 (C/NL), REVW 31 Dec 98.
SECTION VI--THE THREAT TO SOUTH KOREA

Overview

(U) In 1978 the threat to South Korea from North Korea was addressed in terms of the announced withdrawal of U.S. ground combat forces, the detection of North Korean tunnels into South Korea, the extent of surface infiltration into South Korea by North Korean agents, and the on-going reassessment of the North Korean order of battle by elements of the U.S. Intelligence community. During 1979 surface infiltration attempts were detected, evidence of tunneling activity continued, and revised order of battle figures continued to be studied by the intelligence agencies concerned. On 20 July 1979 President Carter announced that further withdrawals of combat elements of the 2nd Infantry Division would be held in abeyance. The timing and pace of any future withdrawals beyond scheduled reductions in support units were to be reexamined in 1981, with special attention to the restoration of a North/South military balance and evidence of tangible progress toward a reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Perhaps the most significant event of 1979 was the assassination of President Park Chung-hee on 26 October. On the night of 12-13 December, a major realignment of power took place within the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. In that incident, the Army Chief of Staff, who was also martial law commander, was arrested along with four other generals. This move was taken without constitutional authority and several battalions were moved in violation of the charter of the Combined Forces Command. The incident raised serious concern about stability within the military and possible attempts by North Korea to take advantage of the situation. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on 5 February 1980, General John A. Wickham, Jr., Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Korea (CINUNC) stated that the total pattern of North Korean behavior--military preparations, psychological warfare, and generally war-like talk--was not reassuring and the security situation remained dangerous.

1. CINCPAC Command History 1978 (TS/ERD), Vol. I, pp. 101-110; Statement, General John A. Wickham, Jr., CINUNC Korea to Hourse Armed Services Committee, 5 Feb 80. During the same hearing, Admiral R.L.J. Long, CINCPAC, testified to the growing Soviet military threat throughout the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. Admiral Long noted that the deployment of sizable PACOM forces to the Indian Ocean, combined with the need to maintain security in the Pacific, left the Pacific Command with a marginal capability to execute its mission.
Tunnel Detection

Three North Korean tunnels had been discovered by the end of 1978. United Nations Command (UNC) counter-tunnel operations intercepted the third North Korean tunnel on 17 October 1978. The entrance to the tunnel was within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and topographically hidden from line-of-sight of the North Koreans. After the tunnel was discovered, the ROK proposed routine and controlled visits to the tunnel by a limited number of persons. Evaluation of the proposal by the UNC staff concluded that there would be little risk of physical danger to such visitors. On 16 January 1979, CINCUNC informed the JCS of his intention to authorize such limited visits as a measure to expose to public scrutiny the North Korean violations of the Armistice Agreement and to deter further aggressive and hostile tunneling operations.¹

It was not until August 1979 that General Wickham advised Admiral Weisner (CINCPAC) of the possible detection of another North Korean tunnel in the First ROK Army area. Drilling operations had begun on 30 July and three bore-holes had penetrated a cavity of five-plus feet. Over 15,000 gallons of water were pumped into the bore-holes and all of the water had drained away. While normal tunneling material such as pipe and rail was not evident in the cavity, the size and shape of the cavity, together with the quantity of water lost, were characteristic of a tunnel. About one month later, on 19 September, CINCPAC was informed that the suspected tunnel entrance was located approximately one kilometer north of the Military Demarkation Line and three kilometers north of the southern edge of the DMZ. The site was selected as a suspected tunnel site based on activity first noted in 1971. After 1976, activity in the vicinity of the suspected entrance apparently ceased and, from 1976 until 1978, no significant activity was noted in the vicinity of the suspected tunnel entrance. In late 1978 and early 1979, however, a ROK soldier observed steam coming from the ground and this, in conjunction with previous evidence, resulted in a decision to initiate intensive search operations.

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1. CINCUNC 160235Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 31 Jan 84.
2. SSO Korea 170112Z Aug 79 (S)(BOM), DECL Aug 80 and 192248Z Sep 79 (S)(BOM), REVW 18 Sep 85.
A possible explanation for the many tunnel sites reported during photo-intelligence missions was the missile tunnel construction near the DMZ reported by a North Korean defector in September 1979. According to the defector, several tunnels, seven meters wide and seven meters high, were being developed in an area within ten kilometers of the DMZ. These tunnels had intersecting passages approximately fifty meters from each entrance. The tunnels were to be used for the storage of a "new type" missile which could be pulled out, fired, and then returned to the tunnel complex. This unevaluated report stated that construction had begun in April 1978 and was nearing completion. The entrances to the tunnels faced to the North and, according to U.S. intelligence sources, if FROG missiles were deployed to those tunnels, they could reach Seoul, which was approximately sixty kilometers away.2

Surface Infiltration

Surface infiltration by the North Koreans continued during 1979. One example occurred on 21 July when, according to a news service report, South Korean naval ships and an armed North Korean "spy boat" fought a fierce two-hour battle with rockets and machine guns. Five North Korean infiltrators and two South Koreans were killed, according to the ROK Defense Ministry. The North Korean boat appeared to be on a mission to gather classified information on military facilities, according to the Defense Ministry. The incident was about 30 miles from the port of Chinhae, where the forward headquarters of the South Korean Navy was located. According to this news report, the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet was studying the facilities for its own use to cope with the increased Soviet naval presence in the Pacific. As reported by the Commander, U.S. Forces

1. IPAC Point Paper (S/NE), 3 Dec 79, Subj: Tunnels Under the DMZ (U), REVW 3 Dec 99.
2. IPAC Chronology of Significant Events (S/NE), REVW 30 Sep 99.
Korea (COMUS Korea), cryptographic material and Russian AK-47 ammunition were recovered.  

North Korean Order of Battle

(SYNFORM) In January 1978 COMUS Korea advised the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) of his belief that assessments of the North Korean ground order of battle were overly conservative and that the time had come for a complete and detailed audit of North Korean Army strength. In February 1978 the DIA proposed a division of labor among the Defense intelligence communities to address the concerns expressed by COMUS Korea. On 30 December 1978 a joint State/Defense message informed the U.S. Embassies in Seoul and Tokyo that it was now deemed appropriate for the Korean and Japanese Governments to be briefed on the new estimates. The Ambassadors were requested to do so as soon as possible, drawing on the material provided.

(S) During COMUS Korea's briefing of the ROK Defense Minister on the range of estimates, the Minister was told that the validation of the figures was not yet complete. The Minister's reaction was that, whatever the range of estimates, it was clear that North Korean ground forces were stronger than earlier estimated.  

(S) The U.S. Army INSCOM, which had been assigned the task of reassessing the North Korean ground order of battle by the DIA, undertook an exhaustive country-wide, zero-based reexamination of North Korean infantry divisions and infantry brigades.

3. COMUS Korea 050930Z Jan 79 (S)(EX), DECL 31 Dec 84.
estimated to consist of 9 corps and at least 41 divisions/brigades. This was an increase of two corps and twelve divisions/brigades. The CIA reviewed the study by INSCOM and agreed that the total number of imagery divisions/brigades was at least 35. The National Security Agency also undertook its own analysis, strictly from a signal intelligence aspect, and its findings were also close to INSCOM's. In February 1979 the DIA validation of the INSCOM study continued. The DIA had not yet subscribed to the full findings of the INSCOM study because of the need to resolve outstanding judgmental and methodological questions and to complete a joint review of the evidence. The preliminary results of the estimates by agency in early 1979 were as follows:\(^1\)

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<td>27/4</td>
<td>30/5</td>
<td>32/6</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{(S/NOFOR)}\) By the end of 1979, an agreed DIA comparison of forces on the Korean Peninsula, releasable to the ROK, had been developed. As a result of the reassessment, it was estimated that the North could mount an attack against South Korea with a well-balanced force operationally controlled by at least eight conventional corps and one special corps. Line elements consisted of at least 34 divisions (32 infantry, 2 armored), 4 separate infantry brigades, 16 light infantry brigades, five reinforced infantry regiments, four reconnaissance brigades/regiments, rocket launcher brigades/regiments, and free-rocket-over-ground (FROG) battalions. By the end of the year, it was IPAC's assessment that hostilities were not imminent. However, there was continuing evidence that North Korea was improving its military readiness and its ability to take advantage of any opportunity. North Korea was maintaining an increased readiness posture, and this, coupled with its advantages over the South in combat strength, warranted close scrutiny by all concerned. The end of 1979 DIA comparison of forces on the Korean Peninsula is shown on the following page.\(^2\)

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2. IPAC Point Paper (SYNE), 10 Jan 80, Subj: North Korean Military Force Capabilities (U), REVW 10 Jan 80.
Other Aspects of the North Korean Threat

(U) After the initial leak early in the year regarding the reassessment of the North Korean order of battle, publicity continued in Korea. In mid-May 1979, a news dispatch from Seoul credited official South Korean sources for the statement that, since 1975, North Korea's Army had increased by 20,000,
boosting the total armed forces personnel to 700,000. According to this article, the North Korean Army possessed 2,600 tanks, 3,800 field artillery pieces and 1,700 multiple rocket launchers. The North Korean Commando force, according to this article, had grown since 1975 from 58,000 to 73,000 men. In mid-July a news dispatch from Seoul credited a Western diplomatic source for the statement that revised U.S. estimates of North Korean strength put the size of the North Korean armed forces at more than 600,000 men, about 125,000 more than had been estimated in earlier years. The diplomat said, according to this article, that the new estimates for the North were imprecise, with analysts divided in their calculations of how many army divisions the Communists had. This number could run from 37 divisions to possibly as many as 41 divisions.1

1. UPI dispatch, dateline Seoul, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 205/2322102 May 79 (U); Los Angeles Times dispatch, dateline Seoul, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 017/1804152 Jul 79 (U)
2. CINCUNC 050900Z Jun 79 (EX), DECL 5 Jun 89.
(U) The revised estimates of North Korean military strength, and the attendant publicity, were not unnoticed by North Korea itself. After President Carter's 10 July announcement that the scheduled withdrawal of U.S. ground combat troops from the ROK would be suspended until at least 1981, North Korean spokesmen said the U.S. decision was a defiant act which betrayed the desires of all Korean people and peace-loving people of the whole world. The decision meant, according to the North Koreans, that the pledge made by President Carter during his Presidential election campaign was a lie from the beginning, and called for immediate and total withdrawal of U.S. troops and arms from South Korea.  

(U) An interview by Admiral Weisner (CINCPAC) with a South Korean newspaper caught the attention not only of North Korea but of the Soviet Union as well. As reported by the Soviet newspaper *Izvestia*, Admiral Weisner announced plans for a U.S. invasion of the North Korean peninsula in the event of deterioration of the situation there. He was quoted as saying that Marines from Okinawa and troops from the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii would move to Korea in the event of an emergency. Other forces from the U.S. mainland would be moved in if and when necessary. A North Korean newspaper labeled Admiral Weisner's remarks concerning U.S. plans to support the ROK as "belligerent" and "powder-reeking of the U.S. imperialist war maniac that huge U.S. imperialist aggression forces would be hurled into the Korean Peninsula." The newspaper further described the Admiral's comments as a "vicious threat of strength to our people and an undisguised challenge to peace in Asia," thus proving "that the danger of war in Korea comes not from the North but from the South."

(SYNFORM) After the assassination of President Park on 26 October, General Wickham, who had replaced General Vessey as Commander in Chief of the UNC and the Combined Forces Command, provided Admiral Long, the new CINCPAC, with an

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1. Ibid.
2. COMUS Japan 240555Z Jul 79 (U).
assessment of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. In terms of the external threat, General Wickham stated that North Korean capabilities provided a wide range of options, not all of which could be executed without warning or preparation. If the ROK appeared to be drifting without effective leadership or to be suffering from domestic turmoil, an increase in infiltration attempts and agent activity could take place. The probability that North Korea would adopt that alternative was great enough to warrant careful monitoring by intelligence collection agencies. Execution of the attack option by North Korea would be influenced by its perception of whether conditions in the South had become so disrupted that the risks of war were outweighed by the probability of swift success.1

1. SSO Korea 080534Z Nov 79 (S)(E)(BOM), DEC 5 Nov 85.
2. Ibid.
The U.S. Embassy in Beijing reported other conversations with PRC officials implying that North Korea would not attack South Korea. However, the PRC assurances were cast in terms of the absence of any aggressive intent on the part of North Korea, and not in terms of the PRC's ability or willingness to restrain North Korean actions. The Embassy stated that China obviously had substantial leverage over North Korea on major issues of war and peace, but that the PRC was not likely to use such leverage arbitrarily in the absence of overwhelming evidence that the North had embarked on a military confrontation with the South. At the same time, North Korea was almost totally dependent on China for its petroleum supplies, and would presumably think twice about launching major military operations against the South without some assurance that its petroleum supplies would not be interrupted. Under the present circumstances, stated the Embassy, the PRC would not be inclined to give Pyongyang carte blanche in that regard. Having said that, the Embassy cautioned against an assumption that the coincidence of interests with Beijing on the central issue of peace and stability in Korea extended to other aspects of Korean affairs. In a situation where events seemed to be driven more by developments in the South than in the North, the PRC would feel that the onus was on the United States to keep its own house in order. The focus of the U.S. concern was naturally on actions which North Korea might take to exploit a political/military crisis in South Korea. On the other hand, the main Chinese concern was undoubtedly that the situation in South Korea could bring into play a constellation of forces more intransigent toward the North, and thus more likely to raise Pyongyang's security concerns. This, in turn, could translate into more assertive Chinese demands on the United States to check such unfavorable trends.  

Another assessment of the potential threat of North Korean military action against South Korea after the Park assassination and the 12 December power play by South Korean generals was provided by the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. The Embassy had been unable to detect any movement by the North to indicate an effort to capitalize on the current situation in the ROK. Nevertheless, the

1. SECSTATE 322415ZZ of 14 Dec 79, transmitted to CINCPAC by SECSTATE 180400Z Dec 79 (S)(EX), RDS 2/3, 12/14/89.  
2. AMEMB Beijing 9140 of 17 Dec 79, transmitted to CINCPAC by SECSTATE 325154/172202Z Dec 79 (S)(EX), XDS-1, 12/17/89.
threat remained. The division within the ROK military establishment, highlighted by shooting incidents on December 12-13, would inevitably prompt the North Korean policy makers to review their options, including active efforts to exploit the situation. The Embassy postulated that the most tempting circumstance for the North and most dangerous development for the ROK would be a clash between full units of the ROK Army, as opposed to the smaller incidents of the previous week. Instability within the ROK military establishment would heighten the risk of North Korean activity. The Embassy urged U.S. officials to make a special effort to view the situation as distorted through North Korean lenses. The Embassy considered it safe to assume that the North Koreans perceived active U.S. involvement in the Park assassination. The subsequent division within the ROK military establishment could also be seen as an attempt by the United States to manipulate the Korean situation.1

1. AMEMB Seoul 18967/170828Z Dec 79 (EX), RDS-2/3, 12/17/89.
2. CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate, 20 Dec 79 (SANE), Subj: North Korean Reactions to Instability in the South (A), REVW 20 Dec 99.
1. Ibid.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>USSR</strong></th>
<th><strong>CHINA</strong></th>
<th><strong>NORTH KOREA</strong></th>
<th><strong>VIETNAM</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>MAJOR FIELD UNITS OF SOVIET ARMY</td>
<td>115 Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>6 (possibly 5) Conventional Corps</td>
<td><strong>REGULAR FORCES</strong></td>
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<td>29 Artillery Divisions</td>
<td>28 Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>29 Infantry Divisions</td>
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<td>2 Corps Headquarters</td>
<td>16 Field Artillery (TO HOW)</td>
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<td>5 SS-1 (SCUD) Brigades</td>
<td>41 Border Defense/ID Divisions (TO) 6,723</td>
<td>11 Engineer Brigade (TO) 7,646</td>
<td>(TO) 10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL 348,000</td>
<td>43 Garrison Divisions (TO) 6,723</td>
<td>5 Infantry Regiments (Reinforced) (TO) 7,646</td>
<td>(TO) 10,000</td>
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<td>* Includes Transbaikali and Far East Military Districts and Mongolia.</td>
<td>14 Railway Engineer Division (TO) 11,146</td>
<td>At Least 10 Light Infantry/Reconnaissance Brigades (TO 3,715/2,993)</td>
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<td><strong>PERSONNEL (Army):</strong> 3,592,000</td>
<td>507 Independent Regiments</td>
<td>6 Armored Brigades (TO 1,581)</td>
<td>(TO) 950</td>
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<td>* 30 additional AAA divisions are subordinate to the Air Defense Command of the CCAF.</td>
<td><strong>PERSONNEL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>REGIONAL/LOCAL FORCES:</strong></td>
<td>Full-time troops assigned to provinces/ districts armed with semi-automatic weapons and medium caliber artillery weapons.</td>
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<td><strong>Source:</strong> Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (SYE), p. 51, REW 16 Feb 80.</td>
<td><strong>Current estimated strength:</strong> 600,000</td>
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<td>Military Security Forces 50,000</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Militia — estimated to consist of 1.6 million people's militia of defense forces and three million reserve forces.</td>
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### COMMUNIST NAVAL STRENGTH (U)
#### FAR EAST & PACIFIC

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<tr>
<td>COMBATANTS AND SUPPORT SHIPS</td>
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<tr>
<td>PATROL SHIPS</td>
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<td><strong>PERSONNEL</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>STRENGTH</td>
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<td>125,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE: (1) Figures in parentheses indicate additional units in reserve.**

- (a) Many Vietnamese units believed to be inoperable.
- (b) Current includes about 500 LCM, 1,231.
- (c) Not included in Auxiliary Coast, Naval Auxiliary, and Naval Air Force.

**Source:** Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (NDRC), p. 53, REV 16 Feb 80.
### SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST AIR FORCES (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMBAT AIRCRAFT ²</th>
<th>USSR ¹</th>
<th>CHINA</th>
<th>NORTH KOREA</th>
<th>VIETNAM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>NAVAL AIR</td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>NAVAL AIR</td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
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<tr>
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<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
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<td>264</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>361</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helicopter: Combat Assault</td>
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<tr>
<th>SUPPORT AIRCRAFT ⁴</th>
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<th>NORTH KOREA</th>
<th>VIETNAM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>NAVAL AIR</td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>NAVAL AIR</td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
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<td>Jet &amp; Turboprop Transport, Light</td>
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<tr>
<td>Piston Trainer</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>117</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helicopter: Admin/Liaison/Transport</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRAND TOTAL</th>
<th>USSR ¹</th>
<th>CHINA</th>
<th>NORTH KOREA</th>
<th>VIETNAM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,259</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>5,451</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>799</td>
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</table>

### Personnel Strengths

- **US$**: 100,000
- **25,000**: 429,000
- **30,000**: 47,000
- **44,000**: 13,000
- **55,000**: 1,100
- **65,000**: 560

**TOTAL**: 2,712,000

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1. (U) Includes all combat and support aircraft in the Far East and Trans-Siberian Military Districts and the Far East Fighter Corps.
2. (U) Combat Aircraft: Fighter and bomber aircraft, which are used in fighter, ground attack, bomber/tanker, reconnaissance/ electronic warfare roles.
3. (U) Combat Support Aircraft: All other aircraft assigned to operational units in support of the combat mission, including light and medium transport, helicopters, all other utility liaison aircraft, and jet fighter trainers.
4. (U) Includes all combat and support aircraft in the Far East and Trans-Siberian Military Districts and the Far East Fighter Corps.
5. (U) Includes all combat and support aircraft in the Far East and Trans-Siberian Military Districts and the Far East Fighter Corps.
6. (U) Includes 320,000 personnel assigned to 3AM and AAA units.

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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (S/W), p. 56, REVW 16 Feb 00.
### SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST MISSILE FORCES (U)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
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<td>SURFACE TO SURFACE*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>SA-2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>SA-3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SA-5 1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>IRBM</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>58 - 78</td>
<td>41 - 67</td>
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<td>MRBM</td>
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<td>SURFACE TO SURFACE</td>
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<td>SURFACE TO AIR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SA-2 2</td>
<td>111</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SA-3</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIETNAM</td>
<td>SURFACE TO AIR</td>
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<td>102</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-2 3</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* East of 100° E (formerly listed as separate sites).

** Occupied sites East of 100° E.

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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (S/NE), p. 58, REVW 16 Feb 00.
Beginning in 1973 the Chairman of the JCS had annually asked CINCPAC to provide input for his annual posture statement. In late August 1979 he again asked for CINCPAC's contributions to the preparation of "this very significant document." CINCPAC sought and considered inputs from the components and various staff agencies in the preparation of his response.1

CINCPAC's detailed submission of 15 September addressed U.S. security objectives supported, challenges to U.S. security objectives in the PACOM, U.S. force capabilities to counter the challenges to U.S. security both at the time and in the near future, an assessment of existing and near-term risks, and other relevant considerations for inclusion in the Chairman's statement. He also furnished views on the strategic importance of the PACOM area, the existing situation, a regional appraisal, and PACOM readiness capabilities and requirements.2

The CINCPAC response is highlighted in the paragraphs that follow. Achievement of national security objectives, CINCPAC said, required not only maintenance of the power balance in Asia and the Pacific and the Indian Ocean areas, but also maintenance of a worldwide power relationship favorable to the United States. Political and military power had to be used in concert with military posture to insure attainment of those objectives. The will to use military power, when necessary, was the decisive factor.

With the forces then assigned and the forward base structure, the PACOM could support the following national security objectives: security of the United States; deterrence of aggression; security of sea and air lines of communication; and protection of U.S. citizens, property, and interests abroad. Any further force reductions would significantly impair the PACOM capability to support those objectives, and would cause significant adverse political

2. J5324 HistSum Sep 79 (§), DECL 4 Oct 85; CINCPAC 150350Z Sep 79 (§), DECL 12 Sep 85.
The USSR was the only world power that had the potential to challenge U.S. security objectives worldwide. It had sufficient military capabilities to challenge effectively and directly the physical security of the United States.

The continued growth of Soviet naval strength indicated both a desire and a capability to project military power abroad and compete, if not dominate, on a global scale. The capabilities of the Soviet fleet constituted a new dimension of threat to United States and allied interests, which was not being countered by growth of U.S. forces. Unanswered expansion of Soviet naval forces constituted an increasing risk.

Sheer size and population gave the Asian-Pacific area a vital place in the political, economic, and military affairs of the world and in the future well-being of the United States.

Events of the previous year had not upset the post-Vietnam equilibrium in the Asian-Pacific area. Such long-standing trends as modernization of Soviet forces in the Far East continued. The balance, however, was dynamic, and challenges to it arose.

CINCPAC provided detailed appraisals of conditions in the various

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regions of the PACOM and of specific countries. He also provided information on PACOM readiness capabilities and requirements, and proposed improvements.

In summary, CINCPAC said that the likelihood for conflicts involving U.S. security interests would depend in large measure upon the degree to which the United States and its allies maintained a credible military capability and a clear national determination to apply that capability throughout the spectrum of potential conflicts. For the future, the Asian-Pacific area would continue to be an area of dynamic change and unpredictable events. U.S. economic, political, and security interests would remain inextricably tied to events in this vast region. In view of the increasing Soviet threat in the PACOM and the expanded role of U.S. air and naval forces in underwriting U.S. commitments to the defense of its allies, demands on PACOM forces would increase. The ability to decisively and confidently meet future challenges in the PACOM would depend, in large measure, on the maintenance of combat-ready, forward-deployed U.S. forces throughout the area.¹

The Chairman of the JCS also requested CINCPAC's personal assessment of relevant considerations in his area of responsibility for use in preparation of the Chairman's Posture Statement for FY 81. "Your recommendations or comments on additional matters not falling directly in your area of responsibility would also be welcomed."²

CINCPAC provided his reply on 20 September. His assessment included comments on the Soviet challenge and the need for prompt offensive action should hostilities commence, coverage of Japan in the upcoming posture statement, future PACOM basing structure, PACOM force structure, the importance of the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf regions, the strategy to force mismatch, pre-positioned war reserve stocks, logistic readiness, and secure communications.³

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1. Ibid.
2. JCS 3491/302000Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 29 Aug 85.
3. CINCPAC 201347Z Sep 79 (S) (EX), DECL 20 Sep 85; J5324 HistSum Sep 79 (S), DECL 4 Oct 85.
CINCPAC also noted that Philippine participation in a non-aligned movement could lead to erosion of U.S. base rights, and he recommended that the posture statement reemphasize the criticality of our remaining bases in the PACOM and the seriousness of any further erosion.

(U) CINCPAC noted that a significant U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean could only be maintained at the expense of Western Pacific security. The Admiral said that it was critical that we provide, as first priority, for the security of the Pacific, while at the same time we were increasing our presence in the Indian Ocean. "This will require real growth in our PACOM naval forces." 1

(U) The Chairman's statement reflected many of CINCPAC's thoughts, noting the importance of Philippine bases and calling Japan a "key" to U.S. security policy in Asia. The Chairman also noted that the United States had major political, economic, and security interests, as well as important allies and trading partners, in the Pacific Ocean and adjacent Asian areas. "Air and sea LOCs that crisscross the Pacific are becoming increasingly important to U.S. and allied security and to the expanding trade and commercial relations which the United States enjoys with countries in the Pacific Basin. A strong U.S. military presence is essential to protect U.S. interests and to demonstrate support for regional peace and security." 2

Defense Guidance and National Level Planning

(U) As explained in some detail in the 1978 CINCPAC Command History, most of the national-level guidance and planning programs and documents had changed in both concept and name. (One exception was the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.) CINCPAC's beliefs regarding the nature and concepts of these national-level plans did not change in 1979, but will be discussed in connection with his comments and recommendations regarding the various documents in the program. There will be some redundancy, because there were recurring themes in CINCPAC's comments, in an effort that appeared to be finally having an effect on Washington planners and decision makers. 3

1. Ibid.
2. J74/Memo/73-80, 20 Feb 80 (U), Subj: Significant Statements (U).
deploy forces from the Pacific came into being in mid-1947, gained momentum in the 1950's and in the 1960's resulted in JCS tasking in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for the PACOM to develop plans to support NATO requirements. At the end of World War II the leading trading partner of the United States was Western Europe, there was no energy crisis, China was the primary U.S. adversary in Asia, nearly all Soviet land and air forces faced NATO, and the U.S. Navy, which had 15 carriers in the Pacific, was virtually unchallenged. A strategy was developed to redeploy selected forces from the PACOM to support NATO requirements.

The fundamental geopolitical, economic, and military situations had changed in the Asia-Pacific region since that time. Japan became the leading U.S. overseas trading partner and trade with Korea had grown greatly; there was similar growth in other PACOM countries. The region was the source of many critical raw materials imported by the United States. The energy crisis had pointed out the importance of Persian Gulf oil to the Western industrialized nations and the potential vulnerability of oil sea lines of communication from the Persian Gulf to Soviet sea control forces. The USSR challenged U.S. security objectives worldwide. The split between the USSR and China had been a major contributor to the maintenance of a U.S.-USSR balance. The Soviets were devoting from 25 to 33 percent of their military establishment to China. The balance of naval forces in the PACOM had changed markedly. The Soviet Pacific Fleet was the primary threat to PACOM forces and was the largest of the Soviet fleets. PACOM naval strength was reduced to six carriers.¹

¹ Ibid.
CINCPAC continued to press for a change in the strategy that required the swing, and it appeared by the end of 1979 that there was a change. While it had not been formally expounded, it appeared that the United States was moving toward a more realistic strategy in which air and naval forces would swing to the area where they were needed the most.

Consolidated Guidance

The Defense Department's Consolidated Guidance had replaced the Defense Guidance, Planning and Programming Guidance, and Fiscal Guidance. It served as a guide to the Services and Defense Department agencies in preparation of Program Objective Memorandums. The revisions were designed to permit earlier Presidential involvement and enhance the leadership of the Secretary of Defense by providing earlier detailed fiscal and programming guidance.²

In response to a request from the JCS, CINCPAC provided his comments on Consolidated Guidance for FY 81-85 in a message dated 23 February. His submission provided comments on major concerns and recommended changes.³

First, CINCPAC addressed defense policy and military strategy. He said the draft Consolidated Guidance did not provide separate and comprehensive statements of defense policy and military strategy. Such statements were necessary to provide a basis for development of the military forces required to execute the strategy. Defense policy was also required to furnish a meaningful baseline to assess the adequacy of programmed forces to meet the strategy.

Regarding Defense Department guidance, he said that the draft Consolidated Guidance had implicitly changed or obscured existing strategy without explicitly highlighting those changes for high-level consideration and decision. It did not reflect some important strategic guidance and made programmed changes without due regard to strategy implications.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. J5324 HistSum Feb 79 (§), DECL 5 Mar 85, which cites CINCPAC 2304132 Feb 79.
The United States and the USSR had resisted numerous temptations to go to war over purely ideological differences and the likelihood that they would abandon this restraint was slight. Conversely, opposing sides had never had to deal with competition between themselves for a critical resource, such as oil. There was a real possibility that the United States, together with its industrial allies, and the Soviet Union might enter such a competition. The USSR might resort to military aggression or active subversion in oil producing countries of the Persian Gulf as an attractive alternative.

Neither did the draft fully recognize the importance of the Sino-Soviet split. This confrontation had been one of the key strategic factors in the world during the previous decade. It was a major contributor to the maintenance
of the U.S.-USSR balance. Because of the split, the USSR devoted a significant portion of its military establishment to China. In a conventional worldwide war, the Soviet uncertainties over Chinese activities could inhibit the transfer of Soviet forces and assets to the west.

Finally, the draft Consolidated Guidance sequence designated to be used in planning and programming could produce a false sense of security and lead to inaccurate program changes. Although it was a demanding scenario, the sequence could significantly restrict the PACOM's ability to react to other scenarios. In addition, the scenario provided for only a defensive, reactive sequence, which was orchestrated by Soviet initiative.¹

Defense Policy Guidance FY 81-85

Defense Policy Guidance initiated and guided the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System/Consolidated Guidance cycle, and was a responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In 1979 the suspense deadline the JCS had to meet to the Office of the Under Secretary did not permit them to request CINCPAC comments on the FY 81-85 draft. The JCS requested, however, that should comments be provided on the draft Defense Policy Guidance, they would be taken into account in the continuing dialogue with the Office of the Secretary of Defense.²

Because of the nature of the Defense Policy Guidance, CINCPAC provided initial comments on the new document on 9 March. In his overview he noted that the draft Defense Policy Guidance provided an excellent step toward a separate and comprehensive statement of defense policy, military strategy, and planning guidance that should prove most beneficial in guiding the development of Consolidated Guidance (see above). Such a statement was necessary, he said, to provide a basis for development of military forces required to execute the strategy. Defense policy also provided a meaningful baseline by which to assess the adequacy of programmed forces to meet the strategy requirements. Flaws still existed in the Planning, Program, and Budgeting System, however. For example, he said, it appeared that there were competing forces within OSD to provide a meaningful Consolidated Guidance. Publication of two documents did not provide a basis for effective and efficient defense planning. Instead of the draft Defense Policy Guidance being the driving force for the development of the Consolidated Guidance, the reverse situation existed. This condition further aggravated the policy-strategy and force mismatch.³

1. Ibid.
2. J5324 HistSum Mar 79 (S), DECL 2 Apr 85.
3. CINCPAC 0920112 Mar 79 (S), DECL 6 Mar 85.
(S) CINCPAC concurred with the criteria for planning, systems design, and pragmatic decisions to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities and complicate Soviet planning considerations. CINCPAC further stated that previous defense guidance rarely recognized that the United States must continue to seek opportunities to defeat the Soviet Union, not only in Europe, but wherever those opportunities existed.

(U) Admiral Weisner concluded by stating that the PACOM was continuing to review the draft Defense Policy Guidance for FY 81-85 and would provide additional comments upon review of the revised version of Consolidated Guidance.¹

¹ Ibid.
SECRET

In his quarterly report of major issues and activities to the Secretary of Defense for the first quarter of 1979, CINCPAC advised the Secretary that he appreciated the decision to make the draft Defense Policy Guidance an integral part of the draft Consolidated Guidance. He said that such an adjustment should prove most beneficial in providing the basis for military forces required to execute strategy and assess the adequacy of programmed forces to meet strategy requirements.1

Defense Policy Guidance FY 82-86

CINCPAC again was asked to comment on a draft Defense Policy Guidance paper in 1979, this one for the period FY 82 to FY 86. This time the request allowed time for the unified and specified commanders to provide their input for development of the JCS response to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.2

CINCPAC's reply of 8 December from Admiral Long was in much the same vein as the comments on the draft paper for the FY 81-85 period addressed above. The same inadequacies remained in the basic draft and some new problems surfaced. The major concerns the Admiral addressed were as follows.3

While the draft Defense Policy Guidance gave recognition to the strategy-resource mismatch (earlier called the policy-strategy and force mismatch), no solutions were offered to correct the problem.

The draft addressed collective security and a "coalition" strategy. CINCPAC believed that while coalition strategies would help, they would not correct the disparities between our national security objectives and the military forces available to achieve those objectives.

In the matter of strategic priorities, the document was heavily NATO oriented with little recognition or guidance for other worldwide requirements.

1. CINCPAC 041950Z Apr 79 DECL 3 Apr 85.
2. JCS 7106/272346Z Nov 79 (U).
CINCPAC noted that unclear statements of objectives and inconsistencies detracted from the draft document in several key areas. He thought the effort to shorten the document had resulted in a lack of the quality that characterized other Defense Department guidance documents.

Lastly CINCPAC addressed maritime superiority. He said that the draft Defense Policy Guidance talked about a maritime balance, whereas it should have recognized that there was a requirement for the United States alone to establish a margin of maritime superiority in certain vital areas.¹

The JCS 27 November message had requested that in addition to CINCPAC's comments on his major concerns he present recommendations for specific changes to the document. CINCPAC forwarded these on 12 December. He said, however, that he hoped the need for specific changes would be obviated by a complete revision of the draft document as a result of the major concerns expressed to the Chairman by CINCPAC and other CINCs.²

Joint Strategic Planning Document FY 82-89

The Joint Strategic Planning Document was a partial follow-on to the old Joint Strategic Objectives Plan and was the JCS mid-range planning vehicle and a major document in military planning. It provided JCS advice on military strategy; a summary of the JCS planning force levels that could successfully execute, with reasonable assurance, the approved strategy; and JCS views on the attainability of those forces. It established the position of the JCS on matters of strategic importance to the security of the country. On 9 August the JCS advised that development of the JSPD for FY 82-89 would take place concurrently with the development of Defense Policy Guidance FY 82-86, addressed above.³

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 122150Z Dec 79 (S), REVW 7 Dec 99, REAS 2-301C 4,5,86.
3. JCS 4269/091512Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 7 Aug 85.
SECRET

(5) In that 9 August message the Chairman of the JCS informed CINCPAC that he would like to send a small team of representatives from the Joint Staff and the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to the PACOM for research and discussions relating to the two documents. The team would be interested in CINCPAC’s views on military strategy and the strategies required to achieve the PACOM’s assigned objectives, and CINCPAC’s assessment of how PACOM operational capabilities, on-hand and programmed, supported those strategies. CINCPAC welcomed the visit, and also invited representatives of the component commands to join some of his staff at roundtable discussions.¹

(5) The CINCPAC Plans Directorate chaired the discussions, held on 16 August, with the Washington visitors. The team chief from the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated that the Secretary of Defense desired development of defense policy guidance that would translate national policy guidance into operational planning guidance. In addition, members of the team wanted to know PACOM’s existing shortfalls and capabilities and the impact of them on near-term planning, and how CINCPAC would prioritize requirements.²

(5) In addition, it was discussed that planners at the Washington level tended to think about a NATO war in isolation, without worldwide implications. To have a stalemate in NATO Europe while at the same time to lose both Japan and China would be no victory at all, and the worldwide balance would shift to the Soviet Union.³

(5) CINCPAC informed the Chairman of the JCS that he believed that the roundtable discussions had helped the team in formulating the approach for putting together details of the forthcoming Defense Policy Guidance and Joint

1. Ibid.; CINCPAC 112230Z Aug 79 (U).
2. J5324 HistSum Aug 79 (S); DECL 7 Aug 85.
3. Ibid.

SECRET

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Strategic Planning Document. He said he was glad to have the opportunity to provide "our views".1

**Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis**

The Joint Strategic Planning Document was derived from a two-part Supporting Analysis, Part I (Strategy and Force Planning Guidance) and Part II (Analysis and Force Requirements). All were a part of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. JSPDSA Part I was published annually by the JCS. It tasked the Services and unified commands to use the guidelines of Part I for development of inputs to Part II. The PACOM normally had 60 days to prepare its submission, but late JCS tasking reduced this time to 45 days in 1979.2

CINCPAC's input to Part II for FY 82-89 was mailed to the JCS on 27 July. It included PACOM comments on existing strategy as defined in Consolidated Guidance and Appendix K of JSPDSA Part I. Specifically, the strategic issues highlighted by CINCPAC as major concerns were the overwhelming bias of current strategic thinking towards NATO, the virtual abandonment of meaningful action in the Pacific in the event of worldwide war, and the strategy-force mismatch. CINCPAC also identified the minimum risk and prudent risk force levels required to support various scenarios:

- Worldwide war with the Soviet Union
- Peacetime forward deployments.

As was the case the year before, the Persian Gulf scenarios were developed without regard for Unified Command Plan boundaries and land, sea, and air force requirements were submitted. This procedure was well received by the JCS as it allowed comparison of total force requirements with the input from the European Command.3

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1. CINCPAC 190141Z Aug 79 (6), DECL 18 Aug 83.
3. Ibid.

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SECRET

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Earlier, the CINCPAC staff had also provided recommended changes in the development of Book III of Part II of the JSPDSA for FY 81-88. This section of the JSPDSA was concerned with Allied and Friendly Forces. CINCPAC's recommendations were forwarded to the JCS on 6 June.¹

(S/NOTFOR) Substantive changes in the recommended desired force levels were:²

1. J5311 HistSum May 79 (S), DECL 29 May 85.
2. Ibid.
Joint Program Assessment Memorandum FY 81-88

On 26 April the JCS requested CINCPAC's assistance in the development of the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum for FY 81-88 by providing comments and advice on how the essential force characteristics identified in the Joint Strategic Planning Document applied to PACOM regional or functional areas of responsibility.

CINCPAC's response of 18 May noted that all Joint Strategic Planning Document force characteristics were most critical to U.S. military forces assigned to the PACOM because of the immense size of CINCPAC's area of responsibility. CINCPAC emphasized the need for significant technological and survivability advantages over potential enemy forces to overcome numerical disadvantages. In this light, flexible response, readiness mobility, sustainability, and command, control, and communications and qualitative superiority were highlighted as features essential to PACOM forces. In addition, the maintenance of existing force levels, as a minimum, and renewed efforts to ensure qualitative superiority were identified as factors necessary to support national security interests and to provide the capability for a flexible defense throughout the PACOM area.

Defense Planning Review Questionnaire 79

On 11 May the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on the proposed U.S. response to the 1979 NATO Defense Planning Review Questionnaire (DPQ). A major issue was whether to include a change in the 1980 categorization of three PACOM carrier task groups that were then in the NATO "assigned" category.

1. Ibid.
2. JCS 7597/261732Z Apr 79 (S), DELC 26 Apr 85.
3. J5322 HistSum May 79 (S), DECL 6 Jun 85; CINCPAC 182349Z May 79 (S), DECL 15 May 85.
4. JCS 1553/110001Z May 79 (S), DECL 10 May 85.
CINCPAC agreed on the lack of U.S. forces to cope with the totality of Soviet military capability and stressed that the United States must continue to emphasize the growth of U.S. general purpose forces.

1. CINCPAC 1809412 May 79 (SECRET), DECL 18 May 85.
The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan was the near-term document in the JCS Joint Strategic Planning System. It addressed the application of in-being forces and capabilities to tasks and contingencies. It constituted the annual JCS tasking of CINCPAC for certain plans and activities.

The annual review of Volume I and II and Annexes B and J was completed and comments forwarded to the JCS on 30 August. CINCPAC's general comments on strategy and forces were as follows:

CINCPAC recognized that progress was being made in this edition of the JSCP by highlighting non-automatic augmentation of the European and Indian Command with coincident trained forces during peacetime. The plan is:

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 302256Z Aug 79 (TS), REVW 22 Mar 99, REAS 2-30IC (6).
programmed as augmentation assets. With the forces assigned in 1979 it was not possible to simultaneously protect U.S. territory; keep open sea lines of communication to Hawaii and Alaska; deter the Soviets from attacking Japan; assist in the defense of South Korea, Japan and other participating allies; and secure sea lines of communication across the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

(S) Deployment of PACOM forces out of the theater (including three battle groups) under the swing strategy would critically impair our warfighting capability and jeopardize the survival of remaining PACOM forces. With the loss of over half of our naval forces to the European and Atlantic Commands, we would have to turn our backs on all of our PACOM alliance commitments and become totally defensive to survive in the Pacific. We would have no other alternative except to react to the strategy chosen by the Soviet Union in the PACOM. This increased USSR options for dominating the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean; attacking U.S. forces and bases in the Pacific and the United States; providing forces or logistic support to a North Korean attack on the Republic of Korea; redeploying forces to the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, or Europe; and isolating Korea, Japan and China from each other and from the United States.

(S) The CINCPAC summary noted that our planning efforts must be realistic and based on existing capabilities. "Presently assigned forces are only marginally adequate to execute national military strategy in PACOM." Such U.S. force shortfalls would not be overcome by planning on major augmentation of forces from one theater to another and would lead to "dangerous consequences during a global conflict." He recommended that the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan be revised to eliminate planning guidance that provided for augmentation of CINCEUR and CINCLANT with major PACOM forces during a global war with the USSR. CINCPAC then proceeded to provide specific line-by-line comments and recommendations on the proposed FY 80 JSOP.

Consolidated Guidance Study 8 and the Swing Strategy

(S) A plan to redeploy significant numbers of PACOM forces, ships, and aircraft to reinforce the European and Atlantic Commands in the event of a NATO war was called the "swing strategy." For many years the various CINCPACs, in turn, had pleaded with the Washington community to change this strategy. In 1978 CINCPAC had addressed the subject repeatedly and emphatically, and he continued to do so throughout 1979. One vehicle that brought the matter to special attention was a study by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of

1. Ibid.
The subject remained under study throughout 1979 among the unified commands in Europe, the Atlantic, and the Pacific; in the Washington community at both the JCS and Secretary of Defense levels; and in the press worldwide after the New York Times published articles based on a copy of the study.

On 22 February 1979 the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on the final draft of Consolidated Guidance Study 8, and provided an updated copy. On 27 February CINCPAC said that the final study conclusions and recommendations had not changed since the third draft, that the study still contended that the

Analysis of the subject continued. On 11 July the JCS informed CINCPAC that the Secretary of Defense had requested that the JCS and three agencies within the Office of the Secretary conduct separate studies on five issues in the 1982-85 time frame using the Consolidated Guidance Study 8 as a point of departure. The three offices in the Defense Department were International Security Affairs, Program Analysis and Evaluation, and that of the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy. The five questions were:

1. What could be the optimum initial split of programmed carrier task forces between NATO, the Pacific, and Indian Oceans in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, assuming no prior limited hostilities? What would be the peacetime deployment implications?

2. J5324 HistSum Feb 79 (S), DECL 5 Mar 85, which cited CINCPAC 270205Z Feb 79.
3. JCS 2152/111840Z Jul 79 (S), DECL 15 Jun 99.
CINC PAC considered the comments from his component and subordinate unified commanders and various PACOM staff agencies in the preparation of his response.

CINC PAC first stated that further studies and additional questions would only delay the Defense Planning Questionnaire. Highlights of his 1 August response are summarized in the paragraphs that follow.¹

Before CINC PAC provided his answers to the Secretary of Defense's questions, however, he provided some general observations, the first on the utility of this study. As noted above he opposed further delay; he believed that any follow-on analyses should concentrate on force programming decisions. He went on to say that the United States must preserve its military options in the Pacific.²

¹ CINC PAC 012250Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 25 Jul 85.
CINC PAC reiterated that our force planning had supported traditional U.S. strategy, concentrating nearly all U.S. forces in the European Theater. The situation had changed, however, due to the growth and wider peacetime deployment of Soviet forces. In addition, CINC PAC stated that unless the United States and its NATO allies were prepared to develop the forces required to offset a force ratio disadvantage in Europe, our strategy had to include a means of insuring that the Soviets would not be able to redeploy their forces from the Sino-Soviet border.

The USSR would profit from Japanese non-belligerency during a U.S.-Soviet conflict.

CINC PAC next provided the answers to the questions posed by the Secretary of Defense. First he addressed the optimum initial carrier split. He said that given no increase in force levels, the 1979 disposition of six carriers was probably adequate to force Soviet consideration of a U.S. naval threat from several avenues in any confrontation with the United States. Increased carrier presence in the Indian Ocean, however, dictated that a seventh carrier be added to PACOM naval forces in order to provide for a higher deployment tempo. In the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, a minimum of four carrier battle groups would be required in the Northwest Pacific in order to secure maritime superiority and influence alignment of Japan and China by taking prompt offensive action against Soviet naval forces and bases. At least three additional carrier battle groups would be required to either defeat Soviet

1. Ibid.
naval forces operating in the South China Sea (from bases in Vietnam) or to counter Soviet initiatives in the Indian Ocean. CINCPAC noted that he had requested a seventh carrier based on JCS tasking to maintain at least a temporary presence in the Indian Ocean, but the JCS had indicated that current assignments were proper and limited assets would not be redistributed at that time.

He said that any reduction of the existing carrier level, in light of the buildup of Soviet ground, air, and naval forces, would be detrimental to U.S. security objectives and interests and was "dangerous." He noted the Consolidated Guidance Study 8 ignored the fact that PACOM responsibility extended not only to the Pacific but around the Horn of Africa to Western Europe. Control of the Indian Ocean sea lines of communication was particularly essential to NATO defense. Of near equal importance was the control of sea lines of communication to Japan, both to reduce Soviet leverage on Japan and to accommodate Soviet desires and to encourage Japan to continue to permit the use of U.S. bases as required.
In his summary, CINCPAC stated that the issues under question attempted to deal with a complex problem (Asia during a worldwide conventional war) with potentially far-reaching implications. "Issues provide a clear case for improving US force levels in Pacific to redress growing worldwide Soviet conventional capability and underwrite current US security objectives."
in PACOM." CINCPAC asked that he be afforded an opportunity to continue to review and comment on studies as they were developed.\(^1\)

\(\mathcal{\Delta}\) Both CINCEUR and CINCLANT were also requested to comment on the follow-on study questions. CINCEUR confined his comments primarily to the first question, the optimum initial split of programmed carrier task forces. His position remained that the minimum acceptable Atlantic/European carrier force level was seven. He said a minimum of four carrier battle groups was needed in the Sixth Fleet at the outbreak of hostilities. He noted that with limited forces worldwide, priorities had to be assigned and greater risks accepted in some areas. He believed that any reduction in the U.S. naval commitment to NATO could cause a strong adverse allied reaction and erode the U.S. leadership role in NATO. He said that Pacific Theater actions to reduce Soviet pressure against NATO were desirable, provided that such actions did not adversely impact upon reinforcement of NATO.\(^2\)

\(\mathcal{\Delta}\) CINCLANT said that the existing division of carrier assets was reasonable and could result in a wartime posture of seven in the Atlantic and Mediterranean and six in the Pacific, with none in the Indian Ocean during no-threat conditions, but with one being allocated from the NATO or Pacific area during a developing threat. He noted that a decrease in announced U.S. support of NATO or its priority in U.S. strategy could not be supported. "Even the appearance of reduced US commitment to NATO will have adverse diplomatic and military impacts."\(^3\)

\(\mathcal{\Delta}\) In a paper dated 1 October the JCS provided their preliminary comments on the follow-on analysis. The completed study was expected to be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense by the end of the year. CINCPAC's Plans Directorate analyzed the preliminary comments to determine the extent to which CINCPAC's comments had been used in the JCS response. The JCS had incorporated directly or indirectly about 51 percent of CINCPAC's comments. In addition, another 10 percent of the JCS analysis was extracted from previous CINCPAC inputs to the draft Consolidated Guidance, Defense Policy Guidance, and the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis, Part I. Examination of the accepted comments indicated that CINCPAC had had a major impact in

1. Ibid.
formulating the JCS response.\footnotemark[1]

\footnotetext[1]{J5324 HistSum Oct 79 (S), DECL 15 Oct 85, which cited JCSM 289-79 of 1 Oct 79, Subj: Follow-on Analysis to Consolidated Guidance Study No. 8.}

\footnotetext[1]{J5324 HistSum Oct 79 (S), DECL 15 Oct 85, which cited JCSM 289-79 of 1 Oct 79, Subj: Follow-on Analysis to Consolidated Guidance Study No. 8.}
(U) On 15 October CINCPAC advised the JCS that he appreciated the support of his positions regarding the Secretary's specific issues.1

The CINC of the U.S. European Command commented on the follow-on analysis in a message to the JCS on 17 December.2

(U) The swing strategy was the subject of an article in the New York Times by Richard Burt on 9 October entitled, "War Plan, Secret 25 Years, Creates Dilemma for U.S." The article reported that public disclosure or official notification of our Asian allies of our intent to swing forces could further undermine the credibility of our commitments in Asia and become an issue in our defense relations with Japan. The article stated that officials said that disclosure of the strategy made it necessary for the Administration to discuss the concept with Asian allies, and that Secretary of Defense Brown would probably raise the issue for the first time with military officials in Japan when he visited later in October. The article continued:3

...Although officials said that European governments had been told that a review of the strategy was under way, the study says that "any American initiative to retreat from the swing concept probably could be viewed in NATO capitals as a major change in our world view, or worse yet, an indication of confusion or indecision among American policy makers."

At the same time, the study says, maintaining the strategy could cause both Japan and China to question whether the Administration planned to abandon Asia in any worldwide war. "In summary," the study says, "planning for the swing strategy poses a political dilemma for the United States. Continuation of the concept runs the risk of alienating Asia. Discarding the concept could disturb the Europeans and undermine NATO."

(U) The State Department put out public affairs guidance for the Missions to use in response to queries on the subject. They described the document as a DOD staff study that in no way represented the policy of the Department of

1. CINCPAC 152303Z Oct 79 (U).
3. COMUS Japan 120034Z Oct 79 (U), which retransmitted AMEMB Tokyo 18069 and STATE 265093.
Defense or the U.S. Government. "The CG-8 study is purely a staff level think-piece." The question at issue was whether the concept of swinging forces was still militarily and politically valid, and whether some of those forces should be placed in a more flexible category that would allow deployments to be determined during the NATO alert process and taking into account the events leading up to the crisis.¹

(U) Newspapers around the world copied the story, stimulating further discussion. The Honolulu Advertiser interviewed Admiral Weisner on the subject and quoted the Admiral as follows:²

Over time, circumstances and geopolitical considerations change and it is sound policy to reexamine our contingency plans ...in the global context.

In that vein, I am in favor of such a review taking place at this time. The increasing importance of the Asia, Pacific, Indian Ocean areas must be recognized.

(U) At a final press conference as CINCPAC just two days later, the Admiral elaborated. He predicted that if conflict broke out between the United States and the Soviet Union it would not be confined to Europe. He continued:³

...It would spread rapidly to the reaches of the Western Pacific and to the various parts of the Pacific. They would rapidly attempt to cut off that flow of oil from the Persian Gulf that supplies 60 percent of the oil used by Western Europe. Initially they might have greater success than they would be able to continue with.

Weisner then reiterated his stand that with the forces in being in the Pacific Command, that we face an even chance of keeping the vital sea and air lines open. That's a 50 percent or even chance. Certainly, as a military commander responsible for only the military portion of the equation, I would like force levels that would guarantee a better-than-even chance of keeping those vital sea lines open.

¹ SECSTATE 262794/01 062122Z Oct 79 (S), GDS 10/7/85.
Admiral Weisner also said that he would like to see the U.S. air and naval forces in the Pacific increased between 25 and 33 percent.¹

The New York Times article was promptly copied in the Japanese press. U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield had told foreign correspondents only days before that he had repeatedly urged that U.S. air and naval forces be strengthened to a "parity" with American forces in the Atlantic and in Western Europe. He said that he had specifically urged that an additional aircraft carrier and an escort force be added to the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet, which had responsibility for safeguarding the entire Western Pacific as well as the Indian Ocean, which he called the "back door" to the oil-rich nations of the Mid-East. He said that he had warned Washington that a threat from the Soviet Union to the United States could "come from any direction."²

On 12 October Ambassador Mansfield met with the Japanese press. The main focus of attention was the swing strategy and naval balance in the Pacific. The morning press the next day carried extensive excerpts, underscoring the Ambassador's comments that recent stories on the swing strategy had focused on a study that did not represent a policy decision and that the U.S. determination to stand by treaty commitments to countries such as Japan and Korea was as strong as ever and no less than toward the commitment to Western Europe. Comments on measures under way to strengthen U.S. forces in the Pacific, particularly the SEVENTH Fleet, were also given heavy attention.³

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown was quoted in the press following talks with the Japanese in Tokyo as declaring that the United States would retain the flexibility to move its military forces into--and out of--Asia and the Pacific. He said that efforts by the United States, Western Europe, and Japan together were needed to counter the global Soviet military buildup and its inherent potential threat. He reportedly told Japanese officials that a so-called swing strategy of moving U.S. military power from Asia to Europe in case of war was only one of many Pentagon war plans. "We need to be able to maintain a flexible capability to move our forces where they are needed and we intend to continue to be able to do so." He ruled out neither moving air and naval forces into the Western Pacific nor preferentially to Europe; he also said there was a possibility of moving forces from both Europe and the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and Mid-East in case of a war or a need to deter a war.⁴

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¹. Ibid.
³. AMEMB Tokyo 18189/130309Z Oct 79 (C), E.O. 12065 N/A.
SECTION II--CINCPAC PLANS

CINCPAC Operation Plans

(1) The CINCPAC staff was continuously in the process of preparing, revising, or studying the requirements for planning for many contingencies and operations. Most numbered CINCPAC Operation Plans were the responsibility of the Plans Directorate, although other staff elements contributed directly with specialized input, particularly for detailed functional annexes to plans. Some plans were prepared or revised by the Operations Directorate, in which case they were usually promulgated by letter or message. The following list identifies CINCPAC contingency plans and their status as of 31 December 1979.1

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1. CINCPAC Plans Status Report, Ser T5, 28 Jan 80 (TS) REVW 28 Jan 80, REAS 2-303c(6). The following definitions pertained. An OPLAN was an operation plan for the conduct of military operations that could be translated into an operation order with minimum alteration. Complete plans included deployment/employment phases, as appropriate. A CONPLAN was an Operation Plan in Concept Format, an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require expansion into an OPLAN or OPORD prior to implementation. An OPORD was a directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

CINCPAC's Director for Logistics and Security Assistance has stressed the importance of establishing a sound logistics data base for the plan containing information on air and sea ports, bases and facilities, standard consumption factors, availability of sealift and airlift assets, and the use of the Joint Operation Planning System as the framework for the planning process.

On 11 April, in response to a request from the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, West Germany, CINCPAC concurred with a proposal for a group of Japanese Government officials to visit U.S. Forces in Germany to learn about various aspects of host government support. CINCPAC considered the visit a good opportunity for the Japanese to gain insight into several areas of prime interest to them, and the United States should be responsive to such reasonable requests. CINCPAC outlined several areas of interest that should be emphasized, such as cost sharing, facilities construction and use, aircraft accident investigation, and automobile emission control standards. He also requested that CINCPAC be apprised of information passed to the Japanese delegation that might be applicable to the U.S.-Japanese security relationship.  

When the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the Japan Self-Defense Force visited CINCPAC's headquarters in June he strongly expressed the importance of a U.S.-Japan common perception of the Soviet threat to Japan; he considered a common assessment of that threat necessary to the bilateral military planning process. He said that the time was right to consider the relative weight of the Soviet threat in Asia and Europe. He also believed that the United States should increase its Pacific carrier force to seven, to express a  

1. J5112 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 31 Jan 86; CINCPAC 142347Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 85.
2. J511 HistSum Mar 79 (S), DECL 9 Apr 85; CINCPAC 052143Z Mar 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 1 Mar 85.
3. J511 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 4 May 85; CINCPAC 112155Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 11 Apr 85.
level of commitment that would keep us from lagging behind the Soviet Union.\footnote{1}

\footnote{2} In still another Washington tasking, this from the JCS, CINCPAC was asked to report on the status of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation projects. CINCPAC sought updated information from COMUS Japan and the component commanders in the preparation of his 25 July reply.\footnote{3}

\footnote{3} The formal consultative forums were listed and described. He believed no additional formal consultative forums were necessary. Staff exchange visits between the Joint Staff Office and U.S. headquarters outside Japan were on-going; this was considered a useful program. JSO and PACOM staff members had exchanged visits annually; they were strictly military without direct involvement of civilian officials of the Japan Defense Agency. The first Navy-to-Navy talks had been held in December 1977 and had been considered a complete success; the next talks were scheduled for November 1979.

\begin{enumerate}
\item J5113 HistSum Jun 79 (\$), DECL 31 Jul 85; CINCPAC 120401Z Jun 79 (\$)(EX), DECL 30 Jun 85.
\item J511 HistSum Jun 79 (\$), DECL 31 Jul 85; CINCPAC 070453Z Jun 79 (\$)(BOM), DECL 30 Jun 85; CINCPAC 250016Z May 79 (\$)(BOM), DECL 24 May 85.
\item J511 HistSum Jul 79 (\$), DECL 31 Aug 85; CINCPAC 252150Z Jul 79 (\$), DECL 31 Jul 85.
\end{enumerate}
(U) Intelligence exchange programs were outlined, as was an on-going exchange-liaison program. These Service exchange programs ranged from formal to informal, and both on-going programs and proposed new initiatives were detailed.

(U) The use of joint and combined training areas was discussed and a number of specific technical and communications facilities were outlined.

(U) The most significant program and activity, however, concerned bilateral planning and associated activities. CINCPAC outlined guidelines, developments and requirements.

(U) CINCPAC concluded with a statement of requirements for an increasing number of U.S. officers well qualified not only in the Japanese language, but in the high degree of cultural orientation that Asians expected from one with Japanese language capability. Language training should reflect extensive area residence and cultural orientation, not merely satisfactory language test scores. CINCPAC knew this would cost more, but he believed that the potential return justified the additional cost.1

(U) As noted above, periodic exchange visits were made by the CINCPAC and Joint Staff Office staffs. During the period 4 to 9 September the CINCPAC Deputy Director of Plans led a delegation in talks and visits to military installations on Hokkaido.2

(U) Japan's defense budget was a matter of concern to the United States. In October the U.S. Secretary of Defense voiced concern to Japanese leaders that their defense budget should at least maintain the previous ratio to the Gross National Product of .9 percent. Subsequently, in development of strategy for a planned CINCPAC visit to Japan in December, the Office of the Secretary suggested that Admiral Long reiterate this concern. When Admiral Long's trip was postponed, he requested that COMUS Japan express the U.S. concerns to appropriate Japanese leaders. This was accomplished by COMUS Japan, and Ambassador Mansfield also made the same point with the Prime Minister. After lengthy

1. Ibid.
2. J5113 HistSum Sep 79 (U).
government debate, the Finance Ministry agreed to increase the defense budget by 6.5 percent, thereby maintaining the .9 percent ratio in the Japan Fiscal Year 1980 budget.¹

CINCPAC's interest (and that of the U.S. Government) in Japan fiscal matters was a result of the concepts of combined cost sharing and defense cooperation. The United States had been gaining some relief through a labor cost sharing agreement reached in 1977. In Japan FY 79 the Diet had funded approval for additional cost sharing, both for labor costs and for construction of support facilities at U.S. Forces bases. (These subjects are addressed in more detail in the Personnel and Logistics chapters of this history.) All indications were that the Japanese would be willing to continue the cost sharing program in future years.²

Based on CINCPAC recommendations, the U.S. Secretary of State had issued prioritized cost sharing objectives to insure coordinated political and military approaches to the Japanese Government. The Secretary had further identified a separate effort to obtain additional financial relief from Japan through the purusance of defense cooperation projects and had asked for CINCPAC's comments. CINCPAC's recommendations had noted that defense cooperation projects were primarily intended to increase the readiness and interoperability of U.S. Forces and the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Cost sharing projects were intended to relieve the cost of stationing U.S. Forces in Japan, and any resultant financial relief to the United States, CINCPAC believed, should be considered a bonus. Counterpart Service coordination was needed to identify and develop technical data for defense cooperation projects. Such projects could then be moved into the joint arena for unilateral and bilateral coordination. The whole concept of such defense cooperation projects had not been implemented, however, because of a lack of final Washington position on the concept.³

U.S.-Korea-Japan Military Cooperation

In response to State Department tasking, the U.S. Embassy in Seoul provided an assessment of existing Republic of Korea-Japan defense cooperation efforts. The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo submitted comments on the Korean message.

1. J5112 HistSum Dec 79 (G), DECL 31 Jan 86; CINCPAC 090112Z Dec 79 (G)(BOM), DECL 4 Dec 85.
2. J5112 Point Paper (C/(NF) of 10 Jan 80, Subj: US-Japan Cost Sharing (U), DECL 31 Jan 86.
CINC PAC action officers met with their counterparts on the component commands in preparation of the response concerning a peacetime show of force. In an informal meeting the major concern expressed was that any activities in Southeast Asia would impact on the U.S. ability to respond to contingencies in other areas. Any of the options under consideration would require further analysis prior to implementation.

CINC PAC's response to the JCS tasking was forwarded on 28 July.

1. J5113 HistSum Jun 79 (S), DECL 31 Jun 85; CINCPAC 092033Z Jun 79 (C), DECL 10 Jun 85.
2. JCS 2344/112309Z Jul 79 (S), DECL 11 Jul 85.
4. CINCPAC 282302Z Jul 79 (S), DECL 23 Jul 85.
(5) CINCPAC next provided a list of militarily feasible activities that would provide a peacetime show of force, including increased frequency of visits by senior ranking military and Defense Department personnel, continued efforts to accelerate Foreign Military Sales deliveries, increased scope and frequency of Mobile Training Team deployments, initiation of small-scale unit exchanges, and such. CINCPAC noted that the proposed options were tentative, and before any such activities were initiated a thorough examination to assess the factors of political and military desirability was required. The impact of the proposed actions on existing programs had not been assessed.

(6) CINCPAC cautioned that the impact on operational readiness of U.S. forces and the reduction in ability to respond to contingencies in other areas had to be carefully considered and close interagency coordination was required prior to implementation of any of the options.

1. Ibid.
1. JCS 4302/112330Z Dec 79 (S)(EX), DECL 11 Dec 85.
2. J5323 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 4 Jan 86; CINCPAC 140341Z Dec 79 (S)(EX), DECL 13 Dec 85.
3. J5314 HistSum Dec 79 (S), Decl 8 Jan 86, which cited CINCPAC 132315Z Dec 79.
4. Ibid., which cited JCS 211918Z Dec 79.
1. J5324 HistSum Jan. 79 (S), DECL 6 Feb 85; CINCPAC 110500Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 6 Feb 85. CINCPAC 130403Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 12 Jan 85 also provided suggestions on these deployments, ship visits, and increased transit flights.
2. JCS 1707/172017Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 15 Mar 85.
3. J5323 HistSum Nov 79 (S), DECL 7 Dec 85; CINCPAC 140202Z Jun 79 (S), DECL 12 Jun 85.
1. J5323 HistSum Nov 79 (S), DECL 7 Dec 85; JCS 5699/070125Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 6 Nov 85; CINCPAC 092142Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 7 Nov 85; PACOPS Hickam 210100Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 14 Nov 85, and 210101Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 1 Oct 85.
SECTION III--MISCELLANEOUS PLANNING ACTIVITIES

CINCPAC Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee

(U) On 20 February Admiral Weisner testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington. This was in connection with Congressional study of the Defense Department budget.\(^1\)

(U) In his prepared statement the Admiral noted that he had appeared before that committee's subcommittee on manpower and personnel two years earlier. At that time he had remarked that the Asian-Pacific region was one of continuing transformation. Relations with every nation had been altered to some degree and potential for further change had been foreseen. He continued:\(^2\)

Even so, it would have been difficult to predict that events over the intervening years would include Soviet and Cuban adventurism in the Horn of Africa, a coup in Afghanistan, a Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty, turmoil in Iran, the large-scale efforts of the People's Republic of China to industrialize, and the Vietnamese takeover of Kampuchea. In this atmosphere of dramatic transition, pragmatism and flexibility must govern military planning and U.S. force structuring in the Pacific.

(U) CINCPAC next proceeded to provide regional summaries of the PACOM; a summary of U.S. interests and objectives in economic, political, and security matters; the threat; U.S. defense requirements and such matters as strategy, collective security, forward defense, and forward basing; the PACOM force structure, by Service, and considerations of force improvement, personnel, and readiness and exercises.

(U) CINCPAC concluded:

...I submit that the Asia-Pacific region with its vast populations and resources is vitally important and demands our keen attention. Although we face many challenges, our

\(^1\) JS324 HistSum Feb 79 (U); Statement by Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN, Commander in Chief Pacific before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 20 Feb 79 (U).

\(^2\) Ibid.
continuous political, economic and security participation in the area is absolutely essential to realize our national goals. Our military presence and force balance are critical indicators of U.S. resolve and commitment; and our security objectives require that we remain a Pacific power. I believe it is imperative that we continue to fashion a national policy with firm sense of direction, and that we take actions consistent with that policy. We should always remain cognizant of the fact that our actions impact significantly on our allies' perceptions of U.S. intentions in the Pacific. Many of the serious problems that we face can be resolved if our allies are confident of our commitment, supported by an effective military capability deployed in the Asia-Pacific area. Our failure to maintain this visible and credible regional presence could have an adverse impact worldwide.

(U) Admiral Weisner thanked the Chairman, Senator John C. Stennis (D. MS), for inviting him to report from the Pacific. He then answered questions posed by the committee.¹

Quarterly Report of Major Issues and Activities

(U) In June 1977 the JCS advised that the Secretary of Defense had requested that each of the commanders of unified and specified commands provide him with quarterly reports listing the major issues and activities of his command. Since then, CINCPAC had provided quarterly reports to the Secretary with a copy to the Chairman of the JCS.²

(U) In his report of 4 April 1979, CINCPAC noted that several events of historical and military significance had occurred in the first quarter of 1979: China's incursion into Vietnam; the closing of the American Embassy in Taiwan; the overthrow of the monarchy in Iran; the decline and anticipated dissolution of CENTO; and violent uprisings in Afghanistan. "We continue to study areas of confrontation to insure that US interests are protected insofar as possible. In this vein, increased US presence in the Indian Ocean is a positive signal to allies in the region." CINCPAC, commenting on the conclusion of an amendment to the Military Bases Agreement in the Philippines, told the Secretary he appreciated the Secretary's strong support in Congress to restore funds for the Philippine compensation package, which would signal

¹ Ibid.
² CINCPAC Command History 1977 (FS/FRD), Vol. I, p. 152
positive U.S. intentions in implementing the amended agreement and in supporting the security interests of our Southeast Asia allies.¹

(§) CINCPAC's report for the second quarter noted that although the situation in the PACOM had been quieter in some respects, it remained unsettled. Afghan internal strife, conflict in Southeast Asia, and Pakistan aid problems persisted. As usual, CINCPAC outlined the major issues and activities, addressing in this report the International Military Education and Training Program, revisions to Defense Department security assistance procedures that might reduce the role of the CINCs in the security assistance program; use of Korean flag shipping and commercial airlines cargo airlift capability in crisis situations, exercise FORTRESS GALE, the second Pacific Armies Management Seminar, and completion of the Taiwan withdrawal.²

(§) CINCPAC also advised that in preceding months there had been encouraging signs of increased cooperation among friends and allies of the United States in the PACOM, perhaps in part to the Soviet naval expansion in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, which was viewed with concern by those allies. He cited as examples of greater cooperation P-3 access to airfields in the northern Indian Ocean littoral; allied coordinated surveillance of the Soviet ship MINSK and a task group during their transit to and operations in the northern Indian Ocean; visits of high ranking Saudi Arabian officers to USS MIDWAY while the carrier was in the Indian Ocean; and Japanese acceptance for the Maritime Self-Defense Forces to participate for the first time in Exercise RIMPAC 80.

(U) CINCPAC concluded by advising that the many high-level visitors to the PACOM during the quarter did much to assure friends and allies of the U.S. commitment to the area. "Visits by President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, and yourself to PACOM nations provided positive signal that US is vitally interested in stability and peace in Asia."³

(§) Admiral Weisner, who served as CINCPAC from 30 August 1976 until 31 October 1979, used the third quarterly report for 1979 as an executive end-of-tour report, explaining that he wanted to expand his comments and philosophize a bit about developments in the PACOM during his tour and discuss some unresolved issues and problems that "we should be prepared for in the future."⁴

1. CINCPAC 041950Z Apr 79 (§), DECL 3 Apr 85.
2. CINCPAC 070234Z Jul 79 (§), DECL 30 Jun 85.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 110410Z Oct 79 (§) (EX), DECL 30 Sep 85.

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CINCPAC first provided a summary of regional developments. He said Japan's new willingness to bring defense issues (including bilateral planning) and cooperation out publicly and to share costs had been one of the very positive developments of the previous three years. The withdrawal of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division from Korea appeared to have been put aside at least until after the U.S. election year, but continued concentration on North Korean capabilities and intentions remained a top-priority requirement.

He believed it was necessary to make known to Taiwan, our Asian allies, and the People's Republic that our new relationship with China had not caused a total abandonment of a former ally and that in building new friendships, remaining U.S. obligations would not be forgotten. He thought we would have to find new ways to fulfill our moral obligations to Taiwan when the Mutual Defense Treaty was no longer in effect. He acknowledged the complexities faced by the State Department in keeping with national objectives of presenting credible, balanced, and consistent military presence policies toward allies, friends, and potential allies.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations had further solidified under the pressure of events in Indochina. Movement toward converting ASEAN into a formal security alliance appeared neither likely nor desirable at the time.

In the South Pacific the decolonialization process was almost complete. The once-feared Soviet and Chinese initiatives had had little success so far, but Soviet efforts continued as evidenced by overtures to establish a fishing facility in Tonga and Samoa. Denial remained the dominant U.S. security strategy for the region.

In South Asia, political instability appeared to be spreading to India, further complicating the problem of devising a positive regional policy. CINCPAC said that regional uncertainties imposed a cautious, evenhanded approach. Even that approach, he said, offered little flexibility given the U.S. nonproliferation law, if India and Pakistan were girding for a nuclear arms race. He said that U.S. interests in South Asia must be advanced through close consultations at senior levels with India to convince India that U.S. policy was consistent with her interests, and with Pakistan to give her confidence in these critical times.
The Admiral said that the vast supplies of oil transversing the Indian Ocean to U.S., European, and Japanese markets; the destabilizing events between and within Indian Ocean littoral nations; Soviet expansion in the Pacific and, in particular, continuous Soviet inroads into the Indian Ocean region clearly argued for an increased U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas. Because of the nonproliferation issue, CINCPAC anticipated that the United States would face significant challenges in achieving adequate repair support and mobile logistics support as diplomatic efforts to obtain necessary port and airfield access, exercise areas, and combined exercise opportunities became more difficult.

In the next part of his report, CINCPAC summarized his concerns relative to force level requirements and strategy for the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. He said that the Soviet Union, like the United States, had vested interests in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Ocean areas. "However, after years of giving forces in Europe priority claim on new weapons, the Soviets are now sending their best bombers, fighter-bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, armored personnel carriers, aircraft carriers, guided missile cruisers and assault landing craft to the Far East." A shift in Soviet priorities was evident with about one-third of her deployed forces stationed in the Far East, an increase of approximately 10 percent over the previous five years. The Soviet Pacific Fleet was the largest of the Soviet fleets. The strength of their ground forces deployed in Asia had increased to 46 divisions, and 25 percent of their bomber force was located in the Far East. "I believe these quantitative and qualitative improvements in Soviet Far East force posture reflect their perceptions that USSR may have to wage a simultaneous war with NATO in the West and against China and the US and its allies in the East. Against this backdrop, PACOM forces have not kept pace with the growing Soviet threat."

CINCPAC said that from 1974 to 1979 there had been an overall reduction of 12 percent in PACOM assigned military personnel.
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(5) Regarding his submissions to the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis, CINCPAC said that he had identified prudent risk force requirements, but that shortfalls between existing and prudent risk forces continued to increase. "I recognize that current fiscal constraints will not permit us to get well in the near term but we must reverse the trend of declining forces relative to the Soviets." We are not being fair to ourselves, he continued, "when we cite projected five year force level improvements, which never occur because of various changes in decisions and fiscal appropriations, as proof we will maintain a superior posture. Since we overstate what we will do and sometimes underestimate Russian advances, these projections invariably result in an inflated impression of our future capabilities vis-a-vis the Soviets and can ultimately lead to dangerous consequences because of the way they tend to influence our strategy." CINCPAC said, "The bottom line is the 'now' year never happens as projected and we never get well."

(5) CINCPAC addressed guidance on forces and strategy. He reiterated his frequently delivered message that Draft Consolidated Guidance emphasized what could be done with programmed forces without examining whether the forces were adequate for protection of vital U.S. national interests, and capable of coping with the totality of Soviet military power.

(5) Admiral Weisner outlined a number of other issues of concern to him. Regarding PACOM exercises, CINCPAC commented on the large distances involved in moving forces and said that funding had to be provided to support an active exercise program.

(U) He commented on the control of public information by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; their guidance to CINCPAC and his staff had been not to comment but to refer queries to that office. He said, "I feel strongly that greater latitude and flexibility should be given to the unified commander in this regard. The ability to selectively release information of importance to the CINCs, allies and our friends should be commensurate with the CINCs' responsibility. Such release of information can go far to enhance the credibility of PACOM in the eyes of the foreign countries in the region."

(U) CINCPAC commented on two matters concerning the Washington community. First was the increased tendency, because of modern communications, to deal directly with the unified CINC's subordinate commands, plus an increase in the number of requests directly to the field for information to be used by "committees" for problem solution at the Defense level or interagency meetings. He recognized the press for expendent action, but recommended that the
existing chain of command be considered essential to reduce the probability that decisions would be made on incomplete information that had bypassed proper evaluation. The second matter was his concern that matters of importance to a CINC did not always receive appropriate level attention in Washington. Too many times, he said, decisions were made by middle management (State desk officers, deputy assistant secretaries) in the routine course of their duties that might take precedence over the advice of the unified commanders and the JCS. He said that on too many occasions he had had to get personally involved to insure that his views on a given issue received appropriate level attention. "My concern is that decisions are being made without the attention and consideration of those most qualified and responsible to make them." There was also a tendency to form "ad hoc" groups that, intentionally or otherwise, circumvented the chain of command.

Regarding the Philippine bases agreement, CINCPAC noted that the relation that followed the 9 January 1979 signing had subsided somewhat, and he recommended that before the subject came up for review again in 1984 that the United States needed to smooth out the peaks and valleys of our overall relationship with that country. He believed we should seek more permanent and stable relations with this ally.

CINCPAC outlined the benefits of training foreign military personnel and urged the Defense Department to fully support increased funding of the International Military and Education Training Program and the greater use of combined exercises and small unit exchanges as a means to effectively and inexpensively encourage empathetic relations between the United States and friendly nations.

CINCPAC noted that he had for years consistently expressed concerns about PACOM countries' perceptions of U.S. resolve and commitment in the Asia-Pacific area. He believed that the State and Defense Departments and the "embassies in the loop" were now working together better to speak with one voice and strengthen U.S. credibility in this area. He appreciated the special effort in Washington to provide high-level visitors to the area and to assign people with special insight and recognized credentials who enhanced Asian respect for the United States in the PACOM. He believed the efforts were achieving positive results and believed we needed to do those things necessary to further "this favorable trend."

The significant exercise FORTRESS GALE had been held successfully on Okinawa in August, despite a typhoon and some local press opposition. It had been received throughout Japan in proper balance and appeared to have opened some doors for improved training, future cooperation, and the possibility of more ambitious joint exercises with Japan.
(U) CINCPAC again thanked the Secretary for the quarterly opportunity to comment directly to him on major issues in the PACOM and he noted that the Secretary's prompt response to issues identified in previous reports had assisted him and his staff by providing timely guidance and insight on issues of paramount concern. He recommended that the quarterly report process be continued.

(U) Admiral Long submitted his first report in this series at the end of the last quarter of 1979. He noted that Admiral Weisner had remarked that change was the expected and challenges were great in the Pacific, and that had certainly been true in the first two months Admiral Long served as CINCPAC. Since 1 November the U.S. hostages had been seized in Iran, the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan was attacked, the U.S. force presence in the Indian Ocean increased significantly, there was a deluge of Kampuchean refugees, disaster relief operations were needed on Majuro in the Marshall Islands, the mid-December actions by younger Korean generals had taken place, and the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan.

(3) Admiral Long said that those events had permitted him a unique opportunity to quickly size operational capabilities and, of equal importance, assess related limitations. He said that events in Iran and Afghanistan had highlighted operational limitations in bringing credible forces to bear quickly and sustaining the effectiveness of those forces.

(3) He described the growing Soviet presence in Southeast Asia and the clear evidence of an effort to establish a formidable permanent presence. He also described the need for additional intelligence coverage of the "third world," a matter of reviewing intelligence priorities and resource allocations.

(3) CINCPAC discussed U.S. initiatives and objectives in Thailand, the complex diplomatic issues in dealing with China and Taiwan, and expanded contacts between the U.S. Army and Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force.

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 100431Z Jan 80 (TS/ERD) (EX), DECL 31 Jan 86.
The Admiral noted that military pay was the single biggest issue with our military people. He said he realized that the Secretary had been directly involved personally and solicited his continued support. "We must retain qualified and motivated people through both a sense of fulfillment from the Service way of life and an adequate standard of living in relation to peers in civilian life." Also regarding the troops, CINCPAC said he was especially proud of the "great job our forces are doing in the Indian Ocean," and the way they had weathered the personal hardships inherent in responding to crisis situations. Admiral Long concluded by noting that he appreciated the opportunity to continue providing his views in this series of reports.

PACOM Carrier Force Levels

The PACOM had been reduced to six aircraft carriers by 1976, the lowest number in its history at a time when the PACOM area had greatly expanded into the Indian Ocean regions. On-going tasking in 1979 to maintain a near-term carrier presence in the Indian Ocean had resulted in spreading resources more thinly, reduced carrier availability to respond to crises in Korea and Japan, and increased the length of deployments to the point where a feasible Indian Ocean deployment meant 7.1/2 months from CONUS departure to return.

1. Ibid.
2. J5322 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 7 May 85.
3. CINCPAC 142209Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 13 Apr 85.
The JCS responded by requesting the comments of the CINCs of the European and Atlantic Commands on the points raised by CINCPAC. The Chairman advised CINCPAC that he understood the urgency of the request. Upon receipt of the comments of the other commanders the JCS would review the near-term disposition of carrier assets. Long-term requirements would be addressed as part of the normal Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System cycle.

Neither of the commands with forces committed in the Atlantic and Europe supported CINCPAC's request; they cited their own deficiencies. On 16 May the Chairman of the JCS advised that there was a clear consensus that U.S. carrier assets were insufficient to meet the many competing demands for them. The Chairman said that he was persuaded that the existing assignment of carriers was proper and that "we should not aggravate regional deficiencies... by redistributing these limited assets at this time." The Chairman did not rule out the possible use of Atlantic Fleet carrier assets for contingency purposes in the Indian Ocean, if required. He said he would continue to welcome the assessments of the CINCs regarding evolving threats in their areas.

1. JCS 4486/202343Z Apr 79 (5) (EX), DECL 19 Apr 85.
2. CINCPAC 211759Z Apr 79 (5), REVW 21 Apr 85.
3. JCS 2467/301305Z Apr 79 (5) (EX), DECL 23 Apr 85.
of responsibility as they impacted on the assignment of forces. Such exchanges, he said, were requisite to the development of a worldwide posture that most nearly met the overall interests of the United States. He reiterated that the JCS would continue to evaluate and analyze comments already presented as part of the Joint Strategic Planning Document/Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan review process as those key force level documents were developed.1

U.S. Military Presence in the Mid-East and Indian Ocean Regions

Prior to the Vietnam War, periodic Indian Ocean deployments had been conducted by units of the SEVENTH Fleet. These were in addition to the presence of the Middle-East Force, based at Bahrain from 1949 to 1977 (since then an afloat command), and consisting of a flagship (normally USS LA SALLE (AGF-3)) and two destroyers or frigates of the Atlantic Command. There had been three PACOM task group deployments per year in the 1976-1978 time frame, but the deteriorating situation in that part of the world caused the military community to spend a great deal of time in 1979 planning to increase the U.S. presence there. Actual deployments in 1979 are discussed in the Operations chapter of this history, and considerations between planning and operations overlapped throughout the year.2

On 9 February 1979 the JCS tasked CINCPAC to comment on proposals by the Secretary of Defense to increase the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea areas. The Secretary had asked to include in the considerations the possibility of augmenting the Mid-East Force with a modest tactical air capability. The Secretary had suggested a force built around amphibious assault ships (LHA or LPH) with AV-8A (HARRIER vertical/short take-off-and landing) aircraft embarked. The LHA or LPH would replace LA SALLE as the Mid-East Force flagship. He also suggested augmenting the size of the three-ship force by two or three additional escort. He requested consideration of this augmented force as a fifth numbered fleet. Finally, he suggested the possibility that a carrier with its associated air wing could be periodically deployed, perhaps for three or four months at a time, as a replacement for the LPH/LHA flagship.3

For planning purposes, the JCS said, the force described suggested the mission of demonstrating U.S. resolve in the area that "conveys to the

1. CINCLANT 021802Z May 79 (S) GDS Apr 87; USNMR SHAPE 031630Z May 79 (S), DECL: 87; JCS 4465/161711Z May 79 (S) (EX), DECL 14 May 85.
3. JCS 3730/092350Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 9 Feb 85. An LPH was an Amphibious Assault Ship, an LHA was an Amphibious Assault Ship (General Purpose).
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USSR as well as US friends and allies the concern the United States attaches to the stability and security of the area." Other suggested missions were providing a visible naval presence in the area by routine operations, port visits, and participation in combined exercises; and supporting U.S. and allied interests in limited contingency situations utilizing naval gunfire support, an embarked Marine air-ground task force, and, when present, naval carrier based air support. The final suggested mission was to be prepared to conduct a show of force to deter outside intervention in a regional crisis; assist efforts to insure the safe arrival of U.S. ground and air reinforcements as directed; defend the sea lines of communication against enemy attacks; attack and destroy enemy ground, sea, and air units in support of U.S. and allied forces; and perform other operations as directed.1

($) CINCPAC's response of 14 February presented a concept to achieve the objectives of the tasking. The concept called for a FIFTH Fleet under CINCPACFLT, use of LA SALLE as the flagship, and adding four or five PACOM escorts to the Mid-East Force, a carrier or amphibious assault ship on a rotating basis from the PACOM, tailored amphibious forces as required, and additional repair and Mobile Logistics Support Force support.2

($) CINCPAC said LA SALLE should be retained as the flagship because of her command, control, and communications capability; the ship could also provide office, berthing and environmental services to support a forward deployed fleet staff (and would obviate the need to cross-deck the staff with every ship rotation).

($) CINCPAC's proposed area of operations would be the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean east of 17 degrees East and west of 104 degrees East. New CHOP (change operational control) lines should be established in the northern extremity of the Red Sea, CINCPAC said, and from the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula south along the 104 degree East longitude line, with turnover to FIFTH Fleet for PACFLT units occurring in the vicinity of Singapore and LANTFLT units in the northern Red Sea. "Change to Unified Command Plan would be required to incorporate Red Sea and Persian Gulf in the PACOM area of responsibility," CINCPAC said.3

($) The increased commitment would spread PACOM resources more thinly, reduce the SEVENTH Fleet's capability in amphibious operations during deployments of the LPH or LHA FIFTH Fleet deployments and in tactical air

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 140713Z Feb 79 ($) , DECL 13 Feb 85.
3. Ibid. No change to the Unified Command Plan took place in 1979, however.

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during carrier deployments, and would challenge Mobile Logistics Support Force capabilities. CINCPAC believed, however, that those costs were no more than appropriate to the realignment of objectives that had been outlined by the Secretary of Defense and the JCS.¹

(\$) The CINC of the European Command also provided his recommendations, noting that he believed that prior to tailoring the naval force there should be an overall review of region-wide security requirements and objectives to include appropriate revisions to U.S. policies with respect to future U.S. diplomatic, military, and intelligence representation in the region. He added, parenthetically, that "any drift toward a PACOM based command and control arrangement would be fundamentally 'off center.'"²

(\$) On 17 February the JCS provided further information regarding the consideration being given to the rotation of tactical fighter squadrons to the Arabian Peninsula states in conjunction with the naval measures. The JCS said they were looking at three options:³

- Establish Dhahran Air Base in Saudi Arabia as a base to which a USAF squadron could rotate. The squadron would have minimum manning and depend extensively on Saudi support.

- Use bases in several Arabian Peninsula states—such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE (Union of Arab Emirates), and Oman. Rotate a squadron sequentially into these states. (It was acknowledged that this option would be complex to manage, but might have significant political utility.)

- Establish Dhahran as a main operating base from which periodic deployments to other states could be made.

(\$) In another query, the JCS had requested comments on the possibility of initially designating the increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean as a numbered "task fleet" or as a "task force" rather than a numbered fleet. CINCPACFLT provided a comment on this question on 29 March. He said that the Navy's battle organization numbering system had evolved over a long period of time and was a well-organized, logical system that was an integral part of the command structure of the Navy. Arbitrarily modifying this system for political

1. Ibid.
2. USCINCEUR 162005Z Feb 79 (\$), DECL 16 Feb 87
3. JCS 2150/171902Z Feb 79 (\$), REW 17 Feb 87.
reasons was considered undesirable and not recommended. He said that the in-use designation "task group" most accurately described the size, capabilities, and functions of the forces then deployed in the Indian Ocean and should be retained if the fifth numbered fleet proposal was not adopted.\(^1\)

\(^1\) In still another facet of planning, and as a response to the JCS tasking messages of 9 and 17 February, CINCPAC provided his thoughts on the need to reassess the capabilities of Diego Garcia with the objective of expanding both its operational and support capabilities. He said that he recognized that the expansion of U.S. military activities would require coordination within the U.S. Government, would have international political implications, and would require modification of the U.S.-United Kingdom use agreement. "Nevertheless, long term US interests in the Indian Ocean/Middle East argue for increased presence with some attendant increase in support capability at Diego Garcia."\(^2\)

\(^2\) He noted that the strategic location of Diego Garcia made it an ideal staging base to support U.S. interests, objectives, and military contingency operations in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, or Africa. He recommended that the JCS or the Navy, as the executive agent, examine the utility of upgrading the facility to improve PACOM forward operating posture by increasing Diego Garcia's capability in certain specific areas: airfield control tower improvement; additional munitions storage; increased aircraft maintenance support; establishment of limited ship repair facility; equipage of pier with steam, water, and electric services for docked ships; additional housing and messing; overall improvements to support transient tactical aircraft, KC-135 tankers, and strategic reconnaissance platforms; and other overall support capabilities as might be appropriate, in particular the capacity of the island water system to support additional people.\(^3\)

\(^3\) The on-going investigation of the whole subject continued and on 31 March the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on six alternatives for effecting the increased U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean area. The six alternatives drew on three basic themes: increasing the size of the Mid-East Force, increasing the deployment frequency of SEVENTH Fleet units, and utilizing tactical air forces of the USAF or USMC to augment either or both.\(^4\)

\(^4\) 1. CINCPACFLT 292353Z Mar 79 \(\$(\), DECL 26 Mar 85.
2. CINCPAC 110136Z Apr 79 \(\$(\), DECL 5 Apr 85.
3. Ibid.
4. JCS 6114/311723Z Mar 79 \(\$(\), DECL 31 Mar 85.
On 5 April CINCPAC responded. He recommended that the Mid-East Force be kept at the same size but that it be designated a task group under the Commander SEVENTH Fleet. For the near term, he recommended augmenting the Mid-East Force by increasing SEVENTH Fleet deployments to one per quarter (an increase of from three to four per year, using carrier battle groups, surface combatant task groups, or an LHA or LPH with a Marine Amphibious Group task force embarked, and use of tactical air deployments to cover the periods when a carrier battle group would not be deployed.\textsuperscript{1}

The CINCPAC message also addressed unity of command. "For optimum C\textsuperscript{2} (command and control), unity of effort, political impact, and efficient utilization of assets, forces operating in Red Sea and Persian Gulf should be under operational command of CINCPAC. This arrangement will permit conduct of maritime operations by CINCPAC in Red Sea/Persian Gulf to support CINCEUR and other designated commands."

