1977 ANNUAL HISTORICAL REPORT

USFK/EUSA
1977
ANNUAL HISTORICAL REPORT
(RCS CINCPAC 5000.4)

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY

Headquarters
UNC/USFK/EUSA
Command Historian

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SECRET
GEN JOHN W. VESSEY, JR
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
COMMANDING GENERAL, EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY
FOREWORD

The HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report is the only continuing record of significant developments within this command. It is designed to satisfy requirements from Department of Army and Commander in Chief, Pacific, providing a primary source document for those headquarters in the preparation of their official military histories. It also aids commanders and staff to plan and act, and is of value and use to anyone interested in the operations of a major overseas joint headquarters. Through this report newly arrived key personnel in Korea will obtain a comprehensive overview of the problems and accomplishments of this headquarters without detailed research into other records.

As with all military history, this compilation has as its ultimate objective the improvement of doctrine, training, procedures and equipment.

The report is prepared by the Command Historian's Office with support from each joint and special agency to include Joint US Military Advisory Group-Korea. It does not cover in detail the activities of component commands which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters. Suggestions for the improvement of this command history are welcome and should be addressed to this headquarters, ATTN: SJS-MH.

JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.
General, United States Army
Commander in Chief
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Basic Information
(As of 31 Dec 77)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
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PRESIDENT                           | PARK Chung Hee               |
PRIME MINISTER                      | CHOE Kyu Ha                  |
DEFENSE MINISTER                    | RO Jae Hyung                 |
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS         | PARK Tong Jin                |
CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF       | GEN KIM Chong Whan           |
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF                 | GEN LEE Saa Ho               |
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS           | ADM HWANG Chong Yon          |
AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF            | GEN CHOO Young Bock          |

US Country Team Principals

US AMBASSADOR                       | HON Richard L. Sneider       |
US AID DIRECTOR                     | MR Dennis P. Barrett         |
COMUSKOREA                          | GEN John W. Vessey Jr., USA  |
CHIEF JUSMAG-K                      | MG Harry A. Griffith, USA    |
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(As of 31 Dec 77)

Front Row (fr left): RADM Hamm, COMNAVFORKOREA; MG Griffith, Chief JUSMAG-K; LTG Gabriel, DCDR USEK; GEN Vessey, CINCUNC; MG Kingston, UNC/USFK/EUSA Cofs; MG Taylor, Cdr AFK.

Rear Row: COL Villaret, UNC/USFK/EUSA Dcofs(J); COL Fitzpatrick, UNC/USFK/EUSA Dcofs(A); EUSA CSM Tapp.
Following is a listing of USFK component commanders:

Eighth United States Army: GEN J. W. Vessey, Jr.
2d Infantry Division: MG M. J. Brady.
38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade: BG W. J. Mehl replaced
   COL C. O. Shelton, Jr, on 29 Mar 77.
4th US Missile Command: COL M. Rhode, Jr, replaced COL J. J.
   Skaff on 27 Jun 77.
US Army Garrison-Yongsan: COL A. Bassham replaced COL W. A.
   Steinberg on 15 Sep 77.
US Naval Forces, Korea: RADM W. C. Hamm (USN) replaced RADM M.
   P. Frudden on 6 May 77.
US Air Forces, Korea/314th Air Division: MG R. C. Taylor re-
   placed MG D. D. Pittman on 28 Apr 77.
8th Tactical Fighter Wing: COL T. S. Swaln replaced COL R.
   Davis on 7 Mar 77.
51st Composite Wing (Tactical): COL F. B. Hoenniger replaced
   COL Vernon H. Sandrock on 15 Jun 77.

(U) Distinguished Visitors

(U) During 1977 there were 272 official visits, involving 1,153
individuals who were in Korea for a total of 1,161 days. At Appendix 1
is a complete list of distinguished visitors for the year.

(C/NOFORN) Establishment of ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC) (U)

(U) Genesis. The ROK/US CFC is a new concept, but integrated
operations have long typified US-ROK military relations in Korea. 4

3. Component structure is shown on chart at page 6.

4. The US Army Military History Institute (USAMHI) is engaged in an
analysis of combined military efforts or as the Army styles it "allied
 interoperability." It revealed that peacetime planning and preparation
for coalition efforts have never been a forte of national military insti-
tutions. The result has usually been disaster in early battles. The In-
stitute stresses that the traditional approach to liaison when applied to
foreign national forces has frequently proved inadequate; technical ter-
minology rather than linguistic difficulties have been more of a hurdle;
the varieties of staff organization, logistic arrangements and supply
problems have been hard to cope with; and human personality plus national
objectives do not lead to smooth cooperation. USAMHI strongly recommended
peacetime planning, organization and training for military alliances,
which it termed "historically inevitable."
Command less OPCON of component forces is a national responsibility.

Note (1) Includes only air defense forces committed to alert missions (except PARPRO).

Note (2) Other forces in the event of hostilities.

Note (3) If assigned.
(U) CHAPTER II: US MILITARY PRESENCE IN KOREA

(U) US Force Reductions

(U) Historian's Note. For the Republic of Korea, 1977 was the best of years, the worst of years. The economy boomed as exports, which totaled $54 million in 1962, exceeded the $10 billion mark and rice production reached a record high. In another historic achievement, a 19-man expedition planted the ROK flag atop Mt Everest in Nepal. There were disasters, too, such as the dynamite-loaded freight train that exploded at Iri, 120 miles south of Seoul, killing 56 persons, injuring 1,300 and leaving 14,000 homeless. But the major event of calendar year 1977, from the Korean point of view, was President Carter's decision to phase out American tactical troops in the ROK. The pros and cons of that plan are better understood when evaluated against the overall US military involvement in Korea. Highlights follow.

(U) Pre-Korean War Period. US forces have been in Korea for more than 30 years. Our military position can be said to have had its beginnings in the 1943 Cairo Declaration where the US, China and Great Britain agreed that when the war with Japan was won, Korea, which had been under Japanese domination for 40 years, should become free and independent. The Soviet Union also agreed to this in Aug 45 when she declared war on Japan.

(U) The war in the Pacific ended on 2 Sep 45. Since the 38th Parallel roughly divides the Korean Peninsula, it was determined by mutual consent that American troops would accept the surrender of the Japanese south of the parallel, and the Russians would receive the surrender of those to the north. Three days after VJ Day, elements of the 7th US Inf Div left Okinawa to carry out that decision, arriving at Inchon on 8 Sep 45. These first US troops in Korea were part of the US XXIV Corps, an occupation force. To handle civil affairs a US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was formed, headed by the CG, 7th Inf Div. Collectively, the American military presence was known as US Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK).

(U) Establishment of the Republic of Korea on 15 Aug 48 led to a shift from military to civilian control and realignment of the US command structure in Korea. USAMGIK came to an end and plans were made for the gradual withdrawal of USAFIK units. Concurrently, advisory personnel were organized into a Provisional Military Advisory
Group (PMAG). This small assistance unit was the forerunner of the US Military Advisory Group to Korea (KMAC) which, in turn, was the major element in the formation of today's Joint US Military Assistance Group-Korea (JUSMAG-K). USAF/IK units began to leave the peninsula in late 1948; the last increment, the 5th Regimental Combat Team, departed on 29 Jun 49. From then until the North Korean invasion in mid-1950, the only US unit in South Korea was KMAC with a strength of under 500 men.

(U) Although USSR occupation troops withdrew in 1948, Soviet influence did not. Before the elections in South Korea, North Korea's Kim Il Sung was established in power and his "Democratic People's Republic" declared itself the only government on the peninsula. The UN passed a resolution in Dec 48 recognizing the ROK as the only legal government. NK was in violent disagreement with the UN's policy of recognition. Then came the war.

(U) The Korean War. On 25 Jun 50 NK launched a coordinated full-scale assault on the Republic. The UN condemned this action and called on member nations for assistance. Within a few days, President Truman committed US air, naval and ground forces. Fifteen other nations also sent combat contingents to help the young Republic defend itself against the invaders. Thus was born the United Nations Command, the first UN force in history formed to stop aggression. The UN appointed the US as the executive agency for the UN Command. The US still represents UN peacekeeping efforts in Korea.

(U) For three years the fighting raged up and down the peninsula. In that period more than two million men, women and children lost their lives. US casualties numbered 142,091, of whom 33,629 were killed in action. It was, at the time, the fourth largest war in America's history. US forces comprised more than 90 percent of the UN commitment. Major units were: Eighth Army with three corps and nine divisions (including the 1st Marine Div); Seventh Fleet with three task forces; and the Far East Air Forces with 20 groups and 70 squadrons. The Marines had both a division and an air wing. Average US strength during the Korean War was over 250,000 with peak (in Jul 53) at 302,000, about 70 percent Army.

(U) The war in Korea ground to a halt when, after two long years of difficult negotiations, the Military Armistice was signed on 27 Jul 53. This was an agreement between the military commanders to stop all hostile acts pending a political settlement. The world powers, after talks at Geneva in Apr 54, were still unable to reach an understanding and Korea remained divided by the military demarcation line. This situation has not changed, and the Military Armistice in Korea is now the longest armed truce in history.
(U) At the time of the Korean Armistice, there were about 932,000 UNC ground forces in Korea, including 591,000 ROK and 39,000 other allied forces. All ROK forces were under OPCON of CINCUNC per a 14 Jul 50 decree by President Syngman Rhee, which was confirmed by a 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty still in force. All foreign elements, the bulk of which were in a British Commonwealth Division, were attached to US units. In addition to the UK these were: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Netherlands, Philippines, Thailand, South Africa, and Luxemburg. Other than small liaison and honor guard contingents, all were withdrawn from Korea by mid-1955 except a Turkish element which departed in 1966 and a company of Thai troops which was withdrawn in 1971. UNC member nations which sent combat forces to aid Korea signed a "Declaration of the 16 UNC Allies" dated 7 Aug 53, which stated in part "...If there is a renewal of the armed attack...we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the Armistice would be so grave that in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea...."

(U) The Post-War Era. The reduction of US forces in Korea after the war was relatively rapid and within two years of the Jul 53 Armis-tice, US ground forces had been cut back to two divisions plus support units. Two Army corps headquarters and seven divisions (including the 1st Marine Div) along with numerous non-divisional Army units departed the ROK throughout 1954 and early 1955.

(U) The Eighth Army configuration by the spring of 1955 was I Corps (Gp), the "Shield of Seoul" responsible for defending the critical western sector of the ROK; the 24th US Inf Div on line in the 18k-mile western sector of the Demilitarized Zone; and the 7th US Inf Div in I Corps Gp reserve. (The 24th was replaced by the 1st Cav Div in Oct 57. The 1st Cav was transferred to Vietnam in Jul 65 and replaced by the 2d US Inf Div.) The balance of the 50,000-man force structure in 1955 was a corps artillery element, an air defense brigade, a missile command, a logistical command and area support and service units.

(U) HQ UNC moved from Tokyo to Seoul on 1 Jul 57 in conjunction with an overall reorganization of US military forces and command structures in the Pacific. Concurrent with this move was the formation of US Forces Korea (USFK), a planning headquarters which coordinates matters of joint concern in the ROK. Eighth Army headquarters was served by a general or G staff while UNC/USFK was served by a joint or J staff. The senior Army officer in Korea has commanded all three headquarters, serving as CINCUNC, COMUSKOREA and CG, EUSA.

(U) In ensuing years, US ground forces in Korea continued their defense readiness mission, helped modernize the ROK armed forces and
added a significant measure of stability that has enhanced the ROK's remarkable economic progress. The major changes in the US force structure in Korea took place in Apr '71 when the 7th Inf Div was withdrawn. Simultaneously the 2d Inf Div was relieved on line by the 1st ROKA Div and went into reserve north of Seoul. This left the US with no ground troops deployed along the DMZ, except for a small element guarding the Panmunjom truce area. The 2d Inf Div thus became the last remaining US division on the mainland of Asia. Predominantly a bachelor unit, it has an authorization of over 16,000 including the integration of 2,000 Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) troops.  

(U) The partial withdrawal in the spring of 1971 was accompanied by increased US military aid to ROK forces and was part of a general policy for US troop reduction in Asia introduced in the Nixon Doctrine. It involved a drawdown of 20,000 American troops, mostly from the departing 7th Inf Div, and necessitated numerous base closures and unit reorganizations and consolidations.

(U) It was also in Apr '71 that KNAG was eliminated as a subordinate command of Eighth Army and redesignated Army Section, JUSMAG-K. Prior to that time the military assistance program had been administered by PROVMAAG-K and three separate service advisory groups (RMAG--the largest in mission and size, 6145th AF Advisory Gp and Naval Advisory Gp) each reporting through its own service chain of command. Establishment of JUSMAG-K simplified command relationships by consolidating organization and effort, with the Chief, JUSMAG-K reporting directly to COMUSKOREA. This restructuring also recognized the lessened need for direct advisory efforts as ROK forces matured.

(U) Meanwhile, the post-war US Army logistical infrastructure in the ROK had been undergoing numerous changes in concept, realignment, reorganization and redesignation—all aimed at providing optimum supply and maintenance to US and ROK forces. The present system evolved in 1972 when EUSA decided to consolidate its support activities on a

1. KATUSA program was initiated in 1950 upon agreement of ROK President, US Ambassador to Korea and CINCUNC. At its 1952 peak, KATUSA strength amounted to over 20,000. KATUSAs not only bolstered wartime US units, but improved combat operations in areas of local language ability, identification of friend or foe, enemy intelligence, knowledge of local terrain, continuity, etc. KATUSA strength declined after the Armistice and in Jul '71, following a reduction of US ground forces in the ROK, stabilized at about 7,000. Replacements, who are selected by ROK Army, receive on-the-job training in a variety of much needed skills of benefit to the US and ROK. KATUSAs serve primarily in combat units but support virtually all Eighth Army organizations.
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functionalized-area basis. As a result, the huge ASCOM complex at Bupyong, one of the most active installations of its kind in the US Army, was closed in Jun 73. Missile/aviation support operations were established chiefly around Camp Humphreys at Pyongtaek and heavier maintenance support further south, primarily at Camp Carroll, near Waegwan. The 19th Support Command, headquartered at Taegu, is the control element.

(U) The USAF in Korea experienced its first buildup after the Korean War as a result of the abortive NK command raid on the Blue House (ROK Presidential Mansion in Seoul) and the capture of the USS Pueblo. Following those incidents, both of which occurred in Jan 68, there was a significant increase in tactical Air Force units in Korea with greater emphasis on air-ground operations training. The number of US air personnel doubled to around 10,000.

(U) The US Navy has had no ships or planes homeported in the ROK and Navy/Marine strength has been negligible, less than 500, except during major Seventh Fleet exercises.

(U) After the Vietnam War ended in 1973 DOD decided to eliminate 60,000 noncombatant spaces worldwide through consolidation, reduction or elimination of management or support type headquarters. Eighth Army, a tactical field headquarters, was not subject to that policy but in response to a feasibility study requested by JCS, the staffs serving HQ Eighth Army and HQs UNC/USFK were integrated into a single joint staff on 1 Jul 74. Twelve of the 20 HQ EUSA special and personal staffs also served HQ UNC/USFK and were only slightly affected by establishment of HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA. The reorganization, a workable arrangement, saved considerable spaces and operational funds. Executive agent for the tri-headquarters is the Department of Army.

(U) Following discontinuation of I Corps (Gp) Artillery in Jan 74, the US military posture in the ROK remained fairly constant although plans were being formulated for inactivation of the 4th Missile Command, the last unit of its kind in the US Army.

(U) The post-war era has been marked by NK belligerence and periods of open violence as the enemy built up its war potential in contravention of the Armistice. Those years of uneasy peace have witnessed, in addition to the command raid on the presidential mansion in Seoul and the seizure of the USS Pueblo, the shooting down of an unarmed USN reconnaissance plane, major infiltration attempts across the DMZ and along both coasts, firesights on the high seas, an assassination attempt on President Park's life which resulted in the death of Korea's first lady, discovery of secret underground tunnel complexes extending from the North into the UNC side of the DMZ, and the brutal bludgeoning of two US Army officers in the Pammunjom truce area.
(U) To the Koreans, the reassuring presence of US troops has been a "comrade-in-arms, forward together" association, a helping hand for their armed forces, communities and morale. There have been no "Yankee Go Home" signs in the Republic of Korea. For the US, our military involvement has important strategic value. GEN Fred C. Weyand, when he was Army Chief of Staff, put it this way:

"America's military presence in Korea provides a uniquely stabilizing element on a peninsula where the interests of four major powers converge by operating as a restraint on North Korean provocations, a brake on Sino-Soviet adventurism, and a reassurance to US allies, particularly Japan, of American commitment to their security."

(U) The Carter Plan. It was against this backdrop that Vice President Mondale, on 31 Jan 77, reaffirmed the President's pledge to withdraw US ground troops (less intelligence, communication and logistics support personnel) by 1981 or 1982. This move, which would reduce the 40,000 US forces in Korea by two-thirds, would be accompanied by a build-up and indefinite retention of US air force units and compensatory US military aid for ROK forces. The plan was formalized at the Tenth US/ROK Security Consultative Meeting held in Seoul in Jul 77. A reduction of 6,000 men was ordered by end of next year, a time-frame which will also see the establishment of a combined (US-ROK) forces command.

(U) On 18 Feb 77, President Carter invited GEN John W. Vessey, Jr, CINCUNC, to the White House to discuss his decision. GEN Vessey was assured that his concerns would be thoroughly considered and that the drawdown would be accomplished in a manner which would not upset the military balance or contribute to instability on the Korean peninsula, and that he would be consulted on form and timing before reduction of Korea-based US troops began.2

(U) The withdrawal plan met with immediate approval in some circles and sharp criticism in others. Among those voicing concern was MG John K. Singlaub, UNC/USFK/EUSA CoS, who was recalled by President Carter for publicly taking issue with stated national security policy. On 21 May 77, Singlaub had told a Washington Post interviewer that he agreed with Korean leaders that "if US ground troops are withdrawn on the schedule suggested it will lead to war." The President, after meeting with the general, decided not to reprimand or admonish him but approved a SECDEF recommendation for reassignment as FORSCOM's CoS, a position comparable to the one he held in Korea.

2. Coord, Mr. H. M. Katz, UNC/USFK/EUSA Command Historian, with GEN Vessey, CINCUNC, 12 Jun 78.
(U) As the year wore one, the planned pullout continued to generate controversy and was exacerbated by the PAK Tong Sun case (see page 71). Park, a wealthy Washington-based rice broker and socialite, was accused of trying to buy US congressional support for Korea through improper political contributions. The so-called bribery case received much unfavorable publicity and became an important diplomatic issue between the US and Korea, one that threatened the traditional friendly relations between the two countries.

(U) By mid-year, the US military command in Korea had assessed courses of action for dealing with reductions in US conventional ground forces (see page 100). Plans and committees were formed to insure orderly withdrawal of targeted troops and coordinate formation of a combined ROK/US headquarters. Care was taken to insure that US soldiers in the field remained fully informed and motivated, as will be noted in the following excerpts:

"US forces are in Korea today to prevent war. The military threat to Korea remains significant. President Carter recently directed that a phased withdrawal of US ground troops be implemented over a five-year period and that this withdrawal be accompanied by the strengthening of the ROK Armed Forces. He envisions a Korea five years from now where peace and stability can be maintained without the American ground presence. But he has - significantly - put that day well into the future and buttressed it with strong reaffirmation of the American commitment to ROK security; he has pledged to do all that is necessary to insure that ROK forces will have the strength to be a viable deterrent or to be victorious in battle, should the North attack. That is not a light commitment. It is evident that President Carter considers what we are doing in Korea today is of vital importance to American interests, now and in the future. Your job is essential and not a little bit hazardous. While the situation in Korea five years from now may well be such that US ground combat forces are not required, it is obvious that your presence now provides the essential war fighting and deterrent capabilities that sustain peace in Korea and protect overall

3. At Appendix 2A & 2B are selected articles illustrative of reasons for and against withdrawal and the dispute surrounding the issue.

US security interests in the Western Pacific. American ground forces will continue to be required, although in ever decreasing numbers, as ROK forces gain the capabilities that will enable them to provide a credible deterrent without an American ground presence. Undoubtedly, you have read newspaper and magazine articles or heard on the radio or television literally dozens of opinions, pro and con, about the planned troop withdrawal. Most of these commentaries ignore the essential point that we have some very tough soldiering to do here before the last American combat troop packs his duffle bag and goes home. Those who say or imply that American troops are not required in Korea now are as out of step with the President's policy - and with reality - as are those who say or imply that US troops will be required here forever. We cannot afford complacency--for complacency can kill. Until that future day comes when ground defense responsibility is placed solely in Korean hands, you have a vital, essential mission - to be trained and ready to defend this nation. You may be called upon to fight today, tomorrow, beyond. To be prepared to do so is why you are here; you are part of the commitment to defense that our nation has pledged under the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty...."

(U) Agreements between the ROK and US governments on the reduction of US ground troops included a tentative timetable, assurances that the headquarters and two brigades of the 2d US Inf Div will remain in place until the final phase, and an arrangement whereby ROK armed forces would be bolstered in advance or parallel with actual withdrawals. This last amounts to transfer of $800 million worth of US military equipment now in Korea. There were indications at year's end, however, that a reluctant Congress might not act on the Administration's request for the compensatory arms package, thus blocking or delaying deployments from Korea.

(U) For USFK members in the field, 1977 was another year of intensive training in combat tactics, services and support. For command and staff personnel, it was a year of added dimensions as they dealt with the mechanics of withdrawal and combined headquarters operations. In sum, while EUSA force reductions are programmed and in the offing, there will be no immediate exodus. The 40,000-man US military presence in the ROK continues.
(FOCU) At 1340 hours, 14 Jul, UNC requested the 385th MAC meeting be convened at 1800 hours that evening. Because of the serious nature of this incident, the normal procedure of giving 48 to 72 hours notice when calling a MAC session was not followed. At 1458 hours the UNCMAC Senior Member sent a follow-up message to his KPA/CPV counterpart noting that the intrusion of NK airspace was unintentional, that UNC was deeply concerned over the regrettable incident, and requested that the crew and helicopter be returned immediately. At 1745 hours the Communist side counterproposed that the meeting be delayed until 1100 hours, 16 Jul. The UNC agreed and requested that crew members be returned at that time.

(U) The incident was first disclosed in the US on 14 Jul by President Carter at a White House meeting with seven senators. He remarked: "We are trying to let them (NKs) know that we realize the mistake was made by the crew in going into the DMZ" and that "our primary interest is in having the incident not escalate into a confrontation and also to account for the crew members."

(U) The UNC opened the 385th MAC meeting at 1100 hours, 16 Jul by stating that the unarmed helicopter was shot down after an "unintentional intrusion" and termed the incident "regrettable." The UNCMAC Senior Member then referred to his earlier request regarding return of the lone survivor, the bodies of three dead crewmen, and the helicopter. The KPA/CPV Senior Member responded by remarking that "we are going to settle the incident leniently so that a complicated situation will not be created." After a brief dialogue the KPA/CPV Senior Member announced that the survivor and three bodies would be delivered with no conditions attached except for a written receipt from the UNC. He further stated that the helicopter was destroyed when it crashed and could not be returned. Both sides agreed that the MAC Secretaries would meet at 1500 hours that day to work out details for transfer of the surviving crew member and bodies of deceased." The Communist side was unusually cooperative during this MAC meeting, in contrast to their hostile behavior at previous Panmunjom sessions.

(FOCU) 448th MAC Secretaries Meeting, 16 Jul 77. Meeting convened at 1500 hours to develop detailed procedures for return of the wounded survivor and remains of three crew members to UNC control. The KPA Secretary proposed that (1) both Secretaries meet along the MDL immediately adjacent to the MAC conference building to oversee the transfer,

5. The Secretariat is an administrative agency charged to assist the MAC by performing record keeping, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign. Secretary for the UNCMAC is the Chief, Armistice Affairs Div, HQ UNC, a US Army officer with O-6 rank; KPA/CPV Secretary is KPA officer with equivalent rank.
(2) the bodies of deceased crew members be returned first, followed by the survivor, (3) UNC "working personnel" be allowed to enter the northern yard of the MAC conference site (NK side) for purpose of identifying the bodies prior to moving them across the MDL into the UNC sector, and (4) that the UNC furnish separate receipts for the three bodies and surviving crew member. The UNCMAC Secretary agreed to these terms and designated UNCMAC assistants as pall bearers/escort officers; personnel participating were from the US, ROK, UK, Canada, Australia and Thailand. After positive identification was made, three caskets containing the bodies were carried across the MDL, where they were received by US Army personnel. The surviving crewman walked unassisted across the MDL escorted by UNC officers. Receipts demanded by the Communist side were provided by the UNCMAC Secretary, and at 2001 hours, 16 Jul 77, the transfer process was completed. No significant difficulties were encountered.

(U) 449th MAC Secretaries Meeting, 26 Oct 77. On 20 Oct 77 a ROKA officer and enlisted man were believed abducted by NK troops in the UNC portion of the DMZ's central sector. The UNC called a MAC Secretaries meeting to demand their immediate return through MAC channels. Meeting convened on 26 Oct with the UNCMAC Secretary proposing that NK bring the ROKA members to a JOT meeting to be held the following day midpoint on "Bridge of No Return." At that point, the individuals could exercise their choice of freedom by walking to either end of the bridge. Ignoring the plan, the KPA side responded by claiming that the two ROKA personnel had defected to the North and that such an issue was not germane to the MAC's mission. The UNC countered that abduction was indeed a proper topic for discussion and further proposed that the two ROKA members be brought before a MAC Secretaries meeting the following day where they could indicate their desire to remain in NK or return to the ROK. The KPA Secretary rejected the latter proposal. The UNC Secretary closed the meeting by pointing out that KPA failure to permit the men a free choice of homeland strongly implied that the NK claim of defection was fabricated.

6. The "Bridge of No Return," located approximately 500 yards w of MAC conference building near JSA's sw corner, served as exchange point for UNC and Communist PWs after Korean War's end. During period 5 Aug - 6 Sep 53, 12,760 UNC prisoners were returned over the bridge, while 70,159 NK and 5,640 Communist Chinese were released to the North. In Dec 68 the 32 surviving USS Pueblo crewmen crossed the bridge to US control after 11 months of captivity in NK. Following mutual agreement on new partitioning of the truce site in wake of 18 Aug 76 tree incident, NK closed the "Bridge of No Return" to JSA traffic and built a new JSA access bridge slightly to the north.
(U) Armistice Violations

(U) During the past year the UNC charged the KPA/CPV with 3,039 armistice violations, 70 percent of which involved identification infractions within the DMZ, i.e., failure to wear armbands. A summary of additional charges includes:

- Air Violations...........................................1
- Weapons Firing in DMZ.................................2
- Intrusions Across MDL..................................1
- Crew-Served Weapons in DMZ............................25
- Automatic Weapons in DMZ..............................478
- Fortifications and Trenches in DMZ....................403
- Military Training in DMZ...............................1
- Unauthorized MDL Crossings in JSA....................6

(U) Since the Armistice was signed in 1953, the KPA/CPV has been charged with 107 air, 86 sea, and 41,533 ground violations. They have admitted to only two, both minor, in the early days of the truce.

(U) In 1977 the KPA/CPV charged the UNC with 19,764 violations, 73 percent of which involved identification infractions. Remaining charges were:

- Air Violations...........................................66
- Weapons Firing in DMZ.................................187
- Intrusions Across MDL..................................3
- Tanks and Armored Vehicles in DMZ....................1
- Crew-Served Weapons in DMZ............................694
- Automatic Weapons in DMZ..............................4,321
- Fortifications in DMZ..................................86
- Unauthorized Entry into DMZ..........................101
- Military Training in DMZ...............................46
- Incendiaryism..........................................5

(U) All charges were investigated and subsequently denied by the UNC, except the unintentional DMZ overflight by a USA helicopter on 14 Jul. Above charges raised total alleged UNC violations since 1953 to 1,017 air, 822 sea, and 198,563 ground. Of these, the UNC has admitted to 79 air, three sea, and 16 ground violations.

(U) Unaccounted for UNC PNs

(U) On 17 Aug 77 the UNCMAC Senior Member sent a letter to his NK

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7. CONF AAD Hist Sum 1977 (info used UNCLAS).
counterpart requesting information concerning 2,233 UNC PWs (389 US) and 21 non-military foreign nationals (4 US) believed held by the Communists during the Korean War but never returned to UNC custody. The KPA/CPV Senior Member’s reply on 22 Aug 77 reiterated the long-standing Communist response that all UNC PWs and civilian captives had already been repatriated as required by the Armistice Agreement.

(U) HQ UNC (Rear) Activities

(U) At the outbreak of the Korean War in Jun 50, the US was continuing the post-WWII occupancy of Japan. Accordingly, no permission was required for use of Japan as a tactical and logistical base to support Korean operations. The 1951 US-Japan peace treaty signaled the end of US occupation and necessitated an agreement on conduct of future military activities. An exchange of diplomatic notes that year between Prime Minister Yashida and SECSTATE Acheson concluded that Japan would permit and facilitate support of UN member nations engaged in any UN action in the Far East. In 1954 an agreement regarding the status of UN forces in Japan, termed the UN SOFA, was signed by most of the UNC contributing nations. Of import are two articles: Article XXIV stated, "All the UN forces shall be withdrawn from Japan within 90 days after the date by which all UN forces are withdrawn from Korea;" and Article XXV stated, "This agreement and agreed revisions thereof shall terminate on the date by which all UN forces shall be withdrawn from Japan." Under these provisions, the Yashida-Acheson notes would also terminate whenever all UN forces were withdrawn from either Japan or Korea.

(U) When HQ UNC moved from Tokyo to Seoul on 1 Jul 57, a rear headquarters at Camp Zama, Japan was maintained in order to continue provisions of the above agreements. The Japanese Government, however, concurrently required that this residual headquarters include personnel from UNC member nations other than the US and also that non-US operational forces of the UNC be stationed in Japan.

(U) This requirement had been satisfactorily met by deployment of the Royal Thai Air Force Det at Yokota AB under the UNC flag. In Mar 76, however, the Royal Thai Government announced its decision to withdraw the detachment from Japan the following month. Such action, if carried out as initially announced, would have placed UNC status under the UN SOFA in severe jeopardy. The US Dept of State, after approaches to several UNC allies, was successful in obtaining assignment of a British officer to HQ UNC (Rear) on a rotational basis effective Jul 76. This UK commitment retained the multinational image of HQ UNC (Rear) and thus satisfied minimum requirements of the GOJ. On 26 Jul 76 the Royal Thai AF Det in Japan redeployed to Thailand, terminating its assignment to the UNC which had commenced on 23 Jun 51. The Thai Liaison Group and Honor
Guard contingent stationed in the ROK continued to serve the command.

(U) At end of reporting period, UNC (Rear) was comprised of a headquarters staff (4 US, 1 UK) and seven liaison groups attached from UNC member nations (see following topic).

(U) Tachikawa AB was certified as a UN base in Jul 57 since it was then the major USAF operational base in Japan. Subsequently, the bulk of USAF activities was transferred to the UN-certified Yokota AB and the need for retention of Tachikawa AB diminished greatly. Likewise, Camp Drake had been designated a UN base in Jul 57 because of its use as a troop staging area and its field hospital support capability for UNC troops serving in the ROK. By 1967, however, Camp Drake's facilities were no longer being utilized and thereafter major portions of the installation were returned to Japanese control. Accordingly, in Aug 77 this headquarters directed that the GOJ be notified through the UN Joint Board that Tachikawa AB and Camp Drake were no longer required for support of UN Forces in Japan and Korea. On 1 Oct 77 the GOJ removed both installations from the list of UNC-certified bases. 8

(U) Fuchu Air Station had been removed from the list of UNC-certified bases on 1 Feb 76; HQ 5th AF was relocated from there to Yokota AB in Nov 74. At end CY 77 seven installations in Japan/Okinawa remained certified for unrestricted use by UNC nations which signed the 1954 UN SOFA: Yokota and Kadena Air Bases; Futema Air Station; Camp Zama; Yokosuka Naval Base; Naval Ordnance Facility Sasebo; and the White Beach (Okinawa) Area. In 1977, 66 personnel, ten aircraft, and two ships representing eight UNC member nations other than the US entered or departed Japan via these bases.

(U) UNC Liaison Group Activities

(U) Shortly after hostilities erupted in Korea in 1950, a liaison staff was established at UNC headquarters in Japan in order to formulate policies and procedures for the integration of national contingents into the UNC and to maintain liaison among the various governments, field forces, and CINCUNC. Initial policy limited official accreditation to UN countries which sent combat forces to Korea; this was later extended to include all nations which contributed to the Korean War effort. Under this latter provision, a ROK liaison group was attached to UNC headquarters in Dec 52. Eventually, all 16 nations which joined the US in forming the UNC fighting team were represented on the liaison staff, as were Denmark, India, Italy, and Norway which furnished medical personnel and supplies.

8. GOJ ltr to UN Joint Board, UNJ-130-HA, 29 Sep 77, Subj: Termination of UNC Facilities.
(U) When UNC headquarters moved from Tokyo to Seoul on 1 Jul 57, those nations which continued their support to the UNC split their liaison groups, retaining representation in Japan at HQ UNC (Rear) and establishing liaison in Korea. The group in Tokyo satisfied requirements of the GOJ and helped assure continuance of the UN SOFA (see preceding topic). Currently, the following nations maintain liaison groups in Japan: Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the Philippines; at UNC headquarters in the ROK, liaison groups are assigned from Australia, Canada, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the Philippines. Senior representatives assigned to Korea are accredited as members of the UNCMAC Advisory Group; most of the liaison group members also serve as military attaches for their governments.

(U) Thailand, Great Britain and the Philippines retain token forces in Korea in the form of contingents to the UNC Honor Guard Company (see page 304). These forces are assigned to their respective country's liaison groups, but are under operational control of the UNC.

(U) The Ethiopian liaison group was recalled from the ROK in Jun 75; replacements were not provided. No official notification from the Ethiopian government has been received by this headquarters concerning their UNC liaison representation. On 23 Dec 77 this command was informed that the Turkish liaison officer stationed in Japan had been instructed by his government to withdraw his UNC accreditation. No further explanation has been furnished by the Turkish government. As of year's end, the proposed Turkish action in Japan has not affected the status of the Turkish liaison group serving in the ROK.
USFK forces throughout Korea, providing weather advisories and warnings for all aircraft operating over the Republic. This centralized tactical role was assumed for the first time during Exercise TEAM SPHIT 77; Korea-wide mission control forecasts provided decision assistance for the UNC Combined Battle Staff at TANGO Main CP. Part or all of the WSU may be deployed to other locations in the ROK to furnish close support for specific contingencies or exercises. Mission planning/control forecasts and computerized flight plans are developed by the WSU for major aircraft movements. As the command's primary forecast agency, the WSU coordinates with all affected weather units to insure that consistent environmental data is provided to all aircraft engaged in a particular operation.

(U) In 1977 the WSU began issuing tailored probability forecasts (TPF) on a daily basis for Koon-ni and Nightmare Ranges. TPFs express in percent the likelihood that weather will meet or exceed specific critical combinations of ceiling and visibility at those ranges. The forecasts were reasonably accurate during the year and have been useful in planning training flights and adjusting mission requirements to meet expected weather conditions.

(U) Efforts to strengthen dedicated weather support for the ACoS, J2 Indications Center continued throughout 1977. Beginning in Sep the USAF 30th Weather Sqn's Det 18, stationed at Yonggan for close support to the tri-headquarters, increased its frequency of weather summaries forecasting conditions over NK and contiguous waters. Additionally, the detachment helped develop an analysis technique for the Indication Center's naval section based on observed and forecast sea conditions to refine enemy sea movement intelligence products.

(U) Weather communications for USFK recipients are dispatched across the ROK by teletype and facsimile transmission; both circuits originate at Fuchu, Japan. The teletype circuits are relayed over microwave channels to the Osan BUCKET Technical Control Facility, which distributed the signal over land lines to users throughout the ROK. Facsimile circuits are routed from Taegu to BUCKET and then switched to land lines across Korea, except for direct trunks from Taegu to Kunsan and Kwangju ABs. This combination of microwave and land line networks is susceptible to degrading by either natural causes or enemy action in wartime. The BUCKET facility at Osan is a critical choke point since its loss would terminate weather communications across most of the ROK. Interface with Korean communications nets is impractical because of system incompatibility and different data transmission rates.

(U) Planning began in 1977 for a backup system which employs high frequency (HF) radio systems transmitting from Japan to key USFK command/control points in the ROK. Feasibility of a HF weather communications
managed control ports in the ROK. The weather communications system incorporated a different data transmission technique.

The system incorporated various weather transmission methods including the International Weather Communication System (IWCS) which provided weather data to U.S. forces through the ROK. The IWCS was designed to provide weather information to U.S. forces in Korea and the ROK. The system was capable of transmitting weather information over a wide range of frequencies, including HF, VHF, and UHF bands.

The system was designed to support the needs of U.S. forces in Korea and the ROK, and was a critical component of the overall weather communications infrastructure in the region. The system was designed to provide weather information to U.S. forces in Korea and the ROK, and was a critical component of the overall weather communications infrastructure in the region.

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exporters. Textiles remained the principal single category of exports (36 percent) followed by electrical/electronic products, metal items, footwear, ships and plywood.

-- The shift from light industrial products to capital/technology intensive heavy and chemical products continued and Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOI) reports indicated exports of rolling stock, chemical fertilizer and cement increased 200 percent during first nine months of the year while heavy and chemical product exports accounted for 35.9 percent of the overall export total.

-- ROK efforts at market diversification continued to show favorable results. While US remained the principal export market, receiving $3.14 billion worth of goods and services, its share increased only 1.3 percent for the year, reaching 33.3 percent; Japan, with 20 percent of the market, also had a less than average increase. The most significant gains were registered in the Middle East (15.4 percent), primarily Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran, where exports (cement, rubber products and textiles) totaled $1.4 billion and service receipts accounted for an additional $1.4 billion. Markets in Europe and Canada continued to expand, and Africa and Latin America emerged as increasingly important new outlets for ROK goods with exports to these areas up 45.7 percent and 149.5 percent respectively.

(U) Korea's trade deficit with Japan continued to be a major problem. Japan, second only to US in providing economic assistance to the ROK, became increasingly aggressive in the area of commercial loans, accounting for two-thirds of all new and existing foreign investment in South Korea. Japan also dominated the area of technology transfer with 66 percent of all contracts, and collected 59 percent of all royalties paid by Korea. Japan remained the leading supplier of ROK imports with 35 percent of the market, followed by US with 23 percent; Saudi Arabia and Kuwait climbed to third and fourth respectively, with West Germany a distant fifth. Agricultural commodities (grain and cotton) continued to be the most important single import, with significant gains recorded in iron and steel products, manufacturing machinery and petroleum products. However, rapid development of a strong services industry, which generated an influx of construction contracts from the Middle East, helped Korea enjoy an excellent balance of payments performance for 1977. The current account registered in the black for the first time, totaling $32 million compared to a minus $248 million in 1976.

(U) Demands for skilled labor in intensive industries generated pressures for higher wages to attract the necessary manpower, and average wages rose some 30 percent over the 1976 level to 77,600 won monthly ($160). The boost in salary, however, had little effect in increasing the real income of wage earners as pay raises were offset by inflation and an elevated tax burden.
(U) Prices continued slowly but inexorably upward, with wholesale costs rising 10.1 percent in 1977 while consumer prices were up 11 percent according to government figures. The real inflation rate was understated, moreover, as controls froze prices of most manufactured goods at mid-year levels. Inflationary pressures were most accurately reflected in uncontrolled wholesale food prices which rose 14.3 percent during first three quarters compared to 3.8 percent for other items, and consumer food prices which were up 13.3 percent compared to a 6.2 percent increase for other products and services.

(U) In Jul, following a seven year study, the government initiated a value added tax system to replace the inefficient program previously in effect. The new system, designed to attain maximum mobilization of domestic capital, merged eight of 11 existing indirect levies and set a basic tax rate of ten percent.

(U) While efforts were made to restrain excessive growth, the money supply nevertheless increased by 41.4 percent. Principal cause was an unprecedented increase in foreign assets (mostly export earnings and overseas remittances), which rose to $1.9 billion by mid-year. Total foreign exchange holdings escalated to an all time high of $4.322 billion by year's end. Import liberalization steps initiated to counter the excessive money supply and concomitant inflation were described by observers as being more promise than action, with concern focused mainly on meeting urgent domestic needs rather than exposing local producers to the stimulus of international competition. Measures included "consideration" of freedom to import articles with excessively high domestic prices, revision of the luxury import items list, and the shifting of certain restricted items to an automatic approval status. Monetary measures included tightening of loan terms and restrictions of converting foreign exchange remittances.

(U) Trade protectionism emerged as a major problem for ROK exporters during 1977. Foreign import quotas, tariffs and self-restraint agreements restricted 122 categories of ROK manufactured goods (primarily raw silk, textiles, footwear and canned mushrooms), resulting in an estimated loss of more than $400 million during the year. Although half the losses incurred since 1972 were due to US restrictions ($650 million out of $1.2 billion), Japanese limitations have had a growing effect on trade, being more closely defined and more enduring in impact. In spite of initial ROK successes in circumventing some trade barriers by rechanneling exports to commodities not singled out for quotas, it is doubtful that this technique will continue to be effective as protectionism by advanced countries increases. In 1978 the ROK will likely undertake an intensified economic diplomacy to gain new markets and protect current trade arrangements. It will also continue efforts to diversify its export product base.

(U) The 1978 budget passed by the National Assembly on 2 Dec 77 provided for a total of W3,517 billion, an increase of 22.5 percent over the
1977 budget. Defense expenditures, set at 35.6 percent of the budget (6.7 percent of GNP) were up 27.2 percent from the previous year, while the defense tax increased 28 percent and the tax burden remained at 19.4 percent.

(U) Initial government projections and goals include a real growth rate for GNP of between ten and 11 percent, the holding of both wholesale and retail price increases at ten percent, and a commodity export target of $12.5 billion. Imports should increase to $13.2 billion while foreign exchange assets are expected to reach $5.01 billion. Per capita GNP is projected to rise to $1,060, and manufacturing again forecast to lead sectoral growth. 1978 will see increased emphasis on auto exports, expanding chemical and heavy industry products, and an upgrading of light industry products. Major problems bearing on economic growth will be oil and raw material price hikes and growing trade protectionism, as 14 more countries are expected to impose controls on 29 additional commodities.

(U) Listed below are Korea's economic indicators for 1976-77 ($ in millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977 (Est)</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
<td>$ -590</td>
<td>$ -518</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>7,815</td>
<td>10,007</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>8,405</td>
<td>10,525</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Capital Inflow</td>
<td>3,509</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>-21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Loans</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>-9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Loans</td>
<td>2,074</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>-32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Investment</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of Payment</td>
<td>-314</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>110.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Acct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Foreign Exchange</td>
<td>2,961</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>25,089.6</td>
<td>31,488.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Exports</td>
<td>2,501.7</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Outstanding</td>
<td>7,366</td>
<td>8,744</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US Embassy/Seoul

(U) Economic indicators at 1970 constant prices:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977 (Est)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GNP</td>
<td>$ 428</td>
<td>$ 465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GNP at</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Prices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP Growth (%)</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Savings Rate</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Investment Rate</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale Price Increase (%)</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Price Increase (%)</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US Embassy/Seoul
Korean foreign trade with US ($ in millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977 (Est)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports, Total (FOB)</td>
<td>$7,715.1</td>
<td>$10,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to US</td>
<td>2,492.5</td>
<td>3,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Share (%)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports, Total (CIF)</td>
<td>8,773.6</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports from US</td>
<td>1,962.9</td>
<td>2,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Share (%)</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ROKG Office of Customs Administration

ROK Self-Help Programs

President Park and his administration are demonstrably following planned courses of action designed to build national fiber, bolster cultural pride, and promote self-reliance. A primary vehicle for this purpose continues to be the community development program (Saemaul Undong) designed to help the rural population attain economic self-sufficiency. During 1977 all villages completed the program's first phase as average annual rural income rose to 1.4 million won ($2,887), exceeding average urban earnings. In Sep, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced plans to release $1.08 billion to improve living conditions and the overall environment in the less developed rural villages in order to achieve more balanced economic growth, facilitate the nation's modernization process at the grass roots level, and help curb rural migration to the cities.

Accomplishments of the program since its inception include improvement of 43,060 kilometers of local roads, completion of irrigation and flood control projects for 2.4 million acres of rice paddy, electrification of 85 percent of the nation's 13,633 administrative districts (Ri and Dong) and continuing replacement of thatched roofs with tile in Korea's 12,000 villages.

Although initially conceived as a rural self-help program, the Saemaul movement has recently been extended to Seoul and other urban centers as a means of aiding low income residents. The focus of the urban Saemaul drive includes urban renewal projects in commercial and slum areas, a conservation campaign to reduce waste of oil, electricity, water and other materials in government offices and business firms, and initiation of compulsory monthly neighborhood meetings with community leaders to discuss urban problems and formulate new Saemaul programs.

ROK Social Welfare

With its political power firmer than ever, President Park's
Since introduction of SFTS, EUSA has realized a savings of approximately 600 flight hours per month in aviator training time.

-- EUSA aviation elements suffered six accidents during CY 77, compared with four in 1976; 1977 accident rate was 8.21 per 100,000 flying hours. (73,055 hours were flown during CY 77.) Two of the six accidents resulted in fatalities; no injuries were incurred in the other four. A serious incident occurred on 2 Mar 77 when a CH-47C helicopter flying in low weather struck a power line and crashed; aircraft was destroyed and its four-man crew killed. An AH-1G helicopter was damaged on a 10 Mar training flight because of improper technique at termination of a practice touchdown autorotation. A propeller malfunction caused an OV-1D to pan off the Camp Humphreys runway on 13 Apr. The second fatal accident occurred on 12 Jul when a UH-1H air ambulance crashed in darkness and bad weather during an attempt to rescue injured occupants of a downed USMC helicopter; three of the four crewmembers aboard were killed. On 27 Jul an CH-53A helicopter struck the edge of a helipad during an approach. Major damage occurred to a CH-47C helicopter on 5 Aug during the ground phase of a maintenance test flight; accident was due to material malfunction, exact nature of which has not been determined.

(FOOU) US Helicopter Overflight of Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)

(FOOU) At 0853 hours, 14 Jul 77, a US Army CH-47 helicopter assigned to the 17th Avn Gp's 213th Avn Co departed A-511 Airfield (Pyongtaek) destined for R-413 Airfield at Kansong on ROK northeast coast (see map, next page). Four crewmembers were aboard with operational mission of transporting construction material for ROKA defensive positions being built in inaccessible areas near the DMZ on eastern front. The helicopter was scheduled to proceed to R-413 via Chunchon (A-306) where a ROK navigator would come aboard; flight would then continue to a materials pickup zone located three kilometers southwest of R-413.

(U) The aircraft missed the rendezvous at R-413 and strayed over the eastern end of the DMZ where it was downed by enemy fire. Three of the four crewmen were killed: CW2 Joseph A. Miles the pilot, SP5 Ronald E. Wells, flight engineer and Sgt Robert L. Haynes, crew chief. Personnel aboard the helicopter were not armed. No special equipment, classified materials or sensitive communication codes were on board.13

(FOOU) The following description of the unintentional intrusion into NK airspace by the CH-47 and its crash in NK territory was subsequently

provided by the sole survivor, co-pilot CW2 Glenn M. Schwanke:

-- When the helicopter reached the east coast the co-pilot observed an airfield and asked the pilot if it was R-413. The pilot replied it was not and indicated that the flight was ten minutes short of ETA. The pilot turned north following the seacoast. At about 1000 hours the crew heard a "popping/cracking" noise, the source of which could have been either gunfire or an aircraft mechanical malfunction. CW2 Miles elected a precautionary landing to investigate for possible damage. At about 1004 hours he turned the helicopter from its northerly heading and unknowingly landed in NK territory at a point approximately eight kilometers north of the MDL (indicated on map). After landing, the engines were shut down with the auxiliary power unit left running. At this time the crew noticed an estimated 200-300 people (soldiers, villagers, and children) approaching the aircraft; they were immediately recognized as North Koreans.

-- After remaining on the ground for approximately two minutes, the pilot attempted to take off and fly south. As the engines were being started NK troops commenced shooting at the helicopter and continued firing as the CH-47 became airborne. CW2 Miles was killed by the hostile fire and CW2 Schwanke, the co-pilot, took control of the aircraft and headed south. At about 1008, with the number two engine on fire, the CH-47 became uncontrollable and crashed in the Singyechon riverbed one kilometer west of the coastline (see map). The co-pilot was thrown from the helicopter into the river and the flight engineer and crew chief were killed by the impact. As the co-pilot swam to shore NK soldiers fired at him and missed. After reaching land he was kicked, beaten and manacled.

-- During his first day in captivity Schwanke was interrogated at great length and threatened with death for not cooperating. The next day (15 Jul) he was taken to a NK town at an unknown location (automobile journey from crash site took about 2½ hours) where interrogation continued. He was generally well treated, however, given medical treatment and food, and told he would soon be repatriated. That evening he was flown to a town near Pammunjom (probably Kaesong) and billeted in a hotel. The following day (16 Jul), prior to his repatriation, he was interviewed by NK press representatives. (Negotiations for CW2 Schwanke's release and return to UNC control, along with bodies of three fellow crewmembers, are discussed on page 28.)

3. In a similar Armistice violation on 17 Aug 69, the pilot of a US Army OH-236 helicopter became disoriented and made a forced landing in NK after receiving enemy gunfire. In this case, NK kept the three crewmembers more than three months before returning them to the UNC. NK has never released captured craft or equipment.

4. FOUO AAD Hist Sum 1977. (U)
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Additional information concerning the overflight was furnished by ground observers and communications operators. A summary of their reports follows:

-- At 0945 hours, 14 Jul 77, Hwarang Radio, located at R-413, reported to FCC Grant that a CH-47 helicopter had passed over the Hwarang station. At 0954 hours the CH-47 pilot contacted Evenreach FCC and reported that his position was in vicinity of R-412 Airfield. (R-412, located off map, is approximately 11 kilometers southwest of FCC Grant.) At 0955 hours Aerial OP 31, positioned one mile south of DMZ southern boundary (indicated on map), observed a CH-47 proceeding northbound and reported the sighting to ROKAF Reporting Position (RP) M-300. A radio warning on emergency frequency was issued by RP M-300 at 0959 hours, however the co-pilot indicated this message was not received by the CH-47 crew. Between 1001 and 1002 hours ROKA Beach Position (BP) #1 and Security Resistance Position (SRP) #21 (located 400 yards south of DMZ southern boundary) fired 67 .50 caliber machine gun rounds as a warning measure. Barely one minute later (1002 hours) ROKA Guard Post (GP) 220, inside the DMZ, fired 83 .50 caliber warning shots, but aircraft continued to head north. At 1004 hours GPs 219 and 220 reported that the helicopter was on the ground for one or two minutes at precautionary landing site (shown on map). GPs further reported observing the CH-47's takeoff and attempted flight south, NK troops firing at the aircraft with automatic weapons, and subsequent crash of the helicopter in the Singyeon riverbed. They also observed approximately 40 NK soldiers near the aircraft, which was right side up and partially in the water.

(U) As a result of this incident, the tri-headquarters aviation staff made a detailed analysis of directives and procedures governing flights into P-518, the Korean Tactical Zone (see following topic). The command regulation specifying controls for aviation operations in the area was subsequently rewritten to clarify and expand responsibilities of commanders and their flight crews. Other measures taken to prevent recurrence included prescribed line of flight to R-413 Airfield, relocation of buffer zone line to identifiable landmarks, increased emphasis on maintenance of warning markers and helipads, and training requirement revisions.

(U) Tactical Air Control and Employment Procedures in Korea

(U) In Jan 76 CINCPACAF tasked 314th Air Div with preparing a single source procedural document that would consolidate existing directives governing employment and control of tactical aircraft in the ROK. Further directions from CINCUNC specified that the new document must be

5. Ibid.

Present plans call for Sep 78 activation of a US-manned Korean Ammunition Management System. Organization will consist of a headquarters and five control teams to perform those statutory accountability and surveillance functions which must be retained by US personnel at all facilities storing US-titled munitions.¹⁰

(FOUO) Standard Army Intermediate Logistics System (SAILS) (U)

(U) SAILS is a standard Army automated data processing system developed by the US Army Computer Systems Command (USACSC). Basic SAILS was designed to accomplish all stock control, supply management and reporting, and related financial management functions between the CONUS wholesale level and direct support or separate unit level in CONUS. In early 1973 DA decided to expand the system worldwide. SAILS AB(X) had been under development since late 1973 and was to be implemented in Korea in Jul 75, replacing the Standard Supply System (3S) and Medical Unique Supply System now in use. When problems developed in Basic SAILS, however, CONUS assets had to be diverted, and local establishment of the system was postponed. During 1976 SAILS AB(X) technical documentation was reviewed, system implementation requirements and impacts determined, and training needs identified. In Dec 76 the Systems Integration Test was successfully completed at Ft Shafter, Hawaii. EUSA CofS established a SAILS AB(X) Task Group in late Dec 76 to monitor all command actions required for successful system implementation. Group was chaired by Sp Asst to ACoFS, J4 and included representatives from Compt., Mgt Info Sys, 19th Spt Cmnd, and 6th Med Depot.

(FOUO) During a Prototype Evaluation Test conducted 3 Jan - 18 Feb 77 in Hawaii, excessive run times were experienced. Extension of the system to Korea, scheduled for May 77, was postponed until Nov. In Jun DA directed US Army Logistics Center and USACSC to reduce system run times by approximately 50 percent in two increments. First increment reduction attempt, to be accomplished by applying Systems Change Packet (SCP) 03, rendered inconclusive results in an Aug Field Validation Test, and extension of system to Korea was further postponed. In Nov application of second increment reduction, SCP 04, yielded decrease in run times considered sufficient enough to permit introduction of SAILS AB(X) within EUSA. May-Jun 78 is target date for implementation.

(U) Perpetuation of Unit Document Number/Department of Defense Activity Address Code (PUDN/DODAAC)

(U) The PUDN/DODAAC system was effectively implemented in Korea on 1 Apr 76, except in 2d Inf Div. Interfacing with worldwide logistics,

10. SECRET J4 Hist Sum 1977 (info used UNCLASS).
(FOUO) The following upgrading projects have been approved by OSD for FY 78, with construction scheduled to commence in May 78:

-- Camp Ames. The present heliport will be relocated in order to comply with explosives quantity/distance requirements. A warehouse will be upgraded for storage of inert components and missile testing/handling equipment; these items are presently stored in premium explosives igloo space. (Estimated cost - $824,000.)

-- Camp Howard. A new 12,000 sq ft ammunition maintenance building will be constructed, and an existing building will be upgraded for use as an additional maintenance shop. (Estimated cost - $521,000.)

-- Camp Thompson. A new surveillance workshop, box and crating shop, and vehicle hardstand is required. (Estimated cost - $271,000.)

(FOUO) Rocket Maintenance Building at Camp Ames (U)

(FOUO) Documentation was submitted to USARPAC in Jun 73 for a minor construction project to replace the missile maintenance facility at Camp Ames which was destroyed by an explosion during that month. Because of the cost factor, a new package for this project was resubmitted to DA in Sep 74, which reduced scope of work and insured a usable building within statutory funding limitations of $300,000. A later survey by the USA Far East District Engineer estimated cost at $351,000. Since cost exceeded original limit, the UNC/USFK/EUSA Engineer submitted a request to DA for use of emergency funds. Revised plans were approved by the DOD Explosive Safety Board in Feb 75 and two months later DA advised that the project had been forwarded for inclusion in the Military Construction, Army Program. On 7 Aug 75 this headquarters was informed that DA had requested SECDEF Military Construction Contingency Funds for accomplishment. OSD approved the project 28 Aug 75 subject to pending legislation which would increase SECDEF approval authority for minor construction projects from $300,000 to $400,000. The legislation was passed and on 4 Sep 75 DA advised that design work in advance of project approval was authorized. Two weeks later the Army Comptroller released $21,000 for this purpose. Design plans were prepared and submitted to the DOD Explosive Board for review and approval in Nov 75. Project approval, along with a $372,000 fund allocation, was received in May 76. Construction commenced in Aug 76 with completion scheduled for Jun 77. Financial difficulties experienced by the contractor, however, caused cessation of construction until a new contractor could be assigned. 1 Mar 78 is revised target date for completion of Camp Ame's new missile maintenance facility.

12. No action was taken on Masan AD (051) and ASP 063 since both are now under ROKA control, see page 153.

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darkness by using available light from the night sky (starlight principle). The goggles enable the user to perform normal tasks such as reading, walking and driving in total darkness. Nighttime employment of weapons, observation, patrolling and other operations in reduced visibility should be materially enhanced. Some 1,100 additional sets are scheduled for deployment to EUSA during 1978-79, as they become available from the manufacturing contractor.

(U) New Commercial Type Vehicles in EUSA

(U) In 1974 a special DA analysis of wheeled vehicles (Wheels Study) recommended placing standard commercial vehicles in tactical Army units. First large-scale application was introduction of the M880/890 series truck system. Deliveries of M880/890 series vehicles to Korea totaled 651/638 in CY 76/77 respectively, completing replacement of 3/4 and 1 1/4 ton (M715 series) trucks except for 48 contact maintenance trucks scheduled for delivery in 1978.

(U) All vehicles were shipped to the ROK in containers to prevent damage and pilferage with exception of ambulances which were too large to fit into containers. Contact maintenance trucks will also be containerized for shipment to avoid loss of costly tools aboard the vehicles. Mechanical problems encountered with M880/890 vehicles have been minimal; at end of reporting period, 129 warranty claims had been initiated to cover various minor component failures. Deadline rate has been very low, and units report performance of new vehicles as excellent. Excess M715 trucks are being transferred to USAF and ROKA. Maintenance and supply support of EUSA's remaining M715 fleet has been reduced to minimum required for mission readiness.15

(U) Administrative Use Vehicle Upgrade Program

(U) In CY 76 a comprehensive program to upgrade EUSA's administrative use vehicle fleet was undertaken. Fleet consists of all US-made sedans, buses, carryalls, pickups and trucks. By end CY 77, 447 vehicles of various types had been replaced with newer models. Replacement criteria was primarily based on vehicle age and accumulated mileage. Some 640 additional vehicles (34 percent of fleet) need to be upgraded to meet established goal of reducing fleet operating expenses by one cent per mile. Approximately 300 vehicles are scheduled for replacement during CY 78.

(U) Introduction of Aviation Unit Maintenance (AVUM) Tool Sets

(U) Aviation maintenance level categories were previously identical

15. Ibid.
with motor vehicle maintenance classifications (organizational, direct support (DS), general support and depot). DA determined, however, that skill levels of organizational maintenance personnel in aviation units were equivalent to those technicians working in DS type activities. Furthermore, the arbitrary distinction between organizational and DS maintenance contributed to unnecessary down time of aviation assets. It was felt that DS functions could be performed at organizational level in aviation units if necessary tools were made available. Consequently, a three-level aviation maintenance program was established, providing a DS capability in Army air units.16

(U) During CY 77 AVUM tool sets were received by EUSA aviation companies and detachments to implement the three-level maintenance concept. By May 77 AVUM 1 sets had been distributed to all units with less than ten aircraft. In Dec three AVUM 2 sets (for units with 10-19 aircraft) were issued to 2d Div's 4th Sqdn/7th Cav by a US Army Troop Spt and Avn Mater Readiness Comd Mat Fielding Team from CONUS. Seven additional AVUM 2 sets are scheduled for 1978 delivery to other EUSA aviation units.

(U) General Support (GS) Maintenance Capability for Electronic Components

(U) In Feb 75 DA directed that all major commands achieve and retain an organic GS maintenance capability for repair of electronic system boards, cards, and modules. DA approved in Nov 76 a EUSA recommendation to establish a centralized Special Repair Activity (SRA) at Camp Carroll for servicing electronic components. Additionally, DA tasked US Army Electronics Command (ECOM) to provide EUSA with assistance and information including recommendations for shop layout, requirements for precision tools, jigs, fixtures, and test equipment, and a listing of components designated for code "I" repair at EUSA's SRA. Project development commenced in Mar 77 with extensive ECOM support, and on 12 Dec the Sp Repair Actv-US Army Materiel Support Center-Korea (MSC-K) became fully operational. Initial manning level was four local national electronics repairmen. Unserviceable assets which cannot be repaired at the SRA will be sent to CONUS depots under ECOM automatic return item list procedures.

(U) Termination of Direct Exchange-Wholesale (DX-W) Program for C-E Equipment

(U) The non-standard DX-W program for C-E equipment had required receipt of an unserviceable item at a CONUS supply source before a serviceable replacement was released by a national inventory control point. In Dec 76 DARCOM announced that the DX-W program would be terminated on

16. Ltr, DA, 27 May 77, Subj: DA Aviation Three-Level Maintenance.
1 Apr 77; thereafter customers would be supported by standard Army supply systems. On 1 Mar 77, following ECOM approval, EUSA's DX-W control points were redesignated C-E Direct Exchanges (CEDX) and became customers of organic or supporting technical supply organizations which requisition in accordance with AR 710-2.17 Electronics system components repaired by the newly established SRA at Camp Carroll (see preceding topic) will be processed through CEDXs, thereby reducing requirements to evacuate unserviceable items to CONUS. No significant problems were encountered during transition from the DX-W program to the standard supply system.

(U) Employment of AN/GSM-256 Test and Measuring Equipment for Maintenance Calibration

(U) In Jul-Aug 76 two calibration sets, secondary transfer standards, AN/GSM-256, were deployed to EUSA to provide additional capabilities and increased accuracies for the Level C Calibration Program. Repair parts for standards in the AN/GSM-256 were provided with each set. Both sets were received and set up to operate in a nonmobile configuration. DA approved staffing of the AN/GSM-256 with Calibration Specialists, MOS 35H. Difficulty was encountered in obtaining trained 35H personnel and it became necessary in Mar 77 to contract level C calibration services to a local firm. One of the new sets is located at MSC-K, Camp Carroll, the other with the 520th Maint Co at Camp Humphreys. In Aug two M820A2 series trucks were received to provide mobility for the AN/GSM-256s, but it was decided to leave sets in their nonmobile configuration due to high work loads at both locations. Both M820A2 vehicles were retained to provide mobility when required for contingency operations.

(U) In-country level C calibration is also performed by EUSA military personnel using five older AN/TS M-55 sets located at the 2d Div's 702d Maint Bn (2 sets), and 19th Spt Comd's 61st and 595th Maint Cos, and MSC-K.

(U) EUSA Operational Readiness Float (ORF)

(U) The ORF is a quantity level of selected "move, shoot and communicate" end items and major equipment components. These are authorized to be stocked at maintenance support activities for response to materiel readiness requirements of combat units. Quantities of items authorized for EUSA ORF are published in the form of an H533 report prepared by DARCOM's Depot System Command (DSCOM).

(U) During CY 77 authorizations for EUSA's ORF were adjusted to

17. ECOM 161425Z Feb 77.
conform with verification data received from DSCOM. Component float 
was authorized and management established at major subordinate command 
level; commanders compute authorizations using factors listed in SB 
710-1-2. Requirements were based on equipment densities as listed in 
approved TOE/MTOEs of supported activities. In Jun 77 DA authorized 
modifications for EUSA ORF management. ORF is subject to a DA pre-
scribed maximum limit but no minimum quantities have been established. 
Accordingly, ORF items not considered essential or which create storage/ 
maintenance problems need not be requisitioned. Excess ORF materiel is 
either turned in for redistribution against other in-country require-
ments or reported to the wholesale supply system for disposition. Value 
of ORF major end items (474 lines) on hand at year’s end was approxi-
mately $17.4 million.

(U) EUSA Property Accountability (PA) Program

(U) EUSA's special emphasis PA Program was developed in late Oct 77 
to adequately respond to CSA's increased concern with management and 
accountability of Army materiel. A EUSA PA Task Force was established 
to serve as a focal point for implementation of DA recommendations and 
to solicit and consolidate PA inputs from EUSA's major subordinate com-
mands. The task force, chaired by a senior J4 logistics officer, is 
composed of ranking representatives from each major subordinate element 
and from all interested EUSA Hq staff agencies.

(U) In mid-Nov 77 a J4 representative from this command attended 
DA's initial PA Task Force Conference in Washington. The first EUSA PA 
Working Group Conference followed on 5 Dec, providing participants with 
an overview of the DAIG Special Report on PA as well as other DA taskings 
and areas of concern. By end of reporting period, EUSA's PA Task Force 
was fully organized and functioning effectively. Major subordinate com-
mand programs had been initiated; a EUSA inventory procedures guide was 
drafted for publication in Jan 78; personnel distribution studies were 
conducted to insure proper utilization of supply personnel; and a letter 
of instruction establishing shipping discrepancy reporting procedures was 
being prepared for distribution in Apr 78.

(U) Accelerated Excess Materiel Program

(U) The UNC/USFK/EUSA Cofs directed major subordinate commands in

18. DALO-SMM-D 151449Z Jun 77.

19. DACS-ZA 131545Z Oct 77. Selected EUSA units were involved in a 
DAIG Special Inspection of Management and Accountability of Army Materiel, 
see page 278.
mid-Sep 77 to conduct a 100 percent materiel inventory and report all items in excess of current authorizations. As of year's end 1,937 lines of excess, valued at roughly $9.2 million, were reported; an additional 285 line items with no available pricing data were also listed. Approximately two-fifths of the total excess discovered will be retained by units pending proposed TDA/TOE changes. Sufficient excess was identified to fill shortages reflected in the command's Oct-Dec 77 Unit Materiel Assistance Designated Reports. Lists of reported excess items were provided to the Eighth Army IG for follow-up on unit turn-in actions.

(U) **Stock Fund Operations**

(U) In Jul 74 the Home Office, EUSA Division, Army Stock Fund was established in Korea. Terms of the Home Office charter have since been carried out by effectively managing, controlling, financing, accounting for, and reporting all stock fund inventories. This was accomplished in a climate of fiscal constraint as well as widespread inflation which tended to erode the supported customers' purchasing power. A significant achievement in FY 75 was the maintenance of a cash position which enabled the EUSA division to return $3 million to DA to help offset shortages of cash that existed in other Army Stock Fund divisions worldwide. FY 76-77 stock fund sales to customers amounted to $151.9 million supported by obligation authority of $149.0 million. During FY 76 the EUSA division received and invested $11.0 million in mobilization reserve funds.

(U) Sales for FY 77 were $118.1 million with obligations of $110.6 million. FY 78 sales are estimated at $90.0 million; decrease from previous years is due primarily to shifting of bulk POL product costs from stock fund sales to direct Operation and Maintenance, Army funding.

(U) **Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Supply Funding**

(U) OMA obligations for supplies purchased from the stock fund for 2d half FY 77 were $36.9 million, which included $21.7 million in direct delivery bills. First half obligations exceeded the second half by $13.4 million; direct delivery bills were $9.6 million higher. This excess obligation rate in the first half precipitated the OMA funding shortage experienced throughout FY 77 (discussed on page 242). Total supply obligations in FY 77 were $87.1 million. This exceeded FY 76 by $10.3 million due largely to inflation. Outstanding commitments were $12.0 million, compared to $15.5 million in FY 76. 1st Qtr FY 78 supply obligations were $21.3 million which included $14.8 million direct delivery billings. Outstanding commitments on 31 Dec 77 were $12.4 million.
(U) Improved Transportation Management for Exercise and Contingency Operations

(U) In Jun 77 the entire military movement control arrangement in the ROK was reorganized to incorporate lessons learned during recent large-scale exercises. New concept involved a merger of the Combined Transportation Center (CTC) with the Combined Transportation Movements Center (CMTC), thereby collocating all personnel who would be involved in wartime transportation support. The restructured CMTC is a joint/combined USFK/ROKF agency operating under staff supervision of the tri-headquarters ACoES, J4. It serves as CINCUNC’s planning, coordinating and management element for transportation support of military operations in Korea. The enlarged CMTC controls all common user land transportation behind rear boundaries of I Corps (ROK/US) Gp/FROKA; the rail system countrywide; and establishes priorities for utilization of military sea and air assets allocated for logistical support. Increased efficiency in transportation management efforts were realized by year’s end as a direct result of the CTC/CMTC consolidation.

(U) Trans-Korea Pipeline (TKP) Operations

(U) Requirement for petroleum pipeline delivery was recognized early in the Korean War when assault pipelines were used to augment the totally inadequate rail and highway delivery systems. Studies in 1968 revealed that the petroleum distribution system in Korea could not support wartime requirements for a sufficient period to allow construction of facilities stated in contingency plans. Therefore, construction of the 258-mile underground high pressure TKP, completed in 1970, was justified solely as a contingency requirement. Since peacetime delivery requirements are less than the throughput capacity of 40,000 barrels (barrel=31.5 gallons) per day from Pohang to Seoul, two domestic companies (Honam Oil and Korea Oil Corporations) signed agreements with the US Government in mid-1971 to lease portions of this excess. By Sep 72 the latter had constructed a pipeline joining its refinery in Ulsan to the TKP, the two pipelines intersecting at Taegu. Previously, products had been transported by tanker from the refinery to Pohang and then pumped into the TKP.

(U) During 1977 the pipeline moved 2,513.8 thousand barrels (MBBLS) of petroleum for military use and 7,941.6 MBBLS of commercially owned product. (Amounts moved in CY 76 were 2,413.3 and 6,251.6 MBBLS respectively.) Revenue from commercial throughput agreements totaled approximately $1.3 million. Damage to the pipeline during the year

20. A map depicting the TKP is at Appendix 4.
conducted a survey of ROK water ports to determine possible contingency site locations for emplacement of De Long piers. Last survey was performed in 1968. Ports at Pohang, Yosu, Mokpo, Samchonpo and Masan were inspected for suitability using following criteria: adequacy of approach/entrance, navigational aids, pilotage, anchorages, landing facilities, onsite MHE, protective works, in-place communications systems, and highway/rail clearance facilities; supplies and utilities; status of ongoing dredging and maintenance operations; and hydrographic conditions. After considering all criteria, it was determined that all sites surveyed, except Samchonpo, were suitable for utilization of De Long piers. During period Dec 74-Sep 76 six type A De Long pier barges (three piers) were delivered to the ROK for support of OPLAN 5027. All barges were received in unserviceable condition.

(U) In Apr 77 responsibility for project management, repair, maintenance and storage of the six barges was transferred from EUSA J4 to Cdr, 19th Spt Comd. Approximately $1 million in FY 78 funds was made available for barge repairs, and by end CY 77 four barges had been rehabilitated. Action was underway at year's end to have remaining two barges repaired by means of a lease indenture with a ROK commercial firm. After performing overhaul at no expense to the US, the firm would be granted use of the two barges for a period not to exceed five years.

(U) Implementation of EUSA Modification Work Order (MWO) Program

(U) Application of MWOs to Army equipment within this command, as well as worldwide, was hampered in the past due to huge volume of MWOs generated by parent commodity commands and inability of support personnel to apply them and still perform their day-to-day maintenance functions. In 1975 the Army-wide backlog of unapplied MWOs represented approximately five million man-hours of labor, with 13,400 man-hours reported for EUSA. This backlog has been substantially reduced by DA rescinding MWOs of marginal benefit and deferment of others to a later implementation date. DA instructed the commodity commands in Jul 75 to drastically reduce number of MWOs developed in the future and to eliminate remaining backlog no later than Sep 78 by sending special teams from CONUS to apply MWOs on site. During 1976 EUSA participated in final verification of specific requirements for remaining unapplied MWOs still considered to be mission or safety essential.

(U) AR 750-10, published Jun 77, established firm controls necessary to prevent proliferation of MWOs with questionable value. Primary responsibility for application of future modifications was assigned to proponent commodity commands. Major modifications performed on EUSA material assets during CY 77 included the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Purpose/Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M163 Vulcan Air Defense System (Gun) (Redesignated M163A1 after modification)</td>
<td>Improve accuracy, safety, and RAM-D. * Oct 77.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Purpose/Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HAWK Missile System (117 MWOs involved)</td>
<td>Improve accuracy, safety, and RAM-D.* Cont into CY 78.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPARRAL Missile System (Block III)</td>
<td>Improve accuracy, safety, and RAM-D.* Jul 77.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M110 8 inch Howitzer (SP)</td>
<td>Increase range; improve safety and RAM-D.* Dec 77.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M578 Armored Recovery Vehicle</td>
<td>Improve safety and RAM-D.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M202A1 Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>Cont into CY 78.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve user safety. Sep 77.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*RAM-D - reliability, availability, maintainability, and durability.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) Above modifications were accomplished by special teams from CONUS except those applied to M578 Armored Recovery Vehicles which EUSA's MSC-K general support activity performed.\(^{24}\)

(U) ROKA Rebuild of Track Components for EUSA Combat Vehicles

(U) In Sep 77 this headquarters concluded an agreement with the ROK Army under which selected track components (shoes and road wheels) of EUSA's combat vehicles would be rebuilt at ROKA's Consolidated Maintenance Depot in Pusan. By end of reporting period, program output totaled $97,787 in rebuild costs; procurement of new components from CONUS would have amounted to $234,724. The new rebuild service is expected to achieve savings of $600,000 annually.

(U) Eighth US Army (EUSA) Tire Retread Program

(U) AR 750-36 established an Army-wide program for maximum use of retreaded tires with objective of obtaining at least 75 percent of tire replacements from retreads. A EUSA supplement to the AR was consequently developed to implement the program locally.\(^{25}\) Significant results were achieved within EUSA by using extensive command-wide publicity, conducting special classes in tire care and inspection, initiating a simplified direct exchange program, and obtaining a cost effective local tire retread commercial contract. Increased use of retreads resulted in savings of $355,000 for CY 77. Since program began in Jul 75 the percent of retread utilization has fluctuated from a low of 45 to a high of 83 percent. Variations were caused primarily by availability of retreadable tires versus seasonal demands for replacements, as well as necessary replenishment of new tire stocks to replace unserviceable casings.

24. SECRET J4 Hist Sum 1977 (info used UNCLAS).

25. EUSA Suppl 1 to AR 750-36, 3 Mar 76, Subj: Maint of Sup and Equip - Rebuild and Retread of Pneumatic Tires.
(U) Implementation of Army Oil Analysis Program (AOAP) in EUSA

(U) The AOAP was established in early 1970s as a coordinated Army-wide effort to detect impending equipment component failures through careful testing of oil samples. Originally adopted from commercial airline companies, program was initially directed only at Army aviation equipment. It was expanded in 1975 to include Army ground equipment in CONUS, and in Jul 76 this phase of the procedure was extended to overseas commands. Specific objectives were to (1) enhance flight safety by recognition of imminent equipment defects, (2) reduce maintenance costs through preventive techniques, (3) improve operational readiness of military equipment, and (4) conserve energy resources. Oil analysis for EUSA’s aviation assets is performed by AFK at its Osan AB nondestructive inspection laboratory. Support has been furnished under a tri-service agreement and is limited to spectrometric analysis. A trial program to provide oil examination for EUSA’s M60 tanks at the Osan AB facility commenced in Aug 76, but was terminated by year’s end because of insufficient manpower resources. Efforts to augment the Osan AB laboratory with EUSA personnel to perform analysis on ground equipment were unsuccessful due to DA manpower constraints.

(U) In Aug 77 AFK advised that laboratory resources had been severely taxed as a result of continuous support to the Army and requested that EUSA assign one technician to accomplish existing workload for Army aircraft; in Oct a space was allocated and filled by a Korean national physical science technician. Concurrent with attempts to obtain EUSA personnel spaces for the Osan laboratory, the feasibility of contracting oil analysis operations to a commercial firm was considered. Efforts to obtain such service locally, however, were unsuccessful. Another alternative undergoing examination at end of reporting period was performance of EUSA’s oil analysis requirements by ROKAF.

(U) Upgrade of Mortuary Service for Korea

(U) Full mortuary services (embalming and cosmotology) had long been provided this command by US Army Mortuary, Yokota AB, Japan. Remains of deceased military members, DOD civilians, and dependents were processed for shipment to Japan (after autopsy) by the Central Collecting Point (CCP) at SP51 on Yongsan South Post, operated by 305th Supply and Service Co. As a result of Presidential Budget Directive 253 CR in early 1976, DOD directed that operational control of the mortuary in Japan be transferred from USA to USAF. In view of this change, DA recommended upgrading of Yongsan's CCP to a full mortuary to improve peacetime services and provide a base for graves registration expansion during contingencies. Action was taken in fall 76 to obtain necessary mortuary operating supplies and

26. There are also CCP’s at Taegu and Pusan, staffed by EUSA sergeants.
equipment from excess stocks in Okinawa on a non-reimbursable basis. In Dec 76 the Cdr, Fac Engr Actv, Korea approved and funded engineering modifications required to upgrade the Yongson CGP.

(U) A local contract was awarded in May 77 and upgrading was completed on 21 Jul. DA had approved in Apr a staffing level of one embalmer/mortician (CS-12) and one local national morgue attendant (KWB-7). Positions were filled shortly thereafter and on 15 Aug 77 the US Army Mortuary began full service operations. The Cdr, 19th Spt Comd was tasked with operational control of the facility. DOD cases have averaged eight to ten per month. Cooperation/coordination is extended to Am/Embassy Seoul in embalming of private American citizens deceased in Korea.

(U) USFK Milk Plant Upgrade

(U) In mid-77 DOD approved a Military Construction, Army project amounting to $1.9 million for building a new USFK Milk Plant in FY 79. In the interim, extensive upgrading of existing facility just south of Seoul was necessary in order to meet appropriate operating/sanitation standards. Several technical assistance visits were made during CY 77 by milk plant experts from US Army Research and Development Command's Natick Laboratory. Physical improvements accomplished during the year included erection of a new metal water tank, placing fuel tanks underground, construction of a loading dock with ramp and adjacent parking area, and installation of a backup generator and new scales. Funds totaling $325,000 were received in Nov to purchase a cottage cheese processing unit, rotary cup filling/capping system, high temperature short time processor, and a blender system. Procurement action was in progress at year's end. To provide more adequate delivery service, two new refrigerator trucks were ordered and are due in Feb 78.

(U) USAKFA Contract Execution and Administration

(U) EUSA's in-country procurement mission is tasked to USAKFA. The agency began operations in 1957 by letting $6 million in contracts to the ROK economy. In 1977 purchases from Korean suppliers totaled $98.5 for 49,638 procurement actions. (1976 figures were $38.9 million for

27. EUSA 170804Z Aug 77, Subj: Operation of Full Service Mortuary. Filed in J4 Spt Sv Sec.

28. Note: On 1 Oct 1976 the USFK milk contract was awarded to Old Dominion Dairy Products, Inc after highly competitive negotiations which included the previous contractor, Foremost International, and Beatrice Foods (Meadow Gold). Old Dominion has a one year contract with a 48-month option clause.
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59,765 actions.) A delineation follows ($ in millions and number of actions in parentheses): Facility Engineering--$52.4 (368) (1976 costs for 323 actions were $8.9); Services--$18.9 (4,124); Supplies--$10.9 (6,254); Subsistence--$6.9 (2,166); NAF--$4.5 (4,690); Government Bills of Lading--$2.8 (31,795); and Construction--$2.1 (261). 29

(U) USAKPA Merger and Reorganization

(U) In 1974 USAKPA absorbed all local Air Force procurements for appropriated fund purchases in excess of $10,000. Tests conducted in first half 1976 to determine feasibility of consolidating the Army and Air Force small purchase mission at USAKPA rendered favorable results. In mid-77 a phase-in of Army procurement personnel began at Osan and Kunsan ABs. Assumption of small purchase functions by USAKPA at both bases commenced in Oct. Staffing requirements added 12 KPA spaces; USAF, however, was able to delete 20 spaces, resulting in net reduction of eight personnel.

(U) Effective 1 Oct 77 USAKPA's Contract Execution and Contract Administration Divs were consolidated in a newly organized Procurement Operations Div. Heretofore, two contracting officers shared responsibility for each procurement; one awarded the contract and another administered it. The consolidation allows one officer to handle a contract from "cradle to grave" and provides requiring activities a single point of contact throughout the procurement life cycle.

(FOOU) Procurement Environment (U)

(FOOU) Since 1967 there had been strong and convincing evidence of collusive bidding practices among Korean contractors doing business with USFK. 31 For example, contractors performing recurring type service work for USFK had retained their contracts for an average of 8.5 consecutive years. USAKPA records were replete with instances which show that a competitive bidding system had not functioned effectively in the ROK. The problem of collusive bidding had been referred to the SOFA Commerce.

29. SECRET J4/USA Korea Hist Sum 1977 (info used UNCLAS).

30. SECRET UNR/USA/USEA Annual Historical Report 1974 (U), p. 112 (info used UNCLAS).

31. The Korea Military Contractors Association (KMCA), representing 561 member firms, is continually instructed on proper procurement procedures and policies and has denied all allegations of impropriety.
Subcommittee in Jul 75 for study and recommendations. Following extensive consultations the subcommittee reaffirmed in Jan 76 that USFK procurement/contracting should be undertaken without interference by outside agencies. In Oct 76 a special study group from HQ DARCOM, representing the ASA (I&L), visited USFK to further analyze the problem and search for possible solutions. After examining a variety of alternatives, the study group concluded that adoption of a single source procurement method (essentially noncompetitive) would eliminate collusion, achieve the best performance at the lowest or most reasonable cost, and protect the integrity of US contracting officials. On 16 Dec 76 the ASA (I&L) approved the DARCOM study group's recommendations and directed USFK implementation of the Controlled Single Source Selection Procedure (CSSSP) for a three-year test period.

(FOOU) On 16 Mar 77 the new procedure was instituted simultaneously in all three DOD procurement agencies in Korea: USAKPA, Korea Regional Exchange, and Far East District Engineer. Concurrently two new overseeing elements were established: the USFK Source Selection Board (SSB) and Command Procurement Policy Board (CPPB). The SSB function is to select the single source to be solicited by procuring activity, while the CPPB is responsible for overall improvement of USFK procurement actions and monitoring of SSB operations. A quarterly report on CSSSP progress in Korea was prescribed by ASA (I&L) in Mar 77. Follow-up review visits were made in Apr and Oct by DARCOM special study group members who had assisted in initial analysis of procurement problems.

(FOOU) By end of reporting period, all indications pointed toward successful accomplishment of CSSSP objectives. The ROKG and KMCA were supporting the single source concept in a spirit of cooperation. The pattern of construction contract awards during CY 77 reflects the CSSSP's advantages. For contracts over $10,000, the average award price was 27 percent below the Independent Government Cost Estimates (IGCE) prepared by the activity initiating the project, and two percent below the USAKPA maximum suggested price. By contrast, in FY 75 construction award prices were nine percent above IGCE and 14 percent above USAKPA estimates. Moreover, there have been no reported incidents of collusion since the CSSSP was inaugurated. The new procedure allows USFK procurement authorities far greater flexibility in selecting a suitable contractor for specific requirements; under previous policy, award to the lowest bidding contractor was mandatory. At year's end the CPPB had tasked two ad hoc working groups to develop more accurate cost estimating procedures and a more efficient inspection system.

32. USAKPA, the CID and OSI also monitored the problem to take action where necessary.

33. SECRET J4/USA KPA Hist Sum 1977 (info used FOOU).
(U) Tax Exemptions on USFK Procurements

(U) In early 1977 USAKPA started actions to exempt USFK procurements from a new ROK value added tax of ten percent to be imposed on all purchases from local sources effective 1 Jul 77. Request for development of specific exemption procedures was referred to the US-ROK SOFA Finance Subcommittee; after extensive consultations with ROK Finance Ministry officials, a set of procedures, to be effective 1 Jul 77, was approved by the US-ROK SOFA Joint Committee. In latter half CY 77 USAKPA learned that some impression fund cashiers and purchasing agents were not receiving value added tax exemptions guaranteed by the SOFA. Investigation revealed that Korean vendors would not apply tax exemptions without special documentation of sales transactions. Accordingly, USAKPA designed a form to satisfy this need; a tri-headquarters regulation prescribing its use was published in late 1977.

(U) Industrial Gas Cylinder Specifications

(U) During 1977 USAKPA experienced increasing difficulty in purchasing industrial gases from local Korean suppliers. Problems were generated by differences between ROK and US testing/inspection standards for gas cylinders. The Korean High Pressure Gas Safety Management Association, a ROK Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) chartered organization, intensified its insistence that all USFK gas cylinders be subject to the Association's inspection criteria. USFK, however, disagreed with the frequency and extent of those inspections and the additional costs involved. For a while, local gas distributors refused to refill USFK cylinders since they could not obtain an Association approval stamp for containers tested under US standards. This could have led to a shortage in USFK's industrial gas supplies, and USAKPA contemplated asking for resolution of the issue by the ROK/US SOFA Joint Committee. There was no need as the situation was resolved in USFK's favor through mutual understanding among MCI, the Association and USAKPA.

(FOUO) SOFA Privileges for US Firms Contracting with USFK (U)

(FOUO) In Mar 76 UNC/USFK/EUSA CofS tasked ACofS, J4 to survey all US firms monitored by the Korean Procurement Agency to assure that SOFA privileges they receive are in strict agreement with the SOFA's intent. The key tests against which these firms were measured were: SOFA requirements that US contractors should be in Korea solely for benefit of the

34. The value added tax, modeled after systems used in Europe and Japan, replaced numerous and varied individual taxes with a flat surcharge.

35. UNC/USFK/EUSA Reg 715-10.
Unified Forces because security considerations preclude open competitive bidding with Korean firms; technical qualifications preclude employment of Korean companies; materials or services from outside Korea are required because of local unavailability; or US law limits the contract to non-Korean concerns. 36 Two groups of contractors have been scrutinized against these SOFA requirements; those providing services to the ROK administered through JUSMAG-K, and those offering sales services, e.g., automobiles, cosmetics, books, etc., administered by the Korea Regional Exchange. Staff studies were prepared on these issues for each group and were coordinated for final review in Jun 1977. As a result, some US firms were deemed not entitled to invited contractor status and their SOFA privileges were deleted. Hereafter, each contractor applying for privileges will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis; UNC/USFK/EUSA Reg 700-19, the directive dealing with the status of US invited contractors and technical representatives, will be revised to clarify policy.

36. SOFA, Part II, Article XV, Invited Contractors.
international transportation, intra-CONUS travel, and student living allowances; the US paid course costs only. Number of students from each service and corresponding costs were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
<th>US COST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROKA</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>$373,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKAF</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>256,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKN (includes Marines)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>251,593</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) In addition, FY 77 IMETP funds were used to procure training aids/devices and publications for ROKA schools as follows: $329,681 for Air Defense School Improved Hawk maintenance training devices/publications; $102,398 for Infantry School TOW trainers; $61,507 for Transportation School UH-ID electric system training device; and $5,875 to purchase ten war game calculators for the Command and General Staff College. Those expenditures raised total US cost of FY IMETP to $1,381,194.

(U) The FY 78 IMETP was implemented on 1 Oct 77 and consisted of 220 students at a cost to the US of $1,209,943. The FY 78 program by service follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
<th>US COST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROKA</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>$573,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKAF</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>246,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKN (includes Marines)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>390,113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) Value of FMS training implemented in CY 77 was $2,420,108. (All FMS training costs are paid by the ROK.) Most expensive case was training of a 60-man Improved Hawk New Equipment Team for ROKA; cost was $2,000,000. Other training provided under the FMS program consisted of: TOW maintenance, M48 tank upgrade, F-4E aircraft maintenance and pilot training, ammunition manufacture, and joint intelligence. FMS training by implementing agency follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
<th>ROK COST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROKA</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>$2,206,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKAF</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>54,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>158,020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) Transfer of Remaining Grant Aid Fund Allocation

(U) Although grant aid material funding for the ROK was terminated

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6. Ibid.
on 30 Jun 76, $20.115 million in grant aid was allocated in FY 77 security assistance legislation for US production of ROKN coastal patrol and interdiction craft (CPIC). Because of numerous project delays and cost increases, JUSMAC-K recommended to the ROK MND that funds earmarked for CPIC be utilized to procure UH-1H helicopters. Proposed transfer would prevent recoupment of grant aid monies, and would also free some FMS funds planned for purchase of helicopters, to be used for other projects in Korea. In Aug 77, following MND concurrence, DSAA approved the program change and CPIC grant aid funds were used for procuring 27 of 48 UH-1H helicopters being purchased under an ongoing FMS case.

(U) Life-of-Type/One-Time Buy Purchases

(U) Life-of-Type purchases for US service-supported equipment are normally offered to all Military Assistance Program countries approximately two years prior to US service termination of support for the item. One-Time Buys are offered when the US service is considering a last-time procurement or upon notification that a manufacturer is ceasing business operations or closing down a production line. The following items were offered and accepted as Life-of-Type or One-Time Buy Purchases by the ROKG during 1977: Nike Hercules conventional warheads with ancillary equipment; Mk 44 torpedoes; M115 8-inch howitzers (towed); M123A1C 10-ton tractor trucks; and M18 57mm recoilless rifles. Sixteen other offers, including those for tank guns and radios, were not accepted.