In conclusion, he said, the PACOM could implement any option addressed by the JCS with varying impacts on other missions. He recommended the phased increase of the U.S. presence to be as follows:\textsuperscript{2}

- The Mid-East Force be designated as a task group under COMSEVENTHFLT with units continuing to be provided by the European and Atlantic commands.

- In the near term augment that Mid-East Force task group's presence with a PACOM surface or amphibious assault ship with a Marine Amphibious Group task force embarked, or a carrier once per quarter for approximately 45 days each.

- Initiate periodic tactical air deployments, primarily to cover gaps in carrier presence.

CINCPAC said those force levels would equate to near continuous presence and achieve the objective of maintaining a credible force in the area to balance the Soviet presence.

The JCS advised in April that an organizing meeting of the Special Coordination Committee of the National Security Council would take place in early May to review security, diplomatic, and arms control issues affecting U.S. national interests and regional stability in the Middle East region.

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1. CINCPAC 050550Z Apr 79 (\$), DECL 4 Apr 85.
2. Ibid.
Subsequent meetings of the Policy Review Committee (PRC) of the National Security Council would discuss force deployments and other military issues to enhance the U.S. capability to respond to Middle East issues.¹

The JCS noted that in preparation for those meetings they had found CINCPAC's comments both timely and appreciated and they would be considered in preparation of the on-going action. Once a policy decision was reached to continue an increased military presence and military objectives had been determined, a detailed analysis of Diego Garcia would be required and CINCPAC's support would be solicited.²

On 22 June the Policy Review Committee agreed to increase the U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean. The JCS requested the unified commanders' assessments of the impact on existing deployment commitments, exercises, and operating tempo; they also requested that CINCPAC submit an illustrative deployment schedule for 1980 to 1982 and a PACOM assessment of impact.³

CINCPAC's 28 June response, with subsequent minor adjustments, provided the following schedule:⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Source/Forces</th>
<th>Days Presence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>EUCOM/LANTCOM/Surface Combatant Task Group</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUCOM/REDCOM/Tactical Air</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PACOM/Carrier Battle Group</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PACOM/Surface Combatant Task Group or Marine Air Ground Task Force (Marine Amphibious Unit/Amphibious Ready Group)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PACOM/Tactical Air</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PACOM/Carrier Battle Group</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PACOM/Surface Combatant Task Group</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUCOM, REDCOM/Tactical Air</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>EUCOM, LANTCOM/SAE Air Ground Task Force</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>EUCOM, LANTCOM/Surface Combatant Task Group</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PACOM/Tactical Air</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ JCS 7705/2620222Z Apr 79 (§)S, DECL 26 Apr 85.
² Ibid.
³ CINCPAC 280300Z Jun 79 (§), DECL 26 Jun 85, which referenced JCS 231835Z Jun 79.
⁴ J5325 HistSum Oct 79 (§), DECL 14 Feb 85; JCS 1587/280300Z Jun 79 (§), DECL 26 Jun 85, which was a TANGO message dispatched by CINCPAC to the JCS by JCS communication facilities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Source/Forces</th>
<th>Days Presence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>EUCOM, LANTCOM/Carrier Battle Group</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>PACOM/Carrier Battle Group</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PACOM/Surface Combatant Task Group</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PACOM/Tactical Air</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUCOM, REDCOM/Tactical Air</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PACOM/Surface Combatant Task Group or Marine Air Ground Task Force</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In August CINCPAC responded to a JCS request for analysis of the diplomatic and littoral support required for an increased U.S. presence. The desired increased access to ports and airfields was described along with an outline of requirements and statement of problem areas. CINCPAC believed:

- Increased exercise opportunity with littoral nations was necessary.
- Increased repair opportunity and facilities, particularly for Mid-East Force units, would be needed.
- Exercise areas for amphibious forces should be established prior to deployment of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Such a deployment without an exercise would cause a visible reduction in Northwest Pacific capability, result in little increase in Indian Ocean visibility, and seriously degrade readiness of the force.
- Repair and logistic support should be provided to deploying forces by their source command rather than having the PACOM provide Mobile Logistic Support Force or destroyer tender repair ship support to European Command forces deployed to the Indian Ocean.
- Scheduling flexibility should be retained by the CINCs to account for support problems and contingencies.

Following deliberations by the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense, the JCS were directed to proceed with planning for an expansion of the Mid-East Force by two to three surface combatants from the

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European Command, an increased presence through deployment of at least one
tactical air squadron per year if it was politically feasible, and an increase
in the number of routine naval deployments from three to four per year, two
to be carrier battle groups, one a Marine Air-Ground Task Force, and one a
surface combatant task group. Prior to deployment of either Marines or the
tactical air squadron to the vicinity of the Arabian Peninsula, national level
political consultations would be conducted. They noted that additional short-
notice deployments might be required to deal with unforeseeable events in that
region.¹

(§) The JCS said that naval deployments to the Indian Ocean should rely
heavily on forces already deployed to the European or Pacific theaters, and
that the deployment tempo from the CONUS would not be increased unless there
were urgent political or military considerations. Degradation to morale,
Service retention, and materiel readiness should be avoided by utilizing
already deployed naval assets and a balanced reduction of unilateral and
combined exercises elsewhere. They said that parallel diplomatic and economic
actions would be taken to secure access to those regional ports and airfields
necessary to support the increased number of deployments.²

(§) Earlier, SAC had suggested introducing B-52s into the Indian Ocean
initiatives. On 2 August the JCS had advised that the option had merit, but
that politically the time was not "propitious" to pursue the initiative beyond
the planning phase. The JCS recommended that CINCPAC work with CINCSAC to
coordinate planning for the inclusion of B-52s.³

(§) In response to the JCS message of 7 September, CINCPAC provided a
recommendation for planned deployments. He recommended a June-July 1980
deployment of a USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64) battle group and a similar group led
by USS RANGER (CV-61) in October-November 1980. The proposed third quarter
deployment was described as dependent upon training area availability for
amphibious forces and political considerations regarding the impact of
introducing an amphibious presence. Options outlined included a surface
combatant task group deployment, a token amphibious presence, or deployment of
a full Western Pacific Amphibious Ready Group. He further proposed the
deployment of 12 PACAF F-4E aircraft to Dhahran Airfield in Saudi Arabia in
July 1980 with replacement aircraft to be deployed from CONUS to Clark Air
Base in the Philippines.⁴

1. JCS 1484/071725Z Sep 79 (§), DECL 4 Sep 85.
2. Ibid.
3. HQ SAC 172102Z Jul 79 (§), DECL 6 Jul 85; JCS 6994/022351Z Aug 79 (§),
   DECL 28 Jul 85.
SECRET

For each deployment CINCPAC outlined funding and fuel requirements and potential operational concepts and exercises.¹

CINCPAC also stated that he would pursue with the CINC of the Readiness Command the cost and feasibility of replacements from CONUS assets for the F-4Es from Clark to Dhahran. Accordingly, on 26 October CINCPAC requested cost and feasibility data for such a backfill from CINCRED. The response from that command on 1 November indicated that such a deployment could be tailored to the Tactical Air Command's CORONET series concept of deploying minimum assets to conduct a mission. The deployment would cost a total of $1.17 million.²

The European Command also responded to the JCS message of 7 September; they proposed that the Mid-East Force not be augmented during battle group or surface combatant task group deployments, or that PACOM assets be used for such augmentation. CINCPAC advised the JCS that he agreed that augmentation would not be critical during deployments of carrier battle groups or surface combatant task force deployments, but he argued that PACOM assets should not be used to augment the Mid-East Force. Using EUCOM forces permitted more efficient use of augmenting ships as surveillance/presence assets immediately after exiting the Suez Canal, while PACOM surface units had to make a 14-day transit to reach or return from the Mid-East Force area.³

The whole planning process changed abruptly with the seizure of American hostages by Iranian militants on 4 November, and the rest of the story is covered in the Operations chapter of this history. The USSR's invasion of Afghanistan on 25 December further heightened tensions.

On 30 December the JCS advised that a requirement existed to maintain an increased naval presence on a contingency basis until further notice. Accordingly, JCS recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for implementation of the planning for a non-contingency presence were being held in abeyance. CINCPAC advised his Navy and Air Force component commanders that detailed deployment planning for 1980 scheduling options would be suspended at CINCPAC until relief from ongoing contingency commitments was in sight.⁴

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.; J5323 HistSum Oct 79 (S), DECL 5 Oct 85; CINCPAC 260403Z Oct 79 (S), DECL 24 Oct 85; USCINCRED 012204Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 30 Oct 85.
3. CINCPAC 152125Z Oct 79 (S), DECL 11 Oct 85.
4. J5325 HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 5 Feb 86; JSC 2380/300429Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 28 Dec 85; CINCPAC 010321Z Jan 80 (S), DECL 31 Dec 85.
In the matter of the further expansion of Diego Garcia, on 19 December the JCS advised they were examining the subject, over and above the Military Construction Program for FY 81-84, to support the increased U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean and requested CINCPAC's views on politically and economically unconstrained expansion. CINCPAC sought the advice of his component commands and on 29 December provided his response to the JCS. CINCPAC said that recent events in Iran and Afghanistan had provided clear indications that the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region would become more unstable in the future and the PACOM strongly advocated an increased U.S. presence in the area. He emphasized, however, that because of physical limitations and remote location, Diego Garcia was not the ideal location for military power projection. Although improvements could be made to increase the logistic support capabilities and response times, the ultimate answer should be found by the Department of State pursuing efforts to acquire additional, appropriate bases and facilities in the Middle East area. In response to JCS tasking, however, CINCPAC outlined three major areas of support that Diego Garcia could provide. First was as a resupply and staging area for Navy and Marine forces. Second was as a staging-throughput base for Air Force tactical air, reconnaissance/intelligence, transport, and Strategic Air Command aircraft. Third was as a staging-throughput area for a U.S. Army force. CINCPAC provided a list of improvements by priority by Service and concluded with recommendations for optimized locations of the various units if the whole island were utilized. Air defense of the island was not addressed.1

1. J5322 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 8 Jan 86; JCS 2911/190003Z Dec 79 (S) (EX), DECL 18 Dec 85; CINCPAC 292151Z Dec 79 (S) (EX), DECL 31 Dec 85.

2. J542 HistSum Dec 79 (S/FRD).
2. COMUSJ 290824Z Aug 79 (TS), REVW 31 Aug 99.
1. CINCPAC 082242Z Sep 79 (TS/FRD).
2. J541 HistSum Dec 79 (TS/FRD).
1. Ibid.
NATO Naval Control of Shipping Responsibilities.

Late in December 1978 the JCS had requested CINCPAC's comments concerning the suitability of regional coordination responsibilities for NATO naval control of shipping in the South Atlantic, Middle East, and Western Indian Ocean areas. CINCPAC concurred with the boundaries that had been proposed. CINCPAC recommended that for clarity a modification should stipulate that the broad agreement for naval control of shipping in the Western Indian Ocean in effect between the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and CINCPAC would apply for naval control of shipping in the PACOM area. The United States was to be the regional coordinator as provided for in the SACLANT/CINCPAC agreement for protection of shipping mission in the Indian Ocean. Area Delta was to be the area to be established covering the Western Indian Ocean and Middle East waters bounded by 17 degrees east and 78 degrees east, to include the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.3

Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation Range, Japan

CINCPACAF proposed to build an Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation range on Okinawa and requested that CINCPAC, through COMUS Japan, seek approval from the Japanese Government in principle for the installation. CINCPACAF had

1. Ibid.
3. J5123 HistSum Jan 79 (U); CINCPAC 050033Z Jan 79 (TS), DECL 29 Dec 84.
also requested a time estimate required to obtain land, airspace, and
frequency approval. COMUS Japan was provided with the definitive data deemed
necessary by PACAF to approach the Japanese through the U.S. Embassy in
Tokyo. CINCPAC advised COMUS Japan to keep all concerned informed of the
progress of the project.¹

Negotiations Concerning Kiribati (the Gilbert Islands)

(U) The new nation of Kiribati was created on 12 July. The new state
was composed of three groups of islands: the Gilberts, the Phoenix Islands,
and the Line Islands and Banaba (formerly called Ocean Island). Under
colonial rule they had been linked with the Ellice Islands, but those islands
had opted for independence earlier under the name Tuvalu. The 33 islands of
Kiribati totaled only 264 square miles in land area but were strung out across
some 2 million square miles of the central Pacific. Hawaii Governor George
R. Ariyoshi led the U.S. delegation to the independence ceremonies; Princess
Anne represented the Queen.²

(§) Delegations from the Gilbert Islands, the United Kingdom, and the
United States had met on 25 and 26 January at CINCPAC Headquarters to draft
an agreement by which the United States would cede its claims to 14 islands
in the Phoenix and Line Island groups. The 14 islands were claimed by the
United States under the 1856 Guano Act; the claim had been contested between
the United Kingdom and the United States since that time. The United States,
with the creation of the independent nation, was seeking non-discriminatory
treatment for American Samoa's fisheries, use rights for U.S. military
facilities on Canton and Enderbury Islands, and an agreement from Kiribati
that no third power would be permitted use of U.S. military facilities without
the consent of the U.S. Government. At the end of the two days of negotiations,
the draft treaty and diplomatic notes were finalized for presentation to the
respective governments.³

(§) Included in the new nation of Kiribati was the U.S.-administered
Canton Atoll complex, which included a runway, billets, water and power
distribution systems, a desalinization plant, etc. Because of interest by
Kiribati, American Samoa, and the State of Hawaii in maintaining the facility
in good condition, the U.S. Government had agreed to leave some $50 million

1. J511 HistSum Jun 79 (§), DECL 31 Jul 85; CINCPAC 232052Z Jun 79 (§), DECL
   30 Jun 85.
2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin & Advertiser, 8 Jul 79, p. A-20 (U), and 29 Jun 79
   (U).
3. J5124 HistSum Jan 79 (§), DECL 27 Jan 85; CINCPAC 272232Z Jan 79 (§),
   DECL 27 Jan 85.
worth of equipment in place. The USAF, however, had terminated the care-taking contract with Global Associates as of 11 July. Kiribati asked for a one-year overlap with Global employees so that their people could learn to run and maintain the equipment. CINCPAC sought JCS reconsideration of a decision to terminate the U.S. presence abruptly on 11 July. The JCS responded that USAF contract personnel would leave on the 11th, but that Hawaii and American Samoa were cooperating with the Kiribatis to provide transition assistance.¹

**CINCPAC Briefing Teams Visit Australia**

(U) CINCPAC briefing teams continued their twice-a-year visits to Australian Service schools in 1979, as they had done for many years. The teams were customarily headed by a flag or general officer of the CINCPAC staff. RADM D. B. Shelton, USN, CINCPAC's Director for Plans, headed the team that briefed the Australian Joint Services Staff College in Canberra on 23 and 24 May. Two members of Admiral Shelton's staff and a representative of the Operations Directorate presented the seminar and discussed the impact of weapons development and military technology on the structure of U.S. forces, and possible developments in Northeast and Southeast Asia and in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas.²

(U) A second team visited in November, this headed by BGEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, the Deputy Director for Plans, with three members of the Plans staff and a representative of the Operations Directorate. They conducted briefings at the Australian Staff College on 3 November, the Joint Services Staff College on 7 November, and the Royal Australian Air Force Staff College on 9 November. All formal presentations were well received and provided the basis for question periods. Student comments at all colleges reflected an Australian concern, not so much with the U.S. contribution to ANZUS, but with Australian responsibilities and possible contributions. Their views appeared balanced and realistic, reflecting an appreciation of the influence of national interests and the interplay of military and political factors in determining national actions. Team members were also invited to a working luncheon in the Victoria (State) Parliament dining room attended by a number of Australians interested in defense policy matters. One of the guests, the Federal Parliament Chairman of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, arranged for a follow-up meeting with some members of his committee in Canberra.³

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1. J5124 HistSum Jun 79 (C), DECL 31 Jul 85; CINCPAC 212159Z Jun 79 (C), DECL 30 Jun 85; JCS 1775/281336Z Jun 79 (C), DECL 27 Jun 85.
2. J5131 HistSum May 79; CINCPAC 111749Z May 79 (U).
CHAPTER IV
MILITARY OPERATIONS

Indian Ocean Operations

The nearly continuous U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean that had begun in November 1978 continued throughout 1979, and for a large part of 1979 a carrier battle group presence was maintained. As the situation in Iran deteriorated, and, as discussed in the Plans chapter of this history, planning continued to increase the long-term naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea area. The number of deployments, and the number of deployment days greatly increased over what had been the standard. "Normal" deployments in previous years had involved one carrier battle group and two surface combatant task groups per year. There had been an 8 to 10 week interval between such deployments. The 1979 deployments were made on an ad hoc basis in response to specific regional events, were more frequent, and lasted longer.

At the end of 1978 a surface combatant task group (TG 75.1) continued a deployment that had begun on 15 November. It consisted of USS STERETT (CG-31) with Commander, Task Force 75 embarked, USS WADDELL (DDG-24), USS BRADLEY (FF-1041), and USNS PASSUMPSIC (TAO-107). The task group had been scheduled to depart the Indian Ocean via the Lombok Strait on 7 January, but it was retained in the Indian Ocean for possible contingency operations until 19 January 1979.

Late in December 1978 CINCPAC had been directed to position a carrier task force in the vicinity of Singapore to be prepared for a possible Indian Ocean-Arabian Sea deployment. TG 77.7 consisted of USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64), USS LEAHY (CG-16), USS KINKAID (DD-965) with Commander, Destroyer Squadron SEVEN embarked, USS DECATUR (DDG-31), USS HOEL (DDG-13), and USNS MISPELLION (TAO-105).

The task group arrived as directed in the vicinity of Singapore on 2 January. The next day USNS MISPELLION detached from TG 77.7 and relieved USNS PASSUMPSIC in support of TG 75.1 on 12 January. USS KANSAS CITY (AOR-3) was designated as relief for MISPELLION and joined the task group on 4 January.

2. Ibid. The USS HOEL was in the task group, not USS SOMERS (DDG-34) as reported in the 1978 history.
3. J313 HistSum Jan 79 (TS), REVW 8 Feb 83.
On 7 January USS KINKAID, with Commander Destroyer Squadron SEVEN embarked, USS HOEL and USS DECATUR detached from TG 77.7, formed TG 75.3, and on 14 January relieved TG 75.1 as the Indian Ocean task group. TG 75.1, (STERETT, WADDELL, and BRADLEY) departed the Indian Ocean on 19 January enroute to Subic Bay for upkeep. The task group led by KINKAID was counted as the first 1979 Indian Ocean deployment, originally scheduled for March-April.1

TG 77.7, meanwhile, conducted normal carrier operations, including a port visit to Singapore from 15 to 19 January. On 12 January USS WORDEN (CG-18) joined the task group and on 20 January USS MORTON (DD-948) relieved USS LEAHY. TG 77.7 was relieved of its contingency assignment by the JCS on 28 January and proceeded to Subic Bay for upkeep.2

In early February USS HOEL and USS KINKAID completed passing exercises with French Navy ships and rejoined the remainder of the task group. The situation in Iran kept getting worse and the task group was positioned to respond rapidly for evacuation by sea of U.S. citizens and others from Iran, if this was directed by higher authority. The port of Chah Bahar was designated for evacuation by TG 75.3.

On 18 February the JCS directed CINCPAC to transfer command of TG 75.3 to the CINC of the European Command (CINCEUR) to facilitate operations and communications during the possible evacuation. Task Force 109 was activated and Commander, Mid-East Force assumed command. Authority to execute sea evacuation at Chah Bahar was granted on 20 February to the KINKAID task group and the ship evacuated 182 people, of which an estimated 70 were American citizens. The British ships HYDRA and FAWN evacuated personnel from Bandar Abbas, rendezvoused with USS LA SALLE (AGF-3, the flagship of the Mid-East Force) in international waters, and transferred evacuees by means of LCM-6 boats. There were 266 people evacuated from Bandar Abbas, including 130 American citizens. On 24 February the JCS authorized TG 75.3 to exit the Western Indian Ocean on 3 March to return to normal operations.3

Earlier, on 5 February, the JCS had asked CINCEUR for comments on the feasibility of providing the U.S. naval presence equivalent to that being provided by CINCPAC for the period 3 March to 16 April. CINCEUR replied that use of his assets was feasible, "but not prudent at this time," and therefore not recommended. The JCS directed CINCEUR to relieve TG 75.3 with similar units.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. J313 HistSum Feb 79 (S), DECL 23 Feb 85; JCS 2467/181948Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 18 Feb 85.
on 7 March and authorized a gap in Western Indian Ocean task group coverage during the period 3 to 7 March. USS DAVIS (DD-937), USS PAGE (FFG-5), and USS BEARY (FFG-1085) arrived in the Indian Ocean on 7 March and the PACFLT oiler USNS NAVASOTA (TAO-106) remained in the area to support the task group under CINCEUR's operational control.¹

On 6 March the JCS directed deployment of a carrier task group to the Western Indian Ocean/Gulf of Aden area, at the earliest feasible time, in response to increased tensions in North and South Yemen. (South Yemen had invaded and occupied territory in North Yemen in February; both countries agreed to the Arab League's call for a cease-fire on 6 March.) TG 77.7, composed of USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64) with Commander TG 77.7 embarked, USS STERETT (CG-31), USS WADDELL (DDG-24), and USS KANSAS CITY (AOR-3), arrived in the Gulf of Aden area (14°N, 52°E) on 16 March. The ships of TG 75.3 (DAVIS, PAGE, BEARY, and NAVASOTA) chopp'd to CTG 77.7's operational control upon the task group's arrival. Also on 16 March, CINCPAC assumed primary responsibility for intelligence collection in the RUBY SURVEY area (Western Indian Ocean/Gulf of Aden/Red Sea) in conjunction with TG 77.7 operations. This intelligence collection was normally a responsibility of CINCEUR. DAVIS had been outfitted with Direct Support Equipment to accomplish this task. USS TUNNY (SSN-682) also deployed to the Indian Ocean to support the CONSTELLATION task group and assist with intelligence collection.²

On 9 March USS BEARY spotted smoke on the horizon and sailed over to investigate. The closest point of approach to land was 54 nautical miles. She encountered the Soviet warship KOTLIN DD-779 in the midst of a swim call, with some sailors in the water and many on deck without shirts, apparently on holiday routine. When the ship sighted BEARY, it immediately retrieved its swimmers and got underway, with sailors going straight from swim call to general quarters. The sailors were manning guns aimed at BEARY while still in swim wear, but now wearing battle helmets and kapok jackets. BEARY sent a parting message, "I wish you a pleasant voyage." The BEARY commander said he considered going to general quarters on his own ship when KOTLIN's guns were trained on his ship, as he was instructed to do for overflights, but he re-frained from doing so. He felt the threat was minimal and considered prudence necessary to avoid a possible escalation in the chain of events because of the volatile situation in that area of the world. He stayed in the area for a

1. JCS 7233/052211Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 5 Feb 85; US CINCEUR 02741/091711Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 7 Feb 85; J313 HistSum Mar 79 (S), DECL 13 Apr 85.
2. J313 HistSum Mar 79 (S), DECL 13 Apr 85; CINCPAC 060225Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 5 Mar 85; CINCPACFLT 111928Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 11 Mar 87; US CINCEUR 100855Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 9 Mar 85; CINCPACFLT 102217Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 10 Mar 85.
SECRET

while to demonstrate that he was not intimidated by KOTLIN's actions. In fact, there were 20 U.S. crewmembers topside taking pictures while the others stood by their stations. The commander summarized that he believed they caught the Soviet ship completely unaware and that she was embarrassed. After KOTLIN vacated the area, BEARY proceeded on her transit.¹

(☐) KOTLIN was not on swim call on 27 March when she trained both forward and aft 130mm guns in the direction of USS CONSTELLATION and illuminated and locked-on the U.S. ship with fire control radars (EGG CUP, SUN VISOR, and HAWK SCREECH). CINCPACFLT advised the Chief of Naval Operations that these actions were a serious violation of the spirit of the Incident at Sea Agreement and a provocative act.²

(☐) On the same deployment, the Soviet ship RFS BOYEVOY also violated the Incident at Sea Agreement by conducting harassing maneuvers against the USS NAVASOTA on 19 March. After approximately 45 minutes of maneuvering by NAVASOTA to avoid collisions, BOYEVOY, at twilight, closed to a range of 100 feet, shining a bright flood light on the U.S. ship. After about 10 minutes alongside, BOYEVOY fell astern, and NAVASOTA increased its speed and BOYEVOY ceased the harassing activity.³

(☐) Air Commodore Eric C. Bennett, Commander of the Sultanate of Oman Air Force, visited CONSTELLATION on 30 March. (Commodore Bennett was a Royal Air Force officer seconded to the Sultan's Air Force.) TG 77.7 conducted a passing exercise with units of the Sultan's Air Force on 30 and 31 March. The Air Commodore expressed a high degree of interest in further mutually beneficial activities including more frequent communications and the use of Masirah and Thumrait Air Fields by USN and MAC aircraft.⁴

(☐) Aircraft from CONSTELLATION were the subject of a protest lodged with the United States by the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen on 21 March (through British diplomatic channels) regarding an alleged provocative act. They said a civil aircraft on a routine flight to the island of Socotra was subjected to a "provocative maneuver" that lasted 40 minutes. They said the same type of maneuver occurred on the return flight that same day. The air-

1. USS DONALD B BEARY 091400Z Mar 79 (☐), REVW 10 Mar 85.
2. USS CONSTELLATION 271142Z Mar 79 (☐), DECL 27 Mar 85 and 281308Z Mar 79 (☐), DECL 29 Mar 85; CINCPACFLT 312157Z Mar 79 (☐), DECL 31 Dec 84.
3. CTG 77.7 192100Z Mar 79 (☐), DECL 19 Mar 85.
4. J313 HistSum Mar 79 (☐), DECL 13 Apr 85; CTF 77 3114422Z Mar 79 (☐), DECL 1 Apr 85.
craft was an ANTONOV AN12. The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations asked for further information on which to base a reply.1

CINCPACFLT's reply of 14 April said, in summary, that he considered no provocative maneuvers or acts to have taken place. He said CONSTELLATION was operating in the vicinity of 14°01'N, 51° 23'E when the task group's radar detected a "non-squawking" aircraft departing Ryian Airfield in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen on a course toward the carrier. The closest point of approach was estimated at 15 nautical miles. One airborne aircraft (an S-3) off CONSTELLATION approached the contact, which first slowed and then accelerated while maintaining heading and altitude. Two F-14s were also vectored toward the aircraft and they escorted it until it had passed CONSTELLATION and was judged to be continuing toward Socotra Island. The aircraft accompanied the Yemeni plane for about 20 minutes. No civil airline markings were visible on the Yemeni plane and it was considered to be a military transport. Two A-7s from CONSTELLATION joined the aircraft on its return flight, remaining with it about 5 minutes and departing when it appeared to be enroute to Aden airfield. In both morning and afternoon encounters all CONSTELLATION aircraft approached from astern and did not fly forward of the abeam position of the other aircraft, all remained at least 75 meters away from it, none maneuvered abruptly at any time and the Yemeni aircraft did not maneuver except for speed changes. No CONSTELLATION crewmen saw any member of the other aircraft's aircrew or passengers. "Identification and escort were conducted prudently and in accordance with existing rules of engagement."2

USS RANGER (CV-61) was to be the lead ship in a carrier battle group (TG 77.5) to relieve the CONSTELLATION battle group on 8 April. On 4 April, however, RANGER was involved in a collision with the tanker "FORTUNE," of Liberian registry, in the vicinity of Singapore while enroute. RANGER had to return to Subic Bay. As a result, TG 75.4 was constituted of USS ENGLAND (CG-22), USS ELLIOT (DD-967) with Commander, Destroyer Squadron THIRTY ONE embarked, and USS ROBISON (DDG-12), with USS CAMDEN (AOE-2) operating in support. The task group proceeded to the Indian Ocean and topped to TG 77.7.3

On 7 April USS MIDWAY (CV-41) was directed to sail from Yokosuka to relieve CONSTELLATION. Task group 77.4, composed of MIDWAY and USS DOWNES (FF-1070), entered the Indian Ocean on 15 April and rendezvoused with TG 77.7 the following day. ENGLAND, ELLIOT, and ROBISON, the surface combatants, plus

1. CNO 071704Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 6 Apr 85.
2. CINCPACFLT 142104Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 31 Dec 86.
CAMDEN chopped to TG 77.4 on 16 April upon the arrival of MIDWAY and DOWNES. Upon completion of this turnover, TG 77.7, composed of CONSTELLATION, STERETT, WADDELL, and KANSAS CITY, departed the Indian Ocean.¹

(U) TG 77.4 conducted operations in the Arabian Sea during the remainder of April. In joint State and Defense Department press guidance promulgated prior to the deployment, one proposed reply concerned a query regarding deployment of another task group to the Indian Ocean when the situation along the North and South Yemen border had eased. The proposed reply was that the current level of naval presence reflected U.S. support for peace and stability in that area, and that the size and composition of the task group and the routine nature of its operations were comparable to many previous U.S. Navy Indian Ocean deployments. The ships would not be designated a numbered fleet, but would retain the SEVENTH Fleet task group designation. In response to a question whether the task group would be supported through Diego Garcia, the proposed reply was the Diego Garcia was capable of providing communications and limited logistic support.³

(S) In April, Commander, SEVENTH Fleet and USS MIDWAY hosted Saudi Arabia Naval and Air Force commanders, headed by the Commander, Saudi Naval Forcés, on a familiarization visit. The visitors seemed most impressed with the naval power demonstrated.⁴

(S) Late in April CINCPACFLT noted that the continuous SEVENTH Fleet combatant presence in the Indian Ocean required means by which units assigned could carry out their combat training missions. Passing exercises in and during transits to and from the area were one effective means. He intended to authorize the Commander SEVENTH Fleet direct liaison with the Commander, Mid-East Force for coordination of such exercises in the Indian Ocean and to give the SEVENTH Fleet commander authority for passing exercise planning and coordination with Australia, Indonesia, and Singapore to take advantage of transit opportunities.⁵

¹ Ibid.
² CINCPACFLT 310437Z Mar 79 (S), DG/C/31 Mar 81, DECL 31 Mar 85.
³ J313 HistSum Apr 79 (U); SECSTATE 061733Z Apr 79 (U).
⁴ CHUSEOPE Riyadh Saudi Arabia 031002Z May 79 (S), DECL 2 May 85.
⁵ CINCPACFLT 262200Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 20 APR 85.
(U) The MIDWAY battle group, with Commander Carrier Group THREE embarked, conducted routine operations in the Western Indian Ocean during May. The task group visited ports, as follows: MIDWAY, CAMDEN, and ROBISON visited Mombasa, Kenya from 8 to 12 May; ELLIOT and DOWNES visited Port Victoria in the Seychelles from 8 to 14 May; and ENGLAND visited Port Louis in Mauritius from 10 to 15 May.  

(U) Four Omani dignitaries visited MIDWAY on 28 May for about 5 hours. They were: His Highness Sayyid Fahar Bin Taymur, Deputy Prime Minister for National Security and Defense; His Excellency Sheikh Burayk Ibn Hamud Al-Ghaffari, Governor of Dhohar and Minister without Portfolio; His Excellency Yousuf Al-Alawi, Undersecretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Air Commodore Eric C. Bennett, Commander of the Sultanate of Oman Air Force.  

(U) TG 77.7 departed the Western Indian Ocean on 19 May and exited the Indian Ocean on 6 June.  

(5) Earlier, on 30 April, CINCPAC had advised the JCS that he intended to relieve the MIDWAY battle group with a surface combatant task group. He recommended that the subsequent deployment patterns be established as one per quarter employing two carrier battle groups and two surface combatant task groups per year depending on ship type and availability. Each deployment, from Subic to Subic, would be about 60 days. While the surface combatant task group was deployed in the Indian Ocean, a Western Pacific carrier would be available to return to the Indian Ocean on short notice, as had been demonstrated by CONSTELLATION's response to the Yemen crisis. CINCPAC advised that maintaining a continuous Indian Ocean presence with a carrier battle group was "clearly... detrimental" as PACOM carrier force levels were inadequate to support such continuous deployments. He said the paucity of Indian Ocean facilities adversely impacted on training and readiness, and increased operating tempo had a decided impact on morale and retention, as well as on unprogrammed operations and maintenance costs. He noted that responsiveness to Northeast Asian contingency requirements was reduced and gave the appearance of lessened interest in Northeast Asia.  

(5) CINCPAC believed that relief of MIDWAY by a routine surface combatant task group was more prudent at that time than use of an amphibious assault ship (LHA/LPH task group) in view of the sensitivities of Indian Ocean littoral  

1. J313 HistSum May 79 (U).  
2. Ibid.  
nations, limitations on availability of port facilities, and, particularly, uncertain access to training areas ashore. (See the Plans chapter of this history for a more complete discussion of on-going planning efforts that addressed the use of such amphibious ships and Marines.)

CINCPAC said that he considered it essential not to predicate U.S. carrier moves on those of the MINSK task group during her on-going Indian Ocean deployment. (MINSK was the new large ASW cruiser of the USSR; some called it an "ASW carrier"; surveillance operations are discussed elsewhere in this chapter.) "Given the uncertainties of MINSK's intentions, we would be faced with constant ad hoc scheduling problems." He believed that the best course of action from the viewpoint of managing foreign government perception and force employment efficiency was to continue routine surveillance while avoiding U.S. overreaction.

CINCPAC strongly urged that a firm policy on future deployments be established along the lines he had described and that CINCPAC be authorized to execute this policy, keeping the JCS informed, but avoiding the delays inherent in a continual Washington-level approval requirement. "Not only will this provide much needed stabilization to Pacific Fleet operations and plans, but will also greatly assist all concerned in stabilizing frequency and level of port visits/exercises/landing rights with Indian Ocean littoral states."1

The next deployment was that of a surface combatant task group, as CINCPAC had recommended, but the JCS advised that until further notice all proposals for Indian Ocean deployments would continue to require interagency approval at the Washington level. Subsequent events also caused an even greater increase in the required naval presence than had been planned.2

Task Group 75.3, composed of USS JOUETT (CG-29) with Commander Destroyer Squadron THIRTY THREE embarked, USS BREWTON (FF-1086), USS BADGER (FF-1071), USS RATHBURNE (FF-1057), and USNS PASSUMPSIC (TAO-107), conducted routine operations in the Indian Ocean during the period 9 July to 1 September.3

In connection with planning for port visits, the JCS advised CINCPAC that a visit to Mayotte in the Comoro Islands was not politically feasible at that time. Ships of TG 75.3 did call at a number of other ports during the

1. Ibid.
2. JCS 1389/272311Z Jun 79 (C), DECL 27 Jun 85; JCS 5667/142001Z Sep 79 (C), DECL 20 Aug 85.
deployment. JOUETT, RATHBURN, and PASSUMPSIC called at Colombo in Sri Lanka from 14 to 16 July and BADGER and BREWTON also called there from 16 to 18 July. RATHBURN visited Rodrigues in Mauritius on 26 July and JOUETT, RATHBURN, and PASSUMPSIC called at Port Louis, also in Mauritius, on 28-30 July. BADGER and BREWTON called at St. Denis on Reunion Island from 28 to 30 July. All ships called at Mombasa in Kenya, BREWTON from 6 to 9 August, and JOUETT, BADGER, RATHBURN, and PASSUMPSIC from 6 to 10 August. BREWTON called at Mogadiscio, Somalia on 11 and 12 August, and PASSUMPSIC called at Bahrain on 23 and 24 August and at Karachi, Pakistan on 28 August.¹

On 7 August the U.S. Ambassador in Kuwait advised that the Foreign Ministry had granted a blanket clearance for USNS PASSUMPSIC and USNS MISSEI-
LION for the remainder of 1979.²

The fourth quarter 1979 deployment of a carrier battle group began on 10 October from Subic Bay and entered the Indian Ocean via the Lombok Strait on 14 October. The force composition of Battle Group ALPHA (TG 70.1) was USS MIDWAY (CV-41) with Commander, Carrier Group SEVEN embarked, USS BAINBRIDGE (CGN-25) with Commander, Destroyer Squadron FIFTEEN embarked, USS PARSONS (DDG-33), USS KNOX (FF-1052), USS STEIN (FF-1065), USNS MISSEI-
LION (TAO-105), USNS NAVASOTA (TAO-106), USS PINTADO (SSN-672) for direct support, and USS SAN JOSE (AFS-7).³

The ships conducted port visits en route at Fremantle, Cockburn Sound, Geraldton, and Bunbury, Australia, and participated in Exercise BEACON SOUTH, a combined USN-Royal Australian Navy nonscenario exercise in Western Australian waters.⁴

Although tensions had mounted with the seizure of the U.S. Embassy and the American hostages by Iranian students in Tehran on 4 November, the battle group carried on with a number of port visits and exercises that had been planned. Ships visited Port Victoria in the Seychelles, Berbera in Somalia, and Mombasa in Kenya. USS SAN JOSE made a resupply stop at Karachi, Pakistan. Following those calls, the battle group conducted a passing exercise with the Kenyan navy and from 13 to 19 November participated in Exercise BEACON COMPASS, a large-scale multi-national sea control exercise in the Northern Indian Ocean. (BEACON COMPASS is discussed in more detail elsewhere in this chapter.) Iran

1. JCS 1389/272311Z Jun 79 (C), DECL 27 Jun 85; J313 HistSum Aug 79 (C), DECL 6 Sep 85.
2. AMEMB Kuwait 3718/070542Z Aug 79 (C), ADS 8/6/81.
4. CNO 201924Z Oct 79 (U).
charged the United States with war threats and called for a meeting of the UN Security Council.¹

Although scheduled to exit the Indian Ocean on 2 December, the battle group remained in the Arabian Sea in support of the Iranian contingency through the end of 1979.²

(U) On 20 November President Carter ordered a second carrier battle group into the Indian Ocean to join the MIDWAY group and the Mid-East Force. CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to deploy KITTY HAWK to the Indian Ocean as soon as possible and at best speed. He also directed that CORAL SEA deploy to the Western Pacific as soon as possible to assume a 96-hour response time for a possible Korean contingency.³

Task Group 70.2 got underway from Subic Bay on Thanksgiving eve, 21 November, led by KITTY HAWK (CV-63), with Commander, Task Force 77 and Commander, Destroyer Squadron THIRTEEN embarked. TG 70.2 also consisted of USS JOUETT (CG-29), USS BERKELEY (DDG-15), USS DAVID R. RAY (DD-971), USS FANNING (FF-1976), and USS WABASH (AOR-5). There were 19 U.S. Navy ships either operating in the Indian Ocean or en route thereto with more than 14,000 USN sailors aboard.⁴

(S/NQEQRN) Operating in direct support of Task Force 70 (the MIDWAY and KITTY HAWK battle groups) was USS PINTADO (SSN-672). Its missions included tactical early warning of hostile surface units exiting the Arabian Gulf, antisubmarine warfare search, search-and-rescue, surveillance of merchant shipping, and if directed the conduct of offensive operations. The submarine had departed Subic Bay on 10 October. On 14 December CINCPACFLT advised CINCPAC that the requirement for two nuclear-powered submarines in the Indian Ocean to support TF 70 had been reviewed and that two were desired in view of the need for forward area support in the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean. He outlined his deployment plans to provide the required support.⁵

The Mid-East Force remained at five ships during this period. A request for a holiday standoff (20 December to 6 January) by CINCEUR was de-

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1. J313 HistSum Nov 79 (S), DECL 4 Dec 85; CINCPAC 060332Z Oct 79 (S), DECL 2 Oct 85; Department of State Bulletin, Jan 80, p.44.
2. J313 HistSum Nov 79 (S), DECL 4 Dec 85.
3. CINCPAC 210026Z Nov 79 (S).
4. CNO 240125Z Nov 79 (U); CTF 77 210430Z Nov 79 (S), REVW 21 Nov 99.
5. CINCPACFLT 142137Z Dec 79 (S/NQEQRN), REVW 31 Dec 85.

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nied by the JCS, who directed that planning should continue to maintain the five-ship level.1

(5) MIDWAY and KITTY HAWK remained on station as the year ended, in the Arabian Sea. During December the battle groups continued to be shadowed by Soviet ships and overflown by various aircraft. Intercepts by carrier aircraft had also been made with aircraft of Oman, Pakistan, and Iran, all without significant incident.2

(5) On 1 December the Chairman of the JCS had asked for comments concerning the impact of maintaining a carrier task group and continuously augmented Middle-East Force in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region during 1980. CINCPAC said that he had outlined the impact on PACOM readiness of carrier battle group deployments in messages on 10 August and 5 October. (These thoughts are addressed in the Plans chapter of this history in a discussion of "U.S. Military Presence in the Mid-East and Indian Ocean Regions." He said that of particular note were the potential limitations in already scarce repair opportunity, littoral port visits, logistic and surveillance support, and exercise opportunity.3

(5) CINCPAC said that if the objective in 1980 was to demonstrate U.S. willingness to undertake any required offensive operations, one carrier battle group in the region could accomplish that objective. "My view is that the risks and adverse impact on readiness of current two CVBG Indian Ocean presence should not be sustained beyond the point at which we determine that actual employment is not likely. If conflict ensues, however, at least two and preferably three BG's should be committed...." CINCPAC outlined the major impact on other PACOM commitments of the continuous presence of a PACFLT carrier battle group. He also outlined carrier scheduling options and the impact such scheduling would have on exercises.

(5) CINCPAC concluded that while he fully supported the need for one carrier battle group, PACOM forces were spread too thin. He believed ways had to be sought to minimize the adverse impact in the short term and examine major U.S. force dispositions in the long term. He recommended that the requirement of two carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean be continually re-examined, and if it was sustained beyond December 1979 that assets from the Atlantic or European commands be used to minimize adverse readiness, morale.

1. JCS 5761/251825Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 8 Nov 85.
2. J313 HistSum c 79 (S), DECL 4 Jan 86.
3. CINCPAC 090622Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 7 Dec 85.

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retention, and political impacts in the PACOM. If such augmentation was not forthcoming, CINCPAC could provide the presence of one carrier throughout 1980 with the very severe impacts he had described.\(^1\)

\(\text{(S)}\) CINCPAC followed that message with another to the Chairman on 14 December, reaffirming the need for an early decision.\(^2\)

\(\text{(S)}\) On 20 December the JCS advised that the Secretary of Defense had approved an inter-theater deployment of forces in order to maintain, for a time, two carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean and had directed CINCEUR to chop one three-ship nuclear-powered battle group to CINCLANT for subsequent deployment to the Indian Ocean and chop to CINCPAC so as to arrive in the Arabian Sea not later than 23 January. USS NIMITZ, USS CALIFORNIA, and USS TEXAS were scheduled to relieve the KITTY HAWK battle group on 23 January 1980. A battle group led by USS CORAL SEA (CV-43) was scheduled to relieve the USS MIDWAY battle group on 7 February 1980. CINCEUR was also to maintain a five-ship Mid-East Force.\(^3\)

**Combined Surveillance Operations**

\(\text{(S)}\) The Soviet KIEV-class, large antisubmarine warfare cruiser MINSK led a task group that entered the PACOM area in the vicinity of the Cape of Good Hope on 9 April and was estimated to be en route to Vladivostok. The Commander, SEVENTH Fleet proposed a combined surveillance of the passage. CINCPACFLT concurred and on 10 April CINCPAC, who also concurred, advised the JCS of the plan. CINCPAC said the possibility existed that all or part of the MINSK group might operate in the Western Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea area prior to proceeding. "To enhance and reinforce Soviet perception of allied maritime solidarity we have planned a coordinated, allied air and surface ship surveillance effort," CINCPAC advised the JCS.\(^4\)

\(\text{(S)}\) The first country to participate was France. Ships and aircraft of ALINDIEN (the Commander of All French Naval Forces in the Indian Ocean) cooperated in the surveillance effort and France permitted the use of the airfield on La Reunion Island by USN P-3 aircraft. France and the French Navy

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 142310Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 14 Dec 85.
3. J313 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 4 Jan 86; JCS 4627/201911Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 14 Dec 80.
4. J311 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 9 May 85; CINCPAC 100515Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 9 Apr 86; CINCPACFLT 070441Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 2 Apr 86, which cited COMSEVENTHFLT 021330Z Apr 79.
did not want knowledge of their operations released to other foreign governments. They viewed the operation as totally bilateral in nature and wanted to maintain a low profile in order to limit the possibility of an inadvertent leak to the press of their cooperation with the United States.  

The Commander, SEVENTH Fleet advised ALINDIEN that discussions he had had with RADM Varganov, Commander of the MINSK task group, on Mauritius had revealed that the MINSK would probably transit toward the Socotra Operating Area. (Socotra is an island that belonged to the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen, about 200 miles from that country.) COMSEVENTHFLT told ALINDIEN that the U.S. Navy desired to continue the coordinated surveillance and information exchange if MINSK operated in the Socotra area, which it did.  

Parenthetically, later in the year CINCPACFLT requested determination of a French Navy position regarding participation in a proposed Indian Ocean multi-national exercise. The Naval Attache in Paris raised the subject with a ranking French Navy officer who stated that French Navy policy was to participate/exercise with the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean as closely as possible, but strictly on a bilateral basis. "French Navy participation in multinational exercise is not possible."  

Australia deployed a P-3 long-range maritime patrol aircraft to Diego Garcia, and conducted coordinated surveillance of MINSK with the U.S. Navy as the task group passed 75°E. That country wanted to make a public announcement of its participation, calling it part of "a continuing program of cooperative maritime surveillance involving the ANZUS partners." The Defense Attache in Canberra said the Australians would like U.S. views on the release and timing of the announcement.  

New Zealand participated by positioning a maritime air patrol aircraft at Tengah Air Base in Singapore. That country also wanted to acknowledge its participation in the surveillance after it became public knowledge.  

Regarding the public affairs announcements, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs said it was long-standing Defense
Department policy that information on surveillance operations would not normally be released. They did not concur in the public announcement proposed by Australia. CINCPAC requested that OASD/PA coordinate the matter with the State Department concerning U.S. views regarding information to be released by other nations participating in surveillance operations.\(^1\)

\(\section{\text{\textsection}}\) The Assistant Secretary of Defense reiterated his guidance on 30 May. "There will be no public announcement of coordinated surveillance operations." Public release of information on such surveillance of the MINSK task group was to be on a "response to query" basis. Reference to coordinated operations, the nations and forces involved, or other related operational matters was to be avoided. "Acknowledgement of U.S. surveillance of MINSK task group should not be construed as superseding the current DOD policy of not normally releasing information on surveillance operations." He provided some responses to specific queries that were approved for use.\(^2\)

\(\section{\text{\textsection}}\) Further guidance was addressed to the Defense Attaches in Canberra, Wellington, and Paris. The divergence of host government opinion was noted, regarding public affairs policy. "Request that you advise host governments of USG public affairs policy for these operations.../as outlined above/ and seek their concurrence to formulate individual policies along the same lines." OASD/PA said that the State Department concurred.\(^3\)

\(\section{\text{\textsection}}\) The New Zealand P-3 joined the surveillance operation when MINSK exited the Malacca Strait. As the task group proceeded through the South and East China Seas and Sea of Japan, various other countries participated in their areas. Beside the Royal Navy's squadron in Hong Kong, participants included Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Japan.\(^4\)

\(\section{\text{\textsection}}\) USS LOCKWOOD (FF-1064), which had been conducting surface surveillance of the MINSK task group, was returned to Commander Task Force 75 on 4 July when Commander, Task Force 72 terminated the surveillance operation. MINSK proceeded to port in Vladivostok.\(^5\)

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1. SECDEF 8740/1200442 May 79 (\$), DECL 30 May 87; ADMIN CINCPAC 190400Z May 79 (\$), DECL 18 May 85.
2. SECDEF 302309Z May 79 (\$), DECL 30 May 87, which cited CINCPAC 221856Z May 79.
3. Ibid.
4. J311 HistSum Jun 79; CINCPAC 070234Z Jul 79 (\$), DECL 30 Jun 85; USDLO Hong Kong 160246Z Jun 79 (\$), DECL 15 Jun 85.

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P-3 Operations

(§) P-3 maritime patrol operations were the primary PACOM source of accurate, reliable, and responsive maritime intelligence in the Indian Ocean. The information obtained by those flights provided intelligence support to SEVENTH Fleet forces operating there, as well as providing continuing support and threat warning to the Commander of the Mid-East Force. This information included the location, identification, and activity of Soviet naval surface combatants, submarines, auxiliaries, and merchant shipping as well as regional acoustic and oceanographic data for the development of environmental forecast data bases. Primary areas of interest were the Malacca Strait, the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Aden, and the major shipping routes connecting them.

(U) The use of specific bases and countries for the continued use of P-3 aircraft is discussed in the material that follows. P-3 operations, of course, became even more important as the operating tempo increased in that part of the world.

Bandar Abbas, Iran

(§) For many years PACOM P-3s had operated from Bandar Abbas, Iran. With the deteriorating situation in Iran, the U.S. Defense Attache in Tehran had advised on 3 January of the personal danger to Americans and the critically low state of fuel supplies. On 3 February CINCPACFLT suspended further P-3 operations and recommended that CINCPAC investigate the feasibility of conducting the flights from bases in Masirah, Oman or Pakistan. Those possibilities are discussed below.2

Saudi Arabia

(§) Both Iran and Saudi Arabia were within the European Command's area of responsibility, not the PACOM. After suspension of operations from Bandar Abbas, the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia in April presented a proposal for P-3 maritime surveillance flights to the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense and Aviation, which was agreed to in principle. The JCS approved a CINCEUR concept of operations and granted authority to open discussions between U.S. and Saudi participants. On 25 June a joint coordinating conference was held to establish procedures. In this joint meeting it was first learned that the

Saudis required in-flight participation by Saudi military officers in P-3 operations as a condition for approval. Procedures were modified so that the aircraft would stay an extra day and fly from Dhahran to Dhahran on that day with the Saudi nationals embarked. The first P-3 flight completed in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf was conducted on 23 July with five Saudi nationals embarked. CINCPAC retained Operational Control of the aircraft under Commander Task Group 72.3.1

Djibouti

(SL) Djibouti, in Northeast Africa, was also not within the PACOM, but CINCPACFLT's P-3s and C-1A carrier logistics support aircraft were allowed to visit, with stepped up tempo during the deployment of Indian Ocean carrier battle groups. The Embassy in Djibouti commented on French cooperation with U.S. aircraft visits (Djibouti is a former French colony). The Embassy reported that they were receiving maximum assistance from the local military command. Following cancellation of the first EP-3 flight in an April series because Djibouti simply did not have hotel space for a one-night stopover by the 25-man crew, the French cleared adequate barracks space and had facilitated fueling, crew movements, etc. CINCPACFLT, in asking that his thanks be passed to Djibouti and French authorities, said that the Djibouti landing rights had greatly enhanced the U.S. Navy's ability to contribute to the objectives of peace and stability in the Indian Ocean.

(SL) It had been planned to return to a "normal" visit rate of about one a month, but the continued presence of larger U.S. Indian Ocean surface forces and also the presence of the USSR's new large ASW cruiser, the MINSK, in the western Indian Ocean caused CINCPAC to request that the increased P-3 tempo be allowed to continue. CINCEUR strongly supported CINCPAC's request to the JCS. The Secretary of State authorized the Ambassador in Djibouti to seek approval for P-3 flights on a case-by-case basis, not to exceed two per week for the month of June. If arrangements to begin flights from Seeb Airfield in Oman were completed on schedule, the number of flights into Djibouti per week was to be reduced to no more than one per week. The French Govern-

ment approved French Air Force support for the two flights a week, and the flights continued.\footnote{1}

(\$) In November, with tensions in the region mounting, and with two carrier battle groups deployed by the United States, CINCPAC again sought and was granted the authority to authorize two P-3/EP-3 flights per week for the duration of the presence of either of the two carrier battle groups.\footnote{2}

Oman

(\$) On 15 February CINCPACFLT remarked to CINCPAC that with the loss of Bandar Abbas as a P-3 operating base, Djibouti was the only Indian Ocean base at the time providing access to most of the Arabian Sea. Djibouti, however, did not provide adequate coverage of the northern and eastern areas. He repeated his earlier recommendation that efforts continue to obtain the use of Masirah (and/or Pakistani airfields) to provide increased flexibility and a hedge against possible future Bandar Abbas-type losses.\footnote{3}

(\$) The use of Masirah had come under study in 1974 when the results of a British defense review revealed plans to withdraw all British forces east of Suez, including Masirah. CINCPAC had believed that the capability to operate from Masirah served U.S. interests in the area and added flexibility when U.S. naval task units operated in the area. The first P-3 flight had occurred on 14 July 1976 and the schedule called for six flights per quarter. With the actual departure of the British at the end of March 1977, however, the extremely high price the Omani asked for the use of facilities caused the flights to stop and the matter to remain under study in diplomatic channels for the next two years.\footnote{4}

(\$) On 9 September 1978 CINCPAC had recommended to the JCS that negotiation efforts be renewed, and on 2 November the JCS advised that both the State and Defense Departments had agreed that conditions might have become favorable.\footnote{5}

\footnotesize{\textbf{1.} CINCPAC 200115Z May 79 (\$), DECL 19 May 85; USCINCEUR 221739Z May 79 (\$), DECL 21 May 85; SECSTATE 134457/260110Z May 79 (\$), GDS 5/25/85; USDA0 Paris 301212Z May 79, DECL 31 May 85, REASON 7.

2. CINCPAC 220306Z Nov 79 (\$), REVW 21 Nov 99; SECSTATE 308396/292343Z Nov 79 (\$), GDS 11/29/85; CINCPACFLT 302341Z Nov 79 (\$), DECL 23 Nov 85 DG/C 23 Nov 83; JCS 2139/300359Z Nov 79 (\$), DECL 23 Nov 85.

3. CINCPACFLT 150007Z Feb 79 (\$), DECL 12 Feb 85, DG/C/12 Feb 81.

4. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/ERD), Vol 1, pp. 185-188.

5. JCS 021602Z Nov 78 (\$), GDS 86, which cited CINCPAC 090040Z Sep 78.
When the negotiations were resumed in 1979, the United States opted for use of Seeb International Airport, rather than Masirah. Seeb, it was believed, was more public and thus any controversy regarding U.S. P-3 use could be more easily handled. On 20 May the JCS advised CINCPAC of approval to negotiate in coordination with the Embassy in Muscat in order to commence operations on 1 June at a rate of one flight per week. CINCPAC so advised CINCPACFLT and passed the action.¹

On 5 May the Commander of Task Force 72 visited Seeb Airfield and met with the Commander of the Sultanate of Oman Air Force, Air Commander Eric C. Bennett, and other members of the Air Force staff. On 22 May the first flight was approved by the U.S. Embassy in Muscat. The first flight took place on 3 June 1979, and weekly thereafter.²

Pakistan

As noted above, with the suspension of operations into Bandar Abbas, the United States began considering alternate sites to support P-3 operations. Pakistan was one such area. In recent years P-3s had occasionally operated from Pakistani airfields. During MIDLINK 78, for example, in December 1978, such aircraft had operated out of Masroor Air Base (near Karachi). Following the loss of Bandar Abbas CINCPACFLT recommended investigating the feasibility of conducting two to four P-3 flights per month. After liaison with the JCS, CINCPAC concurred and granted approval to initiate a diplomatic clearance request for a P-3 visit to Masroor and to conduct a Maritime Air Patrol on the inbound or outbound leg between Diego Garcia and Masroor.³

The U.S. Defense Attache in Pakistan informed CINCPAC, however, that the request would not be handled in a routine manner, but would probably be considered at the highest levels of Pakistan government. With the existing strained relations between the two countries, granting of the clearance would be doubtful. He requested additional guidance to support the request if mission requirements were overriding.⁴

¹ SECSTATE 02160/0300452 Apr 79 (S), GDS 4/2/85; JCS 9093/191519Z May 79 (S), DECL 18 May 85; CINCPAC 192300Z May 79 (S), DECL 19 May 85.
² J311 HistSum Aug 79 (S), DECL 6 Sep 85.
³ J311 Point Paper (S), 29 Jun 79, Subj: P-3 Flights to Pakistan (U), DECL 29 Jun 85; CINCPACFLT 262017Z May 79, DECL 12 Feb 85, DG/C/12 Feb 81.
⁴ J311 Point Paper (S), 29 Jun 79, Subj: P-3 Flights to Pakistan (U), DECL 29 Jun 85; CINCPAC 060322Z Jun 79 (S), DECL 5 Jun 85, which cited USDAO Islamabad 041055Z Jun 79.
CINCPAC advised the Attaché that he appreciated his comments on relations between Pakistan and the United States. He noted that there had been a review of base access in the Indian Ocean littoral countries, and that the United States had been successful in attaining access in Oman and increased access to Djibouti. Access, however limited, to Masroor would afford an increased measure of flexibility to the surveillance effort in the Northern Indian Ocean. He said that while there was no overriding operational need for the proposed flight at that time, he would like to keep the Pakistan option open. If at some future date the Attaché perceived an opportunity to utilize Masroor for P-3 flights, CINCPAC wanted to exercise the prerogative. CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT to hold the diplomatic clearance request in abeyance until such time as the political climate for approval was more favorable.1

Thailand

P-3 flights continued to stage through Don Muang in Thailand. On 27 July CINCPAC outlined his intention to approve up to eight flights per month effective 1 August, and the JCS concurred.

1. CINCPAC 060322Z Jun 79 (S), DECL 5 Jun 85.
3. Ibid.
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Airspace Violation, Maldives

(U) In 1977 the Government of the Maldives had protested the overflight of Gan Airfield by a U.S. P-3 aircraft and CINCPACFLT had taken action to prevent future incidents of such nature, reemphasizing closest point of approach limits and Maldivian sensitivity. Even though a Hong Kong English-language magazine article later that year described frequent violations of Maldivian airspace, CINCPAC said that any subsequent overflight after the first incident was highly unlikely.¹

(U) The Government of the Maldives protested another such violation that took place on 5 April 1979. The Ambassador asked for an immediate report. CINCPAC advised the Ambassador that the Navy aircrew involved had been briefed that Gan could be used as a possible emergency divert field. Current flight documents listed the airfield as closed with no communications available. Because of their potential use of the field in an emergency, the aircrew believed it was prudent to overfly the airfield to determine if it was usable. "Regrettably, the sovereignty of the Republic of Maldives' airspace was not taken into consideration." CINCPAC continued that respect for the sovereignty of territorial airspace of all nations was basic to U.S. policy and action had been taken to prevent the recurrence of incidents of this nature. "Maldivian sensitivity and closest point of approach limits are required briefing items for all Indian Ocean flights."²

Southeast Asia Refugee Operations

(U) In the years since the collapse of the governments in the Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia (renamed Kampuchea), and Laos, over a million Indochinese had fled their homelands. At first the exodus consisted primarily of those who had fought the Communists or had been associated with previous governments or the U.S. Government. In 1978, however, conditions changed radically when the Hanoi government instituted policies designed to restructure the society, shifting city dwellers to the countryside and attempting to eliminate the business and professional class. The policies were principally aimed at Vietnam's 1.5 million ethnic Chinese, who were seen as a security threat at a time of worsening relations with China. By the summer of 1978 there had been a marked increase in the number of people fleeing Indochina. The number seeking asylum in non-Communist countries jumped from around 6,000 a month in August 1978 to a peak of 65,000 in May 1979. Partially as a result of a

² AMEMB Colombo 1855/071015Z April 79 (U); CINCPAC 140240Z Apr 79 (U).
Vietnamese decision to stem "illegal departures," the arrival rate dropped to about 12,000 in August. Those figures reflected the number that succeeded in seeking asylum. How many actually attempted to leave is unknown, but it had been estimated that from 30 to 60 percent perished before arriving at a safe haven.¹

(U) In June, in response to a State Department query, CINCPAC provided a copy of the policy regarding Indochinese refugee boats that had been promulgated to U.S. Navy ship captains and U.S. aircraft commanders. Navy ships on normal deployments in the Western Pacific were to adhere to the following guidelines that applied to all U.S. ships. They were to assist any ship or boat in distress on the high seas. If necessary, they were to render help (food, water, fuel, medical supplies, repair assistance, etc.) to people in seaworthy boats. If the refugee boat was not seaworthy and undue hardship or death might ensue, U.S. Navy ships were to pick up refugees in distress on the high seas. Ships were to disembark the refugees at the next regularly scheduled port of call or at the nearest feasible landing place, as appropriate to the circumstances. When an aircraft commander observed any surface craft in distress he was required to report the circumstances to the appropriate rescue coordination center or air traffic services unit, in accordance with Defense Department flight information publication procedures.²

(Confidential) On 21 July the Secretary of State advised that Vice President Walter Mondale would announce in Geneva on 21 July President Carter's decisions concerning U.S. Navy assistance to the refugees. The U.S. Navy would be instructed to adjust steaming schedules to provide more frequent and responsive assistance to refugees, including the pickup of any in distress. The President also approved the use of ships chartered by the U.S. Military Sealift Command to carry refugees from first asylum camps to processing centers, when they were established, further augmenting the naval presence in refugee sea zones. In addition, reconnaissance aircraft would be dedicated to search for refugee boats requiring help and advising vessels in the area, including those of other countries, concerning vessels in distress.³

(Confidential) Thus, upon receipt of JCS guidance on 21 July, PACOM units (SEVENTH Fleet ships and aircraft) began making a special effort, within normal operations, to locate refugees and provide humanitarian assistance as directed by CINCPAC. By the end of August there had been a number of aircraft sightings

2. CINCPAC 281950Z Jun 79 (U).
3. SECSTATE 188826/211431Z Jul 79 (Confidential), GDS 7/20/85.
and ship assists or rescues. The 20 aircraft sightings had been by P-3 aircraft (15), two by S-3As and one by an SH-3 from USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63), one by a CH-46 off USS WABASH (AOR-5), and one by an SH-2D (LAMPS) off USS KNOX (FF-1052). Eleven of those 20 sightings resulted in refugees being rescued by SEVENTH Fleet ships or merchant ships. Also by the end of August there had been two assists of refugee boats, one by USS PARSONS (DDG-33) and the other by USS ENGLAND (CG-22). There had been nine rescues, two by USS PARSONS and one each by USS ENGLAND, WABASH, WHITE PLAINS (AFS-4), CHICAGO (CG-11), USS BEAUFORT (ATS-2), and USS WORDEN (CG-18), and one additional rescue by a CH-46 helicopter off the WABASH. A total of 210 refugees had been rescued by the end of August and all had been debarked, 145 at Subic Bay in the Philippines and 65 at Phattaya, Thailand.¹

(U) On 14 September the Secretary of State provided the Secretary of Defense with a statement on U.S. Government policy on the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees in distress rescued by ships at sea. He said that maritime tradition and international law recognized the obligation of ships' masters to rescue persons in distress on the high seas. In the case of the Vietnamese refugees, some governments at the ports of call of ships carrying refugees would not permit their disembarkation without a guarantee of their onward movement. In order to encourage rescue at sea, the U.S. Government would accept, if necessary, such refugees for resettlement in the United States when picked up by U.S. flag or U.S.-owned foreign flag ships. Governments in the area and U.S. owners of U.S. and foreign flag ships had been informed of that guarantee. Ships in those categories who picked up refugees were to promptly notify the nearest American consul in the country concerned. The U.S. Government, however, would not issue such guarantees to refugees picked up by ships which were neither U.S.-flag nor U.S.-owned. Neither would it issue guarantees to such ships if they were chartered by American companies. Earlier, CINCPAC had requested that representations be made to the State Department concerning possible requests for "asylum" by refugees. CINCPAC believed the practice of resettlement program procedures would better serve the interests of the refugees and he asked for authority to treat requests as "resettlement" actions in accordance with established resettlement procedures. In the policy message, the Secretary of State agreed with CINCPAC that U.S. units should treat refugees covered by this policy statement as "resettlement actions."²

¹ J313 HistSum Aug 79 (C), DECL 9 Sep 85; CINCPAC 210246Z Jul 79 (C), DECL 20 Jul 85.
² SECSTATE 241880/142058Z Sep 79 (U); CINCPAC 110119Z Sep 79 (U).
In some cases P-3 aircraft asked foreign flag merchant ships to render assistance, but they did not do so. The JCS advised that PACOM efforts to coordinate rescue with merchant ships were greatly appreciated. Data on those ships that refused or failed to assist would be used by the State Department to stimulate responsiveness to the plight of refugees.¹

Briefly, P-3s took the following actions after encountering a vessel in distress. They first called on USN ships in the vicinity; if there were none they contacted nearby merchant vessels. They first tried to communicate by radio using emergency and distress frequency; the aircraft had also been provided with special hand-held high frequency radios to improve communication with the merchant ship. If they were not able to make contact they used standard international procedures for designating vessels in distress. The aircraft would fly low across the bow of the vessel while rocking its wings and flying in the direction of the refugee boat. They also dropped smoke floats to identify boat locations. They also had the capability to drop packages containing food, water, and sonobuoys.²

On 11 December CINCPAC answered a JCS question about the feasibility and impact of extending P-3 refugee operations until the end of FY 80. (P-3s had not assisted in the rescue of refugee boats since 28 October.) CINCPAC delineated the impact first of one flight per day. He anticipated a slight reduction in fleet exercise participation, surveillance flights (maritime air patrol), and fleet support missions. The most significant impact was the loss of flexibility to fully exploit time critical training opportunities such as P-3/submarine and coordinated operations. Two flights a day would reduce participation in fleet exercises to little more than token presence with attendant adverse impact on the exercises, plus the other effects discussed above for one flight per day. Personnel shortages were the primary limiting factor in on-going P-3 operations. The JCS decided to reduce the flights to one per day through FY80.³

A final summary of PACOM refugee operations since 21 July showed that there had been a total of 190 refugee-locate flights. There were 60 sightings of boats by aircraft, 54 by P-3s and 6 by other type aircraft. The total number of refugees taken aboard 29 USN or USNS ships was 846. They

1. CINCPAC 262042Z Sep 79 (C), DECL 25 Sep 85; JCS 7057/271329Z Sep 79 (C), DECL 24 Sep 85.
2. SECSTATE 257576/1/011441Z Oct 79 (C), GDS 9/28/85.
3. CINCPAC 110259Z Dec 79 (C), DECL 7 Dec 85; JCS 7973/191449Z Nov 79 (C), DECL 15 Nov 85; JCS 6417/222010Z Dec 79 (C), DECL 11 Dec 85.

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had embarked all of them, 652 in the Philippines, 148 in Thailand, and 46 in
Singapore. On 28 December, 262 refugees had been relocated from Subic Bay
to the United States for resettlement by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees. There were 286 refugees remaining at Subic, but the transfer
of 200 of them was anticipated by 10 January 1980 and the remainder by 31
January 1980.¹

Augmentation of Korea Forces Following Presidential Assassination

Immediately following the assassination of President Park Chung-hee
of the Republic of Korea on 26 October, the JCS directed that U.S. Forces
Korea be placed in Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) THREE. They cited
reasons for the DEFCON increase as existing tensions with the potential for
political unrest and Korean local government instability. A CINCPAC Emergency
Action Message relayed the instructions to COMUS Korea. CINCPAC instructed
that COMUS Korea should take only automatic, non-provocative actions for this
DEFCON. (There were five DEFCONS, with DEFCON 5 the normal readiness in the
PACOM east of 160°E. West of that line the normal DEFCON was 4, a situation
in which regional tensions existed that required greater military vigilance.
DEFCON 3 was a situation in which regional tensions had become increasingly
susceptible to enemy exploitation or other tensions existed that might have
serious and adverse effects on U.S. interests. In DEFCON 3 the possibility
of U.S. force involvement existed. DEFCONS 2 and 1 were still more advanced
states of readiness, with DEFCON 1 the maximum readiness posture.)²

Both air and naval forces were dispatched to Korea. In announcing
such a move the U.S. Secretary of Defense said it was a warning to North Korea
not to take advantage of the confusion following the assassination. The
deployment of two E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft is discus-
sed elsewhere in this chapter with other deployments of this new system in
1979.

COMUS Korea had requested that a SEVENTH Fleet task group be posi-
tioned in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, Task Group 70.2
was directed to proceed to a modified operating location south of Cheju-do
Island. The task group consisted of USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63), USS H.B.WILSON
(DDG-7), USS BERKELEY (DDG-15), USS D.R.RAY (DD-971), USS FANNING (FF-1076),

¹ J313 HistSum Dec 79 (U).
² J332 HistSum Nov 79 (S), REVW 21 Nov 99, REAS 6; CINCPAC 262030Z Oct 79 (S),
REVW 26 Oct 99; CINCPACINST S3010.4J, promulgated by CINCPAC Ltr Ser
00350, 2 MAY 74, DECL 31 Dec 82.
USS WHITE PLAINS (AFS-4), and USNS PASSUMPSIC (TAO-107). The task group arrived on station on 28 October and operated in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula until after the ROK state funeral on 3 November, at which time the JCS authorized CINCPAC to permit the group to resume scheduled operations. CINCPAC directed, however, that the battle group retain the capability to return to that location south of Cheju-do Island, at combat capability, within 96 hours of tasking to provide for a contingency response.¹

Subsequently the JCS tasked CINCPAC to deploy the battle group to the Indian Ocean at best speed in support of the Iranian confrontation. The USS CORAL SEA (CV-45), USS STANLEY (CG-32), and USS JONES (DDG-32) were directed to transit to the Western Pacific to assume the 96-hour contingency posture for Korea.²

[1] B-52 aircraft of the Strategic Air Command performed Korea low-level training flights during this period of heightened tension, and provided intercept training opportunities as desired.⁵

AWACS Deployments

(U). In 1978 the first E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft had deployed to the PACOM. With its sophisticated radar and computer

1. J313 HistSum Oct 79 (S), DECL 7 Nov 85 and Nov 79 (S), DECL 4 Dec 85.
2. J313 HistSum Nov 79 (S), DECL 4 Dec 85.
3. JCS 2514/120209Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 84; CINCPAC 120926Z Nov 79 (S/WF), DECL 11 Dec 85; CINCPACAF 150432Z Nov 79 (S), REVW 31 Dec 99.
4. J332 HistSum Nov 79 (S), REVW 21 Nov 99, REAS 6; CINCPAC 202019Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 20 Nov 85.
5. CINCPAC 122159Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 12 Dec 85; CINCPAC 150413Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 14 Dec 85.
systems, the modified 707 jetliners were the most expensive planes in the operational Air Force fleet. They vastly expanded command and control and air defense radar coverage capabilities.\footnote{1}

(\S) Two AWACS aircraft were in the PACOM participating in exercise TEAM SPIRIT 79 in March when they were withdrawn and redeployed to Saudi Arabia in support of the Yemen contingency. The nickname for the Saudi deployment action was FLYING STAR. COMUS Korea said that he recognized the importance of providing the E-3A capability to the Mid-East in the circumstances, but he was concerned that deployment of TEAM SPIRIT assets might be perceived unfavorably by our allies in the Western Pacific, "particularly since they know that we have more E-3As that could possibly be used for this mission." He continued, "I recognize that the deployment to Saudi Arabia should not be read as a signal that there is a danger that the US would abandon the defense of Korea for other missions, but events of the last few years have made that fear very real in the minds of the Koreans."\footnote{2}

(\S) The AWACS aircraft were granted overflight clearance by Singapore, and their accompanying KC-135 tankers were refueled there, but both the Singapore government and the U.S. Ambassador were unhappy with the timing of the requests. The Embassy received a flash message at about 6:00 P.M. local time requesting overflight clearance for the morning of the following day; no mention was made of landing. The Air Attache immediately contacted appropriate Singapore government authorities and the overflight clearance was granted. About midnight, the Embassy was instructed to obtain landing clearance for six KC-135 tankers to begin at noon the following day. Both messages stressed the extreme importance of the operation. When the Air Attache sought clearance for the tankers he was unable to obtain it without higher level approval, and the Ambassador had to phone the Defense Minister personally at 4:00 A.M. to request approval.

2. J311 HistSum Apr 79 (U); USCINCEUR 121155Z Mar 79 (C), DECL 11 Mar 85; CINCUNC 080930Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 9 Mar 99.}
(U) One of the E-3As redeployed through the Philippines on 20 April (COPE PAD). It provided Philippine dignitaries with an AWACS demonstration and participated in an abbreviated "NEWBOY" air defense exercise. President Marcos was among the dignitaries to observe the demonstration on 24 April. The demonstration appeared to create a very favorable impression of our mutual defense capabilities. The AWACS completed redeployment to its home base at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, on 26 April.3

(U) On 27 October following the assassination of President Park in the Republic of Korea, the JCS directed the deployment of two AWACS aircraft to Osan Air Base as a non-provocative, highly visible demonstration of support for the Republic of Korea. The aircraft deployed non-stop from Tinker Air Base and arrived at Osan within 24 hours. E-3A in-country activity commenced on 29 October, two days after receipt of the deployment order, and terminated on 19 December after flying a total of 45 missions. They redeployed to CONUS on 21 December.4

(S) As noted above, the first AWACS deployment to the PACOM had taken place in 1978. Prior to that time, in anticipation of future deployments, the CINCPAC Operations Security Branch had conducted an OPSEC survey during the November 1977 COPE JADE/STRIKE exercise. The National Security Agency used the survey data to develop a vulnerability assessment of the AWACS deployment. The conclusions and recommendations drawn by CINCPAC and the Agency were similar in all significant respects and were combined into a single report. The survey report, "Exercise COPE JADE Operations Security Report," was completed and signed on 22 June 1978. It was then distributed to all concerned.

1. AMEMB Singapore 02205/091308Z Mar 79 (S), RDS-3 3/9/89.
2. Ibid.
3. J311 HistSum Apr 79 (U); CINCPACAF 250600Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 23 Apr 85.
4. J311 HistSum Dec 79 (U); CINCPAC 220743Z Dec 79 (U); CINCPAC 122359Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 12 Dec 85.
for appropriate action, as required, to tighten the security of AWACS upon its deployment. A number of procedures were established prior to that first deployment: no TV "downtell" of data, a secure multichannel radio system was to be used to provide a secure communications loop for all AWACS data, and track handling procedures would be restricted to protect AWACS as the source of the data should the secure multichannel radio loop be lost for any reason.1

The CINCPAC OPSEC team conducted a follow-on survey of AWACS during that first deployment. Communications Security monitoring was also conducted, during the survey. The conclusions and recommendations drawn formed the basis of conduct of future secure AWACS operations in the PACOM. The survey report, "AWACS/COPE JADE Exercise Operations Security Report," was completed and signed on 22 January 1979. The report was distributed to all concerned.2

AC-130 Deployment Requests

(U) The Lockheed AC-130 was the gunship configuration of the C-130 cargo aircraft. Its armament consisted of a 105mm howitzer, a 40mm cannon, and two 20mm Vulcan guns.4

CINCPAC supported the request and it was learned that the CINC of the Readiness Command could make two aircraft available for 45 days, but there were no funds available to support the deployment, which was estimated to cost $718,000. CINCPAC requested the assistance of the JCS in identifying possible

1. J316 HistSum Jan 79 (S), DECL 9 Feb 85.
2. Ibid., which cites CINCPAC Ltr Ser S22 of 22 Jan 79.
3. J361 HistSum Apr 79 (S/MF), DECL 31 Dec 84; COMUS Korea 230515Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 84.
4. SECDEF 5301/152103Z Nov 79 (U).
alternative sources of funding. CINCPAC learned on 27 April that no funding would be made available. A possibility existed that the AC-130s would be able to participate in exercise FOAL EAGLE 80, which was scheduled for October-November 1979, should exercise offset funding become available. That exercise, however, was canceled as a result of unsettled political conditions in Korea at the time.¹

On 22 May CINCPAC provided his rationale to the JCS to support the redeployment of AC-130s to the PACOM on a continuing basis. He said his headquarters was convinced that a firm requirement existed for the presence of an AC-130 gunship element in the PACOM to be responsive to wartime, ongoing peacetime, as well as crisis response contingencies. He reminded the JCS that in 1975 CINCPACAF, with CINCPAC support, had attempted to retain the AC-130 in-theater when the 16th Special Operations Squadron that used the aircraft was withdrawn from Thailand. The aircraft were returned to CONUS with the rationale that consolidation was economical and would increase worldwide responsiveness. Since redeployment, responsiveness to PACOM requirements had been less than satisfactory due to time and distance factors and the non-availability of aircraft and deployment funds. The utility of the AC-130 had been well documented in crisis response situations such as the MAYAGÜEZ incident and the evacuations of Saigon and Phnom Penh. The wartime applications had been effectively demonstrated in TEAM SPIRIT 78. In order to effectively utilize the AC-130 in the PACOM, however, it was essential that the aircraft be readily available on a continuing basis to react to contingency requirements and to support necessary training programs with the U.S. and allied forces. In light of increasing requirements, it was deemed appropriate to readdress the issue of forward stationing of the aircraft in the PACOM.²

The most pressing requirement was for rear area security operations in the defense of Korea, but the gunship, by virtue of its sensor capabilities, firepower, and range, was considered ideally suited to a broad range of contingencies, such as those cited above that had already taken place. CINCPAC concluded that the CONUS location of the aircraft precluded their effective utilization in the PACOM because of the high cost of deployments and long response times. "To be responsive to PACOM requirements and contingency operations, aircraft must be placed in WESTPAC on a continuing basis."³

1. J361 HistSum Apr 79 (S/UF), DECL 31 Dec 84; CINCPAC 180151Z Mar 79 (S/UF), DECL 31 Dec 84; JCS 4092/022017Z May 79 (S), DECL 1 May 85; J361 HistSum Oct 79 (U).
2. CINCPAC 220101Z May 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 87.
3. Ibid.
The matter remained under consideration in Washington at the end of
year as part of the Korean force withdrawal offset package.

Four AC-130 gunships from CONUS were temporarily deployed to Guam in
November in response to the unsettled political situation in Korea, as discus-
sed elsewhere in this chapter.

**F-15 Deployments in PACOM**

The USAF deployed the first squadron of F-15 aircraft (18 F-15s) to
the PACOM on 29 September, to be part of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing. The
aircraft arrived at Kadena from Eglin AFB, Florida, with a short stop at
Hickam AFB, Hawaii. Their arrival was marked by the visit of U.S. and Japanese
dignitaries and wide media coverage.¹

The ultimate plan was for three 24-aircraft squadrons at Kadena by
the fourth quarter of FY 80. Meanwhile, F-4 aircraft and their crews were
to be kept operationally ready. The F-15s for Kadena were the latest models,
F-15C/D, with 2,000 pounds of additional fuel possible and a maximum takeoff
gross weight increased to 68,000 pounds.²

**KC-130 Unit Deployment**

On 6 June the Commandant of the Marine Corps advised CINCPAC that he
intended to adjust the KC-130 forces in the Western Pacific. He explained
that in 1976 the Corps had announced plans to meet a portion of their Western
Pacific personnel requirements by deploying limited ground and air combat
units from Hawaii on a six-month temporary duty basis. That plan was expanded
in 1977. There was a six-phase plan. Phase I, for FY 78, had consisted of
initial deployments and relocations to test the concept. Phase II, for FY 79,
was in progress. It involved additional infantry battalion and aviation
squadron relocations with concurrent replacement by like units, again on a
temporary duty basis.³

He said that the successful implementation of the program so far had
indicated the desirability of including the three KC-130 squadrons in the

¹ HQ PACAF 160400Z Jun 79 and 052310Z Sep 79, both (U).
² J5323 Point Paper (CS) of 20 Nov 79, Subj: F-15 Basing, Kadena (U), DECL
16 Nov 85.
³ J5322 HistSum Jun 79 (CS), DECL 31 May 84; CMC 061036Z Jun 79 (CS), DECL
Western Pacific rotation cycle. The adjustment he announced would reduce the KC-130 levels from 12 to 8, distributing the other 4 aircraft evenly between El Toro, California and Cherry Point, North Carolina. The WESTPAC commitments would be met by two four-plane detachments. Over the years there had been a drawdown of tactical air assets without a corresponding reduction in the refueling force. Even though there had been 12 aircraft assigned to the theater only 7 or 8 had been maintained in a ready status. The Commandant said he intended to keep the 8 remaining planes in "A" status at all times, which would actually provide an equal or even greater capability than the previous system, which called for more aircraft but provided fewer in an operational status. Personnel benefits were seen to accrue: the plan would enable the realization of known efficiencies in training, personnel retention, and asset reallocation derived from benefits of reduced personnel and organizational turbulence, unit stability, individually managed assignments, and continuity of leadership.¹

(6) CINCPAC said that although he basically viewed the deployment plan as a reduction of a vital resource essential for the PACOM, he recognized the benefits to be obtained by the Marine Corps. With the understanding that the proposed unit rotation would equal or increase PACOM operational capability, he supported the proposal.²

Marine Aircraft Deploy to Florida

(6) Three RF-4B aircraft were deployed from El Toro Marine Corps Air Station in California to Key West Naval Air Station in Florida to participate in a show-of-force exercise at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, beginning in October and ending in November. The RF-4Bs were used to conduct photography missions of the Guantanamo Bay area under program AJAR RAIL, and synthetic aperture radar missions against Havana Harbor under program ALCOVE HAIL.³

Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 162240Z Jun 79 (6)(EX), DECL 31 May 84.
3. J3124 HistSum Nov 79 (6), DECL 1 Dec 85.
(U) In 1979 CINCPAC staff members, sometimes accompanied by component representatives, visited PARPRO installations in both Alaska and the Western Pacific. The Alaska trip, 2-11 May, was conducted by members of the Intelligence and Operations Directorates and representatives from the staff of CINCPACFLT. The team visited all major PARPRO operating bases and units and their supporting facilities and sites. Visited were the Alaska Air Command, NCR Alaska, the Naval Security Group Activity, the 6981st Security Squadron, and the 1931st Communications Group at Elmendorf AFB; the 6th Strategic Wing, 6985th Security Squadron, and 1995th Communications Station at Eielson AFB; the Naval Security Group Activity, Commander Task Group 32.3, the Naval Communications Station, and CLASSIC WIZZARD at Adak Naval Station; and Detachment 1 of the 6th Strategic Wing, the DOD Anders Facility, and the COBRA DANE Radar Facility at Shemya AF Station. Discussions centered around operating and reporting procedures, shortfalls, potential problem areas, communications procedures, advisory support procedures, and the security and safety of PARPRO operations. No hazards to PARPRO operations were uncovered by the CINCPAC team.1

1. J314 HistSum Oct 79 (£), DECL 7 Nov 85; CINCPAC 181825Z Sep 79 (£), DECL 3 Sep 85.
2. J314 HistSum May 79 (£), DECL 31 May 85.
1. JCS 4859/032126Z May 79 (§), REVW 3 May 85, REAS 3; CINCPAC 112242Z May 79 (§), DECL 11 May 85.
2. CINCPACFLT 142131Z May 79 (§), DECL 11 May 85 DG/C/11 May 81; ADMIN CINCPAC 160055Z May 79 (§), DECL 15 May 85; CINCPAC 160401Z May 79 (§), DECL 14 May 85.
5. Ibid.
Philippine Civil Air Crash and Suspended Military Operations

(U) On 21 July a U.S. F-4 aircraft was on a training flight at low level over the Lingayen Gulf. The aircraft was stationed at Kadena, Japan. It had arrived in the Philippines the night before, spending the night at Cubi Point because bad weather precluded continuing to its destination, Clark Air Base. On the morning flight the plan included low-level flying under visual flight rules. After flying over Baguio and around Wallace Air Station, the crew picked a heading toward land and initiated a descent to 1,700 feet. Seconds before crossing the coastline the crew saw a light aircraft and increased their altitude to avoid passing in front of it. While in the climbing maneuver the pilot banked to the right, at which time both crew members again saw a light aircraft off to their right. There were two light planes in the area. The one they saw was probably one piloted by a Malaysian student pilot flying behind a Philippine Airlines Cessna trainer. Subsequent to the F-4 maneuver, the left wing of the Cessna was reported to have separated from the aircraft, causing the plane to crash and killing its two occupants. There were accusations that the U.S. aircraft had "buzzed" the Cessna, but evidence and eye witness accounts suggested that neither the F-4 crew nor the trainer that crashed saw one another. There was no mid-air collision, but the wing separated from the aircraft shortly after a near miss.3

1. Ibid.
2. J3142 HistSum Nov 79 (S), DECL 1 Dec 85.
(U) Philippine press reaction to the 13th Air Force commander's press conference on the accident on 17 August included reports that the Philippine Airline authorities would study every point raised in the investigation report "as the left wing could not have been broken off on its own accord." One headline said the airline reaction to the report was "Oh, yeah?" In an editorial called "Is this justice and fair play?" one paper noted that even as the 13th Air Force commander cleared the American pilots, the matter was further complicated by the sudden departure of those pilots to Kadena. "What should intrigue the Filipinos, however," the editorial continued, "is the statement of General Hildreth that while Clark's investigation has established that suggestions that the F-4 crew buzzed or otherwise wilfully endangered the PAL trainer are without foundation, he at the same time gave the assurance that damage claims by families of the crash victims will be handled fairly and expeditiously." Thus..."the United States Air Force is ready and willing to pay damages for what it claimed it had nothing to do with. This gives the impression that the US government is acting in the name of charity and not in the name of justice and fair play."1

The Embassy in Manila noted that the extensive and generally hostile press coverage constituted the first serious incident of its kind to reach the public eye since the conclusion of the amended Military Bases Agreement in January. Even before the press conference that announced the results of the investigation, the Ambassador believed it was in the U.S. interest to do everything possible to accelerate normal claims processing procedures and correspond to the victims' families in a prompt and generous offer of compensation if a claim was presented. That Embassy message had been addressed to the 13th Air Force, but CINCPAC, in the interest of proper command channels, took the message for action and forwarded CINCPACAF actions in the matter to all concerned.2

On 14 August the Philippine Civil Aviation Agency published a NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) that suspended until further notice all four published U.S. military low-level training routes over Luzon, in what was seen as a clear violation of the understandings of the recent base negotiations that provided for unhampered military operations involving U.S. Forces in the Philippines.3

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1. USICA Manila 200743Z Aug 79 (U).
2. JS121 HistSum Aug 79 (S), DECL 30 Sep 85; AMEMB Manila 15581/1005592 Aug 79 (S), GDS 8/10/85; CINCPAC 150311Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 31 Aug 85.
3. HQ PACAF 150540Z Aug 79 (S), DECL Aug 85.

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Low-level flying was believed to be only one of the problems with U.S. military use of their airspace perceived by the Philippine CAA. While they had been concerned for some time, the Cessna crash generated emotion and shock countrywide and momentum in that agency to seek review of U.S. flight procedures, control, and use of certain portions of the overland airspace.

Negotiations with the Philippine CAA resulted in agreement on the establishment of three intensive military training areas. Creation of those areas and use of recommended procedures would result in a significant increase in available overland training airspace and provide the means to more effectively separate high performance military air operations from civil traffic. The Philippine CAA approved the proposal and work began on the details of the agreement in September.

Navigational Freedom and U.S. Security Interests

Ever since Law of the Sea negotiations had begun in 1973 the United States had generally not protested objectionable maritime claims made by other nations that the United States did not recognize as being valid under International Law and customary practice. The matter had been studied by the National Security Council and a staff secretary memo on the subject "Navigational and Overflight Policy Paper (C)" dated 1 February 19/9 had been prepared. A memo from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on the same subject dated 20 March had modified national policy in this regard. It had become U.S. policy to protest illegal maritime claims and exercise our rights in the face of such claims and promote the view that freedom of navigation and overflight through straits used for international navigation existed as a high seas right regardless of assertions of jurisdiction over 12-mile territorial seas. The Department of State was to take action to effect changes in excessive claims made by other states and/or make U.S. opposition to the claims known through official diplomatic protests. The Department of Defense was to plan for and carry out operations that would assert U.S. rights in the face of excessive claims by means of naval and air operations.