(U) Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Within ROK Defense Establishment

(U) ROKA. The Korean Army began planning for resource management automation in 1968. Initial programs were designed to facilitate machine processes for all supply management at base depot level. Progress and expansion during early stages were limited since only automatic and punch card machine equipment were available to ROKA. In Jan 74 an IBM 370-135 system was received and installed at Pusan. Force modernization support planning, coupled with expanded requirement analysis and financial accounting emphasis, dictated system memory expansion and faster peripheral tape drive equipment. Consequently, in Oct 76 ROKA replaced its IBM 370-135 Computer with an IBM 370-125. Simultaneously, four terminals were added, networked to ROKA's three logistics support commands and to the Army Logistics Command. These terminals, however, did not provide the level of data manipulation desired; hence in mid-1977 three UNESCOPE 100 intelligent terminals were acquired and installed at the ROKA logistics support commands. Funds are programmed for installation of four additional UNESCOPE 100 terminals at military district commands in 1978. ROKA's Automated Ammunition Supply System, which became operational in 7. SECRET UNC/USFR/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1976 (U), p. 197 (INFO used UNCLASS).
for F-5 fighters, it was improved during the year so that analytical condition inspections are now performed as well. After inspection and necessary repairs, the F-5's service life was extended an additional 400 hours. ROKAF also achieved depot level maintenance capacity in CY 77 for 20 S-2E aircraft purchased by the ROKN.

(U) Expansion of ROKAF's depot-level maintenance operations begun in 1976 will continue through 1979 at a total investment cost of about $35.5 million. Proposed funding includes approximately $12 million from the ROK budget for facilities/installations; $7.8 million in FMS credits for purchase of special test equipment; and $15.7 million from other commercial credit sources for shop equipment and tooling costs. In Nov 77 ROKAF used roughly $4.1 in FMS credits to procure 1,122 shop equipment items and to provide training in CONUS for F-4, F-5E, C-54 and C-123K engine maintenance technicians (Project PEACE DEPOT).

(U) A general plan for attaining the desired capabilities had been submitted to MND in Aug 75 by America's Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc. Northrop estimated that earnings from work performed for USAF and the air forces of other nations could recover the initial investment by 1982. A step in this direction was taken in Sep 75 when a contract was accepted by ROKAF to perform corrosion control and painting on 16 USAF OV-10 aircraft; project was completed by end 1976. Another contract was negotiated with USAF in Sep 77 to perform depot maintenance and corrosion control on USAF T-39s. Work is scheduled to begin in Jan 78.

(U) **F-5 Service Life Extension Program**

(U) Early in 1975 the USAF proposed a structural fatigue test program to determine requirements for extending F-5A/B aircraft service life beyond the established 4,000 hours. This program was canceled in Jul 75 due to lack of interest among prospective participating countries. A new service life extension program with three options was proposed by USAF in Mar 76. The ROKAF chose Option 2 which promised 'low risk to flight safety' without the high cost of extensive airframe fatigue testing, and further promised life extension to 6,000 hours. Overall program cost was estimated at about $2 million; ROKAF share will be $577,583, not including replacement parts costs calculated at $75,000 per aircraft. Project was still under development by USAF by end CY 77. Receipt of interim field inspection procedures is expected in early 1978. Installation of mechanical strain recorders on 20 percent of ROKAF's F-5A/B fighter assets is planned for Feb 78. 28

(U) **ROK Forces Spectrometric Oil Analysis Program (SOAP)**

(U) Since Dec 72 the ROKAF has operated oil analysis laboratories

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at Taegu, Sachon, Kwangju and Suwon Air Bases; a fifth one is under construction at Kangnung AB. ROKAF was tasked during this same period with providing aviation oil analysis for all ROK services under provisions of a MND interservice support regulation. In late 1976 it was determined that from both economic and support capability standpoints the ROKAF SOAP could be feasibly expanded to include all ROK services' diesel-operated equipment.

(U) In mid-77 a joint regulation was published by MND designating necessary SOAP support for all ROK services. ROKAF concluded support arrangements and schedules with ROA in latter half 77. ROA anticipates it will have sufficient sampling kits to begin sending oil samples to ROKAF laboratories by Feb 78. Also at year's end, negotiations between ROKAF and UNC/USFK/EUSA J4 were underway to obtain oil analysis support from SOAP facilities for EUSA's ground transportation equipment (see page 171).

(U) ROK Forces Metrology Programs

(U) The construction and certification in 1976 of the ROKAF Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory (PMEL) facility at Kimhe AB culminated 17 years of progress in the ROKAF calibration program. Capabilities and facilities developed from a small corner of an aircraft maintenance hangar at Taegu AB in 1959 to a 12,000 sq ft laboratory at Kimhe by Mar 75. The facility at Kimhe was constructed to implement a MND directive assigning the ROKAF overall responsibility for managing the ROK forces calibration program and designating the PMEL as primary reference point for all ROK forces. At ROKAF request, calibration inspectors from the USAF Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center (AGMC) conducted ROKG funded audits in May 75 and Oct 76 to determine the PMEL's competence to perform Type IIA depot work. Upon audit completion and review of data by an AGMC PMEL evaluation panel, the USAF issued a Type IIA certificate with no restrictions or limitations.

(U) In 1977 ROKAF expanded their calibration capabilities by establishing flow meter and radic laboratories at the Kimhe AB PMEL. To further improve customer support, ROKAF started construction of an additional calibration laboratory at Suwon AB; target date for completion is Aug 78. Equipment costing approximately $400,000 will be procured for the new facility through FMS credits.

(U) Acting on a JUSMAG-K recommendation, the ROK MND tasked ROKAF in early 1977 to provide calibration support for ROKG defense agencies and Korean defense industries. Since Aug 77, 11 industrial firms and two government agencies have negotiated contracts with ROKAF for calibration assistance.

(U) **English-Hangul Teletype System**

(U) To provide the command with a needed bilingual communications capability, CINCUNC tasked the 1st Sig Bde in mid-1976 to procure special teletypewriters capable of interchangeable English and Hangul (Korean language) operation. Intent was to install the machines, on a loan basis, in major ROKF headquarters and ROK elements of command posts. The Siemens Mfg Co of Munich, Germany, was found to be the best source and 1st Sig Bde reviewed their model FS-100(K) teleprinters for overall capabilities and compatibility with US COMSEC devices. In Oct 76, $230,000 was allocated by the brigade for purchase of 30 machines.

(U) Order was placed in early 1977 and delivery was made to the ROK in Nov. A local electronics firm, Gold Star Tele-Electric Company, Ltd, was selected as contractor to install the dual-language teletypewriters at UNC Command Ctr (Yongsan FCP), TANGO Main CP, ROK JCS, and the headquarters of I Corps (ROK/US) Gp, ROKA and FROKA. Action was suspended, however, when a recent change to a security assistance FMS regulation indicated that, unlike COMSEC equipment, this particular loan must now be approved by the US National Command Authority. An exception to policy was requested in this case since procurement was initiated and completed under provisions of the previous directive (grandfather clause). At end reporting period instructions from Washington were pending.

(U) The system, doubly important now that a Korean-American Combined Forces Command is being formed, should be operational approximately one month after release to ROK forces is sanctioned and installation begins.
(U) CHAPTER X: AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS

(U) Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) in Korea

(U) Background. WWMCCS provides the means for operational direction and technical administrative support involved in the function of command and control. It furnishes the National Command Authority (NCA) and other appropriate commanders with the capability to exercise operational direction of US military forces in peacetime and through all levels of conflict. Primary mission of WWMCCS is to support the NCA; secondary mission is to support the JCS, the services, unified and specified commands, services component commands, and DOD agencies. WWMCCS performs these missions by providing the means by which the NCA and appropriate commanders may accomplish the following: monitor the current situation to include status of US and non-US forces; respond to warning and threat assessment; employ forces and execute operation plans; perform attack, strike and damage assessment; reconstitute and redirect forces; and terminate hostilities and active operations.

(U) WWMCCS is composed of the designated command and control facilities (including associated data collection/processing support, selected warning systems, etc.) from which command and control is exercised. These facilities serve the primary and alternate headquarters and emergency relocation sites of the organizations supported by WWMCCS. WWMCCS also includes those special communications capabilities required by the NCA for the execution of the Single Integrated Operation Plan and other time-sensitive operations. WWMCCS consists of subsystems at the national and theater levels. The national level subsystems are the National Military Command System (the priority subsystem), the WWMCCS-related management information systems of the service headquarters, the command and control support systems of subordinate unified commands and joint task forces when established and assigned, and the command and control systems of headquarters of service component commands. WWMCCS does not include the operating forces; however, it links them via designated communications systems to the appropriate command and control authority.1

(U) In Feb 68 the SECDEF had authorized procurement of 35 automatic data processing (ADP) systems to establish WWMCCS as a global network. In Dec of that year the Naval Command Systems Support Activity, at COMUS-KOREA's request, completed an on-site study of USFK's total ADP requirements. It concluded that ADP functions in the ROK were near saturation and that additional facilities were needed. During 1969-70 COMUS-KOREA forwarded to JCS several recommendations for an ADP system that would satisfy the command's operational and information requirements. A

1. JCS Briefing, 30 Mar 76, Subj: WWMCCS.

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proposal submitted in Dec 70, as part of a CINCPAC feasibility study for providing centralized ADP support to US activities in Japan and Korea, was approved by the SECDEF in Mar 72.2 (This USFK proposal was an important milestone document in development of the COMUSKOREA WWMCCS ADP system, as the basic operational concept, system design and final configuration remained essentially unchanged despite repeated reviews and several revalidations.) In Jan 73 SECDEF directed that Army, Navy and CINCPAC proceed with planning and necessary implementation actions to install a USN IBM 36C 50 computer in Korea during latter part 1973. After a system economic analysis performed by JCS/USN/PACOM ADP specialists in Feb 73, however, JCS announced in Jan 74 that a Honeywell Information Systems (HIS) model 6060 had been selected as the central processing unit (mainframe computer) for COMUSKOREA's WWMCCS ADP system. CINCPAC furnished a technical assistance team to prepare a definitive system equipment list and to assist in completing the Base Electronic System Engineering Plan (BESEP); equipment list was forwarded to CINCPAC in Apr. and BESEP published in May 74. The HIS mainframe system arrived in early 1975 and installation at Taegu's Camp Walker was completed by May 75. After acceptance testing was concluded on the mainframe computer and the Remote Batch Processing System (RBPS) at Yongsan, the COMUSKOREA WWMCCS ADP System was declared operational on 19 Sep 75. Lease of the mainframe computer and Yongsan's RBPS was converted to USN purchase on 1 Oct 75. On same date HIS commenced contract support for system maintenance.3

(U) Current Developments. Until mid-1973 all staff actions to implement WWMCCS development plans in the ROK were responsibility of the ADP Reports Officer in USFK ACoS, J3's Current Ops Branch. After arrival in Korea of its staff complement, the Joint Command Information System (JCIS) section was formally established 1 Jul 73 and assumed WWMCCS ADP staff functions. JCIS became a separate USFK staff agency on 1 Jul 74; its director exercises management and functional control over the COMUSKOREA WWMCCS ADP System, performing under general supervision of tri-headquarters CofSs and under staff cognizance of Dep ACoSs, J3 (Joint). Additionally, the JCIS director maintains liaison with CINCPAC and USN CNO for ADP matters and serves as Chairman of the COMUSKOREA WWMCCS Committee, composed of system users who meet monthly. JCIS manning level at end CY 77 was: 12 officers (5 USA, 3 USAF, 4 USN); 45 enlisted personnel (16 USA, 16 USAF, 13 USN); 17 USN civilian employees; and five HIS technical representatives.

(U) JCIS is totally funded by USN; CNO allocates O&MN funds through CINCPAC and Other Procurement, Navy accounts are used for purchase of computer and communications equipment. The FY 77 O&MN budget totaled

2. Ltr, USFK, 17 Dec 70, Subj: COMUSKOREA ADP Proposal. Filed in JCIS.
$922,000 of which roughly 40 percent was utilized for civilian employee salaries and 35 percent for contract maintenance on the mainframe computer and associated equipment; FY 78 budget ceiling was set at $940,500. Computer and peripheral equipment controlled by JCIS were valued at approximately $2.4 million. Activities relied on for support include Hawaii and Japan-based US Naval Short Rct Actv elements for electronic installation and security support; the in-country 1st Sig Bde (US Army) and 2146th Comm Gp (USAF) furnish communications assistance.  

(U) The local WWMCCS ADP System has been designed to provide two major functional capabilities for USFK and component commands. First is a Command Information System (CIS); i.e., automated storage, update and retrieval of data. Second is the Command and Control Message Processing System (CCMPS), i.e., drafting, storage and retrieval of selected command/control messages for transmission between command centers in and out of Korea via the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN). The CCMPS has a direct interface linking the mainframe computer and the AUTODIN Switching Center at Taegu. In Dec 76 ACoFS, J3 was assigned staff functional user coordination responsibilities for the COMUSKOREA WWMCCS CCMPS.  

(U) The ease with which the foregoing capabilities are achieved is based largely upon the physical configuration of COMUSKOREA’s WWMCCS ADP System. The H6060 mainframe computer, with a 256,000 word memory core, controls information input/output for all system components and holds the system data files. It is equipped with seven disk storage units which offer rapid data access and large storage capacity, enabling achievement of the remote processing capability described below. Associated hardware installed at the mainframe facility includes: eight tape drives, high-speed printer (1150 lines per minute), card reader (1050 cards per minute), card punch equipment (100-400 cards per minute), a Datamem 355 processor which provides communications between the central computer and remote terminals, and an H716 message processor serving as the ADP link with AUTODIN. For system users, data communications is accomplished through two basic methods. First is a high-speed Remote Batch Processing System which is van mounted and normally located at HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA; van is relocated to TANGO Main CP for major exercises or during crisis periods. Basic purpose of the RBPS is to permit location of the mainframe computer at Taegu while providing all the normal high-speed computer input/output capabilities required by tri-headquarters staff agencies in Seoul. Major hardware installed in the van includes an H716 message processor (mini computer), 450 line per minute printer, and card reader/punch equipment. The second means of communicating with the mainframe computer is through remote terminals located in command/control centers throughout the ROK. The COMUSKOREA WWMCCS ADP System had to be uniquely designed for integration of numerous widely separated terminals into the central processing.

4. JCIS Briefing, Feb 78, Subj: WWMCCS.
unit. (The local system employs more operational terminal sites geographically removed from the central computer than any other WWMCCS installation.) These Visual Information Projector (VIP) terminals permit processing, dispatch to and receipt of messages/data from the mainframe computer, and allow exchange of command/control information between command centers via both the CIS and CCIFS. On-line near real time processing capabilities permit job initiation at all terminal sites, with hardcopy output available at those equipped with page printers.

(U) By end of reporting period 16 remote terminals were operational at following locations: Yongsan - UNC Comd Center (two), HQ AFK/314th Air Div (two), ACOFS, J3 (one), JCIS (two), and BBPS Van (one); TANGO Main CP (two); Osan AB (three, all relocatable to K-2 AB at Taegu); Kunsan AB (one); Chinhae NB (one); and Taegu Mainframe Computer Facility (one). Two terminal sets are on hand at Taegu to be installed in the Rear CP when activated. A model 300 remote line printer was installed at Osan AB in 1976 to support additional 314th Air Div requirements. Terminal sites are programmed for 1978 installation at HQ I Corps (ROK/US) Gp (Camp Red Cloud), CS/CT #1 (Camp Long), and Kwangju AB.

(U) By end CY 77 a total of 28 software application systems were operational on the COMUSKOREA WWMCCS computer. Seven were standard WWMCCS systems, ten were imported from other commands, and 11 were COMUSKOREA WWMCCS developed. High priority standard systems used most extensively by action officers at command/control centers included: Force Status and Identity Information Processing (FORSTAT), which provided operational readiness and location information on more than 400 EUSA units; Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS), used to develop force lists, movement schedules and other related contingency OPLAN requirements; and the Computer Directed Training System (CDTS), which gave all users access to a series of 13 WWMCCS student-paced training courses. The Fragmentary Order Preparation (FRAGPREP) system was regularly employed by AFK/314th Air Div to generate and disseminate daily fragmentation orders and reports required in command/control of operational flight missions. A JCIS/J3 developed system, designated COMCON, provided automated updating of approximately 90 command briefing formats required by principal tri-headquarters staff agencies during periods of increased DEFCON.

(U) The following locally designed software application systems became operational during 1977: Automated Personnel Daily Summary (AUTO-PDS), to provide ACOFS, J1 with current personnel status of UNC forces; and ROKA Readiness (ROKAR), to furnish identification, location, readiness posture and equipment status of ROKA forces. A standard WWMCCS program placed into operation was the Electronic Warfare Information System (EWIS), which will give intelligence/operations staffs the current status of US EW assets and their capabilities as well as data on EW threats worldwide. The Emergency Action System (EASY), imported from
US Air Forces Europe, will provide ACOFS, J3 automated assistance for preparing the Command Center Daily Operations Journal.

(U) Systems under development by JCIS at year's end were: Military Armistice Commission Report (MACIREP) to accumulate automated data on alleged violations in the DMZ; Merchant Ship (MERSHIP) system to maintain information on merchant ships arriving and departing NK ports; and a Special Security Officer Billet Access Roster (SSOBAR) system designed to provide Sp Scy Gp Korea with automated lists of sensitive compartmented intelligence billets and of personnel with access to special intelligence information.

(U) Upgrading of WWMCCS Software Equipment and Support

(U) During 1977 a reconfiguration of the COMUKOREA WWMCCS on-line mass storage system was accomplished. Because of accelerating demands for file space on the system, available space had been reduced to a point close to operating limits. Consequently, four permanent and two removable disk packs were installed, replacing the two permanent/four removable disk pack system previously in use. After establishing program priorities in coordination with system users, high demand command/control data files were placed on permanent packs while those with lesser priority were distributed on removable packs. A new four-man element was formed in JCIS to provide technical management for the revamped on-line computer storage facility and to control access to and sharing of data files by users. Virtually unlimited growth space and a more coherent files management system were advantages accrued from revising the mass storage configuration. Principal drawback was slower response time for occasional or low priority users.

(U) In late 1977 a team from DCA's Command and Control Technical Center in CONUS, assisted by local software specialists, installed a communications sub-system at the Taegu mainframe facility which provides completely automatic message processing and switching between the central computer and the Taegu Switching Center. This interface allows messages/data to be prepared at users' terminals and transmitted via AUTODIN to other command/control centers without manual handling.

(U) A new computer operator console was acquired in Jun 77 and installed at the mainframe facility in Taegu. By using the old console as backup, the mainframe's unscheduled downtime rate was lowered to less than two percent. A second van was received in Nov to supplement the Remote Batch Processing System at Yongsan. Administrative and user

5. JCIS Hist Sum 1977.

6. Ibid.
service space for current operations was increased materially; also, capability was provided for evacuating essential WWMCCS ADP equipment from Yongsan if required.

(U) Evaluation of COMUSKOREA WWMCCS ADP System operations during Exercises ULCHI-FOCUS LENS and TEAM SPIRIT 77 indicated that additional computer memory capacity was required to more effectively meet user needs. A request to enlarge the H6060 central processing unit's memory capability from current 256,000 words to 384,000 was approved by JCS in late 1977; increase in memory was scheduled for accomplishment in early CY 78.

(U) Other equipment acquisitions approved were two model 300 remote line printers for terminal sites at HQ AFK/314th Air Div (Yongsan) and Kunsan AB. Installation was planned for Jan and Jul 78 respectively.

(U) COMUSKOREA WWMCCS Support to COMUSJAPAN

(U) In Nov 75 COMUSJAPAN indicated a requirement for an interface with CINCPAC and COMUSKOREA via WWMCCS. A JCIS assistance team from this headquarters determined COMUSJAPAN's functional requirements for software and the hardware necessary to support appropriate ADP service. In Mar 76 the team prepared a Justification, Approval and Acquisition Document (JAAD) and forwarded it through CINCPAC and USN CNO to JCS, who approved the JAAD in Nov 76. Thereafter a WWMCCS ADP Support Agreement was initiated by CINCPAC, setting forth tasks and responsibilities of the three commands involved (PACOM, COMUSKOREA and COMUSJAPAN) in areas of operations, budgeting, program support, documentation and information exchange. Agreement was signed by representatives of all three commands in Dec 77.

(U) Principal component of COMUSJAPAN's WWMCCS facility will be an H716 mini computer (terminal) located at Yokota AB, Japan, hosted by H6060 computers at Taegu and Hawaii. The mini computer will serve as a message concentrator linking four VIP user terminals, a 300 line per minute printer, card reader/punch and tape drive to the host computer. The COMUSKOREA mainframe site will be augmented with an additional disk unit to support COMUSJAPAN. Terminal equipment installation in Japan is scheduled for early 1978.7

(U) Management Information Systems (MIS)

(U) The command's MIS/ADP activities encompass both Standard Army Multi-Command Management Information Systems and local command unique

7. Ibid.
Twelve data processing installations (DPI) are assigned to EUSA major subordinate commands; nine are van mounted and three are fixed site installations. (Types of automatic data processing equipment (ADPE) utilized at each DPI are indicated in following topic.) These DPIs are totally Army funded and process primarily EUSA data systems except the US Army Yongsan Data Processing Center-Korea (USA YDPC-K) which provides ADP support for the tri-headquarters and USFK elements in the Seoul area. The USA YDPC-K and the 19th Spt Comd ADP Center at Taegu are augmented by computer output microform equipment capable of providing customers with ADP products in microfiche media.

(U) The ACoS for MIS, whose office is organized as a separate staff element within HQ UNCF/USFK/EUSA, advises the tri-headquarters CofS on all matters related to planning, controlling and coordinating MIS/ADP activities within the command, except those pertaining to JCIS (discussed in preceding topic). He also exercises OPCON over the USA YDPC-K and is responsible for technical staff supervision of the other 11 EUSA DPIs.

(U) ADP Equipment (ADPE) Utilization

(U) A comparison of CY 77 against CY 76 statistics reflects the following changes in ADPE utilization as percent of available staffing hours:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADPE TYPE</th>
<th>DPI</th>
<th>PERCENT UTILIZATION (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CY 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>348th S&amp;S Co</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th Trans Co</td>
<td>68 (2)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAMS C-K</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCR 500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>305th S&amp;S Co</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAG-Pusan</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>595th Maint Co</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2d Inf Div</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIVAC 1000</td>
<td>USA YDPC-K</td>
<td>64 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIVAC 7015</td>
<td>USA Pusan Port</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIVAC 7060</td>
<td>19th Spt Comd ADPC</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIVAC 7060</td>
<td>USA YDPC-K</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:
(1) Effective 1 Apr 77 command objective was increased from 65 to 70 percent.
(2) Low utilization attributed to excessive equipment downtime during Jul-Sep 77.

8. A major command unique ADP system (CUPIEDS), designed primarily for USFK ration control purposes, is discussed on page 252.
(3) Equipment installed in May 76.
(4) UNIVAC 1005 programs were being converted to UNIVAC 7060 system at end of reporting period.

Source: RCS MLJ-Al Report, ADPE Utilization, Recording and Reporting. Filed at ACoFS, MIS.

(U) Combat Service Support System (CS3)

(U) The CS3 system was implemented in the 2d Inf Div in Jun 76. System hardware consists of a van mounted IBM 360/30 computer. CS3 replaced the Division Logistics System, which utilized UNIVAC 1005 card processors.

(U) During 1977 the system operated successfully from field locations but excessive downtime occurred when equipment was returned to the Camp Casey garrison site. As a result, backup support for CS3 had to be provided by USAIDPC-K and the Central ADP Center at Camp Zama, Japan. Local inspections failed to identify the reason for movement problems and outside assistance was solicited at year's end. A team of computer hardware specialists from US Army Electronics Command and IBM is due to arrive in-country in early CY 78 to thoroughly survey the system and make recommendations for alleviating the equipment downtime.

(U) FY 77 ADP Budget

(U) FY 77 ADP budget requirements were computed as $2.708 million compared to the FY 77 Budget Execution Review limitation of $2.642 million. The unfinanced requirements submitted to DA were identified as $61,000 for stock fund supplies at USAIDPC-K and $5,000 for TDY travel expenses. The ADP budget limitation was increased to $2.78 million upon receipt of $131,000 from DA to cover US and RN civilian employee pay raises and $7,000 for TDY travel. The $61,000 unfinanced requirement for USAIDPC-K supplies was not provided by DA; however, reporting of low obligation data for supplies at 19th Spt Comd and 2d Inf Div DPIs during the year and transfer of funds from 19th Spt Comd to USAIDPC-K offset the unfinanced requirements and contributed to a $188,000 reduction from the obligation target during FY 77 3d and 4th Qtrs. Excess ADP funds could not be utilized at FY end for purchase of leased ADPE due to DA restrictions on use of OMA funds for equipment purchases over $1,000. (In 1976 $105,000 of surplus funds were used to purchase the leased UNIVAC tape drive installed at USAIDPC-K.) As a result, actual obligations recorded were $2.436 million against revised FY 77 obligation target of $2.592 million; fund usage was 94 percent of authorized expenditures.

(U) Effective 1 Oct 77 the Asst to CofS for MIS assumed Major
Activity Director responsibilities for EUSA's ADP budget from the USAG-Yongsan Comptroller.  

upgrade troop living conditions at all EUSA installations throughout the ROK. Dual purpose of this program was to (1) provide essential short-term maintenance and repair of troop billets, dining facilities and latrines using Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funds, and (2) couple this with long-term MCA modernization and replacement of facilities where required. Initial site surveys in Oct 76 by Far East Dist Engr (USAEDF/E) and Fac Engr Acctv-Korea inspectors indicated that work required far exceeded EUSA fiscal resources. On 20 Dec 76 a comprehensive five-year EUSA Facilities Plan was submitted to DA by this command. The VCMA responded shortly thereafter that program need was fully recognized and that DA support would be forthcoming when individual projects were submitted in final form.

(U) The plan provides for upgrading of 12,000 troop billet spaces categorized as "substandard--may be adequate." Short-term repair projects would be undertaken in temporary quonset barrack, dining halls and latrines to eliminate hazards to troop health and safety by end FY 79, while MCA projects would replace or modernize all EUSA bachelor housing (BOQ/BEQs) to conform to the two-story relocatable structures adopted in the FY 77 MCA program (see previous page).

(U) Phase I of the OMA troop facilities repair program, funded for $9.4 million, comprised ten 2d Inf Div installations. By end CY 77 all contracts had been awarded and work was in progress. Phase II was to consist of upgrading at remaining seven 2d Div camps and 44 other installations Korea-wide, but six of the latter were later deleted because of stationing plan revisions. All Phase II projects have been funded for design; FY 77 year-end monies from other OMA accounts in amount of $4.68 million (approximately $700,000 of which were funds originally allocated for Phase I work) covered a substantial segment of design costs. DA has indicated willingness to fund much of this work during FY 78 on condition that improved facilities will be retained for a reasonable period to justify fund expenditure. Estimated FY 78 cost for upgrading troop facilities in Korea is approximately $18 million, $1.5 million of which was received in Dec 77.

(U) 2d Engineer Group Troop Construction Program

(U) During 1977 EUSA's 2d Engr Gp was actively engaged in troop construction programs. Scope of projects ranged from flood damage repair at numerous USFK installations to construction of relocatable troop barracks in 2d Inf Div, I Corps (ROK/US) Gp and 19th Spt Comd areas (see page 233). A record paving season was achieved, with approximately 25,000

metric tons of hot mix asphalt placed. A total of 30 miles of roads in ten 2d Inf Div camps were paved with asphalt, as well as 8.5 miles at two 19th Spt Comd installations and one mile of egress road in the JSA area. Additionally, 40 miles of single surface gravel roads were constructed at same locations. Other significant tasks included major earthwork projects and installation of XM-19 matting for temporary helipads and runways at Army airfields, and erection of 15 PASCOE prefabricated buildings throughout the ROK for use as warehouses, offices, training facilities, and temporary troop housing. A total of 128 projects were assigned during the year, and an additional 11 were carried forward from previous years. The 105 projects completed by the Group in CY 77 represented a $1.93 million unfunded labor cost savings for the command; value of new facilities and improvements was set at $3.66 million.

(U) Upgrading of USFK Family Housing and Bachelor Quarters

(U) During FY 77 a total of $640,000 was utilized for USFK family housing improvements. Major projects included replacement of water lines and roof tiles in US military family housing units at Yongsan, Taegu and Pusan. Additionally, a $446,000 contract was awarded by the USA Korea Procurement Agency in last quarter CY 77 for installation of new ceiling insulation in all Yongsan family quarters.

(U) DA lifted a long-standing moratorium on procurement of replacement family housing furniture and household appliances and, by year's end, had allocated approximately one million dollars to relieve USFK shortages; delivery of items, $900,000 of which is furniture, is expected during 1978. Bachelor housing common table allowance furnishings costing approximately one million dollars had been requisitioned in Dec 76. Despite a nine month lead time less than half the requisitioned items had arrived and been obligated by end FY 77. At close of reporting period this command was awaiting action on a request to DA for authority to directly obligate funds for future bachelor housing furniture procurements to obviate end-of-year fund cutoffs.

(U) Rental Guarantee Housing (RGH)

(U) Background. In Nov 70 an RGH agreement was executed by this command for construction, operation and maintenance of 300 family housing units in Seoul and 72 in Taegu. The project, having a combined value of $9.5 million, was built by a US/ROK joint venture (FEMCO-Sampoong) to conform to US-approved specifications. After numerous delays due to difficulties in obtaining permission to import necessary materials, construction began in summer of 1972 and included recreational facilities, paved all-weather roads, and complete utility services. Opening ceremonies
were held at the Seoul (Yongdong) RGH site on 10 Oct 73 and at the Taegu site 31 Oct 73. Both were named Sampoong Friendship Village.

(U) In return for the contractor’s investment, the US Government guaranteed, for ten years, rent money equivalent to 97 percent occupancy with a limit of $185 per unit. Actual rental charges, paid directly to FEMCO-Sampoong by individual USFK residents, originally averaged $230, with a range from $170 for a two-bedroom to $270 for a four-bedroom unit, excluding utilities. Although rent and utilities charges were allowed to be increased when justified on the basis of rising costs, the amount of the government guarantee remained firm. The ten-year occupancy agreement went into effect 1 Jan 74 and tenant rate quickly rose to 97-98 percent.

(U) At the Seoul site, the contractor also built a six-story shopping center facility, a swimming pool and ten private houses, at no expense to the US. A renewable lease was negotiated in Jul 74 for 4,400 square feet of space in the shopping center complex to be used for an exchange retail outlet, an office for a mess bar, barber/beauty shops, laundry/dry cleaning pickup point, and dispensary. A private house in the complex (4,140 square feet) was leased in Dec 74 for a community center to accommodate scouting activities, worship services and similar functions. A third lease for 4,000 square feet in the shopping center building provided space for a commissary annex.

(U) Developments in 1977. In mid-1974 the contractor developed severe financial difficulties which threatened USFK’s rights under the contract terms. Following extensive study of the problem by the US/ROK SOFA Committee, the ROKG in Sep 75 agreed to provide the contractor approximately $886,000 for FY 76 assistance; a similar sum was later paid for FY 77 support. Concurrently, USFK raised the average monthly rent per unit to $265, effective 8 Sep 75. To further insure continued operation and maintenance of RGH for USFK personnel, agreement was reached whereby RGH quarters would be leased and paid for by DOD after 1 Aug 76 instead of by individual renters. In May 77 DA approved a two month lease extension to 30 Sep 77 so that annual lease period would coincide with fiscal year.

(U) Meanwhile, OSD had voiced concern about possible improprieties and the lease arrangement’s cost effectiveness. Of particular interest was the status and amount of the financial guarantee furnished by the bank servicing the contractor’s obligations. USFK was tasked to provide an economic comparative cost analysis, which was submitted to OSD in Jun 77. DA endorsed renewal of existing lease as serving the best interests of the US Government. On 27 Aug 77, however, OSD disapproved lease renewal and directed that RGH revert on 1 Jan 78 to the original individual

5. Minutes, 106th SOFA Joint Committee Meeting of 4 Sep 75. Filed in J5 Intl Rel Branch.
leasing system. A 90-day extension to the existing DOD lease was granted so that occupants could complete personal leasing arrangements by 1 Jan 78. Shortly thereafter DA obtained approval to reclaim the decision and sent representatives from Office, Chief of Engineers to Korea to assist this headquarters in preparing a more extensive economic analysis. USFK’s comprehensive reclaim was presented to DA and OSD by the command’s Engineer and Judge Advocate during period 14-17 Nov. OSD concerns regarding possible improprieties were allayed, and economic justifications effectively support request for continuing present DOD lease policy. Accordingly, on 1 Dec 77 OSD approved lease renewal covering all 372 RGH units for period 1 Jan - 30 Sep 78.

Throughout CY 77 a 99.3 percent occupancy rate was maintained for RGH quarters.

Proposed Economy Housing for USFK Personnel

During 1977 a serious shortage of reasonably priced western style private housing developed for USFK personnel in the Seoul area. Factors contributing to the worsening situation included a sizeable population influx into the capital city, increasing numbers of relatively affluent Koreans, and stricter enforcement of housing tax laws. Compounding the problem was long-term leasing of modern residences and apartments by foreign business and diplomatic agencies whose personnel had heretofore utilized hotel accommodations. USFK controls only 600 family units in the Seoul area, comprising 300 US Government owned quarters on Yongsan Garrison and 300 RGH units (described in preceding topic) located nearby. Evictions from privately owned housing resulting from changes of ownership as well as drastic rent increases caused many USFK personnel to seek Korean National Housing Corporation (KNHC) apartments, which were designed and built primarily for foreign residents. Approximately 600 KNHC apartment units were being rented to USFK personnel at end CY 77. This type housing is in heavy demand and waiting periods have lengthened to six-eight months. Primarily because of these conditions, more than 700 USFK members authorized command sponsorship in the Seoul area have elected not to bring their dependents to Korea.

On 2 Dec 77 the USFK Deputy Cdr sent a letter to the KNHC President expressing the command’s need for ROK-constructed family housing in Seoul for the exclusive use of authorized USFK personnel. By year’s end

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6. This decision, if implemented, would have caused the lessor (FEMCO-Sampoong) considerable difficulties since it was on the basis of an annual DOD lease that ROKG had agreed in 1975 to furnish an annual subsidy to contractor in order to avert firm’s threatened bankruptcy.

this request had generated extensive discussions between KNHC officials and the tri-headquarters' Engr/J5 staffs. An analysis of USFK's needs in the Seoul area indicated a requirement for approximately 700 apartment units. Preliminary planning was initiated to select a suitable building site close to Yongsan, possibly on USFK-controlled land which could be released through SOFA procedures to the ROKG for command housing purposes. Discussions and plans also included construction of 200 KNHC apartments at Osan AB for USAF personnel assigned two-year tours.

(U) Real Estate Actions

(U) Two significant USFK real estate acquisitions were consummated during 1977. Both required considerable high level coordination between USFK, the American Embassy/Seoul and ROKG agencies. One acquisition, involving ten acres on a mountain peak near Taegu, was required to provide a suitable site for Ground-Based, Electro-Optical, Deep Space Surveillance System facilities to support USAF's worldwide space satellite tracking mission, to be monitored locally by 314th Air Div. Acquisition was approved by the SOFA Joint Committee on 6 Apr 77. The other real estate gain resulted from reorganization of the 4th Sqdn/7th Cav to an air cavalry structure (see page 145). Additional aviation facilities were needed at Camp Stanley to accommodate increased number of helicopters assigned to the squadron. Due to urgency of real estate requirement and as an exception to normal SOFA procedures, the ROK MND expeditiously obtained Ministry of Construction and ROK Presidential approval prior to formal tasking by the SOFA Joint Committee. The acquisition was subsequently sanctioned by the Committee in Sep 77.

(U) In accordance with SALS-K implementing directives (see page 153) Camp Thompson and Masan Army Depot (051) were released to the ROKG during CY 77; installations combined represented more than 2,200 acres of land and improvements valued at approximately $4 million. Since 1974, when SALS-K became effective, USFK has released five munitions installations totaling 5,586 acres and 525 buildings/facilities with estimated value in excess of $9 million. Another major 1977 release action was transfer during Apr-Jun of seven US Nike-Hercules sites to ROKA (discussed on page 193); sites comprised 400 acres of land and 600 buildings/facilities worth approximately $7.8 million.

8. In a 17 Sep 48 Initial Financial and Property Settlement Agreement between the US and ROK governments, the US acquired certain defense-oriented properties (formerly Japanese occupied) in return for basic necessities and other considerations. Yongsan Military Reservation in the southern suburbs of Seoul is a case in point. USFK-controlled land refers to the free leasehold property utilized by US units and agencies under terms of cited agreement.
(U) In 1974 USFK agreed to relocate the 304th Sig Bn from Kimpo International Airport and release the area occupied by that unit to permit airport expansion by the ROK Ministry of Transportation. Suitable facilities for the battalion would be built by the ROKG at Taegu's Camp Carroll Depot at no cost to USFK. The ROKG subsequently awarded pertinent contracts, and construction at Camp Carroll should be completed by mid-1978. Other USFK activities located at Kimpo for which alternate facilities must be constructed are an Area Fac Engr element, health clinic, and branch post office; all three activities will be relocated to Camp Market. Agreement was reached in Dec 77 for construction at Camp Market to be performed by USFK, using funds previously deposited by the ROKG; completion is anticipated by Sep 78. The only USFK facilities scheduled to remain at Kimpo will be a US Army military mail terminal collocated with a USAF aerial mail element.

(U) The Korea Maritime Port Authority has a major project underway to modernize and expand the commercial port at Pusan. Plan includes relocating US Army Port facilities at Pier 3 to Pier 8 on opposite side of harbor; Pier 8 will service both US and ROK military vessels. The SOFA Joint Committee, in Apr 77, approved the relocation with essentially no cost to USFK. At year's end plans/specifications were in preparation; completion of construction is expected by late 1978. Two unresolved issues were ROKG provision of a suitable site to construct a replacement United Seamen Service Club and development of a new road network for EUSA's Pusan Storage Facility.

(U) ROK/US Mapping Conference

(U) The Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G) Arrangement of 1976 between the US Defense Mapping Agency and ROK MND J2 updated a 1956 joint agreement and called for annual meetings to be hosted alternately by USFK and ROKA. Full reciprocation of cartographic, geodetic, photographic, geographic, geophysical and aeronautical data on a quid-pro-quo basis is called for in the document.

(U) The 1977 conference, held on 13-14 Oct at ROKA Map Service headquarters in Pusan, was attended by delegates from DMA, UNC/USFK/EUSA, PACOM, US Army CINCPAC Spt Gp and the Hawaii-based 652d Engr Bn (TOPO). The other ROKA services sent representatives as did the Ministries of National Defense, Transportation and Construction. Agenda items included updates on revision of various map series in Korea and status reports on Military Geographic Intelligence documents, including city plans, gazetteers and trig lists.

(U) It was noted that a potential problem with geodetic control data identified at last year's conference had been resolved. This dealt with deployment of the Inertial Positioning System (IPS) to Korea (see page 63). IPS arrived in Feb 77 for utilization in I Corps (ROK/US) Gp and FRONIKA areas where it establishes geodetic control at approximately two-kilometer intervals along roadways. Controls provide valuable assistance in positioning artillery/missile units.

(U) At conclusion of the session, USFK agreed to continue as the major source for emergency support of ROKA Map Service requirements for as long as the US retains MC&G capabilities in Korea. It was further agreed that both DMA and HQ PACOM will develop alternate procedures for mapping assistance to the ROK when in-country USFK support is found inadequate.

(U) Fire Losses

(U) The command's fire losses for CY 77 (excluding those suffered by Korea Regional Exchange) totaled $723,100 involving 22 reported incidents. (CY 76 figures were $537,275 and 29 incidents.) The largest single property loss occurred on 25 May 77 when a fire gutted a warehouse assigned to the 2d Engr Gp at Camp Market. Fire fighting units from Camps Market and Mercer as well as Bupyeong and Inchon cities responded to the blaze and were able to control it within 90 minutes. There were no injuries; damage was assessed at $610,262. Cause was attributed to ignition of wrapping paper and plastic enclosing rolls of fiberglass insulation material which were unloaded from heated bed of a dump truck directly into the warehouse. The other fires were relatively minor. In all cases there were no casualties and no indications of sabotage or arson. Korea Regional Exchange fire losses at Camp Red Cloud are described on page 303.
(U) FY 77 Command Budget Performance

(U) The command's Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) budget execution for FY 77 (1 Oct 76 - 30 Sep 77) was highly effective. Against the $251.9 million OMA program, obligations totaling $251.4 million were recorded, resulting in a 99.81 percent fund utilization ratio; command objective was 99.9 percent. The separately managed Family Housing program of $4.003 million achieved obligations of $3.978 million for a 99.38 percent utilization rate, well within the acceptable range (95 percent minimum).

(U) Major Budget Submissions

(U) During 1977 the command prepared and submitted the FY 77 Budget Execution Review (BER) and Command Operating Budget Estimates (COBE) for FYs 78-79. Except for items of an emergency nature, the BER was the final document forwarded to higher headquarters pertaining to the current fiscal year budget. Since congressional reductions previously based on the BER are now accommodated during COBE processing, the Army canceled the BER as a formal procedure during FY 78. The FY 79 COBE was submitted for the first time in Zero Base Budget format, which quantifies the entire range of relevant command activity in a more visible mode than traditional base budgeting allowed.

(U) Total requirement for the FY 78 COBE amounted to $234.2 million plus a DA mark-up of $31.8 million for US and Korean civilian employee pay raises and separation allowances for Korean workers. Of this amount, $48.9 million was submitted as unfinanced as shown below ($ in thousands):¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM/DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>2  EUSA Flying Hour Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>2  CTA 50 Items</td>
<td>652</td>
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<tr>
<td>2  Track Maint Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>2  Audio-Visual Pers and Equipment</td>
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<td>M  304th Sig Bn Relocation Costs</td>
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</table>

(U) Control of OMA Supply Program

(U) During first eight months of FY 77 EUSA experienced an inordinately high commitment/obligation ratio relative to the OMA supply funding program. Situation was attributed to following factors:

-- Excessive requisitioning capability granted to subordinate commands, thereby creating a potential for exceeding operating program fund limitations.

-- Items added to authorized stockage lists (ASL) at some supply activities not supported by adequate demands.

-- Costs for certain newly introduced equipment not fully reflected in budget estimates.

-- Equipment density changes caused ASL and Prescribed Load List increases.

-- Maintenance workload diverted from combat units to 19th Spt Comd.

-- Supplier billing time reduced from 90 to 60 day average.

(U) On 31 May 77 a joint Compt/J4 task force which included J1, J3 and Engr representatives was convened at this headquarters to examine the OMA supply funding problem and recommend corrective action. The task force determined that at least $6 million in cost savings/reductions would be required to remain within the budget for balance of fiscal year. Under staff supervision of ACofS, J4, the following corrective actions were implemented:

-- Materiel Management Center and EUSA direct support unit requisitions amounting to approximately $3 million were canceled by 30 Jun 77. Appropriate CONUS agencies were requested to expedite cancellation credits. Methods for requisitioning against ensuing fiscal year funding (front end procedures) were modified to eliminate requisitioner credit for cancellations.

-- Other cancellation actions were applied to US Army Fac Engr Actv, Korea ($300,000) and night vision goggle requirements ($600,000).

-- Checkbook requisitioning authority for Jun-Aug 77 period was reduced by $1.2 million.

-- Fund certification authority for all non-stock fund supplies (except P84 medical) was centralized at ACofS, J4, this headquarters, and purchases were reduced by $100,000 per month ($300,000 savings).
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-- Stock fund credits to OMA accounts were monitored for turn-in and redistribution of excesses on cross-level basis ($300,000 savings).

-- Additional conservation actions and consequent savings were reducing vehicular POL usage by 25 percent ($300,000), curtailing dependent summer hire program by 50 percent ($110,000), and decreasing AFKN live sports event coverage by 50 percent ($45,000).

-- Other supply control measures taken included suspending passage of replenishment requisitions pending recalculation/validation of Requisitioning Objective, and establishing a special program for intensive management of office furniture and equipment.

(U) ACofS, J4 and Logistics Assistance Office-Korea teams made frequent visits to supply support activities throughout the command during Jun-Aug 77 to review and monitor corrective measures prescribed. Collectively the actions taken enabled EUSA to close out FY 77 OMA supply accounts without cost overruns and with only very minor degradations of supply performance.

(U) Military Banking Services in Korea

(U) Effective 1 Oct 77 DOD assumed responsibility for overseas military banking services from the Treasury Department. Worldwide contracts with American Express Company, Chase Manhattan and Bank of America call for 121 full-time and 62 part-time banking facilities.

(U) In Korea, which has long been served by Bank of America, a renewable one-year contract was awarded that firm. It called for Bank of America to operate seven full-time and ten part-time banking facilities at a net cost of $1,384,500. A new facility at Camp Hovey was added by the terms of the contract. Basic customer services remain the same but certain charges have been increased. The fee for returned checks due to insufficient funds was raised from $5.00 to $7.50; charge for US checks returned for same reason increased to $10.00. Also imposed was a 25¢ fee for saving account withdrawals which exceed two per month.

(U) Local commanders were tasked with appointing a military bank liaison officer for each facility to act as interface with comptroller/finance offices. The additional duty appointees, whose name and telephone number appear on signs within each facility, also help to resolve customer complaints.

2. Full-time services are provided at Yongsan, Osan and Kunsan ABs, and Camps Red Cloud, Casey, Humphreys and Henry. Part-time operations are accorded at Hialeah Compound and Camps Carroll, Ames, Howze, Page, Greaves, Hovey, Long, Stanley and Pelham. (The San Diego Federal Credit Union also has on-base offices at these US troop locations except for the last five listed.)
Conversion to All Check Paydays for EUSA Personnel

During early part of CY 77 finance planners at this headquarters studied feasibility of converting to all check paydays for EUSA personnel. Advantages accruing from check payment were determined to be: elimination of man-hours required on cash paydays for Class A agent officer and guard functions; reduction in large amounts of cash in troop barracks susceptible to theft; and added convenience for individual service members. CINCUNC endorsed the idea and on 21 May 77 the check payment system was approved by DA for implementation in Jul (Jun in 2d Inf Div units). Units assigned in remote areas where check cashing difficulties might be encountered were offered option of cash or check paydays; all preferred, however, to adopt latter system. By end of reporting period no significant problems had surfaced relative to new method of payment.

Program Analysis and Resource Review (PARR)

In 1976 EUSA was invited to participate in DA's outyear PARR process. This analysis/review provided a unique opportunity to identify, communicate and justify command needs and obtain DA support for critical outyear program and planning requirements. A Program Development Group comprised of senior staff officers from major activities was established on a permanent basis to assure appropriate emphasis in all concerned command elements. The PARR is viewed as the most significant program document having a direct influence on future force structure planning efforts within the command.

EUSA's 1977 PARR submission, however, was largely overcome by events. Withdrawal of US ground combat forces from Korea was announced before issuance of DA's Program Objective Memorandum, for which the PARR provides the major input. In Oct EUSA's Program Development Group started work on the FY 78 PARR. By DA direction, this document will deal almost exclusively with manpower programming for three withdrawal increments (FYs 78-80) and residual force structure (see page 100).

Management Studies

Eight management studies of import were conducted by the Controller Section during 1977. Summaries follow.

Command Unique Personnel Information Data Systems (CUPIDS). This study, begun in Jan 77 at the direction of the UNC/USFK/EUSA,

3. Payment by check for USAF and USN personnel serving in Korea was already in effect.
examined the ration control section of CUPIDS, a system which contains detailed information on every American military service member, DOD employee, and dependent in Korea. Since ration control directly affects the lives of these people, the study attempted to induce changes to CUPIDS which would make the controls less irritating as well as more efficient and effective. This was done through a questionnaire survey and resultant recommendations (see page 253) that brought about customer-oriented improvements and a decrease in violations.

(U) Garrison Transportation Motor Pools. These studies were conducted from May through Dec at Yongsan, Taegu, and Camps Humphreys and Carroll. Study scope was primarily concerned with improved manpower management and attendant reduction in premium pay compensation, but was expanded to include supply procedures, production control, organization and functions, and layout. Additionally, any major problem area that was discovered on site was investigated. A total of 109 management improvement recommendations were made and implemented. Possible cost savings were estimated at $220,000 with breakout as follows: Yongsan ($108,000), Taegu ($58,000), Camp Humphreys ($21,000) and Camp Carroll ($33,000).

(U) Trans Korea Pipeline (TKP) Commercial Tariff Increase. In early 1977, an intensive economic analysis of TKP operations was made to determine whether the existing rate structure for commercial use was adequate to meet operating costs and regulatory requirements. (See page 166.) The survey determined that a rate structure increase was in order and this recommendation was staffed and approved by CoFS on 2 Jun. On 15 Jun, ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs was notified of US Government's intent to increase TKP rates through tariffs when contracts in being expire in Dec 78. The rate settled upon by contract renegotiations will become retroactive to 1 Aug 77.

(U) US Army AG Printing and Publications Center, Korea (PPCK). This review was initiated upon a 29 Jul 77 request by the UNC/USFK/EUSA AG for a management survey of PPCK's procedures concerning distribution and resupply of forms and publications in Korea. Analyses revealed that PPCK's services and support in these areas were excellent for supporting US forces in Korea. Recommendations were essentially that the status quo be maintained, but that PPCK form a publications/blank forms management assistance team to instruct units in proper stockroom and requisitioning procedures.

(U) HQ USAG-Y/HQ Commandant Consolidation Study. This feasibility study was directed by the CoFS in Oct 77. Review was made of the mission, organization and functions of both elements to determine if common areas could be merged into a single organization that would operate effectively.
now, and in the future as US Army forces withdraw from Korea. Examination revealed that missions were incompatible and that no savings could be identified, except for some manpower, without eliminating services normally made available to service members by a garrison command. The Comptroller, who chaired a study group comprised of J3, HQ COMDT and HQ USAG-Y representatives, cited present uncertainties surrounding garrison support requirements for the ROK/US Combined Forces Command being formulated as well as sifting for residual force elements, and proposed that further study be held in abeyance.

(U) SAILS-AB(X) Impact on OMA Supply Obligations. Purpose of this study was to determine magnitude of reduction in FY 77 OMA supply obligations, based on extent of delay in system run times for direct shipments under SAILS-AB(X). Using composite data, it was found that average time required under SAILS AB(X) from date of requisition to date of OMA obligation was about 83 days while average time under current system was 73.7 days, a difference of 9.3 days. Based on that finding and J4's FY 77 budget, it was estimated that the magnitude of reduction in FY 77 OMA supply obligations was approximately $350,000. (This subject is addressed in greater detail on page 134.)

(U) Cash Management. Intent of this study was to identify excesses that existed in current authorizations to hold cash on hand at personal risk and to achieve savings where possible. Prior to study, total cash holdings of all authorized Army activities in the ROK (US Army FAO-Korea Central Funding Office, four finance offices and two Class B agent offices) was $8.6 million. Study determined that authorizations exceeded cash required to fund USFK finance offices and US Govt-sponsored banking facilities in Korea by as much as $3.6 million. As a result, cash holding authorizations were limited to 14 days projected usage for US currency and seven days for Korean currency (won). On 1 Dec 77 a total authorization of $5 million for all Army finance activities in Korea was established. A Government Accounting Office (GAO) survey conducted during period 12-23 Dec 77 concluded, however, that EUSA was actively seeking to minimize unnecessary cash balances, thus reducing US Govt interest costs. The GAO study also recommended following actions to improve cash management in the command: (1) replenish Central Funding Office cash requirements twice monthly through in-country recoupment, (2) increase frequency of retrograde from disbursing offices to the Central Funding Office and to the

4. HQ Comdt, an organic element of HQ EUSA, has a mission to support the tri-headquarters in garrison and in the field; whereas USAG-Y's mission is to provide installation support services to all assigned, attached, and tenant units of the garrison.

5. US Govt Memo, 22 Dec 77, Subj: Survey of DOD Procedures to Provide Cash to Overseas Actv. Filed in Compt Fin Policy Br.
Federal Reserve, and (3) improve coordination of cash holding procedures between military banking facilities and EUSA disbursing offices. These proposals generated a Comptroller follow-on study to be completed in Apr 78.

(U) Methods and Standards Program. Comptroller part in this four-phase study is to assist HQ USAFE which has been tasked to develop manpower standards for American Forces Radio and Television Facilities DOD-wide, see page 290. The Korea team, headed by Det 4, 6004th Mgt Engr Sq, Osan AB and supported by the Comptroller Management Section, is to participate in the first two phases: Preliminary and Measurement. Most preliminary phase actions were completed locally by year's end and data collected will be forwarded to the lead team at Torrejon AFB, Spain. Instructions for conduct of the measurement phase are expected in early 1978.
service members' views on dollar/quantity\textsuperscript{8} and food item limitations. Response rate exceeded 85 percent, indicating considerable soldier interest and concern, and numerous irritants and system inadequacies were revealed.

(U) The Comptroller-directed management survey was completed in Jun 77 and results and recommendations were briefed to COMUSKOREA. Thereafter, 17 approved changes to the ration control system were implemented during Aug-Nov 77. Major revisions were:

--- Commissary and exchange monthly dollar limits were combined into a single allocation for greater purchasing flexibility.

--- Exchange dollar limit was increased to $160 for individuals not authorized commissary privileges.

--- All purchases in exchanges and commissaries were rounded down to the nearest dollar for recording against the individual's monthly dollar allocation.

--- With exception of certain cosmetic items, all purchases which do not exceed 99 cents, including beer and soda, were not to be counted against the dollar limitation.

--- Temporary RCPs will be valid for two months rather than one.

--- RCPs inadvertently left in retail outlets will be delivered to installation military police for return to authorized holders.

--- Dependents 18 years of age or more who are authorized access to Class VI stores will be allowed to purchase beverages in those facilities.

--- Soda, olive oil and salad/cooking oil were removed from list of controlled items. The monthly allowance of mayonnaise was increased by 32 ounces for 1-3 member families. Placed under control were video cassette recorders and cigarettes (60 packs per month for each adult member of a command sponsored family).

--- A new stock of permanent RCPs was procured with a special panel front for entry of SSN in ink as well as raised letters to inhibit counterfeiting.

--- The POV gasoline ration card was revised so as to be valid for a six month period rather than one, with an estimated 22,000 manhour

--- Of particular concern to the command was high incidence of ration control violations. More than 2,000 per month, mostly inadvertent, were being reported to commanders for necessary action. See page 282.
savings per year in service member application time.

-- A new procedure was initiated to simplify return of a
defective controlled item to the exchange or commissary. The replacement
will be documented at the store, using a refund card and controlled
item purchase record.

-- USFK major subordinate commanders throughout the ROK were
authorized to establish RCP issuing agencies in coordination with ACoFS,
J1. A related policy change permitted installation commanders (05 and
above) to grant exceptions to ration control limitations on an individual
basis.

-- A revised policy was issued for dealing with individuals who
violate ration control regulations; such persons may have their RCPs with-
held for 30 days pending completion of an investigation. To counter
black marketing, new emphasis was placed on monitoring large volume pur-
chases of items over $35 which are not on the controlled list.

(U) The command's Public Affairs Office launched an intensive infor-
mation program to publicize the policy changes as well as overall pro-
sions of the ration control system. Media used included local armed
forces radio and televion, posters, briefing materials and fact sheets
for command-wide dissemination.

(U) In addition to the Comptroller-generated revisions herein dis-
cussed, ACoFS, J1's data management planners initiated numerous programming/
processing changes to expedite turnaround of CUPIDS' computer products.
Waiting time for a permanent RCP was shortened, and system improvements
made it possible to identify ration control violators during the month in
which excessive items were purchased. J1's CUPIDS managers redesigned
and introduced a new combined computer transaction sales card which
reduced volume of sales recording actions (600,000 monthly average) by
25 percent. An optical character reader was programmed for 1978 procure-
ment, to be used as an input device for entering monthly sales transaction
cards and ration control applications into the CUPIDS. When the new
optical reader is operational, the keypunch workload will be sharply
reduced, and the high volume of input transactions should be more exped-
ditionally processed.

(U) Establishment of Command Check Control Office (CCCO)

(U) A new policy was developed in 1977 governing check cashing pro-
cedures at designated USFK banks, finance offices, exchanges, commissaries
and clubs. A three-man CCCO was established within ACoFS, J1 to central-
ize bad check information and perform following functions.
national must first submit an application to their service component headquarters in Korea for processing and approval. Marriage statistics for 1977 follow (1976 figures in parentheses): Total number approved was 3,257 (2,761); figures for the various services were USA--2,451 (2,147), USAF--799 (580), and USN/USMC--37 (34).

(U) Implementation of Organizational Effectiveness (OE) in EUSA

(U) OE is the Army's systematic application of behavioral and management science skills/methods to strengthen the chain of command, increase individual and unit effectiveness, and improve the quality of life in an Army community. In essence, OE is an ongoing DA process that seeks solutions to individual and organizational problems, thereby improving day-to-day operations and readiness. It provides the technology to understand more clearly how people in an organization communicate with one another and how they influence and are influenced by organizational structures, procedures and work environments. Broadening military personnel management through application of behavioral science is aimed at increasing unit effectiveness by improving the military members' attitude, motivation commitment, and sense of well being.

(U) OE principles and procedures were intended for phased implementation specially adapted to the specific requirements of a given Army unit, the process controlled by each unit's leader/commander who would be assisted by an OE staff officer (OESO). An OE program's four phases are: (1) assessment of organizational processes, (2) chain-of-command action planning, (3) implementation of approved plan actions, and (4) evaluation and follow-up modifications.

(U) In Jan 77 this headquarters approved an augmentation space for a full-time EUSA OE Program Manager, and a qualified OESO from command assets was reassigned to serve in that position. During same month two additional OESOs arrived in the command, both of whom had graduated from the US Army OE Tng Center (OETC) at Fort Ord, Calif. One officer was assigned to 2d Inf Div, the other to the 19th Spt Comd. EUSA was directed by DA in May to convert ten spaces for OESO staffing requirements; nine had been converted by end of reporting period. EUSA's planned distribution of OESOs in CY 78 calls for: HQ EUSA-2, 2d Inf Div-2, 19th Spt Comd-2, 38th Ada Bde-1, USAGY-1, and MLPERCEN-K-1. In addition to validation and conversion of OESO spaces, DA's OE Plan required EUSA to provide OE familiarization training in the command's service schools and to provide fiscal support for the OE program.

(U) This headquarters subsequently published specific guidance on the OE program for EUSA-wide distribution. Principal requirements

12. LOI, EUSA, 7 Jun 77, Subj: OE. Filed in J1 Human Rel Branch.
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outlined were: implementation of a command information program at all levels to explain OE purposes and concepts; introduction of a EUSA Leadership and Management Development Course to complement OE familiarization efforts; and initiation of human resource data collection for use in evaluating OE. In Jun 77 OETC representatives visited the command to obtain data on EUSA's OE activities as part of the Army OE Phase II Evaluation Plan and to support revision of the OETC curriculum and DA OE policy.

(U) By end CY 77 some 2d Inf Div units were using OE methods/techniques with favorable results during transition periods of incoming and outgoing commanders. Reports from the 19th Spt Comd indicated that its company and battalion-size units had profited materially from OE practices.

(U) Safety Program

(U) The 1977 accident/injury rates in the command reflected an overall decrease as compared to those for 1976. A total of 527 accidents were recorded in CY 77, 110 less than in the previous year. Significant reductions were achieved in all categories except Army aircraft accidents and total accident costs.

(U) The rate of Army motor vehicle accidents per million miles driven was reduced to 5.76 (21 percent decrease). There were 298 vehicle accidents in 1977, contrasted with 375 in CY 76. Also decreased (by 16 percent) was rate of US military injuries per million mandays; CY 77 rate was 15.4, based on 164 recorded injuries. Included were 14 fatalities; seven in aircraft accidents, three in motor vehicle accidents, and one each from drowning (recreational swimming), an off-post fire, overturning fork lift, and a live fire exercise (16 fatalities were recorded in 1976). A reduction (of 25 percent) was also achieved in the non-DOD personnel (Korean civilian employees and KATUSAs) injury rate. Sixty-nine injuries were reported, 23 less than previous year; three fatalities occurred, two from vehicle accidents and one from fighting an off-post fire. There were no DOD civilian employee injuries reported in CY 77.

(U) In 1977 a sharp upturn occurred (76 percent) in Army aircraft accidents per 100,000 flying hours. Accident rate, which was 4.67 in 1976, increased to 8.21 in CY 77 (see page 138 for accident specifics). Total monetary losses (property damage and disabling injuries) resulting from 1977 accidents amounted to approximately $8.72 million, 68 percent above CY 76 costs. Army aircraft accidents accounted for $5.45 million of total loss figure.

(U) To assist subordinate commanders in carrying out safety standards imposed by the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), this headquarters developed a EUSA-wide ADP program to supplement local efforts.
The system became operational in fall 77 and maintains data on specific deficiencies as well as cost factors involved in their correction. The automated program was deemed necessary since unit manpower was not available to maintain proper records. Forty-four EUSA safety personnel, military and civilian, attended in-country OSHA training sessions conducted by DA safety specialists from Fort Rucker, Ala. Instruction, presented at Seoul and Taegu in 40-hour sessions, included topics on legal implications of OSHA, management improvement measures necessary to integrate OSHA standards into the Army Safety Program, and new techniques to better utilize both full and part time safety staff members and unit safety representatives. Intensive efforts were made by this command to comply as closely as possible with OSHA requirements within the limits of available resources. Baseline OSHA surveys reached an acceptable level during CY 77.13

(U) Education Programs

(U) EUSA's continuing education system is staffed with 52 professional civilian Education Services Officers (ESOs) and counselors. The system provides full educational services paralleling those available in CONUS and other major commands, from remedial instruction to graduate level degree programs through 16 Army Education Centers. Schools operating programs in Korea during the year were the University of Maryland, Central Texas College, University of Southern California, Los Angeles Community College, University of Oklahoma, University of Hawaii, and Saint Louis High School of Hawaii. The chart below shows program enrollment figures from latest quarterly reports:

<table>
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<td>College (Graduate)</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Language</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS Related</td>
<td>2,615</td>
<td>3,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Interest</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10,020</td>
<td>10,567</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) Latest statistics received from DA indicated that EUSA was well above the worldwide average in education program participation rate.

13. CONF J1 Hist Sum 1977 (info used UNCLAS).
Educational objectives set by DA are bachelors degree for officers, associate degree for warrant officers, and high school diploma for enlisted members. Command participation goals, adjusted to realistic levels, are 50 percent minimum for officers/warrant officers and 60 for enlisted personnel. At end CY 77, program rates for EUSA personnel in all categories surpassed those command objectives. Statistics follow in percents: officers-66, warrant officers-59, and enlisted-78.

(U) During their FY 78 budget review, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees expressed concern about the adverse impact on operational readiness which could result from high school completion programs conducted during duty hours. Subsequent congressional directives announced in Aug 77 specified that: education programs for active duty service members carried on during the normal working day would be directly related to military requirements; those courses offered for sole purpose of obtaining high school credits would be conducted during off-duty time; and personnel who enlisted after 1 Jan 77 could participate in the DA-funded off-duty high school program only if enrolled in the Veterans Education Assistance Program (VEAP).14

(U) Using DA guidelines, this command's education planners reviewed the existing high school completion program to identify courses providing skills required for MOS duties or military professional development and those taught solely to satisfy requirements for a high school diploma. The former would be included in the Basic Skill Education Program (BSEP) conducted during duty time as permitted by local training requirements while all other courses would be scheduled after normal duty hours. Concurrently, characteristics of MOSs found in high troop density areas were studied to determine skills required for proficiency. It was concluded that an appropriate amount of remedial instruction in English communication, reading comprehension and basic mathematics would apply to all MOSs and that such courses would continue to be offered in the on-duty BSEP.

(U) On 1 Oct 77 Saint Louis High School of Hawaii under contract with EUSA commenced MOS supporting courses in the BSEP using the following enrollment criteria: individuals testing lower than grade level 8.5 in Reading, English or Mathematics; and soldiers with GT scores below 90. Although it was planned to conduct the High School Completion Program (HSCP) on an off-duty basis starting 1 Oct 77, this headquarters was notified by DA to delay implementation. The Army Commanders' Conference held in early Oct had stressed that major revisions to the HSCP required

14. In Oct 76 Congress passed legislation (PL 94-302) terminating GI Bill entitlements for individuals entering the armed forces after 31 Dec 76 and establishing the VEAP for post-Vietnam era enlistees. Participants contribute between $50-75 per month and the Veterans Administration (VA) matches those funds with $2 for each $1 contributed.
advance notice because of implied obligations to service member participants and to civilian schools supporting the on-duty HSCP. As a result, Congress postponed the requirement for an off-duty HSCP until 1 Jul 78. In this command, participation in the current on-duty HSCP is limited to soldiers whose duty performance demonstrate a potential for advanced skills or leadership training. The program is integrated with unit master training plans to take maximum advantage of block scheduling.

(U) Passage of PL 94-502 in Oct 76 which terminated GI Bill benefits also ended the Predisharge Education Program (PREP). Funded by VA, the PREP had provided for all high school level academic instruction at Army Education Centers. DA submitted requests to Congress in late 1976 to fund these courses and instructed MACOMs to divert monies from other programs for maintaining an on-duty HSCP that would replace PREP. Despite funding uncertainties, EUSA's HSCP continued operation throughout FY 77 by way of interim contracts with Saint Louis High School of Hawaii and University of Hawaii, the two schools which provided the instruction. A new contract with Saint Louis High School, effective 1 Jan 78, will provide instructional services and individualized, competency-based materials for both the HSCP and BSEP.

(U) Since Nov 76 100-hour on-duty Korean Language courses have been offered at Yongsan Education Center to USFK personnel identified as needing familiarity with the language for effective mission accomplishment. During 1977 approximately 60 officers and NCOs completed the courses taught by University of Maryland (UM) instructors. Students may earn six semester credit from UM provided they have previously registered with UM or upon payment of a $15 matriculation fee. Defense Language Institute (DLI) representatives visited Korea in Jul-Sep 77 for purpose of validating Korean language terminal skill objectives and developing course materials for a Korean Headstart/Gateway program similar to the German language curriculum conducted in USAEUR. The DLI materials should be available in the command by fall 1978.15

(U) There are four DOD Dependent Schools in Korea, located at Seoul, Taegu, Pusan and Chinhae. All provide both elementary and high school programs, except Chinhae which has only elementary. At end CY 77 enrollments were: Seoul-1,852; Taegu-442; Pusan-199; and Chinhae-25. All enrollments were very close to optimum with none exceeding maximum capacity. Expansion of library (5,000 sq ft) and industrial arts areas at the Taegu school was completed during the year. At Seoul High School, the

15. Headstart, a 40-hour course offered at 55 CONUS education centers, is optional for officers and EM under assignment to Korea; Gateway, an eight-week course presented at DLI, is mandatory for general officers, brigade commanders and selected joint and CFC personnel in designated positions requiring a Level 1 speaking and reading capability before coming to Korea.
absence of a cafeteria and gymnasium was offset by utilizing available
on-post facilities.

(U) Human Relations Programs

(U) At end 1977 racial composition of the command's military personnel
compared to service-wide tabulations was as follows (in percentages):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CAUCASIAN</th>
<th>BLACK</th>
<th>OTHER*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUSA</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY-WIDE</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFK</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE-WIDE</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes Oriental, Hispanic and American Indian. (EUSA personnel in
this category are predominately Oriental.)

(U) Training continued to be the foundation for this command's suc-
cessful human relations/equal opportunity (EO) programs. All newly
arrived Army personnel receive five hours of human relations instruction
during their first month in-country. Topics include DOD policies, Korean
culture and customs, the KATUSA program, and Korean-American relations.
After the basic orientation, service members receive a minimum of one
hour training monthly on related areas. To enhance EO Programs viability,
ACoFS J1's Human Affairs Branch conducted two Discussion Leaders Courses
in first half 77 for selected military personnel (6 officers, 44 NCOs)
from all major subordinate commands. In mid-year decision was made to
decentralize presentation of this training to EUSA's major units to achieve
TDY cost savings.

(U) During 1977 EO sessions for KATUSA personnel assigned throughout
the command were held on a weekly basis. All KATUSAs are required to
attend a seven-hour block of EO training annually which parallels the
five-hour orientation program for US personnel described above. Instruc-
tion was presented by ROKA liaison officers from this headquarters until
Dec, when training was assumed by ROKA officers on duty in EUSA units,
30 of whom had attended an intensive two-day EO course sponsored by ACoFS,
J1.

(U) Significant events highlighting the Human Relations Program
during 1977 were observance of National Black History Week (13-19 Feb),
National Hispanic Heritage Week (11-17 Sep), and the birthday of Dr.
Martin Luther King (15 Jan). Programs and activities were structured to
give USFK personnel opportunities to attend racial awareness seminars,
movies, commemorative services and a wide variety of cultural events.
(U) Prevention of Alcohol and Drug Abuse

(U) Congressional concern surfaced during 1976 over the military services not devoting sufficient attention to problems of alcohol abuse. Special interest developed after a General Accounting Office report to Congress concluded that overindulgence of alcohol caused more serious and pervasive problems in the armed forces than the misuse of other drugs. DA provided initial proposals and solicited comments from MACOMs addressing an effort to glamorize alcohol consumption among service members. As a result of the exchange of ideas between field commands and DA, this headquarters published a command letter in Dec 76 regarding control of drinking habits.16 The letter outlined objectives aimed at generating a sense of individual responsibility and self-discipline in use of alcoholic beverages, and stressed the need to foster a positive attitude in the military community toward recognition of the vital dependence that mission readiness has on healthy human resources. Policies designed to help accomplish these aims included elimination of specific military club practices that appear to glamorize alcohol (lengthy "happy hours," using alcoholic beverages as gifts or prizes, bar service during duty hours, etc.); and promotion of nonalcoholic drinks at social gatherings. A Jul 77 command letter reemphasized glamorization of alcohol and required major subordinate commanders to establish comprehensive policies and procedures aimed at limiting excessive alcohol consumption.17

(U) Due to EUSA's highly decentralized command locations and widely dispersed units, it was necessary to modify the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program (ADAPCP) organizational structure illustrated in the revised AR 600-85. In late 1976 EUSA adopted an area command Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program organizational model which maximized utilization of limited command ADAPCP personnel assets in high troop density areas with adequate geographical access. A EUSA supplement to AR 600-85 was published in May 77 which provided detailed guidance for the program's operation.18

(U) Drug abuses in this command are not severe, averaging about 225 minor offenses annually. This low rate is attributed, in large part, to stringent ROKG drug control laws which carry penalties up to death for importing and exporting, life imprisonment for manufacturing and ten years for using. In Korea, marijuana is most used drug. Alcohol abuses are

16. Ltr, EUSA, 22 Dec 76, Subj: Responsible Alcohol Practices.
18. EA Suppl 1 to AR 600-85, 19 May 77, ADAPCP.
more prevalent, about the same per troop population as in other US military commands.

(U) In Mar 77 EUSA hosted its second Korea-wide Teen Involvement Program (TIP) Training Workshop at Pusan. Purpose was to provide DOD high school students with the necessary skills, attitudes and values to enable them to transmit alcohol and drug abuse prevention information to lower grade students in their home areas through a total community effort. Workshop was conducted by a DA TIP consultant from CONUS. Teams of students, parents, teachers and ADAPCP staff from Yongsan, Taegu, Chinhae and Pusan attended. Workshop program consisted of small group seminars, lectures and experiential activities designed to develop awareness and understanding in the following areas: attitude formation, value clarification, team and individual confidence building, problem solving techniques, and program planning. TIP has been implemented in cited communities by participating teams and procedures initiated to maintain ongoing local programs.

(U) Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Program

(U) US forces in Korea have historically employed a greater number of minority group personnel and women than had been represented throughout the Army. At end CY 77, however, this command was noticeably underrepresented in two major categories: Women, by 8.4 percent; and Black, by 8.1 percent. Major reasons for these work force imbalances were curtailment of command sponsored positions, which adversely affected availability of women applicants, and secondly, referral lists developed by higher headquarters have not included an adequate number of female and minority group personnel to correct disproportionate levels. The year 1977 marked advent of the command's Spanish Speaking Program (SSP). A part-time SSP coordinator was appointed and new methods were initiated for encouraging Hispanic personnel in CONUS to apply for employment opportunities in the ROK. Descriptive literature and job availability information was sent to Hispanic-oriented private organizations throughout the US. In addition, briefings on the SSP were provided at locally conducted supervisory/managerial training courses and Hispanic publications have been ordered for command-wide distribution to provide greater program visibility and understanding.

(U) During the year five USFK staff vacancies (GS-8 and below) were identified as Upward Mobility Program positions and all qualified employees were surveyed to determine those available to apply for the vacancies when announced. Additional efforts are programmed for 1978 to provide career counseling and individual development for personnel surveyed who expressed interest in career advancement.
(U) Federal Women's Program (FWP)

(U) During 22-26 Aug 77 USFK held its third annual observance of Federal Women's Week. Highlighting the period were two days of FWP training conferences encompassing topics on personal growth, assertiveness, and management skills. Two special workshops on career development were presented by the FWP Coordinator for DA. At a banquet on 26 Aug women in the federal work force were honored and awards were presented to five employees judged to have significantly contributed to the mission of their activity. Nominees had displayed leadership and professionalism which served to upgrade the image and status of women employed by the US forces in Korea.

(U) Reduction of EUSA Average Civilian Employee Grade

(U) In Nov 76 DA placed a ceiling on the average General Schedule (GS) grade of EUSA's filled civilian positions; a 9.7598 average was set as maximum for end FY 77 and 9.7542 at close of FY 78. Baseline used in establishing the ceiling was the command posture on 31 Mar 76 (9.7614). Since overall EUSA average grade on 30 Nov 76 was 10.0966, magnitude of the directed reductions (one-third of a grade) indicated drastic measures to achieve assigned targets. In Jan 77 a command policy was implemented requiring downgrading of every existing non-supervisory position to a lower grade when incumbents departed the command; replacement would be requested at the lower grade. As a result, 42 vacancies were downgraded. Responding to a EUSA request for readjustment, DA revised their assigned ceiling upward to 9.9826 for end FY 77. Downgrading policy implementation, together with other restrictive position management measures, enabled EUSA to achieve a 9.9759 average grade by 30 Sep 77. A marked increase occurred in Nov, however, primarily as a result of vacancies at grades GS-8 and below. (Average grade figures were based on filled positions only.) By 31 Dec 77 the average grade for EUSA's 666 filled US citizen positions had increased to 10.0155.

(U) In Dec 77 DA suspended requirement for achieving previously assigned FY 78 average grade ceiling. A new government-wide grade control program, however, was instituted by the Office of Management and Budget in conjunction with the Civil Service Commission. At end of reporting period DA was developing plans for program implementation.

(U) DAC Recruitment Problems

(U) "Historically, recruitment of US civilian employees for duty in

Korea has been difficult. In the past many positive efforts have been made, however, little improvement was realized. Following requests by this headquarters in early 1977 for streamlined recruitment procedures, DA advised in Sep that records of career employees in CONUS who apply for overseas vacancies in WESTPAC area would hereafter be maintained in a central inventory at the Civ Career Mgt Office, Hawaii for referral to WESTPAC commands, including Korea. DA further stated, however, that continued difficulty was anticipated for Korean recruitment due to uncertainty associated with the announced withdrawal of US ground combat forces.20

(U) As of 31 Dec 77 a total of 76 DAC positions were under recruitment, 28 of which had been on recruitment status for 90 days or longer. Positions most difficult to fill were in engineer, supply and guidance counselor fields. DA intensified advertising of vacancies in Korea during the year in order to enlarge the WESTPAC inventory. New procedures should also shorten the excessive time span between announcement of USFK vacancies and arrival of replacements. Number of days US civilian positions remained unfilled averaged 136 during CY 77; command objective was 90 days or less.21

(U) Change in Five Year Overseas Limit for DOD Employees in Korea

(U) To enhance stability of USFK's civilian workforce during reduction of Korea-based US ground forces and consequent problems in DAC recruitment (see preceding topic), this command requested an exception to policy in regard to DOD's five-years continuous overseas service limitation for US civilian employees. On 22 Sep 77 DA approved the request.22 The change in policy, however, does not constitute an exemption or an automatic extension for those employees who have reached the five year overseas limit and desire to continue working for USFK. Instead, each request for a duty tour extension will be evaluated on an individual case basis with command needs and employee performance/conduct as the primary criteria. Approvals will be granted by the UNC/USFK/EUSA Cofs.23

20. Ltr, DA, PCEP, 20 Sep 77, Subj: Career Referred Service for Overseas Comd.
21. UNC/USFK/EUSA Review and Analysis 1st Qtr FY 78.
22. Ltr, DA, DCSPER, 22 Sep 77, Subj: Civ Pars Policies.
23. Ltr, EUSA, CPJ-FM, 8 Nov 77, Subj: DOD Limitation on Civilian Overseas Service.
UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Standard Civilian Personnel Management Information System (SCIPMIS)

(U) SCIPMIS is a DA system for automated civilian personnel operations at the installation level. It provides for computer preparation of 40 fixed formats which will permit prompt retrieval of information from a local database embracing recurring reports and individual personnel actions. The system gives the using command a new capability to respond quickly to special reporting requirements or queries from personnel managers, organizations and employees.

(U) An advance DA team from the SCIPMIS Project Office visited Korea from 29 Nov - 10 Dec 77 to conduct a 64-hour training course for EUSA and USARJ personnel technicians. EUSA implementation of SCIPMIS is scheduled for early 1978.

(U) Living Quarters Allowances (LQA) for US Civilian Employees

(U) On 28 Jul 77 the annual report of living quarters expenditures incurred by US civilian employees residing on the local economy was forwarded to DA for submission to the Department of State for review and possible adjustment of authorized LQA. Command analysis had revealed that LQA was not sufficient to cover costs for almost half the employees reported. A severe housing shortage, particularly in the Seoul area, coupled with new local tax laws had resulted in sharp increases in rents and utilities for many USFK tenants (see page 237). Effective 23 Oct 77 LQA rates were increased ten percent for US Government employees with families in Korea and 20 percent for those without families.

(U) DA Survey of Civilian Personnel Management in EUSA

(U) During period 13 Sep - 19 Oct 76 a team from DCSPER, DA conducted a survey of EUSA's civilian personnel management programs and practices. The team reported a general improvement in personnel administration in comparison with the previous survey performed in May 73, but identified several areas needing corrective action. An ad hoc committee chaired by the ACOfS, J1 analyzed survey team's comments/recommendations and developed EUSA responses to DA. The following subjects were addressed:

24. LQA in Korea is based on family size, grade, location and cost of rental/utilities. In Seoul, the average 1977 rate for those with families was about $5,250 annually; for single employees living off-post $4,800.


26. Ltrs, EUSA, 14 Jan and 16 Jun 77, Subj: Survey of Civ Pers Mgt. Filed in OCPD.
UNCLASSIFIED

-- Decentralization of CPOs. The team had recommended restoration of US civilian personnel servicing at Taeug (Seoul CPO had assumed centralized servicing responsibilities for all DACs in Korea in Jan 76).

-- Position Management. The team had recommended closer supervisory monitorship of employee work assignments and delegation of personnel management to lower level supervisors. DA was advised that a one time survey had been conducted by commanders and activity directors to review and verify that both US and Korean national employees were actually performing duties called for in position descriptions. As a result, 59 employees were found to be misassigned and corrective actions had been initiated in all cases.

-- Logistics Support to US Employees. Recommendation was made to DA that identification cards issued to civilian employees (DA Form 1173) be overstamped "For Overseas Use Only" rather than "Valid Korea Only." Purpose was to allow employees access to exchanges, commissaries and APO facilities when on TDY or leave status in other PACCOM areas outside Korea. Proposal was approved by DA and implementation commenced in Aug 77.

(U) This command was notified by DA in Aug 77 that all corrective measures directed by the survey team or EUSA exceptions thereto were acceptable and actions were considered complete.27

(U) Dependent Hire Program

(U) In Apr 76 this command implemented an expanded DOD Dependent Hire Program which quickly proved successful for economically filling EUSA vacancies at lower grade levels (GS-8 and below). The Civil Service Commission (CSC) in Aug 76, however, notified DOD that it was withdrawing Schedule A appointing authority for the program effective 31 Dec 76. To counter this action, DA requested that all overseas commands submit information to be included in a DOD reclamation to the CSC recommending reconsideration. In response thereto, this headquarters provided 11 substantive points to support continuance of the program in Korea. During first half CY 77 CSC, at DOD's request, granted several 30 day extensions to continue the Dependent Hire Program on a temporary basis. On 30 Aug 77, however, DA advised that Schedule A authority for appointment of dependents could continue to be used by EUSA until further notice.28 Local hire of dependents curtails retainability to duration of spouse's tour and occasionally results in lack of fully qualified applicants but, on balance,

27. Ltr, PFCP-A, DA DCSPER, 31 Aug 77, Subj: Survey of Civilian Personnel Mgt, EUSA. Filed in OCPD.

the program is considered advantageous to both the command and the dependents employed. As of 31 Dec 77 there were 112 dependents, amounting to 16 percent of the work force in Korea, occupying positions in grade GS-8 and below.

(U) **Summer Employment Program**

(U) The 1977 Summer Employment Program for unmarried student dependents age 16 to 23 was conducted during period 1 Jun - 30 Sep. This annual program's primary purposes were to accomplish needed work in support of the command mission and to provide meaningful employment for student dependents. A total of 311 worked in designated positions at USFK installations in Seoul, Taegu and Pusan. Where possible, college level students were placed in positions directly related to their major fields of study. A summer youth counselor was hired in Seoul, along with an assistant at Taegu, for the program's duration. Responses from employing organizations, participating students, and parents were highly favorable.

(U) **Korean National (KN) Wage Increase**

(U) Based on an annual wage survey conducted during Aug-Oct 77, CTNCFAC's Joint Labor Policy Committee authorized an average 15.4 percent basic pay increase (contrasted with 23.1 percent the previous year) for this command's nearly 23,000 direct hire KN employees effective 1 Nov 77. Pay hike raised the mean monthly salary for the KN work force to about 123,000 won ($258). No changes in fringe benefits were made.

(U) On 23 Jun 77 the Foreign Organizations Employees Union (FOEU) had demanded a 44.2 percent basic wage increase, along with other additional

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29. Ltr, EUSA, 13 Apr 77, Subj: 1977 Summer Employment Program.

30. Joint US/KN survey teams contacted some 100 industrial/commercial firms in the Seoul, Inchon, Pusan and Taegu areas to determine amounts of wages/benefits paid and policies used in administration of compensation systems. Private Korean firms are assured that information USFK obtains is held as confidential/privileged data available only to US Government officials.

31. Current benefits include severance pay (a lump sum given at separation or retirement that equates to at least one month's pay for each year worked), four annual bonuses that amount to five months additional pay, 12 paid holidays per annum, premium pay of 150 to 200 percent for overtime, nights or holidays worked, and small allowance payments for special categories of workers.
benefits including extra holidays, a minimum wage scale plus changes in computation of longevity pay, allowances and bonuses. Since USFK recommenda-
dations were substantially less in monetary terms than union proposals,
the FEOU notified USFK of plans for a series of work stoppages commencing
18 Oct 77 if union demands were not met. On 14 Oct USFK filed a dispute
action with the ROKG's Administration of Labor Affairs (ALA) pointing
out that the FEOU strike plan violated both Status of Forces Agreement and
USFK/FEOU Labor Management Agreement provisions. The FEOU withdrew the
strike threat on 17 Oct, but thereafter filed a formal labor dispute of
their own with ALA for conciliation. After extensive and difficult meet-
ings between representatives of this headquarters, ALA and the FEOU,
agreement was reached and a Memorandum of Understanding restating USFK's
original position was signed on 1 Nov 77.

(U) In a related action, the basic labor management agreement between
USFK and the FEOU, last renegotiated in Aug 75, was formally renewed on
2 Dec 77 after detailed review. The extended agreement, which included
only minor modifications, will remain in effect until 29 Aug 78, subject
to further modification and renewal at that time.

(U) Korean Nationals Outplacement Program (KNOP)

(U) KNOP was established in Sep 70 by USFK in coordination with the
ROKG and FEOU. The program was established to minimize impact of RIFs
and to enhance USFK's image as a responsible employer. Objectives are as
follows: (1) to provide vocational training aimed at developing skills,
(2) to enable employees to qualify for and obtain ROKG licenses or skills
certificates, thereby enhancing their eligibility for positions in the
private sector, and (3) to provide outplacement assistance for employees
who are subject to involuntary separations. The ROKG pays for the voca-
tional instructors while USFK provides necessary materials and facilities
for training.

(U) During CY 77, 1,035 employees completed vocational training in
nine job categories: Tractor/Trailer Operator, Electrician (Interior
Wiring), Heating Equipment Operator, Welder, Auto Mechanic, Forklift
Operator, Refrigeration/Air Conditioning Mechanic, Teletype Operator
(English language), and Radio/Television Repairman. ROKG certification
tests were administered to 719 employees, of whom 557 (77 percent) were
issued licenses/certificates based on successful completion. A total of
609 former USFK employees were placed in new jobs within USFK or in the
Korean economy. Since the program's establishment in 1970, 13,206 em-
ployees have been trained in 29 different job skill categories; 4,272

32. Ltr, USFK, 22 Sep 70, Subj: Establishment of KNOP. Filed in OCPD.
received skills licenses/certificates; and 6,998 have been placed in new jobs.

(U) At year's end a survey of all USFK KN employees was being conducted to determine scope of placement assistance required in event of future RIFs. Survey results will be furnished to the ROKG's Administration of Labor Affairs for its use in planning a government sponsored Outplacement Assistance Center. 33

(U) Fund Campaigns

(U) The 1978 DOD Combined Federal Campaign was conducted during period 7 Sep - 18 Oct 77. All military and government employees were afforded the opportunity to contribute with donations accepted in cash or through the payroll deduction plan. Campaign was most successful ever held in the ROK as receipts totaled $624,275; an increase of more than $152,000 compared to the 1977 fund drive. Participation rate was 84.9 percent, with an average donation of $18.95.

(U) The annual Army Emergency Relief (AER) Fund Campaign was held on 1 May - 10 Jun 77 and raised $50,025; previous year's drive netted $28,878. The 90.4 percent participation rate coupled with a $1.74 average donation resulted in one of the most productive AER fund campaigns ever conducted in the ROK.

(U) Club System Activities

(U) During the year the number of clubs in EUSA varied little. As of 31 Dec 77 EUSA supported 28 officers' club branches (OCB), 79 noncommissioned officers' club branches (NCB), seven combined club branches (CCB), 22 package beverage branches (PBB), and an administrative support branch (ASB) under the jurisdiction of each subordinate command shown below (31 Dec 76 data in parentheses, if different from end 1977 totals):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMAND</th>
<th>NCB</th>
<th>OCB</th>
<th>CCB</th>
<th>PBB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Inf Div</td>
<td>37(38)</td>
<td>16(13)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Corps (ROK/US) Gp</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th USA Ms1 Cmd</td>
<td>-(3)</td>
<td>-(3)</td>
<td>4(0)</td>
<td>2(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAG-Yongsan</td>
<td>15(13)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAG-Taegu</td>
<td>5(6)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAG-Cp Humphreys</td>
<td>11(18)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAG-Pusan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33. Ltr, EUSA, 29 Nov 77, Subj: Placement Assistance Survey Under KNOP.

UNCLASSIFIED
(U) EUSA clubs operated in a profitable status during CY 77, realizing sales of $23,997,048 with net income (profit) of $1,162,052, nearly doubling 1976 profit figure of $583,292 on approximately same sales level. Intensive application of cost management procedures in CY 77 enabled the system to reach a 4.8 percent net income/sales ratio (DA goal is five percent) without appreciable increases in consumer prices. Number of local nationals working for EUSA clubs remained fairly stable during the year. A total of 1,874 were employed at end CY 77, compared to 1,506 on 31 Dec 76.³⁴

(U) The EUSA/314th Air Div Central Locker Fund also operated profitably during 1977. A comparison of 1976-77 operations follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dollar Sales</td>
<td>$4,264,640</td>
<td>$4,831,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Sales (Liquor/Wine)</td>
<td>215,317</td>
<td>226,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intl Balance of Payments Assessments</td>
<td>921,077</td>
<td>842,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profits</td>
<td>240,817</td>
<td>253,997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³⁴. JI Hist Sum 1977.
$493,819.86; 11 remaining non-SOFA foreign claims totaled $23,910.66. There were 914 personal property claims received from USFK members; 692 of these were paid in amount of $226,967.33. Under the Military Claims Act, 52 claims were settled for $8,838.43. USAFSC-K recovered $47,140.15 for the US Government under applicable statutes; nearly two-thirds was regained under the Medical Care Recovery Act. During the year two major maritime claims were adjudicated by USAFSC-K at US Navy request. One resulted from a US Navy ship swamping a Korean fishing boat near Kunsan on 22 Jun 77; claim was settled for $14,477.13. The other involved damage to a Korean commercial fishing net system near Pohang by the USS DUBUQUE in Dec 76. A three-man Foreign Claims Commission from USAFCS-K investigated the claim, found it meritorious, and on 24 Aug 77 recommended to the US Navy's Judge Advocate General settlement in amount of $59,106.13. Final action by USN was pending at end of reporting period.

(S) Inspector General (U)

(U) DAIG Special Inspection: Management and Accountability of Army Material in Korea

(U) During period 13 Jun - 1 Jul 77 a DAIG Special Inspection of Management and Accountability of Army Material was conducted in designated EUSA company level units. Inspection was part of an Army-wide survey/audit of material status at retail (company) level, with emphasis on: repair parts and components (Class IX); components of sets, kits and outfits; hand tools; and organizational clothing and equipment (CTA 50-900). Additionally, a comprehensive review of supply and financial records at unit level was directed. Inspectors were to either validate current supply management procedures or identify those that were inadequate or inefficient. A total of 18 company-size EUSA units (nine each from 2d Inf Div and 19th Spt Comd) were selected as representative samples for inspection by DAIG teams augmented by EUSA and 2d Inf Div inspectors.