1. CINCPACREP Philippines 050745Z Sep 79 (C)(EX), DECL 30 Sep 85.
2. CINCPACREP Philippines 101400Z Sep 79 (C), DECL 30 Sep 81 and 140545Z Sep 79 (U).
3. JCS 6928/022100Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 31 Mar 85.
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The Department of Defense had been tasked to submit to the National Security Council by 15 April a plan of proposed exercises, transits, and overflights by naval and air forces within the following 6 months that would assert U.S. rights. The JCS asked for CINCPAC's recommendations. They provided a list of representative national claims. PACOM countries listed were Bangladesh, Burma, India, Indonesia, Maldives, Mauritius, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands.¹

The Secretary of State notified all diplomatic and consular posts of the new policy, noting that the United States should promote the view that there was freedom of navigation and overflight at least for purposes of transit (as in the Law of the Sea informal composite negotiating text) through straits used for international navigation, but without endorsing territorial sea claims in excess of three miles. "Our naval and air forces should exercise traditional freedoms and rights in the face of illegal claims whenever doing so is practicable and taking into account other missions of these forces as well as fiscal constraints, although in certain cases we must consider going out of our way to contest a claim." Also, "We should consider whether any of our current practices could be misconstrued as acquiescence in an illegal claim. We should consider, for example, distinguishing exercises conducted in cooperation with a coastal state or as a prelude to or after a port visit from the exercise of rights which are not so associated." Such exercises should normally be conducted in a low-key and non-threatening manner, but without special attempt at concealment. "It should also become a matter of public knowledge that our military forces customarily exercise these freedoms and rights."²

The JCS consolidated the recommendations of all of the CINCs of unified and specified commands and forwarded the proposal to the National Security Council. On 20 July the JCS forwarded to the CINCs the list of operations that had been approved by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. They were to be implemented where operationally feasible.³

Four countries were listed for CINCPAC. The first was Indonesia, which had a claimed territorial sea of 12 nautical miles. Its objectionable claim was an archipelago claim, in which the 12-mile territorial sea was measured from a straight base line connecting its outermost islands. The on-going practice had been to provide "courtesy notification" to Indonesia of warship passage through the archipelago. The proposed action was to have Pacific

¹ SECSTATE 097425/01/181116Z Apr 79 (¼), GDS 4/16/85.
² JCS 6504/201439Z Jul 79 (¼), DECL 16 Jul 85.
Fleet units continue to conduct exercises and transits through Indonesian-claimed archipelago waters. The United States, however, planned to direct the U.S. Defense Attache in Jakarta to phase out the courtesy notification of warship passage.

For the Philippines the claimed territorial sea was variable, but that country also had the objectionable archipelago claim. The proposed action was to have Pacific Fleet units continue to conduct routine exercises within the Philippine claimed archipelago and transit Philippine territorial waters en route to high seas areas without providing prior notification.

Fiji, with a claimed territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, and the Solomon Islands, with a 3 nautical mile claim, both also made objectionable archipelago claims. The proposed action for both countries was to challenge their claims by routing transiting (EASTPAC-WESTPAC) ships through those areas.1

On 20 July the Defense Intelligence Agency provided instructions to the Defense Attache in Jakarta on implementation of the revised policy. It was noted that the practice of providing courtesy notification weakened the U.S. Law of the Sea position, jeopardized existing high seas rights, and was contrary to new U.S. policy. Providing the notification in writing further aggravated the problem and appeared to be inconsistent with certain 1972 policy guidance. The new procedure to be followed for U.S. warship transit after 1 August was to substitute oral notification for written, and to provide such notification only after the warship(s) had transited Indonesian-claimed archipelagic waters. If the Indonesians asked for an explanation of the procedural change, the Attache was to remind them that oral notification was provided as a military-to-military courtesy and that the matter of notification reflected U.S. Navy policy. If asked about the ex post facto notification, the Attache might reply that the change resulted from modification in operational procedures. Further questions could be submitted to Washington, if appropriate, but the objective was to keep the dialogue at the lowest practicable military-to-military level.2

Subsequently the Departments of State and Defense modified the instructions that had been provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency. For the first transit that occurred after 1 September, the Defense Attache should notify the Indonesians on the day of passage and the past procedure of providing

1. Ibid.
2. DIA 202105Z Jul 79 (\textcopyright), DECL 19 Jul 85.
notification in writing could be used on that occasion if it was deemed appropriate. For the second and subsequent transits, however, the Defense Attache should make only oral notification on the day of the passage. Notification regarding ships that transited over a weekend, holiday, or during non-working hours could be made during the normal working day immediately preceding the day of passage. The ultimate goal was complete termination of notification by 1 March 1980. Accordingly, prior to that date, the Attache, in consultation with the Ambassador, should seek to omit at least one notification entirely.¹

² The first action under the new policy had a complication. Task Group 70.1 (Battle Group ALPHA), led by USS MIDWAY (CV-41), was scheduled to transit on 12 October en route to operations in the Indian Ocean. In company with MIDWAY was the Australian ship HMAS TORRENS for passing exercises in the Indonesian archipelago. It was Australian policy to give advance notification to Indonesia of such transit intentions by Royal Australian Navy ships, and the procedure had to be followed for TORRENS. (The requirement was considered to be of particular importance at the time in view of sensitive issues generated by the impending declaration of a 200-mile Australian fishing zone on 1 November and other Law of the Sea considerations.) If the U.S. Navy was not going to notify Indonesia and disclosure by Australia through TORRENS notification was contrary to U.S. interests, it would be necessary for TORRENS to be detached from the task group for the duration of the transit.²

³ The U.S. Defense Attache in Jakarta learned from the Australian Naval Attache in Jakarta that Indonesian authorities were notified on 29 September of the TORRENS transit, without reference to U.S. warships in company. Commander SEVENTH Fleet requested that Commander, Task Group 70.1 detach TORRENS prior to entering Indonesian-claimed waters for independent transit. The State Department advised the Embassy in Jakarta that as there was only one further transit scheduled before the end of the year it would be useful to drop written notification in this case if the Embassy believed it was appropriate.³

The last transit scheduled for the year was USS HEPBURN (FF-1055), which was scheduled for 28 November, and approved by the JCS. The JCS modified

1. SECSTATE 225215/2721172 Aug 79 (S), GDS 8/27/85.
2. DEFNAV Canberra 090345Z Oct 79 (S), REW 8 Oct 99.
3. USDAO Jakarta 1373/100443Z Oct 79 (S), DECL 10 Oct 85; COMSEVETHFILT 101340Z Oct 79 (S), DECL 10 Oct 85; SECSTATE 265502/102230Z Oct 79 (S), GDS 10/10/85.
semiannual reporting periods to 1 April through 30 September and 1 October through 31 March to align the reporting requirements of this program with the quarterly planning cycle used for operations and exercises.¹

Also in November the Republic of Maldives was added to PACOM countries in this matter. When operational schedules permitted, transiting SEVENTH Fleet ships were to conduct exercises and transits through the Maldives archipelago claim without advance permission or notification.²

CINCPAC's Staff Judge Advocate provided legal guidance to CINCPACFLT on the exercise of navigational freedom on 19 November. He reiterated that the exercise of navigational rights should not be unnecessarily provocative, and prudent judgment should be exercised in the assignment of units to assert U.S. rights. Adequate protection of operating units had to be assured, but the number of military units should not be so overwhelming as to be perceived by the coastal state as heavy-handed or a threat to its security. He said that in areas of excessive territorial sea and archipelago claims it was imperative that U.S. military operations not be perceived as the exercise of innocent passage. "Innocent passage is passage for the purpose of transversing the territorial sea without entering internal waters, or making for internal waters from the high seas, or making for the high seas from internal waters. It also includes stopping and anchoring incident to navigation, or as the result of force majeure or distress. Passage is innocent as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the coastal state." Submarines were required to navigate on the surface and show their flag; the right of innocent passage did not apply to aircraft. Transits by U.S. forces in excessive claim areas that conformed to those principles not only did not constitute challenges to the excessive claims, but could be viewed by coastal state officials as recognition by the United States of the excessive claims. "Consequently, military operations in areas of excessive claims should be obviously inconsistent with innocent passage. Ship maneuvers, ASW exercises, and other military operations clearly inconsistent with innocent passage through the claimed excessive territorial sea should be employed. In this respect, air operations constitute an immediate and unequivocal demonstration of US non-recognition of an excessive territorial sea claim since aircraft do not enjoy the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea."³

1. CINCPAC 170242Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 15 Nov 85; JCS 4961/151443Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 16 Nov 79.
2. CINCPAC 170242Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 15 Nov 85.
3. CINCPAC 192233Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 14 Nov 85.
Military operations designed to exercise high seas freedoms, however, had to scrupulously avoid violation of the coastal state's legitimate rights and sovereignty. The United States recognized a 3 nautical mile territorial sea, but it generally did not challenge coastal state claims to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea that did not impinge on the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight in straits used for international navigation or require advance notification or permission for transit by military units. "Consequently, military operations designed to exercise high seas freedom of navigation and overflight should be conducted no closer that 12 NM from the land territory of the coastal state, except in international straits, in which event such operations shall approach no closer than 3 NM from the land territory. This policy is not to be construed as US agreement in the international legal validity of 12 NM claims."1

Certain states, the advice continued, (Somalia, Indonesia, Burma, Mauritius, Maldives) combined excessive geographical claims with requirements for prior notification or permission for entry of warships into claimed waters. Other states (the USSR, China, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka) claimed 12 nautical mile territorial seas but also required prior notification or permission. In both cases the notification/permission requirements were clearly excessive and should be challenged.

CINCPAC already had an instruction on the requirement for prior approval of military operations in politically sensitive areas and was to be consulted in planning operations to challenge claims (CINCPAC Instruction C3100.6 (series)). "Except for the East Africa area, challenges in politically sensitive areas incidental to normal operations and point-to-point transits, and challenges in the nature of innocent passage, do not require prior approval. Because of the political sensitivities involved, however, challenges to prior notification/permission requirements in the claimed 12 NM territorial seas of the USSR, PRC, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, North Korea, Taiwan, and Sri Lanka require prior approval by CINCPAC."2

Sea of Okhotsk Operations

During the period 15 to 20 September a surface combatant task group, TG 75.2, conducted a six-day excursion into the Sea of Okhotsk. The purpose of the mission was to exercise the principle of freedom of the seas by conducting a routine naval operation in international waters along the Kuril

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
Island chain and in the Sea of Okhotsk.\(^1\)

A similar operation had been conducted in June 1978. At that time one incident of "possible harassment" had taken place. A Soviet ship had maneuvered close aboard a U.S. ship and crossed its bow at 300 yards, requiring the U.S. ship to maneuver radically on two occasions to avoid collision, but no collision occurred.\(^2\)

CINCPACFLT submitted his plan for the operation on 9 January 1979. CINCPAC cited the importance of demonstrating the U.S. freedom of the seas position that the Sea of Okhotsk was an international body of water with continuing right of high seas navigation and overflights when he recommended early approval of the JCS for the plan. The JCS approval was granted on 11 August. CINCPAC was to insure that forces did not approach Soviet territory closer than 25 nautical miles except as necessary to transit international straits; when transiting the straits the forces were to remain at least 12 nautical miles from Soviet territory. Public release of information concerning the operation was not authorized and queries from public and news media were to be accepted and brought to the attention of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. CINCPAC was tasked, in coordination with appropriate embassies, to prepare public affairs guidance and forward it for Washington coordination and approval.\(^3\)

Task group 75.2, commanded by RADM A. Sinclair, USN, was composed of USS BAINBRIDGE (CGN-25), USS HENRY B. WILSON (DDG-7), USS STEIN (FF-1065), USS PONCHATOULA (AO-148), and P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. STEIN was the only ship that had been on the 1978 deployment and was the ship that had been involved in the near miss with the Soviet ship KRIVAK-602.

The task group followed a pre-planned track up the Kuril chain entering the Sea of Okhotsk about 50°N between the Kuril Islands. After entering the sea, on 15 September, the task force remained over 29 nautical miles from Soviet territory. The group then transited north along Kamchatka to 55°N, then west to Sakhalin Island, then southward to the Kuril chain, exiting into the Sea of Japan on 20 September by the La Perouse Strait.\(^4\)

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1. J313 HistSum Sep 79 (S), DECL 9 Oct 85.
3. CINCPACFLT 090214Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 13 Dec 86 DG/C/31 Dec 80; CINCPAC 152015Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 10 Jan 85; JCS 5792/111309Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 6 Aug 85.
4. J313 HistSum Sep 79 (S), DECL 9 Oct 85.
U.S. tactical aircraft were positioned at Misawa, Japan (from USS MIDWAY (CV-41)) to provide a quick reaction response if such had been necessary.  

Soviet reaction to the task group was limited to periodic overflights during the period 17 to 20 September, with one Soviet "tattletale" surface combatant joining the group on 18 September, followed by three more Soviet surface combatants on 19 September; they remained until 20 September. The task group commander said that the lack of Soviet interest or surveillance for the first two days was "most interesting and disconcerting." He said that the northeasterly transit along the Kuril chain and the apparent undetected passage through the Chetvey Kuril'skiy Strait placed the task group within 13.5 nautical miles of the Soviet land mass and was considered worthy of note. Extremely poor weather and visibility during the period in question and the electronic mission control actions (no high-frequency or surface-air search radars) may have been the reason for no Soviet reaction until 17 September. The task group commander said that the sixty-four dollar question remained on the table, "Were the Soviets not prepared or did they choose not to initiate surveillance of the SCTG until two days after entry into the Sea of Okhotsk?"  

There were no significant incidents or harassments during the transit, and all objectives were accomplished.

1. COMUS Japan 062235Z Sep 79 (S), DECL 31 Aug 87; COMSEVENTHFLT 071035Z (Aug 79 (S)), REVW 1 Sep 85; COMSEVENTHFLT 071500Z Sep 79 (S), DECL 7 Sep 85.  
2. J313 HistSum Sep 79 (S), DECL 9 Oct 85; CTG SEVEN FIVE PT TWO 221030Z Sep 79 (S), REVW 22 Sep 85.  
3. Ibid.  
4. CINCPACFLT 130440Z Jul 79 (S), REVW 11 Jul 99.
Beginning in 1973 ships had had to leave their reconnaissance position for medical or humanitarian reasons for crew members. CINCPAC had, therefore, required intensive medical and emergency screening of personnel prior to deployments. In his tasking message for the May deployment, CINCPAC, as usual, requested that all personnel assigned aboard ARNOLD for the mission be physically qualified and in possession of current medical and dental records.

1. J313 HistSum Jun 79 (§), DECL 10 Jul 85; JCS 4759/132342Z Apr 79 (§), DECL 12 Apr 87; CINCPAC 180322Z Apr 79 (§), DECL 16 Apr 87; COMTHIRDFLT 210619Z Jun 79 (§), DECL 21 Jun 85.
On 25 May, however, a crew member suffered a heart attack and required immediate medical evacuation. ARNOLD departed its test support position for rendezvous with the Coast Guard cutter JARVIS, following which the patient was transferred to Shemya Island by a JARVIS small boat for further evacuation to Elmendorf AFB via P-3 aircraft. ARNOLD returned to the test support position on 272040Z May and continued its mission. At the conclusion of the mission ARNOLD made a brief stop at Adak on 3 July and arrived at Pearl Harbor on 11 July.1

(5) A second deployment was conducted from 11 August to 21 September. That deployment had planned for a mid-mission break from 7 to 13 September, but because of a unique collection opportunity, the break was canceled and the mission was terminated a week earlier than had been planned. ARNOLD transited to Hawaii via Adak, arriving on 30 September.2

(5) A third deployment was conducted from 15 November to 31 December with a mid-mission break from 29 November to 4 December.3

Southern Pacific Cruise (SOPAC) 79

(5) The series of SOPAC training and goodwill cruises that began in 1978 continued in 1979. This second cruise in 1979 was conducted by Commander Destroyer Squadron 25 and consisted of USS COCHRANE (DDG-21), USS ROBERT E. PEARY (FF-1073), and USS ROARK (FF-1053). Port visits were highlighted by numerous receptions, ship tours, sporting events, and voluntary activities undertaken on behalf of local charities. CINCPAC noted that the performance and personal demeanor of the crews was most noteworthy and deserving of the highest praise. "The superb professional competence exhibited by all hands, during the cruise, was epitomized by PEARY's recent rescue of 448 Vietnamese refugees at sea," CINCPAC said. He concluded that the very favorable reactions of the nations of the South Pacific as a result of the cruise were concrete evidence of the fleet's important contribution in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives.4

(U) The ships covered quite a bit of ground. In February, for example, USS COCHRANE visited Nukualofa, Tonga; Suva, Fiji; Noumea, New Caledonia; back to Suva; and on to Wellington and then Bluff Harbor, New Zealand. That

2. J313 HistSum Sep 79 (S), DECL 5 Oct 85.
3. CINCPAC 180030Z Oct 79 (S), DECL 17 Oct 85.
4. CINCPAC 190215Z May 79 (S), DECL 18 May 84.
same month USS PEARY visited Rorotonga in the Cook Islands; Pago Pago in American Samoa; Lautoka and Suva in Fiji; and then Napier and Christchurch in New Zealand. ROARK was calling at Pago Pago, American Samoa; Port Vila, New Hebrides; Suva, Fiji; and New Plymouth and Timaru in New Zealand. The three ships were only together for two days in Suva in the middle of the month.\footnote{1} 

\section*{Solomon Islands Incident}

As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, it had become U.S. policy in 1979 to protest illegal maritime claims, such as claims for excessive territorial waters. One PACOM country that made an objectionable archipelago claim was the Solomon Islands and CINCPAC was to challenge that claim by routing transiting ships through the claimed areas. An incident that took place on 15 October in the Solomons had not been intended to challenge the claim however.\footnote{2}

\begin{quote}
(U) The message received by the Embassy in Port Moresby from the government of the Solomon Islands expressed in "very strong terms" that government's "great disappointment" at what appeared to have been "a 'peaceful' invasion into our territorial waters and air space by USA warships and rocket armed helicopters." They would have expected as a matter of mutual respect and courtesy that they be warned about the coming of the vessels. They said they sighted eight vessels and five helicopters, the latter flying over Florida Island.\footnote{3}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
(U) The Embassy's message transmitting the protest had been addressed to CINCPACFLT and had requested information on the incident. CINCPAC, however, took charge of the inquiry into the matter. There was considerable urgency as the U.S. Ambassador-designate, Harvey J. Feldman, was scheduled to present his credentials in Honiara and had received a telegram from the Solomon Islands Foreign Secretary reinforcing the protest. The Foreign Secretary's message continued, "Prime Minister and his cabinet have instructed me to say further that such violation of sovereign rights is considered to be gravely discourteous and would wish for explanation to be expedited, preferably for good relations before your own arrival tomorrow."\footnote{4}
\end{quote}

\footnotesize
\begin{enumerate}
\item J313 HistSum Feb 79 (U).
\item J313 HistSum Oct 79 (C), DECL 7 Nov 85.
\item AMEMB Port Moresby 1518/160215Z Oct 79 (U).
\item CINCPAC 162031Z Oct 79 (U); AMEMB Port Moresby 4668/170715Z Oct 79 (C).
\end{enumerate}

\footnotesize
EO 12065: N/A.
In a personal message to CINCPAC the Ambassador said he urgently needed to know if U.S. warships and helicopters were in fact involved in an intrusion as claimed, did U.S. helicopters overfly Florida Island without permission, and were units from other countries involved. The information was provided to the Ambassador by telephone.¹

It was later confirmed that eight ships had transited the Solomons, Task Group 75.1, which consisted of USS CHICAGO (CG-11), USS LANG (FF-1060), USS HEPBURN (FF-1055), and USS PONCHATOULA (AO-148), and Task Group 76.3, which consisted of USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10), USS DULUTH (LPD-6), USS MOUNT VERNON (LSD-39), and USS BRISTOL COUNTY (LST-1198). The task groups were en route to Exercise KANGAROO III, in northeastern Australia. The transit had been conducted in conformance with the concept of navigational freedom of the seas. All ships remained in international waters approaching no land mass closer than 3 miles. None of the ships that operated or that were involved in helicopter operations had approached land closer than 9.3 miles. The antisubmarine warfare helicopters of the task group flew a total of six flights on 15 October and Florida Island was overflown on two of those flights. (Both helicopters were SH-2s, one from USS LANG, the other from USS HEPBURN.) Both remained over 2,000 feet. Neither was armed but some external gear features could have been mistaken for rockets. CINCPAC advised the Embassy in Port Moresby that the overflights were regretted and that steps had been taken to insure that such flights would not recur.²

The Ambassador included a formal apology for the overflight incident during his remarks at the presentation of his credentials, also noting that measures were being instituted to make "reasonably sure" that no such occurrences would take place in the future. In accepting the Ambassador's credentials, the Governor-General said that the ship and aircraft violations came as a "complete surprise," which they had found difficult to comprehend. "We know we are comparatively a very small country but we have national pride and greatly value our sovereign rights as an independent nation." He said they could only assume that the incident was an "unintentional miscalculated error."³

On 13 November the United States formally protested the Solomon Islands declared archipelagic regime by delivery of a diplomatic note. "The United States does not recognize the right of any state to designate areas of the

2. CINCPAC 180639Z Oct 79 (N), DECL 18 Oct 85.
3. AMEMB Port Moresby 1563/220255Z Oct 79 (U).

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high seas as internal or archipelagic waters.\textsuperscript{1}

Nuclear Powered and Other Ship Visits to Foreign Ports

Nuclear powered ship visits still had not become "routine" in all parts of the PACOM. Some visits were greeted with protest demonstrations, and some countries did not permit such visits at all. Even in countries where nuclear powered ships called regularly there was some anxiety. For example, there had been a Washington Post story on 2 June to the effect that the U.S. Navy had vetoed the visit of a nuclear powered submarine to New York, deeming the city too heavily populated and vulnerable to terrorism for a visit. As a result, an Embassy official in Japan was asked to call on an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Ambassador subsequently asked for full background on the story and guidance from the State Department. In other areas of the PACOM the concern mounted following the "Three Mile Island" plant incident. Certain ship visits are discussed in the material that follows, by country.\textsuperscript{2}

**Australia**

(U) USS TUNNY (SSN-682) visited Cockburn Sound from 19 through 26 April. There was no protest activity connected with the TUNNY visit. The hospitality provided by the personnel of the Royal Australian Navy at their base HMAS Stirling was considered outstanding. The U.S. Ambassador was very pleased with the visit and encouraged more nuclear powered warship visits to Australia. Subsequently in the year USS BAINBRIDGE (CGN-25), USS PINTADO (SSN-672), and USS GURNARD (SSN-662) visited Australia. Commenting on GURNARD's 24 to 29 November visit to Melbourne, the American Consul in that city advised the State Department that general public acceptance of such visits in Melbourne was high, the press did not handle the visits in an inflammatory manner, the protesters were few and non-violent, and governmental aspects of the visits were handled in a routine and efficient manner. He would encourage more frequent scheduling of nuclear vessel visits "for the more often they come the more routine and non-controversial they will be."\textsuperscript{3}

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1. SECSTATE 299228/171712Z Nov 79 (C), E0 12065: N/A.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 09783/040900Z Jun 79 (S), XDS 6/4/99. Three Mile Island was a nuclear power plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania that in late March threatened to release dangerous amounts of radioactive materials as a result of a series of incidents that were the result of human error, design deficiencies, and mechanical failures.
3. J313 HistSum Apr 79 (U); AMCONSUL Melbourne 2059/010530Z Nov 79 (U).
New Zealand

(U) The port visit of USS HADDO (SSN-604) to Auckland from 19 to 24 January, which was considered successful, followed the same pattern that a visit by USS PINTADO (SSN-672) had in 1978. In both cases the submarines were met with protests and then overwhelmed with hospitality.¹

(U) Initially the HADDO met resistance coming into port by New Zealand demonstrators opposed to nuclear powered warship visits. They called themselves the "peace squadron," and the object of the protest was to force HADDO to slow to 4 knots or less, lose maneuverability, and drift out of channel. Despite concerted efforts by the flotilla of 50 to 55 boats, the police in large numbers of specially hired craft managed to throw up an almost impenetrable screen around the HADDO through most of the harbor entry. A gap developed between the lead escort, the Royal New Zealand Navy frigate WAIKATO, and several protest boats moved in. Five boats actually came in contact with HADDO and she had to stop her screws twice to prevent demonstrators from being injured. HADDO was liberally pelted with yellow paint bombs and one police boat foundered when it was hit by a protest boat. One demonstrator intentionally capsized his sailboat in the HADDO's path and managed to board the submarine; he was taken into custody by the police after berthing. There were no reported injuries on either side and four arrests were made. Royal New Zealand helicopters attempted to move in when the gap was opened by the WAIKATO, but they were successfully foiled by wire-trailing balloons released by the "peace squadron" boats. The Embassy in Wellington described the arrival as "safe, but not easy."²

(U) During the visit the shoreside protest activity was minimal and the officers and men were "overwhelmed with hospitality." There were no reported incidents during HADDO's departure, although the submarine was escorted by a few boats from the "peace squadron."³

(U) While no other nuclear powered warships visited New Zealand in 1979, the police informed the Defense Attache that a Greenpeace group in Auckland intended to demonstrate during the entrance of Destroyer Squadron 31, a conventionally powered group of warships consisting of USS ELLIOT (DD-967), USS DOWNES (FF-1070), and USS BUCHANAN (DDG-14), which arrived on 13 August.

² J313 HistSum Jan 79 (TS), REVW 8 Feb 83; AMEMB Wellington 190412Z Jan 79 (U).
³ Ibid.
(The combat support ship USS CAMDEN (AOE-2) berthed without incident at Wellington.) The police speculated that with the sparsity of nuclear powered warship visits, the anti-nuclear people had seen the anti-nuclear weapons issue as a means of keeping their followers' interest up. For the ships' arrival a "mini peace squadron" of approximately 10 small boats attempted to obstruct berthing by maneuvering between the ships and the wharf. Police boats made several fast dashes to prevent injury. The protestors claimed they had "indications" there were nuclear weapons aboard, apparently referring to the ASROC anti-submarine missile launchers on the three ships. The Embassy commented that what was new about this Auckland protest (it had been raised at Nelson and Dunedin a year earlier) was the strong emphasis on nuclear capabilities of the conventionally powered warships. There was speculation that "mini peace squadron" blockades would be attempted more routinely, especially at Auckland, whenever there was a visit by a conventionally powered ship with obvious nuclear weapons capabilities.\(^1\)

(U) Prime Minister Robert D. Muldoon was reelected in November, but the nuclear powered warship visits had been a campaign issue. Labor Party leader Wallace E. (Bill) Rowling had publicly opposed such visits since November 1975; in the November 1979 campaign he pledged that a Labor Party government under his leadership would "once again close New Zealand ports to nuclear military vessels."\(^2\)

Thailand

\(\text{(S)}\) During a meeting between the Secretary of Defense and the Prime Minister of Thailand in the spring, the Prime Minister raised the subject of increased ship visits to his country. The JCS requested CINCPAC's recommendations and then concurred, permitting an increase in aircraft carrier visits from three to four and overall ship visits from 25 to 32 per year. It was recognized by all that operational commitments might prevent full attainment of the new guideline.\(^3\)

\(\text{(S)}\) In November the JCS advised that the U.S. naval presence should be maximized through port visits during the on-going dry season. They said that a carrier visit in December and another in the first three months of 1980 were

1. COMDESRON THREE ONE 13055OZ Aug 79 (S), DECL 13 Aug 82; USDAO Wellington 04439/122254Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 13 Aug 82; AMEMB Wellington 142325Z Aug 79 (S), E0 12065: XDS-3 08/15/99.
2. SECGSTATE 309943/081808Z Dec 79 (C), GDS 12/8/94.
3. JCS 4291/150037Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 14 Mar 85; JCS 9430/231442Z May 79 (C), DECL 17 May 85, which cited CINCPAC 222339Z Mar 79.
particularly desired. They requested a proposed schedule of visits, which CINCPAC provided on 24 November. CINCPAC said, however, that a visit in the first quarter of FY 80 was not feasible because of the ongoing Indian Ocean and Korean contingency tasking. The JCS concurred on 3 December.¹

**USS TARAWA Makes First PACOM Deployment**

(U) USS TARAWA (LHA-1), first in a new class of amphibious assault ships and the largest amphibious ship in service, arrived in Pearl Harbor on the first leg of its initial PACOM deployment on 9 March. Second in size only to an aircraft carrier, the ship was 820 feet long and 20 stories high. Fully loaded the ship displaced 39,000 tons and was capable of speeds in excess of 24 knots. In Hawaii TARAWA and other units of Amphibious Squadron SEVEN embarked 1,200 Marines of the 37th Marine Amphibious Unit and their equipment. The troops participated in amphibious operations during deployment with the SEVENTH Fleet.²

**New Flagship for Commander, SEVENTH Fleet**

(U) In early October Commander SEVENTH Fleet's flag was shifted from USS OKLAHOMA CITY (CG-5) to USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC-19) in ceremonies in Tokyo. The 57-year-old cruiser was scheduled to be decommissioned. "With her Oklahomac's/fortune, the era in the U.S. Navy of the big gun cruiser comes to an end," SEVENTHFLT said. The ship, which was homeported in Japan, had taken part in the World War II Okinawa campaign and the bombing of Japan in the closing days of the war.³

The BLUE RIDGE had approximately 120 fewer crew members; families of BLUE RIDGE to reside in Japan would not exceed the OKLAHOMA CITY families that had been there. The ship, however, was expected to be a substantial improvement to the fleet commander's command and control capability. It was a relatively new ship with a modern and complex communications capability.⁴

**Loss and Recovery of TOMAHAWK Missile**

(U) During testing operations of the Chief of Naval Operations Project TOMAHAWK missile T20 was dropped by a recovery parachute into the sea at

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JCS 7392/1720002 Nov 79 (U), DECL 13 Nov 85; CINCPAC 242359Z Nov 79 (U), DECL 23 Nov 85; JCS 4359/031938Z Dec 79 (U), DECL 26 Nov 85; CNO 170834Z Mar 79 (U).
Honolulu Star-Bulletin 5 Oct 79 (U).
SECSTATE 013013/172230Z Jan 79 (U), GDS 1/17/85.
32°03'N, 117°38'W on 9 August. TOMAHAWK was an air-launched cruise missile under development and the search began immediately. CINCPAC advised the JCS of his intentions on 10 August. The Soviet intelligence collecting ship AGI GIDROGRAF was in the area. CINCPAC said he intended for the THIRD Fleet to maintain surveillance of GIDROGRAF in accordance with existing Rules of Engagement. If GIDROGRAF closed on the TOMAHAWK missile for a recovery, CINCPAC intended to permit THIRD Fleet forces to maneuver in such a manner as deemed necessary by the commanding officer to prevent GIDROGRAF recovery of the missile. "Maneuvers should avoid physical contact between U.S. Forces and AGI GIDROGRAF if at all possible, but protection of missile from AGI GIDROGRAF is considered paramount," CINCPAC said.¹

The deep submergence vehicle SEACLIFF finally located the missile on 20 August in 5,400 feet of water; it was intact with its nose buried in two to three feet of soft mud. When the weather improved, it was recovered by USS FLORIKAN on 24 August. FLORIKAN took it to San Diego where it was turned over to representatives of the General Dynamics Corporation without incident.²

Recovery of Practice Torpedo

USS SAM HOUSTON (SSBN-609) launched a torpedo as the first event of scheduled refresher training in a submarine operating area off Guam on 10 August (9 August Greenwich Mean Time). The torpedo was recovered by the Soviet intelligence trawler AGI ANEROID. It was returned the following day after State Department negotiations.

The exercise torpedo, an MK 37 Mod 2, was launched at its intended target and appeared to undergo its normal programmed run. Following the end of that run, the submarine searched down the torpedo track on a southerly heading with the torpedo retriever (TWR-8) about 1,500 yards on the port beam. The submarine was broached for 30 minutes during the search. The AGI was located about 3,000 yards astern of the submarine at 13°18'4"N, 144°34'7"E. When the submarine realized that the end-of-run position was astern, the submarine surfaced and reversed its course up the torpedo track. At this time the submarine observed the AGI hoisting the exercise torpedo aboard. The torpedo had not been sighted by the submarine prior to course reversal because of sun glare on the water. The SAM HOUSTON was part of Submarine Squadron FIFTEEN.³

1. CINCPACFLT 100901Z Aug 79 ( ), REVW 9 Nov 94; CINCPAC 101119Z Aug 79 ( ), DECL 10 Aug 79.
2. CTG THREE FOUR PT ONE 210026Z Aug 79 ( ), DECL 31 Dec 85, 220020Z Aug 79 ( ), DECL 1 Jan 80, and 250300Z Aug 79 ( ), DECL 31 Dec 85.

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Commander, Submarine Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet had first provided guidance to request the submarine to pass to ANEROID the message, "Thank you for recovering unit. Please return it." Subsequent guidance from COMSUBPAC resulted in the following message to ANEROID. "We demand return of the torpedo you have on board. It is United States Government property and was recovered in U.S. territorial waters." The message was sent by flashing light by the submarine and the TWR delivered the message by voice. The AGI denied having the torpedo and had moved outside 12 nautical miles of Guam. Recovery of the torpedo had been visually observed by both the commander and executive officer of SAM HOUSTON, but attempted photography at a range of 5,000 yards was not of sufficient detail to confirm Soviet recovery.1

CINCPAC advised the JCS of the incident, noting that the torpedo was obviously not abandoned property and it was clearly within legal rights to demand its immediate return. The torpedo, however, was not sufficiently sensitive to warrant the use of force to recover it.2

The SAM HOUSTON was joined by the Coast Guard cutter POINT HARRIS and P-3 aircraft in their surveillance of ANEROID.3

The Secretary of State advised the U.S. Embassy in Moscow of the incident, requesting that the Ambassador seek an immediate appointment with appropriate authorities to demand the immediate return of the torpedo. He was to advise that non-return would have "serious and adverse consequences."4

At meetings in Moscow with the First Deputy Foreign Minister it was learned that the commander of the Soviet ship was being ordered to return the object he had taken aboard. The Soviets, however, reserved the right to return to the question of whether actions taken by the American submarine might have violated existing agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea, as it might appear that the torpedo might have been aimed in the direction of the Soviet ship and was for that reason brought aboard.5

At first light the day after the capture the ANEROID, by flashing light, said, "Good Morning. I am transferring. Come to my port side." TWR-8 came alongside and took the torpedo on board at 102113Z August. The

1. Ibid.; COMSUBRON FIFTEEN 1002242Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 10 Aug 85, and 100239Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 10 Aug 85.
2. CINCPAC 1004562Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 9 AUG 85.
3. CINCPACFLT 1005182Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 10 Aug 85.
4. SECSTATE 208038/1004382Z Aug 79 (S), GDS 8/10/85.
5. AMemb Moscow 20092/1008362Z Aug 79 (S), RDS-1, 8/10/89.
Soviet ship was cooperative in the transfer process. The torpedo's serial number was verified as the same unit fired by SAM HOUSTON.1

Earlier, CINCPAC had requested that CINCPACFLT submit a plan to intercept ANEROID with appropriate units and to deter or detain the ship from further transit should that course of action have been deemed appropriate. CINCPACFLT was also to be prepared to implement the plan on short notice, when directed. The plan was submitted as required, but events did not require implementation.2

Malaysian Air Force C-7 Recovery Assistance

In November 1978 a Royal Malaysian Air Force C-7 transport had crash-landed in a swamp on Sarawak. The Commander of the Air Force made a personal appeal through the Defense Attache in Kuala Lumpur for CINCPACAF to authorize a USAF heavy lift helicopter to recover the aircraft, which was estimated to weigh 32,000 to 40,000 pounds stripped down. CINCPACAF replied that the quoted weights were well beyond the capability of available PACAF helicopter assets, but indicated that a capability did exist to lift 20,000 pounds. When advised of the problem, CINCPAC staff members found the quoted weights inaccurate; the weight was probably under 20,000 pounds. It was determined that the most suitable option for recovery, however, would be use of a USMC CH-53D.3

In December 1978 CINCPAC tasked CINCPACFLT to study the feasibility and cost of the proposed recovery. CINCPACFLT recommended that recovery be accomplished in the April-May 1979 time frame in order to minimize disruption of operational schedules. Estimated costs included 150,000 gallons of fuel and 6 to 10 hours of CH-53 operations at a non-Defense Department rate of $1,585 per hour. CINCPAC arranged transportation for a U.S. Navy survey and rigging team to and from the site. The recovery was executed by a CH-53 from the 31st Marine Amphibious Unit aboard the USS TARAWA (LHA-1) on 23 April 1979. TARAWA remained outside the Malaysian territorial limit. The C-7 fuselage was lifted from the crash site and placed on board TARAWA and then moved to Kuching Royal Malaysian Air Force Base within 8 hours; costs were held to the $100,000 limit programmed by Malaysia. A small group of Malaysian Air Force officials visited the ship for briefings and to witness the lift. According

1. CINCPACFLT 110528Z Aug 79 (§), DECL 10 Aug 85, which provided a complete report of the incident.
3. J472 HistSum Dec 78 (§), DECL 10 Jan 84.
to the U.S. Defense Attaché, "The C-7 was delivered in an extremely smooth operation. The Chief of Air Staff Taib was extremely happy with the success of the mission and asked the AIRA to pass on his profound appreciation for the assistance provided." 1

Defense Science Board Briefing

(5) The Defense Science Board's task force on Navy Counter C³ (command, control, and communications) completed its study on the opportunities and methods for using counter C³ against the Soviet threat to U.S. Navy forces. The study addressed jamming the communication links among Soviet attacking forces, electronic deception, and possible modifications to U.S. Rules of Engagement. 2

(5) On 1 June the chairman of the task force briefed Admiral Weisner and the CINCPAC staff. The presentation had already been given to the Secretary of the Navy and then to CINCPACFLT and the Commander THIRD Fleet. 3

(5) In response to the study, the Secretary of Defense requested that he be advised of peacetime Rules of Engagement adjustments that might be necessary to permit active countermeasures to protect a carrier task force from surprise attack. CINCPAC advised the JCS that his review of Rules of Engagement determined that they provided sufficient latitude for employment of active countermeasures in the situation studied by the Defense Science Board, and he considered adjustments unnecessary. CINCPAC said, however, that JCS Memorandum of Policy 95 guidance pertaining to protection from a sudden attack during apparent peacetime conditions was mentioned only as an exception to normal procedures. He recommended that it be rewritten to give more positive emphasis on authority to use electronic countermeasures for self-protection. 4

1. Ibid.; J472 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 10 May 85; J472 Point Paper (S), of 14 May 79, Subj: RMAF Request for Assistance, C-7 Recovery (U), DECL 14 May 85; USDAO Kuala Lumpur 260458Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 26 Apr 81.
2. J3414 HistSum May 79 (S), REVW 11 Jun 85.
3. Ibid.
4. JCS 5883/021947Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 1 Aug 85; CINCPAC 112037Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 11 Aug 85.
Exercise POWER PLAY 79, a JCS-sponsored and conducted worldwide biennial Command Post Exercise, was conducted 7 to 23 March. The exercise scenario portrayed a situation characterized by worldwide escalating tensions, highlighted by politico-military disagreements between the Communist country of "Orange" and its allies, and the United States and its allies. Tensions led to an outbreak of hostilities primarily in Europe and the Atlantic, and, to a lesser degree, in Asia and the Pacific. The exercise interfaced with

1. JCS 6092/150555Z Sept 79 (S), REVW 12 Sep 89 REAS 6.
2. J332 HistSum Feb 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 08.
4. J3322 HistSum Sep 79 (S), REVW 12 Sep 89 REAS 6; JCS 6103/150624Z Sep 79 (S), REVW 12 Sep 89 REAS 6.
WINTEX 79, the large-scale general war command post exercise sponsored by NATO. (It was in a series that had been called PRIME TARGET 77 and PRIME RATE 75.)

On 22 February CINCPAC had expressed concern that some elements of the exercise design could lead to misconceptions and erroneous conclusions by exercise participants concerning the PACOM. Although CINCPAC had submitted changes to depict on-going planning and force structure for the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data, 1978 data would be used. Japan was to be played as pre-Western, although CINCPAC suggested Japan be played as neutral, based on pre-war execution of the "swing" strategy and possible Japanese perception of this strategy as U.S. abandonment or resolve in the Pacific. Also, the PACOM Master Scenario Events List suggested that the scenario depict the vulnerability of the Western Aleutians by portraying Soviet seizure of the Western Aleutian Airfields. Control staff instructions for POWER PLAY 79, however, restricted Soviet actions and did not exploit Aleutian vulnerability because of the NATO focus of the exercise. If it was not possible to incorporate CINCPAC's recommendations, he had recommended that exercise participants be cautioned that the exercise assumptions were for exercise design only and no PACOM conclusions should be drawn as a result of the play.

The broad exercise objectives of POWER PLAY 79 were to exercise Emergency Action Procedures, exercise plans for reinforcement of NATO, exercise and evaluate selective release procedures for limited employment of tactical nuclear weapons, exercise and evaluate the Worldwide Military Command and Control System ADP systems, and exercise and evaluate logistic policies and procedures. PACOM participants included CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, Commander U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group (who became CDRWESTCOM on 23 March), COMUS Japan, and CINCPAC staff members.

From the PACOM point of view, the pre-exercise "swing" of Navy and Army units denied the opportunity to exercise the staff in deployment planning and execution. Based on lessons learned from NIFTY NUGGET in 1975, deployment planning was most demanding and required training at every opportunity. It also highlighted the paucity of naval forces available to protect PACOM sea lines of communication.

The inability to include the Combined Forces Command in Korea assumed

1. J3515 HistSum Mar 79 ([)], DECL 5 Apr 85; JCS 011652Z Dec 77 ([)], GDS-85.
2. CINCPAC 220204Z Feb 79 ([)], DECL 16 Feb 85.
3. J3 HistSum Mar 79 ([)], DECL 5 Apr 85.
away a major area in the PACOM. Korea's requirements for force augmentation and logistic support were not exercised and resulted in a loss of training. Although the exercise play was not as intense as NIFTY NUGGET had been, the CINCPAC and component staffs acquired valuable experience in crisis management procedures.¹

Telephone Notification Exercise

(U) A telephone notification exercise of the CINCPAC staff was initiated by the Duty Director for Operations on Tuesday, 18 September at 2000 hours, local time. All CINCPAC staff directorates and elements reported notification complete by 2140, except for one duty officer, who was not contacted because of an inoperative pager.²

BEACON COMPASS

();$ On 18 April the JCS advised CINCPAC of a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense following his review of the JCS-directed exercise schedule for 1980-1984. The Secretary said he had noticed no provision for the conduct of training exercises in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf. Previously the United States had had the advantage of linking a substantial part of our military presence in Southeast Asia and the Northwest Indian Ocean to such multilateral events as CENTO's annual SHAHBAZ air defense exercise conducted in Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and the MIDLINK sea lane of communication protection exercises that had been held in the approaches to the Persian Gulf. "The impending demise of CENTO gives special emphasis to the need to exercise our options for devising new exercises that might accent our interest in the area and further familiarize our forces with this particular operating environment," the Secretary said. He asked the JCS for their recommendations, to include scope and cost and the identity of other nations that might be willing to have their forces participate.³

();$ CINCPAC provided his recommendations on 26 April. In the near term, efforts had already been initiated to conduct small-scale passing exercises and air intercept training. For the longer term, CINCPACFLT had already initiated coordination with the Royal Navy, which would have a major task group in the Indian Ocean in the October-November time frame, and the French Navy to plan for a significant naval exercise in the fall as a substitute for

1. CINCPAC 290441Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 26 Mar 85.
2. J3321 HistSum Sep 79 (U).
3. JCS 2603/181936Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 11 Apr 85.
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MIDLINK. The Omanis, Saudi Arabians, and Pakistanis appeared to be the most likely candidates, should the political situation so dictate.  

(§) Based on inputs from the CINCs, the Chairman of the JCS advised the Secretary of the exercise plans, noting that future joint and combined exercises in that part of the world were both feasible and desirable. He listed the countries considered for participation, noting that they would have to be approached individually through appropriate State and Defense Department channels to determine their willingness. He said that the proposed program related well to contingency plans and provided an excellent range of options by which U.S. interest in the Persian Gulf area could be demonstrated.  

(§) Exercise BEACON COMPASS, a large-scale multinational, sea control exercise in the Indian Ocean was conducted 13 to 19 November. The original concept had been for a U.S. task group, a Royal Navy task group, and forces from Australia, New Zealand, Kenya, Pakistan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia to engage in passing exercises and war-at-sea encounters. Political considerations among Indian Ocean nations, however, necessitated the disassociation of Pakistan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia.  

(§) Several U.S. Navy ships scheduled for the exercise had to be diverted for real world patrol missions in the Persian Gulf area. (The U.S. Embassy in Tehran had been attacked on 4 November and U.S. personnel seized and held hostage.) The USN battle group departed the Seychelles on 12 November and conducted coordinated surveillance of the Royal Navy task group with USN and Royal Australian Navy long-range maritime patrol aircraft. The Royal Navy task group departed from Sri Lanka. The initial encounter between USN surface and subsurface units and the Royal Navy task group occurred northeast of the Seychelles on 14 November. USS MIDWAY (CV-41) and accompanying ships conducted passing exercises with the Kenyan Navy and then engaged in war-at-sea encounters with the Royal Navy task group. Other USN ships that participated were USS BAINBRIDGE (CGN-25), USS PARSONS (DDG-33), USS KNOX (FF-1052), USS STEIN (FF-1065), USS SAN JOSE (AFS-7), USNS MISPILLION (TAO-105), and USNS NAVASOTA (TAO-106) from the PACOM and USS JULIUS A. FURER and USS GLOVER from the Mid-East Force. Ten United Kingdom ships participated.  

1. CINCPAC 260030Z Apr 79 (§), DECL 25 Apr 85.  
2. JCS 7890/051833Z Jun 79 (§), DECL 30 Apr 85.  
4. Ibid.; SECDEF 4703/150502Z Nov 79 (U).  

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TEAM SPIRIT 79

Again in 1979, as it had been in 1977 and 1978, TEAM SPIRIT was the
largest exercise ever conducted in Korea and the PACOM. Conducted from 1
to 17 March 1979, approximately 168,000 troops participated, compared to the
almost 107,000 who had participated a year earlier. Exercise firsts included
utilization of A-10 and E-3A aircraft (the E-3A was the Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS) aircraft). The receipt of $13.9 million of exercise
"offset" funds (to offset the effect of the proposed withdrawal of U.S. ground
forces from Korea) provided for the deployment of a lightly equipped brigade
of the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii and the 407L Mini-CRP deployed from
Eglin AFB, Florida. The 407L Mini-Control and Reporting Post was a radar-
equipped organization manned to provide air traffic control and air defense
in the battlefield area. The exercise was considered the most successful
TEAM SPIRIT to date.¹

¹ Prior to the exercise, COMUS Korea noted some of the management com-
plexities of the exercise, which he described as three distinct sub-exercises.
Mobilization and deployment of Korean reserve units and civilian and commercial
resources was by the Ministry of National Defense through the JCS to the ROK
Services. Deployment, reception, staging, and beddown of U.S. augmentation
forces, and the administrative and logistic support of in-country forces was
directed by the U.S. JCS and implemented by CINCPAC through the component
commanders and COMUS Korea. Tactical employment of attached combat forces
provided by the Koreans and the United States was controlled and directed by
the Combined Forces Command.²

² There was a major departure from previous exercises at the recom-
mandation of COMUS Korea. The exercise was not scenario driven, that is, it
did not exercise any existing operation plan. Both CINCPAC's Air Force and
Navy component commanders had objected to the concept. One said it precluded
meaningful planning and execution of joint-combined operations, which was a
stated purpose of the exercise, and the other said it would reduce the scope of
the exercise to a series of training events conducted simultaneously.³

³ COMUS Korea responded that TEAM SPIRIT had never been an exercise of
the 5027 plan. He cited what he saw as some weaknesses in past scenario sit-
uations and said that his 1979 concept recognized the artificiality of the

1. J3513 HistSum Mar 79 (S), DECL 5 Apr 85.
2. SSO Korea 060651Z Jan 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 84.
3. CINCPACAF 082303Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPACFLT 200303Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86.

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command post exercise and discarded it. He wanted to concentrate the effort on those procedures and training activities that would give the greatest return in a contingency.  

In his summary report after the exercise COMUS Korea repeated that they set out to put all of the emphasis on joint and combined training and did not "fetter" the exercise with "the usual rigid test of war plans." He said the result was "one of the few large field exercises I've seen in which all echelons got good training, and we had a number of excellent training events involving coordination among two or more Services."  

COMUS Korea described the exercise and the forces participating. He said that not only were the most forces deployed, the out-of-country ground force was the largest ever; it performed " admirably" under the Operational Control of one of the ROK divisions. Friendly and aggressor reconnaissance and close air support flown over the ground maneuver area were beneficial to air crews and ground forces. All U.S. Services and the ROK Air Force flew approximately 10,000 sorties over the ROK, accomplishing training in all of the various missions and roles. Firsts in a TEAM SPIRIT exercise included combined dissimilar air combat training, A-10 forward operating location operations, and B-52 mining exercises (dry).  

SEVENTH Fleet ships, submarines, and aircraft actively participated in antisubmarine warfare, mining, salvage, amphibious, and naval gunfire support exercise operations. The presence of USS MIDWAY (CV-41) and her embarked aircraft and support ships lent significant weight to the overall success of the exercise.  

As part of the naval scenario, a U.S. Marine Air-Ground Task Force comprised of units from various bases in the Pacific combined with a ROK Marine Corps regiment to conduct an amphibious assault against an opposed beachhead. In the second phase of the Marine operations, aircraft under the command of Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Korea flew numerous and varied sorties in support of and under operational control of the CINC Combined Forces Command, "a unique command relationship successfully tested."  

As explained in more detail elsewhere in this chapter, two E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft had been deployed to be used in

1. CINCUNC/COMUSK 220350Z Jun 78 (EX), GDS-84.  
2. CINCUNC/CFC/CC 240300Z Mar 79 (EX), DECL 31 Dec 85.  
3. Ibid.
TEAM SPIRIT, but a real world requirement caused them to be redeployed to Saudi Arabia before exercise objectives had been met.

(U) Another TEAM SPIRIT 79 first concerned a U.S. Army Reserve Special Forces Group (-) combined with a ROK Army Special Forces Brigade to conduct the unconventional warfare portion of the main field training exercise. The Operations Support Element, combined with the ROK Army 5th Special Forces Brigade to control the 15 operational detachments that were infiltrated by parachute into the rear areas of the I Corps Group and the First ROK Army. Acting as part of the aggressor force, the unconventional warfare element conducted intelligence gathering and direct action missions. The six operational teams, Combined Special Forces Operations Base, plus five "A" detachments all received C1 and C2 training readiness ratings for their participation in this exercise.1

(☐) TEAM SPIRIT 78 had been given extensive publicity. For the 1979 exercise, however, the ROK Government, the U.S. Embassy, and COMUS Korea all believed that the heavy media coverage should not be repeated. There had been some tenuous political contact between North and South Korea. One of North Korea's proposals, among other considerations, was to terminate all military exercises. While there would be no curtailment of training in this exercise, there was no need to give the impression that the North's demand was being flaunted. The announcement was to be low-key and the exercise not open to press coverage.2

(☐) As the exercise had entailed the largest strategic deployment of augmentation forces undertaken for an exercise in the PACOM, a CINCPAC team studied and evaluated the strategic deployment of certain of those augmenting forces. The team was formed in the Operations Directorate with augmentation from the Logistics-Security Assistance Directorate, the U.S. Army Western Command, and the Pacific Airlift Center. The report was distributed on 15 June.3

(☐) Some of the highlights of that report follow. The airlift committed to the deployment entailed 149 C-141 missions, 137 C-130 missions, 25 C-5 missions, and 5 B-747 missions. There were 7,136 people and 5,253 short tons of equipment moved to Korea from CONUS and elsewhere in the PACOM. The major

2. CINCUNC CFC 090215Z Feb 79 (☐), DECL 8 Feb 85.
3. J342 HistSums Feb 79 (☐), DECL 31 Dec 85 and Jun 79 (U); CINCPAC Ltr Ser C136 of 15 Jun 79 (☐), DECL 15 Jun 85.
units that deployed were the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division with 2,604 troops and 2,584 short tons of cargo; the 86th Signal Battalion, 11th Signal Group with about 50 troops and 95 short tons of Defense Communications System restoral equipment from Fort Huachuca, Arizona; the 6th Battalion, 33rd Field Artillery (LANCE) with 110 troops and 190 tons of conventional mode missile equipment (LANCE was a long-range missile system either conventional or nuclear capable, but played only in the conventional role in TEAM SPIRIT) from Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade with 900 Marines (of the 6,000 total that deployed) and 1,200 tons of ground force and air wing equipment loaded from Okinawa bases. The main amphibious element deployed on Amphibious Ready Group ships. In addition, the 3rd Marine Division's Quick Reaction Force (Airlift Contingency Battalion) performed a "short-notice" airlift deployment from Kadena to Korea.

Tactical Air Command assets from CONUS and PACAF tactical air units included elements of the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (F-15 aircraft) from Langley AFB, Virginia; the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing (A-10 aircraft) from Myrtle Beach, South Carolina; and the 23rd Tactical Fighter Wing (A-7D aircraft) from England AFB, Louisiana. The 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing sent F-4E aircraft from Clark Air Base in the Philippines and the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing sent F-4D, F-4C, and RF-4C aircraft from Kadena Air Base, Japan in a one-day "rapid response" move. Other deployments included the E-3A AWACS, mentioned above, COMBAT TALON (MC-130), F-5 Aggressors, and assorted air rescue, communications personnel, engineer, and hospital elements.

(U) Of special interest was the use of contract B-747s from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet in a peacetime environment. Each B-747 was load-planned to carry the equivalent of five C-141 cargo loads of jeeps, trailers, etc.1

(UL) In 1978 the CINC of the Combined Forces Command had requested PACOM assistance in organizing and conducting a TEAM SPIRIT Operations Security/Communications Security evaluation. CINCPAC representatives attended planning conferences in late 1978 and in February 1979. Because of the joint and combined nature of the exercise, the OPSEC/COMSEC team included, for the first time, officers and men from the Korean Armed Forces. Other members of the team were provided by the 25th Infantry Division's Operations Security Section, the 209th Military Intelligence Detachment, the 501st Military Intelligence Group, the SEVENTH Fleet, the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, and the 6990th Air Force Security Squadron. Areas of major interest during the survey were operations and communications at Command Post TANGO, the I Corps (ROK-U.S.) Group, the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, First ROK Army units,

1. Ibid.

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and the preparation for the reception of units arriving in-country to participate in the exercise. ¹

(C) The team prepared two reports, one Secret and not releasable to foreign nationals, and the other Confidential and releasable to the Republic of Korea. The findings of the team included the assessment that the OPSEC posture of the forces participating in TEAM SPIRIT was only fair. The report listed a number of specific examples of poor OPSEC/COMSEC procedures, a high percentage of which had been repetitions of poor practices noted during previous exercises. A recommendation to assist in correcting the problem accompanied each finding. The reports were disseminated to each headquarters providing participants for the exercise to use during the planning stages of TEAM SPIRIT 80.²

ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 79

(S) ULCHI-FOCUS LENS was the integration of the ROK Government's Mobilization Exercise ULCHI with the United Nations Command's command post exercise FOCUS LENS, the fourth consecutive year for such a combined exercise. The format was designed to strengthen coordination between the military and civilian sectors in developing plans and procedures for the defense of the Republic of Korea. ULCHI-FOCUS LENS was the first Command Post Exercise to be performed since the activation of the Combined Forces Command; the exercise provided an opportunity for training and exercising the staff of the new organization.³

(S) This was a three-phase exercise. Phase 1A, the strategic intelligence buildup, began approximately 30 days prior to the start of the exercise. Intelligence information portraying a realistic military buildup by North Korea was collected and intelligence analysis forwarded through the PACOM to the U.S. JCS. Phase 1B, indications and warning, caused the Combined Forces Command to assume 24-hour operations and react to the Master Scenario Events List. This phase exercised procedures for the selection and deployment of augmentation forces and exercised ROK procedures for the declaration of Martial Law. Phase II, defensive operations, began with a coordinated North Korean land, sea, air, and unconventional warfare attack across the Military Demarcation Line. Combined Forces Command forces, deployed in the forward defense concept, reacted to the simulated attack. Non-combatant evacuation (CONPLAN 5060) was also exercised during this phase. Phase III was counteroffensive planning in accordance with crisis action procedures.

1. J316 HistSum Apr 79 (C), DECL 10 Apr 85.

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The 1979 exercise was conducted from 23 to 28 August and provided a vehicle for evaluation and testing of PACOM command relationships, augmentation force flow, communications, intelligence information flow, combined staff coordination, execution of command prerogatives, and other areas of joint and combined concern to CINCPAC, the CINC of the Combined Forces Command, the CINCUNC, and the Republic of Korea.

CINCPAC participated with an Operations Action Group, a Logistics Readiness Center, a JCS response cell, and a CINCPAC control cell. ROK participation included staffs of the Combined Forces Command, the ROK Ministry of National Defense, the JCS, and other ministries. The ROK Army participated to brigade and division level, the Navy participated to task group and Marine division level, and the Air Force participated to the tactical wing level, for total ROK participation of 94,406 personnel. U.S. Forces included those of the Combined Forces Command and the UNC, Eighth U.S. Army subordinate commands, and Air and Naval Forces Korea, for a total U.S. participation of 1,776 personnel.1

COPE JADE 1-80

COPE JADE 1-80 was a large-scale significant air exercise conducted in the Republic of Korea from 13 to 15 November 1979. (In some planning it had been referred to as COPE JADE CHARLIE.) In-country ROK and U.S. Forces were augmented by deploying units from CONUS and elsewhere in the PACOM. The objective was to exercise and evaluate the mission capability of the air component command through joint U.S.-ROK combined operations to include the integration and control of tactical assets to include USAF, ROKAF, and USMC aircraft through the Korean Tactical Air Control System; defensive counter-air operations; tactical air-to-ground operations; and integration of E-3A aircraft in theater tactical air operations.2

There were a number of firsts in this exercise, two involving new aircraft in the PACOM. Kadena Air Base, Japan, received its first F-15 squadron in October and F-15s were deployed from that base for COPE JADE 1-80. As noted elsewhere in this chapter the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft had been deployed to Korea for TEAM SPIRIT 79, but had been redeployed for a real world requirement to Saudi Arabia. CINCPAC proposed that the E-3A be provided to COPE JADE CHARLIE to demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve to the ROK and to provide the required combined training necessary

2. J3513 HistSum Nov 79 (S), DECL 3 Dec 85.
for refinement of the AWACS/Korean Tactical Air Control System interface. Still another first was the interface of the E-3A through the Message Processing Center. That center's equipment remained on site at Osan, Korea on a permanent change of station.1

USAF participants that were already in Korea included the 8th, 18th, and 49th Tactical Fighter Wings, the 33rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, and the 51st Composite Wing. The E-3As (the 552nd AWACS) came from Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and F-111s came from the 27th Tactical Fighter Wing in Cannon AFB, New Mexico. The ROK Air Force had numerous participants. U.S. Marine Corps and Army units also participated.

The F-111D aircraft from Cannon Air Force Base flew 16 radar scope photography sorties from Osan Air Base, Korea, along 14 separate tracks. The program was called COMMANDO SCOOP and it was designed to provide a data base of radar scope photography for USAF and USN use in future mission folder planning. COMMANDO SCOOP, 8 to 13 November, was conducted during this exercise.2

Original plans had called for 2,313 total exercise sorties, but because of real world commitments this number was reduced to 1,169, and 1,126 were actually flown. The exercise was considered an unqualified success.3

FOAL EAGLE 80

FOAL EAGLE 80 was to have been a JCS-directed, Combined Forces Command-United Nations Command-sponsored unconventional warfare exercise from 31 October through 15 November. Political unrest in Korea, however, had caused a substantial number of Korea Special Warfare Command units to be committed to stability operations. The exercise was cancelled on 24 October.4

Royal New Zealand Air Force Observation of COPE THUNDER

As noted in the 1978 history, participation in U.S. exercises in the Philippines by people from third countries required prior approval by the Philippine government. On 14 July CINCPACAF had requested that representatives

1. Ibid.; CINPAC 310614Z Mar 79 (C), DECL 9 Mar 85.
2. J3142 HistSum Nov 79 (C), DECL 1 Dec 85.
3. J3513 Hist Sum Nov 79 (C), DECL 3 Dec 85.
of the Royal New Zealand Air Force observe an exercise in the COPE THUNDER series. This exercise series had begun in 1976 and after completion of COPE THUNDER 79-4 in March 1979 there had been 10,000 missions flown. In that exercise two new sortie records had been established, one for 760 total exercise sorties and the other for 256 U.S. Navy sorties. CINCPACAF believed that the quality of training had steadily improved, with innovative and realistic day and night training accomplished.¹

On 14 July CINCPACAF advised CINCPAC that the Royal New Zealand Air Force was exploring the possibility of having a survey team of up to three officers observe an exercise in late November or early December. CINCPAC recommended issuance of a joint invitation through the Mutual Defense Board Plans Committee and tasked CINCPACREP Philippines to take action in the matter. The CINCPACREP reported that the proposal letter had been delivered to the Philippine Co-chairman of the committee.²

Royal New Zealand Air Force representatives observed the COPE THUNDER exercise in the Republic of the Philippines in December. The representatives expressed interest in participating in some future exercises of the COPE THUNDER series.³

KANGAROO III

(U) KANGAROO III was an Australian-sponsored, joint and combined land, sea, and air exercise conducted at Shoalwater Bay and the air and sea environs of Queensland and New South Wales during the period 10 to 31 October 1979. It was a biennial exercise with all ANZUS partners participating (Australia, New Zealand, and the United States). The purpose was to exercise ANZUS forces in combined operations against the general background of the defense of Australia, in a limited war setting. It was to exercise those combined forces in command, control, and deployment procedures and to practice airspace coordination techniques; procedures relating to maritime, seaborne support, and amphibious operations; coordination of all fire support resources available; and logistic resupply and maintenance systems of all forces, under operational conditions. There were 13,250 Australian, 1,380 New Zealand, and 6,652 U.S. participants in the exercise, a total of 21,282. PACOM elements participating


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included elements of the 25th Infantry Division, a surface combatant task force lead by USS CHICAGO (CG-11), an amphibious task force lead by USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10), and the 31st Marine Amphibious Unit. Elements of the 27th Tactical Fighter Wing from Cannon AFB, New Mexico deployed 6 F-111s and elements of the 376th Strategic Wing (SAC) from Kadena Air Base, Japan, deployed two KC-135s.¹

(U) The Chief of the Defence Force Staff of Australia, Admiral Synnot, advised CINCPAC of the value the Australian forces obtained from U.S. and New Zealand participation. He described the forces of both countries as "fine ambassadors" and admired their professionalism. He called the exercise an excellent demonstration of the ability of the ANZUS countries to plan, mount, and implement an operation of considerable magnitude.²

Operations and Communications Security Monitoring

(UN) Two areas which received the greatest operations (OPSEC) and communications security (COMSEC) monitoring emphasis in the PACOM in 1979 were Guam and Alaska.

(UN) The Guam study had actually begun much earlier. Since 1975 the Operations Directorate had become increasingly concerned with the increased activity of Soviet AGIs in the PACOM. The AGI was a Soviet auxiliary general intelligence ship, one dedicated to intelligence collection. In late 1976 it had been noted that earlier OPSEC efforts had focused on AGI activities off the U.S. West Coast, in the Tsushima Straits, and on the Kwajalein patrol. In 1977 that focus had moved to Soviet AGIs assigned to the Guam patrol and activities in the Philippine Sea.³

(UN) The visit of a CINCPAC team to Guam in 1977 provided insight into AGI activities. Examples of U.S. military operations that were probable AGI collection targets while in the patrol area were nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, B-52 operations in the Guam area, the communications of the Guam satellite tracking station, and nuclear weapons movement and storage operations. Of equal concern was the suspected involvement of the AGI in providing support to Soviet submarines operating in the Philippine Sea (possibly related to submarine detection system development) and the suspected Soviet satellite support provided to the AGI or submarine during diversions from the normal patrol area.⁴

2. CDFS Canberra 020345Z Nov 79 (U).
3. J316 HistSum Dec 76 (U), DECL 11 Dec 85.
4. Ibid.
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Prior to detailed surveys of specific military activities on Guam, however, a COMSEC monitoring and an "all-source" intelligence collection effort were planned. Ideally the equipment and personnel required for such efforts should be embarked in a suitable surface platform that could maintain close contact with the AGI while on patrol or during any diversions. Further coordination with Washington was required.¹

By late 1978 plans were being firmed and CINCPACFLT was designated as Executive Agent for the COMSEC monitoring. A CINCPAC staff member acted in an on-scene liaison role. The monitoring effort began with meetings of Navy and Air Force representatives in Hawaii in early January 1979. Phase I of the survey was conducted on Guam between 18 and 23 January by representatives of CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and CINCPAC. During that phase the precise parameters of Air Force-Navy communications and non-communications emitters were determined, optimum monitor locations were identified, and personnel and equipment requirements established.²

In March the Director of the National Security Agency expressed the belief that it was in the best interest of the commands concerned to take immediate action to identify U.S. signal vulnerabilities "so that appropriate countermeasures can be employed." The Director further stated that the PACOM proposed joint SIGSEC (signal security) survey to be conducted on Guam "appears to be an ideal first step in this regard."³

The full spectrum COMSEC survey was conducted by representatives of CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF during the period 9 to 31 July. CINCPACFLT directed the Naval Security Group Detachment at Pearl Harbor to collect all data produced by the survey and prepare a final report. On 29 November an informal meeting was held at that detachment to discuss survey results. Also in attendance were representatives of CINCPACFLT, the 6990th Electronic Security Squadron, the PACAF Electronic Security Command, and CINCPAC. Topics included an overview and summary of the project, results of Navy and Air Force monitoring operations, and lessons learned. The final report, which had been originally requested by 15 November, was expected early in 1980.⁴

Elsewhere in this chapter is a discussion of the activities of one AGI off Guam. During August it picked up a U.S. exercise torpedo and held it for a day before State Department negotiations led to its return.

1. Ibid.
2. J316 HistSums Dec 78 (§), DECL 8 Jan 85, and Jan 79 (§), DECL 2 Feb 85.
The vulnerability of SIGINT in Alaska was also the subject of study in 1979. The CINCPAC OPSEC Branch conducted a vulnerability study of all military activities in Alaska in May. Later certain questions were raised by Soviet TU-16 intelligence collection flights against Northwest Alaska. CINCPAC requested that the JCS task an appropriate airborne SIGINT reconnaissance platform. The JCS asked the Strategic Air Command if it had the ability to satisfy CINCPAC's request, and by 13 September the National Security Agency, involved SAC subordinate commands, and the Electronic Security Command had all concurred with and affirmed their ability to support airborne SIGINT surveillance missions in the area.1

CINCPAC hosted a conference to develop a detailed surveillance mission plan. The 24 to 26 September meeting was attended by representatives of the National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, Maryland; the Electronic Security Command and the Air Force COMSEC Center at Kelly AFB, Texas; the 6th Strategic Wing and the 6985th Electronic Security Squadron from Eielson AFB, Alaska; the Alaskan Air Command at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska; the Army Intelligence and Security Command Group in San Francisco, California; and CINCPAC's Operations and Communications-Data Processing Directorates. A draft plan under study included a statement of concept of operations, restrictions imposed upon SIGSEC surveillance by statute or other authority, and emitters in order of priority of interest, and levied analysis and reporting requirements.2

On 12 and 15 October an RC-135V airborne SIGINT reconnaissance aircraft of the 6th Strategic Wing flew signal security and surveillance missions. Signals acquisition and preliminary analysis were performed by personnel of the 6985th Electronic Security Squadron. The two missions were flown according to plan. Final reports had been expected by mid-December from SAC, the Electronic Security Command, and the National Security Agency, but those of the first two agencies had slipped until 1980 and NSA reporting had been deleted because of the lack of intercept of signals of interest.3

CINCPAC's annual report to the JCS on Operations Security was submitted on 28 August, covering the period from 16 June 1978 through 30 June 1979. The report included an overview of the PACOM program, training and indoctrination program activities in the command, OPSEC surveys and studies conducted.

1. J316 HistSums May 79 (S), DECL 6 Jun 85, Aug 79 (S), DECL 6 Sep 85, and Sep 79 (S), DECL 9 Oct 85.
2. J316 HistSum Sep 79 (S), DECL 9 Oct 85.
3. J316 HistSums Oct 79 (S), DECL 7 Nov 85, and Dec 79 (S), DECL 7 Jan 85.
with summaries of significant findings, problem areas and recommendations, significant lessons learned, and a forecast of OPSEC activities for the following reporting period.¹

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**Terrorist Attacks**

In the wake of terrorist attacks on U.S. personnel in Puerto Rico and Turkey, and the seizure of the Embassy and hostages in Iran, CINCPAC, on 15 December, advised the entire PACOM to review security plans and measures prudent to the safety of U.S. personnel. He directed all commands to take any measures deemed appropriate to enhance both the security and threat awareness of personnel in their commands. As a minimum he recommended giving

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2. J36 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 30 Apr 85.
3. J362 HistSum May 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 81.
careful consideration to a "lowering of profile" and a change of routine or habits without, if possible, the disruption of normal activities.1

Disaster Relief

(U) Twice during 1979 the Marshall Island District of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands suffered weather disasters, in January and again in late November. On 12 February the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (later renamed the Federal Emergency Management Agency) notified CINCPAC that the President had declared a major disaster under Public Law 93-228 for the district as a result of damages caused by Typhoon ALICE, 3 to 6 January. On 15 February a team from that agency arrived in the Marshalls, with headquarters on Majuro, to coordinate all Federal assistance. By 19 February the team had determined a requirement to rebuild or repair 63 houses, primarily on Namorik Atoll and the General Services Administration in Honolulu was tasked to obtain the required materials. CINCPAC was requested by the disaster assistance agency to arrange airlift for a portion of the building materials. Airlift of 75 short tons was accomplished on 24 and 25 February by four Military Airlift Command C-141 missions. CINCPAC was further requested by the agency to move 794,000 pounds of building materials by commercial sealift to arrive at Majuro not later than 15 March. CINCPAC informed the disaster assistance agency that he was unable to perform the sealift mission as the Defense Department Executive Agent, the Department of the Army, deemed it inappropriate to designate a military sponsor in this instance, but CINCPAC continued to pursue the matter.2

(U) Several messages were exchanged in regard to the sponsorship issue. The shipment, itself, however, had never been jeopardized and all required cargo was packed and shipped via Matson Navigation Co. on 3 March to arrive in Majuro on 15 March.3

(U) In view of the apparent misunderstandings relative to the shipment and to preclude similar occurrences in the future, the Defense Department Executive Agent for military support, Headquarters Department of the Army, hosted a meeting from 26 to 30 March to establish appropriate procedures.4

(U) The second major disaster on Majuro occurred on 16 November when high tidal water and heavy seas caused extensive damage to the district center of

1. CINCPAC 150432Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 14 Dec 85.
2. J312 HistSum Feb 79 (U); CINCPAC 010220Z Mar 79 (U).
4. Ibid.
Majuro and required the evacuation of approximately 4,000 people.1

On 30 November the Federal Emergency Management Agency requested CINCPAC assistance to transport large quantities of tents, cots, blankets, water containers, cooking outfits, and C-rations from Agency for International Development supply stocks in the Guam Naval Supply Depot to Majuro. The required airlift was provided.

On 1 December the President declared the area a major disaster area. During the entire month of December the PACOM satisfied virtually continuous requirements levied by the regional office of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in San Francisco. Support included 56 airlift missions flown by the Military Airlift Command (51 C-141 missions and 5 C-130 missions); 1.5 million pounds of cargo delivered; and 175 military personnel deployed for 26 days. The deployed personnel were 170 U.S. Army Western Command personnel, consisting of 20 field mess teams plus support, 3 USAF communicators and their equipment, and 2 Navy men sent by the CINCPACREP Guam-Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, one a Commander appointed as CINCPACREP-Majuro and a Chief Petty Officer assistant. By 1 January 1980 all operational military personnel and equipment had been returned to their home stations (except the Navy Chief who remained until 4 January to complete administrative details.)2

Reimbursable military expenses for the PACOM and the Military Airlift Command were estimated to total approximately $2 million. All Defense Department costs associated with military support were chargeable to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Military support during this crisis was considered exceptionally responsive. Coordination and movement of supplies, personnel, and equipment in all cases exceeded the expectations of all concerned.3

The Fiji Islands were the scene of a disaster when Tropical Cyclone MELI struck the eastern and southern parts of the islands on 28 March. The Government of Fiji asked the United States to provide emergency assistance. On 6 April, at the request of the Secretary of State, the JCS requested that CINCPAC dispatch a three to five person team to Suva to assist the U.S. Ambassador in determining aerial photography requirements. A PACOM Assistance Team departed Hawaii on 7 April. The team was joined in Fiji by two Military Airlift Command photographers previously sent to cover the U.S. airlift of

1. J312 HistSum Dec 79 (U).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 112250Z Dec 79 (U); CINCPACREP Majuro 010445Z Jan 80 (U).
Agency for International Development stocks from Guam and Panama to Fiji. ¹

(U) The team completed aerial surveillance and photo reconnaissance of the cyclone damaged areas and returned to Hawaii on 14 April. The four member team had consisted of a civil engineer from CINCPACFLT, a reconnaissance officer from CINCPACAF, a civilian liaison officer from CDRWESTCOM, and the officer in charge, a CINCPAC staff member. In a thank you letter to President Carter, the Fiji Prime Minister made special mention of the "exceptional efforts made by the members of your Armed Forces who carried out the aerial photographic survey for the hurricane relief committee." He also said, "It is one of the few bonuses of a disaster of the sort which we have recently experienced, that we can appreciate the warmth of the friendship of our overseas friends."²

(U) New Guinea experienced the largest earthquake in more than two years on 12 September. Preliminary reports by the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center indicated a magnitude of 7.8 on the Richter Scale. No request for assistance was received by CINCPAC.³

PACOM Medical Assessment Team—Thailand

(U) The unstable political, military, and economic conditions in Kampuchea had caused many Khmer to become refugees and seek safety and sustenance in Thailand. Those refugees had come across the Thai-Kampuchea border north and south of the town of Aranyapraphat. Estimates on the number of refugees in the border areas in November 1979 ranged from 200,000 to over half a million.⁴

(U) The Government of Thailand had established many refugee camps in the border area. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees coordinated the housekeeping and feeding of the refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross coordinated medical care.

¹ On 16 November the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok estimated that the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea might renew military action in the border area to eliminate resistance elements. It was believed that such renewed military action could cause many civilian casualties and would result in the massive

1. J312 HistSum Apr 79 (U).
2. Ibid.; AMEMB Suva 1629/172000Z May 79 (U).
4. J312 HistSum Nov 79 (C), DECL 17 Nov 85.
influx of more refugees into Thailand. Many refugees could become casualties requiring surgical treatment, which would be beyond the capability of the Red Cross to provide. Accordingly, the Red Cross requested that the Ambassador provide a "surgical field unit," and the Ambassador concluded that a military type unit would be the most suitable. He requested an assessment team to determine what was needed to meet the situation.¹

(U) The Secretary of State requested that the Secretary of Defense send a team to Thailand to advise the Embassy; the request was made under the provisions of the DOD directive on Foreign Disaster Relief.²

(U) CINCPAC placed a team on alert and, following a JCS request to deploy, CINCPAC issued an execute order for deployment of the five-man team on 17 November. The team consisted of a medical officer, Medical Service Corps officer, and general logistics specialist from the U.S. Army's Western Command, and a preventive medicine officer and civil engineer from CINCPACFLT. The team departed Honolulu by commercial air on 18 November.

(U) During the period 20 to 25 November the team conducted field survey work and developed recommendations on the type of military medical unit best suited to accomplish the anticipated mission. At the request of the Embassy, the PACOM Medical Assistance Team then undertook to develop a plan for the Red Cross to upgrade in-country facilities and capabilities to handle large increases in civilian casualties. Having completed their portions of the task, two team members returned to Honolulu on 28 November and one two days later. The two remained to coordinate implementation of their plan for the Red Cross upgrade.³

(U) On 3 December the Embassy in Bangkok provided the Secretary of State with a comprehensive plan for the contingency commitment of a U.S. military surgical unit, based on data provided by the CINCPAC team. On 5 December the Embassy modified the requirement because of extensive support available in Thailand from the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences, an overseas activity of Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. The revised requirement was to have approximately 25 U.S. military surgical-type personnel on alert and capable of being in Thailand on 48 hours notice.⁴

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1. Ibid.; AMEMB Bangkok 47165/161601Z Nov 79 (C) EO 12065: NA.
2. SECSTATE 298144/162332Z Nov 79 (U).
3. J312 HistSum Nov 79 (C) DECL 17 Nov 85.
4. J312 HistSum Dec 79 (U); AMEMB Bangkok 49568/031240Z Dec 79 (C) EO 12065: NA; AMEMB Bangkok 49929/051221Z Dec 79 (C) EO 12065: NA.
(U) On 6 December, however, the Secretary of State responded that civilian agencies were being contacted as the proposal did not appear consistent with a military-type mission.¹

(U) The PACOM team, meanwhile, continued to advise the Red Cross on upgrading in-country surgical capability. In implementing JCS guidance, CINCPAC directed that the team redeploy. One member returned to Hawaii on 6 December and the last the following day. On 8 December CINCPAC reported to the JCS that the mission had been completed. Indications were that the team had been effective in assisting the International Committee of the Red Cross in organizing in-country resources and developing proper contingency plans. The Ambassador expressed appreciation for the professionalism and enthusiasm and overall assistance of the team.²

Tropical Cyclones and Typhoons

(U) Tropical cyclones and typhoons occurred in the vast reaches of the Pacific and Indian Oceans throughout 1979. CINCPAC's Geophysics Division of the Operations Directorate monitored the weather throughout the command for its impact on military activities. Some of the storms dissipated over the oceans without ever making landfall. Some had disastrous results. Highlights of 1979 follow.

(U) On 1 January Typhoon ALICE was generated just south of the Marshall Islands with maximum winds of 115 knots by 6 January. In addition to the damage to Majuro, which is discussed in more detail elsewhere in this chapter under the heading "Disaster Relief," the wave action caused shore erosion and minor damage on Kwajalein and the wind caused extensive damage on Eniwetak. Fourteen B-52s and five KC-135 aircraft were evacuated from Guam to Kadena, Japan as a precautionary measure. The new Liberal Democratic Party Governor of Okinawa, in contrast to previous occasions when reformist governors had protested the arrival of the B-52s and demanded their immediate removal, merely expressed the desire that they depart as soon as weather conditions on Guam permitted. He told the press that their weather evacuation to Okinawa "could not be helped."³

(U) There were six cyclones in the southern hemisphere in February, with

1. SECSTATE 313755/060056Z Dec 79 (M), EO 12065: NA.
2. J312 HistSum Dec 79 (U). The detailed after-action report of the team was published as CINCPAC Ser 68 of 20 Mar 80 (O), Subj: PACOM Medical Assessment Team Thailand, After Action Report, DECL 17 Nov 85.
3. J371 HistSum Jan 79 (U); AMCONSUL Naha 016/120921Z Jan 79 (U).
at least one cyclone active somewhere in the PACOM every day.  

(U) The most destructive storm in March was Tropical Cyclone MELI. From 25 to 30 March it reached a maximum intensity of 85 knots and passed within 50 miles of the main island of Viti Levi in the Fiji Islands with 70-knot sustained wind speeds. The press reported more than 50 dead or missing, with at least 21 of those killed on the tiny island of Ono when a church in which they sought shelter was destroyed by the storm. U.S. efforts after the storm are described elsewhere in this chapter under "Disaster Relief."  

(U) In April Typhoon CECIL appeared for a time to become a threat to Manila and the U.S. bases in the area, but it curved and dissipated harmlessly at sea.  

(U) The most destructive storm in the PACOM in 1979 in terms of loss of life was Tropical Cyclone 17-79 detected on 6 May. It hit the Indian coastline near Madras. The press reported approximately 1,000 dead and over 1.2 million homeless. Indian Air Force helicopters dropped food supplies to hundreds of thousands of marooned villagers. Rescue workers said the damage caused in the rich paddy and tobacco growing belt was heavy and the real disaster picture would emerge when communications links were restored. This storm was not as severe, however, as another that also struck from the Bay of Bengal in November 1977 that left 7,000 dead.  

(U) June and July had their share of tropical cyclones, but most were harmless. In August, however, Typhoon HOPE, with maximum winds of 130 knots over the open ocean did considerable damage as it passed Hong Kong with winds of 90 knots on 2 August. Typhoon IRVING almost joined the "100 knot club" moving from the Philippine Sea and then crossing the Republic of Korea on 17 August, by which time the winds had reduced to less than 60 knots. Later that month Typhoon JUDY passed within 100 miles of Okinawa, crossed the East China Sea and tracked along the China coast in the vicinity of Shanghai, then recurved to the northeast toward Korea. Maximum intensity was 135 knots on 20 August. Passing Okinawa, maximum winds at the center of the storm were 80 to 85 knots. Kadena reported peak gusts of 69 knots and aircraft were evacuated. Damages and power outages were minimal and no injuries were reported. Flooding caused by heavy rain was reported at Chinju, Korea.  

1. J37 HistSum Feb 79 (U).  
There were 10 tropical cyclones experienced in the PACOM in September, but none too serious. In October, however, Super Typhoon TIP, the longest super typhoon on record developed south of Guam. The geographic area influenced at one time had a diameter of about 1,080 nautical miles. It moved northwest through the Philippine Sea then recurved east to Okinawa. It went ashore over the Japanese islands of Shikoku and Honshu, crossing Japan at a maximum speed of approximately 55 knots forward movement. It further set a record of minimum sea level pressure of 870 millibars. Maximum center wind speed was 155 knots.

TIP was described as the most devastating storm to strike Japan in 13 years. More than 70 U.S. Marines and three Japanese Self-Defense Forces were injured and three Marines died almost immediately from burns at their barracks area at the Mount Fuji base, southwest of Tokyo. TIP’s winds toppled a 5,000-gallon rubber fuel container. The gasoline ignited and sent a river of fire through the Marine barracks area. Brooke U.S. Army Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas, specialists in burn treatment, received the injured Marines after they were evacuated on C-141s. Of the 37 Marines who were evacuated to Brooke, 17 were returned to active duty, 12 were medically retired, and 8 more died of their injuries.

In November the six tropical cyclones were minor. Both Typhoon VERA and Tropical Storm WAYNE reached the Philippines. Neither caused damage to U.S. military installations, although VERA caused civilian property damage to northeastern Luzon.

The worst of the December storms was tropical Cyclone VIOLA, which lasted 16 days, reached a maximum intensity of 115 knots, and passed close to Mauritius and Le Reunion Islands. The American Embassy in Port Louis, Mauritius indicated that island was struck by winds of 160 miles per hour on the night of 22-23 December. Four deaths were reported and 43 persons injured; 922 houses were destroyed.

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NKTL/SCIL
SKCATL
IOCTL
Fleet Support
TDCATL
Target Intelligence/Target Materials Conference
TI/TTM Activities
TAPA
AWOP
AIF Actions
INSCOM Study
ATTG Production
Abbreviated ATTGs
Graphic Support Subsystem
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Early in 1979 the National Security Council's Policy Review Committee on U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf area endorsed efforts to improve the surge capability of U.S. military forces to that area. The Secretary of

2. Ibid.; (Executive Summary and Annex D) CINCPAC OPLAN 5027 FY 79 w/CH 1 (TS), REVW 31 Dec 2010.
Defense directed the JCS to conduct an analysis of the availability of mobility assets, the adequacy of existing base facilities, constraints on overflight rights and other potential problems prior to initiating political consultations with countries in the area. On 5 July the JCS tasked the unified commanders to provide comments and recommendations for requirements, options, and problems. 1

CINCPAC prefaced his 27 July reply by stating his strong support for an increased U.S. military presence in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region and recommended specific steps to support a surge: 2

- Location and availability of enroute staging and regional closing bases, including associated overflight and transit rights and desirable steps to improve our flexibility in this region.
- Suitability of various regional facilities to handle U.S. surge forces and recommendations for improvement.
- Presence of an interoperable support and logistics system in the region, and options for improvement which could be made to regional infrastructure (airfields, ports, etc.) to facilitate U.S. surge.
- Desirability of pre-positioning various levels of supplies (types of supplies and location), including stockpiling emergency repair equipment for port production facilities, and recommendations with respect to nature and location of such pre-positioning.
- A description of possible surge exercises to include the types of forces that could be involved, possible locations, time factors, costs, allied or other nation participation, and the operational experience that could be achieved by conducting such exercises.
- Suitability of the U.S. facility at Diego Garcia to handle major surge force equipment and supplies, and recommendations for improvements.

1. J418 HistSum Jul 79 (S), DECL 9 Aug 85; JCS 5909/0522302 Jul 79 (S), DECL 5 Jul 85.
2. CINCPAC 2700192 Jul 79 (S), DECL 20 Jul 85.
-SECRET-

- Measures to improve air defense of airfields and port facilities.
- Measures to facilitate surge of mine countermeasures forces.
- A country-by-country assessment of each state's potential contribution to U.S. surge capabilities.