(U) As a result of the worldwide inspection, CSA approved 19 recommendations to strengthen and modify Army capabilities for maintaining accountability and proper management of its materiel. The following were highlighted as requiring immediate improvement:

-- Enforce prescribed inventory procedures by instructing unit commanders in their responsibilities and providing them the time and resources necessary to maintain control of their property.

-- Establish at MACOM and installation levels a management information system that maintains visibility of supply accountability adjustment actions.

5. The DA Inspector General visited the command and DAIG field teams 24-29 Jun 77.

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-- Improve and simplify procedures for turn-in of excess, with objectives of returning material to its intended use and determining true extent of shortages as well as corrective actions required to reduce them.

(U) A EUSA task force under aegis of ACofS, J4 was formed in fall 1977 to serve as a control point for this command's implementation of DA's property accountability recommendations. Specifics are at page 163.

(U) General Inspections of EUSA Subordinate Units

(U) During 1977 the EUSA Inspector General conducted 52 general inspections of EUSA subordinate elements; one was rated unsatisfactory, after reinspection it was rated satisfactory. Although most organizations showed improvement when compared with observations made in 1976, a need for increased emphasis was manifested in the following significant areas:

-- Maintenance Management. Command-wide improvement was needed in management of unit maintenance operations. Inadequate controls had resulted in a shortage of repair parts for essential equipment. This parts shortage, in turn, generated an excessive number of high priority requisitions. Primary cause was commanders/supervisors not actively participating in the unit preventive maintenance program; in some instances such programs were not properly established.

-- Material Readiness Reporting. These reports were not updated as equipment status changed and commanders were not checking reports for accuracy. In approximately one third of organizations inspected during first half of year 40-50 percent of wheeled vehicles and associated equipment were rated in a lower equipment serviceability criteria category than material readiness reports indicated.

-- Property Books. The most frequent deficiencies found in maintenance of organization/installation property books were: inventories not conducted at prescribed intervals, quantities on reverse side of property book pages not in agreement with current balance on hand on front side of page, documents required to support entries not available, and property serial numbers not entered.

-- Transportation Control and Movement Document (TCMD). Serially-numbered TCMDs authorizing movements/shipments were not controlled, safeguarded, and maintained in accordance with pertinent EUSA directives. Supervisory personnel responsible for TCMD issue were not fully aware of their potential use for illegal diversion of supplies/equipment.

-- Training. Forecasts for training were generally inadequate and not supported by weekly schedules in many cases. A number of companies had not implemented comprehensive training programs for squad leaders to
Asset Control and Security Program, a seven-man PADLOCK Team has operated since Oct 72 as a staff element within the Provost Marshal Office. The unit is composed of a Team Chief, Physical Security/Movement/Logistics Inspectors, and Senior Supply/Stock Control and Accounting/Administrative Specialists.

(U) In 1977 the team made assistance visits to 32 command elements, performing accountability audits and reviewing unit control measures for physical security, illegal diversion of assets, and crime prevention. Visits were scheduled to coordinate with EUSA IG general inspections. Common deficiencies found by the PADLOCK team were: misues of inventory adjustment reports, inadequate accountability records, outdated or missing physical security plans/SOPs, inadequate key control procedures, excess equipment on hand, and incomplete inventories. Major contributing factors to these discrepancies were failure to comply with established policies/regulations, shortage of qualified supply personnel and supervisors, and lack of continuity in logistics/supply activities due to short (one year) tours by key personnel. The team also continued to operate a 24-hour "hotline" as a ready means for all USFK personnel to actively participate in the effort to control theft and blackmarketing activities. Of the numerous "hotline" tips received, many contained sufficient information to permit referral to appropriate investigative agencies, resulting in identification of theft/black marketing rings, discovery of deficiencies in ration control procedures and detection of attempted customs frauds. Major end items worth approximately $500,000 were identified as unaccountable during the PADLOCK team's unit assistance visits in 1977; the value of US Government property returned to accountability had not been calculated by year's end.

(U) To reinforce USFK's law enforcement efforts in the ROK, the PADLOCK team sponsored the first annual command-wide Crime Prevention Week in Apr 77. Special activities designed to increase public awareness of and interest in crime prevention included the following: patrol/security dog demonstrations; free engraving of personal high value items by military police; a crime prevention poster contest for DOD school students; over-printing of commissary exchange shopping bags; distribution of free pens, combs, balloons and calendars embossed with crime prevention slogans, equipment displays by military police/criminal investigations units; and intensified use of local newspaper, radio and television media for special crime prevention articles/programs. Activities appeared to be favorably received.

(U) Ration Control Enforcement Statistics

(U) CUPIDS statistics compiled for CY 77 revealed that a total of 25,820 ration control violations were detected and reported to commanders

during the year. This sharp reduction over the 1976 figure (35,710) clearly reflected expanded ration control enforcement measures by unit commanders. (See page 252 for description of CUPIDS and the USFK's ration control system.) Of the total violations, 354 were considered flagrant violations warranting referral to appropriate law enforcement agencies for investigation as suspected black market activity; only 208 were so referred in 1976. The balance (25,466) were attributed to faulty record keeping by individual system users. In Aug 77 the PMO initiated a procedure for forwarding to gaining commanders reports of investigations on gross violators who depart Korea prior to completion of final action. New emphasis was placed on monitoring purchases over those $30 items not requiring a letter of authorization from unit commanders; surveillance measures were also increased on exchange mail order purchases where large volumes of goods received might indicate blackmarketing activities. 9

(U) US Military Police Highway Patrol (USMHP)

(U) In late 1974 the UNC/USFK/ZUSA Provost Marshal identified a need for US military police to patrol ROK highways. It was felt that such a program would save lives, lower speed-related vehicle operating costs, reduce supply diversions, and render aid to stranded motorists. A trial operation in mid-1975 conducted by the 728th MP Bn on the 275-mile Seoul-Pusan Expressway demonstrated the concept's effectiveness. ROK military police and highway authorities expressed strong enthusiasm for the project. In Dec 75 the US-ROK SOFA Joint Committee approved recommendation for establishment of the USMHP.

By US-ROK agreement, the USMHP was authorized to direct and supervise USFK vehicles or FOVs registered under the SOFA, and to carry out the following functions: maintain order and discipline among USFK personnel, provide for administrative control over civilians covered by the SOFA and KATUSA/Korean Service Corps personnel operating USFK vehicles, conduct asset control inspections, and render aid to injured and stranded motorists. Additionally, the USMHP notifies ROK authorities, as appropriate, and provides traffic control when necessary.

(U) During 1977 the USMHP continued to operate on the Seoul-Pusan and Seoul-Inchon Expressways and Seoul-Tongduchon/Seoul-Chunchon Main Supply Routes (2d Inf Div's Camp Casey at Tongduchon, 4th Mal Comd's Camp Page at Chunchon). The patrol investigated 437 traffic accidents, issued 2,206 Armed Forces traffic tickets, processed 405 Military Police reports, medically evacuated 69 personnel, conducted 500 asset control inspections, rendered aid to 110 accident victims, and assisted 818 stranded motorists. Quarterly USMHP activity reports were provided the ROKG in accordance with the Dec 75 agreement.

(U) Added to the patrol’s equipment in 1977 were radar speed timing devices (Speedgun). To stimulate USFK public awareness of new enforcement techniques, announcements and articles explaining purpose/employment of radar equipment were disseminated via command information media (radio, television and local newspapers).

(U) **Arms Room Upgrade**

(U) As a result of DA guidance in Mar 76 it was determined that a major improvement project was required to enhance physical security of arms storage areas. This headquarters’ Provost Marshal surveyed all 275 arms storage facilities in EUSA and identified requirement for 130 new structures and renovation of an additional 69. An arms room upgrade program was developed and submitted to DA for funding from FY 78 monies; estimated cost was approximately $4.2 million.

(U) In early 1977 all MCA projects for arms storage facilities in Korea were canceled by congressional action. Subsequently, this headquarters submitted Urgent Minor MCA projects to DA for upgrading of arms rooms at Yongsan Garrison (Seoul) and Camp Carroll (Waegwan, near Taegu). After Washington’s announcement of US ground combat force withdrawals from the ROK, however, EUSA was unable to revalidate the two planned projects and DA returned the requests without action on 15 Dec 77. In lieu of new construction, the USFK Provost Marshal developed minimal security standards for existing arms storage areas to provide guidance for Engineer rehabilitation priorities. (A related development follows.)

(U) **Joint Services Interior Intrusion Detection Systems (J-SIIDS) for Arms Rooms**

(U) AR 190-11 requires that all US Army arms storage facilities be provided continual surveillance by a guard, on-duty personnel, intrusion detection device, or closed-circuit television. J-SIIDS, developed by the US Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center, provides 24-hour intrusion protection for arms rooms and is the most efficient and economical means of accomplishing the security requirement. Accordingly, DA initiated a program to equip all arms facilities with J-SIIDS.

(U) In early 1976 this command began receiving the systems, and installation commenced in Jun 76. The J-SIIDS three basic components are: (1) a control unit located in the arms room which controls all components installed therein, processes and relays status of all components to a monitor, and provides power for operation of all components within the arms room; (2) sensors placed in the arms room which detect unauthorized entry into and movements within the facility; and (3) a monitor unit, normally located in a military police station, battalion headquarters, or
guard house which receives transmitted signals from the control unit and registers the status and/or alarm condition of all components in the arms room. The J-SIIDS are designed to provide total intrusion protection by detecting attempts to penetrate the storage structure, movement inside, and any efforts to short-circuit the system, tamper in any way with the three basic components, interrupt AC power, or sever the system wiring. Component effective life is estimated at ten years; it is anticipated that the present system will be replaced with more advanced equipment by end of that period.

(U) Sep 77 was established as completion date for installation of J-SIIDS in 248 EUSA arms rooms. At year's end, however, only 147 had been installed by Fac Engr Actv-Korea personnel; of these, 76 were operational. Reasons for delay were late arrival of initial components, non-availability of replacements for defective items, lack of telephone cable, and insufficient skilled manpower for installing the systems. All equipment was expected to arrive by mid-78; target for project completion was end CY 78. At end of reporting period award of a service maintenance contract was under consideration as a means for providing technical maintenance on installed systems; in addition, a J-SIIDS specialist from DARCOM will be assigned to Fac Engr Actv-Korea staff in early 1978.

(FOUO) Public Affairs (U)

(U) Foreign Press Visits to ROK

(U) This command probably deals with more visiting newspeople on an annual basis than any other US military command in the world.

(U) During CY 77 a total of 506 out-of-country news representatives visited the ROK for direct reporting of significant occurrences on the peninsula. HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA's press liaison members coordinated visits of and escorted correspondents from the US, UK, W. Germany, France, Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, Brazil, Egypt, Nigeria, Zaire, Australia, Japan and the Republic of China.

(U) The ROK was center stage in the international press throughout the year because of unparalleled economic progress and allegations of influence peddling within the US Congress. Major local reporting efforts, however, centered around coverage of five military events: recall and reassignment in May 1977 of UNC/USFK/EUSA CofS MG John K. Singlaub (see page

10. Fact Sheet, PMJ, 20 Jun 77, Subj: J-SIIDS for Arms Rooms. Filed at PMJ.


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21); the DMZ overflight and downing by NK of a US Army helicopter in Jul (page 138); Exercises TEAM SPIRIT 77 and ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 77 (pages 124,128) and the Jul ROK/US Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul during which the central issues were agreement on departure of some Korea-based US ground troops by end CY 78 and establishment of a ROK-US combined command in that timeframe (page 95).12

(U) Revisit Korea Program

(U) The Korean War broke out on 25 Jun 50. To commemorate the 25th anniversary, the Korean Veterans Association (KVA) and the Korea National Tourism Corporation (KNTC) cosponsored a Revisit Korea Program which began in Jun 75 and will continue through 1978. Purpose is to show ROK gratitude for past contributions and to allow participants to view the great progress made here since the war.

(U) Selected Korean War veterans and their spouses from the 16 nations that joined the ROK in forming the UNC fighting team and from the five countries that furnished medical units were invited to Korea for five nights and six days. Special package tour rates were offered to include free accommodations and meals during their stay in the ROK. Under the VIP portion of the program, Medal of Honor recipients, Gold Star Mothers and retired general/flag officers were extended special invitations with all expenses borne by the sponsors. A total of 1,709 US (508 VIPs) and 1,176 allied veterans and dependents participated during 1975-77.

(U) Through coordination with PAO, arrangements were made for VIP invitees to visit this headquarters for greetings and remarks by the CINC-UNC, an unclassified Threat/Counterthreat briefing, and viewing of the ROK-produced film "Second Tunnel of Aggression." Groups also visited the Pannmunjom Joint Security Area. In recognition of Korean War service by USFK personnel presently serving in the ROK on active duty or in a civilian capacity, KVA and KNTC co-hosted a reception and special entertainment program on 24 Oct 77 at Walker Hill, a resort hotel complex on the outskirts of Seoul. Sixty-five Korea-based veterans and their spouses were guests of honor at the function.

(U) Visit of Korean War Correspondents

(U) In a planned revisit program, a group of 67 former Korean War correspondents from 16 UNC nations was hosted by the ROKG on 26-30 Apr 77. Highlight of visit was dedication of a memorial to the 18 war correspondents (ten US) killed in the conflict. The ten-meter high monument stands

in a Munsan park, ten miles north of Seoul.\textsuperscript{13} Tours to Korean War battle areas, Panmunjom, a model agricultural village, and scenic/cultural attractions throughout the ROK rounded out the week-long international gathering of combat journalists, many of whom had retired. Prior to departure, they received the command’s Threat/Counterthreat briefing which provided an official overview of the military balance on the Korean peninsula. They also met with CINCUNC, GEN John W. Vessey, Jr. for discussions on the planned, phased reduction of the US military presence in Korea and its impact on defense of the Republic.

\textbf{(U) ROK MND Orientations for US Personnel}

\textbf{(U)} During Mar-Oct 77 the ROK MND conducted 12 one-day orientation tours for 276 enlisted personnel and company grade officers selected by USFK commands. Inaugurated in 1972, this PAO-coordinated program consists of briefings at MND, visits to educational, cultural and industrial institutes in the Seoul area, and complimentary lunch at a Korean-style restaurant and dinner at a Western-style supper club. Participant reaction was most favorable.

\textbf{(U) Korea National Tourism Corporation Orientation Program}

\textbf{(U)} KNTC continued their complimentary goodwill capital city orientation program initiated in 1976. It is intended primarily for USFK troops serving in forward or remote areas. Personnel in the Seoul area could also participate but on a stand-by basis. Highlights included tours of a national palace, museum, university, television station and industrial plant in the Seoul area with a traditional Korean lunch, and a Western-style dinner at a local theater-restaurant. A total of 53 one-day tours were conducted by PAO during period 16 Mar - 2 Dec 77 for 3,444 officers, enlisted members and dependents. KNTC intends to continue this well-received program in 1978 for 4,000 selected USFK personnel and their spouses.

\textbf{(U) Korean-American Friendship Association (KAFA) Home Visit and Tour Programs}

\textbf{(U)} In Jul 75 the KAFA commenced a Home Visit Program, purpose of which was to extend friendship and appreciation to USFK members for American support of the ROK during and since the Korean War. Through this program, businessmen and ROKG officials invite USFK personnel and dependents into their homes for dinner and entertainment. This headquarters' \textsuperscript{13} This was site of Betty Hill, once the advance camp for allied war correspondents.
ACofS, J1 coordinates these home visits through ROKF liaison officers and US military representatives in USFK's major subordinate commands. In 1977, 3,327 American guests were accommodated by 608 Korean hosts bringing total participants since program's inception in 1975 to 9,865 and 2,017, respectively.

(U) KAPA also continued its program of two-three day cultural and industrial tours for USFK personnel and dependents. During 1977 the association sponsored six tours with 228 officers, enlisted members and spouses participating. Program included visits to Kyungju, the ancient capital of Korea; industrial centers at Pohang and Ulsan; and other scenic/cultural attractions in southern portion of the ROK. This command's PAO assisted in coordinating the KAPA goodwill project by conducting pre-tour briefings and maintaining lists of participants nominated by major USFK commands. KAPA plans to continue the tour program in 1978 for 400 USFK members and spouses.

(U) People-to-People (PTP) Activities

(U) President Eisenhower originated the PTP movement in 1956 to promote international peace and harmony through person-to-person contacts. The Korea National Headquarters (KNH) of PTP International was chartered in Jan 72, and has placed priority on establishing PTP clubs in cities and towns near US military installations. In fact, the first PTP chapter to be formed outside the US was in Chunchon, home of the 4th USA Msl Cmd. Many USFK members, military and civilian, have joined 12 local PTP clubs to foster better relations and mutual understanding. Club activities included American-Korean goodwill sports meets, home visits, and cultural/entertainment programs.

(U) Hello Korea Program

(U) Hello Korea is a cultural entertainment program initiated by the ROK Ministry of Culture and Information with sponsorship transferred in Sep 72 to the Public Relations Association of Korea (PRAK). (In Mar 76 PRAK was reorganized and renamed the International Cultural Society of Korea (ICSK).) The two-hour presentation consists of a film on Korea, live performances of Korean traditional folk and court dances, and Korean/American songs sung by the Hello Korea chorus. ICSK, in cooperation with PAO, sponsored three Hello Korea performances before an appreciative audience of 2,500 USFK personnel during 1977. This headquarters provided transportation and the receiving unit furnished meals for the performers; all other costs were borne by the sponsor. ICSK notified this headquarters in Aug 77 that it would discontinue Hello Korea performances in favor of its ongoing Operation Stars - a musical variety production which tours
USFK installations annually. Operation Stars, which includes some cultural acts and reaches more Korea-based American military personnel than did Hello Korea, is discussed on page 301.

(U) American Forces Korea Network (AFKN)
Radio and Television Upgrade

(U) Korea-wide, AFKN operates 19 TV outlets, 15 AM radio outlets (seven with studio originating capability), and a FM network that has grown to ten outlets (six stereo and four monaural). Numerous improvements in AFKN TV and radio service were accomplished throughout the command during the year. Specifics follow.

-- AFKN TV and FM radio reception in the Seoul area was markedly improved in Jul 77 by relocating the Channel 2 antenna tower and installing a new 5,000-watt transmitter. This AFKN equipment is now situated on 850-foot high Namsan Hill 3 one mile northeast of Yongsan Main Post, collocated with a 1st Sg Bde unit. TV transmission from the previous site several miles north of Seoul created shadow areas with resultant poor reception; an additional 20-watt transmitter, Channel 5, provided supplemental service for Seoul area viewers. Relocation of Channel 2 to Namsan Hill eliminated need for Channel 5, which was concurrently deactivated.

-- Expansion and renovation of AFKN's studio/headquarters building at Yongsan was completed in mid-77. By year's end the new facilities were fully occupied except for space allocated to the Network News Center; that element was scheduled to relocate from its present prefabricated quarters by spring 1978. Remodeling work included construction of a two-story annex to the existing building for additional operating space, complete electrical upgrading, and installation of air conditioning.

-- TV reception in 2d Inf Div area was enhanced considerably during the year with activation of two additional UHF transmitters. Channel 70 (1,000 watts) at Kuksabong (Hill 754) and Channel 75 (20 watts) at Camp Hovey now serve the headquarters and two of the division's brigades, supplementing Camp Casey's Channel 2. The transmission site at Camp Stanley was deactivated as Kuksabong's Channel 70 effectively serves the locality.

-- AFKN's 24-hour FM radio broadcasting service was expanded in 1977 by adding three transmitters to reach audiences in Munsan (2d Inf Div), Wonju (Camp Long), and Pyongtaek (Camp Humphreys) areas. All FM programming originates from the automated key station at AFKN headquarters in Seoul.

15. AFKN Hist Sum 1977.
-- In 1976, due to a sharp increase in Camp Humphreys' military population, a request was submitted for DA funds to build and equip TV studio facilities which would be manned by AFKN personnel. Request was approved but higher priority construction projects at Camp Humphreys caused target date of Jul 77 to be moved forward until Jul 79.

-- Approximately 65 soldiers of the 609th Ord Co stationed at Masan Ammo Depot on ROK's southern coast near Chinhae were provided closed circuit TV service during the year signal reception from the microwave relay station at Pulmosan, a mountain located ten miles to the northeast. Establishment of a previously planned separate UHF channel for Masan viewers was determined to be technically unfeasible.

(FOUO) **AFKN Color Television** (U)

(U) The Los Angeles-based American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) advised its TV networks in early 1974 that it intended to convert to full color in near future. Accordingly, AFKN, along with its sister networks, began planning for procurement of color TV equipment. Upgrade was necessary as AFKN and other networks had found that in many cases replacement parts for black and white TV systems were no longer being manufactured. In Apr 74 DA's Material Procurement Priorities Review Committee approved FY 76 funding of $828,000 for AFKN color TV equipment. In fall 1975 AFKN submitted list of required conversion equipment to the Army Television Audio Support Activity (TASA). Later in the year, however, DA placed a hold on FY 76 audio-visual funds due to other fiscal priorities. In mid-1976 DA approved a partial restoration of funds ($275,000) for the color conversion project, of which $205,000 was used for expansion of the AFKN studio building in Yongsan to accommodate new color equipment (discussed in preceding topic). AFKN was required to revalidate equipment requirements; revised list, approved by DA in late 1976, contained less costly and fewer items than those originally requested.

(U) Color equipment arrived in the ROK during Mar-Jun 77; concurrently plans were developed to install equipment without disrupting normal TV programming. For this purpose, AFKN obtained loan of a mobile broadcasting van from TASA for origination of scheduled local studio TV programs during conversion. With all installation work performed by AFKN technicians, the color television cameras and associated production/switching equipment were tested and readied on a phased basis. On 1 Jul 77 color broadcasts of AFRTS network programs were shown for the first time on AFKN-TV; local AFKN studio color televcasts began on 20 Jul.

(U) As AFKN-TV was installing color capable equipment, AFRTS was

preparing to circuit its network programs in color on 3/4 inch videotape cassettes, replacing black and white kinescopes. By year’s end all AFRN programming, except for older movies, was being distributed in color. In Dec AFRN-TV advanced its weekday sign-on time from 1400 to 1200 hours. Generally, prime time shows carried the preceding evening were used in the expanded time block.

(FOUO) In Aug 77 the AFRN Cdr attended a meeting with ROKG Ministry of Culture and Information officials on the subject of color conversion compatibility. It was the position of the Korean authorities that AFRN should not continue broadcasting color television programs until local Korean TV systems have been granted ROKG approval for color telecasts, projected for the 1980-81 timeframe. USFK did not agree. Subsequently, the matter was addressed several times by a US-ROK SOFA Joint Committee during latter half CY 77, with the ROK and US positions on the issue still at variance. Meanwhile, AFRN has limited its color programming to evening prime time shows and weekend sports events, which constitute about 45 percent of AFRN’s total TV broadcast time.

(U) AFRN Programming Developments

(U) Live satellite television coverage of major US sports events by AFRN-TV increased substantially during 1977. A total of 25 live sports telecasts were received for USFK viewers throughout the ROK, compared to seven per year in the past. Satellite coverage included NFL and college football (75 percent), World Series and All-Star baseball, and professional basketball games. The additional live programming became possible because of a marked expansion in DOD funding for satellite telecasts to overseas commands. Concurrent with DOD’s budget increase, AFRN also received $300,000 from USFK FY 77 and 78 monies to support live telecasts on a year-round basis. Increased funding allowed President Carter’s end-of-year press conference to be carried live via satellite in Dec 77. Plans were also firm for live coverage of the President’s state of the union address on 20 Jan 78. USFK viewer reaction to live TV programming was enthusiastic. Continuation of present scope of live coverage hinges on the adequacy of funds to be allocated by both DOD and USFK.

(U) In CY 77 significant improvements were made in timeliness of source material used in AFRN’s TV newscasts. A contract was awarded to ABC News/United Press International in Oct for AFRN participation in their satellite TV news service from the US to Japan. An average of five major US national or international news stories each day (five days weekly) are relayed via satellite to Tokyo, where the coverage is converted to videotape cassette format, and then flown overnight to Korea. Implementation of new system allowed USFK viewers to see film clips within 30 hours of the time they had been telecast in the US. Previously, AFRN had been
receiving all out-of-country news films by airmail from ABC News in New York, but coverage of top news events was obtained from the satellite TV news system in Tokyo. Commencing in Jul 77, AFKN also received CBS News cassette service from Los Angeles five days weekly; news was three-four days old when aired in the ROK.

(U) Adjutant General

(U) Establishment of USAAG Printing and Publications Center-Korea (PPCK)

(U) In Jun 75 SECDEF granted approval to relocate the US Army Printing and Publications Center, Honshu (Japan) to Korea. Decision was based on 1974 studies which noted that: (1) more than 75 percent of publications and forms support and approximately 45 percent of the center's printing workload were for Korea-based units, and (2) savings would be realized not only through reduction in shipping and handling expenditures but also through lower labor costs. An existing building at Camp Market, near Inchon, was selected to house the facility. Due to extensive amount of construction needed at that location, it was decided that a temporary plant would be established in an adjoining building until such time as the permanent plant was readied. During latter half 1975 all printing equipment and the publications inventory were shipped from Japan to the ROK and recruitment of Korean nationals to man PPCK was initiated. Four DAC supervisors, including the Center Director, transferred from Japan to Korea to direct PPCK operations. In Apr 76 the plant's Publications Center Div became fully operational in temporary facilities and assumed mission of processing tri-headquarters publications and blank forms. To carry out this additional function, Supply Point 23 at Niblo Barracks in Seoul was reassigned to and consolidated with the PPCK at Camp Market. In May 76 construction work began on the permanent plant building. PPCK commenced processing major printing requirements from commands on the Japanese mainland, Okinawa and Taiwan on an in-house basis during last qtr CY 76.17

(U) On 21 Apr 77 construction/renovation of Camp Market's permanent PPCK facility by a local contractor was completed. Movement of printing equipment (59 press units) from temporary building and installation to permanent structure was accomplished by end of May. Full personnel staffing was achieved during the year; at end CY 77 there were five US military, four DACs, five KATUSAs, and 65 Korean national employees (69 authorized). Printing production rate at close of reporting period had risen to 16 million units per month. PPCK capabilities enabled the tri-headquarters AG Reproduction Section to remain well within DA limits established for

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duplicating facility volumes (10,000 impressions per page or 25,000 for a multipage document). In early 1977 the Camp Market plant also commenced printing large quantity classified orders previously handled only by AG. Printing production for US Army Japan and Army elements on Taiwan accounted for five percent of PPCK's total 1977 workload. Fulfillment of requirements for USAF/USN organizations in Korea and Japan, performed under Interservice Support Agreements, amounted to six percent of total production. Nearly one fourth of PPCK workload during CY 77 was devoted to printing of command publications and blank forms.

(U) Effective 1 Oct 77 PPCK began printing unit newspapers for seven USFK subordinate commands (six Army and one Air Force). Previously, contracts for printing had been made with Pacific Stars and Stripes in Japan or a local Korean firm. By using PPCK services, units not only realized substantial monetary savings but could more effectively coordinate their printing requirements.18

(U) USA Postal Group-Korea Activities

(U) EUSA's postal system comprises 12 Army post offices and a military mail terminal which serve a minimum of 50,000 military members, DOD employees, invited contractors and their dependents in the ROK. In Apr 76 a separate EUSA postal command was established on a provisional basis. All non-divisional postal units and the UNC/USFK/EUSA AG's Staff Postal Section were reassigned to the centralized group and organized as follows (locations in parentheses): Group Hq and 19th AG Det-Postal (Yongsan), 1st AG Mil Mail Terminal (Camp Humphreys), 10th AG Det-Postal (Camp Red Cloud), 66th AG Det-Postal (Kimpo AB), and 117th AG Det-Postal (Camp Henry). No major changes in the 168-man authorization were necessary.

(U) On 1 Jan 77 the USA Postal Group-Korea was formally activated as a permanent EUSA organization vice provisional status. Commander, an O-4, was dual-hatted as AG's Director of Postal Operations. All numbered units were originally organized under TOE 12-550H; in late 1977, however, units were reorganized under MTOE 12-550HP801. This conversion did not alter personnel strength, but significant equipment authorizations were added which contributed to effective accomplishment of assigned missions. Major postal improvements during CY 77 included:

-- Direct delivery to each EUSA postal activity of surface mail received from SeaVan vessels commenced in Jan. Carrier firm provided

delivery service in lieu of unloading all mail at port. New procedure deleted requirement for eight military vehicles previously used to transport mail throughout the ROK, reduced physical handling, and decreased mail transit time from the port to postal activity by two days.

-- In Nov once-weekly APO service was established at the 2d Inf Div's Cheju-do R&R and Training Center, located 60 miles south of the ROK's southern coast.

-- 1977 Christmas mail was air delivered by the 19th Avn Bn to eleven outlying troop installations, insuring receipt by addressees before 25 Dec. 20

(U) DA Survey of Records Management Requirements

(U) During period 5-27 Sep 77 a representative from the DA Adjutant General's Office conducted a fact-finding survey of 29 selected EUSA units to provide guidance for records disposition when elements are inactivated, discontinued, or withdrawn from Korea. Since the General Services Administration's new computerized system (NARS 5) cannot be implemented in a short tour area such as Korea, alternate shipping procedures and repository locations were explored for EUSA records disposition requirements. The report of findings suggested discontinuance of AG's Pusan Records Holding Area, establishment of an Overseas Command Records Holding Area in Japan, under control of USARJ, which would service all Army commands in the Pacific area. Also recommended was negotiation of interservice support agreements by this headquarters with tenant units in the ROK (those not assigned to EUSA) to provide them with records management support. 21 Specific DA guidance on both recommendations is expected in early CY 78.

(U) Microforms Program in Korea

(U) TAG is responsible for policy and development of microforms systems worldwide. This headquarters' AG, working in close conjunction with the Asst to the CofS for Mgt Info Sys, is the program manager for the Army microforms project in the ROK. Responsibilities include review of proposed microforms systems and issuance/control of readers and printers.

(U) In Jan 75 a complete microform document/information system,


termed MICRODIS, was instituted in the Yongsan Data Processing Center (YDPC). MICRODIS employs computer output micromation equipment at a cost of just under $100,000, funding for which was obtained through the Army Materiel Command's Capital Investment Opportunity Program at no cost to EUSA. The on-going conversion of reports required for command program documentation from hardcopy to microfiche (rectangular pieces of film stored in notebook-type binders) is estimated to save this command at least $150,000 annually in paper costs. By end CY 77, 186 of the 852 reports processed by YDPC were being produced in microfiche form. DA had approved in Dec 76 a MICRODIS capability for the 19th Spt Comd's ADP Center at Taegu. A team of micrographic specialists from TAGCEN visited the ROK in Mar 77 to provide guidance in equipment installation. The Taegu center's MICRODIS facility was expected to be fully operational by early 1978.

(U) Maximum command utilization of MICRODIS had been hampered since 1975 by shortages of readers and reader/printers. In Sep 77 year end funds were made available to requisition 500 additional readers and 100 reader/printers for distribution to all EUSA major commands. Delivery is expected in early 1978.

(U) Surgeon

(U) Aeromedical Evacuation Services

(U) USAMEDCOM-K's 377th Med Co (Air Amb) provides aeromedical evacuation support to USFK military and civilian personnel and their authorized dependents within the ROK. Additionally, the unit provides emergency movement of medical personnel and accompanying equipment/supplies, whole blood, biologicals, etc. to meet critical requirements command-wide. Effective 20 Oct 77 the company was reorganized under MTOE 08137HP801, with elements at following locations: unit headquarters at Yongsan Garrison along with four-eight operationally ready helicopters at Yongsan's H-201 heliport; service platoon at Seoul's K-16 AB where aircraft undergo organizational/direct support maintenance; a flight platoon of six helicopters at Taegu's Camp Walker; and one aircraft each at Camp Casey's H-252 and Osan AB. At the latter two sites, air crews rotated from Yongsan on a non-TDY basis. The MTOE change increased the company's aircraft authorization from 12 to 18 UH-1H helicopters and personnel strength from 91 to 123 (10 officers, 23 WOs, 90 enlisted).

(U) During 1977 the unit's air crews evacuated 793 emergency patients when ground transportation to Seoul was deemed not in best interest of the patient due to severity of illness or time-distance factors. Patient categories were: 508 US military members, 21 US civilian employees, 103 US military dependents, 107 ROK military members, 34 KATUSAs, 18 ROK
civilians, and two US K-9 security dogs. In late 1977 the platoon operating from Taegu was authorized to transport USFK dependents from the ROK's southern regions to the US Army Hospital, Seoul (USAHS) (121st Evac) for non-emergency medical consultation services; flights were scheduled on a twice-weekly basis.²²

(U) Medical Service Augmentation and Training

(U) The US Army Hospital Seoul (121st Evac) had 64 US physicians assigned at end CY 77 although 101 were authorized. The physician shortage is Army-wide. In Korea it is circumvented to a degree by rearranged schedules, greater use of medical assistants, and consolidation of services and clinics. Specialty clinics, such as dentistry and optometry, were properly staffed. Nine Korean national physicians were authorized in 1976 to augment the US hospital staff and medical commands, but due to few applicants only four were employed during the reporting period. USAMEDCOM-K officials cite relatively low pay (KWGS-12 is highest grade possible) as primary cause for lack of applicants.

(U) Several continuing medical training programs were underway at USAHS. Six ROKA nurses, four of whom are in surgical fields, serve for six month periods. In cooperation with the Seoul National University College of Medicine, six medical students in their senior year acquire practical experience in their specialties by working for three-week periods with US medical officers at USAHS. Another program involves eight student nurses from Ewha Womans University School of Nursing serving four-week tours in USAHS wards. These programs are mutually advantageous, providing USAHS with medical service augmentation and the doctor/nurse trainees an enriched educational experience.

(U) Hot Floor Heating Systems and Carbon Monoxide Poisoning

(U) The most significant environmental health hazard encountered during the year was carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning attributed to traditional Korean compressed coal home heating systems. These ondol (hot floor) heating methods are potentially hazardous due to generation of CO when incomplete combustion of compressed coal occurs. Hundreds of CO deaths among the Korean population are reported annually. During Nov-Dec 76 four USFK servicemen died from CO poisoning despite an intensive preventive health education effort launched prior to the winter heating season. Only one USFK death resulted from overexposure to carbon monoxide in 1977, that of an APK serviceman in Apr.

(U) Prior to the start of the heating season in Oct 77, increased emphasis was placed on publicizing the dangers inherent in Korean ondol heating systems. Information means used included: frequent spot announcements on AFKN radio and television; command-wide dissemination of warnings and basic precautions through Troop Topics, weekly bulletin announcements, Stars and Stripes and unit newspapers; periodic scheduling of CO poisoning prevention as a high priority subject in unit training programs; and visits of EUSA preventive medicine and safety specialists to provide comprehensive instruction in troop units.

(U) Medical inspection and evaluation of economy housing remained a key factor in minimizing exposure to hazardous environments. Living quarters utilizing compressed coal heating systems were not approved for occupancy by USFK personnel, unless an alternate safe system was provided and the ondol arrangement made inoperable. USAMEDCOM-K's preventive medicine personnel furnished qualified assistance by means of home visits to all USFK members requesting their services. Efforts continued throughout the year to obtain a reliable, inexpensive detection/warning device for sale in exchanges. Several monitors of both US and Korean manufacture were examined for accuracy, sensitivity and ease of operation, but none were found fully adequate for purpose intended.

(U) Predominant Diseases in Korea

(U) There is a relatively high incidence of two diseases among the US military troop population in the ROK. Both are debilitating but neither are fatal. The first of these is hepatitis, a virus of the liver, usually caused by contamination or poor hygiene in off-post areas. Despite a command-wide gamma globulin program, rate of incidence in 1977 was same as in previous years--four per thousand per year. The other, venereal disease, is far more prevalent affecting 45 US military members per thousand per month. The CY 77 figure reflected the per annum average which is slightly higher than the rate in CONUS military commands. Unlike hepatitis, which can cause absences from duty of up to three months, VD does not result in a loss of appreciable man-days as most soldiers are treated on an outpatient rather than in-patient basis. Unsanitary conditions and availability of contacts add to the VD problem. Both diseases are the subject of frequent health lectures and command information bulletins and articles.

(U) Veterinary Activities

(U) EUSA's 52-man 106th Med Det (VS) provides inspection services for all USFK subsistence items arriving in the ROK from CONUS sources as well as those procured locally from the Korean economy. During the year 599,864,000 pounds of foodstuffs were examined for compliance with health/
sanitation standards; 1,206,657 pounds were rejected as inedible. In early 1977 a comprehensive inspection was performed on subsistence stocks (over 1,000 CONEX containers) held by commissaries at Yongsan and Taegu prior to assumption of Army commissary operations by US Army Troop Support Agency. Potential health hazards at the EUSA Milk Plant were thoroughly investigated during a special sanitation inspection of that facility in Jul 77. Among deficiencies noted were use of improper methods in popsicle production, unsatisfactory rodent control measures, unsanitary cleaning procedures, and building and equipment disrepair. Funds were made available for interim upgrading to allow continued operation of the plant. (Planning for construction of new milk plant is discussed on page 172.) The detachment’s four veterinary teams, located in high troop density areas, administer a continuous zoonotic control program to help safeguard USFK personnel against animal-transmitted diseases. Inspection teams also sample produce and soil on Korean farms which provide salad type vegetables for USFK consumption. Twenty-seven farms were removed from the approved list of local produce suppliers during CY 77 because of parasites found in soil samples taken by a detachment zoonosis control specialist; at end reporting period 17 farms remained on the approved list. Health care for US Government owned animals in the Taegu area was improved in Feb 77 by assignment of a full time veterinary officer to EUSA’s Military Working Dog School at Camp Carroll. During the year the detachment’s Yongsan team conducted two-week veterinary training courses for 18 working dog handlers. The detachment continued to operate an animal hospital at Yongsan for pets of USFK members and two clinics at Taegu and Pusan.23

(U) Chaplain

(U) Religious/Spiritual Activities

(U) During 1977 the UNC/USFK/EUSA Staff Chaplain increased or introduced new spiritual guidance programs. Among them:24

-- The 55 staff and field chaplains concentrated their activities primarily in the important area of troop guidance. Responsiveness was


NOTE: Other activities of Office of the Surgeon, HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA, and the USAMEDCOM-K, have been reported in detail in the Annual Report, Army Medical Department Activities (RCS Med-41 [R4]), submitted to the Surgeon General, DA in Dec 77 under provisions of AR 40-226.

noted by increased attendance at both religious and social/welfare sessions and by the support and favorable comment of unit commanders. This marked improvement in troop participation is attributed in large part to an influx of energetic chaplains whose modern training and sensitivity to people's needs allows them greater rapport with military personnel.

-- A 30-minute television program entitled "Parson to Person" was a well received Sunday morning feature on AFKN-TV during first half 77. Program format consisted of interviews conducted by a staff chaplain with prominent individuals in the ROK, both military and civilian, who fully utilize their religious faith. Interviewees included the ROK President's daughter who, since her mother's death, acts as the nation's "First Lady;" the Israeli ambassador to the ROK; the local USO director; and the US Army Chief of Chaplains during his visit to Korea. Also featured were informal dialogues with US commanders, who presented their views on moral and religious responsibilities and described spiritual development programs within their organizations. The I Corps (ROK/US) Group, MEDCOM-K, and USAG Yongsan commanders appeared on the program in early 1977. Programs were suspended in mid-year because a qualified media-trained replacement was not available when the participating chaplain departed the command for reassignment. Plans were underway at end of reporting period to resume a similar type television program in 1978.

-- More than 12,000 USFK military and civilian members attended 271 retreats conducted during the year at the EUSA Retreat Center. Located on Namseon Hill near Yongsan Garrison, the Center schedules retreats, normally 3-4 days in length, for all faiths. Billeting is available for 65 in double rooms, and facilities include a dining hall, outdoor recreational areas, TV room, a library and classrooms. Tours to local cultural attractions and social activities with Korean student groups add variety to the religious retreat programs.

-- Approximately 250 marriage requests per month were received, each requiring counseling by both the commander and chaplain in accordance with EUSA directives. The language barrier plus time constraints made adequate counseling almost impossible. To overcome these problems this headquarters in Oct 76 approved establishment of a week-long pre-marriage clinic at HQ USAG-Yongsan. Clinic sessions at this pilot project were attended by prospective husbands and their Korean fiancées. A chaplain and his wife led discussions centered on wide differences in Korean and American cultures/life styles and resulting problems of marital adjustment. An average of 12 couples per week attended the clinic throughout 1977. Plans to form similar clinics in other areas of the ROK were under review at year's end.

-- During the year six chaplains received a 32-hour block of
instruction conducted by the Staff Chaplain for implementation of a Parent Effectiveness Training Course (PETC) program in the ROK. Intent was to provide interested couples with guidance on adjusting to pressures on family harmony in Korea. PETC sessions were then conducted during evening hours at five major troop installations.

-- In 1977 initial materials were accumulated for a Religious Resource Center. Established in the Staff Chaplain’s Office at Yongsan, the Center will be stocked with an extensive selection of audio cassettes for use by groups conducting religious training programs and for individual Bible study. Also available in the Center is audio/video tape equipment for use primarily by chaplains in improving their presentation techniques; recorders and playback devices were provided through a US Army Chief of Chaplains Fund grant.

-- Through the foresight of the command, 27 senior members of the 71 visiting denominational representatives in CY 77 received the Threat/ Counterthreat briefing which provided official answers to their questions regarding the presence and continued need of American armed forces in Korea.

(U) Morale and Welfare

(U) US Army Recreation Service Agency, Korea (RSAK) Highlights

(U) RSAK assets comprise 268 sports facilities, 53 libraries, 39 arts and crafts shops, 23 recreation centers, five music/theater centers, four youth activities centers, two bookmobiles, a library service center, and a supply depot.

(U) Major developments in RSAK programs during 1977 included the following:

-- Library improvements included installation of a "Tattle Tape" security system at the Yongsan Post Library in late 77. System is designed to prevent unauthorized removal of library materials; it was estimated that costs for devices would be redeemed by value of materials retrieved within first two years of operation. In Nov 77 a field collection library consisting of a 1,700 volume cataloged set of paperback books was established for EUSA’s Wightman NCO Academy at Camp Jackson.

-- Upgrading of sports facilities at several installations continued throughout the year. At Camp Humphreys a new 12 lane bowling center equipped with automatic pinsetters was opened in May and construction was completed on a $500,000 gymnasium in Nov. Rehabilitation of Yongsan’s bowling center in fall 77 included installation of 18 automatic pinsetters.
UNCLASSIFIED

-- Two mobile tape dubbing centers were established at Camps Humphreys and Walker. The units provide soldiers in isolated areas an opportunity to reproduce reel-to-reel tapes, records, cassettes, and cartridges from a wide variety of music.

-- In 1976 EUSA recreation centers actively participated in a worldwide photography contest with bicentennial themes. Contest was divided into two program categories, 8mm sound movies and 35mm slides timed to an audio cassette tape. When judging was held in Jan 77 at Washington D.C., recreation centers in this command were awarded first/second place in the 35mm slide category (Camp Casey/Yongsan) and first place/honorable mention in the 8mm movie division (Camp Colbern/Pusan). Two new recreation center annexes were opened at Camps Essayons and Pelham during the year to provide troops at those isolated installations with more adequate off-duty facilities.

-- In 1977 the Korean-American Friendship Association (KAFA) sponsored for the third consecutive year a musical variety production entitled "Operation Stars '77." The show toured USFK installations, including those in remote areas, giving 37 performances to enthusiastic audiences during period 15 Apr - 13 May 77. The 37-member troupe included some of Korea's top musical stage and TV personalities. (Other ROK-sponsored goodwill programs coordinated by PAO and ACoFS, J1 are described on page 286.)

-- The annual ROK/US Goodwill Model Airplane Meet was held on 9 Oct 77 at the ROKAF Academy in Seoul. Jointly sponsored by RSAK and the Republic of Korea's "Student Science Magazine," the contest attracted ROK/US military and civilian model plane enthusiasts from all over Korea. Some 120 hobbyists entered competitive events conducted for a wide variety of model aircraft; spectators numbered approximately 10,000.

(U) Korea Regional Exchange

(KRE) Operations

(U) KRE is the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) element servicing all US military and DOD personnel and their dependents in the ROK. The system operates 99 retail stores, 145 food outlets, five automobile repair garages, two gasoline stations, 46 paid theaters (24 35mm, 22 16mm), 73 free theaters (16mm), 832 concessions (88 contracts), two bakeries, one food holding plant, and one centralized merchandise repair

25. On 26 Jun 68 AAFES designated Korea as a separate exchange region, thus establishing KRE. Previously, local exchange operations had been responsible to such organizations as the US Army Forces in Korea (1946), Japan Central Exchange (1949), Far East Exchange Service (1959), and the Japan/Korea Regional Exchange-Pacific Exchange System (1956).
facility. A total of 188 US personnel (43 career, 145 temporary hire) and 2,189 Korean nationals work directly for KRE, which also indirectly supervises approximately 3,240 concession employees.

(U) KRE FY 78 (26 Jan 77 - 25 Jan 78) total projected sales of $105.5 million (a 20 percent increase over previous period) comprised: retail--$80.9 million, food--$16.7 million, vending--$4.8 million, and services--$3.1 million. Concession services, commodity and automotive operations totaled $24.6 million and generated $2.0 million in FY 78 income for KRE. FY 78 net earnings, which represent KRE's portion of the AAFES contribution to Army and Air Force welfare funds, are estimated at $14 million as compared to $10.8 million (actual sum) in FY 77. 26

(U) FY 78 KRE losses through theft and illegal diversions were reduced substantially. A yearly comparison of major loss areas follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>FY 74</th>
<th>FY 75</th>
<th>FY 76</th>
<th>FY 77</th>
<th>FY 78 (est)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purchases/In-Transit</td>
<td>473,825</td>
<td>154,419</td>
<td>192,605</td>
<td>22,167</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory Shortages</td>
<td>974,545</td>
<td>437,043</td>
<td>726,636</td>
<td>492,694</td>
<td>375,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$1,448,370</td>
<td>$591,462</td>
<td>$919,261</td>
<td>$519,861</td>
<td>$367,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) KRE's new Central Depot at Camp Market was fully operational by mid-year; construction of the $3 million facility was begun in Oct 73. 27 Completion of the new depot complex enabled KRE to consolidate its central warehouse operation from 58 buildings used at the previous Inchon location to nine at the Camp Market site, thus allowing more effective control and security. Strategically placed floodlighting, a centralized alarm system, and employment of sentry dogs have been key factors in maintaining a highly secure depot compound. Additionally, US military police conduct direct surveillance of receiving and shipping operations. These intensified security efforts have contributed materially to reduction of losses through theft and diversions, as reflected in chart above.

(U) In early 77 AAFES authorized and funded local procurement of Korean manufactured export quality clothing for sale in KRE retail outlets at bargain prices. Approximately $400,000 was committed for 1977 delivery of men's and women's garments, including fur-lined leather sports coats/jackets. Customer reaction was very favorable, and $200,000 purchase of other export quality product lines, including footwear, bicycles, and crystal, was planned for 1978.

(U) Throughout the year KRE provided exchange services for out-of-country forces deployed to the ROK for training. Prime example was support of Okinawa-based USMC artillery battalions during four three-week firing exercises at Santa Barbara Range. Deployed units averaged 600 in strength. KRE support included mobile retail store and food service units, concession tent stores, barber shops, laundry/tailor facilities, and free movies.

(U) During CY 77 KRE suffered two major fire losses, both occurring at Camp Red Cloud. On night of 11 May 77 the Main Exchange complex, consisting of a retail store, barber shop, food outlet and storage facility, was destroyed by fire. Damage and loss was estimated at approximately $425,000; no injuries were reported. Firefighting units from Camps Red Cloud, Stanley, Sears, and Casey, LaGuardia Army Airfield, and Uijeongbu City responded to the blaze. Cause was attributed to a short circuit in a freezer unit located in the Main Exchange building. KRE officials hastily formulated contingency plans to establish substitute exchange facilities for the Camp Red Cloud military community. The existing Concession Arcade building adjacent to the burned-out area was selected as location for a new retail store. The Arcade in turn was moved to site of Civilian Personnel Office; latter agency was relocated to nearby Camp Falling Water. To quickly accumulate a sufficient stock assortment, merchandise was obtained from the seven other in-country main exchanges to supplement items immediately available at the Camp Market Depot. Opening ceremonies were held for the new Camp Red Cloud Main Exchange on 14 May 77; shortly thereafter barber and food outlet facilities were reestablished in temporary structures within the complex.

(U) On 30 May 77 an early morning fire forced the recently opened Main Exchange to suspend operations temporarily. Water caused considerable damage to merchandise; however, about 80 percent of store stock was salvaged and offered at a fire sale. Nevertheless, total loss incurred was estimated at $96,000. There were no injuries. Cause of fire, which originated in outside area at rear of building, was determined to be arson. Culprits were not detected. Full service store operations were resumed on 9 Jul 77 following rehabilitation of structure.

(U) A new severance pay plan for KRE's Korean national employees was implemented on 1 Apr 77. Plan was agreed to by Hq AAFES-Pacific, KRE, USFK and the ROKG's Labor Affairs Office. The Foreign Organization Employees Union also endorsed the proposal. The new scheme was patterned on procedures used by USFK for its nonappropriated fund KN employees. Under the new policy, all eligible KN employees were given lump sum severance pay for all creditable service from date of hire to 31 Mar 77. A total of $10.3 million was paid to approximately 2200 KRE employees. Effective 1 Apr 77 severance pay will be deposited every two years in individual accounts at a designated Korean bank; employees have option of selecting one of three accredited banks. Under the plan, one month's

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28. Present rate of interest for long term bank deposits in Korea is 18 percent.
severance pay is accrued for each year of service. The new procedure will enhance financial management at KRE since it will permit its severance pay liabilities to be liquidated on a biannual basis.  

(U) Headquarters Commandant

(U) HQ COMDT provides support for the tri-headquarters in garrison and during field operations, less installation and facilities engineering assists. Units assigned to HQ COMDT are: HHC EUSA, EUSA Band, USA Elm, Honor Guard Co, USA MP Det-K, 21st Trans Co (Car), 38th Chem Det, Sp Forces Det-K, and the EUSA Wightman NCO Academy.

(U) In 1977 the HQ COMDT successfully fulfilled the following tasks during Exercises TEAM SPIRIT (26 Mar - 11 Apr) and ULCHI-FOCUS LENS (8-14 Jul):

-- Prepared and published Administrative Instructions for use by players at TANGO and Rear Command Posts.

-- Provided transportation for player/controller personnel and equipment to TANGO and Rear CPs.

-- Maintained physical security of TANGO and Rear CPs through use of the TANGO Security Force and the Honor Guard Co. Access control was established at both locations by issuing an exercise pass, valid at either site, to individuals identified by their staff elements as requiring entrance to a facility. Access to staff section areas was a control responsibility of the section itself. Visitors were provided temporary passes and were escorted by members of the section to be visited. HQ COMDT furnished security personnel to accompany Korean national maintenance and janitorial workers.

-- Operated dining facilities for individuals at TANGO CP, including a General Officers' Mess. Four meals were provided daily at each mess.

(U) The UNC Honor Guard and the EUSA Band provided this headquarters and other units throughout the ROK with professional ceremonial support during 1977. The Band performed 84 commitments for both military and civilian audiences throughout the ROK (not including weekly retreats and other ceremonies at Yongsan Garrison); the Honor Guard participated in 75 ceremonies. Unlike the Band, which is comprised of 40 US male and female members, the Honor Guard is composed of one platoon from the US Army, one from each of the three ROK services, and a composite UN platoon consisting of elements from the United Kingdom, Thailand and the Philippines—a total

29. KRE Hist Sum 1977.
of 165 male personnel. The Thailand and Philippines contingents consist of five men each who serve a one-year tour with the Honor Guard. The 30-man UK contingent is unique. Rotating from Hong Kong every two months, it furnishes both ceremonial support at Yongsan and security augmentation for Military Armistice Commission meetings at Panmunjom. Parent units of UK contingents in the ROK during the reporting period were:31

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th Queen Elizabeth's Own Gurkha Rifles</td>
<td>Jan-Mar 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 2d King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles</td>
<td>Mar-May 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles</td>
<td>May-Jul 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 2d King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles</td>
<td>Jul-Sep 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, The Light Infantry</td>
<td>Sep-Nov 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 2d King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles</td>
<td>Nov 77-Jan 78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31. UNC Liaison Officer Hist Sum 1977.
APPENDIX 1

List of Distinguished Visitors
 to the Command
 1977

(Refer to page 7)
# LIST OF DISTINGUISHED VISITORS TO THE COMMAND

(1 Jan - 31 Dec 77)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/Date</th>
<th>Total Number In Party</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. James D. Martin (GS-17) 4-7 Jan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Deputy Dir, Human Resr and Dev Div, GAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Valcris O. Ewell, Jr (GS-16) 8-28 Jan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Assoc Dir for Proc Mgt Review, DARCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Edwin L. Kennedy 10-14 Jan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CofS, USARJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH (BG) Thaddeus F. Malanowski 14-21 Jan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Deputy CCH, DA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Donald J. Alderson (GS-16E) 15-18 Jan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Library of Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Louis L. Wilson, Jr 17-20 Jan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>CINCPACAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Patrick M. Roddy 17-21 Jan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>HAWK Proj Mgr, MICOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Arthur W. Reese (GS-16E) 17-22 Jan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Computer Sciences Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA1M C. W. Ross 20-23 Jan</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Comdt, Natl Defense College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Irwin L. Lebow (GS-18E) 23-26 Jan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chief Scientist-Assoc Dir, Technology, DCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishop Clarence E. Hobgood (GS-16E) 24-27 Jan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Episcopal Bishop of the Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Thomas B. Hayward 31 Jan - 2 Feb</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Benson K. Buffham (Exec V) 1-3 Feb</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Deputy Dir, NSACSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name/Date</td>
<td>Total Number In Party</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Claire M. Garrecht</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chief, USAF Nurse Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5 Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Donald S. Marshall (GS-16E)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Consultant to the Asst SECDEF for Atomic Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Hiram K. Tompkins</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dir, Directorate for Log, Plans, Ops and Sys, DCSLOG, DA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-11 Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Joseph Koler, Jr</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CG, III MAF/1st Marine Air Wg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8 Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG John R. Guthrie</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cdr, USARJ/CG, IX Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-10 Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMA William G. Bainbridge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sergeant Major of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-23 Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Stanley T. Counts</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Cdr, TF 75/Cruiser-Destroyer Gp FIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-18 Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Wilton B. Persons, Jr</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>TJAG, DA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-19 Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Rupert H. Burris</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cdr, Air Force Communications Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-22 Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Kenneth D. Burns</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cdr, USAF Security Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-27 Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Robert Hiller (GS-16)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dir of Operations Anal, PACAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-8 Mar</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Walter H. Baxter III</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cdr, 313th Air Div/18th TFW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4 Mar</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG John W. Huston</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chief, Ofc of Air Force History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8 Mar</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Benjamin Massey (GS-16E)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Vice Chancellor of Univ College, Univ of Md</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8 Mar</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RADM Sylvester R. Foley, Jr</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cdr, Carr Op SEVEN/TG 77.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-8 Mar</td>
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<td>Name/Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Noah C. New 9-11 Mar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>CG, III MAF/1st Marine Air Wg</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH Douglas M. Blair (GS-16E) 11-14 Mar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Div of CHs and Related Ministries, United Methodist Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Stephen M. Drezner (GS-16E) 13-18 Mar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dir, Proj AF Log Program, RAND Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Mary E. Clarke 14-18 Mar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>WAC Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Wilbur B. Payne (PL-313) 14-18 Mar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dir, TRADOC Sys Anal Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG John B. Marks, Jr 15-20 Mar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dir for Intel, PACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Wilbert McKeechie (GS-16E) 18-22 Mar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>President, American Psych Assoc and Acad Dev Consultant to the FE Div, Univ of Md</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Robert S. Smith 18-23 Mar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cdr, Cruiser-Destroyer Gp ONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG Leroy J. Manor 21-24 Mar</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>CofS, PACOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Edward C. Killin (GS-16) 23-26 Mar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dir, DOD Depn Schools, Pacific Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Robert E. Sadler 22-27 Mar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Deputy Dir, Plans and Programs, DCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. William R. Ferguson (GS-16E) 24-28 Mar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Co-Chairman, Hennessey AF Food Svc Award Com</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Robert C. Taylor 26 Mar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Incoming Cdr, AFK/314th Air Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Walter J. Nehl 29 Mar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Incoming Cdr, 38th ADA Bde</td>
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<tr>
<td>VADM Robert B. Baldwin</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Mar - 3 Apr</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN F. Michael Rogers</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Mar - 1 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTG Edward M. Flanagan, Jr</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Mar - 6 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG David E. Grange, Jr</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Mar - 6 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Noah C. New</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-2 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Duane J. Russell (GS-17)</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-5 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Robert C. Kingston</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-7 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Forrest C. Murphy, Jr</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-8 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Willard W. Scott</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-8 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Max L. Davidson (GS-16)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-8 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Charles C. Pattillo</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-10 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG William H. Fitch</td>
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<tr>
<td>8-9 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Norman W. Courley</td>
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<tr>
<td>8-11 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>RADM Paul Speer</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Noah C. New</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH (MG) Orris E. Kelly 9-15 Apr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chief of Chaplains, DA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Don D. Pittman 10 Apr</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Outgoing Cdr, AFK/314th Air Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. James B. Webster (GS-16) 10-13 Apr</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Systems Architect, NSACSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Oren E. DeHaven 10-19 Apr</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dir of Trans, Energy and Troop Spt, ODCSLOG, DA</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Ames S. Albro, Jr 12 Apr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Outgoing DISTE.NGR, FE Dist, CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Henry P. Glindeman 13 Apr</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Cdr, TF 77/Carr Strike Force, Seventh Flt</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Jan Beckman 15 Apr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Incoming Swedish Member, NNSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>RADM Floyd H. Miller, Jr 16-20 Apr</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cdr, TF 75/Cruiser-Destroyer Force Seventh Flt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reverend Milton S. Ernstmeyer (GS-16E) 16-22 Apr</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Div of Svc to Mil Pers, Lutheran Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>RADM Hugh A. Benton 17-20 Apr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dir for Log and Scty Asst (J4), PACOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Thomas M. Rienzi 21-25 Apr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dir, Telecom and Comd and Cont, ODCSOPS, DA</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Lage Wernstedt 25 Apr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Outgoing Swedish Member, NNSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN Bernard W. Rogers 27-30 Apr</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>CSA</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Lucius Theus 30 Apr - 3 May</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dir of Acct and Fin, HQ USAF, and Cdr, AF Acct and Fin Cen</td>
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<tr>
<td>RADM Warren C. Hamm, Jr 2 May</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Incoming Cdr, NFK</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>LTC Lawrence F. Snowden</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>DCS for Plans and Plcy, HQ USMC</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-4 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>RADM Paul A. Lautermilch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>IG, PACFLT</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-7 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Thomas M. Sadler</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Chief, AF Security Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-8 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Harrison Lobdell, Jr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Comdt, Natl War College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-9 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>RADM Robert M. Collins</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cdr, Naval Surface Gp, WESTPAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-7 May</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RADM Mark P. Frudden</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Outgoing Cdr, NFK</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>RADM George P. March</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cdr, Naval Security Gp Comd</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-8 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Robert W. Tindall</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Admin Secy and Dir of CH Svc, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(GS-16E) 8-10 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN Louis L. Wilson, Jr</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>CINCPACAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-13 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. James W. Jamieson (GS-18E)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>General Mgr, San Diego Navy Fed Credit Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-29 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Keith A. Smith</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Asst Wg Cdr, 1st Marine Air Wg, FMF Pac</td>
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<tr>
<td>11-13 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG James E. Freeze</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Deputy Cdr, INSCOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>14-18 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. John D. Robison (GS-17)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Act Asst Com, Insp and Control Directorate, US Customs Svc</td>
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<tr>
<td>15-19 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTG Walter T. Galligan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cdr, US Forces Japan/5th AF</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-20 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Noah C. New</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>CG, III MAF/1st Marine Air Wg</td>
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<tr>
<td>17-18 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name/Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN William G. Moore, Jr 18-20 May</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>CINCMAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Otis C. Lynn 20-22 May</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>CofS, US Forces Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dean Stephen J. Knezevich (GS-16E) 21-24 May</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dean, Univ of Southern Cal School of Educ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG John Q. Henion 23-28 May</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cdr, USARJ/CG, IX Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Forrest C. Murphy, Jr 23-29 May</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cdr, HQ IX Corps (Augment)/CofS, IX Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN George S. Brown Hon Philip C. Habib 24-27 May</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>CJCS Undersecretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Marion C. Ross 24-28 May</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Asst Deputy CofS for Operations and Plans, DA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Richard L. Bernard (GS-16) 24-28 May</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chief, Ofc of Microwave, Space and Mbl Sys, NSACSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG LaVern E. Weber 25-28 May</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chief, NGB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM William R. St George 26-28 May</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Cdr, Naval Surface Force, PACFLT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG James A. Knight, Jr 26-29 May</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Cdr, USAF Tac Ftr Wpns Cen, TAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. William H. McClure (GS-16E) 27 May - 1 Jun</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chairman, Final Eval Com for the Philip A. Connally Awards Prog, Food Svc Exec Assoc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Donald E. Sampson 28 May</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Incoming CofS, I Corps (ROK/US) Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG William J. Livsey 30 May</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Outgoing CofS, I Corps (ROK/US) Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name/Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Harry A. Griffith 30 May</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Incoming Chief, JUSMAG-K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Francis J. Toner 31 May</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Incoming ACofS, J4, UNC/USFK/EUSA</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Emil L. Konopnicki 3 Jun</td>
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<td>Outgoing ACofS, J4, UNC/USFK/EUSA</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTG James E. Hill 3-4 Jun</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cdr, 8th AF (Vice CINCSAC designee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Hilding L. Jacobson, Jr 3-4 Jun</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cdr, 3rd Air Div, SAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG James H. Johnson 4-11 Jun</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Dir, Personnel/IG, PACOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Oliver D. Street III 5 Jun</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Outgoing Chief, JUSMAG-K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Robert F. McCarthy 5-7 Jun</td>
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<td>Dir, Communications/Data Proc Directorate, PACOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Thomas R. Morgan 6-8 Jun</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Asst Div Cdr, 3rd Marine Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hon Morton I. Abramowitz 6-8 Jun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Deputy Asst SECDEF for East Asia and Pacific Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Joseph A. Amendola (GS-16E) 8-11 Jun</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chairman, Final Eval Com for the Philip A. Connelly Awards Prog, Food Svc Exec Assoc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Ralph Richardson (GS-17E) 9-13 Jun</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>President, Board of Trustees, Los Angeles Com Colleges</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Robert C. Kingston 10 Jun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Incoming ACofS, J3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Noah C. New 12-15 Jun</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>CG, III MAF/1st Marine Air Wg</td>
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<td>Name/Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. John F. Lally (GS-17E)</td>
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<td>Chief Counsel, House Armed Svc Com</td>
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<td>18-20 Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. William Semkow (GS-16E)</td>
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<td>Pacific Area Executive, USO</td>
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<td>18-21 Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Michael E. Manster (GS-18E)</td>
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<td>National Executive, USO</td>
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<tr>
<td>19-21 Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Warren S. Goodwin, Jr</td>
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<td>CG, USAG, Okinawa</td>
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<tr>
<td>20-23 Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Charles R. Metz (GS-16E)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dir, Merchandising Div, HQ AAFES</td>
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<tr>
<td>22-26 Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td>VADM Robert B. Baldwin</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cdr, Seventh Fleet</td>
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<tr>
<td>23-29 Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTG Marvin D. Fuller</td>
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<tr>
<td>24-29 Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTG George G. Loving, Jr</td>
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<td>Cdr, US Forces Japan/5th AF</td>
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<td>29-30 Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG James N. Portis</td>
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<td>Incoming Deputy ACofS, J3 (Joint)</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td>RADM James H. Morris</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cdr, TF 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7 Jul</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brig Kenneth Neely, MBE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Outgoing Chief, Commonwealth Liaison Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Jul</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTG James A. Hill</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>CINCPACAF</td>
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<td>8-12 Jul</td>
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<td>BG Hiram K. Tompkins</td>
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<td>Dir, Directorate for Log, Plans, Ops, and Sys, ODCSLOG, DA</td>
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<td>10-15 Jul</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTG John Q. Henion</td>
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<td>Cdr, USARJ/CG, IX Corps</td>
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<td>12-15 Jul</td>
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<tr>
<td>RADM Gordon J. Schuller</td>
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<td>Cdr, Fleet AF, WESTPAC</td>
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<td>15-19 Jul</td>
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<td>Name/Date</td>
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<td>MG Thomas A. Aldrich, 21-22 Jul</td>
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<td>MG Bates C. Burnell, 22-25 Jul</td>
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<td>RADM Paul H. Speer, 22-25 Jul</td>
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<td>Hon Harold Brown, GEN George S. Brown, 23-26 Jul</td>
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<td>Mr. James R. Hays (GS-16), 26-30 Jul</td>
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<td>Hon Clifford L. Alexander, 30 Jul - 2 Aug</td>
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<td>MG Harold F. Hardin, 1-6 Aug</td>
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<td>MG Adolph G. Schwenk, 3-5 Aug</td>
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<td>CG, III MAF/3d Marine Div</td>
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<td>Dr. Hans Binnendijk, 6-14 Aug</td>
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<td>RADM Paul A. Lautermilch, Jr, 7-12 Aug</td>
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<td>Mr. Carl Feldbaum (GS-16) 10-13 Aug</td>
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<td>LTG Charles A. Gabriel 12 Aug</td>
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<td>BG Walter H. Baxter III 15-18 Aug</td>
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<td>Mr. Edwin F. Powers 17-19 Aug</td>
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<td>VADM Austin C. Wagner 17-19 Aug</td>
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<td>MG James E. McInerney, Jr 17-21 Aug</td>
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<td>RADM John C. Dixon 18-20 Aug</td>
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<td>LTG Arthur J. Gregg, USA 18-21 Aug</td>
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<td>Dir for Logistics, Ofc of JCS</td>
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<td>BG Maurice D. Roush 18-23 Aug</td>
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<td>RADM D. B. Shelton 19-23 Aug</td>
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<td>BG Dorsey J. Bartlett 20-21 Aug</td>
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<td>LTG L. E. Brown 20-24 Aug</td>
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<td>Dr. Frank N. Trager 20-25 Aug</td>
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<td>Dir of Studies, Natl Strategy Information Cen</td>
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<td>Mr. Dean R. Freitag (GS-16) 21-23 Aug</td>
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<td>Chief, R&amp;D Team, OCE, DA</td>
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<td>MG John C. Faith</td>
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<td>BG Thomas R. Morgan</td>
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<td>Sen John H. Glenn (D-O)</td>
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<td>MG Leroy W. Svendsen, Jr</td>
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<td>28 Aug - 5 Sep</td>
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<td>Hon Morton I. Abramowitz</td>
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<td>Rep Les Aspin (D-Wis)</td>
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<td>RADM William H. Rowden</td>
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<td>Mr. Duane Jack Russell (GS-17)</td>
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<td>MG Freddie L. Poston</td>
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<td>Mr. Robert Rich</td>
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<td>BG Leighton R. Palmerton 26-29 Sep</td>
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<td>Mr. Fred J. Shafer (GS-18) 28 Sep - 6 Oct</td>
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<td>Dir, Log and Comm Div, GAO</td>
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<td>GEN Louis H. Wilson 29 Sep - 2 Oct</td>
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<td>LTG James A. Hill 29 Sep - 4 Oct</td>
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<td>VADM Robert B. Baldwin 29 Sep - 3 Oct</td>
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<td>MG Hilding Jacobson 5-7 Oct</td>
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<td>Mr. William Semkow (GS-16E) 11-16 Oct</td>
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<td>Mr. William F. Mills (GS-16)</td>
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<td>MG Daniel L. Burkett</td>
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<td>Mr. Valcris O. Ewell (GS-16)</td>
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<td>MG A. G. Schwenk 15-16 Nov</td>
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<td>RADM Ernest E. Tissot, Jr 27 Nov - 1 Dec</td>
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<td>Mrs. Alvin Moltzen (GS-16E) 30 Nov - 5 Dec</td>
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<td>Chief, Prod Ofc B-1, NSACSS</td>
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<td>RADM William H. Rowden 10-14 Dec</td>
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<td>Cdr, Cruiser/Destroyer Force, Seventh Fleet</td>
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<td>Mr. Michael J. Hershman 10-17 Dec</td>
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<td>BG Thomas R. Morgan 11-14 Dec</td>
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APPENDIX 2A

Arguments for US Troop Reductions in Korea

(Refer to page 22)

Articles by:
President Jimmy Carter
and
Senator George McGovern (D-SD)
UNCLASSIFIED

WHY WE'RE WITHDRAWING TROOPS FROM SOUTH KOREA

By President Jimmy Carter

We have...considered very carefully the question of our (ground)
troops to be withdrawn from South Korea, the Republic of Korea....
This is a matter that has been considered by our Government for years.
We have been in South Korea now more than 25 years. There has never
been a policy of our Government evolved for permanent placement of ground
troops in South Korea.

In 1970 and 1971, a full division of troops was withdrawn. Many
leaders in our country and in the Republic of Korea* have advocated
complete removal of ground troops from Korea.

The essence of the question is: "Is our country committed on a
permanent basis to keep troops in South Korea even if they are not needed
to maintain the stability of that peninsula?" I think it is accurate to
say that the time has come for a very careful, very orderly withdrawal
over a period of four or five years of ground troops, leaving intact an
adequate degree of strength in the Republic of Korea to withstand any
foreseeable attack and making it clear to the North Koreans, the Chinese,
the Soviets, that our commitment to South Korea is undeviating and is
staunch.

We will leave there adequate intelligence forces, observation forces,
air forces, naval forces, and a firm, open commitment to our defense
treaty, so there need not be any doubt about potential adversaries con-
cerning our support of South Korea.

I think it is accurate to point out that overall strategic consid-
erations have changed since the 1940s and early 1950s, when the Korean
question came into most prominence in the international scene. The
relationship between the Soviet Union and us, the People's Republic of
China and us, and the relationship between the People's Republic and the
Soviet Union has all changed, among other things.

South Korea, because of its own incentive and deep dedication to
progress, now has one of the most strong economies in the world. Their
growth rate last year in real terms was 15 percent. They have massive,
very healthy industry—in steel, shipbuilding, electronics, chemical
industries—to make it possible for them to grow into a position of de-
fending themselves.

* ROKG officials have denied this.

EXCERPTED from President Jimmy Carter's Washington Press Conference of
May 26, 1977.
We have also a complete confidence in the deep purpose of the South Koreans to defend their own country. Compared to the North Koreans, they have a two to one advantage in total population. They have much greater access to the Western industrialized democracies for advanced equipment and for technology.

So for all of these reasons, I think it is appropriate now for us to withdraw those troops. A decision has been made. President Park has been informed. And we will work very closely with the South Koreans for an orderly transition, leaving the ground troops of the Republic of Korea strong enough to defend themselves and leaving our own commitment to them sure.
I have growing doubts about the future stability and security of South Korea. What is most unsettling is the fact that those doubts flow from conditions which are largely beyond the control of the United States. No one can dispute the fact that our security arrangements with South Korea—the 1954 Mutual Security Treaty and the physical presence of United States forces—have served for nearly a quarter-century to help avoid a violation of the 1953 armistice between North and South. But their efficacy is fast declining. And the dominant challenge for American policy makers is becoming one of determining the extent to which our own forces should be exposed to the growing risk of another unwinnable Asian war.

Origins of the U.S. Commitment

In defining the American interest in Korea it is often noted that the Korean peninsula is the world’s most prominent point of great power convergence—where there is immediate proximity among the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and the “Pacific frontier” of the United States. Indeed, by jet aircraft Tokyo is barely sixty minutes away. It is fifty minutes to Peking, and only forty minutes to Vladivostok in the Soviet Union. The United States, of course, is directly on the scene, with an authorized force level of 42,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, the Seventh Fleet patrolling the seas nearby, and a heavy, direct stake in the economy of South Korea.

But all of this only states a geographic fact and, in the case of the United States, an old foreign policy decision. It is far more relevant to examine the specific dangers and obligations that logically follow. And that, in turn, requires some attention to how we got where we are in Korea.

For as long as there has been recorded history Korea has been a culturally distinct Asian society that has resisted domination from outside powers. In 1905 that struggle was lost. From then until the end of World War II the peninsula was controlled and exploited by Japanese occupiers.

Like that of Germany, the partition of Korea was a product of American-Soviet collaboration in World War II and of their postwar decisions. When Japan was finally defeated, the Soviet Union—though declaring war on Japan only two days before the Japanese offer of surrender—occupied the portion of Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel. The United States occupied the South. Both occupiers spoke of early reunification through a five-year four-power trusteeship. But both also took steps in the early postwar years to make peaceful reunifica-
tion impractical. By 1948, the Soviet Union had installed a Communist leader and member of the anti-Japanese resistance, Kim II Sung, as premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the United States had established a rigid anti-Communist who had been in exile in this country, Syngman Rhee, as president of the Republic of Korea in the South. Both were dictators, but at opposite ideological poles. Each denied the legitimacy of the other. There was never any reason to expect a convergence between them. In effect, the temporary demarcation line had become a hard political boundary. Both Kim and Rhee threatened to reunify Korea in the only way it could have been done from 1948 on—by force.

Still, Korea was not a major geopolitical concern of the United States. In 1949 and early 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not consider the peninsula to be vital to our own national security nor did they think it was essential to the defense of Japan. It seems surprising in retrospect, but even General Douglas MacArthur held that view at first. In January 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the National Press Club¹ specifically what our policy of containing communism meant—where, precisely, the free world defense perimeter was drawn. Korea was excluded. Perhaps he made explicit what would have been better left ambiguous or unsaid—it was widely assumed later that the speech amounted to a declaration to Kim II Sung that he could attack the South with no fear of a response from the United States. But if his statement was politically hazardous, Acheson was not walking out on a policy limb. He was only articulating the conventional wisdom of the foreign and defense policy establishment at the time.

It should be noted that this view prevailed even in the wake of the revolution in China and the consequent budding anti-Communist hysteria in the United States. Though we did officially regard communism as a Moscow-controlled monolith, Washington also had a sufficient understanding of the situation in China to recognize that the collapse of the Kuomintang was essentially an indigenous event. It was not taken at first as an overt act in an expansionist Soviet game plan.

But six months after Acheson spoke something happened that was seen as entirely different. On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops poured across the thirty-eighth parallel into the South.

The United States promptly joined the battle. I think that was done not because Korea had suddenly acquired a new global significance of its own, but because of how we perceived the attack. As President Truman put it, “The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.”²

So our abrupt shift—from virtually ignoring Korea to war over Korea—was defended by our conclusion that the Soviet Union was even more dangerous than we had thought. The assumption was that South Korea was the helpless victim of naked aggression planned and directed from the Kremlin. Our involvement on behalf of Syngman Rhee was justified not as the defense of one group of Koreans against another, but as the defense of the free world against a blatant Soviet attack.

By today’s lights that assumption itself is highly dubious. When the attack came, the Soviet Union was boycotting the United Nations Security Council because of its refusal to seat the new government in China. It was the Soviet absence which permitted adoption of the U.S. sponsored Security Council resolution branding North Korea the aggressor and calling for a military response under United Nations auspices and command. It taxes the imagination to suggest that the Soviet Union ordered the Korean War while absenting itself from the Security Council. Days later the Soviet Union returned to the United Nations, with the China question still unsettled.

It is also pertinent that the Soviet Union never entered the Korean War, even when Kim’s

¹ Address by Secretary of State Dean Acheson before the National Press Club, January 12, 1950.
² Statement of President Harry Truman, announcing U.S. response to outbreak of war in Korea, June 27, 1950.
forces had been pushed back almost to Soviet territory. That refusal has strained relations between the two countries ever since. Is it possible that the Soviet Union would care so little about the outcome of a war it had planned?

In any case, it was a gross distortion, yet one hardly questioned at the time, to portray South Korea as the peace-loving victim. The contrary was true. Syngman Rhee was spoiling for a war, and had repeatedly condemned the United States for our refusal to undertake a northern adventure. For his inauguration in 1948, he had arches constructed to proclaim the slogan, “Today we establish our Republic. Tomorrow we’ll march northward.” There is substantial evidence that Rhee’s armies had conducted regular forays against the North long before the large scale North Korean invasion. And just days before the war began, Rhee wrote to an adviser that he thought, “. . . now is the best time for us to mop up the guerrillas in Pyongyang. We will drive Kim Il Sung and his bandits to the remote mountains and make them starve.”

 Doubtless Rhee believed the mirror image of what Kim believed—that an attack across the thirty-eighth parallel would spark a popular uprising to welcome the invader as liberator. And the context of the war’s beginnings suggests something else—that regardless of how the fighting actually began, neither Korean regime was a puppet; that instead both were skillful puppets, manipulating the great powers for their own ends.

The Korean War and armistice had a number of profound, far-reaching consequences. When General MacArthur pushed north to the Yalu River, China entered the war, and the experience helped freeze our attitudes about that country for more than a generation. The war cost 33,000 American lives, which in itself created a commitment, to ourselves, that they should not have been sacrificed for nothing. Several million Koreans died, which spread among the people the same mutual antagonism that before had been confined mostly to leadership levels. And, finally, through the drawn-out armistice negotiations, the United States was locked into the sort of lasting security commitment we had not previously thought either prudent or needed.

In the first twelve months of the war, South Korea, then North Korea, and then the South again suffered near-defeats; General MacArthur was relieved of command, and General Matthew Ridgeway took over to slog back to a stalemate at essentially the same lines where the war had begun. Then peace talks started at Panmunjom—and the war dragged on for two more years.

The overriding impediment to peace was Syngman Rhee’s obstinate refusal to let the war end. Like a later American ally in Vietnam, Rhee was bitterly opposed to the peace discussions. He remained determined to retake the North—with, of course, U.S. forces doing most of the fighting and paying the bills.

Rhee finally relented. He was doubtless influenced to some extent by the fact that North Korea’s troops began engaging South Korean units alone, avoiding attacks on the Americans. By themselves, Rhee’s forces were routed.

But in the end Rhee agreed to an armistice only after he extracted from the United States both a pledge of large-scale American aid and a direct American security guarantee—the Mutual Security Treaty formalized in 1954. We had to bribe our ally to get peace. And the payoff was a declaration that from then on the United States was directly and immediately concerned with the security of Syngman Rhee’s government, not only against threats from the Soviet Union or China but also from North Korea, too, or from any other conceivable source. In 1948, the temporary demarcation line became a border; in 1954 a tangential interest in South Korea became a commitment.

A Longer Look at America’s Interest

This history is worth recalling because I think we ought to ask ourselves what was really wrong with the security line Acheson drew in 1950. We must, of course, deal with the problem that if we were to enunciate it again today the same

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thing might happen again. Kim Il Sung might be emboldened to renew the attack. It is a serious question, and I do not dismiss it. But for present purposes, it eases the analysis to set aside the question of deterrence for the moment simply to ask how important American interests might be affected if South Korea were not in anti-Communist hands. If the United States is not the policeman of the world, why must we be the policeman of the thirty-eighth parallel?

Any modern appraisal of Korea's global importance must account for a more practical and less foreboding understanding of the international military threat than the one we held in the 1950s. Since then we have seen Communist unity shattered in the bitter division between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. With it has been shattered the image of a monolithic Communist menace.

Obviously that does not mean we have nothing to fear. Certainly the Soviet Union, in particular, is at least a potential threat to its neighbors and to American interests.

But we do have far less to fear than we used to think. Today's world is not hospitable to empires. Even if we had the power to prevent them, we should now be able to recognize that neither every revolution nor every disturbance of the status quo is an automatic threat to American safety. Regardless of internal ideology, countries tend to act according to what they perceive as their own interests and in line with their own traditions, and not according to some grand scheme planned elsewhere.

Of course no one postulates a Korean attack on this country even should Korea be reunified under Communist control. If it had the inclination, it still would not have the power.

The United States concern over Korea is clearly indirect. It flows partly from aspirations retained at the end of World War II to be both a Pacific power and, beyond that, a power on the Asian mainland. But it is far more comprehensible, and justifiable, to conclude that our interest in Korea stems from our close association and alliance with Japan.

That relationship is firmly rooted in solid ground. Our interest in the security of Japan is fortified by a mutual commitment to shared values. And the position of Japan is unquestionably important to the future of the Pacific area.

It also makes sense for both countries to continue the present mutual security arrangement. Japan is behind both our conventional and our nuclear shield. Japanese military forces are constitutionally limited to the minimum levels required for conventional self-defense. An enlarged Japanese arms program could inflame old fears on the Asian mainland.

But along with the American guarantee, Japan's security has been best served in recent years by increasingly cordial contacts with other major powers in the region. Japan traded extensively with the People's Republic of China even before relations were formalized in 1972. The two-way flow now exceeds $3 billion per year. Because of the expanding interaction, and also because of the historical relationship between the two countries, China should not be regarded as a serious military threat to Japan.

Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union are less friendly, mainly because of disputed claims to islands north of Japan that were occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. Yet here, again, trade is substantial, and there is a prospect for broadened economic cooperation.

While endorsing a continued American presence in the South, Japan has also cultivated a relationship with Kim Il Sung's government in North Korea. Tokyo supplies no military aid to the South Korean government.

While Japan is economically linked to South Korea, it should be obvious that Japan's security depends not on Korea but on the American security guarantee and on good relations with countries which could pose a threat—China and the Soviet Union.

The status of Korea does make our alliance with Japan more convenient. But it is not a decisive factor. The U.S. presence in the Pacific and the Asian region includes nearly 130,000 military personnel, exclusive of Korea. We have 78,000 military personnel on Japan and Okinawa. The Pacific force includes the Seventh
Naval Fleet consisting of two aircraft carrier task forces with associated attack submarines, several wings of tactical aircraft, strategic bombers, and the greater portion of a U.S. Marine division. Those forces, particularly naval and air forces, and not the troops and bases in Korea, make up the weight of our deterrent against the remote risk of a tangible Soviet or Chinese threat to Japan.

And it is a remote risk. Any hostile power must know that aggression against Japan would be the equivalent of an attack on the United States, with all that would entail. Therefore, if such a conflict were to happen, it would most likely be the result not of a deliberate decision but of escalation from a smaller conflict gone out of control.

It is that possibility which raises one of our primary, direct concerns with Korea. Whatever the ideology of the resulting government, a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula would not pose any grave risk to Japan. But a new Korean war could pose such a risk—especially if it involved the great powers, and especially if any of those powers crossed the nuclear threshold.

Therefore, with respect to any possible Korean war, we have conflicting security interests. Not for broad humanitarian reasons alone, our first interest is to prevent a war. To most analysts, that seems to call for a reinforcement of our security commitment to South Korea and a continued American presence, to underscore the deterrent against the North. But at the same time we have a compelling security interest in not being involved if a war nevertheless happens. Beyond the agony we would suffer in another Asian war, our involvement, and that of other great powers that are bound by mutual security arrangements with North Korea, could obviously jeopardize Japan and could present an immediate danger of nuclear war.

Finally, we certainly cannot neglect our concern for the people of Korea. The case is weak for regarding South Korea as a primary security interest of the United States. Nevertheless, after what has happened over twenty-seven years, the Acheson formula sounds harsh and even heartless. We have developed strong cultural, economic, and emotional ties with that country. Our policy has encouraged their dependence upon the United States. We cannot help but care very deeply about what happens to the Korean people. It is morally repugnant to think of them either enduring a war without our help or falling under the control of the North Korean leader and system they genuinely despise.

These, then, are the major factors we must weigh in considering our posture in and toward Korea: Our priority security interest in Asia is Japan; our interest in Korea is derivative. Our security interest would not be seriously endangered by the peaceful reunification of Korea, even if that were to result in a Korean government that was more closely aligned with the Soviet Union or China. But our legitimate security interests could be severely endangered by renewed war in Korea, especially if it involved the forces of major outside powers. And although it cannot be classed as essential to our security, we have a strong preference against the extension of communism across the thirty-eighth parallel into the South, by whatever means.

**A New Policy Allowed**

Since the Korean armistice, a cornerstone of American policy has been to build up a strong and indigenous defense capability in South Korea.

Through fiscal 1975 American taxpayers had financed over $6.5 billion in military aid. Another $5.6 billion in economic aid has also strengthened Korean defenses indirectly, by helping to generate the economic growth and expanded public revenues which have permitted bigger South Korean arms budgets.

By 1971 that process had gone so far as to allow the withdrawal of 20,000 American troops, a step which was accompanied by the launching of a $1.5 billion American commitment to a five-year Korean military modernization program. Actual military aid for the period came closer to $2 billion. Though grant aid has been almost entirely phased out, then Secretary...
of Defense James Schlesinger in August 1975, pledged U.S. support for a $5 billion Korean "Force Improvement Plan" involving U.S. credit sales and assistance in developing an enlarged South Korean arms industry. The plan is scheduled for completion in 1981.

Though there are a few remaining gaps, these programs already have brought a truly formidable South Korean military establishment into being. Even now the military balance on the peninsula lies heavily on the side of the South. With some 595,000 men in ground forces and marines, South Korea has the fifth largest land army in the world. An estimated 300,000 South Koreans are battle tested through combat experience in Vietnam. North Korea has an estimated 410,000 men under arms, or only about two-thirds as many as the South.

Further, North Korea draws from a much smaller pool of potential military resources. Its population of some 15 million people is less than half that of the South. The Northern economy is less than one-third as large. As a result, even to maintain its smaller armed forces, North Korea must devote proportionately twice as much of its national product to defense.

Outside of manpower, North Korea does have numerical advantages in tanks and in aircraft. But the South has an impressive antitank capability, including American TOW missiles, and, when quality is factored in, a case can be made that South Korean air forces are superior. Including deliveries in fiscal 1975 through 1977, South Korea has 330 total combat aircraft to 573 for North Korea. But the South has more than 200 modern, high performance aircraft, compared with 153 on the other side. Most of North Korea's planes are relatively obsolete MIG 15s, 17s, and 19s. The reluctance of the Soviet Union to supply more advanced weapons has, in fact, been a source of tension between the two governments. While Kim's air forces are made up mostly of defensive interceptors, South Korea has a concentration of longer range fighters and fighter-bombers which could inflict punishing bombardments throughout North Korea in response to any attack. Many of those aircraft are housed in hardened shelters, to thwart any attempt at a surprise preemptive strike. And in any event, the perceived deficiencies in Southern forces are being rapidly made up, through aid and projected totals of arms spending that are roughly twice what the North has been mustering each year.

Hence, whether or not there is a guarantee of U.S. involvement, there is already a strong and growing deterrent against North Korean adventurism. The South Korean capital, Seoul, may be geographically vulnerable because it lies only thirty miles from the demilitarized zone. But certainly North Korea could not expect an easy victory—on the contrary, it would have to expect a certain retaliation that would wipe out all of its own reconstruction efforts and return it to the devastated condition of 1953.

If attacking Northern forces were joined by troops from China or the Soviet Union, then obviously South Korea would need direct help. But it is clear that against North Korea alone, South Korea is now, or at least soon will be, abundantly equipped to do the job itself. And that condition should be seen as giving the United States policy options that we may not have had before.

**A New Policy Required**

If the favorable military balance allows us to review our posture in Korea, a second set of new circumstances—President Park Chung Hee's increasing repression—compels us to do so. And it is not only the embarrassment of alignment with a disreputable government that creates that compulsion. I think that Park's actions since 1972 have dramatically heightened the risk of war, and that so long as he persists in that course the odds in favor of armed conflict will continue to rise each year.

Park's dictatorial instincts come as no surprise. He was an officer in the occupying Japanese imperial army in Korea before World War II. He seized power in South Korea in 1961 through a military coup, and promptly banned demonstrations, closed newspapers, arrested tens of thousands of his opponents, established the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA)
for both internal and external spying, and created a new system of military courts.

The Kennedy administration responded forcefully, threatening to terminate all aid. Because his dependence on the United States was so great at the time, Park had no choice but to relent. In 1963 his government promulgated a new constitution, which provided that even in emergencies "the essential substance of liberties and rights shall not be infringed." Until late 1971, largely because of American pressure, South Korea enjoyed something close to democratic rule. But it plainly did not happen because Park had democratic inclinations.

In late 1971, following the withdrawal of about one-third of the U.S. forces stationed in Korea, Park began a sharp swing back to and beyond his earlier form. In December he declared a state of emergency. In October 1972, he declared martial law. The next month, with the force of the national government behind it, he was able to bully through a radically different Yushin, or "revitalization," constitution which literally amounts to a charter for dictatorship. Article fifty-three provides, for example, that Park, of course, is the sole judge of "anticipated" threats to public safety. He has the sole power to suspend whatever rights he finds troublesome, and to withhold them "temporarily" for as long as he likes.

Park had been nearly defeated in the 1971 presidential election by a young reformer, Kim Dae Jung. Kim received 46 percent of the vote, and former State Department officials believe he would have won except for corruption, such as a $3 million contribution by the Gulf Oil Corporation to Park's campaign. The 1963 constitution would have prohibited another term for Park. But under the Yushin constitution, which abolishes the limitation on presidential terms, he had himself reelected in December 1972 by a new National Conference for Unification, which he controlled. Now he can hold power as long as he wants.

Oddly enough, all of this reactionary groundwork was being laid at a time of relative cordiality between North and South Korea. Red Cross teams from the two sides met in 1971, and in July 1972 the two governments signed a joint communiqué calling for a reduction in tensions and for negotiations toward reunification. There had also been an abatement in incidents along the DMZ. This reinforces the conclusion that while Park claims he was moved to extreme steps by the threat from the North, his real motive was simply to consolidate and hold absolute power in the South.