CINCPAC also named additional overall force improvements to increase surge capabilities and operations in the region—increases in amphibious ship building and mine countermeasures capability; expanded acquisition of both airborne tanker and airlift assets and a mobile logistic support force platform; and where possible, acceleration of antiair warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and carrier wing improvements. See also the Plans chapter of this history.1

CINCPAC's comprehensive analysis included the reminder that PACOM forces would be operating in support of the European Command in a Persian Gulf contingency which could very well extend into the Pacific. Consequently, CINCPAC did not anticipate the deployment of PACOM forces exceeding two battle groups to the Indian Ocean-Middle East-Persian Gulf area at any given time. CINCPAC also noted that, if a surge operation to that area involved bases in the PACOM, political reactions in Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia would depend on the perceived self-interest of these countries at the time of the surge.2

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION II--RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Interservice Support

FY 78-82 DRIS Plan

(U) The FY 78-80 Defense Retail Interservice support (DRIS) plan called for
reorganization of the DRIS program worldwide and redefined DRIS geographic
areas. The FY 78-82 follow-on plan tasked each geographic area Joint Inter-
service Resource Study Group (JIRSG) to perform studies to determine the
feasibility of consolidation of any service or function in which a duplication
in requirements or capabilities existed. For the PACOM over 300 studies were
to be performed.¹

(U) From 25 October to 9 November 1979 the Defense Logistics Agency DRIS
Program Manager, accompanied by the CINCPAC DRIS representative, visited four
of the five PACOM JIRSGs (Hawaii, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines) to conduct
training seminars and program reviews. Seminar attendance totaled 229, includ-
ing four representatives from the Guam JIRSG who attended the sessions in the
Philippines. Significant findings by the team consisted of the need for
guidance in dealing with apparent duplication of study efforts between the
DRIS program and various functional area study initiatives. For example,
an OSD-sponsored master plan for military property requirements in the State
of Hawaii (MILPRO-HI) duplicated some of the studies being conducted under
the DRIS 78-82 plan. Some of the functional areas of overlap included ware-
housing, training, communications, medical, and recreation. Because both
plans had the same basic objective of eliminating duplication, the CINCPAC
Interservice Support Branch proposed that, where duplicated, the DRIS study
requirement be filled by the OSD study.²

(U) A similar situation developed regarding consolidation of Navy and
Air Force calibration facilities on Guam. In 1978 CINCPAC had requested that
the Joint Technical Coordination Group/Metrology and Calibration (JTCG-METCAL)
conduct a survey of Guam facilities. The JTCG-METCAL reported that significant
potential existed for interservice calibration consolidation and recommended
a full study. However, in August 1979 the Naval Ship Repair Facility Guam
indicated disagreement with the JTCG-METCAL findings to CINCPAC and it was
determined that the need for conducting a study would be reviewed under the
DRIS 78-82 plan.³

1. J4212 Supplementary HistSum of Jul 80 (U).
2. Ibid.
   HistSums of Jul 80 (U).

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(U) During the course of the DRIS team visit it was also determined that if studies had been done previously on a support category, an updated study, forwarded through DRIS channels (CINCPAC and the JCS to DLA) as a new study, would fulfill the FY 78-82 plan requirement.\(^1\)

**Fuels and Energy**

**PACOM POL Overview**

Plagued by strikes and anti-Shah violence, Iranian oilfields ceased all production on 28 December 1978. This created a loss of ten percent (six million barrels) in daily production of crude oil worldwide and more than two percent of U.S. crude requirements. Most PACOM petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) contractors who supplied Western Pacific requirements did not rely directly on Iranian crude for their refinery production. However, by January it was anticipated that disruption of the Iranian source would have at least an indirect effect on contractor operations which could ultimately affect the maintenance of PACOM stocks required for Prepositioned War Reserve Material Requirements (PWRMR) and operational requirements. On 25 January a joint Defense Fuel Region-Pacific (DFR-PAC)/CINCPAC Joint Petroleum Office (JPO) message to PACOM sub-area petroleum offices initiated procedures to assess the impact of the loss of Iranian production. Narrative reports were to be made every 15 days through 31 March 1979. Shortly thereafter the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) advised that daily contact was being maintained with PACOM suppliers to monitor current status and to be able to react to any abrupt changes in support patterns. Because full restoration of Iranian crude oil could not be predicted and to offset anticipated cutbacks within PACOM, in February the CINCPAC JPO stopped all lifts of DOD POL cargoes from Hawaii to the West Coast. CINCPAC also arranged with the DFSC to deliver 150,000 barrels of JP-4 product from the West Coast to Hawaii in March.\(^2\)

In February and March both POL shortages and prices increased—the latter as much as $2 to $3 per barrel on the spot market. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) predicted that the impact on the fuels stock fund, and ultimately on the Services operating funds, could be severe. There was also a possibility, the DLA stated, of dipping into reserves, even war reserve stocks, on a temporary basis. While endorsing monetary conservation efforts, CINCPAC did not consider the "dipping into war reserves" to be a viable solution to the problems.

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1. Ibid.
2. J422 HistSum Jan 79 (C), DECL 8 Feb 85; DFR PAC 250146Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 24 Jan 85; DFSC 292206Z Jan 79 (U); J4226 HistSum Feb 79 (C), DECL 9 Mar 85; MEB 1-28 Feb 79 (U).
and rather requested continued procurement support from the DLA.\(^1\)

By April contractor problems and shortages became more apparent. For example, the Hawaii Independent Refinery Incorporated (HIRI) was unable to deliver 195,000 barrels of JP-4 for April and indicated that its allocation from the Shell Oil Company would be reduced by 50 percent. In another instance, after a U.S. refusal to loan 600,000 barrels of Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM) to the Philippines, the GOP imposed limitations and restrictions on POL supplies to U.S. Government customers. Product allocations were imposed by ten PACOM contractors and a number of unforeseen and unprogrammed requirements (aerial support for TEAM SPIRIT and increased Indian Ocean activity) caused extremely high consumption of JP-4. Although theater waivers for penetration of PACOM JP-5, JP-4, DFM, and Navy Special Fuel (NSF) war reserve levels had been issued, during mid-April overall PACOM inventories increased from 18,154,000 barrels to 18,870,000 barrels and peaked at 19,300,000 barrels in May. (This was 86.5 percent of the DFSC stockage objective for PACOM compared with a worldwide figure of 85.1 percent.) At the same time, the DFSC reported that, despite increased administrative, supply, and procurement efforts to maintain inventory levels, 2.7 percent of the worldwide inviolate reserve levels had been penetrated. In addition, the JCS charged CINCPAC and other concerned commands to advise the OJCS/J4 each time the Prepositioned War Reserve Material Stocks (PWRMS) were violated.\(^2\)

Meanwhile shortages of certain types of fuel were being experienced by other allied nations in the PACOM. CINCPAC requested that the JCS provide a U.S. position on how to respond to the requests of such countries as Sri Lanka, Korea, and Thailand for AVGAS, which was being phased out in the PACOM, and of Somalia and Singapore for jet fuels. These countries had and were continuing to support the staging of U.S. P-3, C-141, and KC-135 aircraft and various PACFLT vessels. The JCS response provided guidance to CINCPAC and others concerned with similar problems for processing requests from allies for fuels. Requests from foreign civilian agencies were to be forwarded by the American Embassy through the State and Defense Departments to the OJCS/J4, who would coordinate with the DFSC. The DFSC would attempt to locate a commercial source for the country. In support of foreign armed forces, the

1. J4226 Point Paper (U), 16 Feb 79, Subj: POL Outlook; J422 HistSum Mar 79 (S), DECL 6 Apr 85; DLA 261314Z Mar 79 (S), DECL Dec 81; CINCPAC 3103352 Mar 79 (S), DECL 29 Mar 85.
2. J422 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 11 May 85; J4222 Point Paper (S), 2 May 79, Subj: Request for Diesel Fuel by Philippine Government (U), REVW 2 May 85; DFR PAC 210325Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 20 Apr 85; J4226 HistSum May 79 (S), DECL 11 Jun 85; DFSC 120137Z May 79 (S), DECL 12 May 85; J422 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 11 May 85; CINCPAC 150723Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 12 Apr 85; JCS 6255/242040Z Apr 79 (U).
country USDAO was to forward the request through military channels to the OJCS. Again, an attempt to locate a commercial source would be made. If that were not fruitful and if it were feasible to provide DOD fuel, then the country could request an FMS case for armed forces use.¹

(Œ) On 1 June the Chinese Petroleum Corp. (Taiwan) suspended contract deliveries of all (649,000 barrels) JP-5 (approximately 23 percent of the PACOM JP-5 peacetime requirements) and 600,000 barrels of DFM (10 percent of PACOM peacetime requirements) due to lack of crude oil sources. The Guam Oil Refining Corporation (GORCO) also reduced its June deliveries by 96,000 barrels of JP-5 and 207,000 barrels of DFM. The Los Angeles Times reported that, as of 20 June, 17 commercial firms had defaulted on military fuel contracts during 1979 compared with 8 for all of 1978.²

(G) By July additional crude oil production by Saudi Arabia placed crude supplies in reasonable balance with demands on the world petroleum market. Although inventories in Caribbean trans-shipment terminals were full, this upward trend had not yet been reflected in DLA-owned inventory stocks and the DFSC reported a worldwide deficiency of 1,000,000 barrels of JP-5 and 4,000,000 barrels of JP-4. On 31 July the JCS tasked CINCPAC and other unified and specified commands to evaluate the impact of a 5, 10, and 15 percent reduction in POL allocations on operational readiness. The CINCPAC response stated that, since FY 73, PACOM forces had reduced energy consumption at the expense of flying and steaming programs. Readiness training and operational missions, such as increased Indian Ocean activities and the rescue of Vietnamese boat people, were accomplished by drawdowns in existing POL reserves. Because of a shortage in PACOM POL tankage, limited Military Sealift Command tanker assets, and the general worldwide supply problems, Moreover, any further reduction would seriously degrade training and exercise programs, combat proficiency, and morale and welfare of all component forces.³

(G) In August CINCPAC learned of plans to relocate 220,000 barrels of

1. J422 HistSum Apr 79 (Œ), DECL 11 May 85; CINCPAC 150723Z Apr 79 (Œ), DECL 12 Apr 85; JCS 6801/251624Z Apr 79 (Œ), DECL 20 Apr 85.
### 1979 POL Issues

(in thousands of barrels)

#### BY PRODUCT

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<td>1,271</td>
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**Total** 2,337 2,505 3,256 2,410 2,238 3,467 2,812 2,882 3,199 2,888 2,579 2,663 33,236

#### BY AREA

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**Total** 2,337 2,505 3,256 2,410 2,238 3,467 2,812 2,882 3,199 2,888 2,579 2,663 33,236

Source: J422
PACOM POL ISSUES
(IN MILLIONS OF BARRELS)

* Naval Distillate phased out in 1974.
JP-4 from Hawaii to the West Coast in September and recommended that the DFSC find an alternate source in order to protect PACOM JP-4 WRM stocks. (A fire on 14 June at the Pride Refining Company in Abilene, Texas had halted JP-4 production. Pride provided JP-4 to six USAF bases in Oklahoma and Texas.) During September and October a total of 510,000 barrels of JP-4 was relocated from Hawaii to the West Coast to supplement CONUS shortages caused by the Pride fire and heavier than anticipated operational requirements. This relocation reduced Hawaii's war reserve inventory from 15 to 6 days. On the other hand, JP-5 availability from PACOM suppliers improved slightly during August and approximately 135,000 barrels of JP-5 were relocated from Puget Sound, Washington to Subic Bay in the Philippines. Although the PACOM JP-5 penetration of war reserve stocks was reconstituted on 7 September, there were predictions that worldwide JP-4 and 5 penetrations would occur again in late 1979 and continue until at least the spring of 1980.1

Standard Bulk Petroleum Prices

(U) New bulk petroleum standard prices which went into effect on 1 October 1979 reflected the spiraling world-wide POL price increases (as well as diminished Middle East supplies). Prices included adjustments to cover changes in procurement and delivery costs. A comparison of prices per gallon in U.S. dollars is shown below.2

<table>
<thead>
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1. J422 HistSum Aug 79 (s), DECL 10 Sep 85; CINCPAC 280047Z Aug 79 (s), DECL 22 Aug 85; DFSC 302047Z Aug 79 (s), DECL 29 Aug 85; J422 HistSum Oct 79 (s), DECL 8 Nov 85; J42 HistSum Nov 79 (s), DECL 30 Nov 85; J422 HistSum Jul 79 (s), DECL 8 Aug 85; DFSC 302039Z Jul 79 (s), DECL 30 Jul 85; J422 HistSum Sep 79 (u).
2. J422 HistSum Aug 79 (u).
POL Storage at Diego Garcia

In early February 1978 the positioning of SR-71 fuel (JP-7) at Diego Garcia was suggested by the Secretary of Defense to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Based on a recommendation of the Chairman, JCS, the Secretary advised he would initiate action to establish a minimum contingency operating capability for the SR-71 at Diego Garcia for manned photo reconnaissance of the Horn of Africa. Also during February, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and CINCPAC collaborated, with United Kingdom (UK) concurrence, in the positioning of JP-7 fuel in portable bladders and for minimum support at Diego Garcia for possible future reconnaissance operations.¹

In June 1978 USAF headquarters proposed conversion of an existing U.S. Navy 30,000 barrel jet fuel storage tank, along with provisions for a dedicated ocean vessel receipt line and a truck fill system. Estimated costs were $1.385 million. In August a JCS memo recommended establishment of a permanent JP-7 capability to the Secretary of Defense. Accompanying the memo was a request that the Congress be notified of the intent to modify the operational capability of Diego Garcia. With the caveat that any future decision to deploy or operate the SR-71 from Diego Garcia would be subject to consultation, on 1 December 1978 the UK approved permanent JP-7 fuel storage on the island.²

On 2 April 1979 the JCS advised that recent events in the Middle East-Persian Gulf-Horn of Africa regions and the potential for continued unrest along the Indian Ocean littorals indicated a need for prepositioning of JP-7 fuel on Diego Garcia. With JP-7 fuel available at Diego Garcia, the need for overflight rights for tanker support and concomitant potential for diplomatic problems would be minimized. The U.S. Air Force was to deploy portable bladders by 16 April as a temporary measure to support redeployment of reconnaissance aircraft. This supply could also be used for future short notice and routine monthly taskings.³

This was followed by a 17 April tasking from the JCS to CINCPAC, CNO, and CSAF to expedite the capability to receive and store JP-7 permanently on Diego Garcia—without undue disruption to ongoing activities. CINCPAC, in conjunction with CINCPACFLT, provided a plan of action and milestones for conversion of one existing 30,000 barrel Navy JP-5 tank to JP-7. The conversion

2. Ibid.
3. J422 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 11 May 85; JCS 7005/022224Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 27 Mar 85; CINCPAC 130439Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 11 Apr 85.

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would be in two phases, funded under two Air Force projects. The first was an O&M project for the repair of the interior and exterior coatings and installation of temporary receipt and discharge connections followed by an interim fill of JP-7. The second phase was a P-341 project which would involve new construction to adapt the tank for permanent JP-7 use and would include new fill and discharge lines, transfer pump, filter, separator, and flow meter. POL and pier construction work, dispensing facilities, and the necessary connections were to be performed by civilian contractors. Funding of the first phase in the amount of $150,000 was provided on 25 May by the Air Force (SAC) to include the initial fuel fill. The interim conversion was completed as forecast in October and 15,000 barrels of JP-7 were delivered during the last part of December which were in addition to the 86,000 gallons (2,048 barrels) still stored in portable bladders. By the end of the year the P-341 project design had been approved and funded with an estimated completion date of October 1980.1

Subic Bay Fuel Storage Tank Damage

(U) Mudslides, explosions, and fire damaged two fuel tanks extensively and another moderately during heavy rains on 15 August at the Subic Bay fuel farm. During September and October on-site engineers from the Pacific Naval Facilities Engineering Command provided the following estimates concerning the three POL tanks:2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tank #</th>
<th>Type Fuel</th>
<th>Quantity (in barrels)</th>
<th>Estimated Replacement Cost</th>
<th>Estimated Repair Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1630</td>
<td>JP-5</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>$1,400,000</td>
<td>$1,325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1633</td>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>960,000</td>
<td>825,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1649</td>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>369,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. J422 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 11 May 85; JCS 1894/171511Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 11 Apr 85; CINCPACFLT 130121Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 30 Apr 83; CINCPAC 252032Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 19 Apr 85; J4226 HistSum May 79 (S), DECL 11 Jun 85; NAVSUPPFAC Diego Garcia 111335Z May 79 (U); CINCPACFLT 250607Z May 79 (S), DECL 19 Apr 85; J422 HistSum Jun 79 (S), DECL 6 Jul 85; J4222 Supplementary HistSum 23 Jul 80 (U); ROICC Diego Garcia 100415Z Oct 79 (U); J4222 Talking Paper (S), 17 Dec 79, Issue: JP-7 Fuel Facilities at Diego Garcia (U); REVW 17 Dec 85; HQ SAC 101733Z Jan 80 (S), DECL 10 Jan 86.
2. J443 HistSum Oct 79 (U); NSD Subic 230059Z Aug 79 (U) and 240609Z Sep 79 (U).
(U) The problems of repair and replacement were complicated by the need to determine future vulnerability. To accomplish this, services of a CONUS architectural engineer and a facilities engineer (soil investigation) were required and project completion would be delayed up to or beyond one year. In late October CINCPACFLT and the Naval Logistics Command funded $300,000 for the engineering survey effort to determine whether the tanks should be replaced or repaired.\(^1\)

Supply and Services

PACOM Programmed Depot Maintenance

(9) Since 1950 Air Asia, Ltd. in Tainan, Taiwan, had performed depot level maintenance on PACOM aircraft, with emphasis on F-4s beginning in 1966. With the promulgation of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, attempts began to locate a suitable alternate contract facility outside of Taiwan. In August 1978 the President's National Security Adviser directed the transfer of the capability to Korea by 1 March 1980, and in November 1978 the decision was made to award the contract to Korean Airlines (KAL). In December 1978 the President announced his decision to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China and to terminate the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty at the end of 1979. This decision prompted reevaluation of the Air Asia contract termination date. On 3 January 1979 the JCS directed that the transfer of the operation be completed by 31 December 1979 and stipulated that contract administration would be performed exclusively by contract personnel after 30 April 1979.\(^2\)

(U) During 1979 the contract conversion from Air Asia, Ltd. to KAL took place, the new KAL facility at Kim Hae, South Korea was constructed from the ground up, and the changeover culminated with the input of the first F-4 aircraft in October. In April the Air Force Logistics Command established a contract management center at the site to coordinate and furnish necessary equipment. KAL hired a work force which was expected to reach 750 by April 1980, and training was provided at the ROK Air Force Depot at Taegu, as well as at the Ogden Air Logistics Center in Utah. The time period between October and December was difficult because both the Air Asia and KAL programs were in operation. The last aircraft departed Tainan in early December and all of the U.S. Government-furnished property, as well as associated support equipment (except for a runway barrier), was out of Taiwan by Christmas. By the end of

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1. PACNAVFAENGCOM 190101Z Oct 79 (U); CINCPACFLT 260504Z Oct 79 (U).
2. J4232HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 16 Jan 84; JCS 3705/032323Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 3 Jan 85.
December there were two Navy and seven Air Force aircraft in work at Kim Hae with initial outputs scheduled for April 1980. The transition from Air Asia to KAL was accomplished with a minimum of problems and no discernable loss in PACOM operational effectiveness. The efforts and cooperation of the Air Force, Navy, ROK and Taiwan governments, Korean Airlines, and Air Asia Ltd. were outstanding.1

West Coast Ammunition Port Capability

(S) The PACOM need for increased West Coast outload capability had been highlighted since 1977 by CINCPAC contingency planners during each review of the 5027 OPLAN to support Korea. A 1978 Military Traffic Management Command survey had shown the maximum throughput capability at Concord, California (the only West Coast ammunition port) would be 4,000 measurement tons per day out of a requirement of 15,000 tons per day.2

(S) The outloading capabilities of the three CONUS ports were reevaluated by the CNO in 1979 and in August the OJCS/J4 provided improved capability figures for all three CONUS ports. As a result, surface resupply limiting factors, based on port throughput capabilities, were eliminated. However, other limiting factors such as ship availability still existed. The CNO indicated that further studies would be made and other alternatives would be pursued to enhance the buildup rate at Concord and at King's Bay Earle, New Jersey, and Sunny Point, North Carolina.3

Excess U.S. Government Property Disposal

(U) Three PACOM submarine communication cable systems were declared excess during 1979. They were the Wetwash ALPHA system linking San Miguel in the Philippines to Nha Trang, Vietnam; the Wetwash CHARLIE system between Sattahip, Thailand and Vung Tau, Vietnam; and the IJCS-PAC cable system between Camp McCauley, Taiwan and Hamby Field, Okinawa. The first two systems were turned in to the Defense Property Disposal Region, Pacific on 19 November 1979 and the third on 2 January 1980.4

1. J4232 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 16 Jan 84; AFCMC 051645Z Apr 79 (U); DIRMATMGT Hill AFB 211730Z Dec 79 (U).
3. J4235 Supplementary HistSum 11 Jul 80 (S), DECL 10 Jul 86; JCS 281257Z Aug 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 27 Aug 84; CINCPAC 312314Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 29 Aug 85.
4. JCS 2485/301341Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 23 Apr 85; DA 132025Z Feb 80 (U); CDR DPDR PAC 150023Z Dec 79 (U).
War Reserve Munitions

PACOM Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel Requirements (PWRMR) were based on operation plans developed by CINCPAC and approved by the JCS. The most demanding CINCPAC plans were PWRMR included theater munitions requirements which were based on. Every attempt was made to store munitions within or near the most likely areas of combat operations in order to enhance combat readiness posture and to minimize resupply time. Availability and capacities of storage facilities were also factors in selecting munitions storage sites. The overall PACOM objective was to achieve an optimum balance of munitions support of CINCPAC's contingencies and to position specific levels of these stocks in key locations in the Far East. Sites included Korea, the Philippines, and Honshu and Okinawa in Japan. Theater requirements were based on 90 days of supply for the Air Force, 90 for the Navy, 75 for the Army and 60 for the Marines. Army requirements were based on 24 2/3 ROK divisions, 1 U.S. division (in-country), and 3 1/3 U.S. divisions (reentry). The inventory status of PACOM munitions in support of [in short tons] is depicted below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>On hand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army/ROKA</td>
<td>1,019,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force/ROKAF</td>
<td>95,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy/Marine (Air)</td>
<td>167,481a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine (Ground)</td>
<td>14,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,372,707</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. USN/USMC objectives and on-hand assets were based on OPNAVNOTE C8000, which called for 5 carrier task groups. **requirements included 6 carrier task groups and 7 Marine air squadrons. OPNAVNOTE C8000 did not provide for Marine air in defense of Korea.**

Based on available in-theater assets, the following munitions were critical shortfall items in PACOM at the close of 1979:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percent on-hand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Air Force (90-day stockage objective)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIM-7 SPARROW</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIM-9 SIDEWINDER</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGM-45/78 SHRIKE</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGM-65 MAVERICK</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Navy (90-day stockage objective)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-20 Antitank cluster bomb</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-82 Laser kit (EW10)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-82 Laser kit (EW11)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-84 ZUNI rocket</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propellant charge 8/55</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projectile 8/55AP</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonobuoys</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIM-7 SPARROW</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIM-54 PHOENIX</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIM-7 (Basic point defense missile system/Improved point defense missile system)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGM-84A HARPOON</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-46 Antisubmarine rocket</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-37-3 Mine</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

War Reserve Stocks for Allies

War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) were those U.S.-titled stocks identified for use by allies. Since 1976 fiscal year budgetary ceilings established by Congress for WRSA had been limited to munitions. Under DOD guidance, each U.S. Service had been directed to compute munitions requirements for its ROK counterpart in its inventory objectives. Prepositioned stocks were to be sized to replace total consumption and attrition for forces until resupply from CONUS could be established. Since 1977 WRSA requirements had increased from

1. J423 Point Paper (S), 3 Jan 80, Subj: PACOM Ammunition Shortfall (U), REVW 3 Jan 86. See page 292 for Army shortfall items.
690,000 short tons to 985,000 short tons as a result of planned ROK force expansions and increased ammunition expenditure rates under the forward defense concept. Although this concept generated a more realistic requirement, the percentage of fill was greatly reduced. Whereas previously the Congressionally-imposed ceiling had been a key limiting factor, the chief constraint during 1979 in filling the expanded requirements was the limited worldwide stock of ammunition. Increased ROK procurement was seen as one alternative to offsetting part of the additional requirements. Allocations (all for ammunitions/munitions) are shown in millions of dollars/short tons.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 76-78 $/Tons</th>
<th>FY 79 $/Tons</th>
<th>FY 80 $/Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>442.75/247,700</td>
<td>72.2/38,000</td>
<td>79 /32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>40 / 16,000</td>
<td>4.2/ 2,000</td>
<td>4.8/ 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>6 / 1,422</td>
<td>10 / 2,400</td>
<td>8.0 / 1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.6*</td>
<td>3.2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>488.75/265,122</td>
<td>90 /42,400</td>
<td>95 /34,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Contingency (if appropriate excesses become available)

There were, however, significant shortages of war reserve stocks, in Korea, in addition to ammunition, which would seriously degrade the U.S.-ROK ability to sustain combat operations. Shortages existed in all classes of material but were most significant in Class VII (major end items) tanks, radios, and five-ton trucks; and in Class IX (repair parts). Total WRSA shortfalls to support the ROK forces were estimated at $1.7 billion ($1.3 billion for ammunition and $400 million for other classes of supply). Total shortages of war reserve material stocks, including WRSA, totaled approximately $5.8 billion.2

2. J4233 Point Paper (S), Oct 79, Subj: Status of Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel (U), REVW Oct 85; COMUS Korea 221020Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 19 Feb 86; COMUS Korea 220830Z Feb 80 (S), DECL 22 Feb 86.
### Republic of Korea Army WRSA (75-day Stockage Objective)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percent On-Hand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.2&quot; Mortar</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm Howitzer (HE)</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm Howitzer (HE)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; Howitzer (HE)</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar (HE)</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm Tank (APF8DS-T)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm Tank (HEAT-T)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SECTION III--MOBILITY OPERATIONS

PACOM Shipping Requirements Study

(U) A Secretary of Defense memo of 12 January 1979 requested that the JCS provide estimates of shipping requirements in the Pacific and of the force necessary to defend allied shipping against plausible threats for a range of contingencies in the PACOM. The JCS, in turn, provided CINCPAC with a listing of the Secretary's questions on 19 January together with a proposed two-step approach for developing a response. First, an evaluation using readily available data was to be formulated with a target completion date of 16 April. Second, if further analysis was warranted, a detailed follow-on study would be conducted.1

(S) The PACOM shipping requirements study, with a major input by CINCPACFLT, was in two phases. The first addressed military and civilian shipping requirements under a number of scenarios and the second presented CINCPAC concepts for the protection of this shipping. Major factors in the first phase considered the imports, exports, and resident population figures for Hawaii and Alaska; the cargo and POL requirements underwriting Japanese imports, exports, and shipping capabilities. The second part, a campaign analysis, was predicated on the Soviet order of battle for both their Pacific Fleet and naval air. It postulated operating areas for Soviet air and surface interdiction forces of sea lines of communication.2

(S) The study concluded that the extent of the Soviet threat, vis-a-vis U.S. and allied forces, was more a function of the situational variables listed below than a question of weapons systems capabilities:3

- Defense of the Aleutians
- Implementation of the swing strategy
- Alignment of Japan

1. J432 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 14 May 85; JCS 190011Z Jan 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 18 Jan 85.
2. J432 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 14 May 85; CINCPAC Ltr Ser T33 of 27 Apr 79 (TS), Subj: PACOM Shipping Requirements (U), REVW 26 Apr 96, REAS Para 2-301-C6.

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- Soviet access to bases in Vietnam
- Soviet actions in the Indian Ocean.

In addition, the study found that the capabilities of the U.S. and Japanese forces were marginal for establishment and maintenance of barriers to effectively contain the Soviet Pacific Fleet submarines in the Sea of Japan. CINCPAC forwarded the study on 27 April noting that, based on the limited time for development of the study of such specific questions, it should not be construed as an in-depth analysis, nor was it intended to convey a preferred PACOM strategy for global war or a contingency in Korea. CINCPAC and CINCPAC-FLT representatives also briefed the study to the JCS J4 and J5 and staff members of the Navy and Army Departments, the Military Sealift Command and the Maritime Administration.¹

Following a review of the study by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, on 8 January 1980 CINCPAC provided amplifying information on Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force planning factors and operational concepts for protection of Japanese shipping; detailed estimates of Japanese and U.S. mining capabilities, stockpiles, and delivery potential; and concepts of operations and forces required for ASW operations in support of shipping to and from Hawaii and Alaska.²

Korean Flag Shipping

A 1978 review of the FY 79 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan by CINCPAC transportation planners revealed that ships available for support of 308 for FY 79. Of particular concern was the paucity of U.S. shipping available in WESTPAC in the D to D+10 time frame, when only three ships would be available for the movement of PWRM from Japan to Korea and the supply of POL to Korea. COMUS Korea and the JCS shared CINCPAC's concern. As a result representatives from CINCPAC J4, COMUS Korea, COMUS Japan, USARJ, MSC, the U.S. Maritime Administration, the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND), the ROK Ministry of Transport, and the Combined Forces Command studied various aspects of U.S. and ROK shipping availability vis-a-vis logistics requirements. At the end of 1978 a CINCPAC analysis of shipping shortfalls to support the OPLAN was under review by the MSC.³

¹ Ibid.; CINCPAC Ltr Ser T33 of 27 Apr 79 (TS), Subj: PACOM Shipping Requirements (U), REVW 26 Aug 96; J432 HistSum Apr 79 (C), DECL 14 May 85.
² J531 HistSum Dec 79 (C), DECL 8 Jan 86.
On 17 April 1979 the ROKG provided a by-name listing of 92 Korean vessels which could be mobilized and made available to support A CINCPAC draft Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), which established procedures for the acquisition and employment of the Korean ships, was forwarded to the JCS on 16 May. After approval, the JCS forwarded the draft to the OASD(ISA) on 29 June. It was their hope that Defense and State approval would be expedited so that ROKG staffing and concurrence could be completed in time for signature at the 12th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) scheduled for early October. However, the State/OASD(ISA) approval was not granted until 5 September with official delivery to the ROKG on 7 September. At a meeting in Korea on 12 and 13 September, a CINCPAC J4 representative presented a summary of shipping shortfalls to the Korean MND. Although there were no major disagreements and ROK officials were enthusiastic, insufficient time remained for staffing through ROK MND channels, as well as the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Economic Planning Board prior to the SCM.1

After the assassination of President Park on 26 October and the military power takeover on 12 December, the MOA remained in ROKG staffing with indications that a favorable response would be forthcoming but at year’s end there had been no action.2

Sealift for TEAM SPIRIT 80

During the 1979 Exercise TEAM SPIRIT and two previous exercises, deployment of elements of the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii to Korea was exclusively by airlift. However, with the recent increase in MAC operating costs and worldwide fuel prices, in March 1979 CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS an analysis of feasibility, mix, and cost of a joint airlift and sealift deployment. CINCPAC estimated that, based on the number of troops and equipment airlifted for TEAM SPIRIT 79, costs of deployment and redeployment by air would have been cut in half had sealift been used. Moreover, MAC peacetime practices and worldwide airlift commitments limited the number of available airframes and crews. Therefore, the exercise equipment airlift could take as long or longer than by sealift. CINCPAC also felt that deployment using both airlift and sealift would provide valuable training opportunities.3

1. J433 HistSum Dec 79 (B), DECL 15 Jan 86; ADMIN CINCPAC (ALFA 04) 162331Z May 79 (B), DECL 16 May 85; JCS 1977/251325Z Jul 79 (B), DECL 23 Jul 84; CINCPAC 280526Z Jul 79 (B), DECL 26 Jul 85; J433 HistSum Sep 79 (B), DECL 10 Oct 85; COMUS Korea 040705Z Oct 79 (B), DECL 30 Sep 85.
2. J433 HistSum Dec 79 (B), DECL 15 Jan 86.
3. CINCPAC 080219Z Mar 79 (B), DECL 1 Mar 85.
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(S) In May the JCS notified CINCPAC of their support of the joint airlift-sealift concept and later advised that coordination between the Joint Staff and the Services to redistribute funds for sealift support was underway. Based on the total movement requirements for deployment of a brigade, as developed by the Commander of the 25th Infantry Division, on 22 June CINCPAC provided revised cost estimates under two options. Option one called for the movement of 3,575 troops and 10,490 short tons of cargo by airlift alone. This option would cost $65.3 million and consume 69 million gallons of fuel. Option two, using a mix of airlift-sealift would cost $10.6 million and would consume 8.9 million gallons of fuel. CINCPAC again noted that the sealift option would provide realistic training for contingency deployments, particularly with the participation of the Combined Transportation Movements Center in Pusan in the detailed load-out planning and actual movement of cargo. CINCPAC requested approval and funding of the sealift-airlift option for TEAM SPIRIT 80 and recommended that the use of sealift for major exercises be an agenda item at the annual JCS worldwide exercise scheduling conference.

(S) In July the JCS advised that the requested funding would be made available for TEAM SPIRIT 80. During a series of late summer and fall conferences a detailed ship load list and a deployment schedule were developed and provided to MSC. At year's end MSC had prepositioned one ship on the West Coast and CINCPAC was awaiting a final JCS decision on funding. On 15 January 1980 the JCS allocated (reprogrammed) $3.7 million for airlift and $.85 million for sealift for TEAM SPIRIT. The Army was to pay up to an additional $1.45 million for sealift.

Movement Control for Diego Garcia

(U) On 13 November a combined U.S.-UK-Australia exercise (BEACON COMPASS) began in the Arabian Sea south of Iran. U.S. participation included the USS MIDWAY and eight other ships. On 20 November the Pentagon announced that a second carrier task group (KITTY HAWK) would join the MIDWAY in the Indian Ocean and on the following day the Atlantic Command announced that C-5 cargo aircraft would transport an unidentified number of mine-laying helicopters to an undisclosed Pacific Fleet location.

1. JCS 1863/1113482 May 79 (S), DECL 9 May 85; J432 HistSum Jul 79 (S), DECL 17 Aug 85; CINCPAC 2221182 Jun 79 (S), DECL 16 Jun 85.
2. J432 HistSum Jul 79 (S), DECL 17 Aug 85; J433 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 15 Jan 86; JCS 5156/1523562 Jan 80 (S), DECL 14 Jan 86.
3. See Chronology, Chapter XI, this history.

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As a result of these and other unprogrammed operations in the Indian Ocean, on 23 November the Naval Support Facility at Diego Garcia advised that its facilities were saturated. No ramp space or billeting facilities were available and a temporary breakdown in the fueling system limited refueling capabilities. Although the fueling problems and ramp congestion were alleviated within 24 hours, CINCPACFLT urgently requested that CINCPAC establish a single point of control for movement of all units into Diego Garcia. In response, CINCPAC activated his Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) at 291800Z November and established centralized control of all air and sea movements to and from Diego Garcia. CINCPAC notified the JCS, Service headquarters, and major commands that air movements into Diego Garcia required a minimum of 72-hours advance notice from point of departure and sea movements required 7 days notice. The procedures would be effective for 60 days unless rescinded earlier. P-3s based in Diego Garcia, however, were exempt. Although the CINCPAC LRC was deactivated at 151000Z December 1979, clearance procedures remained in effect through the end of the year and CINCPACFLT continued to submit daily situation reports.1

Korean Airlines Contingency Airlift

At Exercise [redacted] held in Korea during July 1977, Korean representatives to the Joint Airlift Management Agency noted that ROK plans called for mobilization of Korean Air Lines (KAL) to supply contingency response airlift. They further stated that this capability could be applied to any domestic or international requirement, ROK or ally, which supported the defense of Korea. Since U.S. airlift was a critically scarce commodity when compared with requirements documented in major OPLANs, the incorporation of a foreign flag capability appeared to the CINCPAC staff to provide clear benefits.2

In early 1978 CINCPAC J4 representatives briefed COMUS Korea and the Chairman of the JCS on strategic airlift shortfalls reflected under the current Informal discussions on the possibility of incorporating KAL commercial airlift capabilities into U.S. contingency planning followed during the ensuing months among CINCPAC, COMUS Korea, and ROKAF officials. In August 1978, however, COMUS Korea indicated that, in view of the on-going withdrawal planning, the subject was especially sensitive.

1. CINCPACFLT 232304Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 23 Nov 85; NAVSUPPAC Diego Garcia 240301Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 24 Nov 85; CINCPAC 280250Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 26 Nov 85; CINCPAC 280316Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 27 Nov 85; CINCPAC 300506Z Nov 79 (C), DECL 28 Nov 85; CINCPAC 142232Z Dec 79 (C), DECL 29 Nov 85.
because it gave an appearance of a decrease in the USAF strategic airlift commitment to the defense of Korea.

In discussions with COMUS Korea and senior ROK military officials during a 20-24 May 1979 visit to Korea, the CINCPAC Director for Logistics perceived that the subject of KAL airlift to supplement U.S. capabilities in a Korean crisis would be received favorably by the ROKG. Therefore, in view of the progress on the Korean flag shipping MOA, q.v., and the positive contribution that a KAL initiative would make to overcome the shortfall, the Director recommended that steps be taken towards development of a U.S.-ROK MOA for use of Korean-owned commercial aircraft during a Korean crisis and that U.S. Embassy Seoul concurrence be obtained.

On 1 September CINCPAC outlined to the JCS and CINCMAC a proposed approach to eventual discussions with ROK military and civilian officials preparatory to concluding an MOA. CINCPAC's original target signature date of 1 July 1980 was subsequently advanced to the end of 1979 at the request of COMUS Korea. After a meeting of CINCPAC and CINCMAC representatives to refine MOA provisions, CINCPAC forwarded the proposed MOA to the JCS on 20 October. Major provisions to the MOA included:

1. J431 HistSum Feb 78 (%), DECL 9 Mar 84; CINCPAC 070051Z May 78 (x), GDS 84; COMUS Korea 030723Z Aug 78 (x), GDS 31 Dec 84.
3. SECSTATE 196038/272350Z Jul 79 (%), E.O. 12065.
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- U.S.-owned aircraft would be used to the maximum extent possible to airlift contingency cargo and personnel.

- CINMAC would schedule and control air transport of essential cargo and personnel consigned to the USG, ROKG, and UN Forces.

- The ROKG would provide to the MAC a list of suitable aircraft, by registration number, which would be updated semi-annually.

- The ROKG would pay all costs (crew, fuel, maintenance, overhaul, war risk insurance).

Initial U.S.-ROK discussions were held in Seoul, Korea on 25 October with representatives from CINCPAC, CINMAC, COMUS Korea, JUSMAG Korea, the ROK Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Transportation, CFC, ROKAF, and KAL. One hitch developed at the meeting, however; the ROK MND representative pointed out that it would be "difficult" for the ROK to sign the MOA because KAL financing arrangements with the World Bank prohibited use of aircraft for military purposes. On 10 November CINCPAC requested JCS assistance in resolving the problem and recommended that, meanwhile, the JCS continue staffing of the MOA. As of 19 December the MOA was still being staffed by the State Department and the JCS advised that the World Bank financial agreement did in fact contain some wartime operational constraints which would require a legal review to determine the effect on the proposed MOA.1

Humanitarian Aid to Kampuchean Refugees

By late 1979 the continuing conflict between Vietnamese and Kampuchean guerrillas had brought millions of Kampuchean refugees along the Thailand-Kampuchea border to the brink of starvation. The Vietnamese-controlled Heng Samrin government of Kampuchea refused an international relief offer on 20 October to bring food, medicine, and other relief supplies to those refugees within Kampuchea via a "land bridge" of truck convoys from Thailand. As a result of the Samrin government's refusal of this means of assistance, in November the JCS proposed several options for use of military and/or commercial charter airlift to land or airdrop relief material to the Kampucheqans.

1. J435 HistSum Oct 79 (6), DECL 15 Nov 85; CINCPAC 200326Z Oct 79 (6), DECL 17 Oct 85; CINCPAC 102220Z Nov 79 (6), DECL 1 Nov 85; JCS 3571/191730Z Dec 79 (6), DECL 17 Dec 84.
CINCPAC analyzed the JCS proposals and created conceptual plans for execution of the various options. At the same time, the 834th Airlift Division was tasked by CINCPAC to perform airfield surveys at Utapao, Korat, and Watthana Nakhon in Thailand. This was in case military airlift was enlisted to supplement the contract airlift of relief supplies to refugees in Thailand. The 834th reviewed airfield suitability for both C-141 and C-130 operations, base support capabilities, and the volume of operations which could be supported. In addition, the Pacific Airlift Center contingency plans staff provided updated tactical and strategic airlift information on bases in Kampuchea and Vietnam. However, as of year's end, no execute orders had been received, either for airdrop in Kampuchea or airlift to Thailand.1

Utilization of Refugee Flights

(U) In the fall of 1979 Southeast Asia refugees were being transported to the United States for resettlement. According to the State Department an average of 15 round-trips per month on chartered TIA and World Airlines were contracted through the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) through FY 80. The U.S. Government paid an average of $600 per passenger on the 400-seat flight or $240,000 per flight, which would amount to $43 million through FY 80 with one way being empty. In a 19 September conversation with Admiral Weisner, Prime Minister Kriangsak asked about the possibility of using westbound legs of these refugee flights for transporting security assistance material to Thailand. On 3 October CINCPAC asked the JCS to study the feasibility of such a proposal.2

(§) On 23 October the U.S. Mission in Geneva advised that the ICEM director could agree to such a proposal, provided there would be no publicity. The State Department, however, opined that movement of military equipment on the ICEM flights would be impossible to conceal. Moreover, since sufficient monies were dedicated to the refugee airlift and westward bound flights were used to transport some personnel and equipment related to the refugee work, State believed "it would be preferable from a political viewpoint to augment this type of cargo rather than begin hauling military equipment." However, should the Thai Government be willing to underwrite the cost of the westward leg, the U.S. Ambassador could refer the matter to Washington for reconsideration.3

1. J434 HistSum Nov 79 (§), DECL 14 Dec 85; JCS 7980/2820152 Nov 79 (§)(EX), DECL 25 Nov 85; CINCPAC 022214Z Dec 79 (U); J434 HistSum Dec 79 (§), DECL 15 Jan 86.
2. J434 HistSum Sep 79 (U); CINCPAC 030431Z Oct 79 (U).
SECTION IV--FACILITIES ENGINEERING

Diego Garcia

As discussed previously in this chapter, the National Security Council Policy Review Committee agreed on a proposal to increase U.S. military presence in the Middle East-Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean areas. The unified commanders were subsequently tasked by the JCS to identify problem areas and precise requirements to improve surge capabilities into the region. One phase of CINCPAC's response recommended improvement of deployment flexibility by upgrading Diego Garcia's support capability, programming for its air defense, and planning for MAC to position high usage C-141/C-5 repair parts and maintenance crews there.1

A joint State/DOD memo was forwarded to the President on 17 August 1979 recommending an increase in U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean. The President agreed with the approach and on 24 August the Secretary of Defense sent a memo to the Chairman of the JCS directing the Chiefs to proceed with detailed planning to implement the concept, including the development of a construction package for expanding facilities at Diego Garcia. This concept, which had been drawn from the JCS Surge Study, the Navy's master plan for Diego Garcia, and the Marine Mobility Enhancement Study, provided for the rapid deployment of a Marine Amphibious Brigade, with supporting tactical aircraft from the Far East, into the Middle East either through, or supported by, Diego Garcia. Although on-going plans called for facilities expansion in support of naval ship operations, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Program Analysis and Evaluation (OASD/PA&E) determined that such plans would not accommodate the new rapid deployment concept. Therefore, in conjunction with representatives from the JCS, Headquarters USAF, and the Navy Department, OASD/PA&E developed a new military construction (MILCON) package for expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia.2

On 14 September the Secretary of Defense approved the plan and directed the $100 million program be included in the FY 81 Navy MILCON budget. The Defense Review Board approval recommended that the construction be accomplished in four increments: FY 81, $10 million; FY 82, $40 million; FY 83, $40 million; FY 84, $10 million. The Board also included the procurement of five maritime

2. JCS 7833/151847Z Dec 79 (§), DECL 14 Dec 85; J444 HistSum Nov 79 (U); JCS 212032Z Nov 79 (§)(BOM), DECL 21 Nov 85.
pre-positioning ships and equipment for three Marine Amphibious Brigades—one each for FY 83, 85, and 87 in the basic package. A Consolidated Decision Package Set (No. N950), with a revised cost estimate of $141.1 million as depicted below, was approved on 26 November. Aircraft and fuel requirements were to be developed by CINCMAC with Headquarters Marine Corps, and United Kingdom concurrence in the concept was to be obtained:¹

**Upgrade of Diego Garcia**  
**Consolidated Decision Package Set No. N950**  
(in $ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>FY 81</th>
<th>FY 82</th>
<th>FY 83</th>
<th>FY 84</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dredging (2.5 million cubic yards)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxiway (87,500 square yards)</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft parking ramp (220,000 square yards)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi-speed fuel hydrants (8 each)</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazardous cargo pad (8,600 square yards)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL storage (400,000 barrels)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pier (200,000 square yards)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrade water system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning/Design (lump sum)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grand Total: $141.1 million.**

² Although CINCPAC was kept apprised of the Diego Garcia MILCON expansion planning effort, it was not until 29 December that the JCS tasked him to identify any additional facility requirements for the FY 83-84 segment of the MILCON expansion program which would be necessary to support the rapid deployment concept. Recommendations were to be limited, however, to facilities which required a long construction time and which must be physically available to support the 64 tactical support aircraft or the stationing of the five maritime pre-positioning ships.²

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2. JCS 212032Z Nov 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 21 Nov 85; J444 HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 5 Feb 86; JCS 2246/291539Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 85.
Meanwhile, on 19 December the JCS requested CINCPAC's views on possible future expansion and usage of Diego Garcia over and above the FY 81-84 MILCON proposal, both with or without additional (UK) acreage. A meeting of CINCPAC's component command representatives was held on 20 December to formulate the "X-mas wishlist." Unconstrained by political or monetary considerations, recommendations were forwarded to the JCS on 29 December. CINCPAC strongly advocated an increased U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area and opined that Diego Garcia offered the potential to support three major functions: first, as a resupply and staging area for Navy and Marine forces; second, as a staging/throughput base for Air Force tactical, reconnaissance/intelligence, transport, and SAC aircraft; and third, as a staging/throughput area for Army forces. Prioritized recommendations for each area were delineated. CINCPAC emphasized, however, that Diego Garcia had physical limitations and was not the ideal location for military power projection in the region. In this regard he believed that the State Department should expedite action to acquire appropriate operating bases and facilities in the Middle East. Nevertheless, CINCPAC stated that the size of Diego Garcia could be increased by the use of lagoon dredge fill along the coral reef in the northwest area of the lagoon and also at the south end of the lagoon. Another initiative listed for future consideration was the construction of a 1,000-foot ammunition pier near the proposed new magazine area which would avoid moving ammunition 16 miles through operational, industrial, and staging areas.

Japan Facilities Improvement Program (Cost Sharing)

(U) The increasing cost of maintaining U.S. forces in Japan prompted the United States to seek relief through sharing of costs with the Government of Japan (GOJ). A U.S.-GOJ labor cost sharing agreement of 22 December 1977, wherein the GOJ agreed to fund approximately $30 million annually of the U.S. Forces local national workforce costs, was precedent-setting in the cost sharing area. During informal sessions at the 10th Subcommittee Meeting of the Security Consultative Committee in Hawaii in January 1978, the subject of additional defense cost sharing was informally broached. On 26 January CINCPAC tasked COMUS Japan to develop a PACOM position and a coordinated cost sharing package. Exploratory discussions revealed that the Japanese were entertaining ideas of further cost sharing, although not in the labor or other O&M areas. Facilities, particularly family housing, seemed attractive. Housing was the priority.

1. J444 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 7 Jan 86; JCS 2911/190003Z Dec 79 (EX), DECL 18 Dec 85; CINCPAC 192110Z Dec 79 (EX), DECL 19 Dec 85; CINCPAC 292151Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 85.
facilities cost-sharing goal of all Services, except the Army, which listed operationally related construction as its number one priority.1

(U) During the period June through October 1978 the GOJ Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) became active in developing its facilities cost sharing plans in coordination with COMUS Japan. In keeping with the GOJ desires that cost sharing be a GOJ initiative, no formal U.S. actions occurred; however, COMUS Japan informed the DFAA of U.S. priorities and goals in accordance with DOD, State Department, and CINCPAC guidance. COMUS Japan was given a preview of DFAA's facilities cost sharing proposal in July 1978 and subsequently had coordinated the proposed projects with CINCPAC and the Military Services in Japan. In Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) 79, adroit political maneuvering and reinterpretation of previous SOFA positions by GOJ officials gained Diet funding approval for additional cost sharing, including an additional $35 million in labor cost sharing and $113 million for construction of support facilities at U.S. Forces bases during JFY 79-80.2

(C) In January 1979 COMUS Japan requested his component services (COMNAVFOR Japan, Fifth Air Force, and USARJ) to begin development of facilities requirements for the JFY 80 program. Service submissions were to include review and validation information on family and troop housing requirements and to nominate up to three environment-related projects and a like number of direct mission-oriented operational projects. Because U.S. Marines constituted the largest percentage (46) of Japan-based U.S. Forces, the Commanding General Fleet Marine Force Pacific advised CINCPAC that the Deputy Commander Marine Corps Bases Pacific at Camp Butler, Okinawa would represent him in submitting Marine Corps requirements direct to COMUS Japan instead of through COMNAVFOR Japan.3

(C) In March the U.S. and Japanese Chairmen of the Facilities Subcommittee under the Joint Committee per Article XXV of the SOFA drafted terms of reference to incorporate the facilities cost sharing program (subsequently renamed Facilities Improvement Program) with the organizational arrangement for relocation projects. (The title of the panel was formally changed to Facilities

2. J5 Point Paper (64NFR), 9 Jan 80, Subj: US-Japan Cost Sharing (U), DECL 31 Jan 86; COMUS Japan Ltr of 30 May 79 (U), Subj: End of Tour Report by Commander US Forces, Japan to CINCPAC.
3. J441 HistSum Apr 79 (C), DECL 9 May 85; COMUS Japan 250532Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 31 Dec 85.
Improvement and Relocation Panel on 3 August.) On 18 April COMUS Japan submitted a proposed JFY 80 facilities cost sharing strategy with a total package value of $126.7 million to CINCPAC. He emphasized a need for U.S. officials to take initiatives in discussions with GOJ officials at all levels on the proposal prior to the next meeting of the Security Consultative Committee Subcommittee scheduled for July 1979. The message also requested expeditious approval to enable timely coordination of the package with GOJ officials. The proposed approach included four facilities categories:

- Family Housing - $65.1 million
- Troop Housing - 40.5 million
- Environmental - 13.5 million
- Operational - 7.6 million

(\(\_\_\_\_\_\_) On 9 May CINCPAC recommended approval to the JCS of the COMUS Japan strategy for JFY 80 cost sharing projects and concurred with the importance of a single U.S. view in dealings with GOJ officials. In a later May message, CINCPAC recommended inclusion of the additional Marine Corps projects to replace any projects on the primary list not accepted by the GOJ. CINCPAC also urged approval of a waiver (recommended in February) to increase building

1. J441 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 9 May 85; COMUS Japan 090505Z Mar 79 (U); COMUS Japan 180958Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 30 Apr 85; J441 HistSum Sep 79 (U); COMUS Japan 200001Z Aug 79 (U).
2. AMEMB Tokyo 6856/200921Z Apr 79 (C), XDS 4/20/99; J441 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 9 May 85; COMMARCORBASESPAC 262041Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 30 Apr 85; CMC 141051Z and 150219Z May 79 (S), DECL 31 May 85.

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of U.S. military housing in Japan up to 90 percent of the effective require-
ment instead of the prescribed 80 percent allowed by the DOD for overseas
locations. Because of a May GOJ decision to accelerate the JFY 80 budget
planning cycle by two months, approval of these proposals was desired at the
earliest possible date. After approval by the Office of the Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics), on 25 June the
JCS concurred in the CINCPAC recommendations and on the following day CINCPAC
authorized COMUS Japan to proceed with coordination of the proposed package
with GOJ officials.1

Sanno Hotel-Tokyo

(U) The GOJ had agreed to construct a replacement facility for the
Sanno Hotel with an estimated cost of $25-35 million. Release of the old
facility to the land owners was scheduled for December 1980. In May 1979
CINCPAC's Engineering Facilities Division Chief conducted an on-site review
of the Sanno Hotel replacement facility to emphasize CINCPAC's concern for
timely completion of the planned 150-room hotel. However, by mid-June 1979
the projected completion date of the new facility had slipped to September
1981.3

(U) In a separate action, as the result of a recommendation by the Com-
manding General, U.S. Army Japan during a visit by the Army Chief of Staff,
on 15 June The Army Adjutant General concluded that the U.S. Army could
no longer justify the Sanno as a transient billeting facility in Tokyo. The

1. J441 HistSum Jun 79 (S), DECL 6 Jul 85; CINCPAC 092250Z May 79 (S), DECL
   26 Apr 85; CINCPAC 242344Z May 79 (S), DECL 21 May 85; JCS 6621/251742Z
   Jun 79 (U), CINCPAC 262130Z Jun 79 (U).
2. J441 HistSum Sep 79 (U); COMUS Japan 102325Z Aug 79 (S/INF), REVW 19 Aug 85;
   J5112 Point Paper (S/INF), 9 Jan 80, Subj: US-Japan Cost Sharing (U), DECL
   31 Jan 86.
3. J441 Point Paper (U), 22 Aug 79, Subj: Sanno Hotel; J441 HistSum Jul and
   Aug 79 (U).
Army's rationale was that transient billets were available at Camp Zama, Yokosuka, Yokohama, Atsugi, and Yokota. The military population in Japan had declined and Sanno room occupancy rates were decreasing (in FY 76, 62.3 percent; in FY 77, 57.8 percent; in FY 78, 53.6 percent; in first half FY 79, 49.2 percent). TAG recommended that plans to discontinue Sanno operations commence, with a projected turnover to the GOJ by 30 September 1980, and that planned construction of the replacement hotel be cancelled. Further, the Army recommended that the funds earmarked for the Sanno replacement be used to upgrade other existing billeting and morale, welfare, and recreation facilities and that another interested Service assume executive agent responsibility of the Sanno effective 31 October 1979.1

(U) At a meeting convened by COMUS Japan the following week, strong support for a Sanno-type facility in downtown Tokyo was registered by U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, and Fifth Air Force representatives. In addition to the need for transient billeting, the representatives, including U.S. Army Japan, believed the facility was important as a place for U.S. officials to host GOJ officials. During 1978, COMUS Japan reported, the Sanno had been the site of 675 official U.S.-GOJ conferences with 16,423 participants, as well as another 517 single Service, tri-Service, COMUS Japan, and United Nations Command official social functions with 25,000 participants. In many cases, reasons of security, as well as propriety, dictated the Sanno location and frequently unilateral U.S. meetings preceded the bilateral functions. Amplifying rationale and support from other interested commands followed and on 5 July TAG directed that plans to discontinue operations of the Sanno and the follow-on facility be held in abeyance pending a CINCPAC evaluation.2

(6) In a 7 July message to the JCS, CINCPAC urged continued operation of the Sanno and its replacement. In addition to the justification provided by COMUS Japan, CINCPAC noted that the occupancy rate was expected to increase to 75 percent once the new facility was built, and that steps would be taken to reduce operation and maintenance costs to keep appropriated fund support as low as possible.3

(U) The JCS 16 August reply indicated that continued operation of the Sanno and a replacement was justified. Moreover, based on the changed Service

2. J441 HistSum Jul 79 (U); COMUS Japan 230140Z, 250912Z, 300245Z Jun 79 (U); J441 HistSum Aug 79 (U); CDRTAGCEN 052030Z Jul 79 (U).
3. CINCPAC 072250Z Jul 79 (N), DECL 7 Jul 83.
utilization rates for 1978 (USN/USMC, 45 percent; USA, 24 percent; USAF 24 percent; COMUS Japan, 7 percent) it was appropriate for the Navy to assume Executive Agent responsibility. The Navy agreed. The JCS requested that CINCPAC initiate this change in a timely manner and monitor arrangements for renegotiation of a new joint arrangement. Pursuant to redelegation of this task, COMUS Japan reported to CINCPAC that a "special Sanno committee" had been formed. Meetings were held on 30 August, 14 September, and 23 October to work out the details of a new joint agreement and the transfer of executive agent responsibilities. As the year ended the transfer was pending and review of the existing Sanno operations by Navy management survey and audit teams was scheduled for early 1980.

Military Property Requirements in Hawaii

(U) Studies on military real property holdings and requirements in Hawaii had roots prior to Hawaii statehood in 1959. In August 1971 a comprehensive review of all DOD real property holdings in Hawaii was initiated under Project FRESH (Facilities Requirements Evaluation, State of Hawaii). The objectives of Project FRESH were to determine real property holdings which could be released by the DOD under the guidelines established by Executive Order 11508 (as superseded by Executive Order 11724) and to develop a land requirements document in support of the long-range military presence in Hawaii. The executive agent for this study was Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (PACNAVFACENGCOM). On 12 February 1976 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Housing) (DASD/I&H), in a memorandum to the counterpart Service assistant secretaries, requested that a thorough update of the long-range military property requirements be undertaken. The study was designated Military Property Requirements in Hawaii (MILPRO-HI) and again, PACNAVFACENGCOM was tasked as the local DOD agency for project accomplishment. The initial draft report was submitted in November 1976 and was updated annually thereafter. As of January 1979, DOD activities had released 26,403 of the 285,000 acres held in 1972.

(U) After the annual review and update of the MILPRO-HI study in late 1978, on 2 April 1979 the DASD/I&H approved the study as a foundation document covering "current, future, mobilization and joint military land use" in the

1. J441 HistSums Sep and Nov 79 (U); COMUS Japan 040605Z Oct and 080645Z Nov 79 (U); J441 Point Paper (U), 22 Aug 79, Subj: Sanno Hotel.
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State of Hawaii. It was to serve as the basis for the development of an integrated DOD master plan for all installations on the Island of Oahu (exclusive of Fort DeRussy) and as the basis "for the excessive of identified areas which are clearly not required for the long term." Contrary to study recommendations, four additional areas were to be released: Public Works Center Water Supply Waiawa (69.2 acres), Upper Fort Shafter (660 acres); Upper Kipapa Ammunition Storage Site (270.3 acres), and Hickam Administrative Annex (3.4 acres). On the other hand, several areas (Wheeler AFB, Fort Kamehameha, and certain storage sites) were to be retained pending further analysis. At a 16 April meeting at Camp Smith, CINCPAC informally advised three members of the Hawaii Congressional delegation of the results of the MILPRO-HI study and that they would receive a formal briefing in Washington in late May. On 9 May the study, as amended, was passed to the Military Services in Hawaii for implementation.¹

(U) The ASD/I&H tasked the Navy on 19 August to develop the OSD sponsored Regional Studies Master Plan for Oahu. For FY 80-82, $550,000 in O&MN funds was budgeted for integrated studies by architect and engineer consultants or in-house planners on communications, vehicle maintenance, utilities, medical, waterfront and port facilities, administration, family housing, POL, waste disposal, exchanges, commissaries, recreation, and services. By the end of October a priority list of studies and a plan of action and milestones was submitted by PACNAVFACENGCOM in conjunction with representatives from CINCPAC and the four Military Services.²

1. DASD/I&H memo of 2 Apr 79 (U), Subj: Military Property Requirements in Hawaii (MILPRO-HI) Study; J44 HistSum Apr 79 (U).

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CHAPTER VI--COMMUNICATIONS-DATA PROCESSING

SECTION I--OPERATIONS AND PLANS

Project APACHE

2. J620 Point Paper (S), 4 Jan 80, Subj: Analysis of the Pacific for Hardening to EMP (Project APACHE) (U), DECL 31 Dec 82.
3. J621 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 26 Nov 85; JCS 4658/202004Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 26 Nov 85.
Satellite Communications

FLTSATCOM

(U) Among the commercial satellite systems in the PACOM was the GAPFILLER tactical satellite system (GAPSAT). The GAPSAT system was leased from the COMSAT General Corporation to provide Navy ship-to-shore satellite capability until the Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) system became fully operational. The GAPSAT system consisted of Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Ocean satellites which greatly enhanced Navy fleet communications by reducing dependency on HF circuits. The Indian Ocean satellite provided coverage eastward to Australia, but not to New Zealand, while the Pacific satellite provided coverage of both countries.  

(U) In September 1979 the CINCPAC Director for Communications and Automated Data Processing (J6) noted that the launch of the FLTSATCOM UHF satellite would open up a new era in Navy communications. However, there was an area of serious concern in the transition from GAPFILLER to FLTSAT. The number of terminals using UHF satellites was growing, while the satellite capacity (number of channels available) in follow-on systems was decreasing. When the next generation of UHF satellites after FLTSAT was launched, there would be an even further reduction in available channels. The CINCPAC J6 considered the early fielding of the Navy and Army Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) equipment would help to alleviate the problem and was an urgent requirement.

1. CINCPAC Command History 1978 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 328 and 329; J612 Hist-Sum Nov 79 (U); DEC 0320112 Dec 79 (U); DCA 3121272 Dec 79 (U).

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In May 1978 representatives from the Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems (WWMCCS) Engineering Organization (WSEO) visited PACOM headquarters to discuss CINCPAC's requirements for a responsive, highly mobile command and control capability. The WSEO had been directed to identify requirements and to develop a consolidated, deployable C³ program which would provide the capability to react rapidly in a crisis situation. As a result of the discussion between the WSEO members and the CINCPAC staff, it became evident that the WWMCCS program had not addressed previously stated requirements for information needs at the lower end of the crisis spectrum. As a result, in December 1978 CINCPAC forwarded PACOM ROC 14 detailing the need for several lightweight communications kits (LICKs) and two small communications augmentation packages (SCAPs) to the JCS. The LICK was an extremely light, man-portable terminal which would provide a single secure voice circuit back

to CINCPAC. The SCAP was a relatively light, jeep-transportable terminal which would provide two secure voice and one secure facsimile circuits from a larger crisis reaction force such as a joint task force back to CINCPAC. ROC 14 specified eight of the LICK terminals and two of the SCAP terminals— one SCAP to be deployed in the WESTPAC and the other in Hawaii. The LICK and the SCAP would provide the PACOM with a highly mobile, flexible, in-theater capability for situation assessment, joint task force command and control, disaster relief and other missions.1

(6) As an interim solution, CINCPAC requested, and the JCS approved, the acquisition from the U.S. Navy of two WSC-5 satellite terminals with secure voice equipment to provide one circuit with each terminal. The two contingency terminals were delivered to NAVCAMS EASTPAC by 8 August 1979, and operational training for CINCPAC J6 personnel began. In May of 1979 a support agreement was signed between CINCPAC and NAVCAMS EASTPAC providing for mutual maintenance and support of the two terminals. On 21 December 1979 the two CINCPAC contingency terminals were deployed in support of increased naval activity in the Indian Ocean.2

Joint Crisis Management Capability (JCMC)

(U) In July 1978 the Secretary of Defense directed that certain previously identified programs designed to support crisis management and control, specifically the airborne command center (ABCC) and the rapid reaction deployable command and control capability (R²DC³), be combined to form the deployable WWMCCS command, control, communications, and computer capability (DWC⁴). During an in process review if the DWC⁴ program in June 1979, the CINCPAC J6 representative was advised that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence (ASD/C³⁴) had consolidated the ABCC, the R²DC³, the DWC⁴ and other previous crisis communications management efforts/programs into an overall JCMC program. The JCMC program incorporated all mobile, deployable or transportable research and development, acquisition and modification efforts whose aim was to provide a capability for joint management and control of crisis and contingency operations. The consolidation was meant to eliminate duplication of efforts and more expeditiously to provide the needed capabilities. The objective was to provide a set of improved C³¹ capabilities that could be rapidly deployed to temporarily extend the WWMCCS beyond its normal day-to-day limits for crisis management and control, limited tactical operations, and

2. J612 HistSums Jun and Jul 79 (U); J622 HistSums Oct and Nov 79 (U); J622 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 4 Jan 86.
support of joint task force (JTF) operations. The JCMC program capabilities, approved in a May 1979 ASD/C3I memorandum, included:¹

Level 1: A minimum communications capability which is transportable by many means, including commercial airlines, designed to provide secure communications in small crisis situations, such as hijackings. This was equivalent to the ROC 14 LICR.

Level 2: An airborne capability immediately responsive to the Unified and Specified Commanders, designed to collect information and provide a relay between the crisis scene and the appropriate area and National Command Authorities (NCA) for the purpose of supporting rapid crisis situation assessment.

Level 3: An air and ground transportable capability designed to provide C3I for a limited JTF Hq or a crisis action staff, with connectivity to the NCA, while either airborne or on the ground at the crisis scene. Operational capability on the ground may need to be different than while airborne. This was equivalent to the ROC 14 SCAP.

Level 4: An air and ground transportable capability designed to augment the C3I capability of a large crisis management force, such as a large JTF, thereby facilitating the JTF responsiveness to the NCA.

(U) The Department of the Army was designated as the cognizant component for the JCMC program. The WSEO was tasked to provide technical guidance, assistance and advice to the cognizant component. The WSEO was tasked also to maintain overall system engineering cognizance over the JCMC program, assuring that the various capabilities were achieved, interoperable with one another and adequately interfaced with other WWMCCS and Service systems. The Army was further tasked to submit a recommended system description and acquisition plan to ASD/C3I by 14 July 1979.²

(U) The alternative systems proposed by the Army were evaluated by the development and user communities. This evaluation indicated that the level of

¹ J612 HistSum Jun 79 (U); J612 Memorandum for Record, 11 Jun 79 (S), Subj: Deployable WWMCCS Command and Control Capability (DWC), 5-7 Jun 79 (U), DECL 31 Dec 93; ASD/C3I Ltr, 14 May 79 (U), Subj: Joint Crisis Management Capability (JCMC) Program.
² Ibid.
the Fuchu communications to Zama. As a result of these taskings and additional coordination, COMUS Japan presented the quid package to the GOJ in April 1977. The quid specified that the GOJ would build a communications building, completely equipped, install commercial terminal facilities, and build 120 units of family housing at Zama, which had been identified by the U.S. Army as a requirement. This requirement, in turn, was linked to the total release of the Makinmato housing area in Okinawa to the GOJ. During 1978 the delay in response from the GOJ to the quid pro quo proposal prompted COMUS Japan to consider other possible courses of action. Among the courses of action considered was to modify the proposal by deleting the 120-unit housing requirement and changing the location of the DCS facility to Yokota Air Base. After extensive coordination between CINCPAC, the DCA Pacific and the component services, in December 1978 the U.S. Army withdrew the requirement for the 120-units of family housing.

(U) On 30 January 1979, in response to CINCPAC tasking, PACAF submitted a cost analysis of Kanto Plain DCS reconfiguration options which concluded that the consolidation of DCS facilities at Yokota Air Base would best improve DCS facilities in the Kanto Plain. In March the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group conducted an independent analysis of the subject, including a review of the PACAF study. The Army recommended an additional alternative, the relocation of Fuchu and Camp Drake DCS facilities to Camp Zama and the transfer of operations and maintenance responsibilities for the DCS in mainland Japan from the Air Force to the Army. The Army contended that significant manpower savings were available, but CINCPAC J6 research of DCS manpower requirements indicated that the manning difference between the Army and the Air Force, so far as operations and maintenance were concerned, would be negligible. On 13 April 1979 COMUS Japan supported a decision to relocate the DCS facilities from Drake and Fuchu to Yokota. COMUS Japan cited a second reason for selecting Yokota as the relocation site—the requirement for a Combined Imagery Interpretation Center (CIIC) at Yokota (discussed in the Intelligence chapter of this history). COMUS Japan noted that the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) would have great difficulty in identifying funds for the CIIC in a separate building, but would easily be able to provide funds for the DCS system without explaining the full details of the CIIC to the Japanese Diet. On 18 April 1979 CINCPAC reviewed the bidding on the relocation options and recommended to the JCS that the consolidated DCS facility be located at Yokota Air Base. CINCPAC also recommended that the existing quid pro quo package be withdrawn and that a revised quid be submitted omitting the housing requirement but providing for the consolidated DCS facility at Yokota and increasing its size to 55,000 square feet.

2. J623 HistSums Jan, Mar and Apr 79 (all S\)], DECL 3 May 85; SSO 5AF 130845Z Apr 79 [\], REVW 13 Apr 85; CINCPAC 180219Z Apr 79 [\], DECL 11 Dec 81.
Pursuant to JCS tasking, the DCA analyzed the proposal to consolidate the DCA facilities at Yokota Air Base in Japan. The analysis was to address the advantages and disadvantages relative to manpower, survivability, operational flexibility, the impact on the DCS five year program, and to provide a recommendation. The analysis determined that there was no single factor which would make either location more advantageous than the other (Yokota vs. Zama). Since there were no overriding technical considerations favoring either location over the other, the DCA recommended that CINCPAC's position be supported and that the consolidation of communication facilities be accomplished at Yokota.1

The JCS approved the consolidation of the Kanto Plain DCS facilities at Yokota Air Base vice Camp Zama, as recommended by COMUS Japan, PACAF, and CINCPAC, on 5 Jun 1979. CINCPAC then tasked COMUS Japan to revise the existing quid pro quo proposal. On 24 July the revised quid was submitted to the GOJ. It provided for U.S. Government release of Camp Drake (containing an AUTODIN switch) and Fuchu Air Station (containing an AUTOVON switch and technical control facility) to the GOJ. In return, the quid provided for the GOJ to furnish a building to house the Fuchu/Drake relocated DCS facilities at Yokota Air Base (55,000 square feet), a GOJ-manufactured AUTOVON switch for use at Yokota Air Base, and other related DCS facilities and equipment.2

The inclusion of a GOJ-provided AUTOVON switch in the quid pro quo proposal had elicited mixed reactions. However, CINCPAC concurred with including the AUTOVON switch with the proviso that DCA criteria be met and provision be made for COMUS Japan to withdraw the AUTOVON switch from the proposal if and when considered appropriate to avoid further delay of the project. In October PACAF suggested to CINCPAC that a "requirements study" be initiated before precise configuration and multiplexing plans for the AUTOVON were determined. PACAF acknowledged, however, that the quid pro quo negotiations should not be delayed during such a study. The DCA Pacific concurred with the PACAF proposal, but COMUS Japan nonconcurred with the requirements study, citing a potential conflict with other on-going planning and study elements such as bilateral planning, C3I requirements in the Western Pacific and communications security planning for Japan. In December 1979 COMUS Japan reviewed the on-going bilateral planning between USJF and Japan Self Defense Force and concluded that there was no need for an additional communications requirements study.

1 J623 HistSum May 79 (C), DECL 29 May 85; DCA 291301Z May 79 (C), DECL 29 May 85.
2 J623 HistSums Jun and Jul 79 (U); JCS 7902/052849Z Jun 79 (U); COMUSJ 162340Z Jul 79 (U); J623 Point Paper (U), 16 Nov 79, Subj: Japan DCS Reconfiguration quid pro quo Proposal.
solely to the Kanto Plain reconfiguration. The bilateral planning process would identify requirements shortfalls in C^3I in the Kanto Plain as well as throughout Japan. A detailed requirements study for all of Japan would be accomplished as a result of bilateral planning efforts. In addition, COMUS Japan recommended that the quid pro quo proposal for the Kanto Plain DCS reconfiguration remain unchanged. CINCPAC concurred with the COMUS Japan position. As the year ended, no official response had been received from the GOJ on the quid pro quo proposal.1

1. J623 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 31 Oct 85; DCA PAC 290100Z Sep 79 (U); Hq PACAF 110035Z Oct 79 (U); DCA PAC 120200Z Oct 79 (U); COMUSJ 190336Z Oct 79 (S), REVW 18 Oct 85 and 100617Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 21 Nov 85; CINCPAC 220211Z Dec 79 (S); DECL 13 Dec 85.
(U) As a result of facility adjustments under the Japan Facilities Adjustment Program and the Okinawa Base Consolidation Program, changes to the disposition of U.S. Forces in Korea, and the return of land to the GOJ, a reconfiguration of the Military Integrated Telephone System (MITS) on Okinawa was initiated. The reconfiguration included the transmission systems over which the telephone circuits were routed. The DCA Pacific provided a system engineering study for the MITS and the DCS on Okinawa which was staffed through the component commands in Hawaii and Japan and approved by CINCPAC in December 1978.\(^3\)

(U) The Management Engineering Plan (MEP), based upon the approved engineering study, was distributed by DCA Pacific to the components in August 1979, requesting coordination and comments. The MEP transferred existing circuits from buried cable, which was difficult to maintain and increasingly costly, to microwave radio facilities and reconfigured the MITS. The portion of the plan pertaining to the construction of a building to house a new tandem switch/dial central office/microwave and technical control facilities was dependent upon quid pro quo negotiations. This involved the return of certain land parcels on Okinawa to the Government of Japan. The MEP, incorporating comments from PACAF, U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM), Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC), COMUS Japan and the DCA Field Office on Okinawa, was approved by CINCPAC on 3 January 1980. Each Service was tasked to develop and coordinate an abbreviated implementation installation plan and submit it to DCA Pacific for approval.\(^4\)

1. CINCPACAF 052000Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 85; COMUSK 130600Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 14 Feb 89; CINCPACAF 102130Z Mar 79 (U); SSO PACAF 220215Z Jun 79 (S) (BOM), DECL 31 Dec 85.
2. J622 Point Paper, 4 Jan 80 (S), Subj: COMMANDO LION (U), DECL 31 Dec 85.
Disposition of Submarine Cables

(U) During 1979 CINCPAC and other concerned agencies initiated action to dispose of three submarine cable systems. These were the Integrated Joint Communications System-Pacific (IJCS-PAC) between Camp Hamby on Okinawa and Camp McCauley on Taiwan; the 439L cable between Danang in Vietnam and Sattahip in Thailand; and, the WET WASH ALPHA between San Miguel in the Philippines and Nha Trang in Vietnam. The latter two systems were left in place by direction of the JCS after the withdrawal of military forces from Vietnam in 1975. Later in 1975, the JCS approved the removal of cable head equipment at Sattahip because of the manpower needed to maintain the cable head in caretaker status and the fact that the Royal Thai Government (RTG) had no interest in the system. Subsequent discussions regarding the disposition of the WET WASH ALPHA cable system were held in abeyance pending the conclusion of base rights negotiations in the Philippines.1

(U) In November 1978 the DCA Pacific informed CINCPAC that a commercial Japanese telecommunications organization and a Taiwan governmental agency were collaborating in the installation of a commercial cable between Okinawa and Taiwan. The new cable would parallel the existing IJCS-PAC cable. In January 1979 CINCPAC J6 advised PACAF that the Japanese and Taiwanese communications representatives had indicated some interest in entering into further discussions regarding the IJCS-PAC cable. CINCPAC noted that the United States would maintain the IJCS-PAC cable only through 31 December 1979, the expiration date of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Government on Taiwan. Therefore, CINCPAC recommended that PACAF pursue the sale of the cable to Japan or Taiwan effective 1 January 1980. PACAF passed this information to U.S. Air Force Headquarters, noting further that any efforts to sell the cable would necessarily involve coordination with the Department of the Army, since the Army owned and maintained the cable heads at Camp McCauley and Fort Buckner (Camp Hamby). PACAF requested the Air Force to explore the subject through appropriate channels.2

(G) Shortly thereafter, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that, since the WET WASH ALPHA cable had not been an issue during the base negotiations in the Philippines, the baseband and associated multiplex equipment previously used

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1. J623 Point Paper, 3 May 79 (G), Subj: WET WASH ALPHA (San Miguel RP to Nha Trang Vietnam) and 439L (Danang, Vietnam to Sattahip, Thailand) Submarine Cables, DECL 3 May 85; J623 Point Paper, 1 Jun 79 (U), Subj: Integrated Joint Communications System-Pacific (IJSC-PAC) Submarine Cable.
2. J623 HistSum Dec 79 (G), DECL 23 Apr 85; DCA-PAC Ltr 30 Nov 78 (U), Subj: Okinawa-Taiwan Submarine Cables; J623 Ltr Ser 226 of 25 Jan 79 (U), Subj: Disposition of IJCS-PAC Cable.

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to provide a terrestrial extension into Clark Air Base be used to meet other requirements elsewhere in the Philippines. Further, CINCPAC recommended that the submarine cable and cable head equipment be disposed of if no longer needed. Before the JCS replied to CINCPAC's message, CINCPAC transmitted a Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand 13 March message to the JCS which indicated RTG interest in the reactivation of the Sattahip-Yung Tau portion of the 49L cable system for commercial purposes. On 30 April the JCS approved CINCPAC's recommendations regarding the WET WASH ALPHA cable system. JCS also directed the CSAF, as the operations and maintenance agent, to proceed with action to dispose of the Sattahip-Yung Tau cable and the WET WASH ALPHA cable and cable head equipment no longer needed. The JCS recommended first consideration be given to the sale of all submarine cable and cable head assets intact to commercial interests.¹

(U) Early in August 1979 U.S. Air Force Headquarters, in a message to CINCPAC, the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy, addressed the disposition of all three submarine communications cables then excess, or soon to be excess, to the needs of the Department of Defense. The Air Force noted that cable systems were Air Force personal property and subject to disposal as foreign excess property in accordance with existing law. The cable head buildings, however, were carried on real property records of the other military departments. The U.S. Navy carried the WET WASH ALPHA cable head at San Miguel, the Philippines, while the U.S. Army carried the IJCS-PAC cable head at Hamby Field on Okinawa and the cable head at Camp McCauley on Taiwan. Thailand and Vietnam owned the cable heads in their countries. If the cable heads owned by the other Service agencies were declared excess, they could be part of a total system sale by the Defense Logistics Agency. Accordingly, the Air Force directed the Air Force Communications Service to transfer the accountability of the cable systems to the Commander of the Defense Property Disposal Region-Pacific at Camp Smith, with the actual transfer of the IJCS-PAC cable not to predate 1 January 1980. CINCPAC replied that there were no known PACOM requirements demanding the retention of the IJCS-PAC system upon termination of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty and concurred with the transfer of that system to the Defense Property Disposal Region after 31 December 1979.²

(U) In December 1979 the Defense Property Disposal Region-Pacific requested the AIT in Taipei to take action to transfer the accountability of equipment on Taiwan, to arrange security, and to prepare to provide access to potential purchasers. No further action had taken place by the end of the year, but CINCPAC J6 noted that the final disposition of the cables was likely to be a

1. CINCPAC 102049Z Mar 79 (C), DECL 7 Mar 85; JCS 2495/301341Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 23 Apr 85.
2. Hq PACAF 082100Z Aug 79 (U); CINCPAC 250211Z Aug 79 (U).
long-term project. In the case of the IJCS-PAC cable, the programmed reversion of Camp Hamby on Okinawa to Japan was potentially a sensitive issue for negotiators.\footnote{DPDR-PAC 150046Z Dec 79 (U); J623 Point Paper, 10 Jan 80 (C Subj: Disposition of Submarine Cables (IJCS-PAC Taiwan-Clark; 439L Thailand-Vietnam; WET WASH-A Vietnam-Philippines) (U), DECL 23 Apr 85.}

**Spacetrack Radar Site**

\footnote{CINCPAC Command History 1978 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 351-353.}

In order to fill the spacetrack mission gap caused by the deactivation of the spacetrack radar at Ko Kha in Thailand in 1976, the Aerospace Defense Command had proposed the relocation of the radar to the Philippines. In July 1976 a formal site survey of the San Miguel Naval Communications Station, John Hay Air Base, and Wallace Air Station was conducted. San Miguel was tentatively selected as the best site of the radar relocation but, because of the sensitive on-going U.S.-Philippine base negotiations, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) had not been advised of the proposed relocation. Preliminary assessments of the siting proposal by the U.S. Navy (which operated the San Miguel site) and the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center (ECAC) of the U.S. Air Force disagreed as to the extent of frequency interference with existing military and civilian electronic equipment in the area.\footnote{CINCPAC Command History 1978 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 351-353.}

In March 1979 CINCPAC requested the CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines (CINCPACREP PHIL) to determine whether the concerns regarding electromagnetic interference were valid and whether there were other factors to delay the immediate initiation of coordination with the GOP at the diplomatic level. Shortly thereafter, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) registered continuing concern that the installation of the GPS-10 Spacetrack Radar at San Miguel would cause electromagnetic interference. Consequently, CNO stated that the siting of the radar at San Miguel would be contingent upon the operation of the equipment in a manner such as not to degrade the communications function of the naval communications station. Other contingencies were that the equipment would not interfere with San Miguel entertainment systems, and that the U.S. Air Force initiate through appropriate channels the approval by GOP. The CNO considered that the U.S. Air Force would be responsible for the alleviation of interference and for any civil complaints resulting therefrom. The CNO tasked the Naval Telecommunications Command to render the final determination on electromagnetic acceptability with existing/planned naval communications station operations. In reply to CINCPAC, and in view of the CNO reservations regarding the interference problem, CINCPACREP PHIL recommended that
coordination with the GOP at the diplomatic level regarding the spacetrack radar site be held in abeyance.¹

In early August 1979 CINCPAC requested the Service components to review the progress of coordination on the spacetrack radar site. CINCPACFLT replied that the U.S. Navy had forwarded the final draft of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to U.S. Air Force Headquarters on 13 July 1979. At the end of August the CNO informed CINCPAC that the question of electromagnetic compatibility and potential radiation hazards raised by the Navy had been resolved to the satisfaction of the Navy in an MOA between the Navy and the Air Force. The MOA was signed on 17 August 1979, and the U.S. Navy interposed no objections to the initiation of diplomatic coordination with the GOP through proper channels. CINCPAC passed this information to CINCPACREP PHIL and requested him to initiate actions through the U.S. Embassy in Manila to effect the necessary coordination with the GOP to locate the GPS-10 at San Miguel.²

On 10 October CINCPACREP PHIL informed CINCPAC that working level notification of appropriate embassy personnel had been made. The U.S. Embassy concurred that the best way to effect coordination would be military-to-military with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff presenting the proposal to President Marcos and the Minister of Defense. In order to address properly the issues which would be involved in notifying the GOP, CINCPACREP PHIL considered it essential that knowledgeable personnel be available in-country for a detailed briefing of U.S. Embassy personnel and personnel of the AFP. Some of the factors to be considered included the release of classified information, military construction requirements, frequency coordination and public affairs aspects. CINCPACREP PHIL suggested that PACAF, as the Air Force coordinator, provide personnel for the in-country briefing. CINCPAC concurred and, on 19 October, requested PACAF to provide personnel for the requested briefings and to assist in developing a written proposal for Philippine officials. CINCPAC informed PACAF and CINCPACREP PHIL that the CINCPAC J6 would provide specific instructions in handling requirements for the frequency coordination. On 27 October CINCPAC advised CINCPACREP PHIL that a frequency proposal which would provide the necessary technical parameters would be forwarded. The

¹ J512 HistSum Mar 79 (S), DECL 9 Apr 85; CINCPAC 010001Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 28 Feb 85; CNO 071035Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 31 Mar 87; CINCPACREPPHIL 080850Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 28 Feb 85.
² J512 HistSums Aug and Sep 79 (S), DECL 30 Sep 85; CINCPAC 040141Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 13 Mar 85; CINCPACFLT 100201Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 8 Aug 85; CNO 311534Z Aug 79 (S), DECL upon notification to the Philippines; CINCPAC 202113Z Sep 79 (S), DECL 30 Sep 85.
automation in the message processing area was excessive and that several communications/deployment considerations were still unanswered. Army was requested to develop two additional alternative configurations to address these concerns and in addition perform the functions of both level 2 and 3. These alternatives were requested by 1 March 1980.¹

PACOM AUTODIN Reconfiguration

The Pacific Defense Communications System (DCS) Automated Digital Network (AUTODIN) provided the Pacific Command with reliable digital communications capable of meeting ever-changing record and data communications requirements. In 1974 the JCS directed the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) to conduct a study entitled "Reconfiguration of the Pacific AUTODIN." The study originally addressed the closure of the Camp Drake AUTODIN Switching Center (ASC) and was later expanded to include consideration of the operational effects on communications of the closure of a combination of ASCs in the PACOM. On 13 January 1978 the Fort Buckner ASC was deactivated and placed in caretaker status. It was to remain in caretaker status pending future installation at Camp Zama, Japan in conjunction with the DCS Reconfiguration in the Kanto Plain (q.v.). Later in 1978, as a result of ASC closure simulation studies, the DCA concluded that either or both of the ASCs at Taegu, Korea and Clark Air Base in the Philippines could be closed from a strictly network performance viewpoint. However, the DCA noted the paucity of out-of-country circuitry from Korea. Thus, the Taegu ASC supplemented the limited transmission diversity available in Korea and its removal did not appear to be a desirable option. On the other hand, given the amount of diverse transmission facilities from the Philippines, survivability of communications was insured even without the ASC at Clark Air Base. CINCPAC concurred and, on 27 November 1978, the JCS authorized the DCA to develop a plan for the closure of the Clark ASC.²

Clark ASC Closure

In January 1979 the DCA published milestone charts and task matrix for the Clark ASC closure. During a meeting in Washington, attended by a CINCPAC J6 representative, the multiplex scheme (non-dedicated black) to be used in conjunction with the Clark ASC closure was selected. In response to the request from the DCA for comment, CINCPAC J6 addressed the potentially adverse operational limitation of the non-dedicated black multiplex option, and stressed the absolute necessity for responsive command and control record communications for

AUTODIN subscribers after the closure of the Clark ASC. Subsequently, the DCA developed a test plan for the selected multiplex scheme, and the original January milestones were revised.\(^1\)

(U) On 25 May 1979 the DCA published the implementation and cutover plan for the closure of the Clark ASC. In June, although the analysis of the initial data collected for the multiplexing test was inconclusive, the majority of subscribers indicated informally that they were satisfied with the service to date, and did not anticipate any problems which could not be resolved. Consequently, on 7 July CINCPAC approved the terminating of the multiplexing test and the implementation of the cutover plan. At the same time, the DCA requested JCS concurrence to retain the Clark ASC in an in-place storage status, after the projected 1 October 1979 closure, for eventual use in conjunction with the Kanto Plain DCS reconfiguration. The DCA also requested JCS approval to remove the Fort Buckner ASC from caretaker status because the building was needed for the installation of an AN/GSC-39 satellite terminal in 1980. The DCA recommended that the Clark ASC be retained for eventual relocation to Japan and that the Fort Buckner ASC be removed. In response to a request by the JCS for CINCPAC comments, CINCPAC concurred with the DCA proposals.\(^2\)

(U) On 1 October 1979, in accordance with the DCA implementation and cutover plan, the Clark ASC was deactivated and placed in an in-place storage status.\(^3\)

Kanto Plain Reconfiguration

(U) The DCS reconfiguration in the Kanto Plain also had its origin in the 1974 JCS-directed DCA study entitled "Reconfiguration of the Pacific AUTODIN." Subsequently, the Commander of the U.S. Forces Japan (COMUS Japan) recommended the consolidation of the Camp Drake ASC and the Automated Voice Network (AUTOVON) and the technical control function at Fuchu Air Base at one location (Camp Zama) and the release of both Fuchu and Drake to the Government of Japan (GOJ). In 1976 a DCA study recommended the consolidation of the Drake and Fuchu communications functions at Camp Zama, the total release of Fuchu and Drake, and the presentation of a quid pro quo package to the GOJ. The JCS tasked the U.S. Army to develop an architectural and engineering plan for the new facility at Zama. The U.S. Air Force was tasked to determine the cost required to relocate

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1. J623 HistSums Jan, Mar, and Apr 79 (all U); DCA 211751Z Mar 79 (U); CINCPAC 270045Z Mar 79 (U), DECL 26 Mar 85; DCA 291951Z Mar 79 (U); DCA PAC 140213Z Apr 79 (U).
2. J623 HistSums May, Jun, and Aug 79 (U); CINCPAC 072016Z Jul 79 (U); DCA 101233Z Jul 79 (U); JCS 8011/181831Z Jul 79 (U); CINCPAC 210120Z Jul 79 (U).
frequency proposal was received from the Air Force and forwarded by CINCPAC on 29 October for submission by CINCPACREPPHIL to the GOP. No response from the GOP had been received by the end of the year.¹

Taiwan Communications Drawdown

(U) The AIT in Taipei conducted the negotiations for the transfer/sale of all communications-electronic assets to be retained on Taiwan. On 28 December 1979, the State Department informed CINCPAC that State and Defense jointly

3. J621 HistSum Dec 79 (U); JCS 6086/081441Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 3 Jan 85; JCS 3857/191856Z Apr 79 (U); Communications Bailment Agreement (sixth revision), 24 Apr 79 (U).
agreed that the agreements for property disposal on Taiwan were acceptable and
directed that the transfer action be completed by 1 January 1980. The AIT
Director in Taipei was authorized to sign the necessary agreements. The agree-
ments were signed on 31 December 1979 by AIT in Taipei and the Coordinating
Council for North American Affairs (Government on Taiwan) with an effective
date of 1 January 1980. As previously discussed, the equipment related to
the cable head at Camp McCauley was retained by AIT for subsequent turnover
to the Defense Property Disposal Region-Pacific for disposal.1

1. J621 HistSum Dec 79 (U); SECSTATE 331442 of 26 Dec 79, transmitted to
CINCPAC by SECSTATE 180740Z Dec 79 (U); AIT Taipei 310759Z Dec 79 (U).
3. Ibid., p.346.
1. Ibid.
1. SSO Korea 1121/121207Z Mar 79 (TS)(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 85.
2. COMUSK 130200Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 12 Mar 85.
1. CINCPAC 140206Z Mar 79 (S/NF), DECL 13 Mar 80.
2. JCS 2244/252029Z Jul 79 (S), DECL 23 Jul 85.
3. COMUSK 180530Z Sep 79 (O), DECL 28 Sep 85.
Of the above priority listings by COMUS Korea, CINCPAC recommended that segments 1, 2 and 7 of the POSK upgrade and items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 of the TPICK priorities (totaling $249,000) be funded with CINC initiative funds anticipated in FY 80. CINCPAC stipulated that, if additional FY 80 and/or FY 81 funds could be made available, CINCPAC, in conjunction with COMUS Korea, should have the opportunity to determine where best to apply these urgently required funds.¹

1. CINCPAC 060340Z Oct 79 (U).

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SECTION II--COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY PROGRAMS

Transoceanic Dedicated Voice Circuit Review

(U) The ability of PACOM subscribers to access AUTOVON and to successfully complete their calls, particularly to the Continental United States (CONUS) had long been a matter of concern to CINCPAC. The consolidation of support facilities from the PACOM to the CONUS had caused a significant increase in the number of commands throughout the PACOM initiating calls to CONUS. This, coupled with the differences in time between the areas, had resulted in heavy saturation of the limited AUTOVON facilities. Compounding this difficulty was the inability to add additional trunk lines due to the Defense Department policy of restricting the quantity of AUTOVON trunks to the number required to complete flash calls (flash non-blocking policy). In mid-1979 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I withdrew the flash non-blocking policy, thus releasing the system from an operationally unacceptable constraint and allowing the addition of new AUTOVON trunks where necessary.1

(U) Subsequently, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I requested that transoceanic dedicated voice circuits be reviewed and rejustified by the Services, unified and specified commands and defense agencies for continued use or inclusion into AUTOVON. The policy statement enclosed with the C3I memorandum specified that the AUTOVON was the primary system for all intra-DOD nonsecure voice calls and must be used when service was available. On 31 July the JCS passed the tasking message, noting that many dedicated voice circuits had been used to meet communications requirements because transoceanic AUTOVON service was unacceptable. With the recent change of policy permitting increased trunking of AUTOVON, the AUTOVON system was expected to satisfactorily accommodate a significant portion of current dedicated voice circuit users. The intent of the review, stated the JCS, was to build a data bank of existing users, and identify those which could adequately be provided service by the improved AUTOVON system. Action addresses, including CINCPAC, were requested to review and rejustify their existing transoceanic dedicated circuits, identifying each and providing a statement as to whether or not users could be satisfied by AUTOVON, and if not why not. CINCPAC requested the DCA Pacific to provide the Service components with a computer printout of DCA circuit data bases for existing transoceanic dedicated voice circuits under their cognizance. Upon receipt of the DCA Pacific printouts, the components were requested to review and revalidate all circuits within their cognizance and forward the results to CINCPAC J6.2

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2. J623 HistSum Aug 79 (U); JCS 5564/312115Z Jul 79 (U), which cites ASD-C3I Memo of 7 Jun 79; CINCPAC 0318012 Aug 79 (U).