Whatever the motive, that is precisely what he has done. Armed with a series of emergency decrees—and with the KCIA, totaling as many as 300,000 personnel—as chief enforcer he has established a pervasive reign of fear. The free Korean press has been abolished, and foreign correspondents considered to be unsympathetic—including two from the United States—have been expelled. Criticism of Park or of his constitution is outlawed. Prominent opposition leaders have been jailed. Students have been expelled and professors have been fired.

In 1975 the government claimed to have uncovered a "People's Revolutionary Party" aligned with the North. By all credible accounts I have seen, the party was a fabrication. But eight members were executed.

Last March the head of a national women's church group read a "Declaration for Democratic National Salvation" at a Catholic church service in Seoul. It was signed by twelve prominent political and religious leaders, including former President Yun Po Sun and former candidate Kim Dae Jung. It reaffirmed the signers' faith in democracy and called for Park's resignation, for repeal of the Yushin constitution and the emergency decrees, and for economic reform. The government saw it as a subversive effort to "incite a conspiracy to overthrow the
government." and arrested twenty-eight people. In August eighteen of them were found guilty of plotting rebellion and were sentenced to prison terms of from two to eight years. (Perhaps in response to pressure from the United States, the sentences were subsequently reduced.)

Park's effort to consolidate power has reached well beyond South Korea's borders. In 1973, Kim Dae Jung was kidnapped from a Tokyo hotel by KCIA agents, after he had made a series of critical speeches in the United States and Japan. The KCIA also operates in the United States to harass Korean-Americans and Korean residents of this country who are critical of the South Korean government. Investigations are underway into charges that the South Korean government has been spending $1 million a year to bribe American public officials. The State Department has confirmed that in 1974 an aide to President Park tried to give $10,000 in cash to a White House official.

While there have been expressions of concern from the Congress and from various human rights groups, any official American alarm and pressure over these events has been blunted by a contradictory American policy—one of reinforcing our commitment to South Korea, especially in the wake of the fall of Saigon in April 1975. When that happened, President Ford had already made a personal trip to Korea. Days later, in May, he told the New York Daily News that "We have a treaty with South Korea . . . this Administration intends to live up to our obligations." In August, Secretary Schlesinger also went to Korea to declare that our troops would remain indefinitely and to lend assurances of U.S. support for the force improvement program. In the same context Schlesinger, and later his successor, Secretary Rumsfeld, hinted strongly that we have tactical nuclear weapons in Korea (the probable total could be in the range of seven hundred, including surface-to-surface missiles with maximum warhead sizes up to nearly seven times as big as the Hiroshima bomb) and that we would not hesitate to use them. Discussions of a nine-day Korean war scenario filtered into the public realm, stressing that the problem in Vietnam was that the United States did not move decisively enough when public opinion still supported the war; in Korea we would avoid that mistake by using whatever was required for a speedy conclusion of the conflict.

Of course all of this was aimed at Kim Il Sung, lest he get the impression that the Vietnam outcome would bode well for his ambitions. And in that sense the American verbal strategy was not at all unreasonable. At the time Saigon was falling in 1975, Kim was traveling to both Moscow and Peking, quite possibly in search of support for a plan to start the Korean War again when a war-weary United States would be least likely to respond. (He apparently found no encouragement. Both countries support reunification under Kim, but they stress that it must come by peaceful means.) But if Kim was the intended audience of American expressions of concern, Park was the beneficiary. The Ford administration could hardly expect to have leverage on human rights at the same time as it was embracing Park more warmly than ever.

How does Park's posture make war more likely? One theory is that the Korean people will become so aggravated at Park that they will simply join forces with Kim Il Sung. I do not see that as a credible prospect in the near term. The leading Korean dissidents are democrats above all else, and if they think Park is bad on political liberties they know Kim is even worse. Donald L. Ranard, a former director of Korean affairs at the State Department, has referred to Kim's "cult of personality mentality, the comparable likes of which in modern times flourished only in Stalinist Russia." North Korea is among the world's most thoroughly totalitarian and isolated countries. One journal, Freedom at Issue, last year rated countries on a one-to-seven scale on political and civil rights abuses. South Korea received a "five" rating. North Korea earned a "seven," or the worst possible score. With such knowledge, and on the basis of their strong com-

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mitment to democratic ideals, today’s dissidents—principally religious and intellectual groups—are not likely to find any grounds for preferring Kim’s brand of dictatorship over Park’s.

It is, though, something we have to worry about over the longer term. Not only politically but economically as well, Park is fertilizing his own land for rebellion.

The image of an “economic miracle” in South Korea masks a reality of grave potential economic problems. The South Korean economy is heavily dependent upon export markets, upon a buoyant world economy, and upon favorable terms of trade both for buying raw materials and energy and for selling such finished products as textiles, steel, and electronics. When international economic conditions slumped in 1974 and 1975, Korea had to borrow heavily to finance growing trade deficits. Between 1973 and 1975 the country borrowed $4 billion, much of it simply to recycle and service debts, a process which creates no growth at all in productivity. By 1975 the outstanding foreign debt was close to $6 billion, or a third of South Korea’s gross national product. Credible studies projected last year that between 1976 and 1980 Korea will have a need for up to $15 billion in capital inflows, worsening trade deficits, and a new foreign aid requirement of $1 billion a year.

In light of Park’s political repression, it does not seem likely that either Congress or the American people would accept United States leadership in such a rescue mission. Indeed, the foreign aid law already places tight limits on aid to countries which “engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”

Nor was the economy a source of universal joy in Korea even without these ominous international conditions. The development of capital-intensive industry has meant that millions of workers were left without jobs—a million unemployed, at least another million underemployed. Many of those who have jobs receive miserably low wages—their “contribution” to the construction of export markets. In 1975, only 13 percent of the work force was making enough to meet what the government itself set as a minimum urban standard of living, and 54 percent of the workers were making less than half that much. On top of worsening inflation, Park has imposed a new defense tax on earnings to pay for the military force improvement program.

South Korea is thus in an extremely dangerous economic and political box. A debt crisis would almost certainly lead to a sustained depression. To avert that possibility, Park is more likely to follow a policy of stringent austerity—which means, in essence, less income for workers and still less of a chance to live for the jobless. Neither route can have the same political results—growing social unrest, radicalization of workers, and the potential for home-grown revolution and for real collaboration with North Korea, instead of the collaboration Park imagines now.

Obviously Park is staking his future on the assumption that a police state can prevent any rebellion. For the present that tactic seems to be working. But South Korea’s economic problems are only beginning. The unsettled question is whether the lonely, brave democratic dissenters of today will be succeeded a few years hence by hundreds of thousands or millions of militants who are determined to bring down the system. And outbreaks of internal violence would, of course, create the perfect opportunity for North Korea to move in.

But there are also more immediate dangers. The most obvious is that at any time Kim II Sung could easily miscalculate and assume that what might happen someday has already happened—that exploitation of workers and political repression has already made the North a welcome alternative to many or most South Koreans. That does not mean he could win a war. It does mean that he might start one, and it is a possibility that ought to be factored into the American posture.

The other short-term danger is one that

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rarely receives any attention in official discussions of this issue. If we are fearful that the smaller, poorer, and less heavily armed of the two Koreas might try forceful reunification, what makes us think that the larger, richer, and more lavishly armed of the two is immune from such ambitions? To explain himself both at home and to the world, Park has relied upon his ability to generate a national mood of almost hysterical fear that the North is about to launch an attack. But hysteria is hard to sustain if the fear is not realized. I consider it quite possible that Park himself may deem it necessary at some point to inspire a major military incident or even full war, in order to persuade both his American benefactors and his own people that the threat is real. After all, he, too, wants Korea reunified under his own rule. And, as noted above, the character of the arms we have supplied him and are sending now leaves him much better equipped than Kim for such an adventure.

**Inevitable Involvement**

The third new circumstance warranting a reassessment of our Korea policy flows from institutional changes here in the United States.

The dubious factual rationale for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, and such later Vietnam incidents as President Nixon’s “incursion” into Cambodia in 1970, raised serious questions in the Congress about the modern application of the constitutional distribution of war powers. In 1974, after several years of hearings and studies, Congress adopted and President Nixon signed a new War Powers Act designed to inhibit presidential wars. The institutional philosophy of the act was the same as the thinking behind the original constitutional language—that since the decision to go to war is one of the most fateful a government ever makes, a positive decision should be hard to reach; that not only the President but the Congress must approve the initial decision.

But in Korea, as in few other locations in the world, the purpose of the act is wholly defeated by the way our troops are deployed.

A full battalion of the American Second Division is based right on the southern edge of the demilitarized zone. They are in a “tripwire” position which guarantees that if war comes—no matter who starts it—United States involvement would be automatic. War Powers Act or not, Congress would have no say at all in the matter, save to decide within sixty days, as the act does permit, whether our forces should keep fighting or be pulled out under fire.

Indeed, the President himself would have no real choice. With an American battalion under fire, could any President avoid sending the remainder of the division, stationed twenty miles away, to help them out? Would a President leave our aircraft in Korea on the ground when their use could save American lives?

The war powers problem is aggravated by the presence of nuclear weapons. Conceivably some of them could be captured in an invasion. They could fall under the control of the South Koreans who could force their use against our will. In extreme circumstances they might be used by American commanders in the field without presidential approval. And certainly a war could escalate across the nuclear threshold without congressional consent. A nine-day, nuclear-dependent scenario could be completed several times over before the War Powers Act would even come into play.

Of course these deployments have a strategic purpose. The strongest deterrent is one that requires no deliberation and no conscious “yes” or “no” decision. As things stand now it is not a question of whether Kim Il Sung thinks we will respond if he starts anything. He knows we will be involved from the outset, because we have removed our own freedom of choice.

But it is not without a price. The American people should be aware and the American government must contemplate that as far as Korea is concerned, for the sake of some increment of deterrence, the new war-powers policy, which was supposed to prevent accidental wars or presidential wars, has been consigned to the ashcan.

**Elements of a New Korea Policy**

It should be obvious from the foregoing that Korea is a dilemma for the United States; there are no obvious or simple answers. By far the
best available choice for that country was outlined last March in the "Declaration for Democratic National Salvation" cited earlier. Beyond calling for the restoration of political liberties, it warned that "the absurd situation of the rich getting richer and the poor poorer" is a "breeding ground for communism." Kim Dae Jung has been making the same case for a number of years: All Koreans want two things, he argues, bread and freedom; Kim II Sung provides at least bread, while Park Chung Hee now-withholds both.

I believe the authors of that declaration were exactly right. The one long-term hope for Korea lies in sweeping political and economic reform. But I am also convinced that there is not much the United States can do to bring it about. The leverage President Kennedy could apply fifteen years ago simply does not exist anymore. As our aid programs phase out, we have less leverage with each passing day. Further, Park doubtless knows that a restoration of political freedoms would inevitably result in his removal from power. I think it is a fantasy for either Korean reformers or sympathetic Americans to assume that the United States can somehow pry Park out of office. And more direct action—subtly, as with Diem in Vietnam in 1963, or perhaps turning CIA assassination teams loose—would be immoral, illegal, probably futile, and unthinkable for any responsible American government. Even the best of motives cannot salvage unconscionable deeds. All shades of American opinion ought to be conscious of the practical limits of American power.

Within that framework, I believe that there are several initiatives the United States ought to stress, in order to bring our Korea policy more squarely into line with our legitimate security interests in Asia.

Militarily, I believe we should promptly remove all nuclear weapons from Korea, and that we should expedite the withdrawal of our remaining ground forces. The rate of the troop withdrawal should be set primarily on the basis of consultations with our Japanese ally, but it should be independent of events in Korea. The most compelling justification for this step is simply that our nuclear and ground forces are not essential to maintain a favorable military balance over the North, and it is not worth the risk of unintended use or involvement to keep them there. There are neither Soviet or Chinese troops nor nuclear weapons in North Korea, and on that basis alone it is difficult to justify a continuous large American presence.

Our air forces, on the other hand, should remain, at least until South Korea's deficiencies in that area have been remedied. This would involve the continued presence of some seven thousand Americans, but not in forward positions where they would be immediately imperiled by any outbreak of fighting.

These withdrawals would not constitute any change in the Mutual Security Treaty with Korea, nor would they rule out direct American involvement in a Korean war. Militarily, the only case in which our troops would be necessary at the outset would be if Chinese or Russian troops joined in the North Korean attack. That prospect is extremely remote. Indeed, there is every indication that they are as opposed as we are to renewed fighting on the Korean peninsula. And if they were to pose a threat of direct involvement, their preparations would give us ample notice to allow a timely redeployment of Americans into South Korea. Meanwhile, the presence of American air forces—along with the Mutual Security Treaty and the threat of an American ground involvement—should continue to pose a considerable deterrent to a unilateral North Korean attack. I think that is the maximum we can do and still remain faithful to our own, carefully considered war powers processes.

We should also go as far as we can to loosen our ties with the Park government, and to apply whatever pressure we can toward political and economic reform. It would be logical in this context to make our support for military modernization—including the sale of modern aircraft—explicitly contingent on progress on human rights. Certainly any new dollar aid program
that might be called for as a consequence of the worsening Korean economic situation should carry the same condition, and should meet the new standards of helping the people most in need that have been written into our foreign aid law. Perhaps we have insufficient leverage to cause reform in Korea, but reform should be our unmistakable policy nonetheless. And so long as it is not achieved, we should be exceedingly cautious about supplying Park with the arms he might one day use to start a war on his own. Many Americans who are concerned about Korea look forward to the time when South Korean forces will be entirely self-sufficient, so we can get out entirely. If Park's current policies remain in effect, I frankly have serious qualms about the wisdom of promoting Korean military self-sufficiency.

Finally, we should undertake a series of diplomatic initiatives with other concerned governments, including particularly Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. Some Asia experts suggest six-power discussions, including the four major outside nations and the two Koreas, to negotiate procedures for reunification and international neutrality. Although we should stand ready to participate in such discussions, they must—in light of the present hardline attitudes in both the North and the South—be seen as only a long-range answer. Another worthwhile step would be to seek United Nations involvement in policing the armistice, to replace the American presence which, though still under United Nations auspices, is nevertheless accurately regarded as a unilateral American endeavor. Again, it is something worth trying, but also without inflated expectations of success.

There are, however, more promising options in the short term. The United States, Japan, the Soviet Union, and China should be able to agree, at a minimum, that Korea will not become a source of military confrontation among them. It may be possible to achieve balancing restrictions on arms aid and sales. And we may be able to work out agreed ways to assure that all parties will refrain from direct involvement in any future Korean conflict. Since both Koreas know they would need help and resupply from outside to have any chance of success in such a war, such an agreement may, in fact, prove to be the best way to deter both sides. Failing in that, it would at least help isolate the conflict, and prevent its spread in ways that would endanger our priority security interests in the Pacific.

These new directions are not without risks. But Korea has come to the point where the greater risk lies in holding to the course of the past. It has not been fashionable to cite parallels between Vietnam and Korea. Certainly there are major differences. The terrain of Korea is far less susceptible to a guerrilla war. The front is relatively clearly defined, and there are no infiltration routes through adjacent countries. The South Korean population is relatively urban, well-educated, and committed to democratic ideals.

But by far the most important difference has been the unity of the South Korean people, behind a government which behaved in ways that inspired their support. And that all-important distinction is now disappearing. The ultimate cause of the collapse of South Vietnam was not a failure of American will or American warriors. It was the failure of President Thieu's government to earn and hold the support of the people. Now President Park in Korea, on the basis of a paranoia inspired, in part, by the experience of Vietnam, is nonetheless copying the example of Vietnam almost to the letter. We could not change President Thieu, and desperately as we may want to help the Korean people, we also cannot change President Park. But we do have the power to stay out of another war much like Vietnam. Given the facts, I think it is what the American people would insist that we do.

And if it is a painful choice in Korea, it does have this advantage elsewhere in the world. It will give strong credibility to the renewed American commitment to human rights that President Carter has stressed. We have relations with other repressive governments. But nowhere in the world are we aligned so closely with one so bad. It is time to repair that condition. Indeed, if we are to escape the mistakes of the past and play a truly constructive international role, I think a new Korea policy is essential.
APPENDIX 2B

Arguments against US Troop Reductions in Korea

(Refer to page 22)

Articles by:

GEN Richard G. Stilwell (Ret),
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and

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UNCLASSIFIED

THE NEED FOR US GROUND FORCES IN KOREA

Richard G. Stilwell

In the course of the presidential campaign, Candidate Carter pledged himself to withdraw American ground forces from Korea. One can be certain that he made this promise convinced, on the basis of the most authoritative advice then available to him, that the pullout of U.S. Army troops was militarily sound and politically feasible—indeed, probably overdue. It was no surprise therefore—for our President is above all a man of his word—that he should feel compelled, very early on, to make good on his pledge to the electorate. Within two weeks of taking office, Vice President Mondale announced in Tokyo that drawdowns would be effected; and at his press conference on March 9, 1977, President Carter confirmed that he remained committed to his pledge to withdraw American ground forces from Korea.

Our President shoulders the most awesome burdens imaginable. In his hands directly rests the security of 220 million Americans and, in large measure, the security of our allies as well. Beyond that, he bears inordinate responsibility for how this troubled world will evolve. The view from the oval office is thus a very special one. Sometimes it differs markedly from what was seen and described on the campaign trail.

When that occurs, the President confronts the hard choice between meeting a campaign commitment and thus maintaining his credibility with the public and, on the other hand, pursuing the course that best assures the welfare of the nation.

Earlier Presidents faced such dilemmas. During the 1916 campaign, President Wilson pledged that he would keep America out of the conflagration of World War I. Within weeks of his inaugural, harsh realities forced him to ask the Congress to declare war on Germany. In 1952, Candidate Eisenhower vigorously challenged, as too defensive, the then operative national strategy of checking Soviet expansion, and committed himself to a new policy toward Eastern Europe, “Liberation Not Containment.” Again, the harsh realities intruded. In the first year of his presidency, the workers in East Berlin rioted and called for help. Three years later, Hungarian patriots threw out their Communist overlords. When the Red Army moved to crush the uprising, Hungary too called for help. In neither case did America intervene.

My firsthand knowledge of the harsh realities of the East Asian environment persuades me that President Carter will also have to reconsider a campaign pledge (now converted to decision) which does not square with the national interest. That conviction has led me to prepare this article as an input to such reconsideration.


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My thesis is straightforward. I hold that the withdrawal of ground forces from Korea, without major countervailing concessions on the Communist side, will undermine the vitality of free Northeast Asia, exacerbate regional tensions, and greatly increase the risk of armed conflict. Thus I contend that the continued forward deployment of those forces is essential to security on the Korean peninsula, to the stability and forward progress of Northeast Asia, and to the maintenance of the U.S. position and credibility as the preeminent world power. Admittedly, this thesis assigns extraordinarily high value to a modest military contingent poised on a small appendage of the Asian land mass. But the facts speak for themselves.

A Bit of History

A 700-mile arc centered on Seoul encompasses Tokyo, Peking, and the air and naval bases contiguous to Vladivostok. This juxtaposition of Korea to three major powers is more than a geographic fact: it has largely shaped the tumultuous history of Northeast Asia. Why? Because for many centuries the Korean peninsula has been inhabited by an ethnically and culturally identifiable people, distinct from their neighbors, and determined to maintain their national identity. In the eyes of those neighbors, then, nonassimilable Korea has been either a barrier or an exposed flank, an ingress or egress, a buffer or a danger. Small wonder that Japan, China, and Tsarist Russia have wrestled for control of Korea; or that the peninsula has periodically been a battleground for their contending armies. Small wonder that the Soviet Union moved quickly in the wake of World War II to gain control of the northern half of the peninsula and maneuvered to bring about, for all of Korea, a political solution which would parallel Soviet successes in Eastern Europe. When that failed, the Soviet Union engineered, in 1950, the most recent effort to subjugate the Korean people.\(^1\)

That conflict brought the United States to the realization that it, too, had a vital stake in that strategic corner of the world. The intervention of American forces, pursuant to the courageous decision of President Truman, frustrated the Communist design to engulf the fledgling Republic of Korea. Significantly, military operations throughout that long and bloody war were conducted by the only legally constituted international force in recorded history. The contingents of the United States, the Republic of Korea, and the fifteen other free world nations who joined in the effort were all brigaded under a single command, established by the authority of the Security Council of the United Nations, with the United States as the executive agent and with General of the Army MacArthur as the initial commander in chief. In midsummer of 1953, MacArthur's successor once removed signed, on behalf of the United Nations Command, the armistice agreement which brought the military dimension of the Korean conflict to a close, and assumed, jointly with the Communist commanders in chief, responsibility for the maintenance of the cease-fire.\(^2\) The agreement also called for the establishment of a narrow demilitarized zone (DMZ) and a series of related armistice tasks.\(^3\) These ad hoc arrangements, implementing an armed truce, were envisioned to be of temporary duration only. The expectation was that a political conference would soon convene to forge an enduring \textit{modus vivendi} for the two halves of

\(^1\) The Soviet objectives, mechanisms and techniques, and degree of success in obtaining control over virtually all aspects of North Korea are thoroughly researched and presented in the U.S. Department of State's excellent study, \textit{North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover} (Department of State Publication 7118, January 1961). Apropos of the attack in 1950, this study concludes, \textit{inter alia}, that "The outbreak of hostilities on June 25 is itself a reflection of the completeness of Soviet controls," and that the nature of these controls "attest to the fact that the decision to attack south could never have been taken without Soviet approval if not inspiration."

\(^2\) The Military Armistice Agreement was signed at Panmunjom on July 27, 1953, by three general officers: General Mark Clark, commander in chief, United Nations Command; General Kim II Sung, commander in chief, North Korean armed forces; and General Peng Teh Hsiu, commander, Chinese Peoples Volunteers.

\(^3\) The armistice agreement established a military demarcation line (MDL), generally conforming to the forward trace of troop dispositions at the time of signing, as the provisional frontier between the two Koreas. Further, the agreement established a demilitarized zone (DMZ), four kilometers wide and centered on the MDL, as a buffer between opposing military forces. On land, the MDL runs from the confluence of the Han and Imjin rivers (about thirty kilometers below the thirty-eighth parallel on the west coast of the peninsula), generally east and north to a point on the Sea of Japan some seventy kilometers north of the thirty-eighth parallel.
Korea. Because of continuing major power confrontation and North Korean intransigence, that work has yet to be consummated. Thus, nearly twenty-four years later, the provisional military machinery is still operative and the armistice agreement still constitutes the only legal basis for defining what is South Korea and what is North.

This point merits stress. The armistice agreement imposes on the United States a juridical responsibility for the maintenance of the uneasy peace on the peninsula—a responsibility from which the United States cannot unilaterally disengage. Anachronism or not, the United Nations Command—headed by an American representing the United States government—must continue in existence until some other multilaterally agreed means can be found to supervise the truce. With the concurrence of the Republic of Korea and other allies, the United States has several times advanced proposals either to make that responsibility a shared one with the Republic of Korea or to concert arrangements which would replace the armistice agreement in toto—either course making possible the dissolution of the United Nations Command. Every such initiative has been summarily rejected by North Korea, which instead demands the abolition of the United Nations Command without precondition, the abrogation of the armistice agreement, and the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces. Acceptance of the North Korean proposals would create an anarchic situation by eliminating the only mechanism for demarcating territorial limits and for airing (and sometimes solving) disputes. As a case in point,

the Military Armistice Commission was the indispensable instrumentality for diffusing the tensions arising in the wake of the ax murders of two U.S. officers at Panmunjom in August 1976.

If there is a lesson to be learned from this bit of history, it is simply that there can be no lasting solution to the problems on the Korean peninsula without the agreement of the major powers.

The Two Koreas—A Startling Contrast

It is well nigh incredible that the two halves of a people monolithic in race, language, and cultural origins could have evolved in such dramatically differing patterns within a space of three decades. Nothing better exemplifies the two competing concepts of a future world order: a cooperative and increasingly interdependent community of open, pluralistic societies as envisaged by the United States versus the centrally controlled complex of authoritarian societies blueprint by the Soviet Union.

The South. The Republic of Korea was terribly ravaged by the war—its subsistence economy in ruins, its fledgling institutions in disarray, its educational systems disrupted. It was a nation bankrupt, disheartened, and virtually unhinged from its historic and cultural values. What has occurred since then borders on the miraculous. The nation has prospered; has implemented three highly successful five-year development plans and launched a fourth; has become firmly linked to the international free-trade market area; has attained the status of a middle power; and has molded its institutions along Western lines. American political backing and military commitment, and large infusions of American financial assistance, have been essential catalysts. But the lion’s share of the credit rightfully goes to the Koreans themselves—to visionary national leadership, to brilliant economic plan-

4 A Korean political conference was held in Geneva from April 26 to June 15, 1954, for the express purpose of “reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.” The allies were represented by delegations from all countries who had contributed forces to the United Nations Command, except South Africa: the Communists were represented by delegations from North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union. The two sides were firmly opposed on three key issues: the authority and role of the United Nations, the principle of free elections, and the withdrawal of foreign troops. On the last issue, which is pertinent to the questions discussed in this article, the allies held that UN forces should remain in Korea until the mission of the United Nations had been completed, that is, the creation of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea. The Communists held, on the other hand, that all foreign forces should withdraw immediately (within six months) and would not compromise on that or either of the other two issues. The conference ended without reaching agreement on any point.

5 There are indications that it has become politically acceptable, at long last, for the Japanese leadership to acknowledge Japan’s responsibilities in this area. Premier Fukuda, for example, is reported to have said in a public speech that stability in Asia is a delicate balance held by four major powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. (Reported in “Confident Visitor,” Washington Post, March 21, 1977, p. A-14.)
ning, to excellent management, and, above all, to a labor force remarkable for its discipline, its dexterity, and its work ethic. The Republic of Korea must rank as the outstanding success story in the long reach of American foreign-assistance policy. This success is all the more extraordinary for having been attained under constant threat from the implacably hostile regime with which the Republic of Korea shares the peninsula.

Integral to South Korean policy has been the creation of a defense establishment which could do its full share in providing the environment of security and confidence essential for a nation levering itself from an agricultural to an industrial economy. The South Korean armed forces today are strong, professional, and dedicated, and they reflect the value system of the society from which they are drawn. Significantly, though, a basic premise in defense planning—institutionalized in the South Korean/U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and necessary to ensure that South Korea had sufficient resources to apply to the paramount objectives of nation building—has been that deterrence and defense were joint responsibilities. In practice, this has come to mean that South Korea would provide the great bulk of the standing forces while the United States would complement those forces in peace and war, principally with high technology, sophisticated combat-support systems, and in-depth logistical backup.

Charges have been leveled that the Republic of Korea is a totalitarian police state, that its political and legal institutions have no substance, that all individual rights have been severely circumscribed. The facts belie these sweeping allegations. The traveler to South Korea will find that the citizenry enjoys freedom of movement throughout the country, choice of residence and of occupation, and pursuit of education. He will find freedom of religion, full churches, and an increasing number of converts to Christianity. He will find no detention without trial nor any trials in secret. He will find, in the body politic, a national consensus on foreign, economic, and defense policy; an all-pervading dynamism in every sector of public and private life; and unparalleled productivity, high ingenuity, and enthusiastic forward planning. He will find enormous pride in accomplishment and in way of life and the determination to defend both, whatever the cost.

To be sure, Korean democracy is not a carbon copy of American democracy. To be sure also, there has been some abridgement of the right of speech, press, and assembly. The Yushin Constitution is faithful to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. But that constitution, adopted by over 90 percent of the electorate in a relatively free and uncoerced ballot, also authorizes the president—as in the case of France—to take emergency measures in the interest of national security. At this writing, there are perhaps 200 individuals, within the population of 36,000,000, in prison for violation of such measures. No right is absolute, and no government is required to be impotent in the face of dangers to peace and tranquility from foreign arms. If one applies the test of a “clear and present danger,” the Republic of Korea’s limitations on free speech and assembly—with an armed enemy twenty-five miles from Seoul and three minutes away by air—seem more justifiable than similar U.S. actions in the Civil War, the world wars, and the Korean conflict. No responsible Korean citizen wants greater individual liberty at the expense of less external security.

In short, the basic concepts of human rights are alive in the Republic of Korea and allege-

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4 In the five-year period, 1971–1976, membership in the several Protestant denominations has increased by 20 percent and now totals 2.9 million. Some 1,700 additional churches have opened. Presbyterians and Methodists account for the great bulk of the increase. During the same period, the number of Roman Catholics has increased by 40 percent to a new total of 1.1 million.

5 There are a number of examples in which the United States, in times of national stress, undertook emergency measures which infringed upon individual liberties and freedoms. In the early days of the Civil War, President Lincoln acted to suppress the right of habeas corpus, and some several thousands were incarcerated under these circumstances. In World War II, every Japanese, whether a U.S. citizen or not, was forcibly removed from the western coastal belt of the United States and relocated to hastily constructed centers in remote areas of the country. In 1950, the Emergency Detention Act was enacted, authorizing the apprehension and detention without trial of all persons “as to whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that such persons will probably engage in espionage or sabotage.” (At that time, incidentally, the closest active enemy of the United States was the same Kim II Sung who now threatens the Republic of Korea.)
tions of gross violations thereof cannot survive objective examination. Anyone who suggests even the remotest equivalence between the brutal regime of Kim Il Sung and the government of the Republic of Korea is either completely misinformed or serving some ulterior end.

The North. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is without question the most secretive, Stalinist, and closed of Communist societies. It stands unequaled as a model of thought control of an entire population. One need only recall that, within a five-year span (1945–1950), the northern portion of a people who had been as one for centuries were motivated to attack their brethren in the South. The leadership that, as a Soviet proxy, launched the violent, unprovoked offensive in June 1950 is still in charge, still pursuing its professed mission of liberating South Korea from “American imperialism and feudal oppression and exploitation,” and still espousing the legitimacy of the use of force to attain that political end.

For three decades, the state propaganda machinery has been hard at work in a society without access to any other information sources. The results are awesome. The indoctrination process has deified Kim Il Sung and has maintained the nation on a war footing. In the words of the Korean Workers (Communist) Party “... the whole country and entire people are firmly united like a monolithic organism breathing, thinking and acting only in accordance with the revolutionary ideas of the great leader... a human historic example of ideological unity... without precedent...” One would be ill-advised to underestimate the power of indoctrination of this genre.

All North Koreans have been inculcated with a fierce hatred of Americans. According to history as revised by Kim Il Sung—writ large in the textbooks studied by an entire generation—it was the United States that attacked in June 1950, laid waste the North Korean countryside, destroyed its economy, raped its women, and, but for the heroics of the North Korean Army, would have eliminated the entire nation. Thus, the United States—and, in particular, the United States troops in South Korea—is the Number One national enemy since, the litany goes, only that presence prevents the collapse of the “puppet” government and institutions of President Park Chung Hee and the victorious conclusion of a war of national liberation.

The external propaganda broadcasts and disseminations have hewn to the same line and, additionally, have constantly asserted that the United States is preparing for renewed aggression. All this has been in support of North Korea’s primary foreign policy objective—to get the U.S. ground forces out of Korea. From Kim Il Sung’s vantage, the lies are justified by the end sought: enhancement of military advantage and loss of confidence and economic momentum within South Korea—circumstances he is set to exploit.

For North Korea, reunification of the divided peninsula is the center line of all policies. And its formula is straightforward:

- Since North Korea is the only legitimate government on the peninsula, reunification will be on its terms.
- Problems of melding diametrically opposed political philosophies, economic systems, and external ties will not arise. One set will simply be eliminated.

Substantial advantages accrue from North Korea’s land border with the Soviet Union and China, with both of which it has mutual defense treaties. First, Kim Il Sung can reinforce his claim to be the unchallenged champion of Korean nationalism by contrasting the absence of foreign troops on his territory with the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea. (True, but Soviet and Chinese troops are just across the river and, in crisis, could be on North Korean soil in a matter of hours!) Second, Kim Il Sung knows that, in extremis, he could count on external help, since neither the Soviet Union nor China would countenance the downfall of the North Korean regime and the positioning of a non-Communist government in its stead.
Consistent with its position on reunification, North Korea has rebuffed any proposal that would institutionalize the existence of two Koreas, even ad interim (such as concurrent admission to membership in the United Nations), and has steadfastly refused to meet with the Republic of Korea as a government (except for some preliminary nonsubstantive discussions in 1972-1973). Indeed, in the North Korean concept of reunification, the South Korean government has been a target to be destroyed rather than a party to negotiation. Witness the efforts—strenuous but unrewarding—during the 1960s to develop “revolutionary nuclei” in the South, with subversion in mind. Witness the raiding parties through and around the DMZ. Witness the construction of tunnels—prodigious undertakings and remarkably useful adjuncts for either subversive or conventional military operations—into South Korean territory. Witness the continuing efforts to infiltrate agents, openly and covertly. Witness the incessant, truculent broadcasts from Radio Pyongyang, ridiculing and defiling the South Korean government and its institutions and inciting the South Korean people to revolt.

As the essential concomitant to its ideological fervor and aggressive designs, North Korea has been at great pains to enhance its military capabilities and options to launch or support a war of national liberation whenever conditions are deemed favorable. The North Korean armed forces constitute a highly trained, highly motivated, and highly ready combined-arms fighting team. Year after year those forces have been accorded an abnormally large share of the national wealth (estimates vary from 15 to 25 percent of the gross national product); and consequently they are both extremely well equipped and supported by an extensive indigenous production base that manufactures, in quantity, everything except aircraft, missiles, and sophisticated electronic gear. Since 1973, these forces have taken on an increasingly offensive stance. This has been manifested by extensive construction in the forward areas and southward displacement of substantial additional elements of all three armed services to these facilities; extraordinary hardening, particularly near the DMZ; increasing mechanization; and substantial augmentation of elite, tough commando forces, which now number many thousand.

These are the hard facts:

- North Korea outguns South Korea in every measurement of ready military power. The disparity is most significant in artillery (2 to 1), armor (2½ to 1), combat aircraft (2 to 1), and naval combatants (2 to 1); even taking into consideration the fact that North Korea must maintain two separate navies.
- All evidence points to continuing North Korean efforts to increase its edge on land and sea and in the air.
- The combat forces north of the DMZ are so positioned that they can attack with little or no prior movement; and the counterintelligence screen is so effective that a three-dimensional attack could be launched with no more than a few hours warning.
- The combination of interceptors, guns, missiles, and hardening make North Korea the toughest air defense environment outside the Soviet Union. There is no prospect for interdiction of the type implemented by the U.S. Air Force during the 1950-1953 war.
- An augmenting inventory of submarines poses a dangerous threat to a South Korea totally dependent on sea lines of communication.
- An indigenous production base and stockpiling give North Korea the capability to sustain an offensive for several months without external support. Kim Il Sung has

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9 David Rees, in the work cited above, estimates that North Korean defense expenditures have been about 30 percent of that country’s GNP.

10 Statistical and other data employed hereunder derive from unclassified U.S. intelligence sources.

11 Available data indicate that the numerical strength of the North Korean Army is somewhat less than that of the South Korean Army. This is a poor index for comparing forces from non-Communist and Communist countries, however, because the military forces of all Communist countries draw considerable support from the civilian sector. What counts is that North Korea fields more divisions than does South Korea, and that the combat power of a North Korean division is at least equal to that of a South Korean division.
thus attained the capability to execute a wide variety of military options without the concurrence of or aid from his allies.

In short, a formidable force—structured on the Soviet model to emphasize violent attack and rapid advance—is poised a few miles from the South Korean heartland. That impressive strength in being and advanced state of operational readiness combine with all-consuming national ambition and aggressive design to make the DMZ the world’s most dangerous frontier.

The Imbalance in Perspective. The North-South military imbalance highlights a question frequently voiced by political commentators, legislators, and analysts, “Why is North Korea with only half the population and a much inferior economy able to field armed forces with more combat power than those in the South?” And the corollary, “Doesn’t this indicate a less than total dedication to survival on the part of South Korea?” The answers are rooted in the national policies of the governments concerned.

The dominant thrust of North Korean policies and programs has been the development of a military establishment sufficient to effect reunification by force, to provide the coup de grace in a war of national liberation, or to provide the “overhang” necessary to bring about a political settlement on its terms. All national programs have been oriented to support short-term development of maximum military power, rather than long-term economic growth. Parenthetically, this course may have sown the seeds of serious industrial and financial problems, some of which are beginning to become evident.

Over the past two decades, South Korean national military policy, forged in close coordination with the United States, has contrasted sharply with that of the North. The overriding objective was reconstruction and development of a nation state, firmly linked to the West’s free enterprise system. It was, of course, essential to maintain a military establishment, which together with U.S. forces would provide requisite security and confidence, but priority would go to the basic determinants of national strength: economic growth, flourishing commerce, rising standards of living, social progress. To permit South Korean resources to be concentrated on nation building, the United States assumed the dollar costs for the support of the South Korean armed forces; and it provided the force margin to ensure a combined South Korean/U.S. military capability equal to that of the North. In the process, the United States exercised the right to prescribe the size, configuration, and weaponry of the South Korean armed forces. Since congressionally appropriated funds were largely consumed in simply maintaining those forces, the pace of modernization has been slow. The first real steps in replacing the Korean War vintage equipment were taken in the early 1970s, concurrent with a 20,000-man reduction in the U.S. troop contingent.12

Over the past ten years, the South Korean government has progressively assumed the dollar costs of maintaining its own forces and will be underwriting the entire bill from 1978 onward. Now that it is financially self-reliant in defense terms, has a clearer picture of the military trends in North Korea, and has increasing doubts about the long-term tenure of the U.S. forces, the South Korean government has embarked on a major program of modernization and improvement, designed to achieve, some seven or eight years hence, maximum practical self-reliance in deterrence of North Korean adventures.13 Ambitious though it be, that program will not completely redress the North-South imbalance; its attainability without jeopardizing other national goals depends on the health of the South Korean economy; and it is premised on the maintenance in South Korea of a substantial U.S. force to complement South Korean capabilities and to convince the North of the viability of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

12 Prior to 1972, there were two U.S. infantry divisions in the Eighth Army, each with a direct role. The Second Infantry Division actually manned defensive positions in the westernmost sector of the peninsula; the Seventh Infantry Division was in general reserve. In 1972, the Seventh Division was withdrawn from Korea and inactivated. The South Korean Army assumed responsibility for the defensive sector of the Second Infantry Division, and the latter moved to the Seventh Division’s old installations and took over the general reserve mission.

13 The South Korean–conceived force modernization plan, launched in earnest in 1976, is nominally referred to as a five-year program. It is so only in terms of procurement; considerably more time will be required to achieve incoming operational capability.
The Role of U.S. Forces

Composition. For the past several years, the U.S. forces in Korea have numbered about 40,000 men and women. They comprise an air/ground team, with army forces numbering more than three-fourths of the total. No U.S. Navy forces are based on the peninsula.

The main U.S. Air Force units are three tactical fighter squadrons, an air support squadron, and warning/control/communication elements. With minor exceptions, these units are concentrated at two air bases, Osan and Kunsan, well south of Seoul. The principal ground force elements are the two command headquarters (Eighth U.S. Army and the combined R.O.K./U.S. I Corps Group), the Second Infantry Division, an air defense artillery brigade, and a signal brigade. The army troop list includes a number of other supporting elements—notably logistic, engineer, aviation, and intelligence. Both the air and the army forces have nuclear-delivery capabilities.

The Second Division is, far and away, the key unit in the deployed force array and, with an approximate strength of 13,000, must figure in any plan for drawdown of U.S. ground forces. That division is located north of Seoul, in strategic reserve. With the exception of one battalion, its cantonments are well to the rear of the South Korean Army main defensive positions. One battalion is based near Panmunjom to support U.S. personnel in carrying out their responsibilities on various instrumentalities of the Military Armistice Commission. High-spirited, well-equipped, competently led, and benefiting from magnificent field training facilities, the Second Division is combat ready.

Capabilities. The U.S. force structure has been carefully tailored to ensure both internal balance and maximum support to the South Korean armed forces. The U.S. forces complement and reinforce the military capabilities of the South Korean armed forces in several important particulars:

- The tactical fighter squadrons are significant in the on-peninsula air balance.
- Ground and airborne controllers provide the expertise and communications essential for harnessing air power to the backs of the defending South Korean ground forces. The South Korean armed forces are developing similar organizations, but they are still skeletal.
- Air defense artillery units perform vital and, for some time to come, irreplaceable functions in the defense of South Korean territorial air space. The South Korean Army will, in due course, assume this responsibility but the transfer must be meticulously carried out, for the threat from the North requires that the changeover be effected without any degradation in operational effectiveness.
- Artillery, antitank, and helicopter assets add substantially to those in the South Korean Army inventory.
- Intelligence units assist in providing timely strategic and tactical information to the command echelons of both armed forces.
- A support brigade provides the mechanism which would be required to manage the flow of combat supply to the South Korean armed forces from the very outset of hostilities.
- The U.S. forces possess a broad spectrum of tactical nuclear delivery systems, and the trained personnel and organizational mechanisms to command, control, and employ these systems.
- Finally, the senior headquarters, with its associated communications and procedures, is the instrumentality through which the commander in chief of the UN Command (CINCUNC) discharges his basic responsibilities—a point which deserves elaboration.

The arrangement, negotiated in the early days of the Korean War, by which the Republic of Korea delegated operational control of South Korean armed forces to General of the Army MacArthur remains in effect. It is codified by a long standing government-to-government agreement which entrusts the defense of Korea from
external attack to the American officer who occupies the position of CINCUNC.

There are solid reasons for this command and control arrangement. Quite apart from his contingent wartime mission, CINCUNC is charged with enforcement of the armistice agreement—to which neither the Republic of Korea nor the United States, per se, is party. That responsibility cannot be discharged with a corporal’s guard! In the face of North Korea’s constant belligerence, encroachments on the DMZ, and forays through that zone, the constant task has been both the positioning and the control of sufficient combat strength to enforce the truce. Indeed, the line between armistice and defense responsibilities tends to be blurred. In Europe, NATO presumably has some reaction time to activate wartime command arrangements.¹⁴ But the compressed geography of Korea and the exceptional state of readiness of forces in the North make an in being structure an absolute necessity. The UN Command has provided precisely that. It has been the glue which has held all together. While preserving U.S. national command lines, it has assured unity of effort, common procedures, common rules of engagement, fusion of intelligence, and, above all, integration of air defense. Should the UN Command be dissolved or become nonfunctional for other reasons, it will be mandatory to concert new command arrangements which will ensure minimum essential integration and synchronization of action and reaction. With a three-dimensional threat minutes away, the alternative—two sets of forces functioning under separate commanders and separate rules and reacting independently of each other—would be folly.

Deterrence. The intrinsic military capabilities of the U.S. forces in Korea are one thing. Their political utility is quite another. That air/ground aggregation is, to North and South Korea alike, the guarantee of the U.S. commitment to the continued security of the peninsula, and, to the other world powers, proof positive of the U.S. determination to exercise major influence in shaping the evolution of East Asia.

North Korea must view the U.S. forces from two perspectives. First, as noted earlier, the war-fighting capabilities of the U.S. air and ground units go a long way towards redressing the North–South military imbalance. Second—and more important in the calculus—those forces are but the leading edge of the U.S. military establishment. So long as Kim Il Sung remains convinced that an attack on South Korea will bring into play both the deployed and the offshore U.S. military power, it is most likely that he will be deterred from military adventure. It is essential that the North Korean perception not change.

The Second Division, poised astride the approaches to Seoul, enforces that perception. It is a major combat formation. The North Korean armies could not reach Seoul without first moving it aside, and to do so would be tantamount to engaging the immense military power of the United States. Thus, the U.S. soldier on the ground has a deterrent value that cannot be duplicated by air or naval elements. Encamped between the demilitarized zone and any logical military objectives, he constitutes the real earnest of U.S. investment in deterrence. His role in the prevention of war cannot be transferred to U.S. air units based well south of Seoul nor, even less, to carrier task groups off the Korean coast. In a blitzkrieg attack, North Korea would most likely ignore them, for the prudential rule—the inherent right of self-defense—is well understood in Pyongyang. Moreover, the North Korean high command appreciates that with air units out of “harm’s way,” it would take a deliberate, agonizing U.S. national decision to commit them to battle.

This illuminates, in striking fashion, the limits on force substitutability in peace and in war. The South Korean Army has sufficient divisions to hold the ground. If war should come, what would be required of the United States is the prompt dispatch of air and naval forces and the application of their potent fighting capabilities to help turn the tide of battle. The infantry

¹⁴ There have been recent indications, however, that faced with a significant upgrading of the perceived readiness of Warsaw Pact forces, NATO authorities are reexamining the problem of gearing the command structure in peacetime for wartime operations.
battalions of the Second Division are not now needed to hold any segment of the forward defensive positions; and, in due course, the great bulk of the division's very important weapons systems could be replaced by similar systems entering the inventory of the South Korean Army. Conversely, in the prevention of war, the Second Division performs a unique, nontransferable function. No additional South Korean division—or even four or five more such divisions—could assume the political and psychological components of its mission which, stated boldly, lays the U.S. commitment on the line. A senior South Korean Air Force general put it succinctly: "Two thousand aircraft might compensate for the withdrawal of the Second Division."