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(U) An intensive review was conducted of all applicable dedicated circuitry assigned to Headquarters PACOM, component commanders and subunified commands. All existing transoceanic dedicated voice circuits were revalidated and a compilation of the component command submissions was forwarded to the DCA by CINCPAC on 5 November 1979. On 10 November CINCPAC formally validated the component command input previously transmitted to the DCA.

ABNCP Long Haul Secure Voice Communications


SECRET

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1. JCS 10-79/232013 Z Nov 79 (U)(BOM); CINCPAC 101759Z Dec 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 86.
1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 201347Z Sep 79 TS(Ex), REVW 27 Sep 99.
1. J6 Point Paper, 8 Feb 79 (S), Subj: Secure Communications Interoperability with Allies (U), REVW 8 Feb 85.
2. J4/Memorandum for Record, 5 Sep 79 (S), Subj: COMSEC Planning Conference for Northeast Asia (U), DECL 5 Sep 85.

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TOP SECRET
2. J613 HistSum Aug 79 (C), REVW 31 Aug 85; CPICK Summary, undated (C-ROK/US); J613 Point Paper, 9 Jan 80 (S/NF), Subj: US/ROK COMSEC Policy Interoperability (C), REVW 31 Aug 85.
2. DIRNSA 8-80/111718Z Jan 80 (N)(EX), REVW 9 Jan 10.

1. J613 HistSum Jan 79 (S/AF), REVW 12 Feb 99; DIRNSA 10-79/251856Z Jan 79 (S/AF), REVW 25 Jan 99; COMUSJ 260749Z Jan 99 (S/AF), REVW 26 Jan 85 and 010635Z Feb 79 (S/AF), REVW 30 Jan 85.
1. AMEMB Tokyo 10903/1909112 Jun 79 (S), RDS 2, 06/19/79.
2. COMUSJ 220222Z Jun 79 (S), REVW 20 Jun 85; CINCPAC 060114Z Jul 79 (S), DECL 26 Jun 85.
1. COS Tokyo 163/10307Z Dec 79 (S) (BOM), REVW 21 Dec 99; J446 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 9 Jan 86; CHMDO Tokyo 261004Z Dec 79 (S), REVW 26 Dec 99.
3. J613 HistSums Jan-Dec 79 (U)
1. J613 HistSum Dec 79 ($), REVW 14 Jan 86; CINCPAC 220020Z Dec 79 ($), REVW 21 Dec 85 and 220217Z Dec 79 ($), REVW 21 Dec 85.
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SECTION III--AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING

WWMCCS ADP

PACWRAC

(U) In 1975 the PACOM regional Automated Data Processing (ADP) facility planning group conducted a feasibility study for the consolidation of all WWMCCS ADP H-6000 computer systems on Oahu (Navy and Air Force). The report identified savings in manpower and material for two possible sites, one at Hickam Air Force Base and the other at Kunia, which at that time was the CINCPAC Alternate Command Post. The feasibility study contained PACAF's minority report, which disagreed with the proposed cost savings and therefore did not concur with the consolidation recommendation. In 1976 a CINCPAC letter transmitted a system development notification (SDN) as the plan to consolidate three computer systems, two single Central Processing Units (CPUs) from CINCPAC and one dual CPU system from CINCPACFLT, into the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC) building at Makalapa on Oahu. Testing of the Honeywell Informations Systems (HIS) H-735G Remote Network Processor (RNP) mini-computer to link data communications between the WWMCCS ADP terminals at Camp Smith and Makalapa began in November 1977.1

(U) In February 1978 the PACOM WWMCCS Regional ADP Center (PACWRAC) concept of operations was published. This was the relocation plan for the three computer systems. The first phase called for the relocation of the CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT general service (GENSER) C2 support; phase two involved the assessment and relocation of the CINCPAC Strategic Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) computer system into the PACWRAC. However, the PACWRAC concept as published for a reevaluation of the relocation of the SIOP function to the PACWRAC facility with respect to both the economic and operations issues. In July 1978 the CNO noted that not moving the SIOP function was contrary to Congressional guidance which had called for the centralization of Army, Navy and Air Force automated data processing and WWMCCS functions into one facility. Shortly thereafter, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the PACOM command and control system master plan was approved in concept, but noted that the consolidation of the Navy WWMCCS excluded the CINCPAC SIOP CPU. CINCPAC replied that after plans for the integration of the Cruise Missile Mission Planning System with the SIOP system had been evaluated, the cost of trade-off for optimum site location of the SIOP system would be reassessed.2

2. Ibid., p. 365, 366.

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In May 1978 the CNO approved the relocation of the FICPAC H-6000 Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) to the PACWRAC location to be used as the GENSEER system in an H-6000 trade in order to ease the transition to a consolidated PACWRAC. On 12 May 1978 the CINCPAC Director of the ADP System Support Group took part in a ribbon-cutting ceremony to celebrate the opening of the PACWRAC facility at Makalapa. However, by late 1978 it had become apparent that the target implementation date for PACWRAC of November 1978 would not be met. Difficulties had been encountered in the establishment of reliable circuitry between Camp Smith and the PACWRAC facility.1

During the first part of 1979 efforts continued to resolve software problems with the RNP which were delaying the PACWRAC implementation.2

On 8 October 1979 PACWRAC became a reality with the movement of the CINCPAC GENSEER operation to the Pacific Fleet Data Processing Systems Center (DPSCPAC), along with the physical relocation of the Fort Shafter ADP equipment to Makalapa. In conjunction with the move, the CINCPAC SIOP function was relocated from Fort Shafter to Camp Smith. The consolidation entailed the relocation of WWMCCS ADP equipment to the DPSCPAC facility at Makalapa where it was connected to the existing CINCPACFLT WWMCCS ADP equipment to make up the PACWRAC triple CPU configuration. In addition to the movement of all CINCPAC operational programs, both command and control and non-critical staff programs, onto the PACWRAC computer, the loading of certain system software changes was accomplished to accommodate the combination of CINCPAC users with those of CINCPACFLT, the THIRD Fleet, the Submarine Command, Western Command, and the Fleet Marine Force Pacific on the PACWRAC system. CINCPAC was connected to the PACWRAC computer via the Honeywell H-735 RNP located at Camp Smith and a high-speed multiplexed communications line.3

The initial growing pains expected with the new PACWRAC configuration exceeded the projected time. Frequent system crashes resulting from hardware malfunctions plagued the system, considerably reducing the service to users. No single specific piece of equipment could be isolated as the major cause of the problems. As the year ended, this continued to be the case. The majority of the crashes occurred at one of the Data Net 355 front end processors or at one of the CPUs. The communications lines problems between Makalapa and Camp Smith had been eliminated, as had those in the RNP at Camp Smith. These problems had delayed the implementation of the new scheduler on the CINCPAC H-6000. The scheduler was intended to spread the workload for all PACWRAC users evenly, with emphasis on command and control projects.4

1. Ibid., p. 366.
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WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN)

(U) The WIN is a communication network to allow WWMCCS computer interconnecting to support routine and crisis C2 information processing. The prototype of the WIN was approved for development in December 1974 and, subsequent to the successful test of the prototype, the JCS validated and approved the WIN. In January 1978 the JCS published the approved WIN implementation plan and, in March 1978 the Defense Department approved the plan up to a configuration which could be achieved by 30 December 1979. The WIN was expected to evolve over a period of years and would consist of a number of WWMCCS host computers interconnected to accommodate both local and remote terminal users. The network was to be used in support of JCS-approved exercises and would exchange information between the WWMCCS and the logistics, intelligence and tactical command and control information systems. WIN also would support the National Military Command System, the Service headquarters, unified commands, selected specified commands, selected component commands, transportation operating agencies and selected Defense Department agencies. Achievement of a WIN capability in the PACOM depended upon the installation of an Interface Message Processor (IMP), a mini-computer to be installed in the PACWRAC to interface between PACOM hosts and the WIN network. The capabilities of the WIN included teleconference, remote access, file transfer, workload sharing and a mail function. By the end of 1978 an approved WESTPAC WIN system configuration had not been agreed upon; the approved portion of the Management Engineering Plan covered only expansion to Hawaii. A final WESTPAC system configuration for COMUS Japan and COMUS Korea was still under development at the end of 1978.1

(U) In June 1979 the IMP was in place at Makalapa and on 24 September 1979, the installation of WIN software was completed in Hawaii. This software allowed users from CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF to access the WIN network. Even though the WIN software had been successfully installed on Hawaii computers, the WIN communications circuit between PACWRAC and the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC) had developed problems. During a 19 October worldwide WIN test sponsored by the Network Operations Technical Control Center (NOTCC), the IMPS associated with the ANMCC, the NOTCC and DPSCPAC went down intermittently and independently resulting in only short usable time segments.2

(U) In November technicians visited Hawaii to isolate and correct the on-island and Oahu-to-ANMCC WIN problems. Problems were found and corrected on the PACAF circuit and the IMP at PACWRAC. Tests of WIN capabilities on-island between PACAF, CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT were successful. Attempts to establish

reliable off-island connectivity to the ANMCC were unsuccessful, with only short (3-10 minutes) periods of uptime, separated by long periods of downtime. The team concluded that the connectivity problems appeared to be centered on the IMP at the ANMCC. In late November and early December the same assistance team visited the ANMCC to identify and try to resolve problems with respect to the poor performance of the PACWRAC WIN connection to the CONUS. Meanwhile, the JCS advised that a series of no-notice user tests of the WIN system would be implemented. The tests would be conducted daily, initially during normal duty hours, but ultimately at any hour for command center personnel. These tests were expected to start the first week in January 1980. In that regard, the Command and Control Technical Center (CCTC) of the DCA had formed a task force with the objective of significantly reducing the number of momentary outages occurring on the WIN by mid-January 1980. All WIN sites were directed to participate in executing a specific set of testing functions and to participate in daily teleconferencing until the problems were resolved.\(^1\)

Second IMP for Hawaii

(U) In November 1979, after a requirement for an additional IMP in Hawaii was suggested by the Joint Deployment Agency, CINCPAC determined that there was no immediate requirement to order another IMP from the current WWMCCS ADP contract and that additional study was needed on factors that would effect the timing of an additional IMP. After a review of the alternatives among the various concerned agencies, CINCPAC learned informally that the Air Force was agreeable to the purchase of the second IMP and would prepare an appropriate SDN. The IMP site would be determined later. CINCPAC advised the JCS that a final recommendation/decision on the location would be made subsequent to the completion of a thorough economic and operational evaluation of the alternatives. The evaluation would be made with the aid of all of the affected organizations on the island of Oahu, and would consider the impact on the PACWRAC, the on-island WIN connectivity, future WIN redundance, follow-on connectivity to AUTODIN II and mission requirements. The JCS informed CINCPAC on 27 November that an acknowledgment memorandum for the SDN on a proposed second IMP in Hawaii, entitled "WIN ADP Hardware for U.S. PACAF" had been signed and processed on 26 November.\(^2\)

WSEO Testbed

(U) The WWMCCS System Engineering Organization (WSEO) was charged with the establishment of a program to investigate, demonstrate and evaluate the

1. J63A HistSums Nov and Dec 79 (U); CINCPAC 200220Z Nov 79 (U); CCTC 072202Z Nov 79 (U); JCS 2457/081212Z Dec 79 (U) and 1178/272319Z Dec 79 (U).
2. J63A HistSum Nov 79 (U); CINCPAC 220325Z Nov 79 (U); JCS 6060/270516Z Nov 79 (U).
utility of ADP in the WWMCCS operational command and control environment. The WSEO was directed to define and prosecute a functional research and development (R&D) program to identify and demonstrate applications of ADP which offered significant improvement to the operational effectiveness of the WWMCCS. Two aspects of the R&D program were deployment planning and situation assessment and response. During 15-16 January 1979, a WSEO team visited the PACOM to discuss and brief information on the two future operational testbeds. After receiving enthusiastic support for the concept of the WSEO testbed program in the PACOM, CINCPAC informed the JCS, on 7 February 1979, that he fully supported the program and agreed on the advisability of locating the testbed experiments in the Pacific. The PACOM offered the optimum mix of military organizational structures and high level of activity to assure maximum benefit from the program.

(U) On 3 May 1979 the JCS selected the PACOM as the overseas site of the operational testbed, stipulating that the operational tests must be concluded in time to allow the initial result to be included in the December 1981 briefing to the WWMCCS Council. As the year ended, CINCPAC J6 personnel were evaluating the WSEO general configuration for the experiment development plan.2

COMUS Korea WWMCCS ADP

(U) The Joint Command Information Systems (JCIS) division of COMUS Korea Headquarters provided WWMCCS ADP support to the COMUS Korea staff and subordinate units, using selected configurations of Honeywell computers and other ADP equipment. Direct user access was provided by a group of remote terminal sites, each connected by a communication link to the WWMCCS main computer system at Camp Walker, Taegu. Remote terminal sites were located at Yongsan, Tango (Command Center), Osan, Kunsan, Taegu, Camp Henry and Chinhae. A mini-computer in a van, normally located at Yongsan but relocated to Tango during exercises/contingencies, provided the capability to input bulk data and receive computer listings. During 1979 actions were in process to provide new/additional terminal support for Tango, Yongsan, Kwangju, Kunsan and Chinhae. Other actions underway included the installation of a mini-computer for Osan to provide local, as well as remote, processing capabilities for fragmentary order preparation/dissemination. An RNP was also under procurement for the Yongsan van to support a concentration of the communications links for Yongsan sites as well as to provide bulk input and output.3

1. J631 HistSum Jan 79 (U); J6 Monthly Executive Brief, Jan 79 (U); CINCPAC 072112Z Feb 79 (U).
2. J631 HistSum May 79 (U); J63A HistSum Nov 79 (U).
3. J633 Point Papers, 27 Jul 79 and 11 Jan 80 (both (U)), Subj: COMUS Korea WWMCCS ADP.
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WWMCCS Circuit Restoral-Korea

(U) As previously discussed in this chapter, the Korea DSC microwave system was a mountain-top system and extremely vulnerable to hostile attack. If the system or segments of the system were destroyed, remote WWMCCS ADP terminal users could not access the WWMCCS main computer. Remote WWMCCS ADP terminals in Korea also could not access WWMCCS main computers elsewhere, such as Hawaii or the CONUS, because of the lack of communications connectivity. Field tests and evaluations of tactical communications in Korea were being conducted to provide WWMCCS ADP terminal connectivity to a WWMCCS main computer outside Korea. Efforts to improve restoral capability relative to ADP equipment and circuits were being addressed on a priority basis.¹

WWMCCS ADP-Japan

(U) The installation of WWMCCS ADP in support of COMUS Japan began in February 1978. The COMUS Japan data processing system was linked to the COMUS Korea WWMCCS standard H-6060 computer in Korea via dedicated DCA circuit. Another second, similar link was scheduled to the CINCPAC H-6060 when that computer became operational in the PACWRAC at Makalapa. An RNP was installed at Yokota Air Base in February 1978 and the first increment of computer programs to support COMUS Japan was installed in the COMUS Korea host computer. By the end of 1978 the final increment of computer programs had been installed in Korea and, by the end of the year, work was in progress to establish a WWMCCS ADP terminal at the U.S. Army, Japan Headquarters, Camp Zama. A study was also underway to establish an RTS at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa to support the CFC Command Post in Korea.²

(U) During 1979 projects were underway to further enhance COMUS Japan's command and control ADP support. Documentation for additional remote terminals at the Kadena Consolidated Command Post on Okinawa had been approved by the CNO and consolidated by the JCS. These additional remote terminals in Okinawa, combined with the second communications link to connect COMUS Japan with the PACWRAC in Hawaii, would further enhance and satisfy PACOM requirements for automated command and control.³

FRAG II

(U) FRAG II was the acronym used in 1979 for what previously had been known as FRAG PREP. The Commander of Air Forces Korea (Commander 314 Air

¹ J633 Point Paper, 16 Nov 79 (U), Subj: WWMCCS Circuit Restoral-Korea.
³ J633 Point Paper, 11 Jan 80 (U), Subj: WWMCCS Support for COMUS Japan.
Division) issued operations and fragmentary orders (FRAGs) through the 603rd Tactical Air Control Center at Osan, Korea to commit forces in tactical air operations within the area of operations of COMUS Korea/CINCUNC. Automated support for the preparation and dissemination (FRAG PREP) was provided by the WWMCCS computer at Taegu, Korea. The FRAG PREP system transmitted orders through AUTODIN, directing aircraft for tactical control. The Tactical Air Control Center received FRAG PREP support from the WWMCCS computer system via a remote terminal. That system was not responsive during peak operating periods and exercises because of competing requirements for ADP resources. Secondly, the communications link between Taegu and Osan remained vulnerable to interrupted service and extended outages. In May of 1978 COMUS Korea submitted an SDN to procure a mini-computer system to improve ADP FRAG PREP support. The SDN was forwarded to the CNO by CINCPAC in July 1978, but, because of vendor equipment and system software non-availability, and additional coordination needed between Air Force agencies involved, it was not until December 1978 that the CNO forwarded the SDN to the JCS for approval. When implemented, according to the SDN, the Honeywell Level 6 computer system (equipment and system software) would be leased, installed, and operated at PACAF headquarters. PACAF would develop the FRAG software system for Korea and, subsequent to the software development, the Level 6 system at PACAF would be deployed to Osan to support the FRAG PREP.1

(U) By mid-1979 a draft data project plan, then known as FRAG II, was being finalized by PACAF. The Plan identified the COMUS Korea JCIS as the cognizant agency for Level 6 installation and acceptance testing. CINCPAC had agreed to acquire a leased Osan FRAG II, Level 6 system. The delivery of the leased Honeywell Level 6 hardware slipped a week at a time until early November, when it was finally crated for shipment. Consequently, acceptance tests for software installation were unavoidably delayed, as well as the operational test phase. The Honeywell equipment was eventually shipped to Osan AB on 6 December 1979, but the FRAG II initial operating capability in Korea had been slipped to January 1980.2

Cruise Missile Systems

(U) The purpose of the PACOM Cruise Missile Mission Planning System (CMMPS) was to plan the routes of sea launched (SLCM) and ground launched (GLCM) cruise missiles by means of a complex computer system. Once the path of the missile was planned, the CMMPS would convert the final route plan into a set of formatted instructions to be directly loaded into the missile on-board

guidance computer. The contract for the CMMPs was awarded to McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Corporation in September 1978. The target date for installation of the CMMPs at Camp Smith was October 1980.1

In January 1979 the Joint Cruise Missile Planning Office (JCMPO) informed the using commands that they were responsible for funding the site preparation for the CMMPs. In December 1978, CINCPAC J6 had been notified by the CNO that WWMCCS ADP funds could not be used for the CMMPs. On 29 January CINCPAC advised the CNO that the CMMPs computer system to support the employment of the weapon system was planned for installation in time to meet the missile initial operability date of 1982. Consequently, site preparation and Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N) funds were needed to support the installation and subsequent operations. CINCPAC requested that the CNO provide guidance on the funding programs available for use in the Theater Planning Package (TPP) site survey and subsequent site preparation. The CNO tasked the problem to the JCMPO for resolution. In March the Navy Comptroller designated the JCMPO as responsible to provide site preparation funds for the CMMPs. Maintenance and operational costs of the system after installation would be the responsibility of CINCPAC, using O&M,N funds.2

In May CINCPAC provided the JCMPO cost estimates and milestones for the installation of the cruise missile computer system at CINCPAC, Camp Smith. At the same time, CINCPAC requested that funds be provided in advance for the preparation of the Basic Electronic System Engineering Plan (BESEP). Overall installation costs were estimated by CINCPAC to be $165,000. The BESEP was to be prepared by the Naval Systems Electronic Engineering Activity, Pacific upon receipt of funds from the JCMPO. In August the proposed site of the CMMPs was approved after the site survey by personnel from the JCMPO and McDonnell-Douglas.3

On 27 December CINCPAC informed the JCMPO that at least 140 days would be required to complete CMMPs site preparation from the date funding was received for the BESEP. If the funds were received by 1 January 1980, site preparations could be completed by early May, assuming that long lead-time items were received when expected. CINCPAC's required installation date for the CMMPs was based on a one year lead time for a mission planning capability. A completely functional CMMPs with operating personnel on board and trained

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2. J631 HistSums Jan-Mar 79 (U); CINCPAC 290103Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 25 Sep 85; NAVCOMPT 191650Z Mar 79 (U).
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was required one year prior to any initial operating capability of the missile. Assuming that May 1982 was the SLCM initial operating capability date, and that 9 months were required for equipment installation, personnel acquisition, and training, installation would have to begin not later than October 1980. CINCPAC recommended that a site coordination visit be conducted as soon as practical to insure that site preparation interfaced properly with the equipment and installation provided by the contractor. In response to action items assigned during a 10-11 December conference, CINCPAC stated:

- Technical representatives assigned to assist in CMMPS operations, maintenance and training will require clearances and access to TS, SI, and SIOP/ESI information.

- CINCPAC favors contractor hardware maintenance support unless there are significant advantages to acquiring an organic hardware maintenance capability that are not now apparent. Support should be administered by a single service logistics manager acting as executive agent for all users.

- Anticipate a one year mission planning cycle beginning 1 October of each year to correspond with OPLAN submission dates.

Military Message Experiment (MME)

(U) By formal agreement among CINCPAC, the U.S. Navy, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a two-year MME was planned at Camp Smith. The U.S. Navy and DARPA had provided approximately $6.5 million for the tests. The objective of the experiment was to determine the utility of an automated message service in an operational environment and to provide improved message handling in the Command Center. By the beginning of 1978 the computer room had been reconfigured, computers had been installed and tested, software had been selected and some training of CINCPAC operators had been accomplished. However, software problems revealed during initial testing had been serious enough to delay the start of the experiment until mid-July 1978. Limited experimental use (LEU) began on 27 July 1978. The LEU permitted training within the participating Directorate for Operations staff elements to develop procedures and gain experience in the use of the MME.2

1. CINCPAC 272311Z Dec 79 (U).
(U) Because of hardware and software instability, the initiation of full experimental use (FEU) of the project did not commence as scheduled on 15 January 1979. On 14 February during a Steering Group Committee meeting in Washington, plans were made for a disc system upgrade in April and a software system upgrade in May. FEU of the MME began on 22 February 1979. The objective during the FEU phase was for participating users to rely upon the MME as their primary source of message handling support, retaining the paper system both as a fallback capability and to meet requirements which could not be met with the automated system. The MME ended on 30 September 1979, having produced quantitative data to be utilized in assessing the effectiveness of automated message handling systems. The MME equipment was shipped to the University of Southern California on 12 October 1979; at the end of the year, a seven-volume final report was being prepared by the agencies involved in MME.1

1. J631 HistSums Jan and Feb (U); J63A HistSum Oct 79 (U).
CHAPTER VII
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
SECTION I--GENERAL

Revision of Security Assistance Policy Directives

(U) In August 1978 the JCS forwarded an Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (OASD/ISA) draft revision of the 20 December 1972 DOD Directive 5132.3, "Department of Defense Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance" to unified commanders for review. The proposed revision removed both the JCS and the unified commander from the policy, planning, and decision-making role in security assistance matters. This would be replaced by a requirement to merely "keep informed" and "assist when required and practicable." CINCPAC took strong exception to the draft revision and provided extensive line-in/line-out recommendations. CINCPAC also addressed conflict between the role of the unified commander and the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) as expressed in the August 1978 revision to DOD Directive 5105.38 "Defence Security Assistance Agency." This latter instruction had apparently been issued without JCS coordination and also preempted the CINCs' assigned functions to supervise and direct the organization, functions, and staffing of the MAAGs. CINCPAC held the view that "the unified commander is uniquely qualified to correlate security assistance plans and programs within his area of responsibility. Further, he must actively participate in the development of those programs in order to discharge his regional responsibilities within the defense establishment." Admiral Weisner concluded his personal view to the Chairman of the JCS by stating "...I am ready to participate further to any degree necessary to ensure that this issue is resolved properly." The Chairman noted CINCPAC concerns and advised that efforts were underway to incorporate CINCPAC recommendations in both directives.  

(U) A second draft of 5132.3 was sent in March 1979. While incorporating many of the CINCPAC recommendations, it still did not define the role of the JCS and unified commanders adequately and CINCPAC iterated previously suggested changes to the Chairman. The Chairman's response enjoined CINCPAC to furnish specific examples of how the unified commanders' authority would


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be limited by the provisions under the second draft. In addition to supplying the requested examples in a July message to the JCS, CINCPAC pointed out the legislative basis for unified commanders retaining the policy, planning, and decision-making roles. It was CINCPAC's position that these functions did not rest solely with the Ambassador as spelled out in section 515(E) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, but that the conduct of security assistance programs was vested as well with the Secretary of Defense under section 623 of the FAA and section 42(D) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). Moreover, a joint State/Defense May 1978 message had reaffirmed this position and provided for DOD component assistance to the Secretary of Defense in performing these responsibilities. Historically, CINCPAC noted, the line of responsibility and channel of communications had included the unified commander and should continue to do so. By a third message to the Chairman, Admiral Weisner outlined the "widely disparate needs and capabilities" of PACOM countries and the CINCPAC involvement in all substantive security assistance matters which would be lost under the second revision.1

(U) On 3 August the third draft of DOD Directive 5132.3 was transmitted by the JCS. While not fully incorporating the CINCPAC views, it did give sufficient authority to continue active involvement by the unified commander. The CINCPAC 18 August message, which concurred in this latest version, stressed the necessity for deleting paragraph D.1.0. from DOD Directive 5105.38 in order to eliminate apparent or implied conflict between DSAA and CINCPAC roles in supervising security assistance matters in PACOM. This change was predicated upon approval of DOD Directive 5132.3 which, as 1979 ended, was still undergoing review in OASD/ISA.2

Release of Advanced Technology and Weapons within PACOM

(U) During the PACOM Security Assistance Conference in November 1978, State and Defense Department representatives had emphasized the need for complete justification of host country FMS requests for defense articles and services. CINCPAC J4 had presented the conference a comparison of existing State Department and JCS guidance (which were at times conflicting) and proposed a single format for use by Country Teams in developing the necessary analysis and justification for evaluating host country requests. Following the conference, CINCPAC forwarded the proposal for review by the JCS.

1. J452 HistSum Mar 79 (U); CINCPAC 272040Z Mar 79 (U); Op.Cit., J454 Point Paper (U) 15 Nov 79; J454 HistSum Jul 79 (U); CINCPAC 072254Z and 072256Z Jul 79 both (B) and DECL 7 Jul 83.
with the recommendation that it be considered for implementation as a joint State/Defense format. Throughout 1979 the proposal remained under review by the JCS. However, JCS interest in the issue was revitalized at the 1979 PACOM Security Assistance Conference and by early 1980 the CINCPAC proposal had been forwarded to OSD/ISA for staffing.1

(U) Meanwhile, in June 1979, CINCPAC Instruction 5050.14, "Release of Advanced Technology and Weapons within PACOM" was republished in an unclassified version and incorporated the proposed single justification format. The new instruction established procedures for evaluation of all requests for Planning and Budgetary (P&B) data, Price and Availability (P&A), and Letters of Offer/Acceptance (LOAs) in order to assess the impact which release of requested significant combat equipment and services would have on U.S. military objectives in PACOM. The instruction tasked PACOM security assistance organizations to review host country requests according to the prescribed methodology and to forward results to the Department through appropriate channels, including CINCPAC. Evaluations of the "Financing Proposed by the Requestor" and "Human Rights" issues were not to be included since these fell within the country Ambassador's purview and were not necessarily military considerations. The CINCPAC instruction also provided that a PACOM Review Board, composed of representatives from major CINCPAC staff elements and component commands, would convene when appropriate to develop a PACOM position on the country request and justification. This position would then be submitted to the JCS for review as the military input and subsequently forwarded via the Secretary of Defense to the State Department for final determination on the release of the requested technology or weapons.2

Security Assistance Reporting Requirements

(U) Under the new security assistance reporting procedures instituted in July 1978 by a joint State/Defense message, an Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance (AIASA) was to be submitted by Country Teams to the State Department with information copies to OSD, the JCS, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), USAID, and unified commanders by 1 May each


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year. The Joint Staff was to review and consolidate these worldwide sub-
missions into two new documents in the Joint Strategic Planning System—the
Joint Security Assistance Memorandum (JSAM) and the Joint Security Assistance
Memorandum Supporting Analysis (JSAMSA). The JSAM and the JSAMSA would be
used by OSD and JCS representatives in interagency zero-based budget deliber-
ations as expressions of military views on security assistance program funding
and manning levels. The JSAM included:

- Security assistance objectives and general priori-
ties used in the assessment of individual country programs.

- A description and evaluation of the budget year
program which would be addressed by the interagency deliber-
ations of the Arms Export Control Board (AECB).

- A worldwide ranking table of alternate funding levels
for each country by type funding; i.e., International Military
Education and Training (IMET), Military Assistance Program
(MAP), and Foreign Military Sales (FMS).

- An assessment of and recommendations on manning
levels of overseas security assistance organizations.

(U) The JSAMSA provided the supporting analysis of individual country
security assistance funding levels proposed for inclusion in the JSAM. It was
based on the Country Team AIIASA input and the recommendations of the Unified
Command, Joint Staff, and the Services. The JSAMSA included regional over-
views, security assistance objectives, and priorities. Also, the JSAMSA
contained descriptions, objectives, overviews, and assessments for individual
country security assistance programs.

(U) General guidance for the submission of country reports was contained
in the above July 1978 message. More specific guidance for the upcoming bud-
get year plus two subsequent years (FY 81-83) submissions was furnished in
March 1979 by another State/Defense message and a JCS memo. Australia,
Bangladesh, Burma, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Singapore and Sri Lanka submitted reports during April and
May 1979, and the report from Thailand arrived in June. Afghanistan did not

1. SECSTATE 167901/0102152 Jul 78 (S); GDS-84; J453 Point Paper (U), 7 Feb
80, Subj: JSAM and JSAMSA.
2. J4/Memo/TS553-80 of 14 July 79 (U), Subj: 1979 CINCPAC Command History;
review of draft.

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recommend a program for FY 81 because of the in-country situation. No submission was received from New Zealand. On 26 May CINCPAC forwarded the PACOM prioritized listing of MAP, FMS financing, and IMET funding and manning levels to the JCS. The listings were annotated according to the prescribed minimum, intermediate, basic (current), first, and second incremental levels. In general, CINCPAC concurred with the individual country submissions and recommended only minor modifications.¹

Training

PACOM Tri-Service Training Workshop

(U) The annual PACOM tri-service training workshop was held from 19 to 23 March 1979 at the Naval Reserve Center in Honolulu, Hawaii. The workshop was attended by 70 representatives from the Defense Department, the Military Departments, Service training commands, CINCPAC, CINCPAC components, and PACOM security assistance organizations. In addition to conducting a review of annual first plan-year training requirements for each of the PACOM countries' IMET and FMS programs, panel discussions were held which resolved a number of training issues and problems. Significant among these were the administrative and foreign student processing problems caused by the non-receipt of IMET MAP orders or the authority to issue invitational travel orders. Another problem area was correspondence course charges. Prior to FY 80 a large number of foreign students had participated in Service correspondence courses free of charge. When charges were instituted, FMS funding was the only authorized payment and student enrollment dropped significantly. As a partial solution to the declining enrollment it was suggested that selected professional military and mid-management courses be offered on an IMET basis. A third major concern was expressed by country training representatives over the frequent tuition price increases for training at Military Service schools in CONUS. It was recommended that budget year Military Articles and Services List prices as distributed to PACOM countries remain firm throughout that fiscal year and, if necessary, any changes should be published before or at the annual tri-service training workshop.²

Foreign Student Training under IMET

(U) Starting in 1975 GAO and Congressional interests in recoupment of all foreign student training costs had caused tuition prices to increase

¹ SECSTATE 077582/282233Z Mar 79 (S), E.O. 12065 N/A; CINCPAC 090310Z Jun 79 (S), DECL 8 Jun 85, which cites JCS Memo of 30 Mar 79; J45 HistSums May 79 (U).
² J452 HistSum Mar 79 (U); CINCPAC Ltr Ser 909 of 9 Apr 79 (U), Subj: Summary of Pacific Command Tri-Service Training Workshop Activities.

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at a significantly faster rate than in preceding years. During the ensuing years several studies had been conducted by CINCPAC to assess the effects on host countries and to instigate measures to reduce the impact of increases. The primary means of offsetting price escalation was to increase overall IMET allocations and to increase emphasis on host country cost-sharing.¹

The subject also surfaced at the 1978 PACOM Security Assistance Conference where country representatives contended that the increased costs had in fact impacted adversely on host country training. In another attempt to define and quantify the impact, CINCPAC solicited information from concerned commands in late January 1979. A February JCS Memorandum formally requested that unified commands provide statistical data and responses to questions relating to current Grant Aid and FMS training course tuition pricing procedures. The CINCPAC 15 May response to the JCS combined country responses to both the CINCPAC and JCS taskings and provided the following analysis. The overall IMET participation in PACOM decreased by 1,011 students between FY 75 and FY 79—a reduction of 55.25 percent. Such losses could not be fully recouped even if IMETP funds were restored the following year. Course cost escalation increased IMETP investment per student by 216 percent and significantly reduced host country flexibility to meet IMET training needs through cost-sharing initiatives. Escalating prices had also reduced attendance at U.S. staff colleges and management courses. CINCPAC recommended that tuition prices be rolled back to FY 77 levels in order to respond to immediate training needs and that current pricing guidelines be reevaluated. Timely provision of better rationale would improve host-country understanding of pricing policies and increases. CINCPAC also requested that consideration be given to providing training at Service staff colleges on a no-cost quota basis in order to release funds for managerial/technical courses.²

Shortly thereafter Admiral Weisner solicited the Service Chiefs' support of the CINCPAC 15 May position regarding the rollback of tuition prices and the reevaluation of current pricing guidelines. He stressed the fact that the IMETP was the most cost-effective means available to maintain favorable relationships with strategically important PACOM countries. Commander in Chief Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF) and Commander, U.S. Army Western Command (CDRWESTCOM) also requested the personal assistance of their respective Service Chiefs to use all available channels to influence reevaluation of tuition pricing policies that had caused escalating tuition fees, IMET reduc-

tions, and exclusion of attendance of Asian students at West Point. In a September message CINCPAC again expressed continuing concern to the JCS over the upward spiraling of tuition costs. The message pointed out disparities in the pricing of similar courses between Services and the training offered at the same location, and differences between IMETP and FMS tuition costs. The JCS response advised that the subject had been discussed with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and that DOD, the Military Departments, and the Joint Staff would continue to seek solutions to the problems.¹

Recoupment of Retroactive FMS Costs

(U) The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Section 21) had directed that "After September 30, 1976, letters of offer for the sale of defense articles or for the sale of defense services that are issued pursuant to this section or pursuant to section 22 of this Act shall include appropriate charges for...administrative services...and any use of plant and production equipment in connection with such defense articles..." This legislation included charges for such defense services as quality assurance and asset use of U.S.-owned plant and production equipment. Implementation of this policy in these two areas, however, had been delayed.

Asset Use Charges

(U) In early March 1979 OASD/ISA announced that a one percent asset use charge would be added to the materiel base price for host country use of U.S. Government-owned plant and production equipment. The 30 September 1979 billing statements to FMS customers would reflect charges for shipments from DOD inventories reported after 1 June 1979 on FMS cases offered on or after 1 October 1976. The same message stated that after the development of the necessary historical cost data, DSAA would determine the feasibility of obtaining a Congressional waiver for the retroactive charges for deliveries prior to 1 June 1979. However, In June the Secretary of Defense advised that no waiver would be sought since the worldwide asset use charges amounted to only $8.8 million and a 1 June GAO report to Congress (B-174901) had recommended against granting a waiver.²

¹ CINCPAC 262141Z May 79 (U); CINCPACAF 232330Z Jul 79 (U); CDRWESTCOM 300200Z Nov 79 (U), DECL 30 Nov 85; CINCPAC 222130Z Sep 79 (U); JCS 2376/ 011353Z Oct 79 (U).
² SECDEF 4971/061506Z Mar 79 (U); SECDEF 5483/122055Z Jun 79 (U).
(U) CINCPAC refuted this rationale by citing the adverse impact which collection of three years' retroactive charges would have on the budgets of several PACOM nations as well as on U.S.-host country relationships in general. Since the failure to collect these charges earlier lay solely with the U.S. Government, CINCPAC recommended that a waiver from Congress still be considered. Should such an avenue fail, then a more lenient collection schedule was requested. Although declining to seek the waiver or to revise payment schedules, the 27 June SECDEF response did state that "...flexibility will be exercised should a country experience difficulty in making prompt payment." Nevertheless, the retroactive asset use charges were billed on the 30 September 1979 billing statement.1

Quality Assurance Charges

(U) A Government Accounting Office report of 22 March 1979 (B-165731) had stated that the U.S. Government had absorbed approximately $370 million in quality assurance costs which should have been charged to FMS customers during the previous six fiscal years. The GAO report attributed the problem to the Office of the Secretary of Defense which lacked sufficient personnel to insure implementation of proper pricing policies by the Military Departments. The Military Departments in turn were responsible for identification of applicable contract items to the various Defense Contract Administration Services Regions (DCASRs) which performed the majority of the quality assurance. The DCASRs were then to submit charges to the Military Departments for billing of FMS customers.2

(U) On 28 June CINCPAC registered concern to the Secretary of Defense over the possibility that recovery of these additional costs from FMS customers would further erode U.S. credibility as an arms supplier. CINCPAC pointed out again that failure to assess and collect these charges previously had been due to neglect on the part of the U.S. Government. Therefore, FMS customers should not be penalized and incur fiscal difficulties resulting from after-the-fact unanticipated charges. Moreover, since costs to compute the charges would undoubtedly be passed on to FMS customers as higher administrative surcharges, CINCPAC recommended that SECDEF seek a Congressional waiver to preclude collection of retroactive quality assurance costs. On 16 July SECDEF stated that the impact on the FMS customer was still under review and that CINCPAC would be advised when an assessment and course of action

1. CINCPAC 201933Z Jun 79 (U); SECDEF 1004/271514Z Jun 79 (U).
could be determined. No further action on the subject occurred during 1979.\textsuperscript{1}

Security Assistance Overseas Personnel

(U) The International Security Assistance Act (ISAA) of 1976 had established, inter alia, guidelines for the eventual termination of MAP grant aid worldwide, the reduction of personnel assigned to security assistance worldwide, and continued gradual reductions of security assistance monetary levels. For example, during 1978 Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group Korea (JUSMAGK) had been the subject of both GAO and DOD manpower surveys. Here the focus had been primarily on reduction of the number of Armed Forces personnel performing advisory and training functions by substituting detailed teams and interpretation of the terms "advisory" versus "assistance" duties in the light of existing legislation (ISAA of 1976).\textsuperscript{2}

(\textcolor{red}{\textsc{\textsuperscript{\textbullet}}}) As part of this continuing effort by the Administration to reduce U.S. personnel based overseas, CINCPAC received the following JCS tasking in September 1979:\textsuperscript{3}

The President has asked for a special FY 1981 zero base budget (ZBB) review of all overseas positions covered by the Monitoring Overseas Direct Employment (MODE) system. The object of this review is to identify potential ways to reduce the number of U.S. citizens stationed abroad. OMB has tasked DOD with assessing the impact of reducing manning of the overseas security assistance management organizations. OMB has indicated that the object of this review is not a uniform decrement on an across-the-board basis, but rather a serious effort to analyze functions to determine if reductions can be made.

The tasking also requested a review of the impact reductions to 95, 90, 80, and 70 percent would have on the FY 81 CINCPAC manning request. The PACOM review covered seven countries addressed in the Joint Security Assistance Memorandum (India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand) plus Australia, all of which were under the CINCPAC chain of command. The CINCPAC response pointed out that from 1977 to 1980 these countries had suffered an overall manning reduction of 37.5 percent while the dollar value of the security assistance programs in these countries had

\textsuperscript{1} CINCPAC 282234Z Jun 79 (C), DECL 26 Jun 85; SECDEF 4702/161737Z Jul 79 (U).
\textsuperscript{3} JCS 7984/062322Z Sep 79 (C), DECL 6 Sep 85.
increased by 127 percent. CINCPAC felt that additional manpower reductions might require some relief from functions legislated under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The message to the JCS also outlined the magnitude of security assistance management functions in each country and the possible degradation in development of host country self-sufficiency, as well as the sensitivities surrounding our commitments in the Pacific. Therefore, in order to maintain maximum cost-effective manning for host country security assistance programs, CINCPAC strongly urged careful joint assessment on a country-by-country basis before any reductions, as implied by the OMB review, were directed.

(S/NOFOR) Shortly thereafter, policy level representatives from all U.S. agencies with personnel stationed overseas met to discuss the findings of presidentially-directed State/Office of Management and Budget teams which visited various embassies in May 1979, and to prepare a list of issues for presentation to the President during the FY 81 budget review. Subsequently, CINCPAC was tasked by the JCS to prepare responses to the following questions:

- Should Defense Attache Offices (DAO) and Defense Cooperation (ODC) offices be consolidated in additional diplomatic missions abroad?
- Should official aircraft attached to diplomatic missions be reduced or eliminated?

Regarding the consolidation issue, CINCPAC contended that, although DAOs were responsible for security assistance matters in 9 of the 16 PACOM nations, these programs represented less than 13 percent of the regional total. Moreover, should these security assistance responsibilities increase, both missions might suffer.

(S/NOFOR) The foregoing rationale also applied to the retention of security assistance aircraft in Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. CINCPAC disagreed with the State/OMB position that too much flight

1. J454 HistSum Sep 79 (S), DECL 17 Oct 85; CINCPAC 260220Z Sep 79 (C), DECL 20 Sep 85; ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 043/280050Z Sep 79 (S), DECL 27 Sep 85.
time was spent transporting high-level U.S. officials and their families; that rapid, modern transportation networks and private air charter existed in most countries; and that host country or U.S. military aircraft from nearby installations could be used. CINCPAC believed that elimination of the C-12A aircraft assigned in the four above-mentioned countries would significantly hamper security assistance responsibilities in outlying areas. Further, these PACOM nations did not have safe and efficient modern transportation facilities except in major cities, and neither air charter nor host government airlift could reasonably be expected to provide timely and cost-effective transportation.1

Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar

(U) The PASOLS Terms of Reference (TOR), which had been adopted at the 1978 seminar, established an organizational framework consisting of a Logistics Review Board (LRB), a Project Development Group (PDG), and a provision for ad hoc study groups. The PDG was to meet semi-annually and its purposes were to:

devvelop cooperative logistics projects for recommendation to the LRB for

1. CINCPAC 200330Z Oct 79 (S/MF), DECL 18 Oct 85.
2. CINCPAC 032239Z Mar 79 (U); J451 Point Paper (U), 29 Jun 79, Subj: Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)-1979; JCS 6311/242231Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 20 Apr 85; CINCPAC 181111Z May 79 (S), DECL 8 May 85; JCS 3842/292210Z May 79 (S), DECL 29 May 85; J451 HistSum Sep 79 (U).
bilateral or multilateral action, develop subsequent additions and deletions to the PASOLS TOR; and monitor and report on the status of study group projects as required.1

(U) At the PDG meeting held in Bangkok, Thailand, from 1 to 4 May 1979, 26 participants represented Australia, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the United States. Some of the topics discussed follow. Data exchange lists had not been provided to the PASOLS secretary although Korea furnished an example of the requested information. Due to the general concern over the worldwide energy/oil crisis, the PDG recommended the theme of "Defense Preparedness through Resource Management" for the 1979 PASOLS. A tentative agenda for the fall PASOLS was also developed.2

(U) The third PDG meeting, held in Canberra, Australia, 11 to 14 December, was sponsored by CINCPAC and hosted by the Australian Department of Defence. Nations represented were: Australia, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. The Group composed a list of 11 action items for the next meeting to be held in conjunction with the April 1980 PASOLS. Also the Group determined that joint use of or sequential visits by U.S. mobile training teams (MTT) to neighboring PACOM countries would be a feasible means of reducing training costs. Members were to submit their proposed FY MTT schedules to the PASOLS secretary who would consolidate these lists and redistribute them for country review and utilization. The CINCPAC Joint Petroleum Officer (JPO) delivered a presentation on the "Pacific Command AVGAS Resupply Posture" which related to the theme of the postponed 1979 PASOLS (see above). As a result of PDG recommendations, the CINCPAC JPO was to consolidate several participants' annual requirements for AVGAS on a one-time basis and to request identification of potential production and crude sources by the Defense Fuel Supply Center.3

PACOM Security Assistance Conference

(U) The annual PACOM Security Assistance Conference was held 13 to 15 November 1979 at Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii. Attendees included senior representatives from the CINCPAC staff, component commands, PACOM security assistance organizations, the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), the Departments of State and Defense, the JCS, and Military

1. Summary of Proceedings (U), Eighth Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar, 20 Oct 78.
2. J452 HistSum May 79 (U).
Unclassified

Departments in Washington, D.C. Presentations from the Washington community and chiefs of the PACOM security assistance organizations provided insights on the direction that U.S. policy would take in the next decade and perspectives on the implementation of security assistance programs.¹

(U) In his keynote address, the Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) stated that the qualitative thrust of the arms transfer policy in PACOM was to not upset the regional balance through the introduction of advanced weapons and a desire to protect our technology from compromise as the key factors affecting FMS sales in PACOM. Funding, however, was the major constraint to the security assistance program, and in terms of real buying power, the budget was declining at least 10 percent per year. Informal sessions resulted in an exchange of views regarding such issues as manning, channels of communication, funding, and arms transfer considerations. A list of 22 key action items was developed during the proceedings for follow-up by responsible agencies. Significant among these were:²

- Expansion of the one-year limitation on open-end cases to two or three years to reduce the administrative burden.

- Implementation of a CINCPAC proposal to consolidate DOD and State formats for evaluation of host country weapon systems and technology requests.

- Worldwide study by DISAM of the impact of escalating tuition prices on FMS and IMET student levels.

(U) Conference closing remarks by the CINCPAC Chief of Staff emphasized the three principal CINCPAC concerns in the security assistance program—reinstatement of the unified commander in the security assistance chain (vis-a-vis DOD Directive 5132.3); improved IMET funding levels for PACOM countries in the face of escalating tuition costs; and relief from legislated functions should manpower reductions continue.³

1. CINCPAC 010053Z Dec 79 (U); Executive Summary 1979 PACOM Security Assistance Conference (U).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Unclassified

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### PACOM SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
#### FY 1980 PROGRAMMED ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS (IN THOUSANDS)
#### AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>CINCPAC MAE FUNDED</th>
<th>FOREIGN ASST ADMIN SERVICES</th>
<th>MILITARY DEPT SUPPORT</th>
<th>TOTAL U.S. COSTS</th>
<th>HOST COUNTRY COSTS</th>
<th>GRAND TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PACOM HQ</td>
<td>$ 566.4</td>
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<td>FMS AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>7.7</td>
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<td>483.3</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAO BURMA</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODC INDIA</td>
<td>116.9</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>218.3</td>
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<td>218.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDLG INDONESIA</td>
<td>379.7</td>
<td>429.4</td>
<td>872.3</td>
<td>1,631.4</td>
<td>$ 494.8</td>
<td>2,176.2</td>
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<td>MDO JAPAN</td>
<td>747.1</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>219.0</td>
<td>1,024.0</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>1,115.4</td>
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<td>39.2</td>
<td>3,852.7</td>
<td>7,543.1</td>
<td>620.5</td>
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<td>13.3</td>
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<td>DAO NEPAL</td>
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<td>DAO NEW ZEALAND</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
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<td>ODE PAKISTAN</td>
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<td>80.2</td>
<td>238.2</td>
<td>532.5</td>
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<td>532.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>JUSMAG THAILAND</td>
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<td>53.8</td>
<td>1,101.4</td>
<td>1,823.1</td>
<td>1,249.1</td>
<td>3,072.2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 6,414.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 729.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 8,309.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>$15,916.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 3,652.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>$18,568.0</strong></td>
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</table>

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (S/ME), p. 29, REW 16 Feb 80.

*Contributed currency is paid directly to the U.S. Government to offset U.S. costs and, therefore, is a non-add item.
### PACOM Country Security Assistance Program
(.in thousands of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FMS Credit</th>
<th>MAP (Grant Materiel)</th>
<th>IMETP (Grant Training)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expended</td>
<td>Allocated</td>
<td>Proposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY 79</td>
<td>FY 80&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>FY 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1,814</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>1,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>15,600</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>310,100</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>315,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**a.** Continuing Resolution Authority levels.

**b.** Supply operations only.

**c.** For supply operations for delivery of previously-funded materiel in pipeline.

**NOTE:** Source for FY 79 figures is Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Dec 79 (U); Source for FY 80 and FY 81 figures is SECSTATE 29861/021814Z Feb 80, and FY 81 Congressional Presentation Document.
SECTION II--COUNTRY PROGRAMS

Australia

Foreign Military Sales

Foreign Military Sales for Australia for FY 79 totaled $111 million. Of this amount $3.3 million was spent on CONUS training for 243 Australian military and civilian students. Three guided missile frigates (of the FFG-7 class) being constructed in the United States for the Royal Australian Navy during 1979, were scheduled for delivery between 1980 and 1982 at a total cost of approximately $179 million. Each was to be assigned two on-board helicopters plus one based on shore, but because neither the manufacturer nor the model had been selected, their delivery date could not be anticipated. Acquisition of HARPOON air-to-surface missiles for the ships was initiated in 1979. Other major purchases during the year included follow-on MK-48 torpedoes and STANDARD ARM missiles.1

Tactical Fighter Force Acquisition Program

For a number of years Australian Department of Defence (ADOD) officials had been studying possible replacement for the 75 French MIRAGE aircraft purchased in the 1960s. As of 28 October 1978 the list of contenders included the U.S. F-18A, F-18L, F-16, and the French MIRAGE 2000. On 21 November 1979 Australian Defence Minister Killen announced to Parliament that the two remaining contenders were the U.S. Navy F-18A and Air Force F-16. The anticipated schedule for acquisition was in three increments of 25 each and a signed LOA during the first quarter of FY 81. Delivery of the first two aircraft was scheduled in December 1983. Australian industry was expected to participate in a large offset program and local part production.2

AUSTRALIA (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAN AREA</td>
<td>7,692,200 Sq Km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS</td>
<td>3 Nautical Miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISHING ZONE</td>
<td>12 Nautical Miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE</td>
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<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANNUAL GROWTH</td>
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<tr>
<td>LITERACY RATE</td>
<td>98.5 Percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIFE EXPECTANCY</td>
<td>71 Years</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA</td>
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<tr>
<td>GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA</td>
<td>$ 66.2 Billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEFENSE BUDGET</td>
<td>$ 2.9 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET</td>
<td>4.7 Percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES (U)

Provide support to the Australian Ministry of Defense to strengthen their military capability to defend against possible external threats and contribute to regional defense.

Maintain and strengthen contacts between host country and U.S. military personnel. Foster favorable attitudes toward the U.S. and encourage pursuit of military objectives compatible with U.S. interests and strategy.

Enable defense of contiguous airspace/sea areas and sea/air routes.

Develop close relationships with military forces of other allied or friendly nations encouraging regional cooperation.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (SY/N), p. 60,
REW 16 Feb 80.
India's IMET Program had grown from $56,300 in FY 75 to $450,000 in FY 79. FMS to India had averaged $1.5 million annually and had been used primarily for spare parts to support previously-acquired U.S. transport aircraft, an air defense radar system (STAR SAPPHIRE), and an air defense communications network (PEACE INDIGO). U.S. military interest in India was to assure that India continued to be a source of regional stability. This was particularly true at the end of 1978 and throughout 1979 when unrest and violence were dominant in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The U.S. Embassy in New Delhi noted that, with the advent of the Desai government in 1977, India had begun a diversification of military supply sources with corresponding diminishing dependence on the Soviet Union. After the 6 October decision to purchase the British Jaguar aircraft, India showed increased interest in procuring arms from the West. This interest coincided with a GOI five-year plan of military force expansion/modernization with an estimated cost of $4 million in new arms purchased. The U.S. Embassy believed that the United States should be among the Western nations providing limited amounts of military equipment to India. Within the context of military training and commercial sales, the Embassy had recommended a carefully orchestrated and highly selective program of FMS.

While CINCPAC also favored the sale of some military equipment to India, as requests for specific items surfaced throughout early 1979, it appeared that CINCPAC and the JCS often were not being included in the decision-making process. On several occasions CINCPAC observed that items which had been approved for sale to India lacked appropriate military analysis and that the January 1979 State Department policy of "evenhandedness" towards India and Pakistan in the sale of arms was not being applied.

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1. CINCPAC 272004Z Jul 79 (£), DECL 23 Jul 85; CINCPAC 272005Z Jul 79 (£).
   DECL 14 Jul 83.
2. J474 HistSum Mar 79 (£), DECL 2 Apr 85; SECSTATE 47530/271945Z Feb 79 (£),

-CONFIDENTIAL-

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The GOI LOA request for 60 TOW ground launchers, 3,724 missiles, associated items and appropriate spares was forwarded by the Embassy on 2 November. The GOI also called for "detailed discussions, particularly on aspects relating to guaranteed supply of spares and maintenance support of the equipment as training items before the contract is finalized." The following day a State/Defense message authorized the Department of the Army to prepare the LOA and to provide the applicable evaluation and notification.

1. CINCPAC 2720042 Jul 79 (S), DECL 23 Jul 85; CINCPAC 1303332 Aug 79 (S), DECL 8 Aug 85; CINCPAC 2421152 Aug 79 (S), DECL 17 Aug 85; AMEMB New Delhi 16275/0712502 Sep 79 (S), GDS 9/7/85.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1978 (TS/ERD), Vol. II, pp. 408-410; The TOW antitank missile is a tube launched, optically tracked, wire commanded, link guided missile.
3. J474 HistSum Jun 79 (S), DECL 9 Jul 85; AMEMB New Delhi 10615/1812292 Jun 79 (S), E.O. 12065 N/A.
data required under Section 36(B) of the AECA as soon as possible. As 1979 closed Congressional approval was pending on the case.1

1. J474 HistSum Nov 79 (C), DECL 10 Dec 85; AMEMB New Delhi 20111/021154Z Nov 79 (C), GDS 11/2/85; SECDEF 3525/030217Z Nov 79 (C), DECL 2 Nov 85.
2. J474 HistSum Nov 79 (C), DECL 10 Dec 85; AMEMB New Delhi 13753/031151Z Aug 79 (C), XDS-3 8/1/87; AMEMB Islamabad 8948/090450Z Aug 79 (C), RDS-3 8/5/87 SECSTATE 3910/060321Z Jan 79 (C), GDS 1/5/85.
In early January 1979 the GOI requested P&A data for a one-time buy of from 25,000 to 35,000 rounds of 106mm recoilless rifle (RR) HEAT ammunition. The U.S. Embassy recommended early approval and delivery of this standard item because the United States had sold the weapons to India in the 1960s and because India apparently had experienced a recent in-country production shortfall. The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) (the DA manager for FMS sales) advised that cost per round would be $180 and the order would require 18 months' lead time. Shortly thereafter the GOI, via the Embassy in

New Delhi, requested information on accelerated delivery of 10,000 rounds. During the ensuing months, attempts were made to obtain substitute types of ammunition to facilitate early delivery.  

Late in May however, when it was determined that the 10,000 rounds of RR ammunition could be delivered prior to the end of 1979, USASAC advised the Embassy that the cost per round would be $359.47. In early June, the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) India, the U.S. Ambassador, CINCPAC, and DA called for a review of costing methodology to explain the 100 percent price escalation, especially in view of the fact that one of the suggested substitutes could be procured at $143 per round. The ODC felt that GOI would view the increase as a turn-down of the request and that this would not "only undermine GOI faith in the FMS program, but also tarnish currently improving relations with the Indian military." Moreover the ODC questioned the validity and usefulness of the P&AA system if cost disparities of such magnitude were customary. The Ambassador also pointed out that this FMS case (ULT) had become a bellwether of the new U.S. arms transfer policy with India. Consequently GOI Ministry of Defense officials, especially those already skeptical of U.S. sincerity, might have second thoughts about relying on the United States for even relatively mundane military items. It was the Ambassador's opinion that such mishandling could cause considerable damage to U.S. long-range credibility. Meanwhile CINCPAC believed incorrect costing methodology had been used in determining the $359.47 figure and cited the similarity of FMS case UGY-Philippines, where reexamination had resulted in a significant unit price reduction. CINCPAC requested that like procedures be used to develop a more accurate unit price for the 106mm RR HEAT ammunition. Later in June, after the U.S. Embassy had relayed GOI dismay over the delay in resolving the price issue, and after corrective costing procedures had been effected, USASAC announced the new, revised price per round would be $136. The LOA for 35,000 rounds was implemented as of 27 September 1979 at a total cost of $5,400,075.2

155mm Towed Howitzer

Initial notice of GOI interest in purchasing the 155mm towed howitzer (M-198) was received from the USDAO New Delhi on 17 April 1979. Once again

1. J474 HistSum May 79 (C), DECL 8 Jun 85; AMEB New Delhi/ODC 583/101227Z Jan 78 (U); AMEB New Delhi 760/121345Z Jan 79 (C), GDS 1/12/85; CDRUSASAC 181710Z Jan 79 (U); AMEB New Delhi 2309/091201Z Feb 79 (U).
2. CDRUSASAC 291807Z May 79 (U); J474 HistSum Jun 79 (C), DECL 9 Jul 85; AMEB New Delhi/ODC 9571/011315Z Jun 79 (C), GDS 23 Feb 85; AMEB New Delhi 9659/041308Z Jun 79 (C), GDS 6/4/85; CINCPAC 092229Z Jun 79 (C), DECL 7 Jun 85; AMEB New Delhi/ODC 10975/221129Z Jun 79 (U); CDRUSASAC 261805Z Jun 79 (U).
the GOI wished to ascertain through informal channels whether or not a request to purchase would be considered favorably by the U.S. Government before making a formal request through FMS channels. One week later the U.S. Embassy supported favorable consideration of the M-198 sale (together with appropriate ammunition) which would be used as a replacement weapon system for World War II vintage 5.5" howitzers. Since no new technology was involved, CINCPAC also recommended approval of an FMS sale to India for the 155mm howitzer and imposed no objection to the release of propellant charges and projectiles for conventional rounds. However, CINCPAC stated that release of other types of munitions (such as rocket-assisted projectiles (RAP) and improved conventional munitions (ICM)) would require further review. CINCPAC further observed:¹

GOI request for M-198 affords USG an excellent opportunity to demonstrate its responsiveness to legitimate Indian defense requests. Favorable action may serve to improve relations with India and further national interests in the subcontinent.

On 24 May the sale of a "reasonable number" of M-198 howitzers was approved by the State and Defense Departments. The State Department cautioned that there would be approximately 25 months' lead time from the implementation date of the LOA and advised that the ammunition question would be addressed separately. On 14 August, the GOI requested a three-month in-country test of the M-198. OASD/ISA directed the Department of the Army to prepare a lease agreement and an LOA for deployment of the necessary personnel, equipment, and ammunition for the test and advised the ODC that the demonstration model would not be available until late in December and the RAP munitions would not be used in the test. In December, after further ascertaining the GOI desires, arrangements were made by USASAC for the test period to commence on 15 February 1980.²

M-47 DRAGON Medium Antitank Weapon

Another informal inquiry was made by the GOI in late June 1979 for procurement of a new medium antitank weapon system. The U.S. Embassy reported that for some time the "...Indian Army was looking for an antitank weapon for

¹ J474 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 10 May 85; CINCPAC 272210Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 24 Apr 85.
² J474 HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 7 Feb 86; SECSTATE 131929/240059Z May 79 (S), GDS 5/23/85; AMEMB New Delhi (ODC) 14415/140628Z Aug 79 (S), GDS 13 Aug 85; SECDEF 2801/292149Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 32 Aug 85; CDRUSASAC 251930Z Jan 80 (U).
its mechanized infantry and armored units. The new wrinkle in the current request is that the GOI is seeking to replace old 106mm RR and up-grade its antitank capability with the DRAGON weapon system." In response to the customary JCS request for comments on such a proposed purchase, on 27 July CINCPAC deferred a recommendation and requested an area policy reassessment. On the same date CINCPAC asked the ODC to clarify the intended use of the M-47—was the GOI seeking a new antitank capability or, if it was to replace the World War II-vintage 106mm RR, why had the GOI requested P&A data a month previous for 250 106mm recoilless rifles? In the same message CINCPAC addressed other recurrent concerns. The M-47 would introduce a new capability into the sub-continent contrary to the arms transfer policy. Supplying it to India might erode relations with Pakistan as further evidence of not treating both nations in an even-handed manner and might prove inimical to future U.S. interests.1

Meanwhile, the State Department proceeded to staff the request as an exception to national policy and on 10 August advised that the production line of the M-47 was due to close on 1 December. This meant that if the GOI wished to obtain the M-47 at a favorable price, an LOA would have to be received by 25 August for presentation to Congress by 5 September. CINCPAC again pressed the JCS and the Embassy for a policy reassessment. The Chairman of the JCS agreed that "recent events...have generated renewed State/DOD interest in this subject," and might provide an opportunity for the desired reassessment. The Ambassador, however, maintained that current policy under PRMs 10 and 13 was adequate and that a reevaluation would take too much time and sacrifice good will and flexibility. The Embassy also stated that India's upgrade program was not a major expansion and would take place with or without U.S. help. In any case, it was not the time to change U.S. policy under the caretaker Indian Government. The M-47 matter had not been resolved at the end of the year.2

Other Weapons Inquiries

(U) During 1979 various GOI MOD officials made inquiries about other weapons and equipment for possible procurement under FMS which are listed

1. J474 HistSum Jul 79 (S), DECL 9 Aug 85; AMEMB New Delhi 11203/261210Z Jun 79 (S), XDS-3; CINCPAC 272004Z Jul 79 (S), DECL 23 Jul 85; CINCPAC 272005Z Jul 79 (S), DECL 14 Jul 83; AMEMB New Delhi 11292/271201Z Jun 79 (S), XDS-3.
2. SECSTATE 208284/101826Z Aug 79 (S), GDS 7/31/85; J474 HistSum Aug 79 (S), DECL 10 Sep 85; CINCPAC 130333Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 8 Aug 85; JCS 3622/201303Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 14 Aug 85; J474 HistSum Oct 79 (U); AMEMB New Delhi 16275/071250Z Sep 79 (S), GDS 9/7/85.
(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA: 1,980,240 Sq Kms
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS: 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE: 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION: 143,938,200
ANNUAL GROWTH: 2.1 Percent
LITERACY RATE: 60 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY: 65 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA: 43 Acres
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (1977): $32 Billion
PER CAPITA: $310
DEFENSE BUDGET (1978 Est): $1.7 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET: 14.5 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT: Republic, Presidential
President: Dr. Suharto, Cabinet, Supreme Legislature
Minister of Defense: General Mohammad Jusuf
Minister of Finance: Dr. Mochtar
CINC Armed Forces: General Mohammad Jusuf
Deputy CINC Armed Forces: General Sudomo
Army Commander: General Widodo
Navy Commander: Admiral Sukito
Air Force Commander: Air Marshal Asman Tjahjadi
Commandant Marine Corps: General Rahni

(U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

U.S. Ambassador: HON. Edward E. Masters
USDAFT: COL. Joe W. Uttinger, USA
CHUSA: COL. William W. Tombaugh, USA

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (SYE), p. 64,
REV 16 Feb 80.
below. However, in the latter part of the year while the caretaker government of Prime Minister Charan Singh was in office, a "wait-and-see" attitude prevailed and no significant actions on these items transpired.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chukkar II RPV</td>
<td>SECSTATE approved, awaiting GOI request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-60 tank engine</td>
<td>SECSTATE approved, awaiting GOI request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockheed L-400 transport aircraft</td>
<td>SECSTATE approved, awaiting GOI request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-109A2 Test</td>
<td>Awaiting LOA preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 caliber machine-gun ammunition</td>
<td>Awaiting GOI request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALR-59</td>
<td>Approval for sale requested. No response received from SECSTATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALQ-125</td>
<td>Approval for sale requested. No response received from SECSTATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIM-9J-1 SIDEWINDER</td>
<td>SECSTATE approved, awaiting GOI request --GOI desires newer model</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ List "FMS India 1980" hand-carried by ODC India, 17 Mar 80 (U).
multiple sources throughout 1979. Acquisition, however, was complicated by several factors. Chief among these was limited funds—from both Indonesian sources and U.S. (security assistance) aid programs. Other difficulties included:  

- Use of non-budget sources (including profits from commercial enterprises owned and operated by various branches of the GOI military) for an undetermined portion of defense expenditures.

- Mismanagement in the GOI-owned Pertamina Oil Company (one of the above sources) in 1975-1977 had created a severe deficit in GOI funds and foreign credit which would burden the Indonesian economy for several years.

- Devaluation of the rupiah by 33.6 percent, the full effects of which were not yet evident during 1979.

- U.S. MAP grant aid was terminated on 30 September 1978.

- FMS credit was reduced from $40 million in FY 78 to $32 million in FY 79. Only $30 million was proposed for FY 80 and 81.

- IMET program funds were reduced by 35 percent from FY 78 to FY 79 while tuition price increases had averaged approximately 20 percent.

Ambassador Masters depicted this changing scene in his May Annual Integrated Security Assistance Assessment and stressed the importance to U.S. and allied interests of continuing support for Indonesia in order to maintain strategic air and sea lines of communication. In relating GOI perceptions of U.S. credibility, the Ambassador further stated:

Clear signals have been given recently that the GOI has reassessed U.S. performance as an arms supplier in light of recent Indochina events. They have expressed dissatisfaction which apparently extends from the President to operational

2. AMEMB Jakarta 6976/030230Z May 79 (S), GDS 5/3/87.
SECRET

levels…and centers not only on FY 79 and FY 80 credit levels but also on what Indonesians perceive to be slow and inadequate responses, through the FMS system, to their requests to purchase equipment and services...that lower level officers were frustrated with the time consuming, complicated, FMS procedures which posed constraints that could not be tolerated at the expense of force modernization.

Again in December the Ambassador summarized his concerns to the Secretary of State regarding proposed cuts in the various U.S. aid programs to Indonesia. He noted Indonesia's significance as the world's largest Muslim nation, as a source of basic raw materials, as a sanctuary for Indochinese refugees, as a frequent supporter of the U.S. international positions, and Indonesia's improved human rights situation. CINCPAC supported the Ambassador's comments in a message to the JCS and emphasized that "Further paring of the already lean security assistance programs...would clearly convey the wrong signal. In sum, we should attempt to 'hold the line' against any further cuts in security assistance programs." ¹

² In spite of chronic budgetary problems and in addition to specific items discussed below, ongoing discussions were held between various U.S. Country Team and Indonesian officials concerning a number of items on the GOI "wish list." In a May meeting with Ambassador Masters, Defense Minister General Jusuf pointed out that air transport in Indonesia was of "crucial" importance. Although the GOI had already purchased three C-130s for delivery in January 1980, the Minister wished to obtain from three to six more, plus three C-141s. He stated further that, if possible, the GOI would like to have U.S. assistance in funding these. Following consultations in Washington, in July the Ambassador told General Jusuf that it was not possible to purchase additional C-130s under FMS because funding was heavily committed to Indonesia's purchase of the F-5s (see below). Moreover, production lines for the C-141 were closed and the United States itself needed all those which had been produced. Additionally, the Ambassador advised that, after the United States had finished using them, little life would be left in the C-141s.²

During 1977 and 1978 the GOI had sought to coproduce M-16 rifles at a small arms factory in Bandung. Although appropriate export licensing had

1. AMEMB Jakarta 19866/140846Z Dec 79 (§), XDS-3 12/14/89; CINCPAC 280001Z Dec 79 (§), DECL 18 Dec 85.

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been obtained and funding arrangements were being worked out, financial constraints caused the GOI to drop the coproduction plan for the time being and place an order for M-16s with Colt Industries. In August 1979 the USDAO Jakarta noted that 30,000 M-16s had arrived in-country for use in the equipment upgrade program. The Indonesians also wanted to buy 750 utility jeeps during 1979 as part of the upgrade and to explore the possibility of a coproduction arrangement. In July the U.S. Ambassador advised General Jusuf that coproduction might be feasible but that it would be subject to licensing by the U.S. Office of Munitions Control, satisfactory arrangements with the manufacturer, and an appropriate agreement regarding disposal to third countries.¹

Overhaul of Indonesian Ships

(Deconfidential) Two of four ex-U.S. Navy CLAUDE JONES-class DEs were repaired at the U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility at Subic Bay in the Philippines in 1977 through MAP grant aid. Repairs for the other two DEs were a continuing discussion topic at various levels of the Indonesian Navy's hierarchy in 1978. However, with the termination of MAP on 30 September 1978 and continued GOI funding problems, the near-term outlook for repairs and overhaul was dim. In August 1979 the Indonesian Navy developed a $52 million proposal for overhaul of 16 ex-U.S. Navy ships at Subic over a three-year period using FMS credit if the funding could be obtained. In October CINCPAC advised that a certain sequence of events was necessary to obtain Government of the Philippines (GOP) approval for the scheduling of the intended repairs after receipt of a formal request and before the tender of an LOA. However, in January 1980 a report from the U.S. Defense Attache Office (USDAO) in Jakarta indicated that the plans for the proposed overhaul had changed and only 14 ships (4 DEs, 8 LSTs, 1 AT, and 1 ARL) would be included in the package. The overhaul would be deferred until 1981 and as many as feasible would be overhauled at the Indonesian Naval Shipyard (PAL) in Surabaya. Plans also called for visits by U.S. teams to determine the scope of the project and PAL's capabilities, as well as preparation of a work package and a list of priorities.²

². J473 HistSum Sep 79 (U); CHUSDLG 200409Z Aug 79 (U); J473 HistSum Oct 79 (U); CINCPAC 132334Z Oct 79 (S), DECL 13 Oct 85; J473 HistSum Jan 80 (U); USDAO Jakarta 230154Z Jan 80 (U).
60 Battalion Upgrade

During a wide-ranging discussion in May 1979, the U.S. Embassy Jakarta and the U.S. Defense Liaison Group (USDLG), Indonesia were informed of GOI plans to upgrade the Indonesian Armed Forces. The GOI schedule called for replacement of basic infantry weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment for 60 battalions during 1979 and for upgrade of an additional 100 battalions the following year. This was to be a "three-pronged program for improving the welfare of the ordinary soldier, the forging of closer bonds between the armed forces and the people, and an improvement in the quality and readiness of all key army units." GOI Defense Minister General Jusuf stated that the GOI would try to obtain these materials by commercial means if necessary but would appreciate any assistance the United States could provide. Additional discussions with HANKAM officials took place in August, but no definitive requests were made at the time.1

(U) In October the U.S. Embassy passed a 16 line-item request for equipment in support of the first increment of the 60-battalion upgrade. The Embassy noted that the program was receiving great emphasis from all echelons of the GOI and urged that "priority attention" be given to processing the request for P&A data and LOAs. The Embassy felt that this request was to be a test of U.S. interest in Indonesia and of the responsiveness of the FMS system. The GOI wished to use both FMS credits and cash for the purchase, and if possible, to obligate any or all residual FMS credits accrued from the F-5 purchase from FY 80 and prior years. CINCPAC supported the request and USASAC took appropriate action to expedite the transaction by requiring preparation of the LOAs no later than 24 November. Meanwhile, it was found that one item was out of production, one was no longer supportable, but more importantly, adequacy of justification for procurement of certain other items under FMS was questioned by OASD/ISA. Two U.S. firms had advised OASD of negotiations with GOI officials for commercial sale of some of the 16 items. While several LOAs were being processed in late 1979, attempts were made to resolve the justification problems. However, in February 1980 the GOI formally notified the DLG that the upgrade would be accomplished by commercial means instead of FMS. The GOI and U.S. Country Team expressed their sincere appreciation for efforts by U.S. Government officials to fulfill their requests.2

2. J473 HistSum Oct 79 (S), DECL 8 Nov 85; AMEMB Jakarta 16567/170001Z Oct 79 (U); CINCPAC 200425Z Oct 79 (U); CDUSASAC 292030Z Oct 79 (U); J473 HistSum Nov 79 (U); CDUSASAC 021330Z Nov 79 (U); AARCML 211945Z Nov 79 (U); CHUSDLG Jakarta 080507Z Nov 79 (U); SECDEF 2497/311836Z Oct 79 (U); J473 HistSum Feb 80 (U); CHUSDLG 220900Z Feb 79 (U).
F-5 Aircraft

(-ts) During 1978 the Indonesian Air Force arranged for the purchase of 16 F-5 aircraft under FMS financing as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>8 F-5Es</th>
<th>4 F-5Fs</th>
<th>$85 million</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PEACE KOMODO I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEACE KOMODO II</td>
<td>4 F-5Es</td>
<td></td>
<td>22 million</td>
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Schedule dates called for delivery of eight F-5s in April 1980 and the remaining eight in July 1980. In addition, a separate LOA was issued for FMS training of instructor pilots, support personnel, and mobile training teams (MTT).

(ts) In March 1979 the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta forwarded a GOI request for 1,200 500-pound bombs, 404,800 rounds of 20mm ammunition, and 24 AIM-9J SIDEWINDER missiles to arm the 12 F-5Es. Because no new technology would be introduced and there would be no significant increase of combat capability in the region, CINCPAC recommended release of these armaments and the State Department granted approval for the cash sale. Delivery of the requested armaments was planned to coincide with, or closely follow, the arrival of the F-5s in-country. However, in August, Headquarters USAF advised that the earliest possible delivery date for the AIM-9J missiles would be July 1981 because all production until that date was committed to earlier FMS purchasers. Complications also arose with the delivery date of the second increment of eight F-5s. The price of the F-5s was based on a production run by Northrop of between 60 and 103 aircraft (including the 16 for Indonesia). With the cancellation of an Egyptian order for 50 in July, Northrop had the right to renegotiate the entire contract and a price increase could follow. Negotiations between the USAF and Northrop resulted in retention of the favorable price for FMS customers but allowed a reduction in the number of aircraft produced per month. Hence, delivery to customers would be delayed.2

2. J473 HistSum Feb 79 (U); AMEMB Jakarta 1998/070402Z Feb 79 (U); CINCPAC 100519Z Feb 79 (ts); DECL 9 Dec 85; J473 HistSum Mar 79 (U); SECSTATE 71085/2213562 Mar 79 (U); J473 HistSum Aug 79 (U); Hq USAF 021340Z Aug 79 (U); ASD WPAFB 031630Z Aug 79 (U); J473 HistSum Sep 79 (U); Hq USAF 042045Z Sep 79 (U); Washington Post, 7 Jul 79, pg. 2, "Egypt Will Get U.S. F-4 Jets," by George C. Wilson.
A-4 Aircraft

(U) In 1978 the GOI studied the feasibility of procuring A-4C SKYHAWK fighter bombers in order to fill the gap between the low-performance OV-10 observation aircraft and the supersonic F-5 interceptors (see above). The A-4Cs would be used primarily in an air-to-ground role in support of the Indonesian Army and could reach most parts of the archipelago. Although the A-4C was no longer in the active U.S. inventory, a number of surplus aircraft were in storage in a nonoperational status at Military Aircraft Surplus and Disposal Command, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. Various means of procurement through MAP, excess defense article (EDA) funds, and FMS credit terms were explored and the U.S. Navy prepared an LOA for 28 A-4Cs. However, the GOI formally advised that, because of budgetary constraints, the LOA could not be considered until April-June 1979. The U.S. Embassy Jakarta recommended that the LOA be held in abeyance until early 1979 and issued with an expiration date of not earlier than 30 June 1979.2

1. J473 HistSum Nov 79 (U); J473 HistSum Dec 79 (U); CHUSDLG 070904Z Dec 79 (U).

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1. J473 HistSum Mar 79 (S), DECL 7 May 85; AMEMB Jakarta 3818/120930Z Mar 79 (S), XDS-1 3/12/89; AMEMB Jakarta 4361/210910Z Mar (S), XDS-1 3/21/89; CINCPAC 170401Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 12 Mar 85.

2. J473 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 7 May 85; SECDEF 5107/142129Z Apr 79 (S). DECL 13 Apr 85; SECSTATE 98355/190415Z Apr 79 (E)(EX), GDS 4/16/85; J473 HistSum Aug 79 (S), DECL 8 Sep 85; CNO 242259Z Aug 79 (U).
1. CHUSDLG 130400Z Aug 79 (U); J473 HistSum Sep 79 (S), DECL 8 Oct 85; CHUSDLG 190822Z Sep 79 (U); J473 HistSum Oct 79 (C); DECL 8 Nov 85; AMEMB Jakarta 15820/030355Z Oct 79 (LOU); SECSTATE 270319/152012Z Oct 79 (C); GDS 10/15/85
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<td><strong>COMUS JAPAN</strong></td>
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<td><strong>CHIEF DATT</strong></td>
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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (UHS), p. 65.
REVW 16 Feb 80.
Japan

Overview of Fiscal Posture

Japan's defense budget was cited by most officials (U.S. and Japanese alike) as approximately one percent of the Gross National Product (GNP). Actually, it had hovered around nine-tenths of one percent for several years. Complicating the picture of actual expenditures was the considerable fluctuation in the dollar-yen rate of exchange. Early in 1979, the rate was around 200 yen per dollar. By the end of the year, the rate had risen to about 240. At that rate, the Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) 1979 defense budget of 2.094 trillion yen equated to approximately $8.7 billion. For JFY 80, the defense budget of 2.230 trillion yen was roughly $9.3 billion at the 240 yen exchange rate. While retaining the nine-tenths of one percent ratio to the GNP for both JFY 79 and 80, the $9.3 billion represented an increase for JFY 80 of 6.5 percent.

The JFY 78 defense budget had contained two precedent-setting policy decisions. One authorized the simultaneous initiation of two major acquisition programs from the United States—100 F-15s and 45 P-3C anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. The other authorized the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to project quantity purchases over a 10-11 year period unless a specifically fixed lesser period was stipulated.

The JFY 79 budget restored authorization to procure four E-2C airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft which had been dropped from the previous year's budget. However, actual approval to purchase these aircraft was delayed until both houses of the Japanese Diet had investigated charges of illegal ("kickback") activities involving the manufacturer, JDA officials, and politicians. Approval to proceed with E-2C procurement was given on 12 July 1979. Other features of the JFY 79 budget continued a trend of qualitative improvements in Self-Defense Force equipment. There were increases of 25 percent in ground war reserve munitions, 18 percent in research and development expenditures, 30 percent in military construction, and 26 percent for the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA). The DFAA increase of $105 million over the JFY 78 figure of $554 million was for Japanese cost-sharing activities.

1. COMUS Japan 020709Z Jan 80 (S),DECL 2 Jan 86.
Major military items in the JFY 80 budget included 34 F-15s, 10 P-3Cs, 60 M-74 tanks, 34 155mm self-propelled howitzers, 3 destroyers, 1 escort frigate, and Improved HAWK and NIKE missiles. Also in the JFY 80 budget was a communications buffer system to link the E-2C AEW aircraft with the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) air defense system.

After the F-15 and P-3C programs, the third largest military aircraft program in Japan was the procurement of the E-2C AEW aircraft. Ordered in 1979, two of the four were scheduled for delivery in 1982; the last two in 1983. At the end of 1979, projected major equipment procurement included:

- **Fighter Aircraft (F-15/McDonnell-Douglas).** 100 aircraft to be acquired over a 10-year period. JFY 78 budget request (1 Apr 78 - 31 Mar 79) included funding for 23 aircraft (8 FMS-2 F/6 TF), 8 commercial Knockdown Kits, and 7 follow-on materials for licensed production. Program continuation by licensed production. Initial delivery date FY 81.

- **Antisubmarine Warfare Aircraft (P-3C/Lockheed).** 45 aircraft to be acquired over an 11-year period. JFY 78 budget request included funding for 8 aircraft (3 FMS, 4 commercial Knockdown Kits, and 1 follow-on material for licensed production). Program continuation by licensed production. Initial delivery date FY 81.

- **Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (AEW).** AEW procurement dropped from JFY 78 budget request due to priority of F-15 and P-3C programs. FY 79 procurement of 4 E-2C aircraft via FMS approved. GOJ plan projected total requirement of 8-12 E-2C aircraft.

- **Improved HAWK (I-HAWK).** Japan planned to convert 18 of 34 basic HAWK batteries to I-HAWK over the next 8-10 years. Conversion to be accomplished under licensed production arrangement at approximate cost of $10 million per battery.

2. Ibid.; J466 Point Paper (C), 11 Jan 80, Subj: Japan Security Assistance Summary (U), DECL 11 Jan 86.
F-15J (PEACE EAGLE) Program

(U) The JDA selected the McDonnell-Douglas F-15 in 1976 as the next generation of fighter aircraft to replace the aging F-104s of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). On 4 April 1978 the Japanese Diet approved the purchase of 100 EAGLEs, including 12 training aircraft. Delivery of the first increment consisting of 2 F-15s and 6 TF-15s was scheduled to begin March 1981.1

(Conf) Two problems with the F-100 Pratt & Whitney engines in the F-15J surfaced in 1979. One was a manufacturing problem--rotor blade stress--and the other was a production problem. Strikes in several subcontractor companies, plus worldwide shortages of raw materials (nickel, cobalt, titanium) had occurred which would delay delivery for from six months to two years. The first problem caused consternation among JDA officials because of the potential impact on Japan's air defense program, and among Okinawan residents from a safety standpoint because the 18th U.S. Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Kadena AB had already received one squadron of F-15s. The Chief, Mutual Defense Assistance Office (CHMDAO) Tokyo advised CINCPAC of continuing JDA concern with the production problem which also impinged on the PEACE EAGLE program. The Japanese contractor for the F-15 engine had learned that the parts in short supply could not be shipped because Japan did not have a Defense Order Priority Rating (this was a U.S. Department of Commerce designation to permit priority purchase of items/materials in short supply). The issue was complicated by the fact that support for the Japan program would be at the expense of U.S. defense production programs. CINCPAC referred the problem to the Defense Department in October. As 1979 ended, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering was studying the issue.2

AIM-9L/AIM-7F Missiles

(Conf) In 1977 Japan asked that AIM-9L SIDEWINDER missiles be made available concurrent with delivery of the first F-15 PEACE EAGLE aircraft scheduled for March 1981. After deliberation by the JCS and CINCPAC on releasability,

2. CMDO 18170/120951Z Oct 79 (Conf), DECL 12 Oct 85; AMEMB Tokyo 19579/060337Z Nov 79 (Conf), GDS 11/06/85; CINCPAC 152395Z Oct 79 (Conf), DECL 12 Oct 85. During Secretary of Defense Brown's stop in Japan after his visit to China in January 1980, the JDA was informed that the Defense Order Priority Rating for Japan had been approved. Source: Enclosure to MDO Japan Foreign Service Inspector Visit, 13 Mar 80 (Conf), REVW 3/12/10; J466 Point Paper (Conf), 12 Mar 80, Subj: F-15J PEACE EAGLE Program (U), DECL 12 Mar 86.
sale under FMS was approved in February 1978, but authority for coproduction or licensed production was withheld. In October 1978 CINCPAC requested the JCS to authorize licensed production (LP) of both the AIM-9L and the AIM-7F SPARROW. Approval for the AIM-7F, less an advanced monopulse seeker, was granted by the JCS on 5 March 1979, but approval was not given on the SIDEWINDER because, the JCS stated, no formal request had been received from Japan. Announcement of the LP authorization for the SPARROW was made at an F-15 technology releasability meeting held 25-27 June. The JDA representatives were advised that the total research, development and production costs would be $125.1 million. The Defense Department did not support the AIM-9L LP because Japanese requirements would be modest and would not warrant establishment of a new production line for which capital investment costs would be very high. Defense also felt it would be reasonable to expect the JDA to procure the AIM-9L from U.S. sources.1

MK-46 Torpedoes

Negotiations between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the U.S. Navy for MK-46 torpedo technology began in 1969. Japan wanted the technology for development of surface platforms in both the tube-launched and ASROC modes, but the U.S. Navy disapproved release of the desired data. By 1973 the MK-46 was released for sale but not for foreign production. When Japan requested an FMS case for two MK-46s, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) advised that the minimum quantity available would be 100. Therefore, Japan opted to continue development of a domestic torpedo program. For the next several years Japan continued to seek release of MK-46 technology, and in 1977 release was granted as the result of a Data Exchange Agreement (DEA).2

In early 1978 Japan requested an FMS case for 50 MK-46 torpedoes per year as armament for the P-3C ASW aircraft. The purchase, however, was contingent upon authorization for licensed production (LP). The CNO approved the

1. CINCPAC Command History 1978 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 382-384; J466 HistSum Mar 79 (S), DECL 19 Apr 85; J466 HistSum Apr 79 (S), DECL 9 May 85; DSAA Memo of 18 Jul 79 (S), Subj: Minutes of 25-27 June 1979 meeting between Japan Defense Agency and DOD Representatives Relative to Guidelines on the Releasability of Production/Technology Data on the F-15 Aircraft (U), REVW 18 Jul 85. On 28 April 1980 advance notice was sent to the Congress of a $11.5 million FMS case for the SIDEWINDER sale to Japan. (SECDEF 3732/291736Z 28 Apr 80 (S)).

FMS purchase but disapproved the LP request, stating that the development program would be too expensive. Shortly thereafter Japan announced that the Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI, the JDA's R&D organization) would continue development of an improved indigenous MK-73 torpedo and that a contract for a new prototype had been awarded to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. At the request of CHMDO in October 1978, CINCPAC asked for reconsideration of the LP issue by the CNO. CINCPAC pointed out that cost alone should not be the driving factor--there were other important considerations, such as standardization and interoperability, which would improve defense relationships with Japan. The CNO again refused to approve licensed production of the MK-46. This time the refusal was based on the possibility of compromise of NATO's first-line ASW weapon and the potential for development of countermeasures, U.S. economic reasons, the fact that the technology had not been released to any foreign government, and because the necessary U.S. support for the program development in Japan would divert talent from the U.S. Navy program.1

During the second half of 1979 Japan was faced with the dilemma of whether to continue solely with the development and manufacture of the MK-73 by Mitsubishi, or to procure a limited number of MK-46s under FMS in combination with reduced procurement of the domestic MK-73. On the one hand, relegation of the domestic program could force the shutdown of the Mitsubishi MK-73 production line with a consequent adverse socio-economic impact on an already badly depressed area in western Kyushu. On the other hand, the MK-73 was technologically outmoded in comparison with the MK-46 and would not provide the P-3Cs with the desired capability to attack Soviet nuclear-powered submarines. In the course of deliberations, GOJ officials inquired as to the minimum number of MK-46s which could be purchased and the latest model which could be made available. At the end of August JDA officials were briefed on the newest version of the MK-46, the MOD-5 NEAR TIP. In November MSDF officials were notified informally that the CNO would consider LP for the MK-46, less the front end. Such a program would assure 75 percent production of the system in Japan. Meanwhile, in September, TRDI had concluded a contract with Mitsubishi for prototype fabrication of the Japanese MK-73 aerial torpedo with delivery scheduled by the end of March 1980. At the end of the year, Japan had not decided whether to pursue the strictly domestic manufacture of the

1. CHMDO Tokyo 111109Z Apr 80 (C), DECL 11 Apr 86; J466 Point Paper (C), 15 May 79, Subj: MK-46 Torpedo Licensed production for Japan (U), DECL 15 May 86; CINCPAC PEG Report, Japan FY 79 (C), p. II-19, DECL 25 Jan 85; MDO Japan Foreign Service Inspector Visit, 13 Mar 80 (C), REVW: 3/12/10, enclosed Point Paper, 12 Mar 80 (C), Subj: MK-46 Torpedo Program (U), DECL 3/12/86.
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA ........................................ 98,400 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS .............. 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE ..................... 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION ........................................ 39,200,000
ANNUAL GROWTH .................................. 1.7 Percent
LITERACY RATE .................................... 96 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY .................................. 70.4 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA ....................... 0.52 Acres
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (1978 Prices) ..... $45.9 Billion
PER CAPITA ........................................ $1,242
DEFENSE BUDGET (1978) ......................... $3.2 Billion
PERCENT OF GNP .................................. 6.5 Percent
PERCENT OF GOVERNMENT BUDGET ........... 35.4 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT ................................ Republic with Power
Centralized in a Strong Executive

* Under Consideration.

PRESIDENT ................................. CHOE Kyu-ha
PRIME MINISTER ............................... SIN Hyeon-brak
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ............ PAR Tae-chun
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ........... CHU Young-keun
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ....... GEN YU Pyong-ryun
CHIEF OF STAFF, ROKA ....................... GEN YI Hoi-sung
CHIEF OF STAFF, ROKAF ..................... GEN YIM Cha-hong
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, ROKN ...... ADM KIM Chong-hun

(U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

U.S. AMBASSADOR .................. MR. Wm R. GLEISTEIN, JR.
COMMISSION KOREA .................... GEN John A. WICKHAM, Jr, USA
CHIEF, JUSMAG-K ..................... MGEN Orlando C. GONZALES, USA

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (S/MF), p. 66,
REV 16 Feb 00.
Disposal of Excess Small Arms

(U) The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force declared approximately 120,000 small arms as excess MAP material in June 1973. In subsequent years approximately 24,300 were redistributed to U.S. Forces on Okinawa, to the governments of Guatemala, Bolivia, and Uruguay, some were returned to Anniston Army Depot stocks, and the remainder were declared excess to worldwide requirements. For three years the Defense Property Disposal Region-Pacific tried without success to locate a willing commercial smelter, and in 1978 recommended disposal by sea burial. However, this method, as well as other conventional property disposal methods, did not meet host country requirements for demilitarization. In June 1979 the Mutual Defense Assistance Office Japan succeeded in locating a smelting source. Arrangements were made with the Japan Steel Works (JSW) to convert the weapons to molten steel. Meanwhile, as a result of contacts made at a PASOLS Project Development Group meeting in Bangkok, Thai officials negotiated the purchase of a quantity of these weapons. The demilitarization of the remaining weapons was conducted in three phases during June, July, and August 1979 in the presence of U.S. and Japanese certifying officers. The JSW paid $11,097.95 to the U.S. Government for this transaction.

Republic of Korea

Overview

1. Ibid.
2. J466 HistSum May 79 (U); DPDR-PAC Ltr of 21 Apr 78 (U), Subj: Reconstruction of Demilitarized MAP Small Arms with Firing Capability; CHMOD 080833Z May 79 (U); CHMOD 091039Z Nov 79 (U).
In conjunction with President Carter's 29-30 June visit to Seoul, Secretary of Defense Brown held discussions with Minister of National Defense Ro regarding arms transfers. At that time, Secretary Brown urged that ground force improvements receive first priority in the ROK budget; that ROK defense spending be increased; and that costly acquisitions such as F-16s and submarines receive careful consideration. On 20 July President Carter publicly ordered a freeze on further withdrawal of U.S. combat elements from Korea, except for personnel in support units, pending further review in 1981.2

On 8 August it was reported that the Republic of Korea Government (ROKG), in response to President Carter's urgings while in Seoul, planned to increase defense spending during 1980 by $500 million. This forecast was later revised to 1.2 billion, for a 40 percent increase over 1979. At the 12th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on 18 October Secretary Brown told ROK officials that about 1,500 support troops would be withdrawn during 1980. At this same time, he announced a modest strengthening of U.S. armaments in Korea (upgrading of artillery and helicopters and deployment of

1. OSD 57-79/082308Z Mar 79 (TS)(BOM), REVW 31 Dec 85.
one A-10 squadron) and approval of the F-5 coassembly program.\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1} Security assistance funding to Korea consisted of FMS credits, IMET, and items from the Cost-free Equipment Transfer (CET) package, originally generated to offset the complete withdrawal of U.S. ground combat troops announced by President Carter in 1977. Also part of the withdrawal compensation was a revised Force Improvement Plan (FIP) for South Korea; the United States had undertaken a "best effort" commitment to maintain the FMS credit level at $275 million per year. Late in December 1978, however, the State Department advised that $225 million would be requested from Congress for FY 79 and FY 80. In January 1979, both CINCPAC and the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUS Korea) expressed dismay over the reduced levels.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{2} In August 1979, COMUS Korea forwarded to CINCPAC a revised withdrawal plan for 1980 which provided for the withdrawal of 2,726 support personnel, the inactivation of one U.S. I-HAWK battalion and two U.S. TOW companies. He also advised CINCPAC that the $50 million reduction in FMS credits for FY 79 had had an adverse impact on FIP planning and budgeting, and indirectly on the CET. While the impact had been tempered somewhat for FY 79 by various adjustments, there would be long-range problems if the $275 million FMS credit level was not restored for FY 80-83.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{3} In late November the JCS advised CINCPAC that FY 80 FMS credits for Korea could drop to $155-165 million and at the end of 1979, Congress had not yet approved a security assistance bill for FY 80. All programs were governed by Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA), which the State Department defined as the lower of the FY 79 level or the FY 80 appropriations bill passed by the House. On that basis, even deeper cuts were in store for Korean FMS.\textsuperscript{4}

Modernization of ROK Tank Force

\textsuperscript{4} Early in 1976 JUSMAG Korea and the ROK JCS agreed that a program was needed to modernize and upgrade the existing tank force of M-47s and early

\begin{footnotesize}


3. COMUSK 160845Z Aug 79 (\textsuperscript{\textit{S}}, DECL 16 Aug 85.

4. JCS 1784/292221Z Nov 79 (\textsuperscript{\textit{S}}, DECL 26 Nov 85.

\end{footnotesize}
model M-48s. The M-47s were becoming logistically unsupportable and the early M-48s were no longer combat effective against the continually upgraded tanks and anti-tank capability of North Korea. It was agreed that the M-47 tanks would be replaced by M-48A1s, and that the entire force of M-48s in the ROK tank inventory would be converted to late model M-48A3s and M-48A5s. At the ninth SCM in 1976, the U.S. Secretary of Defense approved a ROK request to purchase 421 M-48A1s to replace their M-47s.\(^1\)

\(^{(S)}\) By the end of 1979, all 421 M-48A1s had been received by the ROK; 40 tanks had been converted to M-48A5s and 121 to M-48A3s. However, in mid-1979, a ROK review of the tank program resulted in a decision not to convert 280 M-48A2s to the M-48A5 configuration.\(^2\)

\(^{(S)}\) During the 10th and 11th SCMs (1977, 1978), the Secretary of Defense had denied a ROK request for M-60 tanks but, at the 11th SCM, he had informed the ROK Minister of National Defense that 199 M-48A5 tanks would be provided as part of the CET to compensate for the eventual withdrawal of the Second Division and its 118 M-60 tanks in Korea. Subsequently, it was decided to effect part of the substitution in advance of the turnover to the ROK Army. By mid-1979, the exchange of 118 M-60 tanks for M-48A5s had been made and 22 additional tanks were placed in U.S. War Reserves in-country. An additional 59 M-48A5s would be shipped to Korea prior to the Second Division withdrawal.\(^3\)

\(^{(S)}\) Meanwhile, the subject of M-60 tanks surfaced again during the visit to Korea in June 1979 by President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, and Secretary of Defense Brown. A ROK request for two M-60A1 tanks (less laser rangefinder and ballistic computer) to be used for research and development of the ROK Indigenous Tank (ROKIT) program was approved.\(^4\)

ROK Indigenous Tank (ROKIT) Program

\(^{(S)}\) One element of the ROK tank improvement program was the development of an indigenous tank production capability. During the 10th SCM in 1977, this program (ROKIT) was raised and the U.S. Secretary of Defense agreed that the United States would assist the ROK in program development. In August 1977 a specific request for assistance was received from the ROK Minister of Defense to which the U.S. Secretary responded in October with a proposed MOU. Later in the year, after key personnel changes in the ROK Ministry of Defense, disagreement arose among ROK military, political, and industrial.

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2. J461 Point Paper \(^{(S)}\), 11 Jan 80, Subj: ROK Tank Upgrade (U), DECL 11 Jan 86.
4. Ibid.
factions as to the nature and scope of the proposed ROKIT program. To resolve the conflict and to satisfy political as well as military goals, the ROK apparently decided on a two-tiered approach. Hyundai Heavy Industries, a Korean manufacturer, was directed to produce two prototype tanks by June 1980, which assured availability for the October 1980 Armed Forces Day parade. This crash effort was to be augmented by the development of an in-country tank technology base for tank production in the long term. Thus, the crash prototype program met the political objective and would be highly visible, while the longer range effort would respond to perceived military requirements.\(^1\)

(U) By the end of July 1978 the ROK had selected bids from two U.S. firms -- Teledyne Division of Continental Motors and AAI Corporation of Baltimore -- to build wood mock-ups of their own design. These were expected to be equivalent to the M-60 tank in armament reliability and maintainability, but lighter and with a lower silhouette. Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. had been designated the prime contractor and was to be assisted by the Ministry of National Defense and the Korean Agency for Defense Development. The target date for completion of the mock-ups was January 1979.\(^2\)

(U) Both contractors delivered their mock-ups and design packages in November 1978. The ensuing analysis, performed by Battelle Memorial Institute under an FMS case, revealed significant design problems/errors in both submissions. Revised design proposals for the ROKIT were submitted in June 1979. After the mid-year review of the overall tank program (upgrade and ROKIT), the ROK decided that Hyundai would accomplish the ROKIT program with Government furnished equipment, test and evaluation. The goal was to produce 260 ROK-designed tanks by 1986.\(^3\)

(U) In October 1979 the Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA), who was also COMUS Korea, asked the Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (VCSA) about the projected availability of both the M-60 and M-48 as a possible alternative to the ROKIT program. The VCSA replied that, in theory, Korea or any other FMS customer could place an order for the M-60A3 tank until April 1980. In fact, continuation of the production line depended on the receipt of such orders. The VCSA noted, however, that a ROK request would still require both State and Defense approval and Congressional review. As to M-48 assets, there were none available for FMS at that time, nor would there be until the FY 83-85 timeframe.\(^4\)

2. Ibid.
3. J141/Memo/10-80 of 17 Mar 80 (U), enclosure G-7 (C), Subj: ROKIT (U), DECL 17 Mar 86.
4. DA 242005Z Oct 79 (C), DECL 12/31/83.
As the year ended ROK officials were again reassessing various program priorities, among them the tank programs. The EUSA Commanding General advised CINCPAC and VCSA that before making a final commitment to expanded ROKIT production, which was scheduled to begin during 1984, the Koreans wished to review all options—availability and cost of M-60s and additional M-48 hulls vis-à-vis ROKIT development and production. The VCSA repeated that no U.S. M-48s would be available before FY 83-85, but there might be a possibility of reacquiring some from third countries.1

1. CG EUSA 240432Z Nov 79 (E)(BOM), REVW 24 Nov 85; VCSA 112335Z Dec 79 (E) (BOM), DECL 31 Dec 83.
2. Ibid.
1. AMEMB Seoul 11723/220901Z Dec 78 (S), GDS 12/22/84; CHJUSMAGK 092225Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 85; COMUSK 101730Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 10 Aug 85.
2. AMEMB Seoul 11723/220901Z Dec 78 (S), GDS 12/22/84; SECSTATE 8522/112258Z Jan 79 (S), GDS 1/11/85; J5311 HistSum Mar 79 (S), DECL 10 Apr 85; OSD 44-79/262122Z Feb 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 85.

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1. J5311 HistSum Mar 79 (S), DECL 10 Apr 85; CHJUSMAK 091056Z Mar 79 (S), (BOM DECL 31 Dec 85; CINCPAC 160318Z Mar 79 (S) (BOM), DECL 14 Mar 85; CHJUSMAK 092225Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 85.

2. J5312 HistSum Jul 79 (S), DECL 6 Aug 85; CINCPAC 200343Z Jul 79 (S), DECL 16 Jul 85.
1. J5312 HistSum Dep 79 (S), DECL 4 Sep 90; COMUSK 040815Z Sep 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 4 Sep 90; COMUSK 260628Z Sep 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 25 Sep 90, which quoted AMEMB Seoul 240846Z Sep 79; CINCPAC 281845Z Sep 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 29 Sep 79; J5312 HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 6 Feb 86.

2. J5312 HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 6 Feb 86; AMEMB Seoul 18629/100852Z Dec 79 (S), RDS 1 & 3 12/10/87; OSD 151-80/041701Z Jan 80 (S)(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 86; COMUSK 180520Z Jan 80 (S)(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 86.

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Submarine Study

During the 8th SCM in 1975 the question of submarines for the ROK Navy was broached between Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and President Park, but later in 1975 the Koreans agreed to defer the submarine issue until 1980. However, at the 11th SCM in July 1978, the ROK Minister of Defense asked that the United States consider the sale of two submarines to the ROK Navy. Secretary Brown recommended that this requirement be studied with COMUS Korea (General Vessey) in conjunction with the Combined ROK-U.S. SSM study (see above). Accordingly, the formation and ground rules of a combined submarine study group were adopted by General Vessey, MND Ro, Admiral Weisner, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA Armacost. The group of nine ROK and U.S. military officers, chaired by COMNAVFORKOREA, was to:

- Identify missions that could be performed by a small ROK submarine fleet
- Identify costs of procurement, operation and maintenance, training, and support facilities
- Identify alternative methods, if available, for accomplishing the same missions
- Make recommendations concerning the control of operations by the submarine fleet and integration of operations with combined ROK/U.S. naval operations.

The submarine study group completed deliberations in January 1979, and the report, which was prepared unilaterally by U.S. Naval Forces Korea, validated the missions, tasks, and functions of a small submarine force as one appropriate counter weapon to the North Korean submarine force. The mission of the force, as conceived by the ROK, would be development of a good ASW capability, and in wartime, mining of North Korean harbors, landing unconventional warfare forces in North Korea rear areas, and diverting the North Korean naval effort to ASW. Based on the study results and agreement between the Country Team and MND officials, in March the Koreans explored the possibility of obtaining one U.S. TANG-class submarine under FMS for use in studying costs and operational suitability. The Country Team consensus, wherein CINCPAC concurred, was that the United States should participate early in the program analysis stages before a substantial commitment was made. CINCPAC pointed

1. CINCPAC Command History 1978 (FRD), Vol. II, pp. 429-433; COMUSK 140730Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.
out that while a negative signal might reduce ROK cooperation in the SSM area, there were on the other hand numerous ground force requirements competing for precious ROK resources.  

"OSD/ISA developed talking papers on the submarine issue in preparation for SECDEF meetings with ROK officials during President Carter's visit to Korea in late June. In separate reviews of the draft papers, CINCPAC and COMUS Korea agreed that submarine acquisition was desirable, but that it should not jeopardize on-going force improvement programs. CINCPAC suggested that, because of the increased North Korean ground threat, it might be worthwhile to contrast the cost of the submarine purchase with other purchases directly related to enhancement of ROK ground warfighting capability. General Vessey, as the outgoing CINCUNC/COMUS Korea, noted the arguments for the submarines as being compelling and, on that basis, advised he would argue strongly with SECDEF in favor of submarines for the ROK Army:"  

...the Koreans would like to apply their resources in a fashion that best suits a combined defense but lacking specific knowledge on exactly what the United States will do (particularly about ground force withdrawal) they will make some resource allocation decisions independent of U.S. plans and desires. One such decision is submarines. The ROK Government is going to acquire some submarines from somewhere. It would like to get them from us for a variety of very good reasons. The most important of which is the ease of operation with the naval forces of its ally, the United States. Given that point, it seems to me that we get great benefit out of supporting ROK acquisition of U.S. submarines. The submarines would be available to work anti-submarine exercises with the U.S. Seventh Fleet. We keep operational control of the submarines through CFC. We will not pay the O&M costs. They will help us to continue to influence events in the ROK in the years ahead.  

During the June meetings, Secretary Brown advised Minister Ro that the United States would sell the ROK Navy one submarine, but urged prudence in prioritization of requirements and funds. On 24 August the submarine KOUSSEH,
which had been refurbished for Iran, was allocated for Korea.¹

Meanwhile, by early August it was apparent that submarine acquisition was becoming a low-priority item for the MND despite ROK Navy efforts to pursue acquisition. In mid-August the ROK Vice CNO urgently requested a "best estimate" from the U.S. Vice CNO, Admiral Long (prospective CINC PAC). Admiral Long's response estimated the one-submarine package, depending upon existing facilities in-country, but including training, overhaul, and survey teams, could range between $93 and $100 million. On 4 September COMUS Korea (General Wickham) advised that due to high estimated costs, Minister Ro had stopped the submarine project and that Korea would not take up the option to buy the U.S. submarine. Later in September the ROK Assistant Minister of Defense for Logistics and Installations wrote CHJUSMAG that, after weighing the lack of funds, conflict with higher priority programs in the current Korean FIP, and the difficulties which maintenance facilities and personnel training would engender, the submarine purchase would have to be delayed into the future. In reporting this, CHJUSMAG indicated that acquisition was not being abandoned and predicted that the subject would resurface in the 1982 timeframe, but there was no need to continue to hold the KOUSHEH.²

F-16 Aircraft

A formal ROKG request for an LOA covering 60 F-16 aircraft had been pending since early 1977. At the 10th SCM in July 1977, Secretary of Defense Brown had indicated to ROK Defense Minister Suh that the U.S. Government agreed in principle to make the F-16 available, but made no timing commitment. After a full inter-agency review, in June 1978 a decision was rendered to decline to process the LOA at the time and reaffirm the commitment. However, in mid-November President Carter was reported to have rejected an early sale of F-16s to South Korea because it would mean the introduction of a higher level of technology into a region of existing tension.³

When ROK Defense Minister Ro sought Secretary Brown's support for

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1. OSD/ISA 221-79/272306Z Jul 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 85; OSD 254-79/242114Z Aug 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 85.
2. COS Seoul 030803Z Aug 79 (S)(BOM), REVW 8/3/85; COMNAVFORKorea 140800Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 13 Aug 85; CNO 221614Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 20 Aug 85; COMUSK 040815Z Sep 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 4 Sep 90; CHJUSMAGK 062358Z Sep 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 7 Sep 85; CHJUSMAGK 020630Z Oct 79 (C), DECL 31 Dec 85.
acquisition of the F-16 during their meeting on 28 June 1979, the Secretary again assured R.O. of the U.S. intent to sell the F-16, but urged that such acquisition should not interfere with much needed ground force improvements. Further U.S. action would await a ROK reassessment of defense spending priorities. In October the ROK requested P&B data on the F-16s. CHJUSMAG Korea recommended that the data be provided with a view towards impressing the Koreans with the high cost of the F-16 and enabling them to study the budgetary impact it would have on FIP programming. The State Department approved furnishing the requested P&B data for 30 F-16As and 6 F-16Bs, and in early December the Defense Department forwarded the data. The total package estimate was $1.1 billion and was premised on acceptance of an LOA by 31 March 1980 with delivery (and financing) stretched out from 1983 through 1986. The ROK Air Force planned to use the F-16s as partial replacements for aging F-86s and F-5As/Bs during the mid-1980s. Meanwhile the LOA from 1977 was still pending in Washington.\(^1\)

**A-7D/A-10A Aircraft**

\(\text{\textcircled{1}}\) On 10 December 1977 the U.S. Embassy, Seoul recommended approval of a ROK request for P&B data on A-7D/A-10A aircraft. These aircraft would replace obsolescent F-86s and F-5s in a close air support (CAS) role to assist in countering the expanding and overwhelmingly superior North Korean armored force. CINCPAC was on record as supporting this request, and Secretary of Defense Brown had stated U.S. willingness to consider sale of the A-10 during the 10th annual SCM in July 1977. In January 1978 the State Department approved a P&B request for 40 A-7D and 40 A-10A attack aircraft. Late in 1978 the State Department was advised that the ROK had asked Vought Corporation to submit a proposal for coassembly of a small number of A-7 trainer aircraft. The proposal was also to allow for outfitting the trainers with armament at a later date.\(^2\)

\(\text{\textcircled{2}}\) By early 1979 it was apparent that ROKG officials were discussing coassembly of fighter and attack aircraft with various (U.S.) manufacturers.

---

1. OSD 221-79/272306Z Jul 79 (\(\text{\textcircled{1}}\))(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 85; COS Seoul 030803Z Aug 79 (\(\text{\textcircled{1}}\))(BOM), REVW 8/3/85; CHJUSMAG 062358Z Sep 79 (\(\text{\textcircled{1}}\))(BOM), DECL 7 Sep 85; HQ USAF 131445Z Oct 79 (\(\text{\textcircled{2}}\)), DECL 13 Oct 83; SECDEF 6483/180610Z Oct 79 (\(\text{\textcircled{2}}\)), DECL 17 Oct 85; J461 HistSum Dec 79 (\(\text{\textcircled{2}}\)), DECL 9 Jan 86; SECDEF 5867/042319Z Dec 79 (\(\text{\textcircled{2}}\)), DECL 30 Nov 85; OSD 254-79/242114Z Aug 79 (\(\text{\textcircled{1}}\))(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 85.

2. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (\(\text{\textcircled{2}}\))(FRD), Vol. II, p. 328; J4 BWEB 30 Jan-12 Feb 78 (U); SECSTATE 271730/252152Z Oct 78 (\(\text{\textcircled{2}}\)), GDS 10/25/84.
and querying U.S. Government officials on the merits of various models for purchase under FMS. Ambassador Gleysteen summarized the ROKG deliberations on the attack/fighter purchases versus coassembly propositions and the Country Team position in a 18 February message to the Secretary of State.1

After a long period of drift, the ROKG is now actively engaged in an effort to select an attack aircraft in connection with its intention to begin a coassembly program. Viewed positively, a U.S. effort to steer the ROKG toward the desired aircraft, i.e., a dedicated close air support aircraft with an effective anti-tank capability, combined with a willingness to recommend coassembly, might be an appropriate element of decisions taken in response to higher estimates of North Korean military strength.

(§) The Ambassador further stated that while the Koreans realized that an outright buy under FMS would be less expensive than coassembly, there were a number of pressures for coassembly of at least some of the fighter or CAS aircraft. Over a year earlier, President Park had announced his determination to develop an indigenous fighter production capability. Korean industrialists were eager to reap the monetary benefits from coassembly as well as from the potential subsequent production capability. U.S. aircraft salesmen were active in promoting coassembly in spite of cautioning by the Department of State that, for all means of procurement (sale, coassembly, coproduction) provisions of the Arms Transfer Policy requiring Presidential approval would pertain. The Country Team considered that the A-10 was the appropriate model but that, whichever model was chosen, a dedicated CAS aircraft to augment other anti-tank weapons was one of the most crucial ROK priorities. The Ambassador urged strongly that the forthcoming DOD study of the various coassembly options provide general coassembly guidelines on F-4, F-5, A-7, and A-10 aircraft without variation in degree of coassembly to facilitate comparison by ROKG officials.2

(§) In order to meet ROK desires to initiate aircraft production without plunging full-scale into a single-purpose aircraft, as well as to provide the much-needed antitank capability, the Ambassador proposed that the United States support a combination of the FMS sale of 40 to 60 A-10s and the coassembly of a limited number of F-5Es or some other multi-purpose fighter (other than the F-16). The State Department response indicated that P&H data on the A-7 and

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1. AMEMB Seoul 03035/280612Z Feb 79 (§), GDS 2/28/85.
2. Ibid.; SECSTATE 063199/142302Z Mar 79 (LOU); SECSTATE 45653/240800Z Feb 79 (§), GDS, 2/22/85; COMUSK 300051Z Mar 79 (§), (BOM), DECL 31 Mar 85.
A-10 would be provided, that a request for direct sale of either the A-7, A-10, or F-5 would be favorably considered, and that coassembly of either of these would be technically feasible.\footnote{1}

Meanwhile the DOD study on Korean tactical aircraft coassembly was found by the Korean Country Team and CINCPAC to lack definitive data which could be released to the Koreans. Cost comparison data on coassembly options were particularly disappointing because there was conflicting guidance as to whether costing should be done before or after "source" selection. The study also implied a significant program "management" role for JUSMAG Korea which was prohibited by provisions of the FAA and for which JUSMAG did not have adequate staffing.\footnote{2}

In April, while still in the decision-making process, Korean defense officials sought the benefit of U.S. military operating experience. To this end, CINCPAC arranged for briefings by USAF and USN teams on the A-7 and A-10, which in turn generated requests for releasability of the forward-looking infra-red radar (FLIR) if the A-7 were selected, and of the Staballoy depleted uranium (DU) round for the A-10.\footnote{3}

Throughout the summer the Koreans reviewed the various aircraft coassembly options and in August Minister Ro advised General Wickham of the F-5 selection for coassembly. At the 12th SCM an announcement was made that President Carter had approved coassembly of 68 F-5Es and F-5Fs. At the same time, the United States outlined a number of steps to improve U.S. military capabilities in Korea, including deployment of one USAF A-10 squadron in 1982. Therefore, the A-7/10 coassembly options were dropped.\footnote{4}

**F-5E/F Coassembly**

In order to keep on par with North Korean combat capabilities and as part of its overall aircraft modernization program, the ROK Air Force planned, within the limits of national resources, to replace aging F-5A/B and F-86.
fighter aircraft. The ROK Air Force fighter status (six wings) and planned acquisitions as of mid-year were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>On-hand</th>
<th>Due-In</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-4D</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4E</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-5A</td>
<td>81\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-5B</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-E/F</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>14\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-86</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>386</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>409</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} Includes 8 RF-5A reconnaissance aircraft.

\textsuperscript{b} Delivery slated during 1979.

As previously discussed, the first preference of the Koreans was to acquire the new U.S. F-16 multi-role fighter, either by sale or if possible through a coproduction or coassembly arrangement. The United States had agreed in principle to sell the F-16 to Korea, but would not consider a cooperative production arrangement. In seeking alternative aircraft to replace approximately 200 aging fighters, the ROK requested P&B data on 40 and 60 F-5E TIGER 2 aircraft in March 1978. The request was supported by the U.S. Embassy, CHJUSMAG Korea, and CINCPAC, and was approved by the State Department in the same month. In May 1978 the U.S. Air Force provided the data with total estimated costs of $284.9 million for 40 aircraft and $435.5 million for 60. In June the Air Force also forwarded costs (including support) of $84 million for eight RF-5E reconnaissance aircraft.\textsuperscript{2}

As already noted, throughout the remainder of 1978 and much of 1979, the Koreans deliberated on other fighter replacement options. On 1 August Korean Minister of Defense Ro advised COMUS Korea that the ROKG had selected the F-5E/F for coassembly. The primary role of the F-5E would be air defense; that of the F-5F would be combat training. Both would have secondary roles as CAS aircraft. The following day the ROK Assistant Minister of Defense Industry submitted a request to coassemble 36 F-5Es and 32 F-5Fs in the 1982-86

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FIP II timeframe. The request also stipulated that the LOA include provisions for: one year's spare parts, 34 spare J-85 engines, hardware kits, prices for parts and materials, and a guarantee that avionics components and aircraft sub-assembly and fabrication materials be available for 10 years following coassembly of the last aircraft. Embassy and CINCPAC approvals were based on the fact that the ROK already had a good depot level maintenance infrastructure for F-5s and that the F-5 would enhance ROK defense needs and consequently would be in both the ROK and U.S. national security interests.

After a Presidential exception to policy was granted, the PEACE FREEDOM III program was publicly announced at the 12th U.S.-ROK SCM in Seoul in mid-October. Congressional approval of the LOA followed shortly thereafter, and as the year ended, the conditions of the MOU were being negotiated with an estimated package cost of $441 million. It was anticipated that production would start during the third quarter of 1982 and that funding would combine FMS with direct commercial sales.

C-47D Aircraft Purchase

On 15 May 1979 the ROKG requested an LOA for one reclaimed (Navy) C-47D SKYTRAIN which was located at the Military Aircraft Surplus and Disposal Command, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. The C-47D would be modified to an EC-47Q configuration (including replacement with R-2000 engines) for ELINT mission purposes. Upon receipt of the LOA, the ROKG found the price of $70,149 to be significantly higher than anticipated. A revised price of $47,004 without engines was acceptable and the ROKG requested a new LOA with provisions to lease the engines for the transit to Korea. However, the aircraft had not yet been delivered at the end of the year.

ROK Force Improvement Plan

In 1975 the ROK unilaterally conceived a five-year force improvement plan (FIP) with the objectives of:

2. CHJUSMAGK 210400Z Nov 79 (U); SECDEF 1908/310032Z Oct 79 (U); J5112 Point Paper (U), 24 Oct 79, Subj: 12th U.S.-ROK SCM.
3. J461 HistSum May 79 (U); CHJUSMAGK 170107Z May 79 (U); CHJUSMAGK 030507Z Jul 79 (U); J461 HistSum Sep 79 (U); CHJUSMAGK 180217Z Sep 79 (U); HQ USAF 211330Z Sep 79 (U); CHJUSMAGK 240207Z Sep 79 (U).
<table>
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<tr>
<th>ROK Army Projects</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>15 Aug 79</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIKE (Battery)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Conversion kits purchased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved HAWK (Battery)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOW (Company)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>All contracted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H helicopter</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>All contracted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target acquisition (Battery)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>LGA offered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank recovery vehicle</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production/Coproduction Projects</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VULCAN gun</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>Conversion kits purchased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank upgrade (MABA3/A5)</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Coproduction-commercial contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500MD helicopter (OH-6A)</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16 rifle</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M60 machine gun</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16 ammunition</td>
<td>1,317,000,000</td>
<td>969,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M60 ammunition</td>
<td>110,000,000</td>
<td>81,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical radios</td>
<td>24,989</td>
<td>24,653</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm howitzer</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>236</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm howitzer</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>162</td>
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<tr>
<th>ROK Navy Projects</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alouette helicopter</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Purchased from France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol boat, medium (PKM)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>In-country construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Renovation in-country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvage ship</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 AFS transferred 15 Aug 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol boat, missile</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>From procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARP/UN missile</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>All contracted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>TANG Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training aircraft</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Programmed for 1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VULCAN gun</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>In-country production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean KFX (frigate)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Under construction in-country</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROK Air Force Projects</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-4E aircraft</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Completion end CY 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-5F aircraft</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>All contracted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF-4 aircraft</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Programmed for 1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGM-65A M-5ERICK</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>All contracted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laser-guided bomb</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>All contracted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIM-9 missile (SIDEWINDER)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>All contracted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIM-7 missile (SPARROW)</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>All contracted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microwave system</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Programmed for 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap-filler radar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Programmed for 1981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Known New Projects Added</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To FIP I by Revision V</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Fire control system                      |           |           |                                              |
| Special forces aircraft                  |           |           |                                              |
| Oiler                                    |           |           |                                              |
| Minesweeper                              |           |           |                                              |
| Training aircraft                        | 6         | 0         | Unknown type                                |
| Tactical project                         |           |           |                                              |
| Submarine base                           |           |           |                                              |
| Training equipment                       |           |           |                                              |
| A-X aircraft                             |           |           |                                              |
| Command communications system            |           |           |                                              |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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- Development of ROK forces' capability to deter/defend against North Korean aggression by 1980 while relying on the United States to deter PRC and USSR active support of North Korea and to provide logistics support and specialized combat support in wartime.

- Development of ROK defense industries in support of FIP programs.

The ROK revised the FIP periodically based on the existing threat, the growth of the economy, and projected U.S. support. Originally the FIP assumed a U.S. ground force presence but the planned U.S. troop withdrawal necessitated a complete review. The fifth revision of FIP I, which included 10 new projects for completion in 1981, showed that $5.3 billion (or 80 percent of a total $6.63 billion) had been funded/programmed through 1980. The completion status of major projects as of 15 August 1979 is shown in the facing chart. 1

A second defense modernization program (FIP II), for 1982-1986, was also underway. For the first time, senior officers from USFK and JUSMAG were briefed on the FIP in September, prior to approval by President Park. When asked by the Director of the ROK Joint Staff to comment on the plan, U.S. officials noted that objectives and priorities were on track but there were some omissions—command, control, and communications; artillery requirements; ammunition production; ground mobility; and force structure. CINCPAC acknowledged the significance of this early exchange of views and concurred with the need for further work on the omitted areas. 2

Korea Review Group

The Korea Review Group (KRG) was established by the Secretary of Defense on 14 November 1978 to consider a wide-range of policy issues evolving from problems with the $800 million arms transfer package. Representatives of the Service Secretaries, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Chairman of the JCS, three assistant Defense Secretaries, and the Director of DSAA attended flag/action officer level meetings in February and November 1979. Additional representation was from CINCPAC.

1. J462 Point Paper (S), 11 Jan 80, Subj: ROK Force Improvement Plan (U) DECL 11 Jan 86.
2. J5312 HistSum Sep 79 (S), DECL 14 Sep 80; COMUSK 140839Z Sep 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 14 Sep 90; CINCPAC 200650Z Sep 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 17 Sep 85.

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COMUS Korea, JUSMAG Korea, the State Department and the National Security Agency. Action officer meetings were also held in March, May, and August.1

At the February meeting discussions covered, inter alia, the shortfall of equipment in certain units to be transferred (e.g., an HONEST JOHN battalion, an engineer battalion, and two TOW companies), provisions for transfer of special communications and COMSEC equipment, and substitution of 199 M-48A5 tanks for 118 M-60s being transferred from the 2nd Infantry Division. The worldwide shortage of 105mm tank ammunition and the anticipated increase in ROK 105mm requirements were discussed vis-a-vis the additional M-48A5 assets the Koreans were acquiring through their tank modernization program and the CET. The group also was briefed on the status of an OSD-directed study of candidates for ROK aircraft coassembly.2

2. J461 HistSum Feb 79 (S), DECL 8 Mar 85.
3. OASD/ISA(EA&P) Memorandum for Record of 28 Dec 79 (S), Subj: Korea Review Group Meeting - 29 Nov 79 (U), DECL 31 Dec 85.
Government of Malaysia (GOM) apprehensions increased during 1979 after the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) invasion of Kampuchea. As a result, early in 1979 the Malaysian Armed Forces Council planned to nearly double the 65,000-man armed forces and to make substantial military improvements by 1983. However, the GOM cabinet determined that domestic development must have the highest priority and approved only 67 percent of the defense budget request. Therefore, according to a U.S. Embassy Kuala Lumpur July message, the 1979-83 expansion plans would be limited to raising one regular army division, expansion of the territorial army, acquisition of 60-plus attack aircraft (see A-4/A-7 aircraft below), an air defense system, improved radar, medium artillery, tanks, armored personnel carriers, additional engineer and signal squadrons, and a number of infantry battalions. The Embassy message further stated that an additional $100 million in FMS credits would be needed to offset the 33 percent budget cut. This was in the face of decreased FMS credits from a high of $36 million in FY 77 to an estimated $7 million for FY 80. By late October the future looked brighter when Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke advised the GOM Minister of Defense
**MALAYSIA (U)**

### (U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits of Territorial Waters</td>
<td>12 Nautical Miles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limits of Economic Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual Growth</td>
<td>2.5 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>46 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
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<td>Arable Land Per Capita</td>
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<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per Capita</td>
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<td>Defense Budget</td>
<td>$1,022 Million</td>
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<td>Type of Government</td>
<td>Constitutional Monarchy led by Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acting Defense Minister</td>
<td>Dato' Mohd. S. Haji Ahmad</td>
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<td>Minister of Home Affairs</td>
<td>Mohd. Kamaran bin Haji Ahmad</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Naval Staff</td>
<td>Tuan Sri Dato' Haji Ahmad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Air Staff</td>
<td>Tuan Sri Dato' Haji Ahmad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

- U.S. Ambassador: Robert W. Miller
- Chargé d'Affaires: Col. Franklin W. Collins, USA

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (5/46), p. 67, REV 16 Feb 00.
that State/Defense FY 81 recommendation was for $20 million in FMS credits.\(^1\)

**C-130 Flight to the Philippines**

\((U)\) The U.S. Defense Attache Office (USDAO) Kuala Lumpur approached CINCPAC in September 1979 with a proposal for an RMAF C-130 flight to Clark AB, Philippines. The visit would last five days and accomplish three objectives: delivery of precision measuring equipment for calibration under an FMS case, overwater and route familiarization training, and discussions with USAF and USN aircrews. The latter two were especially desirable since the RMAF C-130s were performing maritime patrol only as an additional duty with a dedicated maritime mission scheduled to begin in 1981. CINCPAC favored the mission as a goodwill gesture and outlined the procedural requirements to the USDAO. These included a formal GOM request to CINCPAC, support by PACAF and PACFLT and their subordinate units, notification by CINCPACREP PHIL to the Armed Forces of the Philippines through the Mutual Defense Board, and diplomatic clearance by the GOP.\(^2\)

\((U)\) During October CINCPAC approved the flight and all necessary arrangements were completed. The visit transpired from 12 to 15 November with briefings and discussions on basic maritime surveillance techniques. In an after-action report, the USDAO accorded high praise to all U.S. participants at Clark and Subic. Information and handouts were eagerly received by RMAF C-130 crew members. Certain newly-learned techniques were applied during the return trip to Malaysia and other knowledge channeled future maritime mission planning onto a proper course. The USDAO rated the people-to-people aspects of the visit as an unqualified success and noted a potential for future similar and reciprocal P-3 and C-130 flights.\(^3\)

**A-4/A-7 Aircraft**

\((S)\) The receipt in February 1978 of P&B data on 15 A-4C SKYHAWK attack/ground support aircraft for counterinsurgency operations was followed by an RMAF request for similar information on 54 A-4Es, and if that were not available, data on A-4Cs could be substituted. P&B data ($20.5 million) on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{J472 Point Paper} (S), 25 Jun 79, Subj: Malaysia Security Assistance Program \(\text{(U)}, \text{DECL} 25 \text{Jun} 85; \text{AMEMB} \text{Kuala Lumpur} 13092/1202222 \text{Jul} 79 (S), \text{XDS-1} 7/11/99; \text{USDAO} \text{Kuala Lumpur} 0800392 \text{Nov} 79 (S), \text{DECL} 6 \text{Nov} 85.
\item \textbf{J472 HistSum Sep} 79 (U); CINCPAC 030432Z Oct 79 (U).
\item CINCPAC 070003Z Oct 79 (U); HQ PACAF 172100Z Oct 79 (U); CINCPACFLT 202031Z Oct 79 (U); HQ PACAF 292330Z Oct 79 (U); USDAO Kuala Lumpur 300031Z Nov 79 (U).
\end{itemize}
additional A-4Cs was provided by the CNO in August because, according to the State Department, no A-4Es were available from Israel and the USDAO asked the State Department if such information were true.  

(2) In February 1979 the USDAO queried the State Department on the status of the August request and relayed the Malaysian sense of increased urgency for the additional A-4s due to the Kampuchea-Vietnam situation. The State Department replied that approval in principle had been given to McDonnell-Douglas Corporation for the sale to Malaysia of 60 A-4Es owned by Israel and that the sale could be accomplished through cash sale under FMS.

2. J472 HistSum Feb 79 (C), DECL 10 Mar 85; SECSTATE 28907/030158Z Feb 79 (C), GDS 2/2/79; J472 Point Paper (C), 17 May 79, Subj: Malaysian Requests for Aircraft (U), DECL 17 May 85.
Force/Activity Designator

Country Force/Activity Designators (FADs) were assigned by the JCS to provide commanders of unified commands and the Services a basis for assigning priorities to specific units, forces, activities, and/or specific sales cases in recipient grant aid and FMS countries. 3

Prior to early 1975 Malaysia had been assigned a Force/Activity Designator (FAD) V for FMS purchases. The FAD was temporarily raised to III by the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) in April 1975 as a result of late delivery of 16 F-5s purchased in 1972, supporting accessories, and resultant adverse publicity. Shortly thereafter the FAD was raised temporarily to a II with the proviso that it would revert to the "regularly assigned" FAD upon completion of the initial lay-in. However, interpretations differed as to the meaning of "regularly assigned." The U.S. Air Force interpretation was reversion to FAD V—the RMAF interpretation was to a III. F-5 support difficulties and the FAD misunderstanding continued for several years. In early 1978 a formal request by the Malaysian attaché in Washington to the JCS for upgrade to a III was turned down. 4

2. CINCPAC 240243Z Nov 79 (C), DECL 14 Nov 85; J472 HistSum Dec 79 (C), DECL 10 Jan 86; SECDEF 4519/031822Z Dec 79 (C), DECL 31 Dec 85 and 5044/152121Z Jan 80 (C), DECL 30 Jan 1980.
During an October 1979 visit to PACAF in Hawaii, BGEN Ngah of the RMAF again raised Malaysian logistics support difficulties. Because the FAD applied to all Services, PACAF sought CINCPAC assistance in resolving the problem. Subsequently CINCPAC requested Country Team comments and recommendations regarding the FAD upgrade. The USDAO cited the increased Vietnamese threat and the fact that the Malaysian Armed Forces were engaged in actual combat operations as justification to raise the FAD, but noted that many Malaysian logistics problems were self-generated. CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and CDRWESTCOM, as well as the CDR AFLC, favored raising the JCS FAD from V to III. Their consensus was that the upgrade would indicate sincerity of U.S. interest and responsiveness, which could abet future U.S. initiatives in, and mutual defense arrangements with, Malaysia. The upgrade could also assist Malaysia in improving the internal support system and thereby enhance Malaysian Armed Forces combat readiness and force expansion in the face of the increased communist/Vietnamese threat.\footnote{1}

On 1 January 1980 CINCPAC endorsed component and AFLC rationale by citing the value of Malaysia's contribution to stability in Southeast Asia and to U.S. strategic interests in that region. The JCS approved a FAD III for Malaysia on 22 January 1980.\footnote{2}

**Pakistan**

After the decade-long embargo on exports of military equipment to Pakistan was lifted in 1975, equipment was sold on a case-by-case, cash-only basis. In 1977 the U.S. policy of evenhandedness toward Pakistan and India in the sale of military supplies and equipment was complicated by Pakistan's effort to purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant from France. When the French apparently refused to sell the plant to Pakistan in October 1978, the issue appeared to have subsided. The U.S. State and Defense Departments subsequently developed a military sales package which it was hoped would serve as an inducement to Pakistan to forego acquisition of a nuclear capability and thereby maintain the balance of military power between Pakistan and India. In November 1978 Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology

\footnotesize{1. J472 HistSum Nov 79 (S), DECL 10 Dec 85; CINCPAC 200229Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 16 Nov 85; USDAO Kuala Lumpur 300045Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 29 Nov 79; J472 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 10 Jan 86.
2. J472 HistSum Jan 80 (S), DECL 8 Feb 86; CINCPAC 010230Z Jan 80 (S), DECL 19 Dec 85; JCS 2263/222262Z Jan 80 (S), DECL 21 Jan 86.}
Benson visited Islamabad to discuss security assistance matters with Government of Pakistan (GOP) officials. Among items discussed in the informal but frank exchange of views were fighter-aircraft, air defense systems, and destroyers.\(^1\)

\(^{(S)}\) In early January 1979 the National Security Council reaffirmed the 1 July 1977 policy of equality of treatment in the sale of military supplies and equipment to India and Pakistan. The policy memo stipulated, however, that each sale would be decided on its own merits by taking U.S. interests, as well as individual country and regional circumstances, into consideration.\(^2\)

\(^{(S)}\) On 4 April 1979 former Pakistan Premier Ali Bhutto was executed. In an unconnected action on 6 April, the State Department invoked provisions of the Symington Amendment to the 1977 Foreign Assistance Act because the GOP refused international inspection of the nuclear enrichment facility. In effect, the Symington Amendment curtailed only economic aid, security supporting assistance, and IMET funds to Pakistan, and technically did not address FMS cash sales. (FMS credit to Pakistan had ended in 1968.) However, the GOP understood that no major FMS sales would be approved and a de facto pause in major arms sales to Pakistan ensued. CINCPAC deplored the lack of DOD participation in the decision to cut off IMET funding ($125,000 for fourth quarter FY 79 alone) and other decisions affecting the evenhanded treatment policy toward Pakistan, vis-a-vis India, in the sale of military equipment. In urging a favorable and prompt decision on the sale of four GEARING-class destroyers to Pakistan in June, CINCPAC cited Pakistan's importance to regional stability and strategic value to the United States. Other segments of the U.S. Government also sought alternatives to an American policy hinged on dissuading Pakistan from developing a nuclear weapons capability. In August Chairman Zablocki and four members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee wrote to Secretary of State Vance asking that consideration be given to supplying conventional arms to forestall Pakistan's drive to build nuclear weapons. In October State Department officials sought assurances from a Pakistani delegation that the nuclear capability would not be pursued, but Pakistan declined to provide such assurances.\(^3\)

2. SECSTATE 3910/060321Z Jan 79 (S), GDS 1/5/85.
By November U.S.-GOP relationships had become so tenuous that a mob of Pakistani students, mistakenly blaming the U.S. Government for the takeover of the Mosque of Qabah in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, stormed and burned the American Embassy in Islamabad on 21 November. As a result, two U.S. military men were killed and Embassy dependents and nonessential personnel were evacuated to Washington D.C. on 23 November.\(^1\)

**Destroyers**

Two U.S. Navy GEARING-class destroyers were transferred to the Pakistan Navy (PN) in April 1977 under FMS procedures for $225,000 each. By virtue of separate FMS cases for ship checks, overhaul, and training, these ships underwent overhaul in the United States and in September 1978 were recommissioned in the PN as the TARIQ and the TAIMUR. In November of 1977 there followed an LOA request for four additional DDs (with ASROC weaponry) from the PN, which was supported by CINCPAC. Because of the Washington political climate during the first half of 1978 (nuclear reprocessing issue), the request did not receive favorable consideration until after an October visit to Washington by the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan. During Under Secretary Benson's visit in November 1978, the Pakistanis were advised that the U.S. Government was prepared to make four more GEARING-class destroyers available for sale to Pakistan--two of them possibly by 1980. The "as is--where is" price of the DDs was expected to be about $275,000 each.\(^2\)

\(^2\) After the imposition of the Symington Amendment in April 1979, the U.S. Ambassador urged the Department of State to act speedily and affirmatively to conclude the sale of the four DDs to Pakistan. In supporting the Embassy position, CINCPAC stressed the value of Pakistan to U.S. security interests in an April message to the JCS. The CINCPAC message pointed to the conclusion during the January 1979 South Asia Chiefs of Mission Conference that a healthy Pakistan was critical to the overall stability of the region. Moreover, CINCPAC stated, "Pakistan disillusionment with the U.S. could result in denial of U.S. access to strategically located aircraft/ship facilities and could cause Pakistan to seek assistance from nations whose objectives are inimical to our interests."\(^3\)

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1. J474 HistSum Nov 79 (S), DECL 1 Dec 85.
3. J474 HistSum Jun 79 (S), DECL Jul 85; AMEMB Islamabad 4544/180950Z Apr 79 (S), GDS 18 Apr 85; CINCPAC 201702Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 19 Apr 85.
During a June visit to Pakistan by the U.S. Commander, Middle East Force, he was told that the four destroyers were to become the "keystone of the Pakistan Navy for the next decade." Despite the grand reception accorded RADM Packer and the close ties expounded on a navy-to-navy basis, the Country Team reported relations between the United States and Pakistan were at a low point. The Ambassador and the Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan (ODRP) again expressed the urgency of favorable, expeditious action on the DDs. The Ambassador noted that U.S. refusal to sell the GEARINGs would have little influence on the GOP nuclear attitude but could adversely affect U.S. access to Pakistan ports and airfields and contribute to further deterioration in U.S.-Pakistan relationships.

Just prior to receipt of the foregoing communications from the Ambassador and the ODRP, CINCPAC had received more specific, but informal, information regarding the DD transfer. On 29 May, the Policy Review Committee of the National Security Council had disapproved the release of the four DDs to Pakistan, even though the strong support for the release by the Country Team, CINCPAC, and the JCS was presented. The disapproval was reportedly because of the nuclear impasse. CINCPAC was also informed that the U.S. Navy intention to retire 20 of the 27 GEARING-class destroyers by 1 October 1979 had been altered because of Congressional interest in delaying scheduled ship retirements.

In a 27 June message to the JCS, CINCPAC strongly reaffirmed his support for the DDs, discussed the availability problem, and recommended that any denial of the Pakistan request be couched in terms of current non-availability rather than in terms of the nuclear issue. He stressed that disapproval could affect U.S. access to the port of Karachi and Pakistan airfields, the denial of which would adversely affect U.S. capability to support strategic objectives in the Indian Ocean area. The JCS replied that they had not yet (29 June) been officially informed of a final decision on the DD sale to Pakistan. The JCS continued to support the sale, and agreed with CINCPAC that a contrary decision should cite non-availability rather than the nuclear issue. An attempt would be made through the Defense Department to obtain

1. AMEMB Islamabad 6906/181124Z Jun 79 (S), RDS-3, 6/18/89 and 7081/240640Z Jun 79 (S), GDS 6/20/85; ODRP 220504Z Jun 79 (S), DECL 6/22/81.
2. J4/Memo/S79-79 of 18 Jun 79 (S), Subj: GEARING-Class DDs for Pakistan (U), DECL 18 Jun 85; J4/Memo/S82-79 of 22 Jun 79 (S), Subj: SEACDEF Quarterly Report (U), DECL 22 Jun 85; J474 Point Paper (S) 5 Jun 79, Subj: Additional GEARING Class Destroyers (DDs) for Pakistan (U), DECL 5 Jun 85.
State Department concurrence with that approach.\(^1\)

(\(\$\)) On 1 August the State Department advised the Embassy in Islamabad that no decision had been made on the DD sale to Pakistan, but that none of the DDs scheduled for retirement were available because Congress wanted some of the ships retained in active service. How many was not clear, but none would be available until at least 1980. Subsequently the non-availability status of the destroyers was conveyed to VADM Niazi, Chief of the Pakistan Naval Staff. VADM Niazi responded that the PN had been "mentally prepared for a delay in the GEARING sale." As an aside, VADM Niazi nevertheless stated his desire to have one or more U.S. Navy officers stationed at the Pakistan Naval Academy to assist in program structuring. When advised that an FMS case would be required to defray the costs of such services, the Admiral expressed dismay. He had hoped that the U.S. Navy might have need to station naval officers in the Karachi area for purposes of intelligence or ship liaison who might also assist in academy training. As the year ended, no action on the GOP request had been taken.\(^2\)

**F-5 Aircraft**

(\(\$\)) Pakistan efforts to obtain a follow-on fighter aircraft for their vintage F-86 SABREs commenced in 1976. After evaluation of the A-4, F-5, and A-7, a formal request for 110 A-7s was submitted in May 1976. CINCPAC supported a limited requirement of 59; however, the State Department disapproved the request in June 1977, stating that A-7s would be a provocative and destabilizing influence in the region. In the latter part of 1978, during Under Secretary Benson's visit, the United States offered Pakistan between 70 and 80 F-5Es in lieu of the more advanced A-7, F-16, or F-18. In November 1978 CINCPAC strongly endorsed the F-5 sale. On 20 December, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) Chief of Staff conveyed his desire to purchase 40 F-5Es to the U.S. Ambassador; however, Pakistan was short of funds.\(^3\)

(\(\$\)) There was some question in January 1979, however, in the minds of U.S. and GOP officials as to the configuration of and weapon systems for the proposed Pakistan F-5s. The Pakistanis were of the impression that F-5Es would

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1. CINCPAC 272349Z Jun 79 (\(\$\)), DECL 21 Jun 85; JCS 2851/2991944Z Jun 79 (\(\$\)), DECL 29 Jun 85.
be "fully equipped" to include the MAVERICK air-to-ground missile, as were the F-5s sold to Saudi Arabia previously. The State Department's position was that the F-5E configuration would include wiring for the MAVERICK, but that the missile itself would require separate action, as would other specific systems. Besides, the MAVERICK would introduce a new, sophisticated system into the subcontinent which would be subject to arms transfer constraints. In February the U.S. Embassy reported that a request for 45 F-5E/Fs was awaiting signature by the GOP Minister of Defense but the Pakistanis were still pressing for a more sophisticated aircraft. Simultaneously, the JCS tasked CINCPAC to identify which of the authorized weapon systems and munitions for the F-5 CINCPAC could support for release to Pakistan. In response to CINCPAC's request for evaluation, the Country Team recommended application of a "liberal view" on step-by-step weapons approval. CINCPAC's Release Review Board recommended the eventual release of most conventional ordnance with deferral of the MAVERICK missile, the GBU-12 laser guidance system, and the 30mm gun pod until the PAF gained operational experience in the more basic F-5 capabilities. CINCPAC advised the JCS of his concurrence with the Country Team that the first consideration should be with funding and acquisition of the basic aircraft, followed by pilot and maintenance training, and then related support packages.  

As previously discussed, the invocation of the Symington Amendment on 6 April caused a de facto stoppage of military equipment sales to Pakistan. Later in April the press reported, and CINCPAC referenced, a purported agreement to sell F-5s to Pakistan. For whatever reason, no further official action on F-5s was brought to CINCPAC's attention during the balance of 1979. One press report in August alleged that Pakistan did not consider the F-5 to "meet the competition from India," and had contracted to acquire MIRAGE jet aircraft from France.  

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1. SECSTATE 5045/082158Z Jan 79 (C), 1/8/85; AMEMB Islamabad 348/100518Z Jan 79 (C), GDS 9 Jan 85; SECSTATE 9202/122048Z Jan 79 (C), GDS 1/12/85; AMEMB Islamabad 1519/070745Z Feb 79 (C), RDS-1 2/7/89; J474 HistSum Feb 79 (C), DECL 8 Mar 85; DORP 120930Z Feb 79 (C), GDS 12 Feb 85; CINCPAC 140500Z Feb 79 (C), DECL 12 Feb 85.
2. CINCPAC 172249Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 17 Apr 85 and 201720Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 19 Apr 85; Washington Post, 6 Aug 79, "Arms Sales to Pakistan Urged to Stave Off A-Bomb There," by Don Oberdorfer.
Overview

CINCPAC viewed the retention of the use of the facilities at Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base as the single most important U.S. objective in the Philippines. The U.S. Ambassador tied the long-standing U.S. security assistance program directly to the continuing access and unhampered military operations at these bases for U.S. operations in Southeast Asia and beyond. There were, however, other considerations which had to be balanced against the impact on the continued operational effectiveness of Clark and Subic. Among these considerations were Philippine military desires for advanced weaponry, continued indirect U.S. conventional arms support against the insurgency problem in the southern Philippines, and the U.S. human rights policy.  

Security assistance program values for the Philippines in millions of dollars were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 77</th>
<th>FY 78</th>
<th>FY 79*</th>
<th>FY 80*</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grant Aid MAP</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMS Cash</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMS Credit</td>
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<td>18.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>108.0</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>61.2</td>
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Training Programs

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 77</th>
<th>FY 78</th>
<th>FY 79*</th>
<th>FY 80*</th>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.650</td>
<td>.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* Reduction from FY 79 CPD levels due to Congressional funding action (net loss of $2.5M MAP, $2.9M FMS CR, $50K IMET).

** Letter from President Carter to President Marcos of 4 Jan 79 committed USG to "best effort" to obtain Congressional funding of $500M over FY 80-84.

2. Ibid.
PHILIPPINES (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA ........................................................................... 300,646 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS .................. 0-200 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE .................................. 12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION ................................................................... 48,300,000

ANNUAL GROWTH ................................................................. 2.9 Percent
LITERACY RATE ................................................................. 85 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY ............................................................... 59 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA ............................................ 0.82 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (FY 79) ................... $12.2 Billion
PER CAPITA ...................................................................... $1,603
DEFENSE BUDGET (FY 79) ............................................ $754.3 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ......................... 14.8 Percent
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT ..................................................... Republic
* Martial Law in effect since September 1972 and the constitution suspended.

PRESIDENT .............................................................. Ferdinand E. MARCOS
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ................. Carlos P. RIVULO
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE .................... Juan P. ENRIQUE
CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP ........................................ GEN Ramos ESPINO, Army
CG, ARMY ................................................................. MGEN Fortunato U. ARAYA
CHIEF, NAVY ................................................................. RADM Orlando R. GONZALEZ
CHAIR, AIR FORCE ................................................... MGEN Samuel O. PAGHINTU
CHIEF, Constabulary .................................................... MGEND Palot RAMOS

(U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

U.S. AMBASSADOR ...................................................... HON. Richard W. MURPHY
CINC PACPHIL ..................................................... RADM Lee E. LEVY, USN
CHIEF, JUSMAG ........................................................ MGEND Eugene B. KORPAL, USA

REW 16 Feb 00.
FY 79 MAP funds were to be used for payments on the following equipment which had been purchased in previous years.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Cost</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35 M113 APC</td>
<td>$3.0M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fixed Communications</td>
<td>$4.0M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(includes Mindanao and Visayas Microwave System)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Radar IRAN</td>
<td>$1.1M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 UH-1 Helo Rebuild</td>
<td>$1.6M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship Overhauls</td>
<td>$2.6M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FMS funds for FY 79 were to defray requirements for over $100 million for ammunition and repair parts in support of existing force levels. No major LOAs for new equipment were processed during 1979. In view of projected Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) FY 79 funding shortfalls, it was likely that overall operational readiness rates would decline and ammunition and repair parts inventory levels would be reduced well below an acceptable reorder point. Attempts by CINCPAC and the U.S. Embassy during 1979 to increase IMET funds to $2 million annually to meet the increased training requirements generated by equipment purchases under the Military Bases Agreement compensation package were unsuccessful.²

F-8 Aircraft

An LOA was signed on 17 October 1977 by Philippine officials for 35 F-8H fighter aircraft on an "as is-where is" basis for $11.7 million. Ten air frame "spares" were to stay at Dallas for potential long-term parts support. The other 25 were to be refurbished by LTV (Ling-Temco-Vought) at a cost of $22.8 million. Projected delivery of the initial aircraft was April and of the remainder, between September and December 1978; however, the first F-8H did not reach Basa AB, R.P. until 6 July.³

Numerous problems plagued the program throughout 1978 ranging from delays in training, acquisition of spare parts, support equipment and ammunition and faulty refurbishing procedures, to financial and computer problems. The Philippine Air Force (PAF) development of requirements for ejection cartridges, pylons, racks, launchers, personal flying and survival gear, and armament was on a piece-meal basis with commensurate delays in processing of the

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.; J471 Point Paper (C), 5 Feb 80, Subj: Philippines Security Assistance Program (U), DECL 5 Feb 86.
necessary LOAs. The LTV contract called for training 18 pilots and 60 technicians in Dallas starting in March 1978 and ending in January 1979. However, the only two-seat F-8 in existence (which had been leased from NASA) crashed and alternate arrangements had to be made for pilot training. The U.S. Navy had estimated that $3.2 million worth of F-8H repair parts and aerospace ground equipment, excess to Service requirements, would be available. However, due to computer problems and improper requisition coding, availability was lower than anticipated. As of December 1978 the Navy International Logistics Control Office (NAVILCO) was still attempting to clear the backlog of approximately 1,000 requisitions.  

As a result of the requisition backlog, the Navy suspended processing of all requisitions on 5 January 1979 in order to purify NAVILCO records. It was not until 15 March that the CNO granted authority for LTV to resume submitting requisitions to NAVILCO, again on a "fill or kill" basis. In addition, the CNO advised that once gross requirements list requisitioning was completed, requisitioning authority through the Navy would be terminated. Therefore, when LTV investigated purchase of the non-available items from commercial sources and encountered price increases of up to 600 percent, it was recommended to the AFP that an FMS repair parts case be established. By September U.S. Navy participation in the F-8 program ended; however, it was not until 31 October that the AFP requested a direct requisitioning procedures FMS case for spares. FMS case RAF was issued on 15 November with an initial value of $200,000 for one year. 

In mid-February 1978 the U.S. Embassy in Manila forwarded an LOA request from the AFP for 700,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition. In a May message to the CNO, CINCPAC pointed out that air-to-air and air-to-ground gunnery training had not been conducted by LTV as part of the initial CONUS contractor training package. Therefore, the PAF would have to conduct this training after the aircraft arrived in the Philippines and would need ammunition which the PAF would consider the United States should provide. The FMS case was for 400,000 rounds from stock assets at $6.9 million and 300,000 rounds from production for $16.3 million. The CNO released the LOA for the 400,000 rounds on 31 October; however, at the request of the AFP, the deadline for acceptance was extended three times through 30 May 1979. The LOA was finally signed in April and in June the AFP requested accelerated delivery of 100,000 rounds, if possible from in-country sources. In September the CNO, after

1. Ibid.
consultation with PACFLT, proposed that the request be filled from stocks at Subic Naval Magazine and that the FMS case be converted to a MAP line. Transfer of the 100,000 rounds to the PAF was accomplished at Subic on 11 November.1

The AFP included 50 WALLEYE/BULLPUP air-to-ground missiles in the base compensation military equipment requirements list in December 1977 as a mid-range objective for use on F-8H aircraft. The March 1978 DOD Equipment Survey Team report, however, listed these missiles as equipment which "cannot or should not be provided." In response to a July 1978 request from JUSMAG Philippines, CINCPAC confirmed with the CNO that there were no BULLPUPs excess to U.S. Navy requirements or in a "ready-for-issue" status. Nevertheless, that same month the PAF began staffing an LOA request despite indications that the AFP financial posture would preclude purchase.2

On 24 April 1979 the AFP formally requested an LOA for 72 BULLPUP missiles and in May CINCPAC supported the acquisition, contingent upon a determination that follow-on support would be available. The State Department indicated opposition to the request based on the fact that no precision-guided weapons should be introduced into Southeast Asia. In view of the estimated cost of $4.5 million for 72 BULLPUPs and potential non-availability, the U.S. Embassy was requested to discuss the subject with GOP officials. No further action transpired on the BULLPUP request during the remainder of the year.3

By year's end one of the F-8Hs had crashed, six of the remaining 24 were moved into flyable storage, the operational readiness rate was established at 60 percent, and pilots had received practically no bombing or gunnery training. (The 100,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition from Subic were received unlinked.) However, despite the above problems, disillusionment with LTV support, and high cost of spares, the PAF seemed committed to making the F-8H program successful.4

3. Ibid.; SECSTATE 115895/080046Z May 79 (TS), GDS 5/7/85.
4. J471 HistSum Dec 79 (TS), DECL 8 Jan 86.
**SINGAPORE (U)**

### (U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>LAND AREA</strong></th>
<th>585 Sq Km</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS</strong></td>
<td>3 Nautical Miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE</strong></td>
<td>None Claimed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POPULATION</strong></td>
<td>3,554,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANNUAL GROWTH</strong></td>
<td>1.2 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LITERACY RATE</strong></td>
<td>70 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIFE EXPECTANCY</strong></td>
<td>75 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA</strong></td>
<td>0.86 Acre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT</strong></td>
<td>$6.65 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PER CAPITA</strong></td>
<td>$2,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEFENSE BUDGET</strong></td>
<td>$413.2 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET</strong></td>
<td>16.6 Percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TYPE OF GOVERNMENT** Republic within Commonwealth

### (U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>U.S. AMBASSADOR</strong></th>
<th>HON. Richard F. KNEIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>COUNSELOR</strong></td>
<td>CAPT Peter B. EASTON, USN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (SAF), p. 72, REV 16 Feb 80.
(Excess) Microwave Equipment

(U) In January 1979 JUSMAG Philippines advised that two pieces of communications equipment had been declared as excess to the requirements of the 1961st Communications Group at Clark AB. This equipment consisted of a microwave system connecting Mt. Cabuyo with the Dau complex at Clark and a tropospheric scatter terminal on Mt. Cabuyo including two 30-foot dish-antennae and one 120-foot billboard tropo antenna. A canvas of AFP communication elements revealed that the PAF desired to acquire this equipment for support of Project FORESIGHT SIERRA and expansion of the microware system to Palawan Island. (FORESIGHT SIERRA was an AFP upgrade program of Philippine fixed communications which had begun in 1969.) CINCPAC confirmed availability of the equipment with PACAF and requested that the DSAA establish an excess defense article line in the Philippine FY 79 MAP to cover the estimated acquisition cost of $865,000. Transfer of the equipment was authorized by the DSAA on 14 May.¹

Singapore

Overview

Because of Singapore's sound fiscal condition, security assistance consisted solely of FMS cash purchases in the form of major equipment systems, spare parts support, and selected technical and professional training. The Government of Singapore (GOS) defense budget for FY 79 constituted approximately 17 percent of the national budget or $2.7 billion (U.S.). As in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia, Singapore's reaction to the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea was to strengthen its military forces as rapidly as possible. During 1979 delivery of 21 F-5E/F aircraft purchased in 1977 was completed and 234 armored personnel carriers were acquired from the Food Machinery Corporation. However, two C-130B cargo transports were still being sought and pilot retention/training was a problem.²

Coproduction of Grenade Launchers and 40mm Ammunition

In March 1977 the GOS requested an LOA on the technical data package (TDP) for the M-203 grenade launcher. The GOS proposed a joint production

¹ J471 HistSums Jan, Feb, Apr, May 79 (U); CINCPAC 250251Z Jan 79 (U); CHJUSMAGPHIL 040619Z Apr 79 (U).
² AMEMB Singapore 4043/021114Z May 79 (S), RDS-3, 5/2/99; J472 HistSum Aug 79 (S), DECL 10 Sep 79, PACAF 242200Z Nov 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 23 Nov 85.
venture with the Royal Thai Government (RTG) amounting to an estimated 2,000-
2,500 for the GOS and 5,500-6,000 for the RTG per year. After some delay, an
LOA was signed in February 1978. However, it was not until September 1978
that certain other requirements for the TDP transfer were fulfilled--30 day
notification to the Congress and assurances from the RTG that no launchers
would be made available to any third party without U.S. Government approval.
By the end of 1978 the GOS and the RTG expressed interest in coproduction
of the ammunition (40mm) used with the M-203 in order to support the entire
system in case it was phased out by the U.S. Army.\footnote{1}

(9) In January 1979 GOS and RTG desires to coproduce the 40mm ammuni-
tion were affirmed and CINCPAC supported the program based upon the contrib-
ution it would make towards self-sufficiency and the enhancement of a mutual
support capability of nations friendly to the United States. Sale of the
TDP was approved by the State Department in April, but use of the data was
restricted to study and evaluation purposes only. Should actual production
be desired, State would seek Presidential approval. In September LOAs were
signed for the 40mm cartridge TDP and fuze primer services with a promise of
delivery by the end of January 1980.\footnote{2}

A-4 Aircraft

(9) Arrangements to purchase replacement SKYHAWK attack aircraft were
made by the GOS in 1978 and an LOA for 20 A-4Cs was signed in May 1979.
Increasing tension in Indonesia during early 1979 prompted a review of GOS
air defense capabilities and, as a result, GOS officials felt additional
A-4C squadrons were warranted. In June, citing the regional military and
political changes, the Minister of Defense initiated a request for 50 addi-
tional A-4Cs. Plans were also made to enlarge and accelerate pilot training
facilities and programs. The Country Team supported the request for its
potential stabilizing effects throughout the region and program compatibility
with Malaysia and Indonesia.\footnote{3}

(9) In response to a CINCPAC request, additional supporting rationale
was provided by the USDAO in July. The purchase would demonstrate resolve

\footnotesize{\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l}
2. J472 HistSum Jan 79 (C), DECL 9 Feb 83; J472 HistSums Apr, May 79 (U);
   USDAO Singapore 080644Z Feb 80 (C), DECL 8 Feb 86.
   May 79 (U); J472 HistSum Jun 79 (C), DECL 10 Jul 85; AMEMB Singapore 6499/
   221044Z Jun 79 (S), GDS 20/6/79.
\end{tabular}
\end{center}}
to counter potential communist aggression in support of ASEAN regional stability. It would also further U.S. policy objectives in maintaining access to Singapore's maritime and air facilities and the important lines of communications which linked the Middle East to Pacific areas. CINCPAC endorsed the FMS cash sale and in August State Department approval was given. In September it was determined A-4 assets were not sufficient and 1 NA-4C and 1 TA-4B were substituted to bring the total of A-4s to 70.1

A-4 Training in the Philippines

($) Early in 1975 the GOS approached U.S. officials on the subject of continuation training of A-4 SKYHAWK pilots at a U.S. base in the Philippines. the U.S. Government had advised the GOS it would be willing to examine the question once the GOS obtained approval of the Government of the Philippines (GOP). Training areas in Singapore consisted of limited facilities in extremely congested airspace in competition with commercial aviation. Moreover, according to a report by CINCPACAF, the only RSAF gunnery range was "practically worthless." Between 1976 and 1978 planning had been held in abeyance because of the sensitivity of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) negotiations between the Philippines and the United States. In October 1978 the Singaporeans were given qualified approval to resume discussions with the GOP for A-4 training.2

($) In February and March 1979 the governments of Singapore and the Philippines negotiated agreement on the concept for pilot training at Clark AB. A target implementation date of 1 June 1979 was established which would be preceded by an RSAF survey team visit to the Philippines. On 13 March the U.S. Ambassador to Singapore recommended that the United States "do whatever is necessary to implement the project as soon as possible." At a 26 March meeting with the RSAF Commander, the U.S. Air Attache in Singapore clarified procedural aspects of Article XXV of the 1947 MBA which required formal prior notification by the GOP to the U.S. Government of any plans to introduce third country activity at U.S. facilities in the Philippines. Meanwhile planning between U.S. and RSAF military working levels was carefully limited in order to permit the GOP to take the notification initiative before

finalizing arrangements. Nevertheless, Hq USAF was directed to prepare an
LOA for the training in order to expedite implementation once the GOP approach
had been made. When no GOP notification had been received by early May,
CINCPAC directed CINCPACREP Philippines to discuss the problem informally
with the Philippine Co-chairman of the Mutual Defense Board and Chief, Armed
Forces of the Philippines, General Espino. General Espino had presumed
(erroneously) that the project had been approved by the former U.S. Under
Secretary of State Habib in 1976. On 14 May a note of approval was issued
by the GOP Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy in Manila.
The note provided for a detachment of not more than 75 RSAF members and eight
aircraft to conduct training of two-month increments for a year. The U.S.
response provided for expansion of the agreement to approximately 80 RSAF
members, substitution of British Hawker-Hunter aircraft or F-5s for A-4s,
and leeway for other minor modifications.\footnote{1}

\footnote{2} On 2 August the first contingent of RSAF Hawker-Hunter aircraft
arrived at Clark and low-level naval and air-to-ground training commenced on
9 August. By November the success of the program was obvious because the
RSAF leadership was considering a request to double the size of the program
for the following year. FMS case cost for the first year was estimated in
excess of $1 million. \footnote{2}

\footnote{3} On 19 December on a training mission, three of the Singapore A-4s
crashed, in formation, in high terrain on Luzon. The four crewmembers aboard
were killed. Following their disappearance, aircraft of the 33rd Aerospace
Rescue and Recovery Squadron searched the difficult terrain in bad weather
and located the wreckage a few days later. \footnote{3}

Improved HAWK

\footnote{4} On 9 May 1977 an LOA was requested for an Improved HAWK (I-HAWK)
battery and assault fire unit at a total cost of $50 million. The I-HAWK
was to replace a UK BLOODHOUND system which would reach the end of its service

\footnote{1} AMEMB Singapore 1240/090516Z Feb 79 (\footnote{6}), DECL 6 Feb 84; AMEMB Singapore
2266/130135Z Mar 79 (\footnote{6}), RDS-3, 3/13/89; AMEMB Singapore 2819/280848Z Mar
79 (\footnote{6}), RDS-1, 3/28/89; SECSTATE 100333/210020Z Apr 79 (\footnote{6}), GDS 4/18/85;
J7472 HistSum May 79 (\footnote{6}), DECL 11 Jun 83; AMEMB Manila 9799/180918Z May 79
(\footnote{6}), GDS 5/18/85; CINCPACREPPHIL 230745Z May 79 (\footnote{6}), DECL 31 May 80.
\footnote{2} PACAF 091800Z Aug 79 (U)\footnote{6}(BOM); PACAF 242200Z Nov 79 (\footnote{6})(BOM), DECL 23 Nov
85; PACAF 042304Z May 79 (\footnote{6}), DECL 2 May 80.
\footnote{3} Clark CCP 190545Z Dec 79 (U); Clark CCP 191000Z Dec 79 (U).

\footnote{4}
life in 1981. CINCPAC supported acquisition of the I-HAWK in the FY 78 and
FY 79 JSOP/MSAP and, on 29 November 1977, recommended that the JCS initiate
immediate action to secure approval for the sale to the GOS. On 6 December
1977 the JCS advised that President Carter had turned down the Singapore
request, primarily because it would introduce new technology into the region.1

(S) During a 12 March 1979 meeting on problems related to clearance of
U.S. Air Force aircraft through Singapore, Defense Minister Howe Yoon Chong
formally requested reconsideration of the sale of the I-HAWK missile in an
Aide Memoire presented to Ambassador Kneip. Recent instability in Indochina,
the Minister stated, "added urgency to the request." The Embassy stated that
the sale of the I-HAWK to Singapore had come to be very much in the interest
of the United States and therefore strongly recommended reversal of the 1977
decision. Singapore was one of the world's most vulnerable countries to
air attack. The world's third largest oil refinery complex was crammed onto
several tiny off-shore islands which provided uniquely concentrated targets
for hostile aircraft. The world's third largest port was equally compressed
along the south coast areas. Whichever power controlled the Malacca Strait
also controlled the main sea passage between the Indian and Pacific oceans,
including Japan's lifeline to Middle East oil.2

(S) In supporting the request to the JCS, CINCPAC restated his November
1977 position and emphasized the strategic importance of Singapore and GOS
contributions to U.S. interests, such as the short fuse clearance of KC-135s
to land at Tengah AB en route to Saudi Arabia in March (see the Operations
Chapter of this history). CINCPAC noted that the sale would also provide a
positive signal of U.S. support for legitimate GOS defense requirements. On
17 May the Secretary of State forwarded the text of a letter from President
Carter to Prime Minister Lee which stated in part:3

In view of recent developments in the ASEAN region, I
have reviewed again your interest in a more effective air
defense system and am pleased to inform you that I have
approved the sale of the I-HAWK surface-to-air missile system
to your government...I believe this action provides renewed
evidence of continuing American concern for the security of
your country and of the region....

2. J472 HistSum Mar 79 (S), DECL 9 Apr 85; AMEMB Singapore 2266/130135Z Mar 79,
RDS-3, 3/13/89; AMEMB Singapore 2635/230218Z Mar 79 (S)(EX), DECL RDS-3,
3/23/94.
3. CINCPAC 162103Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 14 Mar 85; J472 HistSum May 79 (S), DECL 8
Jun 85; SECSTATE 125484/171439Z May 79 (S), GDS 5/15/85.
THAILAND (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA ........................................ 512,800 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS .................. 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE ......................... Not Claimed
POPULATION ........................................... 65,205,000
ANNUAL GROWTH .................................. 2.5 Percent
LITERACY RATE ................................... 70 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY ................................... 61 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITAL .......................... 1.7 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT I 1978 .................... $ 21.7 Billion
PER CAPITA (1979) ................................ $ 451
DEFENSE BUDGET (FY 79) ......................... $ 868 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET .................. 20.6 Percent
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT .............................. Constitutional Monarchy
KING ......................................................... PHUMIPHON Adulyadej
PRIME MINISTER ................................. GEN (Ret) KHANDSAK Chamsak
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ....................... GEN SOEM Na Nokdoo
ACM TEERIWI Chusriyai
SUPREME CDR, ARMED FORCES ............. GEN SOEM Na Nokdoo
CINC ARMY ................................................. GEN PRIN Thammasan
CINC NAVY ............................................. ARM EAST Nakhon
CINC AIR FORCE .................................. ACM PHANIKAM Khorat

(U) U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION (U)

U.S. AMBASSADOR .............................. MR. Morton L. ABRAMOWITZ
CHIEF SURVAGTAI ............................. COL. William R. DEANS, USAF

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 80 (S/RE), p. 75.

REVRM 10 Feb 80.
Thailand

Equipment Requirements and Deliveries

(U) In Southeast Asia, 1978 ended with increasing violence on the Vietnam-Kampuchea border and increasing tension between Vietnam and the People's Republic of China (PRC). In Bangkok on 6 November PRC Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping warned Thai officials against Soviet "expansionist activities" (alluding to Soviet military aid to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in Southeast Asia). Fighting between PRC-Kampuchea and SRV forces increased throughout December and on 7 January 1979 SRV armed forces took Phnom Penh and Kompong Som in Kampuchea. 1

2. J476 HistSum Jan 79 (S), DECL 30 Jan 85; AMEMB Bangkok 1163/111256Z Jan 79 (S)(EX), GDS 1/11/85; CHJUSMAGTHAI 150900Z Jan 79 (S), REVW 1/15/85.

2. J476 HistSum Jan 79 (S), DECL 1/30/85; CINCPAC 160503Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 15 Jan 85; CHJUSMAGTHAI 190819Z Jan 79 (S); CINCPAC 260035Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 19 Jan 85.

1. J476 HistSum Feb 79 (S), DECL 9 Mar 85; CINCPAC 150923Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 2/14/85.
2. CINCPAC 160541Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 15 Feb 85; CHUSMAGTHAI 7165/050132Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 2 Mar 86.
1. AMEMB Bangkok 18632/30095QZ May 79 (S), DECL 30 May 84; CINCPAC 022204Z Jun 79 (S), DECL 30 May 85; Washington Post, 30 Jul 79, "Thailand Seeks Loans, Security Arrangements, Following Cutbacks in U.S. Military Assistance," by John Burgess, dateline Bangkok.
2. OSD 175-79/182029Z Jun 79 (S)(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 85.
2. JCS 3480/082104Z Jun 79 (S), DECL 8 Jun 85; CINC PAC 092110Z Jun 79 (S), DECL 8 Jun 85.

2. J472 HistSum Jun 79 (S), DECL 10 Jul 85; CHJUSMAGTHAI 20306/131132Z Jun 79 (S), REVW 13 Jun 85; CINCPAC 170040Z Jun 79 (S), DECL 14 Jun 79.


2. J477 HistSum Sep 79 (C), DECL 10 Oct 85; CINCPAC 210239Z Jul 79 (C), DECL 13 Jul 85; SECDEF 2961/072200Z Aug 79, DECL 31 Jul 85 and 7919/182240Z Sep 79 (C), DECL 18 Sep 85.

3. J477 Point Paper (C), 1 Feb 80, Subj: Thailand Equipment Deliveries (U), DECL 1 Feb 86; Chronology, Chapter XI this history.
CHAPTER VIII--PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--MILITARY PERSONNEL

CINCPAC Manpower Surveys of Headquarters in Korea

(U) When the JCS approved the FY 79 Joint Manpower Program for the newly established Combined Forces Command headquarters in Korea, they directed a space-by-space review of the headquarters after six months of operational experience to be followed by a JCS/Headquarters Department of the Army survey in January 1980. CINCUNC requested that the four headquarters staffs (UNC/CFC/ U.S. Forces Korea/Eighth U.S. Army) be surveyed as an entity because of their unique organizational and operational relationships. As requested by CINCUNC and directed by the JCS, a manpower survey was conducted during the period from 4 June through 14 July 1979. The survey team consisted of five Eighth Army manpower survey specialists and five CINCPAC staff augmentees, who represented the functional areas of personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics and security assistance, and plans. All headquarters staff elements received in-depth on-site appraisals. In excess of 1,900 personnel were interviewed and each major staff agency was briefed upon conclusion of the survey. Cooperation and a positive attitude by all allowed completion of the survey two weeks ahead of schedule.1

(U) The major findings of the survey are highlighted in the material that follows. The absence of an organization and functions manual for the CFC, in sufficient detail to provide managers a clear statement of responsibilities and relationships for each organizational entity, was a significant obstacle to efficient operation of the CFC staff. Recognizing the inherent difficulties in constructing such a document, it remained a vital task that should be accomplished as soon as possible.

(U) The CFC Headquarters was functioning with a diversity between U.S. and ROK personnel in their cultural backgrounds, professional military education, subordinate-to-senior relationships, and staff experience. In some cases functional responsibilities had been overlapping, creating significantly increased coordination requirements through U.S. and ROK channels. This condition had often caused an additional workload for the U.S. Forces Korea/Eighth Army staff. Further, since the CFC was a combined command, all documentation had to be prepared in both English and Hangul, increasing translation requirements with inherent delays. All concerned were working to resolve difficulties in procedures and improve efficiency.

Numerous comments were received by the survey team concerning the limited productivity of short-tour billets. Recognizing the limited number of command-sponsored positions (in which incumbents could be accompanied by their dependents) that could be authorized and the Services' tour length policies, additional emphasis should be given to reducing the time necessary for a replacement to become an effective staff operator. Detailed standing operating procedures and continuity files were suggestions that could contribute to minimizing this persistent problem.

As CINCUNC guidance of 7 November 1978 and Deputy CINCUNC guidance of 22 February 1979 had designated certain CFC staff members to also serve on the UNC staff, a realignment of some UNC staff elements from the U.S. Forces Korea/Eighth Army Joint Manpower Program to the CFC manpower program appeared appropriate. Consideration should be given to accomplishing this realignment during the FY 80 Joint Manpower Program submission. The loss of spaces on one document would compensate for the increase on the other, with no overall increase of in-country spaces.

FY 79 headquarters authorizations had been as follows: Headquarters, U.S. Forces Korea/UNC, 404 spaces; Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, 882; and Headquarters CFC, 195 U.S. full-time spaces and 360 ROK spaces. The survey recommended that the net headquarters changes be an increase of U.S. Forces Korea/UNC by 18, Eighth Army an increase of 25, and CFC an increase of 7. It was noted that a significant number of recommended increases were already being staffed from non-headquarters authorization documents and therefore increases represented no actual increase in personnel performing duty in the respective headquarters.

Headquarters mobilization augmentation requirements were not addressed by the survey team. Such requirements were to be addressed by the commands, to include availability of in-country personnel resources necessary to staff augmentation billets.1

On 7 November the JCS notified CINCPAC that they would not conduct the scheduled January 1980 survey, stating "the PACOM/USFK survey report provided sufficient detailed manpower management information to negate the need for a follow-on manpower survey."2

1. Ibid.
2. J133 HistSum Nov 79 (U)
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Service Manning of Chief, Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan

(U) A triennial review conducted by the JCS provided for Air Force, Army, Navy rotation for the position of Chief, Mutual Defense Assistance Office in Japan. The review was conducted for all security assistance organizations worldwide; the most recent had been approved by the Secretary of Defense in January 1979. That review had supported the CINCPAC recommendation that the Army provide a replacement upon rotation of the Air Force incumbent. CINCPAC, however, subsequently decided to continue Air Force manning for the upcoming tour, and the concurrence of the Ambassador was sought. The Army initially stated its position that the rotation should proceed as scheduled.1

(U) Ambassador Mansfield was out of country when the message was received, but his Charge d'Affaires relayed the Ambassador's thoughts. He said that the rotation matter was one on which the Embassy did not wish to comment, but that the selected officer should "be familiar with the aviation side of the business because the major procurement programs coming up had to do with air equipment."2

(6) CINCPAC advised the JCS that as the near-term emphasis was on air systems, an Air Force officer should be assigned for the next tour, a recommendation the JCS approved on 6 January 1980.3

PACOM Military Customs Conference

(U) The Military Customs Program in the PACOM continued to be managed by CINCPAC, as directed by the Secretary of Defense in 1973. Besides staff officers at the unified and Service headquarters, there were three U.S. Customs Service advisers (one at each of the subordinate unified commands and a third assigned to the CINCPAC Representative Philippines), and a number of full- or part-time military customs inspectors. In 1978 CINCPAC had hosted a conference that included representatives of those agencies plus the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Department of Agriculture. That conference was held in Hawaii.4

(U) CINCPAC hosted a second such annual meeting from 13 to 15 November, this one at John Hay Air Base in the Republic of the Philippines. The CINCPAC Representative Philippines acted as on-scene host and made local arrangements. Approximately 60 participants attended, about double the number from the year before, with substantially the same agencies represented. The workshop portion

1. CINCPAC 222110Z Nov 79 (U)(BOM).
2. SS0 Tokyo 260719Z Nov 79 (U)(BOM).
3. CINCPAC 060054Z Dec 79 (TS)(BOM), DECL 31 Dec 85; JCS 082304Z Jan 80 (U).