The Panmunjom incident of August 1976 illustrates two related points. First—and contrary to what many think—the two splendid American officers (Major Bonaisas and First Lieutenant Barrett) who were brutally murdered were not members of the Second Division. They were assigned to the small UN Command complement which carries out military armistice duties—duties which must continue irrespective of the presence or absence of U.S. ground forces. Second, it was the immediate availability of the Second Division that enabled the United States to react with dispatch and with restraint to reassert its rights, redeem its honor, and, in the end, strengthen deterrence. The sight of Second Division troops—those in the van armed only with chain saws and clubs—was enough to make the North Korean Army stand aside.

It is sometimes argued that the forward deployment of the Second Division guarantees automatic involvement in another land war in Asia. That premise is entirely wrong. Should another war erupt in Korea, the United States will be militarily involved, irrespective of the configuration of its force deployments at the time. United States responsibility for the armistice agreement, the Mutual Defense Treaty, the stakes at issue, and international credibility all assure that. But there is even a more important point. Given the virtually unimaginable consequences of such a war, our single-minded emphasis must be on deterrence. As my successor, General John Vessey, has so aptly stated, "The cost of one day of war in blood and resources could equate to fifty years of deterrence." I maintain that the Second Division, as currently deployed, guarantees that neither the United States nor the Republic of Korea—nor indeed Japan—will be involved in another war on the Asian mainland. To be sure, the soldier's profession involves an element of risk. But the greater risk by many orders of magnitude, is another war on the Korean peninsula precipitated by a North Korean miscalculation of U.S. intentions.

Assurance and Arms Control. Notwithstanding the extraordinary efforts of North Korea to achieve military dominance, a general equilibrium of forces has been maintained on the peninsula. One side of that equation consists of the South Korean armed forces, the deployed U.S. forces, and the offshore U.S. military power. By reason of confidence in the U.S. actual and potential contribution to defense, South Korea has not felt constrained to match every North Korean capability, to build a strongly offensive air force, or to invest heavily in exotic high-technology systems. As noted earlier, that confidence has allowed South Korea to carry out a comprehensive, balanced program of industrialization and economic development. Moreover, that same confidence has led it to develop, attitudinally and physically, a defense concept which would ensure the safety of Seoul. That concept is utterly sound, both politically and militarily, but it requires the immediate generation and orchestration of maximum combat power. A withdrawal of U.S. ground forces will surely lead South Korea to modify its assumptions on the timing and scope of U.S. assistance. South Korea cannot and will not alter its defensive concept, but all else will change. The force improvement program would be adjudged wholly inadequate. South Korea would, in all probability, move to a wartime economy, modifying drastically not only its economic and in-

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dustrial programs but its social and educational ones as well. Development plans would be completed, exports would drop, foreign capital would be increasingly difficult to attain and then only at exorbitant rates. unemployment and inflation would soar, and schisms would be likely to appear in the body politic. Furthermore, South Korea would probably embark on a full-scale program to develop both a nuclear-weapons capability and long-range missiles. Overall, there would be lessened stability and heightened tensions in the entire East Asia region and, essentially, an unbridled arms race on the Korean peninsula itself.

Paradoxically, then, a solid U.S. military presence in Korea is an arms-control measure. That presence stays the North Koreans, promotes political and economic stability, helps keep tensions in the area within bounds, establishes a logical upper threshold for South Korean force development, and, most importantly, provides a disincentive for South Korean entry into the nuclear club.

**Longer-term Leverage.** While no political solution to the Korean question is feasible without great power concurrence, it is also axiomatic that the two Korean states must first find common ground. So long as North Korea adheres to its all-or-nothing policy, the prospects of achieving any *modus vivendi* are very dim. But time should be on the side of South Korea. In terms by which national power is measured, South Korea is already twenty-sixth in rank among the 145 states in the international community, and it has its sights set much higher. Given confidence in the external shield (which is within our capability to assure) and internal political stability (for which the external shield is a precondition), South Korea will meet the objectives of the fourth five-year development plan—and then a fifth and a sixth. The disparity—which is great even now—between the respective strengths and dynamics of the economies, the lots of the individuals, and the vitality of social and educational programs will widen exponentially. At some point in time, therefore, Kim Il Sung or his successor may have to face up to the hard fact that South Korea is too strong and too cohesive to tackle by force of arms, and, in North Korea’s own interest, accept the reality of two Koreas and prepare to negotiate a framework for coexistence. Although the odds are long, this could be the end result—and, unless there were other tasks to perform, the U.S. forces could then go home. One thing is certain: this will never come about if the U.S. component of the shield falters.

In the words of Sun Tzu, the noblest victory is to attain one’s objective without bloodshed. This has been the essence of the U.S. forces’ mission in Korea: by the very presence of their disciplined strength—sheathed but at the ready—to assist in establishing the preconditions for lasting peace on the peninsula. As such, those forces have constituted a bargaining chip of high value in a game for enormous stakes. With the game still in progress, it would be a tragedy to toss in the best hand.

In sum, the 40,000 troops in South Korea have a value all out of proportion to their number in maintaining an environment of assurance and deterrence on the peninsula. Their relevance, however, extends far beyond the boundaries of the Land of the Morning Calm. To restate the obvious, Korea cannot be viewed in isolation. As the latest Japanese Defense White Paper puts it, “Korean peace is prerequisite for the peace and security of all East Asian Nations.”

**The Broader Context**

The immense importance of Northeast Asia needs no underscoring:

- Economically, the forward momentum of the free nations of the region has been dramatic and sustained. Overall U.S. trade with the Pacific basin—most of it concentrated in Northeast Asia—exceeds that with Europe. Japan has become an industrial giant and America’s principal overseas trading partner (the total U.S.-Japan trade exceeding U.S. trade with West Ger-

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many and the United Kingdom combined). The dynamism and potential of the Japanese–South Korean–Taiwanese entrepreneurial sectors make the three-nation complex an increasingly key segment of the international free-trade market area and give meaning to the concept of trilateralism.

- Strategically, Northeast Asia is the locus of direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States on a scale second only to Western Europe. The Soviet Union has assayed unremittingly to extend its power southward to intimidate Japan, encircle China, and achieve dominance in East Asia. Conversely, the main United States objectives have been to maintain and strengthen the alliance with Japan and to block the Soviet Union’s drive for hegemony. This latter determination provided a key motive for the growing rapprochement with Peking.

In retrospect, the free world has done very well in Northeast Asia over the past two decades. Much of that success must be attributed to the American military power projected to and maintained in the region. The Seventh Fleet, the Fifth Air Force, the III Marine Amphibious Force, and the Eighth Army—all backed by the strategic nuclear forces—have had important political as well as military roles. Their capabilities and the substance they have given to the collective security arrangements have assured a military equilibrium and stayed Soviet expansion. They have provided the blanket of security which has been the essential underpinning for the remarkable growth and vitality of the Northeast Asian free economies. Most notably, the long-term deployment of U.S. ground combat forces in Korea as a bulwark against renewed North Korean attack—unilateral or externally supported—has assured Asian allies of America’s firm commitment to peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

Unhappily, the confrontation continues. There is no sign of abatement of the Soviet outward drive; in fact, its military capabilities in the region continue to augment. The North Korean posture is more menacing than at any time in the past. For ally and adversary alike, then, the central question is the continuing American resolve, which, because the United States is not present in Asia by reason of geography, is gauged by its military deployments in the area. Significant changes in those deployments will be perceived as a measure of the value that the United States attaches to what happens in this strategically important area, and what that entails for the major players concerned. Inevitably, attention will be focused on the forward-most of these deployments, the only ones on the Asia mainland—the U.S. forces in Korea.

Japan. Historically, Korea and the power extant thereon have always been critical factors in the Japanese security environment. However one interprets the hackneyed phrase, “a dagger pointed at the heart,” the stark fact is that Korea has been the bridge to and from the Asian mainland, the path by which power has flowed into and out of Japan.

Modern-day Japan is particularly sensitive to the Korean situation. With a very modest self-defense establishment and a constitution which restrains the employment of its military forces, Japan has depended heavily on the U.S. security guarantee for the protection of the homeland and for the uninterrupted flow of seaborne commerce. Soviet military power based to the north and northwest of the Japanese islands is more than enough to be concerned about. Therefore, it is an essential that the Korean flanks be secure. Though there have been minor variations (for domestic political reasons) in the wording of their statements, every Japanese prime minister from Sato onward has affirmed the inseparability of the security of Japan and Korea. In Japanese eyes, the U.S. forces in Korea, especially the ground units and the array of nuclear delivery systems, are indispensable elements of the

17 Most recently, for example, Prime Minister Fukuda said he told President Carter that the 40,000 U.S. ground forces in South Korea are considered both a barrier to attack from the Communist North and a shield for Japan and other democratic countries in Asia. (Reported in “No Precipitous Korea Pullout, Fukuda Is Told,” Washington Post, March 28, 1977.)
U.S. military umbrella covering Japan. Understandably, then, the Japanese government would expect to be consulted prior to any decision to reduce U.S. deployments in Korea materially. This expectation derives less from Japan’s status as America’s major ally in the Pacific basin than from the premise that the two parties should first reach a common appreciation of the threat and a common judgment that any such drawdowns will have no deleterious political or military effect. After all, Tokyo reasons, the U.S. forces in Korea are integral to the Japanese shield.

Any action seen as eroding the deterrent posture sends immediate alarms through Japan, for, given the vulnerability of the nation, the constitutional strictures against external deployments of armed forces, and the prevailing public sentiment, that nation is quite unprepared to cope with the consequences of war. The prospect of being involved, willy-nilly, in renewed hostilities in Korea is no less abhorrent than having to gear for defense of the homeland from direct attack. Japan has thus been motivated to help ensure effective deterrence on the peninsula by fueling the forward thrust of the South Korean economy, by strong endorsement of South Korea in international forums and by granting base rights which have, inter alia, facilitated the support of the U.S. and UN Command forces in South Korea. Within the framework of deterrence and the limitations imposed by the constitution and the domestic political balance, Japan has the potential to do even more, economically and militarily, to complement U.S. and South Korean efforts. It can, for example, assume responsibility for a larger share of the regional naval and air tasks. But for a greater degree of “complementarity” to eventuate, there must be confidence that the United States will continue to make its unique and essential contributions to the overall deterrent structure. In the Japanese calculus, the U.S. ground forces in South Korea meet those criteria exactly for the following reasons:

- They give requisite depth to the external defense of Japan and attest to the viability of the U.S. security commitment.
- They virtually guarantee that there will be no renewal of armed aggression on the Korean peninsula.
- They assure, therefore, that an explicit decision on use of Japanese bases for support of U.S. and UN Command forces in war will not be required. (The Japanese government well knows that the wartime availability of these bases is an article of faith in U.S./Japan relations; yet to honor the commitment is to involve Japan directly in the conflict.)
- They greatly reduce the likelihood that the base rights question will become a subject of major political debate and controversy.
- Overall, they provide evidence that the basic tenet of Japanese foreign policy—political / economic / military partnership with the United States—has been well conceived and holds the brightest promise for Japan’s orderly evolution as a world power.

It follows that the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces—and most particularly the Second Division—would occasion major review of Japanese domestic and foreign policy. Reasoning from the logical premise that the United States was more interested in reducing its investment and risks than in the efficacy of peninsular and regional deterrence, an equally logical conclusion would be that the United States commitments to Japan were in question. Its confidence in the U.S. shield dissipated, Japan would have to chart a new course. One extreme policy alternative would be major expansion of its military capabilities to include development of a Japanese force de frappe—sounding the death knell on U.S. efforts to control nuclear proliferation. At the other extreme would be an accommodation with the Soviet Union. Even if one assesses as low the probability that Japan would opt for either extreme, the very fact that circumstances dictated their serious consideration is
perilous for stability and progress in Northeast Asia. And whatever Japan’s reordered course, one concomitant will be considerably less cooperation with the United States in solving the large economic problems now confronting not only the Western free market area but most of the remainder of the world as well.

The View from Moscow and Peking. The U.S. combat forces in South Korea must loom large in Soviet analyses:

- From the perspective of its military planners, that air/ground team of not inconsiderable capability—a reinforced division, powerful air squadrons, and versatile nuclear delivery means—is positioned only a few hundred miles from vital Soviet installations, closer to the homeland than any other U.S. combat formation. So long as it remains in South Korea, that force will affect Soviet calculations of the course and outcomes of military initiatives, whether along the Sino-Soviet border or in Central Europe. In the latter instance, the Soviets must face the nightmarish prospect of two fronts, 4,000 miles apart.

- In the context of its objective of obtaining hegemonial influence in East Asia, a Korea unified under Soviet style communism would be an even more important advance now than in 1950, when success was but a whisger away. Control of the southern half of the peninsula would extend the reach of the Soviet Far Eastern fleet, bring enormous pressure to bear on Japan, and impel a major policy reassessment in Peking. With 40,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, none of that can occur except by force of arms, and another war on the peninsula embodies too many risks of escalation to be contemplated as a Soviet option.

There is a countervailing consideration. The Soviets must be concerned with North Korea’s continued belligerence and provocations and its growing capability to undertake independent military action. Should North Korea, on its own, resort to force to exploit U.S. troop withdrawal, the Soviet Union could be drawn in against its will—at the minimum, to balance Chinese support, and, at the maximum, to ensure North Korean survival as a Communist state if things went awry. Consequently, the Soviet view on U.S. troop presence is probably ambivalent. On the one hand, the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea would further Soviet strategy. But the Soviets are geared for a long struggle in Asia, reckon time to be on their side, and prefer to win without war. Thus, the timing of a U.S. withdrawal is secondary to the consideration that the vacuum created not occasion a degree of destability beyond the Soviet ability to manage.

The People’s Republic of China has underscored through diplomatic and unofficial channels that a strong U.S. military presence in Asia (except on Taiwan) is a key assumption in its national security policy. What is a thorn for the Soviet Union is a rose for China—except in one particular. The Communist archenemies have common concern over the growing military capability of North Korea, the limited influence they exercise on Kim II Sung’s decisions, and the implications of any North Korean resort to force of arms.

Confronting 25 percent of the Red Army along the extensive Sino-Soviet border, China considers it essential that the Korean flank remain stable and secure. Consequently, although China must perforse provide official political support for Pyongyang on the U.S. troop withdrawal issue, China has a special interest that those forces in fact remain. Moreover, in Peking’s eyes, those forces have added values, actual and symbolic. The U.S. air/ground team serves the Chinese interest in the same way that the NATO military machine in Europe does. Further, its presence in Korea inhibits Soviet expansion and facilitates Sino-Japanese relations.

China could draw but one conclusion from a U.S. decision to withdraw upwards of 30,000 troops from Korea at this juncture: namely, that all assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the United States no longer intended to exercise major influence on the evolution of East Asia.
no longer was dedicated to opposing the extension of Soviet influence in the Asian nations on the periphery of China. The recent moves toward normalization of U.S.-Sino relations have proceeded from a wholly different premise. No less than in Japan, China's confidence in the dependability and staying power of the United States would erode.

**World Perceptions.** The American soldier in Korea—deployed on a critical frontier where the issues are still unsettled—is thus woven into a complex matrix formed by the interactions of the major powers that compete in Northeast Asia. Moreover, what happens to that soldier is of great moment to the entire international community, for it will be construed as a harbinger of future U.S. policy. Two guideposts will shape evaluations.

Immediately following the collapse of the Indochina states, strong U.S. administration statements reaffirmed that Vietnam was an aberration and that the United States would remain a Pacific power, steadfast to its commitments. For our Asian allies, the U.S. force posture in Korea has been the earnest of those statements. What conclusions will these allies draw from a withdrawal of ground forces except that the United States wants to avoid entanglement in a possible conflict? And how does that correlate with the U.S. commitment to come to the defense of the countries with which it is linked by mutual security treaties?

In recent years, the world has been witness to the sustained drive of the Soviet Union to achieve ascendancy over the United States. Soviet efforts have led to notable successes in many areas; and the general estimate is that the balance of power has begun to tilt in its direction. But Soviet gains have been nil in the two key regions where forward deployed American arms have been linked with the military forces and the national will of allies. One of these areas is Northeast Asia. Our actions there—to stay or to retrograde—will be carefully weighed around the world and will profoundly influence the judgment on whether the United States is gradually retreating from its world power responsibilities or intends to stand fast against Soviet imperialism.

**Conclusion**

To sum up, there is compelling rationale for the continued deployment of U.S. combat ground forces on the Korean peninsula. They are key to the security and wellbeing of 36 million human beings and to the protection of U.S. interests, in the face of a very real and growing threat: Kim Il Sung's unflagging efforts to force their removal attest to that. Their presence provides the only lever that might force the North to accept the reality of two Korean states, a precondition for amelioration of tensions. They are valuable—indeed essential—assets in furthering our major objectives in Northeast Asia: strengthening the partnership with Japan; minimizing the Soviet presence; improving relations with the People's Republic of China; sustaining the region's economic momentum; fostering a climate in which the kind of democratic institutions we espouse can take root; and preventing nuclear proliferation. This last role—arms control—merits underscoreging. Finally, that band of 30,000 is the symbol that the United States is no less concerned with the future of the free societies of Northeast Asia than those of the Atlantic Community.

I submit that these enormous returns on a modest investment of men and resources accrue precisely because that investment manifests the staying power of the United States. It follows that alteration of the fundamental character of that investment, the disengagement of the American soldier from ongoing tasks, entails the gravest of risks, not only on the peninsula but also in Northeast Asia and far beyond. Not the least of these risks would be the greatly increased likelihood of conflict in which the United States would be immediately and deeply involved.
UNCLASSIFIED

WHY WE CAN'T LEAVE KOREA

By Donald S. Zagoria

Albert Wohlstetter once remarked that not the least of the tragedies of Vietnam would be the "lessons" we learned from it. More dryly, historian James C. Thomson made the same point. The only lesson we should learn from Vietnam, he said, is never again to fight a nationalist movement dominated by Communists in a former French colony. Unfortunately, all the indications are that President Carter's sudden and fateful decision to withdraw the United States Second Infantry Division from South Korea stems from a Vietnam trauma that still has the President and many of his younger aides in its grip.

For the past quarter of a century, Korea has been without war. During this period, the 36 million people of South Korea have enjoyed some of the fastest economic growth of any nation in history. South Korea today is one of just a few developing countries with an income distribution more equal than Sweden's; rural poverty has been drastically reduced; and, because of this spectacular economic progress, the continuing hostility of North Korea and the unnerving effect of the South Vietnamese collapse, President Park Chung Hee has won grudging acceptance of his authoritarian rule from a majority of South Korean citizens.

Much of this success story has been made possible by the presence of one American division in South Korea, positioned squarely between North Korea and Seoul and giving strong credence to the American pledge to defend the South against any new attack from the North. Yet on Jan 16, 1975, two weeks after leaving the Statehouse in Atlanta and barely a month after declaring his intention to run for President, Jimmy Carter told a group of newspapermen that he favored pulling American troops out of South Korea. And in January 1977, scarcely more than a week after President Carter took office, Vice President Mondale announced during a visit to Japan that American ground troops would be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula.

There had clearly been no time for a review of this crucial decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the American military in Korea, the State Department or the President's own top security advisers. Anyone even noddingly acquainted with the strategic views of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the new head of the National Security Council, will find it difficult to believe that Brzezinski could have favored the move. It was very much Carter's own idea.

At top levels of government, the President's appointees were too new in office to offer much criticism. The new Director of Central Intelligence, Adm Stansfield Turner, did oppose the decision in private, according to reports, and tempering his views in public, told The Boston Globe: "My position is that we have a balance of deterrence (between North and South Korea) today; when you withdraw forces, that in some measure diminishes it." At intermediate levels, there was little enthusiasm for the plan. At a meeting of Asian scholars and governmental experts that was held at the State Department shortly after the withdrawal announcement, Stanley Karnow, a journalist with long experience in Asia, asked why the decision had been made in such haste. He was answered with the embarrassed refrain that this was the President's policy. Similarly, at a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations early this year, a Pentagon Asian specialist who had previously favored keeping troops in Korea until there was a stable peace, and who was now supporting their withdrawal, replied, when I asked him why he had changed his mind: "One does not argue with the President of the United States."

Among the American military, the shock produced by the decision was even greater. Gen John K. Singlaub, chief of staff of the United States forces in Korea, spoke up against the policy in public. He was promptly transferred to another post. Yet in mid-July, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen George Brown, testified before Congress that the Carter pullout was in "fundamental" conflict with the chiefs' recommendation that only 7,000 of the 33,000 ground troops in South Korea be withdrawn over the next five years.

And in Congress, the decision has by no means won the popular approval Carter had apparently expected. The Senate, by a vote of 79 to 15, refused to endorse the plan. In the House, the Armed Services Committee is considering legislation to block the withdrawal.

The unfavorable reaction within the American Government was rooted in the widespread expert opinion that the North Korean dictator, Kim Il Sung, is still determined to reunify Korea on his own terms. For that same reason, the reaction among American diplomatic and military officials was nothing compared with the dismay in Japan. Korea is separated from Japan by a narrow strait, barely wider than the distance between New York and Philadelphia. The strategic peninsula has been the object of wars among neighboring powers, including Japan, in 1895, 1905, 1945 and 1950. Should South Korea fall to the North, Japan would be as shocked as the United States was when Castro agreed to let the Russians place nuclear missiles in Cuba.

Virtually the entire Japanese defense and foreign policy establishment opposes Carter's decision. In April, seven Japanese Cabinet ministers and 235 legislators of both major parties sponsored a resolution declaring that the pullout would be "an invitation to instability in the Korean peninsula...and Northeast Asia as a whole." One high ranking Japanese
defense official told me last June that while American credibility in Asia had been diminished in Vietnam, the Korean pullout plan had finished it off. What especially bothers the Japanese is that Carter made the decision without consulting them—even though, as a Presidential candidate, he had made a big issue of President Nixon's failure to inform the Japanese of the switch on China in 1972.

The biggest shock of all, of course, was to South Korea itself. While Americans enjoy the fruits of detente and are separated by two oceans from any potential enemy, the South Korean capital lies in the shadow of North Korean artillery, 25 miles away. The flying time between the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and Seoul is three minutes. Ever since the 1953 armistice agreement, South Koreans have been living under a state of siege. As of last July 16, North Korea has been charged with no fewer than 40,662 violations of that compact. In 1968, Northern commandos penetrated to within 150 yards of the Presidential Palace in Seoul. In 1974, a North Korean agent killed President Park's wife as she stood beside him.

Moreover, few South Korean families have forgotten the Northerner's brutality during the Korean War. Seoul changed hands four times in the course of the hostilities; whenever the North held the city, it carried out mass roundups and executions, countless families in the South were affected. The millions of refugees who fled the North during the war have bitter memories of their life in that Communist country. They may be ambivalent about President Park—as are many South Korean intellectuals—but they have no mixed feelings about Kim Il Sung.

South Korean consternation over the prospects of American withdrawal was expressed succinctly by Dr. Kim Jun-yop, director of Korea University's prestigious Asiatic Research Center, a man respected by the Government and the opposition alike. Kim wrote: "First of all, to an outsider, it is not clear at all what the purpose of withdrawal really is...I do not believe that Washington has yet offered a satisfactory explanation of why the troops had better be withdrawn. To save money? To improve security? To support democracy? To promote detente? To appease Pyongyang? To please Korea's critics? What conceivable, rational purpose could be really served by withdrawal is a question I find impossible to answer."

Even our principal adversaries in Russia and China must be uncertain about the plan. Russian officials have privately described Kim Il Sung to me as a "hot potato," and when I warned against the possibility of Kim's sucking them into a new war, they would often reply that the presence of massive American power on the Korean peninsula acted as a deterrent on Kim. The Russians are bound to be ambivalent about a weakening of that deterrent. As for the Chinese, they warned Kim Il Sung against any new adventures when he journeyed to Peking, looking for Chinese support, in the promising era he saw opening up after the fall of South Vietnam. The American presence in South Korea appears to have been viewed in Peking
as an indication of American willingness to fight—with consequences costly to North Korea and China alike. An American withdrawal would deprive the Chinese of this argument and would weaken their leverage on their troublesome ally.

What, then, is the reasoning behind President Carter's surprising decision? One can only guess. A debate within the Administration would have given some insight into the President's thinking, but the casual manner in which the decision was sprung makes it more difficult to fathom.

The case for the Administration was stated authoritatively last June 10 in testimony before the House International Relations Committee by Under Secretary of State Philip Habib. In the first place, he said, there was no need to prolong the stationing of American ground forces in South Korea because the country, with its impressive economic growth, was increasingly capable of defending itself. Moreover, American naval, air and key support units would remain in the general area or in position to strike swiftly, if need be, and that would provide sufficient deterrent against any miscalculation on North Korea's part. In addition, the Administration would ask Congress to offset the pullout of the Second Division by authorizing compensatory sales of $1.8 billion in military equipment to Seoul. Finally, Habib argued, the general international situation favored a withdrawal at the present juncture, inasmuch as it would not be in Russia's or China's interests to encourage or support actions by Pyongyang that would increase the risk of war.

So much for why, in the Administration's official view, it would be safe to put an end to the American troop presence that has spanned a quarter of a century. But what of the positive case for withdrawal? Why does the Administration consider it to be to our advantage to terminate the arrangement at this time? Habib was asked that question by a committee member, Lee Hamilton of Indiana, and his answer, in full was: "I don't think it is necessarily desirable to keep people in place when they don't necessarily serve the purpose that you have them there for. I think also that you are better able to maintain your commitments not only in Korea but elsewhere in Asia if you can demonstrate that what you are doing is, what you might say, necessary to maintain commitments not additional to or just because it has been done before. I think our credibility with the Congress and with the public, and the credibility of our deterrent, will be increased if we maintain it at the level necessary and adequate."

There may be another and more fundamental reason—the President's intense desire to avoid being drawn into yet another land war in Asia. Neither Carter nor the State Department has publicly advanced this explanation—it would hardly serve American interests in that part of the world to do so—but a variety of evidence points that way.

Carter appears to have been influenced to considerable degree by an argument for withdrawal presented to him at a January 1975 meeting at the
Brookings Institution by Barry M. Blechman, a Brookings researcher. Blechman characterized the American ground forces in Korea as a dangerous tripwire likely, if sprung, to get the United States automatically into war; he told Carter that "we should take out the nukes right off and phase out the ground troops over four or five years." Carter, as President, told his energy chief, James Schlesinger, one evening, that President Truman, President Johnson and President Nixon were all prevented from concentrating on more urgent problems because of Asian land wars, first in Korea and then in Vietnam, and that he was determined not to repeat their mistake. If North Korea did attack South Korea, he said, he would certainly respond with American air and naval forces, and he could not understand why there should be any doubt about his intention to do so. Still more recently, press leaks of certain secret documents suggest that one reason for the withdrawal is to give the Administration greater flexibility in deciding whether to intervene against a Communist invasion should one occur.

The problem is that avoiding a new land war in Korea and deterring the North Koreans from starting such a war are opposite sides of the same coin. By striving to insure the first, Carter weakens the second. American air and naval forces cannot provide the same deterrent as ground troops. As one American official in Korea put it, "Warplanes are like geese. They can honk and fly away." If we rely on air power alone, it will raise questions about our true intentions in case of a new Korean conflict. Such ambiguity could well increase the risk of war by tempting Kim Il Sung into some new venture.

Kim Il Sung runs one of the most repressive, militarized and capricious political systems in the world. He is aging. His words and actions, and the stupefying cult of personality in which he basks, contain a strong hint of paranoia. He may well be emboldened to try to take over the South once and for all before he dies.

One factor pressuring him to act soon, if he is to act at all, is economic. By 1981, if present economic trends continue, South Korea's gross national product will be six times that of the North. The Northern economy is in grave difficulties because of balance-of-payment problems that have forced the North to default on its international obligations. If these difficulties persist, the strain of maintaining the North's command lead over the South in arms production may prove too great--to say nothing of the political consequences of a visible and ever-widening gap in economic growth. It is generally believed that when the North called off a dialogue with the South begun in 1972, it was partly because too many Northerners were going south and witnessing for themselves the impressive results of South Korea's economic development. According to one anecdote, a Northern visitor said to his Southern host in 1972 that the South must have had a hard time importing all the cars in Asia into Seoul in order to impress the Northerners. No so, was the response. What was difficult was bringing in all the tall buildings.
As the North falls farther and farther behind economically, the temptation for Pyongyang to achieve a "final resolution" of the Korean problem will grow. And, in fact, there is much hard evidence that Kim Il Sung is actively preparing for the war option. Since the middle of the 1960's, Pyongyang has been spending huge sums on developing a modern war industry. Since 1970 alone, Pyongyang has tripled its tank strength and enlarged its air force by one-third. As of 1972, North Korea ranked second in the world in the number of men under arms in proportion to the total population. In recent years, the North has constructed a massive network of underground tunnels and bases in order to harden its defenses against air attack, and it has dug invasion tunnels under the DMZ.

Since 1973, the North Koreans have redoubled their efforts to achieve an independent capacity to manufacture key weapons systems, such as tanks and heavy artillery, so as to make them less dependent on Russia or China in the event of war. Even before the extraordinary effort, the North had a clear advantage over the South in tanks, artillery, aircraft and naval vessels; now it is manufacturing its own tanks, rockets, cannon, armored cars, submarines and high-speed gunboats.

Kim Il Sung recently told an American professor of Korean origin that the international situation is developing in North Korea's favor, that South Korea was becoming increasingly isolated, that "revolutionary forces" in the South were growing, that the South was in the process of disintegration, and that serious "contradictions" between the United States and South Korea were inevitable. The statement would be less disquieting if it reflected nothing more than ignorance or misjudgment, but it seems to be a product of Kim Il Sung’s extraordinary optimism that, one day, all Korea will be his.

Down the years, Kim Il Sung has adamantly opposed all American, Japanese and South Korean efforts to stabilize the situation on the Korean peninsula. He opposes the American and South Korean notion of having both Koreas join the United Nations; he opposes Kissinger's idea of a four-power conference to draw up a permanent peace agreement; he warns his allies Russia and China not to recognize South Korea, even though the United States and Japan are prepared to recognize North Korea in exchange and he contends that North Korea is the "sole sovereign state" in the Korean peninsula, a position so outrageous that not even the Russians have bothered to endorse it. Could there be any clearer indication of Kim Il Sung’s ultimate goal?

Once American ground forces are gone, a blitzkrieg attack by North Korean armor and infantry against Seoul could well be successful, even against American air opposition. In 1950, the North captured Seoul in three days; if the South Korean capital fell again, the United States would be faced by agonizing decisions. Would we bomb Seoul and risk destroying it completely? Would we bomb other targets in North Korea and invite almost certain Soviet and Chinese intervention? Or would we
advise the South Koreans to press for the best cease-fire terms they can get? The latter course would, in all likelihood, be urged by many prominent Americans, even though it would surely lead to the subjugation of the South by the North. Obviously, the least dangerous and painful course for us is to continue to deter the North from starting a war.

Apart from the risk of hostilities, there are other serious hazards involved in removing American combat forces from Korea:

(1) By such a move, we would tell the people of Asia that while we are prepared to shed American blood for Europeans, we are not prepared to do the same for Asians. Apart from the racist overtones of such a signal, it would contribute to Asian suspicions that the United States has no long-term interests in the Pacific and is not a reliable partner for any Asian nation.

(2) Japanese doubts about American readiness to honor the mutual security pact binding the two nations would intensify. The Japanese reaction would almost certainly be a nationalistic lurch to the right or the left, followed by rapid rearmament or an accommodation with the Soviet Union.

(3) China would have increasing reservations about the dependability of the United States as a Pacific power willing and able to help counterbalance growing Soviet strength in that region. This could undermine Chinese interest in normalizing relations with the United States, and it could increase the chances of a Sino-Soviet accommodation.

(4) South Korea and North Korea would be locked in a new arms race over which we would have less and less control. The South has already allocated a whopping 30 percent of its next year’s budget for arms. Eventually, the South would seek to develop a nuclear-weapons capability. That, in turn, would almost certainly trigger similar efforts on the part of North Korea, Taiwan and Japan.

(5) The Soviet Union, sensing the decline of American power in the region, would become more active, both politically and militarily.

There is another aspect to consider. By withdrawing our combat forces without a quid pro quo, the Administration removes an excellent bargaining chip which could have been used to coax the North Korean leadership into accommodation with the South. We will never know what Kim II Sung might have paid for this withdrawal because we never bothered to ask. There is, after all, the possibility that Kim, beset as he is by chronic economic difficulties, might be forced into an accommodation with Seoul if our policy gave him no other alternative--particularly if he got American and Japanese trade and credits in return. Many South Koreans and other Asians simply cannot understand why, if we are really concerned about South Korean security, we would throw away the biggest bargaining
We have for bringing about a political settlement. Is it any wonder that many of these Asians conclude that we are just looking for a way out of our moral and contractual commitment?

The advantage of a pullout that appears to weigh so heavily with the President—that it will decrease the risk of "another Vietnam"—can thus be seen, on closer examination, to be illusory. Its more likely effect will be to increase the risk of involvement in a new Asian land war. What other positive advantages to us may withdrawal be said to offer, the hapless Philip Habib's rambling answer aside?

Would it save us money? The Pentagon estimates that South Korea would need as much as $8 billion in additional equipment to offset the withdrawal and that about $2 billion of this would have to come from the pockets of American taxpayers.

Would it improve the "human rights" situation in South Korea? Park rewrote the Constitution and gave himself emergency powers in the early 1970's after President Nixon removed the Seventh Division from Korea; Park's argument was that greater internal control was necessitated by the resultant increase in the danger of war with the North. Removal of the Second Division would enable Park to rationalize even more extreme measures against his domestic opponents. Representative Donald Fraser of Minnesota, a leading American critic of Park's authoritarian rule, favors a continued American troop presence in South Korea in order to maintain American leverage on Park. For similar reasons, virtually the entire South Korean opposition, including the most vocal of the dissidents, want the Americans troops to stay.

Would our withdrawal make South Korea more self-reliant? The basic psychological and geopolitical realities of the Korean peninsula make self-reliance difficult for any South Korean government allied to the United States. Both Russia and China have a common border with North Korea that would make it easy for them to supply Pyongyang with troops, supplies and advanced weapons in the event of war, and neither great power could afford to let their Korean ally be totally defeated. The United States, on the other hand, is thousands of miles away; many prominent Americans argue that South Korea is of little strategic importance, and the American press projects an image of South Korea that can hardly give the American people a strong attachment to that country's defense. Any South Korean who felt "self-reliant" in these circumstances would have to be an extraordinary optimist. As a matter of fact, the efforts that, we now know, were made in certain South Korean quarters to bribe members of the United States Congress, so as to be sure of continued American support, are rooted in the sense of insecurity. If the South Koreans involved had been out for personal profit, they would have concentrated on American businessmen, not on American Congressmen.

What of the "quagmire" argument? This is the notion that we should
not commit ourselves to the defense of an unpopular authoritarian regime in South Korea because, if it came to war, we would become hopelessly bogged down, as we were in Vietnam. Related to this is the argument that the South Korean Government is just as bad as the North's, and that we should have little to do with either.

These arguments lose sight of certain basic realities. To start with, South Korea is not South Vietnam. Park's rural-oriented development strategy and the land-reform program of many years ago have made the South Korean countryside prosperous, conservative and impossibly poor for rural insurgency. In the 1971 election, the last time a genuinely free vote was held in South Korea, Park carried the countryside by considerable margins, even though the opposition candidate, Kim Dae Jung, got 46 percent of the overall vote; Park's most vociferous opponents concede that the countryside is still solidly in his camp. In contrast to the situation that obtained in South Vietnam, the South Korean opposition, located largely in the urban areas, is militantly anti-Communist and would unite with Park and the army to fight a Northern invasion.

And the Seoul regime is not comparable to the Communist state in the North. On that score, the South Korean scholar Kim Jun-Yop had this to say: "To be sure, I, for one, am far from being enthusiastic about much of what happens (in South Korea). But it is one thing to be critical of aspects of a society and altogether another matter to denounce and condemn a country completely. I happened to have seen North Korea a few years back. The difference between Seoul and Pyongyang is profound, consistent and structural. Anyone who is sensitive at all in matters of relative moral values would have little doubt about the worth of preserving South Korea is, in itself, evidence of the difference he speaks of. No one in North Korea has ever written to the North Korean press to say he was "not enthusiastic" about "much of what happens" in Kim Il Sung's domain.

South Korea is a relatively open society. More foreign travelers come through Seoul's Kimpo Airport in a day than have visited Pyongyang in the past five years, and, in the South, foreigners can go anywhere they please. In Pyongyang, foreign visitors are kept isolated in the International Hotel, unable to walk the streets without official escort. A recent visitor to Pyongyang, the American scholar of Korean origin mentioned earlier, asked if he could visit the home where his wife was born; after long negotiations, permission was granted. But when he arrived at the site with his official guides, he found the street closed off for two blocks in both directions so as to prevent contact with ordinary citizens. No country in the world, except Cambodia and Albania, is more closed off than North Korea.

There is a basic distinction to be drawn between totalitarian regimes, such as the one in North Korea, and military regimes, such as the one in the South. In totalitarian countries, control reaches into every sphere of life. In military dictatorships, the rulers monopolize
only political power, giving freer play to economic, cultural, intellectual and private activities. In South Korea, the press, the courts, the universities, the church and the business community continue to maintain a degree of autonomy from the Government that would be unthinkable in the North. There is also, in the South, an active political opposition, with its quota of dissidents, that manages to gain access to the American press. These are not the features of a totalitarian society.

In sum, it is difficult to see any advantage to President Carter's plan for withdrawing all American combat troops from South Korea. The risks, on the other hand, are great. Perhaps those risks are becoming more apparent in the White House. The Administration has recently postponed the removal of two of the Second Division's three brigades until 1982. It would have been better if all three brigades remained. But since the President cannot be expected to abandon his pet project altogether, it would be wise, at this point, to take another step. The President ought to change his plan for unconditional withdrawal to a policy of conditional withdrawal. Some American combat troops should stay behind, without a cut-off date, until relations between North and South are normalized and the shaky armistice is replaced by a peace treaty. What we want in Korea is a "German" solution—stable coexistence of two governments in a divided nation. We can obtain such a solution only by standing firm.

The same need for firmness applies to East Asia as a whole. We must overcome our historical tendency to oscillate between involvement and disengagement to the distress of our Asian friends and allies, who rely on us to act like a great power. We have interests in the Pacific that are every bit as important as those in the Atlantic; if we do not carry out our responsibilities in the region, we can be certain that our adversaries will fill the vacuum created by our neglect.

On the subject of foreign dictatorships, we must come to understand that the best we can hope for in many authoritarian countries, such as South Korea, is not a change to instant democracy but movement toward a more liberal and open society. We should use whatever influence we have to accelerate such movement, provided we do it discreetly; frontal challenges to the systems we try to reform are bound to do more harm than good. We must also learn that dictatorships come in different varieties. To act as if we were indifferent to, or ignorant of, the substantial differences between North and South Korea, or between South Korea today and South Vietnam under President Thieu, will not win us high marks for moral sensitivity or political sagacity.

Finally, it is important for us to stop short of hypocrisy in our concern for human rights abroad. We went to the defense of South Korea in 1950 not to preserve Korean democracy but to protect our own interests against what we rightly perceived to be an expansionist power, and we continue to have a strategic stake in South Korea today, much as we have
in many authoritarian countries. In recognizing this situation, we should also recognize that much of the repression in South Korea results from a state-of-siege mentality. We need only recall our own violations of the human rights of American citizens of Japanese ancestry during World War II to realize that overreaction to danger is a common national response.

The wish to disengage from Korea that underlies the President's decision owes its precipitate quality, it seems to me, to an overly idealistic view of the American role in the world. Until Vietnam, many American liberals believed it was our moral duty to conduct an anti-Communist crusade. Since Vietnam, many of the same people have come around to the view that almost any use of American power except for self defense, is morally wrong. The common denominator is a tendency to regard foreign policy as the expression of general moral principles and to avoid facing the relationship between those principles and fundamental questions of security.

Vietnam was a great national tragedy for us, and an incomparably greater tragedy for the Vietnamese people. But we will lay the groundwork for even greater tragedies if we do not take the time to view the Korean situation on its own terms, rather than through the residue of guilt and fear left over from Vietnam.
APPENDIX 3

Diagram on Evolution of Logistical Commands in Korea
(Sep 50-Dec 77)

(Refer to page 148)
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EVOLUTION OF LOGISTICAL COMMANDS IN KOREA

2D LOG CMD
SEP 50

3D LOG COM
OCT 50

KOREAN COMMUNICATIONS ZONE (KCOMZ)
AUG 52

AFFE/EIGHTH ARMY G4

EIGHTH US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND
JUL 56

US ARMY AREA COMMAND
1958

7TH LOGISTICAL COMMAND
1959

NORTHERN PORTION OF ROK 1964
EIGHTH US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND
1962

SOUTHERN PORTION OF ROK
EIGHTH US ARMY DEPOT COMMAND
SEP 63

EIGHTH FIELD ARMY SUPPORT
COMMAND
MAR 68

EIGHTH ARMY DEPOT COMMAND /
EIGHTH ARMY REAR
AUG 64

KORSOM (PROV)
NOV 69

USA KORSOM
SEP 71

EIGHTH ARMY G4
JUL 73

19TH SPT BDE
APR 74

19TH SPT COMD
SEP 77

UNCLASSIFIED
APPENDIX 4

Map of Trans-Korea Pipeline

(Refer to page 165)
APPENDIX 5

Map of Defense Communications System

Map of ROKAF Microwave System (PEACE FORTUNE)

(Refer to page 214)
(U) GLOSSARY

This compilation contains a selected listing of abbreviations and acronyms used in this report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERM</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAD</td>
<td>Armistice Affairs Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAFAES</td>
<td>Army and Air Force Exchange Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACW</td>
<td>aircraft control and warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>air defense; ammunition depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>air defense artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADD</td>
<td>Agency for Defense Development (ROK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADIZ</td>
<td>air defense identification zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>automatic data processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFK</td>
<td>Air Forces Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRKN</td>
<td>American Forces Korea Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRTS</td>
<td>American Forces Radio and Television Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>aerospace ground equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>airlift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALO</td>
<td>authorized level of organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALOC</td>
<td>airliner of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOP</td>
<td>Army Oil Analysis Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARM</td>
<td>antiradiation missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASA(ISL)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations &amp; Logistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD(ISA)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD(PA)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP</td>
<td>ammunition supply point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>air traffic control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTODIN</td>
<td>automatic digital network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVUM</td>
<td>aviation unit maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>combat air patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Combined Battle Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>counterintelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC-K</td>
<td>Combined Intelligence Center-Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMINT</td>
<td>communications intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>command post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPTIC</td>
<td>coastal patrol and interdiction craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPV</td>
<td>Chinese People's Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPX</td>
<td>command post exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, US Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Civil Service Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS/CT</td>
<td>Combat Support/Coordination Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUPIDS</td>
<td>Command-Unique Personnel Information Data System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUTF</td>
<td>Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Defense Communications Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCS</td>
<td>Defense Communications System</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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DEFCON............defense readiness condition
DMZ.............Demilitarized Zone
DPI................data processing installation
DS................direct support
DSA................Defense Supply Agency
DSAAS...........Defense Security Assistance Agency
ECE.............US Army Electronics Command
EUSA...........Eighth US Army
EW................electronic warfare
FALOP............Forward Area Limited Observing Program
FIP.............Force Improvement Plan (ROK)
FMS................foreign military sales
FOEU...........Foreign Organization Employees Union (ROK)
FROG...........free rocket over ground
FROKA..........First Republic of Korea Army
FTX.............field training exercise
GCU.............guidance and control unit
GOJ............Government of Japan
GS................General Schedule-Civilian Employees; general support
HDFR............Homeland Defense Reserve Force (ROK)
ICSK...........International Cultural Society of Korea
IH................Improved HAWK
IMETP...........International Military Education and Training Program
IMTSUM...........intelligence summary
IOSS.............Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study
I&W................indications and warning
JOT............Joint Observer Team
JSA.............Joint Security Area
JSOP...........Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JUSMAG-K......Joint United States Military Advisory Group-Korea
KAFAN...........Korean-American Friendship Association
KAL...........Korean Air Lines
KATUSA...........Korean Augmentation to United States Army
KCNA............(North) Korea Central News Agency
KMAG...........Korea Military Advisory Group
KMCA...........Korea Military Contractors Association
KN................Korean national
KNHC...........Korea National Housing Corporation
KNOP...........Korean National Outplacement Program
KNTC...........Korea National Tourism Corporation
KRE.............Korea Regional Exchange
KSC.............Korean Service Corps
KTACS...........Korean Tactical Air Control System
KTMI...........Korea-Tacoma Marine Industries
LOA................letter of offer and acceptance
MAC.............Military Armistice Commission
MACOM...........major Army command
MAF...........Marine Amphibious Force