CONFIDENTIAL

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of the conference allowed each command to provide updated information to other agencies on their customs and drug trafficking suppression efforts, permitted an exchange of program techniques, and prompted frank discussion and planning concerning the most pressing problems facing PACOM units. Significant contributions were preclearance program implementation, changes to intra/inter-theater movement programs, and standardized training of military customs inspectors. Following the conference, programs were established to implement changes in each of those areas.¹

(U) The PACOM customs program was still considered to be the primary deterrent to transportation of illegal narcotics and other contraband on Defense Department aircraft and ships in the Pacific. While some unusual command arrangements in the Pacific posed challenges for the program managers, solid support from senior commanders to the more than 1,100 PACOM customs inspectors was considered to be clearly evident.²

Headquarters USAF Rated Officer Requirements Policy

(U) On 13 August, Headquarters USAF requested a zero-base review of all rated Air Force pilot and navigator positions within the PACOM as a result of a projected deficit of 2,500 active force pilots in the Air Force. The CINCPAC review culminated in submission of a consolidated change to the Joint Manpower Programs of CINCPAC Headquarters; the Intelligence Center Pacific; COMUS Korea; the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea; and the Combined Forces Command, as reported to Washington on 29 September. The change yielded 14 net conversions of positions from rated to non-rated or specific Air Force Specialty Codes to general AFSC officer requirements. Twelve involved pilot authorizations and 2 were navigator conversions. The USAF was satisfied with the CINCPAC contribution to resolution of its serious manpower rated officer shortage.³

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¹ J111 HistSum Nov 79 (U).
² Ibid.
³ J134 HistSum Sep 79 (U), which cited HQ USAF/MPM/131945Z Aug 79 and CINCPAC 292023Z Sep 79.
SECTION II--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Civilian Employee Cost of Living Allowance

(U) The annual survey for the Cost-of-Living Allowance (COLA) paid to statutory-salaried Federal employees in Hawaii was held in February. All full-time permanent, married male employees were requested to complete a housing cost questionnaire. The surveys were to be used to determine the 1979 COLA. Effective 26 August 1979 that allowance was reduced from 15 percent to 12.5 percent for Federal civilian employees on the island of Oahu.¹

Federal Day 1979 Awards Program

(U) CINCPAC submitted nominees in three categories for the Federal Day awards competition in 1979. Nominees competed with those of many Federal agencies in Hawaii in an annual event sponsored by the Honolulu Federal Executive Board. Mr. Thomas Quijano of the Communications-Data Processing Directorate was nominated as Federal Manager of the Year, Mrs. Shirley A. Streck of the Command History Branch, Joint Secretariat, was nominated as Federal Employee of the Year, and LCOL Robert E. Doty, Jr., USAF, of the Research and Analysis Office, was nominated as Serviceman of the Year. At the awards luncheon on 18 May LCOL Doty was selected as Serviceman of the Year for Hawaii.²

Annual Civilian Performance Ratings

(U) The CINCPAC Performance Rating Board/Incentive Awards Committee met in May to review recommendations for Outstanding Performance Ratings and cash awards for civilian employees of the headquarters for the period from 1 April 1978 to 31 March 1979. Of the 60 persons nominated for an Outstanding Performance Rating, 47 were approved. There had been 31 nominations for cash awards, either Quality Salary Increases or Sustained Superior Performance Awards. Eighteen were approved.³

Factor Evaluation System for Civilian Position Classification

(U) A new Factor Evaluation System for the grading and classification of civilian positions was instituted in 1979 for the secretarial, typing, and clerical positions on the staff. An information session on the new system

¹ J144 HistSums Feb and Aug 79 (U).
² J144 HistSums Mar and May 79 (U).
³ J144 HistSum May 79 (U).
UNCLASSIFIED

was conducted on 28 August, and military and civilian personnel were instructed on the revised procedures by staffing and position classification specialists from the Pearl Harbor Consolidated Civilian Personnel Office.¹

Upward Mobility Program

(U) In December 1976 the first CINCPAC position in the Upward Mobility Program had been announced. The goal of that program was to provide an opportunity for advancement in another occupational field for employees with competitive Civil Service status and potential, whose other assignments had not so provided. Three positions had been filled by the end of 1978. A fourth vacancy was identified in 1979, an Operations Research Assistant (Typing), a GS-6 target position. A female staff member who had been working in the Word Processing Center of the Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate was selected for the job, which was located in the Research and Analysis Office.²

PACOM Visit by CNO Equal Employment Opportunity Team

(U) During the period 24 to 26 September CINCPAC was visited by an EEO official representing the Chief of Naval Operations. The Deputy EEO officer for the CNO and her counterpart from CINCPACFLT said they were favorably impressed with the CINCPAC EEO program. Among their findings were that men tended to populate the upper grades and women the lower grades on the CINCPAC staff. The EEO program was to continue to identify upward mobility billets as vacancies occurred and aggressively recruit women for higher-level jobs. EEO training for supervisors and committee members needed more emphasis. As Outstanding Performance Rating nominations for civilian supervisors were required to bear specific justification regarding EEO performance, those nominations were to be routed through CINCPAC's Deputy EEO officer for specific verification or amplification prior to being forwarded to the Performance Rating Board/Incentive Awards Committee. Finally, the EEO committee should play a greater role in the development of the agency's FY 81 Affirmative Action Plan and also in the self-assessment of that plan.³

Labor Cost Sharing--Japan

(U) Spiraling labor costs had been a continuing concern to U.S. Forces Japan during the 1970's. Based on a December 1977 U.S.-Japan Status of Forces

2. J144 HistSums Jan, Mar 79 (U).
UNCLASSIFIED

Agreement (SOFA) Joint Committee agreement and subsequent Japanese Diet approval, the Government of Japan had assumed some 6 percent of U.S. Forces' Japanese labor costs beginning on 1 April 1978. It had been hoped at that time that the Japanese would subsequently assume an even greater share of those costs.¹

(U) A subsequent U.S.-Japan SOFA Joint Committee Agreement of December 1978 was given final Diet approval in April 1979. By that action, Japan assumed an additional 7 percent of the costs of the U.S. Forces' Japanese labor forces as of 1 April 1979. This brought the total Japan labor cost sharing contribution to about 13 percent and amounted to some $65 million for Japan Fiscal Year 1979 (1 April 1979 to 31 March 1980).²

(U) In regard to the latter agreement, Japanese officials in mid-1978 had indicated willingness to explore additional means of sharing costs of U.S. Forces' Japanese labor. In doing so, a U.S. Forces-proposed release of excess Army Japanese employees on Okinawa became a major concern to the Japanese officials. In consideration of expected additional labor cost sharing assistance, U.S. Forces plans for and actual employee reductions on Okinawa were modified.

(U) The agreement ratified by the Diet in April 1979 called for Japan to pick up all U.S. Forces' Japanese labor costs that exceeded the pay and benefits accorded Japan National Public Service employees. Newly identified costs to be paid by the Japanese Government were (with estimated dollar costs in JFY 79):³

- Ten percent U.S. Forces pay differential ($21.5 million)
- English language allowance (1.5 million)
- Premium pay computations based upon the above two items ($2.5 million)
- Severance/retirement formula excess obligation ($9 million).

(U) At the same time, the Japanese asked for U.S. understanding and cooperation in several areas:⁴

2. J121 HistSum May 79 (U).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
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- Joint Committee agreement that the United States would bear labor costs up to Japan National Public Service (NPS) levels. This included raising specified benefits below NPS to the NPS level (at some $3 million additional annual cost to U.S. Forces).

- Joint Committee agreement that U.S. Forces' wage revisions would follow at the same time and in the same proportion as those for NPS employees.

- Agreement on fine points on retirement pay coverage and scheduled workweek.

- Further U.S. Forces-Japan Defense Facilities Administration Agency discussion on Japanese proposals carried over from the 1977 labor cost sharing agreements, i.e., incorporation of some Japanese labor laws into the labor contract, consultations for shifting operations to private contractors, and provision to the Government of Japan of long-term employment projections.

Revised Wage Schedules for U.S. Forces Korea Local National Employees

(U) Revised schedules of wages for U.S. Forces local national employees in Korea were approved jointly and issued by the PACOM Service component commands under authorities delegated by the Secretary of Defense. Those revisions were based on data obtained during a survey of 84 private and public sector firms in four Korean urban areas during April and May 1979. The revised benefits, effective 1 July 1979, resulted in an average increase of 22.4 percent for some 22,000 employees paid from appropriated and non-appropriated funds. Included in the increase was the raising of the payment-in-kind allowance from 48 to 78 won per hour above base pay to each employee and a reduction in the Consolidated Allowance Payment of from 6.9 to 5.7 percent of total compensation. A decrease in a special premium pay for key level engineers was found to be in order. (See the 1978 history for a discussion of engineer pay.) This resulted in a reduction from 25 to 20 percent premium for top level engineers and architects (Korea GS-12 and 13) and from 20 percent to zero at the Korean GS-11 level.1

(U) The U.S. General Accounting Office, in a 1977 review of U.S. Forces Korea employment compensation, had been critical of the method for setting pay rates. That agency, as endorsed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,

1. J121 HistSum Jun 79 (U).

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had recommended that the industrial average pay rate (as developed by the wage surveys) be matched to a step in the U.S. Forces pay schedule that represented the average in-grade length of service of U.S. Forces employees. For Korea, that "average" step was 7.5. The traditional pay setting practice had been to place the industrial pay average at the mid-step (step 5), with step rates on either side of step 5 being calculated at 4 percent intervals. The General Accounting Office had estimated that Korean employees were overcompensated by 10 percent through matching industrial pay to the fifth step, rather than the employee average step of 7.5. The Office of the Secretary of Defense had informed the GAO that the U.S. Forces Korea would move toward the average step over a 3-year period (expandable to 5 years) starting in 1979. Pay rate matching was adjusted for 1979 from one to four percent for various grade categories toward meeting that goal.¹

(U) Korean industry practice was found to have multiple steps within pay grades with a broad range of rates between the in-hire and top step. In order to move closer to prevailing practice, two additional steps were added to pay schedules for each grade level. Those were termed longevity steps and required 3 years of service at the previous step. An increase in waiting period from six months to a year was also established for steps 2, 3, and 4.

(U) U.S. Forces marine employees (there were approximately 89) had been previously compensated through the use of separately issued marine pay schedules. These were phased into existing pay levels on the manual and non-manual schedules beginning 1 July 1979. Separate marine pay schedules were discontinued because an inadequate sample of industry job matches was found.²

(U) Private sector data were collected on a number of compensation-type fringe benefits, several of which were found to be prevailing practice. Examples were health benefits, tuition assistance, recognition of special family events, and company picnics. Under guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, action on these was deferred until average industry matched more closely to the average tenure of U.S. Forces employees, as discussed above. COMUS Korea and the in-country commands, however, were planning to develop a health benefits plan proposal for consideration.³

Korean Local National Employees Severance Pay Plan

(U) In 1979 the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. Treasury Department approved, and COMUS Korea gained U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement

¹ Ibid.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
Joint Committee agreement to implement a severance pay conversion and liquidation plan applicable to some 15,000 Korean National appropriated fund employees of the U.S. Forces Korea. COMUS Korea estimated that this action would result in cost avoidance of $75 million over the first 5 years, increasing to $284 million over the first 10 years.¹

(U) A similar severance liquidation and employee-banked:severance account plan had been in force for non-appropriated fund activities in Korea since 1968. This had been expanded into a uniform severance pay plan for all non-appropriated fund activities in 1978.²

(U) The U.S. General Accounting Office, in a 1977 review of Korean foreign national compensation plans and retirement benefits, had recommended that a severance pay liquidation-conversion plan along the lines of the non-appropriated fund program be applied for appropriated fund Korean National employees. This had been recommended to achieve similar cost-avoidance benefits in the appropriated fund area, thus avoiding the costly annual escalation of severance pay accruals under the existing plan. A U.S. Forces Korea six-months feasibility study had been conducted in line with the General Accounting Office's recommendation.³

(U) In May 1978 two U.S. Forces Korea representatives made presentations in Hawaii to the PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee and in Washington, D.C., to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Service headquarters on a proposed appropriated fund severance pay liquidation and conversion plan. This was followed by a formal proposal from COMUS Korea in July 1978, which was concurred in by the PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee and endorsed by CINCPAC to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for interdepartmental coordination and approval. Additional information was supplied to Washington over the following several months on financial features of the proposal.³

(U) The Department of the Treasury provided its concurrence in January 1979, with a proviso that agreement reached with the host government be precleared by the Treasury Department. The Office of the Secretary of Defense authorized the commencement of negotiations with Korea.

(U) Upon introduction of the severance pay conversion proposal to the U.S.-ROK SOFA Joint Committee, the matter was referred to the SOFA Labor Subcommittee for review and recommendations. The subcommittee requested that

1. J121 HistSum May 79 (U).
3. J121 HistSum May 79 (U).
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agreement be reached first by the U.S. Forces with the employee union. A written agreement with the union was consummated on 4 April and referred to the ROK's Administration for Labor Affairs for concurrence prior to placement before the SOFA Labor Subcommittee. Over the following several weeks, intra-ROK Government coordination was achieved by the Administration for Labor Affairs. An updated management-union Memorandum of Understanding of 4 May was referred via CINCPAC for Defense and Treasury Department approval. Following that approval on 21 May, the plan was presented to the SOFA Labor Subcommittee and, subsequently, formally agreed to by the SOFA Joint Committee on 29 May.¹

(U) The severance pay conversion plan was applicable to appropriated fund Korean National employees on the rolls of U.S. Forces Korea on or after 1 May 1979. Payment of all accrued severance pay through 30 April 1979, at a high-line, reduction in force-rate, was placed in individual employee bank accounts in a bank selected by the employee. Deposits were made on 31 May 1979 with a proviso that bank passbooks would be in employee hands by 11 June 1979. Employees were granted the option of withdrawing money from the banks or leaving it on deposit in an interest bearing account (some 18 percent annually). The rate of severance pay for service after 30 April 1979 was one month's average of the total wages received during the highest three consecutive months of the 12 months preceding 31 March of each succeeding year. This would be placed in employee bank accounts annually. The U.S. Government had no further liability once payment was made to the bank. Employees separated by reduction in force or death would have their service lengthened, for severance pay purposes, by the amount of their accumulated unused sick leave. Those separated by reduction in force would also be awarded an additional amount of one month's normal wages.²

Collective Bargaining in the Philippines

(U) Negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement between the U.S. bases in the Philippines and the Federation of Filipino Civilian Employees Associations had begun on 1 November 1978. They were finally concluded on 11 April 1979. The union, under terms of the U.S.-Republic of the Philippines Bases Labor Agreement of 1968, represented the 20,000 Filipino direct hire employees of the United States military forces in the Philippines.³

(U) In preparation for the negotiations, the U.S. negotiating team traveled from the Philippines to Hawaii to meet with the PACOM Joint Labor Policy

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. J121 HistSum Apr 79 (U).

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Committee from 3 to 5 October 1978. Issues were discussed, strategy was developed, and the PACOM committee's management negotiating parameters were developed and presented on 97 union and 28 management proposals.

(U) During early phases of in-country negotiations, proposed agreement provisions were looked at singly. A number were initialed off as noncontroversial and acceptable to the U.S. representative and to the union president. Those not agreed to by both parties were set aside for further discussion and negotiation.

(U) At the end of 1978 management could not agree to union demands for:

1. Binding arbitration for discipline cases
2. Agency fee (union dues from all employees, both union members and nonmembers)
3. Retaining nonnegotiable compensation provisions in or as part of the agreement
4. Mandatory acceptance of volunteers for reduction in force
5. Philippine Medicare coverage for all employees
6. Deletion of Patron Service and intermittent employment categories
7. Guaranteed minimum number of hours for part-time employees
8. A 1,000 peso bonus to each employee at the time of signing the new agreement.

Retaining nonnegotiable compensation provisions in or as part of the agreement and Philippine Medicare coverage were nonnegotiable under terms of the U.S.-Philippine Bases Labor Agreement.

(U) Management items not acceptable to the union included:

1. Removal of managers, supervisors, and security personnel from the bargaining unit

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

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SECRET

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
COMMAND HISTORY

1979

Appendix I — TAIWAN WRAP-UP

Prepared by the Command History Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861
1980

SECRET
FOREWORD

This appendix to the CINCPAC Command History for 1979 discusses the actions taken by U.S. Forces on Taiwan after President Carter's normalization announcement of 15 December 1978, until their withdrawal on 30 April 1979. It also discusses the political and military mechanisms through which the withdrawal or other disposition of U.S. assets on Taiwan was accomplished from 1 May through 31 December 1979.

During the latter period, CINCPAC's interest in the Taiwan withdrawal was vested in the Provisional Plans Office. This office, comprised primarily of personnel formerly assigned to the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, provided the transitional military expertise needed to coordinate CINCPAC's interests with those of other involved agencies.

Used in conjunction with, and complementary to, the terminal history of the Taiwan Defense Command (Annex E, CINCPAC Command History 1978), this volume constitutes a valuable reference to a successful U.S. military and diplomatic operation during a politically sensitive period in U.S. history.

John L. Wagner
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director, Logistics-Security Assistance
PREFACE

This appendix to the CINCPAC Command History for 1979 is prepared in two parts, consecutively paginated. Part I covers the period 15 December 1978 through 30 April 1979; Part II covers the period from 1 May through 31 December 1979. Each part contains chapters on plans, operations, personnel, organization, logistics, security assistance and communications. Intelligence is not included. At the end of this volume are several key documents pertaining to U.S.-Taiwan relations.

The undersigned wrote this appendix while attached to the CINCPAC Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate after the Provisional Plans Office was disestablished on 31 December 1979. The author was formerly on the staff of the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command and a member of that command's withdrawal committee, subsequently assigned to the Provisional Plans Office as Chief, Administrative/Logistics Division.

Acknowledgment is made of assistance from CINCPAC action officers, primarily in the Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate. Also helpful were comments and suggestions from Colonel Jack H. Sandstrom, USAF, former USTDC Chief of Staff and Director, Provisional Plans Office. Editing was by the CINCPAC Command Historian and the final manuscript was produced by the J4 Word Processing Center.

R. F. WORSENA
Commander, SC, USN
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A—MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY

B—TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON 15 DECEMBER 1978

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PART I
15 December 1978 - 30 April 1979
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Withdrawal Plan

(SYNOFORN) Subsequent to the issuance of the Shanghai Communique of 1972, which announced on-going efforts toward normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), a gradual reduction of military units and personnel began on Taiwan. Early in October 1978, the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC), RADM James B. Linder, USN, directed his staff to prepare a plan for the administrative withdrawal of all U.S. Forces from Taiwan under peacetime conditions. Because of political sensitivity, the development of such a plan was held very closely by the USTDC staff; other U.S. military commands were not advised of the undertaking. After approval of the draft by Admiral Linder, the plan was to have been distributed to other U.S. commanders on Taiwan for review and supporting plan development. The short title of the plan was USTDC OPLAN 506X, later assigned the nickname BATTERY PLATE. Although identified as an OPLAN, it was in actuality an administrative plan to provide for the withdrawal of U.S. personnel and materiel resources. COMUSTDC set a target date of December 1978 for his approval of the draft plan; the eventual goal was approval by CINCPAC and the JCS by 15 March 1979.

(SYNOFORN) The plan was drafted on the basis of two primary assumptions: that a general peacetime environment would prevail during execution, and that the Taiwan government would impose no hinderences or undue restrictions. Thus, when President Carter announced, on 15 December 1978, that diplomatic relations with China would be established, and that formal relations with Taiwan would be severed on 1 January 1979, a withdrawal plan was already in being. The President had declared that all U.S. Forces would be withdrawn by 30 April 1979; as drafted, OPLAN 506X had provided for a "hasty withdrawal" option of 90 days or less and an "orderly withdrawal" option of up to 180 days.

1. Text of Joint Communique issued by the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, 27 Feb 72, in Shanghai; Operation BATTERY PLATE, USTDC OPLAN 506X (SYNE) by USTDC J3, downgrade to (S) on 31 Dec 81, DECL 31 Dec 87.
2. Text of the President's Address to the Nation, 15 Dec 78.
Planning Sequence

(S/NOFORIN) When the Presidential announcement was made the plan was in draft, ready for presentation to Admiral Linder and distribution to other U.S. commanders on Taiwan. By that time, key personnel of these commands had been informed of the plan's existence. By 17 December 1978, the original plan had been coordinated with all U.S. commanders on the island.

(S/NOFORIN) Because the Presidential announcement established a 120-day period to accomplish the withdrawal, specific milestones were developed for that period, but the original plan options were retained pending further guidance. The modified plan was approved by COMUSTDC and submitted to CINCPAC for review, modification and forwarding to the JCS for final approval. CINCPAC's modifications included the retitling of the withdrawal options to "orderly", for the new 120-day period, "expanded" for a period of 121-180 days, and retained "hasty" for 90 days or less. As discussed elsewhere in this history, CINCPAC also deleted from the plan the designation of COMUSTDC as the "on-island commander with operational control/administrative control of all U.S. Forces on Taiwan." In lieu thereof, CINCPAC designated COMUSTDC as the "single on-island commander for coordination and control of withdrawal actions" in a separate directive on 20 December 1978. The plan was forwarded to the JCS by CINCPAC on 27 December; the JCS approved the plan for execution on 30 December 1978.

Operation Plans

Post PRC Recognition - Pre-MDT Termination

(S) As a result of the decision to sever relations with Taiwan and terminate the MDT, the need for OPLANS associated with Taiwan would cease on 31 December 1979. For 1979 the OPLANS needed to be reviewed to determine

1. COMUSTDC 170800Z Dec 78 (S), REVW 20 Dec 86; CINCPAC 270345Z Dec 78 (S/NE), REVW 22 Dec 98; CINCPAC 202336Z Dec 78 (S), REVW 20 Dec 86; JCS 301745Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 28 Dec 84.
CHAPTER II
PERSONNEL

SECTION I--DEPARTURE FROM TAIWAN

(S/N) (SYNCHRONIZED) OPLAN 506X called for the departure of military personnel and their dependents to meet established milestones. The draft plan submitted by COMUSTDC recommended 30-day incremental milestones (D-90, D-60 and D-30). As approved by the JCS and CINCPAC, 506X provided for the following personnel milestones:

D-60 (28 Feb 79) - 20% personnel and dependents withdrawn.

D-30 (31 Mar 79) - 40% personnel, 100% dependents withdrawn. All household goods removed.

D-Day (30 Apr 79) - 100% personnel removed.

(S/N) COMUSTDC advised CINCPAC that the approved time phasing was reasonable and provided flexibility but could be misinterpreted as maximum goals by supporting commands. Therefore, unless otherwise directed, COMUSTDC would pursue originally proposed percentages. CINCPAC responded that the time-phased percentages selected were modifications which permitted time to make decisions on major withdrawal issues and were not as restrictive during the first 30 days of withdrawal. The revised percentages were considered minimums to be used as a guide and could be exceeded in order to meet D-Day requirements.

(U) When 506X was developed, no particular time of the year was envisioned to match the number of days required to depart Taiwan. With D-Day equating to 30 April 1979, a genuine concern was expressed as to the impact on school age children, especially high school seniors. In addition, as military personnel were identified to remain until April 1979, dependents and their sponsors sought waivers to allow families to leave Taiwan together. The plan provided for dependents to be transferred with their sponsors aboard the same carriers, when feasible. The knowledge that the spring break for schools on Taiwan was the week of 9 April, and the school year third quarter ended on 6 April, became key factors in decisions regarding waiver requests.

1. Operation BATTERY PLATE, USTDC OPLAN 506X, (SYNCHRONIZED) by USTDC J3, downgrade to C/NF on 31 Dec 81, declassify on 31 Dec 87.
2. COMUSTDC 030508Z Jan 79 (SYNCHRONIZED), DECL 1 Jan 87; CINCPAC 060346Z Jan 79 (SYNCHRONIZED), DECL 4 Jan 85.
3. COMUSTDC 030731Z Jan 79 (SYNCHRONIZED), DECL 1 May 79.
Military Members

The USTDC proposed OPLAN 506X identified COMUSTDC as the on-island commander with operational control (OPCON)/administrative control (ADCON) of all U.S. Forces on Taiwan. With this authority, USTDC planned to centralize the management of personnel actions and to coordinate all personnel actions for all Services and functions on island. However, because the Service components and CINCPAC did not feel that ADCON was necessary, COMUSTDC was designated as the single on-island commander for coordination and control of withdrawal actions.

The USTDC personnel branch was not staffed to handle all personnel actions for the 26 commands located on island. It was planned that the USTDC personnel element would be augmented from those commands on island providing personnel support functions (Navy - Headquarters Support Activity, Taipei (HSA), Army - United States Army Communications Command -Taiwan (USACC), Air Force - 6217th Air Base Squadron). Without both OPCON and ADCON authority, it became imperative that close coordination between USTDC, the three component commands and the Service personnel centers off-island be established. As a first step, COMUSTDC requested that the Service military personnel centers freeze all personnel assignments to Taiwan.

In anticipation of receiving OPCON of U.S. Forces (less DAO), he also placed all personnel on Taiwan on operational hold until a retention review, to support the withdrawal, was completed. Although the Air Force Military Personnel Center (AFMPC), Randolph AFB, Texas, was the Air Force counterpart to the Navy’s Bureau of Personnel, Washington, D.C. and the Army’s Military Personnel Center, Alexandria, Virginia, it was not the central point for issuance of orders. The majority of Air Force personnel on Taiwan were Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) assets. PACAF was designated, by AFMPC, to act as focal point for all USAF commands on Taiwan and to assign personnel against PACAF in-theater requirements first. The remaining personnel were referred to AFMPC for disposition. PACAF, in turn, delegated initial coordination to the 3rd Combat Support Group, Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, which provided normal personnel support to Taiwan-assigned Air Force personnel. With this fragmented control, personnel coordination was made more difficult for Air Force personnel. Specific details concerning Air Force related personnel withdrawal problems are contained in the COMUSTDC Terminal Command History.

1. COMUSTDC 170800Z Dec 78 (S), REVW 20 Dec 86; CINCPAC 270345Z Dec 78 (S/NF), REVW 22 Dec 98; HQ PACAF 200210Z Dec 78 (S/NF), REVW 17 Dec 98; CDRUSACSG 210200Z Dec 78 (S/NF), REVW 17 Dec 98.
2. COMUSTDC 170420Z Dec 78 (S/NF), DG/C/16 Dec 86; COMUSTDC 170709Z Dec 78 (S/NF), DG/C/16 Dec 86; HQ AFMPC 202345Z Dec 78 (U); HQ AFMPC 19215Z Jan 79 (U); COMUSTDC Terminal Command History, 1 Jan 78-30 Apr 79 (S), p. 36, DECL 30 Apr 85.
(U) The overall withdrawal of sponsors from Taiwan met the OPLAN 506X deadline (see the accompanying chart). The larger number of sponsors leaving in the later portion of the withdrawal period did not create any major problems; however, additional management attention was required at the end to coordinate port calls.

76. Three military personnel remained on Taiwan as of 30 April 1979. Two were incarcerated with one of them being released by the end of May 1979. The third military person was an Air Force officer attending the Foreign Area Officer-Language School in Taichung with the permission of his Service.

Dependents

(5/NOFORN) Based on 506X, all dependents were to depart Taiwan by 31 March 1979, 30 days prior to D-Day. Initially, attaining the established milestones appeared easy because the negative reaction by the people of Taiwan to the Presidential announcement on 15 December 1978 resulted in a general consensus to leave as soon as practical. These reactions included demonstrations at the China Seas Enlisted Club, the HSA East and West Compounds, the American Embassy, and outside individual housing complexes. Some of these demonstrations resulted in minor personnel injury and property damage, but nothing serious. The violence during the Christopher mission also increased apprehensions among some dependents. After 1 January 1979 dependents had a change of heart. PCS orders arrived resulting in household goods being shipped and families moving into temporary living quarters. Living on the local economy was found to be not all that bad even with reductions in commissary and exchange merchandise and finally none at all. With more sponsors remaining into March and April than originally envisioned, dependents sought to stay longer also. As security concerns diminished and the timing of dependent departures during normal school breaks became more desirable, the enforcement of original 506X depedent departure milestones was relaxed in order to reduce family separations.

(5/NOFORN) As early as mid-January 1979 the JCS had recognized that requiring all dependents to leave by 31 March could cause some personal

1. CINCPAC 252034Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 24 Apr 85; CINCPAC 020210Z May 79 (S), DECL 1 May 85; HQ USAF 181620Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 1 May 79.
2. AMEMB Taipei 162014Z Dec 78 (S), GDS 12/17/84; CINCPAC Command History 1978, (TS/FRD), Vol I, p. 69; COMUSTOC 180816Z Jan 79 (S/NE), DECL 31 May 79. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher led a U.S. delegation that included CINCPAC and others to Taiwan on 27 December to discuss the revised relationships that would result from the President's announcement of normalisation with China. The Christopher group was harassed and assaulted by mobs of young people on several occasions, but there were no personal injuries except some cuts from broken car-window glass.
hardships and advised that exceptions could be allowed. In the first monthly withdrawal report, COMUSTDC advised that waiver criteria had been developed for sponsors to use in submitting waiver requests. In the February end-of-month report, COMUSTDC reported receipt of waiver requests for 346 dependents to remain past 31 March. This figure included 22 dependents wishing to remain past 30 April, primarily for the purpose of finishing school. CINCPAC acknowledged these exceptions in the February report to the JCS. At the end of March, 378 dependents remained on Taiwan. Admiral Linder, COMUSTDC, presented a plan to LT GEN M. L. Boswell, CINCPAC Chief of Staff, for the withdrawal of the remaining personnel during April 1979. The plan split the month of April into three equal withdrawal increments (1-10, 11-20, 21-30). General Boswell concurred with the plan. Most personnel were tentatively scheduled to depart in early and mid-April, with only a few very few to depart later than 20 April due to their special situations. The actual number of dependents remaining on Taiwan was reduced to 288 on 10 April, and 142 on 20 April 1979. By 30 April all but 34 dependents had departed Taiwan. With the exception of two incarcerated dependents and one wife remaining with her husband assigned TDY, these dependents planned to depart by the end of July 1979.

**DOD Civilians**

(U) When the decision to withdraw all U.S. forces was announced, 80 of the sponsors on Taiwan were DOD civilians. For scheduling purposes, these personnel were included with military members in meeting withdrawal targets. The majority of DOD civilians and their dependents left Taiwan by D-30. A few key civilians at various commands were retained until April 1979 and civilians assigned to the Consolidated Civilian Personnel Office, a part of the 6217th Air Base Squadron, remained until late April to complete all DOD civilian transactions and to assist in the outplacement of local national U.S. Forces employees.

(U) Through CINCPAC initiatives, the Defense Department granted special reduction in force (RIF) and priority placement program authorities for U.S. civilian employees on Taiwan. Taiwan was immediately designated a major RIF area, thereby enabling all eligible U.S. citizen employees to register in the priority placement program and granting them exceptions to other normal program provisions. In an allied exception to policy, Defense authorization was obtained for special payments to employees who occupied temporary lodging beyond normally allowed periods.

1. JCS 190018Z Jan 79 (U); COMUSTDC 010815Z Feb 79 (C), DECL 85; COMUSTDC 010350Z Mar 79 (U); CINCPAC 060003Z Mar 79 (C), DECL 3 Mar 85; COMUSTDC 050730Z Mar 79 (U); CINCPAC 080522 Mar 79 (C), DECL 6 Mar 85; COMUSTDC 190931Z Apr 79 (C), DECL Dec 87; CINCPAC 252034Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 24 Apr 85; COMUSTDC 011930Z May 79 (C), DECL 30 Apr 84.
2. CINCPAC 202314Z Dec 78 (C), DECL 20 Dec 84; SECDEF 022127Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 28 Dec 84; SECDEF 162150Z Jan 79 (U).
1979 U.S. FORCE REDUCTION - TAIWAN

506X
WITHDRAWAL MILESTONES

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COMMUDOC 010335Z MAR 79 (C), DECL 31 MAY 79
COMMUDOC 100404Z MAR 79 (C,NEF), DECL 31 MAY 79
COMMUDOC 100145Z APR 79 (C), DECL 31 DEC 79
COMMUDOC 100011Z APR 79 (C), DECL DEC 79
COMMUDOC 253051Z APR 79 (C), DECL 24 APR 85
COMMUDOC 011902Z MAY 79 (C) DECL 30 APR 84
COMMUDOC 080012Z MAY 79 (C), DECL 1 MAY 85
COMMUDOC 34 TAIWAN WITHDRAWAL STATUS REPORT DTD 8 MAY 1979 (C), DECL 8 MAY 85
SECRET

SECTION II—TRAVEL TO TAIWAN

(6) Within three days of the President's announcement on the withdrawal from Taiwan, CINCPAC Headquarters had developed a series of issues relating to the military withdrawal and to future policies regarding Taiwan. One of these was whether, if all DOD personnel were withdrawn by 30 April 1979, any DOD personnel would be allowed to return to Taiwan.

(5) Initial DOD guidance on policy issues was provided to CINCPAC by the JCS in early January. Concerning the presence of DOD personnel on Taiwan after 30 April 1979, the JCS advised there would be no DOD representation on Taiwan for any reason, including TDY. CINCPAC Headquarters supported a reclama on this subject pointing out that there were many areas with unknowns which could require TDY by DOD experts and contract monitors to provide efficiency and protection of DOD interests. Some of the areas were planning functions to support the Mutual Defense Treaty, Foreign Military Sales case work, Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) contract monitoring and Defense Property Disposal operations.

1. Official Travel

(6) The JCS reclama to OSD had resulted in some policy changes on travel to Taiwan by U.S. Government officials. Specific guidance regarding military and civilian travel was provided by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense.

(9) There would be no official travel to Taiwan by uniformed military personnel after 30 April 1979.

(7) Subject to case-by-case approval, a limited number of DOD civilian could travel to Taiwan on a TDY basis both in 1979 and beyond to perform such functions as acting as trouble shooters for previously supplied U.S. military equipment; supervising contract work at the PDM facility; administering contracts for war reserve materiel; and performing property disposal and installation transfer functions. Two procedures would apply. DOD civilians remaining for more than 179 days would be separated from their government service and be assigned to and included in the personnel ceiling limit of the American Institute in Taiwan. This requirement was waived for the seven personnel authorized to remain to supervise the PDM facility. DOD civilians remaining for less than 180 days, or visiting Taiwan, were to be placed on a TDY basis by their parent organization.

1. JCS 111722Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 10 Jan 85; CINCPAC 170054Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 15 Jan 85.
2. JCS 062032Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 5 Mar 85; SECDEF 132005Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 11 Apr 85.

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11
The preceding chart displays the withdrawal of sponsors (military/DOD civilians) and dependents from Taiwan from 1 January through 30 April 1979.

**Port Calls**

Normal passenger movement in and out of Taiwan was through the Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) at Taipei. However, no central office on Taiwan was responsible for all port calls.

CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the APOE be retained as long as possible, preferably as long as the MDT was in force. In that event, PACAF advised that Military Air Command (MAC) APOE personnel would require augmentation to support the withdrawal requirements. This augmentation would be necessary at Tainan and Taichung in addition to Taipei.

During the early phases of the withdrawal, port call issues were not a major problem. As dependent waivers to stay increased, it was realized that close control during the March-April period would be necessary. COMUSTDC assigned one officer, full time, to be the central point of contact on all port call issues. This function continued until 15 April. The following also contributed to port call problems: change in orders by military personnel centers altered reporting dates/locations and, therefore, port call dates; seat availability differed from the 60-day forecast provided by MAC; commanders' decisions (after reassessing their mission phase-down progression) that individuals could leave earlier or later than originally planned; and special circumstances such as births, deaths, adoptions, passport or visa problems. Beginning in mid-March 1979, COMUSTDC prevented further changes in port calls by assuming total functional control and close liaison with the Kadena (Japan) Personnel Reservation Center. The center had sent two personnel TDY to Taipei and they provided an invaluable service. Further, COMUSTDC notified the military personnel centers that no further order modifications would be accepted. In the end, a daily name list was maintained. The assumption by COMUSTDC of the port control function earlier in the withdrawal period would have lessened confusion and provided for a more efficient operation.

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1. CINCPAC J4 Taiwan Withdrawal Status Report, 8 May 79 (CQ), DECL 8 May 85.
2. COMUSTDC 160900Z Mar 79 (U); COMUSTDC Terminal Command History, 1 Jan 78-30 Apr 79 (S), p. 40, DECL 30 Apr 85.
Both DOD civilian and military travel to Taiwan in a leave or pass status was authorized. Civilian clothing was required. Neither the conduct of official business nor contact with local authorities in an official capacity was authorized.
SECTION III--LOCAL NATIONAL CIVILIAN WORKFORCE

(U) Following President Carter's 15 December 1978 announcement that all U.S. Forces activities in Taiwan were to be phased out by 30 April 1979, actions were initiated to lessen the impact on U.S. and Local National (LN) civilian employees. The successful drawdown of Department of Defense civilian employees was covered in Section I. This section will describe actions taken associated with LN employees.

Outplacement Program

(C) The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) suggested that an aggressive outplacement effort be initiated to assist Chinese national employees of DOD in obtaining other employment. COMUSTDC requested and CINCPAC tasked the PACOM Component Services to nominate candidates for 60 day temporary duty to set up and lead such a program in Taiwan. A PACAF U.S. civilian personnel specialist, with former experience in Taiwan, was assigned to COMUSTDC in late January for two months. Local resources were used and innumerable contacts were made with private sector firms and host government officials at various island locations. The program resulted in 300 successful documented placement actions out of the 1,367 LNs employed by the U.S. Forces in December 1978.

Special Separation Payments

(C/NOFORN) Within days of the President's withdrawal announcement, employee representatives from all Taiwan activities petitioned U.S. Forces with a number of demands to compensate them for the unexpected and imminent loss of their livelihood. Demanded for each employee (appropriated and non-appropriated fund) were a $20,000 spiritual compensation (for the loss of reputation and based on Chinese law and custom); increased severance pay benefits ranging from one month's pay for 1 to 5 years of service to 3 months' pay for over 20 years of service; payoff of all accrued unused sick leave; all payments in lump sum by 31 January 1979; no RIF actions taken until after Lunar New Year (mid-February 1979) and the same separation date for all, preferably 30 April 1979. 2

(C/NOFORN) The USTDC Joint Labor Affairs Committee (JLAC) met in emergency session on 4 January 1979 to consider these demands and other LN reduction related matters. In general it was agreed that any changes in compensation practices should be based on the prevailing practice principle.

1. SECDEF 022127Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 28 Dec 84; COMUSTDC 050227Z Jan 79 (C); CINCPAC 060227Z Jan 79 (C), DECL Jun 79; CINCPAC 120340Z Jan 79 (C), DECL Jun 79.
2. COMUSTDC 181335Z Dec 78 (C), GDS 84; COMUSTDC 230400Z Dec 78 (C/NE); GDS/C/82; COMUSTDC 290751Z Dec 78 (C/NE), DECL 23 Dec 84.
Supplemental compensation should recognize that LN employees had lost benefits by not being covered by old age pension provisions of the host government Labor Insurance Act (LIA). The LIA had been a prevailing private sector practice since 1970. U.S. Forces were in the process of subscribing to the plan at the time of President Carter's announcement.

(C/NOTFOR) JLAC members agreed that additional benefits were warranted, but any revision of the severance pay table itself would be counterproductive. Therefore, the members agreed that the additional compensation should be in another form, one that avoided excessive administrative problems and yet took into account both length of service and prevailing practice. JLAC members recommended that employees be paid one month's salary for each year of service since 1970, based upon the maximum insured LIA wage in effect for those years. LN employees had also not received medical insurance coverage, since they were not enrolled under LIA. Yet they had been encouraged to accrue sick leave to use for major illnesses or injuries. Compensation proposed ranged from one month's salary for 500 hours or less accrued sick leave up to six months' salary for over 2,500 hours accrued sick leave. The members also agreed not to issue RIF notices until 1 February 1979.

(U) COMUSTDC agreed with the recommendations of the JLAC and submitted proposals to the PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee (JLPC) on 10 January 1979. The estimated total cost of the supplemental severance pay was $1.5 million and for the accrued sick leave $.89 million. COMUSTDC considered that of the three options (supplemental severance pay, accrued sick leave, supplemental severance pay plus accrued sick leave) suggested, the supplemental severance pay was the most supportable under the prevailing practice principle.

(U) While the PACOM JLPC was reviewing the JLAC proposals, COMUSTDC submitted further clarification of the issues and a modification to the sick leave option. He stated that in his view a perceived insufficient settlement package would deter and impede the withdrawal from Taiwan; there was adequate justification as well as a moral obligation to grant some LIA benefits and partial sick leave payments; and withholding partial sick leave payments would probably result in inordinate use of sick leave by LN employees during the critical withdrawal period. Based on the above he submitted an alternative proposal to the sick leave recommendation: payment for 35 percent of all accrued sick leave regardless of time of employment. The new criteria was identified as more equitable, easier to implement and served to motivate the employee to remain on the job throughout the withdrawal period. Cost estimates remained the same.

1. COMUSTDC 100737Z Jan 79 (C/NE), DECL 10 Jan 83.
2. COMUSTDC 100936Z Jan 79 (C/NE), DECL 1 May 79.
3. COMUSTDC 190123Z Jan 79 (C/NE), DECL 1 May 79.
On 20 January 1979 CINCPAC submitted the COMUSTDC request for expanded severance payments to OSD, advising that the PACOM JLPC supported the view of U.S. Forces on Taiwan. CINCPAC noted that the U.S. Embassy Taipei concurred in the need to provide additional severance compensation to LN employees because of unusual circumstances. Pacific Fleet Headquarters and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group concurred with the expanded severance payments. Pacific Air Forces Headquarters believed that unused accrued sick leave should be paid at 100 percent vice the 35 percent rate. It was their opinion that the 100 percent rate would minimize the risk of a large percentage of the LN work force taking extensive sick leave during critical stages of the withdrawal. PACAF was also interested in continuing the goodwill of the former LN employees past 30 April 1979 to support operations (munitions, POL, facilities). Also, the expanded severance pay request constituted an important means for the host government to judge the United States Government's integrity in connection with the withdrawal. A decision on the request, by 30 January 1979, was requested.

The OSD reply came on 22 February 1979. Authorization was given to pay each employee, separating after 30 January 1979, a month's salary for each year of service since 1970. It was justified because of the failure of U.S. Forces to enroll LN employees in the Chinese LIA program which had been available since 1970. The accrued sick leave payment was denied, based in part on the precedent-setting nature such a policy would have in relations with other countries with larger, more highly paid, local labor forces.

Work Disruptions

From January to April 1979, several employee work disruptions occurred and there were isolated instances of employees not reporting for duty. In the main, however, the LN workforce was stable, loyal, and contributed well to the close-down operations. The JLAC had previously agreed not to issue RIF notices until 1 February 1979. When an answer from OSD on special separation payments was not received by this date, COMUSTDC reported that over 270 RIF notices could have already been issued and another 200 should be issued by 16 February 1979. The delay was costing DOD activities (primarily in non-appropriated fund areas) excessively in funds and in meeting activity closure schedules. With no decision by mid-February 1979, notices were issued. This action resulted in disruption in functions, mass requests for leave without pay, sit downs and refusals to work. In response to this reaction to the issuance of RIF notices the CINCPAC Chief of Staff urged the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense MRA&L (Civilian Personnel Policy), for an early, favorable decision on the compensation proposal.

1. CINCPAC 202021Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 10 Jan 83.
2. SECDEF 221815Z Feb 79 (C), DECL upon approval for release to LN employees.
3. CINCPAC 072335Z Feb 79 (C), DECL 10 Jan 83; COMUSTDC 150710Z Feb 79 (C), DECL 85; CINCPAC 160031Z Feb 79 (C), DECL 10 Jan 83.
(U) Employee morale was low as the workforce in December 1978 comprised the longest-employed (average U.S. Forces length of service about 12 years) key members, with average age about 45. (RIFs over the years had reduced the workforce from a high of 5,000 in 1970.)
CHAPTER III
ORGANIZATIONS

SECTION I--MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP

(U) As of 15 December 1978, the MAAG monitored over 400 open Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases with a value of over $300 million. With the understanding that diplomatic relations would terminate on 1 January 1979, and all MAAG personnel be withdrawn from Taiwan by 30 April 1979, questions arose concerning MAAG functions after 1 January 1979, and how the security assistance program was to be administered after the departure of MAAG personnel.

(•) The Chief of the General Staff, Ministry of National Defense, Admiral Soong, had expressed a strong desire to retain some military presence on Taiwan past April 1979. One reason cited was the necessity to carry out President Carter's pledge to provide selected military equipment to Taiwan. Admiral Soong had negative feelings on replacing MAAG personnel with retired military personnel. Admiral Soong further stated to the Chief, MAAG, that he felt MAAG personnel could remain on Taiwan, even in a low key status.

(S) CINCPAC presented three options to the JCS to resolve the status of the MAAG. The recommended option was to retain the present organization under the new unofficial entity by replacing military incumbents with six civilians familiar with security assistance. A reduction to four personnel was suggested as Taiwan personnel gained FMS expertise.

(S) In early January 1979, CINCPAC expressed concern over the orderly transition of security assistance functions to the unofficial instrumentality. In particular, if MAAG personnel left Taiwan on 1 March 1979, a lack of U.S. personnel cognizant of Taiwan security assistance programs during the transition period would occur. To preclude this situation, CINCPAC advised the JCS of his intention to attach MAAG personnel to COMUSTDC effective 28 February 1979, the disestablishment date for MAAG China. Personnel would remain in-country through 30 April 1979.

(S/NSFORN) Reemphasizing the original recommendation for six billets to be MAAG-related, CINCPAC included this function in the 15 DOD-related spaces proposed for the newly named American Institute in Taiwan.

1. AMEMB Taipei 08602/211115Z Dec 78 (8), GDS 21 Dec 84.
2. CINCPAC 210514Z Dec 78 (8), DECL 20 Dec 84.
3. CINCPAC 092324Z Jan 79 (8), DECL 3 Jan 85.
4. CINCPAC 120210Z Jan 79 (8NF), DECL 31 Jan 87.
The JCS concurred with CINCPAC's request to retain MAAG personnel to USTDC during the period 1 March-30 April 1979. The JCS emphasized that the official MAAG function would terminate with the closure of the Embassy on 28 February 1979 and no variation of MAAG should be utilized in identifying the USTDC MAAG personnel. COMUSTDC informed CINCPAC that Chief MAAG would become USTDC J-4.
SECTION II--DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE

1. JCS 200031Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 18 Jan 85.
2. COMUSTDC 090840Z Feb 79 (C/AF)-GDS-85.
SECTION III--PROVISIONAL PLANS OFFICE

(U) COMUSTDC OPLAN 506X required the establishment of an administrative organization, in Hawaii, responsible to CINCPAC for actions related to the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) and other required actions/coordination with Taiwan upon the disestablishment of the USTD. The authorization to establish such an organization, tentatively called the CINCPAC Liaison Cell, was given by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on 4 January 1979.

During the concept phase of developing such an organization, three options were considered by the USTD staff.

(S/NFOEQRN) The first formal COMUSTDC proposal, identifying the mission/manning of the CINCPAC Liaison Cell and those billets in the COMUSTDC FY 79 Joint Manpower Program (JMP) to be offered as compensation, was submitted to CINCPAC on 9 January 1979. The proposal identified 41 billets, all of which were not necessarily collocated within the cell. Examples were dual-hatted PACFLT, PACAF, and Defense Communications Agency Pacific communications personnel. This proposal did include three Government on Taiwan military liaison officers.

Establishment

(S/NFOFQRN) CINCPAC revised the COMUSTDC proposal, and recommended 24 billets to be collocated and administratively attached to CINCPAC headquarters. Some of the COMUSTDC proposed billets, not included in CINCPAC's submission, were recommended as part of the American Institute in Taiwan organization. The GONT military liaison officers were also not included because of the unusual nature of the U.S.-Taiwan unofficial relationship. The name of the organization was recommended for change to the Provisional Plans Office (PPO). COMUSTDC was tasked with submitting a proposed FY 79 JMP for the PPO with an effective date of 1 May 1979. The COMUSTDC-proposed PPO JMP was reviewed at CINCPAC and submitted with minor modifications to the JCS for approval. JCS approval, subject to technical review by the Services, was received on 6 March 1979. The PPO would phase down as

1. JCS 151244Z Jan 79 (U).
2. COMUSTDC Point Paper, undated (U).
3. COMUSTDC 090830Z Jan 79 (S/NFR), DECL Jan 87; COMUSTDC 300748Z Jan 79 (S/NFR), DECL 87.

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

23
requirements decreased and be disestablished by 1 January 1980. The accom-
panying chart, extracted from the CINCPAC PPO FY 79/80 JMP, displays the
authorized billets.

Execution

(S/WOFORM). The BATTERY PLATE plan (506X) called for an advance party to
be formed and sent to CINCPAC from Taiwan on D-60 to establish the PPO. The
accompanying chart identifies the billets selected to comprise the advance
party. As functions were closed on Taiwan in late March and April 1979,
personnel departed Taiwan and reported to CINCPAC. All 24 billets were
filled by 30 April 1979 with the arrival of the Director, Colonel Jack H.
Sandstrom, USAF, former COMUSTDC Chief of Staff. 2

Terms of Reference

A CINCPAC notice published the terms of reference for the Direc-
tor, PPO, and made him directly responsible to the CINCPAC Deputy Chief of
Staff. The Director’s responsibilities and functions were:

- Coordinate U.S. Forces and military activities in support of the MDT
  with GONT.

- Coordinate U.S.-GONT military exercises and USN port visits to Taiwan.

- Coordinate with appropriate agencies, as necessary, to provide liaison
  for communications, intelligence, landing rights, support agreements, Peace-
  time Aerial Reconnaissance Program coordination and other matters, as nec-
  essary.

- Provide recommendations, as appropriate, regarding present or future
  activities on Taiwan.

1. CINCPAC 120210Z Jan 79 (S/ANE), DECL 31 Jan 87; CINCPAC 011956Z Feb 79
   (S/ANE), DECL 31 Jan 86; CINCPAC 120259Z Jan 79 (U); COMUSTDC 070618Z
   Feb 79 (U); CINCPAC 160120Z Feb 79 (U); JCS 062335Z Mar 79 (U).
2. J781 HistSum May 79.
3. CINCPAC Notice S3020, Ser S131, of 20 Apr 79, Subj: Terms of Reference
   for the Director, Provisional Plans Office (U), DECL 12 Apr 85.
- Coordinate directives and guidance concerning PACOM relationships with Taiwan.

- Maintain awareness of the overall defensive capability of Taiwan and of the factors affecting the readiness of Taiwan armed forces.
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<td>Ground Intelligence Analyst</td>
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<td>Admin Clerk</td>
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Notes: 1 - Advance party; 2 - Filled by TDY for 60-90 days; 3 - Local hire.
SECTION IV--AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN

(U) The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) was unlike any other organization connected with the United States Government. AIT was an unofficial instrumentality, in corporate form, whose sole purpose was to represent the people of the United States in conducting and carrying out programs, transactions and other relations (e.g. trade, cultural) with the people of Taiwan. AIT was incorporated in the District of Columbia as a private, non-profit corporation on 15 January 1979. Three retired senior foreign service officers were the Trustees and one of them, Mr. David Dean, was the Director of the Institute's Washington Headquarters. Until the Taiwan omnibus legislation, H.R. 2479 (Taiwan Relations Act), was signed into law (PL 96-8) by President Carter on 10 April 1979, the AIT's legal basis was the President's 31 December 1978 memorandum concerning relations with Taiwan.

Organization and Function

(U) In order to carry out its mission, the AIT headquarters maintained liaison with U.S. Government agencies, state governments, private associations, business firms, and individual citizens. AIT's main overseas office AIT-Taiwan - or AIT-T was located in the former MAAG facilities in Taipei with a branch office in Kaohsiung. The Taipei office had 50 American employees and Kaohsiung 3, none of whom were U.S. Government employees. AIT also operated a cultural center and trade center in Taipei and a Chinese language school in Taichung. The AIT began operation on 16 April 1979, with the exception of the travel services section which opened a week later.

DOD-Related Billets

1. SECSTATE 300259Z Dec 78 (C); GDS 12/29/84; SECSTATE 040148Z Jan 79 (U); SECSTATE 100234Z Jan 79 (C); GDS 1/9/85; SECSTATE 122155Z Feb 79 (C); AIT Taipei 141150Z Apr 79 (U).
2. CINCPAC 120210Z Jan 79 (S/NE); DECL 31 Jan 87; JCS 171657Z Feb 79 (C); DECL 16 Feb 85.
CINCPAC-AIT Relationships

(U) Because of the uniqueness of AIT and the fact that it would be the sole U.S. instrumentality on Taiwan after 30 April 1979, CINCPAC conveyed to the JCS his perception of his responsibilities in carrying out DOD functions related to Taiwan and the procedures required to carry out day-to-day functions on 31 March 1979 (see Part II of this history for the JCS response).

1. JCS 092340Z Mar 79 (C), DECL 9 Mar 85; CINCPAC 100530Z Mar 79 (C), DECL 10 Mar 85; CINCPAC 140309Z Mar 79 (C), DECL 10 Mar 85; JCS 3100082 Mar 79 (C), DECL 28 Mar 85; J135 HistSum Mar 79 (C), DECL 31 Jan 87.
2. JCS 261603Z Apr 79 (U).
3. CINCPAC 310420Z Mar 79 (S/NE), DECL 30 Mar 85.
SECTION V--COORDINATION COUNCIL FOR NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS

(i) As a counterpart to the American Institute In Taiwan, which was established by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Government on Taiwan (GONT) announced on 15 February 1979 that it had established the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA). The Taiwan Relations Act provided for the CCNAA to be extended the same number of offices and complement of personnel as were previously operated in the United States by the governing authorities on Taiwan prior to 1 January 1979. The GONT had 15 offices in the United States prior to 1 January 1979. They decided to maintain only nine of these facilities plus a home office in Taipei. The facility in Washington, D.C., was the main overseas office, with branches in New York, Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Honolulu.

Military-Related Manning

(u) Retired General Wen, previously attached to the Taiwan China Embassy in Washington, remained at the Washington Office in the capacity of Chief, Military Procurement Division.

1. AMEMB Taipei 151315Z Feb 79 (U); AMEMB Taipei 160549Z Feb 79 (U); AMEMB Taipei 230936Z Feb 79 (U).
2. CINCPAC 241901Z Feb 79 (C/NS) BOM, DECL 23 Feb 86; JCS 091800Z Mar 79 (C/NS) BOM, DECL 9 Mar 85; COMUSTOC 191205Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 82; AIT Taipei 300933Z Apr 79 (C), GDS 30 Apr 85.
CHAPTER IV
LOGISTICS
SECTION I--FACILITIES ENGINEERING
Real Property Disposal

(U) Article IV of the Status of U.S. Forces Agreement (SOFA) stated the following in connection with disposal of real property:

- Areas and facilities shall be returned to GROC [Government of the Republic of China] whenever they are no longer needed,

- The U.S. Government is not obliged to restore facilities to the condition at the time of acquisition, and

- At the time of termination, the U.S. Government will be compensated by the GROC for any residual value, to include scrap value, of any installations or improvements developed by the U.S. forces at their expense if such installations or improvements have been or are to be sold, or if their use is desired by the GROC. Residual value, if any, shall be determined by mutual agreement between U.S. forces and appropriate Chinese authorities.

(Confidential) Although Article IV apparently made real property disposal relatively straightforward, CINCPAC advised COMUSTDC that political and military considerations needed to be interfaced before decisions could be made in regard to removal of plant/systems equipment prior to returning basic buildings to Taiwan. The removal of specific plant/systems equipment could render the entire facility useless to the people of Taiwan. Although individual Services could satisfy their requirements by removing equipment from Taiwan facilities, it would not necessarily be appropriate, given the broader political implications at the national level concerning the withdrawal from Taiwan.

(Confidential) In accordance with COMUSTDC OPLAN 506X, on 10 January 1979 the Commander, USTDC was designated executive agent for coordinating the return of areas and facilities to Taiwan and negotiating compensations for any improvements to such facilities which had been funded by the U.S. Government. Pending guidance from the JCS, COMUSTDC, assisted by a PACOM Withdrawal Assistance Team, was to determine what facilities and equipment (less communications-electronics, WRM and POL assets) would remain in-country;

2. CINCPAC 100542Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 4 Jan 85.
establish residual values for possible future reference; develop a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with AIT-T to lease all U.S.-held facilities until 31 December 1979; and develop an MOU with Taiwan authorities for assuming title of U.S. held facilities after 1 January 1980. All of these actions would take place without consulting Taiwan authorities until authorization was received. JCS authorization to discuss real property transfer and U.S. equipment removal with Taiwan authorities was received on 19 January 1979.

Concurrently, COMUSTDC received a request from the Taiwan Foreign Affairs Service Department (FASD), Combined Service Forces (CSF), to assist them in complying with an MND directive to receive intact, and without compensation, any unneeded facilities the U.S. Forces were using.

On 21 January 1979, guidance was requested from the JCS regarding compensation for residual values of U.S facilities on Taiwan. CINCPAC's position was that in developing guidance, the desire to maintain the best possible relations with the people on Taiwan, while attempting to receive a realistic return on the investment, should be taken into account. Past experience indicated that facilities developed for use by U.S. forces would rarely be used for their original purpose by Taiwan authorities. Thus, "residual values" could normally be well below acquisition or replacement costs even where generous allowances for depreciation were made. Four options regarding residual values were presented:

I - Waive SOFA Article IV and receive no compensation;

II - Derive some residual values and, where appropriate, attempt to use the turnover of facilities as consideration for future services;

III - Attempt rigorously to negotiate residual values;

IV - Arrange for residual values to be negotiated, allowing AIT to serve as a quasi-landlord, renting out certain facilities to U.S. commercial enterprises until such time as the U.S. investment in improvements was amortized.

Option II was recommended in general, with Option I for selected facilities in which Taiwan authorities had shown interest and for which no compensatory trade-offs appeared possible.

1. CINCPAC 100542Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 4 Jan 85; JCS 191644Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 19 Jan 85; CINCPAC 210510Z Jan 79 (U).
3. CINCPAC 210301Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 19 Jan 85.
In early February 1979, COMUSTDC submitted a proposal dividing the facilities into three categories: Category I - required during the period 30 April-31 December 1979 in support of the MDT; Category 2 - required beyond 30 April 1979 to store and provide adequate security for excess property turned in for disposal; and Category 3 - not required in support of the MDT and could be transferred to Taiwan authorities prior to 30 April 1979.

In mid-February 1979, CINCPAC forwarded COMUSTDC's proposal to the JCS dividing real property into three categories. CINCPAC stated his understanding that the concept of bailment was acceptable and that the term bailment could include U.S.-funded buildings and structures, located on GONT property, which would be transferred in title to the GONT under the SOFA on 31 December 1979 when the MDT commitment terminated. Unless otherwise directed, CINCPAC intended to commence negotiations for a bailment agreement with the GONT for category I facilities effective until 31 December 1979, with the intention that on 31 December 1979, title to the facilities would be transferred to the GONT by AIT in accordance with the SOFA. A bailment agreement strawman was submitted for approval. On 28 February 1979 the JCS concurred in general with the course of action proposed provided that negotiations, at least initially, were directed towards obtaining a fair return on investments and that additional costs or maintenance/security of U.S. property that would remain on Taiwan after 30 April 1979 be avoided. Accordingly, negotiations would be based on the SOFA provisions for transfer at a mutually agreeable residual value. Initial valuations would be determined by COMUSTDC and the CINCPAC assistance team, and adjusted by CINCPAC as necessary. AIT would accept accountability for all real property not transferred to Taiwan or which was included in bailment agreements. This was accomplished on 26 April 1979.

Bailment Agreement (Category I Real Property)

The initial meeting between U.S. and Taiwan military representative to discuss the bailment agreement was held on 7 March 1979. COL Ferrier, USTDC, headed the U.S. side while MAJ GEN Tseng, Director, FASD, led the Taiwan side. A paragraph-by-paragraph review of the bailment document was conducted. MAJ GEN Tseng asked for an explanation of the term bailor. COL Ferrier replied that the bailor took possession of the facilities without title, and both sides used and kept them in good condition. An MND representative asked if MND would be reimbursed for care of the bailed buildings. The reply was that building bailment was rather simple, maintenance relatively minor, and that the consoliated bench stock provided.

1. COMUSTDC 060856Z Feb 79 (D), DECL 1 May 79; CDR DPDR-PAC 171846Z Jan 79 (D), DECL 16 Jan 85.
2. CINCPAC 160405Z Feb 79 (C), DECL 10 Feb 85; JCS 282246Z Feb 79 (D), DECL 27 Feb 85; HQ PACAF 080320Z Mar 79 (U); COMUSTDC 1tr Ser 833 of 23 Apr 79, Subj: U.S. Military Real Property on Taiwan (U).
with some of the buildings should offset the need for reimbursement. Regarding the final residual value of the bailed buildings, the U.S. position was that this should not be addressed at the time but should be handled under Article IV, SOFA. The Taiwan sentiment, on the other hand, was that residual costs could be amortized by maintenance performed for the duration of the MDT. Both sides agreed that AIT and CCNAA would sign the agreement as bailor and bailee respectively. The buildings discussed for bailment included those identified by USTDC on 6 February 1979, plus those at Tainan AB used by Air Asia Co. Ltd., to house USAF fire protection and aircraft runway barrier maintenance vehicles in support of flight test operations.

On 14 April 1979, the JCS responded to the CINCPAC 16 February 1979 bailment strawman submission indicating it had been reviewed on an interagency basis, and that all changes necessary to accomplish the transfer between AIT and CCNAA had been incorporated. By that time, however, negotiations on Taiwan had evolved to a fourth revision and the JCS rewritten bailment agreement did not dovetail with current negotiating agreement changes. CINCPAC requested that COMUSTDC resolve the differences between the JCS-written agreement and the COMUSTDC revised agreement. COMUSTDC replied with suggested revisions to the JCS agreement. The JCS approved the recommended revisions subject to incorporation of certain wording changes. The JCS also stipulated that execution of the agreement in the Chinese language, in addition to English, would require additional review. On 17 April 1979, COMUSTDC submitted to FASD the fifth draft of the bailment agreement incorporating changes mandated by higher headquarters with those agreed to in discussions between FASD/MND and USTDC. The MND representative, at a meeting on 18 April 1979, requested that one paragraph be deleted. JCS concurrence and acceptance was received, a final version sent to MND and on 26 April 1979, the AIT and CCNAA representatives signed the agreement.
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DPDO-Related Facilities (Category 2 Real Property)

(U) The Defense Property Disposal Region-Pacific (DPDR-PAC) had requested that a number of facilities, either being used by the DPD Office (DPDO) Taipei at the time or required for additional space, be set aside for the remainder of 1979 for use in expediting the turn-in and minimizing transportation of property. These facilities, although excepted from the bailment agreement, were identified in this agreement as being retained by the AIT for use throughout the term of the agreement. Upon termination of the agreement, or when AIT no longer required them (actually, they would be used by Defense Property Disposal TDY civilians), the facilities would be transferred to the CCNAA.

Transfer Agreement (Category 3 Real Property)

(U) When initially planning to transfer real property to the Taiwan authorities, COMUSTDC estimated original construction costs to be in excess of $32 million and expected the Services to provide residual value estimates somewhere between 5 and 10 percent of the acquisition cost. The PACAF representatives on the CINCPAC assistance team (PAF-TAT) recommended to PACAF Headquarters that, in general, the residual value factors used for previous transfers of Air Force real estate on Taiwan be used again. These factors were percent real property values as follows:

Code 1 - 10 percent - Useable Class A (adequate) - used to house the function for which currently designated through end position use.

Code 2 - 5 percent - Useable Class B (substandard) - structurally sound and could be raised to Class A.

Code 3 - 1 percent - Forced use (substandard) - could not practically be raised to Class A but because of necessity must be continued in use for a short duration.

Code 4 - 0 percent - Sterile - due to economic considerations, not considered appropriate for disposal.

(U) Following up on its 15 January 1979 letter, FASD advised COMUSTDC on 19 February that the MND had directed them to commence negotiations for the transfer of U.S. facilities in Taiwan. It was expected the transfer would be on a grant basis, under custody of the GONT in behalf of the U.S. Government, or sold to the GONT on a token sale basis. Token sale had previously been defined as $1.00.

1. DPDR-PAC 171846Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 16 Jan 85; Facilities Bailment Agreement dtd 26 Apr 79.
2. USTDC J121 Memo of 22 Dec 78, Subj: Real Property; PA-TAT; COMUSTDC 130732Z Feb 79 (U).
3. Combined Services Forces, Foreign Affairs Service Dept, 1tr of 19 Feb 79, Subj: Transfer of U.S. Forces Facilities in Taiwan (U).
(U) The February 1979 Taiwan withdrawal status report from COMUSTDC reported that tentative real property residual value computations had been completed. An initial meeting with the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, MND, had been held and MND was in agreement with the concept proposed by TDC on 6 February 1979. On 6 March 1979, COMUSTDC provided FASD with the designations of the three categories of facilities and requested a meeting be held the next day to discuss disposition actions.

(U) During the first half of March 1979, COMUSTDC received formal documentation from the Air Force and Navy representatives on-island providing the original cost and residual value compensations for real property to be transferred in accordance with Article IV of the SOFA. This information was then passed to FASD. Air Force figures were $16,912,796 and $401,586 respectively while the Navy reported $3,350,048 and $97,685 respectively. The Army had transferred facilities to the Navy during the latter part of 1977 and had no accountability for real property on Taiwan.

(S) CINCPAC advised the JCS that the transfer agreement had been under consideration within the GONT bureaucracy for several weeks and steps were being initiated to move the agreement forward. Accordingly, RADM Moreau, CINCPAC Director for Logistics, requested RADM Linder, Commander, USTDC to approach ADM Soong, Chief of the General Staff, MND and the new FASD Director on a personal basis to expedite the negotiations. This approach had been successful during the WRM-POL negotiations. While the agreement was being negotiated, these categories of facilities were being received for by GONT units for custody as they became vacant.

(CINCPAC) On 9 April 1979, COMUSTDC advised CINCPAC of a letter from MND to the Department of North American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), stating MND would ask U.S. Forces to transfer facilities on a non-compensation or on a token compensation basis. CINCPAC guidance on the USTDC position vis-a-vis no compensation/token compensation was requested. CINCPAC replied that guidance on that and related facilities matters would be discussed during RADM Moreau's visit to Taiwan. Meanwhile, however, COMUSTDC's formal discussions with FASD on the transfer agreement became stalemated and were elevated to the SOFA committee. In the presence of the Vice Minister of the MOFA and with the Assistant Deputy and Deputy Chief of

1. COMUSTDC 010350Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 31 May 79; COMUSTDC ltr Ser 650 of 6 Mar 79, Subj: U.S. Military Facilities on Taiwan (U).
2. COMUSTDC ltr Ser 658 of 8 Mar 79 (U), Subj: Excess United States Air Force Real Property on Taiwan; COMUSTDC ltr Ser 729 of 16 Mar 79 (U), Subj: Excess United States Navy Property; CDRUSACSG Ft. Shafter 161930Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 4 Jan 85.
3. CINCPAC 310424Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 30 Mar 85; CINCPAC 310423Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 29 Mar 85; COMUSTDC 030145Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 21 Dec 87.
Staff, Logistics, MND present, ADM Soong advised there were no problems, just some minor changes that needed to be ironed out because of some difficulties in translating Chinese to English.

(U) The final facilities transfer meeting between U.S. and Taiwan military personnel occurred on 23 April 1979. MAJ GEN Tu, Assistant DCGS/LOG, MND, represented the Taiwan military while COL Ferrier, USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel/Logistics, USTDC represented the U.S. Government. The meeting began with the residual value at $499,271. After making deductions for facilities to be torn down, duplications on lists, and installed equipment missing, the residual value was reduced to $448,716. MAJ GEN Tu made one last attempt to pay token compensation of one percent, but finally accepted COL Ferrier’s figure of $448,000. However, MAJ GEN Tu stated that payment would be deferred until 1 January 1980, at which time all the residual values could be settled upon by AIT and CCNA. The transfer agreement was signed by AIT and CCNA representatives on 26 April 1979.\(^2\)

Other Facilities

(U) The war reserve materiel and munitions storage facilities at Tainan, Ching Chuan Kang (CCK) and Chia-Yi Air Bases were addressed separately, with individual bailments and contracts, because of their political sensitivity and potential impact on the readiness of U.S. Forces in the PACOM. The same considerations governed the treatment of the POL facilities at CCK and those for the Taiwan-wide Integrated Joint Communications System. They are discussed elsewhere in this history.

1. COMUSTDC 090530Z Apr 79 (C/NO), DECL 1 May 84; CINCPAC 110039Z Apr 79 (C/NO), DECL 10 Apr 85; J4 Taiwan Withdrawal Status Report of 8 May 79 (S), DECL 8 May 85, p. 120.
SECTION II--RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

PACOM Taiwan Withdrawal Assistance Team

(U) As discussed previously, a PACOM withdrawal assistance team was organized and sent to Taiwan to assist COMUSTDC in completing timely and orderly withdrawal actions. Tasks assigned the team were: establish residual values for facilities; screen and identify assets for Service and other Defense Department needs; identify equipment necessary to support the MDT; preclude unrecognized/unauthorized shipments; and assist COMUSTDC in other areas as required. PACOM Service components were asked to nominate team members.

(U) Headquarters PACAF nominated six team members. CDRUSACSG advised that, because the Army had no accountability for real property on Taiwan, participation at that time did not appear warranted. CINCPACFLT responded that a Navy exchange and commissary assistance team and Navy audit service team were being provided to Headquarters Support Activity (HSA) Taipei to help close out. In lieu of providing assistance team membership, the Commanding Officer, HSA Taipei, was designated as CINCPACFLT representative to the PACOM assistance team. The Marines sent the base supply officer from Camp Butler, Japan. A total of 11 personnel, including three from CINCPAC and one civilian from the Defense Audit Service, Pacific comprised the team, arriving on Taiwan on 22 January 1979. The Chief, Logistics Plans and Policy Division, PACOM, was team chief. He also relieved the CQ; HSA as COMUSTDC J4 and remained on Taiwan until the end of April 1979.

Fuels

(6) On 15 December 1978 there were over 700,000 barrels of JP-4 and over 11,000 barrels combined of Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM), auto Motive Gas (MOGAS) and Aviation Gas (AVGAS) on Taiwan. This POL was located either in USAF bulk storage tanks at CCK AB (seven hill tanks with 55,000-barrel capacities each and two beach tanks with 100,000-barrel capacities each) or in the Taiwan pipeline. CINCPAC's position on this fuel was that it was required on-island to support the defense of Taiwan. If removed, and it became necessary to resume operations quickly, problems would occur in moving it through the 6-inch Taiwan pipeline. Although, if removed, it could be used as operating stock, the prepositioned war reserve material requirement (PWRMR) shortfall in theater would be increased because of insufficient tankage to accept it. CINCPAC's initial recommendation was to turn over the tankage and associated piping and pumping facilities to the Taiwan authorities. Title of the POL would be retained until termination of the MDT. A contract, through commercial means, for maintenance and quality

1. CINCPAC 110349Z Jan 79 (U).
2. CINCPACAF 132100Z Jan 79 (6), DECL Dec 85; CDRUSACSG 161930Z Jan 79 (6), DECL 4 Jan 85; CINCPACFLT 170004Z Jan 79 (U); CINCPAC 210302Z Jan 79 (6), DECL 19 Jan 85.

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surveillance until the expiration of the MDT would be required. At termination of the MDT, the POL could either be sold to the Chinese Petroleum Corporation for credit, payable in like amount of product at a future date sold to the Taiwan Air Force (TAF), or removed from Taiwan to be used as operating stock as tankage became available. The JCS agreed generally with the CINCPAC position and requested a withdrawal plan.

CINCPAC requested Headquarters PACAF provide a plan that would satisfy all the issues associated with near-term retention of POL on Taiwan and eventual removal. PACAF provided a comprehensive reply. The PWRMR fuels on Taiwan were under the PACAF theater storage concept and therefore committed to support CINCPACAF OPLANS as well as the defense of Taiwan. The JP-4 on Taiwan represented 35 percent of PACAF’s PWRMR. There was a 2 million barrel shortfall in theater JP-4 tankage, including the 920,000-barrel storage capacity on Taiwan. For the near term (through 31 December 1979) PACAF recommended retaining title to product and tankage, and letting a contract, with a military or civilian activity, to perform essential maintenance, management and quality control. Payment was preferred in product, using a surcharge arrangement that was being used at the time. For the mid-term (January 1980 through December 1982), the recommendation was to continue the near-term contract and withdraw the product as out-of-country tankage became available. For the long term (January 1983-on), PACAF suggested continuing the contract, and either withdrawing the remaining product or selling it to the GONT. PACAF reported minimal requirements for 115/145 AVGAS stocks on Taiwan and that it could be sold to the GONT or removed for consumption in-theater. CINCPAC approved PACAF’s plan of action except for details regarding the method and timing of tankage title transfer. Since the JCS had already authorized direct coordination with Taiwan officials on removal of U.S.-owned WRM, CINCPAC authorized COMUSTDC to discuss POL matters with local Taiwan officials and provide the outcome of initial contacts.

Fuels Agreement

(C) After discussions with MND fuels personnel on 25 January 1979, COMUSTDC reported that the GONT was receptive to the JCS-approved fuels proposals. COMUSTDC submitted a proposed bailment agreement which they intended to present during further negotiations with the TAF on 6 February 1979. The bailment would cover JP-4 only. COMUSTDC proposed to turn over ground fuels and 115/145 facilities under base facility negotiations and use the sale of these products as a negotiation position with the GONT. The proposed agreement would cease on 31 December 1982. COMUSTDC

1. CINCPAC 1806347 Dec 78 (™) (BOM), DECL 16 Dec 84; JCS 0323232Z Jan 79 (û), DECL 3 Jan 85.
2. CINCPAC 0905032 Jan 79 (û), DECL 8 Jan 85; HQ PACAF 2305002Z Jan 79 (û), DECL 19 Jan 85; CINCPAC 2403502Z Jan 79 (û), DECL 23 Jan 85; CINCPAC 240551Z Jan 79 (û), DECL 23 Jan 85.
strongly believed that bailment was the preferred approach for the following reasons: contracting would generate substantial expense to the United States while bailment would be virtually cost free; extension of the current POL arrangement would perpetuate government-to-government agreements past the 30 April 1979 cutoff; contractual arrangements would involve many associated major issues; and it was doubted that AIT would possess sufficient personnel, funds, expertise, etc., to properly fulfill legal requirements and insure contracts were properly performed. PACAF, however, did not agree that the bailment procedure was the appropriate vehicle to use because, under an existing agreement, the TAF already managed USAF POL under the DREU account. PACAF recommended that this agreement be continued and modified to add management of product at USAF facilities at CCK AB.

(U) Following a review of COMUSTDC's and PACAF's proposals, CINCPAC submitted a proposed POL agreement similar to the one prepared by COMUSTDC. The JCS concurred with the proposed agreement and authorized the USTDC to negotiate an agreement that would be signed by AIT and CCNAA. During March and April 1979 modifications were incorporated into the agreement before signing. The two major changes were a termination date one year sooner (December 1981 instead of December 1982), and a surcharge payment in cash vice fuel for handling, storage operation, and maintenance of the fuel system. Charges averaged $28,000 a month, which was considered a bargain. A payment system was developed involving activities such as CCNAA-T, AIT-T, 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, Clark AB in the Philippines and the Bank of Taiwan. MOGAS was provided to the TAF as compensation for on-base tank farm support/security along with DFM to operate diesel generators. In addition, 372,754 gallons of 115/145 were traded for 503,206 gallons of JP-4. The fuels agreement was signed on 26 April 1979.

Supply and Services

War Reserve Material (WRM)

(S/MKORN) There were three general categories of WRM on Taiwan: ammunition (also referred to as munitions); bulk petroleum (POL); and other related combat support items such as aircraft fuel tanks, repair parts, and sheets and blankets. The POL category has already been discussed and will not be covered here. CINCPAC had been tasked in 1978 to identify any WRM items which could be relocated, and alternatives which would reduce the reliance on prepositioned WRM and still enable treaty commitments to be met. CINCPAC's view, with inputs from COMUSTDC and Headquarters PACAF,

1. COMUSTDC 300919 Jan 79 (C/NE), DECL 30 Jan 84; HQ PACAF 030400Z Feb 79 (C/NE), DECL 2 Feb 85; CINCPAC 040302Z Feb 79 (U); COMUSTDC 050550Z Feb 79 (C/NE), DECL GDS-85.
2. CINCPAC 140654Z Feb 79 (C/NE), DECL 10 Feb 85; JCS 170030Z Feb 79 (C/NE), DECL 16 Feb 85; PAFTAT/COMUSTDC 100815Z Mar 79 (C/NE), DECL 9 Mar 84; Fuels Agreement dtd 26 Apr 79.
Retrograde Operations

In early January 1979, the JCS provided the following guidance in order that a withdrawal plan for WRM could be prepared:

1. JCS/J5 Memo (undated), Subj: Aircraft Contract Maintenance and War Materiel on Taiwan (U); CINCPAC 04202GZ Oct 78 (TS), GDS-86; J42 HistSum Feb 79.
2. JCS 062157Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 5 Dec 84; HQ USAF 131530Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 86.
3. CINCPAC 180634 Dec 78 (TS/NE), DECL 16 Dec 84.
4. CINCPAC 192120Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 19 Dec 78; CINCPAC 200222Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 19 Dec 84; JCS 230055Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 22 Dec 84.
required plan and asked that selection of items to be removed be kept to a minimum.

(U) The PACAF plan, known as the 60/40 plan, recommended that approximately 60 percent (5,600 S/Ts) remain on Taiwan while approximately 40 percent (3,900 S/Ts) be removed and redistributed within PACOM. CINCPAC concurred with the plan and requested JCS approval and permission for COMUSTDC to begin discussions on this subject with Taiwan authorities. On 27 January 1979, the JCS approved the plan and noted that COMUSTDC authority for direct discussions with Taiwan authorities had been provided on 19 January 1979. By this time, COMUSTDC had met with Admiral Soong (Chief of the General Staff, MND) and other GONT military and made a general presentation of the proposed plan. The main area of concern for the Taiwan military was the withdrawal of CBUs. CINCPAC informed COMUSTDC that CBUs were not on the list of munitions previously committed for sale or transfer to the GONT and were needed to fill PACOM operational requirements.

(C) Project NORTH SEA was the name given to the removal of WRM munitions/non-munitions by surface transportation commencing 19 February 1979. The SS GREEN SPRINGS was utilized while docked at Kaohsiung. Rail cars were used to move 2,492 S/Ts of munitions from munitions storage areas at Tainan, Chiayi and CCK Air Bases to Kaohsiung, and 242 S/Ts of non-munitions were also loaded. The operation was completed on 3 March 1979 without incident, accident, friction or security problems from start to finish. The cargo was delivered to Okinawa. The missile shipment of approximately 30 S/Ts by air from CCK AB to Clark Air Base in the Philippines was completed on 15 February 1979.

Munitions Maintenance Contract

(C/NOFO) Once the decision was made on which munitions would be left on Taiwan, amounting to approximately 7,400 S/Ts, it was necessary to determine how maintenance would be performed. The initial CINCPAC position had been to expand the maintenance contract with the TAF 2nd Air Depot. However, COMUSTDC proposed terminating this contract, effective 30 April 1979, and replacing it with a bailment agreement, similar to ones for the IJCS system and POL at CCK. The bailment would have a life of 8 months (until

1. JCS 03233Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 3 Jan 85; CINCPAC 062341Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 5 Jan 85.
2. PACAF 132000Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 5 Jan 85; CINCPAC 160457Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 13 Jan 85; JCS 271833Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 19 Jan 85; COMUSTDC 260551Z Jan 79 (C), CINCPAC 272202Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 26 Jan 85.
3. COMUSTDC 090903Z Feb 79 (C), DECL 9 Feb 84; PAFTAT at COMUSTDC 11054L Feb (C/NF), DECL 8 Feb 84; COMUSTDC 161000Z Feb 79 (C/NF), DECL 15 Feb 84; PAFTAT at COMUSTDC 031300Z Mar 79 (C/NF), DECL 3 Mar 84.
31 December 1979), and at the expiration of the MDT, the munitions in storage (and facilities in which housed and maintained) would be offered to the GONT at residual value.

(C)The proposed bailment agreement was reviewed and discussed by representatives of CINCPAC and PACAF in early February 1979. As a result, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the existing contract be modified to cover additional tasks and have a termination date of 31 December 1979. Some of the advantages leading to the contract vice bailment decision were: the contract existed; TAF was familiar with defense contractor procedures; U.S. control over Air Force munitions was assured; and PACAF/USTDC personnel were available to perform negotiations. On 17 February 1979, the JCS concurred with CINCPAC's recommendation. The cost of the contract was $20,000 per month. Similar to the POL agreement, a payment system including CCNAA-T, AIT-T, TAF 2nd Air Depot, 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, Clark AB in the Philippines and the Bank of Taiwan was developed. Defense Department civilian travel to Taiwan on a TOV basis was authorized for one individual to be the technical representative of the contracting officer and administer the contract. Quarterly visits were to be conducted. The munitions maintenance contract was signed by representatives of AIT and CCNAA on 26 April 1979.

Non-Munitions/Combat Support Items

(U) Very little of this material was shipped from Taiwan prior to 30 April 1979. PACAF informed the 6217th Air Base Squadron at CCK AB, on 30 January 1979, of the items to be left in place for the life of the MDT. Custodial responsibility was transferred to the TAF in April 1979 and was covered by the munitions maintenance contract for purposes of storage and security.

Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) on Taiwan

(C) Since 1950, Air Asia, Ltd., in Tainan, Taiwan had performed depot level maintenance on PACOM aircraft. The promulgation of the 1972 Shanghai Communique initiated attempts to relocate the PDM facility from Taiwan. In 1978, the site selection process was accelerated, with Japan and Korea identified as possible locations. In August 1978, the President's National Security Advisor directed transfer to Korea by 1 March 1980. The name for this project was PACER DOT and, by 1 December 1978, the decision had been made to award the contract to Korean Airlines at Kim Hae. The President's

1. COMUSTDC 010830Z Feb 79 (C/NE), DECL 31 Jan 83.
2. HQ PACAF 080400Z Feb 79 (C/NE), DECL 5 Feb 85; CINCPAC 110531Z Feb 79 (C), DECL 8 Feb 85; JCS 171635Z Feb 79 (C), DECL 16 Feb 85; Munitions Maintenance Contract dtd 26 Apr 79.
3. HQ PACAF 302145Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 30 Jan 85; 6217 ABS 270745Z Mar 79 (C), DECL 11 Mar 85.
normalization announcement prompted a reevaluation of the Air Asia contract termination date.

PACER DOT

CINCPAC advised the JCS that an abrupt termination of contract for PDM at Air Asia (30 April 1979) would have a significant impact on military readiness in the Pacific. PDM should be continued until the new PDM facility in Korea was fully operative (early 1980). Four courses of action were presented with the recommendation that Air Asia be fully recognized in negotiations as a commercial venture and be shifted politically from the perceived realm of U.S. military facilities into the economic sphere, with a view toward continuing work in progress until Kim Hae was ready. The completion date for PACER DOT was accelerated to match the termination of the MDT (31 December 1979). The JCS also advised that after 30 April 1979, contract administration would be performed by contract personnel. This decision was modified when authority was granted to allow seven DOD civilians at the Air Asia facility on a TDY basis from 1 May to 31 December 1979. The U.S. Navy requested that full contract administration support be provided by USAF contract personnel from 30 April 1979 to completion of Navy aircraft/ component rework. At this time the Navy had one DOD civilian assigned to the Taiwan PDM operation. CINCPAC concurred with this position and authorized direct coordination between the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) and CINCPACFLT. The Air Force did assume Navy support.

Excess U.S. Government Property Disposal

The initial concern of CINCPAC regarding property disposal was that there was a tendency to overlook disposition of equipment in withdrawal planning. The situation involving Taiwan would be especially difficult due to the circumstances of the withdrawal and the U.S. reliance on the GONT agencies for transportation, storage, packing, crating, etc. Unless an early agreement was reached with Taiwan authorities, the U.S. Government could lose control over titled material. Four courses of action were recommended to the JCS: convert two military spaces to civilian spaces; insure that disposal actions identified Grant Aid/FMS U.S. military equipment; increase Defense Property Disposal Office, Taipei (DPDO-T) spaces via TDY during the final disposition stages; and insure that DPDO-T actions were included under future commercial activities and authorized in legislation.

1. CINCPAC J4232 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 16 Jan 86; Z. Brezinski Memo, 3 Aug 78 (S), Subj: U.S. Programmed Depot Maintenance Facilities and War Reserve Materials on Taiwan, GDS-86.
2. JCS 0323232 Jan 79 (S), DECL 3 Jan 85; HQ USAF 211930Z Feb 79 (U); CINCPAC 180634Z Dec 78 (TS/ANE) (BOM), DECL 16 Dec 84; CINCPAC J4 Taiwan Withdrawal Status Report, dtd 8 May 79 (S), DECL 8 May 85, p. 24.
3. CINCPAC 180634Z Dec 78 (TS/ANE) (BOM), DECL 16 Dec 84.
During initial meetings between CINCPAC and the Defense Property Disposal Region-Pacific (DPDR-PAC), problems associated with disposal of property during the Thailand withdrawal and lessons learned from that experience were reviewed. The most significant point emphasized was that disposal operations would have to continue beyond the withdrawal date of U.S. Forces (30 April 1979) in order to dispose of U.S. property in accordance with statutory/regulatory requirements and the Disposal Agreement between the United States and Taiwan of 1959. Several aspects of the disposal program, e.g., DOD screening and sales on an accelerated basis, were identified as matters requiring higher level decisions before operational plans would be finalized. Concurrently, COMUSTDC advised military commands on Taiwan that all foreign excess property generated in Taiwan must be disposed of through DPDO-T and the Central Trust of China (CTC), or be shipped off island. Excess property could not be sold to the general public or donated to individuals or organizations by generating activities.

By the end of December 1978, CINCPAC had submitted a proposed concept of operations. Disposal phase-down operations would be in three stages: receipt of excess turned in by U.S. Forces through 30 April 1979; final processing and disposition; and disposal of excess MAP property continuing indefinitely. The latter two stages would be conducted under the auspices of AIT-T. Property disposal operations after 30 April 1979 would be provided as soon as the concept of U.S. activities on Taiwan was further defined.

Reutilization Program

In order to insure that the reutilization program was completed by 30 April 1979, authorization to conduct an accelerated screening was requested. In essence, secondary and non-standard items would be screened by the Defense European and Pacific Redistribution Activity (DEPRA) and DPDO-T simultaneously. U.S. commands on Taiwan would provide a list of projected excess major items to the appropriate military department for screening. Inventory managers (IMs) would provide disposition instructions within 15 days. The duration of DPDO-T screening of non-reportable assets would be 5 days in lieu of 14 days. The reportable item criterion would be increased from $500 to $2,000 and DEPRA screening time for these items would be reduced from 45 to 30 days. The JCS advised that items having been screened through DEPRA need not be screened by DPDO-T and concurred in all other CINCPAC proposed changes. The JCS, in coordination with OASD (MRA&L) and the Defense Logistics Agency, recommended that screening and disposal procedures begin immediately.

1. DPDR-PAC 190153Z Dec 78 (C), DECL 18 Dec 84; COMUSTDC 221050Z Dec 78 (U).
2. CINCPAC 280337Z Dec 78 (C), DECL 23 Dec 84.
3. CINCPAC 280337Z Dec 78 (C), DECL 23 Dec 84; JCS 152226Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 12 Jan 85; CINCPAC 170355Z Jan 79 (U); DPDR-PAC 200140Z Jan 79 (U).
(U) In response to a COMUSTDC request, CINCPAC and DPDR-PAC provided additional guidance regarding accelerated screening and associated time frames. Specifically, the in-service screening completion date was 15 February 1979; surviving items would be reported to DPDO-T and the IM/DEPRA as required by 19 February 1979; all screening was to be completed by 15 March 1979. Non-DOD organizations authorized assets from the DPDO would claim them on 15 March 1979; all remaining items would be sold by DPDO-T. Further, DPDR-PAC would provide a list of all items available for reutilization to its DPDOs in PACOM for review by Service organizations. COMUSTDC informed CINCPAC/DPDR-PAC of the general plan to implement the DEPRA/IM/intratheater screening of assets.

(U) Screening was accomplished in accordance with guidance and time frames established and all reutilization actions were completed by mid-April 1979. Approximately 2,000 line items valued at $3.6 million were reutilized by DOD activities or transferred to other federal agencies.

Sales Program

(5) The sales program and options thereto were first addressed by CINCPAC/DPDR-PAC in late December 1978. In essence it was proposed to continue emphasis on sales to Taiwan under the country-to-country agreement provisions of "right of first refusal." Remaining items, if not sold on a competitive bid, would be sold on a negotiated sales basis. This sales program would extend beyond the 30 April 1979 withdrawal date and envisioned AIT management of the program subsequent to that date. If the sales program could not be extended beyond the withdrawal date other options were proposed. The JCS responded that additional guidance regarding disposal operations after 30 April 1979 would be provided at a later date. The JCS had earlier advised that, for planning purposes, all DOD contacts with officials on Taiwan would be through AIT-T. All activities continuing beyond 30 April 1979, such as DPDO-T, must be accomplished through commercial contract. No temporary duty to Taiwan would be authorized for DOD personnel; however, clarification of this was being sought.

(U) In early February 1979, COMUSTDC, in coordination with DPDR-PAC, DPDO-T and the PACOM assistance team, proposed that upon completion of Service/DEPRA/DPDO-T screening, residual foreign excess personal property (FEPP) be offered in a one-time sale to the CTC at a negotiated percentage of the acquisition value of the property. COMUSTDC pointed out that this was in lieu of normal line-by-line item offering but was within the guidelines of prescribed directives and previously furnished guidelines for the

1. CINCPAC 080129Z Feb 79 (U); COMUSTDC 130908Z Feb 79 (U).
2. DPDR-PAC Memo, 3 Mar 80 (U), Subj: Defense Property Disposal Operations - Taiwan.
3. CINCPAC 280337Z Dec 78 (6), DECL 23 Dec 84; JCS 152226Z Jan 79 (6), DECL 12 Jan 85, JCS 1117222Z Jan 79 (6), DECL 10 Jan 85.
Taiwan withdrawal. Approval for this proposal and authority to discuss it with representatives of the GONT Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) was requested. CINCPAC authorized COMUSTDC to commence informal discussions with the MOFA and requested JCS and DPDS comments on the sales proposal. The JCS concurred with this proposal provided that CTC agreed to purchase the property at a price equal to past negotiated sales with CTC.

COMUSTDC reported that the one-time sale proposal to the GONT of FEPP was submitted to the MOFA on 23 February 1979. However, on 1 March 1979, COMUSTDC reported that an informal reply from the MOFA indicated a high probability of non-acceptance. Therefore, FEPP would be disposed of in accordance with existing disposal procedures if a one-time sale could not be arranged. When this one-time sale could not be agreed on, another proposal was developed. This proposal called for a sale to the Taiwan armed forces by conducting three separate negotiated sales with the MND on 6, 20, and 26 April 1979. Residual property not purchased at the conclusion of these sales would still require a sale with CTC and thereafter a one-time competitive negotiated sale. These MND sales were conducted as scheduled; however, the results were disappointing in that the number of items and proceeds were minimal.

Disposal Operations (Sales) after 30 April 1979

It was necessary to plan for some type of disposal operation after 30 April 1979 to provide for the sale and disposal of excess material generated during the withdrawal operation, that could not be accomplished by 30 April 1979. DPDR-PAC developed a conceptual plan which included disposal operations as one of the functions to be performed by AIT-1. It was recommended that two U.S. civilian positions (four if DOD civilians could not go to Taiwan on TDY) and nine local national positions be included in AIT-T's manpower authorizations. This plan was concurred with by the JCS and the Defense Logistic Agency. CINCPAC had previously identified to the JCS a requirement for two billets within AIT-T to support disposal operations.

DPDR-PAC advised they had been informed that individuals dedicated to the property disposal functional element probably would not be included within the AIT-T's organizational structure but that case-by-case authority could be granted for continuation of certain functions beyond 30 April 1979 on a TDY basis. DPDR-PAC estimated that 90-120 days would be required to conclude disposal actions and requested that DPDS forward a requirement for

1. COMUSTDC 020927Z Feb 79 (U); CINCPAC 080129Z Feb 79 (U); JCS 130043Z Feb 79 (U).
2. COMUSTDC 230911Z Feb 79 (U); COMUSTDC 010850Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 87; CDR DPDR-PAC 240131Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 23 Mar 85.
3. CDR DPDR-PAC 240135Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 23 Jan 85; DLA 061458Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 23 Jan 85; CINCPAC 120210Z Jan 79 (S/FR), DECL 31 Jan 87.
six civilians for TDY to Taiwan to the Defense Logistics Agency for coordination with the Secretaries of State and Defense.

DPDR-PAC's understanding was confirmed when the JCS identified property disposal functions as one of the reasons for retaining DOD civilians on Taiwan on a TDY basis. On 4 April 1979 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) authorized the Defense Logistics Agency to send up to six DOD civilians on TDY status for less than 180 days, after 30 April 1979.

Household Goods Shipments

The withdrawal from Taiwan involved approximately 1,700 personnel (sponsors and dependents) along with their household goods (HHG). The movement of HHG was not considered insurmountable as long as packouts commenced early (the local Taiwan moving companies could move 8 to 10 households per day). If necessary, TDY teams could be sent to Taiwan to assist in packing and shipping HHG.

Included in the proposed withdrawal plan, OPLAN 506X, were the following HHG movement milestones: by 31 January 1979, 20 percent removed; by 28 February, 40 percent; and by 31 March, 100 percent. This schedule was subsequently modified by CINCPAC and JCS to: 20 percent by 28 February, and 100 percent by 31 March. The initial problem with movement of HHG was the delay in receipt of orders by personnel and then setting up packouts. As orders were received packouts were established, with an attempt to minimize the period of time required to have families live in temporary quarters prior to departing Taiwan.

The first estimate from COMUSTDC on the number of HHG shipments was approximately 500 at maximum weight allowance. The first status report submitted by COMUSTDC, at the end of January 1979, advised that 110 HHG shipments had been packed out with 390 remaining. By the end of February, 439 shipments had been packed out and the estimate had grown to 627. By the end of March, 799 HHG shipments had been packed out. Reasons for the increased number of HHG shipments over the initial estimate of 500 were split shipments by some households and secondary shipments generated by local furniture deliveries made after primary shipments were completed. All told, 804 HHG shipments were made by 10 April 1979.

1. CDR DPDR-PAC 03014Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 2 Mar 85; CDR DPDR-PAC 07223Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 7 Mar 85.
2. JCS 062032Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 5 Mar 85; DLA 161954Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 31 Dec 85.
3. CINCPAC 180634Z Dec 78 (TSCNE) (EX), DECL 16 Dec 84.
4. COMUSTDC 170800Z Dec 78 (S), REVW 20 Dec 86; CINCPAC 270345Z Dec 78 (SYNE), REVW 22 Dec 78; JCS 301745Z Dec (S), DECL 28 Dec 84.
5. CINCPAC J4 Taiwan Withdrawal Status Report, 8 May 79 (S), DECL 8 May 85, p. 70-72; COMUSTDC 010815Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 85; COMUSTDC 010350Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 31 May 79; COMUSTDC 030145Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 87.
SECTION III--SECURITY ASSISTANCE

(U) During his announcement on establishing diplomatic relations between the United States and China, President Carter stated, "I have paid special attention to insuring that normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic will not jeopardize the well-being of the people of Taiwan." The Taiwan Relations Act contained the provision that the United States would make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as might be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The nature and quantity of such defense articles and services would be determined by the President and Congress based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. A determination on Taiwan's defense needs would include a review by United States military activities.

(5) As a result of severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan no new commitments for security assistance would be made with Taiwan during 1979. Requests for security assistance items would continue during 1979 short of obtaining approval or commitment. Items that had already been committed to Taiwan prior to 1 January 1979 would be delivered on schedule, including equipment, training of military students, spare parts, and follow-on items such as ammunition. The United States would continue to provide follow-on support such as material, technical training, technical assistance, and technical data packages to support U.S. systems or items already furnished or being provided as a result of existing commitments. Further, Taiwan military students enrolled or to be enrolled per letters of offer and acceptance (LOA's) signed prior to 31 December 1978 would complete training.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

(5) General FMS procedures developed with respect to Taiwan after normalization were as follows: LOAs, the basic exchange which committed the U.S. Government and the purchaser to a contractual agreement, would be routed between the two unofficial entities; communications in other related areas would be directly between the Taiwan unofficial entity (CCNAA) and the responsible elements of the DOD. In some cases, primarily in Taiwan, communications between the U.S. unofficial entity (AIT) and the responsible elements of the Government on Taiwan were authorized. The only written communication between elements of the two governments were restricted to automated requisitioning and notices by electronic means.

1. Text of the President's Address to the Nation, 15 Dec 78; Taiwan Relations Act, Pl. 96-8 of 10 Apr 79.
2. CINCPAC 191903Z Jan 79 (SF), DECL 16 Jan 85.
3. SECSTATE 0101252 Mar 79 (S (EX)), GDS 2/28/85.

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Taiwan Military Training

(U) CINCPAC advised the JCS in early January 1979 that there were 12 Taiwanese students attending CONUS military training. An additional 138 were scheduled during the remainder of FY 79. Of these, 29 students would not complete training until after 1979, including one as late as December 1981. In addition to these students, two armed forces members were assigned as liaison representatives at the Air Force Logistics Command and Navy International Logistics Control Office, and the USAF Academy had a Chinese language instructor. CINCPAC proposed to inform MAAG China that the scheduled students would complete their training and recommended continuation of duty for the other three officers. The JCS answered that, while the official decision on Taiwan Armed Forces training had not been made, indications were that the students then enrolled or to be enrolled per signed LOAs would complete training.

(OU) After the State Department directed the American Embassy, Taipei not to issue visas for Taiwan military students until future notice, pending a decision on continuation of CONUS training, CINCPAC requested that the JCS pursue an early decision on future training and on official visits to the United States by Taiwan military authorities. The JCS reply was that there was a general consensus that some types of training in U.S. military educational/training facilities would continue; however, no decision had yet been made. Meanwhile, the State Department advised the Embassy in Taipei to issue visas to Taiwan military personnel scheduled to receive training at commercial facilities. Training at U.S. commercial facilities did not represent official contact between governmental representatives, was not affected by normalization, and was to be encouraged.

(OU) On 21 February 1979, the Embassy in Taipei acknowledged State Department guidance and agreed that future GONT military training requests should be met as far as possible through private U.S. corporations providing equipment. However, the Embassy indicated that there were special GONT concerns which should be borne in mind which, if not adequately met, could cause the GONT to take their case to the U.S. Congress. CINCPAC supported the Embassy position, informing the JCS that technical and professional military training should be an integral part of the support package for equipment purchased previously, as well as for equipment to be sold to Taiwan in the future. In late March 1979, the JCS provided detailed procedures for the training of Taiwan military personnel at U.S. military facilities. In summary, the United States would provide technical training to members of Taiwan's armed forces only when the training in question could

1. CINCPAC 062350Z Jan 79 (U); J4 Taiwan Withdrawal Status Report (OU) 8 May 78, p. 129.
2. J4 Taiwan Withdrawal Status Report (OU), 8 May 78, pp. 129-130; CINCPAC 310053Z Jan 79 (OU), DECL 26 Jan 85; JCS 052107Z Feb 79 (OU), DECL 1 Feb 85.
not be provided by Taiwan's own military school system or was not reasonably available from commercial sources. DOD would investigate the feasibility of contracting out technical training to civilian sources. The annual technical training program would be prepared by AIT-Taipei from Taiwan military requests and forwarded to CINCPAC for review and forwarding to DOD. Final approval would follow current FMS procedures; i.e., State and Defense Department approval required.

Military Assistance Program

(U) CINCPAC recommended that existing disposition/residual rights of MAP equipment either continue as it had been or that such equipment be sold or transferred free. The JCS advised that the DOD position was for the United States to retain title to the residual rights as long as the GONT retained the equipment.

1. AMEMB Taipei 210749Z Feb 79 (C), GOS 02/21/85; CINCPAC 230552Z Feb 79 (C), DECL 22 Feb 85; JCS 232300Z Mar 79 (C), DECL 23 Mar 85.
2. J4 Taiwan Withdrawal Status Report (C), 8 May 78, p. 132; CINCPAC 191903Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 16 Jan 85.
CHAPTER V
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
SECTION I--WITHDRAWAL ACTIONS

1. CINCPAC 180634Z Dec 78 (TS/MF) (EX), DECL 16 Dec 84.
2. CINCPAC 220210Z Dec 78 (TS), DECL 20 Dec 84.
(U) On 2 February 1979, COMUSTDC requested that CINCPAC take action to stop any additional requests for C-E asset removal not previously approved. Continuing requests for the removal of additional equipment had begun to give Taiwan authorities the impression that the United States was bailing a piecemeal communication system and this was adverse to bailment negotiations. On 8 February 1979, CINCPAC informed all concerned that the list of C-E equipment approved for removal was frozen and any future requests required the approval of the CINCPAC Directorate for Communications-Data Processing.

IJCJ Bailment

1. Ibid.
2. COMUSTDC 220624Z Dec 78 (C), DECL 1 May 79; COMUSTDC 300227Z Dec 78 (S), DG/C/28 Dec 86.
3. JCS 032323Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 3 Jan 85.
4. CINCPAC 132049Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 11 Jan 85.
5. COMUSTDC 020826Z Feb 79 (C), DECL 1 Jan 80; CINCPAC 080229Z Feb 79 (U).

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(U) COMUSTDC submitted a new proposed bailment, based on CINCPAC's 27 January 1979 comments, and indicated that formal discussions on this bailment would be held on 8 February 1979, via the military subcommittee of the Joint SOFA Committee. PACAF concurred with the substance of the proposed agreement, understanding that the format (bailment) required Defense and State Department approval. CDRUSACSG concurred with the proposal. CINCPAC also concurred with this proposal and submitted it to the JCS with the understanding that the DOD General Counsel's Office was comfortable with the bailment concept. CINCPAC pointed out that the agreement for the disposition of C-E assets in Thailand was prepared as both a bailment agreement and a memorandum of agreement, but CINCPAC was satisfied with the single bailment agreement. Expeditious approval of the bailment was requested along with authority for the Joint Committee to enter the agreement on behalf of the United States as soon as possible.

(U) The above information was relayed to COMUSTDC and discussed with Taiwan authorities at a 5 March 1979 meeting. A third revision, dated 6 March 1979, was forwarded to CINCPAC and passed to the JCS. The Taiwan MND representative agreed to pay all O&M costs. Joint inventories were begun on 16 March 1979, and on 1 April 1979 Taiwan assumed O&M responsibility for the microwave system.

1. JCS 081441Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 3 Jan 85; COMUSTDC 170605Z Jan 79 (U);
   CINCPAC 270157Z Jan 79 (U).
2. HQ PACAF 030400Z Feb 79 (C/NF), DECL 2 Feb 85.
3. COMUSTDC 070834Z Feb 79 (U); HQ PACAF 100120Z Feb 79 (U); CDRUSACSG
   122355Z Feb 79 (U); CINCPAC 151912Z Feb 79 (U).
4. JCS 282246Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 27 Feb 85.
5. COMUSTDC 080610Z Mar 79 (U).
(U) As with other agreements being worked in Taiwan and reviewed in Washington, D.C., a time delay developed. By the time the JCS approved the second revision agreement on 14 April, COMUSTDC had already prepared a fifth revision. The JCS cancelled their 14 April 1979 direction, reviewed the latest revision and approved the COMUSTDC 8 March 1979 proposal with incorporation of certain changes. CINCPAC requested that COMUSTDC meet with the Taiwan representatives and obtain their concurrence with the JCS recommended changes.

(U) A sixth and final revision, dated 24 April 1979, was prepared and signed by representatives of AIT and CCNA.

1. JCS 140139Z Apr 79 (U); JCS 162336Z Apr 79 (U); CINCPAC 170255Z Apr 79 (U), DECL 16 Apr 85.
2. Communications Bailment Agreement dtd 24 Apr 79.
1. COMUSTDC 230825Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 85.
2. CINCPAC 240335Z Jan 79 (S/NF) (BOM), DECL 22 Jan 85.
3. CINCPAC 071819Z Feb 79 (G), DECL 6 Feb 85.
4. CINCPAC 020527Z Mar 79 (S/NF) (BOM), DECL 1 Mar 85; AMEMB Taipei 230814Z Feb 79 (S), XDS-3, 22 Feb 79.
1. CINCPAC 090240Z Mar 79 (T5/NE) (BOM), DECL 6 Mar 09; JCS 310008Z Mar 79 (C), DECL 28 Mar 85.
2. CINCPAC 310420Z Mar 79 (S/YN/), DECL 30 Mar 85.
3. COMUSTOC 120740Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 13 Apr 85; JCS 131931Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 13 Apr 85.
4. NSA 171437Z Apr 79 (C), REVW 17 Apr 2009; CINCPAC 181946Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 18 Apr 85.

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SECTION III--ARMED FORCES NETWORK TAIWAN

(U) In March 1979, COMUSTDC received a request from the Director General of the Taiwan Information Office to transfer, in place and cost free, the Armed Forces Network Taiwan (AFNT) equipment and facilities. AFNT would be used to provide nonprofit English language public service broadcasting to the international community on Taiwan. The expatriate community had strong feelings over the loss of the AFNT. This led to the American Chamber of Commerce obtaining permission from the Taiwan Government to establish a noncommercial, nonprofit English language radio station, funded by contributions from the foreign business community. COMUSTDC supported this request both for the enhanced quality of life it would provide for the expatriate community and for improved relations with the people on Taiwan. It also afforded the commander the capability to have emergency communication, through late April 1979, in the event of natural disaster or other emergencies which might otherwise affect the withdrawal.

(U) By message on 17 March 1979, CINCPAC supported COMUSTDC's request as being in the best interest of the U.S. Government and because of the substantial benefits to the United States which would accrue, in accordance with Title IV of the Federal Property Act (40 USC 511-514). The head of the executive agency involved, in this case Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), was required to make the substantial benefit determination. CINCPAC requested that the JCS effect the necessary coordination with CNO.

(U) The JCS requested that the CNO make the substantial benefits determination based on an initial cost of $300,000, and residual value of $25,000. On 2 April 1979, the CNO advised that transfer of the AFNT facilities and equipment to the GONT was considered to be in the best interest of the United States and requested appropriate procedures and instruments be implemented locally to effect the transfer upon the establishment of AIT. Preliminary turnover operations were to commence immediately, since the American community in Taipei wanted to commence broadcasting immediately following cessation of AFNT operations on 15 April 1979. Naval Broadcast Service (NAVBCSTSVC) Detachment 31, Taipei, was directed to take appropriate actions to achieve a smooth transition.

(U) The JCS authorized transfer of AFNT equipment in two phases: NAVBCSTSVC Det 31 to AIT and AIT to CCNAA. This was accomplished and the International Community Radio in Taiwan began operation on 16 April 1979.

1. COMUSTDC 122338Z Mar 79 (U).
2. CINCPAC 172145Z Mar 79 (U).
3. JCS 302230Z Mar 79 (U); CNO 021654Z Apr 79 (U).
4. JCS 131745Z Apr 79 (U); COMUSTDC Terminal History (1 January 1978 - 30 April 1979), p. 31, (S), DECL 30 April 85.

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CHAPTER VI
MILITARY OPERATIONS
SECTION I — EXERCISES

During 1978, PACOM had conducted 15 exercises with the GONT. Five were significant joint/combined exercises and ten were routine. These exercises provided a training base for Taiwan military personnel.

CINCPAC's position was that it was necessary, during the life of the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), to schedule exercises to train and evaluate GONT command and control capabilities under simulated battle conditions. Therefore, he identified to the JCS three options, ranging from canceling the entire exercise program to continuing scheduled exercises during 1979. The recommendation was to modify the existing exercise program commensurate with the withdrawal schedule of COMUSTOC.

Exercise Scheduling

The first exercises to be affected by the normalization announcement were SHARKHUNT, SALVEX and EAGLE/LARK, scheduled for January 1979. The American Embassy, Taipei, supported these exercises and stated that besides the political advantages in demonstrating the validity of our ongoing security commitment during the remaining life of the MDT, the JCS advised that the exercises were canceled.

During February, March and April 1979, CINCPAC made attempts to have EAGLE/LARK/BLUESKY or LARK exercises approved. A total of six exercises were planned, coordinated and canceled during the first four months of 1979. Cancellations were made in each case as a result of State Department decisions that they could cause misinterpretation of U.S. intentions in the

1. CINCPAC 180634Z Dec 78 (TS/NF) (BOM), DECL 16 DEC 84.
2. CINCPAC 230017Z Dec 78 (TS), DECL 31 Dec 79; CINCPAC 030640Z Jan 79 (TS), BOM, DECL 2 Jan 85; Amembassy Taipei 030722Z Jan 79 (TS), DECL 3 Jan 85; JCS 092234Z Jan 79 (TS), DECL 8 Jan 85; JCS 040054Z Jan 79 (TS), DECL 3 Jan 85.
area. Finally, in early May 1979, the JCS advised that the Secretary of Defense had indicated that there would be no more joint/combined military exercises with Taiwan.

**Taiwan Strait Patrols**

Taiwan Strait Patrols (TSPs) were routinely conducted by U.S. Navy ships at the direction of COMSEVENTHFLT in connection with normal transits of the strait and were coordinated with the Taiwan Navy through COMUSTDC. Since COMUSTDC was being disestablished on 30 April 1979, CINCPACFLT requested authorization to discontinue TSPs after 30 April. COMUSTDC disagreed with the request and supported continuation of TSPs through the MDT period utilizing AIT-T as the interface. COMUSTDC foresaw TSPs as the only vehicle available for maintaining a visible interface between the GONT and U.S. military forces past 30 April. Because guidance on U.S.-Taiwan relationships had not been fully developed at that time, CINCPAC held in abeyance the authority to discontinue TSPs until the overall U.S. policy was announced.

1. CINCPAC 082309Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 5 Jan 85; CINCPAC 220306Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 5 Jan 85; CINCPAC 020350Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 1 Mar 85; JCS 222309Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 22 Mar 85; CINCPAC 102107Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 24 Mar 85; JCS 111817Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 11 Apr 85; JCS 080339Z May 79 (S), DECL 8 May 85; COMUSTDC Terminal Command History, 1 Jan 78-30 Apr 79 (S), DECL 30 Apr 85, p. 53; J78/Memo/99-79 of 27 Aug 79 (S).
2. CINCPACFLT 150001Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 11 Feb 85; COMUSTDC 210012Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 1 Jan 84; CINCPAC 222030Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 1 Jan 84.
SECTION II — SHIP VISITS

Four ship visits were scheduled during the Christmas period 1978 and five ship visits were scheduled during the following New Year period. An additional 20 ships were scheduled for the first quarter of 1979. The options available were to continue ship visits as scheduled; cancel all ship visits; or, depending on the attitude of the Taiwan Government and the security situation, continue with the immediate (holiday period) visits and scale down subsequent visits until the political situation stabilized. The consensus was to continue the Christmas period visits but to cancel the New Year period visits because this period coincided with the day (1 January 1979) when the United States severed diplomatic relations with the Taiwan.

In early January 1979, Admiral Weisner advised General Jones, Chairman of the JCS, that he had modified his position of late December 1978 to continue ship visits, at least through January 1979, in accordance with the first quarter employment schedule. Admiral Weisner's new position was to continue ship visits through the year but with a tempo scaled down gradually to a level that by the fourth quarter could include visits to Mainland China as well. Specifically, January visits would be reduced by 50 percent and future months would be further decreased through the fourth quarter. The JCS responded that no ship visits were to be conducted until a change in guidance from higher authority, which they were attempting to have reviewed, was received. The CINCPAC response was cancellation of ship visits through 17 January 1979, leaving three January 1979 visits held in abeyance pending review of existing guidance.

When no change in guidance was received by mid-February 1979, resulting in additional ship visit cancellations, CINCPAC placed all ship visits in abeyance until a ship visit policy was established by higher authority. The JCS were requested to assist in expediting the ship visit decision. In the meantime, CINCPACFLT proposed guidelines for Taiwan port visits when or if a resumption of ship visits was authorized.

On 23 March 1979, the JCS informed CINCPAC that a total of 34 ship visits, commencing that month, was approved for the remainder of 1979. As many as six ships (October 1979) could visit in a month. CINCPAC was requested to advise of any March visits contemplated and to set in motion

1. CINCPAC 180634Z Dec 78 (TS/NF) (EX), DECL 16 Dec 84; CINCPAC 200126Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 31 Jan 79; AMEMBASSY Taipei 200932Z Dec 78 (S), GDS 12/20/84; JCS 201916Z Dec 78 (S) (EX), DECL 20 Dec 84; CINCPAC 230017Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 79.
2. CINCPAC 230017Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 79; CINCPAC 030640Z Jan 79 (S) (EX), DECL 2 Jan 85; JCS 040054Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 3 Jan 85; CINCPAC 082309Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 5 Jan 85.
3. CINCPAC 102233Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 10 Jan 85; CINCPAC 182059Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 17 Feb 81; CINCPAC FLT 302057Z Jan 79 (C/NF), DECL 31 Jan 85.
visit schedules for subsequent quarters for JCS review and approval. Two ships visited Taiwan on very short notice (28 March 1979). A second quarter 1979 ship visit schedule, containing six ships, was submitted on 3 April 1979. The JCS approved the April and May visits (three ships) on 10 April 1979.

1. JCS 231945Z Mar 79 (8), DECL 22 Mar 85; CINCPACFLT 241904Z 30 Jun 79; JCS 262233Z Mar 79 (8), DECL 26 Mar 79; CINCPAC 031031Z Apr 79 (G), DECL 30 Mar 80.
SECRET

SECTION III — AIRCRAFT TRANSIT RIGHTS

(U) Prior to all U.S. military forces leaving Taiwan, Detachment 1 of the 13th Air Force at Clark AB was responsible for U.S. aircraft clearances/overflights on Taiwan. As the withdrawal was completed, COMUSTDC, with technical assistance from the Clark detachment, assumed responsibility. In early May 1979, AIT-T, through the CINCPAC liaison officers, accepted primary responsibility and the CINCPAC Provisional Plans Office monitored this activity and provided assistance as required.

Aircraft Clearances/Overflights

(U) U.S. aircraft, either landing on Taiwan or flying through the Taiwan airspace, previously received approval via a system known as "Mother Hubbard." Effective 1 May 1979, a new procedure, called "Dragon," was established. Dignitary flights previously covered under diplomatic clearances followed the same "Dragon" procedures, but were called "Dragon Victor." The first "Dragon" and "Dragon Victor" flights were conducted on 5 and 14 May 1979 respectively.

Aircraft Landing Rights

(S) In January 1979, CINCPAC provided rationale to the JCS for retaining aircraft landing rights. CINCPAC indicated that U.S. military flights through Taiwan were necessary to support aircraft, medical and search and rescue emergencies; the programmed depot maintenance operation; and to retain flexibility, e.g., weather divert fields. Since this remained an unresolved issue in mid-March 1979, Admiral Weisner reemphasized its importance to General Jones. The PACOM view was that transient military aircraft landing rights were necessary to support helicopter and tactical aircraft deployments between the Philippines and North East Asia. The capability to land on Taiwan, even under limited circumstances, provided the flexibility necessary for these deployments and Military Airlift Command support options and the safety provided by emergency diverts and weather evacuation bases. The reply from the Chairman of the JCS was that the only option that had been retained was emergency landing rights. Any additional rationale that could strengthen the case would be appreciated. The rationale was provided by early April 1979. As a result of this information, the JCS forwarded a memorandum to the Office of the Secretary of Defense emphasizing retention of landing rights that had operational and humanitarian implications.

1. COMUSTDC 191205Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 82; CINCPAC 021959Z May 79 (U); CINCPAC 022123Z May 79 (U).
2. CINCPAC 181946Z Mar 79 (S) (BOM), DECL 17 Mar 85; JCS 262236Z Mar 79 (S) (BOM), DECL 22 Mar 85; CINCPAC 050316Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 31 Mar 85; JCS 142127Z Apr 79 (C) (BOM), DECL 11 Apr 85.
By the end of April 1979 and the withdrawal of all U.S. forces, the issue of landing rights was still under review at the Washington level. In the interest of safety, CINCPAC issued an interim policy for aircraft emergency landings on Taiwan. The overriding consideration was aircrew/aerialcraft safety.

1. CINCPAC 282255Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 27 Apr 85.
(U) There were in excess of 250 Defense-related agreements between Taiwan and the United States in existence in December 1978. When the Christopher mission visited Taipei in late December 1978, Mr. Armacost discussed with the Taiwan authorities the possible termination of these agreements. This led to a request from the JCS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel to review these agreements for the purpose of determining which agreements might be terminated and which would remain in effect.

2. CINCPAC 060329Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 09.
3. CINCPAC 060412Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 09.
PART II

1 May - 31 December 1979

CHAPTER I
PLANNING

SECTION I--PLANS

Operation Plans

(U) CINCPAC OPLAN 5025, COMUSTDC OPLAN 5025, and MND-USTDC OPLAN ROCHESTER were cancelled effective 1 January 1980. CINCPAC components were advised to retain CINCPAC OPLAN 5025 and supporting plans on file for two years.

1. CINCPAC 0502442Z Feb 80 (U).
2. A CONPLAN was an Operation Plan in Concept Format, an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require expansion into an OPLAN or an Operation Order prior to implementation.
CHAPTER II
PERSONNEL
SECTION I -- TRAVEL TO TAIWAN

Official Travel

CINCPAC Role

(U) The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and JCS guidance on authorized DOD civilian travel to Taiwan had not referred to the role that CINCPAC would play in the clearance process. CINCPAC's opinion was that a continuing interest and responsibility did exist to maintain a controlling or monitoring position in established clearance procedures. This resulted in a proposal to OSD for one of two alternatives: the first would continue existing procedures prescribed for travel by senior officials to Taiwan (i.e., traveler first obtain concurrence of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), ASD (ISA), and then area clearance by CINCPAC); the second would place CINCPAC in the approval chain prior to ASD (ISA). CINCPAC preferred the first alternative.

(U) The ASD (ISA) acknowledged CINCPAC's continuing interest in official DOD civilian travel to Taiwan. Because of the unique circumstances involved, however, such travel would require OSD (ISA) and State Department concurrence and final National Security Council approval. Therefore, the procedures outlined in March 1979 were modified, to wit: requests originating in the PACOM area were submitted to CINCPAC headquarters for recommendation and forwarded to OSD (ISA); requests originating outside the PACOM area were submitted directly to OSD (ISA), with a copy to CINCPAC. CINCPAC then provided recommendations directly to OSD (ISA).

Travel Conducted

(S) At the end of 1979, 66 DOD civilians had been authorized to travel to Taiwan under the new guidelines; 39 had commenced travel. The major reasons for travel included:

- Foreign Military Sales cases
- Administering WRM Contracts/
  Property Disposal/Installation Transfer
- Supervising contract work at Air Asia

1. JCS 062032Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 5 Mar 85; SECDEF 132005Z Apr 79 (S), DECL
   11 Apr 85; CINCPAC 280316Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 26 Apr 85.
2. SECDEF 090457Z May 79 (U); J781 Point Paper, 7 Dec 79, Subj: DOD
   Civilians on Taiwan After 30 Apr 79 (S)

(SECRET)

73 (Reverse Blank p. 74)
CHAPTER III
ORGANIZATIONS
SECTION I -- PROVISIONAL PLANS OFFICE

Disestablishment

(U) A CINCPAC Notice advised that normal operations for the PPO would cease on 17 December 1979 and various administrative actions would occur during the period 17-31 December 1979 to provide for an orderly disestablishment of the PPO on 31 December 1979.

Drawdown

(U) The accompanying chart gives the end-of-month strength for the PPO from March thru December 1979, displaying the buildup and gradual decline in personnel. By 31 December 1979, two military were scheduled to remain at CINCPAC until March and May 1980, when they would be transferred to a CONUS and sea command respectively. One civilian remained at CINCPAC; 9 military remained on Oahu in various commands; 10 military were transferred to CONUS commands; 1 military was transferred to an overseas command; and 1 military was transferred to sea duty.

1. CINCPAC Notice S3020 of 14 Dec 79, Subj: Terms of Reference for the Director, Provisional Plans Office (U).

UNCLASSIFIED
AIT-Taipai Manning

(U) Of the six personnel originally nominated for DOD related billets, four accepted. These were the two International Logistics Officers (formerly heads of the Army and Air Force desks at MAAG China), an Administrative Officer (retired senior NCO at the 6217th Air Base Squadron at CCK Air Base, and a Senior Plans Liaison Officer (retired Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USTDC). The two active duty officers retired and arrived on Taiwan on 16 June 1979. The Administrative Officer and Senior Plans Liaison Officer were hired on Taiwan. The second nominee for Senior International Logistics Officer accepted and retired from the Air Force, arriving in Taiwan 10 June 1979. The alternate selection for Plans Coordinator was a retired Marine officer. He arrived in Taiwan 14 June 1979.

(U) The two temporary billets were terminated effective 31 December 1979.

AIT-Washington Manning

(U) In May 1979, a position was added and filled at the Headquarters office to coordinate all DOD-assigned activities. Title of the position was Political/Military Liaison Officer.

1. SECSTATE 120220Z May 79 (U); J135 HistSum Apr 79; SECSTATE 052247Z Jun 79 (S); J781 HistSum May 79.
2. J5325 HistSum Aug 79 (S), DECL Jan 85; J78/Memo/10 July 79, Subj: DOD Representation in American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), (S); DIA 062049Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 1 Aug 85; J781 HistSum, Sep 79.
3. CINCPAC 252341Z Oct 79 (U).
SECRET

CINCPAC-AIT Relationships

(5) The JCS answer to CINCPAC's message of 31 March 1979 (received on 10 May) was not definitive. The Director of the Plans and Policy Directorate, LT GEN Lawson, advised the CINCPAC Chief of Staff, LT GEN Poston, that there was difficulty in providing specific responses because there was no precedent for relations with an organization such as AIT and, therefore, no policy to draw upon. He suggested that those questions which could be answered in the near future would be answered, but for the others, they were best left to time and experience.

(5) In the CINCPAC quarterly report to the Secretary of Defense for the period ending June 1979, the need for improvement in the CINCPAC-AIT relationship was mentioned. Mr. Armacost, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, was asked by the Secretary of Defense to obtain additional information on this problem area. In replying to Mr. Armacost, Admiral Weisner advised that, since the quarterly report was submitted, his concern for maintaining an adequate information flow from Taiwan had been somewhat reduced. There had been improvements in the informal contacts between the CINCPAC representatives in AIT and the MND; also resolution of FMS procedures to maintain the JCS and CINCPAC in the decision process was expected. Admiral Weisner remained concerned that policy decisions limiting the DOD/Taiwan interface should be subject to CINCPAC and JCS scrutiny.

(U) According to a November 1979 PPO working paper, however, no real improvement in AIT-MND contact was apparent. Coordination procedures in Taiwan continued to remain more restrictive than in Washington, D.C., and the GONT MND had complained about the lack of official contact with the AIT CINCPAC representatives. With the termination of the CINCPAC representative billets, the Senior International Logistics Officer/Chief Technical Affairs Section and the Sggrs and Studies and Research Specialist assumed all the DOD related functions.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION III--CCNAA-HONOLULU

Relationship with PACOM Staff

(U) During the course of the period May through December 1979, RADM Lei's presence was of benefit to both Taiwan and the United States and enhanced the understanding between the two countries in deference to the new relationships. He was of considerable assistance in efforts to complete facility transfer negotiations between AIT Taipei and CCNAA Taipei; obtain equitable residual value for facilities and equipment transferred; and enable removal of selected War Reserve Materiel from Taiwan. After each of several discussions with the PACOM staff, RADM Lei dispatched messages to his counterparts on Taiwan and, in all instances, negotiating positions were altered in favor of the United States.

1. J78/Memo/C-32-79, 13 Dec 79, Subj: Taiwan Matters (U); J78/Memo/C-33-79, 19 Dec 79, Subj: RADM Lei Hsui-Ming (Sherman) ROCN (Ret.), Chief, Liaison Division, CCNAA (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

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(Reverse Blank p. 80)
Defense Property Disposal Office-Related Facilities

(U) The requirement for DPDO-related facilities, including warehouses at Sung Shan Air Base, Hsi-Chih, and CCK Air Base was estimated to be four months. Because of the minimum time required, AIT-T requested AIT-W's view on bailing these facilities to CCNAA as quickly as possible. In mid-June 1979, DPDR-PAC advised that property disposal operations had proceeded as planned and all property would be disposed of by the end of June 1979. AIT-T advised AIT-W, in early August 1979, that the MND had informally expressed interest in having these facilities transferred to CCNAA if the United States no longer had a need for them; instructions about when and how to proceed in transferring them was requested. AIT-T was aware that $47,701 was the calculated residual value but, from past experience, doubted that full payment for the facilities would be made. CINCPAC, in coordination with PACOM components who shared an interest in the facilities, advised that no further U.S. requirements for them existed and supported AIT-T's request to initiate transfer action.

(U) The Washington reply was that AIT-T should seek an amendment to the bailment agreement to bail the DPDO properties to CCNAA. In addition, the bailment amendment should include an agreement to pay 90 percent of the $47,701 residual value at the end of the agreement period. AIT-T believed that this approach was unrealistic because the bailment agreement provided for transfer of facilities for which neither AIT nor the Taiwan Armed Forces had a need; the Taiwan Air Force wanted to build barracks at Sung Shan AB and if bailed, the facilities would be maintained as is. Additionally, early transfer would produce a learning curve which would be helpful in transfer actions later in the year. CINCPAC supported the AIT-T rebuttal, noting further that transfer negotiations for all remaining property/facilities on Taiwan should begin not later than 1 October 1979. CINCPAC also clarified that the 90 percent of residual value figure mentioned was coincidental (beginning residual values minus those not required by Taiwan authorities) and should not be used during future negotiations. CINCPAC also offered to assist AIT-T, including preparation of draft transfer agreements.

1. AIT Taipei 300542Z Apr 79 (U); DPDR-PAC 132304Z Jun 79 (CS), DECL 13 Jun 85; AIT Taipei 090533Z Aug 79 (CS); CINCPAC 172324Z Aug 79 (U).
2. SECSTATE 301429Z Aug 79 (CS), GDS 8/29/85; AIT Taipei 040737Z Sep 79 (CS); CINCPAC 122332Z Sep 79 (CS), DECL 7 Sep 85.
Property Transfer Agreement

(U) The transfer of DPDO related facilities was overtaken by the need to reduce the transferring all U.S. property (less petroleum products and DPDO related facilities) on Taiwan. AIT-W requested CINCPAC to prepare a comprehensive draft message on all aspects of property disposal issues. The draft message was submitted on 16 October 1979 and included specific instructions to AIT-T to negotiate and wrap up actions by 15 December 1979. This draft message was never released; however, it provided valuable information to AIT-T personnel involved in real property transfer negotiations.

(C/NOFORN) The USAF was the primary owner of residual military assets on Taiwan. Besides being interested in the turnover of property they were also concerned with the feasibility of removing selected WRM/supply/equipment items (triple ejector racks, chaff, etc.). Before official guidance was promulgated on disposing of property on Taiwan, PACAF began developing a plan called BATTERY PLATE Wrap-up, which among other things, covered the transfer of real estate/structures to the GONT.

(5) On 17 November 1979, the JCS reported that appropriate DOD agencies were preparing instructions to their subordinate units on final property disposal on Taiwan. For real property, the transfer would be effected between AIT and CCNAA on 1 January 1980, and would include all property bailed to Taiwan in accordance with the provisions of the bailment agreements. Communications (JCS) and WRM munition maintenance contract facilities were included, as well as the MDT-related bailed facilities and DPDO-related facilities. Personal property not removed from Taiwan, remaining in these facilities, would also be transferred. The International Security Assistance Act of 1979 (PL 96-92), signed by the President on 29 October 1979, authorized the transfer to Taiwan, under such terms and conditions as the President deemed appropriate, of WRM and non-WRM property. For real property, residual values would be an important element of negotiations. By telephone, on 20 November 1979, the JCS informed CINCPAC that obtaining money for personal property was desired, but the primary emphasis should be placed on real property.

(5) Concurrent with the JCS guidance, the Secretary of State advised AIT-T to assist in the upcoming transfer actions and authorized contacts directly with DOD agencies and CCNAA to dispose of DOD property. On 4 December, AIT-T met with CCNAA-T and Taiwan military representatives. The Taiwan representatives considered the residual values set for the munition facilities to be too high because most of the buildings were very old.

2. HQ PACAF 222100Z Oct 79 (C/NF), DECL 17 Oct 85; AIT Taipei 290922Z Oct 79 (C); HQ PACAF 140100Z Nov 79 (C/NF), REVW 7 Nov 99.
3. JCS 170620Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 14 Nov 85.
further, the residual values of facilities transferred in April 1979 had
worked out to about 2 percent of cost. They indicated that the U.S. com-
munications system would probably not be operated but that a residual value
for the facilities would be negotiated. The residual values for general
facilities (MDT/DPDD related) were also considered to be too high. The next
meeting was scheduled for 11 December 1979.

(UNCLASSIFIED) Prior to that meeting, CINCPAC sent a message to AIT-T
reviewing the previous guidance and providing answers and comments regarding
questions and discussions at the 4 December 1979 meeting. CINCPAC reiter-
ated that residual values must be negotiated, but that facilities not
intended for future use by the GONT could be excluded. Computed residual
values for an opening bargaining position, prior to any adjustment for
exclusion of facilities, would be: DPDO - $47,701; MDT bailed - $180,062
($174,076 - Air Force, $5,986 - Navy); munitions contract - $137,249; com-
munications bairment - $227,947. Personal property not removed by U.S.
Services was considered to have zero residual value and eligible for cost
free transfer commensurate with Services/JCS approval. It was further
recommended that personal property be used to obtain equitable negotiated
residual values for the facilities and assistance from the GONT in areas
such as packing, crating, handling and transportation of property to be
removed from Taiwan.

(UNCLASSIFIED) At the 11 December 1979 meeting the Taiwan representatives
presented their residual value offers for all facilities as follows: MDT
bailed - $48,725; communications bairment $44,261; munitions contract -
$48,176; DPDO - $17,102. Equipment/property in the bailed buildings was
desired cost-free. The Taiwan residual values offer was slightly over 2
percent of the original cost while the U.S. values were about 6 percent.
Taiwan wanted to defer the final negotiated payment until 1 January 1981
because the money was not in their current budget. Prior to commenting on
the Taiwan proposal, CINCPAC informed the JCS that he was unaware of any
formal direction given by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the
Services covering all aspects of property disposal. As the 31 December 1979
deadline approached, it would be necessary to make detailed decisions
regarding disposition values and issue appropriate instructions to AIT-T
negotiators. Accordingly, unless otherwise directed, CINCPAC proposed to
represent the remaining DOD interests and assume authority for making the
"end position" decisions. CINCPAC recommended a zero value for personal
property remaining in facilities and all facilities not to be used by MNF
for purposes intended be accepted. CINCPAC also proposed that any offer
made by the GONT for the remaining facilities which exceeded 25 percent of
the U.S. offer be accepted. Following are comparisons of the U.S. and
Taiwan position on all facilities:

1. SECSTATE 171853ZNov 79 (S), GDS 11/16/85; AIT Taipei 040728Z Dec 79 (S);
   GDS 12/04/85.
2. CINCPAC 081845Z Dec 79 (S/NS), DECL 6 Dec 85.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Original Value</th>
<th>DOD Computed Value (Percent)</th>
<th>Taiwan Offer (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>$2,281,389</td>
<td>$174,076 (7.6)</td>
<td>$48,725 (2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>2,500,765</td>
<td>131,668 (5.3)</td>
<td>44,261 (1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>1,686,036</td>
<td>137,249 (8.1)</td>
<td>48,176 (2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPDO</td>
<td>661,085</td>
<td>43,533 (6.6)</td>
<td>17,102 (2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>$7,129,275</td>
<td>$486,526 (6.8)</td>
<td>$158,264 (2.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CINCPAC was unaware of any rationale which supported the Taiwan position that a two percent residual value for all property had been agreed upon by U.S. and Taiwan representatives in April 1979. The agreed upon residual value of $448,000 for Category 3 property had only coincidentally been about two percent. In addition, the present property being negotiated merited a higher residual value than property previously transferred. Should full residual value not be obtainable, CINCPAC recommended that initially, an approximate 50 percent value (general - $87,000, Communications - $65,000, munitions - $68,000 and DPDO - $21,000, total - $241,000) be sought, with a fall-back to any offer between this 50 percent position and the COALL offer. Deferred payment until 1 January 1981 was supported.

(U) During the third meeting, a final facilities figure of $200,000, subject to approval by higher authority, was agreed upon. This figure was not identified by category of facility, but did include all related installed equipment and personal property, less communications equipment, not covered by other transfer agreements. CINCPAC agreed with the negotiated value. The JCS reply to the 13 and 15 December 1979 CINCPAC proposals stated that it was intended to dispose of property on Taiwan for as good a price as possible. Regardless of price, however, except for POL property or products, no DOD property would be retained on Taiwan after 1 January 1980. The CINCPAC negotiating strategies met that requirement.

(U) On 26 December 1979, the Secretary of State directed AIT-T to complete the transfer actions based on the agreement format and the value ($200,000) previously provided. The transfer document was signed by AIT and CCNAA representatives on 31 December 1979.

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1. AIT Taipei 110619Z Dec 79 (U); CINCPAC 132322Z Dec 79 (C/NE), DECL 8 Dec 85; CINCPAC 152123Z Dec (C/NE), DECL 14 Dec 85.
2. AIT Taipei 180515Z Dec 79 (U); CINCPAC 200107Z Dec 79 (U); JCS 212031Z Dec 79 (C), DECL 18 Dec 85.
3. SECSTATE 331442 of 26 Dec 79 (U); Property Transfer Agreement dtd 31 Dec 79.

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
SECTION II--RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Fuels Agreement

(U) The fuels agreement, unlike the other bailment agreements and contracts, did not terminate on 31 December 1979; however, there was an initial requirement to discuss this agreement during facility transfer negotiations. This requirement existed because certain liquid oxygen equipment needed elsewhere in the Pacific theater had been left on Taiwan in support of the F-4 Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) contract at Air Asia. This equipment needed to be removed and the associated bailed buildings transferred to the GONT. Also some of the fuel related facilities were in the bailment agreement and they would either be transferred or kept with the fuels agreement.

Property Title Discussions

(S/NOFORN) In the initial JCS guidance in November 1979, the only statement regarding the fuels agreement was that bulk JP-4 fuel would continue to be withdrawn as storage became available in PACOM. A telephone call to the JCS disclosed that the State Department was seeking to divest the U.S. Government of title to all bailed real property on Taiwan effective 1 January 1960. If this did happen, then title to the CCK tank farm would pass to the GONT for residual value and PACAF would have to lease the tanks. PACAF had budgeted only for services to maintain the property and for quality control, and considered it vital to continue the fuel storage agreement as written, at least through December 1981. Renegotiations at the time could have resulted in vast price increases. CINCPAC went on record supporting the PACAF position for retaining title to the CCK tank farm until programmed military construction projects for replacement tankage in PACOM could be completed.

(S/NOFORN) PACAF suggested that accountability for the fuels-related facilities be transferred to the AIT. CINCPAC advised the JCS of his support for this proposal, which would permit continuation of the fuels agreement, protect U.S. interests, and preclude a costly lease-back arrangement. Transfer to AIT also could satisfy possible State Department insistence that the United States legally divest itself of title to all real property on Taiwan. PACAF was tasked by Headquarters USAF to prepare a talking paper for a meeting between Mr. Armacost (ASD/ISA) and the National Security Council staff on the fuel facilities. After meetings in Washington D.C., the JCS, on 13 December 1979, concurred with CINCPAC/ PACAF recommendations to continue the bailment agreement on the POL facilities until the agreement terminated on 31 December 1981. However, in order to avoid the potential for undesirable political complications arising from POL-

1. JCS 170620Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 14 Nov 85; HQ PACAF 220415Z Nov 79 (S/NE), REVW 21 Nov 99; CINCPAC 240223Z Nov 79 (S/NE), DECL 24 Nov 85.
associated property transfer negotiations in late 1981, discussions for the eventual turnover of POL facilities were to begin as soon as possible, be completed by 30 April 1980 and made accessory to the existing agreement. Since there was a strong possibility that all JP-4 would not be removed from Taiwan by December 1981, negotiating strategies were to include reasonable lease-back of the facilities after December 1981 until the POL was withdrawn.

Supply and Services

War Reserve Materiel (WRM)

(S) The International Security Assistance Act of 1979 (PL 96-92) authorized the transfer to Taiwan of WRM property under such terms and conditions as the President deemed appropriate during 1980. This included both munitions and non-munitions. The JCS, on 17 November 1979, informed CINCPAC that the Office of the Secretary of Defense would direct the appropriate Service secretaries to remove any WRM, munitions and non-munitions, considered essential by the Services for use elsewhere (e.g., housekeeping kits, F-4 ejector racks and chaff), and to transfer cost-free to Taiwan all other U.S.-owned WRM, munition and non-munitions, on Taiwan. Materiel withdrawn would be shipped by commercial means, involve no supplemental TDY DOD civilians and be completed by 31 December 1979.

Munitions

(U) Part B of the PACAF BATTERY PLATE Wrap-up Plan dealt with the transfer of PACAF munitions on-island to the GONT. By late November 1979, PACAF had provided an inventory of munitions and a transfer method to convey the property to the GONT thru AIT-T. Upon CINCPAC's request to AIT-T to implement the cost-free transfer, AIT-T prepared and submitted to AIT-W a proposed munitions transfer agreement. CINCPAC originally concurred with the agreement format. Later, it was recommended to modify the agreement to cover all WRM, both munitions and non-munitions. The value of the transferred munitions was $10.3 million. The transfer agreement was signed by representatives of AIT and CCNAA on 31 December 1979, effective 1 January 1980.

1. HQ PACAF 261900Z Nov 79 (U); CINCPAC 301655Z Nov 79 (S/NE), DECL 28 Nov 85; HQ PACAF 020400Z Dec 79 (S/NE), DECL 1 Dec 99; HQ PACAF 020445Z Dec 79 (S/NE), DECL 1 Dec 99, JCS 130445Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 7 Dec 85.
2. JCS 170620Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 14 Nov 85.
3. HQ PACAF 140100Z Nov 79 (C/NE), REVW 7 Nov 99; HQ PACAF 280320Z Nov 79 (C/NE), REVW 21 Nov 99; CINCPAC 292121Z Nov 79 (U); AIT Taipei 030817Z Dec 79 (C), GDS 12/03/85; CINCPAC 040012 Dec 79 (U); CINCPAC 200107Z Dec 79 (U); WRM Transfer Agreement dated 31 Dec 79.
Non-Munitions

(SECRET) Part A of the PACAF BATTERY PLATE Wrap-up Plan dealt with the disposal of non-munitions WRM at CCK AB. Material was identified either as essential to the PACAF combat mission or USAF needs, or as material excess to PACAF/USAF. PACAF requested that items such as ejector racks and chaff be moved to Tainan AB and turned over to Air Asia for containerization and shipment along with other Air Force Logistic Command (AFLC) materiel being retrograded from the F-4 Programed Depot Maintenance contract. The excess items would be transferred to the GONT if not economical to move. Additionally, liquid oxygen plant equipment retained under the fuels agreement to support the F-4 PDM operation would also be moved.

(C/NAFFORM) HQ AFLC's response to movement of this materiel was not encouraging because Air Asia was operating at maximum capability in packing, crating and shipping the PDM equipment. Some of the WRM, on a non-interference reimbursable basis, would be moved prior to AFLC's non-essential equipment (desks and chairs). The AFLC representative at Taiwan had estimated that nineteen 40-foot containers would be required to ship the PACAF materiel. AFLC was willing to ship 2 of the estimated 19 containers. PACAF countered that their calculations showed that only eight containers were required and requested a reevaluation of the requirements. PACAF also requested that CINCPAC obtain a ruling on whether materiel required to be moved from Taiwan would meet the 31 December 1979 withdrawal date if it was in the hands of a U.S. commercial firm (E-Systems and their subsidiary, Air Asia).

(C) CINCPAC supported the PACAF position that if U.S. property were delivered to a U.S. agent, the requirement to complete withdrawal of material by 31 December 1979 would be met. CINCPAC, while requesting JCS consent, urged PACAF to first, physically remove by 31 December 1979, or second, deliver to Air Asia, clear through customs, and bgok for shipment. The JCS concurred with this approach on 13 December 1979.

(U) Having received authority from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), PACAF sent a DOD civilian supply representative to Taiwan to assist in identifying and shipping PACAF/USAF-required materiel. As a result a smooth operation was conducted which resulted in more assets being shipped than planned, and three days ahead of schedule. A total of 11 containers was shipped. This did not include the 500-gallon liquid oxygen tank and two samplers, which would be

1. HQ PACAF 140100Z Nov 79 (C/NAF), REVW 7 Nov 99; HQ PACAF 220415Z Nov 79 (SYF), REVW 21 Nov 99.
2. HQ AFLC 282330Z Nov 79 (C/NAF), REVW 28 Nov 99; HQ PACAF 301900Z Nov 79 (C/NAF), REVW 26 Nov 99.
3. CINCPAC 050245Z Dec 79 (C/NAF), DECL 3 Dec 85; JCS 130445Z Dec 79 (S), DECL 7 Dec 85.
shipped later, or the BAK-12 arresting gear. The GONT had previously stated that the BAK-12 system belonged to them. In December 1979 they dropped that position, but requested that it remain on Taiwan until an FMS case delivery, scheduled for the summer of 1980, was completed. PACAF agreed to this request contingent on certain conditions. The TAF advised they could not meet those conditions and requested that the BAK-12 be removed as soon as possible. The barrier was to be removed by commercial contract.

**Programmed Depot Maintenance on Taiwan**

**PACER DOT**

(U) The last F-4 aircraft receiving PDM at Air Asia under Project PACER DOT departed Taiwan in early December 1979. All government-furnished property as well as associated support equipment (except for the runway barrier) were shipped out by late December 1979. The transition from Air Asia to Korean Air Lines was accomplished in a very condensed one-year time frame with a minimum of problems and no discernable loss in PACOM operational effectiveness.

**Excess Property Sales**

**Sales Program**

(U) With the sales to MND being minimal, two negotiated sales to the Central Trust of China on 14 and 24 May were conducted. These sales completed the program and all property was removed from U.S. Government disposal facilities by the end of June. The DPDO-T was closed on 28 June 1979, substantially ahead of schedule, and the two DOD civilians TDY to Taiwan departed by that date. From February through June 1979, 4,885 line items of usable property, valued at $4.2 million acquisition cost, and 869 short tons of scrap material were sold. Approximately $387,000 was collected as proceeds from the sales.

**Excess MAP Property**

(U) Reversionary rights to equipment provided to Taiwan under MAP were transferred cost free. See Section III.

1. HQ PACAF 080200Z Dec 79 (U); AIT Taipei 200708Z Dec 79 (U); HQ PACAF 212329Z Dec 79 (C/NF), REVW 18 Dec 99; HQ PACAF 120202Z Jan 80 (U); HQ PACAF 251900Z Jan 80 (U).
2. J4232 HistSum Dec 79 (S), DECL 16 Jan 86; DIR MAT MGT Hill AFB 211730Z Dec 79 (U).
3. CDR DPDR-PAC 092241Z May 79 (U); CDR DPDR-PAC 080211Z Jun 79 (U); CDR DPDR-PAC 300142Z Jun 79 (U).
SECRET

SECTION III--SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

(C) In mid-July 1979, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD/ISA) promulgated specific procedures with respect to Taiwan FMS. Requests would be submitted by CCNAA-W to the appropriate DOD element (i.e., to Military Departments in the case of support items and to OSD/Defense Security Assistance Agency for others) for direct reply. Requests direct to AIT-T were not encouraged, but, if received, would be forwarded without comment or recommendation to AIT-W with information copies to the appropriate DOD element. CINCPAC concurred with these procedures provided they followed the Military Assistance and Sales Manual that called for the JCS and CINCPAC to receive information copies to allow for appropriate military evaluation. This position was submitted to the JCS to obtain an amendment to the procedures in order that the JCS and CINCPAC roles were clearly recognized. The JCS advised that AIT-W and AIT-T had agreed to include CINCPAC as an information addressee on all message traffic between them concerning security assistance. Additionally, the processing of new requests for major defense equipment would include JCS input for which CINCPAC recommendations would be sought. The accompanying chart depicts the routing of Taiwan FMS transactions.

(U) On 22 June 1979, the President signed Executive Order 12143 which gave AIT and CCNAA-W authority to perform as unofficial representatives of their governments. From that date, until 1 September 1979, new FMS cases, case amendments, and case modifications totaling approximately $598 million were signed by AIT. Those actions marked the resumption of FMS case processing, the first since 1 January 1979.²

(S/NOFORN) The above did not include Taiwan's request for essential weapons and equipment to be purchased in 1980. In August 1979, the MND submitted to the Defense Procurement Division, CCNAA-W a letter containing 15 major weapon items for forwarding to DOD. In accordance with established procedures, CINCPAC submitted recommendations on these requested weapon systems in October 1979. Admiral Weisner personally endorsed to the Chairman, JCS, General Jones, the release of the requested systems to the GONT. In particular, an improved fighter, HARPOON, improved CHAPARRAL and STANDARD missiles were identified as urgent requirements. The dollar ceiling for 1980 sales to Taiwan, of approximately $700 million, was expected to limit the quantity of some of the requested items.

1. SECDEF 1323542 Jul 79 (C), DECL 11 Jul 85; CINCPAC 211727Z Jul 79 (C), DECL 21 Jul 85; JCS 281627Z Jul 79 (C), DECL 24 Jul 85.
2. Executive Order 12143 of 22 Jun 79, Subj: Maintaining Unofficial Relations with the People on Taiwan, AIT-W ltr of 31 Aug 79, Subj: Status of FMS Cases.
3. AIT Taipei 0723332 Aug 79 (C), GDS 08/07/85; CINCPAC 191720Z Oct 79 (S), DECL 11 Oct 85.

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TAIWAN FMS TRANSACTIONS

MND GONT ----> CCNAA WASH. (1)  

CCNAA WASH. ----> AIT/WASH. (6)  

JCS ----> DSAA (COMMENT 3A)  

JCS ----> CINC PAC  

DSAA ----> STATE (AIT/WASH.)  

DSAA ----> SERVICE  

STATE (AIT/WASH.) ----> AIT/TAIPEI  

SIONG  

LOA  

DECISION  

NSC  

Channels:  
DIRECT ----  
IN-DIRECT ------
On 7 November 1979, Gen Wen (CCNAA-W) and three other Taiwan service representatives met with General Graves, Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, and other DOD, State Department and AIT-W officials to discuss 1980 sales.

Taiwan Military Training

In accordance with the new procedures governing the training of Taiwan military personnel by U.S. personnel in-country or in CONUS military schools, no additional justification was required for those FY 79 training courses which started and ended in 1979. Training requirements extending into 1980, and all FY 80 training required an additional review. In mid-May 1979, the JCS advised that action had been initiated by DOD to seek approval for technical courses which extended into 1980 and clearly conformed to published guidelines. Professional courses which extended into 1980 could not be addressed without further justification. In view of the delay in establishing the technical section of AIT-T, the JCS requested CINCPAC's concurrence in cancelling all FY 79 professional courses which extended into 1980. However, AIT-T requested authority to contact CCNAA-T to determine those professional courses for which the GONT wished to resubmit a request with proper justification. To assist and support AIT-T personnel in their attempt to gather training data, CINCPAC provided AIT-T with a recommended list of information to obtain. Concurrently, CINCPAC strongly recommended to the JCS that the decision to cancel any training be deferred until AIT-T could report their findings and requested the JCS to pursue the possibility of accelerating courses normally ending in January 1980 to 1979. The JCS agreed to a short extension of time but indicated that chances for continuing professional training for Taiwan students were remote. The JCS also advised accelerated graduation appeared infeasible.

In early June 1979, AIT-T advised that CCNAA-W had been informed of MND interest in retaining as many of the professional courses extending into 1980 as possible. When no input was received from Taiwan by mid-June 1979, the JCS suggested that courses believed justifiable should be considered for inclusion in the FY 80 training program, rather than as special cases. AIT-T made recommendations for two courses to be continued on 23 June 1979. CINCPAC supported AIT-T's recommendations and added one course. The JCS mid-July 1979 reply stated that time did not allow one of the courses to be taken in FY 79 and that, along with the CINCPAC


2. JCS 232300Z Mar 79 (C), DECL 23 Mar 85; CINCPAC 281840Z Mar 79 (C), DECL 26 Mar 85; JCS 171219Z May 79 (C), DECL 15 May 85; AIT Taipei 180859Z May 79 (C), GDS 5/18/85; CINCPAC 182305Z May 79 (C), DECL 18 May 85; CINCPAC 192215Z May 79 (C), DECL 18 May 85; JCS 251425Z May 79 (C), DECL 22 May 85.
recommended course, it should be added to the FY 80 training package. The remaining course was available during 1979. With the 1979 training requests completed, the JCS urged recommendations for the FY 80 package by 31 July 1979.

(U) The FY 80 Taiwan Armed Forces Training Program request was submitted to the JCS by CINCPAC on 3 August 1979. The package contained 130 training courses of which 98, or 75 percent, received CINCPAC support. The final approval/disapproval decision resulted in 90 courses being approved.

(NS) On 9 August 1979, the ASD/ISA amplified the procedures governing the training of Taiwan personnel in U.S. military installations. It was determined that this new guidance would not be utilized for the FY 80 training program previously submitted, but would be used for the FY 81 submission. AIT-T reported that the reaction by the Taiwan military to the new procedure could best be characterized as bewilderment and dismay. Essentially, they had no concept of how to commercialize their military training on the scale called for under the new procedure. With AIT-T guidance, the GONT prepared an early submission of their training requirements for FY 81 to be used as a shopping list. The list was submitted to the Secretary of Defense, via CINCPAC, for review and agreement in principle, thereby providing an opportunity to concentrate justification and contracting efforts. Courses were listed by categories as follows:

Category I - Training which can only be obtained at U.S. military training facilities;

Category II - Training which will be sought from commercial sources;

Category III - Training which will be incorporated in existing Taiwan military training facilities.

Of the total of 159 courses listed, 86 were Category I, 59 were Category II and 14 were Category III. AIT-T’s review recommended 11 of the 86 Category I’s be shifted to Categories II or III.

(NS) Although this approach was not wholly in keeping with DOD guidance, AIT-T considered the massive effort required, with scant expertise, to immediately commercialize all military training to be impractical.

1. AIT Taipei 080836Z Jun 79 (U); JCS 131852Z May 79 (C), DECL 12 Jun 85; AIT Taipei 230146Z Jun 79 (U); CINCPAC 290422Z Jun 79 (C), DECL 26 Jun 85; JCS 131753Z Jul 79 (C), DECL 5 Jul 85.
3. SECDEF 092234Z Aug 79 (C), DECL 8 Aug 85; AIT Taipei ltr of 8 Nov 79 (U), Subj: Training for Taiwan Military Personnel.
Rather, AIT-T recommended that the FY 80/81 training programs be considered as transitional, leading to greater dependence on local and commercial training. As it was, the Taiwan military did initially place 46 percent of their training requirements in the non-U.S. military facility category. The unofficial review conducted in Washington, D.C., resulted in 44 Category I courses being identified as possible candidates for Categories II and III.

Military Assistance Program

(U) In guidance provided in mid-November 1979 regarding property disposal on Taiwan, the JCS advised that the Office of the Secretary of Defense was directing cost-free transfer of reversionary rights to equipment provided to Taiwan under MAP. Direction to transfer MAP equipment was given on 6 December 1979 under authority of Executive Order 12163.

1. Ibid.
2. JCS 170620Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 14 Nov 85; JCS 212031Z Dec 79 (U).
CHAPTER V

COMMUNICATIONS--ELECTRONICS

SECTION I--INTEGRATED JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS BAILMENT

Transfer Agreement

1. Communications Bailment Agreement, dtd 24 Apr 79; AIT Taipei 110619Z Dec 79 (U); CINCPAC 081845Z Dec 79 (S/NF), DECL 6 Dec 85; CINCPAC 152123Z Dec 79 (C/WE), DECL 14 Dec 85; AIT Taipei 180515Z Dec 79 (U).

2. Communications Bailment Agreement, dtd 24 Apr 79; CINCPAC 302121 Nov 79 (C), DECL 29 Nov 85; AIT Taipei 040728Z Dec 79 (C), GDS 4 Dec 85; AIT Taipei 110619Z Dec 79 (U); CINCPAC 132320Z Dec 79 (C/WE), DECL 8 Dec 85.

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The transfer of the communications facilities and equipment was included in the property transfer agreement, signed by AIT-T and CCNAA-T representatives on 31 December 1979.

1. Property Transfer Agreement, dtd 31 Dec 79.
SECTION II—SUBMARINE CABLE SYSTEM

(U) There were three submarine communication cables in the Pacific which would be excess to DOD needs by the end of 1980. One of these was the cable from Camp McCauley, Taiwan, to Hamby Field, Japan (Okinawa), along with its associated cable head equipment. Known as the Integrated Joint Communications System-Pacific (IJCS-PAC), the submarine cable was owned by the U.S. Air Force. The associated cable head equipment, on Taiwan, was included in the IJCS bailment. The bailment agreement provided for CCNAA to have first option on purchasing the cable head equipment on 1 January 1980.

(U) CINCPAC was unaware of any need to retain this submarine cable past the termination of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty and advised Headquarters USAF accordingly. On 20 November 1979, CINCPAC requested PACAF to transfer the cable to DPDR-PAC effective 1 January 1980. CINCPAC was to insure that all circuits riding the cable were terminated prior to 1 January 1980. This action was based on JCS guidance provided on 17 November 1979, along with other property disposal guidance. PACAF processed transfer paperwork on 21 November 1979.

(U) IJCS Cable Head Equipment, included in the bailment agreement, has been assigned a residual value of $4,600. AIT-T was informed that, should CCNAA not wish to purchase, DPDR-PAC desired to include it with the IJCS cable sale. During the first property negotiations between AIT-T and CCNAA-T, the Chinese expressed no interest in purchasing this equipment.

(U) As previously discussed, AIT-T accepted the Taiwan offer of $42,475 for all communication equipment less the cable head equipment. CINCPAC advised AIT-T to remind CCNAA-T that, although the facility containing the cable head equipment would be transferred to them on 1 January 1980, the equipment contained therein would be transferred to DPDR-PAC for subsequent sale to a commercial company. This sales process could take up to six months and would require AIT-T involvement. DPDR-PAC requested AIT-T to transfer accountability for the equipment to them by 10 January 1980, but for AIT-T to provide for continued security. AIT-T was also requested to identify a property disposal custodian. The documents transferring accountability of the cable head equipment to DPDR-PAC were prepared and mailed in March 1980.

1. HQ USAF 082100Z Aug 79 (U).
2. CINCPAC 250211Z Aug 79 (U); CINCPAC 201951Z Nov 79 (S); DECL 20 Nov 80; JCS 170620Z Nov 79 (S); DECL 14 Nov 85; HQ PACAF/DCMG ltr of 21 Nov 79 (U), Subj: Transfer/Disposition of IJCS Sumarine Cable.
3. CINCPAC 302121Z Nov 79 (CAG), DECL 29 Nov 85; AIT Taipei 040728Z Dec 79 (S), GDS 4 Dec 85.
4. CINCPAC 152123Z Dec 79 (CAG), DECL 14 Dec 85; DPDR-PAC 150046Z Dec 79 (U); DPDR-PAC ltr of 28 Dec 79 (U), Subj: Turn-in of Property to Defense Property Disposal Office; AIT Taipei 110718Z Mar 80 (U).
SECTION III--AIT/DOD COMMUNICATIONS

1. CINCPAC 230410Z May 79 (S), No DECL; J5325 HistSum Aug 79.
2. SecState 191933Z Jun 79 (S), GDS 12 Jun 85; AIT Taipei 220321Z
   Jun 79 (S), GDS 22 Jun 85.
3. CINCPAC 021945Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 17 Oct 85; AIT Taipei 060605Z Nov 79
   (S), GDS 6 Nov 85; CINCPAC 101904Z Nov 79 (S), DECL 9 Nov 85;
   J242/Memo/2700/2-80 of 4 Jan 80 (U), Subj: AIT/CINCPAC Secure Voice
   Circuit; CINCPAC 170016Z Jan 80 (U).

SECRET

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CHAPTER VI
MILITARY OPERATIONS
SECTION I--EXERCISES
FRESH LOOK

The only exercise conducted during the last eight months of 1979 was FRESH LOOK, a United States Command Post Exercise (CPX) conducted from 31 July to 2 August. FRESH LOOK was two-phased. Phase two was an in-house CPX with response to scenarios developed during the seminar phase.

Search and Rescue

AIT-T was requested by MND, through CCNAA-T, to forward an invitation, through AIT-W, for U.S. military aircraft to participate in a combined Search and Rescue (SAR) exercise on 25 and 26 September 1979 at Chia Yi AB. CINCPAC informed the JCS that this SAR exercise was highly desirable since it was humanitarian in nature and different from other combined military operations or exercises. CINCPAC was prepared to support this exercise if Washington level approval could be obtained.

The JCS reminded CINCPAC of the Secretary of Defense's restriction against combined military exercises with Taiwan which remained in effect. Ways of maintaining SAR capability under existing agreements/procedures with Taiwan were under consideration, but with the short lead time until the planned exercise, approval could not be obtained.

1. J7831/Memo/S1-79 of 4 Jun 79 (S), COL Sandstrom to MAJ GEN Solomon, Subj: Requests for Approval to Conduct CPX FRESH LOOK as Presented (U), DECL 1 Jan 80; J02/Memo/S6-79 of 12 Jun 79 (S), Subj: Exercise "FRESH LOOK" Directive (U), DECL 1 Jan 80.
2. J78/Memo/S16-79 of 7 Sep 79 (S), COL Sandstrom to LT GEN Poston, Subj: Exercise FRESH LOOK (U), REVW 12 Oct 97.
3. AIT Wash DC 190557Z Sep 79 (U); CINCPAC 200103Z Sep 79 (S), DECL 19 Sep 85.
4. JCS 241252Z Sep 79 (C), DECL 21 Sep 85.
(U) In the event a future exercise was being considered, the JCS requested sufficient time to allow for Washington-level staffing.

Taiwan Strait Patrols

(U) These patrols continued after all forces were withdrawn from Taiwan. 1

1. COMSEVENTHFLT 081544Z May 79 DECL 30 Jun 79.
SECTION II—SHIP VISITS

(U) With the withdrawal of all U.S. Forces from Taiwan, AIT-T assumed the responsibility for coordinating visits of USN ships to Taiwan, with the USS MAUNA KEA (AE-22) visit (22-24 May 1979) being the first.

(5) On 31 May 1979, the JCS approved two of the three proposed June visits and offered to authorize a third visit if a surface ship was substituted for the submarine USS GRAYBACK (SS-574). This was done and approved by early June 1979.

U.S. Navy ship visits to Taiwan during the fourth quarter 1979 and beyond were considered to be extremely important. For this reason, a fourth quarter 1979 schedule was submitted in September 1979 by CINCPAC. The reply from the Chairman, JCS, on 11 October 1979, was that at this time, the national policy was that ship visits to Taiwan would not be permitted. When the U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan became more clearly defined, the JCS would look for an opportunity to raise the issue again. CINCPAC recognized

1. AIT Taipei 050813Z May 79 (U).
that the issue had been strongly supported by the JCS; any further effort at
the time would be counterproductive. However, in order to be prepared to
submit ship visit schedules on short notice, CINCPAC requested CINCPACFLT to
continue to submit quarterly schedules.

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1. CINCPAC 142225Z Sep 79 (S), DECL 12 Sep 85; JCS 112359Z Oct
79 (S), DECL 8 Oct 85; COMSEVENTHFLT 3005462 Nov 79
(S), DECL 30 Jun 80; J73/Memo/5225-79 of 19 Oct 79 (S), LCOL
Moss to MAJ GEN Solomon, Subj: Taiwan Ship Visits (U), DECL
19 Oct 85.
UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION III--AIRCRAFT LANDING RIGHTS

(U) A favorable decision on landing rights was not received during 1979. With the exception of U.S. Congressional delegations traveling aboard U.S. military aircraft landing at Taiwan airfields and two U.S. military aircraft providing medical evacuation services, U.S. military aircraft were not allowed to land on Taiwan for operational considerations.

1. J51 Point Paper, 14 Jan 80 (S), Subj: Taiwan Landing Policy, DECL 31 Jan 86.
SECTION IV--INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

1. CINCPAC 160114Z Aug 79 (S), DECL 14 Aug 85.
2. J51 Point Paper, 12 Jan 80 (U), Subj: Military Related International Agreements with Taiwan; CINCPAC 2500512 Sep 79 (S), DECL 14 Sep 85; CINCPAC 0803542 Dec 79 (S), DECL 28 Nov 85; CINCPAC 0111562 Jan 80 (S), DECL Dec 85.

SECRET

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KEY REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY

Treaty signed at Washington December 2, 1954;
Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America
February 9, 1955;
Ratified by the President of the United States of America
February 11, 1955;
Ratified by the Republic of China, February 15, 1955;
Ratifications exchanged at Taipei March 3, 1955;
Proclaimed by the President of the United States of America
April 1, 1955;
And exchange of notes

By the President of the United States of America

A PROCLAMATION

Whereas the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America
and the Republic of China was signed at Washington on December 2, 1954 by
their respective plenipotentiaries, the original of which Treaty in the
English and Chinese languages is word for word as follows:

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and
all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the West
Pacific Area,

Recalling with mutual pride the relationship which brought their two
peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight
side by side against imperialist aggression during the last war,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and
their common determination to defend themselves against external armed
attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that
either of them stands alone in the West Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective
defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development
of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the West Pacific
Area,

Have agreed as follows:

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ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in the development of economic progress and social well-being and to further their individual and collective efforts toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty.

ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the Western Pacific under its jurisdiction. The provisions of
Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE VII

The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government of the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of China in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Taipei.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages, at Washington on this second day of December of the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty-four, corresponding to the second day of the twelfth month of the Forty-third year of the Republic of China.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

/S/ JOHN FOSTER DULLES

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

/S/ GEORGE K. C. YEH

UNCLASSIFIED

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THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
ADDRESS TO THE NATION

15 December 1978

Good evening. I would like to read a joint communiqué which is being simultaneously issued in Peking at this moment by the leaders of the People's Republic of China:

"JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
JANUARY 1, 1979"

"The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

"The United States of America recognizes the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

"The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué and emphasize once again that:

"-- Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.

"-- Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

"-- Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

"-- The government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China.

"-- Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world."
"The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange ambassadors and establish embassies on March 1, 1979."

Yesterday, the United States of America and the People's Republic of China reached this final historic agreement.

On January 1, 1979, our two governments will implement full normalization of diplomatic relations.

As a nation of gifted people who comprise one-fourth of the population of the earth, China plays an important role in world affairs--role that can only grow more important in the years ahead.

We do not undertake this important step for transient tactical or expedient reasons. In recognizing that the government of the People's Republic is the single government of China, we are recognizing simple reality. But far more is involved in this decision than a recognition of reality.

Before the estrangement of recent decades, the American and Chinese people had a long history of friendship. We have already begun to rebuild some of those previous ties. Now, our rapidly expanding relationship requires the kind of structures that diplomatic relations will make possible.

The change I am announcing tonight will be of long-term benefit to the peoples of both the United States and China -- and, I believe, to all the peoples of the world.

Normalization -- and the expanded commercial and cultural relations it will bring with it -- will contribute to the well-being of our own Nation, and will enhance stability in Asia.

These more positive relations with China can beneficially affect the world in which we and our children will live.

We have already begun to inform our allies and the Congress of the details of our intended action. But I wish also to convey a special message to the people of Taiwan, with whom the American people have had and will have extensive, close and friendly relations.

As the United States asserted in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, we will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.

I have paid special attention to ensuring that normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic will not jeopardize the well-being of the people of Taiwan.
The people of the United States will maintain our current commercial, cultural and other relations with Taiwan through non-governmental means. Many other countries are already successfully doing so.

These decisions and actions open a new and important chapter in world affairs.

To strengthen and to expedite the benefits of this new relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States, I am pleased to announce that Vice Premier Teng has accepted my invitation to visit Washington at the end of January. His visit will give our governments the opportunity to consult with each other on global issues and to begin working together to enhance the cause of world peace.

These events are the result of long and serious negotiations begun by President Nixon in 1972, and continued by President Ford. The results best witness to the steady, determined bipartisan effort of our own country to build a world in which peace will be the goal and the responsibility of all countries.

The normalization of relations between the United States and China has no other purpose than this -- the advancement of peace.

It is in this spirit, at this season of peace, that I take special pride in sharing this news with you tonight.
TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT (PL 96-8)
10 April 1979

To help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Relations Act".

FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY

SEC. 2. (a) The President having terminated governmental relations between the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, the Congress finds that the enactment of this Act is necessary—

(1) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and

(2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan.

(b) It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area;

(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;

(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;

(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.

(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

(c) Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the United States in human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all the approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.

IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY WITH REGARD TO TAIWAN

SEC.3(a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

(b) The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.

(c) The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.

APPLICATION OF LAWS; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

SEC.4.(a) The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the application of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, and the laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979.

(b) The application of subsection(a) of this section shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

(1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.

(2) Whenever authorized by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to conduct or carry out programs, transactions, or other relations with
respect to foreign countries, nations, states governments, or similar entities, the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized to conduct and carry out, in accordance with section 6 of this Act, such programs, transactions, and other relations with respect to Taiwan (including, but not limited to, the performance of services for the United States through contracts with commercial entities on Taiwan), in accordance with the applicable laws of the United States.

(3) (a) The absence of diplomatic relations and recognition with respect to Taiwan shall not abrogate, infringe, modify, deny, or otherwise affect in any way any rights or obligations (including but not limited to those involving contracts, debts, or property interests of any kind) under the laws of the United States heretofore or hereafter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan.

(b) For all purposes under the laws of the United States, including actions in any court in the United States, recognition of the People's Republic of China shall not affect in any way the ownership of or other things of value, owned or held on or prior to December 31, 1978, or thereafter acquired or earned by the government authorities on Taiwan.

(4) Whenever the application of the laws of the United States depends upon the law that is or was applicable on Taiwan or compliance therewith, the law applied by the people on Taiwan shall be considered the applicable law for that purpose.

(5) Nothing in this Act, nor the facts of the President's action in extending diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, the absence of diplomatic relations between the people on Taiwan and the United States, or the lack of recognition by the United States, and attendant circumstances thereto, shall be construed in any administrative or judicial proceeding as a basis for any United States Government agency, commission, or department to make a finding of fact or determination of law, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, to deny an export license application or to revoke an existing export license for nuclear exports to Taiwan.

(6) For purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Taiwan may be treated in the manner specified in the first sentence of section 202(b) of that Act.

(7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in courts in the United States, in accordance with the laws of the United States, shall not be abrogated, infringed, modified, denied, or otherwise affected in any way by the absence of diplomatic relations or recognition.

(8) No requirement, whether expressed or implied, under the laws of the United States with respect to maintenance of diplomatic relations or recognition shall be applicable with respect to Taiwan.
(c) For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States, the Congress approves the continuation in force of all treaties and other international agreements, including multilateral conventions, entered into by the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and in force between them on December 31, 1978, unless and until terminated in accordance with law.

(d) Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization.

OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION

SEC. 5. (a) During the three-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the $1,000 per capita income restriction in clause (2) of the second undesignated paragraph of section 231 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall not restrict the activities of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in determining whether to provide any insurance, reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with respect to investment projects on Taiwan.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, in issuing insurance, reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with respect to investment projects on Taiwan, the Overseas Private Insurance Corporation shall apply the same criteria as those applicable in other parts of the world.

THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN

SEC. 6. (a) Programs, transactions, and other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any agency of the United States Government with respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or through--

(1) The American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia, or

(2) such comparable successor nongovernmental entity as the President may designate,

(b) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to enter into, perform, enforce, or have in force an agreement or transaction relative to Taiwan, such agreement or transaction shall be entered into, performed, and enforced, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, by or through the Institute.

(c) To the extent that any law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the District of Columbia, or of any State or political subdivision thereof in which the Institute is incorporated or doing business, impedes or otherwise
interferes with the performance of the functions of the Institute pursuant to this Act, such law, rule, regulation, or ordinance shall be deemed to be preempted by this Act.

SERVICES BY THE INSTITUTE TO UNITED STATES CITIZENS ON TAIWAN

SEC. 7.(a) The Institute may authorize any of its employees on Taiwan—

(1) to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, affidavit, or deposition, and to perform any notarial act which any notary public is required or authorized by law to perform within the United States;

(2) To act as provisional conservator of the personal estates of deceased United States citizens; and

(3) to assist and protect the interests of United States persons by performing other acts such as are authorized to be performed outside the United States for consular purposes by such laws of the United States as the President may specify.

(b) Acts performed by authorized employees of the Institute under this section shall be valid, and of like force and effect within the United States, as if performed by any other person authorized under the laws of the United States to perform such acts.

TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF THE INSTITUTE

Sec. 8.(a) The Institute, its property, and its income are exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States (except to the extent that section 11(a)(3) of this Act requires the imposition of taxes imposed under chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, relating to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act) or by any State or local taxing authority of the United States.

(b) For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Institute shall be treated as an organization described in sections 170(b)(1)(A), 170(c), 2055(a), 2106(a)(2)(A), 2522(a), and 2522(b).

FURNISHING PROPERTY AND SERVICES TO AND OBTAINING SERVICES FROM THE INSTITUTE

Sec. 9.(a) Any agency of the United States Government is authorized to sell, loan, or lease property (including interests therein) to, and to perform administrative and technical support functions and services for the operations of, the Institute upon such terms and conditions as the President may direct. Reimbursements to agencies under this subsection shall be credited to the current applicable appropriation of the agency concerned.
(b) Any agency of the United States Government is authorized to acquire and accept services from the Institute upon such terms and conditions as the President may direct. Whenever the President determines it to be in furtherance of the purposes of this Act, the procurement of services by such agencies from the Institute may be effected without regard to such laws of the United States normally applicable to the acquisition of services by such agencies as the President may specify by Executive order.

(c) Any agency of the United States Government making funds available to the Institute in accordance with this Act shall make arrangements with the Institute for the Comptroller General of the United States to have access to the books and records of the Institute and the opportunity to audit the operations of the Institute.

TAIWAN INSTRUMENTALITY

SEC. 10.(a) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to render or provide to or to receive or accept from Taiwan, any performance, communication, assurance, undertaking, or other action, such action shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be rendered or provided to, or received or accepted from, an instrumentality established by Taiwan which the President determines has the necessary authority under the laws applied by the people on Taiwan to provide assurances and take other actions on behalf of Taiwan in accordance with this Act.

(b) The President is requested to extend to the instrumentality established by Taiwan the same number of offices and complement of personnel as were previously operated in the United States by the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979.

(c) Upon the granting by Taiwan of comparable privileges and immunities with respect to the Institute and its appropriate personnel, the President is authorized to extend with respect to the Taiwan instrumentality and its appropriate personnel, such privileges and immunities (subject to appropriate conditions and obligations) as may be necessary for the effective performance of their functions.

SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE INSTITUTE

SEC. 11.(a)(1) Under such terms and conditions as the President may direct, any agency of the United States Government may separate from Government service for a specified period any officer or employee of that agency who accepts employment with the Institute.
(2) An officer or employee separated by an agency under paragraph (1) of this subsection for employment with the Institute shall be entitled upon termination of such employment to reemployment or reinstatement with such agency (or a successor agency) in an appropriate position with the attendant rights, privileges, and benefits which the officer or employee would have had or acquired had he or she not been so separated, subject to such time period and other conditions as the President may prescribe.

(3) An officer or employee entitled to reemployment or reinstatement rights under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall, while continuously employed by the Institute with no break in continuity of service, continue to participate in any benefit program in which such officer or employee was participating prior to employment by the Institute, including programs for compensation for job-related death, injury, or illness; programs for health and life insurance; programs for annual, sick, and other statutory leave; and programs for retirement under any system established by the laws of the United States; except that employment with the Institute shall be the basis for participation in such programs only to the extent that employee deductions and employer contributions, as required, in payment for such participation for the period of employment with the Institute, are currently deposited in the program's or system's fund or depository. Death or retirement of any such officer or employee during approved service with the Institute and prior to reemployment or reinstatement shall be considered a death in or retirement from Government service for purposes of any employee or survivor benefits acquired by reason of service with an agency of the United States Government.

(4) Any officer or employee of an agency of the United States Government who entered into service with the Institute on approved leave of absence without pay prior to the enactment of this Act shall receive the benefits of this section for the period of such service.

(b) Any agency of the United States Government employing alien personnel on Taiwan may transfer such personnel, with accrued allowances, benefits, and rights, to the Institute without a break in service for purposes of retirement and other benefits, including continued participation in any system established by the laws of the United States for the retirement of employees in which the alien was participating prior to the transfer to the Institute, except that employment with the Institute shall be creditable for retirement purposes only to the extent that employee deductions and employer contributions, as required, in payment for such participation for the period of employment with the Institute, are currently deposited in the system's fund or depository.
(c) Employees of the Institute shall not be employees of the United States and, in representing the Institute, shall be exempt from section 207 of title 18, United States Code.

(d)(1) For purposes of sections 911 and 913 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, amounts paid by the Institute to its employees shall not be treated as earned income. Amounts received by employees of the Institute shall not be included in gross income, and shall be exempt from taxation, to the extent that they are equivalent to amounts received by civilian officers and employees of the Government of the United States as allowances— and benefits which are exempt from taxation under section 912 of such Code.

(2) Except to the extent required by subsection (a)(3) of this section, service performed in the employ of the Institute shall not constitute employment for purpose of chapter 21 of such Code and title II of the Social Security Act.

REPORTING REQUIREMENT

SEC. 12.(a) The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text of any agreement to which the Institute is a party. However, any such agreement the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States shall not be so transmitted to the Congress but shall be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President.

(b) For purposes of subsection (a), the term "agreement" includes—

(1) any agreement entered into between the Institute and the governing authorities on Taiwan or the instrumentality established by Taiwan; and

(2) any agreement entered into between the Institute and an agency of the United States Government.

(c) Agreements and transactions made or to be made by or through the Institute shall be subject to the same congressional notification, review, and approval requirements and procedures as if such agreements and transactions were made by or through the agency of the United States Government on behalf of which the Institute is acting.

(d) During the two-year period beginning on the effective date of this Act, the Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, every six months, a report describing and reviewing economic relations between the United States and Taiwan, noting any interference with normal commercial relations.

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RULES AND REGULATIONS

SEC. 13. The President is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act. During the three-year period beginning on the effective date of this Act, such rules and regulations shall be transmitted promptly to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Such action shall not, however, relieve the Institute of the responsibilities placed upon it by this Act.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

SEC. 14. (a) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and other appropriate committees of the Congress shall monitor--

(1) the implementation of the provisions of this Act;

(2) the operation and procedures of the Institute;

(3) the legal and technical aspects of the continuing relationship between the United States and Taiwan; and

(4) the implementation of the policies of the United States concerning security and cooperation in East Asia.

(b) Such committees shall report, as appropriate, to their respective Houses on the results of their monitoring.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 15. For purposes of this Act--

(1) the term "laws of the United States" includes any statute, rule, regulation, ordinance, order, or judicial rule of decision of the United States or any political subdivision thereof; and

(2) the term "Taiwan" includes, as the context may require, the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the people on those islands, corporations and other entities and associations created or organized under the laws applied on those islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities (including political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities thereof).
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AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 16. In addition to funds otherwise available to carry out the provisions of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for the fiscal year 1980 such funds as may be necessary to carry out such provisions. Such funds are authorized to remain available until expended.

SEVERABILITY OF PROVISIONS

SEC. 17. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 18. This Act shall be effective as of January 1, 1979.

Speaker of the House of Representatives

Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate
Section 1. This Act may be cited on the "International Security Assistance Act of 1979."

TRANSFER OF WAR RESERVE MATERIEL AND OTHER PROPERTY TO TAIWAN

Sec. 23. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the calendar year 1980 the President is authorized to transfer to Taiwan, under such terms and conditions as he may deem appropriate, such United States war reserve materiel that was located on Taiwan on January 1, 1979, as he may determine.

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the calendar years 1979 and 1980 the President is authorized to transfer to Taiwan, under such terms and conditions as he may deem appropriate, such rights of the United States in property (other than war reserve materiel) that was located on Taiwan on January 1, 1979, as he may determine.